ANCIENT RHETORICS
# FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDENTS

THIRD EDITION

ANCIENT RHETORICS FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDENTS

SHARON CROWLEY
Arizona State University

DEBRA HAWHEE
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Contents

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 5

Logical Proof: Reasoning in Rhetoric *133*

CHAPTER 6

Ethical   Proof: Arguments   from   Character   163

CHAPTER 7

Pathetic Proof: Passionate Appeals   *205*

CHAPTER 8

Extrinsic Proofs: Arguments Waiting to Be Used   *220*

PART TWO: ARRANGEMENT

CHAPTER 9

CHAPTER 10

PART THREE: STYLE, MEMORY, AND DELIVERY

CHAPTER 11

CHAPTER 12

Memory: The   Treasure-House   of   Invention   316

CHAPTER 13

Delivery: Attending to Eyes and Ears   330

PART FOUR: RHETORICAL EXERCISES

CHAPTER 14

CHAPTER 15

P REFACE

Welcome to the third edition *of Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students* (called *"ARCS"* for short by its authors and editors). Its first author never dreamed she would be writing a preface to a third edition. But here we are. Thanks to all the teachers and students who have said nice things about *ARCS,* and thanks as well to those who have offered constructive criticisms. We have tried to incorporate those in this edition wherever possible.

Here is a list of the changes we made to this edition. The book has been rewritten for clarity throughout. The chapters on the commonplaces and on ideology, memory, and delivery have been substantially rewritten; sections on cultural memory and visual rhetoric now appear in the chapters on memory and delivery, respectively. New examples were embedded throughout. The history chapter has been folded into the introductory chapter, and the chapter on reasoning (logos) now appears prior to its companion proofs, ethos and pathos. The chapter on formal topics has been renamed "Sophistic Topics."

Since this book is about a very old way of thinking, some confusion has arisen about our use of terms relating to time. We do not typically use the term *modern* in a generic sense meaning "the present." For that use we employ the term *contemporary.* Throughout, we use *modern* to indicate a specific set of beliefs about composition and composing. Since we use *modern* somewhat disparagingly, we want to be clear that we are not talking about contemporary students or teachers when we use that term. Rather, we are referring to the habits of mind that still inform ways of thinking about composing. The distinction between modern and contemporary is difficult to maintain, though, since modern ideas still persist in contemporary teaching practices. As a result, the terms we use become slippery because different oppositions are at work: ancient versus modern, modern and contemporary, modern versus postmodern. We write in a postmodern era, an era that embraces change and accepts intellectual discord; hence it demands flexible communication strategies. Most of today's students and many teachers, raised in a complex and stimulating technological and ideological age, hold postmodern attitudes toward composing and composition. We believe ancient rhetorics, which are of course premodern, offer an interesting starting point from which postmodern rhetors might think about discourse anew.

While writing *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students,* we adopted three ancient premises about composing: first, that nobody thinks or writes without reference to the culture in which he or she lives; second, that human beings disagree with one another often and for good reasons; and third, that

people compose because they want to affect the course of events. We appealed to ancient rhetoric as the source of our thinking for this book because ancient rhetoricians invented and taught an art that was immersed in the daily traffic of human events and in communal discourse about them. In this the art differed markedly from the modes of composition ordinarily taught in school today, which present writers and speakers with an abstracted set of pseudo-scientific rules that dictate how a finished discourse ought to look.

Ancient rhetoricians began their instruction about composing by considering the occasions that generated a desire to write or speak. Modern teachers, in contrast, too frequently begin (and end) their instruction with consideration of forms or genres, asking students to begin by composing outlines, thesis statements, or essays. We think that the rich fund of theories and strategies that can be found in ancient rhetorics, particularly instruction about how to address rhetorical situations and how to find arguments (called invention in ancient thought) is far more helpful to students in the stage of the composing process that is most difficult for novices: beginning.

We hope that this book will show writers and speakers that their rhetorical practice and their ethical obligations are always communal. The need to compose arises from composers' desire to insert their voices into the differences of opinion that occur within the discourse of a community. When they are read or heard, compositions enter into that discourse, either to maintain and reinforce it or to disrupt it. Compositions produced in college are as communal as any other writing. Teachers and peers read student writing or listen to student speeches, and these compositions become part of classroom discourse.

Ancient rhetoricians knew that audiences are never neutral: that is, they never receive a rhetor's discourse neutrally or objectively. The reception accorded any discourse depends as much upon the rhetor's relation to the community and her relation to the issue discussed as it depends upon the content of her discourse. Modern rhetorics, particularly the version taught in college, pretend that this is not the case, that compositions on any topic can be made available to any educated reader, who can consume them without prejudice. Ancient rhetoricians, in contrast, taught their students how to analyze the contexts for which they composed and how to adapt their composing processes to fit these contexts as closely as possible. They never assumed that a given discursive situation could be adequately met by employment of generic formulas.

Because we have adopted the ancient assumption that rhetoric cannot be fruitfully studied and practiced apart from the issues that engage the communities it serves, this book introduces its readers to some contested topics in contemporary political and ethical discourse. Its examples are drawn from popular and academic writing about controversial issues. We realize that to engage students in talk about values is a departure from traditional approaches to composition instruction. However, we feel that rhetoric cannot be taught without addressing the issues that vitally concern the people who use it. We are aware as well that some of our examples will

soon become dated. However, it should not be difficult for teachers and students to supply their own contemporary examples in places where the immediate relevance of our examples is no longer apparent.

The book also includes some features of ancient rhetoric that have not received much attention in modern accounts of its teachings. For example, the book contains a thorough treatment of ancient discussions about figures of thought. There are chapters that show how to compose proofs from character and appeals to the emotions, which, so far as we know, are not treated at length in any other contemporary textbook, even though both are commonly practiced in contemporary political and commercial rhetorics.

Nearly half of this book (seven chapters) is devoted to invention. This proportion reflects the lavish attention given to invention by ancient rhetoricians. Of the three books in Aristotle's *Rhetoric,* two are devoted to invention; the third treats delivery, style and arrangement. Of the twelve books of Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory,* five are devoted to invention, two are devoted to style, delivery and memory get a chapter each, and the rest of the work concerns the proper education of an orator. Cicero's *On Invention,* obviously, treats nothing else. These proportions testify to the importance of the first canon in ancient rhetorics. We represent that importance here because all the means of invention defined by ancient rhetoricians are still in use in public discourse.

In ancient rhetorics, a person who was inventing arguments might or might not make use of writing, depending upon the quality of his memory. It is likely that ancient rhetors composed arguments aloud and stored them in memory. The only ancient revision practices that are similar to literate revision occurred when students were working with the elementary exercises called ***progymnasmata.*** They copied passages onto wax tablets, working either from memory or from a text. They then tried out variations in writing. No doubt they memorized the variations that won the most approval.

However, literate revision practices can be built into the ancient system. Students can compose trial arguments as they work their way through this book, and they can revise their work as they master new rhetorical strategies. In other words, the ancient inventional schemes can all be worked out in writing, and so anyone can produce a great deal of writing while using this book. It is organized just as the ancients organized their rhetorical instruction, following the order of the canons of rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. Even though its organization dimly reflects modern descriptions of the composing process—which is sometimes characterized as moving through prewriting, writing, revision, and editing—people who use this book will soon discover that the linear economy of the modern composing process is far too simple to accommodate ancient notions of composing. Ancient teachers emphasized copiousness, or the art of having more to say or write than a rhetor needs for a single occasion. Ancient composing processes did not aim toward the production of a finished product; rather, they equipped rhetors with arguments and materials that would be readily available whenever they needed to compose for a given occasion.

Given our emphasis on invention rather than convention or form, it follows that students and teachers in both writing and speech classes can use this book profitably. We mean the terms *composing* and *composition* generically, to refer to work done by people who are preparing to deliver either oral or written discourse. All of the exercises included here are appropriate for classes in public speaking; indeed, our emphasis on ancient rhetorics harmonizes with the rhetorical approach often used by teachers of speech and communication.

The final chapters introduce students to the composing exercises used by ancient students. Even though these exercises appear at the back of this book, we recommend that teachers exploit them from the beginning, using them along with the work in invention. We explicate each exercise, supply classical and modern examples, and make composing suggestions for each. There are plenty of examples and suggested exercises in the rest of the text, as well, and if readers follow ancient instructions for preparing and composing arguments, they will generate a lot of writing.

The exercises that appear at the conclusions of several chapters are generative: they ask students to employ what they have learned in their own reading and writing. There are no drills, and students are seldom asked to analyze or comment on prose written by other people. The book's most important pedagogical feature, we think, is that it provides students with motives for composing.

This book also differs in some respects from the few contemporary textbooks about ancient rhetorics that are currently available. It does not treat all the rhetorics produced during antiquity as a monolithic theory of discourse. Nor does it assume that the principles and techniques isolated by ancient rhetoricians can be usefully transferred to contemporary situations without qualification. Throughout the book we attempt to alert readers to the fact that cultures that are widely separated in time and space differ from one another, even though the cultures under study here are regarded as the sources of what is now called "Western civilization." In the first chapter, we address some important differences between modern and ancient thought about knowledge and its production. We updated or abandoned altogether the features of ancient rhetorics that are simply too foreign to be of use. For example, we altered translations to mitigate the sexism manifested by ancient teachers as well as their modern translators. Where that was not possible, we pointed out the sexism.

Throughout, we followed ancient practice in assuming that everyone who wishes to speak or write possesses something to write or speak about insofar as he or she participates in the common discourse of the communities to which he or she belongs. As a result, this book never asks students to write personal essays or to generate expressive discourse. We do not accept the assumption that writing should begin with personal expression and move outward into expository and persuasive modes. To the contrary, we agree with the ancients that there are no purely personal opinions, just as there can be no private language.

We hope that this book will interest its readers in further study of ancient rhetorics themselves. The major works of several ancient rhetoricians—Aristotle, Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian—are now available in relatively inexpensive paperback editions. A few anthologies are also available that include portions of their work, along with related ancient treatises on literary composition and elementary exercises. Accompanied by readings in ancient texts, this book might profitably be used in humanities or critical thinking classes as an introduction to ancient ways of knowing and thinking. Of course, it should also prove useful in undergraduate and graduate courses designed to introduce students to ancient rhetorics. In our experience, contemporary students find ancient texts difficult to read unless they are contextualized with history and commentary about ancient times. This book attempts to fill that need although its history of ancient rhetorics is quite brief. Those who are interested in the histories of ancient Greece and Rome and their rhetorical traditions should consult the work of historians listed in the bibliography.

The bibliography also lists the citation sources of classical texts. For the most part we opted to put these titles in a concluding list rather than cluttering up the text with long citations. Prose and poetry by early modern English writers are generally cited from the standard works, where these exist, or collected works.

We included a glossary that defines ancient or technical terms and supplies pronunciation guides for a few terms that have no ready equivalent in English. Such terms are printed in **bold type** when they first appear in the text, as a few do in this preface. The two appendixes contain overviews of the history of ancient rhetorics: Appendix A outlines relevant ancient chronology in a fairly sweeping way, while Appendix B is a more detailed outline of major developments in ancient rhetorics themselves. The bibliography lists modern sources of our quotations of ancient texts and supplies some suggestions for further reading in ancient rhetorics.

Perhaps a word about our use of the term we is in order. It is a departure to use a familiar pronoun in a textbook. However, we wanted to insure that our readers were regularly reminded that statements put forward in this book issue from actual, fallible, people rather than from some unavailable site of teacherly authority. Usually, the term we refers to Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee, particularly when we are giving advice and instruction or rendering opinions about current affairs. However, the use of we can slip into a "royal *we,"* taking on precisely the voice we wish to avoid—that of an indisputable authority. We tried to be aware of this use and to eliminate it wherever possible, but we probably did not succeed. In any case, we hope that readers of this book will want to argue with us throughout, and that's one reason why we wrote it in the first person.

The Instructor's Manual offers supplementary suggestions for teaching ARCS. To this end, it tries to help teachers help students meet the challenges posed by a study of ancient rhetoric, offers a repertoire of strategies for linking ancient rhetorical concepts to contemporary issues, and provides

additional insight into what the authors were thinking when they wrote the textbook. In addition to suggestions for daily use, the manual features sample syllabi and assignment ideas.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ANCIENT RHETORICS: THEIR DIFFERENCES AND THE DIFFERENCES THEY MAKE

For us moderns, rhetoric means artificiality, insincerity, decadence.

—H. I. Marrou

WHEN AMERICANS HEAR the word **rhetoric,** they tend to think of politicians' attempts to deceive them. Rhetoric is characterized as "empty words" or as fancy language used to distort the truth or tell lies. Television newspeople often say something like "There was more rhetoric from the White House today," and editorialists write that politicians need to "stop using rhetoric and do something," as though words had no connection to action. Many people blame rhetoric for our apparent inability to communicate and to get things done.

But that isn't the way **rhetoricians** defined their art in ancient Athens and Rome. In ancient times, people used rhetoric to make decisions, resolve disputes, and to mediate public discussion of important issues. An ancient teacher of rhetoric named Aristotle defined rhetoric as the power of finding the available arguments suited to a given situation. For teachers like Aristotle or practitioners like the Roman orator Cicero, rhetoric helped people to choose the best course of action when they disagreed about important political, religious, or social issues. In fact, the study of rhetoric was equivalent to the study of citizenship. Under the best ancient teachers, Greek and

Roman students composed discourse about moral and political questions that daily confronted their communities.

Ancient teachers of rhetoric thought that disagreement among human beings was inevitable, since individuals perceive the world differently from one another. They also assumed that since people communicate their perceptions through language—which is an entirely different medium than thoughts or perceptions—there was no guarantee that any person's perceptions would be accurately conveyed to others. Even more important, the ancient teachers knew that people differ in their opinions about how the world works, so that it was often hard to tell whose opinion was the best. They invented rhetoric so that they would have means of judging whose opinion was most accurate, useful, or valuable.

If people didn't disagree, rhetoric wouldn't be necessary. But they do, and it is. A rhetorician named Kenneth Burke remarked that "we need never deny the presence of strife, enmity, faction as a characteristic motive of rhetorical expression" (1962, 20). But the fact that rhetoric originates in disagreement is ultimately a good thing, since its use allows people to make important choices without resorting to less palatable means of persuasion—coercion or violence. People who have talked their way out of any potentially violent confrontation know how useful rhetoric can be. On a larger scale, the usefulness of rhetoric is even more apparent. If, for some reason, the people who negotiate international relations were to stop using rhetoric to resolve their disagreements about limits on the use of nuclear weapons, there might not be a future to deliberate about. That's why we should be glad when we read or hear that diplomats are disagreeing about the allowable number of warheads per country or the number of inspections of nuclear stockpiles per year. At least they're talking to each other. As Burke observed, wars are the result of an agreement to disagree. But before people of good will agree to disagree, they try out hundreds of ways of reaching agreement. The possibility that one set of participants will resort to coercion or violence is always a threat, of course; but in the context of impending war, the threat of war can itself operate as a rhetorical strategy that keeps people of good will talking to each other.

Given that argument can deter violence and coercion, we are disturbed by the contemporary tendency to see disagreement as somehow impolite or even undesirable. We certainly understand how disagreement has earned its bad name, given the caricature of argument that daily appears on talk television. In his column "On Television" Bill Goodykoontz had fun with the typical dialogue heard on news talk shows:

> After hour upon hour of watching political "discussion" shows, a fever dream follows:
>
> "Good afternoon, and welcome to *Crossscreech,* where we don't just report the issues, we discuss.them—loudly—and offer you the insight into the story behind the story.
>
> "Let's join our panelists, Larry Liberal and Ronnie Rightwing. Larry?"
>
> LARRY: "Thanks. Lef s just jump right to the news of the day: Iraq! Bush! What?!"

RONNIE: "Communist! Traitor! Turncoat!"

LARRY: "Lackey! Bootlick! Lickspittle!"

RONNIE: "I'd just like to say that ANYONE who expresses ANY doubts about ANYTHING the Bush administration proposes is NOT a patriot! WHY DO YOU HATE THIS COUNTRY?"

LARRY: "Can you not SEE the conspiracy at work here? Are you BLIND? It's all about OIL OIL OIL!"

RONNIE: "I will NOT feel guilt or remorse about driving my Suburban two blocks to work every day."

LARRY: "When I'm riding my bicycle constructed completely out of hemp, I actually feel sorry for you."

RONNIE: "Moron."

LARRY: "Pig."

RONNIE: "OK, let's welcome our first guest, Sue U. All, an attorney for the ACLU. Sue, one question: "WHY DO YOU PLATE THIS COUNTRY?"

SUE: "Uh ..."

LARRY: "Sue, can you please tell this animal in human clothing that until we get the words 'under God' removed from the Pledge of Allegiance, the American people will be living in a virtual police state?"

SUE: "Actually ..."

RONNIE: "What's next, Sue? Another merry skip down the road to socialism? Stricter gun control? Why not reveal your real plan—to not only have every gun taken away from all God-fearing Americans, but to DIS-ARM THE AMERICAN MILITARY?"

SUE: "Well ..."

LARRY: "Sue, please inform this troglodyte that all this country REALLY needs is a good tax increase to get the economy stimulated, to get more money—money without the words 'In God We Trust,' prefer-ably—into the hands of ALL the people?"

SUE: "That's not really my ..."

RONNIE: "Thanks, Sue, but we're running short on time. Informative as always. OK, parting shot. Can I just remind you, Larry, to KEEP THE GOV-ERNMENT OUT OF OUR LIVES. Except our bedrooms. We really do need to monitor what goes on there."

LARRY: "If I want a Druid commitment ceremony performed in the middle of the town square, I WILL HAVE ONE!"

RONNIE: "And that's it for us, folks. Tune in tomorrow night when we discuss *Sesame Street*—kids show or tool of the creeping enemy?"

LARRY: "And tax cuts—of the nondenominational evil supreme being? Good night." ("On Television," *Arizona Republic* December 17, 2002, E6)

Here Goodykoontz aptly captured the shouting and name-calling that pass for discussion on television shows like his fictitious *Crossscreech*. The characters he depicts don't actually argue; rather, they shout **commonplaces** at one another. Neither listens to the other or to the guest,

who is never allowed to speak. This is an extremely unproductive model of argument because it seldom stimulates anyone to change his or her mind.

Engaging in productive argument is much different from shouting tired slogans. For one thing it is hard intellectual work, and for another, it requires that all parties to an argument listen to positions stated by others. Despite its difficulty, people who live in democracies must undertake productive argument with one another, because failure to do so can have serious consequences. In the early months of 2003, for instance, representatives of the United States government tried to convince other members of the United Nations Security Council to authorize an invasion of Iraq. When France and other members of the Security Council refused to support this measure, the government of the United States was faced with several alternatives: negotiate further with the UN, establish alliances elsewhere, halt its plans for war, or go to war without support from other countries. All of the options except the last require the use of rhetoric, and in each of those cases more deliberation could have limited or halted violence.

Interestingly, some Americans responded to this failure to achieve agreement not by asking for more negotiation but by adopting an anti-French stance. Beth Gillin reviewed some manifestations of this position:

CHEESED-OFF: U.S. BASHES FRANCE
LES JOKES, JIBES FLY ABOUT OLDEST ALLY

By Beth Gillin
Knight Ridder Newspapers

PHILADELPHIA—On a recent *Tonight Show,* comedian Dennis Miller told host Jay Leno, "The only way the French are going in is if we tell them we found truffles in Iraq."

On the *Late Show,* David Letterman observed, "France wants more evidence. , . . The last time France wanted more evidence it rolled right through France with a German flag."

Such jibes at America's oldest ally aren't coming solely from late-night comedians.

Several weeks ago, Jed Babbin, a former deputy undersecretary of defense, told Chris Matthews on *Hardball* that "going to war without France is like going deer hunting without an accordion; you just leave a lot of useless, noisy baggage behind."

Call it, as the French daily newspaper *Liberation* did, *"le frog-bashing."* Annoyed that France is backpedaling from earlier support of a U.N. resolution to disarm Iraq, entertainers and commentators are channeling their frustration into sarcasm.

Consider satirist Andy Borowitz, a contributor to CNN's *American Morning.* Recently, he capped off a discussion of Michael Jackson's plastic surgery by quipping, "The French, of course, don't believe it and are demanding further inspections."

The French are reacting with their usual shrug, even as they puzzle over the meaning of the Yankee insult "cheese-eating surrender monkeys."

"It's a little tiresome," an unidentified French diplomat told the *Times* of London. "The Americans always throw tantrums like this when they don't get their way."

Indeed, such jokes as "What do you call 100,000 Frenchmen with their hands up? The army," and "Why are there no fireworks at EuroDisney? Because every time they went off, France tried to surrender," accurately reflect the growing displeasure with France in the United States, as measured by a Feb. 3-6 Gallup Poll.

France's image among Americans is at its lowest point in a decade, the Gallup Organization said. France's net favorable rating fell to 26 percent this month from 63 percent last year.

Germany and North Korea don't win popularity contests, either. But France's image "has undergone the most significant change of any of the countries tested," Gallup said.

This explains why, when the subject is France, callers to Glenn Beck's Philadelphia-based national radio talk show jam the lines.

Beck said, "The French haven't done a thing for us since they gave us the Statue of Liberty. Well, OK, let's box it up and send it back. As long as they'll pay for shipping, I'm fine with that."

All this is nothing new, of course. "A Frenchman's home is where another man's wife is," Mark Twain jotted in his 1878-79 journal. But it was a *Simpsons* episode eight years ago that spawned an insult for the ages. Groundskeeper Willie, forced by budget cuts to teach French at Springfield's elementary school, bellows to the class in his rich Scottish burr, "BONJOURRRRRR, ye cheese-eatin' surrender monkeys."

The phrase has caused puzzlement in France. This month, the conservative newspaper *Le Figaro* translated it as *"primates capitulards et toujours en quete de fromages,"* or, roughly, "capitulating primates always questing for cheeses."

Le Figaro went on to suggest Americans are being whipped into a frenzy by "pen-wielding warmongers" in the White House led by *"le cowboy Bush,"* who are enraged at France over "the affront which it has inflicted on the muscular diplomacy of Uncle Sam."*(ArizonaRepublic* February 21, 2003, *A7)*

The popularity of such jokes suggests that some Americans would rather slander those who oppose their views than look for alternative courses of action.

Indeed Americans often refuse to talk with each other about important matters like religion or politics, retreating into silence if someone brings either subject up in public discourse. And if someone disagrees publicly with someone else about politics or religion, Americans sometimes take that as a breach of good manners. This is so because we tend to link a person's opinions to her identity. We assume that someone's opinions result from her personal experience, and hence that those opinions are somehow "hers"—that she alone "owns" them. If someone we know is a devout Catholic, for example, we are often reluctant to share with her any negative views we have about Catholicism, fearing that she might take our views as a personal attack rather than as an invitation to discuss differences. This habit of tying beliefs to an identity also has the unfortunate effect of allowing people who hold a distinctive set of beliefs to belittle or mistreat

people who do not share those beliefs. The reasoning here seems to be that superior people hold superior beliefs; thus nonbelievers are inferior people who are unworthy of equal **treatment.**[1]

The intellectual habit that assumes religious and political choices are tied up with a person's identity, with her "self," also makes it seem as though people never change their minds about things like religion and politics. But as we all know, people do change their minds about these matters; people convert from one religious faith to another, and they sometimes change their political affiliation from year to year, perhaps voting across party lines in one election and voting a party line in the next.

The authors of this book are concerned that if Americans continue to ignore the reality that people disagree with one another all the time, or if we pretend to ignore it in the interests of preserving etiquette, we risk undermining the principles on which our democratic community is based. People who are afraid of airing their differences tend to keep silent when those with whom they disagree are speaking; people who are not inclined to air differences tend to associate only with those who agree with them. In such a balkanized public sphere, both our commonalities and our differences go unexamined. In a democracy, people must call the opinions of others into question, must bring them into the light for examination and negotiation. In communities where citizens are not coerced, important decisions **must** be **made** by means of public discourse. When the quality of public discourse diminishes, so does the quality of democracy.

Ancient teachers called the process of examining positions held by others **"invention,"** which Aristotle defined as finding and displaying the available **arguments** on any **issue.** Invention is central to the rhetorical process. What often passes for rhetoric in our own time—repeatedly stating (or shouting) one's beliefs at an "opponent" in order to browbeat him into submission, in the manner of the television program *Crossfire*—is not rhetoric. Participation in rhetoric entails that every party to the discussion be aware that beliefs may change during the exchange and discussion of points of view. All parties to a rhetorical transaction must be willing to be persuaded by good arguments. Otherwise, decisions will be made for bad reasons, or **interested** reasons, or no reason at all.

Sometimes, of course, there are good reasons for remaining silent. Power is distributed unequally in our culture, and power inequities may force wise people to remain silent on some occasions. We believe that in contemporary American culture people who enjoy high socioeconomic status have more power than those who have fewer resources and less access to others in power. We also hold that men have more power than women and that white people have more power than people of color (and yes, we are aware that there are exceptions to all of these generalizations). We do not believe, though, that these inequities are a natural or necessary state of things. We do believe that rhetoric is among the best ways available to us for rectifying power inequities among citizens.

The people who taught and practiced rhetoric in Athens and Rome during ancient times would have found contemporary unwillingness to engage

in public disagreement very strange indeed. Their way of using disagreement to reach solutions was taught to students in Western schools for over two thousand years and is still available to us in translations of their **textbooks**, speeches, lecture notes, and treatises on rhetoric. Within limits, their way of looking at disagreement can still be useful to us. The students who worked with ancient teachers of rhetoric were members of privileged classes for the most part, since Athens and Rome both maintained socioeconomic systems that were manifestly unjust to many of the people who lived and worked within them. The same charge can be leveled at our own system, of course. Today the United States is home not only to its native peoples but to people from all over the world. Its **nonnative** citizens arrived here under vastly different circumstances, ranging from colonization to immigration to enslavement, and their lives have been shaped by these circumstances, as well as by their genders and class affiliations. Not **all—perhaps** not even a **majority—have** enjoyed the equal opportunities that are promised by the Constitution. But unfair social and economic realities only underscore the need for principled public discussion among concerned citizens.

The aim of ancient rhetorics was to distribute the power that resides in language among all of their students. This power is available to anyone who is willing to study the principles of rhetoric. People who know about rhetoric know how to persuade others to consider their point of view without having to resort to coercion or violence. For the purposes of this book, we have assumed that people prefer to seek verbal resolution of differences to the use of force. Rhetoric is of no use when people determine to use coercion or violence to gain the ends they seek.

A knowledge of rhetoric also allows people to discern when rhetors are making bad arguments or are asking them to make inappropriate choices. Since rhetoric confers the gift of greater mastery over language, it can also teach those who study it to evaluate anyone's rhetoric; thus the critical capacity conferred by rhetoric can free its students from the manipulative rhetoric of others. When knowledge about rhetoric is available only to a few people, the power inherent in persuasive discourse is disproportionately shared. Unfortunately, throughout history rhetorical knowledge has usually been shared only among those who can exert economic, social, or political power as well. But ordinary citizens can learn to deploy rhetorical power, and if they have a chance and the courage to deploy it skillfully and often, it's possible that they may change other features of our society, as well. In this book, then, we aim to help our readers become more skilled speakers and writers. But we also aim to help them become better citizens. We begin by offering a brief history of ancient rhetorical thought.[2]

A HISTORY OF ANCIENT RHETORICS

Something quite remarkable happened in the small Greek city of Athens during the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries BCE. During this period, the citizens of that community evolved a form of government they called

demokratia (demos [people] and *kratos* [political power]). Any Athenian who was defined as a citizen played a direct role in making important decisions that affected the entire community: whether to go to war, to send ambassadors to neighboring countries, to raise or lower taxes, to build bridges or walls, to convict or acquit people accused of crimes against the state or other citizens.

In the Athenian political system, citizenship was determined by birthright and thus was awarded to any adult male who could establish his Athenian heritage, whether he was wealthy or not, aristocratic or not. These were very inclusive requirements for the time, even though they excluded the bulk of the population who were women, foreign-bom men, or slaves. Because of this, classical Athens can hardly be said to have been a democracy in our more inclusive sense, although we remind readers that for almost half of its history, the United States limited suffrage to white males. Nor was Athens a representative democracy, as ours is said to be, since the few hundred people who were defined as Athenian citizens participated directly in making political and judicial decisions rather than acting through elected representatives.

The citizens met in the Assembly to make political decisions and acted as jurors at trials. Athenian men apparently took their civic responsibilities seriously. Despite the difficulties entailed in meeting this responsibility— leaving work undone for several days, traveling to the city from outlying farms—as many as five hundred or more citizens could be expected to attend and vote in the Assembly when it was in session.

Sometime during the fifth century BCE, all citizens earned the right to speak in the Assembly. This right was called *isegoria* ("equality in the agora" or assembly place). Most likely, very few citizens exercised their right to speak. When five hundred Athenians met to deliberate on important issues, not everyone could speak at once, nor was everyone sufficiently informed about the issue at hand to speak effectively. The task of filling in the details and of arguing for a course of action fell to people who were trained in speaking, who had sufficient education to understand the issues, and who had the leisure to study the issues at hand. These were the professional *rhetores.* In the fifth-century, the term *rhetor* referred to someone who introduced a resolution into the Assembly, but by the fourth century BCE the term meant something like "an expert on politics." Later it came to mean "one skilled in public speaking" as well. In this book, we refer to people who practice rhetoric as rhetors. We refer to people who teach it or theorize about it as rhetoricians.

Early Rhetors, Rhetoricians, and Teachers

Ancient sources do not agree about who invented rhetorical theory. Some credit its invention to Empedocles, a sixth-century philosopher, poet, and magician. Others say that two Sicilian rhetoricians, Corax and Tisias, turned rhetoric into a teachable art, and some say as well that one or both

of them wrote a handbook of rhetoric. There is a wonderful legend about these two fellows. According to this story, Corax was the teacher of Tisias. Tisias refused to pay for his rhetoric lessons until he won his first case. After a year had passed, Tisias had still not paid for his lessons, and Corax took Tisias to court. Corax argued that if he won his suit, Tisias would have to pay for the lessons since the court decreed it. If Corax lost, that would prove the worth of his lessons because Tisias had become a skilled enough advocate to win a suit. So, by Corax's logic, Tisias would have to pay no matter whether he won or lost. But Tisias argued that if the court decreed in his favor, he would not have to pay up, and if he lost, he would not have to pay either, since his inability to convince the court would prove that Corax's lessons were worthless. They were both kicked out of court, the story goes, and the judge said of them: "A bad egg from a bad crow" *(korax).*

During the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, many Greek orators achieved such fame that their speeches were written down and passed on to us. Among the more famous were Pericles and Demosthenes, whose careers exemplify the close connection of oratory to politics in ancient Athens. Pericles is usually credited with the establishment of democracy in that city: he began the practice of paying people to perform public service, and he may have opened an important office to poorer citizens. His democratic ideal, wherein citizens rendered free and intelligent obedience to a fair system of laws, is represented in the funeral oration attributed to him in Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War. Demosthenes was also intimately involved in the affairs of the city, although the major work of his career concerned Athens's uneasy relations with the Macedonian king Philip and his son, Alexander the Great. Demosthenes wrote and delivered many speeches against Philip in an attempt to alert Athenians to the king's acquisitive aims. He was widely regarded during antiquity as the greatest of the Greek orators, and his "On the Crown," a vindication of his political life, is still read as an outstanding example of the persuasive power of rhetoric.

The Older Sophists

Rhetoric was so obviously useful in the new Athenian democracy that teachers and practitioners of rhetoric flocked to Athens from other cities. Among these was a group now called the Older Sophists. *Sophos* meant "wise one" or "teacher" in ancient Greek (hence our word *philosopher,* meaning "lover of wisdom" and our ironic *sophomore.)* The most famous of the Older Sophists were Gorgias and Protagoras, but other people have also earned this title from historians: they include Hippias, Prodicus, Antiphon, and Thrasymachus.

Unfortunately we must reconstruct what the Older Sophists taught from secondary sources. We possess only two speeches and some fragments of other works attributed to Gorgias. None of these were written

down by him but were recorded later by scribes or scholars called doxographers ("writers of opinion"; rendered more liberally, doxographers are recorders of important traditions). We have only a few recorded sayings and fragments from Protagoras. Unflattering portraits of both rhetors appear in Plato's dialogues named after them. Plato was an Athenian aristocrat, an enemy of democracy, and a bit of a xenophobe (someone who fears foreign influences). He opposed rhetoric on the ground that rhetoricians did not search for truth but aimed instead to persuade people to believe. Despite Plato's reservations about them, the Older Sophists prospered in Athens, attracting many students to their instruction. Plato described a visit to Athens by Protagoras as follows:

> When we were inside [the house of Callias], we came upon Protagoras walking in the portico, and walking with him in a long line were, on one side Callias, son of Hipponicus; his stepbrother Paralus, the son of Pericles; and Charmides, son of Glaucon; and on the other side Pericles' other son, Xanthippus; Philippides, son of Philomelus; and Antimoerus of Mende, the most eminent of Protagoras' pupils, who is studying professionally, to become a Sophist. Those who followed behind listening to their conversation seemed to be for the most part **foreigners—Protagoras** draws them from every city that he passes through, charming them with his voice like Orpheus, and they follow **spellbound—but** there were some Athenians in the band as well. As I looked at the party I was delighted to notice what special care they took never to get in front or to be in Protagoras' way. When he and those with him turned round, the listeners divided this way and that in perfect order, and executing a circular movement took their places each time in the rear. It was beautiful.
> *{Protagoras,* 315a-b)

Protagoras's host, Callias, was a very rich man, and the young men listed here came from the best families in Athens at the time. Plato's account showed just a little contempt for the fashionableness of Protagoras's teaching and the obvious hero worship of the young men.

The Older Sophists taught by example rather than precept. That is, they prepared and delivered specimen speeches for their students to imitate. Some may have prepared lists of sample arguments, later called topics, that could be inserted into any speech for which they were appropriate. Such collections, if they existed, would have been called arts *(technai)* of rhetoric; that is, they would have been the rhetoric textbooks of the day, The Greek word for art, *techne,* means roughly "knowledge generalized from experience," and so an "art" of rhetoric could consist of a set of examples, instructions, or even principles that had been collected for the use of students by rhetors and teachers of rhetoric. Certainly imitators and students of the Older Sophists composed and collected lists of topics, since several of these collections were available in Athens by the fourth century BCE.

The Older Sophists were skeptical that anyone could easily discover truth. Rather than philosophizing, they turned their attention to politics and ethics, teaching their students that vigorous rhetorical practice was essential to a stable, healthy community. Thoroughly pragmatic, they

believed that people had to adjust their notions of what is good, useful, and true to the circumstances in which particular communities found themselves. Gorgias argued that rhetors had to take their immediate surroundings into account when they attempted to persuade people to a course of action and so they could not worry about whether their message was true for all people at all times. Their rather casual approach to truth does not mean that the Older Sophists' teaching was unprincipled; in fact, a case could be made that their care for finding solutions to immediate problems rendered their practice more ethical than that of the philosophers who looked for some universal and timeless good.

Philosophers on Rhetoric

Plato was the first in a long line of Western philosophers to condemn the Older Sophists' insistence on immersion in the moment. Because of this, the rhetorical practice associated with their epistemology, called sophistry, now has a pejorative connotation that is unfair to them and their work. Even though Plato was opposed to sophistry, he appears to have understood the importance of rhetoric. In his dialogue *Phaedrus* he developed a philosophical rhetoric that could supposedly be used to find truth. This Platonic rhetoric involved studying the souls of human beings and learning how to properly define and divide an issue into its constituent parts *(Phaedrus* 271). However, Plato's famous student Aristotle was the first teacher who developed a fully theorized account of rhetoric.

During the fourth century BCE, Aristotle collected the rhetorical handbooks or "arts" of rhetoric that were then available and assembled them into a collection called the *Synagoge Technon (Synthesis of Arts).* This research apparently convinced him that the current state of rhetorical theory was unacceptable. Since he was interested in theorizing about practice, Aristotle tried to discover general rules for rhetoric that would work in any given situation. While the Older Sophists taught by example, he preferred to develop principles that could be passed on to future students. Presumably, the text we now call the *Rhetoric* represents his lecture notes. In the opening of that work, Aristotle wrote:

> Rhetoric is an antistrophe to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defined science. A result is that all people, in some way, share in both; for all, to some extent try both to test and maintain an argument and to defend themselves and attack. Now among the general public, some do these things randomly and others through an ability acquired by habit, but since both ways are possible, it is clear that it would also be possible to do the same by [following] a path; for it is possible to observe the cause why some succeed by habit and others accidentally, and all would at once agree that such observation is the activity of an art. (I i 1354a)

Aristotle infers that all people learn how to argue in the course of their daily affairs. However, picking up the knack of arguing through experience

may not be as helpful as studying the principles of argument, which Aristotle claims to have discovered by studying the practices of successful rhetors.

The *Rhetoric* is the earliest extant example of a complete *techne,* or art, of rhetoric. Aristotle's major contribution to rhetoric was his systematic and thorough treatment of invention—the art of finding the available arguments in a given case. We review many of these in this book: **common**-places, **enthymemes, examples, maxims,** and **signs,** as well as ethical and pathetic **proofs.** While Aristotle may have borrowed some of these proofs from other rhetoricians, he was the first to combine them into a systematic treatment of available argumentative strategies. In fact, the *Rhetoric* may have been part of a more ambitious project. Aristotle may have intended to create a comprehensive methodology, a set of intellectual tools that would help people to discover knowledge about anything whatsoever. If so, the methodology would also have included his treatises on logic (the two *Analytics and the Sophistic Fallacies, Topics,* and *Categories)* as well as the *Poetics,* which is about the composition of drama and lyric poetry.

Aristotle's students and followers were called Peripatics *(peripatein,* "walking about," from their habit of strolling up and down the halls of the Lyceum while they lectured). They were interested in rhetoric only as a sideline, which lessened the chance that they would preserve the *Rhetoric* as carefully as they did Aristotle's more philosophical works. Apparently a few copies were housed in the famous library at Alexandria, which was burned to the ground by the Roman general Octavius during the first century BCE. Fortunately, Arab scholars who had worked at Alexandria preserved copies of the *Rhetoric* intact throughout the period that Western historians call the Middle Ages. During the Crusades, northern Europeans reestablished contact with Islamic scholars, and as a result the *Rhetoric* was introduced into European universities during the twelfth-century CE. In modern times its popularity has eclipsed that of Cicero's works, which were the basic texts for the study of ancient rhetoric throughout the European Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Indeed, Aristotle's text on rhetoric received more scholarly attention during the twentieth century than it did during its first 2,200 years of existence. Probably for this reason, the Aristotelian theory of rhetoric is usually what is meant when a contemporary scholar or teacher refers to "classical rhetoric."

Isocrates

Despite Aristotle's current fame, his rhetorical theory was completely eclipsed during his lifetime by that of Isocrates. Some sources say that Isocrates studied with Gorgias, from whom he acquired his interest in style. Isocrates started out as a logographer—someone who wrote speeches for people who for some reason couldn't compose a persuasive speech for themselves. Later, he established a famous and influential school of rhetoric that was attended by ambitious young men from all the Greek city-states.

Throughout his long career, Isocrates taught young men the art of rhetoric so that they could become capable and cultured citizens. In *Antidosis* he wrote about the purpose of rhetorical study as follows:

> When anyone elects to speak or write discourses which are worthy of praise and honor, it is not conceivable that such a person will support causes which are unjust or petty or devoted to private quarrels, and not rather those which are great and honorable, devoted to the welfare of humanity and the common good. It follows, then, that the power to speak well and think right will reward the person who approaches the art of discourse with love of wisdom and love of honor (276-78).

He repeatedly argued that achieving this goal required three things: native ability, study, and practice. Some authorities credit Isocrates with establishing the public speech as an art form. Certainly his surviving speeches are highly polished works of art, and he is said to have worked on some of them for as long as fifteen years. Isocrates' *Art of Rhetoric* does not survive but we do have most of his speeches and letters.

An Early Sophistic Textbook

We do have another rhetoric text available from Aristotle's and Isocrates' time: the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (in Latin, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*). Ancient scholars thought that Aristotle had written it, since it is prefaced with a letter from Aristotle to his famous student, Alexander the Great. But this letter is a later addition to the treatise. The *ad Alexandrum* is so different from *the Rhetoric* that it probably represents another scholarly or pedagogical tradition altogether. It is not a theory of rhetoric, as Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is; it simply lists and discusses the appropriate arguments to use in each part of a speech. The author of the *ad Alexandrum* was probably one of many teachers working at Athens who called themselves "sophists." These teachers should not be confused with the Older Sophists; Isocrates considered them to be cheats and parasites who promised to teach their students the art of living a happy life, when what they really did was hand out lists of stale formulas for putting arguments together.

Hellenistic Rhetoric

Aristotle, the great Greek rhetorician, and Demosthenes, the great Greek rhetor, both died in the same year: 322 BCE. Scholars use this date to mark the close of the classical period of ancient Greek culture. Ancient scholars realized almost immediately that the intellectual work done during the classical period was important. During the Hellenistic period (roughly 300 BCE to 100 CE), Greek rhetoricians codified classical rhetorical lore into a coherent system that could be easily taught to young people. One of these teachers, Hermagoras of Temnos, added something new to the two rhetorical traditions—Aristotelian and sophistic—that were handed down from

the classical period. Hermagoras, who lived during the second century BCE, is thought to have invented stasis theory, a means of invention that was simpler and less philosophical than Aristotle's and which was somewhat better adapted to the needs of courtroom rhetors, as well. Versions of stasis theory either replaced earlier inventional schemes or were incorporated into them in many post-Hellenistic rhetorical treatises.

We have a very full treatise on Greek rhetorical theory from this period, written in Latin. It is called the *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* because its author dedicated the work to one Gaius Herennius. Modern scholars are uncertain about its authorship, although for awhile during the Middle Ages it was thought to have been written by Cicero. In any case, this work gives us a very complete picture of Hellenistic rhetorical theory, and it is especially valuable because it includes a very full discussion of an ancient art of memory.

Roman Rhetorics

During the Hellenistic period of Greek culture, the city of Rome, located on seven hills in what is now south-central Italy, became the economic and military ruler of the known world. Even then Rome was a very old city. Early on, it was governed in a fashion quite similar to that of other city-states, where all those defined as citizens (plebeians) gathered to vote on pressing issues. By the second century BCE, however, the people's assembly had become a working fiction, and the city was in fact governed by a Senate made up of persons who made more or less recent claims to the status of patrician, or aristocrat, by virtue of their ancestry or service to the state. This Senate had no legitimate constitutional authority, having wrested political control away from the plebeian assembly. Because of the political instability of this situation, terrible political turmoil wracked Rome throughout the second and first centuries BCE, until the Empire was firmly established under Octavius shortly before the beginning of the Common Era.

Marcus Tullius Cicero was an important actor in the declining years of Rome's so-called Republic. He was a member of the Roman Senate; but more important for our purposes, Cicero is the most influential practitioner and theorist of ancient rhetoric who ever lived. While he was active in Roman politics, Cicero gave many speeches and managed as well to write works on literature, philosophy, and rhetorical theory. Cicero's politics were unrelentingly republican, which means that he supported the power of the Senate on all issues. Hence he was able to forge only temporary alliances with the succession of powerful generals who wanted to turn Rome into an empire, and it was inevitable that he would sooner or later run afoul of some powerful pretender to the title of emperor. In 43 BCE he was murdered by an assassin sent by Marc Antony. Some ancient sources say that the dead Cicero's hands were cut off, since he used these to write his powerful speeches; other authorities suggest that Cicero's head was displayed in the forum with a golden pin stuck through the tongue. Such was the power of his rhetoric.

Cicero's rhetorical works were read in schools throughout the Western Middle Ages. During the European Renaissance, many thought his literary style to be the finest ever achieved and the only one worthy of imitation. While Cicero was alive, his skill as an orator was respected and feared; indeed, even when he lost (as in his defense of Milo), his speeches were so powerful and skillful that they are still read today. We rely upon Cicero's *De Inventione (On Invention), Orator, Partitiones Oratoriae (The Paris of Speaking), Topica* (the *Topics),* and the *De Oratore (On the Art of Oratory)* in this book. The early treatise *On Invention* was heavily indebted to Hellenistic rhetoric, but Cicero's more mature rhetorical treatises were influenced by the work of Aristotle, as well as that of other Greek rhetoricians and philosophers. But the real shaping force on Cicero's work was the Roman state—its respect for authority and tradition, its political fluctuations, and its ethical dilemmas.

The other important figure in Roman rhetoric is Marcus Fabricius Quintilian, who may be the most influential teacher of rhetoric who ever lived. His *Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of Oratory)* was considered to be a classic work on education almost from the day he published it in 90 CE. Quintilian's influence is evident in the work of his contemporaries, such as the poet Juvenal and the historian Tacitus, and in that of the early Christian fathers as well. Sometime during the Middle Ages, all the complete manuscripts of the *Institutes* disappeared. But in 1416 an Italian scholar named Poggio Bracciolini rediscovered a complete copy of the work in a dusty monastery library. Poggio knew the value of what he had found. He immediately made a handwritten copy of the entire manuscript, thus preserving this ancient work for future generations to enjoy.

The *Institutes* is particularly valuable because it is a compendium of the best of ancient rhetorical theory, composed near the end of its theoretical development. Quintilian was a careful scholar, and his discussions of the competing theories of this or that ancient rhetorician often give us the best (and sometimes the only) information we have about them. Quintilian's theory of rhetoric was thoroughly indebted to Roman practical ethics. The education he prescribed for young citizens was aimed at producing speakers and writers who had the best aims of their community at heart. Many of the practices he recommended were used in Roman schools at least until the collapse of the Empire, and probably beyond.

Rhetoric in Later Antiquity

When political power was solidified within the Roman Empire, the great age of ancient rhetorical theory was past. No new theorists of the caliber of Gorgias or Aristotle appeared. The practice of rhetoric changed greatly under the restrictions imposed by the succession of Roman emperors. Rhetors no longer advocated policy; they no longer dared to blame the powerful for their shortcomings or to celebrate with the people alternative versions of community. Instead, they became performers. They used their art to create dazzling displays of highly ornamented variations on harmless

themes hoary with age. Perhaps rhetorical study was put to its most effective and lasting use during later antiquity by the great Latin poets—Virgil, Ovid, Horace. The only theoretical development, if it can be called that, occurred in discussions of style and literary criticism, written by such Greek rhetoricians as Hermogenes of Tarsus and Dionysus of Halicarnassus. Nevertheless, the rhetorical theories that had been forged during the immediate centuries before the Common Era remained at the center of higher education throughout later antiquity and well into the European Middle Ages and in Greek Byzantium as well.

SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ANCIENT AND MODERN THOUGHT

The great age of ancient rhetorics dictates that there will be differences between them and modern thinking about rhetoric. One such difference is that ancient rhetoricians did not value factual proof very highly, while facts and testimony are virtually the only proofs discussed in modern rhetorical theory (see the chapter on extrinsic proofs). Ancient teachers preferred to use arguments that they generated from language itself and from community beliefs during an intellectual process they called "invention." They invented and named many such arguments, among them commonplaces, examples, conjectures, maxims, and enthymemes (see the chapters on stasis, commonplaces, and on rhetorical reasoning). Another difference is that ancient rhetoricians valued opinions as a source of knowledge, whereas in modern thought opinions are often dismissed as unimportant. But ancient rhetoricians thought of opinions as something that were held not by individuals but by entire communities. This difference has to do with another assumption that they made, which was that a person's character (and hence her opinions) were constructions made by the community in which she lived. And since the ancients believed that communities were the source and reason for rhetoric, opinions were for them the very stuff of argument.

A third difference between ancient and modern rhetorics is that ancient rhetoricians situated their teaching in place and time. Their insistence that local and temporal conditions influenced the act of composition marks a fairly distinct contrast with the habit in modern rhetoric of treating rhetorical occasions as if they were all alike. For example, modern rhetoric textbooks insist that every composition display a thesis. Ancient teachers, in contrast, were not so sure that every discourse has a thesis to display. For example, people sometimes write or speak in order to determine what alternatives are available in a given situation. In this case they are not ready to advance a thesis. And if a rhetor has a hostile audience, after all, it might be better (and safer) not to mention a thesis at all, or at least to place it near the end of the discourse (see the chapter on arrangement for advice about the selection and placement of arguments generated by invention).

A last difference between ancient and modern rhetorics has to do with ancient teachers' attitude toward language. Modern rhetoricians tend to think that its role is limited to the communication of facts. Ancient rhetoricians, however, taught their students that language does many things. Cicero, who was an extremely skilled and influential speaker in the days of the Roman Republic, asserted that the ends of language use are to teach, to give pleasure, and to move. But the point of instructing or delighting audiences is, finally, to move them to accept or reject some thought or action.

Just the Facts, Please

From an ancient perspective, one of the most troublesome of modern assumptions about the nature of argument goes like this: if the facts are on your side, you can't be wrong, and you can't be refuted. Facts are statements that somebody has substantiated through experience or proved through research. Or they are events that really happened, events that somebody will attest to as factual. Facts have a "you were there" quality; if the arguer doesn't have personal knowledge of the facts, he is pretty sure that some expert on the subject does know them, and all she has to do in that case is to look them up in a book. Here are some examples of factual statements:

1. Water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit.
2. The moon orbits the earth.
3. On February 1, 2003, the shuttle Columbia broke apart upon reentering the earth's atmosphere.

These are facts because they can be verified through experience or by means of testimony. Individuals can test the accuracy of the first statement for themselves, and all three statements can be confirmed by checking relevant and reliable sources.

No doubt the importance given to facts derives from the modern faith in science or, more technically, from faith in empirical proofs, those that are available to the senses: vision, smell, taste, touch, and hearing. During the nineteenth century, rhetoricians came to prefer so-called scientific or empirical proofs to all the other kinds outlined in ancient rhetoric. After 1850, American rhetoric textbooks began to reduce the many kinds of evidence discriminated by ancient rhetoricians to just two: empirical evidence and testimony. Both of these kinds of evidence have the you-are-there quality: empirical evidence derives from someone's actual sensory contact with the relevant evidence; testimony involves somebody's reporting their acquaintance with the facts of the case. During the twentieth century, rhetoric **text**books enlarged testimony to include accounts by persons recognized as experts or authorities in specialized fields of study. The modern reverence for facts and testimonies explains why students are often asked to write

research papers in school—their teachers want to be sure they know how to assemble empirical evidence and expert testimony into a coherent piece of writing.

There are some problems with the approving modern attitude toward empirical evidence. For one thing, it ignores the possibility that the evidence provided by the senses is neither reliable nor conclusive. People are selective about what they perceive, and they continually reconstruct their memories of what they perceive, as well. Moreover, people don't always agree about their sensory perceptions. The Older Sophist Protagoras pointed out that a blowing wind could feel cold to one person and hot to another and that honey tasted bitter to some people although it tastes sweet to most.

Perceptions, and thus testimony about them, can also be influenced by an observer's perspective. Over the years during which we have been writing and revising this book, the National Football League has changed its policy on the use of instant replay several times. In instant replay, the referees watch video tapes of a controversial play taken from several different angles in order to decide what penalties to assess, if any. Even though professional referees are trained observers of the game, sometimes they simply cannot see whether a defensive player used his arms illegally or whether a receiver managed to keep his feet within bounds while he caught the ball. The problem with instant replay, though, is that sometimes television cameras are not well positioned to see a contested play, either. In terms used in this book, the supposedly factual or empirical account yielded by instant replay is often no better at resolving disagreements about violations than is the testimony given by referees. Currently the NFL uses a rather complicated combination of taped replays and referee judgements to make decisions about contested plays. In other words, the NFL has opted to combine facts and testimony as evidence for opinions rendered about close calls. This example interests us because fans seem to trust referees' judgements less than they do that of the television camera operators. Indeed, fans often accuse referees of having an interest in one outcome or another, assuming that this interest influences their perception of events. This suggests in turn that football fans may trust machines rather more than they trust human experts, even though the machines are, after all, constructed and operated by human beings. One seldom hears complaints that ABC or CBS or Fox placed its cameras in positions that might serve its own interests, at least in the context of football games.

This example highlights the even more interesting observation that the facts of the physical world don't mean much to anybody unless they are involved in some larger network of interpretation. In football the relevant network of interpretation is the rules of the game. Without these rules, the exact placement of a player's arm or the exact point at which his feet touched the ground pretty much lose their relevance. (Sometimes football players suddenly switch to a network of interpretation that allows them to read an arm in the face as an act of aggression. When this happens, refer-

ees have to assess more penalties until the game's more usual network of interpretation can be restored.)

Here's another example that demonstrates that facts are not very interesting or persuasive unless they are read within a network of interpretation: geologists use the fossil record as evidence to support the theory of evolution. They point to boxes and crates of mute, stony facts—fossilized plants and animals—as evidence that species have evolved over time. But the fossil record itself, as well as the historical relationships that geologists have established among fossils from all over the world, is a network of interpretation. That is, geologists have read a series of natural objects in such a way as to construe them as evidence for a huge natural process that nobody could actually have witnessed. If you want to object that a fossil is a fact, please do. You are quite right. Our point is that it is not a very useful (or interesting) fact apart from its interpretation as a fossil, rather than a rock, and its location within in the network of interpretation called evolutionary theory. Using other networks of interpretation, a fossil can just as easily be read as a doorstop or a weapon.

Ancient philosophers understood the usefulness of empirical facts quite differently from moderns. Early Greek thinkers were skeptical about the status of phenomena, the name they gave to the facts of the physical world—stuff like trees, fossils, rocks, honey, cold winds, and the like. They argued about whether such things existed at all, or whether they existed only when perceived by the human senses. Most agreed that human perception of the facts of the physical world necessarily involved some distortion, since human thoughts and perceptions and language are obviously not the same things as physical objects like rocks.

Perhaps because of their skepticism about the nature of facts, ancient teachers of rhetoric were equally skeptical about the persuasive potential of facts. Aristotle wrote that facts and testimony were not truly within the art of rhetoric; they were *atechnoi*—"without art or skill"—and hence extrinsic to rhetoric. Extrinsic proofs were not developed through a rhetor's use of the principles of rhetoric but were found in existing circumstances. Aristotle defined an extrinsic proof as "all such as are not supplied by our own efforts, but existed beforehand" *(Rhetoric* I ii 1356a). Such proofs are extrinsic to rhetoric, then, because no art is required to invent them. A rhetor only has to choose the relevant facts or testimony and present them to an audience.

Because facts are relatively mute in the absence of a relevant network of interpretation, rhetors seldom argue from a simple list of facts.[3] Today, practicing rhetoricians invent and use a wide variety of nonfactual arguments with great effectiveness. Take a trivial illustration: many detergent advertisements are arguments from example. Advertisers show a smiling woman folding a pile of sparkling clean clothes that she has washed with their product. They assume that the vividly presented example will make people reason as follows: "Well, that woman used Burble and look at how clean her clothes are. If I use Burble, my clothes will be clean and I'll be

smiling, too." The ad writers hope that viewers will generalize from the fictional example to their own lives and draw the conclusion that they should buy the detergent. There are no facts in this argument—indeed it is a fiction, constructed by scriptwriters, actors, directors, and others—and yet it is apparently persuasive, since detergents continue to be advertised in this way.

Rhetors who rely only upon facts and testimony, then, place very serious limits on their persuasive potential, since many other kinds of rhetorical argument are employed daily in the media and in ordinary conversation. These arguments are invented or discovered by rhetors, using the art of rhetoric. Aristotle described invented arguments as *entechnoi*—"embodied in the art" of rhetoric. This class of proofs is intrinsic to rhetoric, since they are generated from its principles.

In rhetoric, intrinsic proofs are found or discovered by rhetors. Invention is the division of rhetoric that investigates the possible means by which proofs can be discovered; it supplies speakers and writers with sets of instructions that help them to find and compose arguments that are appropriate for a given rhetorical situation. The word *invenire* meant "to find" or "to come upon" in Latin. The Greek equivalent, *heuriskein,* also meant "to find out" or "discover." Variants of both words persist in English. For instance, the exclamation "Eureka!" (derived from *heuriskein)* means "I have found it!" The Greek word has also given us *heuristic,* which means "an aid to discovery," and we refer to anyone who has new ideas as an "inventor," from the Latin *invenire.*

A proposition (Latin *proponere,* "to put forth") is any arguable statement put forward for discussion by a rhetor. A proof is any statement or statements used to persuade an audience to accept a proposition. Proofs are bits of language that are supposed to be persuasive. Ancient rhetoricians developed and catalogued a wide range of intrinsic rhetorical proofs, most of which relied on rhetors' knowledge of a community's history and beliefs. The Older Sophists contributed the notions of commonplaces and probabilities. Aristotle contributed **enthymemes,** examples, signs, and maxims, and Hermagoras of Temnos is credited with the invention of stasis theory.

Aristotle discriminated three kinds of intrinsic rhetorical proofs: *ethos, pathos,* and *logos.* These kinds of proofs translate into English as ethical, pathetic, and logical proofs. Ethical proofs depend on the rhetor's character; pathetic proofs appeal to the emotions of the audience; and logical proofs derive from arguments found in the issue itself. Our words *logic* and *logical* are derived from the Greek *logos,* which meant "voice" or "speech" to early Greek rhetoricians. Later, *logos* also became associated with reason.

Here is a hypothetical example of an argument in which a rhetor uses both intrinsic and extrinsic proofs. An astronomer appears before the city council of Ourtown to argue that the city should consider installing a "dark sky" ordinance that would reduce the amount of light emitted into the night sky by streetlights and billboards. Current light levels from these

sources interfere with astronomers' ability to observe the night sky through their telescope, mounted on a hill just outside Ourtown. The astronomer's association with science gives her a strong ethical appeal, since scientists are generally respected in our culture. She can also make an emotional appeal by reminding her audience that human-made lighting interferes with the ordinary person's ability to see the moon and stars clearly, thus decreasing his or her enjoyment of the night sky. In addition, there are **a** good many logical proofs available to her in the issue itself. She can reason from **cause to effect:** city lighting causes so much interference with telescopes and other instruments that the quality of observational work being carried out at the observatory is diminished. Or she can reason from **parallel case:** "A dark sky ordinance was enacted in Othertown, and the quality of astronomical observations has improved enormously there. The same thing will happen in Ourtown if we install a dark-sky ordinance here." In this argument the astronomer relied on only one fact: that current light levels from the city interfered with her ability to make astronomical observations. Interested citizens could contest even this statement (which the ancients would have called a **conjecture),** since it was produced by the astronomer and obviously serves her interests.

Ancient students of rhetoric practiced inventing a wide variety of intrinsic proofs while they were in school. By the time they finished their education, invention strategies were second nature to them, so that whenever they were called on to construct a speech or to compose **a** piece of written discourse, they could conduct a mental review of invention processes. This review helped them to determine which proofs would be useful in arguing about whatever issue confronted them. The means of inventing rhetorical proofs can still provide rhetors with an intellectual arsenal to which they can resort whenever they need to compose. Anyone who becomes familiar with all of them should never be at a loss for words.

To become adept at invention is not easy, though. Invention requires systematic thought, practice, and above all, thoroughness. But careful attention to the ancient strategies for discovering arguments will amply repay anyone who undertakes their study and use. Hermogenes of Tarsus wrote that "nothing good can be produced easily, and I should be surprised if there were anything better for humankind, since we are logical animals, than fine and noble *logoi* and every kind of them" *(On Style* I 214). In other words, to invent arguments is essentially human. But invention also has a less lofty, more practical aim: rhetors who practice the ancient means of invention will soon find themselves supplied with more arguments than they can possibly use.

That's Just Your Opinion

There is another category in popular notions about argument that deserves our attention. This is the category called "opinion." People can put a stop to conversation simply by saying, "Well, that's just your opinion." When

someone does this, he implies that opinions aren't very important. They aren't facts, after all, and furthermore, opinions belong to individuals, while facts belong to everybody. Another implication is this: because opinions are intimately tied up with individual identities, there's not much hope of changing them unless the person changes her identity. To put this another way, the implication of "Well, that's just your opinion" is that Jane Doe's opinion about, say, vegetarianism, is all tied up with who she is. If she thinks that eating meat is morally wrong, well, that's her opinion and there's not much we can do about changing her belief or her practice.

The belief that opinions belong to individuals may explain why Americans seem reluctant to challenge one another's opinions. To challenge a person's opinion is to denigrate his character, to imply that if he holds an unexamined or stupid or silly opinion, he is an unthinking or stupid or silly person. Ancient teachers of rhetoric would find fault with this on three grounds. First, they would object that there is no such thing as "just your opinion." Second, they would object to the assumption that opinions aren't important. Third, they would argue that opinions can be changed. The point of rhetoric, after all, is to change opinions.

Ancient rhetoricians taught their students that opinions are shared by many members of a community. The Greek word for common or popular opinion was *doxa,* which is the root of English words like *orthodoxy* ("straight opinion") and *paradox* ("opinions alongside one another"). Opinions develop because people live in communities. A person living alone on an island needs a great many skills and physical resources, but she has no need for political, moral, or social opinions until she meets up with another person or an animal, since politics, morality, and sociality depend upon our relations with beings that think and feel.

Let's return to the example of vegetarianism. Here is an article written by Associated Press writer Martha Irvine, entitled "Cattlemen vs. PETA in Teen Diet Battle":

> Jessi Lehman may not know it, but she's the sort of girl who's stirring a battle between the beef industry and pro-vegetarian groups—with each attempting to sway young people to its side of the table.
>
> The teen from State College, Pa., grew up surrounded by farm country and in a family of meat-eaters. Yet at age 16, she's been a vegetarian for more than six years, and says a growing number of her friends are following suit.
>
> "In America, we eat so much more than we need," says Jessi, who talks easily about "sustainable agriculture" and "slaughterhouse conditions."
>
> There are signs that young people are increasingly interested in eating vegetarian. Surveys show that more schools and universities now offer non-meat alternatives as main courses. The Vegetarian Resource Group cites its veggie nutrition information for teens as the "top page" on its Web site.
>
> And a recent survey of 12- to 19-year-olds done by Teenage Research Unlimited found that 20 percent of all respondents—and 28 percent of girls— said vegetarianism is "in."
>
> While that's one in five teens overall, a spokesman at Teenage Research, a suburban Chicago firm that tracks youth trends, notes the percentage is not

particularly high when compared to other trends such as using the Internet (92 percent) and downloading music (84 percent).

Cattlemen use Web site

Still, the interest in "going meatless" is substantial enough that the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, a trade group for cattle ranchers, is taking action.

In December, the group posted a Web site titled Cool-2B-Real aimed at girls ages 8 to 12. The site encourages girls to be confident and active with message boards, computer games, self-esteem tests and advice—and recipes featuring beef.

"We are out to promote that all foods fit into a healthy diet," says Mary K. Young, executive director of nutrition for the National Cattlemen, who remembers a time when eschewing meat was considered "fringe."

Young concedes that a vegetarian diet can be healthy. But too often, she says, it isn't. And overall, whether girls are vegetarian or not, she says federal statistics show that, after age 11, many girls' diets lack important nutrients found in beef and other foods.

The data show that 60 percent of girls ages 12 to 19 are not consuming recommended levels of iron; nearly half don't get enough zinc; and a third don't eat foods that contain adequate levels of vitamin B-12.

Sylvia Rimm, a child psychologist who served as an adviser for the Cattlemen's site, says there also are concerns that some girls use unhealthy eating tactics to lose weight.

"We need more industries out there to come out and say. 'Look, be real! Don't build your self-confidence based on peer pressure and your appearance,'" says Rimm, author of the See Jane Win series of books.

PETA puts ads on buses

On the other side, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals is stepping up its pro-vegetarian campaign. PETA officials say that next month in New York City, they'll circulate a bus covered in an ad featuring an obese child eating a burger and the slogan "Feeding Kids Meat Is Child Abuse—Fight the Fat."

The National Cattlemen call the ad, slated for circulation in other cities, "irresponsible."

But PETA spokesman Bruce Friedrich believes there are better sources of vitamins, iron and other minerals than meat. He recommends a vegan diet for adults and children—fruit, whole grains and vegetables, including legumes (beans, peas and lentils). That means no meat or fish and no dairy products, such as milk and cheese—a recommendation that goes against federal food pyramid guidelines.

It's a difference of opinion that even shows itself in the school cafeteria.

"A lot of kids will criticize me for it. Or when they're eating meat, they show it to me and say 'Meeeeat, meeeeeat!' It's kind of annoying," says Grace Marston, an 11-year-old vegetarian from Silver Spring, Md.

Research on the subject is mixed, though many health experts, including researchers from the Harvard School of Public Health, recommend eating more fish, beans and chicken as a source of protein than red meat.

In the end, though, some worry that the overall message to eat healthy is getting lost in a polarized meat-vs.-vegetarian debate.

"What we need to do is teach kids, and their parents, how to eat healthier," says Samantha Heller, a senior clinical nutritionist at NYU Medical Center in New York.

Whether they eat some lean red meat or not, Heller says that means eating more fruits and vegetables, whole grains and nuts—and less junk food. *(Arizona Republic,* February 19, 2003, 4A)

Equipped with the notion of shared opinion, we can see that Jane's opinion about meat eating is not "just hers." Rather, she shares it with other people—her friends (but not her family in this case). She also shares her opinion with thousands of people whom she has never met—with everyone who believes, as she does, that eating meat is morally wrong. And if her opinion is not just hers it follows that, should she wish to, Jane can change her opinion without changing her identity.

This is not to deny that changing one's opinion, particularly about deeply held religious or political beliefs, is very hard work. But it can be done, and it can be done by means of a systematic examination of the available positions on an issue. Vegetarianism is an interesting example in this regard because it is currently a minority belief and practice. Arguments supporting minority beliefs and practices must actively be sought out; often they are not available in venues that convey more dominant opinions, such as mainstream media. It takes work to find arguments against the centrality of meat in the human diet, and a person can become vegetarian only after rejecting a more dominant view. Opinions and practices that are dominant, in contrast, can be accepted without much thought or investigation. Most Americans grow up eating meat; as the familiar commercial puts it, meat is "what's for dinner!" That meat producers have recently found it necessary to run commercials in favor of meat eating suggests that the practice has met with a rhetorical challenge significant enough to threaten its status as a commonplace, that is, as a dominant, mainstream belief that used to "go without saying" (see Chapter 4, on commonplaces).

But to return to our more general argument about the nature of opinions. If we locate opinions outside individuals and within communities, they assume more importance. If a significant number of individuals within a community share an opinion, it becomes difficult to dismiss that opinion as unimportant, no matter how much we like or detest it. Nor can we continue to see opinions as unchangeable. If Jane got her opinion about vegetarianism from somebody she knows or something she read, she can modify her opinion when she hears or reads a different opinion from somebody else. For example, perhaps her doctor will warn her against the protein loss that may occur with a vegetarian diet. Communication researchers have discovered that people generally adopt the opinions of people they know and respect. Opinions are likely to change when we lose respect for the people who hold them or when we meet new people whom we like and respect and who have different opinions.

The modern association of facts with science, and opinion with everything else, draws on a set of beliefs that was invented during the seven-

teenth century. Science was associated with empirical proofs and rational problem solving, while nonscientific methods of reasoning began to be considered irrational or emotional. It was also during this period that the modern notion of the individual emerged, wherein each person was thought to be an intellectual island whose unique experiences rendered his or her opinions unique. While the modern notion of the individual is attractive in many ways, it does cause us to forget that opinions are widely shared. Too, the modern distinction between reason and other means of investigation keeps us from realizing how many of our beliefs are based in our emotional responses to our environments. Indeed, our acceptance of our most important beliefs—religious, moral, and political—probably have as much to do with our desires and interests as they do with rational argument. The reason/emotion distinction also keeps us from realizing how often we are swayed by appeals to our emotions or, more accurately, how difficult it is to distinguish between a purely rational appeal and a purely emotional one. And the notion of the unique individual makes it difficult for us to see how many of our opinions are borrowed from the beliefs that we share with other members of our communities.

Ancient teachers of rhetoric believed that rhetorical reasoning, which is used in politics, journalism, religious argument, literature, philosophy, history, and law—to name just a few of its arenas—is fully as legitimate as that used in any other field. And even though it utilizes appeals to community opinion and to emotions, if it is done responsibly, rhetorical reasoning is no more or less valid than the reasoning used in science. In fact, scientific reasoning is itself rhetorical when its propositions are drawn from beliefs held by the community of trained scientists.

On Ideology and the Commonplaces

We suggested earlier that networks of interpretation—the way people interpret and use the facts—have persuasive potential, while facts by themselves do not. Postmodern rhetoricians use the term *ideology* to name networks of interpretation, and that is the term we use for it in the rest of this book.

An ideology is a coherent set of beliefs that people use to understand events and the behavior of other people; they are also used to predict events and behaviors. Ideologies exist in language, but they are worked out in practices. They are sets of statements that tell us how to understand ourselves and others and how to understand nature and our relation to it, as well. Furthermore, ideologies help us to decide how to value what we know—they tell us what is thought to be true, or right, or good, or beautiful in a community.

Each of us is immersed in the ideologies that circulate in our communities once we begin to understand and use language. Hence ideologies actually produce "selves"; the picture you have of yourself has been formed by your experiences, to be sure, but it has also been constructed by

the beliefs that circulate among your family, friends, the media, and other communities that you inhabit. You may think of yourself as a Christian, or a Jew, or a New Ager, or as an atheist. In each case, you adopted a set of beliefs about the way the world works from some relevant community (in the last case, you may have reacted against dominant ideologies). Even though identities are shaped by ideologies, they are never stable, because we can question or reject ideological belief. As we have suggested, people do this all the time: they undergo religious conversion; they adopt a politics; they decide that UFOs do not exist; they stop eating meat; they take up exercise because they have become convinced it is good for them. Often, it is rhetoric that has brought about this ideological change. Ideology is the stuff with which rhetors work.

We mean no disrespect when we say that religious beliefs and political leanings are ideological. Quite the contrary: human beings need ideologies in order to make sense of their experiences in the world. Powerful ideologies such as religions and political beliefs help people to understand who they are and what their relation is to the world and to other beings.

Ideologies are made up of the statements that ancient rhetoricians called commonplaces. The distinguishing characteristic of a commonplace is that it is commonly believed by members of a community. These beliefs are "common" not because they are cheap or trivial but because they are shared "in common" by many people. Commonplaces need not be true or accurate (although they may be true and they are certainly thought to be so within the communities that hold them). Some commonplaces are so thoroughly embedded in a community's assumptions about how the world works that they are seldom examined rhetorically. Here are some examples of commonplaces that circulate in American discourse:

Anyone can become president of the United States.

All men are created equal.

Everyone has a right to express his or her beliefs because free speech is protected by the Constitution.

Please note that even though these statements are widely accepted in American discourse, they are not necessarily true for all Americans. In other words, outside the communities that subscribe to them, commonplaces may be controversial. If you disagreed with us earlier when we asserted that "men have more power than women," your disagreement should alert you to the presence of a commonplace that is accepted in some community to which we belong but not in the communities with which you identify. In a case like this, the commonplace is contested. Contested commonplaces are called issues in rhetoric, and it is the point of rhetoric to help people examine and perhaps to achieve agreement about issues.

Most people probably subscribe to commonplaces drawn from many and diverse ideologies at any given time. Because of this and because our subscription to many of our beliefs is only partially conscious, our ideo-

logical beliefs may contradict one another. For instance, if John believes on religious grounds that abortion is murder, he may find that belief to be in conflict with his liberal politics which teach that women have the right to determine whether or not they wish to carry a pregnancy to term. Thus John's ideology contains a potential contradiction. This is not unusual, because ideology is seldom consistent with itself. In fact, it may be full of contradictions, and it may (and often does) contradict empirical states of affairs as well. For example, the commonplace which affirms that "anyone can become President of the United States" overlooks the reality that all presidents to date have been <u>white men.</u>

Rhetorical Situations

Ancient rhetoricians defined knowledge as the collected wisdom of those who know. In ancient thought, knowledge was not supposed to exist outside of knowers. Teaching and learning began with what people already knew. People talked or questioned each other, and worked toward new discoveries by testing them against what was already known (Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I i). Ancient rhetoricians assumed that anyone who wanted to compose a discourse had a reason for doing so that grew out of his life in a community. Young people studied rhetoric precisely because they wanted to be involved in decisions that affected the lives of their family, friends, and neighbors. Students of ancient rhetoric did engage in a good deal of practice with artificial **rhetorical situations** taken from history or literature or law (the rhetorical exercises were called ***progymnasmata*** and *declamation).* However, this practice was aimed at teaching them something about the community they would later serve, as well as about rhetoric. In other words, they did not study rhetoric only to learn its rules. Instead, their study was preparation for a life of active citizenship.

A rhetorical situation is made up of several elements: the issue for discussion, the audience for the discussion and their relationship to the issue, as well as the rhetor, her reputation, and her relation to the issue. Rhetors must also consider the time and the place in which the issue merits attention (see Chapter 2, on *kairos).*

Because of its emphasis on **situatedness,** on location in space and time, and on the contexts that determine composition, ancient rhetorical theory differs greatly from many modern rhetorical theories which assume that all rhetors and all audiences can read and write from a neutral point of view. The notion of objectivity would have greatly puzzled ancient rhetors and teachers of rhetoric, because it implies that truth and accuracy somehow exist outside of people who label things with those words. What interested ancient rhetoricians were issues: matters about which there was some disagreement or dispute. In other words, nothing can become an issue unless someone disagrees with someone else about its truth or falsity, or applicability, or worth. Issues do not exist in isolation from the people who speak or write about them.

LANGUAGE AS POWER

Many modern rhetoric textbooks assert that language is a reliable reflection of thought. Their authors assume that the main point of using language is to represent thought, because they live in an age that is still influenced by notions about language developed during the seventeenth century. In 1690 John Locke argued influentially that words represent thoughts and that the function of words was to convey the thinking of one person to another as clearly as possible. The assumption that language is transparent, that it lets meaning shine through it, is part of what is called a **representative theory of language.** The theory has this name because it assumes that language represents meaning, that it hands meaning over to listeners or readers, clear and intact.

Ancient rhetoricians were not so sure that words only or simply represented thoughts. As a consequence, they had great respect for the power of language. Archaic Greeks thought that the distinguishing characteristic of human beings, what made them different from animals, was their possession of *logos,* or speech. In archaic Greek thought, a person's *logos* was her name, her history, everything that could be said about her. Another word for *logos* was *kleos,* "fame" or "call." Thus, to be *"en logoi"* was to be taken into account, to have accounts told about one, to be on the community's roster of persons who could be spoken, sung, or written about. Any person's identity consisted in what was said about her. Someone's name, or tales told about her, defined the space in which she lived.

In keeping with the archaic Greek emphasis on language as the source of knowledge, the Older Sophist Protagoras taught that "humans are the measure of all things." By this he apparently meant that anything which exists does so by virtue of its being known or discussed by human beings. Because knowledge originates with human knowers, and not from somewhere outside them, there is no absolute truth that exists separately from human knowledge. Moreover, contradictory truths will appear, since everyone's knowledge differs slightly from everyone else's, depending on one's perspective and one's language. Thus Protagoras taught that at least two opposing and contradictory *logoi* (statements or accounts) exist in every experience. He called these oppositions *dissoi logoi.*

The Older Sophist Gorgias apparently adopted Protagoras's skepticism about the relationship of language to truth or to some absolute reality. In his treatise on the nonexistent, Gorgias wrote: "For that by which we reveal is *logos,* but *logos* is not substances and existing things. Therefore we do not reveal existing things to our neighbors, but *logos,* which is something other than substances" (Sprague 1972, 84). In other words, language is not things, and language does not communicate things or thoughts or anything else. Language is not the same thing as honey or fossils or cold winds, nor is it the same as thoughts or feelings or perceptions. It is a different medium altogether. What language communicates is itself—words, syntax, metaphors, puns, and all that other wonderful stuff. Philosophers are mis-

taken when they argue that justice or reality exist; they have been misled into thinking that justice or reality are the same for everyone by the seeming unity and generality of the words *justice* and *reality.*

Ancient rhetoricians were aware that language is a powerful force for moving people to action. Gorgias went so far as to say that language could work on a person's spirit as powerfully as drugs worked on the body. He taught his students that language could bewitch people, could jolt them out of their everyday awareness into a new awareness from which they could see things differently. Hence its persuasive force. As he said, language can "stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity" ("Encomium to Helen" 8). If you doubt this, think about the last time you went to a movie that made you cry, or saw a commercial that induced you to buy something, or heard a sermon that scared you into changing your behavior.

Isocrates argued that language was the ground of community, since it enabled people to live together and to found cultures ("Nicocles" 5-9). Communication was the mutual exchange of convictions, and communities could be defined as groups of human beings who operate with a system of roughly similar convictions. For Isocrates, language was the *hegemoon* (prince, guide) of all thought and action. He pointed out that language makes it possible for people to conceive of differences and to make distinctions like man/woman or good/bad. It also allows them to conceive of abstractions like justice or reality.

The Greek notion of *logos* was later translated into Latin as *ratio* (reason), and in Western thought the powers that were once attributed to language became associated with thinking rather than with talking or writing. Cicero blamed the philosophers for this shift:

> [Socrates] separated the science of wise thinking from that of elegant speaking, though in reality they are closely Linked together.... This is the source from which has sprung the undoubtedly absurd and unprofitable and reprehensible severance between the tongue and the brain, leading to our having one set of professors to teach us to think and another to teach us to speak (De *Oratore* III xvi 60).

The notion that thought can be separated from language began with the philosopher Socrates, who was the teacher of Plato, who was the teacher of Aristotle.

In one of his treatises on logic, Aristotle wrote that "spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words" *(On Interpretation* 16a). This passage made two important assumptions: that mental experiences are independent of language and that the role of language is to symbolize or represent mental experiences. The passage also suggested that written words are representations of spoken words, as though speech is somehow closer to thinking than writing. In the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle wrote that style and **delivery—the** rhetorical canons having to do with **expression—were** secondary to the substance of an argument (1404a). Even though it was necessary to study style and delivery, because these forms of expression were persuasive, according to

Aristotle the first prerequisite of style was clarity, which implied that whatever thoughts were being expressed should be immediately apparent to readers (1404b).

Here Aristotle expressed his subscription to a representative theory of language. The notion that a style can be clear, that language allows meaning to shine through it without distortion, makes sense only if language is thought to re-present something else. Naturally enough, philosophers are less interested in the rhetorical effects produced by language than they are in using language to say what they mean, as clearly and exactly as possible. That's why they prefer to argue that language somehow represents thought or reality. However, this argument presents a problem to rhetoricians, since the representative theory of language implies that some piece of language can be found that will clearly express any thought. So if a piece of language is not clear to an audience, anyone who subscribes to this model of language must blame its author, who either had unclear thoughts or was unable to express them clearly. The only other possible explanation for misunderstanding is that the audience has not read the language carefully enough or is for some reason too inept to understand it.

Aristotle's attitude toward clarity also assumed that rhetors can control the effects of language—that they can make language do what they want it to do, can make listeners or readers hear or read in the way they intended. Furthermore, Aristotle's attitude about clarity seriously underestimated the power of language. People who assume that it is "the thought that counts" must also assume that language is the servant of thought and, hence, that language is of secondary or even negligible importance in the composing process. This attitude sometimes causes teachers to blame unintelligible compositions on a student's faulty thinking, when the difficulty might be that the student's language had more and different effects than she intended.

Ancient teachers never assumed that there is only one way to read or interpret a discourse. Audiences inevitably bring their ideologies, their linguistic abilities, and their understandings of local rhetorical contexts to any reading or listening they do. Contexts such as readers' or listeners' experiences and education or even time of day inevitably influence their interpretation of any discourse. This is particularly true of written discourse, which, to ancient ways of thinking, was set adrift by authors into the community, where people could and would read it in as many ways as there were readers (Plato, *Phaedrus* 275). Today, however, people sometimes think that texts can have a single meaning (the right one) and that people who don't read in this way are somehow bad readers. This attitude is reinforced by the modern assumption that the sole purpose of reading is to glean information from a text, and it is repeated in school when students are expected to take tests or answer a set of questions about their reading in order to prove that they comprehended the assignment.

But people do many things when they read a text for the first time, and determining what it says is only one of these things. When you read any text, especially a difficult one, you simply can't find out what it says once

and for all on your first trip through it. You can't consume written words the way you consume a cheeseburger and fries. When written words are banged up against one another, they tend to set off sparks and combinations of meanings that their writers never anticipated. Unfortunately, writers are ordinarily not present to tell readers what they intended to communicate.

Sometimes unintended meanings happen because written letters and punctuation marks are ambiguous. There are only twenty-six letters in the English alphabet, after all, and just a few marks of punctuation in the writing system. So most of these letters and marks must be able to carry several meanings. For example, quotation marks can signify quoted material:

"Get lost," he said.

But they can also be used for emphasis:

We don't "cash" checks.

Or they can be used to set off a term whose use a writer wants to question:

This is not a "liberal" interpretation.

In speaking, the work done by punctuation is conveyed by voice and gesture, but writers do not have the luxury of conveying meaning through their bodies (see Chapter 13, on delivery).

The meanings of words differ, too, from person to person and from context to context. Indeed, the meanings of words are affected by the contexts in which they appear. In current political discourse, for example, the phrase "family values" means very different things to the people who use it, depending upon whether they subscribe to conservative or liberal ideologies. Because people are different from one another, they have different responses to the same discourse.

When we listen to someone speaking, we have several contextual advantages that readers do not have. If we misunderstand a speaker, we can ask her to repeat or to slow down. This is why press conferences or lectures usually feature a question-and-answer session. Our chances of misunderstanding spoken language are also decreased by the fact that we can see and hear the person who is speaking and we can interact with her, as well. Thus we can support our interpretation of the meanings of her words with our interpretations of her facial and bodily gestures and the loudness and pitch of her voice. Too, we are often acquainted with people who speak to us, while often we do not know writers personally. And even if we don't know a speaker well, we do understand our relationship to her. If a speaker is your mother rather than your teacher or boss or aerobics instructor, you can rapidly narrow down the range of possible meanings she might convey when she commands you to "shape up!" All of these kinds of contexts—physical and social—help us to interpret a speaker's meaning.

But these contexts are not available in any writing that is composed for an audience of people who are not known to the writer. So writers have to guess about the contexts that readers will bring to their reading. Usually

those contexts will be very different from the writer's, especially in the case of a book like this one that introduces readers to a new field of discourse. Our experience as teachers has taught us that our familiarity with rhetoric and its terminology often causes us to take some of its fundamental points for granted. When we do this in a classroom, students can ask questions until they are satisfied that they understand. But readers cannot do this. So even though we have tried very hard to make the contexts of ancient rhetorics clear in this book, people are bound to understand our text differently from each other and perhaps differently from what we tried to convey. Ancient rhetorics were invented by cultures that have long since disappeared, and that is one potential source of differential understanding in this particular text. But writers always fail to match their contexts with those of readers, and this kind of differential understanding is universal. It arises simply because writers can only imagine readers—who they are, what they know.

To put all of this another way: writers and speakers always fail to put themselves precisely in their readers' and listeners' shoes. This potential for differential understanding is not a curse, as modern rhetorical theory would have it. Rather, it is what allows knowledge to grow and change. The ancients understood this, and that's why they celebrated copiousness—many arguments, many understandings.

Because ancient rhetoricians believed that language was a powerful force for persuasion, they urged their students to develop *copia* in all parts of their art. *Copia* can be loosely translated from Latin to mean an abundant and ready supply of language—something appropriate to say or write whenever the occasion arises. Ancient teaching about rhetoric is everywhere infused with the notions of expansiveness, amplification, abundance. Ancient teachers gave their students more advice about the divisions, or **canons,** of rhetoric—invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery—than they could ever use. They did so because they knew that practice in these rhetorical arts alerted rhetors to the multitude of communicative and persuasive possibilities that exist in language.

Modern intellectual style, in contrast, tends toward economy (from Greek *oikonomia,* a manager of a household or state, from *oikos,* "house"). Economy in any endeavor is characterized by restrained or efficient use of available materials and techniques. Of course, the modern preference for economy in composition is connected to modern insistence that clarity is the only important characteristic of style. People who bring modern attitudes about clarity and economy to the study of ancient rhetorics may be bewildered (and sometimes frustrated) by the profuseness of ancient advice about everything from invention to delivery.

They also miss an important aspect of ancient instruction: that messing around with language is fun. Composition need not be undertaken with the deadly seriousness that moderns bring to it. Moderns want to get it right the first time and forget about it. Ancient peoples fooled around with language all the time. The Greeks sponsored poetry contests and gave prizes for the most daring or entertaining elaborations on a well-known

theme. Romans who lived during the first centuries CE held rhetorical contests called declamations, the object of which was to compose a complicated and innovative discourse about some hackneyed situation involving pirates or angry fathers. The winner was the person who could compose the most unusual arguments or who could devise the most elaborate amplifications and ornamentations of an old theme.

As you work through the chapters in this book, we hope you will compose a lot of discourse in response to the examples and exercises. You won't be able to use everything you compose in finished speeches or papers. Some exercises are just for practice, while others help you increase your understanding of the rhetorical principles you are studying. If this seems like wasted time and effort, remember that everything you compose increases your **copiousness—your** handy supply of arguments, available for use on any occasion.

EXERCISES

1. Look around you and listen. Where do you find people practicing rhetoric? Watch television and read popular newspapers or magazines with this question in mind. Jot down one or two of the rhetorical arguments you hear or see people making. Presidents and members of Congress are good sources, but so are journalists and parents and attorneys and clergy and teachers. Do such people try to support these arguments **with** facts? Or do they use other means of convincing people to accept their arguments?

2. Think about a time when you tried to convince someone to change his or her mind. How did you go about it? Were you successful? Now think about a time when someone tried to get you to change your mind. What arguments did the person use? Was he or she successful?

3. Try to answer this question: what counts as persuasion in your community? Here are some questions to start from: Think of a time when you changed your mind about something. How did it happen? Did somebody talk you into it, or did events cause you to change the way you think? How do the people you know go about changing their minds? How does religious conversion happen, for example? What convinces people to stop smoking or to go on a diet? How do people get to be racists or become convinced they ought to stop being racist? How does a president convince a people that they ought to support a war? Make a list of arguments that seem convincing in these cases.

4. The Roman teacher Quintilian underscored the importance of rhetorical situations to composing when he suggested that students should consider

   what there is to say; before whom, in whose defence, against whom, at what time and place, under what circumstances; what is the popular opinion on the

subject; and what the prepossessions of the judge are likely to be; and finally of what we should express our deprecation or desire (IV 1 52-53).

If you are at a loss for something to say or write, you can use Quintilian's list as a heuristic, or means of discovery. Begin by thinking about the communities of which you are a part: your families, relatives, and friends; your street, barrio, town, city, or reservation; your school, college, or university; groups you belong to; your state, country, or nation and the world itself. What positions do you take on issues that are currently contested in your communities? This exercise should help you to articulate what you think about such issues.

a. Start with this question: what are the hotly contested issues in the communities you live in (the street, the barrio, your home town, the university you work in, the reservation, the state, the nation?) Make a list of these issues. (If you don't know what these issues are, ask someone—a parent, teacher, friend—or read the editorial and front pages of a daily newspaper or watch the local and national news on television or access news sources on the Internet).

b. Pick one or two issues and write out your positions on them. Write as fast as you can without stopping or worrying about grammar and spelling. Use a word-processor if you have access to one and are a fast typist, or write by hand if that is more comfortable for you. At this point you are composing for your use only. So don't worry about nearness or completeness or correctness; write to discover what you think about these issues. Write for as long as you want to, but write about each issue for at least fifteen minutes without stopping. Remember that thinking is exercise, just like running or bicycling, so don't be surprised if you tire after a few minutes of doing this work.

c. These writings should give you a clearer view of what you think about one or two urgent issues. Let them sit for awhile—an hour is good but a couple of days is better. Then read them again. Now use Quintilian's questions to find out your positions on community issues. What is the popular opinion on each issue? What is the position taken by people in authority? What is your position on the issue? Are there policies or practices you advocate or reject? With which members of your communities do you agree? disagree? On what issues? What positions are taken by people who disagree with you? How will the community respond to your propositions?

d. Now you should have an idea about which issue interests you most. Be sure to select an issue that you can comfortably discuss with other people. Write about it again for awhile—say fifteen minutes.

e. Give what you've written to someone you trust; ask him or her to tell you what else he or she wants to know about what you think. Listen carefully and take notes on the reader's suggestions. Don't

talk or ask questions until the reader finishes talking. Then discuss your views on the issue further, if your reader is willing to do so. If your reader said anything that modifies your views, revise your writing to take these changes into account.

   f. Keep these compositions as well as your original list of issues. You can repeat this exercise whenever you wish to write about an issue or when you are asked to write for a class.

5. Begin recording in a journal or notebook the arguments that you commonly hear or read. (See Chapter 14, on **imitation** for more information on how to keep **a** commonplace book).

NOTES

1. This reasoning is an example of what we call "ideologic." As we explain more fully in the chapter on ideology and the commonplaces, we coin the term *ideologic* to describe reasoning that works from ideological premises (that is, from commonplaces).

2. Readers who are not interested in the history of ancient rhetorics are encouraged to skip to the next section of this chapter, on differences between ancient and modern thought. We encourage readers who are interested in history to consult the appendixes for outlines of important events in the history of ancient rhetorics. If you are interested in reading more about ancient rhetorics, you can look at any of several accessible histories written by modern scholars. The bibliography at the back of this book lists several of these, most of which should be available in any good public or university library. If you are interested in reading the works of the ancient rhetors and rhetoricians themselves, cheap editions of many of these can be found in the classics or literature sections of many bookstores, and they are available in libraries too. The bibliography also lists modem editions of the major works of the most influential ancient rhetors and rhetoricians.

3. Recital of the facts connected with an argument does reinforce a rhetor's *ethos,* or persuasive character. If a writer or speaker demonstrates that she knows the facts of a case, her listeners or readers will increase their respect for her and her argument (see Chapter 6 for more on *ethos).*

WORKS CITED

Burke, Kenneth. *The Rhetoric of Motives.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.

Sprague, Rosamond Kent. *The Older Sophists.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972.

KAIROS AND THE RHETORICAL SITUATION: SEIZING THE MOMENT

ANCIENT RHETORICIANS DIVIDED their **art** into five canons, or divisions: **invention, arrangement, style, memory,** and **delivery.** Invention is the part of rhetoric that helps rhetors find arguments. Arrangement has to do with the appropriate ordering of proofs within a discourse, style with sentence composition, memory with memorization of a completed discourse or a series of prompts, and delivery with appropriate management of the voice, gestures, and appearance. The five canons deal in turn with the activities that rhetors perform as they compose a piece of discourse, and so we have organized this book around them.

A few ancient rhetoricians, particularly the sophists, organized their treatises on rhetoric according to the divisions of a discourse: **exordium, narration, proofs,** and **peroration.** Within each division, they listed topics that were appropriate for use in that part of a discourse. This organization is more common in surviving ancient texts than is the canon-oriented arrangement that we have adopted in this book. We did not use the sophists' approach because it is text oriented. That is, it implies that the art of rhetoric deals with the pieces or parts of a discourse. This orientation may give the erroneous impression

to contemporary readers that the parts of discourses are more important than the rhetorical situation for which they are composed. Ancient users of sophistic texts would not have made this error, since their cultures were far less text oriented than ours.

We begin our study of rhetoric with the first canon: invention. We present three ancient approaches to this canon. The first, considered in this chapter, was developed during the period when the Older Sophists were speaking and teaching in the city of Athens. The development of the second approach—stasis theory—is credited by ancient authorities to a rhetorician named Hermagoras of Temnos. Stasis appears in almost all extant treatises on rhetoric, thus testifying to the high regard in which ancient teachers held this approach to invention. The third approach—the commonplaces—was probably developed by the sophists, but contemporary rhetoricians know it from its powerful presentation in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. We include this wealth of inventional tactics in this book in the spirit of *copia*. We hope that our readers will try out all of them in order to gain facility in invention and to develop an abundance of propositions, arguments, and proofs.

ANCIENT DEPICTIONS OF KAIROS

Ancient rhetoricians recognized the complexity of rhetoric, and they realized that teaching such a multifarious art was a difficult task. Rhetoric cannot be reduced to a handy list of rules on writing or speaking, because each rhetorical situation presents its own unique set of challenges. One way to think about a particular rhetorical situation is to consider its *kairos. A* multidimensional and flexible term, *kairos* suggests a notion of space and/or time. Since American English does not have a term quite like *kairos,* a bit of explanation is in order. An important element of the rhetorical situation is the context of the issues, what Quintilian called the "time and place," or the "circumstances"—what the Greeks called *kairos.*

The Greeks had two concepts of time. They used the term *chronos* to refer to linear, measurable time, the kind with which we are more familiar, that we track with watches and calendars. But the ancients used *kairos* to suggest a more situational kind of time, something close to what we call "opportunity." In this sense, *kairos* suggests an advantageous time, or as lexicographers put it, "exact or critical time, season, opportunity" (Liddell and Scott 859). The temporal dimension of *kairos* can indicate anything from a lengthy time to a brief, fleeting moment. In short, *kairos* is not about duration but rather about a certain *kind* of time. In Roman rhetoric, the Latin word *opportunitas* was used in a similar manner; its root *port-* means an opening, and from it we get English verbs such as *import* and *export* as well as an old-fashioned word for a door or window, *portal. Kairos* is thus a "window" of time during which action is most advantageous. On Wall Street, there are *kairotic* moments to buy, sell, and trade stock to maximize gains. Victorious sprinters often accelerate at just the right time to pass

their opponents. The success of a joke or funny quip depends upon its timing, or the *kairos* of its delivery. The advantage of good timing and seizing opportunities is certainly prominent in our culture, and it is thus important for practicing rhetoric as well.

Kairos was so important for ancient thinkers that it became a mythical figure. Lysippus, the famous ancient sculptor of athletes, chose to "enroll Kairos among the gods" (Himerius 759). It is little wonder that someone knowledgeable about competitive athletics—where timing and an awareness of the situation are critical—would render *kairos* into human form. The picture of Kairos in Figure 2.1 provides a good way to think about the rhetorical situation. Indeed, the rhetor is much like Kairos, bearing many different tools. Not just anybody can balance precariously on a stick while displaying a set of scales on a razor blade in one hand and depressing the pan with the other; such balance takes practice. As you can see in Figure 2.1, a depiction of a relief at Turin, Kairos is concerned about balancing the particulars of the situation, just as he perches tenuously on edge. His winged back and feet suggest the fleeting nature of time and situations. Perhaps the most remarkable and well-known characteristic of Kairos, however, is his hairstyle. Kairos was said to have hair only in the front, suggesting that one must keep an eye out for the opportune moment and seize it by grasping the forelock before it passes.

Figure 2.2 shows another depiction of Kairos, still with wings, this time holding a wheel, suggesting movement again. In this depiction, found on a Theban limestone relief, Kairos is flying on the back of another mythical figure: Pronoia, the figure of foresight. Sitting dejected in the background

FIGURE 2.1
Kairos, from a bas-relief in Turin

FIGURE 2.2

Kairos, from a bas-relief in Thebes

is her counterpart, Metanoia, who is the figure of afterthought or hindsight. This scene, like the forelock in Figure 2.1, suggests the importance of anticipating opportunities and seizing them before they pass.

These figures underscore the many dimensions of *kairos.* The ancients were certainly aware of its relevance to the art of rhetoric. Indeed, the Older Sophist Gorgias was famed for having based his theory of rhetoric on it. The Greek writer Philostratus tells us that Gorgias may have invented extemporaneous speaking:

> For coming into the theater of the Athenians, he had the boldness to say "suggest a subject," and he was the first to proclaim himself willing to take this chance, showing apparently that he knew everything and would trust to the moment [*toi kairoi]* to speak on any subject. (Sprague 1972, 30)

By privileging *kairos,* Gorgias's rhetorical theory acknowledged the contingencies of issues and situations. Gorgias chose to rely on his awareness of the particularities of each situation to help him come up with compelling things to say.

Isocrates, too, emphasized the importance of *kairos,* claiming that people need to discuss prevailing issues before their currency dissipates:

> The moment for action has not yet gone by, and so made it now futile to bring up this question; for then, and only then, should we cease to speak, when the

conditions have come to an end and there is no longer any need to deliberate about them. ("Panegyricus" 5:2)

For Isocrates, the urgency and currency of a situation demands action in the form of lively rhetorical exchanges about an issue. But if an issue has lost its immediacy, then the rhetor must not only deliberate about the issue but make a case for the issue's relevance.

KAIROS, CHANGE, AND RHETORICAL SITUATIONS

We believe, along with the sophists, that the world is always changing and that knowledge itself is full of contraries and never certain. Kairos draws attention to the mutability of rhetoric and discourse, of the ever changing arguments surrounding a particular issue. Further, *kairos* points to the situatedness of arguments and the ways in which different arguments depend on many different forces: the rhetor's political views, her past experiences, her particular stance on the issue at the time she composes a discourse, and the views of her audience at that time and place.

One way to consider the *kairos* of a particular issue is to pay careful attention to the arguments made by various sides in order to develop a better understanding of why people disagree about a given issue at a particular moment in time. A *kairos*-based discourse does not seek certainty prior to composing but rather views writing and speaking themselves as opportunities for exploring issues and making knowledge. A rhetoric that privileges *kairos* as a principle of invention does not present a list of rules for finding arguments but rather encourages a kind of ready stance, in which the rhetor is not only attuned to the history of an issue *(chronos),* but is also aware of the more precise turns the arguments surrounding an issue have taken and when they took these turns. In short, the rhetor must be aware of the issue's immediate relevance to the time, the place, and the community in which it arises. Consider in the following example the way Tom Turnipseed draws on *kairos* by offering moments in civil rights history and from his own experience together with recent events to argue for the continued relevance of the life of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr:

RENEWING THE SPIRIT OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING. JR.: KING DAY AT THE DOME 2003

Columbia, SC—More than 50,000 people marched and rallied at the first annual King Day at the Dome at the South Carolina State House in 2000. The massive gathering sent a message to South Carolina's power structure that the Confederate battle flag had to be removed from atop our Capitol. Truth spoke to power when so many people paraded in peaceful protest and assembled at our seat of government to challenge the symbol of racial division and appeal for unity and fairness. You could feel the spirit of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. whose message of peace and justice challenged hatred and oppression and drew similar multitudes....

In the 1960s, I saw the Confederate flag waved by racist bigots shouting racial slurs at Wallace rallies throughout the United States as the feisty Alabama Governor railed against civil rights initiatives. Thirty years later, I observed the Confederate flag being waved by Klansmen in videotapes of a Klan rally in South Carolina in 1996 where the Grand Dragon of the Klan exhorted his followers to burn black churches in Clarendon County. By then I perceived the Rebel flag from a totally different perspective as an attorney for the Macedonia Baptist Church congregation, who sued the Klan for burning their church. They were awarded $37,000,000.00 in damages by a Clarendon County jury in 1998....

Trent Lott recently praised Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrat Presidential candidacy in 1948 and said the country "wouldn't have had all these problems" if Thurmond had been elected. Such a mainstream manifestation of racism demonstrates the need to reach out to unrepentant Rebels and others who may be playing cynical political games with racism and the Rebel flag. The Lott controversy called media attention to the folkways of the Senate Majority Leader's early childhood in Mississippi where poor whites hated the even poorer blacks in the age-old pecking order of traditional Southern poverty.

The Confederate flag was removed from atop the State House to the prominent Confederate soldier's monument in front of our Capitol on July 1, 2000 to comply with a Legislative "compromise." I stood next to an African-American minister friend as the flag was being repositioned. A snaggle-toothed, little white woman waggled her bony finger in my face exclaiming, "Go to hell Tom Turnipseed, you n——r lovin' SOB." Then she turned to my friend and said, "And you n——r , go back to Africa, the flag ain't on top of the State House no more, it's in your face now. I ain't got nothin'. I'm disabled, live in a single-wide, and dropped out of school in the eighth grade, but I've got somethin you ain't got." Holding her little white hand up next to my friend's black hand, she shouted, "I'm white and you are black."

Dr. King recognized that racism has kept poor people with the same socio-economic needs divided over skin color for 400 years. Four months before he was assassinated, he announced his "Poor People's Campaign" to unite the poor and working class people of all races.

Dr. King also said the options for humanity are "non-violence, or non-existence" and "the chain of evil—hate begetting hate, wars producing more wars—must be broken, or we shall be plunged into the abyss of annihilation." Join with us in his spirit of peace, justice and unity in Columbia, South Carolina on January 20, 2003 for the King Day at the Dome March and Rally. CommonDreams.org (January 9, 2003; full text at http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0109-01 .htm)

With this article Turnipseed, a lawyer, writer, and civil rights activist who lives in Columbia, South Carolina, issues a sort of rallying cry. By beginning with a key moment three years earlier when Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday provided an occasion for active assertion of racial solidarity in a rally against the confederate flag, then by placing that event next to snapshotlike historical moments of the confederate flag's use as a symbol of racism, and ending with a surprisingly recent (1996) instance of Klan rallies in his own state, Turnipseed argues simultaneously that Martin Luther

commuted or reduced the sentences of all the state's death row inmates. The governor acted just two days before the close of his term. Because conservatives tend to favor capital punishment, Ryan's decision was surprising. Here is a segment of a report about his decision, written by Jodi Wilgoren:

TWO DAYS LEFT IN TERM, GOVERNOR CLEARS OUT DEATH ROW IN ILLINOIS

Chicago, Jan. 11—Gov. George Ryan today commuted all Illinois death sentences to prison terms of life or less, the largest such emptying of death row in history.

With a single sweep, governor Ryan, a Republican, spared the lives of 164 men and 3 women who have served a collective 2,000 years for the murders of more than 250.

Governor Ryan's bold move was seen as the most significant statement questioning capital punishment since the Supreme Court struck down states' old death penalty laws, and it is sure to secure his legacy as a leading proponent of changing capital punishment, even as he faces possible indictment in a corruption scandal that stopped him from seeking re-election.

"The facts I have seen in reviewing each and every one of these cases raised questions not only about the innocence of people on death row, but about the fairness of the death penalty system as a whole," Governor Ryan planned to say this afternoon, according to an advance text of his remarks. "Our capital system is haunted by the demon of error, error in determining guilt and error in determining who among the guilty deserves to die."

Mr. Ryan acted one day after he took the extraordinary step of pardoning four condemned men outright and just 48 hours before the end of his term. *(New York Times,* January 12, 2003, A1)

Governor Ryan's action generated a good deal of writing and talking about the issue of the death penalty and related issues. We think that the decision and the period leading up to it brought the issue of the death penalty firmly to the fore of current events, locally and nationally, making the question of capital punishment a newly *kairotic* issue. That is, anticipation of the act and the act itself touched off arguments and raised issues about why the United States still takes such draconian measures, about corruption in state justice systems (many of the inmates on death row, it was revealed, had been tortured into confessing), about race and class, about nonpartisan politics, and about Ryan himself and his motivations. Ryan's decision also lent new urgency to the findings of a study of Maryland's death penalty released just as the public awaited Ryan's decision. The study showed that those accused of killing white people in Maryland are far more likely to be sentenced to death than those accused of killing non-white people *(Baltimore Sun,* January 8, 2003, 1B).

Of course Governor Ryan's decision did not come out of the blue; a long chain of events and a variety of forces came together to make the time right for Ryan to commute the sentences. About two months prior to the actual commutation, Illinois author David Wright chronicled some of these

forces in *Newsday,* and his account nicely details the *kairotic* moments that ultimately led to the nationally watched decision.

COURAGE MEETS DEATH ROW

Two years ago, two days before Anthony Porter's scheduled execution, a Northwestern University journalism professor and his students saved Porter from Illinois' death row, where he had spend the previous 16 years, by unearthing evidence that he had not committed the murder for which he was about to die. According to a spokesman for Gov. George Ryan, a longtime supporter of the death penalty, Porter's case "put a face on the whole problem" of capital punishment.

Since 1977, when the death penalty was reinstated in Illinois, 13 wrongfully convicted—and in some cases, innocent—men had been condemned to die, one more than was executed. Porter's highly publicized case stunned significant numbers of Illinois citizens into awareness, including the chief executive, who ordered a halt to all executions, a review of the death-penalty system, and for the last two weeks, clemency hearings for 142 prisoners on death row, a mass review unprecedented in U.S. history. Yet something had shifted between April, when the bipartisan commission empaneled by the governor released its exhaustive and ultimately damning report, and now. As the clemency hearings rage in panel rooms in Springfield and Chicago, politicians, editorialists, even members of the Prisoner Review Board itself, decry the very fact of the hearings.

Board member William Harris, formerly a state representative, claims, "There's nothing broken in our government." Both the Democratic and Republican gubernatorial candidates renounce the hearings, proclaiming themselves to favor reform without articulating how it will be achieved.

The *Chicago Tribune,* whose 1999 investigation contributed to the death-penalty commission's findings, repudiates Ryan's "hurry-up" fix and the "cruel hothouse atmosphere" it created. Op-ed contributor Dennis Byrne, in the *Tribune,* condemns Ryan as merely being "self-consumed with his 'legacy'" and for "mocking the law" at the expense of the families of victims who now must relive their pain. My local paper, the unapologetically conservative *Champaign-Urbana News-Gazette,* calls the hearings "a farce and a sham from Gov. Lame Duck."

Lost in all of this is the significance of Ryan's enormously courageous act.

Politics today is less about leadership than about the rhetoric of leadership. Ryan, first with the moratorium, and now the clemency hearings, has demonstrated the former. Understanding that political partisanship inevitably will retard and restrict his successor's ability to reform a justice system recognized as dangerously flawed, Ryan took the lead to assure that no innocent men are executed....

His critics argue that his actions subvert the rule of law, but the state constitution grants him the power to offer clemency for the very purpose of checking the judicial branch when clear injustice demands it. The 13 death row inmates whose exoneration provoked the moratorium demand it. All those sentenced to die nationwide, only to be found not guilty—their numbers have been estimated at more than 100—demand it.

The reforms proposed by the governor's commission, which echo in the background of the clemency hearings, can only add a long-needed measure of scrutiny to how suspects from poor communities are treated in the criminal justice system.

Anthony Porter, the man whose case started all of this, attended the clemency hearings and, after sitting through one case, left in tears. "The same thing happened to me," he said. The inmate under review was "not like they are painting him to be."

Porter's story reminds us that we construct our bugaboos, that our fear of these imagined "monsters" can impact our daily lives, in particularly how we judge, how we sentence, how we vote. Gov. Ryan, it would seem, has recognized this. His legacy, his political future and that of his party be damned, Ryan has chosen to do the right thing. (*Newsday,*   October 27, 2002, A28)

Wright's story indicates that the work of the Northwestern students first gave this issue local *kairos* by drawing attention to flaws in the state judicial system. The other historical details provided by Wright reveal the complexity of the issue, but they also underscore its urgency: a good deal is at stake in the issue of a corrupt system that is wrongfully executing people. By detailing the dissonant responses coming from all sides of the political spectrum, Wright also demonstrates the issue's connection to the state of politics today and to his own argument about the ways poor (often black) criminals get produced as "monsters" and punished as such. Both of these moves anticipate arguments that would emerge after Ryan's decision to commute all the death sentences. Whereas Anthony Porter functions as the face of *kairos* in Wright's precommutation story, the face of Governor Ryan would become the force of *kairos* when his decision to commute the sentences two months later brought the issue national attention. At this point Ryan's highly visible action occasioned all sorts of arguments.

Here are excerpts from a story in which **Sheryl** McCarthy uses Governor Ryan's recent action as an opportunity to raise questions about peace, the international perception of the United States and humanitarianism:

A committee headed by a University of Illinois law professor says it plans to nominate Illinois' departing governor, George Ryan, for the Nobel Peace Prize this year because of his "heroic" and "principled" stand on the death penalty....

The United States is almost the last large, democratic, economically developed country that embraces the death penalty. The rogues' gallery of countries that still execute people includes the governments we love to hate, among them Iraq, Iran and North Korea, along with our allies Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Capital punishment has become such an embarrassment for the United States that **countries** such as France have refused to extradite American fugitives unless we promise not to try to execute them.

You might ask: So what does attacking the death penalty have to do with world peace?

Previous Nobel Prize winners have included humanitarians such as Mother Teresa as well as others who have negotiated peace agreements. Professor

Boyle said his committee believed the Nobel Prize committee was leaning toward rewarding the efforts of more human-rights activists.

Governor Ryan's administration has been tainted by an investigation into the sale of driver's licenses when he was secretary of state. If he survives it without serious damage, his stand on the death penalty will be what he is remembered for. On Friday, with three days left in his term, he pardoned four death-row inmates, saying their confessions had been coerced by Chicago police. Then, on Saturday, he commuted the death sentences of 167 people to life in prison.

He has taken a giant step toward eliminating the death penalty—an archaic, inhumane and capricious punishment in the world's most powerful country.

Many have won prizes for less. (*Newsday,* January 13, 2003, A34)

By engaging the question of whether or not Ryan should be awarded a Nobel Peace Prize and by casting Ryan's response as decidedly humanitarian, McCarthy is able to connect two issues with heightened *kairos.* Ryan's decision, that is, came at a time when newspapers were full of stories about a possible war with Iraq and tenuous relations between the United States and North Korea. At a time when U.S. foreign policy is regularly receiving criticism from around the globe for its seeming lack of humanitarian considerations, McCarthy adds the death penalty to the list of policies that deserve reconsideration, all the while praising a leader for placing nonpartisan value on human life.

Governor Ryan's decision, as Wright's article forecasts, spawned negative reactions from the left of the political spectrum as well as the right. David Firestone, a writer for the *New York Times,* reported in an article entitled "Absolutely, Positively for Capital Punishment" on the negative response from members of the Democratic party:

Rod R. Blagojevich, the Democrat who succeeded Mr. Ryan as governor on Monday, said the clemency was "terrible" and a "gross injustice.". . . And Senator Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut, who entered the presidential race last week, issued a bitter denunciation.

"Governor Ryan's action was shockingly wrong," Mr. Lieberman said in an interview on Friday. "It did terrible damage to the credibility of our system of justice, and particularly for the victims. It was obviously not a case-by-case review, and that's what our system is all about." *(New York Times,* January 19, 2003, Section 4, page 5)

Many others worried about erosion of faith in the justice system and used the opportunity to support the justice system and argue for a case-by-case consideration of death penalty convictions. Still, even staunch capital punishment advocates could not back the death penalty if the justice system is potentially faulty. Rod Dreher, a senior writer for the conservative publication *National Review,* posed the question this way: "Is it so important to make a statement by killing at least some murderers that we are willing to live with the possibility—the inevitability—of putting an innocent man to death?" *(National Review Online,* January *13,* 2003, http://www .nationalreview.com/dreher/dreherOU303.aspV Dreher used the

decision as his opening to shift the question away from the death penalty to another solution to the commission of heinous crimes: high security prisons, which he believes allow for the almost universally desired possibility of still freeing innocent people. In his article entitled "Gov. Ryan Did the Right Thing" Drehrer, while troubled by injustices uncovered in Illinois, nonetheless finds a way to change the subject while avoiding sounding like a liberal. In other words, he takes advantage of the *kairotic* moment opened by Ryan's decision as an opportunity to engage the question of high security prisons while still appealing to the audience of *National Review.*

Still other writers in support of Ryan's action seized the *kairotic* moment to raise questions about partisan politics in the United States. Geov Parrish makes such an argument:

> Enthusiasm for the death penalty in America has historically been cyclical, and it's perhaps a hopeful sign for those concerned about other forms of state violence that the execution tide now appears on the way out. In the last six months, a stream of federal court rulings have raised new questions and curbed some of the more wretched excesses of the modern expansion of capital sentencing. A fundamental reexamination, spurred by the courage of people like George Ryan, is on the way.
>
> But it shouldn't take courage to do the right thing. It should be what we expect, what we demand, of our political leaders; it should be a job requirement. In a complex society with countless intractable challenges, the best answers often won't be the simplest or most popular. The current fad of claiming to "run government like a business" is usually an excuse for corporate welfare and cuts to the needy, but in one respect, such leadership would be nice to change. Successful business executives generally don't get to the top by pandering. (January 13, 2003; full text at http://www.workingforchange.com)

The exploration of an issue's history, along with its implications for the future, can produce rich possibilities for understanding an issue and its relationship to contemporary culture. Ancient rhetoricians would have recognized Parrish's use of the common topics of past and future fact as useful ways to contextualize this issue (see Chapter 4, on ideology and the commonplaces).

A rhetor who wants to address the issue of the death penalty, then, should make herself aware of the various **arguments** in circulation for and against the alternatives proposed to it, and the history of the question, as well as other related issues raised in the discussion. A *kairotic* stance is fully aware of the context—the rhetorical **situation—within** which any issue is raised. Such a *kairotic* stance enables a more informed and persuasive approach to this or any issue.

HOW URGENT OR IMMEDIATE IS THE ISSUE?

depends on the audience as well as the existing situation—the urgency around the issue. On one hand, for some activists, like the Abolitionist Activist Group, an organization that continually

vies to have the death penalty eliminated, the issue of capital punishment always bears a certain degree of urgency. Likewise, people involved with Justice For All, a Texas-based group that continually argues for legislation to maintain capital punishment, are highly invested in the issue, as well. An audience comprised largely of college students, on the other hand, might need to be convinced that the issue is pressing and that action needs to be taken. In the case of Illinois, capital punishment was not foremost on the state government's agenda as an issue until students at Northwestern produced new evidence that prompted direct action. As the students demonstrated, with any issue it is advantageous to ask, What is going on at this moment that might help the audience see that now is the time for action? In 2002, for example, when the state of Illinois was conducting its investigation into the efficacy of the death penalty, and in June of 2001, when Timothy McVeigh was executed in Indiana for bombing the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the issue of capital punishment bore a good deal of immediacy. But an issue does not have to be under national scrutiny to have a degree of urgency. For example, if a teenager in Arizona (a state with a death penalty) were tried as an adult for murder, then capital punishment would likely resonate there as an issue worth debating more than it would, say, among residents of Michigan, who have not heard about the case on their local news and who live in a state without a death penalty. Current events both nationally and in local communities are important to consider when trying to gauge the *kairos* of a particular issue.

ARGUMENTS AND INTERESTS

Another important consideration for a *kairotic* stance involves the specific arguments that are currently circulating about a particular issue. Who makes what arguments and why? For example, what interest might motivate a conservative writer like Rod Drehrer to use the Ryan decision as an occasion to support funneling money into supermax prisons? What values are privileged in his rhetoric, and which groups would *accept* or reject his criticism? Considering the interests at stake in an issue can help a rhetor decide the most advantageous way to frame an argument for a particular audience at a particular time. Capital punishment is a highly complex issue that resonates differently among groups with differing political and social agendas. Groups or individuals may agree on a particular issue for very different reasons. People who believe that punishment should "fit" a crime, for example, tend to support administration of the death penalty for those convicted of murder. Likewise, the families of the crime victims may feel that the administration of capital punishment corrects the wrong of capital murder. And yet the American Friends Service Committee with its project The Religious Organizing Against the Death Penalty, can argue, also on moral grounds, that killing is wrong in every case, including administration of the death penalty by the state. Abolitionist groups such as Citizens United Against the Death Penalty strive to offer alternatives to capital punishment. More moderate groups, such as the investigative committee

formed by Governor Ryan, worry about meting out capital measures in corrupt and biased justice systems.

As you can see, concerned groups are invested in the issue of capital punishment for different ideological reasons. Before launching an argument about a hot social issue like capital punishment, then, a rhetor who wishes to argue persuasively would do well to tune in to arguments already in circulation. Furthermore, she should interrogate the values and assumptions that drive those arguments. Rhetors who do this can maintain a *kairotic* stance that readies them to speak to various sides of the issue, supporting those they find convincing and refuting those with which they disagree.

To examine and invent arguments using *kairos* is to consider the power dynamics at work in a particular issue in addition to the recent events and arguments that press on it. The questions to ask here are:

Which arguments receive more attention?

Who is making these arguments?

Which arguments receive less attention?

Who is making these arguments?

When capital punishment arises as an issue, reporters often request statements from groups already organized, such as victims' groups or civil rights groups like the ACLU. In other words, organized groups often have more power to be heard in given rhetorical situations than people who are unaffiliated with a relevant group. Government leaders, too, are asked to make known their stances on such issues; when Governor Ryan announced the commutations, for example, most U.S. senators and governors went on record supporting or disagreeing with Ryan's action. The arguments made by leaders already holding political offices received far more scrutiny and attention from the press after Ryan announced his decision than did the arguments *made* by a professor who nominated Ryan for a Nobel Prize. Furthermore, with the exception of the students from Northwestern, we rarely hear or read the opinions of young people about capital punishment. Writers often speculate about the future of capital punishment in America without bothering to ask those who will someday make such decisions. How do we account for the absence of the voices of the young from public discourse about the death penalty? Could it be that this group is apathetic? Or does their nonvoting status have something to do with the undervaluing of their position? All of these questions and more are raised by consideration of the power dynamics at work in any rhetorical situation (see Chapter 6, on *ethos,* for more discussion of power relations in rhetoric).

•A WEB OF RELATED ISSUES

Rhetorical situations are complex, and a rhetor who is attuned to *kairos* demonstrates an awareness of the many values and the differential power dynamics that are involved in any struggle over an issue. As we showed

earlier, different values can underlie what appear to be very similar arguments. Furthermore, the stakes in an argument can shift according to who is speaking, as is illustrated by the contrasting arguments on capital punishment, above. A rhetor attuned to *kairos* should consider a particular issue as a set of different political pressures, personal investments, and values all of which produce different arguments about an issue. These diverging values and different levels of investment connect to other issues as well, producing a weblike relationship with links to other, different, new but definitely related rhetorical situations.

The issue of capital punishment is linked to the issue of justice systems in general, an issue that has been debated since ancient times. The Ryan decision, as we have seen, opened up all sorts of questions about justice, about victims' rights, humanitarian acts, nonpartisan politics, and super-**max** prisons, for starters. These issues connect to other issues, forming a web with seemingly endless possibilities, or "openings," for arguments.

We are not suggesting that a rhetor should address all the values and actions pressing on a particular issue at a particular time. Rather, we recommend that rhetors be aware of the issue's ever shifting nuances, which might lead to new opportunities for rhetorical arguments. Considering the wealth of possibilities produced by attention to an issue's *kairos,* it is no wonder that Gorgias was bold enough to say to the Athenians, "Suggest a subject," and remain confident that he could make a rhetorical argument about it on the spot.

EXERCISES

1. Survey a variety of magazines and newspapers and select a handful of articles on a given issue. How does each article draw on or create *kairos?* Is the issue so pertinent or urgent that little needs to be done to establish the article's relevance? Do some writers or speakers use an opportune moment to "change the subject" and argue about a separate but related set of issues? Write a brief (2-3 page) account of *kairos* in the selection of articles.

2. Using a library periodical database such as LexisNexis or the Internet, look for a few recent articles on the death penalty. How has the *kairos* changed since we wrote this book? Has the Illinois situation spawned similar studies and actions in other states, or has its *kairos* **"fizzled"?**

3. Choose an issue and read broadly about it, keeping track of the various perspectives. Then, make a visual "map" of the arguments, tracking how the main issue gives rise to others. The map may look like two sets of lists, or it may be more sprawling with lots of offshoots, like a broad web. Be sure to include in the map the arguments people are making, who the people are, and what values they seem to be asserting. Now practice creating *kairos.* Choose an issue and compose an opening paragraph that shows how the issue matters for people you may be addressing.

WORKS   CITED

Himerius. *Eclogae,* XVI, i.

Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott. *A Greek-English Lexicon.* New York: Oxford
    University Press, 1996.

STASIS THEORY: ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS

How is Cato to deliberate "whether he personally is to marry," unless the general question "whether marriage is desirable" is first settled? And how is he to deliberate "whether he should marry Marcia," unless it is proved that it is the duty of Cato to marry?

—Quintilian,
Institutes III 13

STUDENTS WHO WANT a systematic way of asking questions about rhetorical situations can use stasis theory. This means of invention provides rhetors with a set of questions that, when asked systematically, can help them to determine just where it is that the disagreement between themselves and their audience begins. Determining the point of disagreement is an obvious starting point for rhetorical invention, which is always stimulated by some difference of opinion.

Staseis (questions or issues in Greek) were probably part of rhetorical lore as early as the fourth century BCE (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* III 17). But the popularity of this system of invention in Hellenistic and Roman rhetoric was probably due to Hermagoras's codification of the process during the second century BCE. His textbook is lost, so scholars have reconstructed his theory of invention from discussions of it that appear in Cicero, Quintilian, and other ancient and medieval authorities.

The term *stasis* (**Latin** *status* or *constitutio)* is derived from a Greek word meaning "a stand." Thus a stasis can refer to the place where one rhetor takes a stand. Seen from the point of view of two disputants, however, the stasis marks the place where two opposing forces come together, where they rest or stand in agreement on what is at issue. (Hence the appropriateness of the Latin term for stasis, *constitutio,* which can be translated as a "costanding" or a "standing together"). An agreement to disagree must occur in every rhetorical situation; as Quintilian

put it, "Every question is based on assertion by one party and denial by another" (III vi 7). But this resting place is only temporary, suspended as *it* is between conflicting movements, until a skilled writer or speaker comes along to move the argument away from stasis. The most satisfactory modern equivalent for stasis seems to be the term *issue,* which we define as the point about which all parties to an argument can agree to disagree: this is what is at issue.

Determining the point of stasis is crucial to any rhetorical argument. However, figuring out the stasis is more difficult than it may seem at first glance. Most people who are engaged in arguments want to advance their own position as quickly and forcefully as possible. And so they do not want to take the time to find all the available arguments, as stasis theory and other ancient means of invention require. However, this hasty approach can lead to stalemate (or shouting or even violence), as has happened in public arguments over abortion—which we examine in detail in this chapter. Rhetors who do take the time to find all the available arguments can be assured both that their position is defensible and that they have found the best evidence to support it. The very old systematic investigative procedures described in this book were used for thousands of years to help rhetors figure out what arguments are available to them, and we hope that they will help you to determine the issues you want to argue, as well. We recommend that you begin by trying to answer the questions outlined below. Consider all the statements you generate as you work through the questions to be potential propositions. If you work systematically and thoroughly, you should produce a full and useful analysis of the issue you have chosen to examine. Doing all of this intellectual work has several advantages. Rhetors who work through the questions raised by this heuristic in systematic fashion will find that it:

1. Clarifies their thinking about the point in dispute
2. Forces them to think about the assumptions and values shared by members of their targeted audience
3. Establishes areas in which more research needs to be done
4. Suggests which proofs are crucial to the case
5. Perhaps even points the way toward the most effective arrangement of the proofs

What this or any heuristic will not provide, however, is a draft of a paper or speech. Ancient rhetors spent a good deal of time in preparation for writing or speaking, trying out one inventional scheme or another. They did not mind if these trials produced false starts, because they knew that the false starts turned up in one case could most likely be used in a different rhetorical situation. Contemporary debaters work in a similar fashion, preparing all relevant arguments in advance in case they ever need to use them, and to limit as well the chance that a skilled opponent will use an argument they are not prepared to answer. It is important to remember,

then, that practice with this (or any heuristic) also supplies the rhetor with *copia.* Proofs generated in practice with any heuristic system may prove useful at some other time.

THE STASES AND CONTRARY ARGUMENTS

The Older Sophists believed that every argument had at least one contrary argument. According to the ancient historian Diogenes Laertius, "Protagoras was the first to say that on every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other" (Sprague 1972, 21). Some collections of sophistic arguments have come down to us. Characteristically, the arguments in these collections are arranged in contradictory pairs, since the sophists taught their students how to argue both sides of any question. (This pedagogical tactic distressed philosophers, who characterized it as "making the weaker case seem the stronger.") Students using these arguments learned from them how to create a proof favorable to one party in a litigation or to argue for adoption of a proposal before the assembly. Then they would use a set of opposing arguments to prepare a case for the other side or to argue for rejection of the proposal they had just supported.

The sophistic treatise called *"Dissoi Logoi,"* or "Countervailing Arguments" illustrated the sophists' conviction that contradictions pervade rhetorical situations. Here are some sample arguments from that treatise:

> Some say that the good is one thing and the bad another, but others say that they are the same, and a thing might be good for some persons but bad for others, or at one time good and at another time bad for the same person. I myself side with those who hold the latter opinion, and I shall examine it using as an example human life and its concern for food, drink, and sexual pleasures: these things are bad for a man if he is sick, but good if he is healthy and needs them. And, further, incontinence in these matters is bad for the incontinent but good for those who sell these things and make a profit. And again, illness is bad for the sick but good for the doctors. And death is bad for those who die but good for the undertakers and gravediggers (Sprague 1968, 155).

The rhetor continued in this way, listing examples showing that good and bad are the same, depending on circumstances and point of view. The topic in this case is "things that are good for some persons but bad for others." The rhetor simply applied this generalization to all the examples he could think of within the set he chose, in order to flesh out the argument that good and bad are the same. Then he did a turnabout, demonstrating that good and bad are different:

> I think it [would] not be clear what was good and what was bad if they were just the same and one did not differ from the other; in fact such a situation would be extraordinary. And I think a person who says these things would be unable to answer if anyone should question him as follows: "Just tell me, did

> your parents ever do you any good?" He would answer, "Yes, a great deal."
> "Then you owe them for a great deal of evil if the good is really the same as the
> bad." … "Come and answer me this: isn't it the case that you are both pitying
> beggars because they have many evils, [and] again counting them lucky
> because they have many goods, if good and bad are really the same thing? …
> I shall go though the individual cases, beginning with eating, drinking and sex-
> ual pleasures. For the sick these things are [bad to do, and again] they are good
> for them to do, if good and bad are really the same. And for the sick it is bad to
> be ill and also good, if good is really the same as bad. And this holds for all the
> other cases which were mentioned in the previous argument. **(156–57)**

The topic in this case is "things that are good for some people cannot be
bad for them, too." The rhetor simply applied this generalization to all the
specific cases he could think of in order to amplify support for the other
side of the original argument, that good and bad are different.

The abstract, nonspecific nature of this **argument—whether** or not
good and bad are relative to each **other—suggests** that the *"Dissoi Logoi"*
were part of a school exercise. They were sample amplifications, used to
show aspiring rhetors how to exploit systematically the argumentative pos-
sibilities inherent in an issue. When rhetors argued cases or debated before
the assembly, of course, they dealt with much more specific issues, and
they supported only one position on any issue.

For Gorgias and other Older Sophists, contradictory arguments pro-
vided fruitful starting points for the exploration of a particular issue.
Moreover, the doctrine of *dissoi logoi* points to the situational nature of dis-
course recognized by *kairos.* In rhetorical situations, positions on important
issues are always championed by people who disagree with one another. In
other words, there are always at least two sides to every argument. The
people who take those sides can and do change their minds, depending
upon the time and place in which they engage in argument. A systematic
exploration of any issue by means of stasis theory can reveal not only the
available and often contradictory positions that may be taken up with
regard to it; examination of the stases can also reveal that there are often
more than just two sides to any issue,

THEORETICAL VERSUS PRACTICAL QUESTIONS

Ancient rhetoricians divided questions into two kinds: theoretical and
practical. Some questions concern what people should do (action); but
these are always related to questions about why people should do some-
thing (theory). Cicero gave this example of a theoretical question in his
treatise the *Topics* (xxi 82):

> Does law originate in nature or in some agreement and contract between people?

This is the sort of abstract theoretical question that is discussed today by
law school professors and their students when they talk about what

grounds or centers the law. It is an important question because certain practical actions follow from any answer that may be given. If law is grounded in nature it cannot easily be changed. If, on one hand, law is natural, *it* is also difficult to argue that a given law is incorrect or unfair; a rhetor's only option in this case is to argue that the law in question is unnatural. To get an idea of how difficult this is, imagine yourself arguing in court that laws against speeding are unnatural. The argument from nature is used on occasion: motorcycle riders who opposed legislation requiring them to wear helmets have argued—without much success—that such laws violate the natural human desire for freedom from restraint. If law results from human contract, on the other hand, it is much easier to justify alterations to laws, because a rhetor can appeal to the expressed opinions or desires of the majority as support for her argument that a law should be changed.

Unlike theoretical questions, which address the origins and natures of things, practical questions always concern what people should do. Cicero gave this example of a practical question:

Should a philosopher take part in politics?

Notice that this question concerns what people who study philosophy ought to do; it does not raise questions about the nature or aim of philosophy or politics, as a theoretical question would.

The English word *theory* derives from a Greek word *(theorem)* which literally means "to sit in the highest row of the arena." More freely translated, the term meant something like "to observe from afar." A theoretical question, then, allows rhetors to view questions "from afar," as though they had no immediate relevance for daily affairs and putting aside for the moment their practical effects. Many times theoretical investigations provide positions on more practical issues. But they also take rhetors far afield from everyday events. Take this very practical (and very specific) question, fo' instance:

Should jane study this weekend?

To answer this question, a rhetor needs to consider Jane's options ing, visiting home, and so on) and the consequences attached choice. But this practical question has theoretical underpinnings:

Is studying more important than having fun car visiting family?

To answer this theoretical question is more difficult because take into account not only Jane's immediate desires but J goals, her values, her personal history, and so on.

Another way to think about the difference betwee practical questions is to consider the level of generalit' may be addressed. Greek rhetoricians used the term *h* specific question that involved actual persons, places

the term *thesis,* in contrast, to name general questions having wide application—matters suited to political, ethical, or philosophical discussion—which don't refer to actual persons or events. The classic example **of a general issue** was:

> Should anyone marry?

The classic specific question was:

> Should Cato marry?

Here are some contemporary examples of general and specific questions:

1. *General:* Is the death penalty just?

   Specific: Was Governor Ryan's commutation of the sentences of death-row inmates in 2002 just?

2. *General:* Should people convicted of murder be put to death?

   Specific: Should Timothy McVeigh have been put to death for blowing up the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, an act which resulted in the deaths of 168 people?

3. *General:* Are the needs of scientific investigation more important than the safety of citizens?

   Specific: Should Ourtown adopt a dark-sky ordinance to aid astronomical observation even though lower levels of light may endanger citizens?

The ancient distinction between a theoretical question and a question of action is a binary distinction—that is, it allows for only two possibilities. However, general and more specific questions are more helpfully thought of as lying along a spectrum or range from very general to very specific. There are many levels of generalit)' and specificity at which any issue can be stated. Hence the generality or specificity of a given claim is never absolute; it follows that statements of a question are general or specific only in relation to each other. For example:

> *General:* Is conservation of the environment more important than economic development? *(Note that this is a theoretical as well as a very general question—stated this way, the question raises issues for contemplation and discussion rather than action).*

> *More Specific:* Should the United States sacrifice industries that negatively impact its environment—logging, manufacture of certain chemicals and plastics, nuclear power plants—in order to conserve the environment? *(This question, while still general, is no longer simply theoretical; answers to it imply actions to be taken by the United States).*

> *Even More Specific:* Should the City Council of Ourtown reject an application to build a large discount department store if this requires clear-cutting five acres of forest?

Very Specific: Should I take time to recycle plastics, paper, and aluminum even though to do so costs money and time? *(The last three versions of the claim raise practical questions, insofar as they imply human actions; but each successive claim involves fewer people, so each is more specific than the one that precedes it).*

The level of generality at which a question or issue is stated determines the amount of research needed and the kinds of proofs that must be composed in order to argue it persuasively. On one hand, more general questions require broader knowledge and usually require a longer and more complex treatment. To answer the general question about conservation given here, for example, would require least a book-length discussion. On the other hand, the very specific question, involving a personal decision, at minimum requires some private reflection and a bit of hands-on research. To answer this very specific and very practical question would require the rhetor only to recycle plastics, paper, and aluminum for awhile to see how much time and/or money is required to recycle these substances and to compare these results to the time and money required in having unsorted garbage hauled away by the city. A paper or speech answering this question could simply state a proposition ("Recycling is expensive and time-consuming for me") and report the results of this research. As you can see, though, answers given to this very specific question depend upon answers given to more generally stated questions, including the first, very general question stated above. Whether you recycle or not depends, ultimately, upon your values: is preservation of the environment more important to you than your time or your budget? (Here we've restated the very specific question just a bit more generally).

The relation of general to specific issues was a matter of debate among ancient rhetoricians. As Quintilian pointed out, every special issue presupposes a general one: for example, the question of whether Cato ought to marry really couldn't be answered satisfactorily unless the general question, "Should a person marry?" had also been considered (III v 13). Too, there are questions that hover somewhere between the very general and the very specific: for example, "Should an older person marry?" For ancient rhetoricians, questions like these were ethical ones, having to do with a person's character and the right course of conduct for certain characters. Ethical questions still concern us, of course. We regularly read or hear arguments about whether young people ought to marry, for example, and there is a good deal of contemporary argument about when or if people should have children. Often these arguments are cast as personal or financial choices, but they have ethical aspects too, since decisions about marriage and reproduction affect many people, not just those who make them.

Of course any decision you make about the level of generality at which you will pursue an issue is always affected by the rhetorical situation for which you are composing. Who is the audience for the paper or speech? What is the setting? How does the audience feel about the issue? What do they know already, and what will the rhetor have to tell them? And so on.

PUTTING THESE DISTINCTIONS TO WORK

Rhetors can use the set of questions developed by ancient rhetoricians as a means of clarifying for themselves exactly what is at issue between them and their projected audience. And if they choose and frame the question carefully, rhetors can begin the argument from their own ground, rather than an opponent's. Let us return, for example, to the case of the astronomer who argues that the City Council should adopt a dark-sky ordinance. When she prepares her case, she asks: are we disagreeing about a general or a specific issue? She can define the issue specifically as follows:

> Ourtown should adopt a dark-sky ordinance.

As stated, this is a specific issue because it names a particular city and urges the adoption of a particular action. It also provides an advantage to the astronomer because it permits her to take a stand on her own ground; that is, she defines the point at issue in such a way that the ensuing argument must revolve around adoption of a dark-sky ordinance, rather than issues of safety or of the advertising revenue brought to the city from lighted billboards.

The astronomer might prefer, however, to state the issue in more general or theoretical terms. In that case, she could raise a question about community values:

> Which is more important to us: the accumulation of scientific knowledge made available by a darkened night sky or the revenue which is brought to advertisers by lighted billboards?

This statement of the general issue is theoretical. She could also state the more general issue in practical terms, though:

> Should we give priority to advertisers when we pass city ordinances?

To state the issue in general terms gives the astronomer a persuasive advantage, since her audience might view the particular statement of the issue ("Ourtown should adopt a dark-sky ordinance so that astronomers can make night-time observations") as self-serving. Stated generally, the issues raise questions that concern the entire community, not just astronomers.

Stating the Issue

The Practical Question Framed Specifically

Should Ourtown adopt a dark-sky ordinance?

The Practical Question Framed More Generally

Should cities value scientific knowledge over advertising revenues?

The Specific Question Framed as **Theory**

Should the City Council of Ourtown give priority to astronomers or to advertisers when it passes city ordinances?

The Specific Question Framed in Practical Terms

> Will Ourtown profit more from a dark-sky ordinance than from revenue brought in by billboard advertising?

Very Specific, Very Practical Questions

> Will the astronomers who work at Ourtown's observatory close down the facility if they cannot get a sufficiently dark night-time sky? Can Ourtown afford to lose the prestige and money brought into town by the observatory? Does the revenue brought in by billboard advertising offset this loss of revenue?

Opponents of the astronomer's proposal can follow exactly the same procedure. For example, the city police could anticipate the astronomer's statement of the particular issue and simply state it negatively:

> Ourtown should not adopt a dark-sky ordinance.

But this tactic gives an advantage to the astronomer, since it takes up the stand on her turf, so to speak. Thus the police might prefer to begin by defining the issue so that the stand occurs on their ground:

> Lowering the level of light in Ourtown will endanger citizens who must travel the streets at night.

Once again, this is a specific statement of the issue, since it refers to a specific place and implies a single potential action. It is also practical, since it involves human activity. The police might also prepare to argue the case from the vantage point of a general theoretical stance, addressing values:

> The safety of citizens is more important than the accumulation of scientific knowledge.

Or they might choose a general, practical stance that counsels a principle for action:

> When the council of Ourtown passes ordinances, its members should always give top priority to the safety of citizens.

Stating the question this way adds to the *ethos* of the police, since it shows their concern not for the added work they must do if lower levels of tight are permitted but for the safety of the community at large.

There are of course other specific and general, theoretical and practical, questions that can be generated from this issue. A thorough examination of the arguments available to the astronomer can be generated through use of the stasis discussed further on in this chapter. And other arguments are available to other interested parties—advertisers, billboard companies, environmentalists, and other concerned citizens.

A good way to decide which kind and level of question you wish to argue is to imagine the kind and level of question your opponent may advance. Will he argue a theoretical question? In that case, you **must** be prepared to consider the question on that level, in order to meet him in stasis.

The level of generality you choose will also be dictated by the rhetorical sit-uation in which you find yourself. Do the police of Ourtown have an **ami-cable** working relationship with the City Council? Are their spokespeople trusted by council members? Does their ethos outweigh that of the astronomers at the observatory? Will their concerns about citizen safety carry greater weight with the council than the scientific concerns of the astronomers? And so on. (For more discussion about audiences, see Chapter 7, on *pathos).* As you have probably guessed by now, heuristics do not work as reliably as mathematical formulas. There is no guarantee that your consideration and development of theoretical and practical or general and specific questions will provide you with exactly the proposition that you wish to argue. In many cases, you will continue to refine the issue and to develop nuances of your proposition as you work through each of the rhetorical canons. In fact, invention can begin all over again during late stages of the composing **process—arrangement,** revision, or even editing. However, attention to the heuristics described in this book will certainly enrich your stock of **arguments—your** intellectual *copia.* And systematic, thoughtful consideration of the issue at hand just may provide you with precisely the proposition you are looking for, as well as arguments you can use to support it.

WHAT HAPPENS WHEN STASIS IS NOT ACHIEVED?

Contemporary public discourse about abortion provides a stunning exam-ple of an argument that has been sustained for many years but that shows no sign of being resolved. Here is a brief history of the debate over abor-tion, written by William Mears and Bob Franken for CNN:

30 YEARS AFTER. RULING. AMBIGUITY, ANXIETY SURROUND ABORTION DEBATE

Washington (CNN)—Thirty years since *Roe v. Wade,* and little, it seems, has changed.

The January 22, 1973, Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion remains the law of the land, and passions remain high on both sides of the issue, with annual protests on the anniversary.

Access to abortion in the United States, however, is about more than legali-ties. Social, religious and family values, as well as money and politics still play a role in shaping the debate over abortion, but much of that debate has become predictable.

"Much of the controversy about abortion is really stimulated by the interest groups on both sides of the political question, rather than by ordinary Americans," says David Garrow, a law professor at Emory University in Atlanta, and a longtime Supreme Court scholar. "The American people and many political leaders have already made up their minds about legal abortion.

Public opinion on abortion has remained stable over the years. A new CNN/USA Today /Gallup survey found 38 percent of Americans believe abor-

tion should be legal in most or all circumstances, 42 percent believe it should be available in a few circumstances, such as to save the mother's life, and 18 percent say abortion should never be legal. That is almost unchanged in the past 15 years.

The *Roe* decision did not prompt "abortion on demand" as many opponents of the procedure predicted it would. Nor have various legislatures or court rulings restricted access as much as some supporters claim. New research from the Alan Guttmacher Institute found the rate of abortions is at its lowest level since *Roe,* about 1.31 million in the year 2000, down 4 percent from 1996.

Those who celebrate it and those who revile it will mark *Roe's* longevity this week. And while there is no current Supreme Court case that could overturn the ruling, both sides say that day may be close: With Republicans in control of both houses of Congress, they say, the chances for legislation limiting or banning abortion have increased.

Another legacy of *Roe* that remains: the head counting of justices on the Court, a what-if scenario that could lead to the overturning of *Roe.* The current 5-4 conservative majority could shift in either direction, if two or more justices leave the bench in the next few years, as is widely expected.

For abortion rights supporters, the departure of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor would be most troublesome. For anti-abortion forces, the wild card could be the exit of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist.

Roe culminated nearly two centuries of legal activity on abortion that began in 1821 when Connecticut became the first state to outlaw abortions. The 1973 ruling, a 7-2 decision by the high court, gave women a qualified constitutional right to an abortion during most of the pregnancy.

The Court actually heard two cases at around the same time: *Roe* (aka Norma McCorvey who has since become an anti-abortion supporter) *v. Wade,* which challenged a Texas law banning abortions except to save the mother's life; and *Doe v. Bolton,* a Georgia case involving a state law requiring abortions be performed only in accredited hospitals, and only after a review by a hospital staff committee and an exam by two doctors other than her own physician. In all, the *Roe* and *Doe* rulings impacted laws in 46 states.

Questions, anger persist from ruling

For the justices, *Roe* reflected earlier cases involving the right to privacy. That "right," wrote Justice Harry Blackmun in the main opinion for the Court, is "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."

"Prior to *Roe,"* says Garrow, "whether one could obtain a legal abortion in the face of an unwanted pregnancy was a crap shoot. For 30 years now, it's been a constitutionally guaranteed right."

But the ruling was a qualified one, as many anti-abortion supporters have noted over the years, and used by them in their efforts to narrow the scope of other abortion provisions. Blackmun noted the state's "important interests in safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and protecting potential life" are compelling enough to justify regulation "at some point in pregnancy."

That "qualified right" found its form in the controversial "trimester analysis" laid out by the justices in *Roe:* no government regulation during the first three months; limited regulation in the second trimester to protect women's

health and safety; and giving government the power to ban abortions during the third trimester—where medical consensus has concluded the fetus is capable of living on its own.

That reasoning has outraged abortion opponents, and even puzzled many legal scholars.

"The better argument for the result reached in *Roe v. Wade* is that it's necessary for the equality of women, rather than grounding it in the privacy right," says Edward Lazarus, a former law clerk for Blackmun and the author of *Closed Chambers: The Rise, Fall, and Future of the Modern Supreme Court.*

Courts revisit abortion

The abortion issue has been revisited several times since *Roe,* most famously in two cases: *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services* (1989) and *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* (1992).

Webster (5–4 decision) upheld major parts of a Missouri abortion law that prohibited use of public facilities or public employees from performing abortions; and required doctors to test the viability of a fetus before performing any abortion.

Justices Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy said they would allow restrictions on abortion, but only if the restrictions had a rational basis. More importantly, the three conservative justices said a compelling government interest would not be enough to justify restrictions on abortion.

Then came *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* (1992), in which the justices clearly outlined their views on *Roe.* The decision (also 5-4) reaffirmed the heart of *Roe* while giving states the power to regulate procedures as long as they did not impose an "undue burden" on a women's right to abortion.

The standard in the Casey ruling: undue burden exists if "the purpose and effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." The ruling left supporters on both sides of the issue dissatisfied, feeling it was ambiguous. (CNN.com, January 22, 2002)

One reason that this argument has not been resolved is that it cannot be, as long as the central propositions put forward by those involved in it are not in stasis, People who line up against the legalization of abortion offer the following statement as their major proposition:

Abortion is murder.

People who argue that abortion should maintain its current status as a legal operation put the following statement forward as their major proposition:

Women have the right to choose what happens to their bodies, including terminating a pregnancy.

Keeping in mind that reaching stasis means finding the place where opponents agree to disagree, even a cursory examination of these statements shows that they are not in stasis. On one hand, a rhetor who wishes to find stasis with someone who believes that abortion is murder should argue (a) that abortion is not murder; or (b) that abortion is legal so therefore it can-

not be murder, because murder is illegal in America; or (c) that abortion is not murder, because a fetus is not a human being; or some other proposition that defines abortion in such a way that it can be excluded from the category "murder."

Stasis Achieved: Rhetors Can Now Agree to Disagree

A. Abortion is murder.

B. Abortion is not murder.

A rhetor who wishes to find stasis with someone who believes that women have a right to decide what happens to their bodies, on the other hand, must argue that (a) women do not have that right, at least when they are pregnant; or (b) that the right to life of a fetus outweighs a woman's right to choose what happens to her body; or (c) that the right to life extends to fetuses and takes primacy over any other human right; or some other similar proposition about the priority ordering of human rights.

Stasis Achieved: Rhetors Can Now Agree to Disagree

A. Women have the right to decide what happens to their bodies, including terminating a pregnancy.

B. Women do not have the right to decide what happens to their bodies when they are pregnant because a potential life is at stake.

While the propositions we turned up in our stasis analysis do appear in contemporary discourse about abortion, they are seldom offered in the systematic, head-to-head way we have listed them here; that is, they are seldom put in stasis. It is not for nothing that opponents of abortion are called "pro-lifers," while those who want to keep abortion legal are called "pro-choicers." Surely those who support legal abortion do not want to be known as "anti-life," and those who oppose abortion do not want to be known as "anti-choice." As this juxtaposition of terms suggests, stasis analysis establishes that the participants in this argument are arguing right past each other. That is to say, the major propositions they put forward do not address the same issue.

Interestingly the statements that would achieve stasis in this argument are a bit shocking: pro-choice advocates do not often directly address the pro-life position by saying "Abortion is not murder." Nor do pro-life advocates often say in public forums that "women do not have the right to determine what happens to their bodies." This reluctance to admit the implications of its propositions may be another reason why the argument is not in stasis. Those who frame the abortion issue as a question of murder are compelled to argue that abortion, defined as murder, outweighs a woman's right to choose an abortion. They frequently support their position by making reference to religious, moral, or natural laws. Those who support legal abortion, in contrast, have recourse to the political discourse of rights, arguing that individuals have a right to conduct private business

without interference from the state. They assume further that deciding to have an abortion is a private, not a public, matter. Another way to articulate this failure to achieve stasis is to say that people who oppose abortion are arguing from philosophical or theological assumptions about the point at which life begins; people who defend women's rights are arguing from political grounds about the rights of individuals and the relation of those rights to community goods. The point to be made here, however, is that as long as the major propositions in this discourse remain out of stasis, the argument will continue. To date, those who argue about this issue in these terms have been unwilling to meet one another on the same ground.

The following article, written by Mike Ramsey Copley for *Newsday,* illustrates how parties to arguments about abortion try to secure stasis—the point of disagreement—on their own ground rather than that of their opponents:

DRIVE FOR ADOPTION-THEMED LICENSE PLATES CAUSES STIR: "CHOOSE LIFE" SLOGAN UPSETS ABORTION-RIGHTS ADVOCATES

Chicago—Adoption advocates called on state lawmakers Monday to approve a special Illinois license plate that would raise money for their cause.

But the proposed slogan for the adoption-themed plates would be "Choose Life," which already has caused a stir among some abortion-rights advocates.

"They're going to construe it any way they want," Jim Finnegan, founder of Choose Life Illinois, said at a Chicago news conference. "The bill doesn't have anything in there about *Roe vs. Wade;* it has nothing in there about a woman's right to an abortion."

Proponents of the plan say they have collected more than 15,000 petition signatures statewide in support of the program, which has been enacted in six other states, including Florida. They estimate 50,000 Illinois motorists would each pay $25 fees for the new plates, generating more than $1 million annually to aid private, not-for-profit agencies or pregnancy counseling centers that encourage adoption.

Lame-duck state Sen. Patrick O'Malley, R-Palos Park, is sponsoring legislation for the program. The anti-abortion conservative holds out hope his colleagues in Springfield will pass the bill during this week's final three days of the veto session or in early January before he and other elected officials leave office.

"It's very difficult to stand up on the floor of the Senate and say, 'I'm against adoption,' " O'Malley said. "I don't think we're going to hear those words, and [adoption] is what this initiative is completely about."

The Chicago Area branch of Planned Parenthood, which supports access to abortion, condemned the license plate program. President and CEO Steve Trombley said government officials would be "choosing sides in a political debate" if they approved the new plates. *(State Journal-Register* [Springfield, IL], December 2, 2002, C/S 9)

Interestingly, the major propositions used in arguments about abortion do not appear as such in this article. As we pointed out earlier, though, peo-

ple who oppose abortion refer to their movement as "pro-life," and the proposed license plates say "Choose Life." Hence the proposed license plate may be meant to imply that the only available argument against the pro-life position is "Choose Death," As we noted above, this is not acceptable to pro-choice advocates, who argue the abortion issue on quite other grounds. "Choose Life" can also be read to mean "don't choose abortion." Planned Parenthood objects to this proposal, then, not because they oppose adoption, as the state senator claims, but because the proposed license plate cleverly puts the stasis on the side of those who are pro-life insofar as it co-opts the word *choice* at the same time as it suggests that the only available choice, other than life, is death.

THE FOUR QUESTIONS

The process of asking questions does not conclude once the point of stasis has been identified. Ordinarily, the determination of the question for debate will give rise to other questions. Ancient rhetoricians devised a list of four questions, or stases, that would help them refine their grasp on the point at issue.[1]

1. CONJECTURE *(stasis stochasmos)*—"Is there an act to be considered?"
2. DEFINITION (stasis *horos)*—"How can the act be defined?"
3. QUALITY (stasis *poiotes)*—"How serious is the act?"
4. POLICY (stasis *metalepsis)*—"Should this act be submitted to some formal procedure?"

If someone is accused of theft, for example, the first question that must be raised is conjecture: "Did she do it or not?" If all parties agree that she took the property in question, the stasis moves to a question of **definition:** "Was it theft?" (She might have borrowed it). And if everyone agrees that the act can be defined as theft, the stasis becomes: "Was it right or wrong?" (The theft might be justified on any number of grounds—she took liquor from the house of a friend who is an alcoholic, for instance). The ancients called this stasis **quality,** and we will use this term as well. Last, if the question of quality is agreed upon, the stasis then becomes: "Should she be tried for the offense?" This is the question of procedure or **policy.**

> THE FOUR QUESTIONS
> **Conjecture:** Does it exist? Did it happen?
> Definition: What kind of thing or event is it?
> Quality: Was it right or wrong?
> **Policy:** What should we do?

When a rhetor begins to examine an issue, according to Cicero, he should ask:

Does the thing about which we are disputing exist? (Latin *an sit*)

If it exists, what is it? *(quid sit)*

What kind of thing is it?" *(quale sit)*

Cicero said that the first is a question of reality, the second of definition, and the third of quality *(On the Parts* xviii 62). If, for example, a rhetor were concerned with the theoretical issue of justice, she might employ the three questions as follows:

A. "Does justice exist in nature or is it merely a human convention?"
B. "Can justice be defined as that which benefits the majority?"
C. "Is it advantageous to live justly or not?"

The first question forces the rhetor to conjecture about whether justice exists and, if so, where; the second, how it can be defined; and the third, what its value is, and to whom. Cicero and Quintilian insisted that only the first three questions were really necessary to the preparation of arguments to be used outside the courtroom. Nevertheless, the fourth stasis, policy, is sometimes useful in nonlegal settings. People who deliberate in assemblies often have to decide how to regulate practices.

Stasis theory is as useful to writers as it is to speakers, since rhetors must assess the probable response of an audience to their work. Cicero recommended that speakers and writers work through the questions in order. The process of working through questions of conjecture, definition, and quality, in order, will help rhetors to find the points about which they and their audience agree; it will also establish the point from which they must begin the **argument—the** point where they disagree. In the first stasis, the rhetor determines whether or not he and his audience agree about the existence of some being or the commission of some act. If they do, this stasis is no longer relevant or useful, having been agreed **to—waived—by** both parties. In the second stasis, the rhetor determines whether or not he and his audience agree about the classification of the being or the act; if so, the stasis of definition may be passed by. Third, the rhetor determines whether he and his audience agree about the value of the being or the seriousness of the act. That is, what is its relevance to the community as a whole? According to Cicero, in the third stasis, there is a controversy about the nature or character of an act when there is both agreement as to what has been done and certainty as to how the act should be defined, but there is a question nevertheless about how important it is or in general about its quality: for example, was it just or unjust, profitable or unprofitable? *(De Inventione* I viii 12).

ELABORATING THE QUESTIONS

Each of the four questions can be elaborated into other sets of questions. According to Cicero, there are four ways of dealing with a question of conjecture *(Topics* xxi 82). One can ask

Whether the thing exists or is true?

What its origin is?

What cause produced it?

What changes can be made in it?

Some modern rhetoricians call the issue of conjecture "the question of fact." However, the Greek term *stochasmos* is more literally translated as "a guess" or "an inference." Since the term *fact* connotes the sort of hard physical evidence we discussed in the first chapter of this book, it is misleading here. The stasis of conjecture does not establish anything at all about the truth or fact of the matter under discussion; rather, it represents an educated guess about what might be or what might have occurred. And since reality may be perceived very differently by people who occupy different social and political positions, people may paint very different pictures of that reality. For example, a man who tells a dirty joke to his colleagues at work may think that he is only being friendly, while a woman colleague who hears the joke may feel that it belittles women. Or, in another example of conjecture, a recipient of aid to Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) might describe a welfare check as the only means she has for feeding her children. A politician who is opposed to welfare, however, might characterize that very same check as a handout to freeloaders. These people have all offered conjectures about the way the world is or how people behave. In the examples given here, each party has some stake or **interest** in picturing the joke or the welfare check in the way that they do. Their disagreement about these facts is what renders conjecture rhetorical.

Questions of Conjecture

Does it exist? Is it true?

Where did it come from? How did it begin?

What is its cause?

Can it be changed?

For an example, let's return to the case being prepared by the astronomer who wants a dark-sky ordinance to be passed in her city. Under the question of conjecture, the astronomer can ask:

Does light pollution exist in the city?

What is the origin of the pollution?

What causes it?

What will change it?

When she tries to answer these questions, the astronomer learns that she will probably need to provide evidence that light pollution does indeed exist. She will need to provide further evidence that the pollution is not natural (that is, that it doesn't originate from moonlight or starlight). She will have to establish that the pollution is caused by billboards and streetlights, and she will need to establish further that elimination of these two sources

will produce a level of light that will make astronomic observation possible.

Use of the stasis of conjecture is often productive in just this **way—that** is, it demonstrates to rhetors what evidence they need in order to mount their arguments. Sometimes, use of the stasis of conjecture also establishes that there is no issue, or that a rhetor has framed the issue incompletely, or that he wants to change his mind about the issue. Because heuristics often produce **surprises—that** is what they are for, after **all—rhetors** must be prepared for shifts in their thinking. When using the stases or any means of invention, then, rhetors should always allow time for intellectual development to occur.

If all parties to the discussion agree about the **conjecture—the** description of the state of **things—the** search for stasis moves on to matters of definition.

Questions of Definition

What kind of thing of event is it?

To what larger class of things does it belong?

What are its parts? How are they related?

Definitions are rhetorical because they can determine on whose ground the question will be taken up (see Chapter 9, on the sophistic topics, for more about definition). In this case, the astronomer can take advantage of the rhetorical aspect of definition to compose one that suits her interest. She is the probably the only party, other than thieves and lovers, who has an interest in defining light pollution.

Definition requires that the astronomer name the particular or proper quality of light pollution and divide it into its parts. Let's say that she defines light pollution as "that level of light which is sufficient to interfere with astronomical observations." She might then divide such light levels into light caused by

billboards,

streetlights,

home lighting, and

natural sources.

This division demonstrates to her that she needs evidence that establishes the level of pollution caused by each of these sources (see the chapter on the sophistic topics for more about division). It tells her further that if the evidence demonstrates that natural light is not an important factor in creating light pollution, she can concentrate her major arguments on the other sources of light, all of which can be mitigated by a dark-sky ordinance. As it does here, the stasis of definition will sometimes produce a way of dividing up the **discourse—producing** what ancient rhetoricians called the partition (see Chapter 10, on arrangement, for more about partitions).

Other parties concerned about this issue might, on one hand, return to the question of conjecture to assert that there is no such thing as light pollution, in an attempt to render the astronomer's definition irrelevant. If they succeed in this, she too will be forced to return to the stasis of conjecture if all parties wish to continue the discussion. If they accede to her definition, on the other hand, the argument is in stasis and all parties can turn to the next stasis, quality. If they do accept that light pollution exists and that it can be defined as the astronomer asserts, she has been able to set up the discussion in terms that favor her interest.

Questions of quality may be asked in two ways: simply or by comparison. Simple questions of quality attempt to determine the worth of the issue—its justice or Tightness or honor—or how much the community desires it. Comparative questions of quality put the issue in the context of other qualities, comparing it with related issues in order to determine its priority among the community's values. If asked simply, then, the question of quality is "Is light pollution a good or a bad thing?" If asked comparatively in this case, the question could become "Is the safety of citizens more important than the needs of astronomers?"

According to Cicero, there are three kinds of simple questions of quality:

> what to seek and what to avoid,
> what is right and what wrong,
> what is honorable and what base. *(Topics* xxi 84)

Questions of Quality
    Simple Questions of Quality
        Is it a good or a bad thing?
        Should it be sought or avoided?
        Is it right or wrong?
        Is it honorable or dishonorable?
    Comparative Questions of Quality
        Is it better or worse than something else?
        Is it more desirable than any alternatives?
        Is it less desirable than any alternatives?
        Is it more or less right than something else?
        Is it more or less wrong than something else?
        Is it more honorable than something else?
        Is it less honorable than something else?
        Is it more base than something else?
        Is it less base than something else?

Thus our astronomer might ask the following simple questions of quality:

Should lower levels of light pollution be sought or should they be avoided?

If the lower levels of light affect other situations, like **citizens's** safety, should they then be avoided?

That is, is it right or wrong to ask for lower levels of light?

Is it honorable to put the needs of astronomers above those of ordinary citizens?

Is it dishonorable to deprive citizens of a source of safety?

Thinking comparatively, the rhetor compares the importance of her issue to other related issues. In the astronomer's case, for example, a general comparative question of quality is:

Should the present state of affairs, which includes light pollution, be preferred to a state of affairs in which light pollution has been lessened?

A comparative specific question is:

Should the present state of affairs in Ourtown, which includes lighted **bill**-boards, be maintained in preference to an imagined state of affairs (or the actual state of affairs in Othertown) where lighted billboards have been eliminated so that astronomers can see better?

Since questions of comparison are of two **kinds—similarity** and differ-ence—the astronomer will ask herself what differences will be brought about in her observations of the night sky if light pollution is reduced; under the head of similarity, she also will consider what problems might remain even if light pollution is reduced. If she is systematic in her use of the stases, she must produce all the available arguments, even those that oppose her position. She can be sure that those who disagree with her will produce these arguments, and so she must be prepared to answer them. For example, her use of the stasis of comparative difference will produce this question: will the reduction of light pollution, thus giving us a better view, alter our previous descriptions of the night sky? In other words, will astronomers be forced to revise our earlier work if we can see better?

As this example makes clear, the stases of quality are ordinarily very productive. Using them, the astronomer has generated some questions that should stimulate her to compose good arguments. The stases often allow rhetors to articulate assumptions that they take for granted but that may be controversial to others. For example, the astronomer might simply assume, without thinking about it, that other citizens value a dark sky as much as she does. Other citizens, however, will not take this proposition for granted. The police will be concerned about safety, and billboard compa-nies will be concerned about possible loss of revenue if they cannot light their advertising signs at night. Use of the stasis, then, demonstrates to the astronomer that she must prepare arguments that defend the importance she places on a dark sky, should it become necessary to do so.

The fourth stasis, policy, is relevant in the astronomer's case, as well. In questions of policy, the rhetor proposes that some action be taken or that some action be regulated (or not) by means of a policy or law. Questions of policy are usually twofold: they are both deliberative and forensic. That is, a rhetor who wishes to put forward a question or issue of policy must first deliberate about the need for it and then argue for its implementation.

Questions of Policy

Deliberative Questions

Should some action be taken?

Given the rhetorical situation, what actions are possible? Desirable?

How will proposed actions change the current state of affairs? Or should the current state affairs remain unchanged?

How will the proposed changes make things better? Worse? How? In what ways? For whom?

Forensic Questions

Should some state of affairs be regulated (or not) by some formalized policy?

Which policies can be implemented? Which cannot?

What are the merits of competing proposals? What are their defects?

How is my proposal better than others? Worse?

Using the deliberative questions of policy, our astronomer is forced to ask herself some hard questions. She has already decided that some action should be taken. She needs now to ask herself whether her proposal to enact a dark-sky ordinance can be implemented and whether it is a good thing for the community it will affect. She needs to consider changes that its implementation might bring about—loss of revenue to Ourtown, possibly dangerous situations for citizens—and determine whether the seriousness of these changes outweighs the merits of her proposal. Turning to the forensic questions of policy, the astronomer realizes that she can enhance both her ethical and logical appeals by presenting the council with a draft of a proposed dark-sky ordinance. The draft demonstrates the depth of her concern about the situation, since she took the time to compose it. It also strengthens the possibility that her audience will use part or all of her draft when they write the ordinance, since busy people are likely to make use of work that has already been done. She can find arguments for implementing her proposal by showing how it will improve the current state of things, by showing how alternative proposals are not as satisfactory as her own, and by showing that implementation of her proposal is entirely possible. For example, she should try to counter the opposing argument that lowered levels of light can endanger citizens' safety. If possible, she should point out in her proposal that current levels of light from streetlights do not pose a problem to astronomical observation.

So if you wish, on one hand, to recommend that a policy or procedure be implemented, you must compose it. Find out how similar policies are enacted in similar situations, and compose a plan for implementing the one that you suggest. You should also determine how the policy that you recommend can be enforced. If you are recommending, on the other hand, that some public practice be implemented or changed, you must first compose your recommendation. Then find out who can make the changes you suggest, and find out what procedures must be followed in order to make the recommended change. You should also try to find out how your recommended change can be implemented and enforced and offer suggestions for achieving this.

USING THE STASES

The stases still prove surprisingly useful for beating a path through the thicket of issues that often surround a controversy. We suggest that rhetors begin by asking themselves what sort of question they are facing: general or specific? theoretical or practical? Try to formulate the question in each of these terms in succession. Then compare them in order to determine which seems the most effective approach given the rhetorical situation for which you are preparing. Once you have decided upon the level of **generality** at which you wish to argue and have examined possible points of stasis, you should then formulate your question in terms of each of the four questions: conjecture, definition, quality, and policy. Again, compare these formulations: Do any seem to capture the point at issue? Do any hold out the possibility of helping you with further investigation? Do any tell you something about issues that might be raised by a member of the audience or by someone who disagrees with you? Do any help you to begin to develop an argument? Remember that this procedure is intended only to help you decide where to start. Its use does not guarantee that you will generate any useful proofs, much less that you can begin to draft a speech or paper at this stage of your preparation.

In the sample analyses that follow, we used stasis theory to find out what issues reside in two contemporary controversies: abortion and hate speech. The examples are intended to demonstrate how this heuristic can help someone who is just beginning to think about a rhetorical problem. We did no formal research on these issues before we began this analysis, although of course we had heard them discussed in conversation and had read news articles about them. There are many more propositions and arguments available within these issues than those we found by using stasis theory. However, even a preliminary use of this heuristic discloses its rich argumentative possibilities and points out as well the research and composition that are necessary to argue it persuasively. Our examples should not be followed slavishly, as though they model all possible uses of the system. As you will see when you study the examples, we have used the stases very differently in each one. This happened because the rhetori-

cal situations that gave rise to each of the controversies were very different. Because of the situatedness of rhetoric, then, stasis theory cannot be applied mechanically. The issues or problems it turns up will differ from situation to situation, so any rhetor who uses it must be alert to all the possibilities it raises in any case. Rhetors should always be ready to follow any tangent thrown up by their consideration of the stases.

The First Example: Abortion

Because most Americans are familiar with the terms of arguments about abortion, we return to this issue as our first illustration of how stasis theory can work. In what follows, we back up a bit and assume that a rhetor who is examining this issue has not yet developed a position on it. In other words, we use stasis theory here as a heuristic—a means of discovery. We state the issue both theoretically and practically and consider what happens when we state its available propositions at various levels of generality. Then we subject its available propositions to Hermagoras's questions to see if we can discover persuasive arguments that may be useful on occasions when we wish to enter into discussions about abortion.

Step 1. *Decide whether to formulate the question in theoretical or practical terms.*

Possible Theoretical Questions

Seen "from afar," what is the nature of abortion?

What are its origins? Its ends?

Possible Practical Questions

Where and when do abortions occur? Who is involved?

Why do people practice abortion?

What and whose interests are served by the practice of abortion?

What and whose interests are denied by the practice of abortion?

Your answers to these questions may yield propositions that you wish to support or reject. If you try to answer the theoretical questions, you will probably discover that you do not know all that you need to know about this issue in order to argue responsibly about it. To answer the first theoretical question, for example, you need a medical dictionary that will tell you just what this procedure entails. Answers to the second require you to know something about the history and contemporary use of the practice.

Answers to the practical questions lead to lines of **argument**—the related issues that we discussed in Chapter 2, on *kairos.* For example, the second practical question might be answered as follows: people practice abortion as a means of birth control. This answer suggests a line of argument: since there are other means of contraception available, why do people resort to abortion for this purpose? Is there some feature of the state of affairs that keeps people from using these other means?

Step 2. *Decide whether to formulate the question generally or specifically.*

Possible General Formulations of the Question

Do abortions occur? (conjecture)

What is abortion exactly? (definition)

Is it a good or a bad thing? (quality)

Should abortion be regulated? (policy)

Possible Specific Formulations of the Question

Do abortions occur in Ourtown? (conjecture)

Can the abortions done in Ourtown be classified as medical proce-dures? Murders? Methods of contraception? (definition)

Is the availability of abortion a good thing or a bad thing in Ourtown? (quality)

Should the practice be regulated in Ourtown? (policy)

This analysis reveals something about the scope or size of the available arguments on this issue. That is, a rhetor who undertakes this exercise learns how much research will be necessary to tackle the question on either a theoretical or practical level. To answer the theoretical question of conjecture requires empirical research. In their history of abortion, reprinted earlier in this chapter, Mears and **Franken** assert that 1.31 million abortions occurred in 2002; they base this statement on a study done by a research institute. Additional research would be necessary to determine, for instance, the number of abortions practiced prior to *Roe v. Wade.* Answers to the second theoretical question require the composition of a definition suitable to the rhetor's position on the issue, although a careful rhetor will look for definitions advanced by others as well so that he is prepared to argue for the superiority of his own definition. (See Chapter 9, on the sophistic topics, for advice about composing definitions). The third and fourth theoretical questions require at least book-length examination, and indeed, many books have been written about both of them. The practical and specific questions cover less daunting amounts of space and time and hence require a rhetor to do less research. The specific questions may also be more interesting to the immediate community of Ourtown.

Step 3. *Decide which of the four staseis best describes the point at issue in the rhetorical situation at hand.*

In arguments over abortion both the conjectural and the definitional questions are very much at issue. People who are pro-choice conjecture abortion to be among the rights granted to citizens. Those who are pro-life find this position unacceptable (some feminists suspect that pro-lifers do not conjecture women as citizens). The second stasis, definition, is crucial for the pro-life position because the pro-life definition of abortion as murder is precisely the point at issue in this argument. Other definitions thrown up by the stasis of definition (abortion is a method of contraception; abortion

is a medical procedure) are not acceptable to the pro-life position, and any rhetor who argues that position should find arguments against both during invention because opponents will surely use them. Pro-lifers and pro-choicers also struggle over the definitional issue when they contest how exactly to define a fetus. Is it a human life even though it cannot survive without the woman who carries it? The question of quality often forms the point of stasis in this argument as well, as when the question arises whether the ready availability of abortion is a good or a bad thing for a given community. The question of policy has already been decided in American courts of law (abortion is currently legal), although pro-life advocates are seeking to change the policy. It is hard to generalize about which question will prove most useful in a given case, because the rhetorical situation dictates which of the propositions yielded by the stases will prove most useful to a rhetor (see Chapter 2, on *kairos,* for more about rhetorical situations).

In order to illustrate the process of determining which of the four stases best describes the point at issue in a given argument, we turn to yet another example of an argument about abortion. In the following report by Kelly Wallace, at first glance abortion may not seem to be under discussion at all:

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AIMS FOR A CLARIFICATION IN CHILD-CARE REGULATIONS

Washington (CNN)—The Bush administration said Thursday it wants to let states classify a fetus as an "unborn child" so low-income women can qualify for prenatal care—a move that has infuriated abortion rights advocates.

Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson said in a statement that the goal of the regulation change is to provide health care services for pregnant women who would not be eligible otherwise. In what it billed as clarification, the administration shifted the definition of "child" to include those "from conception" to age 19.

"While Medicaid already provides prenatal care for many low-income women, there are still tens of thousands every year who are not eligible under current regulations until after their child is born, or who may even then not qualify under Medicaid even though their child will indeed qualify" under the State Children's Health Program, or SCHIP, Thompson said in a statement. The change would make a fetus eligible for health care under that program.

"The change we are proposing would make SCHIP resources available to states immediately to expand prenatal care for low-income women," Thompson said.

The move immediately rekindled the debate over abortion, with abortion rights groups calling it a political ploy aimed at eventually making abortions illegal. "The Bush administration's proposal demonstrates its commitment to the strategy of undermining a woman's right to choose by ascribing legal rights to embryos," said Kate Michelman, president of the National Abortion Rights Action League. "Anti-choice, anti-family planning officials are directing [the] president's health care policy," she added.

Administration officials denied that abortion politics are a factor in their decision. Rather, they noted that states had to return $3.2 billion in SCHIP

funds to the federal government last year because they were not able to spend the money. The change would expand eligibility, thereby letting states use more of those funds.

"In our minds, this is not an abortion issue," said Kevin Keane, an HHS spokesman. "This is a common sense way to allow states to use some of that SCHIP money, not just for women." Keane questioned how abortion rights supporters could oppose this move, since he said abortion rights activists fight for better prenatal care for women.

Still, Thompson made his stand against abortion clear on Thursday, at a speech he gave at George Washington University Hospital, where he was speaking about public health grants. "Our nation should set a great goal that unborn children should be welcomed in life and protected in law," he said.

President Bush also opposes abortion. One of [his] first acts in office last year—on the anniversary of *Roe v. Wade*—was to sign an executive order banning federal funds to international family planning groups that offer abortion or abortion counseling.

The administration's support for allowing states to define an "unborn child" as eligible for health care coverage first surfaced last July in a draft policy. It was immediately viewed with skepticism by abortion rights groups, who suggested it was an effort by abortion foes within the White House to create legal recognition for the fetus.

Thursday's news that the administration was about to follow through on that policy change was greeted with praise from opponents of abortion rights. "We applaud the proposal," said Douglas Johnson, legislative director for the National Right to Life Committee. "The proposal would recognize the existence of an unborn child in order to allow a baby and the mother to receive adequate prenatal care."

Currently, the SCHIP program provides health care coverage to qualifying low-income children under the age of 19. The proposed regulation change, to be published in the Federal Register within a week, would "clarify that states may include coverage for children from conception to age 19."

The change would be open to public comment for a period of 60 days after it is published. "Prenatal services can be a vital, life-long determinant of health and we should do everything we can to make this care available for all pregnant women," Thompson said. According to HHS, there are an estimated 10.9 million women between the ages of 18 and 44 who do not have health insurance.

Gloria Feldt, the president of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, questioned the administration's sincerity. "If the goal really was expanding prenatal access, they would say we're going to cover more pregnant women," she said. (CNN.com, February 1, 2002)

The most obvious rhetorical struggle occurring here concerns the definition of *child*. If pro-life advocates can extend the definition of childhood so that it is thought to begin at conception rather than at birth, as is now the case, they will succeed in defining the fetus as a human being. If this attempt succeeds, the new definition will mandate that abortion is indeed murder since it terminates human life. This proposed change in child-care regulations, like the proposal to manufacture Illinois license plates that say

"Choose Life," cleverly detours the line of argument so that related issues—prenatal health care and adoption—can be used as covers for the underlying stasis desired by those who hold the pro-life position. In other words, pro-lifers want to stage the argument as a rhetorical struggle over the legal and moral definition of "human life," rather than moving it onto the ground of rights. Pro-choice advocates are aware of this sleight of hand, as is made clear by the president of Planned Parenthood, who asks why the administration doesn't simply provide more care for pregnant women if it is truly concerned about prenatal health, rather than going to the trouble of changing the definition of childhood.

We are now in a position to determine which of the four stases best represents the point at issue.

Conjecture

Is there an act to be considered? Both of the examples we give in this chapter concern proposals, so in neither case had any regulations been changed at the time the stories were written. That is to say, no acts had yet occurred, and so a rhetor could pass by the stasis of conjecture. However, the fact that both proposals have opponents suggests that the arguments underlying this issue have to do with other questions. So an interested rhetor should investigate the questions of conjecture to see whether they yield useful propositions.

Conjectural Questions to Ask

1. Does abortion exist? It would be interesting to know whether or not the "prenatal care" proposed by the administration includes abortions. We suspect it does not, given its refusal to allow abortion counseling to take place in military installations overseas. The license plate proposal recommends adoption rather than abortion; a rhetor interested in the conjecture "whether adoption exists" instead of or in place of abortion may need some statistics or examples about the relation of these practices in order to argue any side of the question of relation. How many pregnant women opt for adoption instead of abortion?

2. How did it begin? Abortion has been used as a method of birth control for thousands of years. Recently, however, safer, more effective means of birth control have been found, and the use of abortion as a means of contraception has become increasingly controversial. The two proposals under consideration here are examples of a tactic recently resorted to by opponents of abortion rights—to adopt legislation in related matters that may effect changes in *Roe v. Wade,* the thirty-year-old Supreme Court decision that made abortion legal. When did opponents of abortion rights adopt this practice? Why did they do so? Will they find it useful in the future?

3. What is its cause? In some cases, of course, abortions are performed because they are required in order to save women's lives. Although contested, this cause does not seem to be so controversial as cases in

which abortion is used as a means of birth **control.** Here the question of cause asks us to consider what causes people to choose abortion rather than other available means of contraception. Those who support the legality and availability of abortion suggest a number of causes for its use: lack of education about birth control, lack of access to birth control, women's fear of rejection or abuse if they use other means of birth control, and women's lack of control over their reproductive **choices—the** most glaring example of which is rape. Those who oppose abortion conjecture its causes quite differently: as irresponsibility, lack of the correct values, and disrespect for tradition.

4. Can it be changed? It is an interesting question whether the practice of abortion will ever cease or whether the number of abortions, legal or illegal, can be changed by regulation. Abortion has been legal in America for about thirty years, which suggests that it can be made illegal again. States have limited access to abortion by mandating a twenty-four-hour waiting period, for example. And on the national level, opponents of abortion rights have attempted to outlaw certain kinds of abortions. These are legal means of seeking change, as are demonstrations and parades and petitions. Some anti-abortion actions have on occasion been found to be illegal, such as protests held too close to clinics. Conjecture about the possibility of change in this case raises further interesting questions: Can illegal **procedures—such** as the bombing of abortion clinics or murder of doctors who perform **abortions—effect** a change in law? If not, why do the perpetrators of such acts engage in them?

Definition

How can the act be **defined?** As we have seen, this is a crucial stasis in the debate over abortion. In this issue the question of definition requires rhetors to examine their moral **positions—something** that is ordinarily very difficult. Perhaps the question of definition is seldom raised in public discussion about abortion because of the very difficulty and seriousness of the questions it raises. If a rhetor accepts the definition of abortion as murder, she can argue propositions that treat abortion like other instances of murder. It would **follow** that similar punishments should be meted out to those found guilty of performing the act. A rhetor who supports abortion rights cannot allow the argument to be taken up at the stasis of definition if his opponents argue that abortion is murder. If he does, he will inevitably find himself in the unenviable and untenable position of defending acts of murder. If he accepts some other definition of abortion, certain other consequences follow. If he defines it as a woman's right, for example, he can compare it to other rights enjoyed by citizens, such as the right to vote and the right to free speech. If he defines abortion as a woman's health issue or as a reproductive issue, other arguments appear. If abortion is defined as a feature of health care for women, for example, a rhetor can argue that its practice ought to be supported legally and perhaps even financially.

Definition Questions to Ask

1. What kind of a thing is it? Is abortion an act of murder? Is it a medical practice? A means of birth control? An affront to family values? A feminist issue?

2. To what larger class of things does it belong? Is a fetus a human being with all the rights to which humans are entitled? Or is a fetus not human if it is not viable outside the womb? What is a human being, anyway? What is the essence of being human? Is abortion a crime against humanity? Is resistance to legal abortion part of a disabling set of patriarchal prescriptions against women?

3. What are its divisions? Currently, federal law proscribes medical intervention in a pregnancy beyond the first trimester (three months) unless it is warranted by some overriding concern (such as the mother's life or health). Is this the best temporal division that can be devised? There are other ways to apply division to the issue of **abortion—who** practices it, places where it is illegal and for whom, and so on.

Quality

How serious is the act? Answers to questions of quality always depend upon the values maintained in the community. There are few issues currently under public debate that so deeply involve community values as abortion does. For many religious people who oppose abortion, its practice is a sin. But people who support legalized abortion take the issue seriously, too, arguing that its practice is part of the larger issue of women's control of their reproductive lives.

Simple Quality Questions to Ask

1. Is abortion good or bad? No one who is party to this argument thinks that abortion is a good thing. Those who oppose it want it banned completely. Those who support it want it to be safe and legal, but they would prefer that women not have to resort to it as a means of birth control. As the bumper sticker proclaims, "Keep abortion safe, legal, and infrequent."

2. Should abortion be sought or avoided? Are there any cases in which abortion ought to be sought? Or should abortion always be the choice of last resort?

3. Is abortion right or wrong? Those who oppose abortion say that the practice is always wrong. Can you imagine a hypothetical situation in which this is not the case? In other words, are there any situations in which abortion is the right choice?

4. Is abortion honorable or dishonorable? Those who are opposed to abortion have tried to shame doctors who perform the procedure by convincing them that it is a dishonorable act. Some doctors refuse to perform the procedure, while others consider it a mark of courage and

pride that they are willing to continue performing abortions under frightening and sometimes dangerous conditions. Are they behaving honorably or dishonorably?

Comparative Questions of Quality

1. Is it better or worse than some alternative? A pregnant woman has only a few alternatives to abortion: parenthood, adoption, or abandonment. Keeping in mind that situations differ, try to rank these alternatives in terms of their relative goodness and badness.

2. Is it less or more desirable than any alternative? Most parties to this discussion think that abortion is the least desirable alternative of those listed above. Can you think of situations in which abortion may be the most desirable alternative?

3. Is it more or less right or wrong than any alternative? Those who support abortion rights often argue that abortion is preferable to bringing an unwanted child into the world. In other words, they say that abortion is less wrong than giving birth to an unwanted child. Is this argument valid? With whom might it be effective?

4. Is it more or less honorable or base than some alternative?

Policy

Abortion is currently a legal medical procedure. However, there is much contemporary debate about policies related to abortion (for example: Should so-called "partial-birth" abortions remain legal? Should women under the age of eighteen be forced to tell their parents about a planned abortion?) As is the case with any issue, rhetors who wish to advocate or oppose adoption of a policy must first deliberate the need for the policy or procedure and, second, must study how it would be implemented (or removed).

Deliberative Questions of Policy

1. Should some action be taken? Should abortion remain legal? Should it be made illegal? Should it be made illegal in some cases only? In the specific cases exemplified here, people are proposing to issue license plates that say "Choose Life" and to extend the definition of childhood to the moment of conception. Should either of these actions be taken? In the case of the license plates, only two alternatives are available: accept or reject the proposal (although presumably the measure could be tabled for a time). In the case of the redefinition of childhood, there is a range of available alternatives between conception and birth that could be designated as the moment when a fetus becomes a child.

2. Given the rhetorical situation, what actions are possible or desirable? Is it possible to outlaw abortion? Is it desirable? In the specific case examined above, is it possible to prevent the Bush administration from altering the definition of childhood? Is it desirable to do so?

3. How will the proposed actions change the current state of affairs? Or should the current state of affairs remain unchanged? Or is the status quo satisfactory? Desirable? If not, how will the new license plates affect community opinion about abortion? Will the administration's proposal, if adopted, affect other legislation? Will these changes be desirable? Satisfactory? To whom?

4. How will the proposed changes make things better? Worse? How? In what ways? For whom? Obviously, the redefinition of childhood will affect the states and people who use the SCHIP fund. The administration claims that more women in need of prenatal care will be covered by the fund. Those who oppose the redefinition can argue that women could be helped by other means, such as extending the SCHIP fund to cover prenatal care without altering the definition of childhood. They also point out that the proposed redefinition will force reconsideration of *Roe v. Wade* and legislation related to the practice of abortion. Will the proposed license plates encourage people to adopt children? If so, will this make the world a better place? How?

Forensic Questions of Policy

1. Should some state of affairs be regulated (or not) by some formalized procedure? The practice of abortion is currently legal, although it is regulated by a variety of state and local laws. Those who oppose abortion, obviously, would like to see it made illegal so that all the regulatory procedures that attend illegal operations (the police, courts, prisons) can be brought to bear on those who participate in abortion.

2. Which policies can be implemented? Which cannot? Given the current ideological climate in America, the legality of abortion must be defended against those who would outlaw it. So it does not seem likely that a proposal which recommends free abortions for everyone will be readily accepted. Rather, proposals such as those exemplified here, intended to limit or deter access to abortion, have been successful in recent years.

3. What are the merits of competing proposals? What are their defects? Those who support abortion rights have often argued that better and more widely available sex education and wide distribution of free contraceptives would markedly reduce the number of abortions that are performed in this country. Are they right? If their proposals were adopted, could abortion then be made illegal?

A Second Example: Hate Speech

We attempt to demonstrate the use of stasis theory by turning to yet another example of a controversial argument in American civic discourse. The First Amendment to the American constitution reads as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or

of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." This amendment guarantees that American citizens have to right to practice whatever religion they wish, to say whatever they wish, and to associate with whomever they please. It also guarantees that no limits can be placed on journalists' freedom of speech or on citizens' ability to seek compensation from government for wrongs suffered.

The First Amendment clause insuring freedom of speech concerns us here. During the 1990s a number of American universities adopted policies regulating the use of so-called "hate speech," that is, language or acts that offend members of certain groups. Rodney **Smolla,** an attorney who is an authority on the First Amendment, defines hate speech as "a generic term that has come to embrace the use of speech attacks based on race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation or preference" (152). The following article points out some of the controversial issues raised by the adoption of such policies.

UNIVERSITIES STRUGGLE WITH FREE SPEECH. HATE SPEECH

East Lansing, **Mich.—Universities** across the nation are grappling with where to draw the line on free speech versus hate speech.

A Michigan State University fraternity was virtually shut down after some pledges wore T-shirts bearing anti-gay remarks earlier this month.

At **Penn** State University, a Palestinian student organization was allowed to post cartoons many consider anti-Semitic on its Web site.

And at Auburn University, some students are fighting suspension for wearing blackface and Ku **Klux Klan–style** robes to fraternity parties.

So are these issues free speech or hate speech? Some universities would argue that they are **both—and** scholars, students and civil rights activists have debated for decades how to find balance on the issue.

"Speech, hateful as it might be, needs the room to be expressed," **Simone** Himbeault Taylor, assistant vice president for student affairs at the University of Michigan, told the *Lansing State Journal* for a recent story. "It's a very delicate issue, dealing with language that is potentially damaging to students and, at the same time, staying true to our principles of free speech."

But **others—including** many students and minority **advocates—argue** universities are right to punish hateful speech when intolerance threatens students and their ability to learn.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, more than 300 schools instituted speech codes prohibiting certain forms of offensive speech, according to the California-based Markkula Center for Applied Ethics.

A series of successful legal challenges kept most of them from surviving. "Even if it's clearly hate speech, it's protected," said Terrell Jones, vice provost for educational equity at **Penn** State.

That's not a clear-cut argument, however. Many schools will punish students or groups for certain speech, using anti-harassment policies or federal laws stating that students are entitled to a hostility-free learning environment.

Almost all schools ban statements that threaten or encourage violence or attack an individual. They also outlaw statements that damage property, such as graffiti or vandalism.

Many groups—including the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Association of University Professors—agree education is the best solution to hate speech on college campuses.

"There are serious dangers in imposing a system of regulation which in effect says it's OK to say things we like, but you cannot say things which we dislike," said Jonathan Knight, associate secretary for the association.

The real danger is to students who are victimized by attacks, said David Warden, a member of Michigan State's gay and lesbian student group.

"Harassment has never been det ermined free speech," Warden said. "If I go around saying 'I hate the university,' that's fine. If I go down the street yelling T hate black people,' then that's attacking people." (Associated Press, April 28, 2002)

The question raised by hate speech, then, is whether it should be included under the definition of free speech cited in the First Amendment. In general, American courts have held that an American citizen may say anything she wishes unless her words create real and immediate danger for others (Walker 64–65). With this exception American courts have, historically, offered First Amendment protection to the content of speech or expressive acts. Until recently, for example, the courts treated flag burning and cross burning alike as expressions that are protected by the First Amendment. The act of burning a flag usually expresses anger at or disagreement with the policies of a government. The act of burning a cross has long been associated with the Ku Klux Klan and is widely regarded as a threat to groups singled out by the Klan for persecution: blacks, gays, Jews, and Catholics. You can readily see, then, how an act such as wearing Klanlike robes to a campus party could be taken by some as an act of hate speech—a symbolic attack on a group. However, distasteful as they may be to some people, flag burning and cross burning are both expressions of political or ideological speech, and hence they are ordinarily protected by the First Amendment.

Examination of the issue of hate speech by means of stasis theory discloses its available propositions and suggests as well the level and extent of preparation necessary to argue any of these. Often, rhetors have opinions about controversial issues before they are ever called to write or speak about them. If this is the case, a rhetor may use stasis theory to discover whether his opinion, expressed in a proposition, can be supported with strong and persuasive arguments. Use of the stases will also disclose arguments that can be used against his position, so that he can anticipate and refute these.

Step 1. *Decide whether to formulate the question generally or specifically.*
Possible General Formulations of the Question

Does hate speech occur? (conjecture)

What is hate speech exactly? (definition)

Is hate speech a good or a bad thing? (quality)

Should hate speech be regulated? (policy)

Possible Specific Formulations of the Question

Does hate speech occur on my campus? (conjecture)

What forms does it take on my campus? (definition)

Is hate speech a bad thing on my campus? (quality)

Should hate speech be regulated here? (policy)

This analysis demonstrates that very different kinds of research are necessary to argue the question as a thesis and as a hypothesis. The general questions require the rhetor to examine the state of affairs on campuses across the country, to examine American values regarding good manners and the limits of expression, and to consider whether regulation of hate speech violates other American practices and policies (such as freedom of speech). A thorough discussion of the question at this level of generality would require at least a book-length treatment and a good deal of specialized knowledge as well—knowledge about constitutional law, for instance.

The specific questions would require much less preparation and composition, although their scope is still quite large. To answer the first or second hypothetical questions would require some informal research: questioning friends or acquaintances, reading through back issues of the campus newspaper. More formal research might include compiling a list of questions to ask of people who claim to have heard hate speech or assembling an attitude survey about its effects on the campus climate. Once a rhetor has documented a list of occurrences of hate speech, she can define it as it occurs on her campus and classify its forms. Either of these questions could be answered in a discourse of three or four pages. Answers to the third hypothetical question, however, are more difficult to compose since they require an understanding of the educational values of the university in question and of its students. Answers to the fourth require study of the university's existing policies in this area, as well as an understanding of how such policies are generated, implemented, and enforced.

Circumstances sometimes force rhetors to use particular questions even when a general question might produce a more powerful argument. If the rhetor is president of the student body at My State University, for instance, she might be suspected of evading her responsibility to represent students at that campus if she chooses to argue the general question. But circumstances may also prevent use of the particular questions. If no instances of hate speech can be documented on his campus, a rhetor who wishes to address the issues raised by its regulation must retreat to a more general formulation. The general formulations of the question do present him with some rhetorical advantages. If he chooses to argue any of them, he takes up the stand on his ground, which always works in a rhetor's favor. For example, a proposition based on the first general question might be constructed as follows:

Hate speech occurs with increasing frequency on American campuses.

Anyone who disagrees with this is forced to argue negatively, which is always more difficult:

> Hate speech never occurs on American campuses.

This is demonstrably untrue, since the controversy surrounding hate speech would not arise at all unless someone, somewhere, had used it. This rhetor can modify his negative stance a bit:

> Hate speech occurs so seldom that its use is unimportant or negligible.

This is still a weak proposition, since its probability is diminished by the very fact that hate speech is being discussed.

Step 2. *If you choose to treat the question generally, decide whether to state it theoretically or practically.*

> Theoretical questions ask why people behave as they do; practical questions investigate actual human behavior.

A General Question, Stated Theoretically

> Is the use of hate speech natural (or unnatural) to human beings?

On

> Do people use hate speech because of their upbringing or education or habits, or because their friends and acquaintances use it?

A General Question, Stated Practically

> What happens when people use hate speech?

This analysis reveals that, as usual, the practical question would be much easier to prepare and argue (although none of these questions are simple ones). The practical question requires only a study of the practice and its effects, while the theoretical questions inquire into human psychology and sociology. A successful answer to the practical question requires only some empirical evidence about what happens when people use hate speech.

Steps 1 and 2 demonstrate the scope of various arguments on a given question. That is, they show the size of various questions and, hence, supply a quick estimate of the work and time required to compose an argument in support of each one. Rhetors can also use stasis theory to get a sense of how much research will be necessary in order to argue a given issue. Practicing rhetors need to know whether they have the resources to do justice to a given formulation of an issue. Use of the stases will help them to decide very quickly.

Step 3. *which of the four stases best describes the point at issue in the rhetorical situation at hand.*

Conjecture

> Is there an act to be considered? That is, has someone used hate speech in some relevant situation? If hate speech has occurred, try to describe the incidents as accurately and as persuasively as possible (see Quintilian's

advice for doing this in Chapter 10, on arrangement). If no incidents of hate speech have occurred, this stasis is not relevant in this case. Move to the next stasis. If such incidents have occurred, however, an examination of conjecture may produce useful arguments.

Questions to Ask About Conjecture

(1) Does hate speech exist? Someone who is opposed to regulation of hate speech could argue that it doesn't exist. To do so, this rhetor can resort to the question of definition in order to define hate speech in such a way that whatever incident stimulated the discussion is not included. For example, rhetors at Auburn or Michigan State could define "hate speech" so that the term excludes wearing clothing that is offensive to some groups. How widespread is its use? Is it confined to a few small groups of people, or is the general climate permeated with it? A rhetor who supports the regulation of hate speech should catalogue as many incidents of its use as she can find. (2) How did it begin? Answers to this question require some empirical research. When did hate speech first occur in the relevant situation? (3) What causes it? Proponents of regulation can argue that hate speech originates in some unsavory source such as racism, sexism, or religious bigotry. Opponents of regulation can argue that it stems from less offensive sources such as carelessness or high spirits. (4) Can it be changed? Proponents of regulation can argue that implementation of a policy prohibiting the use of hate speech can change students' behavior, thus stopping its use. Opponents can argue that such regulations will not change behavior or will only force students to utter hateful remarks in private.

Definition

How can the act be defined? If white students dress up as members of the Ku Klux Klan for a party, for example, is that hate speech? How would a rhetor have to define hate speech in order to include this behavior? If you think that something that happened on your campus is an instance of hate speech, compose a definition of hate speech that can include it (see the discussion of definition in Chapter 9). Your definition should also allow you to take up your stand on defensible ground. For example, if you define hate speech as "all utterances that are offensive," you risk including justifiable criticism of someone's behavior under the heading of hate speech. In case there are no relevant instances of hate speech to be defined, move to the next stasis.

Questions to Ask About Definition

(1) What kind of thing is it? Is hate speech an example of racist, sexist, or bigoted behavior or attitudes? Or is it an example of high spirits, careless good fun, blowing off steam? Must an utterance be backed by an intent to offend in order to be classed as hate speech? Someone who supports regulation of hate speech might define those who oppose him as insensitive clods who underestimate the power of language to wound and offend oth-

ers. An opponent of its regulation might define those who support regulation as extraordinarily sensitive persons who mistake idle chatter for offensive language. (2) To what larger class of things does it belong? Perhaps hate speech belongs among the kinds of speech protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. In this case, it can't be regulated in America. Indeed, many hate speech codes enacted in American universities during the 1990s were found unconstitutional by the courts. Some European countries, in contrast, have recently taken steps to curb the proliferation of hate speech on the Internet. They can do so either because their constitutions have no free-speech clause or because their court systems have interpreted *free speech* more narrowly than do American courts. (3) What are its parts? Are racist, sexist, heterosexist, and religiously bigoted remarks the only kinds of hate speech? Does hate speech include remarks that slur a person's abilities? His or her appearance? Do "offensive utterances" include pornography? Slang? Four-letter words? Does they include acts, such as wearing Klan robes or burning crosses? Does the use of racist remarks bear any relation to the use of sexist or **hetrosexist** remarks? To religiously bigoted remarks?

Quality

How serious is the act? This is a challenging question with regard to the issue of hate speech. Answers to questions of quality nearly always depend on what is valued in a given community. Depending on their ideology, some rhetors may hold that the use of hate speech is very serious indeed, since it violates the American belief that everyone has the right to be treated equally and with respect (see Chapter 4, on ideology and the **common**places). Others may feel that even though hate speech is serious, it is primarily a violation of good manners. Others may think it's not very serious at all. Some people may feel that some instances of hate speech are worse than others; women, for example, may feel quite offended by gender-biased representations. Recently at Harvard some women were offended by a nine-foot snow sculpture of an erect penis, arguing that the sculpture symbolized **masculinist** power to control or harm women. Depending on their circumstances and ideology, some persons will think this is not hate speech at all, or at least that it is not as serious as the use of words **like** *fag, bitch,* or *cripple.* Others, like the women at Harvard, take it very seriously indeed.

Simple Questions of Quality

(1) Is hate speech good or bad? Hate speech is widely regarded as a bad practice, since it breeds divisiveness and unhappiness. Conceivably, a rhetor who opposes the regulation of hate speech could argue that its use is sometimes a good thing, since verbal wounds are not as serious as physical ones. That is, he could argue that people must be allowed to express their hatred verbally so that they need not resort to physical violence. (2) Should hate speech be sought or avoided? Rhetors who support regulation

of hate speech can argue that rules prohibiting it will force people to avoid its use. Rhetors who oppose regulation of hate speech can argue that rules forbidding it will cause people to seek out instances of its use in the hope of bringing users to justice. (3) Is hate speech right or wrong? Answers to this question of quality depend upon a rhetor's religious or moral beliefs. For example, a rhetor might, on one hand, cite Jesus Christ's teaching that humans should love their neighbors as themselves; the use of hate speech is wrong in terms of this religious injunction. On the other hand, a rhetor might cite the First Amendment, which protects the right of Americans to utter their opinions without fear of reprisal, and argue that the use of hate speech is protected by this legal injunction. (4) Is hate speech honorable or dishonorable? If, on one hand, a rhetor has defined hate speech as an attempt to belittle others, its use is certainly not honorable. If she has defined it as a satisfactory alternative to violence, on the other hand, its use is honorable.

Comparative Questions of Quality

(1) Is the unregulated use of hate speech better or worse than a related state of affairs? An opponent of regulation might argue that if the use of hate speech is regulated, students will not feel free to express their opinions on anything. This repressive state of affairs is certainly not preferable to that wherein all speech, even hate speech, is tolerated. (2) Is the use of hate speech more or less desirable than alternatives? A proponent of regulation can argue that the current state of affairs, wherein hate speech runs rampant, is less preferable than one in which students think carefully before they utter remarks that offend others. (3) Is the state of affairs where hate speech is unregulated better or worse than alternatives? This question calls upon rhetors to establish priorities among their values. Is absolute freedom of speech more important than the less offensive climate brought about by regulation of speech? (4) Is the state of affairs in which hate speech is unregulated more or less honorable than alternatives? People who oppose regulation can argue that the existence of policies controlling speech demonstrates that the policy makers do not trust individuals to behave honorably. People who support regulation can argue that people have demonstrated by their use of hate speech that they cannot behave honorably without regulation by external authority.

Policy

Should this act be submitted to some formal procedure? Or how can this policy be implemented? This stasis is relevant in this case only if a rhetor supports or rejects the implementation of a policy regarding hate speech. If you simply wish to take a position on the use, definition, or value of hate speech, careful and thorough use of the first three stases is sufficient to raise the relevant questions. If you wish to implement a policy that will regulate hate speech, however, you must compose it, and be sure to demonstrate how it will serve its intended function. To do this, you can look at the **poli-**

cies used at other universities. Here, for instance, is a policy on intolerance that was adopted at Penn State:

Purpose

The University is committed to creating an educational environment which is free from intolerance directed toward individuals or groups and strives to create and maintain an environment that fosters respect for others. As an educational institution, the University has a mandate to address problems of a society deeply ingrained with bias and prejudice. Toward that end, the University provides educational programs and activities to create an environment in which diversity and understanding of other cultures are valued.

Actions motivated by intolerance violate the principles upon which American society is built and serve to destroy the fabric of the society we share. Such actions not only do untold and unjust harm to the dignity, safety and well-being of those who experience this pernicious kind of discrimination but also threaten the reputation of the University and impede the realization of the University's educational mission.

Definition

Intolerance refers to an attitude, feeling or belief in furtherance of which an individual acts to intimidate, threaten or show contempt for other individuals or groups based on characteristics such as age, ancestry, color, disability or handicap, national origin, political belief, race, religious creed, sex, sexual orientation or veteran status.

Policy

Acts of intolerance will not be tolerated at The Pennsylvania State University. The University is committed to preventing and eliminating acts of intolerance by faculty, staff and students, and encourages anyone in the University community to report concerns and complaints about intolerance to the Affirmative Action Office or the Office of the Vice Provost for Educational Equity, and in cases involving students, reports also may be made to the Office of Judicial Affairs.

Sanctions will be imposed for any violation of University policy, rule or regulation. When the violation is motivated by intolerance toward an individual or group based on characteristics such as age, ancestry, color, disability or handicap, national origin, political belief, race, religious creed, sex, sexual orientation, veteran status or political belief, the sanction will be increased in severity and may include expulsion from the University.

The University prohibits retaliation against anyone who files a complaint and/or participates in an investigation involving alleged acts of intolerance.

Expression of Opinion

The expression of diverse views and opinions is encouraged in the University community. Further, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution assures the right of free expression. In a community which recognizes the

rights of its members to hold divergent views and to express those views, sometimes ideas are expressed which are contrary to University values and objectives. Nevertheless, the University cannot impose disciplinary sanctions upon such expression when it is otherwise in compliance with University regulations. (guru.psu.edu/policies/AD29.html)

As you can see, Penn State's administration defines intolerance in fairly sweeping terms. However, in the final paragraph the authors of the policy qualify their intolerance for intolerance when it comes to speech, saying that the university cannot discipline "expression of opinion" that is contrary to university values if it does not break other campus codes. This is a clever way to regulate offensive behavior while allowing for freedom of speech. Clearly the authors of this statement have given a good deal of thought to the formulation of rules and procedures that will contribute to a congenial campus climate.

If you want to implement, change, or rescind a policy or a procedure, you should find out how policies are generated and implemented at your university or in your community: that is, what committees make policy, where and how policies are published, and who enforces them once they are in place.

EXERCISES

1. Select one of the issues you worked with in the last exercise of Chapter 1. Try to frame the theoretical and practical questions it raises. To determine the theoretical questions, ask yourself, What is the nature or origin of this issue? To determine the practical questions, ask yourself what effects the issue has on people, what is expected of people, what people should do.

   Now try to frame the issue in general, specific, and very specific terms. When you finish this exercise, you should have a list of questions that help you see how much work will be required to argue the issue you have chosen at any level of generality and in theoretical or practical terms. You may discover ways to argue about this issue that you had not thought about before. You should also have a sense of how much research you will need to do to argue the question you eventually choose to pursue.

2. Select one of the issues you worked with in the last exercise in Chapter 1 and examine it using the questions suggested by stasis theory. The first time you try this, you may wish to use our examples as models. But since every issue is different (because every rhetorical situation is different), you will soon discover that our models don't raise all the relevant questions for your issue and that they do raise some questions that are not relevant to your issue.

3. Find a compelling letter or **op-ed** piece on the editorial page of your college or community newspaper. Write up a brief analysis of the argument that appears in this letter. Here are some questions to ask: What is the issue under debate? Given the writer's account of the issue, can you determine at what stasis the argument seems to lie? That is, does the argument rest at conjecture (X exists; X is a problem)? Definition (X is this kind of thing or event)? Quality (X is a good or a bad thing)? Policy (what should we do)? Can you determine the position that is being argued against? That is, what position or positions is the writer attacking? Can the writer achieve stasis with his opponents, given the way he has stated the issue and the ground upon which he has taken his stand?

4. The argument about a dark-sky ordinance actually took place in Flagstaff, Arizona. Here is an excerpt of an editorial about the ordinance, taken from the Web site of the local newspaper, the *Arizona Daily Sun:*

RECOGNITION OF FLAGSTAFF'S DARK SKIES OVERDUE

It's rare for a city of 53,000 to be a world leader in anything. Most civic leaders in cities that size are just glad to have their burg make the *Rand-McNally Atlas* and the listing of state temperatures on the Weather page.

So when someone challenges you at a party to name one thing at which Flagstaff has no peer, you can not only say "world's darkest skies" but offer proof. The International Dark-Sky Association will honor Flagstaff next Wednesday as its first International Dark Sky City in recognition of its leadership on the issue....

Flagstaff, with five observatories, has long had a vested interest in reducing light pollution, dating back to the world's first ban on searchlights in 1958. In 1973, Flagstaff was one of the first cities to adopt a comprehensive dark sky ordinance, which was strengthened in 1988 with a law addressing the total amount of light used. The city is also reviewing all of its own lighting with an eye toward bringing fixtures like the ballfield lights at Thorpe Park into compliance by next year. ...

Following the city's lead, Coconino County has proposed a tightening of its lighting code that will affect service stations, convenience stores and other business, even in remote parts of the county far removed from Flagstaff's observatories. We think dark skies, from the Grand Canyon to Page to Flagstaff, should be a hallmark of all northern Arizona, and we urge supervisors to pass appropriate lighting codes to keep them that way. (azdailysun.com, September 19, 2001)

Clearly, the writer of this editorial thinks that the dark-sky ordinance is a good thing for the community. Imagine that you oppose this position, and use the stases to work out an argument questioning or rejecting the worth of a darkened sky. You can find more information about dark-sky ordinances and related issues at http://www.darksky.org.

NOTE

1. The system of questions given here does not appear in any ancient thinker's work. We have generalized the four questions we feature out of primary and secondary classical sources (for an illuminating if complex account of competing ancient traditions of stasis, see Quintilian's painstaking discussion in the third book of the *Institutes*). Our system is a hybrid, although it is the same one that George Kennedy reconstructs for Hermagoras's lost treatise (307-08). In particular, our consideration of policy along with the other three stases is a departure from ancient stasis theory, since the ancients usually classed policy with questions of law (forensic rhetoric), while the first three stases we discuss were ordinarily associated with deliberative rhetoric.

WORKS CITED

Kennedy, George. *The Art of Persuasion in Greece.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Smolla, Rodney. *Free Speech in an Open Society.* New York: Vintage, 1993.

Sprague, Rosamond Kent. *"Dissoi Logoi,* or *Dialexis," Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 77:* 306 (April 1968): 155-67.

Sprague, Rosamond Kent, trans. *The Older Sophists.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972.

Walker, Samuel. *Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994.

THE COMMON TOPICS AND THE COMMONPLACES: FINDING THE AVAILABLE MEANS

*For just as all kinds of produce are not provided by every country, and as you will not succeed in finding a particular bird or beast, **if** you are ignorant **of the** localities where it has its usual haunts or birthplace, as even the various kinds of **fish** flourish in different surroundings, some preferring a smooth and others a rocky bottom, and are found on different shores and in diverse **regions** . . . so not every kind of argument can be derived from every circumstance, and consequently our search **requ** ires discrim **ination**.*

—Quintilian,
Institutes V x 21

PERHAPS THE SYSTEM of invention most often associated with ancient rhetoric is that referred to by both ancient and modern rhetoricians as the topics (Greek *topos,* "place") or the commonplaces (Latin *locis communis).* The word *place* was originally meant quite literally. Lists of topics were first written on papyrus rolls, and students who were looking for a specific topic unrolled the papyrus until they came to the place on the roll where that topic was listed. Later, this graphic meaning of *place* was applied conceptually, to mean an intellectual source or region harboring a proof that could be inserted into any discourse where appropriate. Even later, the terms *topic* and *place* referred to formal or structural inventive strategies, like definition, division, or **classification** (see Chapter 9, on sophistic topics, for more information about the formal topics).

Ancient rhetoricians often described the places as though they were hidden away somewhere. Quintilian, for example, defined the topics as "the secret places where arguments reside, and from which they must be drawn forth" (V x 20). Just as hunters and fishermen need to know where to look for specific kinds of prey, rhetoricians need to be skilled at tracking down suitable proofs. Quintilian's

students must have used the topics much as hikers use trail markers—to point them in the right direction to take through the wilderness of all possible proofs. As Cicero wrote to his friend Trebatius, "It is easy to find things that are hidden if the hiding place is pointed out and marked; similarly if we wish to track down some argument we ought to know the places or topics" *(Topics,* I 7).

Some modern scholars treat the topics as representations of structures in the human mind, arguing that they describe the processes everybody uses to think with. But this interpretation gives the topics a modern coloring, because it focuses invention on minds or brains rather than on language. The only ancient treatises that lend themselves to such a reading are Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Topics.* However, Aristotle also discussed topics drawn from the operations of the Greek language (as in *Topics* I vii, for example), and he drew as well from the ethical and political issues that confronted fourth-century Athenians (as in *Rhetoric* I iv).

There are two ancient terms for these features of ancient rhetorical theory because ancient rhetors spoke both Greek and Latin. We will take advantage of this duality by using the terms *topic* and *commonplace* to mean different things, even though the terms were used interchangeably in ancient thought. We adopt the term *topic* to refer to any specific procedure that generates arguments, such as definition and division or comparison and contrast. We use the term *commonplace* to refer to statements that circulate within ideologies. This should not be taken to imply that topics are not implicated with ideology, however, because the very processes we think with—difference and similarity and the like—may be ideologically constructed.

Nor should the ancient topics be confused with the modern use of the term *topic.* In modern thought, topics exist either in a body of knowledge that must be learned or in a thinker's review of her experiences. When modern teachers ask students to assemble a list of topics to write about, they mean that students are to select some piece of knowledge found in books, or in other research, or in some personal experience, as subjects that can be discussed in writing. For ancient rhetoricians, in contrast, topics existed in the structures of language or in the issues that concerned the community. That is why they were called *common*—they were available to anyone who spoke or wrote the language in which they were couched and who was reasonably familiar with the ethical and political discussions taking place in the community. Since the topics yield propositions and proofs drawn from daily discussion and debate—the common sense of a community—they cannot easily be separated from consideration of political, ethical, social, economic, and philosophical issues.

ANCIENT TOPICAL TRADITIONS

Humans have used topics for a very long time. Some historians of rhetoric think they may be related to a memory device used during very ancient times by poets called rhapsodes, who traveled about the countryside recit-

ing epic and lyric poetry and telling stories of the gods. Before the time when writing was readily available to most people, rhapsodes recited long poems from memory, and they accomplished this partly by relying on bits of lines or images that they could insert into any recitation wherever they needed a transition or a description or a way to fill out the meter of a line. The poets who are now known collectively as "Homer" probably repeated phrases like "rosy-fingered dawn" and "the wine-dark sea" to help them remember what came next while they recited lengthy poems (see Chapter 12, on memory).

By the sixth or fifth centuries BCE, rhetoricians might have used topics in the same way, memorizing a stock of arguments that were general enough to be inserted into any speech. Because they had this stock, rhetors were ready to speak on the spot whenever necessary simply by combining and expanding upon the appropriate topics. By examining several topics and amplifying each one, rhetors could lengthen any speech to fit the time allotted them by a rhetorical situation. In the dialogue called *Menexenus,* Plato gives us a glimpse of how this might have been done:

> Yesterday I heard Aspasia composing a funeral oration about these very dead. For she had been told, as you were saying, that the Athenians were going to choose a speaker, and she repeated to me the sort of speech which he should deliver—partly improvising and partly from previous thought, putting together fragments of the funeral oration which Pericles spoke, but which, as I believe, she composed. (236b)

In other words, Aspasia used parts of an earlier, similar speech she had composed in making up a new one. These fragments may have been what were later called topics or commonplaces. They would certainly include arguments that praised the dead, and there might be topics of blame used against people thought to have caused the death, as well. Praise and blame are epideictic topics, suitable for use on ceremonial occasions such as funerals. Ancient rhetors and rhetoricians also developed topics appropriate for use in the courtroom and in the assembly, where forensic and deliberative discourse are practiced.

After writing became readily available, lists of topics that had previously served as memory devices could more easily be preserved. Ancient rhetoricians produced at least three topical traditions. One of these is ordinarily identified with sophistic teachers like Tisias and Corax, Theodorus, or Thrasymachus, who may have written the first rhetorical handbooks. No one knows for sure whether any of the Older Sophists wrote handbooks, but if they did, the sections on invention probably contained lists of stock arguments or topics that could be inserted into any discourse. Aristotle developed this sophistic tradition into a complete theory of topical invention, as we shall see later in this chapter.

Two topical traditions were in use during the Hellenistic period and in Roman rhetoric, and both were based on Aristotelian texts. The first was drawn from the *Rhetoric,* the second from the *Topics.* The second tradition

appeared prominently in Cicero, Quintilian, and minor rhetoricians and is the system most often referred to by modern rhetoricians when they discuss classical invention. Some of the topics delineated in this tradition—division, classification, and similarity/difference—survive in modern composition textbooks, where they are usually treated as means of arrangement rather than invention. We discuss these sophistic topics in a later chapter of this book because they can be used as means of arrangement as well as invention.

ARISTOTLE'S TOPICAL SYSTEM

The topical system delineated in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is tightly bound to the system of logical proofs that he erected in his treatises on logic, dialectic, and poetry as well as those on rhetoric and the topics. These treatises taken together reveal in great detail his assumptions about how language can be put to work as a heuristic, a method of finding proofs to use when debating any issue. Like the sophistic topics, Aristotle's topics comply with intellectual assumptions that are far distant in time and space from our own. Thus they display the foreignness of ancient rhetorical thought more graphically than many of its other features. Nevertheless, Aristotle's topical system is still useful when updated to account for the commonplaces used in contemporary ideologies.

Aristotle probably did not invent the topics that appear in the *Rhetoric*. They had most likely been in circulation for many years among traveling sophists and teachers. His contribution was to devise a classification scheme for the topics. He divided rhetorical topics into two kinds: those that were suited to any argument at all (the *koina* or **common topics)** and those that belonged to some specific field of argument (the *eide,* or **special topics)** *(Rhetoric* I ii 21). The three common topics are

1. Whether a thing has (or has not) occurred or will (or will not) occur;
2. Whether a thing is greater or smaller than another thing, and
3. What is (and is not) possible.

Scholars call these common topics **past/future fact; greater/lesser,** or magnitude; and **possible/impossible.** For simplicity's sake we refer to them here as conjecture, **degree,** and **possibility.** You will note some conceptual overlap with the questions delineated in stasis theory. That is not surprising, because ancient teachers of rhetoric were eclectic; they adopted any useful teaching tactic that came to hand without being careful to distinguish sophistic traditions from each other or from Aristotelian thought. We thought it important to retain the term *conjecture* even at the risk of some confusion between systems of invention, because it best conveys the special meaning that ancient teachers conveyed when speaking about things or events perceived in the world.

According to Aristotle, the common topics belonged exclusively to rhetoric because they do not discuss any particular class of things; rather, they are useful for discussing anything whatever. Aristotle apparently developed the category of common topics in order to support his argument that rhetoric was a universal art of investigation. Some authorities on the *Rhetoric* argue that the common topics represent all the kinds of rhetorical questions that can be debated. In other words, an issue has to fall into one of these three categories in order to be available for discussion at all. Other scholars argue that the common topics help people to invent proofs for propositions drawn from the specific arts, chiefly politics and ethics, to which the universal art of rhetoric is most closely related (I ii 1356a). Whatever Aristotle intended the common topics to do, they can still prove useful to people who are looking for good arguments.

The special topics, in contrast, dealt with specific arts and sciences. Aristotle delineated a great many special topics belonging to fields of discourse such as politics, ethics, and law. The special topics of politics, for example, are "finances, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws" *(Rhetoric* I iv 7; Kennedy 53). He pointed out that rhetors need a good deal of specific knowledge to argue from special topics. One who would discuss war and peace, for example, must be able to assess the strength of his country's defenses and that of supposed enemies; must know the history of relations between the two countries; and must study the war-making capabilities of anyone "with whom there is the possibility of war" (I iv 9; Kennedy 54). We have departed from Aristotle, and from rhetorical tradition altogether, by treating Aristotle's special topics under the heading of "commonplaces."

The Topic of Past and Future Fact (Conjecture)

The English word *fact* is ordinarily used to translate the Greek term for "conjecture." However, the facts that can be uncovered by this **common**place are not irrefutable physical facts in the modern sense; rather, they are educated guesses about something that probably took place in the past or present or about something that will take place in the future. The topic of past conjecture is useful in courtrooms, where it is often necessary to speculate about whether something happened or did not happen, while the topic of future conjecture is often used in deliberative assemblies, such as state legislatures, which have the responsibility to make policy that will be binding on future generations.

Contemporary rhetors resort to the topic of conjecture in order to describe the way things are: what people are like, what the world is like, what society is like.[1] Such conjectures may include portraits of a community's history (past conjecture), as well as pictures of its future (future conjecture). Proponents of a given political position can use this topic to argue that certain features of a given society exist, while others don't. For instance, proponents of the current state of economic affairs can conjecture

that even though the national economy is not as strong as it previously was, it is still functioning: the stock market has not closed and inflation has been held at bay. Critics of the current state of affairs, in contrast, can conjecture that the stock market is not the best predictor of economic health and that the level of unemployment, which is a more accurate indicator, is rising. Here are some statements to consider under

The Common Topic of Conjecture

    What exists

    What does not exist

    The size or extent of what exists

    How things used to be (past conjecture)

    How things will be in the future (future conjecture)

Strange as it may seem, rhetors often disagree vigorously about what exists and how extensive it is. As we write, inspectors from the United Nations are in Iraq attempting to determine whether that country has stockpiled weapons of mass destruction to an extent that is not acceptable under international law. Iraq's leader says it has not done so, and he has produced a large study to substantiate this claim. Leaders of the United States and other countries, however, conjecture that Iraq has stockpiled illegal amounts of these weapons, but they have as yet offered no proof of that claim.

Here is another example of an argument about conjecture: One of us taught a class concerning the rhetoric of political correctness. A few students in the class argued that there is no such thing as political correctness, while others argued that political correctness did indeed exist on our campus and that it exerted pressure on students to be careful not to say anything that offended identifiable groups of people. When asked to define "political correctness," members of the class settled on this definition: "Political correctness means not giving offense." We read some books about political correctness whose authors agreed that it exists but disagreed both about what it is and about its extent or seriousness. In *Illiberal Education,* Dinesh D'Souza argued that political correctness is "an unofficial ideology" that generates pressure to conform among students and faculty at American universities (xv). According to John K. Wilson, however, conservatives like D'Souza use the term "to convey the image of a vast conspiracy controlling American colleges and universities" (4). When used by contemporary conservatives, according to Wilson,

> political correctness described a broad movement that had corrupted the entire system of higher education. By this transformation the conservatives accuse universities of falling under the influence of extremist elements. For conservatives, "I'm not politically correct" became a badge of honor, a defense against a feared attack—even though no one had been seriously accused of being politically incorrect. (4)

In other words, D'Souza conjectured political correctness as a powerful ideology that stifles freedom of speech on American campuses. Wilson conjectured political correctness as itself a rhetoric mounted by conservatives in order to brand universities as hotbeds of coercive liberal or leftist thought. Both of these conjectures take the issue of political correctness far more seriously than did the students who conjectured it to be a matter of **etiquette**— a way of speaking that doesn't give offense.

From a rhetorician's point of view, nothing is to be gained by trying to determine which of these conjectures about political correctness is true. Persons who accept either of them believe they are true because each stems from and affirms a **worldview—an** ideology. What is important for rhetors is (a) to understand the commonplaces deployed in each of these conjectures and how they are implicated in ideological positions, and (b) to determine the actual or potential effects of each conjecture in order to decide which causes the least public harm.

Here is another example of the way conjecture works in contemporary American discourse. Stephanie Coontz, who teaches courses about the history of the family, asks her students to write down images of "the traditional family." In her book *The Way We Never Were,* Coontz lists some of those images:

> One is of extended families in which all members worked together; grandparents were an integral part of family life, children learned responsibility and the work ethic from their elders, and there were clear lines of authority based on respect for age. Another is of nuclear families in which nurturing mothers sheltered children from premature exposure to sex, financial worries, or other adult concerns, while fathers taught adolescents not to sacrifice their education by going to work too early. Still another image gives pride of place to the couple relationship. In traditional families, my students **write—half** derisively, half **wistfully—men** and women remained chaste until marriage, at which time they extricated themselves from competing obligations to kin and neighbors and committed themselves wholly to the marital relationship, experiencing an all-encompassing intimacy that our more crowded modern life seems to preclude. (8)

Needless to say, all of these images are conjectures that are associated with the commonplace of "traditional family values." Coontz argues in her book that the rhetorical conjecture of the traditional family had practical, real-life downsides for both men and women, downsides that never appeared on *Leave It to Beaver* and *The Donna Reed Show:*

> All women, even seemingly docile ones, were deeply mistrusted. They were frequently denied the right to serve on juries, convey property, make contracts, take out credit cards in their own name, or establish residence. A 1954 article in *Esquire* called working wives a "menace"; a *Life* author termed married women's employment a "disease." Women were excluded from several professions, and some states even gave husbands total control over family finances.

There were not any permissible alternatives to baking brownies, experimenting with new canned soups, and getting rid of stains around the collar.

Men were also pressured into acceptable family roles, since lack of a suitable wife could mean the loss of a job or promotion for a middle-class man. Bachelors were categorized as "immature," infantile," "narcissistic," "deviant," or even "pathological." Family advice expert Paul Landis argued: "Except for the sick, the badly crippled, the deformed, the emotionally warped and the mentally defective, almost everyone has an opportunity (and, by clear implication, a duty) to marry."(32-33)

Coontz's argument is itself a mixture of conjectures and the extrinsic proofs called "testimony." For rhetoricians, it is worth asking what rhetorical and actual, practical effects would have occurred if Coontz's conjecture about family life in the 1950s had been portrayed in media of the period more frequently than it was. In recent movies such as *Far from Heaven* (2002) and *Pleasantville* (1998), directors and producers have portrayed the American family of the 1950s as Coontz conjectures it to have been. This suggests, perhaps, that sufficient time has passed so that the commonplace conjectures about traditional American family life associated with Beaver Cleaver have become available for argument.

The Common Topic of Greater/Lesser (Degree)

Aristotle anchored his discussion of the topic of greater and lesser in his notion of the golden mean. We know that which is great, he wrote, when it is compared to the normal; likewise for that which is small (I vii 1363b). "Greater" and "smaller" are always relative to each other: greatness can be measured by the fact that it exceeds something else, while smallness is always exceeded by something else. The relation of these terms is easy enough to illustrate with examples from the physical world: if the average person is about five feet eight inches tall, then the average basketball player will be taller since this class of people is marked to some extent by the requisite of tallness. But more difficult, and more interesting, applications of the topic occur when we move to the realm of values. To call someone "a great leader" implies a norm against which greatness is measured—the average leader. The implied existence of such a norm also opens the possibility that lesser leaders exist.

Ancient Athenian citizens apparently agreed on a list of common public values. At any rate, ancient rhetoric texts regularly list goodness, justice, honor, and expediency as important values. While these terms obviously do not mean the same thing to us as they meant to ancient rhetors and teachers, we can still use them to name values that are commonly cited in our own public discourse. Certainly, contemporary rhetors often try to establish that their position is good, just, honorable, or expedient. These values can be phrased in terms of their opposites as well—what is bad, unjust, dishonorable, or inexpedient. The common topic of degree, which Aristotle called "greater and less" can be used, then, to establish the rela-

tions between degrees of goodness, justice, and so on. Rhetors can argue that some state of affairs is better, more just, more honorable, or more expedient than another, or less so. Using the topic of degree, they can also argue that changes in these values have occurred over time: some state of affairs is less good than it used to be, or will deteriorate in the future.

To return to an economic example we used in discussing conjecture: using the topic of degree, all parties in a discussion may agree that the present economic situation is not good compared to that of the recent past; however, they may disagree about whether or not this is relatively a good, just, honorable or expedient state of affairs. For example, a proponent of the current state of affairs, on one hand, can argue that economic decline is better than recession, since most people are still employed and can feed and clothe their families, thus stimulating the economy by spending. A critic of the current state of affairs, on the other hand, can use the same topic to argue that the relative good of gradual economic decline is offset by the fact that the very rich profit far more in periods of decline than do the poor and middle classes.

As this example demonstrates, the topic of greater/less can be applied generally or selectively: a rhetor can argue that what is good for one segment of the community is good for all; or she can argue that what is good for one group isn't necessarily good for everyone or isn't good for other groups in the community.

The Common Topic of Degree

What is greater than the mean or norm

What is lesser than the mean or norm

What is relatively greater than something else

What is relatively lesser than something else

What is good, just, beautiful, honorable, enjoyable, etc.

What is better, more just, etc.

What is less good, less just, etc.

What is good, etc., for all persons

What is good, etc., for a few persons or groups

What has been better, etc., in the past

What will be better, etc., in the future

The topic of degree obviously lends itself to questions of value. Let us return, then, to the issue of abortion in order to illustrate its argumentative possibilities. The analysis that follows touches on only a few of the many arguments opened by this rich topic.

Using degree, rhetors who oppose the legal status of abortion can argue that more abortions are performed when the practice is legal (that is, the number of abortions is greater under the current circumstances); a rhetor who supports the status quo can argue, though, that there are fewer

unsafe abortions performed when the operation is legal. But greater and lesser are not only relative to each other; there are relative degrees of magnitude and minuteness. So, the first rhetor could rejoin that if abortions were illegal, fewer abortions would be performed overall; this decrease in turn would reduce the relative number of unsafe abortions.

Tying the topic of degree to values, an opponent of abortion can argue that legal abortion is not a good thing; nor is it just, or enjoyable, or beautiful. Furthermore, relative to other means of birth control, abortion is less good. His opponent can argue, on the other hand, that abortion is better than bringing unwanted children into the world; that justice means extending the same rights to women that are extended to men (on the ground that men's reproductive practices are not legislated by the state); that while abortion is of course neither enjoyable nor beautiful, it is sometimes the only available practical alternative. An opponent of abortion can argue that while abortion may be good for individual women, it is obviously not good for the fetus; less obviously, it is not good for members of an immediate family or for society at large; a rhetor who supports abortion rights can argue that the availability of the practice is nonetheless better for women, who currently constitute a majority of the population. A rhetor who is opposed to abortion can argue that things were better (and more just and more honorable) in the past when abortion was not legal and women were forced either to bear every pregnancy to term or to undergo an illegal abortion. A rhetor who supports abortion rights, in contrast, can argue that things were worse in the past when alternative means of birth control were not available and women were forced either to bear every pregnancy to term or to seek out some back-alley practitioner. Finally, a rhetor who opposes abortion can argue that legal abortion is not good for future generations, who will lack the proper respect for human life if abortion becomes a routine option. A rhetor who supports abortion rights can argue that the future will be better if unwanted and uncared-for children are never brought into that world.

Our balanced list of value arguments about abortion may give the impression that we are indecisive or heartless (see Chapter 6, on ethos). We are not indecisive about this issue, and we are not insensitive to the emotional costs of abortion for all concerned parties. If we were actually arguing the issue of abortion for an audience, we would never present **all** of the arguments produced by the topic of degree. We would not even present all of the arguments in favor of our own positions (see Chapter 10, on arrangement). Here, however, for purposes of demonstration we have used the topic of degree as a heuristic in order to discover the wide range of arguments that are available on this or almost any issue. Our analysis also demonstrates that if rhetors examine all available arguments raised by the topics, they will come across arguments that follow from their position which may be distasteful to them. In other words, rhetors who use the topics vigorously and thoroughly must be prepared to turn up arguments that they do not like. Warning: thorough examination of an issue has been known to cause rhetors to change their minds.

The Common Topic of Possible/Impossible (Possibility)

Rhetors resort to the topic of **possible/impossible** in order to establish that change either is or isn't possible, now or in the future. For example, proponents of the current economic state of affairs might use this topic to argue that it is impossible for inflation to occur during a period of gradual economic decline. Critics can argue the opposite position, that it is possible for inflation to occur at such times. Rhetors using this topic can argue that it is impossible for the economy to become unstable today, but it might become so in six months or a year. A critic, though, can argue that it is entirely possible that current economic strategies will bring about instability in the marketplace. Strange as it may seem, rhetors can also argue about past possibilities: anthropologists do this when they argue about whether it was possible for some hypothetical set of events to have occurred in the past: Was it possible for *homo sapiens* to have developed a larger brain without an opposable thumb? Without an upright posture? Writers of popular nonfiction are especially fond of the commonplace of the past possible: Is it possible that an extraterrestrial vehicle crashed in the desert around Roswell, New Mexico, in 1947? Is it possible that President John F. Kennedy was killed not by a lone assassin but by a band of conspirators? Use of this topic also admits degrees of possibility or impossibility. While it may not be possible to stabilize economic prosperity for all groups, it may be more (or less) likely that this can be done in the future.

The Common Topic of Possibility

> What is possible
> What is impossible
> What is more or less possible
> What is possible in the future
> What is impossible in the future
> What was possible or impossible in the past

There are, no doubt, other ways to pose questions under the topic of possibility, but these should suffice to get you started.

We return to the issue of hate speech to illustrate the uses of this rich topic. Is it possible that hate speech occurs on our campus? A rhetor who opposes the implementation of a speech code could argue that it is impossible that students at Our State University would be tactless or insensitive enough to use language that offends people. An opponent could argue that, given the strain of student life, it is possible that ordinarily tactful and sensitive people could, on occasion, utter an offensive remark unless they were aware that the possibility exists that they could be punished for saying offensive things. Or, noting the existence of some group that is known for its opposition to another group, she could argue that it is quite possible that members of the first group could utter offensive remarks. Or, noting the currency of racism or sexism in our culture, she could argue that it is quite

possible that hate speech would be used on some occasion. Rhetors who oppose implementation of a speech code could argue that it is possible that such a code will stifle free speech. Arguing from relative possibilities, those who support a code could argue, alternatively, that its implementation increases the possibility that those who might otherwise utter offensive remarks will keep these to themselves.

The topic of possibility is also used regularly in discussions of abortion. Proponents of choice argue that it is not possible to stop women from having abortions by means of legislation against it. Opponents argue that it is possible to stop women from having abortions, and they seek to do so either by passing laws against it or by bringing the moral authority of the community to bear.

COMMONPLACES AND IDEOLOGY

Contemporary rhetoricians have a way of speaking about the *sensus communis,* or the common sense that is shared among members of a community: they call it ideology. As we suggested in the first chapter of this book, ideologies are bodies of **beliefs,** doctrines, familiar ways of thinking that are characteristic of a group or a culture. They can be economic, ethical, political, philosophical, or religious. When we call someone a capitalist or a socialist, we assume that she subscribes to a set of coherent beliefs about the best way to structure an economy. If we say that someone is a Christian, Muslim, or Jew, we imply that she holds a recognizable set of religious values. If we describe someone as a conservative or as a liberal, we imply that her political practices are guided by a distinct set of beliefs about human nature. If we refer to someone as a feminist or an environmentalist, we imply that his ethical, economic, social, and political practices are governed by a coherent philosophical position. Capitalism and socialism, Christianity, Islam and Judaism, conservatism and liberalism, feminism, and **environmentalism** are examples of ideologies.

As the preceding examples illustrate, some ideologies are more sweeping than others, some are highly respected in given cultures, and some are older or more powerful than others. In rhetoric, the power of an ideology is measured by the degree to which it influences the beliefs and actions of relatively large groups of relatively powerful people. Ideologies that are subscribed to by large groups of people are called "dominant" or "hegemonic" (from Greek *hegemoon,* "prince" or "guide"). Ideologies subscribed to by small or marginalized groups are called "subordinate" or "minority." The relations between dominant and subordinate ideologies are complex and they change over time. Forty years ago, for example, **environmental-**ism influenced the discourse and practice of only a **few** people; it was a distinctly subordinate or minority discourse in America. In the process of gaining wider support, environmentalism has challenged the hegemony of other, far more powerful **discourses—chiefly** those of individualism and capitalism. It has not yet succeeded in becoming a dominant ideology, pre-

cisely because it calls into question hegemonic discourses that are central to American thought. Environmentalism has not had much impact on the discourse of individualism, for example, as is attested by the resistance Americans have shown to buying smaller, less polluting vehicles and to cutting back on the amount of driving they do.

Even more confusing, several ideologies can be referred to by a single term: there are varieties of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, just as there are different kinds of feminism and environmentalism. All are subscribed to with varying degrees of faithfulness by people who are influenced by them. Some ideologies are so pervasive or have been in place for so long that the people who subscribe to them seldom actually articulate the beliefs that constitute them. *To articulate* can mean both "to speak" and "to connect to nearby things or concepts," and we hope that our readers will keep both meanings in mind when we use this word. As a general rule, the need to articulate deeply held ideological beliefs comes about only when some new ideological construct challenges an older one. Such is the case currently with vegetarianism, which, as we suggested in the first chapter of this book, has recently challenged the centrality of meat eating within American dietary beliefs and practices.

Ideologies can be held by a small group or an entire culture. No doubt the ideology held by each person results from life experiences and education. But even though ideologies grow out of experience, none is unique, because experiences, and our memories of them, are influenced by prevailing cultural attitudes about ethnicity, gender, class, appearance, and occupation, among a host of other things.

Commonplaces that make up an ideology sometimes contradict one another. Some thinkers about ideology argue that its function is precisely to smooth over contradictions in our lives. How can Americans be persuaded to go to war, for example, where the probability is high that the lives of loved ones will be put in danger? A skilled rhetor who urges our going to war can deploy commonplaces drawn from American patriotism to downplay fears of injury or death and to cause people to forget about the horrors of war.

Groups often coalesce around ideologies, such as environmentalism (Greenpeace, the Sierra Club) or fascism (American Nazi Party, skinheads). Groups also coalesce around specific issues: members of Operation Rescue are united by their opposition to abortion; members of NOW (the National Organization for Women) are united by their desire to enact legislation that will secure equality for women. Members of each of these groups may or may not share the same ideologies, however. Some members of Operation Rescue, for example, appear to oppose abortion on religious grounds, while others oppose it for moral or political or social reasons. Members of NOW may subscribe to a variety of feminisms—liberal, radical, cultural, materialist, third-wave, postmodern—and it is conceivable that a member of NOW may not be a feminist at all.

Some rhetoricians think that entire cultures may subscribe to a common ideology. E. D. Hirsch, for example, claims that there is a perceptible

American ideology that centers on values embedded in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. Hirsch describes America's "civil religion," as he calls it, as follows:

> Our civil ethos treasures patriotism and loyalty as high, though perhaps not ultimate, ideals and fosters the belief that the conduct of the nation is guided by a vaguely defined God. Our tradition places importance on carrying out the rites and ceremonies of our civil ethos and religion through the national flag, the national holidays, and the national anthem (which means "national hymn"), and supports the morality of tolerance and benevolence, of the Golden Rule, and communal cooperation. We believe in altruism and self-help, in equality, freedom, truth telling, and respect for the national law. Besides these vague principles, American culture fosters such myths about itself as its practicality, ingenuity, inventiveness, and independent-mindedness, its connection with the frontier, and its beneficence in the world (even when its leaders do not always follow beneficent policies). It acknowledges that Americans have the right to disagree with the traditional values but nonetheless acquiesce in the dominant civil ethos to the point of accepting imprisonment as the ultimate means of expressing dissent. (98-99)

Has Hirsch captured Americans' commonplace sense of what it means to be an American? Remember that commonplaces are not necessarily **true**— the distinguishing mark of a commonplace, rather, is that it is widely believed. Remember too that the commonplaces that make up an ideology sometimes contradict one another.

Take the value called "patriotism," for example. During the Vietnam war, those who opposed the United States' participation in that war were widely castigated as unpatriotic. A popular slogan, "America: love it or leave it," suggested that anyone who did not support the war did not support America and hence was not wanted in the country. Those who opposed the war, however, thought of themselves precisely as **patriots**—as people who loved their country and showed as much by dissenting from its foreign policy (an act that is quintessentially American, according to Hirsch). Some opponents of the war actually went to prison in order to express their dissent. The boxer Muhammad **Ali,** who was then called Cassius Clay, is probably the most famous person who was imprisoned for refusing to serve in the war. But thousands of other men were also incarcerated for burning their draft cards or otherwise refusing to be inducted into military service.

For rhetoricians, the point of this example is that while Americans may disagree about what counts as a patriotic act, the value of **patriotism—love** of **country—circulates** in American discourse with such power that it affects lives and actions. Disagreements about what patriotism is or about the specific acts that can be classified as patriotic (voting? serving in the military? speaking well of friends and ill of perceived enemies?) are arguments; that is, they can be subjected to invention (conjecture and definition in these examples), and rhetors can work toward achieving agreement about them. Patriotism itself, in contrast, has a second important status in

rhetoric if it is a fundamental tenet of American **ideology—that** is, if it is a commonplace in that ideology.

During the 1960s, conjectures about patriotism became available for argument; that is, there was sufficient disagreement about what constitutes patriotism that fierce discussion and even violence erupted over its meaning. That people were willing to do verbal and physical battle over this value suggests that its status as a commonplace was then in jeopardy. People do not generally make arguments about values that are so fundamental to their belief systems that they literally "go without saying" or can be "taken for granted." Both phrases in quotes are shorthand ways of describing an interesting feature of commonplaces, which are so basic to a mode of thought and behavior that people who subscribe to them may remain unaware of their allegiance to them. Commonplaces are, literally, "taken for **granted"—they** are statements that everyone assumes already to be satisfactorily proven. So no one bothers to discuss them. Today it seems that patriotism has returned to its status as a commonplace that virtually "goes without saying." As we write, however, politicians and journalists are discussing reinstatement of the military draft. We cannot predict the outcome of this argument, but we can say with assurance that arguments about reinstating the draft will be saturated with references to patriotism and struggles over its meaning.

Here is another list of American commonplaces, written this time by Howard Zinn, whose politics are to the left of Hirsch's:

> We grow up in a society where our choice of ideas is limited and where certain ideas dominate: We hear them from our parents, in the schools, in the churches, in the newspapers, and on radio and television. They have been in the air ever since we learned to walk and talk. They constitute an American *ideology—***that** is, a dominant pattern of ideas. Most people accept them, and if we do, too, we are less likely to get into trouble.
>
> The dominance of these ideas is not the product of a conspiratorial group that has devilishly plotted to implant on society a particular point of view. Nor is it an accident, an innocent result of people thinking freely. There is a process of natural (or, rather *unnatural)* selection, in which certain orthodox ideas are encouraged, financed, and pushed forward by the most powerful mechanisms of our culture. These ideas are preferred because they are safe; they don't threaten established wealth or power.
>
> For instance:
>
> "Be realistic; this is the way things *are;* there's no point thinking about how things *should be."*
>
> "People who teach or write or report the news should be *objective;* they should not try to advance their own opinions."
>
> "There are unjust wars, but also just wars."
>
> "If you disobey the law, even for a good cause, you should accept your punishment."
>
> "If you work hard enough, you'll make a good living. If you are poor, you have only yourself to blame."
>
> "Freedom of speech is desirable, but not when it threatens national security."

"Racial equality is desirable, but we've gone far enough in that direction."

"Our constitution is our greatest guarantee of liberty and justice."

"The United States must intervene from time to time in various parts of the world with military power to stop communism and promote democracy,"

"If you want to get things changed, the only way is to go through the proper channels."

"We need nuclear weapons to prevent war."

"There is much injustice in the world but there is nothing that ordinary people, without wealth or power, can do about it."

These ideas are not accepted by all Americans. But they are believed widely enough and strongly enough to dominate our thinking. (3-4)

Zinn's list shows that commonplaces do change. For instance, **commonplaces** about the threat of communism are not now so powerful nor so widespread as they were prior to the collapse of Soviet Communism, and the threat of nuclear war does not now seem so menacing as it once did. Nonetheless, all the commonplaces Zinn lists have enjoyed currency within American discourse, and many still harbor the power to stir people to action.

Even though Hirsch and Zinn do not agree precisely about what beliefs constitute an American ideology, they do agree that it exists. Whether we can list its contents precisely or not, everyone who lives in America is affected by its ideology, since its values are embedded in our public discourse. Our coinage says "From many, one" and "In God we trust"; our elementary schoolbooks tell us that "all men are created equal"; our national anthem tells us that America is "the land of the free and the home of the brave." Action movies tell us that life's problems can be solved by violence—the more spectacular the better. Whether we believe these commonplaces or not, they provide the terms within which American discourse works. Rhetors cannot escape the commonplaces of American public discourse, and they overlook them at their peril.

An understanding of ideology, of the common sense of a group or a whole culture, is important to rhetors because people do not respond to a rhetorical proposition out of context. Their responses are determined by the ideologies to which they subscribe. People use commonplaces to express ideological positions. Contemporary commonplaces range from well-worn slogans ("tax and spend," "family values," "When guns are outlawed only criminals will have guns") to sophisticated texts that encapsulate key beliefs of a given ideology (the platform of a political party, a bible, a constitution). The persuasive power of rhetorical commonplaces depends upon the fact that they express assumptions held in common by people who subscribe to a given ideology. For example: a first principle of environmental philosophy is preservation of the earth's ecosystem. Within the environmentalist community, people have developed commonplaces that express this principle: "Earth first"; "Good planets are hard to find." These slogans represent the received wisdom of the environmental community in a shorthand that reminds its members of their shared beliefs. They can be deployed whenever the group needs to be energized or reminded of its

ideological commitments or when its members wish to persuade others to adopt their ideology.

Rhetorical commonplaces have heuristic potential as well, since they give rise to an inexhaustible supply of proofs. They can be used as major premises for arguments (see our discussion of enthymemes in Chapter 5, on reasoning), and like all rhetorical proofs, they can also be used to persuade others to join the community and to accept its commitments. For instance, the appeal to family values is a well-worn commonplace. Even though it was initially put into circulation by conservatives, it has since been adopted by people who subscribe to other political ideologies. A first principle of contemporary American conservativism is that morality is best transmitted across generations when people live in a nuclear family headed by two parents in which moral authority rests with the father. Hence a conservative rhetor is likely to argue that Americans could solve problems as diverse as high rates of teenage pregnancy, drug abuse, or inadequate public schools if only we would return to traditional family values. The commonplace of family values is a shorthand way for conservatives to express their dismay that most Americans no longer live in nuclear families; its use also strengthens their sense of community. Like all commonplaces, however, the appeal to family values is very general—which explains why it has so easily been appropriated by liberals. Nor is it necessarily a good causal explanation for issues such as dilapidated schools and drug abuse, issues which may or may not be caused by a perceived decline in so-called family values. Nevertheless, this commonplace was so pervasive for awhile it even appeared on a bumper sticker: "Hatred is not a family value."

Like most commonplaces, the commonplace of family values also has heuristic potential. Using it, a rhetor can think through his position on almost any political issue, from AIDS research (Does AIDS threaten families?) to abortion (Is this practice anti-family?) to defense systems (How much and what kind of defense is required to keep American families safe?).

The power of ideology and commonplaces stems from the fact that they reside in the very language we speak and the symbols we rely on. For that reason many of our ideological values are hidden from our conscious awareness, just as Quintilian said they were. Take, for example, the response of the American people to the first President Bush's declaration of war against Iraq in 1991. People who remembered the country's negative reaction to the Vietnam war predicted that Americans would not support another interventionist war. But President Bush's rhetoricians succeeded in associating the war with American values by arguing that it would restore democracy and freedom to the Kuwaiti people. They invoked powerful symbols of American patriotism—the flag and yellow ribbons—and suggested that anyone who did not support the war did not support American soldiers. This strategy, focusing on traditional American values and symbols, diverted attention away from the hard facts of war itself—death and destruction, hunger and privation. For a time, the president's popularity soared, thanks to his rhetoricians' skillful use of commonplace symbols

drawn from the rhetoric of American patriotism. As we write, the second President Bush is threatening to go to war with Iraq once again. Support for this war is not as widespread among Americans as was support for the Gulf War because, according to dissenters, the reasons for it have not been clearly articulated. There has been no aggressive action by Iraq such as the invasion of Kuwait in the **1990s.** If the second President Bush wishes to gain majority support for this war, he will need more persuasive arguments than those that have so far been articulated. By the time you read this book, such arguments will have been made. Did any of them appeal to patriotism?

COMMONPLACES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL RHETORIC

As we have pointed out, Aristotle gave the name *special topics* to places drawn from specific fields of discourse, such as politics, ethics, and law. However, we are using the term *commonplace* to refer to such field-dependent topics. As **a** way of illustrating the importance of commonplaces to rhetorical invention, we have worked out an analysis of the commonplaces typically used in contemporary American political rhetoric. We chose politics rather than ethics or law because political commonplaces are in somewhat wider circulation today than are commonplaces used in other fields.

Conventionally, political ideologies may be distinguished from one another if they are placed along an imaginary line or spectrum.

An American Political Spectrum

Left   **Center**   **Right**

◄——————————————————————————————————————►

Political theorists decide whether to place a given position on the left or right side of this spectrum depending on its adherents' views about a number of issues. Political positions such as socialism, democratic socialism, some versions of communism (Castroism, for example), and liberalism are conventionally placed on the left wing of the ideological spectrum. We list these positions in order of their decreasing leftward leaning: socialism is farthest left, while liberalism is only slightly left of center (from our point of view, anyhow—we are conjecturing, remember). On the right wing of the spectrum are fascism, American neoconservatism (the "new right"), and old or traditional conservatism. We list these ideologies in order of their decreasing rightward leaning: traditional conservatism is just right of center on the political spectrum, while fascism is farthest right.

An American Political Spectrum

Left   Center   Right

◄——————————————————————————————————————►

[socialism—democratic socialism—liberalism   conservatism—neoconservatism—fascism]

Of course the range of political possibilities is much more complex than we have suggested here. American neoconservatism at present has at least two manifestations, called the "new right" and the "religious right." Many more positions on the spectrum are represented in the world than appear in America; Italy, for example, has over one hundred political parties, each representing a slightly different position on the spectrum.

In current American rhetoric there is debate about the following issues, stated very generally.[2]

1. What is the appropriate foreign policy (nationalism, internationalism, interventionism, pacifism)?

2. What is the role of the federal government in legislation, as opposed to the roles of state and local governments?

3. What level of fiscal responsibility do citizens bear toward federal, state, and local government?

4. What social and economic relations are appropriate among citizens (more or less personal freedom: more or less economic equality among classes, races, and genders)?

5. What levels of political and legal equality should exist among genders, races, classes, sexualities (none, some, full equality)?

6. What is the appropriate relation to authority (acceptance, questioning, skepticism, rejection)?

7. What is the appropriate role for government to play in legislating moral issues (none, some, a lot)?

8. What is or should be the relation of human beings and governments to the environment?

The answers given to these questions by individuals or groups give clues about the ideologies to which they subscribe, although these clues are not infallible.

Two ideologies have in the recent past dominated contemporary American political and discourse: liberalism and conservatism. There are fascists, anarchists, libertarians, social democrats, and socialists in America, but their views are generally not sufficiently widespread within mainstream American discourse to generate national commonplaces. In what follows, we attempt to describe commonplaces that are generally accepted by persons who subscribe to liberalism or conservatism. This task has become increasingly difficult, however. In the early years of the twenty-first century, the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate were nearly evenly balanced between Republicans and Democrats. But the commonplace assumption that Republicans are conservative and Democrats are liberal has become much more difficult to maintain. In the last years of the twentieth century, mainstream Democrats moved to the center of the political ideological spectrum, adopting some conservative positions—particularly with regard to economic issues—while many Republicans moved further toward the right. In fact, it seems to us that nowadays fewer and fewer Americans

identify themselves as liberals. To the extent that this assessment is correct, it testifies to the success of conservative attacks on "the L-word," as well as the ability of conservative rhetoricians to persuade Americans to accept their arguments about the Tightness of conservative thought. Hence a more accurate depiction of the contemporary political spectrum might name two poles in commonplace American political thought as "conservative" and "not" or "anti-conservative." This assessment must immediately be complicated by the observation that conservatives profess many beliefs that are products of liberal thought. This is so because the founding documents of the United States were written by people who wove liberal beliefs into them. Historically, the belief that all men are created equal is a liberal notion, although many Americans who think of themselves as conservative can, and do, hold this belief as a commonplace.

One more qualification: the lists that follow are not meant to imply that all persons calling themselves "liberal" or "conservative" subscribe to every commonplace named in those categories. Nor are they meant to imply that someone who subscribes to one or more liberal or conservative commonplaces is perforce a liberal or a conservative. In short, *conservative* and *liberal* do not refer to identities; rather they depict positions on an ideological spectrum. That is to say, what follows is a series of conjectures about contemporary American political discourse.

Contemporary American liberalism tends to support capitalism, but people who subscribe to liberal politics usually feel more secure if business can be regulated by government. Sometimes people who accept liberalism will support policies that lean toward socialism—for instance, some argue that there should be tax-supported health care for all citizens who cannot afford it. Liberalism tends to be internationalist insofar as its supporters want to maintain good relations with other countries. Those who subscribe to liberalism may, in fact, oppose war of any kind—that is, they may be pacifists. The core of American liberalism, however, is support for a high degree of individual freedom and advocacy of social and economic equality for all. Liberalism promotes a positive view of human nature; its proponents believe that human beings are naturally good or at least tend toward good action. If people do not behave well, the liberal assumption is that there is or has been some impediment or lack in their lives and surroundings that have kept them from fulfilling their potential. Liberalism tends to be skeptical of authority (this is in keeping with the high value that it places on individuality). Those who accept liberalism usually advocate government intervention in social and economic issues to correct what they perceive as unfair distribution of wealth, but they generally resist intervention by any authority into moral choices. They tend to characterize moral choices as "private" matters, in keeping with their emphasis on individual freedom and their skepticism about authority.

People who accept the tenets of contemporary American conservatism part company with liberalism on most of these issues. Support of capitalism and business are important conservative values. Conservatism tends to be nationalist insofar as its adherents want the United States to be the most

important nation in the world, and people who accept conservatism will support military intervention in the affairs of other nations in order to further the goal of U.S. supremacy. People who subscribe to conservative commonplaces support personal freedom, but they care less about individual rights than liberals do, since they think that the greater good of the group is more important than individual desire. This is in keeping with conservative respect for tradition and authority, especially that of the family and of religion. Conservatism is skeptical about the perfectibility of human nature—its adherents generally do not assume that everyone is naturally good or capable of moral improvement. Nonetheless, a central tenet of conservatism is that people must take responsibility for their actions. Conservatism also assumes that people who do not take such responsibility must accept the community's decisions regarding their actions. People who subscribe to traditional conservatism do not care for government intervention in social or economic matters, arguing instead that free enterprise will take care of poverty and social inequality. At present, however, people who subscribe to the ideology called "neoconservatism" do advocate government intervention in moral matters. Most of those who accept neoconservatism believe that political struggles must be waged in the cultural arena.

The positions we ascribe to conservatives and liberals are commonplaces within those discourses. Thus, in conservative rhetoric, appeal to traditional family values is a commonplace, while appeal to personal freedom for individuals—now usually cast in the discourse of "individual rights"—is a commonplace in liberal rhetoric. For heuristic purposes, we now explore how people who accept liberal and conservative commonplaces, respectively, would answer the questions named above as major issues in American rhetoric. Remember that we are operating on the level of the commonplace. The positions we delineate are positions that follow ideologically from liberal and conservative rhetoric. That is to say, we are working out their ideologic (for more on ideologic, see the later section of this chapter). Since commonplaces do change, sometimes relatively rapidly, our conclusions may not apply at all times and in all places to people who identify themselves as liberals or conservatives.

1. *What is the appropriate foreign policy?* Generally, liberalism favors peaceful interaction with other countries. Liberals ordinarily support the United Nations and other global political organizations. Conservatism is not so inclined to favor global diplomacy and intervention, especially if these efforts are perceived to interfere with America's political preeminence in the world. Liberalism is not inclined to support military intervention into the affairs of other countries, while conservatism will support military intervention into foreign affairs if such intervention can be characterized as necessary to the preservation of America's position as a world leader. There are exceptions, of course, as there are to any commonplace. Liberals in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations maintained and escalated the Vietnam war, for instance.

2. *What is the role of the federal government in legislation as opposed to the roles of state and local governments?* Currently, people who describe themselves as conservative say they are opposed to "big government," and during the last years of the twentieth century conservatives in the United States Congress supported legislation that passed fiscal responsibility for social programs such as welfare onto state and local governments. Conservative rhetoric typically depicts liberals as favoring federal intervention into many aspects of cultural and social life. Conservative rhetors have argued, for instance, that liberals saddled Americans with restrictions on their right to personal freedom when they imposed affirmative action and environmental regulation. Conservative rhetors would prefer that individuals and corporations undertake such initiatives as are necessary to protect the environment and to advance those who cannot advance by themselves; conservatism assumes that market pressures will urge individuals and corporations to see to it that these things happen. Liberalism, in contrast, typically supports legislation that is intended to correct what its adherents perceive as social wrongs. Social security, civil rights legislation, affirmative action, Medicare, and Medicaid were all sponsored by liberals.

3. *What level of fiscal responsibility do citizens bear toward federal, state, and local government?* Currently, rhetors who subscribe to conservatism argue that the tax burden borne by citizens should be lessened, while rhetors who accept liberal beliefs argue that certain initiatives are so important to social and economic progress that taxpayers must continue to shoulder the burden of financing them (hence the conservative commonplace used to describe liberal administrations: "tax and spend.") Rhetors who accept liberalism generally argue that these social initiatives should include at least social security and Medicare.

4. *What social and economic relations are appropriate among citizens?* The rhetoric of liberalism champions social and economic equality. In fact, the American doctrine that "all men are created equal" is borrowed from eighteenth-century liberal thought. Given its distrust in the perfectability of human nature, conservatism is not sure that all people are created equal to one another in intelligence and ability. However, contemporary conservatism does defend the fundamental American principle that all citizens are equal before the law.

5. *What levels of political and legal equality should exist among genders, races, classes, sexualities?* In keeping with their faith in equality, those who accept liberalism profess that all citizens—no matter their gender, race, class, sexuality, ability, or age—should be treated equally, at least in law. For those who accept conservatism—and especially for those who respect tradition and authority—equality among genders, races, and sexualities is a more complicated and troublesome issue. Strict adherence to traditional beliefs requires an American conservative to assume that men best fulfill their social and moral duties, if not their nature, when they take care of and protect women. Traditional conservatism assumes further that heterosexuality is a norm. Hence people who

accept this position are not sure that full legal equality should apply to women or to homosexuals.

6. *What is the citizen's appropriate relation to authority?* In keeping with their respect for instituted authority and their emphasis on personal responsibility, conservative rhetors tend to take tough stands on crime and punishment and on enforcement of the law. In keeping with their respect for individual rights and the potential perfectibility of human nature, liberal rhetors, in contrast, tend to advocate prevention and rehabilitation rather than punishment for offenders. It makes ideological sense that people who subscribe to liberalism would be more skeptical of received religious wisdom or traditional notions about family structure than are those who subscribe to conservative positions.

7. *What is the appropriate role for government to play in legislating moral issues?* People who subscribe to liberalism tend to resist government intervention into realms that they define as "private." This is why liberal rhetors generally support abortion rights and why many persons of liberal persuasion think that the use of marijuana and perhaps other proscribed drugs should be legalized. These days conservative rhetors, if they share conservatism's elevation of the good of the community over individual rights, tend to support legislative intervention into realms that liberals define as "private." Hence, they are generally opposed to the legalization of drugs and abortion on the ground that drug use and abortion negatively affect the community at large even though they may benefit specific individuals. Liberal rhetors tend to argue against censorship on the ground that censorship is a restriction of the right to free speech. Conservative rhetors tend to support censorship on the ground that the circulation of some materials—pornography, for example—is deleterious to the public good. It is not always easy to predict liberal and conservative positions on moral issues, however. For instance, some liberal feminists support restriction of the distribution of pornography on the ground that pornography is injurious to women. This position conflicts with the liberal belief that everyone—even a pornographer—has a right to free speech. Another contradiction can be found in conservative and liberal responses to no-smoking legislation. Despite their support for the right of freedom of assembly and the personal freedom to indulge habits of choice, liberal rhetors tend to support restrictions on smoking in public areas because they perceive these as serving the public good. Conservative rhetors, in contrast, tend to oppose such measures on the ground that people who object to smoke in public areas should take responsibility tor dealing with this situation without asking government to interfere.

8. *What is or should be the relation of human beings and governments to the environment?* It is hard to delineate conservative and liberal positions on environmental issues. The term *conservation* is etymologically related to the term *conservative,* which suggests that the desire to conserve or preserve natural phenomena is or should be a conservative position. Protection of the common good is also a conservative goal,

and preservation of the environment would seem to serve that goal as well. However, in today's political economy, environmentalists tend to be liberal or **left-of-liberal.** Conservative disinterest in this issue may have to do with conservatism's general support of business, which often finds itself at odds with environmental protection. Liberal rhetors, however, have traditionally favored legislative intervention to correct what they perceive to be wrongs, and so it is they who have typically proposed environmental regulations. However, support for environmentalism can place liberals in difficult rhetorical positions, since environmentalists would like to limit the use of automobiles (thus restricting the individual right to freedom of movement) and place limits on human reproduction (thus restricting the freedom of individuals to have as many children as they wish).

USING COMMON TOPICS AND COMMONPLACES TO INVENT ARGUMENTS

As we suggested above, ideologies vary and change over time because people are differently located in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, class, economic situation, religious beliefs, education, and the political or cultural power they possess. A rhetor who uses the common topics should take careful account of whether or not her arguments will be well received by an audience whose ideological affiliations may prescribe very different versions of what exists, what is good, and what is possible than those espoused by the rhetor. This holds doubly for rhetors who want to use commonplaces to build arguments. We are treating the commonplaces as equivalents of the topics that Aristotle called "special," by which he meant topics that circulate within specific sorts of rhetorical discourse, such as that used in legislatures, courtrooms, and at community events. Aristotle insisted that use of special topics required rhetors to be very knowledgeable about the history, practices, and values important to that community. We agree.

In order to use commonplaces as means of invention, it is helpful to think of them as statements that form bits or pieces of ideologies. In Chapter 5, on reasoning, we employ a term from logic, the premise, to talk about general statements that govern the generation of other related but more specific statements. A **major** premise is any statement that is assumed or supposed prior to the beginning of a discussion, negotiation, or argument. In this chapter we defined commonplaces as assumptions that "go without saying," by which we mean that they are often so deeply held by communities that they are not subjected to discussion or argument. As we demonstrate in the chapter on reasoning, rhetors can create arguments by combining or chaining statements together. We think that reasoning of this sort occurs within ideology as well. We give the name *ideologic* to the kind of reasoning in which commonplaces are yoked together, strung, or chained into a line of argument. In ideologic, commonplaces may be combined with other sorts of statements—such as conjectures or definition, tes-

timony or **evidence—but** the persuasive force of the argument is generally carried by the commonplaces. Aristotle thought that people more readily accepted lines of argument relying on commonplaces because audiences feel that they are actually participating in the construction of the argument when they adhere to beliefs used by a rhetor to advance his position.

Because ideologic relies so heavily on commonplaces, it is seldom fully articulated. However, to work out the ideologic functioning within a statement or argument is ordinarily quite easy. Take, for example, the slogan from the Vietnam war era that we alluded to earlier: "America: love it or leave it." Ideologic-ally, this statement forms a conclusion to a chain of reasoning that goes something like this:

1. American citizens love their country.
2. People who love their country do not disagree with its policies.
3. The war in Vietnam is American policy.
4. People who protest the policy and hence the war do not love their country.
5. People who do not love their country do not deserve to enjoy its benefits.
6. People who do not love their country should not continue to live in it (that is, "love it or leave it").

The third statement had the status of a statement of fact during the Vietnam war, although its status as fact was hotly contested because people opposed to the war argued that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution may not have constituted the necessary congressional authorization for continuing the war. In other words, the third statement is perhaps better categorized as a conjecture. For our purposes here, though, the important point about this bit of ideologic is that most of its premises are commonplaces. Certainly all but the third meet the tests of commonplaces: they are widely believed and they are not often submitted to argument. People do not often work through the ideologic of a statement or assertion, but it is a worthwhile exercise for rhetors because it reveals much about the ideology of people who use it.

Using the commonplaces that appear in contemporary versions of conservativism and liberalism and armed with the notion of ideologic, we can now illustrate how Aristotle's two means of invention can still work to help rhetors find "the available means of persuasion" *(Rhetoric* I ii 1). First, we work out how conservatives or liberals might use Aristotle's topics of conjecture, degree, and possibility to find proofs for pressing issues. We present very brief lists of arguments that may be found on a variety of issues by using the common topics. Then we apply them more extensively and systematically to an exemplary issue. We conclude with some exercises in ideologic, that is, in detecting chains of commonplaces that operate in common lines of argument.

We recommend that, after studying our examples, readers choose some issue that interests them and work slowly through Aristotle's common topics, using them to probe for proofs on the issue. As Quintilian warned, not

all of the topics will be appropriate for use on every issue. Practice and experience are the best guides to their proper use.

The Common Topic of Conjecture

Disagreement often stems from the fact that rhetors interpret reality differently in the service of their interests. Conservative rhetors interpreted the Vietnam war as a fight against the spread of international communism (in keeping with the more general conservative stance in support of a strong national defense), while liberal rhetors viewed America's role in the conflict as an intrusion into a local civil war in keeping with liberalism's general laizzez-faire tolerance for letting other nations do as they wish. Today, conservative rhetors depict Iraq as a threat to the security of the United States, while opponents of war with Iraq depict the desire to go to war with that country as greed for its oil or as an unnecessary act of agression against a sovereign nation.

Liberal rhetors interpret welfare as necessary support for those who cannot support themselves; conservative rhetors interpret it as an oppressive system that keeps people from achieving self-reliance. After an outbreak of disturbances in South-Central Los Angeles in the summer of 1992, liberal rhetors argued that people who lived in the area were frustrated because poverty and underemployment were rampant in the area. Conservative rhetoricians denied that description of reality. Instead, they blamed the disturbances on past fact—people who lived in South-Central LA were frustrated with the failure of liberal administrations during the 1960s to make good on their promises to help them develop economic opportunities. A rhetor's depiction of the present state of affairs necessarily affects her description of future facts. Liberal rhetoricians argued from their depiction of the present state of affairs in Los Angeles that poverty and unemployment would continue in the south-central portion of the city unless the federal government intervened with social programs aimed at changing this state of affairs. Conservatives argued that this would only perpetuate liberal policies that had already been shown to be inadequate, and argued instead that intervention should be left to free enterprise.

The Common Topic of Degree

Using this topic, a rhetor can argue that even though poverty exists in the United States, it isn't as severe as that experienced in other countries. He can argue as well that it is relatively easy (or relatively difficult) to solve the problem of poverty, compared to other problems the world faces. If he is a liberal, he may argue that it is better to address poverty than to fund defense spending. If he has conservative leanings, he may argue that it is better for poverty to be addressed by local or state agencies or by free enterprise, while defense spending is necessarily a federal priority because it protects the community as a whole. If a rhetor is forced by circumstances to

admit that a given situation is less good, or right, or just, or preferable than some other state of affairs, she can use the topic of degree to argue that these negative features are actually a relative good. Conservative rhetors who are forced to acknowledge the existence of poverty and unemployment sometimes argue that the poor deserve their lot, since they refuse to take responsibility for themselves. Liberal rhetors counter this conjecture by arguing that since a capitalist economy dictates that a certain percentage of the citizenry will inevitably suffer from poverty, government is obligated to support its poorer citizens. Finally, using the topic of degree, a liberal rhetor can argue that the achievement of financial equity for all people is more important than accumulation of wealth by the few. Conservative rhetors can argue that free enterprise is preferable to the socialist desire to redistribute wealth, since a free market enhances initiative and fosters community growth.

The Common Topic of Possibility

This topic is regularly put to use in contemporary discussions about environmental protection. Corporations and factory owners, on one hand, often argue that it is not possible for them to conform to clean-air regulations and maintain their present levels of production. Sometimes they argue that while conformity may be possible in the future, it is not possible at the present time. Environmentalists argue, on the other hand, that it is entirely possible that human activity is causing global warming. They argue further that it is impossible for the environment to survive present levels of pollution and degradation.

AN EXTENDED EXAMPLE

In order to give an extended illustration of how the common topics and the commonplaces work, we return to the issue we analyzed in the previous chapter: the regulation of hate speech. This is chiefly an ethical issue, although it can become a legal issue when hate speech is defined as speech protected by the First Amendment. In any case, rhetors who address it can use liberal and conservative commonplaces having to do with personal freedoms, relationship to authority, and social equality. As was demonstrated by our use of stasis theory on this issue in the previous chapter, a rhetor can treat hate speech as an issue of conjecture, definition, or quality, depending upon the rhetorical situation in which he finds himself. Here we treat it as a procedural question, that is, as a question of policy. Two broad procedural positions are available on this issue: a rhetor may favor regulating the use of hate speech or, conversely, he may oppose its regulation. Our example does not illustrate uses of all the available commonplaces, although all are theoretically available for use on any issue.

Using the Common Topic of Conjecture

What exists?

What does not exist?

What is the size or extent of what exists?

Did it exist in the past?

Will it exist in the future?

Using the topic of "what exists," a rhetor who wishes to regulate hate speech can paint a picture of the university as beset by an epidemic of slurs against certain groups. She can mention epithets painted on walls, shouted from windows. Using the topic of size or extent, she can try to show that the problem is widespread and that it represents a general climate of hatred on campus. Using the topic of past conjecture, she may argue that the climate is worse than it used to be, and she may use the topic of future conjecture to show that the situation contains little promise of improvement unless something is done. A rhetor who opposes regulation, in contrast, can describe the campus scene as peaceful and harmonious, or can argue that incidents of hate speech are isolated and do not occur very often or that they are the work of just a few people who can be disciplined and removed from the scene, if necessary. He may argue that the situation is better than it was in the past, since a few guilty persons have been removed from the scene. He can point out that this local action mitigates the need for a blanket policy regarding hate speech, which, after all, anticipates that a need for regulation will arise in the future. If the rhetor who opposes regulation is conservative, she may conjecture that students are responsible people who do not need policies to keep them from behaving badly. A conservative who favors regulation, in contrast, can point out that groups often need to adopt rules and enforce them in order to regulate the behavior of individuals who, inevitably, cannot restrain themselves. A liberal rhetor who favors regulation has much precedent for his argument, since liberal procedure historically has been to adopt regulations that are intended to protect defenseless people from harm. This rhetor, then, can conjecture the campus as a scene where frequent belittling remarks injure students' self-esteem. A liberal who opposes regulation, of course, can always appeal to the individual right to free speech.

Using the Common Topic of Degree

What is greater than the mean or norm?

What is lesser than the mean or norm?

What is relatively greater than something else?

What is relatively lesser than something else?

What is good, just, beautiful, honorable, enjoyable, etc.?

What is better, more just, etc.?

What is less good, less just, etc.?

What is good, etc. for all persons?

What is good, etc., for a few persons or groups?

What has been better, etc., in the past?

What will be better, etc., in the future?

A rhetor who favors regulation of hate speech can use the topic of degree to show why hate speech should be regulated. Generally, she can take the positions that hate speech is bad, unjust, dishonorable, or inexpedient and that regulation of it is therefore good, just, honorable and expedient. Not all of these topics will be useful or necessary in any given case, of course, but in general each should produce arguments for any case. For example, a rhetor can argue that the use of hate speech is unjust on the ground that it discriminates among persons according to unacceptable criteria such as gender or appearance. Or she can argue that the use of hate speech is inexpedient since it can foment uneasiness and even violence on campus.

Relative arguments from degree are also many: a rhetor can argue that regulation of hate speech, even though it impedes personal freedom, is better than unbridled expression of racist or sexist opinions, for example. Or he might argue that regulation is not a good, since it affects everyone on campus, while the expression of hate speech affects only a few. If the rhetor who favors regulation is a liberal, he faces a quandary, given that liberals think of individual freedoms (including freedom of speech) as good, just, and expedient. However, liberals also think of social equality as a good, and hate speech can be construed as an attack on the right of equal access for certain groups. He can resolve this dilemma by using the topic of degree: in other words, he can decide which of his liberal values—freedom of speech or social equality—is more important to him. Or he can argue that hate speech is so disruptive and so immoral that an exception must be made to his general support for freedom of speech. Whether or not he can support regulation of hate speech depends on whether he defines it as a political or ethical issue, since liberals generally support intervention that regulates matters of social equity but do not approve of legislation of moral matters.

If the rhetor who favors regulation is a conservative, she also faces a dilemma. She is not likely to be impressed by the argument that hate speech impedes progress toward social equality, since this is not high on her list of goods. However, she may favor regulations that curtail abusive verbal behavior by individuals in the interests of maintaining harmony among the wider community.

Using the topic of degree, a rhetor who opposes regulation of hate speech may argue that such regulation is neither good, just, honorable, nor expedient. It would be difficult for him to argue that hate speech is good, just, and honorable, but use of this topic shows that such positions are available to him if he wishes to defend any of them. A more defensible topic is available to this rhetor, however. He may argue that a policy of regulation imposes the values of some onto the entire group and, for that reason, regulation is unjust. If this rhetor is a liberal, he can characterize those who use hate speech as exercising their right to free speech, although he faces the

same dilemma as the liberal rhetor who favors regulation, insofar as he has to decide whether individual freedom is more important than social equity in this case. If the rhetor who opposes regulation is a conservative, she can use the topic of degree to argue that university policies are not appropriate means for regulating hate speech, which should be policed instead by family and religious authority; this rhetor can also argue that students have a personal responsibility to behave respectfully toward others.

Using the Common Topic of Possibility

What is possible?

What is impossible?

What is more or less possible?

What is possible in the future?

What is impossible in the future?

What was possible or impossible in the past?

Using the topic of possibilities, the rhetor who favors regulation of hate speech must address the question whether it is possible to curtail hate speech by such means. He must also examine whether such a policy will have the desired effect in the future as well. The rhetor who opposes regulation, of course, can argue that it is not possible to regulate verbal behavior; she can suggest as well that it was impossible for hate speech to have occurred in the past since the term itself is of recent invention.

THE EXAMPLE EMBEDDED IN A RHETORICAL SITUATION

In the chapter on stasis we mentioned flag burning and cross burning as examples of speech that have in the past been protected by the First Amendment. Recently, however, the Supreme Court heard a case about cross burning in which something quite remarkable happened. Here is an account of the event written by Linda Greenhouse for the *New York Times:*

AN INTENSE ATTACK BY JUSTICE THOMAS ON CROSS-BURNING

Washington, Dec. 11—The question for the Supreme Court in an argument today was whether a state may make it a crime to burn a cross without at the same time trampling on the protection that the First Amendment gives to symbolic expression. The case, concerning a 50-year-old Virginia law, raised tricky questions of First Amendment doctrine, and it was not clear how the court was inclined to decide it—until Justice Clarence Thomas spoke.

A burning cross is indeed highly symbolic, Justice Thomas said, but only of something that deserves no constitutional protection: the "reign of terror" visited on black communities by the Ku Klux Klan for nearly 100 years before

Virginia passed the law, which the Virginia Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a year ago.

A burning cross is "unlike any symbol in our society," Justice Thomas said.

"There's no other purpose to the cross, no communication, no particular message," he continued. "It was intended to cause fear and to terrorize a population."

During the brief minute or two that Justice Thomas spoke, about halfway through the **hourlong** argument session, the other justices gave him rapt attention. Afterward, the court's mood appeared to have changed. While the justices had earlier appeared somewhat doubtful of the Virginia statute's constitutionality, they now seemed quite convinced that they could uphold it as consistent with the First Amendment.

Justice Thomas addressed his comments to Michael R. Dreeben, a deputy federal solicitor general who was arguing in support of Virginia's defense of its statute. But he did not have questions for Mr. Dreeben, who in any event agreed with him in nearly all respects. The threat of violence inherent in a burning cross "is not protected by the First Amendment" but instead is "prohibited conduct," Mr. Dreeben had just finished arguing.

Rather, Justice Thomas appeared driven to make the basis for his own position unmistakably clear.

"My fear is you are actually understating the symbolism of and effect of the burning cross," he said, adding, "I think what you're attempting to do is fit this into our jurisprudence rather than stating more clearly what the cross was intended to accomplish."

It was a gripping **made-for-television moment—except,** of course, for the fact that television cameras are not permitted inside the courtroom. Justice Thomas speaks in a rich baritone that is all the more striking for being heard only rarely during the court's argument sessions. His intervention, consequently, was as unexpected as the passion with which he expressed his view.

He referred to an opinion he wrote in 1995, concurring with the majority that the City of Columbus, Ohio, had no basis for refusing permission to the Klan to place a cross among other Christmastime displays in a downtown park that served as an open forum for religious expression. In that opinion, Justice Thomas said he was joining the decision despite his belief that the Klan's cross was not a form of religious expression but rather "a symbol of white supremacy and a tool for the intimidation and harassment" of racial and religious minorities.

There was a suggestion in his remarks today that perhaps he now regretted his effort in that case to meld his own views into the court's jurisprudence and, after 11 years on the court, no longer felt obliged to try.

Afterward, Justice David H. Souter addressed Rodney A. **Smolla,** the lawyer for three men who were convicted under the cross-burning statute in two incidents. Mr. Smolla, a well-known First Amendment scholar at the University of Richmond, had just argued that the government could make it a crime to brandish a gun but not to burn a cross because a gun has physical properties that make it dangerous while the danger inherent in a burning cross comes from the ideas it symbolizes and not its physical properties.

That might have been a winning argument two centuries ago, Justice Souter said, "but how does your argument account for the fact that the cross has acquired potency at least akin to a gun?"

Justice Souter called a burning cross "a kind of Pavlovian symbol, so that the person who sees it responds not to its message but out of fear." He added that "other symbols don't make you scared," suggesting that a burning cross might be "a separate category."

Mr. Smolla recalled the court's decision upholding a First Amendment right to burn an American flag.

"You must concede," he said, that the cross itself "is one of the most powerful religious symbols in human history." As with burning the flag, the act of burning a cross involves "calling on that repository of meaning" to make a symbolic point, he said.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg objected that there was "a big difference" between the two acts.

"The flag is a symbol of the government," Justice Ginsburg said, and it is inherent in the constitutional system that "anyone can attack the government." But burning a cross means "attacking people, threatening life and limb," she said.

The Virginia law prohibits burning a cross "with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons." Mr. Smolla said it would be effective as well as constitutional to make threats and intimidation a crime without singling out a particularly threatening symbol.

"A burning torch and a burning cross—what's the difference?" he asked, evidently intending to emphasize the expressive nature of cross-burning. But Justice Anthony M. Kennedy found a different answer. "One hundred years of history," he said.

Mr. Smolla made the best of the moment, saying, "Thank you, Justice Kennedy, and that 100 years of history is on the side of freedom of speech."

William H. Hurd, Virginia's state solicitor, argued on behalf of the statute in *Virginia v. Black,* No. 01-1107.

"We have not tried to suppress freedom of speech," Mr. Hurd said. "All we've tried to do is protect freedom from fear." *(New York Times,* National Desk, December 12, 2002, nytimes.com)

Here Justice Thomas apparently argued that a burning cross exists in a class by itself, quite different from a burning flag, because of its history as a threat "to life and limb," as Justice Ginsberg put it. Other justices seemed receptive to this argument, although the lawyer for the defendants in the case—who is an authority on the First Amendment—seemed to be made very uneasy by this situation. Why was this?

Let's imagine that two rhetors are trying to develop arguments in this case. One—let's call her Catherine—wishes to argue alongside Justice Thomas that there is something special about cross burning that exempts it from First Amendment protection. The other—call him Rodney—wishes to define cross burning as an expressive act that should be classified as free speech and therefore entitled to protection under the amendment. We attempt to find available arguments in this case by using the common topics and a few of the commonplaces in circulation about free speech in American discourse. As always, our use of this heuristic is only suggestive; that is to say we do not develop all of the arguments that would appear in a full and systematic investigation of the common topics.

Using the common topic of conjecture, Catherine and Rodney can ask:

Does cross burning exist or not?

What is the size or extent of what exists?

Did it exist in the past?

Will it exist in the future?

Clearly cross-burning exists. In the cases before the Virginia court, "two people were convicted of attempting to burn a cross on the lawn of an African-American resident of Virginia Beach, and a third was convicted of burning a cross at least 25 feet tall at a Ku Klux Klan rally at which there was talk of shooting blacks" *(New York Times,* December 15, 2002 4, 14,). Cross burning existed in the past, as justices Thomas and Ginsberg pointed out, when it was used as a means of threatening violence to groups of people singled out by the Klan. Twenty-five hundred documented cases of lynchings of African American men and women occurred between 1880 and 1930, and, Michael Bronski argues, this was always done "by a white mob driven by hate and often with the influence, support, backing, or direct help of the Ku Klux Klan. During this time, the Klan, and groups like it, used burning crosses as a potent symbol that they could—and would—get away with it" *(Boston Phoenix,* December 19-26, 2002). This unsavory history is what renders the contemporary act of burning a cross so frightening. However, even if cross burning is made illegal on First Amendment or any other ground, the practice may continue in the future. If the court rules that the practice is not protected by the First Amendment, people who burn crosses will be liable to prosecution for the first time in American history. Such a ruling would compromise the court's historical stance that the content of speech cannot be regulated, and this possibility makes proponents of current interpretations of the First Amendment, like Rodney, uneasy.

Using the topic of past and future fact as relative measures, Rodney can argue that no matter how vicious the symbol of a burning cross was in the past, things have changed for the better. In the cases before the Virginia court, for example, no one was hurt; the victims were only frightened by the burning crosses. That is to say, times have changed, and African Americans, gays, Jews, and Catholics are no longer subjected to regular and continuing threat of bodily harm by the KKK. Here Rodney can also conjecture that the scope (the extent of what exists) of the problem has changed: Klan membership is much smaller and far less powerful than it used to be. Catherine, however, can use this topic (the extent of what exists) to point out that Klan-inspired lynchings have occurred as recently as 1981, and because of its violent history the mere presence of a burning cross is still a threat to those it is intended to intimidate even though the practice is now less widespread and perhaps less dangerous than it was in the past.

Alternately, Rodney can switch focus and, on the one hand, use the common topic of conjecture to investigate past, current, and future interpretations of the First Amendment. He can argue, for example, that heretofore cross burning was defined as political speech and hence was afforded

First Amendment protection. He can argue that its status as political speech must be protected now and in the future on the ground that to exclude cross burning from First Amendment protection will have the effect of excluding other expressions or acts that have heretofore been protected as political speech, such as burning a flag. Catherine can use this topic, on the other hand, to argue that burning a cross has no content; that is, it expresses no message in the way that burning a flag expresses a message. Therefore, American courts should define cross burning now and in the future as something other than political speech—as the threat of intimidation or violence, perhaps.

Next our rhetors can investigate the common topic of degree. Under this topic they can ask questions such as the following:

What is greater than the mean or norm?

What is lesser than the mean or norm?

What is relatively greater than something else?

What is relatively lesser than something else?

What is good, just, beautiful, honorable, enjoyable, etc.?

What is better, more just, etc.?

What is less good, less just, etc.?

What is good, etc., for all persons?

What is good, etc., for a few persons or groups?

What has been better, etc., in the past?

What will be better, etc., in the future?

In general, the topic of degree raises this question: how is cross burning valued in the community? More specifically, is the practice good or bad, just or unjust, beautiful or ugly, honorable or dishonorable? And who assigns each of these values to the practice? While arguments can be developed from all of these values (apparently a nighttime cross burning can be conjectured by some people as a beautiful sight, for instance), these days a majority of Americans agree that cross burning is bad, unjust, ugly, and dishonorable. If they did not feel this way, there would be no laws such as the one being contested in Virginia. Even advocates of First Amendment protection for cross burning agree that it is a despicable act. When Rodney and Catherine consider the way in which this practice is valued within and across communities, they can ask, Is cross burning good or bad, just or unjust, and so on for some group of persons? Their answers to these more situated questions yield some interesting arguments. For instance, Christians might construe the practice to be blasphemous because of the importance of the cross to their beliefs. Obviously cross burning holds some good for those who practice it, while those against whom it is used suffer from it. Viewed this way, it becomes clear that the courts are being asked to choose between the conflicting values of two or more groups as they rule on this practice.

The topic of degree is productive of other arguments when values are thought of relative to one another: for example, is cross burning better or worse than something else? Using this topic, Rodney can argue that a cross burning ceremony is a ritual occasion during which those in attendance can shout and generally let off steam, thus curbing the potential for more violent behavior. Of course Catherine can use the same topic to argue that this ritual actually inspires violence, as history shows; in other words, as a ceremonial practice cross burning is worse than almost anything else that can be imagined. Last, under the common topic of degree, our rhetors can ask: Do values change? Will we value cross burning differently in the future than we do now or did in the past? Will this change be for the better or worse? History demonstrates that fewer people now value the practice than did in the past. And the *New York Times* editorial cited above argues that if the Supreme Court upholds the Virginia law, it is conceivable that cross burning will come to be widely defined as "an imminent threat of violence to real people, for whom the threat is not abstract." That is, it will no longer be **defined** as the sort of speech that is protected by the First Amendment but rather as the sort of "fighting words" that have long been held to be illegal. If legality or illegality is viewed as a consolidation or affirmation of the values held by a majority of the people, then this change will indicate that the way in which the community values cross burning has changed.

Which brings us to the common topic of possibility. Using this topic, Catherine and Rodney can ask:

What is possible?

What is impossible?

What is more or less possible?

What is possible in the future?

What is impossible in the future?

What was possible or impossible in the past?

The topic of possibility raises some interesting questions in this case. Is it possible to regulate the practice of cross burning? Can this be done by making it illegal? Is it possible or impossible that rendering cross burning illegal will eliminate the hatred that motivates it? Is it more or less possible to legislate the practice out of existence than to eliminate the values that motivate it? Is it possible or impossible that community values will change so much in the future that hatred of groups designated by the Klan will disappear along with the Klan itself? Is it possible that if cross burning had been more responsibly regulated in the past that the motives underlying the practice would have disappeared sooner?

We turn from our examination of the common topics to a look at the commonplaces circulating within this rhetorical situation. At this moment, the Virginia case in some ways reinforces commonplace arguments surrounding cross burning and other forms of hate speech. Typically, liberals have argued for an inclusive definition of First Amendment protection. The

Bill of Rights, after all, was inspired by liberals who valued rights such as the freedom of speech and assembly because of their insistence on the general freedom of individuals to speak and do as they please. And so liberals are generally willing to extend First Amendment protection to expressive acts such as cross burning and pornography even though they may find these practices odious. This causes a dilemma for contemporary liberals, on one hand, who generally oppose racism and sexism because it can be argued that cross burning and pornography give particular offense to African Americans and some religious groups or to women. On the other hand, conservatives have been anxious to narrow the definition of free speech so that it does not protect expressive acts such as flag burning, which is thought to criticize authority or tradition. That is to say, conservatives have been inclined to regulate some political speech. Conservative justices have in the past, however, consistently awarded First Amendment protection to cross burning, as they did in *RAV v. Minnesota,* on the ground that it is political speech. Justice Thomas, who is conservative, is thus behaving consistently with conservative values in arguing that a particular act should not be protected, thus narrowing the range of expressions and acts that are covered by the First Amendment. However, his insistence that a burning cross "was intended to cause fear and to terrorize a population" implies that the content of speech should be regulated, not because it attacks authority or tradition but because it gives offense to certain members of the community. That is, he adopts the politically correct argument often condemned by conservatives who have consistently exempted so-called offensive speech from regulation. Presumably, if adopted, this argument not only would include racist speech or expressive acts but could possibly lead to further narrowing of First Amendment protection for acts of speech that are determined offensive to other groups. That is, conceivably, feminists could use this precedent to argue that pornography should be regulated because it is offensive and possibly dangerous to women; and conservatives could argue that flag burning and war protests should be regulated because they are offensive to conservatives and threaten the ideological integrity of the community.

EXERCISES

1. Reread the descriptions of American ideology given by E. D. Hirsch and Howard Zinn in this chapter. Whose description seems more accurate to you? Can you tell from these descriptions whether Hirsch and Zinn lean toward the right or left of the political spectrum? How can you justify your placement of either writer on the political spectrum?

2. Find a large parking lot. Copy down the bumper stickers that you see on the vehicles parked there: "God Bless America" "My Other Car Is a Lawn Mower," "Abortion—Safe, Legal, and Infrequent," "If You Can Read This, Thank a Teacher." Each of these commonplaces makes an

argument and implies an ideologic. Try to figure out the arguments and ideologics that underlie bumper stickers you have seen. If a vehicle sports several bumper stickers, does the collection suggest contrary or conflicting ideologies? This exercise also works with vanity license plates—"FLYNHI," "BIGDOG," "PDFOR." What do these phrases suggest about the ideologies of their owners? What happens when a commonplace is not commonplace enough?

3. Think about a specific rhetorical situation in which you recently participated. Writing as fast as you can, describe this situation: the people who participated, their relationships to each other (friends, family members, and so on), the place, the time, the issue. Now examine the position taken by one participant in the rhetorical situation (not yourself). Write down as many of his or her arguments as you can remember. What beliefs or values undergird the position he or she took in the argument? See if you can list these. Do any of them look like conservative or liberal commonplaces? Is the person open to persuasion on any of them? If so, how might a rhetor persuade that person to change his or her mind about any of his or her arguments?

4. Use Aristotle's common topics to analyze some issue that you want to understand better. Ask each of the questions listed in this chapter under conjecture, degree, and possibility. Take your time, and write down all of the answers that come to you. Remember, the point of a heuristic is to help you find all of the available arguments. If you are thorough, systematic use of the topics should turn up more arguments than you need.

5. Read the front page of a daily newspaper that covers both local and national news. Read this week's news magazines, watch the news on TV, listen to radio news programs, or surf the Internet. This ought to familiarize you with the issues that are currently being debated in the American public sphere. Then read some magazines that are avowedly partisan in order to see how they treat currently controversial issues. In our opinion *The New Republic, The American Spectator,* and the *Wall Street Journal* are conservative; *The Nation, Dissent,* and *The Village Voice* are liberal or left-of-liberal. Compare the treatments of the same issue that appear in conservative and liberal magazines. Now try to answer these questions: What is the ideological bias (if any can be detected) of your hometown newspaper? Of the news desk of your local TV station? The *New York Times? USA Today? Time* magazine? *Newsweek?* CNN? Network television news? Oprah? Bill O'Reilly? Dr. Laura? Donahue? Rush Limbaugh? Conan O'Brien? Howard Stern? Anna Nicole Smith?

   This exercise will help you to compile an inventory of the commonplaces that appear in American rhetoric. You may draw on this list in two ways: it should help you to understand the ideologic that under-

girds the arguments that are presented to you, and you can use it to build your own arguments.

NOTES

1. We relied on ancient thought as well as Goran Therborn's *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (London: National Library Board, 1980) for the analysis that follows.
2. We do not pretend that this list is exhaustive. And it will change with the passage of time (see the chapter on *kairos).* In the first edition of this book, for example, our list began with this question: "What is the appropriate kind of economy?" We removed that question from this edition since virtually all American political ideologies that have a public voice currently accept capitalism as the preferred economy for the United States.

WORKS CITED

Bronksi, Michael. "'Dworkin Avenged: 'Long Dong' Silver Fan Clarence Thomas Echoes the Arguments of Anti-Porn Feminists to Ban Cross-Burning." *Boston Phoenix,* December 19-26, 2002. bostonphoenix.com/boston/news_features/ other_stories/multipage/documents/02598657.htm

Coontz, Stephanie. *The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap.* New York: Basic Books, 1992.

"Cross-Burning and Free Speech" (editorial). *New York Times,* December 15, 2002.

D'Souza, Dinesh. *Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus.* New York: Vintage, 1992.

Hirsch, E. D. *Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

Kennedy, George. *Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Wilson, John K. *The Myth of Political Correctness: The Conservative Attack on Higher Education.* Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.

Zinn, Howard. *Declarations of Independence.* New York: Harper Collins, 1990.

LOGICAL PROOF: REASONING IN RHETORIC

In some oratorical styles examples prevail, in others **enthymemes;** *and in like manner, some orators are better at the former and some at the latter. Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause.*

—**Aristotle,**
Rhetoric I ii 20

ARISTOTLE TAUGHT THAT three kinds of arguments or proofs are convincing in rhetoric: arguments found in the issue itself, arguments based on the rhetor's character and reputation, and arguments that appeal to the emotions *(Rhetoric* I i 2). He called these three sorts of arguments *logos, ethos,* and *pathos.* We discuss *ethos* and *pathos* in the next two chapters. Here we are concerned with arguments from *logos,* the logical or rational proofs that can be found by examining issues. The Greek word *logos* gives us the English words *logic* and *logical. Logos* meant "voice" or "speech" in archaic Greek. Later it came to refer to "reason" as well, and it carries this sense in English in words such as *logic.* When someone says "Be logical," she means "Think things through—be rational." However, the Greek word's early reference to speaking or language also appears in English words such as *ideology* and *psychology,* where the suffix *-logy* means "words about" or, more loosely, "study of." Hence *ideology* literally means "words about ideas" or "study of ideas"; psychology is "words about the mind" (Greek *psyche)* or "study of the mind."

In his methodology (literally, "ways of reasoning") Aristotle developed four logical methods to

133

help people argue their way through complex issues. The four methods were scientific demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric, and false or contentious reasoning. Aristotle taught that in each of these kinds of reasoning the arguer began with a statement called a premise. This word is derived from Latin words which mean "to send before." Thus a premise is any statement laid down, supposed, or assumed before the argument begins. Premises are then combined with other premises in order to reach conclusions. Arguers can insure that their arguments are valid (that is, correctly reasoned), if they observe certain formal rules of arrangement for the premises. Conclusions reached by this means of reasoning are true only if their premises are true.

In scientific demonstration, according to Aristotle, argument began from premises that are true or that experts accept as true. The premises of scientific argument or demonstration must be able to command belief without further argument to support them. For example: "Water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit" and "The moon orbits the earth" are simple scientific premises. In dialectical reasoning, the arguers are less certain about the truth of the premises; here the premises are accepted by people who are supposed to be especially wise. For example, Socrates' dictum that "the unexamined life is not worth living" is a dialectical premise, as is Jesus' teaching that human beings ought to love each other. In rhetorical reasoning, premises are drawn from beliefs accepted by all or most members of a community. According to Aristotle, false or contentious reasoning differs from scientific, dialectical, and rhetorical reasoning because it relies on premises that only appear to be widely accepted. False reasoning also uses premises that are mistakes or lies.

The premises in rhetorical reasoning always involve human action or belief. Cicero's arguments in Roman courts and in the Senate, for example, usually involved premises about human action—whether Milo actually murdered someone or whether Caesar should be allowed to become a dictator. "Our town should adopt a dark-sky ordinance," "Hate speech is a harmful practice within a university community," and "Abortion is murder" are rhetorical arguments, rather than scientific or dialectical ones, because they deal with human action and/or beliefs.

Some rhetorical premises are commonplaces; that is, they are widely accepted by the relevant community. When the premises of rhetorical arguments draw on commonplaces, rhetorical reasoning can be called ideological, the name we gave to such reasoning in the previous chapter, on the commonplaces. "Convicted criminals should be punished" and "Anyone can become president of the United States" are commonplace premises. Many Americans take commonplace premises for granted, accepting arguments and conclusions that follow from them as forceful and persuasive. Their taken-for-grantedness qualifies them as commonplaces in American ideology, and that in turn qualifies them as premises in ideologic, a kind of rhetorical reasoning.

PROBABILITIES

For our purposes the salient difference among scientific, dialectical, and rhetorical premises has nothing to do with some external criterion for truth. Rather, the difference among them depends upon the degree of belief awarded them by the people who are arguing about them. Ancient teachers of rhetoric began the reasoning process with premises that were widely accepted as certain, and moved to those that were less certain. In fact, Quintilian defined arguments in rhetoric and logic as methods "of proving what is not certain by means of what is certain" (V x 8). Thus, such arguments enable "one thing to be inferred from another"; they also confirm "facts which are uncertain by reference to facts which are certain" (11). Without some way of moving from the certain to the uncertain, Quintilian argued, we'd have no way of proving anything.

Greek rhetoricians called any kind of statement that predicts something about human behavior a statement of probability *(eikos)*. Probabilities are not as reliable as certainties, but they are more reliable than chance. Furthermore, rhetorical probabilities differ from mathematical probabilities in that they are both more predictable and less easy to calculate. Compare, for example, the relative probability that you will draw a winning poker hand to the relative probability that your parents, spouse, or partner will be upset if you get home late from the game. The chances of drawing to an inside straight are relatively remote, although they can be mathematically calculated. The chance that parents or a spouse or partner will be upset if you arrive home later than you promised are relatively greater than your chance at drawing to an inside straight, but this chance cannot be calculated by mathematical means. If you want to estimate the probability of their reaction, you need to know something about their attitudes toward promise keeping, the quality of their relationship to you, and the record of promise keeping you have built up over the years.

The reason for the relative certainty of statements about probable human action is that human behavior in general is predictable to some extent. Aristotle wrote that people can reason about things that happen "as a rule." As a rule, family members become upset when promises made to them are broken. Moreover, people cannot reason about things that happen by chance, like drawing to an inside straight. Since rhetorical statements of probability represent the common opinion of humankind, we ought to place a certain degree of trust in them. Thus statements of probability are pieces of knowledge, and as such they provide suitable premises for rhetorical proofs.

Plato credited the legendary Tisias with the invention of the argument from probability *(Phaedrus* 273b). Whether this attribution is correct or not, probability must have been a sophistic tactic, given its emphasis on human behavior rather than human nature (which is what Plato would have preferred). Since the premises used in rhetoric deal with human action, they are only usually or contingently true. In antiquity the most famous argument from probability was this one:

A small weak person will not physically attack a large strong person.

This is a rhetorical premise, since it articulates some common sense about the way people generally behave. In this case, it is not certain that a weaker person will leave a stronger one alone; it is only probable. The smaller person could hire others to act for him, or he could be so driven by desperation or anger that he attacks a man who is sure to injure him, anyway. A sophist would likely argue the argument from probability in the other direction as well: a small weak person might attack a larger more powerful one, even though she was bound to be injured, since no one would suspect that she had done such a dangerous thing. Her doing so, in other words, was not probable. Our pronoun gender switch may alert you to a probability that is a commonplace in American discourse: we assume that an assailant is probably male.

Quintilian named four kinds of premises that could be regarded as certain:

those which involved things perceived by the senses;

those which involved things about which there is general agreement, such as children's duty to love their parents;

those which involved things that exist in law or in custom, such as the custom of punishing convicted criminals;

those which are admitted by either party to the argument. (V x 12-14)

A sophist might have disagreed with Quintilian about this, however. As we noted earlier, things perceived by the senses are not always certain, since our senses may not be functioning properly: when someone has a cold, it is difficult for him to smell the roses. Moreover, an observer may not be in a position to use her senses properly, or she might not be paying attention. Nor is it true that things existing in law always have certain outcomes; these days, even if someone is convicted of a heinous crime, it is not certain that he will serve the designated sentence. Executions are even more uncertain. The outgoing governor of Illinois in 2003 pardoned or commuted the sentences of several people on death row, a few of whom had been there for many years, because of his uneasiness over the methods used to convict them. Customs are not always certainly adhered to, either, because they change quite rapidly. Men no longer open doors for women, as a rule; women may now ask men for a date, as a rule. Neither of these was a probability thirty years ago. Last, parties to an argument may have extrinsic reasons for accepting a premise as a given: they may have been bribed, or they may think that a premise is irrelevant to their case. In insanity defenses, for example, the defense attorneys sometimes admit that their clients are guilty of the crime they have been charged with. This admission has no bearing on the certainty or likelihood that a client did indeed commit a crime.

In short, very little is certain in the realm of human action. Quintilian regarded three sorts of statements as probable:

those which involved what usually happens (children are usually loved by their parents)

those which were highly likely (a person who is healthy today will be alive tomorrow);

those in which nothing worked against their probability (a household theft was committed by some resident of the household). (16-17).

These sorts of premises are suitable for use in rhetoric, because they are statements about the probable conduct of human beings.

ARISTOTLE ON REASONING IN RHETORIC

For Aristotle argument took place in language. Arguers placed premises in sequence in order to determine what could be learned from the procedure. He wrote that "a statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so" (I ii 11). Aristotle taught his students how to reason from knowledge that was already given to that which needed to be discovered. People who wished to discover knowledge in any field did so by placing premises in useful relations to one another.

Deduction

In rhetoric, as well as in dialectic and science, the discovery process moves in two directions. Aristotle called these directions reasoning *(syllogismos)* and **induction** *(epagoge).* He defined reasoning (also called **deduction,** from a Latin word meaning "to lead down") as "a discussion in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results through them" *(Topics* I i). The most famous example of this sort of reasoning goes as follows:

1. All people are mortal.
2. Socrates is a person.
3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

The first statement is a general premise accepted by everyone. This premise is general because it makes an observation about an entire class: all people. In syllogisms set up like the example about Socrates, the first general premise is called the major premise. The second statement is a particular premise accepted by everyone. This premise is particular because it refers to only one person out of the class of people. This premise is called the **minor premise.** The last statement is a **conclusion,** arrived at by comparing the premises: if Socrates fits in the class "people," he also fits in the class "mortal," and thus his death is inevitable. The reasoner has moved down from a generalization ("All people are mortal") to statements concerning a particular person, Socrates.

Aristotle assumed that premises did two kinds of work: they named classes of things **(generalizations** or classifications) and they named

The Class "Cats"

the lion in **Ourtown's** zoo   a jaguar
Our school's mascot   a tiger   an ocelot
Chako   a lynx
leopards   bobcats
cougars   cheetahs?

FIGURE 5.1
General classification

particulars (one instance of a thing). A class is any number of people or things grouped together because of certain likenesses or common traits (see Figure 5.1). All members of this class share certain traits: they are predatory flesh-eating mammals, usually having soft fur whiskers, four legs each with five toes, and so on. The cheetah has many feline (catlike) characteristics but many doglike characteristics as well. So it is a marginal member of the class "cats."

When logicians make classes or categories, they like to know how completely its members have been enumerated. So any premise beginning with the word *all* must designate a class for which all the members are known or can be found. When a complete class is put into a premise in logic, whatever is predicated of it should be true of every member of the class, as well, as in "All people are mortal." Classes can be divided into subclasses, which indicate groups within a class:-members of a subclass should all have the characteristic or characteristics that define the class, but they may differ in some characteristics from members of other sub-classes. Individual members of classes or subclasses are called "particulars." For example, the class of "all mortal entities" includes people, animals, and plants (see Figure 5.2).

Syllogisms worked in ancient logic because logicians thought that the relations between classes and the particulars were a fundamental element of human thinking. So they often began by naming classes, groups that belonged to those classes, and individuals that belonged to those groups, as seen in Figure 5.3.

Rhetors are not so concerned as logicians are that the members of classes be completely enumerated, since rhetorical classes are intended to be persuasive rather than mathematically or **dialectically** accurate. Complete enumeration of every item in a class would soon put audiences to sleep *(Rhetoric I i 1357a)*. For persuasive purposes, almost any items can be grouped together to be made into a class, depending on the rhetorical situation. The class "politicians" logically includes anyone who runs for public office; but a rhetor might want to include campaign managers or spin doctors in this class, as well, in order to make a more sweeping judgement about the whole group. Here are some examples of complete deductions:

FIGURE 5.2
Subdivisions of a general classification

FIGURE 5.3
Relationships between classes, subclasses, and particulars

Major Premise: Ghosts and vampires are immortal creatures.

Minor Premise: Casper and Dracula are a ghost and a vampire, respectively.

Conclusion: Casper and Dracula are immortal creatures.

Major Premise: No politician can be trusted.

Minor Premise: John is a politician.

Conclusion: John can't be trusted.

Major Premise: The death penalty cannot be justified if innocent people are sentenced to death.

Minor Premise: Governor Ryan of Illinois discovered that innocent people are in fact sentenced to death.

Conclusion: The death penalty cannot be justified.

Induction

Aristotle recognized another movement between premises, and he defined it as "the progress from particulars to universals." Later logicians called this movement induction (Latin *inducere,* "to lead into." Induction leads away from particulars and into a general conclusion). A particular is any individual that can be put into a class. Particulars are also called "instances" or "examples." Aristotle supplied this example of inductive reasoning:

If the skilled pilot is the best pilot [particular premise]

and if the skilled charioteer the best charioteer [particular premise]

then the skilled person is the best person in any particular sphere [conclusion]. *(Topics* I 12)

The inductive reasoner can continue to pile up particulars that reinforce the conclusion by naming skilled athletes, weavers, flute players, engineers, and so on. Induction provides certainty only when all the particulars that belong to a class have been **enumerated—something** that would be difficult to do in this example, which would require a rhetor to name every sphere of human work. However, rhetoricians do not require complete enumeration of particulars, since a piece of inductive reasoning may be persuasive if enough particulars have been named to convince most people to accept the conclusion drawn from them.

Here is an example of inductive argument from Samuel Walker, who is an authority on hate speech:

The 1920s are remembered as a decade of intolerance. Bigotry was as much a symbol of the period as Prohibition, flappers, the stock market boom, and Calvin Coolidge. It was the only time when the Ku Klux Klan paraded en masse through the nation's capital. In 1921 Congress restricted immigration for the first time in American history, drastically reducing the influx of Catholics and Jews from southern and eastern Europe, and the nation's leading universities adopted admission quotas to restrict the number of Jewish students. The Sacco and Vanzetti case, in which two Italian American anarchists were executed for robbery and murder in a highly questionable prosecution, has always been one of the symbols of the anti-immigrant tenor of the period. (17)

Walker begins this paragraph with a conclusion about the high level of bigotry and intolerance in America during the 1920s and then, working inductively, cites a series of **examples—the** Klan and restrictions on immigration—to support it.

Aristotle had a good deal more to say about reasoning in rhetoric, all centered on the relation of general premises to particular ones. Using this

scheme, he invented four types of reasoning that are special to rhetoric: enthymemes, examples, signs, and maxims.

Enthymemes

The premises used in constructing rhetorical proofs differ from those used in dialectic and science only in the degree of certainty we can attach to them. In dialectic and science, deductive arguments are called syllogisms. In rhetoric, they are called enthymemes. The word *enthymeme* comes from Greek *thymos*, "spirit," the capacity whereby people think and feel. Ancient Greeks located the *thymos* in the midsection of the body. Quite literally, then, an enthymematic proof was a visceral appeal.

Rhetors ordinarily use some widely held community belief as the major premise of their argument. Then they apply that premise to the particular case in which they are interested. Here, for example, is an enthymeme that could be used to develop the argument about hate speech:

Major Premise: Racist slurs directed against innocent people are offensive and ought to be punished.

Minor Premise: Members of Gamma Delta Iota wore Klan outfits, stood on the commons, and shouted racist epithets at people passing by.

Conclusion: Members of Gamma Delta Iota engaged in offensive behavior and ought to be punished.

Here the major premise is a rhetorical probability, since it is not certain that everyone is offended by the use of racist slurs. The rhetor counts on the fact that most people accept this premise. Those who do not accept it may be reluctant to admit as much; if so, the rhetor's major premise has a greater chance of winning acceptance by an audience. In this case the conclusion also turns on a probability, given the rhetor's assumption that her audience probably agrees that wearing Klan garb and shouting racist epithets is offensive.

There are many sorts of relations that may obtain among premises. Sometimes, a minor premise is an example of the major premise, as it is in the enthymeme about offensive behavior. Sometimes, though, the minor premise states a reason for acceptance of the conclusion:

Major Premise: Secondhand smoke can cause lung cancer.

Minor Premise: Because people are allowed to smoke in our workplace, secondhand smoke is present there.

Conclusion: Smoking should be banned from our workplace.

The relations between major and minor premises, then, often take one of these two forms:

a. Y (minor premise) is an example of X (major premise).
b. Y (minor premise) is a reason for X (major premise).

And, as is the case in our examples about hate speech and smoking, the conclusion of an enthymeme often has the relation of "thus it follows that," a relation that can by indicated by "therefore."

Standard Enthymematic Patterns

    Y is an example of X.

    Therefore, it follows that Z.

Or

    Y is a reason for X.

    Therefore, it follows that Z.

Here is an argument built on the first pattern, arguing from a single example:

    My brother-in-law spends his unemployment check on booze.
    All welfare recipients cheat.

This inductive argument is neither logical nor convincing, because there is a large gap between the minor and major premises. The rhetor has assumed that what is true of one particular, "my brother-in-law," is true of the class of "all welfare recipients." The only audiences who will accept this argument are those who are already convinced of its worthiness. Despite its flaws, people make arguments similar to this one every day.

    Here is an instance of an argument built on the second pattern, arguing from a reason:

    Men have the power in Hollywood.
    That's why there are so few good roles for actresses.

The first and major premise generalizes about the gender of all powerful people in Hollywood, while the rhetor draws the conclusion that there are few good roles for actresses from a suppressed middle premise. Can you figure out what it is? It goes something like this:

    Men aren't interested in finding good roles for women.

In order to determine whether this argument from a reason is accurate or convincing, the middle premise must be articulated; once it is articulated, a rhetor who wants to be convincing can determine whether or not it can or needs to be supported by evidence. Such an examination in this case shows that at least a few examples should be assembled in order to shore up both the major and the minor premise.

    The enthymematic patterns of example and reason are not and need not be followed slavishly. Sometimes an enthymematic argument begins with its conclusion:

    Because alternative music usually finds its way into pop culture, suburban dwellers like the blues and Waylon Jennings's songs can be heard on the streets of New York City.

The pattern here, then, is

Because Z, X and Y.

The conclusion (Z), that alternative music becomes part of popular culture, is supported by two examples (X and Y) about the crossover popularity of blues and country music. Whether this argument is convincing depends upon whether audiences think the examples are actually particulars that fit into the class asserted in the conclusion.

The advertising slogan for Nike products—"Just do it!"—is a highly truncated enthymeme in which only the conclusion is stated. The other premises are presented in images of skilled athletes who wear Nikes while they perform incredible athletic feats. Nonetheless, the entire enthymeme can be articulated in language:

Successful athletes wear Nikes.
These successful athletes wear Nikes.
If you want to be a successful athlete, you should wear Nikes (or, You Can't Do It without a Pair of Nikes!).

This enthymeme depends for its impact on a number of American commonplaces and attitudes: our reverence for sport, for athletes, for beautiful bodies, for activity, assertiveness, and self-reliance. All of these commonplaces could be adduced as a chain of major premises that underlie the Nike ad. Furthermore, its generalized conclusion (Just Do It!) can be read to mean "Just buy our product!" This is the implicit or explicit conclusion offered by most advertising.

In the presidential campaign of 1988, the ad writers employed by one candidate devised an enthymeme that is now notorious as an example of the "dirty tricks" that are used in such campaigns. Rhetorician Kathleen Hall Jamieson tells the story of the ad campaign in which the damaging enthymemes appeared:

VOTERS ARE PACK RATS

The role that ads, Bush rhetoric, news, and audience psychology played in transforming William Horton's name for some into a symbol of the terrors of crime and for others of the exploitation of racist fears shows the powerful ways in which messages interact and the varying responses they evoke in individuals. Like pack rats, voters gather bits and pieces of political information and store them in a single place. Lost in the storage is a clear recall of where this or that "fact" came from. Information obtained from news mixes with that from ads, for example.

Although Bush had been telling the tale on the stump since June, in the second week in September 1988, the Horton story broke into prime time in the form of a National Security Political Action Committee (NSPAC) ad. The ad tied Michael Dukakis to a convicted murderer who had jumped furlough and gone on to rape a Maryland woman and assault her fiance. The convict was black, the couple white.

The ad opens with side-by-side pictures of Dukakis and Bush. Dukakis's hair is unkempt, the photo dark. Bush, by contrast, is smiling and bathed in

light. As the pictures appear, an announcer says "Bush and Dukakis on crime." A picture of Bush flashes on the screen. "Bush supports the death penalty for first-degree murderers." A picture of Dukakis. "Dukakis not only opposes the death penalty, he allowed first-degree murderers to have weekend passes from prison." A close-up mug shot of Horton flashes onto the screen. "One was Willie Horton, who murdered a boy in a robbery, stabbing him nineteen times." A blurry black-and-white photo of Horton apparently being arrested appears. "Despite a life sentence, Horton received ten weekend passes from prison." The words "kidnapping," "stabbing," and "raping" appear on the screen with Horton's picture as the announcer adds, "Horton fled, kidnapping a young couple, stabbing the man and repeatedly raping his girlfriend." The final photo again shows Michael Dukakis. The announcer notes "Weekend prison passes. Dukakis on crime."

When the Bush campaign's "revolving door" ad began to air on October 5, viewers read Horton from the PAC ad into the furlough ad. This stark black-and-white Bush ad opened with bleak prison scenes. It then cut to a procession of convicts circling through a revolving gate and marching toward the nation's living rooms. By carefully juxtaposing words and pictures, the ad invited the false inference that 268 first-degree murderers were furloughed by Dukakis to rape and kidnap. As the bleak visuals appeared, the announcer said that Dukakis had vetoed the death penalty and given furloughs to "first-degree murderers not eligible for parole. While out, many committed other crimes like kidnapping and rape."

The furlough ad contains three false statements and invites one illegitimate inference. The structure of the ad prompts listeners to hear "first-degree murderers not eligible for parole" as the antecedent referent for "many." Many of whom committed crimes? First-degree murderers not eligible for parole. Many of whom went on to commit crimes like kidnapping and rape? First-degree murderers not eligible for parole.

But many unparoleable first-degree murderers did not escape. Of the 268 furloughed convicts who jumped furlough during Dukakis's first two terms, only four had ever been convicted first-degree murderers not eligible for parole. Of those four not "many" but one went on to kidnap and rape. That one was William Horton. By flashing "268 escaped" on the screen as the announcer speaks of "many first-degree murderers," the ad invites the false inference that 268 murderers jumped furlough to rape and kidnap. Again, the single individual who fits this description is Horton. Finally, the actual number who were more than four hours late in returning from furlough during Dukakis's two and a half terms was not 268 but 275. In Dukakis's first two terms, 268 escapes were made by the 11,497 individuals who were given a total of 67,378 furloughs. In the ten-year period encompassing his two completed terms and the first two years of his third term (1987-88), 275 of 76,455 furloughs resulted in escape.

This figure of 275 in ten years compares with 269 who escaped in the three years in which the program was run by Dukakis's Republican predecessor, who created the furlough program. (17-20)

Jamieson charts some of the enthymematic conclusions that voters were expected to supply. The first ad asked viewers to create the following enthymeme:

Major Premise: Convicted criminals ought to be kept in prison.

Minor Premise: Our opponent allows convicted criminals to take week-end furloughs outside prison.

Minor Premise: One prisoner committed a horrible crime while on furlough.

Conclusion: Our opponent does not keep convicted criminals in prison where they belong (or more subtly, "Our opponent is soft on crime").

The first statement is a general premise, drawn from commonsense beliefs held by the community. The minor premises are particular premises, since they refer to individuals—our opponent and one prisoner. The third statement is a conclusion derived from comparing the premises. And as Professor Jamieson demonstrates, voters were then asked to connect this enthymeme to another, constructed in the "revolving door" ad.

As is apparent from this example, the placement of premises in rhetoric does not require the rigorous formal analysis that is necessary in logic. Thus other conclusions could be drawn from the premises of this enthymeme: that our opponent does not share beliefs that are widely held within the community and that, as a result, the community should not vote for him. Obviously, the ad writers hoped that voters would draw these further conclusions. Nor are rhetors obligated to offer only two premises and a conclusion, as logicians are. Rather, an enthymeme may contain as many premises as are needed to secure the audience's belief in the conclusion.

Ordinarily, rhetors do not state all of the premises and conclusions of an enthymematic argument. The ad writers who devised the enthymeme about furloughed criminals omitted its first general premise (convicted criminals ought to be kept in prison), and they did not explicitly state its conclusion in their television advertisements. In the second ad, they carefully constructed the enthymeme so that it was ambiguous, allowing viewers to draw conclusions that were not true.

From the winning candidate's point of view, this was a very successful argument. From a rhetorician's point of view, however, it is an example of what Aristotle called "false reasoning," because its premises were not true. Rhetoricians are ethically obligated to avoid using premises that are not true.

Enthymemes are powerful because they are based in community beliefs. Because of this, whether the reasoning in an enthymeme is sound or whether the statements it contains are true or not, sadly enough, often makes little difference to the community's acceptance of the argument. Enthymemes work best when listeners or readers participate in constructing the argument—that is, if their prior knowledge is part of the argument, they are inclined to accept the entire argument if they are willing to accept the rhetorician's use of their common, prior knowledge. For this reason, enthymematic arguments do not have to be spelled out completely. The rhetorician may even omit premises or conclusions. The audience will enjoy supplying the missing premises for themselves, and may be more

readily persuaded by the argument because they have participated in its construction.

Take this enthymeme, for example: "Good people do not commit murder; Ethica is a good person; therefore Ethica did not commit murder." While delivering this argument, the rhetor might omit the minor premise, saying only this: "Since good people do not commit murder, obviously Ethica is not guilty." Or he might omit the conclusion: "Good people do not commit murder, and Ethica is a good person." It is easy for the audience to supply the implied conclusion. As is true of all rhetorical premises, the major premise of this enthymeme is a probability rather than a certainty, and thus exceptions to it do exist.

The placement of premises in rhetoric does not require the rigorous formal analysis that is necessary in logic. And ordinarily, rhetors do not state all of the premises and conclusions of an enthymematic argument. Nor are rhetors obligated to offer only two premises and a conclusion, as logicians are. Rather, an enthymeme may contain as many premises as are needed to secure the audience's belief in the conclusion.

Cicero pointed out that while experienced rhetoricians know how to trace out all the arguments that appear in enthymemes, they do not present them according to the strict arrangement of their premises developed during invention. Rather, when it came to arrangement and delivery, a rhetor should chain premises together in the most effective way. The important thing, for Cicero, was to take a variety of approaches to laying out arguments for audiences. He counseled that a rhetor should "use induction at one time and deduction at another; and again, in the deductive argument not always employ all . . . possible parts nor embellish the parts in the same fashion, but sometimes to begin with the minor premise, sometimes use one of the . . . proofs, sometimes both, and finally, use now this and now that form of conclusion" *(De Inventione* I xli 76). In other words, enthymemes may begin sometimes with premises or conclusions, depending on which is most effective in a given rhetorical situation. Furthermore, rhetors may omit premises that are self-evident to an audience. Cicero maintained that a few practice sessions would demonstrate just how easy it is to compose effective enthymemes.

Rhetorical Examples

Aristotle's word for example was *paradeigma* ("model"). A rhetorical example is any particular that can be fitted under the heading of a class and that represents the distinguishing features of that class. One of us lives with a cat named Margaret, who is an example of the class "cat" because she bears the distinguishing characteristics of this class. Lions and tigers (but not bears) are also examples of this class.

As Quintilian defined it, an example adduces "some past action real or assumed which may serve to persuade the audience of the truth of the point which we are trying to make" (V xi 6). If, for instance, a rhetor wants

to convince her neighbor that he should keep his dog inside the fence that surrounds his property, she can remind him of a past instance when another neighbor's dog, running free, spread another neighbor's garbage all over both front yards. Rhetorical examples should not be confused with the particulars used in inductive reasoning. This rhetor has no interest in generalizing about all dogs in the neighborhood but is only concerned to compare the actual behavior of one dog running free to the probable behavior of another in similar circumstances. A rhetor who uses examples is reasoning only from part to part, or like to like, or like to unlike, and not from a particular to a generalization as he does in induction.

Rhetorical examples are persuasive because they are specific. Since they are specific, they call up vivid memories of something the audience has experienced. This effect works well if the rhetor gives details that evoke sensory impressions, that mention familiar sights, sounds, smells, tastes, or tactile sensations. In the following passage, Victor Villanueva, a teacher himself, gives us a portrait of a teacher who influenced him:

> An appreciation for literacy comes from Mr. Del Maestro. He teaches drama, though he ventures into poetry on occasion. A Robert **Culp-like** fellow, square jawed, thin but not skinny, reading glasses halfway down his nose, thin brown hair combed straight back, large hands. He had been a makeup man in Hollywood, he says. Brings movie-making to life. And for me, he brings Julius Caesar to life, removes the mist from "Chack-es-piri," as *abuela* would say it. And for those in the room not as fascinated by Julius Caesar or Prince Hamlet or poor Willy **Loman** as I am, those who **are—in** teacher **talk—disruptive,** Mr. D forgoes the pink slip to the principal, meets the disrupter downstairs, in the gym, twelve-ounce gloves, the matter settled. He has a broad definition of art. He knows the **world—and** he understands the block, *el bloque,* what kids today call "the hood." Mr. D was as close to color as any teacher 1 had known in school. (1-2)

Notice how the details in this example evoke readers' memory of their own teachers.

Examples also work well when they evoke memories of specific historical events that are fresh in the memories of members of the audience. Here is an exerpt from Nancy Gibbs's report on the events of September 11, 2001, in New York City, written for *Time* magazine:

> There were no strangers in town anymore, only sudden friends, sharing names, news and phones. Lines formed, at least 20 people long, at all pay phones, because cell phones were not working. Should we go to work? Is the subway safe? "Let's all have a good look at each other," a passenger said to the others in her car. "We may be our last memory." The passengers stranded at La Guardia Airport asked one another where exactly they were supposed to go and how they were to get there. Strangers were offering each other a place to wait in Queens, giving advice on good diners in Astoria. Limousine drivers offered to take passengers to Boston for a price. A vendor dispensed free bottles of water to travelers waiting in the hot sun. ("Special Report: The Day of the **Attack," TIME.com**)

Inhabitants of New York City have a reputation for being cold to strangers and tourists. But apparently that commonplace did not hold on September 11. Notice how Gibbs specifies and gives life to the generalization that opens this passage by listing example after example of people helping one another.

When a rhetor reasons by means of example, she ordinarily uses a well-known instance to illuminate or explain one that is less well known. Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian all use this illustration of reasoning from example:

> To prove that Dionysius is aiming at a tyranny, because he asks for a body-guard, one might say that Pisistratus before him and Theagenes of Megara did the same, and when they obtained what they asked for, made themselves tyrants. All the other tyrants known may serve as an example of Dionysius, whose reason, however, for asking for a bodyguard we do not yet know. *(Rhetoric* I ii 1357b)

If a rhetor wishes to turn this argument from example into an inductive argument, he can mention as many examples as he needs to be convincing, and then assemble them under a universal proposition: "One who is aiming at a tyranny asks for a bodyguard." He could immediately apply this generalization to new particulars if he wished: "We should beware, then, when Pericles asks for a bodyguard."

Historical *Examples—Brief* and *Extended*

Aristotle pointed out that successful examples may be drawn from history. For instance, people who opposed the Persian Gulf War in 1991 used the historical example of Vietnam to argue that America should not become involved again in a localized quarrel in which America had no direct involvement. Later, presidents Bush and Clinton both used the example of Vietnam as a reason for their hesitation to intervene in a local war between ethnic groups in Bosnia. People who opposed George W. Bush's plan to invade Iraq have also called on the example of Vietnam to caution against unilateral involvement in the affairs of other nations. Or, if a rhetorician were interested in arguing that politicians ought not to be trusted, she could briefly mention a number of examples taken from history—Nathan Hale, Benedict Arnold, or Richard Nixon, who, whether fairly or not, was called "Tricky Dick." The brief argument from example works because people respond to the specificity of examples. It works best when the examples selected (Hale, Arnold, Nixon) seem to squarely represent the class (politicians who were traitors).

Using a procedure called "extended example," a rhetor mentions only one of these figures and establishes his untrustworthiness by naming and describing several instances of it. For instance, Nixon lied to the American people on at least two occasions, he broke several laws, and he destroyed evidence that would implicate him in illegal acts. A rhetor can give as many vivid details as possible in order to evoke the audience's memory of the incident and thus to induce their sympathy with his argument. In the following passage, taken from the first chapter of *The Footnote,* Anthony

Grafton has fun with the point he wants to make by citing extensively from the example set by the great eighteenth-century historian Edward Gibbon:

> In the eighteenth century, the historical footnote was a high form of literary art. No Enlightenment historian achieved a work of more epic scale or more classic style than Edward Gibbon's *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.* And nothing in that work did more than its footnotes to amuse his friends or enrage his enemies.[1] Their religious and sexual irreverence became justly famous. In his *Meditations,* says Gibbon the historian of the emperor Marcus Aurelius, husband of the notoriously gallant Faustina, he thanks the gods, who had bestowed on him a wife, so faithful, so gentle, and of such a wonderful simplicity of manners.[2] The world, urbanely reflects Gibbon the annotator, has laughed at the credulity of Marcus; but Madam Dacier assures us (and we may credit a lady) that the husband will always be deceived, if the wife condescends to dissemble.[3] The duty of an historian, remarks Gibbon in his ostensibly earnest inquiry into the miracles of the primitive church, does not call upon him to interpose his private judgment in this nice and important controversy.[4] It may seem somewhat remarkable, comments Gibbon in a footnote which drops all pretense of decorum, that Bernard of Clairvaux, who records so many miracles of his friend St. Malachi, never takes any notice of his own, which, in their turn, however, are carefully related by his companions and disciples.[5] The learned Origen and a few others, so Gibbon explains in his analysis of the ability of the early Christians to remain chaste, judged it the most prudent to disarm the tempter.[6] Only the footnote makes clear that the theologian had avoided temptation by the drastic means of castrating himself—and reveals how Gibbon viewed this operation: As it was his general practice to allegorize scripture; it seems unfortunate that, in this instance only, he should have adopted the literal sense.[7] Such cheerfully sarcastic comments stuck like burrs in orthodox memories and reappeared to haunt their author in the innumerable pamphlets written by his critics.[8]
>
> Gibbon's artistry served scholarly as well as polemical ends—just as his footnotes not only subverted, but supported, the magnificent arch of his history.[9] He could invest a bibliographical citation with the grave symmetry of a Ciceronian peroration: In the account of the Gnostics of the second and third centuries, Mosheim is ingenious and candid; Le Clerc dull, but exact; Beausobre almost always an apologist; and it is much to be feared that the primitive fathers are very frequently calumniators.[10] He could supply a comic parallel with a gravity usually reserved for the commendation or condemnation of a major historical figure: "For the enumeration of the Syrian and Arabian deities, it may be observed, that Milton has comprised, in one hundred and thirty very beautiful lines, the two large and learned syntagmas, which Selden had composed on that abstruse subject."[11] And he could salute the earlier scholars, good Christians all, whose works he drew upon for a thousand curious details, with a unique combination of amused dismissal of their beliefs and genuine respect for their learning.[12] Gibbon was certainly right to think that comprehensive account of his sources, written in the same style, would have been susceptible of entertainment as well as information.[13] Though his footnotes were not yet Romantic, they had all the romance high style can provide. Their instructive abundance attracted the praise of the brilliant nineteenth-century classical scholar Jacob

Bernays as well as that of his brother, the Germanist Michael Bernays, whose pioneering essay on the history of the footnote still affords more information and insight than most of its competitors.[14] (1-4)

1. See in general G. W. Bowersock, "The Art of the Footnote," *American Scholar,* 53 (1983-84), **54–62.** For the wider context, see the remarkable older study by M. Bernays, "Zur Lehre von den Citaten and Noten," *Schriften zur Kritik* **und** *Litteraturgeschtchte,* IV (Berlin, 1899), 255-347 at 302-322.
2. E. Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,* chap. 4; ed. D. B. Womersley (London, 1994), **I, 108–109.**
3. Chap. 4, n. 4; ibid., 109.
4. Ibid., chap. 15; **I, 473.**
5. Chap. 15, n. 81, ibid., 474.
6. Ibid., 480.
7. Chap. 15, n. 96, ibid. For a recent critical discussion of the story of Origen's self-castration, see P. Brown, *The Body and Society* (New York, 1988), 168 and n. 44.
8. This point is well made by Bernays. For more recent studies along the same lines, see F. Palmeri, "The Satiric Footnotes of Swift and Gibbon," *The Eighteenth Century,* 31 (1990), 245-262, and P. W. Cosgrove, "Undermining the Footnote: Edward Gibbon, Alexander Pope, and the Anti-Authenticating Footnote," *Annotation and* **Its** *Texts,* ed. S. Barney (Oxford, 1991), 130-151.
9. For two helpful case studies see J. D. Garrison, "Gibbon and the 'Treacherous Language of **Panegyrics,'"** *Eighteenth-Century Studies,* i 1 (1977-78), 4062; Garrison, Lively and Laborious: Characterization in Gibbon's Metahistory, *Modem Philology,* 76 (1978-79), 163-178.
10. Chap. 15, n. 32; I, 458.
11. Chap. 15, n. 9, ibid., 449.
12. See e.g. n. 98 to chap. 70, in which Gibbon expertly reviews and assesses the work of the indefatigable historian and editor of texts Ludovico Antonio Muratori, "my guide and master in the history of Italy." "In all his works," Gibbon comments, "Muratori approves himself a diligent and laborious writer, who aspires above the prejudices of a Catholic priest" (Muratori himself would have claimed that writing accurate history lay within a good priest's duties); ed, Womersley, III, 1061. On Muratori himself see S. Bertelli, *Erudizione a storia in Ludovico Antonio Muratori* (Naples, 1960).
13. "Advertisement," I, 5 (this text first appears, under the same title, on the verso of the half title to the endnotes in the first edition of the first volume of the *Decline and Fall* ([London, 1776]).
14. The phrase "lehreiche **Fulle"** is Jacob Bernays', as quoted with approval by Michael Bernays (305, n. 34). The relationship between the two deserves a study. Jacob mourned his brother as dead when he converted to Christianity: but Michael nonetheless emulated Jacob's analysis of the manuscript tradition of Lecretius in his own geneological treatment of the editions of Goethe. For Jacob, see A. Momigliano, "Jacob Bernays," *Quinto contributo* **alla** *storia* **degli** *studi* **classici** *e del* **mondo** *antico* (Rome, 1975), 127-158; for his work on Lucretius, see S. **Timpanaro,** *la genesi del* **metodo** *del* **Lachmann,** 2nd ed. (Padua, 1985). For Michael Bernays, see W. **Rehm,**

> *Spate Studien* (Bern and Munich, 1964), **359–458,** and H. Weigel, *Nur was du nie gesehn wird ewig dauern* (Freiburg, 1989). So far as I know, the third brother, Freud's father-in-law **Berman,** did not venture an opinion on Gibbon's footnotes.

Notice how Grafton peppered his text with learned footnotes of his own, in order to reinforce the message conveyed by his extended example: "historians' arguments must still stride forward or totter backward on their footnotes" (4).

Fictional Example

Aristotle pointed out that successful examples can also be found in fiction. He drew his fictional examples from Aesop:

> A horse was in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag having come and done much damage to the pasture, the horse, wishing to avenge himself on the stag, asked a man whether he could help him to punish the stag. That man consented, on condition that the horse submitted to the bit and allowed him to mount him javelins in hand. The horse agreed to the terms and the man mounted him, but instead of obtaining vengeance on the stag, the horse from that time became the man's slave. (*Rhetoric*   II xx 1393b)

According to Aristotle, Aesop used this fictional example to warn people that they should not give power to a dictator simply because they wished to take revenge on an enemy.

Fictional examples include fables and analogies *(paraboge,* "comparisons"). Fables may be drawn from literature or film, or a rhetor may compose her own stories for illustrative purposes (see Chapter 15, on the *progymnasmata,* or rhetorical exercises, for help in composing fables). Aristotle wrote that fables are easier to use than historical examples, because fables may be invented when no historical parallels are available that fit the rhetor's case. Advertisers often use animals or fabulous human beings to sell their products. One has only to recall Joe Camel or the Marlboro Man to realize how effective these fabulous images can become. These were fictional examples used to sell cigarettes in the days when cigarette smoking was more fashionable than it is today. There is a good deal of argument over whether these fictional examples actually caused people to buy cigarettes, but certainly they did contribute to name recognition of the products they represent.

Fabulous examples work best if the narratives from which they are drawn are well known and liked by the audience. A rhetorician, on one hand, who is interested in establishing the possibility that UFOs are piloted by friendly extraterrestrials, for example, might revive his audience's memory of the vivid scenes of such visitations portrayed in popular films such as *E.T.* or *Close Encounters of the Third Kind;* rhetors who want to portray aliens as hostile, on the other hand, can turn to the vivid depictions of this scenario in *Signs, Alien,* or *The X-Files.* Fables are most effective when

morals, or generalizations, can be drawn from them. So the rhetor who uti-
lizes the movie fables mentioned above should point out exactly how these
fictions reinforce the notions that the intentions of extraterrestrial visitors
are friendly or hostile. He should also directly connect the lessons taught
by the films with the point of his argument.

Analogy

In an analogy a rhetor places one hypothetical example beside another for
the purposes of comparison. Aristotle borrowed his illustration of analogy
from Socrates:

> It is as silly to argue that leaders should be chosen by balloting as it would be
> to argue that Olympic athletes or the pilots of ships should be chosen by lot.

By means of this comparison with examples, wherein choosing by ballot
could produce disastrous results, the rhetor implies the conclusion that
when leaders are chosen by ballot, there is no assurance that they will pos-
sess the skills requisite to leadership. He also manages to imply that leaders
must have skill levels comparable to those of athletes and **pilots** of ships.

In a simple analogy like this one, a rhetor simply compares two or
more things or events. President Lyndon **Baines** Johnson, in a commence-
ment address delivered at Howard University in 1965, used the following
simple analogy to underscore the **need** for affirmative action;

> You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate
> him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, "you're free to com-
> pete with all the others," and still justly believe that you have been completely
> fair. Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens
> must have the ability to walk through those **gates**——We seek **not** . . . just equal-
> ity as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.

Here President Johnson compared those who could benefit from affirma-
tive action to a runner unable to exercise. This analogy became so popular
among advocates of affirmative action programs and policies that it
assumed the status of a commonplace in that discourse.

In complex analogies, in contrast, two examples exhibit a similar rela-
tion among their elements. The physician William Hervey, who is credited
with discovering the circulation of the blood in human beings, used a com-
plex analogy to do so. He reasoned that if sap circulates in vegetables and
keeps them alive, it was reasonable to assume that blood circulates in ani-
mals and performs a similar function for them. Here the similarity lies in
the relationship of circulation, rather than between the items **mentioned—**
sap and blood, vegetables and animals.

Cicero included an example of complex analogical reasoning in the *De
Inventione*. He told a story about an ancient rhetor named Aspasia who
used a series of complex analogies to convince a couple to be satisfied with
their marriage. First Aspasia prompted the wife to admit that, while she
would prefer to have the gold ornaments and fine dresses possessed by a

neighboring woman if they were better than her own, she would not covet that woman's husband, even though he be a better husband. In other words, since ornaments and fine dresses do not bear the same relation to happiness as does marriage to a fine husband, they do not bear the same relation to a woman's well-being or happiness. Aspasia then used a complex analogy to demonstrate to the husband that, while he might prefer to own the better horses and the better farm possessed by a neighboring man, he would not prefer the man's wife, even though she be a better wife than his own. Aspasia concluded:

> You, madam, wish to have the best husband, and you, Xenophon, desire above all things to have the finest wife. Therefore unless you can contrive that there be no better man or finer woman on earth, you will certainly always be in dire want of what you consider best, namely, that you be the husband of the very best of wives, and that she be wedded to the very best of men. (II xxxi 52)

The reasoning in this complex analogy goes like this:

> Any spouse who wants the best spouse must also become the best spouse because part of being wedded to "the best spouse" is being the "best spouse there is."

Because of the mutual relation of spouses to one another, each can be only as good a spouse as the other. The complex analogy resides, then, in the relationship of spouseness itself, rather than in the qualities of either husband or wife. Cicero thought that the force of this conclusion is undeniable, since it is very like the undisputed conclusions about jewelry and livestock that preceded it. He noted further that Socrates used this method "because he wished to present no arguments himself, but preferred to get a result from the material which the interlocutor had given him—a result which the interlocutor was bound to approve as following necessarily from what he had already granted" (53).

Here is an example of a complex analogy, put forward by columnist Maureen Dowd.

WHAT WOULD GENGHIS DO?

It's easy to picture Rummy in a big metal breastplate, a skirt and lace-up gladiator sandals.

Rummius Maximus Pompeius.

During the innocent summer before 9/11, the defense secretary's office sponsored a study of ancient empires—Macedonia, Rome, the Mongols—to figure out how they maintained dominance.

What tips could Rummy glean from Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Genghis Khan?

Mr. Rumsfeld would be impressed, after all, if he knew that Genghis Khan had invented the first crude MIRV (a missile that spews out multiple warheads to their predetermined targets). As David Morgan writes in "The Mongols," when the bloodthirsty chieftain began his subjugation of the Chinese empire in 1211, he had to figure out a way to take China's walled cities:

"Genghis Khan offered to raise the siege if he were given 1,000 cats and 10,000 swallows. These were duly handed over. Material was tied to their tails, and this was set on fire. The animals were released and fled home, setting the city ablaze, and in the ensuing confusion the city was stormed."

In her new book "The Mission," about America's growing dependence on the military to manage world affairs, Dana Priest says that the Pentagon commissioned the study at a time when Rummy did not yet have designs on the world.

To the dismay of his four-star generals, the new secretary was talking about pulling American soldiers out of Saudi Arabia, the Sinai Desert, Kosovo and Bosnia. He thought using our military to fight the South American drug trade was "nonsense."

He hated to travel and scorned "international hand-holding," Ms. Priest writes, adding that the defense chief was thinking that "maybe the United States didn't need all these entanglements to remain on top." He canceled multinational exercises, and even banned the word "engagement." His only interest in colonization was in putting weapons in space.

Then 9/11 changed everything. At the Pentagon, Paul Wolfowitz talked about "ending states who sponsor terrorism." He and Richard **Perle** said our best bet for stomping out Islamic terrorism was to take over Iraq, rewrite those anti-American textbooks and spur a democratic domino effect.

Now, with the rest of the world outraged at the administration's barbed and swaggering style, the Bushies have grown tetchy about the word "empire." They insist they are not interested in hegemony, even as the Pentagon proconsuls prepare to rule in Iraq, the ancient Mesopotamian empire.

Bernard Lewis of Princeton, Newt Gingrich and others worked on the August 2001 report on empires, which noted: "Without strong political and economic institutions, the Mongols and the Macedonians could not maintain extensive empires. What made the Roman Empire great was not just its military power but its 'franchise of empire.' What made the Chinese Empire great was not just its military power but the immense power and might of its culture.

"If we can take any lesson from history it is this: For the United States to sustain predominance it must remain militarily dominant, but it must also maintain its pre-eminence across the other pillars of power." Some demur. A classical scholar, Bernard Knox, said, "Empires are pretty well dead; their day is gone."

Niall Ferguson, a professor at Oxford and New York University who wrote the coming book "Empire," said that while "it was rather sweet" that the Pentagon was studying ancient empires, he thought the lessons were no longer relevant.

"The technological and economic differences between modernity and pre-modernity are colossal," he said.

Besides, he says Americans aren't temperamentally suited to empire-building. "The British didn't mind living for years in Iraq or India for **100-plus** years," he said. "Americans aren't attracted to the idea of taking up residence in hot, poor places."

He's right. America doesn't like to occupy. We like to buy our territory, like the bargain Louisiana Purchase and the overpriced amount we were going to pay Turkey (the old Ottoman Empire) to use its bases, before its Parliament balked. At the outside, we prefer to time-share.

> As the brazen Bush imperialists try to install a new democracy in Iraq, they are finding the old democracy of our reluctant allies inconvenient. *(New York Times,* March 5, 2003)

Dowd cleverly begins by making a simple analogy between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the pop-culture figure of General Maximus from the film *Gladiator.* But her analogy becomes more complex as she compares the Bush administration's supposed desire for empire to that of other historical emperors. She shows that this is a negative comparison because desire for empire is misguided in present times; in other words, the desire for empire bears a negative relation to the present. By means of this complex analogy she suggests that the Bush administration will not succeed in its desire for empire any more than Genghis Khan's birds and cats were comparable to missiles. The analogy allows Dowd to soften her criticism of the administration with humor without sacrificing its point.

Similar and Contrary Examples

Quintilian distinguished between examples that work by comparing two like instances, which he called "simile," and those that work by comparing unlike cases or **"contraries."** His example of simile was *"*Saturninus was justly killed, as were the Gracchi" (V xi 7). The Gracchi were famous brothers, Tiberius and Gaius, who led revolts against constituted Roman authority. Quintilian's comparison implied that the lesser-known and less respected Saturninus belonged in the class of persons who are important enough to pose a threat; it also implied that even though he was a lesser person, he nevertheless deserved a punishment similar to that meted out to the members of the famous Gracchus family.

A contemporary rhetorician might argue from simile as follows: *Survivor* and *Who Wants to Marry a Millionaire* were rigged. So don't expect me to watch *The Bachelorette.* The argument implied by the comparison among these examples of so-called "reality TV" is that if two were rigged, others will be, as well, and are hence not worth watching. A contemporary rhetorician who is skeptical about official explanations of the assassinations of public figures might make a more complex argument from comparative possibility as follows: "If it was possible to capture and imprison the assassin of Robert Kennedy, it ought to be possible to capture and imprison the assassins of Martin Luther King Jr. and John F. Kennedy as well." The comparison suggests that even though suspects were captured and imprisoned in the latter two cases, neither was the actual assassin.

To argue from example by contrary is trickier but nevertheless effective. Quintilian's illustration of contrary example was this: "Marcellus restored the works of art which had been taken from the Syracusans who were our enemies, while Verres took the same works of art from our allies" (V xi 6). This example reflects very negatively on the character of Verres, who, in contrast to Marcellus's generosity to former enemies, stole from friends. A contemporary version of this contrary example could be

employed as follows: "The Surgeon General and the American Medical Association long ago warned that smoking was dangerous to human health; the executives of tobacco companies made this admission only when forced to do so by the courts."

USING EXAMPLES

Aristotle preferred enthymemes to examples as a kind of proof, no doubt because enthymemes were similar to the fundamental unit of proof in his logical system—the syllogism. However, he wrote that if no enthymemes are available to a rhetor, she must use examples since they do produce conviction (II xx 9). If enthymemes are available, he recommended that a rhetor support them with examples and that she put the examples last since they are likely to induce belief. If a rhetor must begin with examples, she should include several; however, if she uses them last, in support of an enthymeme, one example will do.

Aristotle's preference for logical reasoning seems to have overtaken his usual good sense at this point. Modern audiences are ordinarily impressed by examples. The argument from example is certainly a favorite of advertisers—think, for instance, of the ads for beer that show people drinking beer and having a good time. Many contemporary journalists and writers of nonfiction also begin their arguments with extended examples. Here are the opening paragraphs from the first chapter of Peter Baker's book about the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton:

> Hillary Rodham Clinton looked miserable. Her hair was pulled back, her face clear of any makeup, her eyes ringed red and puffy in that way that suggested she had been crying. She stared vacantly across the room. The people who had surrounded her and her husband for the past seven years had never seen her like this. Even in private, she was always perfectly poised, immaculately coiffed, impeccably dressed, and inalterably in control. Now, however, she appeared to have been to hell and back. To see her like this, thought some of the longtime Clinton loyalists who had rushed back to the White House to help in weathering the worst crisis of her husband's presidency, it seemed as if someone had died.
>
> When one of her husband's original political advisers, James Carville, arrived in the Solarium on the third floor of the White House, summoned back overnight from Brazil at her request, Hillary rushed over to him, clutched his hand, and sat him down next to her. "You just have to help us get through this," she said. "1 don't know how we can get through this."
>
> Neither did anyone else. At that moment, on the afternoon of Monday, August 17, 1998, President Clinton was three floors below them, facing off against Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr in the Map Room of the White House and testifying via closed-circuit television to a federal grand jury about his relationship with a young former intern named Monica Samille Lewinsky and his efforts to cover it up during the sexual-harassment lawsuit filed against him by former Arkansas state clerk Paula Jones. Forced by incontrovertible

DNA evidence, Clinton was admitting after seven months of adamant denials that he had fooled around with a woman less than half his age in a private hallway and cubbyhole just off the Oval Office, and he would have to tell the nation later that night. It was not an easy confession to make. Indeed, Clinton had not been able to bring himself to break the news to his own wife. Four nights before, he had sent his lawyer to pave the way for him.

It had to have been the longest walk of David E. Kendall's life, the journey that night, Thursday, August 13, to the residential part of the executive mansion where he had met with the first lady. Kendall, a fastidious yet tough-as-nails attorney from the blue-chip Washington law firm of Williams & Connolly, had represented both Clintons for five years now through every manner of alleged scandal, from Whitewater to Travelgate to Filegate, becoming one of their most trusted confidants. And so it fell to him at that critical moment to play emissary from husband to wife, to disclose the most awful secret of any marriage.

Something had obviously gone on between the president and Lewinsky, Kendall had told the first lady in his soft, understated way. The president was going to have to tell the grand jury about it. Only after Kendall laid the foundation did Clinton speak directly with his wife.

Over the weekend it became clear to others in the White House that the president was about to change his story, and reports citing unnamed sources began appearing in the press, first in the *New York Times* and later the *Washington Post.* Clinton's political advisers began preparing for the inevitable national television address he would have to give to explain himself. Mickey Kantor, a longtime friend who had served as his commerce secretary and now as occasional damage-control adviser, was pushing to have Clinton preempt Starr by addressing the nation on Sunday evening, the night before his grand jury appearance. The lawyers were horrified. A witness never spoke publicly before undergoing an interrogation under oath, they argued; that would only give the prosecution ammunition and possibly aggravate the grand jurors.

No, it had to be Monday night, after the session, or perhaps the next morning, depending on how Clinton felt afterward. With the timing settled, the real question then came down to what should be said and how. Everyone agreed that Paul Begala, Carville's spirited and tart-tongued former partner who had come on board at the White House as a free-floating political adviser, would be in charge of putting together a speech for the president, even though no one had told him officially what Clinton would tell the grand jury. The consensus was that Begala would have the best feel for the delicate job. Begala solicited a draft from Robert Shrum, the longtime Kennedy family adviser and wordsmith, who faxed it over to the White House. In this version, Clinton would say, "I have fallen short of what you should expect from a president. I have failed my own religious faith and values. I have let too many people down. I take full responsibility for my actions—for hurting my wife and daughter, for hurting Monica Lewinsky and her family, for hurting friends." (23-24)

Notice how Baker uses an extended example here to dramatize events in his narrative, events that he could not have witnessed personally. This use of extended example is intended to arouse the passions of the reader, enticing him to read further into the narrative.

If well chosen, examples cause audiences to recall similar circumstances in which they have participated or in which they would like to participate. The rhetorician can hope that the vividness of the comparison will also cause his audience to draw the conclusions at which he has only hinted. The rhetors who design beer ads obviously hope that viewers will connect use of the product with the fun shown in the ad.

Maxims

Maxims are wise sayings or proverbs that are generally accepted by the rhetorician's community. Ancient maxims were often drawn from poetry or history, as with Aristotle's "There is no man who is happy in everything," by the playwright Euripides, or "The best of omens is to defend one's country" from the poet Homer (II 21 2 and 11). But maxims also arise from the common wisdom of the people: the proverb "Birds of a feather flock together" was old even when Quintilian cited it two thousand years ago (V xi 41). Modern examples of maxims include such hoary sayings as "A stitch in time saves nine," "Better late than never," "Rolling stones gather no moss."

In ancient times, when literacy was not widespread, much popular wisdom was contained in oral sayings. Many of these were drawn from lines composed by respected poets, especially Homer. A rhetorician could utter a line from Homer and his audience would immediately recognize the context and the point of the quotation. This is still possible to a certain extent, although modern audiences are not as well acquainted with lines from poetry as people once were. However, many of us do know maxims taken from the Christian Bible such as "an eye for an eye," and most of us have heard the line "To be or not to be" at least once in our lives, although fewer people know that it is the first line of a speech uttered by a character created by Shakespeare named Hamlet. This phrase could well serve as the opening line of a defense attorney's opening speech; in fact a rhetor could use it to organize a list of options in any discourse urging that some action be taken. We do remember lines from speeches, such as Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" or John F. Kennedy's "Ask not what your country can do for you" or George W. Bush's "axis of evil." Such lines serve subsequent rhetors as a rhetorical shorthand that can evoke whole political philosophies.

According to Aristotle, maxims are general statements which deal with human actions that should be chosen or avoided (II xxi 2). The first two modern maxims listed above recommend actions: "A stitch in time saves nine" counsels us to be as well prepared as possible in order to save ourselves extra trouble. "Better late than never" implies that doing something too late is better than never doing it at all. The "rolling stones" maxim implies that people who submit to wanderlust don't pile up responsibilities; since wanderlust as a way of life might be either appealing or repulsive to a given audience, the action recommended here is culturally

ambiguous. A rhetor who relies on the persuasive power of this maxim would do well to clarify whether she approves of wanderlust and why.

Maxims can be found in dictionaries of proverbs or collections of quotations. Their rhetorical force derives from their commonness. Since they are commonly held, they seem to be true. As Quintilian pointed out, "sayings such as these would not have acquired immortality had they not carried conviction of their truth to all mankind" (V xi 41). And as Aristotle noted, somewhat cynically, maxims are especially convincing to audiences who like to hear their beliefs confirmed. Aristotle's example is this: a person who happened to have bad neighbors or children would welcome anyone's statement that nothing is worse than having neighbors or more stupid than to beget children (II xxi 15). This feature of maxims provides a clue as to how to hunt for appropriate ones: a rhetor should try to determine whether his audience has any preconceived opinions that are relevant to his point. If so, he should find an appropriate maxim that generalizes these preconceived opinions. For example, the maxim "Rolling stones gather no moss" would be appropriate for an older audience who disapproves of the way younger Americans tend to move frequently from community to community and from job to job. Their very general nature makes maxims applicable to a wide variety of situations. In fact, part of their persuasive force lies in their **generality—when** applied to a specific case, a maxim can impart its own persuasive force to that case. For example, Marine officers use the motto of the corps, *Semper fidelis* ("Always faithful"), to breed camaraderie among their troops and to convince them to go into battle. The motto is an abbreviated reference to the entire history of the Marine **Corps—it** reminds Marines of the corps's martial history and of its tradition of brotherhood under fire. Thus, though general, the motto can be effectively used in any specific situation when the troops need to be urged forward. Its use is such a commonplace among Marines and ex-Marines that saying *"Semper fi"* establishes an immediate relation of trust between even recent acquaintances.

Aristotle noted that maxims are often the premises or conclusions of an enthymeme. Here is an argument from a news editorial using an enthymeme that employs the maxim "Better late than never" as its conclusion:

> Last year Mr. Bush finally conceded that global warming existed. This year he conceded that human beings were to blame, and the damage was going to be severe. At this rate, next year he'll start to champion policies that will begin to put a dent in climate change—such basic steps as higher gas-mileage standards for American cars and trucks, more research into renewable energy, and tougher enforcement of the Clean Air Act instead of Mr. Bush's attempts to weaken it.
>
> Better late than never. But for an administration that views energy conservation as nothing more than a personal virtue, you probably shouldn't count on it. (" 'Get Used to It': President's New Philosophy on Global Warming," *The Record,* June 4, 2002, L12)

Maxims can serve effectively as the major premises of enthymemes, as well, since they represent the common wisdom of a community. Here is an example:

Major Premise: A stitch in time saves nine.

Minor Premise: There is a small crack in the windshield of Felix's car.

Conclusion: Felix should have the crack buffed out, or else it will spread and he will have to replace the entire windshield.

Note how, in this case, the maxim predicts the particular conclusion so readily that the rhetorician could safely omit the conclusion when she presents the argument.

One cautionary note about maxims is in order: Aristotle warned that maxims should not be used by young people, who run the risk of appearing to espouse something in a maxim that they have not learned through experience.

Signs

Signs are physical facts or real events that inevitably or usually accompany some other state of affairs. For example, if someone has a fever, this is a sign that he is ill; if someone bears a physical scar, this is a sign that he was once injured. If, as in these examples, the connection between the sign and the inferred state of affairs always exists, we have what Aristotle called an infallible sign *(tekmerion)* (I ii 16). But not all signs are infallibly connected to some state of affairs. We can argue, for instance, that a defendant's bloody clothing is a sign that she committed the murder for which she is being tried. However, the defense attorney could plausibly argue that the defendant suffers from frequent nosebleeds and thus that the bloodied clothing is a sign of that problem, rather than her participation in a murder.

The argument from sign can be very effective in an argument for the same reason that examples are effective. Arguments from sign appeal to the daily experiences that we share with members of our audience. The trick for a rhetor who uses the argument from sign is to convince an audience that the sign in question is (or is not) inevitably connected to the state of affairs he is trying to establish. Because of this difficulty, Quintilian recommended that the argument from sign be accompanied by other support (V ix 9). If the prosecuting attorney can prove that the defendant was an enemy of the murdered man, had threatened his life, and was in his house at the time of the murder, then all of these strengthen the connection of the bloody clothing to murder, rather than to a bloody nose.

We rely on arguments from sign more than we perhaps realize. We take a cloudy sky as a sign of an impending storm; if a friend is listless and uninterested in his surroundings, we take that as a sign of depression; when the pilot of an airplane in flight turns off the light that says "Fasten seat belt," we take that as a sign that it is safe to get out of our seats. But

as these examples suggest, it is not always safe to rely on signs as though they were infallible. A darkened sky may result from pollution; our listless friend may be coming down with the flu; sudden unexpected turbulence may make us wish we hadn't taken the pilot's message so casually. If someone who is accused of making hateful remarks has made them on previous occasions, this may or may not be a sign that she harbors racist or sexist attitudes.

The argument from sign has a *kairotic* element, insofar as signs change over time. In the 1960s, a man's long hair was taken as a sign that he was a hippie who believed in free love and using drugs. These days, however, the length of a man's hair does not reliably signify much of anything. Indeed, an important part of contemporary rhetorical argument involves the disassociation of signs from their commonplace referents. Today, rhetors are at pains to point out that tattoos or body piercings are not necessarily a sign of rebelliousness, or that being on welfare is not necessarily a sign of laziness or unwillingness to work. Some extremely conservative groups are trying to establish that refusing to pay one's taxes is a sign of patriotism. Signs differ from place to place as well. In the **midwestern** and southern states, people ask strangers about their parents and family as a sign of friendliness. In western states, however, such curiosity may be taken as a sign of **nosiness** or even of very bad manners. And there are cases in which we turn things or events into signs even though we have no idea what they signify. For example, cattle mutilations and the large designs that have appeared in crop fields all over the world have been taken as signs of something, but no one is exactly sure what.

EXERCISES

1. Find an article from a popular magazine or newspaper and examine its use of enthymemes, examples, maxims, or signs. How effectively are these proofs used?

2. Create an enthymeme to use in some composition you are currently working on. Find a maxim that supports your proposition and work out the argument that connects the maxim to your position. Find a historical example that supports your position and include it. Find or invent a fictional example that supports your position and include it (see Chapter 15, on the *progymnasmata,* for advice about writing fictions). Find an argument from sign that supports some conclusion in your argument.

3. Some popular slogans are conclusions or premises of enthymemes. The statement that "Elvis has left the building" is part of a long enthymematic argument whose other premises are never stated. Can you articulate them?

WORKS CITED

Baker, Peter. *The Breach: Inside the Impeachment and Trial of William Jefferson Clinton.* New York: Berkley Books, 2000.

Dowd, Maureen. "What Would Genghis Do?" *New York Times,* March 5, 2003. nytimes.com.

Gibbs, Nancy. "Special Report: The Day of the Attack." TTME.com. September 12, 2001.

Grafton, Anthony. *The Footnote: A Curious History.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.

Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. *Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Villanueva, Victor Jr. *Bootstraps: From an American Academic of Color.* Urbana, Ill.: National Council of Teachers of English, 1993.

Walker, Samuel. *Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994.

ETHICAL PROOF: ARGUMENTS FROM CHARACTER

As regards the orator, the qualities which will most commend him are courtesy, kindliness, moderation and benevolence. But, on the other hand, the opposite of these qualities will sometimes be becoming to a good man. He may hate the bad, be moved to passion in the public interest, seek to avenge crime and wrong, and, in fine, as I said at the beginning, may follow the promptings of every honorable emotion.

—Quintilian, *Institutes* XI i 42

ANCIENT RHETORICIANS KNEW that good arguments were available to them from other sources than issues. As early as the fourth century BCE, Greek teachers of rhetoric gave suggestions about how a person's character (Greek *ethos*) could be put to persuasive uses, and rhetorical theorists continued to discuss the uses of ethical proofs throughout the history of ancient rhetoric.

We use the terms *character* and *ethical proof* in this chapter to refer to proofs that rely on community assessments of a rhetor's character or reputation. According to Webster's dictionary, the English word *character* retains three of the important senses it carried for ancient rhetoricians: (1) "the pattern of behavior or personality found in an individual or group"; (2) "moral strength; self-discipline, fortitude, etc"; (3) "a good reputation." The modern term *personality* does not quite capture all the senses of the ancient Greek term *ethos,* since it carried moral overtones and since, for the Greeks, a character was created by a person's habits and reputation rather than by her experiences.

To give our readers a sense of how effective this proof can be and of how important it was to ancient orators, we quote at length from the opening of Isocrates' *Panegyricus:*

Many times have I wondered at those who first convoked the national assemblies and established the athletic games, amazed that they should have thought the prowess of human bodies to be deserving of so great bounties, while to those who had toiled in private for the public good and trained their own minds so as to be able to help also their fellow humans when they apportioned no reward whatsoever, when, in all reason, they ought rather to have made provision for the latter; for if all the athletes should acquire twice the strength which they now possess, the rest of the world would be no better off; but let a single man attain to wisdom, and all men will reap the benefit who are willing to share his insight. Yet 1 have not on this account lost heart nor chosen to abate my labors; on the contrary, believing that I shall have a sufficient reward in the approbation which my discourse will itself command, I have come before you to give my counsels on the war against the barbarians and on concord among ourselves. I am, in truth, not unaware that many of those who have claimed to be sophists have rushed upon this theme, but I hope to rise so far superior to them that it will seem as if no word had ever been spoken by my rivals upon this subject.(l-3).

Contemporary rhetors may shy away from such unabashed praise of themselves. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that in this passage Isocrates established his character as a very serious man whose important work is underestimated. At the same time he separated himself from persons who had spoken less well than he does.

To create a persuasive *ethos* is not easy. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that *ethos* always manifests itself to listeners or readers, whether a rhetor is aware of it or not. Consider, for example, the following account of the decision made by television anchor Dan Rather to interview Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, during a period in which the United States was threatening war against that country:

RATHER TREASONOUS DAN

By Tom Marsland

Before discussing Dan Rather's seditious behavior while interviewing the Butcher of Baghdad, let us reflect on a more pristine, though equally dangerous era.

May 20, 1944 (with heels clicking): "Entschuldigen Sie, wenn ich unterbreche, Herr Fuehrer! The American newsman Mr. Edward R. Murrow is here to see you ... und you'll receive him now, mein Fuehrer?"

"Ja, Ja, Major Bucholtz, show him in."

"Willkommen to the Fatherland, Herr Murrow."

"Most kind of you, Herr Reich Fuehrer. May we begin?"

"Ja."

This dialogue seem alien to you? It ought to! The date, May 20, 1944, was less than three weeks away from D-Day, the Allied counter-invasion of Adolf Hitler's Europe.

Hitler's Third Reich brandished the original moniker "Axis of Evil." Germany and its co-conspirators, Italy and Japan, plundered, tortured, raped, massacred and executed their way through the Balkans, Mother Russia,

Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Scandinavia, the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East and on into history's annals of depravity.

No legitimate American journalist would EVER have visited this evil barbarian who sought our extinction. Especially one of such high standing as Edward R. Murrow.

Had that occurred, I daresay his professional life would have lasted about six seconds. He may even have faced a firing squad back **home** . . . I really think he might have met a traitor's demise!

Which brings us to the topic of CBS TV's alpha male, Dan Rather. Comrade Rather did more than meet with this generation's Hitler, he delivered a **softball** interview to human history's No. 1 murderer of Muslims, Saddam Hussein.

Can we agree that Islam has done little to promulgate good will in the West these past 20 months? That being said, I truly wish only health and prosperity upon all peace-loving Muslims. I will go out on a limb here and state my belief that these same conditional warm fuzzies are shared by an overwhelming majority of Americans.

However, this group hug ought not be extended to embrace terrorists, rapists, mass-murderers, robber-barons, torturers or Democrats. OK, so I'm just kidding about the Democrats . . . sort of.

(Note for my friends on the left: This is the part of the article dedicated to **humor—a** decidedly Republican concept, I've observed.)

That Rather is comfortable in these ideological environs is disturbing at least, traitorous at most.

What has happened to our American press? It is the "American press," is it not? It's not the "World press" or the "Euro-press" . . . or is it? CBS, ABC, NBC and CNN have all at least toyed with these notions of "hyper-PC-ism." Not sure that's a word, but you get the point.

Back to our "Rather treasonous Dan."

What does one ask a Hitler hours before D-Day or a Hussein hours before Desert Storm II? Shall we bury our heads in the sand and pretend the stench of Auschwitz was non-existent?

It was in fact repugnant, even to the olfactory deficient, and though the chimneys spewed their purulence night and day, there existed even then anti-war-peace-loving-pacifist WWII protesters, albeit in modest numbers.

I believe our intelligence services know of Hussein's Auschwitz and the world will soon know, too. But Dan rather has no "common man" defense. Mr. Rather is a highly compensated (seven figures per year) super-journalist at the top of his trade . . . nary a courtroom on the planet would excuse his ignorance, much less his hyper-tolerance of ill-doing.

"Evil," as our president espouses in unusually poignant moral clarity, given his top-dog status in the body politic.

I am not certain Rather committed **treason—perhaps** sedition. Perhaps he even has the force of First Amendment law on his slimy side. But is it moral? NO, NO, NO! Does he care about morality? I'll let his actions speak for themselves.

In a few days, thousands more people will die because of **Rather's** mass-murdering, Neilson-rating pal. When the war commences, watch Dan Rather! He called the mass-murderer Hussein "Mr. President" and disrespectfully referred to his own President Bush as simply "Bush."

I put nothing beyond him. He is the perfection of modern enlightenment. Moral idiocy in the embodiment of a learned buffoon. In my opinion, a "Rather

treasonous Dan." (NewsMax.com, February 28, 2003, http://www.newsmax
.com/archives/articles/2003/2/27/165634.shtml)

Whether they agree with him or not, readers inevitably build up an
impression of the sort of person this writer is. He uses inflammatory lan-
guage ("seditious behavior," "the Butcher of Baghdad"), a fictional analogy
comparing Rather to Edward R. Murrow and Hussein to Hitler, an aside
("This is the part of the article dedicated to humor ...'), rhetorical ques-
tions, and unusual punctuation, among other techniques, to create a pow-
erful ethos that may attract or repel readers depending on their attitudes
toward the people and events he discusses.

ETHOS IN ANCIENT RHETORICS

The term *ethos* was used in several ways over the long history of ancient
rhetoric. The author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* cautioned rhetors to be care-
ful about their personal conduct, "because one's manner of life contributes
to one's powers of persuasion as well as to the attainment of a good reputa-
tion" (XXXVIII 1445b 30). This passage implies that a rhetor's ability to per-
suade is connected to his or her moral habits—a connection that was more
fully developed by Roman rhetoricians. Aristotle, in contrast, was not so
concerned about the way rhetors lived as he was about the appearance of
character that they presented within their discourse *(Rhetoric* I ii 1356a).
Perhaps in keeping with Plato's injunction that rhetors must know what types
of souls men have *(Phaedrus* 271d), Aristotle also provided a long list of the
"characters" of audiences, depending on their age, station in life, and so on.

Aristotle's student, **Theophrastus,** wrote descriptions of possible char-
acter traits, a practice that critics later called *ethopoeia* ("fabricating charac-
ter"). These descriptions typically began with a definition and listed
examples of behavior that typified the character being described. Here, for
instance, is Theophrastus's account of the character of a tactless person:

> Now tactlessness is a pain-giving failure to hit upon the right moment; and
> your tactless person ... will accost a busy friend and ask advice, or serenade a
> sweetheart when she is sick of a fever. He will approach someone who has
> gone bail and lost it, and ask that person to be his security for a loan; and will
> come to bear witness after the verdict is given. Should you bid him to a wed-
> ding, he will inveigh against womankind. Should you be but now returned
> from a long journey, he will invite you to a walk. He is given to bringing you a
> merchant who, when your bargain is struck, says he would have paid more
> had you asked; and to rising from his seat to tell a tale all afresh to such as have
> heard it before and know it well. He is forward to undertake for you what you
> would not have done but cannot well decline. If you are **sacrificing** and put to
> great expense, that is the day he chooses to come and demand what you owe
> him. At the flogging of your servant he will stand by and tell how a servant of
> his hanged himself after just such a flogging as this; at an arbitration he will set
> the parties against each other when both wish to be reconciled; and when he

would dance, lay hold of another who is not yet drunk enough to behave fool-
ishly. (XII)

Theophrastus's characters were probably used to teach students how to
analyze character, and they provided moral instruction as well. Later on,
Hellenistic teachers of rhetoric encouraged their students to compose
"characters" for historical or fictional persons as part of their rhetorical
exercises (see Chapter 15, on the *progymnasmata).*

Aristotle recognized two kinds of ethical proof: invented and situated.
The distinction probably depends on Aristotle's prior distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic proofs, or invented and found proofs (1355b).
According to Aristotle, rhetors can invent a character suitable to an occa-
sion—this is invented *ethos.* However, if rhetors are fortunate enough to
enjoy a good reputation in the community, they can use it as an ethical
proof—this is situated *ethos.* But it is, nevertheless, a proof that is extrinsic
to the issue, that is simply found in a rhetorical situation. Interestingly
enough, this distinction parallels two primary senses of the term *character*
in ancient Greek: character could be invented by means of habitual practice;
but it also referred to the community's assessment of a person's habitual
practices. Thus a given individual's character had as much to do with the
community's perception of her actions as it did with her actual behavior.

Today we may feel uncomfortable with the notion that rhetorical char-
acter can be constructed, since we tend to think of character, or personality,
as fairly stable. We generally assume as well that character is shaped by an
individual's experiences. The ancient Greeks, in contrast, thought that
character was constructed not by what happened to people but by the
moral practices in which they habitually engaged. An *ethos* was not finally
given by nature, but was developed by habit *(hexis).* Thus it was important
for parents and teachers not only to provide children with examples of
good behavior but to insist that young persons practice habits that
imprinted their characters with virtues rather than vices. The notion that
character was formed through habitual practices endured throughout
antiquity. Quintilian devoted many pages of the *Institutes* to the importance
of carefully selecting a teacher for very young children, a teacher whose
character would set a suitable example for them and whose practices
would develop positive moral habits in them (I i v).

Since the Greeks thought that character was shaped by one's practices,
they considered it to be much more malleable than we do. Within certain
limits imposed by class and gender restrictions, one could become any sort
of person one wished to be, simply by engaging in the practices that pro-
duced that sort of character. It followed, then, that playing the roles of
respectable characters enhanced one's chances of developing a respectable
character.

According to Quintilian, Roman rhetoricians who relied on Greek
rhetorical theory sometimes confused *ethos* with *pathos*—appeals to the
emotions—because there was no satisfactory term for *ethos* in Latin (VI ii 8).
Cicero occasionally used the Latin term *persona* ("mask"), and Quintilian

simply borrowed the Greek term. This lack of a technical term is not surprising, because the requirement of having a respectable character was built into the very fabric of Roman oratory. Early Roman society was governed by means of family authority, and so a person's lineage had everything to do with what sort of *ethos* he could command when he took part in public affairs. The older and more respected the family, the more discursive authority its members enjoyed, Under the Republic and the Empire the family requirement softened a bit, but it was still necessary for someone to maintain a reputation for good character in order to be heard. In fact, Quintilian equated the skillful practice of rhetoric with a good character: "No person can speak well who is not good" (II xv 35). Cicero, the practitioner, was more sympathetic to the Greek position that a suitable *ethos* could be constructed for a rhetorical occasion, although in De *Oratore* one of the participants remarks that "merit, achievements or reputable life" are "qualifications easier to embellish, if only they are real, than to fabricate where non-existent" (II xlii 182).

In later antiquity, *ethos* became associated almost wholly with style. Hermogenes of Tarsus, for example, furnished a long list of the virtues or characters of different styles—simplicity, modesty, solemnity, vehemence, and so on—that was read and used by students well into the Renaissance.

Contemporary discussions of rhetoric often overlook the role played by ethical proofs, despite the fact that Americans are very much interested in the character and personal habits of public figures. Americans don't talk as much as they used to about persons having a good character, but apparently they still care about such things. The "character issue" is regularly raised in presidential elections, although in this case "character" ordinarily refers to a candidate's personal moral choices: Has he been faithful to his spouse? Has he used drugs? Ancient rhetoricians were not so interested in private moral choices like these as they were in the virtues that counted in public affairs: courage, honesty, trustworthiness, modesty, intelligence, fair-mindedness.

The ancient interest in character is still useful because it highlights the role played by this important kind of proof in contemporary rhetorical exchanges. In this chapter, we review the ancient rhetorical advice about *ethos* that is still useful or interesting to modern rhetors, and we freely adapt some of it for contemporary use. Ethical rhetorical effects are varied and subtle, and we have not attempted to exhaust the enormous lode of ancient teachings about them. We have tried to give a sufficiently full treatment to alert our readers to the persuasive potential contained in this sort of rhetorical proof.

INVENTED ETHOS

Contemporary discourse is often composed for very large audiences, and so it is often the case that the rhetor does not know the people to whom she will speak or write. Thus she cannot use whatever situated ethos she enjoys

among those who know her as a means of ethical proof. So she must rely upon invented *ethos.*

A rhetor who uses invented *ethos,* you will recall, constructs a character for herself within her discourse. In an essay entitled "Finding My Place in Black America," Gloria Nauden invented an ethos for herself by recalling remarks made to her by others:

> "Excuse me, what are you?" As a person of mixed heritage, Black and Korean, I get asked this question several times a day. Sometimes rudely, most of the time innocently. But I'm always open to educating others about what it means to be Black and Asian.
>
> Among Blacks, I get this kind of reaction: "You look so exotic and different" (pickup line); "If s not too often you see an Asian person at a Black function" (ignorantly curious); "You know, I just got back from China" (So what?); and "My exgirlfriend was Black and Philipino" (So you have an Asian fetish?). Then there are the rude taunts. They go like this: "She thinks she's Black"; "I can't stand when Chinese people try to act Black."
>
> The worse incidents are when I'm called a "war baby," a reference to the children who were fathered by American soldiers and left behind in the streets and orphanages of Vietnam. In fact, my mother, who is Korean-born, met my father, an Army man, in her homeland, and came to the United States with me when I was a year old. They have been married for 30 years.
>
> Among the worst of all scenes is when I am called a "chink." Recently, I was at a new hot spot among young Black professionals, the BET SoundStage restaurant in Largo, Md., which is owned by BET Holdings Inc. I am the entertainment director and helped develop the restaurant. But one guest felt comfortable in trying to make me feel unwelcome.
>
> I was in "his" house, he said, taking great pride in this Black-owned venture. Chinese people have slanted eyes "because you're always squinting, being in everyone's business," the brother said. He complained that he was sick of "chinks" like me coming to the United States and trying to take over and that his people are responsible for building this country. Shocked and angry and hurt, as usual, I wanted to deck him. I wanted to let him know that I was the "sista" who had given the restaurant all its **"flava."** But even as I told him, "My father is Black, I am Black," he jeered and walked away while making an obscene **jesture.**
>
> I want people like him to know that I am a very confident, proud and passionate person. I want people to know that my generic code is Black and Korean, but I consider myself an **African-American.** This mostly has to do with how I was reared. Unlike Tiger Woods, who grew up in a predominantly White neighborhood, I grew up in a public housing complex in the Hill District of Pittsburgh. It was a Black neighborhood and my mother and I stuck out like sore thumbs. *(Emerge,* August 1997, 67)

By implication, Nauden established that her identity is quite different and much more complex than the ethnic identities that others attempt to construct for her. She demonstrates her own ability to shift among personas. Her use of first person and her frank admissions about her feelings construct an *ethos* which indicates that she is an honest and trustworthy narra-

tor whose mixed heritage nonetheless causes confusion in insensitive others, which in turn brings difficulty and pain to her.

Aristotle taught that the character conveyed by a rhetor was most important in cases where the facts or arguments were in doubt, "for we believe fair-minded people to a great extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt" (I ii 1356a). In other words, people tend to believe rhetors who either have a reputation for fair-mindedness or who create an *ethos* that makes them seem fair-minded. This is especially true in cases where, as Aristotle said, there is room for doubt.

Aristotle saw three possible ways in which rhetors could make ethical mistakes. First, "through lack of practical sense they do not form opinions rightly." That is, rhetors could be so inexperienced or so uninformed that they simply don't draw the right conclusions. Second, "through forming opinions rightly they do not say what they think because of a bad character." That is, even though rhetors know the right answer or the right course, they may hide it from people because of some character flaw, such as greed or dishonesty. Third, "they are prudent and fair-minded but lack good will, so that it is possible for people not to give the best advice although they know what it is." That is, rhetors may not care about what happens to the people they represent, and so they do not give good advice even when they could. These, Aristotle wrote, are the only possibilities for a failed invented *ethos.*

The first ethical lapse still afflicts rhetors, but it doesn't seem nearly so serious as violations of the second and third requirements. These mistakes describe behavior that is unethical in a much stronger moral sense than failure to develop a persuasive character. Dishonesty, greed, and selfishness were (and still are) considered immoral when practiced by anyone, rhetor or not. Unfortunately, it is possible for these vices to be reflected in a discursive *ethos. A* rhetorician named Ken Macrorie fabricated the following example of a failed invented *ethos:*

> Unquestionably the textbook has played a very important role in the development of American schools—and I believe it will continue to play an important role. The need for textbooks has been established through many experiments. It is not necessary to consider these experiments but, in general, they have shown that when instruction without textbooks has been tried by schools, the virtually unanimous result has been to go back to the use of textbooks. I believe, too, that there is considerable evidence to indicate that the textbook has been, and is, a major factor in guiding teachers' instruction and in determining the curriculum. (177)

The ethos in this piece fails all three of Aristotle's tests: the rhetor doesn't show evidence of having done the necessary homework, and as a result, his honesty can be questioned, as can his good will toward his audience.

To put Aristotle's ethical requirements in positive terms, rhetors must seem to be intelligent, to be of good moral character, and to possess good will toward their audiences. Rhetors can construct a character that seems

intelligent by demonstrating that they are well informed about issues they discuss. They project an appearance of good moral character by describing themselves or others as moral persons and by refraining from the use of misleading or fallacious arguments. Rhetors project good will toward an audience by presenting the information and arguments that audiences require in order to understand the rhetorical situation.

Demonstrating Intelligence by Doing the Homework

Rhetors can create a character that seems intelligent by demonstrating that they are informed about the issues they discuss, and by refraining from using arguments that are irrelevant or trivial. General audiences can be assumed to be relatively uninformed about difficult or technical issues, so in this case rhetors must take special care to convince an audience that they are well informed without overwhelming their listeners with details.

Consider the following editorial by Nicholas D. Kristof entitled "God, Satan and the Media":

Claims that the news media form a vast liberal conspiracy strike me as utterly unconvincing, but there's one area where accusations of institutional bias have merit: nearly all of us in the news business are completely out of touch with a group that includes 46 percent of Americans.

That's the proportion who described themselves in a Gallup poll in December as evangelical or born-again Christians. Evangelicals have moved from the fringe to the mainstream, and that is particularly evident in this administration. It's impossible to understand President Bush without acknowledging the centrality of his faith. Indeed, there may be an element of messianic vision in the plan to invade Iraq and "remake" the Middle East.

Robert Fogel of the University of Chicago argues that America is now experiencing a fourth Great Awakening, like the religious revivals that have periodically swept America in the last 300 years. Yet offhand, I can't think of a single evangelical working for a major news organization.

Evangelicals are increasingly important in every aspect of American culture. Among the best-selling books in America are Tim LaHaye's Christian "left behind" series about the apocalypse; about 50 million copies have been sold. One of America's most prominent television personalities is Benny Hinn, watched in 190 countries, but few of us have heard of him because he is an evangelist.

President Bush has said that he doesn't believe in evolution (he thinks the jury is still out). President Ronald Reagan felt the same way, and such views are typically American. A new Gallup poll shows that 48 percent of Americans believe in creationism, and only 28 percent in evolution (most of the rest aren't sure or lean toward creationism). According to recent Gallup Tuesday briefings, Americans are more than twice as likely to believe in the devil (68 percent) as in evolution.

In its approach to evangelicals, the national news media are generally reflective of the educated elite, particularly in the Northeast. It's expected at New

York dinner parties to link crime to deprived **childhoods—conversation** would stop abruptly if someone mentioned Satan.

I tend to disagree with evangelicals on almost **everything,** and I see no problem with aggressively pointing out the dismal consequences of this increasing religious influence. For example, evangelicals' discomfort with condoms and sex education has led the administration to policies that are likely to lead to more people dying of AIDS at home and abroad, not to mention more pregnancies and abortions.

But liberal critiques sometimes seem not just filled with outrage at evangelical-backed policies, which is fair, but also to have a sneering tone about conservative Christianity itself. Such mockery of religious faith is inexcusable. And liberals sometimes show more intellectual curiosity about the religion of Afghanistan than that of Alabama, and more interest in reading the Upanishads than in reading the Book of Revelation.

I care about this issue partly because I grew up near Yamhill, Ore., which has 790 people and five churches. My science teacher at Yamhill Grade School taught that evolution was false, and a high school girlfriend attended a church where people spoke in tongues (contrary to stereotypes, she was an ace student, smarter than many people fluent in more conventional tongues, like French and Spanish). In the evangelical tinge to its faith, Yamhill is emblematic of a huge chunk of Middle America that we in the Northeast are out of tune with.

Moreover, it is increasingly not just Middle America, but Middle World. As Professor Philip Jenkins notes in a new book, fundamentalist Christianity is racing through the developing world. The number of African Christians has soared over the last century, to 360 million from 10 million, and the boom is not among tweedy Presbyterians but among charismatic Pentecostalists.

One of the deepest divides in America today is the gulf of mutual suspicion that separates evangelicals from secular society, and policy battles over abortion and judicial appointments will aggravate these tensions further in coming months. Both sides need to reach out, drop the contempt and display some of the inclusive wisdom of Einstein, who wrote in his memoir: "Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind." (*New York Times,* March 4, 2003, nytimes.com)

In this essay Nicholas Kristof tackles a delicate issue: relations between evangelical Christianity and secularism. He must create a trustworthy *ethos ii* he wants members of either group to continue reading, and he does this by littering the piece with bits of information. He cites polls and authorities and provides data on the popularity of media that appeal to evangelical Christians. He also acknowledges his own bias, giving the impression that he is honest. Had he not taken such care to establish that he is both an honest and informed writer, his audience may not stay to read his final plea for discussion between the groups.

To seem well informed is especially important when the audience is relatively well informed themselves about the issue at hand. In this case, the rhetor must quickly assure them that he knows what he is talking about. He may do so by using language that suggests he is an insider, by sharing an anecdote that indicates he has experience or knowledge in a par-

ticular area, or by describing his qualifications. In the introduction to his book about George W. Bush, entitled *Made in Texas,* Michael Lind writes:

> The political history of Texas and its implications for America and the world is a topic of more than scholarly interest to me. A fifth-generation Texan, I was born, raised, and educated in Texas and never lived outside of the state until I studied foreign policy in graduate school at Yale in the 1980s. I have to go back three generations, to my great-grandparents, to find ancestors who were not born and buried inside the borders of the Lone Star **State**. (xii)

Lind attempts to demonstrate in his book that Bush is a product of the local culture of a certain region of Texas, and so it is important that Lind establish his firsthand knowledge of Texas culture. And in a more usual means of establishing scholarly authority, he also manages to mention his graduate work at Yale. If our publisher follows ordinary practice, our academic credentials are probably listed somewhere in this book. The point of mentioning our advanced degrees in rhetoric, our lists of other publications in the history of rhetoric, and our teaching experience is to assure readers who buy this book that we have sufficient knowledge and teaching experience to give trustworthy information and advice.

A rhetor may also use specialized language to demonstrate her adeptness in a particular field, thereby reassuring informed readers that what she has to say is worth their time. Jeff Bowers, an undergraduate student writing for expert readers of *Technology Review*—a periodical published by the widely known and respected Massachusetts Institute of Technology—does just that:

> The Superconducting Supercollider was to be the most powerful particle accelerator in the world. The 53-mile underground tunnel, lined with 11,000 **super-**conducting magnets, would accelerate two beams of protons in opposite directions around a gigantic ring, slamming the beams together to create a spectacular fireworks display of subatomic particles. Physicists expected that by mimicking the conditions thought to exist in the primordial plasma of the early universe, the supercollider would reveal new exotic species of particles, thereby providing significant insight into the fundamental structure of matter. ("A Particular Passion," August-September 1997, 50).

Bowers manages to make the scientific terms come to life as he describes the cultural moment in science when he decided to enter the field of physics. Because he details the supercollider's activity with such precision, Bowers establishes himself as someone who knows a good deal about the subject under discussion, and as a result, readers are more likely to pay attention to what he has to say.

We remarked earlier that rhetors who wish to appear intelligent and well informed must demonstrate that they have done whatever research and contemplation is necessary to understand an issue, and they must avoid making irrelevant or trivial arguments as well. A rhetorical disaster may ensue when rhetors fail to establish themselves as well informed about

the issues they discuss. While campaigning for the presidency in 1996, for example, then senator Bob Dole repeatedly criticized Hollywood values. Here is an account of one such incident from *USA Today:*

> Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole Wednesday said Hollywood is "mainstreaming deviancy," and accused the entertainment industry of promoting rape, violence, and casual sex.
>
> At a Los Angeles fund-raiser, **Dole—front-runner** for the GOP presidential **nomination—said,** "It will only stop when the leaders of the entertainment industry recognize and shoulder their responsibility."
>
> Dole is going after Hollywood because advisers say it's good politics. He's hoping to appeal to mainstream voters, as well as conservatives.
>
> Dole called his outrage more than a "codgy old attempt of one generation to steal the fun of another."
>
> He said R-rated movies, like *Natural Born Killers* and *True Romance* "revel in mindless violence and loveless sex."
>
> Dole singled out recording groups Cannibal Corpse, Geto Boys and 2 Live Crew, and a "culture business that makes money from music extolling the pleasures of raping, torturing and mutilating women." And he said Time Warner, which owns Interscope Records, was on the "leading edge of coarseness and violence."
>
> "Bob Dole finds it easier to put the blinders on and attack Hollywood for political points," said Arthur Kropps of People for the American Way.
>
> Dole's Hollywood denunciation is not his first. In April he was criticized for attacking the movie *Priest* while acknowledging he had never viewed the film, which portrays sexual misconduct by Roman Catholic priests. (June 1, 1995, A1, 6).

When asked if he had seen the films under discussion, Dole admitted that he had not. His admitted failure to do his homework negatively affected the reception of his later speeches on violence in the media. Failed *ethos* in one situation can carry over into subsequent situations, shaping a rhetorical character that can hinder the reception of future messages, especially if the rhetor is under intense and constant public scrutiny. In this case, those who recalled his previous mistake might not regard Dole's views as informed evaluations.

Here is an example of failed *ethos* produced by another rhetor who did not do the necessary research on the issue at hand:

> Many students go to college to find a husband or wife. While there are some who attend for the purpose of getting themselves an education, these are few and far between. The majority of companion seekers are men because by the time they reach college most of them are ready to settle down after the bebop life of high school. In most cases, men are tied to home, security, and have problems in adjusting to being completely on their own. In the opinion of this author, men are looking to fulfill their need of security by finding a wife in college.

There is no hint here that the author did any research on this subject, even to the extent of asking one or two college men whether or not his conclusions were true. Audiences whose experiences and aims do not match the

generalizations made here will feel excluded by the rhetor's assertive tone, while others may be offended by it. This tone is mitigated somewhat in the last sentence, where the rhetor tells us that these generalizations are his "opinion." Here is a revision of the passage:

> Although I have some friends who are here to get themselves an education, I know many students who come to college to look for a husband or a wife. For instance, my roommate is having problems adjusting to being completely on his own, and I think he's still tied to home and security. In fact, he has admitted to me that he is looking to find a wife in college who will give him the security he misses. This need for security seems to be the case with many of my male friends.

While talking with the author, his classmates discovered that the generalization about wife-seeking men was based on only one example—his roommate. They encouraged him to limit his generalization to what he knew from experience. As a result, the second version manifests a character who does not make claims about which he is uninformed.

Establishing Good Character

There are probably as many ways to demonstrate good moral character as there are virtues—and vices. Cicero encouraged rhetors to extol their "merits or worth or virtue of some kind, particularly generosity, sense of duty, justice and good faith" *(On the Parts* viii 28). He also suggested that rhetors weaken charges or suspicions that had been cast upon their character and that they elaborate on misfortunes or difficulties that had befallen them in order to strengthen their audience's estimate of their ability to bear suffering *(On Invention* I xvi 22). When Cicero defended a man named Lucius Murena, he was accused of having a double standard—of holding other men to higher standards of conduct than he held for Murena. He responded by commenting on his own character:

> I have always gladly shown the restraint and forgiveness which nature herself has taught me; I have not been eager to wear the mask of dead seriousness and hardness, but I wore it willingly when the crisis of state and the solemn requirements of my office demanded. If, then, when the republic wanted force and uncompromising severity, I overcame my nature to become as ruthless as I was forced into being, not as I wished, may I not now respond to the sympathetic and humane qualities which all the motives in the case prompt in me and accord them my characteristic degree of energy and enthusiasm? *("Pro Murena"* 3)

Here Cicero pictured himself as a sympathetic and softhearted man, forced by his duties into seeming hard-hearted. On this occasion, however, he portrayed himself as a more human and sympathetic character.

Contemporary rhetors are more subtle about displaying moral character than Roman rhetors were, but they still use moral standards as means of proof. Opponents of abortion characterize pro-choice advocates as "baby

killers" and "murderers"; public officials are often charged with immoral behavior such as infidelity or harassment. Apparently, some news writers believe that even actors should demonstrate good moral character, at least when they are not acting, as is suggested by this *Newsweek* review of the film *Men in Black:*

> The key ingredient in getting the movie made was Tommy Lee Jones. No one wanted to make the movie without him. He had approval of the script and director, and everyone lived to please him. . .. The Texas-bred, Harvard-educated Jones has a reputation for being difficult and blunt. "Tommy is like the original cactus," says [producer Laurie] McDonald.... Perhaps apprehensive about playing comedy again after going *mano a mano* with Jim Carrey in the unfortunate *Batman Forever,* Jones fired off a blistering six-page critique of the script. It wasn't funny. Why did it have to be funny? Why Men in Black? Why not Man in Black? ("The Odd Squad," July 7, 1997, 62).

The writers of this review assumed that readers are interested not only in the power of Jones's *ethos* but in his character and background as well. Do Americans associate a certain kind of character with Texas or with a Harvard education? In any case, *Newsweek's* dwelling on the actor's character traits suggests that moral character still matters to Americans.

In order to establish their good moral standing, rhetors may cite approval of their character from respected authorities. Ordinary people establish their character in this way when they ask teachers or employers for letters of reference and when they list such persons' names on their resumes. References are often asked about the same qualities of character in prospective employees that concerned ancient rhetoricians: intelligence, honesty, and trustworthiness. Rhetors can also shore up an audience's sense of their character simply by refraining from the use of **unfair** discursive tactics: faulty reasoning or nonrepresentative evidence, threats, name-calling, or lies.

A slightly different interpretation of good character seems to be very persuasive in modern discourse. This is the *ethos* that conveys a person as an authority, either by virtue of respectable credentials or long experience in some activity. The covers or inside pages of books often list "other works by the same author" in order to establish the writer's history as a published author (and to sell more copies of her books). Advertisements for movies often list actors' credits for other films, thus demonstrating that they have done good work previously. This usually happens when the producers think that the actors' name recognition isn't tied closely enough to their face **recognition—two** kinds of *ethos* that are very important in the movie industry.

The following passage introduced an article in *Emerge* magazine about attorneys who were influential in the development of civil rights legislation. One of them, Fred D. Gray, is introduced as follows:

> Gray is senior partner in the law firm of Gray, Langford, Sapp, McGowan, Gray & Nathanson, which has offices in Montgomery and Tuskegee, Ala. He was Dr.

Martin Luther King Jr.'s first civil rights lawyer; represented Rosa Parks after her refusal to give up her seat to a White man touched off the Montgomery bus boycott in 1955; and helped the NAACP win a suit, which eventually was decided in the U.S. Supreme Court, against the state of Alabama's derision forbidding the organization to operate there. He also represented victims of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. Gray, a former president of the National Bar Association, is author of *Bus Ride to Justice.* ("Dedicated Lives," July-August 1997, 35)

This history of good work associates Gray with several important moments in the civil rights movement, thus indicating to readers why they should be interested in learning more about him.

Sometimes reviewers will allude to a rhetor's history in order to reinforce their estimates of his abilities. Here, for example, is Roger Ebert's review of *Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers.* Notice how Ebert constructs his *ethos* by showing us that he is both an experienced reviewer of movies and that he is also familiar with literary conventions:

With "Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers," it's clear that director Peter Jackson has tilted the balance decisively against the hobbits and in favor of the traditional action heroes of the Tolkien trilogy. The star is now clearly Aragorn (Viggo Mortensen), and the hobbits spend much of the movie away from the action. The last third of the movie is dominated by an epic battle scene that would no doubt startle the gentle medievalist J.R.R. Tolkien. The task of the critic is to decide whether this shift damages the movie. It does not. "The Two Towers" is one of the most spectacular swashbucklers ever made, and, given current audience tastes in violence, may well be more popular than the first installment, "The Fellowship of the Ring." It is not faithful to the spirit of Tolkien and misplaces much of the charm and whimsy of the books, but it stands on its own as a visionary thriller. I complained in my review of the first film that the hobbits had been short-changed, but with this second film I must accept that as a given, and go on from there.

"The Two Towers" is a rousing adventure, a skillful marriage of special effects and computer animation, and it contains sequences of breathtaking beauty. It also gives us, in a character named the Gollum, one of the most engaging and convincing CGI [computer-generated images] creatures I've seen. The Gollum was long in possession of the Ring, now entrusted to Frodo, and misses it ("my precious") most painfully; but he has a split personality and (in between spells when his dark side takes over) serves as a guide and companion for Frodo (Elijah Wood) and Sam (Sean Astin). His body language is a choreography of ingratiation and distortion. The film introduces another computer-generated character, Treebeard, a member of the most ancient race in Middle-Earth, a tree that walks and talks and takes a very long time to make up its mind, explaining to Merry and Pippin that slowness is a virtue. I would have guessed that a walking, talking tree would look silly and break the spell of the movie, but no, there is a certain majesty in this mossy old creature.

The film opens with a brief reprise of the great battle between Gandalf (Ian McKellen) and Balrog, the monster made of fire and smoke, and is faithful to the ancient tradition of movie serials by showing us that victory is snatched

from certain death, as Gandalf extinguishes the creature and becomes in the process Gandalf the White. To compress the labyrinthine story into a sentence or two, the enemy is Saruman (Christopher Lee), who commands a vast army of Uruk-Hai warriors against the fortress of Theoden (Bernard Hill). Aragorn joins bravely in the fray, but the real heroes are the computer effects, which create the castle, landscape, armies and most of the action. There are long stretches of "The Two Towers" in which we are looking at mostly animation on the screen. When Aragorn and his comrades launch an attack down a narrow fortress bridge, we know that the figures toppling to their doom are computer-generated, along with everything else on the screen, and yet the impact of the action is undeniable. Peter Jackson, like some of the great silent directors, is unafraid to use his entire screen, to present images of wide scope and great complexity. He paints in the corners. What one misses in the thrills of these epic splendors is much depth in the characters. All of the major figures are sketched with an attribute or two, and then defined by their actions. Frodo, the nominal hero, spends much of his time peering over and around things, watching others decide his fate, and occasionally gazing significantly upon the Ring. Sam is his loyal sidekick on the sidelines. Merry and Pippin spend a climactic stretch of the movie riding in Treebeard's branches and looking goggle-eyed at everything, like children carried on their father's shoulders.

The Fellowship of the first movie has been divided into three during this one, and most of the action centers on Aragorn, who operates within the tradition of Viking swordsmen and medieval knights. The details of the story—who is who, and why, and what their histories and attributes are—still remains somewhat murky to me. I know the general outlines and I boned up by rewatching the first film on DVD the night before seeing the second, and yet I am in awe of the true students of the Ring. For the amateur viewer, which is to say for most of us, the appeal of the movies is in the visuals. Here there be vast caverns and mighty towers, dwarves and elves and Orcs and the aforementioned Uruk-Hai (who look like distant cousins of the aliens in "Battlefield Earth"). And all are set within Jackson's ambitious canvas and backdropped by spectacular New Zealand scenery.

"The Two Towers" will possibly be more popular than the first film, more of an audience-pleaser, but hasn't Jackson lost the original purpose of the story somewhere along the way? He has taken an enchanting and unique work of literature and retold it in the terms of the modern action picture. If Tolkien had wanted to write about a race of supermen, he would have written a Middle-Earth version of "Conan the Barbarian." But no. He told a tale in which modest little hobbits were the heroes. And now Jackson has steered the story into the action mainstream. To do what he has done in this film must have been awesomely difficult, and he deserves applause, but to remain true to Tolkien would have been more difficult, and braver. *(Chicago Sun Times Online* December 18, 2002, www.suntimes.com).

Ebert filled his review with references to the history of film ("great old silent directors," "Conan the Barbarian") that assure readers he knows what he is talking about. He establishes his moral stance quite subtly, but it is evident nonetheless: he liked *The Two Towers,* but he wishes it were truer to the book and less like action films that feature spectacular scenes

of fighting and war. In other words he prefers complexity to spectacle, and this reinforces his *ethos* as a serious critic of film.

Achieving Good Will

Cicero wrote that good will could be won "if we refer to our own acts and services without arrogance; if we weaken the effect of charges that have been preferred, or of some suspicion of less honorable dealing which has been cast upon us; if we dilate on the misfortunes which have befallen us or the difficulties which still beset us; if we use prayers and entreaties with a humble and submissive spirit" *(On Invention* I xvi 22). While ethical tactics like these were persuasive to Roman audiences, they may be a bit too flamboyant for modern tastes. Modern rhetors can demonstrate their good will toward an audience by carefully considering what readers need to know about the issue at hand in order to follow the argument. They should supply any necessary information that audiences might not already have but should be careful not to repeat information that the audience already knows.

Movie reviewers usually operate on the ethical principle of good will: they must assume that people will listen to or read their reviews in order to decide whether to see a given film. Since people put their trust (and their money) on the line when they take reviewers' advice, movie reviewers are obligated to have good will toward their audiences. They demonstrate this good will by telling audiences just enough about the plot or characters or direction to allow them to decide whether to see a film, but they don't give away the ending. They also demonstrate good will by providing audiences with their frank opinion about a film, as Ebert does in the review above. Here is another review of *Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers,* written from a very different ethos:

> *The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers* is one hell of a spectacular epic despite consisting mostly of guys in medieval armor running around scenic vistas, smashing, thrashing, and flinging arrows into each other with effortless skill. Don't these warriors ever get tired?
>
> So the Fellowship has been broken and our heroes travel their separate ways. Otherwise, not too much has changed. Aragorn is still brave and unshaven, the Dark Lord Sauron is still brewing trouble, and Liv Tyler still speaks in a breathy monotone.
>
> Since the first chapter in *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy, the evil wizard Saruman continues to build his army of disgusting, mindless creatures using his magical powers, his crystal ball of fear, and the biggest nose in all of Middle-Earth. If this world conquest thing doesn't work out, confides Saruman, I could always be the new Toucan on the Froot Loops box.
>
> Come on, is that Saruman's real nose or are his eyes using a walking stick? There will be no dawn for men, he drones. And no spare Kleenex either!
>
> Now I see why we didn't get a better look at one of The Ring's previous owners, Gollum, in the first movie. He's Steve Buscemi in a loincloth!
>
> Hobbits Merry and Pippin meet up with a new character, Treebeard. . . . Treebeard is an Ent—a race of walking, talking trees. He looks like a towering

Sideshow Bob with a bad case of Dermatitis. Treebeard is the oldest being in Middle-Earth, but only because Joan Rivers lies.

And then there's **Gimli** the Dwarf who offers **war-torn** refugees some comic relief. Today he kills **Orcs,** tomorrow he kills twice nightly at Caesars Atlantic City. He's one Brooke Shields short of a USO show.

Gimli and Treebeard sound suspiciously alike, suggesting that while **Orcs** may be abundant in Middle-Earth, voice talent is not.

The time of the Elves is nearly over, warns the Elf leader. Soon, there will be no one to bake the **Keeblers——**

Elsewhere in Middle-Earth.... "There!" exclaimed Frodo, "It's the tower of Sauron." What gave it away? The enormous rabbit-ears on top with a vast EYE in the center? So the Dark Lord gets CBS! You'd think he'd be early on DIRECTV.

Say, if the Dark Lord was really all that powerful, wouldn't he invent a gun?

The good wizard Gandalf returns from what we thought was the dead, but what turned out to be the deepest hole there ever was. Now resurrected, Gandalf the Gray is Gandalf the White. But Gandalf, plum or periwinkle would coordinate better with your coloring, noted helpful Elf, Legolas. When Gandalf mounts his trusty steed, it's off-camera for two hours until his triumphant return.

So our heroes speed towards their destination, the place where The Ring must meet its end before our friends do: The fires of Mount Doom....

Say what you want about sequels, but this one is worth its weight in gold. *The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers* is a towering, stupendous achievement.

Maybe the trilogy is like an Oreo cookie: The middle might be the best part.

(Mark Ramsey, moviejuice.com December 11, 2002)

Note how very different this reviewer's *ethos* is from that established by Ebert. His review is a series of one-liners. If this writer has good will toward his audience, he achieves it by making them laugh rather than by providing details about the film, as Ebert does. Ramsey does risk turning off any readers who are fans of the Tolkien books **and/or** the films by making jokes at the legend's expense. The risk is mitigated somewhat near the end by what appears to be an honest assessment of *The Two Towers.* (This sentence also includes a nice analogy).

The ethical criterion of good will poses interesting problems for writers of newsmagazines like *Time* and *Newsweek.* These writers are obligated to include the facts of the news in their stories, but their stories sometimes appear a week to ten days after the same events have been **thoroughly** covered in newspapers and television. How do such writers manage to present the necessary **facts—in** case some reader has been hiding in a **cave—and** yet do so without boring their readers? Many Americans watched the extensive news coverage of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April **19, 1995.** How are writers after the fact to compete with the gripping images that appeared on television? Here is an excerpt from *Newsweek's* lead story the following week:

Dan Webber was happy to be away from Washington, with its petty rivalries, its crime, its world-weariness. The onetime Senate aide had come home to Oklahoma City to clerk for a judge and raise his family in the normalcy of the

heartland. He had just dropped off his 3-year-old son, Joseph, at the America's Kids day-care center when the force of the explosion hurled him across his desk in the courthouse. Stunned, wild with fear, Webber ran down the street, to the smoking, shattered shell that had, until a few minutes before, been a federal office building. There was just rubble where the day-care center had been. He found a group of children huddled with rescue workers—but his own was not among them. He ran to fetch his wife, who worked nearby. Twenty minutes later, miraculously, he found a policeman carrying his boy. Joseph's face had been slashed by flying glass, his eardrums had been ruptured by the blast and his arm was broken. But he was alive. (May 1, 1995, 28)

This piece is very like fiction: in fact, Aristotle would have called it an argument from example (see Chapter 5, on rhetorical reasoning). The writers used the third-person point of view to describe the details of the blast as it affected one man and his family, before giving other details about the larger effects of the bombing. They presented Webber as a victim of a tragic irony: he and his family moved away to Oklahoma City on the presumption that they would be safer in the Midwest than in Washington, DC. Moreover, the writers characterized Webber as "stunned" and "wild with fear," thus creating dramatic character like those in novels. These details and effects create ethical interest where a simple rehearsal of the facts could not.

As another means of securing good will, rhetors can say why they think their presentation of an argument is important and what benefits will accrue to those who read or listen to it. We made an ethical appeal of this sort at the beginning of this book when we suggested that the study of ancient rhetorics would, in essence, turn people into better citizens. Of course, this ploy works only if audiences do not suspect ulterior motives on a rhetor's part. Television advertisements for life insurance often begin with scenarios depicting loved ones whose lives have been disrupted by the death of a provider who left no insurance. While the companies that sponsor these ads seem to have good will toward their audience insofar as they wish to protect people from harm, viewers know that these companies also want to sell insurance. In this case, they do it by frightening people—a tactic that is marginally ethical.

Establishing good will is especially difficult to manage when students write for teachers, since in this case the audience is usually better informed than the rhetor. The best way to demonstrate good will in this case is to follow teachers' instructions.

VOICE AND RHETORICAL DISTANCE

We have been arguing that rhetors can create a character within a discourse and that such self-characterizations are persuasive. Ancient rhetoricians realized that very subtle ethical effects were available through the manipulation of stylistic features. Here is Hermogenes of Tarsus, for example, on how to convey an appearance of anger by means of word choice:

Rough and vehement diction and coined words are indicative of anger, especially in sudden attacks on your opponent, where unusual words that seem to be coined on the spur of the moment are quite suitable, words such as "iamb-eater or "pen-pusher." All such words are suitable since they seem to have been dictated by emotion. *(On Types of Style 359)*

Rhetors can still create self-characterizations by means of certain stylistic choices: modern rhetoricians give the name *voice* to this self-dramatization in style.[1] Of course, *voice* is a metaphor in that it suggests that all rhetorical situations, even those that use written or electronic media, mimic the relation of one person speaking to another. Written or electronic discourse that creates a lively and accessible voice makes reading more interesting. Like the characters of style, the repertoire of possible voices is immense: there are cheerful voices, gloomy ones, stuffy ones, homey ones, sincere ones, angry ones—the list is endless.

Voices affect the rhetorical distance that can seem to exist between rhetors and their audiences. Once again, the term *distance* is a metaphor representing the degree of physical and social distance that exists between people speaking to one another. But even in written or electronic discourse, rhetors can narrow or widen the rhetorical distance between themselves and their audiences by means of stylistic choice. When creating a voice, rhetors should consider the situation for which they are composing: how much distance is appropriate given their relationship to an audience; how much distance is appropriate given their relationship to the issue. As a general rule, persuasion occurs more easily when audiences can identify with rhetors. Identification increases as distance decreases.

Intimate Distance = Closer Identification, More Persuasive Potential

Formal Distance = Less Identification, Less Persuasive Potential

Rhetors who know an audience well or whose audience is quite small can use an intimate distance (unless some factor in the rhetorical situation prevents this). The distance created in personal letters, for example, is ordinarily quite intimate, while that used in business correspondence is more formal since rhetors either do not know their correspondents personally or because convention dictates that such relationships be kept at arm's length, so to speak. Compare the distance created by Roger Ebert and Mark Ramsey in their reviews earlier in this chapter. Although both pieces are written in first person, Ebert's tone is more distant and formal than Ramsey's. He achieves this by giving information about the film rather than by cracking jokes about it and by establishing himself as an authority on film.

However, rhetorical situations can create exceptions to the distance-intimacy equation. Formal language is ordinarily appropriate in a courtroom, for example, even though an attorney, a defendant, and a judge constitute a very small group. In addition, the attorney may know both the judge and the defendant well. Nonetheless, she probably ought to use formal language in her conversations with both, given the official and serious nature of courtroom transactions. And sometimes very large groups are addressed in quite

intimate language: performers at concerts and television evangelists, whose audiences number in the thousands or even millions, nonetheless occasionally address their audiences quite personally and intimately.

A rhetor's attitude toward the issue also influences distance. On one hand, where rhetors remain as neutral as possible, expressing neither a supportive nor rejecting attitude, distance tends to be greater. On the other hand, rhetors' strong expression of an **attitude—approval** or disapproval, for **example—closes** distance.

<div align="center">
More Attitude = Intimate Distance
Less Attitude = More Formal Distance
</div>

Grammatical Person

The prominent features of style that affect voice and distance are grammatical person, verb tense and voice, word size, qualifers, **and—in** written **discourse—punctuation**. There are three grammatical persons available in English: first person, in which the person or persons speaking or writing refer to themselves as "I" or "we"; second person, in which the audience is addressed by means **of** *you;* and third person, in which the rhetor mentions agents or issues but does not allude directly to herself or her audience.

First-Person Reference

"I will veto this bill when it comes to my desk." (The president speaks, referring to himself as "I.")

Second-Person Address

"You'll **see** . . .I'll veto this bill." (The president speaks to someone else, referring to that person in second person.)

Third-Person Reference

"President Smith will veto the bill sent him by Congress today." (Another person speaks about the president.) or

"Today the White House announced that it will veto the bill. (Someone speaking about the president uses metonymy to increase distance even more; she refers not to the president's person but to the place where he lives).

Composition textbooks (and teachers) often tell their students never to use first-person (J or *we)* or second-person *(you)* pronouns in the papers they write in school. We think that this rule is far too simple and inflexible to respond to the great variety of rhetorical situations that people encounter.

Generally, first- and second-person discourse creates less distance between a rhetor and an audience than does third-person discourse, because the participants in the action are referred to directly. In third-person discourse, the issue or subject is instead foregrounded, and references

to the rhetor or his audience tend to disappear. Thus third-person discourse creates the greatest possible rhetorical distance. First- and second-person discourse are used in situations where rhetors are physically proximate to audiences—in conversation and in more formal speech situations as well. In settings where spoken discourse is used, J and *you* actually refer to participants in the situation, even when the audience is very, very large, as it is at football games and open-air concerts. Third-person is generally used by speakers only within quite formal contexts, or if convention dictates that it be used—at a conference of scientists, for instance.

First- and Second-Person Discourse

First- and second-person are ordinarily used in speech when small groups of people are conversing. Clarity of pronoun reference is ordinarily not a problem in conversation because the persons to whom the pronouns apply are visible and audible to all participants. To see how important it is to maintain the relatively intimate distance necessary to conversation, try speaking about someone who is present in the third person (use her name; use the pronouns *she* and *her* to refer to her). Third-person pronouns create such a distance that the person so referred to may feel that she has suddenly been excluded from the conversation.

First and second grammatical persons have interesting and complex ethical effects in writing and in electronic discourse, since the persons participating in these rhetorical acts are not physically proximate to each other. Here is a fictional example of first-person discourse, from Charles Dickens's novel *David Copperfield:*

> Whether I shall turn out to be the hero of my own life, or whether that station will be held by anybody else, these pages must show. To begin my life with the beginning of my life, I record that I was born… .

Here is a version of the passage revised into third-person discourse:

> Whether or not David Copperfield turns out to be the hero of his own life will be shown in these pages. To begin the story of his life at its beginning, records show that he was born… .

The third-person version demonstrates how that choice increases the distance between reader and writer, as well as between readers and the subject of this novel, the life of David Copperfield.

But use of the first person can increase distance if a writer gives information about his or her ideology or opinions in a way that excludes some readers. Here is an example—taken from an article by Lewis H. Lapham and published in *Harpers*—of a first-person voice that may cause some readers to feel excluded:

> Were I to believe what I read in the papers, I would find it easy to think that I no longer can identify myself simply as an American. The noun apparently means nothing unless it is dressed up with at least one modifying adjective. As

a plain American I have neither voice nor authentic proofs of existence. I acquire a presence only as an old American, a female American, a white American, a rich American, a black American, a gay American, a poor American, a native American, a dead American. The subordination of the noun to the adjectives makes a mockery of both the American premise and the democratic spirit, but it serves the purposes of the politicians as well as the news media, and throughout the rest of this election year I expect the political campaigns to pitch their tents and slogans on the frontiers of race and class. For every benign us, the candidates will find a malignant them; for every neighboring we (no matter how eccentric or small in number), a distant and devouring they. (January 1992, 43)

Interestingly enough, the effectiveness of this first-person voice depends on whether or not readers share Lapham's desire that all Americans be identified as similar to one another simply because they live in the same country. Readers whose identity customarily has an adjective placed in front of it (whether they want this to happen or not) might wonder whether the author represented by this voice understands how difficult it is for some persons to be thought of "simply as an American."

Since it is modeled on conversation, first-person discourse always implies the presence of a hearer or a reader, a "you" who is listening or reading, whether that "you" is explicitly mentioned or not. Prose that relies on an **"I-you"** relation indicates to members of an audience that a rhetor feels close enough to them to include them in a relatively intimate conversation:

Dear folks: I know you may be worried about me, so I'm writing to say that I arrived safely. Please send money. Love, your son.

The author of this note gives no details at all about his **arrival—when,** where, how. He obviously feels so close to his audience that he assumes they need no more information than he supplies.

In relationships that are not intimate, the "I-you" voice has complex ethical effects. Novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky's "Underground Man" provides a good instance of the ego-centeredness that may result from the use of first-person discourse, even when the rhetor is a fictional person, as he is in this case:

I am a sick man ... I am a spiteful man. I am an unpleasant man. I think my liver is diseased. However, I don't know beans about my disease, and I am not sure what is bothering me. I don't treat it and never have, though I respect medicine and doctors. Besides, I am extremely superstitious, let's say sufficiently so to respect medicine. (I am educated enough not to be superstitious, but I am). No, I refuse to treat it out of spite. You probably will not understand that. Well, but I understand it. Of course, I can't explain to you just whom I am annoying in this case by my spite. (1)

Here is a complaining neighbor, wrapped so deeply in his own troubles that he seems at first to be engaging in an ego-centered, aimless, and self-contradictory monologue. But suddenly he acknowledges the presence of

an audience ("You probably will not understand"), a move that establishes a sort of back-fence intimacy. And the final sentence in the passage suggests that the relationship will become "us" against "them" before very long. The intimate "I-you" relationship includes Dostoyevsky's audience, whether they want to be this man's companion or not.

The **ethical** possibilities opened by grammatical person are endless. In *Desert Solitaire,* Edward Abbey used a combination of third and first persons to separate "us" from "them."

> There may be some among the readers of this book .. . who believe without question that any and all forms of construction and development are intrinsic goods, in the national parks as well as anywhere else, who virtually identify quantity with quality and therefore assume that the greater the quantity of traffic, the higher the value received. There are some who frankly and boldly advocate the eradication of the last remnants of wilderness and the complete subjugation of nature to the requirement of—not man—but industry. This is a courageous view, admirable in its simplicity and power, and with the weight of all modern history behind it. It is also quite insane. I cannot attempt to deal with it here.
>
> There will be other readers, I hope, who share my basic assumption that wilderness is a necessary part of civilization and that it is the primary responsibility of the national park system to preserve intact and undiminished what little still remains. **(1968, 47)**

Abbey referred to those who don't share his opinions in the third person, perhaps because he was **pretty** sure they wouldn't be among his readers. This tactic created a "we-they" relationship that gave Abbey's readers a sense of being allied with him against those who do not share his position.

"We," the plural first person pronoun, shares in the complex rhetorical effects created by the use of "I." "We" may establish a cozy intimacy that presumes much in common between rhetor and audience. Consider the use of first person in the following excerpt from a piece written by Victoria A. Brownworth that appeared in *Curve* magazine:

> Pride and naming go together. At early Gay Pride marches in the 1970s, we chanted "Say it loud/gay and proud." In the activist 1980s, when AIDS was killing gay men with such ferocity, we changed, "Say it! Silence equals death." In the 1990s we had a new chant: "We're here; we're queer; get used to it," What we call ourselves is both an evolving process and an essential element of self-acceptance, or what we have come to call pride.
>
> I spoke about identity and pride recently at the University of Pennsylvania. The topic was the word *queer* and the ongoing debate over its use. Like *nigger* or *kike,* it is a loaded word that comes with a history of violence. Reclaiming epithetical language remains highly problematic; renaming ourselves with the negative slurs of the dominant culture in an attempt to assert prideful dominance over their intent to wound is politically laudable, but it doesn't always work. I have never witnessed a Jewish friend do anything but cringe at the word *kike.* Many blacks find the use of *nigger* in rap and hiphop lyrics offensive, just as many lesbians and gay men find it difficult to embrace the words that

have been hurled at us with violent rage. Even if we do not accept these names and wear them with pride, it is a limited construct: Blacks can call themselves *nigger,* whites cannot. Those who spat the word *queer* at us as an invective cannot now use it as if it were accepted parlance.

The process of naming is a constantly evolving one. Embedded within the concept of pride and identity politics is what we *feel* about what we call ourselves. The emotion around naming carries as much weight as its political etymology. There are many names that signify, to myself and to others, who I am. Dyke, queer, feminist, writer, leftist, working-class, Catholic, intellectual. These are identities I claim and assert. But identity is not fixed. Our identities constantly change and that evolution can present us with conflicts over not only the names we claim, but also over our acceptance of what those names stand for, and thus our pride in ourselves. (56)

Brownworth, as a regular columnist for the lesbian magazine *Curve,* is intimate with her audience, and she assumes, for the most part, that her readers share her experience when she chronicles the various chants gays and lesbians have used to assert their identity collectively. Her frequent use of first person discourse at the beginning of the essay demonstrates her own knowledge about such collective action, and what's more, that her knowledge comes from first-hand experience. She moves between the plural first person ("we") in the first paragraph to the first person singular ("I") in the second paragraph, thus effectively showing where she stands on the issue and why she has the authority to write an essay on identity's "legacy." Sentences like "I spoke about identity and pride recently at the University of Pennsylvania" and "I have never witnessed a Jewish friend do anything but cringe at the work *kike"* combine to produce Brownworth as close to her readers even as they establish her as an expert. And as the piece continues, readers are encouraged to see how Brownworth herself has struggled with the question of identity and language. She invokes historical moments (Gay Pride marches) and shared rallying cries so familiar to *Curve* readers ("We're here, we're queer" and "Say it loud/gay and proud") to create the impression that she and her readers have a lot in common by virtue of their being lesbians in the early twenty-first century.

And so the use of *we* may exclude readers depending on whether they are included in the group of persons it designates and on whether or not their inclusion/exclusion matters in some way. Compare the relative inclusiveness of the following uses of *we:*

We the people of the United States.. ..

We shall overcome.

"We weren't always old and conservative. We used to be young and conservative" (New York Life Insurance Company).

In the first example, *we* refers to the Americans who established a federal, or national, government; *we* was intended to consolidate group feeling among Americans. The *toe* in "we shall overcome," in contrast, has a generally inclusive effect. Anybody can join the singers. Compare the original

version to the distancing effect, for anyone who is not African American, of "African Americans will overcome." In the third example, *we* refers, presumably, to the people who run an insurance company, who want to project an *ethos* of wise, risk-free management. This reference to a group of persons that does not include the reader is something of a departure for advertising, which generally uses a second-person voice. Whether or not readers will do as they are asked at the end of the ad ("call your New York Life agent") depends upon whether or not they wish to be included in a group of investors who are "set in our ways" and who "weather the storms" because of their conservative financial philosophy.

We use the first-person pronoun throughout this book, even though to do so is unconventional in textbooks. We do so for three reasons. First of all, this voice seems to be more honest, since much of what we have to say here has developed from our own thinking about the usefulness of ancient rhetoric. As a result, writing in first person was easier for us since we didn't have to go searching for circumlocutions like "in the opinion of the authors" to express what we think. Second, when we take a position on a matter that is debated by scholars of ancient rhetoric, the first-person voice allows us to take responsibility for that position; third person makes flat statements about disputed matters seem far too authoritative and decisive in situations where opinions differ. Third, we hope that readers will identify more readily with a first-person voice. The material in this book is foreign and difficult and, by itself, puts quite a little distance between us and our readers. The use of a third-person voice would only widen that distance. Our choice of first-person does create one problem, one that some readers may have noticed by now. Its use can create an ego-centered voice that excludes an audience. Whether this happens or not depends on the care taken by the rhetor to establish a respectable *ethos* and on his attitude toward his subject. We worried a good deal that our use of the plural first person *we* would take on authority we don't mean it to have. That is, we feared it would become the so-called "royal we," so-called because kings and queens use it when making official announcements. There is yet another rhetorical problem inherent in the use of a first-person voice. First person often led us to want to write in second person as well, as in phrases like "Notice how .. ." and "You should do. . . ." Since we wanted to avoid the instructional tone conveyed by the second person, we were often forced to substitute third-person circumlocutions for *you*—"the rhetor," "the writer."

Second Person Discourse

Second-person discourse is the province of advertising. "Come fly the friendly skies"; "Just do it"; "You're in good hands." Advertisers want their audiences to feel close to the companies they represent and the products they sell. The cozy second-person voices they establish cover over the fact that every ad gives instructions to its audience: use this, buy that. In other words, a potential rhetorical problem is inherent in second-person discourse, because rhetors who adopt it are giving directions. Obviously, this is true of recipes and directions for using or assembling something: "Add

just a pinch of marjoram to the boiling sauce"; "Join tab A to slot B." The person who gives directions assumes a position of superiority to audiences. If readers are ready to be dictated to, as users of recipes usually are, this voice works. When readers or hearers are not receptive to instruction, use of the second-person pronoun can increase distance rather than closing it. For example, political activist and presidential candidate Ross Perot goofed in this address at the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People when he referred to the audience several times as "you people." Perot's grammatical separation created a palpable and alienating distance between himself and his audience.

Third Person Discourse

Third-person voice establishes the greatest possible distance between writer and reader. Use of this grammatical person announces that its author, for whatever reasons, cannot afford too much intimacy with an audience. Third person is appropriate when a rhetor wishes to establish herself as an authority or when she wishes to efface her voice so that the issue may seem to be presented as objectively as possible. In third-person discourse the relationship of both rhetor and audience to the issue being discussed is more important than the relation between them.

Here is a passage from Fredrich A. Hayek's *The Constitution of Liberty* that is written in third person:

> The great aim of the struggle for liberty has been equality before the law. This equality under the rules which the state enforces may be supplemented by a similar equality of the rules that men voluntarily obey in their relations with one another. This extension of the principles of equality to the rules of moral and social conduct is the chief expression of what is commonly called the democratic spirit—and probably that aspect of it that does most to make inoffensive the inequalities that liberty necessarily produces. (85)

Hayek did not qualify the generalizations put forward in this paragraph with an "I think" or even with an "Experience shows that____" He may have had several reasons for choosing to write in this distancing fashion: to seem objective, to seem authoritative and therefore forceful, or to keep his subject—equality—in front of readers, rather than his personality. Since Hayek is a very well known political theorist, his status as an authority (his situated *ethos)* may be such that he doesn't have to qualify his generalizations.

Here's another example of third-person discourse from the first page of *How Institutions Think,* written by a well-known anthropologist, Mary Douglas:

> Writing about cooperation and solidarity means writing at the same time about rejection and mistrust. Solidarity involves individuals being ready to suffer on behalf of the larger group and their expecting other individual members to do as much for them. It is difficult to talk about these questions coolly. They touch on intimate feelings of loyalty and sacredness. Anyone who has accepted trust and demanded sacrifice or willingly given either knows the power of the social

bond. Whether there is a commitment to authority or a hatred of tyranny or something between the extremes, the social bond itself is taken to be something above question. Attempts to bring it out into the light of day and to investigate it are resisted. Yet it needs to be examined. Everyone is affected directly by the quality of trust around him or her. (1)

This third-person voice is a bit less distancing than Hayek's, because it does refer to people, rather than to abstractions. However, Douglas takes great pains not to name anyone, even though she is writing about intimate issues ("feelings of loyalty and sacredness"). Use of the third-person forces Douglas to put rather vague words in the grammatical subject positions of her sentences: *zvriting, solidarity, it, they, anyone*. We have revised the passage into first person, making the author (I) the grammatical subject of most of the sentences:

If I write about cooperation and solidarity, I must write at the same time about rejection and mistrust. I define *solidarity* as the readiness of individuals to suffer on behalf of the larger group and their expecting other individual members to do as much for them. I have difficulty talking about these questions coolly, because they touch on intimate feelings of loyalty and sacredness. Since I have accepted trust and demanded sacrifice, and have willingly given them as well, I know the power of the social bond. I take the social bond to be above question; my commitment to authority or my hatred of tyranny are irrelevant to this question. Every time I attempt to bring it out into the light of day and to investigate it, people resist my efforts. Yet we need to examine it, because all of us are affected by the quality of trust around us.

We think the revision makes the passage clearer and more lively as well. Use of the first person also forces the author to take responsibility for the large generalizations she makes about the touchiness of this question. However, use of first-person discourse does lessen the authority carried by the original passage, because the generalizations made in the revision are less sweeping in scope. That is, they apply to "I" rather than to people in general.

Scientists, social scientists, and other scholars use third-person discourse in order to reinforce the impression that the facts speak for themselves, that human beings have had as little influence in these matters as possible. The warning label on cigarette packages, for example, used to read as follows: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health." Even though the Surgeon General probably did not conduct the research that discovered the connection between smoking and lung cancer, the message relied on the authority of that office to underscore the seriousness of the message. A later version of this warning reads: "Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health." While the newer version is a bit more specific, it is also firmer, because it omits reference to an author and addresses the audience directly. It is probably safe to predict that this warning will never be couched in a first-person voice: "I think that smoking cigarettes is bad for you, and you ought to stop it. Mary Jones, M.D." The intimacy of first-person undermines the authority that this serious message requires.

Our use of alternating male and female pronouns in this book has irritated some of our readers. Some who have complained about this practice would prefer that we stick to a single gender, thus reducing the number of occasions in which gender switches call attention to the rhetoric of our argument and hence distract readers from what we are saying. Other readers assert that consistent use of male pronouns would be less distracting. Calls for consistency in gender reference suggest that readers imagine a rhetorical actor or actors with whom they identify while reading. When that actor's gender is altered, the reader must stop in order to adjust her picture of the imagined actor (as in this sentence). Calls for sole reliance on the male gender, however, seem to us to stem from a commonplace: that rhetorical actors are, or ought to be, male. That is to say, the first objection to our practice is rhetorical; the second is ideological. We adopted the practice of switching the gender of pronouns referring to rhetorical actors in order to call our readers' attention to both the workings of rhetorical actors and the power of the commonplace. Some of our critics have said our second aim goes beyond our responsibilities as rhetoric teachers. What do you think?

Students often use third person when they write for teachers on the correct assumptions that the formal distance lends authority to their work and that it is appropriate for the rhetorical situation that obtains in most classrooms. A curious thing sometimes happens within third-person prose, however: people write phrases like "the writer of this paper feels" or "in the opinion of this author." If these constructions emerge during the writing process, it may be that the issue demands that the rhetor express some opinions and take responsibility for them. In this case, first person may be a better choice. Third-person statements tend to have an authoritative flavor. When rhetors find themselves trying to add qualifiers about their opinions or attitudes, it may be the case that the third-person voice is inappropriate or even dishonest. Of course, dishonesty is disastrous if a reader detects it.

Verb Tense and Voice

The choice of grammatical person is the most influential element in establishing voice and distance. However, other stylistic choices, such as verb tense and voice, affect an *ethos* as well. Present tense has more immediacy than past tense; use of the present tense gives an audience a sense of participation in events that are occurring at the moment, while past tense makes them feel like onlookers in events that have already occurred. Compare your response to the following phrasings:

Present Tense: Quintilian teaches his students to . . .

Past Tense: Quintilian taught his students to .. .

The second example distances readers from Quintilian because it explicitly places his teaching in the past.

In English, verbs may assume one of two "voices"—active and passive. Passive verb constructions betray themselves through an explicit

or implicit "by———————" phrase, as in "The door was left open (by
————————)." Phasing such a construction in active voice requires the
rhetor to supply somebody (or some thing) who can act as an agent
upon the door: John, the dog, the wind, as in "John left the door open."
Active verb constructions tend to lessen distance, since the rhetor using
them is forced to name either herself or somebody or something else as
an actor in the sentence; usually this rhetorical subject (the actor) is also
the grammatical subject of a sentence with an active verb construction.
Passive constructions, in contrast, tend to create distance between
rhetor and issue, since the grammatical subject of the sentence is usually
not its rhetorical subject.

> *Active Voice: Mary* did the dishes.
>
> *Passive Voice:* The dishes were done.
>
> *Active Voice:* I take responsibility for these actions.
>
> *Passive Voice:* Responsibility must be taken for these actions.

Active constructions force rhetors to betray their presence as creator of the
discourse; active voice also forces them to take overt responsibility for their
assertions. Passive constructions permit rhetors to avoid taking responsi-
bility for their statements. "The police were misled" is a passive construc-
tion that avoids mentioning the person who did the misleading.

Sometimes this strategy is useful, depending upon the rhetorical situa-
tion. If a rhetor does not know what he needs to know, he may want to dis-
guise his ignorance by using passive constructions. Rhetors who do so,
however, run the risk of damaging their audience's estimate of their intel-
ligence, honesty, and good will. Take this passive sentence, for example:

> Sometimes ridiculed for directing their presentation to the nonintellectual, tele-
> vision news coverage is obligated to give a concise, easily understandable, fac-
> tual news report.

In this case, the use of third person creates distance between author and
audience, since the passive construction allows the rhetor to disappear. She
is nowhere in sight. Since nobody is around to take responsibility, readers
might wonder just how authoritative this statement is. A reader might
wonder: "Well, who obligates television news coverage to be concise, fac-
tual, and so on? Who says so? In my experience, Peter Jennings and Candy
Crowley and the rest don't always stick to the facts___" If this happens, the
rhetor might as well have never written at all, because important aspects of
her ethos—that she seem well informed and honest and that she have her
audience's interest in mind—have been compromised. Active voice might
have been a better choice, although it requires her to name some names and
take some responsibility for her assertions:

> Critics sometimes ridicule television news coverage for directing their presen-
> tation to the nonintellectual. News writers couch the news in simple terms,
> however, because their duty as journalists obligates them to give a concise, eas-
> ily understandable, factual news report.

Word Size

Other stylistic resources help to establish voice, as well. Word size seems to affect voice and distance. American audiences tend to assume that polysyllabic words (big words with lots of syllables, like *polysyllabic)* indicate that their user is well educated. Hence they are likely to award authority to a rhetor who uses them. Compare the effect of "It will be my endeavor in this analysis . . . " to that of "Here I will try to analyze...."

When used carefully, polysyllabic words are generally more precise than smaller words: *polysyllabic* is more specific than *large* or *big; deconstructing* is both more impressive and precise than "taking apart"; *chloroflourocarbons* is more precise, but less intimate, than "the stuff that causes holes in the ozone layer." Because of their greater accuracy, larger words tend to appear in formal discourse, in which rhetors are more concerned with accuracy than with establishing an intimate relation with readers. However, big words can have the disadvantage of making their user sound pompous; too many polysyllabic words can also discourage people from making the effort to plow through them, especially if their meanings are obscure to the intended audience. Here is a brief passage written by philosopher Jacques Derrida:

> On what conditions is a **grammatology** possible? Its fundamental condition is certainly the undoing of logocentrism. But this condition of possibility turns into a condition of impossibility, In fact it risks upsetting the concept of science as well. Graphematics or **grammatography** ought no longer to be presented as sciences; their goal should be exorbitant when compared to a grammatological knowledge. *(Of Grammatology* [1976] 74)

While Derrida writes simple sentences, he nonetheless litters his pages with polysyllabic terms whose meanings are unfamiliar to many readers (chiefly because Derrida coined many **of** them himself). One has to be very committed to read **Derrida's** work because it takes a long time to learn the meanings of the terms he employs.

Familiar words are effective in informal discursive situations where the audience is on fairly close terms with the rhetor; everyone shares common understanding that lessens the rhetor's obligation to be precise. "Cool!" is an example wherein precision of meaning is absolutely sacrificed to the establishment of intimacy. (As you can see, this phrase, which is ordinarily used in conversation, loses much of its effect in print).

Qualifiers

Qualifiers like *some, most, virtually,* and *all* affect voice and distance. A qualifier is any term (usually an adverb or an adjective) or phrase that alters the degree of force or extent contained in a statement. Compare the relative distance achieved by the use of qualifiers in the following statements:

> All humans are created equal.
>
> It may be that some humans are created equal.
>
> Actually, very few humans are created equal.
>
> Virtually no humans are created equal.

The first statement is quite distant, because it makes a sweeping, authoritative judgement. No authors are present to identify with readers. The other statements are more intimate because they betray the presence of an author, modifying the extent or intensity of her judgement in each case.

As a general rule, the more qualifiers and the more intensity they convey, the more **intimate** the distance between rhetor and audience. Qualifiers have this effect because they indicate, however subtly, that someone is present making judgements about degrees of intensity. Compare this unqualified statement to the heavily qualified one that follows it:

> *Unqualified:* Three months after announcing it had settled a lawsuit filed against it by Bread and Butter Corporation, the City Council of Ourtown made the agreement public today.
>
> *Heavily Qualified:* Three long months after announcing it had tentatively settled one of the most expensive civil lawsuits in the city's history, today the City Council of Ourtown, with some trepidation, made public a proposed agreement between it and the gigantic Bread and Butter Corporation.

The first version creates more distance between author and readers because the writer expresses few judgements about the event under discussion. The author of the second version, is willing to qualify events by using adjectives and adverbs that express degree ("tentatively," "expensive," "gigantic")

Composition textbooks sometimes caution writers against the use of qualifiers, calling them "weasel words." However, <u>cautious</u> rhetors <u>often</u> find it necessary to use a <u>few</u> qualifiers in order to represent a position *as* <u>accurately as possible.</u> (The underlined words in the preceding sentence are qualifiers). Moreover, qualifiers can be effective in reducing distance between a rhetor and an audience in situations where an intimate distance is more persuasive than a more formal one. A side note about gender and language use: linguistic research indicates that women use more qualifiers than men do.

Here is a passage about Newt Gingrich, who was Speaker of the House of Representatives in 1997. It was composed by William J. Buckley and published in his magazine, the *National Review*. We have italicized the qualifiers that appear in it.

> The leader of a *reformist, populist* party in a *representative* government must stay on the offensive to survive. He should not pick *quixotic* fights and need not eschew *tactical* compromises, but he must continue to make *strategic* advances across a broad front. Instead, Gingrich has narrowed the *Republican* agenda and adopted a *defensive* posture. The decision to get the President's signature on a

balanced budget at any cost has enabled Clinton to extort concession after concession from a *demoralized* GOP. That is surely not Gingrich's fault *alone*. But he should not be surprised that troops without a mission will *sometimes* direct their energies against one another. (August 11, 1997, 14).

Some of the italicized qualifiers are necessary to convey the meaning of the passage ("representative," "Republican," "balanced"). However, the other italicized terms work to convey Buckley's opinion of the Republican party ("reformist," "populist"). These terms are conjectures about the party's agenda; not everyone will agree that they appropriately describe the party's goals. Other qualifiers convey Buckley's opinion of the Speaker's recent actions—"quixotic," "defensive"—and obviously, not everyone will agree with this assessment, either.

Punctuation

Punctuation is an extremely subtle means of establishing voice and distance in written discourse. The more exotic marks of punctuation work to close distance between writers and readers; they do the work that gestures, facial expressions, tone, and pitch do for speakers. Dashes convey breathlessness or hurry—or a midthought—or an afterthought. Parentheses (like these) decrease distance, because they have the flavor of an interruption, a remark whispered behind the hand. Exclamation points indicate strong emotions at work! Textbooks say that quotation marks are to be used only to represent material that has been quoted from another source, but increasingly quotation marks are being used for emphasis. This example shows them doing both jobs: "We don't 'cash' checks." <u>Underlining</u> or bold or CAPITAL LETTERS convey emphasis or importance, and all of these graphic signals close the distance between rhetor and audience. In electronic discourse, text written in caps is taken as evidence that the user is SHOUTING, and the tactic is considered impolite unless used sparingly and for effect.

People who use electronic discourse developed a lexicon of punctuation marks, called "emoticons," to indicate *ethos*. Among these are the use of asterisks on either side of a word to indicate some action on the rhetor's part: *blush* *wink*. A wink can be indicated by this creative combination of punctuation marks: ;>). Here is an example of the use of punctuation to enhance *ethos:*

Sharon:

Our meeting yesterday proves that two heads definitely make more stuff ;-). To recap: I will plow through my list, edit the chapters on extrinsic proof and formal logic and deliver the ms to you. Then you will add the remaining items on the list, do a final edit, and we'll be DONE with draft one (*big exhale"). Then we can put on our party hats. @:-)

Debbie

These innovative marks of punctuation seem to make e-mail less distant by bringing authors' personality into their posts.

If you doubt that such small things do influence distance, note whether you are offended the next time you see them in a message e-mailed to you by someone you do not know. Contemporary decorum seems to dictate, in short, that fancy or innovative punctuation should be used in intimate situations while discourse composed for more formal rhetorical situations should feature only the standard punctuation used to mark sentences and indicate possession (see Chapter 13, on delivery).

SITUATED ETHOS

Because rhetoric is embedded in social relations, the relative social standing of participants in a rhetorical situation can effect a rhetor's persuasiveness. A differential power relation inheres within any rhetorical situation simply because rhetors have the floor, so to speak. As long as they are being read or listened to they have control of the situation. But audiences have power, too, particularly in the case of written rhetoric, in which readers are relatively free to quit whenever they please. Few rhetors enjoy absolute power over either hearers or readers. We all know how easy it is to mute television commercials or to skip to the end of a murder mystery to see how it turns out.

But differential power relations exist outside of rhetorical situations, and these affect the degree to which an invented *ethos* can be effective. In other words, exceptions to Aristotle's generalizations about *ethos* occur in rhetorical situations where a rhetor's *ethos* is either bolstered or compromised by his reputation or his position in the **community.** Such exceptions apply most strongly to well-known people and especially to those who are well known because they hold some authoritative or prestigious position in the community. Ministers generally enjoy more cultural authority than **bar-**tenders, at least in rhetorical situations where they are considered to have expertise. A prior reputation as an *A* student or as a **goof-off** may affect a teacher's reception of students' work no matter how carefully students craft an invented *ethos*.

Rhetors and audiences may exist in unequal social relations to one another for a variety of reasons. Within classrooms, for example, teachers have more power than students, and usually teachers can silence students whenever they think it's necessary or proper to do so. Within the culture at large, in general, older people have more authority than younger ones, and wealthy people have more power than poorer ones do, in part because they have better access to the channels of communication. According to the rhetorician Wayne Brockriede, there are three major dimensions in any rhetorical situation: interpersonal, attitudinal, and situational.

The interpersonal **dimension—the** relations among persons who participate in a rhetorical **act—has** three characteristics: liking, power, and distance. Liking has to do with how well the people who are engaging in a rhetorical situation like each other. During the years when the United

States was attempting to broker peace between Israel and Palestine, reporters speculated whether the leaders of the countries involved actually liked each other. If they did, according to Professor Brockriede, their personal relationship should have smoothed discussions of the difficult issues they had to face.

Under the head of "liking," then, rhetors should ask: Are the feelings of liking or disliking mutual among participants in this rhetorical situation or in arguments about this issue? How intense are these feelings? Are these feelings susceptible to rhetorical change?

Brockriede defines *power* as "the capacity to exert interpersonal influence." Power may be the focus of a rhetorical act (as in "a power struggle"), or it may be a by-product of the act. A person may have power in a rhetorical situation for several reasons: because she has "charisma"; because of her position within the social system; because she has control over the channels of communication or other aspects of the rhetorical situation; because she can influence sources of information **and**/or the participants' ideology; or because she has access to other powerful people. President Ronald Reagan, who was frequently referred to as "the great communicator," was thought by his supporters to have great personal charm, or charisma (which was to be expected, perhaps, given his experience as an actor). John F. Kennedy was also thought to be a charismatic person, and many television evangelists owe their success to their personal charisma.

But not everyone has this somewhat mysterious quality called charisma. And so it is also important for rhetors to think about the power structure inherent in any rhetorical situation. Power is usually relatively shared between rhetors and their audiences. Few rhetors enjoy absolute power over their hearers or readers, even those, like the president of the United States, who can exert enormous power in other situations.

Rhetors who control the channels of communication have great situated power, because in extreme situations they can force people to become their audiences. When the president schedules a speech or a news conference on an important issue, for example, television networks are obligated to carry it even though it costs them money in lost advertising revenues to do so. People are obligated to listen and watch, unless they take rhetorical power into their own hands and turn the television off. Rhetorical power is obviously tied to access. Access (or lack of it) can either facilitate communication or disable certain possibilities for fruitful exchange. The issue of access came to the fore during a 1995 controversy over the national budget when Republican leaders claimed to have been denied opportunities to discuss budget concerns with President Bill Clinton. Here is an account of the incident from the *Detroit News:*

> House Speaker Newt Gingrich said Wednesday that he decided to toughen the Republican position on the budget after being "stiffed" by president Clinton aboard Air Force One.
>
> Gingrich, R-Ga., and Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., were among dozens of dignitaries who flew to Israel last week with Clinton to attend the funeral of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

The GOP leaders were insulted that their only contact with Clinton during the 25-hour round-trip flight was when he walked by twice to thank them for **coming,** Gingrich said. A chat with White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta lasted only a few minutes.

Gingrich said he and Dole assumed at least part of the journey would be spent trying to work out the **imminent** budget crisis.

Then the guests were told to exit the rear ramp of Air Force One when it returned to Andrews Air Force Base outside of Washington, while Clinton exited the main steps in full view of waiting media.

"Was it just a sign of utter incompetence and lack of consideration or was it a deliberate strategy of insult?" Gingrich said Wednesday.

He said he concluded at that point that the White House wasn't interested in compromising, and they shared no common ground. Consequently, he said, Congress would have to pass important budget-related legislation without Democratic votes.

"That's part of why you ended up with us sending down a tougher continuing resolution," he said. The continuing resolution, a short-term spending measure needed to keep the government operating until a budget is adopted, was vetoed by Clinton. As a result, large chunks of the government shut down Tuesday.

"This was not petty," Gingrich said. "This was an effort on our part to read the White House strategy.... It was clear **coming** out of that airplane that they wanted a confrontation." (November 16, 1995, 6A).

Here issues of power and access to it came to the fore, radically influencing the rhetorical strategies that followed. Because Gingrich and Dole read their limited contact with the president as a controlled measure of avoidance, a standoff ensued, and for weeks to come, the government did not function as usual. Indeed, federal agencies all over the country closed their doors, leaving 800,000 federal employees temporarily out of work because they had no operating budgets.

Here are some questions to ask about the power structure of a rhetorical situation: How disparate are the power positions of the various participants of a rhetorical act, and does the act increase, maintain, or decrease the disparity? How rigid or flexible is the power structure, and does the rhetorical act function to increase, maintain, or decrease the stability? As we have been saying, the rhetorical principle of distance examines how far apart, socially or situationally, participants are from one another in a rhetorical situation. When choosing a voice for a discourse, a rhetor should ask, Is this the optimal distance for persuasion, or should it be closed or opened up? Answers to these questions will depend in part on the quality of power relations between rhetor and audience.

The attitudinal dimension of rhetorical situations determines what predispositions exist among the participants in a rhetorical act that will influence their response to the situation. We can predict, roughly, that people will respond to a rhetorical proposition in one of three ways: acceptance, indifference, or rejection. Rhetors who are preparing to argue a case should ask: What would or did it take to move someone who **is/** was indifferent

toward acceptance or rejection of my position? Can I move someone from a position of acceptance toward rejection, or vice-versa? People who do research on rhetorical situations have found that the more ego involved a participant is, the less likely he is to be persuaded. Is or was this true in the situation you are analyzing?

People do not respond to a proposition out of context; their responses are determined by their ideology. Rhetors enjoy situated power if they are in a position to influence the ideology of participants in a rhetorical situation, as parents and clergy usually are. Rhetors also have situated power if they can suppress or divulge information that is crucial to understanding or deciding an issue. Press secretaries, spokespeople, and spin doctors enjoy this sort of power. What sorts of beliefs or ideological responses will your audience bring to your rhetorical situation?

AN EXAMPLE

John Chuckman writes for an on-line journal called *Yellow Times.* In the essay that follows, he takes positions that many Americans might think controversial or even unpatriotic, given their ideological positions. As you read, ask yourself whether Chuckman's *ethos* works in his favor in this tricky piece.

DISTURBING THE PLANET AND BLAMING THE MESS ON OTHERS

I received a letter from a reader recently asking me what it is about America that I hated so much. Since its tone was polite, I replied at length. I don't hate **anything—"hate"** is an awfully strong **word—but** there are things I find disturbing about America, and, as it happens, these are things many others also find disturbing.

There's certainly no need for my services in the 24-hour-a-day orgy of noisy self-praise that pours from television, radio, magazines, movies, sporting events, and even sermons in the home of the brave. This non-stop, drum-beating, national revival meeting has become the background noise of everyday American life, so much so that many are not aware that there is anything unusual about it.

There is a wonderful scene in "The Gulag Archipelago." After a speech by Stalin, the audience applauds and applauds and cannot stop applauding. Everyone waits for his or her neighbors to stop before stopping, only the neighbors also do not stop. The applause threatens to continue forever. Why? Because NKVD men prowl the aisles, looking for anyone who stops applauding.

Without making any outlandish, inappropriate comparisons between Bush's America and Stalin's Russia, there is still a very uncomfortable parallel between that frightening historical scene and recent events in the U.S., especially the State of the Union address. Even though the President said nothing demonstrating statesmanship or imagination or even compassion, everyone applauded and applauded and kept applauding. Some media commentators

actually compared his feeble recitation of platitudes with the thrilling cadence and brilliant words of Franklin Roosevelt at a time of true darkness. Several well-known television news personalities felt called upon to make odd, jingoistic personal statements as though they felt the need to prove their patriotic bona fides. What a big fat disappointment America is today. An affluent, noisy, moral netherworld. A place where fundamentalist pitchmen in blow-dried coifs and Pan-Cake makeup plead to fill the moral void, but only add to the noise.

A place where jingoism and mediocrity are lavishly praised. A people bristling with demands about their rights and redress of grievances, but with no thought about their responsibilities. A people who brag of being freer than any other people without knowing anything about other people.

An insatiably-consuming engine of a country whose national dream has been reduced to consuming more of everything without a care for anyone else on the planet.

A people without grace who always blame others for what goes wrong.

Americans, roughly 4% of the planet by numbers, gulp down more than half the world's illegal drugs, but in **all** the strident speeches and in all the poorly-conceived foreign policy measures, it is always the fault of Mexico or Colombia or Vietnam or Panama or the French Connection or someone else out there. Anyone, that is, but the people who keep gulping and snorting the stuff down, and all the shady American officials who are so clearly necessary to keep the merchandise widely available.

One of history's great moments of insufferable posturing came with the creation of annual "report cards" on how well various nations were doing at controlling drugs, as though these other countries were unreliable children being assessed by their wise Auntie America, the same wise Auntie zonked out on a million pounds of chemicals at any given moment.

America has a long history of vote tampering and rigged elections in many local jurisdictions. It is widely understood that vote tampering, especially in Chicago, gave John Kennedy a victory he did not win in the 1960 election, Biographer Robert Caro has revealed how Lyndon Johnson's political career in Texas had the way smoothed by vote **fraud.** And now, two and a quarter centuries after the great republic's founding, she still cannot run a clean election for president.

On top of fraud and unwillingness to spend enough to assure proper ballots, America clings to the most corrupt method possible to finance election campaigns, defining private money as free speech. The more of it, the better. One would almost think that the billions in bribes paid out by the CIA over the decades to corrupt other governments had influenced thinking about how things should be done at home.

Yet with a record like this, the State Department never stops passing public judgement on the inadequacies of democracy in other places. The State Department's views on democracy, about as deserving of serious consideration as the last Congress's idea of why you impeach an elected president, reduce to the same tacky business as the drug report cards: it's always someone else who's wrong. Even worse, the sermons on democracy and rights frequently are used as wedges for trade concessions. It just doesn't get more hypocritical than that.

Having mentioned the CIA's bribery over the decades, its interference in the internal affairs of so many countries, I recall the reaction of American leg-

islators a few years ago when it was thought possible, though never proved, that Chinese money had been tunneled into an American election. Heavens, how dare they do an underhanded thing like that! Sully an American election! The same legislators never considered that they themselves, in tolerating a corrupt system of election finance, were responsible for such activity's even being possible.

Consider Mr. Bush's lurid fantasy about an "axis of evil." One almost wants to ask whether the choice of words reflects long-term deleterious effects of the cocaine he reportedly used when he was sowing oats instead of bombs. The fact is that much of the world's terror is a direct response to American foreign policy that reflects daydreams and wishes in Georgia and Iowa rather than actual conditions abroad.

The CIA's three-billion-dollar fraternity prank with other people's lives during the 1980s in Afghanistan was great fun while it lasted, and there was no concern about Osama and the boys until they decided that the U.S. was just as unwelcome as the U.S.S.R. But it must be someone else's fault, so we'll topple the entire national structure of Afghanistan, destroy much of its infrastructure, kill thousands of innocent people, hold thousands more as illegal prisoners, and maybe go on to attack other places that never heard of Osama bin Laden just in case they're thinking about anything underhanded.

A former American diplomat has revealed how hundreds of visas were rubber-stamped for Afghan fighters. How else was it possible for 19 suspicious people to enter the U.S., some working away for months, with no attention paid by those immense, highly intrusive agencies, the CIA, FBI, and NSA, whose snooping costs tens of billions of dollars every year? Every phone call, fax, and e-mail in America, and a lot of other places, is vetted daily by these agencies' batteries of super-computers.

After the attack on the World Trade Center, there were many American news stories about 2 of these 19 people who possibly entered the U.S. by way of **Canada—stories** that proved utterly false as it turned out. But huge pressures were, and still are, being put on the Canadian government over this concern. America simply blames someone else rather than cleaning up its own house.

A few years ago, the world's richest country suddenly decided to stop paying U.N. dues, ignoring its long-standing treaty obligations. With an arrogant wave of the hand, it dismissed its responsibilities and blamed the U.N. for waste and bureaucracy. The "waste and bureaucracy" stuff came from American legislators who spent years investigating an insignificant, sour real estate deal and put on a colossal, lunatic, government-stopping, impeachment-**as-passion-play** spectacle. The same folks now prepare to squander tens of billions on useless new defense schemes and on measures to curtail American freedoms. But the U.N. has to lobby and wheedle in hopes of receiving its meager portion.

American technical experts analyzing data from a Chinese thermonuclear test some years ago were stunned to realize that the blast had a radiation "signature" similar to that of America's most advanced warhead. Espionage was immediately suspected, and the long, painful ordeal of Wen Ho Lee, an American scientist born in Taiwan, began. While investigation was reasonable, it was not reasonable to target Wen Ho Lee.

His career was ruined even though not a shred of clear evidence was ever produced. The more rational conclusion that the Chinese, a clever and resourceful people, had managed the feat themselves stood little chance when someone from "there" was there to blame.

The case of the Cuban boy Elian provided what may be the most **remark-able** example of this kind of obtuse and arrogant behavior. An ill-considered policy of granting automatic refugee status to all Cubans who made it in flimsy boats to American shores, part of an incessant campaign of hatred against Castro, lured the boy's mother to her death, as it had lured many others. The boy still had a loving father, other family, and friends, but they just happened to live in the wrong country. So an already-injured child was put through months of hell in Miami, a hostage to ideology as surely as American diplomats in Iran, his father, family, and home repeatedly ridiculed and insulted, and it was all some one else's fault; Castro's in this case.

I close by telling my reader that I never object to letters that disagree with me, only to those that are rude or insistent or obscene. And, I have to say, America does generate an awful lot of those. **(http://www.YellowTimes.org, March 1, 2003)**

Does Chuckman demonstrate **intelligence—that** is, does he seem to know what he is talking about? Certainly the essay is littered with details, although Chuckman does not cite any sources for these. Are the specific instances he mentions (the case of Wen Ho Lee and of Elian Gonzalez for example) well-known enough that readers are willing to take Chuckman's word for what happened? Does Chuckman make any attempts to establish himself as a man of good moral character? The opening compliment to a polite reader suggests that he is a civil person, and his distinction between "hating America" and finding the things that Americans do to be "disturbing" shows that he is at least trying to be a reasonable person. Does he demonstrate good will toward his audience? Chuckman provides plenty of examples to back up his claim that Americans tend to blame others for misfortunes of many kinds. Are you convinced?

EXERCISES

1. Find a half dozen short pieces of professional writing. These can be selections from books, newspapers, or magazines, fiction or nonfiction. Read each passage carefully. How does the author of each piece establish an *ethos?* Specifically, how does he or she convince you that he or she is intelligent and well-informed? What tactics does the author use to establish his or her good character? His or her good will toward readers? Make lists of these tactics for future reference. Do any of the pieces display an *ethos* that is not successful?

2. Now analyze the pieces in terms of the rhetorical distance created by their authors' voices. Do the authors assume they know readers well,

or do they establish a formal distance? How do they achieve this distance? Look at their uses of grammatical person, verb voice and tense, word size, qualifiers, and punctuation.

3. For practice, try to alter the voice and rhetorical distance of two or three of the pieces. Change the grammatical person, the word size, the voice and tense; use more or fewer qualifiers; use more or less and different kinds of punctuation. What happens? Is the author's *ethos* altered? How? Does the distance change? How? Is your revision more or less effective than the original? Why?

4. To practice creating an effective *ethos,* write a letter to someone who is very close to you—a spouse, parent, or friend. Now write a letter that says the same thing to someone who is less close to you—a teacher, for example. Now write the letter to a company or corporation. What happens to your voice in each case? What features of your writing are altered?

5. Write a letter in someone else's voice: someone you know, or better yet, a famous person such as a politician, a TV anchor, a movie star. You may have to watch and listen awhile to the person whose *ethos* you are imitating before you can do this successfully.

6. Try imitating the voice used by some writer you admire. (For more exercises of this kind, see Chapter 14, on imitation.) How does the writer achieve ethical effects?

7. Look at several articles in a popular newspaper or news magazine such as *USA Today* or *Newsweek.* Who seems to be speaking? How do the authors of these articles establish an *ethos?* Do they attempt to seem intelligent and well informed? How do they get access to the information they pass along?

NOTE

1. We are indebted to Walker Gibson, *Persona: A Style Study for Readers and Writers* (New York: Random House, 1969), and *Tough, Sweet, and Stuffy: An Essay on Modern American Prose Styles* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966).

WORKS CITED

Brockriede, Wayne. "The Dimensions of Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 54 (1968): 1-12.

Brownworth, Victoria A. "The Legacy of Identity." *Curve* June 2003, 56-57.

Dostoevski, Fyodor. *Notes from Underground.* New York: E. P. Dutton, 1960.

Douglas, Mary. *How Institutions Think.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986.

Hayek, Friedrich. *The Constitution of Liberty.* Chicago: University of Press Chicago, 1960.

Lind, Michael. *Made in Texas: George W. Bush and the Southern Takeover of American Politics.* New York: Basic Books, 2003.

Macrorie, Ken. *Writing to Be Read.* 3rd. rev. ed. Portsmouth, N.H.: Boynton Cook, 1984.

PATHETIC PROOF:
PASSIONATE APPEALS

Speech is a powerful guide, which by means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works: it can **stop** *fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity.... Fearful shuddering and tearful pity and grievous longing come upon its hearers, and at the actions and physical sufferings of others in good fortunes and in evil fortunes, through the agency of words, the soul is wont to experience a suffering of its own.*

—Gorgias,
"Encomium of Helen" 8

RHETORS CAN **FIND** arguments in the issue itself *(logos),* and a rhetor's character *(ethos)* can be persuasive, as well. According to Aristotle, a third kind of intrinsic proof is also available: rhetors can appeal to human emotion *(pathos).* In early Greek thought, the term *pathos* referred to a passive state we might call "experience"; later, in Greek plays called "tragedies," this state came to be associated with suffering. In the fifth century BCE Plato and Aristotle began to use the term *pathos* to discuss the emotions in general. *Pathos* is still used in English to refer to any quality in an experience that arouses emotions, and many English words are borrowed from the Greek term, including *sympathy* and *empathy.* Speakers of modern English generally use an adjective form, *pathetic,* to refer to anything that is pitiful or unsuccessful, as in the phrase "That's a pathetic excuse." But *pathetic* also refers to the arousal or expression of emotions, and that's the sense in which we use it here.

Aristotle and Cicero discussed the following sets of emotions: anger/calm, love/hate, fear/confidence, **shame/shamelessness,** compassion, pity/indignation, envy/emulation, joy, and hope *(Rhetoric* II 2-12; *De Oratore* II i 203). Emotions should be distinguished from appetites, such as pleasure and pain.

They must also be distinguished from values, such as justice and goodness. However, people do hold values with more or less intensity, and this intensity is where the rhetorical force of emotional appeals resides. People respond emotionally when they or those close to them are praised or threatened; rhetorically, they also respond emotionally when their values are reinforced or threatened.

The following passage introduces a book entitled *Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat,* written by attorney Morris Dees.

Louis Beam minced no words.

"I warn you calmly, coldly, and without **reservation** that over the next ten years you will come to hate government more than anything in your life," Beam, a spokesman for the Aryan Nations, told his audience of 160 white men. They ranged from white supremacists to pro-gun extremists, meeting at an invitation-only gathering two months after FBI sharpshooters killed Randy Weaver's wife and son on Ruby Ridge in Idaho. They called themselves patriots.

"The federal government in north Idaho has demonstrated brutally, horribly, and with great terror how it will enforce its claim that we are religious fanatics and enemies of the state," added Beam, his voice rising with each word. "We must, in one voice, cry out that we will not tolerate their stinking, murdering, lying, corrupt government.

"Men, in the name of our Father, we are called upon to make a decision, a decision that you will make in the quietness of your heart, in the still places of the night," Beam continued. "As you lie on your bed and you look up at the ceiling tonight, you must answer the question: Will it be liberty or will it be death?"

"As for me," he concluded in the words of Patrick Henry to thunderous applause, "give me liberty or give me death."

At this gathering, now known as the Rocky Mountain Rendezvous, held on October 23–25, 1992, at a YMCA in Estes Park, Colorado, plans were laid for a citizen's militia movement like none this country has known. It is a movement that already had led to the most destructive act of domestic terrorism in our nation's history. Unless checked, it could lead to widesperad devastation or ruin.

"We bear the torch of light, of justice, of liberty, and we will be heard," Beam shouted over the cheers of his audience. "We will not yield this country to the forces of darkness, oppression, and tyranny."

Dees's point in this book is that paramilitary groups, incited to violence by men like Beam, are a growing threat to the peace of the United States. His opening remarks, then, appeal directly to readers' emotions, particularly fear.

Of all the ancient kinds of rhetorical proofs, the appeal to the emotions seems strangest to contemporary rhetors, and perhaps a little bit shoddy as well. That's because of the modern reverence for reason and our habit of making a sharp distinction between reason and the emotions. In our culture, if you're emotional, you're irrational. Reason is associated with mind, and connotes a calm, studied approach to issues. Emotions are associated with the body and are thought to be superficial and dangerous. People tend to think of emotions as belonging to individuals, tike opinions. Since they are thought to be experienced privately by individuals, then, this set of preju-

dices depicts emotional response as both unimportant and inappropriate for public discussion. All of these associations are inaccurate and unfair.

Despite the popular ideology that characterizes emotions negatively, rhetors make emotional appeals all the time. The most obvious modern use of emotional appeals appears in advertisements that appeal to consumers' desire for success ("Be all you can be"; "Just do it!") or their fear of losing status in their communities ("Don't let this happen to you!"). Apparently, emotional appeals are still as persuasive as Aristotle said they were. Thus it is important for rhetors to know how to recognize such arguments and how to use them effectively as well.

ANCIENT TEACHERS ON THE EMOTIONS

Greek orators could find examples of the persuasive use of emotion in the texts of the poet Homer, whose two great epic poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey,* were well known among the Greek people. In the last book of the *Iliad,* Homer depicted the Trojan king, Priam, appealing to Achilles, the Achean hero, to return the body of his son, Hector:

> Remember your own father,
> Achilles, in your godlike youth: his years
> like mine are many, and he stands upon
> the fearful doorstep of old age. He, too,
> is hard pressed, it may be, by those around him,
> there being no one able to defend him
> from bane of war and ruin. Ah, but he
> may nonetheless hear news of you alive,
> and so with glad heart hope through all his days
> for sight of his dear son, come back from Troy,
> while I have deathly fortune. Noble sons
> I fathered here, but scarce one man is left me.
> Fifty 1 had when the Acheans came,
> nineteen out of a single belly, others
> born of attendant women. Most are gone.
> Raging Ares cut their knees from under them.
> And he who stood alone among them all,
> their champion, and Troy's, ten days ago
> you killed him, fighting for his land, my prince,
> Hector. It is for him that I have come
> among these ships, to beg him back from you,
> and I bring ransom without stint. Achilles,
> be reverent toward the great gods! And take
> pity on me, remember your own father.
> Think me more pitiful by far, since I
> have brought myself to do what no man else
> has done before—to lift to my lips the hand
> of one who killed my son. (XXIV 485-506)

Priam first arouses Achilles' sense of filial love by reminding him of his own father and tries to arouse his pity for the plight **of** lonely old men whose sons are missing or dead. Then he tells how his many children have been slain, hoping to rouse Achilles' pity for his misfortunes, and he mentions ransom hoping to stimulate Achilles' greed. He reminds Achilles of the gods; this is a subtle attempt to make Achilles fearful, since he committed a serious religious transgression by refusing to bury Hector's body. Finally, he asks Achilles to pity him for the shameful position in which he, a king, has been placed by being forced to beg a soldier to return his son's body.

As this passage makes clear, emotional appeals are based on the assumption that human beings share similar kinds of emotional responses to events: fathers everywhere weep for lost sons; an old man who has lost his family is pitied by everyone, even his enemies. While this may not be true across wide cultural differences, it certainly is the case that people who live in the same community have similar emotional responses. If this were not true, governments would not be able to incite great numbers of people to volunteer for military service during wartime (which is an irrational thing to do, after all). In his history of the **Peloponnesian** War, Thucydides reported a speech made by Pericles, who had incited the Athenians to war against the Spartans. When this war did not go well, the people became angry. Pericles "called an assembly, wanting to encourage them and to convert their angry feelings into a gentler and more hopeful mood" (II 59). Pericles was only partially successful in quelling the anger of the people because the war had brought them great suffering. As this passage indicates, Pericles was quite aware that rhetoric could arouse or dispel emotional responses and that communities could share emotional responses to public events.

Ancient rhetoricians also treated the emotions as ways of knowing, thus associating them with intellectual processes. Gorgias argued in the "Helen" that the persuasive effect of verbal seduction is no different from physical force; Helen was blameless no matter whether she was abducted or her seducer simply persuaded her to flee her husband and country. Indeed, early rhetorical theorists like Gorgias and Plato characterized rhetoric as a *psychagogia,* a leader or enchanter of souls. Gorgias argued that, given the right circumstances *(kairos),* a rhetor could alter an audience's emotional state of mind and thus change their assessment of reality, in essence helping them to see the world in new ways.

In other words, the ancients taught that emotions hold heuristic potential. The emotions even seem to be a means of reasoning: if someone becomes afraid, realizing that she is in a dangerous situation, she quickly assesses her options and takes herself out of danger as quickly as she can. Emotions can also move people to action: if someone feels compassion for someone else, he helps the suffering person.

Early sophistic treatises on rhetoric included topics for appealing to the emotions. For example, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* discussed appeals to friendliness, kindliness, and the like as a means urging an audience to act on behalf of the needy (1439b 15 ff.). Since sophistic manuals were orga-

nized according to the parts or divisions of a discourse, they gave no systematic advice about arousing the emotions but rather included it in their discussions of introductions and conclusions.

Aristotle seems to have been the first rhetorician to provide a systematic discussion of emotional proofs. In Book II of the *Rhetoric*, he defined emotions as "those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments" (i 1378a). This sounds very much like Gorgias's argument that emotional responses help people to change their minds. When a person experiences an emotion such as anger, pity, or fear, she enters a new state of mind in which she sees things differently. If she has become angry at someone, for example, she sees that person in a different light than she previously did. Perhaps she is angry with her supervisor because he mistakenly blamed her for something that was not her fault. Her angry reaction to this event will change her attitude toward her supervisor. She may even be moved by this new way of thinking to change her behavior toward him: she may, for example, vow to speak up for herself the next time she is unfairly accused; she may even decide to quit her job.

Aristotle realized that emotions are communal in the sense that they are usually excited by our relations with other people. We do not become angry in some general or vague way; ordinarily we are angry at someone else. We do not feel love toward nothing; we feel love for some persons or creatures. We can also communicate emotions to others—people who are afraid can make others fearful, as well.

Most postclassical rhetorical treatises employed the sophistic habit of treating the emotions as suitable proofs only in the introduction and conclusion of a piece of discourse. Cicero's *De Oratore* and Quintilian's *Institutes* are exceptions to this general rule. While both rhetoricians adopted Aristotle's tripartite division of rhetorical proofs, neither added much of theoretical value to his discussion of *pathos*. However, their treatises do supply numerous examples of successful emotional appeals and give helpful suggestions on how to compose these. For these reasons, we rely on Aristotle for the theoretical part of our discussion of the emotions and turn to Cicero and Quintilian for advice on how to compose emotional appeals.

EMOTIONS AS RHETORICAL PROOFS

According to Aristotle, three criteria must be met if rhetors wish to understand how emotions are aroused or quelled. First, they must understand the state of mind of people who are angry, joyful, or indignant; second, they must know who can excite these emotions in people; third, they must understand the reasons for which people become emotional (II 1 1378a). People do not enter the state of mind called "anger" without a reason, and they become angry at someone, even if they don't know who the person is. If a person leaves his workplace feeling perfectly calm, this state of mind changes when he discovers in the parking lot that someone has put a dent in his car. The reason he becomes angry is that this situation leaves him

with choices that are unpleasant: don't repair the dent, in which case it may rust and become worse, thus lowering the car's value; do repair the dent and pay for it out of his own pocket, since the repair will probably cost less than the deductible on his insurance. Note that his anger is not irrational in this case; it is a perfectly reasonable response to events.

Aristotle's first criterion is that rhetors must know the emotional states of mind of their hearers or readers. An audience may bring a certain emotional state of mind to a rhetorical situation, and if so, the rhetor needs to decide whether this state of mind is conducive to their acceptance of her proposition. If it is not, she needs to change their states of mind. Aristotle thought that emotional change came about through changes in the level of intensity with which emotions are felt (II ii **1377b–1378a**). Emotional intensity alters in accordance with the spatial and temporal proximity of the people or situations that arouse them.[1] When the person with whom someone becomes angry is close, either physically or relationally, anger will be felt more intensely. If the person who dented the car is still in the lot when its owner arrives there, the owner focuses his anger more intensely on the culprit than if he can be only diffusely angry in general with people who dent parked cars and run. (In this case he may even refocus his anger on another car or on the traffic as he drives home.) If the culprit happens to be someone known to the owner of the dented car, the owner's emotional response will be intensified, as well, and the quality of their relationship may evoke other emotions in addition to anger. If the two are coworkers who don't like each other very much, the owner of the dented car may be more intensely angry than if the culprit is a friend. Their relationship may deteriorate even more. If the culprit is a supervisor, however, the owner of the dented vehicle may try to temper his anger with mildness. If the two are spouses or partners, however, things become enormously complex emotionally.

As this example demonstrates, the relation of spatial proximity to emotional intensity depends upon social hierarchy as well. As Aristotle noted, "People think they are entitled to be treated with respect by those inferior in birth, in power, in virtue, and generally in whatever they themselves have much of" (1378b). According to Aristotle's reasoning, people are less prone to be angry with those above or equal to them on a scale of social authority, while they are more prone to be angry with those below them on that scale. According to this analysis, then, if the supervisor who dented the car is a shop foreman, the car's owner may be more angry than he would be if the culprit were the president of the company.

Some emotions are also more intensely felt if people nearby are experiencing them, as well. This feature of emotional intensity is what makes horror fiction and films work, because the audience fears for the characters. The feeling of fear is intensified in a theater because others are sharing it. Joy and anxiety appear to be shareable emotions, and mob violence can be stimulated by shared hatred and/or rage. Communities can feel hope, as when it seems likely that a war is about to end, and they can also feel despair, as Americans did during the Great Depression.

The intensity with which emotions are felt depends on the nearness of their objects in time, as well. Love tends to grow with time, but so can hatred. The intensity with which people feel joy depends very much on the temporal proximity of a joyful event, while sadness seems to linger through time. Anger tends to fade with time, unless the object of that anger is nearby in either time or space. The car owner's anger toward the person who dented his car will lessen over time, unless for some reason he fails to get the dent fixed. In that case, every time he see it he may get angry all over again.

The intensity with which people feel fear is closely dependent on both the spatial and temporal proximity of a fearful person or event. During wartime or when relations between nations are tense, governments try to stimulate fear of the enemy by bringing their images close to the people, altering them into objects of fear and thus disguising the fact of their spatial and temporal distance. In 1987, when relations between Iran and the United States were very tense, American media portrayed the Iranian leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, as a crazed religious fanatic. Pictures of his stern, angry countenance were prominently featured on television and in news magazines. At the same time, Iranian media portrayed the president of the United States, Ronald Reagan, as an idiotic warmonger, using close-up photographs of his vacantly smiling face. In other words, both parties to the conflict tried to personalize it for their citizens, because it is easier to make people afraid and angry toward a person than it is to make them afraid and angry toward an abstraction.

THE CHARACTERS OF AUDIENCES

In the *Phaedrus,* Plato instructed rhetors who wished to be persuasive to study the people in their audiences:

> Since the function of oratory is in fact to influence mens' souls, the intending orator must know what types of soul there are. Now these are of a determinate number, and their variety results in a variety of individuals. To the types of soul thus discriminated there corresponds a determinate number of types of discourse. Hence a certain type of hearer will be easy to persuade by a certain type of speech to take such and such action for such and such reason, while another type will be hard to persuade. (271d)

He might have meant, in part, that rhetors should study the emotions of their potential hearers or readers. In any case, some authorities think that Aristotle followed Plato's advice in Book II, chapters 12-17, of the *Rhetoric,* where he developed some general guidelines for evaluating the emotional states of audiences. He listed many Greek commonplaces about the differing attitudes held by young, middle-aged, and old people. For example, young persons are more passionate than older people, Aristotle wrote, but their emotions pass quickly. Older people, in contrast, tend to be suspicious

because their hopes have often been dashed. He also provided common-places about the differing attitudes of rich and poor, powerful and power-less, and those who have good or bad luck.

In Cicero's *De Oratore,* one of the participants argues that it is desirable for an audience to "carry within them . . . some mental emotion that is in harmony with what the advocate's interest will suggest. For, as the saying goes, it is easier to spur the willing horse than to start the lazy one" (XLIV 185-186). He continued:

> This indeed is the reason why, when setting about a hazardous and important case, in order to explore the feelings of the tribunal, I engage wholeheartedly in a consideration so careful, that I scent out with all possible keenness their thoughts, judgements, anticipations and wishes, and the direction in which they seem likely to be led away most easily by eloquence.... If ... an arbitrator is neutral and free from predisposition, my task is harder, since everything has to be called forth by my speech, with no help from the listener's character. (187)

In this passage Cicero anticipated the findings of some modern research about audiences. Roughly speaking, members of an audience may hold one of three attitudes toward an issue or a rhetor's ethos: they may be hostile, indifferent, or accepting. Communication researchers have found that it is easier to move people who care about an issue than it is to influence those who are indifferent. That is, it is easier to bring about a change of mind in those who are accepting or hostile than in those who are indifferent.

During the Vietnam war, people who opposed the war were called "doves" and those who approved it were called "hawks." Extreme doves wanted the war stopped and American soldiers brought home immediately. Extreme hawks wanted not only to escalate the war but to win it by whatever means were necessary. Many Americans subscribed to neither of these extremes but held more moderate positions. For instance, some doves wanted to scale down America's war effort, limiting it to guerilla skirmishes that would protect vital supply or communication lines. Other doves argued that a limited war should continue while peace was negotiated. Some hawks approved of bombing vital targets but stopped short of recommending large-scale bombing or the use of nuclear weapons. Early on in the war, many Americans were simply indifferent; that is, they held no position regarding it. These people presented both doves and hawks with their most difficult audiences, since those who were indifferent had to be convinced that the war was important to them before they could take up some other position on the issue. Indeed, it might be said that the war was finally ended, not because doves won the national argument about it but because a sufficient number of Americans finally abandoned their indifference toward the war when they saw the toll it took on American lives.

Researchers have also discovered that a person's willingness to change her mind depends on two things: the emotional intensity with which she clings to an opinion and the degree to which her identity—her sense of herself as an integrated person—is wrapped up with that opinion. Persons

who are intensely invested in a position are less likely to change their minds than those who are not.

Someone who was hawkish on Vietnam, for example, might have been so for intellectual reasons: perhaps he saw the strategic importance of the Vietnamese peninsula to American rubber production. His commitment to rubber production and thus to capitalism is a value rather than an emotion, and so it is only partially relevant to his emotional state. Its relevance depends upon the emotional intensity with which he values capitalism, as well as the degree to which his identity **and/or** personal fortunes depend on its maintenance. Theoretically, this person would be easier to move away from hawkishness than someone who was emotionally invested in the position, who feared, for example, that an American pullout in Vietnam would exacerbate the spread of dangerous communist values across Asia. And if a hawkish person's identity were wrapped up with this position, theoretically at least it would be very difficult to move him away from it. This was apparently the case for some high-level military and State Department personnel whose careers depended upon successful mainte- nance of the war.

In sum, rhetors need to assess the emotional states of their audiences as well as the intensity with which they cling to those states. Rhetors need to decide as well whether those emotional states render their audiences recep- tive to themselves **and/or** their proposition. Next, they should decide whether an audience can be persuaded to change their minds and, if so, whether they will be moved by appeals to their current emotional states or to a different one induced by a rhetor.

COMPOSING PASSIONATE PROOFS

Suppose that a rhetor who supports regulation of hate speech wishes to compose some suitable emotional appeals to use in her argument. She first needs to consider whether her audience will have an emotional response to this issue. This is not likely unless members of her audience are users or victims of hate speech or are for some other reason very much interested in the issue. Members of the American Civil Liberties Union, for example, will be interested because that organization has a long record of defending speech protected by the First Amendment. If her audience does not care about the use of hate speech, her emotional appeals should be directed at opening their eyes to its serious effects—the pain it causes, the hatred and anger it creates and sustains. If they are emotionally connected to the issue (perhaps they have been victimized by the use of hate speech), they will be receptive to the rhetor's proposition and no emotional appeals are required. But what about an audience who opposes the regulation of hate speech? Are there any emotional appeals that might persuade such an audience? In what follows we list several kinds of emotional appeals devel- oped by ancient rhetoricians.

Enargeia

In *De Oratore,* Cicero's characters argued that emotional appeals are equal in importance to arguments from character *(ethos)* and from the issue itself *(logos)* (II xliv 185 ff). One of the characters, Antonius, argued further that it is important for a rhetor to feel the emotions he wants to arouse in his audience. He exemplified this point by recalling his defence of Manius Aquilius, who was accused of extortion:

> Here was a man whom I remembered as having been consul, commander-in-chief, honored by the Senate, and mounting in procession to the Capitol; on seeing him cast down, crippled, sorrowing and brought to the risk of all he held dear, I was myself overcome by compassion before I tried to excite it in others. (xlvii 195)

Cicero's rendering of this scene is so powerful that it still evokes compassion in people reading it two thousand years later. Cicero insisted that rhetors must somehow bring themselves to feel the emotions they wish to arouse in their audience. Quintilian echoed this advice in his discussion of emotional appeals, and he gave a useful hint about it. If a rhetor does not actually feel the requisite emotions while he is composing, he can draw on humans' shared emotions, their natural empathy with other human beings. Using these, he can imagine how events must have affected those who suffered them:

> I am complaining that a man has been murdered. Shall I not bring before my eyes all the circumstances which it is reasonable to imagine must have occurred in such a connection? Shall I not see the assassin burst suddenly from his hiding-place, the victim tremble, cry for help, beg for mercy or turn to run? Shall I not see the fatal blow delivered and the stricken body fall? Will not the blood, the deathly pallor, the groan of agony, the death-rattle, be indelibly impressed upon my mind? (*Institutes* VI ii 31)

Rhetors who can imagine the emotions evoked by a scene may stimulate similar emotions in their audiences by deploying the power of *enargeia,* a figure in which rhetors picture events so vividly that they seem actually to be taking place before the audience. Vivid depictions of events, Quintilian argued, stir the emotions of an audience exactly as if they had been present when it occurred. Perhaps Shakespeare had this advice in mind when he imagined Marc Antony's funeral oration for Julius Caesar, which, historians say, whipped the Roman people into a fury of anger at Caesar's murderers—Brutus, Casca, and Cassius. Shakespeare imagined his fictional Antony as standing before the crowd, holding up Caesar's bloodstained cloak for all to see. He put these words into Antony's mouth:

> You all do know this mantle. I remember
> The first time ever Caesar put it on.
> 'Twas on a summer's evening, in his tent,
> That day he overcame the Nervii.

> Look, in this place ran Cassius' dagger through.
> See what a rent the envious Casca made.
> Through this the well-beloved Brutus stabbed,
> And as he plucked his cursed steel away,
> Mark how the blood of Caesar followed it,
> As rushing out of doors, to be resolved
> If Brutus so unkindly knocked, or no.
> For Brutus, as you know, was Caesar's angel.
> Judge, O you gods, how dearly Caesar loved him!
> This was the most unkindest cut of all,
> For when the noble Caesar saw him stab,
> Ingratitude, more strong than traitors' arms,
> Quite vanquished him. Then burst his mighty heart,
> And, in his mantle muffling up his face,
> Even at the base of Pompey's statue,
> Which all the while ran blood, great Caesar fell. *(Julius Caesar* III ii)

It is easy for readers to imagine this **scene—Antony** holding up the torn, bloodstained cloak, putting his hands through the holes made by the daggers that killed Caesar. Note also that he dwells on the emotional relationship between Brutus and **Caesar—Antony** implies that it was Brutus's ingratitude that actually killed Caesar, rather than the assassins' knives. By playing upon the crowd's shock and outrage at the bloody murder, he roused them to anger against the murderers.

We composed this *enargeia* for possible use by a rhetor who supports the regulation of hate speech:

> A small child walks jauntily home from school, swinging her backpack in time with her steps. Her eyes sparkle with **happiness—school** is out for the **day—** and her smile indicates her sheer happiness at being alive on this beautiful autumn afternoon. Suddenly, three girls from her class at school appear on the sidewalk in front of her. Giggling, they point at her in unison and the tallest one yells "Fatso! Go on a diet." They run away.

Of course, this depiction is intended to elicit sympathy for victims of hate speech.

Here is a another passage that illustrates the use of *enargeia,* taken from the work of W. Charisse Goodman:

> No one can deny that America is currently in the throes of a gender-specific obsession with thinness, but what does that mean in terms of the quality of everyday life for large women in this country? Let's take a look at an average day in the life of a composite average large lady in an average city.
>
> As she reads the morning newspaper, she sees ads and articles glorifying the slender **figure** and relegating her own body type to the weight-loss ads. The message: lose weight. You're not a real woman unless you're thin. While taking public transportation to work, she may have to cope with seats designed for much thinner people, some of whom will clearly resent her presence should they have to share a seat with her.

Once at work, she must listen to other women discuss at painful length their diets, their own perceived weight problems, and their anxiety and self-reproach at not being more disciplined. She winces as they express to one another, or her, their disgust and contempt for fatness as a general concept. Eating her meals in the lunchroom results in criticism or comments about her appetite and choice of foods. Perhaps she is even the object of coarse jokes made right to her face, and thinner co-workers who are prejudiced gossip smugly about her. (One man in my former workplace reportedly reacted to news of a relationship between two fellow employees with the immortal words, "That's impossible. She's **fat.**") She may be discreetly or unconsciously excluded from office or extracurricular social interaction. She may be automatically passed over for promotions, even paid less than thinner people for equal work, solely because her size does not reflect a lean, fashionable corporate image. The message: lose weight. You're not acceptable as you are, and you make us uncomfortable.

Should she have a hairdresser's appointment after work and scan magazines or the salon's catalogues for new hairstyle ideas, she finds few, if any, large women in one volume after another of photographs. Message: your type doesn't belong among pictures of beautiful women. On a clothes-shopping trip, she discovers she must shop in a separate department which is often tucked floors away from the smaller sizes; often she must go to a separate store altogether. When she checks out clothing ads in flyers or newspapers, she finds that garments advertised in sizes ranging from 4-14 or -16 invariably portray a woman at the smaller end of the spectrum modeling the product, and that even clothes for sizes 16 and up may be modeled by thin women.

When she turns on her TV or goes to a movie, she finds a seemingly endless number of slick commercials, programs and plots portraying thin women as attractive, lovable, successful, and glamorous while usually presenting heavy women, when they are included at all, as loud, aggressive, oafish, raw, alienated, etc.; in short, as unattractive, unlovable, unsuccessful, and decidedly unglamorous. Practically the only television programming that addresses her directly consists of weight-loss ads. True, sometimes there will be a "special" talk show about large-size fashions or the "special" problems big women face; if she makes enough of an effort, she can even find "special" magazines that actually depict the big woman as normal and attractive, or advertisements for "special" social events or "special" exercise classes geared to large people so they, too, can meet potential mates or exercise in peace. The message? She is set apart from a world that acknowledges only thin people. She is not permitted to **"fit** in."

Should our lady exercise in public, she will be fortunate indeed if she does not encounter harassment in the form of snickers, pitying or contemptuous looks, or even outright jeering from complete strangers passing by who feel they have every right to comment on her body's size and shape. The irony here, of course, is that weight bigots are quite fond of condemning fat people for their supposed sloth; but when a heavy person does make an effort to engage in exercise, she needs a huge does of courage and self-confidence to cope with such negative remarks.

Upon arriving home, she may face a companion or family that hounds her about her weight. If she attends parties to try and meet new people, she may

find that men are often polite but distracted as they jockey for the attention and favors of thinner, conventionally sexy "babes." Indeed, any public appearance is fraught with unpleasant possibilities. (4-6)

If Goodman is correct when she argues that there is widespread "weight prejudice" in this country and if she wants to eradicate that prejudice, she is arguing a distinctly minority view. And so she resorts to *enargeia* to depict the effects of this prejudice as vividly as she can so that thin people can learn what it is like to be fat. In other words, she is trying to elicit sympathy for the plight of large people in order to change cultural attitudes about weight. Of course, the effectiveness of her appeal to *pathos* depends in part on whether people accept her *ethos*. Often enough, ethical and pathetic appeals depend closely upon one another for their effects. In fact, it is sometimes difficult to disentangle the ethical from the pathetic in a successful argument.

Honorific and Pejorative Language

Another way to evoke emotions is to use words that are honorific or pejorative. Honorific language treats people and things respectfully, while pejorative language disparages and downplays them. In the passage that follows, David Denby struggles to articulate what he learned from reading Plato. We have italicized the honorific terms:

> Platonic idealism, in all its *brilliant* absurdity, left me up in the air. I might ridicule the theory of forms, but there was undeniably something powerful in it. When people exclaimed over "a *perfect* tree" or "a *perfect* day," they meant more than "How **beautiful!**" or "My needs have been fulfilled." Perhaps they meant that the happiness they felt made them think, "There must be something more, something else, ordering this *perfection.*" Common sense suggested that the notion of *perfection* could only have been derived from many *achieved beautiful* days or **trees—that** experience and comparison were the only possible furnisher of *ideals.* But the impulse to understand one's *supreme* satisfaction in certain objects did not thereby go away. After all, common sense could not sufficiently account for the relationship between the minds that we have and a reality that is not entirely of our making, a reality that is filled with *beauty* and *force* and also extremes of evil and ugliness. Since there is considerable agreement that Gary Cooper is a *handsome* man, and the leopard a *beautiful* cat, it is not unreasonable to ask where that agreement came from. What ordered the elements of *beauty,* and what caused *widespread* response to it? The theory of forms was not all that different from a longing for *God.* (117)

If you cross out the italicized terms, substitute more neutral terms ("reality" for "perfection" for example) and read the revised passage, you will see that much of its emotional appeal disappears. The author's *ethos* changes, as well, becoming more distant and formal. Does this revision render the passage less persuasive? That is, if its appeals to emotions and voice are limited, does the passage become less rhetorical?

Here is another passage, written by novelist Gore **Vidal.** We have italicized the pejorative terms that appear in it:

> The Bush administration, though *eerily inept* in all but its principal task, which is to exempt the rich from taxes, has *casually torn up* most of the treaties to which *civilized* nations subscribe—like the Kyoto Accords or the nuclear missile agreement with Russia. The *Bushites* go about their *relentless plundering* of the Treasury and now, thanks to Osama, Social Security (a *supposedly untouchable* trust fund), which, like Lucky Strike green, has gone to a war currently costing us $3 billion a month. They have also allowed the FBI and CIA either to *run amok* or not budge at all, leaving us, the very first "indispensable" and—at popular request—last global empire, rather like the Wizard of Oz doing his *odd pretend-magic tricks* while hoping not to be found out. Meanwhile, G.W. booms, "Either you are with us or you are with the Terrorists." That's known as *asking for it.* (10-11)

Choosing pejorative terms here was a complex task. *Civilized* and *untouchable,* for instance, are ordinarily honorific terms, but because Vidal relies heavily on irony in this passage, they work pejoratively here.

We encourage our readers to insert pathetic appeals into their own speaking and writing. We think that if you compose these carefully, with an eye toward the rhetorical situations you face, you will find that listeners and readers may respond to your propositions and arguments more warmly than they might have without your use of these appeals.

EXERCISES

1. Try creating an emotional appeal to use in an argument you are working on. If you are not working in a specific rhetorical situation at the moment, invent one. That is, describe an audience and an issue. Now decide what the emotional state of your designated audience is likely to be. Decide what emotions would rouse them to action, or at least move them to change their minds. Create an *enargeia,* a vivid scene, that is calculated to rouse the requisite emotions.

2. Select a proposition from your own repertoire of beliefs—that is, from your ideology. For example, perhaps you believe that the United States ought to intervene in the affairs of other countries for humanitarian reasons. Perhaps you support the legal status of abortion, or perhaps you oppose the death penalty. Now imagine an audience of one or more persons who are either hostile or indifferent to your proposition. Write a description of a rhetorical situation in which you attempt to persuade this audience to accept your proposition. Try to figure out why your audience is hostile or indifferent to you or to your proposition. Compose a list of their possible emotional responses either to the issue or to your situated *ethos.* List some pathetic proofs you might use to persuade its members to accept your premise or at least to examine it.

3. Think of a rhetorical situation in which an appeal to anger is appropriate. Compose the appeal. Now try composing appeals to other emotions discussed in this chapter. In what context would an appeal to shame be effective? Compassion? Hopelessness? We think that advertisers often rely on **fear—particularly** the fear of losing status in the **community—to** get people to buy things. Do advertisers exploit other emotional appeals?

4. Are Aristotle and Cicero's lists of emotions complete? That is, can you think of other emotions that are used in contemporary emotional appeals? For example, desire is often appealed to in contemporary rhetoric. Politicians say that "the American people want" this or that, and advertisers create extremely subtle appeals to desire, especially erotic desire (perfume and clothing ads are good examples here). Can you think of other examples? Is desire an emotion?

5. Keep a list of the honorific and pejorative terms that you come across in your reading. Once it has become long enough (fifty examples each of honorific and pejorative terms should do), study the list to determine whether they tell you something about community values.

NOTE

1. We are indebted in part to Craig R. Smith and Michael J. Hyde, "Rethinking 'the Public': The Role of Emotion in Being-with-Others," *Quarterly Journal of Speech 77* (November 1991): 446-466, for our analysis of emotional appeals.

WORKS CITED

Dees, Morris, with James Corcoran. *The Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat.* New York: Harper Perennial, 1997.

Denby, David. *Great Books: My Adventures with Homer, Rousseau, Woolf, and Other Indestructible Writers of the Western World.* New York: Touchstone, 1996.

Goodman, W. Charisse. *Invisible Woman: Confronting Weight Prejudice in America.* Carlsbad, Calif.: Gurze Books, 1995.

Vidal, Gore. *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got to Be So Hated.* New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002.

EXTRINSIC PROOFS: ARGUMENTS WAITING TO BE USED

The material at the rhetor's disposal is twofold, one kind made up of the things which are not thought out by himself, but depend upon the circumstances and are dealt with by rule, for example documents, oral evidence, informal agreements, examinations, statutes, decrees of the Senate, judicial precedents, magisterial orders, opinions of counsel, and whatever else is not produced by the rhetor, but is supplied to him by the case itself or by the parties: the other kind is founded entirely on the rhetor's reasoned argument.

—Cicero, *De Oratore* II xxvii 116-17

EXTRINSIC PROOFS DO not need to be invented by a rhetor because they are found in the rhetorical situation. Modern rhetoricians place a much heavier emphasis on extrinsic proofs than the ancients did. Today rhetors often assume that whatever is written down and published is accurate and trustworthy, since, in a sense, it represents someone's testimony about something. The version of rhetoric that is taught in school assumes that accounts based on empirical investigation are absolutely reliable. As a result, students are often taught that there are only two kinds of acceptable rhetorical proofs, testimony and data. Testimony provides audiences with accounts composed by people who for some reason have special access to relevant facts or arguments. The English word *testimony* derives from a Latin phrase meaning "standing as a third," that is, serving as a witness. Hence testimony is a statement given by a witness about some event or state of affairs.

Data, in contrast, include any facts or statistics that are relevant to the rhetorical situation. This chapter is the only place in this book where the term *fact* is used in its current sense to mean something that has been empirically demonstrated. In this modern sense of the word, facts are grounded in experience.

That is, the validity of a fact can be tested by personal observation, or at least we can imagine how such a test might be done. If someone remarks that the temperature has fallen below freezing, we can test this statement of fact by stepping outdoors; if we desire more accuracy, we can look at a thermometer.

Ancient teachers would have categorized both testimony and data as extrinsic to the art of rhetoric, because they are not invented according to its principles. Rhetors need only to find, select, and assemble the relevant extrinsic proofs.

EXTRINSIC PROOFS IN ANCIENT RHETORICS

Scholars doubt that Aristotle invented the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic proofs, even though most ancient authorities credit it to him. However, it also appears in the roughly contemporaneous *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (vii 1428a), which suggests that Aristotle may have found it in one or several of the treatises he gathered and studied in order to compose the *Rhetoric.*

Quintilian, noting that "the division laid down by Aristotle has met with almost universal approval," translated the Greek terms as "artistic" and "nonartistic" (V i 1). Translators have abandoned these terms, however, since *art* carries connotations of "high" or "creative" art to contemporary ears. In the chapter on *ethos* we called these two kinds of proof "invented" and "situated," since, as Aristotle wrote, intrinsic proofs have to be invented with the aid of rhetoric, while extrinsic proofs are situated within the circumstances of a case or issue, and have only to be used (I 2 1355b). We will use that terminology here, referring to extrinsic proofs as "situated."

Cicero stated that all extrinsic proofs rely chiefly upon the authority granted by the community to those who make them *(Topics TV* 24). In other words, Cicero defined all extrinsic proof as testimony. In keeping with Cicero's remark, we might argue that facts are a kind of testimony, since their accuracy depends upon the care taken by the person who establishes them as facts and upon his reputation in relevant communities, as well.

In any case, ancient authorities listed the following items as extrinsic proofs: laws or precedents, rumors, maxims or proverbs, documents, oaths, and the testimony of witnesses or authorities. Some of these were tied to ancient legal procedures or religious beliefs. If someone had refused to take an oath about a disputed issue, this refusal could be introduced in Athenian courts as evidence, for example, and the sayings of oracles were also cited as extrinsic support for arguments. Ancient teachers considered written documents to be extrinsic proofs because they were composed by someone other than the rhetor—usually a court official.

Ancient teachers knew that extrinsic proofs are not always reliable. For instance, they were quite aware that written documents usually required careful interpretation, and they were skeptical of their accuracy and

authority as well. In Plato's *Phaedrus,* Socrates warned Phaedrus that written documents cannot always be trusted:

> Written words . . . seem to talk to you as though they were intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what they say, from a desire to be instructed, they go on telling you just the same thing forever. And once a thing is put in writing, the composition, whatever it may be, drifts all over the place, getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of those who have no business with it; it doesn't know how to address the right people, and not address the wrong. And when it is ill-treated and unfairly abused it always needs its parent to come to its help, being unable to defend or help itself. (275d).

The problem with written words, according to Plato, is that we don't always know their author: who his family was, what sort of work he did, what his reputation or ideological affiliation were. Because we don't know these things about authors, we cannot simply take their work at face value. Rather, we need to interpret it.

Furthermore, written documents that are central to a culture's definition of itself accrue a sediment of interpretation as time passes. Plato's *Dialogues* **are** themselves central to Western culture. When contemporary readers use very old documents like these, they must interpret them through thousands of years of readings and translations. There is no way to retrieve their original or authoritative meaning, as if, indeed, they ever had one.

A related kind of extrinsic **proof—laws—provides** good examples of the need to interpret written documents. In American jurisprudence, laws are written in general terms; that is, they describe the actions a community should take in case an instance occurs that fits within the general situation they describe. The legal debate over regulation of hate speech hinges on whether uses of offensive speech should be interpreted as speech that is protected by the First Amendment or should be read as "fighting words" or as speech that provokes "imminent lawless action." When it is protected, of course, it cannot be regulated at all. If, however, an expression is interpreted as "fighting words" that "tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," the courts may decide to allow its regulation. It all depends on how the law is read and how any instance of the use of hate speech is interpreted. During the first weeks after the attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon in September of 2001, for example, tensions ran so high in America that speech considered ordinary in other times took on the aspect of "fighting words" for some people.

These considerations suggest that Aristotle's distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic proofs is not absolute. Often, extrinsic proofs cannot simply be inserted into an argument without art or skill. Rhetors must interpret and evaluate the worth of such proofs, especially when they contradict one another. Rhetors must also determine whether such proofs will be persuasive. By and large, the ancients recommended that rhetors follow this procedure in composing an extrinsic proof: state it; comment on its relevance to the issue; comment on its effectiveness; make any arguments that are necessary to support it. This is good advice.

TESTIMONY

Ancient rhetoricians generally distrusted the testimony of ordinary persons, especially those who testified in legal cases. The author of *ad Alexandrum* pointed out that "what is stated in evidence must necessarily be either probable or improbable or of doubtful credit, and similarly the witness must be either trustworthy or untrustworthy or questionable" (14). Rhetors could insert testimony into their discourse without comment, he wrote, only when a trustworthy witness stated a probability. Any combination of an untrustworthy or questionable witness with improbable or doubtful testimony required rhetors to supplement the testimony with an account of its worth. Aristotle developed a rule of disinterestedness for determining which witnesses were reliable: persons who had nothing to gain by testifying were more credible than those who stood to profit by doing so (I xv 16). Quintilian argued that rhetors need to know whether a witness favors or opposes a point of view and whether the witness has held this position for a long time or has only recently adopted it (V vii 13). In short, ancient rhetoricians never took anyone's testimony at face value. Instead, they examined the motives of witnesses in order to determine whether their testimony was reliable.

Since testimony is a report made by someone about some state of affairs, it is valuable to the extent that audiences accept the authority and credibility of the witnesses who provide it. Today, audiences award authority to two sorts of witnesses: persons who are respected in the relevant community and persons who were in a position to observe some disputed state of affairs. We call the first kind **community authorities** and the second **proximate authorities.**

Community Authorities

Community authorities are persons whose words or actions have earned them respect within a given community. Rhetors use the words or examples of such persons to lend credibility to their *ethos* and authenticity to their positions. Aristotle wrote that "witnesses are of two kinds, ancient and recent" (I xv 1375b). In Aristotle's time, ancient witnesses were "the poets and men of repute whose judgements are known to all"—Homer, for example. Recent witnesses were "well-known persons who have given a decision on any point"—for example, Solon, who was a famous lawmaker (1376a).

Modern rhetors still rely upon the testimony of ancient witnesses, just as we have quoted or cited texts by Aristotle, Quintilian, and other ancient rhetoricians throughout this book to validate our interpretation of their theories and practices. It was important that we do so, because some of our interpretations are controversial among scholars and historians of ancient rhetorics. If we can support a doubtful or controversial position with a quotation from Cicero, we demonstrate that at least one ancient rhetorician took a position similar to ours. The quotation also suggests that we have

read ancient rhetorical authorities carefully, which reinforces our *ethos*. Thus, citation of relevant authorities is a means of proof, albeit an extrinsic or situated one.

American rhetors often quote historical figures like Thomas Jefferson or Abraham Lincoln in support of a point of view, since both of these men are important figures in American mythology. The following passage from President Gerald Ford's inauguration speech illustrates the rhetorical usefulness of such authorities:

> Those who nominated and confirmed me as Vice President were my friends and are my friends. They were of both parties, elected by all the people, and acting under the Constitution in their name. It is only fitting then that I should pledge to them, and to you, that I will be the President of all the people. Thomas Jefferson said, "The people are the only sure reliance with the preservation of our liberty." And down the years Abraham Lincoln renewed this American article of faith asking, "Is there any better way for equal hope in the world?"

Ford assumed the presidency under difficult circumstances: his predecessor, Richard Nixon, had resigned under threat of impeachment. Thus it was important for Ford to reassure Americans that their democratic tradition of popular government was still intact. He did this by quoting Jefferson, the architect of American democracy, and Lincoln, whose most famous utterances argue for the importance of government by the people.

Study of a community's choice of authorities often discloses the values held by its members. During a Democratic National Convention, for example, audiences are likely to hear speakers cite or quote Democrats and liberals noted for their courage or political skill, such as John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King Jr., Eleanor Roosevelt, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fannie Lou Hamer, Adlai Stevenson, Harry S. Truman, or Rosa Parks. Hamer was a civil rights activist and a member of an African American delegation to the 1964 Democratic convention that challenged discriminatory rules for delegate seating. Parks refused to give up her seat on a bus, and her example inspired the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56. Martin Luther King Jr. was an activist in the civil rights movement, an advocate of nonviolent resistance who was assassinated in 1968. John F. Kennedy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry S. Truman were Democratic presidents, while Adlai Stevenson was the party's nominee for president and ambassador to the United Nations during the 1950s. Eleanor Roosevelt was an activist and philanthropist; Robert Kennedy, brother of John, was assassinated while running for president on the Democratic ticket in 1968. Democrats revere these people for their dedication to party ideals, particularly the furthering of civil rights. Interestingly, both Republicans and Democrats quote or cite Abraham Lincoln; indeed the Republican party styles itself "the party of Lincoln." Lincoln was a Republican, of course, and since he signed the Emancipation Proclamation, which purportedly "freed the slaves," he can be invoked by Republicans to signify their commitment to civil rights. Lincoln's cultural authority is so great, however, that he can be cited by Democrats as well in support of a

strong position on civil rights. (This is all quite ironic because historians doubt Lincoln's commitment to emancipation).

As Lincoln's case demonstrates, it is important that cultural authorities be invoked in support of a position only if they enjoy good reputations in the relevant community. Since reputations represent a community's evaluation of someone's behavior, they do not always accurately represent that person's actual behavior. Some recent Democratic presidents, such as Lyndon Barnes Johnson, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton, are not so often cited by contemporary Democrats as authorities, even though all were active in furthering civil rights legislation during their terms in office. Carter's stock as an authority has recently risen because he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002; it will be interesting to see if Democrats begin to include him in their citations because of this. And while many Democrats admire Johnson for his legislative skills, his reputation as a politician is tainted by his role in bringing on the Vietnam war. Clinton, of course, was thought to have engaged in scandalous behavior in the White House, and it is doubtful that his reputation will recover in the near future despite his considerable talents as a statesman and politician.

A slightly different use of community authority appears in scholarly writing, including student writing, which relies heavily on the authoritative testimony of professionals or experts. In this case, the relevant community is a profession or discipline, such as physics or medicine or psychology or philosophy. Within communities of this kind, witnesses are ordinarily expected to hold the scholarly and/or research credentials authorized by the community: an M.D. for medical doctors, a D.V.M. for veterinarians, a Ph.D. for some scientists and for all scholars in the social sciences and humanities. Scholarly witnesses also accrue authority from the quality and extent of their research **and**/or publication, while their receipt of awards and prizes, such as a Nobel or a Pulitzer, increases their **authority**.

Rhetors who compose discourse to be used in professional or disciplinary communities are expected to cite persons who are defined as authorities within those communities. Such citations can easily be inserted into any discourse:

> Jane Doe, author of several books and many articles and winner of the coveted Status Prize for Weighty Authorities, agrees with my position.

Since we write chiefly for scholarly communities (students and colleagues), we try to cite an authority whenever we make a point that might be misunderstood or contested by an audience. We also try to comment immediately on every quotation we use. Commentary can include an interpretation of the quotation, or can show how the quotation is relevant to the argument in progress, or can do both.

The scholarly habit of invoking authorities often frustrates beginning students who have not yet studied a discipline thoroughly enough to recognize the names of its authorities or to know their work. Here, for example, is the opening of a scholarly article about rhetorical criticism:

> Arguably the most politically consequential philosophy over the last hundred years has been a slowly developing critical identity philosophy of language in use. Thinkers as diverse as Charles Sanders Peirce, Ferdinand de Saussure, Friedrich Nietzsche, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Kenneth Burke, Michel Foucault, Hans Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida, Chantal Mouffe and Judith Butler have analyzed and critiqued the discursive processes through which human subjectivity is constructed, maintained, and transformed, and in so doing have consistently pointed to a convergence between identity philosophy and "critical" rhetoric. (Bruner 281)

Here the author cites a dizzying list of theorists in order to situate his argument within a particular scholarly community. Scholars who work in this field can derive clues about the community of thinkers that interests the author and hence about the ways in which he situates his own work. Pierce was a semiotician and Saussure was a linguist, while Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Foucault, Derrida, and Butler are philosophers. Burke was a rhetorical theorist and Gadamer a hermeneuticist; Mouffe is a political theorist. Anyone not schooled in rhetorical or philosophical scholarship, however, will no doubt be lost in the sea of names. Our explanatory sentences are no doubt equally off-putting because readers may still feel excluded from the community of scholars who read the work of the people mentioned here.

Another scholarly habit of citing authorities sometimes irritates those who are not initiates: using a person's name as shorthand for an ideology or a body of intellectual work. Within a given scholarly community, some thinkers are awarded such high status that they are no longer quoted but only named. Aristotle and Isocrates enjoy this status among historians of rhetoric, and the same is true of Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx in sociology or Claude Levi-Strauss and Margaret Meade in anthropology.

Evaluating Community Authorities

Since most scholarly and intellectual work relies heavily on the testimony of authorities, rhetors ought to know whether the authorities they cite or quote possess whatever credentials are required for entry to a discipline. A scholar's credentials often appear on book jackets or at the end of books, and scholarly articles ordinarily list authors' credentials and accomplishments as well. If there is any doubt about the extent of a scholar's research, an author search in library holdings will show how often and where she has published. References to someone's work by other scholars in the same field also suggest that she is considered an authority.

Rhetors must also be concerned about an authority's accuracy. Authorities may produce inaccurate work for at least two reasons: either they were ignorant of some relevant information, or their ideological bias compromised their accuracy. The accuracy of a scholarly or intellectual authority is sometimes difficult to ascertain, especially for students who are new to a field of study. One way to check the accuracy of a source is to read reviews about it. Reviewers usually indicate whether an authority is trust-

worthy, and they may indicate as well whether his work is controversial. Another way to insure that authorities represent a reasonably accurate state of affairs in their work is to compare it with that of other scholars who discuss the same issues. Another is to use more recent accounts that correct errors in older works.

Students are sometimes surprised to **learn** that scholars disagree with one another. But they do. For example, historians of rhetoric argue over whether it is appropriate or accurate to group historical figures like Protagoras, Gorgias, and Isocrates together into a coherent rhetorical school called "the Sophists." Sometimes these arguments become quite heated. Arguments like these are important because their outcomes are ideological. In the case of the Sophists, if scholars can prove that their work was consecutive and widely recognized as such during the fifth century BCE, they have grounds for modifying Plato's negative comments about rhetoric, comments that have lent a negative coloring to rhetoric throughout the history of Western philosophy.

Some scholars believe that accuracy is insured if authorities are objective. Supposedly, authorities are objective if they have detached themselves emotionally or ideologically from issues and when they write or speak without bias or prejudice. We are skeptical about the ideal of objectivity, however. People ordinarily choose a field of study because **they** are interested in the issues raised within it. If people are interested in something, they have already foreclosed the possibility of their being objective about it. And since scholars also subscribe to ideologies, just like everybody else, their ability to approach any issue without bias is open to question. Given the role played by ideology in all thought, even in scholarly and intellectual rhetoric, *objectivity* is sometimes another name for orthodoxy ("straight thinking")— support of the intellectual status quo. That is, the so-called objective scholarly authority is **thought** to be so because she does not depart radically from the tenets held by her scholarly or intellectual community.

Like ancient rhetoricians who examined the motives of witnesses, then, modern rhetors ought also to inspect the motives and ideologies of even the most respected authorities if they plan to use them as extrinsic proofs. Some authors acknowledge their motives and prejudices in a forward or a preface. James Carville, an adviser to presidents, makes his motives quite clear in the preface to his book *We're Right, They're Wrong.*

> The first person ever to slap me on the ass was a federal employee. He was the army doctor at Fort **Benning,** Georgia, who brought me into this world. My daddy was serving there at Fort Benning as an infantry officer, so he and my momma were able to start me off with some fine federal health care.
>
>   You'd have to say that the federal government made a big impression on me early in life. I grew up in a town in southern Louisiana by the name of Carville, and that's no coincidence; the town got that name because my family provided the town with its most indispensable federal **employee—its** postmaster. Three generations of **Carvilles** served as postmaster, starting with my **great-grand-** mother Octavia Duhon. Believe it or not, working for the federal government was a source of family pride.

You see, the federal government was not considered a bad thing when I was growing up. First of all, it kept my feet dry. Before I was born, the Mississippi River used to overflow its banks every spring and flood the whole town of Carville and many other towns like it. It was a Washington bureaucrat who got the idea that we could build a levee system to stop the flooding, and the federal taxpayers helped us do it. It was the heavy hand of government at work.

In my hometown, the federal government also cared for a group of people no one else was willing to care for—folks from all over the country who came down with Hansen's disease, a condition more commonly known as leprosy. Carville was world famous as the home to the Gillis W. Long Hansen's Disease Center, where doctors developed the multidrug treatment that now allows people with Hansen's to lead a near-normal life. Only the federal government had the resources and inclination to do that.

Washington bureaucrats also came up with the idea that black children should be able to go to school with white children. Integration was *the* searing issue when I was a kid. After the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954, people in Carville, which was 85 percent black, stopped talking about football and the weather. All they wanted to do was scream about race. Like most whites, I took segregation for granted and wished the blacks just didn't push so damn hard to change it.

But when I was sixteen years old I read *To Kill a Mockingbird,* and that novel changed everything. I got it from the lady who drove around in the overheated old bookmobile in my parish—another government program, I might add. I had asked the lady for something on football, but she handed me *To Kill a Mockingbird* instead. I couldn't put it down. I stuck it inside another book and read it under my desk during school. When I got to the last page, I closed it and said, "They're right and we're wrong." The issue was literally black and white, and we were absolutely, positively on the wrong side. I've never forgotten which side the federal government was on.

Federal and state governments helped me get an education and a start in life. They offered me all kinds of loans and the G.I. Bill so I could earn myself undergraduate and law degrees at Louisiana State University. They picked up my salary when I served as a corporal in the United States Marine Corps and again when I taught eighth-grade science at a tiny little public school for boys in South Vacherie, Louisiana.

Government did right by me. I'm the first one to admit that fact. No, let's back up for a minute. I don't just admit that fact—savor it. I hold it up as an example of what government should be in the business of doing: providing opportunity. You will never catch me saying that I am a self-made man I am not. My parents gave me their love, their example, and the benefit of their hard work. And the government gave me a big hand. (xiii-xv)

Here Carville is up-front about his reverence for the federal government and its history of helpful intervention in the lives of citizens, thus betraying his commitment to liberalism. Students can look for passages like these in order to evaluate the bias of an authority. Students should also get into the habit of reading the acknowledgments pages at the beginning of books, where writers cite the people to whose work they are indebted. A list of acknowledgments often tells a discerning reader who the author studied

with, who is colleagues are, and whose scholarship he uses, admires, or disagrees with. Students can also determine a writer's ideological standpoint by looking for lists of the foundations or institutions that funded her work. These are usually listed in the acknowledgments or on the title page. Liberal or socialist foundations include Common Cause, the Brookings Institution, the Institute for Policy Studies, and the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions; conservative or neoconservative foundations include the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Olin Foundation, the Scaife Foundation, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Publishing houses and magazines also have ideological biases. Sometimes they make these explicit, sometimes not. Among English-language publishing houses, Pantheon, South End Press, Beacon Books, International Publishers, Routledge, and Methuen are liberal or socialist, while Freedom House, Reader's Digest Books, Paragon House, and Arlington House are conservative or neoconservative. A book published by any of these houses is likely to reflect its ideological orientation.

People whose politics lean to the right of ours have objected to our assessments of the ideological leanings of these media. Our perspective is no doubt colored by our politics, because we also reject the current commonplace about "the liberal media." From where we stand, in America at present most mass-circulation media are centrist or just right of center; this is true of *Newsweek* and the major television networks, for example. Some cable channels, such as *Fox,* are extremely conservative. Indeed, this network was booted out of Iraq by Saddam Hussein because of its corrosive and repeated criticism of his government. The *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* are centrist but left leaning, while *Time* is further to the right, as are *US News and World Report,* the *Wall Street Journal,* and *Reader's Digest.* Some magazines are explicit about their ideological affiliation: *The Nation, Mother Jones,* and the *Village Voice ave* solidly leftist, while *Commentary,* the *National Review,* and the *New American* are solidly ensconced on the right. Students can sometimes determine the ideology of an authority by looking for her use of the commonplaces associated with certain ideologies (see the chapter on commonplaces).

Proximate Authorities

Contemporary rhetoric includes a kind of testimony that was absent from ancient considerations: statements by persons who were physically present at an event. The authority of proximate witnesses derives not from their wisdom or their professional expertise but from the modern presumption that evidence provided by the senses is reliable and credible. A rhetor who wishes to establish the existence of hate speech on a campus, for example, can cite the testimony of a roommate, friend, or professor who claims to have witnessed its use.

Evaluating the worth of this sort of testimony is difficult. Rhetors can ask whether a witness to an incident of hate speech, for example, was in a

position to observe the incident carefully: perhaps it was snowing or raining, preventing him from seeing or hearing clearly; perhaps he was hurrying to class, distracted with worry about an exam. They can investigate his freedom to report: perhaps some powerful campus group has urged him to come forward, when he would rather not become involved. They can compare his testimony to that offered by other witnesses. They can examine his motives: perhaps for some reason he wishes to exaggerate the incidence of hate speech on campus.

In the passage that follows, cultural critic Barbara Ehrenreich talks about her attempt to live on minimum-wage salaries:

WHO SHOULD FEED AMERICA'S HUNGRY?

Between 1998 and 2000, I went to three different cities, and tried to support myself on the wages I could earn as an entry-level worker. I waited tables, I cleaned the toilets of the rich, I fed Alzheimers patients in a nursing home, I sorted stock at Wal-Mart. All these were difficult, exhausting jobs, and it made me understand what a serious mistake our nation made with welfare reform.

The theory behind welfare reform was that there was something really wrong with welfare: They were psychologically **damaged—lazy,** demoralized**—and** they are that way because of welfare, that welfare causes poverty, some people said.

Never mind that most people on welfare, of course, were busy raising children and working on and off whenever they could; the new law just says everybody has to get off of welfare and into the workforce, to sink or swim. This hasn't worked out too well.

The math just doesn't work. The average woman coming off of welfare since 1996 earns $7/hour, that's **$280/week** before taxes, and you can't support children on that, or even one person.

I know because I tried it. And no matter how carefully I pinched pennies I couldn't get my wages to cover basic expenses. Like rent, at least $500/month plus utilities; like transportation to and from work, at least $60/month; and then if you are a working parent, you have hundreds of dollars a month in childcare expenses. Now if there's one thing that's really demoralizing, it's working hard and not making enough to live on.

Here's a simple theory of poverty: It's not a psychological condition. It is, above all, a consequence of shamefully low wages and lack of opportunity for anything else. In one poll, 94% of Americans said that they believe, if you work, you should make enough to live on. This is a notion that is basic to American values, I'd even say it's part of our social contract. Now we have to make it a reality. (http://www.pbs.org/now/commentary/ehrenreich.html)

Because she undertook this experience, Ehrenreich now presents herself as an authority on poverty. She has been criticized for doing this. Do you agree that her experience as a minimum-wage worker is sufficient to qualify her as a proximate authority on poverty in America?

The worth of testimony offered by proximate witnesses must pass several tests. First, a witness must be in a position to observe the events in question. Second, conditions must be such that a witness can adequately

perceive an event. Third, the witness's state of mind at the time must be conducive to her accurate observation and reporting. If this is not the case, her testimony must be modified accordingly. Fourth, in keeping with modern faith in empirical evidence, testimony offered by a proximate witness is more valuable than evidence offered by someone who was not present. If the proximate witness gave his testimony to someone else (a policeman or reporter, for example), tests one through three must be applied to any testimony offered by the second person, as well.

People who claim to have been abducted by extraterrestrial beings often give compelling accounts of their experiences. Given that people who claim to have had these experiences are the only conceivable proximate authorities available, is there any way to verify these accounts?

DATA

Sometimes statements of fact are reliable and sometimes they are not. Rhetors who use them should be sure that facts come from a reputable and qualified source. They should also be sure that the facts were arrived at by means of some standard empirical procedure, such as random sampling. They should insure as well that any facts they use are current. They should provide all of this information—sources, method, date—to their audiences, especially if the issue they are arguing is controversial. Polling agencies qualify the results of their polls by telling audiences how the results were obtained ("We made 400 telephone calls to registered voters living in the New York City area between January 16 and 17, 2003"; "The poll is accurate to within plus or minus 3 percentage points").

In recent years it has become fashionable to determine the quality of a film by the level of its box office receipts. Here is a list from the Internet Movie Database (IMDB.com) of the ten top-grossing American movies, along with the amounts of money (rounded up) they made in the United States as of March 4, 2003:

1. *Titanic* (1997) $601 million
2. *Star Wars* (1977) $461 million
3. *E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial* (1982) $435 million
4. *Star Wars: Episode 1* (1999) $431 million
5. *Spider-Man* (2002) $404 million
6. *Jurassic Park* (1993) $357 million
7. *Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers* (2002) $330 million
8. *Forrest Gump* (1994) $329 million
9. *The Lion King* (1994) $326 million
10. *Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone* (2002) $318 million

The amounts of money made by the movies named here are statements of fact. But such facts are often used to support an inference that is not always

warranted: movies that make lots of money must be very good. By this reckoning *Titanic* is nearly twice as good as *Harry Potter.*

Other interpretations of these facts are possible, however. First of all, it seems that movies aimed at families do very well at the box office: two of these films were made primarily for children *(The Lion King* and *Harry Potter)* and the others had ratings that admitted all but very young children. Second, with the exception of *Forrest Gump,* all are adventure movies with lots of special effects. That is, they rely for their impact on what Aristotle called "spectacle" rather than on more traditional indicators of film quality, such as plot structure, character development, acting, direction, or cinematography. Last, with the exception of *Star Wars,* all of these films are fairly recent—which suggests that more people now go to movies than formerly and that movie tickets are more expensive than they used to be. (Both of these assertions are statements of fact.) In other words, the box-office success of a film may have to do with things other than its quality.

This impression is born out by lists of the best movies of all times. Here is a list of the ten best movies ever made, in the opinion of users of IMDB.com and current as of March 4, 2003:

1. *The Godfather* (1972)
2. *The Shawshank Redemption* (1994)
3. *The Godfather II* (1994)
4. *Schindler's List* (1993)
5. *Lord of the Rings: Fellowship of the Ring* (2001)
6. *Casablanca* (1942)
7. *Citizen Kane* (1941)
8. *Shichimin no Samurai* (1954)
9. *Star Wars* (1977)
10. *Memento* (2000)

The users of IMDB.com are no doubt fans of film since they frequent this Web site. The films they list as the best movies ever depend for their impact on plot and character development as well as skilled direction, acting, and cinematography, rather than on special effects and spectacle. A few are older, smaller movies filmed in black and white. Interestingly, only one top-grossing film appears on this list: *Star Wars* (1977).

Professional experts agree only in part with users of IMDB. Here is the list of ten best-ever films compiled by the American Film Institute, which claims that the list was put together by "a blue-ribbon panel of leaders from across the film community" (www.afi.com):

1. *Citizen Kane* (1941)
2. *Casablanca* (1942)

3. *The Godfather* (1972)

4. *Gone With the Wind* **(1939)**

5. *Lawrence of Arabia* (1962)

6. *The Wizard of Oz* (1939)

7. *The Graduate (1967)*

8. *On the Waterfront* (1954)

9. *Schindler's List* (1993)

10. *Singin'* in *the Rain* (1952)

Clearly, the "leaders" in film who put this list together were unimpressed by box-office earnings. None of the films they list was a top-grossing film, and only three of the films they chose appear in a list of 250 top-grossing films in the United States *(Gone With the Wind, The Godfather,* and *The Graduate).* These experts agree with the users of IMDB in only four cases, and their list of best films extends further back in time than does the users' list. Apparently professional filmmakers employ standards of excellence that are quite different from those of amateur film buffs and quite different still from those of ordinary film-goers. In short, while box-office receipts certainly reflect a film's popularity, they may or may not reflect its quality. Like all statements of fact, then, box-office receipts make sense only when they are contextualized within some network of interpretation.

Evaluating Data

Rhetors should never accept facts at face value. All data—and this includes statistics—have been discovered and assembled by someone. Rhetors who use data as proof should always ascertain who discovered the data and who vouches for their accuracy. Most important, rhetors should examine the networks of interpretation through which data are filtered. Networks of interpretation give meaning to facts; without such networks, facts are pretty much unintelligible and uninteresting as well.

This caution applies to printed materials as well as to information that circulates on the Internet. The speed with which information can be disseminated electronically makes it doubly important that owners of Web sites take great care to cite the sources of their information. The Web sites maintained by well-known newspapers such as the *New York Times* or the *Los Angeles Times* always cite their sources (usually the Associated Press [AP] or some other reputable news organization). But Web sites owned by private citizens do not always cite the sources of information contained there. Because of this a cautious rhetor will follow any links to other sites that are provided in order to determine the source of the information and its trustworthiness. If a Web site posts information that is neither cited nor linked, rhetors who want to use it should inform their listeners and read-

ers of their uncertainty about its validity. It is also important to remember
that many owners of Web sites have ideological axes to grind. Often such
Web sites will clearly state their owner's beliefs or political leanings, but
many others do not. The cautious rhetor will always try to establish the
validity of any data cited from the Internet. The fact that data are in print
does not make them reliable.

SOME EXAMPLES

In *Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus* (1992), **Dinesh**
D'Souza tells the following story:

> On February 9, 1988, Stephen Thernstrom, Winthrop Professor of history at
> Harvard University, opened the campus newspaper to read the headline,
> "Students Criticize Class as Racially Insensitive." Thernstrom discovered
> that the class in question was "The Peopling of America," a course on the his-
> tory of ethnic groups that he jointly taught with another eminent Harvard
> scholar, Bernard Bailyn. Three of his black students had charged him with
> "racial insensitivity." Wendi Grantham, a junior and chair of the Black
> Students Association political action committee, alleged that Thernstrom
> "said Jim Crow laws were beneficial," and that he "read aloud from white
> plantation owners' journals" that painted a "benevolent" picture of slavery.
> The students took their complaints to Harvard's Committee on Race
> Relations, and administrative committee set up by President Derek Bok to
> arbitrate such matters....
>
> "I was absolutely stunned when I read this," Thernstrom recalled. "None of
> the students had come to me with their complaints. And the comments they
> attributed to me were a ridiculous distortion of what I said in class. I simply
> did not know what to make of it."...
>
> Stung by what he viewed as a meretricious and baseless attack, Thernstrom
> wrote a letter to the *Harvard Crimson* observing that, both in class and during
> office hours, he was "open to any student who wants to speak to me." By
> attempting to adjudicate their grievances through administrative committees
> and in the media, Thernstrom warned, students were engaging in a
> "McCarthyism of the left" which could exert a "chilling effect" both on acade-
> mic freedom and on freedom of expression....
>
> On February 18, 1988, a few days after the Thernstrom incident, Dean of
> the College Fred Jewett issued an open letter to the Harvard community.
> Without mentioning Thernstrom, Jewett said that "recent events" compelled
> him to "speak out loudly and forcefully against all kinds of prejudice, harass-
> ment and discrimination." The most common incidents, Jewett said, "occur
> in comments or actions where the students or faculty members involved may
> be partly or wholly unaware of the import of their words." Jewett added,
> "While such incidents may not require formal college discipline, they should
> elicit from appropriate college officials and from the community warnings

and clear messages about the inappropriateness and insensitivity of such behavior. Every member of this community must be alert to this most insidious kind of intolerance and be ready to state publicly that it can have no place at Harvard."

In short, far from coming to his defense, Jewett appeared to give full administrative sanction to the charges against Thernstorm.. ..

It was not until a month later, on March 9, 1988, that Dean of the Faculty Michael Spence clarified that Thernstrom's academic freedom would be protected; no disciplinary action would be taken against him. Spence did, however, praise the course of action of Thernstrom's accusers as "judicious and fair," because-they had followed university grievance procedures. A couple of weeks later, Harvard president Bok said Thernstrom had a right to teach as he wished, but professors should be aware of "possible insensitivity" in lecturing. Bok wished the whole matter hadn't got so much press, because "public controversy often leads to rigid positions."

Thernstrom read these statements as equivocal at best: according to Harvard, he had the right to be racist, if he wished; but by defending himself publicly, he was being unreasonable and inflexible; he should try to be more "sensitive" in the future. Meanwhile, the integrity of his critics and their charges remained unquestioned. As for Stephan Thernstrom, he had decided, for the foreseeable future, not to offer the course. "It just isn't worth it," he said. "Professors who teach race issues encounter such a culture of hostility, among some students, that some of these questions are simply not teachable any more, at least not in an honest, critical way." (194-197)

This account is filled with extrinsic proofs. There are names and dates; its author read associated documents and quoted them; he interviewed Professor Thernstrom and quoted him.

Here is a description of D'Souza's account of this incident, written by Jon Weiner:

In fact, almost every element of the story D'Souza tells is erroneous. "I talked with one of the students who had complained about Thernstrom," says Orlando Patterson, professor of sociology at Harvard. "She was genuinely upset about one of his lectures. This was not an ideological reaction, it was a personal and emotional one. She said she did not want to make it a political issue, and had deliberately rejected attempts by more political students to make it into a cause. She was trembling with rage at the *Crimson* for making this public. She said that when Thernstrom was lecturing on black family, she understood him to be asking why black men treat their women so badly. I assumed that he had offered a straightforward statement of sociological fact. I told her it's increasingly problematic to have an objective discussion of the black family. We talked for a long time, and in the end she came around to seeing what I was trying to say. I told her I was sure Steve wasn't racist, and suggested she go talk to him about how she felt. She did. They had a long talk, shook hands and that was the end of it. But the *Crimson* had made it into a political issue."

Paula Ford is one of the students who complained about Thernstrom; today she is enrolled at Harvard Law School. D'Souza never interviewed her, she says. Although he reported that the students never complained directly to Thernstrom, she says she and several of her friends talked to Thernstrom after class "a couple of times"—especially after his lecture on the black family....

Regarding Thernstrom's decision not to teach the course again, Ford said she was "surprised" and "not happy" to hear it. "That was not our goal. Our goal was to point out areas in his lectures that we thought were inaccurate and possibly could be changed. To me, it's a big overreaction for him to decide not to teach the course again because of that."

Wendi Graham is quoted by D'Souza as one of the students who complained about Thernstrom. She graduated in 1989; today she is studying drama in New York City. D'Souza never interviewed her, she says. "If he had, I would have made it clear to him that I was not one of the students who filed the complaint. I didn't even know they were filing a complaint. A reporter for the *Crimson* led me to believe this complaint was public, which turned out not to be true. All I said was that I could see that their complaint might have some basis...."

Jewett today remains Dean of the College of Harvard. D'Souza never interviewed him, Jewett says: "My statement had nothing to do with Thernstrom. As I recall, it was distributed in registration envelopes at beginning of term, a couple of weeks before anything about Thernstrom became news. It was titled 'Open Letter on Racial Harassment.' There had been some incidents on campus of swastika paintings, and a few incidents involving the police that had created some concerns. So we felt we needed a strong general statement on harassment. Obviously the Thernstrom case was not in that category. When students disagree with the ideas presented by a professor, they are not dealing with harassment, they are dealing with academic freedom. That's not something that the university should interfere with."

The other administrator criticized in the book and the reviews, Spence, is today graduate dean of the business school at Stanford. Woodward repeats D'Souza's claim that Spence "praised [Thernstrom's] accusers as 'judicious and fair."' Woodward left out the crucial part of the dean's statement, as did D'Souza: the dean said that the students who complained "have avoided public comment. . . . That course of action seems to me judicious and fair." It was not the criticism of Thernstrom that was "judicious and fair" but rather the students' decision not to go public with their criticism that the dean praised.

According to D'Souza, in the same statement the dean declared that "no disciplinary action would be taken" against Thernstrom. In fact, the issue of disciplinary action against Thernstrom was not mentioned in the dean's statement; on the contrary, the dean declared that "[in] disputes over classroom material . . . instructors exercise full discretion over the content of lectures and the conduct of classroom discussion," and "in the classroom, our students are entitled to question views with which they disagree," and finally, "the University cannot prevent all of the conflicts that a commitment to free inquiry

may provoke." Thernstrom found this statement to be "equivocal at best," D'Souza reports, interpreting it to mean that "he had the right to be racist, if he wished." . ..

As for the three students who took their complaint to the university's Advisory Committee on Race Relations, they were advised that the committee had no jurisdiction over professors' teaching, and that they should take their complaint to **Thernstrom—which** they did. ("What Happened at Harvard," *The Nation,* 30 September 1991)

This writer has also quoted people and looked at documents. A comparison of these two accounts of the same incidents suggests that extrinsic proofs are entirely at the service of whoever wishes to exploit them.

EXERCISES

1. Listen to the propositions you hear advanced by friends and family or commentators in the media. How often are these propositions supported by testimony or data? From this investigation, can you determine whether testimony and data are considered necessary in popular rhetoric? If they are not, should they be? Reread something you have recently written. Did you use testimony and data? Were any available? Would their use have strengthened your argument?

2. In modern rhetoric, evidence of the **senses—taste,** touch, hearing, sight, **smell—is** sometimes regarded as indisputable. Can you think of instances in which such evidence might be unreliable? List some of these. Do you think the evidence of the **senses—empirical** evidence—is convincing, or do you accept the ancients' skepticism about such evidence? Find some arguments in which data or testimony is used and test its reliability using the criteria discussed in this chapter.

3. In modern rhetoric, the argument from experience also carries a good deal of rhetorical weight. People can stop arguments by saying something like this: **"Well,** I'm a Catholic and so I ought to know the Catholic position on abortion." The argument from experience assumes that persons who have lived through a series of experiences are authorities on any issues that are relevant to those experiences. What weight do you attach to such arguments? How can they be refuted?

4. Read the arguments you are working on. If any use testimony or data, determine how reliable this evidence is. Use the tests we recommend in this chapter to determine the reliability of these situated proofs.

WORKS CITED

Bruner, M. Lane. "Rhetorical Criticism as Limit Work." *Western Journal of Communication.* 66:3 (summer 2002): 281-299.

Carville, James. *We're Right They're Wrong: A Handbook for Spirited Progressives.* New York: Random House, 1996.

THE SOPHISTIC TOPICS: DEFINE, DIVIDE, AND CONQUER

The creators of the art [the discovery of arguments] were . . .the orators, though we owe a debt of gratitude also to those who have given us a short cut to knowledge. For thanks to them the arguments discovered by the genius of earlier orators have not got to be hunted out and noted down in detail. But this does not suffice to make an orator any more than it suffices to learn the art of gymnastic in school: the body must be assisted by continual practice, self-control, diet and above all by nature; on the other hand none of these are sufficient in themselves without the aid of art.

—Quintilian, *Institutes* V x 121-22

ARISTOTLE'S COMPLEX DISCUSSION of the topics in his *Topics* was intended for use in philosophical or logical disputations and thus is closely tied to his theories of dialectical and scientific demonstration. Nevertheless, some of the topics listed in that treatise found their way into Hellenistic and Roman rhetoric. During its wanderings among various teachers of logic and rhetoric between the fourth and first centuries BCE, this topical system became detached from Aristotle's logic and took on a life of its own in rhetorical lore. In this truncated form it remained popular for many, many centuries. We call the topics derived from this pedagogical tradition "sophistic" in order to distinguish them from Aristotle's more theoretical topical systems and to indicate as well that these topics were probably put together by wandering teachers of rhetoric whose names have long been lost to history. When used with a lower-case s, the term *sophist* simply means "teacher of rhetoric"; these itinerant teachers-for-hire should not be confused with the more theoretical Older Sophists, such as Gorgias and Protagoras.

The sophistic topics differ from Aristotle's common and special topics because they are structural or formal. That is, while these topics do help with

invention, they depend on certain regular patterns or arrangements of material. Hence they can be considered under the head of the second canon, arrangement, as well, and we have so considered them in this book.

The clearest statement of this topical system is found in Cicero's *Topics,* although Quintilian discusses it at some length in book V, chapter 10, of the *Institutes.* Just as Aristotle had done with proofs in general, Cicero divided sophistic topics into two kinds: intrinsic and extrinsic. For Cicero, extrinsic topics, which he called "arguments from external circumstances," are "removed and widely separated from the subject" and "depend principally on authority" (ii 8; iv 24). He gave the following example: "Since Publius Scaevola has said that the *ambitus* of a house is only that space which is covered by a roof put up to protect a party wall, from which roof the water flows into the home of the man who has put up the roof, this seems to be the meaning of *ambitus"* (iv 24). Presumably Publius Scaevola was an authority on architecture or carpentry. At any rate, Cicero assumes that an audience will accept him as such. Since these are the only references to extrinsic topics in the *Topica,* we can safely assume that they did not interest Cicero very much (see our treatment of arguments from authority and other extrinsic proofs in Chapter 8).

Cicero was very much interested, however, in the intrinsic sophistic topics. He defined these as "inherent in the very nature of the subject which is under discussion" (ii 8). He named four kinds of intrinsic topics: arguments derived from the whole (generalization or classification), from consideration of its parts (division), from its meaning (definition), and from things closely connected with the subject being investigated (similarity/difference, cause/effect, antecedents/consequents, and the like). He treats many sophistic topics in some detail, and some of his topics resemble those listed in Aristotle's *Topics* and *Rhetoric:* conjugation, genus/species, similarity/difference, contraries, adjuncts, antecedents/consequents, contradictions, cause/effect, and comparison with events of greater, less, or equal importance.

The sophistic topics were effective in ancient rhetoric because ancient thinkers regularly relied on two formal or structural patterns to describe their thinking processes: **whole/part relations** and **general/specific relations.** In whole/part reasoning, whatever is under investigation is treated as a self-sufficient whole that can be divided up into parts. Here is an example of such thinking drawn from an ancient tradition of rhetorical exercises called declamation:

THE POOR MAN'S BEES

The law allows an action for injuries suffered wrongfully. A poor man and a rich man were neighbors in the country; their gardens joined. The rich man had flowers in his garden; the poor man, bees. The rich man complained that his flowers were injured by the poor man's bees. He demanded that the bees be removed. When the poor man failed to remove them, the rich man sprinkled poison on his flowers. The poor man's bees all died of the poison. He brings action against the rich man for injuries suffered wrongfully.

In this little tale the whole under consideration is "injuries suffered wrongfully." The parts are "damaged flowers" and "dead bees." A rhetor using this formal pattern can examine the relations of the parts to each other (do the flowers and the bees bear a causal relation to one another? Are they similar? Different?), as well as the relations held by any of the parts to the whole (Are the flowers examples of "injuries suffered wrongfully"? What about the bees?). The parts bear no necessary relation to one another: until the bees began to pollinate the flowers, they had no necessary relation to each other or to the whole. The questions at issue in this tale are, What, exactly, is the relation of flowers and bees to each other, and What is the relation of each to the whole?

In **general**/specific reasoning, in contrast, whatever is under investigation is treated as a class (Latin *genus);* a class is a number of particulars (Latin *species)* grouped together because the particulars bear some likeness to each other. In the chapter on rhetorical reasoning, we gave the example of "immortal beings" as a class, under which head can be included angels, vampires, and ghosts. **General/specific** reasoning differs from whole/part reasoning because, in the former, items within a class are treated as instances or examples of the class; that is, they have a necessary relation to the class. In whole/part reasoning, the parts bear no necessary relation to the whole, or they may bear other sorts of relations to the whole, such as cause and effect or similarity and difference and so on.

The rhetorical effectiveness of whole/part and general/specific reasoning depends upon the creativity and appropriateness with which rhetors distinguish wholes or classes and name their constituent parts. Wholes or classes are constructed rather than given by nature, as is well known by zoologists and botanists who try to classify new species into existing genera. But the rhetorical forcefulness of whole/part or **general/specific** reasoning can lie precisely in the construction of interesting classes or wholes. In 2001, for instance, President George W. Bush classified North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as an "axis of evil." The advantages of this class for President Bush's rhetoricians is that its distasteful title can prejudice American opinion toward those countries. The word *evil* is generally the province of religion and theology and is not often used in politics. The word *axis* may remind older citizens of the fascist and Nazi "Axis Powers" against whom Americans fought in World War II. Furthermore, its list of particulars lumps together three very different countries and cultures, implying that they are alike in one important respect: their supposedly hostile intentions toward the United States.

The inclusion of particulars within a whole or class is also constructed, rather than given by nature, and this construction too can be a source of rhetorical force. For example, arguments are currently being waged about whether former president Bill Clinton should be classified as a liberal or a conservative. To class Clinton as a liberal, on one hand, serves the purposes of conservative rhetors given the former president's currently unsavory reputation. To class him as a conservative, on the other hand, serves the

purposes of left-liberals who wish to distinguish and distance their politics from his.

Perhaps the formal or structural quality of the sophistic topics accounts for their survival in modern composition textbooks, where they are ordinarily treated as means of arranging discourse. You may remember composing papers or speeches of comparison and contrast or cause and effect sometime during your education. But Cicero and Quintilian treated the sophistic topics as means of invention, and in what follows we try to show how a few of them can help rhetors to find available means of persuasion.

DEFINITION

Students are sometimes surprised when they read in Cicero that rhetors can compose their own definitions. They are surprised because they have been taught that dictionaries are the final authorities about what words mean. The authority of dictionaries is a good thing, of course. But their users should remember that dictionary definitions are written by somebody and that they change all the time as people change the ways in which they use words. Dictionary makers do not get their definitions from some Higher Authority. All they do is look at how words are used in contemporary spoken or written discourse; then they try to generalize about these uses and compose a list of definitions for each word that describes its most common uses.

Sometimes a rhetor can persuade an audience to accept her argument if she carefully defines a crucial term. In the case of the astronomer who wants her city to pass a dark-sky ordinance, for example, a careful definition of the term *dark sky* might turn up the fact that the level of light pollution required for accurate astronomical observation is entirely compatible with the level of **light** necessary to protect citizens. If she can compose a definition of light pollution that exceeds both these limits and if the police accept the astronomer's definition, the argument is over (unless, of course, some other issue is raised by other interested parties, such as billboard companies).

Definition by Species/Genus

Cicero described the process of defining a term as follows: "When you have taken all the qualities which the thing you wish to define has in common with other things, you should pursue the analysis until you produce its own distinctive quality which can be transferred to no other thing" *(Topics* v 28). His example of the process was this: an inheritance can be defined as a member of the class "property." But this does not distinguish inheritances from other kinds or species of property. So Cicero added the difference "which comes to some one at the death of another" (vi 29). But, he noted, the property of dead persons can be held without its having been inherited;

so more distinctions are needed for a complete definition. Accordingly, he added the word *legally* and the phrase "not bequeathed by will or kept by adverse possession." Now, the word *inheritance* had a satisfactory definition for use in Roman courts of law: "An inheritance is property which has come to one legally at the death of another which was not bequeathed by will or kept by adverse possession."

The process of definition used by Cicero in this example is called species/genus definition. This process of definition puts the word-to-be-defined into a class or category. Then it lists any or all differences between the word-to-be-defined and other members of the class. Here is a formula for composing a species/genus definition:

a. Think of the word to be defined as a single instance or as a **particular**—that is, as a species.
b. Determine a genus, or class of things to which the word belongs.
c. Determine how that word differs from all other members of the selected class, and list these differences.

For example, the word *hammer* can be defined as a member of the class "tools." But hammers differ from all other tools in significant ways. If we select "used for pounding" as its primary difference from other tools, we eliminate most members of the class (although we have not eliminated possible exotic members of the class, such as the heels of shoes). We could enumerate more differences as well: hammers have a head for pounding and an elongated tail for pulling nails; they have relatively short handles made of wood or steel; they are generally held in the hand; and so on. The more differences we list, the more kinds of hammers we **eliminate—jackhammers,** sledgehammers, and so on. Hence our quick and easy definition: "A hammer is a handheld tool used for pounding that has a flat head and elongated tail for pulling nails, as well as a relatively short handle made of steel or wood."

A FORMULA FOR SPECIES/GENUS DEFINITION

To-be-defined (species) = class + differences *or*

To-be-defined (species) = class to which to-be-defined belongs + ways in which the to-be-defined differs from other members of its designated class

AN EXAMPLE OF SPECIES/GENUS DEFINITION

To-be-defined (species) = hammer   *or*

Class to which to-be-defined belongs = tools

Differences of to-be-defined from other members of the class = used for pounding, etc.

The classic example of a species/genus definition was written by Aristotle: "A human is a featherless biped."

human	is	featherless		biped
species	=	difference	+	class

Now this definition is not a perfect equation, since there are other two-footed creatures without feathers, namely primates (which were probably unknown to Aristotle). Nor is the definition very useful, since for most purposes we say little that is revealing about human beings by classifying them according to the number of feet they possess (although this classification is sometimes used for some other animals). In other words, while Aristotle's choice of category yielded up a near-perfect logical definition, as far as he knew, the category limited the definition's rhetorical usefulness.

Aristotle tried out another example: "Humans are rational animals." This definition did separate humans from all other animate organisms, as far as Aristotle was aware. Later rhetors disagreed with it, though. An eighteenth-century rhetor named Jonathan Swift preferred "Humans are animals who are capable of reason." The class "capable of reason" allowed Swift to imply that even though humans have the ability to reason, they don't always behave rationally. And so this example nicely illustrates the principle that the choice of a class for a to-be-defined has rhetorical consequences.

The trick with species/genus definition is to choose a class that limits the scope of the to-be-defined but that also tells audiences something significant about it. To place a public figure in the class "politicians" produces a different effect than putting that figure in the class "honored statesmen" or "fat cats." Of course, each of these classes requires a quite different list of features that distinguish the to-be-defined from other members of the class.

Textbooks and teachers often say that a good definition must list all the differences that exist between a to-be-defined and other members of the designated class. That is, they require that species/genus definitions be perfect equations. However, this requirement obtains only in contexts where precision and exactness are important, such as logic or some of the natural sciences. In rhetoric, classes should be chosen for their persuasive potential, and rhetors need not give exhaustive lists of differences.

Textbooks also caution students not to use metaphoric language in definitions, arguing that it gets in the way of precision. Cicero agreed with them. He told a story about his friend Aquilius, who, when asked to define *shore* was accustomed to define it as the place upon which the waves play. This is as if one should choose to define youth as the flower of a person's age or old age as the sunset of life (vii 32). This restriction against the use of metaphoric language in definition needs to be tempered a bit, we think. The metaphoric term/at *cat* seems precise enough to do the rhetorical work assigned to it, as in this species/genus definition: "Politicians are fat cats who use elected office for private gain."

Cicero listed three additional ways to compile a definition: by means of enumeration, analysis, or etymology. With the exception of etymology,

these means of definition, like species/genus definitions, can be composed without assistance from dictionaries or other reference works.

Enumerative Definition

For some purposes, rhetors may find it useful to define something by enumerating the parts that it can be divided into; Cicero's example is "a body has head, shoulders, hands, sides, legs, feet and so forth" (vi 30). This approach has the persuasive advantage noted by Aristotle of making the whole seem greater than it is. For example, medieval psychologists defined *mind* as having the following constituent parts: reason, intellect, imagination, passions, and will. This definition made mind seem extremely complex and yet gave the impression that it could be understood if its parts could be understood. Hate speech could be usefully defined by enumeration:

> Hate speech includes all speech that slurs someone's abilities, appearance, class, ethnicity, gender, race, religion, or sexual preference.

All the parts of an entity need not be listed in enumeration, since in some cases the parts are infinite (the bodies that make up the universe, for example). An enumerative definition is satisfactory if its list of parts is long enough to suggest the ordinary uses of the word-to-be-defined.

Analytic Definition

Analysis differs from enumeration since the rhetor using analysis must list all the parts that are ordinarily subsumed under the term being treated as a whole. For instance, Aristotle divided rhetoric into three species: deliberative, epideictic, and judicial (I 2); Cicero divided jurisprudence into statutes, custom, and equity (vii 31). Analysis is not a mere listing of parts: in analysis no part may be omitted, since the makeup of the whole depends on the presence of all its parts. Analytic definitions are important in the sciences, where precision and completeness are required. Here, for example, is *Webster's* definition of a quark: "any of three hypothetical particles postulated as forming the building blocks of baryons and mesons and accounting in theory for their properties." "Any of three" demonstrates the exhaustiveness of the available categories of quarks.

Etymological Definition

A term may also be defined by its etymology (Greek *etymon,* "original meaning," and *logos,* "study"). The etymology of a word may be determined by breaking it into its parts and learning the older meanings of each part. We have used this device regularly in this book in order to explain the meanings of technical terms, as we did just now with the word *etymology.*

An etymology may also be established by trying to determine the original or primitive meaning of a word. For example, *etymos* apparently meant something like "true" or "genuine" in Homeric Greek; later thinkers turned it into a noun, *etymon*. **Etymology—the** study of words in order to find out their original or true **meaning—began** with the assumption that the original or primitive meaning of a word was its true meaning. Even though this assumption is faulty, definition by etymology is often illuminating and always interesting. However, its use requires a good historical dictionary, such as the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED). Here, for example, is part of that dictionary's definition of *rhetoric:*

rhetoric n.

rhetoric (ˈrɛtəraɪk), *n.*[1] Forms: 4 [rethorice,] **rettorike, 4–6** ret(h)orik(e, -yk(e, 5-7 rethorick (4 -ikke, 5 **-ykk, -yque,** retherique, 6 rethoric, -ique, -icke, rhet(h)orike, 7 rhet'rique, reth'rick), **6–7** rhetorique, -icke, rhethorick, -ique, 7-8 rhetorick, rhet'ric, 7- rhetoric.

[a. OF. *rethorique* (mod.F. *rhetorique),* or ad. L. *rhetorica, -ice* **(med.L.** *reth-),* a. Gr. ῥητορική (sc. τέχνη), fem. of ῥητορικός **RHETORIC** *a.]*

1. a. The art of using language so as to persuade or influence others; the body of rules to be observed by a speaker or writer in order that he may express himself with eloquence.

In the Middle Ages rhetoric was reckoned one of the seven 'liberal arts', being comprised, with grammar and logic, in the 'trivium'.

13.. *Seuyn Sag.* **186 (W.),** Geometrie, and **arsmetrike,** Rettorike, and ek fisike. **1387** TREVISA *Higden* (Rolls) **III.** 361 **Aristotle..tauȝte** eloquence..as it is specialliche i-sene..in his **Dyalogus** of Poetis and in Tretys of Rethorik. 14.. *Bewte **will shewe** 69* in *Pol., Rel., & L. Poems,* Was neuer clerk, by retoryk or science, Cowde all hyr verteus reherse **tobis** day. **1475** *Bk. Noblesse* (Roxb.) 25 The famous clerke of eloquence Tullius seithe in his booke of retherique **[etc.].** **1481** CAXTON *Myrr.* i. ix. 34 The therde of the vii sciences is called Rethoryque. **1553** T. WILSON *Rhet.* 1 Rhetorique is an art to set furthe by utteraunce of wordes matter at large. 1586 A. DAY *Eng. Secretary* ⸤ **(1625)** 10 Many excellent Figures and places of Rhetorique. **1656** STANLEY *Hist. Philos.* v. **(1687) 176/2** Rhetorick is conversant in singulars, not in universals. 1741 WATTS *Improv. Mind* xx.§33 (1801) 193 Rhetoric in general is the art of persuading. **1836** *Penny Cycl.* V. 280/1 Having lectured successively in grammar, **rhetoric,..humanity,** and moral philosophy. **1843** MILL *Logic* Introd. §3 The communication of those thoughts to others falls under the consideration of Rhetoric,

b. *fig.* or with personification.

[c1374 CHAUCER *Boeth.* ii. pr. i. **(1868)** 30 And wiþ Rethorice com forþe **musice** a **damoisel** of oure house.] 1423 JAS. I *Kingis Q.* cxcvii, Gowere and chaucere, that on the steppis satt Of rethorike.

c1430 LYDG. *Min. Poems* (Percy Soc.) 11 And Retoryk had eke in her presence Tulyus, callyd 'Mirrour of Eloquence'.

1530 LYNDESAY *Test. Papyngo* 11 For quhy the bell of Rethorick bene roung Be Chawceir, Goweir, and Lidgate laureate.

1642 FULLER *Holy & Prof. St.* ii. vii. 73 Some condemn Rhetorick as the mother of lies.

1742 POPE *Dunc.* iv. 24 There, stript, fair Rhet'ric languish'd on the ground.

c. A treatise on, or 'body' of, rhetoric.

1565 COOPER *Thesaurus* s.v. *Hhetoricus, In primo Ciceronis rhetorico..,* in the firste booke of Ciceroes rhetorike.

1580 G. HARVEY in *Three Proper Lett.* 32 To bring our Language into Arte, and to frame a Grammer or Rhetorike thereof.

1581 LAMBARDE *Eiren.* i. xi. 63 It is a good Counsell (which Aristotle giueth in his Rhetorikes *ad Theodectem).*

1654 T. BLOUNT (*title),* The Academie of Eloquence, Containing a Compleat English Rhetorique.

1712 ADDISON *Spect.* No. 297 fl17 Aristotle himself has given it a place in his Rhetorick among the Beauties of that Art.

d. The top class or the second class (from the top) in certain English Roman Catholic schools and colleges. So *t to make one's rhetoric.*

1599 in Foley *Rec. Eng. Prov. S.J.* (1879) V. 569, I have made my rhetoric in these parts.

c1620 in *Mem. Stonyhurst Coll.* (1881) 8 They go down two by two with their books under their arms, and first those in Rhetoric, into the Refectory.

1908 *Stonyhurst Mag.* in *Tablet* 25 Apr. 646/2 We are informed that any boy from Rhetoric down to Elements may join the class.

e. Literary prose composition, esp. as a school exercise.

1828 R. WHATELY *Elements Rhetoric* 4 Some writers have spoken of Rhetoric as the Art of Composition, universally; or, with the exclusion of Poetry alone, as embracing all Prose-composition.

1944 H. J. C. GRIERSON *Rhetoric & Eng. Composition* p. iii, Of University teaching in English I had enjoyed just fifty lectures at Aberdeen, of which twenty-five were devoted to Rhetoric or, as Rhetoric had come to mean under Dr. Alexander Bain and his successor William Minto, English Composition.

1953 T. S. ELIOT *Amer. Lit. & Amer. Lang.* 5, I am happy to remember that in those days English composition was still called Rhetoric.

1972 *Lebende Sprachen* XVII. 35/2 *US* rhetoric—BEIUS literary composition.

2. t a. Elegance or eloquence of language; eloquent speech or writing. Obs.

b. Speech or writing expressed in terms calculated to persuade; hence (often in depreciatory sense), language characterized by artificial or ostentatious expression.

c1386 CHAUCER *Clerk's Prol.* 32 Frounceys Petrak,..whos Rethorik sweete Enlumyned al Ytaille of poetrie.

1426 LYD<3. in *Pol. Poems* (Rolls) II. 133 Alle be that I in my translacioun..Of rethoryk have no manor floure.

1562 WINȜET *Cert. Tractates* Wks. (S.T.S.) I. 25 As I persaue rethorik thairof verray small, swa I can espy na thing thairin abhorring fra the treuth.

1570 DEE *Math. Pref.* 46 Nor your faire pretense, by such rashe ragged Rhetorike, any whit, well graced.

1615 R. BRATHWAIT *Strappado* (1878) 24 Heere is no substance, but a simple peece Of gaudy Rhetoricke.

1671 MILTON *P.R.* iv. 4 And the perswasive Rhetoric That sleek't his tongue.

1733 SWIFT *Lett.* (1766) II. **189 The** one word from you, is of much more weight than my rhetoric.

1784 COWPER *Task* iv. 491 Modern **senators..Whose** oath is **rhet'ric,** and who swear for fame!

1825 MACAULAY *Ess., Milton,* The sublime wisdom of the Areopagitica and the nervous rhetoric of the Iconoclast.

1837 LANDOR *Pentameron* 33 Escape from rhetoric by all manner of means.

1880 SWINBURNE *Stud. Shaks.* 269 The limp loquacity of long-winded rhetoric, so natural to men and soldiers in an hour of emergency.

c. *pl.* Elegant expressions; rhetorical flourishes. Also, rhetorical terms.

1426 LYDG. De *Guil. Pilgr.* 19774 That poete, Wyth al hys rethorykes swete.

1543 BALE *Yet a Course* 26 Neuer coude tolwyn throughlye knowe what these rhetoryckes **ment,** as are denuncyacyon, deteccyon, and presentacyon.

1589 PUTTENHAM *Eng. Poesie* iii. ii. (Arb.) **151** Graue and wise counsellours..do much **mislike** all scholasticall rhetoricks.

1628 WITHER *Brit. Rememb.* 42 b, Their **fantastique** Rhetoriques, Who trim their Poesies with schooleboy-tricks.

1942 W. STEVENS *Parts of World* **143** Midsummer love and softest silences, Weather of night creatures, whistling all day, too, And echoing rhetorics more than our own.

1949 KOESTLER *Promise & Fulfilment* ii. v. 274 **It** was a disappointing speech-emotional rhetorics without a constructive programme.

1976 *Sunday Times* (Lagos) 3 Oct. **10/4** We cannot decide on the fundamental values and goals that will bind the present and future generations on the basis of vague ideas, irrelevant foreign slogans and rhetorics.

d. in ironical or jocular use.

1580 SPENSER in *Three Proper Left.* 14 Like a drunken man, or women (when their Alebench Rhetorick **commes** vpon them).

1595 W. S. *Locrine* iii. iii, I think you were brought up in the university of Bridewell, you have your rhetoric so ready at your tongue's end.

1613 PURCHAS *Pilgrimage* iii. xiv. **(1614)** 316 Some of them vpbraiding both him and other Christians with the names of dogs, Ethnickes, vnbeleeuers, and the like zealous Rhetorick.

1742 FIELDING *J. Andrews* i. xviii, The rhetoric of John the hostler, with a new straw hat, and a pint of wine, made a second conquest over her.

c1750 SHENSTONE *Ruin'd Abbey* 10 Fearless he of shouts Or taunts, the rhet'ric of the wat'ry crew.

1849 MACAULAY *Hist. Eng.* iv. I. **450** He [Jeffreys] acquired a boundless command of the rhetoric in which the vulgar express hatred and contempt.

e. *transf.* and *fig.,* said esp.

t (a) of the expressive action of the body in speaking;

(b) of the persuasiveness of looks or acts;

(c) of artistic style or technique.

1569 SANFORD tr. *Agrippa's Van. Artes* xxi, This daunsinge or **Histrionical** Rhetorike in the ende beganne to be **lefte** of all Oratours.

1587 GREENE *Euphues his Censure* Wks. (Grosart) VI. 252 For he considered with himselfe,..that liberality was the soundest rethoricke.

1588 SHAKES. *L.L.L.* iv. iii. 60 The heauenly Rhetoricke of thine eye.
1597 BRETON *Wit's Trenchmour* Wks. (Grosart) II. **15/1** Silence can best talke with wooden Rethoricke.
1644 J. **B.** *(title),* Chironomia: Or, The Art of Manuall Rhetorique.
1647 COWLEY *Mistr., Rich Rival* ii, Whilst thy sole Rhetorick shall be *Joynture,* and *Jewels,* and *Our Friends agree.*
1669 STILLINGFL. *Six Serm.* iii. **127** Every part of the Tragedy of his [the Son of God's] life, every wound at his **death,..were** designed by him as the most prevailing Rhetorick, to perswade men to forsake their sins.
1712 GAY *Trivia* iii. **318** Mov'd by the Rhet'rick of a Silver Fee.
1851 RUSKIN *Stones Venice* I. i. **11** His larger sacred subjects are merely themes for the exhibition of pictorial rhetoric,—composition and colour.
1941 W. H. AUDEN in *Southern Rev.* VI. 729 Around them boomed the rhetoric of time.
1963 R. I. MCDAVID *Mencken's Amer. Lang.* 339 Among the neo-Aristotelian critics *rhetoric* is a current fashionable synonym for technique... The *Rhetoric of Fiction.*
1964 J. SUMMERSON *Classical Lang. Archil* iv. 33 Well, there are three buildings which, I believe, demonstrate..the 'rhetoric' of the Baroque.
1976 *Howard Jrnl.* XV. i. 52 The rhetoric of treatment will have to be replaced by the reality of treatment.
t3. Skill in or faculty of using eloquent and persuasive language. Obs.
c1440 *Partonope* 5835 These lordis are chosyn be myn assent. The fyrst ys the kyng of affryke For his grete wytte and his retoryke.
1509 BARCLAY *Shyp of Folys* (1570) **17** Though he be wise and of might meruailous, Endued with Rhethorike and with eloquence.
1634 MILTON *Comus* 790 Enjoy your deer Wit, and gay Rhetorick That hath so well been taught her dazling fence.
1680 H. MORE *Apocal. Apoc.* Pref. 7 The highest Encomium..that the Wit and Rhetorick of men or Angels can invent.
1711 ADDISON *Spect* No. 171 ¶2 Joseph..endeavoured, with all his Art and Rhetorick, to set out the Excess of Herod's Passion for her.
1750 GRAY *Long Story* **117** But soon his rhetorick forsook him.
4. *attrib.* and *Comb.*
1656 EARL OF MONMOUTH tr. *Boccalini's Advts. from Parnass.* ii. lxxxviii. **(1674) 240** To Declaim..publickly in the Rhetorick-School.
1806 H. K. WHITE *Let. to Bro. Neville* 30 July, The Rhetoric Lecturer sent me one of my Latin Essays to copy for the purpose of inspection.
1884 *Punch* 23 Feb. 87 To unmask His rhetoric-shrouded weakness.

The first lines of this entry in the OED show all the grammatical and historical forms in which the word *rhetoric* has appeared in English. The second section of the entry tells the history of the word in other languages. In this instance, the English word *rhetoric* apparently came into the language from Old or modern French ("OF," "mod. F"). Apparently it entered French via its earlier use in Latin. It entered Latin from the Greek language, where the noun form was spelled *"rhetorikē."* The dictionary author then provides

a series of definitions of the term as it is presently used: "The art of using language so as to persuade or influence others," and so on. Although we did not include it here, the entry then provides a long list of lines indicating dates when the word appeared in old books and manuscripts. The authors of the OED reprint instances of its use so that readers can grasp the contexts in which it appeared over time. In the case of *rhetoric,* ancestors of the contemporary term appeared in English sometime during the fourteenth century CE. Within the list of dates and usages, any interested reader can also find other historical meanings that have been given to the term in English. Entries in historical dictionaries provide a wealth of interesting information. We find that there is a danger in using the OED: we often become so absorbed in the information it provides that we forget why we opened it in the first place.

DIVISION

Throughout its long history in Western rhetoric and logic, this topic has variously been called division, partition, analysis, enumeration, and classification. (We use the term *division* to avoid confusion with our different uses elsewhere of some of the other terms in the list.) Division is ordinarily paired with definition; indeed Plato made definition and division basic procedures in his art of rhetoric:

> The first is that in which we bring a dispersed plurality under a single form, seeing it all together—the purpose being to define so-and-so, and thus to make plain whatever may be chosen as the topic for exposition. . . . [The second is] the reverse of the other, whereby we are enabled to divide into forms, following the objective articulation; we are not to hack off parts like a clumsy butcher. (*Phaedrus* 265d-e)

In other words, for Plato definition and division represented two opposing movements: establishing a whole and then carving it up into its constituent parts.

Division may be defined, then, as a conceptual act wherein the parts of a whole are named and enumerated. As Quintilian sensibly said, the rhetorical force of the topic of division accrues from its elimination of possibilities (V x 66). If there are only two possible parts of a whole and if a rhetor can show that only one, or neither, is true, the proof from division is very simple and effective: "To be a citizen, a person must either have been born or made such" (65). The rhetor may continue: "Since the defendant was not born in this country and since there is no record of his having been made a citizen, we conclude that he is not a citizen." Quintilian liked this twofold sort of division because it gave the opposition a simple choice. This is especially effective when neither possibility is attractive to the opposition. Quintilian gave this example from Cicero: "Was the weapon snatched from his hands when he had attacked Cotta, or when he was trying to commit suicide?" (69). Neither motive—attacking a man or

committing suicide—was an attractive one for a Roman citizen to admit. The rhetorical force of the division is that it limits the opponent's choices, at least temporarily.

Division can serve rhetors as both an inventional and an organizational strategy. The process of division can become very elaborate if there are many possibilities under a given class. In this case, a rhetor must either show that "the whole is false" or that "only that which remains after the process of elimination is true" (66). Which is to say that a rhetor using division must be prepared to demonstrate both that the designated whole is acceptable to interested parties and that any parts distributed within it actually belong there. Quintilian gave this example:

> You say that you lent him money. Either you possessed it yourself, received it from another, found it or stole it. If you did not possess it, receive it from another, find or steal it, you did not lend it to him.

What is at issue here is the source of money supposedly lent to another. Using division, the rhetor shows that the defendant must be lying by eliminating every possible way in which he could have accrued money he claims to have lent.

In another use of division a rhetor can eliminate all but one possibility, the one she wishes to establish as true, as in this example: "This slave whom you claim was either born in your house or bought or given you or left you by will or captured from the enemy or belongs to another" (67). This is a fairly exhaustive list of the possibilities for acquiring a slave; the rhetor now can eliminate all but the possibility she wishes to establish as true.

A rhetor who wished to compose a discourse about the use of hate speech could use division as follows: "Those who use hate speech do so because they are ignorant, insensitive, or prejudiced." Since this division establishes the terms in which the argument will proceed and yet presents no attractive alternatives, it must be refuted by anyone who disagrees. It also provides the rhetor with a pattern of arrangement if she chooses to use it as a means of organizing her argument.

CLASSIFICATION OR GENERALIZATION

Classification (also called generalization) is a form of genus/species reasoning rather than whole/part. Hence a rhetor using classification assumes that whatever is true of a whole is true of all of its parts, and vice versa.

In Cicero's example of classification, if a husband's will has left all his silver to his wife, she has, without doubt, claim to his silver coins as well (*Topics* iii 13). Here, the class is "silver left by husband to wife"; presumably several items or parts fit under this class—silver plate, silver jewelry, and the like—and so do the husband's silver coins.

Or a rhetor can argue from the specifics to the class. Cicero used this example: Say that rainwater has done damage to someone's land. There are only two possible ways in which water erodes land (through natural rainfall or through human intervention as in the case of erosion of topsoil by **over-grazing**). If someone's land has been damaged by rainwater, he can review the possible events that can create the class of things he is calling "damaged land": either some fault exists in the land, such as its lying in a flood plain; or the runoff was caused by human intervention, such as the excavation of the land by a city road crew (vii, 38).

The rhetor using this classification can systematically eliminate members of subclasses until the only explanation left is the one he wishes to argue.

In a discourse about hate speech, a rhetor can use classification to understand the relations of incidents of hate speech to one another. If she has a list of such incidents, she can try to generate a classification that distinguishes, say, among instances when their use was unintentional or careless and those uses of hate speech that were obviously intended to insult or hurt someone.

This classification has heuristic value for the rhetor in that studying it may clarify some relations between incidents when hate speech was used. Are any events or acts common to incidents A, B, and C? How do they differ? How do they compare to or differ from acts or events in incidents X and Y? The classification can also be used to structure the rhetor's discourse if it seems powerful and accurate enough.

SIMILARITY OR COMPARISON

Anything that is similar to something else is nearly but not exactly the same; anything that bears a similarity to something else resembles it or is like it. Apples are similar to oranges insofar as both are fruits; New York and Los Angeles are similar to each other insofar as both are large American cities. When a rhetor discusses similar things, events, or concepts together, he makes a comparison. The rhetorical force of comparison lies in the conclusion that is implied whenever two things are compared: whatever is true of one thing must also be true of whatever is like it.

We can argue from similarity that since Jones voted for Reagan, Bush, Dole, and G. W. Bush, she is likely to vote for the next Republican candidate for president. This comparison works fairly well because the political positions taken by these candidates for president did not differ markedly. In other words, the more differences that exist between the items being compared, the less forceful the comparison. Hence it is more risky to argue from Jones's having voted for Republicans for president that she will vote for a Republican mayor or **governor.** We can argue from similarity that since the United States government has a long record of intervention in the politics of South American countries, such as Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, we can safely bet that it has attempted to intervene in the politics of Mexico. It is riskier to argue from these examples that the United States has attempted to intervene in the politics of our northern neighbor,

Canada. We can argue that someone who uses hate speech is likely to say or do other things that are offensive; the topic of similarity does not authorize us to argue, however, that a user of hate speech will commit violent acts. In the murder trial of O.J. Simpson, prosecutors argued from similarity that because Simpson had beaten his wife on several occasions, he had murdered her, as well. Jurors in the criminal case apparently did not accept the argument that wife beating and wife murder are similar acts.

The argument from parallel case also uses the topic of similarity, but here the orator names many cases that are supposedly similar to the one at issue, hoping that the audience will conclude that the case at issue will resolve itself in the same way as all the similar cases did. A man who has married and divorced four or five times is likely to marry and to divorce again. A baseball team that has blown its last nine games in the final inning is likely to do so again. Someone who has used hate speech on several occasions is likely to do so again.

Reasoning from similarity differs from induction in that audiences are asked only to compare one or more instances against one that is like them; in rhetorical induction, audiences are asked to reason from a group of similar things to a conclusion about an entire class (see Chapter 5, on reasoning).

Comparisons can also be made in terms of the relations that obtain between the items compared. Quintilian illustrated the effectiveness of comparisons from greater to less: "Cities have been overthrown by the violation of the marriage bond. What punishment then will meet this case of adultery?" (V xi 9). Here is an example that compares a lesser to a greater: "Flute players have been recalled by the state to the city which they had left. How much more then is it just that leading citizens who have rendered good service to their country should be recalled from that exile to which they have been driven?" Here is an example of comparison from less to greater, drawn from an argument about the use of hate speech: "Students are prevented by university policy from engaging in fraternity hazing; how much more appropriate that a university policy prevent them from using hate speech?"

Ancient teachers also pointed out that differences exist between similar things. Apples and oranges are both fruits, granted, but they differ in almost every other respect—size, shape, color, taste. New York and Los Angeles are both American cities, but they differ from each other in size, population, architecture, quality of city services, kinds of neighborhoods, and on and on. Sometimes, examining the differences between similar things produces interesting rhetorical arguments, although this is difficult to pull off effectively. Here are some ancient examples that use the topic of difference: "It does not follow that if joy is a good thing, pleasure also is a good thing" (Quintilian, *Institutes* V x 73); "Courage is more remarkable in a woman than in a man. ... If we wish to urge a man to meet death, the cases of Cato and Scipio will carry less weight than that of Lucretia" (this example of difference demonstrates that ancient sexism does not differ much from modern sexism) (10).

Rhetors may also compare **contraries—things** that are considered opposites. The rhetor using the topic of contraries divides the universe of discourse into two opposing halves; in essence, she assumes that there are just two choices in any system of contraries or opposites and overlooks the possibility that opposites may exist on a spectrum full of distinctions or degrees. We often hear that you can't compare apples and oranges, but the ancients did it anyway. Here are some examples, again from Quintilian: "Frugality is a good thing, since luxury is an evil thing"; "If he who does harm unwittingly deserves pardon, he who does good unwittingly does not deserve a reward" (73-74).

One kind of proof from contraries involves things that belong to the same class but differ absolutely, such as wisdom and folly, slowness and speed, kindness and malice. This topic produces statements such as "She who would shun folly must seek wisdom"; "If Smith does not bear malice to his neighbors, he certainly should show them kindness." Another proof from contraries applies a specific reference to a general phrase: "If this (specific) is so, that (generality) is not." Hence: "A man who has spent all his money is in no position to lend money to others"; "a person who has used hate speech in the past cannot be trusted to argue against its regulation."

Contraries also appear in words with prefixes like *in-* or **un-**: dignity and indignity, humanity and inhumanity. Animal rights activists apparently operate on the assumption that since the treatment of experimental animals cannot be called "humane," it must be inhumane. Unfortunately, arguments over legalized abortion have become almost entirely framed in terms of contraries: pro-choice advocates are pitted against persons who are anti-choice, while use of the term *pro-life* implies that persons who support legalized abortion are anti-life.

EXERCISES

1. Select a word or phrase that is crucial to some argument in which you wish to participate. Say that you are arguing about the regulation of hate speech with your roommate. She asks you to define what you mean by "hate speech." Try to respond to her request without using a dictionary.

   First, define the term by means of **species/genus** definition. You can begin by listing concepts or events that are associated with hate speech. Compose this list very fast, either by free association or by brainstorming with someone else. Now, decide in what class of concepts you want to place hate speech. Is it an example of free speech? A violation of good manners? An insult? A prelude to violence? A way of letting off steam? Once you have decided on a class, determine which members of your list fit into the **class—these** become the differences of the species/genus definition. Now compose a definition. Have you included enough differences to distinguish hate speech from other

sorts of speech? If not, try to include differences that will distinguish hate speech from all other sorts of utterances.

Second, define the term by means of enumeration. List all the possible kinds or instances of the term that you can think of. If the term you are trying to define is a technical or scientific term, it can perhaps be defined by analysis as well. If so, try to list all its relevant parts in an analytic definition.

Now you're ready to use a dictionary. Look up your term in any standard dictionary. Does it supply you with meanings of the term that you might have overlooked? Remember that dictionaries give the most common uses of terms, and so their definitions may not be relevant to the specific rhetorical situation for which you are composing a definition. Rhetorical definitions should be persuasive as well as accurate.

Last, find a good historical dictionary such as the *Oxford English Dictionary*. Look up your term. Does its history provide you with any illumination about its uses? If so, add these to your definition.

2. Try to create a division to add to some proposition you are interested in arguing. Take, for example, the following proposition:

Regulating hate speech causes more problems than it solves.

This proposition fairly cries out for a division that distinguishes problems caused by regulation from those solved by it. Such a division can channel the discussion in ways that are useful to a rhetor, and it can also be used to organize arguments.

3. Devise a classification for some argument you are working on. Here, for example, is a classification of persons who use hate speech:

People Who Use Hate Speech

Those who use it inadvertently	Those who use it to hurt others
unaware, insensitive, etc.	sexist, racist, homophobic, etc.

Creating classes and subclasses and listing their members can serve as a heuristic device, turning up items you might have overlooked in a less systematic procedure.

4. Writing very fast, compose a list of items or concepts that bear similarities to an item or concept that interests you. Using this list, try to compose comparisons. Do any of these help you to advance your argument? Now try to think of differences between the item or concept that interests you and one or two of the items or concepts on your list. Try to compare the item or concept that interests you to one or more of its opposites. Does this exercise generate any arguments?

ARRANGEMENT: GETTING IT TOGETHER

For many arguments occur to us ... but some of these *are* so unimportant as not to deserve notice, and some, even if they offer some amount of *assistance* ... contain *some flaw* ... while if *nevertheless* ... there are numerous advantages and strong arguments, in my judgment those among them that are the least weighty or that closely resemble others that are weightier ought to be discarded and left out of the discourse: in my own case when *I* am collecting arguments for my cases I make it my practice not so much to count them as to weigh them.

—Cicero,
De Oratore II **lxxvi** 309

ANCIENT AUTHORITIES AGREED that arrangement was the second part of rhetoric and second in importance only to invention. In ancient rhetoric, arrangement primarily concerned two processes: selecting the arguments to be used and arranging these in an order that was clear and persuasive.

Ancient attitudes toward arrangement were very different from modern ones. In modern thought, the proper arrangement of a piece of discourse is often dictated by genre: there are formulas for arranging business letters, papers written in school, scientific reports, and even romance novels. The formulas are intended to insure that anyone who is used to reading these kinds of discourse can follow the argument without difficulty, since she knows what comes next if she knows the conventions.

While ancient discussions of arrangement were formal and prescriptive to some extent, ancient rhetors paid much more attention to rhetorical situations than to formal rules. For example, the composition of an introduction was determined by a rhetor's guess about the attitude of the targeted audience toward his *ethos* and his subject. Were they hostile to him or to his position? In this case he needed to diffuse this hostility somehow. If they were receptive, he

could begin more directly. If audiences were familiar with the case, the rhetor did not need to tell them about its history. If they were uninformed and there was no skilled opponent, there was no need to anticipate and answer opposing arguments; thus a refutation was unnecessary in such a case. In other words, the composition and arrangement of the parts of a discourse were determined by a rhetor's informed guess about how listeners or readers would react to it and its author.

Arrangement, then, depends in large part on the rhetorical situation, so the *kairos* questions given in Chapter 2 might prove to be useful aids to arrangement as well. Thus far, we've addressed *kairos* as a temporal concept, but for the ancients, it had a spatial dimension as well. In ancient literature, the term was used to indicate a vital part of the body. In fact, *kairos* indicated the critical spot or parts where wounds are fatal. In book 8 of the *Iliad,* for example, Nestor shoots Alexander "with an arrow upon the crown of the head where the foremost hairs of horses grow upon the skull, and where is the deadliest spot" (84, 326) The spatial dimension of *kairos* can be traced to the sport of archery, where it meant "a penetrable opening or an aperture" (White 1987, 13) It is easy to see how these earlier spatial meanings came to be used in the art of rhetoric as well; in Aeschylus's play *The Suppliant Maidens,* the King compared the act of speaking to archery, proclaiming that when a "tongue has shot arrows beside the mark," another speech may be necessary to make up for the words that weren't exactly on target (446).

Another way the spatial dimension of *kairos* informs the art of rhetoric is its usefulness for the canon of arrangement. The Greek term for arrangement, *taxis,* was originally used in military contexts to denote the arrangement of troops for battle. When considered this way, the connections between *kairos* and arrangement become clear: attention to *kairos* in arrangement means knowing when and where to marshal particular proofs. *Kairos* suggests the possibility of achieving an advantage with optimal placement of arguments, propitious timing, or a combination of the two. We believe that it is crucial to consider the spatial dimension of *kairos* along with Cicero's advice to weigh proofs and place them strategically. He wrote in *Orator* that "the results of [the orator's] invention he will set in order with great care" (xv, 50). Rhetors thus need to give careful attention to questions like these: Which of the arguments produced by invention should I use? Which should come first and which last? How should I order the others? Do I need to rehearse any information about the subject? Where should I do this? Do I need to address the audience? Where? What do I say to them?

ANCIENT TEACHINGS ABOUT ARRANGEMENT

Ancient discussions of arrangement were often lengthy and quite subtle, given the enormous range of possible rhetorical situations. As early as the fifth century BCE, sophistic rhetoricians may have realized that any discourse required several sections and that the need for certain sections of a

discourse to perform certain tasks remained fairly constant in almost any situation. If so, they probably taught their students that a discourse required four parts: ***prooemium*** (introduction), narration (statement of the issue), proof, and conclusion.

In keeping with his general orientation toward simplicity of expression, Aristotle told his readers that a discourse really needed only two parts: a statement of the case and proof *(Rhetoric* III 13 1414a). The other parts were sometimes appropriate in certain kinds of discourse, but not in all. He grumpily dismissed the work of sophists like Theodorus and Licymnius, who, according to Aristotle, distinguished all sorts of "empty and silly" divisions of discourse, such as "narrative, additional narrative, preliminary narrative, refutation and additional refutation" (1414b). Aristotle agreed in this regard with his teacher Plato, who complained about the fancy elaborations of arrangement that had been invented by sophists, such as

> the exposition accompanied by direct evidence … indirect evidence . .. probabilities; besides which there are the proof and supplementary proof . . . and we are to have a refutation and supplementary refutation both for the prosecution and defense. … and covert allusion and indirect compliment and . .. indirect censure in mnemonic verse. *(Phaedrus* 266d-267a).

Perhaps intentionally, in this passage Plato confused sophistic topics, used in invention, with the sophists' teaching on arrangement. This was possible because sophistic treatises did not separate invention and arrangement, as Aristotle did; rather, they organized their treatises according to the parts of discourse and discussed the appropriate topics to be used within each part.

Aristotle's departure from this sophistic habit may have caused some confusion in later texts on rhetoric. Quintilian hovered between the two approaches. In books IV and V of the *Institutes,* he followed sophistic practice, discussing the topics that are appropriate to each part of a discourse. Then, in book VII, he started all over again, this time announcing that he would discuss arrangement as something separate from invention. But book VII turned out to be a discussion of stasis theory rather than of arrangement.

When Cicero was a young rhetoric student, rhetoric teachers apparently agreed that six parts were more or less standard in courtroom discourse. However, this division was often suggested for other sorts of discourse, as well. The six parts were an exordium, or introduction; a *narratio,* or statement of the issue; a *partitio,* or division of the issue into its constituent parts; *confirmatio,* where the rhetor's strongest arguments are made; *refutatio,* where arguments that can damage a rhetor's case are anticipated and refuted; and a *peroratio,* or conclusion.

Cicero's earliest work on rhetoric, *De Inventione,* included a clear and orderly exposition of this six-part division, and it adopted the sophistic habit of discussing appropriate topics within each part. Quintilian's approach was similar to Cicero's, although his treatment of arrangement is much fuller, since he gave rhetors subtle advice about artful arrangements

that pointed up their rhetorical effects. As they did with invention, ancient commentators provided much more advice about arrangement than can ever be used in a given situation.

THE EXORDIUM

The term *exordium* comes from Latin words meaning "to urge forward." The English verb *to exhort,* meaning "to urge earnestly," is descended from this term. Ancient rhetoricians gave elaborate advice for *exordia,* since rhetors use this first part of a discourse to establish their *ethos* as intelligent, reliable, and trustworthy people. Indeed, Quintilian wrote that "the sole purpose of the exordium is to prepare our audience in such a way that they will be disposed to lend a ready ear to the rest of our speech" (IV i 5). However, in book III of the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle contended that the main purpose of the introduction was "to make clear what is the end *(telos)* of the discourse" (1415a). Other functions of introductions, according to Aristotle, include making the audience well disposed toward the rhetor and the issue and grabbing their attention. In any case, it is clear that ancient rhetoricians found many more uses for introductions than simply presenting the issue.

Apparently, ancient students sometimes tried to compose introductions before they had written a discourse to introduce, because Cicero warned his readers about the futility of composing the introduction first: "It does not follow that everything which is to be said first must be studied first; for the reason that, if you wish the first part of the discourse to have a close agreement and connection with the main statement of the case, you must derive it from the matters which are to be discussed afterward" (I xiv 19). In other words, you can't introduce arguments that haven't yet been composed. We suggest that you compose at least the narrative and the confirmation before you consider whether to include an exordium. Not all compositions require an introduction, and as we shall see, selection of the kind of introduction to be used depends upon the rhetorical situation.

Cicero suggested that, in general, *exordia* ought to be dignified and serious. They should not be vague or disconnected from the issues or the situation. Quintilian warned that students sometimes assume that audiences are acquainted with the facts of the case when they are not. If there is any doubt about how much an audience knows about a situation, the wisest course is to review the situation in the exordium in order to secure good will from the audience.

The quality of the rhetor's case determines the kind of exordium required. Cicero discriminated five kinds of cases: honorable, difficult, mean, ambiguous, and obscure. An honorable case needs no introduction, since audiences will support it at once. All other sorts of cases need exordiums, since for some reason audiences will not receive them favorably. According to Cicero, a difficult case "has alienated the sympathy" of audiences, while audiences regard the mean case as "unworthy of serious atten-

tion" *(On Invention* I 20). In an ambiguous case, "the point for decision is doubtful, or the case is partly honorable and partly discreditable so that it engenders both goodwill and ill will." Last, a case is obscure either because the audience is too slow to understand it or because the case itself "involves matters which are rather difficult to grasp."

The Kinds of Cases

1. *Honorable:* has immediate support from audience
2. *Difficult:* audience is unsympathetic to rhetor or to issues.
3. *Mean:* audience regards the rhetor or the issue as unimportant or uninteresting.
4. *Ambiguous:* audience is unsure about what is at issue; or issue is partly honorable and partly difficult.
5. *Obscure:* issue is too difficult for audience to understand, because they are uninformed or because it is complex.

Cicero recommended two sorts of exordiums to handle this variety of cases: the introduction and the **insinuation.** An introduction "directly and in plain language makes the audience well-disposed, receptive and attentive." Introductions, on one hand, may be used in mean, ambiguous and obscure cases, since here an audience is not hostile but only confused or uninformed. Insinuation, on the other hand, should be used only in difficult cases, where an audience is hostile to a rhetor or to her position. Cicero wrote that insinuation "unobtrusively steals into the mind" of audiences. Using Cicero's definitions of the available kinds of cases, a rhetor should be able to figure out whether she needs to compose an introduction or an insinuation.

Introductions

As Cicero pointed out, honorable cases need no introduction of any kind, because in such cases the rhetor is respected, the issue is not controversial, and the audience is interested and attentive. Most other kinds of cases require introduction. Difficult cases, however, may require insinuation rather than introduction.

In a mean case, a rhetor must use the introduction to convince his audience that his position on the issue is important to them and, hence, make them attentive. For instance, a rhetor who opposes the use of hate speech on campus may find himself facing an audience that denies the contribution of hate speech to a negative overall climate on campus. In this case, he needs to impress his audience with the seriousness of this matter. He might do so by alluding to the wider effects of hate speech on the community at large. He could also point out that every student on campus is affected by hate speech even if he or she is not a victim of it.

SAMPLE INTRODUCTION TO MEAN CASE

Hate speech affects every student on this campus, since its unregulated use spreads a climate of hatred, fear, and disgust. In such a climate, students who are often the targets of hate speech must be fearful and watchful wherever they find themselves: in the cafeteria, walking to class, at parties, and even in classrooms themselves. And even though you think that you might never be a victim of such speech, someone among your friends and acquaintances surely will be.

Notice how this introduction both underlines the seriousness of the issue and demonstrates to the audience that they are affected by it.

An ambiguous case is one where there is some doubt about the **issue**—that is, the audience for some reason does not understand the issue or has confused it with another issue. Or there is doubt about the morality of the issue; that is, the audience must be shown that the issue can be defended on moral grounds. In such a case, a rhetor should begin by clarifying the ambiguity. For instance, an audience may be confused about whether a rhetor who disapproves of hate speech also opposes its regulation. If such confusion exists, it should be cleared up immediately in an introduction, as follows:

SAMPLE INTRODUCTION TO AMBIGUOUS CASE

While I am utterly opposed to the use of hate speech on moral grounds, I nevertheless am also opposed to its regulation, on constitutional grounds.

This move, which separates the moral from the legal issue, establishes a rhetor's good will toward an audience because it shows that she makes careful distinctions. However, if the case is ambiguous because it is partly discreditable, a rhetor should emphasize its honorable side in the exordium and try to win good will thereby. Perhaps a rhetor favors hate speech and hence opposes its regulation. Here is a case that is partly discreditable for some audiences, since most people disapprove of the use of hate speech. This rhetor can delay making her argument in favor of hate speech by emphasizing the other point of her case in the **introduction—that** she opposes regulation of hate speech. She can reserve mention of her reason for a later point in her discourse. Or she can introduce it up front and promise to justify it later.

SAMPLE INTRODUCTION TO MORALLY AMBIGUOUS CASE

I am opposed to the regulation of hate speech on campus. I think that the free expression of hate speech should be allowed, since its use may forestall more serious expressions of group hatred. I know that this position is controversial, and I will justify it later on in my remarks.

Once again, the rhetor establishes good will by being honest with her audience.

In an obscure case, the audience for some reason cannot follow the arguments used in support of an issue. In this case, an audience may be

made receptive if a rhetor states her case in plain language and briefly explains the points to be discussed. This should make her audience receptive, even though her arguments may be difficult for them to follow.

SAMPLE INTRODUCTION TO AN OBSCURE CASE

I am aware that many of my readers may not understand why regulation of hate speech has become a hot topic of discussion on college campuses across the country. Briefly, the facts are these: because students have begun openly to use language found offensive by other students, a few universities in the country have adopted policies regulating the use of such language. Penalties for violations range from a reprimand to expulsion,

This rhetor shows good will by taking into account the audience's need to know the relevant data.

Topics for Making Audiences Attentive and Receptive

It is necessary to explain to an audience why they should pay attention to a discourse if the issue taken up in the discourse is ambiguous, mean, or obscure. Cicero composed a list of topics for making an audience attentive in such cases. He recommended that rhetors show that "the matters we are about to discuss are important, novel, or incredible, or that they concern all humanity or those in the audience or some illustrious people or the immortal gods or the general interest of the state" (23).

Cicero also provided a list of topics for securing good will from the audience so that they will be receptive to the rhetor. He wrote that good will "is to be had from four quarters: from our own person, from the person of the opponents, from the persons of the jury, and from the case itself" (22). A rhetor's *ethos* may be a source of good will if he refers to his actions and services to the community; if he weakens any negative charges that have been made against him; if he elaborates on his misfortunes or difficulties; or if he humbly asks an audience for their attention. For example, a rhetor discussing the regulation of hate speech can say why she is interested in this issue. She can mention any experience she has had with it. If she is a member of a group that is interested in regulating such speech, she can mention that too. If she has been the victim of hate speech, she should mention that, especially if her case is mean or obscure. Or she can simply ask her audience to pay attention to the issue. A rhetor can weaken the *ethos* of persons who oppose her point of view if she can "bring them into hatred, unpopularity, or contempt." She can do this by presenting their actions in a negative light; by showing that they have misused any extrinsic advantages they enjoy, such as "power, political influence, wealth, family connections"; or by revealing their unpreparedness on the issue. A rhetor who opposes hate speech can characterize those who use it as racist or sexist, which is especially serious if they enjoy prestige or power. Or she can say that people who use hate speech are unfashionable and out of touch with custom.

A rhetor can derive good will from the audience by showing his respect for them, or by stating "how eagerly their judgment and opinion are awaited." Using this topic, a rhetor who opposes the regulation of hate speech might urge his audience to examine his arguments, accept them, and join him in working against the imposition of such regulations. Last, good will may come from the circumstances themselves "if we praise and exalt our own case, and depreciate our opponent's with contemptuous allusions."

Topics for Making Audiences Attentive

1. Show importance of issue

2. Show how issue affects audience

3. Show how issue affects everyone

4. Show how issue affects general good of the community

Topics for Making Audiences Receptive

1. Strengthen your *ethos*

2. Weaken *ethos* of those who oppose rhetor

3. Show respect for audience

4. Praise issue or position while denigrating position of opponents

Notice how Adam Robinson follows Cicero's advice as he opens his book on Osama bin Laden:

> Imagine for a moment that you awoke one morning to discover that your relative—brother, cousin, uncle—was a mass murderer. Imagine that it was September 12, 2001, and the pendulum of guilt for the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York was swinging in the direction of a member of your family. Imagine, if you can, the revulsion and helplessness that you might feel—almost as strongly as those who lost friends and loved ones in the tragedy. Imagine your exemplary past crushed beneath the weight of those tragic towers.
>
> This numbing reality is what the Binladin family of Saudi Arabia faced. On that morning, on the other side of the world, the responsibility for this callous act of terrorism was being laid squarely at the door of one of their own clan, Osama bin Laden. (11)

Certainly bin Laden's importance is not in question, since he is widely thought to be the leader of a terrorist organization that plotted the horrible events of September 11, 2001. It is not difficult, then, to make audiences attentive to a book about this notorious man. The rhetor does have to make his audience receptive, though, because many readers will think of a book about bin Laden as a dishonorable case. Anyone who wants a receptive audience for a book about him has somehow to humanize its subject. Robinson does this by asking readers to sympathize with—perhaps even identify with—shocked and grieving members of bin Laden's family.

Insinuations

In a difficult case, if, on one hand, audiences are not completely hostile to a rhetor's point of view, he may risk composing an introduction that acquaints the reader with the issue and his position on it; on the other hand, if they are adamantly opposed, either to his *ethos* or his position on the issue, he should compose an insinuation. Cicero wrote that audiences are hostile if "there is something scandalous in the case," or if they are already convinced that a rhetor's point of view is wrong, or if they are weary. If there is something scandalous in the case, a rhetor should simply admit that he, too, is scandalized by it but should add that neither he nor his audience is tainted by the scandal. For example, if a rhetor favors the use of hate speech, he might begin as **follows:**

SAMPLE INSINUATION

Like any other decent person, I am offended by hate speech. Its use is ugly and hurtful. Nonetheless, I support Americans' freedom to say whatever they like, and thus I cannot support regulating the use of hate speech on our campus.

If an audience is hostile for ideological reasons, again, the rhetor should simply admit the difference of opinion and show himself ready to attack the strongest argument against him or his position.

SAMPLE INSINUATION

I realize that you and I do not agree about the unfettered use of hate speech on this campus. However, I ask you to read my arguments carefully before you dismiss them out of hand.

If an audience is weary, in contrast, a rhetor should promise to be brief.

SAMPLE INSINUATION

Since I know that you are tired of hearing about this issue, I will keep my arguments short and to the point.

In sum, there are many available topics for composing an insinuation:

Topics for Insinuations
1. If audience is hostile, admit difference of opinion.
2. If issue is unsavory, admit this.
3. If audience is tired, promise to be brief.

THE NARRATIVE (STATEMENT OF THE CASE)

In the narrative, a rhetor states the issue as clearly and simply as she can. If the rhetor's argument centers on a conjectural issue, the narrative may be a simple statement of the facts of the case:

Sample Narratives

    Hate speech has occurred on our campus.

    If hate speech occurs on our campus, it does not occur often.

    Hate speech seldom occurs on our campus.

Any statement of the issue should depict a state of affairs in ways that favor the rhetor's position. Quintilian pointed out that statements of the case should be in keeping with the facts we desire to be believed: "We shall for instance represent a person accused of theft as covetous, accused of adultery as lustful, accused of homicide as rash, or attribute the opposite qualities to these persons if we are defending them; further we must do the same with place, time and the like" (IV ii 52). A rhetor who favors regulation of hate speech, then, might compose a statement of the issue such as this one:

SAMPLE NARRATIVE

Ugly and divisive racial epithets are now heard daily on the malls and in the halls of our formerly peaceful and harmonious campus.

A rhetor who opposes regulating hate speech, in contrast, might compose the statement of the case in this way:

SAMPLE NARRATIVE

While hate speech may be a problem on other campuses, only a few minor incidents have occurred here at Our State University, and these were readily taken care of by existing policy.

Here are some sample narratives for other kinds of cases:

Sample Narratives

    Since hate speech falls under the head of speech that is protected by the First Amendment, it cannot be banned from this **campus.** (definitive)

    The use of hate speech on our campus wrongs those against whom it is used, dishonors those who use it, and creates an atmosphere of fear and **distrust.** (value)

    Hate speech should be regulated on our **campus.** (procedure)

    A policy that regulates hate speech will interfere with students' right to free speech on our **campus.** (procedure)

According to Cicero, the narrative may be omitted if the audience is familiar with the issue or if some other rhetor has already mentioned it. He recommended that it not be mentioned at all at the beginning of the discourse if the case were unpopular or if the audience were hostile to the rhetor's point of view. Quintilian disagreed vociferously on this point, however. To omit the statement of the case, he huffed, was tantamount to

saying that it was worthless or dishonorable: "Nothing can be more easy, except perhaps to throw up the case altogether" (IV ii 66). If Quintilian is correct, audiences should be suspicious of discourse whose authors make no statement of their position on the issue at hand.

Ancient authorities agreed that the narrative should be clear, concise, and brief, as it is not meant to be persuasive and a clear statement of the issue lends credibility to a rhetor. Quintilian admired Cicero's use of seeming simplicity in his defense of Milo. Cicero stated the case as follows: "Milo, on the other hand, having been in the senate all day till the house rose, went home, changed his shoes and clothes, and waited for a short time, while his wife was getting ready" (57). This simple narrative not only indicated Milo's casual behavior on the day he supposedly murdered Claudio; Cicero's use of ordinary, everyday speech lulled the jury into thinking of Milo as an ordinary person, like themselves, going through an ordinary day.

For any number of reasons, a rhetor may not be satisfied with a simple statement of the case. Sometimes it is useful to give an audience some background or history about the issue so that they can understand why it is important to them. Cicero suggested that a narrative could contain an account of the reasons why an issue is being disputed; a digression to attack the opposition, amuse the audience, or amplify their understanding of the case by comparisons; and/or a true-seeming fiction that is analogous to the case, drawn either from history or literature or created by the rhetor. Sometimes it is very important to establish precisely why there is dispute about an issue. For example:

Sample Narratives Showing Why There Is Dispute

> The police have expressed concern that a dark-sky ordinance will interfere with levels of tight necessary to protect citizens at night; however, streetlights are not interfering with our astronomical observations, while lighted billboards do.

> As many as fifty students have recently complained about the use of offensive remarks in public areas of campus. For this reason, we need to examine whether the university should make a policy regulating the use of hate speech.

A rhetor may also wish to attack the position of those who oppose him in the narrative:

SAMPLE NARRATIVE THAT ATTACKS OPPONENTS

> Students have expressed concern that regulation of hate speech will interfere with their right to freedom of speech. Only those who are insensitive to the terrible impact of hate speech on its chosen victims could be opposed to its regulation, which is what I propose for our campus.

A rhetor may also add a vivid historical or fictional example to the narrative. Such examples should be chosen for their relevance to the issue—that is, they should be analogous to the actual facts of the case. A rhetor

who opposes hate speech can paint a grim picture of an imaginary campus ridden by the use of racial, religious, or gendered slurs. Or she can resort to a fabulous or historical example of some analogous situation, making vivid allusion to events from history or to novels and films wherein hateful remarks led to persecution of members of some religious or racial group.

THE PARTITION

A partition can perform two functions: it can name the issues in dispute, and it can list the arguments to be used in the order they will appear. In a complex argument, partition is very helpful to an audience. First of all, it clarifies for them which issues need to be addressed by any party to the argument. Second, it announces the order in which proofs appear, thus making the discourse easier to follow. These uses of a partition, then, have the ethical effect of making rhetors seem intelligent and well disposed toward an audience.

Rhetors who have used stasis theory during invention should be quite clear about which issues need to be discussed and which do not. The rhetor who wishes to regulate hate speech on his campus, for example, should know whether anyone disputes the fact that hate speech occurs. If there is debate on this point, he is obligated to discuss it, and he may say in a partition that he plans to do so. If all parties agree that incidents of hate speech have occurred, he may move on to a disputed definition; if all agree about a definition of hate speech, he may move to the issues of value that are involved in the discussion; and if all agree on those, he may then discuss procedures that ought to be used (or not) to regulate it. In each case, a partition of his discourse might look like this:

Sample Narrative
  Hate speech must [or must not] be regulated on our campus.

Sample Partitions
  If There Is Dispute about Conjecture: Hate speech occurs [or does not] occur daily on our campus, and I will demonstrate this fact.
  If There Is Dispute about Definition: I define hate speech as any epithet directed at any person that is intended to slur that person's character, ethnic origin, religion, gender, ability, or appearance. [Of course, an opponent of regulation might define hate speech differently, as harmless fun, blowing off steam, or the like.]
  If There Is Dispute about Quality: Hate speech harms its victims and disrupts campus life. [Again, an opponent of regulation would appeal to different values—perhaps to freedom of speech—if there is dispute about values, as is almost certain in the case of hate speech.]
  If There Is Dispute about Procedure: Perhaps hate speech cannot be regulated, but it can be punished if the university adopts a policy

regarding it. [Again, an opponent of regulation will recommend a different procedure, such as expelling offenders or ignoring incidents of hate speech]

As we noted above, a partition may also announce the order in which supporting arguments appear in the discourse to follow. This is a courtesy to listeners and readers. Quintilian argued that this sort of partition "not only makes our arguments clearer by isolating the points from the crowd in which they would otherwise be lost and placing them before the eyes of the judge, but relieves his attention by assigning a definite limit to certain parts of our speech, just as our fatigue upon a journey is relieved by reading the distances on the milestones which we pass" (IV v 22-23). Ancient authorities agreed that a partition, like a narrative, ought to be clear and brief.

THE ARGUMENTS: CONFIRMATION AND REFUTATION

Once the statement of the case is clear, the rhetor presents the arguments she has derived by means of invention. Ancient rhetoricians called this portion of the discourse the "confirmation," since it confirms or validates the material given in the narrative and partition. As a reminder of the possibilities opened by invention, we list strategies discussed in earlier chapters of this book.

1. Consideration of the rhetorical situation: arguments from *kairos,* and from consideration of the relative power of rhetor and audience.
2. The stases: issues of conjecture, definition, quality, and policy.
3. The common topics: arguments from conjecture, degree, and possibility.
4. The commonplaces: arguments in general circulation and arguments from ideologic.
5. *Logos:* arguments available in the issue itself—enthymemes, inductive arguments, examples, maxims, or signs.
6. *Ethos:* arguments from the rhetor's intelligence, good moral character, and good will toward the audience and arguments that establish the appropriate voice and distance for the rhetorical situation at hand.
7. *Pathos;* arguments that appeal to the emotions by painting vivid pictures and using honorific or pejorative language.
8. Extrinsic proofs: data and testimony from reliable authorities.
9. The sophistic topics: arguments found by means of definition, division, similarities, and contrasts.

A rhetor who has worked through some or all of these strategies for invention should have discovered most of the confirming arguments that are available for use in the rhetorical situation for which he is preparing to speak or write.

Not every argument that is available can or should be used, of course; rhetors should select only those arguments that will be most persuasive to a given audience, and they must keep time or length requirements in mind. Quintilian gave some advice for selecting and ordering arguments. He recommended that the strongest arguments be treated singly and at more length, while the weakest arguments (if they must be used) should all be grouped together. In this way, he wrote, "they may not have the overwhelming force of a thunderbolt, but they will have all the destructive force of hail" (V xii 5). Or a rhetor can alternate strong and weak arguments. In any case, Quintilian recommended that the weakest arguments not come last in the discourse.

Sometimes it is necessary for a rhetor to anticipate arguments that might damage her *ethos* or her case if her audience accepts them. The ancients called this process **"refutation."** Thorough attention to invention should disclose arguments that need to be anticipated and refuted. For instance, if a rhetor who approves of regulating hate speech anticipates that liberals will be part of his audience, he must refute their likely assumption that regulation may infringe on individuals' rights to free speech. If he anticipates that conservatives will be in his audience, he needs to refute their likely assumption that regulation of hate speech by university policy is too sweeping and that such speech ought rather to be regulated by community standards, by family upbringing, and/or by religious values.

THE PERORATION (CONCLUSION)

According to Cicero, a rhetor may do three things in a peroration: sum up her arguments, cast anyone who disagrees with her in a negative light, and arouse sympathy for herself, her clients, or her case.

Composing a Summary

A summary, if included in the discourse, should review all the issues named in the partition and briefly recall how each was supported. Cicero and Quintilian both recommended that a summary be clear and brief. If a rhetor chooses to make emotional appeals or to enhance his ethos in the conclusion of his remarks, however, both rhetoricians recommended that he use all his art and skill on these parts of the discourse, since they constitute the last impression he leaves with an audience. As Quintilian wrote, rhetors who have spoken or written well are "in a position, now that we have emerged from the reefs and shoals, to spread all our canvas" (VI 1 52).

Composing Appeals to the Emotions

Cicero listed fifteen topics that could be used to appeal to the emotions in a peroration. The first of these was authority, in which a rhetor calls on whatever authorities are most revered in a community to establish the

importance or urgency of her position. For Cicero's audiences, authorities were the gods as well as "ancestors, kings, states, nations, people of supreme wisdom, the senate, the people and authors of laws" *(On Invention* I 101). In American rhetoric, concluding appeals are often made to the authority of religious texts such as the Christian Bible or to historically important documents such as the Constitution. Rhetors appeal as well to the authority accorded to respected public figures (usually dead) such as Ben Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, or Martin Luther King Jr.

The second topic names people who are affected by the state of affairs promoted or deplored by the rhetor and vividly describes its effects on them. Under this topic the rhetor may comment on the size of the group affected; if it is very large, this is more serious than if it is very small. The third topic inquires what would happen if the state of affairs remains unchanged or if it is changed in the way recommended by the rhetor. For example, a rhetor who supports regulation of hate speech could conclude his discourse by suggesting that the ordinarily peaceful atmosphere on campus will deteriorate rapidly if incidents of hate speech go unregulated. He could even paint a vivid picture of what might happen in that case. The fourth topic shows that the issue affects many people in other similar locations who will apply the outcome of this discussion to their own cases. The fifth topic shows "that in other cases a false decision has been changed when the truth was learned, and the wrong has been righted; but in this case, once the decision has been made it cannot be changed" (102). For example, a rhetor who opposes regulation of hate speech might argue that imposition of a policy regulating it will restrain students from speaking freely to one another for fear their words will be construed as hate speech. The sixth topic addresses whether or not the state of affairs under discussion results from someone's intentions or whether it is unintentional or accidental; Cicero wrote that "misdeeds should not be pardoned, but sometimes inadvertent acts may be forgiven." Certainly, innocent utterances can be mistakenly construed as hate speech, and these should be treated differently than utterances meant to hurt or anger someone. The rhetor opposed to regulation could argue that a regulatory policy won't distinguish between these.

The seventh topic aims directly at increasing indignation toward those who oppose a rhetor's position: Cicero recommended showing the audience that "a foul, cruel, nefarious and tyrannical deed has been done by force and violence or by the influence of riches, and that such an act is utterly at variance with law and equity." Using the eighth topic, a rhetor may demonstrate the utter outrageousness of the state of affairs she opposes; this is especially effective if she can establish that the state of affairs violates some custom, value, or practice that is important to the community. As Cicero wrote, using this topic, the rhetor shows that the state of affairs is unjust toward "elders, guests, neighbors, friends, against those with whom you have lived, those in whose home you have been reared or by whom you have been educated, against the dead, the wretched or pitiable, against famous people of renown and position,

against those who can neither harm another nor defend themselves" (103). The ninth topic compares or contrasts the state of affairs preferred by the rhetor with others, while the tenth creates a vivid picture of the suffering caused by the state of affairs or of the joy that might result if it can be altered according to the rhetor's proposal. The eleventh topic shows that those who oppose the rhetor ought to know better; the thirteenth shows "that insult has been added to injury," thus rousing resentment against haughtiness or arrogance. The fourteenth topic asks the audience "to consider our injuries as their own; if it affects children let them think of their own children ... if the aged, let them think of their parents" (105). Under the fifteenth topic, the rhetor says "that even foes and enemies are regarded as unworthy of the treatment that we have received."

Enhancing Ethos

Cicero mentioned a third option for the peroration: arguments that arouse the pity of the audience so they will identify with a rhetor or with his case. He listed sixteen topics for accomplishing this, all of which are intended to demonstrate to audiences that the state of affairs opposed by the rhetor affects them in some way. We mention only a few of these topics, since most of them reflect Roman customs or laws that perished long ago.

Using the first and second topics, a rhetor can show in her peroration that the state of affairs she opposes is much worse than it used to be, that currently things are very bad, or that they will continue to be deplorable in the future. In the third and fifth topics, a rhetor mentions examples or enumerates a list of things that demonstrate to the audience the specific ways in which they are harmed by the state of affairs she opposes, and she paints vivid pictures of their misery. In the thirteenth topic, the rhetor complains that the state of affairs she opposes causes bad treatment of others by those to whom it is least becoming. Here, for example, a rhetor opposed to hate speech can conclude by pointing out that well-educated people, such as college students, should be the last persons to use hateful language against other people.

Topics for Perorations
  1. Summarize
      a. review issues
      b. briefly recall how each issue was supported
  2. Make emotional appeals
      a. invoke authority
      b. point out effects
      c. show what happens if state of affairs unchanged
      d. point out effects elsewhere
      e. show that decision can't be reversed
      f. show whether state of affairs is intentional or accidental

    g. arouse anger at opponents

    h. demonstrate that state of affairs violates community values

    i. compare/contrast state of affairs with similar one

    j. paint vivid picture of effects

    k. imply ignorance in opponents

    1. show how state of affairs is insulting as well as injurious

    m.ask audience to identify with those injured or insulted

    n. show that injury or insult would not be applied to enemies

3. **Enhance** *ethos*

    a. show how state of affairs has deteriorated

    b. show that state of affairs will continue

    c. show audience how they are harmed by state of affairs

    d. paint vivid pictures of current misery

    e. show how state of affairs causes people to behave badly

As you can see, there are myriad ways to end a speech or paper. The rhetorical situation always dictates which of these, if any, are appropriate for a given rhetor to use with a given audience.

AN EXAMPLE

We conclude our chapter on arrangement with an extended example of a piece of rhetoric that uses all six suggested parts of a discourse. In a *New York Times* editorial, Judith R. Shapiro, the president of Barnard College, voiced her concerns about parents' roles in higher education. We reprint the entire letter, dividing it into Cicero's principles of arrangement:

KEEPING PARENTS OFF CAMPUS

Exordium/Introduction: Every September I join our deans and faculty to welcome first-year students and their families to Barnard campus. It is a bittersweet moment; while parents are filled with pride, they also know they must now begin to let go of their children. Parents must learn to back off.

Narrative: Confidently, with generosity and grace, most parents let their children grow up. They realize that the purpose of college is to help young people stand on their own and take the crucial steps toward adulthood while developing their talents and intellect with skill and purpose.

But this truth is often swept aside by the notion that college is just one more commodity to be purchased, like a car or a vacation home. This unfortunate view gives some parents the wrong idea. Their sense of entitlement as consumers, along with an inability to let go, leads some parents to want to manage all aspects of their children's college lives—from the quest for admission to their choice of major. Such parents, while the exception, are nonetheless an increasing fact of life for faculty, deans and presidents.

Confirmation: Three examples, all recently experienced by my staff, illustrate my point. One mother accompanied he daughter to a meeting with her dean to

discuss a supposedly independent research project. Another demanded that her daughter's academic transcript be sent to her directly, since she was the one paying the tuition bills. And one father called his daughter's career counselor so he could contact her prospective employers to extol her qualifications.

I have had my own awkward encounters on this front. I have met with parents accompanying their daughters on campus visits who speak in the "third person invisible." The prospective student sits there—either silently or attempting to get a word in edgewise—while the parents speak about her as if she were elsewhere. I always make a point of addressing the student directly; although this initially feels as if I were talking to a ventriloquist's dummy, I find that, if I keep at it, I can shift the conversation to one between the young woman and me.

Stories abound of parents horrified by a child's choice of major and ready to do battle with faculty or deans. These parents fail to understand that passion and curiosity about a subject, coupled with the ability to learn, are the best career preparation.

Refutation: We are living in times when educational pressures on families begin when children are toddlers and continue relentlessly through the teenage years. Four-year-olds today face a battery of tests to get into a desirable pre-school. As they face the college admissions process, parents attuned to the barrage of media coverage believe that the best colleges accept only superhumans—a belief encouraged, admittedly, by some universities—and strive to prepare their sons and daughters accordingly. (One father even took a year off from his job to supervise the preparation of his daughter's admissions portfolio.)

By the time their children enter college, parents have become so invested emotionally in their success that they may not understand why it is crucial that they remain outside the college gates. The division of responsibility between parents and colleges during the undergraduate years is a complex matter, as is the question of how much responsibility young people should be expected to take for themselves. We have been hearing much of late about a return to the in loco parentis approach that fell of out favor in the late 1960's. The same baby boomers who fought to end these restrictions want to bring them back, perhaps out of dismay that their own children may have to make some of the same mistakes they did.

Colleges should do as much as they can to provide a safe and secure environment. More important, they must help students learn to take care of themselves and to seek guidance on life's tough decisions. Neither colleges nor parents can make the world entirely safe for our young people and, hard as it may be to accept, there are limits to our ability to control what life has in store for our children.

Peroration: Parents do best when they encourage their college-bound children to reach out enthusiastically for opportunities in the classroom and beyond. And if they can let go, they will see the results that they want and deserve: young people, so full of intelligence, spirit and promise, transformed into wonderful women and men. (*New York Times* 22 August, 2002, op-ed page)

Before analyzing Shapiro's arrangement strategies, we need to consider Shapiro's audience. The letter appeared in the *New York Times,* a newspaper with an audience so broad that her seeming intended audience

(parents of Barnard College students) would be engulfed by the hordes of potential readers. A closer look, however, suggests that her letter is directed less to parents of Barnard College students exclusively, or even to parents of college students in general, than to parents with children of any age. We might even go so far as to say that Shapiro's letter, with its broad criticisms of attitudes toward education in general, could be of interest to all citizens. Shapiro's audience of *New York Times* readers, then, encompasses all sorts of groups, from Manhattan workers commuting on the subway, to parents readying their children to go off to college for the first time, to the college students themselves, to preschool teachers, to professors.

Shapiro's situated *ethos* is enhanced by her byline: she is the president of Barnard College, a prestigious women's college with a reputation for scholarly excellence. The timing of the letter's appearance is also notable. It was published in late August, just as new college students were likely packing their bags to head to campus. In anticipation of this moment, Shapiro opens the letter with a sentence about what happens this time every year. In keeping with Cicero's suggestions, the sentence is dignified. This sentence, however, does more work than just set the scene in a serious manner; it makes the audience receptive by building Shapiro's *ethos* in two important ways. First, it establishes Shapiro as someone who is experienced with this scene—"every September" she is on campus, meeting parents and students, preparing for a new school year. Secondly, the sentence presents Shapiro as someone with good will toward her own faculty, as well as Barnard students and parents: she "joins" with her deans and faculty to "welcome" new students and their families. The second sentence, by marking the moment as "bittersweet," builds this *ethos* even more by demonstrating an understanding of the emotional moment, thus making readers receptive. The third sentence of the piece strikes a much different tone: the short, terse sentence "Parents must learn to back off" works to make even the casual reader more attentive. This is a writer with a point to make. Even people without a direct stake in higher education might take notice and continue to read the editorial at this point.

In the narrative, Shapiro continues to argue why (and how) parents should "back off" by stating her wish more positively—that is, she wishes that parents would recognize the importance of letting children develop on their own and that they would do so with "generosity and grace." Next, in the third paragraph, the narrative states the problem clearly (as narratives should, according to Cicero): education is fast becoming a product to be bought and sold, like a sofa, rather than the vital process of transformation and development Shapiro thinks it should be.

The section Cicero would call "confirmation" begins by discussing three examples of overinvolved parents from Shapiro's own school. She moves from example to example without much discussion. The examples are sufficiently compelling that they don't require elaboration or discussion. Further, the quick movement from one to another to another has the effect of a barrage. While the examples she lists come from her faculty's experiences (but have no doubt been brought up to her as president), the next part of the confirmation presents a picture of how parents typically behave when Shapiro herself is

around. Here, her *ethos* gets a boost, since her description shows how, unlike the parents, Shapiro seeks to engage the prospective student by speaking directly to—rather than about—her. The confirmation draws to a close with the general example about parents' attempts to choose their children's majors, followed by a diagnosis, which leads nicely into the refutation section.

In the refutation, Shapiro anticipates the arguments people will likely make in response to her case so far, arguments such as "sometimes young adults do not realize how crucial one's major can be, and they need parental guidance." Or "if we don't look after our children, who will?" Or, "this is a much different world now than when you went to college, Dr. Shapiro." Or even more likely, "I don't want my son/daughter making the same mistakes I did." Here, she moves to a general, cultural account of transformations that have occurred in attitudes toward education in past years, discussing the rise in competitive measures and acknowledging along the way that for parents, the stakes of their children's college education are high. She even ends the refutation by subtly acknowledging that members of the baby boom generation who went to college in the late 1960s (which most likely describes many of Shapiro's most invested readers) are becoming more conservative in their stance on education and would like their children to take a more businesslike approach to college than they perhaps did. She ends the refutation by devoting space to issues of safety and security, making sure to distinguish such issues from control and authority.

Finally, in her peroration Shapiro revisits the issue at hand by vividly describing the state of affairs she would like to see come about. She does this with one summative sentence followed by a description of the ideal result: "young people, so full of intelligence, spirit and promise, transformed into wonderful women and men." This focus on the students, in turn, boosts Shapiro's *ethos,* a strategy Cicero advised for the peroration. The concluding sentence, then, suggests that Shapiro has a vision, albeit an idealistic one, and her vision does not feature dollar signs, but people.

Judith Shapiro's letter provides an instance of discourse containing the Ciceronian elements and their appropriate topics. Shapiro's piece also exemplifies the important relationship between invention and arrangement. The generation of many effective proofs could be futile if they are ordered in such a way that they lose their persuasive force. Likewise, the most effective arrangement strategies will probably not help a rhetor who has not yet come up with good arguments. Again, a rhetor need not include all the parts of a speech outlined by Cicero and Quintilian; rather, the different parts, their functions, and the variety of topics presented for each part offers a wide range of choices to help a rhetor "assemble her troops" effectively.

EXERCISES

1. Compose an exordium, narrative, partition, and peroration for some argument you are working on. Carefully consider the rhetorical situation before you begin: Is your audience receptive? Hostile? Indifferent?

Does their attitude stem from their relation to the issue or to your *ethos?* Once you have answered these questions, you can decide whether you need an introduction or an insinuation and whether you need to make elaborate appeals in the peroration.

2. Examine a few speeches and essays produced by professional rhetors. (Collections of speeches by famous persons are available in most university libraries.) Can you find examples of insinuations, narratives, partitions, perorations? Examine enough pieces of discourse to determine whether modern rhetors feel it necessary to use any or all of these parts of a discourse.

3. Consider Judith Shapiro's rhetorical situation when she wrote the editorial on parental involvement in higher education. Do her choices in arranging her various arguments make sense? What different topics or proofs might Shapiro use if she were writing for another publication with a smaller, more clearly invested readership like Barnard's alumni newsletter? Would she write a different introduction? An insinuation? Write a new exordium for Shapiro's piece and rearrange its arguments (or generate new ones) so that the piece is suitable for a more specialized audience of Barnard graduates.

WORKS CITED

Robinson, Adam. *Bin Laden: Behind the Mask of the Terrorist.* New York: Arcade, 2001.
White, Eric Charles. *Kaironomia.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

STYLE:
COMPOSITION AND
ORNAMENT

Cicero holds that, while invention and arrangement are within the reach of anyone of good sense, eloquence belongs to the rhetor alone.... The verb eloqui means the production and communication to the audience of all that the rhetor has conceived . . . *and without this power all the preliminary accomplishments of rhetoric are as useless as a* sword *that is kept permanently concealed within its sheath.*

—Quintilian, *Institutes*
VIII Pr. 14-15

ANCIENT RHETORICIANS DEVOTED an entire canon of their art to the study of unusual uses or arrangements of words. They called this canon "style" *(lexis,* or "words," in Greek; *elocutio,* or "speaking out," in Latin). Defined as persuasive or extraordinary uses of language, style can be distinguished from grammar, which is the study of ordinary uses of language.

No one knows for sure when style emerged as the third canon of rhetoric. From earliest times, of course, poets and singers used unusual words and patterns in their work. Here, for example, are some lines from the *Iliad,* which is usually dated from the eighth century BCE—that is, two hundred years prior to Gorgias's trip to Athens during the sixth century BCE:

> Ah, Hektor,
> this harshness is no more than just. Remember, though,
> your spirit's like an ax-edge whetted sharp
> that goes through timber, when a good shipwright
> hews out a beam: the tool triples his power.
> That is the way your heart is in your breast.
> (HI 58-62)

When he compared Hector's heart to an ax used by a strong shipbuilder, the poet employed a figure later called a simile, wherein two unlike things are placed together so that the attributes of one are transferred to the other. Notice how the simile adds meaning to the picture of Hector that the poet is painting; we learn from it that, tike the strokes of an ax wielded by a strong man, Hector's courage is tireless, regular, and strong. As Quintilian remarked, such uses of language make things even more intelligible than does clarity alone (VIII ii 11).

Historians of rhetoric usually credit Gorgias with the discovery that extraordinary uses of language were persuasive in prose as well as poetry. Here, for example, is the opening passage of Gorgias's "Encomium to Helen":

> Fairest ornament to a city is a goodly army and to a body beauty and to a soul wisdom and to an action virtue and to speech truth, but their opposites are unbefitting. Man and woman and speech and deed and city and object should be honored with praise if praiseworthy but on the unworthy blame should be laid; for it is equal error and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy.

The first sentence shows careful attention to **sentence composition** in its use of balanced phrases ("to a body beauty" and so on). Both sentences contain examples of **antithesis,** wherein contrary or contradictory ideas are expressed in phrases that are grammatically alike ("to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy," for example). Even though Aristotle was skeptical about verbal pyrotechnics like these, he was aware of the persuasive power of language. In fact, he was among the first teachers of rhetoric to recognize that extraordinary uses of language like Gorgias's could be systematically studied. In both the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics,* he drew up rules for language use that exploited its tendencies to excite the emotions as well as its capacity to represent thought clearly. Some historians credit Aristotle's nephew, Theophrastus, with the realization that style could be studied separately from other closely related features of rhetoric, such as *ethos* or delivery, but other historians place the emergence of style as a separate area of study much later, during the Hellenistic period.

Stylistic ornament is still widely used. In an article on summertime movies written for *Esquire,* David Thomson employed a simile: "the movies are so hot and the air inside the theaters so temptingly cold, it's a recipe like hot fudge on vanilla ice cream" (August 1997, 36). This example of **personification** appeared in the *New Yorker* magazine: "But now there are three news networks elbowing each other, with the broadcast giants following uneasily in their wake" (Hertzberg, October 20, 2001, 32). And this example of metaphor appeared in a *New York Times* editorial: "In his eagerness to get both American and international support for an invasion of Iraq, Mr. Bush seemed to be piling everything onto this single cart," where the rhetor compares the Bush administration's diplomatic efforts to shopping for groceries (February 27, 2003, A30).

Ancient teachers of rhetoric combined Aristotle's philosophical view of language with Gorgias's sophistic view to argue that rhetorical language ought to be clear and that it ought to touch the emotions as well. Teachers helped their students to achieve stylistic excellence by teaching them about as many unusual uses of language as they could isolate and classify, by asking them to imitate famous authors and to practice composing their own examples of various schemes or figures (Greek *schemata;* Latin *figura,* "shape"). Ancient rhetoricians isolated four qualities of style that permitted them to distinguish a persuasive style from a less effective one. While there was some disagreement about which qualities ought to be included in a list of stylistic excellences, in the main, ancient authors agreed that a good style ought to manifest correctness, clearness, appropriateness, and ornament.

CORRECTNESS

The Greek and Latin words for correctness were *hellenismos* and *latinitas,* respectively. Sometimes translated as "purity," correctness meant that rhetors should use words that were current and should adhere to the grammatical rules of whatever language they wrote. In Greek and Latin, meaning depended to a great degree on word endings; nouns had different endings depending on their case, number, and gender, while verb endings indicated such things as tense and mood. Thus, the achievement of correctness in one of those languages was a more complex and interesting task than it is in English, which depends primarily on word order for its meanings.

Ancient rhetoricians ordinarily left instruction in correctness (and sometimes clarity as well) to the elementary school teachers, who were grammarians and students of literature. Cicero wrote in *De Oratore* that "the rules of correct Latin style … are imparted by education in childhood and fostered by a more intensive and systematic study of literature, or else by the habit of daily conversation in the family circle, and confirmed by books and by reading the old orators and poets" (III xii 48). Interestingly, Cicero agreed in this with the contemporary linguists, who argue that native speakers of any language internalize a good many of its grammatical rules while they are learning it. Since native speakers of a language have an intuitive grasp of its grammar, the correctness rules that trouble people today usually involve conventional niceties of written language such as spelling, punctuation, and some outdated rules of grammar and usage. Since these features of correctness govern choices that can be made while editing, we discuss a few of them in the chapter on delivery.

CLARITY

Clarity is the English word most often used for the Greek *sapheneia,* although it is sometimes translated "lucidity" (from Latin *lucere,* "to shine"), or "perspicuity" (from Latin *perspicere,* "to see through"). The Latin

terms demonstrate that clarity once connoted language that lets meanings "shine through" it, like light through a window. As we noted earlier, however, rhetoricians like Gorgias were suspicious about the capacity of language to transfer meaning clearly from rhetors to audiences. For most ancient teachers, clarity simply meant that rhetors should use words in their ordinary or usual everyday senses unless they had some compelling reason to do otherwise.

According to Quintilian, rhetors could avoid the obligation to be clear only if they were compelled to refer to obscenities, unseemly behavior, or trivial matters. In any of these cases, they could resort to circumlocution (Greek *periphrasis,* "speaking around"), a more roundabout means of reference. Terms like *restroom* or *powder room* are circumlocutions for *toilet;* it is a circumlocution to say that "Henry and the company decided to part ways" when Henry was fired. Clarity can also be obscured by the use of obsolete, technical, new, or colloquial words. Obsolete words are those that are no longer in popular use *(motored* for *drove).* Technical language (that is, jargon) is used by specialists in a profession or discipline (for example, *valorize* and *abjection* from current talk among academics). Quintilian also advised against the practice of coining of new words (neologism) since new words are not familiar to those who hear or read them. He told a funny story about a speaker who, in his anxiety to give a formal tone to his talk, used the phrase "Iberian grass" to refer to the plant known as "Spanish broom" (VIII I 2–3). The problem with "Iberian grass" was that the phrase puzzled everyone who heard it, which is, we must admit, an offense against clarity. Colloquial words are used in a very specific locale or culture. For example, *with it,* originally from the Beat culture of the 1950s, is colloquial and now obsolete as well. So are the "in" terms from the 1970s— *groovy* and *far out.* However, other colloquial terms, such as *hip* and *cool,* are amazingly tenacious: *hip* was "cool" in the sixties, while *cool* was "hip" in the fifties and the seventies; *cool* is still in popular use today, although *hot* seems to be gaining on it.

Modern composition textbooks tell writers to avoid colloquial or technical language altogether. This is nonsense. As Quintilian said, the best course is to call things by the names people ordinarily use, unless for some reason the name would puzzle an audience or give offense. In other words, rhetors should always use language that is familiar to their audiences, even if this language is colloquial or jargon ridden. A rhetor who addresses an audience that uses a dialect should use it if she is comfortable doing so. Former president Jimmy Carter, who was raised in Georgia, uses a Southern dialect of English. When he campaigned in the South, he told his audiences that they should elect him in order to have someone in the presidency who had no accent! Likewise, a rhetor who addresses literary critics should use whatever jargon is currently in vogue within that group, because jargon is ordinarily invented as a means of attaining precision— that is, clarity. A rhetor who is addressing teachers or bosses should try to use language that is familiar to those audiences. If this means learning a technical vocabulary, so be it.

APPROPRIATENESS: KAIROS AND STYLE

Once we move past correctness and clarity, we are working in more truly rhetorical realms of style—**appropriateness** and ornament.[1] Oddly enough, these realms are not often treated in modern composition textbooks, whose authors are more anxious that writers be correct and clear than that they be persuasive.

Appropriateness probably derives from the Greek rhetorical notion *to prepon,* meaning to say or do whatever is fitting in a given situation. Perhaps it is also descended from Gorgias's notion of *kairos,* seizing the right moment to speak, the moment when listeners are ready to hear. Cicero upheld appropriateness or propriety as the most important rule of thumb for effective rhetoric when he wrote that "the universal rule, in oratory as in life, is to consider propriety" *(Orator* xxi 71). But for Cicero, propriety was not something that can be made into a list of hard and fast rules. Cicero defined propriety as "what is fitting and agreeable to an occasion or person; it is important often in actions as well as in words, in the expression of the face, in gesture and in gait" (xxii, 74). So Cicero favored a situational propriety, one that comes closer to the Greek notion of *kairos.* As we discussed in Chapter 2, on *kairos,* the mythical figure Kairos was often depicted balancing on some object—be it a razor blade or a ball or a wheel. Achieving a balanced style is one of the challenges rhetors often face. Cicero was well aware of this challenge as a central concern for rhetoric. He wrote: "When a case presents itself in which the full force of eloquence can be expended, then the orator will display his powers more fully; then we will rule and sway men's minds, and move them as he will, that is as the nature of the case and the exigency of the occasion demand" (xxxv, 125).

Cicero was not the only ancient who expressed a concern for propriety in rhetoric. Even Plato, who was skeptical about the value of rhetoric, emphasized the importance of using an appropriate style. In Plato's *Phaedrus,* the character Socrates tells Phaedrus that when a rhetor supplements an awareness of the audience with "a knowledge of the times for speaking and for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favorable occasions *(kairous)* for brief speech or pitiful speech or intensity and all the classes of speech which he has learned, then, and not till then, will his art be fully and completely finished" (272-73). For Plato, then, attention to *kairos*—the nature of the subject matter, the general attitudes and backgrounds of the audience—helped the rhetor make decisions about an appropriate style. A young aspiring rhetor like Phaedrus, for example, might steer clear of using hyperbole (exaggeration of a case) in front of Socrates, the teacher of reason, for it would be in Phaedrus's best interest to establish himself as a reasonable rhetor. As you can see, concerns about style are linked to the ethical proofs, discussed in the chapter on *ethos.*

Like ethical proof, attention to *kairos* in style requires sensitivity to community standards of behavior, since appropriateness is dictated by the standards of the community in which we live. In our culture, for example,

people do not generally pick their noses in public, because the community defines this as inappropriate behavior.

The community dictates the standards of rhetorical appropriateness as well. When ancient teachers of rhetoric counseled their students to use an appropriate style, they generally meant that a style should be suited to subject, occasion, and audience. This meant that rhetors had to understand the standards of behavior required by the occasion for which they composed a piece of discourse. Since every occasion for writing or speaking differs from the next, it is very difficult to generate rules to govern appropriateness. Cicero underscored this difficulty in *De Oratore:*

> Different styles are required by deliberative speeches, panegyrics, lawsuits and lectures, and for consolation, protest, discussion and historical narrative, respectively. The audience is also important—whether it is the lords or the commons or the bench; a large audience or a small one or a single person, and their personal character; and consideration must be given to the age, station and office of the speakers themselves, and to the occasion, in peace time or during a war, urgent or allowing plenty of time. (III iv 211-12)

In other words, the achievement of an appropriate style requires rhetors to pay attention to the conventional rules for verbal behavior in a given context, rules that have been laid down by their culture. If a rhetor has been asked to give a eulogy (a funeral speech), for example, his language should be dignified and subdued, because our culture dictates dignified and subdued behavior on such occasions. If he writes lyrics for country music, dignified and subdued won't cut it, since the style of country music is down-home and informal.

Ancient teachers distinguished three very general levels of style that were appropriate to various rhetorical settings: grand, middle, and plain.[2] According to the author of *ad Herennium,* discourse was composed in the grand style "if to each idea are applied the most ornate words that can be found for it, whether literal or figurative; if impressive thoughts are chosen, .. . and if we employ figures of thought and figures of diction which have grandeur" (IV viii 11). He supplied us with a fine example of the grand style, which we quote in part:

> Who of you, pray, jury members, could devise a punishment drastic enough for him who has plotted to betray the fatherland to our enemies? What offence can compare with this crime, what punishment can be found commensurate with this offence? Upon those who had done violence to a freeborn youth, outraged the mother of a family, wounded, or—basest crime of all—slain a man, our ancestors exhausted the catalogue of extreme punishments; while for this most savage and impious villainy they bequeath no specific penalty. In other wrongs, indeed, injury arising from another's crime extends to one individual, or only to a few; but the participants in this crime are plotting, with one stroke, the most horrible catastrophes for the whole body of citizens. O such men of savage hearts! O such cruel designs! O such human beings bereft of human feeling! (IV viii 12)

In keeping with our author's definition of the grand style, this passage concerns a lofty issue—treachery—and uses a great deal of ornament. It opens with two **rhetorical questions,** a figure in which a rhetor asks a question to which she doesn't really expect an answer. In fact, asking the question actually provides an opportunity to say more damning things about the traitors. The second rhetorical question also contains an **antistrophe** ("turning about"), the repetition of the same or similar words in successive clauses. Rather than referring to Rome by name, the speaker employs an **epithet—** *fatherland*—which is also a pun that reminds listeners about their dependent relationship on the state (*father* and *patriotism* have the same root, *patria,* in Latin). There are several examples of *isocolon* (balanced clauses), and the final passionate outbursts are examples of **apostrophe** ("turning away") to address absent persons or some **abstraction—"O** such cruel designs."

The middle style does not use ordinary prose, but it is more relaxed than the grand style. Cicero said that "all the ornaments are appropriate" to this style, especially metaphor and its relatives *(Orator* xxvi 91-96). A rhetor using the middle style develops arguments in leisurely fashion and as fully as possible and uses as many commonplaces as can be worked into the argument without drawing attention to their presence. The author of *ad Herennium* also provided an example of the middle style:

> men of the jury, you see against whom we are waging war—against allies who have been wont to fight in our defence, and together with us to preserve our empire by their valor and zeal. Not only must they have known themselves, their resources, and their manpower, but their nearness to us and their alliance with us in all affairs enabled them no less to learn and appraise the power of the Roman people in every sphere. When they had resolved to fight against us, on what, I ask you, did they rely in presuming to undertake the war, since they understood that much the greater part of our allies remained faithful to duty, and since they saw that they had at hand no great supply of soldiers, no competent commanders, and no public money—in short, none of the things needful for carrying on the war? (IV ix 13)

Here the rhetor used ordinary everyday language and loose sentence construction. While there are fewer ornaments than in the grand style, a few do appear: there is a fairly complex isocolon in the second sentence ("their resources, and their manpower, but their nearness to and their alliance with us"). "On what, I ask you" is another example of a rhetorical question.

According to the author of *ad Herennium,* the plain or simple style uses the "most ordinary speech of every day," almost as though it were conversation (IV x 14). Cicero elaborated on this bare description of the plain style, noting that it is "stripped of ornament" and "to the point, explaining everything and making every point clear rather than impressive" *(Orator* v 20). Usually the plain style employs straightforward narrative ("This happened and then this") or simple exposition of the facts, and it uses **loose** rather than **periodic sentences.**

Once again, rhetors should choose the level of style that is appropriate to their *ethos,* their subject matter, their audience, and the occasion. The grand style is certainly appropriate for ceremonial functions like weddings, funerals, and inaugurations. The plain style is appropriate when clarity is the main goal dictated by the occasion, while the middle style is appropriate for almost any discourse that will be published.

ORNAMENT

The last, and most important, of the excellences of style is ornament. Under this heading, ancient rhetoricians discussed uses of language that were unusual or extraordinary. They divided their study of ornament into three broad categories: **figures of speech** (Latin *figurae verborum*), **figures of thought** *(figurae sententiarum),* and tropes (Greek *tropi,* "turn"). Ancient grammarians and rhetoricians argued endlessly over the definitions and distinctions among these three sorts of ornament, and modern scholars haven't done much better at making sense out of the categories. As ancient rhetoric matured, the confusion grew. In some scholarly traditions, ornaments like **climax** and antithesis were classed under more than one heading (sometimes as figures, sometimes as tropes), while others, like **metaphor** and epithet, were often discussed both as single words (diction) and in terms of their effects in groups of words (composition).

Contemporary rhetors don't need to keep the categories straight, since discussions of figures and tropes no longer have to be memorized, as they did in Aristotle's time. However, rhetoricians should be able to distinguish among figures of language, figures of thought, and tropes. So, with Quintilian's help, we try to distinguish among these ancient categories.

Generally, a figure is any form of expression in which "we give our language a conformation other than the obvious and ordinary" (IX i 4). Sometimes Quintilian seems to mean the term *figure* literally; a figure is any piece of language that has a remarkable or artful shape. He likened the changes in language or meaning brought about by the use of figures to the changes in the shape of the body that came about "by sitting, lying down on something or looking back" (IX i 11). That is, use of a figure changes the shape of language, just as a change in posture or position changes the shape of the body. There are two kinds of figures. Figures of thought involve artful changes in ideas, feelings, or conceptions; these figures depart from ordinary patterns of moving an argument along (17). Figures of language, in contrast, involve unusual **patternings** of language, such as repetition or juxtaposition of similar words or constructions.

A trope is any substitution of one word or phrase for another. Grammatically speaking, a trope can transfer words or phrases from their proper place to another. This kind of grammatical trope is rare. Winston Churchill used it when he said "this is a kind of impertinence up with which I will not put." Here Churchill substituted an unusual word order

for the ordinary pattern in order to make fun of the traditional grammatical rule that says prepositions may not appear at the end of sentences. Rhetorically speaking, a trope transfers the usual signification of a word or phrase to another, as in "My love is like a red, red rose." Here the poet (Robert Burns) transferred the meanings associated with roses (fragile, thorny, blooming briefly) to his love.

We review the ornaments of style in keeping with the ancient spirit of *copia.* Cicero wrote to his friend Trebatius, "As I have a guest with such a ravenous appetite for this feast of learning, I shall provide such an abundance that there may be something left from the banquet, rather than let you go unsatisfied" *(Topics TV* 25). Rhetors can study and practice using figures and tropes in order to enlarge their linguistic repertoire and, thus, to have them at hand whenever their use is appropriate to occasion, subject, audience, and *ethos.* But there are yet other reasons for their use. Quintilian argued that ornament, carefully deployed, contributes not a little to the furtherance of our case as well. For when our audience finds it a pleasure to listen, their attention and their readiness to believe what they hear are both alike increased, while they are generally filled with delight and sometimes even transported by admiration (VIII iii 5). A carefully chosen metaphor can make an argument clearer and more striking; a nicely balanced antithesis can lend emphasis to a point. Thus ornament enhances persuasion; indeed, it can also aid clarity.

Sentence Composition

We begin with ancient advice about sentence structure, since an understanding of ancient terms for parts of sentences is necessary to an understanding of figurative language. The ancient term for a sentence was **period** (Greek *periodos, "a* way around"). Modern scholars think that the ancient conception of a period as a whole made up of parts or **members** may derive from an analogy to the human body, which also has a main part—its trunk—from which the limbs or members branch off. In any case, ancient rhetoricians called any stretch of words that could stand on its own a "period," giving a sense of completeness (this is the source of our use of the term *period* to name a piece of punctuation that marks the end of a sentence). An ancient period is equivalent to a modern punctuated sentence: in other words, a period is any unit of prose that begins with a capital letter and ends with some mark of terminal punctuation (period, question mark, or exclamation point).

In order to grasp ancient thought about periods, it is helpful to think of any period as having a main part on which all the other parts depend—just like a tree or a human body. The main part of a period is meaningful all by itself, but this is usually not true of its members or branches.

John loves Mary.   (Main Part)

John loves Mary | even though he barely knows her.

    Main Part   Member

The stretches of language on either side of the | are logically different, because the left-hand one makes sense all by itself, while the one on the right needs more information to make complete sense.

Some periods consist only of one main part, with no additional members: "John loves Mary." It is also possible to string several main parts into a single period: "John loves Mary; Mary loves Fred; Fred despises everyone." Each section of this period is meaningful by itself. (Traditional grammarians call this a **compound sentence.** The ancients did not use this terminology, however.) It is also possible to add several kinds of dependent structures to the main part of any sentence. As the name implies, dependent structures are not meaningful by themselves. (Traditional grammarians call any sentence that has a main part and one or more dependent parts a **complex sentence.)** Ancient rhetoricians recognized two kinds of dependent structures: colons and commas.

Quintilian defined a colon (Latin *membrum,* "part" or "limb") as any expression that was rhythmically complete but meaningless if detached from the rest of the sentence. The author of *ad Herennium* gave these examples of colons:

> On the one hand you were helping your enemy
> and on the other you were hurting your friend. (IV xix 26)

Colons are not always equivalent to English clauses. Nevertheless, the structure known in English as a dependent or subordinate clause is a colon. Hence our use of the terms *semicolon* and *colon* to refer to punctuation marks that set off internal parts of sentences.

The term *comma* (Latin *articulus,* "part jointed on") referred to any set of words set apart by pauses (whence our term for the mark of punctuation, *comma,* which serves that very function in English sentences). Demetrius of Phaleron called a comma a "chip" since it was a piece cut or hacked off from a longer member *(On Style* I i 9). Quintilian defined it as an expression lacking rhythmical completeness or a portion of a colon (IX iv 122). A comma can consist of a single word, as in these examples from the *ad Herennium:*

> By your vigour, voice, looks you have tarried your adversaries.
> You have destroyed your enemies by jealousy, injuries, influence, perfidy.

In the first example, *voice* is a comma; in the second, *injuries* and *influence* are commas. In modern prose, commas are usually set off by punctuation. Since commas are very short, the English word *phrase* is usually a satisfactory translation.

Isocrates was widely regarded throughout antiquity as a master of artful composition. We use a sentence from his "Helen" to illustrate the ancient terms of composition:

> And although the Trojans might have rid themselves of the misfortunes which
> encompassed them by surrendering Helen, and the Greeks might have lived in

peace for all time by being indifferent to her fate, neither so wished; on the contrary, the Trojans allowed their cities to be laid waste and their land to be ravaged, so as to avoid yielding Helen to the Greeks, and the Greeks chose rather, remaining in a foreign land to grow old there and never to see their own again, than, leaving her behind, to return to their fatherland. **(50–51)**

This is a very long sentence (ninety-four words) even by ancient standards. And yet it is still readable, because Isocrates (and his translator) paid careful attention to rhythm, internal punctuation, and the placement and balance of its parts. We graph the sentence in order to indicate its parts and their relations:

> And although
> the Trojans might have rid themselves of the misfortunes which encompassed them by surrendering Helen (COLON)
> > and
> the Greeks might have lived in peace for all time by being indifferent to her fate (COLON)
> neither [the Trojans nor Greeks] so wished (FIRST MAIN PART)
> > on the contrary (COMMA)
> the Trojans allowed their cities to be laid waste and their land to be ravaged (FIRST HALF SECOND MAIN PART)
> > so as to avoid yielding Helen to the Greeks (COLON)
> > > and
> the Greeks chose (SECOND HALF SECOND MAIN PART)
> > remaining in a foreign land to grow old there and never to see their own again
> > > rather than
> leaving her behind to return to their fatherland (COLON).

Traditional grammarians would call this a **compound-complex sentence,** since it has two main parts and each of these has dependent clauses attached. An ancient rhetorician, however, would have noticed the artful placement of the carefully balanced colons, as well as the rhythms built into the entire period. In order to appreciate these, you may have to read the sentence aloud. You can best appreciate the rhetorical effects of the other examples we provide for ancient figures of language if you read them aloud, as well, since they are intended to please the ear as well as the eye. Indeed, we recommend that you get into the habit of reading your own prose aloud in order to determine whether it has rhythm and shape. Reading aloud sometimes indicates the places where internal punctuation is needed, as well.

Paratactic and **Periodic Styles**

Ancient rhetoricians distinguished two types of sentences, which they called loose and periodic. Greek terms for a loose sentence can be translated "running" or "strung-on" or "continuous." Aristotle defined a style made up of loose sentences as having "no natural stopping-places." This

style "comes to a stop only because there is no more to say of that subject" (III ix 9). He seems to have meant that the parts of a loose sentence are simply tacked onto one another. If we accept Aristotle's definition, a style made up of loose sentences might most accurately be called paratactic (Greek *parataxis,* "placed alongside"). A paratactic style gives the impression that the rhetor placed utterances somewhat carelessly side by side, just as they occurred to him. (The preceding sentence is an example.)

Later rhetoricians recommended this style for use in conversation and informal letters because of its simplicity and naturalness. They refined their discussions of the paratactic style to suggest that loosely constructed sentences also observe the ordinary or usual word order of the language in which they are written (as this very sentence does, or did, until we added this parenthesis). Paratactic style is frequently used in electronic mail, for this medium is fast, casual, and conducive to "chat" rather than to formal decrees. Since the paratactic style observes the natural word order of a language, its use does not constitute a figure unless a rhetor uses it to achieve some artistic effect, such as an impression of carelessness or breathlessness.

Aristotle thought that the paratactic style was unpleasant to read "because it goes on indefinitely—one always likes to sight a stopping-place in front of one. That explains why runners, just when they have reached the goal, lose their breath and strength, whereas before, when the end is in sight, they show no signs of fatigue" *(Rhetoric* HI xi 1409a). For this reason, Aristotle preferred a style in which units of speech were more carefully demarcated and set off from one another. Like the rhetoricians who would later apply his terminology to all sentences, he called a unit of this kind a "period," and he defined it as "a portion of speech that has in itself a beginning and end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance" (35). Aristotle wrote that periods satisfied readers because they reached definite conclusions and they were easier to remember too. A periodic sentence, then, has an obvious structure; ordinarily its main part does not come at the beginning, as in a loose sentence. Its meaning may be distributed among several of its parts, as it is in the example from Isocrates, where the two main parts of the sentence are sandwiched between two groups of paired colons. Later rhetoricians dictated that rhetors should postpone the sense of the period until readers reached its final member, but this restriction was not usually a part of classical lore about style. In this example from Gorgias's "Helen," the main part of the period is placed last: "Who it was and why and how he sailed away, taking Helen as his love, I shall not say" (5). Hellenistic rhetoricians also dictated that periods could contain as few as one member or as many as four. Of course it is possible to write sentences that contain an infinite number of members, but ancient rhetoricians generally cautioned against such excess.

A style becomes periodic when readers have the sense that sentences are carefully constructed and satisfactorily "rounded off." Since the periodic style was appropriate to the most dignified and important occasions, most teachers also cautioned their students to use periodic sentences sparingly.

Figurative Language

In general, a paratactic style does not employ many figures of language, because it is structurally simple by definition. This is not true of the periodic style, however. Ancient rhetoricians compiled endless lists of variations on the use and arrangements of the basic parts of the period: these variations are the figures of language. Quintilian wrote that this group of figures has "one special merit, that they relieve the tedium of everyday stereotyped speech and save us from commonplace language" (IX iii 3–4). When they are used sparingly, they serve as a seasoning to any style.

We have divided the figures of language into two broad categories: those that interrupt normal word order and those that repeat words or structures for effect.

Figures That Interrupt Normal Word Order

Here is a periodic sentence from Gorgias's "Defense of Palamedes" "If then the accuser, Odysseus, made his accusation through good will toward Greece, either clearly knowing that I was betraying Greece to the barbarians or imagining somehow that this was the case, he would be best of men" (Sprague, 55).

> If then the accuser made his accusation through good will toward Greece
>   either
>   knowing clearly that I was betraying Greece to the barbarians
>   or
>   imagining somehow that this was the case
> he [Odysseus] would be the best of men.

Notice that Gorgias delayed the sense of the sentence until the very end (Odysseus is the best of men—if his motives are honest). The periodic structure keeps readers in suspense, heightening their curiosity about the author's opinion of Odysseus. Later on, Gorgias used a sentence constructed on similar lines to state another possibility: "But if he has put together this allegation out of envy or conspiracy or knavery, just as in the former case he would be the finest of men, so in this he would be the worst of men."

> But if he has put together this allegation out of envy or conspiracy or knavery
>   just as
> in the former case he would be the finest of men
>   so
> in   this   he would be the worst of men.

Again, the author's judgement of Odysseus's motives is postponed to the very end of the sentence. Taken together, the two sentences create an antithesis that works across several sentences.

Here is a periodic sentence from the nineteenth century written by Ralph Waldo Emerson in his essay "Nature": "Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, without having in my

thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration."

> Crossing the common
>   in snow puddles
>   at twilight
>   under a clouded sky
>   **without** ... good fortune
> I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration.

Emerson postponed the point of the sentence (his achievement of perfect exhilaration) until its end, thus keeping readers in suspense and yet giving them the satisfaction of a firm closure when it finally arrives. He also used grammatically balanced commas (each is a prepositional phrase) inside a longish colon ("crossing ... fortune") to build up suspense.

Here is a third example, a beautiful periodic sentence written by Alice Walker: "Wrapped in his feathered cape, his winged boots, he sent his soul flying to Zede while holding his body, his thought, his attentions on Carlotta, whom he did not cease to love" *(The Temple of My Familiar,* 24).

> Wrapped in his feathered cape
>   his winged boots
> he sent his soul flying   to Zede
>   while holding
>   his body
>   his thought
>   his attentions on Carlotta, whom he did not cease to love.

Walker used parallel commas to emphasize her character's divided loyalties, which she reveals to readers only at the conclusion of the period.

News writers occasionally use periodic sentences, as well. This one appeared in a reflective essay on the history of racism in America, written by Jeffrey Gettleman: "Yet even at the height of segregation, when working-class whites clubbed black demonstrators in the streets of Birmingham and Atlanta, some white leaders were willing to question the old ways" *(New York Times,* December 22, 2002, Wk, 3).

Rhetors can also interrupt normal word order by inserting a word or phrase inside a colon or period. Quintilian called this figure *interpositio,* but it is still known in English by its Greek name, *parenthesis* ("a statement alongside another"). As the interpolation in the previous sentence demonstrates, a parenthetical statement decreases distance, since it suddenly discloses the author's **presence—as** though she were speaking behind her hand. Parenthetical statements may appear between commas, like this, but they are more often punctuated by **dashes—as** we have done **here—or** with parentheses (as illustrated here). The novelist Robert Graves made interesting use of an almost wholly parenthetical style in the opening passage of his novel, *I Claudius:*

> I, Tiberius Claudius Drusus Nero **Germanicus** This-that-and-the-other (for I shall not trouble you yet with all my titles) who was once, and not so long ago

either, known to my friends and relatives and associates as "Claudius the Idiot," or "That Claudius," or "Claudius the Stammerer," or "Clau-Clau-Claudius" or at best as "poor Uncle Claudius," am now about to write this strange history of my life. (1961, 3)

The parenthetical asides nearly swamp the main part of this sentence, inserted as they are between "I" and "am now about to write." Graves used them to suggest an important feature of Claudius's character: even though he wasn't very well organized, he was a stickler for detail.

Rhetors can interrupt normal word order in a number of other ways. The ancients gave such interruptions the generic name of *hyperbaton* ("a sudden turn"). A rhetor can attach a descriptive comma, as follows: "Mary, though reputed to be in love with John, is actually quite fond of Fred." The interpolated comma is an *appositio* ("putting off from," apposition in English), a phrase that interrupts the main part of the period to modify it or to add commentary about it. Or he can use an apostrophe to call on his audience or someone else: "I am, heaven help me, lost." In a very long sentence, it is sometimes helpful to sum up with an interrupter: "Invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery—these, the five canons of rhetoric—are all that occupy me now." The ancients called this figure *metabasis,* a summarizing transition.

Ancient rhetoricians also identified a pair of figures having to do with the use of connecting words between colons: asyndeton (no connectors) and polysyndeton (many connectors). Using the first figure, a rhetor eliminates connectors that ordinarily appear between colons or commas, as in this example from Cicero: "I ordered those against whom information was laid, to be summoned, guarded, brought before the senate: they were led into the senate" (quoted by Quintilian, IX iii 50). Cicero eliminated the *ands* that would ordinarily connect coordinate commas in order to give an impression of haste and vigor. Compare his version to a version that inserts connecting *ands: "1* ordered those against whom information was laid to be summoned and guarded and brought before the senate, and they were led into the senate."

Gorgias used the opposing figure in the opening passage of his "Helen":

> Fairest ornament to a city is a goodly army and to a body beauty and to a soul wisdom and to an action virtue and to speech truth, but their opposites are unbefitting. Man and woman and speech and deed and city and object should be honored with praise if praiseworthy but on the unworthy blame should be laid; for it is equal error and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy.

Both sentences contain examples of polysyndeton, in which the rhetor employs more conjunctions *(and* in this case) than are required by either grammar or sense. This figure enabled Gorgias to stretch out a series of words or phrases, thus calling attention to each item in the series and giving the whole a leisurely pace. To grasp the rhetorical effect of polysyn-

deton as compared to that of asyndeton, compare Gorgias's versions to a revision that substitutes punctuation for *and:*

> Fairest ornament to a city is a goodly army; to a body beauty; to a soul wisdom; to an action virtue; to a speech truth. Man, woman, speech, deed, city, object, should be honored.

Figures of Repetition

Modern composition textbooks often tell their readers to avoid repetition. Most likely, their authors worry that students rely on repetition because they do not have a sufficiently large vocabulary. But the advice to avoid repetition, however well meant, is not necessarily good advice. Since repetition is a means of calling attention to words and ideas that are important, rhetors should not be afraid to repeat words that are central to their arguments.

Artful repetition was available to speakers of Greek and Latin in single words. Rhetors could simply repeat a word in order to call attention to it, as Demosthenes is said to have done when asked what was the most important part of rhetoric. He replied: "Delivery, delivery, delivery." Gertrude Stein used repetition to make fun of poetic metaphors about roses: "A rose is a rose is a rose." In Chapter 2, on *kairos,* we encountered an instance of repetition in the speech by Governor George Ryan with which he commuted the sentences of death row inmates: "Our capital system is haunted by the demon of error, error in determining guilt and error in determining who among the guilty deserves to die" *(Nezv York Times,* January 12, 2003, A1). You can see how the ringing repetition of the word *error* marks the flawed system as that which drove Governor Ryan's landmark decision.

Another means of repeating words is **synomyny** ("the same name"), that is, using words that are similar in meaning as a means of repeating an important point: "call it treason, betrayal, sedition, or villainy—it is one." The author of *ad Herennium* gave these examples: "You have impiously beaten your father; you have criminally laid hands upon your parent" and "You have overturned the republic from its roots; you have demolished the state from its foundations" (IIV xxviii 38). A thesaurus can help when a rhetor wants to pile up similar words to create the figure of synonymy. A thesaurus should never be used to avoid repeating words, though; to do this is to commit the rhetorical sin of circumlocution. As the ancient rhetoricians repeatedly pointed out, repetition is not necessarily a bad thing. Artfully used, it constitutes a figure. A thesaurus supplies lists of words that are similar to one another (synonyms). But synonyms are not pure equivalents, despite their Greek name. No two words mean exactly the same thing, because meaning depends upon context and use. Students who use a thesaurus to avoid repetition or to find words that "sound fancier" than the ones they ordinarily use, then, are misusing it, and they run the risk as well of saying something they don't mean.

There is another class of figures of language that use artful synonymy and exploit other similarities between words, as well. These are now

known generically as puns. Puns allow rhetors to repeat something in an artful and often funny way: "He told the sexton and the sexton tolled the bell." The punch lines of shaggy dog stories were funny because they punned on some sober maxim: "Don't hatchet your counts before they chicken"; "People who live in grass houses shouldn't stow thrones." A practice currently in vogue is to give businesses punning names, such as "Shear Madness," a beauty shop in State College, Pennsylvania, and "The Great Impasta," an Italian restaurant in Champaign, Illinois. Ancient puns often do not survive translation, because the pun depends upon some similarity in word shape or sound. Quintilian quoted this one from the Roman poet Ovid: *"Cur ego non dicam, Furia, te furiam?"* ("Furia, why should I not call you a fury?"); and this one, which does survive translation, from *ad Herennium: "Nam amari iucundum sit, si curetur ne quid insit amari"* ("To be dear to you would bring me joy—if only I take care it shall not in anguish cost me dear") (IV xiv 21; *Institutes* IX iii 69-70). Quintilian thought that this form of the figure was a "poor trick even when employed in jest." Along with Quintilian, we often roll our eyes at puns.

According to Quintilian, puns belong to the class of figures that "attracts the ear of the audience and excites their attention by some resemblance, equality or contrast of words" (IX iii 66). The ancient term for pun was *paronomasia,* which the author of *ad Herennium* defined as "the figure in which, by means of a modification of sound, or change of letters, a close resemblance to a given verb or noun is produced, so that similar words express dissimilar things" (IV xxi 29). Generally, puns exploit accidental resemblances among words. There are many varieties of this figure, but all have to do with using words that are similar to others, either in sound, shape, meaning, or function. In short, puns can exploit almost any accidental resemblance among the shapes, functions, sounds, spellings, or meanings of words. This headline from an article in *Time*—"Hung up on Competition"—about the effects of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, plays on two senses of "hung up"—that the act performed with telephones and the "hang-up," or slight obsession (July 21, 1997, 50).

Using *antanaclasis* ("bending back"), the rhetor repeats a word in two different senses: "I would leave this place, should the Senate give me leave" *(ad Herennium* IV xiv 21). "If we don't hang together, we'll hang separately" (Benjamin Franklin). Using *homoioteleuton* ("same ending"), the rhetor repeats words having similar endings: "You dare to act dishonorably, you strive to talk despicably; you live hatefully, you sin zealously, you speak offensively" *(ad Herennium TV* xx 28). This figure had more uses in Greek and Latin than it does in English, where only a few parts of speech, such as the adverbs illustrated here, have similar endings. Still, *Esquire* writer Walt "Clyde" Frasier used *homoioteleuton* to describe basketball player Lisa Leslie as "tenacious, sagacious, and vivacious" (August 1997, 36).

Using zeugma and its relatives, the rhetor ties a number of commas or colons to the same verb. Quintilian quoted this example from Cicero: "Lust conquered shame, boldness fear, madness reason" *("Pro Cluentio"* vi 15;

Institutes IX iii 62). Modern rhetoricians like to cite Alexander Pope's use of zeugma in "The Rape of the Lock," whose heroine's confused values are such that she would just as soon "stain her honor, or her new brocade." Here is another zeugma from Pope:

> Here thou, great Anna! whom three realms obey
> Dost sometimes counsel **take—and** sometimes tea.

Pope's juxtaposition of the heavily political and the slightly domestic is funny (and it was possibly even funnier when *obey* actually rhymed with *tea).* Because zeugma turns the same verb in different directions, it is useful for dealing with complex issues. This feature, combined with its inherent economy, makes zeugma a favorite for writers of headlines like this one: "Gains on Heart Disease Leave More Survivors, and Questions" *(New York Times,* January 19, 2003, **A1).**

There is another set of figures that depends upon repetition of words, but this group requires the composition of periods having two or more members. Rhetors using these figures repeat words that appear in similar positions in each of several members of a period. For example, words can be repeated at the beginning of successive colons expressing either similar or different ideas (anaphora or *epanaphora,* literally "carrying back"): "To you must go the credit for this, to you are thanks due, to you will this act of yours bring glory" *(ad Herennium TV* xiii 19). Or rhetors can repeat the last word in successive phrases *(epiphora):* "It was by the justice of the Roman people that the Carthaginians were conquered, by its force of arms that they were conquered, by its generosity that they were conquered." Or they can combine *epanaphora* and *epiphora* to get **symploke***("tied* together"): "One whom the Senate has condemned, one whom the Roman people has condemned, one whom universal public opinion has condemned, would you by your votes acquit such a one?" (xiv 20). Note also that this example postpones the rhetorical question, which carries the sense of the sentence, until the very end.

Yet another figure of language links colons or commas together by repeating words in each member (anadiplosis, "repeating two pieces"). Here is an example from *ad Herennium:* "You now even dare to come into the sight of these citizens, traitor to the fatherland? Traitor, I say, to the fatherland, you dare come into the sight of these citizens?" (IV xxviii 38). In a more complex use of anadiplosis, the rhetor repeats the last word of one member as the first word of the next. Here is a wonderful example from the journalist Tom Wolfe's *The Kandy-Kolored   Tangerine-Flake Streamline Baby:*

> And there they have it, the color called Landlord's Brown, immune to time, flood, tropic heat, arctic chill, punk rumbles, slops, blood, leprotic bugs, cockroaches the size of mice, mice the size of rats, rats the size of Airedales and lumpenprole tenants.

Just when this very long sentence threatens to lose itself in a chaotic list, Wolfe brings some order to it by employing **anadiplosis—he** ends one item in the series with the word that begins the next.

When a period has a series of members that become increasingly important, it displays a figure called climax (Greek "ladder"). The author of the *ad Herennium* defined climax as "the figure in which the speaker passes to the following word only after advancing by steps to the preceding one" (IV xxiv 34). He gave this example: "Now what remnant of the hope of liberty survives, if those men may do what they please, if they can do what they may, if they dare do what they can, if they do what they dare, and if you approve what they do?" Here is another example, from Demosthenes' *On the Crown* (179), quoted by the author of the *ad Herennium* and by Quintilian as well: "I did not say this and then fail to make the motion; I did not make the motion and then fail to act as an ambassador; I did not act as an ambassador and then fail to persuade the Thebans" (IV xxv 34; IX iii 55-56).

Strictly speaking, climax uses anadiplosis, as all of these examples do. A less strict application of the figure refers to any placement of phrases or clauses in order of their increasing importance. An eighteenth-century rhetorician named George Campbell quoted this example of climax from the "Song of Solomon":

> My beloved spake and said to me, Arise, my love, my fair, and come away; for lo, the winter is past, the rain is over and gone, the flowers appear on the earth, the time of the singing of birds is come, and the voice of the turtle is heard Ln our land; the fig-tree putteth forth her green figs, and the vines, with the tender grape, perfume the air. Arise, my love, my fair, and come away. (II v 10-13).

Campbell noted that the poet begins with negative phrases indicating that winter has passed and moves toward positive indications of the coming of spring, arranged in order of their increasing importance *(Philosophy of Rhetoric* III i 1). Modern rhetoricians sometimes recommend that whole discourses feature the movement of climax, saving their most important or most persuasive point for last.

Commas or colons themselves can have ornamental effects when two or more that are similarly structured are repeated within a single period. This figure is called *isocolon* in Greek and "parallelism" in English. Here is a famous example from Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address: "The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here." We graph this sentence in order to illustrate the balanced colons a little more clearly:

```
The world will     little note          what we say here,
                   nor long remember
but      it     can never forget         what they did here.
```

In parallelism, verbs should be balanced against verbs, prepositional phrases against prepositional phrases, and so on. Some ancient authors claimed that the members of an *isocolon* should have a similar number of syllables so that the parallelism between them was nearly perfect. Here is an example from *ad Herennium:*

> The father was meeting death   in battle;
> the son   was planning marriage at   his home (IV xx 27).

Here is a modern example of parallelism, written by the nineteenth-century feminist Elizabeth Cady Stanton:

> I should feel exceedingly diffident to appear before you at this time, having never before spoken in public, were I not nerved by a sense of right and duty, did I not feel the time had fully come for the question of woman's wrongs to be laid before the public, did I not believe that woman herself must do this work; for woman alone can understand the height, the depth, the length, and the breadth of her own **degradation.** (speech at the Seneca Falls Convention, 1848)

Stanton repeated the phrase "did I not" in successive colons in order to emphasize her urgent reasons for violating the taboo against women speaking in public. She also used asyndeton to yoke the parallel commas in the last colon, thus vigorously and forcefully expressing the seriousness of women's situation.

Former President Bill Clinton used parallel construction in a speech in which three short sentences were sandwiched in between two others:

> Building one America is our most important mission.... Money cannot buy it. Power cannot compel it. Technology cannot create it. It can only come from the human spirit. (February 4, 1997)

When the parallel members express logically contrary thoughts, as they do here, the figure is called an antithesis ("counterstatement"). In classical rhetorical theory, an antithesis occurred when either words or their meanings were opposed to one another. The author of the *ad Alexandrum* differentiated these two kinds of antithesis as follows: "Let the rich and prosperous give to the poor and needy" (opposition in terms only); "I nursed him when he was ill, but he has caused me a very great deal of harm" (opposition in meaning) (26 1435b). But the author of *ad Herennium* included any use of opposites or contraries under this figure. He illustrated its use with this jingling example:

> When all is calm, you are confused; when all is in confusion, you are calm. In a situation requiring all your coolness, you are on fire; in one requiring all your ardor, you are cool. When there is need for you to be silent, you are uproarious; when you should speak, you grow mute. Present, you wish to be absent; absent, you are eager to return. In peace, you demand war; in war, you yearn for peace. In the Assembly, you talk of valor; in battle, you cannot for cowardice endure the trumpet's sound. (IV xv 21)

All ancient authorities credit Gorgias with the invention of this figure, and its preference for stating balanced contraries is consonant with sophistic thought. In this example, from his "Helen," Gorgias combined antithesis with the figure of thought known as division: "For either by will of Fate and decision of the gods and vote of Necessity did she do what she did, or

by force reduced or by words seduced or by love possessed" (6). Modern rhetors often use antithesis in order to express a contrast more effectively. Television anchor Tom Brokaw used antithesis in a memorable line of a commencement speech: "It's easy to make a buck but hard to make a difference" *(Time,* June 21, 1997, 90). John F. Kennedy's is perhaps the most famous: "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country." This kind of **antithesis—where** the actual words are **reversed—is** called chiasmus ("arranged crosswise"; in the shape of the greek letter *chi,* which looks like an *X).* Sometimes a chiasmus uses more than two words, like this impressive example from novelist Richard Powers: "Data survive all hope of learning, but hope must learn how to survive the data" (88). Note the crisscross pattern in the language here:

<div align="center">data : hope : learning :: hope : learn : data</div>

An even more complex use of antithesis appears in the figure called **antimetabole** ("thrown over against"). Here the rhetor expresses contrasting ideas in juxtaposed structures. Here are two examples from *ad Herennium:* "Apoem ought to be a painting that speaks; a painting ought to be a silent poem"; "If you are a fool, for that reason you should be silent; and yet, although you should be silent, you are not for that reason a fool" (IV xxxviii 39). The best-known modern example was made popular by John Dean of Watergate fame: "When the going gets tough, the tough get going."

Figures of Thought

In *De Oratore* and *Orator* Cicero classed virtually all ornament under the head of figures of thought. This seems appropriate, since these figures *(sententia* in Latin) are the most rhetorical of the ornaments of style. By this we mean two things: first of all, the *sententia* are arguments in themselves; that is, they can function as proofs. Second, they can enhance a rhetor's *ethos* or appeal to an audience's emotions *(pathos).* As Quintilian noted, the figures of thought "lend credibility to our arguments and steal their way secretly into the minds of the judges" (IX i 19-20). Perhaps because they are so highly rhetorical, so obviously calling attention to themselves as artifice and to rhetoric as performance, the figures of thought are not often discussed by modern rhetoricians. This was not true of ancient authorities, however. Quintilian treated only those figures of thought that "depart from the direct method of statement," and he still managed to discriminate well over a dozen (IX ii 1). We have divided our discussion of the *sententia* among figures that call attention to the rhetor, figures that stimulate the emotions of an audience, and figures drawn from the argument itself.

Figures of Thought That Enhance Ethos
This group of figures allows rhetors to call attention to the fact that they are manipulating the flow of the discourse. As such, they strengthen the rhetor's *ethos;* in most cases, their use decreases distance between the rhetor

and an audience, as well. (See the chapters on *ethos* and *pathos* for more information about these rhetorical appeals). Rhetors may use these figures to emphasize a point or to draw attention away from something, to hesitate, apologize, interrupt, attack opponents, make promises.

Rhetors often use questions (Latin *interrogatio)* to draw attention to important points. Quintilian gave the following example: "How long, Cataline, will you abuse our patience?" (IX 11 7-8). Notice that the effect of this differs from a flat statement: "You have abused our patience a long time, Cataline." Rhetors can also ask a question to which it is impossible or difficult to reply: "how can this be?" Or we may ask questions in order to belittle or besmirch the character of the person to whom it is addressed ("What would you have me do, you who have cut off my options?"), to excite pity ("Where will I go, what can I do?"), or to embarrass an opponent ("Can't you hear the cries of your victims?") (IX ii 9-10).

Today, the best-known figure of this group is the rhetorical question: "Do you really expect me to respond to such an outrageous accusation"? or "Who can tell the depths to which this treachery has sunk?" Here, of course, the rhetor does not expect a reply; indeed, she expects the audience to fill in the response for themselves, in the first case with "no" and in the second with the name of the person she hopes will be blamed for the treachery. Variations on rhetorical questioning include *hypophora* or *subjectio,* in which the rhetor asks what can be said in favor of those who oppose her ("Who, indeed, can support those who discriminate against the helpless poor?") or inquires what can possibly be said against her case ("On what grounds, my friends, can you object to so honorable a cause as mine?"). Use of this figure gives rhetors an opportunity to question the opinions or practices of those who oppose them or to anticipate and answer objections that might be made to their positions. Insofar as it allows rhetors to anticipate and answer objections that might be made to their positions, this figure is useful in refutation (see Chapter 10, on arrangement).

Asking a question to get information is not a figure; in order for a question to constitute a figure, it must be used to emphasize a point. Rhetors should also guard against using questions to which they don't know the answers. Audiences can usually discern when a rhetor is asking questions in order to avoid committing himself. The only effective rhetorical question, after all, is one to which the answer is so obvious that everyone, including the audience, can supply its answer. This figure depends for its effect on an audience's feeling that it is participating in the construction of the argument.

The author of *ad Herennium* mentions another *sententia* that depends on questioning. He calls it **reasoning** by **question and answer** *(ratiocinatio,* "reasoning"), wherein the rhetor inserts a question between successive affirmative statements. We quote a portion of his rather long illustration of this device. (The passage also displays several prejudicial commonplaces about women's characters, prejudices that have not entirely disappeared):

> When our ancestors condemned a woman for one crime, they considered that by this single judgement she was convicted of many transgressions. How so?

Judged unchaste, she was also deemed guilty of poisoning. Why? Because, having sold her body to the basest passion, she had to live in fear of many persons. Who are these? Her husband, her parents, and the others involved, as she sees, in the infamy of her dishonor. And what then? Those whom she fears so much she would inevitably wish to destroy. Why inevitably? Because no honorable motive can restrain a woman who is terrified by the enormity of her crime, emboldened by her lawlessness, and made heedless by the nature of her sex. (IV xvi 23)

The use of *ratiocinatio* allowed the rhetor to repeat his charges. The repetitions hammer home the accusations, thus making them seem tenable whether they are or not. The device also calls attention to the ways in which the successive statements connect to each other, thus heightening the impression that the rhetor is proceeding rationally.

The author of *ad Herennium* pointed out that not all uses of interrogation are impressive or elegant. It is so when the points against the adversaries' cause have been summed up and it reinforces the argument that has just been delivered, as follows: "So when you were doing and saying and managing all this, were you, or were you not, alienating and estranging from the republic the sentiments of our allies? And was it, or was it not, needful to employ some one to thwart these designs of yours and prevent their fulfilment?" (IV xv 22). Fans of courtroom drama will easily recognize this device, which contemporary attorneys often use in their summations. The "were you or were you not" construction allows the person using it to repeat statements that may or may not be true without having to commit to them.

Anticipation (Greek *prolepsis,* "to take before") is a generic name given to any figure of thought wherein a rhetor foresees and replies to possible objections to her arguments. For example, a rhetor may anticipate that some point or points in her argument will seem weak or dishonorable to her audience. If she is defending the right to use hate speech on First Amendment grounds, she may confess her distaste for such language, as did the author of this editorial from the *Washington Post:* "Kids should be taught at home and, certainly as soon as they enter school, that derogatory comments about someone else's race, color, religion or physical or mental disability are rude, stupid, mean and unacceptable" (May 22, 1992, A24). A rhetor may also anticipate an audience's negative reaction to her arguments and apologize in advance: "I realize that many Americans are opposed to abortion, but I have good reasons for supporting choice, and I hope that you will be patient enough to listen to them."

Rhetors may also state that they will not speak or write about something all the while they are actually doing so *(paralepsis,* "to take alongside of"). Here is an example: "I will not here list all the negative effects of hate speech: its divisiveness, its disruptiveness, its cruelty, its ugliness." A closely related figure is hesitation or indecision (Latin *dubitatio,* "doubt"). Using this figure, a rhetor pretends to be unable to decide "where to begin or end, or to decide what especially requires to be said or not to be said at all" *(Institutes* IX ii 19). A rhetor may express indecision over a word choice,

for example: "Conservatives label pro-choice positions as 'anti-family,' but I am not sure that this is the most informative way to characterize those who favor abortion rights." Using *dubitatio,* a rhetor may point out that an issue is so vast that it can't be covered satisfactorily in the time or space allotted. Or he may express hesitation or doubt about introducing unpleasant or distasteful matters: "Most people are so sensitive about racism that I hesitate even to discuss it." Quintilian remarked that this figure lends "an impression of truth to our statements." Rhetors who use it can depict themselves as people who are sensitive to nuance and to the feelings of audiences as well.

Another similar figure of thought is **correction,** where a rhetor replaces a word or phrase he had used earlier with a more precise one. The author of *ad Herrenium* gave this example of *correctio:* "After the men in question had conquered—or rather had been conquered, for how shall I call that a conquest which has brought more disaster than benefit to the conquerors"? (IV xxvi 36). The rhetor's reconsideration makes him seem thoughtful and intelligent. In this example, the use of correction also emphasizes the point that the action being discussed can be read in more than one way. Here is another example: "I refer to hate speech. However, things would be clearer if this practice were known by its rightful name—racism."

Figures of Thought That Involve Audience

Quintilian mentioned a set of figures of thought that involve the audience in the argument. He discussed these under the general heading of "communication." In these figures, the rhetor addresses the audience, taking them into her confidence: "No reasonable person can doubt the severe consequences of this practice." One form of this figure is **concession,** by which the rhetor concedes a disputed point or leaves a disputed point up to the audience to decide: "Of course I am aware that hate speech hurts those it is aimed against. Nevertheless, the hurt felt by some does not justify the regulation of all." In suspension, the rhetor raises expectations that something bad or sensational will be mentioned and then mentions something much worse. Quintilian gave this example from Cicero: "What think you? Perhaps you expect to hear of some theft or plunder?" (IX ii 22). Cicero then went on to discuss serious crimes against the state.

The opposite of suspension is **paradox** ("contrary opinion"), in which the rhetor raises expectations and then mentions something trivial. The headlines on supermarket tabloids are paradoxes in this sense. In modern rhetoric, paradox has a different but related meaning. A paradox is any statement that seems self-contradictory but in some sense may be true: "There are none so credulous as unbelievers."

A related figure of thought is **oxymoron,** which yokes contradictory terms together, usually as adjective and noun: "cold heat," "eloquent silence." A favorite example of oxymoron comes from a professor of philosophy: "This passage in Heidegger is clearly opaque."

The author of *ad Herennium* discussed a figure of thought called *parrhesia* ("frankness of speech"). This figure occurs "when, talking before

those to whom we owe reverence or fear, we yet exercise our right to speak out, because we seem justified in reprehending them, or persons dear to them, for some fault" (IV xxxvi 48). For example: "The university administration has tolerated hate speech on this campus, and so to some extent they are to blame for its widespread use." An opposing figure is litotes (understatement), where a rhetor diminishes some feature of the situation that is obvious to all. The author of *ad Herennium* gave this example from the defense of a very wealthy person: "His father left him a patrimony that was—I do not wish to exaggerate—not the smallest" (IV xxxviii 50). Using litotes, the rhetor avoids stating the exact extent of the rich man's holdings, and the audience is led to admire his tact as well. Modern rhetoricians define litotes as any statement that denies its contrary statement: "She was not unmindful of my wishes." But the figure occurs in any deliberate understatement of a state of affairs wherein more is understood than is said: "Nuclear weapons are dangerous." Sometimes litotes is not deliberate, as when an American president brushed off "the vision thing" as inappropriate to his administration.

Figures of Thought That Arouse Emotion

According to Quintilian, "the figures best adapted for intensifying emotion consist chiefly in simulation" (IX ii 26). This group of figures requires more inventiveness from a rhetor than any other, since their persuasive quality depends upon skill in creating convincing fictions. As Quintilian remarked,

> Such devices make a great demand on our powers of eloquence. For with things which are false and incredible by nature there are but two alternatives: either they will move our hearers with exceptional force because they are beyond the truth, or they will be regarded as empty nothings because they are not the truth. (IX ii 33)

This group of *sententia* includes personification, enargeia, irony, and *ethopoeia.* Personification or impersonation "consists in representing an absent person as present, or in making a mute thing or one lacking form articulate" *(ad Herennium IV* liii 66). We may represent someone who has died as though she were present: "If my mother were alive, she would say . . ." We can represent animals or nature as having human qualities, as the poet John Milton did in this passage from *Paradise Lost:*

> Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her seat
> Sighing through all her Works gave signs of woe. (IX 529-30).

The advantage of this figure, according to Quintilian, is that we can display the inner thoughts of others as though they were present. He cautioned, however, that people and things must be represented credibly.

In *enargeia* (usually translated "ocular demonstration" or "vivid demonstration"), a rhetor paints a picture of a scene so vividly that it seems to be happening right in front of the audience. This is usually done by

appealing to the sense of sight. The cultural historian Frances Fitzgerald composed this wonderful *enargeia* of evangelist Jerry Falwell's church:

> Winter and summer the congregation consists mainly of couples with two or three children, but there are a number of young adults and a number of elderly people. There is something distinctive about its looks, but at first glance that something is difficult to pin down. The men wear double-knit suits and sport gold wedding bands or heavy brass rings stamped with mottoes; the women, their hair neatly coiffed and lacquered, wear demure print dresses and single-diamond engagement rings. The young women and the high-school girls are far more fashionable. Their flowered print dresses fall to midcalf but are cut low on the bodice and worn with ankle-strap high heels. They wear their hair long, loose, **and—almost uniformly—flipped** and curled in Charlie's Angels style. Like the boys with their white shirts, narrow-fitted pants, and close-cropped hair, they look fresh-faced and extraordinarily clean____There are proportionately about the same number of blacks in the congregation as there are in the **choir—which** is to say, very few. (The television cameras tend to pan in on the two black choir members thus making them more conspicuous to the television audience than they are to the congregation in the church). What is startling about the **congregation—and** this is its **distinctiveness—is** the amount of effort people have put into creating this uniform appearance. *(Cities on a Hill,* 1986, p. 135)

Fitzgerald peppered this description with references to sight: looks, glance, **appearance—because** she is trying to convey the carefully crafted scene to readers just as it appears on television.

Simply defined, irony occurs when an audience understands the opposite of what is expressed: someone says "Nice day, huh?" when it is windy and snowing; another asks "'Hot enough for you?" when everyone is obviously suffering from the heat. But irony can be extremely complex. As Quintilian put it, in this figure,

> the meaning, and sometimes the whole aspect of our case, conflicts with the language and the tone of voice adopted; nay, a man's whole life may be colored with irony, as was the case with Socrates, who was called an ironist because he assumed the role of an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others (IX ii 46).

Irony abounds in contemporary political rhetoric: "My opponent is an honorable woman, I am sure"; "The party of moral values is the party that brought us Watergate, the **savings-and-loan** scandals, and the **Iran-Contra** affair." Sometimes irony rebounds on its users. When a politician labels his opponent a draft dodger, the situation becomes ironic if the politician himself somehow escaped mandated military service. If this is discovered, his figure can backfire on him.

Advertisers often use irony in their promotional campaigns, which can be a risky move with a vast audience. ABC Television Network's 1997 promotional campaign turned the focus back on **itself—television** as a **medium—and** embraced the commonplace that television is harmful to the

mind. The one-line ads made ironic claims such as "Don't worry, you've got billions of brain cells" and "Eight hours a day, that's all we ask." Another advertisement cautions that "You can talk to your wife anytime," while another asks "It's a beautiful day, what are you doing outside?" The logic of using irony in this instance is that savvy viewers appreciate a sense of humor and that a bit of self-mockery might appeal to them. Still, the campaign was risky. Some experts think the ads may have had an adverse effect: viewers took the messages as serious reminders of television's harmful effects, felt guilty, and turned it off. Irony is very difficult to pull off in writing, where the relation of the rhetor to the audience is ordinarily not intimate.

Ethopoeia, or character portrayal, consists in "representing and depicting in words clearly enough for recognition the bodily form of some person" *(ad Herennium TV* **xlix** 63). The author gave this example: "the ruddy, short, bent man, with white and rather curly hair, blue-grey eyes, and a huge scar on his chin." But character portrayal may deal with a person's qualities as well as her physical characteristics. The author of *ad Herennium* portrayed a rich man by depicting his habits:

> That person there … thinks it admirable that he is called rich.... Once he has propped his chin on his left hand he thinks that he dazzles the eyes of all with the gleam of his jewelry and the glitter of his gold. . . . When he turns to his slave boy here, his only one . . . he calls him now by one name, now by another, and now by a third . . . so that unknowing hearers may think he is selecting one slave from among many. (IV xlix 63).

It is not difficult to update this sketch: simply put a **Rolex** on the man's arm and substitute a personal secretary or a bodyguard for the slave. We have met this kind of *ethopoeia* before, in the character sketches of Theophrastus (see Chapter 6, on *ethos).* Quintilian treated this figure as a kind of imitation in which the rhetor copies or emulates someone's words or deeds. He recommended the use of *ethopoeia* because of its charm and variety. He also pointed out that depictions of character, since they seem natural and spontaneous, can make an audience more receptive to a rhetor's *ethos* (IX ii 59).

Figures of Thought Borrowed from Invention and Arrangement

Quintilian disapproved of the practice of borrowing figures from invention or arrangement, and so he refused to treat them. In book IX of the *Institutes,* he huffed: "I will pass by those authors who set no limit to their craze for inventing technical terms and even include among figures what really comes under the head of arguments" (iii 99). Most ancient rhetoricians were not as fastidious as Quintilian, however. For example, the author of the *ad Herennium* treated **reasoning by contraries** (enthymeme or *conclusio)* as a figure of thought. As you can see from the Greek term for this figure, it is borrowed from invention. In the *ad Herennium,* reasoning by contraries is a figure when the rhetor uses one of two opposite statements to prove the other, as in the following: "A faithless friend cannot be an honorable

enemy"; "George has never spoken the truth in private, and so he cannot be expected to refrain from lying in public." This figure resembles an enthymeme because it draws a conclusion (George will lie in public) from a statement that is not open to question (George lies to his friends). The author of *ad Herennium* liked it because of its "brief and complete rounding-off," and so he recommended that it be completed in one unbroken period (IV xviii 26).

Other figures of thought repeat on the sentence level the parts of arrangement suggested for whole discourses. Cicero was particularly fond of these as a means of helping the audience keep track of the progress of the argument. Along with other ancient rhetoricians, he recommended that complex topics be divided into parts and a reason for accepting the parts be attached to each *(divisio)*. Here is an example from *ad Herennium:* "If you are an upright man, you have not deserved reproach; if a wicked man, you will be unmoved" (IV xl 52). In this case, the rhetor divides alternatives into only two (the man is either upright or wicked); this allows the rhetor to select from among many characteristics that might be chosen and thus to control the audience's response to the man. This figure is closely related to **distribution** *(diairesis, distributio),* whereby the rhetor divides up possibilities and distributes them among different areas. Here is an example from *ad Herennium:* "The Senate's function is to assist the state with counsel; the magistracy's is to execute, by diligent activity, the Senate's will; the people's to choose and support by its votes the best measures and the most suitable men" (IV xxxv 47). The distribution makes this political arrangement seem fair and equitable.

Accumulation *(frequentatio)* is another figure of thought based on arrangement. Here the rhetor gathers together points that are scattered about and lists them all together. This has the effect of making a shaky conclusion seem more evident or reasonable. Interestingly, accumulation is forbidden in courtroom argument. In many cases, prosecutors are not allowed to introduce an accused person's past offenses into their argument on the grounds that a person should be tried only for the crime with which she is currently charged. This practice testifies to the rhetorical power of accumulation: while juries or judges might not be impressed by the evidence assembled to substantiate one instance of a crime, they are more likely to be impressed by evidence that testifies to the commission of a series of like or related crimes. Television uses a combination of images and speech to create the effect of accumulation, as when, for example, a sportscaster calls an NBA game a "dunkfest" while the rolling clips show twelve different slam dunks from the game. The accumulated images reinforce the credibility of the term.

Cicero and the author of *ad Herennium* also treated **transitions** as figures of thought *(Orator* xl 137; IV xxvi 35). A transition is any word or phrase that connects pieces of discourse. Cicero recommended that rhetors use transition to announce what is about to be discussed when introducing a topic *(propositio)* and sum up when concluding a topic *(enumeratio);* if both are used together, they constitute a smooth transition between topics.

Using transition, a rhetor can briefly recall what has just been said and briefly announce what will follow.

Now that we have concluded our discussion of figures, we move to an analysis of tropes.

Tropes

Neither ancient nor modern rhetoricians have ever been able to agree about what distinguishes this class of ornament from figures. It is probably safe to say that tropes are characterized by the substitution of one word or phrase for another, but even this distinction does not clearly demarcate tropes from some figures of language, such as synonymy or puns. However, even though ancient rhetoricians could not agree about the definition of a trope, they knew one when they saw one. With the notable exception of Aristotle, who was ambivalent about every ornament except metaphor, major rhetoricians used a list of ten tropes that remained more or less standard throughout antiquity. The ten are: **onomatopoeia, antonomasia,** metonymy, periphrasis, hyperbaton, hyperbole, synecdoche, catachresis, metaphor, and **allegory.**

Onomatopoeia

According to the author of the *ad Herennium,* the rhetor who uses onomatopeia ("making a new name") assigns a new word to "a thing which either lacks a name or has an inappropriate name" (IV xxx 42). This trope could be used either for imitative purposes, as illustrated by words like *roar, bellow, murmur, hiss (sibulus* in Latin), or for expressiveness. To exemplify this second use of onomatopeia, the author coined a Latin word, *fragor,* which his modern translator renders as "hullabaloo": "After this creature attacked the republic, there was a hullabaloo among the first men of the state." (The 1960s gave us another onomatopeia for a **hullabaloo—** *hootenanny).* Readers who have been paying attention will notice that onomatopeia bears a close resemblance to **neologism—the** coining of new **words—a** practice that was condemned by Quintilian as "scarcely permissible to a Roman." That quintessential Roman, Julius Caesar, warned us to "avoid, as you would a rock, an unheard-of and unfamiliar word" (notice the nice analogy here). Nonetheless, ancient rhetoricians agreed that onomatopeia was the means by which language was invented, as their ancestors found names for things by emulating the noises those things characteristically made *(Institutes* VIII vi 31). Contemporary rhetoricians define *onomatopeia* simply as words or language whose sound emulates or echoes their sense: "The brook babbled and murmured"; "Over the cobbles he clattered and clashed" (Alfred Noyes).

Antonomasia

In the trope called "antonomasia" ("another name"; Latin *pronominatio),* a rhetor substitutes a descriptive phrase for someone's proper name (or vice versa). When Quintilian referred to Cicero as "the prince of Roman ora-

tors," he used antonomasia (VIII vi 30). The author of *ad Herennium* suggested that, rather than naming the Gracchi, whose reputations were contested, a rhetor could more effectively refer to them as "the grandsons of Africanus," since Africanus's reputation was impeccable (IV xxxi 42). Antonomasia appears frequently in contemporary rhetoric. Elvis is "the King"; athletes and teams or squads acquire nicknames like "The Mailman," "The Manassas Mauler," the "Fearsome Foursome." The contemporary popularity of this trope is not limited to entertainment or sports. In the 1992 presidential campaign, his handlers labeled Bill Clinton "the Comeback Kid" because he seemed to be able to recover from almost any setback. In the same campaign Clinton's Republican opponents labeled the Democratic ticket "Double Bubba," because it had two Southerners on it (Arkansan Clinton and Al Gore of Tennessee). The rhetorical effects of this trope are obvious. It not only suggests that someone is so well known that his name need not be used, thus cementing group loyalty; it also provides a rhetor with an opportunity to characterize the person he speaks or writes about in either positive or negative terms.

Metonomy

Metonymy ("altered name") names something with a word or phrase closely associated with it: "the White House" for the president of the United States or "the Kremlin" for the leadership of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The maxim "The pen is mightier than the sword" is a metonomy in which *pen* stands for persuasive language and *sword* for war. We refer to the works of an author by her name: "Morrison" or "Leonard" stand in for novels written by Toni Morrison or Elmore Leonard. We use metonymy when we say "I like the Dixie Chicks," meaning that we like their music.

Periphrasis

We have already met the figure called "periphrasis" ("circling speech") under its Latinate name *circumlocution.* Quintilian defined uses of this figure as "whatever might have been expressed with greater brevity, but is expanded for purposes of ornament" (VIII vi 61). He gave this poetic example from Virgil's *Aeneid:* "Now was the time / When the first sleep to weary mortals comes / Stealing its way, the sweetest boon of heaven" (ii 268). Virgil did not simply say "Night arrived." Rather, he embroidered on this simple observation to achieve the effect of calmness that sleep brings.

Quintilian worried that rhetors would use this figures simply to fill up space or to impress:

> Some rhetors introduce a whole host of useless words; for, in their eagerness to avoid ordinary methods of expression, and allured by false ideals of beauty they wrap up everything in a multitude of words simply and solely because they are unwilling to make a direct and simple statement of the facts. (VIII ii 17).

A contemporary rhetorician named Richard Lanham argues persuasively that much contemporary American prose is written in what he calls the "Official Style." He gives this example:

> The history of Western psychological thought has long been dominated by philosophical considerations as to the nature of man. These notions have dictated corresponding considerations of the nature of the child within society, the practices by which children were to be raised, and the purposes of studying the child. *(Revising Prose* 1992, 10)

In essence, this passage says that psychologists are interested in human nature and that this interest has led them to investigate childhood and child-rearing practices. In other words, users of the official style do exactly what Quintilian warned against—they pile up more words and phrases than are necessary in order to achieve an impressive effect. There is a big difference between using words to enhance an effect or to call attention to a point and simply failing to notice them.

Hyperbaton

Hyperbaton is the transposition of a word to somewhere other than its usual place: "Backward run sentences, until reels the mind" (a parody of the style of *Time* magazine). Strictly speaking, *hyperbaton* is a figure of language, since its effect depends upon a change in normal word order. But as Quintilian noted, it can be called a trope when "the meaning is not complete until the two words have been put together" (VIII vi 66). We parody our own writing by imposing a *hyperbaton* on the first sentence of this paragraph: *"Hyperbaton* is the transposition, to somewhere other than its usual place, of a word."

Hyperbole

Quintilian defined hyperbole ("thrown above"; "excess") as "an elegant straining of the truth" (VIII vi 67) and gives this wonderful example from Cicero: "Vetto gives the name of farm to an estate which might easily be hurled from a sling, though it might well fall through the hole in the hollow sling, so small is it" (73). Aristotle gave these examples: speaking of a man with a black eye, "You would have thought him a basket of mulberries"; and of a skinny man, "He has legs like parsley" *(Rhetoric* III xi 1413a). In other words, hyperbole is exaggeration used for effect. People often use hyperbole to describe extreme weather conditions. During a Midwestern July heat wave, one of us heard this hyperbole: "hotter than the hinges on the gates of hell." Sportscasters, especially color commentators, often use hyperbole to create excitement. When someone makes a long-range three pointer, for instance, the sportscaster might yell "From the parking lot!" or engaging in even more exaggerated hyperbole, he might say the shot came "From Downtown!"

Synecdoche

In synecdoche ("to receive together") rhetors substitute the part for the whole (or vice versa) or cause for effect (or vice versa). Quintilian wrote that this figure occurred most commonly with numbers, as in "The Roman won the day," in which "the Roman" refers to an entire army. The author

of *ad Herennium* gave this example of synecdoche: "Were not those nuptial flutes reminding you of his marriage?" (the flutes stand for the whole ceremony). Like hyperbole, this trope is common in everyday speech. We say "give us our daily bread," where *bread* means something like "enough food to sustain us." We say "give me a hand," where *hand* refers to help or assistance, and we use the phrase "four hundred head" to refer to four hundred animals. We say "weapons of mass destruction," where "weapons" refers to a variety of things: chemicals, viruses, bacteria, explosive devices.

Catachresis

Catachresis ("to use against") is "the inexact use of a like and kindred word in place of the precise and proper one" *(ad Herennium TV* xxxiii 45). The author gave these examples: "the power of man is short," "small height," "long wisdom," "mighty speech." In these examples adjectives are misapplied to nouns: we ordinarily speak of human power as limited rather than short, of wisdom as enduring rather than long, and so on. Quintilian defined this trope more narrowly as "the practice of adapting the nearest available term to describe something for which no actual term exists" (VIII vi 34). The Latin name for catachresis means "abuse," and novice rhetors might be wise to avoid it.

Metaphor

A metaphor transfers or substitutes one word for another. The Greeks have always taken metaphor seriously. If you visit modern Greece, you might notice that a transfer truck bearing the label *metaphoros.* Some metaphors are so common in our daily speech that we no longer think about their metaphoric quality: we say that a disappointed lover "struck out" or "never got to first base," borrowing metaphors from baseball. When someone has exhausted all her alternatives, we say that she is "at the end of her rope," borrowing a grisly metaphor from executions. We say that the abortion question presents us with a thicket of difficult issues, borrowing a metaphor from nature. Truly striking metaphors appear in poetry. Here are two examples from a poem by Emily Dickinson:

> There is no frigate like a book
> To take us lands away,
> Nor any coursers like a page
> Of prancing poetry.

Dickinson compared a book to a ship and its pages to a pair of horses. In prose these comparisons don't make much sense, but they work beautifully in Dickinson's poem to evoke images and emotions.

Metaphor is often the only trope mentioned in traditional composition textbooks, giving the impression that modern writers should limit their use of ornament to a single trope. Aristotle, tike other ancient rhetoricians, was more interested in metaphor than he was in other tropes or figures, and metaphor has received more attention from modern rhetoricians and literary critics than has any other trope or figure. In the *Poetics,* Aristotle defined metaphor as the movement of a name from its own genus or

species to another genus or species (XXI vii 1457b). In the *Rhetoric,* he noted that metaphors borrowed from something greater in the same genus or species were complimentary, while those borrowed from something worse could be used to denigrate the person or thing to whom it was applied. Thus, pirates can be called "entrepreneurs" or "businesspeople," and someone who has made a mistake can be accused of criminal behavior (HI ii 1405a). Humans often get compared to other species because of some shared characteristic that the rhetor wants to highlight. Women's National Basketball Association guard Theresa Weatherspoon, when asked about her stellar defensive game against the league's leading scorer, said: "She told me I was like a gnat, a pest who wouldn't go away." Here the comparison to a pesky insect conveys the frustration an offensive-minded player feels when guarded closely.

At another point in the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle classed metaphors among those tropes and figures he called witty or urbane sayings, and he developed a theory about why metaphors give us pleasure. They do so, he wrote, "because metaphors help us to learn new things, and learning is naturally pleasurable to humans" (x 1410b). In other words, since metaphors express ideas in new or unusual ways, they help us to see things in new ways.

Aristotle suggested that metaphors be taken from two sources: those that are beautiful, either in sound or effect, and those that appeal to the senses (ii 1405b). It would not do, he wrote, to substitute *red-fingered* or even *purple-fingered* in Homer's "rosy-fingered dawn." He told a funny story about Simonides, who at first declined to write a poem for a man who had won a mule race, on the ground that he did not want to celebrate half-asses. When the man paid enough, however, Simonides accepted the commission and wrote "Hail, daughters of storm-footed mares!" Aristotle gave many examples of successful metaphors: citizens are like a ship's captain who is strong but deaf; ungrateful neighbors are like children who accept candy but keep on crying; orators are like babysitters who eat the baby's food and then moisten the baby's lips with their saliva (iv 1406b, 1407a). Sometimes beautiful metaphors seem exaggerated and take on an ironic force, as in this description of golfers' form written by Lee Eisenburg: "Golf Lit's most familiar genre is the instruction manual, that object of perennial hope and self-delusion whose explicit purpose is to tell a hacker how to move his arms and legs with the unified grace of the Cleveland Symphony *(New York Times Book Review,* August 17, 1997, 27). Eisenburg's comparison of the ideal golf form to a symphony orchestra humorously speaks to the drive for unattainable perfection harbored by aspiring golfers.

Quintilian distinguished several kinds of metaphor. In one of these, a rhetor substitutes one living thing for another: "He is a lion"; "Scipio was continually barked at by Cato" (VIII vi 9). In another kind, inanimate things may be substituted for animate and vice versa. Quintilian thought this was most impressive when an inanimate object is spoken of as though it were alive, as in Cicero's "What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero?" or "The dam decided to collapse at that moment." Aristotle would have

classed both of these kinds of metaphor under the head of species-to-species, in which a rhetor substitutes the name of one particular for another. Aristotle and Quintilian both named metaphors that substitute a part for a whole, or vice versa, as a separate class, but modern rhetoricians label such metaphors as synecdoches (for example, "Jane Doe" to represent all women).

In the *Poetics,* Aristotle writes, "In some cases of analogy no current term exists" (XXXI 1458a). The example he gives is this: "To release seed is to 'sow,' while the sun's release of fire lacks a name" (XXI 1458a). The resulting analogy, then, might be "the sun sowed fire on the morning." The contemporary novelist Richard Powers, writing just after September 11, 2001, offers a moving account of the tragedy while considering the very phenomenon Aristotle discusses—when "no current term exists"—to characterize something. The result, in such cases, is use of metaphor or simile (the most explicit kind of metaphor):

THE SIMILE

I was preparing to meet my undergraduate writing class at the University of Illinois when I heard the news. The day's topic was to have been figurative speech: metaphor and simile in fiction. On my way out the door, I saw the first headlines. Then the images and the repeating, unreal film. And every possible class lesson disappeared in that plume.

With the rest of the world, I found myself losing ground against the real. The anchors, the reporters, the eyewitnesses, the experts: all fighting against the onset of shock, all helpless to say what had happened, all working to survive the inconceivable. And when the first, stunted descriptions came, they came in a flood of simile. The shock of the attack was like Pearl Harbor. The gutted financial district was like Nagasaki. Lower Manhattan was like a city after an earthquake. The gray people streaming northward up the island covered in an inch of ash were like the buried at Pompeii.

And in this outpouring of anemic simile, again and again with startlingly little variation, people resorted to the most chilling refrain: like a movie. Like "Independence Day." Like "The Towering Inferno." Like "The Siege." Like bad science fiction. Like a Tom Clancy novel. (Clancy, talking to CNN, seemed to find the plot more unbelievable than any plot of his own.) The magnitude of this day could not be made real except through comparison to fiction. Nothing but the outsize scale of the imaginary was big enough to measure by.

Failed similes proliferated throughout the afternoon. Blocks like the apocalypse. Wall Street executives wandering like the homeless. Streets like Kinshasa. Rubble like Beirut or the West Bank.

No simile will ever serve. In its size and devastation and suddenness, the destruction of Sept. 11 is, in fact, like nothing, unless it is like the terrors experienced in those parts of the world that seemed so distant on Sept. 10.

I met my class, although I could pretend to no teaching. It was not like a wake; it was one. We shared the shortfall of our thoughts. "It's like a dream," my students said. And more frightening still, "Like waking from a dream." The America they woke to on Tuesday morning was, like the skyline of New York, changed forever. The always-thereness of here was gone.

> The final lesson of my writing class came too soon. There are no words. But there are only words. To say what the inconceivable resembles is all that we have by way of learning how it might be outlived. No comparison can say what happened to us. But we can start with the ruins of our similes, and let "like" move us toward something larger, some understanding of what "is." *(New York Times Magazine,* September 23, 2001, 21-22)

Powers's piece gets to the heart of the ancient meaning of **metaphor**—"transference" or **"transport"—the** movement toward something through something else. And what is more portable or mobile, the word metaphor seems to ask, than language?

Aristotle also treated analogy as a kind of metaphor. In analogy, rhetors compare a relationship rather than items. Aristotle cited Pericles' saying that the young men killed in a recent war had vanished from Athens as though someone had taken spring from the year (IH x 1411a). A metaphor becomes an allegory when it is sustained throughout a long passage.

In her book *Writing Permitted in Designated Areas Only,* English professor and rhetoric scholar Linda Brodkey uses allegory to compare the marking off of public smoking spaces to the marking off of writing spaces in American universities. We offer two excerpts from her book to illustrate the use of allegory:

> The international sign that bans smoking in public places can also be read as a sign of cultural hegemony, a frequent and forcible reminder that in democratic societies civic regulations commonly inscribe the will of the dominant culture. That there are two versions of the sign suggests that the dominant culture is of at least two minds when it comes to smoking in public places. One version of the sign prohibits smoking altogether, and the other regulates smoking by appending a note that may be more familiar to smokers than to nonsmokers: "Smoking Permitted in Designated Areas Only." This second sign, signaling the temporary segregation of smokers from nonsmokers, is part of the same expansionist public policy as the first, which seems likely to succeed eventually given the rapidly diminishing number and size of public spaces where smokers are still allowed to smoke. In the meantime, **however—so** long as they remove themselves to those designated **areas—smokers** constitute a literal and figurative body of evidence that a desire to smoke remains strong enough in some people to withstand the ever increasing pressure of social hostility and medical injunctions. That smokers commonly honor the signs, either by not smoking or by smoking only in designated areas, provides smokers and nonsmokers alike with continual public enactments of civil power, namely, the power of the professional-managerial middle class to enforce the public suppression of a desire it has recently identified and articulated via science as endangering its well **being—as** a class. (130)

Here Brodkey sets up one end of the allegory, the smoking signs and regulations with which her readers are already familiar. Boldly questioning the assumptions behind such regulation and its subscription to scientific ideology, Brodkey rearticulates the regulations as "cultural hegemony," the imposition of one group's will onto another group or groups. After **devel-**

oping her critique of smoking regulation a bit further, Brodkey moves to the other side of the allegory, the set of practices she wants to cast in a different light by way of the extended metaphor itself and a series of direct arguments: American writing instruction. Brodkey writes:

> Composition classrooms are the designated areas of American colleges and universities. Composition courses are middle-class holding pens populated by students from all classes who for one reason or another do not produce fluent, thesis-driven essays of around five hundred words in response to either prompts designed for standardized tests or assignments developed by classroom teachers....
>
> It has always seemed to me gratuitous to regulate writing and writers via the contents of prompts and assignments, since a policy of coherence is already being "objectively" executed by assessing student writing on the basis of form and format: the grammar, spelling, diction, and punctuation along with the thesis sentence, body paragraphs, and conclusion. Perhaps both are necessary, however, because while form identifies class interlopers (working-class ethnic and black students), content singles out class malcontents. While it seems to take longer in some cases than in others, composition instruction appears to have succeeded best at establishing in most people a lifelong aversion to writing. They have learned to associate a desire to write with a set of punishing exercises called writing in school: printing, penmanship, spelling, punctuation, and vocabulary in nearly all cases; grammar lessons, thesis sentences, paragraphs, themes, book reports, and library research papers in college preparatory and advanced placement courses. (135-136)

Through subtle language cues, Brodkey sustains the smoking metaphor throughout the passage—and the rest of the chapter (indeed, the metaphor permeates the entire book, thanks to the title). Words like "designated areas" and "regulate" carry over the arguments Brodkey made about regulating smoking to regulating student writing. The allegory enables Brodkey to clarify what bugs her most about prevailing practices in composition classes: writing is reserved for one place, she argues, and that very place is tainted by our culture, marked as the "lower" training ground for other university classes. In this schema, untrained writers—like smokers—are seen as potentially dangerous, threatening, or at least irritating to middle-and upper-class standards, hence necessitating strict regulation. The allegory certainly does powerful work for Brodkey and makes her argument all the more compelling, or at least we think so.

EXERCISES

1. Go on a trope hunt. Between now and your next class meeting, locate a whole host of different kinds of tropes. You may wish to consult broadly: popular magazines, newspapers, Web sites, billboards, and advertisements are all fair game. Once you record the trope, use the

information in this chapter to name it. Be on the lookout for particularly rare or artful tropes. Be prepared to tell the class why you've categorized the trope as you have.

2. Try your hand at composing figures and tropes. Find a passage of your writing and examine it to see whether you unconsciously used any of the figures or tropes discussed in this chapter. Rewrite any of the sentences in the passage, inserting figures or tropes where they are appropriate. Approach this task systematically over a few days or weeks; your eventual goal is to use each kind of figure or trope discussed in this chapter.

3. Revise a passage you've written in the plain style so that it is appropriate for a more formal rhetorical situation. Use complex sentence constructions, longer words, and lots of figures and tropes. For models of highly ornate prose styles, you can turn to the work of composers from earlier periods of history. John Donne's sermons are good examples, as are those composed by American preachers such as Jonathan Edwards or Martin Luther King.

4. Like ancient teachers, we recommend that aspiring rhetors practice imitating sentences and longer passages composed by writers and speakers they admire. We describe a number of ancient exercises in imitation in Chapter 14 of this book.

5. We also recommend that rhetors as a practice be on the lookout for professional speakers and writers' uses of the various figures discussed in this chapter. When you find figures or tropes that you admire, write them down in a commonplace book. Practice imitating them. A modern handbook of the figures is a very useful aid to composers. We highly recommend Richard Lanham's *A Handlist of Rhetorical Figures.*

NOTES

1. Like ancient rhetoricians, we think that correctness and clarity are not truly rhetorical considerations, and so we don't pay much attention to them in this book. We also think that Americans' obsession with correctness and clarity has kept them from studying and enjoying the more complex uses of language that are addressed here. There are plenty of books available that discuss correctness and clarity. Any good handbook for writers will demonstrate the correctness rules of traditional grammar. We recommend *The New St. Martin's Handbook,* by Andrea Lunsford and Robert Connors. Dictionaries of usage are also available; Fowler's *Modern English Usage* is the standard reference work. Writers who are interested in achieving a clearer style can consult Richard Lanham's *Revising Prose* and Joseph Williams's BASIC *Lessons in Clarity and Grace.*

2. Writers who are interested in practicing this kind of stylistic appropriateness can consult the ancient treatises written by Hermogenes of Tarsus, usually called *The Ideas of Style* or *The Types of Style,* as well as that by Demetrius of Phaleron, called

On Style. These treatises give copious advice about how to achieve such effects as solemnity, vehemence, simplicity, force, and the like.

WORKS CITED

Lanham, Richard. *Revising Prose.* 2nd "ed. New York: Macmillan, 1987.
Powers, Richard. *Plowing the Dark.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000.

MEMORY: THE TREASURE-HOUSE OF INVENTION

Now let me turn to the treasure-house of the ideas supplied by Invention, to the guardian of all the parts of rhetoric, the Memory.

—*ad* Herennium
III xvi 28

A RICH MAN NAMED Scopas once invited Simonides of Ceos, a magician and poet, to write a poem in celebration of a banquet he was hosting. When Simonides read his poem at the banquet, he praised the twin gods Castor and Pollux. Scopas was so angry that the poem praised someone other than himself that he paid Simonides only half the fee he had promised. After the banquet began, Simonides was given a message that two young men wished to see him outside the hall. While he searched for them outside, the hall collapsed and everyone inside was killed. When relatives came to collect the remains, Simonides was able to remember the exact place at the table where everyone had been sitting, thus making sure that the right relatives claimed the right bodies. Of course, the two young men who had sent the message were Castor and Pollux. They repaid Simonides' praise by saving him from certain death.

Simonides' prodigious feat of memory is, from a rhetorician's perspective, the important part of this story. Ancient authors were so impressed with the powers of memory that they awarded it a place among the rhetorical canons. Both Cicero *(De Oratore* II 351-53) and Quintilian *(Institutes of Oratory* XI 2) retell the story of Simonides to start their discussions

of memory. Cicero goes on to list the ways memory mattered for the ancients, including not only retaining information or recalling the arrangement of a speech but also giving close attention to opponents' arguments so that all might be addressed, as well as recalling other arguments that have arisen in the past about the same topic, who made them, and where (355).

MEMORY AND KAIROS

The legend of Simonides suggests memory's connection to the ancient concept of *kairos.* In fact, the entire story turns on a kind of propitious timing: Simonides got called away from the dining hall just in time and returned again with impeccable timing. But Simonides' **attunement** to the dining hall surroundings is also suggestive of *kairos.* Quintilian focuses on preparing a "tappable" memory; that is, he suggests employing a system of signs or symbols so that a name, argument, or image will not get lost but will rather be readily available. Such signs and symbols, Quintilian averred, can help "jog" the memory (XI ii 19) when the time is right. He therefore promoted a "memory-ready" condition, not unlike the ready stance described in Chapter 2, on *kairos.* It seems paradoxical, but *kairos* and memory were partnered in several ways. First, both require a kind of "attunement" in that the rhetor who is gathering items for reserve in the memory must be thinking simultaneously about what's available now that might be useful later. Secondly, memory requires an attunement during the moment of speaking or composing, a recognition of the right time for recalling an illustrative example, an argument, and so on. Obviously, people who speak in public need reliable memories, especially if they are asked to speak without preparation, as politicians often are. Actors and comedians need large storehouses, as well. A recent documentary on Jerry Seinfeld, for instance, depicts the veteran of comedy pacing in his hotel room memorizing the order of the jokes he will tell. So although the role of memory is not so apparent in written composition, writers do have to be able to remember information or to recall where it is located and, more broadly, to remember what arguments they have heard on a particular issue before. It is also of crucial importance to be aware of what events or knowledge might dominate the memories of a particular audience. We will treat this phenomenon a bit later under the head "cultural memory." All of these aspects of memory, we believe, connect to *kairos,* the ancient notion of timing and attunement.

MEMORY IN ANCIENT RHETORICS

It may be hard for us to grasp the importance of memory to **premodern** thinkers. Until the modern period, memory held a central place within rhetorical theory (and in most other intellectual endeavors, as well). Ancient rhetoricians distinguished between natural memory and artificial

memory. An artificial memory is a memory that has been carefully trained to remember things. While every human being relies on natural memory to some extent, it is possible to enhance memory through training and practice. A person who possesses an artificial or trained memory has organized it into a set of orderly memory places into which she can locate relevant information so that she can retrieve it easily *(Artificial* in this context simply means created by humans, something not given by nature; for ancient peoples something that was "artificed" was something made or created by human beings. The term did not carry its modern connotations of "fake" or "phony"). In ancient times even people who could write easily and well relied on their memories not merely as storage facilities but as structured heuristic systems.

In other words, memory was not only a system of recollection for ancient and medieval peoples; it was a means of invention. In ancient and medieval times, people memorized huge volumes of information, along with keys to its organization, and carried all this in their heads. Whenever the need arose to speak or write, they simply retrieved any relevant topics or commentary from their ordered places within memory, reorganized and expanded upon these, and added their own interpretations of the traditional material. People who had trained their memories could do this sort of composing without using writing at all. If they wanted to share their memorial compositions with others, they dictated them to scribes.

Some scholars think that ancient peoples invented memorial composition because writing materials were scarce and expensive. Certainly, literacy was not widespread until the modern period. But this explanation for the ancient interest in memory overlooks the fact that people relied on memory systems long past the time when printed books and libraries became accessible to most educated people. In fact, rhetors continued to use memorial composing strategies right up to the modern period. After all, unlike pen and paper or even a portable computer, a trained memory is always readily available as a source of invention. And Cicero, following Plato, compares a good memory to "inscribing letters on wax" (II lxxviii 360).

We shall probably never know whether artificial memory systems were in use prior to the fifth century BCE. It seems likely that they were, since the ability of the itinerant poets, called rhapsodes, to recall long poems cannot easily be explained in any other way. Perhaps rhapsodes used vivid mental images taken from the Homeric poems as memory aids; a trained memory could easily enough connect a vividly constructed mental image of the "wine-dark sea" either to events associated in the poems with seagoing or to the words and lines that narrated these events.

The sophists must have played an important role in establishing artificial memory as an important part of rhetorical training. The sophist Hippias was famous for his memory. According to the ancient historian Philostratus, "After hearing fifty names only once, [Hippias] could repeat them from memory in the order in which he had heard them"; he could do this "even in his old age" *(Lives ofthe Sophists* I 495). After writing came into general use, Hippias and the other sophists could store lists of topics in

manuscript as well as in memory. The handbooks mentioned in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* may be manuscripts that gave lists of sophistic topics. The topics in these lists were arranged in contradictory pairs, since the sophists taught their students how to argue both sides of any question. However, the contradictory-pairs arrangement may also have been a memory aid.

As we have seen, the sophistic *"Dissoi Logoi"* also contains several lists of commonplaces for use in public argument, The lists give possible variations on such topics as "What is true for one person is true for another." Rhetors could memorize this topic by connecting it to some vivid image and locating its variants in some orderly way. They would then be ready to invent arguments drawn from this topic for use on any occasion simply by combining and expanding upon the appropriate variations. A trained memory could house many such topics, along with their associated variations, if these were placed in some orderly manner. Composition, whether written or oral, would then amount to selection, combination, and amplification of appropriate topics and their variations to suit a particular occasion.

Scholars do not know when memory was added to the list of the rhetorical canons. Hellenistic teachers probably included formal instruction in artificial memory in their instruction; we possess a full treatment in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* which dates from the second century BCE, and as mentioned above, Cicero includes a brief discussion of memory in *De Oratore* (II 350 ff). Cicero's famous contemporary, Julius Caesar, must have practiced an art of memory; Caesar was famous in ancient times for prodigious feats of remembering. The historian Pliny wrote, "We are told that he used to write or read and dictate or listen simultaneously, and to dictate to his secretaries four letters at once on his important affairs—or, if otherwise unoccupied, seven letters at once" *(Natural History* VII xxv 92). Such feats would be impossible without the aid of a trained memory (and the Romans did not have Microsoft Word's handy cut-and-paste feature). Later Roman rhetors must have used memory arts as well; Quintilian gives a very full treatment of artificial memory in the *Institutes* (XI 2), and many rhetors of the Second Sophistic were famous for their memories.

ANCIENT MEMORY SYSTEMS

Ancient authorities agree that Simonides should be credited with the invention of artificial memory as an art that can be systematically studied and practiced. According to Cicero, Simonides taught

> that persons desiring to train this faculty must select localities and form mental images of the facts they wish to remember and store those images in the localities, with the result that the arrangement of the localities will preserve the order of the facts, and the images of the facts will designate the facts themselves. *(De Oratore* II lxxxvi 354).

In other words, Simonides concluded that a mental construction, consisting of a series of images connected in an orderly fashion to a series of mental

places, would allow people to remember lists of names or items if they simply associated each name or item with a mental place and/or its associated image. A person had only to review each of the places, in order, to remember the images' names associated with it; a review of the images called up the information being searched for. (The expression "in the first place" may originate from this memory practice).

This memory system took the notion of "place" literally. Its teachers recommended that students visualize a street or a house with which they were familiar. They were then to associate points along the street (say, houses or buildings) or rooms inside the house with the items they wished to remember. People who wish to use this memory system should choose some arrangement or ordering of items that is quite familiar and thus easy to walk through in memory. For example, if a rhetor wants to remember three arguments, he can associate the first of these with the entryway to his home. He then associates the second argument with the next room that he enters in his house or apartment—say it is the living room—and the third argument with the room that comes next—say, the kitchen. It is easy for a rhetor to remember the order in which he enters each room of his house, since he follows this order each time he goes in and out of the house.

Rhetors can use any geographical layout with which they are very familiar as an ordering principle for memory. The main street of a town or city was a favorite organizing device among ancient and medieval practitioners of artificial memory, for instance. It is important, however, that the geographical layout contain memorable features; the hallways of modern buildings are not very useful as an ordering principle, for instance, because they contain a series of doors that all look alike.

The second task in this memory system was to place some striking or memorable item within each of the ordered places. Teachers recommended that the images be vivid and strange enough to be remembered easily and that, if possible, the images be in some way associated with the items to be remembered. For example, a rhetor might place a large red umbrella stand in the imaginary entryway of her house. If the first arguments he wanted to remember had to do with the necessity of stopping acid rain, she might imagine a large yellow umbrella with ragged holes placed in the imaginary red umbrella stand in the imagined entryway to the house.

The *"Dissoi Logoi",* the oldest rhetorical treatise we possess, gave instructions for creating a second kind of artificial memory system:

> The greatest and fairest discovery has been found to be memory; it is useful for everything, for wisdom as well as for the conduct of life. This is the first step: if you focus your attention, your mind, making progress by this means, will perceive more. The second step is to practice whatever you hear. If you hear the same things many times and repeat them, what you have learned presents itself to your memory as a connected whole. The third step is: whenever you hear something, connect it with what you know already. For instance, suppose you need to remember the name "Chrysippos," you must connect it with *chrusos* (gold) and *hippos* (horse). Or another example: if you need to remember

the name *"Pyrilampes"* you must connect it with *pyr* (fire) and *lampein* (to shine). These are examples for words. In the case of things, do this: if you want to remember courage, think of Ares and Achilles, or metal working, of Hephaistos, or cowardice, of Epeios. (Sprague 1968, 166–67)

This treatise counseled students of memory, first, to focus on things they wish to remember. Second, things to be remembered should be repeated many times. The third step resembled Simonides' system in part; here students were to associate the material to be lodged in memory with a vivid image that is connected either to words or to things. If he wished to remember the name *Chrysippos,* the rhetoric student might imagine a golden horse. Or he might imagine a fiery lamp in order to remember Pyrilampes' name. Both images should be vivid enough to be easily remembered.

If a rhetor wishes to remember the name of a person he meets, using this system, he should listen very carefully to the person's name when she is introduced to him. Then repeat the name aloud. Last, the rhetor should mentally associate the name with vivid and familiar images of objects in his memory. Say, for example, that her name is Patricia Smith. The rhetor can associate *Patricia* with a vivid image of an aristocratic person (a patrician) and *Smith* with an image of someone crafting metal, as a blacksmith or locksmith does.

Memory for things is achieved by associating whatever is to be remembered—especially if it is an abstraction like courage or cowardice—with some mythological figure who is associated with that quality. So, if our rhetor learns that Patricia Smith is an astronaut, he can remember that by associating her in his memory with Icarus, who courageously flew all the way to the sun. (This example works only if mythological images are familiar and meaningful to the rhetor.) Or he can combine memory for words and memory for things: since the English term *astronaut* is formed from two ancient Greek words, *astron* ("star") and *nautes* (sailor), he can form a vivid image of a "star sailor" in order to remember Smith's occupation.

In the *Topics,* Aristotle recommended yet a third memory system. He counseled his students to memorize a "good stock of definitions," as well as a stock of premises to use in constructing enthymemes: "For just as in a person with a trained memory, a memory of things themselves is immediately caused by the mere mention of their places, so these habits too will make a man readier in reasoning, because he has his premises classified before his mind's eye, each under its number" (VIII 14 163b). In other words, Aristotle suggested that rhetors memorize the most often used commonplaces that serve as major premises for enthymemes. He also recommended that they group these into categories and give each category a number, so that premises can easily be recalled by mentally running through the numbered system. To use Aristotle's memory system, rhetors can group commonplaces on similar subjects under one mental category and invent a term to name the category. Then choose a key word from each commonplace, assign it a letter of the alphabet or a number, and organize the commonplaces in each category either alphabetically or numerically.

MODERN VERSIONS OF ANCIENT
MEMORY SYSTEMS

Today, since many people are literate, they rely on writing and electronic storage systems to do the kind of work done by artificial memory among ancient peoples. People who use research in their writing, for example, take notes on their reading or make records of experiments while they are performing them; they refer to these notes and records when they begin writing up the results of their work. Thus the role played by memory in modern invention is not immediately obvious. Nevertheless, it is substantial.

When people begin to compose, they necessarily rely on their memories, no matter what composing strategies they use. Even if they take notes on experiments or reading, composers must rely on memory to reconstruct meanings for those notes. They must also remember commonplaces and other argumentative strategies. They must remember how they went about composing other pieces of discourse on other occasions, and they remember what they've been taught about usage and spelling. In other words, people do not begin composing as though nothing has ever happened to them or as though they remember nothing of their past lives.

Cultural Memory

The ancient notion of communal memory seems quite foreign to modern students because these days, people tend to think of their memories as narratives of their past lives, rather than as carefully organized depositories of common knowledge. Despite this belief, our memories are stocked with many things besides narratives of our experiences; we remember things we learn from teachers, parents, clergy, relatives and friends, the media and books, just as well as we remember experiences. Certainly we rely on our memories of all these kinds of teachings whenever we compose.

In a recent *New York Times* opinion piece entitled "A Lost Eloquence," Carol Muske-Dukes, an author and teacher, laments the decline of poetry memorization. "This long-ago discredited pedagogical tradition," she writes, "generated a commonplace eloquence among ordinary Americans who knew how to (as they put it) 'quote.' Poems are still memorized in some classrooms but not 'put to heart' in a way that would prompt this more quotidian public expression" (December 29, 2002). Muske-Dukes writes further that she requires her students to memorize poetry. When discussing this requirement, Muske-Dukes's students usually protest that they are not capable of memorizing long poems, but she writes, "I ask them if they know the lyrics of 'Gilligan's Island' or 'The Brady Bunch,' and my point is made." Muske-Dukes's point, it seems to us, has to do with a kind of communal or cultural memory that exists either through explicit training (in the case of required memorization of poetry) or sheer repeated exposure (in the case of television theme songs). Cultural memory, to be sure, was partly why the ancients memorized Homeric epics and other

poetry. Young Athenians and Romans were still memorizing lines from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* up to ten centuries after their appearance, well after they had been written down.

In fact, the ancient art of rhetoric is at least in part derived from earlier poetic traditions. Poets such as Pindar and Sappho "sang" praises of people and deities, be they famous Olympic wrestlers, talented weavers, or Zeus, the god of thunder. In *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity,* Jeffrey Walker argues that rhetoric's origins can be found within the poetic tradition. To be sure, one way the connection between rhetoric and poetry matters for memory is ancient poetry's role in forming a cultural memory and providing a ready pool of commonly known lines from which rhetors could draw.

Perhaps more powerfully than poetry or songs, world-changing events or situations help form cultural memories, as well. The destruction by terrorists of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, shook the United States to its core. Immediately thereafter, few rhetors could discuss anything without reference to the tragic events that happened on that date. To give a speech on October 4 without mentioning the event would have been thoughtless. You probably recall the myriad ways cultural memory was formed after 9/11: the use of pictures of victims, the widespread praise of heroes, the invigorated display of the American flag, the admiration for New Yorkers and how they were able to pull together in the face of such dreadful circumstance. In this way, monumental events and the memory of those events give rise to new commonplaces or resurrect old ones (such as the flag) in new ways. Even the Spiderman movie, released early the following year, played upon cultural memories of this event by showing the web-casting superhero swooping down beside a grand American flag, waving slowly.

Much like artificial memory, cultural memory thus oftentimes operates through visual images (such as the flag). Still, even those symbols require the words and rhetorics swirling around in order for them to resonate in particular ways. People on the American left, for example, are less comfortable with the image of America as an imperial nation and are therefore more ambivalent about the symbol of the flag and the dominance it sometimes suggests than are people on the American right. Either way, the visual symbol still functions powerfully as part of rhetorical memory and arguments. The ancients and their visual-based memory systems were certainly on to something.

Organizational Memory

Our memories also play a role in organizing things we remember. In an untrained memory, the organization of remembered material may seem chaotic and disjointed, just as it appears to us in dreams. But memories can be trained and organized, just as the ancients said. A little memory work can pay off handsomely if it teaches us how to find things in our memories more quickly.

Some very simple memory systems are available to everyone. The letters of the alphabet are quite useful in this regard. If, for example, you want to remember a list of items to buy at the grocery store, you can organize them in alphabetical order: apples, bananas, cheese, lettuce, pepper, vitamins. It helps to repeat the list aloud a couple of times. When you arrive at the grocery store, simply skim through the alphabet letter by letter, searching your memory for any image you have attached to any letter. Another memory tactic, which resembles ancient geographical memory systems, is to organize your grocery list according to the floor plan of a grocery store in which you frequently shop. The first time you try this, you may need to walk through the store, noting the relation of its aisles to one another and making a mental place to coincide with each aisle. Then, when you make a grocery list, you can create the appropriate images and stash them on the appropriate aisles—carrots and potatoes on the vegetable aisle, milk at the back of the store, and so on. People who learn to do this don't need to make written grocery lists, and they never have to worry about leaving the grocery list at home. These simple memory systems also help writers and speakers to remember things that may be needed during composing. If you are like us, ideas often come to you when you are unable to write them down—while you are riding your bicycle, for example, or doing dishes or watching television or talking to someone. You can imprint such ideas on your memory by associating them with a letter of the alphabet and placing them in memory according to alphabetical order. Say that a rhetor has an idea about memory systems while she is having coffee with a friend. Rather than rudely interrupting the conversation to write this idea down, she can simply file the idea under *M* in her memory. This works even better if she mentally ties the idea to some vivid image. If, for example, she is having coffee with someone named "Michael," she can use his image later to conjure up the idea filed under M; better yet, she can create an image that is suitable to the idea. For example, she could associate her idea about memory with a vivid mental image of Simonides standing in front of Scopas's collapsed house.

Since contemporary rhetors tend to associate memory with narratives of their lives, it might be useful for a composer to use his remembered chronology of his life as the organizing principle in a memory system. Young persons can use each year of their lives from age seven or so, while older persons might wish to divide the remembered chronology of their lives into five-year periods or decades. Assign each section of the chronology a letter of the alphabet or a number (such as *1990*). Try to characterize each section by associating it with something important that happened to you during that period of your life. Then, when you wish to remember something, mentally stash it in the section of your remembered chronology that is most relevant to it. This system is a variant of the one suggested by Aristotle, and it may work for people who have difficulty with memory systems that use places as organizing principles.

Literate Memory Systems

With the spread of literacy, the storage function of human memory was superseded. Public libraries and encyclopedias were developed during the modern period and, to some extent, took the place of artificial memory for things. People no longer needed to remember information or arguments that they could easily look up in print. However, literate storage cannot do something that artificial memory can do: it cannot tell you where to look for the information you need (although electronic storage can do this). Libraries use systems such as the Library of Congress numbers to organize printed materials, and encyclopedias utilize the alphabet (along with other literate memory systems, such as indexes). Books and periodicals use **tables of contents,** indexes, and bibliographies to help users determine whether the material they contain is relevant to their needs.

The organizational principles of literate storage systems have to be learned and memorized if they are to be of any help in locating materials. Students should get in the habit of reading the organizational sections of printed materials first, in order to save the time and energy that may be spent in reading irrelevant sources. It is also useful for students to get to know their way around the library they use most.

Books

The front and back matter of any book can help you to locate material within it more quickly. Books usually begin with a **title page** and a page that gives reference information—including its Library of Congress call **number,** its date of publication, and its publisher. Nonfiction books include a table of contents, which outlines the main headings of material discussed in the book. Read the table of contents to determine whether the book covers material that interests you. If you decide to use the book as a source, write down its author's name, its full title, its date of publication, and its library call number. You will need this information if you cite the book either in footnotes or a bibliography, and you need the call number in case you have to look something up later. If you plan to quote anything directly from the book, be sure to record the page numbers from which you took the quotation.

Books may optionally contain a **foreword,** sometimes written by someone other than the author, which introduces the book and places it in the context of other related work. Ordinarily, the author includes a preface (literally "a speaking before"). In a preface, an author may indicate her purposes in composing the book; she may outline her methods or indicate the scholarly or intellectual tradition to which she is indebted; and she may acknowledge those who helped her compose the work. Skimming a preface can tell you much about a book, and prefaces are often fun to read since authors sometimes feel they can be more informal in a preface than in the rest of the text.

At the back of most nonfiction books, you will find a **bibliography** and an **index.** The bibliography lists all of the works mentioned or used in the book, usually listed in alphabetical order by their authors' last names. Sometimes bibliographies will suggest related sources as well, and so you can use its entries to find more information. Indexes list persons' names and specific or technical terms used in the book, along with the page numbers on which these terms appear. Indexes are extremely valuable tools in literate storage systems. We often begin reading a book by looking at its index, to see if it lists any terms related to our current research or if it lists the names of persons who are important thinkers in the area we are researching. Sometimes notes appear at the back of a book; however they sometimes appear at the bottom of pages (as footnotes) or at the ends of chapters. Glossaries, which explain the meanings of difficult or technical terms; appendixes; and other useful materials may also be included at the end of a book.

Periodicals

Librarians use the term **periodical** to refer to any literate materials that are published under the same name over a stretch of time. Periodicals include magazines, newspapers, and scholarly journals. Most periodicals include the organization information found in books: title pages, information pages, and tables of contents. Sometimes all of this information appears on a single page in a magazine or newspaper. Most periodicals have indexes, but these are issued periodically—once a year, or every three years, or the like. Sometimes it is necessary to browse through one to three years' worth of journal issues to find out in which years they publish their indexes. Periodical indexes are usually organized by author, title, and/or subject; they list all the materials published in the periodical over the time period covered by the index. The *New York Times,* for example, publishes a yearly index of materials contained in that newspaper. This index is usually housed in the reference rooms of large libraries.

Ordinarily, the publishers of periodicals assign a **volume number** to all the issues published in a given year. For example, volume 23 of *Rhetors Monthly,* dated 1992, indicates that all issues of this journal published in 1992 will be bound together as volume 23; each will have a separate issue number. The volume number most likely indicates that *Rhetors Monthly* has been published for twenty-three years. Its title indicates that this journal probably appears twelve times a year, so there will be twelve issues in each volume. The May issue, then, should be labeled "Vol. 23, No. 5." Sometimes page numbers are consecutive throughout a volume. The text of issue number 1 begins with page 1, but the text of the May issue begins with the number that comes after the number on the last page of the April issue.

Libraries

Libraries are to literate information storage what vivid images of city streets were to artificial memory. To be really useful, the literate storage systems used to organize libraries have to be memorized. Students who com-

pose discourse in response to school assignments should study the index-ing system used by the nearest library. Find out whether the library uses the Dewey decimal or the Library of Congress cataloging system. Get a copy of the library handout that explains the system and memorize as much of it as you can. Get a map of the library, and find the reference room.

Very few university libraries still catalog their holdings in large cases called **card catalogues,** although some libraries that have switched to elec-tronic cataloging still retain card catalogues as resources for finding older holdings. Smaller public libraries and some private libraries may still rely solely on card catalogues, however. Both sorts of catalogues are ordinarily arranged according to three indexing systems: by author, by title, and by subject. **E-catalogs** can also be searched by many other means: by keyword, by date, by call number. If you are searching for materials on a given sub-ject, you can use the alphabetical listing of standard subject headings used by the Library of Congress, which is usually available in the reference room. Other reference materials, such as the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature,* are also organized according to author, title, and subject.

If you need help in using these basic reference materials, take a library tour, or ask a reference librarian to explain the basic reference system to you. If the library you use is a large university library, walk through it in order to find where materials catalogued under each section of the system are stored. Ask a reference librarian to tell you when the library's periodi-cals began to be stored on microforms. Memorize that date or write it down. This information can save you time otherwise spent walking between the rooms that house printed periodicals and those where micro-forms can be read. Today, many recent periodical articles can be found on-line, and libraries maintain lists of electronic databases that can help you find these articles. Older articles, alas, must still be found by hand (or foot, actually).

Most libraries divide their periodical holdings into two categories: bound and current. **Bound** periodicals are older issues of newspapers, magazines, and journals that have either been bound together into a book according to year of publication or volume number or that have been trans-ferred to microforms for ease of storage. **Current periodicals** are piled on shelves just as they are; most libraries retain current issues of periodicals in their current periodical section for at least several months, depending on how often the periodical is issued. Daily newspapers, for example, are bound more often because they are so bulky. Bound and current periodicals are sometimes housed in different locations in a large library. The rooms and shelves that hold books are called stacks. Most public libraries allow everyone to browse the stacks. You can find books in the stacks by contin-ually referring to the indexing system that is ordinarily posted or painted on walls, but library research goes much faster if you memorize at least the sections of the system to which you frequently refer. Once you have mem-orized the Library of Congress numbers that you use most often, you can use the system heuristically. That is, since you know where relevant mate-rials are likely housed, you can find them by browsing the appropriate

shelves in the library. If you know that most books and periodicals on rhetoric are housed under Library of Congress call numbers that begin with PN or PR, for example, you know immediately which floor of the library you need to get to, and if you use the same library frequently, a call number will tell you exactly which shelf you need to find (clearly relying on your artificial memory here). When a book or periodical is missing from its appointed place, even though the catalog shows it as "checked in" or "on shelf," search the space where it is supposed to be for a couple of feet in either direction. Look for a missing book or periodical on nearby carts and around copying stations as well.

ELECTRONIC MEMORY SYSTEMS

Electronic memory represents a vast improvement on both artificial memory and literate storage facilities. Computers can remember more information than any single human will ever need. The Web is a vast storehouse of information and images, available to anyone with access to a computer. Researchers no longer need to develop elaborate card systems to help them remember bibliographic information, since this information can be called up from the electronic databases of any good library at any time of the day or night and from any location where there are computer terminals. Software programs are available that help rhetors assemble their personal notes, footnotes, and bibliographies as well. Note taking can now be done wherever research takes place, at the keyboard of a portable computer. Copies of library materials may be made with a copier or scanner, and OCR (optical character recognition) programs can translate a scanned image of a document into text with very little need for editing. Oral composing can be done electronically with the aid of voice-activated word-processing programs that remember and store every sound uttered by a composer.

In other words, **software** is now available that serves the heuristic functions of ancient **memory—something** that literate storage could not do. Software programs can remember where any file in an electronic system is located, even if their users can't remember the file's name, let alone where they stored it. Dictionaries, encyclopedias, thesauruses, **collections** of proverbs and **quotations—reference** materials of all **kinds—are** now available on disk. These electronic references have elaborate cross-referencing systems that are larger and far more subtle than human memory; they will search for related information in places where humans would never think to look. Electronic databases have all but eliminated the need to use literate cataloging systems; a researcher can simply type in a word or name or call number, and the database will display all related items held by that library or any others to which it is connected. Many libraries subscribe to more specialized databases that are organized by field or subject: business, humanities, sciences. Most such databases are user-friendly, providing users with step-by-step instructions for entering and using them. Libraries

usually supply directions on paper as well, and librarians can always be called upon to help with a search of library holdings.

It is an open question whether electronic memory will replace human memory. It is probably more accurate to think of electronic memory as a supplement to, or expression of, human memory. The sci-fi image of the cyborg—part human, part machine—need no longer be limited to movie creations like *The Matrix*. Imagine Simonides seated before a speedy computer equipped with huge amounts of storage, plenty of memory and a fast graphics card, efficient word-processing software, a scanner, and quick access to the Web. We suspect that he would program his machine with one or several of the electronic memory systems that are now available, but he could program and install a version of the artificial memory system he created in the fifth century BCE, as well. Would he then quit using his mental memory system to remember things and their relations, relying instead only on his computer whenever he needed to remember something? We think not. We think he would continue to use both. In fact, interaction with his machine might stimulate Simonides to achieve even more dazzling feats of memory than those he displayed during the fifth century BCE.

WORKS CITED

Sprague, Rosamund Kent, trans. *"Dissoi Logoi," Mind* 78 (April 1968): 155-87.
Walker, Jeffrey. *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

DELIVERY: ATTENDING TO EYES AND EARS

FOR ANCIENT RHETORS and rhetoricians, spoken discourse was infinitely more powerful and persuasive than was written composition. Most discourses were composed in order to be performed, and as ancient lore about memory makes clear, composition could be accomplished without the aid of writing.

The ability to write was not widespread in ancient cultures. While most members of classical Greek aristocracy could read, it was not fashionable to do one's own writing, and so those who did compose dictated their work to a scribe. Those who could write probably edited the scribe's work, especially if they planned to publish a written version of a composition. Nonetheless, they may have done this orally as well, by asking the scribe to read his copy aloud. These practices remained in vogue within Roman culture even among people who wrote easily, like Cicero.

But the relative importance of spoken discourse was not only related to the scarcity of writing ability. Rhetoric was invented for use within very small cultures, where citizens knew one another by sight, if not personally. The agora and the forum were not large by the modern standards set by such arenas as the Sugardome or Madison Square Garden. Of course, the

ancients had few ways to amplify their voices, as is done electronically today, and so the sites of public gatherings were necessarily small.

Ancient rhetoricians would be very surprised by the modern association of intelligence and education with **literacy—the** ability to read and write. For them, writing was an accessory technology, a support for memory as a way of storing information (*Institutes* XI xi 10). Throughout antiquity, discourse was primarily composed to be spoken. As a result, the ancients were very concerned about how speeches ought to be delivered: the proper management of the voice, bodily movement, and gestures. Because of this concern, they made delivery the fifth canon of rhetoric. But this does not mean that delivery was ranked fifth in importance. Quintilian, in fact, boldly proclaimed: "I would not hesitate to assert that a mediocre speech supported by all the power of delivery will be more impressive than the best speech unaccompanied by such power" (XI iii 5). And when Demosthenes was asked to name the most important aspects of oratory, he apparently answered, "Delivery, Delivery, and Delivery" (Quintilian, *Institutes* XI iii 6). Modern rhetoric, for the most part, has neglected aspects of delivery, opting for a "set format" for compositions (a certain number and order of paragraphs; a certain style of writing; strict adherence to grammar rules). Under such conditions, delivery tends to collapse into arrangement and style.

Yet during the twentieth century, technologies such as television and the Internet have reduced distance between rhetor and audience once again, replicating to some degree the conditions of ancient culture. Television and the Internet make certain faces familiar and broadcast political debates and news stories. The important difference, of course, is that the faces and stories are coming into people's homes, and it's easier and more likely for people to stay home to watch and surf rather than venturing out to listen to speakers. In our own time, therefore, the physical and audible features of rhetoric are becoming important once again.

ANCIENT COMMENTARY ON DELIVERY

The Greek word for delivery was *hypokrisis,* and yes, the English word *hypocrisy* is a direct descendant. The term comes from a verb *(hypokrinesthai)* used to describe the work of the actor who responded to the chorus in Greek tragedy. Later, the term *hypokrites* meant simply "actor." There are many stories about ancient orators learning the craft of delivery from famous actors. Plutarch recounted this one about Demosthenes:

> When the assembly had refused to hear him, and he was going home with his head muffled up, taking it very heavily, they relate that Satyrus, the actor, followed him, and being his familiar acquaintance, entered into conversation with him. To whom, when Demosthenes bemoaned himself, that having been the most industrious of all the pleaders, and having almost spent the whole strength and vigor of his body in that employment, he could not yet find any acceptance with the people, that drunken sots, mariners, and illiterate fellows

were heard, and had the hustings for their own, while he himself was despised, "You say true, Demosthenes," replied Satyrus, "but I will quickly remedy the cause of all this, if you will repeat to me some passage out of Euripides or Sophocles." Which when Demosthenes had pronounced, Satyrus presently taking it up after him, gave the same passage, in his rendering of it, such a new form, by accompanying it with the proper mien and gesture, that to Demosthenes it seemed quite another thing. By this, being convinced how much grace and ornament language acquires from action, he began to esteem it a small matter, and as good as nothing for a man to exercise himself in declaiming, if he neglected enunciation and delivery. Hereupon he built himself a place to study in under ground (which was still remaining in our time), and hither he would come constantly every day to form his action and to exercise his voice; and here he would continue, often times without intermission, two or three months together, shaving one half of his head, that so for shame he might not go abroad, though he desire it ever so much. (1025-26)

However much rhetors could learn from actors, there was still a difference between their arts. As Cicero pointed out, orators act in real life, while actors mimic reality *(De Oratore* III lvi 214-15). Furthermore, Cicero suggested that delivery might have had its roots not just in acting but also in athletics. Here is the character Crassus in *De Oratore:*

But all these emotions must be accompanied by **gesture—not** this stagy gesture reproducing the words but one conveying the general situation and idea not by demonstration but by hints, with this vigorous manly throwing out of the chest, borrowed not from the stage and the theatrical profession but from the parade ground or even from wrestling. (DI lix 220)

Given that gladiators and wrestlers occupied a powerful place in Roman culture, it makes sense that Cicero would see overlap between rhetorical delivery and sporting activities. Rhetoric, after all, for the Romans, was highly competitive, culturally important; and most of all, like the arts of gladiators and wrestlers, rhetoric was performed with bodies.

Modern scholars are not sure when delivery began to be included among the rhetorical canons. The fourth-century *ad Alexandrum* included only invention, arrangement, and style. Aristotle briefly discussed delivery, however *(Rhetoric* III i 1402b-1404a). In a very interesting aside, he noted that no systematic treatment of delivery had yet been composed, and he speculated that this was the case because "originally, the poets themselves acted their tragedies." What this means is that by the time Aristotle composed the *Rhetoric* (ca. 330 BCE), professional actors had replaced poets as reciters of tragedies. These actors must have learned to recite tragedies in one of two ways: either by memorizing them while the poets recited or by memorizing written copies produced by scribes. In other words, by this time performance could be separated from composition; the person who composed the play did not need to be the same person who delivered it. Now the actor was copying the words composed by the poet, but he did not have to copy the poet's performance into the bargain. Likely, actors

imbued their performances with their own interpretations, and this mimicry is what set Aristotle's teeth on edge.

This state of affairs lends another level of meaning to the term *hypokrites:* an actor is someone who pretends to be somebody else. It also means that acting and delivery could now become arts, with principles that could be learned and transmitted to others. Once these arts were written down, they could be learned without the example of a teacher, although in the case of delivery (as suggested by the example of Demosthenes) a teacher's example is always helpful.

In his comments on delivery in the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle remarked in passing that performers who give careful attention to delivery "are generally the ones who win poetic contests; and just as actors are more important than poets now in the poetic contests, so it is in political contests because of the sad state of governments" (III i 1403b). This analogy—actors are to poets as orators are to statesmen—indicates a quite conservative attitude toward Athenian democracy on Aristotle's part. Just as poets are somehow the "real" owners and creators of their compositions, aristocrats are the "real" owners and creators of government. With the establishment of acting and rhetoric as arts that anyone could learn, poetic compositions, like political decision making, were available to anyone, not just to those who fancied they had some natural talent or hereditary claim to them. This state of affairs apparently disgruntled Aristotle.

Even though he thought delivery was a "vulgar matter," Aristotle nevertheless paid it some attention. He wrote that delivery "was a matter of how the voice should be used in expressing each emotion." The expression of emotion could be altered by variations in volume, pitch, and rhythm. He also distinguished between oral and written delivery, noting that "where there is most need of performance, the least exactness is present" (III xii 1414a). In other words, written discourse must be more precise than spoken discourse.

Aristotle's student, Theophrastus, was widely credited throughout antiquity with having written a treatise on delivery. But this treatise, if it ever existed, has been lost. While Hellenistic rhetoricians regularly remarked that delivery was the most important of the canons, they didn't have much to say about it. Indeed, the author of *ad Herennium* stated flatly that no consistent treatment of delivery had ever been composed, and he provided us with the oldest account that we possess.

While the author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* does not agree with Demosthenes that delivery is the most important of the five canons of rhetoric, he nonetheless believes that it effectively strengthens the other four parts of ancient rhetoric: "For skillful invention, elegant style, the artistic arrangements of the parts comprising the case, and the careful memory of all these will be of no more value without delivery" (III xi 19). Cicero and Quintilian both argue that the proper delivery can excite the emotions. As Cicero put it in *De Oratore,* "Nature has assigned to every emotion a particular look and tone of voice and bearing of its own; and the whole of a person's frame and every look on his face and utterance of his voice are like

the strings of a harp, and sound according as they are struck by each successive emotion" (III lvii 216). People who have watched great actors at work know that emotions can be powerfully conveyed by facial gestures and tone of voice.

According to Quinitilian, "All delivery ... is concerned with two different things, namely, voice and gesture, of which one appeals to the eye and the other to the ear, the two senses by which all emotion reaches the soul" (XI iii 14). It is fair to say, then, that delivery is that part of rhetoric that extends most explicitly to the audience, as it attends to their eyes and ears, the visual and the aural. In what follows, we will consider the different ways in which rhetors reach out to eyes and ears in oral discourse, written discourse, and finally, electronic discourse.

DELIVERY OF ORAL DISCOURSE

In the context of oral discourse, the ears of the audience tune into the voice of the rhetor, and the eyes focus on the rhetor's facial and bodily gestures (or lack thereof).

The *ad Herennium* author offers an intriguing theory of voice and divides the concern of vocal delivery into three considerations: volume, stability (a calm, composed voice), and flexibility (varying intonations). For the ancients, these areas all reflect and produce *ethos:* a calm but not monotonous voice, for example, implies a calm yet somewhat lively speaker even as it soothes hearers while maintaining their interest. The *ad Herennium* author makes specific suggestions, such as using a calm tone in the introduction, calling a bellowing tone "disagreeable." He notes too that pauses can help "strengthen the voice" and that they serve to separate thoughts, in order to give each thought its due attention and to let the audience reflect.

In general, the ancients recommended that speakers use a modulated tone and speak slowly and clearly. They gave a great deal of attention to the use of tone and pitch to convey emotions; but since contemporary audiences prefer that a speaker's tone and pitch reflect those that occur in conversational speech, today speakers needn't worry about such matters. Ancient rhetoricians also recommended that speakers vary the volume of their voices throughout the speech, using a louder voice to emphasize important words. The appropriate volume to use is determined to some extent by the size of the room and the audience. People who are asked to speak in a room that does not have electronic amplification should check it out ahead of time. As an acquaintance sits in the back row, deliver a few lines of your speech from the front in order to determine whether you can be heard throughout the room. If you are using a microphone, try to maintain the same distance from it throughout your talk, so that your voice does not fade in and out.

Wise rhetoric teachers insist that anyone who speaks in public should rehearse her remarks out loud. This is good advice, and we follow it when-

ever we are asked to speak in a formal setting. Rehearsal is important for several reasons. First of all, practice allows a speaker to time her remarks. Adhering to set time limits is professional and considerate when others are speaking after you, and it is a necessity for those who speak in public broadcasting. Second, rehearsal helps you decide where to pause and where you can look up at your audience in order to establish contact with them. Third, reading aloud helps you to hear the rhythms of the sentences you have written. We often read our work aloud while we are revising it. Sometimes this practice tells us where a sentence construction has gone wrong, but more often it helps us to determine which sentences are too long to read or hear easily. Sentences composed for oral delivery should never be so long that they cannot be uttered in a single breath, unless they are carefully punctuated. Long sentences are elegant if their internal punctuation, balance, and rhythm signal the relations of their parts to readers and listeners. Where this is not the case, long sentences can confuse and ultimately tire an audience. In order to consider the listener's "ear," composers and practitioners of oral discourse need to pay attention to all aspects of verbal delivery, especially volume, tone, pace, and length.

When thinking of the audience's eyes, however, a different set of concerns comes to the fore. The *ad Herennium* author advises speakers to consider physical gestures to go along with the tone of the speech. As with voice, the use of gestures should be appropriate to the rhetorical situation:—bodily delivery should be subdued on formal occasions but animated in the courtroom or legislature, especially when vigorous debate is in progress. The importance of appropriate bodily delivery is underscored if we consider the standards of decorous delivery that obtained in Roman rhetoric. Apparently it was appropriate (and expected) that Roman orators would strike their brows, stamp their feet, tear their clothing, and slap their thighs. (This last gesture served to keep the crowd awake as well). Such antics would excite only laughter or anxiety in modern audiences, who expect restrained delivery from their public performers. The convention of restrained delivery applies even to actors today; the only performers we exempt from this rule are stand-up comedians and televangelists. Yet with the exception of newscasters, rhetors don't often simply just stand and speak with an expressionless face.

The ancients gave elaborate advice about facial and bodily gestures. Since a speaker's face and movement could not be electronically amplified in ancient settings, gestures were very important means of amplifying the speaker's mood and conveying it to distant members of an audience. However, since modern audiences do not care for elaborate facial and bodily gestures, a very limited repertoire of these will suffice in most settings. The most important consideration is use of the eyes. As Cicero wrote, "By action the body talks . . . nature has given us eyes, as she has given the horse and the lion their mane and tail and ears, to indicate the feelings of the mind" *(De Oratore* III lix 222-23). If you are speaking to a live audience, look at them as frequently as you can. If you are speaking before a camera,

be sure to look directly into it whenever possible. Today, gestures should be as natural and spontaneous as possible. Live audiences respond surprisingly well to a few hand gestures, such as pointing the index finger to underscore an important remark or slicing the hand downward to indicate a conclusion. Former president Bill Clinton was known for a subtle yet emphatic gesture wherein he placed his thumb flat onto his bent index finger and, keeping his hand in this position, moved it up and down to mark his most important points. The gesture was strong enough to lend emphasis but subtle enough so that it did not distract from—but rather enhanced—the point he was making. If for some reason you are interested in improving your oral delivery, you can do no better than to take Quintilian's advice to memorize a few passages of written discourse and practice reciting them aloud whenever you can. Or carefully watch speakers you admire and try to imitate their facial gestures and vocal control. The anchors on national network news are very good speakers and are worthy of imitation. If you want to imitate more flamboyant deliveries, watch able politicians, attorneys, and clergy.

If you are composing a speech for oral delivery, then, it makes sense to think about the most appropriate tones and gestures to go along with the speech. What points might need a bit of bodily, facial, or tonal emphasis? As rhetors compose and subsequently practice their speeches, it's a good idea, following the ancients, to consider these aspects of oral delivery, and to even practice different tones or gestures in the mirror to see what may or may not work in the speaking situation. Attention to delivery is crucial for conveying points and establishing and maintaining *ethos.* At the close of his discussion of delivery, the *ad Herennium* author underscores this point: "One must remember: good delivery ensures that what the orator is saying seems to come from the heart" (III xv 28).

DELIVERY OF WRITTEN DISCOURSE

Are rhythm and physicality confined to the spoken word? Does written discourse extend to the eyes and ears of the audience? Certainly it is impossible to stomp one's feet in written prose, yet there are ways in which written discourse nevertheless attends to the ears and eyes of the audience. As we mentioned earlier, in ancient times, writing was always read aloud, whether in a public forum, as with the speech Gorgias delivered at the Olympic games, or in private. It wasn't until about the fourth century CE that silent reading practices emerged in the context of the monastic tradition (Parkes 9).

Also interesting is that, early on, Greek writing had no punctuation. Instead, the text was written in one long stream, breaking a line when necessary (as at the end of the papyrus or stone). This kind of writing—without breaks or other distinguishing marks—is called *scriptio continua.* As reading became more common, teachers and authors began to worry about how students and readers would interpret a text with no breaks, so they

developed systems of punctuation. Teachers, then, were among the very first to use punctuation in order to assist young boys in their early attempts at reading aloud.

There was therefore a kind of correspondence between spoken and written discourse, and in order to preserve this correspondence, the ancients started tinkering with systems of punctuation. Rhetors, for example, marked places where speakers would pause to take a breath. The early origins of punctuation were therefore rhetorical, and while punctuation functions these days to mark more than pauses for breathing, it is nonetheless important to bear in mind the rhetorical value of punctuation. It seems to us that practitioners of modern rhetoric sometimes forget the rhetoric of punctuation in favor of rules about sentence structure.

In his dialogue *De Oratore,* Cicero makes the link between rhythmic speaking and writing by referencing Isocrates and his forebears:

> For they thought that in speeches the close of the period [sentence] ought to come not when we are tired out but where we may take breath . .. and it is said that Isocrates first introduced the practice of tightening up the irregular style of oratory which belonged to the early days, so his pupil Naucrates writes, by means of an element of rhythm, designed to give pleasure to the ear. (III 173)

In another dialogue, Cicero asserts the importance of rhythm more strenuously: "Hence this must be used, call it composition, or finish or rhythm as you will—this must be used if you wish to speak elegantly, not only, as Aristotle and Theophrastus say, that the sentence may not drift along vaguely like a river ... but for the reason that the periodic [or rhythmic] sentence is much more forceful than the loose" *(Orator* lviii 228).

Here, the notion of rhythmic prose harkens back to the notion of rhetorical style—remember, the five canons were interconnected. Still, in the context of delivery, we would draw attention to the rhetorical function of punctuation: the way in which dashes, commas, and periods mimic the pauses, stops, and connections of speech and, as such, attend to the reader's "ear." The first-century-BCE rhetorician Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in his treatment of written composition, even discusses the rhythmic, musical qualities of language, since, as he puts it, "rhythm plays no small part in a dignified and impressive composition" ("On Literary Composition" 17).

In written discourse, attending to the "ear" of the audience has to do with editing a discourse so that it is accessible and pleasant to read. Editing is the very last stage in the composing process. Writers should not attempt it until they are 95 percent sure that they have finished working through the other canons. Nothing stifles composing quite so quickly as trying to edit too soon. Three issues face modern rhetors during the editing process: correctness rules, formatting, and presentation.

Spelling and Punctuation

Obviously, spelling and punctuation present no problems to speakers, but they can be troublesome for writers. People who are chronically bad spellers often think of themselves as bad writers. However, there is no connection between one's ability to spell and one's ability to write. Furthermore, if you are a bad speller, this does not (and should not) reflect negatively on your character.

People have trouble spelling English words because English spelling is irregular and erratic; it is irregular and erratic because it reflects accidents of linguistic history. For example, the "gh" in words like *light* and *bright* is there because it used to be pronounced. The written forms of these words are slowly conforming to their current pronunciation: *lite, brite.* Soon, everyone but traditional grammarians will have forgotten that they were ever spelled differently.

Happily, inability to spell is no longer a problem for people who can afford the technology, since portable spell-checkers and electronic dictionaries are now available, and most word-processing programs have spell-checkers and dictionaries built into their files. Ii you can't afford to get electronic help, read as much as you can. When you come across words that are difficult for you to spell, write them down. Once a week, organize the words in alphabetical order and memorize your list (see Chapter 12, on memory). Use the words as often as you can when you write. This method won't turn you into a champion speller overnight, but it works for most people.

Traditional grammar books contain lists and lists of rules for the use of punctuation. Some of these are necessary and some are not. Most are simply confusing. There are four kinds of punctuation in written discourse. The first indicates where pauses would occur if the discourse were spoken (for example, commas and periods). A second group of punctuation marks indicate the logical relations of parts of sentences (semicolons and colons, parentheses and dashes). The third indicates the graphic or logical relations of larger parts of discourse (paragraphs, headers). The fourth indicates insertions or omissions.

The best advice we can give about the first and second sorts of punctuation is this: read your writing aloud, like the ancients did, and mark the places where you pause. Then put punctuation in these places. Better yet, ask someone else to read your writing aloud while you follow along on another copy. Mark the places where your reader pauses, and put punctuation there when you revise. If your reader falters, mark the passage. Usually, readers falter when writers haven't punctuated clearly enough. Wait to put in larger marks of punctuation, like paragraphs and headers, until you've drafted the entire discourse at least once. Then outline it and use indentations and headers to mark the divisions of the discourse.

If the "play it by ear" method isn't sufficient, try memorizing or referring to the following list.

Punctuation That Marks Internal Pauses

These marks can appear inside punctuated sentences.

1. A comma (,) marks a relatively weak internal pause. Used to set off short phrases (ancient commas) that would interfere with readers' understanding of the sentence, like this, if not so marked.

2. A semicolon (;) marks a stronger internal pause; like this. Used to set off clauses (ancient members or colons) from one another.

3. A colon (:) marks the strongest available internal pause: like this. Generally used to set off longer colons from the main part of a sentence; if so used, sticklers for correctness will look for semicolons at the end of each member; can also be used alone to indicate a very strong internal pause. (Sticklers don't like this use of the colon, but we find it very useful).

4. One dash (—) can be used to set off some loosely connected comma from the main part of a **sentence—as though** it were an afterthought. Paired **dashes—used** to set off any *interruptio—are* appearing more frequently in modern prose (see Chapter 11, on style, for discussion of the figure known as *interruptio).* Parentheses (like these) serve essentially the same function as paired dashes (that is, they interrupt or comment on the main point of the sentence).

Punctuation That Marks External Pauses

These pieces of punctuation are used to mark the beginnings and ends of sentences.

1. In modern written English, a Capital Letter (Latin *caput,* "head" or "chief") ordinarily marks the beginning of sentences. But a capital letter can also mark the beginning of a fragment. Like this. (In Early Modern Written English, Things were Easier, because Capitals were Used to Mark most of the Important Words. Written German still Employs this Convention).

2. A period (.) marks the end of any punctuated sentence that makes a statement. It is also used to mark fragments that are statements. Such as this.

3. A question mark (?) marks the end of any punctuated sentence that asks a question. It also marks fragments that are questions. Got it?

4. An exclamation point (!) marks the end of any punctuated sentence that expresses some strong emotion. It also marks fragments that express strong emotion. Exclamation points are seldom used in formal discourse because they express too much emotion, thus closing the distance between rhetor and audience in a manner inappropriate to the rhetorical situation!

5. Indentation (the writing begins five or six spaces from the left margin). Indentation is used to mark the beginning of a new section of discourse. During the Middle Ages, when people wrote everything by

hand and when paper was scarce and expensive, scribes copied text onto every bit of space available on paper or vellum. Hence it became necessary to mark off sections of longer discourses in some way so that handwritten texts would be intelligible. Medieval scribes invented a mark for such sections, and they called it a paragraph (Greek "written separately"). Eventually the name for the mark got transferred to the section of discourse itself. Paragraphs are a necessity only in written texts, and they are a product of page literacy. Forget all that stuff about the "logic" **of** paragraphs and topic sentences and methods of development. Those rules about paragraphs were invented by a nineteenth-century logician named Alexander Bain who thought that every paragraph should represent a single idea (whatever that is). He also thought that if everyone were to write like logicians, rhetoric would disappear from the face of the earth. (Bain wasn't any Cicero.)

Headers serve exactly the same function as paragraphs except that they mark larger pieces of text. We used them in this book to indicate the relations of one part of a chapter to another. But to some extent, we must confess, the choice of where to put headers is arbitrary, having as much to do with their relative length as with any internal logic of the discourse. We cheerfully confess that the larger divisions of a discourse never become very clear to us until we are almost finished composing.

Punctuation That Marks Omissions and Insertions

1. The mark of punctuation called an apostrophe (') should not be confused with the figure of the same name (see the chapter on style). Apostrophes appear only in written English, and they are there to prevent confusion. In modern English, apostrophes have three uses. First, they indicate that someone or something possesses something else, as in "Colleen's cat" or "the audience's response." If the apostrophe did not appear, readers might take the words to be plurals. In this use, apostrophes can cause their own brand of confusion if the word in which they appear ends with an s or an *x.* At the moment, there is considerable debate about how to mark this occurrence in written English. Should one write "Socrates' socks" or "Socrates's socks"? We prefer the former, but many authors like the latter. Second, apostrophes substitute for an omitted letter. This occurs most frequently in contractions, such as *isn't* for "is not" or *don't* for "do not." **They** are also used, mostly in poetry, to mark the figure called "ellipsis," where a letter has been omitted to make the meter come out right (e'en for "even"). Third, apostrophes are used to form the plural of numbers, symbols, letters, and abbreviations: *Ph.D's;* "There were three e's in the word"; "I counted eight occurrences of 8's."

2. Quotation marks (" ") are used chiefly to indicate material that has been borrowed from some other text or to show that the words they enclose are being referred to, as in "this example." When you quote or emphasize something that is already within quotation marks, use sin-

gle quotation marks (that is, apostrophes) to indicate the quote-within-a-quote: "We don't 'cash' checks."

3. Ellipses (…) are used to mark places in quoted material where stuff has been omitted. Use three dots if no period occurred in the omitted stuff; use four if a period did appear.

If this list doesn't work for you, get a handbook on style and read the chapters on punctuation. Memorize as much as you can. If necessary, refer to these chapters when you edit your writing (but not **before—trying** to edit while you are inventing is the surest way we know to bring both processes to a dead halt). Or hire or beg somebody to edit your work for you.

Traditional Grammar and Usage

Grammar becomes a problem for writers if they try to adhere to the rules laid down in traditional grammar, which is an artificial grammar imposed on English during the eighteenth-century and which observes grammatical rules borrowed from Latin. (Latin was then thought to be a lot sexier than English.) The rules of traditional grammar include this one: infinitive verbs should not be split (write "to speak carefully" rather than "to carefully speak"). In Latin, infinitive verbs could not be split, because they were a single word *(dicere,* "to speak"; *scribere,* "to write"). In English, of course, infinitives are composed of two words, which allows rhetors to insert words in between them if they wish. But this important difference doesn't stop traditional grammarians from imposing an archaic rule on writers.

Our advice concerning such traditional niceties is this: rely on your intuitive grammatical sense about your native language when you write and upon your ear when you read your work aloud. This is good advice unless, of course, your teacher or boss is a traditional grammarian. In that case, get a handbook that lists traditional rules about grammar and use it when you edit your work, or hire someone to edit it for you if you can afford to. If you are not a native speaker of English, continue to do what your teachers told you to do: read and listen to the English used by native speakers whenever you can. **Nonnative** speakers of English and people who use dialects of English have an advantage over the many Americans who are monolingual or monodialectical because they can use the ancient exercise of translation to improve their grasp of both languages or dialects. Ancient rhetoricians recommended translation from one language to another as a useful means of understanding the grammar of a second language, as well as its rhythmic patterns (see Chapter 14, on imitation).

Usage is another matter altogether. Usage can be defined neutrally as the customary ways in which things are done within written discourse. A more biased and yet more accurate definition is this: usage rules are the conventions of written English that allow Americans to discriminate against one another. Questions of usage are tied to social attitudes about who is intelligent and well educated and who is not. A person who says "I ain't got no idea" obviously learned to say this somewhere, probably in her

native community. If she were to say this in other settings or to write it, she risks being marked as illiterate, uneducated, and possibly stupid into the bargain. This is manifestly unfair, since her usage is perfectly appropriate in her native community. Despite their manifest unfairness, however, usage rules exist; they are enforced by people with power; and so they must be observed in situations where they have been decreed to be important.

Because of its social aspect, usage differs from natural grammar, which describes the rules people use to form utterances in their native languages. Many of the rules of usage are drawn not from the language people **use** but from traditional grammar, which is an artificial or historically constructed grammar. Its rules represent an attempt to freeze the language in time, to create a standard for "good English" that allows people who care to do so to mark deviations from it. Utterances that are deemed bad usage in terms of traditional grammar may be perfectly grammatical (and appropriate) in the language or dialect from which they are drawn.

The usages that raise the hackles of traditional grammarians involve perceived misuses of verb forms, pronouns, and adverbs. Writers should try to avoid using verb forms that are perceived as incorrect ("She gone over to Mom's house" rather than the standard "She went to Mom's house"). They should insure that the number (plural or singular) of the main verb in any sentence agrees with the number of the main noun ("They drops by Mom's house" rather than "They drop by Mom's house"). The first construction is perfectly appropriate in some dialects of English, but people who use usage rules to discriminate disapprove of its use in writing.

Writers should also try not to use objective-case pronouns in subject positions ("Her and him dropped by Mom's house"). This archaic rule really irritates us, because case endings are not necessary to preserve meaning in English, as they were in Latin, and so they are not often observed in spoken English. People answering a phone don't often say "It is I" or "This is she"; they say "It's me" and "This is her" and are perfectly understood. But the usage police disapprove of case switching, and we are obliged to report this to you.

Another traditional rule of usage cautions writers to avoid double or triple negatives ("I *ain't* got *no* idea," "It *don't* make me *no never* mind"). Of course, absolute observance of this rule would make it impossible to use the ancient figure called litotes ("This is *not* **unexpected"**). Standard usage doesn't let you double up on comparative adverbs, either ("He dropped by Mom's house acting *more crazier* than ever"). It also dictates that writers avoid substituting adjectives for adverbs, especially with the pair *good* (adjective) and *well* (adverb). "He upset Mom real good" is not acceptable in standard usage, because *good* modifies *upset,* which is a verb, and as every good member of the usage police knows, only adverbs can modify verbs, and only adjectives (and pronouns) can modify nouns.

So there. Those are the usage rules that pretty much bother everyone who sets (set?) themselves up as arbiters of right and wrong uses of the written language. There are a few others that bother the real strict usage police (we committed a usage error in that **sentence—can** you spot it?). The

first of these is sentence fragments. Some people don't like other people to write sentences that don't have subjects or verbs: "So there"; "Even though she reads Woolf." This nonsense derives from an eighteenth-century superstition about sentences, that supposed that every sentence represents a complete thought. Whatever that is. Usually, reading your writing aloud will tell you when you have committed a fragment. You need to answer two questions about any fragment that appears in your writing: Did you commit it intentionally? Will your audience love and appreciate it as much as you do? If the answers to both questions are "no," attach the fragment to some nearby sentence by means of internal punctuation.

An opposite breach of usage rules occurs when a sentence has two members, or an internal comma, that have not been marked off by internal punctuation. This is often called a "run-on" or "fused" sentence. This can be cured by reading aloud and paying careful attention to the places where pauses occur. Mark them with internal punctuation. If you have difficulty understanding why these problems are problems, or how to correct them, get a style handbook that devotes sections to traditional grammar and usage. Read the explanations. Do the exercises. Consult them when you edit. If you don't commit any of these breaches of usage, throw a party and forget about them.

VISUAL RHETORIC

Our discussion of the delivery of written discourse has thus far been limited to what we are calling, following Quintilian, issues of "the ear"—that is, how words sound when they're fit together on a page, connected and separated by punctuation, and so forth. But what about how written work looks? These days, many scholars are concerned with something called "visual rhetoric," a branch of rhetorical studies that considers all aspects of the visual—from the persuasive force of images to words and how they function as images. We believe this contemporary field fits most appropriately under the canon of delivery.

Ocular Demonstration

One aspect of visual rhetoric enters through how words help the audience "see" through use of descriptive language and the like. The author of *ad Herennium* calls this general aspect of language "ocular demonstration." He writes: "It is Ocular Demonstration when an event is so described in words that the business seems to be enacted and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes" (IV lv 68). The author continues: "This we can effect by including what has preceded, followed, and accompanied the event itself, or by keeping steadily to its consequences or the attendant circumstances." This example is a thick description of the orator Gracchus approaching the assembly: "In a sweat, with eyes blazing, hair bristling, toga awry, he begins to quicken his pace, several other men joining him." The description

continues, but you get the picture. Ocular demonstration is another term for what the Greeks called *enargeia,* discussed in the chapter on *pathos,* and is also closely tied to *ekphrasis* (description), mentioned in Chapter 15, on the *progymnasmata,* or rhetorical exercises. Such vivid description of actual events can help to create *kairos* by recreating a scene anew. Of course language is inherently visual in this way, as Aristotle pointed out with metaphor when he wrote, "Metaphors therefore should be derived from what is beautiful either in sound, or in signification, or to sight, or to some other sense" *(Rhetoric* 1405b 13). So written delivery connects back to style insofar as writing style plays to the ears and eyes of the reader.

Textual Presentation

Yet another aspect of visual rhetoric is the way words look on a page. When it comes to physical presentation of the written text, contemporary rhetors are faced with a variety of choices; indeed, textual features and page layouts are an "available means of persuasion," to use Aristotle's definition of rhetoric. Choosing a font style and size is no longer the province of the person at a printing press, since standard word-processing programs offer several kinds of fonts and various styles (italic, bold, underline, shadow).

In designspeak, fonts are categorized as either serif or sans serif. Serif type features a fine line that finishes off the main strokes of a letter, as in the font used in this book. The term *sans serif* means "without serifs," and looks like this. Generally, though, serif type is thought to be more reader-friendly, for the enhanced edges of each letter help the eyes move more easily through the words. Serif type is also considered to be more traditional and formal, while sans serif looks more contemporary. Design experts also claim that serif and sans serif designs put forth a particular character; specialists Sam Dragga and Gwendolyn Gong, for instance, claim that "serif type seems artistic, designed with grace and flourish; sans serif type looks clean, objective, direct" (143).

In rhetorical terms, fonts present a particular *ethos.* Whether because of their historical associations or simply the rhetorical effect of their image, certain fonts can be symbolically charged. The German Fraktur font, for example, because it was a favorite of the Third Reich, is often associated with the Nazi party. Some fonts, like the ones designed to resemble the type used in comics, are not really appropriate in serious matters. We once saw a flyer advertising a lecture on the Holocaust designed entirely in the comic strip font, thus undermining the seriousness of the issue and the *ethos* of the designers. *Kairos,* or attention to the situation, becomes an important consideration here, as font designers (also known as fontographers) are well aware. The designer of a mid-1990s font called "Jackass," for example, cautions that Jackass is only useful in "select situations" (Heller and Fink 26). Further, typefaces are available in different sizes and styles. The measuring unit for a typeface is points; there are 72 points in an inch, so a capital letter in a 72 point font will be about an inch high. A readable type size is 10- to 12-point type; smaller than 8-point type may strain the reader's eyes.

Many writers, especially journalists, use large fonts as a way of drawing the reader's eyes to important material. The more urgent the news head-line, the larger the type size of the headline, and readers' eyes are trained to recognize this correlation of size to importance.

Typestyles are another way to assist readers by adding emphasis. Some basic typestyle choices include plain, **bold,** *italic,* outline, and shadow. Plain, bold and italic are the most commonly used typestyles. The bold style usually indicates emphasis of importance; for example, we use **bold-**face type to draw attention to the key terms in this text. Italics also indicates emphasis, sometimes enforcing a particular forceful tone on the italicized word or words. Earlier in the book, we wrote, "In short, kairos is not about duration, but rather about a certain *kind* of time." Our use of italics in this instance emphasizes the difference between *kairos* and the other concept for time, *chronos.* The main thing for rhetors to remember when experimenting with typeface and style is consistency; if bold is used for headings and ital-ics for subheadings, then this should be a constant textual feature. Inconsistent or arbitrary changes in typestyle can be distracting for readers.

Another element of textual presentation is page layout. The most com-mon page size is $8\frac{1}{2}''$ x 11", and once rhetors allow room for at least one-inch margins all around, the landscape of the page becomes 6" X 9". The major layout issues deal with general organization of information and page for-mat, but they also extend to the use of visual aids (photographs, charts, tables). We believe that good page layout works together with typeface to guide the reader's eye across and down the page, providing textual cues to indicate important information. Moreover, a well-laid-out page is one that achieves visual balance—that is, the text works together with the white space and other layout elements such as visuals to focus readers' attention.

White space can be an effective rhetorical tool; room left in the margins and spaces between the typed lines makes the page look more inviting to read, and lots of readers (especially teachers, supervisors, and editors) like to have space in which to write responses. While too little white space can make a text seem crowded and intimidating, too much white space can cause the text to get lost on a page or send certain signals to readers. If the bottom margin, for example, is larger than the top margin, then the reader may think he has reached the end of the discourse and might not turn the page. Headers and subheaders are useful in longer arguments to "chunk" texts and allow extra space for readers to pause and consider important shifts in arguments.

As much as anyone, college students have figured out what type styles can do for their campus flyers, event announcements, and even for their class assignments. Since the advent of word processing, students have played with font sizes and styles (and margins and line spacing) in order to stretch a four-page paper onto that all-important fifth page or to shrink a long-winded response down to the requested limit. This kind of manipula-tion is not of interest here. Rather, it's the more stylized use of the digital that holds promise for rhetorical invention, style, and delivery. Richard Lanham, a modern rhetorician whose 1993 book, *The Electronic Word,* has

become a classic in scholarship on writing technologies, treats digital formatting as a kind of inventional "tinkering":

> When inspiration lags, *I'll be* tempte*d* t@ see w*hs*4 a new type style mig*h*t do f*o*r me. I can reformat a text to make it easier to read, or, using a dozen transformations, make it harder, or just different, to read. I can literally color my colors of rhetoric. I can heal the long hiatus of silent reading and make the text read itself aloud. At present this reading sounds a little funky, but it will become an expressive parameter as agile and wide as the others. I can embolden my own special key words and places. I can reformat prose into poetry. I can illuminate my manuscript in ways that would make a medieval scribe weep with envy. And when I have finished, I can print it out on my Linotron 300 electronic typesetter by pushing a keystroke or two. (7)

This paragraph was written over a decade ago, in the early 1990s, when desktop publishing was just entering rhetorical scholarship (and when scholars of technology used Linotron 300s). The passage, nonetheless, touts the visual aspects of processed words by emphasizing the way they function as changeable images. When Lanham suggests that he can "make the text read itself aloud" he points out ways in which textual presentation these days can combine the senses of sight and sound we have been discussing in this chapter: words, more than ever, act as images. Quintilian would have been intrigued.

Picture Theory

So words and how they're gathered on a page have a visual aspect of their own, but they may also interact with nondiscursive images such as drawings, paintings, photographs, or moving pictures. Most advertisements, for example, use some combination of text and visuals to promote a product or service. On this topic, Gorgias once observed that

> Whenever pictures of many colors and figures create a perfect image of a single figure and form, they delight the sight. How much does the production of statues and the worksmanship of artifacts furnish pleasurable sight to the eyes! Thus it is natural for the sight sometimes to grieve, sometimes to delight. ("Encomium to Helen" 18)

The ancients were very aware of an image's capacity to move someone to action—the rhetorical force of the visual. While visual rhetoric is not entirely new, the subject of visual rhetoric is becoming increasingly important, especially since we are constantly inundated with images and also since images can serve as rhetorical proofs. "Picture theorist" W. J. T. Mitchell considers the relation between image and word because, as he points out, they often accompany each other (4-5). Like Mitchell, we are curious about visual images, specifically how they function rhetorically—that is, how they work in tandem with words or on their own to make or support arguments. Much of our language about rhetoric, after all, draws on visual metaphors. In spoken and written discourse, words like *see* and *show* abound—"Do you *see*

FIGURE 13.1

Fashion Victim. Source: Roddick, Anita. Take It Personally: How to Make Conscious Choices to Change the World (Berkeley, Calif.: Conari Press, 2001).

what I mean?" "I'll *show* that the president's new tax policies are unfair to the working class." But sometimes these words take on a more literal force, especially when images enter the picture.

Consider the pictures in Figure 13.1, taken from activist Anita Roddick's book *Take It Personally: How to Make Conscious Choices to Change the World* (72-73). The first image, a photograph of a runway model wearing an elaborately beaded dress, when placed next to the second image, a photo of a child laborer working at a loom to manufacture what appears to be some part of the same dress, makes an argument of exploitation: the wealthy and extravagant fashion industry too often depends on low-wage labor provided by people in Third World countries. The accompanying words, though sparse, work on several levels. First, when considered together, they recast a once humorous phrase "fashion victim," commonly used to poke fun at people who have made unfortunate fashion choices, in a more literal, and far more serious, light. Second, the words are split, with *fashion* clearly on one side at the top in a privileged position, and *victim*— in a slightly larger typeface—on the other, in a subordinate yet conclusive position at the bottom of the page. In the original, the photo of the model is in black and white, that of the child worker in color. The black and white mimics the glossy, arty *ethos* of *haul couture,* while the dingy tones of the sweatshop photo evoke a stronger sense of "reality." This color shift also works along with the words to at once split and unite the images: the splitting functions to show how radically separate the worlds of the two people are and how one world consumes while the other produces, and yet the images are united, both by the common phrase "fashion victim" and—perhaps more compellingly—by the image of the dress beads. The images are

loaded with *pathos* and *ethos* and would serve to support a logical argument about ethics in the fashion industry. But it's also interesting how the photographs themselves, when placed together, make an argument, and would do so even without the help of the words.

When incorporating visuals into written text, balance is an important consideration. Consider, for example, the opening page to each chapter in this book. In Western cultures, the reading eye moves from left to right and top to bottom. Note how the opening page to each chapter offers a graphic—the top of a classical column—at the upper left corner of the page. This column draws in the reader's eye and directs it to the epigraph, written in italics, underneath the column. Then next to the column, in a larger type size and bold style, is the chapter title. The title is followed by a significant amount of white space in order to let the readers pause momentarily before diving into the introductory portion of the chapter. Because the page layout seems fairly complicated, featuring a graphic, three different typestyles, and two columns of text, we provided ample white space to allow a "break" from the written text, thus guiding readers' eyes slowly down the page. Though it uses far less text than our book, the "fashion victim" example above also achieves a certain balance between words and images. Take a look at the images again and note how your eyes move from one word across both images to the other word. The order and way in which people will "read"—that is, move their eyes across—the images should be taken into consideration. If you incorporate images into a text you're working on, it's a good idea to show the page with images to someone for a few seconds, remove it, and ask the viewer what she notices and remembers.

CYBERRHETORS

It's no secret that we have moved into an era when words are "processed," stored, and retrieved electronically, an era when words more noticeably exist as and alongside images, and one when much political action and communication transpires on screens rather than, as in the ancient world (or even early America, for that matter), face-to-face at an assembly or a town meeting (Welch 192).

Now that we have moved squarely into the digital age, it seems important for us to consider ways ancient rhetoric can be brought to bear on technology, or what contemporary writers are calling "new media," a term often used to refer to recently created and rapidly changing forms of communication that combine computer and telecommunications technology. "New media" can refer to browser-based technologies, e-mail, and all the various forms of interactive media.

But what in the world could ancient rhetoric have to offer cyberrhetors, rhetors for whom BCE refers to that archaic age "before computers existed"? We believe the canons of ancient rhetoric are quite useful for using new media to read, write, and generally engage the world. The Greeks them-

selves, after all, rehabilitated many of their rhetorical approaches and guidelines as they moved between oral and written discourse. While media change, as we have seen with the move from oral to literate cultures, different concerns come to the fore.

First, though, let's think about how new media are different from spoken or written rhetoric and how they incorporate features of both. Think of the way the television screen looks when it's set on CNN's channel—there might be live action shots in the upper left corner, a newscaster in the center, the Dow report down the right side, and ribbons of headlines at the bottom. Similarly, the Web version of the *New York Times* displays the Dow report in one margin; an index of other sections of the paper in the other; the day's headlines with short blurbs in the center; photos with links and special reports covering any number of topics; hotlinks to the day's weather, charities, sponsoring organizations, all interspersed with advertisements for new movie releases—all this on the initial page. These media are digital, interactive, multimedia, nonlinear, hypertextual, and packed with information. They also include recognizable features of rhetoric treated so far in this book.

Contemporary rhetors Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin use the term *hypermediacy* to describe a visual presentation style that, like CNN or the Web version of the *New York Times,* uses icons, hotlinks, layers of windows, and a browser format. One of the goals of such hypermediacy, according to Bolter and Grusin, is to "engage all the senses" (68). In an odd way, then, the hypermediacy of this millennium shares similar qualities with ancient rhetoric, for, as we've suggested in this chapter, the senses were often foremost on the minds of rhetors from Gorgias to Quintilian. This attention to multiple senses has all but disappeared from modern theories of rhetoric, which, as we have indicated previously, often rely solely on principles of reasoning and lockstep methods of composing. It could be, in fact, that an age of hypermediacy provides a comfortable "home" for ancient rhetorics. Bolter and Grusin have a term for this process of replacing or combining an old delivery system with a new one—for example, the placement of the day's news in both newspaper (old media) and Web (new media) formats. They call the process "remediation." What follows considers some ways in which ancient rhetoric itself is becoming remediated with new technology.

As we saw earlier with the Richard Lanham passage, with electronic writing technologies, delivery can become an inventional tool—that is, new media features, such as the availability of a variety of typefaces, pictures, moving images, and sounds, can sometimes prompt new directions in writing and argument. This does not mean, however, that concerns like *ethos* drop out of the picture. Far from it. We believe that a well-conceived, carefully created, navigable Web site helps produce strong *ethos.*

Kairos is obviously a major component of new media. With the new "just in time" economy, many businesses have moved on-line to meet the rising demand for immediate supply. News stories can be broadcast on-line just as quickly as they can on television, and more quickly than print

media. In this way, new media seem more analogous to the speaking situation, with their immediate, "in your face" visual style.

Perhaps one of the most intriguing ways new media are "remediating" rhetoric is in the area of arrangement. The first screen or home page of a Web site, for example, shares common features with the exordium, Cicero's word for the first section of a speech (see Chapter 10, on arrangement). That is, the home page establishes the tone and *ethos* of the site through its use of fonts and images and, of course, its writing style. From there, though, the differences between new media and spoken or written discourse become apparent. Beyond the home page, more information is generally made available via hotlinks, which move to other pages. Some Web authors design links to move directly from one to another, by installing a "next" button at the bottom right of the page, thus preserving the linear style of oral and written discourse. Others, however, favor the "choose your own adventure" style of writing, presenting the links in a nonlinear form (perhaps in a circle or even moving). This capacity to defy linear arrangement presents the rhetor with interesting inventional possibilities.

We have also noticed the way language about the Internet resembles artificial memory systems, with their emphasis on the spatial. Recall from the memory chapter how the ancients trained their memories by making the parts of a speech into places in a building. The Web shares these qualities as well—we "visit" Web *sites* and can usually "return" to *home.*

We believe that the canon of delivery in new media presents an interesting amalgamation of issues discussed in the oral and written discourse sections, above. Just as speakers think about facial and bodily animation, sound, and so forth, cyberrhetors may incorporate digital features that simulate these very qualities. They may use an avatar—an animated icon—to "guide" users through a site, for example. They can install quicktime movies, sound clips, or images to convey a certain kind of *ethos* or present information in an attention-getting (or annoying!) way.

The design choices available for delivering information on the Internet are virtually limitless. In addition to the typographical choices available for the printed page, rhetors may choose background patterns and colors, and they have easy access to all kinds of dynamite graphics—blinking icons, moving pictures, fun sounds—that can enhance the design of hypertext. Since there is already a flood of information available on Web design, at the end of this chapter we offer a guide to available resources for rhetors interested in spinning their rhetorical abilities onto the Web.

EXERCISES

1. Choose a punctuation marker—the dash, the comma, the semicolon, or any marker discussed in this chapter—and do a little research on how it is used. Consult a variety of textual sources: magazines, a newspaper article, a textbook, ads in buses and trains, instructions on the back of a shampoo bottle. Note the instances in which writers use that particu-

lar punctuation mark. From the usages you observe, compose a one-page analysis of the various functions of the marker. Did different writers use the same marker in contradictory ways? What rhetorical effects did the various usages have on you?

2. Tape-record a conversation with a group of friends and transcribe it, using only periods to punctuate. Then go back through the transcription while replaying the tape, and place the various punctuation markers where you hear distinctive pauses and the like. Write a brief analysis of the editorial choices you made: How did you decide to use a semicolon? Did you use any dashes? If so, why?

3. Explore the relationship between design choices and *ethos* by examining a few different magazines, focusing on the typography, page layout, and spacing. What effects do the design choices have on you as a reader? Is there a connection between the ideology of the publication and the font choices?

4. Log onto the Internet and examine the delivery of several different Web sites. Click on a few links that look interesting, then return to the home page. What kind of *ethos* does the Web page foster? That is, what pictures do you have of the Web site creator or organization that it represents? What is the apparent purpose of the Web site (education? self-promotion? resource hub?) Now look at the hypertextual features. What background colors and patterns are conducive to reader-text interaction? What font colors work well? How do pictures help facilitate communication? Is spacing used efficiently? Which sites look cluttered and why? What are some rhetorical effects of cluttering? What kind of movement does it foster?

5. Choose a proof developed in another essay, and find a way to make the same argument visually. You may either find an image already in existence or create your own. What barriers did you encounter? Is the argument more or less powerful when rendered visually?

6. Choose an argument you have written for this course or for another venue and "remediate" it—that is, design a plan for moving it onto one of the new media. (If you are proficient with Web design, create a Web site for it). Be sure to let hypertext/Web technology play into your inventional strategies. What kinds of arguments does a "linked" essay (linked both among its parts and to other pieces of writing) enable? How might the visual play into your essay?

RESOURCES FOR PRINT DESIGN

Dragga, Sam, and Gwendolyn Gong. *Editing: The Design of Rhetoric.* Amityville, N.Y.: Baywood, 1989.

Hale, Constance, ed. *Wired Style: Principles of English Usage in the Digital Age.* San Francisco: Hardwired, 1996.

Mason, Lisa D. "Design Issues for Producing Effective Multimedia Presentations," *Technical Comunication* (First quarter 1997): 65-71.

Parker, Roger C. *Looking Good in Print: A Guide to Basic Design for Desktop Publishing.* 3rd ed. Chapel Hill, N.C.: Ventana Communications Group, 1993.

Ver Hague, James C. "Graphic Design for Desktop Publishing, Part 1: Typography," *Journal of Biological Photography* 59 (July 1991): 117-123.

————. "Graphic Design for Desktop Publishing, Part 2: Layouts," *Journal of Biological Photography* 60 (January 1992): 25-31.

RESOURCES FOR WEB DESIGN

Benun, Ilise. *Designing Web Sites for Every Audience.* Cincinatti, Ohio: How Design Books, 2003.

Fraterdeus, Peter. *Killer Web Design: Typography.* Indianapolis: Hayden, 1997.

Lynch, Patrick, and Sarah Horton. *Web Style Guide: Basic Design Principles for Creating Web Sites* 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

Siegel, David. *Creating Killer Websites: The Art of Third-Generation Site Design.* 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hayden, 1997. (Updated edition with sample sites available online at http://www.killersites.com/)

WORKS CITED

Bolter, Jay David, and Richard Grusin. *Remediation: Understanding New Media.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000.

Dragga, Sam, and Gwendolyn Gong. *Editing: The Design of Rhetoric.* Amityville, N.Y.: Baywood, 1989.

Lanham, Richard. *The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Heller, Steven, and Anne Fink. *Faces on the Edge: Type in the Digital Age.* New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1997.

Mitchell, W. J. T. *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Parkes, M. P. *Pause and Effect: An Introduction to the History of Punctuation in the West.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993.

Roddick, Anita. *How to Make Conscious Choices io Change the World.* Berkeley, Calif.: Conari Press, 2001.

Welch, Kathleen. *Electric Rhetoric: Classical Rhetoric, Oralism, and a New Literacy.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999.

IMITATION: ACHIEVING COPIOUSNESS

In the art of rhetoric, credit is won not by gifts of fortune, but by efforts of study. For those who have been gifted with eloquence by nature and by fortune are governed in what they say by chance, and not by any standard of what is best, whereas those who have gained this power by study and by the exercise of language never speak without weighing their words, and so are less often in error as to a course of action.

—Isocrates,
Antidosis, 292

CONTEMPORARY RHETORS SOMETIMES assume that great writers are born with an inherent creative ability that is denied to the rest of us. This myth about writing is so powerful in our culture that it sometimes discourages people from even trying to learn how to write better. But the myth isn't true. Ancient teachers thought that the ability to compose fluently and efficiently resulted from a lifetime of study and practice. Moreover, as Isocrates observed, study and practice are in some ways superior to talent. A writer who is only gifted may produce good work on occasion. Study and practice, in contrast, guarantee the production of good work on every occasion.

Ancient orators and teachers of rhetoric everywhere extolled the virtues of study and practice. Demosthenes, the greatest ancient Greek rhetor, shaved half his head so that he would be too ashamed to go out of the house and leave his studies. Cicero, the greatest Roman rhetor, wrote that skill in rhetoric derived from "painstaking," which included "carefulness, mental concentration, reflection, watchfulness, persistence and hard work" *(De Oratore* II 35).

Students can learn an art by imitating the example of people who are good at it. Watching Kevin

Garnett or Chamique Holdsclaw play basketball is an exhilarating experience, and we can learn some beautiful basketball moves by watching them work the court. But the examples set by outstanding models can be made clearer if we study with a coach or teacher. A coach can explain the rules of basketball, show us how each member of a team relates to the other, and develop game plans and strategies that may make up for lack of individual ability.

Another way to learn any art is to study its principles. A cookbook enhances and reinforces what we learn by watching Julia Child put together some exotic dessert, because the cookbook provides us with basic principles that Child never bothers to mention: weights and measures, the effect of temperature on various foods, and so forth. In fact, study of principles has an advantage over learning from either models or teachers: principles can be studied anytime, anywhere. In the other modes of learning, students need a highly skilled or trained person to work with. If a model or a teacher is not available, students who have access to principles can continue their studies on their own.

The first part of this book is devoted to study. In it we reviewed the principles of rhetoric as these were developed by its ancient teachers. The second part of the book is devoted to practice. The ancients believed that regular practice put people in the habit of composing, so that they could begin easily and work without stopping. Quintilian borrowed a Greek term, *hexis,* or habit, to describe the "assured facility" with which capable writers use the strategies and knowledge they possess (X i 1). A latin term for this supply of arguments was *copia,* abundance. In his autobiography, Cicero remarked that he did rhetorical exercises every day while he was studying philosophy *(Brutus* 310). He continued to compose rhetorical exercises throughout his lifetime, even after he had become an acclaimed public speaker. Ancient teachers also thought that daily practice in speaking or composing was crucial for the attainment and maintenance of *hexis* and *copia;* as Quintilian remarked, "facility is mainly the result of habit and exercise" (X vii 8). He compared the orator who had completed his course of study to an athlete "who has learned all the technique of his art from his trainer" and who then "is to be prepared by actual practice for the contests in which he will have to engage" (i 4).

ANCIENT RHETORICAL EXERCISES

Ancient students practiced a number of oral and written exercises intended to enhance their skills and their stocks of rhetorical resources. These included a variety of exercises in imitation, translation, and paraphrase, as well as elementary exercises in amplification of fables, tales, maxims, and commonplaces. More difficult advanced exercises, such as the composition of characters, were practiced throughout their careers by mature rhetors.

All of these exercises required students to copy the work of some admired author or to elaborate on a set theme. Ancient dependence upon

material composed by others may seem strange to modern students, who have been taught that their work should be original. But ancient teachers and students would have found the notion of originality quite strange; they assumed that real skill lay in being able to imitate or to improve on something written by others. Isocrates described ancient attitudes about original composition in a passage from *Panegyricus:*

> Since language is of such a nature that it is possible to discourse on the same subject matter in many different ways—to represent the great as lowly or invest the little with grandeur, to recount the things of old in a new manner or set forth events of recent date in an old fashion—it follows that one must not shun the subjects upon which others have composed before, but must try to compose better than they. For the deeds of the past are, indeed, an inheritance common to us all; but the ability to make proper use of them at the appropriate time, to conceive the right sentiments about them in each instance, and to set them forth in finished phrase, is the peculiar gift of the wise___We should honor . . . not those who seek to discourse on subjects on which no one has discoursed before, but those who know how to use discourse as no one else could. (8-10)

Ancient teachers were not in the business of developing individual personalities or teaching self-expression. They knew that cultures were held together by important ideas and that these ideas are reproduced in speeches and writing on many different occasions. Thus they encouraged students of rhetoric to rework important themes and to imitate revered pieces of discourse as preparation for their roles as citizens. The rhetorical exercises that imitated or elaborated on the work of well-known authors had the double effect of acquainting students with the best products of their culture at the same time as they increased their stock of available arguments.

The rhetorical exercises are meant to be written, even though the discourses that result from them may eventually be delivered orally. Cicero and Quintilian were both great fans of writing practice as a means of attaining *copia.* In *De Oratore* Cicero's spokesman, Crassus, recommended that aspiring rhetors "write as much as possible. The pen is the best and most eminent author and teacher of eloquence" (I xxxii 150). Quintilian quoted this passage and added his own praise for writing practice: "We must therefore write as much as possible and with the utmost care. For as deep plowing makes the soil more fertile for the production and support of crops, so, if we improve our minds by something more than mere superficial study, we shall produce a richer growth of knowledge and shall retain it with greater accuracy" (X iii 2).

At first, these exercises may seem strange and uncomfortable to modern students, since, as we have said elsewhere, it is modern custom to aim at clarity and economy rather than at copiousness. The exercises become less strange and uncomfortable with practice, however. And the practice pays off: if you do a bit of composing every day, you should soon see a dramatic improvement in your powers of invention and arrangement and in your stylistic fluency as well.

THE EXERCISES IN ANCIENT RHETORICS

Historians do not know exactly when ancient rhetoric teachers began to include formal exercises in their instruction. The use of imitation as a means of learning, at least, must be very old. According to Quintilian, the desire to imitate is universal among humans, if not entirely natural:

> It is a universal rule of life that we should wish to copy what we approve in others. It is for this reason that children copy the shapes of letters that they may learn to write, and that musicians take the voices of their teachers, painters the works of their predecessors, and farmers the principles of agriculture which have been proved in practice, as models for their imitation. In fact, we may note that the elementary study of every branch of learning is directed by reference to some definite standard that is placed before the learner. *(Institutes* X ii 1).

Before the advent of writing, rhapsodes and actors must have learned their arts, in part, by studying and imitating their teachers.

Most likely, imitation was introduced into the formal curriculum of rhetorical instruction by the Older Sophists, who taught by example rather than precept. That is, they composed and delivered specimen speeches, and their students attempted to imitate both the master's compositions and his delivery. According to Cicero, Gorgias and Protagoras composed lists of commonplaces; if so, students might have imitated these as well *(Brutus* 46-47). And surely the *"Dissoi Logoi"* and **Antiphon's** *Tetralogies,* both of which date from the fifth century BCE, are rhetorical exercises meant for imitation by students, since neither refers to any specific circumstances (as would be the case with speeches composed for actual use).

The sophistic practice of imitation remained popular throughout ancient times. Greek and Roman teachers of rhetoric developed a variety of exercises in which students copied or imitated the work of admired authors; these included reading aloud, **copying,** imitation, translation, and paraphrase.

Reading Aloud and Copying

As we mentioned in the last chapter, silent reading is a modern practice. Throughout most of Western history, people read aloud, even when they were alone. Reading aloud develops an ear for sentence rhythm, and it strengthens reading skills as well. Reading aloud from the work of others may also enable you to absorb some habits of style that are not currently in your repertoire. Quintilian thought that it improved delivery too *(Institutes* II v 7). Try reading aloud from the work of writers you admire. Read aloud to yourself or to others. You can practice with any of the passages quoted in this chapter, or you may begin by reading your own work aloud. In fact, you should get in the habit of reading your own writing aloud; this will help you to spot places where punctuation is needed (or not) and to determine whether the rhythm of the sentence is pleasing to the ear.

Since ancient times, people have copied out passages from their reading that they wished to remember or to consult later. Malcolm X, who became one of the twentieth century's most compelling orators, used the ancient technique of copying as a means of learning:

> I saw that the best thing I could do was get hold of a **dictionary—to** study, to learn some words. I was lucky enough to reason also that I should try to improve my penmanship. It was sad. I couldn't even write in a straight line. It was both ideas together that moved me to request a dictionary along with some tablets and pencils from the Norfolk Prison Colony school.
>
> I spent two days just riffling uncertainly through the dictionary's pages. I'd never realized so many words existed! I didn't know which words I needed to learn. Finally, just to start some kind of action, I began copying.
>
> In my slow, painstaking, ragged handwriting, I copied into my tablet everything printed on that first page, down to the punctuation marks.
>
> I believe it took me a day. Then, aloud, I read back, to myself, everything I'd written on the tablet. Over and over, aloud, to myself, I read my own handwriting.
>
> I woke up the next morning, thinking about those **words—immensely** proud to realize that not only had I written so much at one time, but I'd written words that I never knew were in the world. Moreover, with a little effort, 1 also could remember what many of these words meant. I reviewed the words whose meanings I didn't remember. Funny thing, from the dictionary first page right now, that "aardvark" springs to my mind. The dictionary had a picture of it, a long-tailed, long-eared, burrowing African mammal, which lives off termites caught by sticking out its tongue as an anteater does for ants.
>
> I was so fascinated that I went **on—I** copied the dictionary's next page. And the same experience came when I studied that. With every succeeding page, I also learned of people and places and events from history. Actually the dictionary is like a miniature encyclopedia. Finally the dictionary's A section had filled a whole **tablet—and** I went on to the B's. That was the way I started copying what eventually became the entire dictionary. It went a lot faster after so much practice helped me to pick up handwriting speed. Between what I wrote in my tablet, and writing letters, during the rest of my time in prison I would guess I wrote a million words. (172)

As Malcolm X points out, copying also enhances *copia* (or abundance) and is an aid to memory as well.

Even though we live in the age of electronic composing, the timeworn practice of copying by hand is still useful. If you want to use copying to enhance *copia,* you should get in the habit of doing a little copying every day. Handwriting works better than typing, because writing by hand slows you down and helps you to focus on the passage being copied. Copy passages you admire into a notebook, word for word. Since the aim of this exercise is the achievement of *copia,* try to copy short passages from many different authors. As Quintilian wrote, no single author displays the best wisdom or eloquence in every passage, and so "we shall do well to keep a number of different excellences before our eyes, so that different qualities from different authors may impress themselves on our minds, to be

adopted for use in the place that becomes them best" (X ii 26). Ancient teachers helped their students with this exercise by analyzing selected passages before the students began to copy, but you can do this work for yourself. Read the whole passage carefully before you begin to copy, noting words that you may not know or structures that seem especially elegant or pleasing. Read each sentence before you begin to copy it. Above all, take your time and enjoy yourself.

A collection of copied passages is also useful, by the way, as a source of quotations and commonplaces that can be used in compositions. In premodern times, most rhetors kept written collections of copied passages; these were called *florilegia* (flowers of reading) in medieval times, and commonplace books during the Renaissance and into the eighteenth century. People often organized their commonplace books in the same way that ancient rhetors organized their trained memories. Erasmus, writing in the sixteenth century, recommended that students who wished to become educated begin by making a "full list of subjects" that they might read or write about *(De Copia* 636). He suggested, for example, that the list "consist partly of the main types and subdivisions of vice and virtue, partly of the things of most prominence in human affairs which frequently occur when we have a case to put forward, and they should be arranged according to similars and opposites." The first division might be "reverence" and "irreverence." Under the section of the commonplace book devoted to reverence, Erasmus suggested, writers could copy any items they ran across that had to do with patriotism, love for children, or respect for parents and teachers.

Apparently this advice about organizing commonplace books was, well, common. The poet John Milton kept commonplace books, one each devoted to Theology and Law. He organized another under the headings of Ethics, Economy, and Politics. He divided each of these main headings into smaller subsections; under Ethics he copied passages dealing with Virtue, Chastity, and Courage, along with entries on Lust, Drunkenness, and Gluttony. A modern writer who wished to adopt this scheme might not be so interested in virtue and vice as people were in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. No matter. Whatever subjects or issues are of interest to a writer—business or politics or engineering or anything at all—can be listed and divided into their respective parts or into important issues. Whenever a writer hears or reads something that she wishes to remember or use later on in her own work, she can copy it down under the appropriate heading in the commonplace book.

But a commonplace book need not feature such elaborate arrangements. Writers' commonplace books can be organized in any way that suits their working habits. If you want to look at examples of commonplace books to see how others organize them, you can find copies of the commonplace books kept by well-known people, such as Ben Jonson or Thomas Jefferson, in many libraries.

Professional writers still carry notebooks that resemble commonplace books. In keeping with this practice, we suggest that aspiring rhetors carry a notebook with them so that they can write down ideas that occur to them

while they are engaged in doing other things. And when you are reading, or talking, or listening to others, you can use the notebook as a **common-place** book, writing down comments or passages that you want to remember, copy, or imitate.

Imitation

In addition to reading aloud and copying, ancient rhetoricians encouraged their students to imitate the work of authors they admired. Imitation differs from simple copying; the imitator may borrow the structures used in the imitated sentence, supplying his own material, or he may try to render the gist of the original passage in other words. The latter exercise is more aptly referred to as paraphrase.

Most authorities agree that the proper procedure for imitation involved copying the model, studying it carefully, and imitating its structures. Here are some sample sentences, all taken from the work of professional writers. Our imitations of the samples are fairly close in that they borrow the grammatical structures of the originals. The samples are arranged in order of increasing grammatical complexity.

Simple Sentence

John loves Mary.

A simple sentence has only one colon. Simple sentences can be expanded in all sorts of ways: for example, by the insertion of *commata* set off by punctuation (as is done by James and Marquez in the samples given below) or by the addition of prepositional phrases (as in the sample from Tuchman).

Sample 1

London was hideous, vicious, cruel, and above all overwhelming.

—Henry James

Imitation

Ourtown was ugly, empty, cold, and above all forbidding.

Analysis

James inserted two one-word *commata* into this simple sentence. The *commata,* separated by punctuation marks, slow readers down and help them to feel London's overwhelming atmosphere.

Sample 2

He remembered much of his stay in the womb. While there, he began to be aware of sounds and tastes…. Yet he was not afraid. The changes were right. It was time for them. His body was ready.

—Octavia Butler, *Adulthood Rites*

Imitation

> She planned most of her day in the morning. At home, she recognized familiar sounds and smells. Yet she was not at home. The feeling was all wrong. The time was not ripe. She was not ready.

Analysis

Butler composed a string of plain simple sentences to convey the impressions felt by a sensitive young child. Strings of simple sentences can also convey other ethical effects, such as intense concentration.

Some Simple Sentences to Imitate

> A phenomenon noticeable throughout history regardless of place or period is the pursuit by governments of policies contrary to their own interests.
>
> —Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly*

> The Antillean refugee Jeremiah de Saint-Amour, disabled war veteran, photographer of children, and his most sympathetic opponent in chess, had escaped the torments of memory with the aromatic fumes of gold cyanide.
>
> —Gabriel Garcia Marquez, *Love in the Time of Cholera*

> Early in the sixteenth century, Francis Bacon proposed that science consisted in the elevation of the authority of experiment and observation over that of reason, intuition, and convention.
>
> —Marvin Harris, *Cultural Materialism*

> Out of the back of the truck the city of San Francisco is bouncing down the hill, all those endless staggers of bay windows, slums with a view, bouncing and streaming down the hill.
>
> —Tom Wolfe, "Black Shiny FBI Shoes"

Complex Sentence

> John loves Mary even though she reads Milton.

In a complex sentence, one or more dependent colons are attached to one or more independent colons. A colon is dependent if it doesn't make sense by itself; it depends on another colon to make it complete.

Sample 1

> Writing, reading, thinking, imagining, speculating. These are luxury activities, so I am reminded, permitted to a privileged few, whose idle hours of the day can be viewed otherwise than as a bowl of rice or a loaf of bread less to share with the family.
>
> —Trinh T. Minh-ha, "Commitment from the Mirror-Writing Box"

Imitation

> Aspen, sycamore, ponderosa, oak, laurel. These are the hardy trees, so I understand, classed among the privileged few, whose growth patterns in every season cannot be viewed otherwise than as a mere creeping along, a finely tuned adjustment to their surroundings.

Analysis

In this passage Minh-ha punctuated the first string of words as a sentence, even though a grammatical purist would deny them that status. In the second sentence, she interrupted the independent colon with another, brief independent colon ("so I am reminded") and attached a dependent colon at the end.

Sample 2

As cars slowed to a crawl and stopped, students sprang out and raced to the rear doors to begin removing the objects inside; the stereo sets, radios, personal computers; small refrigerators and table ranges; the cartons of phonograph records and cassettes; the hairdryers and styling irons; the tennis rackets, soccer balls, hockey and lacrosse sticks, bows and arrows; the controlled sub-stances, the birth control pills and devices; the junk food still in shopping bags—onion-and-garlic chips, nacho thins, peanut creme patties, Waffelos and Kabooms, fruit chews and toffee popcorn; the Dum-Dum pops, the Mystic mints.

> —Don DeLillo, *White Noise*

Analysis

This very long utterance is, nevertheless, a single complex sentence. The main colon is "students sprang out and raced to the rear doors to begin removing the objects inside." The dependent colon begins the sentence, and the rest of the sentence is filled out with noun phrases.

Some Complex Sentences to Imitate

His name was Domenico Scandella, but he was called Menocchio. He was born in 1532 (at his first trial he claimed he was fifty-two years old) in Montereale, a small hill town of the Friuli twenty-five kilometers north of Pordenone at the foot of the mountains. Here he had always lived, except for two years when he was banished following a brawl

> —Carlo Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms,* (1564–65)

The effect was exactly what one expects that many simultaneous crashes to produce: the unmistakable tympany of automobiles colliding and cheap-gauge sheet metal buckling, front ends folding together at the same cockeyed angles police photographs of night-time wreck scenes capture so well on grainy paper; smoke pouring from under the hoods and hanging over the infield like a howitzer cloud; a few of the surviving cars lurching eccentrically on bent axles.

> —Tom Wolfe, "Clean Fun at Riverhead"

Compound Sentences

John loves Mary but Mary despises John.

A compound sentence has two or more *cola* that are independent of one another. That is, each could stand alone as a simple sentence. Usually, the *cola* in a compound sentence are linked together by *and, but,* or *or.* In order

to produce a different effect, however, writers can omit the words that ordinarily connect cola in a compound sentence and substitute punctuation instead (thus producing the figure asyndeton).

Sample 1

She was traveling alone and was too short to wield her roll easily. She tried once, and she tried twice, and finally I got up and helped her. The plane was packed: I'd never seen a plane quite so crowded before.

—Audre Lorde, "Notes from a Trip to Russia"

Imitation

Mary was working hard and was too tired to deal with John well. She put it off, and put it off again, and finally she gave in and called him. The conversation was trying: she'd never known how to do this sort of thing.

Analysis

In the first sentence in this passage, Lord connected the two *cola* in the standard way, with *and.* In the second, however, she used both punctuation and a connecting word, thus creating the figure polysyndeton. In the third sentence in the passage, she used a punctuation mark to connect the compound *cola.* Compound sentences can be used to pile up images or assertions; this piling up yields a variety of effects.

Sample 2

And I never cease to be amazed at the extent to which our reality is predicated on the premises with which we begin; or the extent to which measurement is in the eye of the beholder—or the ear of the listener.

—Dale Spender, *The Writing or the Sex?*

Analysis

Here Spender ignored the traditional advice that sentences should never begin with *and.* Furthermore, she broke up her sentence at unusual and interesting points; another writer might not have employed dashes as an *interruptio* between references to *eye* and *ear,* which are commonly paired.

Some Compound Sentences to Imitate

The late eighteenth century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not Utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseau's natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contracts, but man coerced, exiled, deracinated, in chains.

—Richard Hughes, *The Fatal Shore*

Orlando's fathers had ridden in fields of asphodel, and stony fields, and fields watered by strange rivers, and they had struck many heads of many colours off many shoulders, and brought them back to hang from the rafters.

—Virginia Woolf, *Orlando*

> We called the waiter, paid, and started to walk through the town. I started off walking with Brett, but Robert Cohn came up and joined her on the other side. . . . There were many people walking to go and see the bulls, and carriages drove down the hill and across the bridge, the drivers, the horses, and the whips rising above the walking people in the street.
>
> —**Ernest** Hemingway, *The Sun Also Rises*

Compound-Complex Sentence

> John loves Mary and remains faithful to her even though she reads Milton.

A compound-complex sentence contains at least two independent colons and at least one dependent colon.

Sample 1

> This work came together in a slow way. Always something would get in the **way—relationships** ending, exile, loneliness, some recently discovered **pain—** and I had to hurt again, hurt myself all the way away from writing, re-writing, putting the book together.
>
> —**bell** hooks, *Talking Back*

Imitation

> Always events would block our **progress—equipment** failing, travel, illness, some newly discovered **glitch—and** we had to think again, rethink our work all the way back to the beginning, tinkering, improvising, putting our plans aside.

Analysis

The first sentence in this passage is, of course, a simple sentence. In the compound-complex sentence that follows, hooks inserts a comma between the two independent *cola,* punctuating it with dashes. She then repeats the verb of the second independent colon *(hurt)* to create a dependent colon that concludes with three participial phrases *(writing, re-writing, putting),* thus creating the small parallelism that brings the sentence to a close.

Sample 2

> In the nineteenth century, Parkinsonism was almost never seen before the age of fifty, and was usually considered to be a reflection of a degenerative process or defect of nutrition in certain "weak" or vulnerable cells; since this degeneration could not actually be demonstrated at the time, and since its cause was unknown, Parkinson's disease was termed an idiosyncrasy or "ideopathy."
>
> —**Oliver** Sacks, *Awakenings*

Analysis

The first half of this sentence (before the semicolon) is a compound sentence. The second half begins with paired dependent *cola,* both beginning with *since;* these *cola* are attached to the independent colon that concludes the sentence.

Some Compound-Complex Sentences to Imitate

> We all begin well, for in our youth there is nothing we are more intolerant of than our own sins writ large in others and we fight them fiercely in ourselves; but we grow old and we see that these our sins are of all sins the really harmless ones to own, nay that they give a charm to any character, and so our struggle with them dies away.
>
> —Gertrude Stein, *The Making of Americans*

> There was a man and a dog too this time. Two beasts, counting Old Ben, the bear, and two men, counting Boon Hogganbeck, in whom some of the same blood ran which ran in Sam Fathers, even though Boon's was a plebeian strain of it and only Sam and Old Ben and the mongrel Lion were taintless and incorruptible.
>
> —William Faulkner, "The Bear"

Of course, imitation need not be limited only to sentences. Actually imitation works best with short passages, because you can study the techniques writers use to move from sentence to sentence. Here, for example, is an interesting passage from Toni Morrison's *Song of Solomon:*

> [1.] At that time of day, during the middle of the week, word-of-mouth news just lumbered along. [2.] Children were in school; men were at work; and most of the women were fastening their corsets and getting ready to go see what tails or entrails the butcher might be giving away. [3.] Only the unemployed, the self-employed, and the very young were **available—deliberately** available because they'd heard about it, or accidentally available because they happened to be walking at that exact moment in the shore end of Not Doctor Street, a name the post office did not recognize. (3)

Imitation

> At that time of year, during the middle of winter, four-wheel drives just crept along. Cars with chains were sometimes seen; cars without were left at home; and most residents were putting on their warmest clothes and getting set to go out and see the drifts that rifted across their doorways. Only the old, the bold, and the quick-tongued were **excepted—deliberately** excepted because of infirmity, or grudgingly excepted because they were good at finding reasons why they should not shovel the snow piling ever higher outside, a place that at the moment they did not recognize as relevant to their lives.

Analysis

When we copied this passage, we noticed several interesting things it. The first sentence is periodic. The second sentence begins with two balanced cola. These are connected to a third, much longer colon that itself contains two balanced pairs (the **verbs** *fastening* and *getting;* and the rhyming "tails or entrails"). The faint rhyming echo of *tails* and *entrails* is picked up again in the third sentence with *unemployed* and *self-employed* and the repetition-with-variation of *available.* The third sentence ends with a final colon that seems like an irrelevance or a digression (in fact, the rest of the passage elaborates on it). This carrying of reference across sentences is unusual (it may be one distinguishing mark of Morrison's style); most writers would

begin a new sentence to discuss the post office's failure to recognize Not Doctor Street.

As you can see, imitation does not necessarily produce great writing. It does, however, enable rhetors to recognize and use patterns that they might not otherwise notice. If you use these patterns regularly in your own writing, they rapidly become second nature.

Some Passages to Imitate

Well, children, where there is so much racket there must be something out of kilter. I think that betwixt the Negroes of the South and the women of the North all talking about rights, the white men will be in a fix pretty soon.

But what's all this here talking about? That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me in carriages, or over mud puddles or gives me any best place. And ain't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! I have plowed, and planted, and gathered into barns, and no man could head me. And ain't I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man (when I could get it), and bear the lash as well. And ain't I a woman? I have borne thirteen children and seen them almost all sold off into slavery, and when I cried out with a mother's grief, none but Jesus heard. And ain't I a woman?

—Sojourner Truth, "Ain't I a Woman?"

Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

—Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address

We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans, born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage, and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed

today at home and around the world. Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.

—John F. Kennedy, First Inaugural Address

Translation

Roman teachers regularly advised their students to translate passages from Greek into Latin and Latin into Greek. They argued that this exercise improved their students' understandings of both languages. Obviously, translation also improves one's grasp of the idioms used in a foreign language, something that is difficult to learn by studying its grammar. Translation, like imitation, also improves reading skills and enhances appreciation of good writing in any language.

Of course, translation is useful only for students who are bilingual or multilingual or for students who are trying to learn a second or third language. But translation can also move across levels of usage. If you are lucky enough to use more than one variant of English, you may profit by translating your writing, as well as that of professional writers, into and out of both variants.

Paraphrase

In *De Oratore* Crassus described his favored rhetorical exercise: "This was to set myself some poetry, the most impressive to be found, or to read as much of some speech as I could keep in my memory, and then to declaim upon the actual subject-matter of my reading, choosing as far as possible different words" (I xxxiv 154). Here Crassus referred to the ancient exercise called paraphrase, which literally means "to express in other words." Paraphrase is a very old exercise. A sophist named Theon, writing in the first century CE, provided us with some truly ancient examples of paraphrase:

Paraphrasing Homer, when he says,

For such is the mind of men who dwell on earth
As the father of men and gods may bring for a day *[Odyssey* 18.136-37J

Archilochus says,

Glaucus, son of Leptines, such a spirit for mortal
Men is born as Zeus brings for a day.

And again, Homer has spoken of a city's capture in this manner,

They kill the men, and fire levels the city,
But others lead away the children and deep-belted women *[Iliad* 9.593-94].

And Demosthenes, thus:

> Now when we were on our way in Delphi, it was of necessity to see all these things, houses razed to the ground, walls taken away, a land in the prime of life, but a few women and little children and pitiable old men. [19.361]

And Aeschines, thus:

> But look away in your thoughts to their misfortunes and imagine that you see the city being taken, destruction of walls, burying of houses, temples being pillaged, women and children being led into slavery, old men, old women, too late unlearning their freedom. [3.157] (246)

These examples, in which poets who lived between the eighth and fourth centuries BCE imitate one another, suggest that paraphrase is a very old rhetorical exercise indeed. Throughout antiquity, rhetoric teachers believed that there were many, many ways in which to express any meaning. As Quintilian pointed out, the variety of expression available in language can never be used up:

> If there were only one way in which anything could be satisfactorily expressed, we should be justified in thinking that the path to success had been sealed to us by our predecessors. But, as a matter of fact, the methods of expression still left us are innumerable, and many roads lead us to the same goal. (X v 7-8)

This attitude toward the possibilities of paraphrase prevailed throughout the European Middle Ages and into the Renaissance. In his sixteenth-century textbook on *copia,* Erasmus demonstrated that there are over two hundred ways to write "Your letter pleased me mightily." He changed the word order: "Your letter mightily pleased me; to a wonderful degree did your letter please me; me exceedingly did your letter please" (the last version works better in Latin than it does in English). Then he added hyperbole (overstatement): "Your epistle exhilarated me intensely; I was intensely exhilarated by your epistle; your brief note refreshed my spirits in no small measure; I was in no small measure refreshed in spirit by your grace's hand; from your affectionate letter I received unbelievable pleasure; your affectionate letter brought me unbelievable pleasure" (349). If you wish to see how far Erasmus was able to extend these variations on a theme, find a copy of his *De Copia* and see for yourself. You might want to try this exercise on another sentence, just to see how many variations are possible; better yet, compete with someone else to see who can write the most and/or the best paraphrases of a single sentence.

Paraphrase was still in use in modern times as a means of improving writing skill. In a famous passage from the first chapter of his *Autobiography,* Benjamin Franklin described the paraphrasing exercises he did as a young man:

> About this time I met with an odd volume of the *Spectator.* It was the third. I had never before seen any of them. I bought it, read it over and over, and was much delighted with it. I thought the writing excellent, and wished, if possible, to imitate it. With this view I took some of the papers, and, making short hints of the sentiment in each sentence, laid them by a few days, and then, without

looking at the book, try'd to compleat the papers again, by expressing each hinted sentiment at length, and as fully as it had been expressed before, in any suitable words that should come to hand. Then 1 compared my *Spectator* with the original, discovered some of my faults, and corrected them. But I found I wanted a stock of words, or a readiness in recollecting and using them, which I thought I should have acquired before that time if I had gone on making verses; since the continual occasion for words of the same import, but of different length, to suit the measure, or of different sound for the rhyme, would have laid me under a constant necessity of searching for variety, and also have tended to fix that variety in my mind, and make me master of it. Therefore I took some of the tales and turned them into verse; and, after a time, when I had pretty well forgotten the prose, turned them back again. I also sometimes jumbled my collections of hints into confusion, and after some weeks endeavored to reduce them into the best order, before I began to form the full sentences and compleat the paper. This was to teach me method in the arrangement of thoughts. By comparing my work afterwards with the original, I discovered many faults and amended them; but I sometimes had the pleasure of fancying that, in certain particulars of small import, I had been lucky enough to improve the method or the language, and this encouraged me to think I might possibly in time come to be a tolerable English writer, of which I was extremely ambitious. My time for these exercises and for reading was at night, after work or before it began in the morning, or on Sundays, when I contrived to be in the printing-house alone, evading as much as I could the common attendance on public worship which my father used to exact on me when I was under his care, and which indeed I still thought a duty, though I could not, as it seemed to me, afford time to practise it. ("From Revolution to Reconstruction—An HTML Project," http://odur.let.rug.nl./~usa/B/Franklin/frankl.htm)

Franklin knew the importance of *copia,* a "stock of words," to anyone who wishes to become "a tolerable English writer." His method was similar to Crassus's, except that Franklin took notes on the material he read rather than retaining it in memory.

In order to demonstrate how paraphrase works, we performed one of the exercises recommended by Franklin. The *Spectator* was a popular newspaper published in London between 1711 and 1714. It contained essays about morals, current events, education, and good taste, among other things. Essay number 157, written by Richard Steele, was a meditation on the use of corporal punishment in British elementary schools. At the time Steele wrote this essay, such punishment was frequently used with students who failed to memorize or recite their lessons correctly. Here is the text of his essay:

I am very much at a Loss to express by any Word that occurs to me in our Language that which is understood by *Indoles* in Latin. The natural Disposition to any particular Art, Science, Profession, or Trade, is very much to be consulted in the Care of Youth, and studied by Men for their own Conduct when they form to themselves any Scheme of Life. It is wonderfully hard indeed for a Man to judge of his own Capacity impartially; that may look great to me which may appear little to another, and I may be carried by Fondness towards

my self so far, as to attempt things too high for my Talents and Accomplishments: But it is not methinks so very difficult a Matter to make a judgment of the Abilities of others, especially of those who are in their Infancy. My common-place Book directs me on this Occasion to mention the Dawning of Greatness in Alexander, who being asked in his Youth to contend for a Prize in the Olympick Games, answered he would if he had Kings to run against him. Cassius, who was one of the Conspirators against Caesar, gave as great a Proof of his Temper, when in his Childhood he struck a Play-fellow, the Son of Sylla, for saying his Father was Master of the Roman People. Scipio is reported to have answered (when some Flatterers at Supper were asking him what the Romans should do for a General after his Death), Take Marius. Marius was then a very Boy, and had given no Instances of his Valour; but it was visible to Scipio from the Manners of the Youth, that he had a Soul formed for the Attempt and Execution of great Undertakings. I must confess I have very often with much Sorrow bewailed the Misfortune of the Children of Great Britain, when I consider the Ignorance and Undiscerning of the Generality of School-masters. The boasted Liberty we talk of is but a mean Reward for the long Servitude, the many Heart Aches and Terrours, to which our Childhood is exposed in going through a Grammer-School: Many of these stupid Tyrants exercise their Cruelty without any Manner of Distinction of the Capabilities of Children, or the Intention of Parents in their Behalf. There are many excellent Tempers which are worthy to be nourished and cultivated with all possible Diligence and Care, that were never designed to be acquainted with Aristotle, Tully, or Virgil; and there are as many who have Capacities for understanding every Word those great Persons have writ, and yet were not born to have any Relish of their Writings. For want of this common and obvious discerning in those who have the Care of Youth, we have so many Hundred unaccountable Creatures every Age whipped up into great Scholars, that are for ever near a right Understanding, and will never arrive at it. These are the Scandal of Letters, and these are generally the Men who are to teach others. The Sense of Shame and Honour is enough to keep the World it self in Order without Corporal Punishment, much more to train the Minds of uncorrupted and inno-cent Children. It happens, I doubt not, more than once in a Year, that a Lad is chastised for a Blockhead, when it is good Apprehension that makes him inca-pable of knowing what his Teacher means: A brisk Imagination very often may suggest an Errour, which a Lad could not have fallen into if he had been as heavy in conjecturing as his Master in explaining: But there is no Mercy even towards a wrong Interpretation of his Meaning; the Sufferings of the Scholar's Body are to rectify the Mistakes of his Mind.

I am confident that no Boy who will not be allured to Letters without Blows, will ever be brought to any thing with them. A great or good Mind must nec-essarily be the worse for such Indignities: and it is a sad Change to lose of its Virtue for the Improvement of its Knowledge. No one who has gone through what they call a great School, but must remember to have seen Children of excellent and ingenuous Natures, (as has afterwards appeared in their Manhood;) I say no Man has passed through this Way of Education, but must have seen an ingenuous Creature expiring with Shame, with pale Looks, beseeching Sorrow, and silent Tears, throw up its honest Eyes, and kneel on its tender Knees to an inexorable Blockhead, to be forgiven the false Quantity of a

Word in making a Latin Verse: The Child is punished, and the next Day he commits a like Crime, and so a third with the same Consequence. I would fain ask any reasonable Man whether this Lad, in the Simplicity of his native Innocence, full of Shame, and capable of any Impression from that Grace of Soul, was not fitter for any Purpose in this Life, than after that Spark of Virtue is extinguished in him, tho' he is able to write twenty Verses in an Evening?

Seneca says, after his exalted Way of talking, As the immortal Gods never learnt any Virtue, tho' they are endued with all that is good; so there are some Men who have so natural a Propensity to what they should follow, that they learn it almost as soon as they hear it. Plants and Vegetables are cultivated into the Production of finer Fruit than they would yield without that Care; and yet we cannot entertain Hopes of producing a tender conscious Spirit into Acts of Virtue, without the same Methods as is used to cut Timber, or give new Shape to a Piece of Stone.

It is wholly to this dreadful Practice that we may attribute a certain Hardness and Ferocity which some Men, tho' liberally educated, carry about them in all their Behaviour. To be bred like a Gentleman, and punished like a Malefactor, must, as we see it does, produce that illiberal Sauciness which we see sometimes in Men of Letters.

The Spartan Boy who suffered the Fox (which he had stolen and hid under his Coat) to eat into his Bowels, 1 dare say had not half the Wit or Petulance which we learn at great Schools among us: But the glorious Sense of Honour, or rather Fear of Shame, which he demonstrated in that Action, was worth all the Learning in the World without it.

It is methinks a very melancholy Consideration, that a little Negligence can spoil us, but great Industry is necessary to improve us; the most excellent Natures are soon depreciated, but evil Tempers are long before they are exalted into good Habits. To help this by Punishments, is the same thing as killing a Man to cure him of a Distemper; when he comes to suffer Punishment in that one Circumstance, he is brought below the Existence of a rational Creature, and is in the State of a Brute that moves only by the Admonition of Stripes. But since this Custom of educating by the Lash is suffered by the Gentry of Great Britain, I would prevail only that honest heavy Lads may be dismissed from slavery sooner than they are at present, and not whipped on to their fourteenth or fifteenth Year, whether they expect any Progress from them or not. Let the Child's Capacity be forthwith examined, and he sent to some **Mechanick** Way of Life, without Respect to his Birth, if Nature design'd **him** for nothing higher; let him go before he has innocently suffered, and is debased into a Dereliction of Mind for being what it is no Guilt to be, a plain Man. I would not here be supposed to have said, that our learned Men of either Robe who have been whipped at School, are not still Men of noble and liberal Minds; but I am sure they had been much more so than they are, had they never suffered that Infamy. *(The Spectator* 157, August **30, 1711)**

We read Steele's essay carefully, and one of us copied it out by hand. Then we made notes about important points. The next day we read it again and wrote the following paraphrase:

No word in English is a satisfactory translation of the Latin term *indoles.* Perhaps *nature* or **natural** *disposition* come closest. A person's natural disposi-

tion, if there is such a thing, needs to be taken into account in her education and in her choice of a profession. It is difficult for anyone to know what her own natural aptitudes are, although others can sometimes determine these with ease. History abounds with examples of persons whose early activities hinted at their later greatness. George Washington's honesty about the cherry tree presaged his later courage in the face of difficulties. Abraham Lincoln demonstrated his persistence and ambition as a young man, when he worked long hours and walked many miles to study law.

But bright lights like these can easily be extinguished by ignorant and brutal teachers. It is difficult to believe that the freedom we prize so highly is often purchased at the expense of long years of terror and heartache in school. Ignorant teachers do not distinguish between the able and the less able, but punish all alike for failure to perform correctly. The truth is that many people are not suited for the study of letters. Despite this lack of natural inclination, such persons are beaten into diligence. Often it is these persons who become teachers themselves.

Students' combined senses of honor and shame should suffice to drive them to study. Punishment for failure to give the correct answers does not serve the aim intended for it. Because of their active imaginations, students sometimes give answers that are correct, but are not the answers that teachers were looking for. Students who do this are punished nonetheless. As a result, punishment often extinguishes the scholarly virtue of imagination, while it reinforces the belief that scholarship amounts to absorbing and parroting back trivial bits of information.

Quintilian remarked that "study depends on the good will of the student, a quality that cannot be secured by compulsion" (I iii 8). We do not recklessly prune fruits or vegetables while we are encouraging them to grow; rather we care for them, making sure they have enough water and sunlight, Teachers should shape young minds with the same care and attention that sculptors use to shape pieces of marble into works of art.

Punishment breeds a certain brutishness in even the best-educated persons. Using punishment to force people to learn is like killing someone to cure him of a cold. This method turns people into brutes who only work when they are forced to. Punishment extinguishes rational behavior, rather than encouraging it.

Given these considerations, it makes sense that children who are not cut out to be scholars should be allowed to quit school when they have learned all they can. Those whose natural dispositions incline them away from learning should be encouraged to follow other career paths. I am not saying that our current crop of intellectuals, who were educated in this way, are not fine and upright people. However, I am sure they would have been persons of even more liberal and noble character had they been better treated while they were in school.

This paraphrase is fairly accurate; it condenses Steele's essay and renders it in more modern English. Since we do not agree with much of what Steele wrote in this number of the *Spectator,* this exercise was difficult. However, writing it did stimulate us to think about the issues it **raises**—more so than simply reading the essay would have **done—and** so it may be that paraphrase can occasionally jump-start invention.

We recommend that writers paraphrase anyone whose work they admire. A paraphrase can be longer or shorter than the original; it can use

a different voice or arrangement; it can have more figures or fewer; it can develop fuller characterizations and add more detail; or it can be as spare as **possible—in** which case it is more accurately called a summary or precis. All choices like these are up to the paraphraser.

Here is a method for paraphrasing: Read a passage carefully. Copy it into a commonplace book, wait awhile, and then without looking at the original again, try to compose another passage that captures the sense of the original. Or you can make notes on the original passage, and use these to compose a paraphrase.

The ancients had serious reasons for recommending paraphrase to their students. Paraphrase encourages us to look for words and structures that do not appear in the original, thus increasing our stocks of both. Because it requires us to rely on our own linguistic resources, paraphrase is more challenging than imitation. Indeed, Quintilian recommended it precisely because of its difficulty (8).

Paraphrasing Poetry

In the passage quoted above, Benjamin Franklin mentioned another exercise in paraphrase that was also recommended by Quintilian: turning poetry into prose. According to Quintilian, this exercise is useful because "the lofty inspiration of verse serves to elevate the rhetor's style" (X v 4). In other words, writers of prose may find unusual uses of language in poetry that they can borrow. But paraphrase of poetry into prose may also teach us something about arrangement as well. Certainly it helps us to read poetry more carefully.

Here is Aesop's fable of the stag and the horse, as told in prose by Aristotle:

> A horse had a meadow to himself. When a stag came and quite damaged the pasture, the horse, wanting to avenge himself on the **stag,** asked a man if he could help him get vengeance on the stag. The man said he could, if the horse were to take a bridle and he himself were to mount on him holding javelins. When the horse agreed and the man mounted, instead of getting vengeance the horse found himself a slave to the man. (*Rhetoric* II xx 1393b)

Now here is the same fable, told in poetry in 1688 by a poet named John Ogilby (we have modernized Ogilby's English):

> Long was the war between the hart and horse
> Fought with like courage, chance, and equal force;
>   Until a fatal day
> Gave signal victory to the hart; the steed
> Must now no more in pleasant valleys feed,
>   Nor verdant commons sway,
> The hart who now o'er all did domineer,
>   This conquering stag,
>   Slights like a nag,
> The vanquished horse, which did no more appear.

In want, exiled, driven from native shores,
The horse in cities human aid implores,
    To get his realms again.
Let man now manage him and his affair,
Since he not knows what his own forces are.
    Thus sues he for the rein;
For sweet revenge he will endure the bit,
    Let him o'erthrow
    His cruel foe,
And let his haughty rider heavy fit.

He takes the bridle o'er his yielding head.
With man and arms the horse is furnished,
    And for the battle neighs.
But when the hart two hostile faces saw
And such a centaur to encounter draw,
    He stood awhile at gaze.
At last known valor up he roused again,
    More hopes by fight
    There was, than flight;
What's won by arms, by force he must maintain.

Then to the battle did the hart advance;
The horse a man brings, with a mighty lance
    Longer than the other's crest;
The manner of the fight is changed, he feels
No more the horse's hoof, and ill-aimed heels;
    They charge now breast to breast.
Two to one odds 'gainst Hercules; the hart,
    Though strong and **stout,**
    Could not hold out,
But flies, and must from conquered realms depart.

Nor longer could the horse his joy contain,
But with loud neighs, and and erected mane,
    Triumphs after fight;
When to the soldier mounted on his back,
Feeling him heavy now, the beast thus spake;
    Be pleased good sir to light,
Since you restored to me by father's **seat,**
    And got the day,
    Receive your pay,
And to your city joyfully retreat.

Then said the man; This saddle which you wear
Cost more than all the lands we conquered here,
    Beside this burnished bit,
Your self, and all you have, too little are
To clear my engagements in this mighty war;
    Till that's paid, here I'll sit:

And since against your foe I aided you,
　　Can you deny
　　Me like supply?
Come, and with me my enemy subdue.

Then sighed the horse, and to the man replied;
I feel thy cruel rowels **gall** my side,
　　And now I am thy slave;
But thank thy self for this, thou foolish beast,
That for revenge to foreign interest
　　Thy self and Kingdom gave.
Amongst rocky mountains I had better dwelled,
　　And **fed** on thorns,
　　Gored by the hart's horns,
Than wicked man's hard servitude have felt.   (1688)

As you can see, Ogilby elaborated the basic story a good deal in his paraphrase, providing more plot detail and giving the horse and stag more character than Aristotle cared to (after all, Aristotle was interested in the moral of the story, while Ogilby wished to entertain his readers). But a prose paraphrase does not need to be as spare as Aristotle's version; a faithful prose paraphrase of Ogilby's poem would be at least twice as long as Aristotle's rendering of the fable. As Quintilian remarked, the duty of a paraphrase is not to replicate an original exactly but rather "to rival and vie with the original in the expression of the same thoughts" (X v 5).

Here are poetic renderings of two more of Aesop's fables, suitable for paraphrasing into prose:

THE NORTH WIND AND THE SUN

Between the North Wind and the Sun
A quarrel rose as to which one
Could strip the mantle from a man
Walking the road. The wind began,
And blew, for in his Thracian way
He thought that he would quickly lay
The wearer bare by force. But still
The man, shivering with the chill,
Held fast his cloak, nor let it go
The more the North Wind tried to blow,
But drew the edges close around,
Sat himself down upon the ground,
And leaned his back against a stone.
And then the Sun peeped out, and shone,
Pleasant at first, and set him free
From the cold blowing bitterly,
And next applied a little heat.
Then suddenly, from head to feet,

By burning fire the man was gripped,
Cast off his cloak himself, and stripped.

THE TWO PACKS

Among the gods when time began
Prometheus lived. He made a man
All molded out of earth and **plaster,**
And thus produced for beasts a master.
He hung on him two packs to wear,
Filled with the woes that men must bear,
With strangers' woes the one before,
But that in back, which carried more,
Was filled with evils all his own.
Hence many men, I think, are prone
To see the ills some other bears
But still be ignorant of theirs.

—Dennison B. Hull, 1960

Try paraphrasing these fables into prose. If you wish, you can compare your prose version to any of the hundreds of modern translations of Aesop's fables that can be found on the Internet. For further practice, you can turn your prose paraphrase back into poetry, or you can try to write a poetic version in imitation of Ogilby's seventeenth-century style. Once again, this exercise is useful because it demands that writers find new words and structures to express something already written by someone else.

If you find paraphrase to be fun and/or useful, we recommend that you practice paraphrasing your favorite poetry into prose. We are aware that this exercise may offend the sensibilities of persons who think that great poets have found the best and only way to express anything. This is a quite modern notion, having to do with Romantic attitudes toward originality and the uniqueness of creative ability. The ancients viewed creativity in a far different light: they thought that craft played a large role in the production of fine writing and that craft could be learned through practice. Nor did they believe that any poem or piece of prose was so good that it couldn't be improved upon. As Quintilian remarked, a paraphrase may "add the vigor of oratory to the thoughts expressed by the poet, make good his omissions, and prune his diffuseness" (X v 4-5).

Writers need not imitate or paraphrase only the work of others, however. Quintilian recommended that writers get in the habit of paraphrasing their own work: "For instance, we may specially select certain thoughts and recast them in the greatest variety of forms, just as a sculptor will fashion a number of different images from the same piece of wax" (X v 9-10). In fact, self-paraphrase can become a method of composition. It works like this: after you have written a draft of a composition, set it aside for awhile. Then read it over and quickly write a second draft. Compare the two **drafts,** take what you like from each, and compose a third. Continue with this process until you achieve a draft that satisfies you.

The reasons for using paraphrase are many: it promotes *copia* and it may stimulate invention. Paraphrase also turns people into more careful

readers, and it may make reading more enjoyable too (X v 8). Plus there's always the chance that a paraphrase will turn out better than the original. In that case, paraphrase provides writers with rare chance to congratulate themselves.

Examples of Paraphrase

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries CE, accomplished poets practiced their art by imitating, translating, or paraphrasing poetry composed by ancient and medieval poets. We conclude this chapter with some examples of their art, suitable for imitation or paraphrase.

At the age of fifteen, John Milton paraphrased Psalm 114 in English, probably as a school exercise. Here is a modern English version of Psalm 114 that purports to be a literal translation of the Hebrew original:

> After Israel went out of Egypt,
> the house of Jacob from a barbaric people,
>   Judah became his sanctuary,
> Israel his dominion.
>   When the sea saw him, it fled,
> the Jordan turned back.
>   The mountains leaped like rams,
> the hills like lambs of the flock.
>   What ailed you, O sea, that you fled?
> O Jordan, that you turned back?
>   O mountains, that you leaped like rams?
> O hills like lambs of the flock?
>   In the presence of the Lord writhe, O land,
> in the presence of Jacob's God.
>   Who turned rock into a pool of water,
> flint into a flowing spring.

Here is Milton's "A Paraphrase on Psalm 114" (1623):

> When the blest seed of Terah's faithful Son,
> After long toil their liberty had won,
> And past from Pharian Fields to Canaan Land,
> Led by the strength of the Almighties hand,
> Jehovah's wonders were in Israel shown,
> His praise and glory was in Israel known.
> That saw the troubled Sea, and shivering fled,
> And sought to hide his froth becurled head
> Low in the earth, Jordan's clear streams recoil,
> As a faint Host that hath receiv'd the foil.
> The high, huge-bellied Mountains skip like Rams
> Amongst their Ewes, the little Hills like Lambs.
> Why fled the Ocean? And why skipt the Mountains?
> Why turned Jordan toward his Chrystal Fountains?
> Shake earth, and at the presence be agast
> Of him that ever was, and ay shall last

> That glassy floods from rugged rocks can crush,
> And make soft rills from fiery flint-stones gush.

Try paraphrasing both poems in prose. Or tell the story of the Israelites' escape in more detail.

Here is a love poem by the ancient Greek Sappho; this modern translation is by Suzy Q. Groden:

> As equal to the gods, he seems to me,
> the man who, with his face toward yours,
> sits close and listens to the whispers of
> your sweet voice and enticing laugh.
> To watch has made my heart pounding hammer in my breast.
> For as I look at you, if only for an instant,
> my voice no longer comes to me.
> My silent tongue is broken,
> and a quick and subtle flame
> runs up beneath my skin.
> I lose my sense of sight, hear only drurnming in my ears.
> I drip cold sweat,
> and a trembling chases all through me.
> I am greener than the pale grass
> and it seems to me that I am close to death. (10)

The English playwright Ben Jonson imitated Sappho's poem and included his imitation in one of his plays, "The New Inn." Here is Jonson's imitation:

> Thou dost not know my sufferings, what I feel,
> My fires and fears are met; I burn and freeze,
> My liver's one great coal, my heart shrunk up
> With all the fibres, and the mass of blood
> Within me is a standing lake of fire,
> Curled with the cold wind of my gelid sighs,
> That drive a drift of sleet through all my body,
> And shoot a February through all my veins.
> Until I see him I am drunk with thirst,
> And surfeited with hunger of his presence.
> I know not where I am, or no, or speak,
> Or whether thou dost hear me. (V ii 45-56).

Try paraphrasing Jonson's poem in modern English. Or compose a paraphrase in prose.

The Roman poet Horace was a great favorite for imitation among English poets. Here is a prose version of the fifth ode of book I of Horace's *Odes,* translated into English during the nineteenth century by one C. Smart:

> To Pyrrha,
>   What dainty youth, bedewed with liquid perfumes caresses you, Pyrrha, beneath the pleasant grot, amid a profusion of roses? For whom do you bind your golden hair, plain in your neatness? Alas! How often shall he deplore

your perfidy, and the altered gods; and through inexperience be amazed at the seas, rough with blackening storms, who now credulous enjoys you all precious, and, ignorant of the faithless gale, hopes you will be always disengaged, always amiable! Wretched are those, to whom thou untried seemest **fair!** The sacred wall [of Neptune's temple] demonstrates, by a votive tablet, that I have consecrated my dropping garments to the powerful god of the **sea.** (12-13)

Now here is John Milton's translation/paraphrase of Horace's poem:

What slender Youth bedew'd with liquid odors
Courts thee on Roses in some pleasant Cave,
   Pyrrha for whom bindst thou
   In wreaths thy golden Hair,
Plain in thy neatness; O how oft shall he
On faith and changed Gods complain: and Seas
   Rough with black winds and storms
   Unwonted shall admire:
Who now enjoys thee credulous, all Gold,
Who always vacant always amiable
   Hopes thee; of flattering gales
   Unmindful. Hapless they
To whom thou untried seem'st fair. Me in my vow'd
Picture the sacred wall declares t' have hung
   My dank and dropping weeds
   To the stern God of Sea.

Whose version do you prefer? Again, you can paraphrase Milton's version in modern English, or you can paraphrase either version in prose.

We now quote the opening lines, in Latin, of Horace's Sixth Satire, Book II, in order to demonstrate the freedom with which poetry may be paraphrased.

Hoc erat in votis; modus agri non ita **magnus,**
Hortus ubi, et tecto vicinus jugis aquae **fons,**
Et **paulum** sylvae super his foret: **auctius** atque
Dii melius fecere: bene est: nil amplius oro,
Maia nate, nisi ut propria haec mihi **muner** faxis.

Here is C. Smart's prose translation of these lines:

This was ever among the number of my wishes: a portion of ground not over-large, in which was a garden, and a fountain with a continual stream close to my house, and a little woodland besides. The gods have done more abundantly, and better, for me than this. It is well: **O** son of Maia, I ask nothing more save that you would render these donations lasting to me. (158)

Now here are Jonathan Swift and Alexander Pope collaborating in **1737** on an imitation of the opening lines of Horace's satire entitled, appropriately enough, "The Sixth Satire of the Second Book of Horace Imitated." Their version is almost twice as long as Horace's original, because Pope adds an observation about his own situation under English law at the time:

> I've often wish'd that I had clear
> For life, six hundred pounds a year,
> A handsome House to lodge a Friend,
> A River at my garden's end,
> A Terras-walk, and half a Rood
> Of Land, wet out to plant a Wood.
>   Well, now I have all this and more,
> I ask not to increase my store;
> But here a Grievance seems to lie,
> All this is mine but till I die;
> I can't but think 'twould sound more clever,
> To me and to my Heirs for ever.

Try composing a loose paraphrase of these lines that indicates your hopes for your retirement.

A Roman poet named Ovid, who lived during the first century BCE, was also a great favorite among seventeenth- and eighteenth-century poets. Here is a modern translation by modern poet Horace Gregory of two passages from the eighth book of his *Metamorphoses*. In these passages, Ovid describes a meal served to two gods who are in in disguise and who have sought shelter from a poor couple named Baucis and Philemon:

> Then the old man, raising a forked stick,
> Fetched down a side of bacon from black rafters
> And cut small parings of the precious fat
> To toss them where they steamed in boiling water....
> Then food was served; first came Minerva's fruit,
> The ripe brown olive and September cherries
> Spiced with a measure of sweet wine, new lettuce,
> Creamed cottage cheese, pink radishes, and eggs
> Baked to a turn; and all were handed round
> On plates of country-fashioned earthenware—
> And of the same make came a large bowl, then
> Small wooden cups, all lined with amber wax,
> The service for the soup poured at the hearth;
> Then came the table wine and the next course.
> Set to one side, nuts, figs, and dates, sweet-smelling
> Apples in a flat basket, grapes just off the vine,
> The centerpiece a white comb of clear honey.
> But happier than the simple meal itself,
> A halo of high spirits charmed the table.
>   When the huge bowl drained dry, it filled itself,
> And empty flasks still spouted running wine.

In these passages, Ovid gave us an example of the ancient exercise known as ekphrasis, or description (see chapter 15, on the *progymnasmata).* Here is John Dryden's translation and paraphrase of the same passages, which dates from **1700:**

High o'er the Hearth a Chine of Bacon hung;
Good old Philemon seiz'd it with a Prong,
And from the sooty Rafter drew it down,
Then Cut a Slice, but scarce enough for one;
Yet a large Portion of a little Store,
Which for their Sakes alone he wish'd were more.
This in the Pot he plung'd without delay,
To tame the Flesh, and drain the Salt away....
   Pallas began the feast, where first was seen
The **party-color'd** Olive, Black, and Green:
Autumnal Cornels next in order serv'd,
In Lees of Wine well pickl'd, and preserv'd.
A Garden-Salad was the third Supply,
Of Endive, Radishes, and Succory:
Then Curds and Cream, the Flow'r of Country-Fare,
And new-laid Eggs, which **Baucis'** busy Care
Turn'd by a gentle Fire, and roasted rare.
All these in Earthen Ware were serve'd to Board;
And next in place, an Earthen Pitcher stor'd
With Liquor of the best the Cottage cou'd afford.
This was the Tables' Ornament, and Pride,
With Figures wrought: Like Pages at his Side
Stood Beechen Bowls; and these were shining clean,
Varnish'd with Wax without, and **lin'd** within.
By this the boiling Kettle had prepar'd,
And to the Table sent the smoking Lard;
On which with eager Appetite they dine,
A sav'ry Bit, that serv'd to relish Wine:
The Wine itself was suiting to the rest,
Still working in the Must, and lately press'd.
The Second Course succeeds like that before,
Plums, Apples, Nuts, and of their Wintry Store,
Dry Figs, and Grapes, and wrinkl'd Dates were set
In Canisters, t' enlarge the little Treat:
All these a Milk-white Honey-comb surround,
Which in the midst the Country-Banquet crown'd:
But the kind Hosts their Entertainment grace
With hearty Welcome, and an open Face:
In all they did, you might discern with ease,
A willing Mind, and a Desire to please.

   Meantime the Beechen Bowls went round, and still
Though often empty'd, were observ'd to fill;
Fill'd without Hands, and of their own accord
Ran without Feet, and danc'd about the Board.

Obviously, Dryden was fascinated with the possibilities of artful description, and he amplified Ovid's description of the feast into a passage that is almost twice as long as the original. When Jonathan Swift imitated this story from Ovid in a poem entitled "Baucis and Philemon," in contrast, he

omitted the long description of the feast. Rather, he concentrated on the gods' miraculous response to the old couple's generosity:

> While he from out the chimney took
> A flitch of bacon off the hook;
> And freely from the fattest side,
> Cut out large slices to be fried.
> Then stepped aside to fetch them drink,
> Filled a large jug up to the brink;
> And saw it fairly twice go round;
> Yet (what was wonderful) they found
> Twas still replenished to the top,
> As if they ne'er had touched a drop.

Try telling this story in prose. If you enjoy writing poetry, try paraphrasing any of the three versions into free verse.

Finally, here are two translations/imitations of **the** Middle English poet Geoffrey Chaucer. As you can see, Chaucer's fourteenth-century English is very hard to read. This was true even for eighteenth-century readers. Written English had changed so much by their day that Dryden and Pope undertook the task of translating Chaucer's English into language that was more familiar to their readers.

Here is an excerpt from "The Wife of Bath's Prologue," written by Chaucer sometime during the fourteenth century:

> Experience, though noon auctoritee
> Were in this world, is right ynogh for me
> To speke of wo that is in mariage;
> For, lordynges, sith I twelve yeer was of age,
> Thonked be God that is eterne on **lyve,**
> Housbondes at chirche dore I have had **fy** ve,—
> If I so ofte **myghte** have y wedded bee,—
> And **alle** were worthy men in hir degree.
> But me was **toold,** certeyn, nat **longe** agoon is,
> That sith that Crist ne wente neverer but onis
> To weddyng, in the Cane of Galilee,
> That by the same ensample taught he me
>
> That I ne sholde wedde be but ones___
> Men may devyne and glosen, up and doun,
> But **wel** I woot, express, without lye,
> God bad us for to wexe and multiplye;
> That gentil text kan I wel understonde.

Now here is Alexander Pope's imitation, written in 1704:

> Behold the Woes of Matrimonial Life,
> And hear with Rev'rence an experienc'd Wife!
> To dear-bought Wisdom give the Credit due,
> And think, for once, a Woman tells you true.
> In all these Trials I have born a Part;

I was my self the Scourge that caus'd the Smart;
For, since Fifteen, in Triumph have I led
Five Captive Husbands from the Church to Bed.
   Christ saw a Wedding once, the Scripture says,
And saw but one, 'tis thought, in all his Days;
Whence some infer, whose Conscience is too nice,
No pious Christian ought to marry twice——
Encrease and multiply was Heav'ns' Command,
   And that's a Text I clearly understand.

Here is another excerpt from Chaucer's "The Wife of Bath's Tale"

   In th'olde dayes of the Kyng Arthour,
Of which that Britons speken greet honour,
Al was this land fulfild of fayerye.
The elf-queene, with hir joly compaignye,
Daunced ful ofte in many a grene mede.
This was the olde opinion, as 1 rede;
I speke of manye hundred yeares ago.
But now kan no man se none elves mo,
For now the grete charitee and prayeres
Of lymytours and othere hooly freres,
That serchen every lond and every streem,
As thikke as motes in the soone-beem,
Blessynge halles, chambres, kichenes, boures,
Citees, burghes, castels, hy toures,
Thropes, bernes, shipnes, dayeryes—
This maketh that there ben no fayeryes.

And last, here is John Dryden's paraphrase, published in 1700:

In Days of Old when Arthur fill'd the Throne,
Whose Acts and Fame to Foreign Lands were blown;
The King of Elfs and little Fairy Queen
Gamboll'd on Heaths, and danc'd on ev'ry Green.
And where the jolly Troop had led the round
The Grass unbidden rose, and mark'ed the Ground:
Nor darkling did they dance, the Silver Light
Of Phoebe serv'd to guide their Steps aright,
And, with their Tripping pleas'd, prolong'd the Night.
Her Beams they follow'd, where at full she plaid,
Nor longer than she shed her Horns they staid,
Above the rest our Britain held they dear,
More solemnly they kept their Sabbaths here,
And made more spacious Rings, and revell'd half the Year.
   I speak of ancient Times, for now the Swain
Returning late may pass the Woods in vain,
And never hope to see the nightly Train:
In vain the Dairy now with Mints is dress'd,
The Dairy-Maid expects no Fairy Guest,

To skim the Bowls and after pay the Feast.
She sighs and shakes her empty Shoes in vain,
No silver Penny to reward her Pain:
For Priests with Pray'rs, and other godly Geer,
Have made the merry Goblins disappear....

WORKS CITED

Malcolm X. *The Autobiography of Malcolm X: As Told to Alex Haley.* New York: Ballentine, 1964.

Morrison, **Toni.** *Song of Solomon.* New York: New American Library, 1977.

Sappho. *The Poems of Sappho.* Translated by Suzy Q. Groden. New York: Macmillan, 1966.

Smart, C. *The Works of Horace.* Philadelphia: David McKay, 1895.

THE PROGYMNASMATA, OR RHETORICAL EXERCISES

It is quite evident that these exercises are altogether beneficial to those who take up the art of rhetoric. For those who have recited a narration and a fable well and with versatility will also compose a history **well** *. . .Training through the chreia not only produces a certain power of discourse but also a good and useful character since we are being trained in the* aphorisms *of wise persons. Both the so-called commonplace and description have benefit that is conspicuous since the ancients have used them everywhere.*

—**Aelius** Theon,
Progymnasmata
Preface 1

RHETORIC TEACHERS USED the set of exercises called *progymnasmata* ("elementary exercises") over a very long stretch of time. The term first appears in the sophistic *Rhetoric to Alexander,* written during the fourth century BCE (unless this is a later insertion in the manuscripts). The author furnished a relatively long list of rhetorical tactics, and suggested that "if we habituate and train ourselves to repeat them on the lines of our preparatory exercises, they will supply us with plenty of matter both in writing and in speaking" (1436a 25). His casual reference suggests that exercises were routinely used in the rhetorical schools of the time. In fact, Cicero testifies that Aristotle used an exercise called "thesis" to train his rhetoric students "so that they might be able to uphold either side of the question in copious and elegant language" *(Orator* xiv 46). If Cicero's information is correct, thesis was used even in schools of philosophy during the fourth century BCE. It was still being practiced in Rome some five centuries later, as Quintilian testifies in the second book of the *Institutes,* and it was still in use in some European schools at least as late as the sixteenth century CE.

Aside from brief descriptions that appear in global accounts of ancient rhetorics, such as

Quintilian's *Institutes,* four ancient manuscripts devoted solely to the *progymnasmata* have survived. The oldest of these is attributed to Aelius Theon, a sophist who lived in Egyptian Alexandria during the first century CE. Hermogenes of Tarsus wrote another, probably during the second century CE; this treatise, as translated into Latin by the grammarian Priscian, was very popular during the European Middle Ages. A Byzantine sophist named Nicolaus produced another Greek *progymnasmata* during the fifth century CE. However, the most complete list of elementary exercises we possess is the one put together by Aphthonius, who taught rhetoric in Antioch around the fifthcentury CE. Translated into Latin, this treatise was enormously popular in Europe during the Renaissance.

In ancient Greece and Rome, when boys became old enough to go to school, their parents placed them with a teacher who was a grammarian. (This ancient association of elementary study with grammar explains why American elementary schools are still sometimes called "grammar schools"). While they studied with a grammarian, young students practiced imitating and elaborating on fables, tales, ***chreia,*** and **proverbs.** When they graduated to higher education in rhetoric, they composed sample parts of orations such as confirmations or refutations, sometimes imitating famous speeches and sometimes following a standard arrangement of parts. They also composed **commonplaces, descriptions** *(ekphrasis),* characters *(ethopoeia),* **comparisons** *(synkresis),* and speeches of praise *(encomia)* and blame *(psogos,* **invective).** When students matured, they were set to composing more difficult exercises in deliberative and forensic rhetoric, called thesis and **introduction of law.**

The *progymnasmata* remained popular for so long because they are carefully sequenced: they begin with simple paraphrases (like the ones considered in the last chapter) and end with sophisticated exercises in deliberative and forensic rhetoric. Each successive exercise uses a skill practiced in the preceding one, but each adds some new and more difficult composing task. Ancient teachers were fond of comparing the graded difficulty of the *progymnasmata* to the exercise used by Milo of Croton to gradually increase his strength: Milo lifted a calf each day. Each day the calf grew heavier, and each day his strength grew. He continued to lift the calf until it became a bull *(Institutes* I xi 5).

Like the exercises in imitation discussed in the previous chapter, the *progymnasmata* may look and feel artificial or formulaic to contemporary writers. However, the directions for amplification that accompany some of them are meant to be freely interpreted; for example, not every encomium must have the same number of parts, and the parts need not always appear in the same order. This freedom of interpretation and arrangement is what distinguishes classical exercises from the prescriptive formulas laid down in modern school rhetoric.

If you choose to practice any or all of the exercises reviewed here, we suggest that you adapt them to contemporary themes or issues that interest you. We give a few suggestions for doing this along the way. The object of these exercises is, of course, the achievement of *copia.*

FABLE

Fables are fictitious stories meant to teach moral lessons. In the eighteenth century, a scholar and critic named Samuel Johnson defined a fable as "a narrative in which beings irrational, and sometimes inanimate, are, for the purpose of moral instruction, feigned to act and speak with human interests and passions" ("Life of Gay"). The great French fabulist Jean de la Fontaine composed a more poetic definition:

> Fables in sooth are not what they appear;
> Our moralists are mice, and such small deer.
> We yawn at sermons, but we gladly turn
> To moral tales, and so amused we learn.

A sixteenth-century teacher named Erasmus praised fables in this way: "Their attraction is due to their witty imitation of the way people behave, and the hearers give their assent because the truth is set out vividly before their very eyes" (631).

All cultures produce fables, little stories used to teach moral behavior to children. Aesop's tale of the country mouse and the city mouse, written thousands of years ago, is still part of childhood lore. Native American cultures have produced especially rich traditions of fables that display a fascinating range of human and animal characters such as the trickster coyote and the sturdy turtle. Artist and author Art Spiegelman has created a series of highly acclaimed comic books featuring a Jewish-American son of Holocaust survivors retelling their stories from before, during, and after the Holocaust. In the series, Spiegelman uses different animal species to represent different ethnicities and nationalities—for example, Jews are portrayed as mice, Nazis as cats; the Polish are portrayed as pigs, the French frogs.

The ancient rhetoric teacher Aphthonius divided fables into two kinds: those that use human characters and those that use animal characters. The comic strips *Doonesbury, Pogo,* and *Outland* are or were continuing fables that commented on current affairs; *Doonesbury* uses human characters, while *Pogo* was an animal fable and *Outland* used both humans and animals.

Fabulous uses of animals sometimes appear in political cartoons, as well. In the cartoon in Figure 15.1, fish represent abstractions—war and the economy—and war is depicted as a large, looming predator about to devour the tiny fish fleeing from its jaws. In an era when the economy is shaky, as it was in March 2003, war can be a drain on a nation's resources. The cartoonist suggests this possibility by means of an animal fable.

In Figure 15.2 the Russian bear—the traditional symbol of that country—is represented as having the very sticky problem of Chechnya, appropriately represented as a porcupine, stuck to one of its paws, or feet, suggesting that Putin's interest in being tough may not be an altogether good idea.

Fables are popular with children, of course, and that's why the list of elementary *progymnasmata* begins with them. Ancient teachers asked their very young students to imitate the fables of Aesop. However, older stu-

FIGURE 15.1
Source: *Steve Sack, Minnesota Star-Tribune,* March 6, 2003.

dents may enjoy paraphrasing extant fables or even creating their own stories that make some moral or political point.

Here is an ancient fable as told by Xenophon in his *Memorabilia.* Xenophon used this fable to justify Athenian attitudes about the proper relations that ought to obtain between women and men:

> It is said that when beasts could talk, a sheep said to her master: "It is strange that you give us sheep nothing but what we get from the land, though we supply you with wool and lambs and cheese, and yet you share your own food with your dog, who supplies you with none of these things." The dog heard this, and said: "Of course he does. Do not I keep you from being stolen by thieves, and carried off by wolves? Why, but for my protection you couldn't even feed for fear of being killed." And so, they say, the sheep admitted the dog's claim to preference. (II vii 13-14)

This fable, or any fable, can be used in several rhetorical exercises. You can imitate or paraphrase it, perhaps using human characters. You can compose a moral for it, or write a different interpretation than that implied by Xenophon. Could the sheep and the dog also represent the people of a nation and its standing army, for example?

If you want to stretch your creative abilities, compose a fable that is analogous to some current event or state of affairs about which you are

FIGURE 15.2

Source: Kevin Kallaugher, The Baltimore Sun, March 8, 2003.

concerned. For example, you can compose a version of Xenophon's fable that justifies a less patriarchal view of the proper relations between men and women. In that case, you might want to use different animals than sheep and a dog. In his *Progymnasmata,* Hermogenes recommended that beast fables employ animals whose actions can be plausibly compared to human activities: "If the contention be about beauty, let this be posed as a peacock; if some one is to be represented as wise, there let us pose a fox; if imitators of the actions of men, monkeys" (24).

We composed a fable about hate speech. In keeping with Hermogenes' advice, we chose a crowing rooster to represent people who are careless about the effects of their actions on others:

> There was once a rooster who was very proud of himself, particularly of his gorgeous feathers and his raucous voice. Every morning he paraded among the chickens, preening his beautiful feathers and crowing as loud as he could. One day he noticed a small group of sparrows foraging near his pen. He strutted as close to the fence as he could get and crowed very loudly. The sparrows were startled, but they did not fly away in fear, as he had hoped. As days passed, the rooster became more and more frantic about the sparrows who were foraging so close by and who seemed not to know how important he was among the chickens. He stayed close to the fence, fretting and preening, preening and crowing, until the farmer became irritated by the constant noise. He threw the

rooster off the place, and so the rooster lost his good home with plenty of food, as well as his captive audience.

Fables are usually quite brief; the composer simply presents a bare narrative. If you wish to expand a fable, add descriptions of the setting or compose dialogue for the characters. Of course, any fable you compose can be used for purposes of illustration or analogy in a larger composition.

TALE

The second elementary exercise involved students in retelling stories from history and poetry. Since narrative plays an important role in persuasive discourse, it is important that rhetors know how to compose skillful stories, whether these are historical or fictional (see the chapter on arrangement).

The composition of narrative is not simple or artless. Ancient teachers distinguished between longer narratives that recounted a series of **events**—like Thucydides' history of the **Peloponnesian** War or Homer's *Iliad*—from shorter narratives that told about one event. Of course, very young students were asked to imitate or paraphrase only the very short narratives that they found in their reading. Here is Aphthonius's example of a short tale:

> Let anyone marveling at the beauty of the rose consider the misfortune of Aphrodite. For the goddess was in love with Adonis but Ares, in turn, was in love with her; in other words, the goddess had the same regard for Adonis that Ares had for Aphrodite. God loved goddess and goddess was pursuing mortal; the longing was the same, even though the species was different. The jealous Ares, however, wanted to do away with Adonis in the belief that the death of Adonis would bring about a release of his love. Consequently, Ares attacked his rival but the goddess, learning of his action, was hurrying to the rescue. As she stumbled into the rosebush because of her haste, she fell among the thorns and the flat of her foot was pierced. Flowing from the wound, the blood changed the color of the rose to its familiar appearance and the rose, though white in its origin, came to be as it now appears. (Nadeau 265)

Writers can imitate or paraphrase this short tale. But Quintilian also suggested that students change the order of events in such stories, telling them backwards or starting in the middle, in order to improve their memories (*Institutes* II iv 15).

Quintilian's exercise is useful for improving writers' skill at arrangement, as well. What happens when events are given in a different order than that chosen by Aphthonius? What if the teller were to narrate the story about the rose before she provided the information about the love triangle?

> One day, as the goddess Aphrodite was hurrying through the woods, she stumbled into a rosebush because of her haste. She fell among the thorns and the flat of her foot was pierced. Flowing from the wound, the blood changed the color of the rose to its familiar appearance, and the rose, though white in its origin, came to be as it now appears. Aphrodite was hurrying because the god Ares,

who loved her, was attacking the mortal man she loved, Adonis. Ares thought that if he could kill Adonis, Aphrodite would forget her mortal lover.

We reordered the events of the story and removed the embellishments given it by Aphthonius. This arrangement presents an entirely different impression of Aphrodite, we think. Which version do you prefer?

Aphthonius's version of the tale omitted the fate of Adonis. According to ancient myth, Aphrodite warned her mortal lover to be careful while hunting, but he ignored her warning and was gored to death by a boar. That part of the story can easily be told in one sentence, as we have just done. Compare our spare version to Ovid's lovely narrative:

> Since she believed her warning had been heard,
> The goddess yoked her swans and flew toward **heaven**—
> Yet the boy's pride and manliness ignored it.
> His hunting dogs took a clear path before them
> And in the forest waked a sleeping boar;
> As he broke through his lair within a covert,
> Adonis pricked him with a swift-turned spear.
> The fiery boar tore out the slender splinter
> And rushed the boy, who saw his death heave toward him.
> With one great thrust he pierced the boy's white loins
> And left him dying where one saw his blood
> Flow into rivulets on golden sands. *(Metamophoses* X)

Ovid added touches of description and characterization. Do these additions change the effect of the tale? Can you tell it differently? Can you tell it better? You can find the whole story of Aphrodite and Adonis in any collection of ancient Greek or Roman myths (the goddess is called "Venus" in Roman mythology) or in Shakespeare's poetic retelling entitled "Venus and Adonis."

You needn't go to ancient literature to find short tales to imitate or paraphrase; they abound in our culture. While we prefer telling jokes to writing them down, composing different versions of jokes can be a useful exercise. We can also write and revise or reorder tales about events from our own lives. Often we tell these to friends for their amusement; why not try writing them? There are also fairy tales. Walt Disney Studios has a long history of amplifying these little stories into two-hour animated films, complete with well-developed characters and more complex plot lines than are featured in the originals. Compare the versions of well-known fairy tales found in Grimm or Hans Christian Andersen to those told by Disney, whose versions are ordinarily less gruesome than the originals. Why is this so, do you think? For practice in narrative composition, write a version of a fairy tale that uses bits of Disney along with bits of earlier versions. Or compose your own version of a well-known fairy tale. Update the story of Little Red Riding Hood or the Little Mermaid. Find a copy of the ancient story of Hercules, and compare it to Disney's recent movie.

A curious sort of tale that exists today is the "urban legend." Urban legends are eerie, often difficult to believe stories usually circulated by word of mouth (though a good number can be found on the Internet and via e-mail) that often feature a friend of a friend who has experienced a change of fortune. Another regular component is a twist of corporate conspiracy. One recent legend in circulation, for instance, claimed that a known corporate entity—at various times Bill Gates, Nike, Disney—had developed a sophisticated e-mail tracing program, and offered $1,000 each to the first one thousand recipients. Even the tale that Neiman Marcus was charging an inordinate amount for its cookie recipe turned out to be an urban legend. Some urban legends, however, are local and involve a familiar place (the campus library, an old dormitory), and some resemble horror stories. These are often hoaxes and are often told for the sake of telling.

Writers of contemporary nonfiction conventionally employ small narratives in the beginnings of books or chapters. Here, for example, is the opening of a chapter of *In Our Defense,* a discussion of the Bill of Rights written by Ellen Alderman and Caroline Kennedy:

> On a hot summer night, August 11, 1967, in Pike County, Kentucky, in an old farmhouse in the foothills of the Appalachian Mountains, two young civil rights workers, Alan and Margaret McSurely, were settling in for the evening. Alan was in a spare room writing at a makeshift desk and Margaret was in the kitchen cooking some squash for dinner. From the kitchen window Margaret spotted a dozen or so armed men making their way through the tall grass behind their house. Fearing that the men were looking for an escaped convict, Margaret called out to her husband. He was already up out of his chair and on his way to the front of the house.
>
> "I walked up to the door and reached my hand out to open the door, [it] opened in on me and about five guys came running right by me up into the living room and the first guy said, 'Where is Alan McSurely?' They had gone right by me, I was back by the door. I said, 'I'm right here.'"
>
> The sheriff announced to Alan that he was under arrest for sedition against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and read aloud an arrest warrant and search warrant. "As soon as [the sheriff] finished reading these to me there was a moment when it was clear nobody knew what to do. . . . [Then] some more guys come walking in the front door ... in their uniforms with their guns drawn, and there was this guy with a business suit on and a tie. I recognized him as Thomas Ratliff."
>
> The McSurelys and Thomas Ratliff had never met before that night, but what happened next in the McSurely home would lock them into a seventeen-year battle involving a powerful U.S. senator, his feud with a celebrated columnist, and more than eleven trips to five different courts. (117-18).

Alderman and Kennedy used this narrative to stimulate their readers' interest in the abstract subject of the chapter—the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable search and seizure. Compare the impact of their opening narrative to the section of the chapter that begins

their discussion of the Fourth Amendment: "At the heart of the Fourth Amendment is the phrase 'unreasonable search.' To be brought within the amendment, an act by a government official must first be deemed a 'search.' Advances in law enforcement and technology have made this determination far more difficult than the Framers could ever have envisioned" (136). Had the chapter begun with this material, fewer readers would finish it. Obviously Alderman and Kennedy, like many writers of nonfiction, are aware of the power of narrative to entice and hold readers.

Aspiring rhetors can learn much from reading the skillful historical narratives composed by writers such as Taylor Branch, Antonia Frazer, or Barbara Tuchman. Historical novels are currently very popular, as well: Jean Auel, Charles Johnson, Colleen McCullough, James Michener, and Sharon Kay Penman are only a few of the many skilled historical novelists whose work frequently makes the best-seller lists. Try to condense the narrative of a history or novel into a short tale as a useful exercise in summary paraphrase. Reorder the events of a history or novel. Compare the narrative thread of a film to the book it is based on. What did the filmmakers include and what did they leave out? Did they add anything? Or try your hand at telling the story of some contemporary event: a concert, a snowstorm or tornado, a politician's visit to another country, an athletic event, an accident.

CHREIA

Chreia is an exercise in which students amplify a short narrative, usually taken from history, that points up a moral or teaches a lesson *(Institutes* I ix 4-6). Sometimes *chreia* were developed around famous sayings, rather than narratives, however. Hermogenes defined *chreia* as "a concise exposition of some memorable saying or deed, generally for good counsel" (26). Ancient teachers regularly cited the following example of a famous deed, attributed variously to Diogenes or Crates: this man, on seeing a young boy misbehave, struck the boy's teacher. The moral, of course, is that teachers are ultimately responsible for the behavior of their students. Here is another ancient example, from Plato's *Republic:* "I remember hearing Sophocles the poet greeted by a fellow who asked, How about your service of Aphrodite, Sophocles—is your natural force still unabated? And he replied, Hush, man, most gladly have I escaped this thing you talk of, as if I had run away from a raging and savage beast of a master" (329b). To figure out the moral of this little story, you need to know that Aphrodite was the goddess of sexual love.

In *chreia,* ancient students moved from composing narratives to amplifying them, sometimes by fleshing out the bare narrative but more often by adding commentary on famous deeds or utterances. The ability to amplify on a theme was much prized in antiquity and throughout the premodern period, because it demonstrated the fruits of a rhetor's long study and

well-trained memory. In his sixteenth-century textbook on *copia,* Erasmus wrote that amplification was "just like displaying some object for sale first of all through a grill or inside a wrapping, and then unwrapping it and opening it out and displaying it fully to the gaze" (572). Ancient rhetors could amplify any theme in order to meet situational constraints, such as resistant audiences who needed a good deal of convincing. They could also shorten their compositions if time limits were imposed on them.

Amplification evolved into something of an art form in Roman rhetoric. Seneca the Elder told a story about a rhetor named Albucius, who could amplify a single theme so fully that he could speak through three soundings of the trumpet (the trumpet blew at the end of each three-hour watch during the night). Seneca reported that Albucius wished "to say not what ought to be said but what is capable of being said. He argued laboriously rather than subtly; he used argument to prove arguments, and as though there were no firm ground anywhere confirmed all his proofs with further proofs" (*Controversiae* 7 pref. 1).

Because of the importance of amplification, Hermogenes and Aphthonius both supplied a list of instructions for amplifying on a simple account of a historical event or speech. The fully amplified *chreia* was to begin with praise of a famous speaker or doer **of** deeds; then there was to be an explanation or paraphrase of the famous saying or action; the composer next supplied a reason for the saying or doing; then she compared and contrasted the famous saying or doing to some other speech or event; next, he added an example and supported the saying or doing with testimony; last, he concluded with a brief epilogue.

Aphthonius supplied the following example of a fully developed *chreia.* The famous saying, taken from the work of Isocrates, is "The root of education is bitter, but sweet are its fruits."

> *(Praise for the Author, or Encomium):* It is fitting that Isocrates should be admired for his art, which gained for him an illustrious reputation. Just what it was, he demonstrated by practice and he made the art famous; he was not made famous by it. It would take too long a time to go into all the ways in which he benefitted humanity, whether he was phrasing laws for rulers on the one hand or advising individuals on the other, but we may examine his wise remark on education.
>
> *(Paraphrase of Saying):* The lover of learning, he says, is beset with difficulties at the beginning, but these eventually end as advantages. That is what he so wisely said, and we shall wonder at it as follows.
>
> *(Causes or Reasons for Saying):* The lovers of learning search out the leaders in education, to approach whom is fearful and to desert whom is folly. Fear waits upon the boys, both in the present and in the future. After the teachers come the attendants, fearful to look at and dreadful when angered. Further, the fear is as swift as the misdeed and, after fear, comes the punishment. Indeed, they punish the faults of the boys, but they consider the good qualities only fit and proper. The fathers are even more harsh than the attendants in choosing the streets, enjoining the boys to go straight along them, and being suspicious

of the marketplace. If there has been need of punishment, however, they do not understand the true nature of it, but the youth approaching manhood is invested with good character through these trials.

(A Contrast): If anyone, on the other hand, should flee from the teachers out of fear of these things, or if he should run away from his parents, or if he should turn away from the attendants, he has completely deprived himself of their teaching and he has lost an education along with the fear. All these considerations influence the saying of Isocrates that the root of learning is bitter.

(A Comparison): For just as the tillers of the soil throw down the seeds to the earth with hardship and then gather in a greater harvest, in like manner those seeking after an education finally win by toil the subsequent reknown.

(An Example): Let me call to mind the life of Demosthenes; in one respect, it was more beset with hardships than that of any other rhetor but, from another point of view, his life came to be more glorious than any other. For he was so preeminent in his zeal that the adornment was often taken from his head, since the best adornment stems from virtue. Moreover, he devoted to his labors those energies that others squander on pleasures.

(Testimony): Consequently, there is reason to marvel at Hesiod's saying that the road to virtue is hard, but easy it is to traverse the heights. For that which Hesiod terms a road, Isocrates calls a root; in different terms, both are conveying the same idea.

(Epilogue): In regard to these things, there is reason for those looking back on Isocrates to marvel at him for having expressed himself so beautifully on the subject of education. (Matsen, Rollins, and Sousa, 268-69)

We encourage our readers to imitate or paraphrase this *chreia;* surely it is possible to write a better theme on Isocrates' observation about education. Copy the saying and then follow Aphthonius's instructions.

A more interesting challenge is to amplify the saying about Sophocles' service of Aphrodite, or some other short account of a famous saying or deed. Try amplifying on George Washington's act of cutting down the cherry tree or Benjamin Franklin's flying his famous kite. Or amplify John F. Kennedy's "Ask not what your country can do for you" or Sojourner Truth's "Ain't I a Woman?" (these are quoted in full in the preceding chapter). It is not necessary to use every kind of amplification suggested by the ancient teachers, but each of them does provide practice in important subskills of composing.

Chreia need not be developed only from the sayings or deeds of famous people. You may wish to elaborate on some favorite saying, or some habit, of a relative or a friend; or you can use sayings from editorials in newspapers or magazines; or you can develop a *chreia* of action from a news story. Quintilian suggested yet another kind of exercise with *chreia:* try to determine the causes of some well-known symbolic relationships (TJ iv 26). His examples were these: "Why in Sparta is Venus represented as wearing armor?" and "Why is Cupid believed to be a winged boy armed with arrows and a torch?" Here are a couple of modern examples of this sort of question, around which a *chreia* could be developed: Why is justice represented as blind? Why does the Statue of Liberty bear a lighted torch? Find

out the answers to these questions, and compose a *chreia* that amplifies on the justness of these decisions. Remember the *chreia* differs from tale because the story taken from history is supposed to point up a lesson or moral.

PROVERB

Proverbs are common sayings that every member of a culture knows: "A stitch in time saves nine"; "Haste makes waste"; and the like. (Aristotle called proverbs "maxims" and regarded them as a means of **proof—see** the chapter on rhetorical reasoning). Hermogenes defined a proverb as "a summary saying, in a statement of general application, dissuading from something or persuading toward something, or showing what is the nature of each" (27). That is, proverbs are either persuasive or expository. Examples of contemporary proverbs that persuade people to action are "The squeaky wheel gets the grease"; "Wake up and smell the roses"; and "The early bird gets the worm." Proverbs that dissuade people from doing things are "If you drive, don't drink" and "Don't count your chickens before they hatch," Explanatory proverbs include "Rolling stones gather no moss" and "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." Any of these proverbs can be amplified according to the ancient directions for doing so: begin by praising either the wisdom of the proverb or its author (if the author is known); paraphrase or explain the proverb's meaning; give proof of the proverb's truth or accuracy; give comparative and contrasting examples; supply testimony from another author; compose an epilogue.

We possess an example of this exercise composed by the seventeenth-century poet John Milton, who elaborated on the proverb "In the morning rise up early."

> *(Encomium):* Tis a proverb worn with age, "it is most healthy to rise at break of day." Nor indeed is the saying less true than old, for if I shall try to recount in order the several advantages of this, I shall seem to undertake a task of heavy labor.
>
> *(Paraphrase):* rise, then, rise, thou lazy fellow, let not the soft couch hold thee forever.
>
> *(Cause):* You know not how many pleasures the dawn brings. Would you delight your eyes? Look at the sun rising in ruddy vigor, the pure and healthful sky, the flourishing green of the fields, the variety of all the flowers. Would you delight your ears? Listen to the clear concert of the birds and the light humming of the bees. Would you please your nostrils? You cannot have enough of the sweetness of the scents that breathe from the flowers.
>
> *(Another Cause):* But if this please you not, I beg you to consider a little the argument of your health; for to rise from bed at early morn is in no light degree conducive to a strong constitution; it is in fact best for study, for then you have wit in readiness.
>
> *(Comparison):* Besides, it is the part of a good king not to pamper his body with too much sleep, and live a life all holidays and free from toil, but to plan for the commonwealth night and day.

(Ancient Testimony): As Theocritus wisely urges "It is not well to sleep deep." And in Homer the Dream thus speaks to Agamemnon "Sleepest thou, son of a wise-minded, horse-taming Atreus? 'Tis not well for a man of counsel to sleep all night through."

(Example): Why do the poets fable Tithonus and Cephalus to have loved Dawn? Surely because they were sparing of sleep; and, leaving their beds, were wont to roam the fields, decked and clad with many-colored flowers.

(Contrary): But to extirpate somnolence utterly, to leave no trace of it, I shall attempt to lay bare the numberless inconveniences that flow to all from it. It blunts and dulls keen talent, and greatly injures memory. Can anything be baser than to snore far into the day, and to consecrate, as it were, the chief part of your life to death?

(Conclusion): But you who bear rule, you especially should be wide awake, and utterly rout gripping sleep as it creeps upon you. For many, coming upon enemies, whelmed by heavy sleep, and as it were, buried therein, have smitten them with slaughter, and wrought such havoc as it is pitiful to see or hear of. A thousand examples of this kind occur to me which I could tell with an inexhaustible pen. But if I imitate such Asiatic exuberance, I fear lest I shall murder my wretched listeners with **boredom.** (quoted by Clark 235-46)

A dictionary of proverbs or quotations will supply you with lots of famous sayings to use for this exercise. For example, we found the following quotations listed under the heading of "greatness" in *The Pocket Book of Quotations:*

How dreary to be somebody!
How public, like a frog
To tell your name the livelong day
To an admiring bog!

> —**Emily** Dickinson, *Poems* I

The great are only great because we are on our knees. Let us rise!

> —**P.** J. Proudhon, *Revolutions of Paris*

But be not afraid of greatness: some are born great, some achieve greatness and some have greatness thrust upon 'em.

> —**William** Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night* II 5

Very different themes could be amplified from these three very different attitudes toward greatness.

Proverb, *chreia,* tale, and fable were the exercises used by grammarians to help younger students master the basic composing skills. When students matured, they moved on to study with a teacher of rhetoric, who saw to it that they practiced exercises in the achievement of *copia* that were directly related to composing skills they would need as rhetors.

CONFIRMATION AND REFUTATION

The first of the strictly rhetorical exercises engaged students in composing the main parts of arguments: confirmation and refutation. You might recall from the chapter on arrangement that confirmation is the section of a com-

position that lays out the composer's **arguments** and her support for them. The section called refutation answers the anticipated arguments of those who oppose the rhetor's point of view. Matters of fact are not suitable for this exercise since they need not be confirmed, nor can they be refuted. Discourses that are obviously fictional are not suitable for confirmation or refutation, either.

Quintilian suggested that students compose confirmations and refutations using the same historical materials they worked with in the elementary exercises before they graduated to the composition of confirmations and refutations for use in actual rhetorical situations (II iv 18-19). For example, he suggested that students write compositions confirming or refuting the legend that "a raven settled on the head of Valerius in the midst of a combat and with its wings and beak struck the eyes of the Gaul who was his adversary."

Aphthonius taught that a rhetor's first duty in refutation was to state the "false assertion of the opposition" and then to write a brief exposition of the situation. Hermogenes suggested several topics that could be used to find arguments for refutation: "You can refute an argument from the standpoint of its uncertainty, its incredibility, its impossibility, its lack of consistency, its impropriety, its inconvenience" (Murphy 58).

The opposites of these topics (that is, certainty, credibility, possibility, consistency, propriety, and convenience) can be used in confirmation. A confirmation begins with an account of the good reputation enjoyed by the doer of the deed, presents an exposition of the situation, and employs the opposite topics used in refutation: certainty, **believability,** possibility, consistency, propriety, convenience.

Following Aphthonius's instructions, we composed a sample confirmation and refutation about a contemporary event also considered in the chapter on *kairos.* On January 11, 2003, George Ryan, the governor of Illinois, citing problems with the Illinois justice system, commuted the sentences of those on the state's death row. Here is our confirmation of his action:

> *(Assertion to Be Confirmed):* Governor Ryan was right to commute the sentences of death row inmates in Illinois.
>
> *(Encomium):* Governor George Ryan is an honorable person who makes decisions based on ethics rather than politics.
>
> *(Exposition of the Situation):* On January 11, 2003, Governor George Ryan (R) of Illinois commuted the sentences of his state's entire death row. The decision came after a three-year study revealed major problems with the state's judicial system, including revelations that at least seventeen inmates were innocent, and that some inmates' confessions had been elicited by use of torture. Faced with what he called "startling information," Governor Ryan proclaimed, "I have acted today in what I believe is in the interest of justice. It is not only the right thing to do, I believe it is the only thing to do."
>
> *(Certainty):* It has been repeatedly established that Illinois's judicial system is unreliable and corrupt. No one should be sentenced to death in such a system.
>
> *(Credibility):* Governor Ryan has been evaluating the justice system and weighing the prospects for death row inmates for over three years. Because

Ryan was previously a proponent of the death penalty, this decision was made based strictly on the facts at hand rather than on political grounds.

(Possibility): It is quite possible that the people whose sentences were commuted were innocent. Evidence could still emerge (as it has with others who had already been executed) proving their innocence.

(Consistency): Governor Ryan's action was consistent with a tradition in which presidents and governors may commute sentences at any time.

(Propriety): Governor Ryan's commutation was appropriately timed, because he was about to be replaced by a governor who had indicated he would not commute the sentences.

(Convenience): The commutations were convenient, since it saved the government from considering the sentences on a case-by-case basis, a process that may have taken years.

As with any good sophistic tactic, Aphthonius's format can be used to compose a refutation as well. Here, then, for purposes of contrast, is a refutation of Governor Ryan's action:

(False Assertion to Be Refuted): Governor Ryan was right to commute the sentences of death row inmates in Illinois.

(Exposition of the Situation): On January 11, 2003, Governor George Ryan (R) of Illinois commuted the sentences of his state's entire death row. The decision came after a three-year study revealed major problems with the state's judicial system, including revelations that at least seventeen inmates were innocent, and that some inmates' confessions had been elicited by use of torture. Faced with what he called "startling information," Governor Ryan proclaimed, "I have acted today in what I believe is in the interest of justice. It is not only the right thing to do, I believe it is the only thing to do."

(Uncertainty): It is not certain that the inmates are innocent; therefore each case should be examined carefully.

(Incredibility): It is hard to believe that the Illinois justice system is so flawed as to convict innocent people.

(Impossibility): It is now impossible for the families of the crime victims to have a sense of closure.

(Lack of Consistency): The commutations are inconsistent with Ryan's previous stance on the death penalty.

(Impropriety): Governor Ryan has had a vexed political career; this action is inappropriate because he is merely trying to improve his reputation before he leaves office.

(Inconvenience): The commutations were inconvenient for other governors facing similar situations in their own states,

Remarkably, our systematic use of the ancients' suggested topics produced most of the arguments that were made in the press and elsewhere in regard to this event. This exercise is yet another example of a reality that appears again and again in ancient rhetorics: arguments can be found to support almost any position on a given issue.

We suggest that rhetors practice composing sample confirmations and refutations about any issue drawn from contemporary events. Debatable

questions from history are suitable too: Should the United States have entered the Vietnam war? Should President Truman have used atomic weapons to end World War II? Was Christopher Columbus's arrival on American shores a good thing?

COMMONPLACE

This exercise should not be confused with the commonplaces of invention. In the context of the *progymnasmata,* a commonplace was an exercise in which students amplified or elaborated on some commonly held belief. When practicing commonplace, students can use the argumentative skills they acquired in the previous exercise, but here they do not argue the facts of an actual case. Rather, they argue against some vice or moral fault such as treachery or theft or greed, or they argue for virtues such as honor or justice. The facts of any case used in this exercise are assumed; the object is rather to elaborate on the moral qualities of a virtue or vice. This is why the exercise was called "common": it addressed general topics rather than specific cases that named individual persons or events. Ancient teachers used this exercise to give their students practice in writing perorations, the last and most emotional part of persuasive discourses. Erasmus supplied this list of commonplaces:

1. It matters what company you keep.
2. Offence is easy, reconciliation hard.
3. The safest course is to believe no one.
4. Love as one soon to hate, hate as one soon to love.
5. The friendship of princes is perilous.
6. War is pleasant to those who have not experienced it.
7. The best provision for old age is learning.

He pointed out that commonplaces also include stock comparisons such as "Is the married or unmarried state happier? Private or public life? Is monarchy preferable to democracy? Is the life of the student better than that of the uneducated?" (637).

Aphthonius suggested that the composition of a commonplace begin with a prologue. Then the composer should provide a contrary, then an exposition that interests the listener and a comparison that attaches blame to the accused. This was to be followed by an attack on the doer's motives and a digression that castigated his past life. Finally, the composer rejected any feeling of pity for the doer and reminded his audience of the standard topics that were relevant to the commonplace being amplified: legality, justice, expediency, practicability, honor, or result.

Aphthonius gave an example of a fully elaborated commonplace. Its composer argued against an imaginary ruler who has broken laws and

who has been hauled into court. The composer pretended to represent the people against this would-be despot. Here is our paraphrase of Aphthonius's example:

A KOINOS TOPOS: AGAINST A DESPOT

Proemium A. Inasmuch as laws are established among us and courts of justice are part of our political structure, that man who breaks the laws must pay a penalty to law. For, if it were likely that he would become more moderate by winning acquittal in the present case, perhaps one would have let him off from the trial. But since by escaping now he will be more violent, wherein is it right that leniency in the present should bring about a beginning of despotic rule?

Proemium B. Indeed, all others who have judging alloted to them acquire no harm at all from the acquittal of those brought to trial. But acquittal of a despot will inflict harm upon the judges, for judging is no longer allowed when a despot has gained control. From the contrary, it seems to me that you will grasp more precisely the meaning of the present case if you examine the judgments of our ancestors, for our forefathers, as if with good intent toward us, planned a state free of **domination—and** with every good reason. Since at different times different fortunes befall mankind and alter the judgment r of men, they balanced the vagaries of fortune against the uniformity of laws and thus devised norms of conduct from which they worked out one standard of judgment for all. So it was that law came into being for the bodies of citizens as the rectifier of evils caused by misfortunes.

Exposition. With no thought for any of these matters, that man has conceived a very evil purpose, that of altering the constitution of the state. This is what he would say to himself: "Why are these things so, O Gods? Though I have been shown to be above the crowd, shall I suffer myself to have equality with the rest in every single case? And am I allowing my fortune to acquire wealth in vain, if I shall be providing the same things for the many? Shall poor men assemble to form judgment on me? And is that which seems best to the many to become a law for me? What escape, then, shall there be from these things? I will seize the citadel and I will put the law aside to perish wretchedly; thus I will be the law to the many, not they to me." These are the ideas that he broached to himself without bringing them to fulfillment, for the good will of the gods intervened. Now may these things for which we still owe thanks to the gods not preserve this man from danger today.

Comparison. A murderer is dreadful but the despot is worse. For the former commits his foul deeds against a single person of no consequence; the latter changes all the fortunes of the state. Accordingly, the crime of a manslayer is less serious than that of a despot by as much as the offense of a moment falls short of the murder of all.

Intention. It is the practice for all other men, even if they commit the most heinous crimes, at least to distinguish the intention from the deed; only the despot does not have the temerity to say that his act was involuntary. For if he were unwilling to undertake the course of tyranny, perhaps one would have excused him on the basis of intention. But since he did so deliberately, how is it just to absolve from responsibility a man who had, prior to the acts, become involved by intention?

Digression. Indeed, all other people who come before us in judgment are on trial only for the present circumstances, and because of their past life, they are often freed. Only the present defendant is judged on both lives. For he did not conduct his past life with moderation and his present is more damaging than the past, so that he has to give satisfaction both for those offenses that he earlier committed and for those that he committed in later times.

Rejection of Pity. Who, then, will win his release by appeals for mercy? His children, I suppose? But when they wail, then you may consider the laws to have been established. Surely, it is more just by far to cast a vote for them than for the children of this man. For through the children of this man the despotism would have been confirmed, but through the laws you have yourselves won the right to pass judgment. And so, you are more just in casting your vote in accordance with these laws through which you have been established as judges.

Legality. And if it is lawful to honor those freeing the fatherland, it follows that those reducing it to slavery are to be punished.

Justice. And it is just that a penalty should be fixed among us equal to the harm that this man has done.

Expediency. Further, the despot will pay what is due by falling, for he will be causing the laws to have prevailed.

Practicability. Moreover, it is easy to accomplish punishment of the present offender. For, whereas this man needed armed guards to set up his despotism, we in our turn will not need allies to put an end to the despot. But the vote of judges will suffice to destroy the entire power of despotism. (Matsen, Rollinson, Sousa 271-75)

Sadly, there are still tyrants in the modern world, and their deeds can still inspire compositions against injustice. But commonplaces can concern other vices or virtues than injustice by tyrants; honorable and dishonorable actions, actions that cause evil results, or actions that endanger others can all provide subjects for commonplaces. Was the invention of atomic weapons just? Expedient? Honorable? Is the United States' intervention, military or otherwise, in the affairs of other nations just, expedient, honorable, good? Refer to the lists of common American topics composed by E. D. Hirsch and Howard Zinn (see the chapter on the commonplaces). Compose commonplaces that elaborate on one or two of them.

ENCOMIUM AND INVECTIVE

While commonplace engaged students in composing discourses that examined general vices or virtues, the next two exercises of the *progymnasmata* asked students to compose discourses in which they either praised or abused some specific person or thing. Greek rhetors called a discourse of praise "panegyric," but it is still known in English by its Latin name, *encomium.* A discourse that blames or abuses something or someone, on the other hand, is called "invective." Both kinds allow students to practice composing epideictic rhetoric. Rhetors have many opportunities both to praise good actions or persons and to heap blame on less honorable persons and activities, and so these exercises provide excellent practice for real

rhetorical situations. Quintilian observed that such compositions are often imposed on us, as when we are asked to give eulogies at funerals (a discourse of praise) or when we are asked to serve as character witnesses in court, in which case we may be asked either to praise or to blame an accused person (III vii 2).

Encomium and invective were commonly practiced by the ancient Greeks and Romans. Encomiums were featured in many religious and cultural celebrations in both cultures, and famous rhetors often gave speeches of praise or denunciation to large audiences in order to display their oratorical abilities. Isocrates' *Panegyricus* and *Panathenaicus* are encomiums of the city of Athens. Gorgias and Isocrates, among others, composed encomiums about Helen, whose abduction by Paris initiated the Trojan War. Popular interpretations of Homer's account of that war suggested that Helen was responsible for starting it. But these famous sophists argued the opposite case in their speeches of praise for her.

Encomiums and invective are still being composed today, although we don't call them that. Most Fourth of July speeches are encomiums to the United States, while speeches and editorials composed for Memorial Day praise those killed in war. Mothers' Day inspires endless essays about the virtues of motherhood, which are examples of encomiums to an abstract ideal. Obituaries are encomiums to deceased persons, and letters of reference may praise the character of the person being recommended. Toasts at weddings and retirement parties usually offer praise for the guests of honor. Invective, which exposes evils or heaps blame on someone who has done wrong, is used in political campaigns when candidates heap blame on one another even more frequently than they praise their own efforts.

Invective is also a regular feature of letters written to the editors of newspapers and magazines. Political leaders sometimes use invective when trying to incite people in their area to unite against another person or group of people. President George W. Bush, with the help of his speechwriters, issued an invective when he used the phrase "axis of evil" to refer to different areas in the Middle East and Asia. Sometimes biographies and histories are extended encomiums or invectives. For example, Barbara Tuchman's *March of Folly* (1984) is an invective about war, and unauthorized biographies of famous people are popular precisely because they contain large doses of invective.

Aphthonius, on one hand, defined an encomium as "a composition expository of inherent excellences." He listed its proper subjects as "persons, things, times, places, animals, and also plants: persons like Thucydides or Demosthenes, things like justice or moderation, times like spring or summer, places like harbors or gardens, animals like a horse or an ox, and plants like an olive or a vine." Hermogenes, on the other hand, suggested that students compose encomiums about a race (such as the Greeks), a city, or a family.

Ancient teachers defined an elaborate set of directions for composing encomiums and invectives: Theon, for example, listed thirty-six possible encomiastic headings for amplification. The standard list of headings for an

encomium of a person was as follows: a prologue; announcement of the class of person or thing to be praised or blamed; consideration of the person's origins (nationality, native city, ancestors, parents); education and interests; achievements (virtue, judgement, beauty, speed or strength, power, wealth, friends); comparison; and epilogue. The same topics can be used to compose invectives. Here is Aphthonius's encomium on the ancient historian Thucydides:

To honor the inventors of useful things for their very fine contributions is just, and just it is that the light coming forth from those men be turned with good reason upon those who displayed it. Accordingly, I shall laud Thucydides by choosing to honor him with the history of the man himself. Moreover, it is a good thing that honor be given to all benefactors, but especially to Thucydides about others, because he invented the finest of all things. For it is neither possible to find anything superior to history in these circumstances, nor is it possible to find one more skillful in history than Thucydides.

Accordingly, Thucydides came from a land that gave him both life and a profession. For he was not born from an indifferent quarter but from whence history came, and by gaining Athens as his mother of life, he had kings for ancestors, and the stronger part of his good fortune proceeded from his earlier ancestry. By gaining both force of ancestry and democratic government, the advantage from one supplied a check upon the other, preventing his being rich unjustly through political equality and concealing public poverty through the affluence of his descent.

Having come upon the scene with such advantages, he was reared under a civil polity and laws that are by nature better than others. Knowing how to live both under arms and under law, he determined to be in one and the same person both a philosopher and a general, neither depriving history of military experience nor placing battles in the class of intellectual virtue. Further, by combining things that were naturally separate, he made a single career in things for which he had no single set of rules.

As he arrived at manhood, he kept seeking an opportunity for the display of those qualities in which he had been well disciplined. And fortune soon produced the war, and he made the actions of all the Greeks his personal concern. He became the custodian of the things that the war brought to pass, for he did not allow time to erase the deeds separately accomplished. Among these, the capture of Plataea is famous, the ravages of Attica were made known, the Athenian circumnavigation of the Poloponnesus was described, and Naupactus was a witness to sea battles. By collecting these things in writing, Thucydides did not allow them to escape notice. Lesbos was won, and the fact is proclaimed to this day; a battle was fought against the Ambraciotes, and time has not obscured the event; the unjust decree of the Lacedaemonians is not unknown. Sphacteria and Pylos, the great achievement of the Athenians, has not escaped unseen.

Where the Corcyraeans speak in the assembly at Athens, the Corinthians present answers to them. The Aeginetans go to Lacedaemon with accusations. Archidamus is discreet before the assembly, but Sthenelaides is urging them on to war. And to these examples, add Pericles, holding a Spartan embassy in no esteem and not allowing the Athenians to make trouble when they were

suffering. Once and for all, these things are preserved for all time by Thucydides' book.

Does anyone really compare Herodotus with him? But Herodotus narrates for pleasure, whereas this man utters all things for the sake of truth. To the extent that entertainment is less worthy than a regard for the truth, to that degree does Herodotus fall short of the virtues of Thucydides.

There would be many other points to mention about Thucydides, if the great number of his praises did not prevent the enumeration of all of them. (Matsen, Rollinson, and Sousa 276-77)

A careful reading of this encomium will show that Aphthonius included a prologue, stated the kind of encomium he has composed (praise of a single person), and commented on his subject's birth and upbringing as well as his studies and achievements. The encomium concludes with a comparison and a summarizing epilogue.

Quintilian suggested that praise of persons include praise of place of birth, parents, and ancestry (HI viii 10). This may be handled in two ways: the rhetor may show that someone lived up to the high standards of her place of birth or that her deeds have made her place of birth even more praiseworthy. Someone's character, physical endowments such as beauty and strength, or deeds and achievements can furnish topics for praise (or abuse). Accidental advantages, such as wealth or power, should not be praised for themselves but only if the person put such advantages to honorable use. The only deeds deserving of praise are those that were done for the sake of others, not on the person's own behalf. Sometimes reputations increase (or decrease) after persons have died; in this case, Quintilian says, it is appropriate to point out that "children reflect glory on their parents, cities on their founders, laws on those who made them, arts on their inventors and institutions on those that first introduced them" (18).

The same topics can be used in denunciations of persons. People who came from privileged backgrounds can be blamed if they squandered those resources or if they used them to engage in vice. While we no longer approve of denouncing persons because of their physical appearance, we can blame someone who demonstrates an immoral character or who engages in reprehensible acts. Quintilian pointed out that the reputations of bad or immoral persons redounds upon their children and their homelands as well (21). We may not like to admit this, but we (the authors) think it is still true that we condemn innocent people who are associated by birth or circumstance with individuals who commit immoral acts.

Cities are praised or blamed in the same way. A city's founder can be made responsible for the habits of its citizens in the same way that parents are responsible for their children. Quintilian remarked that great age usually brings fame to a city, as do their settings, public works, and buildings or fortifications. Buildings should be praised for their "magnificence, utility, beauty and the architect or artist must be given due consideration" (27). As an example of an encomium on a place, Quintilian cited Cicero's praises of Sicily in his Verrine orations:

When Sicily was at the height of its prosperity, and abounded in wealth and resources, there were many fine workshops on the island. For, before Verres' tenure as governor, there was not a home somewhat well off in which there could not be found such things as silver dishes with decorative medallions and figures of the gods, silver bowls used by the women in performing rituals, and a censer, even though there may not have been much else in the way of silver plate. These things were, moreover, executed in a classic style of exquisite craftsmanship; one would be led to believe that the Sicilians had, at one time, owned many other things of equal value, but, that incurring their loss through changed fortunes, they still retained the objects associated with religious worship. (IV, 21)

Notice how skillfully Cicero managed to praise the Sicilians at the same time as he blamed Verres for their impoverished condition. In his remarks on the composition of encomiums, Aristotle made a subtle point that does not appear in ancient textbooks: discourses of praise or blame must be carefully suited to their audiences *(Rhetoric* I 9). He quoted Socrates, who is supposed to have said that "it is not difficult to praise Athenians in Athens" (1367b). What is considered honorable in Athens can be an object of blame among Scythians or Laconians. Of course, the same point holds true today. To praise Americans in America is easy enough to do; such a composition would be received quite differently elsewhere in the world. The same holds true for invective; it is easy to blame Americans when writing for other audiences. During the Persian Gulf War, Judith Williamson wrote the following passage for a British publication called *The Guardian:*

It is the unreality of anywhere outside the US, in the eyes of its citizens, which must frighten any foreigner. Like an infant who has yet to learn there are other centres of self, this culture sees others merely as fodder for its dreams and nightmares____The hyped-up concern over US children's fears ("Will Saddam kill me Mommy?") is obscene when you consider that American bombs are right now killing Iraqi children. It isn't that Americans don't care (God knows they care) but that for most of them, other lands and people cannot be imagined as real. (January 31, 1991, 21)

Americans who accept the accuracy of Williamson's invective may nevertheless be put off by her criticism.

Distinct groups of persons also hold differing sets of values. Quintilian observed that "much depends on the character of the audience and the generally received opinion, if they are to believe that the virtues of which they approve are preeminently characteristic of the person praised and the vices which they hate of the person denounced" (III vii 23). The boundaries between virtue and vice are also notoriously hard to define; acceptable behavior in one setting may be utterly unacceptable in another (25). The wise rhetor will keep these differences in mind as he composes encomiums or invective.

The composition of encomiums and invective was a popular exercise among educated persons during late antiquity and throughout the

Renaissance. Erasmus's *Praise of Folly* (in Latin, *Encomium Moriae,* 1509) is a satiric encomium about foolishness. John Milton composed paired poems called "Joy" and "Thoughtfulness" when he was quite young. The poem about joy contains an invective about melancholy, or sadness, that connects its origins with death:

> Hence loathed Melancholy
> Of Cerberus, and blackest midnight born,
>   In Stygian Cave forlorn.
>   'Mongst horrid shapes, and shrieks, and sights unholy,
> Find out some uncouth cell,
>   Where brooding darkness spreads his jealous wings,
> And the night-Raven sings;
>   There under Ebon shades, and **low-brow'd** Rocks,
> As ragged as thy Locks,
>   In darks Cimmerian desert ever dwell.

> —John Milton, "L'Allegro"

The poem about thoughtfulness, in contrast, contains a lengthy encomium to melancholy. We quote only its opening lines:

> But hail thou Goddess, sage and holy,
> Hail divinest Melancholy,
> Whose Saintly visage is too bright
> To hit the Sense of human sight;
> And therefore to our weaker view,
> Ore laid with black staid Wisdoms hue.

> —John Milton, "Il Penseroso"

Once again, Milton's performance suggests that arguments can be found to attack or defend anything or anybody, depending on the situation.

Rhetors can adapt Aphthonius's suggestions to any contemporary topic: you can practice writing discourses that praise or blame nations, cities, families, persons, animals, or things. For a relatively simple exercise, choose a favorite relative, a favorite pet, or even a plant and use Aphthonius's topics to develop a discourse raising it. This exercise does not have to be serious; funny essays can be written in praise or blame of inanimate objects. Isocrates complained about rhetors who composed encomiums to salt and bumblebees ("Helen" 12). **Erma Bombeck,** the columnist, often composed very funny encomiums or invectives about household objects such as vacuum cleaners and garage door openers. Here's a contemporary encomium, this time on a cookbook, written by Lloyd Fonvielle. It appeared in the online magazine salon.com.

ODE TO "JOY"

On the Internet recently I tracked down a mint copy of "The Joy Of Cooking" from the early '50s—the edition I remember as a fixture in my family's kitchen in those times.

Its resonance as an object is oddly powerful to someone of my generation— deeper even than reruns of "The Mickey Mouse Club"—one of those artifacts

of civilization that becomes invisible through familiarity and hard to collect because of use. You have to pay a premium for a vintage copy of the book that isn't splattered and stained with food or split open at the entry for meatloaf.

I was moved to own a copy because the title was recently included on one of those lists of the 100 most important books of the 20th century.

This struck me as a brilliant insight, and a deeply logical one. This is a book that moved with women as they left their old communities, and served in loco parentis in the kitchen, as Dr. Spock served them in the nursery.

It also introduced an ambition for sophistication and a kind of defensive professionalism into domestic cooking at a time when all things domestic were being devalued in the culture at large.

In my mind now, it serves as an emblem of my mother's time in the kitchen, the unrecorded epic of her domestic labor, which in childhood was the clearest expression I knew of absolute love and absolute security.

We dismiss the almost mystical reverence for such labor by the Victorians as insincere sentimentality, a sop to the oppressed, but any child knows differently.

The book remains useful. I recently consulted it for instruction on how long to boil hardboiled eggs. The awesome ignorance this revealed was touching to me, as it also revealed the awesome knowledge of those who don't need it for such things and the bewilderment of those who found that knowledge suddenly underappreciated.

The book is really about the sacredness of cooking. Not cuisine, but cooking—the invisible work done in the kitchen on any ordinary Wednesday. (March 7, 2000, available at http://archive.salon.com/mwt/sust/2000/03/ 07/joy/)

In his encomium on the best-selling *Joy of Cooking,* Fonvielle offers an account that situates the book personally as well as **culturally—diagnosing** its long-standing appeal. Who knew a cookbook could mean so much?

For a more difficult exercise, develop an encomium or an invective about the city council or other leaders of your town or state. A United States senator has been accused of sexual harassment: write an invective that denounces him for this behavior or compose an encomium that excuses him from these charges on the basis of his origin, character, or achievements. You can even compose encomiums and invective about abstract ideas or issues: how about an encomium to rhetoric? No subject is off limits in this exercise. In fact, its versatility is one of its strengths. Quintilian remarked that compositions of praise or blame were "profitable in more than one respect. The mind is exercised by the variety and multiplicity of the subject matter, while the character is molded by the contemplation of virtue and vice" (IV iv 20).

COMPARISON

Comparison is an exercise in which the composer implies that someone or something is greater than another. She does this by juxtaposing descriptions of both people or things. Comparison is similar to the exercise that precedes it, since a comparison is a double encomium or an encomium

paired with an invective. As Aphthonius counseled, "It is necessary for those who make comparisons either to place the good beside the excellent, or the mean beside the base, or the upright beside the wicked, or the small beside the greater." Hermogenes noted that comparison occurs in a number of other exercises, such as commonplace and encomium, as a means of amplification. He counted it as a separate exercise, however, because "some authors of no small reputation" had made comparison "an exercise by itself" (p. 33).

With comparison we arrive at the portion of the rhetorical exercises that were practiced by mature rhetors. Plutarch's *Parallel Lives,* for instance, includes a number of exercises in comparison. Indeed, Plutarch probably learned the techniques used in the *Lives* when he practiced the school exercise called comparison.

Like Plutarch's *Lives,* ancient examples of comparison chiefly concern comparisons of persons. Aphthonius's example compared the Greek warrior Achilles to Hector, the Trojan warrior-prince. Hermogenes recommended comparison between the heroes Odysseus and Hercules. However, he warned that such an exercise required great skill, since the trickster Odysseus was a less heroic figure than the mighty Hercules. The composer's goal in this case would be to praise Odysseus by showing that his virtues were even greater than those of the man who had held the world on his shoulders. Hermogenes also suggested that comparisons could fruitfully be made between abstractions, such as justice and wealth.

The composing strategies used in comparison are the same as those used in encomium and invective. However, Aphthonius pointed out that "it is not fitting that those who make comparisons should set one 'whole' beside another, for this is dull and unimpressive, but they should rather set one point beside another for this is indeed impressive." In other words, the comparison should not treat all the details involved in one item and then move to the next; rather, it should compare the two items point by point. Here is Aphthonius's point-by-point comparison of Achilles and Hector:

A COMPARISON OF ACHILLES AND HECTOR

Seeking to compare virtue with virtue, I am going to measure the son of Peleus by the standard of Hector, for the virtues are to be honored in themselves. Compared, they become even more worthy of imitation.

Accordingly, both were born of not one land, but each alike sprang from one that is famous. One was of Phthia, whence came the name of Greece itself. The other was of Troy, whose builders were the first of the gods. To the degree that having been born in similar lands is not an inferiority in regard to commendation, by that degree Hector is not excelled by Achilles. And being born, the one as well as the other, of a praiseworthy land, both belonged to families of equal stature. For each was descended from Zeus. Achilles was the son of Peleus, Peleus of Aeacus, and Aeacus of Zeus; Hector, likewise, came from Priam and Laomedon, Laomedon from Dardanus, and Dardanus was a son of Zeus. And having been born with Zeus as a progenitor, they had forefathers nearly alike. For the ancestors of Achilles were Aeacus and Peleus, of whom the former

freed the Greeks from want and the latter was allotted marriage with a goddess as a prize for his prowess in overcoming the Lapithes. On Hector's side, Dardanus was a forefather who formerly lived with the gods, and his father, Priam, was in command of a city whose walls were built by gods. To the degree that there was similarity in living with the gods and association with superior beings, by that degree is Hector about equal to Achilles.

And descended from such ancestors, both were brought up for courage. The one was reared by Chiron, while Priam was the tutor of the other by contributing lessons in virtue through his natural relationship. Just as an education in virtue is equal in both instances, so to them both does it bring equal fame.

When both arrived at manhood, they gained similar stature out of a single struggle, for in the first place, Hector led the Trojans and he was the protector of Troy as long as he survived. He remained in alliance with gods during that time, and when he fell, he left Troy lying vulnerable. Achilles, on the other hand, was the leader of Greece in arms; by terrifying all, he was prevailing against the Trojans, and he had the help of Athena in the contest, but when he fell, he deprived the Achaeans of gaining the upper hand. Overcome through Athena, the former [Hector] was destroyed; the latter [Achilles] fell, struck down at the hands of Apollo. And both, having sprung from gods, were taken off by gods; whence they drew their beginning, they also derived the end of their lives. To the degree that there was similarity in life and in death, by that degree is Hector on a par with Achilles.

It would be possible to say many other things on the virtue of both, except that both have nearly equal renown for their deeds.

Persons who are familiar with Homer's *Iliad* are likely to assume that Achilles was Hector's superior, since the Greek hero killed the Trojan prince in battle. However, Aphthonius's exercise demonstrates the persuasive potential of comparison, since his point-by-point consideration of the two heroes shows that Hector is as worthy of imitation as Achilles. Here is Plutarch's comparison of the two most famous orators in ancient times— Demosthenes and Cicero:

THE COMPARISON OF DEMOSTHENES AND CICERO

These are the most memorable circumstances recorded in history of Demosthenes and Cicero which have come to our knowledge. But omitting an exact comparison of their respective faculties in speaking, yet thus much seems fit to be said; that Demosthenes, to make himself a master in rhetoric, applied all the faculties he had, natural or acquired, wholly that way that he far surpassed in force and strength of eloquence all his contemporaries in political and judicial speaking, in grandeur and majesty all the panegyrical orators, and in accuracy and science all the logicians and rhetoricians of his day; that Cicero was highly educated, and by his diligent study became a most accomplished general scholar in all these branches, having left behind him numerous philosophical treatises of his own on Academic principles; as, indeed, even in his written speeches, both political and judicial, we see him continually trying to show his learning by the way. And one may discover the different temper of each of them in their speeches. For Demosthenes's oratory was without all embellishment

and jesting, wholly composed for real effect and seriousness; not smelling of the lamp, as Pytheas scoffingly said, but of the temperance, thoughtfulness, austerity, and grave earnestness of his temper. Whereas Cicero's love of mockery often ran him into scurrility; and in his love of laughing away serious arguments in judicial cases by jests and facetious remarks, with a view to the advantage of his clients, he paid too little regard to what was decent: saying, for example, in his defence of Caelius, that he had done no absurd thing in such plenty and affluence to indulge himself in pleasures, it being a kind of madness not to enjoy the things we possess, especially since the most eminent philosophers have asserted pleasures to be the chiefest good. So also we are told that when Cicero, being consul, undertook the defence of Murena against Cato's prosecution, by way of bantering Cato, he made a long series of jokes upon the absurd paradoxes, as they are called, of the Stoic set; so that a loud laughter passing from the crowd to the judges, Cato, with a quiet smile, said to those that sat next him, "My friends, what an amusing consul we have."

And, indeed, Cicero was by natural temper very much disposed to mirth and pleasantry, and always appeared with a smiling and serene countenance. But Demosthenes had constant care and thoughtfulness in his look, and a serious anxiety, which he seldom, if ever, laid aside; and therefore, was accounted by his enemies, as he himself confessed, morose and ill-mannered.

Also, it is very evident, out of their several writings, that Demosthenes never touched upon his own praises but decently and without offence when there was need of it, and for some weightier end; but upon other occasions modestly and sparingly. But Cicero's immeasurable boasting of himself in his orations argues him **guilty** of an uncontrollable appetite for distinction, his cry being evermore that arms should give place to the gown, and the soldier's laurel to the tongue. And at last we find him extolling not only his deeds and actions, but his orations also, as well those that were only spoken, as those that were published; as if he were engaged in a boyish trial of skill, who should speak best, with the rhetoricians, Isocrates and Anaximenes, not as one who could claim the task to guide and instruct the Roman nation, the "Soldier full-armed, terrific to the foe."

It is necessary, indeed, for a political leader to be an able speaker; but it is an ignoble thing for any man to admire and relish the glory of his own eloquence. And, in this matter, Demosthenes had a more than ordinary gravity and magnificence of mind, accounting his talent in speaking nothing more than a mere accomplishment and matter of practice, the success of which must depend greatly on the good-will and candour of his hearers, ,and regarding those who pride themselves on such accounts to be men of a low and petty disposition.

The power of persuading and governing the people did, indeed, equally belong to both, so that those who had armies and camps at command stood in need of their assistance; as Charas, Diopithes, and Leosthenes of Demosthenes's, Pompey and young Caesar of Cicero's, as the latter himself admits in his Memoirs addressed to Agrippa and Maecenas. But what are thought and commonly said most to demonstrate and try the tempers of \men, namely, authority and place, by moving every passion, and discover every frailty, these are things which Demosthenes never received; nor was he ever in a position to give such proof of himself, having never obtained any eminent office, nor led any of those armies into the field against Philip which he raised

by his eloquence. Cicero, on the other hand, was sent quaestor into Sicily, and proconsul into Cilicia and Cappadocia, at a time when avarice was at the height, and the commanders and governors who were employed abroad, as though they thought it a mean thing to steal, set themselves to seize by open force; so that it seemed no heinous matter to take bribes, but he that did it most moderately was in good esteem. And yet he, at this time, gave the most abundant proofs alike of contempt of riches and of his humanity and good-nature. And at Rome, when he was created consul in name, but indeed received sovereign and dictatorial authority against Catiline and his conspirators, he attested the truth of Plato's prediction, that then the miseries of states would be at an end when, by a happy fortune, supreme power, wisdom, and justice should united in one.

It is said, to the reproach of Demosthenes, that his eloquence was mercenary; that he privately made orations for Phornmion and Apollodorus, though adversaries in the same cause: that he was charged with moneys received from the King of Persia, and condemned for bribes from Harpalus. And should we grant that all those (and they are not few) who have made these statements against him have spoken what is untrue, yet that Demosthenes was not the character to look without desire on the presents offered him out of respect and gratitude by royal persons, and that one who lent money on maritime usury was likely to be thus indifferent, is what we cannot assert. But that Cicero refused, from the Sicilians when he was quaestor, from the King of Cappadocia when he was proconsul, and from his friends at Rome when he was in exile, many presents, though urged to receive them, has been said already.

Moreover, Demosthenes's banishment was infamous, upon conviction for bribery; Cicero's very honourable, for ridding his country of a set of villains. Therefore, when Demosthenes fled his country, no man regarded it; for Cicero's sake the senate changed their habit, and put or. mourning, and would not be persuaded to make any act before Cicero's return was decreed. Cicero, however, passed his exile idly in Macedonia. But the very exile of Demosthenes made up a great part of the services he did for his country: for he went through the cities of Greece, and everywhere, as we have said, joined in the conflict on behalf of the Grecians, driving out the Macedonian ambassadors, and approving himself a much better citizen than Themistocles and Alcibiades did in the like fortune. And, after his return, he again devoted himself to the same public service, and continued firm to his opposition to Antipater and the Macedonians. Whereas Laelius reproached Cicero in the senate for sitting silent when Caesar, a beardless youth, asked leave to come forward, contrary to the law, as a candidate for the consulship; and Brutus, in his epistles, charges him with nursing and rearing a greater and more heavy tyranny than that they had removed.

Finally, Cicero's death excites our pity; for an old man to be miserably carried up and down by his servants, flying and hiding himself from that death which was, in the course of nature, so near at hand; and yet at last to be murdered. Demosthenes, though he seemed at first a little to supplicate, yet, by his preparing and keeping the poison by him, demands our admiration; and still more admirable was his using it. When the temple of the god no longer afforded him a sanctuary, he took refuge, as it were, at a mightier altar, freeing himself from arms and soldiers, and laughing to scorn the cruelty of Antipater. (1070-72).

While Plutarch's comparison supplied a good deal of information about both orators, it is not simply expository. Plutarch used his point-by-point comparison to evaluate the relative personal and professional merits of the two famous orators. In other words, comparison is a way of making judgements, of writing criticism.

Shakespeare's sonnet 18 is an interesting exercise because it compares a person to a day in summertime:

> Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?
> Thou art more lovely and more temperate.
> Rough do shake the darling buds of May,
> And summer's lease hath **all** too short a date.
> Sometime too hot the eye of heaven shines.
> And often is his gold complexion **dimm'd;**
> And every fair from fair sometimes declines,
> By chance, or nature's changing course, untrimm'd;
> But thy eternal summer shall not fade,
> Nor lose possession of that fair thou ow'st,
> Nor shall Death brag thou **wander'st** in his shade,
> When in eternal lines to time thou grow'st.
>   So long as men can breathe or eyes can see.
> So long lives this, and this gives life to thee.

A day in summer may be fair, but it is short-lived. A loved one is equally fair, but she lives longer, and the loved one immortalized in this sonnet will live as long as people read the poem. Here again, an author used comparison to evaluate relative merits.

We often make comparisons in everyday discourse. Of two manufacturers of video/audio equipment, which produces the better product? Of all the things we might do on weekends, which is the most interesting? The most fun? When we vote, we are often asked to choose between two candidates. Which is the better of the two? Which the lesser? You can use Aphthonius's recommended pattern to compose comparisons that attempt to answer these questions or any questions like them.

Contemporary students are familiar with this exercise in its guise as the "essay of comparison." In fact, comparison may be one of the few ancient exercises that survives in school rhetoric. (Description may be another.) However, modern rhetoric teaches students to compose comparisons as noncontextualized exercises in exposition. Thus it misses an important point about the ancient exercise: comparisons are always persuasive, insofar as they praise someone or something by comparing it to a less praiseworthy person or thing.

CHARACTER

Aphthonius defined this difficult exercise as "an imitation of the character of a proposed person." In other words, students using this exercise were to construct a characterization of some fictional person. In modern schools,

this exercise, along with description and narration, is often taught by creative writers—persons who make their living writing poetry and fiction. But the ancients made no sharp distinctions among the composing skills required by rhetors, poets, historians, or novelists. Historians need to know how to depict character just as novelists and poets do. Furthermore, the establishment of a rhetor's character amounts to an important kind of proof in rhetoric.

Aphthonius divided characters into three kinds: *ethopoeia* ("to create character"), *prosopopoeia* ("to create a person"), and *eidolopoeia* ("to create an image or spirit"). In the first kind, students depict the character of some famous historical person by imagining the words that person might say to another. The exercise becomes *prosopopeia* when students imagine a fictional person within a scene and describe that too. The dramatic monologs composed by the English poet Robert Browning are skillful examples of this exercise. In the last kind of character, words are put into the mouth of someone who has died. Shakespeare displayed his skill at *eidolopoeia* when he composed the speeches made by the ghost of Hamlet's father.

In his version of the school exercises, Hermogenes taught that the compositions called "characters" could be either definite or indefinite. A definite character depicts specific persons, such as Andromache and Hector. The characters in novels—Emma Bovary, Holden Caulfield, Bigger Thomas—are usually definite depictions. But some genres of novels, such as westerns and romances, rely to some extent on stock characters—the retired gunfighter, the ruthless cattle baron, the poor but gutsy heroine, the mad monk. Hermogenes would have classed these as indefinite characters, with which the composer attempts to capture typical characteristics of a class of persons. (We have already met with this exercise in the chapter on *ethos,* where we quoted Theophrastus's characterization of a tactless person.) Hermogenes further classified characters as single or double. A single character depicts someone talking to himself, for example, "what a general might say on returning from a victory"; a double character represents another person or persons, as well, as in "what a general might say to his army after a victory."

Hermogenes also recommended that characterizations be appropriate to the persons and occasions being depicted: "For the speech of youth is not that of age, nor the speech of joy that of grief" (35). He pointed out that some characters depict a habit of mind while others depict a passing mood or emotion. In the former kind, the composer should provide details that indicate a person's general habits of mind and action; what, for example, would a farmer say when seeing a ship or the sea for the first time? In the latter sort of character, the composer should portray the effects of powerful emotions on someone: for example, in portraying Achilles' response to the death of Patroclus, the composer should try to depict the hero's rage, pain, and grief.

The chronology of a characterization may be important. Hermogenes suggested that composers "begin with the present because it is hard." (Epic poems conventionally begin in the present, or in medias res—in the middle

of things.) Then, Hermogenes said, the composer should "revert to the past because it has had much happiness; then make your transition to the future because what is to happen is much more impressive." Characters need not involve consideration of past, present, or future, of course; they may depict a single moment in time.

One way to indicate character is to create conversation that gives clues about a person's responses to situations. Ancient teachers asked their students to indicate character by imagining what famous people in history or fiction might say on a given occasion: What would Queen Hecuba have said about the fall of her city? What would Medea say as she was about to slaughter her children? Here is a character written by Plutarch, in which he imagined Cleopatra standing over Marc Antony's grave:

> There was a young man of distinction among Caesar's companions named Cornelius Dolabella. He was not without a certain tenderness for Cleopatra, and sent her word privately, as she had besought him to do, that Caesar was about to return through Syria, and that she and her children were to be sent on within three days. When she understood this, she made her request to Caesar that he would be pleased to permit her to make oblations to the departed Antony; which being granted, she ordered herself to be carried to the place where he was buried, and there, accompanied by her women, she embraced his tomb with tears in her eyes, and spoke in this manner: "O, dearest Antony," said she, "it is not long since that with these hands I buried you; then they were free, now I am a captive, and pay these last duties to you with a guard upon me, for fear that my just griefs and sorrows should impair my servile body, and make it less fit to appear in their triumph over you. No further offerings or libations expect from me; these are the last honours that Cleopatra can pay your memory, for she is to be hurried away far from you. Nothing could part us whilst we lived, but death seems to threaten to divide us. You, a Roman born, have found a grave in Egypt; I, an Egyptian, am to seek that favour, and none but that, in your country. But if the gods below, with whom you now are, either can or will do anything (since those above have betrayed us), suffer not your living wife to be abandoned; let me not be led in triumph to your shame, but hide me and bury me here with you, since, amongst all my bitter misfortunes, nothing has afflicted me like this brief time that I have lived away from you." (1151)

Plutarch uses a monologue to convey Cleopatra's character. In this short speech, we learn much about the nature of her relationship to Antony.

Probably the most famous example of *ethopoeia* in all of English literature is Hamlet's "To be or not to be" speech:

> To be, or not to be, that is the question—
> Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
> The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
> Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
> And by opposing end them. To die, to sleep—
> No more; and by a sleep to say we end
> The heart-ache, and the thousand natural shocks
> That flesh is heir to; 'tis a consummation
> Devoutly to be wished. To die, to sleep—

> To sleep, perchance to dream, ay there's the rub,
> For in that sleep of death what dream may come
> When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
> Must give us pause; there's the respect
> That makes calamity of so long life.
> For who would bear the whips and scorns of time,
> Th' oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely,
> The pangs of despised love, the law's delay,
> The insolence of office, and the spurns
> That patient merit of th' unworthy takes,
> When he himself might his quietus make
> With a bare bodkin? Who would fardels bear,
> To grunt and sweat under a weary life,
> But that the dread of something after death,
> The undiscovered country, from whose bourn
> No traveller returns, puzzle the will,
> And makes us rather bear those ills we have,
> Than fly to others that we know not of?
> Thus conscience does make cowards of us all,
> And thus the native hue of resolution
> Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
> And enterprises of great pitch and moment
> With this regard their currents turn awry,
> And lose the name of action *(Hamlet* III i 56-88).

Shakespeare used this speech to tell us a good deal about Hamlet's character. The ghost of Hamlet's father commanded the young prince to kill the person who murdered him, married the queen (who is Hamlet's mother), and usurped his throne. Despite all these provocations, Hamlet is unable to act. In this speech he considers committing suicide, but he can't bring himself to do this either, because of his characteristic inability to make decisions and his preference for philosophy over action.

Here is another well-known example of characterization from English literature—the opening chapter of Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice.* Notice how Austen portrays the characters of Mr. and Mrs. Bennett through conversation:

> It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife.
>
> However little known the feelings or views of such a man may be on his first entering a neighbourhood, this truth is so well fixed in the minds of the surrounding families, that he is considered as the rightful property of some one or other of their daughters.
>
> "My dear Mr. Bennet," said his lady to him one day, "have you heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?"
>
> Mr. Bennet replied that he had not.
>
> "But it is," returned she; "for Mrs. Long has just been here, and she told me all about it."
>
> Mr. Bennet made no answer.

"Do not you want to know who has taken it?" cried his wife impatiently. "You want to **tell** me, and I have no objection to hearing it." This was invitation enough.

"Why, my dear, you must know, Mrs. Long says that Netherfield is **taken** by a young man of large fortune from the north of England; that he came down on Monday in a chaise and four to see the place, arid was so much delighted with it that he agreed with Mr. Morris immediately; that he is to take possession before Michaelmas, and some of his servants are to be in the house by the end of next week."

"What is his name?"

"Bingley."

"Is he married or single?"

"Oh! single, my dear, to be sure! A single man of large fortune; four or five thousand a year. What a fine thing for our girls!"

"How so? how can it affect them?"

"My dear Mr. Bennet," replied his wife, "how can you be so tiresome! You must know that I am thinking of his marrying one of them." "Is that his design in settling here?"

"Design? nonsense, how can you talk so! But it is very likely that he may fall in love with one of them, and therefore you must visit him as soon as he comes."

"I see no occasion for that. You and the girls may go, or you may send them by themselves, which perhaps **will** be still better, for as you are as handsome as any of them, Mr. Bingley might like you the best of the party."

"My dear, you flatter me. I **certainly** have had my share of beauty, but I do not pretend to be any thing extraordinary now. When a woman has five grown up daughters, she ought to give over thinking of her own beauty."

"In such cases, a woman has not often much beauty to think of."

"But, my dear, you must indeed go and see Mr. Bingley when he comes into the neighbourhood."

"It is more than I engage for, I assure you."

"But consider your daughters. Only think what an establishment it would be for one of them. Sir William and Lady Lucas are determined to go, merely on that account, for in general you know they visit no new comers. Indeed you must go, for it will be impossible for us to visit him, if you do not."

"You are over scrupulous surely. I dare say Mr. Bingley will be very glad to see you; and I will send a few lines by you to assure him of my hearty consent to his marrying which ever he chuses of the girls; though I must throw in a good word for my little Lizzy."

"I desire you **will** do no such thing. Lizzy is not a bit better than the others; and I am sure she is not half so handsome as Jane, nor half so good humoured as Lydia. But you are always giving her the preference."

"They have none of them much to recommend them," replied he; "they are all silly and ignorant like other girls; but Lizzy has something more of a quickness than her sisters."

"Mr. Bennet, how can you abuse your own children in such a way? You take delight in vexing me. You have no compassion on my poor nerves."

"You mistake me, my dear. I have a high respect for your nerves. They are my old friends. I have heard you mention them with consideration these twenty years at least."

"Ah! you do not know what I suffer."

"But I hope you will get over it, and live to see many young men of four thousand a year come into the neighbourhood."

"It will be no use to us, if twenty such should come since you will not visit them."

"Depend upon it, my dear, that when there are twenty, I will visit them all."

Mr. Bennet was so odd a mixture of quick parts, sarcastic humour, reserve, and caprice, that the experience of three and twenty years had been insufficient to make his wife understand his character. Her mind was less difficult to develop. She was a woman of mean understanding, little information, and uncertain temper. When she was discontented she fancied herself nervous. The business of her life was to get her daughters married; its solace was visiting and news. (1-3)

Austen hardly needs to provide the summary of these two characters that concludes her chapter, for she has beautifully portrayed their characters, as well as their relationship, by means of a short dialogue.

Contemporary authors, particularly those who write serious fiction, prefer to indicate character by giving details about their characters' habits and preferences. For example, Ian Fleming characterized his famous hero, James Bond, by giving details about Bond's habits and tastes. Bond always introduced himself in laconic fashion: "The name is Bond. James Bond." He smoked Players' cigarettes, drove an Astin-Martin, and drank his martinis "shaken, not stirred." Similarly, in his novel *The Corrections,* Jonathan Franzen develops his character Enid (a Midwestern mother with grown children) by detailing her attachment to weddings:

In the pageantry of weddings Enid reliably experienced the paroxysmal love of *place—of* the Midwest in general and suburban St. Jude in **particular—that** for her was the only true patriotism and the only viable spirituality. Living under presidents as crooked as Nixon and stupid as Reagan and disgusting as Clinton, she'd lost interest in American flag-waving, and not one of the miracles she'd ever prayed to God for had come to pass; but at a Saturday wedding in the lilac season, from a pew of the Paradise Valley Presbyterian Church, she could look around and see two hundred nice people and not a single bad one. . . . Enid believed in matching and was happiest at a wedding where the bridesmaids suppressed their selfish individual desires and wore dresses that matched the corsages and cocktail napkins, the icing on the cake, and the ribbons on the party favors. She liked a ceremony at Chiltsville Methodist to be followed by a modest reception at the Chiltsville Sheraton. She liked a more elegant wedding at Paradise Valley Presbyterian to culminate in the clubhouse at **Deepmire,** where even the complimentary matches *(Dean & Trish ✳June 13, 1987)* matched the color scheme. Most important of all was that the bride and groom them-selves match: have similar backgrounds and ages and educations. (118-119)

By working through Enid's specific desires for local wedding ceremonies, Franzen reveals a character who abides by Protestant, middle-class values in her privilege of sameness.

Writers who wish to tackle the very difficult exercise of composing characters might begin by imitating successful characterizations composed by historians, novelists, or poets. You can imitate any of the passages

quoted here. It would also be interesting and useful to imitate the characterizations created by writers you admire and enjoy reading. How does your favorite novelist or historian depict habits of mind or action, physical appearance, responses to emotional situations? From imitation, you can graduate to creating original characters. Use Hermogenes' suggestions to depict the characters of friends or relatives or of famous people. Or try your hand at an indefinite characterization. Theophrastus's characters provide lots of models to imitate. You can also use the depictions of stock characters that appear in novels, or you can try to write a character of any of the many stock characters who appear in films.

DESCRIPTION

According to Aphthonius, a description "is an expository speech, distinctly presenting to view the thing being set forth." Hermogenes wrote that descriptions bring "before one's eyes what is to be shown." Descriptions can be written of people, actions (a battle), times (peace or war), places (harbors, seashores, cities), seasons (spring, summer, a holiday), and many other things. Both teachers chose their examples of descriptions from Homer: "He was round in the shoulders, bronzed, with thick curling hair"; "crooked was he and halt of one foot." The ancient authorities recommended that composers follow some order when writing descriptions: a description of a person, for example, should move from head to foot; descriptions of places should distinguish between the places themselves and their surroundings, A description of the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, DC, for example, might begin by describing the memorial itself; then it might move to the immediate surroundings—the people walking slowly past, the gifts left at on the sidewalk in front of the memorial; then it might move outward toward less immediate surroundings—the park, vendors selling war memorabilia, the Lincoln and Washington Monuments. Aphthonius recommended Thucydides' description of the harbor at Cheimerium as a good example of description because it locates the port precisely:

> The fleet sailed from Leucas, and, arriving at the mainland opposite Corcyra, came to anchor at Cheimerium in the country of Thesprotia. Cheimerium is a harbor; above it, at some distance from the sea, in that part of Thesprotia called Eleatis, lies the city of Ephyre, near which the Acherusian lake finds a way into the sea; the river Acheron, whence the name is derived, flows through Thesprotia and falls into the lake. Another river, the Thyamis, forms the boundary of Thesprotia and Cestrine, and the promontory of Cheimerium runs out between these two rivers. Here the Corinthians anchored and encamped. **(I, 46)**

Here is the Roman poet Virgil's description of the wintry land of Scythia:

> Far otherwise is it where dwell the tribes of Scythia by the waters of Maeotis, where the turbid Danube tosses his yellow sands, and where Rhodope bends

back, stretching up to the central pole. There they keep herds penned up in stalls, and no blade is seen upon the plain, or leaf upon the tree; but far and wide earth lies shapeless under mounds of snow and piles of ice, rising seven cubits high. 'Tis ever winter; ever North-west blasts, with icy breath. Then, too, never does the Sun scatter the pale mists, either when, borne on his chariot, he climbs high Heaven, or when he laves his headlong car in Ocean's crimson plain. Sudden ice-crusts form on the running stream, and anon the water bears on its surface iron-bound wheels-giving welcome once to ships, but now to broad wains! Everywhere brass splits, clothes freeze on the back, and with axes they cleave the liquid wine; whole lakes turn into a solid mass, and the rough icicle hardens on the unkempt beard. No less, meanwhile, does the snow fill the sky; the cattle perish, the oxen's great frames stand sheathed in frost, the deer in crowded herd are numb under the strange mass and above it scarce rise the tips of their horns. These they hunt not by unloosing hounds, or laying nets, or alarming with the terror of the crimson feather, but as their breasts vainly strain against that mountain rampart men slay them, steel in hand, cut them down bellowing piteously, and bear them home with loud shouts of joy. Themselves, in deep-dug caves, low in the earth, they live careless and at ease, rolling to the hearths heaps of logs, yea, whole elm-trees, and throwing them on the fire. Here they spend the night in play, and with ale ftlineand bitter service-juice joyously mimic draughts of wine. (Georgics **III** 349 ff).

Virgil made these scenes come to life by using plenty of vivid details.

Plutarch included a lush description of Cleopatra's barge in his life of Marc Antony:

She received several letters, both from Antony and from his friends, to summon her, but she took no account of these orders; and at last, as if in mockery of them, she came sailing up the river Cydnus, in a barge with gilded stern and outspread sails of purple, while oars of silver beat time to the music of flutes and fifes and harps. She herself lay all along under a canopy of cloth of gold, dressed as Venus in a picture, and beautiful young boys, like painted Cupids, stood on each side to fan her. Her maids were dressed like sea nymphs and graces, some steering at the rudder, some working at the ropes. The perfumes diffused themselves from the vessel to the shore, which was covered with multitudes, part following the galley up the river on either bank, part running out of the city to see the sight. The market-place was quite emptied, and Antony at last was left alone sitting upon the tribunal; while the word went through all the multitude, that Venus was come to feast with Bacchus, for the common good of Asia. (1118-1119)

Shakespeare imitated Plutarch's description of Cleopatra's ship in his play *Antony and Cleopatra:*

The barge she sat in, like a burnished throne,
Burned on the water; the poop was beaten gold,
Purple the sails, and so perfumed that
The winds were love-sick with them; the oars were silver,
Which to the tune of flutes kept stroke, and made
The water which they beat to follow faster,

As amorous of their strokes. For her own person,
It beggared all description: she did lie
In her pavilion, **cloth-of-gold,** of tissue,
O'er-picturing that Venus where we see
The fancy outwork nature. On each side her,
Stood pretty dimpled boys, like smiling Cupids,
With diverse colored fans, whose wind did seem
To glow the delicate cheeks which they did cool,
And what they undid did....
Her gentlewomen, like the Nereides,
So many mermaids, tended her i' th' **eyes,**
And made their bends adornings. At the helm,
A seeming mermaid steers. The silken tackle
Swell with the touches of those flower-soft hands,
That yarely frame the office. From the barge
A strange invisible perfume hits the sense
Of the adjacent wharfs. The city cast
Her people out upon her; and Antony,
Enthroned i' th' market place, did sit alone,
Whistling to th' air; which but for vacancy
Had gone to gaze on Cleopatra too,
And made a gap in nature. (II ii 192-233)

Any of these passages is suitable for imitation. Or try rendering the description of Cleopatra's barge into modern prose. (If you need further inspiration, the many films that have been made about Cleopatra usually include the scene of her triumphal entry into Rome on her golden ship.)

The ability to write vivid descriptions is still important, particularly in history and fiction. However, vivid descriptions are also persuasive, and so rhetors should know how to compose them as well (see our comments about *enargeia* in Chapter *7,* on *pathos).* We suggest that you begin by imitating passages of description in novels or essays that you admire. Then try your hand at composing descriptions of people, places, or things that are familiar to you.

THESIS

Aphthonius defined thesis as "a logical examination of any matter under consideration." We have met thesis before, in the chapter on stasis, and the school exercise is probably modeled on mature rhetors' use of the *staseis* in courtrooms and in legislative forums. In the context of the *progymnasmata,* however, a **thesis** is a composition that argues some general point. Ancient authorities distinguished **thesis** from hypothesis, which argues an issue in connection with a real person caught in real circumstances (such specific arguments are, of course, the province of forensic argument). The favorite ancient example of a thesis was "Should a person marry?" This question is a thesis because writers who use it must consider the benefits and disad-

vantages of marriage in general. The question whether Tom, Dick, or Mary ought to marry is a hypothesis. Aphthonius divided thesis into political and theoretical questions. Political questions "admit of an action that holds a city together; for example, whether one should marry, whether one should sail, whether one should build fortifications," Hermogenes added this example: "whether one should study rhetoric." In other words, political theses are questions that concern human activities.

Aphthonius distinguished this sort of thesis from theoretical theses, which "are considered by the mind alone; for example, whether heaven is spherical, whether there are many worlds." Cicero's Stoic Paradoxes are theoretical theses that explain and defend Stoic ethical beliefs such as "Only what is morally noble is good," and "Only the wise person is rich." Theoretical theses concern issues raised by philosophers, pure scientists, and theorists of all kinds.

Hermogenes and Quintilian both noted that an exercise in thesis may have a doubling or relative quality if in defending one side of an issue the writer must attack another. Quintilian mentioned the famous exercise in which a writer debates whether city life is to be preferred to country life as an example of the double or relative thesis (II iv 24). Other well-worn examples include the ancient debate about whether the active life was to be preferred to the contemplative life and whether soldiers are more worthy of merit than lawyers. Cicero composed an extended meditation on this thesis in his defense of Murena (9 ff). Cicero sometimes slipped into hypothesis in these passages, when he referred specifically to the lawyer Servius and the soldier Murena.

Since thesis is so much like actual argument, Aphthonius advised that theses display the standard arrangement and use of parts recommended for persuasive discourse in general (see the chapter on arrangement). Hermogenes disagreed about this, however. He pointed out that "theses are determined by the so-called final headings: justice, expediency, possibility, propriety." Hermogenes' final headings were drawn from the topics of invention. To use them in the thesis about marriage, a composer would show that marriage is just because married persons "make to life the contribution of life itself"; marriage is expedient because it brings "many consolations"; it is proper because married people must display calm dispositions; and soon.

Here is Aphthonius's example of a fully amplified thesis:

A THESIS: SHOULD ONE MARRY?

Let the one seeking to measure the entire question in a few words hold marriage in high esteem. For it came from heaven or, rather, it filled heaven with the gods and father was set up for them, whence originates the title of father. And having sired gods, marriage produced the natural powers to preserve them. Then, coming down to earth, it endowed all the other things with reproductive power. And bringing under its control those things that did not know how to be lasting, marriage cleverly devised the maintaining of them through their successors. First of all, it stirs men to bravery; it is through these [brave

men], since marriage knows how to produce children and wives over whom war is fought, that marriage adds bravery to its gifts. Further, it provides righteous men along with the brave; it is through these [righteous men], since men who are anxious about the things in which posterity takes pride do those things justly, that marriage produces righteous men at the same time as brave men. Nay more, it makes men wise whom it inspires to provide for the dearest ones. And by way of paradox, marriage knows how to supply self-control, and moderation is mingled with the pursuit of pleasures; it is through these [temperate men], since it adds convention to the pleasures, that marriage supplies the pleasures of moderation in support of the convention; and that which by itself is brought as an accusation against itself is admired [when joined] with marriage. If, therefore, marriage produces gods and, after them, each of their descendants in succession, if it provides brave and just men at the same time, and if it furnishes wise and temperate men, how ought one not to esteem marriage as much as possible?

Antithesis. "Yes," he says, "but marriage is a cause of misfortunes."

Solution. You seem to me to be making a charge against fortune, not against marriage. For fortune, not marriage, produces things that men who fare badly encounter, whereas the things that marriage contributes to humankind are not at all those contributed by a desire of gain from fortune. Therefore, it is better to marvel at marriage for the fine things it encompasses, rather than to criticize it for the evil things fortune brings forth. But if we do, indeed, assign the worst of man's misfortunes to marriage, why should one rather refrain from marriage? There are those difficulties that you ascribe to business; these things would not by any means exert an influence toward an escape from business, would they? And let me examine one by one the activities to [each of] which is attributed what you are perhaps charging. Thunderbolts afflict those farming, and hailstorms harass them. Yet a thunderbolt does not spoil the soil for husbandmen, nor do they flee the soil, but they continue tilling it, even if something coming down from the heavens causes damage. On the other hand, seafarers are unfortunate, and attacking storms buffet their ships. Yet they do not thereafter abandon sailing on account of those things that they have suffered in turn, but they attribute the misfortune to chance and they wait for the passage provided by the sea. Furthermore, struggles and battles destroy the lives of the combatants; still, they do not avoid battles because by fighting they will fall; instead, because those fighting are admired, they have become reconciled to death and they join in concealing the attendant drawback because of the associated benefit. For one should not flee from whatever good things there are because of bad attributes, but because of the good things one should endure the worst. Surely then, it is unreasonable that on one side farmers, sailors, and as many as are serving in the army besides, should endure the difficulties arrayed against them for the sake of the praises associated with these activities, but that on the other side we should look down upon marriage because it brings with it a degree of vexation.

Antithesis. "Yes," he says, "but it introduced widowhood for wives and orphanhood for children."

Solution. These are the evils of death, and nature is cognizant of the misfortune; you seem to me to be critical of marriage on the ground that it does not make men gods and to censure marriage because it has not included mortal

things for gods. Tell me, then, why do you criticize marriage for the things that death brings about? Why do you ascribe to weddings things such as those which nature [alone] understands? Grant that he who was born to die will die. Further, if men die because they have lived life's span and in dying bereave one dwelling in the same house and make an orphan of him, why will you say that marriage has finished off those things brought about by nature alone? I, on the contrary, hold that marriage corrects orphanhood and widowhood. To one a father is dead and thus a child is an orphan; but marriage brings in another father for the orphans, and this misfortune does not stem from marriage but is veiled completely by marriage, and marriage becomes the occasion of the disappearance of orphanhood, not the beginning of it. And so nature brought widowhood with death, but marriage effected a change with wedding songs. For marriage, as though standing guard over her gift, presents to a man in wedlock the one for whom death has accomplished a bereavement. For those things that it introduced from the first, it restores again when taken away; thus, marriage knows how to take away widowhood, not how to inflict it. Nay more, a father is deprived of children through death, but through the marriage he has a share of others. And he becomes a father for the second time who does not assent to being one but once. Why, therefore, do you pervert the fine things of marriage into a fault of marriage? Further, you seem to me not to be seeking to dishonor the wedding song but to be commending it. For by the very things you force us to enumerate as pleasures of the wedding songs, you have become an admirer, not an accuser of marriage, and you force us to be amazed at betrayers of marriage, and you make the accusations against marriage a list of good features.

   Antithesis. "Yes," he says, "but marriage is wearisome."

   Solution. And what is set up to halt drudgery like marriage? Whatever is some, through wedding songs it is taken away. Further, there is pleasure generally in coming together with a wife in intercourse. How pleasant it is for a man to go with a wife to the marriage bed! With how great pleasure is a child anticipated! And expected, does he appear! And having appeared, will he call a father! He is then started along his training with care and [soon] he is working with a **father** and addressing the people in the Assembly and taking care of a father; he becomes everything that it is necessary to be.

   Epilogue. It is impossible to cover in a speech the favors that marriage knows how to bestow. A mighty thing is marriage, both for producing gods and for granting to mortals for whom it devises a means of continuing life, that they seem to he gods. And it guides those needing strict rules, it urges a consideration of self-control, and it seeks after pleasures, as many as are obviously not worthy of blame. Wherefore, it is established among all that marriage should be reckoned of the greatest worth. (Matsen, Rollinson, and Sousa 284–286)

This thesis begins with an encomium to marriage. Then its author considers three topics: fortune, death, and boredom. Finally, the thesis concludes with another encomium listing other topics that might be considered.

   Students have composed theses ever since this exercise was invented sometime during the fifth or fourth century BCE. Exercises in thesis were called "themes" during the European Middle Ages and throughout the Renaissance, when the standard question debated in ancient theses was

sometimes turned into poetry: the first seventeen of Shakespeare's sonnets, for example, can be read as meditations on the advisability of marriage.

Papers written for university coursework are still sometimes called "themes," and thesis is a bit like the standard essay that students are asked to write in most American college composition courses. Indeed, one of the standard features of the modern college essay is the "thesis statement," a term that may owe its use to the ancient exercise. However, the ancient exercise differed substantially from the modern college essay because it was an exercise in the composition of persuasive discourse. The ancient exercise that is most like the modern college essay is probably the commonplace, since it is an exercise in exposition rather than persuasion. As Hermogenes pointed out, thesis differs from commonplace because commonplace deals with matters already settled while thesis "is an inquiry into a matter still in doubt." (The preceding paragraph, by the way, is a small exercise in comparison, complete with ancient testimony.)

INTRODUCTION OF LAW

The last, and most difficult, of the *progymnasmata* was called introduction of law. Quintilian wrote that "praise or denunciation of laws requires greater powers; indeed they should almost be equal to the most serious tasks of rhetoric" (II iv 33).

Students using this exercise defended or attacked existing laws. Aphthonius's example concerned an ancient law that required adulterers to be put to death on the spot. He argued that while the law rightly operated "against the crimes of adulterers," it was inexpedient because its provision for immediate punishment threatened the entire system of law. In other words, it allowed people to take the law into their own hands, as a character in a modern western might say.

Typically, according to Quintilian, this exercise centered on one of three issues: whether a law was clearly written and consistent with itself, whether it was just and expedient, and whether it could be enforced. The second of these two approaches is, clearly, the more interesting one, given that rhetors can use the topics of justice and expediency to elaborate on their positions. Aphthonius's example demonstrated that a law can be just (if it is just to punish adulterers) at the same time as it can be inexpedient, if it threatens an entire system of justice.

This difficult exercise is still practiced in modern schools of law. However, its practice should not be limited to persons who have a professional interest in making and enforcing laws. All persons who live in a community are subject to its laws, and hence they should be interested in arguments for and against them. This is as true for laws that affect individuals, like those recently passed in many states mandating stiffer penalties for conviction of drunken driving, as it is for laws that preserve the central tenets of American ideology, such as the First Amendment to the United States Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the

freedom of speech." Rhetors' lives are affected every day by the laws of their community and the people who interpret them. That is why the ancient exercise called introduction of law is still interesting and useful.

Aphthonius recommended that an introduction of law include considerations of these four topics: constitutionality, justice, expediency, and practicability. The composition should also include an introduction and should then state a counterargument as well. We composed an example of an introduction to law according to Aphthonius's instructions, and we imitated his introduction and conclusion where possible:

AN OPPOSITION OF A LAW THAT PERMITS PORNOGRAPHY

(Introduction): I support Americans' right to freedom of speech. On this occasion I will not interest myself in the many specific applications of this general law, save one: I do not approve of laws that define pornography as freedom of speech. Laws are only valid insofar as they have been carefully examined. So it is not unreasonable for me to examine the laws that protect pornography as a kind of free speech.

(Constitutionality and Consistency): The right to freedom of speech is enshrined in the laws of our country, indeed in the first and most important of those laws, the United State Constitution. Laws that define pornography as instances of free speech cannot be attacked on grounds of their unconstitutionality or their inconsistency, since they are consistent with the fundamental guarantee of freedom of speech to all Americans, a guarantee granted them by their Constitution.

(Justice): However, it is not just to protect pornography on the ground that it falls under the kinds of speech protected by the First Amendment. The people who profit from pornography are not the people who are photographed or recorded when pornography is produced. Laws that define pornography as free speech protect the freedom of speech of people who produce and profit from pornography; they do not necessarily protect the freedom of speech of the persons who perform it. Often the people who perform are children or animals, or they are people who have been coerced into performing. Consequently, their freedom of speech is not protected. There is no justice in this unequal application of the law.

(Expediency): It is not expedient to define pornography as freedom of speech. To include pornography under this head is to stretch the limits of free speech far past the limits envisioned by those who wrote the Bill of Rights, who were concerned primarily to protect the free expression of dissenting political and religious views. To stretch the definition of free speech to include pornography permits the unfettered dissemination of a kind of speech that is harmful to others. This is inexpedient, because it reduces our capacity to make useful distinctions among restrictions on speech that harm the community and those that serve it.

(Practicability): It is not practical to define pornography as freedom of speech. When pornography is so defined, it becomes impossible to enforce many other laws that are associated with its production: laws against forced prostitution, against kidnaping, against abuse of children or animals.

(*Conclusion*): The pornographer attains a wicked and complete extreme of premeditated wrongs against the community for his own profit. It follows that his activities should not be defined as activities protected by the first amendment. He should be prosecuted and convicted, and his fate should be made public, because if the punishment meted out to a pornographer escapes notice, he may leave behind many others of his ilk. For others will strive to emulate one for whose punishment they do not know the reasons, and the punishment will become, not the end, but the beginning of crime.

You may wish to imitate our sample introduction of law, perhaps defending another side of the issue.

For more difficult practice, you may wish to attack or defend other laws, large or small. Since the Bill of Rights was added to the U.S. Constitution in 1791, all of its amendments have been interpreted and reinterpreted as a result of court cases. Attorneys and judges have argued that in certain cases, observance of the amendments is neither just nor expedient. Here are the full texts of four amendments to the American constitution.

> Amendment I: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Many questions have been raised by cases appealing to this amendment: Is it just to interpret the use of prayer in public school as an abridgement of religious freedom? Is it expedient to ban prayer from public schools? Is it just to protect hate speech on the grounds that it is free speech? Does freedom of the press extend to the publication of information about the private habits of public figures? Is it expedient to restrict the press from publishing the names of rape victims?

> Amendment II: A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

People who oppose gun control appeal to the Second Amendment as their constitutional ground for doing so. Should the protection offered by this amendment include the possession of assault weapons? Can Congress or the states ban the possession of guns or impose limits on their distribution without violating this amendment?

> Amendment IV: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Fourth Amendment implies that people cannot be searched without proper procedures. Does this so-called right to privacy include persons who carry dangerous weapons in public places, such as airplanes? What about people who break laws in their homes, such as those who keep and deal

drugs? Is it just that they be protected from searches by authorities? Is it expedient? Recently, someone videotaped a couple who were making love in their home. They were not aware that they were being watched or taped. Did the person who made the tape violate the couple's Fourth Amendment rights? If so, was he justified in doing so? Was his act expedient?

> Amendment VIII: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

People who oppose capital punishment do so on the basis of the Eighth Amendment, because they define the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment. Is their position just? Is it expedient? Is it practical?

Try your hand at composing introductions to law that expound, defend, or attack some question raised by these amendments.

WORKS CITED

Alderman, Ellen, and Caroline Kennedy. *In Our Defense.* New York: Morrow, 1991.

Austen, Jane. *Pride and Prejudice.* 3rd ed. London: Oxford University Press, n.d.

Clark, Donald Lemon. *Rhetoric   and Poetry in the Renaissance: A Study of Rhetorical   Terms in English Renaissance Literary Criticism.* New York: Russell and Russell, 1963.

Henry Davidoff, ed. *The Pocket Book of Quotations.* New York: Pocket Books, 1952.

de la Fontaine, Jean. *Fables of La Fontaine.* Translated by Elizur Wright. London, Q 1896.

Erasmus, Desiderius. *De Copia.* In *Collected Works of Erasmus,* Vol 2. Edited by Craig R. Thompson. Toronto: University of Press Toronto, 1978.

Franzen, Jonathan. *The Corrections.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001.

Matsen, Patricia, Philip Rollinson, and Marion Sousa. *Readings from Classical Rhetoric.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990.

Murphy, James J. "Roman Writing Instruction as Described by Quintilian." In *A Short History of Writing Instruction: From Ancient Greece to Twentieth-Century America.* Edited by James J. Murply. Davis, Calif.: Hermagoras Press, 1990.

Nadeau, Ray. "The *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius in Translation," *Speech Monographs* 19: 4 (November 1952): 252-84.

Plutarch. *Plutarch's Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans.* Translated by John Dryden and revised by Arthur Hugh Clough. New York: Random House, 1932.

GLOSSARY

accumulation a figure wherein a rhetor gathers scattered points and lists them together.

active voice a grammatical construction available in English, in which the grammatical subject is the actor in a sentence.

allegory (AL a gor ee) an extended metaphor.

ambiguous case (am BIG you us) case that is partly honorable, partly dishonorable in the eyes of an audience; or a case wherein the audience is not sure of the rhetor's position.

amplification the ancient art of saying a great deal about very little.

anadiplosis (a na di PLO sis) a figure wherein the last word of a phrase, clause, or sentence is used to begin the next phrase, clause, or sentence.

analogy (an AL o gee) a comparison, either of particulars or of relations; also, a proof developed by Aristotle wherein a rhetor compares one hypothetical example **to** another.

analysis a kind of definition; analytic definition divides the term to be defined into parts and lists all of these.

anaphora (a NAF o ra) a figure wherein the same word is repeated at the beginning of several successive phrases, clauses, or sentences.

antanaclasis (an tan ACK la sis) a figure wherein a word is used in at least two different senses.

anticipation a general name for figures wherein a rhetor foresees and replies to objections.

antihimera (an tee HI mer a) a figure wherein one part of speech is used as another.

antimetabole (an tee ma TAB oh lee) a figure that expresses contrasting ideas in juxtaposed structures; also called **chiasmus**.

antistrophe (an TIS troe fee) a figure wherein the same or similar words are repeated in successive phrases or clauses.

antithesis (an TITH a sis) a figure wherein contrary ideas are expressed in grammatically parallel structures.

antonomasia (an toe no MAS ya) a trope wherein a rhetor substitutes a descriptive phrase for someone's name.

apostrophe (a PAWS tro fee) a figure wherein a rhetor addresses some absent person; also, a mark of punctuation that signals possession or omission.

appendix additional material included at the back of a book.

apposition any phrase that interrupts a period to modify or comment on it.

argument in this book, a rhetorical situation in which the people who are involved disagree about something; also used here as an equivalent term for proof.

arrangement the second canon of rhetoric; concerns the selection and ordering of parts in a discourse.

art   any set of productive principles or practices.

artificial memory   the ancient term for a memory that has been carefully trained to increase its potential.

asyndeton   (ah SYN da tun) a figure wherein normal connectors between words (usually "and") are eliminated.

atechnoi   (AY tek noy) Greek term meaning without art or skill.

audience   any persons designated by a rhetor as hearers or readers of a discourse.

authorities   any persons or sources called upon by a rhetor to support his or her arguments.

BCE   abbreviation for "before the Common Era." In the Western calendar, indicates years prior to the year 1. Years BCE are counted backwards, as in "323 BCE, 322 BCE."

bibliography   (bib lee OG ra phee) a list of the works used to compose a discourse, usually appearing at the end of the discourse.

bound periodical   older issues of journals or newspapers bound together into a book, usually according to year of issue.

call number   the number used by libraries to identify books and other materials; printed on the cover and an inside page.

canon   ancient term for a division or part of the art of rhetoric.

card catalogue   drawers containing cards that list all the books and other materials kept in a library; usually found in the library's reference room.

case   a rhetor's proposition and proofs developed for use in a specific rhetorical situation.

catachresis   (kat a KREE sis) a trope wherein a rhetor intentionally substitutes a like or inexact word in place of the correct one.

cause to effect   any argument that reasons from causes to effects or vice versa; an ancient sophistic topic.

CE   abbreviation for Common Era. In the Western calendar, indicates years since the year 1.

character   a rhetor's habitual way of life or reputation in the relevant community; ethos; also an elementary exercise, or *progymnasmata.*

chiasmus   a figure that expresses contrasting ideas in juxtaposed structures; also called **antimetabole.**

chreia   (KRAY ya) an elementary exercise, or *progymnasmata,* in which the rhetor elaborates on a famous event or saying.

circumlocution   literally, speaking around; a figure wherein a rhetor avoids naming an unsavory issue or term.

class   Latin *genus;* a group, kind, sort.

classification   a sophistic topic wherein items are grouped under a single general head.

climax   a figure in which terms or phrases are arranged in order from least to most important.

colon   ancient term for meaningful phrase that was shorter than a sentence but longer than a comma.

comma   ancient term for short phrase; in modern English, punctuation that marks an internal pause in a sentence.

commonplace   any statement or bit of knowledge that is commonly shared among a given audience or a community; also, an elementary exercise, or *progymnasmata.*

commonplace book   a notebook kept by a rhetor as a storehouse of materials to be remembered or quoted.

common topics   means of invention developed by Aristotle that are useful for developing arguments on any issue or in any field of discourse; they are conjecture, degree, and possibility.

community authority any person who is judged as an expert or is qualified to offer testimony based on a good reputation in the relevant community.

comparison   in the sophistic topic called comparison, rhetors place two similar items together and examine their similarities; also, an elementary exercise or *progymnasmata.*

complex sentence   a sentence that contains at least one independent colon and one dependent colon.

compound sentence   a sentence that contains at least two independent colons.

compound-complex sentence   a sentence that contains at least two independent colons and at least one dependent colon.

concession   a figure wherein a rhetor concedes a disputed point or leaves a disputed point to the audience to decide.

conclusion   modern term for the peroration, or final part of a discourse.

confirmation   the part of a discourse that elaborates arguments in support of a rhetor's position.

conjecture   in stasis theory or in Aristotle's topical theory of invention, any issue or topic that considers a proposed state of affairs.

context   the words and sentences that surround any part of a discourse and help to determine its meaning; also, the rhetorical situation and background of an issue that help to determine the meaning of any text.

contraries   a sophistic topic wherein a rhetor compares unlike items, situations, or events.

contrast   a sophistic topic wherein a rhetor compares opposites.

copia   (KO pee ya) abundant and ready supply of language; arguments or figures available for use on any occasion.

copying   an ancient exercise used to enhance *copia.*

correction   a figure wherein a rhetor replaces a word or phrase with a more correct one.

correctness rules   standards of grammar and usage drawn from traditional grammar.

current periodical   any recent issue of a periodical.

cultural memory   a type of collective memory stemming from shared cultural experiences, historical events, educational practices, or social customs.

data   a type of proof based on the evidence of the senses, or empirical proof; also includes statistics.

database   a computer program that accesses information.

declamation   (deck la MAY shun) an art of debating practiced by Roman rhetors and students.

deduction   an ancient means of invention; a method of reasoning wherein a conclusion is derived from comparison of general to particular premises.

definite issue   Greek hypothesis (hy POTH a sis); an issue involving specific persons, places, events, or things.

definition   in stasis theory, any issue that considers how something should be defined or classified; also, a sophistic topic that sets limits to a term.

degree   a common topic that requires rhetors to approach an issue with comparative questions of size, magnitude, and value.

delivery the fifth canon of rhetoric; concerns use of voice and gesture in oral discourse or editing, formatting, and presentation in written discourse.

description   one of the elementary exercises, or *progymnasmata;* discusses attributes or appearance of something or someone.

dialectic   a heuristic that proceeds by question and answer.

differences   in the sophistic topic of definition, a list of ways in which the term to be defined differs from other members of its designated class; also, a sophistic topic that generates a list of ways in which similar items differ.

difficult case   a case that is not honorable or to which an audience is hostile.

distance   a metaphor for the discursive relation obtaining between rhetor and audience; see **rhetorical distance**.

distribution   a figure wherein a rhetor divides a whole into parts and assigns each part to a different field.

division   a sophistic topic that separates out and lists the parts of any whole; also, a figure that does the same.

editing   stage of composing wherein the rhetor corrects errors and makes sure discourse conforms to conventions of formatting and presentation.

eidolopoeia   (eye doe low PO ee ya) an exercise wherein the character of a spirit or an image is depicted.

empirical proof   proof derived from the senses.

enargeia   (en AR gay uh) figure in which rhetor creates a vivid scene.

encomium   a discourse that praises someone or something.

energia   (en ERG ya) a Greek term meaning to energize or actualize.

entechnoi   (EN tek noy) Greek term meaning within or embodied in an art.

enthymeme   (EN thee meem) a means of proof within which the rhetor places probable premises together in order to establish a probable conclusion.

enumeration   a means of definition that lists relevant attributes or parts of the term to be defined.

epanaphora   (ep an AF o rah) a figure wherein a rhetor repeats words at the beginning of successive colons; the repeated words are used in different senses.

epideictic   (eh pi DIKE tick) one of Aristotle's major divisions of rhetoric oratory that praises or blames.

epiphora   (eh PYF o rah) a figure wherein a rhetor repeats the last word in successive clauses.

epistemology   (eh pis tern OL o gee) any theory of how people know; any theory of knowledge.

epithet   a figure in which a rhetor calls someone a name.

ethical proof   proof that depends upon the good character or reputation of a rhetor.

ethics   any set of guides or standards for human conduct.

ethopoeia   (ee tho PO ee ya) character portrayal; Greek term for discourse that creates a character; also, an ancient exercise wherein rhetors invented a set of traits to describe a kind of person.

ethos   the character or reputation of a rhetor.

etymological definition   a definition that supplies a history of a term to be defined.

etymology   the history of a word.

example   a specific instance; a particular; one member of a class; also, a rhetorical proof developed by Aristotle.

exigence   the force or impetus in a rhetorical situation that gives rise to use or practice of rhetoric

exordium   (ex OR di yum) Latin term for the first part of a discourse.

expediency   an ancient topic of value; considers whether a course of action is useful, efficient, or suited to the circumstances.

extended example   a fully developed rhetorical example.

extrinsic proof   proof that is available within the circumstances of the case; does not have to be invented.

fable   a fictional story meant to teach a moral lesson.

facts   bits of knowledge derived from sensory perception; also, bits of knowledge agreed to by all concerned parties.

fictional example   a rhetorical example drawn from a tale, fable, short story, or novel.

figure   generic term for artful uses of language.

figure of language   any artful patterning or arrangement of language.

figure of thought   Greek *sententia* (sen TEN shya); any artful presentation of ideas, feelings, concepts; figures of thought that depart from the ordinary patterns of argument (also called figure of speech).

foreword   a discourse that introduces another discourse.

format   conventional means of presentation; includes spacing, margins, and headers.

general issue   Greek *thesis;* in stasis theory, an indefinite issue.

general/specific relations   an ancient method of reasoning that treats whatever is under investigation as a class composed of specifics or particulars.

generalization   any statement about a group or class.

genus   (GEE nus) the Latin word for class; a group or kind.

genus/species   an ancient mode of definition.

gesture   a persuasive facial or bodily movement; part of delivery.

glossary   a list of terms used in a discourse; supplies definitions (and sometimes pronunciations) of technical or specialized terms.

goodness   an ancient common topic of degree.

grammatical person   a grammatical feature of English that indicates who is speaking or writing, and/or the relation of the user to hearers/readers and/or issues; there are three grammatical persons in English.

greater/lesser   a common topic developed by Aristotle; here called "degree."

hesitation   (also indecision or *dubatio)* a figure wherein a rhetor pretends to be unable to decide what to say or write.

heuristic   (hyur IS tick) any system of investigation.

homoioteleuton   (home ee o TEL you ton) a figure wherein a rhetor repeats words with similar endings.

homonym   (HOM i nim) words that sound the same but that have different meanings.

honor   an ancient common topic of degree.

honorable case   a case that is respected by the audience.

honorific language   language that respects or glorifies.

hyperbaton   (high PER ba tun) a figure in which language takes a sudden turn; usually an interruption; also, a trope that transposes a term to somewhere other than its usual place.

hyperbole   (high PER bo lee) exaggeration.

hypophora   (high POF o rah) a figure wherein a rhetor asks what can be said in favor of the opponents.

hypothesis   (high PAH tha sis) in stasis theory, a specific issue.

ideologic   chain of reasoning by commonplaces that makes up ideological arguments and positions

identification   an ideal rhetorical situation in which an audience feels close to a rhetor.

ideology   any body of beliefs, doctrines, values held by a single individual or by a group or a culture.

imitation   an ancient rhetorical exercise wherein students copied and elaborated on the work of revered or admired authors.

indefinite issue   Greek *thesis;* in stasis theory, an issue or question that is general or abstract.

index   list of important names or topics in a discourse, with page numbers; appears at end of discourse.

induction   an ancient method of invention; a rhetor collects a number of instances and forms a generalization that is meant to apply to all instances.

insinuation   the introduction to a difficult case.

instance   an example or particular.

interest   the reason or reasons why someone takes a given position on an issue; these may be ideological or unconscious

intrinsic ethos   proofs from character that are invented by a rhetor or are available by virtue of the rhetor's position on an issue.

intrinsic proof   argument generated through use of the art of rhetoric.

introduction   the first part of a discourse, called **exordium** in ancient rhetorics.

introduction of law   the last and most difficult of the elementary exercises, or *progymnasmata.*

invective   a discourse that casts blame on somebody or something.

invented ethos   proofs from character that are invented by a rhetor or are available by virtue of the rhetor's position on an issue.

invented proof   any proof discovered through use of the principles of rhetoric.

invention   the first of the five canons of rhetoric; the art of finding available arguments in any situation.

irony   (EYE ron ee) a trope in which an audience understands the opposite of what is being expressed.

isocolon   Greek term for grammatically balanced phrases or clauses.

issue   matter about which there is dispute; point about which all parties agree to disagree.

justice   an ancient common topic.

kairos   (KY ross) Greek term meaning the right time, opportunity, occasion, or season.

lines of argument   related issues and proofs that open up when rhetorical situation is systematically investigated

litotes   (LIE toe tees) a figure in which the rhetor understates the situation.

logical proof   an argument found in the issue or the case.

logos   (LO gose) in archaic Greek, speech, voice, breath, or even spirit; in Aristotle's rhetoric, any arguments found in the issue or the case.

loose sentence   a sentence whose word order follows the word order of whatever language it is expressed in; phrases and clauses are tacked on haphazardly.

major premise   the first statement in an enthymeme; a general statement about probable human action.

maxim   a familiar saying; a bit of community wisdom.

mean case   a case in which the audience regards the rhetor or the issue as unimportant or uninteresting.

member   a phrase or clause; in ancient rhetoric, any part of a sentence.

memory   the fourth canon of rhetoric.

memory places   invented mental categories used to store information and images of an artificial memory.

metabasis   (meh TAB a sis) a summarizing transition.

metaphor   (MET a for) a trope wherein one word is substituted for **another.**

metonymy   (me TAH na **mee)** a trope wherein something is named by words frequently associated with it.

microforms   written materials that have been photographed and reduced in size; libraries use microforms to reduce the space taken up by printed documents. There are two kinds of microforms: film, which is stored on a reel like video or movie film; and fiche, which is stored on a flat surface.

minor premise   a statement in an **enthymeme** that names a particular instance.

narrative   the second part of a discourse; it states the issue and may supply a history of the issue.

neologism   (knee OL o jism) a new or coined word or phrase.

network of interpretation   any interpretive framework used to make sense of an array of data or knowledge; **ideology.**

obscure case   a case that is unclear to the audience.

onomatopoeia   (on o ma to PO ee ya) a trope that uses words to suggest sounds.

oxymoron   (oks ZIM o ron) a figure wherein unlike or opposite terms are used together.

paradox   (PAIR a docks) a figure wherein a rhetor raises expectations then mentions trivia; also, any seemingly self-contradictory statement.

paralepsis   (pair a LEP sis) a figure wherein a rhetor refuses to mention something, all the while doing so.

parallel case   an argument that treats two or more instances as similar.

parallelism   a figure wherein similar grammatical constructions house different words.

paraphrase   imitation with elaboration; imitating sense of a discourse in words other than those used by original author; an ancient rhetorical exercise.

paratactic style   (pair a TACK tick) a string of loose sentences.

parenthesis   a figure in which the rhetor interrupts the train of thought; in modern English, punctuation that has the same function.

paronomasia   (pare oh no MAZ ee ya) pun; words or phrases sound alike but have different meanings; often the juxtaposition is funny.

parrhesia   (pah REEZ ya) frankness of speech.

particular   a single item or a member of a class.

partition   the third part of a discourse; divides the issue into relevant areas.

passive voice   a grammatical structure available in English wherein the grammatical subject of the sentence is not the actor.

past/future fact   a common topic developed by Aristotle; here called **conjecture**.

pathetic proof   proof that appeals to the emotions or motives of an audience.

pathos   (PAY those) Greek term for emotions or passions.

pejorative language   language that disparages or downplays.

period   Greek term for the sentence; in modern English, the punctuation that marks the termination of declarative sentences.

periodical   magazines, journals, or books issued regularly and published under the same name over a period of time.

periodic sentence   sentence with obvious structure; meaning is distributed among several members or saved until last.

periphrasis   (pair i FRAA sis) trope wherein the rhetor substitutes other words for the term under discussion.

peroration   the final part of a discourse; may summarize, arouse emotions, or enhance rhetor's ethos.

persona   (per SO nah) Latin term used by Cicero for **ethos.**

personification   a figure that attributes the qualities of living things to things that are not alive, at least in the conventional sense.

phrase   a short string of words; equivalent to the Greek comma.

policy   the fourth stasis; investigates possible actions in a given situation

polysyndeton   (pol ly SIN dee tun) a figure wherein the rhetor inserts all possible connectors between words, phrases, or sentences.

possibility   a common topic.

possible/impossible   common topic developed by Aristotle; here called possibility.

power relation   the social, economic, or ethical relationship that obtains between a rhetor and an audience.

practical issue   in stasis theory, an issue having to do with human action.

preface   a discourse that may introduce a book, an author's methods and rationale; appears at beginning.

premise   a statement laid down, supposed, or assumed before an argument begins.

presentation   how a manuscript looks; depends on width of margins, use of headers, and the like.

probability   a statement about what people are likely to do.

procedure   in stasis theory, any issue that considers how people ought to proceed.

progymnasmata   (pro ghim NAS ma ta) the elementary rhetorical exercises used in ancient schools of rhetoric.

prooemium   (pro EEM ee *yum)* Greek term for the exordium or first part of any discourse.

proof   any statement or statements used to persuade an audience to accept a proposition; also, the section of a discourse where arguments are assembled; in this book, used interchangeably with **argument.**

proposition   any arguable statement put forward for discussion by a rhetor.

prosopopoeia   (prose oh POE ee ya) an exercise wherein the character of a fic tional person is depicted.

proverb   any well-known saying; a bit of community wisdom.

proximate authority   someone who is in a position to offer testimony because of having been close to the events in question.

pun   artful and sometimes funny **synonomy.**

punctuation   graphic marks used to represent features of spoken language in writing.

qualifier   word in English that mitigates the force of other words.

quality   in stasis theory, any issue that considers values.

reasoning   Aristotle's term for deduction; here, any method of comparing statements in order to draw conclusions.

reasoning by contraries   a figure wherein a rhetor uses one of two opposing statements to prove the other.

reasoning by question and answer   a figure wherein a rhetor inserts a question between successive affirmative statements.

refutation   the part of a discourse wherein a rhetor anticipates opposing arguments and answers them.

representative theory of language   theory of language that assumes language is transparent-that it allows meaning to shine through it clearly and without distortion.

rhetor   (RAY tor in Greek; REH ter in English) anyone who composes discourse that is intended to affect community thinking or events.

rhetoric   (REH ter ick) the art that helps people compose effective discourse.

rhetorical distance   metaphor for the degree of physical and social distance created between a rhetor and an audience by creation of an *ethos.*

rhetorical question   a figure wherein rhetors ask questions to which they and the audience already know the answers.

rhetorical situation   the context of a rhetorical act; minimally made up of a rhetor, an issue, and an audience.

rhetorician   (reh to RISH an) someone who studies or teaches the art of rhetoric.

scheme   generic term for artful use of language.

sensus communis   (SEN sus co MUNE is) Latin phrase for common knowledge shared among members of a community.

sentence composition   in ancient rhetorics, the artful construction of sentences.

sign   facts or events that usually or always accompany other facts or events.

similarity   a relation between items that emphasizes their likenesses or resemblances.

simile   (SIM i lee) a figure wherein two unlike items are compared.

simple sentence   a sentence that has one independent clause and no other clauses.

situated ethos   proof from character that depends on a rhetor's reputation in the relevant community.

sophist   (SOF ist) in ancient times, name given to any rhetor who taught by example; when capitalized, refers to any of a group of rhetoric teachers who worked in and around Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE; in modern English, term for a **rhetor** who may use fallacious or tricky arguments.

sophistic topics   sources of arguments that depend on regular patterns or arrangements of material.

sophistry   (SOF ist ree) term applied to the rhetorical theory and practice of the Older Sophists; in modern times names tricky or fallacious rhetorical practices.

special topics   a means of invention developed by Aristotle; arguments drawn from specific arts such as politics or **ethics**.

species   Greek term for an example, an instance, or a **particular**.

species/genus   an ancient method of definition.

specific issue   in stasis theory, an issue that deals with **a** particular or individual.

stacks   shelves in a library where books are **stored**.

staseis   (STAS ay is) Greek term for issues.

stasis   (STASE is) a stand; place where opponents agree to **disagree**.

stasis theory   theory of invention developed by **Hermagoras** of **Temnos**.

style   the fourth canon of rhetoric; has to do with sentence composition and the use of **ornament**.

style sheet   list of editing conventions used by a specific professional **group**.

suspension   a figure wherein a rhetor raises expectations.

syllogism   (SILL o jiz **im)** name for a deductive argument in logic.

symploke   (SIM **plo** key) a figure that combines *epanaphora* and *epiphora.*

synecdoche   (sin ECK doe key) a trope wherein **a** part of the whole is referred to as though it were the **whole**.

synonymy   (sin ON o **mee)** a figure wherein a rhetor uses similar words as means of repetition.

table of contents   page or pages that list chapter headings or subtitles in a book or journal.

tale   a short narrative; an ancient elementary exercise or *progymnasmata.*

techne   (TEK nay) Greek term for an art; any set of productive principles or practices.

testimony   a person's account of an event or state of affairs.

theoretical issue in stasis theory,   any wide-ranging philosophical issue not involved with specific human actions.

thesis   (THEE sis) in stasis theory, a general or indefinite issue; also, an elementary exercise or *progymnasmata.*

title page   the page of a book that gives its title and author's name.

topic   Greek term for a commonplace; literally, place where arguments are located.

traditional grammar   artificial grammar imposed on English in eighteenth century CE; observes grammatical rules borrowed from Latin; treated as grammatical standard by some.

transition   any word or phrase that connects pieces of discourse.

translation   ancient rhetorical exercise wherein rhetors translated discourse from one language or dialect to another.

trivial case   a case wherein an audience is not convinced that the issue is important or the rhetor worth paying attention to.

trope   any artful substitution of one term for another.

understatement   figure in which a rhetor deliberately makes a situation seem less important or serious than it is.

usage   customary ways of using language.

value   anything that is deemed desirable or worthy by a community.

verb tense   grammatical feature of English that identifies time of action, such as present, past, or future.

verb voice   grammatical feature of English that allows user to identify the grammatical subject with an actor in the sentence (active voice) or to substi tute some other word in the grammatical subject position (passive voice).

visual rhetoric   a burgeoning branch of rhetorical studies that considers images as rhetorical in the way they function to persuade, whether alongside words and on their own as images.

voice   persuasive use of loudness and tone of voice.

volume number   number given to all issues of a periodical published during a given span of time, usually one year.

whole/part relation   an ancient method of reasoning that treats whatever is under investigation as a whole that can be divided into parts.

word size   feature of English that influences **rhetorical distance.**

zeugma   (ZOOG mah) figure wherein the same word is used in different senses in grammatically similar constructions.

APPENDIX A

A CALENDAR OF ANCIENT RHETORICS

The Greek calendar began with the year 776 BCE, legendary date of the first
Olympic games; the yearly calendar was based on the movements of the
sun and the moon, but varied greatly from city to city. The Athenian year
began in the day of the first full moon after the Spring solstice of June 21.

3000-1100 BCE	**Greek Bronze Age**
2000	First Greek-speaking tribes enter Greece
1900-1400	Minoan civilization in Crete
1700-1100	Mycenean civilization created on mainland by Achaeans
1250	Citadel centers at Mycenae, Argos, Tiryns, **Pylos;** war waged on Troy
1200-1100	A second group of **tribes—Dorians—enters** Greece and destroys Mycenean civilization; many Achaeans emigrate to Asia Minor
1100–800BCE	**Greek Dark Age**
	Mycenean palace culture broken up; strong kingdoms fragmented; writing is forgotten
800-500 BCE	**Archaic Period**
	Around 800 Renaissance begins, blending of Dorian, Achaean, Cretan, and near Eastern elements; a new alphabet appears
	Greek city states assume new political and cultural dimensions under aristocrats, lawgivers, and tyrants
	Homeric poems written down
776	First Olympic games
500-323 BCE	**Classical Period**
427	Gorgias arrives in Athens
392	Isocrates opens his school
370-360	Plato composes *Phaedrus*
335-323	Aristotle composes the *Rhetoric*
323-37 BCE	**Hellenistic Period**
ca.84	*ad Herennium* composed
90 **BCE–450** CE	**Roman Period**
89-85 BCE	Cicero composes *De Inventione*
54 BCE	Cicero composes *De Oratore*
27 BCE	Empire established
ca. 94 CE	Quintilian publishes the *Institutes*
426–427 CE	Augustine finishes *De Doctrina Christiana*

Appendix B

Archaic Rhetoric

ca. 1250 BCE: battle of Troy

ca. 1150–850 BCE: Homer composes the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey;* ancient rhetoricians thought that the speeches in these poems demonstrated the great antiquity of rhetoric

Greek Rhetoric in the Classical Period (500-323 BCE)

494–434: Empedocles, a teacher, scientist and magician, may have been a teacher of the sophist Gorgias. Some authorities say he invented rhetoric.

490–429: Pericles, a great statesman and orator, participates in the formation of direct democracy at Athens; everybody who is anybody is a member of his circle, including the famous woman rhetorician, Aspasia, and wealthy, ambitious young men like Alcibiades.

470–450: Corax/Tisias practice rhetoric in Sicilian capital of Syracuse; both apparently wrote *techne,* or arts of rhetoric, that are now lost. These may have been collections of sample arguments, introductions, and conclusions. Some authorities say that Gorgias studied with Tisias.

460-400: Thucydides writes his great history of the Peloponnesian War, which contains many speeches that demonstrate his knowledge of rhetoric.

The Older Sophists

483–375: Gorgias of Leontini, a teacher and theorist of rhetoric, arrives in Athens in 427 as an ambassador from Sicily and takes the Greek city by storm with his fiery displays of stylistic elegance. Like Protagoras, Gorgias was a philosophical skeptic, more interested in ethics, rhetoric, and politics than in metaphysics. We have two entire speeches ("Helen" and "Palamedes") and several fragments of his work. See also Plato's dialogue *Gorgias,* where the sophist is made to look like an unethical fool.

481–411: Protagoras authors the famous phrase "Man is the measure of all things," which some contemporary scholars take to mean that Protagoras scorned the metaphysical speculations of the preSocratic

441

philosophers and perhaps of Plato, as well. He apparently contributed the notion of *dissoi logoi* to sophistic rhetoric, the notion that competing or contradictory statements can be made about any issue. We have only a few fragments of his work, plus the unflattering portrait of him that appears in Plato's dialogue *Protagoras.*

470-399: Socrates is an itinerant teacher and the famous interlocuter in Plato's *Dialogues.* Although modern philosophers might be shocked to find Socrates in a list of Sophists, some contemporary scholars think that he should be included here as being responsible for an inventional scheme called eristic. Socrates was condemned to death in 399 for corrupting the youth of Athens.

436–338: Isocrates founds a very successful school of rhetoric in Athens that competed for students with Plato's Academy. He apparently wrote no systematic treatise on rhetorical theory, but many of his complete orations have been preserved, indicating that people have thought them worth reading ever since his own time. Since he had weak vocal cords, Isocrates did not practice rhetoric for very long, but he was a capable writer of speeches for others—that is, he was a *logographer,* or ghostwriter.

Other persons sometimes classed as Older Sophists are Antiphon, Hippias of Elis, Prodicus of Ceos, and Thrasymachus.

A Handbook

ca. 341: Anaximines (?) writes a textbook called the *Rhetoric to Alexander (Rhetorica ad Alexandrum).* The work was given this title because its author pretended to be Aristotle writing a textbook on rhetoric for his student, Alexander the Great. Its importance is that it probably represents the typical instruction given to students by fourth-century sophistic teachers.

Academic and Peripatetic Rhetorics

420-348: Plato develops an anti-Sophistic theory of rhetoric (chiefly in the dialogue *Phaedrus),* which posits that rhetoricians must know the truth before they speak, must be able to separate true knowledge from opinion, must know the souls of humans, must be able to define and divide topics for discussion, and must be able to develop orderly principles of arrangement. In other words, he turns rhetoric into philosophy.

384-322: Aristotle contributes a very full and systematic theory of invention to the history of rhetoric in his *On Rhetoric.* Aside from this text, Aristotle apparently wrote an early treatise on rhetoric, the *Gryllus* (which is now lost), and collected treatises by other teachers into the *Synagoge Technon,* also now lost but known to Cicero, who consulted it to write the history of rhetoric contained in his *Brutus.*

Famous Greek Rhetors of the Classical Era

384-322: Demosthenes, the exact contemporary of Aristotle, is acknowledged by all classical authorities to be the greatest of the Greek rhetors. He is best known now for his clash with Aeschines, which is preserved for us in the speeches *On the Crown,* During Roman times, scholars developed a canon of famous Greek orators (The Attic Orators) whose works had been preserved and who were thought worthy of imitation. They are: Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isaeus, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides, Lycurgus, and Dinarchus. Most of these orators supported themselves by appearing in court on behalf of wealthy clients and by working as logographers.

Greek Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period (323-37 BCE)

Rhetoric becomes the focus of higher education in Greece and elsewhere. During this period teachers of rhetoric elaborated and sometimes conflated Aristotelian and sophistic theories of rhetoric. We have no Greek manuscripts from Hellenistic teachers, although many later accounts of their teachings exist. Only one major theoretical contribution occurs during this period—stasis theory. However, teachers of rhetoric were interested in refining their study of style, and some developed theories about the levels, or kinds, of style.

ca. 370–285: Theophrastus, a student of Aristotle, advances the study of style and perhaps invents systematic study of delivery. He writes a series of character studies demonstrating the construction and use of *ethopoeia,* which is still extant.

345–283: Demetrius of Phaleron writes "On Style," in which he claims that there are four types of style: the plain, the grand, the stately, and the powerful.

Mid-second century BCE: Hermagoras of Temnos apparently invents stasis theory, which will compete for first place in rhetorical handbooks with Aristotlean and sophistic theories of invention throughout antiquity and into the European Renaissance.

Latin Rhetoric

Roman intellectuals come into contact with Greek rhetoric during the second century BCE, and they adopt Greek rhetorical theory almost intact, only later refining its precepts in order to accommodate the Latin language.

Early first century BCE: Cornificius (?) writes the *Rhetoric for Herennius (Rhetorica ad Herennium),* a very full discussion of Hellenistic rhetor-

ical theory and pedagogy. This treatise contains a discussion of memory, the most complete and oldest available to us.

106–43 BCE: Cicero, who combines an interest in rhetorical theory with skill in speaking, sets stylistic and persuasive examples that will be emulated at least until the Renaissance. Cicero is well acquainted with Greek rhetoric and philosophy, and he writes several important works of rhetorical history and theory: *On Invention, Brutus, On the Parts of Oratory,* and his masterpiece, *Of Oratory.*

35–ca. 90 CE: Quintilian writes the *Institutes of Oratory,* the most complete treatise on rhetorical education available from antiquity.

First century CE: Longinus writes "On the Sublime," wherein he defines *hypsos,* "elevation" or "sublimity," as the quality of excellence found in Greek orators and poets. The sublime has five qualities that are reminiscent of the five canons of rhetoric.

First century CE: Hermogenes of Tarsus writes *On Ideas of Style,* wherein he catalogues the "ideas" or virtues of style: clarity, grandeur, beauty, vigor, ethos, verity, and gravity. Hermogenes's theory is important in rhetorical instruction throughout later antiquity and into the Renaissance.

Rhetorical Exercises

The *progymnasmata* were a series of school exercises used by teachers to hone students' skill in composition. Students imitated, amplified, and composed proverbs, fables, narratives, and arguments drawn from the works of classical authors.

Declamation was a school exercise as well as a popular form of entertainment among Roman adults. Declamation took at least two forms: *suasoriae,* where the speaker took the role of some historical or mythological person; and *contr oversiae,* where a real or imaginary law was cited alongside a real or imaginary case, and the speaker adopted the role of one of the persons in the case or became their advocate.

Greek Rhetoric in Later Antiquity

The Second Sophistic

During the first four centuries of the Common Era, Greek rhetors traveled throughout the Roman Empire, teaching and demonstrating their mastery of the art of rhetoric by declaiming, whenever asked, on any subject whatsoever. If they taught, they did so by means of example; their students watched them declaim and then did likewise. Most historians of rhetoric claim that the Sophists of this period were more interested in artistry and stylistic display than in public discussion of important issues—something that was very dangerous, after all, in the last days of the Roman Empire.

Bibliography

CITATION SOURCES OF ANCIENT TEXTS

Aesop. *The Fables of Aesop, Paraphrased in Verse.* John Ogilby. Los Angeles: Augustan Reprint Society (UCLA), 1965. (Originally printed 1668).

Aesop. *Aesop's Fables Told by Valerius Babrius.* Translated by Denison B. Hull. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.

Antiphon. *Tetralogies.* Translated by J. S. Morrison. In *The Older Sophists,* 136-63. Edited by Rosamond Kent Sprague. Columbia: South Carolina Univers Press, $$$(UP) 1972.

Aphthonius. *Progymnasmata.* Translated by Ray Nadeau. In *Speech Monographs* 19 (Nov. 1952): 264-85. Reprinted in *Readings from Classical Rhetoric,* 267-88. Edited by Patricia P. Matsen, Philip Rollinson, and Marion Sousa. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1990.

Aristotle. *On Interpretation.* Translated by E. M. Edghill. In *The Works of Aristotle.* Edited by W. D. Ross. Vol I. London: Oxford UP, 1966.

Aristotle. *Posterior Analytics.* Translated by G. R. G. Mure. In *The Works of Aristotle.* Edited by W. D. Ross. Vol. I. London: Oxford UP, 1966.

Aristotle. *Rhetoric.* Translated by John Henry Freese. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1926.

Aristotle. *The Rhetoric of Aristotle.* Translated by Lane Cooper. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1932.

Aristotle. *Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse.* Translated by George A. Kennedy. New York: Oxford UP, 1991.

Aristotle. *Topics.* Translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge. In *The Works of Aristotle.* Edited by W. D. Ross. London: Oxford UP, 1966.

Cicero. *Against Verres.* Translated by Palmer Bovie. New York: New American Library, 1967.

Cicero. *Brutus.* Translated by G. L. Hendrickson. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971.

Cicero. *In Defense of Murena.* Translated by Palmer Bovie. New York: New American Library, 1967.

Cicero. *On Invention.* Translated by H. M. Hubbell. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1968.

Cicero. *On Oratory.* Translated by E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1976.

Cicero. *On the Parts of Oratory.* Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1982.

Cicero. *Oratore.* Translated by H. M. Hubbell. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971.

Cicero. *Topics.* Translated by H. M. Hubbell. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1968.

Demetrius. *On Style.* Translated by W. Rhys Roberts. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1982.

Demosthenes. *On the Crown.* Translated by John J. Keany. In *Demosthenes'* On the Crown: *A Critical Case Study of a Masterpiece of Ancient Oratory.* Edited by James J. Murphy. New York: Random House, 1967.

Diogenes Laertius. *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers.* Translated by R. D. Hicks. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1972.

"Dissoi Logoi." Translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague. *Mind* 78 (Apr. 1968): 155-67. Reprinted in *The Older Sophists,* 279-293. Edited by Rosamond Kent Sprague. Columbia: South Carolina UP, 1972.

Gorgias. *Gorgias.* Translated by George Kennedy. In *The Older Sophists.* Edited by Rosamond Kent Sprague. Columbia: South Carolina UP, 1972.

Homer. *Iliad.* Translated by Robert Fitzgerald. Garden City N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1975.

Hermogenes. *On Types of Style.* Translated by Cecil W Wooten. Chapel Hill: North Carolina UP, 1987.

Hermogenes. *Progymnasmata.* Translated by Charles Sears Baldwin. In *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic,* 23-38. New York: Macmillan, 1928.

Isocrates. *Isocrates.* Translated by George Norlin. 3 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1980.

Lucian of Samasota. *Works.* Translated by H. W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler. 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.

Ovid. *The Metamorphoses.* Translated by Horace Gregory. New York: New American Library, 1960.

Philostratus. *The Lives of the Sophists.* Translated by Wilmer Cave Wright. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1922.

Plato. *The Collected Dialogues.* Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971.

Plutarch. *The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans.* Translated by John Dryden. New York: Random House, 1932.

Priscian. *Fundamentals Adapted from Hermogenes.* Translated by Joseph M. Miller. In *Readings from Medieval Rhetoric,* 52–68. Edited by Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser, and Thomas W Benson. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1973.

Quintilian. *The Institutes of Oratory.* Translated by H. E. Butler. 4 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1980.

Rhetoric to Alexander. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1957.

Rhetoric to Herennius. Translated by Harry Caplan. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1981.

Seneca the Elder. *Declamations.* Translated by M. Winterbottom. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1974.

Theon. *Progymnasmata.* Translated by Patricia P. Matsen. In *Readings from Classical Rhetoric.* Edited by Patricia P. Matsen, Philip Rollinson, and Marion Sousa. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1990.

Theophrastus. *The Characters.* Translated by J. M. Edmonds. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1961.

Thucydides. *The Peloponnesian War.* Translated by Benjamin Jowett. In *The Greek Historians.* Edited by Francis R. B. Godolphin. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1942.

Virgil. *Georgics.*   Translated by H. Rushton Fairclough. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1942.

Xenophon. *Memorabilia.*   Translated by E. C. Marchant. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1979.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Atwill, Janet M. *Rhetoric Reclaimed: Aristotle & the Liberal Arts Tradition.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press (UP), 1998.

Benson, Thomas W, and Michael Prosser. *Readings in Classical Rhetoric,* Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969.

Brody, Miriam. *Manly Writing: Gender, Rhetoric, and the Rise of Composition,* Carbondale, Southern Illinois UP, 1993.

Cole, Thomas. *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1991.

Enos, Richard Leo. *Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle.* Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1993.

———. *Roman Rhetoric: Revolution and the Greek Influence.* Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1995.

Grube, G. M. A. *The Greek and Roman Critics.* Toronto: Toronto UP, 1968.

Jarratt, Susan C. *Re-Reading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1991.

Kennedy, George A. *The Art of Persuasion in Greece.* Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963.

———. *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World.* Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972.

———. *A New History of Classical Rhetoric.* Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994.

Kerford, G. B. *The Sophistic Movement.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981.

Keuls, Eva C. *The Reign of the Phallus: Sexual Politics in Ancient Athens.* New York: Harper and Row, 1985.

Marrou, H. I. *A History of Education in Antiquity.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956.

Matsen, Patricia P., Philip Rollinson, and Marion Sousa. *Readings from Classical Rhetoric.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1990.

Poulakos, John. *Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece.* Columbia: South Carolina UP, 1995.

Poulakos, Takis. *Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates' Rhetorical Education.* Columbia: South Carolina UP, 1997.

Romilly, Jacqueline de. *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens.* Translated by Janet Lloyd. New York: Oxford UP, 1992.

Schiappa, Edward. *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece.* New Haven: Yale UP, 1999.

Walker, Jeffrey. *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity.* Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000.

Welch, Kathleen. *Electric Rhetoric: Classical Rhetoric, Oralism, and a New Literacy.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.

CREDITS

P. 2—"On Television" by Bill Goodykoontz, *The Arizona Republic,* Dec. 17, 2002. Used with permission. Permission does not imply endorsement; p. 4—Copyright 2003 Knight/Ridder/Tribune Media Services. Reprinted with permission; p. 10—Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, *Plato: The Collected Dialogues.* Copyright © 1961 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press; p. 11—Reprinted by permission of the publishers and the Trustees of the Loeb Classical Library from *Aristotle: Volume XVI,* Loeb Classical Library, #317, translated by H. Rackham, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937. The Loeb Classical Library Æ is a registered trademark of the President and Fellows of Harvard College; p. 22—"Cattlemen vs. PETA in Teen Diet Battle" by Martha Irvine, as appeared in *The Arizona Republic,* Feb. 19, 2003. Reprinted with permission of The Associated Press; p. 38—From *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion* by Arthur Bernard Cook. Reprinted by permission of Biblo & Tannen Book Publishers; p. 39—From *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion* by Arthur Bernard Cook. Reprinted by permission of Biblo & Tannen Book Publishers; p. 39—Rosamond Kent Sprague, *The Older Sophists.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972; p. 40—"Renewing the Spirit of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: King Day at the Dome 2003" by Tom Turnipseed, published on CommonDreams.org, Jan. 9, 2003. Reprinted by permission of Tom Turnipseed; p. 42—From "What Modern Slavery Is, and Isn't" by Barbara Crossette, *New York Times,* July 27, 1997, 4:1. Copyright © 1997 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission; p. 44—"Two Days Left in Term, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois" by Jodi Wilgoren, *New York Times,* Jan. 12, 2003. Copyright © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission; p. 45—Courage Meets Death Row" by David Wright, *Newsday,* Point of View Section, Oct. 27, 2002, A28. Reprinted by permission of the author; p. 46—"Governor Ryan" by Sheryl McCarthy, *Newsday,* Jan. 13, 2003, A34. Distributed by Tribune Media Services. Copyright © 2003, Newsday. Reprinted by permission; p. 47—"Absolutely, Positively for Capital Punishment" by David Firestone, *New York Times,* Jan. 19, 2003. Copyright © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission; p. 48—From "The Cost of Doing the Right Thing" by Geov Parrish, from www.workingforchange.com, Jan. 13, 2003. Copyright © 2003 Working Assets Online. Reprinted with permission; p. 53—Reprinted by permission of the publishers and the Trustees of the Loeb Classical Library from *Quintalian: Volume I,* Loeb Classical Library #124, translated by H.E. Butler, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1920. The Loeb Classical Library JE is a registered trademark of the President and Fellows of Harvard College; p. 56—Reprinted by permission of the publishers and the Trustees of the Loeb Classical Library from *Cicero: Rhetorical Treatises, Volume II,* Loeb Classical Library #386, translated by H.M. Hubbell, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949. The Loeb Classical Library JE is a registered trademark of the President and Fellows of Harvard College; p. 62—"30 Years After Ruling, Ambiguity, Anxiety Surround Abortion Debate" by William Mears and Bob Franken, CNN.com, Jan. 22, 2003; p. 66—"Drive for Adoption-Themes License Plates Causes Stir: 'Choose Life' Slogan Upsets Abortion-Rights Advocates" by Mike Ramsey, Copley News Service, *Newsday,* Dec. 2, 2002. Reprinted by permission of Copley News Service; p. 77—"Regulation Change Sparks Abortion Debate" by Kelly Wallace, CNN.com, Feb. 1, 2002; p. 84—"Universities Struggle with Free Speech, Hate Speech" by Associated Press, April 28, 2002. Reprinted with permission of The Associated Press; p. 91—Administrative Policy on Intolerance, AD29 Statement," from the *Penn State University Policy Manual.* Used with permission of The Pennsylvania State University; p. 93—"Recognition of Flagstaff's Dark Skies

Index