

Fabrication of EMPIRE

The British and the Uganda Kingdoms, 1890–1902

D. A. LOW



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Fabrication of Empire

During the 1890s, the 'scramble for Africa' created the new country of Uganda. This inland territory carved out by British agents first encompassed some twenty to thirty African kingdoms. In his magisterial new study, Anthony Low examines how and why the British were able to dominate these rulerships and establish a colonial government. At the same time, the book goes beyond providing a simple narrative account of events; rather, Low seeks to analyse the conditions under which such a transformation was possible. By skilfully negotiating the many complex political and social undercurrents of this period, Low presents a groundbreaking theoretical model of colonial conquest and rule. The result is a major contribution to debates about the making of empire that will appeal to Africanists and imperial historians alike.

D. A. Low is Emeritus Smuts Professor of the History of the British Commonwealth, University of Cambridge, and formerly Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University.

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*The British and the Uganda Kingdoms
1890–1902*

D. A. Low

*Emeritus Smuts Professor of the History of the British Commonwealth
in the University of Cambridge*



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For
Belle

In great gratitude for those archives in Zanzibar

Contents

	<i>Preface</i>	<i>page</i> ix
	<i>List of abbreviations and locations</i>	xi
	<i>Sketch maps</i>	xiii
1	Prologue: survey and agenda	1
2	Statecraft: external intrusion and local dominion	28
3	Ferment: conversion and revolution in Buganda	57
4	Upcountry: might-have-beens and the Buganda/Uganda outcome	86
5	Warbands: new military formations and ground level imperialism	127
6	Paramountcy: Toro, Busoga and the new overlords	150
7	Defeat: Kabalega's resistance, Mwanga's revolt and the Sudanese mutiny	184
8	Succession: Nkore and the war of Igumira's eye	215
9	Dénouement: aggregations and rulerships	249
10	Government: colonial settlements and the Buganda model	281
11	Capstone: honour, awe and imperialism	318
12	Round up and review	333
	<i>Select bibliography</i>	346
	<i>Index</i>	353

Preface

Many moons ago I published a number of items on the history of Uganda and East Africa from the late nineteenth to around the mid twentieth century. Fortuitously my paths then took me for quite a while into working on the immediate pre-independence history of India. In association with that and several other related ventures, including the early years of the *British Documents on the End of Empire* project, I have also written more extensively on ‘the end of empire’. Having done so, I began to ask questions about ‘the beginning of empire’. That in due course took me back to the Uganda story and to this book.

This in turn has brought back memories of many friends for whom one from each of the areas with which this book is concerned must stand for the rest – Abu Mayanja (Buganda), Asavia Wandira (Busoga), Kosea Shalita (Ankole), John Kaboha (Toro) and Sarah Nyendwoha (Bunyoro) – and memories too of those who were slaughtered in the dreadful Amin–Obote years: Basil Bataringaya, Michael Kagwa, Henry Nkutu, James Aryada, Frank Kalimuzo and so many others.

I have warm memories too of sustained interaction with that cluster of westerners variously associated with the then East African Institute of Social Research: Audrey Richards, Andrew Cohen, Tom Fallers, David Apter, Cran Pratt, John Beattie and Tommy Gee; and then of the venerable elders: Ham Mukasa, Serwano Kolubya, Paulo Kavuma, L. Kamugungunu, H. B. Thomas, Sir John Gray and Sir Keith Hancock. What memories they stir!

I recall too with immense gratitude the stimulus and help of other colleagues and students over the years at Makerere, at the University of Sussex, at the Australian National University and at the University of Cambridge. What a privilege it has been to have taught and researched in such an array of universities!

It would have been possible in most of the chapters which follow to have offered not only a good deal more detail but often a far more extensive array of references. Since, however, so many of these have now been provided by others I have sought rather to cleave to the argument.

Understandably ‘Imperialism’ remains a highly contested subject. There will be those therefore for whom the following pages will be far too devoid of the colour and creativity they see in the story, while others will no doubt indict them for eschewing anathemas. The purpose here is not to find some ‘middle way’, but rather in one clutch of instances to explore the processes by which imperial rule came to be established, along with some account of how the quite new territorial alignments in this case came to be scored.

Over the years the received orthography for the languages of the Ugandan kingdoms has varied (e.g. from Toro to Tooro, Kagwa to Kaggwa). Rightly or wrongly, I have chosen to use as far as possible the spelling employed by the earliest indigenous historians, while, to avoid pedantry, I have curtailed the range of prefixes they employ, refraining largely from using ‘mu-’ for the single person and ‘ki-’ for the adjectival form, even though this means that ‘Bu-’ for the territory (as in Bunyoro) and ‘Ba’ for the people (as in Banyoro) often need to stand in as adjectives. I have not, I have to say, found this problem being satisfactorily resolved, as some other scholars have done, by omitting such prefixes altogether (as in ‘Nyoro’, ‘Ganda’, ‘Soga’, etc.).


Once again I have been treated with the greatest kindness and professionalism by the staff of Cambridge University Press variously responsible for the publication of this book, and in particular by Michael Watson and Helen Waterhouse. I am much indebted too to Anthony Bright of the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific for producing the exemplary maps which vividly illustrate many parts of the ensuing story.

Anthony Low
The Australian National University

Abbreviations and locations

ESA	Entebbe Secretariat Archives Housed when researched in the basement of the former Secretariat Building in Entebbe, Uganda, now the Uganda National Archives N. B. In order to avoid endless repetition, ESA is only prefixed when the location of the item might otherwise be unclear. Otherwise it is omitted. In its place, all letter/numeral references beginning with A (e.g. A3/7, or A6/4) are to ESA
CMS	Church Missionary Society Archives Now in the University of Birmingham Library N. B. In order to avoid endless repetition, CMS is only prefixed when the location of the item might otherwise be unclear. Otherwise it is omitted. In its place, all letter/numeral references beginning with C (e.g. CA6/025) or G (e.g. G3 A5/01) are to CMS
Add. Mss.	Additional Manuscripts The British Library
AMC	Ankole miscellaneous correspondence Housed when researched in District headquarters, Mbabara
BD	Baskerville Diaries Makerere University Library
BRA	Buganda Residency Archives Housed when researched in the Buganda Residency offices, Kampala
CO	Colonial Office records The National Archives, Kew
enc.	enclosure
FO	Foreign Office records The National Archives, Kew
FOCP	Foreign Office Confidential Prints


- FP Fisher Papers
CMS Archives, University of Birmingham Library
- G/D Gedge Diaries
Rhodes House Library, Oxford
- GD *The Gladstone Diaries*, Vol. XIII, 1892–96, ed. H. C. G. Mathew, Oxford, 1994
- GDD E. T. S. Dugdale (ed.), *German Diplomatic Documents 1871–1914*, 4 vols., London, 1928–31
- GP Gedge Papers and Diaries
Rhodes House Library, Oxford
- JAH *Journal of African History*
- JICH *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*
- LD *The Diaries of Lord Lugard*, 3 vols., edited by Margery Perham and Mary Bull, London, 1959
- LP Lugard Papers
Rhodes House Library, Oxford
- MP Mackinnon Papers
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
- ND Nsambya Diary
Mill Hill Fathers Mission, Nsambya, Kampala
- PP Portal Papers
Rhodes House Library, Oxford
- QVL *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, 3rd series, Vol. II, ed. G. E. Buckle, London, 1933
- RGS Royal Geographical Society
- SNR *Sudan Notes and Records*
- SP Salisbury Papers
Christ Church, Oxford
- TD Ternan Diaries
Rhodes House Library, Oxford
- UJ *Uganda Journal*
- WP Walker Papers
CMS Archives, University of Birmingham Library
- ZA Zanzibar Archives
Housed when researched in the Beit al-Ajaib, Zanzibar, now in the National Archives of Zanzibar
- ZM Zanzibar Museum
Housed when researched in the Beit al-Amani, now in the National Archives of Zanzibar
- ZRA Zanzibar Residency Archives
Housed when researched in the Zanzibar Residency, now in the National Archives of Zanzibar




Map 2 Wars in Bunyoro 1894–1899




Map 4 Toro and 'Toro proper' 1900



Map 5 AnkoLe post-1901, and pre-colonial Nkore



Map 6 British East Africa 1902



Map 7 Location of principal Busoga kingdoms c. 1902

1 Prologue: survey and agenda

This book is about Empire and thus about power. It treats of one set of developments that was variously paralleled across large stretches of the expanding British, and indeed other Western, empires during much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the late twentieth century considerable attention was given to analysing the processes entailed in the decline and fall of the Western overseas empires during its middle decades. Here the focus is upon one example of the opposite end of that story – the initiation of colonial rule in a relatively confined region of eastern Africa around the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Already there are plenty of narrative accounts of this story, and it is no way the present intention to add to their number. Rather the concern here is to analyse how all that came about. As will be clear, the result will not be a blueprint for enquiries into all similar encounters elsewhere since so many of the critical circumstances differed from place to place. It is to be hoped, however, that the present study will provide something of a benchmark against which the consideration of corresponding occurrences in other places may be set.

The area in question lies astride the equator within the northern arc of great lakes 600 miles or so inland from the East African coast, large parts of which comprise the headwaters of the White Nile prior to its great journey northwards to Egypt and the Mediterranean. Here, in a good deal of fertile and well-watered country, there were in the late nineteenth century perhaps upwards of 2 million people living in some thirty and more hereditary rulerships¹ within which ‘the premise of inequality’, as it has been called,² governed relationships. Between 1890 and 1902 the area bounded by Lakes Kivu, Edward, George, Albert, Kyoga and Victoria was transformed into the southern core of the new British

¹ As will be elaborated in Ch. 6, p. 169, a precise number is difficult to specify because of the large numbers of tiny ones in Busoga. Thirty must serve as about the number of those of any great substance.

² J. Maquet, *The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda* (London, 1961).

colonial polity of 'Uganda'. Since, for analytical purposes, the time scales of the chapters which follow periodically overlap with each other, it may be helpful at the outset to outline some of the more salient developments which occurred as they have been conventionally understood, in a more strictly chronological order.³

There was a long history of rulerships, both in this region and to its immediate south, that was punctuated by their rise and fall, by numerous conflicts and some accommodations between them, and marked, as one would expect, by a series of regular as well as distinctive occurrences within them. It was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century that they first received intimations of the much wider world well beyond their confines. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, 'Arab' traders from both the East African coast centred on Zanzibar and from Khartoum in the north began to reach them. As these energetically sought to procure both ivory and slaves and offered guns, cotton cloth and certain other manufactured goods in return, their advent not only significantly changed the regional economy by sucking some of the larger and in turn several of the smaller rulerships into the increasingly heavy demands of this external trade, but by bringing the first firearms to the region soon recast the character of local coercion and conflict.⁴ The Zanzibari traders, moreover, brought with them a new culture and religion – Islam – which in view of some distinctive developments within one of the larger kingdoms, Buganda, began to be espoused there by its ruler and his court. These years saw too the appearance of the first Europeans to come to the region, among them the British explorers, principally J.H. Speke and A.J. Grant in 1862–3; (the later) Sir Samuel Baker and his wife in 1863; and H.M. Stanley in 1875. From 1869 onwards, the Khartoumers' advance came to be greatly enlarged as the Egyptian government proceeded to appoint a succession of European officers to lead a campaign to create an 'Equatoria Province' in the lakes area to add to Egypt's existing dominion in the Sudan. In the course of the 1870s, the rulers of the two largest kingdoms, Bunyoro and Buganda, variously wrestled with this threat, till it was eventually reduced to a rump by being cut off from its base by the Mahdist revolt to the north. With that, Bunyoro's ruler, Omukama Kabalega, enhanced his efforts to reconquer those parts of his forebears' earlier

³ S.R. Karugire, *A Political History of Uganda* (Nairobi, 1980), Chs. 1–3, remains a valuable survey.

⁴ For an extensive study of all this, see R. Reid, *Political Power in Pre-Colonial Buganda: Economy, Society and Warfare in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 2002).

kingdom that had previously broken away, especially in Toro, the principal area to the south.

Meantime, following Stanley's visit to Buganda in 1875, during which its ruler, Kabaka Mutesa, encouraged him to prompt some Christian missionaries to come to his kingdom, some Anglican Protestants arrived at the Buganda court in 1877 and then some Roman Catholic White Fathers in 1879. Coming on top of the earlier embracing there of Islam, this created a deeply confusing situation which was not helped by Mutesa's reluctance to choose between four competing faiths (Buganda's indigenous pantheon of Gods, two rival versions of Christianity, and Islam), and soon led to some of his younger courtiers starting, by the early 1880s, to convert to each of the two Christian creeds. With the accession in 1884 of a new insecure ruler, Mwanga, their situation became exceedingly fraught as Mwanga first had numbers of them put to death; then enrolled the remnants that remained, along with a larger number of Muslim converts, in some new military formations he created; only, however, in mid 1888, out of a deepening paranoia, to seek to destroy all of them completely. With that, a tumultuous upheaval was unloosed in which the Muslims and Christians at his court first combined to expel him from his kingdom and take control of its governance, but then fell apart into three warring camps, first Muslims against Christians, then Protestants against Catholics – during which time, Mwanga was restored to his throne, though not to his former power.

It was just at this point that the first British colonial agents reached the kingdom. This followed upon the upsurge of the European partition of Africa from the early 1880s onwards, which in East Africa led to competing claims to the East African interior by both Germany and Britain. That rivalry was peaceably resolved by the two Anglo-German Agreements of 1886 and 1890 under which the southern half of the East African interior was decreed by them to be a German sphere of influence while the northern one became a British one. Responsibility for a British advance into the latter was thereupon devolved by the British government to a newly formed Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC). While at first being (ineffectually) beaten in reaching Buganda by a German agent, it was then agents of the IBEAC, principally Captain F.D. Lugard, who, accompanied by some Sudanese and other mercenaries, eventually entered Buganda in December 1890. Shortly afterwards Lugard secured a notional treaty of friendship with Mwanga, though without effectively establishing his dominance over him, and then embarked upon a further treaty-making journey to the west, with the intent of enlisting in his service

the remnants of the forces of the Egyptian Equatoria Province who were scattered there further on. Having largely accomplished that, he settled most of them in Toro to the west to act as buffers against the attempts of Bunyoro's ruler, Kabalega, to reconquer the area for his kingdom.

Prior to going westwards, Lugard had given military support to the Christians against the Muslims. On his return early in 1892, he found the two Christian parties edging towards open conflict with each other, in which, at the ensuing Battle of Mengo in February 1892, he very soon gave decisive support to the Protestants against the Catholics, who now had Mwangwa at their head. In the aftermath he set about effecting a grudging reconciliation between both warring parties (in which the Muslims shared in a minor way as well) and thereby signalled the establishment of his dominance over the kingdom.

On his return from the west Lugard also found himself faced by very disconcerting orders from his superiors in the IBEAC to withdraw from the interior altogether, since the company was fast slipping into bankruptcy. In the event a succession of expedients was employed to keep the British presence in Buganda in being, whilst a protracted debate took place in Britain on whether the government should take over the governing role there that it had hoped to devolve upon the company. In the upshot an imperial British 'Protectorate' was eventually proclaimed over Buganda in 1894, and was then extended to its neighbouring regions two years later.

That proclamation was immediately followed, partly on orders from London, by a joint British-Baganda attack upon Buganda's principal rival, Bunyoro, which thereupon unleashed five years of immensely destructive warfare during which Bunyoro's ruler, Kabalega, long evaded capture. This served, however, to free Toro from Bunyoro's depredations and enabled the British to establish under their control a 'Toro Confederacy' made up of Toro 'proper' and several of its smaller mostly related neighbours, while, over the same period, British control was steadily extended as well over many of the Busoga rulerships to the east of Buganda, athwart the key British line of communications with the East African coast.

By the mid 1890s both the Anglican and Roman Catholic missions in Buganda were winning increasing numbers of converts, and before very long were confronted by the beginnings of mass movements. Following Lugard's settlement in 1892 (along with two sets of adjustments by 1894), their leading converts were becoming well entrenched, moreover, in the dominant chiefly positions they had thereby secured, and, while rebutting Mwangwa's attempts to recover his original power, were

becoming increasingly attached to their mutually beneficial alliance with the British Protectorate administration.

By no means all of their countrymen shared, however, their gratification with this outcome, and when, in July 1897, Mwanga eventually fled from his capital to raise a revolt against both the British in his country and the Christian chiefs, he was soon joined in the southwest of his kingdom by a sizeable following. Two months later, three companies of the British administration's Sudanese mercenaries mutinied and, in variously establishing themselves along the first stretch of the Nile, posed for a while the most serious threat which the British position ever encountered. That, however, was saved because not all the Sudanese companies joined the mutiny, the Baganda Christian chiefs supported the British against both their own Kabaka and the mutineers, and reinforcements which included some Indian troops eventually arrived to put an end to both challenges together.

In the wake of these events, the British finally moved, in the later stages of a convoluted succession crisis, to take control of Buganda's southwestern neighbour, Nkore, and before long the smaller kingdoms bordering upon it, while also taking steps to reestablish their hold over Busoga, where it had been brought into question by the passage of the mutineers. At the same time in London these events led to the appointment of an experienced African administrator, Sir Harry Johnston, to bring some settled order to the country. Shortly after Johnston's arrival early in 1900, he found himself embroiled in some tangled negotiations with Buganda's Christian chiefs, out of which came the very extensive Uganda (properly Buganda) Agreement of 1900. That was then followed by briefer Agreements with Toro later that year and with Ankole (as the enlargement of Nkore was now called) in 1901. With these, and with their replications, albeit in less formal terms, in both Busoga and Bunyoro, the pattern of colonial government throughout the new polity of 'Uganda' was largely set for the next sixty years and more.

If, as is the intention here, we are to probe these and their accompanying events in a much more incisive manner than has been customary, it will be necessary both here and in the chapters which follow to lay hands on a large array of different issues. To that end, a beginning can be made by considering briefly the insights of a number of well established explanatory concepts of the British imperial story to see what bearing they may have upon the explorations which here ensue.

Back in 1961 Gallagher and Robinson famously advanced the notion of 'the official mind', which was principally aimed at rebutting the arguments that the extension of British rule into tropical Africa was

chiefly due to the influence over the making of British policy of business, philanthropic and/or imperialist interests.⁵ To the contrary, they argued, a small 'ruling circle' of hereditary ministerial 'aristocrats' and 'expert' senior Foreign Office officials all but monopolised the determination of British policy towards Africa in the light of their understanding of a century old tradition of upholding 'the national interest'.⁶ In the present case one can readily see 'the official mind' at work in the granting of the IBEAC's charter; in the negotiations which led to two Anglo-German Agreements; in the extensive debate about the fate of Buganda as the IBEAC slid ignominiously into bankruptcy; in the secret instructions, received by the British Commissioner in Buganda in 1894, to conduct an advance through Bunyoro towards the Upper Nile; in the dispatch of reinforcements to Uganda against the multiple threats to the British position there in the late 1890s;⁷ and in the appointment of Sir Harry Johnston in 1899 as Special Commissioner in Uganda. But, for all its importance, 'the official mind' had nothing to say about the Africans caught up in this story, nor anything substantial to suggest to its officers on the spot on how to go about establishing British control.

Fieldhouse then elaborated the 'peripheral' or 'excentric' thesis, which argued that it was upheavals at the imperial 'periphery' rather than initiatives from the imperial centre which were the primary propellants of colonial advance in these years.⁸ In the particular case of the British advance into the great lakes area of Eastern Africa in the 1890s, it has been persistently asserted that the 'peripheral' events which determined this move lay not in the lakes area itself but in Egypt, where in the aftermath of their occupation of the country back in 1882 the British had become fearful that, should some other European power gain control of 'the Upper Nile', they could by diverting its flow generate major disturbances in Egypt, and thus throttle Britain's crucial line of communications with its Indian empire.⁹ Chapter 4 below will relate, however, that rather more turned on events in Buganda between 1888 and 1893, upon the eventual establishment there of a British Protectorate, than arguments along these lines have hitherto allowed.

⁵ R. Robinson & J. Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent* (London, 1961).

⁶ For a summary account of its genesis, see M. Duffy, 'World-Wide War and British Expansion, 1793–1815', in P.J. Marshall, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1998), Ch. 9.

⁷ See Ch 7.

⁸ D.K. Fieldhouse, *The Theory of Capitalist Imperialism* (London, 1967), pp. 193–4, and more generally his *Economics and Empire 1830–1914* (London, 1973).

⁹ E.g. Robinson & Gallagher, *Africa*, p. 327.

Fieldhouse's 'peripheral' thesis nevertheless secured reinforcement from J.S. Galbraith's related idea that events upon a 'turbulent frontier' could play a major role in propelling an imperial advance.¹⁰ In the present instance one can readily identify at least four occasions when a consideration of this kind applied: in the focusing of British attention upon Buganda between 1889 and 1894 because of the religio-political conflicts there; in the moves by British officers on the spot from 1891 onwards to succour the Toro area from the depredations of Kabalega's Bunyoro; in their efforts over the same period and beyond to strengthen their control over the turbulence afflicting the Busoga kingdoms to the east; and in their eventual advance in the later 1890s into Nkore (and their transfer of part of its territory to Buganda) in their ultimately successful moves to check the 'turbulence' Mwangwa's revolt had created in the frontier areas lying between them.

Thereafter, two polarised sets of propositions were advanced. On the one hand, Ranger drew attention to the twin notions of 'primary resistance' and 'post-pacification revolt' which Africans mounted against the colonial advent.¹¹ Later it was to be argued that: 'Armed resistance was almost never "primary"'.¹² It was only turned to 'as a last resort'. In the present case the twin categories helpfully serve to distinguish Bunyoro's protracted 'resistance' to the British, from 1894 onwards, from the 'post-pacification revolt' which Buganda saw in the later 1890s.

Robinson then argued that, far from resisting colonial rule, many African leaders became 'collaborators' with the British.¹³ In the present case, several examples of this proposition were spelt out in an illuminating study by Steinhart of the western kingdoms of 'Uganda', where by tracing the careers of several such collaborating leaders its explanatory power can be readily demonstrated. Yet in the very title of his book, *Conflict and Collaboration*, there are preliminary indications of its limitations as an explanatory tool when taken on its own,¹⁴ while a brief glance

¹⁰ J.S. Galbraith, 'The "Turbulent Frontier" as a Factor in British Expansion', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 11 (1960), pp. 150-68; see also his *Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-54* (Berkeley, 1963).

¹¹ T.O. Ranger, 'Connections between "Primary Resistance" Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa', *JAH*, 9, 3 (1968), pp. 437-53. Ranger took the phrase 'post-pacification revolt' from J. Iliffe.

¹² J. Lonsdale, 'The European Scramble and Conquest in African History', in R. Oliver & G.N. Sanderson, eds., *The Cambridge History of Africa*, Vol. vi, *From 1870 to 1905* (Cambridge, 1985), p. 731.

¹³ R.E. Robinson, 'The Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism', in R. Owen & B. Sutcliffe, eds., *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London, 1972).

¹⁴ E.I. Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration: The Kingdoms of Western Uganda 1890-1907* (Princeton, 1977).

at the overall story displays not only that the British were as frequently dependent upon their collaborators as they upon them, but that within the limits ultimately set by colonial power many a collaborator proved remarkably adept at holding his own with them.¹⁵

Lonsdale then advanced the notion that in the later nineteenth century Africa saw a 'revolution in power', which thereupon developed into 'a race for power'. In the present instance this serves to highlight two quite distinct but eventually intertwined developments. In the first place, the latter part of the nineteenth century saw for the first time the advent into the East African lakes area of many thousands of guns. Not only did they much enhance the power of those kingdoms that acquired them, as against their more vulnerable neighbours. In due course, their possession led to a radical reordering of relations of power within each of these kingdoms themselves. They were no match, however, for the new breech-loading rifles, and more particularly the new machine guns, Maxims and Hotchiss,¹⁶ with which the mercenary forces under British command came to be armed.¹⁷ The admixture of these two layered innovations lay close to the roots of so many of the major developments which thereupon occurred.

By contrast two further concepts (despite their evident value elsewhere) prove in the present case to be only marginally pertinent. During the middle years of the nineteenth century Sir John Kirk, Britain's Agent and Consul-General in Zanzibar (backed by British anti-slavery naval patrols), magisterially operated Britain's 'informal empire'¹⁸ along the East African coast and into the East African interior. His influence, however, only rarely stretched as far as its northern lakes, and thus 'informal empire' as an explanatory device has little to offer the present enquiry. Similarly, whilst the intriguing thesis about the role of 'gentlemanly capitalism' in the imperial expansion provides considerable insight into the run-up to the launch of the IBEAC, as soon as the

¹⁵ Lonsdale in 1985 avowed, 'These simplicities have long been discarded': Oliver & Sanderson, *Cambridge History*, vi, p. 728.

¹⁶ See Sanderson chapter in *ibid.*, p. 98.

¹⁷ Tellingly, British-led troops in 'Uganda' were first called the Uganda Rifles, and then, when incorporated along with other British-led East and Central African troops, the King's African Rifles: H. Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles* (Aldershot, 1956), Ch. 5.

¹⁸ R. Robinson & J. Gallagher, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 6, 1 (1953), pp. 1–15 (they specifically mention Kirk's role in East Africa, p. 11, while then remarking that the granting of charters to such as the IBEAC 'marked the transition from informal to formal methods', p. 13). On Kirk more generally, see R. Coupland, *The Exploitation of East Africa 1856–1890* (London, 1939), *passim*. For his correspondence with Buganda, see, e.g., Kirk to Mutesa, 26 Nov., 9 Dec. 1879, ZA FO 1879.

company's failure to mobilise the necessary capital has been canvassed, the scholarly discussion of 'gentlemanly capitalism' ceases to illumine the present story.¹⁹

Preceding and then in parallel with these various propositions, there ran the long-running discussion of 'indirect rule'. The great historical depth, and considerable territorial extent, of its core device – the employment of subordinate administrations in the exercise of superordinate power – goes back in the British case to England's medieval empire, when sundry 'palatines' were granted jurisdictions that otherwise belonged to the King alone: Seneschels in Gascony, Lords Lieutenant in Ireland, Marcher Lords upon the Welsh border,²⁰ along with the classic case of the Palatine Bishop of Durham who, in the twelfth century, was granted governmental powers under the Crown across all of England's far north.²¹ Later there were similar royal grants of governmental powers to the Merchants of the Staple in Flanders in 1359, in Calais in 1363, and to the Merchant Adventurers in 1505. Thereafter these provided the precedents for the charters subsequently granted both to various trading companies (the East India Company in 1600, the Virginia Company in 1606, the Hudson Bay Company in 1670, the Royal African Company in 1672, and so on) and to those undertaking to establish English-peopled settlements in the Americas. To three of the latter – for the Caribees, for Maryland and for Carolina – the jurisdictional privileges secured long before by the Bishop of Durham were quite explicitly granted.²² The line of descent was thus extraordinarily direct. In spite of the eventual demise of the last two of the earlier chartered companies (the East India Company in 1858 and the Hudson Bay Company in 1868), 'chartered' rule was nevertheless revived – for the British North Borneo Company in 1881, the Royal Niger Company in 1886, the IBEAC in 1888, and the British South Africa Company in 1889 (the first of which survived until the Second

¹⁹ P.J. Cain & A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism*, Vol. 1, *Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914* (London, 1993), pp. 387–91.

²⁰ This is the theme of F. Madden with D. Fieldhouse, eds., "*The Empire of the Bretaignes*", 1175–1688, *The Foundations of a Colonial System of Government*, (Westport, 1985) (see Preface, pp. xxiii–xxviii), and the subsequent volumes of their *Select Documents on the History of the British Empire and Commonwealth*. See also A.F. Madden, "'Not for Export': The Westminster Model of Government and British Colonial Practice", *JICH*, 8, 1 (1979), pp. 10–29, and 'Constitution-Making and Nationhood: The British Experience – an Overview', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies*, 36, 2 (1988), pp. 123–34.

²¹ "*Empire of the Bretaignes*", pp. 152ff.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 221, 223, 421.

World War) – making, by the end, for an all-but-continuous tradition extending over eight centuries.

Prior to this there had been the one innovation in the whole schema. As, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the English East India Company brought increasing areas of India under its control, so it established numerous ‘subsidiary alliances’ of one kind or another with a large number of Indian Princes. By these means the essential sinews of local government remained rooted in the traditional authority of the hereditary ruler. By contrast, however, with the English and later British cases where authority stemmed directly from the monarch, such a variant could not ensure that the interests of the superordinate power would be secured. Faced with this issue the Company, following upon its earlier practice of appointing commercial agents to Indian rulers’ courts, instituted the new office that, after much discussion, they eventually called ‘Resident’: resident overseer, that is, of the Company’s interests in the area.²³ Its supervisory essentials here and elsewhere took many forms. In many places in India, for example, where allegedly British ‘direct rule’ was to be found, indigenous landlords succeeded in establishing a similar relationship with the British to that of the Indian Princes (as is recounted in a masterly study tellingly entitled *The Limited Raj*).²⁴ Here the Resident’s role was readily performed by a much more prosaically named ‘District Officer’. Thereafter, the essentials of this system were applied by the British as they extended their dominion over the sultanates of Malaya and Zanzibar, over the emirates of the Persian Gulf and Northern Nigeria, in the very varied circumstances of Fiji, Egypt and Iraq, in several of the kingdoms and chieftaincies in South and West Africa, rather more problematically elsewhere in Africa too, and then in a significantly distinctive way in the Ugandan kingdoms.

By the 1990s a further raft of interpretive concepts was being offered, several of which warrant consideration at rather greater length. One of these canvassed the application to colonial situations of Gramscian notions of ‘hegemony’, which were concerned (as it was put) ‘to account for the predominance of a class achieved through the consent or acquiescence of other classes or groups’.²⁵ Several of the contributors to a symposium discussing these propositions doubted, however, whether they could usefully be applied to a colonial context, and for all their

²³ M.H. Fisher, *Indirect Rule in India. Residents and the Residency System 1764–1857* (Delhi, 1991). Also William Dalrymple, *White Mughals* (London, 2002).

²⁴ A.A. Yang, *The Limited Raj. Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, Saran District, 1793–1920* (Berkeley, 1998).

²⁵ D. Engels & S. Marks, eds., *Contesting Colonial Hegemony. State and Society in Africa and India* (London, 1994).

merits they do not appear to have much to offer the present enquiry. All the same, the term ‘hegemony’ in its more general non-Gramscian meaning of the assertion of power/dominance over subordinated others is a key concept in much that follows, and unless otherwise stated will be used in that sense hereafter.

The most formidable contribution to this further stage in the discussion came in two substantial volumes by the Comaroffs. Drawing principally upon British Christian missionary records from the nineteenth century for a protracted study of the southern Tswana upon the northern borders of South Africa, they regularly found themselves ‘drawn back to the colonization of their [the Tswana’s] consciousness and their consciousness of colonization’.²⁶ It is in no way possible to do any kind of justice here to this study. It offers important parallels to the Ugandan missionary story, though there were considerable differences too – beginning in Buganda with the previous advent of Muslim teachers, and amongst other things a much closer nexus between ‘church and state’. The Comaroffs’ main theme is nevertheless particularly pertinent in the present case to the political story (a matter which they do not themselves much discuss). As Chapter 11 will illustrate, the British could take very deliberate steps to reinforce ‘the colonisation of consciousness’ in the elite figures working with them, and there is not much doubt that ‘colonisation’ in this sense became very widespread. The Comaroffs’ chapter on the changes which occurred, under the impact of the missionaries, in Tswana dress²⁷ prompts, moreover, a reference to the quite distinctive dress which was developed for Ugandan men, following the alien advent, of a well-tailored full-length white Arab robe topped by a European-style jacket, and, for women, a one-piece dress with a voluminous skirt gathered at the waist by a scarf tied in the front – since both autochthonous styles are strikingly iconic of the relative autonomy Uganda’s peoples secured under colonial rule.

The Comaroffs, however, had their critics. Peel, on the basis of his penetrating study of African Christian evangelists in southern Nigeria, principally prior to the colonial advent,²⁸ upbraided them for not taking actual conversions to Christianity seriously enough.²⁹ Here the Uganda story lends strong support to his more general case – from the readiness

²⁶ J. & J. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution. Christianity, Colonialism and Consciousness in South Africa*, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1991, 1997).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Ch. 5.

²⁸ J.D.Y. Peel, *Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba* (Bloomington, 2000).

²⁹ Peel’s review of *Of Revelation and Revolution*, Vol. I, in *JAH*, 33, 2 (1992), pp. 328–9, and his ‘For Who Hath Despised the Day of Small Things? Missionary Narratives and Historical Anthropology’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 37, 3, pp. 585–9.

of so many early Christian converts to accept martyrdom, through to the well recorded cases of actual saintly lives lived later on.³⁰ The Uganda story differs, however, from Peel's story of Christian evangelists being the first to call themselves 'Yoruba', who then created 'the very ethnic category "Yoruba" in its modern connotation',³¹ since the principal Ugandan kingdoms had long since developed their own corporate-identities. Like their Yoruba counterparts, many of their leaders did nevertheless hanker, in the late nineteenth century and thereafter, for what the Yoruba called *olagu*: 'sophistication', 'civilization', most literally 'enlightenment'.³²

Prior to the publication of the Comaroffs' first volume, discussion of indirect rule had resurfaced. In a notable study of some religious revivalist movements during the years of colonial rule in Central Africa, Karen Fields first endorsed Martin Kilson's description of British indirect rule in Africa as 'colonialism-on-the-cheap', and then added the resonant aphorism that this was a way of 'making black men with legitimate authority appendages of white men without it'. Whilst the former is certainly part of the story, it nevertheless left too much unsaid. Whilst the latter prompts the question of how it was that, in the absence of heavy handedness (which by implication she later allowed), did white men manage to exercise any authority at all? Some injection of the Comaroffs' 'colonization of consciousness' could perhaps fill the gap here.

Thereafter Fields embarked upon a lucid and extensive account of Lugard's expositions of 'Indirect Rule' and 'the Dual Mandate'. Here her leading statement that 'Indirect rule was a way of making the colonial state a consumer of power generated within the customary order' matches closely with the argument, later developed here, that British colonial rule in the Ugandan kingdoms drew extensively upon the traditional authority of their rulers and their chiefs.³³ The immediately following statement, however, that this meant that 'Real power issued from the ruled', went too far. For the sharp disparities between the tiny numbers of colonial administrators and their much more

³⁰ For example Anne Luck, *African Saint: The Story of Apolo Kivebulaya* (London, 1963), and Archbishop Jowani Luwum, murdered on General Amin's orders, whose effigy is amongst those of other twentieth-century Christian martyrs which have been placed on the west front of Westminster Abbey.

³¹ Peel, *Religious Encounter*, Ch. 10.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 317; D.A. Low, *The Mind of Buganda* (London, 1971).

³³ Robinson, 'Non-European Foundations', in Owen & Sutcliffe, *Imperialism*, p. 133, put it thus: 'The substance of ruling authority had to a great extent to be extracted from their subjects.'

numerous local employees, let alone the very much larger populations in their districts, which she then carefully tabulated, and which she deployed in support of this argument, are no measure of the ultimate power which the colonial power latently and on occasion could actually dispose.³⁴ Her more measured argument that ‘The regimes built upon indirect rule were doubly articulated. One articulation made the African masses subject to customary rulers; the other made customary rulers subject to the Crown’s representatives’ is nevertheless fully consonant with the Uganda story.³⁵

Thereafter, in a no less notable study, Sara Berry traced the impact of indirect rule upon agrarian change in Africa in a chapter under the arresting title ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring’.³⁶ ‘Scarcity of money and manpower’, she argued, ‘obliged administrators to practice “indirect rule”’; ‘One obvious way was to use Africans both as employees and as local agents of colonial rule.’³⁷ Like Kilson’s and Fields’ ‘colonialism-on-the-cheap’ this points to an important part of the story. Yet there was always more to the institution of indirect rule than its fiscal or manpower value.³⁸ As has been outlined above, it had for a long time been the stock-in-trade of British government at a distance from the metropolis. As, moreover, an episode related in [Chapter 9](#) will indicate, even a run-of-the-mill British army officer could readily provide a sophisticated account of its *political*, as distinct from its fiscal or manpower, advantages. While at the very time that Lugard was busily formulating his doctrines,³⁹ the ultimate ideologue of the ‘Oudh’ school of British administrators in north India, Harcourt Butler, was likewise lauding the *political* merits of ruling ‘through the natural leaders of the people’ (as the term had it there).⁴⁰ There are other considerations too. As [Chapter 10](#) will show, the entrenchment of a distinct form of indirect rule in Uganda principally stemmed from the vociferous protests of Buganda’s leaders early in 1900 against the more ‘direct’ form of

³⁴ On which, see the latter part of [Ch. 7](#).

³⁵ K.E. Fields, *Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa* (Princeton, 1985), Ch. 1; Robinson, ‘Non-European Foundations’, in Owen & Sutcliffe, *Imperialism*, p. 121.

³⁶ S. Berry, *No Condition is Permanent. The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Madison, 1993), Ch. 2.

³⁷ ‘Native agency’ had been employed for a long time elsewhere in the British empire: e.g. B. Stein, *Thomas Munro. The Origins of the Colonial State and His Vision of Empire* (Delhi, 1989), especially pp. 290–1.

³⁸ E.g. J.D. Legge, *Britain in Fiji 1858–1880* (London, 1958), pp. 203–5.

³⁹ M. Perham, *Lugard – The Years of Authority, 1898–1945* (London, 1960), esp. Chs. 8–9.

⁴⁰ S.H. Butler, *Oudh Policy. The Policy of Sympathy* (Allahabad, 1906). See P. Reeves, *Landlords and Government in Uttar Pradesh. A Study of their Relations until Zamindari Abolition* (Bombay, 1991), Ch. 2; and, more generally, T.R. Metcalf, *Land, Landlords and the British Raj. Northern India in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1979).

colonial rule that Britain's Special Commissioner in Uganda, Sir Harry Johnston, seemed determined to foist upon them. Kilson's and Fields' pithy labels, and that of Berry, did not, that is, encompass the extent to which, within the ambit of superordinate colonial rule, the degree of autonomy indirect rule provided was variously sought, welcomed and even jealously guarded⁴¹ by many of its local beneficiaries.

Subsequently a major study by Colin Newbury, which spanned a great range of rulerships under colonial rule – in India, Africa, Malaya and the Pacific – extended the discussion considerably further by arguing that 'a model of relationships between rulers and ruled based on the status differences and the reciprocal advantages in the patron–client construct' would serve historical understanding better than the essentially administrative term 'indirect rule'.⁴² In doing so, he echoed Fields' arguments about the 'double articulation' in such regimes, which first 'joined customary rulers and their subjects' and then 'customary rulers to white officials'.⁴³ Whereupon Newbury proceeded to detail many of the numerous instances where relations between indigenous rulers and their subjects rested upon extensive patron–client linkages between them, while outlining the patron–client bonds which were occasionally to be discerned in some of the transactions between indigenous leaders and colonial officials. While this line of thinking has much to commend it, it needs, in the Uganda context, as Fallers argued in the 1950s, to be moderated by recognising that there at least patron–client relations coexisted with 'state and lineage' structures, not to mention the conflicts which arose between them.⁴⁴

In sum, many of the explanatory concepts that have been offered over the years provide important stimulus as one seeks to probe how it was that a colonial polity came into being. In most cases they do not greatly overlap with each other. Rather, by cutting in at different stages in the evolving story they draw attention to particular issues that warrant consideration in specifying the drama. Not all, it seems, are pertinent to the present case. A few make assertions which it does not bear out. Even they, however, do not lack for stimulus. None, however, provides

⁴¹ As, until the deportation of Kabaka Mutesa II in 1953, was the Uganda Agreement of 1900 by the Baganda.

⁴² C. W. Newbury, *Patrons, Clients & Empire. Chieftaincy and Over-rule in Asia, Africa and the Pacific* (Oxford, 2003). For a more summary account of the argument, see C. Newbury, 'Patrons, Clients and Empire: The Subordination of Indigenous Hierarchies in Asia and Africa', *Journal of World History*, 11 (2000), pp. 232–3.

⁴³ Fields, *Revival and Rebellion*, p. 51. Cf. Robinson's earlier version that 'Two connecting sets of linkages ... made up the collaborative mechanism': Robinson, 'Non-European Foundations', in Owen & Sutcliffe, *Imperialism*, p. 121.

⁴⁴ L. A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy* (Cambridge, 1956).

the near totality for the present study of one further formula that saw colonial rule ‘as a hegemonic system featuring multiple forms of negotiation, complicity and resistance as well as various forms of violence and compulsion’, rather than as a simple binary relationship of domination and subjugation,⁴⁵ though even that could do with something of the Comaroffs’ ‘colonization of consciousness’.

Before honing down on the Uganda story to trace out more particularly how that hegemony came to be established there in the first place, which is the principal intention here, it will be of service to consider some other examples of the processes by which colonial control came to be established to see if there are any common patterns to be discerned. Lonsdale correctly stated that: ‘There were literally hundreds of European conquests of Africa, not one.’ He provided, moreover, a penetrating survey of such cases.⁴⁶ Since, however, these conquests were contemporaneously not confined to Africa, and thus were constituent parts of a much wider story, it will be salutary to explore much further afield. Accordingly, it is proposed to review the course which the establishment of British colonial rule took in three quite arbitrarily chosen instances elsewhere – one in northwestern India, one in Southeast Asia and one in the Pacific, namely in the Punjab, Malaya and Fiji, in each of which British colonial rule was established prior to being so in Uganda – to see what that may have to offer.

First then, the Punjab. Despite the conquest by the British by the first decades of the nineteenth century of the greater part of India, following the Treaty of Amritsar of 1809 they proceeded to recognise for the next thirty years the independent sovereignty of the military-fiscal state of the Punjab under its notable Sikh ruler, Maharajah Ranjit Singh, and as a consequence very successfully entrenched the security of their northwestern borderlands. On Ranjit Singh’s death, however, in 1839 his court fell apart into a series of bitterly lethal internecine conflicts, which soon infected the Punjab’s Sikh-led army as well. Fearful that this important border state might as a result descend into anarchy, the

⁴⁵ G. Blue, M. Bunton & R. Crozier, eds., *Colonialism and the Modern World: Selected Studies* (New York, 2002), p. 21. For the subsequent heyday of colonial rule, the formula requires an injection of Fields’ arguments as outlined above, or as varied by Spear in saying: ‘Colonial policy ... derived less from a common strategy or consent of the governed than from ongoing negotiations and compromises with Africans and among themselves’: T. Spear, ‘Neo-traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’, *JAH*, 44 (2003), p. 26.

⁴⁶ Lonsdale, ‘The European Scramble’, in Oliver & Sanderson, *Cambridge History*, vi, pp. 722–7.

British assembled a force upon its eastern border so as to invade it if that should occur. That only provoked, however, the Punjab's army into reasserting itself in defence of its country, whereupon the two sides slid into the First Anglo-Sikh War of 1845–6. Despite some early successes the Sikh-led army was soon decisively defeated. A British Resident supported by an armed British force was thereupon installed in the Punjab's capital, Lahore. By the Treaty of Bhyrowal of December 1846 he took powers 'to direct and control the duties of every department' of the Punjab's government, and promptly set about retrenching the Sikh-led army.

It was not long, however, before a clash between a local Sikh governor and some British officials escalated into a major revolt. That provided the British with the excuse they were now looking for to crush the Sikh dominion altogether; whereupon the Second Anglo-Sikh War of 1848–9 erupted. Twice the Sikh army inflicted serious defeats upon the British, only, however, to be once again overwhelmed itself. This time the British carried through the full annexation of the Punjab to their Indian empire,⁴⁷ abolished its office of Maharajah, and completely disbanded its Sikh-led army.

Astonishingly, however, just eight years later when, in 1857–8, so much of the British-led army in northern India mutinied, the British speedily summoned large numbers of the Punjab's former soldiery to their service and thereby won crucial assistance in their suppression of the mutiny. Already the Punjab had fallen under the control of the 'Punjab School' of British Indian administrators under the redoubtable Sir John Lawrence. Henceforward, soldiers from the Punjab found themselves in high demand by the British, and under the patronage of a number of leading Punjabi families soon developed into the greatly advantaged core of Britain's post-mutiny Indian army.⁴⁸

As all this was taking place, the Sultan of Perak in Malaya signed in 1874 the 'Pangkor Engagement' with a British representative, by which he undertook to accept a British Resident in his state whose advice would 'be asked and acted upon on all questions other than those touching Malay religion and culture'. Together with its four northern

⁴⁷ While granting that part of Ranjit Singh's dominion that lay in Kashmir to a turncoat Dogra notable who became its princely Maharajah.

⁴⁸ From a large literature, see J.S. Grewal, *The Sikhs of the Punjab* (Cambridge, 1990); A.J. Major, *Return to Empire. Punjab under the Sikhs and British in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Delhi, 1996); P.H.M. van den Dungen, *The Punjab Tradition* (London, 1972); I. Ali, *The Punjab under Imperialism 1885–1947* (Princeton, 1988); D.A. Low, ed., *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan* (Basingstoke, 1991); Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State: Government, Military and Society in Colonial Punjab* (Delhi, 2004).

neighbours – the Malay states of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Patani – Perak had been subordinated to the overlordship of Siam. In 1826, however, by a treaty between a British officer and the Siamese king, it was freed, along with its immediate neighbour Selangor, from Siamese domination, while in the same year the British aggregated their four trading settlements around the Malay coast – Penang, Province Wellesley, Melaka and Singapore – into a new entity, the Straits Settlements, of which in due course Singapore became the capital. For the next half-century, however, they resolutely refrained from extending their dominion not only over Perak and Selangor but over the adjacent Malay states of Pahang, Johor and the handful of small states north of Melaka.

During the course of several preceding centuries, tin had been variously mined in Malaya. With the advent of large numbers of Chinese migrants in the nineteenth century, tin mining there expanded greatly. In due course the much larger tax revenues this brought to the Malay states not only aggravated the inherent conflicts for leading positions at their apex, but became intertwined with major confrontations amongst the Chinese themselves. By the early 1870s this increasingly fraught situation led to a series of civil wars for control of the lucrative mining areas. That generated increasing demands by merchants in the Straits Settlements for British intervention so as to secure their growing trade and financial investments in the region. Such pressures were resisted in London. Eventually, however, along with some softening there, a new Governor of the Straits Settlements seized the opportunity of an appeal by a claimant in a succession conflict in Perak, Raja Muda Abdullah, to appoint a British Resident to Perak in return for British recognition of Abdullah's claims to the Sultanate. From that came the Pangkor Engagement of 20 January 1874. Later that same year another British Resident was foisted upon Selangor. This beginning was soon overtaken, however, by the murder in 1875 of the first British Resident in Perak, to which the British responded by speedily sending in a column of troops, exiling Abdullah and a number of other Perak chiefs, and executing two of those held principally responsible for the murder. They thereby signalled the advent of British hegemony on the Malayan mainland.

It was to be another decade, however, before British Residents were first appointed in the other Malay states. Not until 1885 was a Resident appointed in what, in 1889, became the new confederacy of Negri Sembilan, north of Melaka, while the first British Resident in Pahang was only appointed in 1888. There his actions soon provoked a rebellion – the Pahang War – which came to be seen as a prototype resistance struggle against the British, and was only finally suppressed

in 1895. Thereafter, in 1896, the British aggregated their now four 'protected states' – Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang – into the 'Federated Malay States' (FMS), which henceforth they ruled more directly from their new colonial capital of Kuala Lumpur. Over the following years they gradually advanced their hold over the northern Malay states of Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu till, by a treaty with Siam of 1909, they brought all but one of them, Patani, under their dominion. Whilst, as the 'Unfederated Malay States' (UMS), they were spared the close control of the FMS, Advisers with Resident's powers (albeit on a rather lesser scale) were appointed to each of them. That left Johor in the south where an astute Sultan, Abu Bakar, had long held out against British dominion by living in Singapore and instituting his own governmental reforms. On his death, however, in 1895, his son increasingly found himself struggling to hold his position, till in the end Johor fell under closer British control in 1914. Throughout these post-1874 years, successive British governors played major roles in creating 'British Malaya', none more so than Sir Frank Swettenham, an early Resident in Selangor and in Perak, first Resident-General of the FMS, and later Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner of Malaya.⁴⁹

Nine months after the signing of the Pangkor Engagement, the leading chiefs of Fiji signed a Deed of Cession of their South Pacific archipelago to the British. Amongst the three hundred or so of its islands, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu were much the largest. Society in Fiji was organised in family groups clustered in clans led by ruling chiefs. By the end of the eighteenth century these were being aggregated into much larger 'confederations'. Thereafter, a motley crowd of Europeans came to the islands, bringing with them grievous exotic diseases, some new export trades (sandalwood and beche-de-mer initially), a yearning for land and, after 1835, a new religion, Wesleyan Christianity. By the middle of the nineteenth century, leading confederations, especially that of Bau close to Viti Levu under its self-declared 'King', Cakobau, were struggling to assert a wider supremacy. But with the intervention of Ma'afu, a leading chief from the nearby Tongan islands, and with American citizens seeking compensation from Cakobau for damages to their properties, the situation in the islands became increasingly fraught. In a bold response to this situation the British Consul, W. T. Pritchard, prevailed upon the leading Fijian chiefs in 1861 to seek a British protectorate and grant him

⁴⁹ On Malaya I am much indebted to Mark Emmanuel. See C. D. Cowan, *The Origins of British Colonial Control in Malaya, 1867–1878* (London, 1955); E. Sadka, *The Protected Malay States* (Kuala Lumpur, 1968); B. W. & L. Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia* (London, 1982), Chs. 4–5.

'full ... power to govern Fiji'. Such an arrangement was firmly rejected, however, by the British government. Instead the leading Fijian chiefs were advised by a later British Consul to create a new collaborative government, which should include some Europeans. That was eventually established in 1865 and encompassed a much larger confederation than ever existed before. It soon fell apart, however, in keen rivalry between Ma'afu and Cakobau, each of whom then set up a separate confederacy of his own. Following his crowning as King of Bau, Cakobau in 1871 sought to establish a new islands-wide government with himself as King and some chiefs and Europeans as his ministers. Yet to no avail. His government was traduced both by its Fijian opponents and by Europeans who were hostile to the Europeans in it, till in the end Cakobau, other leading Fijian chiefs, his British advisers and even Britain's Colonial Secretary in London concluded that this mounting confusion could only be resolved, as Pritchard had earlier proposed, by the establishment of a British protectorate over Fiji. As a consequence, Cakobau 'and other high chiefs' signed a Deed of Cession to Queen Victoria on 10 October 1874 under which Fiji became a British Crown Colony. That was soon followed by the appointment of the very experienced Governor, Sir Arthur Gordon,⁵⁰ who, aside from introducing Indian indentured labour to obviate the necessity for Fijians to work in Fiji's now economically vital sugar plantations, soon proceeded to entrench a system of 'indirect rule' under which indigenous Fijian chiefs were left to conduct their own peoples' governance almost entirely on their own.⁵¹

These outlines testify to the very wide variation in the stories of British annexation of overseas territories over very much the same period.⁵² There were, of course, innumerable societal, historical and circumstantial differences between them, and one can readily identify some particular contrasts. Punjab, for example, saw two wars of conquest; Malaya, no more than swift retribution for the murder of a British officer, and the suppression of a localised revolt in just one state; while Fiji saw none of these. Or again: while the position of Maharajah in

⁵⁰ He had already been Governor of Trinidad and Mauritius.

⁵¹ On Fiji I am much indebted to my colleague Brij Lal, see his *Broken Waves. A History of the Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century* (Honolulu, 1992), Introduction. See also Legge, *Britain in Fiji 1858-1880*; P. France, *The Charter of the Land, Custom and Colonisation in Fiji* (London, 1969).

⁵² For some further classic book-length accounts, see, e.g., W. Tordoff, *Ashanti under the Prempehs 1888-1935* (London, 1965); G. Prins, *The Hidden Hippopotamus. Reappraisal in African History: The Early Colonial Experience in Western Zambia* (Cambridge, 1980); J.H. Walker, *Power and Prowess. The Origins of Brooke Kingship in Sarawak* (Honolulu, 2002).

Punjab was abolished, traditional rulership was upheld in Malaya, albeit with much of its governmental powers taken over by the British, whilst Fijian chiefs had their governmental powers strongly reinforced.

There were nevertheless some intriguing commonalities. In each instance, indigenous developments were of paramount importance in setting the scene. The onset of British hegemony came with their intervention in a local crisis (the First Anglo-Sikh War; the Pangkor Engagement; Pritchard's 'British Protectorate'). The full extension of British supremacy then occurred over a period of years (1845–9 in Punjab; 1874–96 in Malaya; 1861–74 in Fiji). While the eventual outcome was substantially shaped by some imperious colonial figure (Lawrence, Swettenham and Gordon) and their associates. Much of this pattern came to be replicated in the Ugandan kingdoms.

When one turns more directly to their story, two major sets of issues call for extensive elucidation. The first concerns the territorial demarcations which shaped the southern core of what in the 1890s became the quite new polity of 'Uganda'. This was linked to the establishment of its node in one of the half-dozen larger kingdoms in the region, leading to what was all too frequently considerable confusion between Buganda and 'Uganda'. None of these outcomes was in any way preordained.

In considering how the former came about one can begin by speculating upon some hypothetical alternatives. Had, for instance, some of the larger kingdoms – say Rwanda (to the south), or Bunyoro, or (as it would later wish) Buganda – rather than finding themselves arbitrarily locked into becoming a constituent part of a German colony to the south or a British one to the north, succeeded in ring fencing themselves against the wider colonial polity advancing upon it – as Lesotho and Swaziland did in South Africa, or, in their heyday, so many Indian states did – the resulting territorial pattern would have been radically different, with all the consequences which would have followed from that. Likewise, had the long chain of pre-colonial kingdoms in the great lakes area, from Burundi in the south to Bunyoro in the north, been cobbled together at the instance of colonial rulers into a single polity, the outcome would again have been very different – more akin, that is, to Malaya where all the Malay states except Patani were eventually bundled into 'British Malaya'.

A good deal less fancifully: had events proceeded upon a range of preceding lines the upshot would have been markedly different too. On one scenario, much of the lakes area could have become part of the Egyptian ruled Sudan. On another, the northern kingdoms, like the southern ones, could have become part of German East Africa. Just conceivably, both Buganda and Toro could have been sliced in half. Subsequently the northern kingdoms might well have remained part

of a British Chartered Company territory (just as Zimbabwe, then Southern Rhodesia, was under British South Africa Company rule till 1923), while, much more probably, they could very well have found themselves a subordinated part of the later Kenya. In the event, they came to constitute the southern half of a separate, up-country, British territory (which eventually came to include large numbers of mainly non-kingdom peoples to their north), under the direct authority of the British Foreign (and later Colonial) Office.

Had things eventuated differently, its hub could just possibly have been in Bunyoro, the largest kingdom to the north. At one stage it stood in Mombasa on the East African coast. On more than one occasion, it might well have been in Wadelai, the former Egyptian post to the north of the region. Momentarily, it might just have been in Toro to the west. It could even have been located in, of all places, Zanzibar, whilst, at a later stage, it could all too easily have been situated upon the Mau plateau amidst Kenya's later settler-dominated 'White Highlands'. As it was, it came to be centred, in many respects quite fortuitously but with major consequences for the future, in the large northern kingdom of Buganda.

In addition to these major eventualities, there was a further one. Between 1891 and 1902 every one of the thirty or so northern kingdoms found its own immediate circumstances being quite radically altered. Every one of the smaller kingdoms which had hitherto either maintained a precarious independence or been satellites and/or raiding grounds of the larger ones found itself being aggregated by the British into one of just five entities – Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and Busoga. These henceforth comprised the five 'kingdom' areas of 'Uganda', which persisted throughout the colonial era and briefly thereafter. At the same time the territorial reach of every one of these five was radically reordered. Buganda was extensively reoriented. Bunyoro was reduced to under half its former size. Toro both recovered its independence and was doubled in size. Despite losing part of its borderlands Ankole was also effectively doubled in size. While 'Busoga' was constituted as a single entity for the first time.

With scarcely an exception, these territorial determinations were effected by a series of British officials acting simply on the arrogated authority of Britain as a world power, without more than very occasional reference to the Africans principally affected by them. With scarcely an exception, moreover, their fabrication was essentially piecemeal. The details followed no pre-ordained agenda for there was none in play. Given, however, their seminal consequences in determining the shaping of what became an altogether new polity, and (let it be said again) their immense consequences for the African peoples principally affected, these developments warrant the detailed attention they will receive.

The other set of issues which calls for extensive consideration relates to the oft repeated question of how it was that no more than two or three dozen British colonial agents managed to assert their dominion over all of these thirty or so kingdoms, and particularly the larger ones.

In embarking upon this it is worth reverting to some basic propositions. We need in the first place to distinguish between various levels of 'Imperialism'. There was first what may be called the 'higher imperialism', concerning the propulsions which impelled the imperial powers to establish their empires (as most famously discussed by Hobson and Lenin).⁵³ More especially, there was 'large-scale imperialism', the phenomenon of extensive, overarching, imperial dominance that so studded both ancient and modern history. Next there was 'middle-level imperialism', the development of a colonial power's purposes and policies in relation to one or more territories.⁵⁴ There was also 'internalised imperialism', the permeation through the imperial power, and its colonial agents in particular, of an ingrained assurance of their inherent right to rule others. Coupled with that there was 'ground level imperialism', the direct interactions between imperial officials on the ground and the societies, and more particularly the political systems, they sought to make subject to them. There was also 'micro-imperialism', the impact of the imperial advent upon groups and individuals who had to make fateful decisions about how to react to it.⁵⁵ This book will not revisit the never ending debate on 'higher imperialism'. Nor will it delve into the propagation, principally in the imperial metropolis, of 'internalised imperialism', though it will be constantly in view. Some attention must necessarily extend to 'large-scale imperialism' since this blocked out the broader context. Where necessary, it will also be given to 'middle-level imperialism' as this impacted on the Uganda kingdoms, while some attention will be given too to 'micro-imperialism'.⁵⁶ The main focus, however, will be upon 'ground level imperialism'.

Here the wider evidence suggests that the initial imposition of colonial rule could take one of three forms.⁵⁷ Either colonial agents could supersede a pre-existing political authority which they then brought under their direct control (as in Bengal, Punjab, Awadh, Burma, Ndebele

⁵³ E.g., more lately, P. Cain, *Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism. New Liberalism and Finance 1887–1938* (Oxford, 2002), and Cain & Hopkins, *British Imperialism*.

⁵⁴ E.g. Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire*; Legge, *Britain in Fiji*.

⁵⁵ These propositions were earlier outlined in D.A. Low, 'Warbands and Ground-level Imperialism in Uganda, 1870–1900', *Historical Studies*, 16 (1975), pp. 591–2.

⁵⁶ See the case study in Ch. 11.

⁵⁷ A fuller discussion of this argument is in D.A. Low, *Lion Rampant. Essays in the Study of British Imperialism* (London, 1973), pp. 9–18.

country in Zimbabwe, etc.); or they could establish their hegemony over a pre-existing political authority which nevertheless continued to exist but under its dominance (as in so many 'native states' and large landlord estates in various parts of India, in the Persian Gulf, Malaya and Fiji, and in several parts of Africa); or, faced by societies which had no distinctly political authorities to be either superseded or subordinated (as in many parts of Africa, e.g. in Kenya and large parts of the southern Sudan, and in most of Melanesia) – 'stateless societies' as the anthropologists have called them – they then found themselves engaged in the difficult task of creating a distinctly political authority in the area for the first time.⁵⁸

It is just conceivable that in these lakes kingdoms the British could have fashioned a situation of the first kind. At the turn of the century there were certainly just a few intimations of that possibility. After 1900 they became extensively engaged in creating situations of the third kind among the mainly stateless societies of what became northern Uganda.⁵⁹ In the event, the course they pursued in southern Uganda was, however, overwhelmingly of the second kind, under which they proceeded to establish their hegemony over the pre-existing rulerships in the region, which in one way or another were maintained under their dominance. The great advantage of this form of proceeding, from the imperial point of view, stemmed from the fact that colonial rule could thereby be made to rest upon the foundations of what were traditionally legitimate political authorities, while for those who ruled over these polities, and those accustomed to according them political legitimacy, it involved a great deal less disruption than would otherwise have occurred.

It is of course well recognised that the establishment of colonial rule all but invariably involved the exercise by the advancing imperial forces of much greater coercive power than could ultimately be mounted by any of the indigenous polities in their path. In southern Uganda, as elsewhere, that principally turned upon the employment by the first British imperial agents of mercenaries (here primarily from the Sudan and the East African coast) and upon the greater lethal power of their weaponry (new machine guns particularly). It also turned on the drill, discipline, well practised firepower and professional military leadership that characterised their use. In the present case, attention needs to be given as

⁵⁸ On which, see, more especially, B. Berman & J. Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley. Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (London, 1992), I.

⁵⁹ For much of that story, see M. Twaddle, *Kakungulu & the Creation of Uganda 1868–1928* (London, 1993), Chs. 4–10.

well to the building by the first British agents of closely confined stockades and forts, which were not currently part of the indigenous defensive portfolio. These were principally designed to protect them and their mercenaries from being suddenly overwhelmed by a hostile indigenous force. But they also served as way stations, as refuges and storehouses on their expanding routes to the interior, as islands in an alien sea where their own rather than any indigenous writ ran; and as bridgeheads for the intrusion of colonial power into the region. Once constructed, they constituted in indigenous terms the citadels of an altogether novel, external, hegemonic power with which, quite suddenly and inexorably, they found themselves confronted. As it chanced in the Uganda case, the security of these forts was never greatly threatened (other than by those of the mercenaries who mutinied against the British in 1897), while, as soon as British domination came to be firmly established, their day-to-day importance shrank away as their intrusive purposes came to be fulfilled.

What is at the same time striking is that it was as often the demonstration effect of greater coercive power as it was its actual lethal use which served to establish colonial hegemony. Ordinarily the first British officers in Uganda much preferred to whittle out some peaceful acknowledgement of their hegemony rather than indulge in any lethal enforcement of it. To that end they employed a range of expedients. They regularly batted on the rifts in the polities they encountered: by letting them play into their hands; by prising them apart so as to assert their own dominance over them; and/or by taking steps to bring the parties together when that seemed the more efficacious way to proceed. As it happened, they encountered in these kingdoms a good many occasions when cleavages within a kingdom's leadership provided exactly the opportunities they needed to advance their cause in these ways. In confronting these kingdoms, British officers much preferred, moreover, to work with and not against the grain of indigenous notions of political legitimacy. In view of the prevalence of more than one perfectly legitimate claimant to a rulership in this region, it often proved possible to exploit such rivalries so as to secure from the chosen claimant active acknowledgement of British hegemony. As that became established, recourse could then be had to the dualism of appeasement and the instilling of awe.⁶⁰

At the same time, on the African side, one can discern something of a sequential repertoire of responses to the imperial advent. As the first

⁶⁰ Ch. 11.

alien presence intruded, so variations upon the theme of ‘containment’ became the order of the day – ranging from an astutely cautious reaction on the one hand to unmitigated hostility on the other. As colonial power then gathered momentum, two polarised responses jostled for primacy. On the one hand, there were varying resorts to ‘rejection’ – often surreptitiously conducted, sometimes publicly displayed, developing at times into open resistance, and then on occasion to purposeful revolt. At the same time, there was many a tendency to ‘seize the main chance’, especially with a view to winning external support in the pursuit of some internal rivalry or dispute. As long as the traditional offices of rulership and its chieftaincies were maintained, this, for many of the contending parties, had considerable attractions. Once the alien power then became entrenched, a further pair of contrasting responses came into play. Those who had lent the alien power their support busily angled to adjust to their own advantage the terms of the alliance they would now have to live with, while others simply succumbed to their fate.

Whilst analyses upon these lines are of first importance, it is nevertheless time to press such analytical procedures further. Accordingly a more extensive analytical guidestick will be offered here that will be built upon the notion of ‘defining conjunctures’, most obviously prior to which colonial hegemony did not prevail, by the conclusion of which it was not only well established but was well on the way to being institutionalised. In each instance, the intervening period saw a fateful encounter between an indigenous polity and an imperious colonial power, the course and outcome of which very largely set the pattern for the relationship which thereafter obtained between them. In each instance, it is then of prime importance to note that these ‘defining conjunctures’, as they will be called, were heavily affected throughout by ‘conditioning circumstances’, principally within each indigenous polity itself (in Nkore, for example, as we shall see, by an unusually complex succession crisis). Each conjuncture, moreover, passed through four readily discernible stages. In doing so, they came close to following the four steps in the sequence earlier suggested in the otherwise disparate cases of Punjab, Malaya and Fiji.

- (i) First there were the ‘precursors’, both on the indigenous side and on the British, as well as conjointly between the two, which set the scene as the defining conjuncture occurred (for example most strikingly in Buganda, as conditioned by the major religio-political revolution which occurred immediately prior to the British colonial advent).
- (ii) Then in each case – though varying considerably in form (lethal force was not, as we have noted, always employed) – there was some

'raw assertion of British hegemony', often in the context of some indigenous crisis, which decisively signalled that a major change in superordinate power in the region had occurred (for instance in Lugard's decisive support for the Buganda Protestants at the battle of Mengo in 1892 in their defeat of Buganda's Catholics under the leadership of Buganda's ruler, Kabaka Mwanga).

- (iii) But such was never the end of the story. Rather, in each case there followed a 'determining vortex', when in interaction with frequently quite distinctive local circumstances the implications of, and the follow-on from that raw assertion, were worked, and often fought, through – a process that could extend over anything from two to six years. (As some examples, in three of the five kingdom areas of 'Uganda' the British found themselves confronted during this stage by major challenges to their claimed hegemony: in Bunyoro by its ruler Kabalega's continuing defiance of their assertions over five years; in Buganda by Kabaka Mwanga's revolt in 1897; in Busoga by their loss of control later that year to three mutinous companies of Sudanese mercenaries.) At the same time these 'determining vortexes' almost invariably saw, within the context set by the advent of British power, a struggle for power within the indigenous elites themselves, whose upshot decisively determined the future both of those who came out adversely (Mwanga and Kabalega were both eventually exiled for life to the Seychelles) and those who emerged as its victors (on which, see below how extensively this was true for a number of what are here called ex-'new model warband' leaders).⁶¹
- (iv) Only when (thanks to local alliances and substantial reinforcements of British-commanded troops) these determining vortexes eventually reached finality did a fourth stage in the establishment of southern Uganda's 'defining conjuncture' take place, with the framing of 'colonial settlements', most obviously in Buganda during the Special Commissionership of Sir Harry Johnston, by the (mis-called) Uganda Agreement of 1900; in Toro by the Toro Agreement of 1900; in Ankole (as we have noted Nkore had now become) by the Ankole Agreement of 1901; and in their paler reflections (for reasons to be explained) in both Bunyoro and Busoga.⁶²

Throughout, however, it needs to be noted that the outcome of almost every particular occurrence turned upon contingencies. Their resolution, moreover, was almost always ad hoc. Colonial officials were of

⁶¹ Ch. 5.

⁶² Ch. 10.

course always fixated upon securing their own hegemony, whilst indigenous leaders wrestled throughout with how best to secure their own and their peoples' interests. There were no appointed procedures, however, to direct the former, whilst the latter faced an incursion quite unprecedented in their history. Amid a paucity of ready prescriptions, both had constant recourse to expedients – as the resulting upshot shows. There was next to nothing here of orderly 'construction' or anything that warrants so precise a term as 'formation'. Indeterminacy abounded – such as lurks in the word 'fabrication'. And it is that which will be outlined here.

2 Statecraft: external intrusion and local dominion

A glance at an all-Africa map will soon indicate how small an area relative to the rest of the continent was occupied by the numerous rulerships in the East African interior that were encircled by the string of lakes north of Lake Tanganyika (see [Map 1](#)). Add an average climate map – semi-arid lands to the north and east, wet tropical forests to the west – and any surprise that they remained long isolated from the outer world will be much reduced.

In view of the extensive kinglists which are common throughout this region it is widely claimed that many of their rulerships have a lengthy heritage. Their roots seem to lie well back in the first millennium AD, before beginning to take shape plus and minus 1100, and then assuming some more recognisable form plus and minus 1500. It was during the latter period – the eleventh to sixteenth centuries – that the large earthworks in western Buganda at Ntusi, Bigo and thereabouts, which clearly required some considerable organised authority to construct, seem to have been built and occupied.¹ Thereafter, it can begin to be plausibly shown that by the sixteenth century, through many vicissitudes, some important dynasties that lasted through to the late twentieth century had come into being.²

These dynasties ordinarily superimposed, upon a kinship structure of dispersed exogamous totemic clans, political kingdoms headed by rulers characteristically associated with royal emblems such as royal drums or royal spears, who had subject to them administrative chiefs, some of whom were hereditary clan leaders, some appointed lay chiefs, some cadet members of the royal clan. While corporate local communities were often of great importance, systems of personal clientship in which

¹ D.L. Schoenbrun, *A Green Place, A Good Place. Agrarian Change, Gender and Social Identity in the Great Lakes Region to the 15th century* (Oxford, 1998), especially pp. 131, 185, 220.

² E.g. C. Wrigley, *Kingship and State. The Buganda Dynasty* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 73–4, 77–8, 85–6, 171, 201–2.

one man served another and was rewarded with his favours, and the more general notion that in any personal encounter one man was subordinate and the other superior, were widespread in this region and ultimately culminated in the authority of the ruler.³

There was thus hereabouts a clear understanding of the notion of political authority and a deep-rooted heritage of functioning political authorities topped by hereditary rulers. To such rulerships belonged the prerogatives of royal statecraft: securing the royal succession, managing the kingdom's apex, fashioning its territorial administration, ordering its collection of taxes, mediating with the forces of nature and the spirits, fostering its external trade; and, in defence of the kingdom or for the purposes of launching some external attack, mobilising its armed forces. Much of the destiny of these kingdoms turned on how particular rulers exercised their royal prerogatives.

While such institutions largely marked off these kingdoms from their Bantu, Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic neighbours, there were at the same time some significant differences between them. As a totality they comprised the northern reaches of the Bantu-speaking peoples, who, with their 400 languages, spread through most of the rest of Africa to their south. Here three different Bantu-language-speaking groups could be discerned. One extended across Burundi, Rwanda and several of their neighbours; a second spread throughout Buganda and Busoga; while a third ran all the way from the south end of Lake Victoria to Nkore to the north and then north again to Bunyoro. There were at the same time some noticeable differences in their social structures. In Burundi through Rwanda to Nkore and amongst most of their immediate neighbours, distinctions generally existed between Tutsi pastoralists (called Hima in the Nkore region), who for the most part constituted the superior minority, and the ordinarily subordinated majority, who were principally agriculturists (Bairu in the Nkore region, Hutu to the south). Similar distinctions, though to a lesser degree, existed in the Bunyoro-Toro region, but barely at all in Buganda or Busoga.

These differences bore no relation to the size, or success, or lack of either, of these kingdoms. Within each of these linguistic and social clusters there were some kingdoms which were large and powerful while others were small and weak. The relationship between them was in part marked by trade. Some kingdoms, like Bunyoro, had access to valuable deposits of salt and iron, whilst others, like Buganda, were short of both. Exchanges therefore took place, often for cattle, but for other goods

³ E.g. Maquet, *The Premise of Inequality*.

as well, and extended to neighbouring peoples beyond the region. Relations between these kingdoms were also marked by war. Right across the region, raids could be fairly easily conducted since there were few natural barriers of forest or steep hillside to deter armed levies. Even the Nile could be crossed quite easily. In several areas, wars were frequently geared to critical changes in the ecological balance between men, herds and pastures. If herds became too small (particularly because of disease), more cattle would be sought. Should they outgrow existing pastures, more would be needed. Wars were more extensively geared, however, to the enhancement of a kingdom's dominion; to the cupidity of its rulers and their followings; and in due course to meeting the demands of a growing external trade.

Interwoven with these circumstances were a number of special features touching the fate of most of these kingdoms. Perhaps the most important related to the rules of kingly succession, chief of which was that ordinarily every son of a previous ruler had an inherent right to succeed to the rulership himself. That had its advantages. By making a number of prominent persons legitimate contestants for the kingship, the importance of the office was thereby underscored and thus the unity and strength of the kingdom became enhanced. But such prescriptions also contained grave dangers. By the mid nineteenth century, Bunyoro, for example, had been much reduced in size, not least as cadet branches of the royal house had set themselves up in independent control of peripheral parts of the kingdom. In the 1830s a Prince named Kaboyo had established himself in control of Toro in its southern confines;⁴ while twenty years later, two other princes proceeded somewhat likewise along its northern borders.⁵ There were similar breakaways in some of the kingdoms along the southwestern and southern reaches of Lake Victoria. In the 1860s the former kingdom of Buzinza broke up completely⁶ – as in the eighteenth century the once substantial kingdom of Mpororo westwards of Nkore had disintegrated too.⁷ At the same time other kingdoms grew. As Mpororo and Bunyoro eroded, so Nkore extended its dominion; while, sometime in the 1840s, in the later stages of a succession war, Rwanda, which had been growing from small

⁴ J.F.M. Wilson, 'A History of the Kingdom of Toro in Western Uganda to 1900', MA thesis, Makerere University, 1972, Ch. 3; K. Ingham, *The Kingdom of Toro in Uganda* (London, 1975), Ch. 1.

⁵ J. W. Nyakatura, *Anatomy of an African Kingdom. A History of Bunyoro-Kitara* (New York, 1973), pp. 98–100.

⁶ P.H. Van Thiel, 'Buzinza unter der Dynastie der Bahinda', *Anthropos*, 6 (1911), pp. 497–520, Pt II.

⁷ H.F. Morris, *A History of Ankole* (Kampala, 1962), Ch. 4.

beginnings over three centuries, after adding Ndorwa and Bugesera finally swallowed its smaller neighbour Gisaka.⁸

It was into this region that there came in the middle years of the nineteenth century the first intruders from the large, variegated outside world which had hitherto been scarcely known about here at all. Local traditions assert that the first manufactured goods only arrived around the middle or latter part of the eighteenth century. Arab traders from Zanzibar did then reach the lakes area in the first half of the nineteenth century.⁹ Rather than come by the route from Mombasa on the Indian Ocean seaboard towards the northeastern shore of Lake Victoria, they came around its southwestern corner through what is now Tanzania.¹⁰ By the 1850s there were reported to be Zanzibari settlements here that were already ten years old,¹¹ while by the 1870s some traders had been active here for over twenty years.¹² Based upon their connections with some well-established kingdoms in the region, they soon found a very profitable market for their trade: cotton cloth, guns and other manufactured goods in return for ivory and slaves.¹³

Their reception in the region nevertheless varied widely. In Buzinza at the south end of Lake Victoria, especially once it had disintegrated, they never found a secure foothold.¹⁴ Here and in Rusubi to its north, they were regularly fleeced for their right to pass onwards. Rusubi, moreover, once contemplated barring them altogether.¹⁵ To the west, the major kingdom of Rwanda sought their cloth and guns, but, fearful of what else they might bring, firmly closed its gates against them.¹⁶ Karagwe, by

⁸ J. Vansina, *L'évolution du royaume Rwanda dès origines à 1900* (Brussels, 1962); Catharine Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda 1860–1960* (New York, 1988), Ch. 3.

⁹ J.K. Miti, 'Buganda 1875–1900. A Centenary Contribution', trans. G.K. Rock, Makerere University, Library, CMS Archives, University of Birmingham Library [pre 1948], pp. 37–41 (pagination according to edited copy); A. Kagwa, *Ekiitabo kya Basekabaka be Buganda* (The Kings of Buganda) (Kampala, 1953) trans. S. Musoke.

¹⁰ J.H. Speke, *What Led to the Discovery of the Source of the Nile* (London, 1864), pp. 255–60; D.A. Low, 'The Northern Interior 1840–84', in R. Oliver & G. Mathew, eds., *History of East Africa*, Vol. 1 (Oxford, 1963), pp. 315–20, 323–4. See also M.G. Kenny, 'Pre-Colonial Trade in Eastern Lake Victoria', *Azania*, 14 (1979), pp. 97–107.

¹¹ J.H. Speke, *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile* (London, 1863), pp. 154–5.

¹² J.M. Gray, 'Arabs on Lake Victoria. Some Revisions' *Uj*, 22 (1958), p. 78.

¹³ E.g. Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 44–5.

¹⁴ Thiel, 'Buzinza', pp. 507, 510 ff.

¹⁵ E.g. Speke, *What Led*, p. 255; Speke, *Journal*, Chs. 7–8; R.F. Burton, *The Lake Regions of Central Africa*, 2 vols. (London, 1860), II, pp. 176, 195.

¹⁶ 'They were highly suspicious and would not allow any strangers to enter their country': Speke, *Journal*, p. 239; J.W. Grant, *A Walk Across Africa* (London, 1864), p. 161; H.M. Stanley, *Through the Dark Continent* (London, 1879), I, pp. 454–5, and, *In Darkest Africa* (London, 1890), II, pp. 332, 343; J. Vansina, *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda*.

contrast, inland of Lake Victoria's western shore, provided a base at Kafuro for the traders' main settlement in the region until the 1880s.¹⁷ To the north they were greatly welcomed in the much larger kingdom of Buganda, where by the 1850s some Zanzibaris had already become regular visitors; some had even been periodic residents.¹⁸ In Bunyoro, further north again, they were also welcomed, though for a while it saw rather fewer of them.¹⁹

Those rulers who welcomed these traders to their kingdoms nevertheless took particular care to control their actions. Rumanika, ruler of Karagwe, once made a group of them withdraw from Karagwe's border with Buganda lest they upset the good relations he had always sought to maintain with Kabaka Suna, its ruler.²⁰ Suna himself forbade the traders from traversing his country northwards lest they ally with some of his neighbours against him.²¹ There was then an occasion in the 1850s when 'by order of the king', their settlement in Buganda was 'broken up' as 'the Arabs were interfering too much with his subjects',²² while following Suna's death in 1856 one group of traders was barred from entering the country till his successor, Mutesa I, had been securely installed.²³ With immense consequences for the future they were then much encouraged to return.²⁴ These measures seem, however, to have served their purpose as, for the next thirty years, the Zanzibaris were evidently very careful not to interfere in Buganda's internal politics. To their existing repertoire of statecraft, rulers were thus having to add a further category that involved grappling with the advent of some quite new intruders into the region.

By the 1860s that requirement began to be further enlarged for the two northern kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buganda as two further sets of new intruders started to advance upon them.

The Nyinginya Kingdom (Oxford, 2004), pp. 168, 174–5; Mackay to Euan Smith, 1 Jan., FO 84/2060; Stokes to Nicol, 15 Jan. 1890, MP.

¹⁷ Speke, *What Led*, pp. 255–6, 259–60; Speke, *Journal*, pp. 196, 201, 237; Burton, *Lake Regions*, II, pp. 177, 184; Stanley, *Dark Continent*, I, pp. 356–8. For its demise by the late 1880s as a traders' base, see Stanley, *Darkest Africa*, II, p. 377; G. Casati, *Ten Years in Equatoria*, 2 vols., 2nd edn (London, 1891), II, p. 282.

¹⁸ Speke, *What Led*, p. 255; Speke, *Journal*, pp. 184, 276; Burton, *Lake Regions*, II, pp. 188–96; Stanley, *Dark Continent*, I, p. 454.

¹⁹ Four are said to have been there in 1862: Miti, 'Buganda', I, p. 54; though it is usually said they did not reach Bunyoro till 1872.

²⁰ Speke, *Journal*, p. 265.

²¹ Burton, *Lake Regions*, II, pp. 186, 195.

²² Speke, *What Led*, p. 259.

²³ Speke, *Journal*, p. 187.

²⁴ Speke, *What Led*, p. 258.

Back in 1841 an Egyptian naval expedition had found the White Nile to be navigable as far south as Gondokoro, just 200 miles north of Bunyoro. At first official, and later private, traders thereupon descended upon many of the stateless societies in the Upper Nile region. By contrast with their Zanzibari counterparts, the Khartoumers, as they were called, rarely encountered political organisations in their pathway that were able to sustain a regular trade. Nor was there much interest hereabouts in the cloth which they brought, or, until later, in their guns. Most peoples in the region focused rather upon mulcting their neighbours of their cattle. As a consequence it was not long before the Khartoumers found themselves ineluctably drawn into a regime of raiding for cattle to barter for the local ivory, and capturing slaves. The ensuing rapine soon became notorious. By the time, in the 1860s, that the first of the Khartoumers reached Bunyoro, raids rather than commerce had become their chief preoccupation.²⁵ Such indeed was their evil reputation that the only party of them ever to enter Buganda soon found themselves summarily ejected.²⁶

The Zanzibaris and Khartoumers were not, however, the only new alien intruders to appear at this time in the lakes region. In 1862 the first two Europeans, J.H. Speke and A.J. Grant, arrived. They had come from the south on a journey of European exploration to find the source of the White Nile. That being their chief objective they travelled along the western shore of Lake Victoria, not, say, towards Rwanda or Nkore, but towards Buganda and Bunyoro. Seemingly encouraged by his successful handling of the Zanzibari advent, Rumanika warmly welcomed them to Karagwe,²⁷ while shortly afterwards they were urged to proceed to Buganda, where its new ruler Kabaka Mutesa, having established successful relations with the Zanzibaris, was evidently anxious to secure what might well be another valuable connection for him.

At this point Grant fell ill, so Speke decided to go on to Buganda alone. On his arrival there he was received in great state. As harbinger of technological and other achievements even beyond those of the Zanzibaris, his advent evidently caused a sensation.²⁸ He himself was much distressed by the frequent executions which took place at the Buganda court, and made it plain he was not willing to follow Buganda protocol

²⁵ R. Gray, *A History of the Southern Sudan 1839–1889* (Oxford, 1961).

²⁶ S.W. Baker, *Ismailia* (London, 1874), II, pp. 98–9.

²⁷ Speke, *Journal*, Ch. 8; Grant, *Walk*, Ch. 8.

²⁸ On Speke and Grant's Buganda visit, see Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 46–54; B.M. Zimbe, 'Kabaka ne Buganda' (Buganda and the Kabaka) trans. F. Kamoga (Kampala, 1939), pp. 16–17; Speke, *Journal*, Chs. 6–18; Grant, *Walk*, Chs. 9–11; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 121–2; Shergold Smith to Wright, 27 Aug. 1877, CA6/022.

unequivocally – by sitting, for example, in the Kabaka’s presence on the ground. Nevertheless, he regularly attended upon the Kabaka, and was careful to cultivate friendly relations too with another figure of key importance, the Namasole, the Queen-Mother. His visit thus proceeded along entirely amicable lines, and for five months he remained their honoured guest.

Once, however, he had been joined by Grant, they became anxious to depart northwards. Mutesa was clearly reluctant to permit them to do so, lest, it seems, they should establish a hostile alliance against him with Omukama Kamurasi of Bunyoro. He pressed them instead to open a route to the east. In the end, however, he relented, and whilst Speke departed on a detour to become, on 28 July 1862, the first European to view the outflow of the White Nile from Lake Victoria,²⁹ Grant travelled northwards towards Bunyoro.

Unlike Mutesa, Kamurasi of Bunyoro had not issued an invitation to them to advance towards his kingdom. He was clearly in two minds as to how to respond to their advent. Along with many of his countrymen he was deeply suspicious of what their visit could entail, particularly as they were coming from Buganda, travelling separately, and upon different routes. At first, therefore, he refused to allow Grant to advance; and when Speke in a flotilla of canoes travelled down the Nile, a Bunyoro force opened fire upon him. Once, however, the two of them had joined up, Kamurasi finally gave orders for them to move forward.³⁰ Upon their arrival at his court, he continued, however, to display his earlier caution, and for over a week refused to see them. In the end, however, he set aside his earlier apprehensions, and was soon seeking their support against the two Palwo Princes, Ruyonga of Kibanda and Mupina of Kihukya, whose fathers had distanced themselves from Bunyoro’s rulership for failing to uphold the tradition that its holders should always be sons of a ruler’s Palwo wife, and had now established themselves upon Bunyoro’s northern borders in open defiance of him.³¹ Speke and Grant declined, however, to accede to his request,³² and after a stay of two months departed northwards.

On reaching Gondokoro, they met up with two other explorers, Samuel Baker and his wife, who now determined to become the first

²⁹ Speke, *Journal*, pp. 466 ff.

³⁰ For their visit to Bunyoro, see Speke, *Journal*, Chs. 16–18; Grant, *Walk*, Chs. 11–12; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 102–4.

³¹ For this and later references to the Palwo, see writings by Ade Adefuye, e.g. ‘Kabalega and the Palwo: A Conflict of Aspirations’, *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 8, 12 (1975), pp. 81–98; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 98–100.

³² Speke, *Journal*, pp. 515, 532; Speke, *What Led*, p. 368; Grant, *Walk*, pp. 284, 314.

Europeans to view the great lake to Bunyoro's west, which Speke and Grant had not seen but had heard about. On entering Bunyoro,³³ Baker's blustering manner, his initial refusal to assist the Omukama against the Palwo, and a vicious attack by some Khartoumers claiming to be the white men's allies upon a Bunyoro party provided an unpropitious start to their visit. Nevertheless, they succeeded in reaching Lake Albert on 14 March 1864, but were then prevented from making an early departure northwards. Having failed to secure Speke and Grant's help against the Palwo princes, Kamurasi was evidently determined to secure Baker's assistance in their place, and in the event, when a party of the Maltese trader de Bono's Khartoumers, who had allied with the princes,³⁴ launched an invasion on their behalf against him, Baker was eventually prevailed upon to enforce their retreat – by, as he claimed, raising the Union Jack in their face as testimony to the greater power to which he belonged.

The possibility that this might lead into a more enduring alliance between Baker and Kamurasi was soon noticed by Kabaka Mutesa of Buganda, who, on receiving information that Kamurasi was preventing the Bakers from visiting his kingdom, sent an army against him, which only withdrew once the Bakers' reinforcements had arrived from the north, and successfully secured their departure.

Despite the fluctuating reception Kamurasi afforded Speke and Grant, and Mutesa's latter-day apprehensions, these initial European visits accordingly passed without serious mishap. At the same time the advantages of effecting an alliance with such alien intruders, and the dangers of permitting this to pass to others, were already beginning to figure in the statecraft of these kingdoms.

There were two important sequels to these visits. In the first place, while Speke and Baker both vigorously denounced the depredations of the slave traders in the region,³⁵ and while Speke and Grant were horrified by the executions they witnessed at Mutesa's court,³⁶ they were much impressed by so much else that they saw of the Buganda kingdom, and thereafter joined in portraying it as much the most substantial in the region.³⁷ By contrast, Baker, who never saw the killings in Buganda, but was no less shocked by those which he witnessed in Bunyoro, regularly inveighed against Kamurasi for what he described as his tyranny, deceit

³³ For their visit, see S.W. Baker, *The Albert N'yanza* (London, 1866), II, Chs. 1–2, 4–6.

³⁴ Speke to Hammond, 28 May 1864, FO 78/1839.

³⁵ Speke, *What Led*, p. 368, and see fn. 37 below; Baker, *Albert N'yanza*, II, Ch. 9.

³⁶ Speke, *Journal*, pp. 374–5 ff.; Grant, *Walk*, pp. 218 ff.

³⁷ Speke, *Journal*, Chs. 10–14; Grant, *Walk*, pp. 299, 215 ff.

and brutality.³⁸ Thus was first adumbrated a British mindset, which was never substantially altered, in which Buganda generally figured positively while all but invariably Bunyoro was denounced.

Meanwhile, basking in his 'discovery' of the source of the White Nile, Speke upon his arrival in London had proceeded to set out a series of proposals for further enterprises in the Upper Nile region. On 18 February 1864, he addressed a meeting in London, with the Marquess of Townsend in the chair, that was called to consider his 'Scheme for Opening Africa'. In this he more particularly urged that a 'United Church Mission' should be sent up the White Nile 'to the kingdom of Unyoro' and that thereafter 'detachments of Missionaries should be sent further on to the Kingdoms of Uganda and Karagwe'.³⁹ It was thus Speke, and not Stanley as has ordinarily been thought, who was the first to suggest missionaries should go there. The Anglican Church Missionary Society considered the suggestion carefully, but in the aftermath of several other societies' failures⁴⁰ concluded that 'such a plan [was] visionary and that we must gradually work up from the Coast Stations towards the interior as the Lord goes before us'.⁴¹

At the same time Speke urged upon the British government the importance of prevailing on the Egyptian government to take steps to suppress the slave trade upon the Upper Nile.⁴² Upon this matter he was soon joined by Sir Roderick Murchison, the very influential President of the Royal Geographical Society,⁴³ and together they proposed to the British Foreign Office that in such an endeavour the ultimate object should be to open trading relations with 'the three kingdoms of Unyoro, Uganda and Karagwe, in all of which the sovereigns have evinced a keen desire for commercial intercourse with civilized companies'.⁴⁴ 'It would first be necessary', Speke advised, 'to establish a force at Gondokoro to prevent armed gangs marching into the country ... Should this be effected the country would be open to the transmission of an Embassy

³⁸ Baker, *Albert N'yanza*, II, e.g. pp. 75–6, 163, 168–9, 254–5.

³⁹ Speke's 'Considerations for Opening Africa', and 'Scheme for Opening Africa' [18 Feb. 1864], ZM item 312. See J.M. Gray, 'Speke and Grant', *UJ*, 17 (1953), pp. 150–1, for more details.

⁴⁰ The London Missionary Society's amongst the Ndebele, the Universities Mission to Central Africa south of Lake Nyasa, and James Stewart's Free Church of Scotland mission to the Shire highlands would be three examples.

⁴¹ Venn to Rebmann, 26 Feb. 1864, CA5/L1. Consequently, only one European remained to brave the East African interior – David Livingstone.

⁴² Speke's 'Considerations' and 'Scheme'.

⁴³ R.A. Stafford, *Scientist of Empire: Sir Roderick Murchison, Scientific Exploration, and Victorian Imperialism* (Cambridge, 1989).

⁴⁴ Memorandum enc. in Murchison to Russell, 28 Apr. 1864, FO 78/1839.

to the Court of Unyoro and the finest lands in the world would be open to Europe.⁴⁵

Upon being referred to the British Consul-General in Cairo, these proposals were, however, roundly derided;⁴⁶ and as they smacked of the disastrous British expeditions up the Niger in 1832 and 1841, and more recently of the greatly riven Zambezi expedition under David Livingstone, nothing immediately ensued.⁴⁷

Had, however, either of Speke's proposals eventuated, the British approach to the lakes kingdoms could first have been by the White Nile and not, as in the event, from the east coast, while Bunyoro rather than Buganda could then have become its pivot, with all sorts of different consequences for the future. As it was, Speke's proposals were simply left hanging in the air.

During the interval before another European intrusion occurred, the traders' search for ivory and slaves expanded widely. The Khartoumers established regular contact with Bunyoro, while, by the 1870s, Buganda had successfully developed a sophisticated organisation for its Zanzibari trade. In this, the purchase of guns became increasingly urgent. By 1872 it was reported that Buganda had over 1,000 of them.⁴⁸ There now developed, moreover, a greatly enhanced waterborne traffic, especially along the western shore of Lake Victoria.⁴⁹

One incident in these years provided an index of many of the forces now at work in the region. In 1869 Kamurasi of Bunyoro died. With much princely and chiefly support an elder son, Kabigumire, claimed the rulership, but was soon challenged by his more popular younger brother, and Kamurasi's designated successor, Kabalega. During the conflict which ensued, different groups of Khartoumers backed different candidates; while, following an appeal from Kabalega, Mutesa of Buganda sent an army to support him which was partly armed with guns. Upon Kabalega emerging victorious and grasping hold of the rulership, those Khartoumers who had assisted him demanded half of his kingdom in return for their help. Kabalega, however, brusquely expelled them, but then found himself confronted once more by Kabigumire who had secured the support of an Nkore army. Lacking

⁴⁵ Speke to Hammond, 28 May 1864, FO 78/1839.

⁴⁶ Colquhoun to Russell, 6 Apr. 1865, FO 78/2283.

⁴⁷ K. O. Dike, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885* (Oxford, 1956), pp. 61-4, 168 ff.; R. Coupland, *Kirk on the Zambesi* (Oxford, 1928).

⁴⁸ Baker, *Ismailia*, II, p. 98.

⁴⁹ G. W. Hartwig, 'The Victoria Nyanza as a trade route in the nineteenth century', *JAH*, 11 (1970), pp. 535-52.

guns, however, this was very soon routed. Yet it required at least three further major encounters before Kabalega's forces finally tracked down Kabigumire and killed him.⁵⁰

In the course of these events, Bunyoro was deeply riven. Royal fought with royal. Both looked for external assistance. Buganda and Nkore each fished in troubled waters. Guns, moreover, were beginning to show their importance. More ominously, Khartoumer intervention now posed an altogether new threat. Alert to this it seems, Mutesa, who had already sent a friendly caravan to the Sultan of Zanzibar back in 1869, took the opportunity of the arrival at his court of the first official embassy from Zanzibar to send two substantial caravans to the Sultan in 1871–2, with the evident design of winning a supportive alliance with him.⁵¹ He thus displayed the importance he now attached to the enlistment of external support in pursuing his statecraft in the region. That was to be still more exemplified in the years which immediately followed.

Up to this point, while the Khartoumers had displayed their readiness to exploit a local conflict, no outside power had as yet sought to establish its political authority over any of the lakes kingdoms. That, however, was precisely what Egypt under Khedive Ismail set out to do in the mid 1870s. Inspired by the assertions of British explorers that the White Nile offered the finest available highway into central Africa, an Egyptian advance into the East African lakes area now became part of a general expansion of Egyptian dominance at this time, southeast to the borders of Ethiopia and southwest to the Nile–Congo divide.⁵² Paradoxically it was Speke, whose proposals had proved abortive in Britain, who principally animated the Khedive, who saw here the possibility of cauterising the slave trade which was straining his delicate relations with Europe, while providing considerable profits to his much depleted treasury from a state-run trading enterprise. To the command of this southwards thrust he appointed none other than the now Sir Samuel Baker, ordering him in 1869 to:

subdue to our authority the countries situated to the south of Gondokoro; to suppress the slave trade; to introduce a system of regular commerce; to open up

⁵⁰ KW, 'The Kings of Bunyoro-Kitara, Part III', *Uj*, 5 (1937), pp. 62–4; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 108–13; Baker, *Ismailia*, I, pp. 137–8, 178–9; G.N. Uzoigwe, 'Succession and Civil War in Bunyoro-Kitara', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 6 (1973), pp. 49–71.

⁵¹ Kirk to Royal Geographical Society, 13 Oct. 1871, *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* (1871–2), p. 186. For further details, see G. Masefield, 'Livingstone and the Baganda', *Uj*, 10 (1946), pp. 79–83; J. Gray, 'Ahmed bin Ibrahim – The First Arab to Reach Buganda', *Uj*, 11 (1947), Appendix B.

⁵² Gray, *Southern Sudan*.

to navigation the great lakes of the interior; and to establish a chain of military stations and commercial depots, distant at intervals of three days march, throughout Central Africa, accepting Gondokoro as the base of operations.⁵³

Accompanied by his wife and nephew and a remarkably well equipped expedition, Baker left Khartoum on 8 February 1870 for Gondokoro. Soon afterwards his party was badly checked by a major blockage in the swamps of the Nile, while thereafter he became much preoccupied both with curbing some of the Khartoumers' excesses, and with the need to establish his expedition's footholds on its route southwards. It was not, therefore, until 1872 that he was in a position to advance into the lakes kingdoms.⁵⁴

As the first agent of an alien empire-building power to enter the lakes region, Baker crossed the Nile to enter Bunyoro on 7 April 1872, close on the heels of Kabalega's triumphant succession war against Kabigumire.⁵⁵ He thereby initiated a six-year-long Egyptian attempt to establish its dominion over the northern lakes kingdoms, which taxed the statecraft of these kingdoms to the full. Those who particularly resented his intrusion were the Khartoumers in the country, who, knowing of his attacks upon their fellows to the north, seized every opportunity to frustrate his plans. At first, however, despite numbers of Baker's escort of Egyptian troops consisting of former slave-raiding mercenaries, Kabalega received Baker amicably – anxious, it seems, like his father to procure the support which Baker could give against the Palwo princes. To begin with, Baker refused to provide this, but in the end appears to have agreed to do so on his own terms.⁵⁶

Before doing so, however, he had his own instructions to fulfil, and accordingly soon raised the Egyptian flag at Kabalega's capital and unilaterally declared Bunyoro's annexation to the Egyptian empire. He thereby confirmed the worst fears that the Khartoumers had dinned into Kabalega's ears. Had Kabalega's statecraft been more circumspect, he might perhaps have held his hand and finessed, but understandably both he and his chiefs were greatly angered by Baker's actions, and as a consequence it was not long before a series of clashes ensued between the two sides, which each soon blamed upon the other. Baker in response built a stockade to secure the safety of his escort. The Banyoro sent them contaminated beer which Baker declared to have been poisoned. Whereupon a series of violent conflicts ensued, during which

⁵³ T. D. Murray & A. S. White, *Sir Samuel Baker, a Memoir* (London, 1895), pp. 148–9.

⁵⁴ Baker, *Ismailia*, I.

⁵⁵ For his visit to Bunyoro, see *ibid.*, II, Chs. 4–9; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 119–23.

⁵⁶ Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 220–2.

Baker torched Kabalega's capital. But then, finding himself and his forces remorselessly threatened, he decided that, since Kabalega could readily mobilise very large numbers of warriors against him, he had no choice but to withdraw his forces as best he could. In the course of his ensuing retreat his escort was endlessly attacked, while he and his wife and nephew were lucky to escape with their lives.

There were three fateful consequences to this encounter. A yawning rift now opened between Egypt and Bunyoro which was still further widened when, shortly afterwards, Baker made an alliance with the Palwo Prince, Ruyonga. Bunyoro's already tarnished reputation at Baker's hands in European circles was still further blackened by the account he subsequently published about the clash. While incensed by the whole episode but fired up by the resounding success of his warriors' violent assaults upon Baker and his escort in ignominiously expelling them from his kingdom, Kabalega evidently concluded that in any further encounter with such alien intruders his stock-in-trade should be violent confrontation.

From the side lines, Kabaka Mutesa of Buganda evidently watched these events with very close attention, particularly since, apart from the Egyptian intrusion, two further uncertainties now impinged upon Buganda's external relations. In spite of an exchange of courtesies, there was no sign that the Sultan of Zanzibar was prepared to enter into any specific alliance with him. Kabalega, moreover, to Mutesa's increasing anger, showed no sign of acknowledging any debt of gratitude towards him for the assistance he had rendered him during Kabalega's recent succession war. Rather, drawing on his enhanced accumulation of ivory and slaves, Kabalega was busily engaged in securing an increased supply of guns from both the Khartoumers and the Zanzibaris now in his country, while simultaneously reconstructing both the military and the administrative structures of his kingdom. Bunyoro, as a consequence, was fast becoming a considerable threat to Buganda's local prominence.

Standing thus unaided both against the Egyptian thrust and against Bunyoro's rising power, Mutesa set about linking together his solutions to the multiple problems now confronting him. In sharp contrast to Kabalega, he eschewed any thought of resorting to open violence against the alien intruders. Rather, in accord with his already established disposition to seek external support, he evidently determined that, if he could not effect an alliance with Zanzibar, he would seek to establish one with Egypt. As he was soon to reveal, his successive calculations here were that not only could this obviate any alliance between Egypt and Bunyoro, it could well win him Egyptian support against Bunyoro and its ingrate ruler. It might also preclude an attack by Egypt upon Bunyoro

on its own that could then open the way for a subsequent Egyptian advance upon Buganda.

As soon as Baker arrived in Bunyoro, Mutesa accordingly twice sent envoys to establish contact with him, and when he then heard of the violent conflict which had erupted between the Banyoro and Baker's forces he dispatched an army and some further envoys to offer Baker his support,⁵⁷ evidently sensing here a golden opportunity to weld a formidable alliance with Egypt against Kabalega. In the event, however, Baker soon withdrew northwards, having effected no change in the balance of power in the northern kingdoms. Mutesa's sharp focus on courting Baker testified, however, not only to his now astute sensitivity to the possibilities as well as to the dangers in the Egyptian thrust, but to his own fleetfooted statecraft. That would shortly be called upon as never before.

In 1874 Baker was succeeded as Governor of Egypt's Equatoria Province, as it was called, by Colonel Charles Gordon, of Chinese and later Khartoum fame. Baker's 'annexation' of Bunyoro had meanwhile been hailed in Britain as a milestone in the opening up of Africa.⁵⁸ It was in fact nothing of the kind. He had certainly curbed some of the depredations of the Khartoumers, but a great deal remained to be done. During his first two years Gordon accordingly was much involved in seeking to enforce a government monopoly on the ivory trade so as to hamstring the slave trade, and then in building a line of stations up the White Nile in support of his expedition.⁵⁹ As soon, however, as he arrived in Gondokoro, he was met by envoys from the now alert Mutesa, who, having failed to lock in any positive result from his earlier contacts with Baker, was evidently bent upon making a much more direct approach for an alliance with Egypt. For Gordon the arrival of Mutesa's envoys made for a providential start to his dealings with the most substantial of the upcountry kingdoms with which he eventually planned to make contact.⁶⁰ He accordingly dispatched one of his assistants, an American Colonel, Chaillé-Long, to make an informed reconnaissance.

On his way southwards Chaillé-Long confirmed the Egyptian alliance with the Palwo Prince Ruyonga,⁶¹ and thereby opened a route to the south which circumvented Bunyoro on the east. Upon reaching Buganda he was handsomely received by Mutesa,⁶² who not only was

⁵⁷ Baker, *Ismailia*, pp. 198, 280–4, 461–7.

⁵⁸ *The Times*, 9, 16 Dec. 1873.

⁵⁹ G.B. Hill, ed., *Colonel Gordon in Central Africa 1874–1879*, 2nd edn (London, 1884), Chs. 1–2.

⁶⁰ Gordon to Baker, 17 Apr. 1874, in Murray & White, Baker, p. 220.

⁶¹ As Gordon intended: G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, p. 65.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

glad to receive this early response to his approach to Gordon, but very soon made his own interests clear. ‘He asked’, Chaillé-Long reported, ‘if I would make war for him against KabaRega. “He is (said he) a bad man and deserves to be killed.” I replied to him: “Not yet, wait until I see the Pascha at Gondokoro.”’⁶³

Prior to his departure, Chaillé-Long assured Mutesa that he would be held in high regard by the Khedive. Subsequently he claimed that he had procured Mutesa’s willingness to become an Egyptian vassal and had persuaded him to open a trade route to the north⁶⁴ (the first of which remains highly problematic,⁶⁵ while for lack of any operational effect the second came to nothing). There was, even so, one highly positive outcome to his visit. It served to establish friendly relations between Egypt and Buganda in marked contrast to the great hostility which now prevailed between Banyoro and the Egyptian forces. That hostility was exemplified by the violent assault by a Banyoro force on Chaillé-Long as he journeyed northwards,⁶⁶ which only served to reinforce Kabalega’s already evil reputation amongst those Europeans interested in the region.⁶⁷

Cheered by Chaillé-Long’s encouraging initiative, Gordon dispatched a second envoy to Buganda, the Frenchman Ernest Linant de Bellefonds. His principal instructions were to explore whether Buganda’s ivory trade with the Zanzibaris might be redirected to the Khartoum route, and thus to the financial benefit of the Egyptian enterprise.⁶⁸ On his way southwards, he met up with the Palwo princes Ruyonga and Mupina, and thus followed the route Chaillé-Long had taken. He also met a 400-strong Baganda delegation, which in Mutesa’s evident eagerness to embed an alliance with Egypt he had dispatched to Gondokoro in response to the promise suggested by Chaillé-Long’s visit. Then,

⁶³ Chaillé-Long’s reports and correspondence about his journey are in Egyptian General Staff, *Provinces of the Equator. Summary and reports of H.E. the Governor General, Part 1: Year 1874* (Cairo, 1877). See also C. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa. Naked Truths of Naked Peoples* (London, 1876), especially Chs. 9–10.

⁶⁴ Chaillé-Long to Royal Geographical Society, 20 Oct. 1874, *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* (1875), p. 108.

⁶⁵ For the view that he secured a treaty from Mutesa to that effect, see E.A. Alpers, ‘Charles Chaillé-Long’s Mission to Mutesa of Buganda’, *Uj*, 29 (1964), pp. 1–11 (and Egyptian General Staff, *Provinces*, p. 62). For the contrary view, see J.M. Gray, *Uj*, 30 (1966), pp. 87–90.

⁶⁶ Egyptian General Staff, *Provinces*, pp. 70–2, 74; Hill, *Gordon*, p. 55.

⁶⁷ Baker, *Ismailia*, II, Ch. 8; G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 81, 65.

⁶⁸ For his account of his visit, see *Bulletin Trimestriel de la Société Khédiviale de Géographie de Caire*, Series 1 (1876–7), pp. 1–104. Sir John Gray translated extracts: J. Gray, ‘Ernest Linant de Bellefonds’, *Uj*, 28, 1 (1964), pp. 31–54. See also Miti, ‘Buganda’, 1, pp. 66–73; G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 62, 64.

bearing gifts for Mutesa and accompanied by an imposing force of 70 men, Linant reached Buganda in April 1875. There he was well received by Mutesa who, in angling for an Egyptian compact, now appeared interested as well in developing Buganda's trade with the north. Once again, however, he soon showed that his principal interest in securing an alliance with the Egyptian enterprise was to win its armed support against Kabalega, while this time seeking as well support against the Bavuma islanders in Lake Victoria with whom he was also now in conflict. Knowing that this would not have Gordon's approval, Linant declined to assist him, and thereafter, despite a series of amicable conversations with Mutesa, his overbearing manner and his posting of armed guards at the gate of his enclosure close to the Kabaka's palace,⁶⁹ soon led to threats being made against him. Whereupon, despite claiming he had made Mutesa a 'willing subject' of the Khedive, he eventually departed with little to show for his mission.

Shortly before Linant's arrival in Buganda another visitor had entered the kingdom from the south. This was the Welsh-American journalist-explorer, Henry Morton Stanley, who four years earlier had dramatically 'discovered' the missionary-explorer, David Livingstone, at Ujiji on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Stanley was now embarked upon an extensive journey to ascertain the full extent of Lake Victoria, and more particularly the outlet to the sea of the major waters further west (down the Congo as he found). He thus approached Buganda around the east side of Lake Victoria, rather than, as we should note, via Bunyoro or, say, Rwanda. Evidently his personal bonhomie created a favourable impression in Buganda, which was subsequently capped by his active support for Mutesa's eventually abortive campaign against the Bavuma.⁷⁰

The upshot here was of great importance. For, following Linant's visit, Mutesa's attitude towards the Khedive's agents became decidedly more circumspect. On his return journey to Gondokoro, Linant, like Chaillé-Long before him, was attacked by a sizeable Bunyoro force. That signalled that there was now little danger of an Egyptian-Bunyoro alliance against Buganda. But at the same time there was no sign of any Egyptian-Buganda alliance in its place. Neither Chaillé-Long nor Linant had proffered anything to match Stanley's support against the Bavuma, while there was no warrant for their claims that Mutesa had ever accepted Egyptian overlordship. Caught in the ensuing uncertainty, Mutesa was soon, however, to show that, even without his hoped-for

⁶⁹ At least this was Stanley's view: *Dark Continent*, I, pp. 161-2.

⁷⁰ On his visit, see Miti, 'Buganda', I, Chs. 5-11; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', Ch. 5; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 129-31; Stanley, *Dark Continent*, I, Chs. 9, 12-16.

alliance, more was still to be gained in containing the Egyptian enterprise by deft and patient statecraft than by Kabalega's resort to violence.

His initial move was to grasp an opportunity to procure an alternative set of allies to both the Sultan of Zanzibar and the now uncertain agents of the Khedive. In the course of some animated conversations with Stanley, he had shown a considerable interest in the rudiments of Christianity. That prompted Stanley to suggest that an invitation might be sent to Britain for Christian missionaries to come to Buganda. For reasons to be canvassed in the next chapter, Mutesa was in any event much interested in what a new religion might bring. He will more than probably have assumed that, like Stanley (or for that matter the Zanzibaris), such missionaries would provide some practical assistance,⁷¹ while he could also have thought that, if Egypt could advance its interests by enlisting Europeans in its service, Buganda could do so as well. If so, it is ironic that it was Linant, who otherwise departed empty-handed, who carried back Stanley's famous letter to the *Daily Telegraph* calling for missionaries to be sent to Buganda.⁷²

Gordon had in the meanwhile concocted a plan that was much more ambitious than anything contemplated previously. It was principally fuelled by the difficulties he was having in communicating with Khartoum – partly because the Nile was regularly blocked to his north, partly because some Egyptian officials on the way were being highly obstructive.⁷³ Instead of relying upon the Nile route, he now proposed that an alternative route should be opened, by which the lakes area would be directly linked to the Tana river on the East African coast. Initially his proposal was warmly welcomed by the Khedive in Cairo who sent an expedition under McKillop Pasha to open up the new route from the seaward end. Based, however, as it was, on some extremely dubious geographical calculations,⁷⁴ and strongly resisted by British supporters of the Sultan of Zanzibar, the whole project soon collapsed in ignominy.⁷⁵

Gordon meantime had determined to make a quite direct approach to the lakes area.⁷⁶ Around the end of 1875 he wondered whether he

⁷¹ Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 74–5.

⁷² H. B. Thomas, 'Ernest Linant de Bellefonds and Stanley's Letter to the Daily Telegraph', *Uj*, 2, 1 (1934), pp. 7–13.

⁷³ Gordon to Stanton, 20 July 1875, in 'Unpublished Letters of Charles George Gordon', *SNR*, 10 (1927), p. 20.

⁷⁴ As Gordon came to learn: Gordon to Stanton, 26 Feb. 1876, *SNR*, 10 (1927) p. 37.

⁷⁵ G. B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 65, 68, 146, 151; Coupland, *Exploitation* Ch. 13. There is extensive correspondence on this episode in the Zanzibar Archives for 1875–6. See also Ch. 4.

⁷⁶ G. B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 126, 149–50, 177–8; Gordon to Stanton, 30 June, 21 Sept. 1875, 26 Feb. 1876, *SNR*, 10 (1927), pp. 18–19, 26–9, 37; Gordon to Baker, 5 May 1875, Geigler to Baker, 1 Mar. 1876, in Murray & White, *Baker*, pp. 223, 232.

should remain in his exacting post any longer,⁷⁷ but decided that he should first place a boat upon Lake Victoria and raise the Egyptian flag there. In view of Kabalega's bellicosity he knew that such an advance could entail a fight with Bunyoro. He feared it might involve a conflict with Buganda too.⁷⁸ So as to avoid the latter, he proposed to advance directly up the line of the River Nile and thereby largely circumvent Buganda.⁷⁹

During 1876 this plan unfolded. Mruli, where the Kafu river which runs through Bunyoro reaches the Nile, was captured from Bunyoro and placed in the charge of the Palwo Prince Ruyonga.⁸⁰ An Egyptian force was then dispatched to attack Kabalega and ravage his capital.⁸¹ Then, on receiving reports of its success, Gordon sent a contingent of 140 troops under one of his officers, Nuehr Aga, up the final stretch of the Nile.⁸²

When Mutesa heard that Gordon was making preparations for an attack upon Kabalega he sent him a letter which he had had written for him by Dallington Maftaa, a mission boy from Zanzibar who had arrived in Buganda with Stanley. That letter ran as follows:

To Sir Canell Gorlden. February 6th, 1876

MY DEAR FREIND GORDEN Hear this my word be not angry with Kaverega Sultan of unyoro I been head that you been brought two manwar ships but I pray you fight not with those Wanyoro for they know not what is good and what is bad. I am, Mtesa king of uganda for if you fight with governour if you fight with governour you fight with the king. I will ask you one thing but let it may please you all ye Europeion for I say if I want to go to Bommbey if the governour and if the governour of Bommbey refuse me to past will I not find the orther road therefor I pray you my friends hear this my letter stop for a moment if you want to fight put ships in the river nile take west and north and I will take east and south and let us put wanyoro in to the middle and fight against them but first send me answer from this letter. Because I want to be a freind of the English. I am Mtesa son of Suna king of uganda let God be with your Majesty even you all Amen.

Mtesa king of Uganda.⁸³

⁷⁷ G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 94, 116, 126; Gordon to Stanton, 21, 23, 24 Sept. 1875, 26 Feb. 1876, *SNR*, 10 (1927), pp. 26–30, 36–7.

⁷⁸ Gordon to Rawlinson, 22 Aug. 1875, *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* (1976), p. 53.

⁷⁹ G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 93–4, 126, 149–50, 177; Gordon to Stanton, 16 Aug., 21 Sept. 1875, 27 July 1876, *SNR*, 10 (1927), pp. 23, 25–8, 49.

⁸⁰ G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, p. 153.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 192; Gordon to Stanton, 12, 21 Sept., 26 Feb. 1876, *SNR*, 10 (1927), pp. 25, 27, 36; Gordon to Baker, 1 Oct. 1875, in Murray and White, *Baker*, pp. 229–30.

⁸² Gordon to Stanton, 27 July 1876, *SNR*, 10 (1927), p. 48.

⁸³ Facsimile insert, G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 160–1 (repetitions in the original).

Such communications warrant sensitive interpretation. It looks, however, as if, like Gordon, Mutesa believed a major clash between Bunyoro and Egypt was now an almost certain probability. Surprisingly perhaps, the letter begins by expressing a seemingly altruistic plea against this. The ensuing reference to 'governour' indicates, however, that Mutesa's principal concern here was to preserve Bunyoro as a buffer state between the Egyptian forces and Buganda. If such a clash was nevertheless to occur, Mutesa made a strong pitch in line with his earlier hopes for an Egyptian alliance for a joint operation between Buganda and the Egyptian forces, no doubt because a singlehanded assault by them on Bunyoro would leave Buganda next in their pathway without the Khedive's agents having acquired any obligation towards him as an ally.⁸⁴

As it happened, Mutesa's worst fears were soon fully justified. Gordon dismissed Mutesa's appeal in Maftaa's letter and attacked Kabalega singlehandedly.⁸⁵ Kabalega thereupon sought Mutesa's help, but, presumably because this would have invited Gordon's hostility, Mutesa refused to provide this.⁸⁶ In any case he was soon faced by the advent of an Egyptian force on his kingdom's border.

That brought matters to a highly critical point, which Mutesa handled with consummate skill.⁸⁷ His principal decision was to summon the Egyptian troops under Nuehr Aga's command, whom Gordon had sent up the final stretch of the Nile, to come and reside in an enclosure at his capital. Gordon at first thought this implied that Mutesa had 'voluntarily given up his independence'. He soon realised, however, that, on the contrary, 'Mtesa has annexed my soldiers; he has not been annexed himself.'⁸⁸ Whereupon, following their involvement in a series of culpable misdemeanours and their raising of an Egyptian flag, a period of acute tension ensued. Mutesa resolutely refrained, however, from assaulting the Egyptian force. Rather, he concentrated on cowing them into immobility.⁸⁹ Their commander was set free to consult with Gordon, but was

⁸⁴ This interpretation largely accords with G.H.E. Hopkins, 'Mutesa's Letter to Gordon', *Uj*, 8 (1940), pp. 37–8. Mutesa (and Maftaa) rained letters on Gordon from February to August 1876 (and periodically over the next four years) in which Mutesa regularly avowed his commitment to Christianity, and on 6 Feb. 1876, 27 Mar. 1878 and 22 Jan. 1880 urged him not to attack Bunyoro. Sir John Gray collected these letters together: J. Gray, 'The Correspondence of Dallington Maftaa', *Uj*, 30, 1 (1966), pp. 13–24. See also G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, p. 192, for Gordon's receipt on 20 Sept. 1876 of letters from Mutesa while on his way south at Mruli.

⁸⁵ G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 192 ff.; Gordon to Stanton, 26 Feb. 1876, *SNR*, 10 (1927), p. 36.

⁸⁶ Gordon to Stanton, 7 June 1876, *SNR*, 10 (1927), p. 45.

⁸⁷ On this whole episode, see Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 85–7; G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 178, 180.

⁸⁸ G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 178, 181.

⁸⁹ Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 85–6.

made to leave his troops behind to be held as Mutesa's hostages. Gordon now imagined that Mutesa must be preparing for open hostilities with him, and at one stage contemplated going to Buganda himself. But he then had second thoughts and, after sending Mutesa two messages, the first of which contained threats,⁹⁰ in an inspired moment he dispatched the mild-mannered Dr Emin, a Silesian doctor in his service, to secure a peaceful withdrawal of the Egyptian force.

Mutesa continued to play the crisis skilfully. Emin at first found himself confronted by 500 armed Baganda – a very different reception from that accorded to Chaillé-Long and Linan – but, when the two men met, Mutesa sought to emphasise his *bona fides*, in particular by declaring he had now become a Christian. He was therefore somewhat disconcerted to learn that Emin had lately become a convert to Islam. At the same time Mutesa stressed that he wanted Europeans rather than Zanzibaris or 'Turks' to come to his country, and clearly indicated that he still had an interest in securing a trade route with the north. As on previous occasions, nothing, however, came of that, but after spending all of August 1876 at Mutesa's court Emin finally succeeded in withdrawing the Egyptian force without further mishap.⁹¹

That was of great importance. For, as a consequence, there was never any armed clash between the Egyptians and the Baganda, and Gordon soon offered to acknowledge Buganda's complete independence.⁹² At the same time, believing Kabalega to be irredeemably hostile and insufficiently mauled by the force he had earlier sent against him, Gordon marched right across northern Bunyoro in a demonstration of force.⁹³ That failed to break Kabalega's power, but it confirmed the deep antipathy between the two sides at a time when peace between Buganda and Egypt was, vitally for Buganda, being maintained.

Vitally because, by 1877, in response to Stanley's earlier call, the first missionaries from Britain, of the Church Missionary Society, were now advancing by the southern route from Zanzibar towards the lakes area. As, despite Baker's and Gordon's efforts, the Khartoumers'

⁹⁰ Gordon to Stanton, 13 Aug. 1876, *SNR*, 10 (1927), p. 50.

⁹¹ Sir John Gray translated fourteen sets of extracts from F. Stuhlmann, *Die Tagebücher von Dr. Emin Pascha* (Hamburg 1916–27), I–IV and VII which appeared successively in *Uf* between March 1961 (25, 1) and 1968 (32, 2). References to these hereafter will be to 'Emin Diaries'. Here, see Vol. I. See also Miti, 'Buganda', I, p. 87; G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 185–9.

⁹² G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, p. 183; Vivian to Derby, 18 Feb. 1877, *ZA*; Pearson to Hutchinson, 15 Aug. 1878, *CA6/019*.

⁹³ G.B. Hill, *Gordon*, pp. 192–6; Gordon to Stanton, 13 Aug., 29 Sept. 1876, *SNR*, 10 (1927), pp. 50–1.

depredations still persisted in the Upper Nile region, the Society had decided they should not travel by that route; and since Bunyoro seemed to be implacably hostile to all foreign intrusions, the Society discounted Speke's earlier suggestion that they should go first to Bunyoro. They were even wary of the missionaries proceeding as far as Buganda lest they should become embroiled in a possible conflict between Egypt and Buganda. The Society ordered them instead to go no further than Karagwe.⁹⁴ On reaching Lake Victoria, however, the missionaries learnt that no conflict had erupted between Buganda and Egypt, and to their great delight received letters from Mutesa urging them to come forward to Buganda forthwith.⁹⁵ As a consequence no missionary ever went in these earlier years to Karagwe,⁹⁶ let alone to Bunyoro.

Mutesa's summons was evidently related to his concern that even now the Egyptian force might turn against him. Should that happen, he wanted the missionaries by his side.⁹⁷ To the same end he once again sought assistance from the Sultan of Zanzibar⁹⁸ (communications were slow; but the Sultan did no more than express his friendly support).⁹⁹ Mutesa's main anxiety seems to have been with the apparent turnabout in the relations between Kabalega and the Egyptian agents. This seems to have been prompted by Kabalega's realisation that his hostility towards the Egyptian agents was only benefiting his Palwo dissidents. That was confirmed when Emin, sent by Gordon (now Governor-General of the whole Sudan) on a peaceful mission to Bunyoro, found Kabalega unexpectedly anxious to make a peaceful settlement with him.¹⁰⁰ In these circumstances Mutesa was evidently anxious that his hitherto untarnished relations with the Egyptian officials should not be overtaken by any *entente* between Egypt and Bunyoro.¹⁰¹ At the end of 1877 he was very careful, therefore, to permit Emin to enter Buganda once again. However, he insisted that he came without troops, that he held only limited discussions with the missionaries, lest they joined hands against him, and he demurred to Emin's request that he should be allowed to depart southwards since he did not wish his kingdom to become a thoroughfare for foreigners.¹⁰²

⁹⁴ Minutes of Special Committee, 23 Nov. 1876 – 18 Feb. 1877, CMS CA6/N.

⁹⁵ Written by Maftaa, the letters, one dated 10 Apr. 1877, the other undated, are in CA6/022.

⁹⁶ See Wilson's Diary, 4 July, CMS; Wilson to Wright, 6 July 1878, CA6/025.

⁹⁷ E.g. Emin Diaries, I, p. 8.

⁹⁸ Kirk to Derby, 1 Apr. 1877, ZA 1877 FO Correspondence.

⁹⁹ Kirk to Mutesa, 2 Sept. 1878, and Kirk to Salisbury, 15 Oct. 1879, ZA.

¹⁰⁰ Emin Diaries, II; Geigler to Baker, 21 Feb. 1878, in Murray and White, *Baker*, pp. 240–1.

¹⁰¹ He sent messengers to get Emin to leave Bunyoro and go straight on to Buganda: Emin Diaries, II, pp. 164–5.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, II, p. 165, and III.

His anxieties, however, soon proved unwarranted. For, by the end of 1878, Gordon had decided that Egypt could no longer afford its full extension southwards, and had set about withdrawing its southernmost garrisons on the White Nile.¹⁰³ As a consequence Egypt moved out of Mutesa's orbit,¹⁰⁴ and, following Egypt's bankruptcy and the British invasion of Egypt in 1882, the Nile route then became completely closed by the mounting Mahdist revolt in the Sudan.

There were several important corollaries to all of this. The Nile ceased to be potentially a major route into the East African interior.¹⁰⁵ The collapse of the Egyptian enterprise relieved the lakes kingdoms from its threats to their autonomy. Despite Kabalega's latter-day reconciliation with the Egyptian agents, that left Bunyoro with the memory that ostensibly the best policy to adopt against such an alien intrusion was violent opposition, while Mutesa's extraordinarily adroit and patient statecraft pointed to the arguably greater advantage of diplomacy.¹⁰⁶ Arising from this contrast, it looks as if some major later events took their cue from the animosity which Bunyoro's actions in the 1860s–70s had generated in European minds, as compared with the conciliatoriness displayed by Buganda.

Throughout the decade of the Egyptian threat, inter-kingdom raiding by the larger kingdoms for captives (especially women), ivory and cattle, to be distributed amongst their chiefs and people, or sold to a Khartoumer or Zanzibari trader in exchange for guns, cloth and manufactured goods, continued unabated. It remained a major feature of the scene throughout the years which followed. With the removal of the Egyptian threat, it soon became interlocked with the principal changes in the political dynamics of the region. Mutesa could no longer aspire to win Egyptian assistance for an attack upon Kabalega. With Bunyoro now armed with a significant number of guns, it was the one kingdom in Buganda's orbit Mutesa was cautious about attacking. With the closure of the Nile route, the only source of supply for the guns, cloth and manufactured goods which they both craved was now the Zanzibari route. A contest for its control soon became crucial to their future.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Gordon to Wright, 27 Aug., CA6/011; Gordon to Baker, 1 Sept., 20 Nov. 1878, in Murray & White, *Baker*, pp. 243, 254; Gordon to Stanton, 13 Oct. 1878, SNR, 10 (1927), p. 56.

¹⁰⁴ Litchfield to Wright, 21 Jan. 1880, CA6/015.

¹⁰⁵ For Gordon's conclusion: Secretaries to Wilson & Felkin, 13 Feb. 1880, CMS Nyanza I Out.

¹⁰⁶ See Gray's concurrence with this judgement: *Emin Diaries*, III, p. 73.

¹⁰⁷ For its extension between Karagwe and Bunyoro, see, e.g., *Emin Diaries*, II, p. 162.

To begin with, Bunyoro could not think of challenging Buganda directly. Instead, Kabalega pressed ahead with building up the strength of his kingdom. In place of the former tendency to entrust territorial authority to Princes or cadet branches of the royal house, he proceeded to establish a territorial chieftaincy under his own increasingly autocratic control.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, from the mid 1870s onwards, he transformed his personal bodyguard, the Abarasura, into musket- and occasionally rifle- armed regiments, often composed of non-Banyoro mercenaries.¹⁰⁹ Especially upon the perimeter of his kingdom, their commanders also became territorial administrators. During the 1870s and well into the 1880s, these changes did little, however, to enhance Bunyoro's powers. It failed, for example, to make any headway in reintegrating its lately seceded territories back within its borders. On several occasions its forces invaded Toro, the small kingdom to the south, where some decades earlier a Prince from a cadet branch of Bunyoro's ruling clan had broken away to form a separate kingdom. They failed, however, during the 1870s and through to the late 1880s, in decisively reestablishing their dominion over it.¹¹⁰ Throughout the same period, moreover, the Palwo Princes continued to hold out against them – despite the death of Ruyonga in 1881 and Mupina in 1887, each of whom was succeeded by a son, Kamiswa to the former, Katchope to the latter.¹¹¹

Meanwhile Buganda's warriors raided to all other parts of the compass.¹¹² They too suffered setbacks – not merely in their fight with the Bavuma in 1875 (in which Stanley had participated),¹¹³ but against Rwanda in 1880,¹¹⁴ and in 1884 at the hands of the Badama and Padhola eastwards of Busoga.¹¹⁵ At the same time, in line with what we will note was Buganda's heritage of carefully managed enlargement, and without seceded regions to reconquer, they made little or no attempt to add additional territories to their homeland. Instead they honed an already well established policy of paramountcy,¹¹⁶ under which, by

¹⁰⁸ S. Doyle, *Crisis & Decline in Bunyoro: Population & Environment in Western Uganda 1860–1955* (Oxford, 2006), Ch. 2. See also Ch. 5 below.

¹⁰⁹ G.N. Uzoigwe, 'Kabalega's Abarasura: The Military Factor in Bunyoro-Kitara', in *Revolution in Bunyoro-Kitara* (Kampala, 1970), Part 1. See Ch. 5 for a fuller account.

¹¹⁰ Wilson, 'Toro', Ch. 5; Ingham, *Toro*, Ch. 2; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 392–7.

¹¹¹ For a running commentary on their survival skills, see, Emin Diaries II, pp. 152–60; III, pp. 84–5; IV, pp. 130, 133–5; V, pp. 3–7, 9, 11–12; VI, pp. 144, 154; VII, pp. 75–6, 78–9, 81; XIII, p. 68.

¹¹² For an extensive account, see Reid, *Pre-Colonial Buganda*, Chs. 9–10.

¹¹³ Stanley, *Dark Continent*, I, Chs. 12–13.

¹¹⁴ Pearson to Wright, 7 Jan., 5 Mar. 1880, CA6/019.

¹¹⁵ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 135; M.S.M. Kiwanuka, *A History of Buganda* (London, 1971), p. 145; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 62–4.

¹¹⁶ E.g. Speke, *Journal*, p. 257.

inflicting raids and tribute demands upon many smaller rulerships in their orbit, and by intervening in their local rivalries and succession conflicts, they made a great many of them subordinate to them.

This proceeding had four separate thrusts. In the case of many of the smaller Busoga kingdoms to Buganda's east, contestants in these conflicts frequently sought the Kabaka's patronage, and to that end sometimes served at his court.¹¹⁷ At the same time they were each made directly subject to the oversight of some leading Buganda notable.¹¹⁸ Such was the paramountcy that Buganda effectively exercised in Busoga that when, in 1885, the first Anglican Bishop, Hannington, reached Bunya on Busoga's southwestern border and sought to enter Buganda along a traditionally forbidden eastern route, Bunya's ruler, Luba, immediately alerted Mutesa's successor, Kabaka Mwanga, to Hannington's arrival; and, when Mwanga then dispatched executioners to kill the Bishop and his whole party, Luba fully cooperated with them.¹¹⁹

Buganda operated this satellite policy in a variety of forms to its south as well, particularly over the small kingdom of Koki on its southwestern border,¹²⁰ and especially by the late 1880s over Karagwe,¹²¹ but also over several of the smaller kingdoms around the southwestern and southern shores of Lake Victoria – Rusubi, Buzinza and its fragments, and even Ukerewe.¹²² In exercising its paramountcy in these parts, Buganda's warriors became heavily supplemented by the 1880s by its powerful fleet of war canoes which soon secured it unrivalled command of the waterways along the western and southern shores of the lake.¹²³

¹¹⁷ Y.K. Lubogo, *A History of Busoga*, [1939], mss. of translation at instance of Eastern Province (Bantu Language) Literature Committee, Uganda, 1960, pp. 6–7, 35, 45–6, 54, 61, 73, 101, 113, 120; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', p. 30; Mackay to Kirk, 22 Dec. 1885, FO 84/1773. For Buganda's depredations, see Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, Chs. 9–16.

¹¹⁸ Kiwanuka, *Buganda*, p. 141.

¹¹⁹ Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 94–5, 98; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 140. It was, however, claimed that the killings were all at the hands of the Baganda: Mackay to Kirk, 26 Dec. 1886, FO 84/1852.

¹²⁰ Linant in *Bulletin Trimestrial* for May 1875, see Gray, 'Linant', p. 46; Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, pp. 2–4, and, e.g., Emin's Diaries, III, p. 88.

¹²¹ J. Ford & R. de Z. Hall, 'The History of Karagwe (Bukoba District)', *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, 24 (1947), pp. 7 ff.; Stanley, *Darkest Africa*, II, pp. 378–9; Casati, *Ten Years*, II, p. 282.

¹²² See, e.g., Van Thiel, 'Businza'; E. Césard, 'Comment les Buhaya interprètent les origines', *Anthropos*, 22 (1927), pp. 460–1, 464–5; Césard, 'Le Muhaya', *Anthropos*, 32, (1937), p. 56; Miti, 'Buganda', I, p. 90; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 122, 132; Hartwig, 'Victoria Nyanza', pp. 545 ff.; Stanley, *Dark Continent*, I, pp. 160–1, 248–58. H. Médard has an extensive account of Baganda dominations at the south end of the lake around this time: 'Croissance et crises de la noyauté du Buganda au XIXe Siècle', 2 vols., doctoral thesis, Paris I, 2001, pp. 282–333.

¹²³ Reid, *Pre-Colonial Buganda*, Ch. 11; W. Junker, *Travels in Africa*, 3 vols. (London, 1890–2, III, pp. 552–7.

Mutesa also sought to proceed likewise in the western kingdoms. In the mid 1870s he twice, however, failed to secure the Nkore throne for a protégé. Instead the successful contestant, Ntare, busied himself turning several of his smaller neighbours into satellites of his own, and generally succeeded in fending off all Buganda's attacks upon his kingdom.¹²⁴

In Toro to the north Mutesa had briefly succeeded back in the early 1870s in placing a Buganda protégé on the Toro throne, only, however, to find Buganda dominance there becoming much resented.¹²⁵ As a consequence of Kabalega's successive campaigns against Toro from the later 1870s onwards, all that, however, changed, and around 1884 Buganda eventually succeeded in placing a further Buganda protégé, Namuyonjo Kakende, on the Toro throne.¹²⁶ That not only frustrated Bunyoro's attempts to effect its most important reconquest. It directly threatened its access to the Zanzibari trade.¹²⁷

Just as the competition between Bunyoro and Buganda was thus reaching a climax, Buganda suddenly felt threatened by an apparently grave recurrence of its former external dangers. During 1884–5 there were well authenticated reports of annexations by more than one European power both on the Congo and on the East African coast. As a consequence the new and inexperienced Kabaka Mwanga, who had succeeded his father, Mutesa, in 1884, soon concluded that a multi-pronged invasion was closing in upon him. A large caravan under the Anglican Bishop Hannington was reportedly advancing towards Buganda from the east.¹²⁸ Emin, now Governor of the Egyptian Equatoria Province, was also upon the move,¹²⁹ while shortly afterwards a Dr Fischer (who was trying to reach Emin) appeared to be advancing from the south. Worse, Emin seemed to be in the process of making an alliance with Kabalega.¹³⁰

It was in these circumstances that Mwanga not only ordered Hannington's murder, but subsequently gambled early in 1886 – as after his early years his father never seems to have done¹³¹ – on launching a

¹²⁴ S. R. Karugire, *A History of the Kingdom of Nkore in Western Uganda to 1896* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 210–11, 339–40.

¹²⁵ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 305; Wilson, 'Toro', pp. 136–43; Ingham, *Toro*, pp. 45–7.

¹²⁶ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 307; Wilson, 'Toro', pp. 170–4; Ingham, *Toro*, pp. 55–6.

¹²⁷ Junker, *Travels*, III, pp. 482–3, 550; and, e.g., Casati, *Ten Years*, II, p. 23.

¹²⁸ It was reported that Mwanga's particular concern was that the Basoga might procure guns by this eastern route, enabling them to cast off 'their allegiance to Buganda': Mackay to Kirk, 26 Dec. 1886, FO 84/1852.

¹²⁹ Mackay to Kirk, 22 Dec. 1885, FO 84/1773, and 28 June 1886, FO 84/1775; Junker, *Travels*, III, pp. 532, 541.

¹³⁰ *A. M. Mackay By His Sister* (London, 1890), p. 273.

¹³¹ See Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 109, 113, 123, but none later.

formidable frontal assault upon Bunyoro.¹³² At the cost of major casualties on both sides, this, however, was resoundingly defeated, particularly at the major battle of Rwengabi,¹³³ following which, as we shall review in Chapter 5, Mwanga seems to have paused and taken stock. Yet he did not change course, and a year later in early June 1887, after haughtily rejecting an appeal by Kabalega for a peaceful accord, he launched a further attack upon Bunyoro.¹³⁴ This time the Baganda army began by forcing Kabalega's warriors into a series of retreats. The Abarasura, however, soon regrouped, and by mid July 1887 had successfully expelled the Baganda army from their country.¹³⁵

During the preceding years, in order to secure his supply of guns, Kabalega had been providing a leading place in his entourage to one of the Zanzibari traders; and, so as to ensure that they could safely bypass Buganda, sought a friendly relationship with Nkore. Following, moreover, his previously amicable relations with Emin, and perhaps with a view to avoiding conflicts upon two fronts at once while he was at war with Buganda, he also extended a friendly welcome to two successive envoys – Junker and Casati – whom Emin sent to secure Kabalega's help in facilitating his communications with the European missionaries in Buganda, and allow the remaining Egyptian troops to pass through his kingdom on their departure from the region – to both of which he assented.¹³⁶ Such cautionary measures were, however, soon swept aside as he became caught up in the overweening ascendancy of the Abarasura at his court. At their instance he first ordered the destruction of an allegedly refractory traders' settlement, and then for most of a year oscillated between frequent accusations against Emin for his alleged designs upon his kingdom and his deepening suspicion of Casati's dealings with his go-between with Buganda, till in the end he had Casati humiliatingly assaulted and bundled from his kingdom.¹³⁷ With that the former rift between the Egyptian enterprise and Bunyoro was reopened (so that in revenge Emin laid waste Bunyoro's great salt works at

¹³² Ibid., p. 274; Casati, *Ten Years*, I, p. 333, II, p. 16; Junker, *Travels*, III, pp. 527, 529, 531, 533.

¹³³ Mackay, p. 275; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 134–6; KW, 'Kings', p. 64; Mackay to Harrison, April (*sic*), Mackay Papers, CMS; Mackay to Kirk, 7 Apr. 1886, FO 84/1775.

¹³⁴ Mackay to Ashe, 25 May 1887, FO 84/1775; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 140; Casati, *Ten Years*, II, p. 74.

¹³⁵ Casati, *Ten Years*, II, pp. 74–81; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 140–1.

¹³⁶ For their visits and many developments in Bunyoro at this time, see Casati, *Ten year*, II, Chs. 3–10; and Junker, *Travels*, III, pp. 524–33.

¹³⁷ Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 139–42.

Kibiro),¹³⁸ while his ill repute in European circles was once again reinforced.¹³⁹ (It was to be still further underscored when in 1889 H.M. Stanley's Emin Pasha Relief Expedition encountered the Abarasura's extensive rapacity at first hand and inflicted a defeat upon them as it traversed the western confines of his kingdom.)¹⁴⁰ At the same time confronted by much subterranean anger within Bunyoro at the depredations the Abarasura were inflicting upon some of its most notable figures – whom, so as to enhance his authority, Kabalega had allowed the Abarasura to despoil¹⁴¹ – in mid 1887, following their second substantial defeat of the Baganda, he eventually launched them upon a final assault upon the Palwo.

Up until this time the Palwo had continued to hold out against him, but unable to rely any longer on Egyptian support they were now finally overwhelmed later in that year.¹⁴² Thereupon Kabalega dispatched his Abarasura against Toro, where, by June 1889, they had successfully forced Buganda's protégé Namuyonjo Kakende into exile in Buganda, and in a very aggressive manner proceeded to clamp their control over the whole area.¹⁴³

As a consequence, Kabalega finally succeeded in reincorporating within his kingdom its two most important seceded territories. By so doing he effectively closed the bypass route around the northern and eastern borders of his kingdom which Gordon's agents and others had followed, and then, more importantly, reopened a critical stage in his Zanzibari trade route to the south. That last constituted a substantial threat to Buganda, which Mwanga had been busily striving to preclude by preventing any Zanzibari traders carrying arms and ammunition from going northwards to Bunyoro except upon his own authority.¹⁴⁴

All of this signalled that while, by the later 1880s, Buganda's local statecraft was fastened upon satellites, and Bunyoro's upon reincorporating separatist territories into its kingdom, they now confronted each other very much more directly than before. Each stood preeminent within its own domain. Each, as we have already partly seen but must see more of later, had greatly strengthened both the administrative

¹³⁸ See Sir John Gray's summary in Emin's Diaries, xi, pp. 196–7.

¹³⁹ Not least by Casati, *Ten Years*, II, Chs. 4–6.

¹⁴⁰ Stanley, *Darkest Africa*, II, pp. 238 ff.

¹⁴¹ Casati, *Ten Years*, II, pp. 60–1, 65.

¹⁴² Emin Diaries, VII, pp. 85–6, 89–92; Junker, *Travels*, III, pp. 439–514; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 138; Casati, *Ten Years*, II, pp. 53, 69, 82–3, 87, 114.

¹⁴³ Emin Diaries, XIII, pp. 76–8; Stanley, *Darkest Africa*, II, pp. 145, 238–324; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 307; Wilson, 'Toro', pp. 170–83; Casati, *Ten Years*, II, pp. 48, 139, 211.

¹⁴⁴ Junker, *Travels*, III, p. 550; Mackay to Kirk, 28 June, FO 84/1775, and 26 Dec. 1886, FO 84/1852; Walker to Lang, 18 June 1888, G3 A5/05.

structures and the armed might of their kingdoms. Neither, however, had as yet completely overwhelmed the other. In each instance, moreover, successive rulers had succeeded, over thirty years and more, in honing their kingdom's statecraft against external intruders. Not only had they successfully contained all the advances by Zanzibari and Khartoumer traders and by European explorers and (as we shall see) European missionaries. They had withstood the Egyptian enterprise as well. In 1872 Baker had raised the Egyptian flag in Bunyoro and believed he had thereby made what is here termed a raw assertion of imperial hegemony. Gordon thought a similar assertion had been effected over Buganda with the installation at Mutesa's capital in mid 1875 of the force he had dispatched up the Nile under Nuehr Aga. Both, however, were soon shown to be quite mistaken. The Banyoro replied to Baker's aggressiveness by forcefully expelling him and his entourage from their kingdom; while, far from Nuehr Aga's escort successfully asserting Egyptian hegemony over Buganda, they found themselves trapped in Mutesa's embrace, and lucky to escape without serious mishap. Kabalega and Mutesa, as Baker and Gordon each effectively recognised, had both demonstrated, moreover, that they could mobilise military levies on a scale that more than matched their own. Kabalega had successfully repulsed the Khartoumers' attempt to exploit the rifts in his kingdom at the time of his succession war, and had succeeded in ensuring that Baker's and Gordon's patronage of the Palwo Princes never constituted a threat to his hold upon his kingdom. The two rulers had then witnessed the steadily increasing atrophy of the Egyptian enterprise till by the late 1880s preparations for its final dismemberment were being made. With that, the prospect of a culminating confrontation between the two of them seemingly stood central to the politics of the region.

It was soon, however, to be completely overwhelmed by a far more portentous alien invasion than the Egyptian enterprise had ever been, under which, over the course of the next decade, all the northern lakes kingdoms, large and small, were made subject to the full force of British colonial power. That soon provided a quite radical contrast to the Egyptian thrust. None of the Egyptian agents dispatched to the region had ever seen his role as that of a governing colonial ruler. From the very beginning, however, the first agents of British imperial power were all intently focused upon establishing their colonial rule. Despite their exiguous numbers, none of their raw assertions of imperial hegemony was ever aborted. The mercenaries they brought to the region were never less than a match for the indigenous forces that stood against them. In two instances they faced stiff resistance, and upon one occasion found

themselves critically dependent upon the support of some locally important allies. There was, however, never a doubt that their far more professionally disciplined soldiery would ultimately prevail. Time and again, moreover, they successfully exploited the rifts between and within these kingdoms to their own advantage. And while their initial commercial enterprise (as we shall see) soon succumbed to financial bankruptcy as Gordon's did in 1878, since Britain, unlike Egypt, was nowhere near to bankruptcy the British government, albeit reluctantly, soon undertook to fill the breach.

While, therefore, the statecraft which the two northern kingdoms had employed – violence by Bunyoro, diplomacy by Buganda – had successfully secured them against the Egyptian advance, and whilst each, as we shall see, variously tempered the British advance, both completely failed to prevent the British from achieving their overall objective of establishing British imperial supremacy over them. So formidable indeed was the British advance that, whilst on the one hand it emasculated large parts of the statecraft each had been pursuing in the immediately preceding years, it simultaneously lavished an altogether towering success upon others. Blackened by its accumulated evil reputation in European circles, Bunyoro was soon to be quite appallingly traumatised – by, among other things, losing half and more of its lately reunited territory, not least to Buganda. Buganda too was soon completely denuded of all but one of its former satellites. But at the same time Buganda not only saw its previously most formidable neighbour mercilessly humbled, but, partly as a consequence of its better reputation amongst its European contacts; partly because, like Mutesa, members of a new generation of Baganda leaders embraced diplomacy; and partly as well because the multiple cleavages within it provided British officials with just the openings they needed in order to assert their supremacy over it – it not only procured substantial additional territories that more than compensated for its loss of satellites, but beneath the panoply of British colonial power it soon gained a head-and-shoulders preeminence above all of its neighbours, right across the northern region.

That, however, did not come until it had first endured five years of grievously fought internecine conflict, to whose genesis and course we now need to turn.

3 Ferment: conversion and revolution in Buganda

The years 1888–93 were a tumultuous period in the history of Buganda. The eruptions emerged from the cauldron of competing aspirations which had scored the apex of Buganda society over the two preceding decades. The upshot here soon became interlocked with far wider events which eventuated in the global imperial power Britain imposing a quite new political framework upon Buganda and its neighbours, within which, as we must see, Buganda found itself quite fortuitously placed in the middle. That in turn became intertwined with the assertion of British imperial hegemony over the more salient operations of the Buganda kingdom and in due course those of its neighbours. Earlier it has been suggested that it was characteristic of many an encounter between an indigenous polity and an imperious colonial power that they passed through a ‘defining conjuncture’ and that this was heavily conditioned, not least at the outset, by ‘conditioning circumstances’ within the indigenous polity itself. It was also said that most strikingly these were shaped in Buganda by the major religio-political revolution that occurred there immediately prior to the British colonial advent. Its genesis has been frequently recounted before and can only be selectively reiterated here,¹

¹ For some summaries, see J. Rowe, ‘Mutesa and the Missionaries. Church & State in Pre-Colonial Buganda’, in H. B. Hansen & M. Twaddle, eds., *Christian Missionaries & the State in the Third World* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 52–65; D. A. Low, ‘Conversion, Revolution and the New Regime in Buganda 1860–1900’, in *Buganda in Modern History* (London, 1971), pp. 13–54. For some longer accounts, see M. S. M. Kiwanuka, *Buganda*, Chs. 7–10; A. Oded, *Islam in Uganda* (New York, 1974) (see also his ‘The Arab and Islamic Impact on Buganda during the reign of Kabaka Mutesa’, *Asian and African Studies*, 9 (1973), pp. 196–237); A. B. Kasozi, *The Spread of Islam in Uganda* (Khartoum, 1986), pp. 14–55; J. V. Taylor, *The Growth of the Church in Buganda* (London, 1958), Chs. 1–2; J. F. Faupel, *African Holocaust. The Story of the Uganda Martyrs* (London, 1962); J. Brierley & T. Spear, ‘Mutesa, the Missionaries and Christian Conversion in Buganda’, *International Journal of African Political Studies*, 21 (1988), pp. 601–18; and D. A. Low, ‘The British and Uganda 1862–1900’, D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1957, pp. 45–82; J. A. Rowe, ‘Revolution in Buganda 1856–1900, Part One, The Reign of Kabaka Mukabya Mutesa 1856–1884’, University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. thesis, 1966; J. M. Waliggo, ‘The Catholic Church in the Buddu Province of Buganda, 1879–1925’, Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1976, Chs. 1–2; and Médard, ‘Croissance et crises’.

since in the present context attention needs to be principally focused on the successive staging points in the sequence of events within Buganda in the years 1888 to 1893. For as will emerge, their particular moments in time proved to be crucial to setting the precise ‘conditioning circumstances’ which obtained as the ‘defining conjuncture’ between the British and Buganda and its first features began to take shape. Since these stages need to be traced seriatim, related issues will for the moment be set aside to be elaborated in the following two chapters.

Buganda appears to have begun as one of the very small kingdoms in the forested country inland from the northwestern shore of Lake Victoria. Its expansion began in the seventeenth century, and was taken considerably further early in the eighteenth before climaxing in the pre-colonial period in the conquest of the highly prosperous southern region of Buddu in the late eighteenth century and, further north, that of Bwekula and adjacent areas in the early nineteenth, all of them from Bunyoro.²

Enjoying a nutrient-rich soil, reliable rainfall and an energetic populace placed above a substratum of slaves, Buganda had by then become a substantial polity. This was dramatised in its succession of royal capitals extending over two miles and more, wonderfully constructed from poles, reeds and grass, to which it was linked by carefully tended roadways as far as the outer reaches of the kingdom. Here there congregated a large array of chiefs and their extensive clientages, the ruler’s numerous wives and concubines, and the corps of juvenile pages sent there to serve him.³ At the centre strode the Kabaka, the ruler – all four of whom by the nineteenth century were ruthless, overpowerful autocrats. In the previous century, constant wars of succession had wracked the kingdom as brother Princes, equally eligible for the throne, had striven to control it. No longer. All but a closely guarded tiny residue were now systematically killed.

In a court deeply infected by intense competition between aspiring candidates to office, sudden death on the whim of the ruler had now become an occupational hazard. It testified to the Kabaka’s personal virility and to his preeminent role in securing the cohesion and well-being of the kingdom. That regime reached its nadir in periodic *kiwendo*, mass

² There are many accounts, e.g. Kiwanuka, *Buganda*, Chs. 1–7; Wrigley, *Kingship*, pp. 79, 84, 171–5, 185, 207–10, 213–15, 218, 226–7; Reid, *Pre-Colonial Buganda*, pp. 186–90; A. H. Cox, ‘The Growth and Expansion of Buganda’, *UJ*, 14 (1950), pp. 153–9.

³ P. C. W. Gutkind, *The Royal Capital of Buganda* (The Hague, 1973), pp. 9–19. Of many accounts of life for a page at court, see, e.g., J. S. Kasirye, ‘Obulamu Bwa Stanislas Mugwanya’ (The Life of Stanislas Mugwanya) (Kampala, 1953), trans. F. Nkonge, Makerere University Library, Chs. 2–4.

slaughters, often of peasants bringing supplies to the capital, which additionally served to symbolise his supreme authority over the kingdom.⁴

That authority was strongly underpinned by his position at the head of each of the two hierarchies of control which, in various kinds of competition with each other, now permeated Baganda society. On the one hand each of his subjects was a member by birth of one or other of its Butaka, its forty or so totemic patrilineal clans. Each of these was headed by an echelon of Bataka, clan heads, chosen for appointment by the Kabaka from hereditarily qualified lineages, all of whom were ultimately subject to his authority as Sabataka, the head of the heads of the clans. Since each clan was at once exogamous and dispersed, Baganda society was extensively matted together. But at the same time clan mobilisation was made very difficult. Thereby the Kabaka stood in a formidable position, epitomised by the fact that, with no royal clan of his own (princes took that of their mother), he occupied the supreme interstitial position between them.

His authority was then greatly reinforced as a consequence of the growth over the two preceding centuries of the provision that, at the same time, everyone was subject by place of residence to a territorial chief directly appointed by the Kabaka, increasingly not upon hereditary grounds but of his own volition, and solely responsible to him. These chiefs were broadly of two kinds. Apart from the Katikiro (the Chief Minister) and the Kimbugwe (the second-ranking chief and keeper of the royal umbilical cord) and other senior officials at court, there were first the Bakungu, the ten Saza (county) chiefs (all but three of whom were by 1890 non-hereditary) and their subordinates; and then the Batongole, ordinarily agents of the Kabaka, his mother, royal sister, etc., who were given charge of their estates scattered across the countryside, often quite independently of the authority of the Bakungu. With unfettered power to appoint and dismiss these chiefs, to transfer them from one position to another, to require them to spend much of their time at court, and to play them off against each other, the Kabaka dominated both these hierarchies as well. Positioned thus at the apex of both a patriarchal and a patrimonial structure of control, as Sabasaja, the greatest of men, he possessed the means to exercise quite extraordinary power over his kingdom.⁵

⁴ E.g. Wrigley, *Kingship*, pp. 152, 210, 215, 224–5, 226, 241–2; B. C. Ray, *Myth, Ritual, and Kingship in Buganda* (New York and Oxford, 1991), notably pp. 171–82; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, Chs. 13–15; Mackay, Ch. 6.

⁵ On all this, see especially L. A. Fallers, ed., *The King's Men* (London, 1964), Introduction and Ch. 2; and for an earlier and more elaborate account, J. Gorju, *Entre le Victoria, l'Albert et l'Édouard* (Rennes, 1920), Ch. 11. Also Miti, 'Buganda', 1,

Such rulers, however, have always been wary of those in their societies who retained a degree of independence from them, and there was still one respect in which the Kabaka remained vulnerable. He himself was neither a god nor the epicentre of any sacral rituals. Control of the principal religion of the kingdom lay, moreover, almost exclusively in the hands of the priests and mediums of the traditional gods, the Lubare. Among the more important of these were Mukasa, the god of the lake, of health and of fertility; Kikuba, the guardian of the western frontier; Nende, of the eastern; and Kawumpuli, the god of plague. Some were linked to particular clans and thus could look to some degree of popular support.⁶ Over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they had been extending their role, not least at the expense of successive Kabakas, and while their priests were appointed by the Kabakas, they were frequently the victors in their periodic conflicts with them – by making one Kabaka mad, overrunning another's capital with rats, infecting a third with smallpox, and so on. They constituted indeed the principal remaining quarter from which a successful challenge to the Kabaka's authority might be mounted.⁷

So it was that, with the advent in the middle of the nineteenth century of Arab traders from the East African coast, a surprising opportunity for Kabakas to counter their challenge opened up. For, in addition to seeking ivory and slaves in exchange for cotton goods, guns and other manufactured items, the traders also brought their religion: Islam. And that eventually seems to have led Kabaka Mutesa, who succeeded to the kingship in 1856, to determine to make Islam Buganda's state-sponsored religion, over which he rather than the traditionalist priests and mediums would have control. He thereby launched a major upheaval in the operations of his kingdom, which was to stretch throughout the rest of his lifetime and much of his successor's as well.

The first Kabaka to learn about Islam was his father, Kabaka Suna (c. 1830–56). After being repeatedly berated by a leading Zanzibari for killing those who had been created by the God who had given him his

pp. 17–22; Ham Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, Vol. 1 (London, 1938), trans. J. A. Rowe, Introduction.

⁶ J. Roscoe, *The Baganda* (London, 1911), pp. 273–7, 290–318. For an extensive list of them, see Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, 1, Introduction. For further details of their inflictions and their purport, see Ray, *Myth*, pp. 163–5. See also Wrigley, *Kingship*, p. 161, re Mukasa, god of the lake.

⁷ E.g. Ray, *Myth*, pp. 44–5, 132, 162, 164, 204; Fallers, *King's Men*, pp. 100, 103; Wrigley, *Kingship*, pp. 182–5, 211, 243, 247–50; Gorju, *Entre le Victoria*, Ch. 18. See also M. Kenny, 'Mutesa's Crime. Hubris and the Control of African Kings', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 30 (1988), pp. 596–612.

kingdom, without in any way becoming a convert he eventually made some study of the opening chapters of the Koran. During his first ten years, his successor, Mutesa, by contrast appears to have taken little or no interest in Islam. From the mid 1860s, however, he set about doing so earnestly. He learnt to read Arabic; took to studying the Koran; expounded it to his courtiers; ordered them to learn to read so they could study it as well; insisted that they only eat meat slaughtered by circumcised Muslims; adopted the Islamic calendar; appealed for qualified Muslim teachers to come to his court; built a substantial mosque at each of his capitals; gave orders for smaller ones to be built in chiefs' enclosures, and across the countryside; and, while refusing to become a circumcised Muslim himself, instituted both daily and Friday prayers. For ten years, moreover, between 1867 and 1876, he faithfully observed Ramadhan.⁸ In due course two lethal episodes expressed his larger purposes. The first involved a direct attack upon the greatest of the Lubare, Mukasa, the god of the lake. In July 1874 Gordon's agent, Chaillé-Long, witnessed 'an unusual assemblage at the palace' at which, amid 'loud vociferations', seven 'spirit guardians of the lake' were taken out and executed. 'It pains my bowels', Mutesa assured him, 'to do this but they have done me and my people great injury'. A year later during Ramadhan in 1875, he ordered the killing of a large number of those who had not as yet embraced his new religion.⁹

In that same year, this whole enterprise started to take on a much more complex and far-reaching character. Beginning with some extensive discussions which Mutesa held both with Gordon's second envoy, Linant, and then with the explorer Stanley in 1875, he now displayed a greatly heightened interest in the knowledge possessed by the outside world. In particular he soon fastened on the fact that the material goods reaching his kingdom were not made by the 'Arabs' who brought them but by Europeans who manufactured them, and that, far from embracing Islam as he had done, their attachments, it was now clear, were to a quite different religion, Christianity. All of which soon precipitated a major debate at the Kabaka's court, which eventually culminated in Mutesa declaring: 'I say that the white men are greatly superior to the Arabs, and I think that their book must be a better book than Mohammad's.' That was then followed by his endorsement of Stanley's

⁸ His successive fasts are specified in Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 124–30.

⁹ An extensive account is in Oded, *Islam in Uganda*, Chs. 2–4. See also Kasozi, *Spread*, Ch. 3; Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, 1, Chs. 1–2; Miti, 'Buganda', 1, Ch. 3; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 129, 133. Chaillé-Long's account is in *Provinces*, pp. 61–2. On the Lubare Mukasa, see Schoenbrun, *Green Place*, pp. 204–6. See also Kagwa and Kitakule in Low, *Mind of Buganda*, pp. 1–2.

appeal for Christian missionaries to come to his kingdom, and by his institution of Christian services at his court.¹⁰

All of this soon put him at odds, however, with the younger men and pages about his court who, in accordance with his earlier injunctions, had now become zealous Muslims. Early in 1876 a crisis eventuated when, among other things, they refused to eat the meat which he sent them lest it had not been ritually slaughtered. In so doing they showed that their commitment to their new religion was taking precedence over their allegiance to the Kabaka. As that was completely contrary to Mutesa's whole purpose in encouraging them to embrace Islam, he speedily gave orders for some seventy and more of them to be put to death so as to teach the others to mend their ways.¹¹

Somewhat over a year later, in response to Stanley's appeal for Christian missionaries to come to the kingdom,¹² the first Protestant missionaries of the Church Missionary Society arrived in June 1877 from England. They were initially given a warm welcome, but, whilst regularly waiting upon the Kabaka, and frequently holding services at his court,¹³ it was soon apparent that, unlike the Zanzibaris, they were not prepared to provide him with the guns and powder and other manufactured goods which he craved.¹⁴ That precipitated a long series of *contre-temps* which were first marked by bitter religious disputes between the Protestant missionaries and the Muslim Zanzibaris,¹⁵ and then, following the arrival in Buganda in February 1879 of a first party of French Roman Catholic White Fathers, became greatly aggravated by the mutual denunciations of each others' religious beliefs by the two sets of missionaries,¹⁶ and by clashes between the Catholics and the Zanzibaris as well. As a consequence, a highly confused situation resulted, which was epitomised by Mutesa's own moves in the course of a few short months later in 1879, first to participate in the Catholics' catechism classes; then to seek baptism from the Protestants; then from

¹⁰ For Linant, see *Bulletin Trimestriel*, pp. 58–82 (Low, *Mind of Buganda*, pp. 2–4); Stanley, *Dark Continent*, I, pp. 202–3, 209–10, 321–5; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 129–31; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', Ch. 5.

¹¹ Oded, *Islam in Uganda*, pp. 152–62; Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, I, Ch. 2; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 131; A. Katumba & F. B. Welbourn, 'Muslim Martyrs in Buganda', *Uj*, 28 (1964), pp. 151–63. See also Rowe, 'Revolution', pp. 83–94.

¹² As famously published in *the Daily Telegraph* on 15 Nov. 1875.

¹³ E.g. Wilson to Wright, 6 July, 21 Nov. 1877, CA6/025.

¹⁴ E.g. *ibid.*

¹⁵ E.g. Wilson to Wright, 18 Feb. 1877, CA6/025; Mackay to Wright, 17 Nov., 26 Dec. 1878, CA6/016.

¹⁶ E.g. Mackay to Wright, 14 July 1879, CA6/016.

the Roman Catholics, whilst all the time continuing with his study of Islam – in the end without committing himself to any one of them.¹⁷

All of which became the more highly charged following the failure of those with medical skills at each of the two mission stations to mitigate his long standing gonorrhoea;¹⁸ for that presented the traditionalist Lubare supporters with a golden opportunity to mount a major counter-attack against all this toying with alien religions by bringing the medium of the god of health, Mukasa, to court and, along with many others gathered there, to propel Mutesa into declaring that henceforth ‘we will have the religion of our forefathers’.¹⁹

As, however, Mukasa was no more successful in alleviating Mutesa’s gonorrhoea than the missionaries, he soon resiled from that position,²⁰ and over the next five years there then ensued, amid a wave of epidemic afflictions,²¹ an endless succession of vicissitudes along these lines:²² periodic disputes at court between competing religious protagonists, a kaleidoscope of occasions when one or other of the new creeds on offer was momentarily given preference, together with a protracted debate at the court upon the momentous issue of the whole future orientation and destiny of the kingdom and its people.²³ Throughout these years Mutesa never committed himself to either of the two versions of Christianity to the extent he had previously done to Islam, and as his affliction worsened persisted in refraining from making a decisive choice between them.²⁴ He may very well have been concerned not to sever the multiple bonds which each provided. Each could, moreover, act as a check upon the others, while to commit himself categorically to just one of them might

¹⁷ In addition to the items listed in fn. 1 above, see Miti, ‘Buganda’, 2, Ch. 14; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 132–4; Zimbe, ‘Kabaka’, Chs. 8, 10; Mackay, Ch. 4; A. Nicq, *Le Père Siméon Lourdel*, 3rd edn (Algiers, 1932). The fullest indigenous account is in Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, I, Ch. 4.

¹⁸ Dr Felkin of the CMS started treating him on his arrival in February 1897, but three months later had left the country: Felkins Journal, 14 Feb. 1879, CA6/010; Litchfield to Wright, 3 July 1879, CA6/015.

¹⁹ Mackay, Ch. 5, provides a striking account of these episodes, as it does of others. See also Kenny, ‘Mutesa’s Crime’, and, e.g., Wilson to Wright, 9 May 1878, CA6/025; Litchfield to Wright, 3 Jan., Pearson to Wright, 7 Jan. 1880, CA6/015.

²⁰ E.g. Mackay to Wright, 21 Feb. 1880, CA6/016.

²¹ E.g. plague and smallpox in 1883–4: Faupel, *Holocaust*, pp. 46–7.

²² E.g. Litchfield to Wright, 7 June 1880, CA6/015.

²³ This is the theme of Low, *Mind of Buganda*, and Low, ‘Converts and Martyrs in Buganda’, in C. G. Baeta, ed, *Christianity in Tropical Africa* (London, 1968), pp. 159–63. But see especially Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma* I, Introduction and Ch. 4, and, e.g., Mackay to Wright, 17 Nov. 1878, CA6/016.

²⁴ E.g. ‘Kabaka learnt but was not a true Muslim. He listened to every religion but did not take up any of them’: Kasirye, ‘Mugwanya’, Ch. 3, also Ch. 5. Also, e.g., Litchfield to Hutchinson, 25 June 1880, CA6/015.

very well have broken his court asunder. Having, in the mid 1860s, originally set out to install Islam as Buganda's state-supported religion under his own control, he thus found himself deeply entangled, two decades on, in no less than four of them, each of whose advocates were vigorously competing – though in the end ineffectually – for his undivided patronage.

This bred a seminal corollary. For with the Kabaka refraining from choosing between the four religions on offer, whilst never doing anything to prevent others from doing so, their proselytisers were presented with a quite exceptional opportunity to recruit their followings openly.²⁵ That was the more possible because many of the young men about the court – ambitious for the future prospects which each of the new faiths seemed to offer, as much for their kingdom as for themselves – soon sought relief from the confusion into which it had now fallen by, in due course, cleaving firmly to one or the other. In a highly competitive context, they frequently took the precaution of doing so in company with some friends and after having tested each of the new creeds in turn, not least for that which promised them their greatest spiritual fulfilment. As a consequence, by the mid 1880s both of the two missions had come to baptise around 200 avowed converts each, many of whom were already formed into tight little clusters.²⁶

In October 1884 Mutesa died and was succeeded by his eighteen year-old son, Mwanga. This was soon followed by a considerable ratcheting up of the ferment at his court, much of which was driven by Mwanga's own insecurity. To begin with there was no move by his father's older chiefs to put any of his siblings to death, while it was only the deftness of his father's Katikiro, Mukasa, that foiled two chiefly plots to replace him within months of his accession.²⁷ Then in January 1885 news reached Buganda that a British traveller (Joseph Thomson) had reached the northeastern side of Lake Victoria. That was quickly seized upon by the Zanzibaris at his court as evidence that a major alien assault upon his kingdom was in the offing. This prompted widespread suspicions about the real intentions of the missionaries, which were deepened when two leading Protestant missionaries, Mackay and Ashe, appeared to be leaving Buganda without having properly secured the Kabaka's

²⁵ E.g. Mackay to Wright, 9 June 1880, CA6/016; Mackay to his father, 27 Feb., 27 July 1883, MP.

²⁶ Figures for Muslim converts are not available, but judging from their later strength these must have been at least comparable and probably greater.

²⁷ Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 120–2; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 138–9; Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, II, Ch. 3.

permission. Although they themselves were only momentarily manhandled, Mwanga promptly gave orders that three of their Buganda followers should thereupon be burnt to death.²⁸

A few months later, more specific reports reached Buganda of German annexations on the East African coast and of Belgian forces up the Congo, all of which made the advance at this time of the Protestant Bishop Hannington by the forbidden eastern route towards Buganda through Busoga, seemingly with a considerable following, all the more ominous. Following a sharp debate at court, Mwanga first ordered his satellite, Luba of Bunya, to have the Bishop and his party killed,²⁹ and then, when rebuked for doing so by a leading Catholic convert, Joseph Mukasa Balikuddembe, who was also one of his closest associates, he had him summarily put to death as well.³⁰

Such, however, was the headway that Christianity, like Islam before it, was now making amongst considerable numbers of young men and some women about his court that these killings in no way led to any diminution in their numbers or any lessening in their zeal.³¹ To the contrary. In view of the greater vistas which the new creeds opened up, their numbers were steadily increasing and their commitment evidently deepening. Mwanga was not without sympathy for some of what they stood for, but when two of his Christian pages refused to participate in his practice of sodomy and when he learnt that some of his personal servants had gone to visit the missionaries when they should have been waiting on him, loyalty to their new religion – as his father had earlier discovered with some Muslims – appeared to be taking precedence over their allegiance to their ruler. Like his father before him, he accordingly launched a fateful persecution against a range of Christian converts which culminated in thirty one of them being burnt to death on a single pyre on a single day.³²

²⁸ Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 122–5; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 91–4; Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, II, Chs. 1–2; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 139; Mackay, Ch. 9; Mackay to Hutchinson, 8 June 1885, CMS 454; Ashe to Kirk [8 June 1885], FO 84/1727.

²⁹ Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, II, Chs. 4–6; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 99–103; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 140; Faupel, *Holocaust*, Ch. 8; Mackay to Kirk, 27 Oct. 1885, Kirk to Salisbury, tel., 1 Jan. 1886, FO 84/1772; Mackay to Kirk, 8 Dec. 1885, FO 84/1773; Euan Smith to Salisbury, 28 July 1888, FO 84/1908.

³⁰ Faupel, *Holocaust*, Ch. 9; Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, Ch. 8; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 140.

³¹ Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, II, Chs. 7, 11–12; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 100–4.

³² Zimbe, 'Kabaka', Ch. 19; Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, II, Chs. 8–11; Miti, 'Buganda', 1, Chs. 20–1; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 141; Faupel, *Holocaust*, Chs. 3, 10–18, Appendixes I, II; M. Wright, *Buganda in the Heroic Age* (Nairobi, 1971), pp. 19–24; Mackay to Kirk, 26 June 1886, FO 84/1775. On this whole story, from the mid nineteenth century till its end, see now J. Iliffe, *Honour in African History* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 167–80.

By this time he was concerned, however, to stamp his authority not only upon the Christians but upon his kingdom as a whole. To that end he first gave orders for leading chiefs and others at his court to go to work with their hands to construct an artificial lake near his palace, beneath the watchful eye of some bullying young taskmasters.³³ Then, having at his accession created one armed formation of courtiers to support him, he proceeded in 1886–7 to establish three more (in particular circumstances to which we must return in [Chapter 5](#)), made up respectively of Catholics, Protestants and Muslims, at his court, in the belief – or so it would seem – that since they had all now been taught a severe lesson in loyalty he could exploit their antipathy towards older and more traditionalist figures, particularly in the countryside, by employing them to force these to bend to his authority.³⁴

By 1888, however, there was not only widespread anger against him in all such quarters,³⁵ but mounting apprehensions that the new formations he had created could well turn against him.³⁶ So as to test their loyalty, he put them to work upon enlarging his artificial lake still further.³⁷ They soon, however, displayed their resentment by coming to work armed,³⁸ whereupon he turned aggressively against them. Realising he could not match them in battle, he plotted to maroon their leaders upon an island in Lake Victoria, there to leave them to the tender mercy of the Lubare Mukasa, the god of the lake, and doubtless his attendant crocodiles. His stratagem was, however, betrayed, and, with Mwanga getting no support from his now widely alienated courtiers, nor from so many outraged figures in the countryside, nor from those who, having endured one persecution, were not minded to suffer another, in a climactic move the four new formations, in which the most longstanding of them, the Muslims, took the leading role, launched on 10 September 1888 a frontal assault upon Mwanga and his residual supporters and forced him to flee from his kingdom.³⁹

³³ Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, II, Ch. 13; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 110–17; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 139, 141; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, Ch. 23.

³⁴ See [Ch. 5](#) for a fuller account. Wrigley remarked that 'the trick for political leaders was clearly to persuade young thugs that they had more to gain by acting as enforcers of central power than free lance brigands': *Kingship*, p. 223.

³⁵ For further details, see Wright, *Heroic Age*, pp. 28–34, and, e.g., Walker to Lang, 18 June 1888, G3 A5/05.

³⁶ Miti, 'Buganda', 1, p. 167.

³⁷ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 143.

³⁸ Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, II, Chs. 13–14; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 143.

³⁹ The fullest contemporary account is in Gordon to Lang, 7 Nov. 1888: see Low, *Mind of Buganda*, pp. 12–23. See also Zimbe, 'Kabaka', Chs. 21–2; Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, II, Ch. 14; Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 167–72; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 143–4; Wright, *Heroic*

There were three major consequences. In the first place, while many Baganda held to their traditional beliefs, crowds of others now flooded towards the two mission stations with a view to adhering closely to one or other of the Christian creeds. To begin with, their numbers fluctuated under the pressure of events, but it was not long before each of the two Christian missions found itself having to accommodate the onrush of what soon became a mass movement of conversion.⁴⁰ Little is known about any Muslim conversions at this time, but at least to begin with there is nothing to suggest that their numbers did not increase as well.

Secondly, whilst the leaders of the now victorious new formations soon replaced Mwanga by his elder brother⁴¹ Kiwewa, they not only swiftly expelled the chiefs of Mutesa's generation who had so far held on to their positions, but, with a view to grasping hold of preeminent political power in the kingdom, immediately proceeded to share out the principal offices of state among themselves. As the appointments to these positions had hitherto been the principal prerogative of the Kabaka, this amounted to a major oligarchical revolution,⁴² to which these newly installed chiefs strenuously held throughout the many eventualities which ensued.

But then thirdly, just a month after they had joined together in overthrowing Mwanga, the victorious coalition began to fall out among themselves. Thereby they precipitated no less than five years of internecine conflict between parties that were principally characterised by their religious affiliations. The vehemence with which this conflict came to be conducted was rooted in the intense competition that marked the Buganda court, in the unyielding denunciations of the others' perfidies by the alien sponsors of each of the creeds in contention, and in the still unresolved and momentous question of which of the three new faiths that had so agitated the Buganda court over the past two decades should be embraced as its guiding hope. During the course of the ensuing conflict, there were no less than ten conceivable and mostly actual

Age, pp. 39–52; Mackay to Euan Smith, 26 Nov. 1888, FO 84/1976; Kabaka Kalema to Sultan Khalifa of Zanzibar, [6 Dec. 1888], FO 84/2061.

⁴⁰ Taylor, *The Growth of the Church in Buganda*; J. M. Waliggo, 'The Bugandan Christian Revolution: The Catholic Church in Buddu, 1879–1896', in D. Maxwell, ed., with I. Lawrie, *Christianity & the African Imagination* (Leiden, 2002), pp. 63–92.

⁴¹ Who should as such have been debarred by tradition from the throne: Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 172–3.

⁴² As an Anglican missionary put it: 'The poor king [Kiwewa] all this time was but a child in the hands of his officers and ministers. His time was chiefly occupied in giving his consent and approval to the distribution and division of the various chieftainships. The division of the land was performed at the hands of the few favoured chiefs already in power': Gordon to Lang, 7 Nov. 1888, Low, *Mind of Buganda*, p. 20.

changes in the commanding religio-political dominance over the kingdom, which we now need to trace out.

It is not intended here to recount every one of the multiple encounters which occurred in the course of the ensuing struggle.⁴³ Attention will be focused rather on the shape of the ten different religio-political alignments which, in uneven succession, looked, if only momentarily, as if they might emerge as the principal determinant of the more permanent distribution of power within the kingdom and of its preeminent religious affiliation. The precise components of these alignments are most readily specified by noting the allocations within them of the two leading administrative positions in the kingdom, the offices of Katikiro and Kimbugwe, along with those of the chiefs of the Sazas (counties) into which Buganda's territorial administration was divided. (For Buganda's later Sazas, see [Map 3](#).) For, together with the major armed clashes that occurred, the hold, if only briefly, of each of these alignments upon Buganda's principal offices of state not only punctuated the course of events, but for present purposes provided the sequence of 'conditioning circumstances' which in the case of some eventuality might, and in other cases did, condition the onset of very much larger consequences for the kingdom. While parts of the necessary analysis must await further consideration in the following two chapters, here the sequence will first be traced through its most tumultuous years, before briefly recounting its dénouement.

We have already seen the delineaments of the first of these seemingly victorious alignments in the Muslim-Christian coalition which effected Kabaka Mwanga's expulsion from his kingdom in September 1888. As we have also seen, that was immediately followed by the distribution between their leaders of Buganda's principal offices of state. Since the new Kabaka, Kiwewa, was expected to become a Muslim, the preeminent office of Katikiro went to the principal Roman Catholic leader, Honorat Nyonyintono, while the principal Protestant leader, Apolo Kagwa, was appointed Mukwenda⁴⁴ of the large northwestern Saza of

⁴³ There are full accounts of these events for the years 1888–90 in, e.g., Zimbe, 'Kabaka', Chs. 23–36; Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 167–219; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, Ch. 18; Kasirye, 'Mugwanya', Ch. 6; Kiwanuka, *Buganda*, pp. 201–19; A. Oded, 'Kalema. The Muslim King of Buganda', typescript; Wright, *Heroic Age*, Chs. 2–3; Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, Ch. 2, and Twaddle, 'The Muslim Revolution in Buganda', *African Affairs* (Jan. 1972), pp. 54–72; and J.M. Gray, 'The Year of the Three Kings of Buganda, Mwanga-Kiwewa-Kalema, 1888–89', *Uj*, 14 (1950), pp. 23–50; Mackay (& Gordon) to Euan Smith, 19 Mar., 10 June 1889, FO 84/1981.

⁴⁴ There were distinctive titles for each Saza chief.

Singo towards the Bunyoro border. Of the two leading Muslims, both of whom had held significant chieftaincies under Mutesa, Kapalaga became Kangawo of the north central Saza of Bulemezi, Muguluma was appointed Pokino of the large southern Saza of Buddu, while another Muslim, Ali Bukulu, became Kimbugwe, second only in rank to the Katikiro. Corresponding allocations were made to a number of other chieftaincies.⁴⁵ All of this saw the installation of the first of the religio-political alignments – a Christian–Muslim coalition – which these years were to see.

The Muslim leaders, however, were by no means satisfied with the distribution, and neither were their Zanzibari associates with it.⁴⁶ Since they had played the leading role in ousting Mwanga, they expected to procure the preponderant share of the appointments that were subsequently made. Nyonyintono's appointment as Katikiro grated upon them especially, aggravated as it was by his insistence, as for his predecessor Mukasa, that he should also hold the office of Sekibobo of the large eastern Saza of Kyagwe. As a consequence there were soon mounting disputes between the Muslim and the Christian leaders. These escalated upon the return from collecting tribute in Kiziba of Dungu, a prominent Protestant, who brusquely demanded the office of Kauta, Steward or head of the Kabaka's cooks, which the Muslims had been careful to secure for themselves so as to ensure that the royal meat supply remained ritually clean. This so angered Kiwewa and the Muslim leadership that they thereupon joined with their Zanzibari supporters in seeking to murder the principal Christian leadership upon their next coming to court. In the event their plot was mostly foiled, but it quickly precipitated an open breach between the two sides which, on 12 October 1888, erupted in open conflict between them. As the Muslim forces were more numerous, and more focused in their intentions, and had Kabaka Kiwewa at their head, they soon routed⁴⁷ the Christian forces, many of whom speedily fled the capital. With that, the original Christian–Muslim coalition collapsed, whereupon the Muslims set about establishing their monopoly control over all the principal offices of state, and thus a Muslim ascendancy.

Nine days later, however, it was Kabaka Kiwewa who made the first move. Not wishing to be circumcised and become a Muslim or be in any way beholden to the Muslim leaders, but rather to restore a traditionalist

⁴⁵ For a full list, see Médard, 'Croissance et crises', pp. 485–6.

⁴⁶ For the role of the Zanzibaris, see Mackay & Gordon to Euan Smith, 19 Mar. 1889, FO 84/2060.

⁴⁷ Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, pp. 37–41, provides a lengthy account.

regime in his kingdom and with it the primacy of its traditional gods, he secretly enlisted a sizeable group of supporters, not least of his father's old chiefs, along with an armed following. Having just seen the Christian forces summarily routed, he now sought to destroy the Muslim leadership as well. To that end he summoned them to his presence and there, in a move to create the second, traditionalist, religio-political alignment of these years, set his henchmen loose upon them. In the ensuing mêlée, Kapalaga, the longstanding Muslim leader who had just become Kangawo of Bulemezi, and the Kimbugwe, Bukulu, were both killed. Kiwewa's attempted coup, however, was very soon foiled. Not only was the Muslim following speedily mobilised, and the remaining Muslim leaders successfully rescued, but the far-better-armed Muslim forces then turned directly upon Kiwewa and his followers. These, 'mostly old men and diviners', displayed none of the necessary resolution to resist effectively, and even less of the military ability to do so successfully; whereupon Kiwewa fled his royal apartments, and, despite fighting a rearguard action over the next few days so as to rally his followers behind him, was soon captured and placed as a prisoner in the stocks. His attempt to reestablish a traditionalist regime thereupon came to nought.⁴⁸ That entrenched the Muslim victory. To cap it they placed another princely candidate, Kalema, on the throne, who not only agreed to be circumcised but, despite seeking on two occasions to cast off the Muslim yoke, became for the most part a staunch Muslim.

All of this was accompanied by a new distribution of senior chieftaincies. Three of the Muslims from Kiwewa's reign were carried over into the new regime. In particular, Muguluma became Katikiro and, as Katikiros were wont to do, held on to his former office of Pokino of the large southern Saza of Buddu; while Tebukozza, who like Muguluma had been a senior chief under Mutesa but had now become a Muslim, became Sekibobo of Kyagwe.⁴⁹ Thus was put in place the third religio-political alignment in this sequence. While thereafter cohorts of traditionalists, especially from the forested areas to Buganda's east, periodically made incursions into the further course of events, their day by now was very evidently over.

Meanwhile, scrambling from their mortifying defeat, the Christian leadership thought first of seeking refuge in Bunyoro. In the event, some of them travelled there,⁵⁰ but what became the future core of the Christian parties chose instead, at the instance of one of their

⁴⁸ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 148–9; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 214–15.

⁴⁹ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 149–50, 156.

⁵⁰ Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 143.

leaders, Nikodemo Sebwato, to retreat to the kingdom of Nkore to the west. There, led by their principal leaders, Nyonyintono and Kagwa, they secured the permission of Nkore's ruler, Ntare, to base themselves under the auspices of an important Prince, Manyantsi, and the watchful eye of a rising commoner, Mbaguta, in Kabula, Nkore's border region with Buganda. There they raided into Buganda for cattle to provide some recompense to Ntare for the succour he provided, while also exercising their skill in the bridgebuilding he more particularly sought from them. At first there were perhaps only 200 of them, but over the coming months they were joined by an increasing number of others. If, however, they were to recover their position in Buganda, as they certainly intended, within the norms of Baganda society they needed to secure a legitimate Kabaka to stand forth as their leader. As Buganda's Princes were all heavily guarded, there was little chance that any of them could be sprung to fulfil this role. As a consequence, they decided, despite his past, to sound out the deposed Kabaka Mwanga instead. To that end they despatched envoys to Bukumbi, the Roman Catholic station at the south end of Lake Victoria, where, after a hazardous flight, Mwanga had eventually found refuge and become a Catholic convert. He soon agreed to place himself at their head.

When Kalema heard of this, he ordered the slaughter of all the remaining Princes and Princesses held in Buganda, other than those who had become Muslims, so that none of them should play the traitor to him. In the ensuing rampage, Kiwewa and the former Katikiro, Mukasa, were also killed. At the same time, Kalema sent an army to punish the Kiziba ruler, Mukotani of Kiamtwara, to Buganda's south, for facilitating the Christian envoys' journey to Bukumbi, with the intent of then moving on to attack their main body in Kabula. When in April 1889 the Christian leaders there learnt of this, they immediately decided to move out and confront Kalema's forces head on. Thereby they set off ten months of the most sustained armed combat which these years were to see.

In the first major battle at Matala in April 1889 they inflicted a substantial defeat upon the Muslim forces, but in three successive encounters were then trounced. At Mawuki, the Muslim Sekibobo, Tebukoza, was killed, but the Christians lost their foremost leader, Katikiro Nyonyintono. At Ndese they were mauled again, and thereupon retreated back to Kabula. The Muslims did not, however, immediately follow up on their victories, and in the meanwhile Mwanga reached Dumu in Buddu. He had been taken there by boat by the former Anglican missionary, now turned trader, Charles Stokes, who in the

coming months was to play a crucial role in the outcome.⁵¹ As Buganda's legitimately appointed Kabaka, he was already beginning to collect a substantial body of supporters,⁵² and, as soon as they could, the Christians from Kabula joined up with him there. But once again they were attacked by the Muslims and at Baja suffered one more defeat, not least by the loss of Nyontintono's successor as Katikiro, Lule Muwemba. In the aftermath, while the Protestant Apolo Kagwa took his place as the (Christian) Katikiro, the main body returned once again to Kabula.

Mwanga, however, sought refuge with his supporters in the Sesse Islands, and with their assistance established himself and the Christian and other forces under his aegis on the northernmost island of Bulingugwe.⁵³ That proved to be a brilliant move. It positioned the forces to whom his presence gave legitimacy within ten miles or so of Kalema's capital. Bulingugwe was separated from the mainland by a channel of less than a half-mile, and was thus protected by a very effective defensive moat against Kalema's forces. It gave the Christian forces, moreover, a strategic position from which to command the lake, and it provided a secure, centralised base from which, along internal lines, Christian raiding parties could fan out all along the Buganda shore line, and frequently penetrate it whenever they wished. There followed a full array of larger encounters and local skirmishes in which the Roman Catholic commander, Gabrieli Kintu, and his Protestant counterpart, Semei Kakungulu, first earned their military laurels. They were soon joined, moreover, by some Anglican and then some Roman Catholic missionaries, whom Kalema and his Arab supporters had earlier expelled from his kingdom.⁵⁴

A crucial moment then followed. Early in September 1889, two 'Arab' dhows carrying arms and ammunition for the Muslim forces reached the port of Entebbe close to Buganda's capital, only, however, to be blown up in a Christian attack⁵⁵ under the rising Catholic military leader, Gabrieli Kintu; while just ten days later Charles Stokes successfully reached Bulingugwe with a shipload of arms and ammunition for the Christians. Given these quite uneven eventualities, the Christians and

⁵¹ Stokes to Euan Smith, 6 Oct. 1889, FO 84/2060. For this colourful character, see A. Luck, *Charles Stokes in Africa* (Nairobi, 1972); N. Harman, *Bwana Stokesi and his African Conquests* (London, 1986).

⁵² Stokes later commented that, because of the strong feeling for him in the country in his adversity, it would have been unwise to put anyone else in as Kabaka: Stokes to Colville, 27 Oct. 1894, A2/3.

⁵³ Walker to Mackay, 21 Oct. 1889, FO 84/2060.

⁵⁴ Walker to Euan Smith, 21 Oct. 1889, LP43.

⁵⁵ Zed-bin-Juma-bin-Saalam to Hashir-bin-Swellam, received Zanzibar, 14 Feb. 1890, FO 84/2059.

Mwanga's followers successfully regrouped, and despite some friction in their ranks between the older elements ('grain eaters') and the more recent reinforcements ('fish eaters') launched a major attack upon the Muslims. Leading this were Kagwa, the new Katikiro, and the rising Protestant military leader, Semei Kakungulu. Following a series of hard-fought and by no means always victorious encounters, during which, early on, the Muslim Katikiro, Muguluma, was killed, they eventually drove Kalema and his forces from the capital on 5 October 1889, and chased them into northern Singo on the Bunyoro border. That enabled Mwanga to transfer to the mainland, there to be reinstalled in its capital.⁵⁶

This triumph under Christian leadership did not, however, last. Not only did their ensuing attempt to rout the Muslims fail. Fishing in the troubled waters of his country's principal rival, Kabalega of Bunyoro not only reprovisioned Kalema's forces, but sent an army to his support, headed by two of his most redoubtable Abarasura leaders, Rwabudongo and Kikukule.⁵⁷ Thus reinforced, Kalema launched a major counter-attack on the Christians, and on 25 November 1889 recaptured the capital for the Muslim cause. Mwanga thereupon retreated to his former base on Bulingugwe, while many of the other Christian-led forces scattered across the kingdom.⁵⁸

Two months later, however, the tide began to turn once more. Late in January 1890, Stokes' boat bringing further supplies of guns and ammunition to the Christian forces on Bulingugwe arrived at a crucial moment once again. Since their first days in Nkore, the Protestant and Catholic leaders had periodically been at odds with each other.⁵⁹ Lately their relationships had become a good deal more fractious. However, at the instance of their missionary supporters, a cooperative agreement was patched up between them – the so-called Bulingugwe Agreement of 3 February 1890 – whereupon a general mobilization of the Christian-led forces was effected. Under the command of Gabrieli Kintu, these first repulsed a forceful Muslim attack, and then three days later launched a formidable assault upon the Muslim capital. There, on 11 February 1890, they broke the Muslim and Banyoro forces and impelled their

⁵⁶ On these events, see also, e.g., Stokes to Euan Smith, 6 Oct., Walker to Mackay, [21 Oct.], Gordon to Euan Smith, 25 Oct. 1889, Mackay to Euan Smith, 1 Jan. 1890, FO 84/2060; Gordon to Ashe, 21 Oct., Stokes to Stanley, 21 Nov. 1889, Mackay to Ashe, 3 Jan. 1890, MP; Euan Smith to Salisbury, tel., 14 Feb., FO 84/2059, 15 Feb. 1890, SP.

⁵⁷ Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 144–6.

⁵⁸ Gordon to Lang, 25 Nov. 1889, LP 43, 20 Jan. 1890, G3 A5/09; Stokes to Euan Smith, 26 Feb. 1890, FO 84/2061.

⁵⁹ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 150.

remnants to flee again to the Bunyoro borderlands. There, shortly afterwards, Kalema died of the smallpox which was ravaging the country, while Katege, the last of the principal Muslim leaders of the later 1880s, was very soon killed.

That, for the moment at least, was the end of the Muslim ascendancy. Whilst understandably the Christians continued to see them as a considerable threat, they had not only lost every one of their principal leaders – Kapalaga, Bukulu, Tebukozza, Muguluma, Katege, Kalema himself –⁶⁰ but, unlike the Christians, they had not as yet thrown up any new ones of substance. Their decree that all men should be circumcised had been much resented across Buganda. Their pillaging of the countryside appears to have been even more rapacious than that of the Christian-led forces, while their cause may well have suffered from the assistance they had received from Buganda's principal foe, Bunyoro. Despite their periodic successes, they were now therefore a much defeated force. The way accordingly stood open for the Christians to assert their dominance in their place.

Back in October 1889, their leaders had marked their first capture of the capital by beginning the distribution of the major offices of state between them.⁶¹ They returned to the task following its recapture on 11 February 1890, and thereby gave point to the fourth religio-political alignment the kingdom was to see. In accord with the spirit of the Bulingugwe Agreement, there was to be an equal division between them. No provision was made for any of their more prominent traditionalist supporters; the settlement was to be solely a Protestant–Catholic diarchy. There was at the same time no turning back upon the oligarchical revolution of September 1888. Although Mwanga once more returned to his capital, he was never granted any role in the allocation of chiefly appointments, other than to ratify these once they had been made. Back in 1888 the Katikiroship, as we have seen, had gone to the Catholics. Following the deaths in battle of first Nyonyintono and then Lule, it finally passed, as we have also seen, to the Protestant leader, Apolo Kagwa. That left the next most important office of Kimbugwe to be filled by the most politically astute of the Catholic leaders, Stanislas Mugwanya. Thereafter the Protestants Nikodemo Sebwato and Yono Waswa became, respectively, Pokino of Buddu and Mukwenda of Singo, while the Catholics Alexis Sebowa and Yozefu Nsingisira became Sekibobo of Kyagwe and Kangawo of Bulemezi. Other Saza chieftaincies

⁶⁰ For a full list, see Médard, 'Croissance et crises', pp. 468–9.

⁶¹ Stokes to Euan Smith, 11 Jan. 1890, FO 84/2060 For a full list, see Médard, 'Croissance et crises', pp. 500–3; also Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 146–7.

and various functional posts were similarly distributed equally between the two parties, while, in an effort to lock in the diarchy, lesser territorial chieftaincies were allocated in alternating layers between them.⁶²

It was precisely at this moment that the first of the new wave of alien empire builders entered Buganda. Back in June 1889 when the Christians were reeling under a succession of defeats at the hands of the Muslims and Mwanga had taken refuge on Bulingugwe, they first heard of a European-led caravan travelling through Masailand on the east on its way to Busoga and Buganda. As one of several expeditions ostensibly seeking at this time to relieve Emin, who following the collapse of the Egyptian enterprise had stayed behind on the Upper Nile with a large number of Sudanese troops, this was led by Frederick Jackson, a notable big game hunter, who was now in the employ of the newly established Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC).⁶³ Such were the straits into which the Christian cause had by then fallen that, on hearing this news, instead of seeking to proceed against Jackson as he had against Bishop Hannington, Mwanga dispatched an envoy to meet him, and then on 15 June 1889 wrote personally to Jackson imploring his aid in recovering his throne.⁶⁴ That plea was reinforced by a letter from Stokes. These letters, however, were held up for five months by a Basoga ruler till he learnt Mwanga was safe, while a similar approach in July 1889 to H. M. Stanley, who was leading the principal Emin Pasha expedition on its way through Nkore, also proved abortive.⁶⁵ There were, however, later letters from the Anglican missionary Gordon, from some of the Baganda chiefs and from Mwanga himself, which reported that subsequently the Christians had (on 5 October 1889) chased the Muslims from the capital, but, as these remained a serious threat, Mwanga still wanted Jackson to advance to Buganda, render him his assistance, and make an agreement for trade.⁶⁶ All these letters were only seen by Jackson on his arrival at Mumia's to the east of Busoga on 7 November 1889. Conscious that, because of its troubles, he had been ordered to bypass Buganda altogether, Jackson was reluctant to

⁶² Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 203–4; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 146–7; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 218–19; Wright, *Heroic Age*, pp. 94–6.

⁶³ The circumstances attending this advent will be traced in the following chapter. For Jackson's contact with and visit to Buganda at this time, see F. J. Jackson, *Early Days in East Africa* (London, 1930), Chs. 16, 18; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 229–30. See also Stokes to Euan Smith, 26 Feb., Buganda Chiefs to Jackson, Gordon to Jackson, Mwanga to Jackson, 25 Nov. 1889, FO 84/2061; 7 Nov. 1889 ff., G/D.

⁶⁴ Mwanga to Jackson, 15 June 1889, FO 84/2061; Low, *Mind of Buganda*, p. 24. Also Duta to [Jackson], 15 June 1889, LP 43.

⁶⁵ Stanley, *Darkest Africa*, II, pp. 337–41, 350–3; Mackay, pp. 407–8.

⁶⁶ See also Mwanga to [Portal], 28 Oct. 1889, FO 84/2062.

proceed there.⁶⁷ Even so, he undertook to remain at Mumia's for thirty days and wait for an up-to-date report on its affairs.⁶⁸ When that came, it indicated that, whilst Mwanga still wished Jackson to proceed to Buganda,⁶⁹ he was 'in no immediate need of assistance'. Accordingly Jackson sent him one of his Company's flags as an indication of his readiness to come to his aid if necessary,⁷⁰ but then, leaving behind some of his belongings at Mumia's, led his caravan northwards in search of as much ivory as he could find, to help reimburse his Company's costs. Thereby he missed a further letter, written at Mwanga's instance by the Catholic missionary Lourdel, reiterating his earlier plea for help following the Muslim recapture of Buganda's capital on 25 November 1889.⁷¹

Upon his return to Mumia's on 4 March 1890, Jackson was deeply outraged to find that the German traveller Carl Peters, nominally at the head of yet another expedition seeking to relieve Emin, had reached Mumia's on 2 February 1890 and had not only read all his correspondence, but, upon the strength of what he read there, had gone on to Buganda post haste. There, following the further expulsion by the Christians of the Muslims from the capital on 11 February 1890, he proceeded with the help of the Catholic missionaries to secure, on 25 February 1890, a treaty of friendship with the Kabaka for his sponsors.⁷²

Despite his instructions Jackson immediately redirected his caravan towards Buganda, and eventually reached the capital on 14 April. There his sustained efforts to secure a treaty from Mwanga, in place of the one he had made with Peters, were all aborted. This was partly at the instance of the Catholic missionaries who, like Mwanga himself, were anxious to maintain an open door for the full range of European countries to come to his kingdom. It was also because of the now prevailing uncertainty about which of the European powers was to hold the primacy in the inland lakes region. In the end therefore it was arranged that an envoy from each of the two Christian parties should accompany Jackson on his departure to the coast on 14 May to learn of the upshot there, while his deputy, Gedge, remained behind with a minimal escort to represent the IBEAC until further arrangements could be made.⁷³

⁶⁷ On which, see Ch. 4.

⁶⁸ Jackson to Mwanga, to Stokes, 8 Nov. 1889, LP 43; 7–9 Nov. 1889, G/D.

⁶⁹ French missionaries to Jackson, 23 Nov. 1889, LP 43; Buganda Chiefs to Jackson, 23 Nov. 1889, FO 84/2061.

⁷⁰ Jackson to Gordon, 6 Dec. 1889, LP 43.

⁷¹ Mwanga to Jackson, Kagwa to Jackson, Gordon to Jackson, 25 Nov. 1889, LP 43.

⁷² A. Perras, *Carl Peters and German Imperialism, 1856–1918* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 161–6.

⁷³ See, additionally, 4 Mar. – 15 Aug. 1890, G/D.

By this time, following their seemingly decisive recovery of the capital, the incipient rivalry between the two Christian parties, which had first become evident during their exile in Kabula and had variously scarred their relationships thereafter, was now beginning to dominate the kingdom's affairs. It was made worse by the vehemence with which both sets of missionaries sought to entrench a principal place within the Buganda polity for their own particular converts, while even seeking to transform it into a regime dominated by their own denomination only. Such vehemence so stoked the conflicting ambitions of their Baganda followers that, in August 1890, the luckless Gedge withdrew to the adjacent islands and before long to the south end of the lake.⁷⁴

These disputes were for a while subsumed by the arrival on 19 December 1890 of a major IBEAC expedition, consisting of some 270 porters and about 50 Sudanese and Somali mercenaries under the command of Captain F. D. Lugard.⁷⁵ A month later they were joined by a further party under Captain W. H. Williams, consisting of about 100 porters and 75 Sudanese. Together these made an eventual total of all but 500 followers. With such backing, Lugard was under orders from his Company's Administrator in Mombasa to impress upon Mwangwa 'the power of the Company' and to secure a treaty from him and his chiefs that would grant him the right to exercise authority over the kingdom's affairs. Five days after his arrival, Lugard presented Mwangwa with a draft for him and his leading chiefs to sign. Since this required that Mwangwa should 'acknowledge the suzerainty' of the IBEAC over his kingdom, which was the last thing he was prepared to do, there was soon considerable tension at his court. The Protestants, however, thinking that as a Protestant himself Lugard would assuredly support their cause, soon agreed to sign, while, subject to confirmation by the envoys sent to the coast of the claim that Lugard made that Buganda now lay within an internationally recognised British 'sphere of influence', the Catholics, under instruction from their missionary priests, agreed to do so too. In drafting his text, Lugard had been careful to make one concession. As flags were still seen in these years as being symbolic of their bearer's allegiance to a higher authority, he carefully refrained from inserting any requirement that Mwangwa should fly the Company's flag. Even so it was only in considerable anger that Mwangwa eventually placed his cross upon

⁷⁴ Jackson, *Early Days*, pp. 250–60.

⁷⁵ For Lugard's first period in Buganda, December 1890 to April 1891, see *LD* II, Chs. 1–3; and Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 230–42; Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 215–18, 2, pp. 9–10; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 156–7; and J. A. Rowe, *Lugard at Kampala* (Kampala, 1969), pp. 1–10.

the treaty on 26 December 1890, which four of his chiefs thereupon endorsed.⁷⁶

Thereafter Lugard devoted much of his time to supervising the completion of a defensive fort for his escort on a small knoll called Kampala, just half a mile north of the Kabaka's capital at Mengo. He periodically intervened, however, in attempting to resolve some of the bitter quarrels between the two Christian parties that had now become common. These principally focused upon a plethora of disputes over the control of land, the hold on offices, freedom of religion, and changes in the balance of power between the two parties. In an increasingly volatile situation, the Protestants began issuing bitter complaints against the Catholics for expelling some Protestants from their lands – complaints that were speedily matched from the Catholic side against the Protestants for doing likewise. These mounting recriminations then escalated into a major dispute over what should happen when a chief decided to change his religious affiliation, particularly when this upset the layered allotment between the two parties. As Mwanga, in standing forth as head of Buganda's Catholic forces, combined the roles of indisputable Kabaka and Catholic convert, there was an inevitable tendency, at a time of deep uncertainty, for the waverers and the uncommitted to hasten towards the Catholic camp. With Lugard declining to support the Protestants in expelling the Catholics from the country (even while assuring them that they were 'indeed our own people'),⁷⁷ that put the Protestants increasingly upon the defensive. On their side, they claimed that, in order to maintain the equal distribution of posts which had governed appointments following the Muslim defeat in February 1890, if a chief changed his allegiance he should thereupon vacate his office. The Catholics, however, strongly backed by their missionaries, argued vehemently that this would be contrary to the liberty of conscience. Lugard then made three attempts to resolve the issue: first by proposing that the thirteen most senior offices in the kingdom should be vacated upon a change in affiliation, but that otherwise there should be no such requirement in respect of the far more numerous lesser chieftaincies. The Protestants, knowing they were already a minority in the country and fearful that this could lead to a major defection to the Catholic side, would, however, not hear of this. So he tried a second time, with the suggestion that even the most petty chief should lose his office if he went over to the other side, but that this provision should only apply for the next two years, after which freedom of religion should prevail. Once again the Protestants,

⁷⁶ See *LD II*, pp. 42–5.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

and not least their missionaries, would have nothing of it. So he tried a third time, with the suggestion that, when a change of allegiance occurred in any of the thirty-five most senior chieftaincies, that should be vacated, but that no such provision should apply to any of the others. But once again the Protestants would not accept this. All this while, angry complaints against evictions continued to be voiced from both sides, while a bitter dispute raged over the Protestants' demand for an allocation of some Sesse Islands, so as to secure their lake route to the south.

Early in April 1891 these dissensions were then momentarily set aside by a decision to mount a joint Christian attack against the Muslims, who, despite their earlier defeats, had taken to raiding the kingdom's northern border. At first Lugard had refused Mwanga's requests to join this; but once his fort was in good shape, and having, moreover, decided, as we shall see, to launch himself on an extensive journey to the west of Buganda, and gratified by the thought of being 'No longer Christian against Christian ... but ... comrades in war against a common enemy',⁷⁸ he eventually agreed to do so. Accompanied by his own force of 300 Sudanese and Swahili⁷⁹ mercenaries, along with some 300 porters, he joined up with a combined Christian force of some 4,700 gun bearers and perhaps 20,000 spearmen, to face an estimated 3,600 gun-bearing Banyoro warriors, supported by 1,300 of Kabarega's Abarasura, along with a plethora of spearmen. After some fruitless parlaying, the two sides clashed on 7 May 1891 in a major battle athwart the Kanyangoro river on the borderlands of Bunyoro, in which the Muslims and the Banyoro were severely defeated.⁸⁰ In the event, Lugard's contingent played next to no part in the battle, and upon its conclusion he sent Williams back to Kampala with a reduced escort to maintain the Company's presence there, while he himself led out the bulk of his following upon his ambitiously planned western journey.

As soon, however, as the victorious Christian forces returned to their homes, the old animosities not only resumed, but, following the defeat of their common Muslim foe, took on an even sharper edge. There was actual fighting between Catholics and Protestants in Buddu in July 1891; thereafter in the Sesse Islands; and most seriously in Kyagwe in November.⁸¹ There were rifts, moreover, in each camp as to how to proceed next. Williams was unclear about the eventual outcome of

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁷⁹ From the East African coast.

⁸⁰ Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 147.

⁸¹ Kagwa, *Basekakaba*, p. 158; Williams to Berkeley, 4 Oct. 1891, FO 84/2243.

Lugard's discussions on what should happen when a chief changed his religion, and, to the foaming anger of the Protestants, decided that, since the issue was 'a question of religious liberty', anyone doing so should not therefore forfeit their lands. In the changing balance which now ensued, with the Catholic following growing apace, and with Mwanga raising his own flag in defiance of both the British and the Protestants, the Catholic priests and their followers set their sights upon transforming Buganda into a Catholic kingdom.⁸² Back in 1889 a likely eventuality had seemed a Muslim Buganda. Thereafter, following the expulsions of the Muslims from the capital, a Christian diarchy formally took their place. By the end of 1891, however, a Catholic Buganda began to look a distinct possibility – a fifth religio-political alignment in the sequence which Buganda had now seen.

Right at the end of 1891, Lugard returned to Kampala after a seven months' absence on an extensive journey to Buganda's west. During this he had enlisted in the IBEAC's service numbers of Emin's Sudanese troops, most of whom he planted in a series of newly constructed forts in the vicinity of his return journey, together with a cohort under their principal leader, Selim Bey, whom he brought with him to Buganda.⁸³ Immediately on his arrival, he found himself plunged into the seething cauldron which was now the Buganda polity. Accusations by both sides against the other for evictions and outrages had now reached fever pitch, while relations between the leaders on both sides, which had so far held the peace, had now all but collapsed. All of this was aggravated for Lugard by Mwanga's momentary oscillations between the two Christian parties till he locked himself into the Catholic leadership; and not least by more than one act of defiance against him.

This explosive situation (which will be traced through in much more detail in [Chapter 5](#)) then reached a climax with the seizure of a gun by a Protestant from a Catholic, and the ensuing murder of a Protestant by a Catholic; seeing here the spark that could set alight a major conflagration, Lugard insisted to Mwanga that the murderer be promptly

⁸² Zimbe, 'Kabaka', p. 250; *Notes on Uganda* (London, 1893), pp. 122ff. The *Hamburger General Anzeiger*, 8 June 1892, quoted Father Achte of the Catholic mission writing that: 'The fight with the Mussulmans was hardly over before it became needful to begin another and far more arduous battle with the Protestants. It seemed to us the most opportune time to make an energetic movement towards the extension of Catholicism and stirring up the dogmatic zeal of the Catholic chiefs. I shall inspire the Catholic army with courage.'

⁸³ For Lugard's western journey, see *LD II*, Chs. 4–10. For his second period in Buganda, see *LD II*, Ch. 10, and *III*, Chs. 1–8. Also Zimbe, 'Kabaka', Chs. 39–43; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 12–24; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, Ch. 19; Rowe, *Lugard at Kampala*, pp. 11–26.

executed. When Mwanga resolutely refused to order any such thing, the sulphurous rupture between the Protestants and the Catholics became conjoined to a direct confrontation between Lugard and the Kabaka. Despite several last-minute exchanges between them, no resolution was reached. As a result, on the afternoon of 24 January 1892, open fighting broke out – soon to be dubbed the Battle of Mengo – between the Catholics and Mwanga on the one side and the Protestants and Lugard and his forces on the other. Following an early sally by the Protestants, with Lugard firing his Maxim gun, and Williams then leading an assault by 200 Sudanese on Mwanga's palace, the Catholics and Mwanga were very soon routed. At first they took refuge once again on Bulingugwe island as before, but following a further attack upon them there retreated to the large, prosperous, southern Saza of Buddu. There, amidst much toing and froing, the Catholics proceeded to congregate, while the Protestants did so around the capital.

Amidst this mêlée, Lugard, having now won a decisive battle, became very determined to leave a peaceful settlement behind him. As he saw it, that involved binding the kingdom together once again, beginning with the Protestants and the Catholics, preferably under Mwanga as, for the great majority of the Baganda, still their undoubted Kabaka, but, if not, then under Mbogo, Kabaka Suna's son and now leader of the Muslims, whom he was just as anxious to reincorporate as the others. Seeing Mwanga as their principal bargaining counter, the Catholics, however, would not release him, till, fearful that Lugard might actually carry out his threat to install Mbogo in his place – thereby, in association with the Protestants, creating a sixth religio-political alignment⁸⁴ – they relented, and on Mwanga escaping from their clutches permitted him to return to his capital and so to his throne.

Lugard's principal self-imposed task thereafter was to oversee the distribution – as had now become commonplace upon a change in the locus of power – of the kingdom's leading chieftaincies. After some preliminaries, aside from the Protestant Kagwa's position as Katikiro and the Catholic Mugwanya's as Kimbugwe, he proposed that the Catholics should have Buddu, together with the two smaller Sazas of Butambala and Mawakota so as to facilitate their connection with the capital. The Protestants, however, objected strongly to any such allocation. They clearly imagined that, following their victory in the Battle of Mengo and the consequential erasure of the recent threat of a Catholic Buganda, Buganda ought now to become a Protestant kingdom. Kagwa

⁸⁴ On this, see *LD* II, p. 461, and III, p. 53. BD, Feb. to Dec. 1892, provides a running account of these and later events.

indeed filled all the positions previously held by the Catholics with Protestants – a seventh religio-political alignment in the sequence.⁸⁵ ‘We hope’, moreover, wrote a Protestant leader to a friend in Zanzibar, ‘that the Protestants will now have chief power in Uganda’.⁸⁶ That, however, was not what Lugard had in mind. His intention was rather to forge a tripartite regime, which would include all three religio-political parties in the kingdom.

Even so, he bent before his Protestant allies’ objections, and manipulated the Catholics into accepting a treaty by which they settled for Buddu only.⁸⁷ With that accomplished, he proceeded to impose on Mwanga, who had now become a Protestant,⁸⁸ a second major treaty which required him not only to acknowledge, as in the earlier treaty of 1890, the Company’s suzerainty over his kingdom, but this time in a highly symbolic manner ‘to fly the flag of the Company’. These provisions were endorsed by the leading Protestant and Catholic chiefs,⁸⁹ whereupon Lugard turned to inveigling the Muslims into a settlement as well.

The Muslim camp was split, but was constrained by some of Emin’s Sudanese, whom Lugard, on his return from the west, had deliberately placed in their rear. Some Muslims had responded positively to Lugard’s hints that, if Mwanga did not return to his capital, he would place Mbogo on Buganda’s throne in his place, and felt much let down when this did not occur. Lugard’s principal concern now was that Mboga should be brought to dwell at the capital so as to preclude any chance that he would be caught up in any challenge against Mwanga. There followed some tense and protracted negotiations, but in the end Mboga came to the capital; the Muslim chiefs endorsed Mwanga’s second treaty with Lugard, and thereupon took possession of the three small western Sazas of Gomba, Busuju and Butambala which he had allocated to them. There they were strategically sandwiched between the Catholics to the south and the Protestants across the north, whom they also served to keep apart. With this settlement, an eighth religio-political alignment was embedded.

⁸⁵ For an explicit statement, see Zimbe, ‘Kabaka’, p. 270, and Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 161.

⁸⁶ Henry Wright Duta Kitakule to a missionary in Zanzibar, 5 Apr. 1892, ZA E. 143 (Low, *Mind of Buganda*, p. 27).

⁸⁷ This treaty is reprinted in F.D. Lugard, *The Rise of our East African Empire*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh and London, 1893), II, pp. 427–9. For his distribution of positions, see *LD* III, p. 188. For the full Buddu story, see Waliggo, ‘Catholic Church in Buddu, 1879–1896’, in Maxwell with Lawrie, *Christianity & the African Imagination*, pp. 63–92.

⁸⁸ Ashe to Madan, 3 May 1892, ZA 1892, FO III.

⁸⁹ See *LD* III, pp. 164–7. The treaty was dated 30 Mar. 1892. It was in fact signed on 11 Apr. 1892: *ibid.*, p. 16.

In mid June 1892, Lugard left for the coast in circumstances to which we shall come in the next chapter, and once more left Williams in charge behind him. Despite some threatening episodes⁹⁰ over the next few months, Lugard's settlement mostly held.⁹¹ So much so that, in January 1893, Williams (who in Lugard's time had led an expedition across neighbouring Busoga)⁹² felt free to launch a major canoe attack upon the Buvuma islanders who were frustrating his attempts to establish a supply route along the northern shores of the lake.⁹³ Nevertheless, even by then he was becoming increasingly perturbed at the continued separation of the Catholics from the capital. They had secured no estates of their own to ensure the safety of their links to the centre.⁹⁴ They were seemingly recovering their strength, and actively accumulating arms. If they were to be effectively reincorporated into the kingdom, as was the intention, it was essential, Williams believed, that they should be granted a greater allocation of chieftaincies than they at present possessed, so as to accord more with their actual power. That, however, necessarily involved concessions by the Protestants. When, however, Williams sought the assistance over this of the Anglican Bishop Tucker, he refused to discuss the matter prior to the arrival of the then expected Imperial Commissioner, Gerald Portal (in circumstances to be traced in the next chapter).⁹⁵

Portal reached Buganda in mid March 1893. He was soon approached by the Catholic Bishop, Hirth, complaining bitterly that Lugard had failed to grant the Catholics all the lands he had originally specified,⁹⁶ and vigorously demanding that a much greater allocation of Sazas be made to them. Portal had a long and inconclusive meeting with the two Bishops, which ended with his requiring that they accept his own settlement. Under this, the Catholic Kimbugwe Mugwanya became a second Katikiro with all the powers possessed by Kagwa, while the Catholics, in addition to the Saza of Buddu, were granted the Sesse Islands, the

⁹⁰ E.g. BD, 17, 19 July 1892.

⁹¹ Williams to Administrator IBEAC, 9 Dec., MP; Macdonald to Portal, 13 Dec. 1892, FO 84/2265.

⁹² See Ch. 6.

⁹³ For a somewhat fuller account, see Ch. 9.

⁹⁴ Though these had been promised them in Lugard's treaty with them, clause 11.

⁹⁵ E.g. Williams to Lugard, 19 Aug., 5 Sept., LP s. 41, to Administrator Mombasa, 9 Oct., 9 Dec. 1892, FO 2/57; Tucker to Williams, 7 Jan., Williams' Memo, 11 Jan., Hirth's note, 14 Jan., Williams' Memo on Catholics, 16 Mar. 1893, A2/1; Macdonald to Williams, 27 Oct. 1892, A2/1, 17 Jan. 1893, A3/1; Tucker to Williams, 10 Feb., Williams to Roscoe, 14 Feb. 1893, A32/1.

⁹⁶ About which Lugard himself was uncomfortable: *LD* III, pp. 304–5; 13 Feb. G/D; Hirth to Portal, 24 Mar. 1893, A2/1.

western Bwekula region of Singo, which earlier in the century had been conquered from Bunyoro and now effectively became a separate Saza, the Saza of Mawokota, and a sequence of lands effectively linking them to the capital. With three small western Sazas in Muslim hands, and across the north and east of the kingdom five in Protestant hands, this constituted the ninth religio-political alignment which these years were to see.⁹⁷

At the end of May 1893, Portal departed for the coast, and with Williams having now left as well, Captain J. R. L. Macdonald became acting British Commissioner. Within days he was confronted by reports of an imminent revolt by the Muslims, who, like the Catholics, had sought an increase in territory but had been firmly rebuffed by Portal.⁹⁸ With their ire rising, a considerable number of them were now congregating close to the capital, where they were evidently seeking support from their co-religionists amongst the Sudanese troops whom Lugard had brought from the west. Macdonald was especially suspicious of their leader, Selim Bey, whom he took the precaution of dispatching to a new fort at Entebbe on the Victoria lakeshore. His apprehensions, however, appeared confirmed when Selim wrote to him to say that, were he to attack the Baganda Muslims, he would regard that as an attack upon himself.

In a swift move to defuse the situation, Macdonald disarmed the Sudanese troops at Kampala fort. That emboldened the largely Protestant force at the capital to attack the Muslims on 18 June 1893 in the variously named Battle of Rubaga and soon put them to flight. Macdonald then marched on Entebbe and arrested Selim, who, on being exiled to the coast, died upon the way.⁹⁹ Thereafter, over a period of two months, a joint Christian army inflicted a further defeat upon the Muslims fleeing to the west and variously harried the remnants, who scattered. Under an energetic young leader, Kahusi, some moved southwards to the small kingdom of Koki, whence a force under a young British officer expelled them to Bukanga in the borderlands of Nkore.¹⁰⁰ Others crossed into German territory, while others sought vainly to

⁹⁷ 'Agreement between the Heads of Catholic and Protestant Missions', 7 Apr. 1893, Portal to Rosebery, 8 Apr. 1893, FOCP 6454/348; G. H. Portal, *The British Mission to Uganda in 1893* (London, 1894), esp. Pt 2, Ch. 2; Portal to his wife, 22 Mar., 4, 8 Apr. 1893, PP; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 288–9; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 27–31; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 165; Kasirye, 'Mugwanya', Ch. 8.

⁹⁸ J. R. L. Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying in British East Africa 1891–1894* (London, 1897), Chs. 14–18; Wright, *Heroic Age*, Ch. 5; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', Chs. 45–6; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, Ch. 29; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, Ch. 20; Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, pp. 91–4.

⁹⁹ 'Court of Acting British Commissioner, Uganda', 21 June 1893, A3/1.

¹⁰⁰ See Ch. 8, pp. 244–5.

recover their former position in Buganda.¹⁰¹ There, however, Macdonald made them forfeit the Saza of Gomba to the Protestants and the Saza of Busuju to the Catholics, leaving them with no more than the one, small, enmeshed Saza of Butambala, with the opportunity to settle elsewhere in Buganda as best they could. At the beginning of these conflicts back in 1888, the Muslims had comprised the largest party, the Catholics ranking second, the Protestants a weak third. By 1893 the ratios had been turned around completely.

It is then striking that, of all these religio-political alignments which over that five-year period had variously had their day, it was this tenth one which in the end became the template for the distribution of political power between the three religious parties in Buganda through the years that followed. Between 1897 and 1899 it was much embroiled in yet one more such conflict,¹⁰² but no further religio-political alignment ever effectively raised its head. With the making thereafter of the eventual colonial settlement as embodied in the Uganda Agreement of 1900,¹⁰³ the distribution of major offices of state essentially entailed an extrapolation from Macdonald's settlement. In the three-person 'Ministry' which that created, the Protestant Kagwa remained Katikiro, the Catholic Mugwanya ceased to be the second Katikiro but took the newly elevated office of Omulamuzi (Chief Justice), while a second Protestant, Kisingiri, held the third post of Omuwanika (Treasurer). In the accompanying increase in Sazas from the original ten to a total of twenty, the Protestants were accorded eleven, the Catholics eight, the Muslims just one.¹⁰⁴ With one exception these ratios persisted throughout the ensuing sixty years of British colonial rule.¹⁰⁵ There was nothing here that was deliberately constructed, preplanned or purposely fashioned. It was all fabrication at the hand of events.

¹⁰¹ For the scattering of the Muslim followers in 1893, see Macdonald to Hardinge, 21 Oct. 1893, A31/1; Macdonald to Gedge, 15 July 1894, GP.

¹⁰² See Ch. 7.

¹⁰³ On which see Ch. 10.

¹⁰⁴ For an analysis based on several interviews with the elderly Ham Mukasa in the latter part of 1954, showing that, with just four mostly explicable exceptions, the holders of these twenty-three positions all belonged to the group of Christians who went into exile on the Nkore border in 1888–9, and for some of their other characteristics, see D. A. Low, *Religion and Society in Buganda, 1875–1900*, East African Studies No. 8 (Kampala, 1957), pp. 12–14.

¹⁰⁵ The Saza of Kabula established in 1899 at the expense of Nkore (see Ch. 8) was transferred in 1913 from the Protestants (leaving them with ten) to the Muslims (eventually giving them two). See, for a fuller discussion, H. B. Hansen, *Mission, Church and State in a Colonial Setting. Uganda 1890–1925* (London, 1984), pp. 325–33.

4 Upcountry: might-have-beens and the Buganda/Uganda outcome

It is now time to turn to the other side of this story – the British side, and in so doing to ask in a quite precise way three questions about the distinctive impress they made on the headwaters of the Nile during the course of the 1890s.

1. How was it for a start that it was the British who established their separate dominion over this region when a number of other possibilities had variously been mooted?
2. How then was it that under their aegis there came to be established a relatively small, oddly bounded, separately demarcated, inland polity – which came to be called ‘Uganda’ – which was completely devoid of anything pre-ordained about it?
3. And then how was it that as this new polity came into being its node should have come to lie in the kingdom of Buganda when a number of other eventualities could conceivably have come to pass?

The first chapter variously canvassed some of the issues here, not least some of the more extreme alternatives, such as some aggregation of the whole range of kingdoms, from Burundi in the south to Bunyoro in the north. Those, however, were only preliminary remarks, and the present chapter will seek to elaborate upon these issues much more extensively. It will not do so by collating the answers to each question in turn. Not only is that not how they eventuated; occurrences relating to one question frequently intermeshed with those concerning others. Characteristically, moreover, the answers to each of the three questions only took form over time. As a consequence, we have to look for their shaping in the vicissitudes of events. That in turn means we have to probe the late nineteenth-century story of the European ‘scramble for Africa’ in this East African region for the clues which it provides. That story has had many an expert expositor already,¹ and

¹ It is no part of the present purpose to rehearse this story at any length, even for East Africa. So see C. Newbury, ‘Great Britain and the Partition of Africa 1870–1914’ in W.R. Louis, ed.-in-chief, *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. III, *The Nineteenth Century*, (Oxford,

so will not be reiterated with any degree of fullness here. Rather this chapter will fasten upon those episodes and phenomena in the story that relate to the outcomes which occurred, in an effort to glean at least something of a comprehensive answer to each of the three questions with which it began.

We may start by revisiting the exploratory journeys of Speke and Grant and the two Bakers, husband and wife, in the early 1860s. For all of them, their overriding objective was to solve one of the outside world's age-old mysteries and determine the ultimate sources of the White Nile. The clues to its unravelling appeared to lie in the vicinity of the two northern kingdoms, Buganda and Bunyoro. So it was towards them that these first European visitors journeyed rather than towards, say, the two other large kingdoms in the region, Rwanda and Burundi, which for them were of no such geographical interest. So spectacular were their 'discoveries' for the outside world, and so readable their ensuing accounts of their journeys, that Buganda in particular – though Bunyoro to a degree also – became lodged in the minds of any European with an interest in the East African interior as a key focal point in the inland lakes region.

Speke, as we have seen, soon went further.² On reaching London at the end of his great journey, he not only proposed that Christian missionaries should be sent up the Nile to Bunyoro, and in due course further south to Buganda and Karagwe. He also sought to persuade the British government to take steps to establish trading relations with 'the Court of Unyoro', whence, he said, 'the finest lands in the world would be open to Europe'. On both scores, however, he was roundly rebuffed, and his implied suggestion that Bunyoro should thereby become the gateway to the East African lakes region was never again repeated.

During the 1870s three other initiatives were taken which, if any had reached fruition, would have so delineated the political map of the northern lakes region, and all which that implied, as to have subjected it to a superordinate polity completely different from that which eventuated. [Chapter 2](#) has outlined the first of these – the Egyptian thrust towards the headwaters of the Nile at the instance of the Khedive throughout most of the 1870s, first under the command of Baker and then of Gordon. This not only involved conflict with Bunyoro, and threats to Buganda, but at a time when Gordon was planning an advance to Lake Victoria, it stirred a group of British humanitarians into pressing

1999), Ch. 27; and J.E. Flint, 'Britain and the Scramble for Africa', in Louis, *Oxford History*, Vol. v, *Historiography* (Oxford, 1999), Ch. 29.

² Ch. 2.

the British government to prevent an Egyptian annexation of Buganda.³ In the event they need not have worried. Bankruptcy in Egypt led first to a withdrawal of all Egyptian posts from the region by 1879, and then, following the Mahdist uprising in the Sudan in the early 1880s, left the remnants of the Egyptian Equatoria Province under Gordon's successor, Emin, and several thousands of its Sudanese troops cut off in the vicinity of Lake Albert and the Nile to its immediate north.

Meanwhile, at Gordon's instance, a second enterprise had been mounted by the Khedive. This was intended to establish an Egyptian base on the northern East African coast, with a view to opening a route from there to Lake Victoria with none of the obstacles – swamps, cataracts and obstructive officials in Khartoum – which had hampered Gordon's advance up the Nile.⁴ Late in 1875, 4 Egyptian warships and 550 Egyptian troops under McKillop Pasha were thereupon dispatched to proclaim the Khedive's dominion over the southern Somali coast from Berbera to Formosa Bay in place of that of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Landings were successfully effected at Barawa and Kismayu. Elsewhere, however, the resistance mounted by the Sultan's local governors proved to be too much for McKillop's forces. Very soon, moreover, the Sultan's champion, Dr John Kirk, the British Consul-General in Zanzibar, not only mounted a counter-demonstration along the coast aboard a British warship, but successfully persuaded his masters in the British Foreign Office to back the Sultan against this threat to the integrity of his dominions. British pressure was thereupon brought to bear upon the Khedive in Cairo to withdraw McKillop's forces, which, since they were far from adequate to their task, he soon proceeded to order.⁵

Despite this outcome, this whole episode underscored Kirk's rising concern about the vulnerability of the Sultan's hold upon his dominions, and thus the preeminent position the British had long held over it.⁶ Ever since 1872 he had, however, been in touch with Sir William Mackinnon, the Scottish Presbyterian businessman who had first made his fortune with a leading Indian Ocean mercantile company, Smith Mackenzie's, and then as founder of the hugely successful British India Steam Navigation Company.⁷ On extending its sailings to Eastern Africa in 1872, Mackinnon had concluded that there were excellent trading possibilities to be had here on the mainland, and he and Kirk had thereupon

³ Gray, *Southern Sudan*, pp. 177, 184.

⁴ Ch. 2.

⁵ Coupland, *Exploitation* Ch. 13, 'The Egyptian Invasion'.

⁶ For its origins, see R. Coupland, *East Africa and its Invaders* (Oxford, 1938).

⁷ J.S. Galbraith, *Mackinnon and East Africa 1878–1895. A Study in the 'New Imperialism'*, (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 29–42.

discussed the idea of establishing, under the sovereignty of the Sultan, a major British trading company to open up the interior as never before to European trade and commerce. In doing so, they became linked with a small coterie of British humanitarians interested in Africa, and more extensively with the extraordinary figure of King Leopold II of Belgium and his plans for an African International Association to promote the 'civilisation' of Africa. Whilst the Association's proposals for lines of communication across the continent eventually faltered, Mackinnon held to his earlier conversations with Kirk, who now proceeded to work on the Sultan's anxieties in the aftermath of the McKillop expedition to persuade him to propose that British 'capitalists' should assist him with the development of trade and civilisation on the mainland. As a consequence, thanks to the support Kirk had given him against McKillop, there followed throughout 1877 and into 1878 detailed negotiations upon a grant of a concession, by the Sultan to a Mackinnon-led British company, of most governmental powers over the whole of the East African mainland from Delagoa Bay in the south to the southern Somali coast on the north. By May 1878, however, this possibility had also dissolved. In the end, Mackinnon evidently hesitated over so ambitious a project; Britain's new Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, seemingly doused it with cold water; the Sultan was incensed at being insulted by his British interpreter, and found himself overborne by his leading Zanzibari advisers.⁸

All three of these alien ventures touching the East African interior during the 1870s thus came to naught. Had the first been realised, Buganda, Bunyoro and their neighbours could well have become part of the southern Sudan. Had the second eventuated, they might have found themselves tied via Mount Kenya to the southern Somali coast; while if the third had fructified, they might very easily have found themselves perched in the far northwestern corner of a British territory half as large again as Nigeria.

As it was, for another six years there was much ado but little of any consequence: Mackinnon, Leopold, Gordon, Kirk and the explorer Stanley canvassed various possibilities for the 'development' of the East African interior. Soon, however, Leopold (with Stanley in his employ) switched his attention altogether to the Congo.⁹ A French attempt to secure a concession similar to the earlier Mackinnon proposal came to nothing. A host of European journeyings into the interior frequently foundered, while an attempt by Kirk to entrench Britain's position in

⁸ Coupland, *Exploitation*, Ch. 14; Galbraith, *Mackinnon*, Ch. 2 for a fuller account.

⁹ Galbraith, *Mackinnon*, pp. 72–83.

East Africa by accepting the Sultan's offer for them to oversee the regency of any under-age successor to his throne was rejected by his masters.¹⁰ For the time being, Kirk succeeded in his keen determination to uphold the suzerainty of the Sultan along the coast and in parts of the interior – and thus his own preeminence there – but was soon under no illusion that there were mounting threats to the security of both of these from the European 'scramble for Africa' which was now gathering momentum.¹¹

Hitherto Bismarck, Germany's Chancellor, had invariably adured colonial ventures, but by 1884 he was having second thoughts. Having, at the expense of the British, annexed territories in Southwestern and West Africa, he decided to call his Berlin Africa Conference of November 1884 – March 1885 which laid down that claims to African territory required 'effective occupation', and then immediately upon its dispersal issued an Imperial German 'Charter of Protection' to Carl Peters of the German Colonial Society in respect of the treaties he avowed he had made with a dozen local chiefs inland from Zanzibar. A month later that 'protection' was extended to cover German claims to Witu on the northern East African coast.¹² (For the Anglo-German partition of East Africa, 1885–1890, see [Map 6](#).)

With that the suzerainty of the Sultan and the paramountcy of the British across the whole region suffered a fatal blow. No-one understood this better than Kirk whose immediate response was to urge the government in London to arrange for steps to be taken to secure similar treaties in the interior and beat the Germans at their own game. Such, however, were the straits into which Britain had fallen at this moment – with Gordon's murder in Khartoum, a threat of war with Russia, and German moves to soften French antagonism towards them which left Britain without an ally in Europe – that he soon received an admonitory telegram from London instructing him not to display 'any marked opposition to German action in the present temper of the German Government',¹³ across which he scrawled in great anger: 'a cowed and kicked Govt'.¹⁴ That was then followed early in 1886 by a joint

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 27–8.

¹¹ Coupland, *Exploitation*, Ch. 16.

¹² On all this there is a large literature; see especially, here and hereafter, *ibid.*, Chs. 15–20; Galbraith, *Mackinnon*, Ch. 3; Perras, *Peters*, Ch. 2.

¹³ Lister to Kirk, tel., 16 Mar. 1885, FO 84/1724.

¹⁴ This and a similar comment on another telegram of that day seem to be the only occasions when Kirk ever wrote anything comparable on his correspondence from the Foreign Office as kept in the Zanzibar Archives.

Anglo-German-French Delimitation Commission, which, under pressure from the German side, confined the Sultan's authority along the coast to an intermittent strip of ten miles and less, leaving the further interior wide open to any European adventurer who sought to make a claim there.¹⁵

The British were not, however, being altogether idle. Following upon a notable journey in 1883–4 by the explorer Thomson across the region between Mombasa, on the coast north of Zanzibar, and the northeastern corner of Lake Victoria,¹⁶ Kirk's Consul in Zanzibar, Holmwood, who was on leave in England, managed as early as April 1885 to arouse once more the interest of Mackinnon – and now a gathering circle around him, which included Hutton, the President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce – in setting up a British company to secure British commercial interests in the area Thomson had traversed. While in the end, in the absence of explicit government backing, Mackinnon once again stood back,¹⁷ late in 1885 the strategic importance to British interests of the harbour and city of Mombasa was strongly argued by Colonel Kitchener,¹⁸ the British member of the Delimitation Commission. The idea was soon taken up by Sir Percy Anderson, the principal expert on Africa in the British Foreign Office, who, with Kirk's full support, proposed that, since the Germans had acquired the port of Dar-es-Salaam to the south of Zanzibar, the British should secure control of Mombasa to its north. Upon which the new British Foreign Secretary, Lord Rosebery, minuted: 'I incline towards Mombasa.'¹⁹

There was then a delay of six months. Eventually, however, Bismarck set his mind to effecting a settlement with the British upon all their outstanding East African questions, and with that in mind dispatched Dr Krauel of the German Foreign Office to London to negotiate with his counterpart there, Anderson. Thereupon the two men promptly

¹⁵ Coupland, *Exploitation*, pp. 448–68.

¹⁶ J. Thomson, *Through Masai Land* (London, 1885).

¹⁷ Coupland, *Exploitation*, pp. 425–9; *Manchester Guardian*, 13 Feb.; Holmwood to Granville, 19 Feb., 27 Mar., and Anderson's minute, FO 84/1730; Aberdare to Granville, 22, 24 Apr., Anderson's memo 24 Apr., FO 84/1737; Anderson's minute on Kirk to Granville, tel., 17 May, FO 84/1725; Anderson's memo, 9 June, FO 84/1739, 2 July, FO 84/1740; Hutton to Mackinnon, 3 July, MP; Hutton to Salisbury, 15 July, MP; Anderson to Mackinnon, 31 July, Lister to Mackinnon, 4 Sept., Mackinnon to Lister, 3 Oct., annexures to FOCP 6661/189; Anderson's memo, 3 Nov. 1885, FO 84/1744; Kirk to Mackinnon, 11 Oct., MP; Brackenbury Memo, 21 Aug. 1886, FO 84/1789.

¹⁸ The later Field Marshal Lord Kitchener of Khartoum.

¹⁹ Anderson's minute, 19 Jan., Rosebery to Kirk, 11 Feb., Kirk to Rosebery, tel. 19 Feb., FO 84/1777, 11 Mar., tel., 14 Mar. 1886, FO 84/1773; Pauncefote and Rosebery's minutes [20 Mar. 1886], FO 84/1782; Kirk to Rosebery, 4 June 1886, FO 84/1774.

arrogated to themselves the unfettered right, as accredited agents of two of the world's great imperial powers, to determine the international boundaries of vast areas of African-held territory. They did at least concede that the Sultan's sovereignty extended over Zanzibar, its northern island Pemba, and two other islands, but otherwise confined it to a ten-mile strip all along the coast. Then, turning to the very much larger area inland, they agreed to partition this between a German 'sphere of influence' based in Dar-es-Salaam in the south and a British 'sphere of influence' based in Mombasa in the north, along a mostly straight diagonal line from the coast north of Pemba to a point 1 degree south on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria. This was then embodied in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886.²⁰ With that, any possibility that in the new era East Africa would emerge as a single territorial whole, under the overlordship of the Sultan or under the British, appeared gone for ever. Henceforth, there were not only two major European players in the region, rather than just one, East Africa was all but irredeemably sliced into two major halves with countless fateful consequences for its many millions of African inhabitants, none of whom was in any way involved in the decisions.²¹

These events overlapped with a quartet of proposals concerning the northern lakes region in the far interior. There Emin, with numbers of his Equatorial forces, had by July 1885 retreated up the Nile from Lado, which was threatened by a Mahdist advance, to a safer haven just north of Lake Albert at Wadelai. There, (For Wadelai, see [Map 1](#).) having made various local connections, Emin's mostly Sudanese troops soon made it clear that they did not wish to depart either to a Madhist-dominated Sudan or to an unfamiliar Egypt, and Emin agreed to stay with them.²² From Wadelai he succeeded in establishing through Bunyoro an exchange of letters with Alexander Mackay, the leading Church Missionary Society missionary in Buganda.²³ From him he learnt of the Egyptian defeat in the Sudan, and through him received

²⁰ E. Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, 3 vols., 3rd edn (London, 1909), III p. 882.

²¹ Coupland, *Exploitation*, pp. 471–6; Malet to Salisbury, 27 June 1885, SP; Kirk to Mackinnon, 6, 11, 22 Oct., Lee to Mackinnon, 21 Oct., MP; Lister to Holmwood, 5 Nov. 1886, and enc., FO 84/1771. In view of large claims by Peters and the German company, the British secured more than Kirk had expected, with the consequence that the eventual 'Kenya' was larger than it might have been; 'Report' by Dr Carl Peters, 14 Sept., FO 84/1791; Kirk to Mackinnon, [30 Oct., 15 Nov.] 1886, MP; Perras, *Peters*, pp. 107–10.

²² For the whole ensuing story here, and more extensively below, see I.R. Smith, *The Emin Pasha Relief Expedition 1886–1890* (Oxford, 1972); also G.N. Sanderson, *England, Egypt, & the Upper Nile 1882–1899* (Edinburgh, 1965), Ch. 2.

²³ E.g. Mackay to Ashe, 25 May 1887, CMS Mackay Papers.

early in 1886 a dispatch from Cairo making it very plain that he could not look for any help from Egypt, and giving him a free hand as to how he should proceed.²⁴

By then Mackay had become increasingly anxious about the repercussions for the interior of the scramble engulfing the coast, and in letters to CMS headquarters in London and to Kirk in Zanzibar he canvassed a variety of consular and other options towards the establishment of a British presence in the lakes region.²⁵ Thereafter, in mid 1886, he went further. He proposed to Emin that, in view of his circumstances, he should deliver 'the whole territory of the Nile sources' of which he would have been Governor 'into English hands'. To this Emin quickly responded 'frankly "Yes"', and later elaborated that, if 'some intelligent officers' were sent to him, he would be ready to hand over his government to them.²⁶

Before anything, however, came of this, news reached Zanzibar in September 1886 of Mwanga's persecution of the Christians in Buganda and, following Bishop Hannington's earlier murder, of the danger in which the missionaries there were placed. By then Kirk was about to go on leave and Holmwood, who a year earlier had sought to interest the Mackinnon circle with the idea of a British advance into the interior, was appointed to act in his stead. Along with Mackay he now urged that Emin should be immediately relieved lest he suffer the same fate as Gordon in Khartoum.²⁷ He also proposed that the opportunity be taken of 'dealing ... with Uganda' and its 'infamous ... tyrant'; of establishing 'a safe depot on the Albert Nyanza ... for the retention of the Upper Nile'; and to these ends that a military expedition of 500 and more British-led troops should forthwith be dispatched to the region.²⁸

²⁴ Baring to Kirk, 30 May, and enc., ZA Misc 1885; Emin to Schweinfurth, 3 Mar. 1886, in G. Schweinfurth *et al.* *Emin Pasha in Central Africa* (London, 1888), pp. 495–7.

²⁵ Mackay to Hutchinson, 2 May 1886, FOCP 5433, pp. 93–4; Mackay to Kirk, 8 June, ZA 1885 FO 126–352, 8, 22 Dec. 1885, FO 84/1773.

²⁶ Emin to Mackay, 6, 7 July (in reply to Mackay to Emin, 2 June), Mackay to Kirk, 15 May, 24 Aug., 26 Dec., FO 84/1775; Emin to Kirk, 7 July, FO 84/1794; Emin to Felkin, 7 July 1886, MP; Mackay to Ashe (quoting Emin to Mackay, 17 Apr.), 25 May 1887, CMS Mackay Papers; Emin to Mackay, 1, 10, 30 Oct. 1886, FO 84/1852. The suggestion reached the Foreign Office in Oct.–Nov. 1886. It elicited no response: Holmwood to Iddesleigh, tel., 17 Oct., FO 84/1775; Felkin to Iddesleigh, 23 Nov. 1886, enc. and minutes, FO 84/1794.

²⁷ Emin to Kirk, 16 Nov. 1885, 1 Jan., Mackay to Kirk, 24 Aug., Ashe to Holmwood, FO 84/1775; Kirk to Salisbury, tel., 8 Feb., FO 84/1777; Holmwood to Iddesleigh, 23 Sept. 1886.

²⁸ Holmwood to Baring, 23, 26, 27 Sept., tels., ZRA Misc 1886; Holmwood to Anderson, 28 Sept., Holmwood to Salisbury, 30 Sept. 1886, FO 84/1775.

Officials in the British Foreign Office were sufficiently interested in these ideas²⁹ to consult the British War Office's Directorate of Military Intelligence. The Directorate, however, would not hear of them. Lord Wolseley, the Adjutant-General, declared that if Emin, with 4,000 troops, could not force his way out, there was no point in sending 500 more. He suggested rather that a diplomatic embassy be sent to Buganda to secure Mwangi's help (with a suitable reward) in enabling Emin and the missionaries to leave.³⁰ When, however, Anderson sent the papers to Kirk, he suggested the alternative of sending a well-equipped caravan to Kavirondo on the northeast side of Lake Victoria, which should bypass Buganda altogether, and from there try to make contact with Emin.³¹ When, however, Lord Salisbury, now Prime Minister as well as Foreign Secretary, received the papers, he rejected the idea out of hand. If 'any servant of the Crown' were sent there, he wrote (with Gordon's fate evidently very much in mind), 'we might have to rescue or avenge him'.³²

By this time, however, there were increasing concerns in Britain that urgent steps needed to be taken to relieve Emin and not leave him to the mercy of unpredictable events in the interior.³³ In supporting this, Kirk remarked that, with the signing of the Anglo-German Agreement in October 1886, the British not only now had 'the best ... line for a rail' to the interior, but that: 'We also have the Equatorial Province.'³⁴ That moved the Mackinnon circle into taking an interest once again in the East African interior, and led Hutton (the Mancunian) to draft a prospectus for setting up a 'Syndicate for establishing British Commerce and influence in East Africa and for relieving Emin Bey'. 'This', it said, 'should open a direct route to Victoria Nyanza and the Sudan and thereby establish stations and commerce in the interior of East Africa'.³⁵

But for a third time Mackinnon held back³⁶ and, to Hutton's chagrin, concentrated instead on organising an Emin Pasha Relief Expedition

²⁹ Additionally they had in front of them ('EB Papers') letters from Emin, 15 Nov. 1884, 1 Jan., 27 Feb., from Casati, 10 Feb., from Mackay, 7 Apr., 14, 26 May, 28 June, from Ashe, 12 July, and from Holmwood, 23 Sept. 1886, FO 84/1775.

³⁰ Brackenbury to Wolseley, 29 Sept. 1886, FO 84/1790; Levensen's memo, Brackenbury's minute on Levensen, 1 Oct., Wolseley's minute on Brackenbury, Thompson to Currie, 2 Oct., Sanderson's minute on 'EB Papers', 9 Oct. 1886, FO 84/1775.

³¹ Kirk's memo on 'EB Papers', 13 Oct., Kirk to Anderson, [14 Oct.], Anderson's and Pauncefote's minutes on 'EB Papers', 15 Oct. 1886, FO 84/1775.

³² Anderson's 'Notes', Pauncefote to Idlesleigh, 18 Oct., Salisbury's Minute on 'EB Papers', [after 19 Oct. 1886], FO 84/1775.

³³ E.g. Anderson's 'Notes' on 'EB Papers', 18 Oct. 1886, FO 84/1775.

³⁴ Kirk to Mackinnon, [30 Oct., 15 Nov. 1886], MP.

³⁵ Hutton to Mackinnon, 26, 27 Nov. 1886, MP.

³⁶ Hutton to Mackinnon, 26, 27 Nov., 21 Dec. 1886 and enc., MP.

with no reference to a Syndicate. With contributions from some other wealthy humanitarians and £10,000 from both himself and the Egyptian government, this was soon organised.³⁷ But when Stanley was then appointed its leader, one more British East African venture soon collapsed. For, given Stanley's association with Leopold, it was decided that the relief expedition should go by a Congo route rather than through Mombasa.

So it was that in just six months several gleams in the eye for a British initiative in the East African interior all evaporated. Had either Mackay's or Holmwood's or Kirk's proposals been accepted, a British agent might conceivably have been established somewhere near the headwaters of the Nile by 1887–8; while, had Hutton's more grandiose plan been effected, a British company could just possibly have been established there before any other European power made a move. As it happened, each served in a seminal way to direct British attention to the northern lakes area rather than towards the region which, following Thomson's journey, Holmwood had first enthused about.³⁸ But by the end of 1886 the whole area was no less devoid of any such alien project, as it had earlier been following the Khedive's, Mackinnon's and Kirk's equally abortive ventures back in the 1870s.

At 6 a.m. on 22 February 1887, however, the tide began to turn, this time at the instance of none other than Barghash, the Sultan of Zanzibar, who had become increasingly distressed by the pressures which the Germans, the British and even the Portuguese had been imposing on him. He now asked Holmwood what line of action would be 'best calculated to save his dominions from being broken up'. Never backward, Holmwood immediately suggested that the best course to follow was to offer Mackinnon a concession on the same lines as had been negotiated in 1877. By 8 a.m. the Sultan was telegraphing to Mackinnon in just such terms.³⁹ Mackinnon thereupon held discussions with officials in the Foreign Office. They were careful to insist that any such concession must not encroach upon the German sphere, while Kirk advised that it should not extend to Zanzibar either.⁴⁰ For his part,

³⁷ As noted above, see, for what follows, Smith, *Emin Pasha Relief Expedition*; also Galbraith, *Mackinnon*, Ch. 4, and the large participants' literature, especially Stanley, *Darkest Africa*.

³⁸ The later Kenya.

³⁹ Barghash to Mackinnon, tel., 22 Feb., Holmwood to Salisbury, 14 Mar. 1887, FO 84/1852.

⁴⁰ Anderson's minute on Holmwood to Salisbury, tel., 26 Feb., FO 84/1851; Kirk to Mackinnon, 8, 18, 30 Mar. 1887, MP.

Barghash's only requirement was that the proposal should have the approval of the British government.⁴¹ So long as it did 'not imply any support ... other than we give generally to British subjects', this Salisbury was prepared to give.⁴² He was at the same time ready to approve of treaties being made with African chiefs in the interior.⁴³ That prompted Mackinnon, with Kirk's approval, to dispatch a treaty-making agent into the interior who would, it was hoped, meet up with Stanley, who with any luck would also be making treaties on his way back with Emin via the east coast route.⁴⁴ Mackinnon thereupon set about negotiating details of a concession with the Sultan, and, with a view to assuring its support, with the British government as well.⁴⁵ Salisbury remained wary but in the end promised all assistance 'consistently with our regard for the British exchequer and for the ascertained rights of others'.⁴⁶ With that Mackinnon had to be satisfied,⁴⁷ and on 24 May 1887 he formally secured from the Sultan a wide-ranging concession over the Sultan's possessions astride Mombasa for his by now newly formed British East Africa Association.⁴⁸

There was then, however, a hitch. For the Foreign Office noted that, by the 1886 Agreement, the area under the Sultan's authority on the coast was only ten miles deep.⁴⁹ That meant that, if the Association was to exercise governmental powers further inland, it would need a royal charter from the British Crown to do this. This Salisbury was prepared to grant, but following two earlier experiences he was perennially worried about Mackinnon's resolution to act energetically;⁵⁰ while, apart

⁴¹ Holmwood to Salisbury, 14 Mar., FO 84/1852; tel. from Zanzibar to Mackinnon, 21 Mar. 1887, FO 84/1860.

⁴² Foreign Office to Holmwood, tel., 23 Mar., FO 84/1850, 1855; minutes on Mackinnon to Barghash, 14 Mar. 1887, FO 84/1860.

⁴³ Anderson's minute, FO 84/1860.

⁴⁴ Mackinnon to Barghash, 14 Mar., Smith Mackenzie's to Mackinnon, tels. 16, 23 Mar., FO 84/1860; Kirk to Mackinnon, 23 Mar. 1887; Mackenzie to Secretary IBEAC, 7 Jan. 1889, MP.

⁴⁵ See FO 84/1834, 1850, 1852, 1834 *passim*; MP April–May 1887, *passim*; Galbraith, *Mackinnon*, pp. 126–34.

⁴⁶ Salisbury's minutes on Anderson's draft of Salisbury to Malet, 14 Mar., FO 84/1834, and on Mackinnon's Memo, 7 May 1887, FO 84/1863.

⁴⁷ Pauncefote's Memo for Salisbury and draft to Mackinnon, 18 May, FO 84/1863; Mackinnon to Mackenzie, tel., 20 May 1887, ZM 258.

⁴⁸ P.L. McDermott, *British East Africa* (London, 1893), p. 457; Holmwood's copy ZM 257.

⁴⁹ Holmwood to Salisbury, 4 June, and minutes, FO 84/1852, 14 July, tel., Lister to Holmwood, tel., 13 July 1887, FO 84/1855.

⁵⁰ E.g. Minute on Mackinnon's Memo, 7 May, FO 84/1863; minute on Scott to Salisbury, 10 Dec. 1887, FO 84/1887; Salisbury to Euan Smith, 26 June, FO 84/1904; Salisbury's memo, 25 Sept. 1888, FO 84/1891.

from needing to mobilise a cohort of committed directors for a chartered company and raise capital in its support, Mackinnon on his side was deeply suspicious of Salisbury's readiness to give it his full support.⁵¹ Nevertheless, by April 1888, an Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) chaired by Mackinnon had been formed, though, because of the protracted nature of the necessary legal steps for a Royal Charter, it was not signed by the Queen in Council till September.⁵²

In the meantime, consideration was given to the course which the IBEAC should take. In line with what had now become conventional thinking, attention was focused upon the lakes area in the far interior. As to the form and the intent with which the British should proceed, there were, however, two very different views. Back in May 1887 the CMS missionary Mackay had urged upon Holmwood ... [with] the court of Buganda'. Whilst nothing at first came of that, when, in April 1888, Mackay reinforced his point,⁵³ this view came to be espoused by the new British Consul-General in Zanzibar, Euan Smith, who in July 1888 told Salisbury that: 'There can be no doubt whatever that King Mwang'a's friendship and goodwill will prove of the greatest importance to the future interests of the British East African Company. He exercises undisputed sway over the whole of the western shore of Lake Nyanza, and can without difficulty control all the trade routes to the North and the West.' He sought and was accordingly given authority to enter into communications with the Kabaka.⁵⁴

The Company, however, thought very differently, and, as they were well informed about Euan Smith's view,⁵⁵ their alternative approach was clearly deliberate. Rather than wait for Stanley to emerge with Emin, they sent letters to Emin proposing that he should retain command of 'the Central African Province' and there be provided with 'such assistance ... as you may consider necessary [both] for the proper administration and development of the territories under your control' and for the opening of a regular caravan route from his headquarters at Wadelai to Lake Baringo (north of Mount Kenya) and thence to

⁵¹ Mackinnon's Memo, 7 May, FO 84/1863; Kirk to Mackinnon, 5 May, Lee to Mackinnon, 14 May 1887, MP; Mackinnon to Salisbury, 24 Aug. 1888, FO 84/1905.

⁵² Galbraith, *Mackinnon*, pp. 137–43.

⁵³ Mackay to Holmwood, 10 Aug. 1887, FO 84/1584, Mackay to Euan Smith, 18 Apr. 1888, FO 84/1907.

⁵⁴ Euan Smith to Salisbury, 1 June, SP, 28 July, and Anderson's minute, FO 84/1908; Lister to Euan Smith, 31 Aug., FO 84/1904, 25 Sept., FO 84/1905, to Mackinnon, 1 Sept. 1888, FO 84/1927.

⁵⁵ Euan Smith to Mackinnon, 30 Aug., MP; Lister to Mackinnon, 1 Sept., FO 84/1927, 25 Sept. 1888, FO 84/1929.

Mombasa.⁵⁶ Their purpose here was clearly to take over an already established upcountry terminal at Wadelai if they could.⁵⁷

Before, however, effect could be given to these initiatives, the tempo of events in late 1888 suddenly became greatly heightened. In mid August, the German East Africa Company set about establishing control of the coastline abutting upon its 'sphere of influence' opposite Zanzibar. The manner in which this was instituted immediately triggered a multi-faceted Arab and Swahili insurrection.⁵⁸ That momentarily led Bismarck and the German government to consider seriously the abandonment of all German activities in East Africa for at least the next twenty years. When Salisbury heard of this he responded: 'Very good news. If the Germans go we shall have plenty of leisure to settle with the natives.'⁵⁹ Had the Germans actually proceeded to withdraw from East Africa, its future shape could well have turned out very differently. But within a fortnight Bismarck had changed his mind, and, in deciding to hold on to Germany's foothold in East Africa, sought British assistance in the suppression of the insurrection the German Company faced. Salisbury agreed to provide this so as to secure a watching brief on German activities in the region.⁶⁰

That, for the IBEAC, was soon highly necessary, as there were now rumours that a rival German Emin Pasha Relief Expedition was being planned. As these were accompanied by reports of German ambitions in the Lake Victoria region,⁶¹ Mackinnon greatly feared that its actual object could be to conclude treaties around the southern and western shores of Lake Victoria and to 'reach Emin Pasha, and ... get him to

⁵⁶ De Winton to Emin, 9 June 1888: a précis is in FO 84/1908, also in FO 84/1905, while the full text is in ZA 1888 FO 77-248. See also Stanley Expedition Book, 17 July 1888, ZM. The idea had been prompted by correspondence between Emin and Dr Felkin, the former CMS missionary in Buganda: Emin to Felkin, 2 Oct. 1886, 15 Aug. 1887, MP; Felkin to Emin, 25 Oct. 1888, FO 84/1991.

⁵⁷ As Hill of the Foreign Office noted of a German enquiry: 'It is true the British Co want to attach Emin to themselves', minute on Malet to Salisbury, 29 Sept. 1888, FO 84/1892.

⁵⁸ For a sophisticated analysis, see J. Glassman, *Feasts and Riot: Revelry Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856-1888* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1995), and for a partial critique, Perras, *Peters*, pp. 127-30. For Euan Smith's reporting, see FO 84/1908, 1909 *passim*.

⁵⁹ Malet to Salisbury, and tel., 26 Sept. 1888, and Hill's, Pauncefote's and Salisbury's minutes, FO 84/1892, FO 84/1929.

⁶⁰ Malet to Count Bismarck, 26 Sept., Malet to Salisbury, 29 Sept., FO 84/1892; Salisbury to Euan Smith, 13 Oct., Currie to Euan Smith, 15, 18, 25 Oct., FO 84/1905; Beauclerk to Salisbury, tel., 19, 20 Oct., FO 84/1893; Salisbury to Malet, 5 Nov. 1888, FO 84/1890.

⁶¹ For a full account of the German side of the story, see Perras, *Peters*, Chs. 3-4.

transfer ... his Government to them'.⁶² Kirk concurred; 'the relief of Emin', he told Mackinnon 'is only a blind'.⁶³ Quite suddenly a race for the interior looked to be in the offing. Salisbury certainly sensed that this was so since, in a long note to the German government in mid September 1888, he went out of his way to declare that:

The English & German Governments have undertaken a civilizing mission on the E. coast of Africa in which they can greatly help each other. It would be the height of madness, if they were to throw away their strength in intriguing against each other. There is, & for a long time to come will remain, an ample field to occupy the available energies of both countries.⁶⁴

For its part, the IBEAC decided to take two precautionary steps. First, Mackinnon wrote to Salisbury and urged that – since the British and German governments had in mid 1887 agreed, at a time when the Germans feared the British Emin Pasha Expedition might make treaties in the rear of their 'sphere of influence', that the IBEAC should have a free hand 'in the territories south of the Victoria Nyanza' but not 'to the east of the Lakes Tanganyika and Nyassa at the back of the German Protectorate' (the so-called 'Hinterland doctrine') – in accordance with this, the boundary between the British and German spheres to the west of Lake Victoria (to which the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886 did not extend) should now be drawn from Lake Victoria's southernmost point to the border of the Congo along the line of 2 degrees latitude. He was told at first that, since the government had further information that the proposed German Emin expedition would not be proceeding, it was not necessary 'to raise the question'.⁶⁵ But with news of a German expedition remaining ominous,⁶⁶ two months later Mackinnon enlarged his earlier claim and henceforth sought a boundary between the British sphere and the German one on a line running diagonally southwestwards from the southernmost point of Lake Victoria to the northern shores of Lake Tanganyika. As this was arguably in accord with the precise wording of the Hinterland doctrine, he thought it had the

⁶² Kirk to Mackinnon, 10 Aug., MP; Mackinnon to Salisbury, 24 Aug., FO 84/1905, 24 Sept., FO 84/1928, 26 Sept. 1888, FO 84/1929; Malet to Salisbury, 15, 22, 26 Sept., FO 84/1892.

⁶³ Kirk to Mackinnon, 25 Sept. 1888, MP.

⁶⁴ Salisbury's memo in Salisbury to Malet, 25 Sept. 1888, FO 84/1891.

⁶⁵ Mackinnon to Salisbury, 24 Sept., and Hill's note, FO 84/1928; Mackinnon to Foreign Office, 26 Sept., and minutes, FO 84/1929; Pauncefote to Mackinnon, 13 Oct., FO 84/1930; Scott to Salisbury, 5 Sept. 1888, FO 84/1892.

⁶⁶ Mackinnon to Mackenzie, 30 Nov., 1 Dec., to Pauncefote, 5 Dec., Mackenzie to Mackinnon, 28, 30 Nov., 26 Dec., MP; Beauclerk to Salisbury, 31 Oct., FO 84/1893; Malet to Salisbury, 2 Dec. 1888, FO 84/1913.

concurrence of officials in the Foreign Office.⁶⁷ It remained the IBEAC's principal claim throughout the ensuing eighteen months.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, in direct response to the German threat, the Company decided to dispatch 'a well equipped caravan' to the northeastern corner of Lake Victoria with a view to making 'Treaties with the chiefs of that region, and beyond' and opening communications 'with the province of Emin Pasha'.⁶⁹ As soon as its acting Administrator, Mackenzie, established himself in Mombasa he promptly took steps to organise this,⁷⁰ and on 11 October 1888 issued orders to a Captain Swayne who had been chosen to lead the expedition to 'enter into friendly relations with the tribes' he encountered; exchange treaties with them; build stations from which further expeditions could be organised, and then 'make Wadelai your destination',⁷¹ 'and avoid if possible the routes which approach the Uganda territory'.⁷² In the event Swayne proved to be an unsuitable leader and was replaced by Frederick Jackson,⁷³ who over the next two months was constantly urged to lose 'no time pushing on to Wadelai'.⁷⁴ In support of this venture, Mackinnon secured indentures from Emin's agent, the former CMS missionary Felkin, which purportedly transferred to the IBEAC Emin's rights over his Equatoria province.⁷⁵

There was then, however, a sudden diversion. Just before Christmas 1888, news came that Emin and Stanley had fallen into the hands of the Mahdists.⁷⁶ This led Euan Smith to crystallise his theory that the right

⁶⁷ Except Sir Percy Anderson who was thought to support a line along 1 degree south, on which see below. Mackinnon to Mackenzie, 30 Nov., 6, 26 Dec. 1888, MP; Mackinnon to Nicol, 1 Aug., FO 64/2036; Walker to IW, 11 Aug. 1889, WP. Mackinnon's first claim – to anticipate – would have included Rwanda and its neighbours in the future Uganda, but not Burundi; his second would have included Burundi and others as well.

⁶⁸ Mackinnon to Mackenzie, 26 Dec. 1888, 23 Jan. 1889, to Nicol, 10 May 1888, MP; Mackinnon to Nicol, 1 Aug. 1889, FO 84/2036; Alexander to Salisbury, 22 Apr. 1890, FO 84/2080.

⁶⁹ Mackinnon to Salisbury, 24 Aug. 1888, FO 84/1905.

⁷⁰ Mackenzie to Secretary IBEAC, 25 Sept., Mackinnon to Mackenzie, 4 Oct. 1888, MP.

⁷¹ Mackenzie to Swayne, 11 Oct. 1888, MP. 'Mr M informs me that they are going right through Ukambani & Ulu ... to Lake Baringo – whence they will strike S. to Kavirondo & NW to Wadelai': Price to Lang, 8 Nov., also Mackenzie to Price, 13 Nov. 1888, G3 A5/05 1888.

⁷² This was the phrase that, a year later, Jackson took to mean that he was 'on no account to go anywhere near Uganda': Jackson, *Early Days*, p. 222, see Ch. 3.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 147, 149, and, for his journey, see his Chs. 11–18, and G/D.

⁷⁴ Mackenzie to Jackson, 10 Nov., to Secretary IBEAC, 14, 19, 29 Nov., 2 Dec., to Mackinnon, tel., 28 Nov., Mackinnon to Mackenzie, 30 Nov., 6 Dec., MP; 4 Nov. – 11 Dec. 1888, G/D.

⁷⁵ Felkin to Emin, 5 Oct., copy FO 84/1991; indenture, 27 Oct., Mackinnon to Mackenzie, 30 Nov. 1888, MP.

⁷⁶ Foreign Office to Malet, 16 Dec. 1888, FO 84/1891.

policy for the Company was to direct its footsteps towards Buganda and 'enter upon intimate relations with the King of Uganda, so as to admit of a large Company's station being established within his territory'.⁷⁷ But within a week it was reported that Emin and Stanley were safe,⁷⁸ which was soon followed by news of Mwanga's expulsion from his kingdom in the previous September and its Muslim takeover in October.⁷⁹ All of which led Euan Smith to concede that relations with Buganda would now have to be 'carefully regulated'.⁸⁰

These events late in 1888 set a pattern for the future. During their course, the embryonic Company not only committed itself to build up a base in Mombasa, but, within weeks of receiving its Royal Charter in response to the German threat, sought a more extensive arena to the west of Lake Victoria than had been prescribed by the 1886 Agreement, and dispatched a substantial caravan to preempt the Germans there.

There were, however, several problems. The Company still had only a limited capital: £250,000. Many of its Directors were not businessmen but philanthropists, retired soldiers and officials.⁸¹ Mackinnon was perennially troubled that Salisbury would not give it any special assistance. At the same time, Foreign Office officials rarely hesitated to urge them to press forward boldly. That left the Company with little option but to persist.⁸² Mackinnon sought to procure the services of the missionary Mackay to make treaties on the Lake Victoria/Tanganyika watershed.⁸³ But that could not be arranged without Mackay resigning from the CMS.⁸⁴ Additional orders were then sent to Jackson (who had returned to Mombasa)⁸⁵ to detach part of his caravan to make treaties and form stations on the east coast of Lake Victoria; 'also to Usoga'.⁸⁶ But while

⁷⁷ Euan Smith to Salisbury, 18 Dec. 1888, SP.

⁷⁸ Lister's note, 21 Dec., FO 84/1835; Kirk to Mackinnon, 24 Dec. 1888, MP.

⁷⁹ Euan Smith to Salisbury, 10 Jan. 1889, tel., FO 84/1984.

⁸⁰ Euan Smith to Mackinnon, 1 Jan., MP; Euan Smith to Salisbury, 10 Jan., FO 84/1984, 3, 11 Jan. 1889, ZA FO 1-100 1889.

⁸¹ Report by IBEAC to founders, 1 June, ZA 1889 FO 126-290; Pelly to Mackinnon, 5 Sept. 1889, MP.

⁸² On this whole episode, see Pelly to Mackinnon, a dozen letters between 13 Mar. and 6 Apr., MP; Mackenzie to Salisbury, to Pouncefote, 27 Mar. 1889, and minutes, FO 84/1991.

⁸³ Mackinnon to Nicol, 3 Apr., 10 May, MP, to Nicol, 1 Aug., FO 84/2036; Walker to IW, 11 Aug. 1889, WP.

⁸⁴ CMS Committee Minutes 54, pp. 216-17.

⁸⁵ 24 April, G/D; Mackinnon to Nicol, tel., 23 May, Nicol to Mackinnon, tel., 30 May 1889, MP.

⁸⁶ I.e. Busoga: Mackinnon to Euan Smith, tel., 28 Mar., Euan Smith to Mackinnon, tel., 30 Mar., Mackinnon to Nicol, tel., 23 May 1889, MP.

he soon set out again for the interior, these orders do not seem to have reached him.

The IBEAC's aim was still to link up with Emin. Mackinnon was accordingly somewhat encouraged when, early in April 1889, a letter arrived from Stanley telling him that Emin was attracted to the idea of settling somewhere in Kavirondo on the northeast coast of Lake Victoria.⁸⁷ For that raised the hope that he would meet up with Jackson's caravan there.⁸⁸ For several months thereafter there was, however, very little news of Stanley; while ominously for the Company, in July 1889, Carl Peters, at the head of a German Emin Pasha Expedition, forced his way through the British coastline and disappeared up the Tana river.⁸⁹ Eventually, on 28 August 1889, Stanley and Emin and their depleted following – most of Emin's soldiery having remained behind – reached Mackay's mission station at the south end of Lake Victoria⁹⁰ where, earlier, he had taken refuge from Mwanga. But this only brought fateful news. For Stanley now wrote to tell Mackinnon that, for the past five years, Emin 'had neither Government, Province or Soldiers'⁹¹ and was in no position to provide the Company with a pre-established base in the far interior.⁹² Mackinnon's woes were then underscored when, instead of Stanley and Emin journeying to the coast through the British sphere to meet up there with the British company, they travelled through the German sphere to German-held Bagamoyo.⁹³

All of this was of dire importance for the Company. For it not only put paid to any claims they might have established to the further interior; but then threatened to leave the whole area wide open to the Germans. In particular, it put an end to any idea of appropriating Wadelai, amid the acephalous peoples of the Upper Nile, as its upcountry base.⁹⁴ It was this collapse that then made an alternative suggestion all the more influential. It came from Mackay, the European who had lived longest

⁸⁷ Stanley to de Winton, 28 Aug., to Mackinnon, 3 Sept. 1888, MP; Euan Smith to Salisbury, 14 Mar. 1890, FO 84/2060.

⁸⁸ De Winton to Mackinnon, 2 Apr., Pelly to Mackinnon, 8, 9 Apr., Mackinnon to Nicol, tel., 13 June, MP; Mackinnon to Stanley, 5 Apr. 1889, FO 84/2036.

⁸⁹ Perras, *Peters*, Ch. 4.

⁹⁰ Emin to Portal, 28 Aug. 1889, FO 84/1981; Smith, *Emin Pasha Relief Expedition*, Chs. 9–10.

⁹¹ Stanley to Mackinnon, 31 Aug. 1889, MP.

⁹² Mackinnon had hoped to get them to come down to Mombasa: Nicol to Stanley, 3 Nov., FO 84/2036; Mackinnon to Stanley, 29 Nov. 1889, MP.

⁹³ Nicol to Stanley, 3 Nov., FO 84/2036; Mackinnon to Stanley, 29 Nov. 1889, MP.

⁹⁴ Which, with all sorts of consequences, would have been rather like the establishment of Rhodes' British South Africa Company's base amongst the acephalous Shona rather than the ruler-led Ndebele.

in the Lake Victoria region and who clearly warranted attention. On 2 September 1889 he wrote to Mackinnon, drawing his attention to the marked changes in the Buganda situation over the past year⁹⁵ and urging on him the opportunities this presented to the Company.

Mwanga [he wrote] ... has all the Christians (about 2,000) with him, besides many others, and is eager to have the assistance of the English to replace him on the throne ... Kalema, who is Mwanga's brother, holds Buganda chiefly by the aid of the Arab traders and of ... the natives as have adopted the Mahommedan faith ... the truest wisdom will be for the [Company] to direct its main energies in aiding Mwanga to overthrow Kalema and his Arabs and thus set [him] on the throne as nominal King only under the Co's protection. The present divided state of that country presents a rare opportunity for furthering the Company's interests ... If you have Uganda you have the lake, and there you will find the only market for ivory and for the disposal of barter goods in all this vast region ... The Equatorial Province is meantime lost ... much better than it, lies Uganda ... Now is the time ... for acquiring the right to hold the finest land in all East Africa.⁹⁶

This was Euan Smith's earlier proposal, except that Mackay was saying that the turmoil in Buganda was not an obstacle but an opportunity for the IBEAC.

There were a number of cautions expressed – by Stanley, by Kirk, and to a degree even by Euan Smith,⁹⁷ till it was learnt that Kalema and his supporters had been overthrown and Mwanga had recovered his throne. That immediately swung Euan Smith back upon the offensive. 'The opportunity seems ... a most favourable one', he told Salisbury in mid February 1890, 'for the ... Company to open negotiations with Mwanga with a view to a permanent settlement in Uganda'.⁹⁸ A month later he was communicating much more urgently as a consequence of a meeting on 13 March, when Emin told him 'in the strictest confidence' that the Germans were preparing an expedition to the south end of Lake Victoria 'with Uganda for its ultimate destination'.⁹⁹ He was still more emphatic three weeks later when he learnt that Emin had undertaken to lead this expedition, which was, he understood, 'at all hazards' to secure treaties in the surrounds of Lake Victoria 'before the English can arrive at

⁹⁵ Ch. 3.

⁹⁶ Mackay to Mackinnon, 2 Sept. 1889, MP. He had earlier written similarly: Mackay to Berkeley, 31 July 1889, FO 84/1981.

⁹⁷ Kirk to Mackinnon, 24 Dec. 1889, Stanley to Mackinnon, 4 Feb. 1890, MP; Euan Smith to Salisbury, 26 Dec. 1889, FO 84/1982.

⁹⁸ Euan Smith to Salisbury, 15 Feb., 5 Mar., SP, tel., 3 Mar., FO 84/2069, and ZA 1890 FO 1; Jephson to Mackinnon, 24 Feb., Euan Smith to Mackinnon, 25 Feb. 1890, MP.

⁹⁹ Euan Smith to Salisbury, tel., 13 Mar., ZA 1890 Tel Jan Feb, 14 Mar. 1890, FO 84/2060, and minutes.

Kavirondo or Uganda'.¹⁰⁰ This was all the more serious since, on one reading of the Hinterland doctrine, a direct extrapolation across Lake Victoria of the dividing line in the 1886 Agreement would slice both Buganda and Toro into two, leaving their southern parts in German territory; while, just conceivably, the very problematic hinterland of the German coastal Protectorate of Witu could be extended to cut the British off from all claims to the further lakes region.¹⁰¹

Despite the German government's longstanding assurance that nothing of this kind was intended,¹⁰² there was great perturbation on the British side, which resulted in a great flurry of meetings, deputations and plans, and a good deal of floundering.¹⁰³ Eventually, at a meeting in Cannes in mid April 1890,¹⁰⁴ the IBEAC's Directors appointed one of their number, Sir Francis de Winton, to be their Administrator-in-Chief in East Africa, and sent orders for Captain Frederick Lugard, who had lately won his spurs in the Nyassa region to the south and had been recruited by the IBEAC,¹⁰⁵ to hurry forward with an expedition to Buganda that would be followed by 200 Sudanese troops under De Winton, giving them a joint total of near 1,000 men, so as to preempt the Germans. 'This looks much more like business', Anderson noted.¹⁰⁶ As indeed it was. For, still with no guarantees of special support from the government,¹⁰⁷ the IBEAC was embarking on a headlong advance towards Buganda as a means of entrenching its claims to its hold upon it and its environs. Had they known that Carl Peters had by this time secured a treaty of friendship from Mwanga, while eventually, hot on his heels, Jackson had failed to secure one for the IBEAC,¹⁰⁸ their perturbations might well have turned to despair. As it was, by the time this news was received at the coast at the end of May 1890, Peters' treaty was already redundant.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁰ Euan Smith to Salisbury, tel., 1, 4 Apr. 1890, FO 84/2060, SP.

¹⁰¹ Euan Smith to Salisbury, tel., 8 Jan., ZA 1890 Tel Jan Feb; Mackay to Euan Smith, 1 Jan., FO 84/2060; Mackinnon to Euan Smith, 27 Feb. 1890, MP.

¹⁰² E.g. Malet to Salisbury, 22 Sept. 1888, FO 84/1892, tel., 8 Mar., FO 84/1959, 4 May 1889, FO 84/1957; Currie's memo, 7 Apr., FO 84/2067; Vincent to Mackinnon, 12 Apr. 1890, MP.

¹⁰³ E.g. Vincent to Mackinnon, 4, 5, 12 Mar., Hutchinson to Mackinnon, 19, 20 Mar., Bruce to Vincent, 3 Apr. 1890 (2), MP.

¹⁰⁴ Mackinnon to Salisbury, 8 Apr., to Vincent, 16 Apr., to Anderson, 17 Apr. 1890, MP.

¹⁰⁵ M. Perham, *Lugard – The Years of Adventure 1858–1898* (London, 1956), Part 2.

¹⁰⁶ Alexander to FO, 22, 26 Apr., FO 84/2060, 8 May 1890, FO 84/2081.

¹⁰⁷ E.g. Bruce to Vincent, 3 Apr., Kirk to Mackinnon, 6 Apr., Alexander to Mackinnon, 7 Apr. 1890, MP.

¹⁰⁸ As recounted in Ch. 3.

¹⁰⁹ Peters to German Consul, Zanzibar, 4 Mar., received 30 May 1890, ZM.

Over the preceding months, Salisbury had become increasingly concerned by these African developments. ‘The Anglo-German question in Africa’, he wrote to a colleague in February 1890, ‘seems to me very difficult – I don’t see the way at present’.¹¹⁰ Back in December 1889, he had first suggested that the two countries should go to arbitration over disputes between them; and the list soon began to mount.¹¹¹ He then found himself under growing domestic pressure not to make concessions in Africa.¹¹² He was, however, now in a stronger position than in 1884–5, particularly after 20 March 1890 when the Kaiser dismissed Bismarck as his Chancellor and renounced Germany’s Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. For thereupon the German government became especially anxious to strengthen its ties with Britain.¹¹³ This is not the place to rehearse at any length the wide-ranging negotiations which then ensued.¹¹⁴ Rather, the present case calls for concentrating attention upon those aspects that critically affected the future Uganda. These came to the fore when, rather than Dr Krauel of the German Foreign Office coming once again to London as he had in 1886, Anderson this time went to Berlin to conduct negotiations there.¹¹⁵ There, soon after his arrival, he carried through an astonishing diplomatic coup.

The two men had their first talk on 5 May 1890. On 6 May, resting upon the already agreed ‘Hinterland doctrine’ of 1887, Anderson telegraphed to London for a copy of ‘a communication respecting the Hinterland which was made by Count Hatzfeldt [the German Ambassador] on 19 August last or thereabouts’.¹¹⁶ This had followed an earlier exchange when, in expressing German anxieties about Rhodes’ wish to extend his British South Africa Company’s operations north of the Zambezi river, Hatzfeldt, in an interview with Salisbury on 25 June

¹¹⁰ Salisbury to Knutsford, 22 Feb., to Malet, 21 Feb. 1890, SP.

¹¹¹ Salisbury to Hatzfeldt, 21 Dec. 1889, and minutes, FO 84/1961; Salisbury to Malet, 11 Mar., 30 Apr. 1890, FO 84/2030.

¹¹² Between 3 April and 9 May 1890, there were leading articles expressing this in, e.g., *The Times*, *St James’ Gazette*, the *Yorkshire Post*, the *Liverpool Mercury*, the *Scotsman*, the *Daily Chronicle*; Queen Victoria to Salisbury, 26 May 1890, SP.

¹¹³ As seen on the British side, e.g. Malet to Salisbury, 3, 24, 31 May, MP, 31 May, FO 84/2031, 2 June 1890, FO 84/2035.

¹¹⁴ Sanderson, *Upper Nile*, Ch. 3.

¹¹⁵ On some of the relevant preliminaries here, see Portal’s memo 10 Mar., FO 84/2060, Mackinnon to Euan Smith, 10 Mar., Malet to Salisbury, 15 Mar. 1890, MP. When Stanley’s claim to have made treaties west of Lake Victoria was at this point made public, Salisbury was quick to disown them, e.g. Vincent to FO, 2 May, FO 84/2081; Malet to Salisbury, 3, 5 May, FO 84/2031, 2035; Salisbury to Malet, 4, 5 May, FO 84/2030, 2031, 2034; Hatzfeldt to Salisbury, 4 May, FO 84/2037; Malet to Marschall, 4 May 1890, FO 84/2031.

¹¹⁶ Malet to Salisbury, tels., 5, 6 May 1890, FO 84/2035.

1889, had given, as an example of his government's good faith in such matters, 'that Uganda, Wadelai and other places to the East and North of Lake Victoria Nyanza are outside the region of German colonisation'.¹¹⁷ When first received, Anderson had immediately sought to secure 'a distinct, categorical, repletion' of this assurance. But Salisbury was more cautious: 'quite binding enough', he wrote, 'without repetition'.¹¹⁸ The Germans in any event remained much concerned about the scramble running in the region south of Lake Tanganyika, and in a further communication of 19 August 1889 Hatzfeldt had reiterated on behalf of the German government that 'Uganda, Wadelai and other places north of the first degree of Southern latitude lay outside the confines of German colonial undertakings'.¹¹⁹

At that first interview on 5 May, Anderson accordingly suggested to Krauel that, as regards the hinterland, they should begin by recording what was already agreed. Krauel assented. There was first, Anderson said, the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886. Then the Hinterland exchanges of 1887 'which pledged each country not to operate in the rear of the sphere of influence of the other'. Whereupon Anderson played his ace. From this, he declared, they could proceed to the exchanges of 1889. If Dr Krauel would refer to their texts, he would see that the German government had already acknowledged that Uganda, Wadelai and other places unspecified to the east and north of Lake Victoria were outside the bounds of German activity. While there might be dispute over the whole area west of Lake Victoria, there could be no doubt about a line running along the latitude of 1 degree south. All of which understandably 'startled and alarmed Dr Krauel' who argued that there had been no response to the earlier propositions. Anderson agreed that various points had been left open, but insisted that 'within certain limits there was no dispute'. The controversy persisted over three days. But, unless Hatzfeldt was to be repudiated, Krauel had no option but to accept Anderson's contentions.¹²⁰

The overall negotiations were not quickly concluded. Amid a plethora of other issues, there were in the present context four further matters.

¹¹⁷ Salisbury to Malet, 25, 26 June, FO 84/1954; Hatzfeldt to Salisbury, 25 June 1889, FO 84/1960.

¹¹⁸ Anderson Memo, and Salisbury's minute, 27 June, FO 84/1960; Salisbury's minute on Cawston to Herbert, 1 July, FO 84/1998; Salisbury to Malet, 6 Aug. 1889; FO 84/1954.

¹¹⁹ Hatzfeldt to Salisbury, 19 Aug. 1889, FO 84/1961.

¹²⁰ Anderson to Malet, 9, 14, 16 May, FO 84/2031; Malet to Salisbury from Anderson, tel., 9, 10 May 1890, FO 84/2035. For a more extensive account (which, however, makes no mention of Anderson's coup in referring back to Hatzfeldt's statements), see W.R. Louis, 'The Anglo-German Hinterland settlement of 1890 and Uganda', *UJ*, 27 (1963), pp. 71–83.

At the second Brussels Anti-Slavery conference, which was running concurrently, Cardinal Lavigerie, the head of the White Fathers, sought to secure support for the exclusion of Uganda from the British or any other European sphere of influence, and was greatly disappointed when none was forthcoming.¹²¹ Mackinnon meanwhile was caught up in the current rhetoric of securing an all-British Cape-to-Cairo route, and to this end negotiated with Leopold a treaty for the lease of a ten-mile-wide strip through his Congo territory from Lake Albert to Lake Tanganyika, which he hoped would secure this. Salisbury initially approved the arrangement, but later denied he had thereby committed the British government to it.¹²² At the same time, during the course of the main negotiations, the IBEAC's Directors pressed for the attainment of Mackinnon's earlier plea for a more southerly boundary, westwards of the Lake Victoria region, than the 1 degree south line Anderson had secured.¹²³ Salisbury began by seeking to secure this,¹²⁴ but when De Winton assured him at an interview towards the end of May that, if the Company secured all to the north of 1 degree south, they would be 'well satisfied',¹²⁵ he generally held back from countering the German refusal to concede this.¹²⁶ As the negotiations then reached their conclusion, Salisbury took a keen interest in Anderson's successful ploy at this stage to secure German recognition for a western boundary of the British sphere along the western watershed of the Upper Nile, and variously upon its eastern flank as well,¹²⁷ and was well pleased with its outcome.

¹²¹ Vincent to Mackinnon, 7 Apr., Kirk to Mackinnon, 6, 30 May, Vivian to Salisbury, 30 May, MP; Playfair to Salisbury, 30 June 1890, ZA 1890 FO 101-92.

¹²² For one of many accounts, see Galbraith, *Mackinnon*, pp. 176-88.

¹²³ Kembell to Anderson, 2 June, Mackinnon to Salisbury, 7, 14 June, Sanderson to Mackinnon, 9 June 1890, MP.

¹²⁴ Hatzfeldt to Marschall, 14 May, *GDD*, II, pp. 32-4; Salisbury to Malet, 21 May 1890, FO 84/2030.

¹²⁵ Salisbury to Malet, 28 May 1890, FO 84/2030. The Company indeed thought it had done well: Anderson to Salisbury, 1 June, Kirk to Salisbury, 18 June, Mackinnon to Salisbury, 20 June 1890, SP; Mackinnon to Salisbury, 7 June, Kirk to Mackinnon, 23 June, Mackinnon to Euan Smith, 10 May 1890, MP.

¹²⁶ Salisbury eventually secured a line curving around the south of Mount Mfumbiro: Malet to Salisbury, 3 May, FO 84/2031; Marschall to Hatzfeldt, 17, 31 May, Hatzfeldt to German FO, 5 June, *GDD*, II, pp. 35, 39-42; Salisbury to the Queen, 4 June, SP; Hatzfeldt to Marschall, 10 June 1890, FO 84/2037.

¹²⁷ Malet to Salisbury, tel., 18 June, Malet to Anderson, tel., 27 June, FO 84/2035; Anderson to Malet, 21 (with draft articles and Salisbury's insertions), 28 June, FO 84/2032; Salisbury to Malet, tel., 25 June 1890, FO 84/2030. This hands-on intervention by Salisbury – but only at the last minute – suggests that both D.R. Gillard, 'Salisbury's African Policy and the Heligoland Offer of 1890', *English Historical Review*, 75 (1960), pp. 631-53, and G.N. Sanderson, 'The Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 and the Upper Nile', *English Historical Review* 78 (1963), pp. 49-72, have their points.

The negotiations as a whole spread out over all but two months, and were by no means smoothly concluded. On at least one occasion they could have collapsed altogether.¹²⁸ In the end it required Salisbury's decision to offer the Germans the island of Heligoland¹²⁹ – at the mouth of their Kiel canal, which was so important to their growing navy – to bring him success. Even then, both the Queen¹³⁰ and the Cabinet¹³¹ took some persuading. But as the weeks wore on following Bismarck's dismissal, the German Emperor and his ministers became increasingly anxious to bring the negotiations to a conclusion.¹³² Amongst the many further provisions which were agreed, the Germans withdrew from Witu on the northern coast of East Africa, while the British established a Protectorate over Zanzibar. The details were embodied in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1 July 1890.¹³³

For our present purposes, some of them were of great importance. Anderson's opening coup for the 1 degree south line had the pivotal effect of delineating Uganda's future southern border. Had Salisbury secured the more southerly line that Mackinnon had sought, Rwanda, Karagwe and the Buhaya states, and possibly even Burundi, could well have been ensconced along with Buganda in a much larger 'Uganda'.¹³⁴ As it was, Anderson's 1 degree south line clove the many rulerships in the region into two separate clusters, one in the British sphere, the other in the German. In so doing, it put paid to the possibility of a German dominion over Buganda such as Peters had sought, and finally placed it and its immediate neighbours within the British 'sphere of influence'. Anderson's last-minute negotiations with Krauel then had the effect not only of outlining the area within which Uganda's other borders came to be drawn, but of opening the way for the inclusion in the future Uganda of numbers of peoples to the north with very different languages and political cultures from those to their south.

¹²⁸ Hatzfeldt to German FO, 22 May, Marschall to Emperor, 4 June 1890, *GDD*, II, pp. 35–6, 40.

¹²⁹ Hatzfeldt to Marschall, 14 May, Marschall to Hatzfeldt, 25, 29 May 1890, *GDD*, II, pp. 32–4, 36–8. It had been captured by Britain from Denmark in 1807 and ceded in 1814.

¹³⁰ Salisbury and the Queen's exchanges, *QVL* 1–12 June 1890, pp. 608–15. Salisbury, as has often been told, was all this time under pressure from Baring in Egypt to secure British control of the valley of the Nile. The archives do not suggest that this led him to embark on his East African negotiations, but he evidently seized upon Anderson's final meetings with Krauel so as to begin to respond, e.g. SP Nov 1889 – May 1890, *passim*.

¹³¹ Hatzfeldt to German FO, 30 May, Marschall to Emperor, 4 June, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, 11 June, *GDD*, II, pp. 38, 40, 42–3; Salisbury to the Queen, 4 June 1890, SP.

¹³² Malet to Salisbury from Anderson, tel., 22 June 1890, FO 84/2035.

¹³³ Hertslet, *Map of Africa*, III, p. 889.

¹³⁴ Or whatever it might have been called.

At a time when (apart from Jackson's travelling partner, Gedge)¹³⁵ there was not a single British agent to be found anywhere in this whole region, the sheer presumption and blatant arbitrariness with which two tiny handfuls of European ministers and diplomats carved up between them so large a part of Africa still remains breathtaking.

Attention, however, now turned to what was to be done about this substantial expansion of the British sphere that the Anglo-German Agreement of 1 July had secured. Back in April 1890, as has been noted, Captain Lugard had been ordered to lead a major expedition to Buganda to preempt the Germans there. Following the Anglo-German Agreement, however, that was no longer necessary. Nevertheless, in view of the injunctions of the Berlin Africa Conference of 1884, it was still necessary for the Company to introduce 'effective occupation' of the greatly enlarged region which it now claimed if that claim was to be upheld. It was with a view to beginning to fulfil that task that, on 6 August 1890, Lugard eventually left the Company's headquarters in Mombasa for the interior.¹³⁶ As his expedition reached the southern edge of Kikuyu country, he built a stockade at a place called Dagoretti to secure a way station there. This he placed in the charge of his Australian companion, George Wilson.¹³⁷ Then, in accord with his original orders, he set out for Buganda, which he reached in mid December 1890. There, as we have seen in the previous chapter, he not only pressured Mwanga into signing a treaty with him, but, after the arrival of some reinforcements under Captain Williams, proceeded to build a fort – Fort Kampala – for the protection of his expedition; and over the following months strove to curb the running disputes between Buganda's Catholics and Protestants.¹³⁸ Thereby he began the inauguration of British chartered company rule in the region.

His mind, however, to a degree we have not as yet noted, was soon elsewhere. For while he always recognised that 'our first duty and the one for which we came was to consolidate the Company's position in Buganda', within days of signing his Treaty with Mwanga he began to ponder the possibility of annexing far more extensive territories to its west and north and of making 'contact even with the Mahdi'. That would mean marching through Bunyoro, enlisting the remaining Sudanese troops that had not left with Emin, 'and pushing on thence

¹³⁵ See Ch. 3.

¹³⁶ Perham, *Lugard*, I, Ch. 10.

¹³⁷ *LD*, I, Ch. 8.

¹³⁸ As outlined in Ch. 3.

to Wadelai'. Despite the Company having a year earlier abandoned any notion of making Wadelai its upcountry base in preference to Buganda, it remained, it seems, the cynosure of some of its agents' eyes. It would after all make 'a bigger splash in Europe to have taken Wadelai', Lugard wrote, than anything else he might achieve. He even hoped the Company would send another officer to serve as Resident in Buganda so as to 'take the Mengo trouble off my hands'.¹³⁹ If that had eventuated, it would have had the effect of reducing his Buganda fort, and perhaps Buganda itself, to little more than a way station (like the Dagoretti one) on the IBEAC's road to the interior.

These notions began to determine his actions in the immediate aftermath of the joint Christian expedition which Lugard supported against the Baganda Muslims in April 1891.¹⁴⁰ For, once he had sent Williams back to Kampala with a minimal escort, he himself set forth with the bulk of the mercenary force available to him, not to attack Bunyoro head-on, but, at the urging of his Baganda supporters, first to circumvent it on the south and west. That launched him upon a great semi-circular western journey. This first took him through the major Buganda county of Buddu where, in circumstances to which we must come, he was introduced to an exiled Toro prince, Kasagama, and his older mentor, Byakuyamba, both of whom undertook to support him against Toro's recent Bunyoro conquerors. Then, after skirting the northern reaches of the kingdom of Nkore where he failed to make contact with its ruler, Ntare, but secured a treaty on the Company's behalf with his emissary,¹⁴¹ he led his expedition into the vicinity of the two small lakes to the west, Edward and George, and there built a stockade to secure control of the adjacent Salt Lake. With that accomplished, he turned north and soon entered Toro. There the occupying Bunyoro forces sought to repel his advance in a whole series of attacks, only to be invariably defeated. That enabled him to proclaim Kasagama Toro's rightful ruler, and provided him with the opportunity to secure a further treaty on his Company's behalf,¹⁴² thereby purportedly extending chartered company rule to the region.

Thereupon, he set out for Kavalli to the west of the southern shore of Lake Albert where, in order to strengthen his hand, he negotiated with Selim, the leader of Emin's residual Sudanese soldiery who were

¹³⁹ LD, II, p. 188.

¹⁴⁰ See, generally, *ibid.*, Chs. 4–9; Perham, *Lugard*, I, Ch. 11; Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, pp. 42–50.

¹⁴¹ See Ch. 8.

¹⁴² See Ch. 6.

congregated there, for their enlistment in the IBEAC's service. He was still bent upon crowning his journey by reaching Wadelai. Selim, however, was not prepared to countenance his followers going either to Wadelai or indeed to Kampala. When, however, he relented about their going to Buganda, Lugard was forced to accept that 'all thoughts of advancing to Wadelai at present must now be put aside'. Wadelai thus reverted for a second time to the ranks of the might-have-beens among the possible bases for the British in the far interior. Instead Lugard busied himself posting Selim's soldiery in two lines of forts, one running north-south, the other west-east, which cordoned off Toro and its environs and 'southern Unyoro' from Bunyoro attacks, behind which, he declared, all the country 'is British'. He then left for Buganda.

As he approached its capital on Christmas Day 1891 he was met by 'a thunderbolt'.¹⁴³ Among the letters forwarded to him were two from officials of the IBEAC ordering him, in the increasingly parlous state of the IBEAC's finances, 'with all practicable dispatch to withdraw your establishments from Uganda and the lake districts and return to Mombasa'. That he immediately concluded would 'be terrible in its results'. As the weaker party, the Protestants would certainly leave the country. The Muslims would 'mop up the RCs'. The Toro leaders would be abandoned, and a general massacre would ensue.¹⁴⁴ His immediate response was to draw on his recent dispositions and propose that the Protestants should take refuge in the Toro region where, along with Buddu, they might be protected by Selim's Sudanese, in what he called a 'Protestant empire'.¹⁴⁵ Early in January 1892, however, in circumstances to which we must come, he received a telegram postponing the evacuation for a year.¹⁴⁶ But at the same time, immediately upon his arrival, he found himself sucked into the major crisis which now overtook the kingdom. As a consequence, his attention switched right back to Buganda, which over the past seven months had been largely absent from his mind. The ensuing story has already been outlined in the previous chapter and will be recounted much more extensively in the next. It led Lugard into the armed conflict between Buganda's Protestant and Catholic camps and between himself and Kabaka Mwanga. As this receded, he bent his efforts to securing a peaceful settlement, but greatly feared that, if the Company's orders to him and his following to withdraw persisted, that conflict would inevitably revive.

¹⁴³ His words: *LD*, II, p. 475.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 469-75.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 476.

¹⁴⁶ See, most conveniently, *LD*, III, p. 17.

After extracting a further treaty from Mwanga and once more leaving Williams behind, he thereupon left for Britain in June 1892 to join in what then became a major 'Uganda retention' campaign.¹⁴⁷

Back in Britain, in the absence of any sign of valuable mineral deposits¹⁴⁸ or promising trading prospects, the IBEAC was continuing to fail to attract investments on anything like the scale its ambitions required. In the first half of 1891 Salisbury and the Foreign Office sought to strengthen its position by securing a Treasury guarantee of 5 per cent on a £1.5 million investment on a railway from Mombasa to Lake Victoria.¹⁴⁹ That, however, required parliamentary approval, and since the Conservatives under Salisbury were in a minority in the House of Commons that could not readily be assured. The Treasury accordingly proposed that a £20,000 subsidy for a preliminary railway survey should be sought instead. Even that, however, was successfully blocked by the Liberal Opposition in the Commons who were vehemently opposed to any such imperial venture.¹⁵⁰ Such was the context in which, with its available funds becoming severely depleted, the Company sent letters to Lugard on 10 August 1891 ordering him to withdraw his forces to the coast. While they avowed their intention to return to the interior, for all practical purposes that was tantamount to relegating Buganda, like Wadelai, to the might-have-beens amongst upcountry bases for the Company.¹⁵¹

No-one was more perturbed about this than the head of the CMS mission in East Africa, Bishop Tucker, who happened to be in Britain at the time. From his first-hand acquaintance with the religio-political rivalries in Buganda, he was deeply fearful of the likely consequences for the kingdom and its Christian converts of the Company's withdrawal.¹⁵² By chance, however, whilst holidaying in Scotland, he met

¹⁴⁷ For a more extensive account of the ensuing story, see Perham, *Lugard*, I, pp. 387–431.

¹⁴⁸ Rather pathetically late, in 1891, the Company decided to send 'a practical geologist' to 'thoroughly prospect for minerals' on the route to the interior: Mackenzie to Lugard, 10 Aug. 1891, *LD* II, p. 471.

¹⁴⁹ Mackinnon to Salisbury, 17 Dec., Salisbury to Treasury, 20 Dec. 1890, FO 84/2097; Welby to Salisbury, 10 Feb., FO 84/2156; Pelly to Mackinnon, 13 Feb., Kirk to Mackinnon, 11 June 1891, MP.

¹⁵⁰ Pelly to Mackinnon, 24 June 1891, MP; *Parliamentary Debates*, 20 July 1891, 3rd ser., Vol. CCCLV, cols. 1759–61; Harcourt to Gladstone, 19, 20, 22 July 1891, Add. Mss. 44202.

¹⁵¹ Mackenzie to Lugard, McDermott to Lugard, 10 Aug. 1891, *LD*, II, pp. 469–75.

¹⁵² Tucker's letter on this to a Company Director has not been found, but see Kembell, 14 Aug., Euan Smith to Mackinnon, 18 Sept., MP; Mackenzie to Hutchinson, 10 Aug., CMS packet 407; Goschen to Salisbury, 18 Sept. 1891, SP. See also CMS to Salisbury, 14 Oct. 1891, FO 84/2176.

Mackinnon who suggested that if the CMS could assist him in raising £30,000¹⁵³ the Company could remain there for another year.¹⁵⁴ Whilst the CMS was entirely sympathetic to the idea, they had to say that they were in no position to transfer any of their own funds to a commercial company.¹⁵⁵ Tucker, however, at a largely attended meeting of the CMS Gleaners Union on 30 October, made a dramatic appeal for private subscriptions to a special fund for £15,000, which, with Mackinnon himself adding £10,000 of his own while seeking the necessary balance from his personal contacts, would enable the Company to remain in Buganda until the end of 1892. To this there was a rousing response, stirred by an immediate confidential offer of £5,000.¹⁵⁶ Within days the success of Tucker's appeal was assured; by the end of the year more than £16,000 had been raised.¹⁵⁷ As a consequence, as early as three days after the Gleaners Union meeting, Mackinnon sent telegraphic orders to Lugard postponing the Company's withdrawal from the interior for one more year.¹⁵⁸

During the ensuing months, there was singularly little activity on the issue. With the support of the Company, Mounteney-Jephson, who had been with Stanley on the Emin Expedition, toured the country during the spring months of 1892 to laud the economic opportunities in the East African interior, and the need for a railway there, to no less than eighteen major-city Chambers of Commerce.¹⁵⁹ Whilst eleven of these sent memorials to the Foreign Office in support of government assistance for the latter, the effect was otherwise negligible.¹⁶⁰ Back in July 1891 when the Opposition had stymied the railway survey vote, the IBEAC had agreed to fund this till the government could reimburse them for it. That, however, required parliamentary approval and that necessitated a debate in the House of Commons on 3–4 March 1892,

¹⁵³ A.R. Tucker, *Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa* (1908) (London, 1911), I, p. 144.

¹⁵⁴ Mackenzie to Hutchinson, CMS 407, Mackinnon to Buxton, 10 Aug. 1891, MP.

¹⁵⁵ Kemball to Mackinnon, 14 Aug., MP; Hutchinson to Mackenzie, 12 Sept. 1891, CMS 407.

¹⁵⁶ There are many references to this meeting, e.g. Stock to Hutchinson, 30 Oct. 1891, CMS 407. (A great-aunt of the author spoke long afterwards of her presence at it.) See also Anderson memo, 29 Oct., FO 84/2177, and Villiers memo, 2 Nov. 1891, FO 84/2178.

¹⁵⁷ There are numerous items about this in CMS 407, as well as on the collapse of a further appeal for funds for a steamer on Lake Victoria.

¹⁵⁸ Enc. in Mackinnon to Hutchinson, 2 Nov. 1891, CMS 407, has the text. Lugard received them on 7 Jan. 1892: *LD*, III, p. 17.

¹⁵⁹ A dozen letters by Jephson to Mackinnon, 20 Jan. – 29 Apr. 1892, MP. Had he not fallen ill, there would have been at least five more.

¹⁶⁰ Anderson's Memo, 10 Sept. 1892, FO 84/2258; some are in FO 84/2241.

during which the Opposition leaders, Gladstone, Harcourt, Labouchere, lambasted the government for the slippage in imperial policy which this expenditure implied. In the event, they chose not to vote against it and it was approved by the unexpectedly large majority of ninety-eight.¹⁶¹ But that had little impact on the Company's standing, and none on its resources. As a result, on 25 May 1892, they once more issued orders for a withdrawal from Buganda at the end of the year.¹⁶² Several Directors sought to keep up the pressure upon the government,¹⁶³ but by June 1892 a general election was in the offing, so that the most Salisbury could say was that: 'The course of the British Government will be largely affected by the financial views of the next House of Commons which is not yet elected.'¹⁶⁴

Following the general election in July, Gladstone returned to office in August 1892 committed to securing Home Rule for Ireland. His overall majority, however, was only forty, which scarcely gave him the necessary leeway. On forming his government – with Sir William Harcourt as Chancellor of the Exchequer – his most difficult task was to persuade the highly talented but very self-regarding Lord Rosebery to become Foreign Secretary once again, so as to secure a spokesman in the House of Lords who could match the formidable Lord Salisbury. It was only at the last moment that Rosebery agreed to serve. More than one general account persuasively argues that these circumstances gave Rosebery a degree of independence which enabled him to withstand the determination of his colleagues to reverse Salisbury's commitment to maintaining Britain's hold on Egypt, following its occupation in 1882. That issue provoked intense diplomatic encounters, particularly between Britain and France, during the 1880s and was to do so throughout the 1890s. It is in no way to the present purpose to traverse that story in any detail once again.¹⁶⁵ The concern is rather to tease out its consequences for the future 'Protectorate' and country of 'Uganda'.

As Rosebery assumed office, he was very soon engaged, amongst several other matters,¹⁶⁶ with the unabated threat of the IBEAC to

¹⁶¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, 3–4 Mar. 1892, 4th ser., Vol. I, cols. 1836–80, Vol. II, cols. 57–82; Pelly, 6 Mar., Kembell, Kirk to Mackinnon, 7 Mar. 1892, MP.

¹⁶² Mackinnon to Salisbury, 25 May 1892, in McDermott, *British East Africa or IBEA*, pp. 528–9.

¹⁶³ Kirk to Mackinnon, 19 May, 23 June, Kembell to Mackinnon, 15 July 1892, MP.

¹⁶⁴ Salisbury's minute on Portal to Salisbury, tel., 18 June 1892, FO 84/2236.

¹⁶⁵ See Robinson & Gallagher, *Africa, passim* (in the present context, pp. 311–23); Sanderson, *Upper Nile, passim* (in the present context, p. 101); G. Martel, 'Cabinet Politics and African Partition: The Uganda Debate Reconsidered', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 13 (1984), pp. 5–24.

¹⁶⁶ Rosebery to Gladstone, 27, 31 Aug., 14 Sept. 1892, Add. Mss. 44289.

withdraw its operations from Buganda by the close of the year. In order to have himself fully informed of the details, within a week, he accordingly sought an 'impartial statement' from his officials about the value of the kingdom, any pressures from the Salisbury government which accompanied its acquisition, and the circumstances and likely consequences in massacres and strategic implications of its abandonment.¹⁶⁷

Over the next two and a half weeks, Anderson, with his colleagues, set about producing, through several revisions,¹⁶⁸ a close-packed nine-page memorandum in which he first recounted Buganda's story over the past thirty years and the British East African one over the past eight, and then made his two principal points. First that: 'All those who know the country have grave apprehensions [about the Company's withdrawal]. They see the possibility of the return of the slave-traders, massacres of missionaries and of their flocks, the resumption of the old system of wars and depopulation of the neighbouring countries. Their fears may be exaggerated; they cannot be groundless.' And then that, while:

At present, by the Anglo German Agreement, the western watershed of the Upper Nile is placed within the British sphere ... it is necessary to indicate, as a question to be considered, that it is almost certain that if England withdraws her claim to the Upper Nile watershed, one or other of the two powers [the Congo state and France] will at once replace her, and that we must face the contingency of the Nile Basin, in its upper waters, and the Equatorial Provinces, being brought under French rule.

In addition, he reported that the missionaries had avowed that they would refuse to leave; whilst there were also the 7,000 Sudanese Lugard had brought from Kavalli, to think about. On 10 September, Rosebery sent the Anderson memorandum for distribution to the Cabinet, with a warning that, given that it took three months for any communication to reach Buganda, if any decision was to be taken about the Company's withdrawal, 'it will have to be taken soon'.¹⁶⁹

Anderson's memorandum met a very hostile reception in the Cabinet. Gladstone 'thought it was a pleading from a missionary society or from the Company'.¹⁷⁰ Harcourt was even more outspoken. 'It is incredible', he wrote in one of several letters to Gladstone, 'that occupying as we do

¹⁶⁷ Currie to Anderson, 23 Aug., Rosebery's Memo, 24 Aug. 1892, FO 84/2258.

¹⁶⁸ Anderson's drafts, 25 Aug., 1, 2, 7 Sept., and minute 8 Sept., Currie's memos, 24, 29 Aug., 7 Sept., and minute 6 Sept., Hill's minutes, 24 Aug., 7 Sept., FO 84/2258; Wingate's Memo, and Rosebery's minute, 23 Aug., FO 84/2257; Kitchener's Memo, 18 Sept. 1892, FO 84/2258.

¹⁶⁹ Rosebery's note, 10 Sept. 1892, along with the drafts and the final version of Anderson's Memo, are in FO 84/2258.

¹⁷⁰ Gladstone to Rosebery, 17 Sept. 1892, *GD*, p. 79.

half the globe we should be so terribly afraid that any other nation should have a foothold in the other'.¹⁷¹ When, moreover, he was asked by Rosebery whether he did not 'fear a great disaster frankly', he replied, 'I do not. I can quite see it is the game of Lugard and Co. to play on our fears in order to force their policy upon us.'¹⁷² During the summer vacation Cabinet members were scattered, but those who were in touch were no less strongly anti-annexationist.¹⁷³ Gladstone for his part spent ten days which, he wrote, 'have been simply horrible'¹⁷⁴ poring over a mass of papers, and writing letter after letter to Rosebery and to other colleagues on the Uganda issue.¹⁷⁵ His strongly reiterated conclusion was that Salisbury's government had clearly 'accepted the withdrawal' and that therefore 'there is no question handed over to us for decision'.¹⁷⁶

Rosebery, however, was now digging in.¹⁷⁷ He had initially displayed some sympathy for intervention.¹⁷⁸ That soon turned to anguish on receiving telegrams from Portal, Euan Smith's successor as Consul-General in Zanzibar, first on 15 and then 24 September, reporting upon the unanimous view of Lugard, Walker of the CMS and others he had consulted that the Company's withdrawal from Buganda would immediately lead to war, murder, unrestrained pillaging and the massacre of Christians.¹⁷⁹ Gladstone's Private Secretary now warned Gladstone that Rosebery could resign upon this issue, which at this point would be quite fatal to the Ministry.¹⁸⁰

Gladstone 'did not want to drive our friend to despair'.¹⁸¹ Accordingly he agreed to hold a Cabinet, and, shortly before it met, Rosebery

¹⁷¹ Harcourt to Gladstone, 26 Sept., one of half a dozen such letters, 20–26 Sept. 1892, Add. Mss. 44202.

¹⁷² Harcourt to Rosebery, 23 Sept. 1892, in A. G. Gardiner, *Life of Sir William Harcourt* (London, 1923), II, p. 194.

¹⁷³ Asquith to Gladstone, 22 Sept., Add. Mss. 44516; Morley to Gladstone, 25 Sept. 1892, Add. Mss. 44256.

¹⁷⁴ Gladstone to Harcourt, 26 Sept. 1892, *GD*, p. 92.

¹⁷⁵ Seventeen in nine days (three to Rosebery on 23 Sept., two more the next day), plus two memos: *GD*, pp. 82–94.

¹⁷⁶ Gladstone's Memo 24 Sept., Gladstone to Harcourt, 23 Sept. 1892, *GD*, pp. 88, 86.

¹⁷⁷ He wrote nine times to Gladstone, 19–27 Sept. 1892, Add. Mss. 44289; H. G. Hutchinson, ed., *The Private Diaries of Sir Algernon West* (London, 1922), 28 Sept. 1892.

¹⁷⁸ As in sending Anderson's Memo forward, and see Kembal to Mackinnon, 6 Sept., Lee to Mackinnon, 12 Sept., Mackenzie to P. Mackinnon, 10 Sept., to Mackinnon, 27 Sept. 1892, MP.

¹⁷⁹ Portal to Rosebery, tels., 15, 24 Sept., FO 84/2236, and 14 Sept. 1892, *QVL*. See also Walker to Portal, 22, 23 Sept. in Portal to Rosebery, 3 Oct. 1892, FO 84/2233.

¹⁸⁰ West, *Diaries*, 29 Sept. 1892.

¹⁸¹ Gladstone to Harcourt, 26 Sept. 1892, *GD*, p. 92.

narrowed down the issues in contention to whether, ‘in view of the fact that a Company has been allowed so to interfere [in Buganda], with a Royal Charter granted by the Executive for that purpose, we are content to face the consequences of leaving that territory, the inhabitants, and the missionaries, to a fate we cannot doubt’.¹⁸²

Both he and, by now, Gladstone fastened on the dire forebodings in Portal’s telegrams of 15 and 24 September.¹⁸³ When, however, the Cabinet met, it simply took up Portal’s plea from Walker – which accorded with the desire of some of its members for more time for consideration¹⁸⁴ – that more time should be given to ‘facilitate evacuation with greater safety’. As a consequence, the most they were prepared to agree to was to finance an extension of the Company’s occupation for another three months.¹⁸⁵ When the Company reluctantly accepted this,¹⁸⁶ withdrawal was summarily postponed for a second time; but only until 31 March 1893. This left the principal issue still to be determined, and upon that Rosebery soon made his position plain to a senior colleague, Lord Ripon, the Colonial Secretary. He was, he now said, totally opposed to evacuation.¹⁸⁷

At this point there were two fleeting interventions. First, King Leopold of the Congo offered his assistance. Gladstone gently told him it would not be necessary.¹⁸⁸ Then Rhodes of the British South Africa Company intimated that he could conduct the administration of Uganda for an annual subsidy of £25m. That, however, also went nowhere; he was more interested in establishing a telegraph line.¹⁸⁹ Harcourt meanwhile had seized on Salisbury’s request to Portal back in August for advice about various future scenarios which the Company offered, one of which some Company officials had elaborated into a proposal that the Sultan of Zanzibar should take over the Company’s responsibilities. He was particularly interested in Portal’s telegraphed reply that ‘the administration could be carried on far more cheaply with the help of Zanzibar’s existing

¹⁸² Rosebery to Gladstone, 29 Sept. 1892, Add. Mss. 44289.

¹⁸³ Rosebery to Gladstone, Gladstone’s Cabinet notes, 29, 30 Sept. 1892, *GD* pp. 95–7.

¹⁸⁴ Asquith to Gladstone, 22 Sept. 1892, Add. Mss. 44516; West, *Diaries*. Rosebery had also argued for this: Rosebery to Gladstone, 22, 24 Sept. 1892, Add. Mss. 44289.

¹⁸⁵ Cabinet minute, in Asquith’s handwriting, 30 Sept., *GD*, p. 97; Gladstone to the Queen, *QVL*, 29, 30 Sept. 1892.

¹⁸⁶ Several items 3 Oct. in MP, especially Kirk to Mackinnon, tel., and also 22 Oct. 1892, MP.

¹⁸⁷ Rosebery to Ripon, 17 Oct. 1892, Add. Mss. 43536.

¹⁸⁸ Leopold to Gladstone, 29 Sept., Gladstone to Leopold, 30 Sept. 1892, Add. Mss. 44516.

¹⁸⁹ Harcourt to Gladstone, 30, 31 Oct., Add. Mss. 44202; West, *Diaries*, 31 Oct.; Rhodes to Rosebery, received 31 Oct., FO 84/2262; Kirk to Mackinnon, 5 Jan. 1893, MP.

machinery'.¹⁹⁰ When he first raised this with Rosebery and with Gladstone, they were both, to his surprise, supportive.¹⁹¹ Rosebery was somewhat hesitant about 'substituting a Mahomedan flag for a Christian flag',¹⁹² but, as the Cabinet eventually met to resolve the Uganda issue, he wove, into a bolder proposal that a Commissioner be sent to Buganda 'to supervise the Company's departure' and 'make arrangements for an organized government', a recommendation that he should also report on 'the best means of administering the country', whether through Zanzibar or otherwise.¹⁹³ Ripon and Kimberley (the Secretary of State for India) had already espoused the idea of sending a Commissioner to Buganda, subject to the Cabinet's freedom to make a final decision upon receiving his report.¹⁹⁴ Gladstone at first roundly vetoed the suggestion that they should 'send a safe man to Uganda',¹⁹⁵ but, after an evidently fraught Cabinet meeting, eventually agreed to the dispatch of a Commissioner to Buganda, so long as his role was pared down to little more than to advise upon 'whether any and what measures ought to be adopted' on the Company's departure.¹⁹⁶ With which with his anti-annexationist colleagues beginning to bend Rosebery eventually agreed to concur.¹⁹⁷

Arguably he did so because, throughout October and November, the 'whole force of Jingoism [was] at the bellows' as Harcourt put it.¹⁹⁸ Back in July 1892, Salisbury had hinted that 'influential bodies' could 'appeal to Parliament',¹⁹⁹ and when, in September, Rosebery accepted the Cabinet's three months' extension of the Company's occupation, he told the Queen that he did so to give time 'to elicit the real feeling of the country which is, he is certain, against evacuation'.²⁰⁰ Having received,

¹⁹⁰ Kemball to Mackinnon, 26 July, MP, Salisbury to Portal, 5 Aug., FO 84/2228, Portal to Salisbury, 9 Aug., ZA 1892 Tel Out, 15 Aug., SP, Portal to Rosebery, tel., 17 Sept., FO 84/2236, and 30 Sept., FO 84/2233, and Anderson's and Rosebery's minutes, 27 Oct. 1892. Kirk had raised this earlier, e.g. Kirk to Mackinnon, 23 Jan. 1892, MP.

¹⁹¹ Harcourt to Gladstone, 20 Oct., Add. Mss. 44202, Rosebery to Gladstone, 20 Oct., Add. Mss. 44290, Gladstone to Rosebery, 21 Oct., to Harcourt, 22 Oct., *GD*, p. 118; PP 107, 20, 21, 24 Oct. 1892; West, *Diaries*, 25 Oct. 1892.

¹⁹² Rosebery to Gladstone, 28 Oct., Add. Mss. 44290, to Portal, 4 Nov. 1892, PP 113.

¹⁹³ Rosebery's memo, 3 Nov. 1892, FOCP 6362/148, to Portal, 4 Nov. 1892, PP 113.

¹⁹⁴ Ripon to Kimberley, 1 Nov. 1892, Add. Mss. 43536.

¹⁹⁵ Morley to Gladstone, 16 Oct., Add. Mss. 44257, Gladstone to Morley, 17 Oct. 1892, *GD*, p. 114.

¹⁹⁶ Gladstone's Cabinet memos, 4, 7 Nov., *GD*, p. 132, 135 and one 7 Nov. 1892 (not in *GD*) Add. Mss. 44648; West, *Diaries*, pp. 79, 72, 75; Kimberley to Ripon, 6 Nov, Add. Mss. 43536; Gladstone to Harcourt, 18 Nov 1892, *GD*, p. 146.

¹⁹⁷ Gladstone to the Queen, *QVL*, 7 Nov., to Rosebery, 9 Dec., Add. Mss. 44549; Rosebery to Gladstone, 9 Dec. 1892, Add. Mss. 44290.

¹⁹⁸ Harcourt to Gladstone, 4 Oct. 1892, Add. Mss. 44202.

¹⁹⁹ Kemball to Mackinnon, 26 July 1892, MP.

²⁰⁰ Rosebery to the Queen, *QVL*, 29 Sept. 1892.

back in September, a deeply troubled CMS deputation,²⁰¹ he saw a larger one, 120-strong, on 19 October, organised by the Anti-Slavery Society.²⁰² By this time Britain's most influential newspaper, *The Times*, against the opposition of a few Liberal papers,²⁰³ was in full throttle denouncing the government's 'cowardly ... "scuttle"' and insisting upon 'the retention of Uganda',²⁰⁴ a position it reinforced by publishing a whole series of letters, not least from Lugard, variously elaborating upon these demands.

A more striking development then followed. For, alongside the newspaper campaign, there soon erupted a remarkable movement for the 'retention of Uganda' right across the country. This ran from mid October to mid December 1892 and involved the calling of at least 100 special meetings. These and a host of others led to the dispatch to the Foreign Office of 147 sets of resolutions, 11 memorials and 16 petitions, all of which variously argued for 'the retention of Uganda', 95 percent of which Rosebery saw.²⁰⁵ They came from a wide variety of, often religious, bodies, and from every corner of the country – indeed, from thirty-five of the forty-two English counties. There was next to no central organisation.²⁰⁶ But in eight or nine major cities – Bristol, Swansea, Norwich, Leeds, Newcastle, Birmingham, among others – there were sustained local campaigns involving a series of meetings. A corresponding response came from Scotland, most notably in a memorial organised by no less than the Chairman of Gladstone's Midlothian constituency committee, John Cowan of Beeslack, which was signed by the Moderators of all three Scottish Presbyterian Churches, the Church of Scotland, the Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church, and many other Scottish churchmen too. Across the country as a whole, resolutions came from nineteen Anglican Diocesan Synods, twenty-three Chambers of Commerce – five of them in Scotland – and from nineteen major public meetings, many of which were addressed by Lugard, who between 5 November and 20 December spoke on over twenty occasions.²⁰⁷ The repertoire of arguments adduced drew upon a *mélange* of deep-seated perceptions in the British mind of the time.

²⁰¹ *Manchester Guardian*, 23 Sept. 1892, had a full account.

²⁰² *The Times*, 20 Oct. 1892.

²⁰³ E.g. the *Globe and Daily News*, 4 Oct. 1892.

²⁰⁴ *The Times*, 8, 29, 30 Sept., 1, 3, 4, 8, 18, 20, 21 Oct., etc., and letters, *passim*; Lugard's letters, 8, 17 Oct. 1892.

²⁰⁵ FO 84/2192. For an extensive analysis, see D.A. Low, 'British Public Opinion and the Uganda Question: October–December 1892', *UJ*, 18 (1954), pp. 81–100, reprinted in Low, *Buganda*, Ch. 2.

²⁰⁶ Despite the interest of the CMS; see CMS packet 418.

²⁰⁷ Perham, *Lugard*, I, fn. pp. 422–3. See Ch. 20, more generally, for his involvement.

They included the need to preserve the interests of trade and commerce, uphold national honour, secure peace and order, and sustain the causes of 'Humanity', 'Civilisation' and 'Christianity'. More particularly, they emphasised the looming dangers of civil war, the likely massacre of Christian converts, the corresponding threats to the missionaries, and above all a revival of the slave trade.

With all this ringing in his and his colleagues' ears, Rosebery, in mid November 1892, set about arranging the dispatch of the Commissioner the Cabinet had eventually agreed to send to Buganda. He began by asking the IBEAC to continue their occupation there for a further year so as to provide for his security. When, however, they tried to bargain for a much longer period, he cut them short,²⁰⁸ and with Harcourt produced a joint proposal to the Cabinet to let the Company's evacuation proceed, to confirm Gladstone's minimalist prescription for a Commissioner's task, and to authorise him to recruit a Zanzibari force for his protection. With that, on 23 November, the Cabinet concurred.²⁰⁹ Rosebery then, surprisingly, secured Gladstone's and Harcourt's approval for the appointment of Portal as Commissioner²¹⁰ (despite his long-held *sub rosa* support for 'retention');²¹¹ and, evidently emboldened by the retention campaign, told Portal: 'I consider it as settled that your main duty will be to arrange the best means of administering Uganda' and, moreover, that it was his 'confident though not my official opinion that public sentiment here will expect and support the maintenance of the British sphere of influence'.²¹² All of this meant that, while the Company's occupation would now end, a British withdrawal would be postponed for a third time – till the Cabinet had been able to consider Portal's eventual report.²¹³

Portal left the coast at the beginning of January 1893 and, accompanied by 400 porters, 200 Zanzibari soldiers and 9 other Europeans, arrived in Buganda in mid March. At a ceremony on 1 April 1893, he

²⁰⁸ Mackinnon to Currie, 18 Nov., to Rosebery, 18, 21 Nov., Rosebery to Mackinnon, 19, 23 Nov. 1892, FO 84/2264.

²⁰⁹ Rosebery's Memo, 22 Nov., FO 84/2264; West, *Diaries*, 23 Nov. 1892.

²¹⁰ Rosebery's minute [for Gladstone], Add. Mss. 44290, Rosebery to Portal, 29 Nov., FO 84/2235, to the Queen, *QVL*, 30 Nov. 1892; West, *Diaries*, 1 Dec. 1892.

²¹¹ Portal to Salisbury, 15 Aug., SP, to Cawston, 12 Oct. 1892, PP.

²¹² Rosebery to Portal, 1, 9 Dec. 1892. Gladstone insisted that Portal's instructions should specifically mention 'union with Zanzibar' as one of the options: Gladstone to Rosebery, 9 Dec., Add. Mss. 44549; Rosebery to Gladstone, 9, 12 Dec., Add. Mss. 44290; Rosebery to Portal, 10 Dec. 1892, FO 84/2228; Harcourt to Gladstone, 5 Jan. 1893, Add. Mss. 44203.

²¹³ Rosebery's draft for a Gladstone reply to Chamberlain made this explicit: 5 Feb. 1892, Add. Mss. 44290; Bentley to Mackinnon, 4 Feb. 1893, MP.

proclaimed the supersession of the Company's rule by that of the imperial government. Two days later, Williams, the Company's last representative, left for the coast. Chartered company rule thereupon came to an end in the northern lakes region.²¹⁴ With that effected, Portal busied himself securing a larger share of territory for the Catholics;²¹⁵ overseeing the withdrawal of Selim Bey's Sudanese from the Toro region;²¹⁶ establishing a new British capital at Entebbe on the Victoria lake-shore;²¹⁷ and, between 6 and 18 May, writing his report. He then had several discussions with Mwangi, which led to a new provisional treaty with the British government in place of the treaties Lugard had imposed upon him on behalf of the Company, and, with that signed on 29 May 1893, departed for the coast the next day. After visiting Zanzibar, he arrived in London on 27 November.²¹⁸

His report first reached the Foreign Office by 30 August.²¹⁹ There it had been preceded by reports in the Belgian and French press of a Congolese expedition under a Captain van Kerckhoven having arrived at or near Wadelai, and of the departure of a French Colonel Monteil for the same region. For Rosebery these were dire tidings as he was still engaged in persuading his Cabinet colleagues to declare an imperial Protectorate over Buganda. All he could do, therefore, without consulting them, was to order Portal to send emissaries to the Upper Nile region to check on the situation there and negotiate treaties so as to secure the British position,²²⁰ while being all the more careful to so treat Portal's report that he should not alienate his colleagues once again. Somewhat ostentatiously, he avowed he would not touch it 'with the tongs'. But it does seem to have been somewhat adjusted after he had held discussions with Portal, following his arrival in London.²²¹ At all events, though dated 'Zanzibar 1 November', it was not ready for circulation to the Cabinet till mid December.

On reading it, Gladstone found it 'very able' and was 'well pleased' with it, though (with Rosebery) thought that 'time must be taken' over it.²²²

²¹⁴ It remained in Southern Rhodesia / Zimbabwe till 1923, and in North Borneo / Sabah till the Second World War.

²¹⁵ As in Ch. 3, pp. 83–4.

²¹⁶ See Ch. 6, pp. 153–4.

²¹⁷ Portal, *Mission*, pp. 230–2.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, *passim*; Rosebery to Gladstone, 27 Nov. 1893, Add. Mss. 44290.

²¹⁹ Anderson to Currie, 30 Aug. 1893, FO 84/1242.

²²⁰ Rosebery to Portal, 10 Aug. 1893, A31/1. See, further, Ch. 7, p. 186.

²²¹ Rosebery's note, 10 Sept., FO 84/1242, and Rosebery to Gladstone, 17 Sept., 27 Nov., 27 Dec. 1893, Add. Mss. 44290.

²²² West, *Diaries*, 21 Dec.; Gladstone to Harcourt, 25 Dec., Add. Mss. 44549, to Rosebery, 25 Dec., Add. Mss. 44549, Rosebery to Gladstone, 27 Dec. 1893, Add. Mss. 44290.

Unsurprisingly, Portal argued strongly in his report for the retention of Buganda. He took his stand on the breach of faith which withdrawal would entail; the probability of renewed sectarian civil war;²²³ the likelihood of intervention by Selim Bey's Sudanese; and a revival of Arab power. To withdraw, he affirmed, would be to renounce a strategically vital British sphere of influence; forgo 'the richest and most populous' parts of East Africa; and cease to participate 'in the suppression of slavery'. In outlining various possibilities for the future, he canvassed several formulae for some connection with Zanzibar, but, whilst leaving that possibility part-open, summarily put aside any suggestion of 'direct administration' by the British, and argued instead for the appointment of a properly backed British Commissioner, with overall control, who would nonetheless 'leave the native King and chiefs to conduct their own administration'.²²⁴

It was, however, Rosebery's own lengthy memorandum for the Cabinet of 12 February 1894 that was seminal. After discussing policy towards the French government over Catholic charges against Lugard,²²⁵ the straits of the IBEAC, and the need to compete with other countries by building a railway, he dismissed any idea of subordination to Zanzibar as 'a transparent imposture' ('as a means of evading responsibility' it could easily collapse, 'perhaps under less favourable circumstances'). Since it was 'not now possible to entertain evacuation', and as 'the country has made up its mind on this subject', 'we have', he argued, 'to consider the form which British control should take'. At present they were 'carrying on the administration of Uganda ... in an anomalous and undignified manner', 'with all the liability, [and] without any of the advantages of a Protectorate'. He did not at this stage advocate any particular form of government, but he did think 'that the bolder is also the better course' and that the Cabinet now had to decide 'whether the British sphere of influence shall, as soon as may be, be converted into a British Protectorate'.²²⁶

As the chances of British politics had it, his memorandum was circulated to the Cabinet just a week before the ageing Gladstone submitted his resignation to the Queen as Prime Minister, and just twelve days

²²³ This was also the strongly held view of Williams and Macdonald in Buganda: Williams to Mackenzie, 9 Dec., MP, Macdonald to Portal, 13 Dec. 1892, FO 84/61.

²²⁴ British Command Paper 7303.

²²⁵ Perham, *Lugard*, I, Chs. 18–19.

²²⁶ Rosebery's memo, 12 Feb. 1894, FOCP 6538/116. While Rosebery was simultaneously actively engaged in securing British claims to the Upper Nile (see Ch. 7 for part of that story), this decisive memorandum contains no mention of that issue: cf. Robinson & Gallagher, *Africa*, pp. 326–30.

before Rosebery was installed in his place.²²⁷ Clothed in this new authority, he moved quickly. Less than a fortnight later, he told the Queen that, at a Cabinet meeting on 22 March 1894, ‘with respect to Uganda the retention was formally determined’.²²⁸ Thereafter, on 12 April, it was announced in the House of Commons, by no less a person than Harcourt himself.²²⁹

This relatively sudden turn of events brought to an end three years of public and Cabinet wrestling in Britain with ‘the question of Buganda’. In the present context, that was of major importance. For what stood at issue here was the future of Buganda at the hands of its newly arrived British imperial masters. On at least three occasions there was a very real possibility that they would withdraw from the country altogether, leaving it to who knows what fate as a consequence. On all three occasions, moreover, evacuation was only postponed by a decision in London at or very close to the last moment; and even then, on each occasion, for no more than a fixed and limited period of time. Formally, the possibility of withdrawal was only finally scotched by Rosebery’s memorandum of February 1894, along with his assumption of Britain’s Prime Ministership in the following month. Throughout, the possibility that Buganda and its neighbours should somehow be placed under the dominion of the Sultan of Zanzibar persistently raised its head. Despite the strong objections which were always advanced against this, even in his final memorandum of February 1894 Rosebery evidently still felt it necessary to pronounce against it, and only then did he decisively kill it. To add to this mix, there was at the outset on the British side a determination to establish imperial dominion over Buganda at the hands of a British chartered company. Despite the IBEAC’s much-anticipated bankruptcy, that idea was only finally quashed in London for Buganda in November 1892.

Such were the extraordinarily arbitrary contortions in British imperial policy which so profoundly determined the outcome for Buganda, and, as we shall see, in effect for other places too. In the end there was no British withdrawal from Buganda; Buganda and its neighbours did not fall under the dominion of the Sultan of Zanzibar; and they were not long subject to the agents of a chartered company. Instead, these events gave birth to three much more persisting consequences. First, Buganda was declared to be a British ‘Protectorate’ under the control of a British Commissioner subject to the British Foreign Office.²³⁰

²²⁷ Gladstone to the Queen, 27 Feb., Queen’s Journal, 3 Mar. 1894, *QVL*, pp. 364, 376–7.

²²⁸ *QVL*, p. 385.

²²⁹ *Parliamentary Debates*, 4th ser., Vol. xxiii, col. 223.

²³⁰ See *Ch. 10*, pp. 123–4.

Kimberley, Rosebery's successor as Foreign Secretary, decided that it should, for the time being, be confined to Buganda,²³¹ but it was then proclaimed in London, on 19 June 1894,²³² and thereafter declared at a ceremony in Buganda on 27 August, immediately subsequent to which Mwanga was required to sign a fourth treaty with the British, acknowledging the new regime, in place of his preliminary treaty with Portal.²³³ At the same time, the notoriety Buganda had been accorded in Britain over the course of these protracted events effectively confirmed its central position in British thinking about its region, which persisted to its considerable advantage throughout its colonial years, while that same salience – along with events to be considered in the next chapter – finally locked Buganda in as the preeminent British base in the far interior of their sphere.

There were then two further developments. In May 1894, in pursuit of his long-running campaign to secure Britain's hold on the Upper Nile, Rosebery secured an Anglo-Congolese Treaty with King Leopold who thereby recognised the British sphere as defined in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, in return for the lease of the Egyptian provinces in its northwest.²³⁴ This aroused so much hostility in Germany and France that it had to be abandoned.²³⁵ Yet its terms formed the basis for the later demarcation of Uganda's western border, notionally along the 30 meridian north and then the line of the Nile–Congo watershed.²³⁶

By the middle of the following year, 1895, the IBEAC was at the end of its tether and, eventually, at the expense of the Sultan of Zanzibar, negotiated a terminal settlement with the Foreign Office.²³⁷ The Foreign Office was thereupon faced with the problem of how to manage the coastal strip which the Company had leased from the Sultan together with the interior immediately behind. That led to the seminal decision that, because of the prior establishment in 1894 of a British Commissioner in Buganda, who from there could scarcely be expected to govern the coast and its immediate hinterland as well, the British sphere (by contrast with the German one, where there was nothing comparable to

²³¹ Kimberley's minute, 18 May, FOCP 6489/56; to Hardinge, 9 June 1894, FO 107/1.

²³² *London Gazette*, 19 June 1894.

²³³ Portal, *Mission*, Ch. 23; Hertslet, *Map of Africa*, I, p. 396.

²³⁴ Hertslet, *Map of Africa*, III, p. 693.

²³⁵ For the whole story, see Sanderson, *Upper Nile*, Chs. 5–8; Robinson & Gallagher, *Africa*, pp. 330–3.

²³⁶ I. Brownlie, *African Boundaries. A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopedia* (London, 1979), pp. 690–705.

²³⁷ Galbraith, *Mackinnon*, Ch. 9.

the British involvement in Buganda) should be divided into two separate territories. This had first been mooted by Anderson in 1892,²³⁸ and thereafter became received Foreign Office doctrine.²³⁹ It was given effect on 1 July 1895²⁴⁰ when, separated from the 'Uganda' Protectorate by a line along the western side of the Rift Valley, a separate 'British East Africa Protectorate' (EAP),²⁴¹ centred on Mombasa, was proclaimed. To the chagrin of the Sultan and others, it was further determined that it should be governed from Zanzibar, not however by the Sultan but by the British Consul-General who would double as its Commissioner.²⁴² As the only place in the British sphere with a resident Commissioner, this served to reinforce Buganda's position as the principal British base in the interior.

Five years on, this whole array of long-gestating outcomes was given its surprising final double twist. Back in 1895 the Rosebery government had decided to proceed with the building of a 'Uganda Railway', running inland from Mombasa. As it proceeded to its then destination on the northeast corner of Lake Victoria at Kisumu,²⁴³ Sir Harry Johnston was appointed Special Commissioner of Uganda in 1899,²⁴⁴ and, among other things, was ordered to advise on the merging of the two East African Protectorates. He soon became an enthusiastic proponent of the idea,²⁴⁵ and in particular for the appointment of an overarching High Commissioner, for whose capital, he soon reported,²⁴⁶ he had found an excellent site close to the railway, atop the Mau escarpment on the western side of the Rift Valley.²⁴⁷ When Queen Victoria died in January 1901, he proposed that it should be named 'King Edward's Town' after her successor. Despite his continuing advocacy,²⁴⁸ however, his proposals were dismissed out of hand by Sir Clement Hill, the Foreign Office's Superintendent of African Protectorates, who, very

²³⁸ Rosebery's Memo, 12 Feb. 1894, FOCP 6538/116.

²³⁹ Report of Committee on Administration of East Africa, 17 Apr. 1894, FOCP 6489.

²⁴⁰ Hardinge to Salisbury, 2 July 1895, FOCP 6761. Rosebery to the Queen, 27–28 May 1895, *QVL*, pp. 515–16, for the decision.

²⁴¹ The future Kenya.

²⁴² Low in V. Harlow & E. M. Chilver, eds., *History of East Africa*, Vol. II, (Oxford, 1965), pp. 5–6, 645–6.

²⁴³ For a full account, see M. F. Hill, *Permanent Way. The Story of the Kenya and Uganda Railway* (Nairobi, n.d. [1949]), Pt 2.

²⁴⁴ Salisbury to Johnston, 1 July 1899, FO 2/200.

²⁴⁵ Johnston to Hardinge, 23 Mar. 1900, A 32/8.

²⁴⁶ Johnston to Salisbury, 18 Feb. 1900, FO 2/465.

²⁴⁷ It was twice changed: H. B. Thomas, 'A Federal Capital for Eastern Africa', *Uf*, 2 (1935), pp. 247–9. See also A. T. Matson, 'Uganda's Old Eastern Province and East Africa's Federal Capital', *Uf* (1958), pp. 43–53.

²⁴⁸ Johnston's 'General Report', 10 July 1901, FO 2/462.

unusually, visited East Africa for two months late in 1900. Whilst there, the first communications were received via the Nile following the British reconquest of the Sudan in 1899. That led Hill to think that the right way to proceed was by placing 'East Africa up to the Eastern shores of Lake Victoria under one Chief, and leave all west of that to another Chief whose relations will in future lie largely with the Nile route'.²⁴⁹ That would have the special advantage, he argued, of placing all the railway under a single administration. In such circumstances there was no need for the High Commissioner Johnston had proposed.²⁵⁰

In the present context, the implementation of Hill's recommendations was of singular importance. For, (See [Map 6.](#)) had Johnston's proposals prevailed, Buganda as the principal base for the British in the East African interior may very well have been superseded by King Edward's Town, while Uganda would have found itself locked together with the future Kenya. Since, however, it was Hill and not Johnston who had the ear of Lansdowne, the new Foreign Secretary,²⁵¹ Buganda's special position was left intact and Hill's proposal that Uganda's eastern boundary should be moved westwards from the Rift Valley to the northeast corner of Lake Victoria was eventually effected on 1 April 1902.²⁵² That left Uganda notably smaller than it would otherwise have been, but freed it at the same time of a large part of East Africa's eventual 'White Highlands', whose imposition upon 'Kenya' was to cause such conflict in the future. Thus, while Anderson's procurement of the 1 degree south line in 1890 had defined Uganda's pivotal southern boundary, Hill's eastern boundary of 1902 entrenched the future distinction between Uganda and Kenya. Negotiations with Leopold had meanwhile sketched out Uganda's western boundary, which left its eventually extensive northern reaches still to be determined. That, however, is a further, mostly later, and altogether different story.²⁵³

²⁴⁹ An insubstantial argument if ever there was one: Hill's minute on Johnston to Salisbury, tel., 27 Mar. 1901, FO 2/465.

²⁵⁰ Hill's Memo, 25 July 1901, FO 2/519.

²⁵¹ K. Ingham, 'Uganda's Old Eastern Province', *Uj* 21 (1957), pp. 43–6.

²⁵² Its precise alignment was subject to some controversy: G. Bennett, 'The Eastern Boundary of Uganda in 1902', *Uj*, 23 (1959), pp. 69–72.

²⁵³ Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, Chs. 5–7; Low in Harlow & Chilver, *East Africa*, II, pp. 87–91, 103–10.

5 Warbands: new military formations and ground level imperialism

It is now time to take stock. [Chapter 3](#) sketched the background to the religio-political hostilities which erupted in Buganda in 1888. It traced the multiple changes of fortune which its Muslim, Catholic and Protestant forces suffered over the next five years, in which the first British imperial agents to station themselves in the country took it upon themselves by 1892–3 to be the principal arbiters. Setting all of that aside for the time being, [Chapter 4](#) canvassed the uneven succession of might-have-beens for East Africa amongst the highly presumptuous delineations of altogether new, large-scale, territorial political arenas, which characterised the onset and course of the late nineteenth-century European ‘scramble for Africa’. It then tracked through the seminal demarcations which gave birth to East Africa’s subsequent entrenched political map. In doing so, it honed in on the fortuitous fabrication of the new, relatively small, upcountry polity of ‘Uganda’, and followed the uncertain course which, in the end, locked the British into centring this in Buganda.

The first British colonial agents in Buganda did not, however, see their overriding task to be either that of umpires in the religio-political conflicts wracking Buganda, or that of emissaries pegging out claims to territories allocated to Britain under international agreements. As accredited agents of the British empire deeply imbued with an advanced form of ‘internalised imperialism’, the ‘ground level imperialism’¹ in which they became engaged principally involved the establishment of their political hegemony over all of the many rulerships in the region now allocated internationally to it. This is a story with which we still have to come to grips. It entailed, particularly in the case of the major northern lakes kingdoms, a ‘conjuncture’ between agents of the advancing colonial power and the ruling authorities in the kingdoms themselves, such as was outlined towards the end of [Chapter 1](#).

¹ For these terms, see [Ch. 1](#), p. 22.

As suggested there, the course which this ‘conjuncture’ took not only characteristically ran through four stages – the precursors; some raw assertion of British hegemony; a determining vortex; and a colonial settlement. It depended heavily upon the ‘conditioning circumstances’ which prevailed, principally on the indigenous side, more especially at the outset of their contact with the British, but in various degrees throughout its ensuing course as well. [Chapter 4](#) has supplied most of the relevant information on the British side. By focusing upon Buganda, [Chapter 3](#) has provided much that was pertinent upon its side. But not all. For, to begin with, there was a further, major dimension to the ‘conditioning circumstances’² on the Buganda side, to which only incidental reference has so far been made. It had its origin not in Buganda but in its closest principal rival, Bunyoro.

Up until this time almost every military force in the region had been composed of rural levies summoned by their territorial chiefs for a particular expedition and placed under the command of a senior chief especially appointed by the ruler for each particular campaign. Despite Kabalega’s eventual success in winning the bitterly fought succession war in Bunyoro back in the early 1870s,³ he soon determined to do better than this. Having faced strong resistance to his accession from so many princely and chiefly opponents, greatly troubled by the erosion of his kingdom at the hands of more than one cadet branch of the royal line – in Toro to the south and Palwo country to the north – and alert to both the Egyptian advance up the Nile and the threats from Buganda, he soon set about transforming the Abarasura his father had employed as bearers of royal messages and providers of royal escorts into ‘new model warbands’, as they will be called here, composed of standing bodies of warriors, increasingly armed with guns, with allocated estates for their sustenance, and each led by its own ongoing commander.⁴ With their support and with an increase in their number, it was not long before he was successfully fastening his personal authority upon his kingdom, sending expeditions against Bunyoro’s dissident royals, and withstanding attacks by both the Egyptian enterprise and Buganda.⁵

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³ See [Ch. 2](#), pp. 37–8.

⁴ Uzoigwe, ‘Kabalega’s Abarasura’; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 123–4, 128, 131–3; Baker, *Ismailia*, II, pp. 187, 217, 268; Casati, *Ten Years*, II, pp. 61–6, 80, 91; Junker, *Travels*, III, pp. 528, 532; E. C. Lanning, ‘Kikukule: Guardian of Southeast Bunyoro’, *Uj* 22 (1966), pp. 119–47.

⁵ See [Ch. 2](#), and, e.g., Baker, *Ismailia*, II, pp. 187, 220, 256.

There were half a dozen aspects to the ensuing story which warrant attention.⁶ First, Kabalega's model came to be diffused elsewhere, most notably to Buganda. This followed the major defeat of an invading Buganda army assembled on traditional lines at the battle of Rwengabi early in 1886, at the hands of a Bunyoro army composed at its core of reformed and enlarged Abarasura, in which the Buganda commander, the Saza chief Kangawo of Bulemezi, Kibirango, and numerous other Baganda (along with numbers of Banyoro) were killed.⁷ That was among the ill omens which fuelled the growing tension at Kabaka Mwanga's court, which by mid 1886 led him to launch the fiercest persecution he ever mounted against the Christian converts there. As soon, however, as that was over, he proceeded to reorganise a formation his father had earlier created, the Kijasi, made up of Muslims at his court under the command of a Muslim chief, Kapalaga, into a new model warband along Abarasura lines, and by early 1887 had created three more. One of these, the Kiwuliriza, was also composed of Muslims at his court under the command of another Muslim leader, Kiwanuka Katege. Then, having effectively tested the loyalty of the Christians in his mid 1886 persecution, Mwanga permitted a third, the Kisalosala, to be made up of Catholics under the command of a Catholic leader, Henry Nyonyintono, and a fourth, the Gwanika, of Protestants under a Protestant leader, Apolo Kagwa.⁸ To test these last two still further, he ordered them to join an army he was sending on a revenge attack against Bunyoro in mid 1887, vowing to have them 'burned if they were not successful'.⁹ As, this time, the Buganda army, despite eventually being expelled from Bunyoro, proved to be considerably more successful than at Rwengabi¹⁰ – thanks no doubt to these reforms – they were spared.

Over the following years, one further diffusion took place. Upon the arrival of the Buganda Christians in the eastern borderlands of Nkore

⁶ Parts of the following argument were first canvassed in D.A. Low, 'Warbands and Ground-level Imperialism in Uganda, 1870–1900', *Historical Studies*, 16 (1975), pp. 584–97.

⁷ Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 134–6; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 140; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', p. 104; Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, II, Ch. 7; Mackay to his father, 7 April 1886, in *Mackay*, pp. 275–6; Casati, *Ten Years*, II, pp. 65–6; Wright, *Heroic Age*, p. 25; Emin to Schweinfurth, 5, 20 Apr. 1886, in Schweinfurth *et al.*, *Emin Pasha in Central Africa*, pp. 499–501; Mackay to Kirk, 30 Jan. 1886, FO 84/1773.

⁸ Authorities differ somewhat about the names given: Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 143; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, Ch. 23; Kiwanuka, *Buganda*, pp. 145–6, 198; Wright, *Heroic Age*, p. 26. The fullest account is Zimbe, 'Kabaka', Ch. 20.

⁹ Bishop Parker to Church Missionary Society, 5 Sept. 1887, in *Mackay*, p. 336.

¹⁰ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 142; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, Ch. 23; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 140; Casati, *Ten Years*, II, pp. 74–80; Mackay to Holmwood, 10 Aug. 1887, FO 84/1584; Euan Smith to Salisbury, tel., 1 May 1888, FO 84/1907.

late in 1888 under their new model warband leaders, Nyonyintono and Kagwa, who were fleeing from the Muslim coup in Buganda, it was not long before the prototype they provided came to be closely followed in the construction of a new model warband in Nkore, the Abagonya as it was called there, under the command of the rising Nkore chief, Mbaguta, who had been sent to oversee them.¹¹

These arrangements were not all along the same lines. Bunyoro had ten principal new model warbands, Buganda had just four, while Nkore had only one. Nevertheless there were marked similarities between them. They were all standing forces, not ad hoc *levées en masse*. Increasingly they were armed with guns; first muzzle loaders, then rifles. Each had an ongoing commander, and all were granted estates to provide for their support, both close to the centre but variously elsewhere in the kingdom as well.

In a number of cases these new model warbands were extensively composed of foreigners, and in some notable instances led by those who were originally marginal men. Kabalega's Abarasura, it seems, were mainly composed of Banyoro, but also included recruits from amongst the acephalous peoples to their north and east. Of their principal leaders, Ireeta came from Nkore,¹² Kikukule¹³ was the son of a refugee from Buganda, while Rwabudongo was an undoubted commoner. Only Byabachwezi came from a Bunyoro chiefly lineage. Likewise, in Buganda, Kagwa, the Protestant leader, was frequently accused of being a foreigner; Kakungulu came from Koki,¹⁴ while in Nkore the Abagonya not only included many Baganda; their leader, Mbaguta, was a member of the Bashambo clan from the now defunct kingdom of Mpororo.

The expected roles of all these warbands were at the same time largely identical. They were all employed by their rulers against over-mighty subjects, and as spearheads for their armies. In Bunyoro, Kabalega endlessly engaged them in buttressing his authority against royals and other prominent individuals whom he believed to be threatening this, while he frequently employed them in military campaigns against secessionist princes, and in defence of his kingdom. He even once sought to play a major role as arbiter in the civil war which was raging in Buganda, by sending a substantial contingent of Abarasura to support the Buganda Muslims in what proved to be their forlorn attempt, in 1890,

¹¹ See Ch. 8, p. 218. Also Miti, 'Buganda', 2, Ch. 24.

¹² Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 111.

¹³ Lanning, 'Kikukule', pp. 119–20.

¹⁴ Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, Ch. 1.

to turn the tables finally upon the two warring Christian factions there.¹⁵ In Buganda, Mwanga, in 1887–8, made extensive use of his four Bapere, as they were called there ('those who had gone bad'), not only in a further invasion of Bunyoro (as we have just seen), but both in rapacious campaigns against leading figures and others in the countryside and in enforcing a humiliating task – enlarging the royal lake – upon many of his chiefs at the capital;¹⁶ while some years later, Mbaguta, commander from the start of the Nkore Abagonya, led them in three devastating assaults upon successive ambitious royals there, and led them in war against Rwanda, and in supporting the insurgents against the British in Buddu in 1897.¹⁷

Rooted in these manifold innovations were two seminal eventualities. In the first place, if one fastens on the developments which occurred at the apex of each of these kingdoms once their new model warbands had been established, something of a common pattern of consequences emerges. This principally took the form – if one may offer a further quite particular formula – of a progression through a series of what we may call three 'Confrontations'. This progression ordinarily stemmed from the basic decision of a ruler to use his new model warbands as a praetorian guard to establish his unchallengeable dominance over his kingdom, and as the shock troops of his army. The threefold progression began, that is, with what may be called here a Confrontation I in which the new model warbands served as the ruler's principal henchmen in belabouring various of his subjects, and in confronting his external enemies. The more successful, however, the ruler and his new model warbands then became in acting thus, the more propensity there seems to have been for a further progression towards what may be called a Confrontation II, in which the new model warbands, having succeeded in proceeding against other leading figures in the kingdom, eventually overcame their hesitation to tackle the greatest of them all, and turned upon the ruler himself (generally, it needs to be said, after some provocation by him). The full progression did not, however, necessarily end there. For, the more successful the new model warband leaders became in their assaults against their ruler, the greater, it seems, their propensity to break apart into a Confrontation III of bitter lethal conflict with each other.

¹⁵ Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 144–6.

¹⁶ Zimbe, 'Kabaka', Ch. 20; Kasirye, *Mugwanya*, Ch. 5; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, Ch. 23; Kiwanuka, *Buganda*, pp. 199–200; R.P. Ashe, *Chronicles of Uganda* (London, 1894), pp. 90–1. For Apolo Kagwa's brief admittance of their behaviour, see Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 143.

¹⁷ Ch. 8.

The most striking outcome of this overall story is then that, in enquiring how it was that British officials established their control over these kingdoms during the 1890s, it transpires that, in these terms, they did so by exploiting a Confrontation I in Nkore, by generating a Confrontation II in Bunyoro, and by first exacerbating and then redressing a persisting Confrontation III in Buganda.

If one then turns to Buganda in particular, it is not too difficult to see along these lines that, immediately upon the formation of his four new model warbands in 1886–7, Kabaka Mwanga set about employing them in a Confrontation I against large numbers of leading figures in his kingdom. When, however, he then turned against the warbands themselves and in September 1888 sought to maroon their leaders upon an island in Lake Victoria, they were swift to expel him from his kingdom in a Confrontation II, while, just a month later, beginning with the Muslim attack upon the Christians, they quickly descended into a much elongated Confrontation III with each other.

Out of this concatenation of events, there came two early consequences of great moment for Buganda. As we noted in [Chapter 3](#), standing at the apex of both a patriarchal and a patrimonial structure of governance, Kabakas of Buganda possessed very considerable power. But, as Mutesa had demonstrated in his campaign against the priests and mediums of the Lubare and in his adoption of Islam, they could still be keen to enhance their power further. When Mwanga succeeded to the Kabakaship in 1884 his youthful insecurity made him feel especially anxious to build upon this. Accordingly, he very quickly grasped the opportunity which the creation of the Bapere gave him to bring under his personal control a more potent instrument of royal power than had ever existed here before. Whereupon, by leading plundering expeditions through the kingdom as testimony to his might, he brought the exercise of personally wielded royal power in Buganda to its apogee. That, however, is a very dangerous height for any ruler to stand upon, particularly when, as here, he was dependent for his personal security upon a praetorian guard of well-armed courtier-warriors, many of whom will have had searing memories of royal persecutions against themselves and their like in the recent past. Thus it was that, when he turned against them in August–September 1888 and was unceremoniously expelled from his kingdom, apotheosis cascaded into nemesis. Kabakas of Buganda continued to be accorded much personal homage and remained guardians of the corporateness of the kingdom, but henceforward political power within the kingdom lay overwhelmingly with its successive oligarchs, drawn initially from the leaders of its new model warbands.

This outcome was coupled with another which was no less formative. Up until 1886 the growing number of converts at the Kabaka's court, both to Islam and to each of the two Christian denominations in the country, had tended to cluster in groups of mutually supportive friends, never more so than when they were threatened with persecution. Some of them had also begun to hold junior chieftainships. In late 1886, however, and in the years that followed, large numbers of them found themselves being incorporated as warriors into one of the most advanced military organisations the region round about had ever seen, not only according to their chosen creed, but in its very defence against one or both of its determined rivals. In this process, Buganda's new model warbands ceased to be the preeminent enforcers of the Kabaka's super-ordinate power and became instead the formidable weapons of each of three vehemently competing religious parties, while growing cohorts of assuredly devout Muslims and Christians soon took on the form of substantial military formations.

As such, the combination of a wayward Kabaka and their mounting rivalries effected a speedy progression in Buganda from a Confrontation I through a Confrontation II to a Confrontation III. Since, however, none of them finally managed to prevail over all the others, Buganda's Confrontation III stretched out over a long five years from 1888 to 1893. It was into this seething cauldron that the first European imperial agents soon marched.

As we have already recounted in [Chapter 3](#) much of the story in Buganda, especially from 1888 onwards, and, in [Chapter 4](#), of the wider course of events on the British side, many of the details there will not be repeated here. Rather, attention will be focused on the course of 'ground level imperialism' as it came to impact upon Buganda.

By the time the first European imperial agents entered Buganda, it had been wracked for eighteen months, following the revolution of September 1888, by lethal conflict between its rival Muslim and Christian forces. In these circumstances Kabaka Mwanga, as nominated head of the Christian coalition, issued, as we have seen, a succession of appeals to Jackson, who was leading the pioneering IBEAC caravan coming up through what became Kenya, to hurry to their aid. Jackson, as we have further seen, had received orders to avoid going near Buganda, and despite some second thoughts eventually turned away from doing so. Having, however, read Jackson's reiterated but hitherto unopened invitation to come to Buganda, that left the way open for the German Carl Peters to hurry forward, and, in the aftermath of the second Christian capture of the capital, and with the help of the Catholic

missionaries, to secure the Kabaka's agreement to a treaty of friendship. Despite its innocuous terms, this could well have been employed in Europe as evidence for a preemptive German claim to possession of the kingdom. But, as we have also seen, with the negotiations that led to the Anglo-German Agreement of July 1890 having already passed a crucial stage, Peters reached the coast too late for his treaty to have any such effect. It was therefore to be with the British and not with the Germans that, over the next ten years, Buganda was to experience the 'defining conjuncture' which eventuated in the fabrication of British colonial dominion over it.

The precursors here, as we have earlier called them, stretched back to the visits in the 1860s and 1870s very specifically to Buganda, because of its proximity to the headwaters of the Nile (rather than, as we have said, to Rwanda, for example) by the British explorers Speke, Grant and Stanley, and to the interest which their writings aroused in Britain. From the later 1870s these precursors took on a more sustained form with the remarkable story of the conversions to Christianity at the Kabaka's court at the instance of missionaries of the Anglican Church Missionary Society. At the outset, there was no suggestion that this would lead to any endorsement for an imperial advance. But in response to Mwanga's persecution of the Christians in the mid 1880s, there was soon an elision at the hands of the leading Anglican missionary, Alexander Mackay, between his missionary involvement and his pleas for an imperial advance to Buganda, which, as we have seen, did eventually have an important effect there.¹⁸ Before, however, that transpired, Jackson, hot on the heels of Peters, marched into Buganda in May 1890. But, unlike Peters, he was unable to secure the treaty he wished from Mwanga. So, leaving his deputy Gedge behind, he departed empty-handed for the coast, accompanied, however, by a Catholic and by a Protestant emissary appointed to report upon any information they could glean there that might affect Buganda.

These encounters, first with Peters and then with Jackson, masked the situation prevailing in the kingdom. That was epitomised in two letters which Jackson now took with him to the coast, both of them addressed to the British Consul-General in Zanzibar. The first came from Kabaka Mwanga. In it he appealed for British assistance against the Muslims, rather as his father had sought an alliance with Gordon against Kabalega, and as he himself had appealed to Jackson in the previous year. His principal concern, however, was now to expound the statecraft

¹⁸ Ch. 4, pp. 97, 103.

which, in the same spirit as Mutesa, he was bent upon pursuing. He had agreed, he wrote, to a 'Treaty of Commerce' with Peters, yet had firmly rejected Jackson's demand to 'farm the Customs of the land and ... put up his flag, and ... enter into his hands'. 'I want', so he specified, 'all Europeans of all nations to come to Uganda, to build and trade as they like',¹⁹ but 'I do not want to give them (or you) my land.'

The second letter was written by the principal Protestant leader, Katikiro Kagwa, and could not have been more different. Its sole concern was with the dangers of a further war with the Muslims and the growing rifts between Buganda's Catholics and Protestants. There was nothing here of Mwangi's determination to secure the autonomy of the kingdom. On the contrary, Kagwa wrote, having talked with Jackson: 'I and all my connection in no way want any other plan [than] ... to place ourselves under English protection, if they help us'. Ruler and Christian were thus alike in their anxieties about a possible Muslim revival. But Kagwa's appeal on behalf of the Protestants for 'English protection' illustrated the radically different agendas which were now rending the kingdom apart, while Mwangi's failure to prevent his own Katikiro from dispatching such a plea was striking testimony to the gravely weakened position in which (thanks to Buganda's Confrontation II) he now found himself.²⁰

Gedge remained in Buganda till August 1890, but, threatened by the contention which ensued, eventually left for the south end of the lake. It was to be another four months (in circumstances which we have already considered) before a further representative of the IBEAC, in the person of Captain Lugard, entered the country in mid December 1890. On so doing, the 'conditioning circumstances' confronting him were in many respects strikingly different from those he might well otherwise have found.

Had he, for example, sought to enter the kingdom a decade earlier, he would have found himself confronted, in Kabaka Mutesa, by an all but supreme, well-entrenched ruler, operating a remarkably sophisticated statecraft, who in recent years had successfully entrapped a considerable Egyptian force encroaching upon his kingdom from the north and secured its withdrawal without having in any way to resort to force. Alternatively, had he tried to enter the kingdom half a dozen years later

¹⁹ He had been reiterating this for the past year, e.g. Mackay & Ashe to Euan Smith, 19 Mar., FO 84/1931; Gordon to Ashe, 21 Oct., MP, to Euan Smith, 25 Oct. 1889, FO 84/2060.

²⁰ Mwangi to Euan Smith, 26 Ap., FO 84/2063; Kagwa to Euan Smith, 25 Apr. 1890, FO 84/2064. See Low, *Mind of Buganda*, pp. 25–6. See also Kagwa to [IBEAC agents], 24 Apr. 1890, LP 43.

at the head of an expedition sent to relieve Emin Pasha, which Consul Holmwood had urged should also ‘deal with Buganda’, he would in all probability have encountered in Mwanga a new and aggressive young ruler and his lately created standing military force of four carefully composed gun-bearing new model warbands, still in their first flush of creation. Thereafter, had he approached Buganda at any time after the outbreak of the rebellion by these same new model warbands in September 1888, he would have found himself faced by a kingdom variously engulfed in one or more of three Confrontations and in the first of the sequence of distinctive religio-political alignments which punctuated its course throughout the ensuing five years. In September 1888, following Mwanga’s expulsion, he would have found the Christian and Muslims leaders at the court joined together in a new, oligarchical government of the kingdom (religio-political alignment 1 as outlined in [Chapter 3](#)). A month later he could very well have become embroiled in the attack by the Muslims on the Christians and their expulsion mostly to the western borders of the kingdom. Shortly afterwards, he could well have been caught in an abortive attempt by a new ruler, Kabaka Kiwewa, to restore a traditionalist regime in the kingdom (religio-political alignment 2); while, at any time between October 1888 and a year and more later, he would very certainly have found himself confronted by a kingdom under a longer-run Muslim ascendancy (religio-political alignment 3), subject, however, to increasing attacks by a Christian alliance which notionally, by that time, had the previously expelled Kabaka Mwanga at its head.

As it was, by the time Lugard arrived in Buganda, he found himself faced, like Jackson and Peters before him, by conditioning circumstances of a very different order. Not only had the combined Christian forces by now twice overwhelmed the Muslims, and for the time being at least thrust them back to the Bunyoro border, but a Protestant–Catholic diarchy (religio-political alignment 4) was installed in its place. Yet such were the ructions now rending the Buganda polity apart that the maelstrom in which it was caught was, if anything, seriously worsening. While its ruler continued to enjoy considerable status, thanks to Buganda’s Confrontation II he had been shorn of much of his previous authority. Deep differences amongst its governing elite were now depriving it of any kind of consensual stand with which to confront a European imperial advance, while the initial gatherings of devotees of the three creeds on offer – which, as we have seen, had by the late 1880s become substantial military formations as well – were by now so expanding their followings as to take on the form of very much larger warring factions. As the months wore on in 1890, mounting differences within the diarchy of Catholics and Protestants not only placed considerable strains upon the

fourth of the succession of religio-political alignments through which the kingdom had passed in just two years. There were soon threats of open warfare between them, such as would enlarge the still as yet unresolved Confrontation III – which hitherto had been chiefly confined to a confrontation between Muslims and Christians – into a three-cornered conflict in which Catholics and Protestants would assail each other as well as, severally or jointly, the Muslims.

It was in these circumstances that, escorted by a Kabaka's envoy and welcomed by letters from both mission stations and from Katikiro Kagwa, on 18 December 1890 Lugard entered Buganda quite unopposed, at the head of the largest alien military force ever to advance upon the kingdom. Far from presenting a bold and united front against an aggressive external intruder, Buganda was here displaying all the marks of a gravely fractured state all too vulnerable to a determined imperial assault.

The fissures coursing through it were vividly exposed within days of Lugard's arrival. In accord with the instructions he had received from the IBEAC to impress upon Mwanga 'the power of the Company', he immediately announced that he had been ordered to secure a treaty from him, and over the next few days set about outlining the lengthy draft he prepared, both to the two handfuls of Catholic and Anglican missionaries in the country, and to separate meetings of Catholic and Protestant senior chiefs. Its twelve clauses covered such details as the 'maintenance of the King and Royal State', the formation of 'a standing army ... like a native regiment in India', and the establishment of a Board of Finance chaired by the Company's Resident, which would control the collection and allocation of the kingdom's taxes. In drafting its text, Lugard was careful to make one concession. He made no mention of Mwanga having to fly the Company's flag. Nevertheless, the principal provision in his text was for Mwanga, his chiefs and people 'to acknowledge the suzerainty' of the IBEAC.

Its summary presentation in this form understandably evoked very considerable tension at the Kabaka's court. Following the Protestants' hope, as expressed by Kagwa's earlier request, for 'English protection', there was little doubt that they would agree to it; but, to begin with, the Catholics refused to do so. Advised, however, by their missionaries, now aware that, by the recent Anglo-German Agreement, Buganda lay within a British sphere of influence, they in the end undertook to do so. It was Mwanga who held out, unsurprisingly seeing here a major assault on the core objective of his statecraft: to preserve the autonomy of his kingdom. By now, however, at once isolated and deprived of much of his earlier authority, he had no option in the end but to scrawl his mark upon it.

All this represented the beginning of a much closer engagement between the British and the Baganda than the precursors to their ensuing defining conjuncture had as yet seen.²¹

Despite Lugard's high-strung determination to lord it over the kingdom ('I am not come here to trifle and fool', he wrote), he was, however, in no position to give early effect to his claim to be exercising suzerainty over it. To begin with, he was busily engaged in securing his Kampala fort. Amid a plethora of problems and some considerable dangers, next to nothing was done to implement any of the organisational provisions of his treaty, while his three successive attempts to develop a formula for resolving the frequent disputes between the two warring religious factions over whether a chief should forfeit his lands upon changing his religion all came to nothing.²² The nearest he came to exercising any semblance of suzerainty lay in his interventions in the role of peacemaker in the now increasingly threatening embroilments between the two warring Christian factions. Not only did this involve him in unending discussions with their leaders. On two occasions he led out a patrol of his own Sudanese troops in an ostentatious demonstration of force that successfully calmed a situation.²³ Since, on more than one occasion, his actions upheld the peace, Mwanga's initial hostility towards him ameliorated somewhat. Nevertheless it was clearly a great relief to Lugard when he eventually felt able to respond to Mwanga's reiterated pleas to give his support to the joint Christian expedition which Mwanga launched against the Muslims on the Bunyoro border in April 1891. As it chanced, the Christians inflicted a major defeat on the Muslims without needing to call upon Lugard's support and that of his mercenaries.²⁴ Thereupon, as we have seen earlier, he promptly launched himself on his great western journey, and dispatched his second-in-command, Captain Williams, to Kampala with a scratch force of 220 men, to hold his fort there and place it upon a better footing.

It had been hoped, at least by Lugard, that a joint expedition against the Muslims would bring the two Christian warring factions together. With the defeat of the Muslims, however, the danger they represented substantially receded – and that left the two of them much freer than

²¹ It will be noted that this and the ensuing discussion of the events of late 1890 to early 1892 straddles the ground earlier traversed in *Ch. 3*, but that it does so from a rather different perspective.

²² As recounted in *Ch. 3*, pp. 78–9.

²³ In addition to *LD II*, *Chs. 1–2*, see, e.g., 2 Jan. 1890, G/D; BD, 3 Jan., 18 Feb., 1890; Lugard to Mackenzie, 7 Jan., to Kirk, 4 Feb., MP; to Euan Smith, 27 Mar. 1891 (enc. in Euan Smith to Salisbury, 27 Sept. 1891), SP.

²⁴ *LD II*, *Ch. 3*.

before to turn against each other. To the dismay of the Protestants, the Catholics seized the opportunity to press forward with an increasingly successful campaign – with the Kabaka’s formal leadership of the Catholics as a principal recruiting ploy – to so enlarge their following as to bring them close to predominating over the kingdom.

Amid this darkening situation, Williams strove to maintain dialogue with both sets of missionaries and with the many Baganda notables who came to see him, and on more than one occasion emulated Lugard’s practice of some bold act of peacemaking – on one occasion by patrolling the capital for four days with a handful of troops until the immediate crisis receded. Such, however, were now the deepening animosities that, during Williams’ watch, there were at least three armed clashes between Catholics and Protestants in quite different parts of the country. The prevailing turbulence, moreover, was aggravated by Mwanga. His principal concern continued to be to uphold the autonomy of his kingdom. To that end he raised a very large flag of his own which, in towering above all others, signalled his claim to an overriding sovereignty over it. But in other respects he vacillated bewilderingly. On one occasion he dispatched a new force of his own creation to join the Catholics in attacking the Protestant general, Kakungulu – a move that was only checked by a further exercise in peacemaking by Williams, who threatened to support the Protestants if open warfare should ensue. More than once, moreover, he momentarily sought to turn Protestant. But such a request was rejected not only by the Protestant missionaries for lack of any sign of genuine conversion, but by Williams who feared that it could only aggravate a situation which was tense enough already. Thereupon Mwanga soon reverted to the Catholic faction, which had been strenuously seeking his return to their midst.²⁵

Such was the situation which Lugard confronted upon his return to Kampala, on 31 December 1891, from his extensive journey to the west.

It is at this point that the seminal events of January 1892 need to be much more extensively considered than in the two preceding chapters.²⁶

On his arrival in Kampala, thanks not least to Williams’ efforts, Lugard entered into a well-constructed fort with an accompanying garrison of 300 or so Sudanese, Somali and Swahili mercenary troops,

²⁵ On all this, see, e.g., *LD* II, pp. 137, 401, 457–61, 466, and III, p. 25; *BD*, 13–16 July, 4–7, 26–30 Dec.; Williams to Berkeley, 4 Oct. 1891, FO 84/2243. On Mwanga, see, e.g., Ashe, *Chronicles*, pp. 201–2; Roscoe’s *Diary*, 27, 29 Oct. 1891, A 2/1.

²⁶ For these, see especially *LD* III, pp. 25–40; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, Ch. 19. For an extensive daily account, see *BD*, 22 Jan. – 2 Feb. 1892.

many of whom had been regularly drilled. In addition there were a large number of porters, women and children. All of these were refurbished just as he arrived by a considerable caravan of supplies from the coast and a large consignment of ammunition. This placed him in a much stronger position at the Buganda capital than he had previously enjoyed before his departure to the west. At the outset, he was much preoccupied with compiling a plethora of reports and in responding to the host of letters which had piled up in his absence, and then not least (as we saw in the last chapter) with the dread implications, as he and Williams saw them, of the IBEAC's decisions to withdraw from the country. But he soon became immersed as well in the highly charged situation which was now rending Buganda. Sporadic fighting between the adherents of the Catholic and Protestant parties had now become general. The Catholics had grown to be by far the largest party, while the Protestants were feeling increasingly disadvantaged. On looking around him, he was greatly dismayed by the considerably increased bitterness between the two Christian parties, and more particularly by the 'enormous flag' that Mwanga was flying, 'cutting out in height and dimensions the British flag'. 'That', Lugard wrote, 'was not good and proclaimed to the whole country that the King was not with us, but apart altogether'.

Early on, he seems to have realised that, despite his and Williams' periodic achievements as peacemakers over the course of the previous year, the 'suzerainty' which had formally been granted to the IBEAC by his treaty with Mwanga had not secured him the commanding authority which he sought over the kingdom. Accordingly, as he returned to Kampala, he started to insist that 'Uganda and its King' should now 'declare openly and boldly for us' and 'declare for England unreservedly'.²⁷ Williams conveyed this message to Mwanga when, following Lugard's arrival, he secretly visited him on three successive nights to tell him that, 'as long as in public he flew a separate flag and declared himself on the French side', he could not expect to secure the guns he was now seeking from the British, without 'a public declaration that he had gone over to the English side'.

When, at this point, news of these secret talks leaked out, the Catholics threatened war. Lugard, however, told Alexis Sebowa, the influential Catholic Sekibobo of Kyagwe, that, 'as the country was English by treaty ... it was time to stop all this and that the King and Catholics should declare for England, and take the [Company's] flag, and let those who wished to read what religion they liked'.

²⁷ In addition, see *LD* II, p. 457.

Meanwhile in response to a request from Mwanga, as conveyed through Williams, that he should provide him with a written statement of what he wanted him to do, in an effort to be conciliatory Lugard once more dropped any reference to a flag, but evidently restated his now emphatic demand that all parties should now 'declare for England'. To this, Mwanga made no reply. Had he done so, he would have needed to make it clear that the statecraft he had inherited from his father held no place for a public submission upon the lines which Lugard was demanding. With Mwanga thus refusing to act on Lugard's injunction to 'declare for England', the Catholics were obviously not going to do so either. Lugard was thus caught in a situation in which his treaty power having proved worthless, and his insistent demands for public declarations of submission being regularly flouted, he was left with no effective basis for the authority which he claimed to exercise over the kingdom.

At one point during his western journey he had mused upon what he euphemistically called 'the ultimate reduction and pacification of Uganda'. That, he wrote, would require the disarming of the Baganda, 'or else a powerful force kept here, strong enough to overawe the country'. Disarmament, however, might be achieved either by force or by stratagem. Force, he thought, 'seems impossible for many years yet'. But stratagem might just succeed – under a programme by which breech-loaders in the hands of the British would be exchanged for muskets in the hands of the Baganda, with, however, the British retaining control of their cartridge supply.²⁸

Such ruminating, however, implied that, in establishing their dominion, the British would find themselves faced by a strong, united Buganda.²⁹ That was now very far from being the case. At best, its ruler was only supported by one of the three warring factions into which his kingdom had become divided. After over three years of fluctuating internecine conflict, it was still in thrall to the Conjunction III it had suffered in 1888 when it had fragmented along the fault lines previously scored by religious disputations at the court. This still quite unresolved contest had, moreover, reached the point when its fourth ensuing religio-political alignment – of collaboration between its two Christian warring factions – had all but completely fallen apart (they could not even join successfully against either a group of traditionalists or the Muslims). There were as a consequence many indications that the country could soon be plunged into fateful warfare between its two Christian warring factions, with its fifth religio-political alignment – a Catholic primacy – as

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 181–2.

²⁹ Stanley to Mackinnon, 4 Feb. 1890, MP.

much its most likely outcome. Not only were numerous bitterly contested expulsions from disputed estates still continuing to occur. Tellingly the leading chiefs of the two sides were no longer coming to see Lugard together. Moreover, whenever they did meet, they quarrelled vehemently with each other. The rifts between them were now running very deep. There were soon mounting signs, too, that the Catholics were mustering their forces for a decisive battle.

Such were the circumstances which conditioned the course which Lugard now took. Buganda was now more deeply riven than ever before. For the first time since internecine conflict had overtaken the kingdom back in 1888, Catholics would be fighting Protestants rather than Christians fighting Muslims. It had long been made plain, moreover, that, were that to happen, the Company's agents would actively support the Protestant side, if only because of their British connections. This meant that, at this nadir in its fortunes, a fateful encounter was now pending between, on the one side, Buganda's Catholic faction with the Kabaka at its head, and the lately reinforced, mainly Sudanese forces under Lugard's command, in conjunction with the Protestant faction, on the other. Hitherto Lugard and Williams had both periodically bent their efforts towards an exercise in peacemaking. Such, however, were the animosities now prevailing between the competing parties that this appeared to have next to no chance of success. They accordingly abandoned it altogether. Instead Lugard 'told the Protestants to call in their men, and be prepared for attack'.

It was then that one of those otherwise incidental events sparked a major conflagration.³⁰ As was sketched out earlier,³¹ following the seizure of a gun by a Protestant from a Catholic, a Catholic seized a gun from a Protestant, who then chased after him only to be gunned down as he entered the Catholic's enclosure. Lugard soon heard of this from agitated Protestants and hurried to the Kabaka's court to demand that Mwanga speedily diffuse the explosive situation which the killing had created by having the Catholic accused promptly executed. When, after a seemingly deliberate delay, he was eventually received, Mwanga was politeness itself. Nevertheless, he told Lugard that he must still hear the evidence first. That evening, Lugard learned that, despite the demand he had made for the Catholic's execution, Mwanga had not only acquitted him – because the Protestant had been invading the Catholic's enclosure, which under Buganda law gave grounds for

³⁰ One thinks on a larger plane of the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914 sparking the First World War.

³¹ Ch. 3, pp. 80–1.

self-defence – but that, allegedly, he had gone on to declare that ‘he had made his decision and he could not help it if [Lugard] disliked it’.

So brazen an act of defiance brought the now escalating crisis, to Lugard’s mind, to its head. Over the next two days he wrote a succession of letters to Mwangi demanding that he reverse his decision to acquit the Catholic, and threatening that otherwise there would be war. Mwangi first sent him a long, disdainful yet personally supplicatory letter, to which Lugard replied that ‘there would certainly be war unless these matters were redressed’. Fearful, moreover, that in this now highly charged situation the Protestants might suddenly be overrun, he then took the very partisan course of issuing them at dead of night with forty guns, mostly muzzle loaders, and a keg of powder.

When Mwangi heard of this, he wrote him a second, more ameliorative letter. These exchanges by now constituted for Lugard a trial of strength, and in response he sent his much experienced Somali emissary, Dualla, to court with yet another letter, once more telling Mwangi that ‘if no justice was done there would be war’. On this being read there Mwangi openly declared that he would not change his mind, and that ‘if the Captain wants war it is his matter’. Thereupon, the Catholic chiefs gathered about him pronounced that, if there was to be war, they would not only assault Kampala Fort but kill all the Europeans in the country and all the Protestants too.

As tension now soared, so none of the parties involved could afford to back down. To the Catholics there was here an unprecedented, and perhaps passing, opportunity to entrench their primacy in the kingdom while their relative numbers stood at a peak and while, in spite of his earlier threats to turn Protestant, Mwangi now seemed lodged once again at their head. To the Protestants the situation was now such that they were faced with the prospect not only of their shrinking ranks suffering defeat, but even perhaps of oblivion. Their one hope was to lock themselves into an alliance with Lugard. Mwangi, at the same time, was in no position to submit to Lugard’s imperious demands. Having now recommitted himself to the Catholic camp, he was heavily dependent upon their support for maintaining his father’s statecraft for securing the autonomy of his kingdom. To buckle under to Lugard’s injunctions would be to abdicate his principal role as its ruler. As for Lugard himself, having in the end made no headway in entrenching his Company’s authority, and finding his successive demands being openly disdained, in view of the depths of his internalised imperialism, he was now in urgent need not only of inflicting an emphatic reverse upon the Kabaka, but of delivering a decisive blow towards establishing his own commanding position over the kingdom.

The climax then followed. By Sunday morning, 24 January 1892, the Catholics were assembling on a line extending from around the Kabaka's palace on Mengo hill on their right to the Catholic mission on Rubaga hill on their left, while the Protestants congregated around Lugard's Kampala Fort and upon the slopes of Namirembe hill to its west. As the conflict now loomed, Lugard issued his remaining stock of 500 or more guns (again mostly muzzle loaders) to the Protestants. Since, like the other warring factions, they comprised at their core a five-year-long battle-hardened military formation, these could immediately be brought into use, making them a far more formidable force than they would otherwise have been. At the last moment, Mwanga twice appealed to Lugard to stop the war. Lugard, however, was now unbending. He would only do so, he said, if Mwanga surrendered the killer to him. Before his response could reach Mwanga, heavy firing, however, broke out, thereby signalling the start of the ensuing Battle of Mengo. Hitherto Lugard had never participated in any fighting between Buganda's warring camps. In supporting the Christians against the Muslims, he and his mercenaries had served only as a reserve. Now, however, he had no hesitation in casting himself and his troops into the very thick of this latest round in Buganda's protracted internecine conflict, so as to fasten his own authority upon it.

As battle became joined, the main, now strongly rearmed, Protestant force on Lugard's right soon overran the Catholics around Rubaga hill ranged against them, and there set alight the Catholic mission. Meanwhile, Lugard himself checked a Catholic advance against his front by some uncertain shots from his Maxim gun, before sending 200 Sudanese troops under Williams' command up towards the Kabaka's palace on Mengo hill, where they very soon scattered the considerable Catholic forces stationed there.³²

Mwanga and his accompanying Catholic survivors thereupon took refuge, as he had done twice before, on Bulingugwe island. When, however, from there they raided a Protestant village on the mainland, Lugard, on 30 January 1892, launched a Protestant attack upon them, with, this time, Williams firing the Maxim gun. This wrought such death and carnage amongst them that the remnants speedily retreated to the far side of the island before scrambling to leave altogether for the south, with Mwanga in their van.³³ A month later Williams again used the Maxim gun to similar deadly effect against a Catholic advance upon the Protestant-held Sesse island of Namuimba.

³² For a more detailed account of the battle, see Rowe, *Lugard at Kampala*, pp. 19–26.

³³ For some further details, see, e.g., BD, 30–31 Jan. 1892.

With these three lethal encounters, the Battles of Mengo, Bulingugwe and Namuimba, the rout of the Kabaka's supporting forces, and Lugard's capture of Mwanga's palace, the precursors to Buganda's defining conjuncture with the British precipitously gave way to its second stage – a raw assertion of British hegemony at the hands of a combined force of Lugard's mainly Sudanese troops, together with two Maxim guns, and their powerfully rearmed Protestant allies – in indigenous terms, much the most formidable 'new model warband' the kingdom had witnessed: a hegemony that was to last for the next sixty years.³⁴

The ensuing events over the next eighteen months have been previously outlined in [Chapter 3](#), and once again many a detail need not be repeated here. Rather, attention will be focused instead upon their inwardness. This had several strands.

First and foremost, by serving to make Lugard the dominant arbiter in Buganda's affairs, these encounters saw the clear initial establishment of British colonial authority over the kingdom. Just two months on from their first defeat at the Battle of Mengo, the Catholics – fearful that otherwise Lugard, as he threatened, would install the Muslim Prince Mbogo in Mwanga's place – permitted Mwanga to give himself up to Lugard. Thereupon, Lugard appropriated to himself the Kabaka's traditional power (which had lately been seized by the succession of religious-political victors) to distribute the principal offices of state amongst the leading figures in the kingdom, and at the same time prevailed upon Mwanga to sign a further treaty with him in which Mwanga not only renewed his previous undertaking to acknowledge the 'suzerainty' of the IBEAC, but – in the prevailing circumstances, much more tellingly – undertook, to quote the seminal phrase in full: 'to fly the flag of the Company, and no other, at my capital and throughout my kingdom'. Thereafter, rather than Lugard walking over to the Kabaka's palace to see Mwanga, Mwanga and his following walked over to Kampala Fort to see Lugard. 'Now', Lugard wrote in his diary, 'the British are

³⁴ Lugard's actions and Protestant partisanship provoked strong criticism from Bishop Hirth of the White Fathers mission, in France, amongst British Roman Catholics, and by Macdonald, who was ordered by the British government to report upon them. Lugard vigorously defended himself but the matter lingered on till 1898. For an extensive account, see Perham, *Lugard*, II, Chs. 18–19. It will perhaps be noted that the account of the events of January 1892 offered here varies somewhat from Perham, *Lugard*, II, Ch. 15, but that, for example, no mention is made there of Lugard's frustrated call for the Baganda 'to declare for England', nor of his several written admonitions to Mwanga that 'if no justice was done there would be war'.

acknowledged *de facto* rulers of the country³⁵ – which a leading Protestant writing to a friend in Zanzibar glossed by saying: ‘King Mwanga has hoisted the English flag and it is now flying before his house.’³⁶

So it was that, after thirty years of sustained efforts by two successive Kabakas to preserve the autonomy of their kingdom by containing the alien advent peaceably³⁷ – rather than resisting it by force as Kabalega was prone to do – Mwanga in the end found his inherited statecraft completely overwhelmed by Lugard’s successive onslaughts, symbolic as well as lethal. Thereupon, Buganda’s ‘defining conjuncture’ with the British entered upon its third stage of a protracted ‘determining vortex’ in which a further entrenchment of colonial power intermeshed with key struggles for power within the indigenous elite.

It is clearly arguable that Lugard secured his triumph by resorting to the age-old doctrine of ‘divide and rule’. In this, as in several other instances, this needs, however, to be moderated. For as we have seen, deep and fateful divisions were already present within Buganda prior to his arrival in December 1890, and over the next thirteen months reached their nadir. Initially, Lugard sought to bridge them. In April 1891 he first, however, supported the Christians against the Muslims, and then in January 1892, finding the Catholics and Protestants, upon his return from the west, on the edge of open warfare with each other, not only took an openly partisan course on the Protestant side, but at a decisive moment turned the soon mounting conflict into a cardinal opportunity to lock his own hegemony upon the kingdom. The speed with which that was accomplished – by contrast with the elongated fate later meted out to Bunyoro – stemmed, however, not from any effort of his own to prise the kingdom apart, but from his full-blooded exploitation of the deepening cleavages which were already rending its governing elite asunder. Thereafter he played Mbogo off against Mwanga, while, eighteen months later, his then successor, Macdonald, successfully mobilised first a Protestant and then a combined Christian army to repel a revived threat by the previously defeated Muslims. So in the end there were substantial components of ‘divide and rule’ in their actions.

Yet, as others had elsewhere, he had another ploy as well: its counterpart, ‘unite and rule’. Immediately after the Battle of Mengo he sent messages to Mwanga and the leading Catholic chiefs urging them to

³⁵ LD III, p. 190.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 212 (29 Apr. 1892); Kitakule to a missionary in Zanzibar, 5 Apr. 1892, ZA (Low, *Mind of Buganda*, p. 27); 1 Apr. 1893, G/D. Cf. ‘The Company’s flag at last floated over the king’s enclosure as well as over that of the chief minister and English influence was an established fact in Uganda’: Ashe, *Chronicles*, p. 313.

³⁷ With the one exception of Bishop Hannington’s murder.

return to the capital and assuring them that if they did so they would retain their former positions. Hirth, the Catholic Bishop, argued for a division of the kingdom into two quite separate halves – Catholic and Protestant. Lugard said he was prepared to consider this, but was wary of doing so. It would be a recipe for continuing conflict. The Christians would have difficulty in uniting against their common Muslim foes. It would entail ‘two separate centres of government’, along with the cost of a second administration. From the outset, therefore, he energetically pursued the alternative. In spite of having played a major part in the fragmentation of the kingdom, he now bent his efforts to reaggregating it once again. He sought to do so, moreover, under a single acknowledged ruler. Thereby, while offering a means by which the kingdom’s seemingly endless armed conflicts could be brought to a halt, he was effectively seeking to enlist traditional sanction for the upshot, while – by drawing upon the hegemony he now possessed – reconstituting a single effective polity tailor-made for the superimposition of British authority over it.

Having, through his support for the Protestants in the recent conflict, nailed their acceptance of his ascendancy, the first step here was to secure Mwang’a’s return – but if not him, then Mbogo – as the essential figurehead for a renovated kingdom. Then, as Mwang’a’s return took place, he set about inducing first the Catholics and then the Muslims to return to the fold as well. To that end he used his hold upon the distribution of the principal offices of state to allocate different areas of the country amongst the leaders of all three confessional parties. In so doing, he encountered strong protests from the Protestants against the amount of territory he initially proposed to assign to the Catholics, and in the end had to prevail upon the Catholics to confine themselves to the one large southern Saza of Buddu. But with that accomplished, and with the Protestants confirmed in their primacy with no less than six Sazas in the north and east of the country, and after a while the Muslims effectively settled in three small Sazas to the west,³⁸ he successfully corralled all three into a settlement of his own making in which – if one may use analytical language – he held the interstitial position between them and thereby fastened his own authority upon them.³⁹

When, in June 1892, Lugard left Buganda, his parting shot was to ask Williams to see if he could secure the Catholics a better deal.⁴⁰ To begin

³⁸ See *LD* III, p. 188.

³⁹ As Lugard put it: ‘King, Protestants, Catholics and Mohammedans all alike look to me as their sole referee, and not one of them is able to do a single thing alone’: *ibid.*, p. 238.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

with, Williams was well content with the way things were settling down.⁴¹ By early 1893, however, he was becoming increasingly concerned about the separation of the Catholics in Buddu from the rest of the kingdom.⁴² Noting his concerns, his successor the Imperial Commissioner Portal, as we have seen, effected a revised settlement under which the Catholics secured a significant enhancement of positions and territory.⁴³

It was just in time. For within days of Portal's departure, his successor, Macdonald, saw himself as faced by a Muslim revolt seemingly inflamed by Portal's refusal to grant them extra territory as he had to the Catholics.⁴⁴ Back in January 1893, when Williams had led a canoe force against the Buvuma Islands, it had been principally composed of Protestants. Likewise, the force which defeated the Muslims at the Battle of Rubaga in June 1893 was a largely Protestant one. Thanks, however – or so it would seem – to Portal's assuagement of the Catholics, a Catholic contingent soon joined with the Protestants in a combined Christian assault upon the Muslim remnant fleeing to the west.⁴⁵ Following their ensuing rout and Macdonald's forfeiture of one of their lately controlled Sazas to each of the two Christian parties, that left the Muslims with just one, while the Protestants now held seven, and, thanks especially to Portal's intervention, the Catholics five, each of them under the command of one of Buganda's now entrenched oligarchs – dependent, however, for their continuing hold upon them on their close association with the British.

Although Buganda's vortex still had half a dozen years to run, this outcome had three major consequences. As we have seen, Macdonald's 1893 settlement became the template for practically every distribution of power within Buganda for the next seventy years. More immediately, it was the second major consequence which had the greater import. For, following the Muslim defeat at the Battle of Rubaga and the subsequent scattering of their forces, they ceased to be a leading component in the body politic of Buganda at precisely the moment when the two Christian warring factions once again recombined. With that, the deep cleavages which, between 1888 and 1892, had rent the kingdom asunder were

⁴¹ Williams to Administrator, Mombasa, 22 Oct., 9 Dec., MP; Macdonald to Portal, 13 Dec. 1892, FO 84/2265.

⁴² E.g. Williams' Memos, 11 Jan., 16 Mar. 1893, A2/1.

⁴³ The Protestant and Catholic chiefs jointly endorsed Portal's settlement: Portal to Gedde, 21 Apr. 1893, GP; Portal, *Mission*, pp. 228–30.

⁴⁴ Portal, *Mission*, p. 243.

⁴⁵ See, more particularly, Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying*, pp. 152–3, 255–7, 281, and M. Bovill & G.R. Askwith, *Roddy Owen: A Memoir* (London, 1897), Ch. 4.

either dispelled or considerably attenuated. As a consequence, five long years on from its fateful beginning, Buganda's Confrontation III finally ended – fateful, as it had proved to be the occasion for the establishment of British colonial domination over it. That outcome then paved the way for the first moves towards creating the rudiments of colonial government in the kingdom.⁴⁶ Its fabrication came to depend crucially upon the consolidation of the confessional gatherings / new model warbands / warring factions which, under the leadership of Buganda's surviving revolutionary oligarchs, then evolved into the two large Christian parties which, in close alliance with their British imperial overlords, were to give the colonial era its formative indigenous ballast.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ See Ch. 10, pp. 296–303.

⁴⁷ For an outline of the later story, see 'Political Parties in Uganda 1949–1962', in Low, *Buganda*, Ch. 6.

6 Paramountcy: Toro, Busoga and the new overlords

Back in February 1890 Stanley had told Mackinnon that, while it was possible to conquer Buganda, it was important to remember that it was ‘a big country, and the people tolerably good fighters’. Without a railway to cover at least part of the journey, it would take eighteen months and would require ‘500 picked Englishmen’, 2,000 porters and 1,000 mercenary troops.¹ From the time of Lugard’s first arrival, it did arguably take eighteen months before he effectively asserted his hegemony over Buganda, but that never required anything like an expeditionary force of the size which Stanley specified. The precursors which conditioned the circumstances which Lugard confronted, in which the consequences that flowed from Kabaka Mwanga’s adoption of Kabalega’s system of new model warbands played a major role, provided him with a situation which presented a far less formidable opposition than Stanley anticipated.

There were two other places where the establishment of British authority likewise turned, in the end, on the actions of new model warband leaders in their midst.²

But what of those places where there had been no diffusion of the new model warband system?

There were two such close at hand – the Toro region to the west of Buganda, and the Busoga region to the east; ‘regions’ because both were made up of a miscellany of small, sometimes minuscule, rulerships,³ none of which was powerful enough to lord it over all the others. Instead, in varying degrees, they stood subject to the overlordship of one or other of the larger kingdoms in their vicinity, Bunyoro or Buganda.⁴ In such circumstances the establishment of British rule turned not upon the

¹ Stanley to Mackinnon, 4 Feb. 1890, MP.

² For Bunyoro, see Ch. 7; for Nkore, Ch. 8.

³ ‘Chieftaincies’ is often an appropriate term for those appointees who do not appear to have undergone ‘royal’ rituals.

⁴ See Ch. 2.

presence of new model warbands in their midst, for there were none, but upon the supersession of the paramourncy of these larger kingdoms over them by the paramourncy of the British.

The details of the 'defining conjuncture' between the British and the smaller polities in these two regions which this entailed differed significantly; but each followed a common pattern. We have already noted a number of the precursors in Toro, the largest kingdom in its region. (For Toro and its neighbours, see [Map 4](#).) Earlier in the 1830s, Kaboyo, a Prince of Bunyoro's ruling Babito clan, had broken away from his father's control and established a largely independent kingdom of Toro. Apart from two periods when Nyaika, Kaboyo's favourite son, held his own, there was protracted internecine conflict between his descendants, which on two occasions saw the imposition of a Buganda supported candidate on its throne. A more sustained assault came from Bunyoro, where Kabalega was long bent (as we have seen) on reincorporating Toro into his kingdom. For this, his principal instruments were his Abarasura, which after a decade and more of escalating attacks were eventually able, by 1889 (by which time Buganda was engulfed in its civil war), to reincorporate Toro into the Bunyoro kingdom and expel his rival Babito claimants and their followers from it.⁵ The Abarasura then extended their reach over Busongora to the south of Toro and, to a degree, over Kitagwenda, the small kingdom to its east. As testimony to the paramourncy which he had now secured, Kabalega appointed county chiefs to each of these places, as he did to other portions of his dominions.⁶

In June 1891, however, Kasagama (a surviving son of Nyaika) and his older mentor Byakuyamba were, as we have seen, introduced from their exile in Buganda to Lugard, who, with a view to securing their support and that of their peoples on his westward journey, gladly took them along with him.⁷ On reaching the vicinity of Lakes Edward and George he built there a fort, Fort George, to wrest control of the adjacent salt lake from Kabalega's grasp, and then after traversing through Busongora territory to its east led his expedition northwards. There it soon entered upon Toro territory. Since that was to intrude upon Kabalega's recent long-sought reincorporation of Toro into his kingdom, not surprisingly Lugard's advance was strenuously opposed. As early as 9 August 1891, a southern Bunyoro army launched a major attack upon it. That was then followed by two further attacks by Banyoro forces, on 26 August and 1 September, which by then included substantial reinforcements of

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 125–9.

⁷ *LD II*, p. 201; Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, pp. 43–6; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 7–8.

Abarasura. Thanks, however, to the discipline of Lugard's mercenary force and his Maxim gun, all such attacks were decisively repulsed.⁸

After the first of these, Lugard took steps to proclaim Kasagama as Toro's rightful ruler, and in so doing seized the opportunity to effect a raw assertion of British hegemony upon the kingdom. That, here, took the form of a draconian treaty which he imposed on Kasagama and Byakuyamba on 14 August 1891, under which Kasagama was required to acknowledge that he had been 'made King of Toro by the British'; that 'Toro and all its dependences ... and the countries that may come under my rule hereafter are entirely under the British Company'; and that he, Kasagama, and his successors would henceforth be 'bound to obey the orders ... of the Company's representative ... in all matters whatsoever'.⁹ Its harshness was somewhat mitigated by Lugard's reiterated statements that, following the defeat of Kabalega's forces, Kabalega's claims to authority over Toro had been superseded by Kasagama's, and by his constant injunction, to those who were contemplating acknowledging Kasagama as their rightful ruler, to do so forthwith.¹⁰

Kabalega, however, was still holding out. Between late September 1891 and mid November, his warriors launched eight or nine minor attacks upon Lugard's forces.¹¹ While none of these was in any way effective, upon Lugard's return from Kavelli, in October 1891, accompanied by his large reinforcement of Selim's following, Kabalega first sought to mount a major attack upon Kasagama (which, however, did not eventuate),¹² and then launched his Abarasura under their locally prominent leader, Ireeta, into two major assaults on Lugard's main force.¹³ Both of these were, however, no less decisively defeated than before, which left Lugard in effective control not only of the Toro region but of a large part of southern Bunyoro as well. He soon signalled his dominance there by distributing large numbers of Selim's Sudanese soldiery in the two lines of forts he had built across the region, and in his reiterated declaration that British authority now prevailed throughout it.¹⁴

For the moment, so it seemed. For when, in February 1892, Kabalega sent a large force against Fort Wavertree, the northernmost of Lugard's

⁸ Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 147; *LD II*, pp. 278–82, 300–11.

⁹ *LD II*, pp. 287–8; MP.

¹⁰ E.g. *Ibid.*, pp. 291, 307, 366. Hereafter, see, more generally, Ingham, *Toro*, Ch. 3; Wilson, 'Toro', Chs. 6–7; and Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, Chs. 3–4.

¹¹ E.g. *LD II*, pp. 360, 369, 375, 397.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 363–4; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 148.

¹⁴ *LD II*, pp. 369, 376–7.

forts, the Sudanese troops posted there ‘thrashed them soundly’.¹⁵ In the course of half a dozen major encounters, Kabalega’s Abarasura had thus been more gravely defeated than ever before. Given this context, Kasagama appointed a series of territorial chiefs subject to his authority, based upon the system he had encountered during his exile in Buganda, as testimony to his supersession of Kabalega’s paramouncy by his own.

But dire events soon obtruded and Toro thereupon embarked upon its vortex.¹⁶ To begin with, since the Sudanese troops were not as yet paid and were expected to live off the country, the depredations they launched against Banyoro settlements soon extended against Batoro ones as well. This was especially so in the vicinity of Fort George in the south.¹⁷ But then, much more seriously, in March 1893, Portal, the Imperial Commissioner, arrived in Buganda to determine whether an imperial Protectorate should be instituted there, and was soon giving orders for the successive withdrawal from Lugard’s western forts and the concentration of their Sudanese garrisons within Buganda, both as a means of curbing their rapine and in case a total British withdrawal from the country came to be ordered.¹⁸ Inevitably, however, that was to open the way for a renewed assault by Kabalega’s forces on Toro territory. Kasagama declared indeed that it would be ‘like taking the lock & key from his front door’.¹⁹

To begin with, there was some suggestion that he and his following should take refuge in the small southern kingdom of Kitagwenda,²⁰ while alternatively Macdonald offered Kasagama, Byakuyamba and another leading chief, Kijagiri, the opportunity to take refuge in north-western Buganda.²¹ Kasagama, however, was determined to remain in Toro²² and was eventually sent 160 muskets to help him hold his own.²³

¹⁵ Fenwick de Winton to Lugard, 9 Mar. 1892, *LD III*, pp. 117–18; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 149.

¹⁶ For other accounts, see Wilson, ‘Toro’, Chs. 6–7; Ingham, *Toro*, Ch. 3; Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, Ch. 4.

¹⁷ Ashe to Williams, 15 Dec. 1892, A32/1; Grant to Williams, 25, 28 Mar., Tucker to Portal, 27, 29 Mar., A2/1; Portal to Rosebery, 6 Apr., FOCP 6454/344; Portal to Anderson, 9 Apr. 1893, PP; Bovill & Askwith, *Owen*, p. 59.

¹⁸ Bovill & Askwith, *Owen*, pp. 44–6, 125; Portal to Owen, 27 Mar., 22 Apr., Macdonald to Owen, 5 June, 19 July, A3/1; Portal Diary, 4 May; Portal to Macdonald, 8 June, A31/1, to Rosebery, 27 Mar., 6 Apr. 1893, FO 84/60.

¹⁹ Bovill & Askwith, *Owen*, pp. 55–6, 74; Owen to Portal, 23 Apr., 4, 24 May 1893, A2/1.

²⁰ Bovill & Askwith, *Owen*, p. 46; Owen to Macdonald, 20 June 1893, A2/1.

²¹ Macdonald to Arthur, 5 June, Macdonald to Owen, 19 July, A3/1; Macdonald to Portal, 13 June, A31/1; Owen to Macdonald, 27 July 1893, A2/1.

²² Owen to Portal, 23 Apr., 3 May, A2/1; Macdonald to Portal, 14 June, A3/1; Macdonald to Portal, 21 Oct. 1893, A31/1.

²³ Macdonald to Cracknall, 21 Oct. 1893, A31/1.

But the other two (who for reasons to which we will come felt little beholden to Kasagama) moved, in September–October 1893, with 4,000 followers into Buganda’s borderlands.²⁴ By that time their worst fears were being realised.²⁵ As early as May 1893 a Bunyoro army launched a first attack on Toro.²⁶ There were two more in June and July,²⁷ while in September 1893 Kasagama was forced by a major Abarasura assault, under their foremost leader, Rwabodongo, to seek refuge in the nearby Ruwenzori mountains.²⁸ With that, Kabalega’s former paramountcy over Toro once more passed into his hands.

But it did not long remain there. For, following the arrival in Buganda of a new acting British Commissioner, Colonel Colville, in November 1893, a major Anglo–Baganda attack (in terms to which we shall come),²⁹ in which both Byakuyamba and Kajigiri joined,³⁰ was soon launched against Bunyoro. Within a month it had compelled Kabalega to take refuge in Budongo forest in the north of his kingdom, where Colville sought to confine him by building a line of forts across Bunyoro’s waistline. In confronting this onslaught,³¹ Kabalega was forced to recall his Abarasura from the Toro region,³¹ and for the second time in two years to abandon his long-sought ambition to reincorporate it into his inherited dominions.

Following the Banyoro withdrawal, it was incumbent upon Colville to decide what if anything to do about reestablishing the British position in the Toro region in his place. Taking his cue from the nexus Lugard had established with Kasagama and Byakuyamba, the way to proceed, he soon declared, was to ‘come to terms with the chiefs of southern Unyoro’, especially since, as he later recalled, ‘Kasigama of Toru had already made a treaty with the officials of the Company, and Rikwiamba [Byakuyamba] one of the southern Unyoro chiefs, was on our side, this seemed feasible’.³² Essentially that was because, having been expelled from their patrimonies by the Abarasura, Kasagama and Byakuyamba

²⁴ Owen to Macdonald, 25 Sept., 10 Oct. 1893, A2/1; Macdonald.

²⁵ Owen to Macdonald, 20 June 1893, A2/1; Owen to Colville, 8 Mar. 1894, FO 2/71.

²⁶ Owen to Colville, 24 May, Owen to Macdonald, 28 May, FO 2/71; Macdonald to Arthur, 5 June, to Owen, FO 2/71 & 25 June, A3/1; Macdonald to Portal, 13 June 1893, A31/1.

²⁷ Owen to Macdonald, 3 July 1893, A2/1; Bovill & Askwith, *Owen*, p. 108.

²⁸ Owen to Colville, 8 Mar. 1894, A2/2; Bovill & Askwith, *Owen*, p. 170; H. Colville, *The Land of the Nile Springs* (London, 1895), pp. 68–70.

²⁹ See the next chapter.

³⁰ Nominal Roll ..., 27 Feb. 1894, FOCP 6617/enc. 2 in 5.

³¹ Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 154–5; Owen to Colville, 8 Mar. 1894, FO 2/71. Colville, *Nile Springs*, pp. 110, 119.

³² Colville, *Nile Springs*, pp. 144, 214, 229; Colville to Cracknall [1894], A32/2.

and their followings maintained an intense interest in recovering their inheritances and were quite prepared to accept the paramountcy of the British over them if that was the price they needed to pay to do so. Such indeed were the conditioning circumstances which henceforth governed the manner in which the British proceeded to entrench their paramountcy over the Toro region.

Building on these, Colville then further decided that, while in Byakuyamba's case in Mwenge, and Kijigiri's in Kyaka, and more extensively in Busongora, there were a number of figures with hereditary claims to chieftaincy (and in Kitagwenda even to a small rulership) separate from Toro, there was also in Kasagama the heir to a larger rulership whose pivotal position in this cluster could well be employed to form a single polity with which the British could more conveniently engage. Accordingly, in mid February 1894, he dispatched Major Owen and Lieutenant Villiers with an armed escort to Toro and in a seminal move ordered that: 'You will proceed to Toro, and there restore confidence and settle the territorial limits and mutual relations of Kasagama of Toru, Rekwiamba of Mwengi and Kijagiri of Kyaka, forming them into a Confederation of which Kasagama will be the head.'³³ Soon after their arrival, Owen went still further and told Colville that he had 'reinstated Kasagama as King of Toru, Usongora [Busongora], and Kitakwenda, Yakyamba as Chief of Mwengi, and Kigisyri as Chief of Chatka, subject to Kasagama';³⁴ that he had delimited the boundaries of all the chieftaincies listed as constituting the component parts of 'Kasagama's country';³⁵ and that on 3 March 1894 he had procured a treaty from Kasagama in which he undertook to give British subjects access 'to all parts of my dominions, including Toru, Usongoro, and the country known as Kitakwendas and their dependencies'. To this was added an attachment that declared that, in 'virtue of the protection afforded me by Her Majesty's Government', Kasagama would pay the British a substantial tribute in salt and ivory.³⁶

These proceedings of mid February 1894 had three major consequences. In the first place, they constituted, even for Byakuyamba, a raw assertion – for Kasagama a reassertion – of British hegemony right across the region. At the same time, they signalled that the paramountcy

³³ Colville to Owen, 18 Feb., A3/2, to Cracknall, 24 Mar. 1894, FO/71.

³⁴ Owen to Colville, 8 Mar. 1894, FO 2/71.

³⁵ Owen's Memo, 1 Mar., A2/2, enc. in Colville to Cracknall, 24 Mar. 1894, FO 2/71.

³⁶ The Toro Treaty, 3 Mar. 1894, enc. in Colville to Cracknall, FO 2/71. In reply the Foreign Office wrote pedantically a year later to say that 'protection' here did not imply a Protectorate but simply the assistance lately accorded Kasagama – a dictum long before overtaken on the ground: Foreign Office to Jackson, 10 Apr. 1895, FO 2/91.

which, on two preceding occasions, Kabalega had successfully reasserted over Toro had now been superseded by the paramountcy of the British. More particularly, despite the absence of several of those primarily affected (other than Kasagama and Byakuyamba), they set out the charter provisions for the much enlarged Toro kingdom of the future. Lugard in his day had been very hesitant about supporting Kasagama's ambitions to lord it over any of the areas outside 'Toro proper' till he had shown himself capable of doing so effectively.³⁷ But, so bent were Colvile and Owen upon welding to their side 'a confederacy' 'under Kasagama' of all those in the vicinity who had locally legitimate claims to authority, as their principal means of exercising British paramountcy over the whole of the region, that any such scruples were completely set aside.

This was to have fateful consequences. For whilst almost all the chiefs listed were much relieved to see Kabalega severely defeated, none of them was of a mind to accept Kasagama's paramountcy in his place. As a consequence, as Toro's defining conjuncture with the British now entered upon its determining vortex, the principal struggle for power took the form of a contest between Kasagama and a penumbra of those holding rulerships and chieftaincies adjacent to 'Toro proper', which, with scarcely an exception, had never been subject to the paramountcy of a Toro ruler before.

It was soon plain, for a start, that the leading chiefs in Busongora in the southwest of the region were utterly opposed to acknowledging Kasagama's ascendancy over them.³⁸ Back in 1893 Kuliafiri, chief at Kasenyi close to Lake George, had firmly rejected Kasagama's claim to exercise any authority over him,³⁹ while, a year later, the British traveller Scott-Elliott told Colvile that Kasagama had no right to the 'sultanship' of Busongora as he had no power to protect it from external attack.⁴⁰ By that time, however, Owen had already proclaimed 'Usongora' to be part of Kasagama's dominions,⁴¹ while Kasagama had begun to take steps to assert his authority there.⁴² Moreover, in August 1894, Colvile soon made his own mind clear when he told J.P. Wilson (whom he had posted to Fort George as the British representative in Toro) 'that the most satisfactory arrangement would be that they [the Basongora chiefs] should own Kasagama's authority, ... but if they cannot make a

³⁷ *LD* II, pp. 407, 410, 420.

³⁸ Owen to Macdonald, 20 June 1893, A2/1.

³⁹ Grant to Williams, 26 Mar. 1893, A2/1.

⁴⁰ Scott-Elliott to Colvile, 2 Aug. 1894, A2/2.

⁴¹ Colvile to Owen, 18 Feb. 1894, A3/2.

⁴² Scott-Elliott to Colvile, 1, 24 May, 25 June 1894, A2/2.

settlement they must go to the wall. I do not wish Kasagama to be weakened in any way.⁴³ Wilson seems, however, to have proceeded cautiously. Kuliafiri soon withdrew to Bunyaruguru further south,⁴⁴ and in effect Busongora first became subject to the British before it ever became subject to Kasagama.⁴⁵

But whereas Busongora had at one time arguably been subject to a Toro ruler,⁴⁶ this had never been true of Kitagwenda in the southeast of the region.⁴⁷ Its rulers belonged to the cadet branch of the Bahaga Babito and had accordingly paid court and tribute to Bunyoro, as periodically they seem to have done to Nkore.⁴⁸ Following Lugard's building of Fort George in 1891,⁴⁹ it had suffered considerably from the Sudanese whom he had left behind there, and in the years that followed turned decidedly hostile towards the British.⁵⁰ As a consequence its ruler, Rwigi, went north to join Kabalega. Whilst there he died of smallpox and was succeeded by his young son Bulemu, with Rwigi's brother, Kakintuli, as his guardian.⁵¹ When news then reached Kakintuli that, by some diktat of a British officer away in Toro, Kitagwenda had somehow been placed under the authority of Kasagama, he naturally treated it with derision. Kakintuli seems, however, to have been a circumspect man. He first put himself in touch both with Kabalega and with Ntare of Nkore,⁵² and when Wilson threatened to attack him responded in a relatively accommodating manner (at the instance, it would seem, of some of his associates), with which Wilson, although not it seems Kasagama, declared himself content.⁵³ There was

⁴³ Colville to J.P. Wilson, 19 Aug. 1894, A4/1; Colville to Cracknall [1894], A32/2; Colville sent Wilson to Toro in July, but he had a humiliating journey there: Colville, *Nile Springs*, pp. 287ff.

⁴⁴ Morris, *Ankole*, p. 31.

⁴⁵ J.P. Wilson to Colville, 24 Sept., 29 Nov. 1894, A2/3; Ingham, *Toro*, pp. 29–30.

⁴⁶ O.W. Furley, 'Reign of Kasagama', *Uj*, 31 (1967), pp. 183–4; Grant to Williams, 26 Mar. 1893, A2/1; Appendix to Kasagama's envoy's statement, 14 Nov. 1895, A511; interview, Yosia Nyakairu, 5 Apr., Revd Zekyeri Binyomo, 5 Apr. 1958.

⁴⁷ Ingham, *Toro*, pp. 58–9.

⁴⁸ Gorju, *Entre le Victoria*, pp. 69–71.

⁴⁹ Rwigi, its ruler, with whom Lugard had equivocal dealings but never met, strongly opposed this: *LD II*, pp. 425–34.

⁵⁰ Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying*, pp. 174, 218–19, 231, 294. J.P. Wilson to Colville, 26 Nov. 1894, A2/3.

⁵¹ Gorju, *Entre le Victoria*, p. 71. Interview with Bulemu's widow, 3 Apr. 1958.

⁵² J.P. Wilson to Colville, 24 Sept. 1894, A2/3; J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 20 Jan., 20 Apr., A4/1; Jackson to J.P. Wilson, 23 Mar. 1895, AS/1; Colville to Hardinge, 5 Dec. 1894, FOCP 6693/270, and see minutes by Hill and Anderson on original in FO 2/72; Anderson to Jackson, 4 Apr., FOCP 6717/15; Jackson to Kimberley, 3 Aug. 1895, FOCP 6805/129.

⁵³ Jackson to J.P. Wilson, 23 Mar., A5/1; J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 20 Apr. 1895, A4/1.

no suggestion, however, at this stage that either Bulemu or Kakintuli in any way acknowledged Kasagama's paramountcy over them.⁵⁴

Kitagwenda, however, was some distance from Toro, and the most salient obstacles to the establishment of Kasagama's authority in the 'Toro Confederacy' lay to the northeast where, in Mwenge and Kyaka, Byakuyamba, Kijagiri and their associates soon showed themselves just as hostile towards submitting themselves to Kasagama's paramountcy as Kakintuli.⁵⁵ The central fact here was that Byakuyamba and Kasagama were from different Babito sub-clans. Kasagama was a Muboyo, a descendant of Kaboyo, the first Omukama of Toro, whereas Byakuyamba was a Mutwara, a descendant of Itwara, a son of the eighteenth-century Omukama Ruhaga of Bunyoro, who had been placed in charge of Mwenge by his father.⁵⁶ As a young man, Byakuyamba, along with other Baitwara, had been expelled from Mwenge by Kabalega's forces, and Mwenge, Kyaka and, indeed, subsequently Toro as well, had then been placed under members of the Buanyonza clan, from which Kabalega's mother had come.⁵⁷ The return, therefore, of Byakuyamba to Mwenge, like that of Kasagama to Toro, represented a return by exiled Babito to lands where their forefathers had held power before them. But this did not carry with it, except at the insistence of the British – which Byakuyamba and other Baitwara such as Kijagiri naturally resisted – any suggestion that the Baitwara should thereby be subordinated to the Baboyo.⁵⁸ In the past Baitwara had been subject to the rulers of Bunyoro. But they had never ordinarily been subject to the rulers of Toro. Hardly surprisingly therefore, when Byakuyamba and other Baitwara returned to Mwenge and Kyaka, they did not see themselves as being subject to Kasagama, as they very clearly demonstrated when, in September 1893, they left Kasagama to his own devices and accepted Owen's offer to take refuge in Buganda with their followers on their own. Kijagiri, who went there with Byakuyamba, had, very probably at Byakuyamba's instance, been recognised as chief of Kyaka.⁵⁹ It was said,

⁵⁴ Neither is mentioned, for example, in the list of 'Confederacy' chiefs attending a meeting in June 1896: Sitwell to Berkeley, 30 June, also 28 June, A4/5. See also Berkeley to Sitwell, 25 Apr. 1896, A5/2.

⁵⁵ Ingham, *Toro*, p. 75; Wilson, 'Toro', pp. 211–12, 214–15.

⁵⁶ Interviews, Revd Zekyeri Binyomo, 5 Apr., Lazaro Basigara (ex-Mugema of Kyaka), 7 Apr. 1958.

⁵⁷ Interviews, Yosia Nyakairu, the then Pokino of Toro, 5 Apr., Lazaro Basigara, 7 Apr. 1958. Another version says Byakuyamba was captured by Baganda raiders: Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, p. 101. This is not necessarily contradictory.

⁵⁸ Interview, Yosia Nyakairu, 5 Apr. 1958, confirmed this supposition.

⁵⁹ Owen to Macdonald, 10 Oct. 1893, A2/11; interview, Revd Zekyeri Binyomo, 5 Apr. 1958.

moreover, that, sometime thereafter, Colville had declared that Kyaka should not constitute part of Kasagama's territories.⁶⁰ But whilst, in his orders to Owen on his mission to Toro, Colville had drawn a distinction between Mwenge, Kyaka and Kasagama's other prospective dominions, he nevertheless ordered that they too should be placed 'under Kasagama'.⁶¹

Byakuyamba, however, increasingly sought to play the role of an independent 'King of Mwenge'.⁶² In January 1895, when he was badly mauled in a fierce attack by a Bunyoro force upon him, he first appealed to Kasagama for help, and then, when Kasagama failed to respond, not only immediately appealed to the Baganda, but seized the opportunity to emphasise that he had been 'told to occupy Mwenge not under Kasagama but under Kampala'.⁶³

During the same period he took steps to assert his claim to be the arbiter of events, not just in his own Mwenge, but in neighbouring Kyaka too. Back in September 1894, Kijagiri of Kyaka had died. Local messengers were thereupon sent to Buganda. But it was Byakuyamba who 'put his man in';⁶⁴ and when J.P. Wilson decided that Kagoro, son of another Mutwara, Bikago,⁶⁵ should be made chief of Kyaka, and ordered Byakuyamba to withdraw his candidate, Byakuyamba was incensed.⁶⁶ He was clearly hostile to any Mutwara who was not his own nominee being installed in Kyaka, particularly as his candidate was Kijagiri's own son Nyama. And in an obvious attempt to seek a counterweight to Wilson, he set about ingratiating himself with Foaker, the British officer now posted in the Nyakabimba region, in the borderlands with Buganda. In the end, Wilson was persuaded that Nyama should become chief of Kyaka, but, because of his youth, also insisted that Kagoro should become his Katikiro.⁶⁷ Byakuyamba made it his business, however, to install Nyama in Kyaka, and in so doing the two of them burnt Kagoro's

⁶⁰ J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 14 Aug. 1895, A4/2. Colville, in his instructions to Owen, at any rate clearly distinguished between Kasagama of Toro, Byakuyamba of Mwenge, and Kijagiri of Kyaka: Colville to Owen, 18 Feb. 1894, A3/2. See also Colville to Cracknall, 24 Mar. 1894, FO 2/71, where his formula ran that Owen was: 'to reinstate in their provinces the Wanyoro Chiefs Rekwimba and Kigigiri ... and to arrange a confederation between them and Kasigama, King of Toro'.

⁶¹ Colville to Owen, 18 Feb. 1894, A3/2.

⁶² Byakuyamba to J.P. Wilson, 26 Jan. 1895, A4/1.

⁶³ Ibid.; J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 20 Jan. 1895, Byakuyamba to Katikiro, etc., of Buganda [1895], J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 1 Feb. 1895, Wilson to Dunning, [2 Feb. 1895], A4/1.

⁶⁴ J.P. Wilson to Colville, 24 Sept. 1894, A2/3.

⁶⁵ Interview, Edwardi Winyi, 3 Apr. 1958.

⁶⁶ J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 20 Apr., A4/1; 5 July 1895, A4/2.

⁶⁷ Foaker to Jackson, 5 June, J.P. Wilson to Foaker, 14 June 1895, A4/1.

house and drove him away⁶⁸ (whereupon Kagoro in his turn sought to try his luck with Foaker).⁶⁹

With Kagoro's departure Byakuyamba evidently felt that he was making some headway, for it was soon being reported that he was insisting that three Bunyoro chiefs should acknowledge him as their overlord;⁷⁰ while, before long, Kasagama was complaining that Byakuyamba was openly rejecting his claims to exercise authority over him.⁷¹ Jackson, Colville's successor as acting British Commissioner, firmly insisted, however, in mid 1895, that the chiefs in Mwenge and Kyaka were 'bound by agreement to acknowledge Kasagama'.⁷² By this time, moreover, a new British headquarters had been built at Fort Gerry, close to Kasagama's capital, Kabarole; a succession of British officers was now regularly posted there, and for the most part they made it their business to uphold Kabalega's paramourncy.⁷³

In the latter part of 1895 the Toro Confederacy, however, fell into great disarray. Much of this was provoked by Captain Ashburnham, J.P. Wilson's successor as the British representative in Toro.⁷⁴ After first seizing Byakuyamba and flogging him on a charge of slave trading,⁷⁵ Ashburnham sent him for trial to Kampala in November 1895. There, in the end, he was acquitted by the lately arrived substantive British Commissioner, Berkeley, but was nevertheless required to stay in Kampala for several months longer.⁷⁶ In his absence, Ashburnham replaced him in his chieftaincy of Mwenge by Kagoro.⁷⁷

Meanwhile there was a suggestion that Kyaka should be transferred to Buganda. Back in May 1895, Rwabudongo, Kabalega's longstanding Abarasura leader, had, in circumstances to which we will come,⁷⁸

⁶⁸ J.P. Wilson to Foaker, 5 July, A4/2; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 23 Nov. 1895, A4/3.

⁶⁹ J.P. Wilson to Foaker, 14 June 1895, A4/1.

⁷⁰ Pulteney to Ashburnham, 12 July 1895, A4/2.

⁷¹ Ashburnham to Jackson, 22 July 1895, A4/2.

⁷² Pulteney to Jackson, 21 June, A4/1; Jackson to Pulteney, 1, 2 July 1895, A5/1.

⁷³ J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 20 Apr., 10 June, A4/1; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 23 Nov. 1895, A4/3; Sitwell to Berkeley, 2 June 1896, A4/5.

⁷⁴ Jackson to J.P. Wilson, 24 June 1895, A5/1. The Batoro called Ashburnham 'Rutabisunga', 'a man who brooks no nonsense': interview, Mukwenda of Toro, 6 Apr. 1958.

⁷⁵ Ashburnham to Jackson, 22 July, 5 Sept., A4/2; Berkeley to Ashburnham, 3 Nov. 1895, A5/2.

⁷⁶ Berkeley to Ashburnham, 3 Nov., A5/2, 10 Dec. 1895, A5/1; Berkeley to Guillermain, 24 Jan. 1895, A7/2.

⁷⁷ Berkeley to Guillermain, 24 Jan., A7/2; Ashburnham to Jackson, 5 Sept., A4/2; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 23 Nov. 1895, A4/3.

⁷⁸ See the following chapter, pp. 192, 194.

surrendered to Kasagama.⁷⁹ Rwabudongo was no Mubito, but, since he was now completely alienated from his former Mubito ruler, Kabalega,⁸⁰ it was understandable that he should have sought to submit himself to another Mubito ruler, Kasagama, who was at least in control of part of the old Bunyoro kingdom.⁸¹ To begin with, he was placed in charge of one of Kasagama's territorial chiftaincies.⁸² But Kasagama displayed so much animosity towards him⁸³ that he soon departed for Kampala, where, after lengthy discussion, prompted perhaps by Rwabudongo himself, the idea was mooted that Kyaka should be transferred to Buganda, and that Rwabudongo should become its chief.⁸⁴ Ashburnham welcomed the idea as he hoped that, with Kagoro chief of Mwenge, and Rwabudongo chief of Kyaka, they would form 'a buffer state on the high road of the powder caravans' going north to Kabalega with arms and ammunition for use against the British.⁸⁵ But when Kasagama heard of the idea he was so concerned that he sent Nyama to Kampala to plead that his recently recognised hereditary claims to Kyaka should be maintained.⁸⁶ In the event, Nyama's appeal succeeded.⁸⁷ Kyaka thereupon remained part of the Toro Confederacy – while the luckless Rwabudongo found himself expelled from Toro altogether.⁸⁸

By that time, however, the position had been greatly worsened as the consequence of a major clash between Kasagama and Ashburnham. Following trouble between them over Kasagama's failure to supply the British fort with food and to produce the ivory he owed them as tribute under the Owen treaty,⁸⁹ Ashburnham in September 1895 not only detained Kasagama in a chain gang in the British fort but flogged his

⁷⁹ J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 7 May, A4/1; Jackson to J.P. Wilson, 20 May, A5/1; Jackson to Kimberley, 20 May 1895, FOCP 6761/288.

⁸⁰ J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 10 June 1895, A4/1.

⁸¹ Interview, Revd Yosiya Kamuhigi, 4 Apr. 1958, corroborated this supposition.

⁸² J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 10 June 1895, A4/1.

⁸³ J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 10 June, 14 Aug., A4/1; Jackson to Ashburnham, 15 Aug., Wilson's Memo 14 Nov. 1895, A5/1.

⁸⁴ Foaker to Jackson, 5 June 1894, A4/1; Wilson to Jackson, 3, 14 Aug., A4/2; Berkeley to Ternan, 27 Sept., A5/1; Wilson to Ashburnham, 2 Oct., Ashburnham to Berkeley, 15 Dec. 1895, A4/3.

⁸⁵ Ashburnham to Berkeley, 23 Nov. 1895, A4/3.

⁸⁶ Ashburnham to Berkeley, 21 Oct. 1895, A4/2.

⁸⁷ Berkeley to Ashburnham, 19 Nov., A5/1; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 15, 29 Dec. 1895, A4/3.

⁸⁸ Wilson to Berkeley, 12 Nov. 1895, A4/3; Pulteney to Berkeley, 23 Mar., A4/4; Sitwell's diary, 20 May 1896, Makerere University Library; see the next chapter.

⁸⁹ J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 20 Apr., A4/1; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 14 Sept., A4/2; Berkeley to Ashburnham, 22 Oct., Wilson's Memo, 14 Nov., A5/1; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 23 Nov., 26 Dec. 1895, A4/13.

Katikiro and two other chiefs in order to make them hand over the women and guns they were alleged to have taken from Rwabudongo. The climax here came in November 1895 when Ashburnham was informed that Kasagama had been harbouring some powder-traders from the German sphere, and dispatched some of his Sudanese escort to ransack Kasagama's headquarters. Fearing further ill-treatment, Kasagama took to the hills. Some of his chiefs, however, were apprehended by Ashburnham's Sudanese and flogged, so that one of them died, whereupon Kasagama sped hurriedly to Kampala to make representations there to the British Commissioner. In the ensuing mêlée and amid a flurry of further accusations by Ashburnham against Kasagama, the Protestant Baganda teachers who had arrived in Toro earlier in the year and had become closely associated with Kasagama were roughly handled by the Sudanese and then peremptorily expelled by Ashburnham from the country.⁹⁰

When they and Kasagama related their stories to their associates in Buganda, the Anglican missionaries made such urgent representations to Berkeley that he called upon Ashburnham to make a full explanation.⁹¹

I am sorry [Ashburnham at first responded] but I beg it will be borne in mind that I am here in Toru the sole barrier against slave-trading and powder-running with every chief doing his best to evade me. If Kasagama is allowed to return to Toru under the impression that he has by the aid of the missionaries triumphed it will I feel be a great blow to the peaceful advance of this district.⁹²

Berkeley, however, then held a private enquiry in Kampala on the case, to which the leading Anglican missionaries were invited, at which Ashburnham broke down in tears, Kasagama was acquitted of all the charges laid against him, and Ashburnham subsequently asked if he might leave the country.⁹³

⁹⁰ Wilson to Jackson, 14 Aug., Ashburnham to Jackson, 11 Sept., Ashburnham to Berkeley, 14 Sept., A4/2, and 31 Dec. 1895, A4/3; Jackson to Ashburnham, 15 Aug., Berkeley to Ashburnham, 22 Oct., Namasole, Toro, to Berkeley, 31 Oct. [incorrectly 1892], Wilson's Memo, 14 Nov., A5/1; Tucker to Berkeley, 27 Nov., A6/1; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 18, 22 Dec. 1895, A4/3.

⁹¹ J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 10 June, A4/1; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 11, 12, 13, 15, 23 Nov., 11, 18, 22, 26, 31 Dec., A4/3; Note by Tucker, 25 Nov., Tucker to Berkeley, 27 Nov., A6/1; Berkeley to Ashburnham, 2, 10 Dec. 1895, A5/1; Tucker to Stock, 10 Jan., Tucker to Baylis, 14 Jan., Walker to Baylis, 2 Mar. 1896, G3 A5/012; Walker to LGW, 2 Dec., to BWW, 29 Dec. 1895, to IW, 5 Jan. 1896, WP; Furley, 'Reign of Kasagama', pp. 86-7; interview, Revd Yosiyi Kamuhigi, 4 Apr. 1958.

⁹² Ashburnham to Berkeley, 18 Dec. 1895, A4/3.

⁹³ Walker to CHW, 3 Mar. 1896, WP; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 3 Nov., 26 Dec. 1895, A4/3; Berkeley to Ashburnham, 25 Apr. 1896, A5/2.

All this led to a further development. For, to the great delight of the Anglican missionaries, Kasagama on 15 March 1896 was baptised with the Christian name of Daudi.⁹⁴ He had for some time been a Christian 'reader', and may well have come under the influence of Apolo Kivebulaya, an exceptional Baganda Protestant catechist who had served in Toro.⁹⁵ He had lately been greatly assisted, moreover, by the Anglican missionaries. Yet it also seems that in accepting baptism Kasagama was prudently ensuring that Byakuyamba, his main rival in Toro, who had for some years been a convert, should no longer hold this advantage over him. At all events, on his return to Toro Kasagama quickly revealed his view of the political implications of his action.

Back in 1893, under pressure from Portal, the Anglican and Catholic bishops had come to an arrangement by which the western parts of the British sphere were, initially at least, to be a field for Catholic endeavour only, while the eastern ones went to the Protestants.⁹⁶ To that end Father Achte of the White Fathers had arrived in Toro in 1895.⁹⁷ Within a very short time, however, these arrangements had broken down. Baganda Protestant catechists had arrived as well,⁹⁸ and in 1896 A.B. Fisher established an Anglican mission station close to Kasagama's capital at Kabarole.⁹⁹

The rivalry between the two missions now became acute.¹⁰⁰ Already there had been a spirited exchange between Berkeley and the Catholic Bishop Guillermain over Kagoro. For, following Byakuyamba's acquittal on a charge of slave dealing, Berkeley had eventually agreed that Byakuyamba should return to Mwenge. But that meant that Kagoro, who at Ashburnham's instance had replaced him there, would once again be dispossessed of a chieftaincy.¹⁰¹ As some insurance against this, Kagoro had lately linked up with the Catholics,¹⁰² and the White

⁹⁴ Tucker to Baylis, 19 Mar., Walker to Baylis, 9 Apr., G3 A5/012; Walker to BWW, 2 Mar. 1896, WP.

⁹⁵ Luck, *African Saint*.

⁹⁶ Portal to Rosebery, 8 Apr. 1893, FOCP 6454/349.

⁹⁷ See Colville to Hirth, 16 July, Colville to J.P. Wilson, 26 Nov., Guillermain to Colville, 14 Dec. 1894, A3/2.

⁹⁸ Fisher to Portal, 29 Mar., A2/1; Tucker to Baylis, 29 Sept. 1893, G3 A5/09; Finance Cte Mins., V. Nyanza Miss., 9 July 1894, G3 A5/010; Berkeley to Sitwell, 25 Apr. 1896, A5/2.

⁹⁹ Fisher to Baylis, 26 Mar., Tucker to Baylis, 14 Apr., 9 May, Miller to Baylis, 12 Aug. 1896, G3 A5/012.

¹⁰⁰ Ashburnham to Berkeley, 22 Dec. 1895, A4/3; Achte to Ashburnham, 30 Apr., Tucker to Ashburnham, 1 May, Kagoro's statement, 4 May, A4/5; Berkeley to Sitwell, 18 May, A5/2; Sitwell's diary, May 1896ff., Makerere University Library.

¹⁰¹ Ashburnham to Berkeley, 29 Dec. 1895, A4/3; Berkeley to Salisbury, 13 Feb., 14 Mar., and enclosures, FOCP 6849/58 and 186; Streicher to Berkeley, 13 Aug. 1896, A6/2.

¹⁰² Tucker to Ashburnham, 1 May, Kagoro's statement, 4 May, A4/5; Walker to L.G. Walker, 3 May, WP; Tucker to Stock, 14 Apr. 1896, G3 A5/012.

Fathers now alleged that he was being discriminated against. Berkeley forcefully rebutted the idea, but, as a compromise, decided that a new chieftaincy should be carved out for Kagoro,¹⁰³ with the consequence that, while Byakuyamba returned to Mwenge, and Nyama found himself confirmed as chief of (west) Kyaka,¹⁰⁴ Kagoro became chief of Lwoko (east Kyaka).¹⁰⁵ Kasagama had never been well disposed towards Kagoro, and reacted sharply against this intrusion into his kingdom, on Kagoro's behalf, of the Catholic-Protestant divide that had so grievously wracked Buganda. As a consequence Kasagama made it plain that he only wanted Protestant chiefs in Toro.¹⁰⁶ He thereupon proceeded to harass those who aligned themselves with the White Fathers.¹⁰⁷ He pressed a case against Kagoro, which Captain Sitwell, Ashburnham's successor, thought should best be transferred to Kampala – where Kagoro was acquitted;¹⁰⁸ and, at a well-attended assembly of senior chiefs in June 1896, at which Sitwell on Berkeley's instructions attempted to proclaim religious freedom in Toro, Kasagama openly repudiated him.¹⁰⁹

Beneath all of this there persisted, so it would seem, a more material matter. For, in sending Sitwell to Toro, Berkeley had reiterated that Kasagama's paramountcy covered the whole of the Toro Confederacy as Owen had defined it.¹¹⁰ But it was still so novel and so arbitrary a creation that Kasagama continued to encounter all manner of local resistances. In such circumstances there can be little doubt that his Protestant partisanship was compounded, in part at least, of an attempt to bind together a new and wider network of loyalties on which he could rely.¹¹¹ Such a stance, however, did him no good with Sitwell,¹¹² who

¹⁰³ Ashburnham to Berkeley, 4 Apr., Achte to Ashburnham, 30 Apr., A4/5; Berkeley to Sitwell, 25 Apr., A5/2; Streicher to Berkeley, 13 Aug. 1896, A6/2.

¹⁰⁴ Berkeley to Ashburnham, 3 Nov. 1895, Berkeley to Forster, 27 Aug. 1896, A5/2, 10 Dec. 1895, A5/1; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 15 Dec., A5/3, 29 Dec. 1895, A4/3, 4 Apr. 1896, A4/5; Sitwell to Berkeley, 29 Oct. 1896, A4/6.

¹⁰⁵ Ashburnham to Berkeley, 29 Dec. 1895, A4/3; Sitwell to Berkeley, 1, 3 June, 1 Aug., A4/5, 29 Nov., A4/6; Berkeley to Forster, 27 Aug. 1896, A5/2.

¹⁰⁶ Ashburnham to Berkeley, 4 May, Sitwell to Berkeley, 30 June, 1 Aug., A4/5; Sitwell's diary, 27 July, 19 Aug. 1896, Makerere University Library.

¹⁰⁷ Berkeley to Sitwell, 26 Aug. 1896, A5/12.

¹⁰⁸ Sitwell's diary, 28 May, Makerere University Library; Sitwell to Berkeley, 1 June, A4/15; Berkeley to Sitwell, 26 Aug. 1896, A5/12. There was one suggestion that Kagoro had served under Kabalega: ND 1895–8, 4 Aug. 1896.

¹⁰⁹ Berkeley to Sitwell, 25 Apr., 18 May, A5/12; Sitwell to Berkeley, 19, 30 June 1896, A4/5.

¹¹⁰ Berkeley to Sitwell, 25 Apr., A5/12; Sitwell to Berkeley, 2 June, 1, 10 Aug., 16 Sept. 1896, A4/5.

¹¹¹ Interview, Edwardi Winyi, 3 Apr. 1958, corroborated this supposition.

¹¹² Sitwell's diary, June 1896ff., Makerere University Library; see also Berkeley to Sitwell, 25 Apr., A5/2; Miller to Baylis, 12 Aug. 1896, G3 A5/012.

was soon couching his growing discontent with Kasagama in terms of a radical criticism of the whole concept of the Toro Confederacy. He thus wrote to Berkeley in June 1896:

I would suggest Kasagama being removed and a chief who has no connection with Toru in any way being placed as king over it. If another chief cannot be obtained as king, it would be even better that all the chiefs had equal rights, & were answerable to the officer here, or Muanga in Uganda, and the place be without a king of Toru at all. On all sides there are people asking to be under an Englishman & not under Kasagama at all, in fact everywhere except here ['Toro proper'] and Chakka, Nyama being absolutely under Kasagama's thumb, the cry is the same.¹¹³

For his part, Kasagama soon felt that Sitwell was so undermining his position that, in August 1896, he suddenly announced that he was renouncing his kingdom altogether and going to Kampala to seek to be placed elsewhere.¹¹⁴ All of which could conceivably have meant that, instead of Toro during its colonial and later years becoming an enlarged 'kingdom', the 'Toro region' would have been made a 'district' under a British officer (such as we shall shortly see occurred in Busoga).

Assuaged, however, by Sitwell, and under pressure from the Anglican missionary, Fisher, who now constantly pressed the point that 'the true philosophy is to build this King up', Kasagama changed his mind.¹¹⁵ Berkeley in any event did not think Kasagama could be deposed without referring the matter to higher authority in London.¹¹⁶ However, he did agree with Sitwell that Mboga, the area around the southwest of Lake Albert where Sitwell was now establishing contacts, should be formed into a paramouncy which should be completely separate from Toro.¹¹⁷ Moreover, he welcomed the appearance at this moment of Nkojo, a half-brother of Kasagama, as an available alternative to Kasagama;¹¹⁸ and after some further contentious incidents instructed Sitwell to impress upon Kasagama 'a sense of the risk he is running through his present

¹¹³ Sitwell to Berkeley, 30 June, A4/5; Sitwell's diary, 7 Nov. 1896, Makerere University Library. J.P. Wilson had not thought much of Kasagama's potential too: J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 10 June 1895, A4/1.

¹¹⁴ Sitwell's diary, 3 Aug., Makerere University Library; Sitwell to Berkeley, 10 Aug. 1896, A4/15; FP, vol. 6, p. 3, vol. 7, pp. 6, 21.

¹¹⁵ Sitwell's diary, 4, 6 Aug. 1896, Makerere University Library.

¹¹⁶ Berkeley to Sitwell, 25 Aug. 1896, A5/2.

¹¹⁷ Sitwell to Berkeley, recd 28 June, 16 Sept., 1, 9 Oct., A4/5, 29 Nov., A4/6; Berkeley to Sitwell, 25 Aug., 11 Nov. 1896, A5/2; Sitwell to Ternan, 12 Feb. 1897, A4/17.

¹¹⁸ Sitwell to Berkeley, 16 Aug., A4/5; Berkeley to Sitwell, 17 Sept. 1896, A5/2. See also Sitwell to Ternan, 25 Feb. 1897, A4/7; interviews, Edwardi Winyi, 3 Apr., Yosia Nyakairu, 5 Apr. 1958, etc.

conduct' which 'may quite well entail his removal as ruler & the substitution of a more suitable person'.¹¹⁹

The situation thus remained fraught. Byakuyamba, moreover, still seemed to be doing all he could to make things difficult for Kasagama.¹²⁰ In November 1896 Sitwell visited Kitagwenda where he was much impressed by Bulemu's guardian, Kakintuli, personally, but was greatly struck too by the depth of Kitagwenda's opposition to any idea of being subordinated to Toro;¹²¹ while by late November 1896 relations between Kasagama and Sitwell again become so bad that Kasagama for a second time announced he would be vacating his kingdom altogether.

Fisher, however, once more intervened and this time managed to effect an agreement 'to announce in Barazza that all Chiefs must obey their King ... draw up a set of rules for the King's guidance ... [and] firmly support the King in everything'.¹²² What was more, back in October 1896 there had been an important development when Kato, who had previously been chief under Kabalega of a part of Bugangadzi north of the Muzizi river, and, following Kabalega's retreat, had been finding himself squeezed from the area because of its transfer to the Catholic Baganda,¹²³ had decided to throw in his lot with Kasagama. In response he had been recognised as head of the separate chieftaincy of Nyakabimba in the Toro Confederacy's northeastern corner.¹²⁴ Like his father Zigija, Kato was not a Mubito. He was, however, heir to the long-established hereditary chieftainship in this area of the Bapopi clan. Zigija's sister, moreover, had been Kasagama's mother. So the switch in the allegiance of this Bapopi leader from Kabalega to Kasagama was not only readily affected,¹²⁵ but gave Kasagama a new and important ally in the northern tier of his Confederacy.¹²⁶

¹¹⁹ Sitwell to Berkeley, 27 Oct., A4/6; Berkeley to Sitwell, 11 Nov., 7 Dec., A5/2; Sitwell's diary, Aug. 1896ff., Makerere University Library; Berkeley to Salisbury, 26 Jan. 1897, FOCP 6964/47.

¹²⁰ Sitwell to Berkeley, 6 Dec., A4/6; Sitwell's diary, 10, 13 Oct., 8 Dec. 1896, Makerere University Library.

¹²¹ Sitwell to Berkeley, recd 28 June, A4/5, 28 Nov. 1896, A4/6; Sitwell's diary, 21 Nov. 1896, Makerere University Library, in which he called Kakintuli: 'Very superior to any native I have seen in Toro'.

¹²² Sitwell to Berkeley, 6 Dec. 1896, A4/6; Sitwell's diary, 30 Nov., 2, 3 Dec. 1896, Makerere University Library; FP, vol. 7, p. 23.

¹²³ See Ch. 9.

¹²⁴ Sitwell to Berkeley, 29 Oct. 1896, A4/6; 'Kako' is mentioned among those present at the large meeting in June: Sitwell to Berkeley, 30 June 1896, A4/5; interview, Revd Yosiya Kamuhigi, 4 Apr. 1958. See also Pulteney to Berkeley, 29 Feb., 23 Mar., A4/4, 19 May, Forster to Berkeley, 30 July, 29 Sept., A4/5; Fowler to Berkeley, 1 Nov. 1896, A4/6.

¹²⁵ Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 127.

¹²⁶ Interviews, Edwardi Winyi, 5 Apr., Karoli, 6 Apr. 1958, etc.; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 161.

The balance was now therefore beginning to swing in his favour. Already Nyama, despite the fact that he was a Mutwara, was much more closely allied with Kasagama than with Byakuyamba (perhaps because he recognised that he owed his hold upon Kyaka to Kasagama's suggestion that he should appeal to Kampala against his proposed supersession by Rwabudongo), while Kagoro in east Kyaka, although a Mutwara too, and certainly no friend of Kasagama, was no friend of Nyama nor of Byakuyamba either.¹²⁷ The three Baitwara chiefs were thus very much at odds with each other, and along with the other assets Kasagama possessed that began to give him the decisive advantage.

It now began to seem plain indeed that it was Byakuyamba who would be the prime loser, given the way things were going. Where he had once aspired to an overall independent chieftaincy of Mwenge and Kyaka, by early 1897 he was beginning to look to be no more than one of three separated Baitwara chiefs subordinate to the Muboyo ruler Kasagama. Sitwell, moreover, was by now supporting Kasagama much more strongly than before¹²⁸ – as the entry in his diary for 1 March 1897 illustrates – ‘Had big shaury K. Byak. Kagero and Nyama. Fined Byak. and Kagero 1 frasila each for not coming when they were told. Made them all understand they were only chiefs and K. was King’¹²⁹ – a very different affirmation from the one he had made just a few months previously. Kasagama, it seems, was beginning to hold his own.¹³⁰

With that, Owen's construction, on Colvile's orders, of a Confederacy of ‘southern Unyoro chiefs’ as the principal agency of British colonial hegemony over the region seemed to be firming up. Despite the animosity which at one time or another most of them had shown against the British, none of them had ever directly resisted the extension of British dominion. All of them had fastened rather on securing British support for their ambitions. For Kasagama and the Baitwara chiefs, the British had provided them with the singular boon of restoring them to their homelands. (The Busongora chiefs and Bulemu in Kitagwenda were then variously brought into the fold, the latter after an attack by Kasagama upon his guardian Kakintuli.)¹³¹ Although all four of the

¹²⁷ Sitwell to Berkeley, 30 June, A4/5; Sitwell's diary, 13 Oct. 1896, Makerere University Library; J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 5 July, A4/12; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 23 Nov. 1895, A4/13; FP, vol. 6, p. 32.

¹²⁸ Sitwell to Ternan, 10 Feb. 1897, A4/7.

¹²⁹ Sitwell's diary, 1 Mar. 1897, Makerere University Library; Sitwell to Berkeley, 29 Oct., 6 Dec. 1896, A4/6; Sitwell to Ternan, 10 Feb. 1897, A4/7; FP, vol. 7, p. 23.

¹³⁰ Sitwell's diary, 15, 19, 20 Mar., 28 June 1896, Makerere University Library. Sitwell's correspondence in A4/17, A4/8, A5/13, and his diary for 1897.

¹³¹ Sitwell to Berkeley, 9 Oct. 1898, A4/13; Bagge to Berkeley, 12 Aug. 1899, A4/20. For subsequent events, see *Ch. 9* and its fn. 122.

leading figures in the Confederacy – Kasagama, Byakuyamba, Nyama and Kagoro – had at one time or another been grievously ill-treated by British officials, by 1897 they had all made successful appeals to British officials in Buganda, and had no reason to complain of the treatment they had received there. In reckoning up the balance sheet, only Byakuyamba seemed to be losing out.¹³²

Over the longer run, however, the key conditioning circumstance which governed the establishment of British dominion over the region lay in the determination of various prominent Babito to seize the opportunity the British advent gave them to restore the *status quo ante* the mounting assaults by Kabalega upon their inheritances over the past twenty years. As a consequence none of them, other than Rwigi of Kitagwenda, was anything but hostile to him throughout his protracted war with the British.¹³³ They and their peoples had been so overrun in recent years by Kabalega's Abarasura that they were glad to welcome any new regime which would hold them in check.¹³⁴ The greater part of the enlarged kingdom of Toro thus came to be held, under the auspices of the British, against Kabalega and his supporters by returned Babito exiles and their associates, who felt themselves to be the rightful beneficiaries of an overdue restoration and the custodians of a reconstructed old order which the Abarasura had largely been developed to destroy.

The central point here was precisely displayed in the contrast between the reception accorded the two most important men who during these years abandoned Bunyoro and sought to throw in their lot with Toro. Kasagama and the Baitwara immediately acknowledged the hereditary claims of the head of the Bapopi clan to Nyakabimba. But what (to judge from the actions of both Kasagama and Nyama)¹³⁵ they could not abide were the attempts by the British to provide some sort of local chieftaincy for Rwabudongo, Kabalega's erstwhile Abarasura leader. Many of the critical events in this area in the 1890s accordingly hinged, not as in Buganda and, as we shall see, in Bunyoro and even Nkore upon the activities of their new model warbands and their leaders, but upon a unique, concerted opposition, by representatives of the pre-existing regime, to Kabalega's new model warbands and all that they stood for. It was primarily upon the back of this unusual restoration that, by mid

¹³² In August 1897 he left Toro for Buganda and there committed suicide. For comment on this, see Wilson, 'Toro', p. 274.

¹³³ For this, see the following chapter.

¹³⁴ Interviews, Edwardi Winyi, Revd Yosiya Kamuhigi, Revd Zekyeri Binyomo, Nikodem Kakurora, Lazaro Basigara, Apr. 1958.

¹³⁵ E.g. Jackson to Ashburnham, 15 Aug., A5/1; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 15 Dec. 1895, A4/13.

1897, the paramouncy held previously by Bunyoro over Toro and its neighbours came to be superseded by the paramouncy of the first British agents in the region, exercised through the paramouncy of the ruler of 'Toro proper' over its neighbours. With that, Toro's vortex reached a conclusion, though it had to wait for three more years for the fabrication of its colonial settlement.¹³⁶

A corresponding paramouncy had meanwhile been achieved by the British over much of the Busoga region to the east (For Busoga, see [Map 7.](#)). Here a plethora of small rulerships had previously been subject, like the rulerships and chieftaincies in the Toro region, to a much larger and more powerful neighbour: in Busoga's case not for the most part to Bunyoro,¹³⁷ but rather to Buganda. From markedly different beginnings and along a very different route, in the course of the 1890s it was freed from Buganda's paramouncy as Toro was from Bunyoro's, but likewise at the cost of being subjected to the paramouncy of the British.

The differences in the two instances permeated the 'precursors' to the 'defining conjuncture' between the Basoga and the British, and in many respects set the 'conditioning circumstances' which attended the British advent as this began to occur in Busoga in 1890. There was, for a start, no rulership in Busoga that, as in Toro, stood out from amongst the others that could have provided a coping stone for a monarchical headed Busoga confederacy. Whereas, moreover, Toro and Kitagwenda were the only two undoubted rulerships in the Toro region – Mwenge, Kyaka and the component parts of Busongora were all chieftaincies¹³⁸ – Busoga had on one count as many as forty-seven rulerships, on another around sixty,¹³⁹ each with its own royal symbols, most with their hierarchies of royally appointed chiefs, some of them royals, others of them commoners. As they were confined to an overall area somewhat smaller than Toro's, their sizes inevitably differed very greatly. Bulamogi in the north, Bugabula in the northwest, Bukoli in the southeast were all as extensive as later colonial counties. Others – like Busambira or Butenya – encompassed no more than a few small settlements. To a greater degree, moreover, than elsewhere in this region – where every male descendent of a former ruler was an equally legitimate successor to the throne – many of these rulerships were plagued by bitter contests

¹³⁶ See [Ch. 10](#), pp. 303–5.

¹³⁷ Cf. Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 130.

¹³⁸ See fn. 3 above.

¹³⁹ Y.K. Lubogo, 'History of Busoga', [1939], Makerere University Library, pp. 3–4; D.W. Cohen, *The Historical Tradition of Busoga. Mukama and Kintu* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 14–15.

between royal brothers, some of whom carved out separate rulerships for themselves.¹⁴⁰ This was not unrelated to the distinctive manner in which Buganda's paramountcy was exercised over them. For while Bunyoro's paramountcy under Kabalega of Toro was relatively recent and stemmed from his Abarasura's military reconquests of formerly seceded portions of the kingdom, and the installation of Banyoro territorial chiefs over them, Buganda's paramountcy over Busoga was not only of much longer standing, but, aside from the appointment of prominent Baganda to exercise general oversight over its interests, never involved the extension of Buganda's boundaries, nor the replacement of Basoga rulers by Baganda chiefs. It operated rather through the infliction of predatory raids and tribute demands upon the Basoga and by interventions in rivalries within Basoga rulerships so as to impose the Kabaka's authority upon them. As a result, many an aspirant to a Busoga throne would attend at the Kabaka's court and seek to become his protégé. That had long enabled Kabakas to play off one against the other so as to clamp their own predominance on them.¹⁴¹

As the first agents of the IBEAC traversed Busoga en route to Buganda during 1890, they made their first contacts with some of the southern Busoga rulers. Both Jackson and Lugard were generously received by Wakoli of Bukoli, and Lugard made blood-brotherhood both with Wakoli and with Mbekirwa of Buyende.¹⁴² During these first years of contact, Busoga's importance to the British lay overwhelmingly in its position astride their crucial line of communications with the coast. It was thus that, late in 1891, C. S. Reddie was appointed as the IBEAC's agent at Wakoli's capital to ensure that this was kept open. When, however, civil war broke out in Buganda early in 1892, some dissident Baganda sought to raise the Basoga against him and threatened to take his life. To this, Lugard, in the wake of his crushing victory over Mwangi at the Battle of Mengo, responded in April 1892 by dispatching Captain Williams to Busoga to go to Reddie's rescue and ensure the safety of the road to the coast.¹⁴³

In the event, armed with a Maxim gun and accompanied by some of the IBEAC's mercenary troops and a party of Baganda warriors, Williams soon set about imposing there, as Lugard had by now done both in the

¹⁴⁰ On this, see *Chs. 3* and *8*, and cf. Kaboyo above.

¹⁴¹ Cohen, *Busoga*, pp. 12–16; Lubogo, 'Busoga', pp. 6–7, 54, 61, 101; Kiwanuka, *Buganda*, pp. 139–44. For an extensive anthropological study, see L. A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy* (Cambridge, 1956).

¹⁴² Jackson, *Early Days*, pp. 253, 387; *LD I*, pp. 407–26, III, pp. 320–2. The titles and spellings are taken from Lubogo, 'Busoga', p. 4.

¹⁴³ *LD III*, pp. 166–7; Reddie to Administrator, Mombasa, 3 Mar. 1892, MP.

Toro region and in Buganda, a raw assertion of British hegemony. To begin with, his advance was opposed, but after two successful skirmishes he received the submission of four of the Basoga rulers, Kayanga of Igombe, Mbekirwa of Buyende, Luba of Bunya, and Wakoli of Bukoli, and then, after visiting Wakoli's capital, proceeded northwards to place Miro, a claimant to the rulership of Kigulu who had long been in exile in Buganda, upon the throne of his fathers.¹⁴⁴ There, along with making short shrift of one or two further clashes, he received the submission of another prominent ruler, Menia of Bugweri. At this stage he was involved in one or two further skirmishes, but his progress nevertheless proceeded unchecked.¹⁴⁵ And when, in July 1892, Wakoli of Bukoli (Kaunye by name) was accidentally shot dead by a caravan porter, he promptly returned to Bukoli, and there supervised the accession of his son, Mutanda.¹⁴⁶ Such was the impact of his exploits¹⁴⁷ that when, in March 1893, he handed over command of the British foothold in Buganda to Portal the Imperial Commissioner, he told him that Luba of Bunya, Gabula of Bugabula, Tabingwa of Luuka and Miro of Kigulu were all very friendly, which suggests that at least four of the more prominent Basoga rulers were already paying court to the first British agents.¹⁴⁸

Yet, as Busoga's defining conjuncture with the British then entered upon its determining vortex, there was no indication that the British government was prepared to assume direct responsibility for the government of Busoga. Moreover, as the overriding concern of British officials based in Buganda was to entrench their alliance with its Christian and Muslim leaders, it was understandable that, to begin with at least, they should have tended to support the ambitions of the Baganda in Busoga and have seen things there through Baganda eyes. As a consequence, they first aimed to uphold the pre-existing paramountcy of Buganda in Busoga, and for the time being deliberately decided not to become directly involved in its affairs.

But there was one difficulty. For they had soon learnt enough about Buganda's paramountcy in Busoga to realise that it was chiefly expressed in indiscriminate Baganda raids for loot and captives upon powerless Basoga settlements. These they were soon determined to stop,¹⁴⁹ and in

¹⁴⁴ Lubogo, 'Busoga', pp. 35–6.

¹⁴⁵ Williams to Lugard, 10 June; Berkeley to Sec. IBEAC, 16 Aug. 1892, MP; Williams' Memo, Usogo, 1 Mar. 1893, A2/1.

¹⁴⁶ Smith to CMS, 19 July, G3 A5/08: BD, 29 July, 4, 17 Aug.; Williams to Administrator, 18 Aug., 9 Dec. 1892, MP; Gedge to his mother, 24 Jan. 1893, GP.

¹⁴⁷ 23, 26 Jan., G/D; Williams to Lugard, 5 Sept., 22 Nov. 1893, LP s. 41.

¹⁴⁸ Williams' Memo, 1 Mar., A2/1: Williams to Lugard, 19 Aug. 1893, LP s. 41.

¹⁴⁹ Portal, *Mission*, p. 247.

an attempt to do so they arranged that, in exchange for a Baganda undertaking to cease their raids, the Basoga rulers should pay a regular annual tribute to the Kabaka in terms for which quotas came to be specified, along with some for the British as some recompense for their own expenditure there. Williams laid the foundations for this policy in 1892, and Portal formalised it at a ceremony in Buganda in April 1893, at which several Basoga rulers were present.¹⁵⁰

But the raids did not stop, and the British now became increasingly concerned about the depredations which the Baganda were effecting in Busoga. So much so indeed that Portal (and his then assistant, Berkeley)¹⁵¹ already foresaw the day when, as Portal put it, it would 'be advisable to free Usoga entirely from the domination of Uganda'. In which case, he thought the right thing to do would be to set up one of their leading chiefs 'as King of that country',¹⁵² as was soon to be done in Toro. For the time being, however, the official British doctrine was correctly stated by Macdonald in June 1893 when he said that 'it has been recognised that Usoga is a state tributary to Uganda', and that, for the present at least, British administrative responsibility did not extend there.¹⁵³

All the same, because the principal British line of communications with the coast ran through Busoga, Portal, as early as April 1893, dispatched Lieutenant Arthur, with two and a half companies of Swahili mercenary troops, to take command of 'the station at Wakoli's village & ... of the countries of Usoga and Upper Kavirondo', and in doing so gave Arthur orders that far exceeded the safeguarding of the route to the coast. For, he told him:

It will be your duty to preserve peace in these districts and to put a stop, as far as possible, to inter-tribal and village raids which have hitherto it is to be feared, been of frequent occurrence. It will be advisable that you shd. organise a system of patrols with a view to maintaining a more thorough control over the different chiefs, and also to be able to check at once any raids by Uganda into Usoga territory ... You will do your best to establish friendly & cordial relations with the various chiefs of Usoga,¹⁵⁴ and in the event of differences & disputes being

¹⁵⁰ Williams to Administrator, IBEAC, 22 Oct., 9 Dec. 1892, FO 2/57; Portal to Rosebery, 6 Apr., 24 May, FO 2/60; Williams' Memo, 1 Mar. 1893, A2/1; Grant to Colville, 25 Sept. 1894, A2/3.

¹⁵¹ Berkeley, 24 Apr. 1893, A2/1.

¹⁵² Smith to Berkeley, 12 Apr., Arthur to Berkeley, 12 Apr., Arthur to Macdonald, 8 May, Berkeley Memo, 24 Apr., A2/1; Portal to Rosebery, 24 May 1893, FO 2/60.

¹⁵³ Macdonald to Arthur, 9 June 1893, A3/1.

¹⁵⁴ He mentioned eight rulers 'among those who are chiefly worthy of notice', whom one can perhaps take to be Luba of Bunya, Tabingwa of Luuka, Gabula of Bugabula, Ngobi of Kigulu, Nanyumba of Bunyuli, Kasaja of Buyodi, Kayanga of Igombe, and Meny of Bugweri.

brought to you for adjudication, it will be advisable that you shd. not refuse to hear & decide them.¹⁵⁵

Couched in these terms, such orders clearly implied that, however strong might be the intention of the British to confine their Protectorate to Buganda, British officials on the spot were already inching their way towards a more direct involvement in Busoga's affairs.¹⁵⁶

They were soon propelled further in that direction as a consequence of the failure of Williams' and Portal's attempts to get the Basoga rulers to pay a regular tribute. By July 1893, indeed, it was clear not only that the Basoga rulers had not yet paid their quotas, but that the Baganda were continuing to raid.¹⁵⁷ Accordingly, in August 1893, Macdonald instructed Arthur to go on a tour of Busoga with the Muganda chief, the Sekibobo of Kyagwe, to try and reach some more satisfactory arrangement about how precisely the Basoga tribute should be paid.¹⁵⁸ Arthur sent in some recommendations for a carefully controlled procedure under which agents of the Kabaka would be authorised to collect the Basoga tribute,¹⁵⁹ but he also proposed that the scales which Williams and Portal had fixed should be reduced, lest the Basoga should sell their women to the Bagishu further north in an effort to procure the necessary ivory. While Macdonald managed to get the Kabaka and Katikiro to agree to a new scale,¹⁶⁰ these moves clearly indicated that the British were now having second thoughts about leaving the Baganda to exercise their paramourcy over Busoga on their own, and were beginning increasingly to participate in it themselves. That became quite explicit in the orders Macdonald issued in September 1893 when he sent William Grant, Lugard's old travelling companion, to Busoga to replace Arthur. While careful to tell him to 'abstain as far as possible from interfering in the administration of Usoga', and reaffirming that Busoga was 'tributary to Uganda', he also told him that:

all cases concerning Usoga and all Wabakas [Kabaka's messengers] having permission to enter Usoga will pass through your office ... Any Waganda

¹⁵⁵ Portal to Arthur, 4 Apr., A2/1; Portal to Rosebery, 6 Apr., FO 2/60; Macdonald to Zschatzsch, 24 June, Macdonald to Arthur, 24 Aug. 1893, A3/1.

¹⁵⁶ E.g. Portal, *Mission*, pp. 215, 224, 227.

¹⁵⁷ Zschatzsch to Portal, 1 June, Mwanga to Macdonald, 8 June, Zschatzsch to Macdonald, 28 July, 10 Aug., A2/1; Macdonald to Arthur, 9 June, A3/1; Macdonald to Portal, 13 June 1893, A31/1.

¹⁵⁸ Macdonald to Arthur, 24 Aug. 1893, A3/1; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 54-6; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 172.

¹⁵⁹ Arthur to Macdonald, 5 Sept. 1893, A2/1.

¹⁶⁰ ESA Interviews Book, 26 Sept.; Mwanga to Macdonald, 28 Sept., A2/1; Macdonald to Arthur, 29 Sept., Macdonald to Portal, 21 Oct. 1893, A31/1.

raiding or robbing the Wasoga are to be turned out of the country & you may arrest the leaders and send them with a statement of the case to Head Quarters for trial ... In case of shamba [land] disputes which may be brought before you – cases which you should have as little to do with as possible unless you consider non intervention would lead to a serious breach of the peace – you should deal with the case yourself as long as the shambas in dispute belong to the same chief: if however they belong to different chieftainships you will conduct the preliminary investigation and send the case on to Hd.Qtr.¹⁶¹

What this, in effect, meant was that a kind of condominium was to be established over Busoga by the British and the Baganda jointly. The Buganda chief, the Sekibobo of Kyagwe, was to be recognised by the British as ‘paramount chief of Usoga’, but Grant was to be its British ‘O.C.’; tribute, moreover, was to be collected jointly, and was to be evenly divided. The two major patrons on the scene were thus to join forces and exercise a joint paramountcy over the Basoga kingdoms.¹⁶²

But this too failed to work in practice. There were several reasons. First – and in British eyes the most important – because the Baganda continued to raid. The British, moreover, had still to mobilise their forces to check them; while, whatever the Kabaka and his chiefs might promise, various Baganda – including sometimes agents of the Kabaka and his chiefs themselves – continued to enter Busoga to round up women, cattle, hoes, goats and ivory. The condominium did nothing to end this. At the same time, it offered little to the Baganda. They could see no reason why the British should check their customary operations in Busoga. The tribute, moreover, for which the British had made arrangements showed few signs of being paid. In this situation it was scarcely surprising that many Basoga rulers should have resolutely refused to pay. For, as long as the British did not take effective steps to check the depredations of the Baganda, those who did pay could very well find themselves having to pay twice – first to the tribute collectors and then to the raiders. Since, moreover, it was not as yet British policy to do away with the paramountcy of the Baganda over Busoga, it was natural that many Basoga rulers should continue to pay court to the Kabaka; and that of course could involve paying even more tribute as well. By the end of 1893, the situation became so confused that Gabula of Bugabula, the ruler of the leading kingdom in the northwest of the region, announced he would recognise nobody but his old paramount, Kabalega of Bunyoro.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Macdonald to Grant, 30 Sept. 1893, A3/1.

¹⁶² Williams’ Memo, 1 Mar., Arthur to Macdonald, 5 Sept., 7 Oct., A2/1; Macdonald to Portal, 21 Oct. 1893, A31/1; Miti, ‘Buganda’, 2, pp. 55–6.

¹⁶³ ESA Interviews Book, 29 Dec. 1893.

By the end of October 1893, Macdonald as acting British Commissioner had, however, become very uneasy about the whole situation. He had tried more than once to make the existing settlement work, but it seemed to be collapsing on every side. He did not feel that he could as yet overthrow official policy completely, but he did now feel strongly that 'as long as Usoga is managed by the Waganda its development will be slow & dwarfed'. He therefore came to the conclusion that the best thing to do would be to 'take on the management of Usoga ... while still leaving it a titular tributary of Uganda'.¹⁶⁴ With this, Grant, as 'O. C.' Busoga, was fully in agreement. Unlike British officials in Buganda who tended to see Basoga affairs through Baganda eyes, Grant had soon been long enough in Busoga to begin to see them through Basoga eyes. Like any other pioneer British administrator, he was anxious, moreover, to establish his own authority over the area committed to his 'command'. He was perturbed by the depredations of the Baganda, but he was also concerned not only by the failure of many Basoga chiefs to pay the tribute which had been allotted to them, but by the defiance which many of them were now displaying towards him personally. Before the end of 1893, Luba of Bunya and Mutanda of Bukoli, the two southern chiefs who were most effectively under British aegis, had paid their tribute and some others had promised to do so. But there were still a number who flatly refused to do so. This was obviously because there had not as yet been a decisive shift in the locus of power sufficient to make them feel that they would be well advised to submit themselves unequivocally to the orders of the British. Grant was aware that this was so, and in November 1893 therefore asked Colville, the new acting British Commissioner, if he might depose a few of the more hostile Basoga chiefs as an example to the rest. He was told that there would be an investigation in Kampala of his charges against them, but that those who refused to appear could be punished.¹⁶⁵

This gave Grant his cue. Although the British Protectorate was not officially extended to Busoga until June 1895, from the beginning of 1894 he began to build upon the foundations which Williams and Arthur had laid before him, and proceeded step by step to establish his own, and thus British, paramountcy over the Busoga kingdoms. His method was precisely that which had been so successfully employed by the Kabaka of Buganda before him. Buttressed by his own self-assurance

¹⁶⁴ Macdonald to Portal, 28 Oct. 1893, A31/1.

¹⁶⁵ Grant to Colville, 19, 28, 29 Nov., 15, 23 Dec., A2/1; ESA Interviews Book, 23, 29 Dec. 1893, 2, 4 Jan. 1894; Gibb to Grant, 15 Dec. 1893, A3/2; Notes on Grant to Gibb, 10 Mar. 1894, A2/2.

and assisted by the small body of mercenary troops at his disposal, he began to turn himself into the major patron of rulerships in the Basoga kingdoms, and to this end exploited the chronic rivalries which beset their royal clans.

In the first half of 1894, he was away from Busoga on more than one occasion on expeditions in Bunyoro and Kavirondo. But in March he took steps to support Miro, the claimant whom Williams had placed on the throne of Kigulu, against a group of his enemies who had apparently conspired to drive him and his British patrons into the lake. He supervised their replacement by some of their kinsmen. In June 1894 he sent for Kayanga, the ruler of Igombe, one of the small kingdoms in southern Busoga, whom he described as the ringleader of those opposed to European control, and had him arrested and deposed. Shortly afterwards he meted out the same treatment to Mbekirwa of Buyende, whose allegiance had fluctuated in the past two years more than once already. Grant replaced Kayanga by a kinsman named Makoba who, he said, understood European customs and would obey any order. He replaced Mbekirwa by Mbabani, one of his brothers with whom he seems to have had a running feud for quite a long time.¹⁶⁶ The results of these measures were soon apparent. In mid July 1894, Grant was writing: 'Five chiefs have sent in safaris. In fact they are becoming a nuisance. Chiefs or their representatives come here daily from all parts of Busoga, taking up a great deal of time with their shauris. Many of them come on business of course. I am however glad to see them.'¹⁶⁷ He was beginning, in short, to establish his paramouncy over the Busoga kingdoms.

The process involved, of course, a direct challenge to the pre-existing paramouncy of Buganda. Grant, indeed, was already demanding that the Kabaka's jurisdiction in Busoga should be terminated altogether,¹⁶⁸ and there had already been one significant step in that direction. In April 1894, Colvile, as acting Commissioner, had announced that he had 'arranged with the King [Mwanga] to take over Lubwa from him'. Luba will in future, he wrote, 'pay his tribute to us and not to Mwanga'. But in some respects this was a special case. Colvile was chiefly concerned to establish effective control over the canoes which Luba of Bunya and his Bavuma neighbours possessed, so as to augment the transport route between Kavirondo and Buganda upon which the British garrison in

¹⁶⁶ Grant to Gibb, 20 Mar., Grant to Colvile, 6 Mar., 11, 19, 23, 27, 28, 30 June, 25 July, Smith to Grant, 14 June, Gibb to Colvile, 25 July 1894, A2/2.

¹⁶⁷ Grant to Colvile, 19 July 1894, A2/2.

¹⁶⁸ Grant to Colvile, 28 June, 22 July, 7 Sept., A2/2; 17 Oct. 1894, A2/3.

Buganda was greatly dependent.¹⁶⁹ His arrangement with Mwanga was, all the same, highly symbolic. Luba was now unequivocally a British client. Nine years previously, in the last days of Bishop Hannington, he had been unequivocally Mwanga's client. A marked change in the locus of power, in this case, had thus been effected. For the moment, however, Colvile's arrangement with Mwanga over Bunya clearly implied that, elsewhere, Buganda's paramountcy in Busoga was still officially recognised, and he took no further steps along the road which Grant would have preferred.

Nevertheless, Grant was now openly protesting against Buganda's claims in Busoga. When the men against whom he had proceeded on behalf of his protégé, Miro, appealed in March 1894 to the Kabaka, and secured from him a recommendation that they should be reinstated in their old positions, Grant protested that this would set a most undesirable precedent. In the event, a compromise was effected. They were given small grants of land under their kinsmen whom Grant had put in their place. It was an indication that Grant was making his way forward – though an appeal to the Kabaka could still very evidently yield results.

All the same, there were signs on other fronts that Grant was now making real headway. In particular, it seems clear that those chiefs in southern Busoga who had been most openly defiant towards him and whom he had deposed for their pains, and especially Kayanga of Igombe and Mbekirwa of Buyende, were amongst those who had sought most persistently to maintain their links with the Kabaka. In the days of their ill-fortune, Mwanga had not come to their aid, and their successors Makoba and Mbabani were, for the time being at least, firmly established in their new positions. In Basoga terms, this meant that Grant had shown, in one or two instances at least, that he and not the Kabaka was now the major patron operating in the Busoga area. Grant was therefore not only now beginning to establish his dominance over Busoga; he was already making inroads upon Buganda's paramountcy there as well.¹⁷⁰

And so he proceeded. In the latter part of 1894, when several cases of rivalry between rulers and other members of a kingdom's royal clan were submitted by their contestants to the jurisdiction of the Kabaka, Mwanga made his decisions in each case, but, in a very significant move, the Katikiro of Buganda now applied to the British administration to give them effect. To Grant, this was a quite unacceptable proposition,

¹⁶⁹ Colvile to Grant, 4 Apr., A3/2; Colvile to Cracknall, 15 Apr., FO 2/71; Grant to Colvile, 11 June, A2/2; Colvile to Hardinge, 9 Dec. 1894, FO 2/72. Cf. Macdonald to Arthur, 24 Aug. 1893, A3/1.

¹⁷⁰ Grant to Colvile, 15 Dec., A2/1; 27 June, 22 July, 16 Aug., 7 Sept. 1894, A2/2.

particularly since he believed Mwanga did not mete out even-handed justice to his suppliants but always gave his decision in favour of the highest bidder. Accordingly, by October 1894, Grant decided to deal himself with two of the cases which had previously been submitted to the Kabaka. He was able this time, moreover, to put his own subsequent decisions into effect.¹⁷¹

Just at this moment, there might have been for Grant a decisive move forward. For the ruler of Bugabula died, and in the ensuing mêlée Grant and Mwanga each gave their support to separate candidates. Grant's nominee, he averred, had local support. He had, however, been sent as a boy to Kabalega's court in Bunyoro, and, unfortunately for Grant's purposes, could not be found, with the result that, with Colville's approval, Mwanga's nominee succeeded instead.¹⁷² But at about the same time Grant once more successfully supported his protégé Miro in Kigulu,¹⁷³ and in this and other ways showed that he was now establishing his predominance not only over an increasing number of Basoga kingdoms, but to the hurt of the Kabaka as well.¹⁷⁴

During the first half of 1895, Grant was again away on expeditions in Kavirondo and Bunyoro, but on his return in June he successfully arrested a Musoga who had been involved in some raids on the Bakedi, the people to the northeast of Busoga, which suggested that his writ was now beginning to run in that direction as well as in the south. At the same time he was beginning to receive much more positive help from acting Commissioner Jackson than he had ever received from Colville.¹⁷⁵ Throughout the preceding eighteen months, the Baganda had continued to raid into Busoga,¹⁷⁶ and Jackson now decided that further steps had to be taken to check them. He accordingly informed the Kabaka 'that he must prohibit any chief from interfering in the administration of Usoga, or demanding tribute over and above the amount assessed by

¹⁷¹ Ansonge to Colville, 5, 7 Sept., 19 Oct., A2/2; Grant to Colville, 17, 28 Oct., 4, 18 Nov. 1894, A2/3.

¹⁷² Grant to Colville, 25 Sept., 12, 17 Oct.; Ansonge to Colville, 5, 10 Oct. 1894, A2/3. Mwanga's nominee, Katalo, was, however, subsequently superseded, with his approval, when Grant's nemisee, Naika, Katalo's elder brother, eventually returned from Bunyoro: Lubogo, 'Busoga', pp. 45–6.

¹⁷³ Grant to Gibb, 18 Dec. 1894, A2/3; Grant to Jackson, 26 Feb. 1895, A4/1.

¹⁷⁴ In the absence of dates in Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 53–6, it is a little difficult to reconcile the details of the account given there with those in the contemporary documentary evidence. But, as a general account of British curtailment of Buganda's activity in Busoga, it assuredly stands.

¹⁷⁵ Grant to Jackson, 8, 15, 30 June, A4/1; 7, 14, 17, 30 July, A4/2; Jackson to Grant, 18 June 1895, A5/1.

¹⁷⁶ Grant to Colville, 19 July, 6 Aug., A2/2; Ansonge to Colville, 30 Sept., 3 Oct. 1894, A2/3; Case No. 48, 15 July 1895, A3/1.

Government'. Grant suggested, moreover, that, as the former Sekibobo of Kyagwe had just died, the opportunity should be taken to put an end to his paramourcy in Busoga.¹⁷⁷ Jackson seems to have pressed these notions upon the leaders of Buganda, for, in August 1895, the Buganda Lukiiko¹⁷⁸ passed three laws which decreed that no Baganda were to go to Busoga to collect taxes; that any of them who wished to go to Busoga would have to procure a permit, and could only travel by one authorised route; and that all Basoga chiefs were to have direct access to the Kabaka – implying, of course, that they would no longer come under the primary jurisdiction of the Sekibobo.¹⁷⁹

But the new substantive Commissioner, Berkeley, despite his earlier support for a take-over policy in Busoga when he had been Portal's assistant in 1893, was at first not prepared to go any further.¹⁸⁰ He allowed that Grant should see that nothing barbarous was done in Busoga, but he reminded him firmly that the British administration had 'nowhere, theoretically, assumed the administration of law over natives' in that country.¹⁸¹ Grant, however, now seems to have realised that the destiny of Buganda's paramourcy in Busoga had once more begun to turn on Buganda's readiness, or otherwise, to stop its depredations there, and he was now sharply reminded of the inevitable conflict between his purposes and those of the Kabaka when he discovered that Mwanga had been seeking to reverse one of his decisions over disputes between brothers, and had been seeking to deprive Makoba (the claimant Grant had supported for the Igombe rulership when he had deposed Kayanga) of some of his territory. Grant accordingly wrote to Berkeley on 19 November 1895:

I regret to inform you that it is impossible for me to administer this district as it ought to be if my decisions are contradicted by Mwanga ... This kind of work is simply infamous. Makoba was appointed Chief in place of Kayanga who was deposed, and as he did not send Mwanga a large present he has to have one of his shambas taken from him. Of course I shall not allow this to be done, until instructions come from you. Mwanga pretends not to understand why the Wasoga are going to him in Uganda. He sends for them, and demands that they should go to him, and naturally they are frightened to go empty handed. Usoga at present is swarming with his people. A few Wa-baka [royal messengers] arrive at the landing place here, while hordes of their followers cross to

¹⁷⁷ Jackson to Grant, 24, 26 June, 4 July, A5/1; Grant to Jackson, 17, 30 June 1895, A4/1.

¹⁷⁸ On which, see Ch. 10.

¹⁷⁹ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 186; Lukiiko Minute Book, 15 Aug. 1895 (Makerere Institute of Social Research).

¹⁸⁰ Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 122.

¹⁸¹ Berkeley to Grant, 12 Nov. 1895, A5/1.

Namugongo a point further S W ... I notice that Mwanga's Wa-baka come in a kind of bouncing way, and talk in rather a high-toned manner. There is something brewing which I cannot comprehend. Formerly I need only call a chief once, and he was here without delay. Now it is ten chances to one, whether he will come or not, as likely as not he replies that he is indisposed and cannot come. Whether it is on account of the absence of the Soudanese, or some intrigue of Mwangas I cannot at present say. It is very unsatisfactory for me as things in the meantime are. People are sent to me to decide their cases, and Mwanga's Wabaka have instructions from Mwanga (he having already decided in favour of the highest Briber) to inform me of his decision ... I am anxious to do all in my power for the good of the people in the district in which I am placed, and cannot calmly sit down, and see them robbed, and imposed on by Mwanga and his hordes.¹⁸²

For their part, the Baganda chiefs suddenly seem to have realised that, unless they moved swiftly, their dealings with Busoga could be curtailed altogether. Assisted by George Wilson, the British official in charge at Kampala, they suggested that Grant should be asked to take steps to have all the Baganda who were still in Busoga sent home. They proposed that they should themselves summon their subordinate chiefs along the banks of the Nile and instruct them to send patrols into Busoga to round up any Baganda who might still be there; and that, if these measures failed, they should destroy all the canoes operating on the Nile except at three selected crossings which should be carefully controlled.¹⁸³

But it was now too late. Grant's thrust had gone home. Berkeley had come to the conclusion that the condominium which the British and the Baganda had tried to exercise jointly over Busoga should be brought to an end. He agreed with Grant that it was intolerable that British decisions in Busoga should be undermined by contrary decisions of the Kabaka, and, at a meeting in Kampala at the beginning of December 1895, he proposed to the Kabaka and his chiefs that they should surrender all their claims to jurisdiction in Busoga and to a share in its administration. At this date it was scarcely conceivable that the Baganda leaders should openly oppose a decision of the British Commissioner. For various reasons, as we have seen, they were now firmly committed to an acceptance of British dominion over their country. So, accepting the inevitable, Mwanga merely asked 'what about the zawadi?' – the profits and tribute from Busoga. Because Berkeley had no desire to offend the Baganda leaders unnecessarily, he immediately offered them the equivalent of the whole of the Basoga tribute, which they had previously been expected to divide with the British. A settlement along these lines

¹⁸² Grant to Berkeley, 14, 19 Nov., 2 Dec. 1895, A4/3.

¹⁸³ Wilson to Berkeley, 21 Nov. 1895, A4/3.

was then embodied in the so-called Uganda–Usoga Agreement of 4 December 1895 – an agreement not between the Baganda and the Basoga as its title might suggest, but between the Baganda and the British about Busoga.¹⁸⁴

It was a personal triumph for Grant.¹⁸⁵ It signified that the British had now superseded the Baganda as the paramount power in Busoga. When, a few days later, the news reached Berkeley that British ‘Protection’ had been officially extended to the area between the Nile and the coast¹⁸⁶ (a decision that was merely the outcome of the final take-over of the operations of the IBEAC by the government), it set the seal upon what Berkeley was soon calling ‘our policy which has been to remove Uganda interference altogether’ from Busoga.¹⁸⁷

But if Grant was now, in effect at least, the one sole paramount in Busoga, this did not mean that his domination there was now complete. In the past, the Kabaka had always been satisfied with exercising his predominance fitfully and from a distance, and had never sought to incorporate Busoga into his kingdom.¹⁸⁸ Grant, however, was now concerned to exercise a much more active domination over the Basoga kingdoms than the Kabaka had ever troubled himself with, and he was also concerned to incorporate them into the structure of a British colonial territory – in some ways a much more complex task than the corresponding one in Buganda. For while Grant’s colleagues in Buganda were faced with the problem of establishing their domination over a very much more powerful kingdom than any with which he had to deal, they at least had only one kingdom to tackle, while he had a dozen or so of some consequence and a host of others, and it was of course impossible for him to be in more than one place at a time. The fact that he had taken the place of the Kabaka in Busoga meant that his task was made somewhat easier than it might otherwise have been, but it did not mean that it was complete.¹⁸⁹

This became especially clear when, early in 1896, he turned once more to the question of extracting the tribute from Busoga for which, under the terms of the Uganda–Usoga Agreement of 1895, the British were now wholly responsible. There were complaints from the Basoga that the scales were still too onerous. The Baganda, however, objected to

¹⁸⁴ Berkeley to Grant, 4 Dec., A5/1; Uganda–Usoga Agreement, 4 Dec., ESA C2/ unnumbered; Berkeley to Salisbury, 8 Dec. 1895, FO 2/93; Miti, ‘Buganda’, 2, p. 122.

¹⁸⁵ Grant to Berkeley, 9 Dec. 1895, 14 Mar. 1896, A4/4.

¹⁸⁶ Berkeley to Hobley, etc., 9 Dec. 1895, A5/1.

¹⁸⁷ Berkeley to Grant, 8 Apr. 1895, A8/4.

¹⁸⁸ Except for a small area around Jinja: Berkeley to Salisbury, 8 Dec. 1895, FO 2/93.

¹⁸⁹ Grant to Berkeley, 23 Dec. 1895, A4/3; 30 Jan., A5/2; 14 Mar. 1896, A4/4.

any alterations, and Berkeley insisted that, since the British were now solemnly committed to the Baganda for the total amount, the rates as scheduled must be paid.¹⁹⁰ Several Basoga rulers, however, were flatly refusing to do so. So in March 1896 Grant once more suggested that he should depose one or two of them *pour encourager les autres*.¹⁹¹ There was then, however, a series of delays. In the months that followed, a few chiefs paid, but, by November 1896, Berkeley was thinking that it was time he went into the whole question once again.¹⁹² Early in 1897, the Baganda chiefs agreed to some minor amendments in the rates laid down, but most of the tribute was still not coming in, and Grant was now telling of Kitambwa, Nkono of Bukono in the northeast of Busoga, who had stated:

that when he tests his strength with the Europeans, if beaten, he will submit to the inevitable, but if successful he will do as he at present does ie. pay no tribute. It is high time [Grant now declared] something were done to him, as the example which he shows, tends to make others feel as if they might do likewise, and go unpunished.

In March and April 1897, he accordingly attacked one or two such chiefs, and then, marching at the head of a well-armed mercenary force and, most tellingly, with the assistance of Zibondo of Bulamogi, the ruler of the large kingdom in the north of the area, Miro, the Ngobi of Kigulu, Tabingwa of Luuka, Kisiki of Busiki and two of Luba's sons, all of whom now actively cooperated, he successfully apprehended Kitambwa and his Katikiro, replaced him by another candidate to the throne of Bukono, and made his people pay their tribute.¹⁹³ With that, Grant's active paramountcy across Busoga was beginning to look entrenched.

The fabrication of empire in these two instances followed both the seemingly more general pattern and a somewhat more precisely comparable course of events as well. Both regions were formerly composed of a miscellany of small hereditary, distinguishable rulerships. Despite some occasional successful resistances, they both lay subject to a very much larger neighbour. It was in these circumstances that, backed by their mercenary troops, the first British imperial agents were able to impose

¹⁹⁰ Wilson to Grant, 29 Jan., 2 Feb., Grant to Berkeley, 8 Feb., A4/4; Grant to Berkeley, 30 Jan., Berkeley to Wilson, 1 Jan., Berkeley to Grant, 17 Feb. 1896, A5/2.

¹⁹¹ Grant to Berkeley, 25 Feb., 25 Mar., A4/4; Berkeley to Grant, 8 Apr. 1896, A5/2.

¹⁹² Grant to Berkeley, 10 Nov., A4/6; Berkeley to Grant, 20 Nov. 1896, A5/2; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 198.

¹⁹³ Wilson to Ternan, 18 Feb., Grant to Ternan, 29 Jan., 17 Feb., 19, 25 Mar., A4/7; 3, 9 Apr., A4/8; Ternan to Grant, 26 Mar., 14 Apr. 1897, A5/3; Lubogo, 'Busoga', pp. 12–14.

their raw assertions of British hegemony upon them: in ‘Toro proper’ as symbolised by Lugard’s imposition of an uncompromising treaty on Kasagama in August 1891; in the Toro region more generally by Colvile’s injunction, in February 1894, to its component parts to form a ‘confederacy under Kasagama’; meanwhile in Busoga by Williams’ imperious progress through it in April–July 1892.

Thereafter, as they both entered their ‘determining vortexes’, the key to the more sustained imposition of British imperialism lay, in both instances, in the supersession of a preceding indigenous paramouncy over them by that of the British. In Toro this was effected by the defeat of Kabalega’s Abarasura by British-led forces, first in 1891 and then more extensively from 1893 onwards, which was coupled throughout with the restoration of some exiled Babito royals to their inherited patrimonies. Meanwhile, in Busoga, the process ran the gamut of three distinctive stages: from British support for Buganda’s paramouncy; via a condominium between the British and the Baganda; till, in the end, the complete supersession of Buganda’s paramouncy by that of the British. In both instances, the British employed their hold to aggregate the component parts into a single new polity – ideally under a traditionally legitimate ruler, as in Toro; for lack of a feasible candidate, as in Busoga, under a British ‘O. C.’ In this process there were losers, like Byakuyamba, Kakintuli, Kayanga, Mbekirwa, Kitambwa and others. Overwhelmingly, however, those with traditionally legitimate claims to local authority came in the end to acquiesce in the new regime being imposed upon them. It was upon its basis in their traditionally legitimate authority that it came to be sustained.

7 Defeat: Kabalega's resistance, Mwanga's revolt and the Sudanese mutiny

Parallel to the unfolding of these developments in Toro and Busoga, there was a very different story in Bunyoro. In Toro, Ashburnham and Sitwell variously employed *force majeure* against several leading Batoro figures, as on a number of occasions Grant did likewise in Busoga. In Toro, however, there was never any armed clash between the British and Batoro – all the fighting there took place between British-led mercenaries and Kabalega's Bunyoro armies – while in Busoga there were never more than three or four brief skirmishes during the course of Williams' expedition there in mid 1892. By contrast, Bunyoro between 1893 and 1899 suffered a long-drawn out colonial war. (See [Map 2](#).) It took the form of one of the three distinctive styles of armed opposition to the British which these years were to see: Bunyoro found itself thrust into a fluctuating case of 'primary resistance'; in 1897, Kabaka Mwanga launched a 'post-pacification revolt'; while, shortly afterwards, three companies of the Sudanese mercenaries 'mutinied'. By 1898, these three coincided to comprise the most formidable opposition which the British enterprise in Uganda ever confronted. For some months its fate lay in the balance. By 1899, however, all three had been decisively defeated, leaving scars behind, particularly in Bunyoro, which were never really healed. Amid the fabrication of a new colonial polity, defeat was a coruscating outcome for a great many people.

While the details could scarcely be more different, the general pattern of events in Bunyoro during the 1890s nevertheless followed the four-stage 'defining conjuncture' which each of its immediate neighbours underwent with the British. Over a critical period, this became intermeshed with the second of the successive 'Confrontations' that occurred wherever 'new model warbands' were to be found.

In these terms, the 'precursors' to Bunyoro's 'defining conjuncture' with the British lay, on the Bunyoro side, in their ruler Kabalega's determination to fasten his personal control upon his kingdom, reincorporate its many lately seceded parts, and greatly enhance its standing in the region. To serve these ends, he created his formidable new military

force, the Abarasura. On the British side, the ‘precursors’ here went back to his clashes in the 1870s with the Egyptian agents Baker and Gordon, since these sowed the seeds of the evil reputation accorded to him by almost every European who thereafter became in any way concerned with him. For while his contemporary, Kabaka Mutesa of Buganda, persistently chose the course of peaceful diplomacy towards the Egyptians, Kabalega gave himself over to open conflict with them.¹ As, through the 1880s and early 1890s, he sent his Abarasura to reconquer Toro, that highly negative perception was greatly reinforced – by Stanley’s encounter with the Abarasura in 1889; by the support they gave to the Baganda Muslims in Buganda’s sectarian civil wars; by their multiple assaults upon Lugard’s expedition in the Toro region in 1891; and, above all, by Kabalega’s dispatch of them in the following year to renew their conquest of the Toro region following Macdonald’s withdrawal of the Sudanese garrisons Lugard had established there.² Twice Kabalega sought a peace settlement with Lugard, who more than once rebuffed him; once too with Williams; and more than once with Mwangi; but then on three subsequent occasions he rejected peace proposals brought to him by Baganda envoys, as these clearly involved some kind of subjection to Buganda.³ Such were the circumstances that principally conditioned the ensuing encounter.⁴

By the end of 1893 Macdonald, having lately routed the Baganda Muslims, was clearly determined to hammer Kabalega into a punitive submission.⁵ To this end he concentrated his available Sudanese forces in three small forts on the Buganda/Bunyoro frontier, and when Kikukule, a leading Abarasura commander, whom he had hoped to separate from Kabalega,⁶ was reported as denying them their food supply and threatening to launch an assault against them,⁷ the newly arrived acting British Commissioner, Colonel Colvile, authorised an attack upon him.⁸ When this put Kikukule and his warriors to flight,⁹ Kabalega sent envoys

¹ As in Ch. 2.

² E.g. Williams’ Memo, 31 Mar. 1893, A2/1. For Lugard’s catalogue of accusations, see LD III, p. 121. For yet one more animadversion, G.F. Elliott, *A Naturalist in Mid-Africa* (London, 1896), p. 66.

³ LD II, pp. 121, 458, III, pp. 120–1; Williams to Administrator, Mombasa, 22 Oct., 9 Oct. 1892, MP; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 150–2.

⁴ For a further account of it, see Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, pp. 58–90.

⁵ Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying*, p. 306. For a military historian’s account of the Bunyoro campaigns from 1893 to 1899, see Moyses-Bartlett, *KAR*, pp. 57–64, 69–86.

⁶ Macdonald to Owen, 29 Sept., A3/1; Owen to Macdonald, 6 Oct. 1893, A2/1.

⁷ Owen to Macdonald, 29 Sept., 6 Oct., A2/1; Owen to Colvile, 16, 29 Nov., 1 Dec. 1893, A2/3.

⁸ Colvile to Owen, 17 Nov. 1893, A3/1.

⁹ Owen to Colvile, 29 Nov. 1893, A2/1.

to Kampala to seek a settlement. But they were sharply rebuffed by Colville who had already told the Baganda leaders that there would soon be war with Bunyoro.¹⁰

The specified reason was that Kabalega needed to be punished for the renewed assault by the Abarasura upon the Toro region, and a parallel attack upon Bugabula in Busoga.¹¹ For Colville there was, however, a second reason.¹² For, following the successful participation of the two Christian parties in Macdonald's crushing of the Buganda Muslims earlier in the year, Colville remained troubled that they might soon turn against each other: an eventuality he sought to obviate by giving them the opportunity, in company with a substantial force of Sudanese mercenaries, of inflicting a far greater defeat upon Buganda's great enemy Bunyoro than it had ever suffered before.¹³

But there was a third reason as well, which was kept quite secret at the time. As we have seen, by August 1893,¹⁴ British Foreign Office officials had become much perturbed by press reports of the arrival of a Congolese expedition under Captain van Kerckhoven at or near Wadelai, and then by reports of the departure of the French Colonel Monteil for the same region. Rosebery, accordingly, had sent orders to Portal on 10 August 1893 stating that, since it had become necessary

for Her Majesty's Government to take such steps as may be in their power to protect the important interests of this country on the Upper Nile ... emissaries should be sent into the district of the Nile Basin ... to ascertain the state of affairs in that portion of the British sphere [and] negotiate any treaties that may be necessary for its protection.

As Portal was by then on his way back to Britain, these orders were handed on to Colville as he left Zanzibar for the interior.¹⁵ In giving effect to them, he might have emulated Lugard and circumvented Bunyoro, or adopted Macdonald's plan for a two-pronged attack – on

¹⁰ Macdonald to Owen, 27, 29 Sept., A3/1; Macdonald Memos, ESA Interviews Book, 4, 5 Dec. 1893; Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying*, Chs. 19, 20; L. Dècle, *Three Years in Savage Africa* (London, 1898), pp. 416–28; Bovill & Askwith, *Owen*, pp. 117–43; Colville, *Nile Springs*, pp. 54, 63, 73–4; Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, pp. 95–9; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 58–63.

¹¹ Colville, *Nile Springs*, pp. 68–70; Macdonald's Memo, ESA Interviews Book, 4 Dec. 1893.

¹² Nyakatura gives a corresponding list: *Anatomy*, p. 154.

¹³ Colville, *Nile Springs*, pp. 71–8.

¹⁴ See Ch. 4.

¹⁵ Currie for Rosebery to Portal, 10 Aug. 1893, enclosing cuttings from French and Belgian papers, transmitted in Rodd to Colville, 4 Sept. 1893 (the day he left Zanzibar: Colville, *Nile Springs*, p. 2), A31/1. Whilst *Nile Springs* makes no mention of these orders, see their replication in Colville to Owen, 19 Jan. 1894, A3/2.

Kabalega's capital to the west and on Mruli to the east. But, given the magnitude of the issues to which these orders referred, he immediately determined upon a speedy lunge across the heartland of Bunyoro towards – yet again – Wadelai. Within a month of his arrival, he accordingly left Kampala, on 13 December 1893,¹⁶ at the head of a large force of 6 British officers, 450 Sudanese, and 12,000 Baganda under the command of Kakungulu, 3,000 of them armed with guns.¹⁷ They were soon across the Kafu river, which broadly divided north and south Bunyoro, and by 2 January had overrun the charred remains of Kabalega's capital at Mparo.¹⁸ As Kabalega was having to await the return of his Abarasura leaders, Byabachwezi and Rwabudongo, from Toro and Busoga, he was evidently very careful not to stand his ground against Colvile's forces lest, like Kikukule, he should suffer defeat, and so withdrew before them. When, moreover, in some early skirmishes, his forces were generally worsted, he sought refuge in the Budongo forest to the north. From there Colvile failed to bring him to battle.¹⁹ But he seized the opportunity to advance to the salting centre of Kibiro on the eastern shore of Lake Albert, from where he launched Owen on a reconnaissance to the confluence of the Victoria Nile and Lake Albert, and thence to Wadelai.²⁰ After an abortive first attempt,²¹ Owen eventually reached Wadelai, and on 4 February 1894 secured a treaty with a representative of its Chief Ali by which British interests in the area were purportedly recognised. There were no signs of any Europeans in the region – though somewhat later 400 Sudanese who had been with Kerckhoven were added to Colvile's mercenaries.²²

Colvile then made a fateful decision. So as to ensure the security of his route to Wadelai, he embarked on the construction of a line of forts from Kibiro on the Lake Albert shore, southwards to Hoima near Kabalega's

¹⁶ Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying*, pp. 306, 311, 316–17; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 173.

¹⁷ Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, pp. 96–100.

¹⁸ Colvile to Cracknall, 2 Jan., 3, 8 Feb. 1894, FO 2/71; Colvile, *Nile Springs*, Chs. 7–9; A.B. Thruston, *African Incidents* (London, 1900), Ch. 4; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 154–5.

¹⁹ Colvile, *Nile Springs*, Chs. 10–11.

²⁰ Colvile to Owen, 19 Jan. 1894, FO 2/71; Colvile, *Nile Springs*, Chs. 12–13.

²¹ Owen to Colvile, 11 Feb. 1894, A32/2.

²² Owen to Colvile, 31 Jan., 5, 11 Feb. 1894, FO 2/71; Colvile, *Nile Springs*, Chs. 14–15; Bovill & Askwith, *Owen*, Ch. 7; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 155–8; Thruston, *Incidents*, pp. 174–88. Over the following years, British officers in the area continued to keep a watch on the Nile, more especially on the Mahdists to the north, and the Belgians to the west, e.g. S. Vandeleur, *Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger* (London, 1898), Ch. 3 (1895); Colvile to Cracknall, 17, 20 Mar., 8 Apr. 1894, FO 2/71; Ternan to Berkeley, 24 Feb., A4/4; Sitwell to Berkeley, 19 June, Pulteney to Berkeley, 6 Aug. 1896, A4/5.

capital, and on to Baranwa on the Kafu.²³ Across the waistline of Bunyoro he there posted small garrisons of Sudanese troops under Sudanese officers, under the overall command of a British officer, Captain Thruston. That was to create an altogether new situation. Hitherto, every preceding invasion of Bunyoro had invariably ended in the withdrawal of the invading forces from the country.²⁴ But not now. The British were evidently bent upon staying.²⁵ Thereby they inflicted 'a raw assertion of British hegemony' on the kingdom.

There followed five years of a harrowing 'determining vortex' that was central to Bunyoro's 'defining conjuncture' with the British.²⁶ As Colville's forts were being constructed, Kabalega, amidst a plethora of armed clashes,²⁷ withdrew eastwards to the Mruli region on the Victoria Nile where he proceeded to congregate his forces.²⁸ Early in April 1894, Colville responded by sending Captain Gibb and a Baganda contingent to attack the Abarasura under their leaders Rwabudongo and Ireeta, who were assembled on an island in the Victoria Nile – only, however, to learn that Kabalega had fled northeastwards and was not to be encountered.²⁹ Later that month there was, however, a telling episode when, in order to foreclose a principal Banyoro base for attacks on his supply columns, Thruston successfully stormed Masaja Mukuru, a precipitous hill which was Byabachwezi's stronghold and was thought to be impregnable.³⁰

Nothing daunted, three months later Kabalega made his most ambitious move. He ordered his whole army to assemble in the vicinity of his old capital at Mparo under his eldest son Jasi, from where they were to mount a major assault upon the adjacent British fort at Hoima. Rwabudongo, Byabachwezi, Ireeta and a motley of others gathered their Abarasura together and, on 24 August 1894, advanced to the attack. After two hours of fighting, however, they were utterly defeated

²³ Colville, *Nile Springs*, Ch. 16; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 62–3.

²⁴ In his pre-planning, Macdonald had abjured any such intention: *Soldiering and Surveying*, p. 308.

²⁵ Thruston to Colville, 26 June 1894, FO 2/72.

²⁶ For much that immediately follows, see Thruston to Colville, 26 Dec. 1894, FO 2/92; for a telling survey of the destruction wrought, see Doyle, *Bunyoro*, Ch. 3 ff.

²⁷ For more details of these over the next five years, see Steinberg, *Conflict and Collaboration*, Ch. 3.

²⁸ Thruston to Colville (and Thruston's diary), 17, 28, 29 Mar. 1894, A2/2; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 155–7; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 62–3.

²⁹ Colville, *Nile Springs*, Ch. 20; Colville to Hardinge, 15 July 1894 and encs., FO 2/72; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 174; Thruston's Field Force Diary, 26 May 1894, FO 2/72.

³⁰ Colville, *Nile Springs*, pp. 270–3; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 158; Thruston's Field Force Diary, 26 May, FO 2/72, 26 Dec. 1894, in Jackson to Kimberley, 17 Jan. 1895, FO 2/92; Thruston, *Incidents*, pp. 189–92.

by a force of 150 Sudanese and a following of irregulars under Thruston's command.³¹ That was then followed by a series of running battles³² which climaxed when Thruston heard that Kabalega was encamped at Machudi in northern Bunyoro and, by forced marches and under cover of darkness, almost succeeded in capturing him. Kabalega was fortunate to make his escape, while leaving key elements of his royal regalia behind.³³

At the end of 1894, following the defeat at Mparo and his rout at Machudi and in response to an ultimatum from Colville,³⁴ Kabalega eventually sent messengers to Hoima seeking a settlement – so long as his country was not placed under Buganda. Thruston immediately declared a three-month truce,³⁵ and the acting Commissioner, Jackson, proceeded to draw up peace terms.³⁶ But within a month the opportunity was lost. For, before the end of January 1895, appeals reached Kampala from Byakuyamba of Mwenge in Toro for help against a Bunyoro attack upon him led by Rwabudongo, Kikukule and Ireeta.³⁷ Intent upon the destruction of their longstanding rival, and sensing it might be within an ace of making an accommodation with the British, the Baganda leaders immediately took up Byakuyamba's cry and offered their full support to the British for a major counter-attack against Bunyoro. Swept along by their tirades, acting Commissioner Jackson unhesitatingly accepted the 'absolutely voluntary proffer from the King and chiefs' because of 'the treachery of Kabalega after suing for peace, obtaining a truce and then violating it in the manner he has'.³⁸ As it happens, it was highly doubtful that treachery was involved. Rather, the evidence is that Rwabudongo went to the area to keep open the road for the arms traders from the south, and as a consequence there were clashes.³⁹

³¹ Colville, *Nile Springs*, pp. 274–7; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 159–60; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 68–9; Thruston's Field Force Diary, 28 Aug. 1894, FO 2/72; Thruston, *Incidents*, pp. 205–10.

³² E.g. Forster to Colville, 2 Oct. 1894, A2/3.

³³ Colville, *Nile Springs*, pp. 280–3; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 160–1; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 69; Thruston to Colville, 21 Nov., 26 Dec. 1894, in Jackson to Hardinge, 17 Jan. 1895, FO 2/92.

³⁴ Text in Thruston to Colville, 21 Nov., Colville to Hardinge, 6 Dec. 1894, and encs., FO 2/72.

³⁵ Thruston to Colville, 26 Dec. 1894, in Jackson to Kimberley, 17 Jan. 1895, FO 2/92; Thruston's Field Force Diary, 30 Dec. 1894, A2/3.

³⁶ Jackson to Cunningham, 18 Jan. 1895, A5/1.

³⁷ Byakuyamba to Buganda Chiefs [Feb.], Unyoro District Diary, 28 Jan., Wilson to Jackson, 1 Feb., A4/1; Jackson to Kimberley, 8 Feb. 1895, FO 2/72.

³⁸ Wilson to Jackson, 2, 3 Feb., A4/1; Jackson to Dunning, 4 Feb., to Wilson, 14 Feb. 1895, A5/1.

³⁹ Byakuyamba to Baganda chiefs [Feb. 1895], Wilson to Jackson, 1 Feb., Cunningham to Ashburnham and Dunning, 9 Feb., Cunningham to Jackson, 18 Feb. 1895, A4/1.

All the same, the damage was done, and a further expedition against Bunyoro was soon launched,⁴⁰ during which Captain Cunningham, with two and a half companies of Sudanese, first overran Rwabudongo's headquarters south of Hoima,⁴¹ and then joined up with Captain Dunning, with two more, along with a Baganda army under Kakungulu. Together they took up a position opposite Kajumbera Island in the Victoria Nile, where Kabalega was now based.

Realising that such a force might soon be upon him, Kabalega, following the defeat at Mparo, had evidently decided not to risk any further confrontation in the open. Instead he organised the construction of a long line of stockades and entrenchments upon the eastern bank of the Victoria Nile north of Mruli, from which to defy and if necessary repulse any attack upon his forces.⁴² Thanks to Dunning's impatience, this was brilliantly successful. For with just five canoes at their disposal, one of them small and two of them leaky, and without waiting for numbers of others on the way,⁴³ Cunningham and Dunning, in the early morning mist of 2 March 1895, attacked across river, and thereupon suffered a serious reverse. Two of their canoes sank. Both of them were wounded, Dunning mortally. Thereupon Cunningham pulled back to Hoima, and with the onset of the rains disbanded his force.⁴⁴

That, however, was anathema to Jackson and Wilson, the British official in charge of Kampala, and to Major Ternan, now the senior British officer in the country. Such a reverse could all too easily restore Kabalega's tarnished prestige and severely damage that of the British.⁴⁵ Since there were reports that some arms traders had participated in the defeat on 2 March, Jackson took energetic steps to stop their caravans passing through the western districts on their way to Kabalega. He ordered the construction of a fort at Nyakabimba in the critical corridor between Buganda and Toro, and despatched reinforcements under Captain Pulteney and Lieutenant Vandeleur to the area, where, over the

⁴⁰ Jackson to Dunning, 4 Feb. 1895, A5/1.

⁴¹ Dunning to Jackson, 15, 19 Feb. 1895, A4/1.

⁴² Vandeleur, *Campaigning*, pp. 59, 66–7; Jackson, *Early Days*, p. 270; Grant to Jackson, 26 Feb., Cunningham to Jackson, 7 June 1895, A4/1; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 88.

⁴³ Grant to Jackson, 25 Feb. 1895, A4/1; Jackson to Cunningham, 10 Mar. 1895, A5/1.

⁴⁴ Vandeleur, *Campaigning*, Ch. 4; Jackson, *Early Days*, pp. 270–1; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 162; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 83–6; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 178–9; Cunningham to Jackson, 23 Mar. 1894, A4/1; Jackson to Hill, 20 Apr. 1895, FO 2/92.

⁴⁵ Jackson to Cunningham, 16 Mar., 6 Apr., to Grant, 16 Mar., A5/1; Jackson to Kimberley, 18 Mar. 1895, FO 2/92; Ternan, *Some Experiences of an Old Bromsgrovian* (Birmingham, 1930), pp. 171–3.

ensuing weeks, they mainly succeeded in breaking the back of the arms traffic through the region.⁴⁶

Meanwhile, Ternan mobilised an expedition on the largest possible scale, which included a large Baganda army for the first time, under the command of Kagwa, the Katikiro.⁴⁷ This foregathered at Mruli, where a fort was built,⁴⁸ and following the arrival on 22 April 1895 of a flotilla of canoes from Busoga under Grant immediately responded to a Banyoro attempt to repel them, by launching a bombardment against them, not only this time with Maxim guns, but by two revolving Hotchkiss guns firing explosive shells. Along with a much more professionally organised canoe attack across river, this soon inflicted a major defeat on the Banyoro. By nightfall the whole of the British-led force was being ferried across the Nile. Kabalega and his remaining followers were pursued to the north, but managed to escape. A commanding fort was built at Masindi in the northern reaches of Bunyoro. And on their return to Buganda, leaders of the Baganda army roundly declared, as Berkeley reported, that 'Kabarega never had such a hammering before'.⁴⁹ He had now indeed been decisively expelled from his kingdom.⁵⁰

It is at this point that the notion of successive 'Confrontations' once again becomes pertinent. As we have noted,⁵¹ following Kabalega's transformation of his father's Abarasura in the 1870s into 'new model warbands', they had extensively undertaken the two roles which in the manner of a Confrontation I they were designed to perform. First they proceeded against over-mighty subjects within the kingdom, beginning with those who had opposed Kabalega's accession and, by the late 1880s, by thrashing those who in his terms were the most recalcitrant of them all: the Palwo princes around the westward bend of the Victoria Nile in the east, and Kasagama of Toro in the south. Then at Rwengabi in 1886 they had inflicted a major defeat upon Bunyoro's most formidable external enemy, Buganda, and thereafter formed the

⁴⁶ Vandeleur, *Campaigning*, Ch. 6; Jackson to Hill, 20 Apr., FO 2/92; Dunning to Jackson, 20 Feb., Foaker to Jackson, 25 Apr., Pulteney to Jackson, 17 June, A4/1, 1 July, A4/2; Jackson to Dunning, 11 Jan., to Foaker, 25 Apr., to Pulteney, 5, 24 June, to Cunningham, 12 June, A5/1; Ternan to Foaker & Sitwell, 30 Nov. 1895, A5/2.

⁴⁷ T. Ternan, *Some Experiences*, Chs. 17–19; Jackson to Grant, 16, 18 Mar., to Cunningham, 16 Mar., to Bagge, 18 Mar., to Ternan, 22 Mar. 1895, A5/1.

⁴⁸ TD I, 18 Mar. 1897.

⁴⁹ Vandeleur, *Campaigning*, Ch. 5; Jackson, *Early Days*, pp. 271–2; TD I, 9 Mar. – 27 Apr.; Jackson to Grant, 16 Mar., A5/1; Cunningham to Jackson, 22 Apr., 17, 28 May, 7 June, Grant to Jackson, 22 Apr., A4/1; Jackson to Hill, 7 June 1895, FO 2/92; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 162–3; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 87–9; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 179–82.

⁵⁰ Cunningham to Jackson, 10 July 1895, A4/2.

⁵¹ See Ch. 5, pp. 128 ff.

backbone of their kingdom's defence against the British-led attacks upon it.

Yet for those leaders, like several Abarasura commanders, who possessed no traditional claims to offices of state, there were ultimately limitations upon their loyalties when these became subject to significant pressure. Back in 1892 a Buganda envoy from Lugard had come offering peace in return for a substantial tribute. Kabalega had summoned his leading chiefs to discuss this, and a majority appeared to support it. But Kabalega opted for war. 'Ireeta and Rwabudongo', Nyakatura reported, 'did not hide their disappointment and anger at this decision'.⁵² Nevertheless, despite hesitations,⁵³ they loyally maintained a united front against the assaults which, throughout 1894 and into 1895, the British and the Baganda launched against them. Against these, however, neither a scorched earth retreat, nor a withdrawal to the Budongo forest, nor many a skirmish, nor the heights of Masaja Mukuru, nor a full-frontal attack at Mparo, nor even (despite their initial success) the fortifications near Mruli – none of these succeeded in securing the defence of the kingdom. Bunyoro's forces had been consistently routed. Their casualties had been countless. The countryside and its inhabitants had been appallingly ravaged.⁵⁴ Their opponents were coming to be vastly better armed and better drilled. And the Omukama had fled from his kingdom. In July 1895 there was some suggestion that he was once more seeking a settlement, but upon being told this would require his unconditional surrender, very soon decided against it.⁵⁵

It was in these circumstances that a Confrontation II now occurred, under which the principal Abarasura leaders and a motley of others turned against their ruler and surrendered to the British.⁵⁶ In response to a bitter quarrel with Kabalega over his renewed opposition to the war, the wanton killing of some eighty of his followers, and his own defeats by a Baganda force, Rwabudongo submitted in May 1895.⁵⁷ Byabachwezi

⁵² Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 151; Wilson to Jackson, 3 Aug. 1895, A4/2.

⁵³ Thruston to Colvile, 28 Mar., A2/2; Thruston's Field Force Diary, 26 May, 28 June 1894, FO 2/72.

⁵⁴ E.g. Wilson to Berkeley, 4 Mar., Pulteney to Berkeley, 16 Mar. 1896, A4/4.

⁵⁵ Cunningham to Jackson, 30 July, Madocks to Cunningham, 18, 30 Aug., A4/2; Madocks to Berkeley, 25 Nov. 1895, A4/3.

⁵⁶ E.g. Cunningham to Jackson, 10 July 1895, A4/2. Later evidence shows they included three hereditary territorial chiefs, the Babito Mugema and Kato, and Bikamba of Busindi (Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 125, 127), and the Palwo Prince Rejumba (TD I, 4 May 1895). See also Thruston's Field Force Diary, 26 May, 28 June, to Colvile, 26 June, Colvile to Hardinge, 6 Dec. 1894, and Anderson's minute thereon, 27 Mar. 1895, FO 2/72.

⁵⁷ J.P. Wilson to Jackson, 7 May, 10 June, Ternan to Jackson, 27 May, Cunningham to Jackson, 18 Feb., 28 May, Foaker to Jackson, 5 June, A4/1; Jackson to J.P. Wilson, 20 May, to Cunningham, 1 June, A5/1; Jackson to Kimberley, 20 May, FO 2/92; Wilson

followed in July, when Ireeta also sought to make peace.⁵⁸ Thereafter, following a series of fluctuating encounters, Kikukule surrendered in October,⁵⁹ and in the following January took steps to bring in Muhenda.⁶⁰

It was not at all clear, however, what was to happen once these submissions had been made. As yet Bunyoro was in no way part of the British Protectorate. Arguably British operations there were in clear breach of quite precise orders to confine these to Buganda,⁶¹ and were only acquiesced in by the Foreign Office because of its concern to be speedily informed about the advance of any other European agents to the region. At the same time, there was scarcely even a handful of British military officers and only two civilians locally available to take command of the full extent of Kabalega's kingdom.

It was in these circumstances that an essentially pragmatic course was taken. It took the form of entrusting some grouping of chiefs who acknowledged British hegemony, and possessed a concerted purpose, with the task of assuming control of a substantial part of Kabalega's kingdom in his place.⁶² Thus, as we have seen,⁶³ Colville in 1894 ordered the creation, under the returned exile, Kasagama of Toro, of a 'confederacy of southern Unyoro chiefs' who had all variously suffered at Kabalega's hands, and soon afterwards – as we shall see – implanted Baganda Christian forces across the whole area south of the Kafu river: with the Protestants, under Kakungulu, taking control of the Namionjo region to the east, where he built a fort; and the Catholics of the area to the west around Bukumi, where the White Fathers soon established a mission.⁶⁴

to Jackson, 3 Aug. 1895, A4/2; Vandeleur, *Campaigning*, pp. 82–3; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 69–70. For Rwabudongo's earlier subordination, see Casati, *Ten Years*, II, p. 91.

⁵⁸ After receiving an assurance that no more Bunyoro territory would be transferred by the British to the Baganda – on which, see below; Cunningham to Jackson, 17, 30 July 1895, A4/2; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 162.

⁵⁹ Lanning, 'Kikukule', pp. 130–5; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 161–2; Cunningham to Jackson, 2 July, Pulteney to Ternan, 9 Sept., Achte to Ashburnham, 26 Sept., A4/2; Pulteney to Jackson, 18, 19 July, Madocks to Jackson, 3 Sept., A4/4, 12 Sept., A4/2, 5 Dec., Ternan to Berkeley, 26 Oct., A4/3; Jackson to Pulteney, 1 July, to Ashburnham, 2 July, Berkeley to Wilson, 6 Nov., A5/1; TD II, 26, 29 Oct. 1895; Miti, 'Buganda', 3, pp. 92–3.

⁶⁰ See Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 132; Ternan to Berkeley, 5 Jan. 1896, A4/4.

⁶¹ Kimberley to Hardinge, 9 June, FO 107/1, to Colville, 23 Nov. 1894, FO 2/70. For Berkeley's circumlocution on this, see Berkeley to Pulteney, 25 April, 30 May 1896, A5/2.

⁶² E.g. Macdonald to Owen, 29 Sept. 1893, A3/1; TD I, 18 Mar. 1895; Pulteney to Berkeley, 12 Apr., 13, 19 May, A4/5; Berkeley to Ternan, 15 Sept. 1896, A5/2.

⁶³ See Ch. 6, p. 155.

⁶⁴ See Chs. 6 and 9; Lanning, 'Kikukule', pp. 127–33; Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, pp. 117–22; Wilson to Berkeley, 11 May, A5/2; Pulteney to Berkeley, 13 May 1896, A4/5. See also TD I, 18 Mar. 1896.

There was, however, no such grouping ready to hand in northern Bunyoro. The uncertainty which, as a consequence, prevailed there was well illustrated by Rwabudongo's experiences during the two years following his surrender. He first submitted himself to Kasagama of Toro, and was there appointed to a territorial chieftaincy. But, as we have seen,⁶⁵ as a principal Abarasura leader he received such short shrift from Kasagama that he took himself off to Kampala instead. There the Buganda chiefs welcomed him to their ranks, and Wilson, the British official there, proposed he should be placed in charge of the Kyaka-Nyakabimba district.⁶⁶ On seeing Rwabudongo, Commissioner Berkeley agreed that he could settle there.⁶⁷ However, its Baitwara chief, Nyama, successfully appealed to Berkeley against Rwabudongo assuming its chieftaincy.⁶⁸ Whereupon Berkeley avowed he had only intended that he should dwell there.⁶⁹

Eventually, however, in March 1896, Pulteney, Thruston's successor as the officer in charge of Bunyoro, tried his hand at replicating the pragmatic course which Colvile had taken. In so doing, he drew in particular upon the ranks of the former Abarasura leaders. Under Rwabudongo as 'paramount chief', he designated Kikukule (who at Berkeley's instance had been sent to Entebbe),⁷⁰ and Muhenda, along with three heirs to local territorial chieftaincies, to chieftaincies across the area in northwestern Bunyoro between the Muzizi river in the south and the Budongo forest in the north.⁷¹ Such, however, was the virulence of the protests by the Baganda Catholics against what they saw here as a curtailment of their recent gains at Colvile's hands,⁷² that, despite having initially agreed to Pulteney's proposals, Commissioner Berkeley eventually gave way. In lieu, he lamely asked Pulteney to compensate Rwabudongo in northern Bunyoro, while ordering both him and Kikukule and their followers to go to Masindi and there await further instructions.⁷³ In June 1896 Pulteney accordingly designated three other areas in northwestern Bunyoro over which Rwabudongo could

⁶⁵ See Ch. 6, p. 161.

⁶⁶ Wilson to Jackson, 3 Aug., A4/2; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 2 Oct. 1895, A4/3.

⁶⁷ Berkeley to Ternan, 27 Sept. 1895, A5/1.

⁶⁸ See Ch. 6, p. 161.

⁶⁹ Berkeley to Ashburnham, 19 Nov. 1895, A5/1.

⁷⁰ TD II, 27 Dec. 1895.

⁷¹ Pulteney to Berkeley, 23 Mar., A4/4; Wilson to Berkeley, 12 Apr., Berkeley to Pulteney, 6, 25 Apr., 6 May, to Forster, 27 Aug. 1896, A5/2. For a full account of this matter, see Ch. 9, pp. 257-9.

⁷² See Ch. 9, pp. 259-60.

⁷³ Berkeley to Wilson, 6 Apr., Wilson to Pulteney, 6, 24, 30 Apr., A5/2; Sitwell to Berkeley, 27 May 1896, A4/5.

be chief.⁷⁴ That, however, availed so little that in October 1896 Rwabudongo joined with Kikukule in attempting to secure the support of Buganda's leaders in an attempt to transfer their allegiance to Buganda.⁷⁵ Nothing, however, came of that either.

Meanwhile, accompanied by his son Jasi and before long by two Abarasura leaders, Ireeta and Muhenda, who reverted to his side, Kabalega roamed the lands to the north and east of the Victoria Nile.⁷⁶ From there his remaining followers variously embarked upon hit-and-run raids,⁷⁷ and periodically clashed with a variety of Lango and Bakedi groups.⁷⁸ At one point he sought to open communications with the Buganda leaders; but to no avail.⁷⁹ Soon, however, it became clear that his overriding concern was to mount one more attempt to secure control of his kingdom. In this cause he sought assistance from the Mahdists, procured further supplies of arms and powder, drilled his riflemen as never before and, despite earlier conflicts, won the support of some Lango and Bakedi groups.⁸⁰

When, in August 1896, Ternan learnt of these preparations, he promptly decided upon taking countervailing action by building two new forts south of the westwards arm of the Victoria Nile as a check upon any crossing from the north.⁸¹ As, in October 1896, the first of these came to be built at Foweira, Kabalega mobilised his most ambitious attack on the British since Mparo two years earlier. From a ridge opposite the fort he launched his riflemen into a barrage of fusillades against it. When, at 900 yards, Ternan responded with his Maxim and Hotchkiss guns, they held their ground for over an hour, but with their losses mounting and some Baganda forces assaulting them across river they eventually withdrew.

With that, Kabalega's forces were severely broken. He himself fled three days' journey to the north,⁸² a second fort was soon built at Fajao

⁷⁴ Pulteney to Berkeley, 25 June 1896, A4/5.

⁷⁵ Wilson to Berkeley, 22 Oct. 1896, A5/2.

⁷⁶ Pulteney to Berkeley, 18 Apr., 31 July, Pulteney to Ternan, 30 Aug., 7 Sept., 7 Oct., Ternan to Berkeley, 14 Oct. 1896, A4/5.

⁷⁷ Ternan to Berkeley, 28 Jan., 1 Feb., A4/4; Berkeley to Salisbury, 15 Feb. 1896, FO 2/113; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 193.

⁷⁸ E.g. Ternan to Berkeley, 25 Jan., 1 Feb., A4/4; Pulteney to Ternan, 7 Sept. 1896, A4/5.

⁷⁹ Sitwell to Berkeley, 17, 21 Feb., Wilson to Berkeley, 3 Mar. 1896, A4/4; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 191.

⁸⁰ Ternan to Berkeley, 24 Sept. 1895, A4/2, 2 Feb., A4/4; Pulteney to Ternan, 30 Aug., to Berkeley, 23 Sept., A4/5; Pulteney to Berkeley, 22 Nov. 1896, A4/6.

⁸¹ TD III, 8–9 Aug.; Ternan to Berkeley, 5, 9 Sept., Pulteney to Berkeley, 23 Sept., A4/6; Berkeley to Ternan, 15 Sept. 1896, FO 2/113.

⁸² TD II, 6 Oct.; Pulteney to Ternan, 30 Aug., Ternan to Berkeley, 4, 10 Nov., Unyoro Expedition Diary, 13, 15 Oct., A4/5, 17 Oct. 1896, A4/6; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 192–3; Ternan, *Some Experiences*, Ch. 25.

to the west; and a whole succession of Lango, Bakedi and Acholi leaders then took steps to make peace with the British.⁸³ Ternan thereupon set about seeking once more to apply Colvile's formula of entrusting a group of amenable chiefs with the governance of the whole of Bunyoro's northern region. To this end he installed the Palwo Prince Rejumba as chief of the area between Mruli and Foweira; nominated Rejumba's kinsman, Mugemu, to be chief from Foweira to Fajao;⁸⁴ appointed a hereditary chief, Bikamba, to Masindi district;⁸⁵ and assigned the two former Abarasura leaders Byabachwezi and Rwabudongo to be, respectively, chief of the Hoima-Kibiro region, and chief from there to Bunyoro's northwestern corner at Magungo.⁸⁶ When Rwabudongo then said that he and his followers wanted to settle at the south end of Lake Albert, Pulteney suggested that he should go to Kampala instead, where he arrived in February 1897.⁸⁷ On Pulteney's further advice, Ternan then split the area he had allocated to Rwabudongo into two, by appointing Melindwa, the chief of the saltmakers, to Kibiro, and Wamara – who, following his father's exiling by Kabalega's father, had served the British since Lugard's day⁸⁸ – to Magungo.⁸⁹

All of this, however, was no more than a highly contrived grouping whose members collectively had little or nothing in common.⁹⁰ Several of them were keeping their lines open to Kabalega, whose influence was 'far from dead',⁹¹ while Ternan himself was under no illusion about his scheme's likely success.⁹² Then, in May 1897, Wamara died of poisoning, evidently at Kabalega's instance,⁹³ and with that the whole flimsy edifice broke apart. 'The country at present', Thruston, Pulteney's replacement, wrote to Ternan on 30 June 1897, 'can hardly be said to be under a government at all: it is rather under a military occupation, or

⁸³ TD, III, 17–18 Oct.; and, e.g., Ternan to Berkeley, 18, 20 Oct., A4/6; Berkeley to Ternan, 29 Oct. 1896, A5/2; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 193–4.

⁸⁴ TD III, 6 Nov. 1896.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 6, 11–12 Nov. 1896.

⁸⁶ Ternan to Berkeley, 26 Sept., A4/5, 20 Oct., 1, 27 Nov. 1896, A4/6.

⁸⁷ Pulteney to Ternan, 1, 3 Feb., Wilson to Ternan, 18 Feb. 1897, A4/7.

⁸⁸ E.g. Thruston's Field Force Diary, 26 May 1894, A2/2; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 157; Thruston to Ternan, 30 June 1897.

⁸⁹ Pulteney to Ternan, 1 Feb., A4/7; Ternan to Thruston, 15 Apr. 1896, A4/7.

⁹⁰ Thruston to Ternan, 30 June 1897, A4/8.

⁹¹ Ternan to Berkeley, 18, 27 Oct. 1896, A4/5; Pulteney to Ternan, 1 Feb., 5 Mar., A4/7; Madocks to Ternan, 10 May, Thruston to Ternan, 31 May, 1 June, 1 July 1897, A4/8; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 109–10; Dugmore to Wilson, 6 Dec. 1897, A4/9.

⁹² Ternan to Berkeley, 27 Nov. 1896, A4/6; Ternan to Thruston, 15 Apr. 1897, A5/3.

⁹³ Thruston, *Incidents*, pp. 292–3; Ternan to Berkeley, 1 Nov. 1896, A4/6; Thruston to Ternan, 31 May, 17, 30 June, 1 July 1897, A4/8.

at most a weak military government⁹⁴ – highly dependent on a series of small Sudanese garrisons placed in a string of forts across the region. Its replacement by an effective civilian order would here require the irreversible defeat of Kabalega along with the installation of a new ruler endowed with traditional authority in his place.⁹⁵ So far, of that there was no sign.

Quite suddenly, the surrounding circumstances were then twice radically transformed. On 6 July 1897, Kabaka Mwanga wormed his way through a reed fence around his royal enclosure, and on reaching the nearby landing place on Lake Victoria left secretly by canoe for the large southern county of Buddu.⁹⁶ Wilson, who was in charge at Kampala, was quite bewildered. At the capital, nothing stirred. But as a precaution he sent his assistant, Forster, to Villa Maria, the Catholic mission there, to check any disturbance.⁹⁷ From there, Forster sent him a note on 9 July saying that ‘it would appear that the King’s flight is the outcome of a deliberately organised conspiracy’; and on the following day added: ‘But there must be no mistake ... but Buddu is to reconquer’.⁹⁸

Such was the launch of Mwanga’s ‘post-pacification revolt’.

Over the preceding four years, following Macdonald’s rout of the Muslims in 1893, there had been many issues in dispute in Buganda.⁹⁹ Nonetheless, it had remained at peace. Mwanga, however, deprived of his earlier supreme authority, understandably yearned to see it restored. Instead, he found himself constantly denigrated and rebuffed.¹⁰⁰ Believing the Catholics would give him more support than the Protestants, he more than once sought to become a Catholic again. But he was sternly warned by Colville against doing so.¹⁰¹ More recently he had been deeply humiliated by being heavily fined for sending a consignment of ivory to Zanzibar without paying the British-imposed customs duty;¹⁰² and then by being made to dismiss large numbers of young pages about his court,

⁹⁴ Thruston to Ternan, 5 May, 30 June 1897, A4/8.

⁹⁵ For Thruston’s penetrating commentary on this, see Ch. 9.

⁹⁶ Miti, ‘Buganda’, 2, pp. 140–1; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 203.

⁹⁷ ND, 6 July; Wilson to Ternan, 6 July, FO 2/133, to Forster, 6 July, to Ternan, 8 July 1897, A4/8.

⁹⁸ Forster to Wilson, 9, 10, Statement by Forster, 10 July, A4/8; Forster to Wilson, 11, 13 July 1897, BRA.

⁹⁹ E.g. W. J. Ansorge, *Under the African Sun* (London, 1899), Ch. 10.

¹⁰⁰ Miti, ‘Buganda’, 2, pp. 135–40; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 203.

¹⁰¹ E.g. ESA Interviews Book, 5 Dec. 1893, 19–22 Mar. 1894; Mwanga to Colville, 24 July, Colville to Mwanga, 25 July 1894, FO 2/72.

¹⁰² Berkeley to Wilson, 30 Nov. 1896, A5/2; Ternan to Wilson, 18 Jan., A4/7, to Salisbury, 25 Jan. 1897, FO 2/132; Miti, ‘Buganda’, 2, pp. 113, 115, 121–2, 138; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 194–7.

whom both the British and the Christian oligarchs believed to be exercising a malign influence over him. His anger was palpable, directed now not just against the British but against his senior chiefs as well.¹⁰³

He was not, moreover, the only notable to be incensed at his treatment. A Sudanese escort had marched a senior Protestant chief, Jona Waswa, Mukwenda of Singo, from Masindi to Kampala, on a charge of stealing Banyoro women, while another, Samwiri Mukasa, Kitunzi of Gomba, was dismissed from his position on a similar charge. Waswa and Sematimba, Kaima of Mawagola, were then both exiled for rebellion.¹⁰⁴ These impositions all had a wider import since treatments like these, of both ruler and senior chiefs, were deeply resented.¹⁰⁵ A seminal episode then followed when Gabrieli Kintu, the Catholics' leading general, was sentenced to death for the murder of a thief who had stolen his favourite gun. Only with Mwanga's connivance did he escape to Buddu to become the leading figure in Mwanga's subsequent revolt.¹⁰⁶ There, away from the beaten path of British intrusion into northern Buganda, the Catholics in Buddu and a miscellany of others from elsewhere, including some Protestants, were soon on the verge of a major insurgency against the very notion of British dominion over their kingdom.¹⁰⁷

There had been several intimations that this was in the offing.¹⁰⁸ When, early in 1897, Ternan, with Wilson and the Catholic Katikiro Mugwanya, spent a fortnight in Buddu,¹⁰⁹ Streicher, the Father Superior at the Catholic mission of Villa Maria there, strove to alert him to the rumblings of revolt. Ternan would have none of them. On the contrary, he concluded, Buddu was 'evidently very flourishing and loyal'.¹¹⁰ Despite this rebuff, Streicher wrote to him in May with forebodings which were even more dire; but with little further result.¹¹¹ When, moreover, down in Entebbe, Ternan first heard of Mwanga's flight, he, like Wilson in Kampala, found: 'All is quiet here.'¹¹² But in response to Forster's increasingly sombre tidings, he immediately mobilised a

¹⁰³ Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 107–24, 138, 141; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 194–7; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 309–11.

¹⁰⁴ Wilson to Ternan, 9 July 1897, A4/9; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 97–103, 123, 134; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 187, 199.

¹⁰⁵ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 196; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 123.

¹⁰⁶ Miti, 'Buganda', pp. 125–33; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 199–203.

¹⁰⁷ Wright gives an invaluable extensive account of the Baganda protagonists on both sides: *Heroic Age*, Ch. 6.

¹⁰⁸ E.g. Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 199, 202, 210; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 123–5.

¹⁰⁹ Ternan to Salisbury, 14 Feb. 1897, FO 2/132; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 199.

¹¹⁰ TD II, 5, 7, 8 Feb. 1897.

¹¹¹ Streicher to Wilson, 3 May 1897, A4/8.

¹¹² TD IV, 9 July 1897.

substantial force to march down to Buddu, made up of the greater part of three companies of Sudanese mercenaries along with 14,000 Baganda under Kagwa, armed with guns.¹¹³ These latter were available to him since, despite some passing wavering in the western counties,¹¹⁴ by contrast with those who rallied to Mwanga's cause, the overwhelming majority of Buganda's incumbent chiefs stood out against him, in no way minded to assist him in retrieving his erstwhile authority, nor to forgo their now entrenched bonds with the British. Wilson summarised the upshot by saying: '11 out of the 12 provinces' (counties)¹¹⁵ into which Buganda was divided refused to support him. It was thus that Mwanga's revolt became transmuted into an unrelenting civil war as well.

Ternan and Kagwa's combined forces entered Buddu on 16 July 1897, and on the 20th defeated Mwanga's 1,400 supporters at a brief but decisive battle at Kabwoko.¹¹⁶ Three days later, Mwanga was reported to have surrendered to the Germans.¹¹⁷ But Ternan stayed on, and on 28 July first encircled and then crushed a Baganda Abangoni¹¹⁸ force at Malongo,¹¹⁹ before returning to Kampala. On leaving Buddu he gave its command to Grant who, with a reduced force under Lieutenant Hobart, defeated, at a battle near Masaka on 23 August, a combination of an Nkore contingent¹²⁰ and a reduced insurgent force under Kintu, who had now taken command of the revolt.¹²¹ Grant and Hobart were then joined by 3,000–4,000 Baganda, under Kagwa and Mugwanya, who extensively scoured the area in search of the now highly elusive Kintu who constantly slipped their net, until eventually, like Mwanga before him, he fled to the German sphere.¹²²

¹¹³ TD iv, 10–14 July; Ternan to Salisbury, 9 July, to Hardinge, 13 July, FO 2/133; Ternan to Jackson, 9 July, to Grant, to N. Wilson, to Thruston, 11 July 1897, A7/3; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 140–2.

¹¹⁴ Ternan to Sitwell, 15 July, A5/3; Malek to Wilson, 28 July – 23 Aug., BRA; Sitwell to Ternan, 23 Aug. 1897, A4/8.

¹¹⁵ Wilson to Hill, 16 Sept., FO 2/133; TD iv, 14 July 1897.

¹¹⁶ Ternan's Field Force Orders, 16–22 July, A27/17; Ternan to Salisbury, 20 July, FO 2/133; TD iv, 14–21 July 1897; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 143; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 205–6; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', p. 313.

¹¹⁷ Zimbe, 'Kabaka', p. 146; Ternan to Salisbury, 23 July, FO 2/133; TD iv, 23 July 1897.

¹¹⁸ A Baganda gathering of exiled pagans otherwise denigratingly called Futabanghi.

¹¹⁹ Ternan to Salisbury, 29 July, FO 2/133; TD iv, 24–28 July 1897; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 145; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 206.

¹²⁰ For the circumstances, see Ch. 8, pp. 235–6.

¹²¹ Grant to [Wilson], 27 Aug. 1897, A5/3; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 148; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 208.

¹²² For extensive correspondence on this late Aug. – late Sept. 1897, see A4/8, A4/9, A5/3, BRA; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 209–11; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 148–52, 172; Wilson to Salisbury, 5 Oct., FOCP 7024/32*; Grant to Malek, 20 Sept. 1897, BRA.

With that, Mwanga's revolt might well have petered out altogether.¹²³ Instead, at the end of September 1897, three companies of the Sudanese mercenaries in the lately formed Uganda Rifles mutinied, thereby inflicting upon the British something like the Baperes' revolt against Mwanga nine years previously, and immensely threatening the whole coercive basis of their embryonic British Protectorate.

Once again there were warning signs which the British ignored. Discipline amongst the Sudanese mercenaries had slackened and twice during the Buddu campaign some of them had threatened to revolt:¹²⁴ their pay was under half that of those in the adjacent East Africa Protectorate; still less than for those in German service; and less too than the average for a porter. Even then it was often in arrears.¹²⁵ Nos. 4, 7 and 9 companies had, moreover, been continuously engaged in campaigning against Kabalega, Mwanga and the Nandi (in what became Kenya)¹²⁶ and were now made to foregather at a base on the western side of the Rift Valley to escort Macdonald on a further treaty-making expedition, of the kind which four years earlier Rosebery had ordered Portal to dispatch to the Upper Nile.¹²⁷ Since this would once again entail a long separation from their wives and families, the assembled Sudanese, despite a minor concession, had had enough. On 23 September, No. 9 company deserted. The other two followed shortly afterwards.¹²⁸ As they marched westwards to rouse their fellows in their cause, they variously swept past the smaller forts upon their route,¹²⁹ before occupying Luba's Fort, adjacent to the outflow from Lake Victoria into the Victoria Nile. There, Thruston, who had taken command, thought the garrison was loyal to him.¹³⁰ But he was mistaken. They very soon joined the mutineers, and he and two other British officials were then arrested.¹³¹

¹²³ Wilson to Hill, 16 Sept. 1897, FO 2/133.

¹²⁴ Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 151–2; Thruston, *Incidents*, p. 295; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 210.

¹²⁵ On these and other issues, see Moyses-Bartlett, *KAR*, pp. 71–2; Jackson, *Early Days*, pp. 304–6; Thruston, *Incidents*, pp. 294–8.

¹²⁶ A. T. Matson, *Nandi Resistance to British Rule*, Vol. 1, (Nairobi, 1972).

¹²⁷ Salisbury to Macdonald, Secret, 9 June 1897, FO 2/144. For the background, see, e.g., Robinson & Gallagher, *Africa*, Ch. 12, 'The Way to Fashoda'.

¹²⁸ For this and subsequent events up to the date they were written, major sources are Berkeley to Salisbury, 16 May 1898, and Macdonald's 'Report on Military Operations, Uganda, 1897–98', and 'Abbreviated Staff Diary of Operations in Uganda, 1897–98', in Berkeley to Salisbury, 30 May 1898, FO 2/155. For further details, see FOCP 7024/25, 27, 28, 79, 80.

¹²⁹ Jackson to Salisbury, 26 Sept. 1897, FO 2/133; Thruston, *Incidents*, pp. 299–300.

¹³⁰ Wilson to Salisbury, 9 Nov. 1897, FOCP 7024/25.

¹³¹ Wilson to Salisbury, 12 Oct. 1894, FOCP 7024/24; Thruston, *Incidents*, pp. 306–12.

As the mutineers moved westwards, Jackson, as acting Commissioner, tried in vain to parley with them.¹³² Macdonald's special escort of 17 Sikhs, 10 Europeans and 340 Swahili troops meanwhile marched in pursuit, and by 18 October had successfully established themselves on Bukaleba ridge overlooking Luba's Fort. There, on 19 October, they were attacked by 300 mutineers and 150 Banyoro, Baganda Muslims and others.¹³³ For five hours they held them at bay, till in a final charge they drove them back to the fort.¹³⁴ There, on the following day, Thruston and his two companions were led out and shot. The die was cast.¹³⁵

Nine days earlier, news of the mutiny had reached Kampala, and a party of Baganda under two British officials was immediately dispatched to prevent the mutineers crossing the Victoria Nile. These preliminaries were then greatly enhanced when a letter from the mutineers was received by Prince Mbogo, the principal Buganda Muslim leader, offering him the Kabakaship – which he promptly rejected – and announcing their impending arrival in Kampala.¹³⁶ For that not only threatened the hold of the Christian oligarchy upon the core of their kingdom. It presaged the establishment of a Muslim regime there in their place. Accordingly, leaving Katikiro Mugwanya in charge of the capital, Katikiro Kagwa promptly led out a much larger force. This reached Bukaleba on 23 October, just in time to provide Macdonald with the reinforcements he needed to lay siege to the mutineers in Luba's Fort, and prevent them from crossing the Nile and entering Buganda. Over the next two months, during which there were periodic but ineffectual attempts at a settlement, Kagwa's forces, through a series of skirmishes and a considerable battle on 24 November (during which they suffered serious losses), successfully confined the mutineers to the fort.¹³⁷ Further reinforcements, however, were now urgently required, not only against the existing mutineers, but in case any other Sudanese companies whom they were pressing to join them should do so.¹³⁸ In this context Kagwa and Wilson succeeded in disarming the Sudanese troops

¹³² Moyse-Bartlett, *KAR*, p. 73; Thruston, *Incidents*, pp. 300–2, 313–14.

¹³³ Wright, *Heroic Age*, pp. 185–7. See, further, Ch. 10.

¹³⁴ Jackson, *Early Days*, pp. 307–15; Thruston, *Incidents*, pp. 316–17; Jackson to Hill, 8 Dec. 1897, FO 2/134.

¹³⁵ Jackson, *Early Days*, Ch. 21; H.H. Austin, *With Macdonald in Uganda* (London, 1903), Chs. 4–5.

¹³⁶ Wilson to Salisbury, 12 Oct., 9 Nov. 1898 and enc., FOCP 7024/24, 25.

¹³⁷ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, Ch. 26; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 152–70; and, e.g., Macdonald to Salisbury, 21 Nov., 13 (2), 17 Dec., FOCP 7024/27, 26, 80, 81; Macdonald to Barrington, 13 Nov. 1897, FO2/144.

¹³⁸ Encs. in Wilson to Salisbury, 9 Nov. 1898, FOCP 7024/25.

in Kampala;¹³⁹ Grant in Buddu and Sitwell in Toro both expressed confidence that theirs could be relied upon,¹⁴⁰ but Dugmore in Bunyoro became deeply fearful that the small garrisons scattered across the countryside could not be so readily counted upon.¹⁴¹

Thanks to the promptitude of Commissioner Hardinge of the neighbouring East Africa Protectorate, a relief column of Indian and Swahili troops was soon, however, on its way.¹⁴² When, moreover, news of the mutiny eventually reached London on 22 November 1897, important decisions were immediately taken to dispatch the 27th Bombay Light Infantry and a wing of the 4th Bombay Infantry to the rescue, and recruit a permanent Indian contingent for Uganda that, in due course, would take their place.¹⁴³ The first of this sequence of reinforcements reached Bukaleba at the turn of the year, and was immediately engaged with the mutineers.¹⁴⁴ Their number, however, was considerably reduced when (as we shall see) it was learnt that Mwangi had escaped from German custody and, along with a considerable following, was once again at large in Buddu. For Macdonald immediately decided to take no chances and speedily assembled a powerful column to attack him. That, however, entailed reducing the force at Bukaleba, which in turn opened the way for the mutineers to evacuate Luba's Fort early in January 1898, with the evident intent of breaking away westwards so as to add further Sudanese companies to their number.¹⁴⁵

Once away from Luba's Fort, the mutineers found themselves hemmed in, however, by the forces Kagwa and his British allies variously posted against them. As a consequence, they marched northwards along the course of the Victoria Nile till they overran Kakungulu's fort at Namionjo, close to the shore of Lake Kyoga.¹⁴⁶ There they set about

¹³⁹ Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 156; Wilson to Chief, German Lake Station, 21 Oct., A7/3; Wilson to Hill, 29 Oct. 1897, FO 2/133.

¹⁴⁰ E.g. Sitwell to Wilson, 25 Oct., A4/8, 20 Nov., Grant to Wilson, 26 Oct. 1897, A4/9.

¹⁴¹ Austin, *With Macdonald*, pp. 50–4. No less than five companies were posted in Bunyoro: see Sitwell to Wilson, 20 Nov. 1897, A4/9; Dugmore to Wilson, 11–13 Jan. 1898, A4/10.

¹⁴² Wilson to Salisbury, 7 Dec. 1897, FOCP 7024/79.

¹⁴³ Hill's Memo, 25 Nov. 1897, FO 2/134; Moyses-Bartlett, *KAR*, pp. 74–6; Hill's and Salisbury's minutes on Director, Military Intelligence to Foreign Office, 20 Oct. 1897, FO 2/143.

¹⁴⁴ Austin, *With Macdonald*, pp. 90–3; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 218–25; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 166–7, 170; Macdonald to Salisbury, 13 Dec. 1897, FOCP 7024/81.

¹⁴⁵ Miti, 'Buganda', p. 178; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 225; Austin, *With Macdonald*, pp. 93–7; Macdonald to Salisbury, 15 Feb., 2 Mar., FOCP 7077/89, 90; Grant to Wilson, 14 Dec. 1897, A4/9.

¹⁴⁶ On this and the ensuing encounters, see Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 225–30; Austin, *With Macdonald*, Ch. 7; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 179–93.

gathering a fleet of canoes that could transport them to Mruli on its west end, from where they could hope to contact their Sudanese fellows in Bunyoro and swing them to their side.

In a speedy response to this move, Macdonald, on his return from Buddu,¹⁴⁷ first dispatched a flying column to Mruli, which, with great skill, successfully disarmed or otherwise disabled the Sudanese troops, both there and in Bunyoro to the west.¹⁴⁸ Then, with the arrival of further reinforcements of Indian and Swahili troops now substantially augmenting his force, he launched its main body on a daring advance upon Kakungulu's fort, which on 18 February 1898 inflicted a considerable defeat on the mutineers.¹⁴⁹ As a consequence, they immediately abandoned the fort. But they then moved westwards across the Sezibwa river and proceeded to build a substantial stockade at Kabagame prior to embarking upon a decisive advance across Bunyoro and beyond. That created a highly critical situation for the Baganda and British-led forces.¹⁵⁰ Macdonald quickly countered by himself returning to Kampala to pick up still more Indian troops, while, in an audacious move, ordering his already available forces to cross the Sezibwa river and its swamps directly, so as to take the mutineers upon the other side by surprise. There, on 24 February 1898 under Captain Harrison's command, they carried the mutineers' fort at Kabagame by assault and trounced them so decisively as to scatter them in great confusion.¹⁵¹

That meant that every attempt by the mutineers, from the Bukaleba conflicts through to Kabagame, to break out to the west had been blocked by the combination of the Baganda and British-led forces. They had quite failed, moreover, to persuade any other Sudanese company to join in their mutiny despite sending emissaries to them. They now found themselves having instead to take refuge in Bukedi country to the east. That, for the time being, removed the most serious threat to the hold of the British and their Baganda allies upon the country that so far they had ever encountered.¹⁵²

There was, however, many an armed conflict still to come. From this point onwards, they were largely concentrated in three rather separate arenas.

¹⁴⁷ Macdonald to Wilson, 21 Jan. 1898, A6/4.

¹⁴⁸ Wilson to Salisbury, 25 Feb., Macdonald to Salisbury, 15 Mar. 1898, FOCP 7077/86, 90.

¹⁴⁹ Macdonald to Wilson, 18 Feb., A4/10, to Salisbury, 1 Mar. 1898, FOCP 7077/91.

¹⁵⁰ Wilson to Salisbury, 3 Feb., 16 Mar. (2) 1878, FOCP 7077/43, 114, 115.

¹⁵¹ Macdonald to Wilson, 25 Feb., A4/10, to Salisbury, 1, 16 Mar. (and enc. Harrison to Macdonald, 28 Feb.), Berkeley to Salisbury, 25 Mar. 1898, FOCP 7077/91, 177, 157.

¹⁵² Wilson to Hill, 2 Mar. 1898, FO 2/154.

The first of these stemmed from Mwanga's revolt in Buddu. That, by September 1897, had been largely crushed, but with the outbreak of the Sudanese mutiny Kintu was soon once again on the move, evidently now looking to see how to forge a link with the mutineers.¹⁵³ In mid December 1897, Macdonald learned that the 200 Sudanese troops in the station at Masaka in Buddu could well be joining Kintu.¹⁵⁴ Accordingly, he made speedy arrangements to lead a small force of his Indian and Swahili troops down there – but held back after hearing that 50 of them had joined their commander, Lieutenant Hobart, and an associated Baganda force in attacking Kintu and 500 or so of his supporters and successfully dispersing them.¹⁵⁵

But by this time Mwanga had also sensed that the outbreak of the Sudanese revolt had given him an unexpected opportunity to reignite his revolt, and soon made his escape secretly by night from the house arrest to which the Germans had confined him.¹⁵⁶ Along with 2,000 or so largely Muslim followers armed with guns who had also taken refuge in German territory, he once more entered Buddu.¹⁵⁷ There the Sudanese at Masaka refused to march out against him. All of which presented Macdonald with a further major crisis, beyond that he and his forces were simultaneously confronting in the east.¹⁵⁸ In response, he first enlarged his earlier force with 200 more Baganda warriors, and then on 8 January pounced upon the Sudanese troops in Masaka and summarily disarmed the 150 or so of them who were thought to be untrustworthy. Then, accompanied by Hobart and the remaining 'loyal' 50, led out his whole force against Mwanga and his following, and on 15 January 1898 at Kasilira to the south inflicted a major defeat upon them.¹⁵⁹

Mwanga, however, survived, and first made his way to Nkore to the west where he succeeded in mobilising a further large force with which to defy the British.¹⁶⁰ At the same time he attempted to persuade the Sudanese under Sitwell in Toro to come to his side. They, however, would have none of it, and instead delivered his emissaries into Sitwell's

¹⁵³ Grant to Wilson, 11, 28 Dec., 14, 16 Dec. 1897, A4/9.

¹⁵⁴ Macdonald to Salisbury, 19 Dec. 1897, FOCP 7024/83.

¹⁵⁵ Wilson to Salisbury, 7 Dec., FOCP 7024/12; Macdonald Memo, 28 Dec. 1897, A5/3.

¹⁵⁶ Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 173–6; Schlobach to Wilson, 24 Dec. 1897, A6/4.

¹⁵⁷ Wilson to Salisbury, 31 Dec. 1898, FOCP 7024/96; Hobart to Grant, 31 Dec., Grant to Wilson, 31 Dec. 1897, A4/10.

¹⁵⁸ Macdonald to Salisbury, 2 Jan., Wilson to Salisbury, 5 Jan. 1898, FOCP 7024/126, 127.

¹⁵⁹ Austin, *With Macdonald*, pp. 93–4; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 169; Macdonald to Wilson, 15, 16 Jan., A6/4; Clayton to friends, 25 Jan. 1898, CMS Clayton Papers.

¹⁶⁰ Wilson to Salisbury, 3 Mar., FOCP 7077/43; Sitwell to Wilson, 12 Feb. 1898, A4/10.

hands. Whereupon, after plunging through some formidably swampy country, Sitwell and a Buddu force succeeded in tracking him down near the Katonga river, and on 2 March soundly defeated him once again.¹⁶¹ Some weeks thereafter, he was defeated once more – for the third time since his return. As a consequence, like Kabalega, both he and Kintu now seem to have decided that they would never stand in the open against a British-led force again, lest they suffer some final disaster by doing so. Instead, Mwanga sought to link up with the mutineers on the Nile, and to that end had already sent 800 of the Baganda Muslims who had joined him across central Buganda to do so. They, however, were checked by the British-led forces in northwestern Buganda, and, along with others whom Mwanga continued to gather about him, soon found themselves sucked into the conflict which (as we shall see) was by now erupting there as well.¹⁶² With that, a division was made between those insurgents under Mwanga's leadership to the north, and those in Buddu and across the Nkore borderlands in Kabula under Kintu to the south.

There, over the ensuing six months following Mwanga's defeat at Kasilira in January 1898, the insurgent forces under Kintu surreptitiously managed to revive their fortunes. Under their pressure, many among the appointed Buddu chiefs sought refuge in the Catholic mission at Villa Maria. Around the British base at Masaka arson became rife, while to the west, in the rest of Buddu and much of Kabula, it was Kintu's authority which soon held sway. Once this was realised in Kampala, Wilson hastily took himself down there to stiffen the resistance of the local chiefs whilst awaiting the arrival, late in August 1898, of a substantial British-led force that was soon upon its way.¹⁶³ This was made up of a company of the Bombay Light Infantry under Captain Tighe,¹⁶⁴ soon to be reinforced by one more, and over 1,000 Baganda warriors armed with guns, along with 2,000 spearmen under the command – tellingly for a largely Catholic county – of the Catholic Katikiro Mugwanya, who thereupon proceeded to direct much of their operations. Together, these comprised a coercive force of an order the region had never seen before.

There followed a great deal of marching to and fro, not least across Kabula, sometimes by flying columns, sometimes by smaller patrols, sometimes by parallel divisions of the combined forces spread out over

¹⁶¹ Macdonald to Salisbury, 16 Mar. 1898, FOCP 7077/117.

¹⁶² Austin, *With Macdonald*, pp. 109–11.

¹⁶³ ND, 24 July, 2 Aug.; CMS, Clayton to his parents, 11 Aug.; Wilson to Tighe, 17 Aug., A4/12 and 27/17; Wilson to Berkeley, 4 Sept., enc. in Berkeley to Salisbury, 5 Sept. 1898, FOCP 7159/68.

¹⁶⁴ Tighe to Hobart, 17 Aug. 1898, A27/17.

a wide front. In their support, three forts were built in Buddu, three more in Koki (which, harried by Mwanga, had refused to join him)¹⁶⁵ and an important one in Kabula. When it was then rumoured that Kintu was about to retreat to Nkore, an ultimatum was sent to its Omugabe calling upon him to declare his unequivocal support for the British. Within the time limit set for this, that was duly affirmed, and was soon given substance by the arrival of an Nkore force in its support.¹⁶⁶ Throughout all this, Kintu and his principal followers, while never effectively threatening the invading forces, invariably succeeded in avoiding capture. With, however, a range of forts now variously held by Indian troops and their Baganda allies across the region, Kintu's lordship in the area, by October 1898, seemed largely dispelled.¹⁶⁷

But this was not so. In February 1899 Macallister, the British official by then in Nkore, had abandoned the Kabula fort in place of one within Nkore. The Baganda levies were failing to patrol the area; and Kintu was once more roaming the region looking for openings to exploit.¹⁶⁸ This eventually induced Ternan (by now acting Commissioner) to dispatch a reinvigorated Baganda contingent to the scene, and then place a senior Buganda chief in full civilian and military control of Kabula.¹⁶⁹ By the end of 1899 these dispositions eventually paid off. Mwanga's revolt was finally ground down, and Kintu once again fled to the German sphere.

By then both Kabalega's resistance and the Sudanese mutiny, in each of the other two arenas in which conflict had concentrated, had finally been scotched as well. Back early in 1898, following his defeats by Macdonald, Sitwell and Mugwanya's forces at Kasilira and near the Katonga river, Mwanga had struck northwards from Kabula into the now Catholic Baganda (previously Banyoro) counties of Mawagola and Buwekula and had there set loose his remaining, now largely Baganda Muslim, forces, whom he had earlier dispatched to the east.¹⁷⁰ That reinforced the intention of two of Kabalega's principal Abarasura leaders, Ireeta and Kikukule (who had now reverted to his side), and his son, Jasi, to seize this opportunity to reignite their resistance to alien

¹⁶⁵ Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 176; CMS, Clayton to his parents, 21 Aug. 1898. For Koki, see Ch. 9.

¹⁶⁶ See Ch. 8, pp. 237–8.

¹⁶⁷ Tighe's Diary of Operations, 21 Aug. – 3 Oct. 1898, A27/17 and other items there; Moyse-Bartlett, *KAR*, pp. 78–9. Mugwanya's personal account is in Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, Ch. 29.

¹⁶⁸ Macallister to Berkeley, 27 Feb., A4/16; Jerman to Wilson, 4, 18 June, 6, 25 July, BRA; Ternan to Wilson, 25 July 1899, A4/19.

¹⁶⁹ See Ch. 9, pp. 264–5.

¹⁷⁰ Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 177, 186; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 232, 239. On this and the next two paragraphs, see, more generally, Lanning, 'Kikukule', pp. 136–42.

rule and recover control of their kingdom. In so doing they opened up the second arena in which these hostilities were conducted.¹⁷¹

Early in March 1898 a joint force, under Kikukule's command, of Banyoro warriors and Mwang'a's mostly Muslim followers embarked upon laying siege to the most obtrusive symbol of the alien invasion in the western region, the Catholic mission station at Bukumi. Yet without success. For not only had the priests taken the precaution of constructing it in the form of a fort, precisely against such an eventuality; within a fortnight three separate relieving forces had come to its rescue: one on 13 March under Sitwell made up of sixty of his 'loyal' Sudanese from Toro; a second the next day under Major Price comprising a contingent of the Bombay Light Infantry (BLI) which had now arrived; along with a third made up of Baganda and Batoro gun-bearing warriors under Katikiro Mugwanya, at around the same time.¹⁷²

Price then led out a combined British-led and Baganda force to the north, where they first dispersed Kikukule and his following, before on three occasions defeating one party of Mwang'a's men, leaving another to suffer heavy loss on two occasions at the hands of a second force from the British fort at Hoima, followed by the routing of 500 Banyoro under Ireeta.¹⁷³ Such encounters quite failed, however, to be decisive.¹⁷⁴ For, despite mounting casualties, Banyoro resistance over the next nine months remained unbroken. Making full use of their knowledge of their own country, various groups of them, along with some Baganda Muslims, wove their way about it, sometimes standing their ground against the Baganda and British-led forces ranged against them: in Ireeta's case, by making full use of the largely secure base which the Budongo forest provided for him; more generally, by engaging in one of the numerous encounters the alien presence provoked. Over the next twelve months, from April 1898 to April 1899, both Kikukule and Ireeta successfully evaded capture, and thereby provided the British with a symbol of their continuing failure to ring down the final curtain on Bunyoro's resistance.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ For an extensive discussion of Banyoro resistance, see Doyle, *Bunyoro*, pp. 72–80.

¹⁷² Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 233; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, p. 165; ESA, Streicher's Diary, 27 Feb. – 14 Mar.; Macpherson to Wilson, 7 Mar., A5/4, 10, 16 Mar., 1898, A4/10.

¹⁷³ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 234; Macpherson to Wilson, 19, 25 Mar. 1898, A4/10.

¹⁷⁴ Macdonald to Berkeley, 16 Apr. 1898, enc. in FOCP 7077/145.

¹⁷⁵ Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 192, 194–5, 207; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 235–7; Fowler to Berkeley, 20 May, Martyr's Report, 26 June, Martyr to Berkeley, 26 July, A4/11; Martyr's Report, 10 July, Price's Report, 25 July, A4/12; Martyr to Berkeley, 20, 25 Aug., A4/12, 4 Sept., A4/13; Broome to Lansdowne, 1 Oct. 1898, A4/13; Evatt to Berkeley, 17 Mar. 1899, A4/16.

That was not for want of trying. Following several skirmishes across a wide area throughout April and May 1898,¹⁷⁶ Price, by now the British commander in Bunyoro, organised a sweep by three columns which advanced from three different quarters up to Fajao on the Victoria Nile and to Lake Albert. Early in July this was then narrowed into an extensive effort by both British-led and Baganda forces to root out Ireeta and Kikukule altogether. Despite, however, more than one encounter, they made no headway.¹⁷⁷ Early in October, the scene was then suddenly changed when (as we shall see) 250 or so mutineers and a large body of Banyoro and mainly Muslim Baganda crossed the Victoria Nile, entered Bunyoro and threatened the British position there as never before. In a dramatic move that led Kikukule and Ireeta to seize the opportunity to destroy the lately abandoned British fort at Hoima.¹⁷⁸ But with that the tables began to turn against them. The mutineer-led invasion was vigorously repulsed. Despite being installed in a carefully prepared defensive position, Ireeta and 400 of his gun-bearing warriors were roundly defeated on 9 December by a force under Price, and, over the next three months, on two further occasions too.¹⁷⁹ Ireeta continued to escape unscathed, but with successive defeats and mounting casualties the ranks of his supporters steadily shrank. Their fate now turned upon the outcome of events in the third of the rather different arenas in which these confrontations became clustered.

That was centred in the Bukedi and Lango regions across the Victoria Nile to the north and northeast. There, as we have seen, Kabalega had retreated following his defeat by the British at Mruli in April 1895. Three years later, he was joined there by Kabaka Mwangi who crossed the Victoria Nile near Foweira in June 1898,¹⁸⁰ evidently in the hope of linking up with Kabalega in a combined operation to recover control of their kingdoms. Neither of them, however, posed a significant threat to the British or their Baganda allies.

It was very different with the mutineers who, in considerable numbers, following their defeat at Kabagame in February 1898, had taken refuge on the eastern side of the Nile. So as to keep them at bay, that had been followed on 26 April by the destruction, at the hands of a column of 260 Indian and Swahili troops under Major Martyr, of the stronghold they had built there near Mruli, and the defeat the same day of a further 50 of them and a large

¹⁷⁶ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 235–6, 238–9.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 236–7; Lanning, ‘Kikukule’, pp. 137–41.

¹⁷⁸ Lanning, ‘Kikukule’, pp. 141–2.

¹⁷⁹ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 260.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

body of Banyoro near Foweira by a force of 70 men, half of them Swahilis, under Lieutenant Malcolm.¹⁸¹ There then followed a further assault upon them by Martyr, with a force this time 500-strong (half of them Indians) which on 4 August inflicted a considerable defeat upon them once again (prior to Martyr himself departing northwards to Fashoda).¹⁸²

Yet over the following two months, 250 or so mutineers, along with some hundreds of Banyoro and Baganda followers of the two rulers,¹⁸³ regrouped, and on 9 October crossed the Victoria Nile south of Mruli to launch the most substantial counter-attack the British and their Baganda allies ever encountered. Had the invaders not clashed with a small party at Kisalizi, a post between Mruli and Kabagambe, they might very well have thrust deep into the borderlands between Buganda and Bunyoro before they were ever discovered. As it was, Price at Masindi was able to take precautions, while Colonel Broome, in command of the BLI, hastily mobilised substantial columns of Indian, Sudanese and Swahili troops, under the command of Colonel Coles and Captain Fowler, to dispatch against them.¹⁸⁴ Whilst the invaders were at first taken by surprise at Kiweri, to begin with they defeated several of the forces sent against them. They even thrust into Buwekula, further into the western borderlands of Buganda than ever before. There they momentarily mounted a second siege of the Catholic station at Bukumi, till it was once again relieved.¹⁸⁵

Thereupon, for the next five months, from mid November 1898 through to the following April, the fog of war¹⁸⁶ descended upon Bunyoro. With the mutineers and their insurgent Baganda and Banyoro allies in various formations on the one side, those under Coles, Price and Fowler were soon supplemented by substantial reinforcements of Baganda warriors sent up from Kampala, on the other.¹⁸⁷ These all engaged in a countless series of skirmishes and somewhat larger encounters¹⁸⁸ well into the new year. By then, however, the tide began to turn as

¹⁸¹ Austin, *With Macdonald*, p. 112; Moyses-Bartlett, *KAR*, p. 77; Macdonald to Berkeley, 17 May, enc. in Berkeley to Salisbury, 13 June 1898, FOCP 7090/117.

¹⁸² Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 237–8; Berkeley to Martyr, 7 July, A5/4, Martyr to Berkeley, 22 July, A4/11, 4, 9, and his Orders, 3 Aug., and Report, 9 Aug. 1898, A4/12.

¹⁸³ Neither of whom was present.

¹⁸⁴ Wilson to Berkeley, Broome to Berkeley (2), 17, 28 Oct., A4/13; Berkeley to Salisbury, 2 Nov. 1898, and encs., FO 2/157; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 200–2.

¹⁸⁵ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 248–9; Sitwell's diary, 11–12 Nov. 1898, Makerere University Library.

¹⁸⁶ Cf. 'the confusion and unrest with which the year 1898 closed': Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 205, and editor's note, p. 203.

¹⁸⁷ Kagwa, *Buganda*, pp. 249–54.

¹⁸⁸ War Office to Foreign Office, 23 Nov., and encs., FO 2/164; Ternan's 'Summary', 27 Dec. 1898, Berkeley to Salisbury, 8 Jan 1899, FOCP 7400/196; Miti, 'Buganda', 3, pp. 204–5.

the relative military might the British and Baganda leaders could mobilise gradually ground the invaders down into small parties of stragglers scattering across the land.¹⁸⁹

Back in July 1898 Mwanga had written to Kakungulu, Kagwa and others with the clear intent of trying to wean them at long last from their British alliance; but to no effect.¹⁹⁰ In December 1898 Bilal Effendi, the mutineers' foremost leader, was killed in a skirmish.¹⁹¹ A trickle of desertions now occurred,¹⁹² and at the end of January 1899 Ternan, now Commandant and Deputy Commissioner, reported that 80 mutineers had been captured or surrendered.¹⁹³ Since, however, upwards of 100 of them were still at large east of the Victoria Nile, their insurgency was by no means over. Eventually, therefore, in March 1899, Ternan, Kagwa and Kakungulu jointly launched a major offensive against both them and the two rulers, Kabalega and Mwanga, who were now in the offing. By 6 April their combined forces were across the Nile, where they received the surrender of some thousands of Bakedi and Banyoro.¹⁹⁴ Fighting then ensued, in which Kagwa reckoned some 300 or more mutineers, Baganda and Banyoro were killed.

The finale then came on 9 April 1899 when, in return for an undertaking that his crops would not be fired, a Bakedi elder led two Baganda columns to where the two rulers were to be found. In the brief encounter which ensued, Kabalega was wounded in the arm before both he and Mwanga were then captured.¹⁹⁵ Thereupon they were marched down to Kampala, from where they were hastily taken by dhows to Kisumu upon their way to exile for life in the Seychelles.¹⁹⁶ Shortly afterwards, Kabalega's two principal Abarasura supporters, Ireeta and Kikukule, surrendered, while Jasi, his son, died of wounds.¹⁹⁷

¹⁸⁹ Miti, 'Buganda', 3, p. 206.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3, pp. 198–200; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 242, 246–8.

¹⁹¹ Berkeley to Ternan, 15 Dec. 1898, A4/14.

¹⁹² Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 204–5.

¹⁹³ Ternan to Berkeley, 21 Jan. 1898, A4/15; Ternan to Salisbury, 14 Apr. 1899, FOCP 7401/7, 18 and encs.

¹⁹⁴ Evatt to Berkeley, 2 Apr., in Ternan to Salisbury, 9 Apr. 1898, FOCP 7041/116.

¹⁹⁵ Evatt to Ternan, 10 Apr., in Ternan to Salisbury, 15 Apr. 1899, FOCP 7401/119; Nyakatura, *Anatomy*, pp. 168–9.

¹⁹⁶ Evatt to Ternan, 10 Apr., A4/16, to Wilson, 15 Apr. 1898, A5/5; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 264; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 209–11. Mwanga died in the Seychelles on 8 May 1903, and was eventually buried in a royal tomb in Buganda on 2 Aug. 1910. On his eventual release, Kabalega died at Jinja on 6 Apr. 1923 before reaching his kingdom, where he was buried on 26 Apr.

¹⁹⁷ Evatt to Ternan, 13, 30 May, 3 June 1898, A4/17. Kikukule died 10 Sept. 1899; Grant to Ternan, 10 Sept. 1899, A4/20.

That constituted the key final defeat of the three most substantial armed challenges to the consolidation of the British position in the country which it ever saw. While the last group of mutineers was only tracked down in August 1901, Kintu and some thousands of his followers, over the following months, surrendered to the Germans, whilst Kabalega's and Mwanganga's more immediate supporters speedily scuttled as best they could.

Throughout this whole conflict, the British were exceedingly fortunate that the three separate risings against them did not prove to be a great deal more formidable than they were. Their opponents, however, were dispersed around the semi-circular perimeter of Buganda/Bunyoro, from Buddu and Kabula in the west, to Fajao and Foweira in the north, to Mruli and Luba's in the east, all of which made their efforts to effect a junction between them especially difficult to achieve. As it was, each of the insurgent forces could be picked off one at a time: Kabalega at Mparo and Foweira; Mwanganga at Kabwoko and Kisalira; the mutineers at Kabagambe and Mruli; while the British could work on interior lines pivoting upon their base at Kampala. When, in October 1898, a broad-based conjunction did eventuate, with the invasion right across northern Bunyoro of a combined mutineer / Banyoro / insurgent Baganda force, the British position and that of their Baganda allies was at first at considerable risk. The invasion, however, came too late. For by October 1898 both the British-led forces and those of their Baganda associates had been notably reinforced. It still, however, took another six months for them to complete the invasion's destruction.

Throughout, the insurgents all faced two additional disadvantages. None of them succeeded in enlisting the support of more than a part, and sometimes only a small part, of their potential followings. Following his flight into exile after Mparo, Kabalega never again succeeded in mobilising a united fighting force to advance his cause; Ireeta, Kikukule and Jasi reverted to his side, but amongst his principal Abarasura leaders neither Rwabudongo nor Byabachwezi did so.¹⁹⁸ Of Buganda's twenty or so leading chiefs, only Kintu joined Mwanganga's revolt, while none of the Sudanese troops in Buganda, Toro and Bunyoro threw in their lot with their fellows. Moreover, all the insurgents' efforts to secure allies and reinforcements from elsewhere, proved fruitless. There was no conjunction with the Mahdists. Periodically some support was

¹⁹⁸ They were among the several Bunyoro chiefs at Kitahimbwa's enthronement at Masindi on 3 Apr. 1898: Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 192. See also Dugmore's General Memo, 3 May 1898, A4/10, p. 192.

forthcoming from the Lango, the Acholi and the Bakedi, but upon the insurgents' defeats it very soon dissolved, and in the end it was a Bakedi elder who betrayed Kabalega and Mwanga to their captors.

By contrast, the British benefited enormously from two singular advantages, both of which were often critical in the fabrication of empire. In the first place, throughout these encounters they possessed the determined support of powerful indigenous allies – Buganda's leading Protestant and Catholic chiefs, led by the two Katikiros, Kagwa and Mugwanya – who all had their own reasons, apart from those of the British, for crushing each set of insurgents in turn. From the start late in 1893, in Colville's invasion of Bunyoro, through to the endgame in April 1899, they continuously mobilised thousands of their fellow countrymen: against Kabalega in the cause of the destruction of their kingdom's principal rival in the region; against Mwanga and Kintu in support of the oligarchical revolution they had earlier effected; against the mutineers lest they destroy the accord they had built with their British allies and install a hostile Muslim regime in its place; against all three in fervent defence of the bounties which, as they saw them, their British alliance was bringing them.¹⁹⁹

In addition, on being confronted by a major crisis in 1897–8, the British possessed the immense advantage of being able to call upon the resources of the very much larger empire to which they belonged. Cost to the metropolis was now of no account.²⁰⁰ After an anxious start, reinforcements of Swahili, Sudanese and Indian troops arrived from the neighbouring East African Protectorate. They were then followed by a full battalion of regular Indian Army troops from India, and eventually by a specially recruited Indian contingent for Uganda to take their place.

These supports played a critical role in securing the eventual outcome. Late in 1897, the Baganda levies were crucially important in first confining the mutineers to Luba's Fort; thereafter, in curbing their attempts to break out westwards; and not least in providing the British with the support they needed when they found themselves having to fight upon two fronts at once: against Kabalega and the mutineers to the north and northeast, against Mwanga and Kintu on the south and west. The first reinforcements of British-commanded troops then arrived from Mombasa just in time to secure the mutineers' defeat at Kabagambe, while, but for the presence of the BLI contingent, the culminating defeat of the invaders in late 1898 through to early 1899 might not then have occurred.

¹⁹⁹ Wilson to Salisbury, 9 Nov., FOCP 7024/25; Wilson to Hill, 31 Dec. 1897, FO 2/134.

²⁰⁰ E.g. Hill's Memo, 25 Nov. 1897, FO 2/137.

These reinforcements dramatised, moreover, that, even against their own local mercenaries, the British were able to mobilise far more potent 'new model warbands' to protect their interests in the region than it had ever previously encountered. It was a lesson that underpinned the establishment and maintenance thereafter of Pax Britannica in the region.

With the final defeat of the three insurgencies, the vortexes through which, over several years, though in quite different ways, both Bunyoro and Buganda had passed were soon foreclosed. Two years earlier, several key issues had stood unresolved in Bunyoro. Kabalega roamed in exile and had lost the support of most of his key supporters; but he remained at large. His remaining followers were, moreover, showing how readily they could undermine the attempts of the British to establish their control over his kingdom. Following, however, his complete removal from the scene in 1899, the death and arrests of his three surviving leading supporters, and the presence of regular British-commanded troops from elsewhere in their empire, all that was changed. The British now fastened their grip upon the kingdom and thereupon paved the way for the imposition of a largely unforgiving colonial settlement upon it.

The Baganda meanwhile, having lived through five years of civil war between 1888 and 1893, between 1897 and 1899 then suffered two more, during the course of which thousands of them had been mobilised by their Christian chiefs to bring these successive insurgencies to an end, and in conjunction with their British allies had succeeded in doing so.²⁰¹ There were four major consequences. Their principal immediate rival – Bunyoro – was all but terminally destroyed. Macdonald's final settlement in 1893 of the protracted sectarian competition for positions of power in the kingdom had, if anything, been reinforced. So had the leaders' oligarchical revolution; and, not least, their close alliance with the British. It was now time for a colonial settlement to be fabricated here as well.

In response to successive pressures by Buganda's leaders, this was largely the work of two men: first George Wilson, by origin an Australian, who, beginning as a Transport Officer under Lugard, ended his career fifteen years later as Uganda's Deputy Commissioner; and then Sir Harry Johnston, who, with as much experience of African administration as anyone else in British service,²⁰² was appointed by

²⁰¹ Buganda Chiefs to Wilson, July 1899, A4/19.

²⁰² Since 1885 he had served in consular positions in the Cameroons, the Niger Coast, Mozambique and Tunis, and as Commissioner in the British Central Africa Protectorate 1891–6: R. Oliver, *Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa*, (London, 1957).

the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, in 1899, to be Special Commissioner in Uganda. Before honing in on the structures of government which lay at the heart of the ‘colonial settlements’ they established, which will be extensively recounted in [Chapter 10](#), we need, in the following chapter, to bring into view the protracted parallel story in the fourth of the larger kingdoms in the region, the adjacent southwestern kingdom of Nkore, and then, in [Chapter 9](#), trace out two highly formative proceedings which coursed in major ways through each of the settlements that were made. To these, we now turn.

8 Succession: Nkore and the war of Igumira's eye

With its border region of Kabula becoming a regular stamping ground of Kintu and Mwanga's following, particularly during 1898, one of the by-products of the British suppression of Mwanga's revolt was the extension of British colonial supremacy over Nkore. (For pre-colonial Nkore, see [Map 5](#).) Although less powerful than Rwanda to its south or Buganda to its northeast, and subject to major raids by the former and previously to many raids by the latter,¹ Nkore had hitherto maintained a sturdy independence. Only once previously had it ever been conquered: for about three years around two centuries earlier by Bunyoro.² It nevertheless succumbed to British domination between 1898 and 1901 without any armed resistance. This no doubt was largely due to a keen appreciation on the Nkore side of the greater coercive power of the British, but due weight needs to be given too to the political skills of one or two Nkore notables. Since armed suppression did not occur, the trauma that followed upon the loss of sovereignty was somewhat tempered, while the readiness of the British to treat Nkore as subordinated kingdom rather than conquered territory left it just enough room for a negotiated settlement. There were, moreover, winners as well as losers in Nkore, together with two bonuses. Despite, by 1901, losing some important territory to Buganda, it had at the instance of the British greatly increased in size,³ and acquired a status more akin to its powerful Buganda neighbour than ever before.

As elsewhere, the systemic change which marked the establishment of British hegemony over Nkore was extensively conditioned by distinctive contingencies within Nkore itself. By contrast, however, with events in

¹ E.g. Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 88, 102, 124, 133.

² Karugire, *Nkore*, pp. 158–9, 164, 187–90, 210–13; A.G. Katate & L. Kamugungunu, *Abagabe B'Ankole* (Kings of Ankole) (hereafter *Abagabe*) (Kampala, 1955), I, pp. 125–8. I am much indebted to Derrick Stenning, Edward Steinhart and Samwiri Karugire who, over the years, generously gave me various translations of both this and Volume II, which I hope I have correctly related to the original.

³ See the next chapter.

neighbouring kingdoms, not only was there a gap of four years between the first intimation of a British advance and its eventual occurrence, but the 'conditioning circumstances' in Nkore were not, as in Toro and Busoga, principally structural, nor dynamic as in Bunyoro and Buganda, but ran through four successive phases. It is particularly important, therefore, in this instance, to sketch out these sequential scenarios, both to mark the varying circumstances which alternatively might have played the principal role in shaping the eventual outcome, and then, while noting the formative residue which each phase contributed to the final upshot, to highlight the crucial importance for the ultimate forging of the colonial conjuncture of the precise stage which events had reached at the climactic points in the story.

In contrast to both Buganda and the Busoga kingdoms, and to a greater degree than in Bunyoro and the Toro area, Nkore's social order was marked, despite some accommodations between them, by some fairly sharp distinctions between its superordinate pastoralist Bahima warrior elite and its subordinate agriculturist Bairu majority, a structure which was variously shared by many of its immediate neighbours and by the larger kingdoms, Rwanda and Burundi, with their Tutsis and Hutus, to the south.⁴ At its apex stood its ruler and principal military leader, the Omugabe, the primary member of its ruling Bahinda clan, whose authority was closely linked, as in so many of these kingdoms, to his hold upon some sacred royal regalia. In Nkore's case, this was most notably the royal drum, Bagyendanwa, which a new ruler beat once his accession to the throne had eventually been accomplished.⁵

Amongst its closest neighbours, Nkore enjoyed a position of some primacy. Following the break-up during the eighteenth century of the former substantial Mpororo kingdom to the west and the scattering of its ruling Bashambo clan into the headship of a number of smaller rulerships in the region, and then with the retreat of Bunyoro dominion northwards, Nkore not only spread westwards and northwards, but was soon receiving tribute from several of its smaller neighbours further away.⁶ Locally,

⁴ On this, see, e.g., Catharine Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*. See also the statements of Ankole's leading historian that Nkore had 'a class society in which the possession of cattle counted a great deal', and that it was from the 'class of cattle owners that the kings of Nkore selected their administrative agents or chiefs': Karugire, *History of Uganda*, p. 34.

⁵ Karugire, *Nkore*, Chs. 1–2; Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, pp. 7–18; F. Lukyn Williams, 'The Inauguration of the Omugabe of Ankole to Office', *Uj*, 4 (1937), pp. 300–5, 310–13.

⁶ Morris, *Ankole*, pp. 5, 10–11, 13, Ch. iv; Karugire, *Nkore*, pp. 76, 187, 190–2, 195, 220–1, 224–6, 228, 230–5; F. Lukyn Williams, 'Early Explorers in Ankole', *Uj*, 2 (1935), p. 196.

its prominence was closely linked to its system of warbands (*emitwe*), generally posted on its borders and often under the command of a Prince of the Bahinda clan, who also had administrative responsibilities.⁷

Back in the mid 1870s, Nkore had been wracked by a particularly lethal succession war.⁸ From this had eventually emerged an especially intrepid Bahinda Prince, who over the following years, as Omugabe Ntare V, became an adroit and skilful ruler. At a peculiarly testing time for his kingdom, he not only successfully held it together and upheld his own authority within it, but in the late 1880s and early 1890s conducted its external relations with an increasingly dextrous flair.

Such a task was never easily accomplished, particularly during the earlier 1890s when, along with many of its neighbours, Nkore was severely wracked by a smallpox epidemic, tetanus, plague, a four-year drought and a devastating rinderpest outbreak.⁹ Their combination greatly aggravated the regime of raid and counter-raid which characterised relationships between rulerships in this area, as each of them sought to replenish its herds.¹⁰ Following the outbreak of civil war in Buganda in 1888, incursions from that direction mostly ceased, but Rwanda to the south was now becoming increasingly hostile. In 1890 it launched a major raid against Nkore and its smaller neighbours, which momentarily forced Ntare to take refuge in the neighbouring kingdom of Koki.¹¹ It was to do so once again a few years later. Ntare himself, however, launched a series of raids – against, for example, the remnants of the Mpororo kingdom in 1890–1, and again in 1894, and in that year too against Karagwe to the south, and then even into some areas subject to Rwanda.¹²

Concurrently with these developments, Ntare was giving succour to a series of exiles from outside his kingdom. In the 1880s he provided refuge to some Babito exiles fleeing before Kabalega's Abarasura in the Toro area,¹³ and, as we have seen, in 1888 under a leading Prince,

⁷ Karugire, *Nkore*, pp. 54–5, 64, 110, 112, 168–9, 187, 200, 203–8; *Abagabe*, I, pp. 141–2.

⁸ *Abagabe*, I, pp. 118–25, 238–42.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 128–30, 141, 147, 243–4.

¹⁰ Karugire, *Nkore*, pp. 188, 207; *Abagabe*, I, pp. 125–38; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 325; Lukyn Williams, 'Early Explorers', p. 196; Stanley, *Dark Continent*, pp. 189, 233.

¹¹ Stuhlmann to Gedge, 11 Jan. 1891, GP.

¹² Cunningham to Colville, 21 Aug. 1894, A2/2; Langheld to Jackson, 24 May 1895, A6/1; F. Lukyn Williams, 'Nuwa Mbaguta, Nganzi of Ankole', *Bulletin of the Uganda Society*, 4 (1945), p. 5; Karugire, *Nkore*, pp. 229–30; *Abagabe*, I, pp. 128, 130, 132–4. See also Macallister to Ternan, 10 Aug. 1899, A4/20.

¹³ Despite his mother Kiboga's earlier killing of some Babito royals (she was from a rival Babito line): Karugire, *Nkore*, p. 217; Ingham, *Toro*, p. 52. For the more positive story, see *LD II*, pp. 201, 435.

Manyantsi, he allowed the Christian exiles from Buganda to settle in Kabula in the eastern borderlands of his kingdom under the watchful eye of a young Bashambo chief, Mbaguta.¹⁴ As, thereafter, the tables were turned in Buganda, he granted some 'futabhangi',¹⁵ ('bhang-smokers': in reality non-Christian, non-Muslim Baganda), who more generally came to be known as Abangoni, and then some Baganda Muslims permission to settle both there and, under a notable Muslim leader, Kahusi, in Bukanga to the south.¹⁶

It was through these latter associations that the new model warband earlier adopted in Bunyoro and Buganda was defused to Nkore. There was only ever one of these in Nkore, the Abangonya, principally composed of Baganda exiles,¹⁷ with a base close to Ntare's capital, but chiefly quartered to the east in Kabula. Throughout, it was commanded not by a Prince of the Bahinda clan (like so many *emitwe*) but by the rising Bashambo commoner, Mbaguta, and thus like others of his kind a 'marginal man'.¹⁸ In typical Confrontation I manner Ntare used the Abangonya both as a spearhead in raids against his neighbours¹⁹ and, in a particularly notorious case, against an over-mighty subject. That stemmed from his deep suspicion, following the death from smallpox in 1893 of Kabumbire, his only indubitable son,²⁰ that his uncle,²¹ Nkuranga, was seeking to preempt the succession to the throne for his own descendants. Ntare's order that Nkuranga and his principal sons should be killed was, however, evaded by a number of his leading notables, till, to the undying anger of many Banyankore, it was carried out instead by Mbaguta and the Abangonya.

Like other new model warbands, the Abangonya were armed with guns. At a time when other rulerships in the region were increasingly seeking to accumulate these, Ntare sought to do so too.²² To that end, he played indulgent host to Swahili arms traders from the south, who, particularly following their defeat at the hands of the Baganda Christians

¹⁴ Zimbe, 'Kabaka', Chs. 25–6; Miti, 'Buganda', 3, pp. 179–80; Mukasa, *Simuda Nyuma*, II, Ch. 40, final pages; Wright, *Heroic Age*, pp. 70–2.

¹⁵ 'Bhang-smokers': in reality non-Christian, non-Muslim Baganda, later called 'Abangoni'.

¹⁶ Williams' Memo, 31 Mar. 1893, A2/1; J.P. Wilson to Colvile, 17 July, 6 Aug., A2/2; Cunningham to Colvile, 24 Sept. 1894, A2/3; *Abagabe*, II, p. 6, Ch. 8. On Kahusi's earlier career, see Wright, *Heroic Age*, pp. 54, 132, 139, 147, 153.

¹⁷ *LD* II, p. 451.

¹⁸ As we have seen, Kakungulu, the Buganda warband leader, was from Koki, Ireeta in Bunyoro from Nkore; *Abagabe*, I, pp. 130, 144; Lukyn Williams, 'Mbaguta', p. 5.

¹⁹ Lukyn Williams, 'Mbaguta', p. 5.

²⁰ His death was reported by Villiers to Macdonald, 27 Aug. 1893, A2/1; *Abagabe*, I, p. 129.

²¹ For the relationship, see Karugire, *Nkore*, pp. 238–9.

²² E.g. *LD* II, p. 451; Anson to Colvile, [27 Sept. 1894], A2/3.

in 1888, now channelled their trade along the western route through Nkore, especially in pursuit of their traffic with Bunyoro to the north. That, however, put him increasingly at risk of the British who, as they began to play an intrusive role in this region, became determined, in the interests of establishing their own hegemony, to destroy this Swahili trade altogether.

Ntare's response to these successive intrusions took some carefully crafted forms. Ordinarily he granted his visitors their essential requirements, while selectively appropriating the benefits they had to offer. At the same time, he was careful to refrain from becoming too closely involved in their activities. He did nothing to help the Babito exiles or any of the Baganda refugees to recover their hold on their kingdoms, and he never allowed the Swahili traders to establish a base in his kingdom, such as the rulers of Karagwe, Buganda and Bunyoro had all done.

From the late 1880s onwards he found himself faced, however, by a further series of intrusions that were ultimately of a more demanding kind. Over a period of five years, half a dozen European-led parties sought to traverse his kingdom. Generally his responses to them were cast in the same mould. Ordinarily he granted his visitors free passage through his kingdom, and all but invariably presented a conciliatory face towards them. He was judicious too in the appeals he made to them for the assistance he thought they might provide.²³ At the same time, he deliberately avoided making personal contact with them lest he should compromise his position as ruler in a way he believed would entail either his premature death or suicide;²⁴ while, early in the 1890s, as the British mounted their successive assaults upon so many kingdoms to his north, he increasingly fastened his mind on how he might best contain their advance. By contrast with Kabaka Mwangi of Buganda, his consolidated grip over his kingdom's elite (thanks in the end to the Abangonya), and by contrast with Omukama Kabalega of Bunyoro, his lack of irredentist ambitions, helped to ensure that he held, almost without exception, to a masterly course of conciliatory containment to match that of Kabaka Mutesa of Buganda in the 1870s.

The first European party seeking to traverse his kingdom was made up of remnants of Stanley's Emin Pasha Relief Expedition on their way southeastwards, in July 1889, to the East African coast. Alert to the defeat they had lately inflicted upon Kabalega's Abarasura,²⁵ he

²³ Lukyn Williams, 'Early Explorers', pp. 196–208.

²⁴ E.g. *LD* II, p. 223; Williams' Memo, 31 Mar. 1893, A2/1; Cunningham to Colville, 16 Sept. 1894, A2/3.

²⁵ T.H. Parke, *My Personal Experiences in Tropical Africa* (London, 1891), p. 429; Stanley, *Darkest Africa*, II, pp. 316–17, 319–23.

immediately granted them free passage. Determined, however, to avoid making any personal contact with them, he devolved the essential details upon his redoubtable Queen Mother, Kiboga,²⁶ who, no less determined to remain beyond their reach, despatched her personal envoy, Kanyabuzana, to oversee their transit. As this was harmoniously effected, Ntare sent his relative Bucunku²⁷ to enter into a form of blood-brotherhood with Stanley, in an effort to seal the good relations which had thereby been established.²⁸

Two years later he sought to act in a similar manner. He sent presents to Emin on his return journey to the west of his kingdom,²⁹ and when Lugard, accompanied by a substantial escort, sought to cross its northern reaches and later returned by the same route, he not only sought to establish friendly relations with him by asking him to send Kisingiri, the Buganda Christian travelling with him, whom he had known since his Kabula days, to detail his requirements; he authorised his relative Birere to enter into blood-brotherhood with Lugard³⁰ and place his mark upon the treaty which Lugard presented to him.³¹

Shortly afterwards, he went even further. Anxious, or so it would seem, to ingratiate himself further with Lugard, alert to the animus Lugard was displaying towards Swahili arms traders in the region, and impelled by a stern injunction from Kabaka Mwanga, he ordered the massacre of a large party of Muslims carrying arms and ammunition through his kingdom.³² That, however, proved to be an egregious error. For, far from bringing him Lugard's approbation, it brought him Lugard's ire, and a severe hectoring of his agents for this and other misdemeanours.³³

²⁶ 'It is admitted by all informants that Kiboga, Ntare's mother, was a powerful political force': Karugire, *Nkore*, p. 109.

²⁷ *Abagabe*, II, p. 45, says he was his nephew; Karugire, *Nkore*, p. 279, says his uncle.

²⁸ Seemingly this was an incomplete ceremony from the Nkore point of view – F. Lukyn Williams, 'Blood Brotherhood in Ankole (Omukago)', *Uj*, 2 (1934), pp. 33–41 (especially pp. 40–1) – while it has been doubted that Bucunku entered into any 'treaty' as Stanley claimed: J. M. Gray, 'Early Treaties in Uganda 1888–1891', *Uj*, 12, 1 (1948), pp. 25–42; Stanley, *Darkest Africa*, II, pp. 358–83; Parke, *Personal Experiences*, p. 459; Lukyn Williams, 'Early Explorers', pp. 197–201; Ntare School History Society, 'H. M. Stanley's Journey through Ankole in 1889', *Uj*, 29 (1965), pp. 185–92; *Abagabe*, II, pp. 48–57.

²⁹ G. Schweitzer, *The Life and Work of Emin Pasha*, 2 vols. (London, 1898), II, p. 185; Lukyn Williams, 'Early Explorers', pp. 201–5; *Abagabe*, II, pp. 57–63.

³⁰ This was from the Nkore viewpoint a fully correct ceremony: Lukyn Williams, 'Blood Brotherhood', p. 41.

³¹ *LD* II, pp. 220–7; Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, pp. 39–42; Lukyn Williams, 'Early Explorers', pp. 205–8; Williams' Memo, 31 Mar. 1893, A2/1; *Abagabe*, II, pp. 63–9.

³² *LD* II, pp. 445–6, 450–2; Williams' Memo, 31 Mar. 1893, A2/1.

³³ *LD* II, pp. 445–6, 450–2.

Two years later he made an even more serious mistake. Langheld, a German officer from Bukoba who had secured British permission to pursue some Swahili traders through the British sphere,³⁴ pitched camp, on his return, close to Ntare's capital. So as to test Langheld's good intentions, Ntare asked him for that most potent weapon of the time, a 'quick-firing gun'. Langheld rebuffed him. Whereupon Ntare launched a major warband of around 800 warriors against him and his small escort, which soon placed them in considerable danger. So superior, however, was the firepower which Langheld's men possessed that they quickly inflicted one of the two significant military defeats which Nkore warbands ever suffered at European-led hands.³⁵

Ntare soon learnt the lessons of both these encounters. Henceforth, he was careful to shun both excessive ingratiating and armed assault. At the same time, while insisting he should be left alone, he soon set about mending his fences with the British,³⁶ and promptly sent Langheld two friendly messengers as well.³⁷ In the early part of 1894 he went out of his way, moreover, to satisfy the requirements of the next British (and this time private) visitor, Scott Elliot.³⁸ Then, in mid 1894, he sent an envoy to Colvile (now acting Commissioner in 'Uganda') to ask for British help in his now mounting contest with Rwanda. As Colvile had become increasingly troubled by the free passage which, following Lugard's denunciation of his earlier massacre, Ntare was once again allowing arms traders travelling north to Bunyoro, he considered the possibility of establishing a British post in Nkore.³⁹ To this end, in July 1894, he sent Ntare a conciliatory message saying he wished to make a treaty with him and would send soldiers to protect his country,⁴⁰ and then ordered Major Cunningham to go to Nkore to see what could be arranged.⁴¹

³⁴ Langheld to Macdonald, 4 Dec. 1893, A2/1.

³⁵ Langheld to Macdonald, 18 Sept., 4 Dec., Macdonald to Langheld, 8 Oct. 1893, Scott Elliot to Colvile, 1 May 1894, A2/1.; Lukyn Williams, 'Mbaguta', p. 6; Scott Elliot, *Naturalist*, p. 67, 70, 76; Colvile to Cracknall, 10 Dec. 1893, FOCP 6557/73.

³⁶ By 1893 Williams (in Buganda) was writing: 'Relations with Ntale King of Ankole are pretty good he only wants to be left alone': Williams' Memo, 31 Mar. 1893, A2/1; Williams to de Winton, 22 Oct. 1892, MP.

³⁷ Langheld to Macdonald, 4 Dec. 1893, A2/1.

³⁸ Elliot, *Naturalist*, pp. 67, 70, 75; Scott Elliot to Colvile, 1 May, A2/2; Colvile to Ntare, 18 July 1894, A3/2.

³⁹ There had been earlier suggestions about this: *LD* II, 169; Owen to [Colvile], 2 Aug. 1893, A2/1.

⁴⁰ Colvile to Ntare, 18 July, A3/2; Wilson to Colvile, 17 July 1894, A2/2.

⁴¹ Colvile to Cunningham, 25 July, FO 2/72; Wilson to Colvile, 6 Aug., A2/2; Colvile, *Nile Springs*, pp. 289–95; Colvile to Harding, 19 Aug. 1894, FO 2/72.

Ntare immediately recognised that this could be a particularly testing intrusion.⁴² Whilst, by contrast with a Buganda or Rwanda raid, the British were unlikely to indulge in predation, their actions in other kingdoms in the region clearly indicated that they were quite capable of employing lethal force to secure their ends. Conscious of the misadventures such a visit could entail, Ntare evidently issued strict instructions to his warriors to avoid conflict with Cunningham at almost any cost,⁴³ and then concentrated himself upon misleading him over the routes that he should take. In the end Cunningham reached Ntare's capital, but only to find that Ntare himself had taken off to some neighbouring hills – though, in an evident move not to alienate Cunningham unduly, not before authorising his now close associate Mbaguta (who, in the aftermath of his close association with the now victorious Christian Baganda in their Kabula days, was fast becoming Nkore's principal external negotiator) to sign the treaty which on 29 August 1894 Cunningham presented to him. These adroitly crafted dispositions paid off handsomely. Cunningham concluded that there was little chance as yet of effectively establishing a British post in Nkore, and, treaty of friendship in hand, contentedly withdrew.⁴⁴

Shortly afterwards, Ntare was faced, however, by another major crisis from another direction. Late in 1894, Mbaguta and his Abangonya extended one of their raids into an attack upon some Rwanda satellites. In response Rwanda mounted a major counter-attack, which, once again, forced Ntare to take refuge in Nkore's eastern borderlands.⁴⁵ In his extremity (and no doubt hoping to match the diplomatic skills he had employed against Cunningham), Ntare despatched a succession of messengers to Buganda urgently seeking assistance both from Buganda and from the British, to whom he offered in return to submit to their authority.⁴⁶ Momentarily, Colvile thought of sending Cunningham back, but soon decided that he lacked the necessary resources to do

⁴² It was alleged that he was warned by the Pokino of Buddu not to allow Europeans to enter his kingdom, but early on he was careful to send messengers and presents to Cunningham: Cunningham to Colvile, 6, 21 Aug. 1894, A2/2

⁴³ Cunningham reported that 500 spearmen lined the pass and hills through which he retired: Cunningham to Colvile, 24 Sept. 1894, A2/3.

⁴⁴ Cunningham to Colvile, 21 Aug., 16 Sept., A2/2, 24 Sept. 1894 (2), A2/3; Lukyn Williams, 'Mbaguta', pp. 6–8; *Abagabe*, I, p. 144; Colvile, *Nile Springs*, pp. 290–4.

⁴⁵ *Abagabe*, I, pp. 132–8; II, pp. 27–8; Karugire, *Nkore*, pp. 29–30, 62, 244; Lukyn Williams, 'Mbaguta', p. 6; Wilson to Jackson, 31 Jan., A4/1; Jackson to Kimberley, 8 Feb., FOCP 6717/177; Jackson to J.P. Wilson, 23 Mar., A5/1; BD, 12 Feb.; G3 A5/011; Hardinge to von Trotha, 24 Apr. 1895, FOCP 6717/enc. in 184.

⁴⁶ Dunning to O. C. Entebbe, 20 Dec. 1894, A2/3; *Abagabe*, I, p. 138; Jackson to Kimberley, 8 Feb. 1895, FOCP 6717/177.

what would be required.⁴⁷ Fortunately for Ntare, once sated and hit by smallpox, Rwanda's raiders, early in the new year, withdrew.⁴⁸

The British had not, however, lost all interest in Nkore. Lately they had been well pleased by the steps Ntare had taken against some arms traders going north to Bunyoro, and surmised indeed that the Rwanda attack might have been instigated by them so as to reopen their route.⁴⁹ Over the ensuing months, however, with their conflict with Kabalega reaching a climax, British officers became increasingly vexed with what they saw as Ntare's readiness once again to grant arms traders free passage through his kingdom.⁵⁰ So irate, indeed, did they become that they not only lambasted him for his infamy; they ostentatiously forced one of his envoys to witness the power of their Hotchkiss and Maxim guns.⁵¹ Had they not now routed parties of arms traders in the Nyakabimba area to the north,⁵² a British attack upon Nkore could very well have ensued.⁵³

In response to this mounting pressure, Ntare, far from buckling under, brought his increasingly adroit and measured statecraft to a peak of achievement. In a wondrous display of self-assured conciliation, which was laced by both a well-targeted rebuke and a dignified demand for reciprocity, a British messenger reported in mid 1895 that he had coolly stated that: 'I have ever been friendly to the King [Mwanga] and Europeans and feel deeply the refusal to help me when I was harassed by the Ruanda. I hope we can be friendly again. Lend me a few guns and I will undertake to stop all powder runners. I am ready to do so and try to do so now.'⁵⁴

⁴⁷ Hardinge to Kimberley, 1 Nov., FOCP 6661/147, tel., FOCP 6661/95; Colville to Hardinge, 5 Dec. 1894, FO 2/72. Wilson to Jackson, 31 Jan. 1895, A4/1. Jackson (who, shortly after, became acting Commissioner on Colville's departure) justified the British refusal to assist Nkore at this point by the absence of any British treaty obligations towards Nkore to do so: Jackson to Wilson, 2 Jan. 1895, A5/1.

⁴⁸ Vansina, *Modern Rwanda*, p. 177.

⁴⁹ Jackson to Kimberley, 8 Feb. 1895, FOCP 6717/177.

⁵⁰ Villiers to Macdonald, 27 Aug. 1893, A2/1; Cunningham to Colville, 24 Sept. 1894, Ansoerge to Colville, [27 Sept. 1894], A2/3; Wilson to Jackson, 10 June, 7 July, A4/1; Pulteney to Jackson, 1, 10 July, A4/2; Jackson to Ntare, 1 July 1895, A5/1.

⁵¹ Wilson to Jackson, 10 June, A4/1; Jackson to Ntare, 1 July 1895, A5/1; see also Villiers to Macdonald, 27 Aug. 1893, A2/1.

⁵² Jackson's proclamation, 1 Apr. 1895; Jackson to Foaker, 25 Apr., to Pulteney, 5 June, to Cunningham, 12 June, A5/1; Foaker to Jackson, 20 May, Pulteney to Jackson 17, 21 June, A4/1; Vandeleur to Cunningham 1 July, Pulteney to Jackson, 1, 18 July, Cunningham to Jackson, 2 July, A4/2; Jackson to Kimberley, 3 Aug. 1895, FOCP 6805/127; Vandeleur, *Campaigning*, Ch. 5.

⁵³ Leakey circular letter, 1 Aug. 1896, CMS A5/013; Wilson to Lugard, 8 Aug. 1895, LP s. 45.

⁵⁴ Quoted in Wilson to Jackson, 7 July 1895, A4/2.

If the British had been able at this time to mobilise the necessary manpower to extend their dominion over Nkore, much could have turned on whether they did so in good humour⁵⁵ or in ill humour,⁵⁶ and on whether they did so of their own accord, or in response to an appeal by Ntare for help against Rwanda. The record, however, suggests that, whatever the circumstances, they would have found themselves confronted not only (by contrast with Buganda) by a firmly established ruler but (by contrast with Bunyoro) by one who had learnt to be an astute and practised player in the high stakes of holding his own with them. These lessons were not to be lost on some of his closest followers.

Quite suddenly, however, the salient circumstances in Nkore were, abruptly altered when, in July 1895, Ntare V died of pneumonia,⁵⁷ leaving no immediately plausible successor to his throne. For with that, the primacy of his carefully nurtured external statecraft gave way to an intense preoccupation with a highly charged issue within the kingdom itself, which soon radically altered the previous equation between the British and Nkore.

More often than not, the death of a ruler in Nkore unleashed a full-scale succession war between the sons of the previous ruler and other leading members of the Bahinda clan. Such struggles, of course, occurred elsewhere, but rarely did such violent rules apply. In Nkore (so the principal anthropological account has it), it was mandatory 'that the strongest of the king's sons should be their leader and that the test should be one of war. The brothers must fight among themselves until one of them alone remained alive.'⁵⁸

Whilst the historical record shows that this was something of an exaggeration (some Princes rallied behind more likely victors, others opted out, others were too young to be involved), in eight out of the previous eleven successions prior to 1895 armed conflict had indeed occurred between the principal princely contestants.⁵⁹ There was, moreover, every expectation that this would now happen again.

It is not too difficult to see why, in a kingdom like Nkore, a fixed line of succession, such as primogeniture, ultimogeniture or indeed any other

⁵⁵ As, for example, at the time of Stanley's, or Scott Elliot's or Cunningham's visits.

⁵⁶ At perhaps Lugard's instance, or over the indulgence Ntare periodically showed to the arms traders.

⁵⁷ *Abagabe*, I, p. 139. Lukyn Williams says it was smallpox: 'Mbaguta', p. 9. Villiers to Macdonald, 27 Aug. 1893, A2/1.

⁵⁸ K. Oberg, 'The Kingdom of Ankole in Uganda', in M. Fortes & E.E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., *African Political Systems* (London, 1940), pp. 157-8; see also Karugire, *Nkore*, p. 152.

⁵⁹ Karugire, *Nkore*, p. 167.

predetermined rule, would not have been a particularly satisfactory way of securing a new leader for its ruling warrior elite. The previous ruler's eldest son might be a weakling, or a coward, or too old. The idea, moreover, that all sons of a previous ruler, and if any of them were dead even their sons as well, were legitimate successors to the throne – which was the position in Nkore as in many other African kingdoms – would seem by contrast to have been a perfectly sensible way of ensuring an adequate range of choice. Should, however, every Prince, whatever his place in the order of birth, be upon an equal basis potentially a ruler, very considerable danger could all too well ensue for the kingdom. Any one of them could, and with full legitimacy, revolt or lead a breakaway.⁶⁰ In several of the Ugandan kingdoms, this was an ever-present problem. It was met in Buganda by the nineteenth century by the careful incarceration of all the Princes; by placing the choice between them in the hands of two major commoners, the Mugema and the Katikiro; and then, following the installation of a new ruler, by (if one may put it like this) killing off most of the surplus. The Baganda, however, were not professional warriors like the Bahima of Nkore. It was quite understandable, therefore, that the Bahima should have preferred that their leading Princes, should fight to the death, not only to be rid of those who could lead revolts and secessions, but in order to secure the most intrepid of their warrior Princes as their ruler.

Succession war promised, of course, a great deal of turmoil. There is no evidence, however, that any of the preceding succession wars in Nkore had led to any disintegration of the kingdom. Rather, as elsewhere, succession war, like princely rebellions, as the anthropologists' insight has it, rather than damaging a kingdom, could very well assist it in holding together. In a traditional rulership, the key institution is the kingship. By fighting for its control, Princes not only established their own claims to be its only legitimate holders. They heightened the importance of the rulership in the kingdom. Princes, it may be said, were specialists in ensuring the primacy of the kingship.

In view of its peculiar importance in conditioning the circumstances which prevailed when the first British officer eventually marched in to establish British hegemony over Nkore late in 1898, Nkore's mid 1890s succession conflict warrants treating in considerable detail. It is not always easy, however, to reconcile the reported details. There are two carefully compiled indigenous accounts, one by Apolo Kagwa in his *Basekabaka*,⁶¹ the other in Katate and Kamugungunu's *Abagabe*

⁶⁰ E.g. Oberg, 'Ankole', in Forkes & Evans. Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, pp. 158–61.

⁶¹ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, Ch. 41.

B'Ankole.⁶² The former was first published in 1901, the latter only in 1955. They rarely dovetail at any point. Then there are two later journal articles that relate to its story by two subsequent British District Commissioners, both of whom spoke the language well and made extensive enquiries about this and other matters.⁶³ Neither of them, however, hit on the essential clues to what happened. There are various scraps of British archival material.⁶⁴ It has, however, to be remembered that these were compiled in Buganda, a fortnight's journey or so away from the events which they describe,⁶⁵ and moreover derived from informants who may well have had their own axes to grind. This documentary testimony is, however, often quite specific, and with one exception is the only contemporary and precisely dated data that we have.

The story they tell begins with a letter from George Wilson, the principal British official in Buganda at the time, dated 31 July 1895, which was based on reports from messengers he had lately sent to Nkore. These stated that, following Ntare's death, 'the country was in a state of intense excitement';⁶⁶ 'Ntare is reported to have no son: the struggle for the throne will probably ensue between two brothers; one reported to be quiet and sensible; the other wild and turbulent.'⁶⁷ The references here, as we shall see, are to Igumira and Kahitsi, the two leading members of the royal clan. Neither, as it happened, was himself a candidate for the throne. In identifying them, however, as the principal figures in Nkore, and in discerning an inherent conflict between them, Wilson's informants were close to the mark.

The first of these, Igumira, was the son of the same father as Ntare, his trusted confidant and a notable warrior. At the outset he advised those who sought to rally around him to attach themselves to Kahitsi.⁶⁸ Kahitsi, however, was an unpopular figure,⁶⁹ and in a situation where, as Wilson soon learned, 'several claimants ... endeavoured to take advantage of the state of anarchy brought about by Mtali's [Ntare's]

⁶² *Abagabe*.

⁶³ Lukyn Williams, 'Mbaguta'; H.F. Morris, 'The Making of Ankole', *Uj* 21 (1957), pp. 1–15 (see also Morris, *Ankole*, Ch. VIII).

⁶⁴ For a later relevant example, see Macallister to Ternan, 10 July 1899, A4/19.

⁶⁵ Wilson to Berkeley, 20 Dec. 1895, A4/3, indicates this.

⁶⁶ *Abagabe*, I, pp. 139–40, lists Ntare's numerous wives and courtiers who committed suicide on his death.

⁶⁷ Wilson to Jackson, 31 July, A4/2; Jackson to O.C. Bukoba, 2 Aug. 1895, A5/1.

⁶⁸ One possible explanation for this is that Kahitsi was the son of Makumbi, a treacherously murdered favoured candidate in the previous succession war, to whom Igumira had himself been allotted on the earlier death of his own father Bachwa: Karugire, *Nkore*, p. 238.

⁶⁹ *Abagabe*, I, pp. 139, 147.

death',⁷⁰ Igumira evidently soon decided that, in order to secure the integrity of the kingdom, he and Kahitsi should take control of the royal cattle and the royal regalia (as a result of which Kahitsi took hold of the principal symbol of kingly authority, the royal drum *Bagyendanwa*),⁷¹ and then together support their own protégé for the throne. The purpose here seems to have been to prevent the extensive internecine slaughter which had occurred on the previous occasion, and secure the preeminent positions in the kingdom for themselves.

This early show of strength generally paid off. Most of the eligible Princes fled the kingdom or were very soon chased from it,⁷² with the result that, by October 1895, Wilson was being told that the contenders for the throne had been 'reduced to two boys; one produced by Kaish and Gomira [Kahitsi and Igumira], two of the strongest brothers of Mtali [Ntare], alleged to be the true son of Mtali: the other produced by Manyasi [Manyantsi], another brother of Mtali, reported by him to be the son of an elder brother of Mtali'.⁷³

The first of these boys was called *Rwamutsizi*, the child's name for the man shortly to be known as *Kahaya*, while the second was named as *Rwakatagoro*. *Kahaya*, *Kahitsi* and *Igumira*'s candidate, was said at this stage to have been sixteen years old, whilst *Rwakatagoro*, *Manyantsi*'s candidate, was only about ten.⁷⁴

Manyantsi was by no means an insignificant figure. A grandson of *Mutambuka* (*Ntare*'s lineal predecessor as *Omugabe*), he had been instrumental back in 1888, as we have seen, in persuading *Ntare* to grant refuge to Buganda's Christian exiles in *Kabula*, and thus enjoyed considerable standing amongst Buganda's new leaders.⁷⁵ In what was an obvious attempt to challenge the control which *Igumira* and *Kahitsi* were evidently seeking to establish over *Nkore*, *Manyantsi* travelled to Buganda to win its support for the candidature of *Rwakatagoro*, the only surviving son of the murdered Prince *Nkuranga*, and, through his sister's marriage, his own nephew.⁷⁶

Rwakatagoro had a strong claim to the succession. Through his father *Nkuranga*, he too was a grandson of *Mutambuka*. Because of the wanton murder of *Nkuranga* by the *Abangonya* (a slaughter *Rwakatagoro*

⁷⁰ Wilson to Berkeley, 20 Dec. 1895, A4/3.

⁷¹ *Abagabe*, I, p. 146.

⁷² Amongst others, they included *Kayondo*, *Mazinio*, *Manyantsi*: *Abagabe*, I, p. 140, II, pp. 2, 45; *Karugire*, *Nkore*, p. 247.

⁷³ Wilson to Berkeley, 20 Dec. 1895, A4/3.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* *Abagabe*, I, p. 132.

survived as being too young to be considered), many Banyankore took the view that justice would be done if a successor from Nkuranga's line were to become Omugabe.⁷⁷ Whilst, in 1895, Rwakatogoro might have been too young to be an effective candidate, he was nevertheless an entirely appropriate alternative choice for the throne. Manyantsi's appeal to the Buganda leaders, moreover, soon succeeded. 'Mwanga and the Uganda [Buganda] chiefs', Wilson was soon reporting, 'were strongly inclined towards Manyasi's protege'.⁷⁸

That constituted a formidable challenge for those left behind in Nkore, since few of them could forget that, during the preceding succession war in the mid 1870s, Baganda forces had inflicted a brutally treacherous massacre on a whole group of Nkore notables (Kahitsi's father, Makumbi, principally amongst them).⁷⁹ If, therefore, the Baganda were now to interfere upon Rwakatogoro's side, armed as they were with guns on a very much larger scale than before, the prospects for Igumira and Kahitsi and their supporters back in Nkore could only have been very bleak indeed. Unsurprisingly therefore: 'On 17th October', Wilson recorded, 'a Muhima (Ankoli tribe) named Amani, who had formerly been in [British] Government service as a caravan askari [soldier], appeared at Kampala with envoys from Kaish [Kahitsi] and Gomira [Igumira] ... The Envoys brought by Amani begged for the support of H.M. Government and the King of Uganda [Buganda], for the son of Mtali [Ntare].'⁸⁰ By whom, they meant Kahaya. Manyantsi, however, promptly denounced their claim. 'Whilst the matter was under discussion', Wilson went on, 'Manyasi [Manyantsi] himself appeared. When questioned he denied the existence of the reputed son of Mtali.'⁸¹

That brought to the very centre of the mid 1890s succession conflict a complex dispute concerning the paternity of one of its leading candidates.

Confronted by this dispute, Wilson sought to play the neutral arbiter. He first arranged that Amani and the Nkore envoys should be detained in Kampala, and then, in conjunction with Kabaka Mwanga, he sent

⁷⁷ As indeed the Banyankore seem to have recognised when, in 1944, their next ruler died childless, and (after another succession conflict – fought interestingly this time in the civil courts) they installed Rwakatogoro's son, Gasyonga, as the new Omugabe: Karugire, *Nkore*, p. 30. For some further details about him, see *Abagabe*, II, p. 43.

⁷⁸ Wilson to Berkeley, 20 Dec. 1895, A4/3.

⁷⁹ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 322–4.

⁸⁰ Amani had earlier served with Lugard and was much used as an interpreter and agent: *LD* III, pp. 47–50, 53–4, 289–90. See also Wilson to Colvile, 6 Aug. 1894, A2/2, and Hobart to Berkeley, 14 Apr. 1898, A4/10.

⁸¹ Wilson to Berkeley, 20 Dec. 1895, A4/3.

messengers to Nkore to ascertain the truth of the rival claims.⁸² Upon their arrival in Nkore these messengers were kept waiting until a large war party had finally chased another possible candidate, Mazinyo, from the country.⁸³ Once that had been done, however, the messengers were summoned to a major conference at a place called Ruhunga, which was attended by Igumira and Kahitsi and a number of other Nkore notables.⁸⁴ Its purpose, so Wilson was told, was ‘to represent the whole of the present Ankoli authority’ and thereupon establish the legitimacy of Kahaya’s claims to be Ntare’s son, so as to counter Manyantsi’s move to secure Bugandan intervention in the kingdom’s affairs, on his own and Rwakatogoro’s behalf, at a particularly delicate moment in its history. To that end, evidence was presented at Ruhunga in support of the claim that Kahaya was Ntare’s son; an identity parade was held; and conciliatory messages were then sent to Buganda. Wilson paraphrased his envoys’ extensive account of what occurred as follows:

The conference was unanimous in declaring that Mtali [Ntare] had given birth to a son, by a woman who had died soon after childbirth. This woman on becoming pregnant, had been sent by Mtali to Gomira’s [Igumira’s] wife, to be delivered. There were witnesses to the negotiations between Mtali and the parents of the woman on the occasion of her becoming Mtali’s wife. The chiefs in conference desired [that Wilson’s and Mwanga’s messengers] who had both seen Mtali to identify Mtali’s son by his likeness to Mtali, out of the number of youths to be gathered together for the purpose ... On the 3rd day two bodies of people gathered near to us, and the chiefs appeared and asked us to carry out the wish of the conference. We had no difficulty in doing so: the son – for we had now no doubt he is such being particularly recognizable from the projecting teeth and thick limbs peculiar to Mtali, besides, of course, a general likeness in features and expression. Kaish [Kahitsi] said he was sorry that Manyasi [Manyantsi] was absent as he was sure he would have waived his claims under these circumstances [claims, that is, on behalf of Rwakatogoro].⁸⁵

Kahitsi and Igumira thereupon were appointed ‘guardians and regents’ of Kahaya, while shortly afterwards two Nkore notables – both of them, it is worth noting, supporters of Kahitsi – were sent with gifts of ivory and cattle to Wilson, Kabaka Mwanga and the Baganda chiefs, ‘as an earnest’, so Wilson put it, ‘of their sincerity in begging support and protection in placing Mtali’s son on the throne, and in governing the country of

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ On Mazinyo, who fled to Buganda, see *Abagabe*, I, p. 140, and II, p. 2.

⁸⁴ Principally amongst them Bitsa, who was named as the chief minister of the Omugabe; Rugumayo, who had been one of Ntare’s principal warband leaders; and Rwakyimete, a close supporter of Igumira.

⁸⁵ Wilson to Berkeley, 20 Dec. 1895, A4/3.

Nkore'; 'during these negotiations', he went on, Kahitsi 'has been most cordial, and together with Gomira [Igumira] has expressed the most earnest solicitude for the friendly assistance of the government'. That, however, was scarcely surprising. For their actions late in 1895 had successfully attained their main purpose. Wilson was soon reporting:

Manyasi is still in Mengo [the Kabaka's capital], but the King and Uganda Chiefs now consider that his part is played out; and they support the claims of Mtali's son; being quite convinced from the evidence acquired by the messengers, of the legitimate claims of Kaish and Gomira's protegee.⁸⁶

Faced by the threat of Baganda intervention, the greater part of Nkore's leadership thus closed ranks, and thereby put a halt to the incursion that threatened their kingdom.⁸⁷

The succession crisis, however, was far from over. Nearly a year later, in November 1896, Berkeley, by then British Commissioner in Uganda, wrote that 'As regards Ankoli ... the position of affairs is somewhat unsettled since the death of Mtali ... and the difficulty attending the selection of his rightful successor';⁸⁸ while, two months, later he wrote again: 'In Ankole ... the situation remains unsettled, owing to the difficulty that has been experienced in adjudicating upon the merits of rival claims to the succession'.⁸⁹

The Nkore evidence confirms this account. There is nothing there to suggest that, following the Ruhunga conference, Kahaya fulfilled the critically important accession ceremony of beating the drum Bagyendanwa. Rather, it states, 'in the time of troubles the leading Bahinda ... failed to settle the succession'; 'they could not settle their differences'; and even, it reports, as late as 1897, there were still 'princes who wanted to enthrone Rwakatogoro'.⁹⁰

The doubts about Kahaya's paternity therefore lingered on. Taken as a whole, the evidence indicates that a woman named Kiyaya was quite certainly married to Ntare and was Kahaya's mother. Prior, however, to Kahaya's birth, she was given by Ntare to Igumira, and he was therefore born in Igumira's kraal. Whether she was pregnant before she moved was the first moot point. The story, however, does not end there. For in 1893

⁸⁶ Ibid. Perhaps by this stage the reader will not need advice about every variant in the spelling of these names.

⁸⁷ Having consorted with the Baganda insurgents under Mwanga and Kintu in 1897, Manyantsi was killed in the course of their suppression in September 1898: Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 245; Wright, *Heroic Age*, p. 184.

⁸⁸ Berkeley to Salisbury, 19 Nov. 1896, FOCP 6951/62. See his earlier concern, Berkeley to Pulteney, 22 Aug. 1896, A5/2.

⁸⁹ Berkeley to Salisbury, 26 Jan. 1897, FOCP 6964/47.

⁹⁰ *Abagabe*, II, p. 1. See also Wilson's Memo, 17 Aug. 1898, A27/17.

both Ntare's only undoubted son, Kabumbire, and Kiyaya both died of smallpox,⁹¹ whereupon Igumira gave Kahaya to Ntare in Kabumbire's place. Whether, in the absence of any other claim, that conferred Ntare's paternity upon Kahaya was a further moot point. An initial Nkore account firmly states that Kiyaya was pregnant before she moved to Igumira's kraal.⁹² By contrast, the principal later Nkore account is emphatic that Ntare 'did not leave a child to inherit the drum', though at one point it nevertheless describes Kahaya as 'the son of Ntare V'.⁹³ It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in the 1890s strong claims were made both that Kahaya was Ntare's son, and that he was not.

Upon a closer look, however, this was not the principal anomaly pervading these events. For questions need to be asked too about both Igumira and Kahitsi. For each was obviously anxious to hold a preeminent position in the kingdom. Neither, however, sought the rulership for himself. Both campaigned for a younger candidate. Both, however, had impeccable genealogical claims of their own to the rulership. Each, like Ntare, was a grandson of Mutambuka. Both were thus at least as well qualified to succeed as Rwakatagoro, and, being one generation older, more so than their own candidate, Kahaya. Why, in view of their very evident personal ambitions, did neither of them advance his own candidature for the throne? In the case of Igumira, Bishop Tucker of the Anglican mission contemporaneously recorded the explanation. Igumira, he noted, had earlier lost an eye.⁹⁴ The explanation in Kahitsi's case does not seem to have been similarly recorded, but some later enquiries in Nkore, of Canon Buningwiri of the Anglican church, who was a young man at the court at the time, yielded the answer. Kahitsi, he reported, was left-handed.⁹⁵

Physical imperfection is known to have been a bar to royal office in a number of other societies, not least in Africa. There is the well-documented story, for example, in the recorded history of Karagwe, the kingdom which adjoins Nkore to the south, of a contemporary Bahinda Prince who played kingmaker not King, not once, but three

⁹¹ *Abagabe*, I, p. 130.

⁹² Lukyn Williams quoting Mbaguta: 'Mbaguta', p. 9.

⁹³ *Abagabe*, I, pp. 131, 134–5, 140, 144; II, p. 15. Note that this was published in 1955.

⁹⁴ Tucker, *Eighteen Years*, 1911, p. 271.

⁹⁵ Derrick Stenning and I originally had various interviews with him and others in July 1958 (at which we were told Igumira had a 'wall eye' rather than had lost one – a difference, however, of no consequence). What we learned had obviously been known to many other Banyankore and is now conventional wisdom; President Museveni (a Bahima) gave me the same explanations (unprompted) at an interview in 1993: Karugire, *Nkore*, pp. 23n., 247–8.

times in succession, because he too was left-handed.⁹⁶ Whilst it may be difficult to credit, the clear evidence is that, at the core of the succession crisis in Nkore in the mid 1890s, there was not only a dispute about the paternity of the principal candidate, but physical disqualifications against the succession⁹⁷ not just in one but in both the leading members of the main royal line.

The implications of the latter were considerable. For had Kahitsi been physically qualified to succeed, it is hard to believe he would not have striven to establish his own claims to the rulership, while it is even more difficult to imagine that Igumira would have preferred Kahaya's claims to his own had it not been for his defective eye. Of the two of them, Igumira, as brother and confidant of Ntare, held the stronger position. Indeed, if Kahitsi had been physically qualified whilst Igumira was not, Igumira could still have backed Kahaya. It was thus Igumira's eye that was the principal factor in shaping the succession crisis of the mid 1890s, even if Kahitsi's left-handedness added to its peculiarities.

The consequences were major. By putting out of contention Nkore's two leading royals, these disabilities transformed the succession struggle in the mid 1890s from the lethal combat between eligible Princes ordained by precedent into an elongated struggle between Nkore mag-nates for predominant influence in the kingdom, which in turn substantially conditioned the circumstances which attended the eventual British moves to establish their hegemony over the kingdom.

This struggle was to stretch out over the five years 1896–1900. It first took this form in Manyantsi's sponsorship of Rwakatagoro against Igumira and Kahitsi's championship of Kahaya. Whilst that and the accompanying threat of Baganda intervention were then scotched by the Ruhunga conference, the struggle soon took on a new form. For not only did controversy over Kahaya's paternity periodically resurface – which suggests that the forces Manyantsi represented had not entirely dissipated – but as soon as the threat from Buganda receded, the initial conjuncture between Kahitsi and Igumira began to fall apart. For, in defiance of his physical disqualification, Kahitsi evidently yearned for the prime position within the kingdom. In view, however, of Igumira's closer affinity with Kahaya, were Kahaya's accession now to be confirmed, the probability was that that position would pass to Igumira.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ J. Ford and R. de Z. Hall, 'The History of Karagwe', *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, 24 (1947), pp. 3–27.

⁹⁷ 'The king must be without blemish – so ran the unwritten law of Nkole': Tucker, *Eighteen Years*, p. 271.

⁹⁸ *Abagabe*, I, p. 146.

In order to keep the position open, Kahitsi (or so it would seem) not only held on to the royal drum, Bagyendanwa, but assiduously prevented Kahaya from fulfilling the key accession ceremony of beating it.

At the same time, he did everything he could to bring Kahaya under his own wing⁹⁹ and thereby secure control over Nkore's larger affairs.¹⁰⁰ That, however, proved to be no easy task. Although he evidently gathered about him a considerable following,¹⁰¹ and, thanks to a parallel succession crisis in Rwanda, the threat from there receded,¹⁰² he failed to organise resistance to an incursion from the German sphere in August 1896;¹⁰³ while, in that same month, he was unable to prevent a major clash between Mbaguta's Abangonya, with Kahaya in its midst, and the Muslim (and some Catholic) Baganda under the leadership of the Muslim leader, Kahusi, whom Ntare had permitted to settle in Bukanga.¹⁰⁴ All this time, moreover, various other Baganda dissidents based in Kabula – Abangoni as they were called – and their opponents, were constantly causing difficulties.¹⁰⁵

The strains which all this placed on Kahitsi first manifested themselves in some greetings he sent to Mwanga and the British officers in Buganda in September 1896, in which, after making sure Igumira formally endorsed his approach, he expressed his regret at being unable to deliver these greetings personally since, he said, Igumira was not helping with the government of the kingdom, nor with the guidance of the young King.¹⁰⁶

By the end of 1896, his discomfiture had clearly greatly increased. For upon his own behalf alone he not only sent a large gift of ivory to the British and asked them to take a closer interest in Nkore and build a fort there, but sent a message to Kabaka Mwanga saying: 'My brother has long since been dead. There is a prince I gave the throne. Kahaya is not Ntare's son his father is Gumira.'¹⁰⁷ By thereby openly reneging on his previous support for Kahaya as Ntare's son, he opened a breach in the

⁹⁹ For a later commentary, see Wilson's Memo, 17 Aug. 1898, A27/17.

¹⁰⁰ Wilson was told he was the 'Senior Regent of Kawaia', and that, he had said that, in 'matters relating to European methods', his colleagues were 'ready to follow his lead; and relegate to him the responsibility of action in this question': Wilson to Ternan, 15 Jan. 1897, A4/7.

¹⁰¹ E.g. Macallister to Ternan, 20 July 1899, A4/19.

¹⁰² Catharine Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, pp. 54, 57–9; Vansina, *Modern Rwanda*, pp. 177–9.

¹⁰³ Sitwell to Berkeley, 16 Aug. 1896, A4/5.

¹⁰⁴ ND, 1895–8, 9, 10 Aug., 14, 15 Sept. 1896.

¹⁰⁵ E.g. Wilson to Ternan, 15 Jan. 1897, A4/7; *Abagabe*, II, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Wilson to Ternan, 15 Jan. 1897, A4/7.

¹⁰⁷ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 326.

solidarity of the Nkore leadership as established at Ruhunga, and so threatened to reignite the turmoil that had wracked the kingdom in the earlier stages of its succession crisis.

This precipitated Nkore's most prominent Bashambo, Mbaguta, into an audacious move. Vexed by the failure of the Bahinda to finalise the succession; dismayed, as Ntare's principal external negotiator, by Kahitsi's self-serving appeals to the Baganda and the British; perturbed, as Abangonya leader, by the persisting conflicts on Nkore's eastern border; and wary, as Nkuranga's killer, of any revival of Rwakatogoro's candidature – he embarked upon the bold venture, not of sending messages to Buganda as Kahitsi had done, but of seeking the help of a Buganda associate from their Kabula days, Semukuto Masimbi, in securing for him a personal audience with the Kabaka of Buganda, 'to ask Mwangwa's aid in restoring order' in Nkore, as he put it.¹⁰⁸ On the audience being granted, Mwangwa asked him first (so the Buganda account tells us) who in the end had become Omugabe.

For some tell me it is Kayondo son of Mazinyo while others say Lwakatogolo and others still say Bucunku. Tell us who is the Kabaka [i.e. Omugabe]. Mbaguta replied and said, 'there is no Kabaka so far, but there is a young prince son of Ntale who is with Gumira. He was born there but his mother was with child before she went there and Ntale himself knew of him as his son'. When Mwangwa heard of such disputes he said to Mbaguta, 'Become Kabaka yourself'. But Mbaguta said in reply, 'I cannot become Kabaka for I am a peasant and not of royal blood'. When Mwangwa heard that Mbaguta was not a prince he now said to Masimbi Semukuto, 'Go together with Mbaguta and put that prince Kahaya on his father's throne'. Masimbi Semukuto and Mbaguta went to Nkore and did as they were told.¹⁰⁹

In thus securing Mwangwa's support for a confirmation of Kahaya's accession, Mbaguta not only trumped Kahitsi's attempt to secure external assistance for his own cause. He singlehandedly tipped the balance in Kahaya's favour. Thereafter, while Kahitsi continued as Kahaya's principal regent and maintained his hold upon the royal drum and much royal cattle, sometime before the middle of 1897 Kahaya was finally able to beat Bagyendanwa at a place called Nyarubanga, and thereby fulfill the most important of the accession ceremonies.¹¹⁰ The Buganda account tells us that both Kahitsi and Igumira thereafter became 'very unruly in their ways'¹¹¹ towards Mbaguta. But that is not surprising,

¹⁰⁸ *Abagabe*, II, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 326. This is confirmed by the briefer account in *Abagabe*, II, p. 1.

¹¹⁰ *Abagabe*, II, pp. 1–2.

¹¹¹ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 326.

since, despite his commoner status, Mbaguta had not only, as a Mushambo, usurped the role of the Bahinda as the ruler's kingmakers. At the very moment when Kahitsi's denunciation of Kahaya's claims had fragmented the alliance between them, Mbaguta's unilateral action had added a structural cleavage between the two of them as royals, on the one side, and himself as a leading non-royal, on the other.

Throughout these events the British would have liked to have established a post in Nkore.¹¹² They never, however, had the necessary resources to do so. Had these been forthcoming, and had either Igumira or Kahitsi been physically qualified, they could well have found themselves faced by a ruler scarcely less mature than Ntare. As it was, they would more particularly have encountered a kingdom rent by an unresolved succession crisis, in which several powerful figures were vying with each other for the preeminent position in the kingdom. In such an event, the British might have ridden in on the back of Buganda's original support for Rwakatagoro, or alternatively in response to Kahitsi's unilateral plea for a British fort, or conceivably in conjunction with Mbaguta's move to secure Mwanga's support for Kahaya. Whichever of these circumstances obtained, the probability was that the character of the conjuncture which then ensued would quite distinctly have reflected one or other of these eventualities.

As it was, the salient circumstances for Nkore were once again abruptly changed with the outbreak of Mwanga's revolt in July 1897. For, since its epicentre lay in the neighbouring Buganda county of Buddu, the Nkore leaders soon found themselves forced to set aside their rivalries and consider urgently how they should respond to the crisis. As a consequence, the Nkore story in these years entered a phase during which the focus of attention switched once again to its external involvements.

It is some measure of the initial widespread expectation that Mwanga's revolt could well succeed in routing the British and their Baganda Christian allies that, seemingly at Igumira's instance,¹¹³ the Nkore leaders at first agreed to support it. Under Mbaguta's leadership, 300 Nkore warriors were thereupon despatched to join Kintu's army in Buddu – only, however, to share in its defeat by Grant outside Masaka on 23 August 1897.¹¹⁴ There was then an inherent possibility that this

¹¹² E.g. Berkeley to Sitwell, 17 Sept., Pulteney to Berkeley, 23 Sept., A5/2; Wilson, 'Rough Notes on Estimates 1897–1898', 28 Oct. 1896, A4/6; Berkeley to Salisbury, 26 Jan. 1897, FOCP 6964/47.

¹¹³ Grant to Wilson, 12 Sept. 1897, A4/8; Wilson's Memo, 17 Aug. 1898, A27/17.

¹¹⁴ Grant to Ternan, 20, 26 Aug., A4/8; Grant to ?, 27 Aug. 1897, A5/3. See also Ch. 7.

could have led to the British taking forcible action against Nkore, of a kind that had lately inflicted such trauma and devastation upon Bunyoro.¹¹⁵ Grant, however, decided first to seek Nkore support.¹¹⁶ That, as it happened (along with a number of exchanges that were chiefly notable for the primacy the British now accorded Kahaya), soon proved to be forthcoming.¹¹⁷ For not only did Kahaya, with Kahitsi at his elbow, speedily learn the lesson of Grant's victory (as Ntare had of Langheld's before them) and desist from any further open resistance to the British, but, much perturbed by the depredations Mwanga's supporters were inflicting upon the eastern borderlands of their kingdom, they despatched a number of war parties against them.¹¹⁸

Over the following year, the Nkore leadership nevertheless faced a number of taxing difficulties, particularly because much of the conflict generated by the revolt became concentrated in Kabula and the eastern marches of their kingdom.¹¹⁹ Anxious not to precipitate a British attack, they were at the same time fearful lest, by committing themselves too openly to the British cause, they should invite a major rebel attack upon them.¹²⁰ As a consequence, they periodically played a hidden double hand.¹²¹ They occasionally gave succour to the rebel forces, and, after rejecting Mwanga's plea for asylum late in 1897, early the next year Igumira and Mbaguta assisted him in fleeing northwards to join Kabalega.¹²²

Their dilemma was well understood upon the British side. Macpherson, a British officer, wrote in April 1898:

Kawaya sultan of Ankole ... is anxious to have the protection of the Government troops for his people. He says that Mwanga and Gabriel [Kintu] have raided

¹¹⁵ Grant to Ternan, 26 Aug., A4/8; Wilson to Grant, 28, 31 Aug., 6 Sept. 1897, A5/3; Wilson's Memo, 17 Aug., Tighe's Distribution Return, 28 Aug. 1898, A27/17.

¹¹⁶ Wilson to Grant, 7, 20 Sept., A5/3; Grant to Wilson, 16 Sept. 1897, A4/9.

¹¹⁷ Grant to Wilson, 12 Sept., A4/8, 16 Sept. 1897, A4/9; Hobart to Grant, 17 Oct., A4/9; Wilson to Macdonald, 3 Jan., A7/4; Kirk to Wilson, 13 Feb., Macpherson to Wilson, 11 Apr. 1898, A4/10.

¹¹⁸ Hobart to Wilson, 17 Sept. 1898, A4/9, Grant to Foster, 23 Sept. 1897, BRA; Tighe to Price, 23 Sept. 1898, A27/17.

¹¹⁹ E.g. Hobart to Wilson, 17 Sept., Grant to Wilson, 20, 30 Sept., Hobart to Grant, 17 Oct., 1 Nov. 1897, A4/9; Macpherson to Wilson, 11 Apr., to Berkeley, 16 Apr., A4/10; Wilson's Memo, 17 Aug., Tighe to Broome, and Tighe's Distribution Return, 28 Aug. 1898, A27/17.

¹²⁰ Grant to Wilson, 18 Sept. 1897, Hobart to Wilson, 1 Nov., A4/9; Kirk to Wilson, 13 Feb., Hobart to Berkeley, 14 Apr., Macpherson to Berkeley, 16 Apr. 1898, A4/10.

¹²¹ So it was alleged: Hobart to Berkeley, 14 Apr. 1898, A4/10. On Amani, see also J.P. Wilson to Colville, 6 Aug. 1894, A2/2.

¹²² *Abagabe*, II, pp. 2–3; ESA, Streicher's Diary, 27 Feb.; Wilson to Salisbury, 3 Mar. 1898, FOCP 7077/43.

through his territory without any restriction and that Mwanga had threatened to have him deposed and put another chief in his place ... The neutral attitude assumed throughout this campaign by Kawaya and his chiefs is owing to their fear that the Govt is not in a position to protect them from Mwanga's vengeance and hitherto this fear was well founded. We can only secure their active cooperation when we have once occupied their country and have recognized posts.¹²³

There continued to be difficulties on the British side in securing enough troops to establish a post in Nkore.¹²⁴ Reinforcements, however, were now arriving to assist with the suppression of Mwanga's revolt and the Sudanese mutiny, so there was soon rather more chance than before that these would be forthcoming.¹²⁵ In May 1898, an official named Macallister appears to have been nominated to go to Nkore.¹²⁶ Nothing, however, occurred for another three months, till in August 1898 Berkeley, as British Commissioner, concerned to scotch Kintu's operations in the Nkore region once and for all, ordered that an immediate advance into Nkore should take place.¹²⁷ Wilson thereupon travelled down to Buddu to settle the affairs of the region and, in particular, the British relationship with Nkore. Like Macpherson, he edged forward cautiously.¹²⁸ After consulting Kahusi,¹²⁹ the leader of the Muslim Baganda in Bukanga, who, despite his clash with the Abangonya, remained loyal to Kahaya but also collaborated with the British,¹³⁰ he despatched an ultimatum to Kahaya on 25 August 1898 saying that, whilst he understood there might well be opposition from Igumira, he must now openly declare Nkore's support for the British cause or suffer an invasion.¹³¹

¹²³ Macpherson to Berkeley, 20 Apr., also 16 Apr. 1898, A4/10; also Grant to Wilson, 18 Sept. 1897, A4/9.

¹²⁴ E.g. Berkeley to O.C. Troops, 13 Aug., A5/4; Wilson's Memo, 17 Aug. 1898, A27/17.

¹²⁵ Berkeley to Ternan, 13 Aug., Berkeley to Martyr, 24 Aug. 1898, A5/4.

¹²⁶ Macallister to Tomkins, 6 May 1898, A4/11.

¹²⁷ Berkeley to Martyr, 13, 24 Aug. 1898, A5/4. See also Macpherson to Wilson, 11 Apr. 1898, A4/10.

¹²⁸ Wilson's Memo, 17 Aug. 1897, A27/17. Prior to Mwanga's revolt, he had been similarly wary: Wilson to Ternan, 15 Jan. 1897, A4/7.

¹²⁹ About whom he was originally highly suspicious: Wilson to Macdonald, 3 Jan. 1898, A7/4.

¹³⁰ Grant to Wilson, 20, 30 Sept., Hobart to Grant, 1 Nov. 1897, A4/9; Wilson to O.C. Buddu, 28 Feb., A5/4; Wilson's Memo, 17 Aug., Wilson to Tighe, 25 Aug., A27/17; Wilson to Berkeley, 4 Sept. 1898, A4/12; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 150; Wilson to Salisbury, 5 Oct. 1897, FOCP 7024/22. Wright persuasively argues that this was in part because the insurgents were his old enemies from the civil wars in Buganda in 1888-93, such as the Catholics and Mwanga: *Heroic Age*, p. 183.

¹³¹ Tighe's Diary of Operations, 24 Aug., A27/17; Wilson to Tighe, 25 Aug., Wilson to Berkeley, 4 Sept. 1898, A4/12.

With that, Nkore's 'defining conjuncture' had arrived. Whilst its preliminaries had been far more protracted and varied than elsewhere in the region, the course that it now took ran a quite typical sequence. The leaders of Nkore no doubt still harboured some hopes for their continued independence. But for four years, and in retrospect for up to eight, they had lived under the shadow of British threats to the autonomy of their kingdom. More than once they had been reminded of their own vulnerability to internal fissure and external attack. Twice their warbands had been defeated by European-led forces. More recently, they had found themselves trapped in the crossfire between Mwanga's supporters and the British,¹³² while by late 1898 the onslaughts the British were inflicting upon Kabalega and Mwanga and their followers, and the Sudanese mutineers, were making it abundantly clear just how disastrous any open resistance to a British advance could be. There was a great deal to be said, therefore, for a cautious response.

Even so, the Nkore leaders evidently engaged in a classic debate over whether to reject the British demand or accede to it. For it was not for over another three weeks after Wilson's ultimatum had been despatched that Captain Tighe, by this time in command of the British operations in Kabula (he had been careful to do nothing provocative),¹³³ received on 16 September 1898 a delegation of five Nkore chiefs carrying Kahaya's eventual reply. This stated that he would welcome British protection; that he had despatched two contingents to serve against the rebels;¹³⁴ that he hoped the British would establish posts in his country to provide protection against them; and that these decisions were 'unanimously arrived at by the King and his chiefs including Gomira'.¹³⁵ This response was specifically endorsed by Mbaguta who assiduously made it known that he too welcomed the advent of a British post in Nkore.¹³⁶ In response Tighe promised to cooperate with the Nkore leaders against the Baganda raiders, asked that a prominent chief be appointed to Kabula for liaison duties, and announced that the appointment of a British official to Nkore¹³⁷ was now under active

¹³² E.g. Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 243–4; Macallister to Berkeley, 1 Jan., A4/15; Macallister to Wilson, 26 Apr., BRA; Wilson to Ternan, 24 July 1899, A11/19.

¹³³ Tighe's Distribution Return, 28 Aug. 1898, A27/17, which also specifies the troops under his command, including those detailed to march into Nkore.

¹³⁴ Tighe to Price, 23 Sept. 1898, A27/17.

¹³⁵ Tighe to O. C. Uganda, 16 Sept., A27/17; Wilson to Berkeley, 17 Oct. 1898, A4/13, 27 Feb. 1899, FOCP 7401/121 enc.; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 244; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 244.

¹³⁶ Fisher to Ternan, 6 Dec. 1898, ESA Kabula Annual Report; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 326; *Abagabe*, II, p. 4.

¹³⁷ Though, even then, Ternan told Macallister that he could not send him any reinforcements: Ternan to Macallister, 6 June 1900, A5/5.

consideration.¹³⁸ For all the courtesies displayed, this exchange was replete with euphemisms. No-one can have doubted that it presaged the advent of British dominion over Nkore.

A small military expedition under Lieutenant Hobart made a brief visit to Nkore in October 1898.¹³⁹ It was two months more, however, before Macallister, the previously designated official, and half a company of mercenary troops could be spared to establish a post there.¹⁴⁰ In the end, in mid December 1898, however, they set out from Kabula, and two days later, on 18 December 1898, on a spur overlooking the Ruisi river at a place called Mbarara in the heart of the Nkore kingdom, he set them to work to build a rough-hewn fort encompassed by a thornbush stockade, in which they would be 'safe in case of night attack'. Elsewhere in this region, the initial construction of such a fort did not necessarily involve any substantial change in power relations. To begin with, for example, Lugard's Fort at Kampala was little more than a way station on his route to the western lakes, while the forts he built thereabouts were principally designed to deter Kabalega's Abarasura from the north. It was not until after the battle of Mengo in 1892 that Kampala Fort became the locus and symbol of British hegemony over Buganda. From the very outset, however, Macallister's fort at Mbarara carried the stamp of 'a raw assertion of British hegemony', and in a trice transformed the destiny of the Nkore kingdom. Hitherto, its external involvements had involved either mobile violence¹⁴¹ or skilful finessing.¹⁴² Never before (at least in living memory) had it encountered the precipitate installation at its core, by agents of a foreign power, of a physical manifestation of their single-minded determination to establish their superordinate authority over it.¹⁴³ Two days later, 'On December 20th', Macallister recorded, 'Kawia, King of Ankole, accompanied by Egumira and Kiyisi, his two principal chiefs, and a following of 500 or 600 spearmen and 50 guns came in'. A further meeting was then held the following day.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁸ The Nkore leaders were also concerned that they might lose territory to the Germans, but were reassured: Tigue to Wilson, 16 Sept., A27/17; Macallister to Berkeley, 1 Nov. 1898, A4/13.

¹³⁹ Clayton to his parents, 6, 12 Oct. 1898, CMS Clayton Papers. *Abagabe*, II, pp. 2-3, says Macallister paid a preliminary visit to Nkore. That may be, but there is no supporting contemporary British evidence. It could be, therefore, that it is recalling Hobart's.

¹⁴⁰ Delayed by a further crisis in Bunyoro: Berkeley to Salisbury, 2 Nov., FOCP 7400/87; Berkeley to Baile, 29 Oct., A5/4; Macallister to Berkeley, 1 Nov. 1898, A4/13.

¹⁴¹ In raids against its neighbours or in oscillating involvement in Mwanga's revolt.

¹⁴² The enlistment of external support in an internal cause, or the deflecting of a perceived threat to the kingdom's autonomy.

¹⁴³ Macallister to Berkeley, 1 Jan. 1899, A4/15.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Faced by a fateful challenge to the integrity of their kingdom, the Nkore leadership momentarily closed ranks as they had very largely done against Buganda in 1895. These were, nevertheless, tense days.¹⁴⁵ At one point the fort was under threat of an attack, and for over a week Macallister kept half his troops constantly under arms. In the end, however, the Nkore leadership was persuaded – particularly it seems, by the refusal of Kahusi and the Bukanga people, who had earlier suffered enough at British hands, to support them¹⁴⁶ – that such was the magnitude of British power that any attack upon the fort could only have fatal consequences. Emulating Ntare, they accordingly held their warriors in check. That was a seminal moment. The preliminary assertion of British hegemony over Nkore kingdom had passed unchallenged.

The ‘conditioning circumstances’ Macallister confronted as he then came to engage more closely with the Nkore leadership differed in a number of respects from those which any earlier British official posted to Nkore would have found. Rather than his advent being in response to some particular Nkore appeal, Macallister had advanced into Nkore in the context of a mounting assault by the British on Kintu’s forces. Instead of confronting a seasoned ruler dressed in the full panoply of his powers (such as Ntare or Kahitsi or Igumira would have been), he found himself faced by an inexperienced, insecure young ruler, Kahaya, whose whole position, moreover, had lately been challenged by an altogether new and gravely ominous threat. For whilst Kahaya’s accession had apparently been confirmed at Nyarubanga, eighteen months later Kahitsi was still not only holding on to the royal cattle and the royal regalia: driven by his fear, it would seem, that Kahaya’s closer affinity with Igumira, and Mbaguta’s greater facility in securing external support, would sooner or later deprive him of the principal position within the kingdom, Kahitsi had now taken the fateful step of breaking openly with Kahaya and Igumira, and was not only so comporting himself as to win the title of ‘usurper’, but had now openly championed Manyantsi’s former protégé, Rwakatagoro, for the throne.¹⁴⁷ Macallister’s advent therefore coincided with a further phase in this Nkore story, in which a seminal threat to its autonomy became inextricably intertwined with the final stages of the highly personalised struggle for power within the kingdom that had been shaped by the singularities of its 1890s succession conflict. It was this complex which principally conditioned Nkore’s ‘determining vortex’, which then ensued as, over the next two

¹⁴⁵ E.g. Macallister to Ternan, 19 June 1899, A4/18.

¹⁴⁶ Macallister to Johnston, 5 May 1900, A21/1.

¹⁴⁷ *Abagabe*, I, pp. 146–7, II, pp. 3–5.

years, Macallister and his successor moved to establish British authority over Nkore.

To begin with, Macallister thought Igumira and Kahaya were both 'friendly'. Yet 'it is highly probable', he reported, 'that Kiyisi will give trouble',¹⁴⁸ for not only was he now acting as 'virtually King of Ankole', he had the support of the largest body of Bahima warriors, 1,500 all told, or as many as Kahaya himself controlled.¹⁴⁹ Early on, moreover, Macallister found him harbouring a long-sought Muslim gun runner and his stockpile of armaments.¹⁵⁰ Along with Kahitsi's contumacy towards Kahaya,¹⁵¹ that presented Macallister with his opening challenge.

'[O]wing to the two parties being nearly equal in point of numbers',¹⁵² as he put it, he was careful to proceed cautiously.¹⁵³ Once, however, the threat to his fort had receded, he summoned the Nkore leaders to a meeting, in late February 1899, and told them that as 'Kawiya had been appointed King of Ankole, the late King's property [should] be handed over to Kawiya, and ... his relations should return to the land they occupied in Ntali's time'.¹⁵⁴ So as to smooth this process, he arranged that, with a much reduced following, Kahitsi should be dispatched to hold the chieftaincy of Nshara towards Nkore's eastern border.¹⁵⁵ Hitherto, the combination of Kahaya, Igumira, Mbaguta and their followings had all quite failed to restrain Kahitsi's mounting defection and make him disgorge his royal hoard. But with Macallister's intervention, no doubt accompanied by the latent threat of some action by his mercenary escort: 'After some little trouble this', Macallister reported, 'was effected peacefully'. Evidently Kahitsi sensed he had no option but to accept his defeat with as much grace as he could muster.¹⁵⁶ Soon after, Macallister reported that 'several of the smaller chiefs have left Kiyisi and now acknowledge Kawiya as their ruler'¹⁵⁷ and that a 'large majority of the people now acknowledge Kawiya as King'.¹⁵⁸ His deft intrusion

¹⁴⁸ Macallister to Berkeley, 1 Jan. 1899, A4/15.

¹⁴⁹ Macallister to Ternan, 20 July 1899, A4/19.

¹⁵⁰ Macallister to Berkeley, 1 Jan. 1899, A4/15.

¹⁵¹ *Abagabe*, II, p. 4.

¹⁵² Macallister to Berkeley, 27 Feb. 1899, A4/15.

¹⁵³ Macallister to Berkeley, 22 Feb. 1899, A4/15.

¹⁵⁴ Macallister to Ternan, 20 July, A4/19; Macallister to Berkeley, 1 Jan., A4/15, 27 Feb. 1899, A4/16; *Abagabe*, II, p. 4.

¹⁵⁵ *Abagabe*, II, p. 5; Macallister to Ternan, 20 July 1899, A4/19. There were suggestions on the British side that he might be made chief of Kabula: Macallister to Ternan, 8 May, A4/16; Wilson to Ternan, 24 July 1899, A4/19.

¹⁵⁶ Macallister to Ternan, 19 June 1899, A4/18.

¹⁵⁷ Macallister to Berkeley, 27 Feb. 1899, A4/16.

¹⁵⁸ Macallister to Ternan, 10 July 1899, A4/19.

into a key fissure in the Nkore leadership had therefore not only served to shore up Kahaya's rulership: it marked the first major step in the effective establishment of British authority over the kingdom.

The former, as for many another British official in Macallister's position, was a crucially important aid to the latter. For, by locking the locally traditional ruler into the structuring of British colonial authority, and thereafter upholding his traditionally legitimate authority, they thereby ensured that the indigenous polity under their aegis persisted intact so as to become the locally effective instrument of British colonial control. During the preceding year, the British had been according Kahaya the primacy in their communications with his kingdom. On the day following his first meeting with the Nkore chiefs, Macallister then embarked upon locking the young Omugabe into his embrace even further. He first arranged to see him on his own in order to secure from him an assurance that he would be fully cooperative.¹⁵⁹ And then, whilst noting over the coming weeks that 'being very young [Kahaya] is much in the hands of his chiefs',¹⁶⁰ following Kahitsi's relegation to Nshara he started to press Kahaya, who was living some distance away, to relocate himself closer to the British fort. That was not easily accomplished.¹⁶¹ At one stage, Macallister was fearful indeed that Kahaya might flee across the German border.¹⁶² But in the end, in June 1899, 'against the advice of many of his elders', Kahaya moved 'with a large following' to within a mile or so of the fort, and even reduced his bodyguard there, or so it was said, from 500 to 50 warriors.¹⁶³ Having thus first asserted British hegemony, and then having checked Kahitsi's rebellion, this constituted a further step for Macallister in establishing British colonial authority over the kingdom.¹⁶⁴ Whilst he continued to acknowledge that Kahaya was still 'entirely in the hands of his advisers',¹⁶⁵ he soon became satisfied that he 'appreciates the administration which is responsible for his being in his present position',¹⁶⁶ and moreover concluded that 'the

¹⁵⁹ Macallister to Berkeley, 1 Jan. 1899, A4/15.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ Macallister to Berkeley, 27 Apr. 1899, A4/17.

¹⁶² Macallister to Berkeley, 8 May 1899, A4/16.

¹⁶³ Macallister to Berkeley, 2 June, A4/17; Ternan to Salisbury, 25 June 1899, FOCP 7402/74.

¹⁶⁴ Macallister to Ternan, 19 June 1899, A4/18; *Abagabe*, II, p. 5.

¹⁶⁵ Macallister to Ternan, 10 July 1899, A4/19.

¹⁶⁶ Macallister to Ternan, 10 July 1899, A4/19. So well pleased were the British at this stage with Kahaya that Macallister was permitted to give him a Snyder rifle 'as a very exceptional mark of Government favour' – a present of an order that Langheld had refused to give Ntare: see above, and Ternan to Macallister, 28 June 1899, A5/6.

natives ... are beginning to understand and appreciate our occupation of the district'; 'in fact', he wrote, six months after his arrival, 'I can safely say that confidence is established'.¹⁶⁷ That seemed to be confirmed when Kahaya now provided Macallister with a substantial force to lead against Kintu and his followers in Kabula.¹⁶⁸

However, these were still early days and when, in a fracas with some Nkore villagers, a fellow officer burnt some huts, Ternan, as acting British Commissioner, tartly instructed Macallister that: 'If we cannot hold Ankoli without a row we must come out of it'.¹⁶⁹ As a consequence, Macallister seems to have taken a cautious line during the events which then ensued.¹⁷⁰ For, in moving closer to the fort, Kahaya, it seems, was intent on securing Macallister's acceptance of the opportunity which Kahitsi's greatly weakened position presented to him to crush him altogether. Macallister well understood the grounds for Kahaya's animosity towards Kahitsi, who had persisted in defying him.¹⁷¹ He did not, however, want a 'civil war', and first suggested to his superiors that Kahitsi should be relocated in Buganda.¹⁷² With Kahaya and his supporters becoming however, impatient, in a conciliatory move he eventually ordered Kahitsi to hand over his chieftaincy to 'the King's party' without further ado. Kahitsi, however, held his ground, and with that Kahaya, with Macallister's concurrence but without his direct involvement, launched the full force of his warriors against him. There followed the one actual battle of this succession war, in which a number of notables on both sides were killed, and at the end of which Kahitsi was finally trounced.¹⁷³ Kahitsi himself, as it happened, survived. To begin with, Macallister gave him refuge.¹⁷⁴ He soon, however, accepted Kahaya's decision to exile him to Kazinga in the far northwestern corner of the Nkore dominions.¹⁷⁵ And with that, Kahitsi's salient role in Nkore's affairs came to an end. More importantly, having now routed his opponents in open battle, Kahaya was at long last able to bring his succession conflict to a close.¹⁷⁶

¹⁶⁷ Macallister to Ternan, 19 June 1899, A4/18.

¹⁶⁸ *Abagabe*, II, pp. 5–8.

¹⁶⁹ To which he replied, 'I do not anticipate any hostilities with the Waankoli, but a show of force is necessary at times when dealing with savages': Ternan to Macallister, 3, 6 June, FO 2/676, A5/5, 19 June, A5/6; Macallister to Ternan, 6 June, A5/5, 19 June 1899, A4/18.

¹⁷⁰ *Abagabe*, II, pp. 8–10.

¹⁷¹ Macallister to Ternan, 16, 20 July 1899, A4/19.

¹⁷² See Ternan to Macallister, 2 Aug. 1899, A4/7.

¹⁷³ *Abagabe*, II, pp. 8–9; Macallister to Ternan, 10 Aug. 1899, A4/20.

¹⁷⁴ Macallister to Ternan, 10 Aug. 1899, A4/20.

¹⁷⁵ Macallister to Ternan, 22 Aug. 1899, A4/20.

¹⁷⁶ *Abagabe*, II, p. 9. For a summary account of the Kahitsi story in these years, see *ibid.*, I, pp. 146–7.

The principal beneficiary of this outcome was Igumira, who, as his nephew/son's principal adviser and as chief of Shema, the most populated part of the kingdom, now stood unrivalled as the most powerful figure in the kingdom.¹⁷⁷ As we have seen, Macallister had begun by finding him 'friendly',¹⁷⁸ but by mid 1899 he started to have second thoughts.¹⁷⁹ For, unlike Ntare, Kahitsi and Mbaguta, Igumira had never asked for the establishment of a British fort in the kingdom, and was evidently very unhappy to see one built there. Over the ensuing year, moreover, several developments generated an increasingly disturbing situation.¹⁸⁰

These started in September 1899 when Ternan appointed a senior Baganda to be chief of Kabula,¹⁸¹ despite it long having been recognised (not least by Ternan himself)¹⁸² as Nkore territory. Orders were then given to its Banyankore population to move into the Nkore heartland.¹⁸³ That was then capped by a further order from Ternan that Nkore should pay tribute to Buganda.¹⁸⁴ The Nkore leadership protested strongly that this had never been paid before,¹⁸⁵ and Macallister warned Ternan that: 'The imposition of a tribute following the annexation of Kabula district cannot but have a disturbing effect upon the Waankole who are now in hand.' Ternan's tart reply was 'Stuff',¹⁸⁶ followed by a brusque rejection of Macallister's objections,¹⁸⁷ whereupon, with Macallister's concurrence, Kahaya appealed to the newly arrived Special Commissioner, Sir Harry Johnston, and, all but inevitably in view of his previous record, sent Mbaguta, his principal go-between with the British,¹⁸⁸ to argue in person the Nkore case against a tribute to Buganda.¹⁸⁹

This was of first importance for it brought Mbaguta to the fore once again. On 9 January 1900, he saw Johnston and successfully secured Nkore's release from the payment of tribute to Buganda – only, however, to be told that the Banyankore would now have to pay taxes to the British. Although there would be certain exemptions (payments could be made

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, II, p. 5, describes him as acting as Katikiro.

¹⁷⁸ Macallister to Berkeley, 1 Jan. 1899, A4/15.

¹⁷⁹ Macallister to Ternan, 19 June 1899, A4/18.

¹⁸⁰ E.g. Macallister to Ternan, 16 Oct., A4/22; Macallister to Johnston, 11 Dec. 1899, A4/23, 26 Mar. 1900, A4/27.

¹⁸¹ Ternan to Macallister, Ternan to Wilson, 10 Sept. 1899, A5/7. For further details, see the next chapter.

¹⁸² Ternan to Macallister, 12 Apr. 1899, A5/5.

¹⁸³ Ternan to Wilson, 4 Sept. 1899, A4/7.

¹⁸⁴ Ternan to Macallister, 9 Sept. 1899, A5/7.

¹⁸⁵ Macallister to Johnston, 12 Jan. 1900, A4/25.

¹⁸⁶ Macallister to Ternan, 16 Oct. 1899, A4/22. See also Macallister to Johnston, 30 May 1900, AMC.

¹⁸⁷ Ternan to Macallister, 29 Oct. 1899, A5/8; Macallister to Johnston, 12 Jan. 1900, A4/25.

¹⁸⁸ *Abagabe*, II, pp. 3, 5; on Johnston's visit, see Ch. 10, pp. 305–8 below.

¹⁸⁹ Macallister to Johnston, 11 Dec. 1899, A4/23.

in kind, and chiefs were to retain 10 per cent of their collections), these were now to be levied 'at the rate of 3 Rupees per hut per annum', and the same amount for up to five guns.¹⁹⁰ That, Macallister reported, soon generated 'a strong anti-European feeling by several of the principal chiefs'. And there was then worse to come. For, in April 1900, Johnston told Macallister 'to divide up Ankole into various districts over which you will appoint and recognise the local chiefs, each chief over a district',¹⁹¹ which led Macallister to announce the 'virtual deposition of Kawiya ... [as] principal Chief of Ankole'. That could well have had fateful consequences. Over the next two days, Kahaya's war drum was angrily beaten.¹⁹² Having, however, also been told by Johnston that 'I wish this matter to be arranged in such a way as not to provoke any outbreak of native hostility',¹⁹³ Macallister quickly retraced his steps and reassured Kahaya that his chiefs would be expected to provide for him and his personal following 'as he is their principal chief'.¹⁹⁴ At the same time he sought to court the majority agricultural Bairu community by arranging that they should elect one of their number to be a chief in place of a Bahima. All of which led Macallister to conclude that the Hut Tax would now be paid,¹⁹⁵ and to tell Johnston in May 1900 that 'the natives have accepted our occupation, and being divided among themselves are no longer formidable'.¹⁹⁶ When, however, it was then learnt that, in his negotiations with the Buganda leaders, Johnston had agreed to the final incorporation of Kabula into Buganda,¹⁹⁷ Macallister told him he would 'not be surprised at a general rising of the natives'.¹⁹⁸

That, however, did not occur because, within Nkore itself, these external impositions became fatefully intertwined with a deepening rift between Igumira and a good many senior chiefs on the one hand (with eventually Kahaya at his side) and not just Macallister but Mbaguta on the other. Hitherto, Igumira and Mbaguta had frequently been allied – in supporting

¹⁹⁰ Johnston to Macallister, and to Jackson, 9 Jan. 1900, A5/9. Over the next two months, Johnston issued further instructions about this: Johnston to Macallister, 28 Feb., 26 Mar. 1900, A5/9.

¹⁹¹ Johnston to Macallister, 13 Apr. 1900, A5/9.

¹⁹² Macallister's monthly report, 1 May 1900, A4/28.

¹⁹³ Johnston to Macallister, 13 Apr. 1900, A5/9.

¹⁹⁴ Macallister's Ankole Report for May, 1 June 1900, A4/28. Jackson expressed surprise about Macallister's pronouncement: Jackson to Johnston, 17 June 1900, A15/1. It was clearly a mistake, but it serves to warrant the objections of the Baganda negotiators of the Uganda Agreement of 1900 to the initial impressions which Johnston gave to them, and evidently to Macallister too: that he intended to abolish their kingship; see Ch. 10, pp. 296–8.

¹⁹⁵ Macallister to Johnston, 12 Jan., A4/25, 5 May 1900, A21/1.

¹⁹⁶ Macallister to Johnston, 5 May 1900, A21/1.

¹⁹⁷ See the next chapter, pp. 263–5.

¹⁹⁸ Macallister to Johnston, 30 May 1900, AMC.

Kahaya, in opposing Kahitsi, and in responding to the Kabaka's revolt. Following, however, Kahitsi's downfall the structural divide between the leading member of Nkore's Bahinda royal clan and its one formidable Bashambo new model warband leader sprang apart. While Igumira became the centre of a rumbling opposition to the British, Mbaguta, drawing (it seems) on the experience of his Buganda contemporaries as witnessed once more on his recent visit to Buganda, now determined to cleave closely to them.¹⁹⁹ He symbolised this in the first place by taking Christian instruction,²⁰⁰ and then, in August 1900, by being the only person of any consequence prepared to escort Johnston on the brief visit he made to Mbarara.²⁰¹ Once again Nkore's leadership closed ranks. But the die was cast when Johnston nominated Mbaguta as Kahaya's 'Prime Minister',²⁰² and warned Igumira not to indulge in opposition to the British, or he would face deportation.²⁰³

That very soon brought this whole story to its climax. While, early in September 1900, Igumira paid 100 sheep in Hut Tax, so deep now was the divide between the leading Bahinda royal and the Bashambo Nyanzi (Chief Minister) that, when Igumira then laid claim to parts of the neighbouring rulership of Igara, Mbaguta accused him of lying. Fearing Igumira was 'causing disquietude', 'scheming some other mischief', and ill-advising Kahaya, Racey (who had just replaced Macallister) now summarily deported Igumira, in a precipitous move, as the 'ringleader of the party in opposition to Her Majesty's Government'.²⁰⁴ Kijoma, one of Igumira's closest associates, sought to stir up opposition, but (Racey

¹⁹⁹ *Abagabe*, II, p. 10.

²⁰⁰ From Clayton, the first Anglican missionary to Nkore: CMS Clayton Diary, 24 Apr., 18 Sept. 1900; Racey to Cunningham, [18] Jan. 1901, A15/1.

²⁰¹ See Ch. 10; *Abagabe*, II, pp. 10–11; Johnston to Tucker, 19 Aug. 1900, A22/1.

²⁰² Previously Kijoma was said to have been 'acting Katikiro': *Abagabe*, II, p. 5. For a summary of Mbaguta's career, *ibid.*, pp. 27–8.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, II, p. 11; Racey to Jackson, 28 Sept. 1900, A15/1.

²⁰⁴ Five other chiefs were deported with him: Racey's Ankole Reports 1 Sept., and [end Sept.], Racey to Johnston, 28 Sept. 1900, A15/1; *Abagabe*, II, pp. 13–16. As early as March 1900, Macallister had adumbrated deportation: Macallister to Johnston, 26 Mar. 1900, A4/27. Igumira was first exiled to Kisumu (in what is now Kenya); two of his wives, some servants and some cattle were sent to him: Johnston to Hobley, 24 Oct. 1900, A19/1. On his visit to Baganda in April 1901, Kahaya evidently asked Johnston if Igumira could return to Ankole. Johnston arranged that he should be brought back as far as Entebbe, but it was not until the next Commissioner, Sadler, had lectured him in Kahaya's presence against causing 'any trouble' that he was allowed to return to Ankole. Following the murder in Ankole, in May 1905, of acting Sub-Commissioner Galt (which was largely unresolved at the time), Igumira (whom Wilson believed to be implicated) was once again deported and died in poverty in Buganda in 1925: Racey's Ankole Report, 30 Mar., A15/1; Johnston to Collector, Kisumu, 17 Apr., A19/1; Partington to Jackson, 18 May 1901, A18/1; Sadler to Bagge, 17 Sept. 1903, A13/1; *Mengo Notes* (Nov. 1903); H. F. Morris, 'The Murder of H. St. G. Galt', *Uj*, 24 (1960), pp. 1–15; Morris, *Ankole*, pp. 42–3;

reported) not only was he ‘overruled by the majority of chiefs friendly to the government’, but, after a clash with some of Racey’s troops, soon fled across the German border.²⁰⁵ Otherwise there was no overt resistance.²⁰⁶

Instead, in the course of three successive ‘barazas’,²⁰⁷ on 29 October, 21 November and 18 December 1900, at which, along with Kahaya and Mbaguta, there was a full turn out of Nkore’s senior chiefs, Racey instituted a new compact. At the first, after defending his decision to deport Igumira, he distributed Igumira’s cattle, principally to Kahaya but in smaller amounts to Mbaguta and others, and then added Igumira’s chieftaincy of Shema to those Mbaguta already held.²⁰⁸ At the second, having enjoined the Nkore chiefs to ‘devote their interest to the establishment of good government’²⁰⁹ and support Kahaya, there were, so he reported: ‘Some very good speeches . . . and much good feeling evinced’;²¹⁰ while, at the third, having carved Nkore up into just seven ‘Amasadza’ (counties), he appointed a ‘Sazar’ chief to each of them.²¹¹

That brought Nkore’s ‘defining vortex’ to its conclusion. For not only was Kahaya now firmly separated from Igumira, and, with Kahitsi’s defeat, fully confirmed in his rulership, Johnston was soon telling Racey that: ‘the best plan would be to support as far as is reasonable the central authority of Kawiya and let him and his subordinate chiefs do as much as possible in the direct collection of taxes’.²¹² As a consequence, Mbaguta – a Mushambo, emissary of two successive rulers, leader of the Abangonya, and scourge (as Nkuranga’s murderer and Kahaya’s boldest kingmaker) of the Bahinda – now stood forth as the principal victor from the five-year-long power struggle that had stemmed from ‘the war of Igumira’s eye’. His office of Nganzi, moreover, now ranked with that of Buganda’s Katikiro,²¹³ which not only put him on a par with

J. Willis, ‘Killing Bwana: Peasant Revenge and Political Panic in Early Colonial Ankole’, *JAH*, 35 (1994), pp. 379–400.

²⁰⁵ Racey to Johnston, 14, 16 Nov., Johnston to Racey, 1, 20 Dec., Racey’s Ankole Report, 13 Sept. 1900, A15/1; *Abagabe*, II, p. 17. Johnston was critical of Racey for letting this happen: Johnston to Racey, 1, 20 Dec. 1900, A15/1.

²⁰⁶ Racey to Johnston, 2 Oct. 1900, A15/1. Kahaya, however, later warned Racey that he was being accused of witchcraft and that there was some danger to his life: Racey’s Ankole Report, 31 Jan. 1901, A15/1.

²⁰⁷ Councils of chiefs with a British Officer, or a ruler’s council of chiefs.

²⁰⁸ Racey to Johnston, 2 Oct. 1900, A15/1.

²⁰⁹ A euphemism, of course, for supporting the colonial government.

²¹⁰ Racey’s Ankole Report for Nov., 1 Dec. 1900, A15/1.

²¹¹ The terms were essentially taken from those in Buganda: Racey’s Ankole Report, 31 Dec. 1900, A15/1.

²¹² Johnston to Racey, 20 Dec. 1900, A15/1.

²¹³ In Nkore, the ‘Nganzi’ was previously no more than the ruler’s favorite: Karugire, *Nkore*, pp. 110–11.

those other former new model warband leaders already holding sway in Buganda and Bunyoro, but constituted the Nkore version of their oligarchical revolution. This was more particularly demonstrated by the severe reduction which now occurred in the number of Nkore chieftaincies, and the consequential breaking of the hold which members of the royal Bahinda clan had previously had upon them, to the very evident benefit of the Bashambo Nganzi.²¹⁴

All of this served to consolidate British colonial authority over the kingdom. Several times during the previous two years that might have been openly challenged, but, as each occasion passed without any open breach occurring, British authority became further entrenched. All of which, moreover, was accomplished without a shot being fired. That principally turned, of course, on a pervasive sense of the greater coercive power of the British. Yet there were other considerations as well. The fact that, while the British persisted with the excision of Kabula and the imposition of a Hut tax,²¹⁵ they relented on both the tribute to Buganda and Kahaya's deposition confirmed Ntare's lesson that if one was adroit one could hold much of one's own with them.²¹⁶ While upon two critical occasions when British officers took decisive action, first against Kahitsi and then against Igumira, they did so successfully by exploiting the cleavages in the leadership of the kingdom which followed upon the distinctive features of its 1890s succession war. By trouncing one of the parties to an internal divide, they enchained the submission of the other. In Igumira's case that took a typically Confrontation I form. For, by championing Mbaguta, Nkore's new model Bashambo warband leader, against Igumira, its leading Bahinda royal and principal over-mighty subject, the British effectively entrenched their hold upon the kingdom.

The upshot of this whole elongated saga can therefore be simply told. Kahaya and Mbaguta emerged triumphant, but at the cost of Nkore's firm subordination to British colonial authority. Early in 1901 Racey put the position starkly:

it has been with the greatest difficulty that various chiefs of importance have been dealt with in order to bring about an acknowledgement of the superiority of Her Majesty's Government, this having been accomplished, it remains to gradually mould the whole into a coherent mass amenable to British rule.²¹⁷

²¹⁴ See the exemplary analysis in Steinberg, *Conflict and Collaboration*, pp. 199–204.

²¹⁵ Macallister to Johnston, 30 May, AMC; Macallister's Ankole Report, 30 June 1900, A4/29.

²¹⁶ In these instances by appealing to Johnston over Ternan's head on the tribute, and by muffling Kahaya's war drum as soon as his 'deposition' was effectively rescinded.

²¹⁷ Racey to Cunningham, [18] Jan. 1901, A15/1. These matters remain to be considered in the next two chapters.

9 Dénouement: aggregations and rulerships

By the late 1890s there were many indications that the British had fastened their colonial hegemony on the great majority of the northern lakes kingdoms. As earlier chapters have variously emphasised, that to a large degree had been accomplished because they commanded far greater coercive power than any who sought to resist them. Under the aegis of a relatively tiny succession of British military officers, they were able to bring to the region sufficient externally recruited mercenary troops to comprise the core of the often much larger local forces available to them. Their formidable armoury of rifles and Maxim and Hotchkiss guns was much more lethal than any held by those who might be minded to confront them. The professional military training of their officers and the discipline they imposed upon their soldiery were similarly unmatched, while the array of forts they built at key points across the countryside not only testified to their determination to impose their dominion upon the region, but provided them with secure footholds from which it proved all but impossible to dislodge them. All of which made them the most formidable power in the region. In the event, actual military force, which could be brutally lethal when it was used, was not invariably employed. The threat that it might be, however, served to deter a great many who might otherwise have sought to withstand them.

At the same time, as we have also seen, the first generation of British officers proved to be remarkably adept at exploiting the range of internal political developments in the rulerships they encountered so as to secure their own predominance over them. At this stage, it will suffice to summarise the procedures which applied in the five major instances that saw the establishment of British colonial rule over what, by the later 1890s, was becoming 'Uganda'. In the key kingdom of Buganda, British dominion was principally secured through the manipulation, by successive British officers, of the rifts in its indigenous leadership which a progression through what has here been called a Confrontation III had opened up, and, in association with substantial elements in that leadership, their suppression of a major revolt against them under the auspices

of its ruler, Kabaka Mwanga. In Toro to the west, British dominion ensued upon the installation at their hands of a formerly exiled claimant to its throne, along with the defeat by combined British/Baganda forces of Bunyoro's previously formidable Abarasura, who had long sought to reconquer it. To the east, in Busoga, the creation of British colonial rule turned on the supersession of the paramountcy previously exercised by Buganda over many of its rulers – an outcome that was underpinned by the curbs the British successfully imposed upon the predatory raids the Baganda had hitherto inflicted upon Busoga. It was only in Bunyoro to the north that, in establishing their dominion, the British chiefly employed protracted military force. Even here, however, a good deal turned in the end upon exploiting the eventual desertion to the British side of some of Bunyoro's most prominent military leaders, in what is here called a Confrontation-II-type revolt against their ruler.¹ Meanwhile, to the south in Nkore (as we have just seen), British dominion was successfully established, in the midst of their suppression of Mwanga's revolt, through some deft interventions in the final stages of a leadership contest that followed upon an unusually complex succession crisis there.

The full extent to which the forces the British brought to the region had succeeded, by the end of the 1890s, in fastening their hegemony upon these and so many of the smaller rulerships in the region nevertheless requires a closer look. For these conclusions by no means occurred readily. Throughout the later 1890s, the British (as we have seen at some length) not only found themselves engrossed in a triple-headed conflict with Kabalega and his followers, Mwanga and his, and the Sudanese mutineers; from the very beginning, they found themselves caught up in a series of seemingly intractable problems as they strove to weld together the principal polities in the region into what would for them be rather more manageable wholes. Over a protracted four-year period (1892–6) leading British figures – Lugard, Williams, Portal, Macdonald, Colville, Wilson – were regularly engaged in striving to reaggregate the Buganda polity which had been so bitterly riven by the religio-political civil wars that had first erupted in 1888. In Toro, they and their successors found themselves repeatedly faced by keen resentments against their determination to impose an overriding Toro rulership upon a miscellany of the original Toro's neighbours, who had never been subject to it before; while in Busoga, successive British officers, Grant in particular, confronted a multiplicity of Busoga rulers with which to engage, in their efforts to bring them under their control. In several respects, moreover,

¹ See Ch. 7, pp. 192–3.

the fragility of their achievements came to be starkly revealed. In 1897 Mwanga's revolt plunged Buganda back into major civil conflict once again, despite the efforts of a succession of British officers to bring this to an end. More than once it seemed likely in Toro that the newly enlarged kingdom would be aborted by its British-imposed ruler himself, while the transit of Sudanese mutineers through Busoga in 1898 emasculated the dominance Grant had constructed there, and, as we shall see, forced him into one further spurt of activity before he could lock its many individual rulers into the paramountcy he had been striving to construct.

Other parts of the historical record nevertheless provide emphatic testimony to the depth and extent to which, notwithstanding these vicissitudes and setbacks, British hegemony had come to be fastened by the turn of the century not only upon each of the major kingdoms in the region but upon almost all of the smaller ones as well. For, simultaneously with these more equivocal pointers to the progress the British were making in imposing their authority, the record shows that during the 1890s they carried through an extraordinary series of major changes in the territorial and structural circumstances of practically every one of these kingdoms. Not only were a great many of their former configurations extensively rejigged, in all but one instance² they found themselves impressed as never before into a precisely demarcated, and in almost every respect extensively novel, grid of territorial boundaries, in which the principal feature was their often quite arbitrary aggregation into just five entities – Buganda, Busoga, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole. Originally, the changes which occurred were in no way driven by any concerted policy. For much of the time, the whole process consisted of no more than the sum of a number of quite distinct responses to varying local circumstances. It was only in the last stages that they came to be deliberately directed to the fabrication of the territorial matrix within which colonial rule would be exercised in Uganda. As it happened, by contrast with the demarcation of Uganda's key international boundaries (which saw no local participation), there was a good deal of varying indigenous involvement in these changes. Occasionally, moreover, there were pockets of resistance. But not only were these invariably overborne; the changes which occurred were principally effected at the instance of the British alone. They accordingly provide an arresting commentary upon the commanding hegemony the British had established over the Uganda kingdoms by the turn of the century, while at the same time specifying the recastings of the political/territorial map of the region

² Rujumbura, west of Nkore, seems the sole exception; see below.

which were such a major feature of the events of the 1890s. In view of the very considerable transformations this whole process entailed, the details warrant recounting.

In setting the context some counter-factuals are worth pondering, since there was no *a-priori* reason why the outcome should have taken the form that it did. For example, the British might well have incorporated most of the Busoga kingdoms into Buganda, to which many of them had been subject in the past, in the way that, as we shall see, they amalgamated Koki and the Buvuma Islands with it. In other circumstances they might have upheld Bunyoro's pre-1895 borders, and even supported Kabalega in his campaign to restore his predecessors' larger kingdom by reincorporating Toro and its smaller neighbours into it. Equally, they might have maintained the pre-1899 borders of Nkore, which, prior to the changes they made, stood further to the east than they were to do under British rule, while at the same time adding to it not only the adjacent kingdoms to the west, which they did incorporate into it, but the Rujumbura rulership and further areas beyond, which they eventually bound together in the separate (non-kingdom) district of Kigezi.³ Had events taken these courses, the numerous northern lacustrine kingdoms would have been reduced to three relatively large ones of a broadly equal size: Buganda, Bunyoro and Ankole. As we shall see, several other alternatives were actively canvassed. As it was, for a series of often quite fortuitous reasons, they all came, however, to be reduced in the 1890s to one large kingdom, Buganda, and three smaller ones, Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, and one 'kingdom area', Busoga. The incremental fabrication of that outcome forged the bedrock for the colonial settlements which then ensued.

The details may now be set out. Prior to 1890, Bunyoro had dominated all of the area to the north and part of the west of Buganda, and Buganda, thanks to its powerful canoe fleet, had exercised a good deal of dominance over several of the smaller rulerships around the western, southwestern and even southern shores of Lake Victoria, while at the same time exercising considerable authority over many of the Busoga kingdoms to its east. All this, however, was comprehensively changed by the British advent.

In the first place, as we have seen, an 'international' boundary was drawn by the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 between the German and the British spheres, to run along the 1 degree south line across the middle of Lake Victoria and then variously to the west (see [Map 6](#)).

³ E.g. *Abagabe*, II, pp. 19–20.

Along with the establishment of a German station at Bukoba on the western shore of the lake, that soon put paid to Buganda's previous ascendancy over the kingdoms to the south.⁴ That does not appear to have caused much concern in Buganda. Hitherto, its ascendancy there had primarily been of importance in securing its main trade route to the southeast to the Zanzibari coast. But with the opening by the British of a new route through what was to become Kenya, before very long this southern route lost its importance.

That, however, was not the only direction in which Buganda lost its preeminence. As we have also seen, by the so-called Uganda–Usoga Agreement of 1895, which the British imposed upon the Baganda, they were forced to relinquish the dominion they had previously exercised over many of the kingdoms to their east. In melding these into the quite separate aggregation of 'Busoga', the British added a quite new component to the principal political entities in the region: not a single kingdom; but a prime constituent of the new colonial order. In two directions therefore – to the southwest and far south, and to the east – Buganda was deprived by the British of exercising the hegemony it had previously enjoyed there.

It was soon, however, to be abundantly recompensed elsewhere. The small kingdom of Koki, which stood just within the Anglo-German border, to the southwest of Buganda, had a similar social structure to Nkore and its southern and western neighbours. In the past it had lain within the larger ambience of Bunyoro, but as, by the nineteenth century, Bunyoro power receded northwards, it not only became subject to raids by Buganda, but found itself both having to pay tribute to Buganda, much as the Busoga rulerships were doing, and coming close to being incorporated into it.⁵

From the late 1880s Koki accordingly found itself inextricably enmeshed in the civil wars which erupted in Buganda.⁶ To begin with, its ruler, Ndawula the Kamuswaga,⁷ joined hands with the Baganda Christians against the Muslims, and at one stage was appointed to command the Christian army.⁸ In 1890–1, when the Baganda

⁴ E.g. Langheld to Colvile, 27 Jan. 1894, FO 2/71.

⁵ For summary accounts of this earlier story, see E. C. Lanning, 'Notes on the History of Koki', *UJ*, 23, 2 (1959), pp. 162–72, and Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, pp. 1–4.

⁶ *LD* II, pp. 401, 403; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 153; Zimbe, *Kabaka*, p. 204; Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, p. 50.

⁷ The British records call him (under various spellings) 'Kamuswaga', the name by which he was known before his accession, and which he chose as his title when he became a Saza chief of Buganda. It seems simplest to refer to him as Kamuswaga throughout: Lanning, 'Koki', p. 167.

⁸ Wright, *Heroic Age*, pp. 80–101; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', Ch. 32; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, Ch. 24.

Protestants dominated the neighbouring areas of Buganda, he was granted some additional territory in return for his aid.⁹ Early in 1892, he more precisely supported the Catholics against the Protestants.¹⁰ But, having previously slighted Lugard on his journey to the west by beating his war drum against him, he was quick, in the aftermath of the Battle of Mengo, to readjust his position and submit himself to Lugard and thus to the Protestants instead.¹¹ In response, the Catholics (who now replaced the Protestants in Buganda's neighbouring county of Buddu) not only demanded the return of the lands which had lately been granted to him, they denounced him both for a series of frontier depredations, and for concocting an alliance of disaffected exiles, and proceeded to mobilise a force to overrun his kingdom.¹²

Lugard made it plain that he looked upon Koki as a tributary state under the Catholic leadership in Buddu.¹³ Nevertheless, he sternly forbade the Catholics from invading it.¹⁴ Recognising, however, that there were issues to be resolved there, he arranged that Mwanga should despatch envoys to investigate the situation on the spot and, in particular, delimit the Koki–Buddu frontier.¹⁵ Upon their return, moreover, he ordered that, in retribution for Kamuswaga's earlier intransigence and with a view to placating the Catholics,¹⁶ he should return the territory lately granted to him.¹⁷

That, however, did nothing to calm the scene. For there was soon controversy both over whether the transfer had actually been made, and over the precise area involved.¹⁸ Although the Catholics held back from attacking Koki, Kamuswaga's relations with them progressively deteriorated.¹⁹ Amid the tangled politics of the time, that led the Protestant leadership to come to his aid by, among other things, accusing the Catholics of planning to replace him by one of his brothers, whom the Catholics believed would be more amenable to their wishes.²⁰ By mid 1893 this whole situation became even more fraught as a consequence of

⁹ LD III, pp. 196, 209; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 302.

¹⁰ LD III, pp. 42, 49, 53–4.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 88, 90–1, 120–1, 134, 146, 196–7.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 146, 193, 196–7, 210, 217–18.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 142, 146; see also p. 199 where he acknowledged that it was 'semi-independent of Uganda'.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 142, 199, 209, 275.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 146, 159, 193, 195, 210.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 197, 198, 209, 275.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 197, 209, 275; Lugard to Father Cretz (?), 29 Apr. 1892, A1/1.

¹⁸ LD III, pp. 264, 273; Williams' Memo, 30 Mar. 1893, A2/1.

¹⁹ LD III, pp. 210, 273.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

the large influx of Muslim refugees into Koki under the energetic Muslim leader, Kahusi, following the Muslim revolt in Buganda.²¹ Macdonald thereupon despatched a small expedition under Lieutenant Villiers to Koki to expel the Muslims from it, while at the same time taking the opportunity to impress upon Kamuswaga that, in British eyes, he was still a dependent of the Catholic Pokino of Buddu.²²

Ostensibly, Kamuswaga bowed to this pressure.²³ Early in 1894, however, the Catholics accused him of not according the Pokino the paramountcy that was due to him, and for good measure not only denounced Colvile, Macdonald's successor, for displaying anti-Catholic animus in being overly indulgent towards him, but supported an accusation by two of Kamuswaga's brothers against him, for the murder of three of his other brothers.²⁴ Seemingly, Kamuswaga pleaded guilty to this charge, but as no evidence was adduced Colvile dismissed it.²⁵ Thereafter, however, controversy became endemic, with disputes erupting both over the payment of Koki's tribute through the Pokino to Buganda (which the British thought to be unduly onerous),²⁶ and over the spread of Catholic missionaries into the kingdom.²⁷ On both these issues, when challenged by Colvile,²⁸ Kamuswaga resolutely protested his innocence.²⁹

In the end, in August 1895, Wilson in Kampala decided that this running sore must be staunched, and thereupon proceeded to induce Mwanga and the Catholic Katikiro, Mugwanya, to endorse a petition from Kamuswaga to the British asking that his kingdom should cease to be subject to the Pokino of Buddu and should become instead an integral county of Buganda, delivering its tribute to the Kabaka

²¹ Arthur to Macdonald, 1 July 1893, A2/1.

²² Macdonald to Villiers, Macdonald to Reddie, 14 Aug., Macdonald to Kagwa, 21 Aug., Macdonald to Villiers, 22 Aug., A3/1; Villiers to Macdonald, 30 Aug., Reddie to Villiers, 22, 23 Sept., A2/1; Macdonald's Note, 6 Sept., ESA Interviews Book; Macdonald to [Portal], 21 Oct. 1893, A31/1; Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying*, pp. 289–92. In the course of this expedition, Villiers clashed with his civilian associate, Reddie: A2/1, A3/1, A32/1, A32/2, *passim*.

²³ Macdonald to Villiers, 22 Aug., A3/1; Villiers to Macdonald, 27 Aug. 1893, A2/1. Later in the year, Kamuswaga sent Macdonald a present of cowrie shells, which prompted him to note 'All well in Koki': 22 Nov. 1893, ESA Interviews Book.

²⁴ Gibb to Colvile, 27 Mar. 1894, and [late Mar. 1894], ESA Interviews Book; Mugwanya, etc., to Colvile, Colvile to [Gibb], n.d. (but evidently about this time), A2/1.

²⁵ Case no. 39, 18 June 1894, A3/1.

²⁶ Anson to Colvile, 26 Sept. (2), 7 Nov., 30 Nov. 1894, A2/3; Jackson to Wilson, 2 Jan., A5/1; Wilson to Jackson, 5 Jan. 1895, A4/1.

²⁷ Gaudibert to Colvile, 11 Nov., Colvile to Gaudibert, 22 Nov. 1894, A2/3. By late 1894, Kamuswaga was seeking to become a Protestant: BD, July–Dec., Walker to Tucker, 27 Oct., to Baylis, 28 Oct. 1894, CMS A5/011; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 175.

²⁸ Colvile to Kamuswaga, 12 Dec. 1894, A2/3.

²⁹ Kamuswaga to Colvile, 29 Dec. 1894, A2/3.

direct.³⁰ Since the British Protectorate was still formally confined to Buganda, Commissioner Berkeley referred the matter to the Foreign Office for a decision, and in so doing gave vent to a much larger proposition. Were, he wrote, Toro and Nkore to 'follow the example of Koki' and likewise be incorporated into Buganda, 'our treaty with the latter would at once give us all desirable powers, and the central native government, which is under our immediate superintendence and guidance, would work with us in a common aim'.³¹

Whilst he allowed that both kingdoms 'remained practically independent' and had never paid regular tribute to Buganda, he nevertheless declared that they recognised 'the power' of Buganda and thus its 'nominal suzerainty'. He acknowledged that this suggestion was greatly at odds with his recent decision to sever all Buganda's links with Busoga, but the Baganda, he argued, 'have always looked down' upon the Basoga, whereas 'the incorporation of any one of these three countries into [Buganda] would be a fusion under one rule of communities on a footing of practical equality'.³²

As we shall see, this was not the last time that such a suggestion was advanced, which would have radically altered the political structure of Britain's emerging Uganda Protectorate. While awaiting London's reply, Berkeley, moreover, developed the idea a step further by raising with Ternan whether Bunyoro might not be incorporated into Buganda too;³³ his idea being that 'the rulers of these districts should of their own free will and initiation . . . ask that their country should be incorporated in [Buganda] itself under the general sovereignty of King Mwanga, they themselves to remain in charge of their countries as first-class 'sazas' or territorial magnates and Governor'.³⁴

On this first occasion, his proposal won the support of Anderson in the Foreign Office. Like Berkeley, he thought: 'It would be a question whether it should also include [Bunyoro]'. Lord Salisbury, however, was not prepared to go that far, and noted that Berkeley had only asked 'for authority to conclude treaties with Koki &c. This', he said, 'should be the first step'.³⁵

³⁰ Kamuswaga to Berkeley, 1 Aug., A4/1; Wilson to Jackson, 1 Aug. 1895, A4/2; Wilson to Lugard, 8 Aug. 1895, LP s. 45.

³¹ See also Berkeley to Ternan, 15 Sept. 1896, A5/2.

³² Berkeley to Salisbury, 18 Dec. 1895, FO 2/95.

³³ Where, shortly afterwards, both Rwabudongo and Kikukule were asking to transfer to Buganda: Wilson to Berkeley, 22 Oct. 1896, A5/2.

³⁴ Berkeley to Ternan, 15 Sept. 1896, A5/2.

³⁵ Anderson's minute on Berkeley to Salisbury, 18 Dec. 1895, 26 Mar. [1896], and Salisbury's note, n.d., FO 2/95.

Thereupon Anderson authorised Berkeley to negotiate with the rulers of Koki, Nkore and Toro, 'if they are so disposed', for their incorporation into Buganda.³⁶ Berkeley was in no position for the time being to move on Nkore, whilst Toro was currently experiencing turmoil.³⁷ But on receiving Salisbury's decision and after commending Kamuswaga for his recent arrest of some slave traders,³⁸ he told him that he proposed to promulgate Koki's incorporation into Buganda at a formal ceremony to be held in Kampala, which he would expect him to attend.³⁹ Kamuswaga readily agreed to do so,⁴⁰ whereupon, on 18 November 1896, the Koki Agreement was signed,⁴¹ by which it became a fully constituent Saza of Buganda with, uniquely for Buganda, Kamuswaga as its hereditary chief.⁴²

On the very same day, a very much larger and altogether more portentous extension of Buganda was finalised as well. Back in 1893, following his assumption of command from Macdonald, Colville had faced ongoing rifts between the Catholic and Protestant Baganda over the territorial allocations made to them, despite their recent extension at Macdonald's hands following the crushing of the Muslim revolt. Colville, however, was gratified by the support the Baganda gave to him during his ensuing campaign against Bunyoro, and thereupon decided that they should be rewarded for their efforts by an extension of 'Uganda to the Kafu' river, in the hope, moreover, that their 'settling down in their new territory will keep them good and happy for a few months to come'.⁴³ His Interviews Book for 9 April 1894 accordingly recorded that: 'Colonel Colville and Captain Gibb attended a baraza at the King's palace. Division of territory up to the Kafu [river] was decided on as follows. Kakunguru to be chief of Namionjua Country, between Namionjua and

³⁶ Anderson to Berkeley, 13 Apr. 1896, BRA (also FOCP 6849/30). The BRA copy shows that Berkeley had a secret meeting with Mwanga and the two Katikiros on this on 22 Aug. 1896.

³⁷ Sitwell to Berkeley, 30 June, 10 Aug. 1896, A4/5.

³⁸ Kamuswaga to Berkeley, 2 June, A6/2; Wilson to Berkeley, 18 Aug., A4/5; Berkeley to Kamuswaga, 30 Aug. 1896, A7/2.

³⁹ Berkeley to Kamuswaga, 30 Aug., 24 Sept. 1896, A7/2. See also Wilson to Macdonald, 3 Jan. 1898, A7/4.

⁴⁰ Kamuswaga to Berkeley, 8 Sept., 14 Oct. 1896, A6/2.

⁴¹ For the full text (seen in the Office of the Protectorate Agent, Masaka), see Lanning, 'Koki', pp. 171–2; Berkeley to Salisbury, 19 Nov. 1896, FO 2/113.

⁴² The Agreement had been translated into Luganda by Archdeacon Walker, but after the signing Kamuswaga was dismayed to discover that his country was to be made 'a mere province' of Buganda: Walker to LGW, 15 Nov., to IW, 24 Nov. 1896, WP. See also Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 111–12. However, his distinctive status was recognised by being the only Saza chief who could not be bypassed by the Kabaka's personal messengers: Wilson to Bagge, 23 Mar. 1899, BRA.

⁴³ Colville to Gedge, 11 July 1894, GP.

Kitumbi River to Unjuru to Protestants, between Katumbi and Msesi River to Catholics: the Kafu forms the northern boundary in each case.⁴⁴ Four months later, he endorsed this undertaking when, in announcing, on 27 August 1894, the confirmation of the imperial Protectorate over Buganda, he told its leaders that 'as a gesture of special appreciation' by the British, all of Kabalega's territory 'abutting upon the western frontier of Buganda' would now be ceded to it.⁴⁵ But he then found himself in no position to confirm these undertakings since he soon received specific orders from Kimberley, the British Foreign Secretary in London, 'to confine his military . . . occupations . . . in [Bunyoro] to such measures as are indispensable to secure the defence of [Buganda]; and that any temporary and partial occupation of [Bunyoro] must be for purely defensive purposes'.⁴⁶

That left some very loose ends, particularly since he did nothing to invite his superiors to endorse his arrangements, nor left his successors any record of his intent.

The Baganda, however, proceeded to give them effect,⁴⁷ and, in March 1895, they were endorsed at a 'baraza' held by Ternan in Kampala, attended by Mwanga and his chiefs, at which it was 'decided to permanently occupy Mrooli and . . . : also to place a number of Waganda settlers there & in the country – thereby extending the Uganda frontier some 50 miles northwards'.⁴⁸

To this was added the explanation: 'The idea being to drive Kabrega so far north as to prevent his getting much following permanently, as he will be practically out of his own country.'⁴⁹ It was not, however, until four months after Berkeley had assumed charge as Commissioner that, in December 1895, Mwanga and his chiefs first raised the issue with him.⁵⁰ Berkeley proceeded to secure details about the posts which various Baganda were by now holding in southern Bunyoro / northern Buganda,⁵¹ but, since he was aware of Kimberley's orders to Colville forbidding any permanent occupation of Bunyoro, he assumed Colville had 'allowed the question to drop', and now did so himself.

⁴⁴ ESA Interviews Book, 9 Apr. 1894; Gibb to Colville, n.d., A2/2.

⁴⁵ In reporting the day's events, Colville, however, made no mention of this transfer of territory: Colville to Hardinge, 28 Aug. 1894, FO 2/72. See also Walker to BWW, 13 Sept. 1894, WP; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 73–4; Anson to Colville, 19 Oct. 1894, A2/3.

⁴⁶ Kimberley to Hardinge, 9 June, FO 107/1; Hardinge to Colville, 10 June 1894, A31/2.

⁴⁷ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 176; Anson to Colville, 31 Aug. 1894, A2/2.

⁴⁸ Cf. Colville's creation of the Toro Confederacy, Ch. 6.

⁴⁹ TD I, 18 Mar.; Ternan to Jackson, 21 July 1895, A4/2.

⁵⁰ Berkeley to Salisbury, 14 May 1896, FO 2/112.

⁵¹ Wilson to Berkeley, 23 Jan. 1896, A5/2.

Early in 1896, however, it was sharply revived as a consequence of Berkeley's approval of the appointment of the Bunyoro exile, Rwabadongo (following his departure from Toro), as 'paramount chief' of the northern section of southwestern Bunyoro, between the Muzizi and Nkusi rivers,⁵² while the southern section in the borderlands of Toro south of the Muzizi was held by the Buganda Catholic chief Lwekula,⁵³ for, led by the White Fathers, the Catholics claimed that Colville had granted the whole of this southwestern area to them in compensation for his grant of Bunyoro territory further east to the Protestants.⁵⁴ Berkeley now apprised himself fully of Colville's purported grants, but concluded that he could not endorse them without referring the issue to his superiors in London.⁵⁵ Early in May 1896, however, the Catholic Bishop, Mgr Guillermain, called upon him and protested vigorously that, while the Administration was encouraging the Protestants to occupy 'their portion' of the territory Colville had allocated to them,⁵⁶ the Catholics who had moved to the area 'were to be evicted from theirs in favour of a pagan chief'. Berkeley was moved by Guillermain's protests. He did not want to upset the Baganda Catholics who had already migrated to the area, nor cause any further jealousy between them and the Protestants. He was anxious, moreover, to maintain the Protestant garrisons along the eastern frontier against incursions by Kabalega and his forces, and he comforted himself by saying that the Banyoro – who overwhelmingly comprised the population in the areas concerned – 'to the best of my belief [were] indifferent in the whole question'. In the end, therefore, he decided to recommend to Lord Salisbury that Colville's allocations be formally confirmed.⁵⁷

That led to a vigorous intervention by Pulteney, the British officer in charge of Bunyoro, who protested that the area to the north of the Muzizi had in no way been conquered at the time Colville made his pronouncement, and that it was 'preposterous' that any further allocations of territory should be made to religious parties. Some Banyoro chiefs, he declared, were now well settled in the area, 'their submission having been accepted with no such proviso': 'If you decide', he then

⁵² And away to the Budongo forest in the north, as in Ch. 7. For the incremental shifts in his location, see Wilson to Jackson, 3 Aug. 1895, A4/2; Ashburnham to Berkeley, 4 Apr., 1 July, Berkeley to Forster, 29 Aug. 1896, A5/2.

⁵³ Pulteney to Berkeley, 29 Feb., 23 Mar., A4/4; 13 May, A4/5; Berkeley to Pulteney, 6 Apr., Berkeley to Wilson, 6 Apr., A5/2; Berkeley to Forster, 27 Aug. 1896, A5/2.

⁵⁴ Ashburnham to Berkeley, 1 Mar. 1896, A4/4.

⁵⁵ Berkeley to Wilson, 6 Apr., 6 May, Berkeley to Forster, 27 Aug., A5/2; Wilson to Berkeley, 12 Apr. 1896, A4/5.

⁵⁶ As they had done, e.g. Walker to BWW, 1 July 1895, 9 Feb. 1896, WP.

⁵⁷ Berkeley to Salisbury, 14 May 1896, FO 2/112.

told Berkeley, 'that S. Unyoro is to be handed over to the Roman Catholics . . . I regret to be obliged . . . to request you to accept my entire resignation of all civil administration in Unyoro'.⁵⁸

Berkeley, however, was not to be deflected from his course.⁵⁹ On 30 June 1896, the Foreign Office formally extended the British Protectorate to cover Bunyoro and other outlying parts of the British sphere,⁶⁰ and then told Berkeley that, whilst they had no record of Colvile's arrangement at the time, they had 'no wish to disturb it'.⁶¹ Thereupon, at the baraza in Kampala on 18 November 1896 at which the Koki Agreement was signed,⁶² Berkeley formally proclaimed the transfer to Buganda of Bunyoro territory,⁶³ whereby 'Mruli'⁶⁴ passed to the control of the Baganda Protestants, to comprise the new Saza of Buruli, together with northwards extensions of the Sazas of Singo and Bugerere, while 'S. Unyoro' fell to the Baganda Catholics, to become the new Buganda Sazas of Buyaga and Bugangadzi. The only concessions Berkeley made to Pulteney were to relieve him of responsibility for southern Bunyoro (which was passed to Forster in Nyakabimba);⁶⁵ to declare that the areas newly annexed from Bunyoro were not to be thought of as conquered territories; and then to affirm that its people and their chiefs were henceforth to be 'entitled to all the public and private rights of Waganda in any other part of the kingdom'.⁶⁶

All of this constituted a major addition to Buganda, and a traumatic excision from Bunyoro.⁶⁷ Whatever, moreover, Berkeley may have hoped, it placed the Baganda leadership in a position of substantial dominance over the Banyoro population in the transferred territories, and in due course generated an unrelenting campaign by the Banyoro, to the very end of British rule in Uganda, for the return to their kingdom of its 'Lost Counties'.⁶⁸

⁵⁸ Pulteney to Berkeley, 19 May, 21 June 1896, A4/5.

⁵⁹ Berkeley to Pulteney, 30 May 1896, A5/2.

⁶⁰ *London Gazette*, 3 July 1896.

⁶¹ Bertie to Berkeley, 8 Aug. 1896, FOCP 6861/112.

⁶² The conjunction was duly noted in the ND 1895–8, 19 Nov. 1896.

⁶³ Berkeley to Forster, 19 Nov., A5/2; Berkeley's circular, 19 Nov. 1896, BRA; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 112.

⁶⁴ I.e. Buruli, or Namiongo as it was otherwise called.

⁶⁵ Berkeley to Pulteney, 30 May 1896, A5/2. Forster also became outraged at the superimposition of the Catholic Baganda over the Banyoro: Berkeley to Forster, 27 Aug., Forster to Berkeley, 29 Sept. 1896, A4/5.

⁶⁶ Berkeley to Forster, 17 Aug., 19 Nov., A5/2; Walker to WCW, 18 Sept. 1896, WP; see also Ternan to Sub-Commissioner, Bunyoro, 27 May 1899, A5/5.

⁶⁷ On this whole story, see, especially, A. D. Roberts, 'The Lost Counties of Bunyoro', *Uj*, 26, 2 (Sept. 1962), pp. 194–9.

⁶⁸ J. Beattie, *The Nyoro State* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 82–94.

Had the Buganda leaders had their way, this enlargement would have gone considerably further. In November 1898, in the aftermath of the crucial assistance they and their followings provided to the British, both against Kabaka Mwanga, Kintu and their followers and against the Sudanese mutineers, the two Buganda Katikiros and two of its Saza chiefs wrote to Wilson requesting that all three of the western kingdoms, Bunyoro, Toro and Nkore, and Busoga too, should now be made subject to Buganda. In particular, they avowed that this had been promised to them by Portal when they had signed the 1893 treaty with him which had brought Buganda 'and its dependencies' under British protection.⁶⁹ Wilson took three months to investigate their claim, but then reported to Berkeley that he had consulted Bishop Tucker of the Anglican mission who had told him that, in 1893, the chiefs had deputed him to ask Portal what the phrase meant – but that Portal had declined to proffer a definition. Wilson accordingly recommended that the claim be rejected.⁷⁰ He nevertheless proposed that 'the adoption of the scheme for a Central Council, in Uganda, of delegates from the countries west of the Nile would probably provide a solution to this difficulty'.

Berkeley thought the idea of 'some sort of "federation" ... and the General Council appears a sound idea'. It stood in line, moreover, with the general policy Salisbury had endorsed in 1896 – but which, during Mwanga's revolt and the Sudanese mutiny, had been shelved – of, in due course, incorporating all of the western districts into Buganda. Berkeley accordingly instructed Wilson to work out a scheme.⁷¹ Nothing, however, having transpired by the middle of 1899,⁷² the Buganda chiefs, first in June and then again in August, raised the issue with him twice again. In June they unequivocally declared that the kingdoms in question 'in former times were subordinate to us',⁷³ while in August they put forward

⁶⁹ It had also been adumbrated by Berkeley, fn. 39 above; Katikiros, etc., to Wilson, 8 Nov. [1898], BRA.

⁷⁰ Wilson twice reiterated his opposition to Buganda domination over its neighbours: Wilson to Ternan, 20 June, A4/17, 24 July 1899, A4/19.

⁷¹ Wilson to Berkeley, 8 Feb. 1899, and minutes, BRA.

⁷² Later, in 1900–1, as Sub-Commissioner of Western Province, Wilson proposed to establish a Common Council of delegate chiefs from the three kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole. Johnston gave him a cautious permission to exercise a general supervision over them, so long as their Collectors continued to deal directly with the Protectorate's headquarters. Two meetings appear to have been held, but the idea then atrophied: Wilson to Johnston, 7, 16 Oct., A12/1; Wilson to Collectors, Western Province, 10 Oct., A15/1; Johnston to Wilson, 22 Nov. 1900, A13/1; Wilson to Racey, 8 June, Racey to Wilson, 19 June 1901, AMC.

⁷³ Regents to Ternan, 26 June 1899, A4/19.

some – very meagre – lists of tributes they asserted had been paid as testimony to the validity of their claims.⁷⁴

This was the only point on which action was now taken.⁷⁵ Ternan, who had replaced Berkeley, ordered that Bunyoro and Nkore should now pay tribute to Buganda. No special orders were required for Busoga since it was already subject to tribute payments to Buganda under the Uganda–Usoga Agreement, while Toro was exempted as, at the time of the alleged tribute, it had been part of Bunyoro, which was now assessed in terms of its earlier larger size. There were immediate protests, however, from both Nkore and Bunyoro. As we have already seen, Ternan sharply rebuked Macallister in Nkore on this score;⁷⁶ but on receiving Colonel Evatt’s protest from Bunyoro, he simply scribbled: ‘Keep for Sir H. J.’⁷⁷

Here, therefore, were at least three might-have-beens which would have dramatically altered the eventual structure of the emerging ‘Uganda’. Had the reiterated demands of the Baganda chiefs been upheld, Buganda would have been even more substantially enlarged, and, in view, of the intense opposition which erupted against the imposition of some Baganda chiefs in Bunyoro in 1907,⁷⁸ and Bunyoro’s subsequent campaign for the return of its ‘Lost Counties’, the British Protectorate would well have been wracked by major disruptions.⁷⁹ These could have been lesser had no more than the tribute arrangements been upheld, but they could well have been considerable even so. As for a ‘Central Council’, it might conceivably have developed into something approaching a colony-wide council in which, from the start, there would have been a major African presence, in contrast to the eventual Uganda Legislative Council which, for much of its life, was all but monopolised by British officials and representatives of the very small immigrant Asian and European communities. As it happened, the only institution which was to bring the rulers

⁷⁴ Chiefs to Wilson, 10 Aug., Wilson to Ternan, 11 Aug. 1899, A4/19.

⁷⁵ Ternan to Grant, 19 Aug., A4/7; Ternan to Macallister, 9 Sept., A5/7; Grant to Ternan, 11 Sept., A4/20; Ternan to Salisbury, 16 Sept., FO 2/203; Ternan to Evatt, 13 Oct. 1899, A5/8. Wilson later claimed that the federal council scheme failed because of the opposition of British officials in the neighbouring countries. He himself, however, when subsequently Sub-Commissioner, Western Province, failed even to establish a federal council for his own Province.

⁷⁶ Ternan to Macallister, 29 Oct. 1899, A5/8.

⁷⁷ Evatt to Ternan, 21 Nov. 1899, A4/22. Sir Harry Johnston, the Special Commissioner, was about to arrive in Kampala.

⁷⁸ G. N. Uzoigwe, ‘The Kyanyangire, 1907: Passive Revolt against British Overrule’, in B. A. Ogot, ed., *War and Society in Africa* (London, 1972), pp. 179–214. See Ch. 2.

⁷⁹ The Sazas of Bugangadzi and Buyaga were eventually returned to Bunyoro shortly after independence in 1962, following the *Report of a Commission of Privy Councillors on a Dispute between Buganda and Bunyoro* [the Molson Report], Cmnd 1719 (London, 1962).

and their principal associates together was the Synod of the Native Anglican Church which Bishop Tucker created in 1909.⁸⁰ However, as soon as Sir Harry Johnston arrived, he made it clear that he would have none of these arrangements. He proceeded instead to treat each of the major kingdoms separately, abolished all of the tribute payments to Buganda,⁸¹ and took no interest at all in the idea of a 'Central Council'. Instead, as we shall see, he fashioned the Protectorate in terms of a provincial and district superstructure monopolised by British officials.

Nevertheless, he did proceed to enlarge Buganda in at least two other directions. Kabula, as we have seen, was the border country between Buganda and Nkore. Soon after the outbreak of Mwang'a's revolt in neighbouring Buddu in July 1897 it became the cockpit, as we have further seen, for a protracted guerilla war between Mwang'a, Kintu and their supporters, and the Sudanese, Baganda and Indian forces whom the British variously mustered against them.⁸² Although the British recognised that 'Kabula is in no doubt in Ankoli',⁸³ by April 1899 Ternan had decided that, in order finally to destroy Kintu and his following in the area, an enlarged Baganda contingent should be sent there.⁸⁴ As Kabula's Nkore chief had been granting succour to Kintu's Abangoni followers,⁸⁵ Macallister proposed in addition that, to stiffen the resistance in the area, the Nkore Prince Kahitsi should be made its chief, since he was, he said, 'a strong man'⁸⁶ – an idea that found favour with Wilson.⁸⁷ Kahitsi, however, evidently preferred to be chief of Nshara.⁸⁸ Thereupon Wilson suggested that Kahusi, the leader of the Buganda Muslim exiles whom Ntare had allowed to settle in the adjacent Bukanga area, who had already provided much support to the British against the insurgents,⁸⁹ should be placed in charge of Kabula instead.⁹⁰ Ternan, however, thought that Kahusi's hostility towards the

⁸⁰ Hansen, *Mission, Church and State*, e.g. pp. 344–58.

⁸¹ E.g. Johnston to Grant, 2 Feb., Johnston to Macallister, 9 Jan., 28 Feb. 1900, A5/9.

⁸² E.g. A4/8, A4/9, A4/10, A4/17, A4/19, A4/20, A5/5, A12/9 and BRA, *passim*.

⁸³ Ternan to Macallister, 12 Apr., A5/5, 10 Sept., A5/7; Wilson to Ashburnham, 27 July 1899, BRA.

⁸⁴ Ternan to Wilson, 12 Apr., BRA; Macallister to Ternan, 4 May, Wilson to Ternan, 4 July 1899, A4/17.

⁸⁵ Macallister to Ternan, 4 May 1899, A4/17.

⁸⁶ Macallister to Ternan, 8 May 1899, A4/16.

⁸⁷ Wilson to Ternan, 20 June, A4/17, 24 July 1899, A4/19.

⁸⁸ *Abagabe*, II, p. 5; Macallister to Ternan, 20 July, A4/19, 10 Aug. 1899, A4/20.

⁸⁹ E.g. Hobart to Grant, 1 Nov. 1897, A4/9; Wilson's Memo, 17 Aug., A27/17; Wilson to Tighe, 25 Aug., Wilson to Berkeley, 4 Sept. 1898, A4/12; Macallister to Berkeley, 27 Feb. 1899, A4/16; Fisher to Macallister, 23 Aug. 1898, AMC.

⁹⁰ Wilson note, 19 June, on Macallister to Ternan, 6 June, Wilson to Ternan, 20 June, A4/17, 24 July 1899, A4/19.

Christian leadership in Buganda would prevent this arrangement working successfully.⁹¹

It was then precisely at this point in mid 1899, with Ternan mobilising an enlarged Buganda force to deliver a final blow against Kintu's supporters,⁹² that one of the Buganda chiefs in the area suggested that, as an alternative to an Nkore appointment, a senior Buganda chief should be appointed to take charge of Kabula instead, and – so as to deprive Mwanga's supporters of continuing local support – that its Nkore inhabitants should be transferred to the heart of their kingdom.⁹³ While this idea was warmly supported by Ashburnham and Grant,⁹⁴ two of the British officers in the area, it was strongly opposed by Macallister in Nkore.⁹⁵ For his part, Ternan did not think a Buganda chief ought to be placed permanently in charge of Kabula.⁹⁶ He believed too that the 'Waganda have so much unoccupied land already'.⁹⁷ So, for several weeks while he mobilised the enlarged Baganda force to operate in Kabula,⁹⁸ he remained in two minds on the issue.⁹⁹ Eventually, however, 'after serious consideration', he decided to endorse the proposal, and in September 1899 asked Wilson to arrange for the appointment of a senior Buganda chief to take charge of Kabula. He then ominously added that:

Of course the Waganda Chiefs will understand that this arrangement does not transfer Kabula to Uganda [Buganda], but I think it will be to the mutual benefit of everybody concerned if it be tacitly understood, that if this arrangement be found later to be a successful check on the Bangoni, it is probable that the transfer of Kabula to Uganda [Buganda] will eventually be carried out.¹⁰⁰

⁹¹ Ternan's note on 20 June 1899, A4/17, 21 June 1899. There was controversy between them over the handling of some Baganda women: Macallister to Wilson, 6 Feb., A4/16; Wilson to Ternan, 22 June, A4/17; Ternan to Macallister, 23 June 1899, A5/6.

⁹² Ternan to Wilson, 4 June, 10 July 1899, on Ashburnham to Adjutant, Uganda Rifles, 6 July 1899, BRA.

⁹³ Ashburnham to Ternan, 19 July, Ternan to Wilson, 20 July, 4 Sept. 1899, [also A5/7] BRA.

⁹⁴ Quotation from Ashburnham on Ternan to Wilson, 4 Sept., BRA; Grant to Ternan, 9 Sept. 1899, A4/20.

⁹⁵ Ternan thought Macallister was 'somewhat prejudiced' against the Baganda: Ternan's note, 19 Sept., on Macallister to Ternan, 1 Sept. 1899, A4/20.

⁹⁶ Wilson to Asburnham, 27 July 1899, BRA.

⁹⁷ Ternan to Wilson, 4 Sept. A5/7.

⁹⁸ Ternan to Wilson, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29 July, 2 Aug., BRA, 25, 26 July, A4/19, 26 July, A5/6; Wilson to Ternan, 4, A4/19, 25 July 1899, BRA. On 31 July he issued a proclamation offering Rs 2,000 for Kintu, dead or alive: BRA.

⁹⁹ Ternan to Wilson, 31 Aug., 4 Sept. 1899, BRA.

¹⁰⁰ Ternan to Wilson, Ternan to Macallister, 10 Sept. 1899, A5/7. Cf. Grant to Ternan, 9 Sept. 1899, A4/20.

Saulo Mganha, a Buganda Protestant, was thereupon chosen to be chief of Kabula.¹⁰¹ Its Nkore inhabitants were moved to the heartland of the kingdom.¹⁰² The Buganda reinforcements were left in control, and the Nkore leaders soon discontentedly resigned themselves to 'the annexation of Kabula district' by Buganda.¹⁰³

By the end of 1899 Ternan's new dispositions eventually paid off. Mwanga's revolt in Kabula was finally ground down, and Kintu fled into the German sphere.¹⁰⁴ With that, Ternan's expectation of what would transpire then ensued. In January 1900, when the Nkore leader Mbaguta went to see Johnston in Buganda, he protested strongly against Ternan's imposition of an Nkore tribute to Buganda, but does not seem to have raised any protest against the loss of Kabula.¹⁰⁵ Its final transfer to Buganda was thereupon effected without fanfare by clause 7 of Johnston's Uganda Agreement with the Buganda leaders of 10 March 1900,¹⁰⁶ where it was simply listed as one of the twenty administrative counties, Sazas, of Buganda. Subsequently there was some controversy about its precise boundaries,¹⁰⁷ but, as a further addition to the Buganda kingdom at the hands of the British, Kabula was now firmly locked in.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, with even less local consideration, the remnants of the former minor rulership of Bwera to its north were largely incorporated into the Buganda Saza of Mawagola.

Johnston's 1900 Agreement¹⁰⁹ with the Baganda chiefs also settled the incorporation into Buganda of the Buvuma Islands. Standing eastwards of the Sesse Islands, which had long been associated with Buganda and which steadily became more interlocked with it during the 1890s as a regular Saza,¹¹⁰ Buvuma could well have become part of Busoga.¹¹¹ It had persistently defied Buganda domination. Back in 1875, Stanley had participated in a fierce conflict between the Buganda and Buvuma canoe fleets, in

¹⁰¹ Ternan to Macallister, 10 Sept., A5/7; Grant to Ternan, 19 Sept. 1899, 4/20.

¹⁰² Ternan to Wilson, 4 Sept., BRA; Macallister to Ternan, 16 Oct. 1899, A4/22.

¹⁰³ Macallister to Ternan, [further letter] 16 Oct. 1899, A4/22; Macallister to Johnston, 30 May 1900, AMC.

¹⁰⁴ Macallister to Johnston, 27 Dec. 1899, 4/23; Howard to Johnston, 10 Apr. 1900, FOCP 7405/101.

¹⁰⁵ Johnston to Macallister, 9 Jan. 1900, A5/9; *Abagabe*, II, p. 8.

¹⁰⁶ See the next chapter.

¹⁰⁷ Macallister to Johnston, 30 May, AMC; Macallister to Jackson, 30 May, Jackson to Johnston, 17 June 1900, A15/1.

¹⁰⁸ See, e.g., Hobart to Wilson, 10 Jan. 1899, BRA; Jackson to Macallister, 18 May 1900, AMC.

¹⁰⁹ See the next chapter.

¹¹⁰ Wilson, in 1898, had, for instance, arranged that henceforward they should have 'two representatives in the Public Baraza in Kampala': Wilson to Berkeley, 4 Sept. 1898, A4/12.

¹¹¹ Johnston to Grant, 13 Oct. 1900, A11/1.

which the Bavuma mostly managed to hold their own.¹¹² Two decades on, Williams, Macdonald and a Major Smith, with a considerable Baganda canoe fleet, launched a major attack upon the islanders for obstructing the communication route Williams was seeking to establish around the northern shoreline of the lake. Armed with two Maxim guns, they inflicted a decisive defeat upon the islanders in the course of a three-day naval battle, and thereby secured the submission of many of their leaders.¹¹³ At that stage, first Williams and then Macdonald left the islanders with their independence, subject only to their accommodation with the British. Several, however, refused to accept that limitation.¹¹⁴ Conflict, therefore, persisted, such that when Johnston arrived in 1899 he sent messengers to the Buvuma leaders telling them that they must desist from further fighting, that he wished to have friendly relations with them, that he or Jackson would visit them shortly, and that he proposed for administrative purposes to attach Buvuma to Buganda. He further told them that, if they responded positively, he would accept one of their number 'as Paramount Chief' of Buvuma and not impose a Buganda chief upon them.¹¹⁵ When, however, they delayed in coming to see him,¹¹⁶ he unilaterally included Buvuma in the list of Buganda's 'administrative counties' in the Uganda Agreement of 1900, and approved the appointment of Nova Jumba, Buganda's Catholic canoe fleet leader, as its Saza chief. He also made it plain that he would not resile from this position,¹¹⁷ and in the end the Bavuma leaders, conscious no doubt, like everyone else, of the military power of the British, mostly seem to have resigned themselves to their fate.¹¹⁸ Later in 1900, Grant visited Buvuma from Busoga,¹¹⁹ and installed Nova Jumba as its Saza chief.¹²⁰ Although there were some residual difficulties, by July 1901 these seemed to have been resolved.¹²¹

¹¹² Stanley, *Dark Continent*, Chs. XII–XIII.

¹¹³ BD, 6 Feb., 29 Jan., 4, 9 Feb. 1893, G/D; Zimbe, *Kabaka*, pp. 286–7; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 165–6; Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 25–7; Williams to Administrator IBEAC, 13 Feb., FO 2/58; Williams Memo, 10 Mar. 1893, A2/1; Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying*, Ch. x; Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, pp. 88–91.

¹¹⁴ Ansonge to Colville, 26 Sept. 1894, A2/3.

¹¹⁵ Johnston to Moorhouse, 28 Feb. 1900, A5/9; Johnston to Grant, 13 Oct. 1900, A11/1.

¹¹⁶ Jackson to Grant, 3 Apr. 1901, A11/1.

¹¹⁷ Johnston to Grant, 13 Oct., 4 Nov. 1900, A11/1.

¹¹⁸ Johnston to Grant, 13 Oct. 1900, A11/1.

¹¹⁹ Grant in Busoga was indeed the principal go-between, which underscores how readily it could have been part of Busoga, e.g. Grant to Johnston, 2 Jan., 2 Feb., 16 Apr., 17 July 1901, A10/1.

¹²⁰ Jackson to Fowler, 12 Sept., Grant to Johnston, 6 Oct., A10/1; Jackson to Fowler, 13 Sept. 1900, A11/1.

¹²¹ Jackson to Grant, 3 Apr., 12 July, A11/1; Grant to Jackson, 22 Mar., 3 May, 1, 24, 25 June, A10/1; Tomkins to Jackson, 2 Apr. 1901, BRA.

All in all, therefore, during the 1890s the reach of the Buganda kingdom was first significantly curbed at the hands of the British and then both substantially reoriented and markedly enlarged. Five areas which had not been part of the kingdom previously – Koki, Bunyoro’s Lost Counties, Kabula, much of Bwera, and the Buvuma Islands – were now fully incorporated into it. No less than seven out of twenty of Buganda’s future Sazas – Koki, Buruli, Bugangadzi, Buyaga, Kabula, Mawogola and Buvuma – owed their creation to this process. Three – Bugerere, Singo and Buwekula – were enlarged by it, while Sesse henceforth enjoyed full Saza status. (See [Map 3](#).) Half of them therefore derived their future form from these events. During the three or so preceding centuries, Buganda had steadily expanded northwards and westwards from its base athwart the northwestern bounds of Lake Victoria, but never before in so short a time had it been enlarged on anything like this scale. As we have seen, its leaders would have liked to have enlarged it further still. These acquisitions, however, effectively transformed it into by far the largest and most prominent kingdom in the region.

It was not, however, the only kingdom to be enlarged. As we have seen, Toro, as ruled by the Baboyo Babito, Kasagama, had been made the paramount authority by the British not only over Busongora but over Mwenge, Kyaka and Kitagweta, where Baitwara Babito had ruled, and over Kitagwenda, where Bahaga Babito had ruled, none of whom had acknowledged Baboyo primacy in the past. Given its position adjacent to Nkore’s northern border, Kitagwenda to the south had previously paid tribute both to Nkore and to Bunyoro. In 1899, that led to a dispute over whether it should be included in Toro or made subject to Nkore. At the outset, Macallister in Mbarara had demanded payments from Kakintuli, guardian of Kitagwenda’s young ruler Bulemu, to Kahaya,¹²² and in mid 1899, on Kahaya’s prompting, told Ternan that his careful enquiries had shown that Kitagwenda had in the past always been subject to Nkore.¹²³ That was vigorously contested by Bagge in Toro who countered that both Lugard in 1891 and Berkeley in 1896 had decreed that Kitagwenda should be incorporated into Toro.¹²⁴ Ternan, as acting Commissioner, was not prepared to undo Berkeley’s decision, and left the issue for

¹²² Meldon to Macallister, 21 Jan. 1899, AMC.

¹²³ Macallister to Ternan, 19 June, A4/18, 20 July 1899, A4/19.

¹²⁴ Bagge to Macallister, 20 June, 22, 28 July, AMC; Bagge to Ternan, 12 Aug. 1899, A4/20.

determination in the future.¹²⁵ It was never in fact reopened. The upshot was that Kitagwenda fell under Toro suzerainty.¹²⁶

As a consequence of the consolidation of Kasagama's Toro which all this represented,¹²⁷ and the transfer of Bunyoro's Lost Counties to Buganda, much the largest losses that followed upon the changes the British effected in the kingdoms' boundaries were suffered by Bunyoro. Its only compensation lay in the reincorporation of the Chope area up to the southern banks of the Victoria Nile, which had previously been held by the Palwo Princes Ruyonga and Mupina, but which had finally been wrested from their sons by Kabalega. Otherwise, given that not so long before its dominion had stretched to the edges of Lakes Edward and George in the south, Bunyoro lost during the 1890s, at the hands of the British, a good half of its former dominion. These draconian excisions were the price it paid for the often fortuitous animosities which the two sides had variously expressed towards each other ever since the 1860s.¹²⁸ They gravely aggravated the distraught state which the ravages of six years of war inflicted upon the kingdom, and it generated a persistent yearning in the Banyoro for the redress of its most obvious inequities. At the same time, its truncation was stark evidence of the power, determination and mastery of which the British forces in the country could now dispose.

Bunyoro, however, was not the only preceding kingdom to suffer loss. As we have just seen, albeit on a much smaller scale, Nkore lost not only Kabula to Buganda, but its claims to Kitagwenda too. It could also have lost Bukanga, the area to the south of Kabula which Ntare had made available to the Buganda Muslim exiles under Kahusi. In the course of a clash with a rival to his north, Kahusi, in 1900, was killed.¹²⁹ The British thereupon installed the other leading Buganda Muslim in the area, Abdul Effendi, as chief of a quite independent Bukanga.¹³⁰ In 1907,

¹²⁵ Ternan to Macallister, 28 June, 2 Aug., A5/6, 25 Aug. 1899, A5/7.

¹²⁶ Sometime in 1899, Kakintuli, after quarrelling with his young chief, Bulemu, crossed over into Nkore with a party of his followers and some of Bulemu's cattle and was soon followed by other Toro dissidents anxious to avoid paying taxes to Toro. Late in 1900 he was, however, routed by Nkore forces, whereupon those who had followed him returned to Kitagwenda, while he seems to have fled across the German border: Bagge to Macallister, 22, 28 July, 1, 27 Nov. 1899, Baile to Racey, 5 Oct. 1900, notes by Baile 8, 19 Oct., Racey to Mundy, 17 Oct. 1899, Mundy to Racey, 22 Dec., AMC; Baile to Johnston, 3 Dec. 1900, A14/1.

¹²⁷ The future of areas such as Bwamba and Mbogo to the west of Toro had still to be determined.

¹²⁸ See Ch. 2.

¹²⁹ Macallister's Ankole Monthly Report, 31 July, A4/30, Macallister to Johnston, 9 July 1900, 30 July 1901, A15/1.

¹³⁰ Racey's Ankole Report, 1 Dec. 1900, A15/1; *Abagabe*, II, pp. 12–13.

Abdul agreed, however, to become one of Kahaya's chiefs, and as a consequence Bukanga became a constituent part of the Nkore kingdom once again.¹³¹

But if, at the hands of the British, Nkore suffered losses upon its eastern and northern borders, it soon came to be substantially compensated on its west and northwest. Previously the small kingdoms in these areas had recognised Nkore's dominance over them, but, with perhaps one exception – Buzimba to the north, whose ruler Nduru had submitted to Ntare in 1894¹³² – none of them had so far lost their independence. As a consequence of British intervention, most of them, however, now came to be incorporated into Nkore as never before.

From early on in his time in Nkore, Macallister took an intermittent interest in these neighbouring kingdoms.¹³³ As early as April 1899, he sought to entice Ndagara, the ruler of Buhweju, the hilly kingdom to the northwest, and Makobore, the ruler of Rujumbura to the far west, to come to Mbarara. Ndagara sent messengers, but Makobore rebuffed him.¹³⁴ Following a visit in September 1899 to Igara, Rujumbura, Kajara and Buihi, Macallister nevertheless sketched out the ensuing pattern by declaring that, whilst Rujumbura and Kajara could remain independent, the rulers of Igara and Buihi should now 'recognise Kawiya as paramount chief'.¹³⁵ Then, in January 1900, he travelled northwards to Bunyaruguru, the hilly country which overlooked Lakes Edward and George, where Dari, a minor chief, had been blocking the road to the salt lakes.¹³⁶ In the past, Ntare had exercised a certain degree

¹³¹ Morris, *Ankole*, pp. 34, 38, 45. There was also controversy over Bulaga on the Koki-Nkore border. The Nkore who had lived there had withdrawn when they had been unable to hold out against the Abangoni and their associates from the German sphere. Koki forces then, however, moved in, and their subsequent claim to hold on to it not only secured the support of Buganda leaders but of Jackson. Macallister's plea to Johnston that Bulaga be returned to Nkore was seemingly lost; Tighe's Distribution Return, 28 Aug. 1898, A27/17; Ternan to Wilson, 4, 18 June, 27 July, Wilson to Ternan, 4, 20 July, Macallister's Memo, 29 Nov., BRA; Macallister to Ternan, 20 July, A4/19; Jackson to Macallister, 16 Dec., Macallister to Johnston, 28 Dec. 1899, AMC, (both also A4/23).

¹³² Morris, *Ankole*, p. 29; *Abagabe*, II, p. 23.

¹³³ Macallister to Ternan, 14 Apr., A4/16, 10 July 1899, Ankole Corr. 1899–1901, 10 Aug. 1899, A4/20.

¹³⁴ Macallister to Ternan, 14 Apr., A4/16, 2 June, A45/17, 19 June, A4/18, 10 Aug. 1899, A4/20; *Abagabe*, II, p. 18.

¹³⁵ Macallister to Ternan, 16 Oct. 1899, A4/22. Kahaya was not recognised by the British as 'supreme chief over all the Ankole District' (i.e. these adjacent rulerships as well) until well into 1901: Racey to Jackson, 27 Mar., Jackson to Racey, 16 Apr. 1901, A15/1.

¹³⁶ Macallister to Ternan, 10 Aug. 1899, A4/20; Macallister to Johnston, 12 Jan., A4/25; Johnston to Macallister, 5 Feb., A5/9; Racey to Johnston, 12 Nov. 1900, A13/1.

of paramountcy over this area, but upon his death it had become riven between eleven mutually hostile petty chiefs. Macallister now summoned these to meet him, but, since most of them went into hiding, he proceeded to burn several of their settlements, and permitted his Baganda associates to drive off numbers of their sheep and goats.¹³⁷ Such, however, was the fear of the coercive force which the British could muster that, within weeks, most of the Bunyaruguru chiefs came to Mbarara to see him, and (as he put it) 'submitted to the Government'. He thereupon acknowledged the Banyampaka leader, Kuri-ofire, as their principal chief, and made him responsible for the actions of all the others.¹³⁸

When, in August 1900, Johnston visited Nkore, he made it clear that he would like to see the 'principal independent chieftainships of Ankole' amalgamated with it.¹³⁹ Racey, Macallister's successor, was, however, much preoccupied over the following months with establishing his own hegemony over Nkore. Nevertheless, in October 1900, he went westwards to Rujumbura to investigate the murder of some Swahili traders, about which there had been a complaint from a German officer,¹⁴⁰ and, together with Rujumbura's ruler, Makobore, and his warriors (and it would seem an Nkore force led by Kahaya and Mbaguta),¹⁴¹ he attacked some of the Rukiga people to the south who were deemed responsible for this. He thereupon installed Makobore's brother as chief of northern Buchiga, and advised Johnston that, should a further British fort be established in this area, a site near Makobore's capital at Niamizi would be suitable.¹⁴²

Like Macallister before him, Racey found himself drawn on his return to Mbarara into the affairs of the Lakes George-Edward region, where Macallister's appointee, Kuri-ofire, seemed unable to control his fellows.¹⁴³ Summoning these to meet him, and proceeding to arrest those who attempted to evade him, Racey dismissed Kuri-ofire from his position,¹⁴⁴ and then placed all the Bunyaruguru chieftaincies, along with the two small chiefdoms of Kamsusa and Ndusi on the Lake Edward shore, under the paramountcy of Kaihura, the chief of the

¹³⁷ Macallister to Johnston, 10 Feb. 1900, A4/25.

¹³⁸ Macallister to Johnston, 21 Mar., A4/27; Johnston to Macallister, 13 Apr. 1900, A5/9.

¹³⁹ Racey's Memo, Oct. 1901, FO 2/676.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.* It was clearly a disturbed area, e.g. Macallister to Johnston, 12 Jan., A4/25, Racey to Johnston, 14 Dec. 1900, A15/1.

¹⁴¹ *Abagabe*, II, p. 16.

¹⁴² Racey to Johnston, 22, 26 Oct., 27 Dec., Johnston to Racey, 14, 27 Nov. 1900, A15/1.

¹⁴³ E.g. Macallister's Ankole Report, 30 June 1900, A4/29.

¹⁴⁴ He was later arrested by Mbaguta accompanied by a British officer: *Abagabe*, II, p. 19.

neighbouring Kazinga area¹⁴⁵ – who as a Babito was a person of some traditional substance. So as to secure these new arrangements, he established a small British fort at Kichwamba overlooking the Kazinga channel.¹⁴⁶ Then, to his great delight, Kaihuru shortly afterwards proposed that he should recognise Kahaya as his paramount chief. Racey seized upon this as opening the way to meeting Johnston's desire to see all the neighbouring kingdoms locked into a much larger 'Ankole'.¹⁴⁷

He was aware, however, that Makobore of Rujumbura was likely to be strongly resistant to any such move. He accordingly proposed 'to keep his province separate', so that, should a further British station be built close to Makobore's capital, 'the two districts could then be used as a set-off one against the other in the event of any movement likely to affect the prestige of Her Majesty's Government'.¹⁴⁸ At the same time, whilst aware that Makobore had married two of his sisters to the rulers of Igara and Kajara so as to bind them more closely to Rujumbura,¹⁴⁹ he decided to take steps to prise them away from Makobore's embrace. In January 1901, he accordingly marched west to Igara, accompanied by an Nkore force under Kahaya, and there prevailed upon its ruler, Musinga, to accompany him back to Mbarara. As soon, however, as Musinga neared the border of his kingdom, he committed suicide, seemingly to fulfil the common understanding hereabouts that rulers should do this before being forced to enter another ruler's domain.¹⁵⁰ This, however, suited Racey's purpose very well. For, as he put it, it enabled him to carry through 'the effectual readjustment of the inhabitants of Igara with Ankole whereby they come directly under control of Kahia's native government'.¹⁵¹ Accordingly, on 21 January 1901, he presided over the selection by fifty-five Igara sub-chiefs of Mukotani, a young son of Musinga's, as the new ruler of Igara, with his older relative Bakora as his regent; and then arranged that, upon Mukotoni's behalf, Bakora should swear allegiance both to the British and to Kahaya.¹⁵²

Racey's next step was to send an armed party under Lieutenant Mundy to Kajara to wean its ruler Rugaramu away from Makobore's

¹⁴⁵ Racey to Johnston, 3 Nov. 1899, A15/1; Racey to Johnston, 12 Nov., Racey to Mundy, 7 Nov. 1900, A13/1. Earlier, Kaihuru and some other Bunyaruguru chiefs had seemingly been subject to Toro, but that was now stymied: Bagge to Macallister, 28 Nov. 1899, AMC.

¹⁴⁶ Racey's Ankole Reports, 1, 31 Dec. 1900, A15/1.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Racey's Ankole Report, 31 Dec. 1900, A15/1.

¹⁴⁹ Racey's Ankole Report, 31 Jan. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁵⁰ Racey to Johnston, 5 Jan. 1901, A15/1; *Abagabe*, II, pp. 17–18.

¹⁵¹ Racey's Ankole Report, 31 Jan. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁵² Racey to Johnston, 21 Jan. 1901, A15/1.

side as well.¹⁵³ Mundy, however, allowed his initially peaceful expedition to become punitive, whereupon, as Racey feared,¹⁵⁴ Rugaramu fled from Kajara into the German sphere¹⁵⁵ and Makobore set out to cross over there as well. Racey recognised that the departure of these two rulers could well mean that 'Ankole can soon be formed into a compact whole', but he was much concerned that, with Makobore in exile, Rujumbura might be left prey to all sorts of disturbances by coastal traders and others.¹⁵⁶ In the event, however, because of the proximity of Mundy's troops, an intervention by Mbaguta as Nkore's Nganzi, and then some second thoughts about fleeing from the clutches of the British only to fall into those of the Germans, Makobore was persuaded to return.¹⁵⁷

When, however, Jackson, now Deputy Commissioner, heard of these events, he sent stern orders to Racey to cease all aggressive activities in these western areas as there was as yet no money available 'to administer the whole of Ankole'. That for the moment effectively put paid to Racey's notions of a further British station in Rujumbura, and to Kahaya being 'recognised as supreme chief over all the Ankole District' – even though Jackson readily admitted that that could happen 'later on'.¹⁵⁸ In Racey's list of chiefs of the Ankole District for April 1901, Makobore was thus marked as 'Requires special attention',¹⁵⁹ while Rugaramu was reported as 'May come to terms in time and recognize Kahia as Principal Chief'.¹⁶⁰

A similar comment was made about Ndagara, the elderly ruler of the hilly kingdom of Buhweju to the northwest of Nkore, to whom in December 1900 Racey had sent a message, through a senior envoy Ndagara had sent to him, ordering him to come into Mbarara within a month.¹⁶¹ Learning, however, that, like Musinga, Ndagara would almost certainly commit suicide if he was forced to enter another ruler's domain, and aware that Ndagara had been making his tribute payments to Nkore, Racey (to Mundy's considerable anger) did not press his summons.¹⁶² In April 1901, however, he made a further move, but being

¹⁵³ Racey to Mundy, 2, 9, 12 Feb., Racey to Johnston, 2 Feb. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁵⁴ Racey to Johnston, 18 Jan., 15 Feb. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁵⁵ Racey to Mundy, 12 Feb. 1901, Mundy to Racey, 13 Feb. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁵⁶ Racey to Johnston, 3 Nov. 1900, 15 Feb., Racey to Mundy, 15, 23 Feb. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁵⁷ Racey to Johnston, 2 Mar. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁵⁸ Racey to Johnston, 15 Feb., Jackson to Racey, 6 Mar. 1901, Racey to Jackson, 27 Mar., Jackson to Racey, 16 Apr. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁵⁹ In the end, in 1919, Rujumbura was incorporated into the new non-kingdom Kigezi: Morris, *Ankole*, p. 45; *Abagabe*, II, p. 19.

¹⁶⁰ Enc. in Racey to Cunningham, 26 Apr. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁶¹ Racey's Memo, Oct. 1901, FO 2/676.

¹⁶² Racey was unrepentant, but relations between the two men became so fraught that in June Racey knocked Mundy to the ground, for which, in August, he was removed from his position: Racey to Mundy, 16, 21 Jan., Mundy to Racey, 19 Jan., Racey to

admonished by Cunningham, Johnston's official secretary, to proceed peaceably,¹⁶³ he now ordered that a major offensive which Mbaguta, the Nganzi of Ankole, had been organising against Ndagara should be halted. Ndagara responded by sending his nephew, Igana, to make blood-brotherhood with Racey, which led him to await further developments.¹⁶⁴ Meantime, Racey visited Rwampara in southern Nkore, and, by August 1901, successfully secured the acknowledgement by its predominantly agricultural Bairu population of Kahaya's primacy, while at the same time summarily dismissing Gwambuzi of Buhuhi, a minor chief in the area, for, in his eyes, being recalcitrant.¹⁶⁵

During all these months there was increasing controversy over the Toro-Ankole border.¹⁶⁶ Early in July 1901, therefore, Racey set out to resolve the issue on the spot. As he did so, he received a message reportedly from Ndagara saying that, if he were to enter Buhweju, he would be speared. Buhweju opinion affirms that this was concocted by Mbaguta who, having already been checked once from overrunning Buhweju, was determined not to be stopped again.¹⁶⁷ Racey had only lately commented that an expedition against Buhweju would be a mistake.¹⁶⁸ He nevertheless determined to accept the challenge and, accompanied, it seems, by an Nkore force,¹⁶⁹ on 12 July 1901 led a party of sixty of his lately formed armed police¹⁷⁰ into Buhweju. Thereupon an appalling encounter ensued.¹⁷¹

On receiving Racey's account of it, Jackson in Entebbe was deeply angered. He wrote:

He appears to have surprised and surrounded the chief, & his followers, and then began firing at those who were thought to be chiefs . . . and finally a hand to hand conflict took place, in which the chief, his son, and 70 of his followers including 24 smaller chiefs were killed, and 51 others; a total of 123 casualties at an

Johnston, 21 Jan., 9 Feb., A15/1; Jackson to Lansdowne, 2 Aug. 1901, Racey's Memo, Oct. 1901, FO 2/676.

¹⁶³ Cunningham to Racey, 9 Feb. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁶⁴ Racey to Jackson, 15 Apr., Racey's Ankole Report, 1 May 1901, A15/1.

¹⁶⁵ Racey's Ankole Report, 1 June, A15/1; 1 July, 1 Aug. 1901, A15/2.

¹⁶⁶ Baile to Racey, 7, 22 Jan., Racey to Baile, 7, 22 Jan., 15, 19, 26 Mar., Mundy to Racey, 22, 24, 30 Mar., Racey to Mundy, 31 Jan., 15, 26 Mar., Mundy to Baile, 11 Mar., Tarrant to Racey, 19 Mar., Racey to Wilson, 29 May, 19 June, Wilson to Racey, 8 June, AMC; Mundy to Racey, 11 Mar., Racey to Wilson, 14 Mar., Racey's Ankole Reports, 31 Jan., 30 Mar., A15/1; Racey's Memo, Oct. 1901, FO 2/676.

¹⁶⁷ This at all events was propounded by Ndibarema in his old age, in an interview with the author in Buhweju in July 1958.

¹⁶⁸ Racey's Ankole Report, 1 July 1901, A15/2.

¹⁶⁹ *Abagabe*, II, pp. 18–19.

¹⁷⁰ On this, see Racey's Ankole Reports, 1 Sept. 1900, 1 Mar. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁷¹ Racey's Ankole Report, 1 July 1901, A15/1.

expenditure of 879 rounds of ammunition . . . It sounds to me like the butchery of a lot of poor, panic-stricken, possibly unarmed creatures, who couldn't run away, and who were shot down at close quarters.¹⁷²

All this, however, was soon whitewashed. Wilson (by this time Provincial Commissioner for the Western Province of Uganda) conducted an enquiry which exonerated Racey, saying he had not been present at the fight for which Sergeant Wood and the new police party were responsible; that Ndagara had had a 'large force behind' him; and that there were not 123 casualties but only 40. Johnston came to Racey's rescue as well, whilst, emulating Wilson, Jackson soon contravened his earlier comments by saying: 'Racey did all he could to prevent fight which was begun by enemy.'¹⁷³ Not surprisingly following such a massacre, the Buhweju people speedily submitted. On 25 July 1901, a fortnight later, Ndagara's son, Ndibarema, was elected in his place, and at a baraza in Mbarara swore allegiance to Kahaya as his 'Principal Chief', surrendered over 200 spears, and was then recognised by Racey and the Nkore leaders as the new chief of Buhwezu.¹⁷⁴ In the course of just seven months, Nkore at Racey's hands was thus so substantially enlarged that it henceforth became more appropriate to call it by its anglicised name: Ankole.¹⁷⁵ With the addition, moreover, following its earlier gains to the west (in Shema and Rwampara), of the Bashambo rulerships of Igara and eventually of much of Kajara,¹⁷⁶ a third of it henceforth owned strong Bashambo connections. In association with the preeminent position achieved by its Bashambo Nganzi, Mbaguta, the scene was set for the ensuing 'elimination of . . . the Bahinda clan, as a political force' in the kingdom, at the hands of the Bashambo.¹⁷⁷

In a few short years, therefore, and frequently in a quite arbitrary manner, the politico-territorial circumstances of virtually every one of the kingdoms north of the Anglo-German border was, as a result of the British advent, substantially recast. In each instance particulars applied, and initially many of the recastings were simply ad hoc. But in the end, and especially at Sir Harry Johnston's instance, they were pushed forward so as to create a smaller number of larger polities in order to

¹⁷² Jackson to Hill, 9 Aug. 1901, FO 2/676.

¹⁷³ Jackson to Foreign Office, Johnston to Foreign Office, 22 Oct. 1901, FO 2/676.

¹⁷⁴ Racey's Ankole Report, 1 Aug. 1901, A15/2.

¹⁷⁵ Its counties consisted of several Nkore chieftaincies and the newly added small rulerships. See [Map 5](#).

¹⁷⁶ Though split by the Anglo-German border, it was otherwise incorporated into Ankole around a decade later: Morris, *Ankole*, p. 45.

¹⁷⁷ M. R. Doornbos, 'Ankole', in R. Lemarchand, ed., *African Kingdoms in Perspective* (London, 1977), pp. 242-4.

facilitate the management of colonial control. In the upshot the several dozen kingdoms in the region were thus compressed into four largely novel aggregations (Buganda, Busoga, Toro and Ankole) along with one traumatic reduction (Bunyoro), an outcome which for Buganda, Toro and Ankole was formalised in the Agreements Johnston and Wilson were to make with them in 1900–1.¹⁷⁸ The fact that this sweeping redrawing of the territorial map was so magisterially effected provides a striking index of the commanding hegemony which the tiny cadre of British officials had established over the kingdoms by the turn of the century.

What, however, is scarcely less notable is that, despite this extraordinarily extensive remoulding of the indigenous map, the British never abolished a single rulership of any consequence.¹⁷⁹ Whilst they did much to support the transfer of most executive, judicial and legislative power into the hands of the new breed of oligarchs in Buganda, Bunyoro and Ankole, they nevertheless upheld the rulership in each one of them. When, in July 1897, Kabaka Mwanga raised the standard of revolt, Ternan as acting Commissioner immediately decided to eject him from his throne, and on his return from his initial successful campaign against him and his supporters in Buddu he summoned a ‘full baraza of the great chiefs’ of Buganda on 14 August 1897 to participate in the formal installation of his infant son, Daudi Chwa, as Kabaka of Buganda in his place; and thereupon appointed its three leading oligarchs, Kagwa, Mugwanya and Kisingiri, as his regents.¹⁸⁰ Early in the following year, amid the crisis of the mutiny and with Bunyoro resistance still not completely crushed, Wilson, as acting Commissioner, proceeded similarly against Kabalega by arranging for the elevation of his young son,

¹⁷⁸ On which, see the next chapter.

¹⁷⁹ Buihihi (later Ndaiija) adjacent to Nkore seems to have been abolished, but not to have been of any size or to have possessed any significant independence: Racey’s Ankole Report, 1 Aug. 1901, A15/2. Bwera too (see above) was excised from the map. It is difficult to think of any other examples outside some minuscule states in Busoga.

¹⁸⁰ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 207–8; Miti, ‘Buganda’, 2, pp. 146–7; Ternan to Salisbury, 13 July 1897, FO 2/133. Anderson in the Foreign Office minuted: ‘Prince Cwa will probably be as good a puppet in another generation as anyone else.’ Born on 8 August 1896, Mwanga wanted him baptised a Protestant; his son Tobi to a Catholic mother died in 1895 aged five months: Wilson to Berkeley, 8 Aug., A4/5; Berkeley to Salisbury, 14 Aug. 1896, FO 2/112; Wilson to Jackson, 24 Feb., 8 July 1895, A4/1. The other Catholic claimants had been made ineligible three years before, and the Christian leaders refused to contemplate a Muslim Kabaka such as Mbogo or Ramazan: e.g. ESA Interviews Book, 1, 9 Apr.; Colville’s proclamation, 10 Apr., A3/2; Colville to Cracknall, 15 Apr. 1894, FO 2/71.

Kitahimbwa, as Omukama of Bunyoro in his place.¹⁸¹ Then, as we have just seen, in Ankole, Racey immediately endorsed the election of Mukotoni as ruler of Igara in the aftermath of his father Musinga's suicide, and likewise recognised the appointment of Ndibarema to be ruling chief of Buhweju following the killing of his father, Ndagara. Moreover whenever (as we have also seen) Grant for one reason or another toppled a Busoga ruler, he invariably replaced him by a traditionally legitimate candidate for the position.¹⁸²

There were at least three occasions,¹⁸³ however, when this concern to maintain the kingdoms' traditional rulerships might not have been sustained. When news of Daudi Chwa's elevation to the Kabakaship first reached London, there was half a suggestion from a junior clerk in the Foreign Office that, should the opportunity arise, the position might well be allowed to atrophy: 'Should it not be considered how far it is necessary', he asked, 'to keep up the Kingship, if the infant King died. The Protectorate fiction has many practical difficulties and if the Regency lasts a few years it will accustom the country to the idea of Government by the Commissioner with the assistance of a native Council.' On which Lord Salisbury equivocally remarked: 'I doubt the expediency of changing the form too soon.'¹⁸⁴ More substantially, in spite of having arranged for Daudi Chwa's appointment,¹⁸⁵ Ternan otherwise displayed a characteristic army officer's preference for a direct line of command. Back in 1896 when he and Berkeley had first considered the replacement of Kabalega by a new Omukama of Bunyoro, he had demurred to this.¹⁸⁶ In August 1898, Major Martyr in Bunyoro actually deposed Kitahimbwa, and it was only upon the representations of the Baganda leaders on behalf of monarchical rule that he was restored.¹⁸⁷ Subsequently, however, when, in 1899, Bunyoro's resistance finally crumbled, Ternan as acting Commissioner not only declared that, since 'Unyoro, unlike Uganda, is a conquered country . . . we are perfectly justified . . . in

¹⁸¹ Wilson to Fowler, 5 Mar. 1898, and two proclamations, A5/4. See also Thruston to Ternan, 12 July, A15/4; Bagnall to Wilson, 23 Mar., 3 Apr. 1898, A4/10. Berkeley had first mooted the idea back in 1896: Berkeley to Ternan, 15 Sept. 1896, A5/2; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 187.

¹⁸² See Ch. 6 above.

¹⁸³ For an arguable fourth example in Toro, see again Sitwell to Berkeley, 30 June, 10 Aug. 1896, A4/5.

¹⁸⁴ Minutes on Ternan to Salisbury, 14 Aug. 1897, FO 2/133.

¹⁸⁵ Which may well have been principally to ensure Mwanga's outlawry.

¹⁸⁶ Ternan to Berkeley, 27 Nov. 1896, A4/6.

¹⁸⁷ Miti, 'Buganda', 3, pp. 191–2; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 243; Martyr to Berkeley, 15 Aug., A4/12, Berkeley to Martyr, 24 Aug. 1898, A5/4.

treating the country immediately under this administration', but ordered Evatt (then in command in Bunyoro) to ensure that Kitahimbwa's 'Regents' should henceforth simply be called 'Guardians'; that 'all executive power will be vested in the Sub-Commissioner'; and that, whilst Bunyoro might have a council of chiefs, this should have 'no executive power'.¹⁸⁸ Thereafter, he sought to impress this same doctrine upon his other officials as well. In August 1899 he told Grant in Busoga that 'all real power exercised by the chiefs of Usoga should be merely delegated to them by the Sub-Commissioner, on whom they should be accustomed to look as their paramount chief',¹⁸⁹ while, shortly afterwards, he enjoined upon Bagge, Grant's counterpart in Toro, that:

a more direct administration of Toru affairs by yourself than has been hitherto exercised . . . would appear to me desirable. No steps of any political importance should be taken by Kasegema on his own initiative . . . advantage . . . will be found . . . from an intelligent and liberal policy conducted . . . by the European resident upon whom the entire native population . . . would look after a time as their supreme chief.¹⁹⁰

More ominously, in the following year Sir Harry Johnston's initially cavalier attitude towards Uganda's major rulerships precipitated, as we shall see in the next chapter, a major controversy with the Buganda chiefs, who feared that he was bent upon abolishing their Kabakaship altogether. That such fears were not unfounded was exemplified by Johnston's remark to Evatt, early in February 1900, that: 'I rather fancy my policy [in Bunyoro] would have been to have abolished the 'kingship' and to have divided up the country into districts where the natives were to be governed by native chiefs under the superintendence of the European officials';¹⁹¹ while, in instructing Macallister in Ankole, in April 1900, to divide up the country into a number of districts over which he should himself appoint chiefs, he led him, as we have earlier seen, to announce the 'virtual deposition of Kawiya . . . [as] principal Chief of Ankole'.¹⁹²

Throughout, however, there were always powerful influences on the other side. Back in 1896, at the depth of the British failure to fabricate a structure of governance in Bunyoro, Thruston had eloquently propounded,

¹⁸⁸ Ternan to Evatt, 3 June, in Ternan to Salisbury, 3 June 1899, FO 2/202.

¹⁸⁹ Ternan to Grant, 3 Aug. 1899, A5/7.

¹⁹⁰ Ternan to Bagge, 8 Sept. 1899, A4/7.

¹⁹¹ Johnston to Evatt, 6 Feb. 1900, A5/9.

¹⁹² Johnston to Macallister, 13 Apr. 1900, A15/9.

almost off the cuff, a sophisticated version of the principal alternative doctrine:

It has always been the practice of England to govern her distant dominions, as apart from her Colonies, whenever feasible by the system of Protectorates; by which system their administrators are placed under the native Prince who governs by the advice of a native Protector. The advantages are obvious; for the people through force of habit, love for the person, or the prestige of his office, naturally submit to the orders of their Prince. The Prince himself through the instinct of self-preservation if through nothing else, usually willingly obeys the orders of his protector, and those orders are further disguised under the name of advice, and are conveyed in such manner as to as little as possible destroy his prestige or wound his susceptibilities. By this means pressure when it is necessary, is brought to bear on one person only, the Prince, and not on the whole population. Even when the Prince withholds his ready cooperation from his protector, the cases of Egypt, of Zanzibar and of Uganda tend to prove that the system can still be employed with a full measure of success.¹⁹³

This was the position espoused by Wilson too, by now by far the most accomplished civilian official in Uganda. In 1899, in connection with a dispute in Toro, he told Ternan that the situation there could be rectified, 'by the Administration strengthening the authority of the King with his people, whilst at the same time acquiring, by political conduct on the part of its representative, a controlling influence over the King'.¹⁹⁴

Such views were endorsed by other officials as well. Both Sitwell and Bagge in Toro expressed themselves well content, for example, with the role Kasagama was playing there. He seemed to be overcoming the earlier hostility to his rule in Toro's newly annexed areas,¹⁹⁵ while throughout Mwanga's rebellion and the Sudanese mutiny he had remained staunch in his allegiance to the British.¹⁹⁶ Bagge therefore did nothing to implement Ternan's injunction to exercise 'a more direct administration of Toru affairs'.

More importantly (as we shall see in the next chapter), the Buganda oligarchs proceeded to mount a formidable campaign to secure the future of their rulership, and, amongst other things, not only propelled Johnston into recognising the Kabaka as 'native ruler' of Buganda, but, in a last-minute move to assuage their suspicions, impelled him to

¹⁹³ Thruston to Ternan, 30 June 1897, A4/8.

¹⁹⁴ Wilson to Ternan, 8 Feb. 1899, A4/16.

¹⁹⁵ Sitwell to Berkeley, 10 Feb. 1897, A4/7, 18 July 1898, A4/12; Sitwell to Wilson, 20 Nov. 1897, A4/9; Bagge to Ternan, 20 Aug., 22 Sept. 1899, A4/20.

¹⁹⁶ The British awarded him a 'Special Star' for 'conspicuously commendable [work] during the rebellion and mutiny': Wilson to Sub-Commissioner, Buganda, 1 July, BRA; Ternan to Sub-Commissioner, Toro, 18 July 1899, A5/6.

accord him the title of ‘Highness’, thus placing him on a par, in British parlance, with the Sultan of Zanzibar ‘or any prominent Indian prince’.¹⁹⁷ Following Johnston’s visit to Nkore in August 1900, moreover, Kahaya – whose five-year contest for the accession could not be quite as easily discounted as Macallister had proclaimed – was effectively recognised as Nkore’s ruler once again,¹⁹⁸ while Racey proceeded thereafter to pressurise neighbouring rulers into acknowledging him as their ‘supreme chief’. The overall conclusion here was summed up by Jackson as acting Commissioner in April 1901, when he wrote: ‘We are not here to govern them, but only to guide them . . . The policy of the Foreign Office is to govern (i.e. guide them) through their Chiefs, and not directly.’¹⁹⁹ All of which indicated that the forces supporting the maintenance of traditional rulerships in the new Uganda polity had now mounted a powerful and ultimately decisive counter-attack.

Not that there were no significant changes in their positions. Besides being subordinated to British rule, these were of two kinds. The rulers of the four rulerships – Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro – which alone during the colonial period counted as Uganda’s ‘kingdoms’, were henceforth accorded a much-honoured monarchical position. Yet, in Buganda, Bunyoro and Ankole, even while the primacy of their rulers was meticulously recognised, the actual governance of the kingdoms now lay overwhelmingly in the hands of those who, by the conclusion of the oligarchical revolutions each of them had seen, had secured the leading positions within them. Only in Toro, which as we have noted had had no oligarchical revolution, and where Kasagama had been of age when he acceded to the rulership, did the ruler personally exercise the predominant executive power in the kingdom.

The most substantial changes, however, bore upon the rulers of the smaller rulerships such as Koki in Buganda, Bulamogi in Busoga, Kyaka in Toro, Buhweju in Ankole, and their various counterparts. Not only did they find themselves engulfed in one or other of the larger entities. They were now having to reconstitute themselves as administrative chiefs of ‘counties’ rather than as rulers (or, where in Busoga they were too small for that, simply as ‘sub-county’ chiefs). Nevertheless, in every case of any significance, these traditional rulers remained at the head of their former territories.

¹⁹⁷ Johnston to Salisbury, 12 Mar. 1900, FO 2/297.

¹⁹⁸ Johnston to Racey, 20 Dec. 1900, Jackson to Racey, 16 Apr. 1901, A15/1.

¹⁹⁹ Jackson to Grant, 3 Apr. 1901, A11/1. The grounds for his attribution to the Foreign Office are unclear.

The degree to which, by the turn of the century, the Thruston-Wilson doctrine of sustaining the operative role of indigenous rulership in the fashioning of the Ugandan polity had overborne the Ternan-Johnston preference for abolishing them altogether then became most strikingly, if fortuitously, epitomised in the small print of the Agreements which Johnston signed with Toro in June 1900, and Wilson with Ankole in August 1901.²⁰⁰ For, along with extensive specifications of their 'county' boundaries, not only were the rulers/chiefs of each of them directly named. They were each quite specifically accorded the right to nominate their successors – a right which was tantamount to upholding their hereditary succession; a right, moreover, which in some instances in Ankole was even extended to those who possessed no such claim. In the years to come, this provision was not always honoured, but its express reiteration is eloquent testimony to the extent to which, by this time, hereditary rulership had become entrenched as a central element in Uganda's emerging colonial settlements.

So it was that, as the vortexes through which the several parts of the region had passed in recent years gave way to their colonial settlements, a seeming paradox then appeared. For, whilst the circumstances of each and every one of the many rulerships which stretched across what was becoming 'Uganda' had in one way or another been significantly altered by the coming of the British – indeed, in each case, at the hands of the British – despite this very extensive upheaval, every rulership of any substance survived. That conjunction, however, was of critical importance for the whole future of Britain's Uganda Protectorate. For, while the creation of so many new boundaries constituted a remarkable exemplar of colonial hegemony, the continuance of the rulerships within them ensured, for the kingdoms in the region and their peoples, much less disruption of their inherited institutional proprieties than might otherwise have occurred. At the same time, the combination for the British of an assured hegemony and a careful concern for local indigenous proprieties provided them with the inestimable advantage of an extensive bedrock of traditionally legitimate local authority, upon which the embryonic superstructure of superordinate British colonial rule could henceforward be made to stand.

²⁰⁰ See the next chapter.

10 Government: colonial settlements and the Buganda model

By the late 1890s the ‘determining vortexes’ which had ensued upon the initial ‘raw assertions of British hegemony’ in the five component parts of the now emerging Uganda had largely reached their closure. All five now stood subject to British colonial authority. Under its aegis the Christian oligarchy was firmly in control in Buganda. Mwanga’s revolt had petered out, and both Mwanga and Kintu were now languishing in exile. In Bunyoro, Kabalega lay in exile too, but, along with a miscellany of other chiefs, two of his principal Abarasura leaders, Rwabudongo and Byabachwezi, having submitted to the British, now held chiefly positions under them; while in Nkore, following the toppling of both Kahitsi and Igumira, Mbaguta stood forth as its principal chief. In each of these instances, the leading figures were ex-new model warband leaders. Kasagama meanwhile had successfully clamped his paramountcy upon his fellow Babito in Toro; while, following the departure of the Sudanese mutineers, Grant, as we shall see, had effectively reestablished his dominance over Busoga.

The principal issue for those primarily involved accordingly became (as the analysis earlier offered here was designed to anticipate) the shaping of the ‘colonial settlements’ that would constitute the governing structure of the new Uganda Protectorate. How (this entailed) was the administrative ordering of the new polity to be framed? What semblance of operational autonomy could the now subordinated rulers and their chiefs hope to secure? What instruments of governance should be adapted or constructed to meet the colonial agenda? Here, as it chanced, the principal answers first came to be fashioned in Buganda, initially in 1895, then more substantially in 1900; upon both occasions in response to fierce Baganda objections to the alternatives being advanced. Whilst embracing important elements from its indigenous past, the forms which these took displayed significant new features. In the years that followed, the precedents they set came to be extensively adopted in the rest of the eventual wider Uganda; while, despite their family likeness to other such

systems of rule elsewhere, they gave Uganda its notably distinctive governing structure.

Once the IBEAC had abandoned its upcountry operations, and a British imperial Protectorate had been established over Buganda, 'Uganda' was made administratively subject to the British Foreign Office in London. Along with the later extensions beyond its Buganda core, it was to remain there till responsibility for its oversight was eventually transferred to the British Colonial Office in 1905. These arrangements had two aspects. In British law, 'Uganda' was now subject to Britain's Foreign Jurisdiction Acts of 1843 to 1890, and, more particularly, to two Africa Orders-in-Council of 1889 and 1892, before it was eventually made subject to its own Uganda Order-in-Council of 1902.¹ Formally, its governance fell under the control of Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Liberal Lord Kimberley from 1894 to 1895 and the Conservative Lord Salisbury, who was also Prime Minister, from 1895 to 1900. Their personal interventions, however, were very limited. The day-to-day oversight of Britain's Uganda Protectorate in the British Foreign Office lay chiefly with the very distinguished Sir Percy Anderson till his death in 1896,² and thereafter more generally with Sir Clement Hill in his role as Superintendent of African Protectorates.³ So far as Uganda was concerned, their main tasks were to oversee the expenditure of the annual British Treasury subsidy, which by 1897 amounted to £49,000,⁴ together with the recruitment and logistical support of the Protectorate's officials.⁵ Neither had any but the vaguest suggestions to make about how colonial government should be conducted on the ground. This was epitomised in an 1894 report by a Foreign Office committee presided over by Anderson, which, in recommending the appointment of 'an independent Commissioner' for 'Uganda', merely stated that:

While not unduly interfering with internal administration he [the Commissioner] would control foreign affairs, have a voice in all serious matters of State, such as appointments of Ministers, the distribution of territory, taxation and

¹ FO 2/549, 663.

² Obituary, *The Times*, 20 July 1896.

³ Hill had been variously involved with African questions since his secretaryship of Sir Bartle Frere's anti-slavery mission to Zanzibar back in 1873: Coupland, *Exploitation*, pp. 182–204. He visited East Africa in 1900. For a highly critical portrait, see Oliver, *Johnston*, Ch. 10, but also Johnston to Wilson, 12 Nov. 1900, A13/1. Hill later became a Unionist MP.

⁴ H. B. Thomas & R. Scott, *Uganda* (Oxford, 1935), Appendix 3, 'Annual Revenue and Expenditure'.

⁵ FOCP relating to Africa for the 1890s, *passim*.

expenditure; would secure the peace of the country and the suppression of the Slave Trade, with a view to the ultimate abolition of slavery; would exercise jurisdiction over Europeans, and would control the administration of justice among the natives.⁶

All of which scarcely amounted to an operational blueprint for the actual exercise of colonial government on the spot.

In the expanding Protectorate itself, the Commissioner had for much of the time an altogether minimal staff. If one takes the official 'Uganda Staff List' for the mid-decade year 1895,⁷ it contained just twenty-one names – a remarkably exiguous number given the very wide area they had to cover and the tasks they had to perform.⁸ The Commissioner, Berkeley, a former Vice-Consul in Zanzibar (who had served as secretary to Portal's mission and was eventually knighted), also held the office of Consul-General.⁹ Under him were three First Class Assistants (who were also Vice-Consuls); four Second Class Assistants; four military officers recruited to command the Protectorate's Sudanese troops; and three First Class and three Second Class Assistants 'for transport' – to manage, that is, the long supply route from the coast. In addition there were three doctors. Eight of these men were army officers, most of whom could speak Arabic and had served with the army in Egypt. Like Colville before them, three of them (Pulteney, Vandeleur and Smith) held commissions in elite Guards regiments and were evidently from British 'county' families (Colville was the son of a peer), while the other five came from less prestigious infantry regiments. Along with Colville, three of them became generals: Colville himself was knighted and became a Major-General, Ternan a Brigadier-General, while Pulteney not only was three times knighted and decorated twice, but served in both the South African and First World Wars, the latter as Lieutenant-General commanding the 3rd British Army Corps. Both Vandeleur and Sitwell were killed in the South African War.

Of the First Class Assistants, Jackson, after being the first IBEAC official to enter Buganda, thereafter held a range of posts across East Africa, culminating with a knighthood and the Governorship of Uganda 1911–17. Macallister was a professional engineer, while Wilson had first

⁶ Report of the Committee on Administration of East Africa (1894), FO 84/1311.

⁷ 'The Uganda Staff List for 1895', *Uj*, 1, (1934), pp. 61–3.

⁸ Two years earlier there were merely fourteen: Macdonald to Hardinge, 23 Oct. 1893, A31/1. By the end of Johnston's Special Commissionership in 1901, their number had, however, grown to eighty civil officials and twenty-nine serving army officers: Moyses-Bartlett, *KAR*, p. 83.

⁹ For his minimalist instructions, see Kimberley to Berkeley, 10, 14 May 1895, FOCP 6717/141, 155.

come to East Africa in 1889 from Australia to try his fortune as an explorer and big game hunter, but then became involved in a variety of enterprises before being appointed in 1894 to an administrative position in the Uganda service to become thereafter its most notable early official.¹⁰ Amongst the others, Hopley had an extensive career mostly in what is now Kenya, while Martin, in 1895 a Second Class Assistant for transport, was an illiterate but much admired Maltese sailor, who from 1882 onwards was involved in all sorts of activities in East Africa, before ultimately being appointed as a District Officer in Uganda. His tale was only matched by that of Spire, Colville's army batman, who, after first being appointed a Water Transport Officer in 1893,¹¹ ended his career three decades later as an especially distinguished Provincial Commissioner.¹² All in all it was, therefore, a scratch team, with each of them having to operate frequently quite on his own, and with an unimaginable miscellany of tasks to perform: 'I have to be a linen draper', one of their immediate predecessors had written, 'a builder, a clerk, a governor, a colonel and an explorer, ... and last, but by no means least ... a doctor, without the provision or facilities of any of them'.¹³

Their position was made none the easier because of the ten changes in the Commissionership between 1893 and 1899, generally because of illness. Only Portal, Berkeley and Johnston held the substantive position. Others – Macdonald, Colville, Jackson, Ternan and Wilson – variously served as acting Commissioner, the last three on two occasions each. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that, amidst their fateful engagements with 'Uganda's' numerous kingdoms, and the armed conflicts in which they became involved, most of them gave little systematic attention to the framing of an ongoing structure of colonial government, particularly when no model was presented to them from on high to follow. It is all the more notable, therefore, that, come the turn of the century, a quite distinctive and long-lasting pattern of colonial administration was well on the way to being constructed.

It is of some assistance in tracing out this story to outline the fairly regular progression in the stages which led to the establishment of a remarkably common pattern of colonial government in each of the five

¹⁰ Hill on Berkeley to Salisbury, 16 May 1898, FO 2/155, but also a tirade against Wilson by Bishop Hanlon (Mill Hill Fathers) to Cardinal Vaughan, 5 Jan. 1898, FO 2/161.

¹¹ Colville to Hardinge, 18 Dec. 1893, FO 2/95; Gibb to Spire, 28 Dec. 1893, 24 Jan., Spire's Diary 25 Jan. 1894, Spire Papers (when read with Mrs Spire, Bishop's Cleeve, Cheltenham).

¹² E.g. Harlow & Chilver, eds., *East Africa*, p. 424.

¹³ Bovill & Askwith, *Owen*, p. 79.

kingdom areas which now comprised the core of the emerging 'Uganda'. Two of these stages preceded the assertion of alien hegemony. Together, they amounted to what may be termed 'impact': in the first place what may more specifically be called 'influence' – a tenuous 'impact' yet readily discernible, even so: as, for instance, in the 'influence' exercised in the 1870s and early 1880s by Sir John Kirk, the British Consul-General in Zanzibar, who, in conducting a considerable correspondence with rulers and chiefs in the East African interior, became a by-word there for distant power, or, in the present instance, in the 'influence' the British presence in Buganda in the early 1890s exercised over the courses pursued by Omugabe Ntare of Nkore in the final years of his reign. When influence became more marked, it became 'sway', as exemplified by the Zanzibar proverb that 'when they pipe in Zanzibar, they dance upon the lakes',¹⁴ and, in the present context, in the appeals which the contestants in the succession conflict in Nkore made in the mid 1890s to Kabaka Mwanga and his chiefs and to Wilson in Buganda. As Berkeley appositely put it in 1895 – three years prior to the posting of any British official there – 'In Ankoli, where king Mtali has recently died, the question of his successor has been practically referred to Uganda, and of course to this office.'¹⁵

Once, however, British hegemony came to be unequivocally asserted, 'influence' gave way to 'dominance'. Here there was often a progression through three successive stages, two of which punctuated most of the vortexes through which the new aggregations passed. First, there would be a clear intention to entrench the alien 'ascendancy', yet with little or no intention of exercising any ongoing role in the governance of the kingdom. In due course this would be overtaken by some ad hoc involvements in its internal affairs, a stage which I have earlier termed 'predominance'; while sooner or later there would be a final move towards a more ongoing form of what I here call 'control'. Alongside these two last stages, one can discern as well – in the conquered territory of Bunyoro – a much more draconian progression, through what I call 'mastery' to 'dictation'.¹⁶

Ordinarily, next to no instructions were issued to British officials placed in charge of a district as to how they should exercise their dominance. Two cardinal elements, however, in the extension of British

¹⁴ Coupland, *Exploitation*.

¹⁵ Berkeley to Salisbury, 18 Dec. 1895, FOCP 6827/288.

¹⁶ For my earlier discussion, see Low, *Lion Rampant*, pp. 30–3. For others' endorsement of this approach, see, e.g., Berman & Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley*, pp. 68–71, and C. W. Newbury, *Patrons, Clients*, p. 3.

imperial rule lay in their unquestioned assumption that it was indubitably legitimate, and that even the most inexperienced amongst them would instinctively know how it should be pursued. It is thus rare, at all events in the present instance, to come across any precise statement of how exactly dominance was to be exercised. Two statements, however, in the Uganda records illustrate what is here meant by 'ascendancy'. Both date from early 1896 when Commissioner Berkeley became anxious that the *de facto* dominance the British exercised over both Bunyoro and Toro had not as yet been authorised by their formal inclusion in the British Protectorate. Both replicated the circumlocution of the Anderson committee on which Berkeley himself had sat. The summary version went to Pulteney in Bunyoro on 25 April 1896. This read:

While, therefore, no local authorities or local law having been constituted in Unyoro since the expulsion of Kabarega, the *natives* of the country are, more or less technically, under the jurisdiction, more or less direct, & in the interests of public order & safety of the English officer commanding in Unyoro.¹⁷

The longer version, written the same day, went to Sitwell in Toro. Around one quarter of this declared that:

while the outside relations of Toro are entirely in our hands, its internal administration is not a matter in which we have assumed definite responsibilities or secured technically defined rights. But nevertheless it is clear that the good government, security & general progress of the district are matters in which we are directly interested, and it is equally certain that the local chiefs look to H.M. representative for guidance in their local affairs and recognise his general authority over them. The technical aspect of the case is one of which they have not the vaguest, if any, knowledge and you will, therefore, have no more difficult task than to maintain & strengthen your ready acquired authority by endeavouring to constantly increase your personal influence and not by relying upon any definite rights & privileges which in reality do not technically exist.¹⁸

When 'ascendancy' gave way to 'predominance', a closer engagement with local affairs was expected. In writing to Spire in Kavirondo in July 1894, Colville told him that: 'You should interfere as little as possible in local affairs, but should any case be brought before you for decision, you will settle it yourself.'¹⁹ And, in anticipation of a more active regime in Bunyoro, Berkeley told Ternan in September 1896 that, henceforth, the duties of a civilian official should consist: 'broadly speaking, of the superintendance & general direction of civil native administration by

¹⁷ Berkeley to Pulteney, 25 Apr. 1896, A5/2.

¹⁸ Berkeley to Sitwell, 25 Apr. 1896, A5/2.

¹⁹ Colville to Spire, 15 July 1894, Spire Papers.

the native authorities that would be constituted ... the settlement of disputes as to shambas [gardens], allocation of territory & c, the promulgation & enforcement of useful laws & regulations, & generally speaking the maintenance of justice & order'.²⁰

The fabrication of a more substantial form of colonial 'control' is hereafter the principal concern of this chapter.

As the prototype here emerged in Buganda, its precursors warrant attention. Back in the mid 1880s, aggressive European intrusions on the East African coast had exercised a dire 'influence' on the newly installed Kabaka Mwanga, as Bishop Hannington learnt at the cost of his life.²¹ Thereafter when, in December 1890, Lugard entered Buganda, it soon fell under his 'sway', as his insistence upon securing a treaty from Mwanga, on building Kampala Fort, and in mobilising his mercenaries to check a Catholic-Protestant clash all indicated. He did nothing, however, in those first few months, to establish his dominance over Buganda, as Mwanga demonstrated by his open defiance of him early in 1892 on Lugard's return from the west. That only occurred with Lugard's raw assertion of British hegemony in the ensuing Battle of Mengo, his subsequent imposition of a religio-political settlement upon the country, and his extraction of a second treaty from Mwanga in April 1892.

Even then, however, both Lugard and his immediate successors Williams, Portal and, to begin with, Macdonald never exercised anything more than a British 'ascendancy' over Buganda, principally because of their preoccupation with the three warring religio-political parties in the country. It was only after the middle of 1893 when Macdonald had suppressed the Muslim threat, and with the conclusion of what in [Chapter 5](#) was called Buganda's Confrontation III,²² that a further change occurred. This first found expression in the adjudications Macdonald proceeded to make in a miscellany of local cases involving assault, wife desertion, murder, land disputes, arms trafficking, slave trading and so on. His successor, Colvile, at first acted similarly, and so began to exercise a British 'predominance' over Buganda.²³ Colvile, however, became anxious that he and his officers should not become too closely involved in such matters, and in April 1894 told a subordinate that 'it is no part of our business to hear cases in first instance only

²⁰ Berkeley to Ternan, 15 Sept. 1896, A5/2.

²¹ See [Ch. 3](#) above, p. 65.

²² See [Ch. 5](#), pp. 148–9.

²³ For up to forty-one 'Case' reports (no. 41, 15 Aug. 1894), see A3/1; ESA Interviews Book, 10, 25, 26 Jan.; Arthur to Colvile, 2 May 1894, ESA Colvile's message book; Colvile, *Nile Springs*, pp. 60–3.

appeals'.²⁴ That same month, moreover, he removed himself to Entebbe on the Victoria lakeshore,²⁵ where, having acquired a large grant of land from Kakungulu,²⁶ he established the Protectorate's capital twenty miles distant from the Kabaka's headquarters, and thereby effectively distanced both himself and his successors as Commissioner from any day-to-day involvement in the governance of the kingdom.²⁷

In moving to Entebbe, however, it became necessary to appoint someone to take charge of Kampala Fort.²⁸ Colvile's first appointee was Captain Gibb.²⁹ But, wracked by rheumatism, Gibb was replaced in August 1894 (such was the shortage of officials) by one of the doctors, an elderly and tactless man named Ansonge.³⁰ And thereupon there ensued what could well have been a determinative four months in the fabrication of the future Protectorate. For, aside from a fortnight's overlap with Gibb so as 'to learn the ropes',³¹ Ansonge received no instructions, and in their absence immediately struck out on his own. His threshold task was to oversee the Sudanese garrison in the Fort, and the squalid 'Swahili Town' close by. In that role he soon took steps to establish a police force and reorder the town's street pattern.³² He also embarked³³ upon a programme of imposing a plethora of sentences, principally upon its delinquent inhabitants: of up to fifty lashes for assault or theft,³⁴ thirty to forty for desertion, arms trading and fighting in the market; together with various amounts of time in his chain gang;³⁵ while sending those accused of murder or manslaughter for trial by Colvile in Entebbe.³⁶

²⁴ Colvile to Arthur, 24 Apr. 1894, ESA Colvile's message book.

²⁵ Portal, *Mission*, pp. 230–2. After first Colvile and then Johnston built residences there, the Secretariat building was constructed in 1903, while the eventual Government House was completed in 1908: Thomas & Scott, *Uganda*, p. 425.

²⁶ ESA Interviews Book, 13 Apr.; Colvile to Cracknall, 15 Apr. 1894, FO 2/71; Wilson to Ternan, 18 Feb. 1897, A4/7.

²⁷ Because of Buganda's key importance, this disjunction later caused difficulties, which Berkeley sought to iron out: Berkeley to Wilson, 30 Sept. 1896, A5/2.

²⁸ ESA Colvile's minute book, *passim*.

²⁹ ESA Interviews Book, 10, 18, 25–26 Jan. 1894.

³⁰ Ansonge, *African Sun*, Ch. 9; Ansonge to Colvile, 1, 19 Oct. 1894, A2/3; Jackson to Hill, 20 Apr. 1895, FO 2/92.

³¹ Ansonge to Colvile, 19 Oct. 1894, A2/3.

³² Ansonge to Colvile, 1, 12, 22 Oct. 21, 22 Nov. 1894, A2/3; Walker to IW, 5 Jan. 1895, WP.

³³ Ansonge to Colvile, 19 Oct. 1894, A2/3.

³⁴ Ansonge to Colvile, 24 Sept., 1, 3, 5, 12, 15, 26 Oct., 26, 30 Nov. 1894, A2/3. The instrument used was ordinarily made of hippopotamus hide.

³⁵ Ansonge to Colvile, 24 Sept., 17 Oct., 7, 12, 30 Nov. 1894; for Kagwa's unavailing questioning of flogging, see, 3 Oct. 1894, A2/3.

³⁶ Ansonge to Colvile, 15 Sept., 10, 19 Oct. 1894, A2/3.

This plunge into an overtly judicial role began by being welcomed by the Baganda leaders for the assistance it provided in resolving some of their own disputes.³⁷ Already, early in 1894, Mwanga and his senior chiefs had openly sought a decision from a quite junior British official in an important child abduction case.³⁸ In September 1894, with the full concurrence of Katikiro Kagwa, one of the Buganda Princesses appealed to Anson to support in a case Kagwa was hearing against one of her former lovers for the murder of her mother's brother. The defendant was avowing that the man had been killed by a mob for thieving, and Kagwa was insisting that nobody should be convicted for the crime in case others should shun a hue and cry in the future.³⁹ Sometimes, in conjunction with the Kabaka, Kagwa himself referred such cases to Anson,⁴⁰ including a complicated rape charge by another Princess.⁴¹ All of which led Anson, before long, to characterise his role as that of a District Judge, presiding over a District Court, which had regulated days and hours for sittings, along with a fixed schedule of fees.⁴²

Had developments along these lines, from Macdonald through, initially, Colvile and on to Anson,⁴³ been extrapolated thereafter throughout the emerging Uganda Protectorate, it could well have found itself subject to a very different pattern of colonial government from that which eventuated. It would have approximated more to the Indian system of District Magistrates, paralleled by Collectors, or a combination of the two of them. In that event, it is difficult to see what place could have been found for Uganda's indigenous structures of government in the future operations of colonial rule.

In pursuing his course, Anson, however, precipitated a major crisis. For, in a number of cases, he soon proceeded in a way which deeply offended the Baganda leaders.⁴⁴ Early in his time, he sentenced the

³⁷ Two cases which Mugwanya, the Catholic Katikiro, took up were resolved in his favour: Macdonald to Mugwanya, 18 Sept., 19 Nov. 1893, Case No. 31, 4 Dec. 1894, A2/3; Mugwanya to Macdonald, 19 Nov., A2/1; ESA Interviews Book, 20 Nov. 1893 (see also 10 Jan. 1894).

³⁸ Hirth to Colvile, 17 Jan. 1894, A2/2; ESA Interviews Book, 18 Jan. 1894.

³⁹ Hirth to Colvile, 26 Sept. 1894, A2/3.

⁴⁰ Anson to Colvile, 24 Sept., 5, 17, 19, 26, 29 Oct., 13 Nov. 1894, A2/3.

⁴¹ Anson to Colvile, 30 Nov. 1894, A2/3.

⁴² Anson to Colvile, 19, 22 Oct. 1894, A2/3. He also sought to inaugurate the registration of civil marriages and produce a Gazette: 26, 31 Oct. 1894, A2/3; and to require purchasers of land to pay a fee to the administration: Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 77–8.

⁴³ For his report on five 'District Court' cases he heard on one day, see Anson to Colvile, 13 Nov. 1894, A2/3.

⁴⁴ For the ensuing episodes, see Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 176–8; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 74–81; Walker to IW, 2 Dec. 1894, 3 Jan. 1895, WP; Walker to Baylis, 30 Dec. 1894,

Sekikubo, a subordinate chief, along with his accomplices, to severe floggings and several months in his chain gang for selling powder in Busoga, and fined their much respected overlord, and prominent Protestant religious leader, Samwiri Mukasa, for having failed to control their activities. Kagwa, along with a number of associates, vehemently protested to Colvile that it was altogether improper for a chief to be punished for the acts of his subordinates; while leading Protestant missionaries pleaded for Mukasa as well – in the end successfully.⁴⁵ Ansonge followed this up a few weeks later with a charge against one of Mwangwa's concubines for assaulting a Lendu woman. Whilst the accusation was probably well warranted, the senior chiefs objected to a person of her status being treated like an ordinary malefactor.⁴⁶ There then followed an even more contentious case when Ansonge arraigned a respected chief, the Musalalalo, upon a charge of bribing some Sudanese soldiers into selling him a rifle, then sentencing him to a year's hard labour and a reduction in his status to that of a peasant. This time Kagwa and his associates journeyed to Entebbe to protest to Colvile in person. Archdeacon Walker of the Church Missionary Society joined in their appeal, and in the end Colvile acceded to it.⁴⁷

All of this was then capped by a major episode in December 1894 when, amid a flurry of unverifiable rumours, Ansonge concluded that a man named Mudima was stirring up a revolt at the capital, and, at dead of night, went to arrest him. It was only with the intervention of the two Katikiros and the Kabaka in the small hours of the morning that open conflict was avoided.⁴⁸ Cumulatively, by the end of 1894, these episodes had generated such tension, between the Baganda around the capital

G3 A5/011; Jackson to Hill, 20 Apr. 1895, FO 2/92; Walker to Buxton, 30 Oct. 1894, FOCP/236; Colvile to Foreign Office, [2 Apr. 1895], Aborigines Protection Society to Kimberley, 10 Apr., Colvile Memo, 12 Apr. 1895, FOCP 6717/3, 39, 50.

⁴⁵ Ansonge to Colvile, 23, 28 Sept., 3 Oct.; Walker to Colvile, 28 Sept., 2 Oct.; Kagwa, etc., to Colvile, 28 Sept., A2/3; Walker to Ashe, 28 Sept., WP; Walker to Baylis, 28 Oct. 1894, G3 A5/011. For Ansonge's further disputes with the Protestant missionaries, see Ansonge to Colvile, 3, 10, 15, 31 Oct., Pilkington to Ansonge, 8, 9, 10 Oct., Pilkington to Colvile, 8, 15 Oct., Ansonge to Pilkington, 9, 10 Oct., Colvile to Pilkington, 12 Oct., Ansonge to Walker, 31 Oct., Walker to Ansonge, 30 Oct. 1894, A2/3; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 176.

⁴⁶ Ansonge, *African Sun*, pp. 128–9; Ansonge to Colvile, 3, 26 Oct. 1894, A2/3; Buxton to Grey, 27 Mar., and enc., FOCP 6693/292; Colvile to Foreign Office, 2 Apr. 1895, FOCP 6717/3.

⁴⁷ Ansonge to Colvile, 22, 25 Oct., Walker to Colvile, [25 Oct.], 2 Nov., Walker to Ansonge, 30 Oct., Ansonge to Walker, 30 Oct., A2/3; Walker to LGW, 29 Oct., 2 Mar., Walker to Ashe, 15 Nov. 1894, WP; Walker to Jackson, 3 Jan. 1895, A6/1; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 177.

⁴⁸ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 177–8; Ansonge, *African Sun*, pp. 137–41; Ansonge to Colvile, 18, 19, Wilson to Jackson, 27 Dec. 1894, A2/3; Jackson to Dunning, 4 Jan. 1895, A5/1.

and the British officials and the British missionaries in the country, that a gravely disruptive situation could all too easily have resulted.⁴⁹

As it was, at the end of December 1894, the British position was quite fortuitously saved by an urgent summons for Anson's medical services in Entebbe where Colvile lay seriously ill. In Kampala he was thereupon replaced by the Australian First Class Assistant for transport, George Wilson, who speedily recognised the pressing necessity of assuaging the animosity Anson had generated. Helped by his conciliatory manner and by his fluency in the lingua franca, Swahili, he adroitly managed to calm the scene.⁵⁰ Whilst proceeding with Anson's plan to create a local police force, he immediately set aside any thought of acting like a District Judge, and, to the considerable satisfaction of the Baganda leaders,⁵¹ soon set about finding some more acceptable way by which British dominance over their country could be exercised.⁵²

In so doing, he was particularly moved by three considerations. He was much impressed by the efficacy of the formal gatherings of leading chiefs at the Kabaka's court, which had long constituted the Buganda 'Lukiko'.⁵³ Every European visitor to Buganda, from Speke in the 1860s onwards, had attended these assemblies, presided over by successive Kabakas, where large and small matters of state were eagerly discussed, and where the Kabaka's ultimate decisions, often as between life and death, were pronounced. 'It is one in its methodical management', Wilson later noted, 'peculiar to [Buganda] alone among all the native races in East Africa'.⁵⁴

It did not, however, fully meet his requirements. Back in 1890–1, Lugard had regularly attended what his diary called (after the Swahili version) the 'barza', 'bursa' or 'baraza' at the Kabaka's court, and had there conducted most of his business with the Baganda leaders.⁵⁵ After his establishment of British hegemony in 1892, however, he moved to having 'the burza on all important matters *here* [i.e. at Kampala Fort]. Mwangi's "Burza"', he now declared, 'is no longer the Law-Court (*that*

⁴⁹ Walker to Colvile, 2 Nov., A2/3; Walker to Baylis, 30 Dec. 1894, G3 A5/011; Wilson to Lugard, 8 June 1895, LP s. 45.

⁵⁰ Jackson to Hill, 20 Apr. 1895, FO 2/92. The Kampala garrison consisted of Wilson, 121 Sudanese troops and 25 Sudanese police, 32 'Swahilis' and 133 local labourers: Kampala Monthly State, 1 Feb. 1895, A2/3.

⁵¹ Walker to BWW, 5 Jan., 20 Sept., WP; Wilson to Lugard, 19 Jan. 1895, LP s. 45; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 81–2; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 178.

⁵² At a preliminary meeting on 31 Jan. 1895, he seems, however, to have annoyed the Kabaka: Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 178.

⁵³ CMS, C. T. Wilson's Diary, 1878–80, vividly recounts the frequency with which Mutesa held it, and its importance in the government of the kingdom.

⁵⁴ Other than the coastal Arabs: Wilson to Elgin, 6 Feb. 1906, CO 536/5.

⁵⁵ LD II, pp. 29–140 (Dec. 1890 – Apr. 1891).

is now *here*) but merely a pageant'.⁵⁶ Upon this matter, his immediate successors were not so single-minded. Colvile, for example, in promulgating the transfer of territory from Bunyoro to Buganda, did so at 'a baraza at the King's palace',⁵⁷ while Anson never seems to have held a Baraza at the Fort at all. Mwanga meantime continued to operate through his Lukiko,⁵⁸ while, at the same time, along with a considerable body of retainers, periodically visiting the British official in Kampala Fort so as to canvass some issue with him – as Kagwa did too.⁵⁹ All of which led to the conclusion (as Berkeley was to note) that 'among the masses there still existed a good deal of doubt as to where real authority lay, and on what lines it was exercised'.⁶⁰

That uncertainty was made all the worse for Wilson not merely because the 'Catholic Katikiro scarcely appeared [at the Fort] at all', but because considerable sectarian animosity still pervaded the Protestant and Catholic parties in the country. This was epitomised when, shortly after his appointment, the Catholic chiefs called on him in a body to excoriate the Protestant leaders for seeking to expel a Catholic holder from his land. Wilson immediately determined to tackle this situation head-on, and thereupon summoned the chiefs of both parties to a meeting, from which he refused to allow them to disperse till, after 'a four hours struggle', they had reached a decision in accordance with 'their own Native laws'. 'These circumstances led me', he later wrote, 'to consider what scheme would provide the necessary controlling power over the [Buganda] Council without creating jealous apprehension that we were aiming at relieving the Chiefs of their legitimate responsibilities. I decided to supplement the purely Native Lukiko by an official Council which was known as the Baraza'.⁶¹

In doing so he established a two-tiered structure of colonial rule which, whilst sustaining the role of 'the purely Native Council where all native questions are dealt with', reserved 'for the Barazza all matters or cases ... requiring the intervention of the government', while at the same time providing that all 'the public business between the Administration and the native authorities' should be settled there as well.⁶²

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, III, p. 212; see also pp. 188, 196, 198.

⁵⁷ ESA Interviews Book, 9 Apr. 1894.

⁵⁸ E.g. *LD* III, pp. 163, 275; Anson to Colvile, 28 Sept., 26 Oct. 1894, A2/3.

⁵⁹ E.g. ESA Interviews Book, 3 Oct., 22 Nov., 6, 7, 9 Dec. 1893, 19 Mar., 10 Apr. 1894.

⁶⁰ Berkeley to Salisbury, 26 Jan. 1897, FOCP 6964/47.

⁶¹ Wilson to Elgin, 6 Feb. 1906, CO 536/5. For some other later reflections, see Wilson to Johnston, 16 Oct. 1900, A12/1.

⁶² Wilson to Jackson, 10 Feb., A4/1; Jackson to Wilson, 14 Feb. 1895, A5/1; Berkeley to Salisbury, 26 Jan. 1897, FOCP 6964/47. Berkeley once paid a courtesy call on

So as to dramatise his decision, he arranged that the Baganda should erect a large reed and thatch building inside the Fort at Kampala, where the 'Kampala Baraza' (as alternatively it was called) would be held, whose meetings the Kabaka and his senior chiefs were expected to attend every Monday.⁶³ Two ornate chairs were there placed on a dias, one for the Kabaka, the other for the principal British official, who 'in conjunction with the Kabaka' presided over the meeting.⁶⁴ Wilson insisted that these Barazas should be held in full public view (and as many as 2,000 people did attend), while he was careful to ensure that all of the different parties in the country had a full and fair hearing.⁶⁵

These arrangements proved to be very acceptable to the Baganda leaders,⁶⁶ who, in conjunction with Wilson, proceeded to employ them in a renewed thrust towards a new order. In March 1894, amidst vigorous discussion, they began to promulgate through the Baraza a whole series of 'Kampala Lukiko Laws'.⁶⁷ 'It may be', so a later British report explained, 'that the Administration suggests the need for legislation in a particular question, and indicates the lines on which it might most advantageously be provided'. Yet the initiative frequently came from the Baganda side. Before long it was arranged that each 'draft statute' should be read at three successive Barazas (shades of the British Parliament) before being submitted to the British Commissioner for his approval. Thereupon it became 'law',⁶⁸ and was duly recorded in two books, one in Luganda, the other in English.

Over the ensuing year, laws⁶⁹ were passed against slave trading,⁷⁰ wife beating, the taking of 'children, wives, slaves etc. as ransom' for debt,⁷¹ adultery, gambling in public, and meetings of chiefs without the Kabaka's or a British officer's permission. They were also promulgated

Mwanga's Lukiko, but not for any business: Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 188; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 102. For a later extended exposition, see *Uganda Notes* (Nov. 1904).

⁶³ Kampala Lukiko Laws signed by Mwanga, the two Katikiros and three other chiefs and Jackson: Lukiko minute book, 3 Apr. 1895 (Makerere Institute of Social Research). For a list of ninety chiefs that were selected to review trials, see Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 189.

⁶⁴ Grant to Lugard, 10 Nov. 1895, LP s. 45.

⁶⁵ Wilson to Elgin, 6 Feb. 1906, CO 536/5; Berkeley to Salisbury, 26 Jan. 1897, FOCP 6967/47.

⁶⁶ But not to Mwanga, who resented having to attend the Kampala Baraza: Miti, 'Buganda', 2, p. 138.

⁶⁷ Kampala Lukiko Laws, Lukiko minute book, 3 Apr. 1895. For Wilson's summary, see Wilson to Lugard, 12 Sept. 1895, LP s. 45.

⁶⁸ Berkeley to Salisbury, 26 Jan. 1897, FOCP 6964/47; see also Walker to LGW, 31 Dec. 1895, WP.

⁶⁹ On one occasion, Jackson as acting Commissioner approved eighteen laws: Lukiko minute book, 7 Sept. 1895.

⁷⁰ Walker to LGW, 31 Dec. 1895, WP.

⁷¹ Walker to LGW, 2 Mar. 1895, WP.

for the management of markets and the Nile crossings, for the digging of deep pit latrines, and for the appointment of a Kabaka's representative at every British fort.⁷² Following a meeting with Mwanga and eight leading chiefs in July 1895, Wilson further arranged that the roads radiating out of the capital should be repaired; that rest camps should be built; and that Baganda rather than coastal porters should henceforth carry the government's loads. He secured approval too for the registration of customary marriages, and (so as to counter the personal prejudices of Mwanga, and the partisan stances of the two Katikiros) for the appointment by the Kabaka of three grades of judges, 'the Chief Justices being the two Katikiros and the Mahomedan chief who are to act together to hear appeals and try first class cases',⁷³ a decision which seems to have markedly reduced their sectarian propensities.⁷⁴

Over the course of the following year, further laws were passed decreeing that Saza chiefs should spend four months in their Sazas and four months at the capital, alternating with their official Mumyukas (lieutenants); that all executive orders should be countersigned by the Kabaka, the two Katikiros and three Saza chiefs; that 'these words "Protestanti" and "Katoliki"' not be used;⁷⁵ and that each Saza chief should have a book in which laws would be copied, so as 'to acquaint the people in the interior with a knowledge of the statutes already passed through their own Public Baraza'.⁷⁶ Wilson took steps as well to introduce the private ownership of land. He arranged for the registration of lands held by the Kabaka, his chiefs and the missions, but also ordained that other land should be set aside as 'public land', 'which cannot be dealt with but by the King in his Council, with the approval or consent, or by the direction of the Commissioner'.⁷⁷ As a consequence of these arrangements, Wilson effectively established British 'control' over the Buganda

⁷² Lukiko minute book, 1895–6, *passim*. For eighteen laws, see Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, Ch. 22.

⁷³ Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, Ch. 22; Wilson to Jackson, 3 (2), 6 July 1895, A4/2; Lukiko minute book, 28 Jan. 1896; Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 97.

⁷⁴ Berkeley to Salisbury, 26 Jan. 1895, FOCP 6964/47. Berkeley and Wilson were generally pleased with the way the system was operating: Wilson to Berkeley, 8 May, 18 Aug., A4/5; Berkeley to Wilson, 16 Apr., 14 May, 30 Sept., A5/2; Walker, 15 Jan. 1896, CMS Annual Letters 1895, pp. 596–8; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 190. For part of Miti's commentary on its workings, see 'Buganda', 2, pp. 103–16.

⁷⁵ Lukiko minute book, 19 Jan. 1896. Kagwa states that the 'executive order' law was only enacted on 12 Sept. 1896 and that it contained provision for an appeal: *Basekabaka*, pp. 188–9.

⁷⁶ Wilson to Berkeley, 8 May 1896, A4/5. See also Wilson to Berkeley, 7 Feb. 1896, A4/4.

⁷⁷ Berkeley to Salisbury, 26 Jan. 1897, FOCP 6964/47.

kingdom, and, moreover, did so to the general approbation of a majority of Buganda's leaders.⁷⁸

The outbreak of Mwanga's revolt in mid 1897 quite suddenly, however, threatened these whole arrangements. On the day Mwanga fled, Wilson managed to hold a Baraza with some 200 chiefs, and in Mwanga's absence over the next two years not only succeeded in having the country 'run by the Baraza of first-class chiefs', but, in a seminal move, introduced the further arrangement of 'running the show with the two Katikiros and Kago'.⁷⁹

As soon as, two years later, it eventually became clear that Mwanga's revolt, the Sudanese mutiny and the elongated conflict with Bunyoro were finally petering out – and following considerable criticism in Britain –⁸⁰ the next step was taken by Sir Clement Hill in London when, in April 1899, he urged his superiors to 'send out a first-class man to Uganda ... [to] put things on a sound footing for the future'.⁸¹ Eventually this led to the appointment of Sir Harry Johnston as Special Commissioner in Uganda. That brought to the embryonic Uganda a major imperial figure to cast his stamp on its future pattern of governance.⁸²

By contrast with his predecessors, Johnston was issued with some outline instructions. His own principal concern following his earlier experience as British Commissioner for South Central Africa (1891–6) was to institute a land settlement before any alien European influx reached Uganda, and, in so doing, to ensure that all existing African occupation of land, together with reasonable room for further expansion, should be assured for the future – while at the same time annexing all remaining land as 'Crown land', for sale or lease as 'one of the assets of the Uganda Protectorate'.⁸³ Meanwhile, his formal instructions particularly enjoined him to 'pay special attention to the possibilities of raising the present revenue, whether by Hut Tax or otherwise'.⁸⁴ Having

⁷⁸ Ibid. Mwanga asked Berkeley to advise on the etiquette to use on receiving foreign visitors: Wilson to Berkeley, 1 Feb. 1896, A4/4. Kagwa wrote effusively to Lugard, 4 July 1896: Low, *Mind of Buganda*, pp. 12–13. Archdeacon Walker was well pleased too: Walker, 25 Jan. 1896, CMS Annual Letters 1895, pp. 596–8.

⁷⁹ They were also Regents of the infant Kabaka Daudi Chwa: Wilson to Lugard, 22 Mar. 1899, LP.

⁸⁰ E.g. *Parliamentary Debates*, 3 Mar. 1898, 4th ser., Vol. LIV, cols. 504–45; *The Times*, 24 Nov. 1897, 23 Jan. 1899; *Times Weekly*, 27 Mar. 1899.

⁸¹ Minutes on draft of Foreign Office to Treasury, 29 Apr. 1899, FO 2/235.

⁸² Of the ilk of Lawrence (Punjab), Swettenham (Malaya), Gordon (Fiji); see Ch. 1. See also *Johnston*, Ch. 10; Johnston to Salisbury, 31 Aug. 1899, and minutes, FO 2/203.

⁸³ Johnston to Salisbury, 13 Oct. 1899, FO 2/204.

⁸⁴ Salisbury to Johnston, 1 July 1899, FO 2/200.

(as he was to say) failed in Central Africa 'to institute the government of the natives through the native chiefs', with the result 'that we were obliged to take into our own hands the direct government of the natives',⁸⁵ he now made it his purpose to divide the country into manageable sub-divisions for administrative and tax-collecting purposes, over which he would appoint chiefs who would act under the immediate authority of British officials.

Following some preliminary contacts with the then eastern part of his 'Uganda Protectorate', he reached Kampala on 20 December 1899, and was received with much ceremony.⁸⁶ He met with the Anglican and Roman Catholic missionaries, and three days later had a lengthy meeting with the Buganda Regents, at which he outlined his plans for a land settlement and the levying of taxes. At this stage, he apparently did not think these would present any difficulty as he immediately departed for the Protectorate's capital at Entebbe, having told one of his associates he would be in Buganda for only 'about three weeks'; 'After that I shall be obliged to continue my tour of inspection.'⁸⁷

In the course of the following week, the Buganda Regents considered his remarks with considerable care, and then sent him a generally conciliatory letter in which they said that, whilst they hoped he would be lenient in the application of his proposals, they were on the whole acceptable. Sensing, however, that he had not paid adequate attention to the importance of their existing structure of government, they cautiously requested that, as they were 'not yet used to carrying out the orders of the Queen', they should be allowed to 'proceed slowly in all spheres'. 'This indeed', they explained, 'is the reason for our begging you to leave us to rule so that we may under your tutelage rule wisely' – for otherwise, 'we who are called friends of the Queen are afraid of losing respect for this will make some people laugh at us'. On seeing this, Archdeacon Walker of the Anglican mission immediately glossed this to say: 'Then as regards the whole country belonging to the Queen, and that in future there will be no King or Chiefs or Native government, this they say, is such a big matter that they cannot grasp it at all.'

With his mind fastened upon dividing up the country into a series of sub-divisions for tax and administrative purposes under the direct aegis of British officials, Johnston quite missed the point here. He proceeded

⁸⁵ Johnston to Roscoe, 25 Apr. 1900, A7/6.

⁸⁶ For a much more extensive account, where full references will be found, of the events in Buganda which followed, see D.A. Low, 'The Making and Implementation of the Uganda Agreement of 1900', in D.A. Low & R.C. Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule 1900–1955. Two Studies* (London, 1960), Part 1.

⁸⁷ Johnston to Ternan, 3 Nov. 1899, A5/8.

instead to send a long letter to Jackson in Kampala, in which he set out his proposals in greater detail, and then told him to present these to the Regents 'in a conversational manner'. Along with innumerable details concerning the abolition of tributes from surrounding countries, mineral rights and so on, he here outlined his lands policy. While all forests, 'waste' and uncultivated land would, he said, be set aside 'at all times to meet the expenses of the Uganda Government', 'each great Chief or Land owner should have attributed to him an estate proportionate to his requirements ... But the remainder of the land which is at present under tribal ownership, occupied and cultivated by bakopi [peasants] will be vested in a Board of Trustees to be composed of native chiefs and European officials.'⁸⁸

He proceeded too to specify that, whilst he would 'confirm as Chief of each county the native chief already recognised by the local government', he would expect them to reside in their counties under the auspices of a British official who would check on their administrative efficiency and their tax collections. Rather than authorising them to retain a percentage of the tax they collected, as he had originally proposed, they would now, he said, be paid an annual salary of £200, together with larger amounts as appropriate for the Kabaka, the Regents and Prince Mbogo, the Muslim leader.

As instructed, Jackson called a meeting with the two Katikiros in the Baraza Hall in Kampala on 13 January 1900. This was attended as well by two important Saza chiefs, the Mukwenda of Singo and the Kago of Kyaddondo, and by representatives of the Anglican and Roman Catholic missions. Paragraph by paragraph, Jackson read out Johnston's letter.

Before very long there was a major outburst. For even Walker, who was doing the translating, took Johnston to be saying that he intended 'to pension off the King and a few of the principal chiefs, and take over the whole country himself and govern it according to English ideas' – an interpretation which, in view of Johnston's reiterated instructions to officials elsewhere in the Protectorate,⁸⁹ and his jaundiced memories of his failing to govern 'through the native chiefs' in British Central Africa,⁹⁰ was very close to the mark. The result was that, in a very short while, the chiefs stormed out of the meeting, proclaiming as they went: 'What have we done to be treated like this? Why does the Government

⁸⁸ Johnston to Jackson, 5 Jan. 1900, ESA Secretariat Minute Paper (SMP) C450.

⁸⁹ Johnston to acting Sub-Commissioner, Unyoro, 6 Feb., to Macallister, 13, to Bagge, 14 Apr., A5/9; to Collector, Iganga, 24 Oct. 1900, A11/1.

⁹⁰ Johnston to Roscoe, 25 Apr. 1900, A7/6.

of the Queen wish to tear up all past agreements between the Kabaka and the Queen?’

The close alliance between the British and the principal Baganda leaders suddenly looked to be in grave danger of falling completely apart.

In the course of the next few days there was much perturbation. Jackson railed against ‘the imaginary glory of their great [Buganda] nation’, while Johnston dismissed the chiefs’ objections as ‘merely sentimental’. Nevertheless it was soon agreed that they should commit their detailed objections to writing. Thereupon, Walker found himself translating their eight foolscap pages into English. Like Johnston, the Buganda leaders canvassed a great range of issues. Eventually, however, they came to their central points:

We gather ... that our Kabaka is being set aside as the Government will rule the country without a king. We would ... ask if our council is abolished ... Perhaps you will ask why the Lukiko should not be abolished? Many of our neighbours have repeatedly warned us that the Europeans will possess our country, but we ... pointed out that ... the Europeans, although powerful, respect our customs for the sake of friendly relations ... We would ask you what is to be done about the Bakungu and other Chiefs? ... These Chiefs are not included in the £200 category of Saza Chiefs ... Will they rank as Bakopi [peasants]? ... These chiefs ... number 783 ... We also wish to know if the capital is no longer to be known as such. Each Saza Chief, we gather, is to remain and will no longer leave his saza and the European officer there ... what will make a Saza Chief attend at the capital in future? There will no longer be a Kabaka or Council which made him come up in the past. We would also enquire the reason which has prompted the Queen to degrade her faithful and loyal subjects ... The Queen’s representative, who came to this country before, had assured us that as long as we remain loyal, we shall retain our Kabaka and our honour.⁹¹

Jackson and Johnston both at first remained dismissive. ‘Their pride, Jackson wrote, ‘has received a severe shock which will do them good’, while Johnson labelled their concerns ‘peevish nonsense’. In an even longer letter to Jackson, in which he prided himself that he had landed ‘one or two knocks on the thick skulls of the Uganda Nobility’, Johnston nevertheless eventually faced up to the Regents’ points:

Where have I said in any of my communications ... that their king would not be called King any longer? ... As to the Lukiko: where have I said that it was to be dissolved? ... So far from wishing to set it aside I should like to strengthen it and make it a more useful institution than it is at present ... As to the 783 Nobleman ... Well, each of them will be granted an absolute possession of the estate, on which he lives.⁹²

⁹¹ Regents to Johnston, 15 Jan. 1900, ESA SMP C450.

⁹² Johnston’s, ‘Reply ...’, 14 Jan. 1900, SMP.

Having thus robustly countered Johnston's failure to acknowledge the importance of Buganda's central institutions of government, the two Katikiros accepted his invitation, at the beginning of February 1900, to meet him in Entebbe. Accompanied this time not only by the Mukwenda and the Kago but by the senior Catholic Saza chief, the Pokino of Buddu, and the Muslim leader, Prince Mbogo, they thereupon thrashed out, over the course of 'two field days', what Johnston was soon calling 'the future constitution of the Kingdom of [Buganda]'. That was then embodied in the twenty-two clauses of the ensuing Uganda Agreement of 1900.⁹³

To Johnston, Article 6 made the pivotal statement that:

So long as the Kabaka, chiefs and people of [Buganda] shall conform to the laws and regulations instituted for their governance by Her Majesty's Government, and shall co-operate loyally with Her Majesty's Government in the organization and administration of the said Kingdom of Uganda, Her Majesty's Government agrees to recognize the Kabaka of Uganda as the native ruler of the province of [Buganda] under Her Majesty's protection and overrule.

For the chiefs, two outcomes were especially important. One (to which we shall come) related to their utter determination to secure unequivocal British recognition of their traditional institutions of government as these had by now evolved, as against Johnston's plans for the division of the country into administrative sub-divisions. The other related to two important aspects of Johnston's land proposals. Assisted by leading Anglican missionaries, the chiefs persuaded Johnston that there was no independent peasantry in Buganda. As a consequence, the Agreement made no reference to his earlier proposal for a British-chaired Board of Trustees which would have oversight of peasant-occupied land. He agreed, moreover, to an increase in the number of 'chiefs and private landowners' who would receive estates from the earlier estimate of 783 to 1,000. Upon both matters, he met their wishes in full.

All this while, the situation back in Kampala and elsewhere in the country had become highly charged. Upon their return from Entebbe, the chiefs, however, successfully persuaded the majority of their senior colleagues that the Agreement they had now negotiated met all of their essential requirements and should be accepted. Thereupon the English text was printed, whilst Walker busied himself translating it into Luganda. Once that was done, on 10 March 1900 at a large gathering

⁹³ As the British were still employing the Swahili spelling and pronunciation, this was called the 'Uganda' Agreement when it only applied to Buganda, and should thus have more properly been called the 'Buganda Agreement'. It never was!

in the Baraza Hall in Kampala, to which the four-year-old Kabaka Daudi Chwa was borne by his six-foot-tall personal carrier, the Uganda Agreement of 1900 was signed by Johnston and eight Baganda leaders, and witnessed by twenty other chiefs, three British officials and four prominent missionaries.⁹⁴

Over the next few years, the new taxation system was brought into operation, while, over the next ten, effect was given to the new land settlement. In the event, the land allocations were made in square miles. It thus became known as the 'mailo' system. Formally it set aside 10,550 square miles of Buganda's territory as Crown Land, leaving 9,000 to be divided, on a descending scale, between the Kabaka, other members of the royal family, the Regents and Saza chiefs (half of whose allocations was tied to their offices), and, in the end, to as many as 4,000 other 'Chiefs and private landowners'. That served to lock in the leading followers of the two Christian parties to the settlement, whilst, since all grants were made in freehold, they effectively tied an endowed aristocracy to the British connection.⁹⁵

On the key issue of the future of Buganda's rulership and the operation of the Lukiko, the chiefs overwhelmingly achieved their purposes and, in the end, Johnston went out of his way to meet their concerns. As a consequence, they pulled off four striking triumphs. In the first place, the Agreement was assiduously pivoted upon 'His Highness the Kabaka', who, as Article 6 put it, 'under Her Majesty's protection and overrule shall exercise direct rule over the natives' of Buganda. The Kabaka's concurrence, moreover, was to be required in the appointment of chiefs and of 'notables' to the Lukiko; in the endorsement of laws and resolutions; in the imposition of local taxation; and in cases of capital punishment. In giving prominence to the Kabakaship, the Agreement thus gave full recognition to the pristine polity of which, for the Baganda, it was the chief expression.

Secondly, despite Jackson, Johnston and the Baganda leaders using the Baraza Hall in Kampala Fort as their principal place of contact, there was no mention in the Agreement of the Official (or Kampala) Baraza. That may well have been due to the absence on leave, at the time of its negotiations, of its architect, Wilson,⁹⁶ but since there is nothing to

⁹⁴ For the text, see Low & Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule*, Appendix II, or N. Turton, J.B. Griffin & A.W. Lewey, *Laws of the Uganda Protectorate*, Vol. VI, *Native Agreements and Buganda Native Laws* (London, 1936), pp. 1373–87.

⁹⁵ In addition to Low, 'Making and Implementation', in Low & Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule*, pp. 106–28, see H.B. Thomas & A.E. Spencer, *A History of Uganda Land and Surveys* (Entebbe, 1938), and H.W. West, *Land Policy in Buganda* (Cambridge, 1972).

⁹⁶ See minutes on Ternan to Salisbury, 5 Sept. 1899, FO 2/203.

suggest that it was deliberately axed, it looks as if it principally fell prey to Johnston's anxiety to fulfil his hurried commitment to the chiefs to uphold and strengthen their Lukiko. Official Barazas continued occasionally to be held. As late as 1906, Wilson was still avowing that 'there are in Uganda two Councils to carry on the work of Local Government, the purely Native Council ... and the Official Baraza'.⁹⁷ But, as the prime superordinate instrument of hands-on colonial rule, the Baraza soon thereafter atrophied, with the consequence that, henceforth (by contrast with many other colonial territories), there was never any administrative council in Buganda presided over by a British official.

Instead the Agreement gave preeminence to a greatly strengthened and reordered Lukiko. Article 11 fixed its membership at eighty-nine, consisting of 'three native ministers' (see below), Buganda's now twenty Saza chiefs, together with three 'notables' from each county, and six 'other persons' appointed by the Kabaka. It empowered the Lukiko to act as a Court of Appeal from the Saza chiefs' courts; 'to discuss all matters concerning the native administration' of the kingdom; and – taking over a major part of the previous role of the Official Baraza – to pass laws and resolutions 'voted by a majority'.⁹⁸ In accordance with the terms of Article 10, the Katikiro, moreover, and no longer the Kabaka, was to preside.⁹⁹

Article 10, in a seminal way, then formalised the appointment of 'three native officers of state': 'a Prime Minister, otherwise known as Katikiro; a Chief Justice; and a Treasurer'. Kagwa held on to the Katikiroship. Mugwanya ceased to be the second Katikiro but became the Chief Justice instead;¹⁰⁰ whilst Kisingiri (the former Kago) became the Treasurer: 'ordinarily', the Agreement then proclaimed, these ministers 'will transact most of the Kabaka's business with the Uganda Administration'; whilst, in future, every Saza chief would 'report direct to the King's native ministers, from whom he will receive his instructions'. Underneath the panoply of the Kabaka's preeminence, all of this served to entrench the chiefs' oligarchical revolution of twelve years before. Building, moreover, on Wilson's later practice of 'running the show with the

⁹⁷ Wilson to Elgin, 6 Feb. 1906, CO 536/5.

⁹⁸ It took a little time to settle into its new format. For a detailed account, see D.A. Low, 'The Composition of the Buganda Lukiiko in 1902', *UJ*, 23, 1 (1954), pp. 64–8. For a 'Table of Buganda Native Laws' 1904–33, see Turton *et al.*, *Laws of the Uganda Protectorate*, vi, pp. ix–x.

⁹⁹ On Buganda's later colonial years, see R.C. Pratt, 'The Politics of Indirect Rule: Uganda 1900–1955', in Low and Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule*, Part 2; Low, *Buganda* Chs. 3–7; Fallers, *King's Men*.

¹⁰⁰ Additionally called the Minister of Justice.

two Katikiros and Kago', this secured for Buganda a formally constituted 'government' which the British recognised, and through which they principally dealt in exercising colonial rule over the kingdom.

So it was that, at a time when there was no prescriptive prototype for the close-up management of colonial rule, Buganda saw, at the hands of a succession of early British officials, four successive models in just six years. Two of them, and indirectly a third, were killed by Baganda animosities; while the thrust, if not the actual details, of the fourth owed more to their leaders than to the British. First there was Anson's push for a district magistracy. When this provoked Baganda hostility, it was curtly cast aside. Wilson's alternative of conjoining colonial rule with the kingdom's government, by superimposing upon the Kabaka's Lukiko an Official Baraza over which he himself presided, proved for some years to be acceptable to the Baganda leaders. When, however, Johnston promulgated the further model of dividing up the country into tax-collecting chieftaincies under British aegis, Wilson's two-tier system disappeared in the furore which followed on the Baganda leaders' perception that this entailed the wanton destruction of their kingdom's central government. Instead, Johnston found himself having to institute a structure of government which closely matched their concerns, that consisted of a largely titular non-executive figurehead, an institutionalised council with wide-ranging powers, and an executive government of three ministers. Article 6 of the Agreement assured the British of their hegemonic powers. Senior British officials retained the right to address the Lukiko, and County chiefs, as Johnston insisted, were made beholden to them for their tax collections. In place, however, of the former linkage between colonial rule and kingdom government through the Official Baraza, British officials now had to operate through the 'native ministers'. On a later appointment to Buganda, Wilson could still say of one of his discussions with them that: 'When this advice was given to them with an order to get to work at once, agreement was instant.'¹⁰¹ Yet, as a result of the 1900 Agreement, British involvement in the kingdom's government was substantially cut back, while, along with the institutional changes it contained, the scope and specificity of the Agreement secured for the Baganda a distinctly greater degree of autonomy than was ever possessed by any other African colonial people.

What is so striking is that, as a consequence of the adroitness with which the negotiating chiefs speedily grasped the fateful implications of Johnston's original proposals for them, and of the skill with which they

¹⁰¹ Wilson to Sadler, 21 Aug. 1900, BRA General 1902.

set about opposing them, the most salient features of the ensuing pattern of colonial governance under British rule here all came from the Baganda side: the high status accorded the Kabaka; the actuality of oligarchical rule; the primacy of two or three senior chiefs in the governance of the kingdom; the solely 'native' council; and the now twenty Saza chiefs. These roles were in each case somewhat tempered by the colonial advent: the Kabaka lost his powers of life and death; oligarchical decisions were ultimately subject to colonial authority; the offices of Katikiro and Kimbugwe were transmuted into the three ministers of the Kabaka's government; the Lukiko had its membership prescribed; and, for some of their roles, Saza chiefs were now made directly responsible to their colonial rulers. But there was nothing here of Ansoerge's District Magistracy, of Wilson's Official Baraza, and little enough of Johnston's scheme for territorial chiefs under direct British control. The 'Buganda model' of colonial governance as the core of a 'colonial settlement' was thus overwhelmingly a Baganda creation, and provides striking testimony to the dexterity with which they confronted the advent of colonial rule.

What, however, of the rest of the 'Protectorate'? In the end Johnston stayed in Buganda not for three weeks but for over five months, being delayed in part by a severe attack of blackwater fever. During this time he sketched out an administrative superstructure for the wider Protectorate of six 'Provinces': 'Eastern' (from the Rift Valley to Kavirondo), 'Central' (from there to the Nile), 'Buganda', 'Western' (Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole), and, purely notionally, 'Nile' and 'Rudolf', each of which was to be presided over by a Sub-Commissioner and (aside from Buganda) divided into Districts headed by a Collector. More deliberately, he formalised his plans for the appropriation of unoccupied land across the whole country and the institution of hut and gun taxes.¹⁰² That accomplished, he set out for Toro on 1 June 1900.¹⁰³

Back in April 1896, Berkeley, as we have seen, had instructed Sitwell, the British officer in Toro, to exert his personal influence so as to develop his authority in a situation where British authority did not as yet 'technically exist'; to exercise, that is, no more than British 'ascendancy'. Over the next two years, as Sitwell crisscrossed the wider Toro, and Kasagama frequently called upon him to receive his advice and take

¹⁰² 'Eastern' was added to the EAP in 1902, pp. 125–6 above. For his summaries, see *Preliminary Report by Her Majesty's Special Commissioner of the Protectorate of Uganda*, Africa no. 6, Cd. 256 (1900), and *Report by Her Majesty's Special Commissioner of the Protectorate of Uganda*, Africa no. 7, Cd. 671 (1900).

¹⁰³ Johnston to Cunningham, 31 May 1900, A5/10.

his instructions, so a more active British predominance came into being.¹⁰⁴ Thereafter, following Sitwell's replacement by Bagge early in 1899, a more regular form of colonial rule began to emerge, as, emulating Wilson, Bagge started to act through both a 'native council' and a Baraza.¹⁰⁵

In advance of his arrival in Toro, Johnston characteristically ordered Bagge to 'divide the country up ... and appoint a chief over every sub-district to assess and collect taxes'.¹⁰⁶ Like the Baganda leaders, Bagge, however, became much concerned at Johnston's seeming intention 'practically to take over the whole country for the Govt', and evidently set his mind on suggesting to Johnston that he should grant Toro an Agreement just as he had to Buganda.¹⁰⁷ Johnston had evidently learnt some lessons in Buganda. Not only did he tell Bagge that, if he thought Kasagama capable of supervising Toro's collection of taxes, he could leave the choice of sub-chiefs to him,¹⁰⁸ he very soon embraced the idea of a Toro Agreement. (See [Map 4](#).) Somewhat sketchily, this followed the Buganda precedent – in making British recognition of the Omukama and his chiefs subject to their adherence to the Agreement; in securing land grants to Kasagama, the Queen Mother, the Katikiro and the divisional chiefs; in bringing 'waste and uncultivated land', forests and mineral rights under British control; and in instituting hut and gun taxes. It differed, however, from the Agreement in Buganda by defining the boundaries of Toro's 'administrative divisions'; by naming their chiefs; by granting them the right to choose their successors; by allocating 10 per cent of the tax collections (rather than a salary) to them and to Kasagama; and by introducing nothing comparable to the 'mailo' settlement in Buganda. More confusingly, it proclaimed Kasagama to be both 'Kabaka' of Toro and administrative chief of 'Toro Proper', and thus placed Kasagama in an invidious position in relation to the chiefs of the other divisions.

In the light of his Buganda experience, Johnston was, however, quite determined not to be dragged into any protracted negotiations with the

¹⁰⁴ Sitwell's Uganda Diary, 1896–8, *passim*; and, e.g., Sitwell to Berkeley, 29 Oct., 13, 28, 29 Nov., 6 Dec. 1896, A4/6, 9 Oct. 1898, A4/13; Berkeley to Sitwell, 11 Nov., 7 Dec. 1896, A5/2; Sitwell to Ternan, 19 Feb., A4/7; Sitwell to Wilson, 20 Nov. 1897, A4/9; and Sitwell's Report on Toro Confederacy, 13 May 1899, FO 2/236.

¹⁰⁵ For which, by the time Johnston arrived, a Baraza Hall had been built in his fort: Bagge to Ternan, 20 Aug. 1899, A4/20. See Ternan's general endorsement, Ternan to Bagge, 8 Sept. 1899, A5/7.

¹⁰⁶ Johnston to Bagge, 14 Apr. 1900, A5/9.

¹⁰⁷ Bagge to Johnston, 7 May, A4/28; Toro Monthly Report, 31 May 1900, A4/29.

¹⁰⁸ Johnston to Bagge, 14 Apr., A5/9, 21 May 1900, A5/10.

Toro leaders.¹⁰⁹ Accordingly, on 26 June 1900, he simply summoned them to a meeting at which he himself translated the English text of the Agreement he had drafted into Swahili; then had it translated into Luganda; and thereupon ordered Kasagama and his leading chiefs to sign it without any opportunity for questions or discussion, upon pain of losing their positions. Over the next few days, he did make some concessions on hut and gun taxes, and agreed to make some land grants to Kasagama's subordinates, but for the rest proceeded in an altogether dictatorial manner.¹¹⁰

The Agreement secured for Toro a measure of autonomy that, over the ensuing years, did help to buttress its status. It only contained, however, some passing allusions to Toro's Katikiro and Lukiko, and the Baraza clearly lingered on.¹¹¹ Bagge, however, secured the approval of Johnston's successor, Sadler, in May 1903, for the establishment of a Lukiko¹¹² with three 'principal officials' and six nominees of the Omukama, and so brought Toro into closer conformity with the arrangements which had eventually been instituted in Buganda.¹¹³ Sadler, however, refused to meet Kasagama's persistent demand that he should no longer be regarded as administrative chief of 'Toro Proper' as well as Omukama of the whole of the new Toro. In the end, however, Sadler's successor, Sir Hesketh Bell, signed a formal memorandum on 13 July 1906 granting his request that 'Toro Proper' be divided into four or so Sazas, each with its own chief, and resolving some other matters too.¹¹⁴ Gradually therefore, and not least in response to indigenous pressure, the eventual pattern of colonial governance in Toro was reached, despite an unpromising start.

By a circuitous route, Johnston then journeyed from Toro to Nkore, arriving there at the height of the culminating confrontation between the Bashambo leader Mbaguta and the most influential Bahinda figure, Igumira. As elsewhere, he had earlier issued instructions for the institution of hut and gun taxes and for the division of the country into administrative districts (orders which, as we have seen, had momentarily sidelined the Omugabe). Recognising, however, that the situation in

¹⁰⁹ Bagge to Johnston, 7 May, A4/28; Johnston to Bagge, 21 May 1900, A5/10.

¹¹⁰ Maddox to Wilson, 3 Sept. 1904, A22/1; Turton *et al.*, *Laws of the Uganda Protectorate*, vi, pp. 1419–25.

¹¹¹ Jackson to Tarrant, 1901, A14/3.

¹¹² Called in Toro, as in Bunyoro, the Rukarato. Kasagama was soon making full use of the Rukurato in buttressing his position: Ingham, *Toro*, pp. 102–3.

¹¹³ Sadler to Bagge, 11 May 1903, A13/1.

¹¹⁴ Ingham, *Toro*, pp. 101–4. See also, for Toro discontents, Tucker to Wilson, 6 Oct. 1904, A22/1. For the later history of Toro, see Ingham, *Toro*, Chs. 4–6.

Nkore was still very volatile, he not only urged Macallister, the British official there, to be cautious, but made it known that he did not think Nkore would be ready for an Agreement for another two years.¹¹⁵

Following upon his arrival there, back in 1898, Macallister had found himself heavily preoccupied with the power struggles in train there and with incorporating some of its neighbouring rulerships into it. He had never really moved, that is, beyond establishing a British 'ascendancy'. Following, however, the subsequent deportation of Igumira in September 1900, Racey, Macallister's successor, even while no less engaged with adjacent rulerships, soon began to institute a more active British 'pre-dominance'. At a Baraza on 21 November 1900, for example, he informed the Nkore chiefs that, with Igumira gone, 'they must devote their interests to the establishment of good government',¹¹⁶ while early in 1901 he suggested that the young Omugabe, Kahaya, should visit Buganda so as to learn how it was now governed.¹¹⁷ Along with several of his chiefs, including the now triumphant Mbaguta, Kahaya visited Buganda in April 1901,¹¹⁸ when (or so Jackson reported) 'they were greatly struck by the manner in which local affairs are discussed and conducted by the Regents and Chiefs in the Lukiko', and thereupon began a campaign to secure an Agreement for themselves similar, if not to Buganda's, then at least to Toro's. They were at first told that, since they were more 'backward' and divided than Toro, this could not be granted to them. However, in July 1901, Wilson, whom Johnston had appointed Sub-Commissioner of Western Province, and who thus became aware of what the Nkore chiefs were after,¹¹⁹ canvassed the matter further with the acting Commissioner, Jackson, and together they agreed that if, upon visiting Nkore, Wilson found the situation had improved – found its 'vortex' had now reached a conclusion – an Agreement could be considered after all.¹²⁰

Upon Wilson's arrival there shortly afterwards, the Nkore chiefs once again pressed for an Agreement along the lines already granted to Buganda and Toro, arguing that, with the recent incorporation of several neighbouring kingdoms into an expanded Nkore, they now represented a compact stretch of territory;¹²¹ that they were unanimous in acknowledging Kahaya as their ruler; and that they wished to institute a more

¹¹⁵ Wilson to Jackson, 3 Aug. 1901, A12/1.

¹¹⁶ Racey's Ankole Report, 1 Dec. 1900, A15/1.

¹¹⁷ Racey to Johnston, 18 Jan. 1901, A15/1.

¹¹⁸ *Abagabe*, II, pp. 14–15.

¹¹⁹ Cunningham to Wilson, 29 May, A5/10; Johnston to Wilson, 24 Aug. 1900, A13/1.

¹²⁰ Jackson to Lansdowne, 31 Oct. 1901, and enc., FOCP 7868/78.

¹²¹ As outlined in Ch. 9, pp. 269–74.

ordered system of government. Wilson was much impressed. He gave them a week to reflect upon their proposals and his admonitions, and in the meanwhile drafted an Agreement along the lines of the Toro one.¹²² Far from being foisted upon the 'Ankole' chiefs, as it had been upon Toro's, it was secured as a consequence of the pressure they themselves had mounted.

As a result, a week later at a special gathering in Mbarara on 7 August 1901, a formal Agreement was signed.¹²³ It divided the original Nkore into seven 'administrative divisions', which, along with its four recent additions – Buzimba, Igara, Buhweju and Bunyaruguru – henceforth constituted the larger Ankole, over which the Omugabe and his chiefs were 'recognised by Her Majesty's Government as the responsible chiefs of the Ankole district'.¹²⁴ (See [Map 5](#).)

At the same time, as in both Buganda and Toro, there was mention only of a Lukiko, none of a Baraza. Hitherto, a dual structure of government had been spasmodically in operation, as Racey had presided over a succession of Barazas,¹²⁵ and Jackson had given orders that indigenous cases 'should be tried by the Chiefs in Council (Lukiko)'.¹²⁶ In the absence, however, of any mention of a Baraza in the Agreement, and in evident response to the desire of the Nkore chiefs to emphasise the autonomy of their kingdom, the overriding role of the Baraza soon unravelled, particularly following the formal composition of Ankole's 'Lukiko', the 'Eishengyero', in 1907.¹²⁷ At the same time, following the expulsions of Kahitsi and Igumira, Ankole's one ex-new model warband leader, the Nganzi,¹²⁸ Mbaguta, soon took on the role of Ankole's executive government well nigh on his own.¹²⁹ While, therefore, Ankole was now clearly subordinated to colonial rule, the detailed

¹²² Wilson to Jackson, 3 Aug. 1901, A12/1.

¹²³ As in Toro, a note was subsequently added granting some hut and gun tax exemptions to Ankole's leaders: Turton *et al.*, *Laws of the Uganda Protectorate*, vi, pp. 1365–72, Morris, *Ankole*, pp. 48–55; Wilson to Jackson, 14 Aug., A12/1; Jackson to Lansdowne, 31 Oct. 1901, and enc., FOCP 7868/78.

¹²⁴ For earlier lists, see Racey's Ankole Report, 31 Dec. 1900, and following Jackson to Racey, 6 Mar. 1901, A15/1.

¹²⁵ E.g. Racey's Ankole Reports, 1, 31 Dec. 1900, A15/1.

¹²⁶ Jackson to Racey, 20 July 1901, A15/1.

¹²⁷ With a membership of thirty-eight, including ten county chiefs: *System of Chieftaincies in Ankole 1907* (Uganda, 1907); Watson's Ankole Report for year ending 31 Mar. 1906, Ankole HQ, Mbarara.

¹²⁸ The title equivalent to Buganda's Katikiro. See also Lukyn Williams, 'Nuwa Mbaguta', *Uj*, 10 (1946), pp. 124–35.

¹²⁹ As in Buganda, the offices of a Chief Justice and a Treasurer were added in due course to make up an executive triumvirate. For some of the later history of Ankole, see Morris, *Ankole*, Ch. 9, and M. Doornbos, *Regalia Galore* (Nairobi, 1976).

structuring, here as elsewhere, of its colonial settlement owed a great deal to indigenous insistence.

As Sub-Commissioner of Western Province, Wilson was based in Bunyoro. There, following Kabalega's successive defeats in 1895–6 and his departure northwards of the Nile, a succession of British officers had been charged with establishing what is here called 'ascendancy' over the kingdom.¹³⁰ The ensuing situation, however, was more tellingly described by Thruston in terms what is here called 'mastery'. 'The country at present', he wrote in June 1897 (as we have earlier noted),¹³¹ 'can hardly be said to be under a government at all: it is rather under a military occupation, or at most a weak military government'.¹³² Subsequently there was much toing and froing over whether Kitahimbwa, a young son of Kabalega's, should be installed as Omukama in his place, till, in March 1898, in an effort to introduce a more orderly system of government, Wilson as acting Commissioner ordered that this should be done.¹³³ The prevailing spirit, however, was more accurately recounted by another British officer when he remarked later that year that: 'As long as this remains a military district these African headmen must do what they are told.'¹³⁴

When, moreover, following the capture and deportation of Kabalega, Ternan, Wilson's successor as acting Commissioner, issued orders in mid 1899 for the future administration of Bunyoro, he bluntly declared that Bunyoro 'is a conquered country ... so that we are perfectly justified ... in treating the country as one immediately under this administration'; 'all executive power', he went on, 'will be vested in the Sub-Commissioner'; and while, under the presidency of a Katikiro, a council of influential chiefs could be formed, 'it will', he ordered, 'have no executive powers' – conditions which constituted what is here called 'dictation'.¹³⁵

In proceeding, however, to carry out these orders, Colonel Evatt, in command in Bunyoro, concentrated rather on initiating a regime that would combine a high degree of local authority with the rudiments of a more orderly pattern of government. To these ends he first appointed a

¹³⁰ E.g. Berkeley to Pulteney, 25 Apr. 1896, A5/2.

¹³¹ Ch. 7, pp. 196–7, above.

¹³² Thruston to Ternan, 30 June 1897, A4/8.

¹³³ See Ch. 7. Miti, 'Buganda', 2, pp. 187, 191–2, 196–7; Wilson to Fowler, 5 Mar., Wilson's Proclamation, Berkeley to Dugmore, 2 May, A5/4; Bagnall to Wilson, 5 Mar., 3 Apr. 1898, A4/10; Dugmore's Report on Unyoro, 13 May 1900, A4/10; Wilson to Hayes Sadler, 22 July 1902, A8/2.

¹³⁴ Martyr to Berkeley, 15 Aug. 1898, A4/12.

¹³⁵ 'Outline of Method to be Adopted in the Administration of Unyoro', in Ternan to Evatt, enc. in Ternan to Salisbury, 3 June 1899, FO 2/202.

Katikiro from amongst the available former Abarasura leaders. Whilst the Anglican missionaries would have preferred Byabachwezi, he appointed Rwabudongo, who long before had been Kabalega's leading Abarasura commander and whose recent sojourn in Buganda had provided him with some insight into what colonial government now entailed.¹³⁶ He followed this up by consulting the council of chiefs – the 'baraza' as he specifically called it – about the appointment of some subordinate chiefs,¹³⁷ and then began to give his mind to some land questions and to the creation of a 'native tribunal'.¹³⁸ All of this started a process by which Bunyoro's parlous state began to be somewhat ameliorated.

Johnston, on his arrival in Uganda, initially took a hard line on Bunyoro: 'it must be remembered', he declared, that it 'is a conquered territory ... I do not think, if I had been out here at the time, I should have sanctioned any "king" to succeed Kabarega.' Subject, however, to there not being 'the least nonsense', he was prepared to accept the accession of Kitahimbwa to Bunyoro's traditional rulership, and thereupon proceeded to replace Bunyoro's military administration by a civil one.¹³⁹

His first appointee was Spire, who had now graduated from batman, to Chief Cashier, to District Officer. Johnston repeated to him his characteristic orders about dividing up the country into territorial chief-taincies that would be responsible for the collection of taxes.¹⁴⁰ Spire thereupon summoned a large gathering of Banyoro chiefs and spelt out Johnston's tax demands in some detail.¹⁴¹ He was soon replaced, however, in June 1900,¹⁴² by Wilson¹⁴³ who, whilst harbouring some concern about the security position,¹⁴⁴ was greatly impressed by the

¹³⁶ Evatt to Ternan, 14 June, A4/18; Ternan to Evatt, 30 June 1899, A5/6; Fisher to Spire, 28 Mar. 1900, A4/27; Uzoigwe, 'Kabalega's Abarasura', p. 9.

¹³⁷ Evatt to Ternan, 10 June, A4/17; Ternan to Evatt, 20 June 1899, A5/6.

¹³⁸ Evatt to Ternan, 2 Sept., A4/20, 4 Nov. 1900, A4/22.

¹³⁹ Johnston to Evatt, 22 Jan., to acting Sub-Commissioner, Unyoro, 6 Feb., to Owen, 8 Mar., to Spire, 13 Apr., A5/9; Spire to Johnston, 28 Mar. 1900, A4/27.

¹⁴⁰ Johnston to acting Sub-Commissioner, Unyoro, 6 Feb., to Owen, 8 Mar., A5/9, to Spire, 13 Feb., and Spire's Diary, 4 Mar., Spire Papers; Spire to Johnston, 6 Mar., A4/27; Johnston to Owen, 8 Mar., A4/9; Johnston to Spire, 13 Apr. 1900, A5/9.

¹⁴¹ Spire's Unyoro Monthly Report, 31 May 1900, A4/29.

¹⁴² Foreign Office people thought his 'class' made his appointment inappropriate: Foreign Office to Johnston, 9 May 1900, FO 2/296.

¹⁴³ Johnston to Spire, 26 May, Cunningham to Wilson, 9 May, A5/10; Spire to Johnston, 26 June 1900, A4/29.

¹⁴⁴ Wilson to Jackson, 23 Aug. 1900, A12/1. Having withstood Mwanga's revolt, Wilson always remained wary of any further outbreak. On visiting Ankole in August 1901, he was very critical of the defencelessness of Mbarara Fort: Wilson to Jackson, 1 Aug. 1901, A12/1.

energetic collaboration which Bunyoro's 'greater chiefs' were by now displaying¹⁴⁵ – evidently in an effort to secure some comparability with their Baganda counterparts – and soon set about replicating the structures of rule he had previously established in Buganda.¹⁴⁶ On 13 August 1900, he officially opened the 'Baraza' in a new building capable of holding 500 people, while at the same time instituting a clear distinction between a weekly 'native Baraza' at which 'minor disputes between natives' would be 'sifted out', and an initially fortnightly 'general Baraza'¹⁴⁷ over which he himself presided. Having earlier formed an unfavourable view of Rwabadongo, Evatt's choice as Katikiro, he then established (as he had already effectively done in Buganda) an Executive Council of three, consisting of Rwabadongo, Byabachwezi and Rejumba, the nephew of the Palwo Prince Ruyonga, and thereby put in place, following Kabalega's exile and Johnston's endorsement of Kitahimbwa, a key combination with whom to deal – of a new traditionally legitimate ruler, two ex-new model warband leaders, and a prominent hereditary figure – that was neatly representative of the cardinal elements in post-Kabalega Bunyoro.

Johnston for his part long intended to visit Bunyoro, but in the end never did so.¹⁴⁸ Instead, in May 1901, all the major Banyoro chiefs went to Entebbe to meet Johnston's acting successor, Jackson, and were clearly well satisfied with their reception. 'They appear', so Wilson reported to Jackson, 'to be particularly pleased with your acknowledgment of their Kabaka and your sanction for Sazaships'. Upon their return home, they followed this up by submitting a definitive list of ten Saza chiefs and their sub-chiefs for formal appointment – each of whom, emblematic of their new alignment, took a chiefly title freely borrowed from Buganda.¹⁴⁹ Because Bunyoro continued to be regarded by the British as conquered territory, it was not, to its chagrin, granted an Agreement like its counterparts till 1933.¹⁵⁰ Yet here too the 'general Baraza' soon fell into disuse,¹⁵¹ while the 'native Baraza' embraced its

¹⁴⁵ Wilson to Johnston, 26 June, A4/29, 27 Aug., 14 Nov., A12/1; Johnston to Jackson, 10 July 1900, A5/10.

¹⁴⁶ For the rest of this paragraph, see Wilson to Johnston, 6 Sept. 1900, A12/1.

¹⁴⁷ Spire to Fisher, 28 Mar. 1900, A4/27.

¹⁴⁸ Johnston to Wilson, 24 Aug., 12, 15, 22 Nov. 1900, A13/1; Bunyoro Agreement, 1933, in Turton *et al.*, *Laws of the Uganda Protectorate*, vi, pp. 1412–18.

¹⁴⁹ Wilson to Jackson, 14 Aug., A12/1; Jackson to Wilson, 16 Oct. 1901, A13/1.

¹⁵⁰ Cunningham's Note, July 1903, A13/1.

¹⁵¹ On 6 August 1904, with a view to resolving some discontents in Bunyoro, Wilson embarked on a 'revival of the Baraza system' (emphasis added) by calling 'the first public Baraza to be held' in Hoima (which had been superseding Masindi as Bunyoro's headquarters since 1900), for which a 'temporary building' had been erected. Little

functions and was then institutionalised as Bunyoro's Rukurato.¹⁵² Over the same period, Wilson's Executive Council, moreover, characteristically evolved into Bunyoro's three ministerial positions of Katikiro, Muketo (Treasurer) and Muramuzi (Chief Judge).¹⁵³ In these respects, the pattern of colonial governance in Bunyoro increasingly approximated to the post 1900 Buganda model along with an oligarchical revolution, while the upshot here owed a good deal to the conciliatoriness which the Banyoro leaders evidently quite deliberately sought to display.

All of which leaves Busoga (see [Map 7](#)). As we have seen, by mid 1897 Grant had gone far to establish there his paramountcy over many of the Busoga kingdoms.¹⁵⁴ With the outbreak of Mwang'a's revolt however, it seemed that several of their rulers, encouraged by the British interpreter, Salimu Bwago, a proselytising Muslim Baganda, might well revolt as well;¹⁵⁵ while, late in 1897, Grant's position was largely destroyed by the transit through Busoga of the Sudanese mutineers.¹⁵⁶ By April 1898, however, he was back at his post,¹⁵⁷ and, having secured the temporary services of Kakungulu from Buganda,¹⁵⁸ he exiled Bwago;¹⁵⁹ deposed the Menia of Bugweri for supporting the mutineers;¹⁶⁰ imprisoned the Gabula of Bugabula for assisting some of them to escape northwards and for seizing some of Kakungulu's women and cattle;¹⁶¹ and twice

more seems to have come of this. For a full account, see *Uganda Notes*, February 1904. For the move to Hoima, see Johnston to Wilson, 12 Nov., A13/1; and A12/1, Nov. 1900, *passim*.

¹⁵² Bunyoro's equivalent of Buganda's Lukiko. For its eventual membership and functions, see Bunyoro Agreement, clauses 17–18, in Turton *et al.*, *Laws of the Uganda Protectorate*, vi, pp. 1415–16.

¹⁵³ For Bunyoro's later history, see Beattie, *Nyoro State*, Chs. 4, 7–11; A.R. Dunbar, *A History of Bunyoro-Kitara* (Nairobi, 1965), Part III; Doyle, *Bunyoro*, Chs. 4 to end.

¹⁵⁴ See [Ch. 6](#), p. 182.

¹⁵⁵ Wilson to N. Wilson, 6, 7 Sept., A5/3; N. Wilson to Ternan, 12 Sept., A4/8; N. Wilson to Wilson, 12, 13, 18, 27 Sept., 1 Oct. 1897, A4/9; Bagnall to Wilson, 13 Feb., A4/10; Berkeley to Wilson, 23 May 1898, A5/4; Wilson to Salisbury, 8 Oct. 1897, FOCP 7024/23.

¹⁵⁶ See [Ch. 7](#) and, e.g., Woodward to Wilson, 16 Jan., A6/4; Wilson to Kirkpatrick, 8 Feb., Wilson to Grant, 14 Feb. 1898, A5/4.

¹⁵⁷ Grant to Wilson, 19 Feb., 9 Apr. 1898, A4/10.

¹⁵⁸ Both Grant and the Basoga were opposed to his staying on: Grant to Berkeley, 13 June, 1 July 1898, A4/11; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 240; Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, pp. 126–7.

¹⁵⁹ Berkeley to Wilson, 23 May 1898, A5/4.

¹⁶⁰ Wilson to N. Wilson, 6 Sept., A5/3; N. Wilson to Ternan, 12 Sept., A4/8, to Wilson, 12, 13, 18, 27 Sept. 1897, A4/9; Bagnall to Wilson, 13 Feb., Grant to Wilson, 22 Feb., 2 Apr., 4 May, A4/10; Berkeley to Grant, 7 May 1898, A5/4.

¹⁶¹ Grant to Wilson, 22 Mar., 9 Apr., A4/10; Grant to Berkeley, 19 May 1898, A4/11; Lubogo, *Busoga*, Ch. 8.

incarcerated the Kisiki of Busiki for being recalcitrant.¹⁶² Along with the more extensive suppression of the mutiny, these measures effectively served to reestablish his former paramountcy over most of the southern and central Busoga kingdoms.

As yet, however, that did not extend to its northern reaches. Back in April 1897, he had there deposed Kitambwa, the Nkono of Bukono. Kitambwa, however, was released by the mutineers, and not only ousted his successor, but held on to his old rulership till he was eventually recaptured in April 1900.¹⁶³ By then Kakungulu had departed northwards to pursue his ambitions in the Bukedi area,¹⁶⁴ while right across Busoga's northern borderlands a plethora of conflicts had started to proliferate, some of which involved former mutineers,¹⁶⁵ while others seemed to have been aggravated by a European freebooter named Gemmill.¹⁶⁶ Johnston, in May 1901, accordingly ordered Grant's stand-in, Fowler, to join up with two other armed expeditions he was sending to the area in a combined operation in the region.¹⁶⁷ Together they encountered little resistance.¹⁶⁸ Fowler's advance constituted indeed the first major demonstration of British force in Busoga's northern region. It was soon accompanied, moreover, by summary measures against several of its rulers.¹⁶⁹ Whilst the Gabula of Bugabula had returned Kakungulu's losses, he was now deposed in favour of his son, Nadiope, under a regency.¹⁷⁰ The new Nkono of Bukono, the Zibondo

¹⁶² Wilson to N. Wilson, 6 Sept., A5/3; N. Wilson to Wilson, 12 Sept., 1 Oct. 1897, A4/9; Grant to Wilson, 9 Apr., A4/10; Grant to Berkeley, 19 May 1898, A4/11; Playfair to Ternan, 16 July 1899, A4/25; Johnston to Macpherson, to Grant, 2 Feb. 1900, A5/9.

¹⁶³ Grant to Wilson, 22 Feb. 1898, 25 Mar. 1901, A4/10; Grant to Berkeley, 25 May, 13 June, 4 July, A4/11, 30 Nov. 1898, A4/14; Grant to Ternan, 30 Nov. 1899, A4/24. He was in the end set free a year later: Grant to Jackson, 25 Mar., 6 Apr., A10; Jackson to Grant, 29 Mar. 1901, A11/1; Lubogo, *Busoga*, p. 15.

¹⁶⁴ Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, Ch. 5.

¹⁶⁵ Foaker to Ternan, 22 June, Wilson to Ternan, 18, 20 July, A4/18; Ternan to Wilson, 23 June, A5/6; Grant to Ternan, 4, 23 Aug., A4/20, 24 Sept. 1899, A4/21; Moorhouse to Johnston, 3 May, A4/27; Fowler to Johnston, 11 May, A21/1; Fowler to Jackson, 1 Aug. 1900, A10/1.

¹⁶⁶ Fowler to Johnston, 11, 21, 22, 23 May, Gemmill to Fowler, 15, 17 May, A21/1; Gemmill to Fowler, 16, 25 May, Gemmill to Johnston, 18 May, Fowler to Jackson, 4 July 1901, A6/9; Fowler to Jackson, 25, 29 June, 7, 8 July, A4/29; Hornsby to Staff Officer, Uganda Rifles, 1 July, 4/30; Jackson to Tarrant, 3 July, A5/10; Fowler to Jackson, 1 Aug. 1900, A10/1.

¹⁶⁷ Johnston to Fowler, 15, 25 May 1900, A5/10.

¹⁶⁸ E.g. Fowler to Jackson, 25 June, A4/29; Hornsby to Staff Officer, Uganda Rifles, 1 July, A4/30; Fowler re Bukedi, 1 Aug. 1900, A10/1.

¹⁶⁹ Grant to Wilson, 22 Feb., A4/10; Grant to Berkeley, 25 May, 13 June, 4 July, A4/11, 30 Nov. 1898, A4/14.

¹⁷⁰ Grant to Berkeley, 4 July, A4/11, 12 Nov. 1898, A4/13; Fowler to Jackson, 5 June, A10/2, 1 Aug., A10/1; Jackson to Fowler, 25 June 1900, A10/2; Lubogo, *Busoga*, Ch. 8.

of Bulamogi, and the Kisiki of Busiki were each arrested and only released on payment of fines;¹⁷¹ while all three, together with the new Gabula, were warned against sending raiding parties to Bukedi.¹⁷² The manner in which all these things were accomplished was neatly indicated in a report, by one of Grant's stand-ins, that: 'Lt. Moorhouse and I+30 rifles marched for two days to Busiki ... which had the desired effect of bringing Kisiki into the Headquarters station'.¹⁷³ Shortly afterwards, these measures were coupled with the long-anticipated replacement of Matanda, the Wakoli of Bukoli to the south, by his son.¹⁷⁴ All of which dramatised that the British had now finally stamped their dominance right across Busoga.

Up until the middle of 1899, the British position there had, however, amounted to little more than 'ascendancy'. Upon his visit to Busoga in mid 1898 to recover his possessions from Gabula and provide temporary assistance to Grant, Kakungulu had expressed a wish to transfer to Busoga, evidently as its leading chief. Grant, however, resisted any idea of a Buganda chief becoming 'Chief over the Wasoga, or in other words "King" of Usoga' and held firmly to his long-established doctrine of 'Uganda for the Waganda, and Usoga for the Wasoga'.¹⁷⁵

As, however, by the middle of 1899, Grant recovered his position in central and southern Busoga, he began to consider how best to exercise his colonial dominance in the future. He first proposed to transfer his headquarters at Luba's in the far south to Kigulu, Miro's country further north, an idea linked in his mind with appointing Miro – the staunchest Busoga ally of the British ever since his accession at Williams' hands in 1892 – to a position 'something similar to the Katikiro' in Buganda.¹⁷⁶ Just at this moment, however, Miro died.¹⁷⁷ Grant was greatly disconcerted.

¹⁷¹ Playfair to Ternan, 21 July 1899, A4/18; Fowler to Jackson, 1 Aug. 1900, A10/1.

¹⁷² Fowler to Jackson, 25 June 1900, A4/29.

¹⁷³ Macpherson to Johnston, 16 Jan. 1900, A4/25.

¹⁷⁴ N. Wilson to Ternan, 4 Sept., A4/9, 12 Sept., A4/8; N. Wilson to Wilson, 12, 13, 18, 27 Sept., 1 Oct. 1897, A4/9; Grant to Wilson, 9 Apr. 1898, A4/10; Fowler to Johnston, 10 May, A4/27; Fowler to Jackson, 28 July, A4/30; Jackson to Fowler, 1, 16, 24(2) Aug., Jackson to Tarrant, 1 Aug., Johnston to Tarrant, 3 Dec., A11/1; Fowler to Jackson, 1, 17, 22 (tel.), 24 (3) Aug., 2, 30 Sept., Fowler re Bukedi, 1 Aug., Tarrant to Johnston, 2 Nov., 10 Dec., A10/1; Tucker to Johnston, 29 Nov. 1900, A22/1. Matanda died at Entebbe a year later: Pordage to Jackson, 22 July 1901, A8/1; Lubogo, *Busoga*, Ch. 3.

¹⁷⁵ Grant to Berkeley, 28 June, 1 July, A4/11; Berkeley to Grant, 6 July 1898, A5/4.

¹⁷⁶ Ternan to Grant, 7 July, A5/6; Grant to Ternan, 2 Aug., A4/19, 12 Aug. 1899, A4/24.

¹⁷⁷ Foaker to Ternan, 7 July 1899, A4/18. Kagwa (emulating earlier practice) sent Miro's 'half-brother' from Buganda to succeed him, but the British installed his young son with two 'guardians': Foaker to Ternan, 2, 4 Aug., A4/19; Ternan to Grant, 3 Aug., A5/7; Wilson, 25 Nov., Skeens, 28 Nov., CMS Annual Letters 1899, pp. 153–4; Lubogo, *Busoga*, Ch. 7.

‘No such capable man can be found to fill his place’, he wrote.¹⁷⁸ Over the next eighteen months, while he was elsewhere engaged, his successive stand-ins held, however, a series of Barazas with the Busoga chiefs,¹⁷⁹ and even started to take an interest in some Busoga land questions.¹⁸⁰ British engagement with Busoga thus began to move from a general ‘ascendancy’ to a greater ‘predominance’.

As it happened, Busoga did not immediately feel the full impact of Johnston’s Commissionership. Upon his way to Buganda in December 1899, he spoke to a gathering of Basoga chiefs,¹⁸¹ and may well have felt that they there accepted his plans for taxes and a land settlement. Nothing, however, eventuated. That was partly because Fowler became preoccupied with his northern expedition, but also because Busoga in these years was convulsed by a severe famine. Johnston sought to arrange for food to be sent there,¹⁸² and eventually agreed that, for the first year, the Basoga should be given exemption from the hut tax.¹⁸³ But, as elsewhere, in October 1900 he ordered that the country be divided up into sub-divisions, over which chiefs should be appointed to undertake tax collections.¹⁸⁴

With all that to effect,¹⁸⁵ with his authority extending for the first time over northern Busoga, with questions about land holdings beginning to erupt, and – by contrast with his counterparts elsewhere, with no ‘Katikiro’ to assist him – Grant on his return to Busoga at the end of 1900¹⁸⁶ found himself ‘principally occupied from morning till evening with Basoga shambas [land] and other disputes’ with all too little time for ‘the greater portion of other work’. In some frustration, on 27 May 1901 he accordingly wrote to Jackson (acting Commissioner once again) to:

¹⁷⁸ Grant to Ternan, 12 Aug. 1899, A4/24.

¹⁷⁹ Foaker to Ternan, 31 July 1899, A4/19; Fowler to Jackson, 24 Aug., Tarrant to Johnston, 2 Nov. 1900, A10/1.

¹⁸⁰ Foaker to Ternan, 28 July, A4/19, 12 Oct., A4/21; Ternan to Foaker, 18 Oct. 1899, A5/8.

¹⁸¹ Johnston to Martin, 8 Jan. 1900, A5/9.

¹⁸² Macpherson to Johnston, 3 Feb., A4/25; Johnston to Tucker, 19 Apr., A7/6; Johnston to Fowler, 21 Apr., A5/9; Hobley to Johnston, 27 Apr., A4/28; Moorhouse to Johnston, 3 May, A4/27; Fowler to Jackson, 2 Sept., A10/1; Jackson to Fowler, 13 Sept. 1900, A11/1.

¹⁸³ Grant to Johnston, 16 Oct., Fowler to Johnston, 30 Oct., A10/1; Johnston to Tarrant, 13 Nov. 1900, A11/1.

¹⁸⁴ Subsequently, Johnston suggested that there should be about six ‘sub-divisions’: Johnston to Collector, Iganga, 24 Oct., to Tarrant, 13 Nov. 1900, A11/1. See also Fowler to Jackson, 10 Aug., 3, 30 Sept. 1900, A10/1.

¹⁸⁵ Some taxes soon began to be collected: Tarrant to Johnston, 2 Dec., Grant to Johnston, 2 Feb., 1 Apr. 1901, A10/1.

¹⁸⁶ Johnston’s “Instructions to Mr Grant ...”, 17 Dec., A11/1; Grant to Johnston, 27 Dec. 1900, A11/1.

suggest that a few of the more influential and important chiefs might be appointed to form a council, holding a native court say twice a week to go into and dispose of all minor questions keeping a record of all cases disposed of. Those to be reported to Collector in Baraza twice a week if necessary. If this were done many cases would be settled without any reference to the Collector of the District, and his time would not everlastingly be occupied in native questions only.¹⁸⁷

To this Jackson promptly replied: 'By all means form a Native Lukiko or Council of Chiefs to thrash out and dispose of all minor questions ... The Lukiko should report to you the result of their deliberations and decisions on Baraza day for your confirmation or otherwise.'¹⁸⁸

As a consequence, there came into being in Busoga the dual structure of colonial rule which Wilson had first fashioned in Buganda. Five years on, however, there was a subtle shift, when, despite earlier hesitations, Kakungulu was eventually appointed President of the Busoga Lukiko. For, with that, the Baraza system was effectively displaced by a system that owed its genesis to the precedents previously established in Buganda.¹⁸⁹

Thus it was that, in each of the four entities outside Buganda which comprised the embryonic Uganda, as the character of British dominance took on the more regular form which is here called 'control', they all experienced a somewhat similar transmutation from one pattern of colonial governance to another. Both approximated to models earlier fabricated in Buganda in response to the angry reactions of Buganda's leaders towards the cavalier proceedings of British officials: the first by Wilson in 1895 following the crisis generated by Ansorge's hamhandedness; the second during the negotiations of the 1900 Agreement following the vehement objections of the Baganda chiefs towards Johnston's original plans. By contrast with their genesis in Buganda, their serial adoption in these other four instances was not occasioned by any local crisis. Rather, Wilson's two-tiered prototype met the initial needs of early British officials for a more regular form of colonial rule, while generally proving acceptable to local rulers.

Then, as administrative chieftaincies came to be formalised, as indigenous councils with their associated ministers became administratively more efficacious, as superordinate colonial power proved sufficient to

¹⁸⁷ Grant to Johnston, 27 Mar., Grant to Cunningham, 29 Jan. 1900, A11/1.

¹⁸⁸ Jackson to Grant, 3 Apr. 1901, A11/1.

¹⁸⁹ In due course, one of Busoga's rulers became President of the District Council, until, given the title of Isebantu Kyabazinga and after the appointment of a Secretary-General, he became more appositely Busoga's titular head. The amalgam which was Busoga was never granted full 'kingdom' status, and never had an Agreement. For the later history, see Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, Ch. 8; Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy*, Chs. 6–9.

maintain British colonial dominance, and as British administrators adjusted to their more general role as energisers and an inspectorate,¹⁹⁰ so the shape of the colonial settlement the Baganda chiefs extracted from Johnston won the acceptance of British officials. At the same time, its consonance with indigenous notions of chieftaincy and rulership, and its seeming assurance of much local autonomy recommended it to many of their subjects, who variously but persistently embraced its precepts. Thereby, in the footsteps of the Baganda, they too served to mould the pattern of colonial rule here. In essence this locked together the many traditional rulerships in the region and the new oligarchs in three of them with the colonial dominance of the British, so as to produce the powerful amalgam of traditional authority, newly emerging forces and the panoply of colonial power. As the ‘Buganda model’ – at its core a titular head, an all-purpose council and three executive ministers / senior officials, all enjoying a considerable degree of autonomy – it came to be widely adopted throughout the eventual, larger, Uganda as its characteristic pattern of colonial government.¹⁹¹

As a system of colonial rule it shared many of its features with other examples of subsumed governmental powers within the British empire.¹⁹² Yet it also had its own distinctive attributes, as a glance at a spectrum of other examples will show. At the one end would stand the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms where the British exercised no control over their internal affairs, only over their external relations.¹⁹³ Next along would stand the Indian Princely States, in which, subject always to British ‘paramourcy’, and despite a miscellany of periodic exceptions, British participation in their internal affairs was ordinarily confined to periods of minority rule and the curbing of gross injustices and maladministration.¹⁹⁴ At the other end lay the Federated Malayan States, where British Residents were in each case their effective rulers, while British officials were extensively employed within the Sultans’ governments themselves;¹⁹⁵ similarly in Zanzibar, where the British Resident

¹⁹⁰ For one of many later accounts of what these involved, see A. Forward, ‘*You have been allocated Uganda*’. *Letters from a District Officer* (Poyntington, 1999), Ch. 6.

¹⁹¹ For a summary of later developments, see ‘Buganda and Uganda’ in Low, *Buganda*.

¹⁹² For a summary of their longevity and spread, see D.A. Low, ‘Rule Britannia. Subjects and Empire’, *Modern Asian Studies*, 36, 2 (2002), pp. 499–503.

¹⁹³ J.B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795–1880* (Oxford, 1968); B.C. Busch, *Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894–1914* (Berkeley, 1967).

¹⁹⁴ Fisher, *Indirect Rule in India 1764–1857*; I. Copland, *The British Raj and the Indian Princes: Paramourcy in Western India, 1857–1930* (Bombay, 1982).

¹⁹⁵ R. Emerson, *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York, 1937); E. Sadka, *The Protected Malay States* (Kuala Lumpur, 1968); B.W. & L.Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia* (London, 1982), Chs. 4–6.

also served as the Sultan's First Minister, and British officials dominated its internal administration.¹⁹⁶

Between these poles stood a variety of other arrangements. In Egypt, for example, in the years of Britain's 'informal empire' prior to 1914, a clear distinction was purportedly drawn between Britain's diplomatic representatives and the government of Egypt. Between 1883 and 1907, the formidable Lord Cromer was never formally more than the British Agent and Consul-General. In practice, however, he was Egypt's 'Viceroy', and, throughout his years, and later, significant British figures held leading positions within the Egyptian polity.¹⁹⁷ In Northern Nigeria, by contrast, under the later Lord Lugard's doctrine of indirect rule, very different arrangements prevailed. No British official served within the Emirs' governments, but the Emirates possessed no formal autonomy, since Lugard attached great importance to there being 'not two sets of rulers – British and Native – ... but a single Government', in which British sovereignty was in no way limited by any treaties or other engagements,¹⁹⁸ as they were in the Persian Gulf, in the Indian Princely States, and in Malaya.

In this company, the Buganda model differed again. As in Nigeria – and here by contrast with Malaya, Zanzibar and Egypt – no British officials worked within the indigenous governments. They did not even preside over its administrative councils. In contrast, however, to Nigeria, British relations with the Ugandan kingdoms were always subject to their Agreements.¹⁹⁹ At the same time, by contrast with India's Princely States, let alone the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms, British overrule was exercised far more closely. In these ways, the model it provided for the larger Uganda was *sui generis*, which, given its genesis in some quite distinctive cross-currents, particularly between Sir Harry Johnston and the leading Baganda chiefs, was scarcely surprising.

¹⁹⁶ J.E. Flint, 'Zanzibar 1890–1950', in Harlow & Chilver, *East Africa*, Vol. II, 13; Ch. 13; L.W. Hollingsworth, *Zanzibar under the Foreign Office* (London, 1953).

¹⁹⁷ Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 2 vols. (London, 1908); Viscount Milner, *England in Egypt* (London, 1920). For the lesser such example of Thailand, see R.J. Aldrich, *The Key to the South* (Kuala Lumpur, 1993).

¹⁹⁸ F.D. Lugard, *Political Memoranda*, 3rd edn (London, 1970), p. 161; Perham, *Lugard – The Years of Authority*, Chs. 7–8; A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, *The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents, 1900–1947* (Oxford, 1965).

¹⁹⁹ See, especially, 'Mitchell's Secret Memorandum, 1939' and 'The Residency System, 1944', in Low, *Mind of Buganda*, pp. 111–19, 124–7; but, more generally, R.C. Pratt, 'The Politics of Indirect Rule: Uganda, 1900–1955', in Low and Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule*, Part 2. 'Overrule' was the term used in the 1900 Agreement.

11 Capstone: honour, awe and imperialism

By 1901, a mere dozen years after the first intrusion by British imperialist agents, the foundations of the new, colonial polity of Uganda had thus been largely laid. The defining essentials of its fortuitously determined territorial dimensions had now been fixed.¹ The heavy-handed and often totally arbitrary rejigging of the boundaries of the kingdom areas at its core, and the forced amalgamation of thirty and more previously relatively autonomous rulerships into a mere five had now been accomplished. In three of them, thanks to British intervention, the entrenchment of what had initially been highly problematic oligarchical revolutions appeared assured, while the relatively distinctive arrangements for colonial government which had eventually emerged in Buganda were taking on the form of a model which was being steadily replicated elsewhere.

The extensive countrywide acquiescence in these major innovations constituted one measure of the fact that British colonial hegemony was now well established. The varying dependence following the death or deposition of every significant immediately preceding pre-colonial ruler of the four remaining acknowledged monarchs upon the favour of the British for the security of their tenure provided a second, while the reorganisation, upon peacetime lines, of the mercenary troops the British employed – now redesignated as the 4th and 5th battalions of the King's African Rifles,² the former 1,000 strong, composed of a variety of local recruits superseding numbers of Sudanese, the latter of 500 Indian troops³ – constituted a third. The British soon proceeded, moreover, to formalise their presumption of lawful jurisdiction by promulgating, under their Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890, the Uganda

¹ The details remained to be fixed by the subsequent appointment of boundary commissions, on which see, e.g., Thomas and Scott, *Uganda*, pp. 110–11, 478–9.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 264–5; Moyses-Bartlett, *KAR*, pp. 63–4, 83, 135–6.

³ They were positioned on the top of Nakasero hill, the highest of the surrounding hills overlooking the Kabaka's capital and its environs.

Order-in-Council of 1902,⁴ which henceforth remained the basic law of their Uganda Protectorate throughout its further sixty years of colonial rule.

All this came to be capped in 1902 by one striking episode.

Back in June 1899, following Kabaka Mwanga's capture and exile, and after discussions with his Anglican mentors, Buganda's Katikiro, Apolo Kagwa, had suggested that he should visit Britain in the following March. He had already deposited Rs. 5,000 to cover his expenses, and the CMS was ready to arrange that Ernest Millar, a Luganda-speaking missionary, should accompany him. Kagwa, however, then asked Ternan, the acting Commissioner, if his visit could be 'more under the auspices of the Government than the mission'. Ternan referred this matter to the Foreign Office, which promptly approved of it.⁵ By March 1900, however, Kagwa was heavily involved in the negotiations for the Uganda Agreement. Nevertheless, the idea of his visiting Britain remained very much alive, and, while advising Kagwa early in 1901 to postpone his visit till the following August so that he could oversee the collection of the second year of the new taxes, Johnston told his masters in the Foreign Office that 'useful results may be expected to follow from [Kagwa] being received and well treated in Britain and taken to visit our manufacturing towns'. Upon the assumption, moreover, that Kagwa would pay for his own sea journeys, Johnston included in the Protectorate's financial estimates a contribution towards his expenses, so that he could be more of a 'Government guest' than 'the guest of any one body of missionaries'. He arranged too that an official named Pordage (who was subsequently described as 'better fitted for such a duty than anyone else out here')⁶ should accompany him. And he then asked that arrangements should be made for the Katikiro to be received by Queen Victoria, 'as it would be worth no end to us out here if she did so'; upon which a Foreign Office minute declared: 'No doubt we could suitably impress the Katikiro.'⁷

In the following June, Kagwa himself, however, asked if his visit could again be postponed for a year, since he and his associates were very concerned about the difficulties they were encountering in the collection of the new hut tax.⁸ But by January 1902 the coast had cleared, and he

⁴ Thomas & Scott, *Uganda*, Chs. 4, 17.

⁵ Ternan to Salisbury, 24 June 1899, and minutes, FO 2/202.

⁶ Jackson to Lansdowne, 24 Jan. 1902, FO 2/589.

⁷ Johnston to Hill, 16 Jan. 1901, and minutes, FO 2/461.

⁸ Kagwa to Tomkins, 17 June 1901, A8/1. For a fuller account, see Low & Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule*, pp. 102–5.

now asked that his visit should proceed. He proposed to depart in May and arrive in Britain in June. Though Jackson, as acting Commissioner, had made no financial provision for Kagwa's visit, as Johnston had, he promptly recommended that it should be approved, particularly since, with the death of Queen Victoria and the accession of King Edward VII, Kagwa's attendance at 'the imposing spectacle of His Majesty's Coronation would greatly impress him';⁹ upon which Hill in the Foreign Office minuted: 'Apollo must come.' Thereupon Britain's new Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, told Jackson that 'H.M. Government will be happy to receive Apollo, Katikiro of Uganda, as a guest of the nation during the approaching Coronation festivities.'¹⁰

The initial idea, however, that he should be escorted by Pordage was dropped, both because, for 'show purposes', Pordage was not thought to have 'quite grip enough of his H's' (i.e. was of a 'lower class' than was thought to be suitable for the escort of a Prime Minister) and because his 'rudimentary' Kiswahili – which Kagwa spoke 'very well' – might entail 'some difficulty in describing the intricacies of a Manchester spinning loom or the working of the various kinds of machinery in our shipbuilding yards and other industrial centres'. In order that 'Apollo should profit as much as possible by his visit' Jackson believed it was important that 'he should be accompanied by someone who can thoroughly explain in his own language what he sees'. The Foreign Office was not particularly anxious to see Kagwa pass 'quite under the CMS', but following consultation with Bishop Tucker it was arranged that, as originally proposed, the Luganda-speaking missionary, Ernest Millar, should accompany him. Millar had the further advantage of being 'a man of independent means who pays all his own expenses'.¹¹ But at the same time it was also arranged that another Ugandan official, Prendergast, should accompany them on their journey to Britain, and that on their arrival there Kagwa's 'official guide' should be Captain C.V.C. Hobart DSO¹² of the elitist Grenadier Guards, who not only was another person of considerable means, but had served in Uganda and had even taken a language examination in Luganda. Whilst, therefore, it was Kagwa who originally pushed the idea of his visit, and then held on to it for two years, successive British officials clearly grasped the opportunity which it presented to them to 'impress' him, and to that end considerable care was

⁹ Jackson to Lansdowne, 24 Jan. 1902, FO 2/589.

¹⁰ Lansdowne to Hayes Sadler, 21 Mar. 1902, FO 2/587.

¹¹ Jackson to Lansdowne, 24 Jan. 1902, and minutes, 24 Jan. 1902.

¹² Distinguished Service Order, the highest British military award for bravery after the Victoria Cross.

taken from the outset to see that, both in English 'class' terms and in the translation services available to him, he should be well served.

Kagwa was not the first Baganda to visit Britain. Three ordinary subjects had been taken there by two CMS missionaries in 1880 and were so mesmerised by all that they saw there and the treatment they received that, initially (it seems), Kabaka Mutesa forbade them from telling anybody else but himself about them, but then had them appointed to junior chieftaincies.¹³ Ten years on, a prominent Protestant convert, Mika Sematimba, had gone there in 1891 and was similarly impressed. But those had been much earlier days, and this was a far more momentous visit. To assist Kagwa, Ham Mukasa, a Protestant convert of the 1880s, an exile in Nkore in 1889, already a prominent chief, and in due course an outstanding Sekibobo of Kyagwe, accompanied him as his personal secretary.

We have a notable description of another such African visit to London by Khama of the Bamangwato just eight years previously, which would seem to have provided something of a precedent.¹⁴ Yet the countless details of its progress which have been provided have been mainly culled from newspaper and other contemporary British accounts rather than, as in the present case, from the participants themselves.¹⁵ It is that which makes the present case so striking. For, throughout their visit, Mukasa kept copious notes and, on their return to Buganda, wrote these up in collaboration with Kagwa into book form. Once that had been accomplished, his original Luganda text was passed to Millar (who had not seen it before) who then translated it into English and arranged to have it published. In doing so, Millar stated that he had omitted some

¹³ Mackay, Ch. 7; Miti, 'Buganda', 1, pp. 101–11; Zimbe, 'Kabaka', pp. 38–9; Kiwanuka, *Buganda*, pp. 172–4; Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 135.

¹⁴ Neil Parsons, *King Khama, Emperor Joe and the Great White Queen. Victorian Britain through African Eyes* (Chicago, 1998). A map of Kagwa's train journeys across Britain would be by no means identical with Khama's (p. 72), but would show the same wide range.

¹⁵ Michael Fisher has kindly sent me a copy of a 'Letter from Winchester' in the *London Chronicle* of 1–3 November 1791, saying an African Prince named John Nambana had visited Portsmouth and seen 'the ships, great guns, and other objects of curiosity'; 'He told them in English, which he speaks with tolerable ease, these things were different to what he was sent to learn; and he was afraid he would not have room in his mind for it all. In the course of the voyage from Africa he was taught to read; an attainment he is fond of, that he is never more gratified than when asked to read the Testament, which he calls the good book. The untutored African Prince seems to consider those that have the power of imparting knowledge to others, as the first of human beings; he therefore looks upon a schoolmaster as the most honourable of all characters. He said, 'When I return to Africa, if I live to succeed, I will not be King of my people; I will be their schoolmaster': D.J. Peacock, *Lee Boo of Belua: A Prince in London* (Hawaii, 1967), pp. 167–8. There could well be many other such accounts.

repetitions and had removed some remarks which he said would 'cause pain', but to judge from the colloquialisms and allusions which the published text still contained, he seems for the rest to have held as faithfully as he claimed to 'the native idiom'. The first publication of the book occurred in 1904 under the title *Uganda's Katikiro in England*.¹⁶ After a long gap it was reprinted in 1971 by the Black Heritage Library Collection in the United States;¹⁷ was then reissued in 1975 in an abbreviated form in Heinemann's African Writers Series as *Sir Apolo Kagwa Discovers Britain*,¹⁸ and then was once more published in full in 1998 under its original title, along with notes and an introduction by Simon Gikandi by Manchester University Press. So, ordinarily, it is readily available.¹⁹ It is the contents of Mukasa's account which will be reviewed here.

The two men left Entebbe, the British headquarters on the shores of Lake Victoria, by lake steamer on 8 May 1902. After being used only to canoes, they were astonished by the speed of the steamer as it travelled along the northern shores of the lake on its way to Kisumu in the East African Protectorate. From there they travelled by train to Mombasa. They had never seen a train before. They were astonished by its speed, by the bridges by which it traversed rivers and ravines, and by the steep gradients which it climbed. And there was soon more to come. At Mombasa they boarded an ocean-going ship – to them a quite astonishing sight – and before long found themselves steaming through that incredible cutting through dry land, the Suez Canal, which, as Christian converts, they found especially intriguing since it bifurcated the route along which the young Jesus had been carried for safety from King Herod. But there was still more to come as they crossed France by train and arrived in London, where they were met on the station platform by both Hill and Hobart. From there they were taken to a hotel 'in the road called Victoria Street, near the Houses of Parliament'; 'it was', so Mukasa

¹⁶ Hutchinson, London. The title page went on to say: BEING THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF HIS VISIT TO THE CORONATION OF HIS MAJESTY KING EDWARD VII. BY HIS SECRETARY HAM MUKASA. AUTHOR OF 'A LUGANDA COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL OF ST MATTHEW' Translated and Edited by The Rev. ERNEST MILLAR, M.A., F.Z.S. OFFICIAL INTERPRETER TO THE KATIKIRO DURING HIS VISIT, AND MISSIONARY OF THE CHURCH MISSIONARY SOCIETY IN UGANDA. WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY SIR H. H. JOHNSTON, K.C.B.

¹⁷ Freeport, New York, Books for Libraries Press, 1971.

¹⁸ Edited by Taban lo Liyong, Heinemann Educational Books, African Writers Series No. 133, London, 1975.

¹⁹ Simon Gikandi is Professor of English Language and Literature at the University of Michigan. His edition appears in Manchester University Press' 'Exploring Travel' series where, very interestingly, it is discussed as an example of travel literature, which, as compared with the discussion here, points up the multiple readings which a single text can suggest.

related, 'as if we were going into the house of the King himself; it was magnificent and beautiful beyond praise'. On entering, he went on: 'We went into a room ... and after we had got in the servant shut the door ... [and] then pulled a small rope and the room took us up'.

Thereafter, in a quite extraordinary manner, they found themselves extensively duchessed and lionised. After seeing them settling in, Hobart took them to dinner at his home on the following evening to meet several members of his family. On their first full day they were called upon by Britain's most notable African 'explorer', now Sir Henry Morton Stanley, who, as we have seen, had visited their country a quarter of a century earlier. A few days later he too had them to dinner with himself and his wife and a gathering of other guests at his home. Hill also called on them, and, as Mukasa recalled, 'talked to us a long time about Uganda affairs'. Amongst the others whom they met early on was the Liberal politician and later significant Liberal cabinet minister, Herbert Samuel, who was probably the first British Member of Parliament to have visited Uganda. He also later had them to dinner.

Thereafter they were taken to the Army and Navy Stores – one of the earliest large departmental stores in London – close by their hotel in Victoria Street, and were wonderstruck by all that they saw there. Kagwa then went to sign the King's 'visitors' book', and was taken on a visit to the Houses of Parliament. Shortly afterwards the two of them were taken to the British Museum, where they saw a selection of Egyptian mummies, and then on the Underground, which to their utter amazement took them right under the River Thames. On the following Sunday they went to a service in St Paul's Cathedral, and were greatly impressed by its huge organ. A day or two later they called on Sir Harry Johnston who, deprived of any further appointment following his Commissionership in Uganda, was now living in retirement. Always fascinated by African and other animals, he took them to the London Zoo. Then, soon afterwards, they attended a major reception held in their honour by the CMS, and from its headquarters in Salisbury Square in the City of London went on to the headquarters close by of the Bible Society, before attending a garden party given by the Bishop of London. They were very soon therefore moving around in a great whirl of engagements.

Occasionally Kagwa was carried away on his own. He was taken, for example, by Hobart to that acme of British aristocratic occasions, the races at Ascot, and by car to view the Albert Memorial in Hyde Park. He and Mukasa then spent a morning at a boys' school, and during the days which followed went to see a performance of *Ben Hur* at Drury Lane Theatre; were taken by Herbert Samuel to watch the circus at the Hippodrome; went on a visit to the London Hospital; and travelled out

to see the Crystal Palace, still then a principal exhibition hall for all the wondrous Western inventions of the nineteenth century. Later on, they were to go to the scarcely less imposing Alexandra Palace. Then, accompanied by Hobart, they visited the Tower of London, where they managed to combine the old with the new, for not only did they see the armoury, the dungeons and Tower Hill where executions used to take place, but were astonished to see Tower Bridge, whose roadway rose up in sections on either side to allow ships to pass underneath.

Thereafter Hobart took them to see the barracks of a cavalry regiment and watch them on parade (at Aldershot it seems), and then took them down to Southampton, where they stayed as his guests at his evidently very handsome country house nearby. From there they first saw a harbour full of passenger ships, before being taken on a small vessel past the 600 ships of the Royal Navy which had gathered there for the great Coronation Review at Spithead. Thereafter, following a visit to Lord Montagu's house at Beaulieu, where they saw the remains of the medieval abbey, they travelled back to London and attended a great ceremonial parade of Indian troops on Horse Guards Parade, close by the Prime Minister's house at 10 Downing Street.

In the event this was reviewed by the Prince of Wales who was standing in for his father, King Edward, who had suddenly been taken ill with appendicitis. As a consequence the Coronation ceremony had to be postponed for some weeks, which meant that, for visitors like Kagwa and Mukasa, their visit had to be quite unexpectedly extended. Their official and missionary hosts were, however, well up to the task, and the second wave of endless sightseeing on which they were soon embarked turned out to be even more engrossing than the first.

Once more they were handsomely entertained. They were frequently guests in the homes of those who were staunch supporters of the CMS in Uganda, and more especially of the families of those who had been or were missionaries there. Mukasa reported upon these occasions with very particular attention. On visiting Cambridge they were dined at 'High Table', both by the Master of Trinity College and by the Master of St John's College, and attended a coffee reception organised in their honour by Cambridge's legendary anthropologist, Sir James Frazer. Kagwa attended a large reception, given, it seems, at Hatfield House, by the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, the principal British architect of the partition of Africa, with whom he had a brief conversation. He and Mukasa later stayed at the stately home, deep in the English countryside, of Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, the principal descendant of the leading British slavery abolitionist, who was himself a successful businessman and a Member of Parliament, a strong supporter of the CMS, and

shortly to be a major player in the founding of the Uganda Company, the first European commercial firm to be established there. Meanwhile, back in London, they were received by Lord Rosebery, who, ten years previously, when he was Foreign Secretary and then Prime Minister, had been the chief proponent in the Cabinet of the British decision to annex Uganda. And that evening Hobart took them to dinner in the Officers' Mess of the Guards Brigade at Wellington Barracks, close by Buckingham Palace.

During the intervening weeks before the rescheduled Coronation, they were taken on several further tours of some of the more notable British sights: the Guildhall in the City of London, Windsor Castle, the Natural History Museum, and, on visiting Edinburgh, Holyroodhouse. They also saw the 'changing of the guard' at Buckingham Palace; were taken on an extended tour of the Houses of Parliament; and before leaving were taken over both Westminster Abbey and St Paul's Cathedral. They also went to see the headquarters of the Mill Hill Fathers, the English Roman Catholic missionary order that was now working in Uganda. And they then had a meeting with the Archbishop of Canterbury in Lambeth Palace.

Nothing, however, was more remarkable about this later period of their visit than their journeys – as Johnston had originally proposed, and Jackson had endorsed²⁰ – to a host of Britain's principal manufacturing towns, mostly in northern England and southern Scotland. These visits had two characteristics. In the first place, they were considerably honoured by the formal civic receptions they received in several of the cities they visited. These began in Liverpool where, so Mukasa recorded: 'We first saw the chief man of the town called the Lord Mayor ... the place where the town council meet, and the law courts, the criminal court and the civil court'. Then it was on to Glasgow where they were welcomed by the Lord Mayor, who gave them a dinner before taking them to a meeting of the City Council, where, as Mukasa recorded, 'Apolo Kagwa spoke a few words, and we all clapped, and then the chief man of the town said a little, and again we clapped.' Next they were off to Edinburgh, where they were met by the Lord Provost 'in a two-horse carriage' who, at a subsequent gathering, Mukasa recorded, made a long speech, 'praising our country and saying how much they wished to be our friends, and how anxious he was that our land should increase in wisdom'.

In similar style they were received in Reading.

²⁰ Johnston to Hill, 16 Jan. 1902, FO 2/461; Jackson to Lansdowne, 24 Jan. 1902, FO 2/589.

Their most remarkable welcome, however, came in Sheffield, where the Lord Mayor, with two horse-drawn carriages and a mounted escort of three policemen, met them at the railway station, from which, so Mukasa related, he ‘took us along with great honour’. And thereupon:

A great many people followed us – some went in front and some on both sides, and we went along in the centre in great state; and everyone wanted to see what we were like, because the chief of the town had given us such very great honour, and therefore many people came, both old and young, to see what sort of people they were who were given such honour.

As their impending visit had been announced in a local newspaper,

all the people in the town [knew about it], so that they were waiting for us in all the streets which we were to pass through, and we went along through crowds of people standing in the streets; some got on the tops of the houses and looked down on us as we passed, to see who they were who were coming in such state: we saw the women lifting up their little children and running with them that they might see what we were like; there were a great many people, young and old, men and women.

Later that day they were taken to a large reception held in their honour in the Town Hall, where they stood with the Lord Mayor to greet the guests, before speeches were made, by Kagwa amongst others, who ‘told the people how we wanted to learn to do work of all kinds’. ‘After he had finished’, Mukasa wrote, ‘every one clapped their hands and cheered to give the Katikiro honour, and to thank him for the good things he had said’.

The other preeminent aspect of these later journeyings lay in the visits they paid to a great array of Britain’s major industrial enterprises at the very peak of its then manufacturing supremacy – including two of its most formidable armaments factories. These began in Birmingham where, after touring a couple of other factories, they went, so Mukasa recorded: ‘to see a factory where rifles and bicycles are made (B.S.A.) ... Every week they make fifteen hundred rifles, but during the Boer war they were making five thousand a week ... when we heard this, we shook our heads like a man suffering from hunger’. From Birmingham they went on to Liverpool, where, amongst other things, they saw the SS *Oceanic*, one of the largest passenger vessels then afloat. Then, upon visiting Cambridge, they went to the University Press where, so Mukasa recorded, they saw ‘some wonderfully clever printing presses’ which prompted him to write, as he similarly did on other occasions: ‘We were amazed at the cleverness of the English, which is unending.’

Thereafter they attended an Agricultural Show in Carlisle where they saw all sorts of ‘pumps and mowing-machines, and thrashing-machines’.

From there they travelled to Glasgow, where they were first taken ‘seven hundred yards down’ a coalmine, and then ‘three hundred yards along the passage’; and then, after visiting a major iron and steel works, and a sugar factory down the river at Greenock, toured around one of the then great shipbuilding yards on the River Clyde. Here, so Mukasa wrote, they saw ‘a great many things – screws for ships, and the way iron plates were pierced and bent ... [and] planes of many kinds, that cut in a most wonderful way by themselves’.

Thereafter they were off to Edinburgh where they saw first the Forth Bridge – ‘one of the wonders of the world – a marvellous thing’, Mukasa called it – before visiting a paper mill where ‘the great rolls of paper were cut up just as if they were merely one sheet’.

From there they travelled to Newcastle where, prior to visiting a pottery where they ‘saw every kind of ware, cups, tea-kettles, slop-pails and flower vases that were like our hand-drums in Uganda’, they were taken to the great armaments factory and naval shipbuilding yard (presumably the formidable Armstrong works) on the River Tyne, where, Mukasa wrote: ‘We first saw how they bored out the barrels of cannon. We saw the gun-carriages and the bullets, which were as tall as I was, and were larger in size. We saw, too, where they forged gun-barrels, and also a hammer as large and as high as a hill made by white ants.’ More particularly, they went over:

a man-of-war, which was made for their wars with one another, when they fight with some other European nation. It had in it another house, which is put there to carry the big guns, and which the bullets of another ship cannot pass through ... We went inside and were wonderstruck and amazed at it. It contained some guns that would carry fifteen miles, and other guns carry thirteen miles. It was just like a house on dry land; its length was ninety-five feet ... The whole works were as large or larger than the space in front of the King’s enclosure at Mengo, and there are twelve thousand men employed in them.

From there they returned to London, only, however, to be taken a few days later to Reading where they saw both a seed factory (Suttons) and a biscuit factory (presumably Huntly and Palmers), and from there travelled north once again, first to Sheffield where, apart from the rousing reception they received, they were taken to an iron and steel factory; then to a brickworks where they watched the extensive procedures which were employed there; and finally to a cutlery factory where, so Mukasa remarked, ‘we were amazed at all the different things the English make’.

But they were not done yet. Next they were carried off to Manchester where, in this heartland of the then British cotton industry, they inevitably visited a cotton factory and watched a thousand women working in one place, before going to a rubber factory where they saw ‘fifteen

different kinds of machines for preparing the rubber' (for raincoats), and then on an excursion to St Helens to see a glass works – a visit which propelled Mukasa into remarking:

I cannot leave off praising the English. Listen! They make a coal fire very deep in the earth, and from this they take pipes everywhere which give them heat for melting iron, and all these things, sand and stones, which make glass – all these things are melted by the gas which comes from the coals and which burns very strongly indeed, and we wondered with increasing wonder. The things of the English are amazing!

Finally they reached Crewe, where they saw both the great railway workshops and an electricity generating station – which led Mukasa to remark that they 'were simply amazed at the way they could store up in one place power enough to give light everywhere by means of electric lamps'.

Their whole visit then came to a climax on two days in August 1902. As Mukasa put it, the 8th August was 'the greatest day of our whole journey because on it we saw the King'. Since this was just the day before the Coronation, an audience with the King, accompanied only by Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, Hobart (presumably as translator) and two palace officials, was, in British terms, an honour indeed. 'The building', so Mukasa wrote, 'was most splendid; each room was finer than the last, and everywhere we went was most wonderful'. When eventually they saw:

"the Father of the Nation" sitting upon his throne, dressed in magnificent kingly raiment; he bowed his head three times, and we did the same and bowed three times, and he then told the Katikiro to sit down, and he sat down on a golden chair.

During the brief conversation which ensued, Kagwa remarked that 'the work which is done in this country of yours is most wonderful'. To this the King replied that he had 'read about what is going on in your country' and had heard about it too. He then took them to see some of the gifts which had been sent to him in celebration of his Coronation – from Ethiopia, for example – though he seems to have been somewhat confused about those which had come from Buganda.

Mukasa's book then has a full account of the Coronation which the two of them attended the next day, at which they were both witnesses of and privileged participants in the most elaborate pageantry of the most portentous worldwide imperial power of the day. At its conclusion they joined in the immense crowds milling around in the London streets, till eventually they reached their lodgings at eleven o'clock that night.

Shortly afterwards, the two of them were on their way back to Buganda, which, after some unhappy experiences on a German ship and a visit to Zanzibar, they eventually reached in mid September. There they first called upon the young Kabaka, and thereafter attended a thanksgiving service for their safe return in (the Protestants') Namirembe Cathedral, before Kagwa spoke at length to a special session of the Lukiko about their experiences. Thereafter, far from being limited, as the junior chiefs had been in 1881, about whom they could talk to, the two of them became extensively engaged over several ensuing weeks in reporting upon all that they had seen and experienced. 'All the time', Mukasa related, 'from September 17th to October 31st we had no rest by day or night; some people went to the Katikiro, others came to me, all wanting to hear all about England'. On these occasions they told their enquirers about:

the vast numbers of the English and their cleverness ... their beautiful houses, and streets, and bridges and boats, and about all that they do in their land, and how their land is so peaceful ... what the trains and the carriages were like, and what large ships they had ... and how large the English cities were, and many other things which I have not written down.

'Well, my friends', he wrote as his account drew to a close, 'you should read this book very carefully and attentively, that you may understand what other and wiser lands are like'. And he then concluded: 'Let us go ahead, slowly and surely; perhaps our grandchildren will be much wiser than we are, but we should encourage our children daily to learn all they can, that they may teach our children after we have gone, and so they may go on increasing in wisdom both in the mind and in handicrafts.'

Amidst the many details of Mukasa's account, there are, for present purposes, several crucial sub-texts. It is clear, to begin with, that the CMS was very anxious to make the most of the opportunity their visit provided to underscore both their own intimate association with the Baganda elite and their preeminent role as its benefactors. Millar not only accompanied them upon most of their cross-country journeys; he and sometimes his brother Charles, and periodically other returned missionaries – Baskerville, Gordon, Roscoe – chaperoned them on most of their visits in and around London. There can be little doubt too that the missionaries and their associates were deeply involved with very many of the necessary arrangements. These evidently required a great deal of organisation. For, as Mukasa acknowledged, the two of them were moved effortlessly from train journey, to factory, to tea

party, to hotel for the night, without needing to trouble themselves with any of the logistics. Millar's special coup was the spectacular welcome they received in Sheffield, which was precipitated by a letter he wrote to the local newspaper announcing its impending date. All of which served to stress to their two visitors just how much influence their missionary associates enjoyed back in their own country, and to dramatise across Britain the extent of the CMS' missionary success out in Uganda.

But it was not only the CMS missionaries who were determined to make the most of their visit. British officialdom, as we have seen, was, from the start, out to 'impress' them. Even before their departure, their guides and translators had been deliberately chosen with this requirement in mind. Upon their departure from Entebbe they were officially farewelled by the acting British Commissioner, and, as we have seen, upon their arrival in London they were met on the railway platform at Victoria Station by both Sir Clement Hill and Captain Hobart.

Thereafter, the outings on which Hobart escorted them – to Ascot, to his family home near Southampton, to Wellington Barracks, to Buckingham Palace – were very evidently deliberately stage-managed. Hill, for his part, seems to have been assiduous in arranging that they should have an audience of the King, and at the end of their journeyings took the two of them to his room in the Foreign Office, where he introduced them to a number of his senior colleagues, and evidently gave them a pep-talk. About this, Mukasa recorded him as saying in part: 'we were like you once or even worse, and you too if you work hard will be like we are now'. Then, on the night preceding the Coronation, Hill gave Kagwa a largely attended dinner party at which one of the guests was Ternan, who had played such a large part with them back in Buganda. And thereafter, on the evening before their departure, Hill dined with them privately, before seeing them off on the next day at Victoria Station. More than once, moreover, Hill urged Mukasa to work up the notes he was compiling about their visit into a book, since, he said, 'a great many people will want to hear about all you have seen; the Baganda and a great many English people too'. Upon their return to Buganda, they were then formally welcomed back by Wilson (acting on behalf of the British Commissioner) 'in a speech', so Mukasa related, 'congratulating us on the completion of our journey ... and saying that he hoped now that the Katikiro had seen England and English ways, he would work at getting Uganda into order'. It was all, that is, a great deal more than a generously arranged 'Cook's' tour. There were considerably deeper considerations at work as well.

In the first place, aside from one recorded exception,²¹ they were treated throughout with very considerable civility. They were taken on a whole series of visits to a wide range of iconic British buildings. They were received in the homes of a whole range of British notables. They were guests in several 'upper-class' 'county' houses. A number of special receptions were laid on in their honour. They were lunched and dined in city halls, Cambridge Colleges, and at Wellington Barracks. Numerous factory managers and many a civic leader went out of his way to make their visit at once pleasurable and informative. Kagwa met Lord Salisbury and together they met Lord Rosebery and the Bishop of London, and had private meetings with the Archbishop of Canterbury. Above all they had an audience with the King himself. Within the hierarchy of British courtesies, they could hardly have asked for more.

Amongst the Baganda, great importance has long been attached to *ekitiibwa*, (honour).²² Throughout their visit, Kagwa and Mukasa were treated with very considerable honour. The esteem accorded them, the hospitality extended to them, the prerogatives with which they were perennially regaled clearly made a great impression on them. As we have noted, Mukasa's account is replete with wonder at the 'honour' they received.

Yet there was, of course, always another side to their visit. While nothing further was actually said about the British interest in 'impressing' them, the programme of arrangements which was made for their visit bespoke little else. Not only did they visit a whole raft of Britain's historically famous buildings; their extensive tour of Britain's vigorously pulsating factories at the very apex of its coal-driven industrial primacy can in the end only have had one intent. All of this was not so subtly accompanied by their arranged visits to the small arms factory at Birmingham, the ship-building yards on the Tyne, the cavalry parade at Aldershot, the review of Indian troops on Horse Guards Parade, and the huge naval review at Spithead, and then their attendance at the great assemblage of the Coronation ceremony itself, where the might and magnitude of the worldwide British empire at its apogee symbolically enclosed them in its embrace.

Mukasa's account (as we have also seen) was replete with references to 'the cleverness of the Europeans'; and as soon as they were launched on their journeys around Britain's principal manufacturing towns, he evidently became transfixed by the mechanical and other 'marvels' which

²¹ After seeing the King, they both wanted to sign his visitors' book, but Hobart told them he would do it instead: Mukasa, *Uganda's Katiikiro*, Ch. 13.

²² On which, see again Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, especially pp. 1, 167–8.

they saw. The detail with which he recorded these, the clear intensity of his engagement with them, the fullness with which he and Kagwa spelt out to their countrymen on their return the intricacies of so much they had seen, all testify to the very considerable impression which, as intended, these had made upon them. They were clearly awed – over-awed – by all that they encountered. In Glasgow, Mukasa wrote, they ‘were much surprised at the cleverness of the British’. Of Manchester, he said: ‘The things of the British are amazing’; and so he said on many other occasions too. Amidst all of this, there was little highlighting of the coercive forces the British could deploy. Mukasa seemingly took these in his stride. But that the ominous message which they carried had punched through to them can hardly be gainsaid.

In the armoury of colonialism, ‘awe’ could be a peculiarly potent weapon. Once it had been generated upon such a scale, any thought of any further revolt against the domination of the colonial power was out of the question. During the 1890s many Baganda had resisted the imposition of British imperial dominion over their country, and in the end their Kabaka had attempted to cast it off altogether. No more, however, could any such thoughts be contemplated. It was not just that every attempt had quite disastrously failed. Kagwa’s visit demonstrated the futility of even thinking of any such attempt again.

Yet the gargantuan nature of imperial power was in this instance, as in others too, made somewhat more palatable because its manifestation was accompanied by many emollient gestures of a very extensive kind; and that kept awe from spilling over into resentment. Where, as here, the emphatic demonstration of awesomeness was accompanied by some accommodation for indigenous notions of personal status and self-respect – by the granting, that is, of *ekitiibwa* – an even more powerful weapon in the repertoire of mechanisms by which imperial authority came to be riveted on colonial peoples came into play. It was not so much that an iron fist was encompassed in a velvet glove. Hegemony tempered by honour left awe greatly reinforced.

12 Round up and review

The 1890s saw the inauguration of Western colonial rule in several parts of East Africa – the large area stretching inland from the Indian Ocean coastline north and south of Zanzibar to the northern end of Lake Nyasa in the south and the headwaters of the White Nile in the north. In 1890, following a number of other possibilities, this whole area was partitioned by Britain and Germany away in Western Europe, into a German sphere in the south and a British one in the north. Subsequently, the latter was divided by British colonial diktat into a larger territory immediately inland from the coast – the future Kenya – and a smaller one – Uganda – in the further interior. There, amid a series of variously canvassed alternatives, its node came to lie in the kingdom of Buganda.

From 1890 onwards, tiny numbers of British army officers accompanied by scarcely larger cadres of civilians led supportive companies of mercenary troops, mostly from the Sudan, into this region, with a view to establishing their colonial dominance over it. Their task was crucially conditioned by the fact that, during the 1890s, the ‘Uganda’ region was all but exclusively composed of the northern half of the array of long-nurtured traditional rulerships which stood within the northern arc of East Africa’s great inland lakes.

Despite the protracted history of British imperial rule – not least over traditional rulerships elsewhere – there was, however, nothing as yet determined as to the course which this might take. It is only in retrospect, therefore, that it can be suggested that the manner in which colonial control came to be effected – ‘fabricated’ – took the form, at least in the present instances, of a four-stage ‘defining conjuncture’ between the first generation of British colonial agents and the leaders of the principal rulerships that stood in their path. ‘Conjuncture’ because, despite the greater force (both lethal and *majeure*) of which the British could dispose, and the particular concerns they variously espoused, these encounters were never just one-sided engagements. The character of the indigenous component, which generally differed from case to case, and, often enough, from phase to phase, all but invariably conditioned the course

of events as well. 'Defining' conjuncture because these generally served to shape the future relationship between colonial power and each of the indigenous polities it confronted. Not infrequently, they also saw the resolution of some intra-rulership rivalry.

At this stage it must suffice to review summarily the principal ingredients in the four stages of the 'defining conjuncture' in each of the five polities which were here subjected to them.

There were first the 'precursors' that so extensively conditioned the subsequent course of events. For the first British agents who advanced towards Buganda in 1890, these lay in their explorer- and missionary-instilled belief that it constituted the key to control of the northern lakes region; for the Baganda, they lay in their protracted civil war with its long succession of religio-political alignments. To the east in Busoga, the 'precursors' for the British lay in its key position astride their crucial line of communications with the coast; while, for the multiplicity of Basoga rulers, they lay in their subordinate position as satellites of Buganda (and, in one or two instances, of Bunyoro). Northwards in Bunyoro, the 'precursors' for the British stemmed from their unmitigated apprehension of the aggressiveness of its monarch and his warbands, and by 1893 from the obstacle it presented to their most direct route to Lake Albert, which, for international strategic purposes, they were after; while, for the Banyoro, they lay in their ruler Kabalega's long-hardened determination to recover some, at least, of the seceded parts of his kingdom. Those included the Toro region. Here, for the British, the 'precursors' lay in the opportunity Kabalega's predation provided to secure them local support; while, for Toro's ruler and the hereditary chiefs of Mwenge and Kyaka, they lay in their fear of being thrust yet again into exile. That left Nkore, where 'the precursors' for the British lay in its uncertain attitude towards the insurgent forces ranged against them; while, upon the Nkore side, they swirled around the complexities of a disputed royal succession and its debilitating consequences.

In each instance there then followed at some point, though often in very different garb, 'a raw assertion of British hegemony': in Toro, by Lugard's imposition of a draconian treaty upon its ruler Kasagama in August 1891; in Buganda, by Lugard's triumphant intervention on the side of the Protestants in the defeat of Kabaka Mwangwa and his Catholic allies at the Battle of Mengo in January 1892; in Busoga, as a consequence of Williams' armed encounters with several of its small rulers in June 1892, as reinforced by his defeat of the Bavuma the next year; in Bunyoro, by the construction, on Colville's orders, of a line of British-controlled forts across its heartland, from Lake Albert to the Kafu river,

in January–February 1894; and in Nkore, by the unilateral construction of a British fort near to its capital in December 1898.

There then followed, as we have further suggested, a ‘determining vortex’. In three respects, the British at this point found themselves very severely challenged, first by Kabalega and Bunyoro’s ‘primary resistance’, then by Mwanga’s ‘post-pacification revolt’, and shortly afterwards by the ‘mutiny’ of three of their Sudanese mercenary companies. With, however, the crucial support of Buganda’s Christian forces, and a considerable reinforcement from elsewhere of imperial mercenary troops, all three were in the end decisively crushed. The hegemony this brought to the British was then exemplified in the refigurings they were able to impose upon the circumstances of every one of the rulerships in their orbit, and by their ability to extend their hold, step by step, over their governance.

In the course of this turmoil, the most salient fates of the four kingdoms and Busoga were cumulatively determined. Bunyoro was severely ravaged, rent by desertions from its ruler, denuded of large swathes of its inherited territory, and thereafter cruelly treated as a ‘conquered country’. Following the Battle of Mengo in January 1892, Buganda’s two Christian parties coalesced once again, especially against their Muslim opponents in 1893, but then, after much campaigning against their Bunyoro rivals, became seriously rent by Mwanga’s revolt. As, however, the leading Christian chiefs refused to join in this, and in a crucial move supported the British in their onslaught upon Mwanga and his allies and the Sudanese troops who mutinied against them, they thereby secured for their kingdom an exceptional degree of independent standing *vis-à-vis* the British, which was then embodied in their 1900 Agreement. Meanwhile, the Busoga kingdoms saw the incremental severing by the British of their subordination as satellites to Buganda – only, however, to suffer its replacement by a still tighter subordination to a British officer. Late in 1897, the British ‘lost’ Busoga to the Sudanese mutineers, but, following the mutineers’ departure northwards, soon restored and even extended their hold. Over the same period, following the withdrawal of Kabalega’s Abarasura from Toro at the end of 1893, Colvile’s plan for the creation of a confederacy of southern Bunyoro chiefs under Kasagama ran into difficulties from the opposition of other hereditary chiefs in the region and from Kasagama’s own vacillations. Eventually, however, these were overcome, and when, in 1897, Mwanga’s revolt erupted, Kasagama was very careful to do nothing to cast any doubt upon his British allegiance. Since, in the fighting that then ensued, the borderlands between Nkore and southwestern Buganda became a key battleground for the guerrilla resistance of Mwanga’s principal

lieutenant, Kintu, the exclusion hitherto of Nkore from British hegemony in the region was soon brought to an end.

Amid all this there were some key personal confrontations, more especially between some who had been new model warband leaders in the three kingdoms where these were to be found. In Buganda, these were epitomised by the long-running rivalries between the acknowledged head of each Christian party and its most notable military leader. On the one side there was a protracted feud between Kagwa – as Katikiro, the Protestants' principal leader – and Kakungulu – their most extensively employed and successful general. That was only ended upon Kakungulu's departure northwards to establish his own personal Baganda-like dominion over the acephalous peoples to the north and east of Busoga.¹ In parallel there ran a rift between Mugwanya – as second Katikiro, the Catholics' principal leader – and Kintu, their most widely renowned and experienced general. With the outbreak of Mwangwa's revolt, Mugwanya stood closely with the British, while Kintu took command of its motley of supporters. Following their defeat and his subsequent exile, Kintu named Mugwanya as 'more hostile to him than even Kagwa'.²

In Bunyoro, the key confrontations ran through the ranks of its Abarasura leaders, between those who concluded there was no future in continued resistance to the British – principally Rwabudongo and Byabachwezi – and those – Ireeta and eventually Kikukule – who stood by Kabalega to the end; while, in Nkore, where Mbaguta stood alone in such company, he used his position to sap the successive preeminence of two dominant royals, Kahitsi and Igumira.

With the resolution of so many issues churned by the vortex, the way stood open, as a consequence, for 'colonial settlement'. In several respects this was forged here by Sir Harry Johnston, the Special Commissioner sent out in 1899 to bring a settled order to the country. Wherever he went, he insisted on the institution of hut and gun taxes. He clamped the colonial grid of provinces and districts upon the whole area, and, in a major move, instituted a 1,500-strong armed constabulary to support civil officers in charge of districts.³

At the core of Uganda's 'colonial settlements', there stood, however, a much closer 'conjuncture' between the region's rulerships and the British than these arrangements might imply. Despite Johnston's initial hesitancy, virtually every existing rulership was retained. Colonial rule

¹ For a full account, see Twaddle, *Kakungulu*, Chs. 4–5.

² Wright, *Heroic Age*, p. 189.

³ Thomas & Scott, *Uganda*, p. 265; Moyse-Bartlett, *KAR*, pp. 83, 135.

thus stemmed here not from the supersession of pre-existing rulerships, but from the superimposition of colonial hegemony over them. Colonial authority, that is, stood here essentially upon the traditional legitimacy of indigenous authority.

Where, however, in these kingdoms new model warbands had been formed, two related consequences emerged. First, their principal offices of state were all filled by ex-new model warband leaders: Kagwa and Mugwanya in Buganda; Rwabadongo and Byabachwezi in Bunyoro; Mbaguta in Ankole. Then, building on the precedent inaugurated late in 1888 in Buganda, they each established and maintained an oligarchical regime. That was facilitated by the youth of their rulers: Daudi Chwa in Buganda an infant, Kitahimbwa in Bunyoro young too, Kahaya in Nkore still in his teens. Aside from Busoga, where the British officer was an oligarch in practice, it was only in Toro, where new model warbands were actively spurned, that the ruler retained executive power.

These outcomes were then locked in by the extensive Uganda (properly Buganda) Agreement of 1900, which the Baganda leaders, drawing upon the standing they had won with the British, prevailed upon Johnston to grant to them. This acknowledged to the full the apical role the hereditary Kabakaship held in Buganda, but at the same time listed three Ministers who would 'transact most of the Kabaka's business'; and out of a merger of the Kabaka's Lukiko with Wilson's instituted 'Baraza' it constituted a 'native council' of administrative chiefs, presided over not by the Kabaka or a British officer but by the Katikiro. This combination of traditional legitimacy with oligarchical rule suited both parties to the 'conjuncture', and, whilst never fully replicated elsewhere, soon became the prototype for others to embrace. All of this was then cemented by the widespread reporting of the first-hand experience of Buganda's formidable Katikiro, Kagwa, and his assistant Mukasa of the might and magnitude of the imperial power as emanating from its centre.

Following upon these beginnings, there ensued sixty further years of colonial rule about which countless stories still remain to be told.⁴ But those must be for other hands.

There remain, however, for brief comment in the light of the Uganda story, several of the explanatory concepts for the study of imperialism which were canvassed at the outset.

There is first the pivotal point. In 1998–9, with the publication of the initial five volumes of the magisterial *Oxford History of the British Empire*,

⁴ But see, e.g., Doyle, *Bunyoro*; Twaddle, *Kakungulu*; Hansen, *Mission, Church and State*.

to which a myriad of scholars contributed, a benchmark was set for its further study. It was shortly followed by several arresting single volumes which were widely read and took the study into neglected territory. One was a tight-packed, largely laudatory account, which, in addition to its extensive economic data, was illuminatingly pinned to a long line of larger-than-life imperial figures.⁵ A second was a voluminous, unbridled, unrivalled account that relates in more detail the separate stories, in more territories, of the role of the British, especially in the shredding of their empire, than any other such survey;⁶ while a third provided a masterly overview of the aftermath of a final attempt to create a Eurasia-wide empire, in which half a dozen and more stand-alone empires spread across it from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, till, with a break-out by sea, its industrial revolution and the addition of America, the 'West', with the British in the van, became widely predominant – only, however, to implode in the twentieth century into two World Wars, with first a bipolar and then a unipolar world as the outcome.⁷

Some engaging items from a quite different genre meanwhile also became salient and they too came to be widely read. Amid much else, its prime examples quite fortuitously provided detailed accounts of what has earlier been suggested here were the two alternative procedures by which traditional rulerships fell subject to imperial domination, either by the supersession of the preceding political authority by the imperial power or by the superimposition of imperial authority over the pre-existing polity. In the course of detailing the horrifying suppression by British-led forces in Delhi of the great Indian Uprising of 1857 William Dalrymple's *The Last Mughal*⁸ recounts the manner in which the hapless Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar II was swept from his throne, and his imperial Dynasty largely expunged – to be superseded nineteen years later by Viceroy Lord Lytton's proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India in his place. Dalrymple's earlier book, *White Mughals*, meanwhile provided a highly personalised account of the superimposition of British dominion over the large southern Indian state of

⁵ N. Ferguson, *Empire. The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York, 2003).

⁶ P. Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781–1997* (London, 2007).

⁷ J. Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405* (London, 2007).

⁸ London, 2006, with the sub-title: *The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi 1857*. For the corresponding, if less harrowing, story, cast in novel form, of the deposition by the British of Thibaw, the last King of Burma, see Amitav Ghosh, *The Glass Palace* (London, 2001), Part One, 'Mandalay'.

Hyderabad, especially at the instance of Governor-General Lord Wellesley – a situation that persisted till the end of British rule.⁹

The first group of these studies relates to what is here termed ‘large scale imperialism’, the second to ‘ground level imperialism’. It is the implication of the present book that the former without the latter detracts from a fully rounded account of, at least, British imperialism.

It happens that, in the Uganda story of the 1890s, the distinction between the two was frequently marked. As we noted at the very outset, much attention has long been given to the role of ‘the official mind’ as a principal player in the operations of ‘large-scale imperialism’ at the time. There can be no doubt that it was of crucial importance in the efforts to fend off rival European powers; in carving out the ‘sphere of influence’ within which its agents were to operate; in striving to secure the necessary non-governmental and then governmental support for their endeavours, at a time when ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ was fighting shy of providing this; thereafter in mobilising crucial military reinforcements when a combination of ‘primary resistance’, ‘post-pacification revolt’ and mutiny threatened the whole enterprise; and not least in the persons of Sir Percy Anderson in Berlin in 1890, and Sir Clement Hill after his East African tour in 1901, in demarcating the pivotal southern and eastern boundaries of the new polity of ‘Uganda’, within which millions of Africans were henceforth destined, quite arbitrarily, to live.

In all the foregoing there has never been any reason, however, to qualify the earlier reference to the complete inability of ‘the official mind’ to provide any useful guidance to British officials ‘on the ground’, as to how they should proceed in their task of fabricating empire. The lexicon of ‘large-scale imperialism’ contained no mention of any recommended procedure to match the scale of their undertaking. No induction was mounted to alert them to its demands. The task was simply devolved on a tiny gathering of agents, cast untutored into the throes of ‘ground level imperialism’ to proceed as best they could. On being dispatched to Buganda in September 1890, Lugard’s operational instructions ordered him to ‘impress [Mwanga] with a sense of the power of the Company . . . consolidate the Protestant party and . . . attempt . . . to conciliate the Roman Catholics’.¹⁰ But nothing more; nor indeed anything further to his immediate successors either. They were left all but entirely to their own devices.

⁹ Dalrymple, *White Mughals*; J. Zubrzycki, *The Last Nizam* (Sydney, 2006).

¹⁰ LD I, pp. 327–9.

Several discernible consequences followed. During his many weeks journeying from the coast to Buganda late in 1890, Lugard, at his own instance, set about initiating his task by making 'blood-brotherhood' and concocting exiguous treaties with several of the leading men and chiefs he encountered on the way. That, however, was never going to be a way to proceed in Buganda. By the time he reached its capital he had therefore determined to go very much further, and within days of his arrival proceeded to thrust a far more elaborate draft treaty upon a much more substantial ruler, who promptly rejected it out of hand. That speedily precipitated a serious crisis. In the end, Lugard had his way; Mwanga scratched his mark upon the treaty. But in the aftermath he needed to be far more cautious in the course which he took. He mainly concerned himself, therefore, with constructing the fort he had begun nearby to safeguard his following, while more generally switching to a more conciliatory way of proceeding.

None of this, however, brought him the dominance which his 'internalised imperialism' demanded. That only came over the next eighteen months, as he first proceeded to exploit the rifts within the Buganda polity by battenning on the hopes and fears of one or more of the parties to it, so as to establish his own hegemony over it, and then, in the vortex which followed, by consolidating his primacy by binding together again the remaining component parts of the kingdom under his own aegis. During the 1890s, with adjustments to meet differing circumstances, this sequential procedure became the stock-in-trade of British 'ground level imperialism' in the region. It owed nothing to 'the official mind', whose officials never expressed any interest in it, let alone offered any comment upon it. By the end of the decade it had, however, played a major role in fabricating the five principal political entities that set the pattern for the future Uganda as a whole.

Accounts of 'large-scale imperialism' are replete with lethal conflict: Plassey, Seringapatam, Assaye, T el el Kabir, Omdurman. They are all but invariably there. There were no counterparts to such events in the Uganda story. From the outset, however, mercenaries were seen to be of crucial importance to the British enterprise. Lugard and his principal associate, Williams, were both accompanied on their first arrival in the region by armed escorts of Sudanese troops. And soon substantial reinforcements were secured. This stemmed from Lugard's unilateral decision, in the absence of any but the most exiguous instructions, to embark upon his quite unauthorised circular journey to the west and north of Buganda, with a view to eventually gaining hold of Wadelai. As, after first marching west, he then turned north, he came within reach of the remnants of Emin's soldiery clustered around Kavalli. There, with

his hopes of ever reaching Wadelai dashed by their leader Selim Bey's refusal to support him in doing so, he settled instead for the enlistment of Selim's following in the IBEAC's service. For that, he had no authorisation from his Company, nor any means of remunerating them for their services, other than granting them a general licence to pillage. He simply took the law into his own hands.

Such a propensity to act without authorisation imbued both the exploitation by the first generation of British agents of a series of 'turbulent frontiers' and the eagerness with which they set about establishing their hold upon them. As we have noted, Lugard's minimalist instructions referred only to Buganda, where, aside from consolidating the Protestants and conciliating the Catholics, he was directed to do no more than 'impress' on the Kabaka 'the power of the Company'. He accepted no such limitation. On his extensive journey to the west, he first took advantage of the 'turbulence' which the depredations of Kabalega's Abarasura in Toro gave him for bringing it within the ambit of British hegemony, and then, on eventually returning to Buganda in the midst of what shortly became a major conflict, he soon buckled to the task of superimposing his own authority upon it. For neither of these proceedings had he any warrant from the IBEAC, let alone from the British government.

On Portal's arrival as Imperial Commissioner early in 1893, he effectively shelved Lugard's engagement with Kasagama of Toro, but, as we have seen at some length, Buganda was not to be so easily sidelined. As a consequence, London's 'official mind' was eventually propelled into having to regularise formally, in its own terms, the issue here. Even then, however, it was all but two and a half years after the decisive Battle of Mengo before it ultimately caught up with developments 'on the ground' by announcing, in June 1894, the establishment of a British imperial Protectorate over Buganda.

In doing so, it succumbed to a notable instance of unauthorised expansion 'at the periphery'. At this stage, no other part of the vastly larger British sphere was in any way so designated. Protectorate status was confined to just one kingdom in its far interior – still ordinarily three months' marching time from the coast.

Nor was this the last such case here. For, stirred by the renewed onslaughts of Bunyoro's Abarasura in the Toro region, and by the depredations of Buganda's raiders in Busoga, British imperial agents were already embarked on a general fanning-out of 'ground level imperialism' from their Buganda base – by launching a string of invasions against Bunyoro; by compressing Toro and its neighbours into a British-ordained 'confederacy'; by steadily impelling the Baganda to

relinquish their previous supremacy over Busoga to them. None of this had any regard to the formal limitation of the British Protectorate to Buganda. Two years later, however, with all this occurring, London's 'official mind' found itself having to play catch-up with events 'on the ground' once again. It eventually did so by announcing, in June 1896, the extension of the British Protectorate over Buganda to encompass Bunyoro and other adjacent portions of the British sphere there. 'Ground level imperialism' left it with no other feasible option.

This fanning-out by the first generation of British agents was heavily dependent upon the ready availability of the Sudanese and Swahili troops who had come up from the coast and then been reinforced by those who had come over from Kavalli. Two hundred of them played a principal part in Lugard's victory at Mengo in January 1892. Thereafter they were extensively employed in campaigns in Bunyoro and in what became western Kenya. Almost invariably, they were accompanied by considerable numbers of local levies, without whose assistance they would have found their tasks infinitely more demanding. In fighting within Buganda, and especially on successive campaigns in Bunyoro, several tens of thousands of Baganda warriors regularly accompanied them in taking the field.

Their involvement requires careful description. For, while there can be little doubt that the Sudanese, Swahili and Indian troops the British mobilised may quite properly be described as mercenaries and thus as employees of the British, to so describe these Baganda forces, as much current historiography would have it, as 'collaborators' or alternatively as 'clients' of the British would be to misrepresent seriously their role. For both the obsequious tone inherent in the former term and the implication of dependency in the latter are much at variance with the position which they took. For, in all their involvements in the armed conflicts of these years, these Baganda and their leaders not only had their own agendas that were measurably different from those of the British; these all but invariably related to some sequence of conflicts in which they had already been extensively engaged. In the Battle of Mengo in January 1892, the principal objective of the Protestant forces was not, that is, as it was for Lugard, to secure his hegemony, but rather to bring to a head their long-festering conflict with the Catholics so as, in alliance with Lugard, to deliver a *coup de grace* against them. When, two years later, Macdonald turned to the by then reunited Christian forces to suppress the Muslim revolt, they eagerly responded, since this presented them with a singular opportunity to crush, with British support, their Muslim opponents, against whom they had been fighting indecisively for much of the past five years. When, thereafter (beginning with Colville's

expedition in late 1893 – early 1894), the British launched a series of invasions against Kabalega with a view to establishing British dominance over his kingdom, tens of thousands of Baganda invariably responded to the opportunity which these presented to eviscerate their most formidable local opponent. Likewise when, in 1897, Mwangwa launched his revolt, Buganda's Christian forces under Kagwa and Mugwanya speedily turned to assault him and his following in defence of the regime which they, with the British, had created in his kingdom, against which he was so much at odds; while, immediately afterwards, when the three companies of Sudanese mutinied and first threatened and then largely succeeded in crossing into Buganda, these Baganda forces, like the British in the country, resolutely fought on several fronts at once for their very existence – as allies, coadjutors, companions-at-arms, with nothing at all servile about them.

The same degree of autonomy marked the version of Indirect Rule which the Buganda model represented. We have already noted its details at some length. We have also canvassed the considerable variety in the actual structuring of such regimes across the British empire. Because of the extent of Lugard's impact on the widespread fashioning in Africa of Indirect Rule, it is tempting to think he must have played a major role in the Uganda case, particularly since its initial architect in Buganda, George Wilson, had earlier served with him, and the two of them long maintained a personal correspondence. Nevertheless this is hard to credit. For all the essentials of the Buganda model were in place before Lugard promulgated his doctrines. They were anchored in a treaty – which was anathema to him; while in Buganda it included details of a distinctive political constitution and a comprehensive new land settlement, both of which were unique to it. Nothing, moreover, in the documentary record suggests otherwise. The Buganda model was pieced together in stages over a five-year period, in direct interaction between Buganda's leaders and, first, Wilson, and then Johnston.

In its application, the British could be decidedly one-sided. Upon embarking on a further drawing of the territorial map, Buganda was declared to be one of the four Provinces of Uganda, while the three western kingdoms were simply to be three of the four Districts of Uganda's Western Province, with Busoga one of the Eastern. Among the rulers, only the Kabaka of Buganda was accorded the title of 'His Highness', while only Buganda secured an extensive new land settlement. Yet, despite these differences, the kingdoms all benefited greatly from the formal Agreements the British made with three of them, which gave them a far greater degree of self-determination than was possessed

by any of their counterparts elsewhere in Africa, and numbers of those in comparable situations beyond.

Yet for all the independence which the Baganda displayed, both on the battlefield and in the exercise of the governance of their kingdom, by 1902 they along with their neighbours, had all fallen subject to British hegemony. This calls for a final reference to the application to the political realm of the Comaroffs' twin notions of the 'colonisation of consciousness' and the 'consciousness of colonisation', which together so greatly imbued the imposition of imperialism.

In the preceding chapter, we have just seen a striking example of the 'colonisation of consciousness' in Kagwa's visit to Britain. It was more generally reinforced by the extensive redrawing of the political map by the British, simply of their own volition; and still more by the extent of the superior power they came to display across so much of the country – from the time of Lugard's victory in the Battle of Mengo onwards. One can trace some of the consequences here. A single example, however, will have to suffice.

In 1907 a Banyoro rebellion against the number of Baganda appointed to Bunyoro chieftaincies was scrupulously careful to avoid violence. For their alleged role in this, four senior Banyoro chiefs, nevertheless, were deposed, forty-two lesser ones were sentenced to six months' detention in Buganda, while twelve were deported to Kenya for three years. Yet even then there was no uprising.¹¹ By now they were all far too conscious of the costs of aggressive revolt.

None of this detracts from the 'consciousness of colonisation'. This was clearly felt by a large part of the African population in so much which they saw around them. Many of them were especially disturbed by the lifelong exile to which the British had dispatched both Kabalega and Mwanga. All of them soon found themselves having to pay the hut and later poll taxes (in Indian rupees) which the British imposed, while, after thirty-seven years as Katikiro, even Kagwa suffered the hard brunt of 'colonisation'.

By 1926 he was greatly at odds with the British Provincial Commissioner, Buganda, who was anxious to bring about his retirement. Kagwa's complaints to the Governor of Uganda against the 'personal animosity' to which he felt himself subjected were, however, imperiously rejected. Thereupon he protested to the Colonial Secretary in London:

that as the Principal Agent in . . . introducing the British Government into this country . . . [and] the leading chief of His Highness the Kabaka . . . I naturally

¹¹ Uzoigwe, 'The Kyanyangire', in Ogot, ed., *War and Society*.

expected to be treated by His Majesty's Government with special and personal consideration.¹²

But to no avail. Despite his services he found himself reduced at the end to no more than the ranks of a colonial subject. That left him with no other option but to resign. He died shortly afterwards.

The mirror images which the Comaroffs' twin formulae present thus go to the heart of the imperial experience. For those caught in its embrace, it comprised a state of being to be endured as well as one could, prior to the means to be rid of it.

¹² Kagwa's Personal Petition, 1926, in Low, *Mind of Buganda*, no. 24.

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Index

- Abdul Effendi 269
Abdullah, Raja Muda 17
Achte, Father 163
Aga, Nuehr 46, 55
Amani 228
Amritsar, Treaty of (1809) 15
Anderson, Percy 91, 94, 104, 105–9,
115–16, 125, 256, 282–3, 339
Ankole. *See* Nkore
Ankole Agreement (1901) 5, 26, 305–8
Ansorge, W. J. 288, 292, 302, 303, 315
Anti-Slavery Society 119
Arab traders 2–3, 11, 31–2
Arthur, Lieutenant 172–3
Ashburnam, Captain 160–2, 163, 184
Ashe, Robert 64
- Bagge, Stephen 268, 277, 278–9, 304–5
Bagyendanwa 216, 227, 230
Bahadur Shah Zafar II 338
Bahaga Babito 267
Baitwara Babito 267
Bakar, Sultan Abu 18
Baker, Samuel 2, 34–6, 38–41, 55, 87, 185
Balikuddembe, Joseph Mukasa 65
Bantu-speaking area 29
barazas 291–2, 292–3, 300–1, 315
Barghash, Sultan of Zanzibar 44, 48, 95–6,
117, 123, 125
Belgium, Congo invasion 65
Bell, Hesketh 305
Berkeley, Ernest James
 Buganda governance 172, 292
 Buganda hegemony 191, 194–5
 Busoga 179–81
 career 283, 284
 governance 286
 Koki 256–7
 Nkore 230, 285
 rulerships 277
 territorial aggregation 257, 258–62, 268
 Toro governance 160, 162, 163–6, 303
- Berlin Conference (1884) 90, 109
Berry, Sara 13, 14
Bhyrowal, Treaty of (1846) 16
Bikago 159
Bikamba 196
Bilal Effendi 210
Birere 220
Bismarck, Otto von 90–2, 98–101, 105
Blue, G. 15
Boer War 326
British East Africa Protectorate 125
British India Steam Navigation Co. 88
Broome, Colonel 209
Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference 107
Bucunku 220
Buganda
 Arab traders 2–3, 11, 32, 60
 Battle of Mengo (1892) 4, 26, 81, 144–5,
 287, 334, 342
 Battle of Rwengabi (1886) 129
 British hegemony 133–49, 249–50
 British penetration 3–5, 7, 75–85
 British Protectorate (1894) 4, 123
 British territorial aggregation 21, 252–67
 Bunyoro relations 40, 49–51, 53–4
 chiefs 59, 299, 301
 Christian rivalries 67, 77–8, 78–82,
 136, 140, 292, 335
 Christianisation 3, 62, 67, 134
 clans 59
 colonial settlement 287–303
 conditioning circumstances 57–8, 68,
 128, 135, 136
 control of Busoga 51, 169–70, 171–82
 control of Koki 51, 253
 defining conjunctures 57–8, 134, 146
 Egyptian expansion 2–3, 40–4, 45–9
 gatherings of chiefs 291–2, 292–3, 300–1
 IBEAC expedition 3–5, 77–85
 Islamisation 2, 60–4
 Kabaka's authority 58–60, 303
 Mutesa's religious policy 60–4

- Buganda (cont.)
 mutiny 5
 new model warbands 129–30,
 132–3, 150
 offices of state 68–70, 74–5
 origins 58
 Protectorate status 341–2
 religio-political wars (1888–93) 3, 26,
 57–8, 67–85, 141–9
 resistance 13
 retention debate 6, 112–26
 Speke and Grant 33–4, 134
 statecraft 54–6
 succession wars 58, 225
 territorial expansion 50–2, 58
 traditional religion 60
 Uganda Agreement (1900) 5, 26, 85,
 265–7, 295–303, 337
- Bugesera 31
- Bukulu, Ali 69, 70, 74
- Bulemu 157–8, 166, 167, 268
- Bulinguwe Agreement (1890) 73, 74
- Bunton, M. 15
- Bunyoro
 1907 rebellion 344
 Arab traders 32
 Battle of Rwengabi (1886) 129
 British conquest 4
 British hegemony 250
 British territorial demarcations 21, 260,
 267–75
 Buganda relations 40, 49–51, 53–4
 colonial governance 285, 308–11
 conquest of Nkore 215
 defining conjunctures 184–5, 188
 early European penetration 34–6
 Egyptian expansion 2–3, 39–41, 42,
 45–6, 47–9
 new model warbands 128–31, 168, 184
 pre-1890 territory 252
 resistance 7, 184–97, 276
 succession 30, 37
 Toro, attacks on 50, 154, 186
- Busoga region
 British hegemony 169–82, 250
 British penetration 4, 5, 83
 British territorial aggregation 21, 256
 Buganda control 51, 169–70, 171–82
 colonial settlement 311–15
 conditioning circumstances 169–70
 mutinous mercenaries 26
 rulerships 169–70
 turbulence 7
- Busongora 156–7
- Butler, Harcourt 13
- Buvuma Islands 148, 265–7
- Buxton, Thomas Fowell 324
- Buzinza 30, 31, 51
- Bwago, Salimu 311–12
- Byabachwezi 130, 187, 188, 192, 196, 211,
 308, 310, 336
- Byakuyamba 110, 151, 152, 153, 154–5,
 158–60, 163–4, 166, 167–8, 183, 189
- Cakobau 18–19
- Chaillé-Long, C. 41–4, 61
- Christian rivalries 67, 77–8, 78–82, 136,
 140, 141–9, 163–4, 292, 335
- Christianisation 3, 11–12, 67
- Coles, Colonel 209
- collaboration 7–8
- colonial settlements
 Ankole Agreement (1901) 5, 26, 305–8
 Buganda model 287–303, 337
 Bunyoro 308–11
 Busoga 311–15
 evolution 284–95
 forms 22
 indirect rule 9–10, 12–14, 317, 343–4
 international comparisons 316–17
 legislation 282, 318
 legitimacy 286
 structure 281–4
 Toro 303–5
 Uganda Agreement (1900) 5, 26, 85,
 265–7, 295–303, 337
- Colville, Henry 160
- Buganda 154–6, 197, 250, 287–8, 290–1
- Bunyoro 156–7, 159, 167, 185–9, 193,
 194, 212, 334, 342
- Busoga 175, 176–7, 178
 career 283, 284
 governance 286
 illness 291
 Koki 255
 Nkore 221, 222
 territorial aggregation 257–60
 Toro Confederacy 183, 335
- Comaroff, J. & J. 11, 12, 344, 345
- conditioning circumstances
 Buganda 57–8, 68, 128, 135, 136
 Busoga region 169–70
 Nkore 25, 216, 240–1
 Toro 155–68
- Congo 121, 186
- consciousness of colonisation 11, 12, 344–5
- Cowan of Beeslack, John 119
- Cromer, Lord 317
- Crozier, R. 15
- Cunningham, Captain 190, 222–3

- Dalrymple, William 338–9
 Dari 270
 Daudi Chwa, Kabaka of Buganda 276–7, 300
 De Winton, Francis 104, 107
 defining conjunctures
 British hegemony 281
 Buganda 57–8, 134, 146
 Bunyoro 184–5, 188
 meaning 25
 Nkore 238
 smaller kingdoms 151
 stages 25–6, 128, 333–7
 Delimitation Commission (1886) 91
 double articulation 14
 Dugmore, Captain 202
 Dungu 69
 Dunning, Captain 190
- earthworks 28
 East India Company 9–10
 Edward VII 320, 324, 328, 331
 Egypt
 bankruptcy 88
 British invasion 10, 49, 114
 colonial settlement 317
 Equatoria Province 2, 4, 41
 slave trade 36
 territorial extensions 38–49, 55–6, 87
 Emin Pasha 47, 48, 52, 53–4, 75, 80, 88, 92–5, 97, 98–9, 100–1, 102, 103–4, 220
 Evatt, Colonel 262, 277, 308–9, 310
- Fallers, L. A. 14
 Felkin, Robert 100
 Fieldhouse, D.K. 6–7
 Fields, Karen 12–13, 14
 Fiji 10, 18–19, 19–20
 Fischer, Dr 52
 Fisher, A.B. 163, 165, 166
 Foaker, F.G. 159
 Forster, E.M. 197, 260
 Fowler, Captain 209, 312–14
 France 89, 90, 114, 115, 122
 Frazer, James 324
- Gabula of Bugabula 171, 174
 Galbraith, J.S. 7
 Gallagher, J. 5–6
 Gedge, Ernest 109, 134, 135
 gentlemanly capitalism 8
 geography 1–2
 Germany
 Anglo-German Agreement (1886) 92
 Anglo-German Agreement (1890) 109, 124, 134, 252–3
 British relations 105–9
 expansion in East Africa 3, 65, 90–2, 98–101
 French relations 90
 Hinterland doctrine 99, 104, 105
 Reinsurance Treaty with Russia 105
 Gibb, Captain 188, 257, 288
 Gikandi, Simon 322
 Gisaka 31
 Gladstone, William 114, 115–18, 120, 121, 122
 Gordon, Arthur 19, 20
 Gordon, Charles 41–2, 43, 44–7, 47–9, 55, 56, 87, 89, 90, 94, 134, 185
 Gordon, E. C. 75
 governance. *See* colonial settlements
 Gramsci, Antonio 10–11
 Grant, A. J. 2, 33–7, 87, 134
 Grant, William 173–82, 191, 199, 202, 235–6, 250–1, 267, 276, 277, 281, 311–15
 Guillermain, Bishop 163, 259
 Gwambuzi of Buihihi 273
- Hannington, Bishop 51, 52–3, 65, 177, 287
 Harcourt, William 114, 115, 117, 118, 120
 Hardinge, Commissioner 202
 Harrison, Captain 203
 Hatzfeldt, Count 105
 hegemony
 comparative history 15–20
 concept 10–11
 hegemonic system 15
 Hill, Clement 125–6, 282, 295, 320, 322–3, 330, 339
 Hinterland doctrine 99, 104, 105
 Hirth, Bishop 83, 147
 historiography 5–15, 337–9
 Hobart, C.V. C. 199, 204, 239, 320, 322–3, 323–4, 325, 328, 330
 Hoble, Charles William 284
 Hobson, John Atkinson 22
 Holmwood, Consul 91, 93, 95, 97, 136
 Hudson Bay Company 9
 Hutton, J.F. 91, 94–5
- IBEAC
 bankruptcy 4, 6, 8
 Buganda operations 77–85, 97–104, 109–25, 137
 charter 6
 creation 3
 dominion over Toro 152

- IBEAC (cont.)
 failure 111–21, 124
 supersession of rule 121
 withdrawal from Buganda 112–13, 140
 Igana 273
 Igumira 226–30, 230–1, 231–2, 233, 234,
 236, 237, 240, 241, 244, 245–7, 248,
 306, 336
 Imperial British East Africa Company.
 See IBEAC
 imperialism
 comparative hegemonies 15–20
 form of colonial rule 22–5
 ground level imperialism 127, 133–49,
 339, 341
 historiography 5–15, 337–9
 large-scale imperialism 340
 levels 22
 medieval England 9
 ‘scramble for Africa’ 86, 90–126
 India
 British communications to 6
 British imperialism 338–9
 indirect rule 9–10, 289
 mutiny (1857) 16
 Oudh school 13
 Princely States 316
 Punjab conquest 15–16, 19–20
 indirect rule 9–10, 12–14, 317, 343–4
 informal empire 8
 Iraq 10
 Ireeta 152, 188, 189, 192, 193, 206,
 207–8, 210, 211
 Islam 2, 60–4
 Ismail, Khedive 38, 44

 Jackson, Frederick
 Buganda 75–6, 100, 101–2, 104,
 133–4, 134–5
 Buganda settlement 297–8, 300
 Buhweju 274
 Bunyoro 189, 190–1, 310
 Busoga 170, 178–9, 315
 career 283, 284
 governance 279, 306
 Kagwa’s visit to Britain 320, 325
 mutiny of Sudanese mercenaries 201
 Nkore settlement 306, 307
 territorial demarcations 272
 Toro 160
 Jasi 188, 195, 210, 211
 Johnston, Harry
 appointment as Commissioner 5, 6,
 125–6, 213
 Buhweju 274

 Bunyoro settlement 309–10
 Busoga settlement 314
 career 284
 colonial settlements 336–7
 governance of Buganda 26, 295–303
 Kagwa’s visit to Britain 319, 323, 325
 Nkore 244–5, 247, 270–1, 279
 Nkore settlement 305–8
 resistance to 14
 rulerships and 277–8, 280
 territorial demarcations 263–4, 265–7,
 270–1, 275
 Toro Settlement 303–5
 Uganda Agreement (1900) 265–7,
 295–303, 317
 Jumba, Nova 266–7

 Kabalega, Omukama
 Bugabula paramountcy 174
 Buganda relations 40, 43, 49–51,
 53–4, 73, 79
 defeat 183, 211–12
 Egyptian expansion 39–40, 45–6, 47–9
 escape 4, 192
 exile 26, 213, 308, 344
 new model warbands 128–31, 150,
 168, 184
 resistance 26, 184–97, 335, 341, 343
 statecraft 54–6, 185
 succession 37, 128, 191
 territorial ambitions 252, 268
 Toro campaigns 2, 4, 7, 52, 151–2,
 152–3, 154, 186
 Toro defeat 156, 335
 Kabimugire 37
 Kaboyo 30, 151
 Kabula 263–5
 Kabumbire 218, 231
 Kabwoko, Battle of (1897) 199
 Kagoro 159, 160, 161, 163–4, 167, 168
 Kagwa, Apolo
 Basekabaka be Buganda 225
 British governance and 289–90, 292
 British relations 135, 137, 210
 Buganda insurgency 71, 73, 199,
 201–2, 212
 colonisation 344–5
 death 345
 new model warband leader 130
 offices of state 68, 72, 74, 81, 85, 129
 regency 276
 Uganda Settlement 301
 visit to Britain 319–32
 Kahaya
 British hegemony 236–9, 239–48

- colonial settlement 306–7
- succession 227, 228–35, 279
- territorial demarcation 268, 270, 271, 272
- Kahitsi 226–30, 231–2, 232–5, 236, 240, 241–2, 243, 246, 248, 263, 336
- Kahusi 84, 233, 237, 255, 263–4, 269
- Kaihura 271
- Kajigiri 154
- Kakende, Namuyonjo 54
- Kakintuli 157–8, 166, 167, 183, 268
- Kakungulu, Semei 72, 73, 130, 139, 210, 257, 288, 312–15, 336
- Kalema 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 103
- Kamiswa 50
- Kampala Fort 239
- Kamugungunu, L. 225
- Kamurasi, Omukama 34–6, 37
- Kamuswaga 253–6
- Kanyabuzana 220
- Kapalaga 69, 70, 74, 129
- Karagwe
 - Arab traders 32
 - Buganda satellite 51
 - royal succession 231
- Kasagama
 - British allegiance 335
 - British hegemony in Toro 151–69, 183, 277, 279, 334, 341
 - Bunyoro opposition 110, 191
 - Toro leadership 110
 - Toro settlement 304–5
- Katate, A. G. 225
- Katchope 50
- Katege 74, 129
- Kato 166
- Kayanga of Igombe 171, 176, 177, 183
- Kenya, territorial demarcation 126
- Kerckhoven, Captain van 121, 186, 187
- Khama 321
- Khartoumers 2, 33, 35, 37, 47, 55
- Kibirango 129
- Kiboga 220
- Kijagiri 153, 155, 158–9
- Kijoma 246
- Kikukule 73, 130, 185, 187, 189, 193, 194–8, 206–8, 210, 211
- Kilson, Martin 12, 14
- Kimberley, Earl of 118, 258, 282
- kingdoms. *See* rulerships
- Kintu, Gabrieli
 - Buganda insurgency 199, 204, 205–6, 211, 212, 236, 263–4
 - Buganda religious wars 72, 73
 - death sentence 198
 - Mugwanya and 336
 - Nkore operations 237, 240, 243
 - resistance 336
 - surrender to Germans 211, 265
- Kirk, John 8, 88–90, 91, 93–6, 99, 103, 285
- Kisiki of Busiki 182, 312, 313
- Kisingiri 85, 220, 276, 301
- Kitagwenda 157–8, 166
- Kitahimba, Omukama of Bunyoro 276, 277, 308, 309, 310
- Kitambwa 182, 183, 312
- Kitchener, Herbert 91
- Kivebulaya, Apolo 163
- Kiwendo 58
- Kiwewa, Kabaka 67, 68–70, 71
- Kiyaya 230
- Koki rulership
 - Buganda satellite 51, 253
 - Koki Agreement (1896) 257
 - territorial absorption 253–7
- Krauel, Dr 91, 105–6, 108
- Kuliafiri 156–7
- Kuri-ofire 270, 271
- Kyaka 159–61
- Labouchere, Henry 114
- Langheld, Wilhelm 221
- Lansdowne, Lord 126, 320, 328
- Lavigerie, Cardinal 107
- Lawrence, John 16, 20
- Lenin, Vladimir 22
- Leopold II 89, 95, 117, 124, 126
- Lesotho 20
- Linant de Bellefonds, Ernest 42–4, 61
- Livingstone, David 37, 43
- Lonsdale, J. 8, 15
- Luba of Bunya 51, 171, 175, 176–7
- Lugard, Frederick
 - assertion of British hegemony 334
 - Battle of Mengo 26, 81, 144–5, 287, 342
 - Buganda operations 3–5, 77–85, 104, 109–12, 135–49, 250
 - Buganda settlement 287, 291–2
 - Bunyoro 192
 - Busoga 170
 - charges against 122
 - doctrines 13
 - ground level imperialism 339–40, 340–1
 - Indirect Rule doctrine 12, 13, 317, 343
 - Kampala Fort 239
 - Koki 254
 - mercenaries 340
 - Nkore 220, 221
 - political lobbying 119
 - territorial demarcations 268

- Lugard, Frederick (cont.)
 Toro 151–3, 156, 183, 185
 withdrawal orders 112–13, 140
- Lytton, Lord 338
- Ma'afu 18–19
- Macallister, R.J.D. 206, 237, 239–47, 262,
 263, 268, 269–71, 278, 283, 306
- Macdonald, J.R.L.
 Bavuma Islands 266
 Buganda 213, 287
 Busoga 172, 175
 career 284
 Kabalega and 185–6
 Koki 255
 Muslim revolt in Buganda 84, 146,
 148, 197, 342
 Sudanese mercenaries 200, 201–4
 territorial demarcations 250
 Toro 153
- Mackay, Alexander 64, 92–3, 95, 97,
 101, 102–3, 134
- Mackenzie, George 100
- McKillop Pasha 44, 88, 89
- Mackinnon, William 88–90, 91, 94–5,
 95–7, 98, 99–103, 107, 113
- Macpherson, Captain 236
- Maftaa, Dallington 45
- Mahdist revolt 2, 49, 88
- Makoba 176
- Makobore of Rujumbura 269, 270,
 271–2, 272–3
- Makumbi 228
- Malaya 10, 16–18, 19–20, 316
- Malcolm, Lieutenant 209
- Manyantsi 71, 218, 227–9, 232–3
- Martin, James 284
- Martyr, Major 208, 277
- Masimbi, Semukuto 234
- Matale, Battle of (1889) 71
- Mazinyo 229
- Mbabani 176
- Mbaguta
 British relations in Nkore 238, 244, 245–8
 Mwanga and 236
 new model warband leader 130, 131
 Nkore settlement 306, 307
 Nkore succession 71, 218, 233, 234–5,
 240, 241, 248
 preeminence 275
 Rwanda raids 222
 territorial demarcations 265, 270,
 272, 273
- Mbekirwa of Buyende 170, 171, 176,
 177, 183
- Mboga 165
- Mbogo 81, 82, 145, 146, 147, 201,
 297, 299
- medieval empire 9
- Melindwa 196
- Mengo, Battle of (1892) 4, 26, 81, 144–5,
 287, 334, 342
- Menia of Bugweri 171
- mercenaries 23, 24, 55
 crucial importance 333, 340, 342–3
 Sudanese mercenaries' mutiny 184,
 200–11
- Mgangha, Saulo 265
- Millar, Charles 329
- Millar, Ernest 319, 320, 321–2, 329–30
- Miro of Kigulu 171, 176, 177, 178,
 182, 313
- Montagu, Lord 324
- Monteil, Colonel 121, 186
- Moorhouse, Lieutenant 313
- Mporo, Battle of (1894) 188–9
- Mporo, disintegration 30
- Mudima 290
- Mugemu 196
- Muguluma 69, 70, 73, 74
- Mugwanya, Stanislas 74, 81, 83, 198,
 201, 212, 255, 276, 336
- Muhenda 194
- Mukasa, Ham 321–7
- Mukasa, Samwiri 64, 69, 71, 198, 290
- Mukotani of Kiamtwara 71, 276
- Mundy, Lieutenant 272, 273
- Mupina, Prince of Kihukya 34, 42, 50, 268
- Murchison, Roderick 36
- Musinga 271–2, 276
- Mutambuka 227
- Mutanda of Bukoli 171, 175
- Mutesa, Kabaka of Buganda 321
 Bunyoro relations 49–51
 death (1884) 64
 early European intruders 33–4, 35
 Egyptian expansion 40–4, 45–9
 Gordon and 134
 religious policy 60–4, 132
 Stanley and 3
 statecraft 54–6, 185
 succession 32
 territorial expansion 50–2
 Zanzibar relations 38, 40, 48
- Muwemba, Lule 72
- Mwanga, Kabaka of Buganda
 betrayal 212
 British hegemony 133–49
 British invasion 3, 75–85
 British Protectorate 4–5

- British relations 97, 109, 111, 121, 124
 British territorial aggregation 258
 Busoga paramountcy 176–8, 179–81
 Catholic faction 4, 26, 139
 colonial settlement and 287, 289,
 292, 294
 conversion to Protestantism 82
 defeat 334
 escape 197, 202
 exile 26, 344
 Hannington murder 52–3, 65, 177
 Koki and 255
 new model warband 129–30, 131, 132–3
 Nkore and 220, 228, 229, 233–5, 285
 overthrow 67, 68, 101
 patronage of Busoga kingdoms 51
 persecution of Christians 93, 129, 134
 return to power 71–3, 74, 103
 revolt 7, 26, 184, 197, 249–50, 251, 263,
 275, 295, 335, 343
 Buddu (1897) 204, 235–8
 statecraft 3, 54–6, 64–7
 treaty with Germany 104
 Mwenge 158–9
- Nambana, John 321
 Namuyonjo, Kakende 52
 native agency 13
 Ndagara of Buhweju 269–70, 273–4
 Ndawula the Kamuswaga 253–6
 Ndbarema of Buhweju 274, 276
 Ndorwa 31
 new model warbands 128–33, 337
 Newbury, Colin 14
 Niger 37
 Nigeria 10, 11–12, 317
 Nkojo 165
 Nkore
 1870s succession war 217
 1890 Rwandan invasion 217
 Ankole Agreement (1901) 5, 26, 305–8
 Bagyendanwa 216, 227, 230
 British dominion 235–48
 British penetration 5, 7
 British territorial demarcation 21,
 256–7, 267–75
 change of name to Ankole 5, 274
 colonial settlement (1901) 26, 305–8
 conditioning circumstances 25, 216,
 240–1
 conquest by Bunyoro 215
 defining conjunctures 238
 Mwanga revolt (1897) and 235–8
 new model warband 130, 218–19
 Ntare V's British encounter 216–24
 Omugabe's authority 216
 Rwandan attacks 222–1
 social order 216
 succession crisis 25, 224–35, 285
 territorial extension 30
 Nkuranga 218, 227–8, 247
 Nsingsira, Yozefu 74
 Ntare V, Omugabe
 accession 217
 authority 270
 British encounter 216–24
 Buganda wars and 52, 71
 death 224
 governance 285
 succession crisis 224–35
 territorial expansion 52
 Nyaika 151
 Nyakatura 192
 Nyama 159–60, 161, 164, 165, 167,
 168, 194
 Nyanza, Albert 93
 Nyonyintono, Honorat 68, 69, 71, 129, 130
- official mind 5–6, 339, 340, 341
 Omugabe of Nkore 216
 Owen, Major 155, 156, 158, 159, 167, 187
Oxford History of the British Empire 337–8
- Pahang War 17
 Pangkor Engagement (1874) 16, 17, 20
 pastoralism 29
 Peel, J.D.Y. 11–12
 peripheral thesis 6–7
 Persian Gulf 316
 Peters, Carl 76, 90, 102, 104, 108, 133–5
 Portal, Gerald 83–4, 116–18, 120–2, 148,
 153, 163, 172–3, 186–7, 200, 250,
 261, 284, 341
 Price, Major 207, 208
 Pritchard, W.T. 18, 19, 20
 Pulteney, William 190, 194–5, 196, 259,
 260, 283, 286
- Racey, R. 246–7, 270–5, 276, 279, 306–7
 Ranger, T.O. 7
 Reddie, C.S. 170
 Rejumba 196, 310
 resistance, primary resistance 7
 revolution in power 8
 Rhodes, Cecil 105–6, 117
 Ripon, Lord 117, 118
 Robinson, R. 5–6, 7–8
 Rosebery, Lord 91, 114–15, 115–16,
 116–17, 120, 121–3, 124, 125, 186,
 200, 325, 331

- Rubaga, Battle of (1893) 84, 148
 Rugaramu 272–3
 Rujumbura rulership 252
 rulerships
 1860s British penetration 32–8, 87
 1870s British advance 87–90
 Arab traders 2, 31–2
 authority 29
 Dynasties 28–9
 Egyptian expansion 38–49
 history 2
 numbers 1
 succession 30–1
 territorial aggregation and 275
 trade 11, 29–30
 Rumanika 32
 Russia 105
 Rusubi 31, 51
 Ruyonga, Prince of Kibanda 34, 40, 41,
 42, 45, 50, 268
 Rwabudongo 130
 British relations 168
 Bunyoro settlement 309, 310
 Kabalega resistance 187, 188, 189,
 192, 211
 post-surrender chiefdom 196, 259
 religious wars 73
 resistance 336
 submission to Kagasema 160–2, 194–5
 surrender 192
 Rwakatagoro 227–8, 230, 231, 232, 234,
 235, 240
 Rwanda
 1890 Nkore invasion 217
 Arab traders 31
 attacks on Nkore 222–1
 Buganda invasion (1880) 50
 succession crisis 233
 territorial extension 30
 Rwengabi, Battle of (1886) 129
 Rwigi 157, 168
 Sadler, James Hayes 305
 Salisbury, Lord 89, 94, 96–7, 98–9, 101,
 105–9, 112, 114, 117, 118, 214,
 276, 324, 331
 Samuel, Herbert 323
 Scott Elliott, G.F. 156, 221
 ‘scramble for Africa’ 86, 90–126
 Sebowa, Alexis 74, 140
 Sebwato, Nikodemo 71, 74
 Selim Bey 80, 84, 110–11, 121, 122, 341
 Sematimba, Mika 198, 321
 Siam 17, 18
 Singh, Maharajah Ranjit 15
 Sitwell, C.G.H. 164–7, 184, 202, 204–5,
 207, 278, 286, 303–4
 slave trade 33, 36, 37, 38, 162, 283
 Smith, Euan 97–8, 100–1, 103–4
 Smith, Major 266, 283
 Smith, Mackenzie 88
 Speke, J.H. 2, 33–7, 38, 48, 87, 134, 291
 Spire, Frederick 284, 286, 309–10
 Stanley, Henry Morton
 Buganda and 2, 43, 103, 134, 150
 Bunyoro 185
 Buvuma Islands 50, 265
 Christianisation of Buganda and 3, 36,
 44, 47, 61
 development of East Africa 89
 Emin Pasha Relief Expedition 54, 75,
 95, 100–1, 102
 Kagwa’s visit to Britain 323
 Mutesa and 61
 stateless societies 23
 Steinhart, E.I. 7–8
 Stokes, Charles 71, 72, 73, 75
 Streicher, Father 198
 Sudan
 Egyptian expansion 2
 Mahdist revolt 2, 49, 88
 Sudanese mercenaries, mutiny 184,
 200–11
 Suna, Kabaka 32, 60
 Swayne, Captain 100
 Swaziland 20
 Swettenham, Frank 18, 20
 Tabingwa of Luuka 171, 182
 Tebukozza 70, 71, 74
 Ternan, Colonel Trevor
 Bunyoro 190–1, 195–7, 308
 career 283, 284
 Kagwa’s visit to Britain 319, 330
 Mwanga’s revolt 198–9, 206, 210
 rulerships 275, 280
 territorial demarcations 244, 256, 258,
 262, 263–5, 268, 276
 territorial demarcations
 aggregation 21
 agreements 275
 Anglo-German Agreement (1890) 109,
 124, 134, 252–3
 Buganda 21, 252–67
 Bunyoro 21, 260, 275
 Busoga 21, 256
 five entities 251, 275
 Nkore 21, 256–7, 274
 processes 20–1, 251–2, 267–75
 Toro 21, 256–7, 267–75

- Thomson, Joseph 64, 91
 Thruston, A. B. 188–9, 196, 200–1, 278, 280, 308
 Tighe, Captain 205, 238–9
 Toro
 British hegemony 151–69, 250–1
 British penetration 7
 Buganda satellite 52, 151
 Bunyoro invasions 7, 50, 54, 151–2, 154, 186
 Christian rivalries 163–4
 colonial settlement 5, 26, 303–5
 conditioning circumstances 155–68
 Confederacy 4, 160, 164–5, 183, 193
 creation of kingdom 151
 succession 30
 territorial demarcation 21, 256–7, 267–75
 trading companies 9–10
 Tswana 11
 Tucker, Bishop 83, 112–13, 261, 263, 320
 turbulent frontier thesis 7
 Uganda Agreement (1900) 5, 26, 85, 265–7, 295–303, 337
 Uganda Company 325
 Uganda retention campaign 112–26
 Uganda Staff List 283–4
 Uganda–Usoga Agreement (1895) 181, 253
 Ukerewe 51
 Vandeleur, Lieutenant S. 190, 283
 Victoria, Queen 319–20, 338
 Villiers, Lieutenant 155, 255
 visits to Britain 319–32
 Wakoli of Bukoli 170, 171
 Walker, Archdeacon 290, 296, 297, 298
 Wamara 196
 warbands, new model 128–33, 337
 Waswa, Yono 74, 198
 weapons 8, 23
 Wellesley, Lord 339
 Williams, W. H.
 Bavuma Islands 266
 Buganda 77, 79, 81, 83, 110, 140, 142, 250
 Busoga 170–1, 172–3, 176, 184, 334
 Christian rivalries 147–8
 Kampala Fort 109, 138–40
 mercenaries 81, 340
 weaponry 144–5
 Wilson, George
 Buganda 237, 250, 285, 291–5, 300, 301, 302, 303, 315
 Buhweju 274
 Bunyoro 190, 194, 276, 308–11
 Busoga 180
 career 213, 283, 284
 Dagoretti station 109
 Kagwa's visit to Britain 330
 Koki 255
 Lugard and 343
 Mwanga's revolt 197, 198–9, 205
 Nkore 226–7, 228–30, 306–7
 rulerships 278, 280
 Sudanese mercenaries' mutiny 201
 territorial demarcations 261–2, 264, 275
 Wilson, J. P. 156–7, 159–60
 Wolseley, Lord 94
 Wood, Sergeant 274
 Yang, A. A. 10
 Zanzibar
 Arab traders 2–3, 31
 British dominion 10, 108
 colonial settlement 316
 German treaties 90
 See also Barghash, Sultan of Zanzibar
 Zibondo of Bulamogi 182
 Zigija 166
 Zimbabwe 21