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What is a citizen subject? A hyphenated subject, equal parts political citizen and subjected individual conscience? A freestanding agent capable of being federated with others? The ratifier of moral law, the self-punisher who dies by a thousand cuts at the hands of his or her own superego? The lead in a play about the psychic life of power in the era of weak states? The plebian legislator posed against the citizen king? A figure of possessive individualism reversed (which is to say, a self-dispossessed collectivist)? Or the *Untertan*, man of straw, anyone, “man without qualities,” figure of *ressentiment*, silently resisting uniform commands? To whom or to what is the citizen subject subject? What comes after the subject when, to paraphrase Jean-Luc Nancy, the concept of “the Political” has been retreated? And what is left of the subject discursively posited as an effect of grammar, or as the product of a political philology of sovereignty? Who comes after the subject if not a process of becoming-subject and becoming-citizen, rethought from the philological ground up and across languages?

The “citizen subject” comes (historically and politically) after the obedient or “submitted” subject emerging from this philology, but the critical faculty never rests in Balibar’s address of the problem of what a “citizen subject” might be. Each time the notion of “citizen” is called up, it recurs to “subject” and vice versa, in reciprocal, chiasmic, and dialectical relation. The doublet “citizen subject” emerges as a singular philosopheme, a calque on another, older doublet: the *subjectum-subjectus*, where *subjectum* referred in scholastic manner to an individual substance, a unity of body and soul, and *subjectus* (the “other name of the *subditus*”), was taken to refer to the human person, “subjected to” divine or princely authority. Reversing the latter and bracketing the former, Descartes defined as *ego cogito* or *ego sum* an antithesis to both of them, positing an “I” effect without foundation in a metaphysics of substance or a theology of incarnation. Much of this monumental book will be concerned with demonstrating the distortions produced, post Kant, by the imposition of a transcendental subject on the Cartesian *ego*, which fostered a projection of the subject as substantialized, self-prescribing of its freedom, guided by a teleology aligned with the construct of the “humanity” of man.

Balibar’s comprehensive genealogy of the “citizen subject” began its life as a response to Jean-Luc Nancy’s question “Who comes after the subject?” circulated in 1988–89 to a group of nineteen philosophers of different generations “in the spirit of eighteenth-century concours and consultations” in order to “punctuate a theoretical *moment* and to highlight the *formulations* inherited from a recurring controversy.”¹ The “moment” in question

here concerned the pitting of “philosophies of the [*originary*] subject” (Descartes, Kant, Husserl), against [post]phenomenological or deconstructive critiques of the “‘metaphysics’ of foundation”; “the structuralist ‘decentering’ of the immediate data of consciousness,” and “the Marxist, Freudian, or Nietzschean critiques of the ‘illusions’ that beset the claims of consciousness to truth.” These debates, for Nancy, could be situated within the even more capacious purview of a referendum on philosophy as such at a pivotal historical pass, a moment of self-questioning as fulcrum of Western civilization. This entailed interrogating how philosophical language would need to be transformed or supplanted in response to cultural shifts and critiques of Eurocentrism. “What between or beyond ‘praxis’ and ‘theory’ would this imply?” Jean-Luc Nancy would ask in his introduction.² Appearing in 2011 in a series titled “Pratiques théoriques” previously coedited by Balibar himself and fellow “Althusserian” Dominique Lecourt, one could say that *Citizen Subject: Foundations for Philosophical Anthropology* (*Citoyen Sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique*) in its French context could be situated in the framework of a broadly recognized, urgent need to study and critique the European lexicon of “praxis” and “theory.”

Balibar reviews how the chapters, written over a long period, are each dedicated to the rereading of specific texts all circulating in different ways around the question of the subject, hinged to the notion of the citizen in the modern world. Balibar notes that the order of his reflection is sited within three interrelated modalities: the subject as self-identified, the subject as communally identified, and the transgressive subject as institutionally identified through law and judgment. Each part contains a series of deep meditations on and within carefully chosen philosophical and literary texts, named by author, but considered as texts that speak the subject: Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, Derrida, Hegel, Marx, Tolstoy, Freud, and Blanchot, to mention only a few. The readings of these texts are embedded in a general discussion of the specific “modernity” of the citizen subject under discussion, a modernity that is signaled in the final chapter of the book as “citizen-bourgeois.” A map of this extraordinary intellectual territory might well adopt the *topos* discovered by Balibar in his reading of Rousseau’s *La nouvelle Héloïse*, that *utopos* constructed through a triple geometry: triangle, couple, network. For the antinomies revealed in this structural diagram play continuously through the analyses, only to return, deepened, recast, and often estranged, to the initial question, the historical and theoretical complex, *subjectus/subjectum*.

If Balibar’s procedures of interpretation are at times reminiscent of deconstruction, recalling the virtuosic way in which Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man would build up the history of certain tropes and figures, tracing their uses in classical arguments and glosses, only to baffle the possibility of making the arguments through a play of infinite reversals, double binds, or proofs about the unownability of language, they differ in their constancy to philosophically posed problems whose import takes precedence over difference effects and language play. Balibar will openly borrow from deconstruction its practice of dismantling “paradoxes of the universal,” its dissolution of oppositions between universal and particular, absolute and relative, formal and material, one and multiple, same and other, but it is the philosophical problem of the universal that remains uppermost. Thus,

it is the desire to give Locke his due when dismantling the myth of Descartes as “inventor of modern consciousness,” or the impetus to unravel Hegel’s “originary form of contradiction inscribed in linguistic usage” (which inflects his fiction of the quasi-subject who speaks in a subjectless voice), or the drive to demonstrate how philosophical expressions always already contain the seeds for deconstructing institutions of modernity, or the concern to unravel Freud’s debt to Kelsen’s juridico-political notion of hyperindividuality (*Über-Individualität*) in forging the Superego (*das Über-Ich*) and “theorizing the ‘judicial moment’ of subjection” that motivates the deconstructive move in *Citizen Subject*.

That said, as with deconstruction, Balibar’s heuristic affirms distinct convictions about how to do things with texts: “Only singular texts articulate *determinate* theses and pose *determinate* problems of interpretation . . . an author *never writes the same text twice*.” We see this point illustrated in the reading of Rousseau, where any “doctrinal” reading of *Julie, or the New Heloise*, *The Social Contract* and *Emile* as three complementary models of one single system is abandoned in favor of a theory of each of these texts relationally competitive with the other two in trying “to resolve the unresolvable problem of community” or describe “a social bond compatible with the ‘voice of nature.’” In this scheme, there are no universal descriptive terms; no metalanguage in philosophy prevails “that would make it possible to reformulate texts in universal, descriptive, or systematic terms, ‘elevating’ them above their letter in order to extract their rational kernel or to reduce them to an ultimate materiality, more fundamental than their own.” If there is a task of the translator here, it is a very particular one, involving not the transference of roughly equivalent meanings from one language to another, but rather, bringing out the untranslatable singularity, the “only once” or singular occurrence (*hapax legomenon*) of the subject enunciated by each articulation or text in its own language.

In building a *translational* genealogy of the subject (or more specifically of the *subjectus-subditus*) that rivals the epistemological genealogy of modern subjectivity found in Foucault’s *The Order of Things (Les mots et les choses)*, Balibar develops a method drafted from an encyclopedic project *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon (Le vocabulaire européen des philosophies: Dictionnaire des intraduisibles)*, spearheaded by the philosopher Barbara Cassin, in which “philosophizing in languages” became the watchword for rewriting concept-philosophy along the axis of mistranslation and endless retranslation. An author of or collaborator on the entries “Subject,” the first person pronoun “I,” “Soul,” and, in the English edition, “Agency/Instance”), Balibar adopts a procedure consistently availed in *Citizen Subject*, one that, in addition to ensuring “the primacy of texts” and “the knot between writing and conjuncture,” subscribes to “infinite translation imposed by idiom”:

To say that philosophers write in a particular fashion is to say that they write in a given language or in an “idiom” whereby they seek with an abundance of inventiveness (not necessarily jargon . . .) to compensate for the lack of universality. Today, there is general agreement on this point. This is why a portion of philosophical work has begun to shift toward the systematic examination of the effects of translation in philosophy, and thus also of the “untranslatables” and of the process of “translating the untranslatables” as a moment of conceptual “invention.”

Unlike Hegel, whose *Phenomenology* aspired to an original, philosophical language that would allow “‘spirit’ to speak as such” and texts to dialogue among themselves in a discourse of absolute knowledge that dispenses with translation as a central problem, Balibar pursues an opposite tack, turning nubs of untranslatability into sites of resistance to any model of absolute knowledge and using a text, term, or specific grammatical usage that defies translation as an opening to collective participation in translational praxis. Untranslatability, as spur to philosophizing in languages, uses linguistic difference and the incommensurability among languages to question the universalism of any univocal idea of the subject, identifying instead singular subjects in singular texts, idioms, diction, and words. An example is the mining—in the discrepancies or voids of comparative translations—of Descartes’s grammar, scrupulously parsed in order to examine what is the ego, who is an “I” or a “me” (in the sense of being alive, existing, thinking oneself). Pondering the gap between Descartes’s “*je pense donc je suis*” from the *Discourse on Method* (or “*ego cogito, ergo sum*” from *Principles of Philosophy*) and the far less well-worked proposition “*ego sum, ego existo*” from the *Meditations*, Balibar construes the early modern subject, self-doubting and alone, yet sustained in theophanic relation, alongside a subject-God who cannot think the human “I” since “he has no ‘I’” and does not need it to exist. A similarly painstaking attentiveness to the grammatical specificities of the letter is applied to the analysis of Hegel’s dialectical enunciation of subjectivity in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: “*Ich, das Wir, und Wir, das Ich ist*” (I that is We and We that is I). It is the German language, which liaises the “*Ich*” to the “*das Ich*,” that brings out the “subject of the uttering within the utterance,” thus allowing the voice (of subject as Spirit) to be heard in the text. And yet it is also this same grammar, with its “embarrassing” use of relative clauses, that overwrites the neuter “*Ich*,” threatening it with the return of a masculine or a feminine denomination that would install the “irony” of sexual difference at the core of the tautological formulations which dialectically convert the formal, empty reflection of the “*Ich*” (*Ich gleich Ich, Ich bin Ich*) into the “absolute” or “concrete” reflexivity of the “*Selbst*” (“*Selbst ist Selbst*”), for which no difference should remain unknowable. This allows in turn for an opening to the exteriority of a “we” (*Wir*) and from thence (through yet more reversals), to the conclusions that, first, the “*Wir* is not ‘being’” (*Sein*), and second, the community, with respect to Being qua *logos* “lacks in being,” condemning collective consciousness to a divisive historical objectivity. If there is a method or approach that comes to the fore in Balibar’s readings of the text at the micro-level of grammatical singularities, it could be characterized as an intensive form of political philology that places the untranslatability of the subject and the unresolvability of the subject-in-community at the center of its praxis.

Does this insistence on singularity and idiomaticity imply that *every* examination of the universal is, for Balibar, foreclosed? Clearly not. But his “universalism” is at bottom a problematic one. For him, rather than *asserted* against its (logical and ideological) opposite (“particularism”), the universal needs to be *problematized* as a specific form of utterance. And this is not deprived of political implications. In contrast to a number of his contemporary interlocutors—Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy, Slavoj

Žižek—who would seem to have abandoned the notion of the citizen along with the many other political specters put out of action by capitalo-parliamentarianism and the “small p” politics of the mediocracy, Balibar holds fast to the “citizen subject,” as lasting monument or remnant of historic, revolutionary inheritance and fulcrum of *equaliberty*. The portmanteau neologism *égaliberté*, to which he devoted the book *Equaliberty: Political Essays*, lays emphasis on “antinomies of citizenship” grounded in “moments of a dialectic that includes both historical movements and relations of force.” These moments trace “a differential of insurrection and constitution lodged at the heart of the relations between citizenship and democracy” and take aim at neoliberalism’s “unlimited promotion of individualism and utilitarianism” in response to the “crisis of the national-social state.”³ Dialectic and antinomy are equally heavy lifters within Balibar’s technics in *Citizen Subject*, enjoined to produce a theory of the subject that is also an education in how to think the theory of the subject, starting with a close reading of *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* (1789), where it is a question not only of determining “which is more foundational, man or citizen,” but of defining an anthropological foundation of sovereignty that deals with the fundamental paradox of “*sovereign equality*.” This paradox—also related by Balibar to a form of “intensive universality”—is grasped in a formula that he uses to emphasize the categorical stipulation of revolutionary equality: “The revolution will say: If anyone is not a citizen, then no one is a citizen” (which we could paraphrase as “if anyone is excluded from citizenship, then nobody has access to, or the right to citizenship”). The play here between the “anyone” citizen and the “nobody” citizen reproduces an aporia. This is citizen-becoming-subject (*devenir sujet*) that is “no longer a *subjectus* and not yet the *subjectum*.” Upon this nascent subject equality will have to be unilaterally conferred, but she or he will always remain a subject of conflict, grappling with contradictions between the individual and the collective, rights and privileges, real and symbolic equality, active and passive participation in governance and systems of representation, egotistic, interest-driven forms of sociality (equal, but in their equality all the more susceptible to mimetic rivalry) and an undifferentiated equality that binds individuals into *a* polity, *a* society (dependent on exclusion of those not belonging). With this riven, suspensive figure of the citizen, vulnerable to destruction through struggles for equality and civil rights, we go, as one of the subheadings of this section on the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* reminds us, from one subjection to the other. When the “citizen subject” occupies the place of both constituent of the State and actor of permanent revolution, it is subjected to different states of subjection, torn, as Foucault articulated so powerfully and as Balibar underscores, between the world of voluntary servitude and the world of right and discipline. For Balibar, *all of Foucault’s work* is concentrated on the transition between these two worlds, a condition that returns us again and again to modalities of subjection in subjectivation, and that produces “a materialist phenomenology of the transmutation of subjection, of the birth of the Citizen Subject. As to whether this figure, like a face of sand at the edge of the sea, is about to be effaced with the next great sea change—that is another question. Perhaps it is nothing more than Foucault’s own utopia, a necessary support for the enterprise of stating that utopia’s facticity.”

“A materialist phenomenology of the transmutation of subjection, of the birth of the Citizen Subject”: This is the signature problematic of both Foucault and Balibar, with Foucault emphasizing the ambivalent force of subjectivation in the history of institutions and biopolitical management, and with Balibar excavating the “it” in the “I”; the strictures of sentient ego or consciousness; the force-field of the conscience directive within structures of moral intention; the self-defeating, tautological principle of “obedience to coercion” enshrined in positive law (one of Freud’s principal points of contestation with the jurist Kelsen); the proprietary exigencies of “own-ness” (*Eigentum*) in self-predication and self-interest. These themes become loci for apprehending what is intractable in subjectivity. Tracking the semantic vagaries and overdeterminations of the Greek (*hypokeimenon*), the Latin (*subjectus/subjectum*), and the German (*Subjekt, Untertan*) of what we usually call in English a “subject,” Balibar reveals the conformations of subjectivation in response to the vicissitudes of sovereign will (or its absent exercise); from princely *Willkür*, absolutism, and the *diktats* (the “oughts” and “shoulds”) of instrumental reason to superegoic self-governance and the psychiatric blandishments of “therapeutic citizenship.” This last establishes the psychotic as a subject of rights positioned exceptionally outside the jurisdiction of the penal apparatus yet exposed to a medicalized space of social relations that often confounds the determination of freedom within the sphere of patients’ rights, ranging across the right to madness, abnormality, and difference and the right to care.

In, through, and beyond the meticulously expounded specificities of Balibar’s readings, we apprehend in philosophically bolded characters: the forced hand of “internal ‘conversion’ towards divine truth” (Augustine); the submission of particular wills to the General Will (which “has the power to ‘force subjects to be free’”); the subordination of the subject to the General Equivalent endowed with the brute capacity to dispose interobjectively of any thing or being in the form of money; the contagious urge to “obey the chief” expressed in *Massenpsychologie*; the judicial nature of guilt; the ego’s self-management through protective shielding and defense (which puts it in crouch position); the sovereign state’s autoimmunity; the adjudicator’s determination of rightness, just cause, sufficient reason; the existential economy’s rule by calculated risk and the extraction of profit from self-properties. Each of these suborning modes is starkly perceived as subject-constitutive in its dialectical relation to structures and institutions of law, onto-theology, primitive accumulation (capital), governmentality, carceral organization, heteronormative orders of sexual difference, racialized assemblages, psychopolitical economies, necropolitics. Viewed from this perspective, the book invites being read and taught as one seminar or as the catalyst of a cluster of canonical investigations into the role of subjection in subject-formation and the polarized parameters of the human.

No contemporary thinker has theorized the political fragility of modern citizenship-subjecthood in the continental philosophical tradition with greater critical nuance and rigor than Balibar. In the course of a career of writing and engagement that spans his participation as a student in the seminars of Louis Althusser in the 1960s and his most recent public tribunes addressing the crises of Europe in the wake of austerity economics, border closings, and Brexit, the citizen subject—in its vanishings and projective

reappearances—has been a catalyst of Balibar’s theoretical project. From his collaboration with Althusser on a symptomatic reading of Marx’s *Capital* to a book coauthored with Immanuel Wallerstein devoted to the politics of race, classes, and nation; his reflections on universalism, force of law, and “equaliberty”; and the philological work on “subject” as a premier untranslatable, Balibar has demonstrated in a way that is particularly significant for Anglophone readers that the term “subject” (French *sujet*) does not just signify topical field or subject of the realm. It underscores how any construct of the free-standing individual or willing agent is flush with *poleiteia*, which is to say, imbued with a fully intersubjective I-ness/We-ness indissociable from the *polis* in the Political. Though there is no one sense of “the Political” (big P), it has been broadly construed as a constitutive sociality grounded in the solidarity of *communitas*; a prospect of Being(s)-in-common, whose aporetic, suspensive, inoperative structure means that it is fated to remain hypothetical, mired in antinomies, perpetually incomplete. It is this very incompleteness, however, that represents for Balibar both an opening and an opportunity to think the subject as transindividual *subjectus* at once collective and singular, where the “I” (as Rousseau would have it), has “become a property that belongs to *each and everyone*, or to whatever citizen-subject . . . on the condition that he or she is ‘indivisibly’ part of the ‘common.’” This catachresis of being(s) in common animates Balibar’s notion of the “citizen subject,” which must reckon with if not supersede in its materialization the conflict of conflicts that Balibar deduces from Hegel’s *Phenomenology of the Spirit*: “the conflict of universalities” replicated in the “conflict of communitarian principles.” It is the “citizen subject” (or subject citizen, as it is alternately conjured), a practical figure of pure *difference* and self-destroying essence, whose infinite task it is to sublimate the irreconcilability of “‘possessive’ individuality and ‘republican’ citizenship” that for Balibar, it would seem, remains one of the great dilemmas of political modernity, just as it was for Hegel.

Though the Locke/MacPherson construct of “possessive individualism” has triumphed in regimes of extreme income inequality and distributive injustice and contributed to the virtualization of the subject of the demos (identified with the “movement beyond the divisions of a society produced by private property”), this does not of necessity preclude the invention of a subject of politics who could remake citizenship for a republic worthy of the name.⁴ Thus, when Balibar purports to “trace the antithetical movements of the *becoming-citizen of the subject* and the *becoming-subject of the citizen*, which never cease to ‘succeed’ one another, but also, more profoundly, to precede and condition one another,” this notion of mediated citizenship harks back to the French Revolution (and more generally, civic/democratic insurrections), particularly the moment at which the condition of being subject to the divine right of kings and held hostage to the caprice of absolutist regimes was changed out in favor of a citizenship vested with sovereign power and legitimacy. A comparable overturning would have to wait, residing perhaps in the prospect of a “citizen subject” finally released from sovereignty altogether. It might be said to coincide with what Miguel Abensour, using a Pocockian formula, calls Marx’s “Machiavellian moment,” qualified by Balibar as “the possibility of thinking an autonomous political practice that is not subjected to a sovereign instance,” the possibility of a subject of “‘true democracy’ and nonstate politics.” Though such a subject is only

fleetingly glimpsed and remains a foreclosed hypothetical (confined to a messianic moment in Marx), it continues to flicker throughout *Citizen Subject* as some kind of as yet untapped resource of the “empty” rather than “full” subject of emancipation, a subject-nihilism if you will, that inverts and supersedes state sovereignty.

The complex structure and finesse of argumentation that is revealed as Balibar walks the reader through the paces of an immensely erudite philological and historical construction of the subject in the history of European philosophy, political theory, and psychoanalysis renders *Citizen Subject* immune to résumé or paraphrase. But stepping back, one ascertains that a central drama of *Citizen Subject* turns on the impossibility of perfectly reconciling universalism with anthropological difference: “abnormal and normality,” “race” and “culture,” “sex” as gender and orientation. As Balibar notes: “in ‘bourgeois’ modernity, anthropological differences realize the living paradox of an inegalitarian construction of egalitarian citizenship; or rather, that of a universalist limitation (founded about general or even generic traits of the human race) of what lends the ‘political’ universal an at least virtually unlimited scope.” While the “citizen” part of the citizen subject exerts real pull on subjects toward the conjoint of a realizable universal (that may be extrapolated to a construct at one point attributed by Balibar to Judith Butler of a “*universalism of differences*,” a “*more than two sexes*” or “*more than a single one*,” situated beyond the binarism of masculine/feminine), it nonetheless becomes clear that each time it is a question of universalism, the remainders of anthropological difference—no matter how delocalized or desubstantialized—affirm their resistance to neutralization because of their own antinomic power of universalization.⁵ This standoff bequeaths a misbegotten condition involving the complex interplay between inclusion and exclusion that Balibar calls the “ill-being of the subject of relation.” As he announces in the final chapter, “within the framework of civic-bourgeois universality, the principal form of exclusion is *differential inclusion*” or, in a formulation that addresses the dis-ease or ill-fittingness of the universal in subjective interpellation: “The subject is here ‘naturally’ the bearer (*suppositum*) or the addressee (*subditus*) of the universal that overarches or constitutes it from inside; but, all to itself, the subject is also inevitably defined as ‘lacking’ universality.” Ill-beingness (*malêtre*) as a category complicates univocal accounts of *Dasein* or, for that matter, any ontology posited in a generalist, generic, or neutral vein. It opens up the singular definite article of *the Subject* not just to plural, “otherwise” modes of being, but also to differently abled, non-normativized subjectivities and modes of cognizing worlds. In this sense, a new field of citizens’ rights occupying the commons of differential intelligences might, through such readings of the subject, breach the philosophically enclosed, in-turned spaces of universal, monological ontology or of singular mathemes of truth (as in Badiou’s axiomatic “I call the subject the local or finite status of a truth”).⁶

Though *Citizen Subject* is in no way a work of political prescription, it seems to enjoin us to follow Rousseau in questing after a form of ego that might “exit its soliloquy” to inhabit a political space of “common being,” a world of self inhabited by the other and socialized by means of attachments that supersede sovereign economies of subjugation, subordination, forcing, and *commandement*. “Our true *self* is not entirely within us,” Rous-

seau wrote, thus prefiguring, with this concise observation, Balibar's "position" on what the citizen subject, as a philosophical construct, may be for—namely, the retreat of exclusion in the universal. As Balibar owns up with characteristic dialecticism, in what may be seen as his "last word" (at least in this book) on the subject: "My position, in other terms, consists in attempting to think the *conatus* of the subject-citizen as overdetermination: the overdetermination of the universal by contradiction, of contradiction by difference, and thus of conflict itself by exclusion, but also by what never gives up forcing exclusion to beat a retreat."

The retreat of exclusion in the universal and the intrication of this problem with subjectivation (caught in a perpetual conflict between subjection and emancipation) are among the predominant concerns of this magnum opus. This connects *Citizen Subject* to Balibar's greater oeuvre, where often it has been a question of demonstrating how, in its worst ascriptions, citizenship assigns normative rank to qualities and abilities of humanity, produces political exclusion, revokes the franchise, restricts the claims of extraterritorial noncitizens to the public good, and renders conditional and precarious the very right "to be" subject. We might say, then, that in an era of militarized security states, zones of detention, eroded cosmopolitan right, refusals of safe harbor, perpetual states of emergency, and sovereign autoimmunity, in which access to citizenship has been increasingly receded and retracted along with the old dream of cosmopolitan hospitality and frictionless border zones, *Citizen Subject*, while not itself addressing these punctual political issues directly, provides the philosophical underpinnings for rethinking the basic terms by which such issues are engaged with as theoretical practice.

FOREWORD

1. Editor Ermanno Bencivenga asked Jean-Luc Nancy to guest edit a special issue of the philosophy journal *Topoi* in 1988. It was then reprised in expanded form (with the addition of other essays, including Balibar's "Citizen Subject" and the longer version of Nancy's interview with Derrida), as the final number of *Cahiers Confrontations* in 1989. Eduardo Cadava and Peter Connor turned it into a book, *Who Comes After the Subject?* (New York: Routledge, 1991), supplemented with pieces by Sylviane Agacinski, Luce Irigaray, Sarah Kofman, and Emmanuel Levinas. The quotation is at page 2.

2. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Introduction," in *Who Comes After the Subject*, 1.

3. Etienne Balibar, *Equaliberty: Political Essays*, trans. James Ingram (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2014), 2–3.

4. On the untranslatable intrications of Lockean consciousness and Cartesian *conscience* in the invention of the modern subject and with respect to Macpherson's theory of possessive individualism, see Etienne Balibar, *Identity and Difference: John Locke and the Invention of Consciousness*, trans. Warren Montag (London: Verso, 2013). See too Stella Sandford's excellent introductory essay, "The Incomplete Locke: Balibar, Locke and the Philosophy of the Subject."

5. In his reading of Butler, Balibar is careful to point out that Butler's gender theory does not really pretend to have done with binarism. "It returns first with the fact that the anatomical uncertainty of gender . . . supports a melancholic relation to the proper body that never really comes to an end; and second with this other (much happier) fact that, without a 'law' or a 'truth,' the identification of 'masculine' and 'feminine' roles remains omnipresent in the 'fantasy' of

amorous desire. Instead of the binarism figuring the natural or symbolic 'code' that would be transgressed by the multiplicity of modalities of jouissance always threatening to the institution, it would be displaced upon the figure of the *couple*, which is always realized in a contingent fashion but remains binding in form because it never lets sexuality—or kinship—escape from the aporia of One = Two and to the displacements that it engenders.”

6. Alain Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” in Nancy, *Who Comes After the Subject*, 25.