

Edited by

**Geir Lundestad**

JUST ANOTHER  
**MAJOR** CRISIS?

*The United States and Europe Since 2000*

OXFORD

## **Just Another Major Crisis?**

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Geir Lundestad

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February 2008

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# Abbreviations

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
ACP	African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States
AHR	<i>American Historical Review</i>
AICGS	American Institute for Contemporary German Studies
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CCGA	Chicago Council on Global Affairs
CDU	Christian Democratic Union (Germany)
CEE	Central and East Europe
CEIP	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPI	Committee on Public Information
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPC	European Political Cooperation

## Abbreviations

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ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUISS	EU Institute for Security Studies
EUPM	EU Police Mission
FDI	foreign direct investment
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GMF	German Marshall Fund
GOP	Grand Old Party (Republican)
GWOT	global war on terror
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Criminal Court
IFRI	Institut Français des Relations Internationales
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRI	Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
ISPI	Institute for International Political Studies (Italy)
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KN	Knowledge Networks
MLF	Multilateral Force
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBER	National Bureau of Economic Research
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRF	Nato Response Force
NSS	National Security Strategy
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom

OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OWI	Office of War Information
PIPA	Program on International Policy Attitudes
PKK	Turkish Workers' Party
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SEATO	South-East Asia Treaty Organization
SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SPD	Social Democratic Party (Germany)
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
USIA	United States Information Agency
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WPO	World Public Opinion
WTO	World Trade Organization

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# 1

## Introduction

*Geir Lundestad*

### The Book and its Background

In 1997 the Norwegian Nobel Institute held a Nobel Symposium under the title “The United States and Europe: Cooperation and Conflict: Past, Present and Future.” Symposium is Greek and means “drinking together.” We did drink together, but, more importantly, a group of distinguished American and European historians and political scientists came together to discuss the past, present, and future of the American–European relationship. The symposium resulted in the book *No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present and Future*.<sup>1</sup>

The general conclusion of the 1997 symposium was that, despite the many changes after the end of the cold war in 1989–91, there had indeed been no end to the Atlantic alliance. The Soviet threat was gone with the disappearance of the Soviet Union itself, but some of the old rationale of “keeping the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in” nevertheless lingered on. New issues, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, underlined the need for continued cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic. Political science realist John Mearsheimer was in a minority of one when he, just like so many other realists, predicted the withdrawal of American troops from the European continent and ultimately the end of the Atlantic alliance itself. No alliance had allegedly survived the disappearance of the threat against which it was directed.<sup>2</sup> Most of the rest of the participants felt that organizations like NATO, the very heart of Atlantic cooperation, would not just dissolve.

In 2007 the Norwegian Nobel Institute held a new symposium on the same topic as ten years earlier. The participants in this symposium at scenic Balestrand on the Sognefjord on the west coast of Norway were a great deal less certain about what would happen to the Atlantic alliance. While a number of American troops still remained in Europe, most of them had indeed left the



continent. While NATO certainly continued to exist, it appeared to have lost its central focus of averting war in Europe. The administration of George W. Bush had gone to war, not in Europe, but first against the Afghanistan of the Taliban and of Osama bin Laden and then against the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. In these wars Washington had gathered together whatever allies, or “coalitions of the willing,” it could find. NATO had invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the first time it had ever done so, against the Islamist attacks of September 11, 2001, but absolutely no effort was made to conduct the wars within a NATO context. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld so explicitly stated: “The mission determines the coalition; the coalition does not determine the mission.” This was just another way of emphasizing that NATO had lost the predominant role it had possessed in US diplomacy under the cold war.<sup>3</sup>

Not that most Europeans had any burning desire to participate in the Bush administration’s military campaigns. Afghanistan was one thing. Here the Islamist provocation of September 11 was obvious, but the need for European troops was limited, at least in the initial military phase. Iraq was to present the greatest challenge to NATO since its founding in 1949. The new united Germany under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made it clear that it would participate in no military operations in Iraq, whatever the United Nations Security Council decided. France under President Jacques Chirac led the criticism of the USA in the UN; traditional enemies Russia and China, which had little desire to offend powerful America, hid behind the French. Chirac told Washington’s vocal supporters in Central and Eastern Europe that they had missed a golden opportunity “to shut up.” The reluctance of France and Germany to promise to support Turkey, in the case of a conflict with Iraq, threatened the very core of the NATO commitment. Despite the support Washington received from London, from several other capitals in Western Europe, and from most capitals in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO’s future appeared to hang in the balance. Except for a brief period in a few countries during the launching of the invasion of Iraq, public opinion in virtually all European countries soon hardened against the American-led action.

NATO had been founded to provide American guarantees to Europeans, who felt themselves threatened by Stalin’s Soviet Union. Now NATO was being transformed into an instrument of intervention, first in Bosnia and Kosovo, which was generally acceptable to most European politicians, and then, when the Bush administration concluded it needed support after all, in Afghanistan, which was also understandable in the light of the events of September 11. But a preventive war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was much too big a step for several European governments and for the general public in almost every European country.

The year 2007, ten years after the previous effort, therefore seemed to be a good time to take stock of what had happened in the previous ten years and to discuss some of the developments that might be most relevant for the future. The primary focus was on the years of the Bush administration, but the contributors also discussed the immediately preceding years of a relationship with different political cycles in different countries.

The year 2000 has been set as the convenient formal starting point of the book based on the symposium. The revised symposium papers were written in the fall of 2007. American–European relations have indeed become a very “hot” topic for both political scientists and historians. It seems more open than ever what will happen to the American–European relationship in general and, more concretely, to NATO, to the EU, and to the relationship between the two organizations.

Instead of focusing rather exclusively on the United States and the major European countries involved, as is so frequently done in such efforts, this book will analyze certain factors that have been of crucial importance in the events of the last few years and are likely to remain so in the future as well. The factors selected are the recent legacy of the American–European relationship, the end of the cold war and the question of the unifying threat, changes in US politics, changes in EU and European politics, the role of “New Europe,” the non-European focus of recent conflicts as opposed to the European focus of the cold war, the leadership issue in alliance politics, the significance of economic and cultural issues in producing cooperation or conflict, and, last but not least, the development of popular attitudes on the two sides of the Atlantic. Two chapters deal explicitly with the future of the American–European relationship. Finally, the editor offers some concluding remarks.

### **Just Another Crisis?**

While some general observers talked, again, about the end of NATO, others disagreed. In our proceedings at Balestrand the question emerged more and more whether the early years under George W. Bush should be seen as just another crisis, however drawn out and deep it appeared at first. Even in the golden years of American–European cooperation during the cold war, there was virtually almost always a big crisis of one sort or another. Just to mention some of the most important ones: the initial years of the setting-up of the Marshall Plan and of NATO, the question of West Germany’s rearmament, Suez, the various crises associated with Charles de Gaulle’s presidency culminating in France’s withdrawal from the military integration of NATO, the Vietnam war, the neutron bomb and intermediate-range missiles,

Ronald Reagan's hard line toward the "evil empire" followed by his extensive cooperation with Mikhail Gorbachev, the unification of Germany. Even this abbreviated list underlines that crises are nothing new in Atlantic relations. The end of NATO has been predicted time and again. The literature has been dominated by the crisis perspective. To pick just a few examples from the mid-1960s, Henry Kissinger wrote about *The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance* (1965), Ronald Steel about *The End of Alliance: America and the Future of Europe* (1964), which later forced him to deal with "NATO's Afterlife" (1991), and Paul-Henri Spaak about *The Crisis of the Atlantic Alliance* (1967).<sup>4</sup>

The question then follows of the extent to which the events of the George W. Bush years should be seen simply as another crisis to be added to this already very long list or whether they represent something fundamentally new in the relationship. At first the answer to this question seemed rather obvious. It was given in my own book *The United States and Western Europe since 1945* from 2003. The subtitle made the answer quite explicit: *From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift*. The United States and Europe had already drifted apart. Most likely the drift would continue, although there would probably not be any divorce between the two sides.

Today the answer appears less obvious than it did just a few years ago. In the United States, the Bush administration was soon forced to admit that developments in Iraq, and then in Afghanistan as well, were not going as planned. The initial military campaigns were indeed successful. In ordinary warfare no one could stand up to the United States. Almost everything else, however, quickly went from bad to worse. Washington was not as omnipotent as it had thought; its intentions were definitely not considered as benignly abroad as at home. In 2004 George W. Bush was re-elected, but it had become obvious to the administration that concessions had to be made. After his reinauguration Bush quickly went to Brussels in an effort to strengthen NATO. Even on the EU, Washington's rhetoric became a great deal more positive. A more united Europe was allegedly now clearly in America's interest. The USA needed friends and allies, after all. Despite the many quarrels and disagreements, most of those allies and friends were still found in Europe. So, in its second term, the administration has lectured less and listened somewhat more.

The growing problems in Iraq also meant that Bush was rapidly losing support inside the United States. In 2007 his popularity ratings were reaching the low levels of Jimmy Carter and even Richard Nixon in his Vietnam and Watergate years. This gave the Democrats an unexpected chance, which they were able to exploit in the 2006 elections to capture both houses of Congress. It also increased their chances of winning the 2008 presidential elections. Even many Republicans lost faith in the initially ambitious and unilateral Bush course, although on Iraq even they were somewhat divided on what was the right solution.

There were also significant developments taking place in Europe. At first it seemed that these might lead to even greater problems in Atlantic relations. In Spain in April 2004 the conservatives under José Maria Aznar were thrown out of office and the Socialists under José Luis Zapatero took over; the new prime minister made it clear that he would be supporting the general policy of France and Germany. Two years later the same happened in Italy, where conservative Silvio Berlusconi, who had been so close to George W. Bush, was replaced by the more radical Romano Prodi. The popularity of Bush was so low in most of Europe that it also affected the standing of the United States in general in a negative way; even anti-Americanism was on the rise.<sup>5</sup>

It gradually became clear, however, that even those governments that had been most critical of the United States over Iraq had a growing interest in improving relations with the USA. Relations had simply deteriorated too much. The United States still had a useful role to play, in the world and in Europe. A hostile attitude to the USA would also divide the EU and make concerted European action more difficult. After the German elections in 2005 Gerhard Schröder's SPD–Green coalition was replaced by the Grand Coalition of CDU–SPD under the more conservative Angela Merkel. The new chancellor came from the old East Germany; she was noticeably friendlier to the United States than Schröder had been. Relations between Berlin and Washington quickly improved.

In France no progress was possible toward America on the sensitive Iraq question, but France and the United States soon cooperated well in Afghanistan, in Iran, and in Lebanon. The Europeans contributed a significant number of troops to the fight against the revived Taliban in Afghanistan; France, Germany, and the United Kingdom took the lead in trying to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue; the United States and France joined forces trying to stabilize the moderate government in Lebanon and to limit Syria's influence there. Despite America's strong support for Israel and the EU's somewhat greater understanding for the Palestinians, the two sides of the Atlantic were also able to work reasonably well together on the Israeli–Palestinian issue, even during the Israeli–Lebanese war in 2006.

The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as president of France in May 2007 led to further great improvements in French–American relations. Sarkozy was determined to reform France, certainly including its relations with the United States. He was much more open to American policies and attitudes than Chirac had been. Suddenly all the theories about transatlantic drift seemed rather outdated. With France cooperating with the United States, no independent Europe was emerging.

All the time there had been strong groups in Europe that favored close ties with America. The UK had consistently insisted on the importance of its special relationship with the USA. New prime minister Gordon Brown was determined to avoid the “poodle” stamp that had come to plague Tony Blair so

much, but even he claimed that the United States was the United Kingdom's single most important ally. Most of the smaller countries bordering on the Atlantic also continued to favor strong ties with the United States (Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark, even neutral Ireland). In Central and Eastern Europe, Poland and the Baltic states in particular emphasized the importance of maintaining close ties with the United States.

All this gave reason to ask whether the Iraq crisis would blow over and the whole issue would just find its place as the latest in the long series of Atlantic crises that interested primarily historians. On the European side, many assumed that, once George W. Bush was out of power in 2008–9 the American–European climate would further improve. Had not relations been excellent under Bill Clinton? Was not Bush then the main problem? An increasing number of Americans agreed that Bush was indeed the problem, but all leading presidential contenders focused on the importance of America's leadership in fighting terrorism. With no major new terrorist incidents in the United States and several in Western Europe, would not the fight against terrorism constitute an important unifying element in Atlantic relations?

### **The 1990s: A Separate Period?**

No one could be certain what the future would hold. But the past was there to study for anyone interested. Was the deterioration in Atlantic relations really all due to Bush and Iraq, as most Europeans assumed, and even some Americans agreed? How close had the relationship actually been under Bill Clinton? If relations had been strained even under Clinton, this clearly suggested that more structural explanations lay behind the Atlantic difficulties. If not, that suggested that Bush was indeed to blame and the problems might then allegedly largely disappear when he left office.

Clinton had generally been a popular president in Europe, probably the most popular since John F. Kennedy. Virtually everywhere he went he was celebrated as a big star. Displaying the characteristic so visible in America, in Europe too he gave so many the impression that he actually agreed with them. Thus, in "Third Way" meetings with Tony Blair and European leftists he clearly suggested he was one of them, or at least that he would have been if he had held the right to vote in Europe. Many Europeans also had much to be grateful for in America and Clinton. Blair was grateful for Clinton's strong assistance in trying to bring peace to Northern Ireland; many Germans appreciated Clinton's and, even more, his predecessor George H. W. Bush's strong support for Germany's unification when other leaders had hesitated; the Central and Eastern Europeans especially liked Clinton's rapidly developing support for their membership in NATO.

It was often argued that the end of the cold war had to weaken the American–European relationship. What was most remarkable, however, about NATO in the 1990s was how limited the changes were. NATO did not disappear; it increased its membership. In 1999 Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary joined, and the expectation was clearly that others would soon follow. NATO worked out a new strategy; it was becoming ever clearer that its relevant geographical area was increasing. The 1999 strategy referred to the “Euro-Atlantic” region.

The United States was rapidly reducing the number of US troops in Europe, but about 100,000 remained under Clinton. The reduction was due to the end of the cold war and expectations in the United States, not to pressure from the European allies. When the Europeans now had to express their opinions on what they really wanted the USA to do, virtually without exception they all wanted the Americans to stay. In fact, from Iceland to Spain, from France to Poland, new invitations were issued for the Americans to remain or, in the old Soviet sphere, to come in. While the old Red Army left the Eastern part of Germany, there was absolutely no pressure for the US Army to leave the Western parts. France dropped some and Spain all of its reservations on military integration in NATO.<sup>6</sup>

There were difficulties in American–European relations in the 1990s, as there had almost always been in the past. The most challenging ones took place in the former Yugoslavia. In Bosnia, Washington first stayed aloof, then vetoed the Vance–Owen plan, which was in a way the EU’s attempt to solve the Bosnia problem, before the Clinton administration finally forced through its own solution in the form of the Dayton accords. Washington’s “lift-and-strike” military strategy (lift the embargo against the Bosnians and strike the Serbs) had been sharply at odds with the Europeans’ more humanitarian approach on the ground. In the end, however, after so much had gone so wrong, both Paris and London were prepared to go along with the American-led military–diplomatic solution. A few years later, in Kosovo, the two sides of the Atlantic worked together more harmoniously, although Washington felt it was rather cumbersome to conduct a war by NATO committee, and at least some Europeans wondered at America’s firm insistence on not committing US ground troops to the fight. Even much of a European left that had for so long been so critical of war and of the United States supported the Kosovo war. Basic democratic and humanitarian principles had to be upheld in Europe against Serbs slaughtering Kosovars.

There were, however, also signs in the 1990s that major pieces were moving in the Atlantic relationship. Three more structural developments were of particular importance. First, the fact that the Soviet Union had disappeared was bound to have dramatic long-term consequences, and not only for the cohesion of NATO. Thus, the impending collapse of the Soviet Union was the precondition for the Gulf War of 1991. Most likely there would have been no

US-led invasion if Moscow had continued to support Saddam Hussein. This was a preview of the situation in 2003. With the Soviet Union being history, again, there was no danger of the United States facing a great-power military response.

In the 1990s the inhibitions against US interventions were primarily domestic. America wanted to take out the “peace bonus” after the cold war and concentrate more on domestic affairs. This was certainly also Bill Clinton’s initial expectation. He pulled the US troops out of Somalia and he did not intervene to stop the blood bath in Rwanda. In Bosnia he long hesitated, until he finally made up his mind in 1995. The 1999 decision about Kosovo was easier. The USA also intervened in Haiti. Clinton was committed to fighting Islamic terrorism and to overthrowing Saddam Hussein, even by military means, although not through a large-scale military invasion. So, while in the 1990s the great-power situation was immeasurably improved with the United States as the sole remaining superpower, Clinton hesitated to take full military advantage of this fact.<sup>7</sup>

Second, the political complexion of the United States was changing. In 1994 the Republicans captured both the Senate and the House of Representatives. This meant that after only two years in office Bill Clinton had lost control, particularly over his domestic agenda. For the first time since the days before Franklin D. Roosevelt the Republicans had taken charge of Congress with a program dramatically different from that of the Democrats.<sup>8</sup> On the foreign-policy side, the unilateralism and the militarism of the South and mountain West were now on the offensive. Thus, the Kyoto Treaty (1997) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) (1998) were dead in Congress even before George W. Bush came to power. Bush just issued the death certificates in a particularly blatant way. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was voted down; the ban on landmines was not even favored by the Clinton administration itself. Much that in Europe was blamed on Bush had in fact been decided well before he came to power.

This set the tone for what was to follow at the presidential level in 2000 when George W. Bush defeated Vice President Al Gore. With the weakest possible mandate from the voters, Bush then continued to lead America as if he had won a most resounding victory. America was strong; it was virtuous; and now it was ready to act, particularly after the events of September 11.

Third, important change was also taking place in Europe in the 1990s. The Maastricht summit of December 1991 was to represent a big step forward on the road toward European integration. The meeting committed the members to a common currency (the euro) and sought to establish a common foreign and security policy; it even tried to lay the groundwork for a common defense policy.

On the foreign policy, and particularly the defense side, there was still a long way to go from intention to reality, but Maastricht definitely signaled

the emergence of a new and more ambitious Europe. Despite initial doubt and uncertainty in many places, in 2002 the euro was the only legal tender in most member countries. This fact boosted the self-confidence of the EU members a great deal, and also encouraged them to speed up their integration efforts in the foreign policy and defense fields. In December 1998 at Saint-Malo, France and the United Kingdom agreed on some important overall guidelines. It had long been implied in European integration that a stronger Europe would also be able to temper the foreign policy behavior of the United States. After the turn of the millennium, with tension increasing between the two sides of the Atlantic, this argument was made more explicit. A stronger Europe was needed to prevent or at least to modify Washington's excesses, especially those of the incoming Bush administration.<sup>9</sup>

## The Contributions in the Present Volume

The contributors and other participants at Balestrand came from many different countries. Almost half were from the United States, the other half from various European countries. None came from outside the NATO area, although it might perhaps have been useful to have had some non-European/American perspectives on the developments of the Atlantic world. A great many different views were presented. No effort was made to produce a scholarly consensus, although the lively exchanges have since led to many modifications in the papers as they were originally presented. Without exception, all the chapters published in the present book are considerably revised compared to the original papers presented in June 2007.

In the analysis of the past, as just outlined, the state of affairs in the 1990s became a central point of discussion. How significant were the changes in the 1990s? Then: how dramatic were the effects of September 11? Even if American-European relations were seen as relatively harmonious under Clinton, September 11 might have changed priorities in Washington so fundamentally that a return to a Democratic administration in 2009 would not represent a return to the ways of Clinton. And, how significantly had the new and more ambitious EU and events in the key member states changed Atlantic relations? While US leadership had been more or less automatic during the cold war, the new EU insisted on being heard in a manner rather different from the patterns of the past.

In the analysis of America's present and the future, was the Republican revolution already over? The demographic changes that had produced the revolution could not prevent the Democratic resurgence of 2006. John F. Kennedy had been the last president from the liberal and relatively European-focused Northeast and Midwest. All later presidents had come from the South or the West, more conservative regions and relatively more focused



on Asia and the Western hemisphere. Yet, even if the more liberal left might come back, it was a fact of life that Europe was playing a smaller role now than it had during the cold war. The cold war had been primarily over Europe, but that conflict was now long gone. Trade across the Pacific had become larger than across the Atlantic in the late 1970s. The most dynamic economies were found in Asia. The energy question was becoming ever more important. That fact, the Islamic fundamentalist threat, the many conflicts of the Middle East, and the special status of Israel shifted the focus to that region. In many ways Europe was now third in Washington's attention, after the Middle East and (East) Asia. On the other hand, on the investment side Europe was vastly more important than either Asia or the Middle East. And, although the percentage of people of European ancestry was going steadily down, roughly two-thirds of Americans still had their roots in Europe.

On the European side, how far will European integration go? Economically the almost fully integrated EU is already the equal of the United States. The EU still has far to go to establish a truly integrated Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). It would seem that any such policy, to be fully effective, presupposes a general agreement between France and the UK, the two countries with the most significant military resources, but also the two that often stand the furthest apart. If European military capabilities were integrated—admittedly a big if—the EU would become a truly major actor, although its military resources would still be considerably less than half those of the USA.<sup>10</sup> If the European side were strengthened, would that make for better or worse relations across the Atlantic?

In his survey of the historical past, "Privileged Partners: The Atlantic Relationship at the End of the Bush Regime," Charles S. Maier reminds us that we are still discussing an unfinished period. While one can make the argument for a disrupted relationship between the United States and Europe, "the rupture has been relatively brief; the [Bush] administration appears to wish to repair it; the imperial intoxication that was one cause of the strains has perhaps worn off." Deeper continuities may well keep the United States and Europe together: their basic status quo orientation in a world of increasing turmoil, their shared politics of productivity, the basic role of the political center on both sides of the Atlantic, and so on. "A shared community of interests, domestic as well as international, make it logical for the United States and Europe to continue cooperation." The Bush years could then be seen simply as an "imperial interlude."

In his chapter, "Atlantic Orders: The Fundamentals of Change," Charles A. Kupchan takes what appears to be virtually the opposite approach: "the Atlantic order is in the midst of a fundamental transition." While important

bonds still remain between the two sides of the Atlantic, “mutual trust has eroded, institutional cooperation can no longer be taken for granted, and a shared Western identity has attenuated.” In the long historical perspective, he identifies at least four basic Atlantic orders, a Balance of Power period from 1776 to 1905, a Balance of Threat period from 1905 to 1941, the years of Cooperative Security from 1941 to 2001, and, finally, the untitled period we have been living in since 2001. Yet, despite his insistence that “the close-knit security partnership of the past five decades is in all likelihood gone for good,” even Kupchan does not entirely rule out that the most recent years might represent “only a temporary departure from deeper cooperation.”

Most observers agree that during the cold war the Soviet threat was crucial in holding the two sides of the Atlantic together. In his chapter, “From the Cold War to the War on Terror: Old Threats, New Threats, and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,” Michael Cox argues that terrorism will not hold the NATO members together in the way the Soviet threat did. In fact, as the war on terror unfolds with probably more attacks on Europe than on the United States, the two “could be pushed apart in the future.” Many in Europe felt that the American approach to fighting terrorism, as exemplified by Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, was counterproductive. Divorce between the two sides may not occur, but they are likely to drift further apart. “There is no way of returning to some presumed golden past of allied unity using the vehicle of something so ill-defined as an ‘Islamic threat’ to hold the alliance together.”

In his contribution, “Unilateralism in US Foreign Policy: What Role does America see for Europe?,” G. John Ikenberry contends that, in a world where the West stands truly triumphant, a fundamental debate has broken out within its ranks about unilateralism versus multilateralism. The Bush administration is not simply more unilateral than previous American administrations; under Bush, America has seemingly forfeited its leadership position as the steward of the rules and institutions of governance. “Europeans want more liberal global governance while the United States seems to want less—perhaps none.” This is at the heart of the difficulties today. Still, Ikenberry is optimistic about the future of the Atlantic relationship. No country can solve the world’s problems alone. Ultimately even the United States will have to recognize that some form of multilateralism is necessary, although it may not necessarily be the variant espoused by the Europeans today.

In “The US Changing Role and Europe’s Transatlantic Dilemmas: Toward an EU Strategic Autonomy?,” Frédéric Bozo asserts that the American role in Europe is being rapidly reduced and that the European Union is becoming a much more important actor, certainly regionally, but to some extent even globally. He maintains that the stronger Europe becomes, the better this will be for Atlantic relations. “Europe can become more independent without

having to duplicate America, and this would be enough to transform what has been from the origins an asymmetrical alliance into a more balanced partnership." The EU has no desire to "become a strategic challenger, if not an opponent of the United States." If for no other reason, the USA is too strong for that. At the same time, Washington, and all of us, should recognize that, despite temporary setbacks over defense capabilities and constitutional ratifications, the CFSP/ESDP will continue to develop.

In his "‘New Europe’ between the United States and ‘Old Europe’," Marcin Zaborowski analyzes the increasing diversity within "New Europe." While it may initially have been true that virtually all the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe wanted to establish strong relations with the United States, Iraq, EU enlargement, and domestic developments in the various states have gradually produced greater diversity. Poland, by far the biggest country of the region, and the Baltic states continue to emphasize the crucial importance of the American security connection, particularly in view of the new strengthening of Russia. The Southeast Europeans (especially in Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia) are emphasizing their New European orientation. Overall, Zaborowski concludes that "America had an enormous capital of trust in the region—a considerable share of this was wasted in Iraq."

During the cold war the primary focus was on Europe, as the main prize in the fight, and on Western Europe as America's main partner. In her contribution, "How Well Can Europe and the United States Cooperate on Non-European Issues?," Helga Haftendorn underlines that the current scene is dominated by the many non-European questions: terrorism and Afghanistan, the issue of nuclear weapons to Iran and North Korea, the failed states of Africa, the emergence of China as a key international actor, and, always creating difficulties, the many problems of the Middle East. In explaining American-European disputes Haftendorn finds that "differences in the power relations . . . are more relevant than diverging concepts of world order, though they still matter." She ventures that "the current transatlantic differences might be trivial compared to the controversies to come."

In "Leadership or Partnership? Can Transatlantic Leadership be Shared?," William Wallace discusses America's leadership of the Atlantic alliance. When the USA perceived itself as weak, it had pursued a policy of isolationism vis-à-vis Western Europe. When it became predominant after the Second World War, it led as a matter of course. Once the countries of Western Europe had rebuilt their economies after the war, they expected to play a larger role. Washington was prepared to move "from sponsorship to partnership." However, the obvious assumption was still that "partnership would not challenge US leadership." With the strengthening of the EU, the question arose of how balanced the relationship could indeed become. The jury is still out on the possibility of a truly balanced relationship. Wallace's conclusion is

that “security leadership cannot be shared; but economic partnership is an everyday reality.”

In recent years it has often been affirmed that economic quarrels have been driving the United States and the European Union apart. In “Do Economic Trends Unite or Divide the Two Sides of the Atlantic?,” David P. Calleo discusses this view. He argues that, while many economic issues have certainly come up, they have generally been relatively quickly and amicably resolved. The most difficult and persistent disputes have concerned the management of the dollar and its exchange rate, related to America’s twin budget deficits. These disputes are still very much with us today. We should never forget, however, that even the dollar disputes have been taking place within a rapidly growing Atlantic market and investment area. “Today, nearly two decades after the Soviet collapse, we sense a growing geopolitical alienation within the West, and hope to invoke our extensive economic ties to counter it.” In the end, however, Calleo thinks the USA and Europe are bound to remain both rivals and partners.

In “Worlds Apart? The United States, Europe, and the Cultural Ties that Bind Them,” Rob Kroes takes two quips as his points of departure. The first is that “the only culture the Europeans have in common is American popular culture;” the second that “the only culture shared on both sides of the Atlantic is European culture.” America was to a large extent founded on European culture, and only when it had defined itself as separate from Europe could America begin to export its own mass culture. This mass culture was then adopted by groups in Europe for their own purposes. While there is a broad mass culture unifying the two sides of the Atlantic, this culture is always complex and often contradictory. Thus, Kroes concludes by arguing that, “if anti-Americanism has risen steeply all over the world, surely in Europe as well, it may have to do crucially with what many see as the betrayal by Americans of something distinctly American, of ‘truths held to be self-evident’.”

In “Can the Circle Be Unbroken? Public Opinion and the Transatlantic Rupture,” Steven Kull argues that the prognosis for repairing the Atlantic relationship ought to be good. There may well be a large split between the policies of the Bush administration and the attitudes of the European public, but “the changes in US foreign policy that the Europeans have found objectionable have also made the American public uncomfortable.” Although American opinion may have acquiesced to these changes, particularly in the wake of September 11, public resistance soon increased and the Bush administration is now on its way out. In broad terms, therefore, despite recent policy tensions, American and European public opinion reveal “substantial common ground on numerous policy issues and the preferred character of the relationship between the United States and Europe.” The rumors of the death of the Atlantic alliance may indeed be highly exaggerated.<sup>11</sup>

In "Where are American-European Relations Heading? A View from the United States," Stanley R. Sloan looks at the future. He contends that "for the next period of history" there will be relatively few dramatic changes. The United States will remain the most important global power; the European Union will gain in relative power, despite the limitations inherent in a "United Europe of States." Despite unilateralist temptations in America and multipolar inclinations in Europe, both sides will, learning from the lessons of recent years, resist extreme positions in dealing with each other. "Neither the United States nor the European nations will be able to identify more effective, compatible, or reliable partners among global players." The added force of global interdependence will increase pressure on the United States and Europe to develop compatible strategic perspectives.

In "The Rise of the European Union and its Impact on the US-EU Partnership: A View from Europe," Gustav Schmidt offers a somewhat different prognosis. He argues that the EU has already emerged as a pole in the international system, "an exemplar of global governance, which should invite others to follow its lead." The EU will be offering a more relevant course for much of the world than the unilateralist temptation of the United States. Not only will the EU be the predominant organization on the European continent, bringing peace to a continent long dominated by war, but it will also be setting much of the agenda in neighboring states and even for the emerging international order. Yet, "such a pole is welcome as an example of responsible conflict resolution and not as a counterweight to the USA in some multipolar system."

In his "Conclusion: The United States and Europe: Just Another Crisis?," the editor notes that, while several of the contributors suggest that the United States and Europe may well return to the cooperation of the past, most factors would seem to indicate that the two have entered a new period compared to the cold-war years. While NATO was ideally suited to dealing with the Soviet threat, terrorism is not similarly unifying; it will have to be dealt with by an array of institutions, global, regional, and national.<sup>12</sup> America will be tempted by the military options it has; Europe by the political instruments that have produced such remarkable results in its own region.

America has changed compared to the cold-war years, especially because of demographic developments and because of September 11. While in the foreseeable future the EU cannot challenge the US militarily or politically, slowly the EU is defining its own identity and increasing its international influence. The United States has never had a truly balanced relationship with anyone; nor is it likely to have one with the EU. In a world dominated almost entirely by non-European issues, the historical record indicates that such issues have most frequently divided the United States and Europe.

On the other hand, a divorce between the two sides of the Atlantic appears unlikely. Practically all the contributors in this volume would seem to agree

on this. In an increasingly complex and interdependent world, the United States and Europe are bound to recognize they have important values in common. The two sides may not be as close as during the cold war, but to the extent that they still need friends and allies—and they do—they will be forced to look to each other. The Bush administration's attempt to lead the world more or less unilaterally has failed. The EU will never be able to unite on a policy of balancing the United States, but neither can the Europeans continue along the cold-war lines of US leadership and domination as if nothing has happened.

We have to wait for the future of the American–European relationship to unfold. History almost never repeats itself; when it does, it is virtually impossible to find out what it is in history that repeats itself. Historians repeat themselves, but that is an entirely different matter, with little or no impact on how history develops.

## Notes

1. Geir Lundestad (ed.), *No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present and Future* (Houndmill: Macmillan-St Martin's, 1998).
2. John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of America's Continental Commitment," in *ibid.* 221–42.
3. Most of the statements in this Introduction will be further discussed in the ensuing chapters. They will be documented there. For a full presentation of my views, see my *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; paperback edn., 2005.)
4. For this literature and these predictions, see Lundestad (ed.), *No End to Alliance*, 3–5.
5. For the most recent polls by the Pew Research Center, see Meg Bortin, "Distrust of US Gets Deeper but not Wider," *International Herald Tribune*, June 28, 2007, 1, 8.
6. For a recent study of American troop developments in Europe, see Carla Monteleone, "The Evolution of the Euro-Atlantic Pluralistic Security Community: Impact and Perspectives of the Presence of American Bases in Italy," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 5/1 (2007), 43–85.
7. For a popular, but still fascinating, account of this period, see David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).
8. The Republicans had controlled both houses of Congress in 1947–9 and 1953–5 and the Senate, but not the House, under Reagan. In the 1940s and 1950s the spirit of bipartisanship was, however, much stronger than after 1994.
9. For a useful, new study of the development of European security cooperation, see Seth G. Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
10. For a quite optimistic recent account along these lines, see John McCormick, *The European Superpower* (Houndmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). For a slightly less optimistic, very detailed, and quite useful account of EU security and defense policy,

see Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (Houndmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

11. For a recent article along similar lines, arguing that divergences in public opinion do not so much separate Europeans from Americans as US Republicans from the rest of the political West, see Miroslav Nincic and Monti Narayan Datta, "Of Paradise, Power, and Pachyderms," *Political Science Quarterly*, 122/2 (2007), 239–56.
12. For a detailed new study of what NATO does and does not do in this context, see Renée de Nevers, "NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era," *International Security*, 31/4 (Spring 2007), 34–66.

## 2

# Privileged Partners: The Atlantic Relationship at the End of the Bush Regime

*Charles S. Maier*

### Introduction

Four hundred years ago English-speaking Europeans established their first colony in North America at Jamestown, Virginia. Jamestown is history; indeed we study the site through archeology—the historical reconstruction of vanished societies by the fragmentary artifacts they leave behind. Archeology presupposes a temporal gap or interruption between the evidence and the scientist. It often entails excavation through intervening layers of sediment; it implies discontinuity and caesura. It is an act of retrieval whose discoveries sometimes convey a sense of melancholy. The pieces dug up are covered in dust and sometimes cracked and broken. Reflecting on the European–American relationship over time has some of the quality of archeology.

Much of the Atlantic relationship, as we call the postwar connections of Western Europe and the United States, seems to reflect an era now buried under a brief but turbulent intervening layer of events associated with the Bush administration. Given the turbulence of Atlantic relations since 2002 and the widespread sense of American impatience with Europe, as well as the attention paid to a rapidly growing Asia, one can make an argument for a disrupted relationship. Defenders of the current president would claim that his regime has followed doctrines and practices that are consistent with the main lines of postwar American policies. They emphasize continuity. I am impressed by the ruptures and discontinuities, some of which I attribute to America's current leadership, but some of which I try to show have deeper and more systemic causes: 11/9 1989 was as important a date as 9/11 2001.



Just as the cold war encouraged a sense of Atlantic comradeship (which could encompass the former fascist powers as well), so the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war allowed a divergence that could never have been tolerated earlier.

Still, the rupture has been relatively brief; the administration appears to wish to repair it; the imperial intoxication that was one cause of the strains has perhaps worn off. Since the US Congressional elections of 2006, it appears that the earlier half-century of close cooperation might be refurbished. Let me venture that the Atlantic relationship will remain important for our common international public life, as it was before 2002. But it will be so for reasons very different from those that prevailed after the Second World War, and the reasons for restored affinity will remain unavowed. The rhetoric of common purpose will probably flag; the constant self-preening of “the Alliance” may well seem archaic. For we are united now less by a common geostrategic or territorially based ideological adversary than by stability and prosperity under the aegis of regimes that protect rights and property. This is a condition that at one and the same time is precarious and hard to celebrate. And it is a partnership in privilege that may ultimately seem narrow and complacent.

The end of the cold war—that prolonged wrenching of political life into adversarial alternatives that shaped culture and politics and national security—gave Americans and Europeans the leisure to emphasize differences they had long noted, but had agreed to overlook for two generations. Often, in fact, these notable distinctions have corresponded to cleavages within each society as much as between them. The USA is more willing to maintain an ambitious defense establishment, is a more religiously observant society, and is more in thrall to locally powerful conservative elements when it comes to capital punishment or gun control. Nonetheless, American legislatures were willing to impose lead-free gas, restrictions on smoking, special provisions for the disabled, and automobile speed limits before the Europeans. American cultural guardians could be more prudish about issues of sexuality, although its citizens led in the pace of marital breakup. Americans have remained more receptive to mass immigration than Europeans, although concerns have grown in the United States. In general the transatlantic differences tend to narrow down over time, but the conflicts within Europe and within the USA remain persistent. The American “red states,” so to speak, think as one with European populists. American “liberals,” as they are known, are at one with European Social Democrats and Greens. The respective parties within each society resemble their ideological analogues across the ocean, even if the conflicts at home remain bitter. Thus it is difficult to aggregate generalizations at the national level.

For half a century the cold war kept Europe and America extraordinarily close and, despite some serious conflicts over colonial empires or local

ambitions, fervently committed to each other's security. The cold war is over. Nonetheless, relations will probably remain close, since both continents have become wealthy regions, distrustful of Islam's growing impact on the West and within the West, concerned about the dilution of some imputed identity they find hard to specify, aware that the advancing societies of East and South Asia may have captured a "vitality" that once inhered in "the West." As during the cold war, the sense of a common structure of interests and values will preserve the alignment—but the challenge has changed. It is no longer communism. It is not primarily terrorism, although we have both been targets. Neither is it "Islam" or even "Islamism," although many on the two sides of the Atlantic have an interest in emphasizing that specter. What holds us together—so efficiently that we hardly take note—is political liberalism, a high level of social tolerance, and socioeconomic conservatism. We tend to hang together because we have much to lose. But what we have to lose is different in the early twenty-first century from what it was in the last half of the twentieth. A brief history of Atlanticism is needed to explain the change in what we might consider the moral basis of alliance.

## The Making of Atlanticism

The US–European relationship has been the object of earnest analysis since before American independence. For somewhat less than half of the four centuries since the Jamestown settlement, most Anglophone settlers considered themselves part of an encompassing British sovereign unit. The struggle for independence and then to establish institutions allowing liberty, national security and stability, and prosperity changed the relationship. Massive immigration of Germans and Irish early on, and of Southern and Eastern Europeans later in the nineteenth century, changed it further, just as Asian and Latin American inflows may be altering it now. Each step of that history entailed stocktaking, often anguished and often divisive.

Some of the fundamental differences in underlying conditions between European and American conditions rendered the relationship particularly hard to subsume under the usual pairings of national differences, such as divided the French and the British, the French and the Germans, the Italians and the French, and so on, and on which Europeans continuously ruminated. The United States was remote; it was vast, and its society might appropriate huge tracts of land for public or private ends once the Native Americans had been subjugated or expelled. For over eight decades of existence the American republic had allowed the enslavement of imported Africans and their descendants, and even thereafter the racialist legacy determined much of politics. By the early twentieth century it was clear that the country was developing an economy larger than any of the European

nations and had the potential to intervene in the continuing international struggles of the European nations. It possessed a third of the world's railroad mileage by the early twentieth century. It produced over a third of its goods and services in the years after the Second World War. What is more, the national and ideological rivalries that made Europeans so recurrently in conflict with each other provided a likely incentive for some of them to enlist American aid and also an incentive for ambitious Americans to try to intervene.

All these factors, naturally enough, have led to unceasing reflection on what tied together the American republic and the nations of Europe and what separated them, and often on what ought to connect them and what ought to preserve their separation. These reflections have become so much a staple of the transatlantic relationship in their own right that any further commentary might seem superfluous. What new elements might possibly be added to the Niagara of manifestos and analyses about political and strategic relationships, the flow of economic ties, cultural interactions, the "Atlantic passage" of social thought and artistic inspiration?<sup>1</sup> Of course one could summarize some or all of these themes, but by now they are utterly familiar. We just need to recall the long parade of illustrious observers of American institutions and mores, such as Tocqueville, Bryce, Sombart, Weber, or Myrdal, or American discussants of their own country's relationship to Europe, such as Emerson, Henry James, and countless other commentators and historians. So, too, dozens of historians have focused on the emergence and functioning of the Atlantic relations, including both the editor of this volume and the contributor of this essay. Some have stressed strategic and cultural developments, others the ideologies of Wilson and Roosevelt and successors, political economy, and the imperial nature of American influence across the Atlantic.

Issues of strategic security were troublesome for the first generation of the American republic, caught as it was between the rival ideologies and ambitions of France and Great Britain. But then the primacy of foreign policy ceased to shape ideological division within the United States. Expansionists largely gave up the notion of conquering Canada, although slave-holders still dreamed of Cuba and the Caribbean. With the Treaty of Ghent, Britain renounced its claims to control the new country's ocean access. For most of the nineteenth century—the Civil War years excepted—American security issues arose with respect to the West and the South and largely because the advocates of continental expansion were impatient to clear away French and Spanish then Mexican and Indian obstacles to their surge across the continent. Only the Russians seemed to yield gracefully in the remote Northwest, and they had their own vast continent to fill.<sup>2</sup>

The age of overseas imperialism from the last decades of the nineteenth century, of mass politics and industrialization, changed the Atlantic variables.

The United States evolved from being a society that deserved attention for its domestic institutions, mass immigrations, and raw economic ascent to one that might enter strategic rivalries—if not in Africa, then in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. Japan and America emerged as potentially acquisitive powers in the second half of the nineteenth century. But, if overseas Pacific colonialism and the acquisition of naval assets (demonstrated by the Americans at Manilla in 1898, and by the Japanese at Tsushima Strait in 1904) gave the American republic a new importance as a strategic player, it was the crumbling of old empires within Europe that would render the United States a critical actor across the Atlantic. The crumbling of the Ottoman Empire and the Serbian challenges to the Austro-Hungarian Empire led to the crises that culminated in the First World War, and kindled a process by which the British and French solicited American help in defeating what had emerged as a major German challenge to their own imperial security.<sup>3</sup>

The First World War confirmed what the ambitious educated elites of the United States felt was the country's natural strategic role and destiny—a key balancing (if not yet a durably hegemonic) role in European affairs. Their ambitious agenda, however, proved impossible to maintain after the First World War. The idea of a continuing Atlanticist program generated a backlash at home. Midwestern and often German-descended political communities understood that the interventionist program of the Wilsonians (like that of Theodore Roosevelt) would result in what was the 1920 version of a “red-state” domestic supremacy on behalf of a “blue-state” coalition that had been largely out of power since the Civil War. (The big difference between then and now was that the largest regional bloc, the South, was still in the Atlanticist or proto-blue-state bloc until the 1960s.)

Implications for domestic politics have always played a crucial factor in American foreign-policy debate, but never with the easy division of left and right, or the class cleavages more characteristic of European societies. The very absence of plausible threats to US territory and the complexity of economic hierarchies in a society with strong ethno-cultural and racial divisions long made foreign-policy alternatives a principle for sorting out contending political coalitions. Since security concerns seemed remote, Atlanticist, Pacific-oriented, and isolationist programs allowed political elites to explain or to ground ambitious competition at home. Foreign-policy divisions sometimes reflected material interests—say, the connections of New York banking houses or export-oriented industries—but also served as a political marker, somewhat as long hair or dress might have done in the 1960s and 1970s. This does not mean that strategic threats were not real: imperial and later National Socialist Germany and imperial Japan had far-reaching programs for territorial expansion. Stalinist Russia denied such aspirations, but in effect came to seek the political subordination of neighboring states.

Still, the threat to the United States itself was less a strictly territorial one than one to its overseas influence and the general climate of values it championed. America defined its national-security needs (except for the brief period of the 1920s) in terms of an ideological milieu that it did (correctly in my view) feel was threatened. And this sense of threat was what linked it to Western Europe, and vice versa. The liberal societies of Western Europe demonstrated that what was at stake was not just national egoism but a community of political ideals. To be sure, territorial survival in a world where radical doctrines prevailed internationally was felt to be precarious and unworkable; hence an interventionist coalition assembled itself in America from 1914 to 1917, from 1939 to 1945, and then from 1947 on. Because these coalitions responded to threats to values and not to territory, they had to overcome significant resistance, which they repeatedly stigmatized as isolationist. So-called isolationists could be conceptually rigorous—see, for instance, Charles Beard's discussion of "The National Interest" in the mid-1930s.<sup>4</sup> But isolationism could also spill over into semi-paranoid notions of conspiracy, whether by Eastern financiers, Jews, or others; so it became easy to discredit.

American mobilization around its perceived security interests came too late to impede the outbreak of war in 1914 and again in 1939. Instead, the United States helped to organize a coalition of democratic reconquest that had to tolerate the Soviet Union's coalition of Communist victories in Eastern Europe. In the late 1940s, however, America mobilized early enough to limit Soviet gains to the areas that Russian soldiers actually occupied and to preclude outright aggression or internal uprising (assuming these might have taken place otherwise). Such a success for containment thus left it an open issue whether Soviet military aggression, after the Second World War had ended, might have taken place or not. In any case, Europeans and Americans felt that territorial aggression was a danger, even if it arose out of ideological divisions.

There was an American alternative to "Atlanticism," which centered on the protection of Pacific security interests. The United States acquired the Philippines in 1898 and also committed itself to "the open door" in China. This meant that it was prepared to oppose other imperial powers from securing a decisive voice over Chinese government policy or large swathes of territorial control. In particular, Japanese acquisitions in 1895, the Twenty-One demands of 1915, and Japan's coastal conquests of 1937 on were all protested against. The US groups that focused on defense of a special US relationship with China tended to be Republican and conservative. In the early 1940s they devoted great effort to discrediting academics and liberals who felt the Chiang Kai-shek government was hopelessly ineffective and corrupt. With the Civil War after 1945, then the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC)

in 1949, this “China Lobby” became a determined and powerful right-wing Republican voice in Washington, augmenting the McCarthyite attacks on “old China hands.” In effect, therefore, Atlanticism had its domestic roots among the Wilsonians and Rooseveltians in the Democratic Party, supported by powerful Southern Democratic congressional committee members and the moderate Republican banking and legal interests in New York and the East. The China-oriented advocates in the United States became more oriented to the Republican right wing, often playing on a sentimental loyalty to Pearl Buck’s vision of the vast Asian giant.

The Pacific orientation thus remained a smaller strident voice in American politics. It operated more as a political lobby, less as a broad political current. It depended on the political star power of some leading military men and political manipulators, including at various times Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Douglas MacArthur. It did not have an Asian–American equivalent of the powerful European intellectuals who had come to this country as refugees from Europe in the 1930s. Defense of Pacific interests involved cooperation with the French, Dutch, and British defense of colonial possessions before Pearl Harbor, as well as support of an independent China. The US Asianists lost a major political decision as early as 1941, when the United Kingdom and the USA agreed that, in the case of a joint military effort, defeating Germany must take precedence over any war in East Asia. Atlanticism was also easier to construct as an international coalition: the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties of Western Europe offered appealing transatlantic partners; Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee were hardly democratic. One could not build a Pacific “community” as one built an Atlantic community. This does not mean that Washington would not protect interests in Asia; it extended important security guarantees to the Nationalist regime on Taiwan and to postwar Japan; and it intervened in Korea. Americans fought in Asia, but the ideological trappings of Atlanticism could not be reproduced by the China advocates.<sup>5</sup>

The fact that Russia had failed to secure an occupation zone in Japan meant that the great drama of anticommunism remained more gripping in divided Berlin and Germany after 1947. Japan of the 1950s seemed far more secure from Communist invasion than divided Germany of the North Atlantic Treaty. The United Kingdom and France and the signatories of the Brussels Treaty in 1948 approached the United States as a Western European Union. There could be no Asian equivalent. In any case, Washington and the “internationalist” elites of urban America were hardly unwilling partners. From Wilson on they defined the goals of these coalitions not merely in defensive but also in positive terms—enhancing a climate for peace, for freedom, and on behalf of democracy. The Democratic administrations that responded to the European calls for assistance used the opportunity to propose an ambitious

agenda of institution building: whether the League of Nations (ultimately an institution “too far” for the US Senate), or later the UN, or NATO. Even as the United States became increasingly a conservative power, it retained these ambitions. John Ikenberry argues persuasively that the American effort at institution building was a prescient way of organizing its power.<sup>6</sup> It left a durable scaffolding for American objectives and it won the cooperation of allies who might otherwise (as today) see only a naked power grab. The UN and the whole range of postwar institutions entrenched American power in a web of arrangements that tended to enhance American power and influence precisely as they constrained it. Power exercised by unilateral fiat had the stigma of being imperial. This was a lesson American internationalists could discern in Thucydides’ discussion of Athenian behavior or histories of Rome. The new institutions made it easier for interventionist Americans to feel justified in seeking an ambitious world role.

### **Social and Economic Dimensions of Atlanticism**

American power was thus, to use John Ruggie’s original phrase, “embedded” in an international institutional regime.<sup>7</sup> But the institutional regime was capacious because it was designed not just to accommodate options for international governance. In effect it simultaneously provided transnational consensus for the new social and economic order of the Keynesian welfare state. This internationalization of shared social and political welfare norms had begun, in fact, after the First World War: the League of Nations established frameworks for dealing with international social issues, including the labor movements, for colonial welfare, and, perhaps most innovatively, for collective minority rights.<sup>8</sup> These last institutions—inscribed into the minority treaties concluded between 1919 and 1932—had many failings. Still, they led to a rich international jurisprudence of collective minority rights that may again serve as the global community gropes toward a regime for minorities. In some respects the League was far more ambitious than the UN, which fell back on affirming individual rather than collective minority rights.

The group rights that the post-1945 international order did implicitly sanction were those of organized labor parties and unions and not those of ethnic minorities. The Atlantic community was constructed indirectly on the solidarity pacts that Resistance coalitions had negotiated even in non-corporatist countries such as Italy, France, and Belgium as well as in the more traditionally solidaristic societies of Scandinavia and the Netherlands. These agreements meant that the post-Second World War Atlantic partners built their international cooperation on domestic alliances with non-communist working-class representatives in each participating country.

Without that breadth the Atlantic alliance would have remained narrow and fragile.

If we compare the institutions developed after the First and Second World wars, the real difference was not in the new bodies created at the international level. The League of Nations sought the transnational participation of working-class organizations and leaders as actively as the UN was to after 1945. But the political role of the working classes between the wars was left precarious at the national level—both in the United States and in Europe. The result was to make the regime of the International Labour Organization an effort, with weaker roots in each participating country. Geneva, so to speak, worked in a vacuum. The second war resulted, however, in a greater institutional symmetry at the national and international level. The political balance of forces in Düsseldorf, Turin, and Durham and not in Lake Success or on the East River assured the international relationships. Atlanticism thrived on a welfare-state class compromise.<sup>9</sup>

Even more fundamental perhaps, it rested on a particular technological conjuncture, one that has included two cycles of innovation: the rise and fall of Fordist production and the beginnings of microelectronics. US ascendancy was built on mastery of Fordist technological processes, conveniently dated from the assembly lines installed on the eve of the First World War and which attained their greatest economic impact in the Second World War. Fordism meant mass production of relatively standardized objects often fabricated of steel or other metals. The labor force became, in effect, an adjunct of the productive process and was hired according to standardized contracts with powerful trade unions that could withhold labor's participation—the unions that played so critical a role in the transnational social coalition underlying Atlanticism. Fordism was a model of industrial output that had a long history and also attracted the Soviet leadership in the 1920s and 1930s, who likewise mastered it for wartime and postwar output and achieved considerable success in tank and aeronautic production. At the same time, Americans—alongside Europeans—developed sophisticated techniques for allowing and encouraging mass production: catalogue sales, the department store, the supermarket, advertising, the concept of the electrified household.<sup>10</sup>

Americans, finally, led in microelectronics after the war: perhaps the development of the transistor in 1947 and its applications can be taken as the salient date. Military spending in the early years of this innovation initiated what would become the exponential growth of data processing. West Europeans followed suit. The Socialist bloc, however, found these technologies harder to apply and incentivize in a system that hoarded information and distrusted its easy access.<sup>11</sup>

Even in the West or the Atlantic community, this technological transformation had a profound impact on all dimensions of social and political life. In a broad way, the continuing stream of information technology and



digitalization has entailed a seismic shift in socioeconomic organization. Crudely put, the construction of networks has tended to displace the structuring of hierarchies as a dominant trend of purposeful social communication. Coupled with the shutting-down of coal mines and heavy steel production in America and West Europe, it has decisively weakened the old industrial labor force and drastically shrunk the role of unions. It has placed a premium on far more individualized products, and indirectly has called forth a new type of protean citizen, no longer confined to his (and the older worker was predominantly male) role as a producer. Emerging social complexity certainly undermined the Communist social model. But it profoundly transformed the Atlantic organization of society as well, as students and women mobilized in their own search for postmodern fulfillment.

Both technological and societal transformations have proved conducive to a reshaping of American hegemony within the Atlantic community. But they tended to exert opposed influences. On the one hand, the new technologies—applied in optics and guidance systems—strengthened American military supremacy. On the other hand, the computer technologies contributed to a new societal flux that undercut political hierarchies in general. Moreover, while the United States remained supreme in the military applications of the new technology, it was hardly superior in the consumer applications, which the Europeans, the Japanese, and other Asian societies could appropriate as their own.

Indeed, it was possible that the American emphasis on the role of military superiority in recent years has itself represented a reaction to the growing dehierarchization of society, implicitly intended to maximize the particular American trumps in the transformation of the global economy. For now this hypothesis must remain a speculative one. In any case, by the new century the incoming American administration had defined a strategy to retain military supremacy beyond any possible plausible challenge. Unfortunately, it was a largely irrelevant technology for the local combat at the edge of its sphere of influence.

## **The Atlanticist Future: Abiding but Transformed**

Countless committees of the great and the good have reiterated that the European–American relationship remains fundamental for both parties' foreign policy. Commentators dismayed by the Bush administration's approach to international affairs have also urged that America seek once again to assert its influence through the UN and other multilateral agencies. Nonetheless, the developments sketched above suggest that it may not be easy just to reanchor American leadership once again in a web of shared international institutions. For each society in Europe and America has, in effect, undercut the national

Keynesian or welfare-state regime on which the shared post-1945 order rested. Indeed, insofar as the United States presses for a common ideological program in the form of what President Clinton lauded as “market democracy,” it continues to dissolve the commitments to social solidarity that emerged in reaction to fascist dictatorship and the harsh experience of German occupation. Where is the bed for embedded liberalism? Those who call for “reform” in terms of labor markets tend to undercut the solidarities that Americans and Europeans found so important to their earlier cooperation. Ralf Dahrendorf, following Hayek, has referred to the constitution of liberty as the underlying set of Atlantic values; but in fact there was also an implicit constitution of solidarity that emerged in reaction to fascist dictatorship and the harsh experience of German occupation.

To be sure, common security dangers provide an incentive for a multilateral security community. The threat of Soviet and related Communist Party advance induced major institutional development in the form of a long-term military alliance and all that it entailed. The end of the cold war and the redimensioning of Russia obviously removed much of the incentive structure for transatlantic security cooperation. It is far from clear that the current dangers of terrorist or Islamist violence make alliance politics an appropriate response. Nonetheless, NATO has survived with far less trouble than I, for one, would have expected in the early 1990s. Adding East European members provided a form of political integration as well. Taking on out-of-area tasks (discussed in detail by Helga Haftendorn, Chapter 8, this volume) likewise has provided a renewed functionality.<sup>12</sup> The wars of succession in the ex-Yugoslavia provided a sort of bridge to out-of-area functionality, even though NATO’s members tended to act individually and for a while ineffectively. What functions the alliance performs will remain unclear for a while. Whether it needs to keep Russia “out” is uncertain; the problem seems hardly (except to the Poles) to keep Germany “down;” and America has always desired NATO to give it a reason for staying “in” or hegemonic.

If there remains an ongoing relationship, then it must be one that subsists because both sides find it advantageous. It has been and will continue to be voluntary. No matter how unipolar a power contemporary America has become, or to what degree imperial swagger dominates current American politics, no American has a vision of marching down the Champs Elysées as the Wehrmacht did in spring 1940. Conversely, despite repeated European concerns that the United States might revert to isolation or simply withdraw its troops, the American political system has sustained a commitment to European involvement from 1941 until the present, or for six and a half decades.<sup>13</sup> So what needs have kept Europeans and Americans together?

First, despite repeated statements by American officials that the United States was a revolutionary power by virtue of its own revolutionary war, both

Europe and the USA have become deeply conservative powers. By conservative I do not mean reactionary, right wing, or determined to resist gradual social change. Certainly there are such conservative elements in the Atlanticist political spectrum. But I mean committed to gradualist and legal change that does not really threaten established hierarchies of power, what we associate with Burkean or Tory reformism. Throughout the postwar period, American leaders have liked to claim that the revolutionary origins of American politics should make it a sympathetic role model for other aspiring revolutionary experiments. In fact, the American Revolution—while radical along political and international axes—was moderate along the axis of social change. Moreover, once the new republic constructed its own constitutional institutions, most of its political class believed that there was no further need of radical upheaval. Despite Jefferson's famous injunction about the utility of revolution every twenty years, this never represented a plausible conviction. Americans distrusted revolution, in their own hemisphere once the republican moment of the early nineteenth century had passed, and elsewhere as well. They have intervened repeatedly to channel or reverse revolutionary upheavals in their own hemisphere and elsewhere since the Second World War. When left revolutions seemed to be a possibility in liberated Europe during 1944–5, Anglo-American military authorities worked hard to preclude them in the areas they controlled. And when thirty years later revolution actually occurred in Portugal, the American Secretary of State—admittedly a man preoccupied by “order”—viewed events with the greatest distrust. Americans and Europeans together were allied in the search for order. As always, order often entailed privilege and rewarded established positions. All the rhetoric of America's revolutionary origins could not override the shared US–European interest in defending social order.

This search did not preclude social and economic reform, but it did require keeping radicals of left or right far from power. To be sure, American policy from the Second World War on was anticolonialist at critical junctures. Roosevelt made it clear to Churchill that he believed Britain must withdraw from India; the USA compelled the Dutch to cease their attempted post-1945 reconquest of Indonesia; American pressure, moral and financial, led Anthony Eden to abandon his 1956 effort at regime change in Cairo; and, as senator, John F. Kennedy sought to have the USA take the Algerian war to the UN. Nonetheless, if the European colonial powers could make a plausible claim that their role in Asia and Africa was undertaken to preclude Communist takeover, they usually found American acquiescence and even financial support. After 1950, Washington indirectly assumed most of the financial burden of the French effort in Indochina. Eisenhower drew the line at providing nuclear assistance. Although, as a senator, John F. Kennedy wanted the French out of Algeria, as president he felt the need to continue their struggle against communism in Southeast Asia and prolonged the deployment

of CIA operations and funding as well as publicly declared efforts at reform. When the Soviets in the UN continued to inveigh against colonialism to the discomfort of Americans, Washington sought to shift the focus of the criticism by arguing that real emancipation would require dismantling single-party dictatorships in the Soviet bloc.

America claimed to keep, but safely shed, any revolutionary pretensions. In successive stages (1917–45, then 1947–91) its political leaders made it clear that the country rejected extremes of “right” and “left,” fascism and communism. European conservatives understood that, once they abandoned their colonial claims, America’s leadership would assist them in the struggle to contain communism. Indeed American doctrines could cheer each side of the political spectrum in Europe: the social democratic left could take comfort from such rhetorical intimations of reform as embodied in the rhetoric of John F. Kennedy, while European conservatives could take comfort from the ongoing moderation and acceptance of the social status quo. The American discrepancy between words and deeds helped to sustain the postwar West European experiment with centrist politics that marginalized the extremes of far left and far right and effectively placed governance in a cartel of center-right and center-left parties that either shared power or alternated peacefully.

Likewise, the United States was safely conservative with respect to its own political economy. Where it moved most radically—that is, in the effort to overcome racial segregation during the Johnson administration—it pursued an internal agenda that had little relation to Europe. With respect to social policy, Americans made do with a more rudimentary welfare system than Europeans, and since the 1970s they have tolerated huge accumulations of private wealth, relying on overall productivity to yield enough growth for their own working classes to sustain the domestic belief in social mobility and opportunity. Admittedly, toleration of inequality varied across party lines. The Democratic administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, in particular, were motivated in part by egalitarian impulses. But, since 1980 at least, major spokesmen of both parties have propagated an updated gospel of wealth, which has justified increasing inequality at home in the name of high employment and overall growth.

How has the American electorate been persuaded to sustain such a system of minimal social welfare and high inequality over time? Why have so many voters whose material interests might apparently benefit from a policy of greater redistribution been convinced time and again to reject such changes? In part the continuity of high employment and job creation has become the primary measure of socioeconomic equity. Americans believe that, if they eschew the “politics of envy” or of class, jobs will remain available for all. In fact, the United States has combined family-income stagnation with high employment. Most growth in real family income has

depended on more hours worked per household. Employment availability has compensated for relative stagnation of individual incomes. Just as important, shared cultural practices have become the major instrumentality for achieving democratization. A vibrant sphere of mass sports and religious commitment eclipses class politics. The rapid advent of consumer electronics, whether allowing such active participation through the Internet and shared communication, or just facilitating a shared space of youth music and common evening TV, has powerfully advanced this democratization of culture.

Since the major non-market societies—the Soviet Union and its satellites—functioned so poorly and collapsed so clamorously, no ideological alternative to this view has really seemed persuasive. (The last West European challenge—on the part of the French Socialists who came to power in 1981—was abandoned in 1983 as Mitterrand opted for a strong franc within the European Monetary System.) Nevertheless, since the 1990s, the rise of so-called populist constituencies has undermined this shared Atlantic consensus. Although such currents had surfaced periodically in earlier decades—for example, with the advent of Poujadism in mid-1950s France, or the German NPD during the period of the Great Coalition of the late 1960s—they faded quickly. Globalization and immigration have made them more sustained and preoccupying alternatives since the 1990s. They are products not of the post-9/11 world, but of the globalizing economy and of the disappearance of a Marxist alternative during the decade before. Some of the same currents surface in the United States, although as tendencies within the major two parties and not as third parties. The European and American establishments thus remain deeply conservative powers, anxious with good reason to preserve a liberal cosmopolitan status quo that contains popular passions. But their control of political ideas and impulses seems far more precarious.

Precisely this precarious commitment to a sort of Atlanticist Tory reform, though, should sustain the European–American cooperation. My belief is that we have been living in the past eight years through an era of sharp discontinuity in the Atlantic relationship—a sort of instinctive effort by the George W. Bush administration to maximize its military supremacy and project power into an area where earlier administrations (including his father's) had had to live with ambiguous results and partial influence. I am hopeful that this imperial interlude will remain just that, an interlude, and not a sustained quest to formalize hegemony, with all the distortion of American constitutional practice that that implies.<sup>14</sup> A shared community of interests, domestic as well as international, makes it logical for the United States and Europe to continue cooperation. If the tendencies toward pretensions of hegemony, perhaps even empire, now recede into the background, Europeans and Americans will continue their cooperation.

But cooperation for what ends? And with what promise of success? Terrorism and Islamism appear as a new version of radical politics. Both Americans and Europeans have a vested interest in moderate outcomes. This holds for the moderate left and the moderate right on both continents. European social democracy can take comfort in the American rhetoric of reform. European conservatives can take comfort in the reality of America's social conservatism. One would expect that the European left would be more critical about the role of the United States, and it often is. Nonetheless, in the last twenty-five years, European social democracy has itself become a far vaguer doctrine than earlier. It, too, has welcomed a vague rhetoric of reform but has offered little in the way of concrete measures that differ from the pro-market policies of the center right.

The major challenge to a common Atlanticist policy of reformist conservatism, or of shared liberalism, arises less from terrorism—which makes the shared interests of Europe and America glaringly evident—than from the ongoing progress of globalization. Even as the specter of Islamic terrorism serves to reunite the old concentration of center left and center right that earlier rallied around hostility to communism, globalization threatens political incoherence across the board. It is closely connected to what is perceived to be the threat of immigration with its submersion of earlier familiar identities in a new postmodern world of diasporas. And it seems to threaten job security within each national society in the West. While a neoliberal capitalist right can live with this erosion of traditional national identities and can welcome the long-term pressure on wages and welfare, the social-democratic left finds it harder to accommodate. Labor is repeatedly asked to trade hard-won welfare-state entitlements for the sake of preserving high employment—but with no guarantees. Its constituency thus tends to desert to parties that seek simpler remedies that impede migration and reaffirm ethnic identity.

Ultimately a close European–American relation depends upon common efforts to build institutions that work toward greater economic equity along two dimensions: first within both American and European societies alike; second, between the privileged Atlanticist realm as a whole and the more disadvantaged regions outside it. There is finally no purely international realm in an alliance structure, just as there is no possibility of defining social and economic policies without creation of a propitious international milieu. American retreat from imperial adventure should make it easier to reconstruct that interlocked construction of “embedded” institutions. But by itself it will not overcome the challenges inherent in the new economic world and perhaps the new strategic order. After all, both Americans and Europeans must now operate in the looming shadow of Asian enrichment and Asian power. That makes their efforts perhaps more compelling, but also more challenging. There is much to accomplish together, particularly

in out-of-area tasks such as cooperation in failed states, and, I would argue, in enhanced intervention outside the Atlantic region designed to reduce the violence nurtured by radical inequalities. Ultimately the issue is not whether a close European–American relationship survives, but what sort of relationship it will be. Atlanticism can continue, but more and more as a coalition of social defense against angered radicals and the poor outsiders who will throng its gates. Is this, however, the Euro-American relationship we want? Or can the European–American relationship be reconceived as a civic commitment beyond its own immensely wealthy and privileged geographical region? Much must be accomplished in advancing economic equity within the Euro-American zone as well. At the end we may need to ask whether it really makes sense to emphasize a regional Atlantic relationship given the challenges of global inequality. We can always have a club. Can we envisage a commonwealth?

## Notes

1. Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
2. Among recent works, see Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, *The Crucible of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500–1800* (New York: Viking, 2005), and Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
3. Among the more recent works dealing with American imperialism, see Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750* (New York: Norton, 1989), and Frank Ninkovich, *The United States and Imperialism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).
4. Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1934).
5. See Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), and Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stillwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–1945* (New York: Macmillan, 1970).
6. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
7. John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization*, 36/2 (Spring 1982), 379–415.
8. Susan Pedersen has surveyed the literature on the League of Nations in "Back to the League of Nations," *American Historical Review*, 112/4 (October 2007), 1091–117.
9. Cf. Charles S. Maier, "Empires or Nations? 1918, 1945, 1989 . . .," in Carl Levy and Mark Roseman (eds.), *Three Postwar Eras in Comparison: Western Europe 1918–1945–1989* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2002), 41–66.
10. Victoria de Grazia has told this story superbly in *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005),

although she perhaps underestimates the Europeans' autonomous development of consumer societies.

11. Ernest Braun and Stuart MacDonald, *Revolution in Miniature*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 35–180.
12. Discussed in detail by Helga Haftendorn, Chapter 8, this volume.
13. See the earlier Nobel Institute symposium (1997): Geir Lundestad (ed.), *No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present and Future* (Houndmill: Macmillan-St Martin's, 1998).
14. Cf. Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).



### 3

## Atlantic Orders: The Fundamentals of Change

*Charles A. Kupchan*

### Introduction

The argument of this chapter is that the Atlantic order is in the midst of a fundamental transition. The transatlantic discord that has emerged since the late 1990s marks a historical breakpoint; foundational principles of the Atlantic security order that emerged after the Second World War have been compromised. Mutual trust has eroded, institutionalized cooperation can no longer be taken for granted, and a shared Western identity has attenuated. To be sure, the Atlantic democracies continue to constitute a unique political grouping. But, as scholars and policy-makers alike struggle to diagnose the troubles that have befallen the Atlantic community and to prescribe mechanisms for redressing the discord, they would be wise to recognize the scope of change that has been taking place in the Atlantic order.<sup>1</sup>

The first section of this chapter identifies three key periods in Atlantic relations: the Revolutionary War through Anglo-American rapprochement in the early 1900s; the early 1900s through America's entry into the Second World War in 1941; and the Second World War through to September 11. I provide a brief historical overview, identifying the key attributes of the order that prevailed during each of these periods. The analysis presented in this section provides a comparative framework for evaluating the recent turmoil in US–European relations, shedding light on whether the Atlantic community is experiencing marginal adjustments within a prevailing order or more profound challenges that are order changing in scope and nature.

The second section of the chapter examines transatlantic relations since September 11. I argue that the 1990s represent a transition decade; key elements of the cold-war order were beginning to erode. But it took the events

**Table 3.1.** Atlantic orders, 1776–2001

Dates	Logic of interaction	Interests	Identity	Character of order
1776–1905	Balance of power	Separate and divergent	Oppositional	Militarized rivalry
1905–1941	Balance of threat	Separate but contingently convergent	Compatible	Peaceful coexistence
1941–2001	Cooperative security	Common	Shared	Alliance/security community

of September 11 to serve as a defining break point, bringing to an end the geopolitical era that opened with Pearl Harbor. Drawing on the framework developed in the historical section, I present a number of theoretical and empirical arguments to make the case that the Atlantic order is today experiencing fundamental change and that the current discord does indeed mark a turning point.

The third and final section of the chapter addresses alternative trajectories for the Atlantic relationship. The analysis is predicated upon the assumption that the relationship remains very much in flux; it is too soon to discern a stable resting point. I therefore reflect on the different forms that the Atlantic partnership has taken in the past, and the conditions that gave rise to those forms, to address where it might be headed in the future. Is the recent discord a passing aberration, likely to give way to renewed solidarity? What drivers could trigger the further unraveling of the Atlantic community? Is it conceivable that transatlantic relations could again fall prey to militarized rivalry? What steps can be taken to avert the further erosion of Atlantic unity?

## The Evolution of Transatlantic Relations

To shed light on how the Atlantic order has evolved over time, I break the historical record into three periods: 1776–1905, 1905–1941, and 1941–2001. I identify the defining attributes of these periods along four dimensions: (1) the geopolitical logic governing relations; (2) the definition of interests; (3) the composition of identities; and (4) the character of order. Table 3.1 illustrates how these defining attributes have changed over the three historical periods in question. The narrative that follows provides empirical elaboration.

### *1776–1905: From the Revolutionary War to Anglo-American Rapprochement*

During this first phase of interaction between the United States and Europe, transatlantic relations were guided by balance-of-power logic. The major

players—the United States, Great Britain, France, and Spain—were regularly jockeying for territory, trade, and geopolitical influence. Each balanced against the power of the other, capitalizing on opportunities for individual gain. The United States fought two wars with Britain and one with Spain. From the 1790s until Napoleon's defeat in 1815, Britain and France were in a prolonged state of war, competing for position in the imperial periphery as well as in the European theater. For the most part, America steered clear of struggles among European powers. The United States did form an alliance with France during the revolutionary period, a pact that nominally lasted until the 1790s. But the alliance was very much a marriage of convenience aimed at balancing British power, not a signal of US engagement in European rivalries. America's founding fathers were quite adamant that the young republic should avoid "entangling alliances" of a more enduring kind. Indeed, successive US governments heeded these warnings, throughout the nineteenth century keeping the country out of Europe's wars and taking advantage of America's natural isolation.

The European powers and the United States saw their respective interests as separate and divergent, embracing a zero-sum view of the security environment. To be sure, transatlantic commerce was beneficial to Americans and Europeans alike, with British dependence on imports of American agricultural products leading to the pursuit of joint gains. But on matters of security, states sought absolute gains. The United States focused its sights on driving the European powers from North America and, ultimately, the Western hemisphere. Britain, France, and Spain sought to protect their colonial possessions, with Britain also intent on maintaining naval hegemony in the western Atlantic.

The European powers were also collectively concerned about the potential challenge that America's rise would pose to Europe's broader primacy on the global stage. Indeed, during the US Civil War, Britain and France supported the South's effort to secede, calculating that disunion would keep North America divided and weak, and thus limit its ability to challenge European hegemony. Britain came close to intervening on behalf of the Confederacy, holding back only when threatened with the prospect of war with the North. William Seward, the US Secretary of State, urged President Abraham Lincoln to take on France and Britain as well as the Confederacy. The president, however, demurred, replying, "Mr Seward, one war at a time."<sup>2</sup> Nonetheless, Europe's interest in "disaggregating" the United States, coupled with America's effort to drive Europe from the Western hemisphere, quite starkly revealed the degree to which balance-of-power logic guided policy on both sides of the Atlantic.

Identities of opposition prevailed. The United States and Britain saw each other as primary enemies. The narrative of hostility was in part about competing geopolitical visions and interests. Americans saw Europe as the old world,

stuck in the illiberal politics and jealous rivalries of the past. When President James Monroe addressed Congress in 1823, he warned Europeans that any effort to arrest the spread of republicanism in the Western hemisphere would be seen as “the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.” So too should Europe refrain from exporting its geopolitical instabilities across the Atlantic, Monroe warned, as the United States saw Europe’s balance-of-power system “as dangerous to our peace and safety.”<sup>3</sup> The concurrent articulation of the Monroe Doctrine made such admonitions somewhat disingenuous; America’s approach to its neighborhood was hardly one of disinterested pacifism. Nonetheless, Americans did see themselves as charting a new course, leaving behind the antiquated politics and geopolitics of the old world.

Oppositional identities also took shape with respect to how Americans and Europeans viewed each other’s social characteristics. Americans tended to view Europeans as elitist and arrogant. In turn, Europeans saw Americans as boorish and unsophisticated. Alexander Hamilton summarized these mutual perceptions in *Federalist 11*: “The superiority she [Europe] has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as profound philosophers have in direct terms attributed to her inhabitants a physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in America—that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.”<sup>4</sup>

Balance-of-power logic, separate and divergent interests, and identities of opposition kept transatlantic relations in a state of militarized rivalry through to the end of the nineteenth century. America’s final war with Britain was in 1812, but the two powers almost came to blows at numerous times during the second half of the 1800s—and kept war plans at the ready. Indeed, when a dispute broke out between Washington and London over Alaska’s boundary with Canada, President Theodore Roosevelt in 1902 dispatched a contingent of cavalry to the region. The Spanish–American war in 1898 was itself a demonstration of America’s will to drive European powers from its neighborhood—through force if necessary. To the degree that an Atlantic order existed during the nineteenth century, it was an order defined by power balancing and militarized rivalry.

### *1905–1941: From Anglo-American Rapprochement to Pearl Harbor*

During the first four decades of the twentieth century, the geopolitical logic guiding Atlantic relations was balance of threat rather than balance of power. The United States and Europe’s democracies began to enjoy the benefits of pacified relations. States no longer balanced against any concentration of power, but only against those nations that they deemed threatening. Regime

type started to play an important role in distinguishing aggressor states from benign states, with liberal democracies no longer engaging in militarized rivalry with each other.

The key driver of this transformation was Anglo-American rapprochement. The process of reconciliation began in the mid-1890s, when London and Washington peacefully resolved their differences over the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana.<sup>5</sup> Soon thereafter, the two parties settled a series of other outstanding disputes over fishing rights and borders. A mutual sense of durable reconciliation set in by roughly 1905, by which time Britain had effectively ceded naval hegemony in the Western hemisphere to the United States and dropped the US Navy from consideration in calculating its global naval requirements. London and Washington were both coming to see the prospect of an Anglo-American war as very remote, if not unthinkable. France was gradually integrated into this community as a result of the Entente Cordiale and the wartime alliance forged to defeat Wilhelmine Germany.

Officials on both sides of the Atlantic still conceived of their national interests as separate, but they were coming to see them as contingently convergent rather than divergent. The strategic environment was no longer zero sum, meaning that states began to pursue relative rather than absolute gains, even on matters of security. In this respect, the security dilemma ceased to operate among the Atlantic democracies; one state's gain was not necessarily another state's loss—and could even be of mutual benefit.

Great Britain, for example, supported America's war against Spain in 1898, thereafter welcoming America's arrival in the Pacific, its colonization of the Philippines, and its effort to open China's market, believing that British interests would be furthered by US expansion. As Kenneth Bourne summarizes elite opinion: "the British cabinet, including Salisbury, preferred American acquisition to that of any other power."<sup>6</sup> In similar fashion, Americans were intent on exercising hegemony over the Western hemisphere, but they did not otherwise see British power as inimical to US interests. As Henry Cabot Lodge wrote to Theodore Roosevelt in 1900, there was in Washington "a very general and solid sense of the fact that...the downfall of the British Empire is something which no rational American could regard as anything but a misfortune to the United States."<sup>7</sup>

Identities of opposition gradually gave way to narratives of compatibility. Britain and the United States were not simply countries with similar interests, but they shared ancestral, racial, and linguistic bonds. Accordingly, elites on both sides of the Atlantic began to view the prospect of an Anglo-American conflict as an act of "fratricide." As early as 1896, Arthur Balfour, leader of the House of Commons, ventured that "the idea of war with the United States carries with it some of the unnatural horror of a civil war... The time will

come, the time must come, when some statesman of authority . . . will lay down the doctrine that between English-speaking peoples war is impossible."<sup>8</sup> In early 1898, soon after stepping down as secretary of state, Richard Olney referred to Britain as America's "best friend," and noted "the close community . . . in origin, speech, thought, literature, institutions, ideals—in the kind and degree of civilization enjoyed by both."<sup>9</sup> He proclaimed that the United States and Britain "may have such quarrels as only relatives and intimate neighbors indulge in," affirming that "England, our most formidable rival, is our most natural friend. There is such a thing as patriotism for race as well as for country."<sup>10</sup>

To be sure, Britain and the United States had not yet become close and enduring allies. At the close of the First World War, the two countries took quite contrary positions on whether London should extend the Anglo-Japanese alliance, with the British ultimately acquiescing to pressure from Washington to abandon the alliance in favor of naval arms control. During the 1930s, US aid to a Europe confronted with Nazi aggression was exceedingly long in coming. Neutrality legislation passed by Congress and strong undercurrents of isolationism precluded US involvement in a prewar alliance that might have forestalled German aggression.

Nonetheless, the logic of balance of threat, separate but contingently convergent interests, and compatible identities transformed transatlantic relations from a state of militarized rivalry into one of peaceful coexistence. The Atlantic democracies were not yet members of a security community; they banded together only as necessary to respond to common threats, not out of a sense of solidarity. It required direct attacks on its forces, but the United States did enter the First and Second World Wars—and endure considerable sacrifice. Unlike during the era that came before the 1900s, the United States did not cordon itself off from war in Europe and Asia, but instead saw the outcome of such conflicts as directly affecting its security.

In this sense, the Atlantic democracies worked together when they deemed their collective interests were at stake—and otherwise acted separately. It was precisely the contingent nature of collective interest that induced the United States to keep its distance from institutionalized commitments, preferring the independence that comes with autonomy. As the Senate's rejection of US participation in the League of Nations made clear, the country was simply unwilling to take on binding obligations to collective action. According to one historian of the Senate debate, opponents of the League were in agreement that "Washington would stir uneasily in his tomb in Mount Vernon if he should learn that we were going to underwrite a League of Nations and keep an army of American boys ready to fight strange peoples in strange lands—all at the behest of some superbody."<sup>11</sup> Europe's democracies showed a greater willingness to take on such obligations in principle. But their reluctance to

follow through with action became all too apparent during the 1930s. The interwar period proved to be the era of fragile “coalitions of the willing,” not collective security.

*1941–2001: From Pearl Harbor to September 11*

The Atlantic alliance reached its apogee during the long decades between Pearl Harbor and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During this era, the guiding geopolitical logic of transatlantic relations was cooperative security. The Atlantic democracies pooled their resources to defend against external aggression. They also pooled their sovereignty, agreeing to multilateral and consensual decision making and binding themselves to each other through integrated military commands, joint forces, and transatlantic institutions. During the second half of the 1940s, the groundwork was laid for a network of economic and security regimes that was to provide the West with a distinct form of transnational governance for the ensuing decades. Far from triggering balancing, material power within the Atlantic community wielded a magnetic attraction, “grouping” states around centers of power such as the United States and the Franco-German coalition.

During the cold war, the Atlantic democracies had common interests, not just contingently convergent ones, making their security indivisible. The security dilemma was not simply in abeyance, but was actually working in reverse: each state’s effort to increase its own security enhanced the security of all. Accordingly, the members of the Atlantic community persistently encouraged each other to increase their military capabilities. Because they operated in a world of common interests and joint gains, the Atlantic democracies were prepared to take on institutionalized obligations. Whereas the League of Nations foundered on the shoals of America’s reluctance to formalize its foreign commitments, the United Nations enjoyed near-unanimous support in the Senate. Whereas the United States steered clear of Europe’s troubles in the 1930s, during the cold war the United States deployed troops in Germany, bound itself to Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty, and took other steps to ensure that the two sides of the Atlantic would not be decoupled.

The compatible identities of the interwar period gave way to a shared Western identity during the cold war. The separate states maintained their own national institutions and symbols, but they also worked hard to build a transnational sense of unity and commonality. With the deepening of a shared identity came a new narrative of solidarity and partnership, not unlike that which emerged between Britain and the United States during the early years of the 1900s. Backed up by a discourse of community, common values and culture, and durable partnership, transatlantic cohesion took on a taken-for-granted quality during the cold-war years. An excerpt from a declaration

signed at a NATO summit in Bonn in 1974 provides an illustrative example of the prevailing discourse:

The members of the North Atlantic Alliance declare that the Treaty signed 25 years ago to protect their freedom and independence has confirmed their common destiny. Under the shield of the Treaty the Allies have maintained their security, permitting them to preserve the values which are the heritage of the civilization and enabling Western Europe to rebuild from its ruins and lay the foundations of its unity.<sup>12</sup>

The logic of cooperative security, common interests, and a shared identity led to the formation and maintenance not only of a formal alliance, but also of a security community—an international society knit together by a sense of “witness,” an agreed-upon set of rules and norms governing behavior, and a shared belief that armed conflict among members of the grouping was unthinkable. The Atlantic community maintained its coherence even after the collapse of the Soviet Union precisely because it enjoyed deeper social linkages, a shared Western identity, and common adherence to the principles of multilateralism and consensual governance.<sup>13</sup>

## **The Erosion of the Post-Second World War Atlantic Order**

The main purpose of the preceding historical overview has been to identify the different forms that the Atlantic order has taken over time, specifying the principal attributes that define these different orders. I now turn to the more recent past, arguing that, on the four key dimensions of order—the geopolitical logic governing relations, the definition of interests, the composition of identities, and the character of order—the Atlantic community has experienced a striking and consequential degradation. Indeed, in important respects, today’s Atlantic order more closely resembles that of the interwar period than the cold-war era. From this perspective, the Atlantic community has entered a historical switching point that constitutes a fundamental break with the patterns of deep cooperation that emerged after the Second World War.

### *The 1990s: A Transition Decade*

The Atlantic order that prevailed during the cold war began to erode well before the election of George W. Bush and the tragedies of September 11. It is the case that the era in transatlantic relations that opened with Pearl Harbor did not definitively close until September 11; it took the seminal events of that day to mark a clear historical breakpoint. But such a stark delineation fails to capture the degree to which fundamental change in the Atlantic relationship had already begun during the 1990s. In this respect, it is worth characterizing



the 1990s as a transition decade, one during which central elements of the cold-war order were in decline as important aspects of the post-September 11 order were already beginning to emerge.

It was soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union that the strategic priorities of America and Europe started to diverge. In the absence of a common external threat, Europe and America no longer relied on each other to defend first-order security interests. The Atlantic allies eventually succeeded in bringing peace to the former Yugoslavia, but only after years of procrastination and political disarray. In intervening in the Balkans, NATO did end up fighting the first war in its history—successfully. But it has continued to exist as a military alliance only in name, its collective defense mandate losing its salience as NATO's main focus has moved to missions beyond its boundaries.

The transatlantic rift that opened up over Iraq was at least foreshadowed by the transatlantic acrimony that ensued over when and how to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. During the 1990s the United States and European countries also differed over policy toward Iraq, Iran, and the Middle East peace process. Such differences were hardly new; the two sides of the Atlantic had historically parted company on policy in the Middle East. But, during the cold war, the political consequences of contrasting approaches were muted and marginalized by the solidarity resulting from the Soviet threat. Barring a militarized inter-German border, troublesome issues in the Middle East that used to be distractions started to dominate the transatlantic agenda.

The evolution of the European Union (EU) added to the transatlantic discord. As a result of its changing strategic priorities, Europe mattered less to the United States than it had since the Second World War. But so did the United States matter less for Europe; a Europe at peace and a deeper and wider EU diminished European dependence on American power. Europeans accordingly grew more ready to assert their autonomy and chart their own course, upon occasion breaking with the United States on key policy issues such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Enlargement also extended Europe's sway eastward and southward, its influence coming at the expense of America's. By the end of the 1990s the United States and Europe still had many geopolitical interests in common, but the end of the cold war had certainly attenuated the previous sense both of solidarity and of the indivisibility of security.

The transatlantic link was weakened not just by changing strategic priorities, but also by the erosion of the bipartisan foundations of liberal internationalism in the United States.<sup>14</sup> The cold-war compact between the two sides of the Atlantic had been based upon a domestic compact in the United States. Europeans accepted the US-led Western order in no small part because of its consensual character. The United States would project its power abroad,

but it would exercise leadership through multilateral rather than unilateral initiative. This compact between power and partnership was a direct by-product of the centrist, bipartisan coalition put together by Franklin Roosevelt and sustained by his successors. Bipartisanship was a necessary precondition for the brand of liberal internationalism that guided US grand strategy—and the transatlantic partnership—for the next five decades.<sup>15</sup>

The end of the cold war expedited the erosion of liberal internationalism in the United States. The bipartisan coalition that supported it had been held together in part by external threat: strategic imperatives engendered political discipline. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, politics no longer stopped at water's edge; foreign policy again became exposed to partisan warfare. Partisan divisions over the Persian Gulf war of 1991 were a harbinger of a widening foreign policy gap between Republicans and Democrats. The Senate did authorize the use of military force to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait, but by only a slim margin—52–47—with the vote breaking primarily along party lines.

Bipartisanship continued to decline as the 1990s proceeded, eroding in a precipitous fashion after the Republicans took control of Congress in the 1994 elections. Indeed, as measured by congressional voting, bipartisanship on foreign policy reached a post-Second World War low in the 104th Congress (1996–7). As the Senate minority leader, Tom Daschle, noted in 1996: “The Cold War exerted a powerful hold on America, and it forced the parties to work together to advance American interests through bipartisan internationalism . . . The tragedy is that such cooperation increasingly seems an artifact of the past.”<sup>16</sup>

By the second half of the decade, international institutions and treaties had fast become the stuff of partisan conflict. The Clinton administration dragged its feet on the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol, but eventually supported US participation in both. Congress, however, was enthusiastic about neither pact.<sup>17</sup> Clinton sent the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Senate, where Republicans promptly voted it down. He turned to multilateralism to bring peace to Kosovo, but the Republican House refused to pass a resolution endorsing the NATO campaign. Instead, Republicans claimed that the Clinton administration's penchant for multilateralism was compromising US sovereignty. As John Bolton, who would become undersecretary of state and then UN ambassador in the George W. Bush administration, wrote toward the end of the Clinton administration, “globalists” were imposing “harm and costs to the United States . . . [by] belittling our popular sovereignty and constitutionalism, and restricting both our domestic and our international policy flexibility and power.”<sup>18</sup> These changes in the substance and tone of American foreign policy contributed substantially to transatlantic acrimony, impressing upon Europeans that the close alliance of the previous decades was in jeopardy.

*The Bush Presidency and September 11: The End of an Era*

If the events of the 1990s marked the weakening of the transatlantic partnership of the cold-war era, the events that followed the election of George W. Bush marked its ultimate demise. Virtually all the geopolitical and domestic after-effects of the cold war's end were magnified by the combination of the Bush presidency and the consequences of the terrorist attacks of September 11. If the Clinton administration had attempted to salvage liberal internationalism, the Bush administration sought to do the opposite: bury it.

After taking office, Bush at once announced his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol and the ICC. The strategic priorities of Europe and America, which were already diverging, grew further apart. The US government and its European counterparts embraced different views of the sources of Islamic extremism and how best to combat it. Washington turned down NATO's offer of help in toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, dealing a blow to the spirit and form of collective defense. When the United States, without UN authority, next turned its sights on Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, many Europeans viewed the war as an illegitimate and unilateralist act—even in those European countries whose governments supported the invasion. The tragedies of September 11 and the war in Iraq that followed also dealt a further blow to liberal internationalism in the United States. The attacks and the Iraq war stoked an angry nationalism, advantaged more extreme voices at the expense of moderate ones, and exacerbated partisan acrimony.

The polarization of the United States and the erosion of its bipartisan center may well prove to be one of the most consequential and durable changes of the recent past. If this hollowing-out of the center reflects its secular decline—rather than representing a temporary aberration produced by the Bush administration—then the demise of liberal internationalism will long outlast the Bush presidency. As argued above, partisan confrontation over foreign policy mounted during the 1990s, before Bush took office. But his presidency certainly contributed to the divide—deliberately. Even though Bush had promised to govern as “a uniter, not a divider,” once in office he consistently tacked away from the center, urged by his political advisers to exploit rather than repair partisan differences.<sup>19</sup> His chief pollster had declared in a memo that the once-vaunted center of US electoral politics had collapsed and political strategies aimed at capturing it would backfire.<sup>20</sup> The underlying logic of the memo was that the most effective policies would be polarizing ones—those designed to mobilize the Republican Party's base.

Even after September 11, with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq creating a need for national unity, Bush subordinated consensus building to wedge politics. Whereas Roosevelt and his successors sought to foster bipartisanship

in foreign policy, the Bush administration used foreign policy as a tool of partisan warfare, especially at election time. In the 2004 presidential election, Bush focused his campaign on the threat of terrorism, charging that the country would “invite disaster” if the Democrats were to win.<sup>21</sup> Vice President Richard Cheney pursued the same critique of the opposition, warning: “If we make the wrong choice [of candidates], then the danger is that we’ll get hit again.”<sup>22</sup> Following the election, the *Economist* concluded that “America is more bitterly divided than it has been for a generation.”<sup>23</sup> The rhetoric continued in the 2006 midterm elections, with Bush insinuating that a Democratic victory means: “The terrorists win and America loses.”<sup>24</sup>

Despite the backdrop of September 11 and the wars that followed, partisanship in US politics intensified. Instead of ushering in an era of revived political cooperation, the terrorist attacks produced only a brief upturn in bipartisanship. During the 108th Congress (2003–4), voting on foreign policy returned to the pre-September 11 pattern.<sup>25</sup> And by the time the Democrats took back the House and Senate in the 2006 midterms, the gap had only widened. When the 110th Congress took its first votes on the Iraq war, only 17 of 201 Republicans in the House joined the Democrats to oppose the surge of US troops into Baghdad. In the Senate, only 2 Republicans joined the Democrats to approve a resolution calling for a timetable for withdrawal. In contrast, 95 percent of House and Senate Democrats voted to withdraw US troops in 2008. According to one widely used index, Congress is today more politically fractious and polarized than at any time in the last one hundred years.<sup>26</sup>

Bush’s style of governing and the Iraq war have certainly contributed to this state of affairs, but domestic developments are also responsible for the fracture of the bipartisan coalition that long supported liberal internationalism. For starters, Roosevelt’s effort to build a bipartisan foundation for liberal internationalism was significantly advanced by the opportunity that had opened up to forge a political alliance between the North and South. Agreement on the advantages of free trade and the benefits of defense spending, as well as the migration of Democrats from North to South, enabled Roosevelt and his immediate successors to overcome the main regional divide that had long stymied bipartisan support for a US grand strategy that combined the projection of power with international partnership.

Today, regional divides are returning to America’s political landscape. The South, once a formidable redoubt of the Democrats, has, along with the Mountain West, become the Republicans’ electoral base. Meanwhile, the Democrats dominate the Northeast and the Pacific coast. Patterns of migration have contributed to this trend. The East and West coasts and the Great Lakes region are increasingly multiracial and multiethnic, the preferred destinations for many immigrants to the United States. These communities are largely liberal and Democratic. Meanwhile, whites from working- or middle-class

backgrounds are relocating to the growing sunbelt economies of the South and Mountain West. These communities are growing more conservative and Republican. As each of the “two Americas” grows more homogeneous, the political gap between them widens, adding to the impediments facing bipartisan cooperation.<sup>27</sup>

The second major change has been the growing ideological divide between the parties, fueled primarily by growing economic inequality. The post-Second World War electoral landscape grew considerably less polarized on socioeconomic as well regional lines. The rapid economic expansion fueled by the war and the postwar boom was the most important reason for the moderation. As it often does, economic growth acted like a political balm, easing the class tensions sparked by the Depression and making it easier for the country’s political leaders to find common ground on foreign as well as domestic policy.<sup>28</sup> The narrowing of ideological differences thus accompanied the decline of region and class as important political dividing lines. Indeed, by the end of the Eisenhower era the emergence of a pragmatic, moderate center had prompted Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell to pronounce “the end of ideology.”<sup>29</sup> On Capitol Hill, this development manifested itself in the rise of a “moderate bloc”—a group of lawmakers who were more likely to vote with the opposing party than their own. The unusually centrist character of US politics after the Second World War helped consolidate the bipartisan foreign policy compact between power and cooperation.

Today, the moderate center is giving way to ideological extremism. The sharpening of socioeconomic cleavages is contributing to the ideological polarization that increasingly finds expression in partisan competition.<sup>30</sup> For many Americans, wages have not kept pace with inflation. US workers historically received roughly three-quarters of corporate income, but since 2001 they have received only one-quarter of the increase in corporate income.<sup>31</sup> The rich have been getting richer, while the working class has been losing ground. Pressure from Americans disadvantaged by globalization has been one of the reasons some Democratic lawmakers have been backing away from support for free trade, breaking with the Republicans on this issue and undermining one of the last remaining policy planks of the liberal internationalist compact. If postwar prosperity soothed ideological clashes over socioeconomic issues, the inequities of today’s brand of globalization are bringing them back to life.<sup>32</sup>

Finally, it is not just elites and party activists that are becoming more polarized, but also the broader public. During the cold war, Republicans and Democrats generally saw eye to eye on the critical foreign-policy question of the era. Some years the public favored more stick than carrot; other years, voters preferred greater reliance on negotiation. Nonetheless, partisan affiliation had little impact on preferences; shifts in popular attitudes did not run along party lines.

Not so today. One recent study of public attitudes toward foreign policy reports “an enormous change” to “an American politics that has not only become more divided in partisan and ideological terms on domestic issues but also in the foreign policy arena.”<sup>33</sup> Foreign-policy issues that have divided the country’s political class for some time are now roiling mass opinion as well. In general, Republicans in increasing numbers favor military strength over diplomacy as the best way to ensure security, while Democrats are moving in the opposite direction.<sup>34</sup> According to a March 2007 poll, after four years of the United States occupying Iraq, only 24 percent of Republicans oppose the war, compared with more than 90 percent of Democrats.<sup>35</sup> This growing public divide does not augur well for grand strategies that seek to combine the use of US military force with the building of multilateral institutions.

## Taking the Measure of Change

How consequential is the transatlantic rift that has opened since 2001? Do the substantive disagreements and political acrimony amount only to “politics as usual” within a robust liberal order? Or are the two sides of the Atlantic breaking out of normative boundaries, signaling the end of the post-Second World War Atlantic order?

The framework developed above indicates that the Atlantic order is indeed experiencing systemic change, not just elevated levels of political conflict within preexisting boundaries. Erosion is taking place on each of the four key dimensions of order.

Cooperative security is no longer the exclusive geopolitical logic governing relations; balance-of-threat thinking is making a distinct comeback. Europe is not balancing against American power, but it is balancing against US behavior. Europe’s effort to resist US policy has for the most part taken the form of “soft balancing”—organizing efforts to isolate the United States diplomatically, as occurred over the Kyoto Protocol and the ICC. However, the attempt by France and Germany to block the invasion of Iraq constituted a far more serious form of resistance. France and Germany did not just opt out of the war—a move that would have been consistent with cooperative security—but they campaigned assiduously to deny the United States the backing of the UN Security Council. Their willingness to do so indicated that they were prepared to deny Washington the legal right to pursue a military operation that US leaders deemed vital to the country’s first-order security interests.

The implications went well beyond diplomatic symbolism. Had the UN Security Council passed a second resolution authorizing the war, the United States may have been able to amass a much larger military coalition from the

outset. A larger force may well have made a considerable difference during the early phases of the occupation, enabling the United States to pacify the country and neutralize the insurgency. Perhaps Turkey would have agreed to allow US forces to open a northern front. Had the operation enjoyed international legitimacy, the United Nations and other international organizations would have been much more involved in postwar governance and reconstruction. The war might also have enjoyed greater support within the Middle East, limiting its ability to stoke radicalism and attract new recruits to the extremist cause. In short, the diplomatic actions taken by France and Germany to block the war arguably imposed considerable costs on the United States in terms of both resources and lives.

The United States responded by following suit and embracing balance-of-threat logic. The Bush administration sought to drive a wedge between pro-war and anti-war members of the EU, rewarding its supporters with access and promises of lucrative contracts in Iraq, while punishing its detractors with isolation. The US government also embraced a decidedly negative view of the project of European integration, worried that a common foreign and security policy might deny Washington the ability, when needed, to secure the support of individual EU members—as it did in the case of the Iraq war. Just as Europe sought to preserve its global sway by hoping that the Civil War would divide and weaken the United States, Washington sought to disaggregate Europe to counter the potential threat it posed to US hegemony. Balance-of-threat thinking prevailed on both sides of the Atlantic.

The record of the past five years has also made clear that Europe and America no longer share the commonality of interest that they enjoyed during the cold war. Instead, their interests have returned to being separate, even if contingently convergent. To be sure, the two sides of the Atlantic still have many international objectives in common. Indeed, there are arguably more areas of agreement than there are disagreement.

But with the rift over Iraq, the United States and key European allies—France and Germany in particular—disagreed on fundamental matters of war and peace. The Iraq war was not the first time since the Second World War that differing positions emerged on the use of force; the Suez Crisis and the Vietnam war certainly provoked sharp disagreements across the Atlantic. But, as mentioned above, these disagreements occurred amid the cold war, meaning that the political impact of policy differences over third areas was muted by common interests and objectives in the core strategic theater. The split over Iraq, however, occurred in the absence of a disciplining threat in Europe. As a result, the contrasting strategic perspectives that emerged on Iraq constituted a fundamental break in transatlantic unity. It became readily apparent that American and European security were no longer indivisible.

The transatlantic divide over Iraq may well prove to be a unique event, representing a particularly glaring and damaging instance of strategic divergence between the United States and Europe. In the light of the troubles that have befallen the United States in Iraq, another similar invasion seems a quite remote prospect. On the other hand, the United States and Europe have consistently taken quite different approaches to the Israel–Palestine conflict. And they may ultimately part company on how to deal with Iran should Tehran refuse to curb its nuclear ambitions. On these and other important strategic issues, the two sides of the Atlantic have different interests and have historically pursued different policies.

This divergence in American and European interests explains why transatlantic security institutions have been strained to the breaking point. Washington now prefers “coalitions of the willing” precisely because it accurately perceives a more divided geopolitical environment in which individual countries whose interests are affected—rather than the Atlantic alliance as a collective—are likely to be the key participants in most conceivable military operations. Furthermore, with Atlantic security no longer indivisible, Washington prefers the flexibility of ad hoc decision making to the binding obligations of formal alliance. Europe, meanwhile, continues to prefer institutionalized multilateralism in large measure because binding obligations offer a means of taming American power.

Consider the diminished centrality of NATO, whose limited role in Iraq is a testament to the scope of the change that has taken place in the Atlantic security order. NATO is ostensibly the mainstay of that security order, an institution meant to orchestrate common action to defend common interests. France, Germany, and other members of the anti-war coalition may well have been right that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not warrant war. But, amid the insurgency and accompanying chaos that ensued after the fall of Baghdad, they could hardly maintain that America’s first-order security interests were not at stake. With American soldiers dying on an almost daily basis and Iraq’s integrity in the balance, it was self-evident that the United States was very much in need of help.

Seventeen individual members of NATO did send troops to Iraq, but many of the contingents were quite limited in size. Nine members, including France and Germany, refused to send troops. Furthermore, the institutional and symbolic centerpiece of the Atlantic order—NATO—kept its distance, limiting its contribution to the training of Iraqi security forces. That NATO became only tangentially involved in a crisis of the magnitude faced by the United States in Iraq speaks volumes about the erosion that has taken place in Atlantic solidarity. To be sure, NATO did take on major strategic responsibilities in Afghanistan. But the forces of many member states operate under “caveats” that restrict their engagement in more dangerous operations. With domestic



criticism of the mission in Afghanistan mounting in many member nations, it is not inconceivable that the NATO coalition could unravel in the face of mounting casualties and insufficient progress in bringing stability to the country. If the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are any indication, the Atlantic community is back in a world of separate interests and contingent commitments to collective action.

The Atlantic order has suffered similar setbacks on matters of identity. The sense of “we-ness” that emerged amid the Second World War and the cold war has dimmed considerably. Indeed, not only has a shared Western identity weakened, but it has to some extent been replaced by a narrative of opposition. It is not only the French who have been calling for the return of a multipolar world and the rise of an EU capable of serving as a counterweight to the United States. Even in Sweden, a country that long ago renounced power politics, the prime minister speaks about the EU as “one of the institutions we can develop as a balance to US world domination.”<sup>36</sup> In the United States, it is not only partisan advocates, such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who denigrate “old Europe” and lament its challenge to Washington’s leadership. Even more centrist individuals, such as columnist Thomas Friedman, have added their rhetorical contributions to transatlantic acrimony, in 2003 referring to France as an “enemy” of the United States.<sup>37</sup>

In important respects, the evolving discourse resonates with the oppositional narrative of the nineteenth century—except the tables have turned in step with the reversal of power asymmetries. During the nineteenth century, America was Venus and Europe Mars. Now, Robert Kagan claims, it is America that understands and wields power, and Europe that has embraced pacifism.<sup>38</sup> Then, Americans saw themselves as progressive, leaving behind Europe’s social atavisms. Today, it is Europe that criticizes America’s social atavisms—the death penalty, the underclass and the uninsured, the insensitivity to environmental change. When Europe enjoyed global hegemony, Americans groused about its arrogance. Now that America is the global hegemon, Europeans regularly complain about its “selfish superpower position,” lamenting that their leaders must go to Washington “to appear at the throne of the freshly anointed American Caesar.”<sup>39</sup>

Such statements represent a radical departure from the declarations of community and partnership that prevailed during the previous five decades. Moreover, the erosion of communal identity is not just an elite phenomenon; surveys reveal a sharp increase in the percentage of Europe’s citizens holding an unfavorable view of the United States.<sup>40</sup> Should balance-of-threat thinking continue to gain ground at the expense of the logic of cooperative security, these attitudinal changes could well mean growing European efforts to oppose US policy.

The return of balance-of-threat thinking, the divergence of interests, and the dilution of a shared identity have led to a consequential erosion of

the Atlantic order. NATO still exists, but its members no longer enjoy the solidarity that they once did. The Atlantic democracies still constitute a security community in the sense that war among them remains unthinkable. However, a transatlantic sense of “we-ness” has diminished considerably. Indeed, for many Europeans, America has lost its allure as a model and magnet. An Atlantic order characterized by alliance and security community appears to be giving way to one characterized by uneasy, even if peaceful, coexistence.

### *The Next Phase: Repair, Stable Equilibrium, or Further Erosion?*

The Atlantic order has experienced a dramatic setback. In important respects, the evolving relationship between the United States and Europe has begun to resemble the interwar period as much as the cold-war era. The progress toward deeper and more institutionalized cooperation that was made after the Second World War has been significantly compromised.

Although a step backward in the sense that advances in international cooperation have been reversed, the new Atlantic order that is emerging is not necessarily cause for alarm. Peaceful coexistence and transatlantic cooperation that is contingent upon the identification of joint interests still provide the basis for a stable order in which militarized conflict remains unthinkable. The security dilemma would not operate unless an aggressor were to re-emerge within the Atlantic community; balance-of-threat logic produces geopolitical rivalry only in the presence of revisionism. Regularized cooperation promises to continue on many fronts, with the transatlantic area enjoying far deeper and wider networks and institutions than existed during the interwar period. The loosening of Atlantic ties may make consensus more difficult to reach at the UN, NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and other global and Atlantic institutions. But these institutions will nonetheless continue to facilitate international cooperation. And the United States and Europe share a commitment to the spread of liberal democracy and markets, meaning that their basic international objectives will align more often than not. From this perspective, the Atlantic democracies may be finding their way to “normalcy,” an order that lacks the unique affinity and cohesion of the cold-war years, but nonetheless enjoys the benefits of pacific relations, economic integration, and not infrequent instances of political collaboration.

It is, of course, conceivable that the recent erosion in transatlantic ties represents only a temporary departure from deeper cooperation. Advocates of this view would claim that the Iraq war was a unique event, not to be repeated. They would also contend that the election of George W. Bush led to a particularly hawkish and ideological brand of foreign policy, one not likely to last beyond his presidency. A Democratic victory, the argument runs,

would restore previous levels of harmony and affinity to the transatlantic relationship.

Although the Iraq war and Bush's brand of international leadership may well prove to be the exception, not the rule, this argument fails to recognize the deeper structural changes that have compromised the Atlantic order. The end of the cold war, the maturation of Europe, the differential impact of 9/11 on strategic priorities—these are the underlying causes of the tensions that have emerged between the United States and Europe. Furthermore, the foreign-policy proclivities of the Bush administration hardly appear to be a passing aberration. The unilateralist turn in policy was evident well before Bush was elected. Despite the Iraq war and the Atlantic turmoil of the first term, Bush was re-elected. And the bipartisan coalition of moderate Democrats and Republicans that was the political foundation of liberal internationalism during the cold war appears to be gone for good. Bipartisanship has become a rare commodity, and generational change is dramatically thinning the ranks of the traditional internationalists, especially in the Republican Party. If Europeans are waiting for America's liberal internationalism to make a comeback, they may be waiting for a very long time.

Rather than pining for yesterday's Atlantic order and seeking to reclaim it, a wiser investment would be to recognize that a new Atlantic order is taking shape, to seek to understand more fully its attributes, and to figure out how to make the most of its cooperative potential. Indeed, policy-makers already seem to be doing so. During the first year of Bush's second term, governments on both sides of the Atlantic appeared ready to put aside Iraq and theoretical disputes about multilateralism, instead opting for ad hoc, case-by-case instances of cooperation. On a host of important issues—Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, and the Palestine–Israel peace process among them—the United States and Europe found considerable common ground. This pragmatic approach to cooperation may well represent a model for the future, a new stable equilibrium that promises to ameliorate the recent acrimony and capitalize on available opportunities for transatlantic partnership.

At the same time, it would be premature and unwarranted to be confident that the Atlantic relationship is fast heading toward a stable resting point. During the 1990s, few scholars foresaw the speed or scope of the erosion in Atlantic relations that was about to take place. Just as a rift of the type that opened over the Iraq war was unimaginable then, so too it is unimaginable today that the Atlantic community could backslide even further, perhaps to the point at which militarized rivalry again becomes plausible.

But the past makes clear that security communities are by no means durable political formations. The Concert of Europe after 1848, the United States in the 1860s, Yugoslavia in the 1990s—these are all examples of security communities that unraveled, their constituent members ultimately falling

prey to geopolitical rivalry and bloodshed. From this perspective, it is worth identifying the pathways that could potentially lead to the further dissolution of the Atlantic order. The Atlantic democracies could then take steps to immunize themselves against such adverse developments.

Parties on both sides of the Atlantic should be mindful of the potent implications of identity politics and narratives of opposition. The Concert of Europe was dealt a decisive blow by the nationalism awakened by the revolutions of 1848. The United States descended into war in the 1860s as the North and South parted company over contrasting social orders and incompatible national identities. Yugoslavia unraveled as the ethnic identities of its constituent peoples were awakened by opportunistic elites.

These cases suggest that elites on both sides of the Atlantic should guard against the inflated rhetoric of the recent past. When European commentators repeatedly refer to the United States as an imperial power bent on global domination, popular attitudes change accordingly. When German politicians campaign for office by insisting that Berlin stand up to Washington and that the EU serve as a counterweight to America, they shift the terms of public debate, potentially diminishing their own room for maneuver in managing Atlantic relations. In similar fashion, when American officials and commentators refer to European countries as enemies, denigrate Europe's role in global affairs, and call for a boycott against French goods, Atlanticism in the United States suffers a blow. The ongoing changes in discourse are particularly important inasmuch as younger Europeans and Americans do not bring to the table the default Atlanticism of the Second World War generation. For the generation coming of age after the fall of the Berlin Wall, rhetoric portraying the United States and Europe as arch rivals has the potential to fuel a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The United States and Europe would also be well served to adjust transatlantic institutions to new realities. If coalitions of the willing, rather than a collective NATO, are likely to be the main vehicle for security cooperation, then it makes sense to loosen NATO's unanimity rule. Otherwise, future efforts to organize ad hoc coalitions will come off as affronts to multilateralism rather than episodes of pragmatic teamwork. Furthermore, assuming that the EU succeeds in centralizing decision making on matters of foreign policy, building new links between Washington and Brussels makes more sense than clinging to the NATO model, in which each European country has its own voice.

If transatlantic security is no longer indivisible, as argued above, then the members of the Atlantic community need to learn how to disagree more agreeably. The rift over Iraq was particularly damaging because divergent strategic perspectives led not only to opposing policies, but also to an open political confrontation. France and Germany did not just opt out of the

operation, but actively sought to block it. The United States retaliated in kind, not just ignoring Europe's protestations but actively seeking to impede the project of European integration.

Europe and America are likely to face continuing disagreements over policy in the Middle East, East Asia, and other third areas. Such disagreement was the norm during the cold war; it is likely to be even more pronounced now that the cold war is over. The United States and Europe should confront this reality, seeking to cooperate when possible, but also finding ways to contain and limit the impact of the disagreements that will inevitably emerge.

Finally, the European Union should strive to develop a more unified voice on matters of security policy and acquire the military capability needed to back it up. Progress on the defense front would enable Europe to capitalize more effectively on opportunities for concrete cooperation with America. Confronted with the drain on resources that Iraq has imposed on the United States, Washington has become well aware that it needs help on virtually every front. It would therefore be prepared to listen hard to European concerns if the EU had important assets that it could offer in return for US compromise. The United States would get the help it needs. The Europeans would get the influence they want, forestalling European inclinations to balance against US policy.

Atlantic relations are still in a transitional phase; it is far too soon to determine what type of order will constitute a stable and durable equilibrium. Nonetheless, scholars and policy-makers alike should realize that the Atlantic community has already passed through a historical breakpoint and that the close-knit security partnership of the past five decades is in all likelihood gone for good. It is better to recognize that reality and seek to lock in a new type of cooperative order than to pretend otherwise, unwittingly contributing to the further erosion of the Atlantic community.

## Notes

1. Portions of this chapter have appeared in two earlier publications: Charles A. Kupchan, "The Fourth Age: The Next Era in Transatlantic Relations," *National Interest*, 85 (Sept.–Oct. 2006); and Charles A. Kupchan, "The Atlantic Order in Transition," in Jeffrey J. Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse (eds.), *The End of the West? Exploring the Deep Order of the Transatlantic Structure* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). The current version of this chapter reflects feedback received at the Nobel Symposium convened in Balestrand Norway in June 2007 to discuss the draft chapters for this volume. For their helpful comments, I am indebted to Geir Lundestad and the other participants in that meeting, as well as the critics of the two essays cited above.
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3. Monroe cited in Dexter Perkins, *Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (Boston: Little Brown, 1941), 28.
4. Hamilton, *Federalist 11*, in James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 133.
5. See Lionel Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics, 1898–1906* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938); A. E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895–1903* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1960); Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898–1903* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957); Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815–1908* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Stephen Rock, *When Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); and Stephen Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000).
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7. Cited in Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding*, 203.
8. Rock, *Appeasement*, 32.
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10. “Olney Talks at Harvard,” *New York Times*, Mar. 3, 1898.
11. Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 32.
12. Declaration quoted in Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European–American Relations since 1945* (London: Macmillan, 1980), 282.
13. See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The Logic of the West,” *World Policy Journal*, 10 (Winter 1994).
14. The following discussion of the political foundations of liberal internationalism in the United States draws on Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, “Grand Strategy for a Divided America,” *Foreign Affairs*, 86/4 (July/Aug. 2007), and Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, “Dead Center: The Decline of Liberal Internationalism in the United States,” *International Security*, 32/2 (Fall 2007).
15. For extended discussion of the linkages between bipartisanship and liberal internationalism, see Kupchan and Trubowitz, “Dead Center,” 5–9.
16. Tom Daschle, “The Water’s Edge,” *Foreign Policy*, 103 (Summer 1996), 4–5. See also Kupchan and Trubowitz, “Dead Center,” 11–15.
17. See Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 216, and Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 31–45.
18. John R. Bolton, “Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?,” *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 1/2 (Fall 2000), 206.
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21. Sheldon Alberts, "Candidates Address 'Security Moms': Bush Warns Kerry Would 'Invite Disaster,'" *Gazette* (Montreal), Oct. 19, 2004.
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23. "America's Angry Election," *Economist*, Jan. 3, 2004.
24. Michael Abramowitz, "Bush Says 'America Loses' under Democrats," *Washington Post*, Oct. 30, 2006.
25. Kupchan and Trubowitz, "Dead Center," 26.
26. See <http://voteview.ucsd.edu/>.
27. See William H. Frey, *Metropolitan Magnets for Domestic and International Migration* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003). Other analysts suggest that the digital economy is contributing to this process of balkanization by detaching workplace from geography, enabling Americans to make decisions about where they live based on lifestyle, values, and political orientation. See Joel Kotkin, *The New Geography: How the Digital Revolution Is Reshaping the American Landscape* (New York: Random House, 2000).
28. Historically, bipartisan cooperation in Washington has generally increased during periods of economic prosperity. Partisan pressures on lawmakers ease with rising personal incomes and expanding federal coffers. For statistical evidence on the effects of economic growth on bipartisanship, see Peter Trubowitz and Nicole Mellow, "'Going Bipartisan': Politics by Other Means," *Political Science Quarterly*, 120/3 (Fall 2005).
29. Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (New York: Free Press, 1960).
30. See Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).
31. Lawrence Summers, "Only Fairness Will Assuage the Anxious Middle," *Financial Times*, Dec. 10, 2006.
32. See I. M. Destler, *American Trade Politics*, 3rd edn. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics 1995), and James Shoch, *Trading Blows: Party Competition and US Trade Policy in a Globalizing Era* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
33. Robert Y. Shapiro and Yaeli Block-Elkon, "Political Polarization and the Rational Public," in Morton H. Halperin, Jeffrey Laurenti, Peter Rundlet, and Spencer P. Boyer (eds.), *Power and Superpower: Global Leadership and Exceptionalism in the 21st Century* (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2007), 66.
34. In 1999, 46% of Republicans saw diplomacy as the better option. In contrast, 60% of Democrats favored diplomacy. This partisan gap has widened as a result of the Iraq war and the war on terrorism. In the 2004 presidential elections, 66% of Bush voters backed military force as the best way to defeat terrorism compared with 17% of Kerry voters. Among Kerry voters, 76% felt that excessive use of force creates anti-American sentiment and encourages terrorism, with only 25% of Bush voters supporting that position. See Gary C. Jacobson, *A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 222–36; and Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "Politics and Values in a 51%–48% Nation: National Security More Linked with Partisan Affiliation," Jan. 24, 2005, <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=236>.

35. Bill Schneider, "Poll: Support for Iraq War Deteriorates," *CNN.com*, Mar. 19, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/03/19/iraq.support/index.html>.
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37. Thomas Friedman, "Our War with France," *New York Times*, Sept. 18, 2003.
38. Robert Kagan, *Of Power and Paradise: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003.)
39. Quotes from Kupchan, *The End of the American Era*, 223.
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## 4

# From the Cold War to the War on Terror: Old Threats, New Threats, and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

*Michael Cox*

### Introduction

The relationship between the United States and Europe constitutes one of the most long-lasting and intimate in modern history. Indeed, in spite of George Washington's famous and oft-repeated injunction that the American republic should not become entangled in the affairs of the old world, the fate of the former and the history of the latter could not have been more closely connected. As Irving Howe once remarked, if America played a vital part in forming the European imagination it was largely because America itself "began as a European idea."<sup>1</sup> So it had been from the very beginning—America would not have come into being without European expansion and European wars—and so it would continue from Waterloo to Ypres, that *longue durée* when European migration, European capital, and a century-long European peace contributed in vital ways to America's seemingly ineluctable rise. Nor, in spite of their own self-proclaimed exceptionalism, were Americans so different from the Europeans. Like them, they justified expansion and ethnic cleansing on the fashionably nineteenth-century grounds of racial superiority. They were expansionist. And, like the more powerful European states, once the United States became sufficiently powerful itself, it began to view the world through distinctly imperial eyes, something that did not go unnoticed in Europe itself, so much so that by the beginning of the twentieth century European chancelleries that had once viewed the Americans with so much disdain began to take the United States increasingly seriously and in their very different ways began to devise strategies through which they

might best deal with this “dangerous new nation” emerging on the other side of the Atlantic ocean.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the British were the most sensitive of all to this transformation;<sup>3</sup> and, special though the relationship might have later become, there was no hiding the fact that, in spite of its many efforts to woo the Americans through repeated reference to their common language, shared history, and Anglo-Saxon identity, this could not do away with one of the more basic laws of world politics: namely that, when great states rise, they inevitably challenge those who have a vested interest in the status quo.<sup>4</sup>

If Europe facilitated America’s rise in the nineteenth century by exporting its people and keeping the peace, it accelerated it even more rapidly during the twentieth by collapsing into armed conflict. Indeed, whereas relative calm on the European continent created the conditions that made America’s smooth ascent in one century that much easier, it was to be Europe’s wars in another that made it inevitable. In the process Europe was not only refashioned at great cost but, according to Americans, “saved” on no less than three occasions—first in 1917 when the United States entered the war on the side of the allies, then again during the Second World War when it made an even more important contribution to Germany’s defeat, and once more after the war when Western Europe looked toward the United States to provide it with dollars, arms, and political guarantees to help it recover its equilibrium on a continent now divided and threatened by the USSR. In fact, according to another American discourse, Europe was not only saved by US effort on several occasions, but ultimately rehabilitated completely at that critical moment in time known as the end of the cold war. On this occasion, the United States, it is argued, slayed the Soviet bear and as a result reunited the continent for the first time since the end of the war. Whether or not it did so—or more precisely did it alone—is open to debate.<sup>5</sup> However, the story, and others like it, gets repeated in much the same way and for primarily the same reason: to remind Europeans of just how much they owe and still owe to their protector across the ocean. Policy-makers might like to talk of an alliance built on sovereign equality, shared values, and common principles. The fact remains that the transatlantic relationship after 1945 was a deeply unequal and ambivalent one carrying all the psychological baggage that normally accompanies relations where one of the actors knows it has all the power while the other constantly feels resentment about its own dependence.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps no single image can completely capture the complexity of any relationship. Sometimes, though, they have their uses, as the controversial Robert Kagan discovered in 2002 when, in his controversial and much criticized piece published in the midst of what some cynics no doubt regarded as “the worst transatlantic crisis since the last one,”<sup>7</sup> he cast Europe in the part as Venus—feminine, unreliable, and weak—and America in the form of Mars—muscular, virile, and actively assertive.<sup>8</sup>

Whether it is because it has been so close, so fraught, so important, or, over the past few years, so “troubled”, the literature on the transatlantic relationship’s past, present, and future continues to pour out of the presses in ever greater quantity. Anniversaries help (NATO was 50 in 1999, the European Union the same in 2007).<sup>9</sup> So too do crises. In fact, there would seem to be nothing like a good row to stimulate the intellectual juices, and since 2001 there has probably been no topic—bar perhaps the US decision to go to war with Iraq—that has generated more debate, more international conferences, and more policy papers than the state of the transatlantic relationship in the era of George W Bush.<sup>10</sup> It all began in the late spring and early summer of 2001 when the new president began to take potshots at those carefully constructed multilateral structures and treaties much beloved by his allies in Brussels.<sup>11</sup> It continued after September 11 (though there was a moment of reprise) when the USA made it clear to its NATO allies that the coming war in Afghanistan—unlike the one in Kosovo—would be planned, orchestrated, and executed by American forces alone. It went from bad to worse during the build-up to the war in Iraq. And it reached a crescendo of sorts when nearly ten million people took to the streets in Europe to protest the decision to overthrow Saddam. Naturally, there was more than one voice in this debate, some of whom tried to pour a great deal of oil on the troubled waters of the transatlantic relationship.<sup>12</sup> Nor did everybody agree with the author of one particular article who talked in melodramatic terms of the near death experience of the West.<sup>13</sup> But even the more sanguine had to admit one thing: this particular crisis appeared to be a good deal more serious than anything they could recall in the past, and even the most optimistic of Atlanticists accepted that the relationship was increasingly suffering what was regularly being referred to now as a “crisis of legitimacy”<sup>14</sup> and began to look for reasons (structural, generational, cultural, possibly economic<sup>15</sup>) to explain why the United States and Europe were rapidly drifting apart.<sup>16</sup> As one pessimist conceded, though we should beware of giving aid and comfort to those who had for many years been looking forward to that famous and much predicted “transatlantic train wreck”, there was nothing especially natural about the relationship any longer.<sup>17</sup> Officials might continue to mouth the old clichés that “the globe’s most important relationship” was in good shape.<sup>18</sup> Others felt that NATO was in fine fettle.<sup>19</sup> But there was no hiding the simple fact that a new, and much less sunny day had dawned over the Atlantic. The transatlantic relationship appeared, in the words of Chris Patten, to have “run out of road.”<sup>20</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is not to contrast the current crisis with previous ones,<sup>21</sup> explain why the level of anti-Americanism in Europe is probably higher now than it has been previously,<sup>22</sup> make sense of the different opinion polls charting the gap (or otherwise) between Europe and the United States,<sup>23</sup> assess whether or not we can still talk of a “free world,”<sup>24</sup> or even examine in

detail the various schemes that have been devised of late with the intention of either broadening, repairing, refounding, reconstructing, or even “charting a new course” for the “transatlantic relationship.”<sup>25</sup> Others have already done that and a lot more besides. Rather, it is to ask and hopefully to seek an answer to two related questions that many have asked but have rarely answered satisfactorily: basically, what parallels are there—if any—between the cold war and the war on terror? And, by implication, whether a “new” cold war masquerading under a new title could give new meaning to the transatlantic relationship? The argument has been cast in many ways but rests on three simple assumptions.

The first is the broadly realist one that threats sustain alliances in ways that nothing else ever can.<sup>26</sup> This may not necessarily lead to a formal or permanent treaty. However, states in the end will choose their friends, not because they are seeking to establish some kind of balance in the international system (let alone because they share the same values), but because they feel endangered by something or someone else.<sup>27</sup> This in turn leads to the second, more historical, proposition: namely, that the principal, though not only, reason why the Western alliance came into being in the first place—*notwithstanding the long historical connection between Europe and the United States*—was because it faced a common enemy after 1947, and, when this danger passed between 1989 and 1991, the alliance began to falter badly.<sup>28</sup> Fortunately though—and this brings me to my third and more central point—help was at hand in the shape of the new global menace that soon came to be known as “Islamic terrorism.” This, it was argued, was not only the wake-up call the democracies needed after that extended “beach holiday” known as the post-cold-war period. It would compel the West to pull together, unless it wished to hang separately. The danger of disintegration was thus most exaggerated. The minor spats caused by Bush, Iraq, and a few other trivial matters like Kyoto would in fact soon be forgotten as the Europeans and the Americans took stock and confronted the existential threat they now faced together. The West should not be downhearted, therefore. To paraphrase the title of one very well-known book on the cold war, we were “present” at a new “creation” with an identifiable enemy around which we could now group our forces. Admittedly the risks were great. But so too were the potential benefits. The “inevitable alliance” was safe for at least another generation.<sup>29</sup>

I want to respond to this conceptual challenge in three ways. In the first section I will look at the various parallels drawn between the war on terror and the cold war. As I will show, the Bush administration has raided the archives of the cold war fairly frequently, though more often than not in a highly selective fashion. The purpose of these raids, however, has not been without its own logic: for, by casting its own policies in a long American tradition of resisting totalitarianism, it has sought—not without some success—to sell the idea of a “war on terror” to its own people and to its various allies, most

notably those located on the continent of Europe. However, as I point out in the next section of the chapter, such efforts have not been especially successful. In fact, the argument that the war on terror will have a similarly unifying impact on the transatlantic relationship as the cold war is not sustainable—in part because Bush immediately undermined the possibility of this by folding Iraq into the new security paradigm, in part because it underestimates the very real differences between the cold war and the current situation, and in part because it ignores the critical fact that threats can just as easily divide allies as unite them. Indeed, if we are to draw lessons from the cold war, it should not always be the more obvious and repeated one about how the existence of “something worse”<sup>30</sup> always united the West, but of how much this “something” often divided it.<sup>31</sup>

Finally, I will conclude with a few brief arguments about the future of the transatlantic relationship. Here it is difficult not to fall into the rather obvious trap that has bedeviled such prognoses in the past: that is, of adding up all the factors that continue to unite Europeans and the Americans (shared values, economic interdependence, and institutional overlap), setting them alongside all those things that apparently divide them (conflicting conceptions of sovereignty, differences in power capabilities, and the like), and then arriving at what on paper at least looks like a balanced conclusion. My conclusion will be anything but balanced, for I suggest two things here: one, that, as the war on terror unfolds with probably more attacks on Europe than on the United States itself, the divide between the two will grow; and, second, that, in an era when US leadership is under the most intense scrutiny in Europe, there is little chance of the two uniting or coming back together again. Divorce between the two may not, and, for important reasons, cannot occur. To this extent, some kind of transatlantic bargain holds. However, as the clash with radical Islamism intensifies, and the political and moral influence of the United States in Europe diminishes (with little in the medium term to arrest the process), the two are likely to drift further apart. Consequently, some very challenging times lie ahead.

## **The War on Terror as a “New” Cold War?**

The attack of September 11 caused many things to happen, but one was a rather desperate rummage by policy-makers and academics alike into those two historical baskets labeled “lessons” and “analogies.”<sup>32</sup> No doubt because it was the first attack on the American homeland since the beginning of the nineteenth century, something—though not much—was made of the war between Britain and America when the former had the temerity to burn down the White House.<sup>33</sup> Much more, of course, was made of Pearl Harbor, a “surprise attack” if ever there was one, carrying the important message to

others that, when ruthless men do unspeakable things to the United States, they had better beware of the consequences.<sup>34</sup> But it was the cold war in the end that was compelled to do the heaviest lifting of all—so much so that in a remarkably short space of time a number of pundits were already beginning to talk of the “war on terror” as representing something akin to a new cold war: some because it was the conflict they remembered best,<sup>35</sup> a few because most of Bush’s key advisers were old cold warriors themselves,<sup>36</sup> and a good number because national security was now back at the top of agenda in much the same way as it had been between 1947 and 1989.<sup>37</sup> For all these reasons, and no doubt a few more, it was not at all unreasonable for writers to think of this new and uncertain present in terms of a known past.

Within the Bush team, however, the purpose of such analogical thinking was less to reflect seriously about the past and more to establish some framework within which it could legitimize its own actions. In the process it did what all administrations since the end of the Second World War had done: that is, derive the lessons it wanted to draw and ignore those that complicated the telling of a particular tale. That said, the tale it went on to narrate had its own appeal, starting with the end of the cold war itself. Here the Bush administration was uncompromising. The defeat of Soviet communism, it argued, represented a massive victory for freedom that had left the United States in a position of unrivaled primacy. On the other hand, the events between 1989 and 1991 had had the altogether unfortunate consequence of leaving the United States without a purpose. As one well-known American historian close to the White House pointed out, the United States had won the cold war, but as result become a nation lacking a grand strategy.<sup>38</sup> Now, at a stroke, the vacuum had been filled by the challenge of global jihad, the almost perfect antidote to Western sloth and what some around Bush viewed as an America grown decadent and flabby in an era personified by Clinton and exemplified by a foreign policy that wandered aimlessly between various missions that rarely touched upon America’s vital interests. Some were more explicit still. Without a clear and present danger—similar to that which had existed before 1989—the United States was more likely to decline than lead. Indeed, in their view, the end of the cold war had been marked by a serious “threat deficit” and no amount of clever talk about promoting democracy and spreading the virtues of liberal economics could hide the fact that the United States had lost the capacity to define the international agenda. It may have had most, if not all the power, as writers like Charles Krauthammer suggested.<sup>39</sup> It had no serious rival worthy of the name.<sup>40</sup> But there was very little it seemed to be able to do with all this spare capacity. To all intents and purposes, it had turned into a superpower—perhaps even an empire—without a mission. Now, because of 9/11, it appeared to have discovered one.<sup>41</sup>

If 9/11 provided a solution to what some regarded as America’s strategic vacuum, the cold war more generally offered the Bush White House a

ready-made supply of easy arguments about what to do next.<sup>42</sup> Naturally, Bush himself was highly selective in terms of what he chose to learn and from whom. However, the fact he felt compelled to learn something says a lot about the power of the past and the hold it had on a president of even his limited intellectual powers.<sup>43</sup> Unsurprisingly, the one cold-war president from whom he clearly tried to learn most was Ronald Reagan—Republican hero, enemy of the original evil empire (no coincidence, of course, that Bush himself later talked of an “axis of evil”), and ultimate reason according to many on the American right as to why the Soviet Union was finally consigned into the proverbial dustbin of history. Reagan seemed to be the almost perfect role model for Bush. Like Bush, he entered office after what he regarded as a period of foreign-policy drift (Reagan often talked of the 1970s as a “decade of neglect”). He vowed to make America strong once again. There were many around him who were anything but “realist” in international outlook. And he saw the United States being opposed by a dangerous global threat that, if not checked, could easily threaten nuclear Armageddon.

Naturally, there were differences. Reagan took over with a fairly clear idea of what he wanted to do abroad; Bush did not acquire such an outlook until after the attack of September 11. Reagan, moreover, was heir to an ongoing cold war, whereas Bush was facing what many around him felt was something quite novel.<sup>44</sup> Bush, though, was not deterred. In Reagan he saw not only someone willing to challenge the status quo by employing American military power, but a leader of rare courage who was not afraid of discussing international affairs in moral terms. Indeed, as Bush noted when praising one particularly influential book that drew parallels between Reagan’s successful struggle against the Russians and Bush’s war on terrorism, Reagan conducted his affairs abroad in a distinctly no-nonsense American way, and as result brought about regime change in the USSR in much the same way as he was about to do in those states that had hitherto sheltered the West’s main enemies.<sup>45</sup> The so-called Bush Doctrine may have appeared entirely novel in terms of the American foreign-policy tradition. But, as Bush and others pointed out, with its focus on transformation rather than order, and its attempt to frame American policies in terms of more general universal principles, there was something very Ronald Reagan (and by extension something very cold war) about the war on terror.<sup>46</sup>

But, if Reagan served as an important positive point of reference for Bush, so too, in a more general sense, did one very important part of the wider US foreign-policy tradition: that which saw a direct connection between US security and the promotion of democracy. Here again America’s larger role in the world after 1947 served to inspire and guide those whose job it was to conduct the war against terror. Of course, critics might argue that the United States was driven then as it was motivated now by less exalted goals: preserving the balance of power, maintaining stability, and securing America’s

access to key commodities and markets. But, as a number of realists like Morgenthau and Kennan discovered during the cold war (and others of a similar persuasion discovered after 2001), US foreign policy was driven not merely by realist calculations of interest but rather (or equally) by a desire to change the world and, by so doing, to achieve security. Thus, when Bush talked in grand, if not always eloquent, terms of defeating Al-Qaeda by sowing the seeds of liberty in the Middle East, this was not merely rhetoric. He was drawing from a cold-war vocabulary that believed that America's "fundamental purpose"—to paraphrase NSC-68—was not just to contain its enemies but to eliminate them altogether, and there was no better way of doing this than by holding firm to its liberal principles.

One final lesson that the Bush team drew from America's great foreign-policy past more directly concerned Europe and the "Europeans." The Europe they had in mind, however, was not that normally portrayed in standard Atlanticist discourse. This was no partner waiting in the wings ready to share the burden of world leadership at a critical juncture. On the contrary, in the administration's view, Europe was more nuisance than ally; less serious friend than possible rival, in some eyes.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, Europe, it was felt, not only remained stuck where it had been for the duration of the cold war—weak, dependent, and divided—but now even seemed to be opposed to the outlook of the new team: wedded to treaties, infatuated with the United Nations, almost completely indifferent to military power, and constantly seeking to tie the United States down through a complex variety of regulations and international laws, there was something distinctly un-American about the "Europeans." Furthermore, in spite of all of its fine words and almost daily declarations of Atlantic solidarity (quite common in the Clinton years and made concrete once again when Article 5 was invoked after 9/11), Europe had neither the means nor the will to act as a solid partner in crisis situations, as its miserable performance in Yugoslavia during the 1990s revealed only too tragically.<sup>48</sup> Why then should the United States bother to listen to Europe when the USA was confronted with issues involving its national security, possibly even its very survival? In this way the ground was prepared for America's declaration of unilateral independence, which demanded that it alone would determine military policy toward Afghanistan, and a little while later take the crucial decision to go to war against Iraq—with certain willing Europeans, if they could be so persuaded; without them, if they could not.<sup>49</sup>

### **Selling the "Islamic threat"**

This, then, brings us to the "war on terror" proper and whether or not it has successfully forged a new sense of purpose and cohesion across the Atlantic, as some believe it must and as a few insist it already has. There is certainly



no lack of optimism in official circles. Here the general line since 2001 has been that, whatever might have divided the Atlantic community for a while—and nothing divided it more than Iraq—is bound to be outweighed by that which unites it, and what unites it most obviously is the simple fact that it is confronted by the same opponent with the same ambition: to destroy the West. This, of course, is why the Europeans and the United States are standing together under the banner of NATO in Afghanistan, why intelligence services on both sides of the Atlantic are working closely together, and why in the end they will remain allies for the long term. Nor is this something opposed by ordinary people. On the contrary, opinion polls on both sides of the Atlantic seem to indicate a very great degree of convergence when it comes to the “Islamic” threat in particular<sup>50</sup> and Muslims more generally.<sup>51</sup> They also show a very high level of intolerance toward anybody who either supports or shows sympathy for the activities of jihadists worldwide.<sup>52</sup>

There is no disputing these very solid facts. Nonetheless, they do not tell the whole story. Nor can they account for something that has been obvious from the outset: that there remains a good deal of transatlantic confusion about whether we are in fact at “war” with something called “terror.” As Michael Howard early pointed out in an influential critique, the idea of a “war on terror” was a most dubious one that not only lent legitimacy to Al-Qaeda but presupposed an extended conflict that would continue almost for ever. The notion, he argued, was also strategically incoherent. No state or group of states he observed can declare war on a method.<sup>53</sup> Nor should it try to do so. The debate did not end there, of course. Indeed, as time passed, the critics grew in confidence—to such an extent that some Americans (and at times Bush himself) began to experiment with other ideas and at one point even replaced the more dramatic notion of a global war on terror (GWOT) with the apparently less offensive idea of a “long war.”<sup>54</sup> At one level this mattered not a jot. However, it did point to at best a lack of strategic clarity, and at worst a lack of confidence in what the United States and its various allies were supposed to be doing. It also compared rather unfavorably with what happened during the cold war. As we now know, there was a great deal of debate in the West about the Soviet threat, where it was most likely to arise, and how best to deal with it.<sup>55</sup> Indeed, no less a person than Kennan raised a whole series of critical questions about it that challenged Western policies to the core. But at the end of day, once governments had decided that there was a threat of some kind, they did not question or challenge the idea. Once a consensus, always a consensus, it seemed—until, that is, Gorbachev began to change the rules of the game after 1985.

This, in turn, raises a second more theoretical issue about whether or not it is possible to sustain an alliance against or around something as nebulous as terrorism? Here the comparison with the way alliances have been forged in the past, and the way this new alliance is being constructed, bears serious

comparison. As the literature suggests, alliances may be formed for many different reasons, not all of them having to do with the presence of a clear and unambiguous threat. In fact, there is a large non-realist literature that insists that threats alone are never enough to maintain cooperative alliances over the long term.<sup>56</sup> Yet even the most constructivist of readings of the past in general, and of the cold war in particular, would agree that having a threat certainly helps. The issue, then is how credible the threat actually is. Again there may be very different answers to this, but even members of opposing theoretical schools would find it difficult to disagree with what realists have had to say on this issue: namely, that it is very difficult to construct or sell any kind of threat unless the threat in question has serious capabilities, which under modern conditions means that it must be a state of some form.<sup>57</sup> Thus the USSR could be viewed as a threat not simply because it had an opposing ideology and was not a democracy (though both things helped) but because it had a massive amount of territory, had successfully industrialized after 1929, had a large manpower basis, and happened to have the largest army in Europe after the Second World War, and all this within the framework of a very well-defined state created since 1917. Take all this away, as Morgenthau suggested, and it is unlikely that a Soviet Union with say minimal capabilities and a weak state—however aggressive its ideology and repressive its polity—would have produced the same level of concern it did in the West after the war.<sup>58</sup>

Within this framework, it becomes perfectly easy to understand why the war against Islamic-inspired terrorism has not been anywhere near as successful in forging a new sense of purpose across the Atlantic as the Soviet threat. As Buzan has observed, while serious, the terrorist threat simply lacks the “depth of the Soviet/communist one.”<sup>59</sup> If nothing else, without a clear and present danger taking the form of a real state, it becomes extremely difficult for governments to sustain a sense of true danger. Hence, while transatlantic publics may agree that there is something out there (or at home) that threatens them in general, if nothing serious happens then concerns about terrorism begin to fade rather quickly. Indeed, one of the features of the period since September 11 is that threat perceptions have risen and fallen with alarming speed and regularity. Thus immediately after the London bombings of 2005 British opinion was decidedly hawkish; later, however, it began to return to “normal.”<sup>60</sup> Meanwhile, in other countries in Europe where no such attacks had occurred (with the exception of Spain), views ranged from the complacent to the decidedly war weary. Even in the United States public opinion has not been consistent, something that poses a very real problem that security services there have tried to resolve by repeating the refrain that, just because there have been no outrages since 2001, this does not mean they are not being planned.

To complicate matters even more, there is a strong and possibly growing opinion—on both sides of the Atlantic—that there are those in power who

are merely using the tensions caused by the current security situation to further their own political ambitions. The fact that the war on terror helped get George Bush re-elected in 2004 hardly helps generate consistent, across-the-board support for US goals, especially in Europe.<sup>61</sup> Nor do scandals that challenge core liberal values. This is why Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo proved to be so disastrous, and why the United States is facing such problems legitimizing what looks increasingly like “its” war, not only to a large number of its own citizens, but to an ever larger percentage of Europeans, even those not known for their left-wing sympathies and who ultimately see al-Qaeda as a serious threat to the “civilized” world.<sup>62</sup>

Threat perception is thus a most delicate thing, and if ordinary citizens—not to mention influential opinion-formers—feel that they are either being sold something phony or likely to undermine their notion of what constitutes the good society, then it makes waging the war all the more difficult. Which brings us inevitably to the question of Islam itself, ultimately the problematic ideological source of “jihad.” Here again the global war on terror involving the wider Atlantic community faces some near insurmountable obstacles in generating a clear point of reference around which to unite. There are at least three reasons why. First, Islam, unlike communism, has only limited ideological appeal; it is not, in other words, a universal threat. Secondly, the overwhelming majority of Muslims (unlike the overwhelming majority of communists during the cold war) do not seek the overthrow of the various states under which they live. And, thirdly, in attempting to contain radical Islam, the West has been compelled to appeal to the very religion that also happens to be the source of inspiration for those seeking the West’s destruction.

To make matters even more complicated for the West, it has been forced by the logic of the “war” to seek alliances with at least two states—Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—members of whose elites happen to be either closet supporters of the terrorists, sources of funds for the ideology that inspires them, or, more cynically, willing to use them for their own political or strategic purposes. The “complex” relationship that bin Laden himself had with the House of Saud until they finally decided to cast him adrift has already been well documented.<sup>63</sup> We also know how close some sections of the Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) are to the Taliban.<sup>64</sup> The cold war was not without its complexities. China, after all, did after 1978 support the American “imperialists” against the USSR, orthodox communists did appear to regard dissident members of the communist movement as being even more dangerous than the international bourgeoisie itself, and the Soviet elite did at times make deals with its capitalist enemies. But even these gyrations cannot compare to the complicated, and in the end debilitating, maneuverings now involved in fighting the war on terror.

Finally, the current conflict is occurring in a world that in many ways is a lot more complicated than the world that existed during the cold war. As Halliday reminded us some time ago, the very great success of the cold war in mobilizing support and forging accord between potentially fractious and competitive states was not because the USSR was more powerful than America. Rather it was because the United States as leader of the West was able to construct the world in such a way that other critical issues were either seen as being secondary or were successfully folded into the larger East–West competition.<sup>65</sup> This nesting of issues has not been so easy over the past few years. Here again opinion polls tell a most interesting story. That people in Europe and the United States are together concerned about terrorism is clear. But it is not the only or possibly even the most important thing they are concerned about. In fact, what polls reveal is a hotchpotch of various concerns ranging from rising China, the spread of nuclear weapons, organized crime, through to what many now see as being the biggest danger of all: namely, global warming.<sup>66</sup> Nor should we ignore the potent impact that rising economic problems have had upon transatlantic opinion, especially (and perhaps most critically) in the United States itself. As one of the more innovative US Think Tanks pointed out at the beginning of 2008, “no matter what the issues were yesterday”—and here it was evident they were thinking of foreign policy and the larger war on terror—it was becoming clearer by the day “that the economy” would become “the biggest political issue” in the United States from now on. This was not only likely to impact on transatlantic unity (people who were hurting economically were less likely to be concerned about the views of outsiders). It was also beginning to shape the presidential race itself. Presidential hopefuls might still utter important words about the world. They could hardly do otherwise. But none any longer was prepared to make foreign policy a priority—and for good reason: the American people had in large part lost interest in the narrative that had defined the Bush administration since September 2001.<sup>67</sup>

### Conclusion

In this chapter I have asked and tried to answer a deceptively easy question: namely, whether or not the Atlantic community could be recreated, restored, or revived by possibly the oldest strategic device of all: that is, of having an enemy (or in Schmittian terms) an “other,” standing outside or inside the gates of the *polis* posing a fundamental threat to its continued existence? As I have tried to argue, while the new international conjuncture has clearly changed the world in very important ways, it is most unlikely to recreate some golden age—if ever such existed—of transatlantic unity. This does not

mean, of course, that there are not other equally powerful factors such as shared economic interests, similar values, and overlapping membership of international institutions still holding the West together. Nor is it to ignore completely those areas where there has been concrete cooperation (especially at the intelligence and financial levels) in the wider struggle against terrorism. Still, as I have tried to show, I hope convincingly, the idea of the West has not been rekindled around the idea of an Islamic threat. As Garton Ash has convincingly argued, it is still possible that one day it might and that as result we will see a sharp revival in what he calls the “geopolitical unity” of the West. But this has not happened yet, and, outside an attack of devastating proportions on both sides of the Atlantic, it is unlikely to do so any time soon.<sup>68</sup>

Naturally, critics of this view could, and often do, respond by pointing to NATO’s new collective role in Afghanistan. The more subtle still could also point—and again do—to the fact that both the United States and the European Union now tend to sing from the same political hymn sheet about the need to do something about global terrorism. Indeed, the well publicized EU document dealing with “grand strategy” published in March 2003 mentions terrorism on several occasions. Still one has to exercise some caution here. Take the example of Afghanistan. It is true that the war there has given NATO a new sense of purpose. But it has also exposed some deep fissures too. Indeed, this expanded mission—inconceivable only a short while ago<sup>69</sup>—has revealed deep differences not only between the Americans and the Europeans on the ground,<sup>70</sup> but between the Europeans themselves.<sup>71</sup> The same is true in the broader area of global security. Here differences in outlook persist between a militarily preponderant America and a rather ill-equipped Europe. Furthermore, even when the European Union did seek to develop a new strategic outlook by publishing the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003,<sup>72</sup> far from papering over the divide between the two sides, it only revealed how wide the gap had become. Indeed, the ESS did not even view the world’s major problems as arising from terrorism. Instead it talked at length about globalization. Furthermore, the world order described in ESS seemed to owe more to liberal theories of international politics than it did to an American doctrine of exceptional power. If anything, the ESS appeared to reject altogether the very American notion of unipolarity while insisting that, in an interdependent world where all things were connected, there could be no unilateral solution to any single problem.<sup>73</sup>

Where then does this leave the Atlantic relationship in the future? The answer to this will depend in large part on a whole host of fairly concrete factors other than threats, including in no particular order of importance the changing structure of the Euro-Atlantic economy, the future evolution of Russia, whether or not Turkey gets admitted into the European Union, the role of opinion formers, and—never to be underestimated—which politicians

happen to get elected in either Europe and the United States. It will also depend on what words get uttered about each other and what words do not. But of one thing we can be sure, however: there is no way of returning to some presumed golden past of allied unity using the vehicle of something so ill-defined as an “Islamic threat” to hold the alliance together. This might not spell the “death of the West” as such. However, in the absence of some common purpose, it is reasonable to suggest that the West is likely to become—as it has tended to become overall since the end of the cold war—a more fractious place.

This I conclude would not matter much if it were not for two other things. One is the growing feeling in Europe that what the United States began in terms of declaring a “war” will in the end cause more problems for Europeans with their thirteen million Muslim inhabitants than it will for the USA itself. The fact there have been attacks in Europe and not the United States since 9/11 is at least one measure of the extent to which the United States, with its more integrated Muslim population, and Europe, with its more marginal and increasingly alienated Muslim peoples, could be pushed apart in the future. The other issue concerns the by now irrefutable, but unfortunate, fact for old-style Atlanticists, that trust in the United States and American leadership has plummeted across the European continent, from the rugged fjords of once loyal Norway<sup>74</sup> to that very special floating aircraft carrier standing off the European mainland known as the United Kingdom. This I would suggest could prove critical. Alliances after all do not just happen; they are made. However, they rarely flourish without a sense of direction being provided by an “indispensable nation” whose words are trusted and views respected by those it is trying to gather around it. It is one thing having no uniting enemy. It is bad enough when the risks look as if they are not being shared equally. But when the leader begins to lose the right of command, then we can be sure that the relationship is in deep trouble.<sup>75</sup>

## Notes

1. Irving Howe, *Celebrations and Attacks: Thirty Years of Literary and Cultural Commentary* (London: André Deutsch, 1979), 243.
2. See Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2006).
3. The American “threat” at the beginning of the twentieth century was discussed in a well-known book written by the English journalist W. T. Stead, *The Americanization of the World; or the Trend of the Twentieth Century* (New York and London: Horace Markley, 1901).
4. See John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).
5. I discuss this in Michael Cox, “Another Transatlantic Split? American and European Narratives and the End of the Cold War,” *Cold War History*, 7/1 (2007), 121–46.

6. On America's "historical ambivalence" toward Europe, see John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan and Dean G. Acheson* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
7. Quoted in Christian Locher and Anna Locher (eds.), *Transatlantic Relations at Stake, Aspects of NATO, 1956–1972* (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2006), 10.
8. Robert Kagan's original characterization of America and Europe was initially aired in his influential "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, 113 (June–July 2002). For my own take on Kagan, see Michael Cox, "Martians and Venutians in the New World Order," *International Affairs*, 79/3 (2003), 521–32.
9. See the optimistically titled volumes edited by Gustav Schmidt, *A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, Volume I, II and III* (Houndmill: Palgrave, 2001).
10. For an example of this "crisis" literature, see Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro (eds.), *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq* (New York: McGraw–Hill, 2004).
11. See Ivo Daalder, "Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?," *International Affairs*, 77/3 (July 2001), 553–67.
12. See, e.g., Erik Jones, "Debating the Transatlantic Relationship," *International Affairs*, 80/4 (2004), 595–612.
13. See Michael Cox, "Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia," *European Journal of International Relations*, 11/2 (2005), 203–33; with a reply by Vincent Pouliot, "The Alive and Well Transatlantic Security Community: A Theoretical Reply to Michael Cox," *European Journal of International Relations*, 12/1 (2006), 119–27.
14. See Robert Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs*, 83/2 (Mar.–Apr. 2004).
15. Economic relations between Europe and the United States have normally been taken to be supportive of the relationship. See the relevant chapters in John Peterson and Mark Pollack (eds.), *Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty First Century* (London: Routledge, 2003). For one of the few studies that does not paint the economic picture in such bright hues, see Mario Deaglio, "Drifting Apart: A Study of the Disintegration of the Euro-American Economy," paper presented at Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) 70th Anniversary Conference, Milan, Italy, Feb. 2004.
16. For a useful summary of the arguments, see the last chapter in Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Europe since 1945: From "Empire to Invitation" to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
17. Dana H. Allin, "American Power and Allied Restraint: Lessons of Iraq," *Survival*, 49/1 (Spring 2007), 129, 132.
18. Javier Solana, "The Globe's Most Important Relationship," *Wall Street Journal Europe*, May 2, 2002.
19. Ryan C. Hendricksen, "The Miscalculation of NATO's Death," *Parameters* (Spring 2007), 98–114.
20. Rt Hon. Christopher Patten, "Europe and America—Has the Transatlantic Relationship Run out of Road?," speech at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, Feb. 13, 2004.
21. This is done very well in David M. Andrews (ed.), *The Atlantic Alliance under Stress* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

22. See AHR Forum, "Historical Perspectives on Anti-Americanism," *American Historical Review*, 111/4 (Oct. 2006).
23. For two contrasting sets of findings on how Europeans and Americans view each other and the world, see the less sanguine Craig Kennedy and Marshall M. Boulton, "The Real Transatlantic Gap," *Foreign Policy*, 113 (Nov.–Dec. 2002), 66–74, and the somewhat more optimistic German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2006* (2006).
24. Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time* (London: Allen Lane, 2004).
25. On the different schemes to save the transatlantic relationship, see, amongst others, Douglas K. Bereuter and John Lis, "Broadening the Transatlantic Relationship," *Washington Quarterly*, 27/1 (Winter 2003–4), 147–62; Ronald D. Asmus, "A Progressive Blueprint for Repairing the Trans-Atlantic Relationship," Center for American Progress (2004); James B. Steinberg, "Re-Founding the Transatlantic Relationship," Aspen Institute Italia talk in connection with the June 2003 US–EU Summit; and Richard N. Haass, "Charting a New Course in the Transatlantic Relationship," remarks to the Centre for European Reform, London, June 10, 2002.
26. "Alliances are against, and only derivatively for someone or something... cooperation in alliances is in large part the consequence of conflicts," wrote George Liska in *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 12–13.
27. See Steven Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1987).
28. See Peter W. Rodman, *Drifting Apart? Trends in US–European Relations* (Washington, DC: Nixon Center, 1999).
29. See Vittorio Parsi, *The Inevitable Alliance* (Houndmill: Palgrave, 2005).
30. The term "something worse" to refer to the Soviet threat during the cold war is used by John Lewis Gaddis in his *Surprise, Security and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 66–7.
31. If there had been such unity based on a common understanding of the Soviet threat during the cold war, there would perhaps have been fewer books published at the time arguing that the transatlantic relationship was in disarray, in crisis, or about to collapse. On this see Geir Lundestad (ed.), *No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present and Future* (Houndmill: Macmillan-St Martin's, 1998), 4.
32. For the use of analogy in the later run-up to the war in Iraq, see Jeffrey Record, "The Use and Abuse of History: Munich, Vietnam and Iraq," *Survival*, 49/1 (Spring 2007), 163–80.
33. See Michael Cox, "American Power before and after 11 September: Dizzy with Success?," *International Affairs*, 78/2 (2002), 261–76.
34. "The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today", Bush noted in his diary on the night of September 11, 2001. Quoted in Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 37.
35. Anatol Lieven, "Fighting Terrorism: Lessons from the Cold War," *Policy Brief*, 7 (Oct. 2001) (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1.
36. James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004).



37. Anatol Lieven and John C. Hulsman, "Neo-Conservatives, Liberal Hawks, and the War on Terror," *World Policy Journal* (Fall 2006), 64–74.
38. John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy," *Foreign Policy*, 113 (2002), 50–7.
39. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, 70/1 (Winter 1990–1), 23–33.
40. G. John Ikenberry (ed.), *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).
41. See Michael Cox, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower without a Mission?* (London: Francis Pinter, Chatham House, 1995).
42. Barry Buzan, "Will the 'Global War on Terrorism' be the new Cold War?," *International Affairs*, 82/6 (2006), 1101–18.
43. See Ian Shapiro, *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007).
44. I discuss this in Cox, "American Power before and after 11 September."
45. The book in question is Natan Sharansky and Ron Denner, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* (Green Forest: Balfour Books, 2005).
46. Melvyn Leffler, "9/11 and the Past and Future of American Foreign Policy," *International Affairs*, 79/5 (2003), 1045–63.
47. On emerging anti-Europeanism on the US side, see the relevant sections in Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
48. Bosnia was the testing ground for European resolve, and Europe, it is agreed, failed abysmally. But according to one senior US official at the time—Lawrence Eagleburger—this was not only inevitable: "they will screw it up," he quipped; it would also "teach them a lesson." Quoted in Brendan Sims, *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia* (London: Penguin, 2001), 54.
49. How insignificant all Europeans were to be in Bush's calculations is strongly implied in one of the few Iraqi studies on the war, by Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007). The two key European opponents of the Iraq war—Chirac and Schroeder—are not even mentioned in his very detailed study, while Blair is referred to only four times, once under the mini subheading of "others," where he is discussed (in two lines) as having "abandoned traditional British caution" (p. xvii).
50. "Large numbers of Americans and Europeans agree on the importance of global threats with the largest increase over the year in those who see Islamic fundamentalism as an 'extremely important' threat..." (*Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings, 2006*, 4; see also pp. 7–8).
51. "Fifty six per cent of Americans and Europeans do not feel that the values of Islam are compatible with the values of democracy" (*Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2006*, 4).
52. See the useful findings in Alexander Hoese and Kai Oppermann, "Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation: What Role for Public Opinion?," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 5/1 (2007), 43–61.
53. See Sir Michael Howard, "What's in a Name?: How to Fight Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, 81/1 (Jan.–Feb. 2002), 8–13.

54. See "Abizaid Credited with Popularizing the Term 'Long War,'" *Washington Post*, Feb. 3, 2006. President Bush has also sought to place the enemy in the camp of fascism, hence the now regularly used designation "Islamofascism" to describe jihadists of all shapes and sizes.
55. I discuss these issues in Michael Cox, "Western Military Intelligence, the Soviet Threat and NSC-68: A Reply to Beatrice Heuser," *Review of International Studies*, 18/1 (1992), 75–83.
56. See, e.g., Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
57. For a fine realist attempt to theorize alliances, see Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1997).
58. I discuss this issue in Michael Cox, "Hans J. Morgenthau, Realism, and the Rise and Fall of the Cold War," in Michael C. Williams (ed.), *Realism Reconsidered* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 166–94.
59. Barry Buzan, "Will the 'Global War on Terrorism' be the New Cold War?," *International Affairs*, 82/6 (2006), 1112.
60. By 22% between 2005 and 2006, according to *Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings, 2006*, 4.
61. See, e.g., Simon Jenkins, "They See it here, they See it there, they See Al-Qaeda Everywhere," *Sunday Times* (London), Apr. 29, 2007, 16.
62. Paul Wilkinson, *International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU's Response*, Chaillot Paper, 84 (Paris: ISS, Oct. 2005), 17–18, 24–5.
63. This is documented in detail in Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower, Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Knopf, 2006).
64. See Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, *Islamic Networks: The Pakistan–Afghan Network* (London: C. Hurts & Co., 2004).
65. See Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1984).
66. Stern Review, *The Economics of Climate Change* (London: HM Treasury, 2006).
67. See "As the Economy Screams: Perspectives and Proposals from the Presidential Campaign," *New America Foundation*, Jan. 23, 2008.
68. Garton Ash, *Free World*, 234.
69. "Afghanistan today provides the 'why' for... NATO's continuing transformation. Few would have predicted, even five years ago, that 26 Allies and 11 Partners would support more than 30,000 troops 3,000 miles from alliance territory in making a long-term commitment to the peace and stability of that country" (speech by Victoria Nuland (US Permanent Representative to NATO), Oct. 23, 2006, Brussels, *NATO Review* (Winter 2006)).
70. Though we are told (rather unconvincingly) that the "ISAF Commander meets with his US counterpart for Operation Enduring Freedom every week to coordinate activities... great effort", it concluded, was being "made to ensure maximum synergy between the two operations". See *NATO Briefing: Afghanistan* (Oct. 2006), p. 10.
71. See *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007).
72. European Security Strategy, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', Dec. 12, 2003.

73. For a useful guide to European Security Strategy and its similarity (or otherwise) with the US National Security Strategy Document, see the debate between Alistair Shepherd, Felix Berenskoetter, and Bastian Giegerich, *International Politics*, 43/1 (Feb. 2006), 71–109.
74. See Geir Lundestad, “The United States and Norway, 1905–2000. Allies of a Kind: So Similar, So Different,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 4/2 (2006), 187–210.
75. For some somber reflections on the future of “transatlantia” from one of the bastions of Atlantic relationship, see Charlemagne, “Transatlantic Tensions”, *The Economist*, Apr. 7, 2007.

## 5

# Unilateralism in US Foreign Policy: What Role does America See for Europe?

*G. John Ikenberry*

### Introduction

A paradox lies at the heart of today's West. On the one hand, Americans and Europeans seem no longer to exist as a coherent political community. The old political alliance forged during the cold war is gone. NATO is no longer a site for true strategic consultation. Where America was once a provider of security, many Europeans now see it as a source of insecurity. The Bush administration's invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003 precipitated a crisis of transatlantic relations that revealed deep divisions over fundamental issues of security, order, sovereignty, justice, the use of force, and international law. Yet, on the other hand, by any reasonable world historical measure, the West itself stands triumphant. Western values and organizing logics have spread worldwide. The modernizing world revolves around the institutions of democracy and capitalism that the Atlantic world pioneered. The economic and political governance institutions built in the postwar era by the United States and Europe—although under pressure to reform—remain the organizing framework for the global system. The United States remains in formal alliance partnership with Europe, unchecked by a coalition of balancing states or a superpower wielding a rival universalistic ideology. These are the worst of times but also the best of times.

How do we unravel this seeming paradox? One possibility is that we are witnessing Freud's narcissism of small differences—and, indeed, people with minor differences do often fight harder than people with more profound differences. Another possibility is the distortion of historical perspective. We tend to view today's conflicts in the context of a half-century of extraordinary

cold-war-era interstate cooperation. This creates the misleading view that today's relatively minor and routine disagreements look like a great crisis of Western order. Placed in any other regional or historical context, the recent conflicts between the United States and Europe would be seen as utterly benign—even indications of a healthy and mature political relationship. In this view, it is precisely the deep stability of the West that allows American and European leaders to give such strong voice to their disagreements. A more pessimistic possibility is that we are in fact watching a slow-motion rise of first-order differences that will increasingly divide the West. In one version of this view, America and Europe are emerging as competing producers of world order, each offering a distinct and rival vision. The globalization of the Western system has revealed the tensions and contradictions left buried in the cold-war Atlantic order. The triumph of the West is also its undoing.

These possibilities carry with them very different anticipations of the future of Atlantic relations. Depending on your view, we are witnessing either politics as usual or some sort of grand historical shift of the Atlantic relationship. The West is either a deeply rooted political order entering a brave new era or an outdated security pact on the verge of breakdown. If the Atlantic world is in crisis, this crisis is either leading to the end of the alliance or transforming it into something new. As Samuel Huntington reminds us, crisis can break political orders apart, but it can also lead to settlements, resolutions, innovations, and reforms that create deeper and more durable institutions of political order.<sup>1</sup> Conflict, crisis, breakdown, transformation—these are weigh stations and switching points along grand historical pathways. But what is the pathway of Atlantic order?<sup>2</sup>

The critical issue—one upon which each of these visions of the Atlantic future hinges—is America's evolving orientation toward world order. Is the United States altering its long-standing commitment to multilateralism and rule-based order? If the United States has turned more unilateral in recent years, is this a reflection of the peculiar proclivities of the Bush administration and its Iraq war or is it a reflection of deeper shifts in America and the wider global system? Does the United States need Europe as a global partner? Does it still have incentives to operate alongside Europe within an international order organized around agreed-upon rules and institutions? Or has America's grand strategic orientation turned away from Atlantic partnership and toward looser "special relationships" and coalitions of the willing? How have the failures of the Bush administration created new lessons, incentives, and opportunities to renew and reinvent old Atlantic bargains?

America has always been ambivalent about operating within a rule-based international order. Yet across the twentieth century it was also the leading champion of the rules and institutions that today provide governance of the global system. The question is whether America's traditional ambivalence toward multilateralism has recently turned into resistance. Is America seeking

less rule-based governance precisely at a moment when Europe is seeking more? The answer is that the setting of American foreign policy is shifting—creating more incentive and opportunities for Washington to act unilaterally. But, at the end of the day, the United States can operate as an effective global leader only if it wraps itself in agreed-upon rules and institutions—and to do this it is required to remain tied to Europe in the provisioning of global governance.

In this chapter, I argue that the old postwar logic of liberal hegemonic governance is in crisis. The old bargains, relations, rules, and institutions are under stress. America is less committed to the old logic. But this shift in strategic orientation is rooted in deeper changes in the global system than simply Bush's conservative and neo-conservative inclinations—although Bush's foreign policy has made it worse. What we are watching is a crisis in the liberal international order—and it is this crisis that is being manifest in weakened Atlantic relations. Unipolarity, eroded norms of sovereignty, democratic legitimacy, and new security imperatives have eroded the old bargains and institutions and created a crisis in American-led liberal hegemonic governance. At the same time, there is no good alternative to liberal hegemonic governance. Its alternatives—neoconservative unipolarity and multi-polar balancing—have been discredited or leave everyone less well off. In the aftermath of the Bush era, both the United States and Europe have incentives to reinvent and renew the postwar foundations of the West organized around liberal internationalism.

I make five arguments. First, the United States and Europe did create a coherent and functional political order in the postwar era. During the decades after the Second World War, the United States did not just fight the cold war; it created a liberal international order of multilayered pacts and partnerships that served to open markets, bind democracies together, and create a trans-regional security community. The United States provided security, championed mutually agreed-upon rules and institutions, and led in the management of an open world economy, and in return other states affiliated with and supported the United States as it led the larger order. It was an American-led hegemonic order with liberal characteristics. There is still no alternative model of international order that is better suited to American interests or stable global governance.

Second, long-term shifts in the global system have altered the circumstances in which the Atlantic order operates—and these shifts have eroded the old bargains and institutions. The globalization of the world economy set new players and issues into motion. The rise of new security threats eroded the logic of alliance and security partnership. The rise of American unipolarity also created new discontents. America became the pre-eminent global state unchecked by traditional great-power balancing forces. After September 11, America showed itself to be not the satisfied protector of the “old order” but a

threatened and insecure power bent on transforming the global system—and it resisted the bargains and constraints of its own postwar order. As a result, in the first years of the new century, the character of “rule” in world politics has been thrown into question. America appears less willing to play the liberal hegemonic leader. There has emerged a crisis of governance.

Third, Bush foreign policy has taken advantages of these shifts to pursue a radical break with the old liberal hegemonic order. But it has not worked and it has made the crisis of liberal hegemonic governance worse. The Bush unipolar approach to security and order has severely eroded America’s global position—and endangered its ability to lead and facilitate collective action. This erosion of America’s authority has real costs for the United States.

Fourth, out of this crisis of governance new forms of cooperation are taking shape. The post-cold-war era of American-led order seems to be giving way to a new pluralism of governance. Old multilateral institution—the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank—are competing with other modes of governance. These include less formal mechanisms—such as the G-20 and other coalitions—and regional organizations. How this new system of pluralistic governance and fragmented authority will operate is still unclear. In this sense, we are currently living between eras when the old logic of order is eroding but the new logic is not yet fully evident. The Atlantic order will have a less distinct and autonomous position within this larger pluralistic governance system.

Finally, in the evolving system of global governance, incentives and opportunities will grow—not decline—for the United States to act multilaterally and commit itself to rule-based international order. These incentives will lead the United States into more—not less—cooperation with Europe. These incentives include straightforward functional incentives of problem solving, the search for hegemonic legitimacy, political identity incentives, and the creation of mechanisms to embed a rising China. Any sustainable American foreign policy will need to return to the older logic of multilateral governance, cooperative security, and Atlantic cooperation. In the background, the United States will need to renegotiate and renew its grand bargains with Europe and others. In these bargains, the United States will need to signal a new willingness to restrain and commit its power, accommodate rising states, and operate within reconfigured and agreed-upon global rules and institutions.

Over the longer term, the crisis of the Atlantic order might be seen as a historical passage that other political orders have traveled. Old rules and institutions come under pressure as the underlying array of actors and interests evolve. The old bargains and settled arrangements inevitably need to give way to new circumstances. That the United States and Europe seem to be able to do this without resort to balance-of-power politics or threats of force is itself an indication of the deep character of that order. The Atlantic order created rules and institutions for the United States and Europe to “do business,” but it also

set the stage for the globalization of the world economy and the integration of other regions and newly independent countries into that order. The Atlantic order became, in effect, a global liberal order. The crisis of the West is in this sense a crisis of success. The globalization and integration of countries and peoples into the old Atlantic system have created a new and enlarging reality that will require new governance arrangements—bargains, rules, and institutions—that go beyond those crafted by the United States and Europe. It is in this process that the Atlantic order will be recreated and reinvented.

### The Atlantic Political Order

To begin, it is useful to see US–European relations as a distinct political order. The postwar origins of this Atlantic political order are well known.<sup>3</sup> Emerging out of the turmoil of the world wars and depression of the first half of the twentieth century, it took coherent shape during the cold war. It is held together by military alliance, economic integration, shared values, and networks of political and diplomatic governance. Democracy, capitalism, and a common civilizational heritage also give it shape. This sense of an Atlantic political community was evoked in Walter Lippmann’s observation in 1943 that the ocean that separated the United States and Europe is actually an “inland sea” around which a common people live.<sup>4</sup>

But the Atlantic political order is not just a common political space that sprang naturally to life. It was a constructed political order, built around American hegemony, mutual interests, political bargains, and agreed-upon rules and norms. The United States, as Geir Lundestad puts it, “set up a world of its own.”<sup>5</sup> The blueprints of this political order were not as formal or specific as, say, the founding documents and visions of the European political community. But the ideas of an Atlantic political community do exist in a sequence of diplomatic acts: the Atlantic Charter of 1941, the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, the UN Charter of 1945, the Marshall Plan of 1947, and the Atlantic Pact of 1949. In different ways, these acts laid down principles, institutions, and commitments that formed the foundations of Atlantic order.<sup>6</sup>

The core of the Atlantic political order is the NATO security pact. It provided the most formal and durable link between the United States and Europe. But the alliance—and the larger array of formal and informal economic and political institutions—are not simply products of the cold war. The political construction of the Atlantic political order after 1945 was facilitated by the visions and principles of Western order that predated and emerged semi-independently of the cold war. Even the birth of the Atlantic pact in April 1949 had a positive vision behind it reflected in British Foreign Minister Ernst Bevin’s call in December 1948 for a “spiritual union” of the Western democracies. That is, NATO was part of a Western community and not just a



military alliance. John Foster Dulles made the same point in 1954 when he argued that the major emphasis of the Atlantic alliance was “on cooperation for something rather than merely against something.”<sup>7</sup> It is this democratic community impulse that must be recalled when searching for the underlying bases of Atlantic political order.

In effect, the West would be tied together in a cooperative security order. This was a very important departure from past security arrangements within the Atlantic area. The idea was that Europe and the United States would be part of a single security system. Such a system would insure that the democratic great powers would not go back to the dangerous game of strategic rivalry and balance-of-power politics. It helped, of course, to have an emerging cold war with the Soviet Union to generate this cooperative security arrangement. But the goal of cooperative security was implicit in the other elements of Western order. Without the cold war, it is not clear that a formal alliance would have emerged as it did. Probably it would not have taken on such an intense and formal character. But a security relationship between Europe and the United States that lessened the incentives for these states to engage in balance-of-power politics was needed and probably would have been engineered. A cooperative security order—embodied in a formal alliance institution—insured that the power of the United States would be rendered more predictable. Power would be caged in institutions, thereby making American power more reliable and connected to Europe and to East Asia.

This Atlantic order is built on two historic bargains that the United States has made with Europe. One is a realist bargain—and grows out its cold-war grand strategy. The United States provides its European partners with security protection and access to American markets, technology, and supplies within an open-world economy. In return, these countries agree to be reliable partners who provide diplomatic, economic, and logistical support for the United States as it leads the wider Western postwar order. The result has been to tie America and Europe together—to make peace “indivisible” across the Atlantic. Binding security ties also provides channels for consultation and joint decision making. Common security threats gave shape to unprecedented security cooperation embodied in the NATO alliance.<sup>8</sup>

The other is a liberal bargain that addresses the uncertainties of American asymmetrical power. East Asian and European states agree to accept American leadership and operate within an agreed-upon political-economic system. In return, the United States opens itself up and binds itself to its partners. In effect, the United States builds an institutionalized coalition of partners and reinforces the stability of these long-term mutually beneficial relations by making itself more “user friendly”—that is, by playing by the rules and creating ongoing political processes with these other states that facilitate consultation and joint decision making. The United States makes its power safe for the world. and in return Europe—and the wider world—agrees to

live within this American-led system. The institutional structure of the order provided mechanisms for conveying reassurance and signals of restraint and commitment on the part of the United States, embedding American hegemonic power inside of a community of democracies.

The Atlantic political order also allowed for the United States and Europe to pursue their own, semi-independent political projects. The American project was the building and management of a wider hegemonic system—alliances, open markets, special relationships, multilateral regimes, regional protectorates, and so forth. American power, geography, ideals, and history animated this global ambition. So too did the geopolitical realities of the bipolar cold-war struggle. Europe was an essential partner in many of these endeavors. But America essentially pursued a separate, non-Atlanticist foreign-policy agenda in its dealings with Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

The European project was the unification and integration of Europe. The United States initially played a direct supporting role in helping to launch the European integration project. The United States insisted that a European security grouping (the Brussels Pact) be established before it would enter into a North Atlantic security commitment. The United States also channeled Marshall Plan funds to Europe in a way that was contingent on increased European economic cooperation. But, as the agenda of European integration took off, the United States largely stepped aside and allowed Europe to chart its own course.

Implicit in this vision of the West was the view that the West itself could serve at the foundation and starting point for a larger postwar order. The West was not fundamentally a geographical region with fixed borders. Rather it was an idea—a universal organizational form that could expand outward driven by the spread of liberal democratic government and principles of conduct. In this sense, the postwar West was seen as a sort of molecular complex that can multiply and expand outward.

Out of these ideas, institutions, and bargains, the United States created a liberal hegemonic order that has been at the center of world politics for half a century. It is an order that is not simply organized around the decentralized cooperation of like-minded democracies—although it is premised on a convergence of interests and values among the democratic capitalist great powers. It is an engineered political order that reconciles power and hierarchy with cooperation and legitimacy. It is a political order in which the United States is first among equals—but it is not an imperial system. The United States dominates the order, but that domination is made relatively acceptable to other states by the liberal features of this order: the United States supports and operates within an agreed-upon array of rules and institutions; the United States legitimates its leadership through the provision of public goods; and other states in the order have access to and “voice opportunities” within it—that is, there are reciprocal processes of communication and influence.

The conflict between the United States and Europe can be seen, at least in part, as a breakdown of these institutions, political processes, and great historical bargains. The security bargain has eroded in the aftermath of the cold war, even as the NATO alliance has expanded into Eastern Europe. American commitment to norms of consultation and multilateral cooperation has also been thrown into question. In the meantime, the American project and the European project seem to coexist less comfortably than in the past.

The crisis of the postwar order is manifest in the erosion of these basic features of Atlantic relations and liberal global governance. The United States appears less willing to sponsor and operate within rule-based institutions. The United States appears less willing to provide public goods in the context of leading an order built around openness and cooperative security. The United States appears less willing to consult, accommodate, and respond to the interests of its allies and partners. The question is: how deeply rooted are the causes of this erosion of the old American-led Atlantic order?

## The Crisis of American Liberal Hegemony

The immediate source of crisis is the Bush administration itself, which signaled from the beginning that it did not want to operate within the old postwar liberal order. This was signaled early in the administration by its resistance to a wide array of multilateral agreements, including the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Germ Weapons Convention, and the Program of Action on Illicit Trade in Small and Light Arms. It also unilaterally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which many experts regard as the cornerstone of modern arms control agreements. Unilateralism, of course, is not a new feature of American foreign policy. In every historical era, the United States has shown a willingness to reject treaties, violate rules, ignore allies, and use military force on its own. But many observers see today's unilateralism as practiced by the Bush administration as something much more sweeping—not an occasional ad hoc policy decision but a new strategic orientation, or what one pundit calls the “new unilateralism.”<sup>9</sup>

The most systematic rejection of the old logic of liberal order came with the 2002 National Security Doctrine and the Iraq war, articulating a vision of America as a unipolar state positioned above and beyond the rules and institutions of the global system, providing security and enforcing order. It was a strategy of global rule in which the United States would remain a military power in a class by itself, thereby “making destabilizing arms races pointless and limiting rivalry to trade and other pursuit.” American pre-eminent power would, in effect, put an end to five centuries of great-power rivalry. In doing so, it would take the lead in identifying and attacking threats—preemptively

if necessary. America was providing the ultimate global public good. In return, the United States would ask to be less encumbered by rules and institutions of the old order. It would not sign the landmine treaty, because American troops were uniquely at risk in war zones around the world. It would not sign the ICC Treaty, because Americans would be uniquely at risk of political prosecutions. In effect, the United States was to become the unipolar provider of global security and order.

The leading edge of this new conception of America's role and rule in the world concerned the use of force. The Bush administration's security doctrine was new and sweeping. The United States announced a right to use force anywhere in the world against "terrorists with global reach." It would do so largely outside the traditional alliance system through coalitions of the willing. The United States would take "anticipatory action" when it itself determined the use of force was necessary. Because these actions would be taken to oppose terrorists or overthrow despotic regimes, they would be self-legitimizing. Countries were either "with us or against us"—or, as Bush announced, "no nation can be neutral in this conflict." Moreover, this new global security situation was essentially permanent—it was not just a temporary emergency. There could be no final victory or peace settlement in this new war, so there would be no return to normalcy.<sup>10</sup>

The point is that the Bush administration was, in effect, announcing unilaterally the new rules of the global security order. It was not seeking a new global consensus on the terms of international order and change, and it was not renegotiating old bargains. The United States was imposing the rules of the new global order, rules that would be ratified not by the support of others but by the lurking presence of American power. This grand strategic move was a more profound shift than is generally appreciated. The Bush administration was not simply acting "a little bit more unilateral" than previous administrations. In rhetoric, doctrine, and ultimately in the Iraq war, the United States was articulating a new logic of global order. The old liberal hegemonic rules, institutions, and bargains were now quaint artifacts of an earlier and less threatening era.

In the background, longer-term shifts in the global system provided the permissive circumstances for the Bush administration's big doctrinal move. The shift from cold-war bipolarity to American unipolarity has triggered a geopolitical adjustment process that runs through the 1990s and continues today. Unipolarity has given the United States more discretionary resources—and, without a peer competitor or a great-power balancing coalition arrayed around it, the external constraints on American action are reduced. But, with the end of the cold war, other states are not dependent on the United States for protection as much and a unifying common threat has been eliminated. So old bargains, alliance partnerships, and shared strategic visions are thrown into question. At the very least, the shift in power advantages in favor of the

United States would help explain why it might want to renegotiate older rules and institutions.

But, more profoundly, unipolarity may be creating conditions that reduce the willingness of the United States to support and operate within a loosely rule-based order. If America is less dependent on other states for its own security, it has reduced incentives to tie itself to other states through restraints entailed in alliances and multilateral agreements. Incentives also increase for other states to free ride on a unipolar America. Under these circumstances, the United States may indeed act unilaterally in ways it did not in the past—or, in the absence of willing partners, its own willingness to provide hegemonic leadership may decline.<sup>11</sup>

The erosion of international norms of state sovereignty is also putting pressure on the old liberal hegemonic order. This is the quiet revolution in world politics: the rise of rights within the international community to intervene within states to protect individuals against the abuses of their own governments. The contingent character of sovereignty was pushed further after September 11 in the intervention in Afghanistan—where outside military force, used to topple a regime that actively protected terrorist attackers, was seen as an acceptable act of self-defense. But the erosion of state sovereignty has not been accompanied by the rise of new norms about how sovereignty transgressing interventions should proceed. The “international community” has the right to act inside troubled and threatening states—but who precisely is the international community? The problem is made worse by the rise of unipolarity. Only the United States really has the military power systematically to engage in large-scale uses of force around the world. The United Nations has no troops or military capacity of its own. The problem of establishing legitimate international authority grows.

The shift in the “security problem” away from great-power war to transnational dangers such as terrorism, disease, and insecurity generated within weak states also compounds the problem of legitimate authority inherent in the rise of unipolarity. If intervention into the affairs of weak and hostile states in troubled regions of the world is the new security frontier, the problem of who speaks for the international community and the establishment of legitimate rules on the use of force multiply. America’s unipolar military capabilities are both in demand and deeply controversial.

So the rise of unipolarity brought with it a shift in the underlying logic of order and rule in world politics. In a bipolar or multipolar system, powerful states “rule” in the process of leading a coalition of states in balancing against other states. When the system shifts to unipolarity, this logic of rule disappears. Power is no longer based on balancing and equilibrium but on the predominance of one state. This is new and different—and potentially threatening to weaker and secondary states. As a result, the power of the leading state is thrown into the full light of day. Unipolar power itself becomes

a “problem” in world politics. As John Gaddis argues, American power during the cold war was accepted by other states because there was “something worse” over the horizon.<sup>12</sup> With the rise of unipolarity, that “something worse” disappears.

Taken together, American power and a functioning global governance system have become disconnected. In the past, the United States provided global “services”—such as security protection and support for open markets—which made other states willing to work with rather than resist American power. The public-goods provision tended to make it worthwhile for these states to endure the day-to-day irritations of American foreign policy. But the trade-off seems to have shifted. Today, the United States appears to be providing fewer public goods, while at the same time the irritations associated with American dominance appear to be growing.

It might be useful to think of this dynamic this way: the United States is unique in that it is simultaneously both the provider of global governance—through what has tended in the past to be the exercise of liberal hegemony—and a great power that pursues its own national interest. America’s liberal hegemonic role is manifest when it champions the World Trade Organization (WTO), engages in international rule and regime creation, or reaffirms its commitment to cooperative security in Asia and Europe. Its great-power role is manifest, for example, when it seeks to protect its domestic steel or textile industry. When it acts as a liberal hegemon, it is seeking to lead or manage the global system of rules and institutions; when it is acting as a national great power, it is seeking to respond to domestic interests and its relative power position. My point is that, today, these two roles—liberal hegemon and traditional great power—are increasingly in conflict.<sup>13</sup>

### **The Future of Atlantic Order**

American relations with Europe have suffered because of a combination of a shifting global landscape and the post-9/11 national-security strategy of the United States. Unipolarity and eroded norms of sovereignty give the United States capacities and a warrant to project power across the world. At the same time, the Bush administration’s resistance to international rules and institutions, doctrine of regime change, and unilateralism exacerbate worries about American power. In past decades, the United States was, in effect, the keeper of the rules of governance of the global system. It is now widely seen as the revisionist superpower that is deeply disrespectful of global rules and institutions.

It is not that the Bush administration is a “little bit more unilateral” than past American administrations that troubles the world. It is that America has seemingly forfeited its leadership position as the steward of the rules

and institutions of governance. It is this crisis of liberal hegemony that is unfolding today. The Atlantic order—embedded as it is within this liberal hegemonic system—is suffering as a result. Europeans want more liberal global governance, while the United States seems to want less—perhaps none. This is the fundamental problem behind the divisions that beset Atlantic relations.

I have argued that the sources of erosion of the old liberal hegemonic order run deeper than the Bush administration and its post-9/11 foreign policy. Yet the United States does have an array of incentives to pursue its interests through some sort of updated and revised system of multilateral governance. One set of incentives relates to the re-establishment of America's leadership position—to do this will require a return to the logic of liberal hegemony. Another set of incentives relates to the efficient pursuit of its interests—that is, there are growing functional incentives for the United States to operate within multilateral, rule-based arrangements. There are also incentives that relate to burden sharing, the rise of China, and American political identity that provide pressures for the United States to return to its more traditional postwar approach to global order. In each of these ways, the United States will find circumstances where it will want to renew and update the Atlantic order. We can look more closely at these sets of incentives, which provide a setting for an American return to some sort of updated liberal international governance.

First, the alternatives to some sort of global system of liberal governance have been tried and discredited. The Bush administration's neoconservative unilateral strategy has failed—and failed spectacularly. In pursuing a strategy of unipolar dominance, the United States has lost its authority and legitimacy as the leader of the system. The world has pushed back. The United States has the capacity to dominate but not the legitimacy to rule—it has power but not authority. Peoples and countries around the world have rejected the Bush administration vision of global order—a vision where the United States stands above other states and above the rules and institutions of the system providing security and order.<sup>14</sup> The Bush administration has led the United States into a crisis of order that can be resolved only by tacking back toward a more liberal internationalist orientation.

At the same time, the European strategy—or perhaps it is better described as the Chirac strategy—has also failed. This is the strategy of multipolar soft balancing. In this strategy, Europe seeks to build itself into a rival center of power that is at least partially defined in opposition to the United States. This strategy has failed for several reasons. One is that Europe itself is not sufficiently united around it to make it work—nor are European governments willing to assume the long-term financial and political costs that this strategy entails. On an entire range of issues, the United States and Europe must work together, so this strategy is essentially unworkable.

What we have witnessed since 2001 is not simply the crisis of American-European relations but the failure of alternatives to Atlantic order. The Bush and Chirac visions have both had some political attractions, respectively, in Washington and Europe—but they are hugely costly strategies and they do not seem to work. Sometimes the virtues on a strategy—in this case liberal internationalist governance—are revealed by the failures and liabilities of the alternatives.

Second, to re-establish American hegemonic leadership, the United States will need to return to support for multilateral, rule-based governance. Under conditions of unipolarity and eroded sovereignty, the United States can lead only if it finds ways to reassure other states and bind itself to the wider international community. If American power is to regain its lost authority, it will need to be reinserted into a reformed system of agreed-upon global rules and institutions. It will need to send an unmistakable signal to the rest of the world—that it is again committing itself to promoting and operating within a rule-based international order. A rule-based international order does circumscribe the way power is exercised—and it does, to some extent, reduce America's autonomy and freedom of action. But, in return, the United States buys itself a more predictable and legitimate international order. By getting other states to operate within a set of multilateral rules and institutions, the United States reduces its need continuously to pressure and coerce other states to follow America's lead. When the United States makes itself a global rule-maker, other states become less concerned with resisting American power and more concerned with negotiating over the frameworks of cooperation. Today, American unipolarity is associated with the erosion of a global system of rules and institutions. This association is not inevitable. The United States can turn itself—as it did in the 1940s—into a rule-producer, and its authority will increase accordingly.

Third, the failure of the Iraq war makes clear that the United States needs to look for ways to make decisions on the use of force within wider collective bodies, particularly the United Nations and NATO. America's near-monopoly on the use of force is a worry felt around the world. To the extent that this military power is channeled through widely respected multilateral bodies, the resulting uses of force are likely to be seen as legitimate. Ideally, the United States should try to gain UN Security Council approval for its use-of-force decisions, gaining the legitimacy that flows from this global venue. But practical political constraints on getting the United Nations to make supportive and timely decisions gives the United States incentives to look for collective approval from other bodies. Among the alternatives, NATO—which embodies the security interests and capabilities of the major Western democracies—is the most promising.

In committing itself to making strategic military decisions within NATO, the United States would be making a basic bargain with its European partners.



The United States opens itself up in various ways to the views of other states and in return it gets their cooperation and the legitimacy that follows. The United States gives up some policy autonomy but gets the benefits of other states contributing to the campaign. As a formal organization, NATO provides the mechanisms to engage in strategic planning and aggregate military capacities. As an informal mechanism, NATO provides a venue for consultation. Washington, in effect, says to others: our door is open, please come in and make your case. In the end, the United States will decide on its own and do what it wants. But it creates a political process where other states get involved in transgovernmental pulling and hauling—and they are at least given the opportunity to influence Washington policy.

In binding itself to other states, the United States makes the exercise of unipolar power more acceptable to the outside world. Robert Kagan has argued that, to regain its lost legitimacy, the United States needs to return to its postwar bargain: giving some European voice over American policy in exchange for European support. The United States, Kagan points out, “should try to fulfill its part of the transatlantic bargain by granting Europeans some influence over the exercise of its power—provided that, in return, Europeans wield that influence wisely.”<sup>15</sup> This is the logic that informed American security cooperation with its European and East Asian partners during the cold war. It is a logic that can be renewed today to help make unipolarity more acceptable.

Fourth, the emerging economic, political, and security issues that both Europe and the United States will confront can be pursued only through complex and sustained forms of functional collaboration. NATO’s role in Afghanistan is an example. Neither the United States nor Europe alone is willing—or even capable—of sustaining a long-term operation in this troubled country. Yet the security stakes are high for both sides. NATO provides precisely the sort of collaborative mechanism needed for this circumstance—capacities are pooled and burdens are shared. On a wider range of soft security challenges—where peace keeping and state building are the principle focus—America and Europe can achieve their goals more effectively if they work together. Each has competence and capacities that complement each other and burden sharing makes these operations more sustainable.

More generally, in a globalizing world, the United States and Europe have growing—not declining—incentives to compose their differences and coordinate their policies. The more economically interconnected that states become, the more dependent they are for the realization of their objectives on the actions of other states. “As interdependence rises,” Robert Keohane argues, “the opportunity costs of not coordinating policy increase, compared with the costs of sacrificing autonomy as a consequence of making binding agreements.” Rising economic interdependence is one of the great hallmarks of the contemporary international system. Over the postwar era, states have actively

and consistently sought to open markets and reap the economic, social and technological gains that derive from integration into the world economy. If this remains true in the years ahead, it is easy to predict that the demands for multilateral agreements—even and perhaps especially by the United States—will increase and not decrease.

The American postwar commitment to a system of multilateral economic rules and institutions can be understood in this way. As the world's dominant state, the United States championed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—and the Bretton Woods institutions—as a way of locking in other countries to an open world economy that would ensure massive economic gains for itself. But to get these states to organize their postwar domestic orders around an open world economy—and accept the political risks and vulnerabilities associated with openness—the United States had to signal that it too would play by the rules and not exploit and abandon these weaker countries. The postwar multilateral institutions facilitated this necessary step. As the world economy and trading system have expanded over the decades, this logic has continued. This is reflected in the WTO, which replaced the GATT in 1995, and embodies an expansive array of legal-institutional rules and mechanisms. In effect, the United States demands an expanding and ever-more complex international economic environment, but to get other states to support it the United States must itself become more embedded in this system of rules and institutions.

Finally, embedding rising states. The rise of China—and Greater Asia—is perhaps the seminal drama of our time. In the decades to come, America's unipolar power will give way to a more bipolar, multipolar, or decentralized distribution of power. China will most likely be a dominant state and the United States will need to yield to it in various ways. The national-security question for America to ask today is: what sorts of investments in global institutional architecture do I want to make now so that the coming power shifts will adversely impact me the least? That is, what sorts of institutional arrangements do I want to have in place to protect my interests when I am less powerful? This is a sort of neo-Rawlsian question that should inform American strategic decision making.

The answer to this neo-Rawlsian question would seem to be twofold. One is that the United States should try to embed the foundations of the Western-oriented international system so deeply that China has overwhelming incentives to integrate into it rather than to oppose and overturn it. Those American strategists who fear a rising China the most should be ultra-ambitious liberal institution builders. The United States should compose its differences with Europe and renew joint commitments to alliance and multilateral global governance. The more that China faces not just the United States but a united West, the better. The more that China faces not just a united West, but the entire world of capitalist democracies in the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD), the better. This is not to argue that China should face a grand counterbalancing alliance against it. Rather, China should face a complex and deeply integrated global system—one that is so encompassing and deeply entrenched that it essentially has no choice but to join it and seek to prosper within it. Indeed, the United States should take advantage of one of the great virtues of liberal hegemony—namely, that it is easy to join and hard to overturn. The layers of institutions and channels of access provide relatively easy entry points for China to join the existing international order.<sup>16</sup> Now is precisely the wrong historical moment for the United States to be uprooting and disassembling its own liberal hegemonic order.

## Conclusion

The Atlantic political order has just passed through a dramatic moment. Serious observers argue that the essential character of that order—forged after the Second World War—is at risk. Some see the conflict between the United States and Europe over Iraq and over the rules and institutions of international order as part of a longer-term breakdown and dissolution of the Atlantic order. Europe and America will not disappear, but the interests, identities, and institutions that give them their essential character as a functioning political order are shifting.

Conflict is inherent in political orders, whether those orders are domestic or international. How conflict is managed, channeled, and resolved tells us a great deal about the character of the political order itself. The recent crisis in US–European relations was very real and consequential. But the long-term impact of this crisis is likely to push the Atlantic political order in new directions—to alter and loosen its older postwar rules, institutions, and bargains. The Western order may simply adapt to a new array of interests and power realities that were brought into play by the recent crisis. Or it may be transformed into something strikingly different. How the lessons of the recent crisis are understood by the next generation of leaders and the wider global shifts within which Atlantic relations are embedded will have a great deal of influence on the developmental trajectory of the West.

The crisis that befell the Atlantic countries in the first years of the twenty-first century—capped by the clash over the Iraq war—brought to an end the old era of Western order. But it was a particular type of crisis. It was not a crisis in which the old forces of anarchy and power politics reasserted themselves and destroyed the “liberal project” that had flourished in the hands of American and European partners in the postwar era. In many ways, it was the opposite: it was the success of the liberal project—the unleashing of global forces and the growing integration of the wider global system into

the West—that brought the crisis to a head. The realities that shape the conduct of Atlantic relations had shifted and become truly global. The West, in essence, really lost relevance as a unit for governance. New countries—and non-Western rising powers—were increasingly part of the system in which the United States and Europe operated. It is the way that the United States and Europe cope with this expanding scale and scope of world politics that will shape the logic and politics of international order in the new century.

### Notes

1. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).
2. See G. John Ikenberry, "Introduction: Explaining Crisis and Change in Atlantic Relations," in Jeff Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse (eds.), *The End of the West? Exploring the Deep Structures of the Transatlantic Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).
3. See G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
4. Walter Lippmann, *American Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1943).
5. Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation: The United States and Europe, 1945–1952," *Journal of Peace Research*, 23/3 (1986), 264.
6. A wide-ranging literature exists that explores the political, economic, and intellectual foundations of the postwar Atlantic order. See, e.g., Robert Strassz-Hupe et al., *Building the Atlantic World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); James Robert Huntley, *Uniting the Democracies: Institutions of the Emerging Atlantic–Pacific System* (New York: New York University Press, 1980); Harold van B. Cleveland, *The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Richard Gardner, *Sterling–Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956); and Robert A. Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
7. Quoted in Mary N. Hampton, "NATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany, and the Wilsonian Impulse," *Security Studies*, 4/3 (Spring 1995), 625.
8. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
9. Charles Krauthammer, "The New Unilateralism," *Washington Post*, June 8, 2001, A29.
10. These features of the Bush doctrine are discussed in Ian Shapiro, *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
11. See Robert Jervis, "The Remaking of a Unipolar World," *Washington Quarterly*, 29/2 (2006), 7–19; and G. John Ikenberry, "Global Security Trap," *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, 1/2 (Sept. 2006).

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12. John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 66–7.
13. See G. John Ikenberry, “A Weaker World,” *Prospect Magazine* (Nov. 2005).
14. Recent opinion polls from around the world reveal this changed reality. In a summary of these results, the report indicates: “A multinational poll finds that publics around the world reject the idea that the United States should play the role of preeminent world leader. Most publics say the United States plays the role of world policeman more than it should, fails to take their country’s interests into account and cannot be trusted to act responsibly” (The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org, “World Publics Reject US Role as the World Leader,” Apr. 18, 2007).
15. Robert Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, 83/2 (Mar. 2004), 86.
16. See G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China, Power Transitions, and Western Order,” in Robert Ross (ed.), *The Rise of China* (forthcoming).

## 6

# The US Changing Role and Europe's Transatlantic Dilemmas: Toward an EU Strategic Autonomy?

*Frédéric Bozo*

### Introduction

During the cold war and in its immediate aftermath, the transatlantic relationship was premised on two major features of US grand strategy: Europe was its centerpiece and multilateralism its privileged modality. Yet the past decade has been one of sea change. Starting in the late 1990s, the USA showed a declining interest in European security and a rising preoccupation with global threats. At the same time, it proved increasingly impatient with international institutions and tempted by unilateralism. These evolutions have been both revealed and catalyzed by the major crises that have occurred in the period, from Kosovo in 1999, to the terrorist attacks of 2001, and of course Iraq in 2003. Although the past few years have been characterized by a quieter international environment and more benign US policies, the very foundations of transatlantic relations have been shaken. How have the Europeans reacted? Have they perpetuated the model of dependence on the USA that had prevailed during the cold war and immediate post-cold-war eras in the name of the *Primat* of transatlantic relations? Or have they sought to augment their own role in order to compensate for the US disengagement from Europe and to gain influence over US global policies, moving toward a genuine strategic autonomy and a redefined Euro-American alliance?

The argument offered here goes clearly in the second direction. As long as the essentials of US policies remained unchanged, the Europeans would not—and could not—contemplate strategic autonomy. But, with the US engagement in Europe waning and America's unilateralist temptations rising, the Europeans have undertaken to make the European Union a political-military

actor in its own right, in particular—though by no means exclusively—through the development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), thus beginning to break with a half century of strategic effacement. To make this point, the chapter starts with a narrative of what has changed in US policies over the past decade as seen *from a European point of view*. It then examines the way in which the Europeans have dealt with the US disengagement from Europe. It argues that the old dilemma, which had long prevented them from compensating for America's diminishing commitment to European security for fear of precipitating a US withdrawal, has essentially been overcome in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. It then looks at how Europeans have reacted to the rise of US global unilateralist tendencies, in particular in the wake of the events of 2001 and the Iraqi crisis in 2003. A new dilemma has appeared: how can Europe assert its vision and interests without fueling these same tendencies and jeopardizing the transatlantic relationship? The chapter argues that this new "global" dilemma remains substantial today, but that the Europeans, beyond persisting differences among them, have *begun* to choose Europeanism rather than Atlanticism in order to solve it. The chapter concludes on some forward-looking thoughts.

## The USA and Europe: A Decade of Change

As seen from Europe and from the vantage point of 2007, the magnitude of changes that have occurred over the past decade in America's international role and in US–Europe relations is unprecedented since 1947. Throughout the cold war, America's posture vis-à-vis Europe derived from two sets of assumptions. First, although its agenda was of course global, the USA saw the old continent as an absolute strategic priority. America essentially guaranteed the defense of Europe's Western part irrespective of its often unsuccessful attempts at eliciting its allies' support beyond Europe. Second, the USA's international role was shaped by the idea and practice of multilateralism on the global level and in transatlantic relations. While US unilateral temptations often surfaced, they did not threaten the foundations of the international system as a whole, which, in any case, rested mostly on the organizing logic of the cold war, nor those of the Atlantic alliance, which also held together thanks to the cement of the Soviet threat. In addition, the USA, in spite of the irritants generated by European integration, was fully committed to the emergence of a unified Europe and of a true US–Europe partnership, at least in the long term. In short, the US role toward Europe rested on two cornerstones: the scope of the transatlantic relationship, which was mostly European; and its spirit and functioning, which were essentially multilateral.<sup>1</sup>

The events of 1989–91 could have led to a prompt redefinition. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, European preoccupations could have

become second to global ones in American eyes. Moreover, the end of the cold war could have triggered an upsurge of unilateralism in America's global role and attitudes toward Europe. Yet this did not happen—at least not immediately. The reasons are clear in retrospect. First, if the *defense* of Western Europe was no longer a priority, Europe's *security* at large continued to be one as seen from Washington. The Soviet threat, in essence, was replaced by the more diffused yet pressing risks of European instability. Those risks, in turn, called for avoiding a precipitous withdrawal from Europe after the end of the cold war: "Our first requirement", wrote former president George H. W. Bush and his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, "was to prevent yet another repetition of the turmoil which had beset Europe in the twentieth century," which meant that the USA "had to continue to play a significant role in European security."<sup>2</sup> A fundamental choice was made, in other words, to keep America a "European power"—a choice soon validated by the outbreak of war in ex-Yugoslavia. The second factor of continuity in the US role in the early post-cold war was the enduring importance of multilateralism in its global and European strategies. On the global level, the Gulf War of 1991 was waged under the aegis of the UN and it led to Bush's call for a "new world order." On the European level, Atlantic multilateralism remained the privileged mode of America's relationship with, and involvement in, Europe, as reflected in Secretary James Baker's call for a "new Atlanticism."<sup>3</sup> Quite logically, the corollary was the continuation of the USA's historic support to European construction, then being relaunched by France and Germany, and the maintenance of the long-term objective of a Euro-American partnership of "equals."

To be sure, there were growing signs, in this early post-cold-war period, of a reappraisal of the US role in the international system in general and toward Europe in particular. By the mid-1990s—the end of the war in Bosnia in 1995 was, in retrospect, a turning point—questions were beginning to arise as to the durability of the Euro-American status quo. Were not US wider concerns (the Middle East and the Gulf, of course, were already high on the agenda after the first Iraq war) going to take precedence over a European situation that now seemed under control, and would not the global agenda increasingly influence the transatlantic relationship as a result of Washington's growing determination to obtain European support to US policies beyond Europe? And would not unilateralist temptations more and more influence US international policies in general and US policies toward Europe in particular as a result of America's now undisputed status as the sole superpower?<sup>4</sup>

The redefinition, however, remained latent until the end of the first decade after the cold war. With hindsight, Kosovo was a watershed in US–Europe relations. With issues of international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and Iraq looming in the background, the coming Balkan crisis, throughout 1998, was not top of the US agenda. It was the



Europeans, not the Americans, who led international efforts to impose a settlement, at least until diplomacy failed and NATO launched air strikes against Serbia in the spring of 1999. In spite of the US preponderant military role in the campaign and of the successful denouement of the crisis, Kosovo was widely interpreted as revealing the extent to which European security had decreased in US strategic priorities. The crisis also coincided with fast-changing American attitudes with regard to the workings of multilateralism. As illustrated by the US negative stance vis-à-vis significant international instruments—for example, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court (ICC), or the comprehensive nuclear test ban—and by a growing propensity for the USA to act unilaterally in issues involving military coercion—this was already very much the case with regard to Iraq—US global unilateralism was already on the rise in the last years of the Clinton administration. Yet the Kosovo crisis first and foremost illustrated the growing US dissatisfaction with NATO. The conduct of the air campaign famously gave rise to misunderstandings between the Americans and the Europeans. The former strongly resented the eagerness of the Europeans—and especially of the French—to control the target lists and circumvented the allied decision-making process. The NATO operations, in American eyes, also revealed the weaknesses of the European forces involved, thus exposing a growing US impatience with the military shortcomings of European allies.<sup>5</sup>

The events of 2001 dramatically confirmed and amplified these trends. With Condoleezza Rice stating during the 2000 presidential campaign that “we don’t need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten,” the incoming administration of George W. Bush signalled a willingness to disengage from the Balkans and to reshape US policy on the basis of a “national interest” whose definition left little room for Europe as a strategic priority.<sup>6</sup> The terrorist attacks of September 11 self-evidently consecrated the globalization of US strategic concerns and, as a consequence, the diminished importance of the old continent. With the “global war on terror” declared in the wake of 9/11, Europe could no longer be seen by the USA as an intrinsic priority. The tendency toward a more global, less European, America was confirmed. The same was true of America’s unilateralist propensity. On the global level, the war on terror could conceivably have led the United States to a multilateral re-engagement, as some hoped in the aftermath of the attacks: after all, if the challenge was global, the response had to be a global mobilization of the international community. This, however, did not happen—quite on the contrary. The Bush administration’s frequent use of the parallel between 2001 and 1947 soon proved to be misleading: unlike the strategy of “containment”—which combined a strong US leadership with an equally strong multilateralism—the war on terror would be America’s war, and the rest of the world would have to be “with us” or “against us,” as George W. Bush then famously stated.<sup>7</sup> On the Atlantic level, the victim was

NATO. Although the terrorist attacks led for the first time to the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington treaty and although European nations had pledged their full support to the US military response, the US reaction was dismissive. Individual allies contributed on a national basis according to their capabilities and, most of all, to US needs, but NATO as such played no role in the campaign against the Taliban in the autumn of 2001. The changing US attitude vis-à-vis NATO, which had been made clear during the Kosovo crisis, became inescapable against the backdrop of the war in Afghanistan: as a result of the by-then much famed “capabilities gap,” the political disadvantages of NATO’s involvement—recognizing a measure of allied influence over the conduct of operations—far outweighed its military advantages as seen from Washington. Of course, barely two weeks after 9/11, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had famously theorized NATO’s growing irrelevance by stating that, “in this war, the mission will define the coalition.”<sup>8</sup>

By the end of 2001, the two key assumptions that had lain behind America’s role vis-à-vis Europe throughout and immediately after the cold war appeared to be in question. The events of 2002–3, culminating with the Iraq war, pushed these changes even further. By consecrating global terrorism and WMD proliferation as the number one threat, the 2002 National Security Strategy essentially turned the page of Europe—which was hardly mentioned at all—as America’s primary security concern.<sup>9</sup> With new global priorities and the Iraqi conflict in the background, the tendency toward a US disengagement from Europe was by and large confirmed throughout 2003. It was now increasingly clear that the sizable US military presence inherited from the cold war and the immediate post-cold war (the former period symbolized by US bases in Germany and the latter by peacekeeping operations in the Balkans) was being gradually phased out. To be sure, new, “lighter,” installations and troop deployments in Eastern and Southeastern Europe—for example, in Poland, Rumania, or Bulgaria—were considered, but their vicinity with the Caucasus, the Middle East, and even Central Asia only illustrated the new strategic US priorities (the same can be said of the planned deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic of elements of a US missile defense, ostensibly justified by the threat of a nuclear and ballistic Iran).<sup>10</sup> US policy, meanwhile, broke with the rules of multilateralism for good, as illustrated by the 2002 National Security Strategy’s emphasis on US unilateral “pre-emptive” options. Iraq, of course, soon provided the test case of the new US doctrine as a result of the decision to invade the country irrespective of a formal UN Security Council authorization. The Iraqi crisis, in turn, seemed to complete the transformation of US attitudes toward Europe and the Alliance. NATO was not only marginalized, as had been the case in Afghanistan, but became an instrument to coerce reluctant allies into supporting US policies, as illustrated by the February 2003 crisis over Turkey. Meanwhile, the US historic commitment to a unified Europe seemed to have become obsolete,

as illustrated by Washington's attempt to play the "New Europe" against the "Old Europe," in Rumsfeld's by now classic characterization. The departure from the US Atlanticism and pro-Europeanism of the cold-war and post-cold-war eras now appeared to be radical.<sup>11</sup>

To be sure, events post-Iraq may be seen as marking a return to normalcy. Against the backdrop of rising difficulties in the aftermath of the US-led intervention, the Bush administration soon embarked on a new course, which was confirmed after the president's November 2004 re-election. Washington's general attitude quickly ceased to be systematically dismissive of the UN, as illustrated soon after the intervention by its pursuit of Security Council resolutions in order to legitimize the situation in Iraq. The same was true with regard to the Atlantic alliance. Washington rediscovered that NATO could be used as an instrument of burden sharing, as shown by the US willingness to involve the alliance in Iraq and the Middle East starting at the June 2004 Istanbul summit. The Americans also seemed willing to re-engage militarily in NATO, as illustrated by their readiness to participate in the NATO response force and to put US soldiers under the NATO flag in Afghanistan. Attitudes toward Europe also changed to a considerable extent. Bush's visit to Brussels in February 2005 marked a turning point. There was no longer talk of dividing Europe, and Washington's attachment to European construction was reaffirmed.<sup>12</sup> It is too early to say whether this new course—to a large extent attributable to lessons learned from the failures of earlier policies, most of all in Iraq—will be durable. Yet it is hard to imagine that things will go back to where they were a decade ago in America's international posture and its relationship toward Europe. With global threats still looming, the US presence on the old continent is likely to become residual and Europe increasingly to be seen, not as an issue per se, but as a function of its potential role in helping the USA deal with these threats: "Today our agenda is mainly not about Europe, but rather about how America and Europe can work together in a world full of challenges to all of us," a senior State Department official recently noted.<sup>13</sup> As for attitudes toward multilateralism—whether on the global or the Atlantic level—much will depend on whether the post-Iraq turn has been a matter of choice or of necessity, in other words of tactics or strategy. Still, few would predict a return of US policies to the standards of global and Atlantic multilateralism that had prevailed during the cold-war and post-cold-war eras.

## **The European Response (I): Compensating for the US Disengagement**

How have European countries collectively reacted to these changes and, first of all, to the US declining engagement in Europe? The question is, of course, not new. It became a defining issue starting in the 1960s as a result

of the emerging balance of terror, thereby posing the most basic dilemma that the Europeans have had to face in their relations with the USA during the cold war. On the one hand—this was, in a nutshell, the logic behind “Gaullism”—building up Europe’s strategic autonomy could be seen as the most appropriate response to the declining reliability of the US guarantee; but, on the other hand—this was the argument of critics of Gaullism—such a move could be perceived as entailing the risk of aggravating the problem by encouraging those in favor of an American disengagement, first and foremost in the USA. In short, building up Europe strategically was seen as a necessity by “Europeanists” in order to anticipate a US withdrawal, whereas it was seen as dangerous by “Atlanticists” because it could precipitate such a withdrawal. Of course, the latter prevailed as long as the cold war lasted: Gaullism was defeated in the 1960s and beyond, because the risks of an autonomous Europe accelerating a US disengagement were consistently seen by the majority of Europeans as far superior to its benefits in terms of compensating for it.<sup>14</sup>

Because it seemed to make a US disengagement from Europe a sure thing, the end of the East–West conflict and the fading away of the Soviet threat in 1989–91 could have been a defining moment. The revival of the European strategic project in the late 1980s–early 1990s was clearly premised on the renewed Gaullist assumption of the USA’s inevitable withdrawal. Its foremost initiator, French president François Mitterrand, typically justified his long-term ambition to build up a European defense by the likely US withdrawal after the cold war: “Where will NATO be in twenty years?,” he asked George H. W. Bush in early 1991.<sup>15</sup> Yet the US decision to remain engaged in Europe and in the Alliance soon put an end to French-inspired Europeanist ambitions—at least for the time being—and gave new life to Atlanticism among European countries. Washington conveyed in no uncertain terms the message that a truly autonomous Europe would be incompatible with the maintenance of a strong US commitment in Europe: “If Western Europe intends to create a security organization outside the Alliance, tell me now,” Bush famously declared at the Rome NATO summit in November 1991.<sup>16</sup> True, the US effective post-cold-war re-engagement in Europe remained uncertain for a while as a result of Washington’s reluctance to intervene in the conflicts of ex-Yugoslavia; yet the failure of the Europeans to impose peace in the Balkans soon appeared to confirm the need for an active US involvement. By the time of the Dayton agreements and of the deployment of the NATO-led force in the autumn of 1995, the demonstration had been made that America remained a “European power,” in fact the dominant one, thus leading to a re-Atlanticization of European security to a degree unforeseen five years before. Although the Maastricht Treaty of February 1992 had established a European Union equipped with a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and supposed to develop in due course a “common defense policy” and, down the road, a “common defense,” this did not happen in the 1990s. European

efforts remained confined to the prudent and incremental development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, a schema that clearly reflected the enduring assumption that the emergence of a real European autonomy had to be avoided if the Atlantic status quo was to be preserved. The US post-cold-war re-engagement in Europe, in other words, essentially prolonged the Europeans' classical dilemma: "If we are to explain why European public opinion, as well as government policy, did not emerge from the end of the cold war in a groundswell of support for a purely European defense policy," wrote a political scientist, "then at least one major answer must be found in the fact that, far from being distracted from European security concerns, successive American governments reacted to the end of the cold war by re-committing the United States to the preservation of the European balance of power."<sup>17</sup>

This is precisely what began to change at the very end of the decade, thus leading to the effective relaunch of the European politico-strategic project. To be sure, intrinsically European factors have played a role, first and foremost the deepening of European integration that took place in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty and eventually triggered a "spillover effect" in non-economic areas. Yet the main driving force was the American factor: if the Europeans began to harbor truly autonomous politico-strategic ambitions in the late 1990s, it is first and foremost because they realized that the US role in Europe, ten years after the end of the cold war, was waning. The earliest indication was the UK shift. Whereas Tony Blair, when coming to power in 1997, appeared determined to continue past policies of opposing European strategic autonomy in the name of the preservation of the US engagement, British attitudes started to evolve rapidly throughout 1998, thus paving the way to the historic Franco-British Saint-Malo declaration in December, in which London recognized that the EU needed to have a "capacity for autonomous action" and be able to act militarily independently from the alliance if need be.<sup>18</sup> Although other factors were clearly also in play—for example, Blair's eagerness to avoid Britain's isolation against the backdrop of the completion of economic and monetary union—changing US attitudes played a key role: if Blair, in the words of Jolyon Howorth, proved ready to "cross the European defense Rubicon," it was because the British were discovering, with the looming crisis in Kosovo and Washington's aloofness, that a continuing US commitment to European stability could not ever be taken for granted. If they wanted to be able to deal with coming crises at the periphery of the EU (and perhaps maintain a degree of US implication), the Europeans, as a result, needed to share a larger part of the burden and become a credible politico-military actor in their own right.<sup>19</sup>

Because it essentially confirmed the foregoing, the outbreak of the Kosovo war in the spring of 1999 marked the real starting point of ESDP. As seen by the Europeans, Washington's initial reluctance to intervene, followed by the

US heavy-handed conduct of operations when it did, revealed the extent to which America's strategic outlook was now diverging from Europe's, as well as its increasing dissatisfaction with the workings of the Atlantic alliance. The result was the decision taken in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo crisis at the June 1999 European Council meeting in Cologne to establish an institutional framework for European defense within the EU, followed at Helsinki in December by the adoption of a "headline goal" for future European military capabilities.<sup>20</sup> That the launching of ESDP took place after decades of stalemate in European defense within barely a few months against the backdrop of a fast-changing US posture toward Europe speaks for itself: as Charles Kupchan rightly observed: "It [was] anything but happenstance that Europe redoubled efforts to forge a common defense policy just after the close of NATO's war for Kosovo. The Europeans [were] scared—and justifiably so—that America will not show up the next time war breaks out somewhere in Europe's periphery."<sup>21</sup> Of course, the establishment of ESDP did not magically resolve the daunting difficulties and controversies that have been historically linked to the European strategic project. Two opposite visions continued to compete: on the one hand, Europeanists—France first and foremost—saw the project primarily as the expression of the EU's ambition to become a fully-fledged strategic actor, hence the need for a robust and truly autonomous ESDP; on the other hand, Atlanticists—the UK to begin with—saw it as mostly aiming at restoring the transatlantic link, hence the need to keep ESDP modest and complementary to NATO. Predictably, this gave rise in the months and years after the 1999 decisions to a familiar tug-of-war on such notions as NATO's "right of first refusal," the three "Ds" (later "Is") and the like.<sup>22</sup> Yet these quarrels were secondary compared with the fundamental novelty that the launching of ESDP revealed: although there continued to be argument on the appropriate level of European ambitions, there was no disagreement on the plain fact that the diminishing US interest in Europe's security needed to be compensated for by some measure of European strategic autonomy and that this would contribute to the maintenance of the transatlantic link rather than precipitate a US disengagement—which anyway was becoming a fact of life.

The events of 2001 could have stopped this dynamic. The incoming administration's tough stance on alliance issues—which only echoed the defense of the "national interest" that the Bush team had pledged to make the yardstick of future US policies—seemed bound to influence the effective shaping of the emerging European defense along the lines of a minimalist, Atlanticist ESDP. This was illustrated in the early months of 2001 by Blair's by now more cautious policy and his willingness to reassure Washington in that regard.<sup>23</sup> As for the September 11 attacks, they appeared first as likely to reverse the factors that had led to the resurrection of the European strategic project barely a few years before. The attacks seemed almost certain to give renewed

saliency to the original rationale of the Atlantic alliance—that is, America’s protection of a vulnerable Europe: indeed, no longer against a massive, Soviet-like threat, but against the more amorphous but no less formidable perils of “hyper-terrorism.” This new situation, as many observers then believed, could have led to the abandonment of ESDP: at best, European defense, as defined post Kosovo, had become irrelevant; at worse, it could antagonize the USA and jeopardize the transatlantic link at a time when the US guarantee could again be perceived as existential. Yet this logic did not prevail. To be sure, in the wake of 9/11, ESDP was somehow put on a backburner. NATO—which had been imprudently declared dead by many as a result of its being sidelined by the USA in the campaign against the Taliban—gained a new lease of life, as illustrated by the success of the Prague summit in November 2002. And yet the European defense project, as defined post-Kosovo, survived post-9/11. ESDP was declared “operational” at Laeken in December 2001; the EU announced in spring 2002 its readiness to replace the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Macedonia; and, in December 2002, the “Berlin Plus” agreement was concluded, clarifying the procedure allowing the EU to draw on NATO assets when need be. The plain fact was that not only did 9/11 not call into question the original rationale behind ESDP, but it also reinforced it: the “global war on terror” could but accelerate the US disengagement from Europe and call for an increased EU role in European security.

The resilience of a European defense project designed to compensate for a US–Europe withdrawal proved no less remarkable against the backdrop of the Euro-Atlantic crisis of 2002–3. During the crisis itself, keeping ESDP on track in spite of the dispute over Iraq *de facto* served as a policy of intra-European—and especially Franco-British—damage limitation. The most striking illustration was the Franco-British summit at Le Touquet in February 2003. Although it took place in the run-up to the Anglo-American intervention and at the height of the intra-West crisis (on this more below) and of Franco-British mutual recrimination over who was responsible for the “failure of diplomacy,” the summit proved surprisingly fruitful with regard to defense matters, whether on the bilateral level or in terms of ESDP (it was at Le Touquet, in particular, that Paris and London reached agreement on a Franco-British proposal on the EU taking over from NATO the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2004), and, in March 2003, the EU effectively launched operation “Concordia” in Macedonia—a small-scale military operation under “Berlin Plus,” but the first EU military operation ever.<sup>24</sup> The aftermath of the crisis by and large confirmed this logic. To be sure, the initiative taken in April 2003, shortly after the invasion of Iraq, by Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg—the countries most opposed to the USA in the crisis—to reinforce the EU operational autonomy was utterly controversial as a result of its context, since it could be interpreted as an effort to build Europe in opposition to the USA. Yet the outcome of the initiative was all the more noteworthy. Although

its original ambition was considerably trimmed down in subsequent intra-European negotiations—essentially between the French, the Germans, and the British—the decision to create an embryonic EU planning and command capability, taken in November 2003, was the first symbolic breach into the old taboo of “non-duplication” with corresponding NATO capabilities, thus reinforcing, at least in the long term, the logic of European autonomy that had been in play since Kosovo.

The traumatic split among Europeans over Iraq, therefore, did not shatter ESDP. In fact, the reverse happened: ESDP became truly operational in 2003 and the project gained momentum overall. Beyond the historically proven capacity of the EU to overcome its crises, the reason for this apparent paradox is clear: not only was the split *not* about the issue of the future of the US engagement in Europe and its role in preserving the continent’s stability, but the very reason for the dispute—US policy toward Iraq—only confirmed the trend of America’s withdrawal and therefore the need for a European effort to fill the vacuum. The following months and years confirmed this. In December 2004 the EU launched Operation “Althea” in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the EU-led EUFOR in effect substituting for the NATO-led SFOR. Although it was waged under “Berlin Plus,” the launching of the 7,000-troops operation was a quantum leap for ESDP, and its success over the past two years or so essentially validated the EU’s ability to take over from NATO the task of completing the military stabilization of the Balkans—in addition to its massive political and economic contribution to that goal—a task for which ESDP was created in the first place.<sup>25</sup> The bottom line thus seems clear: although the USA in the years ahead will probably remain significantly involved on the Eastern margins of the EU (on this more below), the change of paradigm in transatlantic relations prompted by the USA’s strategic departure from the bulk of the old continent and its problems, which the Kosovo crisis revealed, has been by and large confirmed over the past decade. Because the vast majority of Europeans have come to recognize this reality, their traditional dilemma—how to anticipate a US disengagement without precipitating it—is on its way to becoming a thing of the past.<sup>26</sup>

### **The European Response (II): Balancing the USA Globally?**

Yet a new and equally pressing dilemma over what to do about an increasingly global and unilateral-minded America has appeared. During the cold war, Europeans and Americans often diverged on US global policies. Yet these divergences had but limited consequences: because the alliance remained predicated on the core function of defending the West *in* Europe, “out-of-area” disputes did not fundamentally jeopardize the transatlantic relationship. The immediate post-cold-war period did not radically change the situation, at



least as long as European stability remained at the forefront of European and transatlantic preoccupations and US major interventions remained embedded in multilateralism—for example, the 1991 Gulf war. Yet, starting in the second half of the 1990s, a new dilemma was in the making, at least virtually: on the one hand, the Americans were increasingly vocal about the fact that the future of the Alliance would depend on the Europeans' ability to share the US global strategic agenda as well as the burden of implementing it; but, on the other hand, America's rising unilateral temptations were not easily reconciled with the EU's emerging international stance—one unmistakably based on multilateralism and its defense in accordance with the very nature of European construction. A new dividing line was likely to appear among Europeans. When confronted with this new dilemma, Atlanticist nations (whether "old" ones like the UK or "new" ones like countries of Central and Eastern Europe) could be expected to emphasize the need for the Europeans to support the USA for the sake of transatlantic relations even at the expense of European preferences, while warning against the danger of building Europe in opposition to America—a scheme that in their eyes could only weaken the alliance and aggravate US unilateralism. As for Europeanist countries, they were likely to argue in favor of a strong Europe able to mitigate America's global stance even at the risk of irritating Washington, while underlining the danger of alignment with the USA—a danger that an overly acquiescent Europe would run in their view. Yet the debate remained mostly academic until the very end of the decade, if only because the more pressing issue of the decreasing US interest in European stability and its consequences—illustrated by Kosovo—took precedence over that of the rising unilateralism in US global policies.<sup>27</sup>

The events of 2001 changed this situation and brought the new dilemma into the open. To be sure, September 11 could have settled the issue. As mentioned, the attacks seemed likely to restore the Alliance's core function of collective defense and—although it was the USA that was under attack—resuscitate America's role as Europe's ultimate protector, thus making the Europeans inclined to sign up to the post-9/11 US global strategic agenda. Even for those who later proved critical of US policy, the circumstances called, in the words of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, for "unrestricted solidarity" and left little room for the expression of a distinctive European posture in the newly declared "global war on terror."<sup>28</sup> Yet this proved short lived. Not only were the European allies sidelined in Washington's military response to the attacks—a decision that certainly contributed to undermine the Alliance's newly restored collective defense role—but "phase two" of the war on terror quickly became a matter of concern, especially after Bush's speech on the "axis of evil" in January 2002. Some began to fear, in the words of Schröder, a US "adventure."<sup>29</sup> With Iraq looming as the probable target throughout 2002 and with Washington stepping up pressure in order to obtain allied support

against what was described as an existential threat, the dilemma was bound to augment dramatically. By early 2003 the Europeans were divided between those, France and Germany to begin with, who believed that precedence should be given to the adoption of a European—that is, a multilateral—approach of the Iraq affair, even at the risk of antagonizing Washington, and those, led by the UK, who believed that supporting the USA was a must, even if this meant compromising on European preferences.

There is no need here to review the dynamics that led to the transatlantic and intra-European crisis in the run-up to the US-led invasion.<sup>30</sup> The key point is that the dispute among Europeans was *not* primarily over how the Iraq crisis should be dealt with in principle, on which there was in fact relative consensus, reflecting by and large European preferences. The declaration adopted by the EU heads of states and governments in Brussels on February 17, 2003, at the height of the dispute, provides an illustration. By stressing that the UN was “at the center of the international order” and that “the primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament” lay with the Security Council, and that the process had to be led “peacefully” and according to “relevant UNSC resolutions,” the (then) fifteen essentially sketched out a “European”—ergo, a multilateral—approach to the Iraqi problem. Of course, the declaration warned *in fine* of Baghdad’s “final opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully,” a phrase clearly inserted at the request of Atlanticists against the backdrop of Washington’s by then inescapable determination to intervene unilaterally irrespective of the results of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.<sup>31</sup> The reason for the dispute among Europeans was therefore relations with America, not Iraq. This was also reflected in the famous “letter of eight” published on January 30, 2003 by European leaders eager to express their support of the US stance in the Iraqi crisis.<sup>32</sup> Tony Blair recognized as much when he said that he preferred a divided Europe that was “partly pro-USA” than a united Europe “opposed to the USA.”<sup>33</sup>

The Iraq crisis thus became a test of how Europe’s new transatlantic dilemma would—or would not—be solved in the future. This was made clear by declarations on both sides in the immediate aftermath of the US-led invasion. Blair argued that the “fundamental decision” facing the West was “whether we see our task as trying to construct a genuine partnership with America for the future” or “whether the world breaks into different centres of power that I think very quickly will become rival centres of power.”<sup>34</sup> Chirac declared the next day that what was at stake was “the willingness to build Europe” in order to contribute to the overall balance of the emerging “multipolar world;” this required “a strong Europe and a strong United States linked by a strong covenant,” which, “naturally”, had to be done “between equal partners.”<sup>35</sup> Blair and Chirac could not have expressed more clearly their fundamental divergences on how to manage the Europeans’ dilemma when

faced with US global unilateralism—and the fact that Iraq was bound to be a defining moment in that regard.

So how did the Iraq crisis affect European approaches of the dilemma? It is of course too early to answer this question with certainty. Its long-term effects are still unclear, with analyses ranging from affirmations of the indivisibility of the West to statements on the inevitability of a “continental drift.”<sup>36</sup> Moreover, European attitudes are diverse, varying according to countries (for example, “old” versus “new” Europe), actors (for example, governments versus public opinion) and many other factors that cannot be thoroughly examined here. Still, the evolution of the European strategic project since 2003 provides an indication. In retrospect, it is noteworthy that the project not only survived the crisis, but that it was confirmed—not just, as seen above, in the European dimension, that is, as a response to the US disengagement, but in the global one, that is, as a response to the changing nature of US global policies. Two main elements illustrate this. The first is the evolution of ESDP *stricto sensu*. Not only, as seen above, has European defense as defined post-Kosovo—that is, Europe focused—not been shattered by the crisis, but developments since Iraq have reflected a readiness on the part of the Europeans to play a stronger role *beyond* Europe. The year 2003 was in fact the one when ESDP went “global,” if modestly. Launched in June, operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the first autonomous—that is, non-“Berlin Plus”—ESDP operation and the first non-European operation in geographical terms. Subsequent developments, including the decision in 2004 to create “battle groups” for high-intensity combat and to adopt a new, qualitative capacity objective (the Headline Goal 2010) confirmed this trend toward a less Europe-centered ESDP, as did the decision to launch other distant (though non-military) operations in Indonesia and in Gaza in 2005, and, in 2006, a new military mission in the DRC.<sup>37</sup> Of course, the extension of the EU’s military reach beyond Europe in the past few years has remained limited and in accordance with its self-perceived international role—it is indisputably closer to that of a *Zivilmacht* than to that of a muscular military power, at least for the time being. Still, as Jean-Yves Haine has observed, “from a tool of crisis management in the Balkans,” ESDP, after Iraq, has started to develop into a “device to enhance Europe’s role in the world.”<sup>38</sup>

Beyond (and upstream of) the beginning of a “globalization” of the nascent ESDP, the other and perhaps more important illustration has been the willingness of the Europeans, in the wake of the Iraq crisis, to reinforce the EU’s cohesion as a global strategic actor. The initiative taken by France, Germany, and the UK (the “EU-3”) in the autumn of 2003 to prevent Iran from moving toward a military nuclear capability was the clearest manifestation. By adopting a united front and by exercising leadership in this issue so soon after the Iraq psychodrama, the Europeans’ foremost objective was clearly to avoid the pitfalls of intra-European divisions and thus to be in a better position to

influence international—and most of all US—responses to what could well develop into a crisis of the magnitude of Iraq. The theory soon followed the practice. By approving in December 2003 a common security strategy for the first time, the Europeans acknowledged the need for the EU to articulate a vision of its own, distinctive global role if a repeat of the Iraq experience was to be avoided in the future.<sup>39</sup> With the emphasis laid on UN-based “effective multilateralism” as well as “preventive engagement,” the European Security Strategy (ESS) put forth a concept that was not only shared by all members of the EU, but unmistakably different from the US approach as articulated in the US national strategy of the previous year. Barely a few months after such a divisive crisis, this was also a remarkable development—although less so if one recalls that the Europeans, as noted above, had been less divided on how to deal with Iraq *per se* than they had been on the issue of relations with the USA. The “Solana document,” in that sense, was but a reflection of the emerging European consensus on the fundamentals of security, a consensus that had been shattered during the Iraq crisis as a result of diverging views of the transatlantic dilemma—but that the crisis has, paradoxically, helped to crystallize.<sup>40</sup>

With hindsight, the Europeans indeed seem to have quickly drawn a key lesson from the Iraq crisis: that a divided Europe was in no position to have an impact on US global strategy and, conversely, that US global strategy could further split the Europeans—hence the need for them to act more cohesively in order to wield greater influence internationally. The background of this realization was the remarkably swift intra-EU reconciliation that took place in the months following the crisis—a typical pattern in European history, but one that was further encouraged by the upcoming dual challenge of enlarging (with ten new members set to join the EU in 2004) and deepening (with the adoption of a European constitutional treaty scheduled that same year). The turn taken by events in Iraq quickly after the US-led invasion was, of course, another factor. The fact that the official justification for the invasion (Iraq’s alleged possession of WMDs and links with Al-Qaeda) soon proved void, and that its consequences for Iraq, the Middle East, and the international system as a whole turned out to be disastrous, indeed vindicated *ex post facto* what might have been a “European” stance in the crisis, thus justifying efforts further to strengthen Europe’s role and cohesiveness as a strategic actor. This has been notoriously reflected in public opinion polls over the past few years: by 2006, the proportion of Europeans viewing US global leadership as desirable (37 percent) had essentially reversed from what it was in 2002 (64 percent) and a majority of Europeans (55 percent) supported “a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs.”<sup>41</sup>

Of course, the steps taken over the past few years in order to make the EU a more cohesive and assertive global actor would not have been possible without the transatlantic reconciliation that has happened during the same

period: if the USA could split Europe, Europe could not reunite against the background of continuing tensions with Washington. Although Chirac and his allies have often been accused of deliberately using the US–Iraq predicament in order to push for their vision of a Europe as a rival or an opponent to the USA, this has hardly been the case. After the 2003 crisis, France, like other countries opposed to the war, and Germany to begin with, proved eager to mend fences with Washington in order to help overcome the transatlantic split, fully aware that the overcoming of intra-European divisions, let alone progress in the European strategic project, would have been impossible otherwise (initiated under Chirac, this policy of Franco-American rapprochement was spectacularly amplified after the election of his successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, in May 2007).<sup>42</sup> In devising the ways and means of reinforcing Europe as a global strategic actor over the past few years, the Europeans have been careful to take into account the US factor and to avoid antagonizing Washington. Iran is a case in point: the remarkably intransigent approach adopted by the EU-3 from the outset was to a large extent driven by a willingness to ensure that US diplomacy would not reject their approach as too complacent. (While they have not succeeded in durably changing Iran’s behavior, the Europeans have remained cohesive on the issue, and they have somehow managed to influence the USA, as illustrated by Washington’s endorsement of their approach.<sup>43</sup>) The same reasoning prevailed in the drafting of the EU security strategy: many aspects of the Solana document point to a willingness to ensure compatibility with US views, as illustrated by the notion of *effective* multilateralism, a notion that may be seen as echoing Bush’s warning in September 2002 that the UN had to be “relevant” or be doomed to irrelevance.<sup>44</sup> Predictably, the document concludes that “the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable” and that the aim of the Europeans should be to establish “an effective and balanced partnership with the USA.”<sup>45</sup>

So where do the Europeans stand with regard to their “global” dilemma in transatlantic relations after Iraq? Clearly, unlike the “European” dilemma discussed above, they have not yet overcome it—far from it. The majority of them simply believe that US views must be integrated in shaping European strategic preferences, both because the USA is self-evidently a global actor impossible to ignore and because the very logic of an alliance means that both partners need to take into account each other’s conceptions. More fundamentally, many European countries still think that their security ultimately depends on US protection, which, in turn, depends on their support of US policies—and some of them even feel that support must be granted irrespective of the actual merits of these policies. The entry into the EU since 2004 of ten new members with strongly pro-American feelings has no doubt enlarged the Atlanticist constituency, at least for the time being. It would, therefore, be foolhardy to predict that a future crisis of the magnitude of Iraq—perhaps over Iran—will not again confront the Europeans with an agonizing choice

between asserting their vision and interests and supporting the United States, a choice in which some of them are still likely to prefer the former course of action while others are likely to choose the opposite one. And yet there is little denying that the Europeans over the past few years have begun to improve their ability to overcome the dilemma by strengthening the European strategic project on the global level. This tendency, in and of itself, arguably marks a fundamental choice in the direction of a long-term Europeanist solution to the dilemma through the emergence of a global European actor and the search for a new Euro-American equilibrium, rather than an Atlanticist solution stemming from the acceptance of enduring intra-European divisions and of a structural asymmetry in EU–US relations. In that sense, Europe *has* engaged in balancing the USA, though it is definitely about soft balancing (that is, trying to mitigate US global unilateralism by weighing more in the international system) rather than hard balancing (that is, trying to build up a counterweight to the USA, including a military one)—a fanciful notion given the asymmetry of nature, purpose, and power between the two entities and the enduring community of values and interests that they share.<sup>46</sup>

### Some Concluding Thoughts

To be sure, Europe’s strategic momentum seems to have paused since 2005 as a result of the rejection of the European constitutional treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005 and the persisting gap between “old” and “new” EU members. Yet, because similar causes produce similar effects, there are reasons to believe that the US factor will continue in the years ahead to push the Europeans in the direction of a more assertive EU in order to compensate for America’s decreasing commitment *in* Europe and to mitigate its policies *beyond* Europe. In spite of Russia’s rising power and propensity to coerce its neighbors, the return of a massive, cold-war-like threat against Europe justifying a US massive re-engagement remains a far-fetched scenario. And, although the potential for crisis from Belarus to the Caucasus remains high, a comeback to a situation comparable to the one that prevailed in the Balkans in the 1990s, justifying a fundamental US recommitment to European stability and security, is unlikely. While Washington will certainly be keen to remain a player on both sides of the EU’s Eastern periphery (through its influence on new EU members and perhaps through NATO enlargement to countries like Georgia), it is thus difficult to imagine what could reverse the present trend of US strategic withdrawal from the bulk of the continent. As for America’s role beyond Europe, the present phase of US international moderation and relative multilateral re-engagement seems driven by necessity rather than choice. As the looming 2008 US presidential campaign seems to indicate, the “global war on terror” should remain the name of the game in the years ahead, and

it is hardly a recipe for a return to the fundamentals of “atlanticism” as they prevailed in the second half of the past century, at least in European eyes. The incentive for differentiation with the USA will therefore remain strong as the EU continues to shape its own global role.

This tendency is likely to be encouraged by future EU trends. Whatever the present doubts on future enlargement, the devolution to the Europeans of the primary responsibility for completing the stabilization of the continent would probably be confirmed by the further expansion of the EU. In spite of the considerable obstacles that still lie ahead, the gradual incorporation of the countries of the Western Balkans would signal the completion of a Europe “whole and free” under its aegis; although the continuing stability of that region cannot be considered a sure thing—if only because the fate of Kosovo remains uncertain—it is indeed hard to imagine a situation in which the Europeans would want to rely on outside actors in the way they did in the 1990s, when the Balkans were on the outside of their periphery. Beyond, the EU will continue to want to play a primary role in stabilizing its present Eastern periphery from Ukraine to Georgia, whether through its new neighborhood policy, or through enlargement. As for Turkey—whose accession anyway seems to be an increasingly uncertain prospect—its inclusion would arguably not call into question the EU’s role as Europe’s stabilizer, and advocates believe that it would contribute to the further globalization of the EU’s role as a result of its positioning as Europe’s “bridge” toward the Middle East. More generally, while opponents of further EU expansion—most of all in respect of Turkey—warn against risks of political dilution and of jeopardizing European identity, the case can also be made that, the more the EU gains demographic weight and geographic surface, the more significant a global strategic actor it will become. True, the rejection of the constitutional treaty has been seen—rightly—as a serious setback for the deepening of political integration in general and for an increased strategic role for the EU on the global level in particular. Yet this may well be but a limited and temporary setback. First, as demonstrated in the past few years in particular by the adoption of the ESS, the institutions and instruments already in place in matters of security and defense have proved conducive to the strengthening of a European strategic culture, and the “new” members are not immune to a certain “socializing” effect.<sup>47</sup> Second, the development of CFSP/ESDP has not been interrupted by the current failure of the constitutional process, and the emerging scenario for a relaunch of the process (a “mini-treaty” as advocated by Sarkozy during his campaign, focusing on decision making) would probably put security and defense—which rank as fairly uncontroversial items—high on the agenda.

So where does this leave us in terms of the Europeans’ future ability to face their transatlantic dilemmas? As argued above, the “European” dilemma that they had to face during the cold war and its immediate aftermath—how to compensate for a US–Europe withdrawal without precipitating it—has been all

but overcome. With the exception of Western Eurasia, where the Americans and Europeans are both involved, the USA has in effect largely given up, and the EU mostly taken over, the role of the continent's stabilizer—and the coming years are likely to confirm this trend. The Europeans' "global" dilemma, by contrast, has not yet been solved. True, the past few years have seen a strengthening of Europe's strategic cohesiveness and assertiveness on the world scene, and this process is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Yet Europeans remain torn apart between their willingness to act globally according to their interests and vision and the deep-seated belief that they depend on a US guarantee for their security. Some (typically the "new" Europeans) see US protection as existential as a result of the perceived resurgence (or persistence) of cold-war-like threats—Russia, to name one. In a more residual way, others (typically European states with a high international exposure, such as Britain, Germany, or even France, for all its advocacy of a more independent Europe) see it as necessary when faced with post-9/11 dangers—hyperterrorism, WMD, or any combination thereof. The Europeans will, therefore, truly overcome their "global" dilemma and thereby definitively tilt the balance in a more Europeanist, less Atlanticist, direction when their attitudes toward the USA are no longer dictated by their perceived need to rely on US protection to face these threats. So the question becomes: are such perceptions there to stay in the long run? Much, of course, will depend on future events, on which one can only speculate. If such threats do not materialize in the years ahead, it is entirely possible that the Europeans—even nations that have so far been Atlanticist—will gradually lose the sense of their dependency on the USA as a result of a declining threat perception combined with an increasing faith in their ability to face potential dangers. If, on the contrary, these threats do materialize, things are arguably more open. On the one hand, this could well lead to a reversal of the current European dynamic. Regarding "new" threats, a repeat of 9/11 in the years to come, especially if it happened in Europe, could re-establish America's credentials as Europe's protector; and an escalation of the Iran crisis in a way that would directly expose Europe could have the same effect. As for "old" threats, increased pressures on the part of Russia on East Central European members of the EU would probably have the same effect, at least on the countries most concerned (Moscow's reaction to Poland's and the Czech Republic's decision to deploy elements of the US ballistic defense system provides an illustration). But, on the other hand, a materialization of these threats—whether new or old—could have the opposite effects if they were seen as the consequences of ill-advised moves on the part of the USA or of policies running counter to European approaches or interests.

The key point here is normative rather than speculative: whatever the course of events in the years to come, the more progress the Europeans make toward collectively overcoming their security dilemma in their relations with the United States, the better it will be for transatlantic relations. The crisis over



Iraq has shown the extent to which the Europeans' feeling of dependency on the USA for their own security is likely to affect their behavior negatively when confronted with a choice between defending their interests and vision and supporting the United States for the sake of the transatlantic relationship. The result has been a dismal one: Europe has been able neither to mitigate US policies nor to supplement them—in other words, it has not been able to act as a strong partner of the USA. A more autonomous Europe would arguably fare better. Because its posture when faced with strategic challenges would be defined on its own merits rather than against the yardstick of its relationship with Washington, it would be in a better position to help if needed—or when necessary to resist the USA in a crisis. More fundamentally, such a Europe would be likely to be in a better position to shape US policies upstream of a crisis, as the Europeans have recently been trying to do with Iran. As for predictions that an independent Europe would necessarily become a strategic challenger if not an opponent of the United States, they appear at best as fanciful, considering the disparity of power and, most of all, of nature between the two entities: even the most enthusiastic Europeanists see the development of the EU into a rival of the USA as a sheer fantasy. Europe can become more independent without having to duplicate America, and this would be enough to transform what has been from the origins an asymmetrical alliance into a more balanced partnership, thus putting the transatlantic relationship on a healthier footing instead of it relying on a tradeoff between US protection and European submission. Of course, this would entail a new kind of a transatlantic set-up. NATO, as it has functioned since its origins (that is, as a US-dominated alliance with little or no space for Europe's collective identity), cannot accommodate the emerging European strategic actor; this, together with the US growing impatience with the constraints of the Alliance, is the fundamental reason for its current state of disarray. The time has come to think creatively in the transatlantic relationship. For this, the logical venue should be the EU–US relationship.

## Notes

1. Some reject this narrative as an *ex post facto* rationalization, arguing that the USA had in fact never been fully committed to multilateralism and that it had frequently embarked on unilateral actions in the past: see, e.g., John Van Oudenaren, "Transatlantic Bipolarity and the End of Multilateralism," *Political Science Quarterly*, 120/1 (2005), 1–32. This allows the author to minimize the rupture induced by the recent upsurge of US unilateralism and to describe the European denunciation of it as disingenuous; yet this reading is disputable, for it underestimates the fundamental fact that the significance of US unilateral actions—especially in issues of war and peace—are far greater in an international system no longer regulated by the strictures of the cold war.

2. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 230.
3. This was, of course, the catchphrase of his landmark speech in Berlin on Dec. 12, 1989.
4. For a discussion of these emerging questions at the time, see David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
5. For an analysis of the impact of the crisis on transatlantic relations, see Frédéric Bozo, "The Effects of Kosovo and the Danger of Decoupling," in Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler (eds.), *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
6. The quotation is in "Bush Would Stop US Peacekeeping in Balkan Fights," *New York Times*, Oct. 21, 2000; see also Condoleezza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, 79/1 (Jan.–Feb. 2000). For an excellent historical analysis of the events of 2001 and US policy, see Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Europe since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 269 ff.
7. The sentence was pronounced in a joint press conference with French president Jacques Chirac on Nov. 6, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011106-4.html>. The parallel between 1947 and 2001 was made, e.g., by Condoleezza Rice in a speech at the Paul H. Nitze School on Apr. 29, 2002; see <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020429-9.html>. For a refutation of the parallel, see, e.g., Frédéric Bozo, "1947–2001: La Regression multilatérale," *Commentaire*, 6/104 (Winter 2003–4), 865–9. For a scathing indictment of US post-9/11 unilateralism, see Stanley Hoffmann, "America Alone in the World," *American Prospect*, 13/17 (Sept. 2002).
8. Donald H. Rumsfeld, "A New Kind of War," *New York Times*, Sept. 27, 2001.
9. *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, Sept. 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.
10. See Lawrence J. Korb, "US Military in Europe: The Pentagon's Eastern Obsession," *New York Times*, July 30, 2003, and Jon D. Klaus, "US Military Overseas Basing: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, Nov. 17, 2004, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21975.pdf>.
11. On the Iraqi crisis, see, e.g., Stanley Hoffmann (with Frédéric Bozo), *Gulliver Unbound: America's Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
12. On the new course of EU–US relations after the Iraqi crisis, see Marcin Zaborowski (ed.), *Friends Again? EU–US Relations after the Crisis* (Paris: IIS, 2006), and Dana H. Allin, Gilles Andréani, Philippe Errer, and Gary Samore, "Repairing the Damage: Possibilities and Limits of Transatlantic Consensus," Adelphi Paper, 389 (London: IISS, 2007).
13. R. Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, "Riga and Beyond," Remarks to the Welt-am-Sonntag Bundeswehr Forum, Berlin, Oct. 23, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/75422.htm>.
14. For an analysis of the origins of this debate in the 1960s, see Frédéric Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

15. Bush–Mitterrand meeting, Martinique, Mar. 14, 1991, private papers. For an analysis of the renewed debate between Europeanists and Atlanticists in that period, see Frédéric Bozo, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005; English translation forthcoming).
16. Quoted in Robert L. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of US Policy in Europe* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 281.
17. Richard C. Eichenberg, "NATO and European Security after the Cold War: Will European Citizens Support a Common Security Policy?," in Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia (eds.), *Decision-Making in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) 169.
18. Joint Declaration, British–French Summit, Saint-Malo, Dec. 3–4, 1998, in *From Saint-Malo to Nice. European Defence: Core Documents*, Chaillot Papers, 47 (Paris: ISS, May 2001), 8–9.
19. On the origins of Saint-Malo and the UK turn, see Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?*, Chaillot Paper, 43 (Paris: ISS, Nov. 2000) (quotation from p. 25), and "The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma: France, Britain, and the ESDP," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 3/1 (2005), 39–54.
20. Details in Howorth, "European Integration and Defense;" see also Bozo, "The Effects of Kosovo."
21. Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 152.
22. It is not the place here to review this often convoluted narrative; for an excellent account, see Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 135 ff.
23. On this and what follows, see Howorth, "The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma," and Howorth, "France, Britain, and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis," *Survival*, 45/4 (Winter 2003–4), 173–92. See also Anand Menon, "From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq," *International Affairs*, 80/4 (2004), 631–48.
24. In January 2003, the EU had launched the first *non*-military ESDP operation, the EU Police Mission (EUPM), in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For a description of ESDP operations starting in 2003, see Giovanni Grevi, Dov Lynch, and Antonio Missiroli, "ESDP Operations," EUISS, <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf>.
25. See *ibid.* (of course, NATO—and the USA—remained present in Kosovo as at 2007).
26. For a concurrent conclusion, see Howorth, "The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma."
27. For an illustration of this emerging debate among academics, see Gompert and Larrabee, *America and Europe*, and Frédéric Bozo, *Where does the Atlantic Alliance Stand? The Improbable Partnership* (Paris: IFRI, 1999).
28. Gerhard Schröder, *Entscheidungen. Mein Leben in der Politik* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006), 164.
29. *Ibid.* 196.
30. For a narrative, see Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004).
31. For the declaration, see [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/74554.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/74554.pdf).

32. See "United We Stand," *Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 30, 2003; while the first three paragraphs of the letter aimed at a solemn statement of the importance of preserving the "bond between the US and Europe" and of the need to prevent the transatlantic relationship from becoming a "casualty" of the Iraqi crisis, the rest of the document stressed the Europeans' "backing for Resolution 1441, [their] wish to pursue the UN route, and [their] support for the Security Council" (in fact, French and German officials did not find the substance of the letter to be controversial per se: see Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 129).
33. Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 131.
34. Press Conference, Downing Street, Apr. 28, 2003, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page3535.asp>.
35. Joint press conference, Jacques Chirac, Jean-Claude Juncker, Gerhard Schröder, and Guy Verhofstadt, Brussels, Apr. 29, 2003, <http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/francais/accueil.2.html>.
36. For two opposite approaches, see Kupchan, *The End of the American Era*, and Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of our Time* (London: Penguin Books, 2005).
37. Since 2003, fifteen civilian or military missions have thus been launched under ESDP; see Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli, "ESDP operations."
38. Haine, "ESDP: An Overview," EUISS, <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf>.
39. See *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.
40. On the emergence of a European strategic culture after Kosovo and Iraq, see Christoph O. Meyer, "Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms," *European Journal of International Relations*, 11/4 (2005), 523–49.
41. See the German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends 2006* (2006), 5–6.
42. On France's policy toward the US after the Iraqi crisis, see Frédéric Bozo and Guillaume Parmentier, "France and the United States: Waiting for Regime Change," *Survival*, 49/1 (Spring 2007), 181–98.
43. On this see Allin et al., *Repairing the Damage*, 41 ff.
44. On the interplay between the US and the EU security strategies, see Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson (eds.), *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations* (London: Routledge, 2006).
45. *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. Another illustration of the fact that the Europeans have been careful not to reinforce their strategic assertiveness at the expense of relations with the US has been their 2005 decision to postpone the lifting of the arms embargo on weapons sales to China, a move staunchly opposed in Washington.
46. For a discussion of soft balancing, see Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," *International Security*, 30/1 (Summer 2005), 7–45; see also Barry R. Posen, "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?," *Security Studies*, 15/2 (Apr.–June 2006), 149–86.
47. On this, see Meyer, "Convergence."

# 7

## “New Europe” between the United States and “Old Europe”

*Marcin Zaborowski*

### Introduction

A few hours after France and Germany had adopted a joint declaration on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, on 22 January 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was asked how he viewed the European criticism of the USA's diplomacy over Iraq. He replied: “That’s old Europe . . . If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the centre of gravity is shifting to the East.” There is no doubt that Rumsfeld made this distinction with the purpose of splitting the Europeans and weakening the emerging Franco-German opposition to the war in Iraq. He succeeded. Of course, it was not just the work of Rumsfeld and his associates (especially Bruce Jackson) and there were many other forces at work, but there is no denying that Europe did split over the war in Iraq, with all Central and East European (CEE) states joining the pro-US camp. And ever since then, it has often been taken for granted that the “Old–New” divide in Europe is real and will endure.

However, beyond the example of the war in Iraq, it is by no means certain that New Europe (which became synonymous with the CEE states) is a fixed construct and that it will uphold its pro-US instincts. In fact, it is not even clear whether “New Europe” actually exists. The group of ex-communist states that Rumsfeld referred to is in fact very diverse. On its extremes it includes Poland—a forty-million-strong nation with an imperial past and regional ambitions—but there is also Slovenia—a new, small state that did not exist before 1992 and that has more in common with neighboring Austria and Italy than with the rest of the CEE states.

True, there are some historical and cultural aspects that differentiate West and East Europeans. For example, Che Guevara and Soviet Union t-shirts,

which are so popular among trendy youth in Western Europe, are unlikely to be seen on the streets in Warsaw or Tallinn. Anti-globalization movements remain tiny, and attitudes toward capitalism are overall positive in most ex-communist states. Most importantly, unlike in Western Europe, seeing the USA as the major menace to global stability is but a fringe view in the CEE states.

Following the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, the attitudes, views, and lifestyles in the CEE states have been rapidly evolving. According to opinion polls, new member states no longer stand out from the old ones in their attitudes toward European integration and the emerging foreign-policy role of the EU. For historical reasons the elites in these countries remain more pro-USA than is the case in the older member states. However, a simultaneous combination of two factors—on the one hand, their unrewarded engagement in the unpopular war in Iraq and, on the other hand, the apparent benefits of EU membership—is already altering this tendency. As once argued by Poland’s foreign minister Radek Sikorski, even the “youngest among the new Europeans may soon grow old.”<sup>1</sup>

This chapter is divided into four parts, discussing, respectively, the Old–New Europe divide, the roots of CEE Atlanticism, the positions of the CEE states on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and, finally, the future of Europe as a political construct.

## **Transatlantic Relations and the Old–New Europe Divide**

Just over a week after Rumsfeld’s infamous remarks, on 30 January 2003, a group of eight European leaders (the UK, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, and three ex-communist states, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) expressed their solidarity with the position of the USA on Iraq.<sup>2</sup> The subsequent Letter of the Ten, which was an even bolder declaration of support for the USA, was signed by the so-called Vilnius Group of states, composed of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria.<sup>3</sup> These letters affirmed transatlantic solidarity between the signatories and the USA, helped sanction the US route to war in Iraq, and, in effect, dislodged the Franco-German motor as the driving force behind EU foreign policy.

They also contributed to the fissures in Europe that had appeared following Rumsfeld’s words and had deepened after French president Jacques Chirac had lambasted East European states in February 2003 for supporting US policy. By siding with the United States, these countries had, in Chirac’s eyes, stepped out of line and missed an opportunity to “keep quiet.” Moreover, these “New Europeans,” according to the French president, had demonstrated that they

were “badly brought up” and did not know how to behave. EU Commission president Romano Prodi also signaled his disappointment at the candidate countries’ behavior, which, according to him, revealed the failure of the applicant states to understand that the EU was not just about economic union but also about shared political values and consensus.<sup>4</sup>

Ultimately, these spats demonstrated that the dispute within the EU between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists had not only continued unabated, but had intensified in the context of EU enlargement. Iraq also brought into focus the question of whether the older and larger member states should speak for the EU and the applicant countries accept a subservient role in the development of the EU’s foreign affairs.<sup>5</sup> In some quarters, the answer to this question was clearly “yes.” It has been common, for example, for some old Europeans to speak about the EU as a respectable club where rules were set up by its founding members. The Central and East Europeans were seen in this context as “badly brought-up” new members who enter the club and start “dancing on the table.”<sup>6</sup>

Against the background of European disharmony and the United States’ determination to go to war with Iraq, most Central and East Europeans decided to send troops to Iraq, with Poland being by far the largest contributor.<sup>7</sup> Compared with the situation in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy (which also supported the USA), the debates and decision-making processes over Iraq that Central and East Europeans witnessed were rather muted and uncomplicated affairs. Indeed, the driving force behind these decisions was the desire to enhance their status and role and, above all, to demonstrate their loyalty as America’s allies at the time of need.<sup>8</sup>

While, as elsewhere in Europe, public opinion was divided over the war, Central and Eastern Europe experienced no anti-war mass demonstrations; nor was there anything remotely comparable to what took place in other European countries supportive of Washington’s policy, such as the United Kingdom or Spain.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the decisions of CEE leaders to send troops to Iraq to participate in the postwar stabilization project did not spark much controversy.

Iraq has certainly been the starkest demonstration of the solidarity of the “New Europeans” with the USA, but there are other areas where the US and ex-communist states see eye to eye and cooperate intensely. In Eastern Europe, the USA strongly supported Poland’s and Lithuania’s push for democratization in Ukraine and Belarus. The USA played a major role during the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. In Moldova, the USA pushed for the withdrawal of Russian forces and has supported Chisinau in the Transdnistrian conflict. In Southeastern Europe the USA continues to be a vital element of the region’s fragile stability, especially in Kosovo. But America’s involvement in these areas still did not recreate the Old–New Europe dichotomy, which simply does not exist in these cases.

America’s decision to base its missile defense installations in Poland (ten interceptors) and in the Czech Republic (radar) has greater potential to revive the Old–New Europe divisions. German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and the leader of the SPD Kurt Beck have both criticized the plan as leading to new divisions in Europe and antagonizing Russia.<sup>10</sup> The former French president Jacques Chirac, whose radical opposition to the war in Iraq was among the key factors prompting the Old–New Europe split, has also criticized the scheme in the same terms as the German SPD.<sup>11</sup> So far, this debate is still nowhere near as acrimonious as the split over Iraq. Chancellor Angela Merkel did not endorse the views of her foreign minister and did not object to the US project in principle, although she stressed that it has to be dealt with in a NATO framework. Chirac was replaced by Nicolas Sarkozy, who is likely to become the most pro-US French president since the founding of the Fifth Republic.<sup>12</sup> Meanwhile, in October 2007, Poland, which was meant to be hosting the shield’s interceptors, elected a government that is decidedly less enthusiastic about the project than its predecessor.

It is, therefore, possible that nothing major will come out of the tensions over the missile defense shield. For now, the major dividing lines run not inside Europe but between Russia and the West. The Kremlin recently responded to the missile defense plans by freezing its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement and by retargeting its missiles toward European locations. However, it is not insignificant that the Old and New Europeans have again demonstrated a tendency to lapse into the rhetoric reminiscent of the split during the war in Iraq.

## **Why are New Europeans Pro-American?**

Thirteen post-communist states plus five EU/NATO members rallied behind the USA during the war in Iraq. What motivated the CEE leaders to do this? To what extent is this alliance inside the Alliance going to survive strategically, in the context of current developments in Iraq and the entry of those New Europeans into the EU? A number of motives have been suggested to explain New Europe’s behavior. Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida spoke about the CEE states’ “immaturity,”<sup>13</sup> whilst others mentioned the expectations of material profits or opposition to the Franco-German attempt to dominate Europe’s foreign policy.<sup>14</sup> Leaders in New Europe often argued that their primary motivation was the preservation of the Euro-Atlantic community that they had worked so hard to join over the previous decades.

Providing a balance for the “Franco-German monster”<sup>15</sup> certainly played a role in the decisions of the eight and the ten to sign the letters. The joint declaration issued on the occasion of the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty on 22 January 2003 was perceived in the CEE



states as an attempt by France and Germany to speak on behalf of Europe and against the USA. When this was combined with the French favorite themes of multipolarity and providing a balance for the superpower, as well as Gerhard Schröder's radical "no" to any military action against Iraq, this manifestation of the revival of the Franco-German *Directoire* raised fears of a European *coup d'état*. This was seen by the post-communist Atlanticists as a neo-Gaullist plot aimed at driving the USA from Europe. When Russia joined France and Germany at a triangular summit meeting in St Petersburg on 10 February 2003, the old specter of a Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok—that is, with Russia but without the USA—began to haunt the minds of many in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>16</sup>

Expectations of economic and other benefits also played a role. The CEE states were keen to recover old debts owed to some of them by Saddam's Iraq, as well as to get privileged access to the funds and contracts for the postwar reconstruction. The Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles hoped to have a comparative advantage based on their past participation in the building of Iraqi economic and technical infrastructure (roads, municipal power systems, oil industry installations, and so on) in the 1970s and 1980s. The post-communist countries have also offered their know-how of transforming or building nations, states, and democracies for use in Iraq's transition from dictatorship into a more representative regime.

An unusually important role in garnering CEE support, and especially in engineering the Letter of the Ten, was played by a Republican lobbyist, Bruce Jackson. Several of the states that signed the letter (Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, and Lithuania) were about to join NATO; others wanted to join (Macedonia and Albania). Jackson was an unofficial "messenger," saying to those countries that the fulfillment of their NATO ambitions would depend on their support for Bush's Iraq policy. As a lobbyist working for the defense industry, Jackson also promised US investments in the most loyal countries.

## The Historical Argument

While all these reasons played a role, the bottom line is that most CEE states would still do the same thing again, even without American threats or incentives. This is because, for most CEE states—and especially those from the former Soviet bloc—the main rationale for their pro-Americanism is historical. Several of these states were re-established thanks to the support of the USA. Czechoslovakia and Poland were indebted to President Wilson for their recreation after 1918, and the USA never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

The origins of New Europe’s “reflexive Atlanticism” are to be found, first and foremost, in the legacy of Second World War and the postwar division of Europe. Three developments resulting from the war were to shape Central European perceptions of international relations. No matter on which side they were, all CEE states lost the war and were about to lose the peace. Whether they chose to fight and experienced crushing military defeat (Poland and Yugoslavia), or surrendered (Czechoslovakia) or joined (Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania) the axis powers, they were all humiliated by their invaders or protectors and ended the war either losing their sovereignty altogether (the Baltic states) or at best keeping it all but nominally. Unlike in London or Paris, there was no jubilation but rather a sense of uncertainty (Prague) or outright depression (Warsaw and Budapest) at the end of the war. The experience of the war confirmed that CEE states were weak and unable to defend themselves. They needed a credible ally.

Second, the cataclysmic results of the West European appeasement policy and the way in which the CEE states were, in effect, abandoned by France and the United Kingdom in the face of Nazi and Soviet invasions engendered a very skeptical view of Western Europe and, specifically, of its ability to guarantee security and stability on the continent. During the interwar period Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia were tied with France in a system of mutual defense alliances, in essence not that dissimilar from today’s NATO. However, France had not only failed to fulfill its alliance obligations vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia in 1938 and Poland in September 1939 but had also proved unable to defend itself against the Nazi invasion of 1940. For the Czechs, Poles, and others, one of the strategic lessons of the Second World War was that France could not be trusted and that in any case it was not strong enough to make a credible ally. Moreover, for much of the cold war France’s Eastern policy remained ostensibly focused on the Soviet Union, and it was clear that Paris would not risk damaging its relations with Moscow for the sake of its CEE allies.

Third, the West’s agreement to submit Central and Eastern Europe to the Soviet sphere of influence illustrated the degree to which the “great powers” could and would exclude the CEE states from crucial decisions affecting the region. The sense of betrayal resulting from Yalta has installed in CEE nations hypersensitivity to any decisions that are taken without their participation. This was well understood by President Clinton, who, when speaking to the crowds gathered in Warsaw to hear him speak about NATO enlargement, famously declared ‘nic o was, bez was’ (nothing about you, without you). This was exactly what Central Europeans nations wanted to hear.

The origin of the CEE foreign policies’ predisposition toward Atlanticism can be identified in these historically motivated tenets of “strategic cultures” in the CEE states; indeed, during the postwar years the independence-minded opposition in the CEE states came to advocate an Atlanticist dimension to its

foreign policy. While it was inevitable that the United States would be blamed, alongside the United Kingdom, for endorsing the Yalta agreement, it could not be blamed for the appeasement policy; nor had the USA been obliged, unlike the UK and France, to assist Czechoslovakia in the face of Nazi threat and Poland during the Nazi–Soviet assault in September 1939. Most important, however, the USA was viewed as the only power in the world willing and able to oppose the Soviet Union and restrain Germany. The USA made a credible ally; nobody else did.

History is the major factor informing the “New Europe’s” worldviews of today. Europe and America continue to have similar threat perceptions, but they differ in their views on multilateralism, military intervention, and the hegemonic structure of the international system. The views of New Europeans (especially at the elite level) on these issues, while not overwhelmingly different from those of their western neighbors, are more compatible with the views of the USA. For example, international law and multilateralism are not viewed in the CEE states as principles that are necessary to make the international system more peaceful just because they exist. After all, the United Nations came into being at the same time as the communists were tightening their grip on the CEE states, and the subsequent cold-war division was never addressed by the UN or any other multilateral institution.

As regards the principle of military intervention, the issue is more complex. It is true that public opinion in the CEE states has not generally diverged on this question from the views of their neighbors and has remained generally reluctant to endorse military intervention for other than defensive purposes. However, at the same time, the historical memory in the CEE states warns against West European appeasement and pacifism—the policies for which CEE states were in the past sacrificed by their Western neighbors. The existence of this historical element essentially means that foreign-policy elites in Warsaw and Budapest were freer than those in UK or Spain to endorse the interventionist policies of the USA, even when the majority of their populations disagreed.

Finally, there is the issue of recognizing America as the international hegemon. This is clearly a major difference between the CEE states and Western Europeans. The majority of the CEE states were subjected to the direct hegemony of their neighbors and denied sovereignty and statehood for much of their modern history. Therefore, the situation in which the hegemon is a faraway country and a liberal democracy is a clear improvement from a CEE perspective. The same is not true for most West Europeans.

These historical differences between Old and New Europeans have clearly affected their positions toward the war in Iraq and, more generally, American foreign policy. They have also had an impact on views toward the prospects of the European Union developing into a more robust security and defense

actor. However, since most CEE states joined the EU in 2004, their views have been converging with those of the older member states.

## Europeanizing the New Europeans: CFSP and ESDP

Since the CEE states embarked on the road to EU membership, both the international environment and the EU itself have transformed. One of the most profound and far-reaching consequences of this transformation has been the emergence of the EU as a security actor. From the initial articulation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht in 1992, through the Saint-Malo declaration of 1998, which gave rise to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), to the launch of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, the EU's aspirations to become an autonomous security actor have grown. For the CEE states, such developments have not always been easy to accept. Unproblematic in the run-up to EU accession,<sup>17</sup> the process of closing the CFSP chapter with the CEE states was relatively quick and easy, not least because it involved mostly “rhetoric” and only limited “action” and thereafter attracted little controversy compared with issues such as agriculture and EU structural funds.<sup>18</sup> However, toward the end of the 1990s, the foreign-policy role of the EU began to change to become more diverse in response to various external and internal impulses and challenges, rendering the CFSP a far more complex and contentious issue in the context of enlargement.

The development of particular consequences in this context was the emergence of the ESDP, to which the CEE states responded “late and defensively.”<sup>19</sup> In the early stages of the development of the ESDP and before EU enlargement in 2004, the CEE states were preoccupied with policies to overcome their status as “outsiders;” but because of their Atlanticist tendencies, they were also overtly sceptical about the ESDP project. Thus, while Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest strove to enter the decision-making arena, their policies remained generally less than enthusiastic. Every opportunity was used to stress that the EU's involvement in security should be limited and should not seek to duplicate or negate NATO.

The CEE states saw the functions of NATO and the EU, as well as their integration into those institutions, in rather conservative and rigid terms, or, to put it another way, in discrete “boxes;” moreover, the United States was regarded as the ultimate guarantor of Europe's security. In one “box,” NATO performed the task of delivering the all-important hard-security guarantees, while, in another “box,” the EU dealt with broader political, social, and economic issues.<sup>20</sup> Hence the CEE states were not impressed when the functions of the EU began to transform and appeared to encroach on the remit of the

alliance. But, with EU enlargement on the horizon, the CEE candidate states did not want to be seen as overly critical of the ESDP so as not to have a head-on confrontation with the EU. For this reason they tried to steer the evolution of the ESDP in a direction that reflected their Atlanticist preferences.<sup>21</sup>

However, this generally skeptical and rigid view of the EU's role was about to change, owing to a combination of factors. CEE policies were defined until 2003 by the goal of limiting the scope of the ESDP; and, to a certain extent, they continue to be defined by that aim today. But the experience of Iraq and its aftermath, coupled with EU enlargement, has given way to a palpably more positive approach to the ESDP. In retrospect, the CEE states' policies on Iraq can be seen as a high point or "crossroads" in New Europe's Atlanticism.<sup>22</sup> Thereafter, a reappraisal took place and the CEE states displayed a new willingness to boost Europe's collective voice and improve its collective capabilities in security matters. This is not to say that New Europe's Atlanticism was abandoned as a result of EU membership and Iraq. Rather, by 2004 it had become tempered, as new EU member states began to accept the idea of an autonomous ESDP.

### **Recalibrating CEE Policies after Iraq: The Growing Relevance of the ESDP and CFSP**

The ESDP proceeded on two levels after September 11, 2001. On the one hand, the diminished role of multilateral forums and the lack of a coherent European voice after 9/11 seemed to expose the innate fragility of the EU's foreign policy, which called into question the whole ESDP project. Early initiatives, led by France and Germany, to regroup and take the ESDP forward initially failed to gather support from across the EU and in many ways only entrenched the prevailing "old-new" Europe divide. From the point of view of new Europeans, the idea of forming a collective defense alliance within the EU through "closer cooperation," as proposed by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg in April 2003, was unacceptable.<sup>23</sup> Equally unappealing was the idea of "structured cooperation," which was seen as a Franco-German attempt to sideline the pro-USA new EU member states by establishing military criteria they would never be able to meet.

Paradoxically perhaps, given the general disarray in Europe at the time, the ESDP made significant progress from around May 2003 onwards and began to cohere through EU-led military deployments, the formulation of the ESS and (by the end of 2003) preliminary agreements on institutional arrangements that were based on proposals emanating from the Convention on the Future of Europe. Toward many of these developments and innovations the CEE states adopted an increasingly positive and constructive approach.

A number of mutually reinforcing factors contributed to this change. First, the confidence of the CEE states that their role and status would be enhanced through their engagement in Iraq was undermined by events in that country and the perceived lack of reward, either material or political, for their participation in the campaign. Second, CEE proximity to the EU acquired more significance as membership of the union drew nearer; thus skepticism about the ESDP, which had derived from New Europeans “outsider” status, was abating. Also, the fact that the ESDP was becoming more elaborate and had proved itself in practice helped transform the CEE perceptions of the policy. While the ESDP had been largely “declaratory” at its inception—expressing aspirations and ill-defined priorities, which, arguably, made it difficult for non-EU members to confirm their commitment—the precise nature of the EU’s role as a foreign and security policy actor became clearer throughout 2003, as did the ESDP’s “mission” and purpose.

The year 2003 witnessed the launch of ESDP operations. The EU engaged in three missions—in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—and troops from CEE states were involved in all three. The EU Police Mission (EUPM), launched in January 2003, took over from the UN International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and aimed at establishing local law-enforcement capabilities to aid the stabilization of the region. At the end of March 2003 the EU launched its first-ever military mission, namely Operation “Concordia” in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which replaced the NATO mission Operation “Allied Harmony.” Led by France as the “framework nation” and supported by NATO assets and capabilities, the operation was the first test case of the Berlin Plus agreement and proved a success. Again, CEE troops were present.

The third mission of 2003 was Operation “Artemis” in the DRC. Led by the French, this short mission was significant because it took the EU outside Europe, demonstrating not only that the EU could “go global” but also that the UN now viewed the EU as a major security actor. Though arguably uncontroversial, limited in scope, and heavily reliant both on the leadership of the large “old” EU states and on NATO assets, the ESDP missions in 2003 signalled a breakthrough. They have since been followed up by other EU deployments involving troops from both EU and non-EU states.<sup>24</sup>

Even more importantly, in 2004 the EU proved to the CEE states that it could be an effective diplomatic actor and a supporter in the area of vital interests for the region—namely, in Ukraine. The 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections were compromised by massive corruption, voter intimidation, and direct electoral fraud leading to the social unrest and a standoff between the pro-Russian and pro-Western camps. Ukraine’s western neighbors Lithuania and Poland acted as negotiators between both camps and argued in favor of repeating the elections. The rest of the EU—and especially France and

Germany—were initially reluctant to lend the official EU support to the mission of the Lithuanians and the Poles; however, eventually they agreed that EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, should join the negotiations. As a result, what was initially a regional initiative of two CEE states became a policy of the EU, which undoubtedly made a considerable difference to the outcome of the negotiations, which resulted in the repeating of elections and the triumph of the pro-Western camp.

An important consequence of these developments was that Central and East Europeans ceased to view the functions of the EU as irrelevant in providing security. Crucially, the increasing relevance of the EU's security policy in the face of growing concerns over Iraq highlighted the significant overlap and blurring of functions that could now be detected between the roles of NATO and the EU.

## The Constitutional Treaty and the European Security Strategy

Parallel to the proliferation of EU-led missions and the growing relevance of the EU's foreign-policy role, the institutional development of the CFSP and ESDP proceeded from 2002 onwards within the framework of the Convention on the Future of Europe charged with writing a constitutional treaty for the EU. While disagreements over Iraq threatened to dismember EU foreign policy, the convention was getting to grips with some fundamental and forward-looking questions related to the CFSP/ESDP.

In the early deliberations of the Convention on the Future of Europe, the candidate states kept a relatively low profile and adhered to mainstream opinion. With EU enlargement on the horizon, CFSP-related questions were pushed down the agenda by the more immediate and pressing concerns of accession. CEE governmental and parliamentary representatives to the CFSP and Defense working groups raised uncontroversial issues that were familiar themes in their foreign policies: the ESDP should not be developed as a rival to NATO, which should remain the core security institution in Europe; and it should become an "inclusive" entity with equality for all participating states, regardless of their size and whether they belonged to the EU.

However, amid the progress made by the Convention on the Future of Europe and against the backdrop of Iraq, the CEE states became more involved in the convention's proposals on foreign- and security-policy issues and adopted a more embracing approach. For example, Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz called for the EU to expand the CFSP area.<sup>25</sup> Though doubtless a response to accusations that Poland was being disloyal to the EU, Cimoszewicz's call demonstrated that Polish thinking on the ESDP had travelled a considerable distance. More important, it showed that a more articulate and detailed policy stance could emerge.

In subsequent statements, the CEE governments welcomed the pro-integrationist proposals that emerged from the Convention on the Future of Europe. They were particularly forthcoming on issues related to the CFSP and supported all major initiatives put forward by Luc Dehaene’s working group, including the idea of a “double-hatted” foreign minister who would have broad authority and one foot in the Council of Ministers and the other in the European Commission. In addition, the CEE states backed the idea of giving the union a “legal personality” and establishing an EU diplomatic service.

CEE responses to the proposals made by Michel Barnier’s working group on the ESDP were more qualified, albeit generally positive. They supported the creation of an EU Armaments and Research Agency and the inclusion of a mutual defense (‘solidarity’) clause.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, despite consistently emphasizing the need to respect and preserve the role of NATO, the CEE states made several statements indicating their openness toward the idea of increasing the EU’s autonomous planning capacity and supported the British proposal to install a European planning cell at NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium. In general, CEE delegates recognized that the EU needed its own defense capabilities, which, though complementary to those of NATO, could be deployed independently of the United States.<sup>27</sup>

New Europeans’ growing willingness to embrace the CFSP and ESDP was mirrored by their approach to the ESS, which was negotiated against the backdrop of the divisions over Iraq. CEE receptions of the ESS demonstrated a shift from skepticism toward the realization that the EU could be a credible security actor. In particular, the combination of political role and economic carrot without neglecting the importance of the military stick appealed to the candidate states. The New Europeans praised the ESS for its bold language, its holistic approach to security, and its appreciation of the value of transatlantic relations. They were also satisfied with what appeared to be the prospect of the EU’s becoming a global actor—one that would not shy away from international engagement, including the use of force.

There was a clear recognition in the CEE states that the ESS promoted a stronger and internationally more active EU, which was increasingly seen as compatible with interests of CEE states. This view was overwhelmingly supported by public opinion. For example, in 2004 no fewer than 65 percent of Slovaks and 77 percent of Poles believed that Europe should have more military power in order to be able to protect its interests independently of the United States.<sup>28</sup>

Since the CEE states joined the EU, their status has fundamentally changed, and one of the main reasons for their Atlanticism—their exclusion from West European decision-making bodies—no longer exists. Besides the domestic impact of EU enlargement, another factor that is likely to influence the further evolution of CEE foreign and security policies is the continued development



of the EU's Neighborhood policy. The key reason for CEE Atlanticism is not some special cultural affinity with the USA but fear of Russia. As soon as the EU proves capable of speaking with one voice vis-à-vis Russia and the regional interests of new member states are taken seriously in the rest of the EU, the pro-Americanism of Central and East Europeans will abate.<sup>29</sup>

## The End of New Europe?

The picture of transatlantic relations outlined by Rumsfeld in January 2003 no longer exists. Spain and Italy have pulled their forces from Iraq and both now have governments that could rival Jacques Chirac in their criticism of the USA. At the same time, Germany and France have governments far more sympathetic to the USA than was the case with their predecessors. In fact, France's new President Nicolas Sarkozy is now criticized at home for his alleged pro-Americanism in very similar terms to the criticism that used to be made against Tony Blair. Perhaps most symbolically, Donald Rumsfeld himself left the stage amidst the criticism not just of driving the nation to war but predominantly of mishandling it so badly. What about the most loyal "New Europe"? Is it still out there for America when it needs it? Is it still in a quarrel with its West European neighbors? Does it still exist?

There is no doubt that the concept of "New Europe," understood as a group of pro-US states in Europe, has been considerably weakened in recent years. This was caused by three developments: Iraq, EU enlargement, and growing divergences amongst the CEE states.

### *Iraq*

Iraq has actually always been a more controversial issue for the CEE states than is usually acknowledged. Even at the time when it was not as clear as it has since become that this war would fail, public opinion in all these countries was out of step with their governments—between 60 and 70 percent of the population in CEE states were opposed to the war and the approval rating of the US policy has declined sharply in the region.<sup>30</sup>

There were many controversies over Iraq and US policy within the political establishments of the New Europeans as well. For instance, by signing the letter of eight, Czech President Václav Havel was in fact acting in disagreement with his government. His successor Václav Klaus declared that he would not have done the same. The Czech government's position was characterized by its prime minister as "precisely halfway" between the USA and European neighbors. The then Czech foreign minister distanced himself from the letter

and claimed that the country “sides with the coalition without being a member.” Similar positions were held in Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary and tensions emerged within their governments.<sup>31</sup>

Following the end of the combat operation in Iraq, it soon became clear that the New Europeans would be disappointed in their expectations of being awarded some form of booty for siding with the USA. The prospects of economic benefits resulting from the participation of CEE companies in the reconstruction of Iraq proved elusive. Instead, New Europeans found themselves under pressure from the USA to write off the debts owed to them by the regime of Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, instead of assisting military reform in the CEE states, the USA suspended military aid to six of the seven future NATO members (except for Romania), who refused to sign bilateral agreements exempting US military serving abroad from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (the Article 98 dispute). Perhaps most controversially for the CEE public opinion, all New Europeans continue to be subjected to stringent migration rules and visa requirements in the USA. When Poland’s former president Aleksander Kwasniewski raised the issue during his visit to Washington, it was made clear to him that his query was bordering on being inappropriate and that no change of policy was going to transpire.<sup>32</sup>

Finally, it has on occasion been made clear to the CEE states that they have no say in defining the coalition’s future moves in Iraq. For example, when James Baker’s and Lee Hamilton’s Iraq Study Group was compiling its report, *The Way Forward: A New Approach*, the panel interviewed British, Italian, and Danish leaders but not a single leader from the CEE states. This was particularly surprising for the Poles, given that, as of June 2007, they still led the Multinational South Central Division and were the fourth largest foreign force in Iraq.

In short, the CEE states got little in return for their engagement in Iraq. On the contrary, sending troops there was not only domestically unpopular but also costly, in many cases setting off defense reforms by consuming scarce resources that some of these states saved for modernizing their armed forces. Some CEE coalition members, such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Ukraine, experienced considerable casualties, in all cases the largest ever in any operations that these states had been involved in since the end of Second World War.<sup>33</sup> Of course, the numbers of coalition casualties are not comparable with those of the USA, but, unlike in America, almost nobody in the CEE states would accept that these troops were actually defending their homeland. Iraq has weakened the perception of the USA as a credible ally. The USA is, of course, still perceived as the most powerful nation, but also as a reckless one.<sup>34</sup> In some quarters of the CEE states, the USA is now seen more as a bully than an ally.<sup>35</sup>

### *EU Enlargement*

At the same time as the CEE states were disappointed in their transatlantic solidarity, most of them experienced an unexpectedly smooth integration into the EU. For anyone who dreamt that “special relations” with the USA could provide some sort of alternative to EU membership, a comparison between the two could not be more striking. Following EU enlargement, CEE nationals were able not only to travel (this freedom the EU had granted to most of them years before) but also to work and settle in most of the EU. Young Poles, Czechs, and Lithuanians now often gain experience by working and studying in London, Paris, and Berlin. Given the remaining visa restriction going to the USA, that is far more difficult and no longer as attractive for the CEE youth.

Various EU funds started to flow to the CEE states, for Poland alone amounting to over 150 billion euro over five years compared with the minuscule amount of \$30 million of military support that Warsaw receives from the USA. The effect of the EU programs is already visible—with all new member states rapidly upgrading their infrastructure, building new roads, airports, and so on. Economic growth has shot up in all new member states, with some of them—the Baltic states—recording double-digit rates outpacing Chinese figures. The results are not only economic but also political. Support for EU membership in new member states is now much higher (on average close to 70 percent in 2007) than in 2003–4 and on the whole amongst the highest in the whole of the EU.<sup>36</sup> CEE nations are also supportive of boosting the EU’s political, defense, and foreign policies.

### **Divergences amongst the CEE States**

The CEE states form an increasingly diverse group of countries with different agendas and interests determined now more by their geography and neighborhoods than their past. In fact, the CEE states never really existed as a coherent group. What united these countries was the past—their experience of foreign domination—and their common goal to join NATO and the EU. As argued earlier, both these factors played a role in their pro-US choice during the war in Iraq. But even then divergences in the group were apparent. For example, whilst Poland and the Baltic States were genuinely guided by their pro-American instincts, some others—such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Macedonia—were decidedly less Atlanticist and therefore had to be “persuaded.”

With most CEE states having joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, that common objective, which gelled them together, is now gone. It has already become apparent that the CEE states do not speak with a common or even a coherent voice in the EU. For example, whilst most new member states (Hungary,

Slovakia, and the Baltic States) enthusiastically embraced the proposed EU constitution that subsequently failed in the referendums in France and the Netherlands in spring 2005, Poland and the Czech Republic joined the group of skeptics. Poland (alongside the UK) also became a main obstacle to the EU agreement on resurrecting a slimmed-down version of the constitution during the German Presidency's summit in Brussels in June 2007. Objecting to a new voting system that substantially reduced Poland's weight vis-à-vis Germany and other bigger member states, Warsaw caused a crisis in its relations with both Old and New Europeans.<sup>37</sup>

In the past it was not unusual for CEE states to diverge in their economic interests or in racing to join the EU; they were, however, at least united in their security perspectives and especially in their relations vis-à-vis the USA (friend) and Russia (foe). By 2007 even this gel was not what it used to be. For example, Hungary withdrew all its forces from Iraq in a politicized manner not dissimilar to the Spanish withdrawal in 2004.<sup>38</sup> The same thing happened in Slovakia, where the issue became politicized, contributing to the defeat of the conservative coalition and the subsequent withdrawal of troops from Iraq. In Bulgaria, in June 2007 the outgoing parliament voted in favor of pulling out its 450 troops by the end of 2007.<sup>39</sup> The 2007 Hungarian, Slovenian, and Slovak governments had effectively already left the Atlanticist camp, with some of their members going out of their way to outdo “Old Europeans” in their criticism of the USA.

There is also a growing diversity in the CEE states' relations with Russia, which in the past served as a litmus test of CEE identity. Most CEE states remain wary of Russia and continue to work on loosening their dependence on Russian energy—the tool that Moscow routinely uses to exercise pressure on its neighbors and extract political concessions. However, some individual CEE states have chosen to establish closer relations with Russia and have not fended off Gazprom's attempt to monopolize their energy markets. For example, after years of playing both ways, Hungary signed a deal on the construction of a new Gazprom-sponsored “Blue Stream” pipeline, which not only gives the Russians an almost absolute control of the Hungarian market but also directly jeopardizes the EU Nabucco project—which was intended to address Europe's growing dependence on Russian gas—and weakens Ukraine's position as a transit country vis-à-vis Russia.<sup>40</sup> In less-publicized deals, Slovakia and Bulgaria have sold their networks to Gazprom too.<sup>41</sup>

In the meantime, Russia's relations with Poland and the Baltic States have worsened. Moscow views Poland and Lithuania as agents of Westernization in the former Soviet Republics and especially in Ukraine and Belarus. Following the incident with the removal of the Soviet hero's monument from the center of Tallinn, Russia and Estonia have in fact been in a state of cyber warfare. In opposition to the more relaxed Southeast Europeans, the Poles and the

Lithuanians do whatever they can to weaken their dependence on Russia, not least by teaming up with Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan in building an alternative oil pipeline from Odessa to Plock in Poland.<sup>42</sup>

Over the past few years Rumsfeld's "New Europe" has split into two major groups: the core Atlanticists in Northeast Europe (Poland and the Baltic States) and the Southeast Europeans (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia), who are shaking off their past Atlanticism and eagerly joining "Old Europe." These groups are, of course, not always very neatly defined around the geographical boundaries. For example, Romania and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic, whilst geographically more in the south, remain in fact politically core-Atlanticist. The key reason why Atlanticism persists in the first group but wanes in the second is the different attitude toward Russia, which, for example, is very divergent for Estonia and Slovenia. New Europe still exists, but it is much smaller than during Rumsfeld's day. Moreover, even the most diehard Atlanticists in New Europe would not now so unreservedly endorse America's foreign policy. America had an enormous capital of trust in the region; a considerable share of this was wasted in Iraq.

## Notes

1. See Radek Sikorski, "Losing the New Europe," *Washington Post*, Nov. 7, 2003.
2. "Europe and America Must Stand United," *The Times*, Jan. 30, 2003.
3. [http://www.novinite.com/view\\_news.php?id=19022](http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=19022).
4. <http://www.cnn.com/2003/world/europe/02/18/sprj.iqr.chirac/>.
5. Simon Duke, "The Enlarged EU and the CFSP", 4, [http://www.csm.org.pl/images/rte/File/Raporty%20i%20publikacje/Raporty%20i%20analizy/2004/rap\\_i\\_an\\_0504.pdf](http://www.csm.org.pl/images/rte/File/Raporty%20i%20publikacje/Raporty%20i%20analizy/2004/rap_i_an_0504.pdf).
6. This analogy was presented to the author in Washington's famous Cosmos club by an official of one of the EU founding member states.
7. 194 Polish troops, including 54 special forces troops (GROM), participated in the actual invasion of Iraq. Following the fall of Saddam's Iraq, Poland took command of the Multinational Central-South division, with its troop contributions reaching 2,500 at the highest level.
8. George J. Viksnins, "New Europe, New Problems: The Case of the Baltic States," *National Interest*, 73 (Fall 2003).
9. John Springford, "'Old' and 'New' Europeans United: Public Attitudes towards the Iraq War and US Foreign Policy," a background brief published by the Centre for European Reform, [http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/back\\_brief\\_springford\\_dec03.pdf](http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/back_brief_springford_dec03.pdf).
10. Interview with F.-W. Steinmaier, *Handelsblatt*, Feb. 19, 2007; Kurt Beck, "Keine neue Raketten in Europa," [www.spd.de/menu/1708639](http://www.spd.de/menu/1708639).
11. On Mar. 9, 2007, Chirac said "le projet américain de bouclier anti-missiles, qui inquiète la Russie, risque de recréer de nouvelles lignes de divisions en Europe" ([http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/afp/depeches\\_francais/bouclier\\_anti-missiles\\_chirac\\_met\\_en\\_garde\\_contre\\_de\\_nouvelles\\_divisions.74138.html](http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/afp/depeches_francais/bouclier_anti-missiles_chirac_met_en_garde_contre_de_nouvelles_divisions.74138.html)).

12. See Emmanuelle Laloum and Stine Rasmussen, “Shaping French Foreign Policy for the Next 5 Years,” *Analizy Natolinskie*, 5/18 (2007), [www.natolin.edu.pl](http://www.natolin.edu.pl).
13. Jürgen Habermas und Jacques Derrida, “Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 31, 2003.
14. Matthew Rhodes, “Central Europe and Iraq: Balance, Bandwagon, or Bridge?,” *Orbis* (Summer 2004).
15. The Franco-German Monster, *The Economist*, Oct. 25, 2003.
16. Helen Szamuely, “The Myth of a Single European View: Old Europe and New,” The Brugges Group, Comments, 2003, <http://www.bruggesgroup.com/mediacentre/comment.live?article=145>; Michael Radu, “Old Europe vs. New,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-notes, Mar. 12, 2003; Josef Joffe, “Continental Divides,” *National Interest* (Spring 2003).
17. Jean-Luc Dehaene and Pal Dunay, “Boxes: Why CFSP and CESDP Do Not Matter Much to EU Candidate Countries,” a policy paper published by the Robert Schuman Centre, 1/5 (2001), 11.
18. See Fraser Cameron and Antoinette Primatarova, “Enlargement, CFSP and the Convention,” European Policy Institutes Network Working Paper, No. 5 (June 2003), <http://www.epin.org/convention/index.html>; and Simon Duke, “The Enlarged EU and the CFSP,” a report published by the Centre for International Relations, Warsaw, 5/4, Apr. 2, 2004.
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## 8

# How Well Can Europe and the United States Cooperate on Non-European Issues?

*Helga Haftendorn*

### Introduction

When coalition forces attacked Iraq in March 2003, the United States and the UK did so without a mandate from the UN Security Council. Their unilateral move led to a deep crisis in transatlantic relations. It marked a peak of several years of tensions between Europe and the USA on global issues. But to understand the scope of this crisis better, we need to establish whether this rift has been a corollary of the idiosyncrasies of the Bush administration and the rigidities of its neo-conservative doctrines, which will go away with a new president. Or has the dispute on the Iraq conflict—coming after the dramatic events of 11/9 1989 and 9/11 2001—been a catalyst for fundamental divergences in interests, values, and norms, and concepts of world order on both sides of the Atlantic that will stay? Or do these disputes relate to structural causes and are a sign of more trouble to come in a world at the same time more connected and more separated, with no accepted overarching global security structure?<sup>1</sup>

In this chapter,<sup>2</sup> I will analyze how well Europe and the United States cooperate on non-European issues and ask why they find it so hard to agree. Why do these disputes often lead to serious transatlantic conflicts that are difficult to reconcile? To answer the question about resilience, I need to establish whether transatlantic conflicts are caused by transient, factual problems and personal attitudes, or whether they relate to structural causes that will endure and not go away with a change of administration. There is much evidence, however, that the transatlantic harmony evident in the cold-war days cannot be restored again, at least not on non-European issues. Further, transatlantic relations before were not as harmonious as many remember. Still,



we should appreciate that Europe and America share common values as well as a common understanding of the major risks confronting them.

I will look at a number of issues where different American and European approaches manifest themselves. They are selected both for their topicality and their variance. I will analyze the following illustrative cases:

- coping with failing states: European focus on sub-Saharan conflict;
- combating terrorism: war and reconstruction in Afghanistan;
- preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD): the case of Iran;
- the Middle Eastern tangle: what future for Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq?
- the emerging challenge of China: economic opportunity or military threat?

The individual cases will show where Americans and Europeans are engaged, under which conditions they cooperate well, and when cooperation has been difficult or impossible. I assume that there is a linkage between the various causes underlying the political explanations given. Thus various layers of rationales have to be separated. A first cut reveals a whole gamut of common and competing interests. A second cut uncovers sets of overlapping though often incongruent values, norms, and belief systems. Based on these, a third cut substantiates contrasting concepts of world order. These explanations have to be brought together. Commonalities and differences will derive from structured rationales such as power relationships and geostrategic positions, historical and cultural traditions; they shape America's and Europe's operational code, strategy, and the instruments used.

Before describing the various rationales, two caveats are in order. In spite of the large constitutional powers a US president wields, the USA is not a unitary actor but harbors various currents and fractions that shape administration decision making as well as advice and consent given by Congress. Even less do Europeans speak with one voice. While the European Union (EU) strives for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it is made up of twenty-seven sovereign states following different political priorities. Especially in security affairs, the authority continues to rest with the individual state. "American" or "European" standpoints and priorities have to be understood as approximations of shared positions.

A second caveat relates to changes over time. Both the US and European governments respond to domestic demands and moods. Agenda setting results from a tug-of-war between political leadership on the one side, and media and public opinion on the other. At the 2006 mid-term US elections the increasing criticism of the war in Iraq resulted in Republican defeats and forced the Bush administration to modify its practices, while the leadership changes in Germany, Poland, France, and the UK altered these countries' operating styles.

## Common and Competing Interests

The United States and the European countries share basic interests and core threat perceptions. They will defend their country if attacked, assure economic well-being, and preserve national identity and moral values. American and European priorities on how to realize these objectives diverge, though, according to power position, historical experience, and cultural tradition.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States ascended to a position of primacy unchallenged by any other nation. Its “victory” in the cold war has been the defining experience that shapes its political outlook. Unrivalled power endows the USA with an ability for global leadership and a capacity to mold the international environment according to its preferences. To preserve this favorable situation, President Bush in his inaugural address declared that the USA will build its defenses beyond challenge.<sup>3</sup>

It took a while before Americans realized their supremacy<sup>4</sup> but they did before Al-Qaeda struck on September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks created a deep trauma: America’s plentitude of power could not protect the country from attacks on its homeland. This badly shook the USA’s self-image of power and invulnerability, and explains the stark reaction taken by the Bush administration. The “Bush doctrine” threatened that international terrorism would be destroyed with military force everywhere where it could be found.<sup>5</sup> The “war on terror” received widespread domestic support and was seen as an act of self-defense. When the USA intervened in Afghanistan to smoke out safe havens for Al-Qaeda and Taliban, the Europeans supported them in solidarity. They realized that in a globalized world their security had to be defended at the Hindukush.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, at its November 2002 summit, the Atlantic alliance resolved to shed the geographical limits of the 1949 NATO Treaty.<sup>7</sup>

Europe, in comparison, suffers from an asymmetry of power vis-à-vis the USA, a loss of centrality in international affairs, and a lack of unity among its members. As long as an integrated Europe has not found its role in the world, this makes for insecurity and uncertainty. Europe’s defining historical experience, after the drama of two world wars, Nazi domination, and the cold war, has been East–West détente and the peaceful unification of its continent. Integration serves to prevent a rebirth of ill-fated nationalism and to give Europeans new unity and political weight in the international arena. But it is slow and cumbersome, because of the diversity of interests and traditions, and the peoples’ concern that their national identity might be engulfed by the Brussels juggernaut. To protect themselves, Europeans tend to make the USA into an “another” against which identity building takes place.<sup>8</sup>

In a subtle way the US National Security Strategy<sup>9</sup> differs from the European version<sup>10</sup> though the latter basically is a replica of the first. Both take a global

approach and recognize as primary threats international terrorism, the spread of WMD, regional conflicts, and the emergence of failed states; they also link security to economic well-being. In their goals both strategies are largely compatible, but they differ in the ways and means with which they are to be accomplished. The US strategy favors the use of military power; it builds on offensive action, aims at regime change, and does not rule out preventive war. The Europeans instead talk about “pre-emptive engagement.” They put the accent on promoting international stability; they follow a strategy of engagement, of regional conflict solution, and of economic development. They emphasize elements of soft power such as strengthening multilateralism and international institutions. This attitude, though, makes them vulnerable to charges of being appeasers. The Balkan experience has further led Washington to assume that it was better off acting alone and avoiding another war by committee. Assertive unilateralism has thus become the Bush administration’s hallmark.

Another US priority is to uphold the favorable economic situation that has evolved and has made Washington a gatekeeper of the world economy. It serves best America’s need for secure access to raw materials, and shapes its relations with oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia and Nigeria. But the USA tries to balance its political interests with its economic ones, accepting authoritarian but US-friendly rulers, though without compromising on its basic security concerns: fighting for a victory in the war on terror and preventing nuclear proliferation. It also tries to keep the global market in good shape, supports the World Trade Organization (WTO), and ensures the stability of the dollar as one of the world’s prime reserve currencies.

Since the end of Second World War, the European Union has become an economic and financial competitor to the United States. But, as Europe’s wealth depends on its integration into a liberalized global market, it shares America’s interest in its preservation. Both, the USA and the EU are heavily dependent on each other, not just in trade but also in financial transactions and communication. Even more than the USA, Europe depends on access to foreign markets for the export of its industrial products and on imports of a wide selection of raw materials. The EU is usually reluctant to compromise on reaping the economic benefits of its relations with other countries. This is evident in its approach to China: the Europeans regard the People’s Republic and its large domestic market as an enormous economic opportunity, while the USA sees in China a political competitor and a military threat, especially considering the fragile situation in the Taiwan Straits—a risk to which most Europeans are oblivious. The EU is not yet a robust political and military actor in Asia that could compare with the USA—and it is not the EU’s intention to become one.

## Overlapping but Distinct Values and Belief Systems

As most American principles are old European ones, there is much overlapping. Both value freedom; they believe in government of, by, and for the people, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and promoting market economics. But there are subtle differences in their belief systems and in their interpretation of norms and values. Americans think that the responsibility for their own fate rests with the individual and that relations with others are based on competition. Republicans generally believe that the state should guarantee individuals' rights but interfere as little as possible with their pursuit of happiness. Europeans instead hold a state-centered view according to which the government should provide for the protection of individuals, assure their access to equal opportunities, and create conditions for solidarity between individuals and their fellow citizens. It is thus no surprise that, besides liberal traditions, socialist ideas have found a fertile soil in Europe but not in America.

Much wider is the gap in belief systems. The Presbyterian tradition of America as "God's chosen country" gives Americans great moral assurance. Their self-image of a "city upon the hill" provides a yardstick with which they measure other actors and distinguish between good and evil forces. In recent years religious fundamentalism has further gained in strength, especially among the conservative right. While in the 1980s President Ronald Reagan stigmatized the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" that belonged on the "ash heap of history," President Bush has associated Iran, Iraq, and North Korea with an "axis of evil" that needs to be eradicated.<sup>11</sup> From this belief springs the conviction that, if freedom and democracy were brought to the lands of darkness, their people would embrace these values enthusiastically, defeating radicalism and terrorism. The Bush administration's interventions have been characterized as a mixture of "Wilsonianism and power," or, in Pierre Hassner's words, as "Wilsonianism in boots."<sup>12</sup> The rhetoric of freedom is more than a cloak for self-interest, and disappointment in Iraq has been a setback but no ground yet for changing America's moral course. In contrast, European societies have become widely secularized though religious beliefs still influence individual behavior. The European project can be seen as a secular humanist application of the Enlightenment. Memories of two world wars and the holocaust, though, prevent most Europeans from entertaining as Manichean views as spring from American exceptionalism.

Generally unwavering in their beliefs and convictions, Americans are concerned about challenges to their identity but tend to minimize the changes that take place at home as a result of waves of Hispanic immigrants and the rise of new non-European elites. Their fight against Islamic fundamentalism

has a unifying effect and takes the place that anti-communism held during the cold war. It is already ten years since Samuel P. Huntington coined the slogan of an approaching “clash of civilizations.”<sup>13</sup> In its popular version, 9/11 has confirmed it.

Preserving national identity and cultural values has several dimensions. On both sides of the Atlantic there is a strong awareness of American cultural preponderance: English is the lingua franca in most parts of the world, and US achievements in research and teaching as well as in film and modern art provide international benchmarks. Accordingly, many in America see culture as an element of soft power easily deployable. In Europe, the French in particular are concerned about infringements of their culture and language. French Euro-Gaullists on the right and left-wing German intellectuals emphasize European differences, asserting the superiority of their culture because of its long history and refinement, which they compare to America’s quickly changing fashions and pop cultures. This kind of anti-Americanism has contributed to identity building in Europe, too.

Belief systems and cultural traditions also shape the diverging foreign-policy styles. In general, Americans define their national interests before they make a decision, though since 9/11 their actions have been driven more by risk than by interest. Most EU governments first seek guidance from the enduring principles of international law and/or enter a discourse within the appropriate organizations. Americans base their foreign policy on the assumption that they, not an international organization, are responsible for their own fate, and that it is ethical to pursue national interests. Legitimacy cannot be conferred by institutions; it must result from the moral power of the objectives and how they are implemented. For them, international institutions and covenants are opportunity structures subject to a cost-benefit analysis. Most Europeans, especially in the Protestant north, do not share this utilitarian rationale but follow the German philosopher Kant’s “categorical imperative,” according to which individual behavior should be sustained by moral principles and keep to the rule of law. It follows from this approach that they—especially the Germans—pursue a legal or even legalistic approach according to which agreed norms and rules must be followed and moral principles heeded.<sup>14</sup>

## **Contrasting Worldviews and Concepts of Order**

In spite of the backlash in Iraq that is upsetting the American psyche, the United States sees itself at the apex of a unipolar world system that has hegemonial features. The terrorist attacks fuelled American neoconservatives with a desire to play Metternich, remaking the world according to their own design.<sup>15</sup> But, contrary to the claims from its critics, the USA in general does

not strive for imperial powers to govern the world; rather it aims at global structures that are conducive to its goals and aspirations. While it wants to work with allies in order to meet the challenge of international terrorism, it desires to preserve its ability to act alone if necessary. Washington expects its partners not to challenge America's leadership and tries to keep the EU from attempting to balance the USA; it feels rather that it should join the bandwagon. The Europeans, on their part, often think in terms of balancing. The EU, to be effective and stable, is built on a system of sophisticated balances, which prevent one country from dominating another, and ensure the weak are not at the mercy of the powerful. Because of the salutary effects of both balancing and integrating, the EU in its relations with non-European states tries to encourage others to integrate and to balance.

Grounded on a firm set of beliefs and convictions, US foreign policy aims at universalizing American principles. With a view of the world as an anarchic Hobbesian system, it has embarked on a fierce war against terrorism. Its goal is regime change in rogue states; its long-term vision to transform the Greater Middle East, which it sees as the hub of Islamic fundamentalism, into a region where freedom and democracy govern and conflicts are solvable. After the frustrating experiences in Iraq, though, the second Bush administration has advocated the use of military power primarily to defeat threats to American security, and not to redesign the world.<sup>16</sup>

Less assured of themselves, the Europeans do not have a stringent concept of global order; its members instead tend to advertise their national models. They follow the readings of John Locke rather than those of Thomas Hobbes, and argue for a universal treatise on governance. Legitimacy is a central element in their understanding of power, international legitimacy being based on multilateral consensus. It is embodied in international organizations that provide systems of agreed rules and regulations, and foster legitimacy through their process and output. On the global level the Europeans support the United Nations, in the transatlantic arena NATO, and in Europe the EU. In dealing with other states they emphasize the benefits of multilateralism; they also try to prevent the USA from taking recourse to unilateral actions.

Though both Americans and Europeans worry about the risks caused by terrorists and failed states, they diverge in their strategies on coping with them. Instead of declaring a war on terrorism, Europeans try to control it by a mixture of police and intelligence activities. The Bush administration, instead, wants to eradicate terrorism with "fire and the sword" and believes that, if countries embraced freedom and democracy, they would defy terrorism and live as responsible members of the international community. After 9/11, Western-style democracy building, if necessary by force, became a key element of the US policy vis-à-vis rogue states. Slowly Washington has realized that popular elections may produce very unwelcome results. The Iraq quagmire had a further sobering effect on its democracy campaign.

Kantian Europeans are often too ready to embark on nation building, though they do not have an ideal recipe for stabilizing failing states either. Since they believe that a new democracy needs a fertile soil for it to take root, Europeans prioritize political stabilization and economic reconstruction. They also display a greater tolerance for different cultures and seek to strengthen the traditional elements of governance and cooperate closely with local leaders. At least in theory they want to be advisers and not preceptors. Europeans also interpret human rights more broadly; their concept encompasses elements of human security, such as freedom from hunger, shelter, and health. Needless to say, there is often a big discrepancy between aspirations and practices.

### **Coping with Failing States: European Attention on Sub-Saharan Conflict**

Failed or failing states represent threats to the region and risks to Europe and the United States. To influence developments in a positive manner, the EU uses its institutionalized relationship with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. In the Cotonou Agreement (2000), it has made aid to these countries conditional on their adherence to the principles of good governance. In December 2005 the EU approved a comprehensive strategy for Africa and resolved to strengthen its Africa Action Plan for support and peace in the region.<sup>17</sup> But it is very doubtful whether the African states will heed those prescriptions. At the 2007 EU–African summit they openly challenged European admonitions to observe human rights as preposterous. To strengthen African ownership, the EU has also pledged to cooperate closely with regional institutions such as the African Union (AU), the Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). It sees regional institutions as the best means to strengthen Africa’s capacity for the prevention and management of conflicts.

The USA prefers to deal bilaterally with individual countries. Its policy on sub-Saharan Africa is marked by the contradiction between a humanitarian façade and a focus on political stability. Washington anxiously watches developments in East Africa, afraid that the area’s weak states might provide safe havens for Islamic terrorists. Another concern is that the rich uranium mines of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) could fall into hostile hands. Otherwise, America’s interests center on Nigeria, which it sees as a stabilizing factor and a regional partner for containing ethnic violence in West Africa.<sup>18</sup> As the single largest consumer (40 percent) of Nigeria’s oil, it wishes to shield this resource. To protect Western oil firms from conflict in the Niger Delta, it has concluded a special US–Nigeria security agreement. In West Africa,

Britain and France—the former is engaged in Sierra Leone and the latter in Ivory Coast—compete with the USA and China for the region’s resources and industrial opportunities.

Europeans also seek influence and advance economic interests. Their attention has focused mainly on the DRC. In 2006 a European unit, EUFOR, was deployed in the Kinshasa area to assist the UN peacekeeping force MONUC and to safeguard presidential and parliamentary elections. To prove the EU’s ability to act autonomously, this has been kept as a purely European operation. NATO was deliberately not involved, which caused some raised eyebrows in Washington. The initiative for this was taken by France. It wanted to establish a European footprint in the region. Additionally, it wanted to prove the effectiveness of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Because French forces were insufficient to do the job alone, Paris persuaded its partners to send additional troops and Germany to set up a command staff. With a portion of good luck the mission was successfully accomplished and the forces were withdrawn after six months.

In spite of latent competition and occasional ruffles, the gap between European and American policies in sub-Saharan Africa is not very wide nor does it incite open tensions. US attention has rather focused on other regions such as Afghanistan and the Middle East.

### **Combating Terrorism: War Fighting and Reconstruction in Afghanistan<sup>19</sup>**

After 9/11, President Bush declared a global “war on terror” that required a national response. He singled out Afghanistan for providing a logistical basis for Al-Qaeda that needed to be eradicated. For its campaign the USA did not seek the support of the UN or NATO; instead it built a “coalition of the willing.” After the fighting had ended, Washington called on the Europeans to staff an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which started operating on 2 January 2002 and has been under NATO command since mid-2003. Its first task was to shield the Afghan constitutional process. Concurrently, substantial US, British, French, and some German Special Forces fought residual Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the Eastern regions.

The Germans used their contacts with traditional Afghan leaders to guide them toward self-government. In the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001, representatives of the various Afghanistan fractions agreed on a timetable for re-establishing an Afghan state. In this effort they were assisted by US advisers, while Europeans and Japanese helped rebuild political governance and reconstruct the economy. In 2003–5 ISAF forces moved into the Northern and Western provinces and established small Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to assist with civil projects, provide security, and extend Afghan central



control. The European teams focused on reconstruction, while those established by the USA concentrated on security.<sup>20</sup> The Europeans resisted a merger of ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), because they worried that ISAF's stabilizing role might be compromised by the casualties caused by OEF anti-terrorist operations. In December 2005 NATO beefed up the ISAF mission and extended its reach to the Southern and Eastern provinces known for Taliban strongholds. Soon British and Canadian ISAF forces became engaged in heavy fighting, suffering substantial losses.

In spite of differing national priorities, the alliance managed to maintain a basic unity of purpose until mid-2006. Then Taliban attacks intensified, and neither the new Afghan army nor the small police forces were up to their task. The rebuilding of Afghan governance and the physical reconstruction of the country were also lagging far behind established goals. As a result the central government lost in effectiveness and credibility, leading to growing frustration among the Afghans. President Hamid Karzai was falling between two stools: in Afghanistan he was seen as an American puppet, while Washington was getting ever more impatient with him for not delivering what his government had set out to do.

With increasing unrest in Afghanistan, tensions also built up between the USA and its allies. Disagreements related to the goals to be realized and the methods to implement them. Should Afghanistan be rebuilt as a model democracy once the war against the Taliban had been won, as the Americans argued? The Europeans doubted whether a working democracy could be established in a tribal country, and advocated as much regional governance as possible under the rule of law whether this was Western or Shia. Other disagreements concerned the formation of the Afghan police: whether the country needed a lot of armed sheriffs quickly (as suggested by the Americans), or a well-trained police force devoted to putting civil rights into practice (as the Europeans argued).

When Taliban insurgents intensified their attacks in 2007, the USA called on the Europeans to increase their forces substantially and to shed national constraints that restricted their deployment and effectiveness. Only the UK, Poland, and Denmark committed substantial new forces, bringing the ISAF up to 40,000 troops, with a further 10,000 in OEF under US command. Germany and France provided additional reconnaissance and transport aircraft. Among the European public, skepticism has grown as to whether the military campaign can turn the tide; they are demanding more emphasis on reconstruction. They criticize the May 2005 American–Afghan partnership declaration, which has an anti-Iranian bias and grants Washington base rights and other privileges. They also argue that the struggle cannot be won in Afghanistan alone. Instead, Europeans favor building a truly multilateral security framework for the whole region, involving Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, and all the other countries that can play a positive role. Events in neighboring

Pakistan have had a very unsettling effect on the situation in Afghanistan: Waziristan and other border areas serve as safe havens for Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and the Pakistani military and political leadership are making a less than halfhearted attempt to fight them. Only a multilateral effort can pave the way for a regional solution. It would, however, need Washington to establish direct contact with Tehran—which it has so far refused to do.

## **Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Iran**

Transatlantic differences over “engagement versus containment” have marked the West’s approach to Iran.<sup>21</sup> Most European and American politicians consider Tehran and its refusal to renounce a nuclear option a very dangerous development but differ on the best method to cope with it. Despite Iran’s suspected development of a nuclear weapons’ program, the EU has long favored dialogue and trade over coercion. US relations with Tehran have been troubled since members of its embassy were taken hostage by Iranian *Pasadaran* in 1979. Washington adopted a containment policy to prevent Iran from using its oil resources as a political tool and from acquiring WMD. Transatlantic tensions mounted after Europe refused to join in sanctions against Iran, because of its substantial economic interests there. When in August 2002 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors discovered proof of previously unknown progress in Tehran’s nuclear program, President Bush announced that the USA would not tolerate the construction of Iranian nuclear weapons. He did not specify the actions Washington might take but hinted at the possibility of a military strike—something the other partners wanted to prevent at all costs.

To de-escalate the crisis caused by Iran’s nuclear program, its concealment, and the strong US reaction, the foreign ministers of the UK, France, and Germany, in a joint EU action (EU-3), persuaded Tehran to sign an Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities. In linking rewards to constraints, they promised to support Iran’s membership in the WTO and held out the prospect of a comprehensive trade and cooperation agreement. Iran observed the protocol for two years but never ratified it. In 2005 it resumed its nuclear research activities and removed the IAEA seals. The EU-3, backed by the United States, now called on Iran to stop these activities immediately while they searched for a common solution in talks with Tehran. When these negotiations amounted to nil, they declared that time had come to restore the credibility of IAEA resolutions and involve the Security Council. Washington had long argued for bringing the case before the UN; it recommended applying all means short of war—strict political and economic sanctions—while the Europeans were

concerned that too much pressure would strengthen the radicals in Iran and intensify their resistance.

In March 2006 the Security Council called on Iran to shelve uranium enrichment. A stronger message was not possible at the time, because Russia, China, and many non-aligned states objected to sanctions. But, when Tehran did not stop enrichment and insisted on its right to exploit the full fuel cycle for peaceful purposes, the USA and the EU, now with Russian and Chinese consent, in December 2006 announced that sanctions would go into effect if Iran did not give in. In March 2007 the sanctions were further tightened. The joint action by the five, even more than the modest sanctions enacted, induced Iran to resume cooperation with the IAEA, though it still refuses to yield on reprocessing.

A US or Israeli military attack on Iran's nuclear installations to cut the Gordian knot, which some in Washington recommend, would fully inflame the Middle East and make solutions for the other conflicts of the region impossible. In December 2007 an evaluation by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was leaked, reporting that Tehran had already discontinued its military nuclear program in 2003. This revelation has taken the heat off from the issue somewhat, though nothing has changed fundamentally. Washington continues to urge for more robust sanctions and calls on Europe as well as on the Russians and Chinese to support a UN resolution to this effect. Newly elected French president Nicolas Sarkozy has promised European support and suggested that, if necessary, unilateral sanctions should be enacted by "willing countries," thus narrowing transatlantic differences.

## **The Middle Eastern Tangle: What Kind of Future for Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq?**

On the Middle East, Americans and Europeans follow shared goals: they want to establish Arab-Israeli peace, to prevent nuclear proliferation, to promote moderation and reform, to cooperate on anti-terrorism measures, and—above all—to achieve political stability in the Arab world. But they disagree in their analysis of the causes of the problems, are at variance on the means to reach their goals, and have different priorities in searching for solutions. Washington sees a common pattern of Islamic fundamentalism fuelling these conflicts and advocates a common solution. In the European perspective, though, all three conflicts have separate roots and need to be treated individually. Europe's priority is a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict; its prime goal is regional stabilization; it doubts whether the democracy campaign advocated by Washington<sup>22</sup> can really pacify the region. Domestic politics add further restraints: any US administration has to pay attention to vocal Jewish

groups, while Europe fears adverse reactions from its immigrant Muslim communities.

The Bush administration initially put the Arab–Israeli conflict on the back burner. But, when the situation deteriorated, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice resumed America’s traditional shuttle diplomacy. After prodding from Germany, the “Quartet”—made up of the USA, Russia, the EU, and the UN—also reinvigorated the “road map,”<sup>23</sup> which incorporates guidelines for a solution of the conflict. At its center are security guarantees for Israel and the prospect of statehood for the Palestinians. The *quid pro quo* is a firm Palestinian commitment to respect the existence of Israel, its security, and previous agreements.

When the radical Hamas faction won the Palestinian elections in January 2006 and took control of the Gaza strip in June 2007, the situation deteriorated further. Israel’s punitive counteractions and American and European financial sanctions led to a factual division of Palestine and restricted the authority of President Mahmud Abbas to *Fatah land* on the West Bank. The EU’s efforts at building a viable Palestinian state were counteracted by its policy of sanctions. Washington’s strategy of squeezing out Hamas also failed, and led to a radicalization of the Palestinians. New efforts by the Saudis and the Arab League, and direct talks by Israeli premier Ehud Olmert and Abbas, did little to bridge the gap.

In a last-ditch effort before it steps down in January 2009, the Bush administration convened a multilateral conference on the Middle East in Annapolis in November 2007. In a marked change from previous policies, the USA invited all states from the region, including Syria, to this conference. The other members of the Quartet were relegated to second-tier participants. The conference yielded few tangible results, except for a vague declaration read by President Bush, committing the Israelis and Palestinians to resume negotiations and to work for a peace agreement within a year. But the huge stumbling blocks to an understanding have not yet been removed: Hamas is not prepared to recognize the existence of Israel as a Jewish state and desist from attacks on Israel, nor are the Israelis ready to stop building new settlements in the West Bank and remove the existing ones. Even less imaginable is an agreed solution for the status of Jerusalem. And, as there is no legitimate partner to speak for all Palestinians, with whom should a peace accord be negotiated that will be observed by all Palestinians?

The 2006 Lebanon War spelled disaster for all involved. For the first time in its history, Israel’s army suffered a defeat and failed to establish a *cordon sanitaire* at its northern border. A reinforced UN peacekeeping mission UNIFIL, with substantial European participation, was deployed in Lebanon to prevent the outbreak of new hostilities. Not only did Lebanon suffer physical damage from the Israeli campaign, but the delicate balance between its religious groups was also shattered, Hezbollah was substantially strengthened, and the

government of Premier Fuad Siniora was undermined. So far, both Americans and Europeans support the elected Lebanese government, while concurrently Washington is trying to weaken the Syrian and Shi'ite forces and European is calling on all parties to exercise restraint.

From its inauguration, the Bush administration saw Iraq as the most dangerous of the rogue states in the "axis of evil." It suspected that Saddam Hussein was striving to acquire nuclear weapons and to incite terrorist acts throughout the region. Washington sought regime change and assumed that a decisive demonstration of US force in Iraq would change the face of the Middle East and probably also produce a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the United States could not get a UN mandate to attack Iraq, American and British troops, assisted by others from Italy, Poland, and Spain, invaded the country in March 2003 and succeeded in bringing down Saddam Hussein within six weeks. Many Europeans, though, were skeptical about the value of military intervention and thought that Washington grossly underestimated the magnitude, time, and costs of war in Iraq. They warned that it could inflame the whole Middle East. A heavy blow to allied as well as European unity was the open opposition from France and Germany. Their concern about entanglement corresponded with an American feeling of defection. Germany, though, began to link its policy of public demarcation with measures of tacit support, because it was concerned that otherwise NATO cohesion would be put at risk.

Five years after the intervention, peace is not at hand. The current "surge"—a last-ditch increase of US forces by an additional 30,000 troops to smoke out the enemy in Baghdad and other terrorist strongholds—has managed to establish some islands of security. In the rest of the country a kind of institutionalized civil war rages between Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Kurds as well as within the various groups. Turkey, with American backing, is further destabilizing Iraq by attacks on Turkish Workers' Party (PKK)<sup>24</sup> strongholds in the Kurdish territories. The central government is weak and divided; it cannot safeguard the country's security and enable the coalition forces to prepare for an orderly withdrawal and a transfer of authority to the Iraqis. Driven by domestic criticism, many European allies have already pulled out or reduced their troops. A quick US withdrawal, though, could plunge the country into full chaos; it would leave a power vacuum sucking every neighboring country into the struggle between the ethnic/religious groups and speeding up Iraq's complete break-up. To prevent this from happening, a multilateral scheme should be created involving all Iraq's neighbors<sup>25</sup> instead of playing Sunnis against Shi'ites as Washington is currently doing. In the hope of avoiding defeat, the USA has reversed some of its previous positions and is now prepared to sit at the same table as Iranians and Syrians at a regional conference. Initial European *Schadenfreude* at America's problems has given way to helplessness and a deep concern about how the region can be stabilized.

## The Emerging Challenge: China—Opportunity or Threat?

China became an issue in transatlantic relations in 2004 when the EU considered rescinding the arms embargo that the West had enacted after the Tiananmen Square massacre in mid-1989. The USA was afraid that sensitive technologies could fall into Peking's hands, leading to changes in the regional balance of power in China's favor. Washington was also concerned that stability in the Taiwan Straits would be undermined and the security of the island endangered. It thus unleashed a political campaign in favor of the embargo, arguing that lifting it would be against US and EU interests. In spite of enhanced cooperation after 9/11, Washington mistrusts China's strategic objectives. It sees Peking as a rising competitor and a military threat in Southeast Asia. The US strategy on China focuses on containment and emphasizes military build-up. The Europeans, on their part, felt that the embargo conflicted with their aim to establish a "maturing partnership" with China<sup>26</sup> and to increase political and economic cooperation. But when the Chinese People's Congress passed an anti-secession law in 2005 and threatened military intervention in case Taiwan decided on national independence, calling off the embargo became a dead issue—at least for the time being.

What the United States sees as a challenge, the Europeans view as an opportunity. They focus on the economic prospects that China offers and utilize a mixture of instruments and forums that center on economic and trade relations, investment, and development aid. The EU also looks favorably on regional cooperation, welcoming Peking's integration into Southeast Asian regional networks such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asian Regional Forum. It wants to engage China in a strategic partnership and bring it into global multilateral institutions. Contrary to Washington, the Europeans do not suspect Peking of exploiting multilateral cooperation to strengthen its role as a regional hegemon. Rather, they are concerned about China's unfair industrial and trade policies. On the Taiwan conflict, the EU advocates a peaceful resolution but tries to isolate its active policy on China from this dispute. It is more worried about China's drive for preferential access to raw materials in Africa, disregarding European efforts of inducing these countries to adhere to good governance.

## Conclusion

How well do Europe and the United States cooperate on non-European issues? Cooperation requires that the actions of individual states that are not in a pre-existing harmony and that follow different interests be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation that is often referred to as "policy coordination."<sup>27</sup> Cooperation between the USA and

Europe involves dealing with transatlantic divergences caused by asymmetries of power that are no longer contained by a common threat. Furthermore, America and Europe embrace different concepts of world order that are founded on diverging values, belief systems, and experiences. Based on these, they also use different strategies and instruments to shape international affairs.

Most Americans want to build a world according to their own image: a unipolar system with few constraints on the United States' ability to act forcefully. With a Hobbesian interpretation of the world, America follows its basic strategic interests by relying on a whole gamut of instruments: rewards and incentives, restraint and containment, different kinds of sanctions, and a wide array of military measures. It believes that containment is more effective than engagement in drawn-out and often futile negotiations. Further American-European divergences exist concerning the Bush administration's global campaign for freedom and democracy. To bring about regime change, the USA is prepared to consider the decapitation of a country, as it did in Iraq.

The Europeans, on the other hand, adhere to a Lockian perception of an international social contract and rely on soft power. Their preferred means are international law and institutions, multilateral negotiations, trade and economic inducements. They too wish to see freedom and democracy implemented, but they know that these need a fertile soil in which to grow. They thus want first to stabilize a country or region. Many Europeans—in particular the Germans and Scandinavians—are very reluctant to use military force, except as an instrument of last resort. They tend to make conditions of its use: first, an international mandate, preferably from the United Nations, and, second, a broad international consensus legitimizing intervention. This different approach considerably burdens transatlantic relations.

Is Henry Kissinger's dictum still true that the United States has global interests while the Europeans follow regional goals? My findings show that both follow their own national interests, whether they are global or regional. But, because of the asymmetries in military and political strength, America and Europe have different capabilities for power projection and policy enforcement. The USA undertakes engagements in a broader spectrum of regions and countries than do the Europeans, who lost their colonies many decades ago; after the Second World War they concentrated instead on the European project. While the Bush administration wants to leave a military footprint worldwide, Europeans feel that their interests are best served by a peaceful world order. Only gradually have they realized that, in a globalized world, "the real challenges for Europe's future prosperity and stability... lie beyond its borders."<sup>28</sup> Though the EU strengthened its capacity for political and military action—as seen in the EUFOR missions in the DRC and the EU-3 activities vis-à-vis Iran—it still lacks political resolve and military capabilities for a broader

role. With twenty-seven countries, all with distinct experiences and interests, agreement is difficult to reach, especially if common or individual countries' basic interests are not directly threatened.

An inventory of cooperation between Europe and America reveals that many of their approaches are identical: some complement each other, while others are mutually exclusive. My analysis of the sources of conflict indicates that differences in the power relations between Europe and America are more relevant than diverging concepts of world order, though they still matter. In most cases the USA prevails over competing views, because of its dominant power. The Europeans lack critical capabilities and succeed only when America runs out of options. When it comes to global issues, five basic interaction patterns are shaping transatlantic relations:

1. *A pattern of open conflict.* In this type of situation, US and European core interests and values diverge. Because of their different political cultures, the most divisive issues relate to the use of military force. Either side can find itself in a situation where domestic concerns are more pressing than international considerations.

The Iraq campaign saw an open skirmish between the USA and the UK, on one side, and France and Germany, on the other. When the Anglo-Saxon powers attacked Iraq without a UN mandate, their action was heavily criticized by France and Germany. For different reasons they wanted to distance themselves from the conflict and to contain America. Their opposition produced a deep transatlantic split as well as one within Europe. Though Europe could claim the moral high ground, Washington prevailed politically.

2. *A pattern of American dominance.* In this scenario, the USA sees that its central strategic or other major interests are at risk and feels it is its duty to ward off perceived dangers. The more it takes recourse to unilateral actions, the less it appreciates foreign counsel and involvement.

The American intervention in Afghanistan initially fitted this pattern. NATO had activated Article 5, its assistance clause, but the US administration told the allies: "We will call you if we need you." Instead of requesting NATO assistance, Washington formed a coalition of those who were willing, which included Russia and the central Asian states, and, together with the forces of the Northern Alliance, it was able to evict the Taliban from Afghanistan.

A similar pattern can be observed in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Though Europeans and Americans could use the Quartet's road map as their common basis for dealing with the conflict, Washington controls most initiatives while the Europeans are relegated to onlookers at the sidelines.

3. *An arrangement of transatlantic burden sharing or risk sharing.* In this pattern, Europeans and Americans share common interests but they



have different priorities—the USA pays the piper and calls the tune. Cooperation is dependent on Washington's lead, but, for the mission to be effective, both partners need to recognize each other's concerns.

The second phase of the Afghan mission saw a more equal distribution of responsibilities. A European and later NATO-led ISAF took care of stabilization, establishing PRTs for reconstruction across the county, while special forces fought remaining Taliban and Al Qaida terrorists. Risk sharing suited the Europeans well, because they were afraid that the stabilizing role of ISAF might be compromised by the predominantly military campaign of OEF. In December 2005 a third phase began. Recognizing European concerns, NATO established a common roof for ISAF and OEF and extended its deployments to the Southern and Eastern provinces. Disputes erupted over the most adequate strategy to cope with the resurgent Taliban.

4. *A pattern of reliable cooperation.* This paradigm is based on shared interests and mutual trust. It requires the USA to interact with the Europeans on an equal level and accept the EU as a full partner, while the latter has to desist from forming a counterweight.

Such has been the situation Iran in 2005–7. After different strategies had been followed for a long time—Europe preferring to offer carrots and the USA to wield a stick—Washington ran out of options and agreed on a joint strategy with the EU-3. They got Russia and China on board for a joint UN resolution and imposed sanctions on Iran when Tehran did not comply.

5. *A pattern of benign neglect.* Here, either the USA or Europe does not care about an issue and ignores the actions of the other partner—provided there is no intrusion into the other side's national preserves or sensibilities.

Sub-Saharan Africa is an example. Europe tolerates American involvement in Africa—though not without some misgivings—as long as Washington does not intrude into one of the former colonial power's preserves—such as the Ivory Coast, where French forces are deployed. The USA approved of European efforts to stabilize the DRC, as it had no intention of sending troops, though it would have preferred to have a *droit de regard* on the mission under a NATO Berlin Plus agreement.

Similarly, in its dealings with China, Europe was for a long time able to disregard US concerns. But those became an issue when EU politicians wanted to rescind the 1989 Western arms embargo. Washington was concerned that sensitive technologies could fall into Chinese hands, producing negative changes in the regional balance of power and endangering the security of Taiwan, and thus violently opposed the EU's intention.

How have America and Europe overcome their disputes on the above issues? In the case of Iraq, the conflict softened when Germany and other countries opposing US intervention saw other vital interests at risk, such as alliance cohesion. Over time all former opponents realized that chaos in Iraq was not in their interest, and, though they were not prepared to cooperate militarily, they assisted with the Iraqi reconstruction by providing financial contributions, training missions, and so forth. In the second pattern, that of American dominance, a shift evolved in Afghanistan from a purely national approach to a more multilateral one when Washington saw that its actions were more effective if it got support from partners and allies. A risk-sharing arrangement, the third pattern, assumes parallel interests, as in Afghanistan after 2002, but is prone to tension when a clear-cut separation of tasks is no longer feasible. This was the case when OEF and ISAF missions were brought together and the overall situation deteriorated. The fourth pattern, that of partnership, presupposes a broad basis of mutual trust. It will evolve only when Europe is able to act jointly and can muster the necessary capabilities, as it is doing in the Balkans, or when the USA has run out of feasible options to implement and finds it advantageous to join forces with Europe, as it did in the Iran crisis. The fifth pattern, a policy of benign neglect, is very unstable, because new events outside the two sides' control can create substantial clashes in transatlantic relations that affect the interests pursued by each partner. It depends on the relevance of the causes involved whether the divergences can be limited to feuds on language and style, as in sub-Saharan Africa, or whether they will erupt into a full-blown conflict, as when Europe planned to lift its arms embargo on China.

To overcome transatlantic differences, the Europeans prefer to use international organizations, which offer institutional procedures and give them an equal voice vis-à-vis Washington. These procedures enable weak states to join forces with other countries, to articulate their interests, and jointly to balance more powerful states. In exchange for increases in influence, the Europeans accept restrictions on their autonomy, but they seek to minimize undue encroachments. Though the USA was once the architect of many international organizations and alliances, it now uses these institutions according to its own preferences. When the Bush administration came into office, it pulled out of a number of international treaties that in its view had outlived their usefulness. It did so to shield its political options from the constraints of supranational decision making. America practiced a kind of unilateral multilateralism but continued to use partnership language. This was difficult to accept for the Europeans, though they acknowledged that, until Europe could muster the necessary strength, they had few alternatives. Both Washington's inclination to act unilaterally and the EU's ambitious rhetoric have weakened the basis of trust on which in the past America and Europe were able to overcome differences effectively and smoothly.

Successful cooperation presupposes suitable forums in which policy coordination can take place. Though the UN Charter resembles a global treatise of peace, its binding power is weak, and other international organizations are mostly limited to the region or issue for which they have been designed. The EU–USA summits have not yet managed to adopt a format that allows for more than an exchange of views. Some other institutions have been better placed in specific situations, such as the G8 on Afghanistan, the Quartet on the Arab–Israeli dispute, or the P–5+1 (i.e., the five permanent Security Council members and Germany) for consultation on the Iranian nuclear threat. The size of many institutions forces decision-makers to look for smaller and more informal bodies. More flexible structures may have more success in the future.

NATO has been a core body for transatlantic coordination, though the alliance has not yet fully adapted to its new role as an international crisis manager. To discharge this mission well, it needs globally deployable forces and flexible coalition arrangements. Afghanistan has been called a test of its effectiveness. If the mission fails, what will happen to NATO? Reactions will differ on both sides of the Atlantic. America's original skepticism about the adequacy of the alliance to fight terrorism, as well as its preference for unilateral actions and coalitions of the willing, will be reconfirmed; NATO will wither away in the doldrums. Having attributed less significance to the Afghan mission, the Europeans, on their part, will want to save NATO as a forum for transatlantic policy coordination. But what will be the use of an alliance in which the USA has lost all interest?

How will transatlantic cooperation fare in future decades? I assume that structural factors will make cooperation even more difficult. A future world will be both more connected and more segmented. The United States will probably have lost its supremacy. It will have to compete for power and influence with China and/or with India, and possibly also with Europe. With the *Pax Americana* gone, no commanding force or overarching structure will shape the global agenda and mediate competition and conflict. The current transatlantic differences might be trivial compared to the controversies to come. Given the structural asymmetries between Europe and America, it is unlikely that they will unite to cope jointly with the new challenges, because these will affect them differently. Rather, both sides will seek to adapt according to their own needs. America will try to retain as much of its power as it can, and Europe will need to muster its resolve to overcome national habits and to become a dynamic actor on the global stage.

## Notes

1. Nicole Gnesetto and Giovanni Grevi (eds.), *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* (Paris: ISS, 2006), 206.

2. Research for this paper has been funded by a generous grant from the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, Cologne, and has been assisted by Michael Harsch, FU Berlin. Criticism and valuable suggestions were offered by the participants of the Nobel Symposium at Balestrand, Norway, June 20–3, 2007.
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## 9

# Leadership or Partnership? Can Transatlantic Leadership be Shared?

*William Wallace*

### Introduction

From the outset, the Atlantic alliance, and the broader Atlantic community that enlightened American policy-makers hoped would grow from it, was built upon a delicate balance between American leadership and American pressure for its West European partners to share the burdens and responsibilities of leading what was then called “the free world.” Once the countries of Western Europe had rebuilt their devastated economies and re-established the democratic foundations of their states, successive US administrations looked to move from sponsorship to partnership. American policy-makers, however, assumed too easily that that partnership would not challenge US leadership; since they saw themselves as representing the best of the common values that the free world shared, they expected like-minded governments to pursue like-minded policies. They also assumed that West European integration would create a coherent partner—a united Europe—with the resources and the decision-making capability to respond to US initiatives. From 1958 on, the French, junior partners to the United States in launching West European integration, challenged both the supranational character of the European Communities and the legitimacy of American leadership—allowing other West European governments to position themselves as intermediaries between France and the USA, without fully addressing the implications of building a more equal political partnership.

Nearly two decades after the end of the cold war, the underlying questions beneath successive schemes for closer transatlantic partnership remain unanswered. Could the American sense of mission be reconciled with Europe’s more cautious diplomacy? Could the ‘soft power’ of American prestige and reputation continue to legitimize US leadership as the dominant external

threat from the USSR lessened? Were American preoccupations with sovereignty, and the complexities of Washington's federal politics, compatible with mutual consultation? Were the European allies, in their turn, collectively capable of presenting a coherent approach to strategy and foreign policy to their American counterparts, rather than following American leadership with different degrees of reluctance or enthusiasm? Were the shared values that underpinned the Atlantic community during the cold war sufficiently strong to hold together a distinctive transatlantic partnership when interests differed? To these questions the end of the cold war has added another: is the closeness of the economic relationship sufficient to hold European and North American governments together even when political and strategic differences drive them apart?

It is notable that all major initiatives for redefining the transatlantic relationship—except for the Gaullist challenge to the Atlantic relationship as such—have come from Washington, and that all have stressed the security and strategic framework within which economic relations have developed. The “Grand Design” of the Kennedy administration was for a wider economic and political community, within which its European partners—together with East Asian Japan—would extend the model of postwar economic and political development and the containment of Communism across the third world. It was the common threat of the Soviet bloc, however, which held the Atlantic partnership together; under the shadow of this threat, American provision of security still trumped European economic interests in transatlantic negotiations, as Henry Kissinger reminded European governments in his “Year of Europe” speech of April 1973. It was American policy-makers, again, who negotiated with the Soviet Union the reunification of Germany which ended the cold war, leaving its European partners—above all the West Germans—to pay the costs incurred. Since then NATO enlargement has led to EU enlargement, often marked by underlying assumptions among Washington policy-makers that EU membership naturally follows accession to NATO; and NATO has extended from a defensive alliance to a global security partnership, in which its European members have followed—often reluctantly—the evolution of American security concerns.

“Partnership” is an underdeveloped concept in the theory of international relations. “Empire” and “concert” are easier to grasp. The first connotes relationships built upon dominance and submission—or, in informal empire, of leadership and followership. The second focuses on bargaining and negotiation, with multiple tradeoffs among multiple actors. Game theory has modeled two-person games, but under conditions of mistrustful competition rather than of proclaimed shared values and interests; under game-theoretical assumptions, cooperation can be learned only through rational calculation of long-term gains. *Equal* partnership is almost unknown in international history. The Anglo-Dutch alliance in the War of the Spanish Succession was,

in effect, a “war by committee,” from which the Duke of Marlborough escaped by marching his forces off to link up with the Austrians in Bavaria.<sup>1</sup> The Franco-Russian alliance at the end of the nineteenth century was a partnership of fear against a rising German Empire; the competing German/Austro-Hungarian alliance was one in which Germany was clearly the stronger partner. The United States rose to global prominence as a free-rider on British liberal imperialism; when at last it accepted the responsibilities of global power, from 1941, the UK at once became its junior partner. Personal partnerships, it might be argued, were also easier to sustain when based upon assumptions of unequal partnership. The revolution in the status of women across the Western world has been accompanied by a sharp rise in divorce rates, as partners have failed to negotiate mutually acceptable patterns of sharing and exchange.

In practice, a transatlantic economic partnership has emerged, without the need for a grand design, through successive trade rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), through the Franco-German initiative that led to the Group of Seven, and through extensive interactions between European and American regulators and standard setters. Within today’s far more integrated global economy, in which East Asian economies and oil-producing states play much larger roles, American and European authorities continue to set the terms of financial diplomacy and the rules of trade. Security partnership has proved much more elusive, partly because the European allies have shown little inclination to pool their limited security capabilities, let alone to raise their level of spending to the American level. Here lay the underlying contradiction in the American concept of partnership, asking the West European allies to provide an increasing proportion of the conventional forces of the Atlantic alliance while wishing to retain both strategic deterrence and strategic direction under Washington’s control. The structure of NATO was built around US leadership; neither strategic direction in a crisis nor military command is easy to share. European governments, however, have rationally hesitated to invest in military capabilities to serve American strategic objectives, particularly outside the European region.

The Atlantic partnership since 1945 has been an old-fashioned marriage, in which American Mars has set the terms of the security relationship and European Venus has accepted—while grumbling about the patterns of exchange. Differences of political style and culture between American and European democratic politics have exacerbated misunderstandings. American political discourse resounds with grand designs and projects, explicit missions to reshape world politics within short timescales—with an exaggerated rhetoric of threats and opportunities to mobilize the US public in support. European political leaders, with occasional exceptions from within France and



the UK, are more comfortable with limited and implicit objectives, with longer timescales, and with unspoken assumptions behind negotiated compromises. Coalition governments, and coalitions among governments, favor working within established intellectual frameworks, recognizing historical, social, and cultural constraints. American optimism sweeps these constraints aside; the competition among elites in Washington, and the transition from one administration to another, throws up repeated initiatives to reshape international order.

The US public, socialized within a strong national narrative of American exceptionalism, responds to missionary concepts of global transformation. European publics, in contrast, are preoccupied with different national constraints and traditions. There is no comparable European narrative, no foundation for a distinctive European vision of global order and international role, no more than there is a European federation to balance the United States. It is part of the myth of American exceptionalism that people of reason and goodwill in other countries should share America's view of the world. If American dreams of the creation of a united Europe *had* been realized, however, the vision its leaders would have propounded and the interests they would have defended would have been more likely to compete with US priorities than to blend with them.

## The Shadow of the Past

It was, from the outset, an unequal partnership. The Atlantic Charter of August 1941 spelled out the aims of what became the wartime alliance in Wilsonian terms, accepted by the British because they desperately needed American arms supplies and more. The promise "to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live" went against Churchill's instincts; he contradicted its pledge in a speech the following year, when he declared that "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." The British consoled themselves by the comfortable self-belief that they provided "the brains" in this unequal partnership—or that they were playing the part of wise Greeks in this new Roman Empire, as Harold Macmillan remarked during the Anglo-American North African campaign—but they were uncomfortably aware that America had 'the money' and most of the military-industrial capability.<sup>2</sup> The leaders of liberated France, not present with "the Big Three" at Potsdam, were even more uncomfortably aware of their dependence on American support.

The Marshall Plan and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) were even more clearly US defined and US led. Americans

saw a weak and divided continent, which they had had to rescue twice in less than twenty-five years, now threatened again by internal and external Communism; and set out to impose economic integration—and, if they could, political integration as well—on the postwar governments they sponsored. John Foster Dulles was, for a time, the secretary of the US Committee for a United States of Europe; many of the most fervent postwar proponents of European unity were American. The later Franco-German narrative of West European integration, of historic reconciliation between ancient enemies under the leadership of far-sighted statesmen, painted over the acute pressure American officials placed on the French to allow the rebuilding of the West German economy, and later to create a European Defence Community to allow the rebuilding—within an integrated framework—of a German army. Gaullists saw Jean Monnet, with some justification, as Washington's man in Paris.

It was taken as given in Washington that, at the end of the process of West European economic recovery and democratic stabilization, the bulk of American forces would return home. Enlightened self-interest had persuaded the USA to shoulder a heavy military and economic burden, for a limited period, to give the West European democracies the time to rebuild; but as they recovered they would be able to take over much of the responsibility for their own defense against the Soviet threat, later even to contribute in their turn to the economic development of countries outside Europe. At the outbreak of the Korean War, Washington rushed extra forces to Europe; but for the longer term the Americans launched a generous program of military assistance and technology transfer to help West European countries—including West Germany—manage their own defense. Once the rearmament of Federal Germany had been agreed and began to get underway, President Eisenhower began to draw down US conventional forces in Europe—only to reverse this withdrawal when the second Berlin crisis broke out, rising again into the early 1960s.

The Atlantic community the Americans envisaged was, therefore, one in which their European partners would progressively take a greater share in the burden of the “common defense” in the core theater for the Alliance: Central Europe. The formal organization of NATO, with an American supreme commander and a European deputy, and a developing structure of subordinate commands under European leadership, reflected this intended pattern of (senior and junior) partnership. It was, however, harder to offer partnership in the strategic, nuclear, field. Political Washington had been ambivalent about the British nuclear deterrent, and largely hostile to the French. The issue of how to appear to offer nuclear participation to Germany, without losing control of Alliance strategy and arousing the fears of Germany's neighbors, led to the complicated—and unworkable—proposal for a Multilateral

(nuclear) Force (the MLF), under which jointly manned ships would carry US-supplied missiles with dual European and American keys, supplementing the US strategic deterrent as this became based primarily on intercontinental missiles located in the continental United States.

President de Gaulle did attempt one partial reshaping of Atlantic relations on his return to office in 1958, proposing to expand the privileged relationship between the USA and the UK into a triumvirate: a political initiative rather than a detailed plan, intended to re-create the global-security partnership that these three had briefly represented at the end of the Second World War, while leaving other continental states in a subordinate position.<sup>3</sup> The Americans, in contrast, came forward with detailed plans, across the broad security and economic fields. To mark the graduation of West European economies from postwar recovery—signalled by the emergence of a German surplus in bilateral trade with the USA—the Eisenhower administration launched a new GATT trade round, and proposed transforming the OEEC into the broader OECD. To provide themselves with a more effective and economically liberal European partner, Eisenhower, Dulles, and other veterans of transatlantic diplomacy since the Second World War pressed the reluctant United Kingdom to apply to join the European Economic Community (EEC)—to abandon its preferred ‘special’ relationship with the USA in return for playing a leading role within a more united Western Europe, capable of managing the shared burdens of global leadership.

The Kennedy administration’s “Grand Design” built on its predecessor’s plans. President Kennedy’s “Declaration of Interdependence,” in his Independence Day speech of 1962, was a confident assertion that the United States would now share decisions with others because others shared its view of the world. American prestige stood high. The global planners of the Kennedy administration saw themselves as extending the model of reconstruction and modernization that had been so successful in Western Europe (and Japan) to the emerging states of the “third world,” with their European and Japanese partners contributing substantially to the economic assistance required.<sup>4</sup> All this, however, required the UK and French governments to play the roles in this Grand Design that Washington had written for them. The British hesitantly negotiated EEC entry, presenting it to their domestic public and their Commonwealth associates as primarily a trading arrangement. The French, with some justification from their own perspective, saw the British as America’s Trojan Horse at the gates of a French-led Western Europe, and seized the opportunity presented by the Nassau Agreement to veto British entry. The Franco-German Elysée Treaty, which followed, was a direct challenge to the American concept of a closely connected two-pillar Atlantic community, and provoked active American intervention in the domestic German ratification process in order to limit the damage.

The bitterness of the Franco-American confrontation of 1962–6 still colors transatlantic relations: bubbling up to the surface in 1973–4, simmering in Washington at every proposal for closer coordination of European foreign policy and defense, bursting out again in American Francophobe rhetoric in 2003–5. The anti-American tenor of the Gaullist challenge has made it difficult for other European governments to provide a balance between the two antagonists; Washington's association of a stronger and more autonomous group of European states with Gaullist anti-Americanism has made for instinctive suspicion of each subsequent initiative, even if it came from London. French withdrawal from the integrated structures of NATO, together with its expulsion of NATO agencies and supply lines from France, made attempts to rebalance the Atlantic relationship through closer European cooperation much more of a zero-sum game, if more European, then necessarily less transatlantic, because less engaged with the Atlantic alliance. The collapse of the Atlantic community idea left France outside NATO, and disillusion within Washington about the project for West European integration that it had fostered.<sup>5</sup> Yet in rational terms the French were right. There was an underlying contradiction between American leadership, institutionalized within NATO, and a balanced relationship between a now-recovered Western Europe and the United States. So long as Soviet troops and missiles remained massed in Central Europe, however, West Europeans continued to need American military deterrence, and thus American leadership.

Nevertheless, the United States *did* accept Western Europe as a partner in the trade negotiations—the Dillon Round—that accompanied this US-led drive to adjust the balance of the transatlantic relationship. The Commission of the EEC led in GATT, with member governments caucusing around it. In subsequent trade rounds the Commission has become the equal partner of Washington, in hard-fought bilateral bargaining that has led other participants to caucus in their turn. The extension of Community competences, to include competition, regulation, and standards, has widened the economic agenda of transatlantic relations. The US Mission to the EEC rapidly became a major outpost of Washington, lobbying for the European institutions to take US views and interests into account. Supporters of European integration may argue that this demonstrates that the achievement of common policies pushes Washington to adjust, and that the failure to achieve a more equal partnership in foreign and security policy reflects the confusion and division still evident among European governments about these issues. Others, however, may take the “realist” view that political and security issues are closer to the heart of national interest than economic relations, and that American acceptance of European equality in this sphere did not set a precedent for future strategic relations.

There was a deep ambivalence as to whether NATO was a regional or a potentially global alliance. The USA rebutted French attempts to argue that the revolt in Algeria was a matter of alliance concern; but in Southeast Asia the United States progressively shouldered the burden the French had laid down, and pressed the European allies to contribute to the "common defense." The British deflected the pressure by pointing to their parallel military containment policy in Malaysia. It was unthinkable for the German government to send troops, but hard to resist American pressure to support the dollar, as the costs of the Vietnam conflict escalated; American policy-makers threatened to draw down US troop numbers in Germany unless Bonn invested more substantially in US Treasury Bonds.<sup>6</sup> The United States provided Western Europe's strategic defense; its officials therefore felt justified in asking their European allies to provide both military and economic support for American strategic priorities outside Europe.

American preoccupation with Southeast Asia left space for West Europeans to develop a degree of autonomy in foreign policy. The compromise between President Pompidou's Gaullist government and its EEC partners that permitted the opening of negotiations for accession with the UK agreed in return to accept the Gaullist idea of consultations on "political union" among representatives of member states. The German government successfully harnessed this to its developing *Ostpolitik*, encouraging its partners to accept and transform the Soviet proposal for a European security conference into what became the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It was through the CSCE that European Political Cooperation (EPC) developed its structure of committees and working groups, with the European Commission associated with the economic "basket" of negotiations. The Helsinki Declaration of 1975 established a commitment to basic political and civil rights, and a framework of review conferences, which reshaped East-West relations within Europe over the next two decades: an achievement in which Washington had played a secondary role while West Europeans had led.<sup>7</sup>

The American response, as attention returned to the European theater after the retreat from Vietnam had begun, was to remind its European allies of their strategic dependence on the USA, attempting to reassert American leadership across the range of issues in the transatlantic relationship. Henry Kissinger's "Year of Europe" speech was concerned as much to remind Europeans that they owed America cooperation in economic and financial matters in return for the strategic protection the USA provided as to insist on US leadership in East-West relations: "the political, military and economic issues in Atlantic relations," he argued, "are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other." The legitimacy of American leadership had been damaged by the perceived illegitimacy of the Vietnam war; anti-American demonstrations across Europe had preoccupied

European governments since 1968. Kissinger used instead the classical Realist arguments of power and dependence.

The United States had not consulted its European partners about unpegging the dollar from gold in 1971—on which President Nixon had famously remarked to Treasury Secretary Connally ‘[expletive-deleted] the Lira’—but it expected its European partners to consult the USA fully on plans to move toward economic and monetary union. Meetings among European foreign ministers—now including the British—to discuss strategic international issues threatened the primacy of NATO; the initial American request was for an American official to attend every meeting within EPC. The intervention of the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War, in which the USA resupplied Israel from its German bases without prior consultation with the German government, brought matters to a head. At French instigation, an Arab League delegation arrived at an EEC summit in Copenhagen, which agreed to launch a “Euro–Arab Dialogue.” Washington’s reaction was hostile: US policy-makers insisted that Middle East policy was a matter for the West as a whole, under US leadership, not for Europeans themselves. Franco–American relations descended to personal abuse between leaders in the months that followed, before changes of personnel in several governments permitted a compromise—within the framework of a NATO meeting in Ottawa—in which the Americans were granted the promise of full briefings before and after all EPC ministerial meetings, and foreign ministers agreed to state that

the Allies are convinced that the fulfilment of their common aims requires the maintenance of close consultation, cooperation and mutual trust . . . They wish also *to ensure that their essential security relationship is supported by harmonious political and economic relations*. In particular they will work to remove sources of conflict between their economic policies . . .<sup>8</sup>

Alongside this, however, the finance ministers of France, Germany, and the UK persuaded the US Treasury Secretary that informal consultations (which their Japanese counterpart soon joined) were needed to cope with the transatlantic turbulence in exchange rates that followed the dollar’s uncoupling from gold, exacerbated by the actions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the rapid rise in oil prices. Out of these meetings, from 1975 onwards, grew what became the G7 summit process: a European initiative to increase economic leverage over US macroeconomic and exchange-rate policies, which expanded to cover not only trade and development issues but—from 1980 onwards—such political issues as East–West relations and international terrorism. Policy-makers in Washington, through successive administrations, were much less resistant to multilateral negotiation with their European partners on economic than on politico-military issues,

even though US insistence on Canadian, as well as Japanese, participation demonstrated American reluctance to be caught negotiating with a group of European governments alone; by 1977 the Italian Prime Minister and the President of the European Commission had joined these summits, to bring five European voices to the table. The Plaza Accord of 1985, through which finance ministers agreed on coordinated expansion and adjustment of the dollar exchange rate, represented a high point in transatlantic policy coordination.<sup>9</sup>

American insistence that strategic policy outside Europe remained a matter for American leadership, and European acquiescence, was sustained through successive administrations—in spite of the repeated changes of American strategy and personnel, as within less than a decade the Nixon administration was followed by those of Ford, Carter, and Reagan. Under a UK Presidency and on UK initiative, EC member governments attempted in 1980 to set out, in the Venice Declaration, a common European approach to the Israel–Palestine conflict, autonomously from the USA. The reaction from the Reagan administration in Washington was as firm as that from Henry Kissinger in 1973–4: in Middle East policy, the United States expected to lead, and expected its European partners to follow.

American and European narratives on the end of the cold war differ significantly. The dominant American narrative sees the cold war as a two-power game, with the Europeans largely passive partners, vulnerable to Soviet pressure. West Europeans see the evolution of East–West relations within Europe, within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as contributing to the transformation of the Soviet Union and its Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) partners: European détente, alongside superpower détente, was a German-led strategy. When the pace of change across Central and Eastern Europe began to speed up, however, West European cohesion fell apart. Both the French and UK governments, whose leaders had signed endless NATO communiqués calling for the reunification of Germany, balked at the prospect that it might take place; their Italian and Dutch counterparts were no more enthusiastic. German–American partnership secured the reunification of Germany, with President Mitterrand offering reluctant support when he realized its likely success, and Prime Minister Thatcher failing to adjust even then. Here is where the shadow of the past most directly darkens the present. Many of those in the first Bush administration engaged in the 4 + 2 negotiations, which led to the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet/Russian forces—including Robert Blackwill, Philip Zelikow, Robert Zoellick, and Condoleeza Rice—returned to serve in the second Bush administration, bringing back with them their skeptical assessments of West European strategic capabilities.<sup>10</sup>

## The End of the Cold War and the Continuation of US Security Leadership

Nor were European governments capable of collective reassessment of the strategic revolution across their continent between 1989 and 1992. James Baker, as US Secretary of State, set the agenda for a post-cold-war Europe a few weeks after the Berlin Wall had fallen, in his December 1989 speech in Berlin, placing NATO at the center of a post-cold war Europe, with the United States still the alliance leader, while offering a broader relationship to countries emerging from state socialism. No European leader attempted any comparably broad vision of European security, then or later. German political leaders were forced to address somewhat wider questions, since reunification reshaped their geopolitical position, and raised delicate issues of future relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia; but the hesitancy, the awareness of historical inhibitions, that had marked West German diplomacy since sovereignty had returned in 1955 remained. The governments of the European Community committed themselves—with differing degrees of enthusiasm or reluctance—to negotiating a treaty on European Union in the course of 2001, discussing the institutional implications of a common foreign policy as first federal Yugoslavia and then the Soviet Union disintegrated. The Maastricht Treaty duly declared that ‘a common Foreign and Security Policy is hereby established’; but only the French were willing to send troops with vigorous terms of engagement to Bosnia, and the European forces that arrived in Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR attempted at first to play a limited peacekeeping role.<sup>11</sup>

Southeastern Europe has provided the framework within which EU member governments have learned the painful problems of common foreign and security policy, in the same way that the CSCE provided the framework within which EPC took shape. Franco-British military cooperation in Bosnia helped to establish the conditions for the Franco-British initiative on European defense, which Blair and Chirac launched at Saint-Malo in December 1998. European troops operated together, discovering that they shared tactical approaches and attitudes to the population among whom they moved with each other more than they did with their American counterparts. First in Bosnia, then in Kosovo, British and French insistence on the importance of occupying the ground and protecting the local population countered the American preference for high-altitude bombing and minimum exposure to casualties; Blair’s willingness to commit the bulk of the British army to a ground intervention in Kosovo helped to win Washington over. Nevertheless, it was American diplomacy that set the terms for a Bosnian settlement, after American support for Croatia had undermined earlier European efforts; the Dayton conference and its outcome left European participants embittered,



and reinforced the skepticism of Richard Holbrooke and other Democratic officials, in their turn, about European capabilities.<sup>12</sup> Since then, responsibility for the political administration and economic reconstruction of Bosnia and Kosovo has gradually transferred from NATO to the EU; but on the crucial outstanding issue of the future relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, the United States remains a strategic player, primarily because Russia also remains actively engaged.

The eastern enlargement of the EU has now reshaped the European region. Fifteen years after the Berlin Wall was demolished, eight states that had formerly been part of the socialist world—three of them part of the former Soviet Union—became member states; three years later, Bulgaria and Romania joined them. In many ways, eastern enlargement has been the single greatest achievement of common foreign policy, expanding the Atlantic zone of security, prosperity, and democracy across the historically insecure *Zwischenländer* between Germany and Russia. Detailed conditions—political, economic, administrative, legal—balanced by interim aid and technical assistance, with the promise of major gains in status and market access when the conditions are met, backed by regular reports on progress toward meeting them, pushed the painful process of transformation forward. Access to EU markets raised economic growth, domestic adoption of EU rules attracted foreign investment. Rarely, however, in this process has the EU collectively addressed the geopolitical implications of enlargement, or the *finalité* of further enlargement; member governments have preferred to focus on detailed negotiations and specific conditions, leaving the long-term strategy implicit and domestic publics unformed (and unpersuaded) of the advantages of enlargement. The process *has* been guided by strategic thinkers, in Brussels, London, Paris, and Rome, above all in Berlin; but they have worked within European institutions and governments, largely outside the view of publics and parliaments, disguising the larger picture from a wider audience.

There has thus been a major difference of political style and culture in European and American approaches. Multilateral Europe, cobbling together interim compromises between multiple governments, each constrained by distinctive domestic pressures, moves forward by deliberate indirection. Washington administrations, each determined to spell out its global vision—often in deliberate contrast to the strategic vision of its predecessor—prefer to speak in geopolitical terms, even when they are influenced in their turn by domestic interests. Successive Democratic and Republican administrations have criticized the slow pace of EU enlargement; the change of policy in Washington on NATO enlargement, in 1993–4, drove that strategic transformation through both more rapidly and—from the perspective of Washington—more decisively. Yet the Clinton administration's openness to NATO enlargement owed much to Democratic links to Polish–American and Baltic–American lobbies within the USA; Clinton as candidate made his first

speech on NATO enlargement to a Polish–American audience in Chicago during the 1992 presidential campaign. The US Committee to Enlarge NATO was predominantly funded by Lockheed Martin, actively engaged in soliciting sales of weapons systems from applicant states. Pressures from within Washington to extend the process of NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia have been similarly ill thought through, even counterproductive.

There has been less substance to American claims of grand strategy in reshaping Europe than Washington has asserted, and more strategic direction to European policy than most EU governments have wished to admit. American policy-makers have defined the reshaping of the European region in politico-security terms, with the agenda of NATO enlargement pushing ahead further and faster than EU enlargement around the western and southern borders of Russia. The EU has offered only a loosely defined “Neighborhood Policy” to the states of western Eurasia: deliberately ambiguous, using economic incentives to promote political adaptation, less threatening to Russia, but offering an open-ended framework for negotiation that may—or may not—lead to closer partnership.

A similar difference in style, leading to mutual misunderstanding, even irritation, has been evident in approaches to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The United States actively sponsored Turkey’s application to join the European Union, seeing Turkey as a key member of NATO, and seeing the EU both as a part of the broader Western Alliance and as the external anchor that would hold this Muslim state within the West. American officials have looked to—and dealt with—the secular Turkish state and the Turkish military, underestimating the complications both of domestic Turkish politics and of the military’s treatment of Turkey’s large Kurdish minority. They were thus unprepared for the Turkish Parliament’s rejection of American requests to use Turkish territory as a base from which to invade Iraq, or for the complications that the Kurdish issue—and the Turcoman minority within Iraq—would present for postconflict policy.

In the margins of the 1999 Helsinki European Council, which offered Turkey the prospect of negotiations for membership, American diplomats had brought intense pressure to bear on the British and German delegations, in particular, to support the Turkish position. European governments, with significant populations of Turkish and Kurdish origin within their territories, extending Turkey’s internal tensions into Dusseldorf, Amsterdam and London, were conscious that the question of Turkish EU entry was far more complex than Washington’s politico-military policy-makers wished to consider.<sup>13</sup> The EU’s incremental approach to the negotiated entry of a divided Cyprus, however, relied too much on economic incentives without addressing the complexities of nationalist politics. The Greek Cypriot government, once accepted within the EU, persuaded its population to reject the UN plan for reunification. US and European plans for NATO to coordinate its missions

with the EU's distinctive foreign-policy capabilities, agreed in 2004, thus remained blocked by Turkish refusal to cooperate with the (Greek) Cypriot government, and the Cypriot government's refusal to ease restrictions on northern Cyprus.

The Spanish EU Presidency in 1995 launched a new European initiative—the Barcelona Process—toward the countries of the southern Mediterranean and Middle East. This was partly intended by the Spanish, French, and Italian governments to counterbalance their northern partners' reorientation toward Eastern Europe, ensuring that substantial EU funds flowed across the Mediterranean as well as across Germany's eastern border. Over the following decade a multitude of projects, assisting economic development, training police and judges, assisting local non-governmental organizations, have been pursued, with marginal but useful results within traditional societies and authoritarian states. The EU has attempted to play a more visible and constructive role in Middle East diplomacy since the Madrid conference of 1991, providing the largest share of aid to the Palestinian Authority, negotiating an association agreement with Israel (for which the EU is its most important trading partner), acting—through Javier Solana—as a member of the Quartet. The American response to the Barcelona Process included a separate—and competitive—NATO dialogue with the North African and Near Eastern states, including Israel, reflecting Washington's politico-military assumption that in Western strategy NATO should set the framework and the EU should follow. Yet constant turnover of Washington officials, and lack of attention to the difficult details of economic and political modernization in the Arab world, meant that, when in early 2004 a team of Bush administration officials arrived at a pre-Dutch presidency conference to sell to the Europeans their new plan to democratize the Greater Middle East within ten years, they were surprised to discover that the EU was already engaged in a rather longer-term program, with a budget much larger than the Bush administration was proposing for its own plan.<sup>14</sup>

US officials and commentators have charged that the hesitancy of European approaches to Middle East issues reflects weak leadership, driven by fear of Europe's growing Muslim minority. European governments and commentators worry that the active leadership successive US administrations have offered on Middle Eastern issues—intensive efforts to promote moves toward an Israel–Palestine settlement under the Clinton administration, a shift to hostile actions against Iraq and Iran under the second Bush administration—is driven by domestic interests and ideologies more than clear-sighted global strategy. Europe's collective diplomacy moves slowly and cumulatively, recognizing the complexity of local conflicts and the long-term nature of the problems to be managed. American diplomacy is self-consciously activist, sweeping aside local details and historical complications; each new administration sets out to solve problems rather than to manage

them, to define in broad-brush terms friends and enemies. This difference of style is almost a difference of substance, a major obstacle to the global politico-security partnership that Washington now expects its European partners to accept.

Difference of style has extended to a different approach to war and the management of conflict since the end of the cold war. In the first Gulf War, in 1991, the weight and concentration of American firepower in a conventional state-to-state war was decisive. Only the British proved capable of supplying a combat-ready division for such a conflict; French embarrassment at the inadequacies of the forces they offered motivated the major restructuring that they undertook in the next few years. But in several other more loosely defined conflicts in the 1990s, it was far less clear that the American approach, with its emphasis on high-technology firepower (“shock and awe”) and minimum contact with the enemy, was more appropriate than European emphasis on peacemaking. Italian officials and officers deplored the American disregard for the complex internal politics of Somalia, in 1991–3, which led to the failure of the US-led intervention. European and American commanders differed over tactics first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo. In the Kosovo campaign, American bombing failed to halt Serbian atrocities, running short of legitimate targets before the Serbians had agreed to negotiate; when ground forces entered Kosovo, the British General Jackson refused an order from NATO Commander Wesley Clark to block Russian occupation of Pristina airport.<sup>15</sup> The second Bush administration reinforced this difference of approach, denying that postconflict peacemaking was an appropriate part of a military mission and closing the US army’s training center for postconflict policing. Subsequent failures in postconflict peacemaking in Iraq led to some rethinking, with a critical article on US forces in Iraq by a British officer circulated around military academies in the United States.<sup>16</sup> But in Afghanistan, where the decisive character of the American victory in 2001 had been followed by neglect of postconflict reconstruction, the expansion of NATO forces in 2005–7 was still hindered by underlying differences over rules of engagement, use of airpower, relations with the civilian population, and the balance between military force and economic reconstruction.

Divergent approaches to China and Russia have demonstrated similar transatlantic divergences: American overemphasis on military and strategic aspects, and European underemphasis. China does not present a threat to Europe, unless in economic terms; but, in considering political relations with the Chinese government, and in proposing to lift its arms embargo, European governments appeared unconcerned about the security of their transatlantic partner—or the widespread perception in Washington that China represented a serious potential threat. The German, French, and Italian heads of government, in particular, seemed deeply unwilling after 1998 to address evidence

that Russia's transition to a market economy and open society had gone into reverse, pursuing bilateral energy contracts and competing to cultivate President Putin. George W. Bush at first followed a similar line, before Washington's preoccupation with geopolitics regained influence over the new administration, with competition for influence in Central Asia and the southern Caucasus, and competition between Russian and American pipeline strategies. Washington policy-makers naturally think in geopolitical terms, sometimes imposing strategic templates on non-strategic issues; European governments avoid such broader perspectives, even when it would seem prudent to take them into account.

### **Economic Partnership, Political Distance?**

There *is*, therefore, a close European–American partnership. It represents the world's most intricate and intimate economic relationship, in which officials, central bankers, regulators, and competition authorities talk to each other constantly because they recognize that they share common interests. They also share common values, in open markets, in accepted rules to regulate competition, in financial institutions, in accounting and intellectual property, and in combating financial fraud and transnational criminal networks. Officials and private actors are daily engaged in negotiating the detailed terms of transatlantic exchange on these issues, between the EU and Washington agencies, within the OECD, in working groups associated with the G8, and in conversations between business organizations and parliamentarians. There are frequent disputes, sometimes sharply argued; but the overriding framework of a well-regulated global market economy is shared by policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic, and mutual investment and production give Europeans and Americans a solid foundation of common interests

It has become effectively an equal relationship, in which authorities on both sides of the Atlantic respect each other's expertise and interests, and recognize each other's domestic constraints. Furthermore, in spite of the shift in the balance of the world economy away from the Atlantic to the Pacific, this so far remains the relationship that defines the rules for the global economy. The Asian members of the OECD have not yet played leading roles in most of its discussions; the Japanese and Korean governments have been passive participants in most meetings, the Chinese government has indicated that it is too soon for it to shoulder the full responsibilities of joining G8.

The balance of this economic partnership, of course, alters with each economic cycle. In the early 1980s, when the dollar was riding high and the West European economy was in the doldrums, an air of triumphalism crept

into American economic discourse. When the dollar slumped and the US economy went into recession, while confidence and growth in Europe were boosted by the 1992 program to establish a “Single European Market,” there were best-selling studies of American decline, and an MIT economist wrote of *Head to Head: The Coming Clash between the United States, Europe and Japan*.<sup>17</sup> When in the early 1990s the costs of German unification weighed down the EU economy and financial markets, while a surge of innovation and investment in information technology boosted the US economy, triumphalism—and gloomy predictions about the decline of Europe’s economy and society—returned; a Harvard economist even predicted that the adoption of a single currency would lead to European war.<sup>18</sup> We may anticipate that a further decline of the US dollar, together with continued recovery in the German economy’s growth rate, will produce another mood swing, from undue American pessimism about the economic and social future of Europe to undue concern. Meanwhile central bankers, finance ministries, trade negotiators, regulators, and competition lawyers will continue to manage this intricate and intimate relationship, often playing subordinate roles to the entrepreneurs and investors who drive it.

This intensive economic partnership, on which the open-world economy rests, is an immense achievement. The signatories of the Atlantic Charter would be delighted to discover how successfully their commitment to “bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field . . .” has been fulfilled. In terms of burden sharing, furthermore, European governments collectively provide 40 percent of the budgets of the UN and its agencies, and over 50 percent of official development assistance, shouldering the responsibilities for global economic development that the Kennedy administration’s grand design sought to transfer.

Intensification of economic partnership, in a period when strategic partnership has become much looser and more open to question, demonstrates the reverse of Kissinger’s Realist insistence that transatlantic economic relations had to be nested within the wider framework of politico-military alliance. After 1989 there were some within European business and government who were actively concerned that the weakening of the security imperative would lead to sharper economic disputes, as the US Congress saw European companies and banks as hostile competitors rather than participants within a shared security community. The European Round Table, the European Commission, and members of the European Parliament formed the Transatlantic Policy Network in 1991 as a forum for engaging key Congressmen in a transatlantic dialogue on trade and economic regulation. In the years that followed a succession of institutions and initiatives have been floated to hold the attention of Washington, and to hold together the transatlantic economy: official proposals for a Transatlantic Free Trade Area in various forms,

semi-official Transatlantic Business Dialogues and Legislative Dialogues, innumerable transatlantic conferences under German, British, Italian, even French chairmanship. European fears that the achievement of a peaceful European continent, and the consequent shift in the focus of US strategy to other regions, would threaten transatlantic crises in economic relations have so far proved misplaced; the mutual interests at stake in each other's prosperity appear strong enough to hold against immediate difficulties.<sup>19</sup>

Is this sufficient, without sustaining as close a security partnership? To attempt to develop a more equal security partnership would present a much greater challenge: a massive rebalancing of military spending between the USA and its European allies, a convergence of their divergent concepts of threats and how to meet them, greater mutual understanding of the dilemmas that follow from their different geopolitical situations, and a reconciliation between their strategic cultures and their understandings of global politics. NATO itself, an alliance built around the premise of American strategic leadership, is part of the problem. Continuation of a security alliance under American leadership requires European acceptance of the legitimacy of that leadership and of the direction in which it points. Since 1989, the central value of NATO to its European members, old and new, has been to maintain American engagement in the security of the European region, against the distant prospect of the resurgence of a hostile Russia. For the United States, it has become far more a vehicle for a widening West, providing European support—alongside Australian, Korean, and Japanese—for American global strategy: an alliance in which the allies are expected to share the burden of defense against threats to Western values and interests, but not to gain a voice in defining what those threats may be or how to manage them. The concept of an American-led "Concert of Democracies," based upon NATO and its English-speaking and East Asian allies, has little appeal to European governments for whom the alliance was about securing the European region and the North Atlantic. Nor is it clear to cautious European governments that the Bush administration's drive to democratize the world is compatible with the regimes it chooses to support in the Middle East, Central and South Asia.

The gap between American military spending and European is now so wide that it is politically impossible to close. Certainly, European defense ministries continue to press for moderate increases in spending, to fund the long-range airlift, helicopters and logistical chains they need to support expeditionary forces outside the European region. But there is no call for the scale of investment, nor the high-end military technology, that have marked American defense budgets in recent years. European governments see no need to compete with, or duplicate, American strategic and expeditionary forces; in effect, they accept that American power now protects the world from a potential future aggressor state, and prefer to concentrate on the indirect

threats to global order that flow from state collapse and internal conflicts—which seem to them major threats to international security. The second Bush administration, more than its predecessors, has sent out ambivalent signals about expectations of European burden sharing: rejecting offers of immediate assistance for the intervention in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, calling for support in the intervention in Iraq in 2003, then transferring operations in Afghanistan to NATO and in 2005–7 repeatedly calling for additional European troops and equipment.

European dependence on the United States is now most evident in the nuclear field, including in investment in missile defense against rising nuclear powers. Controversies within Europe about the proposed deployment of American missile defenses, however, partly reflect unease among European governments and publics about American strategy—about being caught in the middle of a new “long war” between Judeo-Christian America and the Muslim world. Secular European publics fear Muslim fundamentalism; but they also fear the fundamentalism of a “clash-of-civilization” response, which categorizes the turmoil of authoritarian Arab societies in transition and the rejection of Western values by a minority of Europe’s Muslim minority as an existential war, rather than as a complex of problems to manage. The aggressive unilateralism of US policy, the rejection of international rules and multilateral institutions that has characterized the response to 9/11, and the anti-European undertones of American officials and commentators have weakened American prestige and legitimacy. What American commentators refer to as rising anti-Americanism within Europe can also be characterized as a collapse of American soft power: that the United States has lost, at least for some years to come, the ability to command the respect of its European partners and their domestic publics for the policies it proposes.

There is, thus, a widening gap between European perceptions of threat and of preferred international order and the conventional wisdom of Washington, as well as between Washington’s emphasis on military responses and European emphasis on economic and civilian instruments. Neither European governments nor their citizens share the dominant American interpretation of the strategic challenges posed by the Middle East region, of the origins and injustices of the Israel–Palestine conflict, or the threat posed by Iran, or the desirability of the United States remaining the dominant power across the region. Conversely, there is little sympathy within American policy elites for Europe’s strategic dilemmas with respect to its Muslim and Arab neighbors, and the continuing flow of young people from within these societies struggling to cross the Mediterranean. European skepticism is deepened by American inability to reduce its dependence on imported oil, and by the continuing resistance of a significant proportion of Americans to accept the evidence of climate change and the threat it poses to international order. There is a deep contradiction between the dominant American view of European



societies and governments as cowed by the emergence of the dual internal and external threat in the “long war” between the American-led West and radical Islam—in the same way that West European governments were seen as cowed by the Soviet Union during the cold war—and European fears of being caught in the middle between two fundamentalist visions of competing global orders.

The contrast between the style, and the reception, of the US National Security Strategy (NSS) and the European Security Strategy (ESS), in 2002–3, illustrates the width of the divide. The NSS was lengthy, detailed, focused on military threats from states and the forces needed to meet them, and widely discussed in Washington. The ESS, drafted by Javier Solana and his policy unit for the approval of EU governments, was brief, tentative, focused on the multiple threats presented by non-state movements and the spillover across borders of internal conflicts and of territories without effective government, and tentative on the implications of the threats identified for European military requirements. It was also largely ignored by national media and national parliaments throughout the EU.<sup>20</sup> Multilateral Europe has made some progress in common policies to contain transnational criminal and terrorist networks, to cooperate in patrolling maritime borders, and to reduce energy use and carbon emissions. But on all these American policy-makers have resisted Atlantic partnership, insisting that mutual cooperation against crime and terrorism is limited by the prior claims of American sovereignty.

Slowly, almost imperceptibly, European governments are developing cooperation in defense, a shared understanding of conflict and its management, foreign policy and military staff in Brussels, and a coherent approach to their neighbors—including Russia, the Mahgreb, and the Middle East.<sup>21</sup> It is not impossible that within the next ten or twenty years the evolution of common policies will have provided a significant capability for external power projection, and a shared understanding of the purposes for which hard power must be used. The four-to-eight-year cycle of American politics, however, moves at an entirely different pace, building an American impatience with the reluctant European responses to US initiatives, and European resentment over the twists and turns of US strategy.

There is a deep transatlantic dissensus on the role and purpose of NATO, the hierarchy of threats that NATO members face, and the appropriate use of force in responding to threats. The future of NATO, politicians and commanders now suggest, rests on shared success—and a shared definition of success—in Afghanistan, and a shared approach to the overlapping conflicts of the Middle East. Differences over tactics in Afghanistan, and over strategy toward the “Greater Middle East,” suggest that it would be wise not to start building the planned replacement for its current headquarters. Only if a clear common enemy again emerged—a revived and actively hostile Russia, a revolutionary

Iran with nuclear weapons, and an intransigently anti-Western strategy—would European governments again recognize their dependence on predominant US deterrent power, and so continue to accept their secondary roles within the Atlantic alliance.

In the spring of 2009 another new administration will spell out to its European allies its vision of a new NATO, and its distinctive understanding of the threats the alliance faces. European heads of government will press their different perceptions in what will probably be a disorganized and incoherent fashion—as their predecessors pressed the importance of climate change, one after the other, on a resistant George W. Bush at his first EU–US summit in 2001. It is unlikely that they will easily agree on approaches to the Middle East, on Islamic fundamentalism, on the role of international law and institutions, perhaps also on approaches to Russia and China. Yet their officials will plunge into detailed negotiations on economic, financial, and commercial issues, and on managing the implications of technological innovation on international trade. Multinational companies with operations in both Europe and North America will press for convergence in approaches to climate change, in spite of continuing differences between domestic political assumptions. The millions of business, student, and leisure travellers across the Atlantic will press for some harmonization of border controls and extradition arrangements, in spite of Congressional and Supreme Court assertions of un-negotiable US sovereignty.

It is now the economic ties that bind the Atlantic together: a relationship of equals, covering an ever-widening agenda. The security relationship, in contrast, is deeply asymmetrical, both in armed forces and equipment and in perceptions of threat and of mission. The idea of security partnership was flawed from the outset; the United States never contemplated joint commands and negotiated strategies, while Europeans never accepted a level of military spending that would justify equal status. Security leadership cannot be shared; but economic partnership is an everyday reality.

## Notes

1. His unilateral initiative led to the most decisive victory of the war, at Blenheim, although British and Austrian troops suffered heavier casualties than the cautious Dutch States-General had been willing to risk.
2. The verse, attributed to a member of the British negotiating team at Bretton Woods, was: “In Washington,” Lord Halifax/Whispered to Lord Keynes, “It’s true they have the money/But we have got the brains.”
3. Alfred Grosser reprints de Gaulle’s Memorandum in *The Western Alliance* (London: Macmillan, 1980).
4. Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland (eds.), *The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

5. Harold van B. Cleveland, *The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); Earl Ravenal (ed.), *Atlantis Lost* (New York: New York University Press, 1976), especially the chapter by Stanley Hoffman, "No trumps, no luck, no will: gloomy thoughts on Europe's plight."
6. Gregory Treverton, *The Dollar Drain and American Forces in Germany: Managing The Political Economies of Alliance* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1978).
7. Philippe de Schoutheete, *La Coopération politique européenne* (Brussels: Labor, 1980.) It is striking that the contribution that European détente made to the gradual transformation of East–West relations has almost disappeared from American accounts of the end of the cold war.
8. Ottawa Declaration, quoted in William Wallace, "Issue Linkage among Atlantic Governments," *International Affairs*, 52/2 (Apr. 1976), 163–79; emphasis added. On the early development of EPC, see David Allen and William Wallace, "Political Cooperation: Procedure as Substitute for Policy," in Helen Wallace et al., *Policy-Making in the European Communities* (London: Wiley, 1977), ch. 9.
9. Robert D. Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, *Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits* (London: Heinemann, 1984); see also their second edition of 1987, and Nicholas Bayne, *Hanging in There: The G7 and G8 Summit in Maturity and Renewal* (London: Ashgate, 2000). The EC Commission President was the eighth member of G7, just as Switzerland was the eleventh member of G10.
10. Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, *Germany United and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Needless to say, this was a study in *American* statecraft more than in coherent Western diplomacy.
11. Robin Niblett and William Wallace (eds.), *Rethinking European Order: West European Responses, 1989–1997* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). See also Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "Common Foreign and Security Policy," in Helen Wallace et al., *Policy-Making in the European Union*, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), ch. 16.
12. Pauline Neville Jones, "Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations," *Survival*, 38/4 (1997).
13. Eva Østergaard Nielsen, *Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany* (London: Routledge, 2003).
14. Personal recollection; I was one of the speakers at that conference.
15. "If you are asking me to start World War III, I'm not going to do it." The Russian contingent arrived in Pristina airport without sufficient water or food. The British—in larger numbers—surrounded the airport, and negotiated the conditions on which they would provide supplies, successfully avoiding direct confrontation. Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001); Michael Jackson, *Soldier: The Autobiography* (London: Bantam, 2007).
16. N. Aylwin-Foster, *Operation Iraqi Freedom Phase Four: The Watershed the US Army Still Needs to Recognise* (London: Seaford House Papers, 2005). See also Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: 2006).
17. Lester Thurow, *Head to Head* (New York: Morrow, 1992). See also, among many others, Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), and Daniel Burstein, *Euroquake* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).

18. Martin Feldstein, "EMU and International Conflict," *Foreign Affairs* (1997).
19. Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan (eds.), *Deep Integration: How Transatlantic Markets are Leading Integration* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005).
20. Alyson Bailes, *The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2005). See also Felix Berenskoetter, "Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies," *Security Dialogue*, 36/1 (2005). An enquiry to members of the FORNET network of scholars working on European foreign-policy issues across EU countries, coordinated by the London School of Economics, received the response that only a Finnish parliamentary committee had discussed the draft document within six months of its publication.
21. Steven Everts et al., *A European Way of War* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004); William Wallace, "Is there a European Approach to War?," in Charles Reed and David Ryall (eds.), *The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

## Do Economic Trends Unite or Divide the Two Sides of the Atlantic?

*David P. Calleo*

### Globalism and Atlanticism

The question that frames my chapter—are present economic trends dividing or unifying the Atlantic world?—could easily have been raised at a seminar during the cold war.<sup>1</sup> But our motives for asking the question today are probably quite different. In the cold war, as Europe grew more united and powerful as an economic actor, there was concern that economic rivalry would divide the West—and thereby undermine the strong geopolitical consensus that otherwise prevailed in the face of the Soviet threat. Today, nearly two decades after the Soviet collapse, we sense a growing geopolitical alienation within the West, and hope to invoke our extensive economic ties to counter it. Today's Atlanticists, however, are not having an easy time with their arguments. "Globalism" rather than Atlanticism is the prevailing fashion for the world economy. For both the USA and the EU, trade is growing much more quickly with Asia's rapidly developing economies, and with China and India in particular, than with each other. In the period 2000–6, for example, US exports to the EU grew by 47 percent, to China by 208 percent, and to India by 167 percent. US imports from the EU grew by 48 percent, from China by 185 percent, and from India by 126 percent. In absolute terms, US imports from China alone were almost \$300 billion, smaller than from Europe—\$534 billion—but increasing nearly four times as quickly.<sup>2</sup> For traditional Atlanticists, the geopolitical implications of such trends are not welcome.

Atlanticists, however, have powerful counterarguments. Economic interdependence goes beyond simple trade. Transatlantic economic ties appear more significant if we take into account the huge reciprocal stock of transatlantic investments—the accumulation of a couple of centuries—together with the products and earnings of those investments.<sup>3</sup> The USA trades heavily

with Europeans by selling them products of American affiliates located in Europe. Europeans sell to Americans from their affiliates located in America. By 2004 these combined affiliate sales were roughly \$3 trillion.<sup>4</sup> With sales of affiliates taken into account, reciprocal transatlantic trade was almost \$4 trillion—roughly double reciprocal Asian trade with the West, sales of affiliates included.<sup>5</sup>

It is easy enough to come up with striking figures to illustrate the primacy of transatlantic over Asian investment. By 2006 total US direct investment in Europe on a historical cost basis was \$1.25 trillion, nearly three times larger than in all of Asia and the Pacific.<sup>6</sup> The pattern remains robust. In 2006, for example, Europe attracted 59 percent of total US foreign direct investment.<sup>7</sup> Employment figures are another indication of the huge scale of transatlantic direct investment. In 2006 American affiliates in Europe directly employed over a million workers in the UK, over 600,000 in Germany, 562,000 in France, and 238,000 in Italy. European affiliates in the US directly employ over 3.5 million Americans.<sup>8</sup> Europe, of course, is also a major source for direct investment in America. In 2006, Europe's accumulated FDI in the US was \$1.27 trillion, accounting for over 70 percent of total foreign investment in the USA.<sup>9</sup> During 2006, European direct investment in the USA was \$122.2 billion, as opposed to \$26.8 billion from Asian and Pacific countries.<sup>10</sup>

Of course, mutual investment has also been accelerating between Asia and the West.<sup>11</sup> Western corporations have rapidly proliferating joint ventures and affiliates in Asia. Japan is heavily invested in US-based manufacturing. An Indian firm has recently taken over a large part of the European steel industry.<sup>12</sup> China is currently planning to invest some \$300 billion of its vast dollar reserves in Western equity markets.<sup>13</sup> In short, present trends, if they continue, point toward a greater convergence among Asian, European, and American levels of reciprocal trade and investment.

The growing importance of Asia for intra-corporate trade suggests a major change in the character of world trade in general. During the postwar era, the biggest trade and investment flows were among the advanced economies themselves. European and American markets, ostensibly very similar in cost structures, were nevertheless thought to be sufficiently differentiated, so that Western corporations could derive real advantages from dispersing their production to markets on both sides of the Atlantic. Having an affiliate present in a regional market, sensitized to local culture, part of local corporate society, interacting with local politics and providing local employment, was thought to bring significant competitive advantages, despite the extra costs. Modern transport and communication made it easy to keep in touch, or to move factors around.<sup>14</sup>

The heavy outsourcing by Western firms of their production to China, and, in general, the growing proportion of Chinese products in Western markets,

suggests the return to a more classical pattern of trade—one where advanced countries with high technology, high productivity, and expensive labor trade with relatively underdeveloped countries with cheap labor.<sup>15</sup> Whether this assignment of roles in manufacturing and services will satisfy the Chinese remains to be seen. They are well aware that producing goods with low technological input often means low profits.<sup>16</sup> And, while they certainly have abundant cheap labor, they do not fit easily into the rest of the classic profile of an underdeveloped partner. Instead, with very high saving rates, they are increasingly capital-rich. They are also rapidly developing their own capabilities for advanced technology and research.<sup>17</sup> With abundant capital, growing technological prowess, and increasingly well-trained labor, they seem likely to become serious competitors all across the spectrum of the modern world economy. Insofar as their labor costs will still remain significantly lower than in the West, their competition will be much more formidable than that of less populous Asian states. The same can probably be said of India.

What do these trade and investment trends suggest about transatlantic and global economic relations? For the present, they certainly reinforce the widespread presumption of transatlantic economic interdependence. Europe and the USA each has a significant part of its capital directly invested in the productive capacity of the other. This huge reciprocal direct investment reflects the critical role of international corporations. Overall, roughly one third of traditional exports and imports is said to be between corporations and their own affiliates.<sup>18</sup> For international corporations diversification of production is a classic hedging strategy. A boom in one market can compensate for a slump in another. Diversification helps to protect against regional shocks—an important consideration in a politically uncertain world of unstable currencies and acerbic trade disputes. From this perspective, however, the tendency of Western corporations to plant their production on both sides of the Atlantic can be read less as a sign of close transatlantic coordination of government policies than of its absence; hence the need to hedge against political disruptions. How Chinese firms, intimately tied to their government, might fit into this pattern is yet to be seen.

Today's international economy is not merely about trading goods and services, but also about the flow of money. Today's money flows include, of course, much more than direct corporate investment. There are also huge short-term movements in liquid capital markets. The prominence of derivatives and hedge funds bears witness to the scale of footloose money. Forward markets, for example, are often several times larger than the real markets they shadow.<sup>19</sup> An informed estimate during the summer of 2007 put the notional value of derivative contracts outstanding at an astonishing \$415 trillion.<sup>20</sup> Monetary flows are not all private. Many states have built

large currency reserves. Prominent among these are China and Singapore, as well as several oil-producing countries (including Norway). Collectively these reserves form a large pool of capital—recently estimated at some \$2.5 trillion. Formerly invested in relatively stable and inert US Treasury Bonds, these reserves are now increasingly being invested actively in equity markets around the world.<sup>21</sup>

## Fear of Chaos

Thoughtful analysts are often uneasy over the size and velocity of global money. Although the world economy, saturated with money, goes on producing ever greater wealth, the old shibboleths of economic virtue no longer seem to apply. In a world seemingly awash with liquid capital, the capacity for investment no longer seems reliably linked to the capacity for saving. The United States has been a major beneficiary of this new dispensation. Americans consume heavily and invest heavily—at home and abroad. But they do not save. As an economy, the USA gathers enormous rewards from capitalism, but, aside from success itself, Americans practice few of the traditional capitalist virtues. Under such circumstances, the behavior of the world's money bears a certain resemblance to weather patterns. Often there seems to be no coherent explanation for what goes on. The prevailing state sometimes appears to be chaos—frequently benign but also fitfully destructive—as when great waves of money begin to flow in and out of someone's real economy. Hence the repeated currency crises, oil shocks, real-estate booms, and dot-com bubbles. The reigning god of this monetary universe is not always Apollo but sometimes Typhoo.<sup>22</sup>

A world that fears chaos tends to value power. The economy of power, like that of money, supposedly has its own particular rules of balance. Monetary disequilibrium and geopolitical disequilibrium often mirror each other. Imbalance in one often reinforces imbalance in the other. When rules of balance cease to prevail, power and money together can slip their habitual restraints and run amok. These observations reinforce a conclusion suggested earlier: close economic relations do not, in themselves, guarantee harmonious political relations. Indeed, entwined economies can easily result in greater friction without a system of stable rules and practices accepted on all sides. The cold-war years, for example, witnessed persistent and sometimes intense transatlantic friction over economic rules, in particular over the management of the dollar and its exchange rate. Cold war transatlantic history suggests not so much that economic ties can overcome geopolitical alienation as the reverse: that unifying geopolitical imperatives are needed to overcome the economic quarrels that often divide Europe and America.



## Cold War Lessons

The 1970s and 1980s provide a rich history of heated Western disputes over the dollar's unstable exchange rates.<sup>23</sup> Monetary issues were often linked to trade disputes. Americans, for example, regularly accused the fledgling European Economic Community (EEC) of discriminating against American agricultural products, thereby depriving the USA of its comparative advantage as a food supplier to Europe. In the Kennedy Round of the 1960s, the USA tried vehemently but unsuccessfully to torpedo the Common Agricultural Policy.<sup>24</sup> Americans also claimed that the dollar was "overvalued" and blamed Europeans for refusing to revalue their currencies. The USA had serious trouble defending the dollar's exchange rate as early as 1968. By the 1970s the USA had begun running an unprecedented trade deficit.

Monetary disputes were often linked to the "burden-sharing" issue—the continuing imbalance between American and European military power in Europe itself. The USA appeared to be spending more on European defense than the Europeans themselves. As Nixon's secretary of the Treasury, John Connally, pointed out as Bretton Woods was collapsing, America's "basic" balance-of-payments deficit was about equal to the exchange cost of US troops stationed in Europe.<sup>25</sup> The economics may have been dubious but the politics were clear. By the 1980s, the dollar's instability was closely linked to America's chronic "twin" deficits—fiscal and external. The fiscal deficit meant that the government was spending significantly more than its income. The twin external deficit registered how America's real economy was absorbing more than it produced, and was therefore in deficit with the rest of the world. Both fiscal and external deficits grew steadily throughout the 1970s and 1980s. And both could plausibly be tied to America's world role and the heavy military spending that went with it.<sup>26</sup>

While politicians debated burden sharing, economists began to be concerned with inflation—bounding growth in the world's money supply, along with the mounting price and wage inflation that accompanied that growth. By the 1970s, as inflation grew rampant in Europe and the United States, the dollar's instability was taken as both a sign and a cause. There were, of course, numerous causes for inflation present in Europe itself, particularly after the widespread social and labor unrest in the years around 1968. Arguably, inflation was inherent in the very nature of the communitarian welfare states that were postwar Europe's cure for the deflationary tendencies of the interwar years. As postwar Europe's inflationary drift grew progressively more difficult to ignore, classic liberal principles once more grew fashionable. Nearly every European country began a prolonged struggle between neo-classical and communitarian models for public policy.

Meanwhile, it remained popular and plausible to blame postwar inflation on America's macroeconomic mismanagement. The European monetarist

position against the USA was already spelled out in the mid-1960s by General de Gaulle himself—inspired by his economic adviser, the French liberal economist, Jacques Rueff. Rueff was a long-time critic of the “gold-exchange standard”—the monetary arrangement of the 1920s reimposed on postwar Europe by the Americans at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944. This confirmed the dollar as the world’s official “reserve currency,” to be used in place of gold. Since the Bretton Woods system posed no effective limits on America’s creation of new money, Rueff saw it as inexorably inflationary. A world financial system based on the dollar would eventually collapse, he predicted.<sup>27</sup> Meanwhile, Europeans were expected to absorb America’s excess dollars, which meant that they absorbed America’s inflation and thereby greatly exacerbated their own inflationary tendencies. De Gaulle added a coda of his own: Bretton Woods was also geopolitically abusive. By holding the excess dollars from America’s overseas spending, Europeans were financing not only America’s foreign military adventures, as in Vietnam, but also the huge investments American corporations were making while taking over industries in Europe itself.<sup>28</sup>

Events in the late 1960s and 1970s—the Vietnam war, Europe’s inflation and social unrest, the floating and depreciating dollar, the massive buildup of credit in the Eurodollar market, the oil shocks, the frantic “recycling” of petrodollars—all tended to substantiate de Gaulle’s critique. By the decade’s end, shared opposition to America’s management of the dollar had rejuvenated the Franco-German special relationship. French president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, collaborated in support of the European Monetary System of 1979, a major step toward the euro. The rationale was to stabilize Europe’s exchange rates so that the single market could function properly, regardless of the unstable dollar.<sup>29</sup> Meanwhile, however, the dollar’s volatility persisted into the 1980s, as America’s twin deficits continued to mount.

The technical methods for financing America’s deficits changed from decade to decade.<sup>30</sup> In the 1970s, from the Nixon to the Carter administrations, deficits were financed mostly by creating and exporting dollars.<sup>31</sup> European and Japanese central banks went on absorbing a large part of these exported dollars, while an even larger amount joined the huge pool of dollars held in private offshore accounts. Exporting dollars was the path of least resistance for the USA, which generally seemed better able than most European countries to ignore the domestic inflationary effects of a weak currency. America’s national economy was relatively autarkic and, unlike the European economies, not so vulnerable to rising import prices. It helped greatly, of course, that oil and other commodities were factored in dollars. Meanwhile, the oil shocks lent a certain legitimacy to creating an abundance of dollars. It meant easy credit for developing countries financing their big oil deficits. By Carter’s last year, however, America’s immunity to inflation began to fail. The

year 1980 saw a burst of inflation in the USA itself, a further radical fall of the dollar, a second oil shock, and an explosive commodities boom, all of which forced the administration into a rigorously restrained macroeconomic policy. Carter installed a strong-minded monetarist, Paul Volcker, to head the Federal Reserve.

Volcker's classic restraint prevailed for only a short time. Soon after appointing Volcker, Carter was defeated by Reagan and the USA adopted a new formula—Reaganite fiscal indulgence combined with Volcker's monetary stringency. The natural consequences were high interest rates and a super high exchange rate for the dollar. Capital inflows, seeking the record yields, more than adequately financed the growing twin deficits. In effect, the Reagan formula borrowed back the money the Nixon formula had exported earlier. Like the Nixon formula, however, the Reagan formula generated problems that eventually brought it down. While the Nixon formula had ultimately meant unsustainable inflation, the Reagan/Volcker formula, with its high dollar and tight credit, severely damaged America's traditional export industries. Widespread bankruptcies threatened, especially throughout America's Middle West. Moreover, as real interest rates and the dollar's exchange rate both rose to unprecedented heights, foreign borrowers of dollars began to default. By the 1980s, banks that had enthusiastically recycled petrodollars to developing countries in the 1970s, when the world was awash in liquidity, found their borrowers in trouble and began themselves to falter. Volcker was periodically forced to loosen credit to avoid catastrophe. The result was a hectic succession of speculative booms and crashes, including a severe stock-market crash in 1987.<sup>32</sup>

By the late 1980s, the USA was widely depicted as in "decline," ailing from "overstretch." Declinist scholars promised America the fate of Habsburg Spain and Bourbon France.<sup>33</sup> The new president, George H. W. Bush, tried, like Carter at the end, to return to more conventional economic discipline. Like Carter, he was a one-term president. But he was also the last of the Cold War presidents. Soviet overstretch was far worse than American. With the Soviet's gone, Bush's successor in 1993, Bill Clinton, faced a radically altered geopolitical dispensation, with all-important economic consequences.

Before going on to the new post-Soviet framework, we might pause to gather lessons from the cold-war years. That history, with its adventurous and unpredictable dollar, challenges the old chestnut that greater economic interdependence fosters closer political ties. Nevertheless, despite the cold war's economic frictions, its political ties did hold. The monetary issues were managed, if not resolved. How can we explain the forbearance of America's creditors in the face of the volatile dollar of those decades? It seems perverse to deny that the geopolitical context was critical. Given America's heavy deficits, the dollar depended on support from Western Europe and Japan. Both lived within comfortable military protectorates maintained by the United States.

If nothing else, this explained their willingness, however grudging, to go on with their support for the dollar. But these protectorates also go a long way toward explaining the chronic American fiscal and monetary “indiscipline” thought to be responsible for the unstable dollar.

On the surface, America’s fiscal problems seemed to stem primarily from its relatively low level of taxation. If the USA had had the same overall tax levels as European states, and its expenditures had remained the same, there would not have been an outsized fiscal deficit. Logically, raising taxes and eliminating the fiscal deficit should also have prevented so extreme an external deficit. What explained the American public’s comparative unwillingness to pay taxes? It is tempting to speculate on differences between American and European fiscal cultures. The American Revolution was, after all, the product of a tax revolt. But so, it might be said, was the French Revolution. A less contentious explanation can be derived from a comparatively straightforward cost–benefit analysis. Compared to postwar Western Europe, the USA had a relatively parsimonious version of the welfare state. In America, citizens received far less in civilian public goods from their government. Instead, Americans had defense spending at a much higher order of magnitude.<sup>34</sup> In practice, however, America’s political system imposed a different reckoning. As the Western superpower, the USA was willing to spend more on defense and, at the same time, forgo the high level of civilian public goods common in Europe. But the Americans would also refrain from taxing their incomes at European levels.<sup>35</sup>

As we have seen, the resulting American fiscal deficits were financed either by issuing dollars, or by borrowing back the dollars saved by others. Since the aggregate loans grew larger and larger over time and the dollar depreciated sharply, much of the real cost of America’s global role was eventually passed on to others. Americans found it easy enough to justify their behavior. America’s heavy cold-war defense spending could, for example, be explained by the need to keep large conventional forces in Europe. From this perspective, financing the American external deficit was a sort of imperial users’ tax for the NATO and Japanese alliances. As the USA oscillated from printing money to borrowing it back, the inevitable result was a volatile dollar.

For a Europe trying to form a single market, the consequences grew increasingly unwelcome. A volatile dollar provoked strong tensions among Europe’s own currencies. Having Europe’s internal exchange rates mutually unstable was widely believed to distort the workings of the single market Europe was seeking to create.<sup>36</sup> European governments, the French and German in particular, had long been planning an escape. As soon as the Soviet threat disappeared, they put forth their own radical solution—the euro. With a common European money, an unstable dollar would do much less damage to the single market. Erratic and uneven changes in national exchange rates would no longer disrupt the EU’s internal trade and investment. In France,

particularly, it was hoped that the new strong currency would pressure firms to upgrade their products and productivity—thought to be an essential strategy if Europe was to remain rich and successful in an increasingly competitive world. Some also hoped that a Europe that was collectively as autarkic as the USA, could, like the USA, pursue expansive growth strategies while ignoring the exchange rate. And many also saw the euro not only as a major step toward fulfilling the European Community's economic design, but also as a dramatic symbol of Europe's reviving power. Like the EU itself, the euro was as inspired by de Gaulle as by Monnet.<sup>37</sup>

## Clinton's Post-Cold War Economy

The fall of the Soviets, together with the creation of the EU and the installation of the euro, set a new framework for transatlantic relations. Arguably, the new framework may intensify Western economic quarrels, since the powerful offsetting structural conditions of the cold war no longer prevail. Not only did the Western nations formerly share an overriding common geopolitical interest in the face of the Soviet threat; they also shared a common international currency, for which there was no alternative. Today, the unifying Soviet threat is gone and there is an alternative to the dollar—the euro—a widely used international currency issued from Europe itself.

These changes reflect basic shifts in the world's geopolitical framework. The collapse of the bipolar world was widely interpreted—in the USA at least—as automatically resulting in a unipolar world dominated by the USA. As Iraq indicates, that judgment was very likely wrong and certainly premature. Instead, the demise of the Soviets has been accompanied not only by a certain geopolitical liberation of America's European and Japanese allies, but also by the rapid rise of China and India as potential superpowers. Meanwhile, Russia is again pressing to regain a major world role, while a violent surge of dissatisfaction is reanimating the Muslim world. Very likely, the new world order is fated to be more plural than the old. The consequences for the postwar Atlantic alliance are far from clear. Understandably, partisans of the Alliance are uneasy. In a more diverse world, the West, they feel, has all the more reason to hang together. They stress cultural and military ties, and, above all, the transatlantic world's economic interdependence. But, as we have seen, that remedy is rather problematic. Economic interdependence is, in itself, no guarantee of harmonious relations.

Whether the structural changes resulting from the end of the cold war eventually result in closer or more distant transatlantic economic relations probably depends heavily on how the Americans eventually react to the new situation. A determining issue is whether the USA at last achieves a stable dollar. Arguably, this depends on whether the USA sees the end of the cold

war as an opportunity to retreat from geopolitical overstretch or as an invitation to press forward with global hegemony. If the former, the USA should be able to cut military spending sufficiently to stabilize its economy and accommodate Europe's conventional preoccupation with monetary stability. Transatlantic economic relations should stabilize and intensify. If the USA chooses the latter course, large deficits and monetary conflict are very likely to continue. With a common currency, however, Europe is vulnerable and better equipped to defend its own interests. Ironically, in pursuing hegemony, the USA will undermine the Atlantic alliance upon which success most probably depends.

Throughout the Clinton years, the USA appeared to be following the first course—retreating from geopolitical overstretch and thereby appeasing Europe's old grievances. American policy followed a conventional path pointing toward a stable dollar. With the Soviets gone, defense spending was allowed to fall sharply and the resulting "peace dividend" was applied to balancing fiscal policy. Taxes were also raised.<sup>38</sup> With the federal government borrowing significantly less, interest rates fell, private investment soared—pumped up by the dot-com boom. Productivity also rose sharply, which encouraged growth without inflation. Clinton's equilibrium, however, was only half-achieved. The fiscal deficit disappeared but the external deficit kept growing strongly. In other words, the US economy continued to absorb considerably more than it produced. But, thanks to the booming dot-com industry, record direct investment flowed from Europe to the USA. The inflow from abroad more than covered the current account deficit. Foreign investors in general, and private Europeans in particular, became enthusiastic participants in America's future.<sup>39</sup> The USA was seen to be the avatar of the new technology. Under these circumstances, America's "borrowing" of foreign capital to cover the external deficit was adding not so much to the country's debt as to its stock of productive investment. America's external deficit could be portrayed as a virtuous contribution to the welfare of others. It made America the world's "consumer of last resort." Above all, it fueled the rapid rise of China. The Clinton administration appeared to have precipitated a new international division of labor: America innovated and consumed while Europe saved and China produced.

Like any other economic grand design, Clinton's formula had a geopolitical foundation. Fiscal balance went hand in hand with deep cuts in defense spending. But lowering defense spending was a responsible policy only if accompanied by a commensurably restrained foreign policy. Logically, such a foreign policy called for cooperative relations with Russia and China, as well as a Europe able to take primary responsibility for security in its own space. It also called for serious progress toward resolving the Palestinian problem. The administration pursued all these aims with varying success. It was reluctant to intervene anywhere militarily. When it did so, it was under the influence of

the “Powell Doctrine,” designed to keep American forces from getting bogged down in other people’s local wars.<sup>40</sup>

It is tempting to believe that Clinton did find a viable post-Soviet formula, and it is even more tempting to believe that this formula can somehow be restored. But events were conspiring to make it improbable that Clinton’s restraint would endure. The genocidal conflict in Yugoslavia was a severe test. According to the basic Clinton strategy, coping with Yugoslavia was Europe’s business. European forces did intervene under a limited UN mandate. Despite much brave talk about common European defense, cooperation had not progressed to the point where it was militarily competent. US intervention grew inevitable. With Americans in the lead, peace was imposed. This provoked a flood of American triumphalism that undermined the administration’s self-restraint. The country’s political class grew increasingly intoxicated by the vision of a “unipolar” global order. “Neoconservative” strategic thinkers, fiercely critical of the administration’s modest geopolitical footprint, seized the initiative. The administration, gravely weakened by scandal, grew increasingly the prisoner of its critics. Early on, moreover, President Clinton himself strongly supported exuberant NATO enlargement, which predictably began to poison relations with the Russians.<sup>41</sup> Clinton also stepped up interventions in Iraq. Meanwhile, efforts at a Palestinian settlement broke down. By the end of the administration, defense spending was rising sharply.<sup>42</sup>

Arguably, the USA was already in a geopolitical pattern that would eventually undermine Clinton’s newly won fiscal balance. The geopolitical balance that emerged from the cold war weighed too strongly in America’s favor. Europe’s integration after Maastricht proceeded too slowly to create a new equilibrium. Europe failed to live up to the military requirements of its new position. It was still free-riding. Previously, the Soviet Union had provided a sort of counterbalance that in some senses added weight to Europe’s position vis-à-vis the United States. The USA could not afford to alienate Europe’s governments or publics. The Soviet collapse removed that restraint. Ending the cold war thus made the imbalance between America and Europe grow worse. It became all too easy to consider the USA as the unique superpower in a unipolar global system. Americans saw less and less reason to restrain their power, while Europeans no longer felt an overriding need to borrow it. Serious transatlantic estrangement over foreign policy was perhaps inevitable.

Before long, the old economic patterns of the cold war began to reappear. The new Bush administration quickly began undermining Clinton’s stable dollar and preparing the way for the return of the twin deficits. Before 9/11 came the dot-com crash and a recession. The administration responded with sharp tax cuts.<sup>43</sup> Following 9/11, defense spending skyrocketed. With the war in Iraq, current defense spending exceeds cold-war levels. With the US military now deeply involved in several intractable struggles, it is difficult to imagine a return to Clinton’s “peacetime” defense budgets. Meanwhile, demographic

trends also point toward rising entitlement spending.<sup>44</sup> Clinton's solution to the fiscal deficit seems lost for the foreseeable future.

A similar fate has overtaken Clinton's solution to the external deficit. Luring the necessary direct investment from abroad depended upon foreigners' faith in the long-term technological and financial predominance of the USA. The Clinton administration promoted this ambitious goal with characteristic intelligence and coherence. The collapse of the dot-com boom before 9/11, however, raised the issue of whether Clinton's economic formula was really sustainable, and in particular whether his way of financing the external deficit could have continued. From our present soured perspective, Clinton's big capital inflows seem to have been merely a temporary bonanza from a passing bubble, a further illustration of the world economy's surfeit of volatile capital.

Naturally, when the big foreign capital inflows for investment ceased in 2001, the dollar fell sharply. The external deficit nevertheless remained high, with government and private consumption at record levels. Big capital inflows did resume in a couple of years, but went into short-term bonds and other liquid assets rather than long-term direct investment. The source of the inflow, moreover, shifted dramatically—from European firms to the central banks of Japan and China.<sup>45</sup> The shift was unpromising for the dollar's long-term stability. Japan, a stagnant but extremely prosperous and well-developed society, might be content to go on supporting the dollar indefinitely—as insurance for its favorable trade balance and continuing military protection. But China—a rich country with a very poor population—urgently needs infrastructure and internal development generally. Eventually it seems likely to find better things to do with its savings than subsidize America's outsized consumption. More immediately, China at least wants a better return on its savings than currently available from US Treasury Bonds, particularly given today's high risk of dollar depreciation. Like the Europeans and Japanese earlier, the Chinese want to transform their surplus dollars into ownership of a real share of the American economy. The Chinese presence in America could rapidly grow heavy. China's "sovereign wealth fund," initiated in 2007, was scheduled to invest \$300 billion from dollar reserves into equities. China had roughly a trillion more of dollar reserves, accumulating at the rate of \$40 billion a month. Almost certainly American governments will grow restive at Chinese public investment in US industry on such a scale. Even private European firms often find stiff official resistance when they attempt to enter industries with sensitive technology. In other words, the USA is likely to deny at least one of the logical consequences of its continuing heavy indebtedness to China.<sup>46</sup>

Another outcome is possible, perhaps even likely. Should China's support diminish and the dollar fall as dramatically as some now predict, America's competitive position in the world should improve significantly, with a stunning rebound for America's industrial production and external balance.<sup>47</sup> Foreign exporters not tied to the dollar would suffer commensurably. Abruptly



falling exports to America might have highly disruptive domestic consequences for China in particular. But the effects on exporters in Europe and Japan could also prove traumatic. In recent years, all advanced economies—American, European, and Japanese—have faced intense competition from one another. Competing increasingly with very low-cost producers like China and India, all have gravitated toward a similar strategy of concentrating the home economy on high-technology goods and financial services. Thus, in the near term at least, a radical fall in the dollar risks a severe strain in transatlantic economic relations. An unstable dollar falling rapidly will probably reinforce Europe's determination to protect its own industries and look for long-term regional partners. Paradoxically, it might also encourage more mutual transatlantic investment—a strategy for business firms to escape the ravages of unstable exchange rates and inflamed trade disputes. This might serve the interest of the West's global corporations, but not be popular with Western governments, increasingly attuned to the interests of their beleaguered domestic industry and labor. In the longer term, as China itself advances toward greater technological mastery, most probably without losing its big advantage in labor costs, Western states may be inclined to seek refuge in a giant protectionist bloc. Rich countries might reaffirm the postwar pattern of trading mostly with themselves. China would be kept at arm's length—a course with heavy geopolitical implications that might work to restore the common threat needed to sustain Western unity.

Noting the critical role of China in the dollar's future should remind us that the transatlantic minuet is not as intimate as it used to be. China's explosive energy continues to shake up the rest of the global economy. It also continues to shake up China, whose government is impressive, but riding a tiger. Having several new and highly competitive players in the world economy presents great potential for conflict. With the best will in the world, it will not prove easy for Western labor to compete against the labor forces of the Asian giants. Nor, given today's rapidly growing consciousness of environmental constraints, can we expect headlong growth to resolve our conflicts. Under these circumstances—with restricted prospects for growth and vigorous and diverse competition—economic interdependence can as well point toward conflict as cooperation.

To avoid spiraling conflicts, closely integrated international markets will, more than ever, require adequate political frameworks. Successfully negotiating frameworks for intimate collaboration will almost certainly be more likely in a regional than in a global dimension. While small countries may find it easier to negotiate an honorable niche for themselves, in a world economy, regional consolidation will permit firms in medium-size economies, collaborating with neighbors, to achieve collectively the scale needed to compete with American and Asian giants. The EU is the obvious model. While its formula, especially in its federalist versions, has globalist pretensions of its

own, Europeans are growing increasingly sensitive to the geographic, social, and cultural limits on how far their own regional bonds can be stretched. If regional patterns do prevail as the century progresses, the global economy seems less likely to integrate as a whole than to form a number of distinct blocs. Arguably, such a multi-tiered world system is already evolving. The EU, for example, seems to be succeeding in incorporating the former Soviet "satellites."<sup>48</sup> It remains for Europeans to come to terms with Russia, together with their other Eurasian, Mediterranean, and African neighbors. Regional systems are also springing up in Asia and in the Americas.

How can these blocs be prevented from warring with one another? Global rules and institutions will be needed to facilitate adjustment among the blocs. Confrontations will have to be contained before they grow unmanageable. There seems to be no lack of global institutions hoping to create and implement the agendas needed to link the emerging regional systems—the UN Security Council, the Group of Eight (G8), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank—to mention some of the more obvious. Many of these organizations need recalibrating to make them more reflective of regional realities than universalist pretensions.

Is it possible to imagine an American-led Atlantic system continuing as the central core within such a plural world? If Western relations with the new Asian superpowers take a catastrophic turn, or the global economy breaks down in chaos, Europe and America may cling to each other as intimately as during the cold war. In theory, a "War of Civilizations," if not a "War on Terror," may cement a new Western alliance. But, with a less catastrophic prognosis, the cold-war alliance seems likely to loosen. The USA and Europe are the two great Western regional powers, both struggling to meet the challenge of Asia's giant low-cost producers. In this, they are rivals as well as partners. Rivalry grows embittered when one feels taken advantage of by the other. Americans feel aggrieved when Europeans appear not to be assuming a fair share of common security burdens—above all in Europe itself. The issue is still very much with us. With all the recent talk of European Venus and American Mars, the Western world has seen a major revival of the old burden-sharing debate. As usual, American complaining is ambivalent. Americans prefer a Europe strong enough militarily to provide effective support but not strong enough to have independent policies of its own. For their part, Europeans are increasingly impatient with what they see as incompetent American foreign policies in neighboring regions vital to their own security.

Behind the updated burden-sharing debate is a still more fundamental transatlantic geopolitical difference. The Western world's political imagination is divided between two models for organizing interstate relations in the future. One, popular among political elites in America, sees the world as a global system urgently in need of a benevolent unipolar hegemon. In this vision, Europe reverts to its cold-war status—geopolitically dependent but

contributing to American power, and especially to American finance. In what will probably be a more harshly competitive economic environment, both Europeans and Americans may find it difficult to remain satisfied with such an arrangement.

Europeans tend to favor a more pluralist, less hegemonic interstate formula—one that emphasizes institutionalized bargaining and mutual appeasement, a vision derived from Europe's own successful postwar regional model. But to promote effectively a wider global version of their own system, European states will need to achieve greater geopolitical solidarity among themselves, together with enough military force to keep order in their own space. Such a Europe would probably be less inclined than the USA to quarrel with the Middle Eastern Muslim states or with Russia. Paradoxically, this difference of geopolitical outlook might lead European states to cling nevertheless to their NATO ties—not so much to contribute to American power as to control it. Meanwhile, Americans eager to assume world leadership will doubtless remain dissatisfied with Europe's tendency to bargain rather than confront.

Americans, of course, are increasingly divided among themselves. Those attempting to bring greater discipline and restraint to the use of American power will be inclined to hope for a more balanced transatlantic relationship. From this perspective, the United States seems better served by balancing friends than resentful dependants. In any event, in a more balanced transatlantic relationship, with a stronger and more independent Europe, the old special ties will doubtless remain. Each side of the Atlantic will seek, as always, to penetrate, influence, and enjoy the other. But each will also seek to preserve its own capacity to interact directly with the world's other major powers. The result, we may hope, will be a new Concert of Powers writ large across the globe. To offer leadership for such a system, or attract Europe into a genuine partnership, the United States will itself have to find a new inner and outer balance, which it probably cannot do without Europe's help. This will have to include a better balance between the USA and the world economy, together with a more stable dollar. These are, at the same time, the conditions that should favor maintaining and deepening transatlantic economic ties.

Parallel to the Western split over geopolitical approaches, however, is a deep fissure between two radically different approaches to economic policy making—a divide that expresses itself most clearly over monetary policy. In recent years, the Europeans have, on balance, tended to emphasize equilibrium and the Americans to emphasize growth. The two approaches might be described as "Aristotelian" and "Nietzschean." Apollo versus Dionysus is perhaps a better metaphor for transatlantic differences than Venus versus Mars. For Aristotelians, the purpose of monetary policy is to create the framework for an orderly, predictable, and just economy. Clear rules are

needed to prevent excesses and protect the vulnerable. For America's financial Nietzscheans, however, the task of monetary policy is to enable an expanding system to push its potential to the limit. Aristotle suits a plural world searching for safety. Nietzsche suits a global hegemon, with an outsized appetite pressing for growth. Of course, the divide exists on both sides of the Atlantic. In recent years, with Europe's common currency and Central Bank, Aristotle appears to be ascendant in the Old World. With the return to twin deficits in America, Nietzsche now prevails in the New. Neither side seems stable or satisfied with its present situation. As the history of the twentieth century suggests, it is difficult for the two approaches to coexist without some geopolitical threat that compels cooperation.

## Notes

1. This chapter was produced with the help of a series of admirable research assistants at Johns Hopkins SAIS: David Beffert, Kai Behrens, Mark Huberty, and Kelly O'Malley.
2. See Table 10.1.
3. A notable illustration is Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, *Transatlantic Economy 2006: Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade and Investment between the United States and Europe* (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 2006).
4. See Tables 10.2 and 10.3.
5. In 2006, combined reciprocal affiliate sales between the USA and Europe totaled \$3.1 trillion. Reciprocal trade (exports and imports) totaled approximately \$865 billion. In 2006, combined reciprocal affiliate sales between the USA and the Asia/Pacific Countries totaled \$1.2 trillion and reciprocal trade totaled \$1.1 trillion. Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce, [www.bea.gov](http://www.bea.gov).
6. See Table 10.6.
7. See Table 10.4.
8. Hamilton and Quinlan, *Transatlantic Economy*, 13.
9. See Table 10.7.
10. See Table 10.5.
11. In 1997 European firms supplied 73.1% of all FDI flowing into the USA, compared to only 12.9% coming from Asian companies. By 2005, however, the European share had slipped to 66.4% of 2005 FDI inflows, while the Asian share had grown to 21.8%. Relative stocks of direct investment are comparable. In 2002 European firms held 71.8% of foreign-held direct investment in the US on a historic cost basis, compared to 14.7% for Asian firms. By 2005 Europe's share had slipped to 60.9%, while Asia's had risen to 17.5%. The data thus point toward an eventual convergence of FDI shares among America's major foreign economic partners. See "Foreign Direct Investment in the US: Capital Inflow" (Washington, DC: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1997–2005), at <http://www.bea.gov/international/>. For the rise of sovereign wealth funds, see Tony Tassell and Joan Chung, "The \$2,500bn Question: How Sovereign Wealth Funds Are Muscling in on Global Markets,"

- Financial Times*, May 25, 2005, 7. For Western investment in Asia, see Busakorn Chantasawat et al., "Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia and Latin America: Is There a PRC Effect?," Asian Development Bank Institute Discussion Paper, No. 17, Nov, 2004.
12. The June 2006 takeover of Belgian specialty steel manufacturer Arcelor by the Indian giant Mittal created the world's largest steel conglomerate. It went ahead despite opposition from both Arcelor's management and senior politicians in several EU countries, including France. See "Mittal Steel Wins Battle for Arcelor" and "Patriot Games; French Business," *The Economist*, July 1, 2006.
  13. Richard McGregor, "China Confirms Agency to Manage Forex Reserves," FT.com site, published Mar. 9, 2007.
  14. See James R. Markusen and Keith E. Maskus, "Multinational Firms: Reconciling Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers, No. 7163, National Bureau of Economic Research, Washington, DC, 1999.
  15. Ricardian trade theories, up to and including Heckscher–Ohlin models, typically predict inter-industry trade (usually, capital-intensive traded for labor-intensive goods), which would suggest that relatively capital-rich developed countries would trade mostly with relatively labor-abundant developing nations. Throughout the postwar era, however, rich developed nations were inclined to trade and invest with one another. To explain these patterns, economists developed a variety of theories on intra-industry trade, including product-cycle, product-differentiation, and product-variety theories of supply and demand. For a survey of the history of modern trade theory and the inter/intra-industry problem, see Elhanan Helpman, "The Structure of Foreign Trade," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 13/2 (Spring 1999), 121–44, and Elhanan Helpman, "Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms," NBER Working Papers, No. 12091, National Bureau of Economic Research, Washington, 2006). See also W. W. Rostow, *World Economy: History and Prospect* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978). For China's role, see Yum K. Kwan and Edwin L.-C. Lai, "Understanding China's Trade Flows," Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Aug. 2005, <http://personal.cityu.edu.hk/~efedwin/Understanding%20China%20Trade%20Flows%204C.pdf>.
  16. A World Bank study points out that the structure of industrialization in China has kept most of the intellectual property and firm knowledge for high-tech products within foreign affiliates, resulting in little technology spillover to the Chinese economy. This is true for non-Chinese Asian affiliates as well as for US affiliates. In short, while China's export-led growth has generated significant wealth for that country, it may not be contributing to the sustainability of its economic performance. See Mona Haddad, "Trade Integration in East Asia: The Role of China and Production Networks," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4160 (Washington: World Bank, Mar. 2007). But see recent (Aug. 2007) data on China as fourth generator of new patents after US, Japan, and the combined EU.
  17. Richard McGregor, "China Develops Research Sector," FT.com site, published Aug. 28, 2007.
  18. Variation among industries and regions is great. Intra-firm trade is very high among firms producing computers and electronics in certain special bilateral relations, like Mexico in NAFTA. See "Intra-Industry and Intra-Firm Trade and the Internationalization of Production," *OECD Economic Outlook 71*, ch. 6.

19. EU sources estimate the size of the global hedge fund industry between \$145 billion and \$295 billion. Greater precision is impossible given the minimal reporting requirements for public hedge funds. See Tomas Garbaravicius and Frank Dierick, "Hedge Funds and Their Implications for Financial Stability," *Occasional Papers Series no. 34*, Aug. 2005 (Frankfurt: The European Central Bank, 2005), at <http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp34.pdf>.
20. John Authers and Gillian Tett, "Snapping Point?," *Financial Times*, May 23, 2007, 11.
21. Tony Tassell and Joan Chung, "The \$2,500bn Question: How Sovereign Wealth Funds are Muscling in on Global Markets," *Financial Times*, May 25, 2007.
22. For further discussion, see Michael Veseth, *Selling Globalization: The Myth of the Global Economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
23. For early presentations of this argument, see David P. Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, *America and the World Political Economy* (Bloomington, IN: Indian University Press, 1982), and David P. Calleo, *The Imperious Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
24. Ultimately, however, the USA was willing to compromise. Richard Pomfret, *The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 114.
25. See Edward R. Fried, *Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget and US Troops in Europe: Issues, Costs, and Choices* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1972); Edward R. Fried, "The Military and the Balance of Payments," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (1973), 80–5.
26. For a more extended analysis, see David P. Calleo, *The Bankrupting of America: How the Federal Budget is Impoverishing the Nation* (New York: W. Morrow, 1992).
27. Jacques Rueff, *The Monetary Sin of the West*, trans. Roger Glémet (New York: Macmillan, 1972).
28. Press Conference of 4 Feb. 1965, in Charles de Gaulle, *Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences, March 17, 1964–May 16, 1967* (New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division, 1967), 79–81. See also Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *Le Défi américain* (Paris: Denöel, 1967).
29. David P. Calleo, "The Strategic Implications of the Euro," *IISS Survival*, 41/1 (Spring 1999), 5–19, and "No Substitute for Consensus," *Survival*, 44/1 (Spring 2002), 93–6.
30. For an earlier and more extended version of this analysis, see Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony*, chs. 6 and 7, and *The Bankrupting of America*, ch. 6.
31. Robert Triffin, "The International Role and Fate of the Dollar," *Foreign Affairs*, 57 (Winter 1978–9), 269–86.
32. For my earlier and more detailed analysis, see Calleo, *The Bankrupting of America*.
33. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).
34. In 1985, at the height of the cold-war arms buildup, the USA spent 6.7% of its GDP on defense, compared with the European allies' 3.5% of their collective GDP spent on defense. See Table 10.8.
35. For the military arguments at length, see David P. Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance* (New York: Basic Books, 1987). The tax and deficit arguments are developed most thoroughly in Calleo, *The Bankrupting of America*, summarized on pp. 100–1.

36. Intra-European exchange-rate instability could easily be seen as largely the result of uncoordinated monetary and fiscal policies. See M. Keivan Deravi and Massoud Metghalchi, "The European Monetary System: A Note," *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 12 (1988), 505–12; Horst Ungerer et al., "The European Monetary System: Recent Developments," IMF Occasional Paper No. 48 (Dec. 1986).
37. See David P. Calleo, "The Strategic Implications of the Euro," *IISS, Survival* (Spring 1999), and "No Substitute for Consensus," *IISS, Survival* (Spring 2002). For differing French expectations, see Jean-Pierre Landau, "The French Economy and the New Europe," *SAIS Review* (Fall 1993, Special Issue). For a different French view, see Jean-Paul Fitoussi, "Productivity, Growth Potential and Monetary Policy in the EMU," *Parlement européen, Commission des affaires monétaires et économiques* (Dec. 2006).
38. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 created the 36% and 39.6% brackets, where previously the highest tax bracket had been 31%. These and other changes were estimated to bring in an additional \$24.3 billion in their first year, \$45.3 billion in the second, \$52.5 billion in the third, and \$65.9 billion in the fourth. As director of the National Economic Council and later Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, argued, these taxes aided the economy because they addressed the Ricardian Equivalence problem of ongoing deficits—namely, that people and corporations would reduce current spending and investment in expectation of future taxes to pay off federal liabilities. By taxing people now, Rubin argued, economic expectations for the future would be improved, and spending and investment would pick up. For an analysis of the Clinton tax increases as compared with other postwar tax legislation, see Jerry Tempalski, "Revenue Effect of Major Tax Bills," OTA Working Paper 81 (Washington, DC: United States Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, 2003).
39. In 1993–2000 the USA accumulated nominal liabilities from the annual current account deficits equivalent to \$1.335 trillion. In return, the USA received 85% of that, or \$1.137 trillion, in FDI. Foreigners, investing another \$1.136 trillion in corporate equities and bonds, more than covered the remainder. In total, FDI constituted 27% of the net asset acquisitions of foreigners in the US during this period. In comparison, official foreign government purchases of Treasury securities accounted for a mere 6% of total financial inflows. See "Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Annual Flows and Outstandings," 1985–1994 and 1994–2005 (Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2007), table F.107.
40. Powell's doctrine, first proclaimed during the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1, argued that American forces should not be sent to combat without a precise and limited mission tied to clear American national-security objectives, comprehensive support at home and abroad, and the ability to deploy overwhelming force to assure an American victory. The doctrine was designed explicitly to avoid repeating the sort of engagements the US had made in Vietnam in the 1960s or Lebanon in the early 1980s. See Colin L. Powell, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1992–3), 32–45.
41. See Calleo, *Rethinking Europe's Future*, 310–13, text and notes.
42. See Andrew J. Bacevich, "Discord Still: Clinton and the Military," *Washington Post*, Jan. 3, 1999, C.1.

43. In its first year, the new Bush administration ran a fiscal surplus of 1.3% of GDP. In subsequent years, the weight of tax cuts and security spending dragged the budget back into the red, reaching a low point with the 2004 deficit of 3.6% of GDP. It then recovered, and the deficit fell officially to 1.9% of GDP in 2006. It has since deteriorated. See *The Economic Report of the President* (2007), table B79.
44. Future projections for the US federal budget depend on a plethora of assumptions on GDP growth, demographics, inflation, and other factors. Nevertheless, the continuing fiscal pressure of the large entitlement programs will put pressure on the US to run substantial deficits. According to the Congressional Budget Office, four of six possible scenarios see expanding budget deficits for the foreseeable future as baby boomer retirement and aging puts additional pressure on Social Security pension funds and Medicare. Only a politically unlikely combination of lower overall spending and higher overall tax revenues would produce a sustainable budget balance through 2050. Otherwise, covering overall federal outlays will require much higher revenue, in some scenarios 50% of GDP or more. See *The Long-Term Budget Outlook* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2005).
45. In 2000 FDI totaled over \$321 billion. However, FDI fell to \$167 billion by 2001, to \$80 billion in 2002, and to a mere \$67 billion in 2003. Meanwhile, between 2000 and 2005, the dollar fell 25% against the euro. Similar declines were seen against the pound (-16%) and the Canadian dollar (-18.4%). See OECD, *Statistics Databank* (2006), <http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/viewhtml.aspx?queryname=336&querytype=view&lang=en>.

During the 2001–5 period the accumulated liabilities of the current-account deficit equaled \$3.6 trillion. Of this, FDI covered only 21%, or \$758 billion. Adding purchases of corporate equities and securities left a gap of \$861 billion. Foreign purchases of Treasury securities increased to fill that gap. Official foreign holdings increased by \$734 billion and private holdings by \$465 billion, constituting 11.9% and 7.5% of total financial inflows, respectively. China, with its large reserves of dollars accumulated via its trade surplus, played a major role in these Treasury acquisitions, and now ranks among the largest holders of US Treasury assets, as the table below suggests:

Foreign holdings of US Treasury securities (\$bn.)

Country of entity	July 2005	November 2006
Japan	669.4	637.4
China	296.4	346.5
United Kingdom	73.2	223.5
Oil Exporters	64.1	97.1
Can Bnkg Ctrs	65.2	63.6
Korea	62.6	67.7
Taiwan	68.8	63.2
Germany	44.8	52.1
Hong Kong	44.7	51.0
Mexico	32	38.2



- See "Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Annual Flows and Outstandings," 1985–1994 and 1994–2005, and "Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities," United States Department of the Treasury, Sept. 18, 2006, and Jan. 20, 2007, at <http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt>. For a comparison with the Clinton years, see n. 25.
46. See Henderson Global Investors, "China's New Sovereign Wealth Fund: Implications for Global Asset Markets," 14–17, July 2007. [http://www.hendersongroupplc.com/content/singapore/restricted/documents/research/2007-07-17\\_chinasnewsovereignwealthfund.pdf](http://www.hendersongroupplc.com/content/singapore/restricted/documents/research/2007-07-17_chinasnewsovereignwealthfund.pdf). In summary, in the 1993–2000 period, private fixed and portfolio investments were sufficient to cover the US current account balance, whereas after 2000 the USA was forced to rely also on foreign government purchases of US sovereign debt. See "Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Annual Flows and Outstandings," 1985–1994 and 1994–2005, and "Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities," United States Department of the Treasury, Sept. 18, 2006, and Jan. 20, 2007, at <http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt>.
47. For Alan Greenspan's relatively unconcerned view of the external deficit, see his new book, *The Age of Turbulence* (New York: Penguin Press, 2007), chs. 25, 26. For his subsequent alarm about inflation, see Krishna Gua (interview), "A Global Outlook: Alan Greenspan Sees Inflationary Pressures Building," *Financial Times*, Sept. 8, 2007. For a view emphasizing the advantages to the USA of a sharp devaluation, see Jim O'Neill, "Dwindling US Trade Deficit could Reshape World Business," *Financial Times*, Sept. 26, 2007, 28.
48. See Andres Oppenheimer, "Soviet Satellites Now Starring in Economic Growth," *Miami Herald*, Sept. 26, 2004, 1L.

**Table 10.1.** Transatlantic trade statistics

Area	US international transactions (\$m.)							Average growth (%)
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	
EUROPE								
Exports of goods and services	296,269	286,398	274,266	291,270	330,654	359,873	408,886	47
Imports of goods and services	-358,881	-355,324	-364,050	-397,172	-446,262	-492,477	-534,565	48
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC								
Exports of goods and services	294,230	266,277	264,464	278,000	313,435	342,944	388,038	14
Imports of goods and services	-511,435	-463,050	-484,986	-515,216	-607,622	-683,408	-765,728	49
CHINA								
Exports of goods and services	21,365	24,779	28,074	34,284	42,232	50,896	65,959	208
Imports of goods and services	-103,390	-106,069	-129,462	-156,630	-202,784	-250,545	-295,407	185
INDIA								
Exports of goods and services	6,256	6,809	7,391	8,814	10,618	13,196	16,711	167
Imports of goods and services	-12,602	-11,591	-13,648	-15,068	-18,432	-23,868	-28,504	126

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce.

**Table 10.2.** US direct investment abroad, majority-owned foreign affiliates, sales and value added (gross product)

Country	US direct investment abroad (\$m.)		Percentage change between 1999 and 2004
	1999	2004	
<b>EUROPE</b>			
Sales	1,220,468	1,709,354	40
Value added	324,634	460,010	41
<b>ASIA/PACIFIC</b>			
Sales	426,280	684,722	60
Value added	101,077	156,786	55
<b>CHINA</b>			
Sales	20,381	60,435	196
Value added	3,945	13,336	238
<b>INDIA</b>			
Sales	4,554	13,100	187
Value added	1,068	3,937	268
<b>ALL COUNTRIES TOTAL</b>			
Sales	2,218,945	3,238,471	
Value added	566,396	824,336	

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, UD Department of Commerce.

**Table 10.3.** Foreign direct investment in the USA, majority-owned US affiliates, sales and value added (gross product)

Country	Foreign direct investment in the USA (\$m.)		Percentage change between 1999 and 2004
	1999	2004	
<b>EUROPE</b>			
Sales	1,059,510	1,380,217	30
Value added	261,473	332,450	27
<b>ASIA/PACIFIC</b>			
Sales	485,361	545,055	12
Value added	71,836	82,082	14
<b>CHINA</b>			
Sales	1,303	2,058	57
Value added	134	345	157
<b>INDIA</b>			
Sales	476*	2,029	326
Value added	88*	689	682
<b>ALL COUNTRIES TOTAL</b>			
Sales	1,792,520	2,292,931	
Value added	397,295	511,474	

\* Data for India for 2002; earlier years not available.

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, UD Department of Commerce.

**Table 10.4.** US direct investment in Europe and Asia, capital outflows without current-cost adjustment 2006

Countries	\$(m.)
<b>EUROPE</b>	<b>127,375</b>
Austria	1,363
Belgium	4,524
Czech Republic	323
Denmark	139
Finland	473
France	4,886
Germany	8,275
Greece	175
Hungary	578
Ireland	13,264
Italy	3,184
Luxembourg	15,127
Netherlands	32,896
Norway	1,021
Poland	908
Portugal	654
Russia	1,804
Spain	2,712
Sweden	2,954
Switzerland	10,441
Turkey	7
United Kingdom	19,382
Other	2,284
<b>ASIA AND PACIFIC</b>	<b>45,041</b>
Australia	6,460
China	4,656
Hong Kong	4,817
India	2,074
Indonesia	1,167
Japan	12,241
Korea, Republic of	2,402
Malaysia	1,935
New Zealand	801
Philippines	232
Singapore	5,363
Taiwan	1,251
<b>ALL COUNTRIES TOTAL</b>	<b>216,614</b>

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, UD Department of Commerce.

**Table 10.5.** European and Asian/Pacific direct investment in the USA, capital outflows without current-cost adjustment 2006

Countries	\$(m.)
<b>EUROPE</b>	<b>122,183</b>
Austria	-29
Belgium	783
Denmark	1,029
Finland	696
France	28,141
Germany	31,003
Ireland	7,299
Italy	3,756
Luxembourg	11,109
Netherlands	17,029
Norway	2,587
Spain	7,313
Sweden	-308
Switzerland	1,536
United Kingdom	11,468
Other	-1,230
<b>ASIA AND PACIFIC</b>	<b>26,781</b>
Australia	1,658
China	-206
Hong Kong	363
India	505
Japan	21,282
Korea, Republic of	2,759
Malaysia	16
New Zealand	-75
Singapore	266
Taiwan	24
Other	189
<b>ALL COUNTRIES TOTAL</b>	<b>175,394</b>

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, UD Department of Commerce.

**Table 10.6.** US direct investment in Europe and Asia/Pacific, historical-cost basis, 2006

Countries	\$(m.)
<b>EUROPE</b>	<b>1,250,508</b>
Austria	17,405
Belgium	52,054
Czech Republic	3,090
Denmark	5,753
Finland	2,592
France	65,933
Germany	99,253
Greece	2,073
Hungary	4,014
Ireland	83,615
Italy	28,936
Luxembourg	82,588
Netherlands	215,715
Norway	10,280
Poland	7,190
Portugal	3,033
Russia	10,064
Spain	49,413
Sweden	35,938
Switzerland	90,085
Turkey	2,088
United Kingdom	364,084
Other	15,311
<b>ASIA AND PACIFIC</b>	<b>431,718</b>
Australia	122,587
China	22,228
Hong Kong	38,118
India	8,852
Indonesia	10,585
Japan	91,769
Korea, Republic of	22,280
Malaysia	12,450
New Zealand	5,721
Philippines	7,034
Singapore	60,417
Taiwan	16,126
Thailand	8,217
Other	5,334
<b>ALL COUNTRIES TOTAL</b>	<b>2,384,004</b>

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, UD Department of Commerce.

**Table 10.7.** Europe and Asia/Pacific direct investment in the USA, historical-cost basis, 2006

Countries	\$(m.)
<b>EUROPE</b>	<b>1,270,570</b>
Austria	2,367
Belgium	12,590
Denmark	7,209
Finland	7,289
France	158,830
Germany	202,581
Ireland	28,551
Italy	11,883
Luxembourg	130,925
Netherlands	189,293
Norway	7,835
Spain	14,942
Sweden	22,287
Switzerland	140,259
United Kingdom	303,232
Other	30,495
<b>ASIA AND PACIFIC</b>	<b>259,810</b>
Australia	25,727
China	554
Hong Kong	3,524
India	2,002
Japan	210,996
Korea, Republic of	8,609
Malaysia	432
New Zealand	615
Singapore	2,412
Taiwan	4,199
Other	740
<b>ALL COUNTRIES TOTAL</b>	<b>1,789,087</b>

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce.

**Table 10.8.** US Military spending, 1979–2011, compared to cold-war levels

Years	Current dollars (bn.)	FY 2007 dollars (bn.)	% real change
1979	126.5	353.0	0.2
1980	143.9	358.7	1.6
1981	180.0	399.9	11.5
1982	216.5	442.2	10.6
1983	245.0	477.5	8.0
1984	265.2	498.7	4.4
1985	294.7	532.0	6.7
1986	289.2	511.4	(3.9)
1987	287.4	495.5	(3.1)
1988	292.0	486.0	(1.9)
1989	299.6	479.8	(1.3)
1990	301.2	468.8	(2.3)
1991	296.2	443.8	(5.3)
1992	287.7	420.2	(5.3)
1993	281.1	402.9	(4.1)
1994	263.3	369.5	(8.3)
1995	266.4	366.1	(0.9)
1996	266.2	358.0	(2.2)
1997	270.4	355.6	(0.7)
1998	271.3	348.0	(2.1)
1999	292.3	365.7	5.1
2000	304.1	370.9	1.4
2001	334.9	396.8	7.0
2002	362.1	418.0	5.3
2003	456.2	511.6	22.4
2004	490.6	533.9	4.4
2005	505.8	533.1	(0.1)
2006*	561.8	575.4	7.9
2007+	513.0	513.0	(10.8)
2008	485.2	473.5	(7.7)
2009	505.3	481.4	1.7
2010	515.3	479.1	(0.5)
2011	526.1	477.2	(0.4)

\* Includes \$70 billion supplemental appropriations request.

+ Includes \$50 billion administration expects to request as a down payment on FY 2007 war costs.

Sources: National Defense (050) Budget Authority: CSBA, April 2006. Based on OMB, CBO and DoD data; excludes funding for the 1991 Gulf War and related allied cash contributions. Steven Kosiak, "Historical and Projected Funding for Defense: Presentation of the FY 2007 Request in Tables and Charts," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 7 April 2006; available at <http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20060425.FY07Bud/R.20060425.FY07Bud.pdf>.



# 11

## Worlds Apart? The United States, Europe, and the Cultural Ties that Bind Them

*Rob Kroes*

### Culture in Europe and the United States: Rival Models

It has been said, in jest, that the only culture that Europeans have in common is American popular culture. As such quips go, it might be said with equal glibness that the only culture shared on both sides of the Atlantic is European culture. And, tongue in cheek, it might be added that there is a lot of truth in both these sayings. Much, of course, depends on what we understand by the word culture when we ask ourselves the question whether Europe and the United States have been united or rather divided by culture. If we think of culture in terms that go back to the work of Clifford Geertz,<sup>1</sup> then culture presents itself for our present purpose as consisting of symbolic systems, language prominently among them, that allow people to make sense of the world and the otherworldly, of their own place in both, and to share such constructed meanings with others through forms of communication. This is a view of culture that emphasizes its implied semantics, looking at human beings as sense-making animals. Such a view has the advantage of suggesting continuities between the concept of culture and the concept of ideology. Ideology, then, is that form of culture that organizes cultural worldviews into guidelines for purposeful collective action in the world. Thus, for instance, from their early universalist call for independence, Americans saw themselves as acting on behalf of universal human rights and freedoms, instilling among themselves a sense of being a “redeemer nation,” providing a safe haven to the high hopes of all of mankind, while at the same time providing them with a national ideology. From the Declaration of Independence on to Wilsonian enthusiasms, and Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, to be protected “anywhere in

the world," through the cold war and on to Bush's view that in Iraq "freedom is on the march" thanks to the American intervention, we can recognize this strange blend of nationalism and cultural universalism as an inspiration for America's foreign-policy views.

If the issue in the following exploration is how people in Europe and the United States have meaningfully constructed their sense of collective self, as well as their sense of the difference in cultural identity on both sides of the Atlantic, we shall have to confront the inherent dialectics in these constructional conventions. Historically, both Europe and the United States have functioned as each other's "significant Other," as a helpful counterpoint in the construction of collective selves. From the early days of American settlement, of course, culture migrated from Europe along with the colonists. Even today, in many areas, ranging from language to religion, continuities can clearly be discerned. Yet, over the centuries, a sense of American identity as distinct from its European sources has pushed to the surface. "From British subjects to American citizens" (playing on the well-known book title of *Peasants into Frenchmen*<sup>2</sup>) would be a good way of summarizing this long, secular process of cultural (in addition to political) emancipation, away from European cultural tutelage to the point of becoming the leading light across the full range of cultural endeavor, in fulfillment of Bishop Berkeley's, or for that matter Crèvecoeur's, anticipation of the westward course of empire finding its closure on the Western shores of the Atlantic. Europeans may have begrudged America's cultural ascendance, particularly in the years following the Second World War,<sup>3</sup> and Americans at the time may not quite have recognized themselves in avant-garde forms of American art. Yet, contested as they may have been domestically, in Congress and in public opinion,<sup>4</sup> America's cutting-edge art was sent abroad precisely as a vibrant expression of American individualism and American freedom. Ironically, the impact of such artistic developments played itself out in the traditional European mold of cultural reception and consumption, at the high end of public appreciation, among elites and leading cultural critics.

Of arguably greater impact on the minds and hearts of European publics were the many forms of American popular culture as they had emerged since the late nineteenth century. The story that I will look at more closely here is of the exposure to and reception of American mass culture in Europe, of the many ironic ways in which it was appropriated (to use a term common in Cultural Studies circles) and turned into an adopted cultural vernacular in Europe. Once adopted and adapted, it could then either serve as a marker of a public affiliation with things American, or be turned against its source in displays of anti-American protest. It may have taken the continued exposure of generations of younger Europeans to forms of American mass culture<sup>5</sup> for them to acquire their transnational cultural appetites. More often than not,

as I shall argue below, the reception of forms of American mass culture in Europe provided younger Europeans with the repertoires of opposition to cultural standards jealously guarded by cultural elites in their various countries. Why, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, American mass culture played this role more successfully than any varieties produced in Europe, in its various national settings, is a question that will lead us to consider and discuss the larger theme of Americanization. As for the flip side of this theme, the Europeanization of the United States, we shall have to explore the ways in which European cultural standards have been received and made to work in an American setting, providing Americans in their quest for a truly American culture with the benchmarks for defining their cultural specificity and difference. If from this perspective Europe and the United States can be said to have been equally involved in cultural contests about the definition of national identities, these culture wars have not proceeded in tandem. The United States has had to reach a cultural consensus on these matters, defining itself as distinct from Europe while developing forms of cultural practice to Americanize the nation, particularly the hordes of immigrants arriving on its shores. Only then could it successfully use these tools of Americanization for export abroad. And only then, when confronted with this cultural challenge from America arising in the early twentieth century, could groups in Europe, vying for cultural hegemony in the debates about their own national identities, begin to use forms of American mass culture, and the meanings and messages it carried, as a *tertium comparationis*. In a process of cultural triangulation, American mass culture served as a yardstick for taking the measure of cultural trends and evaluating them as either positive or negative.

Usually studies of the impact of American mass culture abroad, of the Americanization of Europe if you wish, set their time frame as truly beginning in the post-Second World War era, in what is otherwise known as “the American Century.” Yet one has to go back in time to fathom the rise of an American mass culture and the early European response to it. In a recent book, *Buffalo Bill in Bologna: The Americanization of the World, 1869–1922*, two cultural historians, one from the United States, the other from Europe, explore this early period.<sup>6</sup> It is no secret that, by the early 1920s, American culture had dimensions that were so arresting that they were becoming the subject of an intense debate among European and American intellectuals concerned about the implications of these novel cultural forms for modern societies. But as early as 1901 an English journalist, W. T. Stead, had already written a book entitled *The Americanization of the World*, in which he shrewdly argued that American economic organization had reached such an advanced stage of development that England, and eventually the rest of the world, would be swamped by American products and American cultural values.<sup>7</sup> Whether or not he was right about its effects, it is clear that at the beginning of the

twentieth century, American mass culture, blooming in the United States, was already pollinating shores on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, creating some interesting cultural hybrids in the process.

Putting the rise of American mass culture in a transatlantic setting is illuminating for a number of reasons. American innovations in mass culture certainly had their counterparts in Europe (think, for instance, of the film industry or the production and marketing of stereographs). So why did American mass culture make such inroads in Europe? The Americanness of American cultural products is at the core of an answer to this question. By the end of the nineteenth century more than a few Americans had begun to embrace vernacular cultural forms as self-conscious alternatives to elitist cultural formations. Ragtime music and jazz, not classical music, vernacular forms of spoken American—in the writing of Mark Twain and others—not literary language in the transatlantic Victorian fashion, railway stations and movie theaters, not private mansions, articulated an expressive individualism that challenged existing cultural hierarchies and created cultural tensions that receptive Europeans could deploy in their own struggles against hierarchical social structures and established hierarchies of taste. In all this, the United States formed the first arena for these cultural clashes to work themselves out.

While American mass culture developed its early forms and audiences, in opposition to it the accepted canon of “high” culture, as defined by the likes of Matthew Arnold, and redolent of European views of culture, was upheld by bourgeois elites across the United States. They shared in what may be termed a civilizing offensive that proceeded apace on both sides of the Atlantic and left a marked bourgeois imprint on American and European cities alike.<sup>8</sup> In America, though, the bourgeois offensive pursued a different agenda than its equivalent in Europe. It wished to project a view of American high culture as basically cast in a European mold. Palatial mansions duplicating European models were filled with private collections of European art. As museums and concert halls went up in American cities, the paintings shown and the music played were all European. In the public display of cultural taste and cultural standards America’s elites chose to emphasize the continuity with Europe’s cultural heritage—the European roots of America’s genteel culture.

Yet, while fully engaged in their quest for domestic cultural hegemony, the attitude of America’s leading bourgeois elites toward Europe’s cultural heritage was always one of ambivalence, rift by dialectical tensions. Even cultural nationalists among their number, in their quest for a purely American cultural expression, held up European standards of excellence for American artists to emulate. The ultimate version of this highbrow pursuit of cultural emancipation from Europe’s tutelage could assume the contours of an act of exorcism, as in the case of Randolph Bourne. His was one of the leading voices among a generation of young cultural critics who, at the time

of the First World War, set out to storm the stuffy bastions of a reigning genteel culture in the United States. As they saw it, America's high culture was derivative. In Bourne's words: "New England was *Old* England transplanted, and weakened in the transplant. . . . We must overcome that which is England in us."<sup>9</sup> Yet, at later historical junctures, particularly in the post-Second World War era, America's cultural elites shared the self-assured view of America as fully partaking of the civilizational matrix and heritage of the West, broadly conceived, a view of America as the last safe haven of Western civilization, as the guarantor and protector of a vibrant transatlantic cultural life, where in many areas it was second to none. It had world-class conductors, orchestras, and performing artists. In its top universities a cosmopolitan life of the mind was preserved and scholarship ranged across the full realm of the humanities to the point where leading authorities in the study of Europe, or of antiquity for that matter, are often American. This sense of a rightful cultural place was at the basis of the post-Second World War idea of the Atlantic World. It was an idea actively disseminated through America's cultural diplomacy and reflected, for instance, in a leading transatlantic intellectual journal like *Encounter*. Yet, even without efforts in the area of cultural diplomacy, America's cultural and intellectual pre-eminence is evident in the pages of a truly cosmopolitan magazine like the *New York Review of Books*, with its range of discussion and conversation that effortlessly spans the range from classical antiquity, world literature, European cultural history, to American political trends and developments. It sets a tone that resonates among a truly international intelligentsia. It, and the America for which it speaks, has forever left behind the qualms and ambivalences of Randolph Bourne's generation of cultural nationalists.

Yet, if we look back at the cultural ferment of Bourne's times, in the United States bourgeois cultural visions never quite gained the commanding, if not hegemonic, place they did in Europe in the late nineteenth century. In the USA, such visions had to contend with alternative views of culture and of the role it could play in its demotic, vernacular forms in reaching and guiding, yes even educating, the masses. The urgent quest here was for the creation of mass cultural forms that would unite people across the continent. The agency and auspices behind these cultural productions could differ. They could be strictly entrepreneurial, pure business ventures going for the public's money, as in the case of P. T. Barnum and many others. They could also proceed under the auspices of civic leadership circles, as in the design of World's Fairs in American cities. Yet, whatever the explicit auspices, recent scholarly revisits make clear that, in addition to entertainment, these forms of mass culture also offered ideologically structured readings of the contemporary world to its audiences, in terms of its structures of inclusion and exclusion, of superiority and inferiority, along lines of race, class, and gender. From Worlds Fairs to D. W. Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation* (1915), audiences were exposed to the

anthropological ideal of what American historian Alexander Saxton has called the "White Republic."<sup>10</sup> Ever since, American mass culture has presented this outward face of entertainment while purveying at the same time ideological constructions of the world to its audiences.

With the massive increase in immigration in the last half of the nineteenth century, the American population as a whole trebled, while the industrial labor force doubled. In the middle of the nineteenth century the average work week was about sixty to seventy hours and encompassed six full days of labor. By the end of the First World War the direction of American society was clearly set toward the forty-hour week and growing parity between work and leisure. In this social context, new technologies of production (especially Henry Ford's perfection of mass-production techniques), and new institutions of distribution and consumption (especially department stores, World Fairs, advertising agencies, and installment buying) reconfigured American culture around values associated with leisure and amusement. Market forces played an important role in the emergence of an American mass culture, but so did the cultural designs and visions of social elites. The new mass cultural forms were hardly value free or neutral. As already pointed out, they often expressed and conveyed ideologies of race, gender, empire, and consumption and played a pivotal role in the process of reconstructing the American national identity after the Civil War. Millions—indeed, tens of millions—of people "took in" movies, fairs, circuses, amusement parks, and dime novels. But, in the course of "taking in" these mass cultural forms, were they "taken in" by their ideological messages? Were the so-called culture industries all-powerful and their audiences passive sponges? Or were audiences more resilient and creative than we often think? Many recent scholars, and I include myself among them, tend toward the latter view, emphasizing aspects of freedom in cultural reception and consumption, of selective appropriation and the refashioning of meaning. Yet debates in cultural studies circles continue. Nagging questions remain. If the market, say, through advertising, shapes people's desires, is it right to speak of free choice without some measure of qualification? If the logic of industrialism, of mass production and standardization, was an industrial necessity, had it not also, in its American guise, become "an ideal of civilization?" Such were the concerns among European cultural conservatives, once Europe had begun to feel the full blast of American mass culture in the 1920s. Others, though, Antonio Gramsci and others on the European political left among them, had to admit that what they admired about American society was its industrial efficiency and modernity, both of which, Gramsci believed, "will compel or [are] already compelling Europe to overturn its excessively antiquated economic and social basis."<sup>11</sup>

Much of the story of the advent and conquest of Europe's cultural space by American mass culture in the later twentieth century is at the same time

the story of Europe successfully “overturning itself,” following in America’s footsteps, but, whenever possible, on its own conditions. Part of this story is the highly inventive way in which American public diplomacy availed itself of the appeal of its mass culture as a form of soft power. Through the Marshall Plan first, under the auspices of the United States Information Agency (USIA) later, America advertised itself with full mastery of mass-culture techniques.

It was not the first time this had happened. America had learned the ropes during its brief, but decisive, intervention in the First World War. On April 14, 1917, within hours of asking the US Congress to declare war on Germany, Wilson moved to issue an Executive Order creating the Committee on Public Information (CPI). Headed by George Creel, the CPI set out to mobilize and coordinate already existing forms of American mass culture into weapons of war and vehicles of US government propaganda. Through its two major divisions, domestic and foreign, the CPI globalized American culture on an unprecedented scale as part of the “fight for the mind of mankind.”<sup>12</sup> This first instance of the harnessing of mass-cultural techniques and appeals for political purposes would later on serve as a model for the Office of War Information (OWI) during the Second World War, and American cultural diplomacy during the years of the cold war. The First World War added a government hand to the process of “spreading the American Dream,” as Emily Rosenberg has called it,<sup>13</sup> a process already under way since at least the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago. It was an American dream of high technology and mass consumption both promoted and accompanied by an ideology of free-market, level-playing field, liberal developmentalism. That this American ideology was mostly self-serving, and the playing field never quite level, was the stuff that later European and American *Ideologiekritik* would feed on.

## American Mass Culture: Its Rules of Transformation

Ever since its formative years, American culture has known no borders. It has spread from its home base to encompass the globe, it penetrates our everyday environment, it invades our phantasy worlds, if it has not actually, as German filmmaker Wim Wenders once ruefully put it, colonized our subconscious. It has instilled in us needs, dreams, and longings that may drive us in directions we might not have gone without our exposure to America. Yet for many at the receiving end America has become a provider of ingredients for repertoires of cultural self-expression. It is only one among many sources, of course. It adds to more traditional repertoires, as these have established themselves in the course of long-ranging historical processes of state formation and nation building. Yet it does so in strangely dialectical ways. America has never merely added to these repertoires of cultural affiliation and expression of collective

identities, in the sense of widening a range of equivalent options. More often than not, the American option served as a counterpoint to established repertoires, providing groups with the expressive means for cultural opposition and revolt against a prescribed mold of cultural affiliation.

One crucial element in American culture that has always perplexed foreign critics, while at the same time appealing to those who welcomed American culture, was its aspect of a successful mass culture. More radically so than any other culture, American culture took its central cues, in the ways it was produced, disseminated and received, from the secular process of democratization. From the early days of republican enthusiasm, cultural nationalists agreed that American culture, in order to be American, needs to be democratic culture. The mission for America's cultural production was to appeal to the many, not the few, and to reflect the lives of the citizenry at large rather than of elite groups in its midst, setting standards for others to follow.

In their critique of American culture, many cultural and political conservatives in Europe may have grudgingly paid tribute to the democratic aspirations of American culture. What perplexed them, however, was that more often than not culture as they observed it in America appeared not only as democratic, but also and unashamedly as commercial. If the American mode of cultural production and reproduction was geared to the many, it implied that it was also geared to the market. The public for cultural consumption had to be reached in much the same way as consumers in the economic sense: through the market. It implied that Americans were less reluctant than many Europeans in adopting techniques of mass production through mechanical reproduction, and of cultural dissemination through mass marketing, implying advertising techniques, and the use of technical breakthroughs in mass communication. They were less in thrall of a European, Benjaminian sense of the aura surrounding culture, of a deference that is by its very nature at odds with the vulgarity of the market. European critics, whether on the left or the right of the political spectrum, chose to look at this potent brew of democratic and commercial instincts as a clear case of the commodification of culture. Others in Europe, though, welcomed American culture precisely for its blithe irreverence toward standards that cultural gatekeepers in Europe rallied to defend.

Many are the explanations of the worldwide dissemination of American mass culture. There are those who see it as a case of cultural imperialism, as a consequence of America's worldwide projection of political, economic, and military power. Others, broadly within the same critical frame of mind, see it as a tool rather than a consequence of this imperial expansion. Behind the globalization of American culture they see an orchestrating hand, whetting foreign appetites for the pleasures of a culture of consumption. Undeniably, though, part of the explanation of the worldwide appeal of American mass culture will have to be sought in its intrinsic qualities, in its blend of



democratic and commercial vigor. The particular mix of these two elements may differ. At one extreme the commercial component may be well-nigh absent, as in the worldwide dissemination of jazz and blues music. At the other extreme, the commercial rationale may be the central carrying force, as in American advertisements. While trying to make a sales pitch for particular products, advertising envelops these in cultural messages that draw on repertoires of American myths and symbols that find recognition across the globe. Thus, the Marlboro Man could come to stand for a particular brand of cigarette while representing a mythical reading of the American West. In the process, both the West and the cigarette got branded; as commodities they both received their aura from the mother of all brands: America. Publics on either side of the Atlantic have become equally adept at reading such tangled messages, but it is the outcome of a learning process that dates back to the late nineteenth century. The European encounter with American mass culture after the Second World War needs to be understood as part of a cumulative and complex history of American cultural transmissions and European cultural receptions that occurred as part of the ongoing nation-building processes that gave form to the modern world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

This is not to deny, of course, the significance of the Marshall Plan or US government cultural diplomacy agencies for transmitting American mass culture to Europe in the post-Second World War years. Through exhibitions of American consumer products (most famously at American trade shows that featured American consumer products), American movies (by 1951, well over half the movies playing in Europe were produced by Hollywood), and American music (notably through Willis Conover's radio program *Music USA*, with tens of millions of listeners), all sponsored by the US government, postwar planners sought to win the hearts and minds of Europeans and to create a bulwark against Soviet Communism. Nor should this diminish the impact of forms of American mass culture as they traveled under their own commercial auspices, free from government backing, to reach European audiences. But it is important to understand that mass culture served as an instrument for promoting American values well before the *First World War*. That those who planned the reconstruction of Europe after the *Second World War* looked to American mass-cultural forms to further their cause should not be surprising. Since the Civil War, mass culture had been vital to efforts to rebuild the American nation and to "Americanize" millions of immigrants. During the First World War, the US government's Creel Committee made American mass culture the centerpiece of its efforts to construct a world that would be safe for democracy and American exports. Little wonder, given the devastation of Europe during the Second World War and given their knowledge of the capacity of American mass-cultural forms to influence public opinion, that planners seeking to reconstruct postwar Europe would give

their work a cultural turn and regard American mass culture as vital to their efforts.

Over the course of the “American Century” the United States undeniably assumed a centrality in world affairs that can rightly be called imperial. Like Rome in the days of the Roman Empire, the United States has become the center of webs of control and communication that span the world. Its cultural products reach the far corners of the world, communicating American ways and views to people elsewhere, while America itself remains relatively unaware of cultural products originating outside its national borders. If for such reasons we might call the United States imperial, it is so in a number of ways. It is imperial in the economic sphere, in the political sphere, and in the cultural sphere. Indeed, these forms of imperial reach—through which America, literally, holds empire over others<sup>14</sup>—overlap to a considerable extent. For instance, America, in its role as the new political hegemon after the Second World War, could restructure markets and patterns of trade through the Marshall Plan, which guaranteed American firms access to European markets. Political empire, in short, could promote economic empire. At the same time, opening European markets for American commerce also meant preserving access for American *cultural* exports, such as Hollywood movies. Conversely, as carriers of an American version of the “good life,” American cultural products, from cars to movies, from clothing styles to kitchen appliances, all actively doubled as agents of American cultural diplomacy. Trade, in short, translated back into political empire. And so on, in endless feedback loops—positive feedback loops, we might add, resulting in a virtuous circle of self-reinforcing power.

This, of course, was every diplomat’s dream, the dream of the Americanization of the world. It is a dream where the exercise of power is really a matter of the uses of soft power. In the past half century, American companies have marketed their products abroad taking advantage of their Americanness as an asset to boost sales. Buying a Ford, a pair of Levis, or Nikes; drinking a Coke, devouring a Big Mac, or smoking a Marlboro offered a chance, however fleetingly, to partake of the American Dream. These and dozens of other American brands capitalized on the appeal of their home country to sell their wares to international consumers.

In the real world things hardly ever proceed so smoothly. Imperial ambitions do not always result in imperial successes. As they have tried to accommodate themselves to their diminished role and place in the world, European countries have at times opted to resist particular forms of America’s imperial presence. France is arguably the most telling case. It chose to resist America’s political empire by ordering NATO out of the country; it warned against America’s economic empire through Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s *Le Défi américain*; and it briefly tried to prevent *Jurassic Park* from being released in France. Some French critics tried to prevent EuroDisney from opening on

the outskirts of Paris, seeing both *Jurassic Park* and EuroDisney as American cultural imperialism threatening France's cultural identity. More recently, in the context of war in the Balkans or in Iraq, acts of violent protest have been directed against emblems of American mass culture like McDonald's restaurants. If there is no American embassy nearby to have its windows smashed, there is always a McDonald's. This suggests a circle of a different sort, vicious this time, not virtuous. The visceral dislike of one manifestation of American empire may then begin negatively to affect the other forms. Negative feedback loops are being triggered, setting in motion a downward spiral that is commonly studied under the label of anti-Americanism. Clearly not every demonstration protesting specific American policies or practices is a sign of anti-Americanism. But when people translate their outrage at one manifestation of American empire onto others—when, say, the war in Iraq inspires people to boycott American consumer products—then a process is underway that one might meaningfully label anti-Americanism. And something along these lines may be happening today.

The steep drop in America's symbolic capital (which, as Pierre Bourdieu would have reminded us, is one important mainstay of power), as measured by international opinion polls during the Bush Jr. presidency, may have begun to translate into a rejection of America's economic empire. There may be a potential relationship between the downturn in global attitudes toward the United States and the shift now under way in global market choices. In a survey of 8,000 consumers in eight countries, fully 20 percent of Europeans and Canadians said their objections to US foreign policy would prevent them from buying US brands. The brands most closely associated with the United States, Marlboro and Coca Cola, have lost market share in Germany and France.<sup>15</sup> We should also remind ourselves that, long before global opinion of the United States declined in 2002, anti-globalization protesters routinely launched boycotts against American icons such as Burger King, McDonald's, and Citibank.<sup>16</sup> But, as Julia Sweig reminds us, "after all, anti-American and anti-globalization protesters in capitals around the world can be seen on television running from the cops in their Nikes."<sup>17</sup> They do it in much the same way that in the late 1960s anti-Vietnam-war demonstrators, in both the United States and Europe, could be chanting the anti-American slogans of the day, while wearing the full regalia of an American youth culture that had already developed into an international youth culture.

There are many ironies here. Not only does political or economic anti-Americanism go together well with cultural appetites clearly derived from America; at times a further twist is given to such combinations. In such cases, the very ingredients of a mass culture that had received its American imprint before it conquered the world and turned global are being rearranged to produce a message whose thrust is anti-American. In other words, an American

mass-cultural idiom acquired by outsiders is then being turned against its source. How does that work?

In Europe's lasting encounter with American mass culture, many have been the voices expressing a concern about its negative impact. Cultural guardians in Europe saw European standards of taste and cultural appreciation eroded by an American way that aimed at a mass market, elevating the lowest common denominator of mass preferences to the main vector of cultural production. This history of cultural anti-Americanism in Europe has a long pedigree. In its earlier manifestations, from the late nineteenth century through the 1950s, the critique of American mass culture was highly explicit and had to be. Many ominous trends of an evolving mass culture in Europe had to be shown to have originated in America, reaching Europe under clear American agency. An intellectual repertoire of Americanism and Americanization evolved (as in Germany's *Amerikanismusdebatte* during the 1920s) in a continuing attempt at cultural resistance against the lures of a culture of consumption. Never mind that such cultural forms might have come to Europe autonomously, even in the absence of an American model. America served to give a name and a face to forces of cultural change that would otherwise have been anonymous and seemingly beyond control.

This European repertoire is alive and kicking. Yet, ironically, as a repertoire that has become common currency to the point of being an intellectual stereotype rather than an informed opinion, America nowadays is often a subtext, unspoken in European forms of cultural resistance. I have two examples to illustrate this. A 1996 political poster for the Socialist Party in Salzburg, during the run-up to municipal elections, showed us the determined face and the clenched fist of the party's candidate. He asked the voting public whether the younger generation were to be losers, and called on the electorate to "fight, fight, and fight." What for? "In order to keep young people from getting fed up with the future [*Damit unsere Jugend die Zukunft nicht satt hat*]." In a visual pun, at the poster's dead center, the getting fed up is illustrated by the blurred image of a hamburger flying by at high speed. Fast food indeed. The call for action is now clear. Austrians should try and fend off a future cast in an American vein. American culture is condensed into the single image of the hamburger. It is enough to trigger the larger repertoire of cultural anti-Americanism without mentioning America once.

We may choose to see this poster as only a recent version of cultural guardianship that has always looked at the younger generation as a stalking horse, if not a Trojan horse, for American culture. In fact, historically, it has always been younger generations who, in rebellion against parental authority and cultural imposition, have opted for the liberating potential of American mass culture. Yet interesting changes may have occurred in this pattern. Today young people, in their concern about forces of globalization, may also target

America as the central agency behind these global trends. And they may do it in the vernacular language of a mass culture that was American before it went global.

My second example will serve to illustrate this. I have a music video, a few years old, of a Basque group.<sup>18</sup> The video, in its own right, is an act of cultural emancipation. The lyrics are in the Basque language and the station broadcasting the video has all-Basque programming. This may suggest localism, if not cultural provincialism. Nothing would be farther from the truth. What we have here is a perfect example of glocalization, to use Roland Robertson's neologism.<sup>19</sup> The music used is "world music," hailing from the Caribbean and popularized through the British music industry. The format of the music video itself is part of global musical entertainment. Yet the message is local. What the video shows is a confusing blend of the traditional and the modern. The opening shot—nostalgically arcadian—is of a man using a scythe to cut grass. Then the camera moves up and shows a modern, international-style, office block. A mobile phone rings, and the grass cutter answers the call. More images show modern life. We see an old man talking into a microphone strapped to his head, as if he is talking to himself. We see a group of young men with barcodes on their heads working out in tandem, yet in complete isolation, as if in a transported glimpse of an American gym. Then the protagonists of the video appear, with a rickety van, getting ready to sell the local variety of Basque fast food, a sausage on a roll. The very smell breaks the isolation of people caught in the alienating life of modernity. They all flock to the sausage stand. There they come to life, stirred into celebratory action by the sight and smell of what purportedly represents a taste of true Basqueness. The lyrics repeat the refrain: "Down with MacDonald's, Long live Big Benat" (the name of the Basque delicacy).

The claim made in this video is on behalf of the authenticity of regional cultures struggling to survive in a world threatened by the homogenizing forces of globalization. Yet the medium of communication, the format of the music video, testifies to the impact of precisely those forces that the video protests against. There is much irony in all this, but most important is the fact that what is shown as modernity truly revives a long repertoire of European cultural anti-Americanism. America stands for modernity, and the long history of European resistance to America is truly a story of resisting the onslaught of modernity on Europe's chequered map of regional and/or national cultures. Yet no fingers are pointed. The anti-America/anti-modernity nexus is triggered, as in the Salzburg poster, by the single reference to the Big Mac. A further irony is that Europe's younger generations, while adopting forms of an international mass culture, now use them to voice protest precisely against forces of globalization.

Clearly, in view of all these recent trends and ironic twists, it is impossible to come up with a single diagnosis of how American mass culture is doing

in an age when patent, finger-pointing forms of anti-Americanism have so powerfully resurfaced. As I have argued in much of my work on American mass culture, there is an inherent anti-authoritarian if not rebellious streak in it that may well lend itself perfectly to its recent uses for the production and dissemination of statements against America's empire. Quite apart from its antinomian potential, though, there may also be an enduring entertainment power in America's mass culture, an enduring appeal of its Americanness even to the most unlikely publics. Thus American TV shows, usually in English with Arabic subtitles, are now hugely popular among Iraqis craving entertainment in the (admittedly, relative) safety of their homes. Entire box sets of shows such as *Seinfeld*, *Scrubs*, and *Friends* are finding their way into DVD players across Baghdad.<sup>20</sup> The hatred of Americans as an occupying force in Iraq has clearly not made Iraqis immune to the pleasures offered by the American entertainment industry. What this tells us about the continuing potential of American mass culture as a tool of what Joseph Nye would call soft power, I am not sure. What I do know is that mere public relations, aimed at "rebranding" America in the Madison Avenue manner, will not do. Yet this was how the State Department went about shoring up America's battered image in the Middle East in the aftermath of 9/11. It hired a star public-relations veteran, Charlotte Beers, to overhaul US public diplomacy. Her tenure was brief and much derided.

Much remains to be done, or should we say recovered, in the area of cultural diplomacy. American policy-makers would do well to follow Machiavelli's advice to princes to go back to first principles and find inspiration there. Rather than subverting America's Republican and Democratic principles, as has consistently happened under the current Bush regime, people across Europe would happily welcome the return of an inspirational American voice that for so long sustained its empire as an empire by invitation, if not inspiration. And yes, there may be such voices that strike chords of memory for many in Europe. In that vein, this is what one presidential contender, Senator Barack Obama, had to say recently:

Many around the world are disappointed with our actions. And many in our own country have come to doubt either our wisdom or our capacity to shape events beyond our borders. Some have even suggested that America's time has passed.

I still believe that America is the last, best hope of Earth. We just have to show the world why this is so. This President may occupy the White House, but for the last six years the position of leader of the free world has remained open. And it's time to fill that role once more.

The American moment has not passed. The American moment is here. And like generations before us, we will seize that moment, and begin the world anew.<sup>21</sup>

There is a rich resonance to these words, reminding us that "to begin the world anew" may well be a special American dispensation. Seizing the moment,

beginning anew, Americans more than others may refuse to see things coming to an end. It is for others to foretell the end of the American empire, or the loss of its cultural allure for the outside world.

Victoria de Grazia, for one, ends her book on America as an irresistible empire<sup>22</sup> on a tone of the end of an era, due not to failure but to the very success of America's imperial venture in spreading its commercial culture. Increasingly, ways of business that were initially seen as originating in America, and in many cases derived their appeal precisely from their American aura, have now assumed local colors and blend in with their various cultural settings. Things may indeed have come full circle and come to a close.

This may be true, but it is not the whole story. As *The Economist* reminds us, America is still a brand that sells well: "In Carrefour at Montesson, a giant out-of-town hypermarket west of Paris, the bakery shelves are stacked with 'Harry's American sandwich' bread, a sliced product that has taken the land of the baguette by storm." As the magazine sums up its point, "the more American brands flaunt their origins, the better they seem to do."<sup>23</sup>

There is a much broader issue to be raised at this point, in view of the current and future impact of forces of cultural globalization. For how much longer will terms like "American" or "European" continue to make sense in a world of increasingly rapid cultural change and exchange? In connection with revolutions in communication technology, with globalized networks of control and ownership of the culture industries, with transnational financing, should we not speak of globalization rather than Americanization? Should we not give up on any kind of geographical denomination of cultural origin as hopelessly outdated? Well, not so fast. Individual countries in Europe as well as the European Union collectively feel in need of claiming an exception, if not exemption, when it comes to culture. They tend to promote and sponsor cultural production in such areas as film, music, and television precisely because these are seen as critically linked to the expression, formation, and preservation of collective cultural identities. They refuse to conceive of cultural products in those areas as being just like any other commodity and therefore subject to the logic of free trade and global markets. As for Americanization versus globalization, the example of the Basque music video or the Salzburg political poster may remind us that both can be read as forms of protest against globalization as a force eroding local or national cultural standards. Yet, at the same time, the symbols chosen in articulating the protest are emblems of America—the Hamburger or Big Mac. In the current global production, dissemination, and consumption of mass culture, many of the ingredients are still recognizably American. Rap music produced by immigrant youths in Marseille, Turks in Berlin, or a Palestinian rapper in Canada, can still be meaningfully understood as so many uses of an American cultural form, originating in the black neighborhoods of the United States. Yet at the same time they are culturally different, illustrating

my earlier point about the selective appropriation of American mass culture and its hybridization at the receiving end. Once transformed in such ways, the outcome can also be seen as a re-localization of globally available forms of mass culture, allowing for the expression of local life and local identities.

There may be ways, though, where the continued globalization of mass culture may force us conceptually to recast issues of national and geographic origin, or of cultural identities. The area that most radically illustrates this is the Hollywood movie. Suggestive of a place and nation of origin as is the richly resonant word Hollywood, it is in need of a radical deconstruction in much the same way that Saskia Sassen, in her seminal book *The Global City*, forced us to rethink the idea of the city.<sup>24</sup> We may need to come up with a conceptual view of Hollywood as a denationalized node within the deterritorialized network of media and entertainment production. The globality of Hollywood, in this view, lies in the transnational nature of its finance, production, and distribution. The prime exhibit here is the Blockbuster movie as it has come to define Hollywood since the 1970s. It is a type of movie that basically means high-production value, a reliance on special effects and computer technology, and the successful targeting of global audiences. Does this radical reconfiguration of Hollywood and the films it produces mean that we can no longer speak of them as “American,” nor see them as powerful engines of Americanization? Surprisingly, there are those who look at these recent trends and see no major change. In Europe and the United States there are those who reject the current Hollywood products in much the same vein that European cultural nationalists in the 1920s used to reject Hollywood films. Benjamin Barber, an American critic of Hollywood, in fact brings back the old dichotomy of Hollywood being only commercial, versus Europe producing creative “auteurs.”<sup>25</sup> Others, in contrast, argue that the attempt to assign cultural nationality to the Hollywood productions of today is either done arbitrarily or aims to serve specific agendas.<sup>26</sup>

The reconceptualization of Hollywood, as here suggested, may well call for the rethinking of national denominators as meaningful categories in cultural analysis. Transcending them, or leaving them behind, may allow us to see more clearly the portent of things to come, the effects on film content and its narrative structure of the global mode of production of “Hollywood” movies. It may help us fathom the interplay between such separate forms of global entertainment as video games and blockbuster movies. We may be witnessing the transition from film narrative based on conventions of plot and character development—cultural conventions central to Western civilization since the days of classic Greek tragedy—to a novel form that more closely resembles the logic of levels in video games, with no quality of drama, no sense of history, no transcendence.<sup>27</sup> The death of tragedy, as a sign of cultural loss and the degeneration of Western civilization, has been announced by



cultural pessimists, from Friedrich Nietzsche to George Steiner, adding their influential voices to the mainly European chorus of cultural declinists. Often the implied agent in such diagnoses of our time was the baneful and erosive influence of an American mass culture. Now, tellingly, American cultural critics, like Daniel Mendelsohn, have joined the chorus in their turn.<sup>28</sup> American and European intellectuals, on either side of the Atlantic, now voice their stark warnings of the demise of Western civilization, as we have known and cherished it, at the hands of the uncontrollable process of cultural globalization.

### **Conclusion: The Atlantic as a Cultural Divide?**

Whatever the future may hold, at our present juncture such categories of thought as “European” and “American” are still widely used. In that vein, let me revisit the issue this chapter set out to address: at present are Europeans and Americans basically bonded by culture or divided by it? The answer cannot be a simple one. We have explored patterns of interwovenness, of cultural exchanges and clashes, of reception and hybridization, in a story that is basically one of cultural symbiosis. Yet there are areas of life, normally included in the single word “culture,” where the United States and Europe can be shown to have drifted apart in recent history. One such area, clearly, is religion. As cultural changes go, they are mostly unnoticed until a coagulation point is reached and a new cultural configuration presents itself. Thus, after many years of a life in the shadow, in both the USA and Europe, Islam now appears to have exploded onto the stage, confronting societies with dilemmas of cultural coexistence. There is not much that European countries can learn from the United States, given the fact that Muslim immigrants in Europe, apart from religion, differ strongly from those in the United States in terms of class, education, geographical origin, and urbanity. Islam as the one common denominator may falsely suggest that Europe and the USA share a problem, particularly when Muslims as a group, through cultural “profiling,” tend to set alarm bells ringing in a world that calls itself Christian.<sup>29</sup> This is particularly ironic in a Europe that is increasingly secular, yet rallies around its alleged Christianity to exclude the Turks as a nation from membership of the European Union. That the Turks already live among Europeans in sizable numbers and arguably share a transnational sense of themselves as a community that one might call proto-European is a thing Europeans conveniently tend to ignore.

It is not so much Islam, though, as Christianity that brings ironies I wish to explore further. It is no longer the bonding element it may historically have been. Europe shows a long-term trend toward secularism, while the

United States, as if caught in a quasi-colonial time warp, embraces the old-time religion and its worldview. Here too the trends have gone on unnoticed for quite a while, until the moment when the opening divide causes a cultural shock and both sides behold each other in utter estrangement. Not only have both sides evolved in opposite directions in the sphere of religion, but other spheres of life, such as politics, education, or morality, appear as crucially affected by these diverging trends. Contemporary American religiosity, as many Europeans see it, appears as a form of obscurantism that is still engaged in pitched battles with the spirit of the Age of Enlightenment. Tellingly, though, some of the most incisive criticism of such trends comes from the United States.<sup>30</sup> As so often before, critical voices from Europe are in unison with American voices.

This may not be as strongly the case, though, in the defense of republicanism, civil rights, and democratic values. If political culture, like religion, is part of my brief for this chapter, we must remind ourselves of the language used on both sides of the Atlantic in the days and weeks following the terrorist assault of 9/11. In an instant, if not instinctive, response, the terms of public debate were those of the West and the values it stood for, values of freedom and democracy. It did not take long, though, for public debate in Europe to turn away in disgust from what it saw as the cynical subversion at the hands of the Bush administration of precisely those values. This time it was more difficult for Europeans to recognize if not reach out to like-minded critics in America's public space. There, time and again conservative forces can be seen to dictate to the public the terms of public debate and to silence dissent. No one harboring political aspirations can say the unwelcome thing without alienating entire voter blocs. Age-old fears of what a garrison state—that is, a warfare state, not a welfare state, or in more current language a national security state—could mean for the survival of republicanism—fears expressed so eloquently, among others, by the Nobel Peace laureate Jane Adams at the time of the First World War—are now more urgently recognized and discussed in Europe than in the United States. This is a tragic reversal of a long history where repeatedly America was the beacon and safe haven of liberty at times when tyranny and dictatorship held sway in Europe, and people from Europe looked to America as the last, best hope of democracy and freedom. Precisely now that Europe is in its long-continuing reinvention of itself as a Kantian place of order and the rule of law, America may be showing worrying signs of placing itself above the law, nationally and internationally. It now finds itself in the dock, literally, as in a Milan court on the issue of “extraordinary rendition,” or more generally in the court of public opinion. If anti-Americanism has risen steeply all over the world, including in Europe, it may have to do crucially with what many see as the betrayal by Americans of something distinctly American, of “truths held to be self-evident.”

## Notes

1. Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), 47–77.
2. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976).
3. A good example is Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).
4. For the full ironic story of the political uses made of America's cutting-edge art, see Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper: The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 1999).
5. For a neutral, value-free definition, may I propose that mass culture as a term comprises all those forms of culture that for their production, dissemination, and even consumption crucially depend on technological innovation, from the early industrial revolution to the current revolution in global communications. Mass, in this context, is used solely as a quantitative category, implying large numbers of commodities produced, of messages disseminated, and of customers/users reached.
6. Robert W. Rydell and Rob Kroes, *Buffalo Bill in Bologna: The Americanization of the World, 1869–1922* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
7. W. T. Stead, *The Americanization of the World; or, The Trend of the Twentieth Century* (New York and London: Horace Markley, 1901).
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## 12

# Can the Circle Be Unbroken? Public Opinion and the Transatlantic Rupture

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### Introduction

In the post-9/11 period US foreign policy went through a number of changes that elicited a strong and sustained negative reaction among Europeans reflected in public opinion polls as well as exchanges among policy elites. As the Bush administration approaches the end of its tenure, a key question arises as to whether this rupture reflects a fundamental shift in transatlantic relations or if it is unique to this period and has the potential to repair under a new administration.

In this chapter, I seek to answer this question primarily through the lens of public opinion. From this perspective the prognosis for repair is good. The changes in US foreign policy that Europeans have found objectionable have also made the American public uncomfortable. Though Americans at times acquiesced to these changes, their resistance has increased over time. Broadly, comparisons of American and European polls reveal substantial common ground on numerous policy issues and the preferred character of the relationship between the United States and Europe—much more than recent policy tensions would suggest.

### European Reaction to the post 9/11 US Foreign Policy

Some have dismissed the current negative views of US foreign policy in Europe, saying that it is all but inevitable, given the asymmetry of power between the United States and Europe. However, this asymmetry has been in place for decades and until recently European public attitudes toward the United States were for the most part positive.

In 1999 polls by the US State Department found robust majorities saying they had a favorable view of the United States in most of the countries polled at that time—UK 83 percent, Germany 78 percent, and France 62 percent. Only Spain was more lukewarm, with a 50 percent plurality expressing favorable views.

Though President Bush was not highly popular with the European people, in the months before 9/11, Europeans still had a general feeling that US–European relations were on a solid foundation. Asked by the Pew Research Center in August 2001 (one month before 9/11) “Aside from your opinion of George W. Bush, in recent years, have the basic interests of Europe and the USA grown closer, further apart or have they remained about the same?”, only minorities in the UK (24 percent), Italy (14 percent), Germany (17 percent), and France (20 percent) believed that they had grown further apart.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Europeans showed an outpouring of empathy and concern for the United States. The British and the French stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States when the UN Security Council demanded that the Afghan government hand over Al-Qaeda and subsequently contributed troops to military operations in Afghanistan to secure the new Karzai government that displaced the Taliban. In an April 2002 Pew poll, majorities in the UK (73 percent), Italy (59 percent), Germany (61 percent), and France (64 percent) approved of “the US led military campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.”

At the same time, the first signs of discomfort were heard in response to President Bush’s “axis-of-evil” speech. In the same April 2002 Pew poll, majorities disapproved of “President Bush calling Iraq, Iran and North Korea an Axis of Evil” in the UK (55 percent), Italy (60 percent), Germany (74 percent), and France (62 percent).

Still, overall views of the United States remained mostly positive, though they slipped a bit. In the Pew 2002 poll, as compared to the 1999 State Department poll, favorable views of the United States dropped in the UK from 83 percent to 75 percent, and from 78 percent to 61 percent in Germany, but held steady in France (62 percent to 63 percent). A German Marshall Fund (GMF) poll of seven European countries found an average of 64 percent saying that it is desirable for the United States to “exert strong leadership in the world.”

It was only when the United States went to war with Iraq that these views began to dip sharply, with those expressing a favorable view of the United States falling by more than 30 points in some countries in 2003 (Pew). In Germany favorable views dipped from 61 to 25 percent, in France from 63 to 31 percent, in Italy from 70 to 34 percent, and in Italy from 70 to 34 percent. Opinion also fell sharply in the UK (75 percent to 48 percent) and Turkey (30 percent to 12 percent).

While majorities in most European countries were already saying that they disapproved of the way President Bush “is handling international policies” in 2002, in 2004 the numbers in a GMF poll saying that they strongly disapproved shot up. In France they went from 21 to 46 percent, in Germany from 12 to 45 percent, in the UK from 22 to 37 percent, and in Italy from 9 to 35 percent. In 2004 large numbers also strongly disapproved in Spain (52 percent), Slovakia (47 percent), and Turkey (63 percent). These numbers have stayed roughly the same ever since. The percentages saying that that it is desirable for the USA to “exert strong leadership in world affairs” dropped off sharply in 2003 and, according to the GMF, have remained a minority position ever since.

### Reaction to the Iraq War

Apparently the strongest trigger for the shift in European attitudes was the US decision to go to war with Iraq in March 2003. European publics were not persuaded by the arguments for taking action against Iraq. In the autumn of 2002, no more than half in the UK, Germany, France, or Turkey saw Iraq’s government as a “great danger” to “stability in the Middle East and the world.” France, Germany, and Turkey all leaned toward viewing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a bigger threat than Iraq’s regime though pluralities in the UK saw Iraq as a bigger threat. Most did think that, if Saddam were removed, it would mean a more stable Middle East in the long run. However, many were worried that a possible war with Iraq might lead to an all-out war in the Middle East. And all these publics agreed that a war would increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks on Western populations.

Opposition to military action against Iraq only grew over time. In April 2002, Germans and Italians were clearly opposed, but the British and French were divided. By November, German opposition had grown to a large majority, and the French became clearly opposed. Turks were overwhelmingly opposed. All three remained opposed through March 2003.

In early 2003, Gallup International offered the publics in sixteen European countries three response options regarding military action against Iraq: under no circumstance, only if sanctioned by the United Nations, or even without UN sanction. In twelve of the sixteen countries a majority or plurality said they would support action under no circumstances. About half in Holland and Ireland were favorable of action with UN sanction, and the British and Swiss were divided between that position and being fully opposed.

Asked by Pew about contributing troops to an operation with the USA and other allies at the start of 2003, majorities of the British, Italians, Spanish, and Poles were all opposed. In the end, though, all of these countries’ governments did eventually send troops.



There were suspicions about US motives for going to war with Iraq. In France and Germany most thought it was “because the US wants to control Iraqi oil” not “because the US believes that Saddam Hussein is a threat to stability in the Middle East and world peace.” In a January 2003 poll by Pew, the British were divided on this question.

The quick success of US-led forces did not mitigate opposition. In a May 2003 Gallup International poll large majorities in most European countries rejected the idea that the war would result in greater peace and stability in the Middle East.

When weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were not found in Iraq, large majorities in France, Germany, and Turkey believed that US and British leaders had lied about WMD in Iraq as a pretext for war. However, according to Pew, in Britain, pluralities thought their leaders had only been misinformed.

Not surprisingly the continuing conflict has not mitigated the negative views of the war. Large majorities believe that the war has increased the likelihood of terrorist attacks, and hurt the war on terrorism. The only concession expressed is that, in the long run, the Iraqi people will be better off because Saddam Hussein has been removed from power. Among countries that have contributed military forces, support for that decision has declined, and among those that have not, approval has increased to overwhelming majorities.

## **European Perceptions that the USA is Unconstrained by the International System**

Though the Iraq war may have been the strongest trigger for negative reactions to the United States, it should not be assumed that this is the whole of it. If it were, one would expect that with time there would be a regression to the mean, and that views of the USA would soften as the decision receded into the past. This has not proved to be the case. Even in the last few years, views about the USA have continued to erode. A BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll asked respondents whether the USA was having a positive or negative influence in the world at the beginning of 2005, 2006, and 2007 and found that in most European countries views worsened over time and none improved.

Clearly this suggests that the European reaction is to something much more fundamental than one specific decision. Rather it appears that European concerns have been about whether the United States has become unconstrained by the international system of law based on treaties and conventions governing the behavior of states—that the USA has even become a threat to global stability. There is also the perception that the USA is unconstrained

by human-rights conventions governing the treatment of detainees. More broadly, Europeans seem to be concerned that the United States has reverted to being a traditional hegemon: that it is too eager to use military force and seeks to pursue its interest with little concern for the consequences to other countries or to the world as a whole.

## Constraints on the Unilateral Use of Force

A cornerstone of the international legal system has been restraints on the unilateral use of military force except in self-defense or in response to an imminent attack. The fact that the USA was not constrained by this system in its action against Iraq appears to have elicited concern that the USA is generally unconstrained from using force as well as being too eager to use force. In a May 2003 Ipsos Reid poll, majorities in five European countries agreed that “there is no country or world organization that can stop the USA doing whatever it wants in the world today.” And a Gallup International poll found majorities in eighteen countries polled said that “the US is too keen to use military force in other countries.”

The Bush administration did make efforts to create some continuity between US policy and the international system by arguing that, in taking military action against Iraq, without UN approval, the United States was merely making an amendment to the international system made necessary by the potential for WMD proliferation. Building on the principle that states have the right to act pre-emptively against an immediate threat, the USA, it was argued, should have the right to act preventively to eliminate an emerging WMD threat.

Europeans appear to have been largely unpersuaded. In a Pew poll of May 2003, majorities in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain largely rejected the preventive war argument that “using military force against countries that may seriously threaten our country, but have not attacked us” can be justified. Only the British had a majority endorsing this view, while the Turks were divided. Apparently Europeans generally adhered to the standard position that the threat must be imminent: when asked by the GMF in June 2004 about using force to prevent “an imminent terrorist attack,” large majorities were approving.

Europeans appear to be concerned that the USA may also follow the logic of prevention and use military force against Iran. A July 2006 BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll asked what the UN Security Council should do “if Iran continues to produce nuclear fuel.” Very few Europeans in eight countries polled favored authorizing military force. Nonetheless the USA has pointedly declined to take the military option off the table in its dealings with both

countries. This is likely to be a key reason why large majorities in eight out of nine European countries polled in a January 2007 BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll disapproved of the way in which the USA was handling the conflict with Iran.

## Constraints on the Treatment of Detainees

Europeans appear to see the USA as also unconstrained by the system of international treaties (primarily the Geneva Conventions) that govern the treatment of detainees. The ongoing treatment of terrorism suspects at Guantánamo Bay and the treatment of a variety of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq has stirred substantial criticism. While the Bush administration conceded that some abuses occurred at Abu Ghraib, it insisted that, as a matter of policy, it does not violate the system of international laws for the treatment of detainees.

Once again it appears that the Europeans were unpersuaded. A January 2007 BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll found large majorities in eight European countries saying that they disapproved of “how the United States government has dealt with the treatment of detainees in Guantánamo and other prisons.” More to the point, a World Public Opinion (WPO) poll in the UK, Germany, and Poland found that 65 percent of the British, 85 percent of Germans, and 50 percent of Poles said they believe that the “current US policies for detaining people it has captured and is holding in Guantánamo Bay are . . . not legal, according to international treaties on the treatment of detainees.” Large majorities in the UK and Germany and a plurality in Poland also said they believed that the United States had permitted Guantánamo prisoners to be tortured during interrogations.

Concern that the USA was allowing torture of terrorism suspects led to the uproar over the American “extraordinary renditions;” the USA was reportedly using European airspace to transport suspects to countries known to use torture. In the WPO poll large majorities of the British and Germans and a plurality of Poles said that, if the USA requests permission to fly through their country’s airspace “when it is transporting a terrorism suspect to a country that has a reputation for using torture,” their country “should refuse permission.”

These concerns have generalized to a broader perception that the USA is no longer a significant force for promoting human rights. In a striking vote of no confidence, the WPO poll also found that a majority of the British (56 percent) and Germans (78 percent) said that the USA was doing a bad job in “advancing human rights in other countries.” This is in sharp contrast to a 1998 United States Intelligence Agency (USIA) poll, when, in response to the

same question, 59 percent of the British and 61 percent of Germans said that the USA was doing a good job.

## Cooperativeness

More broadly, it seems Europeans worry that the USA has become less cooperative in its approach to international relations. Rather than pursuing the vision of a cooperative world order that the USA championed in the postwar period, the USA is seen as reverting to a traditional hegemonic power that seeks to dominate the world according to its interests.

The USA is widely seen as not taking into account the interests of other countries. Between 2002 and 2005 Pew asked on three occasions how much the USA takes the interests of other countries into account when making international policy decisions. Growing majorities in most European countries feel that the United States does not consider the interests of their country. Increased skepticism about the USA is most dramatic among the German public, which shifted from a majority in 2002 who believed the USA at least somewhat took the interests of other countries into account (53 percent does consider, 45 percent does not), to a majority in 2003 who believed the USA did not (66 percent) and 2005 (59 percent). By 2005, more than seven in ten in France (82 percent), the Netherlands (79 percent), Spain (76 percent), and Poland (74 percent) all doubted that the United States took the interests of other countries into account. Two-thirds (66 percent) in the UK said that the United States did not consider the interests of other countries, up significantly from the slight majority (52 percent) who held this view in 2002.

US policies are seen as increasing the gap between rich and poor. In a Pew 2002 poll, majorities or pluralities in ten European countries felt that US policies increase the gap between rich and poor countries, including large majorities in Germany (70 percent) and France (69 percent). Significant numbers also held this view in Turkey (63 percent), the Slovak Republic (62 percent), and Italy (58 percent), followed by modest majorities in the Ukraine (54 percent), Czech Republic (54 percent), and UK (53 percent). Pluralities in Poland (49 percent) and Bulgaria (48 percent) also felt that the USA increased the rich-poor gap.

Particularly galling to Europeans is the US refusal to join the Kyoto Treaty and to impose limits on its greenhouse gas emissions, even as most European nations have undertaken to impose limits while already producing lower emissions per capita than the USA.

As early as August 2001, Bush's decision not to support the Kyoto Protocol earned overwhelming disapproval from European publics: Germany

(87 percent), France (85 percent), the UK (83 percent), and Italy (80 percent). More recently, in a January 2007 BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll, majorities in seven of eight European countries said they disapproved of US policy on climate change.

## The American Public and the Iraq War

I will now seek to examine how much the changes perceived by Europeans apply to the American public. Given that the US decision to go to war with Iraq appears to be the primary trauma that soured European views of the USA, I will explore American public attitudes about this decision in some depth. I will then explore American attitudes about constraints on the use of force, constraints on the treatment of terrorism suspects, and finally the broader question of the level of cooperativeness in US foreign policy.

Though the American public did ultimately back President Bush at the moment of the decision to go to war with Iraq, in the run-up to the war Americans showed strong resistance to taking action without UN approval and the participation of allies. They exhibited a strong belief that to do so would be at odds with international norms.

Three separate NBC News polls between December 2002 and February 2003 found 51–65 percent who said the USA “should take military action only if the UN supports it” and a Pew Research Center poll in February 2003 found that 57 percent of Americans said the USA “should first get a UN resolution” before using force. In two CBS polls, Iraq was also presented as a “clear and present danger to American interests.” Even in this case, however, 56 percent of Americans in early February and 64 percent in late February 2003 said the “US needs to wait for approval of the United Nations before taking any action against Iraq.” Only 31 percent in early and 38 percent in late February said “the United States needs to act now, even without the support of the United Nations.”

Other polling organizations found similar results. A January 2003 CNN/Harris Interactive poll found only 27 percent felt the “US should send ground troops to Iraq...even if the United Nations opposes such action.” Fifty-one percent agreed that the “US should send ground troops to Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power only if the United Nations supports such action.” Seventeen percent said the “US should not send troops to Iraq...regardless of whether the United Nations favors or opposes such action.” Five percent were not sure.

Similar questions were asked in two *Los Angeles Times* polls conducted in January and February 2003. In January and February 2003, 65 and 62 percent respectively agreed when asked whether the USA should “take military action against Iraq only if that military action has the support of the United Nations

Security Council.” Only 30 percent in January and 37 percent in February disagreed.

How then did it happen once hostilities began that the public did support the action without UN approval? Indeed in the weeks immediately after the decision to go to war numerous polls that simply asked whether people approved of the decision found large majorities—ranging from two-thirds to three-quarters—saying that they approved. Combined with the Congressional vote giving the president power to go to war and the apparent enthusiasm of the press, this raises the question of whether the reservations expressed by the American public in the run-up to the war reflected superficial ruminations rather than fundamental values. Naturally, this is key to the question of whether the American public is indeed in favor of constraining the use of US military force according to multilateral principles—thus providing common ground with European publics—or if the American public thinks about the use of force in fundamentally different ways from Europeans.

I will make the case that the shift in expressed attitudes once hostilities began did not reflect an abandonment of multilateral principles. A number of factors, already apparent in polls that were taken before the war, foreshadowed how this shift would occur. Though Americans were clearly uncomfortable with taking action without UN approval, there were two mitigating factors. These included an underlying belief that taking action against Iraq was in fact a legitimate act of self-defense based on the belief that Iraq was supporting al-Qaeda when it attacked the USA on September 11 and the fact that there was some allied participation in the operation. In addition there was a rally-round-the-president effect, which, polling conducted at the time revealed, was a fairly superficial (and temporary) accommodation to the president rather than real shift in attitudes.

## **The Belief that Iraq Effectively Attacked the United States**

Even as large majorities opposed taking action against Iraq without UN approval, there was a key factor operating in the minds of many Americans that logically weakened the inhibition against using military force without UN approval. This was the belief that Iraq had provided support to Al-Qaeda when it attacked the USA on September 11 and thus had effectively attacked the United States. Thus taking military action against Iraq was arguably an act of self-defense and not constrained by the obligation to gain UN approval.

Before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a modest majority believed Iraq gave support to Al-Qaeda. In a PIPA/Knowledge Networks (KN) February 2003 poll a majority of 56 percent said they were convinced that Iraq had given substantial support to Al-Qaeda (36 percent) or was even directly involved

in the September 11 attacks (20 percent). Twenty-nine percent believed only that a few Al-Qaeda individuals had visited Iraq or had contact with Iraqi officials, while another 7 percent said there was no connection at all. In the same month Pew found 57 percent believing that “Saddam Hussein helped the terrorists in the September 11th attacks.”

Those who had the belief that Iraq was in some way connected to September 11 showed higher support for going to war without multilateral approval. In the PIPA/KN February 2003 poll, among those who believed that Iraq was directly involved in 9/11, 45 percent said that “the US should invade Iraq, even if the US has to go it alone.” Among those who believed that Iraq had given Al-Qaeda substantial support, but was not involved in September 11, support dropped to 37 percent for an invasion without UN approval or allied support. Support for unilateral action was much lower among those who believed that a few Al-Qaeda individuals had contact with Iraqi officials (25 percent said go it alone) or that there was no connection at all (15 percent said go it alone).

In a March 2003 poll, just prior to the invasion, Gallup found that those who perceived a connection between Saddam Hussein and September 11 widely felt it was a reason for supporting the invasion of Iraq. Of the 51 percent who said they believed that Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11 attacks, 40 percent said this link was “the main reason” (13 percent) or “one reason” (27 percent) why they would support invading Iraq.

Several poll questions reveal that, if new evidence emerged linking Iraq to terrorism, this would strengthen support for taking military action. In Pew polls taken in both January and April 2002, when respondents were asked to suppose “we learned that Iraq helped terrorists attack the United States,” an overwhelming 83 percent said they would see it as a “very important reason to justify the use of military force.”

## Allied Participation

Another factor that may have mitigated American resistance to going to war without UN approval was the fact that a number of European and other allies did contribute troops to the operation and other governments did express support. While earlier polling found Americans insisting on UN approval in the immediate run-up to the war, in some cases a majority expressed approval with allied participation. This may have been partly a convergence with the rally-round-the-president effect, as this view became stronger as the president’s choice became clearer.

The *Los Angeles Times* asked respondents if they would support military action in Iraq if “the United Nations Security Council does not approve

military action against Iraq but the US has the support of some allies, such as Great Britain." In this case a slight majority of 51 percent expressed support as early as January, rising to 55 percent in February.

At no time, however, did Americans support unilateral action. When respondents were asked by *Newsweek* for their opinion if "the United States acted alone in attacking Iraq, without the support of the United Nations," only 31 percent in January and 43 percent in March 2003 supported military action.

### Rallying Round the President

Historical research has shown that, once a president has decided to use military force, there tends to be a significant surge in public support for the action. This appears to have occurred in the case of Iraq and to have played a role in overriding the inhibition against using force without UN approval.

Interestingly, this shift was not simply a reflexive response to the decision but was clearly foreshadowed some months before the military action commenced. In a December 2002 PIPA/KN poll, respondents were presented the following question:

Imagine that after the initial UN inspections in Iraq, the US and other countries in the UN Security Council disagree about whether Iraq is adequately cooperating with the UN inspectors. President Bush moves that the UN approve an invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein, but most of the other members of the UN Security Council want to continue to use threats and diplomatic pressure to get Iraq to comply, and the motion does not pass. President Bush then decides that the US will undertake an invasion of Iraq, even if the US has to do so on its own. Just based on this information, what do you think your attitude would be about this decision?

While only 43 percent said they "would agree with this decision," an additional 27 percent said they "would not agree with this decision, but would still support the president." Thus, including those willing to rally round the president, 70 percent of Americans were willing to support going to war with Iraq, though only a minority really agreed with the decision to give up on the UN route.

This rally round the president began to take effect even before hostilities broke out. In the days before action commenced, but when it was clear that the president had decided to take action, support for taking action had already begun to increase.

Shortly after the war started, PIPA found that a significant number of respondents were even willing to report that their support was an expression



of support for the president not a real approval of the decision to go to war. In a May 2003 PIPA poll 68 percent of respondents said “the US made the right decision . . . in going to war against Iraq.” These respondents were then asked whether this was their position because they believed going to war was “the best thing to do” or because they were not sure it was the right thing to do but “support Bush’s decision, because he is president.” Fifteen percent said they were supporting the president, though 53 percent held to the view it was the best thing to do. (Some of these may actually have also been simply supporting the president, because the best way to support the president may not be to admit that one does not think it was really the best thing to do.)

As is often the case, this rally-round-the-president effect soon began to fade. The percentage saying going to war was the right decision declined steadily over the subsequent months. By December 2003, PIPA found only 55 percent said it was the right decision and in the follow-up question just 42 percent said it was the “best thing to do,” while 13 percent said they were simply supporting the president.

## Constraints on the Use of Force

Once the USA had actually overridden the norm against unilateral military action, it is reasonable to assume that this might have had the effect of diminishing the power of the norm. This does not appear to have been the case with the American public.

Even as the USA invaded Iraq in March 2003, without UN approval, Americans confirmed their continuing support for the norm against unilateral military action. In a poll conducted by PIPA in March 2003, respondents were asked whether “in the future the US should or should not feel more free to use military force without UN authorization.” A strong majority of 66 percent in March felt the USA “should not feel more free,” while only 29 percent felt the USA “should feel more free.” These results were relatively unchanged in April and June PIPA polls, with 60 percent or more continuing to say the USA should not feel more free to use force without UN authorization in the future.

A PIPA poll conducted in November 2003 also asked Americans to evaluate a number of principled arguments that had been used in the run-up to the Iraq war to justify taking military action without UN approval. The questions presented the issue in abstract terms and not in relation to the Iraq war. Respondents were presented a series of general arguments about the conditions under which countries generally have the right to overthrow a government that may be developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (the preventive war argument), may be providing support to terrorist groups

(related to the charge that Iraq had supported Al-Qaeda), or is violating the human rights of its citizens.

Most respondents rejected the argument in favor of preventive war, but many did accept the right to act pre-emptively. Given four positions, only 31 percent endorsed the preventive war argument that had been used to support the US right to attack Iraq because it was building WMD. It read: "Countries have the right to overthrow another government if they have strong evidence that the other country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could be used to attack them at some point in the future." On the other hand, only a quarter chose the two most restrictive positions—that "countries have the right to overthrow another government only if the other country attacks them first" (9 percent) or "countries have the right to use military force to stop another country from invading, but this does not give them the right to overthrow the invading country's government" (15 percent). The largest percentage (41 percent) chose the option: "Countries have the right to overthrow another government only if they have strong evidence that they are in imminent danger of being attacked with weapons of mass destruction by the other country."

Most also rejected the right unilaterally to attack another country because it was supporting a terrorist group. Asked "under what conditions do you think countries have the right to overthrow another government when they have evidence that it is providing substantial support to a terrorist group," only 23 percent chose the least restrictive option: "whenever they deem it necessary, even without UN approval." Only 29 percent chose the two most restrictive options: "only when they first present their evidence to the UN and the UN determines that such an action is necessary" (23 percent), or "under no circumstances" (6 percent). A plurality (44 percent) chose the more nuanced position: "as a general rule, only with UN approval, but if the terrorist group has attacked them, UN approval may not be necessary."

Another normative argument used to justify US action against Iraq has been that the USA was freeing the Iraqi people from a government that was violating its human rights. Respondents were asked "under what conditions do you think countries have the right to overthrow another government that is committing violations of the human rights of its citizens." Only 27 percent chose the least restrictive option: "whenever a government is committing substantial violations of the human rights of its citizens." Once again, only a quarter endorsed the most restrictive conditions: "only when they first present their evidence to the UN and the UN determines that such an action is necessary" (23 percent) or "under no circumstances" (5 percent). Once again the plurality (41 percent) chose the more nuanced option, saying that countries can overthrow another government, "as a general rule, only with UN approval, but when the violations are large scale, extreme and equivalent to genocide, UN approval may not be necessary."

## The Treatment of Detainees

As discussed above, European publics have had a strong negative reaction to US treatment of detainees in Iraq and its war on terror. Europeans perceive that the USA has violated international law in its treatment of detainees. Though Americans are less clear as to whether the USA has violated international law, they also tend to disapprove of the treatment that is occurring. Most significantly, Americans strongly endorse existing norms for the treatment of terrorism suspects and in this way are highly convergent with Europeans. On some issues Americans are even more restrictive than some Europeans.

Asked in June 2006 whether it was their “impression that current US policies for detaining people it has captured and is holding in Guantánamo Bay are or are not legal, according to international treaties on the treatment of detainees,” 52 percent of Americans thought the USA was behaving in a way that was legal, in contrast to the 85 percent of Germans, 65 percent of the British, and 50 percent of Poles who said they thought it was not legal.

However, in January 2007 Americans were divided on whether the USA was “currently allowing interrogators to use torture to get information from suspected terrorists” (47 percent said they were, 45 percent said that they were “making every effort to make sure that interrogators never use torture”). Large majorities of the British (62 percent) and Germans (76 percent) and a plurality of Poles (49 percent to 24 percent) said that they thought the USA was using torture (WPO).

Also in January 2007 a plurality of 50 percent of Americans concurred with Europeans in saying they disapprove of “the US treatment of detainees in Guantánamo and other prisons” (39 percent approve). In eight European countries, large majorities ranging from 61 percent in Poland to 89 percent in Germany said they disapprove (BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA).

When Americans and Europeans are asked general questions about the treatment of detainees, their views are largely consistent. For example, Americans as well as Europeans reject the idea that the threat of terrorism warrants relaxing the prohibition against terror. Told by BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA that “most countries have agreed to rules that prohibit torturing prisoners,” respondents in July 2006 were asked whether they believed “terrorists pose such an extreme threat that governments should now be allowed to use some degree of torture if it may gain information that saves innocent lives,” or “clear rules against torture should be maintained because any use of torture is immoral and will weaken international human rights standards against torture.” Majorities of Americans (58 percent) as well as majorities in eight European countries (ranging from 54 percent in Ukraine to 81 percent in Italy) felt that the clear rules against torture should be maintained.

In a July 2006 WPO poll, Americans (73 percent), the British (64 percent), Germans (72 percent), and Poles (72 percent) endorsed the treaties that “prohibit governments from holding people in secret and that require the International Committee of the Red Cross to have access to them.” Only minorities said that these treaties are “too restrictive because our government needs to have all options available when dealing with threats like terrorism.”

In the same WPO poll, respondents were asked about specific, treaty-based standards for the treatment of detainees. In some cases Europeans were less inconsistent in endorsing them than were Americans. Three prohibitions were presented to respondents: against using physical torture, against threatening physical torture, and against humiliating or degrading treatment.

- Germans and Poles supported most strongly the ban on “using physical torture,” at 76 percent and 67 percent, respectively. Among the British, majority support for such a ban was slimmer, 53 percent to 45 percent. Americans were virtually identical to Germans, with 75 percent approving a torture ban.
- There was less consistent support for a prohibition against threatening physical torture. Majorities in Germany (69 percent versus 28 percent) and Poland (54 percent versus 38 percent) approved of prohibiting such threats. A majority of the British (53 percent), however, said such a standard was too restrictive (43 percent approved). Among Americans, a strong 60 percent said threats of torture should be outlawed, while 37 percent disagreed.
- The prohibition against “treating detainees in a way that is humiliating or degrading” received a similarly mixed response. Germans were the most supportive of a ban on such treatment, with 72 percent approving. Fifty-nine percent of Poles also approved of a ban (32 percent said it was too restrictive). A modest majority of the British (53 percent) once again said such a ban is too restrictive, while 43 percent approved of one. Sixty-one percent of Americans said humiliating treatment should be prohibited (36 percent said it should not).

However, across all the countries polled, there is general agreement that military commanders should be held accountable for torture committed under their command, even if they claim they were unaware it was taking place. The British strongly endorse this principle of responsibility, with 73 percent saying commanders should be held accountable for the acts of subordinates. Most Germans also think commanders should be held responsible (72 percent). The Poles’ responses (59 percent responsible, 31 percent not) are similar to those of the Americans (58 percent versus 37 percent).

## Cooperativeness

During the years that Europeans have expressed dissatisfaction with the level of cooperativeness in US foreign policy, Americans have expressed concern about this and largely concurred with their assessment. Large majorities have expressed unease with the hegemonic character of US foreign policy and favor a US role that puts much more emphasis on cooperation in general and with Europe specifically.

Americans have shown concern about European criticism for some years. In a February 2003 PIPA/KN poll a majority of 70 percent agreed with the argument: "In Europe as well as in other parts of the world, there have been rising anti-American feelings and criticism of the USA as not being cooperative enough. If the USA proceeds to take action in defiance of the other countries on the UN Security Council, it could seriously damage US relations with some of its most important allies and could weaken support for the war against terrorism."

Majorities have also concurred with this criticism. In September 2003, when PIPA/KN asked about "how the Bush administration has been acting in relation to other countries over the last two years," 54 percent found the Bush administration too assertive, 14 percent said the administration was too cooperative, and 28 percent thought the administration "has the balance just right."

Americans have also concurred in the view that the Bush administration has not paid enough attention to the views of other countries. In October 2004 64 percent said that, "When it comes to making decisions on treaties and other policies about the role of the US in the world today... President Bush should pay more attention... to the views of other countries?" In April 2006 this number dropped a bit but was still a majority of 56 percent.

Americans have also concurred with the criticism that the Bush administration has been too quick to use military force. In July 2004, Pew asked about the Bush administration's "dealings with foreign countries and its handling of international problems" and found that 59 percent felt that it was "too quick to get American military forces involved." This rose to 65 percent in an October 2006 PIPA/KN poll.

Overall, dissatisfaction with US foreign policy has grown. While in 2003 only 30 percent said they were dissatisfied "with the position of the United States in the world today," this rose to 51 percent in 2005 (Gallup) and 68 percent in October 2006 (PIPA/KN). In October 2006 PIPA/KN found that majorities felt that "the way the Bush administration has been conducting US foreign policy" increased "the likelihood of terrorist attacks against the US" (60 percent) and decreased "goodwill toward the US" (78 percent). Seventy-one percent said that in the "upcoming Congressional race" they were looking for a candidate who would "pursue a new approach to US foreign policy,"

while just 26 percent favored one who would “support the current approach.” These attitudes were clearly taken to the ballot box in November 2006 when the Republicans lost their majority in both houses of Congress.

More broadly, a very strong majority of Americans feels that the USA is playing the role of the hegemonic or dominant world leader more than it should be. Majorities reject the idea that the USA should play the role of “world policeman.” Asked, “Do you think that the United States has the responsibility to play the role of ‘world policeman,’ that is, to fight violations of international law and aggression wherever they occur?,” only 22 percent said yes while 75 percent said no in the July 2006 Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) poll.

More importantly, a majority feels that the USA is playing this role too much. In the July 2006 CCGA poll, 76 percent agreed that “the US is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be.” This is nearly the same as the 80 percent who held this view in the 2004 CCGA poll, and significantly up from 65 percent in the 2002 CCGA poll and 68 percent in a June 2000 PIPA poll.

In a variety of polls Americans have expressed their discomfort with the USA playing the role of world leader. Gallup has asked about “the role the US should play in trying to solve international problems.” In February 2005, only 19 percent said the USA should take “the leading role,” while 53 percent said the USA should “take a major role but not the leading role.” Another 21 percent said the USA should take a “minor role” or “no role.” Pew has asked respondents about what kind of leadership role they would like to see the USA play in the world. In October 2005 a strong majority of 74 percent believed that the USA should play “a shared leadership role,” while just 12 percent felt that it should be “the single world leader.”

Americans put a strong emphasis on wanting to pursue a cooperative, multilateral approach. In a July 2006 CCGA poll, respondents were presented three options for America’s role in the world. Just 12 percent chose the option that “the US should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems.” Similarly, only 10 percent embraced the idea that, “as the sole remaining superpower, the US should continue to be the pre-eminent world leader in solving international problems.” However, an overwhelming 75 percent endorsed the view that “the US should do its share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries.”

Americans show strong support for working in conjunction with and consulting allies. Most recently, the GMF Transatlantic Trends poll from June 2006 showed 91 percent agreeing (65 percent strongly) that, “when our country acts on national security issues, it is critical that we do so with our closest allies.” This corresponds with Pew’s October 2005 poll, which found 79 percent agreeing that, “in deciding on its foreign policies, the US should take into account the views of its major allies.”

A large, though declining, number of Americans (60 percent in 2004, 53 percent in 2005, and 45 percent in 2006) believe that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the USA and the EU should become closer, with another one in five saying that it should remain the same. Few say that Europe should take a more independent approach. A modest majority of Europeans, however, believes that Europe should take a more independent approach from the United States (GMF).

Something that may surprise Europeans is that Americans not only express discomfort with the role of world hegemon; they have an active desire for Europe to play a strong role in world affairs. Between 2002 and 2006 GMF asked on five occasions whether it was desirable for the European Union to “exert strong leadership in world affairs.” In every case large majorities of Americans—approximately three in four—said that it was desirable. (Europeans have not returned the compliment in regard to US leadership since 2002.) Americans are not interested, though, in Europe becoming a military superpower.

Finally, on the specific issue of US unwillingness to limit its greenhouse gases, an abundance of polling shows American public readiness to do so. In the June 2006 CCGA poll 70 percent of Americans favored US participation in the Kyoto Treaty. In polls that have specified the increased energy costs, Americans are still supportive. In the January 2007 BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll, 54 percent of Americans agreed with majorities of Europeans in their disapproval of the current US policy on addressing climate change.

## Conclusion

In summary, it does seem that an assessment of the public attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic reveals a substantial amount of convergence on a wide range of international issues, including the roles of the USA and Europe in the world and with each other. In particular we have found that the American public has shared many of the discomforts Europeans have had with some of the new directions in US foreign policy under the Bush administration.

Naturally one cannot make predictions about whether a future American administration will or will not act in a way that is consistent with these American public sentiments. Many factors will contribute to this outcome. US public opinion will be only one.

The American public does tend to give the Executive Branch substantial leeway in conducting foreign policy. However, when it departs too far, like a rubber band, it does begin to exert a pull back to the mean. The results of the 2006 election are widely interpreted as just such an effect, and there is substantial polling evidence to support such a view. Clearly there are numerous factors that can influence the future of the transatlantic relationship, but it is

likely that the force of public opinion is likely to be one, pulling in a direction of reducing tensions.

This does not mean that one should also expect a feeling of complete amity. While there may well be some underlying tensions between publics on each side of the Atlantic—just as there are tensions within the EU—and while we do find that there is substantial transatlantic consensus on many of the broad foreign-policy issues that have troubled intergovernmental relations, there are differences that do point to intercultural dissonance. Americans are substantially more supportive of the death penalty and are considerably more religious than are Europeans. These trends will no doubt throw a little salt and vinegar in the ongoing relationship.

Further, even with a change of administration, there will no doubt be continuing points of tension between the USA and Europe, derived from ongoing and inherent conflicts as well as the complexities of dealing with the aftermath of controversial decisions the Bush administration has made.

However, the data of public opinion do appear to undermine the null hypothesis that the divergence of US foreign policy from European expectations is an inevitable result of a deeper divergence about fundamental questions. Rather they suggest that there is still quite a lot of common ground between the two societies and that rumors of the death of the alliance may indeed be exaggerated.



## 13

# Where are American–European Relations Heading? A View from the United States

*Stanley R. Sloan*

### Introduction

Contrasting images of the future of the Euro-Atlantic relationship emerge from different interpretations of the near and distant past. What was this transatlantic alliance? From one perspective, the Euro-Atlantic relationship was a forced marriage, inspired by fear of the Soviet Union's military power and communist ideology, and therefore likely to fall apart when that threat expired. It is an open question whether or not a new "Islamic terrorist" threat should now replace the Soviet one as the motivation for close US–European relations. Americans tend to say "yes," Europeans "no."

From another point of view, the Euro-Atlantic relationship was imposed by the United States at a time when Europe was weak and dispirited after the Second World War, and was therefore bound to be displaced when a recovered and confident Europe asserted its unity to balance US power. This perspective suggests that, as the process of European integration continues, Europe will be increasingly autonomous of and distanced from American power and influence.

Other, perhaps more idealistic, perspectives see the Euro-Atlantic partnership as a marriage that is not just based on fear and necessity but is also founded on a rock of shared values and common political, economic, and security interests. According to this Atlanticist bias, the United States played a critical role in ensuring Europe's peace, freedom, and prosperity following the end of the Second World War. Even after the cold war, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the advance of European integration, the fundamental logic of American–European cooperation persists in this view.

In a more pessimistic view, the United States and Europe once shared common values and interests but have drifted apart in both categories. They no longer occupy the same planet, and are therefore destined to a future of reduced cooperation and intimacy and even the potential for tension and conflict.

Of course, such “schools of thought” do not rigidly contain the views of all observers who think, write, and lecture about transatlantic relations. A few commentators may fit comfortably into one school or another, but other observers capture elements of several different schools. Some may even move from school to school over time. However, the bottom line comes down to questions about whether or not it is in the interest of the United States and European nations to keep their cooperation alive and well and, if it is, what is required to do so.

This analysis argues that there is no “automatic” future for American–European relations, even though some structural factors may push developments in somewhat predictable directions. This analysis identifies the choices that appear to be in the best interests of the United States and the European democracies as they face their future together. It concludes by suggesting which directions the relationship seems likely to take in the next period of history.

By way of confession, I admit to being a committed Atlanticist. I believe that common values and interests still outweigh the differences between the United States and its European partners. I am convinced that leaders and governments can choose policies and attitudes that promote cooperation, or they can choose paths that promise conflict. To choose cooperation, they must first re-establish a greater degree of mutual trust and respect. Ideally, they should seek to renew a sense of community in Euro-Atlantic relations. This can come partly through pragmatic cooperation, such as is currently going on in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iran, and, to a degree, Iraq. But, in my view, it may require some major act of recommitment to the US–European relationship on both sides of the Atlantic. And it will have to include closer cooperation on major international challenges, including the future of the Middle East, the emergence of new major global players in Asia, and Russia’s uncertain evolution.

### **A Time of Troubles**

The essence of foreign-policy issues is often captured most effectively by political cartoonists. At the height of the transatlantic crisis over Iraq, one cartoonist showed two NATO team soccer players, one called “Europe,” the other “USA,” going at each other on the soccer pitch. The NATO coach,

watching the players fight, tells the referee: "They'd be a good team if they spent more time kicking the ball and less time kicking each other." Before the United States and Europe can develop effective strategies toward terrorism, Islam, Iraq, Iran, Middle East peace, proliferation, relations with Russia and China, and other challenges, they clearly must stop "kicking each other."

For some, it may be necessary to say something about why we should even be discussing this question. One of the reasons is that a lot has been said and written about a "structural gap" increasingly separating the United States from Europe. Such structural differences created the potential for US-European divisions even before 9/11 and the Iraq war dramatically brought such differences to the surface. The near-term stimulus for the recent crisis was provided by the failure of European states to build sufficient military capabilities to make significant contributions to post-cold-war security problems and the resulting loss of US confidence in the extent to which it could count on its European allies. The roots of the problem are real and run deep, but are also always subject to "rediscovery."

Neoconservative author Robert Kagan argued famously that Americans and Europeans were on two different planets, borrowing from the relationship literature, by writing that "Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus." Kagan argued that the success of the European integration process, which created a zone of peace and cooperation among countries that had warred for centuries, had also given birth to a "non-use of force ideology."<sup>1</sup>

Like most popular exaggerations, Kagan's analysis starts from a factual foundation. We have known for years that Americans and Europeans have somewhat different attitudes toward the use of force. In 1984, for example, this author asked:

To what extent do US global military capabilities permit the West European allies to concentrate on nonmilitary approaches? Does military strength generate an inclination to use force to further national objectives? Perhaps these questions frame the proposition too dramatically. But it nonetheless seems clear that differing world roles and military capabilities constitute another important source of divergent European and American approaches to East-West relations.<sup>2</sup>

Kagan extrapolated on that reality to argue that the United States and Europe were therefore destined to disagree more and more in the future. Kagan's observations have spawned a variety of European responses. In one reaction, Peter van Ham says that Kagan is "absolutely right" in judging that "Americans and Europeans no longer share a common 'strategic culture'." Van Ham has written: "for non-Americans, this is gradually becoming a world where the US acts as legislator, policeman, judge and executioner. America sets the rules by its own behavior, judges others without sticking to these rules itself. . . ." Ham's answer is that Europe needs to unite more strongly against American power.<sup>3</sup>

It is true that “structural differences” have led to different US and European attitudes on when and how to use military force. States tend to use the instruments of statecraft available to them. Moreover, what instruments they develop and fund is at least somewhat dependent on what their history has taught them. The history of the Second World War led many Europeans to conclude that military conflict is to be avoided at all cost. On the other hand, many Americans think the Second World War demonstrated that appeasing dictators only whets their appetite for conquest.

During the cold war, West European nations learned that putting aside old antagonisms allowed them to build a prosperous, stable community—today’s European Union. Meanwhile, deterring and defeating the Soviet Union in the cold war reinforced the American conviction that the demonstrated willingness to use force is necessary in dealing with potentially aggressive regimes.

All the extreme caricatures of US and European behavior have come to life early in the twenty-first century. The George W. Bush administration from the very beginning of its term applied shock and awe unilateralism to US–European relations. After 9/11, the United States virtually ignored initial allied and NATO offers of assistance. The Bush administration reportedly kept the “axis-of-evil” language in the January 2002 President’s State of Union Address partly because officials knew it would upset the Europeans.<sup>4</sup> US officials publicly disparaged NATO and allied militaries. The United States made it clear it was going to war against Iraq come hell or high water. Moreover, the Bush administration’s 2002 “New National Security Strategy” raised profound questions about international conventions on use of force, asserting the US right to use pre-emptive force to prevent an enemy from attacking the United States.

The response from Europe was also damaging to the Euro-Atlantic relationship. Germany declared it would not participate in an attack on Iraq, even if the United States and the United Kingdom managed to get a UN Security Council mandate. Early in 2003, Germany joined France and Belgium in questioning whether they would support Turkey if it were attacked in the context of the looming conflict with Iraq, raising fundamental uncertainties about the NATO security commitment. Europeans left themselves exposed to the American observation that Europe now follows the dictum: “Speak softly and carry a big carrot.”<sup>5</sup>

French President Chirac did his part, insulting new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe who had supported US policy in Iraq, advising them that they should know when to “shut up” after they had joined with some West European countries in support of US Iraq policy. The Iraq war created huge political divisions in NATO and the EU, and, according to a senior European diplomat, in every capitol and ministry in Europe.<sup>6</sup> Bush administration officials acted in ways intended to emphasize and deepen those divisions.

By 2007, in spite of such differences, the United States, Canada, and the European democracies still shared political systems built on the values of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. The belief in and practice of democracy remained an important part of the foundation for the Euro-Atlantic community.

In addition to shared political values, the United States and EU member states have market-based economic systems in which competition drives the market but is governed by democratically approved rules and regulations. European and American market economies are the essential core of the global economic system.<sup>7</sup> The European Union is the largest US partner in the trade of goods and services. In 2006 the members of the EU had over \$860 billion of direct investment in the United States; the United States had some \$700 billion invested in EU states.<sup>8</sup>

The EU and the United States together account for more than 40 percent of world trade and represent almost 60 percent of the industrialized world's gross domestic product. Moreover, the Western political/economic/security system continues to attract new participants. Former Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe and three former Soviet Republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) have worked hard to adopt "Western" political and economic systems. They wanted to align with the United States and to protect themselves against Russian influence, a motivation only strengthened by recent developments in Russian policies. They wanted to be EU and NATO members to ensure that they are part of Europe with strong links to the United States.

In spite of these difficult times, Europe remains for the United States the prime source of allies who are willing and able to deploy substantial military forces in zones of conflict far from their borders. Moreover, NATO, the main instrument for US-European military cooperation, has become an important instrument for international, not just European, peace and security. As Václav Havel put it, NATO has moved from being a key player in European security to becoming a "key pillar of international security."<sup>9</sup> In addition, the European Union and its member states can bring together a rich package of assets for crisis management and avoidance, including diplomatic mediation, peacekeeping forces, police forces, humanitarian assistance, and development aid.

In general, international problems are most easily and effectively handled when the United States and its European allies work together. The international system, including the United Nations, does not work very well unless the United States and its European allies are working together. Taken together, the political foundations of Euro-Atlantic relations, the economic realities of transatlantic ties, and the security aspects of the Atlantic alliance, all suggest that the US-European relationship remains vitally important to both the United States and Europe.

Before addressing policy recommendations that grow out of this analysis, we might benefit from taking a quick look at the two “partners,” and where they stand today, as a prelude to where they will most likely go tomorrow.

### What United States?

With the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself elevated from its position as one of two “superpowers” to its current status as the sole truly global power. At the opening of the twenty-first century, it led all other states in most measures of their ability to pursue international objectives.<sup>10</sup>

In the early 1990s, the question raised had been what the United States would do with its new role—a role that came without a set of directions for US leaders. The United States, ever since, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, has struggled to shape a new role consistent with evolving international power realities, traditional US values, and contemporary American interests.

US strategy immediately following the end of the cold war was designed to facilitate the transition from the tensions of a frozen cold-war international system to a new, more positive environment. It had a major impact on the evolution of the US–European relationship. US and allied leaders hoped that the new circumstances would be conducive for the evolution of former Warsaw Pact states and Soviet republics toward liberal democratic systems governed by the rule of law, respectful of human rights, and fostering market-based economies. US policies also sought to create the basis for concerted action against states whose behavior defied international law or human-rights standards, potentially threatening post-cold-war peace and stability.

Toward these ends, the United States facilitated the reunification of Germany, supported democratization and reform of former Warsaw Pact states and Soviet republics, opened NATO’s doors to new European democracies that demonstrated their commitment to the goals of the alliance, organized a UN-mandated military operation to repulse Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and helped bring peace and the possibility of democratic transformation to former Yugoslav republics.

This new global setting saw the United States waver, from tendencies to self-deterrence—choosing not to use force except in cases of direct threat to the United States—particularly following the failed US intervention in Somalia, back toward a greater willingness to use force on behalf of goals accepted by the international community (or at least by US allies) in Kosovo against Serbia.<sup>11</sup>

George W. Bush came to office pledging to limit US military involvement in nation-building and peace-support operations. John Hillen, a conservative

defense analyst, provided the slogan subsequently adopted by George W. Bush when he wrote that “superpowers don’t do windows.”<sup>12</sup> Campaigning for the presidency, Bush said he would not support US involvement in such operations, reserving US forces for responses to direct threats to US interests.

From the beginning, the Bush administration was skeptical about the extent to which the European allies could assist the United States in dealing with the “hard work” of international security. This skepticism was based on the limited ability and demonstrated reluctance of many European countries to project force beyond their borders. Such skepticism was reinforced by experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo. In particular, the conduct of Operation “Allied Force,” a NATO-mandated and conducted mission that sought to push Serbian forces out of Kosovo in 1999, convinced many observers who would become key Bush advisers that Europe had little other than political meddling to offer in future military operations.

At the outset of George W. Bush’s presidency, the United States had the support of most of the world for its response to the Al-Qaeda attacks. The United States had a strong base for its role in the world: a large and growing economy, shrinking budget deficits, diverse and capable military forces, alliances and partnerships being adapted to new security concerns, and large reserves of latent soft power to deploy around the world. Its alliance with European nations remained strong, even if how and where the alliance would be used was open to some question.

The 9/11 watershed, however, set the stage for the Bush administration to place heavy reliance on the use of the military, in nation-building as well as war-fighting roles, on behalf of US foreign- and security-policy goals. The first stage of this new approach—the attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the al-Qaeda forces they were sheltering—was generally supported by US allies and international opinion.

The second major move in the Bush administration’s post-9/11 policy was to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power. The decision’s one clear outcome, beyond removing Hussein from power, was a precipitous drop in US prestige and respect for US leadership around the world.

In 2007 the United States still had a solid foundation for its future global role, but the hard- and soft-power resources to support that role had been diminished by US choices over the past several years. In general, the United States was weakened politically, militarily, and economically by the decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In reaction to US unilateralism and perceived hegemonic behavior, American leadership was no longer supported nor desired by wide margins in public and elite opinion around the globe. US policies and actions toward prisoners in Iraq and detainees in the war on terror had seriously undermined the perception that the United States is a leading force on behalf of human rights. US protests

about the human rights behavior of other states were no longer taken seriously.

Other nations and their populations did not “trust” that American judgments and actions are in their best interest. The quality of US intelligence gathering and analysis was no longer held in high regard by the international community. US positions in international forums were looked on with suspicion and skepticism, requiring US representatives to overcome such responses in order to gain support for US policy preferences. US options for dealing with emerging security challenges, like those in Iran and North Korea, had been narrowed by the Iraq and Afghanistan drains on US military and financial resources. The immense sums spent on Iraq military operations and reconstruction assistance had taken resources away from domestic programs that are needed to preserve a strong base for America’s international role.

Actions during the second Bush administration suggest that administration officials, while not admitting the invasion of Iraq was a mistake, became more sensitive to the need to counter negative perceptions of the United States and repair damage to US alliances. Perhaps out of necessity as much as a result of a conversion to multilateral cooperation, the United States took a less unilateralist approach to the issues created by Iran’s apparent intent to become a nuclear-weapons state and North Korea’s October 2006 test explosion of a nuclear device. In these cases, US policy won support from broader segments of international opinion and other governments

Even though hard feelings remain on both sides of the Atlantic about the Iraq experience, the Bush administration became more aware of the costs of unilateralism and the importance of trying to lead a unified transatlantic alliance as a source of US power and influence. The bottom line of this relationship is that both the United States and the European states seem to recognize that neither the United States nor Europe can afford to go it alone internationally, even if future differences might tempt both to do so again down the road.

And so, the United States with which European leaders and states will have to deal in the foreseeable future will remain a de facto hegemon with the capacity to do much good or much harm in terms of European interests and international stability. It seems unlikely that this potential elephant in the china shop will be as strongly influenced by the neo-conservative, neo-Wilsonian tendencies that motivated the first George W. Bush administration. It seems equally unlikely that, under the leadership of a Democratic president, the United States would pull back from international involvement. There is no leading candidate for the presidency who in any dimension resembles an “isolationist.” However, the Iraq war disaster will infuse either a Democratic- or a Republican-led administration with a large dose of caution. Both would be inclined to remain committed to some sort of successful outcome in



Afghanistan, and to finding a “least bad” way out of Iraq. Both would want to see a very substantial European role—political, economic, and military—in fighting international terrorism and working to promote international stability.

## What Europe?

Europe, at least as seen from the Western shores of the Atlantic, presents a complicated picture. This is not exactly an entirely new phenomenon. In 1973 the US intelligence community produced a memorandum of estimates on the process of European integration.<sup>13</sup> In April of that year, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger had given a speech entitled “The Year of Europe,” whose purpose many Europeans questioned. As J. Robert Schaetzel later wrote: “The principal European reaction to the speech has been confusion . . .” Schaetzel, a well-respected former US ambassador to the European Community, noted that the talk raised a number of issues, including “the linkage among the questions to be dealt with, the accusation of Europe as a regional bloc, the differences in perspective between Europe and the United States, the role of Japan, the ability of the European countries to work out a common approach, and, most importantly, whether the United States really wants such a common approach.”<sup>14</sup>

The questions Kissinger raised undoubtedly gave rise to the intelligence community’s decision to prepare an estimate on the development of a “common” European approach. Just as many of the issues raised by Schaetzel in 1973 remained open in 2007, the overall conclusion in the estimate remains reasonably accurate. The draft, later approved in the interagency review process, noted that the United States should think in terms of a “uniting Europe,” making the point that what was underway was a long historical process, with no clear outcome foreordained.

The estimate also observed that, for a long time into the future, “Europe” would be increasingly solid at its core while remaining “fuzzy” around the edges. The point was that, as integration advanced, and as more common policies were decided, a “uniting Europe” would nonetheless present a mixed picture to the outside world, a blend of areas in which the central institutions had been given authority over key decisions and implementation of community policies, and areas in which national identities, interests, and prerogatives were protected.

Even though the European Union of 2007 was far advanced from the European Community of 1973, the even-more solidified core of the process remains surrounded by fuzzy edges. The European Union is much more of an international actor than it was in 1973, although it is still misleading to speak of “Europe” as if it consisted of like-minded, similarly thinking and acting,

states and citizens. Europe's "identity" also remains clouded by questions about future expansion, particularly whether or not Turkey should be brought into the European fold or left with tenuous European moorings.

By some accounts, the EU is second only to the United States in measures of power.<sup>15</sup> The EU has impressive resources that it can deploy to affect international affairs: well-trained and capable diplomats, development assistance expertise and resources, military units prepared to take on relatively modest missions at short notice, and a senior official who acts like the EU's foreign minister, even if the position is not endowed with significant independent powers of initiative. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Germany's Minister for Foreign Affairs, has called for a recommitment of EU members to the "value of solidarity," referring back to French foreign minister Robert Schuman's declaration in 1950 that "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single, general plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a *de facto* solidarity."<sup>16</sup> The process of construction to which Schuman referred, remained underway in 2007 but was still far from complete, still poised between various visions of what kind of Europe it should become.

The unilateralist character of US foreign and defense policy under Bush led some Europeans to favor using the process of integration in the European Union to "balance" US power in the international system. This multipolar temptation, like the US unilateral temptation, threatens transatlantic cooperation and therefore international stability. François Heisbourg, director of the *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique* think tank, has argued persuasively that his government should avoid the divisive rhetoric of multipolarity and pursue a multilateral agenda of cooperation with the United States and others.<sup>17</sup> The real world has reinforced such arguments in the policy debate. The failure of the EU Constitution to win approval in France and the Netherlands undermined the argument that Europe could effectively balance US power, and strengthened the case for building Europe in parallel with maintenance of a cooperative transatlantic relationship—a position favored by several EU members led by the UK and many of Europe's new democracies.

A "Reform Treaty" negotiated in Berlin in June 2007—a more modest version of the EU constitution—if approved, would confirm the continuity of the process of integration. But it would also confirm the judgment that the emergence of anything like a United States of Europe remains for future generations to manage. As the respected German commentator Theo Sommer has observed, "the United States of Europe is a long way off. But the United Europe of States is a realistic short-term goal."<sup>18</sup> It therefore is still misleading to view Europe simply as a unitary actor on the international scene. The "Europe" available to partner the United States will, in the foreseeable future, remain a complex blend of integrated community and

autonomous nation states. Europe cannot be, and may not want to be, an “equal” partner with the United States, but it can be an effective partner all the same.

## The Future of Euro-Atlantic Relations

The key countries in the Euro-Atlantic region, in a space of just a few years, will all have changed leaders. While unsettling in some respects, this does create new opportunities for the relationship. Those who led through the crisis years are all scarred by the experience, and to some extent discredited, each in their own way. George Bush has no credibility left in Europe, and diminishing credibility in the United States. His retirement at the beginning of 2009 will be the most important opening for a new start in the transatlantic relationship. This opportunity will be facilitated by the departure of French President Jacques Chirac, who became so strongly committed to opposing the United States that Paris found it difficult to cooperate with Washington even when it was in French interests to do so. The replacement of Gerhard Schröder in Berlin with Angela Merkel has put Germany back in a more traditional mixture of pro-European and pro-Atlanticist postures. Tony Blair’s step down from leadership in the United Kingdom brings to an end a disappointing tour of duty for a capable leader who was captured by his support for George Bush on Iraq and dragged down with it.

The new leadership that is already in place or expected in the near future does not guarantee a more healthy transatlantic relationship, but it does create opportunities that did not exist with the old guard. If one assumes that the United States and Europe have no choice but to make the most of their relationship, what policy choices can be recommended to this new batch of Euro-Atlantic leaders?

The most immediate challenge to allies on both sides of the Atlantic is to rebuild a constructive dialogue to replace the destructive interactions that have characterized handling of the Iraq issue. This will require the United States to “speak more softly.” Everyone knows that the United States already carries the “biggest stick.” Future US administrations will be required to be more constructive and creative in the use of international institutions and multilateral cooperation.

For their part, Europeans will have to bring more resources and capabilities to the transatlantic security table. The US–European relationship needs a better balance in terms of both authority and capability. However, it is not up to the United States to “give” Europe more authority. European nations and the European Union will wield greater influence in Washington and internationally if they use their will and ability to contribute to solutions of international security problems.

The United States needs to learn how to use its power in ways that serve its interests, enhance its international standing, and promote allied and international sharing of security burdens. In other words, the United States must learn how to be a hegemon without acting like one. This advice was tendered in a 1997 report to Congress, well before George Bush demonstrated how costly acting like a hegemon can be for US interests. The report observed: "the United States faces the challenge of using its power in ways that reflect US interests and draw on the American public's desire to cooperate with other countries while not inspiring opposition as a result of appearing too dominating."<sup>19</sup> More recently, Josef Joffe has written: "To continue on its path, to ensure in the twenty-first century if not beyond, this hegemon must surely soften the hardest edge of its power, all with the world's assent."<sup>20</sup>

In addition, the United States must accept that, while it can "win" most modern conflicts on its own, it needs to cooperate with allies and international institutions to win peace. This must be built into preconflict policy planning, not adopted as an afterthought.

The United States should accept that it needs NATO. Ad hoc coalitions undoubtedly will be necessary from time to time, but day-to-day political and military cooperation in NATO facilitates broadly based multilateral responses to crises as well as providing the essential foundation for coalition of the willing military operations.

The US government must give higher priority to coalition operations in US defense planning and encourage the growth of "coalition culture" in the US defense and foreign-policy community. The US Secretary of Defense should order that all new strategies, tactics, and systems be assessed for how they will affect the USA's ability to operate with allies.

The United States should not pursue strategies designed to divide Europeans. Europeans do this quite nicely on their own. The United States needs to understand such divisions and take them into account in its policies, but not seek to make them worse.

For their part, European officials should avoid talk of multipolarity and "balancing" US power as the motivation for deeper European integration. "Multipolaritis" is the European counterpart to American unilateralism. Both are unhelpful, divisive, destructive tendencies.

European governments must lead on defense requirements and resources and seek to influence parliamentary and public opinion. They must seek increased support for defense and for NATO and EU missions. Governments must ensure the success of EUFOR in Bosnia and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with long-term commitments and sufficient resources.

The EU must work closely with NATO to ensure that progress toward stability and development go hand in hand in Afghanistan. It is increasingly

clear that the ability of the international community to establish stability in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to Pakistan's uncertain future evolution. This is a question that would benefit from closer US–European collaboration and contingency planning.

More generally, European governments must help the United States deal with the future of Iraq, Iran, and the Middle East region, and in the fight against international terrorism. European nations, for the most part, are not to blame for the contemporary mess in that part of the world, but their interests will be critically affected by the outcomes.

In the bigger picture, the United States and Europe must try to develop common, or at least compatible, strategic perspectives on how to deal with China and India, two emerging global players, and Russia, a former superpower that, with its energy resources and residual strategic nuclear forces, is an important wildcard in the future of European and global stability.

The attitudes and capabilities the United States and Europe bring to the transatlantic table in the years immediately ahead will determine whether the Euro-Atlantic partnership will become part of the answer to problems of global stability. If the United States and the European NATO and EU members successfully manage the stabilization effort in Afghanistan, both NATO and the EU will establish their credentials as serious and constructive frameworks for multilateral security cooperation for the international community. Of course, failure could have disastrous consequences for US and European interests as well as for international stability more generally.

Mastering twenty-first-century security challenges will obviously require the effective use of military power to deal with tyrants like Saddam Hussein and terrorists like Osama bin Laden. But most of the struggle against terrorism and instability will require deployment of soft power (a nation's ability to influence events based on cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions, about which Joe Nye has written so eloquently<sup>21</sup>) as effectively as the United States can deploy its hard-power assets. Soft power can help legitimize hard power. Hard power is essential to win wars, and often to give credibility to strategic choices, but soft power is vital to win and preserve the peace.

Given the current disparities between US and European military capabilities, some have suggested dividing responsibilities in the alliance. In fact, however, any formal division of responsibilities in the alliance (hard-power tasks for the United States, soft-power jobs for the Europeans) would be disastrous for US–European relations. It does make sense for individual nations, or groups of nations, to take on specific tasks within the overall framework of transatlantic cooperation. In fact, the special capacities that European allies have for managing stabilization and reconstruction activities could be usefully combined with the potent US ability for war fighting to develop a full spectrum of preconflict, conflict, and postconflict coalition activities. But a

formal transatlantic division of responsibilities would create even bigger gaps between the United States and Europe concerning how best to respond to international security challenges. Such an approach would only encourage US tendencies toward the unilateral use of military force as well as European tendencies to believe that all problems can be solved without military force backing up diplomacy.

In a world of divided Euro-Atlantic responsibilities, the response to every future security challenge would have to overcome growing divergences in appreciation of the problem before cooperation could be arranged. The bottom line is that there should be a practical division of tasks among the transatlantic partners, but not a formal division of labor across the Atlantic. Ideally, both American and European forces should be engaged in the high-intensity and lower-intensity ends of future conflicts, sharing responsibility for the strategies required for the entire continuum.

To help get back on a constructive track, perhaps the United States and the NATO and EU nations should authorize an independent group of respected experts and former officials to study how the Euro-Atlantic nations could handle future security challenges more successfully than they handled Iraq. This device has been used effectively in NATO's history as a way of adapting cooperation to new security challenges—the 1967 Harmel Study being the best case in point. The essence would not be to place blame on one side or the other of the Atlantic, but rather to develop new guidelines concerning when force needs to be used to defend common interests; how the use of force should be mandated, organized, and deployed; the role of the United Nations in this process and the relationship between the UN, NATO, and the European Union; and questions surrounding the preventive or pre-emptive use of force in dealing with contemporary security challenges.

### **The Case for an Atlantic Community Initiative**

For several years, a few voices in the wilderness have agued in favor of broadening the base for transatlantic cooperation. The chorus is growing stronger. At the 2006 Munich security (formerly “Wehrkunde”) conference, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in his keynote address concluded: “We must build a true strategic partnership between NATO and the EU.”<sup>22</sup> The US Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, has similarly set the goal of NATO and the EU working together at the heart of a “global community of democracies.”<sup>23</sup>

Early in 2006 US analyst Francis Fukuyama argued that the neoconservative moment had past, having failed to create a sustainable basis for US foreign and security policy. Fukuyama accepted the neoconservative critique of the United Nations, but argued that “the United States needs to come up with

something better than 'coalitions of the willing' to legitimate its dealings with other countries." According to Fukuyama, "creating new organizations that will better balance the dual requirements of legitimacy and effectiveness will be the primary task for the coming generation."<sup>24</sup>

More recently, a study prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggested that "the formal establishment of a council, including all EU and NATO members, as well as the EU itself . . . would create the appropriate forum for the discussion of the critical challenges to the 21st century Euro-Atlantic community."<sup>25</sup>

NATO remains politically important as the commitment the allies have made to cooperate in dealing with security challenges together and functionally as an instrument to facilitate that cooperation. There is nothing else in the world comparable to NATO's Integrated Command Structure that helps perpetuate the "habits of cooperation" that are essential to the operations of military coalitions, whether under a NATO flag, EU banner, or in an ad hoc formation led by a NATO member state.

However necessary NATO remains for contemporary security requirements, it is by no means sufficient for the security needs of the United States and Europe. Following the Iraq crisis in US-European relations, the United States and Europe need a major initiative to help restore mutual confidence in transatlantic cooperation. Functionally, the Euro-Atlantic nations need a broader cooperative framework for security, one that includes all NATO and EU members and that concentrates on all areas of non-military cooperation—areas that are currently beyond NATO's mandate and those of other transatlantic bodies.

The new leaders of the alliance in the United States and Europe should make it a high priority to create such a framework. They could do so by directing the preparation of a New Atlantic Community Treaty to be signed by all NATO and EU members.<sup>26</sup> The new treaty then should be opened for signature by all democratic states that can subscribe to and defend treaty values and goals. For example, democratic states that currently contribute to the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan and other efforts intended to promote international stability, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, could be invited to join.

The treaty would create an Atlantic Community Treaty Organization for non-military security cooperation that would complement, not compete with or replace, NATO and the EU. Such a structure would be ideally suited for dealing with the complex issues raised by globalization and the post-September 11 terrorist and security challenges. Regular consultations would take place among all members of NATO and the EU, following patterns already established in both organizations.

Operation of a new Atlantic community could include the organization of twice-yearly summit meetings among all members of NATO and the European

Union as well as observers from all countries recognized as candidates for membership in those two bodies. The meetings could be scheduled in conjunction with the regular NATO and EU summits and would supplant the current US–EU summit meetings. A permanent council and ad hoc working groups would support the summit framework by discussing issues as they develop between summit sessions. To give the community a representative dimension, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly could be transformed into the Atlantic Community Assembly, including representatives from all member states in the community, with the mandate to study and debate the entire range of issues in the transatlantic relationship. To help reduce institutional overlap and heavy meeting schedules for transatlantic officials, all items currently on the US–EU agenda could be transferred to the new forum, covering virtually all aspects of transatlantic relations and including all countries with interests in the relationship, unlike the more narrow US–EU consultations. When specific US–EU issues arise, they could be handled in bilateral US–EU talks. Atlantic community institutions could be established in or near Brussels, Belgium, to facilitate coordination with NATO and EU institutions.

It might be beneficial to address some other consolidation issues at the same time. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in NATO has never established itself as a uniquely useful forum for dialogue and cooperation. At the same time, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could be strengthened as the body that would bring together the members of the new Atlantic community and all the other states in Europe that do not qualify for or do not seek Atlantic community membership, including, most importantly, Russia and Ukraine. Shifting all relevant EAPC functions to the OSCE framework would be a useful consolidation of European structures. The main responsibility of the OSCE would be to provide the “collective-security” function for relations among states in Europe, helping build peace and cooperation across the continent through confidence-building and arms-control measures, early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and postconflict rehabilitation activities.

Approaching problems and issues from the broad perspective offered by an Atlantic community framework would open up possibilities for discussions of issues that are handled unofficially among allied representatives at NATO but are not within NATO’s formal mandate. In an Atlantic community forum, there would be a better opportunity for a dynamic problem-solving synergy to develop when all aspects of issues can be put on the table.

The war against terrorism is a good example. If there had been an Atlantic Community Council on September 11, it could immediately have established working groups to address all aspects of the campaign against sources of international terror. The North Atlantic Council would not have been required to wait for the Atlantic Community Council to act and could have invoked Article 5 on September 12, just as it did. However, in the meantime,



discussions in the Atlantic Community Council could have been coordinating the response of police authorities in community countries, discussing actions to cut off sources of financial support to terrorists, developing public diplomacy themes to accompany military and diplomatic action, and beginning consideration of long-term strategies designed to undermine support for terrorist activities.

A new Atlantic community would embrace, not replace, NATO in the overall framework of transatlantic relations. Because it would be a consultative forum only, it would not threaten the "autonomy" of the European Union or undermine NATO's Article 5 collective defense commitment. In fact, it could help bridge the current artificial gap between NATO discussions of security policy and US-EU consultations on economic issues, which have important overlapping dimensions.

Because an Atlantic community would encourage members to address issues that NATO does not tackle, the new structure would provide added value beyond that offered by the traditional alliance. It might also provide some additional options for shaping coalitions willing to deal with new security challenges in cases where using the NATO framework might not be acceptable to all allies and where action could be blocked by a single dissenting member.

Such an initiative would admittedly face some tough questions. Diplomats are reluctant to open the transatlantic relationship for review and revision, fearing with some justification that the outcome might be worse than the status quo. Some critics might ask what another "talk shop" among the Western democracies would accomplish. Would consultations in the Atlantic community framework eventually take precedence over those in NATO's North Atlantic Council? Would such a forum have avoided Euro-Atlantic differences over Bosnia and Kosovo or Iraq? Would discussions in such a forum contribute to the settlement of transatlantic economic issues? Would US participation in such a setting simply add to the expense of US international involvement at a time when some want to reduce the scope and cost of the US role in the world? Some might question whether the proposal is an attempt to substitute process (more consultations) for a diminishing substance (common interests) in the relationship. Others might charge that such a community would threaten the "autonomy" of the European Union, others that the United States would be sacrificing sovereignty.

The answer to all these questions is that no one outcome is guaranteed, and all such questions will be answered by the choices made by participating governments. Some in Europe and in the United States might prefer to move away from alliance and toward something more like a "handshake relationship" in which cooperation continues but in a more ad hoc, less institutionalized setting. This formula might yield greater freedom of maneuver for the United

States and a uniting Europe but would probably also produce more tensions and frictions, given the lack of a solemn commitment to cooperation as a frame of reference.

To advance a framework for non-military security cooperation like the one discussed above, Europe would have to show a greater willingness to blend its impressive soft-power capabilities with hard power to provide coherent answers to tomorrow's challenges. And the United States would have to build a better balance between soft- and hard-power instruments in its foreign- and security-policy tool kit. In the long run, the effective marriage of US and European soft- and hard-power capabilities would help prevent some problems from becoming military challenges, and enhance the ability of the world community to deal with postconflict scenarios in ways that promote stability.

These questions and issues should all be considered in a debate on the need for a new Atlantic community. The point, however, is that such a debate is required. No consultative arrangement will guarantee that the United States and Europe will be able to solve all problems between them. But without a renewed commitment to community and without the necessary institutional settings for dialogue and cooperation, the foundations of the transatlantic relationship could be at risk.

### What Future?

Based on the perspectives outlined in this analysis, what can be said about the future? To this observer, it seems most likely that, for the next period of history:

- The United States will remain the most important global power. Other countries and groupings of countries will nonetheless gain in relative power and influence, including the European Union. This emerging reality will progressively be reflected in the US approach to its international role.
- The European Union will neither be transformed into a United States of Europe nor fall apart at the seams. It will continue to evolve toward a “United Europe of States,” but will find it difficult to define its borders, including most notably the question of how to link Turkey to the integration process.
- The United States will continue to struggle with unilateralist temptations, and some Europeans will be tempted to counter such American instincts with multipolar manipulations. Learning from the lessons of the recent years, however, both will resist extreme positions in dealing with each

other. Neither the United States nor the European nations will be able to identify more effective, compatible, or reliable partners among other global players.

- Global developments will increasingly demonstrate the interdependence of the problems affecting US and European interests. Additional global economic, political, and strategic players will increase pressure on the United States and Europe to develop compatible strategic perspectives.
- The requirement for enhanced US–European cooperation will highlight the deficiencies of existing transatlantic institutions. NATO will continue as the institution that manages US–European military cooperation, and as a symbol of US–European shared strategic interests. However, policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic will search for approaches that go beyond simply muddling through.
- Even if “muddling through” is the principle *modus vivendi* for the next period of history, the transatlantic relationship will occupy a special and critically important place in the foreign and security policies of the United States and the European democracies.
- The United States will continue to need its European friends and allies to help deal with a wide range of global issues and will benefit both from the material support that they can supply as well as the political legitimacy that the United States needs.
- The international community, led by the United States and the European countries, will probably have to sustain a presence in Afghanistan for many years to come. Success or failure there will continue to be seen as a test of US–European cooperation as well as of the effectiveness of international institutions, including the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union, in dealing with international security challenges.
- The European states, individually and collectively, will find their interests best served by continued cooperation with the United States, in part because they will continue to share important core values and interests with the United States and in part because cooperation will enhance the international influence of European countries and provide channels through which they can exert influence on a country whose actions so directly affect European interests.

At the end of the day, the quality of the transatlantic relationship will depend to a great degree on the choices made by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. Recent years have demonstrated how bad choices can drive the relationship into crisis. Lessons should be learned from this period and applied constructively in the coming period of history. This is the task ahead for the nations of the Euro-Atlantic community.

### Notes

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2. Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985).
3. See Stanley R. Sloan and Peter van Ham, *What Future for NATO?* (Centre for European Reform, October 2002).
4. According to an unnamed source who was involved in the interagency review of the draft.
5. This is not the combination the 26th President of the United States, Theodore (“Teddy”) Roosevelt, recommended when he adopted the adage “Speak softly and carry a big stick. You will go far” as the best way to deal with other nations.
6. The diplomat in question frequently makes this observation in lectures at the NATO Defense College.
7. See Joseph P. Quinlin, “Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy” (Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, DC, Mar. 2003).
8. See David Calleo’s discussion of the US–European economic relationship, Chapter 10, this volume.
9. Václav Havel, “Prague Predictions,” *NATO Review* (Apr. 2002).
10. An analysis by researchers from the RAND Corporation observes that “The United States is at the top of the power structure . . . While the United States currently holds nearly a fifth of total global power, it is closely followed by the European Union, considered as a unified actor, and China, which each hold about 14 percent. India, moreover, holds about 9 percent, while Brazil, South Korea and Russia each hold about 2 percent” (Gregory Treverton and Seth G. Jones, “Measuring Power: How to Predict Future Balances,” *Harvard International Review*, 27/2 (Summer 2005)).
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12. John Hillen, “Superpowers Don’t Do Windows,” *Orbis*, 41/2 (Spring 1997).
13. The account of this matter is based on the author’s recollection of events as seen from his position as drafter of the estimate.

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23. Ambassador Victoria Nuland, Remarks by the US Permanent Representative to NATO at the German Marshall Fund, Sept. 22, 2005.
24. Francis Fukuyama, "After Neoconservatism," *New York Times*, Feb. 19, 2006, NYTimes.com.
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# 14

## The Rise of the European Union and its Impact on the US–EU Partnership: A View from Europe

*Gustav Schmidt*

### Introduction

The redefinition of the American–European relationship is an ongoing process. Europe is no longer the central focus of tensions in world affairs that it was in the eras of the two world wars and during the cold war. America has lost its aura as a “force for good,” even though it is still expected to come to the rescue if situations in EU-Europe’s ‘backyard’ necessitate showing a strong hand. EU-Europe has become a *pole*, and its functional activities in outside regions has given it many of the trappings of “Empire.”<sup>1</sup> It has to figure out its relations with the other principal powers, especially Russia and the United States, and how to be master in its own enlarged realm, which it denotes as a zone of peace, freedom, and justice. Parallel to this ascendancy of EU-Europe as a global power, which recognizes Africa and Central Asia as spheres of influence, new pools of wealth have emerged, especially China, and this has triggered shifts in the distribution of economic and financial might, with concomitant demands for membership in the multilateral clubs (G7 and G8) and a greater importance for international organizations. So EU-Europe has not only to define its position in relation to the old and new principal powers, but must also address the problem posed by the many violent non-governmental actors<sup>2</sup> that threaten Western democracies’ notion of the state as a guarantor of security and as the institution that renders the development of civil society possible. Is EU-Europe better equipped than the USA to cope with these new types of security threats and should it therefore search for actors that are supportive of its leadership, or is it simply hubris that Europeans pretend to know it all and yet are unable to do it better? The

question is whether the EU really should aspire to replace the USA as the “normative superpower,”<sup>3</sup> or whether it should decide to work together with the USA to make the best use of the still dominant position of the Western powers to implement fundamental Western norms and rules of conduct in the codes of world order.

The first section of this chapter gives an overview of the fundamental changes that have occurred in Europe’s position since the era of global contest between the two superpowers (1947–90) and the decade of America’s “unipolar moment.” The second section considers the factors that are conducive to continuity or that could lead to the parting of the ways between EU-Europe and America. The final section appraises the two sides of the Atlantic and their relationship in the world setting, where the coincidence of major objectives of the USA and the EU is challenged both from within their constituencies and from those states and/or usurping (violent) actors who want to take ever more advantage of the setbacks and over-commitment of the USA and the non-assertiveness of the EU.

## **Fundamental Changes in the American–European Relationship**

The most conspicuous change in the US–EU relationship has been the reversal of roles: EU-Europe has made a virtue of its limited capabilities as a predominantly civilian power, advocates effective multilateralism, and is seeking to replace the USA as a force for good. In the case of the International Criminal Court, French president Jacques Chirac and other European leaders wanted to demonstrate that powers other than the USA are willing and capable of setting global norms and that the USA could no longer impose its principles, norms, and rules on the rest of the world. In the past, it was America’s part to establish and practice multilateralism, and to initiate and support international organizations with a view, first, to channelling preferences and interests of individual states for the common benefit, and, secondly, to committing the USA to comply with the agreed norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of such institutions.<sup>4</sup> John Ruggie put these anchor-points for the international legitimacy of America setting universal norms in a nutshell:

the breadth and diversity of multilateral arrangements across a broad array of issue-areas increased substantially after 1945. Quite naturally, therefore, one associates this change with the postwar posture of the US... For American postwar planners, multilateralism served as foundational architectural principle on the basis of which to reconstruct the postwar world... Even for the relatively more liberal United States, the international edifice of the open door had to accommodate the domestic interventionism of the New Deal... the move toward some form of collective security organization... had to (strip away) the Wilsonian aspiration that collective security somehow be substituted

for balance-of-power politics... Instead, they sought to make the two compatible, so that the collective security mechanism would have a basis in the balance-of-power but also mute the more deleterious effects of balance-of-power politics.<sup>5</sup>

The key element of *American* hegemony is the “permissive domestic political environment in the leading power”: the US governments ensured that the principles of a multilateral world order would conform to America’s “sense of self as nation,” which was seen to be the result of a successful experiment in multiethnic integration.<sup>6</sup>

It was the Bush administration that played havoc with the basic postures on which US primacy and “protective hegemony” had been predicated, thus giving the EU the chance to slip into the former US position by advocating an “effective multilateralism” as practiced within the European community.

The key notions of the EU’s model resemble the idioms of America’s post-Second World War benevolent hegemony. These are: (1) promoting a convincing model of peaceful integration at home, which could and should be exported; and (2) supporting regional cooperation in other parts of the world.<sup>7</sup> “Now we must extend this success to Europe’s neighbours as well as other regions of the world... the success of European integration... made the European Union an exemplar of global governance... Promotion of regional cooperation... is therefore a key task for the European Union...”<sup>8</sup> This demonstrates the aspiration to parity with the USA and a similar sense of mission. The missing element, which was and is the key to the American model, is that the EU lacks the means to offer security guarantees to its contracting partners and thus cannot yet replace the USA as a “protective empire.”

The EU is still struggling with the legacies of the cold war. The main feature is the complementary, albeit asymmetric, coexistence of the Atlantic security partnership and the West European integration process. To a large extent, NATO, representing the indispensable American and British security guarantee, absolved the continental West European nation states from the responsibility of meeting the threats from the Soviet-dominated Eastern bloc directly by constituting a full political union. In that sense, NATO came to the rescue of the European nation state and diluted the (reluctant) willingness to establish a genuine supranational European order. After the—delayed—integration of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into NATO, European security and defense were disentangled from the evolution of the Common Market. Membership in NATO was the forum where the Bonn Republic’s claim for a “voice” on the many divisive issues had to be satisfied. The members of the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Community (EC) accepted that France—with German backing—could mastermind the European institution, whilst America’s role as a hegemonic “European” power was to subdue the fear that (West) Germany might regain a predominant



position. The Adenauer governments were tempted to enlarge the areas of competence of the EEC/EC and Western European Union (WEU) as a backdrop against the vicissitudes of American politics, but in general they sustained the posture that “Securing Europe” did not require a security and defense dimension of the (then) Six, but rather a security strategy supplement of European integration. On the other hand, the continuing economic integration was considered enough to provide the cohesion that was required to compensate for the declining coherence of NATO, resulting from the inevitable tensions within the alliance.<sup>9</sup>

The EU has nevertheless become a pole in the international system. For this, two criteria are relevant: (1) The EU sustains order in its region. (2) The combination of hard and soft skills lets the EU display a modern version of world-power status: the purchasing power of its internal market; the EU as a major source of finance for the rest of the world; the association of large areas of the globe to the EC via a “pyramid of privileges;”<sup>10</sup> the domain of justice and good governance domestically and internationally, and finally the ability to dispatch combined military and civilian intervention forces when necessary.<sup>11</sup> Being a pole, Europe is called upon and prepared to shoulder responsibilities in other regions, and also volunteers to become an agent for UN peace-support operations.

The EU has finally become the looked-for third power. This inevitably affects Europe’s relationships with the “giants” to the West (the USA) and to the East (the Soviet Union/Russia), whose global contest had circumscribed the freedom of action of the Europeans in the cold-war era, and may, if their pursuit of establishing zones of interests turns into antagonism, put the EU’s “third-way” strategy of building interactive environments through the diffusion of norms and economic links to the test. Notwithstanding the fact that the EU, the USA, and Russia all dismiss resort to force as an option in their own mutual relationships, the Europeans do admit that the EU cannot play only an economic role, but must be ready for a military role in world affairs.<sup>12</sup>

The points to be made are as follows:

(1) With reference to the USA, the question is whether the Europeans, being members of both NATO and the EU/ESDP, think it is worth having NATO—and therefore see UN-mandated missions in Afghanistan and/or Kosovo through, retrieve the NATO–Russian partnership, and cope with the “new” security threats; or whether they prefer direct EU–US relationships in all policy arenas (from trade and investment over “Euro:Dollar” toward security and peace-building missions) and therefore do not push EU autonomous action too fast and/or too far. The US response to the latter option is predictable: “if European attitudes remain as they are, the US government, no matter who is running it, will eventually reach . . . the conclusion: if the Europeans

want to go their own way politically, they have every right to do so, but if they do, they should not expect the United States to guarantee their security.”<sup>13</sup>

(2) As regards Russia, in the past Russia subjected its “European policy” to an America-first strategy. This predisposition meant the USA could threaten that, “if ever Europe decided to play an independent role, issues between the US and the USSR would be greatly reduced;”<sup>14</sup> this sufficed to keep the FRG firmly attached to the US–NATO framework. In 2007 the Kremlin pulled the “old” member states of the EU in the direction of traditional national interest and power politics, whereas the USA exploited its reputation of protecting states to push the new member states to request cohesion and solidarity from NATO and the EU in the face of Moscow’s blackmail.

The one thing the EU knows for sure is that it does not want the contest between a resurgent Russia resolved to retrieve its ring of dependent states and an America using its “unipolar moment” to make friends with the newly independent states along Russia’s beltway to turn into another East–West conflict. Concentrating on institutional progress, the EU has made little progress on common foreign-policy stances. Short of a firm position, it has concentrated on getting both the USA and Russia to act responsibly while ensuring that priorities that are binding for all EU member states are defined early enough to maintain room for maneuver.<sup>15</sup>

The problem here is that the EU would have to choose whether to form a joint position first with the USA or with Russia,<sup>16</sup> even though the Europeans are having to work to de-escalate the mistrust between the USA and Russia. There is no reason to view or to treat Russia as an antagonist, and conflicting interests should not be made into contradictory postures. The European capitals, conscious of the *droit de regard* to the “big neighbour in the East,” stress how important it is “[to keep] Russia and its enormous potential close by the [EU’s] side, and [to promote] close Russian ties with Europe.”<sup>17</sup> Some analysts are inclined to favor enhancing “Moscow’s European future” in very concrete ways: “The European Union faces the important task of explaining to Washington why it makes sense for Europe to pursue a constructive Russia policy based on mutual interests.”<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, Moscow’s fierce determination to impose its terms on neighboring countries and its strong-armed tactics concerning agreements about arms control, production sharing, and energy supply demonstrate a mindset of “we win, you lose.” Benefiting from economic godsend—such as petrodollars and soaring prices for its energy and metal resources—the ruling politicians believe that Russia can afford to change “the rules of the game in European energy politics” unilaterally<sup>19</sup> and are disregarding friendly appeals from European partners.<sup>20</sup> An example is the Kosovo issue, in which the Kremlin has led the EU into situations where the “good” options have been lost or are melting away. It is difficult to detect

signs of a serious interest in reciprocal engagement, which would be the EU's key criterion for constructive partnership.

At present the EU borders on a re-ascending Russian empire and is distancing itself from America's protective hegemony. So the EU has created for itself a situation where constant balancing is required. It is mitigating the struggle between its own and Russia's conflicting paradigms, which are most intense in their overlapping peripheries, by an awareness that an autonomous ESDP, meaning some distancing from US attitudes, would require the development of ties that bind Russia. Since Russia does not make the EU's mission in its enlarged backyard easy, the EU realizes that its priority must be to foster the partnership with America, in order to be able to solve problems in turbulent regions.<sup>21</sup> In the case of Kosovo ("the biggest policy challenge facing the EU" (Solana)), Moscow (and Belgrade) hint at a partition of the area between Albanians and Serbs, a solution that the EU's representative in the troika with Russia and the USA, Wolfgang Ischinger, considers the most dangerous outcome. In the case of Iran, France and Britain are poised to confront Tehran with more united resolve on sanctions, whilst the USA has reciprocated by announcing concessions to Iran (that have been long awaited by its allies) if Tehran follows North Korea's suit.

Still, both the United States and Russia can, and do, at timings of their own choice, reveal the differences within the EU, thus picking privileged partners who in turn become supportive actors of either America's or Russia's case. Likewise, in a new era of violence and a quest for energy security, both the USA and Russia (not to speak of China) seem to be better equipped—mentally as well as physically—to push their claims. On the other hand, the EU's capabilities better fit a conjuncture in which the distribution of "peace dividends"—such as foreign aid, diffusion of norms, and environmental protection—meets with universal approval. The implication for the EU's role in world affairs is that it should push an agenda where it can be an effective player.

With regard to the United States, the EU's rise as an international actor has been marked by two processes of disengagement from conventional perceptions. One process relates to the reversal of the long-standing secret that Europe wanted the USA to lead as long as the USA moved in the directions the Europeans wanted it to go in anyway (Elizabeth Pond). In blunt American terms, the emphatic unilateralism objects to the "multilateral handcuffing of American power" (Robert Kagan).<sup>22</sup> Congress insists that the USA cannot allow its decisions to be made at the UN or in foreign capitals. The second process relates to the claim of the EU that the success of European integration makes the EU "an exemplar of global governance," which should invite others, including the USA, to follow its lead. With its modern-style polity, the EU requests recognition as a chief architect of global order. To the extent that international politics have been legally domesticated, the EU rightly asserts that its treaty-based community building (polity) represents a role model.

Defining new international law implies, however, that states fashioning the principles and norms seek to advance their interests and intra-regional practices. One example of the EU's path-breaking assertion of new international standards is the way in which the EU Commission has forced multinational companies of the size of General Electrics and Microsoft to abide by EU rulings and regulations. The Europeans still have to display a similar pragmatic interest in restraining Russia's cold-blooded policy of conquering Europe's energy markets via state-owned (or controlled) monopolies. The EU has been called upon to be as consistent with Gazprom "as we were with Microsoft." The EU would thus demonstrate that it is prepared to use the internal competition policy device of separating the distribution network and the production and supply business as an instrument at its external relations front to prevent Gazprom from extending its monopoly on the Russian market onto the EU energy market. It would prevent the state-controlled Russian company from taking advantage of the liberalization of the internal energy market and of the intended breakup of the European vertically integrated companies.<sup>23</sup> "Those who want to preserve Europe's room to maneuver must drastically reduce Moscow's blackmailing potential, simply so that Moscow is not tempted to use the energy weapon further just because it has the opportunity to do so."<sup>24</sup> As a side effect, such equality of treatment of the USA and Russia will deprive Moscow of occasions in which EU member states allow Russia to play the Europeans off against the USA or, in reverse, invite the USA to favor individual member states as anchors for intertwining partnerships.

The third change is EU-centered. The central shift in the USA/NATO–EU relationship started with the framing of the EU's post-'cold-war' institution building. The treaties progressively obliged the member states to practice not only solidarity, but also a "cohesion" and "convergence" of postures and actions.<sup>25</sup> Consequently, the EU has a claim on its member states to consider the union as first option when engaging in international activities. The calls for EU- (rather than NATO-)led missions, often accredited to France (for example Congo in 2003 and 2006; Lebanon, Chad), are therefore consistent with the logic of the institution-building process.

The conviction that the EU must take the initiative and set the international agenda relates not only to development policy or environmental policy, but also to robust peacemaking mandates.<sup>26</sup> The stipulated preference for EU-led missions in combination with the commitment of the European Security Strategy (ESS) to "effective multilateralism" implies that the EU is bound to invite like-minded and willing partners to form their own Partnership for Peace, duplicating the older NATO framework.

The fourth change is that the EU is seeking to create its own sphere of influence. It is aiming to entrench its standards of governance and market economy in the peripheral states of the former Soviet Union—that is, Russia's

so-called Near-Abroad—and in the Mediterranean. The partners of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) are expected gradually to adopt the EU's relevant body of laws and to support the central security-strategy objectives of the ESDP. "A binding expansion of the EU legal area to the [ENP] countries in certain sectors . . . coupled with practical and financial implementation measures . . ." shall lead to a greater sphere of peace and stability, the rule of law and constitutional legality, and economic development and social security.

Notwithstanding the weaknesses in the ENP policy,<sup>27</sup> its "ring of friends" program expects partners to shore up weak frontiers and commit themselves to change and reform. These paradigms affect especially the relationship with Russia and induce observers to speak of "open system friction"<sup>28</sup> and a "clash of two empires."<sup>29</sup> The Kremlin calls the ENP a provocation, even though the limits of what the EU can accomplish in the "borderland" between Russia and the EU-27 are all too obvious.<sup>30</sup> The really new situation is that the EU must watch its unstable periphery in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and prevent the states there from failing, or from regaining a "satellite" position toward Russia, or from becoming outposts of the USA.<sup>31</sup> The EU wants to guard against importing the appalling problems of its neighboring countries or the outbreak of wars about territories. Instead, the EU would prefer to export stability, while at the same time avoiding being drawn into a gyrating conflict, which would overstretch its capacity as an international actor. "The Europeans face the paradoxical danger of being imperially overstretched without being an Empire."<sup>32</sup>

The EU's quest to play a stabilizing role in its eastern neighborhood is based on the assumption that its export of stability would serve Russia's best interests, as it would lift a burden from Russia's shoulder and allow Moscow to turn its attention to geopolitical challenges on other "fronts" of its empire. It assumes that Moscow is prepared to make a difference between Brussels's good-natured extension of responsibility to Russia's *glacis* and NATO's US-inspired eastward expansion. "It should be the role of the European Union to compensate for NATO's neglect of Russia. . . ."<sup>33</sup> But Russia defies the concept that it may well reach an agreement with the EU, but not with NATO. While NATO is blamed for ignoring Russia's legitimate security interests (to be surrounded by friends Moscow can trust) and serving Washington's encirclement strategy, the EU is accused of yielding to the 'dictate' of small states from the former Soviet bloc, which do not want Russia to regain a say on their national security and economic development.<sup>34</sup>

Putin requested that Moscow should have a voice in Europe's councils and should be free to take every opportunity to multiply Russia's riches, without reciprocating in kind. He wanted to permit free movement of ideas and their bearers (civil society), to open Russia's energy-distribution market to foreign investment, to acknowledge the priority of treaty-based concessions over (wilful) unilateral changes in legislation, and to respect the EU's say in

matters affecting the western Balkans, where the United Nations had put the EU in charge.

Even moderate Russian foreign-policy experts threaten that, “in a rough struggle, Moscow would win.”<sup>35</sup> Putin demonstrated this when he—via Gazprom—contracted the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan pipeline and purchased the gas production at low prices with the aim of selling it at higher world-market prices to European companies. Moscow thus deprived the EU of a promising card in Central Asia’s energy poker. The irony of Putin’s coup is that Europe was left with one new<sup>36</sup> choice in its search for greater independence from Russian-controlled supplies: a pipeline through Iran.<sup>37</sup> And even this option risks losing its value, if Russia’s project of coordinating the producers’ interest in securing the level of demand leads to a *de facto* gas cartel with Iran and Algeria.

In its foreign-policy scenarios and preventive diplomacy, the EU has had to obtain Russia’s cooperation on many important matters such as Iran, Kosovo, and Palestine/Lebanon/Syria, and so has had to be prepared to pay a price for securing such help. In bargaining for Russian support, the EU has been limited in what it could offer as price or prize. Russia wants recognition as the “eternal great power,” a sphere of influence and autonomy in determining its domestic order. Conscious of its status, Moscow considers it an insult if it has to show an interest in cutting a deal. The highest prize the EU—as a civilian power—can award to non-members of international regimes is to grant them the status of market economy; it must then refrain from discriminating or imposing penalties in reaction to dumping and other damages to its peoples. But in the case of Russia, that prize was frittered away as the price for gaining Russia’s crucial ratification of the Kyoto Protocol; it should also be noted that the EU agreed a package of concessions to Russia that had previously been denied to the USA. If the EU had held back the prize or had linked it more appropriately to Russia’s commitment to oblige in the core elements of the Energy Charter, it would not be suffering now from a lack of negotiating power.<sup>38</sup> Hitherto, key member states were resolved to stand up to Washington, but were reluctant to draw red lines vis-à-vis the Kremlin and insist on reciprocity of goodwill and concessions in kind.

### Continuities and Parting of the Ways

Continuity in the European–American relationship relies on the coincidence of major strategic and economic objectives and interests, supported by close transnational communications between business, academic, and technical elites. Different mindsets and contradictory postures, which result from changes in the domestic alignments and from different perceptions of terrorist threats and the use of force in conflict resolution, might nonetheless change

the (terms of) interaction. The assessment will have to get the balance right between two sets of arguments:

(1) The first set is based on the premise that modern societies need effective protection against non-governmental actors that use organized force of various sorts to interfere with, disrupt, and discredit Western democratic ways of governing and living. In view of the unresolved problem that “the international institutions created to keep peace between nations be adapted to secure peace within nations,”<sup>39</sup> it is timely to consider whether it is legitimate for the Europeans and Americans to make a concerted effort to coordinate their options on how to achieve control over conflict management and assess the reliability of partners needed for building international regimes and/or regional stability. Certainly, conflict resolution seems impossible without involving China, Russia, and other principal powers. The question is about the stages in the process. Russia (and China) think foremost of stopping America and Europe from achieving success and of promoting their political foothold and economic stakes without regard to the violations of international law and agreements by authoritarian countries; at times, Russia (and China) even assert that no “objective data” exist to prove Western claims that Iran (North Korea) was seeking nuclear weapons; why then call for the UN Security Council to enact stricter sanctions if Iran does not come around? In this respect, Russia and China are rather part of the problem than they are partners in refashioning global order.<sup>40</sup> They prefer to drag out the burning issues (Kosovo, Iran, Sudan) with the intent of exerting pressure on the USA and also the EU to adhere to Russia’s (and/or China’s) position as a major player, instead of exerting their influence on the offending regimes. There is also no sense of obligation for the Americans and Europeans to do the “dirty work” in Afghanistan—that is, the *cause celebre* as a threat to international peace that exists in their vicinity. Only belatedly did the Russia- and China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization resolve to obstruct the export of heroin, thus depriving the Taliban and Afghan warlords of their main source of power. As long as Russia and China use their veto-power against organizing international pressure to change the course of violators of international resolutions, the Americans and Europeans would do better to consult among themselves about a common comprehensive strategy and then explain to Moscow (and or Beijing) their tactics of how to enforce a change of mind in regimes renegeing on their obligations<sup>41</sup> or refusing—like North Korea, Sudan, Syria—to acknowledge the authority of the UN Security Council to call them to account for their violations.

What supports the assumption that the USA and the EU have the authority to initiate commonly defined international standards and ensure compliance? The United States and the European Union and its member states

have a comparatively good record of peaceful change, common prosperity, and social equity at home and of assisting development abroad. With a good record of maintaining peace in their own region, they both constitute examples of the normative force for good<sup>42</sup> that is needed for developing and defending international order. Both also have a record of establishing international institutions that perform meaningful governance functions and have proved their will to assist in the development of partner states. Using their common ground, then, they could induce China, India, Russia, and other principal powers to get involved in the evolution of an advanced global order. The assumption, derived from historical cases, is that it takes two partners-in-leadership to negotiate and then to present an accord, with a view to initiating a multilateral agreement on a functional or regional regime. This relates specifically to the many policy arenas in which the USA and the EU, as majority stakeholders, are being advised to prevent regulatory competition from turning into trade wars; such efforts at coordinating rules of fair conduct would boost exchanges between the two parties, and should not be denounced just because they would erect barriers that would exclude third actors.<sup>43</sup> The two-parties-in-leadership concept is likely to result in more joint activity whenever “the pace of diplomacy is much too slow compared to the pace” of major problems turning into dangerous and unacceptable situations.<sup>44</sup> France and the UK will support the USA on tougher economic sanctions, irrespective of a UN Security Council accord, if Russia and China resist in the Security Council the call for collective action or try to water down a resolution so that it becomes too weak or vague to convince Tehran that the international community knows of a third way beyond the unacceptable alternative of bombing Iran or living with an Iran bomb. The third way implies effective sanctions, on the one hand, or offers to accommodate Iran’s justified demands for direct US negotiations with Iran and resumption of the EU-Iran talks about Iran’s position in the region, on the other hand. Any one-sided threat would be self-defeating, as it would allow Tehran to substitute Russian, Chinese, and other contractors for European banks and industries.

The USA and the EU are confronted with similar challenges and are engaged in many of the same out-of-area conflicts. “Europe’s instinct in response to these challenges cannot be to contain US power, but rather to marshal its own—to be America’s counterpart, not its counterweight.”<sup>45</sup> What the Americans and the Europeans can do together on (Non-)Proliferation, “Humanitarian Intervention,” and the turbulent area of the Near and Middle East, is predicated on a mutual sense of obligation. Whilst defining its strategy, the EU should take care that the USA is not undermined in its efforts to strengthen the “West’s” position and role in unstable regions; after all, EU-Europe, though strengthened politically, cannot be counted on to engage militarily if the situation should require this. What is more, the EU’s chances of diversifying



its oil and natural gas imports depend on the influence that the USA is able to maintain and exert in many regions of the world. In reverse, the USA must not take advantage of the cooperativeness of the Europeans or seek to marginalize the EU's presence in such areas of joint operations.

It is not only for the USA to support the security of others; the EU must also shoulder global responsibility in security matters: "Europe must get involved" (Solana).<sup>46</sup> The EU will also have to take on new burdens should the USA withdraw from some regions. (In trade and financial matters, the EU has already had to compensate for the declining absorption capacity of American markets.) It is likely that an American administration, should the EU gain more influence, will request the Europeans to do more for their own security and to enter into new commitments in their "near-abroad." In reverse, the EU- and NATO-Europeans are warning Washington that its tendency to push the front of operation areas forward to neighboring countries—for example, in Pakistan—is not helpful at a time when they are asking for more troops in order to succeed in Afghanistan.

The EU, in declaring itself—in December 2001 at the Laeken and in June 2003 at the Thessaloniki summits—able to back up diplomacy with force, can, however, seldom act alone on its own capabilities, as the 2003–4 study exercise of strategic scenarios for the EU's military dimension pointed out;<sup>47</sup> France has admitted that EU-led military operations depend on access to NATO capabilities.<sup>48</sup> The Europeans still have to meet their targets; the military know that both the euros and the skilled soldiers are a scarce resource.<sup>49</sup> So NATO and the EU would be well advised to cooperate in closing the capability gap and to strengthen the compatibility of strategic concepts and instruments to improve the practical coordination that can be used for EU-led engagements.<sup>50</sup> The European Security Strategy calls the transatlantic partnership "irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world..." Consequently, these two need to act as driving forces in formulating joint positions and strategies—a task that should not be allocated to an EU–Russia Strategic Partnership.<sup>51</sup> The EU- and NATO-Europeans will have to develop a transatlantic rather than "a narrow" European security and defence identity.<sup>52</sup>

The "Western powers" overall are in a precarious situation. Their ability to shape preferences and frame choices—that is, to make an effective use of their power—is constrained by two intermingling processes: (1) because of the commitment of their available forces and resources to UN-mandated stabilization missions (ISAF, SFOR, KFOR, Lebanon) and/or self-mandated military interventions (Afghanistan, Iraq), the USA and the EU have their hands tied and find themselves exposed to severe criticism at home and abroad; and (2) the dilemma of the "Western powers" enhances the assertiveness of the other big players in the Near, Middle, and Far East and encourages them to sap the confidence of local pro-Western power-holders with US and EU backing.

As a result, America and Europe have to support their standing by inviting these others to cooperate in steering (Contact) groups. This constellation makes the USA and especially the EU vulnerable to the bickering of such awkward partners and distracts them from agreeing on the measures that could really affect the conduct and actions of actors that constitute a “threat to international peace” according to UN standards.

Given the unpropitious power structure in the all-important crisis zone (from the Lebanon to Pakistan), the main issue is how to define the right limit to compromise with the powers on the spot. The question is twofold: (1) How much will be at risk—for example, in the conflict with Iran—if the EU takes the more assertive American course to increase the pressure on the defiant state? In reverse, how much is really to be gained if Washington follows the European line to rescue the chances for a negotiated deal by providing the “carrots” at its disposal, hoping for a change of mind in Tehran to reach a settlement in the conflict? (2) Is empowering the “moderates”—for example, the Karzai government—to govern from the national capital and act as a free agent in making formal and informal power-sharing deals with local-regional principals, the only option? Or should the stabilizing intervening powers use their Provincial Reconstruction Teams for “peace-in-part” solutions—that is, cooperate with supportive actors in their respective zones of responsibility and make the area safe against the return of the partly defeated Taliban and their comrades-in-arms?

(2) The second set of arguments picks up on Geir Lundestad’s thesis about the developing cultural split between Americans and Europeans.<sup>53</sup> Some observers even take extreme positions. For them, the USA is *the* culprit of world evils; they warn that getting close to the Americans is like catching the paranoia of chasing enemies at home and abroad. Some also doubt that Iran or North Korea or some of the terrorist groups listed as outlaws (like Hamas or Hezbollah) are really jeopardizing international security, and recommend treating them as partners in regional settings, because they are wielding power anyway and will not give in to outside pressure.

Differences in strategic perspectives have developed over time, otherwise the major dividing issues would not have become cut-and-dried opinions. A certain degree of divisiveness has always been significant for intra-West relationships, deriving from the different positions and roles of the USA and the European states and their communities in the world security system and the world economy. The European habit of taking the US security guarantee for granted and assuming the right to criticize America’s assertiveness—a standard reproach of US presidents since Eisenhower—was the reverse side of the USA patronizing what the Europeans must do to retain America’s reassurance. Partly in reaction to America’s vicissitude between ending and reviving the “cold war” and at the same time burdening their allies with the

repercussions of their war-and arms-race economy, the Europeans, and especially Germany, developed—since the early 1970s—the notion of enlarged security and became immersed into a sort of “peace-in-part” mentality—that is, buying safety for their region through negotiated settlements with the USSR and other adversaries. This strategy could be and was exploited to distinguish European perspectives from American approaches to new security threats by resorting to power projection and the intrusion in public affairs of other societies. The reasoning as to why EU-Europe should become a “normative superpower” and counterbalance America’s influence rests on the premise that the USA, posing no military threat to Europe, could be opposed on political issues. The proposition that political problems need to be addressed by political means and methods became the shibboleth of Europe’s emancipation from US domination of its allies; in reverse, the USA used the “indivisible Security of the West” as a pretext for getting its version of Atlanticism accepted.<sup>54</sup>

What is new is the spread of automatic anti-American reflexes along the line that “the United States aggravates problems rather than tries to solve them;”<sup>55</sup> hence indications of pro-American sentiments—of the sort that America’s position may not be that wrong after all—are thought to be a vote-losing liability. “Everything that is American remains politically radioactive in Western Europe—those who get in touch with it too closely and for too long, are contaminated to the extent of being non-eligible.”<sup>56</sup>

Differences over climate change, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and what to do about Iraq and Afghanistan reflect different visions of “human security” and will therefore endure. It may be too far-fetched to maintain the analogy that European governments highlight their concerns over issues belonging to the core of “enlarged security,” especially climate change, in the same way that the USA focuses on Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran as representing multifaceted threats to national and international security. The more the Europeans identify their claim for “giving a lead” on issues on which the USA is known to look bad, and the more the USA in return insists that the really demanding and difficult security tasks exist in certain regions of the world, the more the blame-hitting competition is infused with bossiness. Responsible policy will instead remember that success in an internationally disputed case is only worthwhile if the solution: (a) addresses the problems that were meant to get attention; (b) is consistent with the available range of means to deliver on the goals; and (c) makes concessions only to those parties that will participate in the contracted-in solutions. The EU’s record on the Kyoto Protocol, for instance, does not stand this test. The fight about the ICC was a distraction from the more relevant debate about conflict resolution. One school maintains that the task of external intervention—which is inevitable, because the local and regional actors involved in the deadly conflict see no end to fighting for their (uneven) claims—is to get almost all the belligerent

parties to negotiate, search for a power-sharing formula, and provide resources to commit the former enemies to take part in the new process. This method prohibits the recourse of prosecuting the culprits (or originators) of genocide, atrocities against humanity, and so on, at least as long as they are leading actors on the scene. The other school, in contrast, presumes that international “might can do right”—that is, that the internationally composed mission of military and police forces and administrative and judicial personnel assist in (re)introducing basic components of civil governance and empower indigent people to learn to govern by consent and with respect for institutions. In this context, the demonstration that “justice” takes hold of the major “guilty men” is seen as an essential element of the state-building process. It is crucial that the USA and the EU act in concert about what to do in each individual case (Sudan/Darfur; Kosovo; Lebanon/Palestine) rather than spring surprises on each other or hackle about institutional *finesse*.

### **The Impact of the EU’s Rise as Global Power upon the USA and Ways of Shaping World Order**

What principles are going to prevail in world politics? Will it be the American trust in addressing the need to subdue—even unilaterally—the centers of violence in order to safeguard the homeland security (both of itself and allies) or the Europeans’ insistence on “effective multilateralism” to make sure that the principal powers, too, especially the USA, have to abide by the authority of the law, resting in the hands of the UN Security Council?<sup>57</sup> In this respect, the EU is attempting to transfer its version of multilateral authority onto the global level, implying the constitution and empowerment of some central authority.<sup>58</sup> In so doing, it is ignoring the fact that the EU still represents a group of nation states who remain “masters of constitution-by treaty-making;” there is no legal basis for the EU to usurp competencies for external relations from its member states<sup>59</sup> or to effect “centralization.” The member states—whether big or small—pursue options that fit domestic political purposes in the first place and even opt for non-members as main strategic partners. That speaks in favor of an interest in the creation of regime-generating clubs and Contact Groups, in which member states of the EU and sometimes the EU High Representative, but also the UN Secretary-General, are participating, and not so much for putting all its eggs in the UN basket. Such “institutional pluralism”<sup>60</sup> offers a reasonable hope for global governance in the most important functional areas, such as competition policy, trade-and-investment relations, proliferation security, climate change, but also regional zones of violent conflict.

In pursuing its idea of a new international community with empowered institutions and self-enforcing norms, the EU should think twice before it

commits itself to taking a lead in issues where the USA is known to raise objections. American arguments are not per se objectionable;<sup>61</sup> it will do no good to reject views from Washington, partly because the EU—for example, in the post-2012 Climate Change Regime or the regulations concerning state-owned investors—might have to join the USA in exerting more pressure on Russia, China, India, Brazil, with a view to reallocating the costs of international regimes or the maintenance of the principle of reciprocity. In the economic field, the regulatory competition between the USA and the EU reflects the self-assertiveness of two giants, but also promotes a process of agreeing on best available practices.<sup>62</sup> However, in matters of security, including provisions against terrorism, the unresolved problem of clarifying the differences between police and military missions (within the EU) and of sharing responsibilities between NATO and the EU expresses the discrepancy between (roughly) the politicians' aversion against a formalized arrangement—fearing that it would codify an unsatisfactory division of labor—and the informal cooperative practices of the high-level as well as the field-tested military and police enforcement agencies.<sup>63</sup> Here, too, the practitioners' cooperation may be conducive to overcoming, first, the EU-internal problems of effective coordination of (a) civil and military efforts and (b) member states' and EU-centered activities, and, secondly, the EU and US/NATO question of authority.<sup>64</sup> In view of the convergence in the approach to stabilization missions,<sup>65</sup> it is less necessary than in the past to distinguish European from American policy.

The Europeans' commitment to effective multilateralism implies that the EU is obliged not to go it alone.<sup>66</sup> Hence, it needs the UN's legitimation, and, insofar as possible, America's consent. Who else but the USA is to be the Europeans' first choice in counteracting serious threats to international security? The EU-US summit reaffirmed that "close collaboration between the European Union and the United States, consistent with and building upon cooperation within NATO,"<sup>67</sup> is the way to go. "The new thinking must result from an assessment of the medium- and long-term strategically important developments on a global scale with the intent to coordinate US and EU objectives as far as possible and to allocate—on Europe's part—the capabilities required for such an implementable strategy."<sup>68</sup>

In view of the available capabilities, on the one hand, and the common task of refashioning global order and subduing the appalling force of international terrorism, on the other hand, the EU can only supplement NATO and the USA. The ensuing expenses of the security buildup of an emancipated EU-Europe (*Europe Puissance*) and the foreseeable revolt of their publics against European "militarism" may stop the ESDP from pursuing the path of a "third option."<sup>69</sup> Doing less—on an exclusive ESDP account—will be more when financial assets are invested and displayed on a EU-US pattern. That could well

be the *rationale* behind France's turn toward building a strong European pillar within NATO.

The gap between expectations and capabilities associated with the EU's presence in world affairs seriously hampers the EU's performance as a force for good. Certainly, the multi-perspective EU polity presents a convincing example of effective multilateralism; its combined civil–military operations are ideal for supporting the UN's central position in maintaining and elaborating world order.<sup>70</sup> However, its claim to know that this is the right solution for the problem of failing states—and reproach that the USA, relying on its military might, cannot do it right—is not matched in practice. The EU finds it difficult to back up diplomacy by employment of sanctions or policing missions, partly because the necessary military and police units are committed elsewhere. In a telling statement, the head of the UN's Peace Support Operation agency, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, accused the EU of alarming ignorance concerning the changes in the UN's range and type of missions and the rules of engagement.

The Europeans could invest the UN with the required power, but do not think strategically and do not take action against their lack of military might. Considering the Europeans' intention to have the same status as the US and its demand for effective multilateralism, it must demonstrate its willingness to operate side by side with non-European states. That would reveal that they left their colonial past behind.<sup>71</sup>

In order to mend the “capability-expectations-gap” (S. Duke), some European governments debate publicly that the experience of the chastening Balkan, Kosovo, and Afghanistan conflicts must result in a firm determination to put Europe's money where its commitments are—that is, to allocate substantial resources to achieve a concrete, stronger, and more usable military capability.<sup>72</sup> They were and are aware that, in international conflicts, the USA could not be left alone to do the military work. It is a matter especially for Germany to face the consequences of such judgment and to invest more than they have done so far. If the Germans actually side with the British and French in supporting Europe's aspiration to lead truly multilateral peace enforcement missions, the restructuring of financial and military options can go ahead: (1) the shift in individual government expenditures would have to be more substantial; (2) it seems that it would be necessary to authorize the EU—as already recommended by Aillot-Marie, Joschka Fischer, and others in 2003–4—to raise a special tax to increase the forces for expeditionary operations; and (3) there would need to be a contract between willing governments to pool the existing military forces into an operational ESDP and European collaboration in the production and procurement of modern combat weaponry to equip this European mobile joint task force.<sup>73</sup>

The Europeans have to maintain the EU's fundamental assumption that the UN system is authorized to define what limitations should be imposed on the

exercise of sovereign rights by arbitrary states. In view of America's diminished influence over events in many regions in particular, and, in general, the waning impact of the "West" on torn-apart societies (Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan, Congo, and so on), the EU in general and the French and British governments in particular (as permanent members of the UN Security Council) are called upon to contribute ideas and instruments about how such self-centered and ambitious powers like Iran or Sudan can be stopped from disregarding rulings of the UN Security Council and/or of international regime agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Unfortunately, there are limits to doing it the European way: "the EU has neither the resources nor the instruments, neither the incentives nor the means to exert pressure on the potentates in its Mediterranean neighbourhood to abandon their hitherto existing position."<sup>74</sup> What applies in the EU's so-called ring of friends is definitely applicable in other regions where the EU has tried its hand. Neither Iran nor Sudan shows any signs of complying with the EU's belief in "legalization of international politics," introduction of independent judiciary and public administration, or political progress through activities of civil-society-based institutions. Nonetheless, the Europeans hold on to their quest for *political* solutions and are prepared to accept deals that are ambiguous about the definitive obligations of such non-compliant regimes. By contrast, the USA demands that the "West" should agree on the range of effective sanctions that might induce a change of course and proceed with actions without waiting any longer to find out whether Russia and China, the other veto powers in the UN Security Council, would come along. If values are a *conditio sine qua non* for the EU as global actor, then the EU and the USA must organize and inspire the emerging "concert of democracies" whose constituents share these values and want them to endure and prevail. This is not to say that such a league of democratic nations is *ipso facto* authorized to interfere with the internal sovereignty of other states;<sup>75</sup> but it may have to determine—especially if UN Security Council procedure is blocked—whether a situation of the type found in Kosovo, Lebanon, Sudan, or even Iran, calls for a robust international intervention.

In this respect, the EU must come to terms with the fact that the USA on one important score is still the indispensable nation that manages to move the world to take effective measures (M. Albright).<sup>76</sup> Without American military (and resultant political) superiority, it would become less likely that international law could prevail.

If the goal is . . . to try to make sure that (an international conflict) runs its course in such a way that [it] is ultimately resolved peacefully, then it may be entirely proper, and indeed necessary, that power be brought to bear . . . If power plays a central role in international politics—then the last thing that we should want is to give people the sense that they can ignore power realities with impunity—that they are sheltered by legal norm from retaliation and that they are free to act as irresponsible as they like.<sup>77</sup>

Not everybody is prepared to swallow such argument. But it comes with a twin. Those who take living under the umbrella of American power for granted shall not dispute the American *logic* that the USA, in order to lead “robust” missions, needs weapons that others do not and should not have;<sup>78</sup> only this will provide a counterweight to the blackmailing potential of the Iranians, North Koreans, et al., and the remorseless use of violence against unprotected civilians by terrorist activists or in ethnic conflicts. In return for accepting and apprehending US superiority in military security, the EU must ask for a voice in deploying such force as a back-up facility of coercive preventive diplomacy.<sup>79</sup>

In any event, EU-Europe’s challenge is to find out (1) who the other anchor powers might be for setting norms and rules in international politics and what value-adding strategies could be practiced with them,<sup>80</sup> and (2) how seriously these major players take the EU’s capability of sharing risks with them and in return to what extent the major players have regard for the complicated evolution of EU policy stances.

Let us assume that the member states do promote the “Europeanization” in the area of defense and security and intersect their humanitarian, reconstruction, and emergency responses. Even so, the EU’s favorite high-policy objectives and methods—for example, protection and implementation of human rights; global regulation of emissions; confidence-building agreements on arms limitations and reductions; global regulations constraining “pure” market mechanisms; injecting domestically anchored social-policy views into preventive development assistance policy—do not resonate well with Russia’s and China’s muscling reliance on their new or regained exportable assets (foreign currency reserves, arms, energy and raw materials, and industrial products). Moscow’s and Beijing’s self-assertiveness does not necessarily come along with bellicosity against the West, but the underlying message is that they want to be strong enough to get their way in their *glacis* and in areas where Europeans and the USA were influential (Africa, Latin America). Consequently, the EU, fearful of losing influence in these energy- and raw-material-rich regions, sees itself forced not only to compete with Russia and China, but also to adapt to the terms of their zero-sum games.

The USA is experienced in such rivalries. It is still the only actor firmly entrenched—via formal and informal security guarantees as well as foreign direct investments and multinational corporations—in every region that is central for world politics and international economics. Although the US position as epicenter in global finance and military proliferation is shrinking relatively, it has managed to improve its relationships with China, India, and Brazil, and demonstrated, particularly vis-à-vis China,<sup>81</sup> that mutual engagement as responsible stakeholders and respectful conduct of their relations is conducive to enhancing stability in the region or at least to de-escalating tensions. To some extent, China is acting as a more cooperative competitor



to the USA in (North and South) East Asia than Russia is toward the USA and the EU in Central Asia and independent Eastern Europe. Accusations that China's rulers are pursuing a hidden strategy and are intending to take advantage of the fact that the USA is preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan can hardly be proved. To ensure working relations with China, the USA has a distinct—and long-standing—interest in preventing Taiwan from triggering China's preordained unification by resorting to the use of force. In return, China does not challenge the US presence as a protective power in the Far East, as long as the USA encourages rather than discourages normal relations between, for example, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and China, and China has little interest in getting involved in Russia's maneuvers to force the USA out of the Caspian and Caucasus region. China is conscious of the importance both of the US market for the sustained growth of its export-driven economy and the double-edged ramifications of its hold on US assets, and also of America's strategic partnerships with Japan and India. Noticing the interest of Asian countries in the emerging intra-regional Far East trading, investment, and monetary zone, China presents itself as a reasonable actor.

The EU welcomes the development toward such intra-regional cooperation. By upgrading its "constructive engagement" into "strategic partnership" with China,<sup>82</sup> India, Japan, and ASEAN, the EU has contributed to the emerging cooperation in the Far East. How successful the EU's continuous buildup of economic relations with Asian countries has been is best illustrated by the fact that China agreed in its bilateral negotiations with the EU about the terms of entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) to hold 40 percent of its foreign-exchange reserves in euros. The EU, however, is aware that it cannot be—and does not want to become—a major player in this area, as long as power politics, nationalism, and arms races<sup>83</sup> still mark East Asia, compared to Europe's integration process after the Second World War. The EU offers its good services for promoting political dialogue, confidence-building structures, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their technology; in this respect, India's voluntary agreement not to export nuclear technology—thereby strengthening a central principle of the regime without becoming a contracting party—serves as a welcome contrast to China's and North Korea's position on this score.

The initiative in engaging Asia's self-centered nation states into cooperative frameworks rests, however, with the USA.<sup>84</sup> Its bargaining with China about terms of entry into the WTO paved the way for the following EU–China negotiations, in which China granted the EU more and better concessions than the USA had earned.<sup>85</sup> Since then Beijing has not responded to the EU's diplomatic efforts to bring an end to China's regulatory discrimination, abuse of intellectual property rights, and other violations of its obligations under the WTO regime; hence the EU is getting ready to align its policy with the USA. In some issue areas, like the Proliferation Security Initiative,

the EU supports Washington's course of action, but in others, like climate-change policy, it sets a different course. The EU urges mandatory measures, anchored in a worldwide treaty under control of some central UN agency; the USA seeks to secure the support of Asia's top polluting nations to consider voluntary reductions, devised by individual states, energy imperatives, and "smart" greenhouse-gas reducing technologies as key elements of a post-Kyoto consensus.

In any case, the Asian nation states' insistence on acting autonomously is the pivotal factor; it has two effects: (1) It limits the range of agreements that the Western powers can expect from bargaining processes; the results vary according to the success in playing off the EU against the USA. (2) It causes tensions and rivalries in the area, but the East Asians are increasingly anxious to develop cooperative frameworks of their own. This is welcome news to both the EU and the USA. Knowing well that the US guarantees are cornerstones of the Far East's security and that Washington conducts affairs there fairly reasonably, the EU is reluctant to emphasize its differences with the USA. The EU employs its presence in East Asia to convince the executives of the advantages of a long-term cooperation with the "West." In that sense the EU's advocacy of intra-regional cooperation in East Asia, embracing economic interpenetration as well as political dialogue, is to encourage the evolution of another zone of peaceful coexistence—that is, another pole. For the EU, such a pole is welcome as an example of responsible conflict resolution and not as a counterweight to the USA in some multipolar system.

### Notes

1. Alan Posener, "Empire Europa," *Internationale Politik*, 61 (2001), 1, 65–6; "[Herfried] Münkler shows that the EU has no future if it does not borrow a leaf from the order model of empire" (Claus Leggewie, *Die Zeit*, No. 33, Aug. 11, 2005); Björn Hettne and Frederik Söderbaum, "Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism," *European Foreign Affairs*, 10/4 (2005), 535–52.
2. Susan Strange, *States and Markets* (London: Pinter, 1988), 23–42, was first in setting out the proposition that her notion of four-sided *structural power* also applies to non-states, e.g. the Mafia; Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, *Seeing the Elephant: The US Role in Global Security* (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books, 2006), ch. 4, "A New Age of Empowerment;" Christopher Daase, *Kleine Kriege—Große Wirkung. Wie unkonventionelle Kriegführung die internationale Politik verändert* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999); Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Herfried Münkler, *Über den Krieg: Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel ihrer theoretischen Reflexionen* (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2002).
3. Heinrich Vogel, "Von der Völker- zur Männerfreundschaft," in *Internationale Politik* (Sept. 2005), 65. The disposition of its member states' governments to attain

privileged bilateral arrangements with the principal powers and resource-rich states impairs the ability of the EU to redeem its moral high ground.

4. G. John Ikenberry, Chapter 5, this volume, presents the case; see also Peter Rudolf, "Rückkehr des liberalen Hegemon," *Internationale Politik*, 61:1 (2006), 10.
5. John Gerald Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity* (London: Routledge, 1998), 123.
6. *Ibid.* 216–19.
7. Heide-Irene Schmidt and I have developed the argument in Gustav Schmidt and Charles F. Doran (eds.), *Amerikas Option für Deutschland und Japan. Die Position und Rolle Deutschlands und Japans in regionalen und internationalen Strukturen. Die 1950er und die 1990er Jahre in vergleichender Perspektive* (Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr N. Brockmeyer, 1996). The European Neighbourhood policy and the recent Association Treaties rest upon the two approaches.
8. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, "Interaction and Integration," *Internationale Politik online* (Apr. 2007).
9. Gustav Schmidt, "Die Römischen Verträge und der Ost-West-Konflikt," in Michael Gehler (ed.), *From Common Market to European Union Building* (Vienna and Cologne: Böhlau, 2007).
10. Through preferential trade and association agreements, the EU has some 117 countries as formal partners; Michael Smith, "The EU as a Trade Policy Actor," in Brian Hocking and Stephen McGuire (eds.), *Trade Policy*, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 2004), 294.
11. Stuart Gordon, "Exploring the Civil–Military Interface and its Impact on European Strategic and Operational Personalities: "Civilianisation" and Limiting Military Roles in Stabilisation Missions," in *European Security*, 15/3 (2006); Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Burkhard Schmitt (eds.), *Die Sicherheitspolitik der EU im Werden. Bedrohungen—Aktivitäten—Fähigkeiten* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004).
12. Hervé Morin, quoted in N. Busse, "Neuer Streit entlang alter Fronten," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Oct. 1, 2007, 7.
13. Mark Trachtenberg, "The Iraq War and the Future of the Western Alliance," in David M. Andrews (ed.), *The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US–European Relations after Iraq* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 201–31, particularly 228.
14. Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Alphand, May 28, 1962; Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 56.
15. Franco Algieri, "A Weakened EU's Prospects for Global Leadership," in *Washington Quarterly*, 30 (Winter 2006–7).
16. The leaked German Foreign Office "Change through Rapprochement," with its emphasis on separating Putin's regime changes and the urgency of forging a grand partnership between the EU and Russia, was at first seen as an alternative strategy to the Bush–Cheney administration's linkage strategy.
17. Steinmeier, "Interaction and Integration."
18. Ulrich Weisser, "Don't Ignore Russia," *Internationale Politik online* (Apr. 2007).
19. Angela Stent, "Berlin's Russia Challenge," American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) email article, Jan. 3, 2007; Hannes Adomeit and Alexander Bitter, "Rußland und die Raketenabwehr. Wer spaltet wen?," *SWP–Aktuell*, 23 (Apr. 2007).

20. Visiting Moscow in mid-May 2007 as acting EU-President, Steinmeier appealed in vain to Putin to acknowledge that interaction in the energy sector can work only if it is based on sound principles; such guiding principles are enshrined in the Energy Charter and the supplemental protocol.
21. The EU cannot face worst-case scenarios on its own—e.g., the breakup of Egypt, concerted Hamas–Hizbollah–Syria–Iran assaults on Israel, or, in reverse, Israeli pre-emptive strikes, e.g., against Syria. It is doubtful whether the USA can keep a lid on the powder keg. A close(r) understanding between the EU and the USA might stabilize working relationships between so-called moderate powers in the region.
22. Walter Russell Mead, “American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk,” *Orbis*, 49/4 (2005), 589–98.
23. The EU presented its case at the EU–Russia Summit meeting in Helsinki in Nov. 2006 and again in Sept. 2007, when the Commission submitted the policy outline; Hans-Joachim Spanger, “Was bleibt von der Strategischen Partnerschaft?” *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, 2 (2007), 91–113.
24. “Rußlands Energieimperialismus und die Rückkehr der Geopolitik,” *Der Tagespiegel*, Jan. 9, 2007.
25. Constitutional Treaty, Article I. 39. Note that the traditional position of the member states as “masters of the process” has been reaffirmed in the recent Lisbon Treaty.
26. The EU invited candidate countries and NATO members who are not EU member states to participate in or contribute to the Chad Force; N. Busse, “Neuer Streit entlang alter Fronten,” *FAZ*, Oct. 1, 2007, 6.
27. Steffen Erdle, “Die europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik. Ein Motor für Reformen im Mittelmeerraum?,” *Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Auslandsstudien*, 4 (2007); Richard Youngs, “Europe’s Uncertain Pursuit of Middle East Reforms,” *CEIP Democracy and Rule of Law Project* (2004).
28. Michael Thumann, “Ohne Wodka–Seligkeit,” *Die Zeit*, May 17, 2007.
29. Michael Emerson (former EU Ambassador to Russia) et al., *The Elephant and the Bear: The European Union, Russia and their Near Abroads* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2001); Kirsten Westphal (ed.), *A Focus on EU–Russian Relations: Towards a Close Partnership on Defined Road Maps?* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang Verlag, 2005).
30. Stent, “Berlin’s Russia Challenge;” Anneli Ute Babanyi, “Die Initiative ‘Schwarzmeersynergie’: Die EU plant den Ausbau ihrer regionalen Zusammenarbeit,” *SWP–Aktuell*, 29 (May 2007), 4.
31. President Putin sought to restore Russia’s preponderance in Southeast Europe and the Caucasus by incorporating their oil and natural gas pipelines into its state-protected Transneft and Gazprom transport monopolies. The USA pushes for Georgia’s membership in NATO and sees the integrity of the Ukraine as a litmus test for Russia’s dissociation from the sins of its imperial past.
32. Herfried Münkler, *Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft. Vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten* (Berlin, 2005).
33. Weisser, “Don’t Ignore Russia;” Lothar Rühl, “Aus Partnerschaft wird Gegensatz. Moskau macht politische Front gegen die NATO,” *FAZ*, May 22, 2007.
34. Sergei A. Karaganov, “Time to Back off,” *International Herald Tribune*, May 16, 2007. For a rebuttal see Josef Zieleniec (MEP, former Czech Foreign Minister, 1993–7), “Putin stellt die Einigkeit der EU auf die Probe,” *FAZ*, May 16, 2007, 12.

35. Karaganov, "Time to Back off."
36. The second, but longer-existing option is, of course, Norway. It is the eighth-largest producer and third-largest exporter of oil and natural gas; since 2001, Norway has invited foreign energy companies to compete for licenses.
37. Gas supplies from Turkmenistan, the fifth-largest source of natural gas, via Iran, the second largest resource, are essential to the Nabucco Pipeline project.
38. Press reports about an internal document of the EU Commission on foreign energy policy; *FAZ* and *IHT*, Sept. 13–18, 2007.
39. Daniel Hamilton, "Angie: Where Will You Lead Us From Here?," *Civis* (2006). 4, 18.
40. Brad Roberts, "All the King's Men? Refashioning Global order," *International Affairs* 83/3 (May 2007), 523–30; Hannes Adomeit, "Russlands Iran-Politik unter Putin. Politische und wirtschaftliche Interessen und der Atomstreit," *SWP-Studie S*, 28 (Apr. 2007).
41. For example, UN Security Council resolutions 1696 (July 31, 2006), 1737 (23 Dec. 23, 2006) and 1747 (Mar. 24, 2007) requested Iran to suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities.
42. The ESS *expressis verbis* characterizes the EU and the USA together as a force for good.
43. Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan, *Deep Integration: How Transatlantic Markets are Leading Globalization* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005).
44. Thérèse Delpech, quoted in John Vinocur, "Tough Talk in France on Iran and the Bomb," *International Herald Tribune*, Mar. 6, 2007; Josef Joffe, "Paris, Texas", *Die Zeit*, Sept. 27, 2007.
45. Hamilton, "Angie," 19.
46. Christoph Bertram, "Zentral, nicht bloß normal," *Die Zeit*, July 29, 2004.
47. ISS, *European Defence: A Proposal for a White Paper*, Report of an Independent Task Force (Paris: May 2004).
48. Jean-Pierre Jouver, Minister for European Affairs, in Michaela Wiegel, "Sag 'Qui' zum EU-Vertrag," *FAZ*, Oct. 5, 2007, 6.
49. Peter Schmidt, "Alliance Retreats on Creation of Attack force," *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 21, 2007. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is to be reduced to a core of standby forces, but the concept and task assignments will be upheld. The NRF is the wherewithal for transforming the European militaries and restore interoperability with US forces.
50. Stephanie Hofmann and Christopher Reynolds, "EU–NATO–Beziehungen," *SWP-Aktuell* (July 2007), 37; Heinz Gärtner and Ian M. Cuthbertson, *European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), 52.
51. "The European Union and Russia... have more experience with transformational processes... and (can) help the United States to avoid making more preventable mistakes" (Weisser, "Don't Ignore Russia").
52. Ralph Thiele, "Projecting European Power: A European View", in Esther Brimmer and Stefan Fröhlich (eds.), *The European Union's Search for a Strategic Role* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2003), 80; Volker Heise, "Die ESVP in den transatlantischen Beziehungen," *SWP-Studie*, 23 (Aug. 2007), 18–19, 22.

53. Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 282–91.
54. Gustav Schmidt, "Mindsets, Doctrines, Divergences: Primacy and Other Ways of Shaping World Order," in William Zartman (ed.), *Imbalance of Power* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), ch. 7.
55. Arnaud Montebourg, Royal's campaign spokesman, quoted by Elaine Sciolino, "France will Miss Chirac's experience on Global Stage," *International Herald Tribune*, May 1, 2007.
56. Jan Ross, "Das Bauchgrimmen des Erdballs," *Die Zeit*, Apr. 26, 2007, 13.
57. Wolfgang Ischinger, at the time German Ambassador to the United States, quoted in Michael Inacker, "Ein neues Band über den Atlantik." *FAZ*, June 16, 2003.
58. One example is the WTO; the EU aims at establishing a similar authority for the global emissions regime.
59. Annegret Bendiek, "GASP nach dem Fußnotengipfel", *SWP-Aktuell*, 42 (July 2007).
60. This argument borrows from Robert O. Keohane, *Power and Governance* (London: Routledge, 2002); summary in Binnendijk and Kugler, *Seeing the Elephant*, 49–50.
61. To take one item from a long list of instances: the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) (internally) or the local representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Kabul agree that in Afghanistan a paramilitary vocational training of police forces is necessary; *FAZ*, Aug. 4, 2007, 2.
62. The mutual recognition agreements, a key feature of the Internal Market, are applied to EU–US economic relations; the Transatlantic Business Dialogue promotes this technique; Steven McGuire, "Firms and Governments in International Trade," in Hocking and McGuire, *Trade Policy*, 282.
63. Volker Heise, "*Die ESVP*," 18–19, 22; Hofmann and Reynolds, "EU–NATO–Beziehungen," 4. A Coordination Committee is expected to improve the combined employment of EU, US, and NATO capabilities in Afghanistan; the prototype already operates in Kosovo. The participation of Afghans in the work of the Coordination Committee is thought to be essential.
64. EU-Council, Summit, Presidency Conclusions, June 22, 2007; the report on activities of the ESDP and the Chairman's report on conflict prevention are attached to the Conclusions, July 20, 2007; Stuart, "*Exploring the Civil–Military Interface*," 354–5.
65. The EU and the USA are moving in similar directions on the coordination of civilian (administrative, economic, judicial, police) and military assistance and in arranging mutual support. The EU Peace Facility for Africa has (since 2004) assisted the 'empowering' institutions of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Quadrennial Defense Report 2006 called for the military assets of the African Union to be strengthened and for a more cooperative Defense Department relationship to be developed with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
66. This also applies to climate-change policy. With responsibility for 14% of global greenhouse-gas emissions, the EU is reliant on the willingness of many principal actors to achieve its goal of curbing emissions worldwide by 20% and more by 2020. Sarkozy's and Brown's proposal for reducing taxes on environmentally friendly products has its counterpart in legislation being considered in the USA; Katrin

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67. 2007 EU-US Summit, *Promoting Peace, Human Rights and Democracy Worldwide*, Apr. 30, 2007, 10, [www.eurunion.org/partner/summit/Summit20070430/Pol&SecurIssues.pdf](http://www.eurunion.org/partner/summit/Summit20070430/Pol&SecurIssues.pdf).
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69. Charles G. Cogan, *The Third Option: The Emancipation of European Defense, 1989–2000* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).
70. Esther Brimmer, "ESDP and International Peacekeeping," in Esther Brimmer and Stefan Fröhlich (eds.), *The European Union's Search for a Strategic Role* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2003), 106–7; Sven Biscop (ed.), *The European Union and the United Nations: Partners in Effective Multilateralism*, Chaillot Paper, 78 (June 2005); Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds.), *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, Principles, Practicalities* (London: Routledge, 2005); Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds.), *The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralism* (London: Routledge, 2006).
71. Jean-Marie Guéhénno, "Europas Ignoranz ist erschreckend," *FAZ*, May 8, 2007, 5.
72. Joschka Fischer in an interview with Schirmmacher and Schwägerl, *FAZ*, Mar. 18, 2003; Alain Lamassoure, quoted in Ulrike Guérot, "Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen zwischen Geopolitik und GAP: Bericht über die deutsch-französische Konferenz der Association Jean-Monnet in Houjarray," July 5–7, 2002, in *Dokumente*, 58/3 (2002), 13.
73. Michael Clarke and Paul Cornish, "The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit," *International Affairs*, 78/4 (2002), 777–88; Julian Lindley-French, *Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma post-11 September*, Chaillot Paper, 52 (May 2002); Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari, *Transforming European Militaries: Coalition Operations and the Technology Gap* (London: Routledge, 2006); Center for Strategic and International Studies, *European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities* (Oct. 2005), [www.csis.org/isp/edi/index.htm](http://www.csis.org/isp/edi/index.htm); Gustav Lindstrom, *EU-US Burdensharing: Who Does What?*, Chaillot Paper, 82 (Paris: ISS, 2005).
74. Erdle, "Die europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik", 38.
75. Samuel Huntington warns that Western intervention into the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict in a multicivilizational world.
76. Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005). As the opposition of Albright to the Iraq war and warmongering on Iran demonstrates, the posture is by no means a *carte blanche* for the reckless use of force.
77. Trachtenberg, "The Iraq War," 223.
78. Robert J. Lieber, *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
79. An example is the stationing of US forces before the Gulf Wars. In 1990, the diplomatic front was held together; in 2002–3, the French and the Germans not only supported, but also urged for an increase in, the deployment of US forces to induce Baghdad to cooperate with the inspection; both stipulated that this

should by no means be considered *carte blanche* for a subsequent US invasion of Iraq.

80. Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, *Global Security Governance* (London: Routledge, 2006).
81. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, 2004); Walter Russell Mead, *Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk* (New York: Knopf, 2004); Peter Rudolf, "Die USA und der Aufstieg Chinas," *SWP-Studie S*, 9 (Apr. 2006).
82. Nicola Casarini, "The Evolution of the EU–China Relationship: From Constructive Engagement to a Strategic Partnership", EUISS Occasional Paper 64 (2006).
83. Kent E. Calder, *Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America's Future in Asia* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1996); the basic tenets of the study are still valid.
84. Peter Rudolf, "Die USA und der Aufstieg Chinas. Die Strategie der Bush-Administration," *SWP-Studie S*, 9 (Apr. 2006); see, however, n. 68).
85. Hubert Zimmermann, *Drachenzähmung. Die EU und die USA in den Verhandlungen um die Integration Chinas in den Welthandel* (Baden–Baden: Nomos, 2007).



## 15

# Conclusion: The United States and Europe: Just Another Crisis?

*Geir Lundestad*

### Introduction

Many seem to have forgotten now, but even in the golden years of American–European cooperation, during the long cold-war years, there was almost always a major crisis in Atlantic relations: the creation of NATO, the rearming of Germany, Suez, Charles de Gaulle, Vietnam, the neutron bomb, the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe, Ronald Reagan’s hard line toward the Soviet Union, Reykjavik and Reagan’s soft line, the unification of Germany.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the crisis perspective consistently dominated the contemporary literature on the American–European relationship. Book after book dealt with the various crises. The end of NATO was frequently predicted. It is another matter that in hindsight these crises were soon forgotten. The basic emphasis in later writings has, therefore, been on how well the NATO alliance worked during the cold war.

When George W. Bush came to power in the United States and American–European tension climaxed over the Iraq war, these events led observers to conclude that what so many had so confidently predicted earlier, NATO’s demise or, at best, its irrelevance, was now actually about to come true.<sup>2</sup> Something dramatically new had happened in Atlantic affairs. This new view was so strong that few, if any, asked the question of whether the Atlantic crisis we now saw could be just another in the long series of NATO crises that were now simply continuing after the end of the cold war.

Therefore, the crisis question was really the underlying, but still dominant, one in our discussions at Balestrand. True, the crisis over the Iraq war was probably the deepest in NATO’s long history. Yet, it has not even lasted the full eight years of the Bush administration. There has been a marked difference between the strained climate of the first four years, particularly

the years 2003–4, and the quieter years of the second term. During the second term important developments have taken place both in the United States and in Europe that have brought the two sides much closer together again.

No consensus was reached on whether the (first) Bush years were just another Atlantic crisis that had already blown over or would blow over sooner or later or whether the problems were deeper this time around. While in his chapter Charles S. Maier suggests that the earlier structure of cooperation might well be rebuilt, in his chapter Charles A. Kupchan thinks the period of cold-war cooperation is over and that we are now in a new historical period.<sup>3</sup> NATO may not be dissolved, but it has lost much of its essence. The cold-war years had their own logic. That logic is now gone. Not all the contributors addressed this question as explicitly as this, and we all realized how difficult it is to make predictions about the future. Still, at least indirectly, the lines of division were evident. One group thought it most likely that Atlantic cooperation would continue. In addition to Charles S. Maier, this group can be said to consist of G. John Ikenberry, David P. Calleo, Steven Kull, and Stanley R. Sloan. On the more skeptical side were found, in addition to Charles A. Kupchan, Michael Cox, Frédéric Bozo, Helga Haftendorn, and Gustav Schmidt. Marcin Zaborowski, William Wallace, Rob Kroes, and myself were found in various middle positions.

It is striking that, with the exception of Kupchan, all the American contributors were relatively optimistic about future developments, while all the Europeans were more pessimistic. One explanation for this line of division seems rather obvious: the American participants felt that developments, particularly in America, had changed quickly in the past; they could change again. Basic American attitudes toward Europe were generally friendly. Europeans were more prone to generalize about more lasting and structural differences between Americans and Europeans as such. Attitudes in Europe had also become quite negative not only to the Bush administration, but also to many US positions and policies as such.

Thus, the present chapter will represent not a consensus arising from the conference, because there was no such consensus, but my own middle position. In presenting this position, I will deal with some basic historical arguments as well as the findings of the other contributors.

## The Cold-War Framework

Despite the many cold-war crises, there was indeed a common framework that held the two sides of the Atlantic together for almost five decades. Nobody summed this up better than Lord Ismay, NATO's first secretary-general, when he allegedly stated that NATO was formed "to keep the Russians out, the

Germans down, and the Americans in.”<sup>4</sup> There could be differences in the analysis of Soviet intentions, but on the whole the NATO allies agreed on the basic substance of the Soviet threat. Rather less was said publicly about the German threat, but we see now that even at top levels, not only in Paris, but also in London and even in Washington, they long worried about what the Germans would be up to in the future. Western Europe needed the United States. First only Washington could provide the economic assistance needed to rebuild Europe; then only the United States could provide the political support and, finally, the military guarantees the Europeans desired against the Soviet Union and even Germany. This was indeed “empire by invitation.”<sup>5</sup>

During the cold war Europe was the big prize Washington and Moscow fought over. This was the continent that could most dramatically change the balance of power between East and West. As Winston Churchill told President Harry Truman in the heat of the Korean War, he hoped the United States would not become too heavily involved in Korea, “for it is in Europe that the mortal challenge to world freedom must be confronted.”<sup>6</sup> This was where most of the serious cold-war crises occurred. At the very center were Germany and Berlin. While the two sides of the Atlantic could generally agree on European issues, colonialism, Suez, and Vietnam illustrated how easily the United States and European powers divided over issues outside Europe.

Whenever there was talk of reducing the American troop presence in Europe, European governments reacted very negatively. De Gaulle, rather isolated in his criticism of Washington, kicked the American troops out of France, but, since they remained in West Germany, he could still count on America’s nuclear deterrence and its military presence in Europe. Thus, even he continued the venerable French tradition, dating back to the end of the First World War, of wanting American guarantees, first against Germany, later against the Soviet Union. The United States strongly backed European integration, for a long time actually much more strongly than did the Europeans themselves. An integrated Europe would represent an extension of the more efficient US federal model, it would save American taxpayers’ money, it would help solve the German problem, and, finally, it would strengthen the West against the Communist threat. Most importantly, it could safely be assumed that this integration would take place within an Atlantic framework that guaranteed America’s leading role.<sup>7</sup>

On the economic side, a huge and rapidly growing Atlantic market and investment area was created. Whenever economic disputes developed, presidents and prime ministers put their respective ministers in place. As George H. W. Bush stated at the very end of the cold war, “what an absurdity it would be if future historians attribute the demise of the Western alliance to disputes over beef hormones and wars over pasta.”<sup>8</sup> On the cultural side it seemed

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that an American-dominated mass culture was making the United States and Western Europe more and more alike. We saw the same movies and later even many of the same television programs, read many of the same books, wore many of the same clothes, even began to eat much of the same food.<sup>9</sup>

## Atlantic Crisis

When you are right in the middle of the flow of history, it may be difficult to decide when one period ends and another begins. Change is rarely complete. The mixture between new and old may have changed, but it will still be a mixture. The present chapter argues that the cold-war period was unique. The next question is, then, when did the new period start. Did it start with the end of the cold war in 1989 or with George W. Bush and the Iraq war? The 1990s were clearly years of transition. The continuities with the past were really remarkable, although at a deeper level change was obvious: the cold war was over, America had become more conservative, Europe had moved toward more comprehensive integration and greater autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. Still, it took time before these changes became fully manifest. Therefore, as suggested in the Introduction, I see the 1990s as a subperiod within the earlier one, not the later one.<sup>10</sup>

In 2007–8 the situation is certainly different from the long cold-war years.<sup>11</sup> The cold war itself is definitely over. That big unifier in American–European relations, the Soviet Union, has disappeared. We read in NATO communiqués that the member states agree on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) being the new threats, but the polls clearly tell us that September 11 had a much greater impact on the Americans than on the Europeans. The United States was shocked into furious action; many European countries had been dealing with terrorism for quite some time already. Many in Europe feared the war in Iraq strengthened terrorism; it certainly did not seem to weaken it. As Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev has stated: “The Americans feel they are engaged in a war, the Europeans feel they are engaged in preventing one.”

With terrorists having struck in several European cities, most notably in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, the urgency has increased on the European side. Anti-terrorist legislation in European countries has come to resemble that in the USA. On the other hand, while NATO had seemed the perfect organization to handle the Soviet threat, terrorism had to be dealt with on many different levels. While deterrence had appeared sufficient to prevent conflict with the Soviet Union, it seemed to have no effect vis-à-vis terrorists.

There are obvious differences in the foreign-policy consequences of American and European attitudes, as seen over Iraq and Iran. These differences

are also reflected in the national-security strategies of the United States (from September 2002, updated in March 2006) and the European Union (from December 2003). While both sides agree that in principle all instruments have to be used against terrorism, the American documents stress the coercive side relatively more. Washington refers to the “war on terror;” Brussels to the “fight against terrorism.”<sup>12</sup> To the United States the terrorist threat is largely external; to the Europeans it is more internal. This too requires different means. Virtually all European countries, including the UK, have objected to the indefinite detention of prisoners at Guantánamo and the examples of American torture at Abu Ghraib and other prisons. Although some were, Europeans presumably should not be cooperating in any of this, whether through “renditions” or in other ways. Michael Cox even argues that new terrorist attacks will only serve to make the divide between the United States and Europe grow.<sup>13</sup>

The United States has always been ideologically exceptionalist, in the sense that it considered itself unique with a special message to present to the rest of the world. Until the Second World War this American “city on the hill” had to be protected from the outside world; after the Second World War there was no danger of “God’s own country” being contaminated by the Old World; almost all influence would now flow in the other direction, from the United States to Western Europe. More recently, however, the unilateralism that was always there has reached new heights. In a slap at the Clinton administration’s alleged multilateralism, assertive or not, the new Bush administration insisted on pursuing America’s own national interests. All states, of course, pursue their national interests. What the new administration was really saying was that it would now define these interests more narrowly, while at the same time making it very evident that it expected the rest of the world to follow America’s lead.

The rise in America’s unilateralism is easily explained. The United States was in a triumphant mood. The military and in part the economic might of the United States has grown tremendously since the end of the cold war. The Soviet Union declined and then disappeared entirely, thus making the Gulf and the Iraq wars possible. With the Soviet Union still intact, these wars would simply have been too risky. Globalization has begun to affect even the United States in new and sometimes rather undesirable ways. September 11 dramatically changed America’s policy. Obviously, the Republican domination of US politics greatly underlined the national(ist) dimensions in American foreign policy. In 1994 the Republicans took over Congress, in 2000 the presidency. While September 11 would have also changed the policies of Bill Clinton, it is still striking how dramatically better American–European relations were under Clinton than under Bush.

On the European side, with the cold war over, most governments anticipated they had increased freedom vis-à-vis the United States. France, which

had always insisted on the American security guarantee and therefore in virtually all cold-war and even post-cold-war crises had ultimately sided with the United States (various Berlin crises, Cuba, later the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, 9/11, and Afghanistan), now felt much freer to act. It led the international opposition against the USA over Iraq. In a dramatic reversal of history, Russia and China could now hide behind France.<sup>14</sup> During the cold war, Germany's division—with the Iron Curtain running straight through the country, the Red Army being stationed in great force in the Eastern part, and West Berlin in a highly vulnerable position—had automatically guaranteed West Germany's high degree of loyalty to the United States. Now, with the country unified, the Red Army gone, and Germany surrounded in all directions by friendly neighbors, new attitudes quickly developed and Berlin used its new-found freedom to distance itself from Washington. In September 2002, for the first time a German election was won in part on the government distancing itself from the United States.

Impatient people, like Americans and journalists, easily underestimate the progress the European Union is making. The EU has been able to combine geographical widening and a deepening of content. European integration has expanded from six to nine to twelve to fifteen and then to twenty-seven members. It has moved from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), to the Treaties of Rome, to the Single Integrated Market, to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Although the recent European constitutional treaty was not ratified, this significant setback for European integration will be tempered by the more ad hoc integrationist measures now being adopted.

To define Europe, also vis-à-vis the United States, was almost always an element in European integration, although this was long done largely implicitly and within the Atlantic framework. Now, however, many Europeans want the defining done somewhat more explicitly and the Atlantic framework is to be much looser than before. While several Central and East European governments are actively inviting the United States in, the invitational aspect is largely, although not entirely, gone in Western Europe. With some of the traditional advantages associated with European integration having become outdated, the Bush administration's response was evident. While publicly continuing much of the support for European integration, in practice the emphasis was on "disaggregating" Europe. Particularly after Iraq, "New Europe" was to be supported over "Old Europe." While Britain was to remain a crucial partner, the United States should "punish France, ignore Germany, and forgive Russia."<sup>15</sup>

While during the cold war Europe had been the main prize and the likely battle ground, after Bosnia and Kosovo Europe appeared stabilized. All the new crises occurred outside Europe. Washington's new focus was on

“the Greater Middle East,” including Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, and then on East Asia. Europe now appeared a rather distant third in Washington’s attention. Reluctantly the Europeans came to accept the American view that “NATO had to go out of area or out of business.” NATO went from a European to a Euro-Atlantic and then to a rather global organization, from protecting the Europeans against the Soviet threat to intervening against terrorist/failed/rogue states far from Europe. (Washington liked to focus on “rogue states”, Brussels on “failed states.” Sometimes they were one and the same.) This change among the Europeans was remarkable, but the geographical shift was taking its political toll in the form of increased Atlantic division.<sup>16</sup>

On the economic side there was a proliferation of disputes, and now the economic interests were no longer necessarily subordinated to wider strategic–political ones. Through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other institutions the distinction between domestic and foreign considerations was blurred. Anti-trust legislation, environmental policies, even aspects of taxation were becoming matters of international resolution, sometimes with negative repercussions for Atlantic relations. More politically, while the Europeans were busy pooling their sovereignty, Washington’s opposition to multilateralism was stronger than ever. The downside of Europe’s pooling of sovereignty was that, once the Europeans had finally been able to agree among themselves, it was difficult to modify this policy in negotiations with others.

On the cultural side, which for so long had brought the two sides of the Atlantic closer together, the Americans were now frequently criticized, not only for what they did, but also for who they were. They were morally retrograde because they did not respect international law and the environment and practiced the death penalty; they were socially retrograde in that they did not care about the poor; they were culturally retrograde in their religious crusades, their tawdry mass entertainment, and their adulation of Mammon. In opposition to all this stood Europe, with its alleged tolerance, community, taste, and manners. Much of this was caricature and had little to do with reality. There was also considerable variation in attitudes within Europe, with Poland and Britain generally being most friendly toward the USA. Nevertheless, all this illustrated the New European climate. In Europe, George W. Bush was frequently seen as the problem, but this kind of criticism clearly went much deeper than simply the president. It also went wider than those on the left and the far right, who had more or less always criticized the United States.<sup>17</sup> The Americans, on the other hand, often saw the Europeans as unwilling to stand up to evil and sin, whether abroad or at home, as administering lethargic economies, and as largely concerned with themselves and their many internal problems.<sup>18</sup>

## An Improved Atlantic Climate

So, although there had almost always been crises in Atlantic relations, the new troubles seemed to be deeper and more permanent. We appeared to be in a period of transatlantic drift, possibly even divorce. Yet, there would soon be signs of improvement. In its second term the Bush administration has appreciated its European allies more highly than before. The many problems in Iraq had underlined the danger of going it alone. Most of America's best and most capable allies were, after all, found in Europe. NATO, despite its problems, was still a useful instrument for exerting influence in Europe, and now, after NATO's transformation, to some extent even globally. Increasingly, the focus was on Afghanistan, where NATO was doing an important job. The Democrats, who won control of Congress in the 2006 elections, clearly favored improved relations with Europe.<sup>19</sup>

In Europe the transatlantic divide first appeared to increase when elections in Spain in April 2004 brought to power a Socialist government clearly more critical than its predecessor of the USA; after Romano Prodi's narrow election victory in Italy in April 2006, a similar, but somewhat smaller, move to the left took place there.

Yet the European front of opposition to the United States was weakening. In crucial France and Germany, the establishment in particular, if not so much the public, felt that it might have gone too far in alienating Washington. Iraq remained a major problem, but the rapprochement was seen over Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iran. After the September 2005 elections, the new CDU-SPD coalition government in Germany under Angela Merkel changed course. The dominant CDU was closer to the United States than the SPD had become; with her background from East Germany, Angela Merkel had a personal interest in an improved Atlantic climate. She clearly wanted to renew American-European cooperation.

In France Nicolas Sarkozy was elected president in May 2007. He saw himself, and was seen by many, as the outsider reformer of a France long run by traditional elites and badly in need of reform. The reforms definitely included relations with the United States. He too favored closer ties with the USA. He took vacations in the USA and admired American economic efficiency and popular culture. He chose a foreign minister who had even supported the American intervention in Iraq. Sarkozy condemned the regime in Iran and showed greater sympathy for Israel. These were all dramatic changes compared to the last years under Chirac. They brought Paris much closer to Washington. Despite the disillusionment over Iraq and domestic criticism of the USA, the UK, even under new prime minister Gordon Brown, the smaller West European Atlantic-oriented states, and, as Marcin Zaborowski shows,<sup>20</sup> most of the Central and East European



governments, led by Poland, still wanted to maintain close relations with the Americans.

The bitter dispute over Iraq had overshadowed the fact that the overall objectives had, after all, been rather similar on the two sides of the Atlantic. To a large extent they still were. America and Europe had and still have a common interest in promoting democracy and human rights. As political-science liberals have insisted, democracies do not go to war, at least not against each other; they cooperate. The most firmly rooted democracies in the world are found in North America and in Western Europe. The two sides of the Atlantic want to combat terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons, although they disagree on exactly how this should be done. G. John Ikenberry argues that, after the failed unilateralism of Iraq, both America and Europe will come to recognize that only a new form of multilateralism can solve their and the world's most serious problems.<sup>21</sup>

In Bush's second term the rhetoric has changed again. Cooperation in NATO has been encouraged. The administration has become more consistently pro-integrationist, although much of the underlying skepticism has remained. Europe's loyalty to the United States can still not be taken for granted. That has made it dangerous to promote a strong EU. Washington gave no direct support to the EU constitutional treaty. To the extent that it was needed, the UK was warned against extensive military cooperation with France.<sup>22</sup>

The two sides also share a common interest in freer trade and economic prosperity. The Atlantic economy constitutes an effectively functioning market; as David P. Calleo emphasizes, in this larger perspective the many economic disputes are still minor and most of them are relatively quickly resolved.<sup>23</sup> While trade across the Pacific had long surpassed trade across the Atlantic, on the investment side Europe dominated. In 2000–4 six countries in Europe were among the top ten destinations of US foreign investment. Investment in Ireland (the sixth country) was three times larger than in heavily focused China. The situation was similar with regard to European investment in the USA.<sup>24</sup>

While, with the increasing conservatism of the USA, the political cultures of the United States and Europe might well be separating, to a large extent the two sides still share a common mass-consumption culture. This was underlined by the new French president, who brought a dramatic change from the traditional disdain of French elites for most forms of American popular culture. Traditionally the French masses had not shared this disdain. Thus, the top film in France in 2005 was *Star Wars: Episode 3*; the all-time blockbuster was *Titanic*; Britney Spears was the person most searched for on Google France in 2004.<sup>25</sup> Rob Kroes stresses that, despite a rising anti-Americanism in Europe, the cultures of the United States and Europe are closely intertwined.<sup>26</sup> On the even more populist side, the prevalence of the same reality TV programs

appears to be bringing about a truly integrated Atlantic TV culture. In a world where “clashes of civilization” seem to be on the rise, this common basis is important in preventing the two sides of the Atlantic from drifting apart. Steven Kull even argues that the basic political division runs, not between the two sides of the Atlantic, but between Republicanism in America and the rest.<sup>27</sup> In more realist terms, the United States still wants to play an important role in Europe; most, but far from all, Europeans still want it to do so.

Here, on the basis of recent history, I shall discuss three more general factors that would seem to be of particular significance for the future of the American–European relationship. The first concerns America’s leadership role and how strong and how explicit it should be in a period when Europe is defining itself more and more also vis-à-vis the United States. The second has to do with the future of the EU, how unified it is likely to be and on what basis. For decades Washington has insisted that it favors an integrated Europe with increased military capabilities. What is likely to happen if its wishes are finally granted? The third factor concerns the instruments of foreign policy, where the United States often favors sticks, including even military force, whereas the Europeans on the whole prefer dialogue and carrots.

### **Atlantic Relations Redefined: Leadership**

Through the years many attempts have been made to redefine the Atlantic relationship. The most explicit ones were made by John F. Kennedy in his Interdependence speech on July 4, 1962, by Nixon–Kissinger in their Year of Europe initiative of 1973, by Helmut Kohl and George H. W. Bush in what led to the Transatlantic Declaration in November 1990, and by Kohl and other European leaders in what in 1995 became the New Transatlantic Agenda and the Joint Action Plan.<sup>28</sup> As far as the future was concerned, the point of most of these initiatives was generally that, in return for the Europeans taking on larger commitments, particularly in defense, Washington promised them greater influence. These efforts at redefinition met with rather limited success, although it could be argued that at least in a long-term perspective the process was moving slowly in the desired direction. The Europeans were doing more and they were becoming somewhat more influential.

Despite Europe’s shortcomings, particularly when it comes to military capabilities, sooner or later there has to be a true redefinition of the American–European relationship. As William Wallace argues, the transition from American leadership to an American–European partnership will be difficult.<sup>29</sup> The United States has never had a really balanced relationship with Western Europe. Under isolationism the United States stayed away from Europe in security terms because the New World perceived itself as vulnerable

and weak. After the Second World War, America's influence was clearly dominant. In the American–British relationship, before the Second World War, when the two countries had been more equal in strength, there had been no special relationship. That came only when it was obvious for all to see who was the senior and who the junior partner.<sup>30</sup> All talk among Britons of their being the smart Greeks of the Roman Empire primarily served to soften London's shock at the new realities of power. Even détente with the Soviet Union in the early 1970s flourished only when the United States saw itself in a period of relative decline and the military expansion of the Soviet Union therefore had to be contained.<sup>31</sup>

Since the Second World War the United States has always been the leader in Atlantic affairs. Virtually nobody questioned this. Probably no administration led as creatively and effectively as did Truman's. Washington then set up an international and a European structure—in the form of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), NATO, the Marshall Plan, and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), later the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)—that was clearly based on America's predominance, but that at the same time provided for the basic needs of the Western Europeans. Despite the cracks that began to develop, particularly in the 1970s, this structure has lasted into the new millennium.

Despite America's tremendous strength (in 1945 its total production was virtually as high as that of the rest of the world combined, a fact never seen before and unlikely to be witnessed again in history), there was surprisingly little explicit emphasis on America's national interests and even less on these interests being opposed to those of other countries. Washington just acted, assuming more or less automatically that the United States and Western Europe had the most basic interests in common. The Europeans invited the Americans to play the role they did. Under Eisenhower, Washington went so far in its support for European integration that the administration repeatedly talked about Western Europe as a "third force" in international relations. This was not to be interpreted literally, in that even Eisenhower always assumed that the third force would be cooperating rather closely with the United States, but it illustrated how eager the administration was to give Europe freedom to organize under America's security umbrella.<sup>32</sup>

Even de Gaulle recognized America's "hegemonic" role. His plans for a Western triumvirate to run global affairs were probably an effort to secure France's equality with Britain, rather than with the United States. In NATO nothing of substance could be decided against the will of Washington. Whenever the United States had to integrate its own policies into a common structure, this policy had to represent an extension of US policy. Thus, America's military strategy was to be NATO's, although de Gaulle was able to delay the formal

shift from massive retaliation to flexible response for a few years. When needed, Washington could act with great decisiveness vis-à-vis its allies, as was seen during Suez in 1956 and with the Franco-German Treaty in 1963.<sup>33</sup> In 2007–8 no ally is able to interfere with America's "war on terror."

Whenever Washington put the emphasis on outward and explicit recognition of its leadership role, trouble tended to follow. Ronald Reagan insisted that America had declined because "America had simply ceased to be the leader in the world." America had to regain "the respect of America's allies and adversaries alike." If the United States provided the leadership, the European allies would presumably follow. In the early days of the Reagan administration, the attitude to the Soviet Union was influenced by Washington's "evil-empire" approach. With the substitution of terrorism for the Soviet Union, does this not sound quite familiar?

The results of Reagan's initial policy were not very satisfactory. More concretely, the Reagan administration's attitude led directly to the pipeline dispute where the administration went against the desire of practically all Western Europe, certainly including Thatcher's Britain, to develop economic ties with the Soviet Union. After an acrimonious debate, Washington ultimately backed down on the pipeline issue. From 1983–4 the evil-empire approach to the Soviet Union was abandoned, although only in part because of Europe's negative response to it.

Politically George W. Bush is the son of Ronald Reagan much more than he is the son of his physical father president. America's national interests are to reign supreme; anything that limits America's freedom of action is wrong. Multilateralism, in the form of countries having certain common overriding interests, was rejected. Clinton had allegedly practiced multilateralism. And for a long time "Clinton" was as close as many members of the Bush administration came to a swear word. It was another matter that this description of Clinton did not actually represent reality. He had not really sacrificed America's interests at the altar of allied unity. There had, in fact, been substantial US–European differences over Bosnia and Kosovo, and lesser differences even over NATO expansion. Washington's warnings against decoupling, duplication, and discrimination represented efforts to contain the EU's aspiring defense efforts. Generally Clinton prevailed. His troubles were more domestic, particularly after the Republicans had captured control of Congress in 1994. Thus, he made no effort to get Kyoto, the International Criminal Court (ICC), or the landmine treaty through Congress.

After the war in Iraq had turned out to be much more protracted than had been foreseen, the Bush administration had to temper its unilateralism. As has been stated, Clinton's policy was "multilateral when you can, unilateral when you must." Bush's new attitude could be described as "unilateral when you can, multilateral when you must." It became obvious that Washington would benefit from broad support, as far as both international legitimacy

and military and economic resources were concerned. In his second term George W. Bush has emphasized the values of “freedom” and “liberty” in the American liberal tradition. Although an improvement on the rhetoric of his first term, even the emphasis on freedom and liberty has not really united the two sides of the Atlantic. The new rhetoric is seen in part as internationally destabilizing and dangerous, in part simply as a new justification for what the USA was doing in Iraq. And, from the viewpoint of Europe, there were always new approaches coming out of Washington; invariably they were presented as the ultimate solution to whatever problem they were meant to address.

In his ambition to change the world, Bush has been compared to Woodrow Wilson. Bush’s policy was said to be “Wilsonianism with boots.” There were obvious similarities, particularly in the emphasis on freedom and liberty. But Wilson promoted international organization in the form of the League of Nations; Bush did no such thing. And Wilson’s overall ideology was rather different, as when he proclaimed: “Whenever we use our power, we must use it with this conception always in mind—that we are using it for the benefit of the persons who are chiefly interested, and not for our own benefit.”<sup>34</sup> The Bush administration generally put matters rather differently, particularly during its first term in office. As Condoleezza Rice wrote, action had to benefit America. “There is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect.”<sup>35</sup> Brent Scowcroft summed up the change from George H. W. Bush to George W. Bush most succinctly, “I used to be on the right. Now I am suddenly on the left. And I have not changed my views on anything.”<sup>36</sup>

Thus, the Bush administration has insisted on its leadership role being more explicitly recognized than has any previous administration in Washington, and that would include Reagan’s. In its first term this was done almost aggressively. America was to lead; its leadership was to be based on its own national interests. In the second term the message has been more universal, but again with an obvious claim to leadership. Equally significant, this has occurred at a time when the EU was insisting on a more balanced relationship than before. In France and Germany both leaders and public opinion were openly questioning America’s claim to leadership. The war in Iraq had greatly accelerated this process. Even Tony Blair was working hard to increase Europe’s military capabilities and thereby strengthen its voice, also vis-à-vis Washington. His efforts to reinforce the EU’s defense role were met with skepticism in the American capital and were tolerated only because of Blair’s strong record in working closely with Washington in major international crises. At the public-opinion level, comfortable majorities in the EU countries want the EU to become a superpower like the United States, although one generally cooperating with the USA. Still, while 66 percent of

Americans think the partnership of the United States and Western Europe should remain as close as it has been in the past, only 26 percent of the French, 39 percent of the Germans, and 42 percent of the British feel the same way.<sup>37</sup>

During the cold war virtually everybody had recognized the leadership role of the United States. Now the situation appeared more ambiguous. Consultation was required; it had to mean more than simply being told a short time in advance of some action. For the Europeans, some sort of European veto on American actions might have been desirable, but Washington would never agree to any such veto. The Europeans did not give Washington any veto over their actions. In fact, on the European side, in most capitals it was taken as a matter of course that they would adopt positions different from those of the USA (over the ICC, Kyoto, the Middle East, and so on), sometimes without even informing the United States of major new initiatives (such as lifting the weapons embargo against China).

The lesson appears clear. If the United States is to continue to exert its leadership, this has to be done on the basis of genuine respect for general values and not as an afterthought after very explicit unilateral claims to leadership have failed. It is probably too late to reclaim what has been lost, but there is a clear warning here as far as the future is concerned. Washington cannot lead effectively if it insists on first defining and then presenting its interests as entirely different from those of its friends and allies. If its interests are truly so different that they cannot reasonably be presented in any other fashion, this is just another way of stating that transatlantic drift, or worse, is here to stay. On the other hand, if the Europeans insist on influencing the world's only superpower, it goes without saying that they in turn have to be willing to consult Washington in a meaningful way on matters of important overall concern.

### **Atlantic Relations Redefined: Equality**

After considerable initial uncertainty, the Bush administration, at least publicly, came out in favor of the traditional American goal of a strong and integrated Europe. This public support has become more explicit in Bush's second term. In practice, however, Washington showed how skeptical it was to a united Europe. The primacy of NATO and thereby of America's leadership in Atlantic affairs had to be protected. There was to be no truly equal relationship between the USA and the EU.

In a sense the Bush administration has been correct. There could be no truly balanced relationship between the USA and the EU until the two sides had become more equal in power. True, the EU already has a population that is

almost 200 million larger than that of the USA. The EU's total gross national product is at least as large as that of the United States and probably even larger, depending in part on the fluctuations of exchange rates. The euro is gaining on the dollar as the leading global currency; together the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve govern most of the world financial system.

Still, despite the EU countries having around 1.6 million men (and women) under arms and the USA 1.4 million, there can be no hiding the fact that in great-power terms the EU lags far behind the USA. The diminishing defense budgets of the EU countries in 2007–8 actually represent considerably less than one-half of the growing budget of the United States; the effect of EU defense spending is probably less than half of that again in that the still lingering territorial approach of the EU countries is quite ineffective in great-power terms.<sup>38</sup>

In fact, Europe still cannot take care even of its own defense, in the sense that a substantial, although declining number of American soldiers remained in Europe even after the end of the cold war. Washington brought the number of 100,000 down by sending some of its troops home; others were moved to the new NATO allies further east. After 2001 the withdrawals stopped. The protests against the reductions, particularly in Germany, illustrate Europe's continued sense of dependence on the United States, a fact that would seem to be incompatible with true equality.<sup>39</sup>

The EU is nowhere close to being a unified and effective actor on the world stage. The events in Iraq have illustrated the divisions within the EU more clearly than ever. Yet, it continues to define ever new goals for its foreign and security policy; it is also setting up ever new mechanisms to carry out this policy. In addition to monitoring, assistance, and police missions, the EU is even able to take on new military tasks, as we have seen in Macedonia, in Bosnia, and in Congo. (The first two were done in cooperation with NATO, the third on its own.) Frédéric Bozo emphasizes how far EU cooperation has actually advanced and how likely it is that this cooperation will continue to move on in the future.<sup>40</sup> In the Balkans an overextended USA has been relatively happy to see the EU take on a larger role. On softer issues such as trade, development assistance, in the approach to anything from the Middle East to Kyoto and the International Criminal Court, the EU countries have been able to reach a consensus, but on most of these issues the EU still exerts less influence than one could have expected. Even when the EU is able to hammer out common views, sometimes these views do not count for much in international diplomacy. In the diplomacy of the Middle East the EU is still a subordinate actor, except on the financial side;<sup>41</sup> on the Korean peninsula it is hardly an actor at all. This has something to do with a lack of military and political power, but it may also reflect the degree of seriousness with which the EU adopts its positions.

On Europe's crucial relationship with the United States, the EU was long at an impasse. On the one hand, it was impossible for the EU to define Europe as a separate pole in a multipolar world, much less to unite Europe against the United States. France has long been interested in promoting a more independent Europe, although one that could still call upon the United States in time of crisis. With the cold war over and no clear and present danger to Europe, Paris's urge for independence grew considerably. It received considerable support from Germany (particularly under Gerhard Schröder), Belgium, and Luxembourg, and also from Spain after the change there to a Socialist government in 2004. In virtually every European country public opinion went against the American intervention in Iraq. Yet, this was not sufficient to make the EU adopt its own course of action. The UK, Italy, and the smaller Atlantic-oriented states were strongly opposed, as were most of the Central and Eastern European countries, with Poland firmly in the lead. On the other hand, these pro-American countries could not make the EU adopt their view as the official EU position. France, Germany, and their supporters would never agree to that. Although it is now much reduced, this is still the lingering division inside the EU. Thus, in return for his forthcoming attitude to the USA and NATO, Sarkozy is clearly expecting American acceptance of a stronger identity for Europe.

Although the EU lags far behind the USA in military capacity, it is still true that in 2004 the EU-25 together spent as much on defense as China, Russia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, India, and South Korea combined.<sup>42</sup> The problem is that there is no EU defense force; there are 27 national armies, 23 air forces, and 20 navies. For any European Security and Defense Policy of real substance to develop, the EU countries have to spend more and more importantly better on defense. This means that the UK and France will have to work together. With the partial exception of these two countries, there are few signs that Europe is spending more, although it may be spending somewhat better, in that the concept of territorial defense is slowly being modified and the EU countries are willing to see their defense structures in a more common perspective. The EU has been able to handle a growing number of conflicts at the lower end of the violence spectrum. Yet, this process still has far to go for the EU to become a truly significant military force in international affairs, actually able to handle the higher end of the spectrum conflicts such as Kosovo in 1999.

France and the UK traditionally represented the extremes within the EU in the debate on the relationship with the United States; they are also the only two powers with really significant military strength. The two tried to form a common basis at Saint-Malo in December 1998. Saint-Malo in fact led to the formal adoption of the ESDP.

Iraq pushed much of the substance, if not necessarily the vocabulary, of the ESDP to the side. With the protagonists eager to put Iraq behind them,



attempts were soon made to revive ESDP. Focus shifted from the only partly fulfilled capacities of the Headline goals (1999) to the higher quality of the smaller battle groups (2004). The UK has played a prominent role in defining these concrete, military targets.<sup>43</sup> It is often forgotten that Tony Blair was not only a pro-American prime minister. He was also, next to Edward Heath, the most pro-European prime minister the UK has had. Naturally, the United Kingdom will have more leverage with Washington the more support it has in Europe and the greater the defense capabilities of the UK and its fellow EU countries. In the new improved post-Iraq climate, it may well be that Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy will be able to take British–French cooperation beyond what Blair and Chirac did. Unfortunately for them, British public opinion, as well as the UK's continued close cooperation with the USA, set clear limits to what they will be able to accomplish; even Sarkozy is bound by France's still lingering Gaullism.

France and Germany long provided the engine in European integration. When the EU expanded to twenty-five members, this French–German basis was too limited. That was the lesson both of the Iraq war and of the constitutional process inside the EU. If the duo had been expanded into a trio with the inclusion of the United Kingdom, this could possibly have provided a new engine. France and Germany were, however, too ambivalent to the UK and the UK was too ambivalent to the EU. There were also other countries that wanted to be included, particularly Italy, Spain, and Poland. As Jolyon Howorth has argued, in some respects neither the UK's nor France's traditional position did make much sense. France's hard line toward Washington got it nowhere; it served only to divide the EU, and, with the new countries joining the EU, the line of division did not favor France. On the other hand, the UK's frequently almost unconditional alignment with the United States robbed it of its potentially crucial role in forming a European foreign and security policy, an area where Britain's contribution would really matter.<sup>44</sup>

A policy of divide-and-rule may prove tempting for the United States; it has for virtually all previous great powers of the past. At a minimum, it would prevent the EU from uniting against the USA. Yet, most likely such policies would be counterproductive, even for the USA. Charges about US imperial behavior would increase in intensity in Europe; popular sympathy for the USA would dwindle further. At worst, a policy of divide-and-rule could substantially harm both NATO and the EU. If, then, the Europeans are still among the best allies the USA is likely to have, it should probably bear with the occasional fiction that the USA and the EU are equal. (Economically and commercially they are.) In any case, all elements of power considered together, this notion is closer to reality in 2007–8 than at any time in the past, when equality was frequently so loudly, and so misleadingly, proclaimed.

## The Instruments of Foreign Policy

By definition a superpower has at its disposal instruments that other powers do not have. As Robert Kagan has so succinctly informed us, if you are a superpower and have a gun, the prowling bear is not necessarily such a big threat. If you are a middle power and have only a knife, the bear becomes much more of a problem, but with luck it is perhaps still manageable.<sup>45</sup>

On top of the different capabilities, while Americans and Europeans share many common objectives, they also tend to have somewhat different cultural dispositions. Again, analysis may easily develop into caricature. Still, it generally holds true that most Americans are more optimistic than most Europeans. Americans do think that problems can be solved; Europeans tend to think that often they can only be managed. George W. Bush is out to eradicate terrorism; the US "Soldier's Creed" posted in camps in Iraq stated that "I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat."<sup>46</sup> Most Europeans are not so sure about the "destroy" part. Most Americans are considerably more religious than most Europeans; they also like to think in terms of good and bad, black and white; Europeans tend to see matters more as grey. Thus, views on terrorism, on the use of force, on defense spending, on the Middle East, on the environment are different on the two sides of the Atlantic.<sup>47</sup>

Helga Haftendorn indicates how these differences have shown up in different attitudes on the two sides of the Atlantic to what Washington calls "out-law governments", "rogue states," and "the Axis of evil."<sup>48</sup> With only slight variation, going back all the way to the late days of the Carter administration, America's list of such states has been virtually the same. Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba constituted the core group. On this point at least, there were continuities from the Clinton to the Bush administrations. They both put the regimes in the five countries just mentioned under great pressure. Economic sanctions were reinforced.<sup>49</sup> Congress passed acts that included provisions for sanctions even against foreign companies doing business with these states. At least with regard to Iraq and Libya, regime change was the objective also of the Clinton administration.

In some cases (Libya and Iraq in the early 1990s) the United States could pursue the sanctions at least in partial cooperation with the Europeans. Particularly vis-à-vis Iran and Cuba, Washington had to proceed unilaterally. What has been new with the Bush administration has been its determination to use the necessary military means to effect regime change in Iraq and possibly also in other cases. This change had to do with the priorities of the Bush administration, but also with September 11. In the end the latter made even ex-president Clinton and most Democrats support the invasion of Iraq.

With the primary exception of Cuba, the European analysis of the nature of the regimes concerned was not so different from the American one. Europeans too had little sympathy for the Gaddafis and the Kim Il Sung of the world. Yet, except where there was a clear international mandate, most European capitals were opposed to the complete isolation of these regimes. Europeans professed to believe in “constructive engagement” or “critical dialogue” with them. Europe did not have many successful examples to point to, but neither, then, did the United States with its sanctions policy.

On Iraq, Europe was divided over Bush’s decision to go to war. On Iran and North Korea, it is obvious that the Bush administration has had a strong dislike of negotiating with the regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang. Regime change was, and possibly still remains, its preference. Most Europeans thought regime change unlikely; if it was to come at all, then it was seen as more likely to result from a policy of increased contacts with these states, not from their complete isolation. The United States definitely did not want to exclude military instruments as the ultimate stick; the Europeans believed more in the carrots. The problem was that most of the desirable carrots—particularly in the form of military guarantees, but also economic trade and aid—were held by the United States. The lessons from the one success, Libya’s normalization with the West in 1999–2003, were ambiguous. Pressure from Washington most likely helped, although the emphasis on “regime change” probably did not. Effective sanctions, combined with problems in Libya itself, made negotiations meaningful well before the Iraq invasion of 2003.<sup>50</sup>

These are deep differences that are not easily bridged. Americans think they can eradicate evil; Europeans believe they can control it. During the cold war the same differences could actually be seen. Washington wanted to isolate China diplomatically and both the Soviet Union and China economically; the Europeans wanted to maintain diplomatic contact with China and more economic contact with both of them.<sup>51</sup> Still, in theory a compromise ought to be achievable: first you negotiate, then, if necessary, you use blunter instruments. One difficulty is that Washington has not really been willing to provide the carrots that might possibly solve the problem.

On the other hand, the Europeans, particularly the Germans, are skeptical about the sticks and from the very beginning have virtually excluded military instruments. Over Iran’s nuclear program, Britain has sided with France and Germany, and Washington has, at least temporarily, left the initiative with the EU-3. The Europeans in a way mediated between Washington and Tehran. Now, in 2007–8, because of Iran’s determination to proceed with nuclear enrichment, the effort has broken down and modest sanctions have been imposed. The question of using force has inevitably arisen.<sup>52</sup> So has the question of direct negotiations between the United States and Iran. After the

Bush administration agreed to negotiate with North Korea, apparently with fair results in 2007, it is difficult to understand why it should not be willing to negotiate directly with Iran also, outside the Iraq context. An American military attack on Iran would probably drive the USA and most of Europe considerably further apart.

It has been suggested that the American–European differences could be solved by some sort of grand bargain where the United States specializes on the military side and the Europeans on the political–economic one.<sup>53</sup> Such suggestions are unlikely to provide any solution. If the USA does undertake a military operation, it will of course insist on also having the lead in the political–economic reconstruction. Similarly, Europe will not agree simply to foot the bills resulting from US military interventions. Europe will want influence on what produced the bills in the first place.

In a compromise, while the USA has to give full support to negotiations, at least as a first step, the Europeans may ultimately have to accept certain sticks, in extreme cases even military ones. This requires greater military strength. It will not do to argue, as many Europeans do, that the EU represents a less military and more political–economic approach to international affairs and therefore does not need greater military strength. This argument might seem highly relevant in the case of Iraq, where so much has gone so wrong for Washington. Often long-term containment may indeed represent a better solution than the use of force. Nevertheless, this does not answer the point that Europe has also been ineffective in solving the problems in its own backyard, as was seen so clearly in Bosnia and Kosovo. The EU's initial ambition to handle the situation in Yugoslavia on its own failed miserably. In the end Washington had to take charge, militarily and politically. Similar situations can easily arise again, over Iran, in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, in the Middle East.

The Atlantic relationship will be influenced by what happens in Iraq and, more and more, in Afghanistan. The probable failure in Iraq will have major consequences, especially in the Middle East, but since it has been expected for some time now, ramifications for American–European relations will probably be more limited. In great-power terms, the United States recovered relatively quickly from the defeat in Vietnam; so did France from Algeria. In Afghanistan the Europeans are strongly involved. Developments are going in the wrong direction even here. A defeat for NATO will in all likelihood have quite negative consequences for Atlantic cooperation, to some extent depending on exactly what the unfolding scenario will be. If NATO fails here, with a strong mandate from the UN, broad initial support in NATO, and a popularly elected government in Afghanistan, major questions will be raised about NATO's future. Few organizations are dissolved.<sup>54</sup> They may, however, lose much of their content.

## The More Distant Future

On the more general level, in a certain sense it seems rather obvious what has to be done to improve Atlantic relations. Along the lines suggested by Stanley R. Sloan,<sup>55</sup> the United States has to lead less explicitly and more on the basis of general values than the Bush administration has done. The Europeans have to give up any French-inspired notion of balancing against the USA; neither can they consistently follow the US lead. Positions between these extremes have to be developed. In relations with the “rogue states” of the world, the United States has to give diplomacy its full support, while the Europeans have to agree that sanctions and even force are final, but nevertheless real, options.

Yet, there are equally obvious reasons why such solutions are not easily agreed upon. The cold war is over; terrorism, rogue states, and WMD cannot replace the Soviet threat as the great unifier. The United States has become more unilateralist in orientation, in part because of its tremendous strength, in part because of September 11, and in part because of a whole set of domestic developments.<sup>56</sup> A Democratic president in 2008 would reverse some, but not all, of these developments. With the cold war over, France and Germany have redefined their policies several times over; the EU is becoming more integrated; even those countries most loyal to the USA recognize the need for a stronger Europe. As Gustav Schmidt suggests, whether we use the term or not, more and more the EU is developing into a separate “pole” in international relations. It is defining standards in many different fields, from the environment to monopolies, standards that are often not only at odds with American ones, but also gaining in support internationally.<sup>57</sup>

The question of a further widening of NATO could also produce tension between the two sides of the Atlantic. There is a temptation in the USA to bring in not only Ukraine and Georgia, a question on which the Europeans are skeptical, but later possibly also the leading democracies outside the Atlantic area, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. In a way this would be seen as an ideological triumph for NATO. In reality, however, any such widening is more likely to mean the further dilution of the organization and less emphasis on actually trying to work out difficulties between the two sides of the Atlantic.

The expectation has generally been that a more balanced relationship between the United States and Europe would make for an improved political climate between the two sides of the Atlantic. European dependence on the United States bred European irresponsibility. Matters would allegedly become much easier if Washington had one person to talk to in Europe instead of all the different national political leaders. On this basis, the United States pressed long and hard for a more integrated Europe; even when this commitment began to falter somewhat, Washington kept beating the drum for a

Europe with stronger defense capabilities. In fact, every administration since Truman's has lectured the Europeans on the importance of doing more in defense. "Burden sharing" has been America's constant exhortation to the Europeans. The suggested bargain has been quite evident: the stronger Europe became, the greater would be its influence in Atlantic affairs. Presumably, then, if Europe actually did more, America would be satisfied, and the two sides of the Atlantic would live happily ever after. Or, as Charles A. Kupchan has argued, "when the EU's capabilities are more robust, its perception of threat may also be in closer alignment with those of the United States."<sup>58</sup>

There may well be something to this line of reasoning. While the fact that the EU has become so integrated economically and at least in this respect the equal of the USA may have led to more, rather than fewer, disputes, most of these disputes, as Calleo and Wallace show, have been relatively quickly resolved or managed.

Yet, there are other forms of logic, and then not simply the logic of political-science realism, which, with no common threat, would clearly predict greater conflict between the USA and the more integrated EU. Many otherwise national disputes would turn into US-EU disputes; when the two sides want to prove their points, transatlantic differences could become more ideological; the parties could also start building international support for their positions. This is indeed what we have seen with Kyoto and the ICC.<sup>59</sup>

As Kissinger stated in the Nixon years: "We have sought to combine a supranational Europe with a closely integrated Atlantic Community under American leadership. These objectives are likely to prove incompatible . . . if the price for this [European unity] is that we cannot talk with our traditional European friends, then over time this could create a massive change in our relations."<sup>60</sup> A stronger Europe would probably be willing to stand up more to Washington. Nixon-Kissinger were exceptional in their skepticism about European integration, but their reasoning may still hold. In fact, as we have seen, the Bush administration's fear that Europe is no longer taking the predominance of the Atlantic framework for granted again led Washington to question its traditional support for European integration.

If increased Atlantic conflict is the more likely outcome of European integration in general, why would this be different with regard to European defense capabilities? It is unrealistic to expect that a strengthening of European capabilities would encompass only those very areas Washington wants to see reinforced. Would not a more general strengthening of European defense capabilities, however unlikely at the moment because of the public's lack of support for greater defense spending, make Europe more independent? If Europe could handle its own basic security needs and America withdrew its troops from Europe, would not this weaken Washington's leverage in dealings with the Europeans and further reduce Europe's hesitation about standing up to the United States?

Slowly Europe has become more integrated. Even more slowly the EU members are trying to coordinate their military structures. They are moving away from territorial defense and establishing some modest capabilities for long-distance intervention. Contrary to what is often assumed, Europe's growing-together and becoming stronger may well put more, not less, strain on the Atlantic relationship. That could lead Washington openly to distance itself from the objective of European integration, potentially even from the increase in Europe's military capabilities. In other words, America would be pursuing an open policy of divide-and-rule, a scenario not likely to strengthen US popularity and influence in Europe.

Thus, in all likelihood, what we have seen recently is not just another in a long series of Atlantic crises, but something deeper, more structural. As long as a divorce remains highly unlikely, a certain transatlantic distancing need not be such a bad thing. Perhaps it quite simply goes with the natural transition from one historical period to the next. The cold war had its requirements; the United States and Western Europe more or less had to act together. Now it is somewhat uncertain exactly what historical period we are in, but the requirements are clearly different from those that existed during the cold war. Even if the two sides move away from each other, they will probably still remain friends and allies. If that is not too much to hope for, Europe may possibly be forced even to handle its own defense needs in a more satisfactory way than at present. But perhaps we no longer need to have the constant debates about America's leadership, about Europe contributing more, and about Europe's right to organize itself militarily.

## Notes

1. This section on the past is based largely on Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; paperback edn., 2005).
2. See, e.g., Richard E. Rupp, *NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (Hound-mill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Ilana Bet-El and Rupert Smith, "The Bell Tolls for NATO," *National Interest*, 93 (Jan.–Feb. 2008), 62–6.
3. See Charles S. Maier, Chapter 2, and Charles A. Kupchan, Chapter 3, this volume.
4. These famous words have consistently been attributed to Lord Ismay, although nobody has apparently been able to locate the original quotation.
5. I started working with the concept of "empire by invitation" in the early 1980s. The most frequently cited version is my "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952," *Journal of Peace Research*, 23 (1986). 263–77. See also my "Empire by Invitation in the American Century," *Diplomatic History*, 23/2, 1999, 189–217.
6. Martin Gilbert, *Churchill and America* (Bath: Free Press, 2005), 396.

7. Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
8. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush, 1989 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), 584; Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration*, 112.
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