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# Creating Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force, 1945–2015

A Sword Well Made

David Hunter-Chester

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# Introduction

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of various factors on the performance of a specific task. The study is divided into several sections, each focusing on a different aspect of the task. The first section discusses the theoretical background and the objectives of the study. The second section describes the methodology used, including the participants, the task, and the experimental design. The third section presents the results of the study, and the fourth section discusses the implications of the findings. The study is organized as follows:

- 1. Theoretical Background
- 2. Methodology
- 3. Results
- 4. Discussion

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## Chapter 1

### Introduction

#### *Renouncing War, Struggling to Rearm, Creating the Ground Self-Defense Force, and Reimagining the Soldier*

Japan has one of the most storied warrior traditions in the world, embodied by such iconic figures as the samurai, the kamikaze pilot, and even the ninja. Warriors ruled Japan for over 800 years and members of the warrior class made up the national leadership, officially and later in an unofficial capacity, from the Meiji era, in the late nineteenth century, into the beginning of the Taishō era in the early twentieth century. During the Meiji Restoration these Japanese elites placed the warrior tradition at the center of their nation-building efforts, with its rallying cry “Rich Country, Strong Army.” Moving through and beyond the Meiji era Japan’s soldiers remained powerful icons until the end of what I will refer to as the Fifteen-Year War, or simply the war, from the so-called Manchurian Incident in 1931 until Japan’s surrender in 1945.<sup>1</sup>

Through the Fifteen-Year War Japan’s governing elites often used a created, carefully shaped version of the samurai ethos to instruct Japanese subjects in their duties to country, empire, and emperor. Yet after the surrender Japan’s leaders took the unprecedented step of both renouncing war and renouncing arms, constitutionally (if the constitution is read literally) when it adopted what is therefore called the Peace Constitution in 1947. Japan was not sovereign at the time. The Allied Powers during the fierce “war without mercy” in the Pacific had come to view Japan and the Japanese people as a treacherous dragon, a danger to all those around her. Both the Potsdam Declaration and the Initial Post-surrender Policy called for this dangerous dragon to be defanged after Japan’s defeat, nor was a single dragon’s tooth to be left to threaten others. Yet only five years after capitulation, while still under the American Occupation, Japan began to rearm, establishing the National Police Reserve in 1950.

The NPR from the first was a police force in name only. A nascent army, the NPR was initially trained by U.S. Army officers in U.S. Army tactics and

with U.S. Army weapons. Ambassador William Sebald, political advisor to General MacArthur during the Occupation, writes "The new Japanese Army, in fact, looked as though it had been made in the United States. On a visit to one of its training camps, I thought at first I had stumbled into an American base, for everything from guns to fatigues was GI. Only when I saw the Japanese soldiers eating with chopsticks did I fully realize that these were, indeed, soldiers of another Japanese generation."<sup>2</sup>

Eventually, with two name changes, domestic political wrangling and prodding from the United States, this new postwar Japanese army became the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (*Rikujō Jieitai* or sometimes shortened to *Rikuji*, in Japanese) in 1954. Establishing an army after renouncing war and arms required heated debate across layers of two societies, Japanese and American. Given this turbulent process, and the many negative factors the GSDF has had to contend with, including questions concerning its constitutionality and legality, its perceived relatively low social status and its inevitable ties to both the United States—who many Japanese came to perceive in the postwar era as war loving—as well as the legacy of the defeated (and some would say disgraced) Imperial Japanese Army, one might expect the GSDF's development to have been crippled. In fact, the GSDF has developed into a professional force, respected internationally, and, despite the enumerated challenges, supported domestically; it is indeed, as former Chairman of the Japan Self-Defense Force Joint Staff Office General Fujinawa once said, "a sword well made."<sup>3</sup> This study is mainly concerned with answering the questions: Why did Japan renounce war and even the arms to prosecute war? How does a country that has renounced war and armaments create an army? How did the Japanese, a society dealing dynamically, emotionally, and sometimes violently with fundamental questions concerning war, peace, and militarism (a militarism often most closely associated with the Imperial Japanese Army) reimagine war and the warrior? And, given that these questions were central to Japan's redefinition of its national identity after their Fifteen-Year War, how does Japan's postwar army, the Ground Self-Defense Force, born in and tempered by the heat of this discourse, ultimately form a positive professional identity for itself? Answering these questions begins, as answering many questions does, with a story.

## DISCARDING A SWORD: RENOUNCING WAR

In 1946 Representative Yamazaki Iwao, during Diet interpolations on the draft of Japan's postwar constitution, told a story: "During the reign of Emperor Temmu about 1300 years ago," he began, the Sacred Sword, one of the three imperial treasures, was stolen. The Imperial Court sent an

expeditionary force to retrieve the Sword, and they recovered it once a storm beached the thief's boat. However once the Sword was in the emperor's possession, Temmu grew ill. Consulting a seer, the emperor was told the Sacred Sword had been cursed. Once he returned it to the shrine where it was normally safeguarded, the emperor "immediately recovered and achieved a noteworthy administration that is shining in our history." Yamazaki went on to explain "The Manchurian Incident, the Shanghai incident, and the China Incident were all caused by the curse of the sword," but now that "[Japan] has been wise enough to discard the sword and renounce war for good," Japan can build "a splendid state."<sup>4</sup> In the conclusion of this chapter, focusing on the origin, development, and final defeat of the Imperial Japanese Army, this study will address the aspects of the IJA's history which led to disaster. This was a foundational factor as the Japanese people in the postwar came to regard the Imperial Japanese Army, so recently conceived as embodying the Sacred Sword of the empire, as instead embodying a sword accursed.

Japan in 1945 went further than Emperor Temmu. Temmu placed the Imperial Treasure in a place where it could be safeguarded and preserved. In contrast, after defeat Japan broke the IJA, their apotheosized sword, and discarded the shards. Japan is not the only country to constitutionally renounce war—the Philippines, Brazil, and other countries also renounce war in their constitutions—but Japan is unique in not only renouncing war, but the armed forces to wage war. How and why was Article 9, Japan's Renunciation of War clause, developed and adopted into Japan's postwar constitution? An important part of the answer is that Japan alone did not make this choice, as the choice was made while Japan was occupied, principally by the United States. The factors behind this decision are addressed in chapter two, focusing on the years leading up to Japan's defeat and through 1946.

Carol Gluck tells us Japanese and American histories of the Occupation involve "entangling illusions."<sup>5</sup> Particularly in chapter two I will try to focus on a skein of this tangle usually not addressed. While most studies of this topic focus on the policy and process involved in disarming Japan, while describing that process I will focus on those who advocated what was first a minority view—that a "reformed" Japan should eventually rearm—but later the majority view, at least in the United States. The thread in Japan is somewhat more snarled. Immediately after the war most Japanese did accept the victors' decree the country be disarmed, for their own reasons, but in Japan, too, a minority of policymakers demurred, and in Japan too, within a few years a majority of the public came to support a renewed military (though a limited one and one not referred to as military). Following those strands of this entwined history as well, the warp and woof of this yarn becomes visible first by examining both America's and Japan's preparations for the end of World War II in the Pacific.

In America, planning for the occupation of Japan began as early as 1942 in various Washington planning committees.<sup>6</sup> From the point of view of probably most Americans, the war in the Pacific was entirely Japan's fault. Japan, without warning or provocation, had attacked and killed Americans. Moreover, Japan was inherently militaristic "because of the peculiarities of its own history, culture, and collective psychology."<sup>7</sup> This message had been reinforced for Americans, and indeed other Westerners, by what the Allies had documented as Japanese atrocities during the war. It is no surprise, then, after this enemy had provoked, in the words of the American popular media "a holy war, a racial war of greater significance than any the world has heretofore seen,"<sup>8</sup> and then proved so savage, there was little sentiment among Americans for a merciful peace once the fighting stopped. As so well captured in the Frank Capra film *Know Your Enemy: Japan*, to many in the United States, Japan had been acting in accordance with what Americans constituted as the samurai tradition, and thus represented the kind of threat aptly summed up by author Mishima Yukio, "Once a Japanese sword is drawn from its scabbard, it cannot return until it completes its mission of cutting something or someone."<sup>9</sup> To Americans Japan and its people were a dangerous weapon, a sword, and to ensure world peace that sword had to be broken so that it could never be drawn again. Thus, for many Americans, it seemed wisest that Japan never be allowed to rearm—the broken sword was not to be reforged.

In Japan after the surrender many Japanese, war weary and shocked by national defeat, came to hold similar views, albeit for different reasons. In the first place, probably never had the attempt of Japan's wartime regime to place their soldiers, "the glory of the Empire," at the center of its New Order in East Asia or the later Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity, been fully embraced by the public. Nor, given the evidence of steadily increasing privation and the devastating Allied bombing raids,<sup>10</sup> did the Japanese people believe their government when they were told repeatedly of the Empire's continuing victories. This doubt, disillusionment and anger was no doubt magnified by the defeat and the devastation.

Which is not to say the Japanese people had been against the Fifteen-Year War from the beginning. The taking of Manchuria in 1931 was, for instance, viewed by many as an opportunity for life in a frontier type of environment, and the area itself was coveted for its economic potential and for the security of a buffer zone it provided for Korea, annexed at the time to Japan.<sup>11</sup> The expansion of the war into wider China in 1937 was widely accepted as provoked by China and thus justified, while the expansion into Southeast Asia four years later was promoted as both necessary to achieve self-sufficiency in resources and as a genuine mission to free Asian people's from European imperialism (though Japan's own imperialism was rationalized by such

concepts as the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and “new world order,” underlain by such concepts as “proper place” and purity of motives).<sup>12</sup>

Arguably it was this support for war, tacit, active or just unreflective, that made explanations for the defeat all the more difficult. Adding to the difficulty, as Haruko and Theodore Cook explain, “Japan was defeated, and there is no well-established narrative form for telling the tale of the defeated. In war histories and literature alike, the tale is often told most convincingly by the victors, even when they shade the story in neutral tones.”<sup>13</sup> In the case of Japan, the victor, in the form of the American Occupation, participated with the vanquished (but not in neutral tones) almost immediately, constructing a narrative which assigned blame for Japan’s disaster to Japanese militarists. Concomitant with the identification of the perpetrators was the conclusion the best defense against any recurrence of the calamity that war—shorn of even the pretense of purity of effort or sincerity of intention—represented was to dismantle militarist institutions and destroy all weapons.

This was only part of the story as Japan “embraced defeat” in John Dower’s term.<sup>14</sup> In order to produce a new national identity as a nation of peace, the Japanese began a project that, as Igarashi Yoshikuni explains, continues even today, in which the loss of the war “was transformed . . . into a sacrifice needed for Japan’s betterment.”<sup>15</sup> Early on in this particular process, in which forgetting is as important as remembering and in which the Imperial Japanese Army is a consensus choice as the villain—the worst of the militarists—disarmament was considered a relief before it was considered a necessity.

Disarmament, as well as democratization, was after all written into the terms of surrender. And disarmament was in the air. At the same time as many Americans were demanding a disarmed Japan, they looked forward to disarmament in their own country as well. For a time, then, some hoped, the Pacific Ocean would have a chance to finally attain to the idealistic aspiration of its name. But the seeds of an existing conflict which, in a reversal of botanical logic, had lain dormant during the heat of global conflict, began to sprout in the cold that followed.

Standard histories of Japan’s post-defeat disarmament portray Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, uniquely renouncing not only war but the arms to prosecute war, as “idiosyncratic,”<sup>16</sup> or “revolutionary,”<sup>17</sup> but these characterizations were made during the Cold War or thereafter. As this study will argue, during the period examined in the next chapter the need for a disarmed Japan was the consensus position in the United States. After all, this was not the first time nations of the world had tried to administratively banish war. Less than 20 years earlier 65 nations, including the United States and Japan, had signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, also known as the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (which had been studied by and served as an inspiration to the drafter of Japan’s constitutional Renunciation of War Article,

Colonel Charles Kades).<sup>18</sup> Nor was Japan the only target of this disarmament. The Atlantic Charter, announced in August 1941, "called for the disarmament of aggressor nations 'pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security,'" though it did not call for permanent disarmament,<sup>19</sup> and finally, disarmament was not the most extreme measure contemplated for the Japanese people before the end of the war, as will be pointed out in chapter two. Viewed through this prism, this history finds the idea of permanently disarming Japan as the conventional, majority view among Americans at the end of World War II. In this as well as the focus on following the preservation of a minority view that allowed for or advocated a more nuanced policy of an eventually rearmed Japan, this history departs from many other studies.

Chapter two is the only chapter to focus on the renunciation of war, but the ramifications of this policy persist throughout the remaining chapters, and to this day in Japan. In chapter two I trace the development of Article 9, Japan's the war-renunciation article in Japan's postwar constitution, and in doing so I challenge what has become the standard account of the article's origin, by scholar Koseki Shoichi. Chapter three begins this study's discussion of the struggle over rearmament, which also continues to this day in Japan.

Though I will highlight who disagreed, to most Americans at the end of the war with Japan the consensus in 1945 was that the erstwhile enemy, a fierce dragon, had to be completely defanged, not leaving a single tooth. The extraction went unexpectedly well during the initial Occupation. Unexpected as well, though, at least among those charged with sowing those dragon's teeth in order to reap new, democratic soldiers, once the consensus changed, was the difficulty of the subsequent harvest.

## DOES REARMAMENT REALLY MEAN REMILITARIZATION? THE STRUGGLE TO REARM

Given the strength of the consensus among the Allies at the end of the war about the threat to world peace posed by Japan one would have thought the dragon would be kept stripped of its sharp teeth for 100 years. Instead within a scant couple of years after the searing heat of global war, as America's relations cooled into a different kind of conflict with the Soviet Union, views toward Japan's military capabilities had begun to reverse, at least in the United States. From the beginning of policy discussions those voicing dissent toward a policy of hard peace had concurred with initial demobilization of the defeated enemy, but had then envisioned, at some future date that differed among advocates, rearming and remobilizing Japanese soldiers under a new, democratic regime. For various reasons these individuals felt a perpetually unarmed Japan, far from assuring peace, would instead steadily undermine

international security. As the ice of the Cold War spread and thickened, more voices joined this chorus, championing not only a rearmed Japan, but one rearmed powerfully and soon, albeit one under firm civilian control.

In Japan, at least among policymakers, there was a concern that Japan must achieve an equal and honorable position in the international system. For some policymakers, though not all, an important prerequisite for achieving this honorable position was to rearm. Once independence was restored, concern about a hot war between the free nations and the communist bloc roiled discussions on all sides. Thus, despite the aspirations for peace, soon after the Fifteen-Year War, people on both sides of the world's largest ocean, perhaps mindful of the admonition of Ho Yen-hsi "When the world is at peace, a gentleman keeps his sword by his side,"<sup>20</sup> or its Western equivalent, *Si vis pacem, para bellum*, began to think the Japanese sword should be reforged, though then kept sheathed at Japan's side, only to be drawn in times of need and, best, for common cause.

Ironically, this view was gaining strength in the United States just as the new constitution of Japan was being promulgated; the Peace Constitution, attempting to codify with its Renunciation of War clause the previous consensus that Japan must remain unarmed perpetually. Even before the Korean War started in June 1950, many Americans, policymakers, and citizens, began to favor establishing a rearmed Japan as a bulwark against what was viewed as a monolithic communist threat during the Cold War. In Japan there was less of a consensus. Some number of Japanese wanted to rearm, but others wanted to focus on recovery and rebuilding; in this latter group, many felt Japan could not afford to rearm while rebuilding. Yet others felt there was no room for a military in this new country of peace and culture, they were building, a society "cleaved by war" from the society it had been. I trace these developments beginning with chapters two and three, though the examination continues throughout the remaining chapters as well.

In chapter four the struggle centers on the peace treaty with Japan and the first security treaty in the first two years of the 1950s. The negotiation of both treaties centered around matters military and the talks include the first evidence of Japan pursuing what came to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine, which involves a conviction "that armaments should be curbed and military spending suppressed while all efforts [are] concentrated on the economy."<sup>21</sup> As well the Yoshida Doctrine stresses allowing the stationing of U.S. forces on Japanese soil and advocates depending on the security alliance with the United States for Japan's ultimate security.

In chapter five I will focus on probably the most dynamic period in Japan's struggle for rearmament, following both the policy discourse conducted from 1952, when Japan regained independence, to the period in 1960 just before Japan was convulsed by the most violent demonstrations it has yet

experienced in the postwar era, when the struggle over rearmament turned deadly in the *Anpo*, or Mutual Security Treaty, riots. Challenging the still-common assertion that postwar Japan is a pacifist nation I will discuss how two different ideas about how Japan should approach its national security clashed before one, the aforementioned Yoshida Doctrine, became dominant in the decades following the 1950s. The alternate model would have had Japan amend its constitution to, at the least, recognize its right to establish and maintain armed forces, and would have had Japan build up a more powerful military, facilitating the departure of U.S. forces, and allowing Japan to defend itself either alone or in a collective security arrangement.

This alternate identity had the strongest chance of becoming part of the dominant national identity during the premierships of Hatoyama Ichirō and Kishi Nobusuke, the powerful revisionist politicians who followed Yoshida Shigeru as prime ministers in the 1950s. The exploration of Japan's struggle over rearmament in this treatise demonstrates Japan's peculiar, by international standards, defense institutions and practices were not the inevitable result of the American Occupation; Japan wrestled with choices, especially during the 1950s, and continues to wrestle with choices. Chapter five also looks at how a specific term, *saigunbi*, or rearmament, came to take on a negative connotation among the Japanese, probably because it became associated by the Japanese with a return to the situation which obtained during the war of a Japan run by undemocratic militarists, a development which has seldom been acknowledged in previous studies, with the few exceptions noted in the chapter. And the chapter demonstrates that the United States and the security alliance with the United States, while accepted, if grudgingly, as the ultimate guarantor of Japan's security, also became associated with this possible return to militarism. These two developments, along with the trauma of the *Anpo* Riots, were important in setting Japan on its unusual security path.

In the sixth chapter I will continue to examine the struggle over rearmament as well as the other themes in the study from the *Anpo* Riots in 1960 up until increased tensions in the Cold War in the late 1970s. The reaction to the tumult of the *Anpo* Riots, including Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato's policy of pursuing income doubling in Japan, was decisive in moving Japan toward becoming a "Civilian Power." In terms of defense policy, despite one-party rule during most of the postwar period by the Liberal Democratic Party, a conservative party with the goal of revising the constitution a consistent platform plank, the LDP was unable to achieve or even initiate constitutional reform. Instead policymakers engaged in what Kent Calder called crisis and compensation,<sup>22</sup> or what Andrew Oros describes as the practice of "reach, reconcile, reassure,"<sup>23</sup> during which policymakers like Nakasone Yasuhiro and Ozawa Ichiro pushed the limits of defense policy as far as they could—"reaching,"

in Oros' terminology, then reconciled with those who protested the policy, in order to reassure both dissenting policymakers and the Japanese public that Japan was not returning to its militarist past.

With the end of the Cold War Japan, like so many other countries began to question just what sort of forces it should maintain. The first Gulf War of 1990–1991 had a dramatic impact on these debates. Japan contributed 13 billion dollars to the war effort, but did not deploy any troops. Afterwards a grateful Kuwait took out a full-page ad in the *New York Times* thanking all the states in the coalition which had freed their country from Saddam Hussein's occupation, with the single exception of Japan. The policy debates that had raged in Japan during the build-up and execution of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm continued in Japan after the end of hostilities, as Japan's elites debated how Japan could best make "international contributions." The result was the passage of Japan's Peacekeeping Operations Law in 1992, and the subsequent dispatch (*haken*, or dispatch, not *hahei*, or deployment, since that would be considered beyond what is constitutionally permissible in Japan) of troops for the first time in postwar Japanese history. The first dispatch was of GSDF troops to a UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, followed by other PKO and humanitarian dispatches which continue to this day, and these developments will be covered in chapter seven.

In chapter eight I will examine the tumultuous changes of the 20 years from 1995. While transforming into what I call a proscribed postmodern army the GSDF is challenged as it dispatches for the first time to a non-pacified area in Iraq. Unprecedented as this was, it did not act as a catalyst to transform the *Rikuji* into a post-postmodern, expeditionary army—the model of an army some others, like the U.S. Army, are actively converting into in the age of the War on Terror. However the challenges Japan has faced for the last 10 years, from an unstable North Korea and, especially, a resurgent China, are producing defense policy changes, which may yet result in the GSDF's fourth transformation. It is in this chapter that I, as a career U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer, focused on Japan, enter the history, at least at the staff or action officer level. Carol Gluck, again, calls chronicles of the American Occupation of Japan written by those who worked in the Occupation apparatus "history written close to the bone."<sup>24</sup> I realize I open myself to the same danger of insufficient emotional distance when discussing my staff actions. On the other hand, the GSDF, by virtue of the history you are about to examine, is more strongly intertwined with the policies of another nation, the United States, than perhaps any other army in the world. I hope my small intrusions into this story may shed some light on how that influence sometimes operated, person-to-person and soldier-to-soldier.

## A WELL-MADE SWORD: RECREATING AN ARMY, THE GROUND SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

Though, of necessity, this study focuses much attention on policy, it is also an institutional history of the GSDF. After the Fifteen-Year War, its country occupied for the first time in its recorded history by foreign troops, Japan, a country that had placed its military at the pinnacle of its society for centuries, renounced that military and “threw off” war.<sup>25</sup> Having broken completely the old sword, when occupied Japan was directed to rearm it struggled over forming a new army. Regaining its independence Japan continued to struggle, while its society questioned received ideas and images about war and warriors, reimagining both for the new Japan. The heat surrounding the popular and policy debates was the furnace heat in which old iron and new steel was shaped, while the defense policy delimited by the debates and the reimagined images were the walls of the forge, but it was the Defense Agency, later the Ministry of Defense and, ultimately, the Ground Self-Defense Force itself, that decided the final shape of Japan’s new sword, as the GSDF organized, reorganized, and formed its own professional identity.

Though many of America’s policymakers had begun to prefer a rearmed Japan by 1950, the activating event that solidified the new consensus in the United States was the onset of the Korean War. When America’s Occupation troops in Japan deployed to fight in Korea, General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (the acronym SCAP is used to refer to MacArthur, but also to refer to the entire apparatus of the military occupation), perceived a need for a constabulary force in Japan, and ordered the formation of the National Police Reserve (NPR). In chapter four I will examine how this force was recruited, trained, and equipped. In doing so I will draw heavily on Japanese memoirs from individuals who served in Japan’s postwar army, and from a civilian official who, as the head of what became the Defense Agency personnel bureau for the first 14 years of the SDF’s history, played a key a key role in that history. I will also draw on the papers of Frank Kowalski, Jr., who, as a colonel serving in SCAP’s Civil Affairs Section, acting as the Chief of Staff, further acted as a midwife for the birth of Japan’s postwar army. Using his papers, and other archival material, to an extent which has seldom, if ever, been done, I am able to correct a mistaken claim concerning the initial manpower strength MacArthur directed for the NPR. In his memoir written about the experience, only published in Japan and, in Japanese until recently, Kowalski claims MacArthur directed an initial strength of 75,000 because of the number of police forces the Potsdam Declaration calls for, but the Potsdam Declaration does not address police forces. In further departures from previous studies I will correct the misconception

that most Japanese leaders were against allowing Imperial Japanese Army or Navy veterans into the NPR, and I will begin the examination of how Japan's new army began to create its own identity, even while forming at the direction and under the supervision of the occupying American military.

The focus on identity creation occurs throughout this study, with emphasis in chapters four, and six through nine. Despite the *hadome* or brakes, placed on defense flexibility and actions, resulting from the defense policies described, it was also during the period of this study that the GSDF went through three phases, and has perhaps begun a fourth, as it has created and recreated a professional identity for itself.

In chapter six I examine how the organization of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force changed as it grew and took on new missions, and I will look at how the GSDF was able to consolidate a positive identity for itself, as a moderately armed, territorial army, stressing the development and dissemination of the *Jieikan no Kokorogamae*, or ethos of the SDF member. I will touch on how the GSDF became accepted as the repository of many traditional culture values, and the practice of sending salarymen—the new samurai in some ways—to learn warrior values by training with the SDF.

I will discuss in chapter seven the changes in the GSDF's identity first produced by a colder Cold War, from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, and later refined by the end of the Cold War and the GSDF's first deployments overseas beginning in 1992. In the approximately 10 years of the second phase of its identity development, the GSDF shaped itself into a modern, heavy, high-tech army, with broader international roles and awareness, but a still limited scope. In the third phase, beginning in 1992 when the GSDF deploys overseas for the first time, the GSDF became more international in its scope, and, in some ways, moved toward the model of a postmodern army, though one still hemmed in by restrictions not placed on most armies. Also in chapter six I will discuss the GSDF as a disaster relief and public service organization, roles the force has enthusiastically embraced since 1951.

In fact, when GSDF *taiin*, or unit members, are asked what sets the GSDF apart from their counterparts in other countries, they will frequently cite their roles in disaster relief and humanitarian missions. Indeed, if the GSDF is a sword well made, it is also a ploughshare, as the *Rikuji* and its equipment have much more often been used for peaceful purposes than any other. Japan has always been wracked by natural disaster. Three tectonic plates meet in Tokyo Bay and, on average, 10 percent of all the earthquakes that occur worldwide every year occur in Japan. Thus Japan has always had need for emergency services, and the GSDF has played an important role in responding to this need. For a force often plagued by a history to which it is still not reconciled, disaster relief and humanitarian operations have been a way for the GSDF to gain the kind of positive status and regard all organizations desire.

I discuss this important aspect of the GSDF's professional identity in chapters seven and eight.

### GUARDIANS OF THE *IMEJI* NATION: REIMAGINING THE SOLDIER

War stories are popular the world over, perhaps because they are so easily the setting for what literary scholar Christopher Booker describes as the first of seven "basic plots" for all stories, "overcoming the monster."<sup>26</sup> Some of the earliest known literature, the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, *Beowulf*, and the *Iliad*, for instance, center on the courage, strength and cleverness of their warrior protagonists. Japan, too, has a rich tradition of warrior tales, from its earliest written works, the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*,<sup>27</sup> to later, more purely war tales, like the *Shōmonki*, the *Hōgen Monogatari*, the *Heike Monogatari* and beyond.<sup>28</sup> War stories are not only exciting, but have often been used to teach morality and virtue.<sup>29</sup> Probably nowhere are these stories always wholly devoted to praising warriors and their actions; quite the opposite can be true, whether the purpose is to teach a lesson by emphasizing the consequences for misbehavior, to criticize a policy or, again, to simply tell an entertaining story.<sup>30</sup>

Quite simply, human beings use stories to "make sense of the world," and to help us "recognize our own identity."<sup>31</sup> It is no wonder then, in the age of nation-states and nationalism, stories are important not just for the formation of individual identity, but for forging national identity. And a national identity, concerned with the nation's "survival, security and dignity," and consisting of "reproduced memories and largely self-defined physical, cultural and historical characterizations"<sup>32</sup> will almost inevitably have war stories as an important component of these characterizations. This is true, yet problematic, for Japan in the post-Fifteen-Year War era when it engaged in a thoroughgoing redefinition of its identity. The dynamic is made much more complex in the case of Japan because, despite having constitutionally renounced war and the bearing of arms, Japan did rearm.

Japan's war stories in this period are further problematized because unlike most other postwar major powers, Japan's experience has been postwar (by which I mean Japan as a nation has not officially engaged its armed forces in a combat situation) as well. Given the concern about a nation's survival in the international system in the context of identity construction, a nation's armed forces tend to play a prominent role. Japan's armed forces are at the center of Japan's postwar and postwar reconstruction of its identity, and the GSDF has been more impacted by the contradictions listed above than the other two SDF services.

For militaries another function of stories is to create the imaginative space for serving in a force. This is accomplished in at least four ways: by instilling an interest in the military, by modeling positive and heroic behavior, by inspiring a potential recruit to join the service and by giving a person in the service someone in story with whom they can identify. In 1961 fully 50 percent of enlistees said they had been inspired to join the U.S. Marine Corps by watching *The Sands of Iwo Jima*, but postwar aspirants to Japan's army have few domestic productions that might replicate such inspiration. This study finds few soldier images in popular culture, while rare glimpses of the image are presented in an almost entirely negative fashion.

Finally, the imagination also shapes expectations and limits. Commonly in societies that experience prolonged periods of peace there is increasing curiosity about, and often glorification of, war and warriors.<sup>33</sup> This is not always true, even in the case of victor nations, like France after World War I, the country that between the two world wars "saw the publication of the greatest number of anti-war novels."<sup>34</sup> Japan, too, is somewhat of an exception. Japan's popular media is suffused with military imagery, but, despite not having had troops participate officially in a war zone since its defeat, the anti-war genre in Japan's popular media has remained strong. Yet Japan is not and has not been wholly pacifist. Postwar Japanese society is replete with war stories, and within those stories some images of warriors regained their pride of place fairly quickly. But not ground troops, for the most part.

This dearth of positive soldier images in the popular media was not inevitable. Portrayals of modern soldiers as heroic had regained some viability by the end of the 1950s, signified, for example, by the star and a small number of other admirable characters in the three-film series *The Human Condition*. But then, especially with regard to portrayals of Imperial Japanese Army soldiers, the varied approach to the trope in the 1950s narrowed to a single, negative depiction when represented at all. From the 1960s on it is difficult to find a sympathetic portrayal in the Japanese popular media of IJA soldiers. Other imperial military figures, such as kamikaze pilots and sailors of the Imperial Japanese Navy, to a certain extent, regained some luster and were favorably portrayed in manga or movies. The GSDF was favorably portrayed, and increasingly central, though not always consequential, in *kaiju eiga*, or giant monster movies, as time went on, but were otherwise largely absent from the popular media. While there are some exceptions to this by the end of the period, the overwhelmingly negative position of the IJA soldier in the public imagination is one of the factors that leave the GSDF largely cleaved, in public, from their heritage (and heritage is necessarily taught and prized in armies). The issues of popular culture are explored particularly in chapter nine.

In concluding remarks I will mention the GSDF's problematic relationship with history, and particularly the legacy of the Imperial Japanese Army.

All GSDF units can trace their lineage back to IJA units. Many units have "Remembrance Rooms," where artifacts, records, photos and other items from these IJA units are displayed. Yet these rooms and this legacy is almost completely hidden from anyone outside of the GSDF. The GSDF is thus placed in a peculiar position, remembering the war and its warriors while many of their countrymen, as Yoshikuni Igarashi explains, prefer to remember "reinventing itself as a peaceful nation that attained economic prosperity."<sup>35</sup>

## A SWORD ACCURSED

How did Japan's first modern ground force, the Imperial Japanese Army, come to be considered accursed, in Yamazaki's metaphor? The GSDF's predecessors and Japan's first modern army, the IJA fell victim to the twin evils of ignorance regarding its true historical heritage and unquestioning acceptance of self-serving myths created in place of that heritage. As well the IJA had no effective civilian control from the beginning. It vied for power, as did other institutions in an ill-conceived national structure; it did not develop a culture of detached, professional national security analysis and advice, instead prizing institutional and national prestige; it developed an operational doctrine that treasured independent action at all echelons above any other consideration; and it embraced the same expansionist and nationalistic fervor that came to grip most of the nation, with the important distinction that the IJA could and did act on this fervor.

Nation-states and their armies must first be imagined. In the case of Japan, the Tokugawa era polity was cracking under various strains by the mid-nineteenth century, just at the time when Western imperialism, particularly in China, seemed most threatening to Japan's continued independence and dignity. What Richard Samuels terms the "Meiji Consensus," was a conviction, an imagining, that preserving Japan's independence and dignity required "catching up and surpassing" the West.<sup>36</sup> The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) was central to this project from the first.

The Meiji consensus was forged by the leaders of the Meiji Restoration, reformers who produced a revolution. They designed their new Japan as a centralized Westphalian-style state under an oligarchy, but the state was never completely centralized under the oligarchs alone; they had to contend with sharing political power from the first, among themselves and increasingly among other individuals and powerful groups as time went on.<sup>37</sup> Among themselves the struggle for power resulted in expulsion from the fold of those oligarchs whose ideas threatened the overall pragmatic plans of the remainder. As time went on and the oligarchs competed with other power centers, and in particular with the powerful force the public became, the oligarchs

had to choose different strategies. Two of the best known of these oligarchs, or *genrō* (elder statesmen, as they came to be known) were Ito Hirobumi who drafted the Meiji Constitution and founded one of Japan's first political parties and Yamagata Aritomo who is considered the father of the Imperial Japanese Army. Ito's and Yamagata's ventures are best understood as means they undertook to centralize the state, ensure loyalty and discipline among Japanese subjects, and maintain the *genrō* in power.

The oligarchs chose the emperor as a centralizing and legitimizing symbol around which the Japanese nation-state could be built. With centralizing the state, establishing security, perpetuating his own influence, and catching up to and surpassing the West in mind, Yamagata, organized and trained the army. He had not been the first of the oligarchs to organize Japan's new army. That had been Ōmura Tasujiro, a fellow clansman of Ito and Yamagata, who had shown great skill at organizing and training mixed samurai and peasant units who had become "the armed vanguard of reform,"<sup>38</sup> in Chōshū, the most significant of the anti-Tokugawa domains. Ōmura had cemented his dominance over the army when he commanded the forces that secured Edo over troops loyal to the Tokugawa regime during the short civil war in 1868. Edo was renamed Tokyo as the young Meiji Emperor for whom the era is named had his throne and the seat of the imperial government moved there. The following year Ōmura was assassinated. His replacement soon quit the oligarchic fold and after other candidates were either unavailable or unacceptable to other objecting oligarchs, "In August 1870, the council of state appointed Yamagata minister of the military department, a post that had been vacant for almost one year."<sup>39</sup>

Security for the throne, and new government, deemed most important, Yamagata and others organized the Imperial Guard, with 6,200 samurai from Chōshū and two other key domains in March 1871. The following August having "played on the foreign threat, especially Russia's southward expansion,"<sup>40</sup> the military department divided the country into four military districts, with the Imperial Guard in Tokyo and garrisons of mostly infantry conscripts in Osaka, Kumamoto and Sendai (these same cities, with the addition of Sapporo in Hokkaido, host the GSDF's five territorial Armies, corps-sized units, today). The department went on to improve on standardized training and equipment, open firing ranges, set up military prep schools, retool or establish technical and other specialized schools, and establish academies for noncommissioned officers and officers.<sup>41</sup>

Having tried conscription twice before with unsatisfactory results, the government passed a new conscription law in 1873, requiring three years of active service and four years in the reserves. Conscription, and the use of the non-Samurai classes as soldiers, had been divisive among the oligarchs and the country as a whole. Yamagata recognizing the samurai as a contending

body of power, had pushed both abolition of the samurai as a class and a wider conscription system. Former samurai still served, and thus, "To eliminate preferential treatment for the warrior volunteers, Yamagata revived ancient imperial myths and largely fanciful traditions of military service to the imperial household to promote loyalty to the emperor while curtailing samurai independence."<sup>42</sup> He also realized "army indoctrination could translate the conscripts' regional loyalties into national allegiance and send them home as veterans to proselytize army virtues, modernization and proto-nationalism to their communities."<sup>43</sup> These were convictions he held for the rest of his life, and passed on to his influential protégés. In 1910, for instance, at the inauguration ceremony for the Imperial Military Reserve Association Yamagata enjoined, "We reservists . . . must carry out our organizations' primary aims and fulfill the ideal that all citizens are soldiers."<sup>44</sup>

The government had insured an imperial memorial was issued in February, 1870, that "proclaimed the emperor a living embodiment of godhood and his throne a holy office established the Sun Goddess and handed down in unbroken succession to the present."<sup>45</sup> In 1872 an imperial rescript propounded a soldier's duties were based upon "loyalty to the throne, obedience to orders, courtesy and respect for superiors, and the prohibition of various types of disruptive conduct."<sup>46</sup> The army, per Yamagata's design, was the most powerful institution in promulgating these attitudes and social norms throughout Japanese society through the end of 1945.

Despite talk of the foreign threat, of most concern to the early Meiji government was domestic unrest. Conscription, poor harvests and other social stresses led to riots. Former samurai banded together in insurgencies. In 1874 responding to a samurai uprising in Kyushu, the government appointed Ōkubo Toshimichi, at the time Home Minister and "one of the most powerful leaders of the new regime, [who had] wanted a samurai army,"<sup>47</sup> to lead the national army contingent to quell the uprising despite his civilian status. Yamagata, at this point the Army Minister and imperial adviser to the army's Tokyo headquarters, "was so annoyed by civilian command he reorganized the army ministry's sixth bureau into a small prototype general staff to exercise control over military operations."<sup>48</sup> Yamagata then resigned as minister, and appointed himself director of this new operations staff as well as commander of the Imperial Guard. He led the Guard to the uprising, and though the fighting had already ended this established the precedent of the army ignoring civilian authority, relying instead on the supreme command of the emperor. It was also at this time that the government had deployed a punitive expedition to Taiwan in response to Taiwanese islanders' slaughter of "Ryūkyū Island sailors" three years earlier. As a result of the ensuing fight, China "paid an indemnity and gave de facto recognition to Japanese claims on the Ryūkyū Islands, which became Okinawa Prefecture in 1879,"<sup>49</sup> and

thus set another precedent, of successful army overseas operations resulting in territorial expansion.

The largest of the samurai uprisings, the Satsuma Rebellion, was led by one of the (still) most popular leaders of the Restoration, an oligarch until he left the government in 1873, Saigo Takamori. The rebellion cost more lives than the Restoration's civil war.<sup>50</sup> Metaphorically, and sometimes literally, just as bruising was the popular rights movement, led by another former oligarch who had left the inner circle at the same time as Saigo, Itagaki Taisuke. With a group of like-minded activists Itagaki petitioned the government in 1874 to establish a national assembly, elected by the people.<sup>51</sup> Despite government attempts to coopt or subvert the movement, as education and news about the outside world spread in Meiji Japan, the people began to demand the kinds of rights enjoyed by others in the world. The government established prefectural assemblies in 1878, hoping to assuage the movement, but this only increased calls for a national assembly, and a constitution. In 1881 the emperor promised a constitution and a national assembly by 1890. Also in 1881 Itagaki formed Japan's first political party, while another was formed the following year.<sup>52</sup>

Ito was the primary author of the constitution, promulgated by the emperor on February 11, 1889, giving the people a national representative assembly, known as the Diet. Ito's intent was the oligarchs remain the pre-eminent power, and for this reason modeled Japan's new constitution after the one in Bismarck's Germany. The *genrō* saw a model they wished to emulate in this late-organizing state that had become a Great Power, and which had an emperor as a, nominal, head of state, while the real power remained in the hands of a few capable men, with Bismarck the first among them.<sup>53</sup>

Though the Meiji Constitution confirmed the emperor as being invested with all sovereignty, his power was not absolute: "The emperor could appoint and remove ministers at will, but his decrees had to be countersigned by them to take effect; the prime minister had no appointive control over his ministers, but he could suspend or reprimand them; the cabinet was granted considerable executive powers, but had to share them with the privy council, the imperial household ministry and the military high command."<sup>54</sup> In addition the Diet gave the political parties "a forum where politicians were able to attack oligarchic leadership free from police harassment and unhindered by press or libel laws," while "the Diet's right of appeal to the emperor" allowed them, "to pass resolutions impeaching government ministers. Although these had no legal standing, they were profoundly embarrassing."<sup>55</sup>

Tradition, mounting precedents and a developing professional bureaucracy added additional *de facto* limits on the emperor's and thus the oligarchs' powers. The control over budget approval gave the Diet, and thus the new political parties more power than Ito had probably intended. He insisted, at first, on

“transcendental cabinets,” ones above political parties, which were dominated by the *genrō*, but then, realizing a political party could serve to bolster his own power, Ito formed one himself in 1900.<sup>56</sup>

Yamagata remained opposed to political parties. The Meiji Constitution had codified both supreme command, conducted through the general staff (which an army reorganization had provided), and “direct access” to the emperor by “both the general staff and the service ministers.”<sup>57</sup> Yamagata further tilted the complicated influence structure in favor of the military by passing an ordinance, as prime minister in 1899, requiring the service ministers be active-duty “generals or admirals.”<sup>58</sup> This, paired with “the tradition of cabinet unity,”<sup>59</sup> allowed the army to veto cabinet policy, while the resignation of a service minister could bring a cabinet down.<sup>60</sup>

The oligarchs had intended to perpetuate their extra-constitutional rule but were unable to leave behind a similarly influential coterie of protégés. In the new century as the *genrō* proved ultimately mortal, the political parties, both genuinely desiring liberal democracy and an increase to their own power, tried to fill the leadership void. But as Japan continued its quest to catch up to and surpass the West it ultimately met with economic and security challenges with which “The system of constitutional irresponsibility”<sup>61</sup> could not cope. Regarding checks and balances, as the Taishō era began, the Meiji system gave the political parties, through the Diet, some room to cultivate political power and democratization, especially because the Diet funded and wrote the government’s checks; but as time went on and a stressed society grew radicalized, the army used its prerogatives to force the balance of power in its favor, and ultimately assert control in the Shōwa era.

Japan sought to become a Great Power, for economic and security reasons, as well as for nationalistic reasons of prestige. Korea had been one of the first targets of this ambition, when Japan “opened” the country in 1876.<sup>62</sup> The army had employed French advisers and translated French doctrine as it tried to emulate perceived Western military success, but was dissatisfied with French emphasis on small-unit tactics, which it felt had hampered army performance in the Satsuma Rebellion. The army ended the French contract in 1879. But the Prussian army’s victory in 1870 over France had made the Prussian army the new model for a modern force, and in 1885, after a year-long tour of European military developments, senior officers in the IJA asked Prussia to provide military advisers. Major Klemens Wilhelm Jakob Meckel began to advise Japan’s army staff college. Meckel’s focus, like Prussia’s, was continental, and he warned Japan’s army the Korean peninsula was a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. Subsequently, in 1890, in his first speech to the Diet as prime minister, Yamagata outlined his view of Japan as a continental power, one with the need to secure a “line of sovereignty” which included all Japanese territory proper, and a “line of interests” which

included Korea.<sup>63</sup> Japan fought its next two wars over control of the Korean peninsula.

Victory in these wars granted Japan, after the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, status as a regional power, and then, after the Russo-Japanese War, in 1905, the status coveted since the beginning of the Meiji era, as a Great Power. Nationalism grew apace. Economically Japan's most successful war was World War I, because "The developed economies of the West were fully occupied in mutual destruction, unable even to exploit the colonial markets from which Japan had been excluded. Japan's modern sector was prepared to fill the gap."<sup>64</sup> Japan transformed from a debtor to a creditor nation, its Gross Domestic Product growing more than 40 percent during the war years.<sup>65</sup>

But this high point was followed by a crash. Though Japan was one of the five Great Powers accorded a seat on the Council of the League of Nations, many of Japan's leaders, both civilian and military, began to feel as Prince Konoe Fumimaro, who accompanied Japan's representative to the Versailles Peace Conference, expressed, that the Great War had really been about "'have' and 'have not' powers," expressing sympathy for Germany, a late-comer to the game like Japan, and antipathy toward the Western allies who now wanted to protect their already gained prerogatives.<sup>66</sup> This point of view became more widespread as Japan plunged into its most severe depression since beginning industrialization. National resentment grew as the United States insulted Japan by outlawing immigration in 1924, and the Western allies undertook naval arms limitation talks, known as the Washington Conference System, granting Japan a smaller ratio of naval tonnage than either the United States or United Kingdom and thus viewed by many Japanese as yet more discrimination.<sup>67</sup>

Japanese society was stressed and began to fracture. Education and information had spread as never before, bringing a new awareness not only of "haves" and "have nots" internationally, but domestically. Zaibatsu, Japan's new conglomerates, and some industrialized sectors weathered the depression or recovered relatively quickly, while the farming sector and those engaged in traditional crafts—still the majority of the population—suffered. Without the extra-constitutional guidance of the original *genrō*, party governments during this so-called Taishō Democracy period tried to seize the reins, but the constitutional system and government institutions proved inadequate and the resulting leadership ultimately feckless.<sup>68</sup> The army grew more concerned.

Soldiers of the IJA had taken two different lessons for World War I: one segment believed the Great War demonstrated wars would be prolonged and total, from this point, requiring the mobilization of all a nation's people and resources to prevail. Another segment believed Japan could not fight a prolonged war, and must instead aim for a short war, preferably against a single opponent, the results safeguarded by diplomacy from a position of strength, after victory. The proponents of a short war argued for a large standing army,

ready to overwhelm violently any opponent. Realizing Japan's deficiencies in size and resources compared to likely opponents like America and Russia, these short-war advocates, harkening back to the effectiveness of the samurai in the Satsuma Rebellion and the IJA itself in the Russo-Japanese War, believed that Japan's unique family state, under the divine emperor, granted its people and especially its soldiers a spiritual strength that could overcome any merely material or numerical superiority of an enemy. The army, like the rest of Japan's political system, had been riven with factions from birth; those soldiers who believed in Japan's unique spiritual strength also stressed the army's role in particular as the direct extension of the emperor's divine will, and this group eventually coalesced into what was called the *Kōdōha*, or Imperial Way Faction. The group that considered prolonged, total war inevitable was more concerned about gaining control of Japan's economy in order to grow its heavy industries, and desired control of society to enforce mobilization of all Japan's people when it became necessary. This group became known as the *Tōseiha*, or Control Faction, and was willing to sacrifice some force structure—that is numbers of troops and amount of equipment—for money to invest in industrial infrastructure.<sup>69</sup>

Both factions, for different reasons, were concerned about protecting the Korean peninsula. Formal annexation in 1910 had extended Japanese territory onto the continent, and thus the line of interests into Siberia to the north and China proper to the west. Securing that line of sovereignty in Korea, as well as the development of an operational doctrine that stressed the necessity of independent, offensive-minded action by army units to gain ultimate victory, and the total-war leanings of a key IJA officer, led to the so-called Manchurian Incident, in 1931, and the beginning of the Fifteen-Year War. The seizure of Manchuria in 1931 had been independently planned and executed by the *Kantōgun*, usually romanized as the Kwantung Army in English, a constabulary force already in the area to protect the South Manchurian Railway.<sup>70</sup>

Though the Taishō era produced many benefits, like expanding educational opportunity and the franchise, many, both civilians and soldiers, perceived increasing chaos. As the 1920s progressed right-leaning groups started calling for a Shōwa Restoration, believing, ahistorically, that Japan's departure from direct rule by a divine emperor had led to the present calamitous situation. A segment of the IJA's soldiers agreed with this, while the larger institution became more concerned with how to restore discipline to society internally and defend society externally.

As the Taishō era gave way to the Shōwa era generals and admirals became more powerful political actors. From 1885 until 1945 half of the 30 prime ministers were active duty or retired military. Though this percentage had dipped in the 1920s, it rose again in the 1930s as Japan reeled from crisis to crisis, both domestic and international.<sup>71</sup> Both short-war and total-war

advocates ascended to leadership. Ugaki Kazushige, IJA general and short-war advocate, as the war minister in 1925 was able to push through a reduction of force of about 40,000 soldiers, in order to fund modernization of equipment for the remaining troops, but what he did with these displaced soldiers was more significant in the long run: "He placed officers from inactivated units into positions as military instructors in elementary and middle schools as drill instructors, extending the army's influence in the education system . . . [to] indoctrinate youth with accepted military values and patriotism," and thus address both the perceived need for more discipline in the civilian populace and imperial subjects who were better prepared for soldiering if conscripted.<sup>72</sup> For the same reasons, in 1926 Ugaki furthered this influence by establishing the Young Men's Military Training Corps, "a voluntary organization that offered civics education and military training under the auspices of members of the Reservists Association to youths age 16 to 20 who had completed their education," with the incentive that those who completed the training and were drafted could shorten their conscription period by six months.<sup>73</sup> Yamagata's goal of all subjects as soldiers thus moved forward.

Within the IJA the contest for influence by the Imperial Way and Control Factions continued, but so did lawlessness and terror in the civilian population, infecting the rank and file of the army as well. As Japan moved into the 1930s, "Between 1930 and 1935, there were twenty major domestic terrorist incidents, four political assassinations, five planned assassinations and four attempted coups."<sup>74</sup> In the so-called 2.26 incident, on February 26, 1936, a group of radicalized young army officers and civilian right-wing radicals murdered the Lord Privy Seal (a retired admiral), the Inspector General of Military education (an active-duty army general) and the Minister of Finance (a civilian) while they slept in their bedrooms. Others were wounded and the prime minister escaped the attempt on his life. The goal of the insurrectionists was a Shōwa Restoration, and they wanted to name one prominent Imperial Way general to be prime minister and another, Araki Sadao, to the post of home minister to "carry out" the restoration. The terrorists were captured and the influence of the Imperial Way Faction was curtailed, at least at the highest levels.<sup>75</sup> The Control Faction came to the fore and focused on unification and preparing to mobilize the entire country for total war.

As this drama and its consequences unfolded domestically, internationally Japan took its next step in a long war, when on July 7, 1937, in fighting between Japanese and Chinese forces at the Marco Polo Bridge, near Beijing, was escalated by the action of a Japanese colonel, who kept the ideal of offensive-minded initiative in mind. A familiar saga of hastily dispatched reinforcements meeting continued resistance, leading to more reinforcements, unfolded as Japan's war extended into what would become the quagmire of China operations.<sup>76</sup>

Domestically the army forced the selection a Control Faction general as prime minister but he was quickly followed by a unification figure, Prince Konoe. It was Konoe who brought Araki back into government, as the Minister of Education, and it was in this post Araki was able to disseminate his ideas about Japan's *Kokutai*, the semi-mystical family state under the benevolent and divine guidance of the emperor throughout the educational system.<sup>77</sup>

Konoe had been convinced of Western prejudice toward East Asians and a coming "race war" since at least 1918<sup>78</sup> (though this did not prevent him from reaching out to Germany, with whom he had expressed sympathy at Versailles, to try to end Japan's international isolation). As prime minister he bought into Japan's mission to civilize and lead the rest of Asia, first announcing a New Order in Asia when it looked like Japan might be able to establish another puppet regime in the part of China pacified by 1938. After a brief time out of office, Konoe returned and "once it seemed clear that Japan would seize the low-hanging fruit of Southeast Asia, the predominantly continental New Order was supplanted by the even grander fiction of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere," in August, 1940.<sup>79</sup> The following month Japan occupied northern Indochina, despite Vichy protests. At the end of the month Japan signed the Axis alliance with Germany and Italy in Berlin.<sup>80</sup>

This move brought sanctions from America and the West. Still the war in China dragged on, while Japan's need for resources grew more acute. In July 1941, when Japan moved into southern Indochina, America "froze all of Japan's assets," and embargoed oil.<sup>81</sup> Coming as this did on top of previous sanctions, Japan found itself with a deadline to either thrust even farther south and west to secure the resources and territory necessary for autarky, or to give in to Western demands.<sup>82</sup> The army estimated Japan had enough fuel to fight until October before having to go to war to secure more resources. Konoe engaged in negotiations with America, but resigned in October, to be replaced by his War Minister, *Tōseiha* member Tojo Hideki. The deadline for acquiescence or attack was extended into November and then into December.<sup>83</sup>

For the half-year after December 8, 1941 (on Japan's side of the International Dateline), it seemed the IJA might live up to its own created myths. But then the IJA and Japan had to wake from its dream, though plunged into nightmare. The Japanese imperial military, both the army and the navy, had taken from their victory in the Russo-Japanese War an unshakeable belief in the efficacy of a decisive battle, like the Battle of Tsushima, in bringing war with the Allies to an end favorable to Japan. It was this belief in a decisive battle, as well as concerns for national and institutional prestige and the cherished mystique of Japan's invincible *gunjin seishin*, soldierly or martial spirit, that kept the generals and admirals in the war years past a rational and honest assessment of the situation. The emperor shared the faith in a decisive battle:

“At the very least it’s fair to say that well into 1945 Hirohito held out hope a military victory would enable Japan’s diplomats to negotiate a settlement to the war.”<sup>84</sup> But, in the end it was “Japan’s generals and admirals who led the nation into a defeat they were unwilling to accept.”<sup>85</sup>

And the Japanese people have not forgotten.

## CREATING THE GSDF: A COMPLEX VICTORY

As a study with both thematic and chronological elements, the two categories do not always perfectly overlap, nor are all themes, or topics within themes, either covered or covered in as much depth in each of the chronological periods. Thus, for instance, though the focus of the study is the 70 years from 1945 to 2015, in order to discuss Japan’s renunciation of war, and of arms, I investigate the history of the IJA from 1868 until 1945, and the planning that began in 1942 in the United States. When discussing important aspects of the consolidation of the GSDF’s positive military identity in chapter six, which chronologically covers the 1960s and 1970s, I pull in information from the 1950s, and I do the same when discussing the disaster relief and community support missions the GSDF has made an important part of their identity, in chapter seven, though it is chronologically focused on the years from 1978 to 1995. In tracing the reimagining of warriors and an army, in chapter nine, I cover the entire 70 years and, at times reach back to an earlier period than the chronological setting of the particular section.

This work is the first of its kind to offer, in English, an institutional and organizational history focused on the GSDF for the first 70 years of its existence. It takes on issues of policy and challenges the accepted history of the origin of Article 9. It is the first study to focus on the GSDF’s creation of its own professional identity, and the first history to trace depictions, and the lack of depictions, of soldiers in Japan’s postwar popular culture. As well, the history highlights understandings of and challenges to Japan’s defense policy and defense identity in popular culture. The history of the creation of the Ground Self-Defense Force is complex, involving policymakers from two nations, a public that comes to desire a defense force that does not seem military, and most, importantly, a military that wants to serve that public. The story begins with defeat, but is ultimately a story of victory; the victory of a dedicated group of soldiers and other public servants who, working through the difficulties enumerated in this study, manage to craft a professional, well-respected ground force that is committed to serving the nation of Japan and contributing to international security abroad and still seeks a consistently positive and active presence in their country’s imagination.

## NOTES

1. There is no unproblematic designation for the war in Japan. The Greater East Asia War is considered a term on the right, and began in 1941. The Pacific War is a more neutral term and also began in 1941, but has connotations of only involving Japan's battles with the Allies, and not the Asian peoples involved. The Manchurian Incident (1931), the China Incident (1937), the Japan-China War (1937–1945) all address subsets of the period in question, but the Fifteen-Year War, though considered “a term of the left” is the most inclusive of the period addressed in this work, so I will use Fifteen-Year War or simply the war. See Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook, *Japan at War: An Oral History* (New York: The New Press, 1992), 11.

2. William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), 198.

3. From his acceptance speech for induction into the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College International Hall of Fame, April, 1998.

4. Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, “The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947.” (Princeton, NJ: distributed by Princeton University Press, 1998), RM349.

5. Carol Gluck, “Entangling Illusions—Japanese and American Views of the Occupation,” in *New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg*, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 169.

6. See especially Dale M. Hellegers, *We, the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Marlene J. Mayo, “Wartime Planning for Japan,” in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952*, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984).

7. John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 29.

8. As quoted in *ibid.*, 7.

9. Quoted in Darrell Houston, “The Mishima Incident: ‘A Wasteful Way to Die,’” *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* (1970), <http://aliciapatterson.org/APF001970/Houston/Houston07/Houston07.html>.

10. For a Westerner's perspective, see Isaac Shapiro, *Edokko: Growing up a Foreigner in Wartime Japan* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2010).

11. See the individual recollections recounted in Cook and Cook.

12. *Ibid.* See also John W. Dower, *Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays* (New York: The New Press, 1993), 278–279.

13. Cook and Cook, 14.

14. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999).

15. Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945–1970* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 12.

16. Robert Edward Ward et al., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 24.

17. Yoneyuki Sugita, *Pitfall of Panacea: The Irony of US Power in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 19.

18. Theodore McNelly, *The Origins of Japan's Democratic Constitution* (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 2000), 6, 109, 41. Also see Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM286.

19. McNelly, *The Origins of Japan's Democratic Constitution*, 114.

20. Samuel B. Griffith, ed. *Sun Tzu the Art of War*, Unesco Collection of Representative Works Chinese Series (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 114.

21. Nakamura Takafusa, as quoted in Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: AEI Press for the American Enterprise Institute, 1996), 33.

22. Kent E. Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949–1986* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Tetsuya Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics* (New York: C. Russak, 1991).

23. Andrew Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*, Studies in Asian Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 68.

24. Carol Gluck, "Japan's Modernities, 1850–1990s," *Asia in Western and World History: A Guide for Teaching*, eds. Ainslie T. Embree and Carol Gluck (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997).

25. During interpolations on Japan's 1946 draft constitution in the Imperial Diet's House of Peers Yamamoto Yūzō, "playwright, novelist, editor," who "proposed writing the Constitution in colloquial Japanese," asked why the Japanese government had chosen to translate "renunciation of war" into Japanese as "*sensō hōki*," which "when put into everyday Japanese, will mean the 'throwing off of war,'" Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," Biographical Notes; *ibid.*, RM45.

26. Christopher Booker, *The Seven Basic Plots: Why We Tell Stories* (London: Continuum, 2004), esp. 21–50.

27. Ivan I. Morris, *The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan* (New York: The Noonday Press, Farrar Straus Giroux, 1975), esp. ch. 1.

28. H. Paul Varley, *Warriors of Japan as Portrayed in the War Tales* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), esp. 11–125.

29. Martin van Creveld, *The Culture of War* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008), esp. section III. See also Bruno Bettelheim, *The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales*, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1976). In Japan, *Heike*, for instance, offers good examples. See Varley, *Warriors of Japan as Portrayed in the War Tales*, 87.

30. In the West a good example of criticizing war aims and the military ethos is found in the *Iliad*. See Caroline Alexander, *The War That Killed Achilles: The True Story of Homer's Iliad and the Trojan War* (New York: Viking, 2009). In Japan see for example Morris, *The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan*; Varley, *Warriors of Japan as Portrayed in the War Tales*.

31. Booker, *The Seven Basic Plots: Why We Tell Stories*, 568.
32. Takashi Inoguchi, "The Evolving Dynamics of Japan's National Identity and Foreign Policy Role," in *Global Governance: Germany and Japan in the International System*, ed. Hanns W. Maull Saori N. Katada, Takashi Inoguchi (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), 31.
33. William R. Hochman, "Something of Great Constancy," in *Something of Great Constancy: Essays in Honor of the Memory of J. Glenn Gray, 1913–1917*, ed. Timothy Fuller (Lunenburg, VT: The Stinehour Press, 1979), 165–66.
34. van Creveld, *The Culture of War*, 203.
35. Igarashi, 11.
36. Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 15.
37. See especially introductions, Paul E. Dunscomb, *Japan's Imperial Intervention, 1918–1922: A Great Disobedience Against the People* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), and Frederick R. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999).
38. Edward J. Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 5.
39. *Ibid.*, 21.
40. *Ibid.*, 24.
41. *Ibid.*, 23–25.
42. *Ibid.*, 29.
43. *Ibid.*
44. Richard J. Smethurst, *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974), 2.
45. Drea, 31.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*, 20.
48. *Ibid.*, 37.
49. *Ibid.*, 38.
50. Peter Duus, *Modern Japan*, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 107.
51. *Ibid.*, 108.
52. *Ibid.*, 109–112.
53. *Ibid.*, 112, 125–126
54. *Ibid.*, 126.
55. *Ibid.*, 172.
56. *Ibid.*, 172–174.
57. Dunscomb, 13.
58. Duus, 173.
59. Dunscomb, 13.
60. *Ibid.*, and Duus, 174.
61. Dunscomb, 11.
62. Duus, 140.

63. Drea, 74–75.
64. Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 531.
65. *Ibid.*
66. *Ibid.*, 519.
67. *Ibid.*, esp. 520–522.
68. *Ibid.*, 519–575.
69. Drea, 150–169. See also Samuels, 15–21.
70. *Ibid.*
71. Jansen, 590–591.
72. Drea, 154.
73. *Ibid.*
74. *Ibid.*, 181.
75. Jansen, 597–598.
76. Drea, 191.
77. Jansen, 620.
78. Samuels, 27.
79. *Ibid.*, 28.
80. Drea, 213.
81. Jansen, 636.
82. For the Control Faction's drive for autarky, see Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
83. Jansen, 639–642.
84. Drea, *In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 199.
85. *Ibid.*, 210.



## *Chapter 2*

# **Disarmament and the Voices of Dissent**

Soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army loomed like supermen during the first six months after Pearl Harbor, “a solid wall of uniform strength that nothing could wear down and in which every soldier was an ideal fighting machine.”<sup>1</sup> Yet this wall began to crack by the spring of 1942 and by the time of the Japanese surrender it had all but collapsed. The IJA had suffered hard-fought defeat after hard-fought defeat. From 1937 until 1945 2.3 million Japanese had died “from combat, combat-related injuries and war-related fatal illnesses.”<sup>2</sup> A further 1.5 million were missing.<sup>3</sup> Approximately 5.5 million IJA soldiers had survived, with 2.3 million on the home islands and 1.2 million overseas.<sup>4</sup> Many of the survivors were starving or wounded. As the emperor’s once-proud soldiers were repatriated and demobilized they began to bear another burden—the blame for causing the suffering of their countrymen in the Fifteen-Year War. Like many of their fellow subjects (still not yet citizens) most of the humbled soldiers of the emperor probably wanted more than anything else to put their wartime experiences behind them.

Americans, however, were in less of a mood to forget, or to forgive. Most Americans viewed the Japanese Army as monstrous. And since many likely agreed with a U.S. Navy officer who said at the time, “The Japanese Army IS the people,”<sup>5</sup> it is no surprise that the American consensus seemed to be this people had to be kept down; this army had to be broken. Considering the moods in the United States and Japan at the time of surrender, both the American decision to enforce and Japan’s decision to embrace a renunciation of war is not surprising. Less well known is the story of the few on both sides of the Pacific, in and outside of their respective governments, who kept alive the idea of an army in postwar Japan. Though a dissenting minority during and immediately after the war, these dissenting voices, first murmuring, perhaps, but then ever more strongly, declared Japan would need arms to effectively

cope with the threats of the international system. These voices moved from a dissenting minority to the majority, at least in the United States, early in the Cold War. Yet the conception of, the attitudes toward, the images of—even the shape and feel of—a new army in Japan had forever changed. Japan needed a new ground force, a new army, but this was to be a new kind of sword.

### PRE-SURRENDER: PLANNING FOR A HARD PEACE

Eugene H. Dooman, a counselor in the American Embassy in Tokyo while Joseph Grew was the Ambassador, and arguably Grew's closest associate in the State Department, noted in his postwar talks and writings that the pre-surrender American attitude toward the Japanese almost universally favored a hard peace:

As one might have expected, the measures called for were of the most drastic character and if carried out would have overturned Japan's social order and national polity and have condemned the Japanese people to the lowest level of subsistence, if not actual starvation. . . . In short, the demand for harsh treatment was public opinion.<sup>6</sup>

Permanent disarmament was an integral part of this hard peace, and widely considered the first priority. The following quote from a 1943 *Newsweek* article is typical of the time: "In the first place, the aggressors in this war must not only be disarmed, but must be kept disarmed."<sup>7</sup> In some ways the consensus for a peace without mercy for Japan had taken on some of the trappings of an ideology. As Dooman, again, says, "the voices of a handful of citizens who were shocked by this primitive hatred could not be heard above the clamor."<sup>8</sup> The overwhelming public consensus in the United States was that Japan was inherently militaristic; that a Japanese, as the narrator in the Frank Capra-directed 1945 documentary *Know Your Enemy: Japan* ominously intones, "has been trained to be a soldier almost from birth," and believes "treachery, brutality, rape and torture are all justified if used towards non-Japanese."<sup>9</sup> The evidence seemed clear; not only had Japan attacked America, but both its samurai traditions—at least Western constructions of samurai traditions, so well crystallized then further propagated in the Capra film—and the war atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers during the fierce fighting in the Pacific appeared to confirm that Japan and the Japanese would have to be firmly held down to enforce peace.

Under the resulting pressure those who favored an alternative, arguing for a longer view concerning the treatment of Japan in general and the issue of eventual rearmament in particular, tended to do so discreetly. Though seldom

found in print this alternative view was sufficiently widespread in 1943 to elicit this warning in the January issue of *The Atlantic Monthly*, in effect, cautioning the faithful against backsliding: "Suspicious of China arise from ignorance of the Far East and from fear that a strong China and a strong Russia might develop aggressive tendencies. Hence the reluctance to crush Japan. Hence the argument that the course of wisdom consists in maintaining a strong Japan in order to block the ambitions of our present allies."<sup>10</sup> From the context it is clear the intent of the column from which this quote was taken is to expose this argument as specious and dangerous, but the argument in the quote itself closely hews to and neatly summarizes the rationale of many who then and later advocated Japanese rearmament; to do so openly in 1943, however, was to risk the almost certainty of being labeled an advocate of appeasement or of soft peace, almost a form of heresy.

Policymaking, and perhaps particularly foreign policymaking, however, is somewhat hermetic; though certainly drawing from and influenced by public opinion, it also tends to move to its own rhythms and stores of knowledge. From the beginning of the war there were those in the United States who advocated a more measured policy toward Japan, once defeated, that would allow for at least eventual rearmament. The first draft surrender terms, written in 1942 by the President's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy's Subcommittee on Security Problems, did not envision permanent disarmament, but only sought partial disarmament of Japan's extant armed forces, with "a highly limited occupation that would leave Japanese military units intact and still armed in areas not occupied."<sup>11</sup> In the State Department planners coming up with an agenda for a subsequent meeting of the Subcommittee on Security Problems focused on Japan issues, in 1943, still suggested discussing "such objectives as limitation of the power of the military,"<sup>12</sup> not the permanent dissolution of the military.

It was particularly in the State Department that a group, variously called "Japan Hands" or the "Japan Crowd," academics and diplomats like Hugh Borton, George Blakeslee, and Robert Fearey who were specialists on Japan, would argue for less drastic measures in a postwar peace with Japan.<sup>13</sup> Others like the so-called China Crowd, saw republican China as the champion and hope for a stable Asia after the war, and these individuals argued Japan had to be kept down, and disarmed, lest it disrupt a Pax Sinica firmly subordinated to a Pax Americana. Still others in Washington argued for the most extreme of measures, from Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's idea to strip both Germany and Japan of their industry and enforce on them status as permanent agrarian economies, to ideas for the sterilization of all Japanese males held in the United States at the time, to the outright extermination of all Japanese.<sup>14</sup> While the harsher views drew strength from the general American public's call for a hard peace, the Japan Hands remained a moderating influence throughout the

pre-surrender planning process. Their influence was more effective for being almost entirely out of the public eye, as demonstrated by the derision heaped on more moderate views once such views were made public.

Perhaps the best-known figure thus pilloried for supporting such a moderate stance was Joseph C. Grew. Grew had been the U.S. ambassador to Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor. After he and other embassy members returned to the United States following a high-level prisoner exchange, the ambassador traveled around the country exhorting his fellow citizens to take the Japanese enemy seriously; to prepare for a long war; and to settle for no compromise peace, which would entail another war one or two generations on.

By the end of 1943, however, a new note had entered Grew's speeches. In a talk before the Illinois Education Association, in December 1943, after his usual blandishments about accepting no compromise in surrender, he took issue with the "obscure thinking in our country arising from an inadequate grasp of the facts, which has brought about a deep-rooted prejudice against the Japanese people as a whole." He also questioned the utility of "building a fence" around postwar Japan, and he cautioned against imposing harsh surrender terms on Japan as a means of preventing Japan from regaining its pre-war competitive position in the global marketplace, admonishing his audience that using military means to achieve such ends was contrary to the Atlantic Charter. Grew encouraged, instead, cooperation with elements in Japan amenable to American aims. For these and similar statements, and probably especially for his view that American authorities should leave open the possibility of retaining the Emperor in office after the war, Grew was accused in both the media and in some government circles of being an exponent of soft peace.<sup>15</sup>

There is only indirect evidence Grew supported rearming Japan. After the war Grew was named honorary co-chairman of the American Council on Japan, a group which actively supported rearming Japan.<sup>16</sup> In the pre-surrender period Grew's use of the following quote, from eminent Japan historian Sir George Sansom, may have indicated the ambassador's support for a rearmed Japan: "An outlawed Japan, even weakened to the point of despair, cannot be other than a danger, a kind of septic focus. I therefore see no escape from the conclusion that, in their own interests, the United Nations must after the war endeavor to enlist the collaboration of Japan in their projects for the security and welfare in the Pacific area."<sup>17</sup> While the term "security" as used here does not refer explicitly to a role for recreated Japanese arms, in the diplomatic lexicon the use of the word security often implies at least the possibility of the exercise of armed force. Those closest to Grew explicitly supported rearmament: his wife<sup>18</sup> and his closest associate, Eugene Dooman.

As stated previously Grew and Dooman continued to work closely together once they returned to Washington and the State Department. The near identity of their views concerning Japan is best illustrated by the following example.

In the years leading up to Pearl Harbor Grew became convinced his views were being misrepresented in Washington, especially by Stanley Hornbeck, a China Hand, and "the State Department's most outspoken critic of Japan's continental expansion."<sup>19</sup> For a time Hornbeck was the head of the State Department's Far Eastern Division. In 1940, therefore, when Dooman decided to take leave in the United States, Ambassador Grew urged his friend and subordinate to contact President Roosevelt, Grew's Harvard classmate. The Ambassador provided Dooman with a letter of introduction (beginning, "Dear Frank") which read, in part:

When this letter is delivered to you, Eugene Dooman, our counselor of Embassy, will be for a few days in Washington on leave of absence. During these difficult years he has been my right-hand man and *fidus achates*, and since our views coincide in practically every respect with regard to affairs in this part of the world, I believe it would be worth your while if you would see him if only for a few moments, for it would be very much like talking to you myself.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, at least in Grew's opinion, his and Dooman's views on Japan being practically identical, support for Japanese rearmament on Dooman's part may indicate similar support for rearmament on Grew's part.

Described by historian John Dower "as one of the core members of the State Department's 'Japan Hands,'" and "one of the most effective advocates of a strong, reconstructed Japan,"<sup>21</sup> Dooman, in January 1945, was chosen to chair the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Subcommittee on the Far East (SFE). The subcommittee was given the task of formulating "for presentation to the parent committee, the policies to be carried out during the occupation of Japan after its surrender."<sup>22</sup> The SFE was the first stop for the coordination of the State Department's views with the views of similar bodies in the Navy and War Departments, before submitting those views to the parent committee. Again and again, in this position and at other times, as Under Secretary Grew's Special Assistant, Dooman tried to soften the hard peace positions of many other participants—both within the State Department and elsewhere—in the policymaking process.<sup>23</sup> His primary concern was not Japanese rearmament; rather he shared the concerns of Grew that the Emperor be retained in some capacity on his throne after Japanese surrender, and that Japan be economically rehabilitated after the war. With regard to this latter concern, he felt that Japan's rearmament would be concomitant with the revival of Japanese industry. In a speech he prepared for the Foreign Policy Association in 1945 Dooman states: "No nation will ever reconcile itself to a reduction of its standard of living, and if we are not prepared to keep down the standard of living, by force if necessary, and for all time to come, we need not delude ourselves into thinking the demilitarization of our enemies is anything but temporary."<sup>24</sup>

Though Grew and Dooman were influential in keeping at least the possibility of an eventually rearmed Japan alive, they could not dictate such a policy. The answer to the question of whether Japan was to be kept permanently disarmed or to be allowed to rearm eventually continued to see-saw in the planning process. Outside of the government as well, in spite of the increasingly harsh tone of the general public's discourse by 1944, individuals on occasion urged restraint toward Japan. Stefan T. Possony, a conservative scholar and realist, later to make a name for himself as "an influential academic strategist of the cold war,"<sup>25</sup> was one such dissident voice.

In a 1944 article in the journal *Review of Politics*, entitled "No Peace without Arms," Possony is not opposed to disarmament absolutely, but to disarmament carried on too long. He notes the difficulty of keeping a state disarmed, even if the victor state is willing to occupy the vanquished state indefinitely, and further notes the impossibility of universal disarmament. People will inevitably protect themselves with some sort of weapons, he argues, even if only with small arms. "The disarmed state," he also writes, "is, of course, an easy prey if the armed countries should turn to aggression."<sup>26</sup> Contrary to the conventional wisdom of the time, he goes on to note, "there is no iron law that a nation which was once aggressive will always remain so." For these reasons, he warns, "Unilateral disarmament is only a short-term solution. As such it is effective; yet if a status of unilateral disarmament is perpetuated, in spite of its *raison d'être* having vanished, it might become the germ of a new war."<sup>27</sup> Possony notes the ineffectuality of past, even partial, disarmament regimes, contending, as an example, the dissatisfaction Japan felt after the Washington Treaty System of the 1920s directly contributed to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Summing up his argument in the conclusion, Possony quotes George Washington, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving the peace."<sup>28</sup>

But to say that foreign policymaking takes place within a relatively hermetic process is not to say it is wholly cut off from popular opinion, and by 1944, even in the only semi-permeable foreign policymaking circles those urging a more moderate approach to Japan's post-defeat occupation took on an almost defensive tone. In a paper entitled "Steps to Prevent the Revival of Militarism," for instance, published by the Postwar Programs Committee, the problem of eventual rearmament was approached tentatively:

If notwithstanding the wide consensus that Japan should not be permitted in the postwar period to retain an army, navy, or air force, Japan should later be permitted to maintain some form of military establishment, such permission should envisage as an essential condition the elimination of existing statutes and ordinances that stipulate that ministers of war and of the navy shall be high-ranking military and naval officers.<sup>29</sup>

The struggle continued into 1945. In December 1944 the aforementioned SWNCC was established as the final arbiter of postwar planning and policy recommendations to the President; and the SWNCC's subcommittee, the SFE, was established the following month. A draft document of the subcommittee, entitled "United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan," also known as SWNCC 150, called for "to the extent possible the permanent disarmament and demilitarization of Japan." This language was apparently in response to a proposal from the Office of Naval Operations which had opposed an earlier State draft calling for "current or temporary disarmament and demobilization."<sup>30</sup> In the second version of the document the position hardened further. The phrase "to the extent possible" was dropped and instead the policy became "to accomplish the permanent and complete disarmament of Japan."<sup>31</sup> The document went through two more versions before being approved by President Truman and transmitted to MacArthur on August 29, 1945, the day before he flew into Atsugi Air Station to begin his tour as the Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Japan. This final document, "The Initial Postsurrender Policy for Japan," directs "Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation,"<sup>32</sup> but the language on permanent disarmament and demilitarization has been dropped.

Just whose position carried the day on the advisability of at the least keeping open the possibility of Japan rearming in the future is impossible to say. The role of the Japan Hands has already been mentioned. Portions of Possony's article were excerpted in a well-balanced Library of Congress study, "Armaments Policy in the Postwar World," published in May 1945,<sup>33</sup> and it is possible President Truman and some policymakers may have been persuaded by his arguments. Other dissident voices included President Herbert Hoover who, concerned about the possible Soviet domination of the Pacific if Japan was kept down too long, sent a letter to President Truman suggesting not permanent disarmament, but that Japan's army and navy be dissolved "for a long enough period (probably a generation)" to break the power of Japan's military clique.<sup>34</sup> Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who had questioned "How far and how thoroughly do we want to beat Japan? In other words, do we want to Morgenthau those islands—do we want to destroy the whole industrial potential?" in May 1945,<sup>35</sup> would later be a leading figure in the Occupation's reverse course<sup>36</sup> and even later as Secretary of Defense would direct a "feasibility study on rearming Japan,"<sup>37</sup> and may also have influenced Truman's decisions.

In any case, as the Occupation began neither the Potsdam Declaration issued in July 1945—which did make clear Allied demands Japan's "war-making power [was to be] destroyed," and the Japanese military was to be "completely disarmed"<sup>38</sup>—nor the Initial Post-surrender Policy, the two primary policy documents, made explicit that disarmament and destruction

of war-making potential were to be permanent. As the Occupation began the issue of permanent disarmament still had not been resolved.

### AND ON THE SEVENTH DAY THEY RESTED<sup>39</sup>

Nor was the issue of constitutional revision settled. The Japan Hands in the State Department, in particular, had discussed the probable need for revising Japan's Meiji Constitution. In October 1943, for instance, Hugh Borton authored a document stating "Constitutional change is desirable."<sup>40</sup> Though there were other suggestions for constitutional revision, the idea did not become embedded in the policies eventually published, and neither the Potsdam Declaration nor the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan explicitly called for revising the Meiji Constitution. Thus when General MacArthur arrived to take on the duty of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers in September 1945 it was not only individuals in Japan, but also members of MacArthur's General Headquarters staff who believed that, instead of revision, creative interpretation could be applied to existing constitution.<sup>41</sup> MacArthur did not wait for a formal directive from Washington, however. In quick succession he told the first two postwar cabinets revision of the constitution would be required.<sup>42</sup>

If there was confusion over the necessity for constitutional revision on the American side, the situation was equally confused on the Japanese side. Not only was there disagreement concerning the need for revising the Meiji Constitution at all,<sup>43</sup> but, soon after the Occupation authorities directed revision, just who was responsible for revising the constitution became tangled between two bodies.

MacArthur met with Prince Konoe Fumimaro, first in September, in Yokohama, and then on October 4, in Tokyo. Konoe had been prime minister during the war three times, and was deputy prime minister in the post-surrender cabinet of Prince Higashikuni. In the second meeting with SCAP, on October 4, the Foreign Ministry interpreter who had accompanied Konoe reported that MacArthur had said the Japanese constitution would have to be revised.<sup>44</sup> The Higashikuni cabinet fell on the same day. Konoe was subsequently appointed to the Privy Council as a special advisor, and, having advised the Lord Privy Seal, Kido Koichi, and the emperor himself, Konoe undertook to begin revising the Meiji Constitution.

The new cabinet, under veteran politician Shidehara Kijuro, however, had other ideas. Forewarned that MacArthur might direct them to undertake constitutional revision, Japanese officials had met with Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, on MacArthur's staff, and the Japanese side had agreed with the American side that no explicit call for constitutional revision would be

made when Shidehara met MacArthur. Thus, when the SCAP first met Prime Minister Shidehara, MacArthur called for the "liberalization of the constitution," but not explicitly for revision. Shidehara, still hoping to either avoid revising the Meiji Constitution or to revise it minimally, subsequently established the Committee to Study Constitutional Problems. The PM appointed minister without portfolio Matsumoto Jōji, a conservative jurist who did not allow his near-complete lack of expertise in constitutional matters to shake his supreme self-confidence in his inerrant ability to drive such a study.<sup>45</sup>

For a time both Konoe and his advisors, reporting to the Privy Council, and the Matsumoto Committee, reporting to the cabinet, claimed responsibility for revising the constitution. The rivalry became public in an increasing number of reports in the Japanese press, and many of these reports were critical of the Privy Council's involvement in constitutional revision. At the same time reports in the United States became critical of entrusting Konoe with the responsibility to revise the Meiji constitution.<sup>46</sup>

Konoe had been prime minister in 1937, when Japan's limited war in Manchuria widened to China proper. A *New York Herald Tribune* editorial declared "of all the absurd blunders made by America in the Far East, one of the worst is the selection of Prince Fumimaro Konoe to draft Japan's constitution. It is equivalent to choosing a gunman to devise rules for a reform school."<sup>47</sup> On November 1 SCAP issued a statement contending MacArthur had not directed Konoe to undertake constitutional revision. The general explained he had told Konoe revision would be necessary, but because the Higashikuni cabinet had resigned the same day, MacArthur subsequently had also told the Shidehara government revision would be necessary. The change in the SCAP's tone was due not only to the increasing criticism of Konoe in the U.S. press, but to an internal SCAP investigation which indicated Konoe should be considered a war criminal.<sup>48</sup>

Though Konoe did submit a draft constitution in November to the Emperor, the draft went no further. Konoe committed suicide the following month, to avoid prosecution as a war criminal.<sup>49</sup> Though Ambassador Grew considered this an ignoble end for a man he had once described as the Japanese leader who had "alone tried to reverse the engine," of Japan's drive to wider war,<sup>50</sup> Konoe's ultimate legacy is more ambiguous. Though he did later join with others to try to end the war earlier than it did end, it was Prime Minister Konoe who had signed Japan's Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, and Konoe who had declared Japan's mission to form the Great East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere, which had turned out to be neither particularly great nor particularly prosperous for the countries occupied by Japan.

In the end, Konoe's draft constitution had no impact on the drafting of Japan's postwar constitution, but it does reveal Konoe and those who worked with him on the draft were among those who contributed to the Japanese

voices of dissent regarding Japan's armaments. The third of nine provisions Konoe had listed as necessary in his draft revision of the Meiji Constitution reads, "It shall be made especially clear that the command and organization of the armed forces are affairs of State."<sup>51</sup> Provisions for the Japanese military mirrored those in the Matsumoto draft. Neither Konoe's nor Matsumoto's drafts had much influence on the content of the American draft, but American interactions with Konoe did indicate that the idea of Japan rearming after the conclusion of the Occupation was still being considered at least by some U.S. officials.

Four days after Konoe's fateful meeting with the SCAP in Tokyo he met again with SCAP Political Advisor Atcheson, who had attended the initial meeting. Atcheson outlined several revisions needed in the new constitution. One suggestion included a revision to diminish the authority of the Emperor over the army and navy, and no mention was made of abolishing those forces. The suggestions from Atcheson were based on his own initiative, since he had not yet received a reply to a query concerning constitutional revision he had sent to the Secretary of State on October 4. After Atcheson's office had received a reply from State, Konoe met with two of Atcheson's staff members, John K. Emmerson and Robert T. Fearey, on October 25. In this meeting Konoe was given the more explicit instructions for constitutional revision which had arrived from State; included among these instructions was an injunction for a revision stipulating that any ministers for armed forces be civilians, in case Japan was to be allowed armed forces in the future.<sup>52</sup>

As the possibility of future rearmament was being discussed, lingering doubts among a number of Japanese and Americans concerning the necessity of revising the Meiji Constitution seemed to dissipate. Within two months of the beginning of the Occupation revision seemed to be on everyone's mind, both on the SCAP staff and in the general Japanese public. In October MacArthur directed his Government Section to conduct a thorough review of the Meiji Constitution in order to determine which provisions were "contrary to the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration."<sup>53</sup> In parallel in the Japanese public the creation of postwar constitutional revisions became something of a cottage industry and by December proposed drafts proliferated as, to rephrase an old Chinese saying, one hundred constitutions bloomed.<sup>54</sup>

In Japanese government circles these blossoms had appeared even earlier, and in discussing the probable need to revise the Meiji Constitution, the status of the military and the emperor's war-making functions were of particular interest. In a memorandum dated September 18, 1945 Toshio Irie enumerated articles in the Meiji Constitution that would have to be amended, given the Potsdam Declaration. He listed all articles related to the military, including those articles giving the Emperor the right to declare war (Article XII), declare a state of siege (Article XIV), and exercise the "Emperor's prerogative in case

of emergency" (Article XXXI), recommending either removal of war or military-related language or outright removal of the entire article. He finally notes in his remarks that some might think the articles just listed need not be amended, admitting some interpreted the Potsdam Declaration as allowing the emperor and the Japanese state some war-related powers.<sup>55</sup>

Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, a constitutional scholar from Tokyo Imperial University, in a lecture to the Foreign Ministry on September 28, 1945, disagreed with this more flexible view of the Potsdam Declaration, focusing on three key points which would necessitate revising the Meiji Constitution and changing laws, and include dissolving the military. First noting disbanding the military would mean the end of the system "peculiar to the past government . . . of the so-called 'double government,'" including "the high command's direct access to the Throne." He also notes the "state of siege," article, which, when put into effect, invoked military rule, was meaningless without armed forces, and went on to stress the necessity that foreigners not mistake any changes Japan made to the Meiji Constitution as indicating retention of armed force; indicating for instance, that the "Emergency Power" provision could be retained only "if this is understood not to be a part of military government." He finally felt, "Under the Potsdam Declaration constitutional revision must come," but, in response to a question, stated it would be possible to promulgate an interim constitution,<sup>56</sup> thus presumably giving Japan more time later to come up with their own solution, one not mandated by the victors.

In an interim report on constitution revision, dated October 5, 1945, Yabe Teiji states retention of military clauses in a revised Meiji Constitution would be "ideal" but immediately declares that objective "unrealistic." He goes on in his article-by-article notations to recommend elimination of all the military clauses, but in each case adds, if the article is retained, a recommendation to amend it, without any specificity regarding the form of the amendment.<sup>57</sup>

Finally, in this short survey of some of the official views in Japan regarding revising the constitution and the possibility of postwar Japanese armament immediately after the surrender, officials in Japan's Legislation Bureau, in a memo dated October 22, 1945, ask whether the Meiji Constitution's conscription article should be eliminated, and go on to suggest the possibility of substituting the phrase "have the honor of defending the homeland," for "obligation of military service" in the extant article.<sup>58</sup>

Thus there were a few dissident voices among Japanese officials regarding disarmament from the beginning. Around the same time as the last of the Japanese reviews mentioned above, the American Occupation officials continued to consider options. In addition to Government Section efforts, George Atcheson, spurred on when SCAP directed him to cease communications with Konoe in November, cabled the State Department for further instructions regarding constitutional revision. In December he received and briefed

to MacArthur, the gist of "Reform of the Japanese Government," the latest paper produced by the SWNCC. SWNCC 228, as the final planning document eventually became known, explicitly advocated constitutional revision, but it was not a directive; instead it was for "information only." MacArthur received a written copy of SWNCC 228 in January, 1946.<sup>59</sup>

Though SWNCC 228 otherwise had a significant impact on the contents of the eventual American draft of the postwar constitution, it did not advocate the permanent disarmament of Japan. Instead, similar to the paper by the Postwar Programs Committee already cited, SWNCC 228 recommended, "action permanently subordinating the military services to the civil government by requiring that ministers of state or members of the cabinet must, in all cases, be civilians."<sup>60</sup> The contents of SWNCC 228 were not made available to the Japanese before they completed their own draft.

### A Lost Clause and a Potential Problem

The Matsumoto Committee in the meantime, putting behind the initial confusion, had worked steadily through the New Year. The committee submitted its draft to SCAP's Government Section in late January. An English-language explanation Matsumoto sent along with his proposed revisions indicates how the committee considered providing a post-Occupation military for Japan. Matsumoto explained the new constitution would signify a break with Japan's militarist past by dropping the terms "army" (*rikugun*) and "navy" (*kaigun*) and substituting the term "armed forces" (*guntai*). As is also typical of subsequent arguments from pro-revisionists, Matsumoto stressed civilian control would be maintained, and he stressed Japan would need some sort of military once it joined the United Nations, in order to fulfill its obligations under the charter which calls for collective defense.<sup>61</sup>

Matsumoto's rationale for each of his other revisions was equally detailed, but the Government Section was not swayed. Forewarned by press leaks they had expected a draft too little changed from the Meiji document, and the Matsumoto draft confirmed their fears. After a quick but thorough critique they determined Matsumoto's proposals to be "totally inadequate," contributing to the chain of events which led to the Government Section drafting its own version of an acceptable constitution.<sup>62</sup>

On February 4, 1946, Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, chief of the Government Section, relayed MacArthur's order to draft a constitution to a select group of his subordinates at a closed, highly secretive meeting. The drafting was to continue under the same veil of secrecy as this initial meeting, and Whitney explained the drafting committee was to adhere to four principles which MacArthur had given him (the so-called MacArthur Notes), and to the provisions of SWNCC 228 as closely as possible. The committee

was given a week to accomplish its task, in order to complete a draft in time for a meeting already scheduled with Matsumoto and then-foreign minister Yoshida Shigeru.<sup>63</sup>

Whether the idea for a war-renunciation clause originated with MacArthur or Shidehara is a point of historical dispute.<sup>64</sup> The earliest written version of what became Article 9, given below, is attributed to MacArthur, but MacArthur later repeatedly and pointedly insisted the idea for a constitutional renunciation of war and arms came from Shidehara; a claim which Shidehara later confirmed. Takayanagi Kenzo, chair of the Commission on the Constitution, which investigated the creation of the postwar constitution through exhaustive hearing from 1957 to 1963, "was inclined to believe"<sup>65</sup> the claim Shidehara authored the article, but many of the individuals closely associated with Shidehara, including his son, as well as individuals associated with actually drafting the constitution, like Matsumoto, rejected the idea, insisting MacArthur was the actual author.<sup>66</sup> The most thorough investigation into the origins of war renunciation has been done by historian Theodore McNelly.

Shidehara met with MacArthur on January 24, 1946, and it was during this meeting he supposedly suggested Japan constitutionally renounce war and arms, McNelly explains, an account later backed up by MacArthur in his memoirs and Brigadier General Whitney, in his biography of MacArthur.<sup>67</sup> However, if Shidehara indeed suggested the article, some have suggested Colonel Charles Kades, a lawyer in his civilian life, and a self-professed admirer of the Kellogg-Briand Pact from his days in law school, who chaired the Government Section's constitutional drafting committee and drafted the original wording of Article 9, may have originally been the source of the prime minister's inspiration.

In mid-January 1946, while being driven to a meeting with Shidehara along with Whitney, Kades, having been impressed by the Emperor's New Year rescript, in which the Emperor had called for a "thoroughly . . . pacific" Japan, wondered aloud "if the Emperor could be convinced to issue an imperial rescript for renouncing war, which might also help remake the Japanese international image and help carry out the Potsdam Declaration?"<sup>68</sup> Whitney then suggested such a rescript to Shidehara as the Americans were leaving the meeting with the prime minister, to which suggestion the prime minister made no reply.<sup>69</sup> The foregoing account was written by Kades in a letter to McNelly in 1970.<sup>70</sup> If accurate it may be construed as indicating the emperor may have inspired, and Kades and Whitney may have suggested, Article 9. However, Kades later clarified he thought this meeting between Shidehara and Whitney took place after the meeting between the prime minister and MacArthur, and therefore would not have been the source of inspiration for what became Article 9.<sup>71</sup>

Kades, though he later called the origin of Article 9 “the greatest mystery of the constitution,”<sup>72</sup> also reported his impression MacArthur himself had dictated the so-called MacArthur Notes to Whitney on February 3,<sup>73</sup> and seemed to feel MacArthur, not Shidehara, was the originator of war renunciation. In a more lighthearted recollection, Kades at another point probably had the best answer to this question when he related “this anecdote. Near the end of the occupation a high-ranking Japanese official asked the same question regarding the source of constitutional renunciation. A high-ranking American official replied, ‘*Before the Korean War the author was our old man. After the Korean War the author was your old man.*’”<sup>74</sup>

Mysterious provenance aside, what is not in dispute is the wording of the second of the MacArthur Notes which formed the basis for Article 9:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling disputes *and even for preserving its own security*. It relies upon the higher ideals now stirring the world for its defense and its protection.

No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.<sup>75</sup> (emphasis added)

But a funny thing happened on the way to the meeting with Foreign Minister Yoshida and Committee Chair Matsumoto. The form of the war-renunciation clause in the draft constitutions given by the Americans to the Matsumoto Committee reads:

Article VIII. War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with any other nation.

No army, navy, air force *or any other war potential* will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the State.<sup>76</sup> (emphasis added)

Besides the earlier number for the article at this stage of the draft, the phrase “and even for preserving its own security,” had been deleted. This lost clause is significant because the Japanese are no longer explicitly forbidden the right to self-defense. According to constitutional scholar Nishi Osamu, that was precisely the intent. Years after the event, in an interview, Kades told Nishi he had omitted the phrase, in his capacity as the chairman of the drafting committee, because, “it seemed to me unrealistic to say if Japan were attacked it could not defend itself.”<sup>77</sup>

Yet, if Kades wanted to make clear Japan’s right to self-defense he only partially succeeded. In the same interview with Nishi, Kades said he had

added the phrase concerning "war potential" to prevent Japan from rearming for militaristic purposes while calling its armed forces something other than an army, navy, or air force. The result is not surprising: after promulgation of the constitution, those in Japan arguing against rearmament consistently insist not only that Article 9 does not explicitly recognize Japan's right to self-defense, but that any rearming, even for self-defense, is unconstitutional as such rearming would permit Japan to have a capability which constitutes war potential.

Brigadier General Whitney and his Government Section steering committee presented their proposed constitution to Matsumoto, Yoshida, and other Japanese representatives February 13, 1946, at Foreign Minister Yoshida's official residence. The American effort had remained a secret, and the Japanese greeted the Americans expecting to discuss the Matsumoto draft; they were shocked to be presented with an entirely new document, entirely in English. Having presented several copies of the draft, the Americans went outside to the garden to allow the Japanese to peruse the new material.

Whitney had ended the meeting on February 4 saying that MacArthur hoped the Japanese would voluntarily accept the American draft, but if they did not the SCAP had authorized "not only the threat of force, but force itself,"<sup>78</sup> to compel Japanese acceptance. If accurate, this threat of force was not long in coming.

After some minutes Shirasu Jirō, Yoshida's secretary, came out to inform the Americans the Japanese were ready for discussion. Whitney said, "We are out here enjoying the warmth of atomic energy,"<sup>79</sup> a threat no Japanese could fail to recognize. Upon returning inside, Whitney intimated that MacArthur was under increasing pressure to treat the emperor as a war criminal, but that adoption of this draft constitution by the Japanese would make the emperor's position "practically unassailable."<sup>80</sup> After some further discussion the Americans left, giving the Japanese 48 hours to decide whether or not to accept the draft.

During the ensuing weeks the Japanese requested and were granted several extensions of the original deadline (to, among other things, translate the draft into Japanese). The Matsumoto Committee and the Government Section were in frequent contact and several minor alterations to the American draft were approved. The war-renunciation clause was a key concern.<sup>81</sup>

At one point Matsumoto asked if the war-renunciation clause could be moved out of the body of the constitution and into the preamble. Whitney asked if the purpose of the move would be to make war renunciation a principle, rather than a constitutional stipulation, and Matsumoto replied that was the intent. Whitney answered the Americans wanted war renunciation to have the full power of a constitutional clause, and that he had personally wanted it as the first clause in the constitution. Matsumoto did not press the request.<sup>82</sup>

The Americans and the Japanese ironed out a final draft acceptable to both sides during what became an all-night and often rancorous session from March 4 through March 5. Some minor wording changes in the war-renunciation clause had been made, and it had gone from Article 8 to Article 9, but it was otherwise unchanged from the SCAP draft. The Japanese government released a summary of the draft constitution to the public on March 6, and SCAP issued an accompanying statement expressing "a sense of deep satisfaction" with the "new and enlightened constitution . . . drafted after painstaking investigation and frequent conference between members of the Japanese Government and this headquarters."<sup>83</sup> Article 9 was immediately both praised and questioned in the press.

### Preaching and Childlike Faith, Utopia and Perdition

In the United States the *New York Times*, on March 6, characterized the draft constitution as a "bloodless revolution," but expressed doubt about Article 9: "when the new Constitution goes on to abolish all land, sea, and air forces, and to declare that Japan will henceforth rely for her 'security and survival upon the good faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world,' it strikes a Utopian note which seems bound to weaken respect for it among realistic Japanese." A day later an editorial in the *Philadelphia Record* does not question Article 9, but the intentions of the Japanese people. "We don't know whom Hirohito is trying to fool," the editorial declares, "but we think we had better stay around for a long, long while—to make sure that war has been renounced and that Hirohito doesn't try to build again a real Empire."<sup>84</sup>

In Japan, too, Article 9 received attention. Among a series of man-on-the-streets interviews *Kyodo* reporter Satō Junseki characterized the article as laudable, but Satō goes on to wonder "whether such a time as is exempted from war would really come in the future," while Kudo Sumiko finds "'expulsion of war' difficult if not impossible."<sup>85</sup> Newspaper editorials in Japan were positive, for the most part, but a few were cautious. On March 9 an editorial in the *Tokyo Shimbun* warns "even a nation with guaranteed neutrality should be allowed sufficient armed force to repel aggression."<sup>86</sup> The *Yomiuri Shimbun* on March 10 cautions "Without a healthy development of the UNO, the existence of a peaceful Japan . . . despite the 'no war' clause of the new constitution . . . will be impossible," but the same paper strikes a more hopeful note the next day, "Japan is going out unarmed and preaching world peace. In this we are setting a pattern for the world to follow."<sup>87</sup>

MacArthur seems to reply to many of these stated and implied criticisms in a memo, dated April 5, 1946, welcoming the members of the Allied Council on Japan<sup>88</sup> to the country. In typical MacArthurian bombast, the SCAP describes Article 9's renunciation of war as a natural and necessary part of

human social evolution. Just as nations had been formed, the general explains, by individuals surrendering "certain rights" to the state, now Japan was leading the way, "for mutual protection against war," toward "a yet higher law of international, social, and political morality." Whether consciously or not, he echoes Hirohito's surrender rescript when he stresses movement toward this higher law is not merely wishful thinking but a necessity upon which "both progress and [the] survival of civilization is dependent," because, he warns, "another war may blast mankind to perdition." Though, he observes, many seem to think Article 9 is naïve, reflecting on the part of the Japanese people a "childlike faith in the future," the article is neither naïve nor foolish, he assures. Article 9 is instead necessary to "consolidate and strengthen the peace won at the staggering cost of war." He concludes by stating Article 9's ultimate purpose is global in scope, to "further universal adherence to the higher law of the preservation of peace which finds full and unqualified approval in the enlightened conscience of all the peoples of the earth."<sup>89</sup>

While the SCAP was expressing concern for the survival and progress of global civilization, a memo from Japan's Foreign Ministry, dated the same day, expresses trepidations more prosaic. Diplomat Hagiwara Tōru, who later served as Japan's ambassador to Canada, writes "what requires careful examination is the new provision unprecedented in any country's Constitution which explicitly denies the right to wage war." He warns that just because Japan renounces war does not mean that other nations will not wage war against Japan, and further points out, if Japan is to join the United Nations, the country would assume "obligations to take cooperative action with other nations in applying collective sanctions, and would assume in that case the obligation to engage in war." Hagiwara concludes warning, aside from the fact that "in international law the constitutional provisions which deny the right of war are meaningless," if Japan tries to both join the UN and enforce Article 9's provisions, the country "would escape obligations based on war and would produce a variety of inconveniences internationally."<sup>90</sup> Many of the doubts, hopes, questions and resolutions swirling in the press and official documents after the draft constitution was made public surfaced again during following reviews and deliberations over the document, as the draft was passed from the cabinet to other parts of the Japanese government.

As the next stop for the draft constitution on the way to promulgation Prime Minister Shidehara presented the draft to the Privy Council on April 17, 1946. After eleven meetings of the Council's Examination Committee on the Subject of Referring the Draft Revision of the Imperial Constitution to the Imperial Diet the Privy Council approved the draft on June 3, with only Minobe Tatsukichi opposed.<sup>91</sup> Minobe was an eminent constitutional scholar who felt the Meiji Constitution should be reinterpreted to fit Japan's new situation, rather than revised. He had recommended this kind of reinterpretation

with changing circumstances for more than 30 years, at this point in time. For instance, specifically with regard to the military, he wrote in 1912 “the only exception to the prime minister’s control over the affairs of state,” was the right of the army and navy ministers to appeal directly to the Emperor. He reversed this opinion in 1930, writing “Apart from the cabinet, there is no other institution with responsibilities toward the parliament . . . According to this principle, both the army and the navy must be placed under the cabinet, and the cabinet must take responsibility for military actions.”<sup>92</sup>

Virtually the last act of the Privy Council before the new constitution dissolved the body, the answers to members’ questions during this review revealed the lineaments of the Japanese government’s consistent policy toward Article 9 during the constitutional debates. In the second meeting of the committee, held on April 24, Privy Council member Hayashi Kiroku, “delegate to the Versailles peace conference and Washington conference on arms control, 1919–1921,”<sup>93</sup> observed, “the right of self-defense seems to exist according to paragraph 1,”<sup>94</sup> but then noted this right would not be recognized by the wording in the second paragraph. Nomura Kichisaburō, retired admiral and former ambassador to the United States in the run up to Pearl Harbor, a champion of Japan’s rearmament, seemed to agree, but requested clarification, “Is not war for self-defense comprehended in the right of belligerency?”<sup>95</sup> Matsumoto Jōji replied no, the right of belligerency referred to a declared war, and not to self-defense. He went on to explain though for Japan, abiding by the second paragraph, would make it “virtually impossible to wage war,” self-defense was permissible. Endō Genroku, Privy Council member, lawyer and author, asked if it would not be better to delete the terms “right of belligerency,” to make clear defensive war was permitted. Otherwise, Endō felt, should Japan be involved defending itself in a war, citizens of the country might be considered guilty of murder and other crimes. Matsumoto dismissed his concerns as “contrary to reason.”<sup>96</sup> Again on May 6, a member asked if Japan would, when joining the UN, ask for an exemption to the use of arms.

This time Irie Toshio, head of Legislative Bureau (later reconstituted as the Cabinet Legislative Affairs Bureau, or CLB), answered, in perhaps the earliest formulation of an interpretive tool that has remained consistent in the CLB’s rhetorical arsenal down to the present day, that while Japan may have the inherent right to self-defense, the country cannot constitutionally exercise that right “in the form of war.” Irie pointed to paragraph two of the draft article, emphasizing “war potential is not to be maintained as the fundamental idea of the new Japan.”<sup>97</sup>

On the final day of deliberations, with Emperor Hirohito in attendance, the vice-chairman of the Privy Council, and reporter for the committee’s deliberations, Ushio Shigenosuke, had clearly accepted the government’s stated position. A significant portion of his report had to do with renouncing

war and arms. Ushio voiced the fears and hopes of many when he said “the remarkable progress of science foretells the invention of arms that have dreadful power of destruction, in the event of such arms being completed, the world will be awakened, we take it, to think seriously about the renunciation of war.” Article 9 was designed, he explained, “with the aim of totally eliminating the opportunity of using arms rather than with the aim of inventing or equipping arms in the future. Against a domestic emergency, the powerful exercise of police power shall be resorted to, and against invasion from abroad, there shall be no choice but to rely on the good faith of peace-loving nations.” Hayashi and Nomura again related their concerns from the earlier meeting, with Nomura asserting police may be inadequate to some domestic contingencies.

The questioning ended when Prince Takahito, the emperor’s younger brother, who had served in the Imperial Japanese Army, spoke, supporting Article 9 and recommending neutrality, because, “Japan having been a menace to all the world since the Manchurian Incident . . . must make a new start for peace at the junction of defeat . . . to expel military power from the Japanese people may serve the development of a sense of justice; nor can military or political forces alone secure order and peace.” The Council recommended the draft move forward with one vote opposed.

### **An Awkward Dilemma and Progressive Party Particles**

The next stop for the draft constitution was the House of Representatives, presented there on June 26, 1946. It was in the House of Representatives—more specifically in the subcommittee of a special committee set up to revise the government’s draft—that Article 9 took on its final form, and it was in this subcommittee that a government representative admitted the government had designed into their draft of the article wording and an ordering of paragraphs to permit flexibility in Japan’s eventual rearmament, though this admission was vaguely worded and the transcript containing the admission was closed to the Japanese public until 1995.

As had already been the case, questions concerning “the intent of the renunciation-of-war clause (had Japan renounced even the right of armament for ‘self-defense?’)”<sup>98</sup> were again a primary focus of discussion. Yoshida Shigeru, as a result of Japan’s first post-defeat elections, was now the prime minister. He stressed in the plenary sessions and afterwards the most significant chapters in the draft were chapter one, concerning the Emperor, and chapter two, the Renunciation of War; there were several questions about both chapters.

Kita Reikichi of the Liberal Party claimed Article 9 made the draft constitution “far more radical” than any other publicly available draft, whether from

the political parties or other organizations, and he wondered if the Japanese government would pursue neutrality in light of Japan's defenselessness.<sup>99</sup> Representative Hara Fujirō, active in the Minseitō Party during the war, expressed concern about renouncing even the right of self-defense in the case of invasion by another country, describing such a possible future scenario as "an awkward dilemma confronting us." Suzuki Yoshio of the Socialist Party recommended changing "War, as a sovereign right of the nation" to "War, as a national policy of the nation," as a way of strengthening the provision, but also urged the government to pursue a positive peace policy, and membership in the UN, describing Kita's earlier recommended policy of neutrality as an "anachronism." Tokuda Kyuichi of the communist party downplayed the symbolic significance of Japan renouncing war, explaining, "for a country which has been defeated and disarmed to say that it will never go to war is just the same as for a poor man who has been reduced to dire poverty to say that he will henceforth be thrifty," and went on to ask rhetorically was not Japan's exercise of its right to self-defense, "the very fundamental right of the state?"<sup>100</sup>

Yoshida replied to both Hara's and Tokuda's concerns with the official position of his government for the next three and one-half years, and it is worth quoting at some length:

The provisions concerning the renunciation of war in the draft Constitution do not directly deny the right of self-defense. But because the second Paragraph of Article 9 does not recognize all war potential and the country's belligerency, both war as a manifestation of the right of self-defense and the right of belligerency are renounced. Of late years, most wars have been waged in the name of self-defense. This is the case with the Manchurian Incident, and so is the War of Greater East Asia. The suspicion concerning Japan today is that she is a war-like nation, and that there is no knowing when she may re-arm herself, wage a war of reprisal and threaten the peace of the world. This is the most serious suspicion and misunderstanding respecting Japan. I think that the first thing we should do today is to set right this misunderstanding. The suspicion I have spoken of is a misunderstanding, it is true, but there are not a few instances in the past history, in the light of which it cannot be said that there is no foundation for that suspicion. Therefore, we should like to demonstrate in the proposed Constitution our determination, first of all, to renounce voluntarily the right of belligerency in whatever case it may be, to make that renunciation the basis of establishing the peace of the whole world, to march forward in the vanguard of the world's peace-loving nations, and thus to contribute to the establishment of world peace.<sup>101</sup>

There were other questions and comments centered on Article 9 during the plenary session, but in his memoirs Yoshida recalls one questioner in

particular—from Nozaka Sanzo, head of the Japanese Communist Party—who “asked whether Japan should not rather limit the kind of war to be renounced . . . since wars of self-defence obviously could not be classified, *ipso facto*, as evil.” Yoshida goes on to note, with no little irony, “in those days Japanese communists supported war, even if limited to wars of self-defence.”<sup>102</sup>

The draft constitution was next referred to a House of Representatives Special Committee on the Revision of the Imperial Constitution, and then to a subcommittee, it was during the deliberations of this subcommittee, which were closed to the Japanese public until 1995, that Article 9 underwent its most controversial changes, and gained its final form:

*Aspiring to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.*

*In order to accomplish the aims of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.*<sup>103</sup> (emphasis added)

Ashida Hitoshi, a future prime minister and, like Yoshida, a former diplomat, was the chair of both the special committee and this subcommittee, and he later claimed credit for the addition of the italicized phrases at the beginning of each of Article 9's paragraphs above, which hence are known as the Ashida Amendments. In what has become the standard account, scholar Koseki Shoichi disputes Ashida's claim to authorship. After an examination of the minutes of the subcommittee's meetings, as well as other pertinent documents, Koseki reasons Kanamori Tokujiro, who had replaced Matsumoto as the Minister of State for the Constitution, “may well have been”<sup>104</sup> the actual author, and this conclusion has been considered definitive, but probably goes too far. While it is true Ashida later misrepresents and enlarges his role in fashioning the amendments, a careful reading of the subcommittee's transcripts calls for a more capacious understanding of the origin of the amendments than the overly simple representation of a clueless Ashida being manipulated by a wily Kanamori.

Kanamori did play a key role in the process. A former head of the Legislative Bureau (as Matsumoto had also been),<sup>105</sup> Kanamori had come afoul of the military authorities during the war, like Yoshida, and had been appointed to the cabinet by the prime minister specifically for shepherding the constitution through the Diet: “He spoke more than anyone else during the debates on the constitution, responding to questions and comments 1,365 times.”<sup>106</sup> Described as “articulate” and “eloquent,” Kanamori often turned aside questions and verbal jabs with folksy sayings or adages. When asked if Article 9

did not endanger Japan's security, he replied "A hard tooth breaks, but the soft tongue does not."<sup>107</sup> Summing up the Yoshida administration's attitude toward what many still call the MacArthur Constitution, he said "the water flows but the river stays. In this point lies our basic conception of the constitution."<sup>108</sup> What Kanamori had to say about Article 9 and rearmament is covered below; and while Kanamori's contribution is important, it is overstated in the standard account, while Ashida's role, in the same account, is understated.

Ashida had keyed in, at least, on the War Renunciation clause almost from the beginning of his involvement with the draft constitution. When Matsumoto first presented the American draft to Shidehara and his cabinet on Tuesday, February 19, the prime minister and several of his cabinet members stated the draft was unacceptable, but Ashida, Shidehara's Welfare Minister, cautioned that if a copy of the draft leaked to the media, the people would seize on it and demand it be enacted and the cabinet would have to resign en masse. The mass resignation under such circumstances, would, in turn, imperil conservative chances for success in the upcoming elections. Two other ministers agreed and Ashida suggested Shidehara see MacArthur and, while acknowledging both the Matsumoto draft and the SCAP draft were similar, ask for more time to study the SCAP draft.<sup>109</sup>

Shidehara met with MacArthur on February 21. During their meeting the SCAP emphasized to the prime minister the importance in the American draft of chapter one, concerning the Emperor, and chapter two, the Renunciation of War. On the latter chapter MacArthur emphasized Japan's war renunciation was the only way to convince other countries Japan had peaceful intentions, and thus the adoption of Article 9 was "in Japan's own best national interest."<sup>110</sup> When Shidehara spoke to the cabinet the following day, Ashida pointed out the similarity between Article 9 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It was at this meeting the cabinet decided to accept the SCAP draft as the basis for their new constitution.<sup>111</sup>

In his role as the chairman of the Lower House's special committee on revising the constitution, inaugurated on June 29, Ashida makes clear his misgivings about Article 9. Both Kanamori and Yoshida had indicated, when replying to repeated questions in both the plenary sessions and the committee meetings, Japan had indeed given up all arms, even for self-defense. In the ninth meeting of the committee, after another such answer from Kanamori, to wit, "we are going to renounce the right of belligerency and join the peace-loving nations of the world at the risk of our national existence,"<sup>112</sup> Ashida took issue. Declaring, "Article 9 of the revised Constitution has been discussed enthusiastically at these committee meetings, and I do not think that the explanations given by the Government were wholly responsive to the questions," the chairman went on to state he did not doubt his fellow countrymen's desire for peace, nor did he question the need for Japan to amend its

Meiji-era constitution in order to reconstruct itself, regain independence, join the UN "and hold an honored position in international society." But he still had concerns. His concerns, he explained, boiled down to "three questions:"

First, is Japan to give up even the right of self-defense under Article 9? This is a point which has been discussed again and again by members at the committee meetings. Secondly, in consequence, will Japan not be able to defend herself successfully, unless her security is ensured by international guarantee? Is there no fear that Japan is likely to become a battle-field in the event of war between other countries? Thirdly, as a result of her renunciation of war, Japan will not be able to shoulder the obligation to provide an armed force as a member state of the UNO. For this reason, will she not be denied admission to the UNO?<sup>113</sup>

Ashida admitted these questions had been asked already, but he said he found the government's explanations unsatisfactory. For one thing, once Japan joined the UN, he pointed out, her inherent right to self-defense would be recognized under chapter fifty one of the UN charter. Kanamori blandished, "this Constitution has been drawn up in ink, but from our stand-point, it has been written in letters with our whole soul in them,"<sup>114</sup> rather than answering, again, questions he must have felt he had already answered.

What became known as the Ashida Amendments were added during the closed sessions of the subcommittee meetings. The subcommittee first discussed Article 9 during their third meeting on Saturday, July 27. Most of the discussion centered first on whether or not to replace *hōki* in *sensō no hōki* (literally the "throwing away of war") with *hinin*, a more exact translation of "renounce," and later focused on whether or not to use the words *sengen*, declare or *seimei*, announce to introduce Japan's decision to renounce war. In the midst of these discussions Inukai Takeru of the Progressive Party said his biggest problem with the article was its weak and "whimpering" tone, and that it seemed clear Japan was being forced to take this measure. He suggested placing a positive statement before renouncing war, such as "Japan declares abandonment of war as a permanent national principle," others chimed in liking the suggestion of a more positive declaration on Japan's part.

The discussion then moved to an article supporting pacifism suggested by the Social Democrats that began, "Japan makes it a national principle to love peace and value international faith." Following this Yoshida An, another member of the Progressive Party, offered, "Japan loves peace and values international faith", may be followed by Mr. Inukai's words, 'declares abandonment of war as a permanent national principle.'" All of these suggested phrases were meant to precede the rest of Article 9 as it was then worded. As various proposals were made suggesting Japan declare "permanently" either a love for peace or the renunciation of war, the use of the word "permanent" became an issue, and counter suggestions were made to drop the term from

the draft article. Toward the end of the session Takahashi Yasuo, Liberal Party, asked if the word permanent was to be struck from Article 9 altogether. Ashida decided to close the meeting, and asked each party to think about that question for the next meeting.<sup>115</sup>

At the fourth meeting of the subcommittee, on July 29, Ashida explained that, after he had discussed Article 9 with various "members who came early this morning," the group had come up with a proposal for amendment, which he then read aloud:

Paragraph One. The Japanese people, aspiring to an international peace based on justice and order, pledge not to maintain land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, and renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation.

Paragraph Two. In order to achieve the purpose of the preceding paragraph, forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, or the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.<sup>116</sup>

This proposal adds the phrases that became known as the Ashida Amendments, but reverses the order of the paragraphs in the government draft.

There followed a spirited discussion mostly concerning whether or not it was proper in this article for Japan to "declare" (*sengen suru*) or "announce" (*seimei suru*) its intentions. Though some thought it necessary to use one of these or a similar phrase in order to stress the unique importance of the clause, others, including Suzuki Yoshio of the Socialist Party, were adamantly opposed, on the grounds that such phraseology was inappropriate in the body of a constitution, and that it made the clause sound more like a provision in a treaty or a diplomatic document than basic law. Suzuki said, in fact, the original government draft of Article 9 was preferable. To this Ashida replied the paragraphs had been amended as he had read aloud because "the wording in the original draft, reading, 'The maintenance of land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be authorized . . .', [was] rather awkward as a Japanese sentence." With the addition of the two participial phrases before the original paragraphs (though the order of the paragraphs was reversed in Ashida's proposal), the chairman averred, "the entire Article sounds quite natural."

The discussion continued, including questions about and opposition to the fact the original order of the paragraphs had been reversed in Ashida's proposal. Suzuki in particular questioned the switched order, though he finally conceded switching the two paragraphs, placing the relinquishing of the right of belligerency before the renunciation of war, might be worth considering. Ashida at this point explained the change had been suggested because renouncing the right of belligerency first, as a "premise" for renouncing war,

seemed a more natural order. Kanamori and others did not agree, as became clear the following day.

At the fifth meeting of the subcommittee, on July 30, Ashida again read out the amended version of Article 9 in essentially the same language he had used the previous day, but inserting the word *sengen* or “declare.” Mr. Kanamori, who was attending this particular meeting, now interjected. Though he was “not inclined to give [his] opinion on any amendment proposed by the members of the Diet,” he explained, when the government (meaning the Legislative Bureau) had drafted the constitution it had done so with the understanding “the words to be used in the provisions of each Article should be modest and not pompous, but substantial enough to express their meaning,” gently indicating that *sengen* or similar wording should not be used. Ashida thanked him and asked if there were other questions for Mr. Kanamori.

Suzuki Yoshio, still pondering the reversed order of the paragraphs, asked, “from the perspective of legislative technique,” whether the minister thought it would be better to place *kōsenken*, the right of belligerency (or, more literally, the right to wage war) in the first paragraph and *sensō hōki*, the renunciation of war, in the second paragraph, as was the order in the amendment discussed since the day before. In his reply, redacted from the original stenographic minutes and not published until 1995, Kanamori was typically careful in his choice of words, but he expresses dissatisfaction with the change, and hints perhaps more explicitly than at any other point in the Diet discussions that the Japanese government had modified the received wording of what became Article 9 with an interpretation in mind that would allow Japan more flexibility in eventually rearming. In describing the article before the order of the paragraphs was reversed he says:

[This is indeed a very delicate issue and it should be mentioned very carefully. The first clause uses words such as “renounces forever”, and says it very strongly. However, the second clause does not use the word “forever”. This may be merely my intuition, but I think that there still remains an area to be considered in Japan’s relations with the United Nations, in the future, in the second clause with regard to the right to maintain war potential. Therefore, we redrafted Article 9 into two clauses, moving that part which very clearly mentioned “permanence” or “forever” to the first clause. This is what we were thinking. I am not sure whether this has anything directly to do with your question, but we made this draft with such a consideration in mind.] (brackets were used in this source for all originally redacted material)<sup>117</sup>

The word “forever” is, in fact, the phrase *towa ni*, which, in the above discussions, had been translated as “permanent.”<sup>118</sup> Thus Kanamori was

explaining, albeit elliptically, that the Japanese government had taken pains to insure that while it “permanently” renounces war and the threat or use of force to settle international disputes in the first paragraph of the government’s draft—what can be interpreted as aggressive war—there was no reference to permanence in the second paragraph which renounces maintaining armed forces (the English version has the word “never” in the second paragraph, the Japanese version does not).<sup>119</sup> Kanamori further hinted the government had done this with UN membership in mind; most likely the idea of the necessity to maintaining armed forces as a member of the UN in order to participate in collective self-defense. This session of the subcommittee ended soon after Kanamori’s telling explanation. Suzuki persisted, making his concern plainer in the seventh meeting of the subcommittee, two days later, perhaps correctly thinking Kanamori had agreed the original order of the paragraphs should not be reversed, but, if so, mistaking the minister’s reasons for agreement.

Ashida began the discussion of Article 9 on August 1 asking the members of the subcommittee what they would think if he simply removed *sengen* from his proposed amendment. Suzuki, who had strongly held out against the use of *sengen* or any similar expression now ignored the chairman’s question, but said he was “seriously concerned” and again asked if the order of the clauses in the amendment could be reversed, back to the original. Ashida replied the order of the paragraphs was simply “a matter of individual taste,” indicating, perhaps, he misunderstood Kanamori’s and the government’s position. Suzuki continued, perhaps mistrusting Ashida’s motives in changing the order of the paragraphs, “I remember the observation of a certain international jurist to the effect that the right of belligerency should be better placed before the renunciation of war, for this implies the maintenance of the right of self-defense.” Suzuki’s statement seems to indicate he believed the reversed order of the paragraphs, introduced by Ashida, might be used to claim Japan still had the right of self-defense. If that was his belief he seems to have missed that Kanamori had hinted just the opposite, that the original order of the paragraphs offered Japan more interpretive flexibility concerning rearming.<sup>120</sup> Seeking reassurance, perhaps, Suzuki closes his statement with an admonition, “Mr. Kanamori, State Minister, sometime ago said that war is to be renounced forever.” On this final point Ashida simply replied he disagreed with Kanamori (and thus with Yoshida, who had repeatedly made the same point).

Inukai Takeru of the Progressive Party at this stage seems to have taken notice, and asked Satō Tatsuo, the Deputy Director General of the Legislative Bureau, if the order of the paragraphs of the amended articles indeed had significance as Kanamori had seemed to indicate in the previous meeting. Satō, while demurring that he could not answer for Kanamori directly, avowed the minister had made “his intentions easily understandable.” Inukai concluded,

“Therefore, this order is not meaningless, but has considerable significance,” and finished with a statement, also redacted until 1995, simply stating the order of the paragraphs “could be a subject to discuss.”<sup>121</sup> A Mr. Etō also indicated the original order of the paragraphs was preferable.

Then Yoshida An of the Progressive Party, in another previously redacted portion of the transcript, asked, given what Kanamori had indicated about the implications of the order of the clauses in the amendment, would it not be better to maintain Article 9 in its original form? Ashida answered that changing the order as he had suggested, with the introductory phrases, would be easier to translate into English, and thus easier to negotiate with the Americans. Now it was Inukai’s turn to persevere.

Inukai explained the government’s draft of Article 9, in its original order, read as if its provisions were commands from outside the country the Japanese were forced to obey, but if the subcommittee retained the original wording and order of paragraphs yet added a phrase like “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people hereby declare . . .,” the phrase Ashida had introduced two days earlier, the article would be placed in a more positive, proactive light.

Ashida in reply explained he was most concerned with the portion of the article concerning the denial of war potential (which came in the second paragraph in the government draft), and that if the subcommittee accepted his proposal, that paragraph would come first and be used “adjectively” to describe the renunciation of war, which, he explains, will be easier to negotiate with the Americans (though why he thinks so, despite the fact the Americans had already agreed to the original order of the paragraphs, he does not explain). Yoshida An speaks up again, to say he had favored Ashida’s proposal from the beginning, but then adds, in a redacted portion, he still did not understand what Kanamori had meant about order of the paragraphs in the original draft, and [“. . . I am afraid that nothing much will happen in the second clause in the future.”] Ashida’s reply was also redacted. [“However, that will not be decided by the way the Constitution is written, but will be determined by the extent of Japan’s democratization and the international situation. Therefore, having the word “forever” in the clause might be very important as a formal issue, but as a practical issue I don’t think it makes very much difference.”] Other suggestions followed, with most committee members favoring Inukai’s position of retaining the original order of the paragraphs but adding the participial phrases suggested by Ashida during the previous meetings, and Ashida fretting about the second paragraph and the English translation of the article.

At one point Ashida says he cannot find a consensus and wants to drop the discussion to return to it later. Suzuki protests and urges the chairman to seek a decision, because he thinks Article 9 “may be the most important one, from the standpoint of the authorities concerned.” Ashida relents, and

Inukai speaks up again, "I think that the composition of the first and second paragraphs should be kept as they are, only with an amendment that the words "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph" be inserted, as the Chairman has said. I wish that the words "aspiring to . . . justice, etc., the Japanese people, etc. . . ." will be put in at the beginning of the provision. Are there any objections to it?" There were a few other minor points discussed, and some desultory word changes made, but Ashida finally agreed calling the suggestions the "Progressive Party's draft" and Article 9 took on the final wording it retains to this day.<sup>122</sup>

The subcommittee finished its deliberations the next day, but had to return to make changes mandated by SCAP over the next few weeks (SCAP suggested no changes for the amended Article 9 and Ashida was surprised.)<sup>123</sup> The House Special Committee approved the subcommittee's amendments on August 21, and the amended draft was again considered by the Lower House as a whole. The draft was approved on August 24 and sent to the House of Peers.<sup>124</sup>

Thus it is still unclear who exactly proposed the Ashida Amendments. Ashida is the first person on record to read the phrases aloud, his only explanation that he had discussed the amendments with some others, without specifying whom, earlier in the morning of the day he first introduced the proposal. It is clear from the record that the idea of an introductory phrase, couching the renunciation of war in a positive declaration by the Japanese people, had its genesis in the discussions of July 27. It also seems clear, as Koseki states, Kanamori had been thinking about Article 9 for some time, but it is not at all clear, as Koseki seems to think, that the amendments should rather be called the "Kanamori Amendments."<sup>125</sup>

Kanamori's redacted speech has everything to do with the wording and order of the paragraphs in the original government draft of Article 9, but nothing to do with the introductory statements introduced by Ashida on August 29. And to say Kanamori knew inserting the phrase "'in order to accomplish the aim of the previous paragraph,' would be sanctioning war in self-defense or sanctioning the maintenance of war potential for the purpose of self-defense,"<sup>126</sup> is not supported by the available documentation. Kanamori never mentions either of the participial phrases. Nor is it as clear as Koseki seems to indicate that Ashida did not know the intent of these phrases.

Ashida said from the time he read aloud the amendments on August 29 that he was most concerned about the second paragraph, the one that renounces armed forces, war potential, and the right of belligerency. His idea was to move this to the first position because he explained, variously, that it flowed more logically, that treating the subjects of that paragraph "adjectivally" to modify the renunciation of war would make the amendment easier to sell to SCAP, or that the order did not particularly matter, so why not use the new order he had suggested. Having insisted more than once over the nearly two

days of debate that he was most concerned with changing the second paragraph, when Ashida explained he wanted to use that entire set of conditions, dealing with maintaining armed force and war potential, as well as the right of belligerency, "adjectivally" to modify the renunciation of war he may have had in mind an interpretation that the limits imposed, worded that way, would only apply to aggressive war. It is also possible once he realized he would get the same effect by keeping the original order—which a majority of the committee favored—but interpreting the second introductory phrase, "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph," as referring only to aggressive war in the first paragraph (as the Japanese government had) would gain the same result.

It is impossible to know for certain. Understanding the origin of Article 9's wording from the sterile stenographic record is complicated by the implicit communication and distancing behavior linguist Haru Yamada has identified as characteristic Japanese "rules" of discussions,<sup>127</sup> as well as by the fact that at least some of the participants were trying to keep things from the Americans and from one another.

On July 30, toward the end of the day's discussions, Chairman Ashida called what essentially became the present wording of Article 9 the Progressive Party draft. In fact almost all of the parties represented had contributed to the discussion, and Suzuki of the Social Democrats to a significant degree, but Inukai, Yoshida and Ashida, all of the Progressive Party probably had the most input on the final wording, at least according to written records. So the amendments could be called the Progressive Party Participles, but given the fact Ashida did introduce the amendments, did preside over the debates, and did, to a degree that cannot be ascertained from the written record, contribute to the wording of the amendments, to continue to refer to them as the Ashida Amendments is best. And while it seems clear Kanamori favored an interpretive approach that would allow Japan to rearm for self-defense from the first, his interpretation was dependent upon the wording and order of the original government draft, not on the amendments introduced in the subcommittee, and it is therefore inappropriate to refer to these introductory phrases as the Kanamori Amendments, as Koseki suggests.<sup>128</sup>

In an interview done in in 1957 Kanamori explicitly stated the new constitution "was forced prematurely on Japan and Article 9 was absurd. We accepted it because, though MacArthur insisted Japan should abandon war absolutely we believed self-defense was inviolable."<sup>129</sup> This is just how proponents of rearmament have interpreted Article 9 as amended, but just as Kades' lost clause did not end the controversy, neither did the Ashida Amendments; reactions were mixed from the beginning.

In an article in *Political Science Quarterly*, "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," published more than 40 years after

MacArthur's week-long constitutional assembly, Kades notes that during negotiations several members of the Japanese government had expressed concern that Japan's renunciation of war would not allow Japan to contribute forces to UN-sponsored collective defense actions, and thus would prevent Japan from eventually joining the United Nations. Since "The Ashida Amendment appeared intended to alleviate those concerns,"<sup>130</sup> because "the rather vague terms of the amendment would permit Japan to have forces, such as a home guard and a coast guard, sufficient to repel any invasion as well as to contribute an armed contingent to a United Nations International force,"<sup>131</sup> Kades had no problem with the proposed changes, asserting it was not Occupation authority to block Japan's eventual entry into the UN. Others who viewed the amendments were less sanguine.

Copies of the subcommittee's draft, with all changes highlighted (though some dialogue had been elided this was unknown to the SCAP authorities at the time), had been sent to the Far East Commission as well as SCAP. The FEC, in Washington, D.C., as well as the Allied Council for Japan, in Tokyo, had been set up to give the Allies at least a nominal say in the occupation of Japan. After seeing the Ashida Amendments, the FEC's China representative, Dr. S. H. Tan made the following statement:

The Chinese delegation notes that that Article has been so revised by the House of Representatives of Japan as to permit of an interpretation which might in effect permit the maintenance by Japan of land, sea, and air forces for purposes other than those specified in the first paragraph of Article IX . . . that means there is [a] possibility for Japan to employ such armed forces under certain pretexts, such as, for instance, self-defense . . . .<sup>132</sup>

The FEC thus urged MacArthur to press for a constitutional guarantee that the prime minister and all the ministers of states would be civilians. This had been a provision recommended by SWNCC 228, but with the original war-renunciation clause it had been thought redundant. The civilian clause was subsequently incorporated into Article 66.<sup>133</sup>

The House of Peers, another body abolished by the new constitution, was the final stop of the Diet's delicate dalliance with defense discourse. Here again Kanamori was repeatedly asked what Japan would do if invaded. Kanamori admits the government's position would be Japan's "right of self-defense under an emergency situation will be taken as the basis of interpretation."<sup>134</sup> When asked if Japan renouncing both self-defense and collective defense, which are sanctioned by the UN charter, would not be an issue, Kanamori again hints at the government's design, admitting the same thing had been asked in the House of Representatives, and adding, "there is room enough for study."<sup>135</sup> Takagi Yasaka, who had been an adviser to Konoe during his constitutional drafting efforts, when discussing the implications of

Article 66, muses: "Perhaps it is the intention of the other side to have a civil official be the minister of military affairs when we can create an army in the future."<sup>136</sup>

Promulgated on the Meiji Emperor's birthday, November 3, 1946, Japan's Peace Constitution was introduced to the Japanese public as it remains today. Kades writes of the process: "exactly nine months to the Sunday that MacArthur had conceived the idea of writing a model for a constitution, Japan gave birth to a new constitution embodying principles that Matsumoto had considered 'revolutionary.'"<sup>137</sup> However, regarding desires by both American and Japanese officials involved that the constitution should be presented as Japan's own progeny, the conception was, if not abortive, troubled from the start. That the SCAP had actually drafted the constitution "was apparent from the outset to almost everyone," to the extent that, soon after it was made public, when a Japanese was asked what he thought of the nation's new basic law he reportedly replied, "Oh, has it been translated into Japanese already?"<sup>138</sup>

Also on November 3, 1946, Ashida Hitoshi published a tract entitled *Interpreting the New Constitution*, in which he writes concerning Article 9: "In reality it is meant to apply to wars of aggression. Therefore, its provisions do not renounce war and the threat or use of force for purposes of self-defense."<sup>139</sup> Ashida was thus the first Japanese official to publicly articulate this position, but he certainly was not the last.

## PEACE BLOOMS, BUT FROST IS ON THE GROUND

Not declining to praise their own handiwork, nor lacking in hyperbole, the Government Section, in explanatory notes accompanying the accepted draft, note Article 9 is "so inspired a position with such far reaching implications that uncounted future generations may well come to look upon it with the same reverence as the Magna Carta."<sup>140</sup> To some Americans the promulgation of Article 9 must have felt like a victory over the perceived militarism of Japan's culture. Nor were such Americans alone in considering Article 9 a signal achievement; many Japanese, anxious for a new, peaceful life, praised the article as well, some in nearly identical terms.

During the House of Peers review of the draft Kinoshita Kenjiro, though he first admitted "I have also gained the impression [of] something like a foreign smell," associated with Article 9, later in the same session declared "it may be considered that the present Constitution constitutes not only a Magna Carta for administration of this nation, but a precious canon teaching the very essence of the life of man as well. I even imagine that no written constitution in this world is so perfect and substantial as this Constitution of ours."<sup>141</sup> Many other Japanese, as well, during the debates had effusively embraced Article 9 declaring the article a reflection of the inherent peacefulness of

Japan's culture. Matsumoto Gaku of the House of Peers initially took a more questioning approach. He had in an early session pointedly stated "The renunciation of war declared in Article 9, cannot, in my opinion, mean the relinquishment of defense."<sup>142</sup> Yet by the end of deliberations, Matsumoto too, had come to accept Article 9, though rather than rejecting Japan's military past, he reconciles Article 9 with Japan's *gunji seishin*, or military spirit, which he felt was all important.

In one of the final deliberative sessions of the House of Peers, Matsumoto lectured to the assembled. Citing "one of the old military books said to have been written by Ōe no Masafusa," the Peer explains Japan's military spirit is its generative force, "the source of creation and the origin of everything." Matsumoto further explains Ōe had metaphorically compared *gunji seishin* to the beak of a chick that breaks the shell to bring the chick into the world. This, Matsumoto maintains, is the key to understanding Japan's military spirit: "not to use power indiscriminately, but [as] the source of power. Think of the small chicken just about to come out from the shell. That power, that feeling, that power of will." He finishes declaring "that the provision of Article 9 . . . fully represents Japan's inherent characteristics and Japanese-like character."<sup>143</sup>

The consensus in America in 1946 was, arguably, Japan must be kept permanently disarmed. In Japan at the same time many accepted this as inevitable, and some as a relief. Those on both sides of the issue probably fell into the trap of thinking of a country's culture as unchanging, failing to recognize that all cultures evolve in response to changing circumstances, and failing to recognize that the hybrid blossom that was Article 9 had bloomed in the midst of a spreading frost. Indeed, when Japan's military spirit was again given flesh in the form of a new army, it did not break through the shell of an egg, but through the ice of the Cold War. The years 1946 through 1950 were years of conflict around the world, as proxy local wars proliferated in the Cold War context. In the United States this spurred a reversal of the previous consensus, and the at-first dissident voices calling for a rearmed Japan became the majority. In Japan, a society that had wanted to forget war instead debated it and reimaged it in its public discourse. Initially limited by Occupation policies and censorship, this discourse became more wide-ranging as policies changed and censorship relaxed. These competing policies and visions became the mortar and brick of a forge for a new sword, and it is this forge, these competing ideas that will be examined in the next chapter.

## NOTES

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4. *Ibid.*, 117.

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6. Quoted from "The American Council on Japan and Its Influence on Relations between the United States and Japan," manuscript, Box 1, Eugene H. Dooman, "Eugene H. Dooman Papers, 1918–1973" (Hoover Archives, 1918–1973), 2.

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9. Frank Capra and Joris Ivens, "Know Your Enemy—Japan," in *Why We Fight*, ed. Frank Capra (U.S.A.: War Department, 1945).

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13. Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989); Mayo, "Wartime Planning for Japan," esp. 13–21.

14. Hellegers, *We, the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution*, 67.

15. See for instance Grew's confirmation hearings for Under Secretary of State in United State Department of State, "Bulletin," ed. Department of State (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 762–63.

16. For detailed discussion of the ACJ see "The American Council on Japan and Its Influence on Relations between the United States and Japan," Dooman, "Eugene H. Dooman Papers, 1918–1973"; Justin Sr. Williams, "American Democratization Policy for Occupied Japan: Correcting the Revisionist Version," in *History of Contemporary Japan, 1945–1998*, ed. Edward R. Beauchamp (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998); Howard B. Schonberger, "The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy, 1947–1952," *Pacific Historical Review* XLVI, no. 3 (1977).

17. Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn from the Diaries and Private Official Papers of Joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932–1942* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 18.

18. Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 17.

19. John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954*, Harvard East Asian Monographs (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1988), 106.

20. Dooman, "Eugene H. Dooman Papers, 1918–1973," in Box 1, file labeled, "Oral History Interview," Columbia University, 1973, microfiche, 64. In this interview Dooman goes on to note that when he arrived in Washington he submitted this letter through channels in the State Department, which included Hornbeck, to request an appointment at the White House. His request to make such an appointment was denied.

21. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954*, 105.

22. Dooman, "Eugene H. Dooman Papers, 1918–1973," in a separate manuscript entitled, "Memoir of Eugene H. Dooman, American Foreign Service," I.

23. See for instance Hellegers, *We, the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution*, 91–100.

24. See , file labeled "Asia's Problem and Ours," Box 1, in Dooman, "Eugene H. Dooman Papers, 1918–1973."

25. Wolfgang Saxon, "Stefan T. Possony, 82, a Scholar of International Security Affairs," *The New York Times* (1995), <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/02/obituaries/stefan-t-possony-82-a-scholar-of-international-security-affairs.html>.

26. Stefan T. Possony, "No Peace without Arms," *Review of Politics* 6, no. 2 (1944): 224.

27. *Ibid.*, 225.

28. *Ibid.*, 226.

29. Quoted in Ward et al., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*, 23. Ward attributes authorship of this paper to Hugh Borton. A paper with similar sentiments toward eventual rearmament was authored by Blakeslee, Dooman and others earlier in 1944. See Hellegers, *We, the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution*, 182.

30. Kazuhide Kinugawa, "American Policy Towards Japan's Military Capability During the Occupation: From Disarmament to Rearmament" (Master's, University of Victoria, 1985), 16.

31. *Ibid.*, 18.

32. David J. Lu, *Japan, a Documentary History 2, the Late Tokugawa Period to the Present* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1997), 460–63.

33. Douglas MacArthur, Milo E. Rowell, Courtney Whitney, and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Government Section, "Milo E. Rowell Papers, 1945–1946" (Hoover Archives). Possony's excerpts are on pp. 80–83. The study notes the public is almost universally in favor of disarming the belligerent states. It goes on to present pro and con arguments for disarmament as well as arguments for and against an "international police forces."

34. Hellegers, *We, the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution*, 96.

35. Arnold A. Rogow, *James Forrestal, a Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy* (New York: MacMillan, 1963), 161.

36. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952*, 172–74.

37. Eiji Takemae, Robert Ricketts, and Sebastian Swann, *Inside Ghq: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 461.

38. Hugh Borton, *Japan's Modern Century* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1955), 485–86; Lu, *Japan, a Documentary History 2, the Late Tokugawa Period to the Present*, 454.

39. With thanks to Peter Duus, my master's advisor, for the subtitle. See Peter Duus, *Modern Japan*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 261. As with general pre-surrender planning, the best accounts of MacArthur's "constitutional assembly" in English are Hellegers, *We the Japanese People*; Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*; Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*; Ward, et al., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*. In Japanese the best work, in addition to the Japanese versions of Koseki's and Takemae's histories, remains Hata Ikuhiko, *Shiroku: Nihon Saigumbi (Japan's Rearmament: A Documentary History)*, 1976.

40. Ward et al., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*, 19. Borton goes on to note constitutional changes should include "elimination of the privileges and practices that have enabled the military to control important spheres of political policymaking in Japan," but he does not recommend permanent dissolution. See *ibid.*

41. Milo E. Rowell, "Milo E. Rowell Papers, 1945–1946," Box 1, file labeled "Drafts (and memos 1–4)," "Report of the Government Section to Far East Commission, 17 January, 1946," 31–34.

42. United States Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East" (1946), <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1946v08>, 220–21; Shoichi Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, trans. Ray A. Moore (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 7–16.

43. Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM080.

44. In light of subsequent events it was reported the interpreter had made an error in translation. See Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 18; Harry Emerson Wildes, *Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), 34. But Acheson, in a telegram sent to the State Department on October 10, 1945, confirmed MacArthur had told Konoe the "constitution must be revised" at the October 4 meeting, which Acheson attended. See Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM065. MacArthur's own press release, dtd November 1, 1945, acknowledges Konoe was "deputy premier" on October 4, and that it was in this capacity Konoe was told "the Japanese Government would have to revise the Constitution" but goes on to say from the time the Higashikuni cabinet fell Konoe no longer had anything to do with constitutional revision. See *ibid.*, 075. Also see Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948; Report*, 91. And see Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM061.

45. Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 7–11.

46. *Ibid.*, 14.

47. Quoted in Toshio Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 2004), 113.

48. Koseki, 16–23.

49. Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann, *Inside Ghq: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, 558.

50. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn from the Diaries and Private Official Papers of Joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932–1942*, 481.

51. Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 19.

52. *Ibid.*, 15–16; Ward et al., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*, 25. See Moore and Robinson, “The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947,” RM065. for a copy of the telegram Atcheson sent to State regarding his meeting with Konoe. For a copy of the reply from the State Department to Atcheson, see *ibid.*, RM071.

53. Milo E. Rowell, “Milo E. Rowell Papers, 1945–1946.” Box 1, file marked “Drafts,” “Report of Preliminary Studies and Recommendations of Japanese Constitution,” dtd December 6, 1945, cover sheet.

54. For a good summary of several of the proposals see Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948; Report*, 94–98.

55. Moore and Robinson, “The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947,” RM058.

56. *Ibid.*, RM059.

57. *Ibid.*, RM062.

58. *Ibid.*, RM072.

59. Ward et al., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*, 26–30. See also Moore and Robinson, “The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947,” RM060.

60. Ward et al., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*, 34.

61. Milo E. Rowell, “Milo E. Rowell Papers, 1945–1946.” Separate ms. titled, “Proposed Revision of the Army and Navy: Provisions in the Constitution,” box 1, 1–3.

62. *Ibid.* This is outlined in “Memo, June 16, 1975,” op. cit.

63. *Ibid.* See file labeled “Drafts (and memos 1–4)” Ellerman Notes, “Summary of 4 February 1946 Government Section Meeting,” 1–3.

64. See for instance Theodore H. McNelly “Induced Revolution: The Policy and Process of Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan,” esp. 79; Ward et al., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*, 76–106.

65. McNelly, *The Origins of Japan's Democratic Constitution*, 106.

66. *Ibid.*, 107.

67. *Ibid.*, 108–09.

68. *Ibid.*, 109–10.

69. *Ibid.*, 110.

70. *Ibid.*

71. In a letter to Theodore McNelly. See *ibid.*

72. *Ibid.*, 112.

73. *Ibid.*, 115.

74. Charles L. Kades, “The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution,” *Political Science Quarterly* 104, no. 2 (1989): 224.

75. Milo E. Rowell, "Milo E. Rowell Papers, 1945–1946," memo 8.
76. *Ibid.* Eight, using the roman numerals, was the number of the article at this point. See box 1, file labeled "Original Draft of Proposed Constitution," copy five of the SCAP draft, 3.
77. Osamu Nishi, *The Constitution and the National Defense Law System in Japan* (Tokyo: Seibundo, 1987), 84. For an almost identical assertion with a separate interviewer, see Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," 286.
78. Milo E. Rowell, "Milo E. Rowell Papers, 1945–1946." See Ellerman Notes, op. cit., 3. Though Hellegers relates that Rowell and others later denied Whitney had said anything about the use of force in the February 4th meeting the exact quote is in Ellerman's notes of the meeting, Ellerman was present at the meeting, and the notes were originally classified; there seems to be no reason for dissembling in the notes. See Hellegers, *We, the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution*, 771.
79. Milo E. Rowell, "Milo E. Rowell Papers, 1945–1946." See file marked "Record of Events on 13 February when Proposed Constitution for Japan was Submitted to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yoshida, on Behalf of the Supreme Commander." Box 1, Memo 17. See also Meirion Harries and Susie Harries, *Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarization* (New York: MacMillan, 1987), 92–93. And see Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 99–105. Koseki's account includes the Japanese reaction to the American presentation.
80. Milo E. Rowell, "Milo E. Rowell Papers, 1945–1946," *ibid.*
81. *Ibid.* See Memos 16–24, Box 1.
82. *Ibid.* At one point in the drafting process war renunciation was the first article in the constitution. See *Kenpo Kinenbi Tokushu*, "Kenpo Daikyūjo no Hanseiki," broadcast by NHK, May 1, 1991.
83. Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 130.
84. Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM245.
85. *Ibid.*, RM235.
86. *Ibid.*, RM244.
87. *Ibid.*, RM247.
88. The Allied Council on Japan, or ACJ, was a four-power body, consisting of representatives from the United States, USSR, China and the Commonwealth nations, set up to advise SCAP on occupation policies. See *ibid.*, glossary.
89. *Ibid.*, RM264.
90. *Ibid.*, RM266.
91. Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 168–69; Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM288, RM307.
92. Junji Banno, *The Formation and the Collapse of the Meiji Constitutional System* (Tokyo: Office for Japanese Studies Center, The Japan Foundation, 1987), 6–9.
93. Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," glossary.

94. Ibid., RM288. Hayashi is referring to the first paragraph of the March 6 draft, "War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with any other nation."

95. Ibid. Nomura refers to the second paragraph of the March 6 draft, "No army, navy, air force or any other war potential will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the State."

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid., RM295.

98. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954*, 321.

99. Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM317.

100. Ibid., RM319.

101. Ibid.

102. Shigeru Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis*, 1st American ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 140. British spelling of "defence" in the original. It is significant that Nozaka Sanzo had spent several years with Mao's forces in China, where he had recruited and converted many former IJA soldiers after the surrender into Mao's guerilla forces. Though the Japan Communist Party has been otherwise the most strident of Japan's political parties in its opposition to Japanese rearmament and Japan's security treaty with the United States, Nozaka was a Communist Party member who knew the worth of a well-armed force if it was on what he no doubt considered the right side of history. See Donald G. Gillin and Charles Etter, "Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945–1949," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 42, no. 3 (1983). For Nozaka's statement in the plenary session, see Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM322.

103. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948: Report*, 671.

104. Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 198.

105. Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," introduction.

106. Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 167–68.

107. Ibid., 168.

108. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954*, 325.

109. Donald L. Robinson Ray A. Moore, *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under Macarthur* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 111–12.

110. Ibid., 113.

111. Ibid., 114.

112. Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM337.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid., RM380.
116. Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 198. See also Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM381.
117. ———, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM384.
118. Kenneth L. Port, *Transcending Law: The Unintended Life of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2010).
119. Ray A. Moore, *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under Macarthur*, 250.
120. Koseki says "Suzuki Yoshio appears to have known what Kanamori had in mind," Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 199. But if he did know what Kanamori had in mind, why did Suzuki insist the order revert to the original, but end his remarks reminding Ashida Kanamori had said Japan would renounce war forever? When Suzuki gives the example of the jurist who said placing the mention of the right of belligerency before the renunciation of war—as Ashida does in his reordered paragraphs—would mean the article could then be interpreted to allow rearming for self-defense, Suzuki was indicating disapproval; rather than knowing Kanamori's intent, he indicated just the opposite, while also demonstrating his distrust of Ashida.
121. Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM387.
122. Ibid. Also see Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 198–200.
123. Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM286.
124. Ibid., chronology.
125. Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 200.
126. Ibid.
127. Haru Yamada, *Different Games, Different Rules: Why Americans and Japanese Misunderstand One Another* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 20.
128. Shoichi Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," *Japan Quarterly* (1988): 236–38.
129. Douglas H. Mendel, *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1961), 73.
130. Kades, "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," 237.
131. Ibid.
132. Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," 238.
133. Marlene J. Mayo, "Literary Reorientation in Occupied Japan: Incidents of Civil Censorship," in *Legacies and Ambiguities: Postwar Fiction and Culture in West Germany and Japan*, ed. Ernestine Schlant and J. Thomas Riner (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), Box 6, FEC-001/43, p., and Box 7, FEC 87/8, 3. Also see Kades, "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," 237–38.
134. Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM448.

135. Ibid.
136. Ibid., RM473. Not published until January 1996.
137. Kades. "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," 241.
138. Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 51–52.
139. Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," 237.
140. Milo E. Rowell, "Milo E. Rowell Papers, 1945–1946." See Memo 13, Box 1.
141. Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM478. As well, at about the same time, August 1946, Miyazawa Toshiro, who had been on Matsumoto's drafting committee, is quoted declaiming the "draft Constitution which has as its purpose to become the Magna Carta of the New Japan." Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 132.
142. Moore and Robinson, "The Constitution of Japan: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947," RM455.
143. Ibid., RM478.

## Chapter 3

# Hot- and Cold-Running Wars and a Changing Consensus, 1946–1950

Ashida was the first Japanese governmental official to articulate publicly an interpretation of war-renouncing Article 9 that allowed Japan to rearm for self-defense. Ashida was not as singular in his conception of the need for Japan to be able to defend itself as it might seem at first, either in Japan or the United States.

Ward, in *Democratizing Japan*, having examined numerous instances in the pre-surrender planning during which Japan's complete and permanent disarmament was contemplated, concludes that MacArthur's Note II to Whitney, "'No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be authorized'—may be less idiosyncratic than has often been thought."<sup>1</sup> In fact MacArthur's direction only seems idiosyncratic from the perspective of the Cold War, and particularly the Cold War period after the Korean War. During the World War II the need to permanently disarm Japan had become conventional wisdom in the United States. The voices of dissent, who wanted Japan to retain a military capability, first did so with a general view that Japan should be prepared to defend itself, if necessary, from future though unspecified threats. Almost immediately with the end of the war this vague future threat became concrete, embodied by the Soviet Union, before 1949, and by both the USSR and Communist China after 1949. What was viewed as a monolithic communist threat, as well as the collective security clause in the UN charter, and the generalized need for the United States to seek security allies in the Cold War, was deemed sufficient cause to require Japan to rebuild an army by an increasing number of both Americans and Japanese as the chill of the Cold War deepened. This new thinking was shaped by both Japanese and Americans.

## TEMPERING THE AMERICAN HARD PEACE

As early as 1943, Ambassador Grew had warned about a defenseless Japan becoming the seed of a new war. In 1945, in the same meeting during which Secretary of the Navy Forrestal had wondered how badly the United States wanted to "beat Japan," he made explicit the possible power vacuum that concerned him: "What is our policy on Russian influence in the Far East? Do we desire a counterweight to that influence? And should it be China or Japan?"<sup>2</sup> While still somewhat unusual in 1945, the sentiment became more common as the decade wore on, though signals from Washington remained mixed.

In January, 1946, Political Advisor George Atcheson, who had earlier sought and received guidance from the State Department which envisioned a potentially rearmed Japan, reported, disapprovingly, "there is an expectation (or hope) in many Japanese quarters that the United States and Russia will eventually fight each other . . . some actually believe we will be forced to develop and re-arm Japan for this purpose."<sup>3</sup>

In August of the same year, W. Walton Butterworth, counselor in the American Embassy in Nanking, sent a wide-ranging telegram to his superiors in Washington that would have been startling a year earlier. He questioned whether the United States had planned adequately for the power vacuum in Asia and the Pacific after Japan's defeat, and he cautioned China would not be able to fill the vacuum as previously hoped. He provides insight into changing opinions among the U.S. military, noting "our armed forces in Asia, only too openly, talk of Japan as our future bulwark against Russia."<sup>4</sup> He added he disagreed with such a prospect, but he did urge the economic rehabilitation of Japan to increase stability in the area.

In the media, too, the tide was turning. In the same in *Atlantic Monthly* column that, as previously quoted, three years earlier had warned against heeding the call of soft peace advocates appeared the following:

Aspirin in Japan is one cure that has been proposed for the United States headache in China. According to this theory, the Kuomintang is past saving and should be abandoned; but Japan has a fine military tradition, a fine anti-Russian tradition, and industrial and managerial know-how as a bonus. Japan should therefore be salvaged as an American Gibraltar off the mainland of Asia.<sup>5</sup>

The column goes on to caution this theory may not work because too many rightists had been allowed back into the Japanese government in the latest elections, but the almost-complete reversal in attitude toward a rearmed Japan is clear. Harry Kern, Foreign Editor of *Newsweek* continued along this theme when he wrote in 1947, "It might not be beyond the realm of possibility that the United States would . . . revive Japan not only as an industrial but as a military power as well."<sup>6</sup>

If the increasing chill of the Cold War with the Soviet Union was the proximate cause of America's changing policy toward Japanese rearmament, the embryonic policy of containment in the late 1940s helped give the policy more shape. George Kennan had outlined the basis for the policy in 1946 in his long telegram to Washington, and his "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* the following year introduced the term "containment" to the world.<sup>7</sup> The evolving strategy called for reviving both Japan and Western Europe as industrially strong, democratic bulwarks against the Soviet Union. Regarding Japan Kennan thought economic revival was the key, but he was concerned with security as well. In 1948, as the director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, during a meeting with MacArthur in Tokyo to discuss a peace treaty, Kennan urged "The Japanese government should assume more and more authority from SCAP and establish a centralized police force or even a small army to resist Communist subversion."<sup>8</sup> MacArthur remained against any Japanese rearmament, because he thought Japan was not economically ready, but Kennan insisted, "Either we must not have the treaty at all and retain allied troops in Japan, or we must permit Japan to re-arm to the extent that it would no longer present an open invitation to military aggression."<sup>9</sup>

Kennan was apparently influenced by the activities of the American Council on Japan. The ACJ first became active in 1947.<sup>10</sup> Harry Kern, author of the *Newsweek* piece above, was a founding member of the ACJ. The ACJ published several position papers, including one which urged "Permit[ting] Japan to have a well-armed constabulary of 150,000 men,"<sup>11</sup> but according to Dooman, another of the charter members of the council, the ACJ mainly employed one-on-one, behind-the-scenes advocacy with such policy luminaries as Secretary of Defense Forrestal, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, and Secretary of Commerce W. Averell Harriman. The approach may have worked, as these individuals became public champions for many of the ACJ's positions, including Japanese rearmament.<sup>12</sup>

While Kern's and Forrestal's support for rearmament have already been mentioned, some consider ACJ confidante Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall's speech in San Francisco, in January, 1948, to be the real turning point in US policy concerning Japanese rearmament. He said, in part: "We hold to an equally definite purpose of building in Japan a self-sufficient democracy, strong enough and stable enough to support itself, and at the same time to serve as a deterrent against any other totalitarian threats which might hereafter arise in the Far East."<sup>13</sup> While the idea of rearmament had been circulating in policy circles since the beginning of pre-surrender planning, Royall's speech may well have indicated a tipping point, signaling that voices advocating Japanese rearmament, previously the voices of dissent, had now become the voices of the majority among US policymakers. It was

one month after Royall's speech that Forrestal ordered the remilitarization of Japan feasibility study mentioned earlier.

The shift in attitudes is clear with regard to the Defense Department. Previously, in its pre-1947 incarnations as separate War and Navy Departments, this part of the U.S. executive branch had strongly urged a permanently disarmed Japan. In 1947 the departments urged the opposite. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well, who as late as November 1945 had directed SCAP to "prepare for the permanent dissolution of all military and paramilitary organizations"<sup>14</sup> in Japan, in April 1947 issued a study declaring "Japan deserves primary consideration for current United States assistance designed to restore her economic and military potential."<sup>15</sup> While Royall, Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs may have both reflected and been key in consolidating official Washington's move toward a policy of rearming Japan, one of MacArthur's subordinate generals, also an ACJ associate, Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, may have been the most important advocate of a rearmed Japan to America's general public.

Eichelberger had fought in the Pacific during the war, and had gained a professional soldier's respect for the enemy; he was quoted in *Newsweek* praising the toughness of the Japanese soldier.<sup>16</sup> After the war he was the commanding general of the Eighth Army, headquartered in Yokohama, Japan, where he quietly became a link between Americans and Japanese who supported a strong, rearmed Japan. On the Japanese side he was on good terms with individuals like Yoshida, Ashida, and Nomura Kichisaburō, a postwar advocate of Japanese rearmament.<sup>17</sup>

Because of the relations of trust Eichelberger had built with such high-ranking Japanese officials it was perhaps natural he should be asked to act as an intermediary with Washington. In 1947 it became clear to Japanese officials associated with the foreign office that, "The atmosphere was now favorable for the opening of private and unofficial talks between the United States and Japan concerning a peace treaty and the related question of Japanese security."<sup>18</sup> Ashida Hitoshi, then Foreign Minister, worked with other Foreign Ministry officials to draw up a memorandum explaining Japanese goals for both peace and security treaties.

The memo suggested the United States and Japan enter into a pact to guard against aggression from a third country, while Japan would agree to strengthen her land and sea police forces. The memo was given to Eichelberger to carry back to the United States when he went on leave in September.<sup>19</sup> During his time in Washington Eichelberger spoke with the Secretary of State and recommended Japan rearm with an army of about 200,000 men, among other forces (echoing an April War Department report that recommended an army of 200,000 to 300,000 men for Japan).<sup>20</sup> Though the September visit produced no immediate affirmation from Washington, the contents of the memo

presaged accurately the terms of the eventual peace and security treaties, while the numbers Eichelberger and others recommended soon became the approximate targets urged by the United States when its policy became to actively encourage a level of Japanese rearmament.

Eichelberger's activism did not end with his service in Japan. As is often the case with professional soldiers who hold strong views on politically sensitive subjects, Eichelberger waited until his retirement to become more vocal in his opinions; but once he retired in 1948 he returned to the United States "to become the first and foremost public proponent of Japanese rearmament."<sup>21</sup> At a luncheon for businessmen, sponsored by the ACJ, Eichelberger proclaimed a renewed Japanese army would force the Soviets to consider a two-front war, and thus, "A rearmed Japan would doubtless act as a powerful deterrent to Soviet expansion in the West . . . and Far East."<sup>22</sup>

The incipient Cold War clearly drove this reverse in US policymaking regarding Japanese armaments. President Truman was at odds with the Soviets over their policies almost from the time he took office. Concerns over Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere continued through 1946. In 1947 concern about communist insurgency in Greece and Turkey prompted a global response in the form of the Truman Doctrine, but in 1948, not only were there the invasions of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, but communist uprisings continued elsewhere, spreading through much of Asia. It is no wonder, then, by 1948 the army,<sup>23</sup> the Joint Chiefs of Staff,<sup>24</sup> the Department of Defense<sup>25</sup> and others either recommended or were studying various levels of Japanese rearmament. The urgency only increased with the Communist victory in China in 1949. In Japan "obsessed with international communism and the threat of revolution-from-the-outside, ever since the Bolshevik Revolution,"<sup>26</sup> these developments, as well, prompted often-parallel debates about the need for armaments. As an occupied nation, though, Japan's fate had been subordinated to American policy, and within Japan these debates were tempered by, among other factors, the war weariness of a defeated and destitute people and the need to regain independence.

### A BEATEN NATION, WITHOUT A SINGLE SOLDIER,<sup>27</sup> CONSIDERS REARMING

Though his relationship with the military was ambivalent, and his policies stressed minimalist rearmament once he felt pushed toward it, in Japan Yoshida Shigeru was the primary architect and chief mason for the forge in which a new sword, the Ground Self-Defense Force, was formed. Already having figured so prominently in this history, he was "the pre-eminent

politician of Japan's first postwar decade."<sup>28</sup> He served as prime minister for a total of 86 months, second in the postwar era only to Satō Eisaku.<sup>29</sup>

Yoshida is perhaps best known to those who study Japan as the originator of the so-called Yoshida Doctrine. At its most basic, the Yoshida Doctrine was "an exclusive focus of Japan's national energies on economic rehabilitation,"<sup>30</sup> with a concomitant minimalist defense posture. Yet it is also true "Yoshida . . . set the pattern for Japan's course of slow but creeping rearmament."<sup>31</sup> Indeed, it was under Yoshida's administrations that the government of Japan began its postwar practice of enabling creeping rearmament by revising, not the constitution itself, but the Japanese government's interpretation of the constitution. No politician was better placed to do so. Foreign Minister Yoshida had hosted that first fateful meeting between the Americans and Matsumoto, while, as prime minister, Yoshida shepherded the constitution through the Diet, presided over the signing of the peace and security treaties with the United States that ended the Occupation, and defended the three incarnations of what became the Self-Defense Forces. Though key in effecting Japan's policy of creeping rearmament, Yoshida was not the only Japanese concerned about the status of Japan's postwar military. Most such concerns seemed to center on a fear of leftist insurgency at home, or the communist threat abroad, and were expressed even before the war ended.

In addition to the efforts of the Japanese government after defeat, outlined in the previous chapter, some Japanese worried about Japan's military even before the surrender. In early 1945, Prince Konoe Fumimaru, perceiving the inevitability of defeat, presented to the emperor what became known as the "Konoe Memorial" urging surrender to the Allied Powers. In the memorial, among other things, Konoe worried that leftist elements had penetrated the IJA, and suggested if those elements were purged Japan's army would be less of a danger to the national polity, and more acceptable on the international stage after surrender.<sup>32</sup>

Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, in charge of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Military Affairs Section, in informal and secret talks before the war's end, went further when he recommended to his Navy superiors that Japan disarm after surrender in order to stamp out militarism. He suggested a new army and navy could be formed after about 10 years to serve "a more modern Japan," though he thought a small naval force should be maintained because of the power vacuum that would be otherwise created in Japan's vicinity after its defeat.<sup>33</sup>

That power vacuum was also on the minds of other Japanese officials. In May 1945, Inoue Masutaro, counselor of the Japanese legation in Lisbon, contacted the local OSS official (undercover at the time) with the following message:

We are prepared to give up all conquests in this war but would like to keep what we had before. We think we have a rather good point for argument: China and Russia. The United States no doubt knows that Russia will try to drive them out of the Far East and that the United States may lose the great China market . . . So instead of waging a very long war against Japan in China and finally losing the China market to Russia the western powers should come to some sort of arrangement [with Japan].<sup>34</sup>

The message was dismissed at the time by American officials as not representing Japan's official view.

Efforts from within Japan aimed at insuring the continuity of Japan's armed forces did not end with surrender. Though not well-remembered now, some groups of Army officers tried to prevent Japan from surrendering at all. Three different groups from the Imperial Guards Division tried to prevent surrender: the first group tried on the August 14, 1945, "to seize the recording of the emperor's surrender broadcast," before it went out over the air the next day, while the next group, on August 15, tried to institute a coup, and a final group, tried again on the same day to prevent the broadcast itself of the emperor's recorded message. Other scattered attempts were made in the army, sometimes teamed with rightist student groups, to attack political leaders or to circulate pamphlets that either claimed the surrender rescript was a fake, or that, even if the rescript was genuine, true patriots would not obey it. The attempts lacked any support from either higher in the chain of command or the general public and so came to nothing.<sup>35</sup> Short of attempted coups or otherwise ignoring orders to surrender, other military members as well tried to give Japan at least the option of keeping a sword by its side, some of the most notorious with the aid of American officials.

Major General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2, that is, the head of his intelligence section, was arguably both the highest placed official in SCAP and the most assiduous in his efforts to help former members of the IJA keep alive the idea of and prepare for an eventual rearmament. Born in Germany, conservative, vehemently anti-communist, and proud of his Prussian military heritage, Willoughby was known by MacArthur as his "lovable fascist."<sup>36</sup> The G-2 gathered many former military officers together in organizations like the First and Second Demobilization Ministries—formed from the former Japanese Army and Navy Ministries respectively, and responsible for, just as their titles state, the post-surrender demobilization of the millions of Japanese soldiers and sailors, both domestically and abroad<sup>37</sup>—as well as more covert organizations charged with both domestic and international espionage and counterespionage.

One of Willoughby's first recruits was General Arisue Seizo, the former head of Japanese Military Intelligence. Soon after their initial meeting Arisue

requested through Willoughby that SCAP allow Japan to retain one division of the Imperial Guards on active duty after the surrender, ostensibly to protect the Emperor. He later admitted he “naturally” and “secretly” hoped retention of such a force would prove to be “the basis for rearmament.”<sup>38</sup> Another Willoughby recruit was former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army Lieutenant General Kawabe Torashiro, who, recent research has uncovered in previously classified documents, actively, though secretly, planned for the creation of a new army after the war.<sup>39</sup> Perhaps the most notorious of former imperial military officers urging postwar rearmament was Colonel Hattori Takushiro.

Hattori had a storied, or notorious, career in the Imperial Japanese Army, graduating with distinction from the Army Academy, serving in the Kwantung Army as the chief of the General Staff Office Operations Section, and as Tojo’s private secretary, among other positions.<sup>40</sup> After the surrender he served first in the First Demobilization Ministry, as well as its later manifestations (First Demobilization Bureau and, finally, Repatriation Bureau) and he was later placed in a historical section set up by Willoughby, ostensibly, to write a history of the Pacific conflict.<sup>41</sup> At some point Willoughby apparently came to consider the former IJA officers in this latter group as the nucleus of a new Japanese army, with Hattori as its chief of staff.<sup>42</sup> With access to all the records of demobilizing soldiers, Hattori was ideally placed to plan for the rebirth of Japan’s army. He and a small coterie of like-minded colleagues soon formed an informal organization which came to be known as the *Hattori Kikan*, or the Hattori Group. An ardent anti-communist, Hattori was convinced the United States and Russia would fight soon, and that the United States would want a rearmed Japan as an ally.<sup>43</sup> He and his group came up with detailed plans for an army of 15 divisions with 260,000 soldiers, which could be expanded to 45 divisions in wartime.<sup>44</sup> Hattori’s rearmament plans were perhaps the most ambitious and best known during the Occupation, though other Japanese also discussed Japan’s future arms.

Yoshida, for instance, discussing his role with SCAP from the time he was the foreign minister, notes “our daily negotiations with GHQ were so many negotiations for peace,”<sup>45</sup> and concern about security were central to such “daily negotiations” from the first. As early as January 1946 members of the Foreign Ministry, then under Yoshida, argued Japan must build up a small security force for self-defense, and in 1947 Foreign Ministry officials approached W. MacMahon Ball, the Commonwealth representative to the Allied Council on Japan, about Japan building up armed forces numbering 100,000.<sup>46</sup> But others in the ministry thought the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration would prevent any Japanese rearmament, and recommended Japan adopt permanent neutrality, with its security guaranteed by the UN or some other international grouping.<sup>47</sup>

Yoshida's personal opinions on rearmament can be difficult to decipher at any particular moment. He felt a perhaps natural antipathy toward Japan's military, having been imprisoned himself during the war by militarists, yet he felt neutrality was "a cowardly attitude, the opportunism of the weak." In his memoirs he states "the idea of rearmament has always seemed to be one verging on idiocy."<sup>48</sup>

Yet one of Yoshida's closest confidantes, Shirasu Jirō, reportedly told the U.S. State Department Article 9 should be changed to allow Japan to rearm,<sup>49</sup> something he would have been unlikely to do without Yoshida's knowledge. Other officials as well reported Yoshida being in favor of rearmament, though, they explained, he refused to say so publicly in order to avoid offending foreign countries.<sup>50</sup>

Years after the Occupation Yoshida wrote to Tatsumi Eiichi, a former lieutenant general in the IJA, "The renewal of national strength and development of political independence require that Japan possesses a military force as a matter of national honor."<sup>51</sup> Thus it seems clear that Yoshida's initial stance on rearmament was both politically motivated—a stance he took to maintain the widest possible public support both at home and abroad—and temporary, due to his concerns about Japan's fiscal health; he was against large-scale rearmament during the Occupation because he did not think Japan could afford it.

The first official interpretation of Article 9 by Yoshida and his cabinets, repeatedly defended during the constitutional ratification process and afterwards, was that "Japan . . . could not either wage or maintain an armed force—even for the purpose of national self-defense,"<sup>52</sup> and thus no different from the second MacArthur note. As contrasted with the militarism of its immediate past, Yoshida said he and his countrymen would focus on "the building of Japan as a new nation of culture and a new democratic state."<sup>53</sup> In a speech given on the first anniversary of Japan's surrender, Yoshida said, "Now that we have been beaten, and we haven't got a single soldier on our hands, it is a fine opportunity of renouncing war for all time."<sup>54</sup> Yoshida maintained this interpretation throughout the 1940s, despite increasing pressure from the United States, where the chill of the Cold War, as has been noted, and, in 1949, the shock of the so-called loss of China were prompting increasing calls for a rearmed Japan to be America's bulwark against communist expansion in the western Pacific.

One of the last key American figures to take up this call was MacArthur. After having originally directed a policy of permanently disarming Japan the general had continued to laud Japan's new constitution, "Foremost of its provisions is that which, abolishing war as a sovereign right of the nation . . . forbids in future the authorization of any army, navy, air force or other war potential . . . By this undertaking and commitment Japan surrenders rights inherent in her own sovereignty and renders her future security and very survival subject to the good faith and justice of the peace loving people

of the world.”<sup>55</sup> Yet, having argued with all comers that Japan should remain unarmed, protected by American or UN arms, by 1950 the Cold War had cooled the idealistic flame of MacArthur’s previous convictions. Six months before the North Korean invasion tensions were such that MacArthur felt compelled to retreat from his earlier stance. In his 1950 New Year’s address to the Japanese people, MacArthur intoned, “by no sophistry of reasoning can [Article 9] be interpreted as complete negation of the inalienable right of self-defense against unprovoked attack.”<sup>56</sup> And six months later he seemed even more convinced: “Despite Japan’s constitutional renunciation of war its right to self defense in case of predatory attack is implicit and inalienable.”<sup>57</sup>

The reason for MacArthur’s change of heart is perhaps best summed up by Omar Bradley, in the general’s autobiography. Visiting MacArthur soon after assuming the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley reflected on the then-extant war plans for a “global war” with the Soviet Union, known as “Offtackle.” Offtackle placed emphasis on a “strategic offensive” in Europe and, “strategic defensive” in East Asia, with Japan and Okinawa as both the base for and the most important objects of that defense. Bradley writes he suspected that though MacArthur did not say so out loud, the SCAP “privately . . . disagreed. To MacArthur, Asia—the Far East—was the crucial battleground in the war against communism. Vast China, swallowed up by communism was close at hand, threatening the fragile balance of power in the Far East . . . From Tokyo, Europe seemed quiescent, while the Far East flamed.”<sup>58</sup>

In January 1950 Yoshida, too, retreated from his previous position when he stated “the renunciation of war did not mean the renunciation of the right of self-defense.”<sup>59</sup> But he still insisted, “There can be the right of self-defense without there being arms. I can conceive of unarmed defense.”<sup>60</sup> Soon thereafter, evoking an image that would resonate with all Japanese, he explained “I mean by the right of self-defense without the force of arms the right of self-defense which does not employ even two swords.”<sup>61</sup> This conception, however, became just one of many victims that failed to survive when the North Koreans poured across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950. Soon after the invasion MacArthur directed the establishment of the 75,000 man National Police Reserve, to replace the American soldiers who would be deploying to Korea.<sup>62</sup> Yoshida complied, but, despite the fact that the NPR was soon equipped with tanks, mortar and artillery, the prime minister adamantly maintained “the NPR was simply a police force.”<sup>63</sup>

### PURSUING PEACE AMIDST INCREASING CONFLICTS

The policies and narratives outlined above shaped both the forge and the steel of Japan’s new sword. What was viewed as a monolithic communist threat, as

well as the collective security clause in the UN charter, and the generalized need for the United States to seek security allies in the Cold War, was deemed sufficient cause to require Japan to rebuild an army by an increasing number of both Americans and Japanese as the chill of the Cold War deepened. Thus, in the United States urging Japan to rearm, concomitant with a restoration of Japan's independence through a peace treaty, would become policy.

The United States had considered a peace accord with Japan since the beginning of the Occupation, announcing in 1946 the U.S. government was considering a peace treaty with Japan which would have, among other provisions, stripped Japan of all armaments for 25 years.<sup>64</sup> With no progress on this initial proposal, MacArthur had urged and the U.S. government had considered an early peace treaty again the following year, but disagreements, both international, particularly with the Soviet Union,<sup>65</sup> and domestic, particularly between the State Department and the War and Navy Departments (the Department of Defense from 1948) had stymied any progress. The War and Navy Departments had worried in 1947 that a peace treaty might compromise the disposition of U.S. forces in Japan and Okinawa (almost universally viewed through separate lenses by the United States—and, to a certain extent, by some “main-island” Japanese—at the time), and further, the American military was concerned a peace treaty which entailed the removal of U.S. forces from Japan would in turn invite a Soviet invasion of the islands.<sup>66</sup> The communist victory in China's civil war in 1949 perhaps had intensified these worries and the Defense Department's discontent with a peace treaty had continued into 1950.

In Japan as well, though not as quickly nor as completely as in the United States, opinions had been changing amidst the increasingly number of hot conflicts in the Cold War. As early as 1947 there had been war scares in Japan, including rumors, “Former *Kamikaze* pilots were . . . being conscripted for service in the United States Air Force.” And—almost like an Arthurian-style myth of a hero not dead, but merely sleeping, who will awaken to defend his country at its time of greatest need—the fantastic story began to spread at about the same time that Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki, the Tiger of Malaysia, “had not been executed,” but had been spirited secretly to the United States in order that he might advise the American military on how to deal with a Russian thrust through Manchuria.<sup>67</sup>

This war scare faded but communist forces made gains or started violent revolutions throughout Europe and Asia in the following years, until, in 1949 there sprang up other “factors which helped stimulate Japanese thinking on national security.”<sup>68</sup> These factors included widely reported remarks by Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall in February 1949 which questioned whether the United States should keep troops in Japan,<sup>69</sup> the communist victory in China's civil war, in October 1949, and the Sino-Russian accord announced in February 1950, specifically naming Japan “or any state allied with her” as a threat.<sup>70</sup>

Amidst this changing international situation Yoshida continued trying to keep his options open. His two primary goals were to regain Japanese independence and to rebuild Japan's economy. He had begun, as foreign minister in 1945, to study a strategy for achieving a peace accord with the United States.<sup>71</sup> The fruits of this research had first been passed to the Americans via Eichelberger, in 1948, under Ashida as foreign minister. Though he had at first embraced, or at least publicly and repeatedly advocated, a belief that "Japan will fight no wars of any kind. But to recognize defensive war would be to invite war. Therefore limiting war renunciation specifically to aggression could do more harm than good,"<sup>72</sup> by 1949 Yoshida had declared Japan had the right to self-defense "by diplomatic and other means."<sup>73</sup> By January 1950, just as with MacArthur, he had become an even more straightforward advocate of Japan's right to self-defense.

### FIVE YEARS LATER

Five years after defeat and the first and only occupation of its territory by a foreign power; five years after the Emperor, then a military monarch and deity, now a very human civilian symbol, called for the Japanese to endure the unendurable in order to reap the rewards of "eternal peace"; five years after suffering through fire bombings, atomic bombings, widespread destruction and famine, the Japanese had a very different view of their military past than the narrative which had been promulgated during the war. Many Japanese had turned away from war and wanted to stay turned away, but war came to them, or at least to an area that had been considered vital to Japanese security since before the turn of the century.

The North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel plunging the Korean peninsula into war and once again Japan was asked to form an army. Once again young Japanese men answered the call to defend the peace of their country. They did so while still occupied by foreign powers and while contending with official and public views of the army and of soldiers very different from those of just a few years before. The North Korean invasion of June 25, 1950 did not produce, a volte-face on Japan rearmament policy, but it was the sudden flame into which both old iron and new steel was thrown, as Japan began to forge a new sword.

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## *Chapter 4*

# Old Iron and New Steel, 1950–1952

The Japanese sword is made with a core of iron, to give it strength, and a shell of steel, which can be sharpened into its cutting edge.<sup>1</sup> Similarly an army is formed from old iron and new steel, with a strong core of experienced veterans, old iron, when available, but an outer shell of younger recruits, new steel, who become the cutting edge in any ground force.

Kashiwagi Yasutake, then, was steel; his first memory of the National Police Reserve (NPR) was seeing the recruiting posters that began to sprout inside trains, train stations, and public bulletin boards in August 1950. With the dove of peace superimposed over the rising-sun symbol of the Japanese police, the posters proclaimed things like “Peaceful Japan is asking for you,” and “Come young men, protect peace, the National Police Reserve is recruiting.”<sup>2</sup> As a child during the war years Kashiwagi had dreamed of taking the entrance exam for Japan’s naval academy, only to see that dream evaporate in 1945 when he was just 15. At 20 he felt enlisting in the NPR was a chance to rekindle this hope from his childhood, albeit in a different form. Neither his father nor his uncle wanted him to join; they remembered the beatings and abuse suffered by new recruits in the Imperial Army, but Kashiwagi had reached his age of majority, at 20, and decided to take the entrance examination despite their objections. Having succeeded in entering the NPR, the 20-year-old’s initial impression was the “training was American.” Yet, during breaks in the day’s training and at night in the barracks, he relates the recruits “leaned forward eagerly and just listened” to the stories from imperial military veterans about their battlefield experiences and their former schools and training.

Thus these former soldiers and sailors, veterans of Japan’s Fifteen-Year War, who Kashiwagi remembers as making up the “great number of recruits” had an impact on the shaping of the NPR, and the Ground Self-Defense Force

it developed into.<sup>3</sup> To Kashiwagi the NPR was “a Japanese army, with the name of police reserves” and the initial training he went through in the NPR was both “heaven and hell,”<sup>4</sup> but to Hiruma Hiroshi, 10 years older when he entered the NPR, old iron as a veteran of the Imperial Japanese Army, the NPR was simply “a copy of the U.S. Army.” Hiruma was bothered by things as inconsequential as American-style military drill commands being used in training, rather than IJA commands, and as potentially consequential as the American doctrinal training on how to attack an enemy position the NPR recruits received. Hiruma judged the doctrine less effective and more dangerous than IJA doctrine. And it was certainly less Japanese.<sup>5</sup>

Both Kashiwagi and Hiruma agreed the food they were able to eat at the formerly American military facilities the NPR had taken over was plentiful and wonderful, especially at a time when many Japanese still struggled to get enough to eat. Their memoirs well illustrate the many conflicting currents in the birth of the Ground Self-Defense Force: a national army not called an army, trained by and under the control of an occupying authority, which was another nation’s army; a force having to live down the ignominy of the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Army, while incorporating into its ranks many veterans of the same army, veterans who, to some number of Japanese, not only symbolized defeat, but also embodied the institution widely considered responsible for leading Japan into the suffering of the wartime years. All of these currents, moreover, ran through a force whose own existence was constitutionally and legally questionable and subject to public opprobrium.

### **A JAPANESE ARMY NAMED NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE OR A COPY OF THE U.S. ARMY?**

In the opening sentence of his memoir about his experiences as a member of the first cohort of recruits to join Japan’s National Police Reserve, Kashiwagi Yasutake states, “What decided my destiny was the Korean War.”<sup>6</sup> This hot conflict in the midst of the Cold War shaped (some would say warped) many destinies, not only in Japan, but in East Asia, the United States and much of the rest of the world.

As Japan was still occupied, for the Japanese as well as Americans, the response of the U.S. government was particularly fateful, and what that response would be was unclear on June 25. The United States had, after all, removed its military forces from South Korea the previous year, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a now-famous omission during a speech in January, 1950, had not included South Korea as part of the “defensive perimeter” the United States intended to maintain in the western Pacific.

After the North's invasion the United States did take action, sending aircraft to support South Korean forces almost immediately, and, with the helpful legitimization of the UN Security Council, beginning an infusion of ground forces into the peninsula within days. The nearest American ground forces were the four U.S. Army divisions on occupation duty in Japan, and these forces were quickly ordered to Korea. MacArthur and others in the United States were concerned about Japan's safety—many policymakers suspected Japan might be the real target of what they viewed as a monolithic communist threat (and indeed Stalin, who gave Kim II-Sung permission to invade the south after Kim had badgered the Soviet dictator for several months, did so partially because Stalin wanted to have a communized Korean peninsula to off-set what he feared would be the soon be a newly rearmed Japan allied to the United States).<sup>7</sup> On July 8th MacArthur, in a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida, directed the Japanese government “to establish a national police reserve of 75,000 men.”<sup>8</sup> This was the beginning of Japan's postwar army.

The Japanese government, for their part, concerned about what was going on in Korea but lacking many options as an occupied state, scrambled to make sense of MacArthur's directive, and quickly put together a group of people to tackle the problem. MacArthur's letter had been received by the Foreign Ministry's Kimura Shirokazu, from Frank Rizzo, who had replaced Colonel Charles Kades as the deputy of SCAP's Government Section.

Kimura had delivered the letter directly to Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki Katsuo. Okazaki, seeing “national police” referred to in the letter called in Ohashi Takeo, Home Minister and Attorney General for Japan, the cabinet minister in charge of police at the national level for Japan. In the same building with the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Ohashi arrived quickly, and almost immediately the two men decided, since the letter seemed to refer to a force that would back up Japan's National Rural Police, that Ohashi would be in charge of setting up the new force.<sup>9</sup>

Okazaki and Ohashi quickly settled on another member of the group, Kato Yozo, who was then in charge of administration for the National Rural Police.<sup>10</sup> (Kato, described by a knowledgeable observer as “the one who shines head and shoulders above” the other civilian bureau chiefs,<sup>11</sup> remained with the Japanese forces, the civilian in charge of the personnel bureau, for 14 years.)<sup>12</sup> Ohashi and Okazaki, having translated the directive's term of National Police Reserve directly into its Japanese equivalent, *Kokka Keisatsu Yobitai*, first delivered the letter to Prime Minister Yoshida. Yoshida was delighted, as his government had already asked GHQ three times for permission to increase Japan's police strength, but had been rebuffed each time. The premier was concerned however, that the formation of this force would naturally come up for intense discussion in the then-ongoing extraordinary Diet, so he directed the two ministers to find out the intent behind GHQ's order.<sup>13</sup>

Okazaki and Ohashi wasted no time in returning to SCAP headquarters the afternoon of the 8th. This time meeting with Brigadier General Whitney and, again, Frank Rizzo, the ministers went into the meeting having taken the NPR's designation at face value. They thought this new force would be a supplement to the existing municipal and rural police forces. In talking to Whitney and Rizzo, though, "it gradually became clear, though this was an organization to support order, it was to be completely separate and independent from the police, and thought to be rather a military-like organization by the American side."<sup>14</sup> If the Japanese government was initially unsure about the intent behind establishing this force, on the American side the intent was made explicit, though secretly, from the beginning.

Colonel Frank Kowalski Jr. had been stationed in Japan for about two and one-half years, working in military government positions as the chief of military government in Kyoto and Osaka in 1948, and then as the chief of the wider civil affairs region of Chugoku from 1949–1950,<sup>15</sup> before he moved to Tokyo with his wife and two children to become the chief of staff for Major General Winfield P. Shepard, the head of GHQ's Civil Affairs Section, two months before the Korean War started. He enjoyed living by the park surrounding the Meiji Shrine, only a 15-minute drive to work in SCAP headquarters, in the Dai Ichi Building. But with the start of the war, work had reached "a fevered pitch," seven days a week, 16 hours a day. He reports his normally open boss, General Shepard, had become increasingly secretive from the beginning of the war.

On July 9 the GHQ G-1 (personnel bureau) called for General Shepard, and Colonel Kowalski stayed on the line, as he usually did, in case his boss needed him to take action. Kowalski overheard the G-1 (the designation applies to the office as well as the head of the office) tell General Shepard Kowalski had been selected to command a regiment in Korea. Shepard replied to the G-1 after "a long silence . . . 'I'll be over to talk to you in a little while.'" Kowalski hung up the phone and waited; he wanted to go to Korea and command a regiment. When Shepard did not stir for several minutes Kowalski walked into his boss's office and told the general he wanted to go to Korea. Shepard said no, that Kowalski was needed in Japan. Kowalski tried to argue his case, but Shepard got up, told his chief of staff he would speak with him after returning from the G-1, and left.<sup>16</sup>

When Shepard returned about an hour later he called Kowalski into his office and had him close the door. After the two were seated, Shepard said:

"Frank, I know how much you want to command a regiment, but you are not going to Korea. I cannot let you go because you and I have a big job to do here in Japan. I have been designated by General MacArthur to organize a National Police Reserve, a Japanese security force of 75,000 men with four divisions.

This is the beginning of the Japanese Army. You are going to be the Chief of Staff, so forget Korea."<sup>17</sup>

Kowalski says his "head whirled" at what he had just been told. Shepard then handed him a document marked Top Secret, told him it was the "Basic Plan," and explained more explicitly, "our four divisions now on these islands are all going to Korea. We have the job to organize and train four Japanese divisions to take the place of the Americans."<sup>18</sup>

This Basic Plan, which Kowalski described as "the Bible for the new Japanese Army,"<sup>19</sup> was actually entitled "Increase in Japanese Security Agencies," a broad plan including timelines, equipment, types and locations of units, and costs, that had been put together by an ad hoc committee of the SCAP staff.<sup>20</sup> As for the number of troops specified for the NPR, Kowalski writes "At Potsdam, fortunately, it had been agreed that Japan would be permitted to maintain a police force of 200,000 men."<sup>21</sup> While it was true that the municipal police at the time numbered 35,000 and the National Rural Police numbered 90,000, a total of 125,000 which would have thus permitted the increase of 75,000 to meet what Kowalski claimed is enumerated in the Potsdam Declaration, in fact the Declaration says nothing about police strength in Japan.

Instead this number came from a study done by the U.S. Army in 1948. Already concerned about security in Japan due to the Cold War, an Army report recommends, if small-scale military rearmament cannot be undertaken because of Japan's constitutional restrictions or the objections of neighboring countries, Japan increase its police forces from the then-extant 125,000 to 200,000. The report goes on to say the force might form the basis for Japanese military rearmament in the future, if the restrictions on rearmament are lifted.<sup>22</sup> NSC 13/3, adopted in May 1949 continued the call for strengthening Japan's police forces and various U.S. government officials as well had continued to sound the call for expanding the police force, or establishing a constabulary force, throughout 1950.<sup>23</sup> Clearly as SCAP and the U.S. government tried to decide how best to provide for Japan's security once American forces left, they were aware of these proposals.

Exactly when MacArthur had decided to form the NPR is unclear. SCAP sent a cable to the Department of the Army declaring "expansion of the Rural Police by 75,000 and of the Maritime Safety Police by 8,000 is in process,"<sup>24</sup> on July 3, 1950. This was five days before MacArthur directed Yoshida and the Japanese government to undertake the expansion, and six days before the date Kowalski received a copy of "Increase of Japanese Security Agencies." The date on an extant copy of the plan is July 10; apparently the plan was not finalized until a day after Kowalski received it.<sup>25</sup>

Having taken on board the Army's recommendation for a force of 75,000, and since the NPR was intended to replace the four divisions of U.S. Army

troops soon to be leaving Japan, for the GHQ planners, further organization of the force became, essentially, a math problem. As the NPR volunteers passed through recruiting centers they were to be organized into groups of 1000 each because, "The standard United States battalion is slightly less than 1000; the Japanese battalion [of the demobilized IJA] is slightly greater. From this it is determined that the basic units should be formed in groups of 1,000 men."<sup>26</sup> From these 1000-man battalions "four regions or divisions," were to be formed with approximately 15,000 men each. Sub-regional organizations, or regiments, were to serve between the battalions and the regions, and, "a national headquarters, two corps or intermediate headquarters, [and] a Service Force"<sup>27</sup> would function above the regions or divisions.

The planners envisaged the "regions" as pared down American infantry divisions, stationed in locations which were to "conform roughly to the regional locations of the four U.S. divisions of Japan prior to the present emergency," whose locations, in turn, "In many instances coincide with the previous Japanese empire division areas."<sup>28</sup> Each man was to be initially armed with a carbine rifle. What Kowalski describes in his memoir as the beginning of "a calculated creeping rearmament tuned to the will of the Japanese public and Allied reaction,"<sup>29</sup> the SCAP planners had in mind from the beginning. The Americans envisioned "progressively equipping" the NPR, eventually ensuring the regions, or infantry divisions, would have, in addition to the individual carbines, higher-caliber rifles, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, tanks and artillery, among other items.<sup>30</sup> In another characterization, Kowalski summed this process up as equipping the NPR "as rapidly as possible (the Japanese public and Allied opinion permitting)."<sup>31</sup>

Inevitably, for a brand new force, issues of pay, uniforms, and facilities took up much time, and all of these issues were complicated by the tortuous process involved; a Japanese administration, working with a certain amount of misdirection aimed toward its own Diet, negotiated with SCAP General Headquarters (GHQ) planners from different sections of the headquarters who not only lacked a unified position, but were frequently trying to undermine one another's bureaucratic standing and prerogatives within GHQ. Due to delays caused by these byzantine procedures, the new recruits of the NPR were not paid until November,<sup>32</sup> but perhaps no issue better illustrates this collision of collusion and competition than the issue of leadership.

A G-2 memo dated August 10, 1950 finds "the line of demarcation between purged and non-purged former Army officers indicates that the Japanese Government purged every grade above that of Captain, [and] one-half the Captains, while leaving First and Second Lieutenants comparatively untouched."<sup>33</sup> There had been some exceptions. Prime Minister Yoshida reportedly offered the top uniformed job in the new force to Tatsumi Eiichi,

a retired IJA lieutenant general.<sup>34</sup> Tatsumi was one of the few former military men close to the prime minister, having served with Yoshida in London from 1936–1938 as army attaché when Yoshida was Japan's ambassador.<sup>35</sup> One account characterized Tatsumi as Yoshida's "military brain,"<sup>36</sup> but though Tatsumi continued to advise Yoshida, he declined to return to uniform.<sup>37</sup>

Yoshida then, apparently at the suggestion of Ohashi and Okazaki, selected Masuhara Keiichi, as the first civilian head, or director general of the new force, and Eguchi Mitoru as his deputy.<sup>38</sup> Masuhara and Eguchi then, again working with Okazaki and Ohashi, selected Hayashi Keizo, a career Home Ministry official with police experience but no military experience, for the top uniformed job.<sup>39</sup>

Masuhara Keikichi was 46 years old when selected for the position of the Director General of the National Police Reserves. The governor of Kagawa Prefecture when selected, Masuhara was a graduate of the Law Department, Tokyo Imperial University and had long experience in Japanese police forces, even serving "a few years in Peking as an attaché for the National Police Bureau in the Home Ministry" at the Japanese Embassy,<sup>40</sup> before first being appointed governor in Kagawa Prefecture, and then winning election to governor, in 1946 and 1947 respectively.<sup>41</sup> Reportedly Masuhara had been visiting Tokyo in July when petitioners from Kagawa approached him about requesting NPR units be stationed in Zentsuji, a former IJA camp in the prefecture. Masuhara took the petition to a classmate of his from Tokyo University, Ohashi Takeo. A few days later, on the day Masuhara was scheduled to depart Tokyo, Ohashi called and asked him "to serve as the NPR Chief."<sup>42</sup>

Aside from this school connection to one of the members of the Japanese government's NPR committee, it is difficult to say why Masuhara was chosen. He was formally appointed Director General of the NPR on August 11, though he had already been active in the role for almost a month.<sup>43</sup> Eguchi Mitoru, a graduate of Kyoto Imperial University, also had a police background, and had been the Vice Minister of Labor when he was selected to be Masuhara's deputy.<sup>44</sup> Eguchi handled much of the day-to-day negotiations with the Americans, and often spoke before the Diet, but his role is otherwise not prominent in existing documents. Hayashi Keizo's role, on the other hand is prominent. His selection as the head of the uniformed force was controversial because it was tangled in SCAP bureaucratic rivalries.<sup>45</sup>

Hayashi had no formal military experience prior to becoming, in effect, the commanding general of Japan's new army. Hayashi's father, Hayashi Yasakichi, had been a lieutenant general in the IJA. Hayashi the son had graduated from the Law Department, Tokyo Imperial University, like Masuhara, and had climbed steadily through the ranks of the Japanese bureaucracy, mostly in positions connected with the Home Ministry.<sup>46</sup> After the war

Hayashi was appointed governor of Tottori Prefecture, at age 39, "probably the youngest governor ever appointed or elected in Japan."<sup>47</sup> In August 1948 he was appointed the Assistant Director of the Imperial Household.<sup>48</sup> According to rumor Hayashi had been considered for the post of the "first director of the National Police Reserve," but did not accept the position over an issue of "integrity."<sup>49</sup> Hayashi's name was put forward for the position of uniformed head of the NPR by the Japanese government in September. Masuhara or his deputy, Eguchi, checked with American officials almost daily from mid-September until early October on the status of Hayashi.

By September 28 Masuhara was told the "G-2 did not approve Mr. Hayashi. It seems the G-2 has a certain person in mind that they want to recommend as Chief of the NPR Uniform Headquarters." Masuhara decided to go to Okazaki and Yoshida over the matter. On October 6 General Whitney, still the head of the Government Section, called General Shepard and asked Shepard if the Japanese "still wanted Mr. Hayashi." Shepard answered affirmatively. Shepard later told Masuhara the matter was "in the hands of General Whitney," and Hayashi was likely to be appointed.<sup>50</sup> Hayashi was appointed a few days later and would remain the top uniformed officer in Japan's new forces, through its three incarnations, for 14 years.<sup>51</sup>

Masuhara and the other Japanese officials well knew the "certain person" G-2 had in mind for the chief of the uniformed forces. They knew on the U.S. side the question of who would lead Japan's new army had immediately become mired in a bureaucratic rivalry over which part of MacArthur's staff would oversee Japan's rearmament. They may not have known MacArthur's top intelligence officer Major General Charles Willoughby, had been planning for Japanese rearmament from the beginning of the Occupation.

Willoughby had handpicked several senior IJA officers to man the First Demobilization Bureau with the intent that, once a new Japanese Army was authorized, these officers would become the nucleus of a new Japanese General Staff, and thus was poised perhaps better than any other staff head to seize the initiative. Once the order to form the NPR was given Willoughby pushed forward his candidate for the top uniformed officer, former IJA Colonel Hattori Takushiro.<sup>52</sup> Hattori and his staff had come up with detailed plans for Japan's new army, featuring Hattori as the new chief of staff, and 400 other former officers populating the rest of the General Staff.<sup>53</sup> Hattori and company had been in an ideal position for this task; having managed the demobilization of the IJA they had records detailing names and current locations of all surviving former IJA officers (Kowalski noted in his Daily Report on August 8, 1950, that many "of those [on] the list submitted by Mr. Hattori's office . . . are at present still connected with the Demobilization Bureau of G-2").<sup>54</sup> All of this had been kept secret from the Japanese government.

Reminiscing in an account published a little more than 10 years after the fact, Mr. Masuhara recalls how he had learned of the Willoughby/Hattori plan: "Hattori burst into the room with about seven or eight others."<sup>55</sup> He then recalls that Hattori had copies of a detailed plan for rearmament, and that Hattori told Masuhara and others present that Willoughby had told the former colonel he was to be the chief of staff for Japan's new army, but that Hattori was not to tell the Japanese government yet. Hattori continued he had decided to tell Masuhara "since we are both Japanese."<sup>56</sup> Masuhara remembers being flabbergasted. However, this attempt by Willoughby to control Japan's rearmament failed. Masuhara passed his concerns, unspecified in his reminiscence, upward to PM Yoshida, who, in turn spoke to MacArthur.

Kowalski had in the meantime, been to see MacArthur's aide, a Colonel Bunker, and expressed concerns about the G-2's moves.<sup>57</sup> Kowalski records in his Daily Record of that date meeting Hattori on August 9, and informing Tojo's former secretary that no purged officers would be allowed into the NPR, and thus neither he nor the six men Hattori had appointed as liaison officers to the six National Rural Police Reception Centers would be admitted to the new force.<sup>58</sup> This spelled the end of Hattori's ambition to be chief of staff of the new Japanese army, but it did not prevent the former colonel from continuing to plan Japan's rearmament. Nor, apparently, did it prevent Hattori from becoming an adviser to Masuhara later, though he and his group initially disparaged the NPR.<sup>59</sup>

The G-2 tried to strike back immediately. The same day Kowalski informed Hattori and company their services were no longer required, a member of Willoughby's staff submitted a memorandum to Willoughby, subject: Personnel for National Police Reserve Forces. In the memo, which included six tabs and several annexes, the staffer points out all purged officers were "graduates of the Military Academy," while those not purged were "formerly special reserve officer candidates, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers." The analyst goes on to point out the relative dearth of training and education non-Military Academy graduates received, many receiving only six months or a year of training, as opposed to the "four years and ten months" of Academy graduates.<sup>60</sup>

But the problem was not only the level of education and amount of training. The memo further warns that the Japanese Communist Party had decided on a policy to "devise any means possible to infiltrate into the [National Police] Reserves." Having defined the threat, the memo emphasizes, "It has been a definite fact in the annals of the Japanese Army for the past several decades that the regular army officer graduates of the Military Academy (now purged), always constituted, without exception, the strongest bulwark against Communism in Japan." To bolster his position, the analyst points out Japanese officials, at this point in time, are willing

to consider including IJA veterans in the nascent ground force, noting Attorney General Ohashi, at a meeting of the Liberal Party on August 2, had stated "ex-servicemen might be recruited" for the NPR. The analyst underlines his point highlighting Japanese public opinion, by mentioning "comments in the Japanese newspapers" that purgees should be released to serve in the new force. In closing the memo the writer comments, at the time the memo was being written, Russia was making use of former IJA soldiers "and there is no good reason why we should not do likewise." The writer saved what he likely felt was his most compelling point, however, for Annex D. After recommending all Academy graduates from 1922 onwards be depurged and allowed to serve in the NPR, the analyst stresses the NPR must be built into a strong force immediately because "the Communist Army [is] on the verge of overrunning Korea and [this indicates] the imminent approach of World War III."<sup>61</sup>

Willoughby sent a single-page memo to the Chief of Staff and MacArthur the following day, summarizing the findings of the memo he had received and recommending "Appropriate steps be taken to release from the purge the necessary qualified officers to fill the urgent need for trained personnel from company grade to division staffs."<sup>62</sup> There is no reply in the records from Willoughby's seniors.

The question of leadership was not confined to the top echelons, but was an issue at every level of the new organization and though some may assume Masuhara and the others, themselves lacking a military background, did not want former IJA officers in leadership positions, that is not correct. Though Kato writes in his memoir that the policy to exclude purged military officers from NPR leadership positions was the Japanese government's policy from the beginning,<sup>63</sup> in an interview taken almost a decade and one half before Kato's memoir came out, published in the official history of the first 10 years of Japan's defense forces, Kato is quoted stating the small coterie of Japanese officials involved in standing up the NPR initially assumed the top leadership positions would be filled by IJA veterans.<sup>64</sup>

Again and again Masuhara and others pushed for former soldiers to be admitted to this new force, as part of a list of almost 1000 special appointees the Americans had allowed in order to fill senior leadership positions, but most such attempts failed, usually due to objections from GHQ's Government Section.<sup>65</sup> Thus, when Masuhara's recommendations for the special appointees, after a tortuous process, were finally approved, many of the most senior appointees did have police backgrounds like himself.<sup>66</sup> Beginning in October 1950 there was a depurge of 10,000 former officers,<sup>67</sup> and eventually 300 of these were allowed to join the NPR.<sup>68</sup> In order to fill other leadership positions Masuhara instituted examinations for the NPR recruits, and chose officer candidates from among those who scored the highest.<sup>69</sup> Once Ridgway

replaced MacArthur as SCAP, in April, 1951, the new SCAP pressed to have many more officers depurged.

Ironically, at least from the point of view of those who put together the August 9 memo for Willoughby, all IJA officers with the rank of colonel and below were eventually allowed to join the NPR, just as the memo's authors had recommended.<sup>70</sup> To give just one example of what this meant to officers serving in the force, one officer in the NPR was demoted three times, as successive groups of depurgees allowed those with higher ranks than his into the force.<sup>71</sup>

Willoughby's bid to manage Japan's rearmament had been mainly opposed by Brigadier General Whitney.<sup>72</sup> After much wrangling within the headquarters between his head of the Government Section and his G-2, General MacArthur designated a third flag officer, Major General Shepard, as the general officer in charge of the "development and control of the National Police Reserve" in a memo dated 14 July 1950. Shepard was further directed to establish a Military Advisory Group to advise the Japanese government on all aspects of the NPR's "organization, equipment, training and control,"<sup>73</sup> but since the fact that the NPR was military or at least paramilitary in nature was supposed to be kept secret, the military advisory group was not called a military advisory group, but instead, as cover, called the Civil Affairs Section Annex (CASA). Shepard's chief of staff, Colonel Frank Kowalski, was given charge of CASA.

Though difficult, because Korea had priority for personnel, Kowalski immediately gathered around himself some capable individuals.<sup>74</sup> For office space CASA took over, on July 21, what had been the Japanese Higher Nautical Training School, on what the Americans called Camp Hogan, and what the Japanese called Echujima, just after the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division left the camp for Korea.<sup>75</sup> The national headquarters of the NPR was soon co-located with CASA.

The NPR was to report directly to the prime minister. The prime minister brought up the National Police Reserve in an address before the Diet on July 14. After noting North Korea's invasion south, the PM declared, "To us the battle of Korea is not a 'fire across the river.' It demonstrates how real and imminent is the menace of Communism . . . Our country itself is by no means free from danger . . . Japan, though not in a position to play a positive role, will cooperate within the limits of her ability."<sup>76</sup> After disparaging those whom he said unrealistically proposed "neutrality" or "non-involvement" he goes on to note, "The government has long been making studies concerning our police system. On July 8 General MacArthur authorized the augmentation of our police strength to a level similar to that of other democratic states . . . We propose to establish a national police reserve of 75,000 men," and he further notes the increase in the Maritime Safety Agency.<sup>77</sup>

This public announcement was as far as the PM was willing to go, at this point. Four days later, when Shepard and other members from SCAP met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki and Attorney General Ohashi, to discuss forming the NPR, the topic of a "Potsdam Ordinance" (that is an ordinance directed by SCAP, as the occupying authority) legalizing the creation of the NPR came up. Okazaki said the Japanese government preferred to wait until after the Diet adjourned to issue the ordinance, for "political reasons."<sup>78</sup> Though the Americans wanted the ordinance issued immediately, the Japanese government did wait, in order to avoid loud protests from the opposition in the Diet. The order was issued on August 10, "Cabinet Order No. 260, establishing the National Police Reserve."<sup>79</sup>

In the same memo naming Shepard the lead for forming the NPR, the G-3, or operations officer, is directed to provide guidance on organization and initial deployment and the G-2 is directed to coordinate "General recruiting." The memo also notes "initial organization into 1,000 man units is to be accomplished by the National Rural Police utilizing the existing six (6) National Rural Police Regional Training Schools as reception centers."<sup>80</sup> The G-2's Public Safety Division (PSD), under Colonel H. E. Pulliam, already managed the National Rural Police (NRP) and the municipal police, and the plan was to use the NRP's "existing recruiting machinery."<sup>81</sup> Perhaps because of the PSD's experience Willoughby was given charge of recruiting, while he shared the responsibility for selecting the "top leaders for the force" with General Courtney Whitney of the Government Section.<sup>82</sup>

Each prefectural NRP headquarters and every local police station became a recruiting office, and prospective recruits could also pick up forms at any local government office. The PSD made extensive use of existing police-recruiting practices, advertising in newspapers, and on radio broadcasts, as well as with posters (like the one Kashiwagi remembers seeing on a train) and pamphlets.<sup>83</sup> Recruits were given physicals, as well as general knowledge examinations and were interviewed to determine whether or not they possessed "moderation of thought and action," as well as "moral character."<sup>84</sup> Recruiting began on August 13 and lasted through September 2, with an extension on Hokkaido until September 10; 382,003 applied for the 75,000 positions.<sup>85</sup> Recruits were then shipped to the six regional NRP schools, where they received their initial training.<sup>86</sup>

## CARBINES ON TRAINS: INITIAL TRAINING

On the same day as the first cohort of NPR recruits entered service, August 23, 1950, the NPR headquarters and the U.S. Advisory Group established schools, at both Eta Jima, on the grounds of the former Imperial Japanese

Naval Academy, and on the grounds of the former Camp Hogan, using the facilities of the former Higher Nautical School. This latter school was thus co-located with CASA and the NPR headquarters. At Eta Jima courses teaching recruits to become *kanbu* or “staff” (as officers in the SDF to this day are called, eschewing the literal term for commissioned officers, *shōkō*, used by the IJA and still used by the SDF to refer to officers in other militaries), were offered, as well as classes on fire arms and other weapons, and communications. At the former Camp Hogan courses on personnel, supply and management issues were taught. All courses were set up through CASA, with American instructors using interpreters. In September 1951 a commander’s course and a *bakuryō* or primary staff officer course were established, each five weeks long.<sup>87</sup>

Though there was some initial confusion about the role of the National Rural Police officers on loan at the reception centers—who were to help train the recruits but who did not understand that role initially<sup>88</sup>—the training got underway quickly. At the reception centers the new recruits received training on “basic riot control,” as well as training on formations for squad, platoon and company drills.<sup>89</sup> Moving on to their assigned camps, the recruits underwent a thirteen-week basic training program devised by CASA, based on U.S. Army basic training. Training was to be eight hours a day, six days a week,<sup>90</sup> and included “Riot and Field Formations,” “Guard Duty,” “Dismounted Drill,” and “Physical Training and Strength Test,” among other subjects.<sup>91</sup> For dismounted drill the recruits were trained to conduct “squad, platoon and company drill for foot troops; [and] ceremonies,” in order to be able “to execute movements . . . with precision and sharpness.”<sup>92</sup> Physical training included a “strength course, combatives, log exercises, 5-mile walk-run, athletics and swimming when facilities and weather permit.” The objective for physical training was to “Pass the prescribed physical fitness test,” and sometime between the 8th and 13th week of training, to be capable “of executing the 5 mile walk and run in 50 minutes maximum.”<sup>93</sup>

The most hours in the basic training program were devoted to “Riot and Field Formations (129 hours),” the scope of which involved “Basic formations to include movement, control, signals, security, and fire and maneuver for both Riot Control[,] Domestic Disturbances and Field Combat Formations.”<sup>94</sup> The first week of basic training was to be devoted exclusively to marksmanship with and the “Knowledge of [the] mechanical operation and functioning of” 30-caliber carbine rifles.<sup>95</sup> This carbine training was considered even more imperative for one group of recruits.

Kowalski recounts in *Saigunbi* that he and CASA were informed in August the final American division in Japan would be departing from Japan’s northern-most main island, Hokkaido, in September. The Americans were

concerned any gap in defensive forces in Hokkaido could invite an invasion by Soviet troops, perhaps even including Soviet-trained Japanese troops in their numbers.<sup>96</sup>

The Far East Command had been concerned about Hokkaido, as a "strategically vital outpost," at least since November 1948, when the command sent a message to Department of the Army requesting reinforcements for Hokkaido, estimating "an adequate defense force on Hokkaido" at two divisions.<sup>97</sup> If Soviet-trained Japanese troops seems far-fetched, it was a genuine concern at the time, based on reports of the USSR positioning former IJA troops in "Manchuria or Sakhalin," for use in an invasion of Japan.<sup>98</sup>

It should also be remembered, as of November 1949 the Soviet Union, last of the Allies to do so, had returned all the Japanese POWs it had admitted to holding, but this had left, by Japanese records, "which had proved remarkably accurate for all other areas," 315,000 Japanese unaccounted for.<sup>99</sup> Many of the former Soviet POWs who had returned had been indoctrinated by the USSR, and there was precedent for former IJA troops fighting for a communist cause, as many former Japanese troops had fought on both sides of the Chinese civil war.<sup>100</sup>

Kowalski was ordered to transport 10,000 NPR troops to Hokkaido as quickly as possible. CASA coordinated private rail cars for the recruits. There was no time to train these recruits at their induction centers prior to boarding the rail cars, so the recruits were instructed on the trains how to care for, load and aim their carbine rifles, though without ammunition. Kowalski and other Americans were afraid they might have to use these spare new skills, with actual ammunition and in actual combat, upon arriving in Hokkaido.<sup>101</sup> Despite the time constraints and many other challenges of making this move while trying to establish a brand new 75,000-man force, the rail cars holding the NPR recruits rolled up to their new camps just as the American troops were departing, with no Soviet threat materializing.<sup>102</sup>

Once the individual training for the new recruits had been completed, by January 1951, the new force moved on to an eighteen-week course of additional training. The focus of basic training had been individual recruits, while this follow-on training focused on small units, up to battalion level. The new training schedule reduced the training week by four hours, but emphasized night training, mandating "at least" one-third of the training occur at night (though this night training was not to add to the 44-hour training week, eight hours a day five days a week and four hours on Saturday).<sup>103</sup> Operations to be taught included "Offensive and defensive formations," as well as, "Street and house to house fighting," and "Maneuver of one small unit against another small unit."<sup>104</sup> Out of 11 operations listed only one, "Dispersion and control of demonstrations, mobs, and riots," was a police function.<sup>105</sup>

Army basic training tends to be memorable for those who experience it, regardless of the army, and this has proved to be the case for those who have written their memoirs of the early days of the NPR. One of the things most striking to Kashiwagi about initial training was the extravagant wealth, or at least material excess, displayed by the Americans in something as simple, yet basic to soldiering, as rifle practice. What so stunned Kashiwagi was the sheer number of bullets the recruits fired, as evidenced by the shell casings which “fell to the ground and covered it like dew.”<sup>106</sup>

Kashiwagi maintained his cohort, whom he referred to as “the Shōwa Year 25 Troops,” (by which he meant young men his age who had not been old enough to serve in the war and entered the NPR in 1950, which was Shōwa 25), were less bothered by the NPR’s American-style training than the IJA veterans. Indeed, what bothered the Burma veteran Hiruma, who entered the NPR two years later than Kashiwagi, after his IJA Academy class, class number 57, had been depurged, was the American tone of the training. He was bothered, for instance, by the difference between IJA and American positions of attention (the main difference being what was done with the fingers—in both countries soldiers at the position of attention stood straight, heels together, looking forward with their arms straight down at their sides, hands aligned along the middle of the seams of their trousers—but in the IJA the soldiers stood with their fingers pointing straight down the legs of their trousers, while the American style taught to the NPR recruits had them curling their fingers inward, or as Hiruma put it, “Holding their fingers as if cupping an egg”).<sup>107</sup> Similarly, he complained the Americanized position the NPR recruits had to assume when given the command *Yasume!* (“Rest!” in English), required the recruits to hold their fingers straight, hands overlapping, in the small of the back, with legs straight and shoulder-length apart. This was not restful, he says, as opposed to the IJA version, in which you held your arms however you liked, placed a foot forward, and then rocked your weight back to your rear foot, which he did find restful.<sup>108</sup>

But the Burma veteran’s greatest scorn was for the combat training. He explains, in the American version of training he received in the NPR, as you approached the enemy, you were taught to simply stand up, walking forward and firing your rifle. To someone whose “body is used to Japanese Army training,” doing so, instead of staying low until you are closer to the enemy and then rushing forward, was “just absurd.”<sup>109</sup>

A third memoirist, Yamasaki Takahara, who also entered in 1952, remembers most the running every morning with his fellow soldiers in four columns, spending days on learning how to care for and maintain individual equipment, barracks lessons, “the many things requiring attention,” the oppressive heat and “sweat-drenched training,” and the final 40-kilometer road march before graduation.<sup>110</sup>

## FIGHTING WORDS: LANGUAGE AND THE NPR

An organization of questionable constitutionality, legality and legacy, born of subterfuge on the part of both the American occupiers and the Japanese government, it is no wonder what became the Ground Self-Defense Force is and was from the beginning, rife with euphemisms. On the American side the first indication of a word fight over fighting words is perhaps in the Basic Plan. The plan itself, with one exception, refers to the new force in Japan as a National Police Reserve. The exception appears in tab 3 of the final annex G, "Estimated Cost—JFY 1950–51." In this tab instead of NPR the label used is constabulary,<sup>111</sup> a word with military connotations, and one that had been used, most recently, by the American occupiers in Korea for the force which became the Republic of Korea Army.

In another American case, all copies of the first set of regulations for the NPR were gathered up and burned at CASA's direction; the reason for this becomes clear when a daily report after the burning states the regulations were rewritten to specifically include "fewer military terms."<sup>112</sup> The Americans continued to show care even in internal documents, not meant for Japanese eyes. In the daily record of activities Kowalski kept for most of the first two years of the NPR's existence Hayashi, the top uniformed officer of the Japanese force, is first referred to as "Mr. Hayashi." After his appointment, twice, in apparent slips, in October and December 1950, he is referred to as "General Hayashi," and in the remainder of the records he is referred to by his NPR rank, "Superintendent Hayashi."<sup>113</sup> The Americans also tended to be careful with what they said in private meetings. It was surprising enough to Masuhara to be noted in a later report by Masuhara to Shepard that, in a meeting the civilian NPR head had attended with Colonel Pulliam, the head of G-2's Public Security Division, the colonel had referred to the NPR as a "military" rather than as a police reserve.<sup>114</sup>

The Japanese, too, immediately seemed to latch onto euphemisms. From the beginning the Japanese eschewed the word for soldier, *gunjin*, in favor of *tain*, unit member; Hayashi used this word to refer to troops in one of his first major policy speeches, given to a group of new NPR officers in December 1950.<sup>115</sup> Officers were referred to as *kanbu*, or staff member, a term previously applied to staff members of civilian companies, instead of by the term *shōkō*, or commissioned officer, which is still used to refer to the officers of all other armies. As early as September 6, 1950, Masuhara asked CASA if the Japanese could "use numbers for the various outfits of the NPR instead of names such as the 57 mm Company," because, he explained, "if names such as 57 mm, etc, were used, the public as well as members of the NPR, will misunderstand the pure purpose of the NPR."<sup>116</sup> In February 1952 Eguchi mentioned to Kowalski that some NPR camps still had signs like "Artillery Battalion,"

since the first NPR organizational documentation had included such terms. The deputy chief explained the units would be instructed to take such signs down; otherwise, Eguchi worried, the public might react badly, and he was especially concerned about any response from “Communists.”<sup>117</sup>

Some of the mangled language had more to do with inexperience and the difficulties inherent among those with no military background trying to interpret military jargon—a task made even more difficult by the fact the jargon was from a foreign army and in a foreign language—than with any attempt at using euphemisms. On August 28, 1950, Masuhara received from the Americans in CASA a Table of Organization (T/O) for a single NPR battalion, with the promise that other T/Os would be passed to him as the documents became available.

A T/O (more recently called a TOE or Table of Organization and Equipment) outlines job positions, titles and ranks, numbers of personnel in those positions and the types and numbers of equipment for the military unit it pertains to. Such documents are rampant with military acronyms and jargon,<sup>118</sup> so it is no wonder Masuhara had to bring the T/O back on August 30 in order to have its terms explained to him.<sup>119</sup>

Kashiwagi bemusedly recalls an instance of civilians unintentionally mangling military language when he describes the results of American advisors using interpreters to relay orders. The interpreters, Kashiwagi explains, were “militarily tone deaf,” and rendered basic military drill commands like “Attention! (*Ki wo Tsuke!*),” and “Rest! (*Yasume!*),” in the middlingly polite, collaborative form: “Everyone, let’s come to attention (*Minna-san ki wo tsukemashō*),” and “Everyone let’s rest (*Minna-san yasemashō*).”<sup>120</sup> On the other hand, when it came to incorrect levels of politeness in communicating, NPR troops complained to their American advisors that the Japanese used in signs around NPR camps were written in language that was too abrupt, and they requested the wording be made more polite. A directive was sent to regional advisors to do so.<sup>121</sup>

### SEEKING SHELTER FROM THE COLD (WAR): A WONDERLAND OF DEFENSE DEBATES

Even as Japan was rearming, the struggle over rearmament (*saigunbi*) in Japan continued, since, while the Korean War served to further solidify and add urgency to the consensus in the United States that Japan needed to rearm, in Japan the results were more mixed. The hot war in Korea certainly forced the war-weary Japanese to “remember what the heart had pledged to forget,” in the words of one of Japan’s most popular radio dramas in the 1950s,<sup>122</sup> but, given a variety of factors, this new conflict, rather than forging consensus,

exacerbated fractures in Japanese public opinion. For all Japanese except young children, war had been Japan's reality for 15 years before the defeat, and those who had been forced to remember what they would have preferred to forget wished to put those 15 years behind them forever. Both Occupation and Japanese leaders had stressed since 1945 that the post-defeat period was a new start for a new Japan; educators and the mass media had stressed for five years the former "military clique" had led Japan into its disaster,<sup>123</sup> and war and warriors, were, for the most part, either evil, shameful, best ignored or some combination thereof.

Given that many, if not most, Japanese were preoccupied with survival and rebuilding there was little appetite for challenging these images. For a smaller cohort—especially to intellectuals and the left—since the 1947 adoption of the constitution, unarmed neutrality had become a viable alternative. For another small cohort—those in Japan who did want to rearm—motivation tended fall into one of two camps. For one group the motive tended to be, first, that Japan should again become independent and autonomous; arms for this group were concomitant with a sovereign state and the Korean War was more an opportunity than a threat as it presented another reason to push for an independent, strong Japan. For the other pro-rearmament group, rearmament would make Japan a better ally for the United States and would help Japan fulfill its obligations to the UN.

Thus, by 1950 the Japanese public was split three ways, in general, between those who advocated rearmament, either for autonomous self-protection or in alliance with the United States and the West, those who adamantly clung to a hope for unarmed neutrality, and those who just wanted to get on with their lives, with neither the desire nor the time to think about potential threats, willing to war no more.<sup>124</sup>

### Two Treaties and a Token Contribution

In the United States the Cold War's newest white-hot point became the catalyst for a wide-ranging consensus on the American Japan policy, though stubborn fissures had remained right up until the beginning of the war. When Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Omar Bradley traveled to Japan in mid-June 1950, just before the invasion, they argued against a peace treaty for Japan.<sup>125</sup> The Defense Department, at this point, remained in favor of Japanese rearmament, stating in one 1950 analysis of a peace proposal that, though the department remained against pursuing a peace treaty at the time, one of the few redeeming virtues of a peace treaty with Japan if pursued would be, "The fact that the conclusion of a peace treaty will hasten the time when the rearming of Japan will be politically feasible."<sup>126</sup> At the same time in the State Department there were

those in favor of an immediate peace treaty with Japan, but adamantly against Japanese rearmament.<sup>127</sup>

Though consensus for pursuing an immediate peace treaty with Japan in his administration was lacking, President Truman appointed the staunch Republican John Foster Dulles as a consultant to the State Department in April 1950, and made Dulles his envoy to do just that. The appointment of Dulles was an attempt by Truman to inject bipartisanship into foreign affairs. Dulles, the grandson and nephew of former Secretaries of State,<sup>128</sup> and a well-connected lawyer in his own right, had attended the Versailles peace conference, and “served as a senior adviser at the San Francisco Conference which established the United Nations, and as a member of American delegations to the United Nations.” He “occupied a position of power in the Republican Party and was acknowledged as its ‘shadow’ Secretary of State.”<sup>129</sup>

From the first Dulles was convinced any peace treaty with Japan had to dispense with what he called the “vicious cycle of war-victory-peace-war,”<sup>130</sup> and that rearming Japan would help break such a cycle. He did not indicate any concern about Japan’s constitutional war renunciation. When briefed by the State Department about Japan peace settlement issues soon after having been appointed consultant in April 1950, and asked about referring to Article 9 in a peace accord, Dulles only said mentioning the war-renunciation clause “might be useful as ‘scenery’ . . . in getting the agreement adopted.”<sup>131</sup>

It was common sense to Dulles that Japan would have to have the means to defend itself, and that it would want to have such means; he was unprepared for the attitude he actually encountered once he traveled to Japan and met with Japanese representatives. His first trip as envoy was to Korea and Japan in June 1950, and despite many briefings and position papers, including a copy of Yoshida’s May 1950 peace treaty proposal, which will be discussed below, the straightforward lawyer was unready for his first meeting with the Japanese prime minister.

To be fair to Yoshida, the cross currents of opinion, at times fierce, made difficult the political shoals the PM had to navigate. By January 1950, after the United States had already announced its intention to build a defensive alliance system in the Pacific, including the Philippines, Japan and Okinawa,<sup>132</sup> and MacArthur had recognized Japan’s right to self-defense in his New Year’s address to the Japanese people, Yoshida had followed the SCAP’s address with a similar statement of his own.<sup>133</sup> Seeing the need to once again broach a peace proposal in early 1950, Yoshida worked up such a proposal and then, in secret, sent one of his closest associates, Ikeda Hayato, then Yoshida’s finance minister, to the United States to discuss the plan with Washington officials.<sup>134</sup> In Washington after courtesy calls with other officials Ikeda met with Joseph Dodge, “Financial Adviser to the Supreme Commander and Fiscal Adviser to the Under Secretary of the Army.”<sup>135</sup> Dodge had spent “six to eight months

of the previous year" in Japan and had developed a rapport with Ikeda and Yoshida.<sup>136</sup> Yoshida conveyed, through Ikeda, that the Japanese people remembered Royall's remarks from a year before "that Japan was not necessary to the United States," and other perceived indications of a lack of U.S. interest in East Asia, declaring "The Japanese people are desperately looking for firm ground."<sup>137</sup>

While the earlier Ashida memorandum had mentioned UN forces protecting Japan, this time Yoshida proposed the United States maintain bases in Japan as a requirement of a peace treaty, trying to reassure any hesitant American officials with the carrot that Japan would request such bases "if the U.S. Government hesitates to make these conditions."<sup>138</sup> Joseph Dodge's summary of this meeting was passed to other officials, including Dulles before his first visit. Having read Dodge's summary of Yoshida's proposal, Dulles was prepared for Japanese acceptance of American military bases after the occupation, but he was unprepared for Yoshida's refusal to acknowledge a need to rearm.

After a four-day visit to Korea, Dulles arrived for talks in Tokyo on June 21, just missing the delegation of Secretary Johnson and General Bradley. The following day, addressing the American Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo, Dulles spoke about the dashed hopes for "one world of human fellowship" after World War II. "Unhappily, instead of one world there are now two worlds: the Free World and the Captive World,"<sup>139</sup> Dulles explained. He went on, "Japan will have the opportunity and the responsibility of choosing between the Free World and the Captive World. If it chooses the Free World, it will then have the primary responsibility of protecting itself by its own efforts against the ever present menace of indirect aggression."<sup>140</sup> Dulles was thus, from the first, focused on the need for Japan, restored to an independent status, to join with the United States as an armed and reliable ally—America's bulwark in East Asia—albeit, at this point, he was more concerned about internal subversion than the risk of invasion. When he spoke to Prime Minister Yoshida later on the same day, Dulles initially requested only a modest build-up of forces, to about 100,000.<sup>141</sup>

But Yoshida did not want to discuss even modest Japanese rearmament at the time. The premier was "in one of his puckish moods, when in Western terms he refused to talk 'sense' . . . he spoke with circumlocutory indirectness, with vagueness, and with the astute use of parables . . . 'Yes,' he said, 'security for Japan is possible, and the United States can take care of it. But Japan's *amour propre* must be preserved in doing so.'<sup>142</sup> Besides, Yoshida said as he went on, if Japan were "democratic, demilitarized, and peace-loving . . . world opinion would protect her."<sup>143</sup> After reporting these words, Ambassador William Sebald, who had replaced George Acheson as MacArthur's political advisor, and who had accompanied Dulles to the meeting with Yoshida, opines the PM was repeating the words of "various policy positions from

the Far Eastern Commission, and I think . . . sort of rubbing it in.”<sup>144</sup> Dulles was “flabbergasted,” and later told Sebald, “he felt very much like Alice in Wonderland.”<sup>145</sup> North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, just three days after this first meeting between Dulles and Yoshida, cut short the planned length of the envoy’s stay, but only added impetus, in the United States, for a policy of pressuring Japan to rearm.

The world had changed, and Dulles was more concerned than ever for Japan’s security. After returning from Japan, in a memo to the Secretary of State, dated July 19, he writes:

My impression is the Korean attack makes it more important, rather than less important, to act. The Japanese people have been in somewhat of a postwar stupor. The Korean attack is awakening them and I think that their mood for a long time may be determined by whether we take advantage of this awakening to bring them an insight into the possibilities of the free world and their responsibility as a member of it.

If matters drift because of total preoccupation with the Korean war, we may lose in Japan more than we gain in Korea.<sup>146</sup>

Dulles set about with renewed energy to forge consensus. Dulles was assisted in forming this new administration-wide resolve by a memo the envoy had received from MacArthur on June 23.<sup>147</sup> Reassured by a proposal in this memo, echoing Yoshida’s, that the United States could maintain troops in Japan with Japanese agreement, after a peace treaty, the Department of Defense was mollified, and eventually indicated through news releases in September it supported pursuing a peace treaty with Japan.<sup>148</sup> The State Department’s Policy Planning staff, in the meantime, affirmed in July that, though it had previously not been in favor Japanese rearmament, it now found such rearmament “imperative.”<sup>149</sup>

U.S. allies were less enthusiastic, and Dulles spent many of the months between his first and second meetings in Japan cajoling and pressuring these allies. During a press conference on September 15, the day after President Truman made the official announcement the United States was pursuing a peace treaty with Japan, “Dulles made public the fact that the United States was not proposing any restrictions on rearmament in Japan.”<sup>150</sup> Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Burma were particularly concerned about the menace a rearmed Japan would present, while India and the Soviet Union expressed concern not only about Japanese aggression, but about American bases in Japan.<sup>151</sup> Undeterred, Dulles returned to Japan in January 1951, this time with the full rank of ambassador,<sup>152</sup> more determined than ever that the occupation of Japan needed to end and that Japan needed to rearm. He arrived with a consensus of the American government backing him, though with still many thousands of miles to fly in his attempts to convince allies.

Since their first meeting Yoshida had been busily trying to navigate those difficult Japanese political currents. On July 29 the PM said to the Diet's "Upper House Foreign Affairs Committee, 'I am against leasing military bases to any foreign country,'" mystifying some U.S. officials. When asked about this statement Vice Foreign Minister Ohta confirmed to Sebald the PM was against stationing foreign troops in Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty. Not only did this contradict what Yoshida had pledged through Ikeda back in May concerning hosting U.S. military bases in Japan, but, in the mind of the State Department Desk Officer writing the report, seemed to contradict what the Vice Foreign Minister himself had said two weeks earlier when he declared, "the hostilities in Korea [have] resulted in the question of security no longer presenting a problem to Japan, inasmuch as Japan would now gladly accept any reasonable proposition which the United States might put forward regarding Japanese security." Sebald reported he thought Yoshida was just "laying the groundwork for future bargaining."<sup>153</sup>

The prime minister, whose habit of making decisions himself without consulting others had earned him the nickname "One Man" (*Wan Man*) in Japan, was not himself explaining his reasoning, but he may have had not just an international audience in mind, but a domestic one as well, as he tried to placate those in the Japanese public who feared their country could soon be pulled more directly into the Korean War. These two audiences, domestic and international, were likely also on his mind when the premier told the press in December 1950:

We should not easily talk about rearmament . . . Even if we are forced to rearm we have to consider the fact that because of excessive militarization in the past, we had to greatly suffer in both internal and external affairs . . . we fought a reckless war . . . Talking about rearmament reminds neighboring countries of the past Japanese aggression, which will have a negative effect on a peace treaty.<sup>154</sup>

These two constituencies must also have been on Yoshida's mind during his first meeting with Dulles upon the latter's return to Japan in January 1951. Yoshida again tried his off-putting remarks about Japan rearming, but after initial statements from both men, rearmament was the first thing Dulles wanted to discuss, asking the premier what "contributions Japan would make after independence," and insisting Japan would have "the moral obligation to assist the free world."<sup>155</sup> Yoshida argued if Japan attempted to rearm immediately, just when Japan was "getting back on its feet financially," the economy would not support it and Japan's living standards would suffer.<sup>156</sup> The PM also argued rearmament could pave the way for Japanese militarists to regain power.<sup>157</sup> Dulles, in turn, stressed, "in the present state of the world the necessity of sacrifice."<sup>158</sup> Dulles expressed understanding for Japan's straitened

circumstances, but pointed out Japan could at least make “a token contribution and a commitment to a general collective security.”<sup>159</sup>

With no satisfactory resolution the first day the meeting ended. Dulles continued to push, “and evidently had Sebald tell the prime minister to stop stalling.”<sup>160</sup> Talks continued with lower-level officials, with the Americans still pressing for specifics on Japanese rearmament, and, at one point, “call[ing] for the establishment of a national defense agency, alongside the Foreign Ministry, so that Japan could have institutions corresponding to the Departments of State and Defense,”<sup>161</sup> while also asking for other, mostly security-related, concrete actions. Dulles met with other leaders. In view of the increased threat—not only the Korean War itself, but also the Chinese intervention into the war the previous October—Dulles now thought in terms of the need for an approximately 300,000-man Japanese force,<sup>162</sup> and he must have been gratified to hear, from Nomura Kichisaburō, who conveyed a personal plan for a 250,000-man force, including 200,000 in the ground force and 50,000 in a navy-air force.<sup>163</sup>

In another private meeting Dulles met with Yoshida rival Hatoyama Ichirō (a purgee who nonetheless led a faction in Yoshida’s Liberal Party), who “argued (1) Japan should be equipped with enough defense capability to deter invasions by the communist countries; (2) democratic nations should form a strong united front against them; [and] (3) a militarily stronger Japan would be a good ally for the United States and other nations;”<sup>164</sup> all of which must have been music to Dulles’ ears.

Yoshida, in his turn, had formed two groups the previous October to advise him on a detailed negotiating strategy for the peace treaty talks, one composed mostly of diplomats and one composed mostly of former IJA military men. This latter group eventually urged creation of a 200,000-man force,<sup>165</sup> while Ashida Hitoshi’s Democratic Party had come out in support of a 200,000-man, 15-division force in December, and the aforementioned Hatoyama faction of the PM’s own party’s “openly supported” a 300,000-man force.<sup>166</sup> Having done his best to head off immediate rearmament, but facing pressure to rearm from both the U.S. and these domestic sources, Yoshida came back to the talks with Dulles with a much lower bid than any pro-rearmament individuals or groups were proposing, on February 3. In a document titled “A First Step for a Rearmament Scheme” Yoshida proposed a 50,000-man ground force separate from the NPR.<sup>167</sup>

Thus, five years to the day since MacArthur had provided guidance to the SCAP Government Section that Japan was to have no army, navy or air force authorized under its new constitution, a Japan’s top government official offered the first formal plan for Japanese rearmament. Not that Yoshida called his plan formal; the wily One Man still kept his options open, claiming the plan was just his personal idea. Nor was Dulles satisfied, but he took what he

could get. Much of what was worked out in those several days in early 1951, as well as during a subsequent visit by Dulles in April, including a provision to maintain American military bases in Japan, with very few limitations on the actions the American military would be able to take in Japan, became the basis for the security treaty, which would be signed just after the peace treaty in September 1951, both to go into effect the following April.

### A MIXED BIRTH, INCOMPLETE INDEPENDENCE AND IDENTITY

Revising that security treaty resulted in the unrest and protests covered in the next chapter; unrest and protests that were a manifestation of the conflicting ideas in the struggle over rearmament. NPR recruits themselves not only had to deal with these competing ideas and images, but with the rigors of joining a military organization. All military organizations are in the business of establishing among its constituent members a military identity, one associated with values, attitudes and beliefs which will enable the members to accomplish assigned missions.<sup>168</sup>

In the case of the NPR, this initial socialization into a new military identity was complicated not only by the sometimes fierce contestation over national identity, but, and this was particularly true in the case of the NPR, by the fact that this initial foray into identity formation was not just national, but binational. I will explore how the Ground Self-Defense Force was able to construct for itself a positive military identity in more detail in chapter six, when discussing the consolidation phase of the GSDF's creation, but in concluding this chapter in which I have traced the back-and-forth struggle between occupier America and occupied Japan over rearmament, and particularly the creation of a postwar Japanese army, I will close by touching on the implications of the hybrid nature of the NPR's birth.<sup>169</sup>

Frank Kowalski's Daily Reports, succinct accounts concerning almost every day of the first two years of the NPR's existence, record a number of firsts, and firsts are always important in the formation of group identities. The reports capture as well many frustrations in the birth of a national army formed under occupation by, tutelage of, and, at first, command of another nation's army; that is, the legacies, of the NPR's mixed parentage. The NPR's (and thus the eventual GSDF's) first G-2, or intelligence office, was set up soon after October 23, once Masuhara received permission;<sup>170</sup> the NPR's first doctor, a Dr. Honna, was an acquaintance of Masuhara, and agreed to serve in early November.<sup>171</sup> The NPR's Military Police Corps was born due to a request from Masuhara that he be allowed to form MPs in order to police the NPR's new troops, who were sometimes drinking on weekends and getting

into some trouble in local communities (and this, too, applies to identity formation, as Masuhara felt strongly NPR troops should police their own forces rather than relying on civil police). The idea for an NPR Women's Army Corps, or allowing women into the force, at least, apparently originated when Superintendent Hayashi asserted to CASA that Japanese men did not want to train as typists, but the NPR needed typists, so perhaps women could be enlisted.<sup>172</sup> Other firsts abound, but so do the frustrations inherent in the hybrid creation of a national army formed at the order of and under the direction of an occupying nation.

The Japanese had to ask permission to raise their own national flag at NPR camps,<sup>173</sup> and GHQ did not approve regulations for flag raising until November 9.<sup>174</sup> The Japanese leadership had to deal with this perception of hybridity among their countrymen as well. On November 23 Deputy Director General Eguchi had to deny to a Diet committee that NPR recruits were required, when joining the force, to place their hands on a Bible.<sup>175</sup> On December 4, Ohashi had to deny, responding to a question in the Diet, that General MacArthur had the authority to order the NPR to Korea.<sup>176</sup> Masuhara and Hayashi recall, in the SDF's first official history, *Jieitai Jū Nen Shi (The Ten-Year History of the Self-Defense Force)* that the most frustrating aspect of this mixed parentage was having the NPR units—a force responsible for defending Japan—commanded, at first, by American officers. Masuhara recalls feeling Americans commanding troops responsible for defending Japan “was completely inappropriate,” while Hayashi remembers the troops “having to use American weapons and American ammunition, under the direction of the American Advisory Group,” were “really troubled,” (*kurō wo shita mono desu*), but the Japanese soldiers “all did their very best for us.” (*minna yoku ganbatte kureta to omoimasu*).<sup>177</sup> These problems of identity and hybridity may have been felt most acutely in Japan's new army, but the issues of identity and hybridity, both within Japan and in the considerations of Japan's government for their country's place in the international community, became ever more central in Japan's discourse as the 1950s progressed, and renouncing war, yet preparing for war, the proper role of soldiers and Japan's relationship with its only ally, America, were central to this debate.

Perhaps most significantly for the developing discourse, the debate moved beyond the government elites who had mainly participated and shaped it to this point, and became a true people's movement—possibly the most significant such movement since the popular rights movement of the nineteenth century. With the signing of the Peace Treaty, though it had not included all belligerents in the previous conflict, Japan became once again sovereign in April 1952. Yet this sovereignty rested in the people, as opposed to the Emperor. The Security Treaty, which allowed the stationing of a large American force, spread throughout Japan on many bases, indicated to some,

however, a yet incomplete sovereignty. As his primary goal Yoshida had aimed for regaining independence, and he had viewed the American presence as both the price of that independence, and as a way to avoid the costs of building up indigenous forces.

A ground force not officially acknowledged as a national army continued to struggle for a sense of its own identity, given its unusual provenance, questions of constitutionality and legality, the conflicting images and messages in the public sphere concerning war and warriors, and Japanese government's contradictory rhetorical stances. Yoshida remained in power for two more years, and left an important legacy, but he was followed by two avowed revisionists, who, in turn, faced changing political and social dynamics. As these and other revisionists tried to effect their respective visions for a revitalized Japan—a Japan, among other things, rearmed—the official struggle over rearmament was no longer confined to government elites on both sides of the Pacific, but became part of the roiling, contrasting ideas contested by the Japanese public. The struggle of Japan's new army for a positive identity was part of a larger struggle within Japan as a whole to define itself, and this struggle proved first vigorous throughout the 1950s, and then dangerous, in the *Anpo* Riots of 1960.

## NOTES

1. Kanzan Satō, *The Japanese Sword: A Complete Guide*, trans. Joe Earle, Japanese Arts Library (New York: Kodansha USA, 1983), 13.

2. Yasutake Kashiwagi, *Sengo-Ha Nijuu-Go Nen Hei Yomoyama Monogatari: Keisatsu Yobitai Ikki-Sei No Kaisou* (Tokyo: Hikaribito-sha, 1998), 11.

3. *Ibid.*, 15.

4. *Ibid.*, 24.

5. Hiroshi Hiruma, *Jeitai Yomoyama Monogatari* (Tokyo: Hikaribito-sha, 1988), 17.

6. Kashiwagi, *Sengo-Ha Nijuu-Go Nen Hei Yomoyama Monogatari: Keisatsu Yobitai Ikki-Sei No Kaisou*, 7.

7. David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 1st ed. (New York: Hyperion, 2007). Also see the report of MacArthur's comments in January 1950 that, "Many people in the United States and elsewhere also thought that we intended to build up Japan as a weapon to use against the Russians." *State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific*, 1110.

8. Document titled "Public Safety Highlights," Frank Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963)," Box 9, File 7, file titled "Public Safety Highlights," 5. In the same letter SCAP directed increasing the Maritime Safety Board, a type of coast guard, by 8000 men.

9. Sengoshi-han, ed. *Saigunbi No Kiseki*, 35–39; Yozo Kato, *Shiroku: Jieitai-Shi* (Tokyo: Gekkan Seisaku Seiji Geppo-sha, 1979), 18.

10. ———, *Shiroku: Jieitai-Shi*, 18–19.

11. Noted by Frank Kowalski, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Civil Affairs Section Annex, from 1950–1952, and author of the most thorough book on the formation of the NPR, in what was probably one of his drafts for the book. Untitled manuscript, beginning with p. 13, Kowalski, “Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963),” Box 19, Folder 3, 23.

12. Kato, *Shiroku: Jieitai-Shi*, 19.

13. Sengoshi-han, ed. *Saigunbi No Kiseki*, 39–40.

14. Kato, *Shiroku: Jieitai-Shi*, 19. See also Hata, *Shiroku: Nihon Saigunbi*, 142. Sengoshi-han, ed. *Saigunbi No Kiseki*, 41.

15. Biographical Note, Frank Kowalski: A Register of His Papers in the Library of Congress, Prepared by Margaret H. McAleer (Washington, DC: Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 1992), 2.

16. Untitled manuscript, Kowalski, “Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963),” Box 18, Folder 6, untitled manuscript, 1–3.

17. *Ibid.*, Box 18, Folder 6, untitled manuscript, 4.

18. *Ibid.*, Box 18, Folder 6, untitled manuscript, 1–3. Interestingly, the same conversations quoted above are repeated verbatim in Kowalski’s memoir, which had only been published in Japanese, as *Nihon Saigunbi: Watakushi wa Nihon o Saibusō Shita*, until recently, and for which the documents I am citing were drafts. Though not included in the draft I am citing, in *Saigunbi*, Shepard goes on to say “This is because [that is we are forming the NPR because], as you know, there are 250,000 of our countrymen, mostly women and children, in Japan.” This last sentence was quoted unfavorably by Fujiwara Akira, in *Nihon Gunji-shi*, a military history of Japan. Fujiwara concludes from this additional sentence the NPR was actually formed not to protect Japanese citizens, but to protect American women and children in Japan. I do not think Shepherd or Kowalski meant for this to be interpreted that way. The fact American family members would remain in Japan was an additional concern, but it was not the primary reason the NPR was formed. It is unfortunate for the GSDF the sentence in question—the only time the concern is mentioned in Kowalski’s memoir—has given this impression to Japanese readers like Fujiwara. It is just one more mark against its legitimacy the GSDF has had to overcome. For the account in *Saigunbi* see Kowalski, *Nihon Saigunbi: Watakushi Wa Nihon O Saibusou Shita*, trans. Katsuyama Kinjiro (Tokyo: The Simul Press, Inc., 1969), 34. For Fujiwara’s comment see Akira Fujiwara, *Nihon Gunji-Shi Gekan*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Shakai Hihyou, 2007), 48.

19. Untitled manuscript, Kowalski, “Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963),” Box 18, Folder 6, untitled manuscript, 4–5.

20. MacArthur Memorial (MacArthur Memorial Library and Archives), RG 6, Box 100.

21. Untitled manuscript, Kowalski, “Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963),” untitled manuscript. Box 18, File 6, 10.

22. Hiroshi Masuda and Congressional Information Service, *Rearmament of Japan* (Bethesda, MD: Congressional Information Service, 1998), microform.

23. For 13/3 reference see FRUS 1949, United States Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia (in Two Parts),” vol. VII (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949),

<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1949v07>, 732. For other references to strengthening police forces see for instance ———, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific," 1204, 10; MacArthur Memorial. For constabulary, see *ibid.*, 1210. Also see Hata, *Shiroku: Nihon Saigunbi*, 80–81.

24. Folder marked "DA CX July 1950," MacArthur Memorial, RG9.

25. "Increase in Japanese Security Agencies," *ibid.*, RG 6, Box 100.

26. *Ibid.*, tab 1, annex A, third unnumbered page.

27. Untitled manuscript, Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963)," Box 18, Folder 6, 14.

28. "Increase in Japanese Security Agencies," Tab 1, Annex G, MacArthur Memorial, RG 6, Box 100 document titled "Increase in Japanese Security Agencies," Tab 1, Annex G, first unnumbered page first unnumbered page.

29. Untitled manuscript, Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963)," untitled manuscript, Box 18, File 6, 13.

30. "Increase in Japanese Security Agencies," Tab 1, Annex F, Incl 1, MacArthur Memorial, Memorial, RG 6, Box 100 document titled "Increase in Japanese Security Agencies," Tab 1, Annex F, Incl 1.

31. Untitled manuscript, Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963)," Box 18, Folder 6, untitled manuscript, 13.

32. Daily Report, dtd 7 November 1950, Kowalski Papers.

33. Memorandum from G-2 to Chief of Staff and C-in-C, Far East Command, dtd 10 August 1950 MacArthur Memorial, RG 23B, Box 3, Folder titled "Command and Staff for the N.P.R."

34. Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–71*, 72.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Sengoshi-han, ed. *Saigunbi No Kiseki*, 39.

37. Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–71*, 72.

38. Bōeicho, ed. *Jieitai Juunen-Shi* (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsu Kyoku, 1961), 20, 45.

39. *Ibid.*

40. Short manuscript, titled "Keikichi Masuhara: Director General, NPR-J," Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963)," Box 8, Folder 25, 2.

41. Single sheet, first line, "Name; Keikichi Masuhara," *ibid.*, Box 8, Folder 25.

42. Photocopy of a newspaper clipping, *The Mainichi*, Thursday, November 30, 1950, *ibid.*, Box 7, Folder 22.

43. Single sheet, title "Masuhara's Appointment to be Fixed by Cabinet Tomorrow," *ibid.*, Box 8, Folder 25.

44. Document titled "Mitoru Eguchi: Deputy Director-General, NPR-J," *ibid.*

45. Kowalski, *Saigunbi*, 95–104.

46. Untitled document, first line, "Name: Keizo Hayashi," Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963)," Box 8, Folder 25, first unnumbered page.

47. *Ibid.*, Box 8, Folder 25, second unnumbered page.

48. *Ibid.*

49. Document titled “Who’s Who: HAYASHI, Keizo, Chief of General Group headquarters of the National Police Reserve,” *ibid.*, Box 8, Folder 25, first unnumbered page.

50. Daily Report, titled “Mr. Hayashi,” *ibid.*, Box 8, Folder 2, 1–2.

51. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 76.

52. Hata, *Shiroku: Nihon Saigunbi*, 165–6; Hiroshi Masuda, *Jieitai No Tanjou* (Tokyo: Chuo-Koron Shinsha, Inc., 2004), 25–27; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, 75–76.

53. *Ibid.*

54. Daily Report, dtd 8 August 1950, Kowalski papers.

55. Bōeicho, ed. *Jieitai Juunen-Shi* 46.

56. *Ibid.*

57. Hata, *Shiroku: Nihon Saigunbi*, 165; Masuda, *Jieitai No Tanjou*, 26; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, 75.

58. Daily Report, dtd 9 August 1950, Kowalski, “Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963),” Box 8, folder 2. See also untitled manuscript, *ibid.*, Box 18, File 6, 16–17.

59. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, 75.

60. Memorandum to General Willoughby, from Major Ralph J. Rinaducci, dtd 9 August 1950, MacArthur Memorial, RG 23B, Box 3, Folder titled “Command and Staff for the N.P.R.,” first unnumbered page.

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*, Memorandum from G-2 to Chief of Staff and C-in-C, Far East Command, dtd 10 August 1950.

63. Kato, *Shiroku: Jieitai-Shi*, 25.

64. Bōeicho, ed. *Jieitai Juunen-Shi* 45.

65. See for instance Daily Reports dtd 13 and 17 October 1950, and 8 January 1951, Kowalski papers.

66. See “Biographical Information for Japanese Officers,” Kowalski papers, Folder 25, Box 8.

67. See *ibid.*, for a list of high-ranking civilian and uniformed leaders, with summary backgrounds. Almost all had Home Ministry and police backgrounds, though Miyazaki Shunichi, the NPR’s first Operations Officer, was a 1938 graduate of the Military Academy.

68. Daily Report 6 February 1951, *ibid.*, 3.

69. Daily Report, 9 October 1950, *ibid.*

70. Memorandum to Willoughby, from Rinaducci, dtd 9 August 1950.

71. *The Pacific Rivals; a Japanese View of Japanese-American Relations*, 198.

72. Untitled manuscript, beginning with p. 13, Kowalski Papers, Box 19, Folder 3, 22. See also Hata, *Shiroku: Nihon Saigunbi*, 165–68; Kato, *Shiroku: Jieitai-Shi*, 25–26; Sengoshi-han, ed. *Saigunbi No Kiseki*, 149–56.

73. Untitled manuscript, Kowalski, “Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963),” untitled manuscript. Box 18, File 6, 15.

74. *Ibid.*, Box 18, Folder 6, untitled manuscript, 17.

75. *Ibid.*, Box 18, Folder 6, untitled manuscript, 18.

76. Document entitled "The Address of the Prime Minister before the 8th Diet," dtd July 14, 50, MacArthur Memorial, Folder marked "Yoshida, July 1951" RG 10 VIP Correspondence, 3.

77. *Ibid.*, 5.

78. Memorandum for Record, Subject: Orientation Conference Reference, National Police Reserve Force Authorized by SCAP, dtd 18 July 1950, Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925-1976 (Bulk 1948-1963)," Box 2, Folder 8, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Orientation Conference Reference, National Police Reserve Force Authorized by SCAP, dtd 18 July 1950.

79. Untitled manuscript, *ibid.*, untitled manuscript, Box 18, File 6, 19.

80. *Ibid.*, 1st unnumbered page.

81. Increase Agencies, Tab 1, third unnumbered page.

82. Untitled manuscript, Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925-1976 (Bulk 1948-1963)," File 6, Box 18, 5.

83. Public Safety Highlights, Kowalski papers, Folder 7, Box 9, 10.

84. *Ibid.*, 12-13.

85. *Ibid.*, 1.

86. Increase Agencies, Annex A, first unnumbered page.

87. Bōeicho, ed. *Jieitai Juunen-Shi*, 34-35.

88. Daily Reports, date torn off, but probably 31 August 1950, Kowalski Papers.

89. Memorandum to Chief, Public Safety Division, Subject: Report of Police Training for 1950, dtd 23 February 1951, Masuda and Congressional Information Service, *Rearmament of Japan*.

90. Memorandum, titled "Basic Training Program for National Police Reserve Recruits," National Archives (College Park, Maryland: National Archives and Records Administration), RG 331, Box 2510, Folder 8. Basic Training Program, first unnumbered page.

91. *Ibid.*, 3.

92. *Ibid.*, 4.

93. *Ibid.*, 5.

94. *Ibid.*

95. *Ibid.*

96. Kowalski, *Nihon Saigunbi*, 167.

97. Cable from General headquarters, FEC, to Dept. of the Army, dtd 20 November 1948, MacArthur Memorial, Blue Binder, titled "Plans and ops," 7 July 47-3 December 48, Box 157, RG 9.

98. Cable from State Department to SCAP (POLAD) dtd 17 December 50, *ibid.*, RG 9, Box 86, Folder titled "State In: December 1950." For a report of five divisions of ex-IJA, Soviet POW troops ready for an attack on Japan see cable from Department of the Army to CICFE (personal for Willoughby), *ibid.*, QRG 9, Box 41, Folder titled "Incoming Dept, of the Army. Jan-Apr '51." See also Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, 72.

99. Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1950).

100. Gillin and Etter, "Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949."

101. Kowalski, *Nihon Saigunbi*, 166–169.
102. Ibid.
103. Memorandum titled “Small-Unit Training Program for National Police Reserve,” undated, Archives, RG 331, Box 2512, Folder 7, first unnumbered page.
104. Ibid., 2–3.
105. Ibid., 3.
106. Kashiwagi, *Sengo-Ha Nijuu-Go Nen Hei Yomoyama Monogatari: Keisatsu Yobitai Ikki-Sei No Kaisou*, 45.
107. Hiruma, *Jeitai Yomoyama Monogatari*, 16.
108. Ibid., 14. Hiruma is actually describing the American position of “Parade Rest,” a modified position of attention, intermediate between “Attention” and “Rest.” Parade Rest is not meant to be restful, unlike “Rest,” in which American soldiers can do whatever they like with their arms, and shift their weight back on forth on their legs if they like.
109. Ibid., 16.
110. Takaharu Yamasaki, *Keisatsu Yobitai, Hoantai, Jieitai No Kyuu Nen* (Tokyo: Nihon Bungaku Kan, 2010), 27–58.
111. Increase Agencies, MacArthur Memorial, RG 6, Box 100, Annex G, Tab 3.
112. Daily Report, dtd 10 November 1950, Kowalski, “Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963),” Box 8, Folder 4. Also see Daily Report, 14 November 1950, *ibid.*, Box 8 Folder 4.
113. Ibid.
114. Daily Report, dtd 1 November 1950, Kowalski, “Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963),” Box 8, Folder 4.
115. Ibid.
116. Daily Report, dtd 6 September 1950, *ibid.*
117. Daily Report, dtd 24 February 1951, *ibid.*
118. Such documents are now called Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for combat units, and Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for non-combat units in the U.S. Army. Both kinds of documents remain replete with jargon and acronyms.
119. Daily Reports, dtd 28 August 1950 and 30 August 1950, Kowalski Papers.
120. Kashiwagi, *Sengo-Ha Nijuu-Go Nen Hei Yomoyama Monogatari: Keisatsu Yobitai Ikki-Sei No Kaisou*, 43.
121. Kitamura Reports, February 1952, Kowalski, “Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963),” Box 8, Folder 16.
122. Yamasaki, *Keisatsu Yobitai, Hoantai, Jieitai No Kyuu Nen*, 12. The radio show was called *Kimi no Na wa?* (What is Your Name?).
123. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan*, 17.
124. Prior to its defeat Dean Acheson stated Japan had a cultural “will to war.” See Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy, *Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 346.
125. Sebald, *With Macarthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation*, 252–3.
126. State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific,” 1129.

127. Ibid., 1168.
128. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952*, 238.
129. Frederick Sherwood Dunn, *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 96; Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 84–5.
130. ———, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 85.
131. State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific,” 1165.
132. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947–1968*, 47, 50–1.
133. Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann, *Inside Ghq: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, 461.
134. Yoshitsu, *Japan and San Francisco Peace Settlement*, 32. The trip was so secret Yoshida did not tell Ikeda himself, nor give him the proposal, until just before Ikeda boarded his airplane.
135. State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific,” 1196.
136. Yoshitsu, *Japan and San Francisco Peace Settlement*, 34.
137. State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific,” 1196.
138. Ibid.
139. Contemporary Japan, July–September 1950, 455. This subsequently became the accepted idiom for referring to the bipolar international situation.
140. Ibid., 457.
141. Yoshitsu, *Japan and San Francisco Peace Settlement*, 41. Also see Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3.
142. Sebald, *With Macarthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation*, 257.
143. Ibid., 42.
144. Yoshitsu, *Japan and San Francisco Peace Settlement*, 42.
145. Sebald, *With Macarthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation*, 257.
146. State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific,” 1243.
147. Reflecting the SCAP's continuing divided opinion, this memorandum, given to Dulles on June 23, contradicted another memorandum MacArthur had written on June 14, which had recommended unarmed neutrality for Japan. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952*, 247.
148. Yoshitsu, *Japan and San Francisco Peace Settlement*, 43.
149. State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific,” 1256.
150. Dunn, *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan*, 108. This reflected a stipulation in NSC 60/1, which had been signed by President Truman about a week before. See Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952*, 250–1.

151. State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific," 1308–9, 22; Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952*, 254–5.

152. ———, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952*, 255.

153. State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific," 1262–3. Of course, as seen repeatedly in the examination of this struggle to rearm Japan, what Yoshida meant by "Japanese security" was often different from what was meant by his American interlocutors, sometimes due to genuinely different conceptions and other times due to political reasons. The definition of what constituted "reasonable propositions" also frequently eluded interlocutors from both sides.

154. Sugita, *Pitfall or Panacea: The Irony of US Power in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952*, 118.

155. Yoshitsu, *Japan and San Francisco Peace Settlement*, 51.

156. State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific (in Two Parts)," 829.

157. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 91. State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific (in Two Parts)," 129.

158. *Ibid.*

159. Sugita, *Pitfall of Panacea: The Irony of US Power in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952*, 121.

160. Yoshitsu, *Japan and San Francisco Peace Settlement*, 52.

161. *Ibid.*, 58.

162. Michael Schaller, "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia," *The Journal of American History* 69, no. 2 (1982): 35; Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952*, 256; Yoshitsu, *Japan and San Francisco Peace Settlement*, 61; Martin E. Weinstein, "The Evolution of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces," in *The Modern Japanese Military System*, ed. James H. Buck, *Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications 1975), 46.

163. Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–71*, 76.

164. Mayumi Itoh, *The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 114.

165. Sugita, *Pitfall of Panacea: The Irony of US Power in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952*, 124.

166. *Ibid.*, 110.

167. *Ibid.*, 123; Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 93.

168. For a rigorous, cogent examination of the formation of military identity among post-Cold War cadets at West Point, see Volker Franke, "Preparing for Peace: Military Identity, Value Orientations, and Professional Military Education" (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers 1999). <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=15407563>. For a thorough examination of this kind of socialization among U.S. Marines, see Thomas E. Ricks, *Making the Corps*, 10th Anniversary ed. (New York: Scribner, 2007).

For the importance of an imagined narrative, albeit with regard to nationalistic as opposed to military identity, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised ed. (New York: Verso, 2000).

169. Hybridity is also an important issue when discussing Japan's national identity. See Igarashi, particularly 75–82.

170. Daily Report, dtd 23 October 1950, Kowalski Papers.

171. *Ibid.*, dtd 9 November 1950.

172. *Ibid.*, dtd 16 January 1951, 3.

173. *Ibid.*, dtd 22 September 1950.

174. *Ibid.*, dtd 9 November 1950.

175. *Ibid.*, dtd 23 November 1950.

176. *Ibid.*, dtd 4 December 1950.

177. Bōeicho, ed. *Jieitai Juunen-Shi*, 46.

## *Chapter 5*

# **The GSDF Organized, 1952–1960**

America, as the occupying power, ordered Japan to disarm and Japan complied. The occupier then codified a renunciation of war and permanent disarmament in a new constitution, and the acting government elites in Japan ratified the document, though some elites, at least, felt the War Renunciation Article left some wriggle room to allow arming for self-defense. The American consensus on permanent Japanese disarmament began to shift with the advent of the Cold War, and a full reversal of that consensus, seeking to rearm Japan as an ally, was given sudden urgency by the outbreak of the Korean War. Still occupied, Japan had no choice but to accede to an order to rearm, though misdirection by both SCAP and the Japanese government was necessary since the renunciation of war and arms remained in effect. Japanese elites chose to use America's desire for a rearmed Japan as a bargaining chip to regain freedom, and to minimize the level of rearmament in order to focus on economic development. Allowing the United States to continue to station troops on Japanese soil after the Occupation's end was added as a sweetener for the deal. The Japanese had no time to study and plan for rearmament, though they acted and effected change where they felt they could, and increasingly as the process went along.

Rearmament was made more difficult by the fact that in the five years since the defeat a narrative had developed that laid the agonies and misfortunes of the war years squarely at the former military's feet, and particularly at the boots of the Imperial Japanese Army. The very word rearmament—a fact though it was—had taken on negative, politically costly connotations.

Rearming—recreating—an army, first known as the NPR but within a few years as the GSDF, was ordered and managed at the elite level, with various tactics used to respond to or preempt, public reaction. Once Japan regained independence some Japanese elites saw a chance to change the narrative, and

reclaim a Japanese identity as a country that maintained a full-fledged army. But questions of what was necessary and what was not, what was desirable and what was not, and what was permissible and what was not were no longer consigned largely to elites. The Japanese people, now citizen and not subjects, reclaimed democracy. The 1950s were a boisterous time for discussing what kind of country Japan would be, and what kind of army, if any, Japan would have. Conclusions were far from foregone.

Ideas concerning war renunciation and rearmament were at the center of this often fierce discourse, as were myriad images of warriors and soldiers, presented more freely than such images had been in over a decade of first wartime then Occupation censorship. It was during the 1950s that the powerful Teacher's Union adopted its anti-militarist—perhaps even anti-military—pacifist-leaning policies which still animate its view toward a proper education in Japan. Other powerful groups wanting to build a peaceful Japan also got their starts in the 1950s. But many organizations on the right of the political spectrum, too, had their beginnings in this decade, and many of these organizations openly and vociferously supported rearmament. All of this was part of Japan's attempt to define a new identity for itself.

A national identity is based on a vision or visions of what the nation should be. As Charles Hill has said about, though about national strategy, the requirements of a national identity's creation lie, "beyond rational calculation in acts of imagination."<sup>1</sup> It is clear that during the 1950s the Japanese public produced works which were engaged in this kind of imaginative exercise regarding national identity. An important aspect of this creation of an acceptable national identity involved imagining the role armed forces would play in Japan. Thus the Japanese produced widely varying depictions of troopers and warriors. Perhaps more varied in this decade than at any other time in their modern history, these images depicted samurai and soldiers as heroes and villains, saviors, and pariahs. In the midst of these dynamic discourses the NPR became the National Safety Force, which in turn became the Ground Self-Defense Force, and this force itself, as well as the Japan Defense Agency, tried to shape an acceptable role and identity for Japan's new army in the unsettled times.

And unsettled is the key descriptor. Though it is still common to characterize the Japanese people during this time and later as pacifist, if pacifist is taken to mean refusing to countenance military activity of any kind, such a blanket description is inappropriate. Polling data demonstrates there was substantial support for armed forces (*guntai*) whose duty it was to protect Japan throughout the 1950s and beyond. The title of chapter fifty nine in the second edition of the Japan Broadcasting Network's (NHK) history of postwar polling results tells the story: "Consistently Strong, the Necessity of Armaments." The data compiled by NHK demonstrates a support of 50 percent or more

(with a high of 71 percent support in September 1951) for a military to protect Japan 11 out of the 14 times the question was asked in the 1950s, and the other three times the percent of those supporting the existence of a military was between 39 and 47 percent.<sup>2</sup>

Though support for maintaining armed forces remained strong and consistent in the 1950s, the struggle over rearmament took a significant turn concerning the interpretation of the word rearmament (*saigunbi*) itself. The same polling data already cited demonstrates when the word rearmament was used, instead of the words *guntai* and *gunbi* (armed forces and armaments), as used in the previous question, the resulting percentages showed strong support for rearmament in September 1951, at 76 percent, with only 12 percent opposed. However, subsequently the percentages steadily reversed, with only 31 percent supporting rearmament by August 1957 (the last month for which data for this question is shown) and 41 percent opposed.

The most significant drop in support occurred between 1951 and 1953. The NHK compilers of the data opine the reversal was due to the fact that though the Japanese people consistently in the postwar era express support for a military that can protect Japan, they also think the SDF is adequate to that task, and thus feel no rearmament beyond the extant capabilities of the SDF is necessary.<sup>3</sup> Other observers, including a key interlocutor during the Administrative Agreement negotiations on the American side, and an important participant in and shaper of Japan's discourse on war renunciation and rearmament on the Japanese side, thought the Japanese people came to associate the term rearmament with remilitarization and war during the very public negotiations over the Security Treaty Administrative Agreement and Mutual Security Act Agreement, thus accounting for its increasingly negative connotation.<sup>4</sup> It is also true that the U.S. alliance, and the United States itself, came to be seen as war-promoting during this turbulent decade; I will turn to these developments, including the negotiations, as well as the entrenching of the so-called Yoshida doctrine and the attempts of the revisionists who followed Yoshida to reverse that doctrine, in the following discussion of the continuing struggle over rearmament.

### **NOW IF DISARMAMENT WAS RIGHT IN 1946, WHY IS IT WRONG IN 1953?**

MacArthur had been converted to the pro-rearmament side of the ongoing debate before he was fired as the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers by President Truman. In early 1951, the SCAP had told PM Yoshida the NPR could be doubled, if needed.<sup>5</sup> The SCAP's change of heart indicated the consensus on the American side was complete. The Security Treaty signed in

September 1951 captured this American policy consensus, calling for Japan to “increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense.”<sup>6</sup> The policy thus codified, in American policymakers’ minds, as a bilateral agreement that Japan would pursue rearmament, the focus for the Americans became how quickly the Japanese would do what they had agreed to do. American pressure for Japan to meet what the Americans saw as an obligation continued in both the day-to-day U.S.-Japan relationship, and, more insistently, in formal negotiations.

Of the U.S. officials who urged rapid rearmament on the Japanese during this period perhaps none were more robust and colorful than General Shepard’s replacement as the head of CASA, Brigadier General LeRoy Watson, who from the beginning of his tenure urged “Japanese government officials to expand the NPR and announce it as a Japanese Army.” The general was chastened for his bluntness by his superiors in SCAP. Watson had insisted soon after he assumed his position he saw “Japan as a great reservoir of military power to be used in the fight against Communism,” and he protested the “farce” of standing up the NPR instead of “organiz[ing] damn good Japanese divisions to fight in Korea.” Not only Watson’s superiors chided him; when Kowalski pointed out the limitations both SCAP and the Japanese government labored under, Watson “literally bristled. Who the hell won the war anyway?” he snapped.

Though chastised after his initial rumblings, Watson saw another chance with the arrival of the new SCAP, General Matthew Ridgway, who replaced General MacArthur in April 1951. After arranging for General Ridgway to inspect an NPR camp, Watson had a private meeting with him for three hours. Afterwards he excitedly told Kowalski, “You better make some plans as a first effort for at least 300,000 troops. We’re on the way to big things.”<sup>7</sup> In the end Watson must have been disappointed, but whether due to Watson’s urgings or to his own appraisal of the situation, General Ridgway was a strong advocate of immediate and large-scale rearmament.

Indeed, Ridgway, almost immediately upon assuming the position as SCAP, instructed the Japanese Government to relook the purge, in order to depurge enough former IJA officers to man an expanded ground force, and he later wrote he believed he and Yoshida “had, in principle, agreed, that that by 1954 the Japanese would field a ground army of 350,000.”<sup>8</sup> (It is unclear when Ridgway thought he had received this agreement in principle. In a telegram Ridgway sent to Washington, dated April 19, 1951, he writes he had “maintained consistently . . . the Japanese are capable of dev[eloping] an NPRJ of 150,000–180,000 during Japanese Fiscal Year 52–53 and of 300,000–325,000 during Japanese Fiscal year 53.” But he acknowledges in the telegram the Japanese had only agreed to expand to 110,000 by the summer of 1952.)<sup>9</sup> Ridgway, in any case, continued to push for greater and faster expansion of the ground forces.

In 1953 visiting Vice President Richard Nixon got involved, urging rearmament in a speech. His words are worth quoting at length, as they represent well the consensus at the time in Washington, but in a public speech, rather than classified cables:

I had the opportunity to inspect some of the National Safety Forces here in Japan. They are in every respect excellent forces, well led, well trained, good men from top to bottom. Yet leaders of those forces would be the first to admit that at the present time they are not adequate to defend Japan against aggression from abroad. It must be admitted that the primary responsibility for Japan's defense must rest upon Japan and the Japanese people. . . The nation's economic capabilities have been sapped by the war through which it has gone, but it is essential, if Japan is to survive as a free and independent nation, that we recognize frankly that its defense forces must be increased eventually to an adequate level. . . There are those who say the United States is taking a very inconsistent position about the rearmament of Japan. They might say: In 1946 who was it that insisted Japan disarm? . . . it was at the insistence of the United States that Japan disarmed. Now if disarmament was right in 1946, why is it wrong in 1953? And if it was right in 1946 and wrong in 1953, why doesn't the United States admit for once it made a mistake? I'm going to do something I think perhaps ought to be done more by people in public life. I'm going to admit right here that the United States did make a mistake in 1946.<sup>10</sup>

Nixon made the speech after coordinating with Washington officials, but it remains a rare instance, on either side, of publicly addressing the policy struggle over rearmament.

Thus the consensus policy in the United States, which had gathered adherents during the Cold War, been tempered in the heat of the Korean War and then had taken a sharper edge as the conflict continued, was expressed to the Japanese in fairly constant pressure from various American officials. The pressure became even more pointed and specific during formal negotiations, particularly for two agreements: the Administrative Agreement agreed to in the Security Treaty, and the Mutual Security Act (MSA) agreement which allowed U.S. military aid to continue to flow to Japan.

### **Two Agreements and the End of the Rainbow**

Article III of the Security Treaty had stipulated an "administrative agreement" would "govern the disposition of the armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan."<sup>11</sup> The formal negotiations on this Administrative Agreement—almost every detail of which was leaked, becoming the source of "daily bitter discussions in the Diet," and of daily almost universally negative press coverage<sup>12</sup>—may have served to further associate in the public mind's eye

a conflation of the new security alliance between Japan and the United States with the remilitarization of Japan. Particularly controversial was the draft proposal for Article 22, which called for the intervention of American forces in instances of widespread public unrest in Japan, as well as a clause calling for the combined command of all forces, United States and Japanese, under an American supreme commander in emergencies. To the Japanese people the implications of both these clauses were that the occupation was still to continue after the peace treaty, although under another guise, and thus neither clause was acceptable. The Americans could not understand the problem—from their point of view of course the Japanese were free, but they had already agreed to the presence of U.S. forces. In an emergency those forces as well as the military Japan had pledged to create would have to be commanded and Japan simply did not have the capacity to command at this time. The United States, after all, planned to remove its troops from Japan when Japan was capable of handling these necessary defense tasks on its own. The Americans were perhaps mollified, then, when during negotiations a senior Japanese interlocutor admitted, of course the Americans would be in charge in an emergency, but he insisted formally codifying this kind of combined command in the Agreement itself would be too controversial to make it possible politically; it would have to remain an understanding.<sup>13</sup> If some Americans did feel placated, the feeling almost certainly did not last. The Agreement was completed in February 1952, leaving out both controversial clauses, but it, and its successor under the revised Mutual Security Treaty signed in 1960, the Status of Forces Agreement, have remained lightning rods of controversy to the present day.

Prime Minister Yoshida felt pressure for rearmament not only from the Americans but from some on the domestic side as well. Ashida Hitoshi was concerned about Japan's right to rearm, and to specifically form a new army, from the first. Sometime, probably in 1951, he expressed written concern about the creation of the NPR by cabinet order, arguing, "the fact that such an important decision had not been made by legislative process would isolate the National Police Reserve and National Diet from each other in the future, rendering any affinity impossible with the people." He also "wrote of the necessity of making it clear the National Police Reserve in the future would be considered an army."<sup>14</sup> While Yoshida took pains to reassure the public Japanese citizens would not be sent to fight in Korea, Ashida openly called for Japanese volunteers to join UN forces in the war.<sup>15</sup> In March 1952 Ashida repeated the call for a 15-division force he had made in December 1950.<sup>16</sup> Rearmament became a plank in Ashida's Democratic Party platform. The party "on its inauguration, announced its policy of favoring creation of a self-defense force,"<sup>17</sup> and in April 1952 the party, now under Shigemitsu Mamoru, published a plan for a 200,000-man force, and also called for the revision of the constitution "in order to build a democratic defense force."<sup>18</sup>

The leader who probably came closest to revising the constitution to, among other aims, legitimize military forces, was Hatoyama Ichirō, after he became prime minister at the end of 1954, as will be discussed later in this chapter. During the time period under discussion his voice was important in adding pressure on the Yoshida government to embrace rearmament because, despite the fact that he was officially purged at the time in question, he still headed his own faction in the Liberal Party he had founded.

Yoshida remained cautious about the rate and extent of rearmament, but, urged by General Ridgway to rearm more quickly and in greater numbers, the Yoshida government did increase the strength of the NPR to 110,000 in 1952.<sup>19</sup> Yoshida also worked with his rival, Hatoyama, and others to pass a law in the summer of 1952 which changed the name of the NPR, *Keisatsu Yobitai*, to *Hoantai*, or Safety Force, and placed the redesignated ground force along with the Maritime Security Force under a new Safety Agency. The National Safety Agency was established on August 1, and the NPR became the National Safety Force on October 1.<sup>20</sup> He also stood up a National Security Academy to train future officers for Japan's forces. In order to justify these moves Yoshida had to change his rhetorical tactics. He had already moved from negating to affirming Japan's right to self-defense, as the international conditions changed. In 1952, with pressure from both the United States and conservative revisionists in Japan, he now reversed an earlier position on "war potential."

In 1951 Yoshida had said war potential even for self-defense was forbidden; in March, 1952, responding to questions in the Diet about the Safety Forces, Yoshida remarked "that what the constitution prohibited was war potential as means of settling international disputes; it did not prohibit war-potential for self-defense."<sup>21</sup> After a hail of criticism he retracted this remark, and his administration took a different tack, arguing Japan's nascent forces did not possess war potential as long as they could not "wage modern war effectively."<sup>22</sup> On the left, the Japan Socialist Party, who had added "constitutional defense" to their other principles, for "Four Principles of Peace," in January 1951, was critical of Yoshida's "rearmament by installment"<sup>23</sup> moves, while, on the right he was attacked for not going far enough and fast enough with rearming, and for not being up front about rearmament. Yoshida tried to deflect some of the pressure by "Publicly . . . treat[ing] the new Japanese armed forces as if they were a favor to the Americans,"<sup>24</sup> but this only opened up the premier to the criticism of being too accommodating to the Yanks.

Though U.S. officials welcomed any moves toward strengthening Japan's embryonic security establishment, they continued to push for a larger and quicker response. At the time the United States was urging its allies around the world to build up defense forces in response to the perceived Soviet threat. Though the United States had stated it was prepared to "bear any burden,"

in the face of this threat, already in the 1948 Vandenberg Resolution, there was commingled with this forward-leaning posture a call for self-help among U.S. allies. In 1952 this call became U.S. law, the Mutual Security Act (MSA), which required any country receiving military aid from the United States to first make efforts to build up its own military capability. The Japanese followed this development with regard to alliance security policy and began to plan for how it would respond.

Yoshida again selected his closest protégé, Ikeda Hayato, assisted by Miyazawa Kiichi, to lead his government's efforts in MSA discussions with the United States. Ikeda's counterpart would be U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Walter J. Robertson, and the so-called Ikeda-Robertson Talks would begin in October 1953.

In the lead up to the talks defense remained a controversial topic in Japan, and Yoshida continued to straddle the rhetorical fence; upon the inauguration of the National Safety Agency, he told the assembled Japanese ground troops it was "not the time to rearm," but insisted the NPR (it would not be redesignated the NSF for a few more months) constituted the "nucleus of a new national military."<sup>25</sup> The announced increase in strength of this force, to 110,000, and a major recruiting drive, to both replace many of the initial recruits who had left the force after two years to earn the 60,000 yen bonus, and to fill the expanded billets created for the increased end-strength numbers, also garnered much media attention.

While Yoshida and his supporters wrestled with these domestic pressures, the United States continued to push for rearmament. When Ridgway began urging Japan to stand up an army of 10 divisions, with around 300,000 troops, Yoshida tried to deflect this pressure by agreeing, but arguing "not yet." Ridgway reported Yoshida "outlined his plan of shortly beginning a campaign of education of the Japanese people . . . [so that] the people, understanding the Communist threat, would themselves demand Japan provide for its own protection by rearming." The SCAP quoted the premier as stating, "We are going to watch the Gallup poll and when we get two-thirds who demand rearmament, then the Government can move openly in that direction."<sup>26</sup> The irony of the continuing defense debate was not missed by Ridgway, who told a U.S. diplomat in 1952 "there is a psychological difficulty in our having first indoctrinated the Japanese people with the undesirability of having land forces and now being faced with the necessity of indoctrinating them in the desirability of doing so."<sup>27</sup> Despite the assumed cultural hegemony and condescending tone, Ridgway sums up one of the key problems in convincing the Japanese people the time had come to rearm. The understanding of this difficulty by some U.S. officials, however, did not translate into a lessening of pressure.

In September 1952, before the Ikeda-Robertson Talks, Ikeda and Miyazawa attended a Board of Governors meeting for the International Monetary

Fund and the World Bank, in Mexico City. At the time Ikeda was Japan's Finance Minister, but much of what the Japanese delegation heard was more concerned with a Japanese military buildup than finance. From Assistant Secretary Snyder the Japanese heard "the US government . . . wished Japan would increase its defense capabilities as quickly as possible, as called for in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty."<sup>28</sup> The following day Dodge—at this point Eisenhower's Budget Director—repeated numbers Yoshida had previously heard from Ridgway, when the director explained, "research findings from the Defense Department suggest that the National Police Reserves could reach 180,000 . . . and that within a few years it could reach 325,000."<sup>29</sup> This was both a much larger number and a much faster rate than Yoshida was proposing; his delegation would hold out for lower numbers built up at a slower pace.

It was in the runup to the MSA talks that Yoshida was most explicit about his take on rearmament, at least to his inner circle:

Rearmament is something that Japan is in no position to do right now at all. Moreover, the public will not support it . . . rearmament will probably eventually come about naturally when the lives of the people have improved sufficiently. While it might seem cunning, for the time being we should let America [be responsible for Japan's defense] (brackets in the original) The Constitution's forbidding a military is a true blessing. If America says anything, we just show the Constitution. Politicians calling for its revision are complete fools.<sup>30</sup>

Yoshida's negotiating team followed this advice to good effect, but the Yoshida administration first had to deal with more domestic politics.

In March 1953 Yoshida called an opposition member a "stupid fool," resulting in a no-confidence vote and the dissolution of the Lower House of the Diet. In the subsequent election the Democratic Party and a faction led by Hatoyama campaigned on revising Article 9 and establishing a "self-defense army." Yoshida's Liberal Party won more seats, and Yoshida formed his fourth and final government. The MSA was increasingly a topic of discussion. On June 6 during a Lower House budget committee meeting Foreign Minister Okazaki replying to a question said, regarding "aid based on the MSA, if it is beneficial to strengthen our self-defense capabilities, and contribute economically to the people, then it is good to accept it."<sup>31</sup> Around the same time a plan by the new Director General of the National Safety Agency, Kimura Tokutaro, which posited a five-year plan to grow the NSF to 200,000, became public.<sup>32</sup> This plan was later denied by the Yoshida government.

Vague answers in the Diet and the increase in end strength of the National Safety Force to 110,000 did not end pressure for even greater rearmament and Yoshida, sensitive to increasing demands from both internal and external sources, realized he had to better shore up his rearmament credentials.

Reaching out to the head of the largest pro-rearmament conservative party, Yoshida went to see Shigemitsu Mamoru, in Shigemitsu's Kamakura home, in September 1953.<sup>33</sup>

Shigemitsu had been foreign minister at war's end, and had signed the surrender document on the *Missouri*. He had gone to Sugamo prison as a war criminal, but was released after never being tried. After being depurged he had joined many other conservative politicians in urging revision of the constitution, rearmament, and a more independent foreign policy. The price of his support in his 1953 meeting with Yoshida was that the National Safety Forces be redesignated, in order to acknowledge their role in the self-defense of Japan, and that the mission of the forces be changed to explicitly acknowledge defense against external aggression, as well as continuing to acknowledge internal defense duties. Yoshida acceded, but the submission and passing into law of the bills which became the Self-Defense Agency and Self-Defense Force laws took another year of negotiation.

In the meantime, in final preparations for the MSA talks, the Ikeda group began to send detailed questions through the American Embassy in Tokyo, with the goal of "limiting the demands from MSA to the greatest extent possible."<sup>34</sup> America had reinforced its demands in a very public way shortly before when Secretary of State Dulles had testified before Congress that Japan would soon rearm up to ten divisions. After an unusually pointed rebuke from the U.S. ambassador to Japan, John Allison, to a sitting Secretary of State, the Secretary offered some qualifying language, but in his qualification he also mentioned a specific number, saying Japan would rearm to 350,000.<sup>35</sup>

Yoshida and his team suspected this number was arbitrary (though the Systems Research Committee, chaired by Masaharu Keikichi, a secret committee within the National Safety Agency, came up with an only slightly smaller number of 300,000 for a ground force in its March 1953 Plan).<sup>36</sup> In the United States—or at least in the U.S. Department of the Army and later the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department—these kinds of numbers and higher numbers had been discussed since 1948.<sup>37</sup> A National Intelligence Estimate dated April 20, 1951, leaving aside questions of constitutionality and popular support, and purely from the perspective of available manpower and industrial capacity, had suggested, "A Japanese Army of up to 500,000 theoretically could be created within six months or a year once Japan had agreed to rearmament, equipment and supplies had become available, and a training program had begun."<sup>38</sup>

In February 1951, after MacArthur had asked for the provision of heavy armaments, on a priority equal to the provision of armaments for forces in Korea, to bolster the equipment of the NPR's originally projected four divisions, the JCS jumped in and recommended not only enough equipment for the four divisions, but for ten divisions in total, which would equal between

325,000 to 350,000 in terms of manpower. This size for a Japanese force became the JCS's and the DoD's default recommended position.<sup>39</sup> This kind of number had been pressed privately by Ridgway and others, but now publicly in Japan, the number 350,000 became associated with the MSA. Yoshida's team thought the number not only arbitrary, but too great by far.

Having secured support at least to his right with his deal with Shigemitsu, Yoshida felt ready to engage in negotiations over the MSA. The aim Yoshida directed for Ikeda's delegation was to "attain the least possible commitment over the longest time."<sup>40</sup>

When the Japanese delegation arrived in Washington for the talks, in October 1953, they did not bring anyone from the National Safety Agency, because they felt the NSA was too close to the American Far East Command, and thus too close to Washington; they did not trust them not to compromise Japan's negotiating positions. The first of those positions was to push talk of arms to the background of the discussions.

While this may seem odd—trying to minimize talks of armaments during negotiations to garner military aid—it reflects a continuing theme among Yoshida and his protégés. Yoshida genuinely felt Japan could not afford to rearm, but he had realized during the negotiations for the peace and security treaties that the cost of first freedom, then protection, from America would be, at least, what Dulles had described as a "token contribution" on the part of Japan. Yoshida was determined to cash in this token, wrangling as much economic benefit as he could from the most minimal contribution. Having agreed to an initial minimally sized force with Dulles in the treaty negotiations, when the Americans pushed for commitments certain on troop levels in the negotiations that followed, Yoshida's subordinates focused on how much American aid Japan would receive for rearming.

Going in to the Ikeda-Robertson Talks the Japanese, thus, attempted to set the conditions, by passing to the Americans a five-point paper laying out Japan's expectations. The first three of the numbered points dealt exclusively with economic issues. Only in a subparagraph of the fourth point do the Japanese say, "In looking at the Japanese situation in light of the above position . . . We have begun to study how to gradually increase Japan's defense. However, it would be difficult to decide this issue in isolation as it is related to Japan's economic power, reparations and other considerations."<sup>41</sup> Even this single mention of defense, among twelve issues raised, is hedged with an emphasis on the primacy of economic considerations.

The Americans pushed back, viewing the connection between economics and a military build-up from the opposite end of the scope. In a discussion of GARIOA (Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Areas) Budget Director Dodge, intoned, "the Japanese appear to have forgotten all of the relief supplies sent over during the Occupation. Even now on defense issues it really

should be Japan itself paying for new defense capabilities."<sup>42</sup> Defense representative Charles A. Sullivan added that he had heard Yoshida and Shigemitsu had met. Though, Sullivan acknowledged, the previous Japanese position had been "rearming is against the Constitution," now that Yoshida and Shigetmitsu had agreed upon the need to increase Japan's defense capabilities, Sullivan wondered, expressing the hope of the American side, would not the Japanese government's position on the constitutionality of increasing arms change?<sup>43</sup>

Ikeda's reply to Sullivan's question echoed the position Yoshida's administration had begun to take in its domestic debate on defense. Sullivan, Ikeda pointed out, seemed to think the self-defense forces discussed by Yoshida and Shigemitsu would constitute "war potential." Instead, Yoshida's envoy argued, since possessing war potential in Japan was unconstitutional, the projected SDF would perforce remain "below the level of 'war potential.'"<sup>44</sup>

Defense Secretary Robertson, the head of the American delegation, was incredulous, and his reply proved to be prescient:

It cannot be war potential, but it is okay if it is below war potential. Just where exactly do you draw the line? If 100,000 are okay, but 300,000 is bad, why? Maybe, you will say that now, 100,000 is all that is possible, and a couple of years from now, "well perhaps up to 300,000 is permissible." It's like a rainbow. If you go to the end of it you think you will find what you are looking for when in fact you won't.<sup>45</sup>

The conversation then shifted to the possibility of Japan amending the constitution, and Ikeda stated constitutional revision was unlikely for at least several years. When Robertson followed up by asking if the Japanese government was trying to educate the Japanese people about the need for "defending a country by oneself," Ikeda ignored the question and returned to his delegation's main premise, that "what must not be done is cutting the [Japanese] standard of living by pushing defense."<sup>46</sup>

The United States did not give up. Later in the conference Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank C. Nash gave a presentation on the danger of a Soviet invasion of Japan. Nash emphasized, "The U.S. has concluded that ten divisions of 325,000 ground troops would be necessary in Japan to protect it against such an attack."<sup>47</sup> But the Japanese, as mentioned, had heard such numbers before and were inured to them. Miyazawa was frank in his diary when he observed, "We basically just let the explanation go without really paying attention."<sup>48</sup>

Though the Japanese had successfully shifted much of the emphasis of the talks to economic issues, they realized they would not be able to reach an agreement without some discussion of numbers for a projected ground force in Japan. Not having brought anyone from the ground force in question, the delegation came up with these numbers on their own. They reasoned, first of

all, that Japanese divisions would not need the heavy logistical component of American divisions because American divisions were designed to deploy overseas and fight, and had to be self-sufficient, while Japanese divisions would only fight on the Japanese home islands. Thus, the delegation further reasoned, if vehicles needed to be repaired the Japanese forces “could just take them to a [local] repair shop.”<sup>49</sup> Therefore, though agreeing to the American premise of ten divisions, the Japanese felt each division, stripped of the bulk of logistical and other support units, could be much smaller, at about 18,000 men, so the Japanese came up with a recommended total of 180,000 for the ground force.<sup>50</sup>

The day after Nash’s original presentation the assistant secretary returned with a timeline for achieving the force goals he had outlined for the Japanese. For the ground force the United States envisioned reaching six divisions by 1954, eight divisions by 1955, and ten divisions, with 325,000 troops, by 1956.<sup>51</sup> The Japanese submitted their proposal, for 180,000, the following day. They planned to reach ten divisions with this smaller number of troops by 1958.<sup>52</sup>

The two sides next exchanged memos, each persisting in their positions. In their memo of October 21 the United States had added more details about their ground force proposal. Still asking the National Safety Force to be eventually expanded to between “320,000 to 350,000” the memo now indicated “the U.S. desires that Japan increase its ground troops by 24,000 within the current year, and 46,000 by the next year for a total of 180,000.”<sup>53</sup> The Japanese were hopeful that the specific mention of the number they had proposed, which had now appeared in a U.S. document, indicated some room for agreement, and they began to think of ways to reconcile the two-year difference in the tempo of the build-up to reach 180,000.<sup>54</sup>

In the end, after two weeks of discussion, the issue of numbers and timing had not been resolved, but the Japanese had wrung from the Americans the concession, “the rapid increase in Japan’s self-defense capabilities that [the United States] desires is impossible due to constitutional restrictions, economic, and social reasons.”<sup>55</sup> The MSA agreement, now known as the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, was signed March 1, 1954, codifying the primacy of “economic stability”<sup>56</sup> over any defense build-up. The Ground Self-Defense Force did reach an authorized strength of 180,000, though the figure was reached by 1960,<sup>57</sup> rather than 1955 or 1958. This remained the GSDF’s authorized strength for decades, though the actual recruiting quota was much lower, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

### **The End of an Era, the Birth of a Doctrine**

Yoshida, the embattled “One Man,” was outmaneuvered by Hatoyama when the latter formed the Japan Democratic Party in November 1954.

Yoshida resigned as prime minister on December 7, and he would not hold the premiership again, but he left what has turned out to be an indelible legacy.

Yoshida remains a complex figure. An ardent anti-communist, he maintained that neutrality was “cowardly” to the end of his days.<sup>58</sup> Yet he also adamantly maintained his fellow citizens were not ready for rearmament, because of a “‘38<sup>th</sup> parallel’ in the heart of the Japanese people,”<sup>59</sup> and, in more private moments, insisted Japan simply could not afford to rearm. He established a pattern of minimally rearming, with little, if any, thought to the threat (which he discounted) or other security needs of the nation; instead Yoshida insisted on building up forces only to what the Japanese government perceived as the minimal level acceptable to Japan’s American ally, while focusing the preponderance of Japan’s national energy on economic growth.

Though this policy, or the eponymous doctrine by which it became known, was challenged—especially by the two avowed revisionists who followed Yoshida as premiers for the remainder of the decade—the Yoshida Doctrine became the mainstream policy of the Liberal Democratic Party—a party not even formed until almost a year after Yoshida’s resignation. In many ways the Yoshida Doctrine holds sway as Japan’s primary foreign policy lens to this day.

The American response—indeed, the American participation—in the formation of this policy cannot be discounted. Again and again, throughout the negotiations for the two treaties and the two agreements that followed, American officials would proclaim that now Japan was getting it, now Japan was waking up, now Japan was recognizing the commonality of this allied undertaking. Again and again those officials were disappointed. Again and again American officials were warned about “the sensitiveness of the Japanese Government to questions of sovereignty and rearmament,”<sup>60</sup> and again and again, in the negotiations, out of frustration, the U.S. negotiators would question their Japanese counterparts’ gratitude,<sup>61</sup> capacity,<sup>62</sup> and honesty.<sup>63</sup> Few of the American negotiators reflected on America’s own responsibility for the difficulty of the struggle to rearm Japan, though it was SCAP, for instance, that so heavily stressed “war victim consciousness”<sup>64</sup> in their information campaign during the Occupation, centering it on the fact that “As a scapegoat the military clique is made to order.”<sup>65</sup>

Though there were those like Ridgway and Allison who at least acknowledged some culpability on America’s part, in the end, the Americans did not make the decisions resulting in this policy, the Japanese did. Whether one attributes the formulation of the policy to realism, either “pragmatic,”<sup>66</sup> “mercantile,”<sup>67</sup> or some other variety;<sup>68</sup> to constructivism and the development of norms of either “antimilitarism,”<sup>69</sup> or “domestic antimilitarism;”<sup>70</sup> to “pacifism or passing the buck;”<sup>71</sup> or simply to the decisions of a protected people who no longer had to seriously consider threats,<sup>72</sup> the essential ligaments of

the policy, and, in turn, America's reactive counter policy, were formed during Yoshida's terms as prime minister. In the simplest form of these interacting policies, the United States would, in a phrase that only gained currency in Japan during the second Gulf War, tell Japan "to show the flag," and Japan would, instead, "show the constitution." This tactic bore fruit as the Japanese continued to resist American calls for larger, more capable Japanese forces, but the adoption of this tactic and the Yoshida Doctrine was not a foregone conclusion when Yoshida left office. In the rancorous discourse of the 1950s the sly former PM's design was challenged by other political leaders who wanted to revise the constitution and openly rearm, and particularly by Hatoyama Ichirō and Kishi Nobusuke.

### Two Revisionists, a Horse and a New Treaty

Yoshida was replaced by Hatoyama Ichirō in December 1954. Long a champion of a more independent, rearmed Japan, Hatoyama, scion of "arguably the most prominent political family in modern Japan,"<sup>73</sup> may have been the best placed of pro-rearmament leaders to achieve constitutional revision and rearmament,<sup>74</sup> but in the end was unable to achieve these goals. Hatoyama had been the founder and head of the Liberal Party which won the plurality of seats in the first postwar elections for the Lower House of the Diet, and thus presumptive prime minister, but *Chicago Sun* reporter Mark Gayn had then publicized the fact Hatoyama had authored during the war a "pro-Nazi" book in which he praised Hitler and Mussolini. As a result, Hatoyama had been purged, in May 1946, just before he was to have taken office.<sup>75</sup>

Though Hatoyama picked Yoshida as his replacement—and thus Yoshida began his first term of office—the two soon became bitter rivals.<sup>76</sup> Despite their rivalry they had worked together to establish the National Safety Agency and to expand to 110,000 the number of men in the renamed National Safety Force in 1952. This cooperation had not extended to the elections in October 1952. Hatoyama had made agitation for the revision of the constitution central to his campaign for leadership. He had made fun of the premier's sophism that the NSF were not armed forces, saying, "Mr. Yoshida's thesis is that a white horse is not a horse."<sup>77</sup> After Yoshida had dissolved the Lower House again in March 1953—the "Stupid Fool Dissolution"—Hatoyama had left the Liberal Party for a time, to form the almost-identically named Japan Liberal Party and run against Yoshida.<sup>78</sup> Yoshida had won and had formed his final cabinet in April 1953. Yoshida had then had reached out to those on his right, setting the stage for the MSA negotiations by negotiating joint goals with Shigemitsu's Progressive Party.

These joint goals had eventuated in the passing of the two self-defense laws—the Self-Defense Agency Law and the Self-Defense Force Law,

in July 1954. Yoshida had also wanted to bring Hatoyama back into the fold, and had promised to insert, at Hatoyama's request, a plank in the Liberal Party's platform calling for revising the constitution to recognize Japan's right to self-defense.<sup>79</sup> As well, One Man had established a Constitutional Research Council.<sup>80</sup> Hatoyama had returned to the fold of the Liberal Party in the summer of 1953, but relations with Yoshida had remained chilly. In November 1954 Hatoyama had left with others of the Liberal Party, again, this time to form, with elements formerly from the Progressive Party, the Japan Democratic Party (JDP). The JDP had been the second largest party in the Diet upon its formation,<sup>81</sup> and Yoshida had been irreparably weakened. Yoshida resigned the following month, and Hatoyama formed his first cabinet.

When Yoshida had admitted in 1952 Japan had the right to self-defense his rationale and rhetoric concerning the National Safety Force had changed; he had shifted the focus of the defense debate from the question of the right to self-defense to the question of what constituted the "war potential" mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 9, and had maintained the capability to conduct "modern war" constituted "war potential." Since the NSF could not conduct modern war, his reasoning went, its existence did not cross that unconstitutional threshold. Yoshida and his government maintained this interpretation through the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces (*Jieitai*) and the Defense Agency in 1954.<sup>82</sup>

Despite Hatoyama's strong and consistent championing of the need to revise the constitution, in the end, he had neither the two-thirds majority nor the popular support to effect constitutional amendment. In October 1955 the two Socialist Parties merged, and in the following month the Liberal and Democratic parties merged, to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),<sup>83</sup> thus setting the stage for politics in Japan for more than half a century afterwards. The aim to revise the constitution remained a plank in the LDP's platform, but the LDP was so riven with factions—some of whom like Hatoyama's and Shigemitsu's followers, thought constitutional revision necessary and others of whom, like followers of Yoshida and Ashida, thought revision unnecessary—pursuing a unitary policy pushing for constitutional revision was difficult.

Hatoyama did push through the formation of the *Kokubō Kaigi* (National Defense Council), a civilian advisory board on defense policy, and the *Kenpō Chosakai Kaigi* (Constitution Investigation Council), but he was unable to take his defense-related aims any further.<sup>84</sup> Though, in terms of foreign policy he was able to achieve a goal he thought would help restore Japan's status as an independent actor on the international stage, by achieving a pact reestablishing relations with the Soviet Union, with regard to Japan rearming to defend itself—a step he thought necessary to restore Japan's true "political-diplomatic equality" with other nations<sup>85</sup>—he made little progress.

Hatoyama did, however, shift the terms of the defense debate, explaining in 1956 how his administration's position differed from that of his predecessors:

Mr. Yoshida said that we could have military potential or war potential so long as it was not modern, but that if it was modern war potential it was prohibited by Article IX . . . My interpretation is different: we can have a modern army, if it is for self-defense. . . if it is for self-defense and of the degree necessary for self-defense, we can have war potential.<sup>86</sup>

With this pronouncement the focus of the debate within Japan shifted again; the question was no longer whether or not self-defense capabilities constituted war potential, or whether or not the forces in question could conduct modern war, but rather the question became what kinds of defense actions, organization, and equipment, and to a lesser degree, what numbers, comprised a defense organization that was established to "the degree necessary for self-defense."

Hatoyama resigned in December, 1956. After the short premiership of Ishibashi Tanzan, Kishi Nobusuke, became prime minister. According to Richard Samuels, Kishi, as "the architect of the corporatist Japanese state and 'transwar' economic system," who after the war, was "reinvented as a democrat to design and lead the '1955 system' of conservative consolidation and Liberal Democratic Party hegemony," is the most significant figure in twentieth century Japan.<sup>87</sup> Beginning his career as a "reformist bureaucrat" (*kakushin kanryo*) in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Kishi rose to serve Prime Minister Tojo as his Minister of Commerce and Vice Minister of Ordinance (one observer highlighted the significance of Kishi's political rehabilitation by contrasting the coming to power of such a noteworthy wartime figure with what happened in postwar Germany, posing the hypothetical question: "Can you imagine Albert Speer [Hitler's armaments minister] becoming chancellor in West Germany?")<sup>88</sup> During the war Kishi had become disillusioned with the war effort and resigned from Tojo's cabinet in 1944, but, as a signatory of the declaration of war against the United States, Kishi was imprisoned as a class A war criminal in Sugamo Prison after the defeat, though he was never tried.

After depurging, on the day Japan regained independence, April 29, 1952, Kishi and other depurgees joined the Japan Reconstruction Federation. He made his concern for the necessity of constitutional revision and rearmament clear almost immediately. Though there was disagreement among the members of the Federation whether or not the organization should even be a political party, several members stood for election to the Diet in August 1952.

Kishi, as one of the leaders of the Federation, though he did not stand for election himself, made many speeches around the country supporting conservative causes, warning of the communist threat, and "demand[ing] that the

Constitution, particularly the provisions forbidding rearmament, be revised so that Japan could attain 'true independence.'"<sup>89</sup> In an article he wrote for a Japanese magazine during the same time Kishi further elaborated on this theme. The future prime minister writes: "In order to regain real independence we must consider the national defense problem before anything else." He goes on to analyze what he viewed as a growing allergy to all things military among the Japanese people. "The fair sex" he writes, particularly wives who lost husbands and mothers who lost sons in the Fifteen-Year War, "is, as a rule, opposed to rearmament . . . To them war is anathema." Japanese youth, he explains, are concerned they will be called up and, using a phrase made famous after the Russo-Japanese War, "utilized as human bullets . . . sent to the firing line in Korea." Noting the symbolic impact of ex-soldiers "making a pathetic appeal in the streets and in trains, from the general public," Kishi declares this also "a factor which intensified hatred of war." To counter these currents in the developing discourse Kishi writes "The mistakes common to these lines of argument against rearmament is the hasty conclusion that rearmament means war."<sup>90</sup>

All but one of the candidates standing for election from the Japan Reconstruction Federation lost their bids for election in August 1952, and the movement dissolved. Kishi was then persuaded to join his brother, Satō Eisaku, in the Liberal Party. Like Ashida Hitoshi, another rearmament advocate, then in the Progressive Party, Kishi supported a strong, rearmed Japan in an anti-communist alliance with the United States.<sup>91</sup> Unlike Ashida, Kishi thought constitutional amendment would be necessary to fully realize this vision.

Appointed as the chairman of the Constitution Investigation Commission established in 1953 by Yoshida, Kishi became specific about what kind of constitutional revision he advocated with regard to Article 9, urging the article be changed to specify Japan renounced "aggressive war"<sup>92</sup> (*shinryaku sensō*). In 1955, then the Secretary General of the Japan Democratic Party, Kishi had the chance to join the binational struggle over rearmament with the United States, when he accompanied then Foreign Minister Shigemitsu to Washington for talks on Japan's plans for expanding the Self-Defense Forces and revising the Security Treaty. These meetings in Washington were important for setting the tone of Kishi's later relationship with the United States when he became prime minister.

During the first meeting with Secretary of State Dulles, August 30, 1955, Dulles almost immediately dashed Shigemitsu's hopes for negotiating a more mutual security treaty stating flatly he did not think the Japanese government "had the unity, cohesion and capacity to operate under a new treaty arrangement." When Shigemitsu tried to parry that Japan had needed the Security Treaty when unarmed, but now Japan possessed its own defense forces, Dulles dismissed the forces as "inadequate." This sentiment was echoed by Admiral

Radford, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, also present at the meeting. When Shigemitsu said Japan planned to increase its forces, Radford said the plan for expansion was insufficient, noting in particular the lack of logistical support included in the plan.<sup>93</sup> Eventually Dulles said the United States could consider a more mutual treaty "when Japan had adequate forces, a sufficient legal framework and an amended constitution." When Shigemitsu protested he wanted to make sure the United States did not intend to keep Japan in a "semi-independent position," by such things as annual "haggling" over Japan's defense budget (the MSA agreement required Japan to consult the United States on defense budget issues), Dulles shrugged it off, saying the United States also discussed defense budgets with its NATO allies every year, describing such discussions as "part and parcel of collective security." At this point Kishi interjected he was "elated" the United States would consider treaty revision eventually, and then enumerated the two conditions he thought had to be met prior to this revision: Japan's standard of living had to be improved and the conservative parties had to be consolidated. With that accomplished Japan could plan to strengthen its forces, which strengthening would then lead to the departure of U.S. forces and the revision of the constitution.<sup>94</sup>

The joint statement following the series of meetings says, in part, "Japan could, as rapidly as possible assume primary responsibility for the defense of the homeland and be able to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security in the Western Pacific." Perhaps most significantly to the Japanese public, Dulles answered a question from the press and said "yes," a new treaty entailing the responsibilities outlined above might also involve sending Japanese troops overseas. Press reaction in Japan was immediate and negative, criticizing Shigemitsu for committing Japan to new obligations "without Diet or popular support," and particularly critical of possible "overseas dispatch."<sup>95</sup> Following this meeting Shigemitsu was progressively weakened by not only the bad press following these talks, but more bad press during negotiations with the Soviet Union over the normalization of relations. Partly as a result of this weakening, Kishi became one of the key figures the United States worked with behind the scenes, more than a year before taking on the premiership.<sup>96</sup>

Thus, the United States was hopeful when Kishi became prime minister in 1957 that they now had a Japanese leader they could work with.<sup>97</sup> Though this was the initial hope of U.S. officials, those hopes must have quickly dimmed as Kishi began to pepper the new American Ambassador, Douglas MacArthur II (named after his uncle, the former SCAP), who assumed office almost at the same time as the new premier, with papers explaining Japan's positions. In those papers Kishi made brutally clear the distance between the two allies. He mentioned the broad aversion to war in Japan, as well as the consensus in Japan that the United States was pursuing a "war policy."

There were wide-spread fears among the populace, he declared, that Japan would be pulled into America's wars. In a parallel to his earlier statements that the Japanese people had come to associate the term "rearmament" with war, Kishi emphasized to the ambassador that Japanese citizens equated the term "armament" with war, and identified U.S. policy as unfairly bullying Japan into further rearmament, arousing the Japanese people's hatred.<sup>98</sup>

Kishi was trying to set the stage for reengaging with the United States over the necessity of replacing the Security Treaty with a more mutual (from the Japanese point of view) security treaty, but, in the end he ran into the same barriers to defense reform and constitutional revision met earlier by Hatoyama. In 1955 Japan's industrial output had surpassed that of its wartime output, and the yearly increase in GDP had continued since. Concurrent with the time Kishi had stated to the Americans during the Dulles-Shigemitsu talks that a necessary precondition for strengthening Japan's defense forces was an improved standard of living for the Japanese people, the Japanese economic boom had been providing just that. Not long after his participation in those talks Kishi had been one of the prime architects for achieving the merger of conservative parties, resulting in the creation of the Liberal Democratic Party; thus he had played a significant role in achieving what he had described as the second necessary precondition for increasing Japanese forces. Though the two prerequisites for strengthening Japan's force he had enumerated had been met, the follow-through Kishi had predicted—building up the Self-Defense Forces, which would then precipitate a departure for America forces and create an atmosphere favoring constitutional revision—did not materialize.

Kishi's designs were thwarted not only by the strength of the Socialist opposition—which ebbed and flowed with each frequent election, but remained close enough to one-third of total Diet members to make all issues associated with the SDF difficult, and constitutional revision next to impossible—but also by the fractiousness of the party Kishi had labored to weld together. The LDP, was "no more than the coalition of eight large factions, backed by different interest groups,"<sup>99</sup> and Kishi had to spend an inordinate amount of time dealing with political sniping from his own party, on every conceivable issue. Nor had he overstated the problems with public opinion in his notes to Ambassador MacArthur.

According to one astute observer, the Japanese had come to view the Americans as "war loving," from the time of the so-called *Lucky Dragon* Incident, in 1954, in which Japanese fishermen were contaminated by fallout from an American hydrogen bomb test, eventuating in the sickness of all the Japanese fishermen and the later death of one of their number.<sup>100</sup> This as well as the feeling of many Japanese that the Occupation had never really ended, evidenced by the thousands of American troops still present in Japan; the

association in the public's mind of the every-detail-leaked negotiations of the Administrative and MSA agreements with both large-scale rearmament and with bullying from the U.S. side; and the more recent, at the time, controversies over the introduction of atomic weapons and guided missiles into Japan by the United States,<sup>101</sup> as well as the developing movement in a segment of Japanese society favoring (at least one-country) pacifism, had combined to make talk of now changing the Security Treaty—which opponents considered tantamount to perpetuating the alliance with occupation by the United States—a toxic political issue in Japan. Nevertheless, Kishi, not only wanting a more independent Japan, but also wanting to strengthen the Japan-U.S. security relationship, steadfastly pursued replacing the Security Treaty with a Mutual Security Treaty.

Though frustrated in his cherished dream to revise the constitution and regain a more independent posture for Japan on the world's stage, Kishi was able to push through some items on the defense agenda. In May 1957, after three years of debate, Japan established the Basic Policy for National Defense:

The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded on democratic principles.

To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby establishes the following principles:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
2. To promote the public welfare and enhance the public's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.
3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.<sup>102</sup>

Kishi was also able to push through the "First Defense Plan," which had been in embryonic form at least since the founding of the National Safety Agency in 1952.<sup>103</sup> An earlier form of this plan had been the basis for the discussions in Washington described above. As the Japanese delegation presented it in the Dulles-Shigemitsu talks in 1955, the plan had been for a six-year program. The published plan had been shortened to a three-year program, having taken into account both Ministry of Finance and internal LDP concerns.

Just as had been negotiated in the MSA talks, the target troop strength for the GSDF was 180,000<sup>104</sup> (though the date for reaching this target was now slipped from 1955, proposed by the Americans, and 1956 counter-proposed by Ikeda, to 1960). The plan was published June 14, 1957.

Unable to achieve actual constitutional amendment Kishi took up the tactic of reform through interpretation, expanding the definition of self-defense more than any other prime minister until more than 50 years later. To Kishi “the degree necessary for self-defense” included the capability to defend against missile attacks,<sup>105</sup> “the maintaining of the minimum amount of nuclear weapons for self-defense,”<sup>106</sup> and the capability to conduct bombing raids, though he later retracted this last capability.<sup>107</sup>

Perhaps Kishi would have eventually taken up the banner of actual constitutional amendment, if not for his experience with another revision question. Kishi took up revision of the Security Treaty with the United States in 1957, however many members of his own party were against revision, and a series of missteps domestically, including pushing through educational reform, leading to riots, in 1957, and attempting to push through police reforms, resulting in such violence that his government withdrew the draft legislation in 1958, enflamed a large segment of the Japanese population.<sup>108</sup>

In 1960 nonetheless, Kishi had managed to negotiate with the United States the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, usually referred to as the Mutual Security Treaty or MST in English and as the *Anshin Hosho Jyōyaku* or *Anpo* in Japanese. Though it was Kishi’s majoritarian tactics in forcing the passage of the *Anpo* through the Diet that provided the proximate spark for the most destructive and deadly phase, and though other factors were also involved, it was ultimately Japan’s contending narratives of the past 15 years clashing in a crescendo that resulted in the most violent protests in postwar Japanese history. This violence, when the struggle over rearmament became physical rather than verbal or imaginative, with deadly consequences, proved a defining moment in Japan’s postwar reconstruction of its national identity. More details of this violent stage in Japan’s defense debate will be covered in the next chapter. For now, it is clear from the foregoing history of policy debates, that Japan’s choice as a nation that it should not possess more than a minimal level of armament, nor possess certain military capabilities, did not have to coalesce in the way it did.

## THRUST INTO THE FIRE

The Japanese strategy, norm, or expedient—depending upon one’s point of view—of maintaining minimally armed organizations that are rarely acknowledged as true military forces, and fencing these Self-Defense Forces

with extraordinary restrictions, did not have to become dominant by the end of the 1950s. As the decade had progressed there had been many public defenders of an armed Japan. The latter half of the 1950s, further, had been dominated by two premiers who strongly wanted to revise the constitution and rearm Japan.

Though pragmatic One Man, Yoshida, described *saigunbi*, rearmament as “simply a word with which politicians and others may conjure, but which to anyone with the slightest knowledge of the subject can never be anything more than a word,”<sup>109</sup> in 1962, Kishi better captured the connotations of the word, and thus a key dilemma for those who have advocated a more traditional army for Japan, a decade earlier when he said, “Personally I don’t like the prefix “re” in the word “rearmament.” For it smacks of a return to militarism. Now that Japan has regained her independence, if nominally, it must eliminate the necessity of keeping foreign troops here for the protection of the nation against aggression. Japan should be strong enough to defend herself. This is the right and obligation of an independent nation.”<sup>110</sup> By the end of the 1950s, the term rearmament had taken on a negative connotation among the Japanese people. Those who have focused on the following decades of Japan’s history most often have focused on its economic miracle, frequently attributing one factor of this economic success as Japan’s minimal military spending. But the struggle over that spending, and over all aspects of rearmament and the military continued, as will be described next.

To give it its distinctive shape, strength and cutting power, the metal of a Japanese sword blade is forged and reforged, thrust into the fire and drawn out over and over, hammered out, and folded over many times, then sharpened. For the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force this plunging into fire and hammering and folding took place within the often fiery context of competitive discourses concerning Japan’s overall national identity. Ultimately, despite the many barriers, constitutional, legal and societal, to doing so it was during the 1960s, that the GSDF in the midst of these contentious discourses, while remaining a sheathed blade, kept that blade sharp and bright, forging a positive identity for itself. This study turns to this next, after discussing the most blazing period of the defense discourse, the *Anpo* Riots.

## NOTES

1. Charles Hill, *Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft and World Order* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 5.

2. NHK Housou Yoron Chousajo, *Zusetsu: Sengo Yoronshi, Dainihan*, vol. Second Edition, Nhk Bukksu (Tokyo: Nihon Housou Shuppan Kyokai, 1982), 170–71.

3. Ibid. See also Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon Hawley Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance*, Westview Special Studies on East Asia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 45.

4. See Sebald's comment in United States Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. China and Japan (in Two Parts)," ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952-1954), <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195254v14p2>, 1067. And Kishi's comments at Kurzman, *Kishi and Japan: The Search for the Sun*.

5. State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in Two Parts)," 808.

6. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 225.

7. Fragment of an untitled manuscript, starting with p. 12, Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925-1976 (Bulk 1948-1963)," Box 19, Folder 3, 12-16.

8. General Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 226.

9. Masuda and Congressional Information Service, *Rearmament of Japan*.

10. Jon Livingston, Joe Moore, and Felicia Oldfather, *Postwar Japan, 1945 to the Present*, 1st ed. (New York, Pantheon Books, 1974), 263-64.

11. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*.

12. State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. China and Japan (in Two Parts)," 1182, 95.

13. FRUS *ibid.*, 1141, 78.

14. National Diet Library, "5-13: Creation of a National Police Reserve," <http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html>.

15. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 89.

16. "Summary of Japanese Press," dtd 7 March 52, Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925-1976 (Bulk 1948-1963)," Box 7, Folder 19.

17. Sung-Bog Hong, "The Development of Japan's Defense Policy and Self-Defense Forces: 1945-1982" (Northern Arizona University 1983), 40.

18. Partial Manuscript, titled "Grace of Heaven (Japan Rearms), Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925-1976 (Bulk 1948-1963)," Box 18, Folder 9, 33.

19. Bōeicho, ed. *Jieitai Juunen-Shi*, 65.

20. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 111. As I will do throughout, some translate *Hoantai* as Safety Force and *Hoancho* as Safety Agency. See, for instance, State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. China and Japan (in Two Parts)," 1835; Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, 397. Others translate "Safety," in the title of the agency and of the ground force, as "Security." See for instance Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 104.

21. Sissons, "The Pacifist Clause of the Japanese Constitution: Legal and Political Problems of Rearmament," 52.

22. This being a rather novel argument from a legally designated commander in chief of national forces—that his forces were not very good. See *ibid.*

23. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 108. For “rearmament by installment,” *ibid.*, 117.

24. *Ibid.*, 102.

25. Kiichi Miyazawa, *Secret Talks between Tokyo and Washington: The Memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi, 1949–1954* (New York: Lexington Books, 2007), 70.

26. State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954. China and Japan (in Two Parts),” 1218; Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 112. Yoshida may have had the fraction “two-thirds in mind” because amending the constitution required the vote of two-thirds of its members, as well as a public referendum. Grant Goodman, who served on MacArthur's SCAP staff as a junior officer, stated the American drafters of the constitution purposefully made it difficult to amend, during a group presentation commemorating the 69th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, December 7, 2010, at the Hall Center for the Humanities, University of Kansas.

27. State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954. China and Japan (in Two Parts),” 1219.

28. Miyazawa, *Secret Talks between Tokyo and Washington: The Memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi, 1949–1954*, 73.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, 76.

31. *Ibid.*, 90.

32. *Ibid.*, 89.

33. *Ibid.*, 92–96; Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 118.

34. Miyazawa, *Secret Talks between Tokyo and Washington: The Memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi, 1949–1954*, 91. With 11 years' worth of negotiating with Japanese officials while serving in the U.S. Army, I am not surprised by this opening gambit, and I am confident the questions continued throughout the negotiations. We American interlocutors referred to this as “death by a thousand questions,” and often lamented that no detail was too small to escape these queries.

35. *Ibid.*, 92. See also Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 98.

36. ———, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 104–05.

37. Sugita, *Pitfall of Panacea: The Irony of US Power in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952*.

38. State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in Two Parts),” 993–95.

39. *Ibid.*, 884–85.

40. Miyazawa, *Secret Talks between Tokyo and Washington: The Memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi, 1949–1954*, 97; *ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*, 100.

42. Ibid., 102.
43. Ibid., 103.
44. Ibid., 104.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., 105.
47. Ibid., 110.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 114.
50. Ibid., 113. Earlier in his memoir Miyazawa expresses doubt that the Americans had come up with a serious number, but then, with no apparent irony, attempts to justify his own, self-admittedly, uninformed and ultimately arbitrary number. This—as well as the utter inanity of a military unit sending vehicles to a local repair shop within useful support distance while the unit is actively engaging an invading enemy force (perhaps instead of a “fire sale” they could receive “firefight sale” prices), never having occurred to the Japanese delegation—perhaps best demonstrates not only what Miyazawa admitted, that the Japanese delegation’s “knowledge of defense issues was superficial at best,” (see *ibid.*, 112) but also probably more fundamentally illustrates the delegation’s conviction, a reflection of Yoshida’s own, that Japan was in no actual danger of invasion. They did not take a mission of defending against external aggression seriously, despite the fact such a mission had been agreed to as necessary between Yoshida and Shigemitsu, because they did not think such aggression would occur.
51. Ibid., 112.
52. Ibid., 113.
53. Ibid., 124–25.
54. Ibid., 126–28.
55. Ibid., 131.
56. Hong, “The Development of Japan’s Defense Policy and Self-Defense Forces: 1945–1982,” 49.
57. James H. Buck, “The Japanese Self-Defense Forces,” *Asian Survey* 7, no. 9 (1967). See also Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan, 1978*, trans. Mainichi Daily News (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1978), 66.
58. Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis*, 371.
59. Ibid.
60. Masuda and Congressional Information Service., *Rearmament of Japan*.
61. Miyazawa, *Secret Talks between Tokyo and Washington: The Memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi, 1949–1954*.
62. United States Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957. Japan,” ed John P. Glennon. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955–1957), <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195557v23p1>, 98.
63. Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie; Or, Allison Wonderland*.
64. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan*, 14–32.
65. Ibid., 17.

66. Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*, 1st ed., A Century Foundation Book (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).
67. Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
68. Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2001). Also see, again, Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*.
69. Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
70. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*.
71. Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japan's Security Policy," *International Security* 29, no. 1 (2004), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137548>.
72. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*.
73. Itoh, *The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations*, 1.
74. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 136.
75. Itoh, *The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations*, 89–103. Mayumi Itoh states Hatoyama did not write the book in question; rather, it was ghost-written for him, see *ibid.*, 118.
76. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 103–05.
77. *Ibid.*, 104.
78. Itoh, *The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations*, 119–20.
79. Jr. Joseph P. Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 34.
80. Itoh, *The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations*; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 329.
81. Itoh, *The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations*, 127.
82. Sissons, "The Pacifist Clause of the Japanese Constitution: Legal and Political Problems of Rearmament," 54; Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–71*, 177.
83. Itoh, *The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations*, 129; Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 121.
84. Itoh, *The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations*, 131.
85. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, 139.

86. Sissons, "The Pacifist Clause of the Japanese Constitution: Legal and Political Problems of Rearmament," 54.

87. Richard J. Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 141.

88. The Albert Speer hypothetical was mentioned by Skip Orr, then the director of the Stanford Center in Kyoto, in the summer of 1990, to the author. For other comparisons of Kishi to Speer see Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 120.

89. Kurzman, *Kishi and Japan: The Search for the Sun*, 267.

90. All as quoted in *ibid.*

91. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 120.

92. Sissons, "The Pacifist Clause of the Japanese Constitution: Legal and Political Problems of Rearmament," 53.

93. State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957. Japan," 100.

94. *Ibid.*, 98–103.

95. *Ibid.*, 119.

96. See for instance *ibid.*, 225.

97. *Ibid.*, 271.

98. Roger Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945–1990*, ed. Steve Smith, paperback ed., vol. 21, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 81–83. Also see Kurzman, *Kishi and Japan: The Search for the Sun*, 267–68.

99. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 114.

100. Miyazawa, *Secret Talks between Tokyo and Washington: The Memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi, 1949–1954*, 136.

101. State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957. Japan," 269.

102. Joseph P. Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*, 38.

103. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 100–13.

104. Joseph P. Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*, 38–39.

105. Sissons, "The Pacifist Clause of the Japanese Constitution: Legal and Political Problems of Rearmament," 55.

106. Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–71*, 178–79.

107. *Ibid.*, Joseph P. Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*, 37.

108. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 149–59.

109. Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis*, 192.

110. Dan Kurzman, *Kishi and Japan: The Search for the Sun* (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1960), 268.

## *Chapter 6*

# **Sheathing the Blade, Polishing the Spirit**

**1960–1976**

The 1950s may have been the decade when a key part of Japan's national identity, whether or not it would be a country possessing an army like other countries, was most energetically contested. Yet from the 1960s until the present, the contestation has continued. With the issue not completely resolved, Japan's army, the Ground Self-Defense Force, has been left in what is by international standards a condition of peculiar tension. The GSDF on the one hand has maintained, to a degree, a high level of support from the Japanese people throughout the postwar period, according to poll numbers. Nor have the issues of war and the roles of warriors been ignored in the public sphere. As will be explored in chapter nine, some military figures, such as the Japanese Imperial Navy and Kamikaze pilots, were rehabilitated, to a certain extent, in the public mind by the 1960s. On the other hand, ground soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army were not rehabilitated. Largely left ignored, when the most numerous of the emperor's former military were brought up at all it was almost universally in a negative context.

Yet, again reflecting the peculiar tension, fairly early on the GSDF came to be regarded as the repository of positive cultural values. It became common, for instance, for salarymen (in many ways viewed as the warriors of Japan, Inc.) to be sent by their companies to GSDF camps where they could receive what was described as spiritual training and discipline.

Early in this time period the Defense Agency and the SDF members themselves defined what should be the internal—often referred to as mental, psychological or spiritual—basis for their professional identity. Other factors as well, including international norms of what constituted military professionalism, helped shape that identity. There were challenges, like the Three Arrows scandal that set back military contingency planning for years, but fairly early in the timeframe under discussion, as Japan focused on its

civilian and economic identity, the GSDF settled into a professional identity that has remained the foundation of its current identity. This was an identity that was not shaken by the spectacular alternative Mishima Yukio literally shouted from a balcony just before his suicide in the office of the commanding General of the GSDF's *Tōbu Hōmentai* (Eastern Army, a GSDF Army being roughly equivalent to a U.S. Army corps). Nor was this identity rattled when the defense debate was sparked to a higher level in the 1970s. The key event in 1960, which, in part, kept the policymaking defense debate at a lower level for the rest of the decade, and which had a constitutive effect itself on the GSDF's identity, were the *Anpo* Riots of 1960.

### THROUGH SECURITY RIOTS TO INCOME DOUBLING, JAPAN BECOMES A CIVILIAN POWER

The *Anpo* Riots, complicated and enflamed by the wide-spread Japanese opinion that America was a bellicose country whose policies might draw Japan into an unwanted war,<sup>1</sup> ultimately constituted a fight over the kind of country Japan was going to be. Kishi wanted to restore Japan to what he and others considered an honorable place in the community of nations, yet he realized early after his release from Sugamo Prison that normalizing Japan's military would be complicated by the fact that the Japanese people had come to equate rearming with a return to the militarism of the war years.

Nevertheless, the revisionist PM felt Japan's post-Occupation "subordinate independence," had been brought on in part by the 1952 Security Treaty, and that this less-than-complete sovereignty was embodied by the American forces still present on Japanese soil, who could be used "regardless of [the] intention of Japan and, in certain cases for purposes irrelevant to [the] direct defense of Japan."<sup>2</sup> The prime minister thus made it one of his top priorities to renegotiate a security treaty with the United States. The United States however, convinced that Japan was not serious about building up its own armaments, deflected Kishi's efforts, to focus on trade issues instead.<sup>3</sup>

Domestically, during his three and one-half years in office, Kishi faced the fractiousness of his own party, as well as an increasingly active public that more and more associated the prime minister with the militarism of the wartime governments.<sup>4</sup> Regarding the former, Kishi had come into office promising to rid the LDP of factions, but governed by pitting one faction against another.<sup>5</sup> The left, with its vision of unarmed neutrality, was fractious as well, though relatively more united in their goals than Kishi and other pro-armament revisionists.

For these and other reasons Kishi's vision, of a Japan with its own strong army and no foreign troops stationed on its soil, was at a disadvantage

relative to alternative visions. The dynamics of LDP cantankerousness, qualified Socialist Party unity, and increasing public activism mobilized to oppose Kishi's policies were evident in the struggle over and defeat of a police reform bill presented by Kishi to the Diet in the fall of 1958. The bill had originated in reaction to what Kishi considered "violent incidents—the recent struggles over teacher certification and in opposition to moral education,"<sup>6</sup> and had been submitted at about the same time as the United States had agreed, finally, to negotiate a new security treaty with the Kishi administration.<sup>7</sup> The police bill "would have enlarged the powers of the police in preventive action, including interrogation, search and arrest."<sup>8</sup> In opposition to the police bill, the Socialist Party previewed some of the tactics it would use during the *Anpo* struggles, when they proceeded to "barricade committee rooms to prevent deliberations," and boycott Diet sessions. At the same time members of the LDP, also presaging the later *Anpo* struggle, publicly voiced their own opposition to Kishi's actions. Finally labor also got into the act, calling for a strike to protest the bill.<sup>9</sup>

The following year these same forces came together in a concerted effort to oppose a new security treaty. They were led by what was called the People's Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty, a body, inspired by a similar group that had formed in order to thwart the passage of the police bill. In this new movement Socialist Party members were joined by more radical—and violent—groups like the Zengakuren, a radical student group which had broken away from the Communist Party as it "embraced Leon Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution and favored staging a violent revolution,"<sup>10</sup> and the leftist labor organization Sōyō. Intellectuals as well joined the movement, the best known of whom was probably Maruyama Masao. These *interi* (intellectuals) in turn connected the more radical elements of the anti-*Anpo* forces to Japan's middle class.<sup>11</sup>

Soon after the formation of the People's Council the opposition movement was heartened when a Tokyo District Court ruled the existing security treaty unconstitutional, though the Supreme Court quickly overturned this verdict in what is known as the Sunakawa Case.<sup>12</sup> Kishi pressed on and managed to sign a revised treaty with President Eisenhower in January 1960. Kishi next wanted to have the Diet ratify the treaty in time for a planned visit to Japan by President Eisenhower in June, but domestic opposition increased. The Diet debate was intensely and minutely followed in the press; protests enlarged and became more violent, as Kishi was increasingly associated in the public's mind with the militarism of wartime. Violence flared up elsewhere, as well, in the strike at the Miike coal mine, where eventually one person died.<sup>13</sup>

Kishi pushed forward, hoping to have the new treaty ratified by the time President Eisenhower was scheduled to visit on June 19. The Gary Powers U-2 downing in May reminded the Japanese of a U-2 crash in their own

country, and that U-2s continued to fly from U.S. bases in Japan, stirring up further feelings of resentment about subordination to the United States and stoking fears among the public of Japan being drawn into U.S. conflicts.<sup>14</sup> Thwarted at every turn Kishi was faced on May 19 with the necessity of both extending the Diet session and ratifying the treaty. Obstructionist tactics by the opposition included a sit-in and a barricade of the LDP Speaker's office, "to prevent him from taking the rostrum."<sup>15</sup> There was much wrestling and shoving, and eventually a walk out of the Diet by the opposition party members not involved in the sit-in. The Speaker called in the police, and the remaining Socialist Party members were carried out of the Diet chamber one by one. With only the LDP members present, the vote was taken to extend the session just before midnight. Just after midnight, on May 20, the LDP members of the Lower House of the Diet, still with no opposition members present, voted to ratify the Mutual Security Treaty. By the rules of the Diet, without any action from the Upper House, the ratification would stand 30 days later on June 19, 1960.

The tactics Kishi had used to ratify the Mutual Security Treaty, though in accordance with Diet rules, were almost universally condemned in the Japanese press as undemocratic. There followed strikes, demonstrations that continued to increase in violence, and the besieging and damaging of Eisenhower's press secretary's car as the press secretary was on an advance trip to Tokyo. The tragic culmination of the *Anpo* Riots occurred with the death of Kamba Michiko, a 22-year-old student, during a storming of the Diet. President Eisenhower's visit was cancelled. On June 19 the treaty was automatically approved.<sup>16</sup>

Kishi resigned. He was followed by two Yoshida protégés, Ikeda Hayato and Satō Eisaku, the latter of whom was Kishi's younger brother. Ikeda's "income-doubling plan" is widely regarded as the key to Japan's turn, after the violence of the *Anpo* struggles, toward embracing a national identity defined—and delimited—by economic success. It was as if the rallying cry from the Meiji era, *Fukoku Kyōhei*, Rich Country, Strong Army, had simply become Rich Country, or perhaps Rich Country, No Army. This left many issues regarding Japan's existing army unresolved, but it also allowed the Japan Defense Agency and the members of the army, the GSDF's *taiin*, some space to define themselves. This they did by stressing training and hard work, and by focusing on internally directed ethical standards.

## THE SWORD IS FORMED: SHEATHE THE BLADE

From its establishment, at the order of General MacArthur, de facto shogun of Japan, through the turbulent 1950s, the only constant for Japan's new

army was change. IJA veteran Hiruma Hiroshi did not notice much difference as the NPR became the National Safety Force in 1952 and the Ground Self-Defense Force in 1954, except that that the designation of his unit, “for whatever reason, randomly changed,” from the 510 Facilities Battalion (which would have been called an Engineer Battalion in either the IJA or other present-day armies), initially, to 530, and then, after splitting in two, to the 101 and 107 Facilities Battalions.<sup>17</sup> For Kashiwagi Yasutake, the optimistic member of the “Shōwa Year 25 Troops,” the transition was a hopeful one, because it seemed to presage constitutional revision, which would in turn entail the GSDF transforming into a national army. As he explains, after the Defense Agency and SDF laws were passed, “it came to be said . . . in about one or two years. . . [the existing SDF] would formally become the new national armed forces.”<sup>18</sup>

Though proved wrong this conventional wisdom among Kashiwagi and his colleagues demonstrates the aspirations of those serving in Japan’s new army to be accepted as soldiers of a national army. For other *tainin* less lofty concerns marked the change. What was most notable for Yamasaki Takahara—at nineteen the youngest of the memoirists when he entered the force—would have been, he explains, “unthinkable in the former armed forces . . . the fact that one became able to hear the bright voices of women within the [previously] all-male units.”<sup>19</sup> After the consistent change and novelty of the 1950s, in the 1960s the GSDF settled into its bedrock professional identity, though that is not to say it did so putting aside all ambiguity. Japan’s postwar army still has not managed that.

The soon-to-be National Safety Force had struggled through a difficult summer in 1952, as many of its *tainin* took the generous 60,000 yen departure bonus and returned to civilian life—so many that training in the young force almost came to a standstill.<sup>20</sup> By August 31, 1960, however, after the first Buildup Plan, from 1958–1960, the GSDF was a much larger, and smoothly running body, organized along the lines which would characterize it for the next 35 years, with a Ground Staff Office at the top, five regional Armies (equivalent to a U.S. Army corps, an organization usually with two or more divisions; the organization is called *Hōmentai* in Japanese), 19 independently reporting units, 14 schools, and five supply depots beneath. The five Armies, the Northern, Northeastern, Eastern, Middle and Western, were comprised from the GSDF’s six infantry divisions and four composite brigades. The composite brigades were subsumed as the GSDF grew to thirteen infantry divisions during the 2nd Buildup Plan, from 1962–1966, and one composite brigade was added back in during the 4th Buildup Plan, 1972–1976.<sup>21</sup> The GSDF’s authorized strength in 1960 was 180,000,<sup>22</sup> but the actual fill was only a little over 147,000.<sup>23</sup> The reasons for the low rate of fill are somewhat unclear.

Though authorized 180,000 in 1960, the recruiting quota was 170,000, and this quota did not reach 180,000 until 1973.<sup>24</sup> The officers and non-commissioned officers were maintained at nearly 100 percent strength, but the enlisted force at around 70 percent, for a total fill of around 86 percent. Recruiting numbers have been down at times of brisk economic growth, but there has regularly been a two-to-one or greater ratio of recruits to vacancies.<sup>25</sup> Though the Chief of Staff of the GSDF, General Kinugasa Hayao, wrote in 1970 that the number of vacancies in the GSDF was the force's biggest problem, and though, in the same year, this was echoed by the Defense Agency's Administrative Vice Minister (the highest ranking career bureaucrat in the agency),<sup>26</sup> it seems clear part of the issue was due not to a lack of applicants, but to the GSDF enforcing recruiting standards. Had the organization admitted more of those who applied, the number of vacancies would have shrunk dramatically. The lower fill numbers may also reflect budgetary pressures, both from the Ministry of Finance to keep defense spending down, and internal to the Defense Agency, prioritizing money spent on equipment vice personnel.<sup>27</sup>

Most headquarters and school units were maintained at near full-strength. The thirteen infantry divisions came in two varieties: Type A divisions, 9000 men, with a headquarters, "four infantry regiments of approximately 1,200 men each, one artillery regiment, a tank battalion, and divisional support units,"<sup>28</sup> and Type-B divisions, 7000 men, with three infantry regiments, and otherwise organized similarly to the Type A, though with "correspondingly smaller combat support and combat service support units."<sup>29</sup> Training in the force had become fairly standardized, with most training days beginning at 6:00 am and ending at 5:00 pm, and standardized breaks for meals. Due to the lack of training areas in Japan, most training was and is individual and small-unit, focused "at the regimental level and below,"<sup>30</sup> though "large-scale maneuvers with the participation of airborne units and others" have been conducted annually at the Fuji Training Center beginning in 1955.<sup>31</sup>

By 1960 the GSDF had grown to more than twice the size of the original National Police Reserve, was equipped with modern equipment like tanks, helicopters and howitzers, and had shed the pretense of being a police force, embracing a mission of defending the nation under the Self-Defense Force Law in 1954. This mission was reinforced in 1957, under the National Defense Policy, and made more specific to include repelling an invasion. The GSDF looked like, and had some of the roles and missions of, a traditional army. But the GSDF was not a traditional army. The organization itself was not called an army, nor were its members called soldiers.

Yet, the GSDF's mission to protect the people of Japan remained. Japan as a whole had debated and would continue to debate its military legacy since the end of the Fifteen-Year War, and especially since the end of the Occupation, but the convulsions of the *Anpo* Riots, as well as the offer of

an alternative vision for Japan's national identity in Prime Minister Ikeda's income-doubling plan, seems to have marked a tipping point; wholesale debate over defense was potentially dangerous and the alternative of Japan as an economic powerhouse offered the Japanese people a chance to find an honored position in international society not as a traditional Great Power, which would include a powerful military, but as a Civilian Power. What need does a Civilian Power have for an army? What need of soldiers? The civilians of the Japan Defense Agency and the soldiers of the GSDF were largely left to themselves to find the answers.

### FORMING IDENTITY BY POLISHING THE SPIRIT

All armies try to instill a strong identity among their constituent soldiers. Armies are created for combat; for sending men (primarily, but increasingly women as well) into situations where they may be killed, and where they will be expected to kill others. To take on these daunting tasks successfully soldiers must not only master technical and tactical requirements, but crucially must strongly identify with one another.<sup>32</sup> It is no wonder, then, that the Japanese and Americans tasked with creating a new army for Japan in 1950, embraced as one of their first concerns creating a group identity for that new army.

Identity in an army is created in several ways, obvious and not so obvious. Uniforms, training, what the U.S. Army calls tactics techniques and procedures—that is, the ways to get combat tasks done—are all ideally designed, first of all, to make units effective in fighting (though, since armies are human organizations non-ideal factors unrelated to fighting often exert great influence—with regard to uniforms and equipment, for instance, faddishness can play a large role).<sup>33</sup> Creating a group mindset and fostering good morale, that is, creating a positive identity becomes an important corollary for unit effectiveness.

In the case of Japan's new army in 1950, complicating factors included: the recent defeat of the IJA; the blame the IJA, perhaps in particular, had come to bear not only for the defeat, but for the suffering of the Japanese people; an organizational disruption—no army for five years; the negative connotations of anything connected with war; the fact that the NPR as a national army was not only trained, clothed and equipped by an occupying power, but, initially, commanded by that power's army as well; and the constitutional and legal restraints the GSDF operated under. Nor did the Japanese have adequate time to plan for their new army; recall that the Americans sent raw recruits to what they thought might be a potential combat zone in Hokkaido immediately after those recruits were inducted, and only two months after MacArthur had directed the formation of the NPR.

The American trainers as well had complicating considerations, including building an army constituted by citizens of a recently defeated enemy nation whose language and culture was very different from their own, but the Americans perhaps focused on two additional concerns above others: a desire to foster a professional identity for an army that would serve a democratic society, and a desire to do so discreetly. In order to accomplish the latter objective, careful use of language was the main tool. For the former objective Kowalski and the other trainers focused on legal and structural requirements for civilian control, as well as on oaths of service. The Japanese themselves, while embracing these requirements, also emphasized spirit.

Though Japan's new army was created while Japan was occupied, that is not to say the Japanese slavishly recreated an army in the American image. As an example, regarding what is perhaps to many the *sine qua non* of armies, uniforms: while the NPR adopted the American-style fatigue uniform as their work uniform, the legs of which had to be shortened; and were issued U.S. Marine Corps combat boots, which had to be "reconstructed" to fit Japanese feet;<sup>34</sup> the nascent army did not blindly select all American army uniforms. For the dress shirt of their new official ensemble, for instance, they selected an Australian model.<sup>35</sup>

One goal was to select uniforms that were workable, but would boost morale, and in this the new army was successful. If, however, a secondary goal was to differentiate itself from the American army, the results were a little more questionable. In a questionnaire that was given to three enlisted men, all of whom may have had some experience in the Imperial Japanese Army, one of the questions asked the men was about their new uniform. All three were approving. The uniform was described as, "stylish and democratic," by one, "sharp," by a second, and "compared with that in the old Army . . . much better in style," by a third soldier, though this third soldier also noted, "It seems that the NPR uniform has unfavorable impression (sic) upon the civilian from its resemblance to the US Army uniform."<sup>36</sup>

But uniforms are not the only important symbols for armies. The enlisted men in this small survey were also apparently asked about inspirational, or possibly warlike sayings (the questions are not included in the documents with the answers), and the three agreed the NPR did not have "such fierce warlike" rallying cries, but two of the three praised the NPR song as inspirational. Regarding the song, right from the start Japan's new soldiers had wanted to sing something as they marched from one training event to another, so had been singing a National Rural Police song, but Masuhara wanted the NPR to have its own song.<sup>37</sup> In the selection of the NPR song, the Japanese again exercised autonomy, holding a contest to select the inspirational song.<sup>38</sup> But once again, if one of the goals had been to differentiate themselves, this time from the IJA, the effort was not entirely successful, at least in the hearts

of some of the troops. Though not an IJA veteran Shōwa Year 25 Troop Kashiwagi writes, "I can still remember the words, but make no mistake . . . [the recruits sang the NPR song because the wartime songs they all knew like] "*Kitashima Kessen no Uta* [The Decisive Battle of Kitashima Song] . . . would not have been allowed."<sup>39</sup>

Three officers, also apparently all IJA veterans, were interviewed and asked about important symbols. Questioned about the officer's sword as a symbol in the IJA, two of the veterans noted the NPR had "nothing at present . . . which takes the place of the officer's sword in the old Army." One of the veterans thought the NPR should study providing a replacement, while another thought the NPR should focus on the Japanese national flag as an inspiring symbol. The third veteran was silent on the matter.<sup>40</sup>

While working to boost a sense of identity internal to the NPR, Hayashi, Masuhara and others, were keen to distance Japan's new Army from the IJA. In some areas this went too far, ultimately impacting on the recreated army's ability to carry out the full extent of its missions; this is true of the designation of the new soldiers not as soldiers, or *gunjin*, but as "special category" civil servants, for instance, and of the failure to enact a military justice code. These acts of commission and omission break with the international norms that have developed for national armies and soldiers over the last few centuries, and could potentially create difficulties for *jieikan* in combat or even peacekeeping conditions.<sup>41</sup>

Another issue was discipline; those forming the new army were determined to separate themselves from the well-known and well-deserved reputation of the IJA for harsh, even sadistic discipline. Though criticized by some veterans, at first, Hayashi was insistent, "Taking the problem of discipline . . . which I believe forms the backbone of group life, the NPR has no intention to enforce it as it was in the old days. Compulsion is the last policy the NPR is willing to take . . . this policy of respecting individual freedom has been successful."<sup>42</sup> All three veteran enlisted soldiers in the above-mentioned survey noted discipline in the NPR as much less harsh than that in the IJA, but still effective. Two of the three men in the survey spoke of morning and evening roll call as "one of the terrible things in the old Army," a time of group punishment in the name of "joint responsibility" for the smallest infraction; a time when "we were in mortal fear." By contrast, one maintains, "in the NPR we are not afraid . . . at all," while another praises "being free from violence."<sup>43</sup>

The Americans, too, were focused on separating Japan's new army from its imperial antecedent. As evidenced by the SCAP policies enacted Kowalski and CASA probably agreed with what Samuel Huntington later asserts in his seminal *The Soldier and the State*, that the Japanese Imperial Army had represented the worst of "political militarism;"<sup>44</sup> they may have likewise

concluded, as Huntington does, this was largely due to the survival of feudalism and bushido into the modern era.<sup>45</sup> The Americans tried to correct what they and certainly many Japanese citizens perceived as deficiencies in several ways.

First, the cabinet order forming the NPR, and the subsequently written NPR regulations, direct "the National Police Reserve shall perform its duties by order of the Prime Minister," specifying the prime minister, constitutionally required to be a civilian, as the force's commander in chief. The regulations also specified that NPR members were required to obey legal commands<sup>46</sup> (a point disparaged by the Hattori Group, wanting no qualification on directives from superiors, who demanded, "Whoever heard of an Army which allows its personnel to question a command?").<sup>47</sup>

Kowalski and the other members of CASA also stressed civilian control in their talks with Masuhara, Hayashi and other NPR officials. In some ways this effort may have been too successful. What has evolved for the SDF's civilian control is not what is practiced in the United States as civilian control. In both countries policy is formulated and ultimately orders are given by elected civilian officials, but in the United States military personnel also help to formulate policy and actively advise civilian policy makers, to the extent that, "At the most senior policymaking levels, the civil-military distinction is blurry and only awkwardly fits the neat categories of classical civil-military relations theory."<sup>48</sup>

In Japan, by contrast, a series of *hadome*, or brakes were put into place which constrained the SDF even further than the already restrictive legal and constitutional limitations, to a certain extent alleviating the need for Japanese political leaders to give much short- to medium-term guidance and leaving the SDF on a kind of "auto-pilot," as one scholar puts it.<sup>49</sup> At the same time, rather than allowing SDF members to actively engage with and advise political leaders, the Japanese government exercises its civilian control through "surrogates acting on behalf of politicians,"<sup>50</sup> that is, the bureaucrats in the Japan Defense Agency (after 2007, the Ministry of Defense). By agency directive, "General staff officers of the JSC [Joint Staff Council] and the three service staff offices were . . . prohibited from making direct contacts with the Diet members and officials of other government agencies without the presence of a civilian JDA official."<sup>51</sup> This insulated or "nested"<sup>52</sup> civilian control became so much a part of the SDF's identity that, in the 1990s, when the Chief of Staff of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, Fukuchi Takeo, and Chairman of the Joint Staff Council (Japan's equivalent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Nishimoto Tetsuya, "both of whom were retiring," were invited into Prime Minister's Hashimoto's private office, for a drink with the PM, Fukuchi became emotional, exclaiming how happy he was that after

30 years of service, “for the first time ever, I have been allowed into the PM’s office without any administrators in attendance. I would never have imagined that I would find myself in the prime minister’s office drinking with the prime minister himself!”<sup>53</sup>

Another way the Americans sought to infuse professionalism into Japan’s nascent army was through oaths of service. To enter the NPR all members were required to recite the following in front of a designated authority:

I esteem it a great honor to have been appointed to the personnel of the National Police Reserve, which maintains the peace and order of our country and guarantees the public welfare. I solemnly swear the following:

1. I will faithfully protect and defend the Constitution and laws of Japan, and I will abide by orders.
2. I will observe fidelity, revere sincerity, and with courage perform my duties.
3. I will obey faithfully the commands of superior officials who are performing their duties.
4. I will not join any public body or organization whose principles require me to follow the same as a priority over my duty.<sup>54</sup>

The Safety Agency and Defense Agency in turn crafted similar oaths, though dropping the less direct language of number four above, having inductees declare they would perform their duties “without regard to politics,” after 1952 and, yet more explicitly, having the new soldiers proclaim they would “not participate in political activities,” after 1954.<sup>55</sup>

Bushido was closely associated with feudalism in the American mind, as indicated for example by the Frank Capra film *Know Your Enemy: Japan*. Judging from the answers, CASA apparently asked the three officers in the above-mentioned survey about whether or not bushido was appropriate for training NPR officers. All three maintained bushido was appropriate, Superintendent 3rd Class (equivalent to a major) Otsu Hikaru describing the code as “not such an evil thing,” being neither, “jingoistic or aggressive.”<sup>56</sup> Superintendent 2nd Class (equivalent to a lieutenant colonel) Hatano Nobutoshi, an aide in the General Group Headquarters, gave the most extensive answer about bushido. Hatano who explains bushido had been interpreted in many different ways “throughout [the] ages,” gives a brief historical background, noting the “Great difference” between bushido as interpreted during the Meiji and Taisho eras as opposed to during the period after the Manchuria Incident in 1931 when “fascism was gaining influence in military circles.” Hatano then says, in a description that may have surprised the American CASA advisors, bushido is found in enforcing “the following virtues” (the translation evidently was not done by a native speaker of English, nor have I corrected it):

1. The believer in bushido used to be faithful to his feudal lord in old days, but recently he fights against his enemy at the sacrifice of his life for his country, for welfare of all his people or for justice and humanity.
2. He is the bravest man to carry out what he wants.
3. He is at all times contented with honest poverty, never yield to avarice.
4. He will at all times respect courtesy and observe fidelity.
5. He will never act the coward.
6. He will love his enemy. (In case his enemy loses fighting strength, he will help him.)

Hatano finishes his discussion of bushido explaining "If 'bushido' had . . . permeated . . . the old Army, they would never have been criticized by all the countries of the world."<sup>57</sup> Superintendent 2nd Class Kozuma Masayasu had the least to say on the subject, but he agreed bushido could be used to train NPR officers, adding bushido alone should not be the guide, rather "we must further set up 'NPR spirit' by which officers should be trained."<sup>58</sup> Kozuma's concern for spirit was shared by many Japanese and Americans leaders.

In his first speech to the Diet after the announcement of surrender Prime Minister Higashikuni said, "Many things will come of this defeat. All of us on the front lines and the home front, the military, the civil servants and the people, must especially now repent and reflect on the past so that it may serve as a precept for the future. We must renew our spirit."<sup>59</sup> Nanbara Shigeru, peace activist, spoke of Japan's "spiritual confusion,"<sup>60</sup> and Yasui Kaoru, anti-atomic bomb activist, spoke of a "spiritual revolution."<sup>61</sup> Yet there was some unease as well with calls for spiritual renewal, given the intimate connection talk of spirit had with Japan's recent attempts at securing empire. John Dower, for instance, points out in the postwar "decadence movement," there was an explicit rejection of the spiritual for the carnal, because, as Tamura Taijiro, author and exemplar of the movement explained, for too long the Japanese people had been "deformed by a long tradition of so-called spiritual ideas."<sup>62</sup>

Yet spirit, defined as "the vital animating force within living beings; the part of a human being associated with mind, will, and feelings; and the essential nature of the person,"<sup>63</sup> must be dealt with when inducting soldiers into and building an effective army. In a profession that may require combat or other situations in extremis, such things as psychological preparedness, coolness under extreme stress and morale take on exceptional importance. Another essential consideration under the heading of military spirit is ethics, as military historian Richard Gabriel explains, "Military ethics form the core values for a profession engaged in a very special task that sometimes requires the sacrifice of human life as well as the deliberate killing of other human beings."<sup>64</sup>

The Japanese faced an issue that was simultaneously being faced by the West German government, as they began to discuss reestablishing an army after World War II: in forming an army for a democratic nation-state, with a soldierly tradition of blind obedience to orders and strict, inhumane discipline, how does the government foster an effective, regulated army composed of citizen soldiers? Both countries came to the same conclusion: such soldiers, who will act as an arm of a democratic state, managing violence and sacrificing their own lives if necessary for the sake of that state, must not themselves become a danger to the state, and must represent the values of the state. Such soldiers must be led by their hearts or their spirits; they must be inner directed. The Germans coined a new term for this called *Innere Führung*, which can be translated as “inner leadership.”<sup>65</sup> The Japanese were able to use a term already considered “a key element in all education, all training, and ideally all work in Japan,”<sup>66</sup> and thus widely used in areas as diverse as business and the martial arts: *kokorogamae*, which can be interpreted as “inner attitude” (literally pairing heart, *kokoro*, with attitude or posture, *kamae*, this can be translated as “mental attitude,” “moral attitude” or “ethics” as well).

As Kato Yozo explains in his memoir, Masuhara and Hayashi, working with their subordinate officials, from the beginning wanted to break with the tradition of the Imperial Japanese Army, which used its imperial mandate and harsh discipline to demand immediate and unconditional obedience to orders. As opposed to the top-down approach, he explains, these Japanese leaders wanted to foster a bottom-up ethic of self-cultivation, using less harsh education and training.<sup>67</sup>

One of the first efforts in this direction was directed toward officer training, in the establishing of the *Bōei Daigakkō*, or Defense Academy, commonly referred to as *Bōdai*. *Bōdai* was founded in 1952 as the National Safety Academy, and became the National Defense Academy two years later when the SDF was formed. Yoshida was very involved in the founding—he wanted to produce “A professional soldier who not only protects his own country and people but also protects [the] freedom of the people in the world,” one who would have “a sense of citizenship,” as well as “a love for humanity.”<sup>68</sup> In the words of the original plan for the academy, the goal was to “Bring up harmonious, democratic officers whose character is such that they possess the ability to command, but at the same time possess an obedient spirit (*fukujū seishin*).”<sup>69</sup> The academy is joint; officers for all three services matriculate there (in hopes that a common experience as undergraduates will prevent the dysfunctional relationship the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy had displayed with their officers having graduated from two separate academies). The focus of academics was, for the first 20 years, engineering (perhaps because of a similar focus at West Point and Annapolis, used as models) and basic science, and the only majors offered were in these subjects.

In 1973 the types of possible majors were expanded to include subjects in the Humanities.<sup>70</sup>

In contrast to efforts in education, codification of the *Kokorogamae* took more than 10 years after the founding of the new force. The reasons for the delay are unclear. Masuhara had indicated an interest in the new army's spirit at least from November of 1950, when, while visiting Hokkaido, he said "At present, the Police Reserve has no fundamental standard to serve as a spiritual guide. However we are now contemplating a plan to formulate such a guide."<sup>71</sup> Hayashi, too, had urged an inner guide for the *tainin* from the first. In speech after speech Hayashi told the new troops that, as a first principle, *jieikan* must be guided by patriotism (*aikokushin*) and love of the Japanese people (*minzokuai*, or sometimes *aiminzokushin*). By love of the people he explained he meant the same love the troops felt for their families. He repeatedly used the phrase that all Japan's new soldiers must "be of one *kokorogamae*" to meet the obligations of their mission.<sup>72</sup>

Possible explanations for the delay seem diametrically opposed. There may have been no sentiment to codify *kokorogamae* because it is culturally taken for granted; *kokorogamae*, in the sense of possessing the right attitude or being properly prepared is a key consideration for most undertakings in Japan. Conversely, the code of ethics may not have been written down because of the negative connotation that had come to be associated by with all *seishin* (spirit) related education, training or even admonitions. There had been objections when Prime Minister Yoshida asked his education Minister Amano Teiyu to prepare "moral guidelines for the reference of the Japanese people,"<sup>73</sup> for instance, and there were protests over PM Kishi's attempts to add "spiritual education"<sup>74</sup> to educational reforms. Whether it was that *kokorogamae* was too taken for granted to codify, or an explicitly defined code of ethics was too sensitive politically to put into writing at first is unclear, but what does seem clear, at least from Kato's memoir, is the incident or incidents that spurred the codification of the *Jieikan no Kokorogamae*, or Ethos of the Self-Defense Force Member.

The formal service pledges mentioned above, and establishing *Bōdai* and other educational and training initiatives had been a first attempt at beginning to produce a more democratic and humanistic attitude in Japan's new soldiers, and, as Kato explains, approaches to achieve this consensus goal were successful for the most part. Still, the former personnel director explains, there were some recruits who did not internalize the sense of mission and duty the leaders of Japan's new army were trying to impart. From September 1950 to October 1952 there were 5,146 disciplinary incidents. But, Kato adds, with the passing of the Safety Agency Law in 1952, the duties of, and the penalties for failing to fulfill those duties by Safety Force members were made more explicit, while, with the passing of the Self-Defense Force Law in 1954, these

more explicit duties and expectations were tied overtly to the way *tain* were to “protect the peace and independence” of Japan.<sup>75</sup>

Though this new approach to training as well as the new standards of conduct, were welcomed by most of the soldiers in Japan’s new army, issues still surfaced. In February, 1957, during a night-time maneuvers exercise, a GSDF unit commander took his unit on an 80-kilometer march, beating with fresh bamboo canes anyone who lagged. Two soldiers died. Shocked, Kato was reminded of a time right after the defeat when, repeatedly, he saw veterans returning to their hometowns, and going out to those towns’ sports areas to cry out their resentment against their officers. He thought at the time, on the battlefield the soldiers must have only pretended to respect and obey their officers. He further thought no army with that kind of dynamic could be effective, and he was convinced more than ever that GSDF officers must be educated in such a way as to prevent this kind of thing from recurring. He remembers being mindful at this point of seeing what he called a “*kokorogamae* for officers” in the hands of American army officers. Called “Army Ceremonies and Regulations,” Kato recalled the guide as a “well written” guide which addressed, “for example,” under the topic heading of “Indicators of Command Climate,” subtopics like “Understanding Subordinates,” “Surveying Subordinates,” and “Empathy for Subordinates.”<sup>76</sup>

In June 1961, due to the “great effort” of Defense Agency Education Department Chief Ohata, the *Jieikan no Kokorogamae* was issued. More than 10 years after its founding, yet incorporating the ensuing experience, Kato writes, the GSDF “finally produced a formal document establishing a spiritual basis” for its existence, mission and duties. Unlike his idea, this codified ethos was not just for officers, but for all members of the service. The *Kokorogamae* focuses on “five virtues: Awareness of Mission; Individual Development; Fulfillment of Responsibility; Strict Observance of Discipline; and Strengthening of Solidarity.” The ethos is included in the “Self Defence Force pocketbook,” and familiarity with the ethos is often checked during inspections.<sup>77</sup> The GSDF has defined itself in this ethos, which declares, “Whether in peacetime or in the event of an emergency, Self Defence Forces personnel must, at all times, be prepared to identify themselves with the people and take pride in serving the public without regard to themselves.”<sup>78</sup>

With the continuation of the all-volunteer system of special-category civil servants; the introduction of women into the force, in August 1952<sup>79</sup> (then-young memoirist Yamasaki’s most memorable facet); the adoption of the *Kokorogamae*; the important refusal to use the GSDF to put down the rioters during the *Anpo* Riots (some politicians had urged then-Japan Defense Agency Director General Akagi Munemori to call out the GSDF to quiet the rioters, but Akagi demurred, saying such an action might turn the people against the GSDF)<sup>80</sup>; and the completion of the third defense buildup plan in 1966, the

identity of the GSDF had been consolidated as a relatively small, moderately equipped defensive, territorial army, whose "spiritual heart" consisted of a "proper sense of patriotism and identification with their own people."<sup>81</sup>

Moreover, this proper sense of patriotism had made the GSDF a repository for virtues that many in the business world and the wider culture still valued. It became common for the GSDF to host groups of salarymen and others for periods of training in order for those salarymen to experience the traditional values the soldiers represented.<sup>82</sup> Yet despite these developments, by the 1960s the GSDF was as much defined by the limitations placed upon them, not only constitutionally, legally and by government policy, but socially, as by the virtues described above. In the society they were sworn to protect, the *jieikan* found themselves the victims of a certain lack of prestige, found their legitimacy challenged, and found they carried the weight of their hybrid heritage.

In a survey conducted in 1958, measuring occupational ranking in terms of prestige, income and importance of the occupational function to society, as well as the desirability of the occupation as a job out of high school, high school students ranked "In prestige 'soldier' . . . 19 of 23 . . . In . . . income . . . 12 of 23." Significantly, given the impact on the GSDF's sense of their place in Japanese society, "in ranking based on functional necessity of the occupations, 'soldier was at the bottom of the list, being rated as 'of no importance at all.'" Finally, none of the 536 high school students wanted to join the military after graduating.<sup>83</sup>

In academic circles, where what has been called Japan's military allergy had been gaining strength since the defeat, SDF officers were sometimes refused admission to programs or attendance at talks or seminars. In terms of legitimacy, the Japan Socialist Party, consistently making up about a third of the Diet, refused to recognize the SDF's constitutionality. During the timeframe in question, the Socialists and others had taken this question to the Supreme Court where in 1952, the Supreme Court had refused to rule on the question, as it had been introduced without connection to a specific incident;<sup>84</sup> while in 1976 Japan's highest court declared that it could not rule on the question of SDF constitutionality, because it was "a political matter, involving legislative judgment."<sup>85</sup> Hardly a ringing endorsement in either case. On the right, as well, the GSDF had been and was being attacked for being too associated with the American army, and for not being a real army itself.

The issue of hybridity with the American army had dogged the GSDF from the first. The NPR was accused of being a "mercenary" army of the Americans in the press,<sup>86</sup> for instance, and the first Deputy Director General, Eguchi, had to deny in response to questions from Diet members rumors that new NPR recruits were taking an oath of service when joining while placing a hand on the Bible, as mentioned previously.<sup>87</sup> On another occasion Eguchi,

echoing similar protestations from Ohashi, denied General MacArthur had the right to order the NPR to Korea.<sup>88</sup> Masuhara's and Hayashi anguished over the soldiers of Japan's new army being commanded by American army officers. Of those who charged the GSDF was not a real army, one of the most celebrated was Mishima Yukio. Ironically, Mishima's famous suicide, or rather the rejection by the GSDF members of Mishima's call for the GSDF to conduct a coup to restore Japan's pride, served to confirm the GSDF's identity as the new army of a democratic Japan. The GSDF, "founded on the healthy spirit of the nation itself,"<sup>89</sup> had pledged to serve the civilian government. A coup was unthinkable.

### LAST REVISIONIST STANDING

The defense debate had been given its basic form by the imperatives of the Cold War and the Korean War, and was further shaped by the Yoshida Doctrine, which dictated incremental expansion of Japan's defense capabilities—usually in response to U.S. pressure—while focusing national energy on economic development. After the convulsions of the *Anpo* Riots Prime Minister Ikeda's vision of income doubling had further focused both policymakers and the Japanese public on Japan as an economic power, as a civilian power.

At the same time as Mishima was making his final plea to GSDF troops in Ichigaya (see chapter nine), Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, was making a speech in which he declared Japan would never again become a military power. During the 1960s, both Japan and the United States wanted, "to avoid another major political crisis,"<sup>90</sup> thus, though the United States still pressed Japan to meet commitments it had made to strengthen its defense forces, it did not do so stridently. As the decade neared its end the alliance was focused on a return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, Vietnam, and, increasingly, trade disputes.

The proximate cause for a renewal of defense debate in Japan then became the Nixon Guam Doctrine, that Asian nations should do more on their own to defend themselves; the American drawdown in Vietnam, as well as drawdowns elsewhere in the Pacific; and the accession to the Director Generalship of the Japan Defense Agency of one of the last avowed revisionists of the wartime generation, Nakasone Yasuhiro.

Political Scientist Tamamoto Masaru describes Nakasone's motivation, and judges his lack of effect, in this way:

While there has been a small minority of conservative thinkers and actors--notable among political leaders were Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone--who have argued that true national independence cannot be regained until the people become prepared once again to sacrifice their lives for their country, such talk has had only a marginal impact.<sup>91</sup>

Nakasone Yasuhiro had identified himself as a constitutional revisionist early in his career. He first addressed the defense issue as a young Diet member, when he sent a "Representation to General MacArthur," in 1951. The future prime minister wanted to point out that not everyone in Japan was happy with the idea of a permanently disarmed Japan, arguing "public opinion in Japan for or against rearmament . . . are in reality half and half."<sup>92</sup> He further argued the only cure for the malaise he saw gripping Japan was to restore its "complete independence and equal status."<sup>93</sup>

In 1954, nettled both by what he perceived as the inequalities in the peace settlement with the United States and the reality gap in Yoshida's defense policy, Nakasone wrote: "It is my earnest desire that the constitution be rewritten as soon as possible and Japan possess the ability to defend herself . . . The more we strengthen our self defense, the better able we are to force the removal of American troops from Japan. Thus will we restore the independence of our motherland in both name and reality."<sup>94</sup> The following year Nakasone enthusiastically supported Hatoyama's campaign for constitutional amendment, even composing "the Constitution Revision Song," and performing the song on television.<sup>95</sup>

Nakasone was given a chance to put his beliefs into concrete form when he was appointed to the position of Director General of the Defense Agency in 1970. Holding fast to one of his often cited ideals, in an early speech Nakasone appealed for national support for defense, using a Japanese saying to stress that the need for such national support was "even clearer than a flame of fire."<sup>96</sup> Yet in the intervening years since he had first been elected to the Diet he had come to accept the futility of pushing for constitutional amendment for the time being. Replying to a question about constitutional reform after the speech he said, "As for revising the constitution, including Article 9, I think that should be left to the next generation."<sup>97</sup>

As Director General, Nakasone presided over the drafting of the fourth defense build-up plan. Continuing a trend that had begun with the third build-up plan adopted in 1966, Nakasone called for a more "autonomous defense" (*jishu bōei*), and intimated his plan would cost twice as much as the previous one.<sup>98</sup> In order to allay the fears this prompted among opposition members, Nakasone labeled this defense policy, in the first-ever Defense White Paper, published by the Defense Agency in 1970, "exclusively defensive defense" (*senshu bōei*).<sup>99</sup> This kind of rhetorical flourish may have been intended as reassurance but did not alleviate the worries of the opposition. Nor did Nakasone convince either the members of his own LDP or the many bureaucrats who held Japan faced no credible threat; the fourth build-up plan was drastically scaled back before passing the Diet.<sup>100</sup>

Nixon's playing of the China card in 1971, and detente between the United States, and the Soviet Union, had further tamped down security anxieties in

the region, strengthening the hands of those who perceived no real threat. Japan had steadily modernized its forces during the 1960s, and Nakasone's fourth build-up plan would have greatly accelerated this trend but, the factors mentioned, plus the fiscal restraint following the first oil crisis in 1973, favored those in Japan who wanted to limit the defense build-up. The question still remained what level of defensive capability was constitutionally permissible. An answer came in the form of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO—usually known as *Taikō* in Japanese) adopted in 1976.<sup>101</sup>

The *Taikō* attempted to define a "Standard Defense Force," which could repel limited aggression. It assumed continuing detente. The LDP, in its platform, had declared as early as 1960 its policy was to maintain the SDF "to the degree of minimum necessity,"<sup>102</sup> in accordance with the 1957 Basic Defense Policy. Perhaps to further reassure those who were against the expansion of the SDF that the "standard defense force" was not going to depart from this policy the phrase *Jiei no tame no hitsuyō saishō gendō*, or "minimum level necessary for self-defense" was coined, and enshrined in the Defense White Paper as the definition of what level of defense was permissible. The argument went, and remains, that anything exceeding this minimum level was unconstitutional.

### A PEOPLE'S ARMY RESPONSIBLE TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN

On April 28, 1952, the day Japan regained its sovereignty, Colonel Kowalski and other members of CASA were invited to "a small banquet" by Director General Masuhara. Superintendent Hayashi was also present. After some celebratory toasts "the party became very lively and the Japanese and American staffs intermingled quite freely." Kowalski took the opportunity to ask Masuhara if the Director General thought Japan would now modify its constitution. Masuhara answered immediately that the "fundamental concepts of the constitution would remain," though, he asserted, "some changes were necessary," including amending Article 9. Asked if he thought the Japanese people had so thoroughly accepted the article that it would be difficult to revise, Masuhara replied the political parties would have to work hard but the Japanese people would recognize they need an army. Asked what would be done about the status of the Emperor, Masuhara, again, immediately replied the constitution would be amended in such a way that the Prime Minister would be the commander in chief. He explained, "Japan must have a people's army responsible to all the people of Japan." Twenty-four years on Masuhara had been proven wrong and right. The Japanese had not been persuaded to amend Article 9, and though the GSDF had successfully defined for

themselves a role as a people's army, many in Japan's new army did not feel their fellow countrymen had recognized they needed an army.

Through 1976 an imaginative landscape had been constructed from which, though allowing a somewhat more positive image for the navy and for air power, tended to condemn, ignore or proscribe soldiers and the army. But, as Walter Goldschmidt notes, "If a society is to have the advantage of having military personnel, the motivations for warriorhood must be established. It is a matter of great significance that these must be *created* (italics in the original)."<sup>103</sup> Recognizing this the GSDF, despite questions of prestige, legitimacy, legality and utility, created a positive identity for itself, its motivation to protect and represent the Japanese people. It had continued to garner consistently strong support from the Japanese populace, as a small, professional territorial army with growing capabilities, but limited scope of action.

The GSDF remained an army as much defined by its proscriptions as by its responsibilities. At each stage of growing capacity the push-pull dynamic in policymaking circles had insured *hadome* were placed on the *Rikujū*. In 1954, just as the self-defense laws had been passed, the Diet had passed a ban on overseas deployment. Based on the ban, having joined the UN in 1956, Japan refused to send the SDF on UN-requested missions in 1958 and 1961.<sup>104</sup> The backlash of the so-called Three Arrows Incident, in 1965, referring to a plan for possible SDF responses in the case of a renewed Korean War, which the SDF had undertaken on its own initiative, without direction from the civilians in the Japan Defense Agency, painted the SDF as "out of control," for doing what in other countries is mandated, that is planning for possible contingencies, and effectively shut down such planning for over a decade.<sup>105</sup> As well, soon after the NDPO was adopted, PM Miki made into policy what had been de facto principle since the 1960s, that Japan would keep its defense spending under 1 percent of its GDP.

Yet these *hadome*, seen as necessary by Japan's policymakers in part because of the public's military allergy, were also premised on the international security environment remaining static. It did not. The end of détente, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Soviet build up in Northeast Asia, inaugurated what some called the new Cold War, and just as the beginning of the Cold War was the catalyst the birth of the GSDF, its renewal produced a second phase in the GSDF's identity; subsequently the end of the Cold War 10 years later provoked even more dramatic changes for Japan's postwar army. By 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Fifteen-Year War, having deployed overseas, responded to its largest domestic disaster relief to date, and dealt with, for the first and only time so far, a terrorist attack on home soil, the rearmed, recreated army was reimagined once again, having undergone some of its most significant changes since its founding, and entered the third phase of its identity.

## NOTES

1. See previous chapter, and, for instance, Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945–1990*, esp. ch. 4.

2. Kishi in a discussion paper given to Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, 1957, quoted in *ibid.*, 80.

3. *Ibid.*, esp. 84–86.

4. See for instance Igarashi Yoshikuni, “Yokoi Shoichi: When a Soldier Finally Returns Home,” in *The Human Tradition in Modern Japan*, ed. Anne Walthall (Lanham, MD: SR Books, 2004).

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34. Kowalski, *Nihon Saigunbi: Watakushi Wa Nihon O Saibusou Shita*, 164. Kowalski adds in his that there were not initially enough boots for the recruits in the summer of 1950, so many wore geta and "zukkuna mono" (cloth or canvas shoes) with their uniforms. See *ibid.*
35. ———, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963)."
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37. *Ibid.*, Daily Report 31 January 1951, File 5, Box 8.
38. *Ibid.*, Daily Report 9 December 1950, File 4, Box 8.
39. Kashiwagi, *Sengo-Ha Nijuu-Go Nen Hei Yomoyama Monogatari: Keisatsu Yobitai Ikki-Sei No Kaisou*, 45.
40. Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963)," undated document titled "Officers," File 7, Box 9.
41. Regarding the status of the SDF member under international law, what would be that status, for instance, if during a peacekeeping deployment a member is made a POW by a warring party? Can someone who is formally designated a civil servant, special or not, be accorded the protections of the Geneva Convention? Regarding the lack of a military justice system, as an example, there is no penalty for disobeying a lawful order. The Federal Republic of Germany faced many of the same issues, but did legislate a "code of military justice." See Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 170.
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The first step in the process of job design is to identify the tasks and responsibilities of the job. This involves a thorough analysis of the job description and the current job design. The next step is to determine the skills and abilities required for the job. This is done by comparing the job requirements with the skills and abilities of the current job holder. The third step is to identify the resources and constraints of the job. This includes the available equipment, materials, and time. The final step is to design the job to match the job holder's skills and abilities, while also taking into account the resources and constraints.

Job design is a complex process that requires a deep understanding of the job and the job holder. It is a process that is ongoing and iterative, as the job and the job holder's skills and abilities may change over time. The goal of job design is to create a job that is challenging and motivating for the job holder, while also being efficient and effective. This requires a balance between the job's demands and the job holder's capabilities. The process of job design is a key component of human resources management, as it helps to attract and retain top talent in the organization.

There are several factors that can influence the process of job design. These include the organization's culture, the available resources, and the job holder's preferences. The organization's culture can influence the level of autonomy and responsibility that is granted to the job holder. The available resources can influence the level of complexity and challenge of the job. The job holder's preferences can influence the level of motivation and engagement in the job.

Job design is a process that is essential for the success of any organization. It is a process that helps to create a work environment that is supportive and motivating for the job holder. This, in turn, leads to higher levels of productivity and performance for the organization.

The process of job design is a key component of human resources management, and it is a process that is ongoing and iterative. It is a process that requires a deep understanding of the job and the job holder, and it is a process that is essential for the success of any organization.

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## *Chapter 7*

# **A Sword in the Storm, a Life-Giving Sword**

## *Policy and Ground Truth, 1978–1995*

Despite Nakasone's efforts the structures put in place and habits formed since the defeat militated against a more autonomous Japanese defense capability, and funneled efforts toward a policy emphasis on limitations; a focus on what Japan could not do, rather than on what Japan could or should do. The National Defense Program Outline, created to regularize and mitigate the bruising haggling over successive buildup plans, was focused on the minimum necessary level of defense, and it was difficult for those who disagreed with the policy to make any headway. However, after Nakasone had left his position in the Defense Agency, first, changes in U.S. policy, including a U.S. forces drawdown in the Pacific; and second, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the military reinforcement of its East Asian holdings—sometimes called the new or second Cold War by the Japanese—did produce changes in Japanese defense policy. At the request of the Japanese government, the United States and Japan entered into negotiations in 1976 that produced the first U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines in 1978 and this, in turn, led to an increased level of joint planning and joint exercises with the U.S. military, which added impetus to GSDF desires to better conform to the international norms for national armies.

The return, then, of the last revisionist standing, Nakasone, to a prominent and public position in the defense debate as the prime minister, allowed the premier to push, again, for a more active defense policy. During the New Cold War the GSDF underwent its second phase of identity development, transforming into what can be termed a conventional army: a modern, heavy, high-tech army, with increasing international connections.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, as well as the first Gulf War, produced even greater changes, as, in 1992, the GSDF deployed overseas for the first time. As the GSDF was changing it remained

committed to one of its most important domestic missions, that of disaster relief. In 1995 the GSDF participated in their greatest disaster relief operation to that date, after the Kobe Earthquake. The GSDF response to the sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subway that same year can be seen as culminating more than 15 years of expanding missions and roles for Japan's army. The GSDF's overseas missions were focused on peacekeeping, and humanitarian and disaster relief. As it took on these missions, in addition to its similar domestic role, the GSDF underwent its third phase of identity development, into what some scholars term a postmodern and others a cosmopolitan army (though neither appellation can be applied without caveats about the use of force).

### OPEN THE DOOR (TO NEW COOPERATION)— IT SEEMS COLDER HERE

The Nixon doctrine, the end of the war in Vietnam, and a U.S. drawdown in both Japan and Korea, formed an important background for the increasing salience of defense issues in policymaking circles in Japan in the late 1970s. In the public as well, polls indicate growing concern about defense issues as the decade progresses.<sup>1</sup> The NDPO was focused on constraining rather than building defense capability, but, with the Soviets continuing to build up their forces in the Far East, concern over the U.S. drawdown, and perhaps because JDA Director General Sakata Michita personally thought more open dialogue with the United States would help build a better consensus for the alliance among the Japanese public, the Director General called for talks between the JDA and their U.S. counterparts on ways the two countries could cooperate in the defense of Japan.<sup>2</sup> In 1976, the Security Consultative Committee, set up as the highest bilateral policymaking body under the Mutual Security Treaty, established a Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (SDC). The SDC, in turn, "decided to consult on (1) Japan contingencies, (2) contingencies in the Far East, and (3) the U.S.-Japan Joint Exercises and other activities under normal circumstances."<sup>3</sup>

The Guidelines were approved by Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda in November 1978. Based on the Guidelines the Japan Defense Agency and the SDF, for the first time, had political authorization to conduct planning regarding operations, logistics and intelligence (The Three Arrows Study had brought together U.S. and Japanese military planners informally, to discuss responses to a Korean scenario in the mid-1960s. Once the plan was leaked the subsequent media and opposition backlash had prevented even informal discussions since 1965.)<sup>4</sup> One of the first of these studies involved a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, and this study helped prompt the GSDF to change

its posture on its northern-most main island, creating a heavier, tank-centric force.<sup>5</sup>

The Hokkaido study and others prompted an increase in the number of bilateral exercises, first between each SDF service and its U.S. counterpart (or counterparts in the case of the GSDF, since they exercised with both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps), and later, in 1986, between all three SDF services and their U.S. counterpart services, in what are called joint and bilateral exercises.<sup>6</sup> The GSDF's first bilateral exercise was conducted in 1980, with the U.S. Army on Camp Zama, an installation on the western edge of the Kanto Plain.<sup>7</sup> This was followed by an exercise concerned with communications training at Fuji Training Area with the U.S. Marines in 1981.<sup>8</sup> Probably most significantly for the GSDF's further development were the Yama Sakura exercises.

The first Yama Sakura exercise, in February 1982, took place on the Takigahara GSDF base. Participating were 1000 members of the GSDF Eastern Army and 500 soldiers from U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ); the five-day exercise was based on a scenario of repelling an invasion of Japan by Soviet-style forces.<sup>9</sup> The name for the exercise, Yama Sakura (YS), combines the mountain, or yama (which is Fuji) on the patch worn by USARJ soldiers and the cherry blossom, or sakura, which the GSDF uses as its symbol. The field portion of the exercise, held every winter, is the largest annual exercise the GSDF participates in (a planning exercise, also called Yama Sakura, is held every summer in Hawaii). YS is conducted at the *Hōmentai*, or Regional Army, level for the GSDF, with a corps-level organization from the U.S. Army acting as a counterpart.<sup>10</sup> The GSDF has also participated in a number of lower-level exercises with the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps since 1980.

The importance of the exercises was magnified by the so-called New Cold War.<sup>11</sup> By 1980 four out of five Diet members supported gradual expansion of the SDF.<sup>12</sup> Due to the Soviet buildup in Asia defense analyst Kase Hideyaki, sounded an alarm about the possibility of a conventional attack, noting, "northern Hokkaido was truly Japan's front line of defense."<sup>13</sup> The GSDF had objected to the "no threat" basis of the NDPO from the beginning,<sup>14</sup> and in response to the perception of increasing tensions, as well as warnings like Kase's and the findings of the Guidelines-connected Hokkaido study, the GSDF strengthened its posture on Hokkaido. As part of this strengthening, as well as to attain a goal set forth in the NDPO's Standard Defense Force, the GSDF stood up the 7th Armored Division in Hokkaido, in 1981.<sup>15</sup> This remains the GSDF's only armored division.

Within a few years the GSDF effectively had half of its strength stationed in its northern-most main island. The GSDF also changed its operational doctrine. Until the 1980s the intent was to fight the enemy once that enemy

arrived on Japanese soil, falling back on prepared defensive positions until the enemy advance could be stopped and reversed. By the 1980s, however, the Soviet Union had deployed 43 divisions, 390,000 troops in East Asia, as well as 840 ships (1,850,000 tons), and 2,390 aircraft.<sup>16</sup> As it modernized against this overwhelming buildup, the GSDF decided it could not tolerate the kind of carnage this type of force would wreak on Japanese soil, and fashioned a doctrine coined Sea Shore Strike (S3),<sup>17</sup> to use stand-off weapons and aviation assets to prevent the presumed Soviet enemy from landing. As well, with the S3 doctrine the GSDF could block the three straits north of Hokkaido, Tsugaru, Soya, and Mamiya, preventing egress from the sea of Okhotsk, and thus bottling up the Soviet Pacific Fleet berthed there.<sup>18</sup>

Iwaide Toshio, took command of the GSDF 2nd Division, located on Hokkaido, in 1980. In his memoir about his experience in the position, Iwaide explains the strategic importance of blocking the straits. By the 1980s, he points out, because the United States and the Soviet Union could fight on several fronts simultaneously, Japan was in a “strategic sumo ring” (*senryaku dohyō*), with limited options:

The vital problem is if the Soviet Union and the U.S. found themselves in an actual war situation, in Europe, say, or the Middle East, the U.S. Seventh Fleet would head for that front. The Soviets would want to deploy their Pacific Fleet from Okhotsk. The U.S. would want to blockade the three straits. The Soviets would plan for securing those straits, including a limited, armed invasion of the area surrounding the straits, and Japan would find itself, too, in a war situation.<sup>19</sup>

It was clear, he goes on to explain, that Japan could not prevail against the Soviet Union alone, but had to cooperate with the United States.

With the Defense Cooperation Guidelines, and facing the perception of a significant threat, the GSDF moved away from what some had perceived as a more ambiguous status toward becoming a truer “military force . . . driven by technology and geography to project its power offshore.”<sup>20</sup> Regular exercises at the highest operational levels as well as below with the United States Army and the U.S. Marines, helped shape this trajectory. Some scholars, “suggest an important role is played by ‘transnational connections within the military profession’, in the form of officer exchanges, foreign military education and the ‘development of an international defence literature.’”<sup>21</sup> By the late 1980s the GSDF identified itself more strongly as an army, arguably, in part because of stronger transnational connections, especially due to the increased contact between the GSDF and U.S. forces through exercises.

It is true the GSDF had sent its officers to U.S. Army schools from its founding. Given the connotations of a national army too much under the influence of another’s nation’s army, the SDF is, typically, almost apologetic

about this in the official history of its first 10 years: "though it may be strange to aim at [attaining] the character of the U.S. Army, the necessity of dispatching [officers] to study a scientific, efficient management and training system at U.S. Army schools was recognized as no small point."<sup>22</sup> These types of exchanges between armies had been the norm since the nineteenth century, and Japan had already developed its first modern army, the IJA, through the study of, exchanges with and training by foreign armies.<sup>23</sup>

Therefore this was not the first time Japan had experienced and arguably benefited from "a widening consensus of what constitutes a modern military."<sup>24</sup> The difference between what had been happening since 1950 and what began in the 1980s, was this exposure to international norms concerning what constituted a national army was now more broadly shared by all ranks in the GSDF. Another important factor impacting on this further consolidation of the GSDF's identity as a modern army was the return to the political stage, in a more prominent way, of that important revisionist, Nakasone Yasuhiro.

### **Security Plus Honor**

Given the increased tensions, and pressure from the United States, in 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki Takeo had expanded the meaning of maintaining Japan's forces—and responsibilities—at the "minimum level necessary for self-defense" to include Japan patrolling its sealanes out to 1000 miles. When Nakasone returned to a central position in the defense debate—as prime minister from 1982 until 1987—the stage had been set. The Soviets were again the "Evil Empire," and Nakasone did not hesitate to push the envelope in his interpretation of what Japan could do, not only in its own defense, but in defensive cooperation with the United States.

In practical terms Nakasone pushed for, and the realigned political and bureaucratic groupings acquiesced to, increasing defense spending "sharply . . . relative to other budgetary items,"<sup>25</sup> by 6 percent a year,<sup>26</sup> which was important for the modernization of the SDF. Symbolically and rhetorically, this revisionist who, like his fellows Kishi and Hatoyama, wanted not just security for Japan, but "honor and status"<sup>27</sup> as well, had shaped the defense discourse in large ways and small, and continued to do so. For instance, to mention a quotidian yet symbolic detail, when Nakasone became Director General of the Defense Agency in 1970, meals in the GSDF mess hall, heretofore rich in nutrients and calories, but largely consisting of "watery rice and vegetables . . ." had under his orders transformed to include a variety of meats and fish, with fresh fruit for dessert.<sup>28</sup> As prime minister he transformed the rhetorical menu of the defense debate as well, expanding and enriching it.

In 1983 Nakasone deliberately referred to Japan's security relationship with the United States as an "alliance."<sup>29</sup> When Prime Minister Suzuki had used the

term two years earlier he was forced by the domestic uproar to issue a retraction and his foreign minister resigned to take responsibility, but Nakasone made the term acceptable. Nakasone also referred to Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier,"<sup>30</sup> and he promoted widening the government's interpretation of Japan's acceptable self-defense actions to include allowing SDF units "to defend not only Japan but also U.S. military forces operating outside Japanese territorial waters in the defense of Japan,"<sup>31</sup> though this advocacy only bore fruit as fully codified policy after he left office. In 1987, his last year as prime minister, in another act with important symbolism, Nakasone's cabinet abrogated the 1 percent of GDP limit on defense spending which had been a government policy since 1976.<sup>32</sup> Also in 1987, perhaps most significantly for the next period of intense defense debate, Nakasone's cabinet determined dispatching SDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf could be constitutionally permitted, though no minesweepers were actually dispatched at the time.<sup>33</sup>

Though Nakasone did not realize his earlier dream of actually amending the constitution, the atmosphere of the New Cold War, his leadership, and renewed pressure from the United States arguably pushed Japan's revision-through-reinterpretation reconceptualization of self-defense further and faster than at any time since the 1950s. This broader interpretation of the range of acceptable actions, as well as increased budgetary resources and the development of a doctrine that stressed forward defense against a formidable opponent, pushed the GSDF, by the late 1980s, closer to the model of a modern-day, conventional army, in both reality and self-conception, then it had yet been. But there was still discontent in the ranks, in the GSDF, and those in the policymaking circles among those who wanted an even more normalized army as part of a vision of Japan different from the mainstream.

Participating in the bilateral exercises of the 1980s, more GSDF *jieikan* became exposed to the international norms concerning national armies than ever before. While this helped shape a new institutional consensus on what the GSDF should be, it exacerbated the tension between the GSDF and their conception of what constituted their role as a national army and those in Japan who still were either suspicious of any national military, or simply had a different view of what represented Japan's national identity.

The contrast between these views was previewed early in this period, by a general officer in the GSDF, Kurisu Hiroomi. As the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council in 1978, Kurisu was extremely critical both of the no-threat premise of the NDPO, and of the lack of clarity concerning what constituted the "limited and small-scale" attacks the SDF had been charged to repel in the *Taikō*.<sup>34</sup> He was also critical of his insulation from policymaking circles<sup>35</sup> by Japan's practice of nested civilian control. But when he "in a series of pronouncements and interviews, stated that if Japan were attacked suddenly, he would have to take 'supralegal' measures to defend the nation until he could

receive proper authority from the prime minister," he had gone too far, and was forced to resign.<sup>36</sup> In this last instance Kurisu was trying to highlight the importance of passing Emergency Legislation that would allow the SDF to operate across the maze of central and local government authorities and strictures in Japan in order to respond to any kind of emergency, like an enemy attack, that would require the mobilization, movement and operation of a large number of SDF troops. But he had crossed a line in publicly advocating action on the issue.<sup>37</sup> Study of such legislation had begun in 1977. The annual YS exercise served to emphasize to participating GSDF members the "gap between pretense and reality," which, "every country has its share of . . . but in the case of Japan's conservative leaders . . . was extreme."<sup>38</sup> Annually during the YS exercise the GSDF would simulate Emergency Legislation had been passed, in order to enable it to participate with the United States in the exercise scenario of defeating an enemy invasion of Japan.<sup>39</sup> The legislation only became law in 2003.<sup>40</sup>

By the end of the 1980s, the GSDF found itself relatively better equipped: heavier, with tanks, mechanized infantry vehicles, and mobile artillery; and higher tech, in terms of communications equipment and stand-off weapons like missiles. As a result, more closely resembling other national armies, the institution settled into the second phase of its identity development. Interaction with the U.S. military, especially, may have reinforced his self-image as well, because as "Ramesh Thakur suggests, 'certain homogenising trends (cross-fertilisation of ideas through a shared military literature, staff exchanges, common training establishments and doctrines, etc) [may lead] the military establishments across countries [to] have more in common with one another than with other subsets of culture within countries.'" (brackets in the original)<sup>41</sup>

In some ways, however, this identification with soldiers in other nation's armies only made worse the resentment some GSDF members felt about Japan's unrealistically restrictive defense policies. Certainly the GSDF had begun to bristle at the "weight of postwar tradition,"<sup>42</sup> which seemed to prevent them from taking steps other countries deemed common sense. A change in Japan's security climate, and the charismatic advocacy of the last wartime-generation revisionist had allowed a wider interpretation of what the GSDF would be allowed to do, but the vision of a relatively disarmed Japan was still compelling to many.

This vision was voiced by Miyazawa Kiichi, the "most consistent adherent of the Yoshida Doctrine,"<sup>43</sup> when he said, "the road which Japan, an economic superpower has been walking . . . should be the best model for disarmament. No better model can be found, even if we search throughout history."<sup>44</sup> Never mind that Japan had already rearmed; for Miyazawa and others of a similar view, the euphemisms and other rhetorical tactics, and the policy, legal and

constitutional limits on armed force were enough; Japan did not have an army or a military if Japan did not acknowledge it. In the 1990s the dueling visions of Japan's national identity again clashed, but this time without the familiar structure of the Cold War to shape the discourse.

### Sword in the Storm

The Japanese have a saying: *taigan no kasai*, which means "fire on the opposite shore" and refers to crises and dangers which, while terrible for those involved, do not directly threaten those who are observing from the relative safety of distance. As Thomas R. H. Havens tells us in his *Fire Across the Sea*, the Vietnam War was one such "fire on the opposite shore" for the Japanese.<sup>45</sup> Though the war sparked demonstrations in Japan, the Japanese never felt directly threatened by the conflict. Similarly, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was, at first, seen by the Japanese as a *taigan no kasai*, but it quickly became evident there were some key differences to this gathering storm on the opposite shore.

First, in the postwar era Japan had maintained that the UN would eventually take on the role of providing for international security (though, as noted, when the UN had asked Japan to provide the SDF for sanctioned missions, Japan had demurred). Still, the Gulf War coalition, itself not a UN force per se, was acting at the behest of a UN Security Council resolution in conducting operations in the Gulf, and thus represented just the kind of actions championed by proponents of an unarmed Japan. As well Japan had declared in its Basic Policy for National Defense since 1957 its intention, "To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace."<sup>46</sup> Second, Japan had a strategic interest in the Gulf's oil supply. One of the reasons the Nakasone cabinet had pushed for a role for SDF minesweepers in 1987 had been Japan's dependence on Gulf oil. Under these twin pressures, then, one of the options Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki's government first considered in 1990, after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, was to dispatch minesweepers to the Gulf.<sup>47</sup> This ran into almost immediate opposition centering around the limits of the words *haken* and *hahei* in the government's official definition of what constitutes the minimum level of force necessary for self-defense. The terms mean dispatch and deployment of troops, respectively, and an explanation of what the terms means in the context of what the Japanese government interprets as constitutional self-defense is found in the annual Defense White Paper.

Controversy over deploying Japanese forces overseas actually coincides with the birth of the NPR, and had continued when the NPR had become the GSDF in 1954; thus one of the first *hadome* placed on the new force was a resolution in Japan's House of Representatives that banned "overseas action"

(*kaigai shutsudō*).<sup>48</sup> Nakasone's 1970 Defense White Paper simply states *kaigai hahei* (overseas deployment) will not occur.<sup>49</sup>

In the next White Paper, in 1976, perhaps harkening back to a distinction made by the government in a discussion in the House of Councilors in 1966,<sup>50</sup> the previous, relatively straightforward statement was qualified, reading "dispatch of armed units with the intent of taking military action to another country's territory, or so-called overseas deployment of troops, can be thought of as exceeding the constitutionally recognized limits of self-defense." A phrase very similar to this (only adding territorial sea and air) has been the government's official position, and has been carried in each annual Defense White Paper, since.<sup>51</sup> Though Nakasone's cabinet had declared an SDF minesweeping mission to the Gulf would be constitutional, the concept had not actually been tested. Kaifu's government ran into immediate questions about the qualification of *haken* versus a *hahei*. Would the SDF minesweepers Kaifu wanted to dispatch to the Gulf have "the intent of taking military action?" Would they be armed? Pressure was increased on the Kaifu government when the cabinet revealed a request from the United States for cooperation in the Gulf crisis which included "some form of direct contribution."<sup>52</sup> Kaifu's cabinet frantically scrambled to cobble together some sort of "direct contribution," interpreted to mean a dispatch of personnel, but was frustrated at every turn.

When he tried to push through a UN Peace Cooperation Bill, Kaifu was impeded not only by the *hahei/haken* question, but by a separate 1980 government position that SDF units could not participate in UN actions that will result in military action,<sup>53</sup> and by the—at that point—even longer-held government position that Japan cannot participate in collective security actions. (Kaifu's government maintained Gulf action would constitute collective security, not collective defense. In 2014 Abe Shinzo's government changed the official interpretation to allow Japan's participation in collective defense under specific restrictions.)<sup>54</sup> Kaifu submitted other plans that would have involved dispatching personnel, but, in the end, could only gain approval for a monetary contribution to the war.<sup>55</sup> At 13 billion dollars this was one of the largest monetary contributions of any single country to the Gulf effort, but Japan was still criticized for not sending people.<sup>56</sup>

This criticism was certainly on Kaifu's mind when, after combat had ended he again brought up a plan to dispatch minesweepers to the Gulf—this time successfully. The cabinet's argument was that the Gulf War was over, so this dispatch would not have a military objective, nor would Japan be taking part in a collective security effort. As a final argument the cabinet pointed out minesweeping was specified as one of the duties of the Maritime Self-Defense Force in Article 99 of the SDF Law—and the law does not specify where the minesweeping will occur.<sup>57</sup> The minesweepers departed on April 26, 1991. Kaifu departed almost simultaneously for a tour of Southeast Asian

nations to ease any fears among those nations about the minesweeping mission. The response was almost universally positive. Though Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew expressed some reservations, saying "As someone put it, you may be giving liqueur chocolates to an alcoholic,"<sup>58</sup> his voice was in the minority. Domestically, as well, the mission was strongly supported.<sup>59</sup>

The success of the mission was probably what prompted an apparent attempt to revise what the Defense White Paper outlines about dispatching SDF units overseas. In June, 1991 the *Yomiuri Shinbun* reported the draft of the 1991 White paper would address the issue as follows: "A dispatch of units with no intent to take military action to another country's territory is constitutionally permissible."<sup>60</sup> In contrast the standard wording reads, "An armed unit, with the intent to take military action, dispatched into another country's territorial land, sea or air, what is called a deployment of troops, in general exceeds the limit of the minimum necessary for self-defense, [and] is thought of as not being permitted under the constitution."<sup>61</sup> Both passages really say the same thing, but the proposed change stresses what is permitted, while the standard passage stresses what is restricted. The proposed draft was not published, and the entry in the White Paper regarding overseas dispatch has remained unchanged, but the fact the draft surfaced indicates some of the currents flowing in Japan's defense debate in the summer of 1991.

Those currents favored an expanded role for the SDF, and lack of opposition at home and abroad to the minesweeping mission helped turn the currents into a torrent by Japanese standards. After returning from Southeast Asia, Kaifu's cabinet began to put together a new bill which would allow the dispatch of SDF members to participate in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). After a year of debate and delay—which included fist fights in the Diet and the Socialists using the so-called "ox-walk" tactic—that is walking as slowly as possible to cast their ballots—the PKO bill was enacted as the International Peace Cooperation Law on June 13, 1992. Thus, for the first time in its post-Occupation history, Japan dispatched forces overseas for non-training missions. Through the end of 1995, Japan had dispatched GSDF soldiers to Cambodia for a PKO mission, and to Mozambique and Zaire to conduct humanitarian relief.

As these missions were carried out, the defense debate continued. One of the key players in the defense debate during and after the first Gulf War was Ozawa Ichirō. Ozawa argued for direct participation by the SDF in the war, and he put together the votes necessary to pass the thirteen-billion-dollar contribution.<sup>62</sup> In 1991 Ozawa was placed in charge of the LDP's Special Research Committee on Japan's Role in the International Community, which came to be known as the Ozawa Research Group. Ozawa's report helped lay the groundwork for the passage of the UN PKO bill, and highlighted, once again, constitutional revision through interpretation.

Though Ozawa laughed at the phrase “revising the constitution through interpretation,” saying, “those kinds of strange words are usually made by the mass media,”<sup>63</sup> his report, in fact, carries this revision through interpretation further than any previous attempt. Nor is he so coy about it elsewhere, when he says “Each cabinet can interpret the constitution in its own way.”<sup>64</sup> In the report the Ozawa group calls for “positive and active pacifism,” as well as “international collective security.” The gist of these terms is that the Ozawa group champions a new reading of the preamble of Japan’s constitution, which would allow the SDF to operate fully as a member of a UN force, even to the point of using force. The report also states Japan could participate in multinational military actions—such as the Gulf War—if it restricted itself to non-combat support roles.<sup>65</sup>

Ozawa expands on these ideas in a book published in 1993 called *Blueprint for a New Japan*. Amid his calls for Japan to be a “normal state,” he says the SDF’s “exclusively defensive defense strategy” is inadequate for the then-current world situation. He maintains the SDF should, instead, through closer cooperation with the United States, adopt a “peace promotion strategy,” that would help to strengthen UN activities. Ozawa argues the adoption of such a strategy is permissible under the current constitution but he recommends adding a paragraph to Article 9 which clearly states that the SDF can conduct “peace promotion activities,” and can operate under UN command.<sup>66</sup>

The same year his book was released Ozawa left the LDP to form, along with Hata Tsutomu, the Japan Renewal Party. There were several more defections, and when an election was held in August 1993 the LDP lost, and for the first time since its formation in 1955 was not the government party. A child of the Cold War but raised by the LDP, the GSDF was, on the one hand, now bereft of both (though the LDP managed to gain power again as the lead in a coalition in a matter of months). On the other hand the events surrounding the Gulf War had ushered in a new era for the defense discourse. Ozawa’s proposals, outlined above, were only part of the vigorous discussion.

Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro, Japan New Party, in 1994 set up a “private advisory body” under Higuchi Yotaro, head of Asahi Beer, and charged them to look at Japan’s defense policies.<sup>67</sup> Hosokawa also instructed his Defense Agency Director General to review the NDPO, for the purpose of publishing a new one the following year. In the summer of 1994 the so-called Higuchi Report was handed to Murayama Tomiichi, Socialist Party, who had become prime minister in June 1994, his party in coalition with the LDP. The Higuchi Report had an important impact on the new NDPO. The report still stressed maintaining the security alliance with the United States and possessing diverse defense capabilities, but placed new emphasis on “multilateral cooperation,” stressing UN-sanctioned PKO in particular.<sup>68</sup> Also in 1994 Murayama stated and the Socialist Party accepted, that the SDF was

constitutional.<sup>69</sup> Forty-four years after its founding, no major party considered the GSDF unconstitutional.

But other factors continued to roil a renewed defense debate, including a nuclear crisis in North Korea in 1994.<sup>70</sup> The year 1995 proved particularly eventful; given the North Korean nuclear crisis and the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, talk of war and soldiers was already much evident in the public realm when the rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl by two U.S. Marines and a U.S. sailor, and the resulting huge protests on the island plunged the U.S.-Japan security relationship into crisis.<sup>71</sup> Meanwhile the soldiers of the GSDF were prominent in both an unprecedented event—their response to the sarin nerve gas attack in a Tokyo subway—and in a role with which many of their fellow citizens had come to most associate them with (though of unprecedented scale)—disaster relief.

### A LIFE-GIVING SWORD: THE GSDF IN PEACEKEEPING, DISASTER RELIEF AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Yagyū Munenori was a contemporary of Musashi Miyamoto. Samurai and philosopher, retainer to Tokugawa Ieyasu, and sword instructor to Tokugawa's son and his grandson, Munenori popularized the Yagyū Shinkage school of swordsmanship.<sup>72</sup> Munenori is the author of one of the key texts of the school, *Heihō Kadensho*, which has sections on the death-dealing sword and on the life-giving sword.<sup>73</sup> Munenori explains, "In our school the sword that is positioned to attack is called the death-dealing blade, and the sword that is not, the life-giving sword." In the conclusion Munenori elaborates on the metaphor, "A blade that kills people is in truth a sword that allows them to live. In a disturbed world, many people are killed without cause. A death-dealing blade is used to bring peace to such a world; but once peace is achieved, the same blade becomes a life-giving sword, does it not?"<sup>74</sup> As the retainer or instructor of the first three Tokugawa shoguns it seems clear this metaphor reflects the new, peacetime roles for the samurai of maintaining order and providing administration after the wars of consolidation.

The idea of a life-giving sword also resonates with the GSDF. After the "disturbed time" (another translator has it as "chaos")<sup>75</sup> of the Fifteen-Year War—this time not settled by but widely blamed on the death-dealing blade, the IJA—the GSDF consciously crafted itself as a life-giving sword. To gain the trust of the people they had sworn to protect, the GSDF embraced disaster relief and community support missions. In the 1990s they became a peace-keeping sword as well.

Disaster relief dispatches had begun early. The SDF's official history records that in July and August 1951 the NPR Fukuchi Yama unit and part

of another unit responded to a flood disaster, but, since the NPR “had no regulations concerning dispatches for disaster relief,” this first mission is considered an “informal one.” The next dispatch, in October of the same year (presumably after *kitei* or regulations had been written, though the official history elides this) was in response to Typhoon Luce, in Yamaguchi Prefecture. Taking lessons learned from this dispatch the NPR did some planning for what it termed *shukkō* (literally, “comings and goings”), and based on the *shukkō* conducted six more disaster relief dispatches to Hokkaido, to provide earthquake, large fire (*taika*) and other relief efforts.

As the NPR transitioned to the National Safety Force, bearing in mind the significance of disaster relief operations, Article 66 of the National Safety Force Law had specified prefectural governors could request disaster assistance through the National Safety Agency Director General; Article 83 of the SDF Law then was worded similarly, but it also enjoins the SDF to plan and prepare for disaster relief, making it a formal mission of the SDF. Until 1960 the SDF and its previous incarnations had conducted dispatches to 1,058 disasters, involving 1,639,130 SDF members.<sup>76</sup> Given the nature of the operations, the majority of such dispatches were conducted by GSDF members.

Disaster relief, which includes not just responses to flood, earthquake and fire, but activities as diverse as restoring water supplies, “epidemic control,” search and rescue, and “emergency transportation of people and materials,” has continued to be a major mission for the GSDF.<sup>77</sup> The longest disaster relief operation during the period of this study lasted from 1992 to 1995 and was in response to the eruption of Mount Fugen in Kyushu. The operation lasted “1,658 days,” and included “210,000 personnel and 70,000 vehicles.” Efforts included the kinds of things already mentioned, but also involved repairing a national highway and “24-hour vigilance and surveillance operations.”<sup>78</sup>

The Mount Fugen eruption relief operation ended in December 1995. In January the same year the GSDF’s largest-scale disaster relief operation had begun, in response to the Kobe earthquake, more formally known as the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. The earthquake “caused 6,336 deaths and injured 34,900 people,”<sup>79</sup> with, “damages estimated at \$100 billion.”<sup>80</sup>

There was criticism from some quarters about the slowness of the response. General Matsushima Yūsuke, then the commanding general of the Middle Army, which includes the affected area in its jurisdiction, laid the blame largely on unprepared local officials. According to the SDF Law, SDF members can react on their own initiative if necessary to an emergency situation in their geographic area of responsibility. The general points out, after the first reports came in at 6:35 am, the 35th Regiment, from Itami, had “forty-two troops . . . engaged in rescue work at the sole discretion of the regimental commander.”<sup>81</sup> Matsushima also points out his aviation unit had a helicopter doing reconnaissance less than an hour after the first report. In contrast,

he points out, the regiment from Himeji, responsible for Kobe, but not in its immediate area, tried to contact prefectural authorities in order to receive a request for assistance and did not receive the request until 10:00. When the Middle Army was able to get through to Kobe, and asked about the situation the reply was, "We just established our Disaster Rescue Center. We do not have information on the disaster itself . . ." <sup>82</sup> Municipal officials as well could not tell the SDF where to deliver food or other relief aid, though, the general points out, below the municipal level, "some wards were . . . functioning smoothly." <sup>83</sup> The general also notes that on certain occasions civilian officials interfered with SDF efforts, by, for instance, not allowing Matsushima's helicopters, or other SDF aircraft, to land at either the Itami or Kansai civilian airports, because "There has been no precedent of allowing airplanes of the SDF to land." <sup>84</sup> In the end, most of the public seems to have agreed with the general's view, giving praise to the SDF for their efforts, but criticizing the local and central governments. The public was moved by scenes they watched, night after night, on television, of GSDF troops rescuing survivors.

A typical example is found in a book that centers on the 14th Infantry Regiment (*Futsū-ka Rentai* as the GSDF designate it, which literally means "Normal Branch Regiment"), from Kanazawa, written by retired GSDF officer, Kamei Kotarō. Among other things, Kamei describes the experience of the regiment when it participated in the relief efforts. Each company was given a sector, he explains, and began patrolling, calling out for survivors amidst the wreckage and rubble. In a certain sector a civilian in front of a rubble pile spoke to a group of *tainin*:

"I can't find my grandma (*uchi no obaachan*). She was supposed to come back to the sitting room inside this home." The *tainin* began to immediately pull tile and rubble from the area indicated. After about thirty or forty minutes, mixed in with their own voices, the *tainin* noticed they were able to hear something that sounded like a low, moaning voice. "Don't speak! Be quiet!" said the squad leader, stopping the work to listen for the voice. It was certain—[they] could hear a person's voice. Placing his head close to an opening in the rubble, [the squad leader] said, "Grandma, are you there?" From the area they previously had heard the voice, they clearly heard a faint voice say, "Water, please." (*mizu, chōdai*) Unable to help themselves, [the squad members] shouted, "She's alive!" Peering into the hole with a flashlight, they could see the upper part of the grandmother's body. While saying, "Hang in there, we'll help you soon," [the squad] desperately removed parts of a collapsed wall and ceiling, as well as things like furniture. <sup>85</sup>

They got her out alive. And she got her water. Scenes like this played out again and again on television screens across the nation. As did scenes like a sobbing family member bowing repeatedly before a group of GSDF members, who themselves remained bowed, and apologizing to the GSDF

members for having worked so hard, when, in the end, they had found the body of the missing family member rather than a survivor.<sup>86</sup>

The SDF and the nation realized things had to be done about disaster management in Japan as a result of the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. Changes were made in the Disaster Measures Basic Law and the national Disaster Prevention Basic Plan "was revised a great deal" due to the findings of a study panel.<sup>87</sup> Changes were also made to the SDF Law; for example, authorizing SDF units, during disaster relief, to move damaged or abandoned vehicles in order to allow SDF vehicles to transit, if the police are unavailable, or to order evacuations out of or to bar civilians from entering into dangerous areas. As a result of these and other changes local governments began more seriously planning for disasters and began conducting drills with local SDF units.<sup>88</sup>

Once the PKO Law was passed the GSDF members were able to take their decades-long experience in humanitarian activities and disaster relief overseas for the first time. In the pivotal year under discussion, 1995, the GSDF dispatched troops to provide humanitarian aid to Rwandan refugees in Zaire.<sup>89</sup> Overseas deployments beginning with that to Cambodia in 1992 produced some of the most significant changes yet in both the GSDF's self-image and the public's view of the GSDF.

Its first troops departing Japan in September 1992, the GSDF sent a contingent of about 600 *jieikan* to Cambodia in support of the UN mission UNTAC. The core of the contingent was a battalion from the Middle Army's 4th Facilities (that is, Engineer) Brigade, with additional support from various other units. The primary mission at first was road and bridge repair. Later SDF medical personnel were added, who provided medical care to local nationals as well as military personnel from other countries supporting UNTAC. In 1993 the second contingent of GSDF members began to provide water purification, facilities construction, transportation, and supply-stockpiling support to UNTAC as well.

Kamei again humanizes the story as he describes the experiences of four sergeants from the 14th Regiment sent to support the Engineer unit. Arriving in Phnom Penh Airport with the members of the main body, the four join the others on an UNTAC bus that is filled with exhaust fumes, has no door, and has only two or three seats. The main body trundles to the base in Takeo province from which they will operate. One sergeant, Otsuka, a *hancho* or squad leader in the public relations section of the Engineer unit, spends his days "doing things like preparing itineraries for, coordinating, and guiding (serving as a driver for) the as-if-every-day visits from the likes of Diet members, journalists, high-ranking SDF officials, supporting organizations, and questionable celebrities."<sup>90</sup> Two other sergeants, Terada and Murata, work as cooks and "get up earlier than the other *taiin*," in order to get to a storage area and bring back potable water in five-liter bottles. At the water

distribution point the “fast-talking, English-speaking female Canadian soldier makes [them] shake in their boots even when they understand her.”<sup>91</sup> The final sergeant, Ishikami, spends his days, “in desperate battle with the heat,” building facilities on the Takeo base for UNTAC members. Tired after difficult days, the “big three for happiness” activities on Takeo base are taking a bath, drinking a beer, and talking with family or friends back in Japan through the use of INMARSAT telephones.<sup>92</sup>

There were issues with this first deployment. Violence rose as Cambodia prepared to hold elections in 1993. As a result, though the first contingent did not take weapons, the second contingent did carry fire arms, though under strict conditions. When a Japanese UN volunteer and a Japanese policeman were killed in Cambodia in 1993 there were calls in Japan to bring the troops home, but Prime Minister Miyazawa’s administration held firm.

The new international missions, as well as the unprecedented domestic response by a GSDF chemical unit, in March 1995, to conduct rescue operations after the sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, demonstrated the existence of a new GSDF; a GSDF redefined both in their own eyes and in the eyes of their countrymen. Approval ratings for the GSDF surged in the polls after the Cambodia deployment and after relief operations for the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. A new pride was visible, for instance, in a briefing by a contingent of soldiers returning from the second iteration of Japan’s Cambodia mission to class 39 of the GSDF Staff College.<sup>93</sup>

By 1995 polls indicated that the Japanese people most identified the SDF with disaster relief and humanitarian support missions, but support for the SDF’s national defense mission had also grown, while overall approval ratings for the SDF were at a new high. Nor was this the first time high profile public-service missions had garnered such results. Visible GSDF support 30 years earlier, to the 1964 Tokyo Olympics had “led to an all-time high in public opinion”<sup>94</sup> at that time. Some armies resent and resist non-combat missions like peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, but as scholars have pointed out “some organizational choices are best explained by aspects of organizational culture rooted in unique historical experiences,”<sup>95</sup> and given the historical experiences of the GSDF—a new army trying to distance itself from the failures and excesses of its predecessor—the GSDF’s organizational choices from the first had focused out of necessity on building trust with their fellow citizens through disaster relief. Far from detracting from a more traditional national defense role, the GSDF felt embracing disaster relief would ultimately enable them also to perform their desired traditional defense role as the nation’s new army. Kashiwagi had observed that in 1954, after the formation of the SDF, the consensus of Japan’s new troops was the constitution would soon be amended and the GSDF would formally become a national army. He goes on, “Therefore, it was clear to each soldier,

of the Shōwa Year 25 troops,” and subsequent cohorts, that “preparing to respond to the requests of citizens while in the midst of disaster relief missions, so that no one could judge [the forces] negatively, [was paramount].”<sup>96</sup> This insight was borne out repeatedly, and highlighted in 1995.

### PROSCRIBED POSTMODERN, ESSENTIALLY COSMOPOLITAN: THE GSDF THROUGH 1995

From the second Cold War to the first Gulf War was a time of tremendous change for the GSDF and for the larger public’s imaginative construction of the roles of soldiers and armies. Facing a colder war from the late 1970s onward GSDF development hewed more closely to the norms of a modern, high-tech army than previously, and Japan’s postwar army had successfully embraced such a model by the end of the 1980s. Just a few years later, with the end of the Cold War and the advent of peacekeeping missions, the GSDF deployed overseas for the first time in their history, again redefining themselves. Nor did the relationship with the United States remain static. Academic turned Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, concerned the U.S. defense strategy was ignoring the Asia-Pacific, crafted the East Asian Strategy Report that firmed up U.S. commitment to the region, assuring the Japanese, among other things, the United States would keep 100,000 troops in the Asia-Pacific theater. Japan, in turn, working with the United States, and with input from the Higuchi Report and other sources, and concerned about the recent nuclear crisis in North Korea and more recent rape crisis on Okinawa crafted a new National Defense Program Outline, published in 1995.

Unlike the first *Taikō*, the 1995 version emphasized international contributions to security, and included provisions for the SDF to aid U.S. forces not just in Japanese territory, but in areas around Japan that affected Japanese security<sup>97</sup> (known in U.S.-Japan alliance parlance as “Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan,” or SIASJ, the geographical limits of this area is undefined). The Japanese public, perhaps especially during 1995 with its inescapable reminders of the cost and horrors of war given various commemorative documentaries and films, as well as, for those who could remember, the scenes from the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake of devastated cityscapes, had begun to broaden the scope of what they found acceptable in their new army. This broadening of scope was abetted by scenes of the GSDF operating overseas, rescuing survivors from the Mount Fugen disaster, and doing the same for survivors of the Kobe earthquake, as well as scenes of the GSDF chemical unit responding to the gas attack on the Tokyo subway.

The GSDF began to undergo its third transformation, into what some scholars have called a postmodern and other have called a cosmopolitan army,

though the GSDF fits neither classification perfectly, in the early 1990s. A postmodern army is described as “a volunteer force,”<sup>98</sup> with little distinction between combat and support roles, whose mission has changed from “fighting wars to missions that would not be considered military in the traditional sense . . . [and one that is] used more in international missions authorized (or at least legitimated) by entities beyond the nation state.”<sup>99</sup> However a postmodern army by this definition is also one in which “civilian and military spheres” demonstrate “increasing interpenetrability . . . both structurally and culturally,” and there is “increasing internationalization” with the creation of multinational units.<sup>100</sup> The GSDF by the 1990s well matched three of, but was prevented by policy, tradition and constitutional interpretation from hewing to two of the characteristics of a postmodern army as defined, but might be called proscribed postmodern army. Similarly, cosmopolitan militaries have been described as ones whose missions “include peacekeeping operations such as separating belligerents and maintaining ceasefires, controlling airspace, protecting safety zones or relief corridors” as well as “traditional policing tasks.”<sup>101</sup> While the SDF has participated in many of these types of operations since 1992 outright prohibition and otherwise severe restriction on the use of force means the GSDF does not fully meet this definition either, but can be called essentially cosmopolitan.

An unplanned army, supported by its citizens but granted little prestige and held in suspicion when considered an army in the traditional sense, the GSDF continued to evolve when faced with new situations and new challenges for the first 55 years of its existence. The *Rikuji* often focused on tasks such as disaster relief, and humanitarian and other community support in order to gain the support of the country it was sworn to protect. One of the several ironies of the GSDF's history is that these non-traditional military tasks it took on from the first became much more the norm for armies around the world after the end of the Cold War. The Ground Self-Defense Force was thus proficient and comfortable with these tasks when its *taiin* went abroad, while other armies, like the U.S. Army, were less comfortable with their missions in these non-traditional roles; even as a proscribed postmodern army the GSDF arguably fit the postmodern model better in some ways than the U.S. Army in the 1990s. But, foundationally, the postmodern military conception was predicated as a development of militaries that no longer faced “the threat of invasion.”<sup>102</sup> The concept was born at the end of the Cold War, when, just as at the end of previous global conflicts, leaders and thinkers projected war between nations was done or nearly so, and that any other military enforcement would be of low intensity and more like international law enforcement than past actions. Developments in the next century have pointed in a different direction, and the GSDF has continued to evolve to meet new threats in the international security environment.

## NOTES

1. Kataoka and Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance*, 46.
2. Michael J. Green and Koji Murata, "The 1978 Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Process and Historical Impact, Working Paper No. 17," (1998), <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/GreenMurataWP.htm>.
3. Ibid.
4. See note 10, Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack, eds., *Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2001), 128, <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108060987>.
5. Murata, "The 1978 Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Process and Historical Impact, Working Paper No. 17."
6. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 327, <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=113270698>.
7. Glenn D. Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*, ed. Teigo Yoshida J. A. A. Stockwin, Frank Langdon, Alan Rix, Junji Banno, Leonard Schoppa, The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series (London: Routledge, 1996), 52.
8. Shinbunsha, *Haran No Hanseiki, Rikujou Jieitai No 50 Nen: The History of JGSDF 1950-2000 by Photograph*, 132; Kataoka and Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance*, 78.
9. Ibid., 132.
10. The author has participated in five YS field exercises, in 1991 and 2004-2008, and two YS planning exercises, from 2004-2006.
11. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 73, <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=113270444>.
12. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, Cornell East Asia Series (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993), 117.
13. Kataoka and Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance*, 27.
14. Sebata, *Japan's Defense Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007*, 116-17.
15. Flanz, "Japan," in *Nonaligned, Third World, and Other Ground Armies: A Combat Assessment*, 160, <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=23598844>.
16. Kataoka and Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance*, 77.
17. Mark Lorell Norman D. Levin, Arthur Alexander, *The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security Policy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 44.
18. Kataoka and Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance*, 84-85.
19. Toshio Iwaide, *Shidanchou No Shinikki: Jieitai No Shunkashuutou* (Tokyo: Eideru Kenkyuujyou, 1984), 57.

20. Katzenstein and Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, 176.
21. Farrell, "Culture and Military Power."
22. Bōeicho, ed. *Jieitai Juunen-Shi*, 198.
23. See, for instance, esp. ch. 6, David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
24. Theo Farrell, *The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 39.
25. Katzenstein and Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, 157.
26. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*.
27. Tetsuya Kataoka, *Waiting for a "Pearl Harbor": Japan Debates Defense*, Hoover International Studies (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), 6.
28. Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 53.
29. John D. Rockefeller, "The Nakasone Legacy: Japan's Increased Commitment to Security," in *Speaking of Japan*, vol. 9, no. 88, April 1988, 12.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, 13.
32. As the Western media and public often mistakenly assume this one-percent-of-GDP level of defense spending is a constitutional or legal limitation, it is worth reiterating it was a policy adopted by Prime Minister Miki's cabinet in 1976.
33. Rockefeller, 14.
34. Kataoka and Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance*, 74; Sebata, *Japan's Defense Bureaucratic Politics, 1976–2007*, 116.
35. *Ibid.*, 173–74.
36. Joseph N. Flanz, "Japan," in *Nonaligned, Third World, and Other Ground Armies: A Combat Assessment*, 156, <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=23598840>.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*, 264.
39. Based on the author's own experience in five YS exercises, already mentioned.
40. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, 101.
41. Farrell, "World Culture and Military Power," *Review of International Studies*, vol. 24, no. 3, June 1998: 413. I do not argue GSDF members completely identified with the U.S. or other national armies. Such complete identification is unlikely given the kinds of resentments produced by the GSDF's history with the U.S. Army, by the strong protective identification of any nation's army with that nation and by the cultural turn in postwar Japan that has identified "Japaneseness" as so unique in the world. The point is, rather, GSDF members came to identify themselves more as a

conventional army in part by comparing themselves with other conventional armies, the U.S. Army being the most familiar.

42. Kataoka and Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance*, 75.

43. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*, 267.

44. Kataoka and Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance*, 28.

45. Thomas R. H. Havens, *Fire across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965–1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

46. See chapter five.

47. “Yōin Haken Hokaisei ga Shōten,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 18 August 1990, morning edition, 2.

48. See, for instance, Obuki Yoshito, “*Kenpō Gakusha ga Shindan Suru ‘Ozawa Toshinan,’*” *Chūō Kōron*, May, 1992, 46.

49. *Nihon no Bōei*, 1970, 35.

50. Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization*, 79.

51. See, for instance, *Bōei Hakusho*, (Tokyo: *Bōeicho*, 1993), 88. It is telling this explanation is found in the section concerning the constitution and the SDF, and under a subheading, “*Jieitai Kōdō no Yōken*,” or “Necessary Requirements for SDF Actions.” The explanation about operations overseas reads, in part, “*Buryoku kōshi no mokuteki no motte busou shita butai wo takoku no ryōdo, ryōkai, ryōkū ni haken suru iwayuru kaigai hahei wa, ippan ni jieitai no tame no hitsuyō saishō gendo wo koeru mono de ate, kenpōjo yurusarenai to kangaete iru*, or “An armed unit, with the intent to take military action, dispatched into another country’s territorial land, sea or air, [or] what is called a deployment of troops, in general exceeds the limit of the minimum necessary for self-defense, [and] is thought of as not being permitted under the constitution.” This section is immediately above the section that declares though Japan is a sovereign nation with the right to engage in collective defense, to exercise that right would be unconstitutional.

52. “*Wangan Bōei Chokusetsu Kōken wo*,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 19 August 1990, morning edition, 1.

53. Obuki, op. cit.

54. “SDF, Yasukuni, Enthronement—Three Touchy Issues,” *Mainichi Daily News*, 4 May 1991, 1.

55. “Time for a Change,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* [hereinafter *FEER*], 6 May 1993, 24.

56. Ronald Philip Dore, *Japan, Internationalism and the UN*, The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), xiii.

57. Gwen Robinson, “Will ‘Cherry Blossoms’ Bloom Again?” *Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter*, June, 91, 18.

58. “Japan Reaches Out” *Asiaweek*, 17 May 1991, 28.

59. A *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll indicated 75% support for the mission on 26 April, the day the minesweepers departed. See Robert Delfs, “Advance to the Rear,” *FEER*, 6 June 1991, 13.

60. "Bōei Hakusho ni 'Gokenron,'" *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 24 June 1991, morning edition, 1.
61. *Bōei Hakusho*, (Tokyo: Bōeicho, 1991), 99.
62. Ronald Philip Dore, *Japan, Internationalism and the UN*, The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), xiv.
63. "Tabu- wa mo Hayanai," *Chūo Kōron*, May 1992, 32.
64. "Nihon no Seiji wo Tō: Ozawa Ichiro-shi Intabyu-" *Tokyo Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 12 March 1992, morning edition, 2.
65. "Tabu-," 32–41. See also Obuki, 47
66. Ozawa Ichirō, *Nihon Kaisho Keikaku* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993), 115–24.
67. Sebata, *Japan's Defense Bureaucratic Politics, 1976–2007*, 266; Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1994–2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy*, Second ed. (Leiden, The Netherlands; Boston, MA: Brill, 2005), 78.
68. ———, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1994–2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy*, 79; Sebata, *Japan's Defense Bureaucratic Politics, 1976–2007*, 266.
69. McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis*, 126.
70. Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch—Japan* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 12, <http://www.questia.com/read/124081946/global-security-watch-japan>. Also see Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), <http://www.questia.com/read/120380905/nuclear-north-korea-a-debate-on-engagement-strategies>.
71. *Ibid.*, 89.
72. Munenori Yagyū, *The Life-Giving Sword: Secret Teachings for the House of the Shogun*, trans. William Scott Wilson (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2003).
73. *Ibid.*, 132.
74. ———, *The Sword and the Mind*, trans. Hiroaki Sato (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 1986), 108.
75. ———, *The Life-Giving Sword: Secret Teachings for the House of the Shogun*, 132.
76. Bōeicho, ed. *Jieitai Juunen-Shi*, 354–56.
77. Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, trans. Ltd. The Japan Times (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1993), 170.
78. ———, *Defense of Japan: Responding to a New Era*, trans. Ltd. The Japan Times (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1996), 143.
79. Richard B. Finn and Warren S. Hunsberger, eds., *Japan's Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), xxvi, <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=105403394>.
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81. Lu, *Japan, a Documentary History 2, the Late Tokugawa Period to the Present*, 578.
82. *Ibid.*, 579.
83. *Ibid.*, 580.

84. *Ibid.*, 581.
85. Kamei Kotarou, *Mononofu Gunzou: Rikujou Jieitai Futsuu-Ka Rentai* (Tokyo: Kaya Shojo, 1996), 246–47.
86. The author was stationed in Japan at the time. I watched such scenes on the news.
87. Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan: Responding to a New Era*, 145.
88. *Ibid.*, 145–48. As a result of the changes in plans and disaster preparedness drills the local municipalities, years later, for the first time, began to invite representatives from U.S. Army, Japan to participate in discussions. In charge of government relations, I attended some meetings. We found out, for instance, that in the event of a disaster the communities planned to house, in tents, up to 10,000 refugees on Camp Zama, where U.S. Army Japan headquarters is located. It is apparently a long-standing plan, but this was the first we had heard of it.
89. Paul Midford, *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?* Studies in Asian Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 224.
90. Kotarou, *Mononofu Gunzou: Rikujou Jieitai Futsuu-Ka Rentai*, 229–31.
91. *Ibid.*, 230–31.
92. *Ibid.*, 232.
93. In October 1993 some of the members from the contingent briefed officers in class 39 of the GSDF Officer School's Command and Staff Course. The author received the briefing as a member of the class.
94. Brendle, "Recruitment and Training in the SDF," 89. Also see Katzenstein and Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, 112.
95. Farrell, "Culture and Military Power."
96. Kashiwagi, *Sengo-Ha Nijuu-Go Nen Hei Yomoyama Monogatari: Keisatsu Yobitai Ikki-Sei No Kaisou*, 62.
97. Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 19945–2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy*, 82–85.
98. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, David R. Segal, "Armed Forces after the Cold War," *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1.
99. *Ibid.*, 2.
100. *Ibid.*
101. Eichi Katahara, "Japan as a Civilian Peacekeeper," *Forces for Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-First Century*, Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman, eds. (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 271.
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The first part of the book is devoted to a general history of the United States from its discovery to the present time.

The second part is devoted to a detailed history of the United States from the discovery to the present time.

The third part is devoted to a detailed history of the United States from the discovery to the present time.

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The nineteenth part is devoted to a detailed history of the United States from the discovery to the present time.

The twentieth part is devoted to a detailed history of the United States from the discovery to the present time.

## Chapter 8

# New Century, New Threats, New GSDF, 1996–2015

The first half of the 1990s were a time of great change for Japan's security policies, precipitated, at first by the so-called turning point (*tenkanten*)<sup>1</sup> of the first Gulf War. Culminating in the crises of 1995 and increased salience in the public's mind of World War II due to 50th anniversary commemorations, Japan had been primed for policy change. A significant result of the renewed debate came in 1996 when Japan updated its Defense Cooperation Guidelines for the first time since 1978, expanding the scope and roles of SDF cooperation with the U.S. military, and for the first time, allowing for the possibility of security cooperation with the United States not only in Japanese territory, but in areas surrounding Japan. The new Guidelines led to new enabling legislation in 1999, but this legislation was preceded by another security shock in 1998, when North Korea fired a *Taepodong* missile over Japanese territory. Reading back over the history of defense policy change presented here, one might expect relative quiescence in Japan after its society grappled with first an intensified Cold War standoff and then the Cold War evaporation, similar to the relative lull in the defense debate in the 1960s after the vociferous and finally violent debate in Japan in the 1950s. Yet new threats, both global and more local, have ensured an increased pace of policy change instead.

Having selected for prime minister Koizumi Junichirō, maverick and champion of normalizing Japan's defense, the inauguration of the so-called Global War on Terror had the potential to make the greatest impact yet on Japanese security policy in general and on the GSDF in particular. Mindful of the lessons of the first Gulf War, Japan was one of the first major nations to declare support for the United States after 9/11 in 2001. Within months they had deployed Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels to the Arabian Sea to refuel U.S. and other coalition ships conducting anti-terrorist patrols. Early in 2004 the GSDF placed boots on the ground in Iraq, the first time Japan

had deployed the GSDF into a non-pacified area.<sup>2</sup> Also in 2004 Japan promulgated a new NDPO.<sup>3</sup> In 2007 the Defense Agency became the Ministry of Defense. For years Japan had worried about China's military build-up, and in 2010 a newly assertive China pushed Japan in the direction of yet more change, with threats to islands Japan claims as the Senkakus and China claims at the Diaoyutai. This new threat, as well as the second coming of Prime Minister Abe, in 2012, led to yet another new NDPO, and the publication of Japan's first national strategy in 2013, as well as the reversal of more than a decade of declining defense budgets. In 2014 Abe's cabinet reversed Japan's postwar-long policy on collective self-defense, defining it as constitutional, albeit with stringent restrictions. Perhaps the biggest changes for the GSDF organizationally during this time were the addition of a few thousand more troops (to 151,000 from a low of 142,000), the beginning of the development of a new amphibious doctrine and capabilities and a concomitant refocus of energies toward outlying islands, especially in the southwest of Japan. The United States and Japan were said to have reached a high point in the alliance when George W. Bush was president and Koizumi was prime minister, but policy and actual change continued with new vigor under Prime Minister Abe, through 2015 and beyond.

### SITUATIONS IN AREAS SURROUNDING JAPAN

Events within and outside of Japan roiled Japan's defense debate for the first half of the 1990s. After half a century of the Cold War, the international security environment was resetting; given the consistent precedence security bureaucrats in Japan had given to the U.S.-Japan security alliance, it is no surprise these officials sought reassurance from the United States as to its commitment to Japan. On the part of the United States, this renewed interest in dialogue was a chance to once again urge Japan to take on a larger defense responsibility in the wider world.

U.S. defense officials had been concerned Japan seemed unable to overcome what they perceived as self-inflicted constraints to join the coalition of the willing during the first Gulf War, and as a result some questioned Japan's viability as an ally.<sup>4</sup> In 1995 the alliance was further roiled when two U.S. Marines and one U.S. sailor raped a 12-year-old Okinawa girl. Okinawa, a prefecture which constitutes 1 percent of Japanese territory, hosts 50 percent of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, with fully 20 percent of the main island of Okinawa taken up by U.S. military installations. The Okinawans had endured the situation with *gaman* (stoical endurance) for decades, but the rape was too much; the largest-ever protests against the U.S. military presence broke out. Defense officials on both the U.S. and Japanese sides came together to defuse

the situation. In 1996 the two sides published the Special Action Committee on Okinawa report, which pledged, among other things, to return 22 percent of the land occupied by U.S. forces on Okinawa to Japan.

Even before the rape incident, a nuclear crisis in Korea, 1993–1994, had strained the alliance. North and South Korea had been making uneven progress toward improved relations since 1985, when parliamentary talks had been agreed to by the two sides. In 1991 this “new phase of detente between the two Koreas culminated in the signing on 13 December . . . of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchange and Cooperation, under which both sides agreed to respect their respective political systems; to adhere to the principle of non-interference;”<sup>5</sup> among other stipulations. North Korea, already a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), later signed an agreement to denuclearize the Korean peninsula with its southern neighbor and finally acceded, after years of pressure, to signing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement. IAEA inspectors found evidence of plutonium processing by North Korea in early 1993, and requested access to previously unacknowledged nuclear sites. North Korea refused. The regime compounded this nuclear crisis in March 1993, when it gave notice of its intent to withdraw from the NPT in ninety days. The United States and South Korea, particularly, took a carrot-and-stick diplomatic approach with North Korea, but renewed IAEA inspections in 1994 revealed more instances of plutonium reprocessing. The IAEA inspectors withdrew, the United States and South Korea began planning UN sanctions, and North Korea declared it would consider sanctions an act of war, while mobilizing its troops.<sup>6</sup>

Though briefly stabilized in June 1994, with a visit from Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang, during which the former president negotiated directly with Kim Il-Sung,<sup>7</sup> tensions rose sharply again only a month later when Kim II-Sung died, and his son, Kim Jong-Il, who had a reputation for homicidal recklessness, came to power. Japan was as concerned as the United States or South Korea, especially considering North Korea had demonstrated the capability of firing a missile capable of reaching Japan the previous year. As diplomats and policy elites focused on sanctions and other negotiation tools, there were those in Japan who wondered if the United States would really risk blood and treasure to protect Japan if the situation spiraled into a military emergency. In the GSDF an officer put it this way, “We think this means war, and we want to know if the U.S. will support us.”<sup>8</sup>

If there was doubt in Japan about the reliability of the U.S. defense guarantee, there was also doubt among U.S. defense officials of Japan’s reliability as a defense partner. The officials had watched the debate over Japan contributing to the first Gulf War devolve into what some considered farce. Then, during the North Korea nuclear crisis, some of the U.S. side wondered how well Japan could be counted on if the increased tension on the peninsula

morphed into actual combat. If Japan could not be counted upon to act in its own strategic interest during the first Gulf War, being much more dependent on Middle East oil than the United States, the reasoning went, would Japan be any more willing to act if the Korean War reignited, even considering the country would then be residing in the theater of war? If not, how could Japan be depended upon to be a defense partner at all?<sup>9</sup>

The North Korea nuclear crisis was resolved, for the time being, by the October 1994 Agreed Framework, in which the United States agreed to with North Korea "the replacement of its existing graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with light-water reactors (LWR);" as well the United States agreed to supply NK crude oil to make up energy shortfalls until the LWRs could come online.<sup>10</sup> With regard to U.S.-Japan security ties, in the meantime, worries on both sides about the efficacy and even longevity of the alliance led to talks about how to repair and renew ties.

One focus of the dialogue was the SACO report, an attempt to forestall nascent calls for U.S. forces to vacate Okinawa completely from growing stronger. The centerpiece of the report, was the reduction in size of U.S. military installations on Okinawa. As well the report included an agreement to move the Marine Corps Air Station currently in Futenma, a heavily urbanized part of southern Okinawa island, to an alternate location, and an agreement to release into Japanese custody even before indictment U.S. military personnel suspected of heinous crimes like murder and rape in certain cases. Another line of dialogue consisted more broadly of what some Japanese called the *saikakunin* (reconfirmation) of the alliance. This track had already produced, in November 1995, the first revision of Japan's National Defense Program Outline since the original NDPO was published in 1976. To U.S. defense planners the expansion of the scope of the alliance to include a Japanese role in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was particularly noteworthy.

A product largely of the post-Gulf War era in Japan, the 1995 *Taikō* was a cautious step away from the limitations on defense stressed in the 1976 NDPO. The Outline calls on the SDF to defend Japanese territory working with U.S. forces, but also directs the *Jieitai* (SDF) to "be prepared for large-scale disasters . . . and play an appropriate role in a timely manner in the Government's active efforts to establish a more stable security environment."<sup>11</sup> In contrast to 1976 the 1995 NDPO stresses cooperation with U.S. forces from the beginning of any military attack on Japan—not just if Japan cannot repel a small-scale invasion—recognizes the importance the disaster relief and international peacekeeping missions have taken on and stresses training, consultation and interoperability with its U.S. ally as well as training and exchanges with other countries. While the 1995 Outline did not go as far as the preceding Higuchi Report, which advocated SDF participation in peacemaking operations, which can include combat, the U.S. side was

still heartened by language that directed “Should a situation arise in areas surrounding Japan, which will have an important influence on national peace and security, [the SDF will] take appropriate response in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws and regulations,” supporting the United Nations or “Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements” as appropriate.<sup>12</sup>

Reassurance on both sides continued in a summit meeting between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro in April 1996, during which a new Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was announced and a Joint Security Declaration issued. Both the Joint Security Declaration and the ACSA, stressed an expanded logistical role for Japan in support of U.S. forces (though in the case of the ACSA this support was initially only for exercises), while the concept of SIASJ promised at least the possibility of expanded geographical area for cooperation. These expansions in mind, the Joint Declaration announced the intent of the two allies to revise the 1976 Defense Guidelines for the first time.

Defense officials from both countries got to work, and the new Defense Guidelines were issued in 1997. In addition to logistical support, the Guidelines “added ‘operational cooperation’ missions for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in time of regional conflict, including intelligence gathering, surveillance, and minesweeping missions.”<sup>13</sup> The enabling legislation, the “Law Concerning Measures to ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan”<sup>14</sup> passed the Diet in 1999, but not before North Korea’s firing of a *Taepodong* ballistic missile over northern Japan prompted the “U.S. and Japanese governments . . . to proceed with joint research on Theater Missile Defense (TMD),” a move the two governments had been studying for five years.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, as the alliance moved into the new century Japan had moved toward increasing the SDF’s responsibilities on a regional and even global level. But, given the new emphasis on mobility and the expense of one of the new priorities—missile defense—not all the SDF branches benefited equally. With the 1995 NDPO the GSDF found its end strength cut from 180,000, the number recommended nearly 40 years earlier by the Ikeda delegation, to 160,000, with 145,000 on active duty and the remaining 15,000 in the reserves. The number of divisions was reduced from twelve to eight (though separate brigades were increased from two to six), while tanks were reduced from around 1200 to around 900 and artillery pieces were reduced from 1000 to 900. That these reductions were only the first was a worry for members of the GSDF. In 2002 a GSDF officer visiting the Pentagon worried out loud the GSDF would continue to lose in budget battles, because the GSDF is not responsible for big-ticket missile defense systems, like the Air Self-Defense Force is for the Patriot missile system, and the Maritime Self-Defense Force is for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Destroyers. He also worried the GSDF

would continue to lose tanks and artillery pieces because of the disappearance of the Russian threat to Hokkaido (he was not wrong). Visiting the Japan Desk at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), perhaps wondering if OSD could apply some *tatemaie* (literally meaning “standing before,” and often translated as façade, *tatemaie* are polite fictions Japanese use in social interactions to avoid discussing unpleasant topics directly), the officer asked informally if OSD could not just say the United States still feared a Russian invasion? Intelligence assessments did not support such a scenario and the answer was no.<sup>16</sup> Not long after this conversation, U.S. officials in OSD were talking to their counterparts in Japan about another threat; one with historic implications for the GSDF.

### BOOTS ON THE GROUND, NOT *BUTZU* ON THE GROUND

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, occurred at a time that was late in the evening in Japan. I was stationed in Japan at the time. It was after 10:00 PM when my wife awoke me to see the pictures of the first tower, smoking, on television. We watched together, then, and saw when the second tower was struck. I was attending a course for senior field grade officers at Japan’s National Institute of Defense Studies at the time, while my family and I lived on Yokota Air Force Base, on the western edge of the Kanto Plain. Because of increased security concerns we were not allowed to leave the base for the following three days. Once I returned to class my classmates graciously expressed concern for me and my family, regarding 9/11. After I had spoken to the class about what had happened, from the point of view of the United States, one of my GSDF classmates (all three SDF branches attend the course, as well as Coast Guard, civilian and international students), asked me what the United States would do now. “*Sensō chū desu* (We’re at war),” I replied. He told me later he was startled I would answer so frankly, and he attributed my straightforwardness to my American culture. Yet there were those in Japan just as forthright, including the new prime minister.

#### Normal Nation-alist

Koizumi Junichirō, whom Richard Samuels terms a “normal nation-alist”<sup>17</sup> had been sworn in as prime minister in April. The son of a former defense minister he was originally from Yokosuka, home of the largest U.S. Navy base in Japan, where the U.S. Seventh Fleet is berthed, as well as an MSDF fleet and where the SDF Defense Academy is located, and, Koizumi was perhaps pre-disposed toward an interest in defense policy. He had entered the Diet in 1972. Unusual for a Japanese prime minister, he was not a member of

a particular faction, and it was perhaps partly due to this independence that he often got out ahead of his party, the LDP, and the government.<sup>18</sup> After the 9/11 attacks Koizumi immediately “established within the Cabinet Secretariat the ad hoc Iraq Response Team”<sup>19</sup> with himself as the chair, and was one of the first national leaders among America’s allies to voice support for the United States. He then shepherded through the Diet emergency legislation to allow the dispatch of MSDF ships to the affected area in a record three weeks.<sup>20</sup> Under the new legislation Japan dispatched the MSDF vessels to provide fuel to coalition ships patrolling in the Indian Ocean.

Japan’s contribution was appreciated. At one point the MSDF was supplying up to half the fuel coalition ships were using in the operation. But as the Global War on Terror began to focus on a possible invasion of Iraq U.S. defense officials were after more.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was a fan of Japan. While the secretary had served in Congress he had been instrumental in founding a parliamentary exchange with the Diet. Meeting the OSD Japan Desk members, including the author, and our boss, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Asia-Pacific, after a meeting on a Japan policy issue, the secretary expressed his admiration for Japan, and then held his hands tightly together in front of his chest. This was how much Japan was doing in terms of global security, he told us. Then he separated his two hands and held them a few inches apart, fingers curved inward. And this is what they could be doing, he explained. Your job, he told us, was to help Japan bridge that delta. We kept that in mind in all our efforts.<sup>21</sup>

One of the tasks we took on was to discuss with Japan joining the coalition if, as it seemed increasingly likely as 2002 wore on, we were going to invade Iraq. We initially met with high-ranking members of the Japanese embassy. Two of us accompanied Deputy Assistant Secretary (later Deputy Under Secretary) Richard Lawless to our initial meeting. As we expected the Japanese diplomat stressed Japan would not be able to participate in any kind of military action in Iraq, due to constitutional limitations, but Japan was prepared to send its P3 patrol aircraft to do surveillance patrols outside of the combat area, thus freeing up American and other coalition assets for surveillance missions in Iraq. We had prepared for this answer, and DASD Lawless told the diplomat, bluntly, we expected more from Japan, a wealthy ally with a lot to offer. The diplomat was aghast, and again protested constitutional restrictions. Prepared, DASD Lawless did not miss a beat when he said Japan’s interpretation of what was permissible under the constitution had been flexible in the past, and that it was time for flexibility again.

We met again, several times, and Ambassador Kato met twice with Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, with Secretary Rumsfeld dropping by both times. We steadily encouraged Japan to join the coalition, just as other

offices were working with other potential partners. Meeting the embassy staffer who was the embassy's point man on this possible deployment, I kept insisting what we needed was boots on the ground, a common phrase we in the U.S. military use to talk about deploying soldiers abroad. This was not a phrase the Japanese were familiar with, and my interlocutor staffer remembers sending a cable to Tokyo in April 2003, including the phrase for the first time.

Soon after the fall of Baghdad in March, 2003, the embassy told us Japan would participate in some fashion in the coming occupation. According to their first plan, they would focus on a water-purification mission. They planned to provide U.S. forces with clean water as a first priority, other coalition forces as a second priority, and everyone else as a third priority. The SDF would also deploy some engineers for road and infrastructure repair, and some doctors and nurses for health care. We thought the latter missions sounded good, but noted water purification is an area-support mission, and to set priorities as they suggested might not be feasible. Rather the mission should be to support the inhabitants of a specified area with the clean water. As the months went on we continued to meet at the staff level. We had talked about the fact that Japan would need to do a Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS), somehow, to determine where in Iraq the SDF would be operating. But as more and more time passed my interlocutor could not say when the PDSS would take place.

While talks continued at the staff level, PM Koizumi had been involved in his own negotiations. Pro-rearmament, Koizumi had come into office in April 2001 calling for the Cabinet Legislative Affairs Bureau (CLB) to loosen its interpretation that Japan could not constitutionally participate in collective self-defense, a position the CLB held finally for 60 years, from 1954 to 2014. Though he later announced he would not seek to change the then-current interpretation, he also said he found more room to maneuver in the interpretation than had previously been applied, and when the head of the CLB chided the PM about sections of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law—the legal basis for the MSDF dispatch—the premier made clear it was the last time CLB officials would do such a thing.<sup>22</sup> Declaring Japan “will no longer hold that the Self-Defense Forces should not be sent to danger spots.”<sup>23</sup> Koizumi proposed not only that Japan's soldiers operate in a wider area, including “India, Pakistan and the Afghan-Pakistan border region,” but that SDF medical personnel support U.S. military personnel in combat zones and provide humanitarian relief to refugees in Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup> This was too much of a stretch for some LDP members, and for the party's more dovish coalition partner, Komeito, however. Koizumi had to drop the medical support, as well as a planned dispatch of the GSDF to Pakistan. And new *hadome* were included on the expanded missions: the Anti-Terrorism law was limited to

two years, with one extension possible, transporting weapons for coalition forces was not included, and the number of troops deployed was limited and “to 1,200 or 2,400 during rotations.” In the end the Koizumi’s administration announced five policies: “(1) economic assistance; (2) reconstruction assistance; (3) humanitarian assistance; (4) disposal of weapons of mass destruction; [and] (5) land-mine removal.”<sup>25</sup>

At the staff level our team continued to push for as flexible a deployment as possible (aware of the difference between *haken*, dispatch, and *hahei*, deploy, we consciously used the term deployment), and we continued to push for Japan to deploy their PDSS team. Adopting the phrase we had repeatedly used, DASD Lawless told his Japanese interlocutors at one meeting that a small, relatively undeveloped Asian country had committed to putting their boots on the ground, but had told us, first, they needed boots.<sup>26</sup>

I received a phone call in August, 2003, that Japan was now ready to send the PDSS, which they called a *Chōsadan*, or investigation team, to Iraq, and wanted the team to be dispatched in September. It was my job to call the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), in overall operational command of U.S. forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, to get permissions for the team to travel around Iraq on the dates they planned. After the initial euphoria of the fall of Baghdad, the situation in Iraq had steadily deteriorated, by this time, as the insurgency grew. Many politicians, from all over the world had taken to visiting Baghdad, however, and the action officer on the phone told me 11 different Japanese politicians had already paid a visit. These visits, he continued, drained important resources away, which the multinational forces on the ground, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF 7) could not afford. Assuming the *Chōsadan* would just be more of the same, the action officer, saying “we’re trying to fight a war,” denied the request. I told my boss then called the Japanese embassy. Less than an hour later I received a call from the National Security Council and was told the President would be meeting with Koizumi soon, so the PDSS had to be authorized. I informed my boss, called CENTCOM back, and then called the Japanese embassy with the news. The *Chōsadan* was approved for the dates they had requested.

Japan’s PDSS, accompanied by the author from OSD and one American air force officer from the U.S. Joint Staff, departed in September 2003. The team went to Qatar, Jordan, and Kuwait, first, where the Japanese held consultations with their embassies and with elements of the coalition—that is, largely American—forces in the area. The *Chōsadan* head of delegation was Masuda Kohei, a calm, smart, dedicated professional.

One of the first stops in Iraq was Balad, where we Americans, for the most part, were establishing an air and logistics hub. The delegation went there to see a demonstration by an American National Guard unit, who were conducting a water-purification mission.

The highest ranking *Jeikan* on the delegation was Major General Izumi Kazushige, the Joint Staff J3. Izumi had a fierce countenance and a reputation for having the heart of a warrior. He was the kind of leader around whom larger-than-life stories sprang. Because of the sensitivity to all things military in Japan, training areas are few and training itself has many constraints. When firing artillery, typically, the cannons aim points are fixed. Still, on occasion, due to a technical issue, a round overshoots its target and lands in a farmer's field. Typically the division commander then is driven to the accident area where he profusely apologizes to the landowner. This kind of incident happened when Izumi was a division commander. Instead of being driven out to the offending incident site in a jeep, however, Izumi ordered a helicopter to fly him there, and he fast-roped down, to apologize to the landowner.<sup>27</sup>

Izumi the warrior was the same way in Iraq, walking energetically, swiftly and determinedly everywhere the PDSS team went, despite the punishing temperatures. In Balad at the water-purification demo, the American Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) giving the demonstration first showed General Izumi and the rest of the delegation a jar of water straight from the Euphrates River, which was cloudy and had some particulates floating in it. Nor did it have a particularly nice bouquet. The NCO then walked the team along the line of the Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU), explaining how the water was filtered and purified at each step. At the end of the ROWPU the NCO held a small cup to a spigot, filled it, and offered it to Izumi. The general took the cup and took a healthy swig. Smiling, he said, "*Amai!*", which, literally translated, means "sweet," but, in this case, probably meant, "tastes good!"<sup>28</sup> The GSDF would go on to provide tons of clean water by ROWPU to Iraqis in the Samawah area.

The next stop was for the PDSS team was at Camp Victory, near the Baghdad International Airport, where the primary on-ground coalition military unit, the Combined Joint Task Force 7, was headquartered. The troops called Camp Victory Water World, because of the artificial lakes Hussein had built around his palace there. As the team sat in the headquarters Masuda-san looked around at all the international officers from the contributing nations and said maybe Japan's contribution could be to send twenty or so liaison officers (LNOs) to Water World. I asked what the LNOs would do. Masuda said they would be LNOs. I told him the policy in CJTF 7 was there were no pure LNOs, simply reporting back to their respective armies. Each LNO also had to fill a staff position and work in the CJTF headquarters. I asked what sections the Japanese LNOs would work in. Masuda answered they could not work in the CJTF, because collective defense was proscribed. I replied the LNOs would not be welcome in the CJTF, then. Masuda smiled ruefully and said a joke had been going around the JDA that Japan might not be able to put boots on the ground, but might instead put *butsu* (stuff, materiel) on

the ground. I smiled too, and said the coalition would welcome the materiel, but we wanted people, too. Masuda acknowledged this. The delegation continued to hold talks, and settled on a location in Samawah, in Muthana governorate, a location where they could provide the kind of humanitarian and reconstruction support they felt they could contribute.

### The Commander with a Mustache

Though it was rumored at the time of the PDSS that Izumi wanted to find a way he could deploy—that is, be dispatched—to Iraq, in the end he was not able to manage it. An officer who did deploy, commanding the first 600-person Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group, was Colonel Banshō Koichirō. Banshō had a reputation as a warrior; he was “credited with a cool head and quick thinking in combat drills,”<sup>29</sup> and demonstrated, to a certain extent, the distance Japan’s defense debate had traveled when, just prior to their deployment, he told his assembled GSDF soldiers they hailed “from the country of bushido,” to some headlines, but relatively little controversy.<sup>30</sup> Though Banshō became relatively well known due to his historic mission, the GSDF officer who became best known, and forever changed, by the Iraq operation preceded Banshō as the first commander of GSDF boots on the ground in Iraq, albeit of a smaller unit.

Colonel Sato Masahisa was well suited to his task as the commander of the GSDF Advance Unit into Iraq. Born in Fukushima, in Tohoku, northern Honshu, Sato was something of an overseas dispatch expert. Not only had he been an early participant in the first PKO mission to Cambodia, he had been the deputy of the first unit to support the UN mission in the Golan Heights in 1996, and he had attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), so his English was good, helpful with the international press.

Sato arrived in Kuwait with his advance unit on January 19, 2004, and drove into Samawah the following day. Due to the large media contingent Japan had on the ground in Iraq, he was instantly the most photographed man in Japan, and his mustache—unusual for Japanese men—was his trademark. In his book about the experience Sato says he had grown the mustache purposefully, as an outreach to Iraqis, because he had been advised to do so by Middle East experts before he had gone to the Golan Heights, due to the fact that in many Arab cultures a mustache was a sign of coming of age for men.<sup>31</sup> Soon, all over his support area in Iraq even those who did not know his name knew the mustachioed commander (*hige no taichō*).

The advance team was billeted in Camp Smitty, a Dutch military camp, while the JGSDF’s camp was being constructed. The Japanese camp was constructed within a few weeks, complete with high-tech video surveillance and innovative containerized housing units (CHUs). CHUS were used by

coalition troops all over Iraq, and oblong housing units, usually sleeping two, that resemble shipping containers. The Japanese innovation was to reinforce the ground CHU while fastening an empty CHU filled with gravel and other debris directly above it to protect sleeping troops from gunshot and mortar rounds—even rockets—which otherwise easily penetrated the relatively thin roofs of the standard containers.

The entire mission was innovative for the GSDF as it was the first deployment to a non-pacified area (though Samawah was one of the safest areas in Iraq at the time). Sato was busy from the first with relationship-establishing activities. The Coalition Provisional Authority, under Ambassador Paul Bremer, had a local office occupying a building in Samawah in which Sato and his team, as well as two Japanese diplomats, from Basrah, conducted meetings, and occasionally eating in the small dining area in the building with those with whom they were coordinating. At first coordination between Sato, his team and the local CPA was sporadic, due to inexperience on both side. The local CPA office complained about the lack of coordination to CPA in Baghdad, and the CPA's Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, sent a staff member down to Samawah to smooth over the situation. Though stretched thin, Sato made time for the staffer and the two were able to quickly work out an agreement concerning coordinating use of CPA facilities and resources. During a brief talk about his impressions with the CPA staffer, Sato said he was glad the GSDF had come to Iraq, because he thought they could make a difference. He also said it was a mission of firsts, including this mission being the first time the GSDF had worked with diplomats from Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and supporting MOFA had been eye-opening.<sup>32</sup>

Sato's strongest impressions of Iraq was that it was eye-opening in other ways as well. While the GSDF's experience in PKO missions in places like "Cambodia, the Golan Heights, East Timor," had been worthwhile and valuable, in Iraq, he writes "the character of the mission was completely different,"<sup>33</sup> because though the PKO missions had involved some similar tasks, like repairing roads, that support had been mainly for other military forces. In Iraq, Sato recalls, the support was not primarily for the multinational forces, but for the citizens of the Muthana governorate. He also writes of the excessively high expectations of the GSDF in Samawah, being told by Iraqis, for instance, with the Japanese now in their area, bringing big engineering projects employing 20,000 people "Samawah will soon become like Tokyo!"<sup>34</sup> Sato did his best to provide realistic hope for the Iraqis in his area, but also displayed his heart for his soldiers as he explains he knew his *taiin* were on edge, because out in the community most of the men were armed, and you never knew who was friend and who was foe.<sup>35</sup>

The mission on the ground lasted until 2006. The GSDF provided tons of clean water, repaired roads and other facilities, including hospitals, and

provided medical care and medical education. In the end Sato feels the mission could only have been done by the *Jieitai*.<sup>36</sup> After returning to Japan Sato spent a few more years in the force and then got out to serve in the Upper House of Japan's Diet, where he still serves. And where he is still a champion for a normalized defense force in Japan.

### BETWEEN THE (SENKAKU) ROCKS AND A (RESURGENT, ANTI-STATUS QUO CHINA) HARD PLACE

The dispatch to Iraq, though certainly significant due to the precedent, did not turn into the transformative event many predicted. Due to the unpopularity of the Iraq War, in large part, even PKO missions to UN-supported, pacified areas became more difficult.<sup>37</sup> However, the changed international security environment, followed by the coming to office of another revisionist, did push the defense debate forward.

The defense-minded Koizumi had ordered a commission to look at the NDPO, and the commission's resulting Araki report, like the Higuchi Report before it, had a big impact on the new *Taikō*, issued in December 2004, and now called the National Defense Program Guidelines, or NDPG, in English, but with no change to the Japanese name. Recognizing the world had changed in the era of the War on Terror, the 2004 NDPG describes the new dangers, "outlining a range of new threats to Japan, including ballistic missile attacks, guerilla and special operations attacks, incursions into territorial waters, and chemical and biological warfare."<sup>38</sup> The NDPG also identifies North Korea and China as threats for the first time, and goes beyond regionalism to stress a global role reaching at least from "the Middle East to Japan."<sup>39</sup> This is also the first defense document to stress the threat to Japan's outlying islands.<sup>40</sup> Two of these elements, a rising China threat and threat to outlying islands, and the return of Shinzo Abe, have driven the next phase of change for the GSDF.

Abe Shinzo is the latest prime minister during the time period of this study to desire the creation of a more normal Japan, including the commensurate army. Abe is the grandson of Kishi Nobusuke, and must have picked up this desire to change the post-*Anpo* Riots status quo literally at his grandfather's knee. Before Abe became prime minister the first time, as Koizumi's Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary he was already actively promoting change in Japan's deeply embedded security norms, among which he championed "reining in the CLB," which, he told other lawmakers "has been providing misleading explanations on collective defense."<sup>41</sup> After the paradigm-shift inducing Iraq deployment, Abe himself became prime minister in 2006.

In this first term Prime Minister Abe continued to advocate collective defense, and called for Article 9 to be revised. No doubt he wanted to

continue breaking defense barriers—or at least releasing pressure on defense brakes (those infamous *hadome*)—like his predecessor Koizumi. But the Iraq War had become so unpopular Abe found his options limited.<sup>42</sup> To better coordinate Japan's defense policies, he first sought to establish a National Security Council.<sup>43</sup> Though the new premier was unable to overcome the bureaucratic obstacles in pursuit of this goal, Abe did succeed in passing legislation, in December 2006, to upgrade the Japan Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense in January 2007.<sup>44</sup> Abe also experienced success with his defense diplomacy. In 2007 Abe brought to term what Koizumi and he had engineered through a series of high-level exchanges, with the issuing of the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. Having secured Australia's support Abe made a similar approach to India for security cooperation.<sup>45</sup> A degree of success in this effort led Abe "to declare an 'Arc of Freedom and Prosperity' in Asia stretching from Japan across Pacific Asia to India (and notably excluding China)."<sup>46</sup> In the end, it was not only the unpopularity of the Iraq War, but the fact Abe was premier for only one year during this first term that curtailed Abe's agenda. There would be an interim of five years and five prime ministers before Abe could return to more successfully pursue defense reform. In that interim China, with its expanding military and expansive territorial claims, overtook a still-dangerous North Korea to drive Japanese defense policies.

As China has grown more wealthy in the past 30 years it has modernized its military and has begun to make more assertive claims to territory, particularly in the East and South China Seas. It is in the East China Sea that Japan's and China's Exclusive Economic Zones meet, and where a groups of islands—some really no more than rocks—called the Senkaku by Japan and the Diaoyutai by China are located. Both China and Japan (as well as Taiwan) claim the territory.

China and Taiwan both claim the islands belonged to China at least as far back as the Ming Dynasty, but Japan bases its claims on actions its government took in the late nineteenth century. The Senkakus lie west of the southern portion of the Ryukyu island chain. The Japanese government had incorporated the Ryukyu islands into Japan in the 1870s. In 1895 the government sent a survey team to the Senkakus. Discovering no inhabitants, and no sign of past inhabitants, the survey team determined the territory was *terra nullius* (territory that is not under anyone's sovereign control) and laid out markers, claiming the islands for Japan. The following year Koga Tatsushiro, an entrepreneur, "obtained permission from the Japanese government to develop the islands, and many Japanese people moved there. Settlers ran businesses in dried bonito manufacturing, feather collecting and other activities. The islands counted more than 200 inhabitants at one point."<sup>47</sup>

Thus Japan claims it first surveyed what it found to be uninhabited territory, and then claimed that territory for itself, and second had Japanese people inhabiting the islands for a period of time. Both the first and the second methods described are recognized under international law as legitimate means by which a nation-state may incorporate and rightly claim sovereignty over new territory. Japan goes on to point out China, too, has recognized Japan's sovereignty over the islands on official government documents in the past and notes China did not announce claims on the Senkakus until 1971, after a survey of the surrounding ocean floor indicated the possible presence of valuable minerals and fossil fuels.<sup>48</sup> China and Japan set aside discussion of who owned the islands when they normalized relations in 1972,<sup>49</sup> but "The rhetoric and action over territorial disputes over off-shore islands and maritime resources have ratcheted up notably in the past decade, fueled by nationalist activists on both sides."<sup>50</sup> Tensions have also increased in the South China Sea as China has begun to stress its claim for sovereignty over essentially all the islands, rocks and sea features encompassed within its Nine-Dash Line, which has been printed on Chinese maps for years and incorporates most of the South China Sea.<sup>51</sup>

In Japan in 2010, "the passage of a large People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) flotilla (or armada, as described in the Japan media)," had already caused an outcry when later the same year, "the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) arrested the captain and crew of a Chinese trawler that attempted in September to ram its vessels in the disputed area."<sup>52</sup> There were immediate outcries from the Chinese government—as well as sanctions applied by the China on rare-earth mineral exports to Japan—and anti-Japanese protests in Chinese streets. Japan released the captain after a few days, but protests in China broke out again in 2012 when Japan bought three of the Senkaku Islands from the private Japanese owner. Japan's government took this action to prevent Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro from following through with his stated intent to buy the islands with funding he was publicly raising. Ishihara based his fund raising on claims the GOJ "was not doing enough to protect the islands."<sup>53</sup> In 2012 a Chinese major general and a former Chinese diplomat both opined that China's claims could actually extend over the entire Ryukyu chain, and a "similar sentiment was echoed in the *Global Times* which operates under the auspices of the *People's Daily*."<sup>54</sup> Tensions ratcheted again in 2013, when China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Senkaku Islands, one that overlapped with Japan's own ADIZ.<sup>55</sup> Caught between the rocks of the Senkakus and the hard place of a China which apparently sees both the East and the South China Seas as arenas where they can redress what they continue to call their century of humiliation, the JSDF has begun to undergo what may become its most significant transformation yet as it seeks

to develop the capacity to protect and take back, if necessary, its outlying islands. The GSDF is at the center of this effort.

An archipelagic nation consisting of some 6,852 islands and a long martial tradition, Japan is no stranger to island defense. But, until the recent history, the development of the GSDF's equipment and doctrine has focused more on traditional, or continental, style operations. A famous incident from Japan's Gempei War symbolizes many of the challenges of defending Japan's offshore islands.

The Gempei War was fought between the two most powerful samurai families of the time, the Minamoto and the Taira. In 1185 the Taira forces had gathered at a fortified location on Yashima, an island just north of Shikoku. Yoshitsune, commander of the Minamoto, led a small force in an amphibious landing on Shikoku, and then crossed Shikoku to attack Yashima. Observing the approaching Minamoto force, the Taira boarded ships and fled Yashima, but not far. Perhaps realizing how small the Minamoto force was, the numerically superior Taira decided to retake Yashima. But first they decided to employ some psychological warfare. The Taira fixed an open fan atop the mast of one of their ships, and then had a beautiful young woman come out on the deck of the ship to taunt the Minamoto samurai. According to one version of the story, the young woman told the Yashima defenders the fan atop the mast had been blessed in a temple of Hachiman, the God of War, and unless the Minamoto could shoot the fan down, the Taira were guaranteed to win the coming battle. Yoshitsune ordered his best archer, Nasu no Yoichi, to shoot the fan down. Yoichi rode his horse into the surf. Rocked by the surging waves himself, Yoichi selected an arrow and fired at the fan atop the swaying mast hundreds of feet away. With this single shot Yoichi toppled the fan, and the Minamoto, despite being outnumbered, won the ensuing battle.<sup>56</sup>

The JGSDF has been trying to turn key units into modern embodiments of Nasu no Yoichi, to face down and triumph over a numerically superior Taira, in this case the People's Liberation Army, since at least 2004. Both the Araki Report and the 2004 NDPG had recommended the JSDF "should be characterized by mobility and rapid reaction; [as well as] joint command and control."<sup>57</sup> Probably planners at this time were focused on making the JSDF more capable of the international cooperation that had been highlighted in the Araki Report, but the same characteristics are necessary to develop a capacity to better defend the offshore islands to the southwest of Japan's main islands, and this was also on the minds of Japanese defense planners in 2004. To meet the perceived threat presented during the New Cold War the GSDF had organized for a conventional fight against an armored and mechanized Soviet-style force, with Hokkaido as the frontline from the late 1970s through the 1980s. After the Cold War, as the GSDF had transitioned to a proscribed post-modern force, it had shed some of its heavy equipment. As the GSDF officer who visited the Pentagon in 2002 had worried, new threats in the new century

and the resulting emphasis on mobility has meant a loss of yet more tanks and artillery pieces, reducing in the 2004 NDPG from approximately 900 each to approximately 600 each, a reduction by half of the number of tanks and two-fifths of the artillery pieces outlined in the 1976 NDPO. However, unlike the officer had worried, the GSDF's end strength actually increased, from 145,000 to 148,000 in this later *Taikō*.<sup>58</sup> The GSDF also began to focus more on helicopters and light armored vehicles with this NDPG, and it stood up a new unit focused on high mobility and overseas missions, the Central Readiness Force (CRF).

The CRF, which stood up in 2007, is commanded by a three-star general, just as the GSDF's five armies (*hōmentai*) are, and the unit reports directly to the Minister of Defense. The CRF brought under its command structure the GSDF 1st Airborne Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade, Central NBC (Nuclear Biological Chemical) Protection Unit and the Special Forces Group, and stood up, also under its command, a Central Readiness Regiment, and International Peace Activities Training and Education Unit. The new emphasis on mobility and agility also would have a big impact on the rest of the GSDF, as:

Today, the GSDF deploys two types of divisions and brigades. One is readiness-modernized divisions/brigades (*sokuo kindai-ka shidan/ryodan*). Deployed throughout Japan except for Hokkaido, their force build-up is geared toward responding to situations in which agility and flexibility of the force are essential. The other, comprehensive modernized divisions/brigades (*sougou kindai-ka shidan/ryodan*), has a more traditional force structure that is deployed only in Hokkaido.<sup>59</sup>

Thus, with the 2004 NDPG the earlier New Cold War orientation of the GSDF, on a conventional threat in Hokkaido, was reversed, from heavier, mechanized forces, focused on a northern frontline, to a lighter, more mobile force focused on the offshore islands in Japan's southwest.

While some observers thought the Central Readiness Regiment might be the unit tasked with taking on the amphibious operations mission—to protect or retake offshore islands, or, in other words, become the Marines of the GSDF—in the end a decision was made to build up the Western Army Infantry Regiment (a light infantry unit stationed in Kyushu) into a Rapid Deployment Amphibious Brigade. This decision was made with the second coming of Prime Minister Abe, elected again in December 2012 to take the position he had vacated in 2007.

### The Radical Moderate

It is not that the defense debate had not moved forward in the intervening years. Driven by an increased sense of threat from China and the bilateral

Defense Policy Review Initiative talks with the United States, which included agreements on Common Strategic Objectives (global in scope), in-depth talks on roles and missions, and bilateral decisions to co-locate the JASDF air defense headquarters with their U.S. counterparts on Yokota Air Base in a Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center, and to co-locate the U.S. Army Japan/I Corps Forward headquarters with the CRF headquarters on Camp Zama, the defense discourse in Japan had remained vibrant.<sup>60</sup> The 2004 NDPG had been replaced by a new one in 2010. In the 2010 iteration Japan drops references to the Basic Defense Force in favor of a Dynamic Defense Force, for the purpose of “promoting timely and active ‘operations.’ It will also enable Japan to play active roles in various situations such as international peace cooperation activities.”<sup>61</sup> The 2010 NDPG introduces new threats, such as those in cyber space, and brings up the difficulties of gray zone incidents, “confrontations over territory, sovereignty and economic interests which have not escalated into wars,” and mentions defense of off-shore islands prominently in its priorities.<sup>62</sup> The GSDF, according to the document, was to lose 1000 people on active duty, taking that number down to 147,000, lose an “anti-aircraft artillery group,” and lose 200 each of tanks and artillery pieces, which would bring the total of each of those systems to about 400.<sup>63</sup>

Robust as the discussion might have been, the once-and-present (as of this writing) prime minister, Abe was not satisfied. Upon assuming office the second time, in December 2012, he froze the 2010 NDPG, ordered a new one be drafted and ordered a national security strategy document be crafted. The threat from China was made more manifest just a month later, when, “a Chinese frigate reportedly locked fire-control radar on an MSDF destroyer in the east China sea, 180 kilometers north of the Senkaku Islands”<sup>64</sup> Locking fire-radar on another’s country’s ship or aircraft is considered an act of war, and this act spurred the already ordered planning process on. A year after Abe returned to the premiership his administration published three important documents on December 17, 2013.

The overarching policy document was the first of its kind, National Security Strategy. In it Abe touts his Proactive Contributions to Peace, a policy stressing international cooperation, universal values and the rule of law, a strengthened, more tightly knit alliance with the United States and a more effective Self-Defense Force. The document spells out the threats posed by North Korea and by gray zone incidents. It also stresses the threat from China: “China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea,” and then mentions the Senkaku Islands directly.<sup>65</sup>

The Senkaku and other southwestern islands are important not just as sovereign territory, with citizens who need to be protected, but for their strategic position. The Japanese islands form an important part of what is known as the First Island Chain, usually construed as stretching from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines to Indonesia.<sup>66</sup> To reach the open ocean Chinese ships, whether of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), of China's burgeoning paramilitary maritime security fleet, or of commercial cargo, must transit through this chain. Given the economic dynamism of the Pacific region as a whole, and that China and Japan generate the second and third largest economies in the world, an enormous percentage of the world's trade transits through the sealanes the First Island Chain gives access to. Thus ensuring access is of strategic interest, and "of the sixteen major straits and channels critical to China's oceanic access, eleven are situated along the Japanese-controlled southwestern islands."<sup>67</sup> Given China's coercive tactics in the East and South China Seas Japan is concerned with continuing to control its sovereignty and with maintaining free access to the sealanes upon which its economy depends even more than China's economy; therefore Japan explains its national interest as "the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders."<sup>68</sup>

But Japan also gives notice it no longer construes its interests as strictly limited to its own territory, stating "As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, through close cooperation with other countries, in maintaining and developing 'Open and Stable Seas,'"<sup>69</sup> The document notes in passing its new National Security Council (NSC), which was established by a law enacted also in December 2013, and represents "Japan's most significant security-relevant institutional reform in recent memory,"<sup>70</sup> would coordinate realizing and effecting the tenets of the overall strategy. Abe had tried to stand up the NSC in his first term, but had not succeeded. The prime minister and others in Japan had recognized, as the United States and other nations have, that the kind of non-conventional crises that have proliferated in the post-Cold War world require what is often called a whole-of-government approach.<sup>71</sup> While Japan has discussed a Comprehensive Security approach for years, the inauguration of the NSS as a "control tower"<sup>72</sup> will allow the Japanese government to institute this approach "in a more strategic and structured manner."<sup>73</sup>

While Japan stresses international cooperation from the first in the NSS, discussing strengthening its alliance with the United States, as well as strengthening cooperation with the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India specifically, and the United Nations and other international entities more generally, it also acknowledges the SDF as "the final guarantee of its national security which deters direct threats from reaching Japan and defeats any threat that

reaches it.”<sup>74</sup> Central to this guarantee is a revamped, more agile and mobile GSDF, with the ability to conduct amphibious operations.

Just as governments in the turbulent past 15 years or so have increasingly realized complex problems require not just military but whole-of-government solutions, militaries have increasingly, if individual branches thereof somewhat grudgingly, acknowledged threats to the international order must be addressed with more the separate military services working together. These multi-service operations are known as joint operations in the United States. Arguably, amphibious operations, sometimes known in the U.S. military as Amphib Ops or simply PhibOps, are the most joint of all. Typically PhibOps require an organization that is multi-service throughout. Amphib Ops require sea control at least around the shore of the amphibious target. Navy ships achieve and maintain that control, while also transporting the amphibious troops and their equipment, and providing supporting fires during and after the amphibious troops reach the shore. Military aircraft are necessary to achieve air superiority as well as to support and transport troops and equipment throughout. Meticulous planning regarding ship loading and offloading, geographical and maritime features, primary versus supporting fire and support roles, and command hand-offs. (For instance, while the overall operational command is likely to remain at a standing joint organization throughout, once the amphibious operation is underway, typically, the commanding officer of the amphibious assault vessels has overall command of an amphibious task force. Once the Landing Force is on the shore, the Landing Force commander has overall command.) Successful PhibOps require superior situational awareness, through Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, equipment appropriate to the problem (whether the landing will be opposed or unopposed; what infrastructure is available), the aforementioned planning, and much, much practice.<sup>75</sup>

Between World Wars I and II, of the Great Powers, Japan was the first to develop amphibious doctrine.<sup>76</sup> After World War II, given the *nioi* (whiff, scent or smell) of offensive war around amphibious operations, the SDF never bothered to reacquire any expertise. While the GSDF has been training for amphibious operations for at least the last 10 years,<sup>77</sup> to reestablish Japan’s amphibious capability, as well as effect the overall transformation of the GSDF and other two services—potentially the most significant evolution in the SDF’s history—has begun with the new NDPG and new Midterm Defense Plan (covering the first half of the NDPG’s projected 10 years), both published on the same day as the NSS.

The 2010 NDPG, though designating non-Hokkaido divisions as more operationally ready, only listed the CRF and one division as mobile.<sup>78</sup> The 2013 NDPG designates three divisions and four brigades as rapid deployment units, including the added “amphibious rapid deployment brigade.”<sup>79</sup>

The number of tanks and artillery pieces are reduced once again, to approximately 300 each, but the overall active-duty endstrength of the GSDF rises to 151,000.<sup>80</sup>

The Western Army Infantry has been designated as the GSDF's amphibious-capable unit. It will grow from about 700 *taiin* presently to about 2000 in 2017, when the Rapid Deployment Amphibious Brigade is scheduled to stand up, gaining another 1000 members by the following year when the brigade is planned to be fully operational.<sup>81</sup> To equip this force Japan plans to buy 52 amphibious assault vehicles (AAV-7s, the kind currently used by the U.S. Marine Corps), by 2018. The AAVs are armored, equipped with a .50 caliber machine gun and a .40 millimeter automatic grenade launcher, can carry 24 troops and their equipment.<sup>82</sup> The brigade will also be equipped with the indigenously produced Maneuver Combat Vehicle, "a 26 ton 8x8 wheeled armored vehicle armed with a 105mm gun." Which, in turn, is "designed to be carried by the new C-2 transport for rapid deployment to Japan's remote islands."<sup>83</sup> Acquisition of the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft will give the troops speed and flexibility.<sup>84</sup>

The practiced, ingrained ability to work with other branches of service seamlessly, jointness, is vital to the success of amphibious operations. The 2013 NDPG first acknowledges this by tweaking the designation of the target force, from Dynamic Defense Force to Dynamic Joint Defense Force, but more importantly calls for the kind of equipment and organization necessary to bring about this change. Given the importance of ISR—to amphibious operations in general and highlighted in the NSS<sup>85</sup>—for instance, Japan plans to buy three Global Hawk surveillance drones, and confirmed its intent, noted in the 2010 NDPG, to establish a GSDF radar and coastal surveillance unit, with about 100 soldiers, in Yonaguni, Japan's southern-most inhabited island (the unit stood up in March, 2016).<sup>86</sup>

To transport the new amphibious troops, the MSDF already possesses "three *Osumi* LSTs," tank landing ships, each of which "possesses a well deck that can embark either two Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCACs, which in turn can carry multiple LAVs) or one of the GSDF's heavy tanks."<sup>87</sup> The MSDF also possesses two *Hyuga*-class helicopter destroyers (small aircraft carriers) that can embark up to four helicopters, and plans to procure two of a new, larger helicopter destroyer, the "22DDH" which will embark up to nine helicopters.<sup>88</sup> The ASDF will be obtaining additional transport and surveillance aircraft, as well as the F-35 joint strike fighter, and is sending "a second squadron of F-15J air superiority fighters," to Naha on Okinawa.<sup>89</sup>

In addition to the defense policy documents enumerated above, Abe has been able to pass some controversial legislation. The first is the "Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets." Giving the GoJ better legal tools to protect classified information, the law strengthens cooperation and coordination in

the U.S.-Japan Alliance, because the United States can now feel more comfortable sharing military secrets. The other law is more significant, and possibly Abe's most significant defense accomplishment: the premier, after dismissing the head of the CLB and appointing a new one, managed to change the GoJ's official interpretation of Article 9 to allow for Japan's participation in collective self-defense. This change does come with a set of *hadome*: "Domestic resistance, especially from the LDP's coalition partner, compelled the Abe Cabinet to stipulate three strict conditions for exercising CSD: Japan's survival (*kuni no sonritsu*) is threatened; no alternative means of addressing the threat exists; and whatever force Japan uses will be limited to the minimum necessary,"<sup>90</sup> but it least realizes a long-held dream for Abe himself, and represents a step toward recognizing what Japan has practiced in a limited fashion since 2001. Legislation enabling the brake-lined collective self-defense, as well as a bill entitled "'Permanent International Peace Support Law,' . . . intended to enable the JSDF to provide logistic support to multinational forces with prior Diet approval but without the need to formulate and debate ad hoc 'special measures laws' each time," passed in September, 2015.<sup>91</sup>

Finally, Abe was able to place his imprimatur on the latest set of Defense Cooperation Guidelines, the first change to the Guidelines since 1997. Highlights include Japan unambiguously embracing a global role, the forming of "a standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)," and "expanding the substantive scope of cooperation to include ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), intelligence-sharing." Collective defense with other countries, while "engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan," is also permitted.<sup>92</sup> As has been the case with almost all the defense policy changes advocated by Abe and his administration, the publication of the Defense Cooperation Guidelines was met with heavy criticism and some demonstrations, although, in this case, perhaps exacerbated by the fact in April 2015, when the Guidelines were published, the Kantei<sup>93</sup> had not yet submitted the enabling draft bills to the Diet.

### THE PLOUGHSHARE IN THE TRIPLE DISASTER OF 3.11

After 1991 the GSDF transformed into a proscribed postmodern army, one more focused on non-traditional roles and missions, like peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, than conventional combat. Given the importance the GSDF had imbued on gaining the Japanese people's acceptance through works of service in the civilian community it is understandable the GSDF was further along the path of accepting these kinds of missions than many other national armies, including the U.S. Army, for instance. The GSDF may now be poised to make yet another transformation, into what

I will call an expeditionary army; a lighter, more agile kind of force, which, in Japan's case, will still be more likely to train and focus on non-traditional roles and missions, but one that will now be trained and equipped to deploy considerable distances and respond to burgeoning gray zone situations and combat missions. Japan's location in the rim of fire, and the GSDF's rich heritage of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, as well as continuing peacekeeping forays, will insure the GSDF's role as a ploughshare rather than a sword will continue to exert a strong influence on its development. No event illustrates this better than the mammoth triple disaster that occurred on March 11, 2011, which is typically simply called 3.11 in Japan.

On March 11, 2011, an earthquake, measuring 9 on the Richter Scale, struck northern Honshu, violently shoving "Japan . . . eight feet closer to North America."<sup>94</sup> The temblor was accompanied by a tsunami that immediately "claimed the lives of nearly twenty thousand residents"<sup>95</sup> and a reactor meltdown at the Fukushima *Dai Ichi*, or No. 1, nuclear power plant. The SDF began immediate disaster relief, starting with the GSDF troops of the Northeastern Army (NEA), headquartered in devastated Sendai. By March 14 Prime Minister Kan had dispatched 100,000 SDF members to the scene and appointed General Kimizuka Eiji, the commanding general of the NEA to head Joint Task Force Tohoku (Japan's first JTF),<sup>96</sup> spearheading relief efforts on the ground. The most senior GSDF general, Oriki Ryoichi, Chief of Staff, Joint, Staff, had been directing overall SDF operations from the start,<sup>97</sup> with the forces surging into action "29 minutes after" the earthquake struck.<sup>98</sup> During the operation, the largest in the SDF's history, the SDF: rescued 19,000 out of 27,000 people; recovered 9,500 out of 16,000 bodies; and set up "about 200 water supply locations, about 100 food supply facilities, and about 35 outdoor bathing facilities."<sup>99</sup> The CRF's "1st Helicopter brigade's dropped approximately thirty tons of seawater on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station's Unit 3"<sup>100</sup> on March 17, while GSDF fire trucks continued to spray hundreds of tons of water more during March 17 and 18 at the No. 3 reactor, and during March 20 and 21 at the No. 4 reactor. The GSDF conducted decontamination at nine centers around the reactors, and continued decontamination in surrounding communities for months afterwards.<sup>101</sup>

The SDF's relief efforts during the triple disaster had a significant impact on Japan's overall defense discourse. The SDF worked closely with its American counterparts in Operation Tomodachi. The United States deployed approximately 16,000 troops, 140 aircrafts, and 15 vessels, including the aircraft carrier *Ronald Reagan*, for assistance. U.S. military personnel worked with the JSDF throughout the disaster area, and sent a team to work with Japan's MOD in Ichigaya. Japan, in turn, sent a Bilateral Crisis Action Team, headed by Banshō Koichirō, who had been promoted to major general, to Yokota Air Base where U.S. Forces, Japan, is headquartered.<sup>102</sup> The result

was tremendous good will on both sides, and lessons learned for how to better work together; some of these lessons, at least, were later worked into updated Defense Cooperation Guidelines. Regarding amphibious operations, the disaster highlighted how valuable such a capability is during HA/DR operations. The SDF flew important and timely search-and-rescue missions with the four helicopters from the helicopter destroyer *Hyuga* and saw how a bigger amphibious assault ship can be valuable, when the U.S. dock landing ship *Tortuga* transported over 200 GSDF soldiers and over 90 vehicles. The value of strategic airlift was emphasized when Australian and U.S. transport aircraft helped move 115 troops and 68 vehicles from Okinawa to Tohoku.<sup>103</sup>

### **Adaptive Agile Ground Defense Force**

The GSDF's, as well as the other two services', popularity reached new heights after their response to the triple disaster. In the beginning of the manga that has been created about Sato Masahisa, the commander with a mustache who is now a member of the House of Councillors, Sato goes to Fukushima, his birthplace, after the disaster. Distraught by the level of destruction he sees he enters a refugee center and bows toward the refugees. He's surprised when one of them asks him if he isn't Sato, the commander with the mustache, Sato replies he is. The refugee smiles and offers his hand to shake, explaining "You're an SDF veteran. I want to thank the SDF." Another refugee exclaims, "We all owe a lot to the SDF, truly." This was common after the disaster, and must have felt good to GSDF members, who had been working and hoping for acceptance for over 60 years at that point.

That the acceptance of the GSDF by the Japanese gained new heights in the aftermath of 3.11 is also indicated by a poll taken in January 2012, in which almost 98 percent of respondents "appreciated the SDF operation in Tohoku."<sup>104</sup> Public acceptance of the GSDF had grown fairly steadily during one transformation and one potential transformation in the 20 years covered in this chapter, from 1995 to 2015. Beginning in the early 1990s the GSDF had successfully transformed from a conventional, heavy force to a proscribed postmodern army, proficient, in many of the peacekeeping and humanitarian and disaster operations that characterize such armies, especially after the relaxation of some restrictions in the PKO law in 2004 permitting a wider range of peacekeeping tasks (though not ones that involved combat). The first deployment of GSDF troops to a non-pacified area in 2003 had the potential to be another turning point, moving the *Rikuji* into non-traditional army roles, such as counter-terrorism and stability operations that some armies, like that of the United States, have begun to adapt to in the last 15 years. But in this case the transformation, into what I call an expeditionary army, has been stalled. Rather than expanding missions, the backlash against an unpopular

war in Iraq has made even peacekeeping deployments, such as the one to the Sudan, difficult to go forward. Paul Midford thinks an “Iraq Syndrome in Japan” has caused this “reverse course.”<sup>105</sup>

Likewise, the longer term impact of the GSDF’s largest ever dispatch—70 percent of the *Rikuji* having been sent<sup>106</sup>—and its first binational operation with the United States (with more than 30 years of binational exercises, this was the first actual operation) in the 3.11 disasters remains to be seen. In some ways, despite its magnitude, the divisions in Japan over the use of arms have only been reinforced by the disasters, with those who want Japan to disarm arguing the SDF should become a global disaster relief force, but eschew combat anywhere; those who want Japan to rearm on a greater scale and stop depending to any degree on the United States for defense, arguing the SDF’s actions were laudable but demonstrate a need for Japan to independently possess, for instance, strategic lift assets and an amphibious capability; and those who want to acquire some new equipment, but only to better cooperate with Japan’s only treaty ally, the United States, arguing the success of both nation’s disaster relief efforts indicate the alliance should “stay the course.”<sup>107</sup>

As well, despite all the press PM Abe’s security policies have received, how significant are the changes, really? The changes are only significant in the context of Japan’s unusual defense discourse. Taking a broader, comparative view, Abe’s policies are, at best, what Adam Liff calls “radically moderate.”<sup>108</sup> But world has not attained that state some hoped for at the end of the Cold War, in Francis Fukuyama’s famous phrase, “the end of history,” entailing a cessation of Great Power conflict. Instead Great Powers like Russia and China have demonstrated they no longer wish to follow established international rules of the road. In addition the global terrorist threat, cyber threats and other concerns show no sign of abating. The security situation around Japan is “severe” as noted in the NSS; the instability produced by a nuclear-armed North Korea and the open bullying of an international status-quo challenging China are just two examples.

## AN HONORED PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

Ishiba Shigeru (possible future prime minister) says, “If Japan desires, as stated in the preamble of the Constitution, ‘to occupy an honored place in an international society,’ then it must make clear what systems it believes are needed internationally and what risks Japan will assume therein. Might without right is no more than brute violence, but right not backed by might is powerless.”<sup>109</sup> But do enough of his fellow citizens feel the same to effect change? If so, the GSDF and the other SDF services could be on the cusp of potentially their greatest transformation yet, if they fully embrace the

requirements of traditional national militaries, which would mean becoming an expeditionary army, because of Japan's geography as an archipelagic nation. Certainly there are those in the GSDF who see this as necessary. General Iwata Kiyofumi, Chief of Staff of the GSDF has stated "I am determined to put JGSDF through the most drastic reform since its foundation and I will do my best to transform its fighting force into a truly capable one. In this reform, what I especially emphasize is countermeasures for potential attacks on Japan's remote islands."<sup>110</sup> Thus, if he and other reformers succeed, the GSDF would undergo its most significant transformation since it was established, into a modern, relatively light and agile, expeditionary army.

Any transformation, great or small, begins in the mind. As unusually restricted as the parameters of Japan's defense debate have been a discourse has continued for the past 70 years about Japan's national army. Ideas about soldiers and an army have been changing as a result, and the morphing images of the imagination have been feeding back into the discourse. For much of the 70 years the consensus image of the soldier, with some exceptions, has remained remarkably consistent, and negative, but over the last 15 years, especially, the image may be changing again. Can the Japanese people imagine a fully functioning army that they can trust with their property, their lives and their children's lives? How has this been reflected in the popular culture? It is to the popular imagination that the next chapter turns.

## NOTES

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2. The author was assigned to the Pentagon and deployed to Iraq at the time. The law that allowed the GSDF to be deployed specified missions in non-combat areas, and Samawah, where the GSDF operated, was arguably one of the most stable in all of Iraq at the time, but the coalition considered all Iraqi territory at the time as potentially non-permissive (that is, soldiers risked being shot or blown up).

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4. This discussion is based on discussions I had with defense officials while I was stationed in Japan from 1993–1996, particularly.

5. Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea* (London: Routledge, 1999), 62, <http://www.questia.com/read/103873082/japan-s-economic-power-and-security-japan-and-north>.

6. *Ibid.*, 62–65. See also Global Security.org, "North Korea Nuclear Crisis February 1993–June 1994," accessed May 14, 2016, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/dprk\\_nuke.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/dprk_nuke.htm).

7. Hughes, *ibid.*

8. This statement and question came to the author from a GSDF classmate on a bus in Japan in July 1994. I attended the JGSDF Command and Staff Course, class 39, from July 1993 until July 1994, on the SDF base in Ichigaya. The exchange occurred as we were returning from one of our last curricular trips.

9. This is based on discussions I had working with those defense officials over a number of years, but especially while being stationed in Japan from 1993–1996 first as an exchange officer student, and later in U.S. Army, Japan; serving in Japan again from 1998–2002, in U.S. Forces Japan and as an officer student at a higher level school (the National Institute of Defense Studies, class 49); and while serving as the Country Desk Officer for Japan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) from 2002–2004. See also Leszek Buszynski, *Asia Pacific Security: Values and Identity* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 61–62, <http://www.questia.com/read/107573010/asia-pacific-security-values-and-identity>.

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13. Thomas J. Christensen, ed., *Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 236, <http://www.questia.com/read/121049648/worse-than-a-monolith-alliance-politics-and-problems>.

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15. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 328–29.

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17. Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 5.

18. Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch—Japan* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 144, <http://www.questia.com/read/124081899/global-security-watch-japan>. See also Samuels, “Politics, Security Policy, and Japan's Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Who Elected These Guys. Anyway?” Japan Policy Research Institute, JPRI Working Paper no. 99, March 2004, <http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp99.html>, and Buszynski, 73.

19. Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 75.

20. Buszynski, 75.

21. This conversation with the Secretary took place in the fall of 2002.

22. Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 47–48. See also Samuels, “Who Elected These Guys, Anyway?” <http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp99.html>.

23. Quoted in Midford, 115.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 97.

26. In May 2003. The country in question performed heroically in Iraq.

27. Told to the author by a peer of Izumi's in 2004.

28. The conversation took place in December 2008, Camp Asaka, Japan. As an example of a war story (as we call them in the U.S. Army—stories that are sometimes the equivalent of urban legends), years later now Lieutenant General Izumi was commanding the GSDF Eastern Army (*Tōbu Hōmentai*), and I was participating in the exercise. One of the general's subordinates expressed admiration for Izumi because the general had participated in the Iraq *Chōsadan*. I agreed with the subordinate's assessment, mentioning I had accompanied the general at that time. The subordinate grew excited and asked (in Japanese), "Is it true he drank water straight from the Euphrates River and called it sweet?" I did not hesitate. Yes, I said, he did.

29. "Iraq Commander Noted for Cool-headed Decisions," *Japan Times*, News, February 2, 2004, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2004/02/02/national/iraq-commander-noted-for-cool-headed-decisions/#.V63pto-cHSV>.

30. Sankei Shimbun Iraku Shuzai-han, *Iraku Jindō Fukkō Shien no Shinjitsu* (Tokyo: Sankei Shimbun News Service, 2004).

31. Masahisa Sato, *Iraku Jieitai Sentōki* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2007), 66. Masa, as he asked us to call him while was one of my students when I taught at the Command and General Staff College, in Fort Leavenworth, KS, from 1997–1998, had told me a mentor in the GSDF who was also from Fukushima, had told him to grow the mustache because it would make him look fierce, so he did. He had the signature mustache while a student in Kansas, too.

32. The soldiers of many armies feel that way about working with diplomats who come from what tends to be a different subculture than theirs. The staffer from CPA was the author. I served in CPA, in the Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, from November, 2003, to May 2004. I was selected to go to Samawah because I speak Japanese, and because of my familiarity with the GSDF and with Sato personally.

33. Sato, 40.

34. *Ibid.*, 35.

35. *Ibid.*, 155.

36. *Ibid.*, 77.

37. See Midford, 146–153.

38. Hughes, 118.

39. *Ibid.*

40. Oros, Tatsumi, 17.

41. Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 99.

42. Midford, 146–153.

43. Oros and Tatsumi, 42.

44. *Ibid.*, 33.

45. *Ibid.*, 116.

46. *Ibid.*

47. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The Senkaku Islands," March 2014, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/pdfs/senkaku\\_pamphlet.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/pdfs/senkaku_pamphlet.pdf). Mark E. Manyin, "Senkaku (Diaoyu/diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty

Obligations\*,” *Current Politics and Economics of South, Southeastern, and Central Asia* 21, no. 3/4 (2012), <http://www.questia.com/read/1P3-3784918651/senkaku-diaoyu-diaoyutai-islands-dispute-u-s-treaty>. See also David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, and Bonny Lin, *Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2014), 234, <http://www.questia.com/read/124690585/blinders-blunders-and-wars-what-america-and-china>.

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49. Robert A. Manning, “3: Waiting for Godot? Northeast Asian Future Shock and the U.S.–Japan Alliance,” in *The U.S.–Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 61. See also Chung, 24–60.

50. Oros and Tatsumi, 107.

51. M. Taylor Fravel, “Chapter 11: Things Fall Apart- Maritime Disputes and China’s Regional Diplomacy,” in *China’s Challenges*, ed. Jacques Delisle and Avery Goldstein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 213, <http://www.questia.com/read/124296457/china-s-challenges>.

52. Chris Hughes, “8: Japan’s National Security Discourse- Post-Cold War Paradigmatic Shift?” in *Providing for National Security: A Comparative Analysis*, ed. Andrew M. Dorman and Joyce P. Kaufman (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2014), 145, <http://www.questia.com/read/123200125/providing-for-national-security-a-comparative-analysis>.

53. Fravel, 217.

54. Corey Wallace, “Financial Times: China Eyeing Okinawa in the Long-term?” Japan Security Watch, New Pacific Institute, July 23, 2012, <http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=10398>.

55. Gombert, Binnendijk, and Lin, 233.

56. Adapted from a talk given by the author to the Okazaki Institute, in Tokyo, in February, 2015. I was the Director for Raytheon’s Remote Island Defense program at the time.

57. Hughes, “Military Modernization,” 118.

58. *Ibid.*, 119.

59. Oros and Tatsumi, 53.

60. The author was the first project officer for the DPRI talks, which Tokyo first agreed to in January 2003. See also Hughes, “Japan’s National Security Discourse,” 150, <http://www.questia.com/read/123200130/providing-for-national-security-a-comparative-analysis>.

61. Ministry of Defense, Japan, Summary of National Defense Program Guidelines (hereafter 2010 NDPG), FY 2011—, Dec. 17, 2010, <http://www.uk.emb-japan.go.jp/en/news/NDPG.pdf>.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*

64. Justin Goldman, “An Amphibious Capability in Japan’s Self-Defense Force: Operationalizing Dynamic Defense,” *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2013, vol. 66, no. 4, 119.

65. Japan Kantei, National Security Strategy (hereafter NSS), December 17, 2013, 12, [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96\\_abe/documents/2013/\\_\\_\\_icsFiles/afield-file/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/___icsFiles/afield-file/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf).

66. Son Key-young and Ra Mason, "Building a Maritime 'Great Wall' to Contain China? Explaining Japan's Recalibration of Risk with the Militarization of Okinawa," *Asian Perspective* 37, no. 3 (2013), <http://www.questia.com/read/1P3-3069352441/building-a-maritime-great-wall-to-contain-china>.

67. Goldman, 128.

68. NSS.

69. NSS, 16.

70. Adam P. Liff, "Japan's Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer, 2015, 83.

71. The NSC is suffused with what it calls "whole-government" efforts. U.S. joint doctrine has recently moved to expand the concept from a focus on what is still termed interagency approaches, or approaches involving multiple entities in the federal government, to what is called interorganizational efforts. Interorganizational is a comprehensive concept, acknowledging that facing complex threats requires efforts, and coordination where possible, of all levels of government, multinational entities, non-governmental organizations, and private and academic entities.

72. NSS, 2.

73. Ibid.

74. NSS, 15.

75. The best treatment of amphibious operations is Theodore L. Gatchel, *At the Water's Edge: Defending Against Modern Amphibious Assault* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996).

76. Allan R. Millett, "Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare between the Wars: The American, British and Japanese Experiences," in Williamson Murray, Allan R. Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 52.

77. Kyle Mizokami, "Inside Japan's New Defense Plan," USNI News, December 20, 2013, <https://news.usni.org/2013/12/20/inside-japans-new-defense-plan>.

78. 2010 NDPG, final unnumbered page.

79. Ministry of Defense, Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond, December 17, 2013, 31, [http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217\\_e2.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf).

80. Ibid.

81. Franz-Stefan Gady, "Japan's Elite Amphibious Assault Force Trains with US Marines: US Marines Teach Japanese Soldiers How to Fight from the Sea in a Bilateral Military Exercise," *The Diplomat*, January 28, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/japans-elite-amphibious-assault-force-trains-with-us-marines/>.

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84. Gady, "Japan Approves Massive Defense Budget," *The Diplomat*, December 28, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/japan-approves-record-defense-budget/>.

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86. Desmond Ball and Richard Tanner, *The Tools of Owatsumi: Japan's Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities*, Australian National University Press, 19–27, <http://press.anu.edu.au/node/444/download>. See also Nobuhiro Kubo, Tim Kelly, "Japan opens radar station close to disputed isles, drawing angry China response," Reuters, Edition: United States, March 28, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china-eastchinasea-idUSKCN0WT0QZ>.

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101. Japan Defense Focus, Special Number.

102. Based on a discussion I had with one of the U.S. liaison officers during a business trip to Japan in June 2014.

103. Ibid. and Goldman, especially.

104. Samuels, *3.11*, 80.

105. Midford, 146–170.

106. Samuels, *3.11*, 89.

107. Ibid., esp. 80–109.
108. Liff, 96.
109. Shigeru Ishiba, Forward, in Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2004*, November 1, 2004.
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## Chapter 9

# Drawing Weapons

### *Reimagining the Soldier, 1945–2015*

All cultures have heroes, and all cultures tell stories and present images of these heroes to entertain, extol or teach virtues like duty and courage and to explore themes like the meaning of life. What John Dower means when he says, “In Japan . . . postwar victim consciousness is inevitably coupled with the traumatic recollection of shattering defeat . . . leaving those who survived bereft of even the psychological consolation of ultimate victory. There could be no heroes for the losing side,”<sup>1</sup> is there was a cost for adopting the narrative that scapegoated the Imperial Japanese Military, and especially the IJA, for Japan’s tragic and traumatic Fifteen-Year War. The cost was the legitimacy of the Imperial Japanese Army, and of soldiers. For the public at large this meant they could not even comfort themselves with the blandishment that though they were defeated, their soldiers had done their best in protecting the country, all the more heroic for the impossible odds they had faced. For the soldiers of Japan’s next army, founded only five years into this developing national narrative it was even more problematic.

Japan’s civilian populace, as the narrative developed, could at least draw comfort as the victims, not the victimizers; the civilians were the heroes and the soldiers were the villains. Yet though the Japanese people wished to put war behind them forever war occurred, just five years after the previous one. Japan had to reestablish an institution it had abolished and was increasingly criticizing. The soldiers of this new army, many veterans of the former army, had to distance themselves from the disgraced IJA, the villains of the narrative. This isolated those soldiers from the larger society of heroic victims and survivors. These soldiers of the GSDF then had to deal with not only constitutional and legal questions of legitimacy, but, perhaps more significantly as it is constituted by thinking, feeling, social human beings, the cognitive, cultural and social isolation imposed. How do you recruit men, mostly, and

women to such an organization? How do you find a useable past, useable stories when the dominant narrative denigrates all armies and all soldiers? How do you motivate soldiers to take on “the real reason the culture of war matters: namely the critical role it plays in overcoming men’s natural inclination to avoid, or flee from, danger while at the same time preparing them to make the ultimate sacrifice if and when required,”<sup>2</sup> when the larger culture says such calls for a willingness to sacrifice oneself are lies that will never be necessary and moreover are lies propounded by only the worst of men? The latest manifestation of the scapegoats themselves, GSDF members did not have the convenient shield of blaming others for Japan’s disastrous defeat.

Since the public at large increasingly professed a wish to banish war for all time there is a certain irony in the truth: far from vanishing images of war and soldiers proliferated. Particularly in the 1950s, presentations of the warrior, the soldier and the army varied widely, certainly more widely in postwar and post-Occupation Japan than such images had under the careful eye of the military censors during the war years, and perhaps more widely than at any time in modern Japanese history, given the purposeful manipulation of such concepts by Japanese government officials during the Meiji, Taishō, and wartime eras, and the suppression of such images by the new group of censors writers, artists and other creators had to face during the American Occupation. The images in popular culture reflected, but probably also helped to shape, the discourse on national identity. In the 1950s that discourse provided for at least the possibility of Japan as a nation with an honorable army, but, after the *Anpo* Riots of 1960, that possibility was discounted; while an air force (embodied by the Zero pilots of the Fifteen-Year War), and navy were rehabilitated, to a certain extent, in the public imagination, an army and soldiers vanished almost completely, and when present were used almost exclusively to indicate the evils of such people and institutions. This situation continued to reflect the national narrative at least into the 1980s, when placing soldiers, whose presentation was mitigated by various factors, into a fantastic setting became acceptable. As time has gone on and Japan’s official defense policies have been adjusted to new realities in the international security environment, so have presentations of soldiers, including GSDF soldiers, normalized, to a certain extent, in the popular culture as part of the national discourse. This chapter will examine what popular culture can tell us about the place of soldiers and an army in Japan over the past 70 years, and how what the public imagines soldiers and an army to be have affected the GSDF and its members. Again, though ironic, for “pacifist” postwar Japan, just as for societies all over the world, “war retains a strong appeal to the popular imagination,”<sup>3</sup> and Japan’s popular culture is replete with the images of war. For the sake of making analysis manageable, I will focus on three media: comic books, or manga, anime, or animation and movies.

## DRAWING, EFFACING AND REDRAWING THE SWORD: SOLDIERS IN JAPAN'S POPULAR MEDIA, 1945-1950

Typically in Japanese history the warrior has been a central and usually positive symbol. According to myth the Japanese islands formed from brine that dripped from the tip of a spear the god Izanagi had dipped in the ocean. One of the three sacred treasures of the imperial line is a sword, given to Japan's first Emperor by his forebear, the Sun Goddess Amaterasu. Some of Japan's earliest literature gives prominent place to the warrior, like the *gunki-mono* and *senki-mono*, or war tales of the tenth through sixteenth centuries.<sup>4</sup> But the image of the warrior has always been a facile one, manipulated by the Tokugawa shogunate to produce a loyal, but (relatively) peaceful administrative class; by Meiji ideologues, who, though they abolished the samurai as a class, tried to imbue all Japanese with the Tokugawa-manufactured samurai principles of absolute loyalty to an overlord—in this case the Emperor—and self-sacrifice;<sup>5</sup> and by the Taishō and Shōwa Japanese governments, increasingly from the Russo-Japanese War until defeat in the Fifteen-Year War, who tried to use the samurai image to militarize and mobilize the entire nation.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the wishes of the ideological image makers of Japan's *ancien regime* the ideal of the "100 million hearts beating as one" was never fully realized during the war, and in fact, this "jewel of the 100 million" became ever more fractured as the depredations of the war period went on. While the *tennōsei*, or emperor system, with its concomitant importance accorded to the *gunjin seishin*, or soldier spirit,<sup>7</sup> was never completely embraced by all, it did have the impressive coercive machinery of the entire government behind it. With defeat and the discrediting of the military, and with both the government and the overlay of the SCAP now pushing the ideology of democracy and demilitarization, the postwar era ushered in a time of experimentation, and of new images.

One area to see the most immediate impact of the reversal of the positive military icon was the classroom. This is not surprising; Marlene J. Mayo tells us MacArthur and the SCAP occupationees in general saw post-defeat Japan, "in effect as one big reeducation camp."<sup>8</sup> Even before the SCAP was officially formed, on October 2, 1945, the Japanese government, immediately after the surrender on August 15, had begun to have school children blacken out, with brush and black ink, references to the military or to ultra-nationalism in textbooks. This was continued and expanded by SCAP's Civil Information and Education (CI&E) Section after October.<sup>9</sup> But what were considered military and ultranationalist references were so extensive that by December 1945 CI&E "suspended textbooks and courses in history, geography, and morals until acceptable textbooks became available."<sup>10</sup> Rewritten textbooks became available the following fall, starting with *Kuni no Ayumi* (*Footsteps of*

*a Nation*), an elementary school text co-authored by Ienaga Saburo. Whereas in the pre-war and wartime texts the Imperial Japanese Army had always advanced from one victory to the next, in the new text the students read of the “looting of Nanking.”<sup>11</sup> Just the beginning salvo of what continues to be a war of words over war words in textbooks, future texts would address, though not without challenge, Nanking in stronger language, the infamous and cruel biological experiments of Unit 731 and Okinawan civilian deaths at the hands of Japanese soldiers, among other issues.<sup>12</sup>

During the war Japanese government officials had called on the people to build a strong country of culture; in the postwar they called on the Japanese to construct a nation of culture and peace. Writers of all stripes were involved in this project from the intelligentsia (*interi*)<sup>13</sup> to more literary writers.<sup>14</sup> Perhaps nowhere was the resulting narrative more evident or varied than in comic books, called manga in Japan and one of the most popular forms of mass entertainment.

### Related Comically

Some have traced the origins of manga back to Japan’s earliest art traditions. The famous woodblock print artist Hokusai coined the term manga, but it is probably more accurate to trace these serialized comics to the early twentieth century, when, influenced by American and other international sources, the Japanese first started publishing the serialized adventures in a format similar to what continues today. Characterized by cute animal stories as well as adventure and romance, from the first there had been a strong connection between the military and manga publishing.

After Japan began to modernize in 1868 the military realized a need for realistic drawings. The military required such *shinsha* (true sketching) from the artists that accompanied troops during wars, and “in the course of the Fifteen-Year Asia-Pacific War [realistic drawings] came to be sought after in manga too.”<sup>15</sup> During the war, as with all media, the content of manga had been strictly controlled by the government, and used to extol the virtues of the loyal soldier.

One manga artist who managed to criticize the war effort, Yamanishi, did so only after he had fled to the United States. In his comic, which was printed by the United States as a pamphlet and dropped to Japanese troops as part of US psychological operations, a poor boy from a farming community is drafted, abused by his officers, forced to fight for a cause he does not believe in, and eventually killed. Reportedly found on the bodies of many slain Japanese soldiers this pamphlet, though used in American propaganda efforts, presages some of the comics that would be drawn by former soldiers who became manga artists in post-war Japan, though they would not present

their war accounts until many years after the war ended. After the war CI&E censored manga as well as other media, and there are few references to war, though a few comics, like *Sabaku no Maō* (Desert Devil), first published in 1949, were able to deal with military themes by placing them in imaginary lands.<sup>16</sup>

The real revolution in manga was produced by Tezuka Osamu. Though trained as a physician Tezuka had always been interested in drawing, and had been fascinated by Disney animation and Western cinema. He brought these sensibilities to his first best-selling comic adventure, *Shin Takarajima* (New Treasure Island) and started a revolution involving story comics that used cinematic techniques to convey action and tension. Though Tezuka was neither the first *mangaka* (manga artist) to use cinematic techniques, nor the inventor of long-form manga storytelling, as is often asserted, he was innovative, and he did seem to have a genius for “providing audiences with exactly what they wanted.”<sup>17</sup>

His next work, *Metropolis*, published in 1949, which takes only its title from the film of the same name, was about an artificially created person who goes on a rampage after he finds out he was not born from human parents, but grown from human cells, and destroys much of the city with his super powers before he can be stopped. The ending of the story reflects well the anxiety of many in Japan: “Michi’s life is over. The creation of life made possible by the consummation of modern technology has only resulted in disturbing our society. Technology may get out of control and be used against mankind someday.”<sup>18</sup> The “consummation of modern technology,” really at issue is the atomic bomb; as Japan’s new “foundational narrative” was developed anxiety concerning the Bomb became connected with anti-militarism in the minds of many.<sup>19</sup> Tezuka, and other *mangaka*, particularly from the wartime, had become resolutely anti-militarist, as their works have continued to reveal.

### Reel Soldiers, Real Villains

Another important group of opinion shapers in Japan were film makers. Though wartime movies in Japan, as John Dower points out, had never been given over completely to propaganda, often possessing “humanistic . . . elements,” still the enthusiastic embrace of new themes of democracy immediately after the war has been bemoaned by some in Japan as demonstrating a lack of conviction. The portrayal of soldiers, in particular, is the reverse of their portrayal in wartime in the immediate postwar films. A documentary, *The Tragedy of Japan*, shown briefly in 1946, shows a still picture of the Emperor, in military uniform as he was always pictured in the war years, transforming into a still picture of the Emperor in his rumpled civilian suit and goes on to depict the exhaustion and despair of soldiers and the utter

insanity of the war.<sup>20</sup> In the *gendaigeki* or modern drama genre, the brave soldiers who can do no wrong are replaced by villainous soldiers. In Kurosawa Akira's 1946 *No Regrets for Our Youth*, based on real events, the villain is the military system which silences a democratically inclined professor and wrongly imprisons a young man who then dies in prison, leaving a young wife behind.<sup>21</sup> In *Morning for the Osone Family*, also released in 1946, the villain is the uncle, a colonel in the IJA involved in shady dealings. The heroine of the film, in what could be a coda for the postwar narrative about the army, denounces the colonel's malfeasance, "You destroyed the Japanese nation and made many people suffer. Now you deserve to suffer, too!" She then kicks the colonel and his wife out of the house.<sup>22</sup>

In the midst of the Occupation, Japan struggled to define itself. Abetted by Occupation policies which targeted Japan's military as a "scapegoat,"<sup>23</sup> the developing narrative quickly focused on those forces and especially the Imperial Japanese Army as the source of Japan's suffering. Another narrative, more traditional, that some warriors are heroes who fight to protect others, was present, in *kamishibai* (paper plays shown by itinerant peddlers from the backs of their bicycles), manga and movies, but referenced only the samurai, not modern soldiers.

### WHO IS GUARDING THE GUARDIANS? A MIXED VIEW OF WARRIORS IN THE POPULAR MIND, 1950-1959

With the end of most censorship in Japan in late 1949<sup>24</sup> the Japanese were able, for the first time, to grapple in the public media with images of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which would become powerful and staple touchstones for anti-war activists. War memoirs, the Korean War, veterans of the IJA straggling back to Japan five and more years after defeat, a nascent war-bereaved recognition movement, the depurging of veterans and the close coverage of the NPR's development in the mass media also kept soldiers and war in the forefront of public consciousness. But the messages were not monolithic.

Mass newspapers for instance, reported obsessively on the founding of the NPR, and then on rumors or the reality of build-up plans for the nascent army through its next to its final name change, but coverage of the build-up plans was often coupled with talk of the Communist threat and there were pro- as well as anti-build-up media outlets.<sup>25</sup> Depurged veterans wrote memoirs<sup>26</sup> and were elected to public office,<sup>27</sup> indicating some level of acceptance for their status. The growth of a movement to recognize the sacrifices of fallen soldiers,<sup>28</sup> as well as favorable press accorded to such things as the establishment of a war memorial on Iwo Jima<sup>29</sup> also indicates some vindication for

former soldiers—or at least a willingness, in the case of honoring the dead, to accept the sacrificed soldiers as fellow victims. In manga, too, there were mixed messages.

### Mighty Armed Manga

As a form of inexpensive entertainment, especially with introduction of *kashibonya*,<sup>30</sup> or loan libraries that specialized in loaning out comic books, it is not surprising that during the 1950s a boom in manga publishing which continues to this day began, and it is difficult to overstate the impact Tezuka Osamu's comics had on this development.

As one of the only Japanese scholars to focus on the themes of war and soldiers in manga, Natsume Fusanosuke notes Tezuka's wartime experience strongly colored his manga storytelling, but the *mangaka* (the artist, writer and creator of the manga) dealt mostly with this experience filtered through a science fiction setting. Tezuka mixes revulsion and idealism, all the while depicting the utter inanity and destructive potential of war.

In one early work, *Kurubeki Sekai* (The World that Should Come), that ran from 1951, Tezuka told the story of a world war between the Star Country and the Uran Country (clearly representing the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively). The two countries busily pile up nuclear armaments and then go to war. Just before humanity is about to be wiped out the leaders of the two countries meet and declare ever-lasting peace, but the scene shows them standing on a blasted, still-smoking plain, with no other survivors in sight. Already a foundational truism of the national narrative is evident; the use of armed force leads to the use of atomic (later nuclear) weapons, which can lead to apocalyptic consequences. In another recurring theme of Tezuka's the only accepting heroism is the self-sacrifice of a hero to insure peace. In *Rokku Bounenki* (The Chronicles of Rokku's Adventures), for instance, the lead character, Rokku, sacrifices himself to ensure peace between the warring humans and Rokku's own bird people.<sup>31</sup>

The preceding stories reflected both Tezuka's wartime experiences and the fears elicited by the Cold War. While it may be true that "all science fiction concerns the present and not the future,"<sup>32</sup> nowhere is this clear more than in the introduction of the most iconic of character in Tezuka's oeuvre, *Tetsuwan Atomu* (Iron-Arm or Mighty Arm Atom). Better known as Astro Boy in the United States, this character's first story closely mirrored ongoing real-world events at the time.

Tezuka introduced Atom in April 1951, but not initially as the later, long-running character Iron Arm. In his first story the oh-so human boy robot was Ambassador Atom. In the introductory story arc the Earth has been invaded by aliens, and Atom, as a robot—the outsider is another recurring theme in

Tezuka's stories—and presumably neutral, is chosen to negotiate the peace treaty between the aliens and humanity. Atom was created by a scientist who modeled the robot after the scientist's recently deceased son. Having purposefully introduced Atom as a kind of Pinocchio (though he also draws from Japan's own tradition of Momotaro, a young boy who goes forth to conquer monsters and demons), Tezuka imbued his robot with one of Pinocchio's dilemmas: Atom wanted to be able to grow up. As the negotiations progress successfully the aliens, grateful for Atom's help in negotiating the peace treaty, reward him by presenting him with an adult face plate to replace his child face, telling Atom "We constructed an adult face for you using your current face as reference. It won't do for you to remain forever a boy. When next we meet, let it be as equals." Just to make the point even clearer, Tezuka then has Atom's friend, Tama, the stand-in for the Japanese people, pipe up, "Next time I too will be grown up."<sup>33</sup>

This parable of the treaty process could not have been clearer to a Japanese audience familiar with MacArthur's then-recent testimony before the U.S. Senate, where he had compared the Japanese people to a 12-year-old boy.<sup>34</sup> Tezuka was thus representing the aspirations of the Japanese people as a whole that Japan would be accepted by the community of nations as an adult, once the peace treaty was signed.

### Reeling Them In

As the decade of the 1950s progressed, the Japanese had more disposable income, movie theaters multiplied, and, by mid-decade, a government report reveals, "every person in Japan went to the movies an astonishing ten times per year."<sup>35</sup> Though the phenomenon of war continued to be presented as unremittingly negative, with the end of Occupation censoring, and the successful rehabilitation of at least some former soldiers, the images crafted to present soldiers became more varied. Japanese movies produced in the 1950s constitute for some the "golden age" of that country's cinema, and soldiers were often subjects, though SDF members themselves showed up rarely, except in the *Godzilla* and other *kaiju eiga* (giant monster films).

The relaxation of censor controls allowed for movies concerning a wider array of topics, including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The first, *Bells of Nagasaki*, was shown in 1950, based on a true story that had been a best-selling book the year before.<sup>36</sup> *Children of Hiroshima*, first shown in 1952, was sponsored by the staunchly anti-war National Teachers' Union, and was not the last film about Hiroshima sponsored by the Union, perhaps because this first film was "More broadly humanistic than political."<sup>37</sup> These cinematic renderings of the atomic bombings became potent symbols for anti-war/pacifist groups. Another film which had a significant impact on Japan's

developing pacifist movement centered on students who had fought and died in the war.

In 1949 a student group put together “a collection of testimonies by students of elite universities who had been killed in the war,” published that fall as *Kike Wadatsumi no Koe* (Listen to the Voices from the Deep).<sup>38</sup> The book eventually spawned a statue, a society, a newspaper and, in the summer of 1950, a movie.<sup>39</sup> Though the film was criticized as “idealistic, formalistic, stereotypical and unoriginal,”<sup>40</sup> the book and the movie, especially, “became part of an antiwar repertoire generations of Japanese high school students would grow up with.”<sup>41</sup> Given the timing the NPR was impacted from the first; the movie was cited in a pamphlet protesting NPR recruiting by the Women’s Peace Front Preparatory Committee, in Hokkaido just a few months after the film’s debut. Calling the recruiting drive “preparation of next War (sic),” the pamphlet enjoins readers to call back those who have already joined the NPR, protests the “high rate of tax” necessitated by the NPR, and warns “If you don’t want to repeat Movie ‘Listen Your Friends Voice (Kike Wadatsumi no Koe) don’t join NPR no matter you have to take risk of death (sic).”<sup>42</sup> This was not the last time the NPR or its ensuing incarnations would hear such protests.

Classic *gendai-geki* were made in the 1950s, and pacifism vied with other views, though movies with a pacifist or anti-war sentiment seem better known. A pacifist classic is *Twenty-Four Eyes*, 1954. *Twenty-Four Eyes* is the story of an idealistic young woman who becomes a school teacher on one of Japan’s small remote islands. She has twelve students, six boys and six girls. She is first made fun of for being a *modan ga-ru* or modern girl, that is for wearing slacks and riding a bicycle in the 1920s, but she soon wins over probing students and cautious parents through her sincerity. As Japan moves toward militarism the hardship on the families of the island, and the increasing paranoia of the school administrators, is made clear. Of the six boys, four die in the war, and a fifth is blinded. The teacher’s own husband is also killed in the war, and she deals with the pain of her two sons playing soldier and yearning to join the army themselves. Two of the girls die as well, due to the harsh conditions in wartime Japan. The film manages to both tap into nostalgia for a more traditional Japan, and exemplify the wide-spread sensibility about the futility of war.<sup>43</sup>

*Gendai-geki* also took on depictions of the imperial Japanese forces, and these often in romanticized terms. In 1953, the movie, *Taiheiyō no Washi* (Eagle of the Pacific), a sentimental portrayal of Admiral Yamamoto, was one of the most successful films.<sup>44</sup> *The Emperor Meiji and the Great Russo-Japanese War* was a “blockbuster” in 1957. Though more noted for its positive portrayal of the emperor, and despite the fact it was also associated by many viewers with the misery of war, *Emperor Meiji* did present a positive portrayal of IJA soldiers.<sup>45</sup>

In 1956 the image of the soldier also received sympathetic treatment from director Ichikawa Kon, in *The Burmese Harp*. Based on a novel of the same name, by Takeyama Michio, which had been popular since 1946,<sup>46</sup> the movie portrays a group of soldiers in a positive light. The soldiers are led by a young captain, Inoue, who had studied music in college, and one of the implicit messages of the movie is that music has tamed these otherwise savage beasts. The captain's insistence on the unit singing, accompanied by the central character's—Mizushima Yasuhiko, a private who is the unit's scout—instant virtuosity on a local instrument, the titular Burmese harp, has produced a unit with good morale and a positive outlook. As a result of singing a Japanese song which shares its tune with the English song *Home Sweet Home* the unit is able to surrender without a shot fired when an Anglo-Australian force approaches, guns initially raised, and informs the Japanese their country has surrendered. This is contrasted soon after with a Japanese unit holding out nearby. Upon the request of the Anglo-Australian authorities, the company commander asks the scout, Mizushima, to approach the unit and inform them the war has ended in Japan's surrender. This second unit, its soldiers much more haggard and desperate looking, refuses to surrender, and with a final charge, dies to the last man. Mizushima is accidentally wounded in the exchange and left for dead, but he is nursed back to health by a Burmese Buddhist monk. After repaying his rescuer by stealing the monk's robe, Mizushima tries to make his way back to his unit disguised as a monk. Grieved and changed by witnessing the bodies of dead Japanese soldiers he comes across, Mizushima decides to stay in Burma, burying the dead, while his unit returns to Japan, determined to rebuild. Though "Resolutely pacifist,"<sup>47</sup> the film does portray the idea that not all soldiers were mindless militarists. At one level, the crazed and desperate members of the unit that refuses to surrender and is slaughtered can be read as stand-ins for those militaristic leaders in Japan at the end of the war who thought the entire nation should die rather than surrender; the soldiers of Inoue's unit as a whole, on the other hand, are a bittersweet metaphor for those IJA soldiers who returned to Japan determined to rebuild, but who knew they had left the best, most idealistic part of themselves, that part of themselves resembling Mizushima, behind in foreign lands, symbolically burying their dead and never to return.<sup>48</sup>

Ichikawa Kon's later film, *Fires on the Plain*, based on the novel by the same name and released in 1959, is the director's most graphic and gruesome condemnation of war and the soldiers who fight it. The story centers on Tamura, an IJA private with tuberculosis, who is serving in the waning days of the war in the Philippines. In the opening scene Tamura's squad leader is dressing him down for returning to the unit from the field hospital to which he had been sent due to his tuberculosis. The squad leader tells the passive private he is useless and only another mouth to feed. Tamura is instructed to

return to the hospital, stay until he is admitted, or to kill himself with his final grenade if he is not admitted. What follows is an excruciating sequence of misery and hopelessness, including depictions of cannibalism, murder and a crazed and dying soldier eating his own offal. In the original novel the main character Tamura eventually finds some comfort in embracing Christianity, but Ichikawa's version ends with Tamura alone, shot dead as he staggers forward across an empty field, arms raised in an attempt to surrender. Unremittingly bleak, this film has been criticized for only stressing the victimization of Japanese soldiers, but the soldiers are both victims and victimizers—there are no heroes, no one to look up to or aspire to be.<sup>49</sup>

Similar to *Fires on the Plain* the depiction of a soldier's life in *The Human Condition* is bleak, but unlike *Fires*, the protagonist Kaji, played by heart throb Nakadai Tatsuya, is both admirable, and a good soldier. The series of three films, released from 1958–1961, was directed by Kobayashi Masaki, who had vigorously entered into the swirling military-related discourse of 1950s Japan in two previous films, both released in 1956. His film *The Thick Walled Room*, based on the diaries of “war criminals,” championed “the idea that most of the imprisoned were innocent, while the real criminals escaped,” while his film *Black River*, also starring Nakadai, cast an unsparing eye on “corruption on American bases in Japan.”<sup>50</sup>

*The Human Condition* trilogy was Kobayashi's most popular work, and one of the most successful series of movies in Japan at the time. Nakadai's Kaji is handsome, educated and sensitive. Kobayashi does not hesitate to show the brutality of the Imperial Japanese Army soldiers, toward not only Chinese and other civilians, but their own subordinates, and the director's sympathies are clear: the only good Japanese soldiers are, like Kaji and his closest friend Shinjo, imbued with the humanism common in postwar Japanese cinema while both Kaji and Shinjo openly wonder if the Soviet system might be preferable to militaristic Japan. At one point Kaji says “my only crime is being Japanese!” Kaji is later disillusioned with the Soviet Union after he is captured by the Red Army and suffers the same kind of cruelty from his captors he had previously witnessed IJA officers meting out to Chinese prisoners. But Kaji himself is presented as a good soldier; he is a good shot and a natural leader, who takes beatings himself, rather than exposing new recruits placed under his command to the unrelieved cruelty of the other IJA veterans in the unit. And as Sandra Wilson points out, Nakadai Tetsuya was a matinee idol, schoolgirls considered the fictional character Kaji, “the ideal man,” and others considered the Kaji of the novels on which the movies are based “a hero for the times.”<sup>51</sup> So though *Human Condition* wholly condemns war and the militaristic Japanese state, it also demonstrates that good soldiers can rise above such horrific conditions, and is thus a sympathetic synthesis of the portrayal of IJA soldiers in Japanese cinema, just as Kurosawa's similar

positive synthesis of samurai heroes in *Seven Samurai* resurrected the positive image of Japanese warriors while still condemning war, Kobayashi's *Human Condition* does the same for IJA soldiers.<sup>52</sup>

The GSDF themselves were also portrayed in a positive light in movies, though their roles are limited, in the 1950s (and largely thereafter) almost exclusively to their appearances in the *Godzilla* series and other *kaiju eiga*, and they are often not identified by their official designation. The film that set the standard and created the genre of *kaiju eiga* was 1954's *Gojira* (Godzilla), produced by Toho pictures. Honda Ishiro, the director, Tsuburaya Eiji, the special effects director, and Ifukube Akira, the music director were all veterans of the Imperial Japanese Army. While the film was made in cooperation with the Ground Self-Defense Force, and a panoply of their equipment, such as M-1 Garand rifles, M1919A4 medium machine guns, M24 Chaffee light tanks, and M1 155 millimeter howitzers are on display<sup>53</sup> (albeit not particularly effective against the monster), the GSDF is not referred to as part of the Self-Defense Force during the film. Instead the force is referred to as the Bōeitai (Defense Force or Defense Units), while the headquarters of the ground force, when introduced, is labeled the *Tokusetsu Saigai Taisaku Honbu* (Especially Established Natural Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters).<sup>54</sup> In a follow-on science fiction movie, Honda's first widescreen effort, known as *The Mysterians* in the United States, in 1957, this renaming convention is carried even further. The SDF in the film are under the UN's command, and known as the *Chikyū Bōeigun* (Global Defense Force), which is also the Japanese title of the movie.<sup>55</sup>

It was not until 1958 in a movie known as *Varan the Unbelievable* in the United States (*Daikaijū Baran*, or Giant Monster Varan, in Japan) that the GSDF and other two SDF services appeared under their actual designations.<sup>56</sup> *Varan* (the name is derived from *Varanis Pater*, father of all lizards)<sup>57</sup> is especially notable for the amount of screen time given over to the SDF. The film was originally planned as a television production to be shown in both the United States and Japan, but the American television producer pulled out. Toho then decided to air *Varan* as a feature film instead, and used a lot of footage from the SDF to fill out the length. All three services are given screen time as a result, and the movie resembles a recruiting film, at times. It sends all the kinds of messages the SDF must have wanted to send at the time, depicting a commander carefully checking his troops' preparations for battle, and the military deferring to the civilian authority, in the form of the head of the Defense Agency.<sup>58</sup> The SDF would not have as much screen time again for decades. Unfortunately for Toho and for the SDF, the film was both a critical and a box office failure. As Bill Tsutsui says, the role the GSDF and other SDF services played in the *kaiju eiga* genre can be construed in some ways a kind of "military pornography, allowing the guilt-ridden, chastened, and disarmed Japanese public to indulge its illicit (and explicit) martial fantasies

on the silver screen,"<sup>59</sup> but it was also, perhaps especially in the 1950s, an attempt to imagine an appropriate military for postwar Japan, away from the policy battles of the official struggle over rearmament.

Official defense policy, enshrined in the Basic Policy for National Defense, adopted in May 1957, called for depending on "the U.S.-Japan security arrangements," to contend with external aggression, but U.S. troops do not show up during these invasions by monsters and aliens. Instead there is, in *Gojira* an idealized Defense Force, which still does not take military measures, but countermeasures against natural disasters (the kind of mission the GSDF and other services liked to actually publicize). The Basic Policy also looks toward "the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future," and such a future is envisioned in *Chikyū Bōeigun*, to the extent that Japan's forces, now protecting the world, can reclaim the *gun* (military or armed force) title that had become toxic in other contexts during the struggle over rearmament. The *kaiju eiga* and related films continued to provide an important showcase and means for normalizing the existence of the SDF in the eyes of the Japanese public for decades.

The Japanese people as a whole had begun to play a more active role in defining a national narrative during the 1950s in part by reinvigorating what one observer calls Japan's "culture of the visual."<sup>60</sup> As the Japanese collectively sought to *imeji appu* (a phrase using the English loan-words "image up," and meaning to make a concept clearer) various important notions, including what role, if any, soldiers and an army would have in a new Japan were disputed.

These images of war and warriors, the army and soldiers, were contested in the 1950s, just as the GSDF was being created. Images of the soldier during the turbulent decade were not wholly negative. There were soldier figures, like Kaji in *Human Condition* who might be embraced by the student protesters, on the left, for his progressive ideals, but still embraced as well by those in favor of a more traditional military, or prospective SDF recruits, for his qualities as an effective and courageous soldier and warrior. Yet, after the various currents of the defense debate were subsumed by the white-water rage constituting the *Anpo* Riots, options and images suddenly narrowed sharply. Moving into the next decades the image of a heroic IJA soldier, and by association GSDF soldiers, except for rare cases, vanished and the GSDF was left to consolidate a professional conception for itself under difficult circumstances.

### POP GUNS IN THE NARROW MARGIN: WARRIORS IN THE POPULAR MEDIA IN THE 1960s-1970s

Chikamatsu Monzaemon, Japan's celebrated dramatist, wrote of the "narrow margin between truth and fiction."<sup>61</sup> Popular culture fiction in the two decades

under discussion is abounding in weapons-wielding warriors many of whom may be considered the equivalent of hired guns in the lexicon of the American Western, and many of the tropes of these pop guns seem to have been established during this period. While the stories are created to entertain, for the most part, they were also used to explore issues of morality, war responsibility, courage, service to the state versus individual aspirations, and many other issues. These pop guns in the narrow margin were shaping the imaginative space for Japan's military, but not necessarily for all three services.

Replete though Japan's popular culture is with military images, modern soldiers are almost completely absent beginning in the 1960s. On television, the medium that replaced movies as the most popular form of visual entertainment from the 1960s forward, the samurai tropes depicted had reverted to those seen during the pre-war and wartime years—displaying warriors who fight for the right and protect the weak. Segments of the *kyūgun*, the Imperial Japanese armed forces, as well, had been rehabilitated, to a certain extent, in the popular media, particularly kamikaze and Zero pilots and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Yet the soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army—the GSDF's legacy force, whose veterans played an important role in Japan's new army into the 1970s—had not been rehabilitated. With a few exceptions, when IJA soldiers appeared at all in the popular media the images were almost exclusively negative. There was one individual, however, for whom Chikamatsu's margin seems to have been particularly narrow, who tried to reverse and revive the fortunes of the IJA: Mishima Yukio.

### Mishima's Way of the Samurai

Mishima was a "delicate" child who published his first book at the age of nineteen, in 1944. Receiving his draft notice in February 1945, Mishima was diagnosed as "unfit" for military service.<sup>62</sup> After the war Mishima joined a group of other writers called *Kindai Bungaku* (Modern Culture) which published a journal by the same name and which in turn is considered a "cornerstone of postwar literature."<sup>63</sup> While several writers in the group helped construct the negative image of the IJA that has been cited so far in this study, Mishima's writing, perhaps especially in the 1960s, took the opposite tack. As a part of an overall rejection of the kind of Japanese identity he perceived postwar Japan to be creating Mishima, "rediscovered Japanese tradition, at the same time that many Japanese, especially the younger ones, were intent on negating all tradition."<sup>64</sup> His was a reaction against what he considered "the scum of humanism . . . Western European ideals."<sup>65</sup>

At the heart of Japanese tradition Mishima found the Imperial Japanese Army, veneration of a divine Emperor, and an "erotic and narcissistic fascination with death."<sup>66</sup> In his work *Yūkoku*, usually translated as "Patriotism,"

published in 1961, Mishima imagines an ideal IJA lieutenant, Takeyama, who was disappointed in not taking part in the 1936 coup attempt, known as the 2-26 Incident, because it took place on February 26. Having determined he cannot honorably act against his colleagues who have been arrested, he decides to commit *seppuku*. When he explains his intentions to his bride, Reiko, she decides to commit suicide as well. Their senses heightened by impending death, they make love and then kill themselves. Mishima later wrote, directed and starred in a short film of the same title based on this work. In it Mishima has a chance to wear the IJA uniform he was denied in real life, as well as a chance to show off the chiseled body he had created through weight lifting in response to his rejection by the army.

The short film is black and white, heavily influenced in its staging by *noh* theater and features such realism in the depiction of the lieutenant's *seppuku*, with bowels visibly spilling from Mishima as he slices his torso (he was slicing through a patch of artificial skin from which spilled pig bowels), that some audience members in the Paris arts show for whom the film had been created are said to have fainted.<sup>67</sup>

Two years after the making of this film, and just three years before his actual suicide, Mishima published his commentary *Hagakure Nyumon*, translated in the United States as *The Way of the Samurai*, making explicit what is implicit in his works of fiction. Expounding on a view diametrically opposed to that of fellow member of *Kindai Bungaku*, Noma Hiroshi, who in his work "based on his experiences in China and the Philippines, depicts the agony of soldiers who are deprived of their humanity and become mere cogs in the wheels of the imperial army,"<sup>68</sup> Mishima decries the postwar state of his fellow countrymen, writing, "They forget the ideals for a total human being; to degenerate into a single cog, a single function, becomes their greatest ambition."<sup>69</sup> Mishima's focus is death. He explains the motive for the *Anpo* Riots as ultimately based on the fact that, "the young people who participated in it were simply seeking a cause for which they would be willing to lay down their lives,"<sup>70</sup> and writes of, "Our enormous frustration at not being able to die . . . When all other demands have been satisfied, death becomes our only unsatisfied desire."<sup>71</sup> Unsatisfied, as it turned out, for not much longer.

Mishima had formed a small, unarmed "army" called the *Tate no Kai* (Society of the Shield), designing the stylish uniforms and training with the young men on GSDF installations. The police did not consider the Society violent, so training the group was seen by the GSDF as equivalent to hosting and training other civilian groups, as had become common, and probably regarded as better than usual for public relations purposes, given Mishima's celebrity. On November 25, 1970, Mishima and three other members of the Society, in uniform, arrived at the Ichigaya installation of Japan's Eastern Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Masuda Kanetoshi, for a

pre-arranged appointment to meet the general. Once in his office Mishima and the others seized Masuda and tied him to his chair. Mishima demanded to speak to the soldiers of the Eastern Army from a balcony adjoining the general's office. After fighting off an attempt to free the general and blocking the door to the office, Mishima strode out to the balcony and began his harangue of those gathered below. Three years earlier in his commentary on *Hagakure* he had written, "in present-day Japan under a constitution that outlaws war, people who consider death to be their occupation—and this includes the National Defense Forces—cannot exist, on principle."<sup>72</sup> Now he bellowed to the gathered troops, "I had believed only the Defense Forces retained the real Japanese soul in Japan. My dream for the Defense Force has been shattered. We will take our lives to protest the Constitution which prohibits Japan's rearmament," only to be laughed at and derided by those below. Mishima admonished them, demanding to know why they would defend a constitution that made them illegal. He continued to be met with derision, disbelief and anger. Finally Mishima shouted "I have waited for the past year for the Defense Forces to rise up and assert themselves. You are fools." With a final shout of "Tennōheika, banzai!" Mishima strode back into Masuda's office and committed *seppuku*.

Morita Hissho, one of the Society members, acted as the *kaishakunin*, or second, though it took at least three swings of his sword before he could behead Mishima.<sup>73</sup> It may be, as one observer commented soon after the suicide, that Mishima had "been directing his life as if it were a play. He probably decided on a directed, aesthetic way of death to end his life."<sup>74</sup> If so, the troubled author may not have really expected a positive reaction to his call for a coup from the GSDF troops.

If, however, this was one of Mishima's genuine "attempts to save the Japanese spirit,"<sup>75</sup> then Mishima failed to grasp the GSDF's spirit did not need to be saved. Their alternately puzzled, troubled, or laughing reaction to Mishima's adjurations were a demonstration of a different kind of spirit; they had embraced a professional spirit of quiet, though unappreciated, service to the people, and what Mishima had urged them to do was completely alien to that spirit.

### **Manga: A Phenomenon of Extraordinary Proportions**

Though the GSDF had chosen, nurtured and consolidated a professional identity in the 1960s, the parameters of the GSDF's ethic of quiet service, as well as the imaginative space for the roles, duties and values of all warriors, was still being contested in the narrow margin between truth and fiction. Manga was one medium in which pop guns were both inescapable and dynamically contested.

During the 1960s and 1970s the Japanese gained steadily more disposable income. Combining that with a bevy of creators and a highly literate audience, manga, in the words of Tezuka, “exploded into a phenomenon of extraordinary proportions.”<sup>76</sup> For the GSDF *taian*, or those who might be interested in joining, an irony is that in the flood of titles available on almost any given topic in the 1960s and 1970s, so few focused on modern army stories, while those that did were almost incessantly negative. There were many manga, however, that valorized military service, though, in naval, air or fantastic settings. From a fantastic future, to the present, to the past, Japan’s pop guns explored the meanings of duty, courage and service.

The fantastic is appropriate in a study with an important focus on identity, since “a kind of Ur-theme of the fantastic [is] the search for home or identity, a notion which is part of all literature but which the fantastic is particularly suited for.”<sup>77</sup> With the fantastic the Japanese were limited only by imagination as they constructed possible identities for themselves and explored themes like war.

One of the first important military-by-other-means manga characters to debut in the 1960s was *Cyborg 009*. Created by Ishinomori Shotaro, the series debuted in the comic magazine *Shonen Sunday*, in 1964. Described by one observer as “one of the original Cold War warriors,”<sup>78</sup> *Cyborg 009* is a young Japanese man, who, after an accident, is given cybernetic enhancements by a kindly scientist in the employ of a nefarious crime organization, the Black Ghost. As his designation indicates, the Japanese youth, Joe Shimamura, is the ninth in a series of cyborgs that have been created by cybernetically enhancing people from all over the world, granting each of them specific powers like super strength or speed. As the latest, Shimamura, the only Japanese on the team, is given all the powers. The goal of Black Ghost is to profit from creating super soldiers who will take Earth’s conflicts into outer space. Soon after Shimamura is enhanced, however, the nine cyborgs and the kindly scientist, Dr. Gilmore, escape from Black Ghost, and spend the rest of the series trying to foil the evil organization’s plans.

Groundbreaking in a few ways *Cyborg 009* popularized, for example, the trope of the “ensemble of prototypical characters”<sup>79</sup> who must overcome any internal frictions to work together as a team to win, which became common not only in the fantastic genre, in series like *Kamen Rider*, but also in sports or other manga. *Cyborg 009* was well ahead of its time in imagining a multinational team, the depicted racial and cultural stereotypes notwithstanding, and thus was an attempt to imagine Japan’s place in international society. As a metaphor for seeking that honored place in international society, while the message of the series is explicitly anti-war—the heroes are trying to foil the schemes of the warmongering-for-profit Black Ghost organization—the series’ implicit message is that these super soldiers (and thus

ordinary soldiers), including the Japanese, can fight for a just cause as part of an international effort.

Finally, the series was ahead of its time by sending its heroes into Vietnam in 1965. Others would follow, like *Tetsuwan Atomu* (Astro Boy) in 1968, but the cyborgs got there first. In another departure *mangaka* Ishinomori's message was not anti-American, as was that of many other Japanese creators when dealing with Vietnam. Almost like the recitation of a *benshi*—a narrator in Japanese film—Ishinomori places text at the beginning of the story arc, wondering why a superpower like America is unable to subdue the ill-equipped Viet Cong. For three reasons, he explains, because the Americans have difficulty telling combatant from non-combatant, because of the dense jungles the Americans are forced to fight in, and because—big reveal—Black Ghost is secretly supplying the Viet Cong with advanced weapons. This series thus imagined multinational soldiers fighting for a good cause (that is the destruction of the criminal organization Black Ghost) and, while the story does not praise the war in Vietnam, or any war, nor was it specifically critical of Japan's one treaty ally. Like so many other manga, it inspired follow-on television shows and a movie.<sup>80</sup>

The 1960s was also the time that *gekiga*,<sup>81</sup> dramatic manga with more realistic drawings and cinematic pacing, came into its own. Many of these were set in contemporary settings, but few dealt with soldiers or combat, and those that did were, again, almost wholly negative. There was a spate of manga that dealt with Navy themes, zero fighters and kamikaze pilots, many of which presented positive and heroic narratives, but, for the most part, stories of ground troops were omitted.

One study found that of 28 "Major Japanese War Comics, 1957–1967," only one features ground troops, and the one, *Shiroi Hata*, "The White Flag," by Mizuki Shigeru, published in 1964, "tells the story of a commander who decides to surrender to give his wounded soldiers a chance to retreat."<sup>82</sup> Though the self-sacrifice of the commander is represented that individual as heroic, this type of event was almost unheard of in the actual war, and thus may not be accepted as compelling by modern-day Japanese soldiers.

By the 1970s other IJA veterans, like Mizuki, began to produce manga stories about their experiences. From the years 1968–1977, the study cited above discovered, of "the twenty-six examples found, twenty dwell on the tragic ground war."<sup>83</sup> Of these, perhaps Mizuki's *Sōin Gyokusai Seyo!* (All of US, Let's Die Gloriously Together!), 1973, based on his experiences in the IJA on Rabaul during the Pacific War is best known, and stressed the cruelty, danger, deprivation and sheer stupidity he and the other soldiers faced while in the Imperial Army.<sup>84</sup>

Though soldier role models were in short supply, there were a plethora of titles that stressed values important to warriors and soldiers. A *bildungsroman*

storyline, typically requiring *gaman*, or perseverance during suffering, and often featuring apprenticeship under a wise mentor, was and is common across the various manga genres, but perhaps especially prevalent in sports and salaryman manga.<sup>85</sup> Thus stories that stress perseverance, the importance of training, of sacrificing for others and of working effectively in a team, are readily available and easily related to military service.

### Film: Tropes Traditional and New

There were few portrayals of the GSDF on the small screen (though they were in a supporting role in some episodes of *Ultraman*), and few portrayals of modern ground combat at all, though the American 1960s show *Combat*, depicting American infantry in Europe, was shown.<sup>86</sup> On the large screen as well, when it came to *gendaigeki*, that dealt with war or military themes, there was a dearth of depictions of ground combat, while almost all depictions of the IJA that did come out were deleterious.

*Tora! Tora! Tora!* 1970, directed by Richard Feischer, is an American film, but it was made in collaboration with Japanese film makers, and its depictions of the IJA versus the Imperial Japanese Navy are fairly typical. In the only scenes with IJA characters the soldiers are depicted as venal and scheming, while IJN characters are depicted relatively straightforwardly, some even voicing their hesitance about the wisdom of attacking America and “waking the sleeping giant.”<sup>87</sup>

In 1971, Okamoto Kihachi's *Okinawa Kessen (The Battle of Okinawa in the United States)* came out; a film that bucks prevailing trends and revives more traditional heroic-soldier tropes. The film opens with depictions of IJA troops, suffering malnutrition, dysentery, and other miseries as they face American forces who came on “like an avalanche” as war with the United States progressed. Continuing, the narrator intones, “finally” on Saipan, the IJA soldiers choose *gyokusai*, or glorious death, while across the screen flicker a montage of still pictures not just of dead troops, as was true of the previous montage, but of dead Japanese troops and children. This sets the tableau for the battle of Okinawa. Okamoto's depiction of the historical details of the battle itself are fairly accurate, but his depiction of soldiers in *Battle* conforms more closely to tropes of heroic soldiers defending their country—arguably common to war movies in most countries—than is true of most other depictions of ground combat in postwar Japanese cinema.

While there are nods to abuses, such as the shooting to death of an Okinawan man, a school principal, by IJA troops who have accused the principal of being a spy, in part because of a mysterious wrapped parcel he is carrying (as he falls dead the wrapping slips, and the portrait of Emperor Hirohito, which had adorned the school, is revealed), or the IJA troops that

try to order civilians out of shelters at gunpoint, and who then have to back down when a young civilian woman browbeats them.

But these examples are outnumbered by such scenes as a commander who worries for his soldier because the commander's young charge has volunteered to personally set an explosive under an approaching American tank. As the scene unfolds the commander registers relief when the soldier succeeds, and both the commander and the soldier radiate pride at the success. In another instance there is a depiction of a major with an almost zen-like calm—a modern-day *Kyūzō* from *Seven Samurai*—who keeps on fighting against overwhelming odds and finally dies with his few remaining men in a last charge toward the American enemy. Other than the token scenes mentioned above there are few depictions of an important aspect of the Okinawan narrative of the battle: that Okinawans were as much victims of the IJA as they were of the invading Americans.<sup>88</sup>

The attempt at rehabilitating the soldier's image in *Okinawa Kessen* may have been influenced by the media sensation caused by the return of Yokoi Shōichi to Japan a year prior to the film's release. Yokoi was an IJA soldier who had survived on Guam "hiding in the jungle for twenty-seven years."<sup>89</sup> Discovered while trying to raid shrimp nets in a river, Yokoi, after hospitalization, returned to and became the center of a media spotlight in Japan. The reaction to Yokoi's return was mixed. His return, may have, for instance, sparked a renewed interest in recovering the remains of IJA soldiers from their distant Pacific island resting places,<sup>90</sup> and the phrase he used at the beginning of his first media interview, at Haneda International Airport, "though embarrassed," became an immediate catch phrase in the culture used by Japanese who were "little concerned as to what the original speaker was embarrassed about."<sup>91</sup> (To open his press conference Yokoi had said "Though embarrassed, I have returned home to tell about the conditions on Guam.")<sup>92</sup>

While some lauded his *gaman* and loyalty, others castigated him for hiding instead of bravely facing the enemy. Many in the postwar generation "cast a curious eye on the man who had been imprisoned by wartime social mores," and they found him "simply incomprehensible."<sup>93</sup> There were positive references to his ability to survive all those years undetected, and to live off the land, but he was also represented as "weird," while "the idea that he should be admired as a soldier was, overall, firmly rejected."<sup>94</sup> The return of another soldier, Onoda Hirō, from the Philippines, prompted another media frenzy, in 1974. A contrast was made between Onoda and Yokoi—Yokoi who had run away, Onoda who had stood his ground, maintained a working rifle, and refused to leave until ordered to do so by his former commander. For a time Onoda was depicted as the "paragon of the soldier," but soon afterwards others would say he was "not a hero nor a soldier nor a brave man."<sup>95</sup>

In part the fall from pop culture grace both men experienced was the result of disillusionment; their carefully crafted personas which the veterans had partially helped to create and partially had thrust upon them, were unsustainable. In other part the temporary lionization, and then commodification of the images of these two IJA veterans did not rehabilitate the IJA soldier in the popular Japanese mind because the image of Japanese soldiers remained, for a variety of reasons, a "fearful thing," as one of Yokoi's "war buddies" characterized Yokoi.<sup>96</sup> The return did occasion opportunity for reflection on the part of the Japanese people regarding war, and even about their collectively shabby treatment of returning veterans from the war, but this did not mark a turning point in the conception of modern Japanese soldiers. Yokoi became a caricature<sup>97</sup> and Onoda migrated to Brazil,<sup>98</sup> both of them becoming figurative or literal aliens. Postwar Japan did not have soldiers was the implicit message.

Which left GSDF soldiers with what status? Tarred with the same brush. Fukasaku Kinji's *Gunki Hatameku Moto ni (Under the Flag of the Rising Sun in the United States)*, 1972, makes this clear. It is the story of Sakie who has tried every year to obtain payment as a war widow since such pensions were restored. Set in 1971, with a new bureaucrat dealing with her case, Sakie is finally told she has not been receiving pension payments because she is not entitled; her husband is listed as a deserter. Sakie cannot believe her husband deserted, and sets out to talk with the few survivors from her husband's unit she can find. The first survivor lives in a garbage dump. He tells Sakie her husband died leading a courageous charge, and on the screen the audience is shown a scene that conforms to the tropes of the self-sacrificing combat hero. Through further investigation she finds out this was a lie.

Actually her husband was executed after he and others in his squad killed an abusive officer. As Fukasada pieces together various versions of Sakie's husband's death, the misery and despair of the ill-equipped, starving soldiers who have been forced into cannibalism and other horrors is made clear. When Sakie speaks to a former officer in her husband's unit the veteran relates how he became a teacher when he returned to Japan, "to convey the misery of war to future generations." As he is speaking American transport aircraft fly overhead, possibly to supply the then-ongoing American conflict in Vietnam, and Fukasaka cuts to a montage of still images, including the May Day riots in 1952, a newspaper headline that reads *Saigunbi* (Rearmament), and Eisenhower and Kishi signing the *Anpo* agreement. The montage nears conclusion with stills of Mishima addressing the GSDF troops from the balcony of the Eastern Army headquarters in Ichigaya just before he commits suicide. Cutting from Mishima, the final still is of the gathered GSDF troops, presented in negative. Next cutting to a film of marching GSDF troops, the picture is still in negative, at first, and then resolves into a normal overhead shot which ends focused on the fixed bayonets of the marching soldiers.

Fukasaka then returns to the narrative thread of the film, ending the scene with students unfurling banners protesting American military bases in Japan and the American war in Vietnam. The veteran asks, "Is this what we fought for?" Fukasaka thus emphasizes the alien nature of the GSDF, an army in a country that has renounced war and armies, and directly connects it with a foreign army on Japanese soil then conducting what was considered illegitimate aggression in Vietnam, reminding any GSDF viewer that a segment of Japanese society view them in what for them is a troubling light.<sup>99</sup>

Thus *Okinawa Kessen* had not signaled some kind of redemption for the IJA—it remains one of the few positive portrayals of the Emperor's soldiers; nor had the return of the last of the Emperor's soldiers marked their rehabilitation in Japanese pop culture. GSDF appearances in popular culture was, like positive portrayals of the IJA, rare. Exceptions were still the *Godzilla* and other *kaiju* movies, which, regarding a positive imaginative space for the GSDF, at least depict a disciplined force willing to help the civilian populace, but do not show that force, ultimately, as effective against the threats faced.

### REEL AND OTHER IMAGINARY SOLDIERS: MAKING UP SOME GROUND, 1980s–1990s

Though there were many models among the pop guns of Japan's mass culture to emulate, the image of themselves the GSDF found presented was dual edged. The SDF was considered both representative of a discipline and an ethic of earnest hard work civilians no longer possessed, yet as not quite normal, and, if necessary, not particularly effective, nor particularly prestigious. These images of the popular mind had taken hold at least by the 1970s, and remained arguably the standard image for decades. For policymakers, however, by the 1970s, changes in the international security environment, as well as Japan's increasing wealth, and other factors, including the rise to political power of an avowed revisionist, prompted changes in Japan's defense policy which ultimately impacted both policy and how the GSDF defined itself.

#### Anime—War is Heaven!

Japan's take on animated television shows and movies, now well known worldwide as anime, became popular first in the 1960s, but perhaps came into its own in the 1980s and 1990s. It was and is a medium replete with military themes. Like the boom in manga popularity, Tezuka Osamu can be given much credit for popularizing the form, given the success of "the first Japanese animated television series," his *Tetsuwan Atomu* (*Astro Boy* in the United States), which began in 1963.<sup>100</sup> In the 1970s *Uchū Senkan Yamato*

(*Space Battleship Yamato*) proved a popular show. Based on a manga (as so many anime are) of the same name, in this case by Matsumoto Leiji, the story valorizes military themes, which has drawn criticism from some quarters. In Frederick Schodt's opinion, however Matsumoto's military-themed stories, of which there are many, "are neither pro-war nor anti-war, but a romantic/existentialist view of the human struggle to survive."<sup>101</sup>

Be that as it may, romanticizing a Space Battleship continues a theme of rehabilitating the Navy as a legitimate force in the popular mind but does not extend to ground forces. As if to emphasize this point, Matsumoto himself, in a manga story that involves ground-level combat, focuses on the misery and isolation of troops involved in his *Ghost Warrior*, 1983.<sup>102</sup>

But anime from this period does begin to allow soldiers, as distinct from their navy and air power counterparts, to make up some ground, so to speak. *Kidō Senshi Gandamu* (called "Mobile Suit Gundam," in the United States, but more accurately translated as "Mobile Warrior Gundam"), premiering in 1981, and based on a manga that had debuted two years earlier, features ground troops—albeit ground troops driving armored, science fiction mechanized suits, called mecha—fighting the good fight to protect their territory.

Widening the discourse to include soldiers does not mean exonerating all soldiers of wrongdoing. The series offers plenty of heroic military action, but also explores themes like just war theory and weapons of mass destruction.<sup>103</sup> The series and its innumerable spin-offs is popular with GSDF members,<sup>104</sup> and even features a future GSDF using Gundam mecha of their own, albeit briefly and not very successfully, in *G Gundam*, 1994.

*Metal Skin Panic MADOX-01*, 1987 also features the GSDF in mecha, this time called Slave Troopers, or STs and set in a much nearer future. The GSDF has developed the STs and is testing them, when the latest version is lost, then found by a military *otaku* (obsessive fan), who accidentally climbs into the suit and then cannot get out. An example of mecha much more on a human scale than that of many of the mecha presented in the Gundam series, MADOX is also an example of so-called gritty mecha—that these are ground troops there is no doubt, as the STs kick up, slide through and are pounded into the dirt. Then current and soon-to-be-developed GSDF equipment are peppered throughout the anime, including Type-74 and the Type 90 tanks (the latter in development at the time), Cobra Attack helicopters, Type-64 Guided Antitank missiles, Type 73 Armored Personnel Carriers, and Apache Attack Helicopters (again, then not yet in the inventory). The message about the GSDF troops is mixed, in that the heroes are not soldiers themselves, but instead a research scientist and the aforementioned civilian *otaku*, and the villain, who is a soldier but probably not from the GSDF, represents the near-insane war-loving trope—spouting at one point, "The scent, the taste—war is heaven!" But the GSDF as an institution are presented as having developed

this superior technology—which, in a simulation shown in the first scene, beats top-of-the-line American tanks. The attention to detail on the GSDF equipment, as well, is hard to find anywhere else. This anime thus imagines a GSDF with a world-leading, high-tech edge, a positive imaginative space for either GSDF members or those who aspired to be.

*Kidō Keihatsu Patoreba-2* (Patlabor 2), 1993, features a much more problematic representation of the GSDF, but also neatly presents an encapsulation of many of the currents involved in the defense discourse. The anime opens “somewhere in Southeast Asia,” clearly Cambodia, with GSDF soldiers under the UN facing hostile fire. The mecha are called Patlabor and the GSDF’s Patlabor is damaged almost from the start by hostile fire, though the soldier in the mecha retains the ability to return fire. Requesting to do just that the soldier is told no, to hold his fire, because a Canadian unit is en route. The GSDF soldier is then killed by the enemy, and his commander, Tsuge Yukihito, is almost killed in his own mecha as well. Afterwards in this film directed by Oshii Mamoru, a cabal of crooked Japanese and Americans politicians, businessman and disgruntled soldiers, concerned Japan has not stepped up defense efforts, stage an attack on the Yokohama Bay Bridge to shock peace-loving Japan into embracing a more normal military posture. Key to the plot is the aforementioned Tsuge, who does not want to see any more of his soldiers die because of Japan’s ill-thought-out, to his mind, military restrictions.

The encapsulation of the defense discourse follows after a police officer trying to catch Tsuge asks a GSDF intelligence officer, Arawaki, if the intel officer thinks Tsuge is out to start a war. In a voice over, as the police officer sails under the damaged Bay Bridge, Arawaki explains the war started long ago. Japan, he says, since the defeat and Occupation, has selfishly turned away from the international system. Profiting from wars all around the world while not experiencing war at home, its economic prosperity had been won with blood-drenched hands. The resulting peace, he declares, has produced “An unabashed lust for peace based on an unmitigated terror of war.” Further it is an unjust peace, he continues, kept by others. When the police character says he prefers an unjust peace to a just war, Arakawa says he understands the view, but that the line between just and unjust wars is not always clear-cut, and simply to deny war at all costs will lead to a state of war in all but name. Arakawa implies Japan is already in such a condition.<sup>105</sup>

The view of the GSDF presented in *Patlabor 2* is problematic for *taiin* in that, though it depicts the majority GSDF members doing the right thing, others are depicted as participating in an attempted coup. Yet the sophistication of the defense narrative, though stressing the negative, is difficult to find anywhere else in the popular culture, and belies the assumption that Japan’s “pacifist” public is naïve when it comes to questions of international security.

### Manga: Cats in the Nam

In manga as well, the discourse continued. Portrayals of the misery, depravity and stupidity of ground combat flourished in the 1970s—essentially the genre of *senki*, or war diaries, presented in manga form. In the mid-1980s Nippon Shuppansha began to publish *Combat Comic*. It has a circulation of about 100,000, including both mecha fans and many SDF members, according to the publisher.<sup>106</sup> As has been the trend, many of the stories in *Combat* center around naval and air forces, but one of the more popular stories, *Apocalypse Meow*, is about “a three-soldier unit in the Vietnam War . . . a close-up look at combat on the ground, told with anthropomorphic bunnies and other animals.”<sup>107</sup> Though catering to the Japanese demand for *kawaii* or cuteness, just as the graphic novel *Maus*, in the United States, took on the serious themes of the Holocaust with a set of anthropomorphic animal characters, *Meow* is a serious look at ground combat, and, bucking the postwar trend, shows soldiers that are brave and tactically proficient.<sup>108</sup>

### Fighting Monster Movies

In live-action features, once again, the Godzilla franchise is one of the few that offers roles for the GSDF. Having dispensed with the kinder and gentler Godzilla at the end of the previous run when the Godzilla had returned in 1985, in 1989's *Godzilla vs. Biollante*, Japan once again faces a dire threat, and the GSDF is ready to respond. In this feature the GSDF has leading roles that more closely resemble traditional heroic-soldier tropes. GSDF Colonel Kuroki, seconded to the National Land Bureau, has created the “Special Disaster Research Center G Room,” (*Tokushū Saigai Kenkyū Kaigi G Ru-mu*) to track Godzilla's movements.<sup>109</sup> His subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel Gondo, leads troops against Godzilla. In his effort to complete his mission, Gondo climbs to an upper floor in a skyscraper and launches a shoulder-fired missile with a special warhead, designed to take out the monster, at point blank range down Godzilla's throat; Godzilla retaliates and kills him. At one point in the film Colonel Kuroki is so worn out, he takes a nap. Watching the colonel sleep, Dr. Shiragami, the good scientist in the film, remarks to a younger man with him that Kuroki carries a lot of responsibility for such a young man, and then says, “I guess it's time for my generation to move aside. From now on it's up to you.”<sup>110</sup> It is possible the same can be said about images of GSDF soldiers in Japanese movies—with the advent of a new generation of filmmakers Japan's soldiers in the mid-1990s were beginning to be presented in a way that would be considered normal in most countries, but had been abnormal in Japan up to that point.

In *Godzilla versus Mechagodzilla*, 1993, *Godzilla versus Space Godzilla*, 1994 and, *Godzilla versus the Destroyer*, 1995, the ground force gives way in pride of place to the airpower of the imaginary G-Force, though aspects of a rehabilitated identity for the GSDF are indicated in subtle ways. In *Mechagodzilla*, for instance, Aso, portrayed as a GSDF major the one time he appears in a dress uniform, is depicted in the first part of the movie as a kind of modern-day Sanjuro—scruffy and blunt-spoken but courageous in battle. In all three films the highest ranking G-Force officers wear GSDF Ranger pins, indicating they are graduates of the GSDF's elite Ranger course, which is focused on intensive infantry tactics; training which, in Kamei's words, is "meant to produce warriors."<sup>11</sup>

The studio Daiei also rebooted its Gamera movies at this time, and these films treat the SDF in a more realistic fashion than the Godzilla franchise in terms of both equipment and policies—albeit in a setting that includes a giant turtle that can fly spinning like a UFO known as Gamera, and mutated pteranodon-looking creatures known as Gyaos. *Gamera: Guardian of the Universe*, 1995, was the first of a trilogy for the reboot. The Gyaos monsters attack innocent civilians and the cabinet orders the SDF to capture the monsters. GSDF helicopters lure the winged creatures to an area where they can be caged within a sports stadium. One of the creatures escapes and Gamera shows up. A civilian asks a GSDF officer if the GSDF will attack Gamera and the Gyaos, and the reply is "Our actions are limited to defense, unless the enemy attacks first." A bill which will allow the SDF to attack the monsters is submitted in House of Representatives, and a newscaster notes, if passed, it will allow Japan to take military action for the first time. Soon after this voice over a young man in the film says, "I want to join the SDF and fight the monsters." The Diet passes the bill and the GSDF is able to shoot down Gamera with a type 81 Surface-to Air Missile, though the tough turtle is only down temporarily (given the amount of damage and death the terrible terrapin has caused the SDF and government can be forgiven at this point in the film for not realizing the Gyaos are the greater threat, and that Gamera is trying to take out the Gyaos). GSDF tanks, scouts on motorcycles and Chinook helicopters also make appearances in the film. For the most part the SDF is presented in a much more sympathetic light than civilian government officials.

The IJA as well, though to an even more limited extent than the GSDF, receives some positive treatment in live-action films during this time. In an earlier Godzilla film than those mentioned above, *Godzilla versus King Ghidora*, 1991, for instance, there is a flashback to a group of IJA soldiers on Lagos island in the Indonesia archipelago in 1945. The brief scene emphasizes the victimization of the bedraggled soldiers by superior American firepower, but the soldiers are presented as relatively disciplined, and appropriately thankful to their savior, a dinosaur that has survived on this isolated

island and that, in this version of the story, later is mutated into Godzilla by the radiation from the Bikini atoll Hydrogen Bomb test. A much more poignant portrayal of the IJA appears in the 1995 Kurosawa Akira film *Dreams*.

After Yokoi Shōichi's return from Guam in 1973, a writer writes, "I feel we owe something to the dead soldiers, and we have to return what we owe them. I feel we need to respond to their deaths."<sup>112</sup> Kurosawa provides a response in 1995. Written and directed by Kurosawa *Dreams* presents seven vignettes—dreams that Kurosawa had, according to hand-written characters which appear before each segment. One opens with a platoon commander from the IJA, still in uniform and alone, trudging tiredly on a road toward a mountain tunnel. Just before he reaches it a dog comes out of the mouth of the tunnel, with grenades in a kind of canvas holster slung over its back. The dog growls, bears its teeth, and barks menacingly at the platoon commander. The soldier hesitates, then squares his shoulders and moves forward, not looking back. The sound of the dog's pursuit fades. Once he is through the tunnel the platoon commander does turn back, and he hears the sound of marching feet.

Kurosawa is invoking the story of Orpheus and Eurydice. The dog, with grenades slung on either side of its back, is the three-headed dog Cerberus, guarding the gates of the Underworld, and the platoon commander is Orpheus. In the myth, Orpheus enters to bring back to the world of the living his lost love, Eurydice, and Hades agrees to let her go, but only under the condition that she follow Orpheus the whole way, and that Orpheus not look back while he is still in the underworld. Orpheus almost makes it to the living world but cannot bear not knowing if Eurydice is still behind him. He glances back to see her drawn back into the Underworld by that glance, lost forever.

The platoon commander, however, has succeeded. He did not look back until after he had exited the tunnel. But having succeeded he has now allowed the dead to follow him into the living world. The first is Private Noguchi. Private Noguchi comes to attention and reports to his platoon commander. Stunned, the platoon commander tells Noguchi he died. Noguchi thinks this cannot be so. He remembers recently having a wonderful home-cooked meal with his family. The platoon commander tells him it was "a strong dream," Noguchi had had just after getting wounded, and that the private had told the commander of it, just before he had closed his eyes again and died in the commander's arms. The commander finally convinces Noguchi he is dead, and the soldier turns and marches back into the underworld. No sooner has he done so than the commander hears the sound of several marching feet. His entire platoon marches out. The platoon sergeant at the center front halts the unit and reports to the commander, all present, no casualties. In utter anguish the commander tells him, no, they, his platoon, had all been wiped out. The platoon commander was the only survivor, as he had been captured before going into this last battle. Now standing in for all of Japan, the commander cannot

look his former unit in the face and chokingly tells them it had been his fault; he cannot blame the extremities of war—he had ordered them to their deaths. He tells them they died like dogs, and that he is sorry, but there is no place for them in the living world. He asks them to return to the underworld to sleep. When they do not respond, the commander buttons his uniform coat, comes to attention, and orders the platoon to attention. They comply sharply. He orders an about face and then orders them forward, back into the tunnel. As the platoon disappears into the darkness the dog appears, barking and growling at the commander, who is now alone again. The scene ends.<sup>113</sup> Thus in a poignant, moving portrayal, Kurosawa has apologized to the IJA for the fact they were uselessly sent to their deaths, and ignored afterwards, but he has also reminded them there is no place for them in the modern world, both apologizing for and confirming their status in postwar Japan.

### ALL THEIR TROPES AND MEMES, SOLDIERS IN POP CULTURE, 2000–2015

The anime movie *Patlabor 2* and the vignette in Kurosawa's film *Dreams* indicate the degree of sophistication the defense discourse had taken on. Though images of the IJA and GSDF soldiers had remained both under represented and often problematic when shown, there were alternatives for those interested in or those already members of the GSDF in the imaginative space created by the popular culture. In the new century that followed the images of the soldier continued to normalize.

#### Manga: Won't You Use that Body to Defend the Country?

As Japan entered the new millennium and 55 years had passed since the end of the Pacific War, the GSDF finally started to make its way into ever-popular manga. Interestingly, given the still small percentage of the GSDF constituted by women, one of the first series concerning a *jieikan's* life featured a female protagonist.

In the series, *Tatakae! Wakkuchan*, by Hanatsu Hanayo, which debuted in 2009, the GSDF finally gets a bildungsroman-type of story. The series follows Wakita-san, a 23-year-old woman, as she transforms from a flighty, man-obsessed immaturity to a confident member the GSDF's Women's Army Corps (WAC, the *wakku* of the title). As is typical, the series is full of comedic moments. For instance, she is recruited during an encounter she has mistaken for a date. Wakita thus misunderstands when the recruiter tells her, "I want your body." Wakita pictures something intimate in her mind, but, of course, the recruiter finishes, "Won't you use that body for national

defense?” Peppered with other lighthearted moments, Wakita learns grit and how to appreciate her team of fellow WACs—representing the typical tropes of a classic Japanese beauty who effortlessly gets things right, a *gyaru* (gal— young women who effect dark tans, “blonde hair, revealing clothing, and an outgoing personality,”)<sup>114</sup> and a socially awkward, doughty otaku—during basic training. Cliches abound: the tipping point for her decision to join the GSDF, for example, is her hope find a serious boyfriend (*kareshi*) because of the number of men who will be there. But she also finds her sense of purpose. Toward the end of her training she is unsure if the GSDF way of life is for her, and happens to meet a former crush in a park. When she tells this man about her training, he demeans all women who would try to join the GSDF, saying they must not fit in anywhere else, and that they are only after men. This is the spark for Wakita’s moment of clarity. She kicks the former crush to the curb (or, in this case, into a fountain they had been sitting in front of), telling him he has no right to denigrate women that train hard every day, face danger, and care for one another. She is going home, meaning back to the GSDF camp. She has been confirmed in her own mind as a WAC, and the GSDF is now her home. Given that most Japanese are unfamiliar with the SDF, the last two pages of the first collected-manga volume offer a useful guide to many of the specialties open to WACs, and an explanation of the various branches of the GSDF.<sup>115</sup>

*Tatakae* is a Jousei-style comic (aimed at young women) and the bildungsroman story is more typically featured in Seinen-style manga (focused on young men). In 2012 *Raijingu San* (which can be romanized as either Rising Son or Rising Sun), by Fujiwara Satoshi debuted in such a comic.

The protagonist in *Raijingu San* is Ikki Kai, an aimless young man who is unsure who he should be as a man, particularly because his father, an outdoorsman, has died. Ikki trying to test his survival skills, has a chance meeting on a mountain with a fit, impressive hiker who is a member of the GSDF. Ikki decides to join. Again, typical tropes abound such as the physical struggles of a stocky, less fit character and Ikki’s clashes with another recruit—mutual dislike and fierce competition gives way to grudging respect and the shared recognition of one another’s tenacity; the two become best buddies (*badi*). Most *jieikan* are men, and *Raijingu* finally gives them a hero they can identify with directly in manga form.<sup>116</sup>

Finally, the most popular manga to star the JGSDF has been *Ge-to—Jieitai Kare no Chi ni te Kaku Tatakaeri*, usually translated into English as *Gate—Thus the JSDF Fought There*. In this story the otaku, in the form of First Lieutenant Itami Yōji is the hero. Itami is headed to an otaku convention in Tokyo’s Ginza district when a breach to another dimension opens in the middle of a Ginza street. Fantasy creatures—ogres and other monsters—as well as armored knights on horseback come pouring out and begin

a general slaughter. The prime minister (who bears a striking resemblance to Koizumi) orders in the JSDF. The GSDF comes in with tanks, artillery, rockets, attack helicopters and rifles. Defeating the monsters and establishing security on the Ginza side of the gate, Itami is placed in charge of a new GSDF unit, the 3rd Reconnaissance Team, and ordered to scout the territory, now called the “Special Region,” on the other side of the gate and to establish contact with whoever was responsible for the massacre. Adventures ensue.<sup>117</sup>

Yanai Takumi, a former *jieikan*, first published *Gate* as episodes “serialized online on a novel website called Arcadia,” which were later issued as print novels in 2010, turned into manga in 2011 and collected in volumes in 2012. The manga were adapted an anime in 2015.<sup>118</sup> The *shinsha* tradition is evident throughout the *Gate* manga (and anime), with the P9 pistol, Howa Types 64 and 89 rifles, Sumitomo Minimi machine gun, and many other fire arms rendered in exactly accurate detail. The manga and anime also put on display a lot of the JGSDF’s equipment, including Komatsu Light Armored Vehicles, Type 74 and Type 10 tanks, Type 75 Self-Propelled Howitzers, and Cobra and Apache Attack Helicopters, all rendered with the same care for detail.<sup>119</sup> While mediated by a fantasy setting, the popularity of these novels, manga and anime must feel gratifying to GSDF soldiers, given the long wait for such validation.

### Anime-ted Discourse

The validation of seeing the GSDF represented so favorably, and at least in terms of equipment details, accurately, rests in the near complete absence of such images until the last few years. The GSDF had been mentioned before, in *Kōkaku Kidōtai Ghost in the Shell*, for instance, as early as 1989 in the original manga by Shirow Masamune, which was turned into an animated film in 1995 by Oshii Mamoru. The protagonist is a female cyborg, Major Kusanagi Motoko, who gained that rank in the GSDF. Another main character is Batou, a former GSDF ranger.<sup>120</sup>

In *Ghost in the Shell 2<sup>nd</sup> GIG*, 2005–2006, the JGSDA, so a Ground Self-Defense Army (at least in the English dub) is part of a nefarious plot by the Japanese government, and though they possess high-tech equipment that look like plausible advances from current inventory, the soldiers are no match for intrepid Section 9, the team led by the major.<sup>121</sup>

A prequel anime, Section 9’s origin story, was broadcast in 2015, shedding some light on the major’s experience. In the prequel, known as *Ghost in the Shell: Arise—Alternate Architecture* Kusanagi is a major (*sansa*) in the GSDF, judging by her dress uniform when she wears it. She works for the mysterious 501 organization, tracking hackers, terrorists and other miscreants, as she will soon in Section 9. It is during this series Kusanagi meets

Batou, who is still in the GSDF Ranger Battalion, and other key members of her team. Kusanagi is called *sansa*, the designation for major in the SDF, early in the series, but temporarily loses that rank, through the malfeasance of a corrupt government official, a common trope in the series, and has her rank restored after an investigation, but now, and from this point on, she is referred to as *shōsa* the word for major in a *rikugun* (the armies of the rest of the world), because of some kind of reorganization that is not explained, vice what they are called in the SDF.<sup>122</sup>

The GSDF does appear in a couple of other anime series. In *Full Metal Panic*, the main characters enter the GSDF base in Narashino, where, in reality, the GSDF 1st Airborne Brigade is stationed. Not the focus, the GSDF are shown in a positive light, for the most part.<sup>123</sup> In *Eureka Seven AO*, an SDF still exists, but in this imagined future it is the designation of a force that defends an independent Okinawa, while the troops of Japan have normalized and are called Japan Armed Forces.<sup>124</sup> In any case the Japanese military is presented in a normal light, with good and not-so-great members, but not as necessarily evil or inept.

As with the manga, GSDF are most prominent in the anime version of the *Gate* franchise. *Gate* pokes fun at GSDF tropes—when a dragon threatens a group of refugees in the Special Region Itami and crew take action, shouting “Battling monsters is an SDF tradition!”<sup>125</sup>—while also indulging in some wish for fulfillment for *Rikuji* soldiers. In season 1, broadcast in 2015, Itami is called back to the Diet by opposition candidates, hoping to score points at the expense of the GSDF. Itami has been accompanied by residents of the Special Region, one of whom looks like a young girl, but is actually more than 900 years old and the priestess of a war god, with significant powers, named Rory Mercury. When the opposition politician is trying to get Rory to publicly say it had been negligence on the part of Itami’s unit that led to the deaths of a quarter of the total number of refugees in the dragon attack, and did not Rory think the unit had placed their own safety above that of the refugees. Rory’s answer is one put-upon soldiers around the world can identify with. Rory first asks the politician, are you stupid? First, what would be wrong if soldiers tried to survive? Who else would protect people who live in comfort like you if they all died? Itami’s soldiers, Rory declares, are courageous. They did not lose a quarter of the refugees, they saved three-quarters of them. She finishes by saying if people like the politician cannot understand that, the soldiers of Japan must really have a difficult time.<sup>126</sup>

### **Movies: Not Just, but Still, a Kaiju Defense Force**

Though presented in a more normalized fashion than previously, the SDF remains under-represented on the silver screen, particularly the GSDF and

particularly with regard to *gendai geki*. One exception does not feature the GSDF, but does shed a positive light on the ASDF and the MSDF. *Sora e Sokui no Tsubasa—Rescue Wings*, debuted in 2008, and tells the story of the first female Rescue Helicopter pilot, who is stationed in Komatsu, on Honshu. Growing up on a remote island, the mother of the heroine, Kawashima Haruka, is transported to a main-island hospital by an ASDF rescue helo that has to fly through near-typhoon conditions to reach the patient. As an adult Kawashima becomes a rescue pilot herself and the movie revolves around her training in the ASDF as well as her landing on a sailing MSDF destroyer to rescue a colleague, a historic first for an ASDF pilot. The movie presents all the *jieikan* in the story as professionals who learn to love one another like family; it had the cooperation of the Ministry of Defense and of the ASDF and MSDF.<sup>127</sup>

Another 2008 film, *Tokyo Sonata*, depicts a soldier, but not of the GSDF. In the story the father of the family, Sasaka Ryuhei, loses his job and must scramble for another but is too ashamed to tell his family. His wife and two sons are each going through a crisis as well. The older son, Takashi, is dissatisfied with his life and drops out of college. The film imagines that America has opened a recruiting office in Tokyo because of the U.S. Army's insatiable need for manpower to fight in the Middle East. Takashi asks why he should not be able to join and possibly sacrifice himself just because his country's constitution forbids it. Takashi thinks America offers more hope for the future, so he enlists to gain American citizenship. Later in the movie his mother dreams Takashi comes back bloodied, talking about how many people he has killed, and she is horrified (in reality, later in the story Takashi writes and says he is no longer in the army, but will stay in the Middle East to try to find his way in life).<sup>128</sup> A son questioning the rightness of Article 9 and his mother horrified by, in effect, a change to Japan's no-battlefield-deployment policy offers an interesting snapshot of the defense discourse.

In the new century the GSDF have an expanded presence in the Godzilla series. In *Godzilla vs. Megaguirus*, 2000, the opening scene centers around a squad of GSDF troops bent on confronting Godzilla with shoulder-fired missiles. The unit commander sacrifices his life to save a female subordinate, Tsujimori. Inspired by her commander's sacrifice, Tsujimori goes on to head the unfortunately named (at least for English-speaking audiences) G-Grasper force. In the end the SDF win, and this is achieved due to the potentially self-sacrificing act of the dauntless star Tsujimori; not only does this feature the rehabilitation of the GSDF, but the WACs of the *Rikuji* are finally presented with a role model (even earlier than Wakita-san above).<sup>129</sup>

Another film in the series, *Godzilla, Mothra & King Ghidorah: Giant Monsters All-Out Attack*, 2001, was yet another reboot of the series, and can be read as an extended metaphor for the normalization and celebration of

the SDF. The opening and closing scenes are explicitly tied to the role of the Defense Forces (*Bōei*, again, rather than *Jieï*); Godzilla is overtly identified as embodying the spirits of Imperial Japanese forces slain in the Pacific War (a kind of huge, rampaging embodiment of Yasukuni), as well as the spirits of all the Allied soldiers slain in that war; so when Admiral Tachibana slays this dead-eyed specter of the past—from a submarine named Satsuma, no less—the SDF (or again, DF) hit a triple, claiming a link to a usable heroic past with the Satsuma reference, literally slaying their troublesome IJA heritage, and defeating the spirits of the Allies from that time in the kind of retroactive revisionism that has had some popularity in Japan since around the mid-1980s. This movie, known as GMK among fans, opens with a lecture on the role of the Defense Forces under the Japanese constitution, and ends with the hero, Tachibana, saluting fallen comrades at sea; while the hero is not a GSDF *jieikan*, but rather MSDF, it is a validation of the SDF as a whole, at least imaginatively.<sup>130</sup>

### NEW MILLENIUM, NEW MONSTERS

In the new millennium Japan has faced new monsters, literal and figurative, metaphorical and virtual. Depictions of armies and of soldiers, have normalized to a degree, though depictions of GSDF soldiers remain vanishingly rare. How the image of the GSDF is presented in Japan's popular media is important because that media both reflects and helps to shape Japan's culture. Culture is important to any national army because "Culture, as both professional norms and national traditions, shapes preference formation by military organizations by telling organizational members who they are and what is possible."<sup>131</sup> Telling a national army who they are and what is possible is important because, as Sun Pin warned "though war may take place only once in a hundred years, it must be prepared for as if it could break out the very next day."<sup>132</sup> War—despite what airpower, naval power and perhaps now cyberpower proponents might argue—is ultimately decided on the ground, and for this the nation-state needs armies. It is vitally important to the people of any state, then, that their army know "who they are and what is possible." While the GSDF has managed to create for itself a professional self-image despite its relative cultural isolation, that professional identity remains incomplete if it is not firmly connected to the larger culture. The GSDF and any army need positive images in the surrounding culture to provide models of the behavior that show them what is expected and what is accepted; it needs to gain respect, like any organization, to attract recruits and for its members to feel pride; and its members need pride to remain in service the length of time necessary to become proficient and professional.

The GSDF do take pride, and rightly, in their disaster and humanitarian relief roles, but that is not enough. Japan as a whole must come to terms with its military past, in order for Japan's military to successfully face the future.

## NOTES

1. John W. Dower, *Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World* (New York: The New Press, 2012), 119.

2. Van Creveld, xiv.

3. *Ibid.*, 310.

4. Varley, *Warriors of Japan as Portrayed in the War Tales*, xi.

5. For instance the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education instructs all subjects "should emergency arise offer yourselves courageously to the State (*giyuko ni hoshi*); and thus guard and maintain Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth." See Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Studies of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 121.

6. For a good discussion see Lisa Narroway, "Symbols of State Ideology: The Samurai in Modern Japan," *New Voices 2: A Journal for Emerging Scholars of Japanese Studies in Australia*, no. December (2008).

7. Professor Gluck translates this as military spirit, but I prefer to translate *gunjin*, which literally means military person, as soldier. See Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 181.

8. Mayo, "Literary Reorientation in Occupied Japan: Incidents of Civil Censorship," 135.

9. Yoko H. Thakur, "History Textbook Reform in Allied Occupied Japan, 1945–52," *History of Education Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (1995): 265.

10. *Ibid.*, 266.

11. *Ibid.*, 270.

12. *Ibid.*, 276.

13. For example Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, a legal scholar and one of the members of the Matsumoto Committee. See Koseki, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, 124.

14. Irmela Hijija-Kiirschnereit, "Post-World War II Literature: The Intellectual Climate in Japan, 1945–1985," in *Legacies and Ambiguities: Postwar Fiction and Culture in West Germany and Japan*, ed. Ernestine Schlant and J. Thomas Rimer (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 100–01.

15. Eiji Otsuka, "Disarming Atom: Tezuka Osamu's Manga at War and Peace," in *Mechademia 3: Limits of the Human*, ed. Frenchy Lunning, *Mechademia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 120.

16. Brigitte Koyama-Richard, *One Thousand Years of Manga*, English-language ed. (Paris: Flammarion, 2007), 137.

17. Jason S. Yadao, *The Rough Guide to Manga*, ed. Peter Buckley Kate Berens, Tracy Hopkins, Matthew Milton, Joes Staines, Ruth Tidball, Rough Guide Reference (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 2009), 12. See also Schodt, *Manga! Manga! The World of Japanese Comics*, 62–66.

18. Ferenc M. Szasz and Issei Takechi, "Atomic Heroes and Atomic Monsters: American and Japanese Cartoonists Confront the Onset of the Nuclear Age, 1945–80," *The Historian* 69, no. 4 (2007), <http://www.questia.com/read/5025535506>.

19. See Igarashi, *Bodies*, 14 and 19–46.

20. For a full treatment of this interesting story of a documentary which hit most of the right notes for SCAP censors, yet was pulled from circulation after only a few days probably because of its depiction of the Emperor, see especially Kyoko Hirano, *Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo: The Japanese Cinema under the American Occupation, 1945–1952* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), 122–45.

21. Donald Richie, *A Hundred Years of Japanese Film: A Concise History, with a Selective Guide to Dvds and Videos*, Revised ed. (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 2005), 111.

22. Keiko I. McDonald, "Whatever Happened to Passive Suffering? Women on the Screen," in *The Confusion Era: Art and Culture of Japan During the Allied Occupation, 1945–1952*, ed. Mark Sandler (Seattle and London: Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, Smithsonian Institution in association with the University of Washington Press, 1997).

23. James Joseph Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 14–32.

24. Robert Wolfe, ed. *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 85.

25. Ambassador Sebald sent summaries of many of these conflicting articles back to Washington. See for example, Cable, W.J. Sebald, chief, Diplomatic Section, to Dept. of State, dtd 29 July, 17 August and 25 August 50, MacArthur Memorial, Rg 9, Box 87, Folder titled "State Out" July–August 1950.

26. Known as *senki*, or war diaries. See Sandra Wilson, "War, Soldier and the Nation in 1950s Japan," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 5, no. 2 (2008): 195.

27. Like former colonel Tsuji Masanobu. See *Ibid.*, 199.

28. See especially the introduction and ch. 2, Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005*, Harvard East Asian Monographs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center: distributed by Harvard University Press, 2006).

29. Beatrice Trefalt, *Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 64, <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=104270453>.

30. Schodt, *Manga! Manga! The World of Japanese Comics*. See also Shunsuke Tsurumi, *A Cultural History of Postwar Japan, 1945–1980*, ed. Yoshio Sugimoto, Japanese Studies (London: Kegan Paul International, 1987), 34.

31. Fusanosuke Natsume, *Manga to Sensou* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1997), 13–22.

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33. Eiji Otsuka, "Disarming Atom: Tezuka Osamu's Manga at War and Peace," in *Mechademia 3: The Limits of Human*, ed. Frenchy Lunning (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 111–13.
34. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, 301.
35. *Ibid.*, 204.
36. Hiroshi Kitamura, *Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultrual Reconstruction of Defeated Japan*, ed. Mark Philip Bradley and Paul A. Kramer, *The United States in the World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 53–54.
37. Richie, *A Hundred Years of Japanese Film: A Concise History, with a Selective Guide to Dvds and Videos*, 267.
38. Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005*, 135.
39. *Ibid.*, 135–46.
40. Film critic Goshō Heinosuke, quoted in *ibid.*, 146.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Translated pamphlet, titled "Let's Not Send Your Boyfriends, Brothers and Friends to War," Kowalski, "Frank Kowalski Papers, 1925–1976 (Bulk 1948–1963)," Box 7, Folder 10, first unnumbered page.
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44. Wilson, "War, Soldier and the Nation in 1950s Japan," 205.
45. *Ibid.*, 209–10. See also Barrett, *Archetypes in Japanese Film: The Sociopolitical and Religious Significance of the Principal Heroes and Heroines*, 164.
46. A pamphlet included with the Criterion Collection edition of *The Burmese Harp*, containing an essay by film critic Tony Rayns, *Unknown Soldiers*, 2nd unnumbered page.
47. Richie, *A Hundred Years of Japanese Film: A Concise History, with a Selective Guide to Dvds and Videos*, 273.
48. Kon Ichikawa, *The Burmese Harp* (United States: Criterion Collection; distributed by Image Entertainment, 2007), videorecording. I am again indebted to my wife for her insights.
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51. Wilson, "War, Soldier and the Nation in 1950s Japan," 212.
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53. Kyle Mizokami, "Sci-Fi and the Self-Defense Forces: 'Godzilla,'" *Japan Security Watch*, <http://newpacificinstitute.org/jsw/?p=6229>.
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66. *Ibid.*

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70. *Ibid.*, 26.

71. *Ibid.*, 99–100.

72. *Ibid.*, 27.

73. The door leading to Masuda's office, and the doorframe, with the strikes from the sword still visible, are preserved, along with the balcony, in a history museum off to the side of the present Ministry of Defense buildings.

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75. Napier, "Death and the Emperor: Mishima, Oe, and the Politics of Betrayal."

76. In the foreword to Schodt, *Manga! Manga! The World of Japanese Comics*, 10.

77. Susan J. Napier, *The Fantastic in Japanese Literature: The Subversion of Modernity*, ed. Teigo Yoshida J. A. A. Stockwin, Frank Langdon, Alan Rix, Junji Banno, Leonard Schoppa, The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series (New York: Routledge, 1996), 17.

78. Jonathan Clements and Helen McCarthy, *The Anime Encyclopedia: A Guide to Japanese Animation since 1917* (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 1991), 77.

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81. Schodt, *Manga! Manga! The World of Japanese Comics*, 67.

82. Eldad Nakar, “Framing Manga: On Narratives of the Second World War in Japanese Manga, 1957–1977,” in *Japanese Visual Culture: Explorations in the World of Manga and Anime*, ed. Mark W. MacWilliams (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008), 178–80.

83. *Ibid.*, 183–84.

84. Schodt, *Manga! Manga! The World of Japanese Comics*, 74–75.

85. For a good overview of sports comics see *ibid.*, 79–87. For a good example of a salaryman bildungsroman, see Duus *Japan Inc.*

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88. Based on what the author heard while serving on Okinawa for a year.

89. Igarashi, “Yokoi Shoichi: When a Soldier Finally Returns Home,” 198.

90. Beatrice Trefalt, *Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 38, <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=104270427>.

91. Igarashi, “Yokoi Shoichi: When a Soldier Finally Returns Home,” 207.

92. *Ibid.*

93. *Ibid.*, 198.

94. Beatrice Trefalt, *Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 118.

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101. Quoted in Yadao, *The Rough Guide to Manga*, 133. Also see Schodt, *Manga! Manga! The World of Japanese Comics*, 188.

102. For a version translated into English, see ———, *Manga! Manga! The World of Japanese Comics*, 189–214.
103. Yadao, *The Rough Guide to Manga*.
104. Personal observation based on discussions with my classmates in the two Japanese military courses I attended. One classmate told me his interest was because he believed in the future the *Rikuji* (GSDF jargon for *Rikujō Jieitai*) would use something like the Gundam mecha suits.
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106. Frederik L. Schodt, *Dreamland Japan: Writings on Modern Manga* (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 1996), 1116–117.
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109. Fujikawa, *Gojira-Jieitai Kessenshi: Ware, Gojira to Tatakaeri*, 117.
110. Quoted in David Kalat, *A Critical History and Filmography of Toho’s Godzilla Series* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1997), 176.
111. Kotarou, *Mononofu Gunzou: Rikujou Jieitai Futsuu-Ka Rentai*.
112. Igarashi, “Yokoi Shoichi: When a Soldier Finally Returns Home,” 198.
113. Akira Kurosawa, “Akira Kurosawa’s Dreams” (U.S.A.: Warner Brothers, 1990).
114. Tvtropes.org, Useful Notes/Subcultures in Japan, <http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/UsefulNotes/SubculturesInJapan?from=Main.SubculturesInJapan>.
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## Chapter 10

# Conclusion

## *A Sword Well Made*

When I mentioned to a GSDF general officer I was thinking of calling a history of the GSDF I was writing *A Sword Well Made*, he asked if I meant a sword as a weapon or as a work of art? The answer to that, of course, has been of the Ground Self-Defense Force's own making. In 1947, when the constitution went into effect, Japan renounced war. Three years later, directed by the United States as the occupying power it began to rearm. Rearmament faced fierce opposition from those who had embraced peace, and especially those who had come to associate anything related to the military with war, and to relate war with the privations and loss of liberty under militarism. Too much rearmament too fast was also resisted by those who put economic recovery first, by those who genuinely preferred a national identity as an economic power rather than a military power, and by those who embraced the Yoshida doctrine as a "low-cost, low-risk, benefit maximizing strategy."<sup>1</sup> Some have wanted to restore Japan's military capabilities commensurate with that considered more typical for an advanced rich country; others have simply acquiesced to the pressures of Japan's single treaty ally, the United States, to rearm. The Japanese public's reimagining of the roles and place of an army and soldiers in their society has both been shaped by and helped to shape this debate. The GSDF themselves have had to do the final shaping, as they remolded themselves into a recreated army. Regarding this last facet of the *Rikuji*'s creation, if the GSDF is art, it is the art of a master-finishing craftsman who has prepared a tool for the service of the nation; if it is a weapon that must be wielded there is little doubt it will acquit itself well.

Having renounced war—and citizens of what country would not wish to?—the majority of Japanese quickly realized, in a dangerous world, they would need a military force. Thus the Japanese people have consistently supported the existence of the Self-Defense Forces. Yet those who had genuinely

embraced war renunciation, though not often thinking through the ramifications of their convictions, have had an impact on the defense discourse, especially in the education system and in the largest opposition party, until its dissolution in the early 1990s, the Socialists. What Andrew Oros describes as “domestic antimilitarism,” that is, proscribing traditional military forces and activities domestically while accepting such activity and forces on the part of other nations, and especially on the part of the United States as Japan’s ultimate guarantor of security, became and remains the postwar norm.<sup>2</sup>

Domestic anti-militarism then roils the struggle over rearmament. In addition to the strictures on traditional military trappings, between 1951 and 1953 the term for rearmament, *saigunbi*, took on the connotation of remilitarization—that is, a return to military dictatorship (or properly in Japanese *saigunkoku shūgi*). Yet Japan has rearmed. The GSDF has tanks, multiple-launch rocket systems and attack helicopters; Japan has one of the largest military budgets in the world. But the polite fiction is maintained that the GSDF and the other SDF services are qualitatively distinct from traditional military forces.

Those advocating a more traditional military stance, to include maintaining a traditional national army, have had to do so within strictly limited confines, and those limits have been expanded carefully and only incrementally. Euphemism and other rhetorical devices are often at the heart of these attempts at pushing the envelope. Three factors, primarily, have necessitated this approach, and obfuscating Japan’s postwar defense debate, make following the discourse difficult, especially from the perspective of those outside of Japan.

## FAITH, CONVERSATIONS AND CONSENSUS

First, war renunciation and the struggle over rearmament have, in some ways, taken on the cast of a secular religion; rules of discussion are not necessarily based on logic or reason, but become questions of faith, and must be interpreted in light of holy texts like Article 9 and any other government document, finding or statement that limits traditional military activity.<sup>3</sup>

The second and third factors are interconnected. As linguist Haru Yamada explains in her exploration of the difference in communication styles between Japanese and Americans, Americans value independence and explicit communications, while the Japanese value interdependence and implicit communication. Under Japanese rules of conversation, what is implied is often more important than what is spoken, and to be too direct is thought of as rude or even stupid. But to introduce new ideas, new things, at times have to be said directly. This produces what Yamada calls the “double-bind” of Japanese

communication rules; the unspoken is more important than the spoken, but to communicate certain things must be spoken. One way to get around this double-bind is to speak from "an others-centered point of view."<sup>4</sup> These rules may lead Japanese leaders at the national level, for instance to stress the needs of the United States or of the international community as opposed to Japan's own national interests, when discussing security issues.

These rules of the game of this second factor lead to the third factor obscuring Japan's defense debate. In order to minimize public clashes, the Japanese tend to prefer building consensus before moving ahead with sensitive national policies, and none are more sensitive than defense. To craft consensus, before important decisions are made, the Japanese will often conduct *nemawashii* or informal coordination, to arrive at an accord. Thus when a decision is announced a consensus has already been reached, with minimal public disruption. This behind-the-scenes practice is ubiquitous in all types of small groups in Japan, but using *nemawashii* in this manner with the Japanese people as a whole is impossible due to the scale involved. Instead it takes the form of the continual advance and retreat made by public officials to build a consensus. When Prime Minister Suzuki cannot use the term "ally" but Prime Minister Nakasone can, when the UN Cooperation Bill does not pass the Diet, but the UN PKO Bill does, a very public form of *nemawashii* has been, or is at work, building a consensus. Public statements are therefore carefully vetted and end up couched in language that appeals as broadly as possible. This broad appeal is also necessitated by the importance accorded by policymakers to public opinion, especially since 1960. Positions crafted in this manner to serve multiple purposes working within these dynamics yield at times rhetorical gymnastics.

### IN THE PEOPLE'S EYES

The public itself, so important in the postwar era, has consistently supported the existence of the GSDF, and has especially lauded its disaster relief role.<sup>5</sup> Yet using their new sword only as a ploughshare has proved not enough, and Japanese society has gone further in reimagining a place for an army and soldiers. The Japanese people have crafted in their popular culture, as John Dower explains (while discussing a wider creative sphere), "marvelous expressions of resilience, creativity, and idealism of a sort possible only among a people who have seen an old world destroyed and are being forced to imagine a new one."<sup>6</sup> Among those "marvelous expressions" in the popular culture, however, after a turbulent decade in the 1950s, with all manner of contending images, the images of IJA soldiers largely disappeared from this conceived new world. And though as Nakar points out, the increasing

frequency of military-themed stories from the 1960s on, to a certain extent, constructed “triumphant memories,” these triumphal narratives have focused on naval and air forces;<sup>7</sup> ground forces, at least, arguably until the advent of the *Gundam* series in the late 1970s or early 1980s, are either absent from the narrative entirely, or, particularly with regard to the Imperial Japanese Army, tend to be presented in exclusively disapproving terms. Exceptions in the decade and one-half that have passed in the new century indicate progress in accepting a more traditional military ground force but not resolution.

Resolution is important because soldiers in a national army need to know what is called in the U.S. Army their left and right limits.<sup>8</sup> A comparison of two movies that were remade, one about the GSDF, first produced in the 1979 and then in 2005, and the other about Japan’s decision to surrender, first aired in 1967 and then remade in 2015, indicate growing (though not complete) public acceptance for soldiers and an army, while a fifth movie, debuting in 2011 gives a rare glimpse of a positive portrayal of the IJA.

The 1979 film *Sengoku Jieitai* (literally, *Warring States Self-Defense Force*, but known as *G.I. Samurai* in the United States) has virtually no upside for the GSDF. A group of modern-day GSDF *Jieikan* are sent back 400 years, to the *sengoku jidai*, or warring-states period of Japanese history, where they eventually, and unsuccessfully, bring their modern equipment to bear in samurai battles. Soldiers desert, rape civilians, and prove completely ineffective—each eventually being killed (with one exception, the only soldier shown to have any decency, who nevertheless deserted when he went to help a peasant family). Though I think fans of the film’s star, Sonny Chiba, would disagree, on the whole the movie is an example of 1970s excess, gratuitous in all respects.<sup>9</sup>

In 2005 when the remake, *Sengoku Jieitai 1549* debuted, very different images of the GSDF emerge. *Jeikan* are represented, for the most part, in a positive light, as professionals and as good people. In fact, for live action, the movie is probably one of the most significant returns to a military movie with standard heroic tropes since 1971’s *Okinawan Kessen*.<sup>10</sup>

Similarly, the remake of a film depicting the frantic events leading to Japan’s surrender indicate something of a softening of the view of IJA soldiers as individuals and an even greater reversal in the image of the role of the Emperor, who, after all was the supreme commander. The 1967 version of the film, *Nihon no Ichiban Nagai Hi* (*Japan’s Longest Day*, in the United States), was directed by Okamoto Kihachi and deals with Japan’s decision to surrender in August 1945. It features many soldiers, almost all of them portrayed negatively. The young officers attempting to prevent the emperor’s surrender broadcast are depicted and the leaders as clearly demented, even insane (historically, there is no doubt as to their extreme fanaticism), while the enlisted soldiers are depicted as bullying their countrymen while blindly following these clearly mad officers. Mifune Toshiro, one of Japan’s best-known and

respected actors, plays General Anami Korechika, IJA Minister of War, whose stubborn refusal to consider surrender needlessly extends the suffering caused by the war, while Navy Minister Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, played by Sō Yamamura, is presented as more measured.

Once the emperor does speak up in council, with a decision to surrender, Amani is presented in a more sympathetic light, as he commits *seppuku*, though he forbids two other officers who want to follow him in suicide from doing so, telling them they have to stay alive to help build a new Japan.<sup>11</sup> Okamoto's take on this process is fairly conservative—the emperor is never clearly shown on camera, and no blame is attached to him for the tragic war Japan has suffered. Many scenes were filmed in Ichigaya, in the actual building housing the Ministry of War during the war, and it is no accident that the most crazed of the young officers, Major Hatanaka, is shown desperately pleading with another officer to join the coup attempt in the conference hall of that building which would later be the site of the Tokyo War Crimes trials.<sup>12</sup> Though many Japanese hold the War Trials in low regard as victor's justice, the implicit message remains the IJA are the villains of the narrative, even responsible for the shame of trials conducted by an occupying power. Adding ambiguity as well, the last scenes of Amani depict him as a latter-day, honorable samurai, but this does not detract from the ultimate message of the movie: among the feckless dithering of Japan's elites on display the head of the War Ministry, an IJA general, most firmly argues for continuing a suicidal war; if any organization must take the blame for Japan's tragedy, the IJA deserves it more than others.

Directed by Mitani Kōki when it was remade in 2015, the events portrayed, though, like the first film, largely conforming to the history of the events as known, Mitani's film, titled *The Emperor in August* for English-speaking viewers, displays some significant differences. The most significant is arguably Mitani's portrayal of the Shōwa Emperor. Played by Motoki Masahiro, the emperor gets screen time second only to Anami, who is played by Yakusho Koji. Regarding the emperor, the storyline does not conform to the historical record and is instead hagiographic. The emperor is depicted as kind-hearted and gentle, who only has the suffering of his people in mind. Opinions vary, but after 1989, since it is still true to a degree "the debate over the late emperor rages on in Japan,"<sup>13</sup> at least a nod toward this from the director would have provided a picture with more balance. Though the record does indicate, for instance, as Japan prepared to expand its war into one against the Allies, "Hirohito's military leaders contravened his attempt to shape a consensus . . . They were determined to go to war notwithstanding the emperor's realistic concerns about the implications of war with the West,"<sup>14</sup> documentary evidence equally supports the conclusion that, far from being concerned with the Japanese people as if they were his own children, Hirohito, "In the

face of total defeat . . . valued the imperial institution more than his people, his army, and his empire.”<sup>15</sup> The portrayal of Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro, played by Yamazaki Tsutomu, as well departs from historical documentation. Not selected to become premier for the sole purpose of ending the war as the film presents, it seems more likely, like key military leaders including Anami, Suzuki “was looking for one victory to serve as the basis of a negotiated end to the war. His bellicosity in June and July 1945 was real. Suzuki was not yet ready to lead a peace faction to surrender.”<sup>16</sup>

In the 2015 remake, Anami is still the central figure, and his may be the most historically accurate portrayal (though a subplot concerning his wife is invented). In contrast to the original film, the director goes out of his way to humanize Anami. The general is shown as more than anything a family man who loves his children and grandchildren. It is true, as depicted, “The war had touched Anami personally in 1943 when his second son was killed in action in central China. Thereafter he always kept the boy’s picture on his desk.”<sup>17</sup> True also, as shown, “many junior officers regarded him more as a friendly uncle than an imposing presence,” and “archery, kendo (Japanese fencing), and judo kept Anami in excellent shape.”<sup>18</sup> But the director’s focus on his qualities of *ninjō* (humanity, empathy, kindness—treasured traits emblematic of the best samurai) is somewhat disingenuous,<sup>19</sup> as it distracts from the fact that Anami could have put his significant weight behind an earlier end to the war, but instead allowed his faith that a final decisive battle could yet change Japan’s fortunes to cloud his judgment. Many died as a result.

Many also die in a 2011 film as the result of a mistaken conviction by a commander, but those deaths produce a positive change of heart as the IJA join their Navy and pilot brethren in being granted a fully normalized, feature-length film, *Taiheiyō no Kiseki—Fokkusu to Yobareta Otoko* (Miracle in the Pacific: The Man They Called the Fox, but titled *Oba: The Last Samurai* for English-speaking audiences). Directed by Hirayama Hideyuki and starring Takenouchi Yutaka as Oba Sakae, the film is based on actual events. Oba, an IJA captain, survives the largest Banzai charge of the war on Saipan in 1944. At this point, after some successful evacuations and scores of deaths, Saipan has about 200 Japanese civilians, who had hidden themselves in the jungles by the time of the Banzai charge, convinced the Americans would rape, kill, and even eat them otherwise. After the Banzai charge Oba discovers these civilians. The civilian colonists ask Oba, with his small group of 47 other IJA survivors, to stay and protect them, but Oba, the ranking officer, explains their mission is to kill the Americans and leaves. A subsequent bombing run by the Yanks leaves several civilians dead or wounded. Chastened, Oba returns and says he was wrong; his mission is to protect the civilians. Oba is so successful in this new mission the occupying Americans, who are using Saipan as a base for strategic bombers, grow to respect him and call him the fox. The war

ends and Oba, after some false starts, makes sure the civilians make it safely to the American base, though he still holds out for a time in the jungle with his platoon-sized group of soldiers. In December 1945, having received orders from a superior, Oba marches the men into the camp in smart order and surrenders. Oba is handsome, stoic, soft-spoken, modest and sensitive; when a soldier exclaims to him early on all the IJA survivors must attack the Americans in order to gain a glorious death, Oba corrects the trooper, telling him the IJA should not fight in order to die, but instead should fight in order to win. He is the opposite of the crazed, sadistic IJA officer most often portrayed in Japan's postwar war films, as self-sacrificing hero who successfully protects his countrymen.<sup>20</sup> and a better example than the relatively positive model of Anami in the 2015 version of *Nagai Hi*, as his portrayal more closely hews to the historical record.

### HISTORICAL BASIS

History, wrestled with as honestly and objectively as possible, is important to militaries, as the study of history provides "a practical tool from which practical lessons could and should be derived."<sup>21</sup> Most GSDF units have "Remembrance Rooms" somewhere in their headquarters buildings, and most organizations, at least at the division level, trace their lineage back to an IJA antecedent (complete with records, for instance, of how many Americans were killed by that IJA division in the war).<sup>22</sup> These records are a valuable resource, but not used as effectively as possible due to GSDF concerns about public sensitivity; those outside the GSDF rarely know the records exist.

Donald Abenheim, in *Reforging the Iron Cross*, investigates how the German government spent five years debating and planning how "to select what might be called a usable past," for its new army, called the *Bundeswehr*. Japan had no time for such planning and the many issues regarding the image of and connotations associated with the Imperial Japanese Army have continued to inhibit the GSDF from mining the rich tradition of its own military past for varied and eminently appropriate ore. History, properly reflected upon, becomes part of an army's traditions, and as Gordon A. Craig writes, "Without a sense of tradition, a military force lacks perspective and orientation; its professional stature is diminished."<sup>23</sup>

A GSDF general once told me the GSDF had spent most of its history running away from the Imperial Japanese Army.<sup>24</sup> This reflects not only the social stigma, but public relations. The GSDF *jieikan* have taken advantage of greater acceptance in the public's mind as reflected in pop culture, producing, for instance, their own *Prince Pickles* manga, featuring *kawaii* (cute) characters explaining the rationale behind defending one's country.<sup>25</sup> Even more

recently have been using *moe* (cute or attractive anime, manga or videogame character depictions), like *Girls und Panzer* (young girls who study “the way of tank warfare”), *Gate* and others to attract recruits and give the GSDF a more positive image.<sup>26</sup> But history remains a delicate subject. Issues of history for the Japanese society as a whole have garnered much attention; for Japan’s guardians the issue is not just political, but professional, and critical to their overall effectiveness. Developing an important facet of that identity is inhibited until the GSDF embraces the usable past available in its fertile military heritage.

### STILL TRANSFORMING

As it recreated itself as Japan’s postwar army, the Ground Self-Defense Force has gone through three distinct stages in constructing a professional identity, and is in the midst of a fourth. In the first stage, from 1950 until the mid-1960s, the GSDF focused on fashioning itself as a small, moderately armed territorial defense force of citizen soldiers with limited capabilities, but a strong commitment to public service. The crafting and internalization of a usable ethos, the *Jieikan no Kokorogamae*, was at the center of the effort. The second phase began in the late 1970s and lasted a decade. In this phase the GSDF embraced the identity of a modern, heavy, high-tech army with increasing connections to international security, though one with a still limited scope of action. The Soviet threat from the north and the regular exercises it held with the U.S. military were at the center of this effort, especially as the latter exposed GSDF members from all ranks to international norms concerning a national army. The third phase began in 1992, with the promulgation of the PKO law. As the GSDF developed into a proscribed postmodern army; the heart of this effort has been the deployments themselves, as well as the further exposure to international standards and the planning and support requirements these deployments entail. Throughout all its efforts at transformation the GSDF has remained committed to disaster relief and public service at home. Indeed this domestic experience undoubtedly enabled a smoother transition to similar types of missions overseas. Though it may be ironic, given that many GSDF members seem to consider the U.S. Army the very model of a modern major military,<sup>27</sup> the fact Japan’s army has felt an ease with peacekeeping and humanitarian support missions from the start may indicate the GSDF developed further along this postmodern line than the U.S. Army, which continues to resist non-warfare roles.<sup>28</sup>

In the era of the Global War on Terrorism<sup>29</sup> another paradigm for a modern army is developing, which, for the sake of simplicity, I am calling an

expeditionary army. An expeditionary army is a military with high readiness, light enough to deploy quickly at great distance from its sustaining base, but equipped and trained to fight or support the full-spectrum of possible scenarios, from high-intensity combat down to, stability operations (now called wide-area security in the U.S. Army), PKO, disaster/humanitarian relief, and gray zone situations. It is an army habitually operating with other services, and other agencies, in a whole-of-government effort, and one that operates with other nations. The U.S. Army is developing in this direction.

For the GSDF the latest strategic defense documents outline threats that would best be defended against by a *Rikuji* that fully undergoes a fourth transformation, into an expeditionary army. After the dispatch to Iraq the GSDF could have continued down a path of transformation to become a national expeditionary army, but instead pulled back. The development of an amphibious capability is now a clear necessity, but also an opportunity. The new law allowing for collective defense is also an opportunity, but will the built-in *hadome*, and, more importantly, a lack of political will, hobble these newly permissible actions? Prior to Japan's deployment to Iraq a civilian official from the Japan Defense Agency, meeting in the Pentagon with OSD, stressed a primary concern for Japan was to find a safe area in Iraq for their troops. The JDA did not want any casualties. An OSD official warned any deployment presents the danger of casualties. The JDA official (who, years later, was the primary author of Japan's NSS)<sup>30</sup> acknowledged this, but said the important thing was to deploy successfully, and a successful deployment meant no casualties. One step (*ippo*) at a time he said.

The deployment was a success. But the envisioned next step forward seemed, instead, half a step backwards. Even given Abe's reputation for pushing the envelope on the defense debate, how much progress has been made? For instance, spending—only a partial gauge at best, but still indicative—remains little changed and minimal. As Adam Liff points out, "Despite widespread hype about Japan's defense spending increases under Abe, culminating in an 'all-time' high in 2015, since 2012 the defense budget has increased only 1.9 percent per year, a moderate pace that follows eleven consecutive years of decline. In nominal yen terms, Japan's 2015 defense budget remains lower than in 1997."<sup>31</sup> As well, as Yuki Tatsumi points out, the debate surrounding the security legislation passed by the Abe administration was ultimately a chance for "a thoughtful discourse on Japan's future national security policy that is rooted in reality, not in ideology."<sup>32</sup> But this was a road not taken, and though the GSDF has begun a fourth transformation, there is no guarantee it will be allowed to complete it successfully.

## A STUBBORN LEGACY

Fundamentally Japan's debates over war renunciation, the struggle to rearm, the contradictions inherent in the roles and images of its reimagined soldiers, and the difficulties of recreating an army, reflect a failure on the part of Japan to come to terms with the legacy of its war years. In all other sectors the Japanese behave like actors in other nation-states; that is, generally, if some action is not illegal or immoral, it is permissible. Only in matters military do the Japanese take the tack that any action by the military is unlawful, unless the action is sanctioned specifically by law. This is unworkable, and would be for anyone or any organization in any sector. Japanese disdain for and distrust of an army is only unusual in its degree and in the length of time it has lasted; it is otherwise not unlike attitudes in the United States toward the American army after the Vietnam War, and in other liberal democracies at other times. It is one of the many ironies of this study that Japan's army is trusted even in countries, like those in Southeast Asia, where the Imperial Japanese Army held harsh sway during the war, and is distrusted, really, only in Northeast Asia, by South Korea, China (both of whose distrust is based on their own constructions of national identity),<sup>33</sup> and the Japanese people themselves. In 2000, in a paper Bانشō Koichirō wrote while attending the U.S. Army War College, wrote "the Japan Self-Defense Forces should develop real military capabilities, which will enable them to carry out their missions. Japan must pay scrupulous attention to the state of affairs of the world, develop a vision of the future environment, and apply pragmatism and flexibility to deal with new realities,"<sup>34</sup> and this remains true today.

Kataoka Tetsuya has argued the anti-military attitudes of the Japanese are so firmly entrenched the attitudes will not be changed by any event short of a military catastrophe. Like the Pearl Harbor attack was a catalyst to transform America from isolationist to combatant, he argues, Japan would have to suffer something equivalently traumatic to change its postwar ways militarily.<sup>35</sup> It is true that 9/11 produced extensive change in American defense policy and structures. Short of a Pearl Harbor or a 9/11 the GSDF is left a national army whose nation does not trust them to act as a national army, beyond humanitarian/disaster relief and peacekeeping with no danger of combat.

This leaves the GSDF an overly restricted army that cannot even call itself an army. In Cambodia the GSDF unit had to get cabinet permission before allowing the attached GSDF medical personnel to treat UNTAC personnel from other countries.<sup>36</sup> In Iraq soldiers from Holland, Australia and Great Britain had to provide security. During the timeframe of this study, until 2015 and beyond it is still rare to see a GSDF member in uniform outside an SDF installation in Tokyo, and this in a society that, as Fruhstuck says, is

“relatively uniformed.”<sup>37</sup> Rules of Engagement have been so restrictive that, in order to provide supporting fire to an adjacent unit from another army, GSDF soldiers have talked about running into the line of enemy fire. Only individuals themselves who were under fire could return fire, so running into enemy fire would be a way to enable themselves to fire back in support of a contingent from another country (or even an adjacent SDF unit) if they themselves were not originally under fire.<sup>38</sup>

### AIR WAY OR JEEP WAY: A SWORD WELL MADE

On February 15, 1946, two days after the initial meeting in which General Whitney and his subordinates had delivered the American draft of the new constitution to Yoshida and the others, General Whitney received a letter from Shirazu Jiro, who had been present at the February 13 meeting. Shirazu contrasts the American and Japanese decision-making styles: He explains the American preference is for the direct “air way” while the Japanese preference is for the round-about “jeep way.” He continues, if the objective of the decision was on the other side of a mountain range the American style would be to fly quickly and directly to the objective in a plane, while the Japanese style would be to wend their way slowly through the mountains in a jeep, eventually arriving at the objective. The Japanese way takes longer, he explained, but eventually arrives at the same destination. While the “jeep way” certainly seems to characterize much of the defense debate in Japan it does not lessen the toll the meandering road takes on the Ground Self-Defense Force that wants to define itself with pride as an army for the Japanese.

The GSDF, in fact, likely feels, Japanese policymakers have been a little heavy on the brakes in this jeep-way debate, more concerned about placing *hadome* on the use of force than supporting the soldiers who might nonetheless have to use that force; and Japan’s soldiers, perhaps, have more a sense of having been run over by the heavy automotive of public distrust and opprobrium, than having experienced the sense of slow and iterative, but persistently forward motion indicated by Shirazu. Yet, right from the beginning, the GSDF determined for itself it would be a force that would serve its countrymen, no matter the difficulties inherent in its origin, nor the continuing struggle over its purpose. In more recent years GSDF members have adopted the motto, *Mamoritai hito ga iru*, or “There are people we want to protect.” Really, for this life-giving sword that is, indeed, a sword well made, this has been the Ground Self-Defense Force’s desire regarding the nation of Japan all along.

## NOTES

1. Katzenstein and Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, 204. See also Roger Dingman, "The Dagger and the Gift," in *Showa Japan: Political, Economic and Social History, 1926–1989*, ed. Stephen S. Large (New York: Routledge, 1998).

2. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*, esp. 51–55.

3. I have had discussions about Japan's defense debate involving a kind of secular religion several times with Japanese diplomats.

4. Yamada, *Different Games, Different Rules: Why Americans and Japanese Misunderstand One Another*, esp. 5–21.

5. Katzenstein and Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, 112.

6. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 44. Also see Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*, 49.

7. Nakar, "Framing Manga: On Narratives of the Second World War in Japanese Manga, 1957–1977."

8. This refers to both limits beyond which a soldier cannot traverse his/her fire arm, and limits enforced on a defensive position to prevent the danger of cross-fire with another soldier at the position, and is used as a metaphor for what is acceptable and what is not in a soldier's conduct of a particular mission or duty.

9. Kosei Saito, et al., *Sengoku Jieitai* (Tokyo: Kadokawa Haruki Jimusho, 1979), videorecording.

10. Masaaki Tezuka, et al., *Sengoku Jieitai 1549* (Tokyo: Toho, 2005), videorecording.

11. Kihachi Okamoto, et al., *Nihon no Ichiban Nagai Hi* (Wilmington, NC: AnimEigo, 2006), videorecording.

12. After the war, before the building was demolished and replaced by a new complex that became the Ministry of Defense in 2007, it housed, among other organizations, the JGSDF's Staff College. My class, 39, was inducted into the Staff College in that same auditorium, and I received my certificate of completion for the course there a year later.

13. Edward J. Drea, *In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), xv.

14. *Ibid.*, 182.

15. *Ibid.*, 215.

16. *Ibid.*, 202.

17. *Ibid.*, 204.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Mitani Kōki, et al., *Nihon no Ichiban Nagai Hi* (Tokyo: Shochiku Company, 2011), videorecording.

20. Hideyuki Hirayama, et al., *Oba: The Last Samurai* (Tokyo: Chukyo TV Broadcasting Company, Cine Bazar, D.N. Dream Partners, 2011), videorecording.

21. Van Creveld, 55.
22. This is based on my own experience of visiting these remembrance rooms and being told how many Americans the division in question had killed.
23. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*, xvi.
24. Personal discussion with the author at a reception. I had told the general I was interested in tracing traditions the GSDF maintained from the IJA. The general physically took a step back as he told me the GSDF had run away from the IJA for its entire history.
25. Sabine Frühstück, *Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).
26. Jonathan Gad, "The Japanese Military is Getting Offensively Cute," Vice News, Defense and Security, April 13, 2015, <https://news.vice.com/article/the-japanese-military-is-getting-offensively-cute>.
27. Ibid.
28. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
29. A problematic term. Terrorism is a tactic used by a weaker opponent, or a symptom of a distressed, radicalized or otherwise dysfunctional group, and a war cannot be waged against a tactic or a symptom, but the discussion lies beyond the scope of this study.
30. The official had talked about the need for Japan to have an NSS for years. I met him for lunch during a business trip to Tokyo in August, 2014, and he confirmed to me he had been the author of the NSS.
31. Liff, 91.
32. Yuki Tatsumi, "Japan's New Security Legislation: A Missed Opportunity," Diplomat, July 16, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/japans-new-security-legislation-a-missed-opportunity/>.
33. A discussion is beyond the scope of this book, but for a good beginning see Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).
34. Koichirō Bانشō, "The Security Environment of the Asia Pacific Region at the Beginning of the 21st Century and Japan's New Security Strategy," USAWC Strategy Research Project, April 4, 2000, 14.
35. Kataoka, *Waiting for a "Pearl Harbor": Japan Debates Defense*.
36. Dore, *Japan, Internationalism and the UN*, xv.
37. Frühstück, *Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army*.
38. This came up in a discussion at Japan National Institute for Defense Studies while I was there attending a year-long course. The discussion involved Japanese and international officers talking about a PKO mission to East Timor.



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