


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EDITOR IN CHIEF

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## Encyclopedia of Religion, Second Edition

Lindsay Jones, Editor in Chief

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS USED IN THIS WORK

<b>abbr.</b> abbreviated; abbreviation	<b>3 Bar.</b> <i>3 Baruch</i>	<b>2 Chr.</b> <i>2 Chronicles</i>
<b>abr.</b> abridged; abridgment	<b>4 Bar.</b> <i>4 Baruch</i>	<b>Ch. Slav.</b> Church Slavic
<b>AD</b> <i>anno Domini</i> , in the year of the (our) Lord	<b>B.B.</b> <i>Bavā batrā</i>	<b>cm</b> centimeters
<b>Afrik.</b> Afrikaans	<b>BBC</b> British Broadcasting Corporation	<b>col.</b> column (pl., cols.)
<b>AH</b> <i>anno Hegirae</i> , in the year of the Hijrah	<b>BC</b> before Christ	<b>Col.</b> <i>Colossians</i>
<b>Akk.</b> Akkadian	<b>BCE</b> before the common era	<b>Colo.</b> Colorado
<b>Ala.</b> Alabama	<b>B.D.</b> Bachelor of Divinity	<b>comp.</b> compiler (pl., comps.)
<b>Alb.</b> Albanian	<b>Beits.</b> <i>Beitsab</i>	<b>Conn.</b> Connecticut
<b>Am.</b> <i>Amos</i>	<b>Bekh.</b> <i>Bekhorot</i>	<b>cont.</b> continued
<b>AM</b> <i>ante meridiem</i> , before noon	<b>Beng.</b> Bengali	<b>Copt.</b> Coptic
<b>amend.</b> amended; amendment	<b>Ber.</b> <i>Berakhot</i>	<b>1 Cor.</b> <i>1 Corinthians</i>
<b>annot.</b> annotated; annotation	<b>Berb.</b> Berber	<b>2 Cor.</b> <i>2 Corinthians</i>
<b>Ap.</b> <i>Apocalypse</i>	<b>Bik.</b> <i>Bikkurim</i>	<b>corr.</b> corrected
<b>Apn.</b> <i>Apocryphon</i>	<b>bk.</b> book (pl., bks.)	<b>C.S.P.</b> Congregatio Sancti Pauli, Congregation of Saint Paul (Paulists)
<b>app.</b> appendix	<b>B.M.</b> <i>Bavā metsi'a</i>	<b>d.</b> died
<b>Arab.</b> Arabic	<b>BP</b> before the present	<b>D</b> Deuteronomic (source of the Pentateuch)
<b>'Arakhb.</b> <i>'Arakhin</i>	<b>B.Q.</b> <i>Bavā qamma</i>	<b>Dan.</b> Danish
<b>Aram.</b> Aramaic	<b>Brāh.</b> <i>Brāhmaṇa</i>	<b>D.B.</b> Divinitatis Baccalaureus, Bachelor of Divinity
<b>Ariz.</b> Arizona	<b>Bret.</b> Breton	<b>D.C.</b> District of Columbia
<b>Ark.</b> Arkansas	<b>B.T.</b> Babylonian Talmud	<b>D.D.</b> Divinitatis Doctor, Doctor of Divinity
<b>Arm.</b> Armenian	<b>Bulg.</b> Bulgarian	<b>Del.</b> Delaware
<b>art.</b> article (pl., arts.)	<b>Burm.</b> Burmese	<b>Dem.</b> <i>Demā'i</i>
<b>AS</b> Anglo-Saxon	<b>c.</b> <i>circa</i> , about, approximately	<b>dim.</b> diminutive
<b>Asm. Mos.</b> <i>Assumption of Moses</i>	<b>Calif.</b> California	<b>diss.</b> dissertation
<b>Assyr.</b> Assyrian	<b>Can.</b> Canaanite	<b>Dn.</b> <i>Daniel</i>
<b>A.S.S.R.</b> Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic	<b>Catal.</b> Catalan	<b>D.Phil.</b> Doctor of Philosophy
<b>Av.</b> Avestan	<b>CE</b> of the common era	<b>Dt.</b> <i>Deuteronomy</i>
<b>'A.Z.</b> <i>'Avodah zarah</i>	<b>Celt.</b> Celtic	<b>Du.</b> Dutch
<b>b.</b> born	<b>cf.</b> <i>confer</i> , compare	<b>E</b> Elohist (source of the Pentateuch)
<b>Bab.</b> Babylonian	<b>Chald.</b> Chaldean	<b>Eccl.</b> <i>Ecclesiastes</i>
<b>Ban.</b> Bantu	<b>chap.</b> chapter (pl., chaps.)	<b>ed.</b> editor (pl., eds.); edition; edited by
<b>1 Bar.</b> <i>1 Baruch</i>	<b>Chin.</b> Chinese	
<b>2 Bar.</b> <i>2 Baruch</i>	<b>C.H.M.</b> Community of the Holy Myrrhbearers	
	<b>1 Chr.</b> <i>1 Chronicles</i>	


- Eduy.** *Eduyyot*  
**e.g.** *exempli gratia*, for example  
**Egyp.** Egyptian  
**1 En.** *1 Enoch*  
**2 En.** *2 Enoch*  
**3 En.** *3 Enoch*  
**Eng.** English  
**enl.** enlarged  
**Eph.** *Ephesians*  
**'Eruv.** *'Erubin*  
**1 Esd.** *1 Esdras*  
**2 Esd.** *2 Esdras*  
**3 Esd.** *3 Esdras*  
**4 Esd.** *4 Esdras*  
**esp.** especially  
**Est.** Estonian  
**Est.** *Esther*  
**et al.** *et alii*, and others  
**etc.** *et cetera*, and so forth  
**Eth.** Ethiopic  
**EV** English version  
**Ex.** *Exodus*  
**exp.** expanded  
**Ez.** *Ezekiel*  
**Ezr.** *Ezra*  
**2 Ezr.** *2 Ezra*  
**4 Ezr.** *4 Ezra*  
**f.** feminine; and following (pl., ff.)  
**fasc.** fascicle (pl., fascs.)  
**fig.** figure (pl., figs.)  
**Finn.** Finnish  
**fl.** *floruit*, flourished  
**Fla.** Florida  
**Fr.** French  
**frag.** fragment  
**ft.** feet  
**Ga.** Georgia  
**Gal.** *Galatians*  
**Gaul.** Gaulish  
**Ger.** German  
**Git.** *Gitṭin*  
**Gn.** *Genesis*  
**Gr.** Greek  
**Ḥag.** *Ḥagigah*  
**Ḥal.** *Ḥallah*  
**Hau.** Hausa  
**Hb.** *Habakkuk*  
**Heb.** Hebrew  
**Heb.** *Hebrews*  
**Hg.** *Haggai*  
**Hitt.** Hittite  
**Hor.** *Horayot*  
**Hos.** *Hosea*  
**Ḥul.** *Ḥullin*
- Hung.** Hungarian  
**ibid.** *ibidem*, in the same place (as the one immediately preceding)  
**Icel.** Icelandic  
**i.e.** *id est*, that is  
**IE** Indo-European  
**Ill.** Illinois  
**Ind.** Indiana  
**intro.** introduction  
**Ir. Gael.** Irish Gaelic  
**Iran.** Iranian  
**Is.** *Isaiah*  
**Ital.** Italian  
**J** Yahvist (source of the Pentateuch)  
**Jas.** *James*  
**Jav.** Javanese  
**Jb.** *Job*  
**Jdt.** *Judith*  
**Jer.** *Jeremiah*  
**Jgs.** *Judges*  
**Jl.** *Joel*  
**Jn.** *John*  
**1 Jn.** *1 John*  
**2 Jn.** *2 John*  
**3 Jn.** *3 John*  
**Jon.** *Jonah*  
**Jos.** *Joshua*  
**Jpn.** Japanese  
**JPS** Jewish Publication Society translation (1985) of the Hebrew Bible  
**J.T.** Jerusalem Talmud  
**Jub.** *Jubilees*  
**Kans.** Kansas  
**Kel.** *Kelim*  
**Ker.** *Keritot*  
**Ket.** *Ketubbot*  
**1 Kgs.** *1 Kings*  
**2 Kgs.** *2 Kings*  
**Khois.** Khoisan  
**Kil.** *Kil'ayim*  
**km** kilometers  
**Kor.** Korean  
**Ky.** Kentucky  
**l.** line (pl., ll.)  
**La.** Louisiana  
**Lam.** *Lamentations*  
**Lat.** Latin  
**Latv.** Latvian  
**L. en Th.** *Licencié en Théologie*, Licentiate in Theology  
**L. ès L.** *Licencié ès Lettres*, Licentiate in Literature  
**Let. Jer.** *Letter of Jeremiah*  
**lit.** literally
- Lith.** Lithuanian  
**Lk.** *Luke*  
**LL** Late Latin  
**LL.D.** *Legum Doctor*, Doctor of Laws  
**Lv.** *Leviticus*  
**m** meters  
**m.** masculine  
**M.A.** Master of Arts  
**Ma 'as.** *Ma'aserot*  
**Ma 'as. Sb.** *Ma' aser sheni*  
**Mak.** *Makkot*  
**Makh.** *Makhshirin*  
**Mal.** *Malachi*  
**Mar.** Marathi  
**Mass.** Massachusetts  
**1 Mc.** *1 Maccabees*  
**2 Mc.** *2 Maccabees*  
**3 Mc.** *3 Maccabees*  
**4 Mc.** *4 Maccabees*  
**Md.** Maryland  
**M.D.** *Medicinae Doctor*, Doctor of Medicine  
**ME** Middle English  
**Meg.** *Megillah*  
**Me 'il.** *Me'ilah*  
**Men.** *Menahot*  
**MHG** Middle High German  
**mi.** miles  
**Mi.** *Micah*  
**Mich.** Michigan  
**Mid.** *Middot*  
**Minn.** Minnesota  
**Miq.** *Miqva'ot*  
**MIran.** Middle Iranian  
**Miss.** Mississippi  
**Mk.** *Mark*  
**Mo.** Missouri  
**Mo'ed Q.** *Mo'ed qatan*  
**Mont.** Montana  
**MPers.** Middle Persian  
**MS.** *manuscriptum*, manuscript (pl., MSS)  
**Mt.** *Matthew*  
**MT** Masoretic text  
**n.** note  
**Na.** *Nahum*  
**Nah.** Nahuatl  
**Naz.** *Nazir*  
**N.B.** *nota bene*, take careful note  
**N.C.** North Carolina  
**n.d.** no date  
**N.Dak.** North Dakota  
**NEB** New English Bible  
**Nebr.** Nebraska

- Ned.** *Nedarim*  
**Neg.** *Nega'im*  
**Neb.** *Nehemiah*  
**Nev.** Nevada  
**N.H.** New Hampshire  
**Nid.** *Niddah*  
**N.J.** New Jersey  
**Nm.** *Numbers*  
**N.Mex.** New Mexico  
**no.** number (pl., nos.)  
**Nor.** Norwegian  
**n.p.** no place  
**n.s.** new series  
**N.Y.** New York  
**Ob.** *Obadiah*  
**O.Cist.** Ordo Cisterciencium, Order of Cîteaux (Cistercians)  
**OCS** Old Church Slavonic  
**OE** Old English  
**O.F.M.** Ordo Fratrum Minorum, Order of Friars Minor (Franciscans)  
**OFr.** Old French  
**Ohal.** *Ohalot*  
**OHG** Old High German  
**OIr.** Old Irish  
**OIran.** Old Iranian  
**Okla.** Oklahoma  
**ON** Old Norse  
**O.P.** Ordo Praedicatorum, Order of Preachers (Dominicans)  
**OPers.** Old Persian  
**op. cit.** *opere citato*, in the work cited  
**OPrus.** Old Prussian  
**Oreg.** Oregon  
**'Orl.** *'Orlah*  
**O.S.B.** Ordo Sancti Benedicti, Order of Saint Benedict (Benedictines)  
**p.** page (pl., pp.)  
**P** Priestly (source of the Pentateuch)  
**Pa.** Pennsylvania  
**Pahl.** Pahlavi  
**Par.** *Parah*  
**para.** paragraph (pl., paras.)  
**Pers.** Persian  
**Pes.** *Pesahim*  
**Ph.D.** Philosophiae Doctor, Doctor of Philosophy  
**Phil.** *Philippians*  
**Phlm.** *Philemon*  
**Phoen.** Phoenician  
**pl.** plural; plate (pl., pls.)  
**PM** *post meridiem*, after noon  
**Pol.** Polish  
**pop.** population  
**Port.** Portuguese  
**Pru.** *Proverbs*  
**Ps.** *Psalms*  
**Ps. 151** *Psalms 151*  
**Ps. Sol.** *Psalms of Solomon*  
**pt.** part (pl., pts.)  
**1Pt.** *1 Peter*  
**2 Pt.** *2 Peter*  
**Pth.** Parthian  
**Q** hypothetical source of the synoptic Gospels  
**Qid.** *Qiddushin*  
**Qin.** *Qinnim*  
**r.** reigned; ruled  
**Rab.** *Rabbah*  
**rev.** revised  
**R. ha-Sb.** *Ro'sh ha-shanah*  
**R.I.** Rhode Island  
**Rom.** Romanian  
**Rom.** *Romans*  
**R.S.C.J.** Societas Sacratissimi Cordis Jesu, Religious of the Sacred Heart  
**RSV** Revised Standard Version of the Bible  
**Ru.** *Ruth*  
**Rus.** Russian  
**Rv.** *Revelation*  
**Rv. Ezr.** *Revelation of Ezra*  
**San.** *Sanhedrin*  
**S.C.** South Carolina  
**Scot. Gael.** Scottish Gaelic  
**S.Dak.** South Dakota  
**sec.** section (pl., secs.)  
**Sem.** Semitic  
**ser.** series  
**sg.** singular  
**Sg.** *Song of Songs*  
**Sg. of 3** *Prayer of Azariah and the Song of the Three Young Men*  
**Shab.** *Shabbat*  
**Shav.** *Shavu'ot*  
**Sheq.** *Sheqalim*  
**Sib. Or.** *Sibylline Oracles*  
**Sind.** Sindhi  
**Sinh.** Sinhala  
**Sir.** *Ben Sira*  
**S.J.** Societas Jesu, Society of Jesus (Jesuits)  
**Skt.** Sanskrit  
**1 Sm.** *1 Samuel*  
**2 Sm.** *2 Samuel*  
**Sogd.** Sogdian  
**Soř.** *Sořah*  
**sp.** species (pl., spp.)  
**Span.** Spanish  
**sq.** square  
**S.S.R.** Soviet Socialist Republic  
**st.** stanza (pl., ss.)  
**S.T.M.** Sacrae Theologiae Magister, Master of Sacred Theology  
**Suk.** *Sukkah*  
**Sum.** Sumerian  
**supp.** supplement; supplementary  
**Sus.** *Susanna*  
**s.v.** *sub verbo*, under the word (pl., s.v.v.)  
**Swed.** Swedish  
**Syr.** Syriac  
**Syr. Men.** *Syriac Menander*  
**Ta'an.** *Ta'anit*  
**Tam.** Tamil  
**Tam.** *Tamid*  
**Tb.** *Tobit*  
**T.D.** *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō*, edited by Takakusu Junjirō et al. (Tokyo, 1922–1934)  
**Tem.** *Temurah*  
**Tenn.** Tennessee  
**Ter.** Terumot  
**Ṭev. Y.** *Ṭevul yom*  
**Tex.** Texas  
**Th.D.** Theologiae Doctor, Doctor of Theology  
**1 Thes.** *1 Thessalonians*  
**2 Thes.** *2 Thessalonians*  
**Thrac.** Thracian  
**Ti.** *Titus*  
**Tib.** Tibetan  
**1 Tm.** *1 Timothy*  
**2 Tm.** *2 Timothy*  
**T. of 12** *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*  
**Ṭoh.** *ṭohorot*  
**Tong.** Tongan  
**trans.** translator, translators; translated by; translation  
**Turk.** Turkish  
**Ukr.** Ukrainian  
**Upan.** *Upaniṣad*  
**U.S.** United States  
**U.S.S.R.** Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
**Uqts.** *Uqtsin*  
**v.** verse (pl., vv.)  
**Va.** Virginia  
**var.** variant; variation  
**Viet.** Vietnamese

**viz.** *videlicet*, namely  
**vol.** volume (pl., vols.)  
**Vt.** Vermont  
**Wash.** Washington  
**Wel.** Welsh  
**Wis.** Wisconsin  
**Wis.** *Wisdom of Solomon*  
**W.Va.** West Virginia  
**Wyo.** Wyoming

**Yad.** *Yadayim*  
**Yev.** *Yevamot*  
**Yi.** Yiddish  
**Yor.** Yoruba  
**Zav.** *Zavim*  
**Zec.** *Zechariah*  
**Zep.** *Zephaniah*  
**Zev.** *Zevahim*

\* hypothetical  
? uncertain; possibly; perhaps  
° degrees  
+ plus  
– minus  
= equals; is equivalent to  
× by; multiplied by  
→ yields



# Community

Images and the visual practices that put them to work contribute significantly to the experience of those social and cultural groupings that structure human life. Clan, tribe, ancestors, congregation, family, ethnic group, race, and nation are only some of the many shared orders of social life. These forms of association configure the loyalties, obligations, and affiliations, as well as the aversions and oppositions, that shape individual and collective identity. The creation, display, gifting, veneration, ritual observation, and destruction of images all can help perform group solidarity and signal individual status within the group.

In the manner of open-ended advertisements, some images broadcast identity in a way that situates an individual or family within a larger public setting, such as a domicile in central Ethiopia (a), which displays murals painted by the Protestant owner of the home.



In this instance, the murals announce the particular nature of the homeowner's faith. Images are also used

to promote the interests of a particular clan and its social intentions. The Shintō figure of a goddess (b), which also represents a court figure, belonged to a shrine ensemble that was typically installed by a clan with the aim of elevating its standing and even as a way of serving its political ambitions. Royal and noble patronage of the visual arts accounts for much of the world's finest art, and much of this was created to broadcast status or curry

(a) *Tukul* (thatched hut) in Hossana, Ethiopia, with murals painted by the Protestant owner. [Photograph by David Morgan] (b) INSET. A tenth-century carved and painted wood statue of the Shintō goddess Nakatsu Hime Zo, wearing the robes of a court lady, from the Hachimangu Shrine in Nara, Japan. [©Werner Forman/Art Resource, N.Y.]



(c) ABOVE. Masks (*kavat sowelmot*) worn by young Uramot Baining men moving to a higher level of social status, bark cloth, wood, fiber, pigment, Gazelle Peninsula, New Britain.  
 [©Wolfgang Kaehler/Corbis]


support of the priestly or monastic classes, the devout laity, or the gods themselves.

Images are often what members of a group physically share with each other as members. Some objects and images orchestrate people's relationship to one another. The Uramot Baining people of Melanesia initiate young men into higher grade levels of age by using masks, such as the animated tree fork shown here (c), which represents a natural configuration used in dwellings, and therefore is something whose power consists of its operation in two domains—nature and culture—which power the mask can deploy to disrupt the cultural order, dislodging a youth to move him to another social status. An ancestor figure (d) from Papua New Guinea represents an important predecessor who is accompanied by animals that are



the clan totems associated with the ancestor. This carving was displayed among a group of such ancestor figures in a cult house where the figures were consulted as oracles before a battle or hunt. The tattoos a man received while in prison in Mexico (e) indicate his identity as a Chicano, his machismo, and his long-suffering prison stays; they even mark the individual years spent in prison. Another sort of display common among gangs in Los Angeles is graffiti (f), which is used to mark territory belonging to gangs, display pride in the gang's symbols and presence, and, in the case of the illustration reproduced here, to commemorate members of the Eighteenth Street gang in Los Angeles. The image of Our Lady of Guadalupe and Christ above the cross clearly signal the religious nature of the commemoration, as well as the importance of Catholicism for Chicanos.

(e) RIGHT. Tattoos on a Latino man in Los Angeles indicate his cultural identity and the years he spent in prison. [©Susan A. Phillips] (f) BELOW. A graffiti memorial for deceased members of the Eighteenth Street gang, near MacArthur Park in Los Angeles, 1990. [©Susan A. Phillips]







A Vodou initiation ceremony (**g**), is organized around a candlelit altar and chalk diagram, in which properly costumed participants take part in a structured liturgy. Whether Vodou or Christianity, Hinduism or Shintō, visually elaborate, theatrically complex ceremonies literally perform group identity, assigning particular roles to participants, even calling upon them to perform a repertory of actions or utterances. Such events may be restricted to small, semiprivate groups, such as the women's societies in African secret associations (**h**), in which the masks and costumes of society members cloak their identities as they assume the identities of spirits or ancestors. Or the events may be vast, highly orchestrated affairs, as in the annual

**(g) TOP.** Participants in a Vodou ritual in Haiti kneel around a candlelit altar and chalk diagram, while onlookers sit outside of the ritual circle. [©Morton Beebe/Corbis] **(h) LEFT.** Sande women costumed as spirits and ancestors at a ceremony in Sierra Leone. [Photograph by Ruth B. Phillips]



Gaṇeśa festival in Mumbai (i), where, during the culmination of the festival, thousands of participants accompany large sculpted figures of the elephant-headed “remover of obstacles,” made of unfired clay, to the sea, where the image is submerged and dissolved. The ritual destruction of the image brings the festival to a single, dramatic end in the public witness of an entire city’s inhabitants.

Memorials and monuments enact collective identity in powerful, though distinct, ways in modern urban settings. The Marine Corps War Memorial (j), though called a memorial, is much better described as a monument if by that term one intends a heroic celebration of a great deed

(i) **RIGHT.** Hindus in Mumbai, India, carry a sculpture of Gaṇeśa to the Arabian Sea. [©Amit Bhargava/Corbis] (j) **BELOW.** Felix de Weldon, Marine Corps War Memorial, near Arlington National Cemetery, across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C., dedicated in 1954. [©Alan Schein Photography/Corbis]





**(k)** A tribute in light over the site of the World Trade Center in New York City in spring 2002. [©Mark E. Gibson/Corbis]

that is erected for the sake of public affirmation as constitutive of the nation's well-being. Monuments are intended to gather the group—in this case, the nation—around a figure or event that totemically represents the whole. Memorials, on the other hand, are constructed as commemorations of loss. The towering beams of light that marked the site of the World Trade Center Towers (**k**) destroyed on September 11, 2001, did not aggrandize anyone or glorify the city or nation, but acted as a colossal form of mourning and remembrance. As a city and nation, New Yorkers and Americans regarded the dramatic memorial as not only an elegiac and all too ephemeral reminder of what was taken from them, but also what might register that loss within the larger gesture of a luminous connection with the night sky over Manhat-





tan. Both memorials and monuments seek to materialize a larger self, whether national or even divine. Both declare in different ways and possibly to different ends that each person is incomplete in him or herself and only more fully alive and purposeful as part of a larger self.

Images are often charged with the task of encouraging the submission of individual interest to the interest of the community. Clearly, this is the message of the Maoist poster (I) in which Chairman Mao Zedong radiates light like a solar deity above a smiling crowd of China's many ethnic peoples, several of whom conspicuously display copies of Mao's Little Red Book. Self-effacing obedience was part of Chinese Confucian tradition. Obligation to ancestors, parents, and superiors is the focus of Confucianism, but, in contrast to Mao's dictatorship,

(I) A Chinese propaganda poster portrays Mao Zedong as the sun, with representatives of China's various ethnic groups holding Mao's Little Red Book. The text declares "Chairman Mao is the everlasting red sun in our hearts." [©Ric Ergenbright/Corbis]



(m) Remonstrance before the Emperor, handscroll, ink on silk, China, from Li Kung-lin, *The Classic of Filial Piety*, chapter 15, 1085 CE. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Ex coll.: C. C. Wang Family, from the P. Y. and Kinmay W. Tang Family Collection, Gift of Oscar L. Tang Family, 1996 (1996.479a-c). Photograph by Malcolm Varon. [Photograph ©1991 The Metropolitan Museum of Art]

authority was not unchecked. In the Chinese illustrated scroll entitled *The Classic of Filial Piety* (m) a minister remonstrates with his sovereign, but while doing so he bows very low and avoids the sovereign's superior gaze. All spectators avert their eyes from the ruler out of respect for his authority, but also perhaps to absent themselves from his wrath or embarrassment as he is called delicately to task. Authority is a socially enacted reality, bestowed by all members of a society, even though not equally, nor with the same benefit, to everyone.

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DAVID MORGAN (2005)





## GODDESS WORSHIP

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

- AN OVERVIEW
- GODDESS WORSHIP IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST
- GODDESS WORSHIP IN THE HELLENISTIC WORLD
- THE HINDU GODDESS
- THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

### GODDESS WORSHIP: AN OVERVIEW

The scope and antiquity of goddess worship are remarkable. Female sacred images are associated with some of the oldest archaeological evidence for religious expression and they still have efficacy in the contemporary world. Goddess images are depicted in a wide range of forms, from aniconic representations, such as abstract organs of reproduction, to fully elaborated icons decorated with the finery of monarchy. They are linked to all major aspects of life, including birth, initiation, marriage, reproduction, and death. They display the elaborate variegation of religious experiences in different cultural contexts. A historical survey reveals goddess worship to be a continuous phenomenon, despite periodic ebbs and tides during certain critical epochs.

**GODDESS WORSHIP IN UPPER PALEOLITHIC CULTURES.** Some of the earliest archaeological evidence for the human religious impulse consists of sculptured images and cave paintings of female figures excavated in hundreds of Upper Paleolithic sites throughout Europe and northern Asia, including France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria, the Ukraine, and Siberia. These images, carved in bone, stone, antler and mammoth tusks, outnumber those of male figures ten to one. They have been identified sometimes as part of an elaborate and pervasive worship of goddesses; they are commonly known as “Venuses,” after the Roman goddess of love and beauty. The interpretation of these artifacts remains controversial today.

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CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT CORNER. The Court of the Lions in the Alhambra in Granada, Spain. [©E.O. Hoppé/Corbis]; Sixth-century BCE marble relief of Aphrodite, Artemis, and Apollo from the east frieze of the Siphnian Treasury at Delphi, Greece. Archaeological Museum, Delphi. [©Erich Lessing/Art Resource, N.Y.]; Eleventh-century Byzantine mosaic of the Madonna and Child at Hosios Loukas Monastery in Boeotia, Greece. [The Art Archive/Dagli Orti]; Gaṇeśa, twelfth to thirteenth century, from Mysore, India. De Young Memorial Museum, San Francisco. [©Werner Forman/Art Resource, N.Y.]; The Parthenon on the Acropolis in Athens, Greece. [©Bettmann/Corbis].

Some Venuses have been discovered in Aurignacian deposits as old as thirty to forty thousand years. However, they appear more frequently about 25,000 years ago. Remarkably, these same goddess figurines have been unearthed from sites dated as late as the early Neolithic period. One of the earliest of these figurines, found in the Dordogne region of France, was estimated to be thirty-two thousand years old, roughly the age of the famous cave art of that period and situated one level above Neanderthal artifacts associated with what are believed to be ceremonial burials. This “pregnant” figure was carved from reindeer antler and is marked by a series of small notches that do not appear to be purely decorative. One cannot be sure how to interpret this figurine, though it might be part of an elaborate cult associated with later discoveries of the same type.

The Venuses have been widely interpreted as evidence of a single phenomenon, fertility symbolism. Some scholars have lumped these prehistoric figurines together with a later so-called Great Goddess complex and the emergence of agriculture. Most archaeologists, however, hesitate to treat all these female images as fertility symbols, because they are the product of a wide variety of peoples with different economic systems, cultural traditions, and languages. Perhaps the Venuses had a great variety of meanings, both within the different cultural contexts in which they were found and depending on the time period. Each of these images must be read in the context of its archaeological provenience. Thus, theories that the Venuses represent an ancient, widespread cult of “fertility magic” are oversimplifications. Current research suggests that the Venuses may be associated with a wide range of phenomena involving women, such as maturation, menstruation, copulation, pregnancy, birth, and lactation. They are not to be treated separately or isolated in any way from other artifacts of the same period that represent some type of “storied event.”

The Neolithic goddess figurines take different forms. Some are thin and geometric, representing snake and bird goddesses. These water and air deities were likely cosmic symbols of the regeneration of life. Other figurines are faceless, unclothed, and corpulent. Still others appear to be conspicuously pregnant, with exaggerated breasts and large buttocks. The most famous of these figurines, the Venus of Willendorf (Austria), is often taken to be typical of Upper Paleolithic mother-goddess figures. This image is four and three-eighths inches high, made of soft stone, faceless, fat, but not apparently pregnant; it appears to have been painted with red ocher. However, the diversity of female images is marked; not all are full iconic representations. There is a variety of images of female body parts such as sculptured breasts (from sites in Czechoslovakia) marked with curious notches that may have been either notational or decorative—some of these were worn as a string of beads, others as a single pendant. Abstracted images of vulvas have also been unearthed in France, Spain, and Italy. Some are forked images, others are shaped like disks, and all have clear, finely marked notch-

es, which may be connected in some way with the menstrual cycle.

Other permutations include the various female images painted on cave walls that have some association with animals and a variety of different symbols and markings of probable notational significance. A number of abstracted images of female buttocks have been found in various sites, sometimes with breasts and torsos. In one Italian grave site, for instance, a decorated bone pendant in the shape of female buttocks was found. The image is well worn, and it seems to have been used for some purpose during the life of its wearer and then placed among various other ceremonial burial objects, including two other crudely carved goddess images made especially for the burial.

There is a great range of evidence for goddess worship in the Upper Paleolithic era. The character of this worship is largely uncertain, and no single interpretation is adequate. The figurines may have been associated with pregnancy, birth, burial, fertility, initiation, hunting, and the menstrual cycle; they may even have had some erotic function. Although they represent a prominent element in the religious life of this period, it is erroneous to isolate these female figurines from other important and associated imagery, such as animals, male images, and undeciphered markings. Nor can one make the further leap of suggesting that this rich collection of sacred female images constitutes proof of an early stage of matriarchy; the symbolism of these images tells nothing clear about male or female roles in the social organization of Upper Paleolithic cultures.

**NEOLITHIC EARTH GODDESSES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AGRICULTURE.** The most noteworthy fact about Neolithic goddess worship is its strong continuity with earlier Upper Paleolithic configurations. Gradually Paleolithic goddess symbolism was transformed to fit into the complex of human needs generated by increasingly agricultural and urbanized forms of social organization. Most sources date the Neolithic era around ten thousand to four thousand years ago; it was marked by the appearance of ground stone tools and the domestication of plants and animals in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and throughout various parts of Asia. The female images found in Neolithic sites represent the continuity of traditions from earlier Mesolithic and Upper Paleolithic cultures. Chevrons, meanders, serpentine and spiral designs associated with Neolithic goddesses are all familiar motifs prefigured in Paleolithic female images. Also, it appears that the Neolithic goddesses who were linked to lunar mythology are derived from earlier roots. Many of the Neolithic goddess figurines are corpulent, like their Upper Paleolithic predecessors; they are connected also to the supply of wild animals, but by this time with the addition of domesticated animals such as the dog, bull, and male goat as well. Some of these Neolithic figurines are pregnant, seated on a throne, representing goddesses of vegetation. In general, they are composite images, sharing the traits of both preagricultural and agricultural societies. Also noteworthy is a comple-

mentarity between male and female images—one is not subordinate to the other.

The complex imagery of the Neolithic era was centered around females and animals, as illustrated by evidence from the famous Anatolian site of Çatal Hüyük, excavated by James Mellaart in 1961–1963. This Neolithic settlement located in southern Turkey is dated from the seventh to sixth millennium BCE. Its more than forty shrines, distributed through nine building levels, have yielded a wealth of information about Neolithic religion. The evidence displays a clear cultic continuity associated with a mother goddess and accompanying male deities. In some shrines at Çatal Hüyük the goddess is depicted as being supported by leopards or giving birth to a bull, which was a male deity. This association of goddesses with male deities is unusual at Neolithic sites; they usually appear without a male counterpart.

The statuettes at Çatal Hüyük suggest that goddesses were connected variously with pregnancy, birth, ritual marriage, and command over wild animals. Images of stylized female breasts similar to Upper Paleolithic figurines have also been found here. The principal deity of this Neolithic site is a goddess represented in three forms, as a young woman, a mother giving birth, and an old woman. There are also several images of twin goddesses, with one of the two portrayed in the process of giving birth.

In other Neolithic shrines, goddesses appear as bird and snake deities connected to rain and water. Further recent evidence of Neolithic goddess worship comes from a village site presently being excavated outside of Amman, Jordan. Here an international team of archaeologists has unearthed a series of plaster figurines three feet tall with startled expressions on their faces, along with fifty animal figurines, two adorned plaster skulls, and three Venuses. One of the statues is of a nude female standing and pushing up her breasts with her hand. This image may foreshadow the later cult of the goddess Astarte, who was widely worshiped in the area.

The question has to be raised as to whether these Neolithic goddesses were part of a single cult complex spread across Europe and the Middle East or whether they represent different traditions entirely. In some places they are associated with ancestor worship, death, and the afterlife; in others they are related to the emergence of agriculture and the fertility of crops. In still others, they represent developmental functions, as they had in the Upper Paleolithic era. Whatever the answer may be to this question, one thing is clear. Goddess worship is not, as some scholars have suggested, an innovation that appeared suddenly in the Neolithic period with the emergence of agriculture, which these scholars then see as a woman-controlled form of subsistence.

**GODDESS WORSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZATIONS.** Goddess worship has played a central role in the worldwide transition from small-scale social organization to the emergence of civilizations in India, the ancient Near East, Greece, Rome, China, and Japan. In these complex ag-

ricultural societies female deities have been variously linked to the fertility of crops, the sovereignty of kingship, the protection of urban ceremonial centers, and the waging of warfare against enemies.

**India.** No civilization in the world developed goddess worship so elaborately as did India. Terra-cotta figurines of mother goddesses have been found in the Indus Valley, dated at 2500 to 1500 BCE, along with abstract stone rings representing the yoni and lingam, prototypes for the later god Śiva and his female consort. Goddesses rarely functioned separately from male divinities in ancient India. Nor was goddess worship the central theme in the development of Indian civilization except during periodic episodes of florescence. Indeed, the goddess does not appear as a major focus in Indian literature until 600 BCE, in a legend recorded in the *Kena Upaniṣad*. Not until much later, probably the seventh century CE, did goddess worship emerge as a somewhat separate cult in Hinduism and eventually in Tibetan Buddhism. This Tantric expression of goddess worship was particularly strong in eastern India where it continues to flourish today, though somewhat less intensely than formerly.

At no point in the development of Indian civilization was goddess worship completely separate from devotion to male deities. The Hindu rajas wielded power through the manipulation of icons of major male deities such as Sūrya, Viṣṇu, or Śiva. While these gods had female consorts who were worshiped alongside them, goddesses usually played a secondary though by no means unimportant role as images of cultural identity. No doubt at the village level there has been a long, relatively unbroken continuity of goddess worship extending back to Neolithic times. Local village goddesses were besought (as they continue to be today) to increase human fertility, to cause or cure diseases, to bring about good fortune, to enhance the productivity of crops, or to destroy demons. Yet, at the more exalted level of courts and kings, these female deities played a less prominent role. Up until the early part of this century many rajas incorporated tribal peoples into their spheres of influence by worshipping local goddesses, but this royal patronage of goddess worship was usually accompanied by an even stronger devotion on the part of the raja to the sect of a male deity. Thus, it would be erroneous to conceive of Indian goddess worship as a distinct component in the development of Indian civilization. The widely known Hindu goddesses such as Sarasvatī, Lakṣmī, and Pārvatī rarely stand alone. Only Kālī and Caṇḍī, the more ferocious aspects of female divinity, become focal points for separate worship. Even in these cases the goddess rarely acts as a primary source for establishing the legitimacy of kingship.

**The ancient Near East.** In the ancient Near East the phenomenon of goddess worship displayed an even more elaborate and subtle set of nuances. Here are encountered several distinct civilizations, some having borrowed heavily from each other. A number of goddesses were prominent in ancient Egypt: Nut, goddess of the sky and consort of the



earth god, Geb; the goddess Neith, patroness of victorious weapons and the art of weaving; Isis, goddess of wisdom; and Hathor, another sky goddess who assumed various forms. Some of these goddesses were deeply entwined in the development and continuity of divine kingship. The name *Isis*, for instance, is related linguistically to the term for “chair” or “throne.” The throne or “holy seat” of the pharaoh was the “mother of the king.” The pharaohs thought themselves to be sons of Isis. Later Isis became linked to the god Osiris. The heroic story depicts Isis’s famous search for her murdered husband’s corpse, her discovery of it, and his resurrection. Eventually Isis became universalized as a benevolent goddess of the harvest. Her cult spread from Egypt to Greece and throughout the Roman Empire. By 300 BCE the cult of Isis had become a popular mystery religion, with secret initiation rites promising salvation and rebirth.

Another stream in the ancient Near Eastern tradition of goddess worship flows from the Mesopotamian civilization located on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. In that area the goddess Inanna was worshiped; she was the queen of heaven and earth and the goddess of love, and she was profoundly involved in the rise of Sumerian state-level social organization. Although she was one of many goddesses of ancient Sumer, Inanna outlasted and overshadowed them all. Also known as Ishtar and later worshiped by different Semitic peoples, Inanna had very ancient roots. She was part of an amalgamation of Sumerian and Akkadian religious and political beliefs, extending back to 3000 BCE or possibly further, and she is connected to the fertility of crops, the emergence of increasing sedentary patterns of social organization, and the development of the first urban centers.

In the late nineteenth century the world’s oldest texts on cuneiform clay tablets were unearthed after having been buried for at least four thousand years. Some of these texts tell the life story of Inanna from adolescence through womanhood and her eventual apotheosis. The texts are extremely rich; they reveal the sexual fears and desires of the goddess, an elaborate history of kinship among various deities in her family tree, her power as queen of Sumer, and her responsibilities for the redistribution of resources and fertility of the earth. Inanna’s cult was centered at the ancient temple city of Uruk. Here archaeologists have provided evidence for the earliest known urban civilization, dated 3900–3500 BCE and characterized by monumental temple architecture and the first writing. The oldest shrine of Uruk was dedicated to Inanna, as were numerous later temples. She was the supreme patroness of the city. Though related to other deities, she retained a certain degree of independence. Inanna’s shrine was the focus of considerable economic activity and the redistribution of resources characteristic of urban life.

Unlike the female divinities of India and Egypt, the goddess Inanna, who was most likely derived from Neolithic and possibly even earlier Paleolithic roots, played the principal role in the religious tradition of an urban society. She was considered to have equal status with the sky god, An, head

of the Sumerian pantheon. In this urban context, Inanna became a focal point for the full emergence of life in city-states, and she assumed the regal responsibility for victory in war and the redistribution of resources among urban peoples. Often these functions have been allotted to male deities in other traditions, as in the case of the Hindu gods Śiva and Jagannātha.

Inanna is identified with the Semitic goddess Ishtar and the West Semitic goddess Astarte. These deities, along with the Canaanite goddesses Asherah and Anat (a wrathful warlike deity), were worshiped by the early Hebrew people. It is certain that the early Israelites worshiped the Canaanite goddess Asherah; even Solomon praised the pillars representing this deity, and his son Rehoboam erected an image of her in the temple at Jerusalem. Probably the female deities of the early monarchic period did not disappear but were changed into different forms, despite repeated efforts to reestablish a strong monotheism in Judaism in the biblical period. Raphael Patai (1967) has argued that various disguises are assumed by the goddess in later Judaism: she appeared in the form of the cherubim (depicted as man and woman in an erotic embrace); in images of Yahveh’s wife Astarte; as the one and only God having two aspects, male and female; and in the form of the Shekhinah (the personified presence of God on earth). In this latter form, the Shekhinah argues with God in defense of man; she is sometimes manifested as Wisdom and at other times as the Holy Spirit. The feminine element played an important role in qabbalistic thought, especially in the thirteenth-century *Zohar*, which stressed the Shekhinah as female divine entity; she was also referred to there as Matronit (“divine matron”). The Shekhinah was seen as an intermediary between God and the scattered peoples of Israel and was widely accepted in Jewish communities in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, when Qabbalah had widely felt influence. According to Patai, the complex concept in Qabbalah that the Shekhinah and God are one, filtered down to the Jewish masses, led to the simplified belief in her as a goddess.

Although the early Israelites engaged in the worship of female deities, at some point goddess worship was removed from the religious tradition. Whether one places this purge of the goddess early in Judaism or posits a disguised form of goddess worship that was retained for centuries and then finally removed, the really important question is why the phenomenon was eliminated from the tradition at all. Some feminist scholars have argued that this purge of the feminine represents a repression of women. However, the phenomenon can be explained also by the purely theological argument that monotheism requires the loss of all “extraneous” deities, no matter what gender. This raises yet another question. Why has none of the monotheistic religions worshiped a feminine deity as its centerpiece? Could there be some truth to the often asserted position that monotheism represents a final ideological phase in the evolution of complex state-level civilizations? If this were true, how then does one explain In-

dian civilization, which is clearly a state-level form of social organization, but is neither monotheistic nor associated with an exclusively dominant male divinity? Perhaps the gender of deities has little, if anything, to do with the social structure in which they are manifested. Such questions require further research from different theoretical perspectives.

**Greece.** In Greece, the rebirth theme is found in the Eleusinian mystery cult associated with the earth goddess, Demeter. However, instead of the rebirth of a male deity, a female deity is reborn: Demeter's daughter, Persephone, is resurrected after her abduction by Hades, lord of the underworld. The pre-Olympian goddesses of Greece were usually connected to vegetation rituals. A prime example was Gaia, earth mother and chthonic mother of the gods. This deity was associated with the oracle at Delphi before the oracle became exclusively Apollo's. Her rituals included animal sacrifices, offerings of grain and fruit, and ecstatic possession trance. Many of the later Greek goddesses emerged from pre-Hellenic earth goddesses like Gaia. The famous twelve deities of Olympus included the goddesses Hera, Athena, Aphrodite, Hestia, Artemis, and Demeter. These Olympian goddesses were each given distinct roles to play in accordance with their earlier spheres of influence. The original chthonic aspects of these goddesses were diminished as they became subordinated in the Olympian hierarchy ruled by Zeus. No longer was each goddess an organic link to the generative forces of life and death. Instead, she became highly compartmentalized in her new role in the male-dominated Olympian pantheon. This compartmentalization demarcates a transformation in the role of goddess worship in the development of Greek civilization.

**Rome.** There was a strong identification of Greek deities with Roman deities. Most Greek goddesses had their Roman counterparts. In 204 BCE Roman aristocrats officially adopted the foreign cult of the Anatolian goddess Cybele, later to be known as the Magna Mater (Great Mother). On April 4 of that year the image of the goddess was carried into the city by Roman matrons, a temple was erected, and she was installed as a national Roman deity. Only self-castrated foreign priests were allowed to serve in the temples dedicated to Cybele, because Roman citizens were forbidden to be priests until the reign of Emperor Claudius (41–54 CE). Driven by Cybele, his angry mother, Attis died of self-castration and then returned to life in response to his mother's intense mourning. This death and rebirth theme was celebrated during a series of holidays at the beginning of spring; the rituals included a procession carrying a pine tree (representing the dead Attis) into the temple of the Magna Mater, violent ritual mourning, a celebration of the rebirth of Attis, and the bathing of Cybele's statue.

**China and Japan.** The Vajrayāna tradition of Tantric Buddhism in Tibet and Mongolia is widely associated with goddess worship. Male and female manifestations of the divine power are depicted as opposite but complementary aspects of each other. This dynamic tension of male and female

principles, derived from Tantric Hinduism, has resulted in a large number of goddesses who are intimately related to their male counterparts as consorts. Some goddesses, however, retain a certain degree of autonomy and represent independent deities. This is the case of the goddess Tara, a female *bodhisattva* who became a universal protectress. In Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, Guanyin, goddess of mercy, is also considered to be a *bodhisattva*. She is a principal teacher, a savior who can give her devotees assurance of enlightenment and carry believers to the western paradise of O-mi-t'o-fo's Pure Land. This goddess continues to be worshiped throughout China and in Japanese Buddhism.

The tradition of goddess worship is well established in Japan, not only in Buddhism, but also in Japanese Shintō, where many male and female nature deities are propitiated. In Shintō the world was created by a divine creator couple, the god Izanagi and the goddess Izanami. They gave birth to the sun goddess Amaterasu and her brother Susano-o no Mikoto, god of storms, along with other nature deities. Amaterasu eventually became the cult deity of the Japanese royal family, retaining both her Shintō function as sun goddess and a new role as Shining Buddha of Heaven. Until this century the emperor of Japan was considered to be the descendant on earth of Amaterasu. He was charged to keep peace in the world and to support her major pilgrimage shrine, located at Ise.

This survey of archaic goddess worship points to the diversity of the roles goddess worship has played in the development of civilizations. In some parts of the world goddesses were central in the emergence of urbanism and kingship. Elsewhere they were secondary consorts of male divinities or vestiges of mystery cults associated with earlier shamanistic religion. Sometimes they represented a continuity with Neolithic and Paleolithic traditions or were transposed and reconceived as the bearers of complex social organization—waging warfare, presiding over the collection of taxes and controlling the redistribution of resources. The emergence of virtually every major civilization was associated in some way with goddess worship. While there may not be a single "Great Goddess" worshiped universally, the ubiquity of the phenomenon remains unbroken from Paleolithic times.

**CONTEMPORARY PATTERNS OF GODDESS WORSHIP.** The worship of female sacred images is found in some form or other throughout the world, except in those societies dominated by Islam or certain branches of Protestantism. Even in cultures heavily influenced by iconoclastic secular movements vestiges of goddess worship remain. For instance, Joanna Hubbs (in Preston, 1982, pp. 123–144) traces images of a divine feminine in contemporary Russian folk art, film, and literature, noting strong national themes that continued to thrive in the Soviet era.

Goddess worship is represented widely in the Hindu, Buddhist, and Shintō countries of Asia. Catholic Europe is replete with pilgrimage shrines devoted to the Virgin Mary; some of these are associated with earlier pagan goddesses,

while others represent a postindustrial flourishing of Marianism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even in North America, where Protestantism predominates, sacred female imagery is venerated in Catholic enclaves, like the large pilgrimage shrine devoted to Saint Anne de Beaupré in Quebec, Canada. In the United States a quarter of a million pilgrims a year visit the Shrine of the North American Martyrs (in Auriesville, New York), a composite pilgrimage site devoted to the Jesuit martyrs along with the American Indian Kateri Tekakwitha, “Lily of the Mohawks,” who is a candidate for canonization. Åke Hultkrantz (in Olson, 1983, p. 202) notes an extensive pattern of goddess worship among American Indians despite the widespread misconception that these religions are mostly oriented around male deities. Native American goddesses are often earth mothers linked to the cultivation of corn. Goddess worship played an important role in ancient Aztec, Maya, and Inca civilizations, traces of which continue to thrive in descendant Mesoamerican populations. The goddess Tonantsi remains today a vibrant focus of worship among the Nahuatl of Mexico (remnants of the great Toltec and Aztec civilizations). Here goddess worship expresses its typical syncretic pattern; images of Tonantsi are displayed on altars alongside Christian sacred images, like the statue of Joseph, who is considered by the Nahuatl to be a son of the goddess.

Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean a pattern of syncretism involving goddess worship is evident. Particularly widespread is the transformation of local Indian goddesses into Marian images. The best-known example of this syncretic expression is the famous Roman Catholic pilgrimage icon of the dark-skinned Virgin of Guadalupe, whose shrine was built on the site of a temple once dedicated to the Aztec goddess Tonantsi. Goddesses are prominent in some African tribal religions. Daniel F. McCall (in Preston, 1982, pp. 304–322) traces the diffusion of Neolithic goddesses from Southwest Asia to West Africa, where they became variously syncretized with local deities and were absorbed into Akan, Yoruba, and Igbo religious traditions.

**PATTERNS AND THEMES OF CONTEMPORARY GODDESS WORSHIP.** A comparative study of this vast array of types of goddess worship reveals certain common themes and distinct differences in the ways female deities are experienced. They are worshiped as nurturant or punishing mothers, protectors of community, images of national identity, sources for the resolution of human problems, symbols of virginity and purity, the origins of the fertility of crops and human beings, mediators between humans and male divinities, and sources for healing. None of these attributes is assigned to every goddess, although they frequently recapitulate one another and cluster together. The nurturing power, for instance, is associated often with the fertility of crops and conceived to be the source of community identity, but this pattern is not found everywhere. The following is a survey of common features identifiable with goddess worship throughout the world. While they are not universal characteristics of the phenomenon, these common features demonstrate how deeply rooted

goddess worship is within human experience. They each deserve special attention.

**Virginity.** In some parts of the world female deities are associated with virginity, purity, and perfect piety. This tradition is strongly represented in several religions. In Hinduism, Kannagi, goddess of chastity, symbolizes the sacredness of motherhood, which is linked to pure Tamil ethnic identity, language, justice, and politics. The Tamil concept of chastity connotes not asexuality but sacred power. Another example of the Hindu virginity theme is found in Nepal and India where Kumār *pūjā*, the worship of a premenstrual girl as the embodiment of a goddess, has been a tradition of some frequency until recent years. The combination of two seemingly contradictory themes—virginity and motherhood—was evident among ancient Near Eastern goddesses such as Inanna, Ishtar, and Anat. These goddesses were simultaneously chaste, promiscuous, nurturant, and warlike. While the Virgin Mary is never portrayed as being promiscuous, she sometimes embodies and exhibits a continuity with the attributes of these earlier goddesses; she is pious, intercedes, protects the community, bears children, is virginal, and enters from time into the world to do battle against the forces of evil. The apparent contradiction in the juxtaposition of virginity and motherhood dissolves if the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is taken to “reinforce the dogma that the Virgin’s child is the son of God” (Leach, 1966, p. 42). The divine mother is not a mere projection of human motherhood; female divinities give birth, but, unlike human mothers, they are rarely considered to be polluted by the event because of their supernatural status.

**Motherhood.** Another dimension of goddess worship that enjoys widespread representation is the role of nurturant female divinities as god bearers and sources of both carnal and spiritual life. Deities of the ancient Greek and Roman world gave birth to gods, occasionally by having intercourse with humans. The earlier pagan role of god bearer finds continuity in Mary’s capacity as *theotokos*, mother of the incarnate divinity; here Mary becomes a human partner in the unfolding nature of God. Consequently she is the supreme intercessor with God on behalf of individuals who seek her assistance. The nurturing power of the divine feminine has very ancient manifestations, extending back to Neolithic goddesses, whose theriomorphic form was the cow. The nurturing goddess is often associated with mother’s milk, which gives life and has strong curative powers. A. J. Weeramunda (in Preston, 1982, pp. 251–262) describes the milk-overflowing ceremony in Sri Lanka, which is a ritual means for bringing health, both to individuals and the Sinhala community. Here the goddess, symbolized by milk, stands for matrilineal kinship, mother’s blood, bodily health, and integration of community. This ancient theme is recapitulated in Roman, Greek, and Coptic tales of miracles worked by the Virgin Mary that refer to the milk from her breasts and the power of her tears to cure diseases.

**Wifehood.** Goddesses are depicted frequently as wives and consorts. Sometimes as consort she is subservient to her



partner. However, the goddess may be raised to the powerful position of queen and protectress. In India, each year Jagannātha is said to argue with his jealous wife Lakṣmī after he has returned from a visit to other deities in the neighborhood. Here Lakṣmī is portrayed as a nagging wife. However, the role of consort to a male deity may be only secondary for a goddess. Inanna, the supreme goddess of ancient Sumer, was queen of heaven and earth foremost; her role as wife to Dumuzi, the shepherd king, was less important. Inanna's power was evident in the prolonged Sumerian New Year celebration that culminated in the sacred marriage rite of the goddess Inanna to the reigning monarch, a rite designed to ensure the fertility of soil and womb.

**Protection.** One of the most widespread and significant roles of female deities is the tripartite function of protectress, monarch, and emblematic symbol. This pattern contrasts with gentler, more nurturant motifs like fertility and healing. The Chinese Buddhist goddess Guanyin is a popular domestic deity who is considered also to be a *bodhisattva* and celestial bureaucrat. The Virgin of Gaudalupe provides a famous example of the emblematic, integrative, and protective role of the sacred female image. During the fight for Mexican independence, loyalists carried the banner of the Virgin of Remedios while their opponents marched into battle with the banner of the Virgin of Guadalupe; soldiers polarized between the two shot at the banner of the “enemy” virgin. In many parts of the world female sacred images assume highly specialized protective qualities; the Daoist goddess Mazu is protectress of fishermen and sailors who face the dangerous storm-ridden Taiwanese Straits; in Spain Our Lady of Macarena is protectress of bullfighters; the goddess Amaterasu was the supreme national guardian deity of Japan. The Black Madonna of Częstochowa continues to be considered queen of Poland, her image is worn on badges by members of the Solidarity movement, and she is highly revered as a focus of pilgrimage by millions of Polish Catholics, including Pope John Paul II.

**Earth goddess.** Some scholars have attempted to link the gender of deities with natural phenomena, typically associating female deities with the earth and male deities with the sun. Although this pattern is widespread, there are several noteworthy exceptions. For instance, the ancient Egyptian goddess Nut was conceived to be a sky deity whose partner, Geb, was an earth god. According to C. Jouco Bleeker (in Olson, 1983, p. 31) Egyptian goddesses were not believed to be intrinsically earth mothers. The Japanese Shintō goddess Amaterasu, who is identified with the sun rather than earth, is another example. Thus, the general rule that goddesses are earth mothers is clearly not without exception. There is considerable evidence from ancient times that goddesses were associated with various natural phenomena, particularly the sea, the earth, and the phases of the moon. The many *pithas* associated with goddesses in India are linked to the earth. Each of these pilgrimage sites devoted to goddesses is considered to be a fragment of Sati's body (the dead wife

of Śiva) that fell to earth when her corpse was divided up by the gods to prevent Śiva from going mad with grief. In Orissa, in eastern India, women behave as though they are menstruating during the three days when the earth mother menstruates; nor is it uncommon in India for men to avoid tilling the fields when the goddess is menstruating.

**Fertility.** This leads to another widespread characteristic of goddesses; namely, their power over the fertility of soil, the fecundity of women, and a plentiful food supply. The ancient Neolithic city of Çatal Hüyük offers evidence for goddesses of the hunt and the abundance of crops. Alexander Marshack (1972, p. 355) speculates that the Neolithic goddess, as mistress of animals, is prefigured in female images from the Upper Paleolithic era where goddesses are displayed holding animal horns that have been stained with red ochre. Goddesses remain associated with the abundance of food even today. The Inuit (Eskimo) goddess Sedna is an example; if angered by sins committed in the community she withholds the supply of sea animals. According to Hultkrantz, the American Indian conception of the mother goddess as mistress of animals was changed by the introduction of horticulture about 2000 BCE, when she began to be identified with the cultivation of maize, beans, squash, gourds, and other crops. In Europe corn-mother images have been placed in fields by peasants for hundreds of years. This concern with the fertility of the earth is repeated in the widespread association of goddess worship with human fertility. Barren women in Europe, India, Africa, and many other parts of the world turn to female divinities to ask for aid in pregnancy. Here goddesses become a source of life so that the human community may be sustained. The ability to bear a large number of children is often a sign of status in agricultural societies where abundant human labor enhances the wealth of a family unit. Thus, some form of goddess worship for the purpose of bearing children is often widespread in these societies.

**Healing.** If goddesses can give life they can also take it away. They are frequently supplicated for curing diseases. The Indian goddess Śitalā not only cures smallpox, she is considered to be its source and requires elaborate rituals to cool her anger, which causes the disease. Thus, Hindu people both fear and adore her. The healing of wounds, prayers for health, and the quest for wholeness are so universally associated with goddess worship that this aspect requires special scholarly attention.

Why are female deities more frequently invoked than male deities for purposes of healing? The obvious answer is that goddesses tend to be attributed more often with overall nurturant qualities. They are the primary and original sources of life, like human mothers, and they consequently represent a reprieve from the more painful realities of death, decay, and disease. Yet, as been already observed, goddesses are linked also to the darker experiences in the human condition. There must be an even more subtle reason for the ubiquity of the healing function attributed to female deities. In traditions where the female is subordinate to the male (and

this is quite widespread), the worship of female sacred imagery represents an embracing of the whole field of symbolic potentials and the bringing together of opposites. While male deities are approached during the course of everyday life for the favors required to sustain a worldly existence, female divinities become the focus for ongoing sustenance of the individual or local family.

It is no accident that female deities are strongly represented in home rituals, in roadside shrines, and at local pilgrimage sites in many parts of the world. Surinder M. Bhardwaj (1973) has demonstrated this point for Hinduism, noting how pilgrimage shrines devoted to goddesses are visited by pilgrims more on a subregional basis for the purpose of curing diseases and asking for small favors, while pilgrimage to the shrines of male deities is almost always at the regional or national level and for the purpose of *darshan* (Skt., *darsana*; “sight of the deity”) rather than a quest for cures. Not only is the mother more accessible and nurturant than the more distant father, she is the completion of a process by which the individual embraces the whole religious field, including both gods and goddesses who constitute not separate but complementary parts of a unified whole.

**Violence and anger.** The ambivalence associated with certain types of goddess worship is characteristic of another major theme in this survey. Because female divinities can take away life, they sometimes display a vengeful, angry, and terrifying aspect. Such goddesses are identified with dark occult powers, sacrifice, and death. Usually the darker aspects of goddesses are consonant with nurturing qualities. The Balinese Hindu goddess Rangda, the witch, is an exception to this rule. She is linked to the terrible and fearful powers of divine origin. Rangda, whose name means “widow,” is associated with her husband’s death. She is constantly doing battle with her archenemy Barong the dragon. Elaborate ritual battles between Rangda and Barong are acted out in the famous trance dances that have attracted so many tourists to Bali.

Rangda is associated with evil and death, unlike her Hindu counterpart, Kālī, who has a more nurturant side. Kālī grants boons to those who respect her, but she is easily angered and must not be crossed. Her major role is to battle demons, whose skulls she wears in a garland around her neck. Like Rangda, Kālī is linked to death by her association with widowhood and graveyards. In a brilliant essay on the goddess Kālī, C. Mackenzie Brown (in Olson, 1983, pp. 110–123) notes that her bloody intoxication with rage and violence is not an indication that she is evil. Kālī is “mother of us all”—she gives birth, dazzles with her splendor, and consumes in the game of life. Both beneficent and terrible qualities are combined in the image of Kālī. Just as Hindu disease goddesses become angry and cause epidemics because people have neglected to worship them, Kālī rises up from time to time, bringing about a reign of chaos in the realm of human order. Thus, she evokes enormous fear and ambivalence among devotees. Such violent expressions of

goddess worship are found in many of the world’s religions. Artemis and Medusa evoked similar responses among the ancient Greeks. Also, the Middle Eastern goddesses Ishtar and Isis were considered to have a terrible aspect associated with the cosmic dark forces. The Aztec goddess Ilimatēcutli was one of several deities associated with death.

The theme of ambivalence is further elaborated in the concept of *vagina dentata* (“vagina with teeth”) where the womb of the earth goddess appears to have a devouring mouth. For example, when the goddess is angry, she who is the source of life can take it away as slayer of life. The vessel of procreation becomes a tomb. Death by absorption into the *vagina dentata* is not always a punishment for wrongdoing. Sometimes the devouring womb represents the necessary death of the old order to establish a new social and religious organization. In these cases, entry into the *vagina dentata* is a rite of initiation leading through a dangerous passage along a path toward new birth. The violent act of being swallowed by an earth deity is a tradition found in many American Indian religions, among the Australian Aborigines, in Hinduism, and in various parts of Africa and Polynesia.

One of the most interesting rites associated with goddess worship is the widespread but not universal practice of blood sacrifice, which is found in some form or other in most religious traditions. While sacrifice is not confined to the veneration of female deities, it is represented widely in goddess worship traditions. The sacrifice of blood, whether of human or animal origin, has been linked to goddess worship from ancient times. Sacrifice is widely celebrated in that brand of goddess worship where female deities are portrayed as angry, vengeful, or punishing. Kālī and Durgā in the Hindu pantheon are deities of this kind. In contemporary India large numbers of goats, buffalo, chickens, and other animals are offered to these deities to satisfy their thirst for blood and to display community allegiance. Even human sacrifice is reported to have been practiced as an expression of goddess worship. It is not difficult to understand why blood sacrifices should be associated with goddesses. Through sacrifice human beings create bonds between themselves and deities. Because people turn to goddesses to fulfill their needs, it is logical for sacrificial offerings to be made as expressions of thanksgiving. Despite the fact that blood sacrifice has been outlawed in many parts of the world, this custom continues to thrive, often underground. Sometimes various types of sacrificial substitutions are made in place of blood offerings, like the sacrifice of cucumbers, pumpkins, or money.

The many patterns of goddess worship evident throughout the world extend deep into antiquity and continue to thrive in many of the world’s religions even today. Goddesses played a prominent role in prehistoric cultures, throughout the development of agriculture, and in the emergence of urban life associated with the great traditional civilizations. They continue to be a fertile source of religious experience within the contemporary world. Goddesses are multivalent

sacred images best understood within their separate historical and cultural contexts.

**SEE ALSO** Agriculture; Feminine Sacrality; Lady of the Animals; Neolithic Religion; Paleolithic Religions; Prehistoric Religions; Shekhinah; Virgin Goddess.

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### GODDESS WORSHIP: GODDESS WORSHIP IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST

The diversity of female divinities within ancient Near Eastern societies makes it impossible to arrange them into neat categories, and any attempt to do so would inevitably involve a great deal of simplification. There are two main reasons for this: the complexity of the religious systems, and the long period over which they developed.

One could and should ask, with some legitimacy, why female deities are singled out for separate analysis. The answer to this lies, to a large degree, in the history of the discussions on goddesses. The topic has sometimes been covered with academic rigor, sometimes with highly charged ideological arguments. In the cultures investigated in this article, goddesses were inseparably integrated into a complex divine world. No single fundamental pattern universally repeats itself even in the cultures of the ancient Near East. The genders of the deities are culturally determined. For example, the sun was gendered male in Mesopotamia, while it was gendered female in the Levant and Anatolia. The “fickle” moon, universally assumed to be female, was gendered male throughout the ancient Near East. In Egypt the sky goddess belies the “Earth Goddess” stereotype. Thus, the goal of this article will be to identify the range of goddesses in particular societies and to comprehend their symbolic significance, rather than to delineate a rigid code that holds for all contexts. Unfortunately, the limited space allows only an introduction to the subject.

**THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE.** Reconstructions of ancient Near Eastern theologies are based on texts and artifacts, unevenly distributed in time and space. Data on goddesses can

be compiled from personal and place names, god lists and offering lists, seal inscriptions and votive dedications, mythological literary compositions and liturgical hymns, petitionary prayers and exorcistic incantations.

The literary and visual evidence are neither complementary nor comparable. Unfortunately, the texts have no pictures and the pictures rarely bear texts. In Mesopotamia, images of goddesses were clearly differentiated from mortal women by their divine horned headdresses. In other cultures, non-human features such as wings and animal attributes are indicators of divinity.

The most problematic artifactual material are figurines of nude women known from the Neolithic through all later periods and in all areas of the Near East, from Egypt to Iran. In prehistory, there are no written records to explain these mute figurines, but they are commonly assumed to be images of the goddess and/or images for fertility magic. Their exaggerated hips and breasts could also be understood as stylized conventions for rendering ideal feminine beauty. No evidence exists to identify the typical figurine with any major goddess. On the rare occasions that goddesses were depicted naked, they can be distinguished by context, stance, or attribute.

The meaning of figurines is not something enshrined in them but something that people confer on them, changing with time and context. Figurines can be considered both as “images of” human form and as “images for” important human concerns. Written records and anthropological evidence suggest numerous possible functions and meanings for these miniature human representations. Magical ritual texts specify how the figurines of a sick person are to be used during healing rituals. In Tanzania, adolescent boys are shown figurines of pregnant women during rites of initiation into adulthood. Had such images been found out of context, this type of figurine could easily have been identified as a “goddess” rather than as a symbolic device that plays a role in the formation of male identity.

There is an immense range of possible uses for figurines. They may have been cult figures, focal points of veneration in a private household shrine or public chapel. Conversely, figurines found in temples may well have been votive offerings given by worshippers to the deity, expressing their donors’ fervent piety, heartfelt thankfulness, or heartfelt entreaty. Figurines discovered in temple depositories may have been images created as part of a temple ritual.

Outside the temple, figurines were used in magic rituals to prevent or produce certain situations or states, such as ensuring fertility or good luck, warding off evil, curing illness, or causing harm to others. In these situations, the figurines might serve as talismans, amulets, fetishes, or therapeutic objects. These varied functions are known from many texts recording charms, incantations, and descriptive rituals.

On a more personal level, figurines might be markers of special times such as birthing or rebirthing, or periods of

transition or of other time-based processes such as female menstrual cycles. Figurines were employed as educational aids and teaching figures, used in initiation or puberty rites to illustrate sexual topics for adolescents of both sexes. Diminutive anthropomorphic images were also undoubtedly put to use as toys, in particular as dolls. They could also be adapted to illustrate songs, epics, or myths.

Figurines may have been placed in graves as part of burial rites to counteract the harmful effects of the ghost of the dead, as substitutes for the dead person's body in the next world, as images of a protective deity who guided the deceased to the underworld, or perhaps as favorite possessions to be enjoyed by the dead in the afterlife.

The functions listed above cover only part of the spectrum of possibilities, and a single figurine may have served more than one of these functions. Given the range of types, sizes, and potential uses of figurines, it is clear that no single explanation could ever account for them all.

**PREHISTORIC EVIDENCE OF FEMALE DIVINITIES (10,000–4000 BCE).** Female figurines with large stomachs and pendulous breasts from the European Upper Paleolithic and Neolithic periods (c. 40,000 to 5,000 years ago) are claimed to provide evidence of a homogeneous European prehistoric religion centered on the “Great Goddess,” whose image is reflected in these figurines. Many scholars have interpreted these figurines as depicting pregnant and/or breast-feeding women, and thus signifying fertility. This speculative interpretation was subsequently applied to the ancient Near East, where the first stone figures known were found in the Jordan Valley, on the shores of the Dead Sea, and around Mount Carmel (c. 10,000 BCE). In the ensuing period, crude female figurines of clay and stone appear at Mureybet, on the upper Euphrates (8000–7600 BCE). Anthropomorphic and zoomorphic examples occur in central Anatolia (8000–7000 BCE) and in the Valley of the Yarmuk River (late 7000–early 6000 BCE). Yarmukian anthropomorphic representations include those made of clay and of river pebbles, both detailed and schematic, some with cowry-like eyes and massive thighs but minimal breasts. On the Tigris in Mesopotamia, 6000 BCE graves (especially those of infants) have yielded female alabaster statuettes while ordinary settlement debris contained clay figurines, both human and animal. The alabaster statuettes are carved schematically with no accentuation of any female anatomical sexual parts. Disparate clay figurines are found at 6000 BCE sites in Mesopotamia and on somewhat earlier Zagros sites such as Jarmo. Farther east, from the Bakhtaran region in Iran, female figurines with tall necks, no facial features, and bulging breasts and thighs were uncovered in the excavations of Ganj Dareh and Tepe Sarab. Halaftian sites in northern Syria and northern Mesopotamia (5000 BCE) produced a variety of figurines, of which the most famous are the painted terra-cottas of seated women with pinched heads, long necks, arms encircling large breasts, and fat, bent legs lacking feet. The significance of these figurines is difficult to explain because their remarkable diversity and

varied places of discovery precludes any single explanation of their purpose. Some seem to be site-specific, reflecting local religious customs, such as the alabaster statuettes from Tell es-Sawwan.

One particular site (and its interpretation) has provided the basis for the belief in the worship of a universal monolithic “Mother Goddess”—the site of Early Neolithic Çatal Hüyük in south-central Anatolia, where certain female figurines are portrayed with large stomachs and pendulous breasts similar to the European prehistoric examples. In 1993, excavations began again at the site, now seen not as distinctive but within the context of a range of settlements from Early Neolithic Çayönü in southeastern Anatolia to Late Neolithic Hacilar in western central Anatolia.

**GODDESSES OF MESOPOTAMIA.** For over three millennia, the religious life of Mesopotamia was presided over by thousands of deities worshipped by a mixed population of Sumerians, Akkadians, Amorites, Kassites, and Arameans. A continual process of reinterpretation and syncretism, mutation and fossilization, fusion and fission generated a Mesopotamian religion that was a complex, multilayered accumulation.

It has often been remarked that female deities dominated early Mesopotamian religion. Major cities dedicated to goddesses were: Uruk and Zabalam, dedicated to Inanna (goddess of love, war, and sexuality), Eresh, dedicated to Nidaba (goddess of grain and writing), Shuruppak, dedicated to Sud (daughter of Nidaba, perhaps related to water and purification), Kesh and Nutur, dedicated to Ninhursaga (goddess of birthing), and Lagash, dedicated to Gatumdug (Mother of Lagash). However, other cities of equal rank had male tutelary deities.

In the second millennium, previously important cities in the lower stretches of southern Mesopotamia were abandoned for political, demographic, and perhaps ecological reasons. As the earlier cult centers began to lose their priority, the religious center of Nippur gained by their loss. In Nippur, Ninlil assumed the prerogatives of many of the other goddesses. This process was mythologized: Sud of Shuruppak was equated with Ninlil of Nippur through marriage with the god Enlil. When Sud became the bride of Enlil, she was renamed Ninlil. Once she was identified with Ninlil, she disappeared for all practical purposes from the Mesopotamian religious scene. Thus, the decline in the number of goddesses as city patrons between the third and second millennia has been explained as due to the decline of the cities of lower Mesopotamia. Similarly, the rise of northern cities brought their gods into prominence, such as Babylon and its god Marduk.

Other elements of nature, such as the earth, played a minor role in ancient Near East mythology. The primal female elemental at the beginning of time was water—the mingling of the waters was considered the source of life. The goddess of subterranean waters, Namma, was the engenderer of all—the heaven, the earth, and the gods.



The “mother goddesses” in Mesopotamia were birthing mother figures. The emblem of the “mother goddess” was the omega-shaped uterus rather than a child in her arms. The interchange of Ninhursaga (Lady of the Foothills), Nintur (Lady Birth-hut), Ninmah (Great Lady), and other “mother-goddess” figures becomes increasingly common as time passes.

The expected functions of “mother goddesses” regarding other aspects of human and animal life were in the hands of diverse goddesses and gods. The fish and water-fowl goddess Nanshe was better known for her association with divination, dreams, and oracles. She was also an administrator, responsible for checking weights and measures, protecting the weak, meting out justice, and punishing immoral acts. While Ninurta (the god of agriculture) was responsible for the fertility of the land, grain goddesses (of which Nidaba was the most prominent) were accountable for the growth of the grain. She was also in charge of the scribal arts, including accounting and surveying.

Goddesses occupied the same sex roles in the divine family as in the human family: mothers, wives, brides, sisters, and daughters. Pronounced complementarity existed between the divine genders, especially in a brother-sister relationship. The archetypical sister was Geshtinanna (Grapevine of Heaven), a paragon of sisterly devotion. She sheltered, mourned, and substituted for her brother Dumuzi in the netherworld. She played a prominent role as a singer of dirges and was associated with singing and music in general, and she became the recorder of the gods, particularly of the netherworld in the second and first millennia.

Goddesses were also responsible for clothing manufacture, beer brewing, the education of children, and doctoring the sick. Healing was always in the hands of the goddesses of medicine throughout the millennia, while pestilence and destruction were in the hands of the gods.

Inanna (in Sumerian, Ishtar in Akkadian) was the most revered and popular goddess of ancient Mesopotamia, and she has consequently served as a focus for persons seeking to revive “goddess” worship. Inanna first appears in the late fourth millennium as the patron deity of the city of Uruk, where she represented the numen of the central storehouse.

Even at this period, Inanna appears in various manifestations, each of which has a separate temple and cult. Two of her manifestations, “Morning” and “Evening,” describe the goddess as the planet Venus, in the morning and in the evening sky. In later texts, as Morning Star, Venus was female; as Evening Star, male. The two aspects corresponded to the double character of Inanna/Ishtar as goddess of love and war. She was viewed as a beautiful goddess of love who ruled the day and as a bearded goddess of war who ruled the night. Even in her male role, she never becomes fully male, but seems to be a female with male gender characteristics, thus providing a powerful symbol of the ambiguities of pure sexuality.

Despite her masculine gender roles, she was conceived as the epitome of femininity. She was the youthful goddess of love, and literary compositions relate the romance of Inanna and Dumuzi. Paradoxically, some compositions extol her as a timid virgin while others exalt her as a licentious harlot. In love poetry, she manifests her eroticism and celebrates sensuality.

In the late fourth millennium, there existed a pan-Mesopotamian league centered on Uruk and its deity Inanna. The importation of Inanna into every community, and her absorption of local female divinities of various character, resulted in one mega-female divinity. In addition to this process of syncretism, her character became more ambiguous as the result of further fusion and fission. Inanna and her Semitic counterpart Ishtar had partly merged by the mid-third millennium. Simultaneously with this fusion, different goddesses split off from this amalgam. At the end of the third millennium, the goddess Nanaya appeared in Uruk as the goddess of love. Inanna shared her aspect as Venus with Ninsianna, the “red lady of heaven,” who executed divine judgments.

The Canonical Temple List assigns the largest number of temples to various manifestations of Ishtar. These goddesses were understood as both one goddess and as many. They were hypostases of a single divine archetype, a situation similar to the proliferation of the various Zeus figures of classical antiquity or the local manifestations of the Virgin in Catholic belief.

The second millennium brought changes in the theological system. Gradual reduction of the roles played by female divinities, as well as domination by divine male spouses, curtailed their power of independent action. They therefore assumed an increasingly mediatory function between the human world and the masculinized divine world. Most of the goddesses popular in the third millennium continued to be worshipped but commonly under the names of their Akkadian counterparts.

With the rise of Babylon and its god Marduk to supreme dominion of the divine and human worlds, Sumerian and Akkadian divinities, both male and female, were relegated to lower positions in the hierarchy.

**GODDESSES OF IRAN.** Iran’s vast terrain is divided into areas of relatively isolated local cultures. The best known is Elam, in southwestern Iran. Yet, it is difficult to say anything certain about Elamite deities since little is known about Elamite mythology and the only sources of information are royal inscriptions.

The major goddesses were: Pinengir, Kiririsha, Narunde, and Manzat. In a treaty from the third millennium invoking the gods of Elam, the goddess Pinengir appears in first place as the highest deity of the Elamite pantheon. Despite assumptions concerning her being a mother goddess, nothing is known about her character until the Middle Elamite period (latter part of the second millennium) when

not only a temple but also an “inn” was dedicated to her. The latter suggests that Pinengir was responsible for love and sex life. During the second millennium on the coast of the Persian Gulf, another goddess, Kiririsha (Great Lady), occurs. Apparently, from Middle Elamite times, two separate deities existed, both designated “mistress of the sky,” “mother of the gods,” and “great consort.” Kiririsha seems also to have been responsible for combat and battle, judging by her votive offerings of battle axes.

Narunde, the sister of the seven good demons, is found only in the third millennium. She was a goddess of victory, who fought against the seven evil demons. Manzat (Rainbow) was the wife of Simut, god of Elam, and her function may have been to protect women as votive offerings of female figurines were found in her temple.

In the latter part of the second millennium, Medes and Persians migrated from the Asian steppes onto the Iranian plateau. Among the Iranian deities, one goddess alone is prominent: Ardivi Sura Anahita. She was the goddess of all the waters upon the earth and the source of the cosmic ocean. She was regarded as the source of life, purifying the seed of all males and the wombs of all females. Because of her connection with life, warriors in battle prayed to her for survival and victory.

**GODDESSES OF ANATOLIA.** In Anatolia, peoples of different languages and cultures coexisted producing a heterogeneous polytheistic system—an amalgam of Hattic, Hittite, Luwian, and Hurrian traditions with Syrian and Mesopotamian influences. It is difficult to determine the original character of the gods of the Hattic people, who preceded the Hittites on the central Anatolian plain, since knowledge of these gods has been transmitted through Hittite traditions. The Hittites were an Indo-European people who have left numerous texts dealing with religious practice and theology. Another Indo-European group, the Luwians, resided in southwestern Anatolia. The Hurrians were speakers of a Caucasoid language whose influence expanded throughout Syria and Anatolia in the mid-second millennium.

As the Hittite kingdom expanded, the cults of the various peoples of Anatolia, all of whom had their own religious traditions and local gods, were incorporated into the Hittite system. Interference between these theological systems resulted at times in gender change: the male Hattic/Hittite ruler of the underworld Lelwani became female under Hurrian influence and was identified with the Hurrian goddess of the underworld, Allani. The Hattic goddess Kait, the deity of vegetation, became the Hittite god Halki (Grain).

Important goddesses of the Hattic pantheon were the two sun-goddesses, the sun-goddess of the sky, Wurunshemu, the consort of storm-god, and the sun-goddess of the earth (or the netherworld). The name of the sun-goddess of the earth in both Hattic and Hittite is unknown while in late Hittite texts she was referred to by the Hurrian designation Allani. Next in importance was Inar (Hittite: Inara), a young

warlike goddess, the protective deity of the land. In addition to being a goddess of the wild animals, she was said to have power over fields and floods.

At the head of the Hittite pantheon were the storm-god and the sun-goddess of Arinna, identified with Hattic Wurunshemu. A mother goddess, Hannahanna (Grandmother), was a wise old woman, skilled in healing and childbirth, whose advice was regularly sought by other gods in the old Hittite vanishing god myths. Two important groups of goddesses were the Gulsh(esh) goddesses of fate and the mother goddesses. Kamrushepa, the Luwian goddess of healing, was responsible for the curing of earthly and heavenly diseases and illnesses.

Deities of Hurrian origin were mostly worshipped in Kizzuwatna (southern Anatolia) during the Hittite Empire period. In the sanctuary at Yazilikaya, a procession of the chief divinities of the Hurrianized Hittite pantheon was carved on its walls: one procession of gods on the western wall and another procession of goddesses on the eastern, with the principal deities meeting in the center. This monument provides an affirmation of the symmetry and equal importance of the gods and goddesses. Leading the goddesses was Hapat, the spouse of the storm-god Teshup, with their son, Sharruma, and daughter, Allanzu. From her images together with her son, she is thought to be a mother goddess and generally bears the title “the Lady, Queen of Heaven.” Shaushka, the bellicose and beautiful sister of the storm-god Teshup, appears twice, among both the gods and the goddesses. It is assumed that she had a bisexual nature, with both male and female characteristics and attributes.

**GODDESSES OF THE LEVANT.** Deities from a variety of backgrounds were venerated in the Levant: Syrian, West Semitic (Amorite, Canaanite), Hurrian, Akkadian, and Sumerian. In the second half of the second millennium, mythological and ritual compositions found at the site of Ugarit (modern Ras Shamra) on the Levantine coast provide a window into Canaanite theology. The principal Ugaritic goddesses were: Athirat (Ashratu, Asherah), Anat, and Athtart (Ashtart[e]).

The goddess Athirat appears for the first time as Ashrata in Amorite personal names in Mesopotamia during the first half of the second millennium BCE and sporadically in later Mesopotamian sources. In the latter half of the millennium, this goddess occurs in texts from Ugarit, Akhetaten (modern Amarna) in middle Egypt, and Taanach in northern Israel while in the first millennium her worship was limited to sites in southern Judah, Philistia, and northern Sinai, and to written references from the Bible. Nevertheless, she was invoked in one Phoenician magical plaque found in the Aramean city of Hadatu (modern Arslan Tash).

In Ugarit, this goddess appears as *’atrt* (or Athirat). In the mythological texts, she was the wife to the god El and mother to his seventy sons. She held the title “progenitress of the gods” and was associated with the fecund sea.

In the Bible, Asherah occurs most frequently as a cultic symbol of the divinity (wooden pole or tree), as in *Deuteron-*

omy 16:21, and occasionally as the goddess herself. She was often associated with Baal, as in *1 Kings* 18:19, when Elijah rails against four hundred and fifty prophets of Baal and four hundred prophets of Asherah.

Evidence of the importance of Asherah in the popular religion of the region of southern Judah is found in the controversial inscriptions on the pithoi vessels at Kuntillet Ajrud. One inscription reads: "I bless you by YHWH of Samaria and his asherah."

The two deities Anat ('nt) and Ashtart ('štrrt, Greek form: Astarte) share similar characteristics. Both were beautiful maidens and doughty warriors, and both were depicted as smiting goddesses, brandishing weapons above their heads and holding a shield and spear. After their first appearance in Syria, the worship of these two goddesses spread throughout Egypt and the Levant. Both goddesses were venerated in Egypt: at Deir el-Medineh, the craftsmen's village in Upper Egypt, the workers set up reliefs in their honor, while an Ashtart sanctuary was discovered at Pi-Ramesses, the northern capital in Lower Egypt. Both Anat and Ashtart survive in formal lists of Egyptian gods well into Roman times. In the first millennium BCE, Ashtart was the chief deity of the Phoenician city of Tyre (in modern Lebanon) and took precedence over Anat, although the latter continued to appear sporadically in dedications from as far afield as Lower Egypt. Both goddesses were invoked in the treaty made by the Assyrian king Esarhaddon with the king of Tyre.

Although these two goddesses were similar in character, they had different origins. The name Anat goes back to Hanat, the *theos eponymous* of the Amorite Hanean tribesmen in Syria, in the early second millennium. The cult of Anat was first attested in Egypt in the late Middle Kingdom (eighteenth century BCE). As the daughter of the sun-god Re and the wife of the war-god Seth, Anat acted as a mediator between the two. In late second-millennium Ugaritic myths, she was the sister of the storm god Baal, and again a mediator between him and the great god El. She was the mistress of animals, both protectress and huntress, as well as midwife at both animal and human births. She was pictured as a young maiden without children, swift as a bird and fierce as a lioness. Her proficiency in battle was legendary. The Baal myth tells of her bellicose attacks on men and divinities, as well as her help in placatory mediation for the building of Baal's palace. Anat searches for Baal in the realm of Mot (Death), and with the help of the sun-goddess Shapsu she finds and buries him and finally revives him by vanquishing Mot.

Ashtart epitomized the fury of battle and probably had astral associations with the planet Venus. In Emar (on the bend of the Euphrates River), one of her manifestations was Ashtart-of-Battle. In Egypt, she was addressed as "Lady of the Battle, goddess of the Asians." In the Phoenician cities of Tyre and Sidon during the first millennium, she was the leading goddess. In the Bible, Ashtart appears both in singular and plural forms: 'ashtoret and 'ashtorot. The Bible cites her worship as widespread among the original inhabitants of

Canaan and associates her with fertility and love rather than warfare.

From this review, it can be seen clearly that none of these major goddesses were "fertility" goddesses and that there were no "fertility" cults in ancient Canaan. The deities responsible for fertility were male. Baal was responsible for the fertility of the land and El for the fertility of human beings.

**GODDESSES OF EGYPT.** As in the other regions of the ancient Near East, the goddesses of Egypt can be described as local deities, although several local deities were worshipped throughout Egypt, from the beginning of the historical period onward.

According to the Heliopolitan cosmogony, the creator god Atum (He who makes/is complete), appears spontaneously in the waters of the god Nun. He engendered from himself the next generation of deities: the male Shu, the preserving force of dry air, and the female Tefnut, the corrosive force of moisture. Atum was said to have produced the pair by masturbation, by his personified feminine hand, or by a female complement, Iusaas ("She comes and grows great"). Shu and Tefnut bore the earth god Geb and the sky goddess Nut. Geb and Nut produced two more pairs of gods and goddesses: the gods Osiris and Seth and their respective wives and sisters Isis and Nephthys. One myth tells of the conflict between the two brothers Osiris and Seth. It describes how Seth, envious of his brother Osiris, drowned him and cut his body into pieces. However, Isis and Nephthys managed to collect the parts of Osiris' dismembered body. With her extraordinary magical powers, Isis then revived her husband-brother, was impregnated by him, and later gave birth to Horus.

The three goddesses Nut, Isis, and Nephthys were worshipped as the most important goddesses of Egypt. The sky-goddess Nut was the regenerative mother, the mother of the deceased king (and thus a mortuary goddess). She was also the mother of the solar deity Re who traveled by boat through the night sky within the body of the goddess. At dawn the god was reborn from between the thighs of the goddess in the East.

Isis was the primary symbol of the devoted mother and wife; she was referred to as "the Savior" and "Great of Magic," and she was entreated for protection, particularly on behalf of women and children. Representations of Isis suckling the infant Horus in her arms illustrate her role as the protective goddess-mother.

Although Nephthys (Mistress of the House) was the wife-sister of the god Seth, her loyalty to Osiris, her husband's opponent, earned her a similar position in the funerary cult to that of her sister Isis. Like Isis, she was regarded as the savior and protector of Osiris, and consequently of every dead person. Nephthys also played the role of wet nurse, despite not being able to give birth to children of her own.

Two other notable goddesses were Neith and Hathor. The history of Neith begins with the earliest history of Egypt, when she had a close, protective relationship with the king and queens. Her emblems, the double bow and crossed arrows, indicate her role as huntress. Once the most prominent goddess, her cult faded until the Late Period of ancient Egypt. In the Greco-Roman period she came to be portrayed as a primordial creator deity.

In the latter part of the Egyptian Old Kingdom, the goddess Hathor of Dendera came to the fore. Her complex nature is reflected in her numerous and diverse roles, her different forms, and her many cult centers. Hathor appeared as a woman, a cow, a falcon, “Lady of the Sycamore Tree,” a fiery *uraeus* (the cobra), and a savage lioness. Her name, which means “House of Horus,” identifies her as the mother of the king (who was identified with Horus), and is associated with her ancient role as the celestial cow and mother of the sun. Hathor was also the beautiful and sensual goddess of love, sexuality, joy, dance, and music.

Taweret (the Great One) was one of the most popular deities, associated with pregnancy and childbirth. She was usually represented as a composite being, with the body and head of a hippopotamus, the paws of a lion, and the tail of a crocodile, or a complete crocodile on her back. She was shown standing on her hind legs; her swollen abdomen and pendulous breasts indicate her association with pregnancy and nursing. The goddess Maat represents the perfect, stable order of existence which governs every aspect of the world from the laws of nature to the rules of human social life.

Clearly, there is no one gender role incorporated by these goddesses, each of whom exhibit an amazing amount of individuality.

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JOAN GOODNICK WESTENHOLZ (2005)

## GODDESS WORSHIP: GODDESS WORSHIP IN THE HELLENISTIC WORLD

After Johann G. Droysen’s famous *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (1833–1843; 1877–1878), the term *Hellenism* was increasingly used to qualify a crucial period in the history of the ancient Mediterranean world. Droysen considered the exploits of Alexander the Great (356–323 BCE) as a crucial turning point in the politico-cultural history of the vast geographical area around the Mediterranean and saw the year of his death as the beginning of a new historical cycle. This cycle started with the progressive fragmentation of the supranational empire set up by the Alexander in the thirteen years of his dazzling career (336–323 BCE) and the creation of new kingdoms by his generals, the Diadochi, and ended with the Roman conquest of Egypt after the Battle of Actium (31 BCE). By reducing the ancient kingdom of the Pharaohs (subsequently inherited by the Ptolemies) into a Roman province (30 BCE), the new power of Rome, soon itself at the head of an empire, concluded its gradual conquest of the kingdoms of ancient Macedonian origin.

**THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD.** Hellenism covers a wide period: three centuries of intense political, military, social, economic, and religious events that influenced in various ways all the peoples of the Mediterranean. In the East, in particular, it affected the kingdoms that had been formed from the division of lands conquered by Alexander. However, this circumscribed definition is now considered inadequate, and the scope of Hellenism extends to cover the entire time span of the Roman Empire until its transformation into a Christian Empire at the end of the fourth century. At this time bloody sacrifices were prohibited by Theodosius (391 CE), with the aim of putting an end to the traditional cults of the Mediterranean world. The antipagan legislation of the Christian emperors took effect gradually and over a long period of time, and polytheistic religious traditions persisted, albeit to a lesser extent, in many regions of this vast geographical area for at least another two centuries. It was however the clear sign of a deep cultural and religious transformation that brought to a close the long and variegated historical period known as Hellenism. A distinction between early and late Hellenism can be identified, respectively, as the ancient Droysenian phase and that of Imperial Rome—each have particular aspects while also being part of an historical continuum.

**Hellenistic culture.** Unlike the Greek etymon *hellenismos*, which defines Greek as opposed to those different than Greeks (represented by the “barbarians”; i.e., all non-Greeks), after Droysen the term *Hellenism*—insofar as it refers to the last three centuries before the Christian era—was

used to express the complex cultural physiognomy of that age, with its repercussions in subsequent centuries. This was the result of Greek elements meeting and amalgamating to various extents with the traditions of those peoples—above all Asian, but also Western—who came into direct contact with them. The first and most evident consequence of the *gesta* of Alexander the Great, who had created an immense supranational empire and modeled the subsequent structure of Hellenistic kingdoms, was in fact the intense movement of people that, although mainly for military and commercial purposes, acted as a vehicle of wide-ranging cultural exchange and the source of profound changes also on a religious level.

Extremely significant differences existed on the social, economic, and institutional levels, between the nations of the eastern Mediterranean, where monarchic Hellenistic states lived alongside independently ruled Greek cities and their leagues. However, it is possible to talk of Hellenism as a sufficiently homogeneous cultural entity, based on a common language (the Greek of the *koine* set up on the basis of the Attic dialect) and characterized by common spiritual and intellectual traits. The religious component is an essential part of this culture, and here also there is significant homogeneity, albeit with local and national variety. This homogeneity is the result of various kinds of interference between the Greek religion and that of the peoples with which it came into contact. In other words, in religious terms the Hellenistic period was characterized by a phenomenon that, although foreshadowed and rooted in the archaic and Classical periods, now acquired such large proportions that it became a distinguishing feature of an entire phase in the history of Mediterranean civilization.

A distinction should also be made between the situation in the western Mediterranean and of the oriental regions, where Hellenism penetrated deeply into the local humus and from which in turn it sucked vital nutrients. Here, alongside peoples only marginally touched by Greek expansion in the early Hellenistic period, there were entire regions such as Magna Graecia and Sicily, with a Greek tradition dating back to the seventh and eighth centuries BCE, and Etruria, with centuries of contact with Greece and the East. For its part, during its gradual expansion through the peninsula, Rome was receptive to Hellenic influence already in the monarchic age, whereas the Classical period brought direct contact with the poleis of continental Greece. Moreover, with the eastward expansion of the Roman Republic, the Hellenistic period witnessed the large-scale Hellenization of the cultural and religious life of the Urbs, which would continue throughout the life of the Empire.

**Fundamental tendencies of Hellenism.** Although tending to be linked primarily to tradition, the dialectic connection between various components of a cultural system, beliefs, and cults nevertheless influence change in a community's socio-political and economic life. Two fundamental tendencies run through Hellenistic culture: (1) cosmopolitan

open-mindedness and the preeminence of the individual (i.e., the overcoming of the particularistic barriers of both the polis and the wider national aggregate) and (2) the initiative of the individual who, by making new life choices, may reject traditional patterns and participate independently in the many activities available in a supranational panorama. In this situation the individual often looks for new forms of aggregation, including from a religious point of view, and may join groups, communities, and associations that in foreign lands practice the cult of one or another deity (of the nation of provenience or of local deities) encountered by immigrants in their new home. In the case of the indigenous populations, certain divine figures are sometimes the object of particular veneration by groups of worshippers, independent of public or city traditions, and thus fuels dynamic forms of personal religion.

The phenomenon of religious contacts and influences is an almost structural factor in the history of Mediterranean peoples as far back as the observation of history allows. For the Greeks, it represented an important aspect of their colonial experience in the East and West, in which they took their own gods and came into contact with those of the local populations. However, it assumed particular relevance in the Hellenistic period and, subsequently, under the Roman Empire. The Greeks and almost all the peoples of the Near East and the West had in fact ethnic religious traditions whose origins and development were contemporaneous to the origins and developments of the communities in which they originated, where they were perceived as an essential component of cultural identity, together with language and the socio-economic and political framework. Because they are related to highly civilized peoples, the respective religious contexts may be defined as national rather than ethnic because they have (to varying extents) common constants and tendencies that, as in the case of the numerous Greek poleis, give homogeneity to the religious life of the individual ethnic group and go beyond local identities. The national religions of the ancient Mediterranean world were, then, the heritage of individual peoples, mutually acknowledged and cohabiting without intolerance or exclusivism.

An essential component of the picture is the structure of such religious traditions, which, with the exceptions already mentioned, may all in various ways be defined as polytheistic, implying the belief as reflected in ritual praxis in a series of superhuman entities with more or less clearly defined personalities. These divine figures possess particular attributes and prerogatives and are often connected with the various cosmic departments whose working they ensure and with human institutions over whose foundation they presided and of which they are now protectors. Greek polytheism may be defined as a dynastic-departmental religious structure, because the various deities (especially the main ones) are linked by bonds of parentage and endowed with power over the various spheres of cosmic and human life.

As contact intensified in the early Hellenistic period and, subsequently, in the Imperial Roman period, the struc-

tural similarities between the religious traditions of Mediterranean peoples made possible the phenomenon of religious cosmopolitanism that characterizes the period. In fact, certain cults (i.e., mythical–ritual complexes gravitating around single deities or divine “families”) spread progressive beyond their respective national boundaries, as is the case of the oriental cults that spread through Greece and the West. At the same time, Greek religion penetrated extensively into the East, in part superimposing itself on local systems and in part cohabiting with them, giving the religious life of the great Eastern cities—whether newly founded or of ancient origins—a more or less marked but in any case decisive Hellenic stamp. With the affirmation of the power of Rome, numerous figures of the Roman pantheon also began to be worshiped under various guises by the peoples of the Mediterranean and were found to be susceptible to forms of convergence or identification with local deities.

**METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES.** Before examining the Goddess worship in the Hellenistic World, two preliminary difficulties need to be discussed. The first regards the polytheistic structure of the religious contexts in question, in which each figure acts and functions with specific attributes and prerogatives yet also within a complex web of relationships involving the other superhuman entities—particularly those to which they are linked due to having similar or contrasting functions. This web implies a strongly anthropomorphic gender differentiation, which is translated into a distinction between gods and goddesses (i.e., in the creation of a male and female divine world). The question, as posed by Nicole Loraux (1990), then becomes “what is a goddess?”—an inquiry that can be related to the Greek pantheon as well as similar Mediterranean religious contexts.

When facing the problem of the significance of female divine figures within the religious systems of a Hellenistic milieu, the structural dialectic of the relations operating among all their components and, in particular, between the two gender dimensions must be taken into full consideration. The focus on the various female presences should not overshadow the individual basic reality of religious contexts in which the divine world is articulated according to the complementary functions and prerogatives of these two dimensions.

The second difficulty regards the very notion of Hellenism assumed as the parameter of reference for the theme under discussion. As mentioned previously, this term combines a time span that current historical research extends significantly beyond the limits of Droysen’s formula with an extremely wide-ranging spatial dimension, enveloping all the cultures of the Mediterranean area that in various ways came into contact with Greek culture. It follows that, in principle, the entire chronological and cultural framework in question must be examined to identify the personality and role at least of its main female figures, who embody the spiritual and religious needs that the worshipers—both men and women—in turn express through the prerogatives and the attributes with

which they create the goddesses’ images and organize their cult. Additionally, all the religious contexts converging in this vast geographical area maintained their ancestral structures and, despite the more or less profound changes caused by the politico-military and socio-economic events of the age, fundamentally conserved the beliefs and worship practices consolidated by tradition. Each of the divine figures of the numerous national pantheons had by now assumed universally recognizable stable and defined prerogatives and attributes, so a full description would require the examination of the deity’s entire history, right back to the most ancient sources.

Despite these reservations, we may try to identify the peculiarities of certain main female divine figures that occupied a dominant role in the collective religious imagination of early and late Hellenism. The distinguishing traits of this wide historical time span were individualism and cosmopolitanism—factors able to trigger processes of confluence and cultural homogenization. Also, on a religious level, it is legitimate to focus attention on those figures and their mythical–ritual systems that were involved in similar processes, grouping aspects and prerogatives of similar figures from other cultural contexts around an original national identity. These are not phenomena of syncretism (a widely abused term that is contested by religious historians) but authentically creative processes, whereby certain aspects of a deity’s defining functions and attributes were selected and developed so that the deity drew to itself other divine figures with similar functions but from different historico-cultural contexts.

**GREEK ORIGINAL TRAITS IN GODDESS WORSHIP.** In this process, as in other components of the Hellenistic cultural amalgam, a predominant and guiding role was played by the Greek religious tradition, in which there were a number of great goddesses with a long history (perpetuated by various sources of nourishment) and whose origins were often unclear (e.g., Mediterranean, Indo-European, Near Eastern), but which had by now assumed strong polyhedral identities. Figures included Hera, bride of the great Zeus, whose distinguishing feature is her link with marriage; Athena, the *parthenos* (never a child, always a virgin) who emerged intact and motherless from the head of Zeus as a warrior and patron of the arts, protectress of the polis, and civilizing deity; Artemis, the virgin huntress, mistress of the animals (*potnia therōn*), and protectress of the critical passages of human life from birth to male and female initiations; and, lastly, Aphrodite. She represented the very force of sexual desire and, according to Hesiodic tradition, was born before the other gods of Olympus from the marine foam fertilized by the member of Uranus and mutilated by his son Cronus to open the cosmic space necessary for the creation of gods and men. This figure undoubtedly had oriental connections in contiguity and probably in continuity with the Babylonian and Phoenician Astarte (perhaps via the Cypriot culture; Kypris is already a typical Homeric name given to her) and also brings together warlike aspects and a bisexual component.



In the Hellenistic period, Aphrodite once more takes forceful possession of those far-off roots, moreover never forgotten, to become associated and identified with numerous goddesses of Near Eastern pantheons. Already in the archaic and Classical periods, those roots were expressed, amongst other ways, in the typical love–death relationship with Adonis, whose typological analogies and historical connections with the Babylonian Tammuz are clear. Associated in Sappho's female *thiasos* with the ritual of mourning and in classical Athens with women dancing on roofs in a state of emotional turmoil, in the city of Alexandria during the days of Arsinoë II, wife of Ptolemy II, the cult of Adonis was, instead, the great city festival described in the famous Idyll XV of Theocritus, thus confirming a religious continuity that in the Hellenistic period widened to involve the cosmopolitan public of the newly founded cities.

The metropolis of Alexandria was, in fact, built on Egyptian soil by Alexander the Great as a tangible sign of *hellenismos* introduced into the heart of the ancient local civilization and, under Ptolemaic rule, was considered one of the most prestigious cultural and religious centers of the Mediterranean world. The traditional Greek cults were practiced there, and sources indicate that the prevalent cult was that of Demeter, who was the subject of numerous festivals also observed in Egyptian society and in Eleusis, a suburb of Alexandria, where she was evoked in her peculiar dimension as the figure-head goddess of the mystery cult. With no local “branch offices” to perform its role, Attic Eleusis would remain a religious center of extreme vitality throughout early and late Hellenism, attracting worshipers from all over the Mediterranean and, in particular, from Italy and Rome. Eleusis was also visited by many emperors from Augustus (31 BCE) to Gallienus (264/65 CE); Hadrian, an admirer of Greek culture, was a particularly devoted worshiper. They displayed a special respect for Demeter's gifts, which the famous Ciceroian formula listed as cereal cultivation and the mysteries with their eschatological guarantees.

On the acropolis of Pergamum (founded by Attalus I and capital of his kingdom) near the great altar of Zeus, stands the sanctuary of Demeter, together with those of Athena Polias and Hera Basileia. This sanctuary testifies to the substantial Greek influence on the new Asian kingdom, along the lines of the ancient Hellenic colonies in the Anatolian peninsula. This sanctuary, moreover, was also a particular center for the worship of Artemis, who in numerous sites of ancient origin or Hellenistic foundation displayed evident oriental traits (reflecting both the marked Mediterranean and Anatolian components of her ancient roots) and new confluences with figures of great local goddesses. Examples include the great sanctuary at Ephesus in which the unusual iconography of the cult statue of the goddess, enclosed within a sheath decorated with numerous animal protomes (heads or foreparts), plastically expresses her essential dimension as mistress of wild animals (*pothnia therōn*); those of Magnesia on the Meander, in which Artemis bears the name of

Leukophryene; of Sardis; of Perge in Pamphylia; of Bargylia, with the epithet Kindyas; and of Hypaipa, where she is identified with the Persian Anaitis. In fact, in the Hellenistic period, the Persian goddess was worshiped in various Anatolian centers, which to a varying extent preserved traces of ancient Persian domination. In the game of finding similarities between the traits and functions of divine figures that emerged from the contact between different religious contexts, she is usually identified with the Greek goddess. The name Persian Artemis (*persike*), in fact, is one of the most frequent names given to Anaitis—especially in Lydia, which emphasizes how various defining traits of the two figures are similar, such as their links with nature and the animal kingdom in particular.

**THE ORIENTAL AND EGYPTIAN CONTRIBUTION.** In the Hellenistic period, other major Eastern goddesses began to be worshiped beyond their national boundaries, thus increasing their number of worshipers. The contact with some of the main characters in the Greek, and then also Roman pantheon, led to partial changes in their personalities.

**Dea Syria.** A case in point is the Semitic goddess Atargatis, whose main center of worship was the city of Hierapolis-Bambyke in northern Syria. She had been known in Greece since the third to second century BCE by the name of Pure (*hagne*) Aphrodite or Goddess Syria and was on occasions called Aphrodite Goddess Syria or *Hagne* Aphrodite Atargatis, confirming that worshipers perceived certain analogies between the two goddesses. Moreover, Atargatis did not lose her own distinct identity, underlined by the national name and clearly expressed in her traditional association with the great Syrian Baal Hadad, lord of the tempest and of lightning, who was linked to the kingdom of the underworld and fertility.

In Delos, where the cult was introduced by Syrian merchants, the two gods were first venerated together as patrician gods by the Eastern community. When Athens took control of the island, the public of worshipers widened to envelop its entire cosmopolitan population, and the goddess progressively acquired supremacy over her male counterpart. From 118/117 BCE the holder of the priesthood seems to have been an Athenian, who proclaimed himself *hierews tēs agnēs Aphroditēs* (priest of the Pure Aphrodite). This title is an indication of the advanced process of Hellenization in which the goddess was by now involved. Lucian (second century CE) is attributed with the treatise “The Syrian Goddess,” which provides a description of the cult and religious traditions related to the great sanctuary of Hierapolis-Bambyke. The goddess, although linked to her male counterpart Hadad and to a lower ranking figure of unknown identity, seems to be the undisputed protagonist of the cult and of relative mythical traditions. Assuming the identification of Hadad with Zeus—considering that the numerous Semitic Baals and the major male deities of the numerous local pantheons tended to be assimilated with the king of the Greek gods or with the Roman Jupiter, by now perceived as his counterpart—Lucian also puts Atargatis on the same level as Hera.

However, confirming the polyhedral nature of this divine figure, Lucian declares that “on the whole, she is certainly Hera, but she also has something of Athena, Aphrodite, Selene, Rhea, Artemis, Nemesis and the Fates” (*De Dea Syria* 32).

There is an evident sense of a “game of identification” between various divine figures, clearly perceived by contemporary peoples, as a tool for classifying and evaluating their functions and prerogatives when comparing the numerous national pantheons. The presence of phallic symbols in the Heliopolitan sanctuary, together with many other elements of the ritual praxis, shows the goddess’s fundamental link with nature and fertility. The existence of a religious staff consisting of eunuch Galloi and of men and women who in the grip of obsession worshiped the goddess with singing, dancing, and the music of sacred instruments (*De Dea Syria* 43), indicates a cult with clear orgiastic traits, similar to that of the great Anatolian mother Cybele, with whom some ancient sources identify Atargatis. The marked astral and cosmic characterization of her personality (often identified with the constellation of Virgo), together with her peculiar traits as protectress of the polis and her identification with Fortuna and Tyche, portray a complex personality. This was the result of a long historical process that grew from the ancient local roots of a sovereign goddess of a city community to become—according to the canons of Hellenistic cosmopolitanism—the figure of the *omniparens* (universal genetrix; mother of all) and omnipotent cosmic deity celebrated by Apuleius (second century CE).

In terms of the diffusion and significance of her cult in the Mediterranean regions, Atargatis took her distance from her original male counterpart, who also—as Zeus or Jupiter Heliopolitanus and often bearing the name Optimus Maximus—enjoyed a certain popularity under the Empire. The divine consort of another Syrian god, the Baal of the city of Doliche in Commagene (northern Syria), however, assumed a subordinate position to her companion, while enjoying the latter’s great popularity in the imperial period (second–third century CE) only by reflection. This figure is identified with Iuppiter Optimus Maximus and bears the localized title of Dolichenus. He has warlike but also celestial and cosmic attributes and a bride whom epigraphic and iconographic sources identify with Juno, or often Regina Juno or Santa Juno.

This assimilation fits perfectly into the general framework in question and shows how the major female figures in the Greek and Roman pantheons, which were by now extremely similar, provided specific parameters of reference that allowed many divine figures with different national origins to be received into the great Hellenistic cultural amalgam. Moreover, filtered by Hellenic and Roman influence, these figures acquire a supranational, cosmopolitan dimension and are often characterized in cosmic terms, assuming functions and prerogatives of many other female deities while never totally obscuring their primitive identity. Al-

though her title identifies her with the bride of the highest Roman god, the iconographic type of the Juno of Doliche reveals its oriental origin in a number of characteristic elements. In parallel with her divine bridegroom, who is depicted standing on a bull’s back, the goddess appears upright on an animal (not always clearly identifiable as bovine or cervine) in a long robe with her head covered by a veil, or sometimes wearing a diadem (jeweled headdress) or a *calathos* (a cylindrical cap). The scepter and the mirror are her typical attributes.

**Cybele.** The Phrygian goddess of animals and mountains, Cybele was already known to the first Greek colonists on the coasts of Asia Minor and since the seventh to sixth century BCE was included in the Greek pantheon under the name of Great Mother (*Mēter Megalē*) on the basis of her identification with Rhea, mother of the Olympian gods. The iconographic scheme that originated in this period would remain basically unchanged until the last manifestations of her cult, which became one of the most widespread in the Mediterranean world after its official introduction in Rome in 204 BCE. In this solemn image of the goddess, she seated on her throne, often within a *naiskos* (shrine or small temple), with her veiled head surmounted by the polos, bearing the attributes of the sceptre, the *patera* (a libation bowl), and the *timpanum* (tambourine), and with a lion cub in her lap or accompanied by one or two lions in a heraldic position near the throne.

More or less Hellenized (also due to her relationship with Demeter) the Anatolian goddess does not lose the peculiar connotations of her personality and cult. Her individual characteristics are expressed in the names that refer to her Eastern origins (Berecynthian, Idaea, Cybele) and in the orgiastic forms of the rite, with a significant role given to women and its nocturnal connotations. In fact, the goddess has the prerogative of infusing obsession (*mania*) both in the religious dimension of divine possession and in the destructive manifestation of pathological madness, which however she may also cure in her role of healing goddess. Above all, the presence of a male counterpart, Attis, the subject of a bloodthirsty cult involving the self-castration of a number of worshipers forming the group of the Galloi, shows the oriental roots of the mythical–ritual system revolving around the Anatolian Great Mother.

The process of Hellenization of this system, which in the Classical period caused the figure of Attis and his bloody rites to be abolished, did not however achieve its radical transformation. In the early Hellenistic period in Greece, the young male counterpart of Cybele reemerged on a mythical and ritual level. His anthropomorphic representation displays the connotations of a superhuman figure linked to vegetation. He is the protagonist of a tragic event of death, redeemed by a promise of bodily incorruptibility and, above all, by the ritual evocation of the event itself. In this way, he becomes the subject of worship together with the Great Mother. The official introduction in Rome of the Metroac-

cult apparently supplants the Greek experience of it, because at the height of the military and political crisis caused by Hannibal's presence on Italic soil during the Second Punic War (218–210 BCE) the Senate turned to King Attalus of Pergamum as mediator at the sanctuary of Pessinunt, home of the Great Goddess. On arriving in the Urbs, the Black Stone, aniconic image of the goddess was housed in the temple of Victoria on Palatine Hill and then transferred to the sacred temple dedicated to her on the same hill, the center of the city's ancestral cults. The Hellenized dimension is present also in the figure of the Roman Magna Mater Idaea, adopted as national deity due to her links with the tradition of the city's Trojan origins as protectress of Aeneas, son of an Aphrodite perceived as homologous to the goddess Venus. In fact, the religious policy implemented by the public powers of Rome once again reflects the trends typical of the contemporary religious scene, whereby an oriental deity was introduced into the traditional religious structure and the aspects most suited to that structure were developed and its physiognomy remodeled to harmonize it with the other members of the pantheon.

At the same time, the new goddess does not lose her own identity, which in the case of Cybele would be affirmed strongly in the late Republic and early Empire when the Phrygian and mystic aspects of the cult reemerged. These aspects had been relegated to within the Palatine sanctuary, together with the figure of Attis and the eunuch Galloi, whereas the official space had been entirely occupied by the public festival organized by the aristocrats of the annual Megalesia games, which included the procession of the divine image and its immersion in the waters of the river Almo. The emperors Claudius (41–54) and Antoninus Pius (138–161) instituted the Phrygian festival cycle of March 15–17, in which the story of Attis was publicly evoked with manifestations of mourning and joy and marked also by the bloody practices of the Galloi. Once the Metroac ritual was adopted as the official cult of the state, thereby protected and promoted by the emperors, this Roman festive cycle spread to many parts of the Empire. By 160 CE the entire Empire knew of the Metroac sacrificial rite in its dual form of the taurobolium (sacrifice of a bull) and criobolium (sacrifice of a ram) and was performed by city communities and private individuals for the health of the emperor and his family as an expression of devotion and loyalty toward the highest public authority. In the drastic evolution of lifestyle and religious feeling in subsequent centuries, the cathartic connotations of the taurobolium were accentuated, and it shifted from being a public rite performed for the salvation of the social community in the person of its highest representative to become an individual, private rite. Its aim was thus the purification and salvation of the worshiper.

Both in the forms of the festival cycle of March and in those of the bloody rite of the taurobolium, the Great Goddess, protagonist of the cult, together with her male counterpart, Attis, would maintain her position of importance up

until the end of Hellenism. In the late fourth century CE she would unite in the taurobolium those representatives of the Roman aristocracy who had remained impervious to Christianization. From Vettius Agorius Praetextatus and his bride Fabia Aconia Paulina to many other members of the great Roman senatorial families, the tenacious loyalty to ancestral religious traditions would be given particular importance and attention through devotion to the Magna Mater Idaea, whose ancient Eastern personality is inextricably intertwined with the equally marked traits of her Hellenic and Roman manifestations.

**Isis.** The Egyptian goddess Isis is undoubtedly the figure that more than any other exemplifies the Hellenistic typology of a national deity assuming a cosmopolitan nature when coming into contact with similar personalities and under dominant Hellenic influence. Herodotos (c. 484–between 430 and 420 BCE) noted in his *Histories* that all Egyptians, independent of their innumerable local cults, venerated the couple of Isis and Osiris. For thousands of years they played a central role in Egyptian religion, due to their triple connection with pharaonic ideology, funerary practices and eschatology, and agrarian fertility.

In the light of the Greek interpretation, Osiris is identified with Dionysos because of his chthonic and agrarian aspects and especially the *pathē* (sufferings) embodied in his mythical story and cult, and Isis is identified with Demeter. This identification, however, only covers the aspect of her divine personality linked to fertility and maternity. Parallel to a progressive diffusion of her cult in Greece, Asia Minor, the islands of the Aegean and the West (first in Sicily and southern Italy and then throughout the peninsula and in the various regions of the Empire) in the Hellenistic period Isis's attributes and prerogatives underwent such extraordinary development that she became a *panthea* goddess. In his novel *Metamorphoses*, Apuleius (second century CE) defined her as "single Godhead (*numen unicum*) adored by the whole world in varied forms, in differing rites and with many diverse names" (*Metamorphoses* 11, 5). In the prayer that the protagonist of the novel addresses to the bright moon rising from the waters of the sea over the beach of Cenchreae (Corinth), he invokes the *Regina caeli* (Queen of Heaven) by listing the main figures of the Greek-Roman pantheon—all expressions of her multiform identity: Ceres honored at Eleusis, the *caelestis* (heavenly) Venus "worshipped in the island shrine of Paphos; or the sister of Phoebus . . . now adored in the celebrated temples of Ephesus; or whether as Proserpine . . ." (*Metamorphoses* 11, 5). He concluded: "By whatever name or ceremony or visage it is right to address thee, help me now in the depth of my trouble" (*Metamorphoses* 11, 5). In the reply of the epiphanic goddess, further details are added to the divine picture:

Thus the Phrygians, earliest of races, call me Pessinuntia, Mother of the Gods; thus the Athenians, sprung from their own soil, call me Cecropeian Minerva; and the sea-tossed Cyprians call me Paphian Venus, the ar-



cher Cretans Diana Dictynna, and the trilingual Sicilians Ortygian Proserpine; to the Eleusinians I am Ceres, the ancient goddesses, to others Iuno, to others Bellona and Hecate and Rhamnusia. But the Ethiopians . . . together with the Africans and the Egyptians who excel through having the original doctrine, honour me with my distinctive rites and give me my true name of Queen Isis. (*Metamorphoses* 11, 1–5)

Deeply Hellenized but at the same time rooted in the ancient Egyptian tradition, this image of Isis Myrionyma (with ten thousand names) is most vividly expressed in the hymns of praise (*aretologies*). In these, the goddess declares her powers (*dynameis*) and lists the benefits she has bestowed on humankind, configuring herself as a typical cultural heroine in line with the Hellenistic model of the *euretēs* (inventor of the fundamental human techniques and institutions) and *euergētēs* (benefactor). The Isiac *aretologies* are attested by epigraphs in many places of the Hellenized world and by literary documents and probably derive from a single prototype in which ancient Egyptian concepts were elaborated in the light of a new religious vision typical of the Hellenistic period. The model of Isis's *aretologies* is, in fact, attributable to the beginning of this period and was aimed at promoting diffusion of the cult of the goddess whose functional identity and iconography had by now become deeply Hellenized. After the goddess's genealogy and a list of her main cult centers, a list follows of her cosmogonic exploits (e.g., separation of the land from the sky, fixing the route followed by the stars, the sun and the moon) and of the benefits she bestowed on humanity (e.g., the abolition of cannibalism; the institution of public and family law; the invention of language, writing, and navigation; the institution of religious rites; and the definition of ethical laws). The listing of the numerous *aretai* presents a picture of Isis as a universal power, mistress of the cosmos in its natural and human dimension, and in some documents (e.g., *Hymn from Andros*, *Hymn from Kyme*, *Metamorphoses*) sovereign of astral destiny—the *Heimarmene* (fate) imposed on Hellenistic society as a dark and tyrannical force. This prerogative of the goddess is expressed in the frequent name of Tyche or Fortuna with which worshipers invoked her and in the iconographic attributes of the cornucopia and the rudder. Its liveliest representation is the story of Lucius narrated by Apeuleius in *Metamorphoses*. This trait explains the exceptional favor that Isis enjoyed in the entire Mediterranean world and represents the most typically Hellenistic aspect of her personality. In the variety of her attributes and her typology, the figure of Isis—although rooted in a national tradition—is a typical creation of Hellenism in the sense that she exemplifies its cosmopolitan aspects and at the same time satisfies individuals' needs for personal guarantees for the present and future. To this end, according to ancient Egyptian ideology, an essential role is played by the goddess in the mythical–ritual framework associating her with her spouse Osiris and her son Horus. In the organic explanation of the second century CE Greek writer Plutarch (before 50–after 120 CE), the Egyptian myth attributes Isis with the essential

task of searching for the dismembered body of her spouse. On recomposing it, she celebrated the funeral rites, through which she made the great Osiris immortal. At the same time, Plutarch defines the salvific function of the goddess toward humanity:

The sister and wife of Osiris . . . , nor did she allow the contests and struggles which she had undertaken, her wanderings and her many deeds of wisdom and bravery, to be engulfed in oblivion and silence, but into the most sacred rites she infused images, suggestions and representations of her experiences at that time, and so she consecrated at once a pattern of piety and an encouragement to men and women overtaken by similar misfortunes. (*De Iside et Osiride*, 27 as cited in Griffiths, 1970, pp. 26–27)

The divine story contemplates suffering and death but also provides a positive solution in the reanimation of Osiris, who regains life and sovereignty, albeit in the kingdom of the underworld. To the eyes of the Greeks, who are aware of the religious experiences typical of the Greek mystery cults, the story becomes an exemplary model for contemporary men and women. Translated into ritual terms (the *teletai*), it offers worshipers the hope of overcoming the difficulties and sufferings of human existence.

Plutarch's text thus draws a picture that is clearly illustrated in Book 11 of the *Metamorphoses*, namely, the presence in the Isiac cult of the initiatory and esoteric praxis of the mysteries, insofar as they are rites that place the worshiper in intimate contact with the deity through the ritual reevocation of a painful event that, however, has a positive outcome. The mystery component—absent from the ancient Egyptian religious context—is the result of the undeniable influence of the Greek, probably Eleusinian model, as in other cults of oriental deities. In particular, at the beginning of the Hellenistic period in some Greek centers, Cybele, another great goddess involved in the process of Hellenization characteristic of the age, assumed traits typical of mystery cults. These would persist with different forms and methods up until the imperial period, when they are discussed by Christian authors such as Clement of Alexandria (150–215) and Julius Firmicus Maternus (fourth century CE).

Insofar as they are subjects of a mystery cult resulting from the dense network of contacts with Greek religious influences and in particular with that of the Eleusinian Demeter to whom in various ways both are typologically related, the two goddesses, Isis and Cybele, express an important component of the great Hellenistic religious amalgam. They are, in fact, characterized by marked individualistic tensions, which on a religious level are reflected in the search for a more intimate and personal relationship with the deity, such as could be realized in initiatory and esoteric rites. At the same time, the Isiac cult is one of the most characteristic manifestations of the tendency to set up new community groups because it requires total devotion of the initiate. In exchange for the divine protection that broke the bonds of



the blind Fortuna and introduced him into the secrets of the cult, the Lucius of Apuleius must dedicate to Isis his whole existence in a total relationship of personal religion. Although not definable in terms of conversion because it persists within the framework of special devotion for a single deity without excluding the other members of a polytheistic pantheon, this relationship nevertheless expresses a religious experience of significant intensity and personal commitment, different from that offered by the traditional practices of public cults.

A last characteristic of the Hellenistic Isis—typical of numerous contemporary cults of female deities, yet in her case particularly significant—is the extension and role of the female presence that without being either exclusive or preponderant is proportionally large, both in terms of worshippers and priestly staff. As is known, in the ancient world a connection often appears between female deities and female priesthoods, without however there being any exclusion of male priesthoods nor of priestesses in the cults of gods. In any case, both in the public forms of the cult exercised in the great Hellenistic temples and in private forms of religious associations that are often of a local nature, the role of the female priesthood is highly significant in the worship of Demeter, Artemis, Athena, Cybele, the Goddess Syria Atargatis, and Isis. The fact that a special web of relationships relates each of these divine figures in various ways to the life of women in their fundamental roles of wife and mother is equally important. Among these, Isis stands out once more as the *Hymn from Kyme* proclaims: “I am she who is called God by women . . . I forced women to be loved by men” (as cited in Beard, North, and Price, 1998, vol. 2, pp. 297–298).

**SEE ALSO** Cybele; Hellenistic Religions; Isis; Roman Religion, article on the Imperial Period; Women’s Studies in Religion.

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GIULIA SFAMENI GASPARRO (2005)

**GODDESS WORSHIP: THE HINDU GODDESS**

Academic interest in Hindu goddesses has burgeoned since the 1970s because of three coalescing factors: in the United States, funding for fieldwork in South Asia through postwar area studies programs; feminist scholarship, with its stress on women's experience and feminist perspectives; and the move from a reliance on texts and elite viewpoints to an emphasis

on local, oral, village contexts where goddesses tend to thrive. With increasing numbers of publications, however, the best way to characterize Hindu goddesses, either as individuals or as a category, has become contested and complex. Accordingly, this essay has three aims: to cover representative Hindu goddesses; to indicate the types of scholarly methodologies currently employed to study them; and to describe major hermeneutical controversies in their interpretation.

For heuristic purposes, this survey organizes goddesses via a pacific (*saumya*)/fierce (*raudra*) spectrum, or, as Wendy Doniger first labeled it, a juxtaposition between "breast" (gentle and nurturing) and "tooth" (ambiguous and potentially dangerous) goddesses (1980, pp. 90–91). In general, breast goddesses are boon bestowing and provide mediation and access to their more powerful consorts. One example is Śrī or Lakṣmī, associated from the Vedic period with royalty and from the epic period with auspiciousness, fertility, wealth, and usually Lord Viṣṇu. Iconographically, she is portrayed either alone, seated on a lotus and surrounded by symbols of fecundity (coins, water, elephants, and the color red) or with Viṣṇu in a position of humble subservience. Theological reflections on Lakṣmī reach their apex in the medieval writings of South Indian Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, for whom she is Viṣṇu's inseparable breast-jewel, and she argues with her lord over devotees, independently granting them grace (*prasāda*).

Other instances include Sarasvatī, the Vedic river goddess who by the epic period symbolized purity, learning, and the arts, and who, though putatively linked to Brahmā, helps devotees directly; Sītā, the wife of Rāma, the model of wifely perfection who, in Tulsidāsa's sixteenth-century Hindi version of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Rāmcaritmānas*, acts as the devotee's intermediary to Rāma; and the various forms of Śiva's wife Satī, or Pārvatī, the one to draw her unpredictable husband from the sphere of *mokṣa* to that of *dharmā* through her beauty and sexuality. In the South Indian theological speculations of Śaiva Siddhānta, she is identified with Śiva's grace (*arul*), inherent in every human. In all cases, these mediator-goddesses are said to be *svakiya*, or married to their consorts, and even if they are soteriologically more significant than the male gods, the latter are more important ontologically.

"Tooth" goddesses are sometimes dangerous and must be viewed with caution. Famous examples are Durgā, or Ambikā/Caṇḍikā, the battle queen of the famed sixth-century Sanskrit "Devī-Māhātmya" section of the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, who slays demons on behalf of the gods and who offers her devotees either worldly enjoyment (*bhukti*) or liberation (*mukti*); and Kālī, the emaciated demon-chopper who emerges from Durgā's wrath to have an autonomous career as an awesome mother goddess, rescuing her votaries from distress. Other instances of ambivalent goddesses include those whose provenance is local calamity or disease, such as Śītālā and Māriyamman, goddesses of smallpox and skin maladies. Like "tooth" goddesses in general, they represent both the release from suffering and the cause

of that suffering; devotees of Śītalā in pox outbreaks claim that the mother's "mercy" (*dayā*) is manifest on the bodies of those she favors. Each of these powerful, independent goddesses, though potentially allied with a male, either as consort (Śīva is the husband of both Durgā and Kālī) or as companion (Jvārāsura, the Fever Demon, is Śītalā's helper), are not intermediaries to their male partners; one prays to them directly, hoping that their compassionate sides will "intercede," so to speak, with their more dangerous aspects.

Midway between "breast" and "tooth" goddesses are those who are neither subservient nor independently powerful, neither peaceful nor fierce, but who claim an equal status with their male companions. Pārvatī in her form as the female sexual organ (*yoni*), coupled with that of the male, Śīva *linga*, is a perfect example of such complementarity, as are Śīva and Pārvatī as two halves of the same being, Ardhanārīśvara, Śīva Half-woman. Rādhā, Kṛṣṇa's cowherd lover, is another illustration; although, like the "breast" goddesses mentioned above, she renders Kṛṣṇa accessible to Vaiṣṇava devotees, offering her grace and compassion to those who seek it (see Sūrdās's *Sūrsāgar* and the *Brahmavai-varta Purāṇa*). In other texts Kṛṣṇa exalts her over himself and even serves as a model of devotion to her rather than the reverse (see Jayadeva's *Gītāgovinda* and Rūpa Gosvāmin's *Vidagdhamādhava*).

In a theological move similar to that of Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavadgītā*, who asserts that all gods are really just forms of himself, Hindu goddess worshippers also claim that all manifestations of the divine feminine, whether benign or ambivalent, are simply faces or aspects of the one Great Goddess, Mahādevī. This profession is attested textually from at least the time of the "Devī-Māhātmya," where one finds epithets praising one goddess in terms of another, stories in which goddesses emerge from each other, and philosophical declarations about female energy (*śakti*), primordial nature (*prakṛti*), delusive power (*māyā*), and the absolute ground of being (*brahman*), each of which is said to characterize female deities. The concept of Mahādevī was an especially powerful tool for assimilating local, indigenous goddess cults into the normative, widespread Hindu pantheon, and the Purāṇas (fifth to eighteenth centuries) are textual repositories of lore concerning this process of consolidation. Recent anthropological studies underscore the same point: tribal and local deities in Orissa are slowly being identified with the pan-Indian Durgā; a local "girl" in Madurai has risen through identification with Śīva's consort Pārvatī to the status of his royal wife, now more beloved by devotees than her husband; and Vaḷḷi, Murukaṅ's Tamil wife, is a classic low-caste Cinderella whose origins have nearly been erased in her gradual upward mobility. The 108 Śākta "seats" (*pīṭhas*) of the Goddess, each a local shrine glorified by its incorporation into the legend about the fallen body parts of Śīva's wife Satī, are another illustration of regional deities being unified under the banner of a universal goddess.

One of the results of the proliferation of studies on Hindu goddesses has been both the expansion of knowledge

about individual goddesses and the theoretical nuancing of scholarly approaches to goddesses in general. Alongside translations or descriptive works, therefore, are field studies promoting feminist, neo-Dukheimian, Freudian, or post-colonial interpretive lenses. These treat a variety of individual goddesses, such as Āṅkālaparamēcuvārī, Bhadrakālī, Draupadī, Māriyamman, and Mīnākṣī, from South India, and Manasā, Nandādevī, Śītalā, and Vaiṣṇodevī, from the north. As a group, such works challenge two influential hermeneutical frameworks proposed when the study of Hindu goddesses was still nascent in the 1960s and 1970s. The first rests on a dichotomy between the local or "little" and the universal or "great" traditions and claims that local goddess cults lack geographic spread, textual articulation, Brahman priests, sophisticated theology, vegetarian ethos, and a domesticated deity. As new field research shows, such juxtapositions may be too stark. Āṅkālaparamēcuvārī is a village goddess prominent in Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh; her spread is wider than that of Mīnākṣī, who lives solely in one temple in Madurai, but the latter is a royal deity whose fame, and the wealth and Brahmanical prestige of her temple draw crowds from around the country. Bhadrakālī, a multiform of the north Indian Kālī, shares several important elements with her northern namesake, but her cult in Kerala has many unique features. The same is true of Manasā, the goddess of snakes, who is widely worshiped throughout India but in varying ritual and iconographic forms. Draupadī is reputed for her role in the *Mahābhārata*, but only in South India is there a cult centered on her. Nandādevī and Vaiṣṇodevī, both variants of Durgā, inspire complex local traditions in the central and western Himalayas, respectively. Finally, Śītalā and Māriyamman share a concern with skin diseases, but their iconography, personalities, and ritual prescriptions differ from region to region across India. Such scholarly studies imply twin processes at work: Sanskritization or Brahmanization, the identification of the local with the universally respected "higher" culture, and localization, whereby widely recognized goddesses adapt to bounded geographic contexts. Hence, the demarcation between "great" and "little" traditions is more porous than scholars once thought. A second influential opposition, according to which divine ferocity is associated with marital independence, has also been disputed; Kathleen Erndl, Lynn Foulston, and Stanley Kurtz all document sweet, married goddesses who accept blood sacrifice, possession, and fire walking, as well as independent goddesses who are benign and vegetarian.

Among other themes of interest to contemporary scholars of Hindu goddesses is the question of origins: from where do Hindu goddesses come? From the Indus Valley civilization, in the third millennium BCE or earlier? The Vedic period, after the mid-second millennium BCE? Autochthonous tribal culture? Although the issue is hotly debated, the scholarly consensus is that the Indus Valley peoples were probably goddess revering, as there are parallels between scenes depicted on some of their steatite seals and later Dravidian sacrificial goddess cults. Goddess worship is also important, as one

sees even today, in many tribal societies. In spite of the natural theological desire to read goddesses back into the Vedic tradition, there is little evidence for this in the Vedic texts themselves, although it is likely that because they are authored by the Brahman elite, they do not represent the totality of Vedic religiosity.

An additional topic that galvanizes scholarly and popular audiences, East and West, is the relationship of Hindu goddesses to Hindu women. Does the worship of female deities imply anything about expectations for women's behavior? The evidence is mixed: many goddesses appear to act as approved models for Hindu women. *Sītā*, *Sāvitrī*, and *Pārvatī* embody the ideal in wifely virtue; *Nandādevī*'s ritualized reluctance to leave her parents' home for *Śiva*'s abode mirrors the feelings of out-married Garhwali women; and the Orissan *Kālī*'s outstretched tongue is interpreted locally as a symbol of desired wifely shame on the part of the goddess when she realizes that she has stepped on her husband's prostrate body. In such cases the goddess's conduct acts to reinforce what many see as patriarchal values. Other goddesses, however, represent the opposite: no mother would want her daughter to have the fate of *Rādhā*, an adulteress played upon by the fickle *Kṛṣṇa*, or the character of the unruly *Kālī*, who dances naked, uncontrolled. Several scholars have investigated the specific effect that goddess worship has on women in particular locales. Most of them conclude that goddesses have not always been "good" for women: *Bhadrakālī*'s cult in Kerala is nearly exclusively male and represents male fears of women; almost no women in *Vindhyachal* at the shrine to *Vindhyavāsīnī* find any relationship between the *śakti* of the Goddess and ordinary women; and even the famed spiritual giant, *Ānandamayī Mā*, is perceived by her devotees as transcending gender entirely. However, such authors also concede that the potential for positive influence is present. As Kathleen Erndl notes, the goal for Hindu feminists on an ideological level is "to rescue *śakti* from its patriarchal prison," in which women, because of their power, need to be subdued (1993, p. 96). Western feminists and denizens of women's spirituality have long found Hindu goddesses inspirational sources of inner strength; until recently, however, Indian feminists have eschewed goddess symbolism as being a tool of patriarchal oppression.

Another site for the investigation of Hindu goddesses is the context of Hindu nationalism. With the rise of the *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* and the *Bharatiya Janata Party* in the late 1980s, one sees a concomitant resurgence of interest in the cult of *Bhārat Mātā*, or Mother India, and the weapon-bearing eight-armed *Aṣṭabhujā*, a deity self-consciously constructed by the women's wing of the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* to provide women with an anti-Muslim rallying symbol. The politicized use of goddess imagery in the modern period goes back at least as far as the late nineteenth century, with *Bankimcandra Chatterjee*'s famed hymn, "Hail to the Motherland," or "Bande Mātaram!" (1882), in which the land of India is equated with the pillaged goddess in need

of her sons' heroic self-sacrifice. Most scholars, whether Indian or not, find the explicit equation of the nationalists' enemies with the goddess's victims to be extremely worrying.

Of course, goddesses are a malleable lot, and the nationalists are not the only ones to employ them for human ends. For example, *Santoṣī Mā*, Goddess of Contentment, found a mass following after the release of a Bollywood film celebrating her power in 1975, the *AIDS-Āmmā* was created by a health educator from *Andhra Pradesh* in 1999, and many ecologically minded activists are exploring goddess traditions for environmentally friendly stories, rituals, or associated philosophical concepts. Again, the data is conflicting; to take the case of the *Ganges River*, the same belief in the *Gangā* as goddess leads some Hindus to overlook pollution, since the Mother's purity is inviolable, whereas others attempt to cleanse her out of reverence.

A further topic is the intersection between *Śāktism* and *Tantra*, the antinomian ritual and philosophical system in which the normally forbidden is utilized as a means to the divine. From at least the tenth century, particularly in *Bengal* and *Kashmir*, *Tantric* speculation has involved goddesses: the ten *mahāvidyās* (great goddesses of transformation), the seven *mātrkāś* (mothers), and numerous *yoginīs* and *ḍākinīs* (female ghouls or adepts) in addition to *Kālī* and other deities. As *David Kinsley* opines, because of the ambiguous, death-dealing nature of many *Tantric* goddesses, they push the devotee to new insight: if one can embrace, worship, even love such deities, then one wins the *Tantric* boon of freedom from fear (1975, p. 144). Investigations of *Tantric* goddesses cults aim to decipher the relationships between the *Tantric* elevation of goddesses and ideas of women (most scholars conclude that, ideology notwithstanding, *Tantra* is primarily male oriented); to understand the nexus between the patronage of *Tantric* goddess cults and the power ambitions of their sponsors (since the time of the late *guptas* in the sixth to seventh centuries, kings, whether real or titular, have utilized *Tantric* symbolism to bolster their own claims to prestige); to study the interaction between Hindus and the British during the colonial period (for instance, in reaction to the first partition of *Bengal* in 1905, many nationalists used *Tantric* images of bloodthirsty goddesses to exhort rebellion against the white colonialists); and to chart the British-influenced Hindu critique of *Tantric* deities, due to which many have lost their rough, sexualized, meat-eating demeanors.

Evidence of the health and vitality of Hindu goddesses is indicated by the number who have made their homes outside India. Whether the new residence is the Caribbean, Europe, Britain, or North America, mainstream *devīs* such as *Lakṣmī*, *Sītā*, *Kālī*, *Durgā*, *Mīnākṣī*, and *Vaiṣṇodevī* have adapted in novel ways to their host environments. Most Hindu communities attempt to replicate as faithfully as possible the worship settings of "back home"—temples known for their claims to authenticity are the *Kālī* temple in *Toronto* and the *Mīnākṣī* temple in *Houston*—but even so, accommodations are made in terms of festival timings, temple



construction and zoning laws, and types of offerings. Devotees must also contend with the fact that non-Hindus in diaspora settings may have strange or even hostile attitudes toward their imported deities. How should a New York Hindu react to gift shop lunch boxes decorated with the face of Durgā, or to Western feminists' interpretations of Kālī as a symbol of women's rage against patriarchy? Such appropriations are balanced by what is perceived as more "genuine" attitudes towards Hindu theism, like the Western-organized and -financed Kālī Mandir in Laguna Beach, California, to which priests from Kolkata's Dakshineswar Kālī Temple are regularly brought for ritual accuracy. As scholars note and devotees experience, the Hindu Goddess, embodied in countless goddesses in Hindu contexts the world over, is complex, theologically flexible, and alive and well.

**SEE ALSO** Bengali Religions; Durgā Hinduism; Ganges River; Hindi Religious Traditions; Hindu Tantric Literature; Indian Religions, article on Rural Traditions; Marathi Religions; Rādhā; Śaivism; Sarasvatī; Tamil Religions; Vaiṣṇavism.

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## GODDESS WORSHIP: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Theories about goddess worship have been advanced ever since the emergence of the social sciences disciplines in the nineteenth century. Religion specialists in the fields of anthropology, sociology, folklore, psychology, and comparative mythology have contributed numerous theories to explain the phenomenon of goddess worship. The topic has been revived in recent years, particularly by specialists in the area of women’s studies. The following survey of theoretical issues in the study of goddess worship reflects controversies that have raged over broader issues concerning the more general interpretation of religion.

**EARLY PERSPECTIVES ON GODDESS WORSHIP.** Nineteenth-century European social scientists and specialists in comparative religion were fascinated by what they conceived to be universal themes of human experience. Because they relied heavily on the accounts of missionaries, traders, and other travelers to different cultures rather than firsthand fieldwork, many of their speculative theories are discredited today. These writers were concerned with the origins of human institutions such as marriage, law, and religion. Contemporary scholars tend to be more cautious than these early writers about the origins of religion, believing that it is just as dangerous to speculate about the past as it is to develop theories about other cultures without firsthand field observation.

One of the most influential theories in the study of goddess worship was advanced by the nineteenth-century Swiss jurist and historian of Roman law J. J. Bachofen (1815–1887), who linked goddess worship with a more general theory of social development. He asserted that the first human societies were matriarchal and characterized by widespread promiscuity, which was reflected in the worship of female deities. While this theory has been discredited by contemporary anthropologists, early social theorists such as Lewis Henry Morgan, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels praised it. Sir James Frazer set himself the task of completing Bachofen’s assemblage of evidence for matriarchy among world cultures. Even Sigmund Freud thought that goddess worship was linked to an earlier stage of matriarchy. For Bachofen and his followers, “mother right” marked a fixed and predetermined stage in the evolution of human cultures. This stage in human evolution, according to Bachofen, can be confirmed by myths about goddess worship, which are living expressions “of the stages in a people’s development, and for the skillful observer, a faithful reflection of all the periods

in the life of that people” (Bachofen, p. 75). The matriarchal period of human history was one of sublime grandeur, when women inspired chivalry, chastity, and poetry in men. Although men had superior strength, women strove for peace, justice, and religious consecration—guiding the men’s “wild, lawless masculinity.” This early phase of cultural evolution was displaced, in Bachofen’s view, by a later period of conquest and patriarchy.

As early as 1851 proponents of the matriarchy theory were embroiled in a controversy set off by the famous jurist Sir Henry Maine, who insisted that the patriarchal family was the original social unit. This was the same year in which Bachofen was preparing his work *Das Mutterrecht*, asserting exactly the opposite thesis. Over thirty years later, anthropologist and folklorist J. F. McLennan (1886) reasserted the matriarchal theory, citing new anthropological evidence. Again in 1891 the matriarchy concept was discredited by Edward A. Westermarck, who was disturbed by Bachofen’s idea that myths and legends preserve the “collective memory” of a people. Westermarck’s argument attempted to reestablish Maine’s patriarchal theory of human origins.

The issue flamed into controversy once again in 1927 with the publication of Robert Briffault’s encyclopedic work *The Mothers*. Arguing against Maine and Westermarck, Briffault reasserted the existence of a primitive matriarchy that universally preceded patriarchy. However, unlike Bachofen, who defined matriarchy as a period of mother rule and inheritance through the female line, Briffault conceived matriarchy to be a period when women were socially rather than politically dominant. Briffault speculated that the “male instinct” created the original social herd and that the “female instinct” was responsible for the establishment of the family. Much of Briffault’s evidence was derived from the study of religion; he thought that the widespread existence of lunar deities among primitive peoples was proof of the early social dominance of women, because women were the first hierophants of lunar cults. Briffault’s evolutionary theory was not the last of its kind. As recently as the 1930s Wilhelm Schmidt advanced a theory for the origin of religion employing a multilinear rather than unilinear model of cultural evolution. Schmidt assumed the existence of three types of “primary cultures”—matrilineal, patrilineal, and patriarchal. According to Schmidt, women were involved in the earliest cultivation of plants. Consequently their social importance increased, giving rise to widespread goddess worship.

Few psychologists have contributed theories about goddess worship. Freud thought devotion to female deities represented an infantile desire to be reunited with the mother. According to Freud, goddess worship represents universal unconscious fantasies characteristic of a stage in early psychic development in which the mother seems to be all-powerful to the child. C. G. Jung placed the religious impulse in a more central position than did Freud. He postulated a set of innate universal archetypes operative in the human psyche, one of which was the feminine principle. Jung utilized

symbolism from primitive, archaic, and contemporary religions to shed light on the operation of these archetypes.

The Jungian perspective has been most fully developed in a classic work by Erich Neumann entitled *The Great Mother* (1955). This massive volume explores the phenomenon of goddess worship from a number of psychological perspectives. Unlike social theorists who traced the development of goddess worship in social time and space, Neumann analyzes the phenomenon purely in terms of inner psychic images. Although he repudiates Bachofen's sociological analysis of matriarchy, he praises him for having made lasting discoveries about the elementary character of the feminine. In Neumann's words, "early mankind and the matriarchal stage are not archaeological or historical entities, but psychological realities whose fateful power is still alive in the psychic depths of present-day man." Neumann posits a matriarchal stage sequentially preceding patriarchy at the psychic level. This stage in the evolution of the human psyche is represented by belief in the Great Goddess. A strange contradiction permeates Neumann's work; on one hand he discounts Bachofen's sociological argument for matriarchy, but at the same time he praises Briffault for having "discovered the fact (which is still insufficiently recognized) that early culture is in very high degree the product of the female group" (p. 281). At the methodological level, Neumann admits to removing documents and images of goddess worship from their cultural contexts. He rationalizes this methodology by asserting that psychohistory (a set of stages in the development of the human psyche) does not necessarily parallel historical events in a linear way. Despite such methodological curiosities, Neumann's work represents one of the most comprehensive treatments of goddess worship ever assembled by a Western scholar. Not only does he demonstrate the great variety of forms manifested in the phenomenon of goddess worship, he reveals the "transformative" nature of this religious impulse. He sketches out four manifestations of the Great Mother archetype: (1) the Good Mother (associated with childbearing, vegetation mysteries, and rebirth); (2) the Terrible Mother (linked to death, dismemberment, sickness, and extinction); (3) the Positive Transformative Goddess (related to wisdom, vision, ecstasy, and inspiration mysteries); and (4) the Negative Transformative Goddess (connected to rejection, deprivation, madness, and impotence). Any female deity can be classified as one of these four functions of the archetype; some goddesses can be placed in more than one of these categories.

There has been no major work on the topic by a single author since Neumann's classic treatment of goddess worship in the mid-1950s. There are several reasons for this. First, the works of Neumann and Briffault, who wrote in the twentieth century, reflect the nineteenth-century approach to comparative religions, which relished the fabrication of elaborate and ambitious theoretical frameworks for the study of complex phenomena. Also significant is the emergence of scientific anthropology, which, until recently, has stressed

the analysis of single, manageable cultural entities through direct fieldwork. Armchair speculation went out of style with the emergence of the Boasian school in anthropology during the early twentieth century. Few psychologists, excepting Freud and the Jungians, have studied religious topics. Contemporary psychologists have focused on discrete measurable phenomena, such as the religious content of dreams and the relationship of psychedelic drugs to altered states of consciousness. Within the mainstream of American psychological thought virtually nothing has been written on the subject of goddess worship.

Other than anthropologists and psychologists, some religion scholars have approached goddess worship from a phenomenological perspective. Joseph Campbell for instance, in his monumental four-volume work *The Masks of God* takes a Jungian approach to goddess worship. While he sometimes uses caution in connecting goddess worship with a matriarchal stage in cultural evolution, at other times he perpetuates the nineteenth-century hypotheses of primitive matriarchy. E. O. James (1959) vacillates between a purely historical description of different goddesses in their cultural contexts and generalizations that border on a universal psychic unity approach, much like Erich Neumann's.

**CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF GODDESS WORSHIP.** After nearly thirty years without a major work on goddess worship, there has been a revival of interest in the topic from three quarters—anthropology, religious studies, and feminist scholarship. Several new books have been published on goddess worship in the early 1980s. The work *Mother Worship: Theme and Variations* (1982), edited by the author of this article, utilizes current data generated by anthropologists to address the topic. Another volume, *The Book of the Goddess: Past and Present* (1983), edited by Carl Olson, is a collection of articles by historians of religion and feminist scholars. Goddess worship is a central theme in the Autumn 1983 issue of *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, which is devoted to the study of women and religion. This recent revival of interest in goddess worship is due to three main factors: (1) a new interest in the old matriarchy controversy, (2) an active discussion among feminists about goddess symbolism, and (3) the emergence of a new comparative religions.

**The matriarchy controversy.** The issue of primitive matriarchy, which once plagued the study of goddess worship, has not disappeared. Some modern writers continue to assume there was an early historical phase when females dominated males. They cling to the notion that goddess worship is a remnant of that earlier period. The controversy continues to stir lively debate among popular writers, though many scholars think the issue is a dead one.

Most contemporary historians of religion accept the anthropological view that a stage of matriarchy never existed. However, a few scholars of eminent stature like Joseph Campbell (in Bachofen, 1967, p. lv) continue to support Bachofen's idea of an age of "mother right" that preceded pa-

triarchy. They insist that this has been “confirmed irrefutably” by archaeological evidence. Although most feminist scholars today agree with the anthropological position, there remain a few articulate feminist authors who continue to perpetuate the idea of an original matriarchal stage. An example of this genre is Starhawk’s *The Spiral Dance: A Rebirth of the Ancient Religion of the Great Goddess* (1979), in which the author discusses a rediscovery of the ancient “matrifocal civilizations” and the “falsehoods of patriarchal history.” According to Sally R. Binford (1981, pp. 150–151) the belief in early matriarchies has taken a religious form for some feminists; mother-goddess worshipers in Los Angeles, for instance, have become organized into a church with a temple and priestesses. They believe that the archaeological data that refute their position reflect a conspiracy against women among professional archaeologists. Binford calls this movement a “New Feminist Fundamentalism.”

The only other scholars to take primitive matriarchy seriously in recent decades were Soviets, who espoused Friedrich Engels’s outdated nineteenth-century notions. Alexander Marshack (1972, pp. 338–339) cites Soviet archaeologists who interpreted Upper Paleolithic mother-goddess figurines as confirmation of the existence of early matriarchal hunting societies organized around totemic clans controlled by women. According to Marshack, this view is simplistic, a distorted interpretation of complex data. He insists that the goddess images from the Upper Paleolithic era are evidence for symbolic processes “extremely variable in meaning and use and that they played a number of specialized and generalized roles across the complex, integrated, time-factored culture. . . . These facts do not confirm a matriarchy.” Marshack adds one final but crucial note to his argument: the era was also marked by a separate, specialized masculine imagery and complex animal mythology, and the female figurines must be considered in this context. Thus, Upper Paleolithic society was neither matriarchal nor patriarchal, despite Marxist claims to the contrary.

There is no anthropologist today who would argue for a stage of matriarchy associated with goddess worship. It has been refuted on many occasions by anthropologists of all theoretical persuasions, including Marxists and feminists. In a brilliant argument against the matriarchy theory, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban (1979, p. 343) notes three errors committed by scholars who insist on perpetuating this myth: They mistakenly assume that (1) the presence of female deities is evidence of matriarchy, (2) matrilineal societies are survivals of an era of matriarchy, and (3) matrilineality and matriarchy are related to each other. According to Binford (1981, pp. 152–153) all these ideas are false and misleading. In fact the myth of matriarchy is damaging to the cause of feminists. Women are not freed by perpetuating the myth. The idea that the type of complex social organization required for matriarchy could be found among prehistoric societies is so patently ridiculous as to be a source of embarrassment for serious scholars pursuing the study of religion.

Even scholars who reject the existence of a historical stage of matriarchy sometimes insist that the symbolism of goddess worship can provide information about the history of female social roles. Some feminists argue, for instance, that the absence of female sacred imagery in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is due to the repression of women in Western societies. This attempt to draw a parallel between the gender of sacred images and women’s roles is misguided. Occasionally the two may parallel each other, but the social role of women may directly contradict or differ significantly from that suggested by a religion’s sacred imagery. A study of Hindu goddess worship does not allow us, for instance, to predict with any certainty the relationship of women to men in Indian society. This same point is made by the historian and women’s studies specialist Judith Ochsorn (in Olson, 1983, p. 18) in her 1982 study of the Middle Eastern goddess Ishtar. According to this scholar, the Near Eastern deities were heavily anthropomorphized. Sometimes they reflected the reality of social roles in the Middle East, but more often they represented a different concept of community—as exemplified by the frequent instances of incest among the deities, a totally foreign idea in the social reality of that period.

Today most scholars of comparative religions, including feminists, would agree that primitive matriarchy is a myth. This does not preclude continued research on male and female roles in prehistoric societies. Because fieldwork has not confirmed the existence of even a single matriarchal society, the matriarchy controversy is a quasi-religious issue that has no place in the serious study of goddess worship. Far more important is the contemporary scholarship of feminists who seek to deepen the understanding of the relationship of human nature to religion without invoking dubious nineteenth-century issues like primitive matriarchy. In much of this work women are searching for a new focus of identity in the modern world. Goddess worship has been intimately linked to this quest.

**The feminist revival of goddess worship.** One reason for the increasing popularity of goddess worship as a subject of inquiry is the expanding influence and scholarly development of women’s studies. According to Carol Christ (in Olson, 1983, p. 235) feminist writings about the gender of deities reflect two distinct types of argumentation: (1) religions that stress the maleness of the supreme being deify the masculine principle and see it as the only source of legitimate authority; (2) the attribution of male qualities to deities reflects distorted concepts derived from alienated male experience in Western societies. Feminists who use the first argument stress the need to eliminate masculine pronouns and gender-specific titles from Jewish and Christian scriptures and liturgy to restore authority to women. Feminists who assert the second argument oppose this simple solution because in their eyes the distorted male image of divinity in Western religions cannot be removed by merely changing gender-specific language. They argue that the symbolism will remain biased because of the dualistic, conquest-oriented, patriar-



chal, and hierarchical infrastructure that underlies these male-oriented religions.

Carol Christ (in Olson, 1983, pp. 238–248) presents a schematic view of feminist solutions to the problem of gender in the worship of deities. According to this scholar, there are four approaches advanced by feminist theologians to resolve the problem of male symbolism of God: (1) male symbols of God can be reinterpreted in nonoppressive ways; (2) language used to refer to God can be made androgynous; (3) female symbolism for the Supreme Being must be introduced in order to create an imagery that reflects dual gender; (4) male symbolism must be deemphasized to provide an opportunity for the Great Goddess, whose existence has been obscured by this symbolism, to reclaim her ascendancy. Western feminists are experimenting with many different ways to introduce female sacred imagery into Judaism and Christianity.

Those feminists who believe sexism to be an integral part of Western religions want no part in saving them from what they see as built-in sexist biases; instead, they advocate a reemergent goddess worship as a focus of religiosity appropriate to complex modern life. These feminists are actively developing extensive experimental liturgies for raising consciousness about goddess worship, both as it existed in antiquity and in religions outside of Western civilization. Thus, goddess worship and imagery are considered to be the focus of a new power for women rooted in the women's liberation movement and grounded in a new symbol system. *The Spiral Dance* by Starhawk is a recipe for the rebirth of an "ancient religion of the Great Goddess." It reflects the conviction among some feminists that goddess worship is a source of strength and creativity for women, and also provides an antidote to the regrettable patriarchal "conquest of nature" theme that characterizes Western thought.

The debate among feminists about these social and theological issues has been a healthy source of revitalization not only in terms of the reawakening of the study of goddess worship but also in terms of scholarly inquiry into assumptions about human nature that lie at the heart of Western religions. The growing literature in this field promises to shed new light on the role of goddess worship in the contemporary world. Consequently, one can expect a steadily increasing growth in the amount of research on the veneration of female deities, deriving particularly from the work of those contemporary feminists who are intentionally constructing new myths to transform traditional patterns of goddess worship into forms that give women a stronger sense of their own identity, power, and meaning in the modern world. Thus, the feminist movement is a major contributing factor in the revitalization of goddess worship as a topic of inquiry among popular writers and scholars in different disciplines.

**The new comparative religions.** A significant new direction is developing in the social sciences after the long siege of behaviorism in psychology and historical particularism in anthropology. The revolt against the errors of nineteenth-

century armchair theoreticians has come to an end. This is reflected in a new comparative religions, which focuses once again on the main themes of human religious experience. Instead of working from a dubious, in fact erroneous, data base, the new comparative religionists are treating these universal themes with the benefit of more than fifty years of extensive field work conducted in various cultures by cautious social scientists. Since the mid-1970s social scientists and religion specialists have been working together more closely. The result is the publication of numerous volumes devoted to the main themes of religion, such as sacrifice, death, rebirth, rites of passage, the evil eye, pilgrimage, and goddess worship. These new works are neither too speculative nor overly cautious about exploring panhuman dimensions of religious experience.

One of the most widely publicized and heavily attended sessions at the American Anthropological Association meetings in San Francisco during 1975 was entitled "Anthropological Inquiries into Mother Worship." This session resulted eventually in an edited volume on the topic (Preston, 1982).

The mid-1970s marked a watershed in the anthropological study of religion. Since that time some anthropologists have been about the business of synthesizing a vast amount of data accumulated over the years on various dimensions of religion. Much of this new information was isolated previously in the contexts of specific ethnographies devoted to the elaboration of particular cultural descriptions. The large numbers of people who attended the session on goddess worship in San Francisco were not attracted by any "star quality" scholars making their usual erudite presentations, but rather the time was ripe for introducing once again a topic that had remained more or less dormant for several decades. An extensive amount of data had been gathered on goddess worship in many different cultural contexts, and no one knew what to do with it. Scholars were seeking a new frame of reference. Historians of religion had been synthesizing the work of anthropologists for years. It was now time for anthropologists to return to their original task of making sense of a topic like goddess worship by placing it in a comparative framework.

The new approach to goddess worship, though cautious, strives to retain a delicate balance between cultural context and the broader panhuman issues that continue to be vital in the comparative study of religion. Despite the early years of ambitious speculation and the later period of overcautious skepticism, many questions about goddess worship remain unanswered. More knowledge about the relationship between male and female deities is needed. Why in some religions are female sacred images almost totally absent? What about the role of goddess worship in the development of complex forms of social organization? Why do female sacred images continue to thrive, even in Communist countries where religion is not officially sanctioned? How do the personal religious experiences of devotees who turn to goddesses differ from those who turn to male gods for answers

to their prayers? Why is goddess worship associated with such great antiquity? How does the worship of female deities fit into the postindustrial world? The new comparative religions, with its balanced perspective that incorporates questions of panhuman and culturally specific levels of analysis, has been another stimulus for the revitalization of major themes of religious significance shared by human beings the world over.

No single theory is adequate to explain the multifaceted phenomenon of goddess worship. What deeply felt impulse is there that continuously kindles the veneration of female sacred images for thousands of years among human populations? Are Victor Turner and Edith Turner (1978, p. 236) correct when they ask whether the resurgent interest in female sacred images during the modern era is an index of discontent with male iconoclasm, technology, progress, and bureaucratization? Elsewhere this author has written (Preston, 1982, pp. 340–341) that the loneliness of urban life, the contemporary emphasis on independence, the fast pace of technological society, and the radical severing of humankind's relationship with the earth have left people in postindustrial societies with a deep sense of disenchantment that is perceived to have the potential to be healed by a return to sacred qualities, which are often considered to be best expressed through a divine mother image. Even if one does not agree with the Jungian idea of a feminine archetype, all humans understand the mother-infant bond and recognize the related universal symbol of the womb as mother of life. The worship of female sacred images is deeply entwined with a panhuman experience of this primary bond. While not every incidence of goddess worship is an expression of the attempt by humans to return to the primary bond of origin, there can be no doubt this theme underlies the strong continuity of goddess worship expressed in so many different forms and in such great profusion throughout the world.

SEE ALSO Archetypes; Women's Studies in Religion.

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**GODS AND GODDESSES.** In human religious experience, manifestations of sacred power (hierophanies) provide centers of meaning, order, worship, and ethics. Humans have always felt that real life is in close contact with sacred power, and that sacred power is often encountered in the form of divine beings. Ideas and experiences of these goddesses and gods thus are not so much intellectual reflections as existential concerns, revolving around the fundamental human questions of life in this world. The manner in which the divine beings are imagined and experienced, and the particular types, functions, and personalities of the divine beings, depend on the cultural context of the particular community of people.

Gods and goddesses fit most aptly into what have been called polytheistic cultures, where the divine reality has not been unified into monistic or monotheistic systems. Monistic views still allow for goddesses and gods as manifestations or emanations of one divine reality, whereas a monotheistic worldview absorbs their functions as attributes of the one God, or downgrades them to helpers, such as angels or saints. This article will focus on the major types of gods and goddesses in the cultures in which plurality of divine beings is taken for granted.

Scholarly discussion on gods and goddesses has raised a number of issues. One question has to do with the relation between gods and human society. Even though the goddesses and gods of a particular society necessarily reflect the values and traditions of that society, one cannot assume direct correspondences between the mythological divine world and humans. Just because a society emphasizes a mother goddess

does not mean that it was originally a matriarchy, for example. It seems that myths about the gods and goddesses cannot be taken as direct reflections of human historical experiences. At the same time, careful study of the changing visions of the divine beings may suggest some facets of the dynamics of social change within a particular community of people. For example, a change in dominance from one god or goddess to another may reflect the rising power of a particular group within the society with its mythological concerns. Or a change in a particular goddess or god's function could conceivably reflect new needs and concerns on the part of the people.

Another issue questions whether it is possible to identify the "original" function of certain goddesses and gods, in contrast to added or accumulated functions, or to distinguish between "primordial" gods, on the one hand, and lesser spirits or deified humans, on the other. While these distinctions can provide valuable insights, they can also be misleading. Although certain central functions may stand out, like those of creator, warrior, or fertility giver, often a particular goddess or god displays a number of functions, and it cannot be determined with certainty which should be considered the original or primordial. In fact, most divine beings are highly complex and are perceived to meet the needs of the people in a variety of ways.

In the last several years this discussion has been carried on particularly by feminist scholars who have focused a great deal of study on goddesses, with results that have enhanced our understanding of the importance, richness, and complexity of the individual goddesses. Earlier scholarship emphasized the importance and variety of male gods while stereotyping goddesses as secondary and limited to mothering and fertility functions. But feminist scholars have brought the study of goddesses to the fore and shown convincingly that they are no less important in power and sovereignty than male gods, and they are equally diverse in their functions.

One central issue is the question whether there was, in the prehistorical period, one unified Great Goddess (e.g., Mother Earth) that is somehow revealed or expressed in the various goddesses of the different peoples. J. J. Bachofen gave impetus to this theory in *Das Mutterrecht* (1861) by arguing that mothers ruled over families in the prehistoric era. Other scholars, such as Sir James Frazer in *The Golden Bough* (1911–1915), Erich Neumann in *The Great Mother: An Analysis of the Archetype* (1955), and E. O. James in *The Cult of the Mother Goddess* (1959), established the idea that the cult of the Mother Goddess was prevalent throughout the ancient world and that it reflects an essential human archetype. Archaeologists James Mellaart and Marija Gimbutas argued that evidence from archaeology supports the theory that the cult of the Great Goddess was reflected in the female figurines and other feminine symbols which dominated these societies. Gimbutas put forth the view that peoples of ancient Europe and the Near East were devoted to the worship of

the Mother Goddess in her various forms and lived in matriarchal, peaceful societies. They were disrupted and changed by the invasion of war-like Indo-Europeans, who brought their male gods and established patriarchal, violent societies.

Many feminist scholars, through extensive critical investigations of goddesses in past and present world religions, have questioned this theory of a unified Great Goddess behind all goddess figures, and of the societal changes that took place. These scholars, such as Lucy Goodison and Christine Morris in *Ancient Goddesses: The Myth and the Evidence*, argue that the theory that all goddesses represent mother or fertility power actually constricts and diminishes their role. Rather, they find goddesses representing the whole range of divine functions—creators, rulers, warriors, fertility-givers, promoters of sexuality, mistresses of animals, bringers of destruction and death, among others. And they show that male gods also include so-called feminine functions such as giving birth, nurturing, and bringing peace. The emphasis in this scholarship is not on uncovering a unified Goddess archetype, but on recognizing the complexity, diversity, and significance of goddess figures in the cultures of the world, past and present.

Yet discussion of the Great Goddess still plays a significant role in some contexts. Hindus, with their full array of goddesses, have long speculated about one Great Goddess (Mahādevī), manifested in various goddesses, including Pārvatī, Lakṣmī, Sītā, Durgā, and Kālī, while at the same time exulting in the individual aspects and activities of these goddesses. A significant appropriation of the idea of the Great Goddess has also taken place in the contemporary western movement variously called Goddess Spirituality, Goddess Religion, and Women's Spirituality. Growing out of feminism, Goddess Spirituality resonates to the perception of the Great Goddess, affirming women's bodies and lives and providing powerful images of the mysteries of life and death, regeneration, creativity, and the divine force in all of nature.

**HISTORY AND MORPHOLOGY OF DIVINE BEINGS.** To understand the full dimensions of gods and goddesses in the various cultures of the world, it is helpful to keep in mind both the cultural history and the morphology of human involvement with what they have considered sacred beings. Historically, all the different deity forms that have developed need to be understood and related to the cultural areas in which they are at home. People of each particular culture choose certain types of sacred modalities as strong and efficacious, and these modalities define the goddesses and gods as they are experienced and described within that culture. There is always an ongoing process of revaluation of the gods and goddesses, even in archaic cultures that seem to change very little over long periods of time. The modalities of the sacred are dynamic, one form diminishing in importance or becoming absorbed into another form, while new experiences give strength to other forms of the sacred. The way in which the people envision the gods and goddesses reflects something of

their social, political, economic, and cultural experience in a living process.

In considering the morphology of goddesses and gods across various cultures, the modalities by which the sacred is experienced are embedded in the structures of nature itself and in the structures of human life. Almost every significant reality in human experience has been seen in one culture or another as the arena of a sacred manifestation: sky, earth, sun, moon, mountains, water, hunting, planting, sexuality, washing, childbirth, eating, rulership, war, death, and so forth. Some common cross-cultural themes exist in the way peoples of the world have envisioned gods and goddesses. Since their power meets human existence precisely at the most vital and crucial areas of life, humans experience these divine manifestations in concrete, compelling forms. The goddesses and gods thus revealed are felt to have efficacious power, personality, and will. The fact that the divine beings have personality and will is rooted in the sense that human existence is not just aimless and haphazard but is related to the sacred pattern created or structured by the will of the gods and goddesses.

Each people's system of gods and goddesses depends on their traditional cultural context, for deities are always envisioned in ways appropriate to a culture. For example, divine beings in archaic hunting societies include ancestors, sky and astral gods, and representations of mother-type goddesses. But most characteristic of hunting cultures are sacred beings associated with animals: culture heroes in animal form and, above all, masters and mistresses of animals. These are powerful gods and goddesses who represent the sacred as experienced in the people's relationship to animals.

Planting cultures also know animal forms of gods, but here earth gods of fertility come to the fore. Earth goddesses and gods are creators and givers of life, appearing also in vegetarian goddess forms as, for example, Mother of Grain. Atmospheric gods—storm and sun—are important in that they fertilize the earth goddess and bring fecundity. Dying and rising deities often symbolize the cycle of vegetal fertility. Ancestors or culture heroes are important as the divine beings who originated cultivated plants.

Pastoral peoples are of many types and often include some planting activities in addition to keeping their herds. Sky and atmospheric gods tend to be supreme among these peoples. But they also revere divine powers associated with herds of animals, because sacred life-giving power comes to the people especially in relation to their herds.

Cultures that have developed beyond these archaic levels create very complex pantheons of goddesses and gods. For example, agricultural city-state societies like those of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, or Mexico typically have a hierarchical pantheon ruling over the city-state through a human ruler, the pantheon mirroring in some respects the various functions of the city-state. The complex civilizations established throughout Europe and Asia by Indo-European



peoples retained some elements of the early pastoralist gods but greatly expanded and developed these pantheons as they interacted with the religious traditions of the indigenous peoples in their various settlement areas.

In most cultures the plurality of divine powers is understood to operate as some sort of pantheon, a system of gods and goddesses functioning as a sacred community. Pantheons arise from the experience of the sacred in different arenas of nature and society. They change over time as some functions become more important and others less so, reflecting dynamic changes in social groups and culture. Often a pantheon has some kind of hierarchal structure based on the different functions of its goddesses and gods. There may be a sovereign or head of the pantheon, for example, a father of the gods (such as 'El for the ancient Canaanites) or a great goddess who ranks first before all in power and authority (such as Amaterasu in early Shintō). Sometimes the head of the pantheon is envisioned as old or remote, and the vital functions of maintaining life and order are performed by other powerful, immanent gods and goddesses. The pantheon functions as a particular culture's way of understanding the various experiences of the sacred in a symbolic system, providing orientation and unity to human existence in a world made up of a plurality of divine wills.

**TYPOLOGIES OF GODDESSES AND GODS.** In order to sketch the rich scope of divine beings in human history and culture, two somewhat different perspectives on gods and goddesses are explored here: a cosmic typology and a social typology. The cosmic typology outlines some of the epiphanies of sacred power through the structures of the cosmos and the organization of these divine forms. The social typology explores sacred beings in relation to functions in vital areas of human society and culture.

**Cosmic goddesses and gods.** Many religious traditions expressly recognize a cosmic typology of gods and goddesses. The Greeks divided their gods into the Olympians and the chthonic gods, and early Shintō myths spoke of *kami* of heaven and *kami* of earth. Deities of the Indo-European peoples typically are related to the three realms (Skt., *lokas*) of sky, atmosphere, and earth. In ancient Mesopotamian cultures, gods had cosmic functions, such as An of the heavens, Enlil of the storm, and Enki, lord of the earth and waters.

**Sky gods and goddesses.** Among cosmic gods, the sky deities generally take precedence. Even the most primal, archaic cultures know of a primordial supreme god who is manifested in the vault of the sky. The characteristics of this god are drawn from the experience of the sky: this is the high god with authority over all, all-seeing and thus all-knowing, present everywhere and sovereign in power. The sky god is also the ultimate creator and sustainer of everything, as well as the law-giver and moral overseer. At the same time this god is remote, a *deus otiosus*. Other goddesses and gods of the sky and atmosphere are often thought of as helpers of the supreme sky god. Tribes of southeastern Australia have a sky god called Baiame, or Daramulun, who is self-created, causes

rain, and sees and hears all. The Yoruba sky god is Ọlọrun, an almighty, immortal, all-knowing creator. An of ancient Mesopotamia is the supreme authority in the sky, presiding over the assembly of the gods. Varuṇa of Vedic India is visible everywhere, with the wind as his breath; he gives rain and thunder and is all-knowing, thousand-eyed, and is the universal king and the guardian of cosmic order. Ahura Mazdā, the Iranian supreme god, and Zeus, who became the high god of the Greeks, retain this celestial character of sovereignty, as do the related sky gods Jupiter of the Romans and Óðinn (Odin) of the Scandinavians. Among the ancient Chinese, Tian (Heaven) was considered the upholder of the universal moral order. Hathor, mistress of the sky in ancient Egypt, was closely identified with the king's sovereignty, and another sky goddess, Nut, extended that sovereignty to the journey into the afterlife. These sky gods and goddesses also take on many other specialized functions.

**Meteorological gods and goddesses.** Deities associated with meteorological and atmospheric phenomena often represent specialized functions or attributes of the supreme sky god. Important among these are, first of all, the storm and wind deities. Moving away from sovereignty and transcendence, they express fecundity, creative force, rain-providing power, epiphanies of force and violence and war, sources of energy for nature and for civil order. An, the Mesopotamian sky god, in this aspect is called the "fecund breed-bull"; he manifests his powers in the spring sky with thunder and fertilizes Ki (Earth) with rain. In this form, too, appear such great storm gods as Enlil of Mesopotamia, Indra of India, Min of ancient Egypt, Baal and Hadad of the Northwest Semites, Marduk of Babylon, and Þórr (Thor) of Scandinavia. While the supreme sky god is quite remote and transcendent, these storm gods become more immanent: Varuṇa the sky god becomes old and feeble, and Indra takes over; 'El is sometimes pictured as old and impotent, and Baal moves to central stage as the fecundator. The storm gods overflow with strength and vitality, burst open the clouds for rain, send fertility to the fields, and keep the cosmic forces going. Wind and storm are destructive as well as fecundating, and the ravages of such storm gods and goddesses as Þórr (Thor), Enlil of Mesopotamia, Anat of the Canaanites, Tlaloc of the Aztecs, Ngai of the Maasai, and Ẓango of the Yoruba are dreaded.

Sun divinities are meteorological sacred powers related to the sky, embodying and dispensing the power of life. The sun god brings light, enlightenment and wisdom and is often characterized by unchangeability, stability, and order. Shamash, sun god in ancient Mesopotamia, was considered god of oracles and diviners; Hammurabi called him the great judge of heaven and earth, source of laws and order. In ancient Egypt, the sun god, fighting against darkness and chaos, was thought daily to conquer darkness and create light anew. In many cultures the sun god or goddess plays the role of the supreme god; Re-Atum in ancient Egypt, Huitzilopochtli in Mexico, the sun god among various North

American Indians, and Amaterasu in Japan exemplify this. The sun god also has the power to destroy, especially in desert cultures; this god overpowers the living with heat and drought, devouring as well as generating life. The sun god has connections with the underworld, like Re of ancient Egypt who leads dead souls through the underworld, or Utu of Mesopotamia who acts as their judge during the nightly journey.

Goddesses and gods associated with the stars and planets frequently are experienced as the eyes and/or ears of the sky god, lending themselves to the all-seeing and all-knowing qualities of the supreme god. The Masai of Kenya believe the sky-rain god Ngai has universal vision through his nighttime “eyes”; a falling star is one of the eyes of Ngai coming closer to earth in order to see better. The sky god Varuṇa is “thousand-eyed,” and the Samoyed sky god Num employs the stars as his ears, through which he listens to the earth from the boundless regions of the sky. Inanna, Sumerian goddess of the morning and evening star (the planet Venus), was considered to be the source of the king’s power, one who brought the arts of civilization to the city and death and restoration to life. The polestar (north star), because it appears not to move, is seen in many cultures to represent divine power of stability; in India, for example, newlyweds worship Dhruva (the polestar) as a source of constancy in marriage. The complicated movements of the stars and planets led the ancient Babylonians to associate them with divine beings who control events in nature and human life, an idea also expressed by the ancient Greeks and others.

The moon waxes and wanes, disappears and reappears, and thus its divine epiphany epitomizes mysterious power, change and transformation, death and rebirth, fertility and regeneration. Frequently the moon manifests a fertility-giving goddess; this is true for Selene among the Greeks, Rabie among the Wemale of Ceram, and Pe among the Pygmies. There are also lunar elements associated with many of the great goddesses who have other functions. While the moon deity is often thought to be a goddess, in some cultures the moon is considered male, while the sun is a female divine being, as, for example, Tsukiyomi and Amaterasu in Shintō mythology. The moon deity rules especially over the rhythms of life associated with the waters, rain, vegetation, and the fertility of earth and all women. At the same time, the moon goddess or god sometimes becomes the mistress or master of the dead, receiving those who die and regenerating them. Gods of the moon, such as Thoth of ancient Egypt, Nanna of ancient Mesopotamia, and Aningaag of the Inuit (Eskimo), measure time and regulate natural phenomena.

*Earth gods and goddesses.* Earth deities form an important and complex category of the cosmic typology. Basic types include the various manifestations of the earth itself: waters, mountains, the great many hierophanies associated with animal forms and vegetal forms—all the divine aspects that seem “given” in the powerful epiphanies of sacred earth.

The earth is the primary source and nurturer of all life, and it is also the sacred power that receives all life back again. Many human cultures have perceived a particularly significant epiphany of the sacred associated with earth itself, sometimes named Mother Earth. Hesiod states in his *Theogony* that Gaia (Earth) first gave birth to Ouranos (Heaven), and the hierogamy between Gaia and Ouranos initiated the whole process of life. Humans perceive that the earth itself is endlessly creative but at the same time passive and indistinct, the repository of a wealth of sacred forces. Manifest in the very soil of the place where humans live, this earth type of goddess is expressed first of all in motherhood (that is, inexhaustible fruitfulness) from very ancient times in human experience. In the long saga of human life prior to the discovery of agriculture, various forms of mother goddesses played an important role in the way humans understood their existence; the multitude of female figurines found from Paleolithic cultures provides evidence of the importance of this power. And so it has continued through all human history. Children come from the earth mother; the sick are regenerated by being brought again into close contact with her; the dead are returned to her womb. For example, Ala, worshiped by the Igbo of Africa, is the source of fertility for the land and the family, the abode of the ancestors, and the guardian of laws; barren women pray to her for children, and men ask her for success in trade or increase in livestock. Throughout human history, goddesses with mothering and nurturing functions, together with fertility-giving functions, have been widespread, including both great goddesses widely worshiped and countless local goddesses.

It is striking that often these creative, mothering goddesses also have a dark side, seen as a source of violence and death. For Hindus, the great goddess Kālī epitomizes the ravages of time and death, as she is pictured with bloody fangs and devouring mouth, a necklace of human heads, and a skirt of human arms. She devours her children, and yet many Hindus worship her as loving mother. Equally gruesome are mother goddesses among the Aztecs, as, for example, Coatlicue, pictured with a skirt of writhing snakes, a blouse of human hands and hearts, heads of serpents for hands, claws for feet, with twin spurts of blood gushing from her decapitated body. Her central creative act was giving birth to the great war god Huitzilopochtli just as her four hundred children sought to kill her. Huitzilopochtli, born fully grown and armed, slaughtered the siblings, providing a central motif for the ritual human sacrifices at the Templo Mayor of Tenochtitlan. Such goddesses demonstrate the human experience that creativity, life, and growth are inevitably linked with violence, death, and decay.

Indistinct and unformed like the earth, yet similarly powerful, the *fons et origo* (font and origin) of all life is the sacred power manifest in water. Water symbolizes the primal reality from which all forms come and to which all forms return. Nun in ancient Egyptian mythology, for example, is the primordial ocean in which are the germs of all things.

Rich in seeds, the divine water is homologized to semen and fertilizes earth, animals, and women. Hapi, a male god of the Nile, is often depicted with breasts to show that he is a bringer of life. Enki, Sumerian god of waters, helps to organize and create the world and human life. Water also purifies and regenerates, and so the Iranian water divinity Aradvī Sūrā Anāhitā is thought to purify humans and multiply flocks. A great many local cults are associated with springs, streams, and lakes in various religions. For Hindus, Gaṅgā (the River Ganges) is a powerful goddess, nourishing the land and mediating between this world and the divine world. The beautiful Yoruba river goddess Oṣun bestows gifts of rulership and wealth on the rulers of the towns and cities through which her river passes. Many of the most powerful deities of the Ashanti are those associated with rivers and lakes; they can cure sicknesses and social ills, but they also have destructive powers. So water deities are ambivalent: water both generates life and destroys it. There is a sense that the goddesses and gods of the waters are capricious, randomly doing good or evil. Well known from Greek mythology is Poseidon, the untamed and faithless god of the ocean; from his palace at the bottom of the sea he swallows the world and renews it in rhythmic cycles. In Scandinavian mythology, Ran, the sea god Aegir's wife, draws people down with her net. Sedna, the sea goddess of the Inuit, is the mother of sea animals, but when humans violate taboos, she sends famine and destruction with icy dispassion. Water gods and goddesses can be symbolic of chaos, taking the form of dragons and snakes, both destroying the world and bringing rain and fertility; Apsu and Tiamat in Babylon, Prince Yamm in Canaan, and Vṛtra in India exemplify this duality.

Powerful epiphanies of earth deities are experienced through mountains, strong and distant pillars of heaven, stabilizing the earth and providing order and fertility. Most mountains in Japan, such as Mount Fuji, are felt to be the locale of *kami* presence; and Taishan in China is a divine mountain that attracts extensive worship. Śiva is called "lord of the mountains" in Hindu tradition, and his consort Pārvatī is "daughter of the mountains"; their favorite abode is on Mount Kailash in the Himalayas. The ancient Hebrews worshiped 'El Shaddai, apparently related to the mighty mountains, and the Israelite god Yahveh was first encountered as the god of Mount Sinai. Mountains are the source of life-giving springs and streams, and well as violent storms—and so many storm gods are linked with mountains, such as Baal-Hadad among the Canaanites. Pele, goddess of volcanic fire in Hawaii, demonstrates the destructive aspect of volcanic mountain epiphanies.

Reaching back to the dawn of human existence is the sense that the sacred is manifested in animal form. Epiphanies are associated with animals that are powerful and terrifying, those that exhibit wisdom or secret knowledge, those that are symbolically connected with the power of the earth, the moon, or the waters, and above all those that share sacred life-power with humans through their very flesh and blood.

Animal symbols of goddesses and gods include the cow in ancient Egypt, a manifestation of the sky goddess Nun; the fox Inari in Japan; the coyote in North America; the bear among the Ainu; the buffalo among North American Indians; serpents and dragons in a great variety of cultures; and others, including caribou, elephants, dolphins, whales, and eagles. Powerful deities in animal form are linked to rain and storm, in particular the bull (Baal, Indra, Rudra, etc.), the thunderbird, and the dragon. Imaging the divinities in animal form expresses a sense of close relation to the sacred life that sustains animals and humans alike.

With the agricultural revolution came also a revolution in cosmic epiphanies, giving rise to various forms of goddesses and gods of vegetation, as well as giving new emphasis to the fertilizing male earth gods. Plant life is an epiphany of sacred power. For example, in a bas-relief of Assur, the upper part of a god's body is represented as coming out of a tree; and a seal from the Indus Valley civilization depicts a divine being within a tree faced by a group of worshipers. Demeter was a goddess responsible for grain for the ancient Greeks, and among the Cherokee the goddess Corn Woman is the origin of the corn plant. Among the Polynesians the growth of plants such as banana trees and taros actually comes from the sacred concentration of power in the ancestral *dema* deities of the time of the beginnings. Characteristic of plant life is the rhythmic cycle of death and birth, season after season, and so the divinities of vegetation reflect this pattern of death and rebirth; this is true, for example, of Baal of the Canaanites and Tammuz of Mesopotamia. Gods of phallic energy, such as the ancient Egyptian Min and the Indian Śiva, express another aspect of the divine source of generative power.

**Gods and goddesses of the underworld.** Chthonic deities live in the dark recesses of the earth and are especially related to the underworld. In some cases, the gods of the underworld are raging, destructive monsters who bring down even the gods of life; such a figure is Mot in Canaanite mythology. The ruler of the place of the dead is grim and dreaded; this is true of Hades in ancient Greece, Ereshkigal in Mesopotamia, and Seth and Nephthys in Egypt. Sedna, sea goddess of the Inuit, and Taishan, a mountain god of the Chinese, are cosmic divinities who receive the dead into their abodes. These goddesses and gods of the world of the dead are ambiguous in the extreme: dreaded and avoided, they still have sacred powers that can assist people in this most critical passage of life. Often the deities of the underworld are related to the deities of life-giving power; Satene among the Wemale of West Ceram is an example. After all, it is the divine mother who gives and nourishes life who also finally receives back the dead. In illustration of this, figurines of pregnant goddesses have been found in prehistoric burial sites, providing images of life-giving power within the realm of death.

**Gods and goddesses of social functions.** Much research has been done on the social functions of goddesses and gods, especially on the triad of functions common to Indo-European divinities: (1) a sovereignty function with magical

and juridical aspects; (2) a function of physical power and bravery, especially in war; and (3) a function of fertility and prosperity. Georges Dumézil in particular has shown how this triad of functions penetrates all the societies that stem from proto-Indo-European culture, although each culture went on to develop their divinities further. While this important system of categorization is incorporated to some extent in the social typology used here, it should be noted that this scheme does not apply as readily to non-Indo-European cultures. For example, many deities of the ancient Near East and of Africa combine the sovereign and the warrior functions, and other ancient societies do not so clearly separate the food-producing class and its attendant deities from the warrior class and its gods. Most of the great gods and goddesses of non-Indo-European peoples cannot be neatly pigeonholed into this triad of functional classes; thus the following categories are amplified somewhat.

**Creators and guardians of society and order.** Supreme or sovereign deities often are considered to be creators and preservers of society and order. Often the supreme god creates human society and originates and upholds cosmic and moral law. This god holds people responsible on the basis of the moral design, judges them, and punishes them, either directly or through other deities who perform this function. In Vedic thought, the sky god Varuṇa is the cosmocrator and also the upholder of *ṛta*, the cosmic and moral law to which all things are subject. In theistic Hinduism, Vaiṣṇavas see Viṣṇu as the originator and preserver of society. Kṛṣṇa, *avatāra* of Viṣṇu, advises Arjuna to fulfill the duties of his warrior caste, for even Viṣṇu performs his *dharma* (duty) so that the worlds continue to function (*Bhagavadgītā* 3.3–24). Yahveh of the Hebrews both originates human society and gives forth the law that governs all peoples. Jupiter, the Roman high god, is the guardian of oaths, treaties, and moral duty. Shangdi, “Lord Above,” worshiped by the Shang rulers in ancient China, sends both weal and woe in governing the fortunes of the rulers. And Tian, “Heaven,” supreme deity for the Zhou rulers, provided a moral mandate for just rulers but withdrew it for those who were unjust. In Babylon, the assembly of the great gods, having created humans as servants of the gods, supervises human society and determines human destinies. Widespread among African peoples is the notion that the supreme god is the ultimate originator and authority governing human life, even as other gods fulfill the needs of everyday life. In Hindu tradition, the great goddess Śrī Lakṣmī, embodying Śrī (radiance, creative power), was thought to provide sovereignty and power to the kings in their rule.

Sometimes the supreme god or gods create the first gods, who then complete the creation. In Mesoamerican myths, the supreme dual creator god engendered several sons, including Tezcatlipoca and Quetzalcoatl, who then created the universe and the other gods. In other mythic scenerios, the original humans are first produced and then as divine culture heroes they complete the creation and over-

see its order. For example, the *dema* deities of the myths of the Marind-anim of New Guinea create the vital aspects of human culture and morality by their actions in the time of the beginnings. Ancestors often take the place of the high god as guardians of human morality, although the high god is recognized as the ultimate authority, the court of last resort. The high gods may have inspectors, like Eṣu of the Yoruba and Satan of the Israelites (*Job* 1–2), to help in upholding the divine order.

**Goddesses and gods of protection and war.** Gods who display physical power often function as gods of protection and war. This role is ascribed especially to cosmic storm goddesses and gods, such as Indra in the Vedas and Þórr (Thor) in Scandinavian mythology. Ancient Near Eastern cultures have combined sovereign storm gods to function as divine warriors and protectors; Marduk of the Babylonians and Yahveh of the Hebrews are two such gods. Mars of the Romans is a classical god of war, protecting the state against its enemies but also preserving fields and herds against damage and disaster. In Mesoamerica, the powerful warrior god Tezcatlipoca collaborated in creating the world and is present everywhere, but he also promotes conflicts and induces people to transgress. Huitzilopochtli, Aztec war god and sun god, was born in full warrior regalia and killed threatening deities so as to renew world order. For the Yoruba, Ogun is god of hunting, iron-making, and war; in great festivals he is worshiped by hunters, blacksmiths, and warrior chiefs, as well as the king. Mixcoatl, central Mexican warrior god, was also worshiped as god of the hunt. Many goddesses, such as Athena among the Greeks, Anat in Canaanite mythology, Sekhmet in ancient Egypt, and Durgā in Hindu tradition, are also presented as divine warriors and protectors.

Deified humans rise to become gods of war and protection, such as the famous Chinese general Guandi, who was deified as the warrior protector *par excellence*. The Christian apostle St. James is known as Santiago in Spain, where his body was miraculously brought after his death; he became the warrior saint for the Christian Spaniards, driving out the Muslims during the reconquest of Spain. Then Santiago was invoked as the warrior-protector during the conquest of Mesoamerica, helping to defeat the Indians who resisted becoming Christian. Gods can also appear in human form to destroy evil, as do the *avatāras* of Viṣṇu, whom this high god sends out from age to age to battle the rise of evil in the world.

Overall, a great variety of goddesses and gods function as divine protectors in every conceivable time of crisis: Castor and Pollux protect warriors for the Romans; in China the deified girl who became Tianshang Shengmu (Holy Mother in Heaven), known popularly as Mazu, is the protector of sailors; Min of ancient Egypt is the protector of travelers, as are the *kami* of the road in Japan and Saint Christopher in popular Christianity; and gods and goddesses all over the world protect women in childbirth and children as they grow up.



**Goddesses and gods of fertility and prosperity.** Deities promoting fertility and prosperity fit into an extremely broad and diverse category; in fact, the majority of gods and goddesses take on some of these functions, and the remaining categories listed below could be included in a general way in this basic category.

All the goddesses and gods associated with hunting and agriculture belong in this group. It is perhaps in securing and producing food that humans experience most deeply the interpenetration of divine cosmic powers and the divine forces of society and culture. In hunting cultures special importance is given to the hierophanies related to the animal herd most essential to the survival of the people, such as bears, reindeer, caribou, seals, and walruses. Sacred power manifests itself in mythological form as the master or mistress of animals; this god or goddess is an archetype of the herd, protector and master of animal life, who also provides boons to humans, giving to them of the sacred life of the animals. The Caribou Man of the Naskapi Indians (of Labrador), the Great Bull Buffalo of the Blackfeet Indians, and Sedna as the keeper of sea animals among the Inuit are examples of this type of divine being.

Planting peoples associate the sacred work of planting and harvesting with the deities who originate and continue the powers of vegetal fertility. In West Ceram, myths tell how the body of the goddess Hainuwele was cut up and planted in the earth, where it changed into root plants that the people have continued to cultivate. Widely known is the Mother of Grain, exemplified by Demeter in ancient Greece as goddess of the cultivated soil, and Corn Woman of Native American tribes.

A primary concern in the realm of fertility is human procreation, and most societies have deities of love, marriage, and procreation. In Greek mythology, Hera, wife of Zeus, is goddess of marriage, and Aphrodite and Eros are instigators of love. Ishtar of Mesopotamia and Hathor of ancient Egypt are goddesses of love and procreation. Freyja in Scandinavian mythology is at the same time divine lover/mistress and wife/mother. All across China, the bodhisattva Guanyin is invoked to help women in conceiving and child-bearing. The central Mexican goddess Xochiquetzal was widely popular as goddess of the arts, physical pleasure, and amorous love. Popular Mexican conceptions of the Virgin Mary, especially La Virgen de Guadalupe, identify her with indigenous fertility goddesses who occupied the land prior to the coming of the Europeans. Aborigines of Australia have myths about the Great Rainbow Snake who is responsible for human fertility.

An extension of this divine function of fertility is the granting of prosperity and wealth. In Scandinavia this function is performed by the deities known as the Vanir: Freyr, for example, grants peace and fertility, and his father, Njörðr (Njord), dispenses prosperity to those who go to sea. In the Hindu pantheon, Lakṣmī, the divine wife of Viṣṇu, is the goddess of wealth and happiness, granting sovereign power

to kings and prosperity to subjects. And Gaṇeśa, the popular elephant-headed god, is widely worshiped as the overcomer of obstacles and the bringer of good fortune. The human aspiration is summed up in the Chinese popular triad, the Gods of Posterity, Prosperity, and Longevity.

**Domestic and community gods and goddesses.** The center of concern for fertility and prosperity is the home, and many goddesses and gods dwell and function within it, guarding the door, presiding over the hearth, sustaining marital ties, and granting children—everything that makes for happy home life. Hestia is the goddess of the hearth for the Greeks, as Vesta is for the Romans. Among the ancient Aryans, Agni, the god of fire, also presides over the family cult of the hearth. Neith in ancient Egypt is skilled in the domestic arts, as is Athena among the Greeks. For the Ainu of northern Japan, the fire goddess, Iresu-Huchi, presides over the home, giving peace and prosperity, receiving and keeping children who have died. Traditional Japanese homes have images of Daikoku and Ebisu as protectors of the household, and the Chinese have Zao Jun, the god of the cooking stove, who watches over and brings prosperity to the family. For the Romans, the *penates* guard the storeroom, and the *lares* guard the family estate boundaries.

Beyond the home, local communities have gods of protection and prosperity. At the entrance to traditional Japanese villages stands a stone image of the bodhisattva Jizō, erected for the protection and welfare of the village. And the Chinese earth god Tudi Gong is worshiped in traditional villages; he is the god rooted in the locality who keeps track of village happenings and generally oversees the prosperity and welfare of the community. For cities, there are the Gods of Moats and Walls, to perform the necessary bureaucratic functions in the divine realm. In India, most traditional villages have a powerful local deity (*grāmadevatā*), usually a goddess, celebrated in rousing festivals, thought of both as village founder and protector and also occasional source of disease and disaster.

#### **Gods and goddesses of healing, sickness, and death.**

A major concern in human life has always been sickness and death; appropriately many goddesses and gods operate in this critical area. Some bring sickness and death, others cure sickness and protect the dead, and still others perform both functions. Well known is the Greek god Asklepios, who presides over healing and medicine. In China, Baosheng Dadi was a human doctor who after death became a god of medicine and healing. Traditional Japanese keep images of the Buddha Yakushi, king of medicines, in their homes for health. Some gods and goddesses specialize in bringing about sickness: the Pakoro Kamui brings smallpox to the Ainu; Irra is the dreaded plague of ancient Mesopotamia; and Namtar, the herald of Ereshkigal, Mesopotamian goddess of the underworld, has sixty diseases that he can spread among humans.

The ambiguity of divine power is often expressed in the existence of one deity who is both the bringer of health and prosperity and the agent of destruction and death. Hermes,

protector and guide of travelers, becomes the grim psychopomp who guides souls to Hades. In the Vedas, the god Rudra often brings sickness and destruction, although he is also revered as the healer. The Great Rainbow Snake of the Australians, Hina of the Hawaiians, and Kālī of Hinduism all promote fertility and birth but also cause destruction and death. Human hopes of merciful treatment in the passage of death are reflected in the existence of many goddesses and gods who guard, nourish, guide or otherwise help the deceased. Hathor of ancient Egypt nourishes the dead, and the *bodhisattva* Jizō in Japan is especially revered as the receiver and protector of infants who die. Yama of Hinduism, as the first mortal to die, guides the dead to the celestial world. Amida (Skt., Amitābha) is popularly worshiped in Japan as the merciful Buddha who, when a person dies, appears with his holy retinue to lead the soul to rebirth in the Pure Land paradise. Some cults link the worshiper to the story of the deity's death and resurrection. Prominent cults of this type are that of Osiris and Isis in Egypt, Tammuz in Mesopotamia, as well as several of the Hellenistic mystery religions.

#### Gods and goddesses of culture, arts, and technology.

Divinities related to cultural expressions are quite diverse, with roles corresponding to the needs and experience of a particular society. Among divine culture heroes are Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods for the benefit of humans; Blacksmith in Dogon tradition, who acquired seeds from heaven and brought them to earth for the first crops; Rāma, the carrier of culture, whose feats are recounted in the Hindu *Rāmāyaṇa*; Nyikang, the first king of the Shilluk of Africa; and Quetzalcoatl, the deified hero of the Aztec. Some culture heroes are thought of as the original humans who created the vital aspects of human existence in the mythic time of the beginnings. The *dema* of the Marind-anim and the ancestors in the Dreaming of Australian myths provide the prototypes for human cultural activities such as planting, sexuality, and festivals. The changing image of the trickster, such as Coyote among North American Indians, perhaps could fit here; though not necessarily worshiped as a god, the trickster typically wrests some cultural benefit for humans from the gods.

Gods and goddesses are patrons of the arts, representing the creative force and the secret knowledge of individual arts. Creativity comes from divine sources, and so worship of gods and goddesses provides inspiration and creative energy for poets, writers, sculptors, painters, weavers, dancers, musicians, and various other artists. Sarasvatī in Hinduism is the goddess of learning, art, and music, widely worshiped in school festivals. Thoth, the god of wisdom in ancient Egypt, is endowed with complete knowledge and is the inventor of all the arts and sciences: arithmetic, surveying, geometry, astronomy, soothsaying, magic, medicine, surgery, music, drawing, and—above all—hieroglyphic writing. In India, Śiva is the lord of the dance, inspiring festival dancers; Ogun inspires ecstatic dancing among the Yoruba as well as creative body art done with iron tools.

There are goddesses and gods for almost every conceivable occupation, craft, and technology. Njorðr (Njord) of

Scandinavia is patron of those who build ships and go to sea. In Greek mythology, Herakles and Hermes are associated especially with merchants, Athena is associated with women artisans, and Hephaistos, the god of fire, is the creative flame of the forge in metalwork. Amaterasu in Shintō tradition was linked to the art of weaving. Among the Yoruba it is believed that Ogun clears away obstacles and gives prosperity to all those who work with iron and steel—warriors, hunters, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, barbers, butchers, and (in modern times) mechanics and taxi drivers. Hermes is the patron not only of merchants but also of thieves and rogues; and Inari of Japan is the *kami* of rice growers as well as geisha and prostitutes.

#### Gods and goddesses of esoteric knowledge and magic.

The mysterious character of divine power finds expression in deities associated with secret mysteries and magical powers that are available only to those who have special knowledge or have been initiated into the worship of these goddesses and gods. The high god of the Indo-Europeans is, in one of his aspects, the source of esoteric knowledge and magic. Varuṇa of the Vedic period in India has the sun as his eye and controls *māyā* (“creative power,” but later also “illusion”). Óðinn of the Scandinavians is one-eyed, having left his other eye in the well of the giant Mímir in return for the gift of wisdom. A famous poem describes how Óðinn hung on a tree for nine days and nights in order to acquire the esoteric knowledge of magical runes. Deities of esoteric knowledge inspire poets, shamans, and prophets, and they give up secret knowledge to diviners. The Scandinavian goddess Freyja, for example, taught the gods magical knowledge, and this is tapped into by women called *völva*, who go into trances and act as soothsayers. Yogic exercises in Daoism attempt to tap into the power of the exterior and interior gods, and Tantric practices in Esoteric Buddhism involve invoking the cosmic Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* for esoteric knowledge and power.

**SEE ALSO** Agriculture; Animals; Cosmogony; Culture Heroes; Deity; Deism; Deus Otiosus; Earth; Henotheism; Indo-European Religions; Lady of the Animals; Lord of the Animals; Meteorological Beings; Monotheism; Moon; Mountains; Polytheism; Sky; Stars; Sun; Supreme Beings; Theism; Underworld; War and Warriors; Water.

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THEODORE M. LUDWIG (1987 AND 2005)

**GÖKALP, ZİYA** (1876–1924), Turkish sociologist influential in the modernization of religious thinking and in the development of Turkish nationalism. He was born Mehmed Ziya in the small town of Diyarbakır in southeastern Turkey. After a traditional Muslim primary education and a secular secondary education in Diyarbakır, he went to Constantinople to continue his studies in 1895. Five years later he was arrested and banished to his hometown for his involvement with the Young Turks, then a secret organization.

Following the successful Young Turk revolution of 1908, he went to Salonika as a delegate to the Society (later Party) of Union and Progress. There he contributed to a journal of philosophy (*Yeni felsefe mecmuası*) and a literary review (*Genç kalemler*) published by the Young Turks. It was at this point that he adopted the pen name Gökalp ("sky hero"), which he retained for the rest of his life.

With the outbreak of the Balkan War, he and his associates moved to the Ottoman capital, where their Turkish nationalist ideas were sharply opposed by the politicians and writers known as Islamists, as well as by the traditional Ottomanists. In Constantinople Gökalp became acquainted with a group of Turkish-speaking émigré writers from Kazan, the Crimea, and Azerbaijan whose ideas had been influenced by those of the Russian Narodniks. Prominent among these writers was Yusuf Akçura of Kazan, the author of a lengthy essay entitled *Three Ways of Policy* (*Üç tarz-i siyaset*), in which he speculated on three possible directions for the Ottoman Empire—a continuation of Ottomanism, a political unification of Muslims, or a national unification of the Turks (possibly including those of the Russian Empire).

This formulation of the Turkish problem had a strong influence upon Gökalp, whose writings after 1911 were concerned with the resolution of Akçura's trilemma within the framework of the modern nation, although the modifications he proposed were unacceptable not only to the Ottomanists and Islamists but even to the Turkists themselves. In his major work, *Türkleşmek, islamlaşmak, muasırlaşmak* (Turkism, Islam, and Secularization, 1918), he presented the concept of secularization, already initiated by the Tanzimat reforms, as a means of reconciling the "three ways." Throughout his life Gökalp dealt with the political, religious, cultural, and educational ramifications of what he believed



to be the reforms necessary to arrest the decline of Turkish national unity. Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire he welcomed the birth of the nationalist, republican, and secular regime in 1921, and in the remaining three years of his life he strove to adapt his earlier writings to it.

Central to Gökalp's thought were two distinct yet inter-related concepts, "civilization" and "culture." The first of these he associates with traditions created by and belonging to different ethnic groups and capable of being transmitted from one group to another, while "culture" represents the specific and unique set of mores of a particular nation. For Gökalp "culture" is the more basic of the two because without cultural roots, any attempt to develop a dynamic civilization will be unsuccessful.

In applying this distinction to the concrete issue of Turkey's transition from a multiracial, formally Muslim empire to a democratic, Western-oriented, and secular nation-state, whose cultural basis would be Turkish and only secularly Muslim, he was dealing not with the problems of Western society or civilization, but with a nonsecular, non-Western society that had come under the influence of Western civilization. He was concerned mainly with the place the Turkish people would assume in the modern world, since they were seen as alien to the Christian cultural background of Western civilization. He felt that the nations of the West, while remaining Christian in character, were destined to become secularized because of the dominant role assumed by science and rational thought. Non-Christian Turks, however, and others who were neither Christians nor Muslims, such as the Japanese, could be secularized only if and when they became "nations," for modern Western civilization had little to do with the language, religion, folkways, and mores of the people outside the world of Christianity.

After Gökalp's death, there was a decline of interest in his earlier writings, which preceded the readjustment of his thinking to the conditions of the nationalist, secular regime. His ideas, however, would exert considerable influence upon later Muslim thinkers, such as Muḥammad Iqbāl.

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**GOLD AND SILVER** are among the most widespread symbols in the history of religions. Their exceptional physical qualities make them—like their celestial counterparts, the sun and the moon—unusually powerful symbols of spiritual realities. As a physical substance, gold is quite literally incorruptible: it is highly resistant to chemical reactions and is immune to the corrosion that affects baser metals. It is also intrinsically luminous, seeming to shine with a light of its own. Thus no speculative leap was required to make gold the universally acknowledged symbol of life and the spirit and of perfection and immortality. There is a certain obviousness to the symbolic value of gold that explains its universal appeal throughout history and in virtually every corner of the world.

Silver too is naturally suited to serve as a religious symbol. Its faultless whiteness has made it a symbol of purity and—in the appropriate historical contexts—of chastity. Purified in the refiner's fire, it becomes a symbol of purification and perfection. Associated with its silvery counterpart in the night sky, it is integrated into an entire complex of lunar symbolism that includes—not surprisingly—the great purifier, water.

**RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE.** When John Ruskin spoke of gold's "imperishable splendour," he spoke metaphorically of a universally recognized quality that people of earlier times took quite literally. For many in the history of religions, gold has not merely symbolized the imperishable but embodied it. In ancient India the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* identified gold with immortality. The ancient Chinese identified it with Heaven. Beliefs such as these lie behind the extremely widespread use of gold in connection with a whole variety of funerary practices. Indeed, most of the surviving examples of the ancient goldsmith's art have been found in graves. One of the most impressive collections of artistic gold articles was discovered in the tomb of Tutankhamen (Egypt, fourteenth century BCE), including the stunning gold burial mask that formed a part of the king's coffin. Gold funeral masks are quite common globally: They have been found from Champa (modern Vietnam) to Peru. The mummies of the kings of ancient Peru were completely wrapped in gold foil. In addition to masks, many other accessories and ornaments found in graves are also made of gold or silver. In the case of gold the meaning is clear: The immortality of the deceased is ensured by providing the deceased with an immortal persona, the mask made of gold. Moreover, gold (like jade) was sometimes used to block up the natural openings of the corpse in the belief that this would prevent its decay. In some cases, notably in ancient China, such concern for immortality began while the person was still alive. Thus Chinese alchemy, as in some other alchemical traditions, it was believed that drinking an elixir made from gold would confer immortality.

As a symbol of spiritual realities, gold occurs frequently in the representations of key religious figures. The Buddha, the Enlightened One, is frequently portrayed in gold. One



of the most impressive examples is the huge image of the Buddha found in the Wat Traimit in Bangkok, Thailand, an image made entirely of gold. One also thinks of the dazzling gold ornaments that adorn the *bodhisattvas* in the paintings discovered at Dunhuang. Equally striking are the golden aureoles that surround the heads of saints in Christian iconography.

Religious rituals have also made use of gold and silver. All manner of ritual implements and vessels have been fashioned from these precious metals. The medieval Christian church made extensive use of gold in the construction of crosses, chalices, patens, ornamental covers for the Bible, and reliquaries. One also finds silvered cases created to house Buddhist sūtras, and a variety of Buddhist ceremonial objects in gold.

Yet the symbolism of gold and silver in the history of religions has not always been completely positive. Particularly in the Western Semitic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), gold and silver have occasionally taken on a negative value. One need only recall the story of the golden calf (*Ex.* 32) or the golden image set up by Nebuchadrezzar, which Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego refused to worship (*Dn.* 3). In the Hebrew scriptures gold is often the symbol of idolatry or of purely human glory. There is a similar distrust of gold and silver in Islam. According to one *ḥadīth*, or saying of the prophet Muḥammad, “He who drinks from gold and silver vessels drinks the fire of Hell.” In the opinion of the thirteenth-century Persian cosmographer al-Qazwīnī, the use of gold and silver for ornament thwarts the divinely intended purpose of these metals, which should be used as coinage for trade.

**ASSOCIATION WITH SACRED TIME AND SPACE.** Gold and silver have also played an important part in the articulation of sacred time and space. Sacred time par excellence is often represented as a Golden Age, which is followed by an only slightly inferior Silver Age. The widespread schema of the four ages of the world finds its way into the *Book of Daniel* (2:31–45), in Nebuchadrezzar’s dream of a colossus with a head of gold and with breast and arms of silver.

To the extent that sacred space has been organized around a temple, the presence of gold and silver ornament has contributed powerfully to the creation of a properly numinous ambience. Here one thinks not only of the wealth of Solomon’s temple and of medieval Christian cathedrals, but also of the Temple of the Sun at Cuzco in ancient Peru, which was covered with enormous quantities of gold. In the Hindu tradition the world has passed through four periods of time; according to popular legend, all the accoutrements used by people were made from gold in the earliest period, which was regarded as the purest era.

**ASSOCIATION WITH ALCHEMY.** Nowhere, however, is the symbolic potential of gold and silver exploited more fully than in the various traditions of alchemy. According to alchemical doctrine, gold and silver develop in the earth under the influence of the sun and moon respectively. The ultimate

goal of this development is the production of gold, which is consequently viewed as the perfect metal, and as a symbol of spiritual perfection. The alchemist’s art is intended to hasten this natural process, both in external nature and within the alchemist’s soul. Silver here becomes the symbol of the soul’s purity and passivity before the activity of the spirit, symbolized by gold.

**SEE ALSO** Alchemy; Colors; Money.

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**GOLDEN AGE.** In its narrowest sense, the term Golden Age refers to a mode of utopian existence, described in a variety of Greek, Roman, and later Western Christian texts, that is freed from the vicissitudes of everyday life and is characterized by peace and plenty, with nature spontaneously producing food and humans living in close relationship to the gods. Most usually, the Golden Age is located temporally in the far past or, more rarely, in the distant future. Spatially, it is located in vague or far-off regions of the earth; more rarely, it is a place accessible only after death, as described by Pindar (fifth century BCE) in his portrait of the Elysian Fields (*Olympian Ode* 2.68–76). In its broadest sense, the term has been extended by some scholars to include any mythical, paradisaical time of origins. As banalized in common discourse, *golden age* has been transformed into a quasi-historical label for any period of extraordinary wealth or human achievement.

**THE HESIODIC MYTH AND ITS DEVELOPMENT.** The most particular reference to the Golden Age, although it does not use the term, is the account of the successive races of people given by the Greek author Hesiod (eighth century BCE) in his didactic poem *Works and Days* (106–201). Whether di-

rectly or indirectly, Hesiod is the sole source for the myth in later Western literature and the arts. The account sits somewhat uneasily in its Hesiodic context, being introduced almost by way of a digression, and seems to be in tension with other anthropogonic motifs in the poem. Five races or kinds of people are described in temporal succession. Four are characterized by valuable metals: the golden race, the silver race, the bronze race, and, after an intervening race of heroes that is most likely not part of the original schema, the iron race. Although not fully developed, there appears to be a succession of moral and physical decay. With the exception of the intrusive race of heroes, each state appears to be inferior to its predecessor.

In its brief description of the golden race, the Hesiodic narrative combines six motifs: (1) the succession of races of people (in Hesiod's account, these are different species, separate creations of the gods, and are not to be seen as successive stages of mankind, the world, or history); (2) the correlation of the races with metals; (3) the identification of the golden race with the reign of an elder deity (in Hesiod, with the rule of Kronos); (4) the topos that, in the beginning, humans lived in close company with the gods; (5) a set of paradisaical features including a carefree existence of feasting, wealth, and peace in a state of perpetual youth, terminated by a peaceful death; and (6) the spontaneous yield of crops from the earth, so that humanity was fed without toil. Each of these motifs has worldwide distribution. At times, they have served as elements that have been integrated into broader systems of religious, historical, and anthropological thought (for example, systems of apocalypticism, messianism, utopianism, or primitivism) as well as literary genres such as the pastoral. However, the combination of motifs in Hesiod is without parallel.

In later Greek poetic versions, especially the influential *Phaenomena* (96–136) by Aratus (third century BCE), additional details were added to Hesiod's brief account. The Golden Age was characterized, above all, by justice. Its utopian mode of life included vegetarianism. What was of greater importance, the metals now identified stages in the history of a single race, and the implicit theme of degeneration was more consistently applied. In Greek philosophical literature—most extensively by Plato (*Statesman* 269–274)—this latter element was fully developed and related to notions of historical periodicity, recurrence, and world cycles. The later, expanded portrait of the Golden Age, with the additional motif of free sexuality, was carried over into Latin versions of the Hesiodic myth, above all in the first-century work of Ovid (esp. *Metamorphoses* 1.76–150). The Latin tradition is important in three respects. First, the persistent Greek terminology referring to the “golden race” (*chruseon genos*) was transformed into the more familiar phrase “the Golden Age” (*aurea saecula* or *aurea aetas*). Second, although some Roman texts maintain the four metals schema, the contrast was reduced to a duality: then and now, the Age of Kronos and the Age of Zeus, the Golden Age and the present times. Third, with the general loss of Greek literature in the Middle Ages,

it was the Latin tradition, especially the Ovidian version, that was most influential on later Western literature. Beyond its adaptations of the Hesiodic myth, Roman tradition contributed new spatial and temporal dimensions to the Western imagining of the Golden Age. Two innovations were of greatest significance; both may be associated with the towering figure of Vergil in the first century BCE. The development of the Alexandrian conventions of the pastoral, the literary topos of the idyllic place (*locus amoenus*), and the paradisaical imagery of the Golden Age came together in Vergil's portrait of Arcadia in his *Eclogues*. In such poetry, the Golden Age came closer to the experience of the contemporary human. Taken out of mythical time and reduced to the “good old days,” to bucolic scenes of the rustic, simple life, the pastoral became “an image of what they call the Golden Age” as Alexander Pope observed in his *Discourse on Pastoral Poetry*. At the same time, an eschatological element was introduced. Often tied to imperial ideology, the notion was advanced that the Golden Age was recoverable, now or in the immediate future. While this became a commonplace of imperial rhetoric (see Vergil, *Aeneid* 6.791–794)—no fewer than sixteen Roman emperors claimed that their reigns had reestablished the Golden Age—the best-known example remains the fourth of Vergil's *Eclogues*. This mysterious poem, composed in 41–40 BCE, ties the end of the Iron Age and the initiation of a new Golden Age to the birth of a wondrous child. In Vergil's work, the myth of the Golden Age is no longer an expression of pessimism with respect to the present; rather it has become a prediction of future hope and regeneration. Elements in the poetic tradition of the Golden Age lent themselves to christianization. In its Greek form, it could be harmonized with accounts of Eden and with notions of sin as accounting for humanity's fall from Paradise. The eschatological understanding of the Golden Age could be harmonized with predictions of the birth of the Messiah and the coming of Christ's kingdom. However, apart from contributing to theories of world periods, the myth of the Golden Age was not a major element in Christian literary imagination from the early sixth century (see Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* 2.5) until the Renaissance. While late medieval epic traditions (for example, Dante and the *Roman de la rose*) continued antique conventions of the Golden Age, a variety of new historical factors contributed to a reawakening of interest in the motif of the Golden Age. Alongside of the rediscovery of classical texts and works of art was the self-consciousness of a “renaissance,” of a new birth, a new age that was, at the same time, a recovery of lost, past glories. Thus, the motto of Lorenzo de' Medici, “the time returned” (*le tems revient*), the description by Vasari of the era of Lorenzo as “truly a golden age” (*Life of Botticelli*), the elaborate court and coronation pageants in which Saturn-Kronos and the four metallic ages were depicted by actors (Vasari, *Life of Pontormo*). Once again, the language of the Golden Age and imperial ideology were conjoined. The development of Renaissance urbanism led to a new, nostalgic interest in the pastoral, a form rediscovered by Jacopo Sannazaro and Tor-

quato Tasso and culminating in Edmund Spenser's dominant interest in the Golden Age. The reformers found in the concept of the Golden Age an expression of their interest in a return to simplicity (see, for example, Erasmus's *In Praise of Folly*). Above all, it was contact with other cultures through exploration that allowed a sense of the palpable presence of the Golden Age. Joined to the topos of the Noble Savage, the new peoples and territories, especially those of the "New World," are unceasingly described in the Renaissance chronicles as living in the Golden Age. While shorn of much of its mythic content, the concept plays a role in the subsequent, somewhat turgid history of rival theories of the progress and degeneration of mankind. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these various contexts were much elaborated, especially in the context of the mythic understanding of immigrant America. It was a place of new birth and rebirth, a place of freedom, its bounty vast and unimaginable. From the seventeenth-century Puritan imagination (in Cotton Mather's words, "the first Age was the Golden Age; to return unto that will make a man a Protestant, and I may add, a Puritan") to the nineteenth-century romanticization of the American West (historian H. H. Bancroft, for example, described life as "a long happy holiday . . . such as the old-time golden age under Cronus or Saturn"), the imagery was self-conscious and persistent. Finally, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the topos of the return of the Golden Age was joined to the industrial myth of progress, expressed on the one hand in the notion of science as providing a world without care, and on the other in theories of primitive communism that animated many radical social and political utopian experiments and political movements. Both of these ideologies are a major motif in the writings of Dostoevskii (most explicitly in *Notes from the Underground* and *The Dream of the Ridiculous Man*), perhaps the most creative literary use of the Golden Age since Vergil.

**THE GOLDEN AGE IN CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON.** In considering the worldwide distribution of the myth of the Golden Age, much depends on decisions of definition and classification. Does one seek close parallels to the specific constellation of motifs found in the Hesiodic narrative, or does one note any instance of a sharp duality between a previous age of perfection and the present? Does one include such closely related topoi as postmortem realms that are the reverse of present conditions, or terrestrial paradises? Does one insist on the notion of past possession of the Golden Age? Does one focus on those mythologies that report its permanent loss, or on those that promise its return? Does one include mythologies in which characteristics resembling life in the Golden Age serve as narrative elements, expressing some contrast between a past and present state (as in the various mythologies of the origin of death), but do not function as the focal point of the myth? Does one include instances of isolated motifs (such as the widespread motif of self-harvesting plants or automatic implements) that occur in folkloristic contexts other than a Golden Age? Out of the number of possible comparisons, three systems of Golden

Age mythology stand out, both for their persistence and for their differing functions: the Golden Age in relation to myths of origins, to millenarian activities, and to royal ideologies.

**Myths of origins.** Most myth posits a sharp duality between "then" and "now," a duality often overcome in the narrative through modes of transformation whereby the one becomes the other. This split and its attendant transformation is most clearly expressed in myths of origin, especially those that take the form of a mythology of rupture between a previous state and the present order. Evaluations of this previous state vary: it may be better, or worse, or simply different than the present. Among early literary accounts, scholars of the ancient Near East have identified a genre of creation narrative that begins with the formula "When there was not" (the same negative formula recurs in medieval Christian descriptions of the other world). Some of these take on the form of a myth of a Golden Age. For example, "Enki's Spell," a part of the Sumerian epic *Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta*, tells of a time when there were no dangerous animals to threaten humans, when there was nothing to fear, and when humankind spoke a common tongue, obeyed divine laws, and was ruled by the beneficent deity Enlil. This happy state was brought to an end through the jealousy of another deity (Enki). This same negative formula recurs in Scandinavian mythology to describe the original cosmos (*Völuspá* 3, 5). In this state, before the creation of man, the gods lived in peace, playing games and possessing much gold (*Völuspá* 8). This happy mode of existence will return. The golden feasting tables will once again be set out and the fields will bear crops without cultivation (*Völuspá* 61–2). This last motif is common to many Indo-European epic traditions; for example, *Mahābhārata* 3.11.234–235 tells how during the *kr̥tayuga* there was no work and the necessities of life were obtained by being merely thought of. The motif occurs as well in many mythologies of the invention of agriculture, especially in the Indonesian and North American Indian culture complexes. For example, in a variation on this theme, which includes as well the mythologem of rupture, a characteristic etiological tale from the Bororo (of Mato Grosso, Brazil) tells how, in olden times, a woman went to pick maize, which in those days was planted and cultivated by spirits. The woman accidentally hurt her hand and blamed the accident on Burekóibo, the chief of the spirits. In punishment, the spirits ceased their labors, and humans had to toil for food, clearing the forest, planting the seed, and cultivating the crops. There was as well a diminution in the size of the ears of corn since the days when the spirits were responsible for agriculture.

**Millenarianism.** The explicit connection of the Greco-Roman myth of the Golden Age and Christian chiliasm is at least as old as the third century (Lactantius, *Divine Institutes* 5.5, 7.24) and was fully developed in the complex, medieval Christian sibylline traditions. Similar combinations are equally prominent in archaic mythologies and recent na-

tivistic movements. While none of these are demonstrably free from possible Christian influence, they reflect, as well, indigenous tradition. Perhaps the clearest set of examples is from the South American Indians of Gran Chaco and Amazonia. There are mythologies of a lost Golden Age such as that found among the Temb . In earlier times, there was once a place where work was unknown. The fields planted and harvested themselves. When the inhabitants grew old, they did not die but were rejuvenated. The present-day Temb  no longer know the route to this "Happy Place." Such a mythical place can also be used to describe an original peaceful unity, subsequently shattered, which explains the difference between the white colonialist and the native. Thus, the Mataco picture a time and place long ago when there were no Christians, when the ancestors of what would later become the Christians and the Mataco lived together harmoniously in a single house. Everything was provided without labor, from tools to domesticated animals and clothing. The Christian ancestors took away the best of these things, leaving the Mataco only clay pots and dogs. In other versions of this motif of the origin of inequality, the native utopia is superseded by a European one, as among the Bororo. After living peacefully together, quarrels broke out over the possession of magically produced objects. The white people's ancestors were sent away in boats to avoid bloodshed and have never returned because they found a more beautiful and even more wondrous uninhabited land. A more complex expression of a recoverable Golden Age occurs among the various Tupi-Guaran  and Tupinamba groups who have set off on lengthy tribal wanderings from the interior to the Atlantic coast in order to reach a mythical "Land without Evil" or "Land of Immortality and Perpetual Rest." (The earliest record of such a journey is from a Spanish report in 1515; the most recent instance occurred in 1957.) This land, variously described by the different groups, has neither sickness or death; it is a vast garden-island, filled with game and fruits, on which the inhabitants will spend their time feasting and dancing. The same sort of Golden Age imagery recurs among Tupinamba nativistic resistance movements. The Santidades, as described by late sixteenth-century Jesuit missionaries, were common among groups displaced by force to work on the colonial plantations. Native religious leaders urged their followers to stop work and revive old rituals. If they did so, the fields would plant and harvest themselves, tools would work automatically, and old people would be rejuvenated and not know death. The fundamental imagery of these groups stems from shamanistic visions of an other-world. Many exhibit, as well, clear Christian borrowings. Such influence, however, was reciprocal. In 1539, a large group of Tupinamba crossed the South American landmass at its widest point in a nine-year journey ending in Peru. There their tales of the mythical "golden place" they were seeking so excited the Spaniards that an expedition was immediately launched to locate Eldorado (originally a golden man; later believed to be a city of gold).

**Kingship.** From the earliest Mesopotamian hymns of self-praise by Shulgi, ruler of the third dynasty of Ur (r. 2094–2047 BCE) to the encomia addressed to seventeenth-century European monarchs (such as Charles II, whom Abraham Cowley celebrates for having transformed an Age of Iron into an Age of Gold), royal ideology and the myth of the Golden Age have been intertwined. As noted above, historical kings from the emperors of Rome to the Medicis have claimed that their reigns reestablished the Golden Age. There is even greater elaboration of Golden Age motifs in the myths of primordial sacred kings. Kronos-Saturn in Greco-Roman tradition is one such example, already present in the Hesiodic account. Iranian mythology is more extended and explicit.

After the ninth century CE, in the late Pahlavi, New Persian, and Arabic writings as well as in the so-called secular epic tradition, the disparate Iranian royal genealogical and mythical traditions were organized into a systematic presentation that located the origins of kingship in the figure of H shang. Depicted in quite conventional terms as an ideal king and civilizing hero as well as the progenitor (with his sister Guzak) of the Iranian people, H shang established justice, peace, and law. He invented iron-working, the arts of mining and navigation, and the building of canals for irrigation. He was the first to hunt with dogs, make clothing out of skins, and to fashion wooden doors for houses. During his reign, according to the fifteenth-century universal history by M rkhw nd, the *Rawzat al-saf * (Garden of purity), the "world bloomed" and people "reposed in gardens of content." Behind this stereotypical portrait of an ideal realm, lies an older, most likely pre-Zoroastrian, myth of a full-blown Golden Age, that associated with the reign of the Indo-Iranian figure of Yima. In the earlier traditions of the Avesta, Yima is like the sun. In his reign of a thousand years, humans and beasts do not die (indeed, there is no difference in appearance between a man and his son); waters and plants do not dry up from the heat; there is neither excessive warmth, nor cold, nor any form of disease; and there is an inexhaustible supply of food (*Yasna* 9.4–5; *Yashts* 9.10, 10.50, 17.30, 19.32–33). During this Golden Age, Yima enlarged the world three times in order to make room for his citizens and bounty, but such a realm could not be extended indefinitely. Therefore, Ahura Mazd  warned Yima that a universal winter would come and that Yima was to carve out a subterranean kingdom with magical tools, into which he was to bring the most magnificent individuals among the men, animals, and plants in his realm as well as the most savory foods. This kingdom, *vara*, in many respects resembles Yama's realm of the dead in Indic tradition. There, in his underground golden kingdom, which will glow with its own self-generated light, Yima will rule and men will live "the most beautiful life" (*Vendidad* 2). In late traditions, Yima will emerge, at the end of the world's winter, to repopulate the earth (*M n g i Khrad* 27.27–31). Following the so-called Zoroastrian reform, this archaic myth was radically altered. The Golden Age of Yima's rule lasts only until he lies, when the glorious



kingship will leave him (*Yashts* 19.33–38). Indeed, in some traditions, Yima is only the builder of the subterranean realm; Zarathushtra's third son will be its ruler (*Vendidad* 2.42–43).

**SEE ALSO** Heaven and Hell; Millenarianism; Paradise; Utopia.

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**GOLDEN RULE.** The expression *Golden Rule* has come into use in various modern European languages over the past

few centuries as a popular reference to the dictum, "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you," best known in Western culture from its formulation in the New Testament (*Matt.* 7:12, *Luke* 6:31). Identical or similar axioms of moral behavior are nearly universal, however, appearing in a wide variety of cultural contexts from oral folk wisdom to ancient scriptural and philosophical writings. The written canonical versions most frequently cited as examples of golden-rule thinking include those found in early Jewish sources, both in the Mishnaic and Talmudic corpus (*Pirke-Avot* 2:10, *Babylonian Talmud: Shabbat* 31a) and in the apocryphal and pseudepigraphic literature (e.g., *Ben Sira* 31:15, *Tobit* 4:15, *Jubilees* 36:8); additional passages in the New Testament (*Rom.* 13:8–10, *Gal.* 5:14, *Acts* 15:20 [Western recension, codex D]); Qur'anic and post-Qur'anic Islamic teachings (*sūrah* 83: "The Deceivers" [*At-Tatfif*, or *Al-Muṭaffifīn*]; Al-Nawawi, *Forty Hadith* 13; Ibn Al-'Arabi, "Instructions to a Postulant" [*Risāla . . . l'il murīd*]); classical Greek and Latin texts (e.g., Plato, *Republic* 443d; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 9:8; Isocrates, "To Nicocles" 61b, "To Demonicus" 14, 17); sacred precepts imparted in the *Udyoga* and *Anuṣasana* sections of the Sanskrit epic *Mahābhārata* (5:39:57, 13:114:8); and comparable pronouncements in the Zoroastrian *Avesta* (*Dadestan-i denig* 94:5, *Shayest Na-shayest* 37:51), the Buddhist *Dhammapada* (10:129–130), the Jain *Āgamas: Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (1:10:13, 1:11:33) and other sūtras, and the Bahā'ī scriptures (*Kitāb-i Aqdas* 148). There are also striking parallels in the *Analec*tis (4:15, 5:12, 15:23) and other works of the Confucian canon (*Daxue* 10:2, *Zhongyong* 13:3, *Mencius* 7:A:4).

Occurrences in these and other traditions can be multiplied virtually without limit, inasmuch as statements preaching a basic consideration for the feelings of others—in ideal conception if not in common practice—are all but self-evident in human culture, reflecting both the fundamental imperatives of social organization and a deeply ingrained, though regularly ignored, instinct of empathy for fellow members of the species. However, many apparently parallel statements about elementary human decency are simply too vague or sweeping to support detailed comparison, while others may have been taken out of their original contexts and put forward as equivalent teachings by apologists keen on defending the validity of one non-Western ethical system or another. In order to properly assess the cultural and religious significance of various golden-rule formulations, therefore, it is vital to scrutinize them from the perspective of a number of specific variables and issues:

1. The place of this teaching within its given religious or philosophical context: does it simply describe a commendable mode of behavior, or is it enshrined as the central pillar of an entire moral edifice?
2. The defense of this principle in the face of abundant evidence of its nonobservance in human conduct: Is it taken a priori as an inviolable tenet of revealed dogma, or is it proposed as a piece of utilitarian advice for the

successful regulation of social life? Does it merely enjoin a correct attitude toward one's fellow humans, or does it require one to translate these feelings into the praxis of concrete acts?

3. The manner in which the precise rhetorical structure of a given formulation reflects the specific intellectual underpinnings of its cultural milieu: Is it presented as an incontestable point of doctrine, or is it put forward as a polemical position or a defensive response within a context of moral disputation? Is its verbal form, especially its framing in either positive or negative grammatical terms, simply an aspect of literary style, or does its linguistic mode of presentation correspond to deep-seated assumptions about the moral ground of the human condition and the possibility of humankind's spiritual perfection?
4. Claims of universal validity: is a certain culture-specific version held to be a statement of moral truth for all humans and all time, or is it understood to apply exclusively within a particular religious community or sociohistorical context?
5. Mutual influences and borrowing: does a given citation represent an independent enunciation of the principle, or can it be traced back to a chain of inherited sources or to ur-texts shared with other traditions?
6. Commentarial expansion: how do scriptural exegetes and textual scholiasts seek to elucidate the message of empathetic self-projection expressed in canonic teachings and to ground this in the logic of philosophical or theological discourse?

**THE GOLDEN RULE AS THE CORE OF MORALITY.** That which makes various Golden Rule formulations in different cultures not simply shining precepts of moral excellence but truly golden—in the sense of setting the highest standard of moral value—is the explicit claim that the exhortation to treat one's fellow humans by the same criteria of behavior one wishes to enjoy oneself constitutes the essential core of an entire system of belief. For example, Hillel the Elder (first century BCE–first century CE) folds all of Jewish law into one succinct reply—while his questioner “stands on one foot”—as, “What is hateful to you, do not do unto your fellow man” (*Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat* 31a). In this is heard the unmistakable echo linking it with the language of slightly later enunciations of the same message in several New Testament passages.

This may reflect no more than direct borrowing or the use of common oral and written sources drawn from the fount of Eastern Mediterranean wisdom literature. But what gives this parallel its primary significance is the manner in which both texts go on to cite these gnomic statements as encapsulations of religious truth: “the entire Torah” in Hillel's words and “the law and the prophets” in the Gospel refrain. Significantly, we observe very much the same impulse to elevate the Golden Rule to the status of an all-embracing

universal principle in a wide variety of other cultural contexts, including at least two passages among the vast pool of edifying verses in the *Mahābhārata* identifying this teaching as the “essence” or the “summation” of the *dharma* (duty or morality), Al-Nawawi's (1233–1277) blanket pronouncement that one who fails to observe this precept cannot be called a member of the Muslim community of the faithful, and the set of linked passages in the Confucian *Analec*s that use words virtually identical to those of Hillel (“what is not desirable to you yourself, do not do”) to define the “single thread [binding all of Confucius's thought] into a consistent whole.”

In all of these examples, it is noteworthy that what is claimed to be the “central thread” of the Golden Rule is reduced to a rather unexpected point of doctrine, in each case accentuated by conspicuous silence with respect to such essential tenets as the creation of the world and the acceptance God's commandments in Judaism, the unity and singularity of God in Islam, the ideals of virtuous rule and ritual order in Confucianism, or the metaphysical underpinnings of Hindu and Buddhist thought: spiritual liberation, enlightenment and *nirvāṇa*, the universal godhead. In many of these passages, therefore, one suspects that the citation of the Golden Rule as the ultimate ground of an entire body of moral teachings is pointedly intended to be provocative, its stark enunciation designed to shake listeners from complacent belief in their conventional articles of faith and to force them to contemplate the core principle of primary human empathy underlying all ethical thinking. As a result, it is not surprising that in each of these respective scriptural traditions, legions of commentators have come forward to meet this intellectual and spiritual challenge, exercising their best exegetical skills in an attempt to reconcile the sublimely simple message of the Golden Rule with finer points of doctrine.

**RHETORICAL FORMS AND CONTEXTS.** With respect to the rhetorical articulation of golden-rule statements, the most commonly debated issue revolves around the use of positive or negative terms of discourse in different occurrences. Much ink and breath has been expended to argue that these two alternative grammatical modes reflect profoundly variant perspectives on the human condition. According to a widely held view, the framing of the precept in positive terms (“Do unto others”) rather than negative ones represents at once a more idealistic and a more demanding view of man's capacity for altruistic behavior, setting standards of moral perfection that, if met, would amount to an *imitatio* of divine compassion. By this same reasoning, the negative formulation would seem to set the bar of moral expectation far lower, at the more “realistic” level of a covenant of nonintervention, requiring of people only that they refrain from aggressive and exploitative treatment of their fellows. In some discussions, however, these assumptions are reversed, and the point is made that, in a sense, basing one's behavior toward others on what one wishes to receive in return turns the selfless empathy of the Golden Rule into a form of self-interest, at best, or that it may even give license to impose one's own values

and preferences on other people. Conversely, it may be argued that the idea of mutual nonaggression, far from enjoining simple inaction or restraint, may be understood to sanction an even more open-ended commitment to the inviolability of individual rights.

Regardless of which of these views is upheld, when one surveys the full range of canonic golden-rule statements, one discovers that typically the selection of positive or negative verbal form is not set in stone as a choice between mutually exclusive approaches to the principle of reciprocity in human relations. This observation becomes immediately clear when we note the inseparable connection drawn between the Golden Rule and the command to “love thy neighbor” in both testaments of the Bible (linked in the Gospels by direct textual contiguity and in the rabbinic tradition by virtually automatic exegetical association)—a point underlined by the fact that the original source text for this shared teaching at the heart of both testamental traditions, in *Leviticus* 19:18, presents these words as the culmination of a series of negative ethical injunctions. Moreover, even the uplifting note of positive exhortation in the Gospel versions of this teaching, often held to embody the purest expression of Christian love, did not prevent the early church fathers from transposing the words recorded in *Mark* and *Luke* into negative formulations in certain other early Christian writings (e.g., *Acts* [Western recension, Codex D] 15:20, *Didache* 1:2, and the *Apologia* of Aristides 15). In the same spirit, we find in such post-biblical Jewish texts as *Mishna Avot* (*Pirke-Avot*) and *Ben Sira* a fairly free alternation between positive and negative wording. The same is true of the terms of the Golden Rule enunciated in the Confucian *Analects*. The near replication here of Hillel’s negative formulation may tend to lead certain Western observers to hasty conclusions regarding the practical, or this-worldly, character of traditional Chinese religious thinking—until one notices that this statement is conspicuously counterbalanced by a crucial passage in *Mencius* where a strikingly positive rhetorical exhortation is used to enjoin concerted efforts to live by the ideal of reciprocal empathy.

In weighing the significance of this point of textual analysis, therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between the purely linguistic choice of this or that mode of assertion and the deeper semantic grounding of positive and negative propositions regarding human perfectibility. Just as the negative language in certain Old Testament and Confucian versions in no way precludes a positive moral signification, so, too, the parallels cited in Hindu texts as the essence of the *dharma* can be construed in this term’s double sense of both a set of restrictive laws and rules of behavior and also a positive evocation of the entire structure of meaning in human existence. In all of these examples, the notion that the evil inclination, sinful nature, or aggressive impulses of humans require the coercive force of moral sanction to prevent mutual injury is in no way inconsistent with a concomitant faith in the spiritual power of primary human empathy. This is particularly clear in the later Confucian development the vision of

human interrelatedness set forth by Mencius (c. 371–c. 289 BCE), within which the all-embracing framework of prescriptive ritual observances is conceived as a modality for recovering and bringing to realization the inborn core of humanity’s essential moral nature.

A second rhetorical factor conditioning expressions of the wisdom of the Golden Rule in different cultures concerns the precise positioning of a given formulation within the broader context of intellectual discourse in which it figures. Thus, where the best-known Judeo-Christian and Hindu-Buddhist versions present this precept as the foundation of universal moral law, in a number of classical Greek and Latin sources statements of more or less equivalent import tend to be uttered within the framework of discussions on the ideal fulfillment of human character, especially in connection with the classical ethical conceptions of temperance, moderation and spiritual well-being. For example, expressions of the principle of reciprocity in the *Republic* and *Gorgias* (507b), by Plato (c. 428–348 or 347 BCE), and the *Rhetoric* (1166–1167) and *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle (384–322 BCE), are oriented more toward the perfection of the individual self than toward the reciprocal relation between person and person. In major works of Stoic philosophy such as the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius (121–180 CE) (e.g., 5:20, 7:73, 9:4, 11:1), this ideal of altruistic self-transcendence is cited, in a manner reminiscent of Mencius, as the mark of an individual’s fullest attainment of harmony with Nature.

In many passages, the wisdom of the Golden Rule seems to carry a markedly utilitarian message with reference to the ordering of specific sets of human relationships. This occurs, for example, in the citation of this principle in the writings of Seneca (4 BCE–65 CE) (*Epistles* 47:11) with respect to the treatment of slaves, in the context of punishment in the Buddhist *Dhammapada* and honest measurement in the Qur’ān, and in the preaching of kingly virtues in the “Letter to Aristieias” (207) included within the corpus of the Jewish apocrypha. Indeed, discussions of the practical implications of such teachings for the maintenance of primary social order constitute a central focus of more recent golden-rule discourse, from the classic analysis of the essential structure of power in works such as *Leviathan* (chapter 15), by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), to the scathing critique of humanity’s hypocritical sacralization of its own self-interest in chapter 5 of *Civilization and Its Discontents*, by Sigmund Freud (1856–1939).

Within the Greek vision of the maximum fulfillment of human capacity, this issue is commonly linked to the concept of justice, in the sense of the interpersonal balancing of conflicting needs and wants. In this light, certain negative formulations of the Golden Rule may be understood as mirror images of the concept of retributive justice, prescribing a sort of proactive or reactive payment in kind for undesirable behavior. In its starkest form, this type of interpretation may even be reduced to the unforgiving terms of the *lex talionis*, “an eye for an eye,” in apparent opposition to the doc-

trine of compassionate forgiveness suggested by the textual contiguity of the Golden Rule to the sermon on the mount in its Gospel manifestations. But just as the literal application of the principle of retributive justice was replaced early on in Jewish law by the concept of mutual responsibility, “requiting love for love” (*gemilut-ḥasadim*), so, too, in a famous passage in the *Analects* (14:34), Confucius (551–479 BCE) is pictured as rejecting the idea of repaying injustice with justice (literally, “requiting injury with virtue”) on the grounds that this would constitute a breach of equity, preaching instead that one repay only virtuous behavior in kind and respond to injury with the “correctness” of justice.

**METAPHYSICAL AND THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS.** In a number of important canonic enunciations of the Golden Rule, both in scriptural and in commentarial writings, thinkers go beyond the positing of its wisdom as the central pillar of their respective ethical systems espousing consideration and justice toward one’s neighbor (variously construed as one’s fellow Jew, fellow members of the Islamic community of the faithful, and the like, or in the broadest sense, all of one’s fellow human beings) and ascribe to this precept significance of a metaphysical or theological character. Thus, for example, an authoritative rabbinic commentary on the *Leviticus* injunction to “Love thy neighbor” (*Palestinian Talmud, Nedarim* 9:4) cites this single verse as comprising the entire “book of the creation of man” (*sefer tol’dot-ha’adam*).

In certain formulations (e.g., the Jain *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*) the scope of application of the principle of universal empathy is expanded to a cosmic level to take in all one’s fellow creatures, indeed all of creation, as coterminous with one’s own eternal Self. This same exegetical impulse also finds expression in the philosophical writings of a number of later Confucian thinkers, among them Wang Yangming (1472–1529), who see in the moral message of the Golden Rule enunciated in the *Analects* a metaphysical identification with the “single body” (*yiti*) of the entire universe. This understanding gives new meaning to Mencius’s attachment of his own positive formulation of the Golden Rule to the startling proposition that “the ten-thousand things are all within myself,” here not an expression of the vaunt of unbounded ego but a soaring affirmation of the innate moral core lodged within every human heart. This leap of faith from basic human interrelatedness to a spiritual identification with all creation may also help to explain the textual linkage in both Jewish and Christian scripture between the parallel commands to “love thy neighbor” and to “love thy God,” as well as Ibn al-‘Arabi’s mystical extrapolation from the wisdom of the Golden Rule to the submission of humans to the infinity of the divine will.

SEE ALSO Morality and Religion.

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**GOLDENWEISER, ALEXANDER A.** (1880–1940), was an American anthropologist and student of primitive religions. Born in Kiev, the son of a distinguished jurist and criminologist, Alexander Alexandrovich Goldenweiser was educated in his native Ukraine, and later, at the graduate level, in the United States. An important early influence was the intellectual companionship and guidance of his father, Alexander Solomonovich Goldenweiser, a social thinker influenced by Hegel and Spencer. Father and son shared a broad intellectual outlook and traveled together in Europe.

Goldenweiser immigrated as a young man to the United States and from 1900 to 1901 pursued graduate study in philosophy at Harvard. He later shifted his studies to Columbia, where he came into contact with Franz Boas and his students, and took his doctoral degree in 1910 under Boas’s supervision. Goldenweiser taught as an instructor at Columbia from 1910 to 1919, served as a lecturer in the Rand School of Social Sciences from 1915 to 1929, and was professor of thought and culture at the Portland Extension of the University of Oregon from 1930 until his death in 1940. He also taught at the New School for Social Research, the University of Wisconsin, and Reed College.

Although he carried out several months of anthropological fieldwork (on the social and political organization of the Northern Iroquois), Goldenweiser’s primary interests were



theoretical. He was known as the most philosophical of American anthropologists, and he remarked once that he would rather read bad theory than no theory at all. The formative influence on his mature work was clearly that of Boas and his students. Goldenweiser's most influential writings are sober and sharp-sighted critiques of the cultural evolutionism and diffusionism prevalent in the early twentieth century.

Goldenweiser's "Totemism: An Analytical Study" appeared in 1910, the same year as James Frazer's monumental *Totemism and Exogamy*, although, as Lévi-Strauss later noted, Goldenweiser's 110 pages were to have a more permanent theoretical influence than Frazer's four volumes. Frazer sought to establish the status of totemism as an evolutionary stage of religious development, a sort of universal primitive institution. Goldenweiser argued that what was called "totemism" was in fact merely the co-occurrence of three otherwise distinct traits—the differentiation of formally similar clans, the use of plant and animal symbols to distinguish them, and the recognition of a special relation between clan and totem.

Goldenweiser, often immersed in the themes and issues of his times, wrote widely on a number of topics relating to culture and history. It was, however, in such works as his analysis of totemism, or his essay (1913) on "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Cultures" (in which he argues, against the diffusionists, that limited possibilities make cultural similarities inevitable) that his remarkable, critical intellect was able to transcend the limitations of its era.

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Goldenweiser's most significant contribution to the study of religion was his essay "Totemism: An Analytical Study," *Journal of American Folk-Lore* 23 (1910): 179–293. A shorter early essay sets forth the "minority position" on the subject of independent invention and diffusion: "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," *Journal of American Folk-Lore* 26 (1913): 259–270.

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ROY WAGNER (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**GOLDZIHNER, IGNÁCZ** (1850–1921), was a Hungarian Arabist and Islamicist. After elementary schooling and a Jewish religious education in his birthplace, Székesfehérvár, Goldziher moved to Budapest in 1865. By the time he completed the *Gymnasium* in 1868, he had already begun to study Islamic languages at the university under Arminius Vámbéry. From 1868 until 1870 he pursued his studies first in Berlin with Friedrich Dieterich and Emil Rödiger for Ara-

bic and Hebrew, and with Abraham Geiger and Moritz Steinschneider for the historical relations between Judaism and Islam, and then in Leipzig, where he received his final training as an Arabist under Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer, obtaining his doctorate in 1870. The work of the Austrian scholar Alfred von Kremer opened up for Goldziher the perspective of an intellectual history (*Geistesgeschichte*) of Islam. Appointed privatdocent at the University of Budapest in 1871, he undertook several journeys, including a year's stay in Egypt (1873–1874), where he attended lectures at al-Azhar mosque. Goldziher became secretary of the Liberal Jewish Community in Budapest in 1876 and had to confine his research largely to the evenings; yet during these years he prepared his major publications. He became professor of the philosophy of Judaism at the Jewish Seminary in 1900 and was appointed to the chair of Semitic philology at the University of Budapest in 1905; from there he exerted great influence as the "patriarch" of Islamic studies until his death in 1921.

Goldziher may be said to have laid the foundation of Islamic studies as a scholarly discipline based on the literary and historical study of texts, most of which were at the time available only as manuscripts. It required great erudition and immense knowledge acquired through the reading of the original sources, and a creative use of the categories of the history of religions, to reconstruct the architecture of the history of Islamic religion as he did.

Goldziher's first contribution was to reveal and then study Islam's sources (such as the Qur'an and the *hadīth* literature) as well as its religious disciplines: the techniques of Qur'an exegesis (*tafsīr*), jurisprudence (*fiqh*), and philosophical theology (*kalām*). He also successfully undertook the study of texts pertaining to the further development of religious ideas, including those of mystical and "sectarian" developments.

Second, by trying to understand the problems treated in the religious texts within the framework of Muslim thought itself, Goldziher was able to show the inherent logic of the history of ideas in Islam. He could situate texts and ideas not only in the "outward" history of Islamic institutions and in political history but also as part of the inner development of Islam as a religion.

Third, Goldziher carried out a critical quest for historical truth and strived to show the historical situation, character, and limitations of ideas and practices that were of a religious nature and that were consequently held to be of an eternal validity. As a historian, he revealed the historical character of the texts that, with their interpretations, form part of Islamic religion and culture. He also traced external historical influences that have played a role in the development of Islam.

Goldziher revealed Islam as a complete entity in itself—that is to say, a religious entity—and encouraged its study. His insights into Islamic scripture and tradition, law, and

theology were certainly enhanced by his familiarity with similar problems in the study of Judaism. The respect he enjoyed among Arabs is noteworthy; his contacts with Muslim scholars were many, and several of his publications have been translated into Arabic. The diary he maintained—an unusual habit in the world of scholarship—was published in 1978.

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JACQUES WAARDENBURG (1987)  
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**GOLEM** SEE LÖW, YEHUDAH BEN BETSAL'EL OF PRAGUE

**GOOD, THE.** A distinction has to be made between two sets of questions related to the concept of the good. There are ethical problems about how to elaborate reasonable criteria of goodness, where goodness is conceived as a characteristic of human actions and of things or properties that are directly or indirectly relevant to human life. And there are questions concerning the goodness of God or of existence as such, apart from God's benevolence and love for the human race. I shall concentrate upon the latter question.

In archaic and polytheistic religions, gods are not necessarily good either in the sense of caring about human well-being or in the sense of providing humanity with a model of moral conduct; some are, some are not, and many combine good and evil characteristics in both respects. Yet in the myths of origin, the evil of gods has been connected, as a rule, with destruction and disorder, and goodness with creation and harmony, whether or not any one of the gods was invariably and systematically good or evil. In Iranian dualist mythology good and evil were attributed respectively to one and another mutually hostile divine beings. In all monotheistic religions God is totally good in an absolute and unqualified sense, and his goodness consists not only in that he loves his creatures: It is his intrinsic, nonrelative property; God would be good even if he had not created the universe. So conceived, goodness acquires a metaphysical meaning that probably cannot be further analyzed, cannot be reduced to other concepts, and has an axiomatic character.

Philosophical reflection on this kind of goodness is Plato's legacy; he discovered the idea of the good, which is, of course, desirable and therefore good for humankind, as well as the source of all goodness; but the good is not good because desirable, but desirable because intrinsically good. This topic was taken up and elaborated by later Platonists, including, in particular, Plotinus; to him the One is good both in terms of human needs and happiness and good in itself, apart from this relationship. Other Platonists, however, denied that the characteristics of goodness could be meaningfully attributed to the first principle: Speusippus, Plato's successor in the academy, made the point, and so did the last pagan philosopher, Damascius, to whom the first principle, being utterly ineffable, could not possibly have any properties, whether relative or even absolute; having no name (even the word *principle* is not appropriate) and no relationship with other realities or even with itself, it cannot be called good in any sense.

Christian philosophy, which assimilated many Platonic categories, has always stressed all the meanings of divine goodness: God is good in himself, he is the creator of all goodness, he is benevolent, and he is the source of criteria whereby one's acts are called morally good or evil. Whatever

else is good is such derivatively and by participation in the goodness of God. And, apart from a few dualistic sects, all creation was, in Christian thinking, attributed to God; because no existence is conceivable apart from God, whatever exists is good by definition. Evil has no positive ontological characteristics and is to be defined as pure negativity, *privatio*, lack of being: evil comes from the ill-will of human or diabolic creatures endowed with freedom of choice and abusing this freedom; yet even the devil, insofar as he exists, is good, even though his will is incurably and totally corrupt. This doctrine has been elaborated in detail by Augustine. In Thomas Aquinas's idiom it is summed up in saying that being and goodness are coextensive (*esse et bonum convertuntur*). Some Christian philosophers and theologians discussed the question (broached already by Plato): Are the criteria of good and evil, given by God, arbitrary or intrinsically valid? In other words, is the good good because God has decreed it to be good (as some nominalists and Descartes believed), or has God said that it is good because it is good in itself (as Leibniz argued)? If the former, moral rules appear to humans as arbitrary and contingent as, say, the rules of traffic; God could have decreed other norms of conduct and said, for instance, that adultery is good and loving one's neighbor wrong—a conclusion that sounds outrageous to common sense; yet, if God orders what is intrinsically good, apart from his decrees, he appears to be bound by laws that do not depend on him, which makes his omnipotence doubtful. The question can be invalidated, however, by saying—in conformity with Thomist metaphysics—that God is what he decrees and that there are no rules of goodness different from his essence, therefore he neither obeys a foreign law nor issues arbitrary decrees of which the content is contingent upon his essence.

If God is good in himself, and not only benevolent to his creatures, it is essential, in Christian terms, that one should love him not only as a benefactor and savior but because he is who he is. The point was strongly stressed by many Christian mystics and other "theocentrically" oriented writers. They argued that God is not only the highest good but the only good proper, therefore humankind is for God, rather than he for humans; individuals should admire him utterly oblivious of all favors and graces received from him; indeed their love should be the same even if they knew that he condemned them to hell, and they should be happy to accept his will unconditionally, whatever it means to them; they ought only to want God to be God, whereas to love God in reciprocity for his benevolence is unworthy or perhaps sinful. The standard Christian teaching, while stressing the value of the disinterested love of God, never goes so far as to say that worshipping God in connection with his gifts and graces is a sin or to deny that one's salvation is an intrinsic good and not only an instrument whereby God's glory is augmented; indeed, the last two statements sound heretical. The theory of "pure love" was hotly debated in the Catholic church in the seventeenth century.

The idea of divine goodness as a nonrelative property does not seem to be a product of pure philosophical speculation. It is rooted in, and makes explicit, the old tenet of many religions: Creation as such is good, and therefore the creator is good as such.

The distinction between autotelic (or intrinsic) and instrumental goods has been almost universally admitted by philosophers since Plato and Aristotle, yet there has never been an agreement about how to draw the line between them and how to define what is good in itself; many philosophers have denied that a collection of properties can be found that would be common to all the things and experiences people have called good. In the conflict between utilitarians and Kantians, and between utilitarians and pragmatists, these problems are among the most often debated.

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LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**GOODENOUGH, ERWIN R.** (1893–1965), was an American historian of religions. After studying for the Methodist ministry at Drew Theological Seminary and Garrett Biblical Institute, Goodenough spent three years in New

Testament and Jewish Studies at Harvard University, chiefly with George Foot Moore, before proceeding to Oxford University and earning a D. Phil. in 1923. Little influence of Oxford is discernible in his work, except perhaps in the sketch of Middle Platonism provided in his dissertation on Justin Martyr. In the published version (Jena, 1923) he mentions none of his teachers. The book does, however, foreshadow his later studies of Philo Judaeus, for in it Goodenough discovered the influence of Philo to be pervasive in early Christian theology.

Goodenough began teaching at Yale University in 1923 and remained there until his retirement, steadily producing articles and books to demonstrate that many sectors of Judaism had been receptive to Greco-Roman influence, not only in the realm of philosophical ideas but also in those of mystical intuition and artistic representation. His *By Light Light*, subtitled *The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism* (1935), was not universally accepted by students either of the Hellenistic world or of Judaism, but like all his works it stimulated interest in his hero, Philo.

In 1953 began the publication of Goodenough's major work, *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, which was posthumously completed in 1968 in thirteen volumes (including a volume of valuable indexes and maps). The genesis of this remarkable combination of fact and analysis was a visit Goodenough made to Rome during his time at Oxford. In Rome he saw catacomb frescoes and intuitively concluded that the depictions of Old Testament scenes must have had Jewish models. Excavations in the early 1930s at Dura-Europos (in which Yale participated) seemed to confirm his theory, for a third-century synagogue with bold and mysterious frescoes of biblical themes (now preserved at Damascus) was found.

Such paintings, prohibited by rabbinic teaching, required explanation, and Goodenough took two primary lines of approach. First, he went back to the Jewish catacombs at Rome and to many museums elsewhere, searching for the symbols present at Dura and working out their meanings for members of the Jewish communities. Then, influenced by psychoanalytic methods, he proceeded to explain their "basic" (usually Freudian) significance. Another principle he employed had to do with his division of the paintings into "left" and "right" on the basis of Pythagorean and gnostic notions, although the scenes themselves seem to be arranged "up" and "down."

The possibility or even likelihood that Goodenough was overinterpreting naturally occurred to him as well as to others, but he preferred to take this course rather than to retreat into agnosticism. As an "ex-Christian," as he called himself, he found mystical theories especially attractive. His tendency to say what he thought, and to point out what he did not believe, aroused the ire of the youthful William F. Buckley, Jr., whose *God and Man at Yale* (1951) included an attack on Goodenough's lack of orthodoxy in teaching college students.

During a year at Brandeis University (1962–1963) Goodenough moved to Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he contemplated writing a study of early Christianity based on his Hellenistic Jewish model. In a commemorative essay, Goodenough's friend and sometime student Samuel Sandmel raised questions about the possibility of such a work, in view of Goodenough's lack of knowledge of the history of scholarship, especially in the New Testament field, but he concluded that what Goodenough considered "prolegomena" to this proposed final work were probably more valuable than any book on Christian origins would have been.

Goodenough was active in learned societies, serving as editor of the *Journal of Biblical Literature* from 1934 to 1942 and as president of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences from 1947 to 1958. He took an active part in the American Council of Learned Societies from 1953 to 1965 and was a member of its Committee on the History of Religions. In this setting especially he was highly influential because of his learning, common sense, and personal charm.

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ROBERT M. GRANT (1987)  
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**GORĀKHNĀTH**, also known by the Sanskrit form of his name, Gorakṣanātha, was a teacher of *haṭhayoga* who lived sometime between 900 and 1225 CE. A leading Hindi scholar, Hazariprasad Dwivedi, has observed that "since the time of Śaṅkarācārya there has not been anyone in India as influential or as great" as Gorakṣanātha. There is still no consensus about either his dates or the compositions that may be correctly attributed to him.

Scholars who favor an early date for Gorakhnāth base their claim mainly on indications of an early date for his guru, Matsyendranāth. They focus especially on a reference made by Abhinavagupta (tenth century?), in which he identifies a Matsyendranāth as his own guru. Some sources call



Gorakhnāth's guru Mīnanāth (both *mina* and *matsya* signify "fish"). Most scholars take Matsyendranāth and Mīnanāth to be the same person. Svatmarama's *Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā*, however, lists Gorakhnāth as the fifth or sixth in spiritual descent from Matsyendra and the direct disciple of Mīna. This lineage would lead one to conclude that Matsyendra and Mīna are different and that Gorakhnāth lived more than a hundred years after Matsyendra. A later date for Gorakhnāth is based on the genealogy of Jñāndev, the author of the Marathi classic *Jñāneśvarī*, which, according to some manuscripts, was written in the year 1290. Jñāndev claims to be the third in spiritual descent from Gorakhnāth. This would place Gorakhnāth in the early thirteenth century.

No reliable data on the life of Gorakhnāth exist. He is, however, the subject of many fascinating legends, legends that provide an archetypal portrait of a great yogīn and wonder-worker. The majority of these legends originated with the Hindu sect known as the Kānpḥaṭā Yogīs—also called *nāths* and *nāth siddhas*—who have been the principal proponents of the doctrine and practice of *haṭhayoga*.

It is said that Gorakhnāth's doctrine was first propounded by the god Śiva. Śiva imparted the doctrine to his wife, Pārvatī, while they were seated in a boat, or castle, floating on the milk ocean. Matsyendranāth changed himself into a fish in order to listen surreptitiously to Śiva's teachings. When the god became aware of this ruse, he uttered a curse foretelling that Matsyendranāth would forget what he had learned. Eventually, Matsyendranāth became ensnared by the charms of the women of the mythical land of Kadalī and forgot the doctrine. His disciple Gorakhnāth disguised himself as one of the dancing girls of Kadalī and broke his guru's enchantment through the words of his songs. Matsyendranāth and his disciple then returned to their former practice of austere yogic asceticism.

Gorakhnāth and Matsyendranāth are included among the eighty-four *siddhas*, who belong as much to Buddhist Sahajiyā tradition as to the Śaiva tradition of the Kānpḥaṭās. The Kānpḥaṭās also include them among the so-called nine *nāths*. Although the names of some of these *nāths* vary from list to list, two of them—Jālandharīpā or Hāḍisiddha, an Untouchable brother-disciple of Matsyendranāth, and Kānhupā, Jālandharīpā's chief disciple—form the principal subjects of a related cycle of legends that recount their relations with King Gopīcānd and his mother, Queen Mayanāmatī. Kānhupā may be identical with Kṛṣṇapāda, the author of several of the Tantric Buddhist songs called *caryāpadas*.

The texts attributed to Gorakhnāth are all expositions of the practices and mystic doctrines of *haṭhayoga*. Some are written in Sanskrit and others in Hindi or other languages of North India. Most important are the *Siddhasiddhānta-paddhati* and the *Gorakṣa-śataka* in Sanskrit and the *Śabadī* and *Gorakhbodh* in old Hindi.

The *Gorakṣa-śataka* (Hundred verses of Gorakṣa) is one of the basic texts of *haṭhayoga* and shares many verses with

other such texts such as the *Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā* and *Gheraṇḍa-saṃhitā*. The *Gorakṣa-śataka* describes the six (elsewhere eight) "limbs" of yoga—postures (*āsana*), breath control (*prāṇāyāma*), sense withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*), concentration (*dhāraṇā*), meditation (*dhyaṇa*), and illumination (*samādhi*)—and pays particular attention to certain yogic practices such as the *khecarī mudrā*, the muscle contractions called *bandhas*, and meditations on the seven mystical centers (*cakras*).

The *Siddhasiddhānta-paddhati* is a more extended and theoretical work that gives a somewhat different map of the supraphysical anatomy of the subtle body. It describes nine *cakras*, together with sixteen mental supports (*ādhāras*), three points of concentration (*lakṣyas*), and five firmaments (*vyomans*). These are all used as points of reference and aids to the attainment of supreme reality, here called the *anāman* ("nameless"). An elaborate cosmology postulates a series of correspondences between the microcosm of the individual body and the macrocosm of the physical universe. The goddess Śakti is called the support of the body. *Anāman* is closely related to, or identical with, the union of Śiva and Śakti. When the master yogīn produces this union within his subtle body, the supernatural powers (*siddhis*) appear spontaneously. After twelve years of practice the yogīn becomes the equal of Śiva himself.

SEE ALSO Cakras; Haṭhayoga.

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DAVID N. LORENZEN (1987)

**GÖRRES, JOSEPH VON** (1776–1848), was a German publicist and Romantic mythologist. Born in the Rhineland and educated in Catholic schools, Johann Joseph von Görres remains best known for his fervent nationalist activities as editor and pamphleteer: successively a republican, monarchist, and, as Catholic polemicist, an ultramontanist—this last position also marked his tenure as professor of history at Munich in the final third of his life, during which he wrote *Die christliche Mystik* (4 vols., 1836–1842). His nationalism is reflected in his mythic interests. While lecturing

at Heidelberg from 1806 to 1808, he was associated with Achim von Arnim and Clemens Brentano, who were then publishing their landmark German folklore collection *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* (1806–1808). Görres published his own collection *Die teutschen Volksbücher* (1807) and *Allteutsche Volks und Meisterlieder* (1817). In 1820, after having studied Persian from about 1808, he presented a translation entitled *Das Heldenbuch von Iran* (part of the *Shahnameh*). His major work on myth is *Mythengeschichte der asiatischen Welt* (1810).

This “history of the myths of the Asiatic world” seeks to demonstrate that a primal monotheism originated in India and spread from there through the world, though in confused or debased form. Görres carries his thesis into discussions of Indic, Persian, Chaldean, Egyptian, Greek, Chinese, and Germanic myth. Seen from this perspective, his book is a prime example of German Romantic descriptions of pagan myth as “plagiarized” versions of the one true monotheistic revelation—a doctrine borrowed from earlier Christian writers. But his book is not a history in any rigorous sense so much as a grand Romantic visionary system, rapturously elaborated. He openly relies on “higher” intuitive insight where scholarly evidence is lacking or recalcitrant. His thought (always difficult) is perhaps best understood as suggesting that the godhead is perpetually present. In the far-off mythic age, original humankind lived in the godhead, openly, spontaneously, and wholly. When this golden age dissolved, humans entered “history” and came to believe in an external “nature.” Still, the original truth survives in myth and can be at least partially recovered despite humanity’s dispersal and self-division into many peoples and languages. There are echoes of Schelling in Görres’s emphasis on nature and history as the self-revelation of the godhead. But he also seems at times to deny history or nature any real status whatever, and in this vein he may be close to certain views of William Blake.

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BURTON FELDMAN (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**GOŚĀLA**, more fully Gośāla Maskariputra (sixth century BCE according to tradition, but, following Western research, rather fifth, or even fourth century BCE); one of the principal heterodox religious figures of early India. A contemporary of the Buddha and the Jina, Gośāla was the leader of the Ājīvika community and is said to have regarded himself as the twenty-fourth *tīrthānkara* of the current *avasarpinī* (“descending”) age. His name is given in various forms depending on the source of the reference: Makkhali Gośāla in Pali; Maskarin Gosāla (“the ascetic with the bamboo rod”) in Buddhist Sanskrit; Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta in the Jain Prakrits; and Maṅkali in Tamil.

Much of the information concerning Gośāla and the Ājīvikas derives from early Buddhist and Jain scriptures and the commentarial literature that developed around them. As a result, the picture of the Ājīvikas suffers from the inevitable distortions of sectarian prejudice. Some stray allusions to the Ājīvikas can also be found in Sanskrit literature. The Tamil epics, however, are comparatively well acquainted with the sect and the Ājīvikas are mentioned in South Indian epigraphs dating from the fifth to the fourteenth century CE.

A fairly reliable account of Gośāla’s life and his relationship with Māhavīra can be found in the fifteenth chapter of the fifth *aṅga* of the Jain canon. According to this account, Gośāla was born in the kingdom of Magadha (Bihar), probably the son of a *maṅkha* or professional mendicant. Impressed by the teachings and personality of Māhavīra, Gośāla insisted on being admitted as his disciple and for at least six years accompanied him on his peregrinations. At last, feeling himself to be spiritually more advanced than his master, he undertook the practice of austerities, acquired magic powers, and challenged Māhavīra. Surrounding himself with disciples, he is alleged to have established his headquarters in Śrāvastī (northwest of Magadha), forging close links with the potters’ community there.

In the twenty-fourth year of his asceticism Gośāla was visited by six other ascetics, possibly disciples. It is surmised that at that meeting the teachings of Gośāla were codified to form the core of Ājīvika scripture. It was on this occasion that he enumerated the six inevitable factors of life: gain and loss, joy and sorrow, and life and death, along with the two “paths,” song and dance. It is now believed that the original corpus of Ājīvika scripture was composed in an eastern Prakrit, perhaps akin to the Jain Prakrit Ardhamāgadhī. Quotations and adaptations of these scriptures appear to have been sporadically inserted in Buddhist and Jain accounts of the sect, but the Ājīvika scriptures themselves failed to survive.

Ājīvika doctrine apparently contained elaborate teachings on cosmology, reincarnation, and the elemental categories. It divided humanity into six groups, classified according to their psychic color (black, blue, red, green, golden/white, white/supremely white. Compare the *lesyas* in Jainism). However, the school is best remembered (and condemned in Buddhist and Jain sources) for its uncompromising determinism (*nīyati*). In a Jain text an Ājīvika deity declares that

there is in fact no real human effort, no deed, no strength, no courage, no action or prowess: all beings are instead “determined” (after Basham). This determinism thus denies free will, moral responsibility, or the maturation of *karman*. It was this tenet that elicited the strongest condemnation from the Buddha in his assessment of various “false views.”

SEE ALSO Ājīvikas.

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COLETTE CAILLAT (1987 AND 2005)

**GOSPEL.** As a word in the English language, *gōspel* represents Middle English terminology derived from the Old English *godspel* (from *gōd*, “good,” and *spel*, “story”). “Gospel” is the common translation of the Late Latin *evangelium*, which is a virtual transliteration of the Greek *euaggelion*. In classical Greek, *euaggelion* designated everything connected with the *euaggelos*, the bearer of good news (from *eu*, “well,” and *aggelos*, “messenger, one who announces”). Initially *euaggelion* designated the reward given to the messenger who brought happy news (see Homer, *Odyssey* 14.152–153). In the plural the term *euaggelia* was used to designate the offerings to the gods made in thanksgiving upon the reception of good news (e.g., Xenophon, *Historia Graeca* 4.13.14). Later *euaggelion* came to be used for the content of the message, the good news itself, usually an announcement of a military victory.

*Euaggelion* occasionally entered into religious use, where its connotation was derived from oracular usage. Within this context, *euaggelion* signified a divine utterance, but the term was also used in the cult of the emperors. There it enjoyed a mythical quality. Anything having to do with the emperor

could be qualified as *euaggelion*, particularly imperial birth announcements and news of the emperor’s ascension to the throne, but even imperial decrees. A significant passage in this regard is a calendar inscription (9 BCE) from Priene in Asia Minor that comments upon the birth of the emperor Augustus. This passage is usually translated “For the whole world the birthday of the [emperor] god began the joyful news [*euaggeliōn*, a genitive plural] in his regard,” but the passage is mutilated, and the Greek *euaggeliōn* may just as well refer to “joyful sacrifices” instead of “joyful news.”

Hellenistic Jewish authors, such as Philo of Alexandria (d. 45–50 CE) and Josephus Flavius (37–c. 100 CE), used *euaggelion* with a secular connotation. The term was also employed by the translators of the Greek Bible (the Septuagint), who used *euaggelion* to render the Hebrew *bsr*. In the Hebrew scriptures *bsr* is used only in a secular sense. *Euaggelion* likewise has only a profane meaning in the Septuagint. There *euaggelion* is used of the reward given to a messenger in 2 Samuel 18:22 and of a joyous message in 2 Samuel 18:20 (likewise 2 Sm. 4:10, 18:25, 18:27; 2 Kgs. 7:9).

**THE SEPTUAGINT.** In the Septuagint (a Greek translation of the Hebrew scriptures), the verb *euaggelizein*, cognate with *euaggelion*, is commonly used in the profane sense with the meaning “to announce.” In “Second Isaiah” (*Is.* 40:9, 52:7, 60:6, 61:1), however, and in some texts dependent upon it (*Na.* 1:15; *Ps.* 68:11, 96:2), *euaggelizein* specifically connotes the announcement of the good news of salvation. The messenger of good news (*euaggelizomenos*) announces that the time of salvation is at hand, that Yahveh will reign as king, that a new age is about to dawn. Within this context the use of the verb acquires an eschatological connotation. The era of salvation is made present by the announcement of it. Neither “Second Isaiah” nor the dependent texts use the noun *euaggelion* in this eschatological, salvific sense.

The notion of the bearer of the good news of salvation persisted in both Hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism (see the Targum on *Isaiah* 40:9 as well as 1QM 18:14 from among the Dead Sea Scrolls). The mid-first-century *Psalms of Solomon* (11:1–2) uses *euaggelizein* in the eschatological sense, while in postbiblical Judaism *bsr* and its cognate verb refer not only to concrete historical news but also to prophetic messages of weal and woe, angelic messages, and divine announcements of consolation and blessing.

**NEW TESTAMENT.** Within the New Testament, *euaggelion* is used far more frequently by Paul than by any other author (forty-eight times in the indisputably Pauline writings). His writings are the first literary attestation to the Christian usage of the term. It is characteristic of Paul that he uses the term in an absolute sense and without any qualifying adjective. To some authors this suggests that Paul first gave a Christian connotation to the term *euaggelion*, while to others it implies that Paul had taken over an earlier Christian usage. In any event, there is little doubt that the term acquired its Christian significance in a Hellenistic environment. While some scholars maintain that the early Christian usage was derived



from emperor worship, the more common opinion locates the roots of the Christian use of *euaggelion* in “Second Isaiah.”

**Paul.** In the Pauline letters two passages confirm the thesis that Paul has taken over the absolute use of *euaggelion* from early Christian usage. The passages in question are *1 Corinthians* 15:1–4 and *Romans* 1:1–4. In his first letter to the Corinthians, Paul uses classic language to describe the handing on of traditional teaching and employs *euaggelion* to identify the content of that teaching. Paul explicates the content of the *euaggelion* by citing a creedal formula, probably derived from Palestinian Christian circles, that focuses on the death and resurrection of Jesus. In the opening verses of the letter to the Romans, the content of the gospel is the disclosure of Jesus as the Son of God and the Lord by his resurrection from the dead. Thus, for Paul, the basic content of the gospel is the resurrection by means of which Jesus is constituted as Lord. This is understood as the fulfillment of the scriptural promise. Paul sometimes (e.g., *1 Cor.* 9:12, *2 Cor.* 2:12) calls it the gospel of Christ (*euaggelion tou Christou*) because the good news of salvation has Christ as its central object.

In the writings of Paul, *euaggelion* also defines the oral proclamation of the missionary (e.g., *2 Cor.* 8:19, *Phil.* 4:15). In *1 Corinthians* 9:14, Paul uses the word in two senses, that is, as his message and as the act of proclamation. The act of proclamation involves more than recitation of a creedal formula or recital of the traditional kerygma on Jesus’ death and resurrection. Paul’s whole person is involved (see *1 Thes.* 1:5, 2:8). His proclamation is the work of an apostle “approved by God to be entrusted with the gospel” (*1 Thes.* 2:4). Paul writes succinctly of “my gospel” (*Rom.* 2:16) or “our gospel” (*2 Cor.* 4:3). Those who receive his message receive it “not as the word of men but as what it really is, the word of God, which is at work” (*1 Thes.* 1:13). For Paul, the gospel is the “gospel of God” (e.g., *1 Thes.* 1:9, *2 Cor.* 11:7) because it comes from God and is about God’s work. Coming from God, the gospel is powerful. Its proclamation brings about the eschatological era of salvation; it implies the ending of one world order and the beginning of a new one.

**Mark.** Both in understanding of the term *euaggelion* and in frequency of its usage (seven times), Mark is similar to Paul. This does not imply a direct dependence of Mark on Paul, because both of them reflect earlier Christian missionary usage. Mark, however, uses only *euaggelion*, the noun, and not the related verb. For Mark, *euaggelion* is a technical expression used to denote the kerygmatic announcement of salvation. Jesus is the subject of the gospel insofar as he proclaimed the coming of the kingdom of God (*Mk.* 1:15). When proclamation occurs, that which is proclaimed becomes a reality. Accordingly, the activity of Jesus became the object of the gospel. Mark editorializes on the tradition he has incorporated into his work in order to affirm that the gospel relates to that which has been done in and through Jesus. Mark emphasizes this notion by opening his

work with “The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God” (*Mk.* 1:1). This striking statement brings into focus a point of view even if it does not, strictly speaking, function as a title for the entire work.

**Matthew and Luke.** Neither Matthew nor Luke employs *euaggelion* so frequently as does Mark, and the Johannine literature does not use the term at all. Matthew uses the term four times but never without further qualification. He writes of “the gospel of the kingdom” (*Mt.* 4:23, 9:35), of “this gospel” (*Mt.* 26:13), and of “this gospel of the kingdom” (*Mt.* 24:14). In all four instances Matthew uses *euaggelion* in relation to a speech complex. For him Jesus is no longer the content of the gospel; instead, he is the communicator of the gospel. The speeches of Jesus are “gospels.” Matthew’s emphasis is on Jesus’ preaching and teaching as providing a paradigm for the Christian way of life.

Luke does not use *euaggelion* at all in the first part of his written work, but it appears twice in *Acts* (15:7, 20:24). Nonetheless, Luke employs the verb *euaggelizomai* (“I bring the good news”) frequently both in his gospel (ten times) and in *Acts* (fifteen times). By doing so, Luke emphasizes the act of preaching, which is then explained by the direct object that accompanies the verb. He sharply distinguishes the preaching of the apostles from Jesus’ own preaching. Willi Marxsen has suggested that Luke deliberately avoided using *euaggelion* in the first part of his work because instead of giving a record of the church’s proclamation he was writing a type of “life of Jesus.”

**THE WRITTEN GOSPEL.** The general Pauline usage of *euaggelion* to mean the proclamation of salvation as concretized in the death and resurrection of Jesus continued into the second century as the writings of Polycarp of Smyrna (*Letter to the Philippians* 9.2) and the *Didache* (12.3.1) attest. Aristides of Athens, the first of the Christian apologists, once mentions the “evangelical writing” (*euaggelikē graphē*), and Ignatius of Antioch intimates that the gospel was a written text when he wrote to the church of Smyrna that neither “the prophetic predictions nor the law of Moses nor the gospel” has convinced his opponents (*Letter to the Smyrneans* 5.1).

Even when *euaggelion* came to be applied to a written text, the word continued to be employed in the singular, and this use of the singular was still widespread in the third century. The usage bespeaks the conviction that the gospel was identical with the teaching of the Lord. This usage is reflected in the formulaic expression “the Lord says in the gospel” (e.g., *2 Clem.* 8:5), but it is also reflected in the titles of the Gospels. The earliest parchment codices of the New Testament, namely, the fourth-century Sinaiticus and Vaticanus codices, entitled the Gospels “according to Matthew,” “according to Mark,” and so on. This manner of providing each of the written gospels with a title suggests that *euaggelion* applied to the whole collection of the four canonical gospels. Nonetheless, three of the early New Testament papyri have made use of more complete titles: *Gospel according to Matthew* (P<sup>4</sup>) and *Gospel according to John* (P<sup>66</sup>, P<sup>75</sup>). Even this



is a strange turn of phrase if the sole intention is to designate authorship. These titles seem to suggest that the single gospel was narrated according to the vision of a specific evangelist. There was only one message of final, eschatological salvation, namely, salvation accomplished through the death and resurrection of Jesus, but the message could be conveyed in different ways.

In the middle of the second century, Justin Martyr (c. 100–163/5), writing in Rome, was the first Christian author to write of the Gospels in the plural (*euaggelia*). In his *First Apology* (c. 155) and his *Dialogue with the Jew Trypho* he refers to the “memoirs of the Apostles” on some fifteen occasions. The first time he mentions the memoirs, he adds by way of explanation “which are called gospels” (*hatina kaleitai euaggelia*; *Apol.* 1.66.3). In two other places, however, he retains the singular use of *euaggelion* (*Dial.* 10.2, 100.1). At the time of Clement of Alexandria (150?–215?) the *euaggelion* was understood to be a book on the system of Christian morality. Subsequently the term was also applied to the so-called apocryphal gospels, the oldest of which come from the second century.

The transference of *euaggelion* from the designation of an oral proclamation to a written text—a usage that most probably derives from the first verse of Mark—attests that these texts had the same content and purpose as the oral proclamation. Both the oral proclamation of the gospel and the written gospel speak of eschatological salvation accomplished in the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth. Far from being biographies of Jesus, the four canonical gospels attest to his preaching and to his activity in the light of his death and resurrection. The historical traditions they contain are subordinated to their religious and kerygmatic purpose. They were written to evoke and/or confirm faith in Jesus as Christ and Lord (see *Jn.* 20:31). The central content of the gospel is one, even if it is attested in documents written by different authors.

**LATER USAGE OF THE TERM.** At the time of the continental Reformation, Martin Luther (1483–1546) sharply distinguished between the law and the gospel. The law makes demands and provokes anxiety; the gospel bestows grace and brings consolation. From his study of *Romans* 1:16–17, where Paul writes of the gospel as “the power of God for salvation . . . for in it the righteousness of God is revealed through faith for faith,” Luther concluded that justification did not depend on outward obedience to the law. Although the content of the law is the unchangeable will of God, the law brings humans before the throne of judgment. The first use of the law deters people from sin by fear of punishment; a second use makes even believers conscious of their sin. In contrast, the gospel, appropriated through faith, reveals the saving love of God, assures believers of justifying grace, and offers a promise of the forgiveness of sins.

In modern times, preaching the gospel is characteristic of Christian missionary endeavors throughout the world. Gospel faith is popularly associated with evangelical preach-

ing and the view that Jesus is one’s personal savior. The reading of a passage from one of the four canonical gospels (*Matthew, Mark, Luke, John*) is a key feature of worship services of the more liturgically oriented Christian churches. Frequently the excerpt that is read is simply referred to as “the gospel.”

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**GOZAN ZEN.** The Japanese term *gozan* (also pronounced *gosan*; Chin., *wushan*; “five mountains”) refers to a system of monastic organization and its associated culture that flourished in Song-dynasty China and medieval Japan. Because many Buddhist monasteries in premodern China and Japan were located on mountains and conceived of as being secluded from the world, the word *mountain* came to connote a monastery. The “five mountains” were a designated group of Zen (Chin., Chan) monasteries. Gozan organization began to develop in China during the Song dynasty (960–1279) and was transmitted to Japan during the Kamakura period (1185–1333). These monasteries developed a

distinctive pattern of Zen monastic life, a common organizational hierarchy, and a characteristic cultural style. Thus the expression “five mountains” is also applied to the literature produced by monks from these monasteries (*gozan bungaku*), the wood-block books printed in these monasteries (*gozan-ban*), and the art and culture associated with them (*gozan bunka*). This article will outline the development of the Gozan administrative organization, define the Gozan style of Zen, and introduce Gozan literature and culture.

As with Zen itself, Gozan organization, learning, and culture had their origins in China, and throughout their history in Japan the Gozan monasteries remained major conduits for the dissemination not only of Zen but also of Chinese culture in the broadest sense. During the Song dynasty some fifty large Chan monasteries in the Hangzhou and lower Yangze regions of China were brought under the regulation of civilian officials and organized into a three-tier hierarchy headed by five great monasteries (*wushan*; Jpn., *gozan*). These were among the most prestigious Chan training centers in China. They were visited by such Japanese monks as Eisai, Dōgen, and Enni, who went to China in search of Zen beginning in the late twelfth century. From the mid-thirteenth century on, Chinese monks from these monasteries, fleeing the advancing Mongols and seeking a new mission field for Chan, made their way to Japan, where they were patronized by shoguns, provincial warrior chieftains, and members of the imperial court.

Before the close of the thirteenth century a similar three-tier hierarchy of Zen monasteries was beginning to take shape in Japan under the patronage and regulation of the Hōjō regents who dominated the Kamakura *bakufu*. The early Kamakura Gozan included Kenchōji, Engakuji, and Jufukuji. Jōchiji and Jōmyōji were added later. With the overthrow of the Kamakura *bakufu* in 1333, the Kemmu Restoration of 1333 to 1336, and the establishment of the Muromachi *bakufu* after 1336, political power shifted back to Kyoto. A Kyoto Gozan hierarchy was quickly designated by the emperor Go-Daigo and the early Ashikaga shoguns.

The Gozan network assumed its final configuration, although by no means its full scale, under the third shogun, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu. By an edict of 1386 the five Kyoto Gozan, ranked in order of seniority, were Tenryūji, Shōkokuji, Kenninji, Tōfukuji, and Manjuji. Their counterparts in Kamakura were Kenchōji, Engakuji, Jufukuji, Jōchiji, and Jōmyōji. The great Kyoto monastery of Nanzenji was set at the apex of the Kyoto and Kamakura Gozan as a superior temple. Lesser Zen monasteries in Kyoto, Kamakura, and throughout the provinces were ranked beneath the Gozan as either *jissatsu* (“ten temples”) or *shozan* (“many mountains”). Just as the Gozan category had been inflated from five to eleven monasteries, so too the *jissatsu* and *shozan* tiers grew rapidly in number. By the fifteenth century there were nearly fifty *jissatsu* and more than two hundred *shozan*.

This network was a fairly centralized system with uniform monastic regulations and organization and with close

links maintained between the Gozan in Kyoto and Kamakura and their satellites in the provinces. Monks could move fairly freely among the monasteries, and a novice who began his religious career in a provincial *shozan* might continue his training in a larger regional *jissatsu* and, perhaps, go on to hold high office in a central Gozan. The whole network was supervised by a Zen monk official, known as the *sōroku*, from a subtemple within Shōkokuji. The *sōroku* served as the mediator between the *bakufu* and the Gozan. Not all Zen monasteries were included within the Gozan. The Gozan system was dominated by those branches of the Rinza school, especially the lineage of Musō Soseki, who found favor with the *bakufu*. Very few Sōtō Zen monasteries were included, and the Rinza monasteries of Daitokuji and Myōshinji were excluded.

Zen monastic life within the Gozan was lived under the traditional Buddhist monastic precepts and characteristic Zen regulations known as *shingi* (“regulations for the pure community”). Gozan Zen practice in Japan was based on the codes in force in Chinese Chan monasteries and shaped by such Chinese émigré monks as Lanqi Daolung and Wuxu Zuyuan in the thirteenth century, and their successors Musō Soseki, Gidō Shūshin, and Zekkai Chūshin in the fourteenth century. The core of monastic life was communal meditation in the monks’ hall, private and public interviews with a Zen master involving the resolution of *kōan*, lectures on the sūtras and Zen texts in the Dharma Hall, and prayers and sūtra chanting in the Buddha Hall. In the late Kamakura and early Muromachi periods the standards of Gozan monastic life were fairly strictly observed. By the fifteenth century, however, a slackening of discipline was becoming evident as monks took the privilege of the great monasteries for granted, neglected the rigorous practice of Zen, and devoted themselves to more worldly interests or to cultural activities. The monk Ikkyū Sōjun was so disappointed that he quit the Gozan in disgust and joined the Daitokuji community. He castigated Gozan monks, calling them idle rice bags who were concerned only with eating well and living comfortably.

Many Chan masters of the Song dynasty had consorted with lay scholars and artists, whose cultural interests they shared. Chan monks became well known as calligraphers, painters in ink monochrome, poets, and students of Chinese philosophy. Some masters rejected these non-Buddhist avocations as distractions from the true quest for enlightenment through Chan. Other monks defended them as legitimate means of expressing, enhancing, or relaying the insights of the search for enlightenment. These cultural interests were too strong to contain and the acquisition of secular learning and cultural accomplishments became a part of life in the great Chinese monasteries. These tastes were quickly transmitted to the Japanese Gozan, where they served to draw the Zen monks and their warrior and court patrons more closely together. Calligraphy and the writing of Chinese poetry were the two most common avocations, but Gozan monks were also accomplished ink painters, designers of gardens and

buildings, arbiters of taste in art objects, interior decoration, and the advocates of drinking tea, as well as teachers of Confucian and Daoist thought.

Under the patronage of the *bakufu*, the court, and the provincial warrior nobility, the Gozan system flourished economically. Gozan monasteries acquired estate holdings throughout Japan. The Kyoto Gozan, in particular, were active participants in trade with China, in commerce, and in money lending. The bursars of some monasteries acquired reputations as astute managers of resources and lands. Politically, Gozan monks were active in defense of their monastic interests. They lent their managerial and diplomatic expertise to warriors, serving as advisers and go-betweens in domestic disputes and in the conduct of diplomacy and trade with China. By the fifteenth century, the Gozan was much more than a network of monasteries. It could be counted among the most influential and powerful religious, political, and economic institutions in medieval Japanese society.

The weakening of the Muromachi *bakufu* and the warfare of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries exposed the Gozan to depredation. Many monasteries were burned or lost their landholdings. Communities were scattered, morale was reduced to a low ebb, and spiritual concerns were neglected. Although some recovery took place under the patronage of Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa shoguns, the Gozan never recovered the influence it had had in the medieval period. Perhaps the last prominent Gozan monk was Ishin Suden of Nanzenji, who served both as *sōroku* of the Gozan and as an influential adviser to Tokugawa Ieyasu.

Many of the former Gozan monasteries survive today, some of them as Zen training centers. Among these are Nanzenji, Shōkokuji, and Tenryūji in Kyoto, and Engakuji in Kamakura. The Gozan system, however, as a monastic hierarchy and means of regulation and centralization faded out with the Meiji Restoration. Contemporary Zen monasteries are grouped by lineage around their major monasteries (*honzan*). Moreover, contemporary Rinzai Zen owes more to Hakuin Ekaku (1686–1769) and the Daitokuji and Myōshinji lineage than it does to the medieval Gozan.

SEE ALSO Ikkyū Sōjun; Musō Soseki; Zen.

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**GRACE.** The religious significance present in the Anglo-French word *grace* is both multifaceted and ambivalent. As a theological term, it may attempt to pinpoint the activity of God here and now, or it may disclose nothing less than the reality underlying all of religion and faith.

This almost transparent term points to the fundamental power and horizon of every revelation, to the ultimate religious question and statement in any religion, for grace stands primarily not for human virtue but for God's presence. Grace is a divine activity in human history and in human lives. The reality signified by *hesed* ("loving-kindness") in the Hebrew scriptures and by *charis* ("grace") in the Greek scriptures can be found in the Dao, in the power of the Hindu triad, and in the radical absence contemplated by Buddhism. Occasionally one can find in these other traditions the same theological discussions about the mediation by grace of the divine in human freedom and suffering.

Christian theologians have filled volumes with definitions and classifications of grace. Because God remains mystery, the ineffable presence of the deity eludes precise definition, and therefore the ultimate meaning of the word remains mysterious. In theology, as distinct from the expression of religion in art (where grace is shown rather than defined), the word *grace* frequently denotes either too much or too little.

Moving back through the Latin *gratia* to the Greek *charis*, with its overtones of graciousness and liberality, the word *grace* assumed a Christian theological importance with Paul. But even for Paul, whose creative interpretation of Christianity began the turbulent odyssey of this term, the word has several meanings. *Charis* can mean a power coming from the spirit of Jesus active in a Christian (the charism of healing or preaching; *1 Cor.* 12), but it can also mean the power of God to help one follow Christ despite the evils and difficulties of human life. And with Paul there is also a more objective meaning of grace. The foundation of all grace and of all graces (charisms) is the generous saving activity of God manifested toward humankind in the history and destiny of Jesus. God's grace is the gift of persevering, loving, purposeful generosity that becomes visible in a climactic way in the life, teaching, death, and resurrection of Jesus.

*Charis* means the favor of God, but that favor made active in the advent of Jesus Christ, particularly so in his words and deeds. God's loving generosity in Christ bestows not only forgiveness of sin but a new, death-surviving mode of existence. Jesus Christ is grace objectified, and in and after him the worlds of creation, time, and human personality have been radically (if invisibly) altered. Paul applied Jesus'

phrase “the kingdom of God” largely in a concrete manner to Jesus himself, particularly through the triumphant guarantee of newness assured by Jesus risen from the dead.

In a significant phrase, Paul proclaims that while sin inevitably leads to death, the *charisma* of God to humanity is “eternal life in Christ Jesus” (*Rom.* 6:23). The following chapters of that letter describe this *charisma*: new freedom, familial intimacy with God, the capability to follow the new “law” of love, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in men and women, and God’s advocacy on behalf of needy individuals (*Rom.* 8). Personal entry into this life is begun by baptism conceived as rebirth in Christ’s death, burial, and resurrection. The event of Easter has both personal and cosmic results.

A final realization of *charis* for Paul comes from this very baptismal life. The new life of grace is not only a divine favor and an adoption but also a commissioning for action. *Charismata*, charisms, are powers of the Holy Spirit active in mature Christians, empowering them to act on behalf of the reign of God and the life of the church. Christians are not passive. Each Christian has through the baptismal spirit some active gift to aid the church either inwardly or in its mission of service and evangelization. Drawing on his metaphor of the body, Paul faces the difficult challenges of diversity and unity in the young churches and of leadership amid a variety of services. Nonetheless, Paul will not abandon this final realization of the new presence of God where grace continues through time to be present in human life and ministries of service (*Rom.* 12, *1 Cor.* 12).

#### **HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEOLOGY OF GRACE.**

Eastern Christian theology was heir to thought forms of human participation in the divine and subsequently emphasized less the evil and ruinous counterpart to grace than the almost mystical capacity of the human person to become, through grace, a participant in the life of the triune God. In the first two centuries of Christianity, the church was largely Greek-speaking. However, by the end of the second century, with the influence of Tertullian in the West and Clement of Alexandria in the East, Greek and Latin theology had begun to take distinct directions. In the more Hellenistic, Neoplatonist world of the Eastern Empire the seeds of the New Testament teaching about a new creation, a new man and woman, and a human being who is the temple of the spirit of God found fertile soil.

The school of Alexandria in the third century, the great bishop-theologians of the fourth century, and monasticism and mysticism in the fifth to eighth centuries solidified and concretized Eastern theology—a theology of trinitarian, divinizing grace renewed by Christ. In the East, Manichean dualism and the Augustinian theology of a God redeeming a segment of the fallen world were overshadowed by a view owing much to Neoplatonism, which envisioned a single world in which the divine plan and presence was intertwined with creation and the Trinity continues that plan and presence through the effects of redemption.

After the sporadic but often intense persecution in the second and third centuries, the role of baptism as a commission for an eschatological life related less to the fading idea of martyrdom than to the newer opportunity of communal eremitical monasticism. Some monastic figures stressed the ascetic side, others the contemplative. With schools and theologies influenced by orientations based in the thought of Origen and Dionysius the Areopagite, the monastic life became a school of contemplation fulfilling in a special way the Christian vocation. Far from being simply training for visions and miracles, monasticism viewed grace as the seed or enabler of a God-bestowed contemplative outlook that, as it intensified, fostered not visions but apophatic faith in touch with the darkness of the divine essence. Furthermore, in the Eastern Christian churches, the liturgy became the sacramental place where grace reaches the concrete; in the liturgy, the social and the historical meet contemplatively the timeless icon, hymn, and sacrament of worship.

In the West, Christianity came to emphasize salvation from sin. With Augustine grace took on characteristics of an intermediate power sent from God to heal the effects of evil in human beings. Augustine’s life and conversion led him to emphasize sharply the human person’s proneness to evil and corresponding need for some divine assistance so that men and women might turn to God in faith and hope and to their neighbors in mercy and love. With Augustine, grace appears in a triad along with freedom and evil. Human freedom can mean freedom to choose this or that, but more often it means the freedom to choose God as the personal ultimate in a life. Evil can mean the fallen human condition—characterized, for example, by prison camps—or it can mean the personal realization of evil in a sinful act.

Within Western Christianity the history of the controversies over grace illustrate the changing and perduring meanings of the word. In the first decades after Christ Paul asserted, against Jewish or Christian groups who based their hopes on external religious observances, the free and open salvation made widely accessible by God’s recent entry into human history. Augustine upheld against the ascetic Pelagius (whose view of the positive capacity of human nature made a strict following of the Christian way more plausible) the pervasive infection of the primal fall. Augustine considered human choice without grace to be enchained, bereft of the contact of a divine activity (namely, grace) by which one could please and live for God. In Augustine, conceptions of the fall, the human sinful condition, and original sin describe the opposite of salvation, of true goodness and life. The view of the nature of grace as an intermediary, as a quasi entity of divine promise and power, began to appear.

In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas, who was at work on his synthesis of nature and society with Christian teaching, disagreed with his Augustinian colleagues over the need for grace. Thomas defended the natural potentialities of the human personality to do their work—to know the truth, to seek the good. He considered original sin to be a



serious wounding of the personality from within the emotions and the ground of the will but not an irrevocable termination of the image of God. He brought back into Western thinking the spirit of the Alexandrian school, a synthesis of nature and grace where every aspect of creation and grace has the potential to find its place in a harmonious whole.

Martin Luther, propelled by his rediscovery of Augustine and Paul, protested against the localization of divine power in things (e.g., indulgences and noncommunal liturgy) and denied that the forms and laws of the church had a monopoly over grace. Luther's theology of justification by faith permitted him to disengage grace from human control and to return its meaning to God alone. Despite the extrinsic nature of grace for Luther and its initial separation from virtue and service, it would not be correct to view Luther as unconcerned with progress in the Christian life, that is, with sanctification. For Luther, the Christian life is different from the life of sin: The Christian life is lived as the product not of law and effort but of an initial constituting and saving (justifying) grace. Calvin selected other emphases for his Reformed theology of grace, particularly God's sovereignty manifested in the divine transcendent plan for the elect.

The Reformation began a long period filled with controversies over the nature of grace. Essentially these were arguments over how human freedom in need of redemption was affected by truly divine grace. If grace is God's act or the exercise of God's power, how do the finite and the created participate in it? How can predestination and human freedom be reconciled?

The great topic of Baroque Roman Catholic theology lasting for almost two centuries after the middle of the sixteenth century was grace conceived as a finite, God-given force that converts, sanctifies, inspires, and saves. Corresponding to the culture of the times, with its new empirical science and Cartesian philosophy, grace had the characteristics of the subjective, the mechanical, and the theatrical. Italian and Middle European art and architecture of the period were frequently statements of a cosmic and mystical theology of grace: In a sacral world of light and golden divine symbols, great saints were depicted in their triumphant lives.

For Protestant communities as well as for Catholic religious orders the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were times of meticulous theological analyses of grace. Strongly held views on God's action and human psychological response (both at the time of conversion and during the span of a Christian life), similar to those of the Jansenists, Jesuits, and Dominicans, brought into existence Arminians, Methodists, and Pietists who debated the triad of divine action, human freedom, and sin.

The spirituality of the Jesuits reflects the Baroque (and later nineteenth-century) Catholic devotional analysis of the interior life as activated by modes of "created grace," that is, God as the principle of human transformation rather than God as God ("uncreated grace"). In the seventeenth century,

the Jesuits, providing leadership to the Counter-Reformation, found themselves embroiled in controversies over freedom and grace on three fronts. The origin of the Jesuits' positive view of human efforts cooperating with grace lay with the great Reformation theologies. Within Roman Catholicism, the Dominicans judged the Jesuits' theory of human freedom to be exaggerated and their theology of divine foreknowledge to be inadequate, while the followers of Michel de Bay (Baius) and Jansen asserted that the Jesuits neglected the seriousness of original sin.

As the eighteenth century progressed, such theological controversies seemed dated and were swept aside by the rationalism and naturalism leading to the Enlightenment. If human nature was good, wounded by the past structures of society, it needed not a divine jostle but its own education to pursue the good. Grace is transformed, even replaced, by the human mind and will, a nature awaiting cultivation, and even by human history, where religion should be viewed as a facet of reason.

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy provides a different interpretation of the active presence of God in history and life. The movement from Schelling and Hegel to Marx saw no need to preserve any separation of grace from nature and sin. Consciousness, freedom, and development become aspects of one reality, the enactment of the life of the ultimate, and in that process of enactment there is no supernature above nature.

After World War I some theologians began to rethink Christianity precisely as a religion of grace, but from modern perspectives on the self and freedom. Grace was viewed as a horizon of consciousness and history, as the challenge made by the holy against the demonic in life. Grace is the presence rather than the mechanics of God. For Paul Tillich, all aspects of human life could be theonomous, that is, transparent to the divine, rather than authoritarian or superstitious. As symbols of God, nature, religion, and art inspire a new being in believers, one that struggles with the problems of meaning, life, and morality. For Tillich's Roman Catholic counterpart, Karl Rahner, grace was no less than God as horizon and presence. God's activity in human life and history is universal and actively draws the world to a future that is the plan and future of God. Human life, open to and vivified by grace, is realized, preached, and exemplified particularly in Christ. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the Jesuit paleontologist, was convinced that the ultimate force driving the threads of evolution—spiritual as well as biological—on earth was not instinct but grace. What the *Gospel of John* calls *agapē*, love, is in Christ the source and the goal of the cosmos. For Teilhard, religious history, like evolutionary history, is acted out over a long time. From the great religions of the world a central line emerges—that of Christ as the incarnation of God's gracious purpose. In the contemplation and discipleship of grace, a higher, developmental phylum introduces to the human race individuality-in-community and freedom-in-charity. Rather than the end of the world being

close, the human race, for Teilhard, is only a few steps out of the cave.

In the thought of these three popular twentieth-century theologians, Tillich, Rahner, and Teilhard, one sees the modern, post-Kantian, and post-Heideggerian shift to the historical subject. Grace is both a divine presence and a developmental horizon of all history; Christ and the church are grace manifest, but they are not its exclusive repositories. In short, grace is viewed no longer as the change of God's will (Luther) or as a supernatural divine power agitating within human minds and wills (Council of Trent, 1545–1563), but as the patient, luminous, inviting presence of a transcendent and mysterious God intimately active in the pain and glory of life.

**PROSPECTS IN THEOLOGY OF GRACE.** Reinterpretations of grace reestablished grace as nothing less than the underlying reality of all religious enterprises, as the very presence of God. In this way it is the foundation for various schools of spirituality—Origenist, Greek and Russian, Benedictine, Franciscan, Dominican, Anabaptist, Carmelite—but it also confronts and stimulates Christian ethics to put greater emphasis on issues of peace and justice in the world. Grace is perceived as the axis along which the kingdom of God confronts institutionalized evil.

The ecumenical movement, which began as the mutual acceptance of Christian churches—Protestant, Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox—gradually discovered through scholarly investigations a remarkable lack of conflict between, for example, Luther's and Thomas Aquinas's interpretations of grace, and between Trent's and Karl Barth's. There are fewer doctrinal and theological differences than first assumed. Drawing on the tradition held by mainstream Christianity that God's active presence reaches an incarnation and a climax in Jesus Christ but is not monopolized by Christ, Christian theologians such as Karl Rahner and official Christian assemblies such as the Second Vatican Council have increasingly acknowledged the presence of grace in other world religions and in the struggles of individual lives in increasingly secular and agnostic contexts. For example, dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism is now not simply an exchange of similar words about ritual or theodicy but an exploration of different presentations and explorations of grace in speculative, monastic, and mystical traditions.

Realms as diverse as art, politics, and monasticism disclose different approaches to what Jesus called the kingdom of God and to what the history of Christian theology calls grace. In the realm of art is found the presentation in various media of the primal dialectic between sin and grace. Here grace emerges from the dramatic reiteration of an active unseen presence that reveals "the more" and its opposite, the violent exploitation of the holy, the beautiful, and the human. The structure of Gothic architecture, the oils of Fra Angelico and the engravings of Rembrandt, the formation of light by the Baroque, the planned abstractions of Kandinsky (which are there to make real "the realm of the spiritual")

are struggles with the horizons of the holy, of the spiritual, of grace. Such novelists as Fyodor Dostoevsky, Graham Greene, Georges Bernanos, François Mauriac, and Flannery O'Connor have often had evil and grace as their themes. In such works, grace challenges in the most surprising ways the conventions of religion and society, and evil is presented as the almost necessary counterpoint to grace. Life becomes a chiaroscuro of evil and grace.

The Christian theological term *grace*, then, can refer at the same time to the most abstract dimension of religious power or human transcendentality and to the blood and sweat of ordinary everyday life. The record of theological controversies over grace illustrates its prominence as a religious problem and its ultimate mystery. The core of that mystery is God as active in history and in every human life.

**SEE ALSO** Evil; Free Will and Determinism; Free Will and Predestination, article on Christian Concepts; History, article on Christian Views; Justification; Kingdom of God; Merit, article on Christian Concepts; Paul the Apostle; Redemption; Sin and Guilt; Transcendence and Immanence.

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THOMAS F. O'MEARA (1987)  
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**GRAEBNER, FRITZ** (1877–1934), German ethnologist, was born on March 4, 1877, the son of a schoolteacher in Berlin. Graebner attended school in Berlin from 1887 to 1895 and studied history, German philology, and geography, and other subjects (especially ethnology) at the universities of Berlin and Marburg (1895–1901). In 1901 he received his doctorate in philosophy at Berlin with a dissertation on medieval history. By this time he was already employed at the Berlin Museum of Ethnology as an auxiliary scientific assistant.

In 1906 he transferred to the museum of ethnology in Cologne (called the Rautenstrauch-Joest Museum after those who endowed it), became a full assistant there in 1907, and the museum's director in 1925. In 1911 he qualified as a privatdocent at the University of Bonn. His work was interrupted by his capture in Australia at the outbreak of World War I; because he was German, he was kept prisoner there until 1919. In 1921 he was appointed professor extraordinarius at Bonn and in 1926 became an honorary professor at the University of Cologne. However, he was unable by this time to lecture any longer, because he was already suffering from a serious illness that soon made all scientific work impossible. He retired in 1928 and returned to his native city, Berlin, where he died on 13 July 1934.

Graebner's fields of specialization were the cultures of Oceania and Australia. He first became generally known in the field of ethnology through his 1904 lecture "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Ozeanien," which was delivered at a meeting of the Berlin Society for Anthropology, Ethnology, and Prehistory and published in *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 37 (1905). (Bernhard Ankermann, a colleague of Graebner, delivered the lecture "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Afrika" at the same meeting.) From then on, Graebner produced numerous detailed studies that dealt with, among other things, themes of social organization and spiritual culture (thus it is wrong to consider him merely a "museum ethnologist" who concentrated in a one-sided way on the material aspects of culture). In these studies he made broad comparisons that ranged throughout the world. Contesting the theories, prevalent at the time, of the more or less unilinear evolution of culture and the "elementary idea," Graebner

(in his first book, *Methode der Ethnologie*, 1911) took up ideas first espoused by Friedrich Ratzel and Leo Frobenius and developed the culture-historical method. This method seeks to bring cultural-historical processes to light even where written sources are lacking or insufficient. To this end, Graebner's method begins with particular facts and seeks to establish "culture circles" (*Kulturkreise*), then to infer from the geographical locations of these complexes their "culture strata" (*Kulturschichten*), that is, the relative ages of cultures and their reciprocal influences, and, finally, to uncover the origins of individual cultures.

Because a culture circle must comprise all the necessary categories of cultural life, including religious ideas, Graebner also took up certain problems of the history of religions. He rejected speculations that traced all religious manifestations back to a single primordial phenomenon (e.g., animism or belief in magic); he subjected the theories of E. B. Tylor and James G. Frazer to detailed criticism and sought, unlike them, to bring to light the religious phenomena typical of individual culture circles or, as the case might be, larger cultural groups. Thus he regarded patrilinear and matrilinear cultures not as phases of a single standardized development but as independent cultural forms that coexisted with each other; he established, for example, that animism, worship of the dead, and lunar myths played a greater part in matrilinear cultures, whereas belief in magic and sun myths were more important in patrilinear cultures. He discussed this system (which was in large measure taken over by Wilhelm Schmidt) in many essays on specific topics, in the relevant sections of his comprehensive presentation of ethnology ("Ethnologie," in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, edited by Paul Hinneberg, 1923) and in full detail in his final major work, *Das Weltbild der Primitiven* (1924). In this last book he represented the religious ideas of nonliterate peoples as the points of departure for the religions of the high cultures and for subsequent philosophical systems.

SEE ALSO Schmidt, Wilhelm.

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*Revised Bibliography*

**GRAIL, THE.** Late in the twelfth century, a mystic theme appeared in Western literature that was fast taken up as the central feature of chivalric romances with a religious message and appeal. The key image of the theme is “the Grail,” or, frequently, “the Holy Grail,” which is still a metaphor for spiritual salvation and the goal of a quest by the elect. As a religious concept the Grail is of interest for having served, for about one century and in the context of contemporary civilization, as a symbol with, in social terms, a strongly aristocratic connotation. The two pivotal works of the Grail cycle, *Conte del Graal* (or *Perceval*) by Chrétien de Troyes and *Joseph d'Armathie* (or *Roman de l'estoire dou Graal*) by Robert de Borron, were dedicated, respectively, to Count Philip of Flanders and Count Gautier of Montfaucon, both feudal lords, both Crusaders who died in the Holy Land.

**THE FORERUNNER: CHRÉTIEN'S GRAIL PROCESSION.** It is widely accepted that the earliest appearance of the Grail theme is in Chrétien's *Conte del Graal*, written in the late eighties of the twelfth century but left unfinished, probably because of the author's death. The relevant narrative is concentrated in two brief scenes, the one set in the “Grail Castle,” the other in the “Hermitage.” An innocent young knight, unaware of the realities of life and aimlessly wandering, is directed by a mysterious fisher to a mysterious castle. In the hall he meets the same fisher, the “Fisher King” and lord of the castle, an invalid bound to his couch. The youth then sees a strange procession passing by, full of symbols: a squire with a white lance, from which a drop of blood falls on his hand; two squires bearing golden candelabra; a noble maiden carrying a *graal*, a receptacle set with precious gems and shedding a brilliant light; another maiden with a platter of silver. The young knight, who has not yet matured enough to fulfill his destiny and who overrates the chivalric virtue of silence, does not ask the question of charity expected of him, “Who is served with the *graal*?” He thus fails to meet the test that would have restored the ailing Fisher King and the wastelands surrounding him. When he awakens the next morning the spell has disappeared, the castle is empty, and he resumes his wanderings, now in search of the lost castle. After five years he is directed to a hermitage and begs help from a holy man, who consents to the repentant's desire for salvation. The Fisher King, he learns, is his uncle, whose father's life was sustained by a Host brought to him in the Grail.

**CHRISTIANIZATION OF CHRÉTIEN'S PROTOTYPE.** Soon after Chrétien, in whose Grail fragment Christian doctrine is handled in rather ambiguous terms (as pointed out by Leonardo

Olschki, 1966), the topos is again taken up and transformed into the central feature of a spiritual, and ever more Christian, body of literature. The following titles exemplify the genre.

Robert de Borron (late twelfth to early thirteenth century) is the author of *Joseph d'Armathie*, written in verse and, somewhat like a Christian legend, based on apocryphal gospels, the *Evangelium Nicodemi* and the *Vindicta Salvatoris* (Vengeance of the Lord). Joseph, thrown into prison, survives thanks to the *veissel* in which Christ, during the last supper, instituted the Eucharist and in which his blood was gathered during the passion. The symbolization has taken a sharp turn: The Host, which was the content of the Grail in Chrétien's story, is here replaced by Christ's holy blood, and the vessel itself has changed into the chalice of the sacrament. Borron, furthermore, links the evangelization of Britain with the transfer of the Grail to the West.

A prose version of *Joseph d'Armathie*, named *Didot-Perceval* (after the manuscript collection in which it is preserved) and attributed to the same Robert de Borron, is patterned after Chrétien yet has a distinct religious reinterpretation of the happenings: The Grail of the procession, for example, becomes the receptacle of the last supper, and Perceval, if he passes the test, will become the guardian of Christ's blood.

*Perlesvaus*, a prose text (written between 1191 and 1212), blends a chivalric romance with a Christian allegory, strongly in the Cistercian spirit. Here the Knights of the Grail have become knightly monks.

A group of five romances in prose, attributed to Walter Map and called the Vulgate Cycle (1215–1230), was the most popular of the Grail versions. Among them are the *Estoire del Saint Graal* and the *Queste del Graal*. In these stories the quest of illustrious knights for the Grail is told in terms of expiation and redemption, election and rejection. The Christianization is emphasized by changing the carrier of the Grail, according to sacramental usage, from a woman to a man. The knights' worldly virtues have been replaced by chastity and charity. The Grail, now the goal of the quest, symbolizes the blending of the two worlds of contemporary civilization, knighthood and religion.

**THE ELUSIVE GRAIL.** The corpus of the Grail romances raises questions that, in general, are unanswerable. The Grail itself has remained a riddle: Its shape varies from vase to cup to dish to stone; the use is that of a talisman or a reliquary; its symbolic meaning shifts with the context. By the middle of the twelfth century the term appears in the western French dialects, still marked by the indefinite article as a common noun (“a grail”). This is also the way Chrétien uses it. But already in his prologue, and from Borron on, it is commonly used as a proper name, “the Grail.” The derivation of the word itself is still hypothetical. There is a consensus on a base form *gradalis*, but the consensus stops at the root morpheme of *gradalis*: It has been variously identified as *gradus* (“degree,



step”), implying that food was placed in the vessel “step by step”; as *cratis* (“wickerwork”) or *creta* (“fuller’s earth”), both of which hint at the material used in making the receptacle; and as *cratus*, a shortened tenth-to-thirteenth-century Latin form of the Greco-Latin *crateral/craterus* (“crater”), secondarily expanded by the suffix *-alis* in analogy to other words for vessels, such as *baucalis* and *garalis*.

The long history of exegesis, striving to bare the issue of the myth, has been moving in two directions. The one is synchronic: It relates a work to the events and currents of its time and thereby aims to discover the meaning (*sens*) a story may have had for its contemporary public. The other direction is diachronic: It centers on the subject matter (*matière*), which it locates in a tradition and which it derives, as far as possible, from specific models. Knowledge of the model highlights the “message” of the work.

**THE SYNCHRONIC VIEW.** The impact of the contemporary world on the Grail corpus and, above all, on Chrétien’s *Conte del Graal* has been traced to religious diversity and policy, upper-class education and ethical perceptions, and to events of historical import. Various interpretations follow.

1. The objects carried in the ceremonious procession before the Fisher King, such as the Host in the Grail, the bleeding lance, and the candelabra, have been explained as echoes of the eucharistic procession practiced in the Byzantine Mass (Konrad Burdach, William A. Nitze).

2. The extensive Christianization manifest in the *Queste del Saint Graal* has been interpreted as a reflection of Cistercian mysticism, specifically that of Bernard of Clairvaux (Albert Pauphilet, Étienne Gilson).

3. The spiritual structure of the *Conte* is related to ideas current at Chartres, the Western center of the twelfth-century Renaissance. Chrétien realizes in his work what Bernard Silvester, the humanist, requested of a true author: “Being a philosopher, he has to write about the nature of human life.” And Chrétien has created in Perceval a character motivated by the two forces of theology and charity, from which the Fisher King and the wastelands expect their redemption (Leo Pollmann).

4. The legend implies a heretical attempt (Nitze speaks of its “heterodox tinge”) to fight the supremacy of Rome and to replace Rome’s propaganda of the doctrine by another authority (Giulio Bertoni).

5. The Grail myth is considered a militant allegory, inspired by the activity of Count Philip of Flanders, against the heresy of the Cathari and other dualistic sects; the father of the Fisher King is the Perfect Man of Catharism (Otto Rahn, Leonardo Olschki). To Olschki, the castle, representing the dualistic beliefs, is contrasted to the hermitage, which stands for Christian orthodoxy; and Perceval does not yield to the lure of the former but embraces the true faith of the latter.

6. Chrétien’s *Conte del Graal* is an *Erziehungsroman*, a novel of education, describing the military, chivalric, spiritu-

al, and religious formation of Perceval, the perfect knight and the perfect Christian (Martín de Riquer). Specifically, because Perceval displays traits of Prince Philip Augustus, the *Conte* seems to have been designed as a “mirror of princes,” sponsored by Philip of Flanders to further the education of his royal godson and pupil, the future king (Rita Lejeune).

7. Perceval symbolizes the two virtues of prowess and charity (defined as “love of God”), and charity finally prevails over prowess (David C. Fowler).

8. The decadence and fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem function as a starting point. An analogy can be drawn between the concept of the Crusades and the religious theme of the Grail: The quest for and conquest of a Christian ideal is transferred to the elect in a castle of mystery. The construct of defeat and renewal represents an underlying exhortation to persevere in the Crusades (Helen Adolf).

9. The quest for the Grail is the conversion of the Jewish Temple, intended to offset further bloodshed of the Jews by fanatic Crusaders. Chrétien was working against the hatred of the Jews (Urban T. Holmes, Jr., M. Amelia Klenke).

10. The Grail procession was inspired by representations in Christian art of the Crucifixion, with such figures as Longinus, the carrier of the lance, and a beautiful young woman who gathers the blood of Christ in a vase; she in turn becomes an allegory of the church who brings the Eucharist to the Old King (Riquer). Similarly, Klenke relates the objects of the procession to the cathedral art of contemporary France.

11. According to C. G. Jung’s depth psychology, the vessel is not a historical reality but an idea, or primal image, and as such is of universal significance, found in untold numbers of myths and legends.

**THE DIACHRONIC VIEW.** The supposed models of the Grail romances vary widely as to provenance and genre. They include specific paradigms such as the Indic Vedas, an Iranian national epic, the Alexander legend of late antiquity. But three great traditions of medieval culture are now recognized as the dominant influences: Christian legends, Celtic folklore, and ancient rituals.

**Christian legends.** The hypothesis of a Christian foundation of the Grail myth centers on the objects in the Grail procession. The apocryphal gospel *Vindicta Salvatoris* contributed a cardinal episode to Robert de Borron’s version: that of the elect, Joseph of Arimathea, kept alive by a vessel—an image deeply noted in Christian tradition. Once in existence (as Willy Staerk points out), the Grail blended with the varying perceptions of the last supper in early Christianity. Staerk recognizes five connotations of the Grail: vessel with Christ’s blood; receptacle of the last supper; calix of the first Eucharist; receptacle of the Host; calix in which the first Mass was celebrated. The image of the lance, too, was embedded in the Christian tradition: It is the lance with which Longinus, a pagan soldier and Christian martyr, opened the side of the crucified Christ (*Jn.* 19:34). Longinus turned into

the hero of a legend (Burdach). The third object, the silver plate (*tailleur d'arjant*), has been repeatedly identified as the paten on which the calix of the Last Supper was placed. Some analysts question the assumption of an underlying Christian model and see Chrétien's *Conte*, the first medieval form of the Grail story, as still "pré-Christianisé" (the term used by Pierre Gallais). They see in Robert de Borron's Christian version an *ex post facto* reconstruction of the myth's "early history," produced with the aid of pseudogospels.

**Celtic folklore.** Because the Arthurian world provides the milieu for the Grail romances, the repeated attempts to derive features of the myth from Celtic lore are certainly justified. Irish sagas and Welsh tales, it is assumed, were taken up by Breton storytellers, who adapted their themes to the French environment. The Grail objects are among such themes: The magic horn of the gods, the wish platter, and the horn of plenty anticipate the Grail, and the spear of Lugh, either dripping blood or held before a caldron of blood, returns in Chrétien's bleeding lance. Above all, one character vital to the narrative, the Fisher King, has his Celtic counterpart: The maimed king, his wound, and his wastelands reflect the pagan belief, transferred into Celtic lore, that the reproductive forces of nature were related to the sexual potency of the ruler (R. S. Loomis, William A. Nitze, Emma Jung and Marie Louise von Franz).

**Ancient rituals.** The Grail myth in its sundry versions can be read as a saga of nature worship (Jessie L. Weston). The mythic prototype discernible behind it is the ancient cult of Adonis, the deity linked to vegetation and fertility and symbolizing the fading and rebirth of nature. He was the lover of both Persephone, goddess of death, and Aphrodite, goddess of love, and thus always on his way from death to life, and from life to death. Proceeding from there, Weston interprets the episodes and characters of the Grail story in terms of a nature ritual: The maimed Fisher King, deprived of his reproductive powers, is to be restored to life by the fulfillment of the quest, and thus is an analogue of the wastelands; cup and lance are the sexual symbols of female and male, just as blood stands for life; the Grail, by providing the sacramental meal, represents the source of life.

Following a similar line of thought, Nitze senses behind Perceval's story, with the decisive role of his mother and the nonrole of his father, echoes of a matriarchal system; and he sees in the suffering of the Fisher King and his land, to be ended by the initiate's (at first unasked) question, the key to the Grail procession: the restoration of life and vegetation. This leitmotiv is prefigured (without, as Nitze emphasizes, an immediate connection) in ancient ceremonies such as the Eleusinian mysteries and the cults of Mithra and Isis.

**COUNT PHILIP'S BOOK.** In his prologue to the *Conte*, Chrétien states that Count Philip of Flanders transmitted to him a book containing a very good story, the *Tale of the Grail*, with the suggestion "to turn it into rime." This cryptic statement by the author about his source has provoked numerous hypotheses, not least concerning its reliability. Because Chrétien

is unlikely to have made a playful or insincere reference to the illustrious name of his patron, one must assume that the model for the *Conte* was a real one and that it was a story written in prose. Of the sources mentioned here, ancient rituals anticipated, in several respects, the *sen* of Chrétien's Grail narrative, and Celtic lore prefigured various details of the objects and characters. But none of these analogues, nor their aggregate, amount to what Chrétien's prologue praised as "the best story every told at a royal court." Yet such a story, the authors of this article suggest, did exist. The model was the *Isis Book*, the eleventh book—half fiction and half a personal memoir—of Apuleius's novel, the *Metamorphoses* (second century). In Chrétien's time the *Metamorphoses* existed in Florence in at least one manuscript but was not well known in France and had hardly been exploited for literary purposes. A comparison reveals both direct analogues between the works of Apuleius and Chrétien, and source material contained in the Apuleian text, which Chrétien may have associated with features of other traditions.

**Analogues.** The similarities cover subject matter, structure, textual homologies, and major and minor details. The *Isis Book* is, in the words of Arthur Darby Nock, "one of the great ancient documents of a conversion." Its theme, like that of the *Conte*, is the salvation and rebirth of a young man, Lucius, who is selfish and a sinner and yet a select, and who after his tribulations (narrated in the preceding ten books) is initiated into a mystery religion. The *Isis Book*, in the portions comparable to Chrétien's Grail story, describes the procession of Isis and the conversion of Lucius. The Isis procession, moving in ritual order, is dominated, just as Chrétien's procession is, by gold, light, beauty, and mystery. Lucius's conversion, like Perceval's, is staged as a dialogue between two characters, the initiate and the initiator. The phases of the ritual run parallel in both versions, with numerous textual concordances: selection; the initiate's readiness; his prayer for help; revelation; the hortatory sermon; the initiation.

Four topoi occurring in the *Conte*, three of them in the hermitage scene, are prefigured in a Hermetic dialogue which was traditionally ascribed to Apuleius and likewise narrates an initiation. From the ninth century on, an apocryphal treatise, the *Asclepius*, was included among the works of Apuleius. The *editio princeps* (1469) of the *Metamorphoses*, based on an unknown manuscript, contained the *Asclepius*. In short, it is not clear whether Count Philip's book contained the treatise together with the novel or not. The *Asclepius* was the Latin translation of a Greek dialogue that described the catechesis of Asklepios by the mystagogue Hermes Trismegistos. It was familiar to and often quoted by the prominent authors of the school of Chartres. The analogues to the *Conte* are a secluded sanctuary as the locus of the ritual, with four men present; the Hermetic term *malitia* for spiritual ignorance (*agnosia*), rendered as *mal* by Chrétien; a vegetarian meal ending the conversion; and the topos of the wastelands as an apocalyptic vision of Egypt, which in the *Conte* is tied to Perceval's (failed) test.

**Stimuli.** Chrétien's technique of syncretism seems to emerge from his use of the Isis procession, which provides motifs for the two central features of his Grail scene.

*The Fisher King.* The prelude of the Isis procession, the Anteludia, consists of a bizarre spectacle of persons and properties. Among the many unconnected items are (in this order) the following: a hunting spear; a hunter; a sword; a fowler; a fisherman with hooks; a sedan on which someone is carried; a golden cup; a feeble old man. These eight unrelated words (or phrases) return in Chrétien's word portrait of the Fisher King and his court: a *fisherman* fishing *with hooks* in a river (where Perceval meets him first) reappears as the lord of the castle, marked as such by having among his men a *hunter* and a *fowler*; maimed by a *spear*, he is confined to a *couch* on which he *is carried* around; he presents a *sword* to his guest and pours wine from a *cup of gold*, while he watches the procession that brings the life-sustaining wafer to the *feeble old man*, his father. By welding these incoherent bits into one figure and linking it to ancient fertility myths and Celtic lore, Chrétien created an impressive character of medieval literature.

*The Grail.* Two vessels carried in the main body of the Isis procession share the salient features of the Grail, above all, those of its external aspect: Both are golden; in addition, the *cymbium* ("bowl") sheds an intense light and the *urnula* ("small urn") is ornamented and mysterious. The inherent powers of the Grail, on the other hand, are prefigured in other sources. Celtic tradition may have contributed the idea of the horn of plenty. As to the ancient rituals, the *Corpus Hermeticum* seems to have provided with its fourth treatise, entitled *The Krater*, a model of the Grail that contributed its mystic functions. The Greek text states that "the vessel is divine," repeated nearly verbatim in Chrétien's "Tant sainte chose est li graaus" ("The Grail is so holy an object"). The content of the Hermetic vessel is *nous*, intellect, which makes one perfect; it is concretized as the wafer that the Grail contains. The Old King (the Fisher King's father), sustained in his retreat by such spiritual rather than material nourishment, evolves, in other words, into Perfect Man. The means by which the Hermetic materials were transmitted to Chrétien is not clear. The fourth treatise of the *Corpus Hermeticum* was known in Byzantium, to be sure, and Chrétien, quite knowledgeable about contemporary Byzantine affairs, as he demonstrated in his *Cligès*, could easily have heard about Hermetism and its mystical appeal. But Hermetic ideas were in vogue at the school of Chartres, and if the Old King is a replica of the Hermetic Perfect Man, as he is portrayed in the death scene of Hermes in the contemporary *Liber Alcidi*, the scene at the Grail Castle turns into an example of twelfth-century theosophy and "literary paganism."

**WOLFRAM'S KYOT.** With his Grail story Chrétien left a rich legacy to medieval letters; yet his followers divided the heritage. On the one hand, starting with Robert de Borron, the romances of the Grail cycle displayed an ever greater emphasis on the Christian aspect; on the other hand, there stands,

by itself, a masterpiece of literature, Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Parzival* (c. 1200–1212). Its narrative, to be sure, is modeled after Chrétien's *Perceval*. The differences of content, frequently at the frontier of religion, appear to be related to a difference of sources. But on the question of sources the two authors are not very helpful. Chrétien's puzzling remark about Count Philip's book has its counterpart in Wolfram: He mentions an enigmatic informant, Kyot, as having provided an Arabic model for the *Parzival* and, in addition, as having expressed his misgivings about Chrétien's choice of the (unspecified) source for *Perceval*. Questions of Kyot's provenance and even his mere existence have provoked varying hypotheses. On the basis of Wolfram's scattered remarks, of the Catharist beliefs ascribed to the Grail community, and of the striking role that the science of geomancy plays in *Parzival*, the authors of this article identify Kyot as Guillot (i.e., William) of Tudela, in Navarre, the author of the first part of the *Chanson de la Croisade albigeoise*. He was, as the author of this work, familiar with Catharism, was an adept of geomancy, had settled around 1199 in southern France, wrote in a Provençal French *Mischsprache*, and in all probability knew Arabic.

The source that Kyot transmitted to Wolfram and that Wolfram fused with Chrétien's story was, again in this analysis, the *Corpus Hermeticum* ascribed to Hermes Trismegistos. The treatises of this body of works communicate the mystical beliefs of a loosely structured brotherhood in second- and third-century Egypt, and they were written in Greek, known in Byzantium, and transmitted to the West through Arabic. The treatise that topically comes closest to Chrétien's Grail fantasy is the one on the soteriological vessel of Hermetism, the Krater. Wolfram re-created the Grail in Hermetic terms as an astral myth. In *The Krater* it is stated that "God filled a great krater with intellect and sent it down to earth"; similarly, in Wolfram's version, the Grail is an astral vessel whose powers derive from a wafer brought down by a dove. The radiant maiden who carries the vessel in Wolfram's Grail procession also represents a Hermetic concept: She is called Repanse de Schoye, which translates the Greek for "knowledge of joy," the second most important virtue (after knowledge of God) in the process of spiritual rebirth.

The great religious conversion scene at the hermitage in the *Conte* also seems to be re-created by Wolfram in accord with his Hermetic inspiration. In the treatises of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, Hermes Trismegistos appears as the dominant figure: He is a saint, an ascetic, a teacher, a sage; he is the symbol of learning and the founder of astrological science. Wolfram's mystagogue, Trevrizent, appears to be a portrait of Hermes Trismegistos. He is a holy man, has written about religious doctrine, and is a teacher of astrology. This typological derivation accords with the etymological root of this name. The epithet *trismegistos*, "the thrice-great," was rendered in Arabic as "the thrice-sage," which was translated into medieval Latin as *triplex scientia* ("threefold wisdom") and into Old French whose obvious (although not docu-

mented) equivalent *treble escient* was, finally, corrupted by Wolfram into *Trevrizent*.

The works whose resemblances to the Grail myth have been outlined here, the *Isis Book* for Chrétien and the *Corpus Hermeticum* for Wolfram, fall within the broad class of sources often subsumed under the label of "ancient rituals." Yet the web of homologues involving subject matter, structure, characters, text, key terms, and the ambience of mystery appears sufficiently dense to consider these works, on the borderline between religion and literature, as the specific models of the two Grail romances.

SEE ALSO Hermetism.

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**GRAIL MOVEMENT.** The Grail movement was begun in the Netherlands in 1921 by a Dutch Jesuit priest, Jacques van Ginneken, and a group of students at the Catholic University of Nijmegen who were among the first Dutch Catholic women to earn university degrees. They were inspired by van Ginneken's vision that Western civilization was in crisis and in need of major changes, arguing that women had never had a fair chance to develop their capacities to the full, in either the church or society, and that women had great gifts with the potential to change the world and move it in a Godward direction. Van Ginneken envisioned a movement of young women, under female leadership, willing to give themselves totally to spreading the kingdom of God, not as nuns in the cloister but as laywomen in the midst of the modern world.

**INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.** By 1936 the Grail movement had spread to Great Britain, Germany, and Australia, although the movement was suppressed in Germany by Adolf Hitler's government in 1939. In April 1940, on the eve of the German invasion, two Dutch Grail leaders sailed for the United States to establish the Grail in the Chicago archdiocese. Serious disagreements with diocesan authorities led them to relocate to Cincinnati, Ohio, where Archbishop John T. McNicholas welcomed the group of autonomous laywomen determined to define their own work. They purchased a farm in Loveland, Ohio, where they established a training center named Grailville and offered programs of alternative education, preparing women for leadership in the lay apostolate. Grailville quickly became the hub of a national movement, with eleven other centers spanning the country from coast to coast.

The Grail in the United States pioneered in many fields, promoting full, active participation of the laity in the liturgy, fostering vigorous contemporary expressions of a Christian spirit in the arts, and disseminating its ideal of a new Christendom through publications, exhibits, and art and book stores. In the 1950s the Grail trained teams of young American women and sent them to developing countries. Other Grail teams organized projects for racial and economic justice in the inner cities of Detroit, Brooklyn, and Cincinnati, and in rural Louisiana. In the 1960s the Grail was in the forefront of ecumenical dialogue and opened its membership to women of other Christian traditions. It also played a significant part in the modern catechetical movement, emphasizing personalist, psychological, and artistic approaches in the teaching of religion.

From 1940 to 1965 the Grail continued to expand internationally. Teams from the lay mission school at Ueber-



gen in Holland were sent to Brazil, Surinam, and Java in the 1940s. In the 1950s and 1960s teams from Holland and the United States went to South Africa, Basutoland, Uganda, Nigeria, and Japan.

**POST-VATICAN II.** The many liberation movements of the 1960s brought vast religious, social, and cultural changes. The Grail responded with a rethinking of both its structures and its key concepts. Structurally, as a result of an international process of consultation carried on from 1964 to 1967, the organization changed from a highly centralized and hierarchical pyramid, having at its apex a core group committed to celibacy, to a more collegial institution. The new structure enabled all members—married, single, or celibate—to share as peers in policy and decision making and to be eligible for any functional role. Grail work was reorganized into three task forces; working nationally and internationally, each focused on a broad goal that included living the faith, the empowerment of women, and liberation.

The early concerns with racial and economic justice that had led Grail members into the inner cities and overseas service were deepened by a feminist liberation theology that emphasized the interconnections between racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, and environmental degradation. The goal of the struggle for justice was broadened to include justice for the earth and a global ecological vision of a sustainable society. The original psychology of complementarity that stressed the fostering of womanly qualities as the way to empowerment gave way, after a long process of study, to the development of a strong feminist consciousness among Grail members. The feminist approach included a thorough analysis of sexism in church and society, and an affirmation of women as moral and religious agents, fully capable of engaging in theology and of setting ethical norms. Moreover, the 1940s goal of striving to build a new Christendom in the midst of a secular world gave way to an acceptance of religious pluralism. In the words of the 1988 International General Assembly, “We are a faith community of women. We are learning that we are nourished by different wellsprings.” A 1999 Grail pamphlet adds, “We support one another in our search for God. We work towards transforming our world into a place of justice, peace, and love.”

The Grail has empowered thousands of women who have participated in its activities, enabling them to move beyond what was expected of women by church and society. Since 1969 the movement has contributed significantly through its conferences, programs, and publications to the development of feminist theology and spirituality in the United States and Europe, a contribution recognized by many theologians, Protestant as well as Catholic. Mary Jo Weaver, a professor of religious studies at Indiana University, commented:

Their commitment to women has resulted in some stunning and influential programs . . . [that] brought women together from all over the country to discover and articulate the need for a more inclusive theology

and liturgical language . . . broke new ground for women and supported an emerging feminist theology that begins, not with God, but with a theological reflection on women’s experience. . . . The Grail is small . . . as contrasted with NCCW (National Council of Catholic Women) but it is significantly more influential as a forum for Catholic feminist thought. (1993, pp. 126–127)

Nelle Morton, a professor of theology at Drew University, wrote: “These two conferences [Alverno 1971, Grailville 1972] became a watershed for women of religion to critique boldly the traditional male-oriented theology as partial (not including woman experience) and examine our own experiences for sources of theological reflection” (1985, p. 12). Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, a professor of scripture at Harvard Divinity School, evaluated the 1972 Grailville Conference by saying: “This workshop proved to be one of the birthplaces of feminist theology, a movement that since has profoundly changed both theology and church” (1998, pp. 1–2).

By 1998 the Grail had become established in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, Tanzania, Uganda, and the United States.

**SEE ALSO** Christianity, article on Christianity in North America; Feminist Theology, article on Christian Feminist Theology.

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JANET KALVEN (2005)

**GRANET, MARCEL** (1884–1940), was an eminent French Sinologist associated with the Durkheimian sociological tradition. Granet wrote extensively on ancient Chinese

religious institutions in relation to the development of Chinese civilization. He was born at Luc-en-Diois and, after demonstrating his outstanding scholastic abilities at several *lycées*, enrolled at the elite *École Normale Supérieure* in Paris, where he studied European history and came under the sway of Émile Durkheim, who was offering lectures there. The crystallization of Granet's intellectual interests, along with his turn toward China, came about during his graduate work from 1908 to 1911 at the *Foundation Thiers*. His commitment to sociological theory deepened, and in looking for comparative material to extend his study of the code of honor in European feudalism, he took up the study of Chinese language and history under the direction of the renowned Sinologue Édouard Chavannes. From this point on, Granet's academic focus was fixed on China. As forecast by his initial interest in feudalism, he was continually concerned with the problem of the development and significance of ancient Chinese "feudal" institutions as interrelated with kinship, morality, and religion.

Granet's baptism as a Chinese scholar came when he studied the Chinese classical texts and commentaries in Beijing during the years 1911 to 1913, the traumatic period of the republican overthrow of the Qing dynasty. He was to return to China only once more, for a brief stay in 1918, at the end of his World War I military service. Returning to Paris, he married in 1919, took his doctorate in 1920, and resumed writing and teaching in his prewar position at the *École Pratique des Hautes Études*. At about this same time he accepted an additional teaching appointment at the Sorbonne, and in 1926 he was elected to a prestigious chair at the *École Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes* and was installed as the first director of the *Institute des Hautes Études Chinoises*. Throughout this period Granet gained fame for his brilliantly synthetic style as an author and teacher and was actively engaged in Parisian intellectual circles that included such notable colleagues as Marcel Mauss, Henri Maspero, Marc Bloch, Édouard Mestre, and Louis Gernet. After the fall of France in 1940, Granet took over the fifth section of the *École Pratique* from Marcel Mauss, who, because he was a Jew, was forced by the Nazis to relinquish his post. Granet's distinguished career was tragically ended shortly thereafter, when he died suddenly at the age of fifty-six.

Granet's importance stems both from his specific analysis of ancient Chinese religion and from the methodological implications these specialized investigations have for the overall interpretive study of religion. With regard to his approach to early Chinese tradition, especially as set forth in *Fêtes et chansons anciennes de la Chine* (1919; translated into English as *Festivals and Songs of Ancient China*, 1932) and *Danses et légendes de la Chine ancienne* (1926), Granet violated the traditional Sinological mold of strict philological and historical exegesis by considering the whole corpus of ancient Chinese documents, both the classics and nonorthodox texts, as fragmentary specimens of a comprehensive system of

thought. The point of textual analysis, therefore, is not just to distinguish between true historical facts and false mythological embellishments but to accept the fact that an entire ancient text, or set of texts, reveals a particular logic that is ideologically grounded in mythic and ritual themes. In fact, for Granet and his contemporary Henri Maspero, the actual historical facts are often only emblematic scraps manipulated in accordance with a mythic and ritual code that, in turn, categorically reflects back on the forms and transformations of ancient social life.

From this admittedly controversial perspective, Granet attempted to show that the ordinarily ignored aspects of primitive, peasant, or folk tradition are embedded even in orthodox classical works and that these archaic social and religious patterns are crucial for understanding the fundamental "collective representations" that regulate all subsequent Chinese thought. In *Fêtes et chansons*, for example, Granet uncovered in the classical Chinese *Book of Odes* an ancient spring and autumn festival cycle that, he implied, is the basic categorical imperative for the later Chinese cosmological system of complementary dualism. Although he typically eschewed the use of comparative ethnographic material, in *Danses et légendes* he extended his earlier analysis, much in the spirit of Marcel Mauss's "Essai sur le don" (1923–1924), by demonstrating how the mythic and ritual themes of totemism, initiatory masculine brotherhoods, and potlatch that are found in the whole ensemble of ancient texts help to expose a specific pattern of cultural development that leads from ancient peasant society through a clan system of alternating prestations (i.e., a comprehensive system of social reciprocity) to a developed patriarchal feudal system.

Aside from other important technical writings that also touch on the same key theoretical issues, the culminating expression of Granet's approach to China in particular and to methodology in general is *La pensée chinoise* (1934). The significance of this stylistically graceful and keenly insightful example of *haute vulgarisation* is that, besides presenting a brilliant portrait of the distinctive character of the Chinese mind, it implicitly goes beyond a simple application of a Durkheimian sociology of knowledge by suggesting that the categories of Chinese thought may be viewed as a total transformational system of linguistic representations not wholly determined by the historical flux of social forms. As with his last work on kinship, *Catégories matrimoniales et relations de proximité dans la Chine ancienne* (1939), which the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss acknowledged as a precursor to his own methodology (*Les structures élémentaires de la parenté*, 1949), *La pensée* unconsciously points toward the modern development of structural hermeneutics, as is seen, for example, in Lévi-Strauss and, appropriately enough, in the work of Granet's students, the Indo-Europeanist Georges Dumézil and the paleohistorian André Leroi-Gourhan.

Granet has often been condemned by Sinologists as too much of a poetic generalist and by sociologists as too much of a narrow specialist. And it is true that his special genius

was to fall between the two camps by respecting both philological limits and interpretive breadth. Granet was an artisan of texts who sometimes “gambled” with his speculative conclusions, and there is no doubt that much of his work on Chinese religion and society must be discarded or at least drastically revised. At the same time, however, recent scholarship indicates that Granet’s pioneering methodological spirit and some of his specific findings still have considerable relevance for the study of traditional Chinese religion and the general sociology of religion.

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## GREAT MOTHER SEE GODDESS WORSHIP

**GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH** is a broad term used to describe several historical expressions of the life of

the Christian church. The terms *Greek Christianity* and *Greek church* are often used as synonyms for it, but with different nuances. This article seeks to clarify the term *Greek Orthodox church* by describing Greek Orthodox Christianity through its historical development to its twenty-first century expressions.

**THE EARLY CHURCH AND GREEK CHRISTIANITY.** In their broadest meaning, Greek church and Greek Christianity can refer to the earliest development of Christianity as it moved from its Jewish matrix into the Greek cultural world of the Roman Empire. In this sense it is contrasted to Jewish Christianity. Cultural life at the time was imbued with the Greek heritage: language, philosophy, religion, literature, and political values. In the early Christian tradition, Greek often meant pagan or Gentile, but it referred, as well, to Christians who came to the faith from a polytheistic background as distinguished from Jews who accepted the messiahship of Jesus. Much of the New Testament and the earliest Christian patristic documents were written in the Greek language. Thus, insofar as early Christianity was a religion of conversion, it reflected its immersion in Greek language and thought.

**GREEK CHRISTIANITY AND LATIN CHRISTIANITY.** Greek Christianity soon came to be distinguished from other cultural embodiments of the Christian experience, especially Latin Christianity. The early development of Latin Christianity has its roots in the Greek tradition as exemplified by Irenaeus of Lyons (c. 130–c. 200). The Greek approach to Christianity was strongly theological, seeking to come to as careful a comprehension as was possible of the mysteries of the Christian faith. It expressed itself, as well, in rich worship traditions and iconography, on the one hand, while cultivating monastic, ascetic, and mystical Christian traditions on the other. But by the late third century the special characteristics of the Latin cultural milieu began to influence the church in the West and formed a more practical, legally oriented Christian expression. Nevertheless, Greek and Latin Christianity at this period were not contrasting forms of the faith but were complementary to each other.

**BYZANTIUM’S GREEK CHRISTIANITY.** The Christian church in the Byzantine (East Roman) Empire (325–1453) retained and developed the ancient traditions of Greek Christianity. Organizationally, this fostered more of the early church’s sense of local autonomy, in which the council remained central to church life. The early Christian tradition, as expressed in the Greek fathers, Eastern monastic spirituality, early canonical practice, and liturgical life became normative for Byzantine Christianity. Distinct Christian traditions, however, differentiated from the Greek tradition, producing other ecclesial identities. These were the Oriental Orthodox churches, the Nestorian church, and the Roman Catholic Church.

The Oriental Orthodox churches (each with a national component and traditionally characterized as monophysite) and the Nestorians became ecclesially distinguished from Greek Christianity by the fifth century. Latin Christianity, following its own inner dynamic, and strongly influenced by

the rise of Frankish and Germanic political and economic power in western Europe, developed into a distinct ecclesiastical reality. This distinction was formalized with the Great Schism between the two great halves of Christendom that occurred over a period from the ninth to the early thirteenth century. The schism between Greek East and Latin West was made permanent by the sacking of Constantinople in 1204 during the Fourth Crusade. It then became a linguistic convention to refer to the church in the West as “the Roman Catholic Church” and the church in the East as “the Greek Orthodox church.”

**GREEK ORTHODOXY AND SLAVIC ORTHODOXY.** With the rise of Slavic Christianity, a new ethos affected the identity of the Greek Orthodox church. This development was a direct result of Greek Orthodox missionary policy in the ninth through the twelfth century, which fostered indigenous cultures, liturgical languages, and clergy in each mission church. Originally, the church hierarchy was composed of Greeks. But each of the various Slavic and other peoples eventually obtained their own hierarchies. All of these new churches, however, received the Christian faith in its Greek form (in contradistinction to the Latin/Roman form). But while there was a deep-rooted spiritual identity with the ancient Greek Orthodox tradition of Christianity, there came into being a new Slavic identity within these churches.

What intensified the mix of traditional Greek Orthodox Christianity and the Orthodox Christianity of local nonethnic Greeks was the *millet* system put in place by the Muslim conquerors of the Byzantine Empire (1453). As a means of governing the Orthodox Christian peoples, as well as all other ethnic-religious groups, the Muslims understood them to be one people, or nation (the *millet*). The patriarch of Constantinople was recognized as the head of the Orthodox Christian nation with civil as well as religious duties. Greek metropolitans and bishops were appointed over the various Orthodox peoples to exercise this new administration, which included responsibilities for collecting taxes, assuring the observance of the law, and the loyalty of the Orthodox Christian populations to the central government. The combination of spiritual and secular responsibilities created many difficulties and occasioned abuses, but it also provided many opportunities for service to Orthodox unity. Thus, the ecumenical patriarchate served as a focal point in the defense of the Orthodox faith from incursions of Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries intent on proselytizing the Orthodox during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Numerous councils were held for this purpose. With only a few exceptions, all of the documents arising out of this movement were written originally in Greek.

At the same time, the ecumenical patriarchate, both as a representative of the Turkish authorities and as an agency of Greek ethnic influence upon the indigenous cultures of these Orthodox peoples, began to be perceived in some ways as an alien force. When, in the first half of the nineteenth century, various national wars of independence were initi-

ed against the Muslim Ottoman Empire, they were often concurrently actions of independence from the Greek cultural influence of the patriarchate of Constantinople as well as from its political influence. This led to the formation of independent (autocephalous) national churches. A partial exception was the Church of Greece. Its separation from the ecumenical patriarchate was forced by political considerations only.

Generally, the new order of things required a church organization and consciousness that would demarcate the newly organized autocephalous churches from the ethnic Greek traditional character of the ecumenical patriarchate, while concurrently acknowledging fully its historical ecumenical character as *primus inter pares* (first among equals) of the Orthodox world. In this manner, the Orthodox churches of Russia (1448), Serbia (1879), Romania (1885), Bulgaria (1870), Czechoslovakia (1922), Finland (1923), Poland (1924), and Albania (1937) came into being. Thus, for example, today it is possible to differentiate Greek Orthodoxy from Slavic Orthodoxy and Romanian Orthodoxy as cultural realities within the canonically unified Eastern Orthodox church.

**GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCHES TODAY.** In the modern and ethnic sense, Greek Orthodoxy is understood to include those churches whose language, liturgy, and spirit keep Orthodoxy and the Greek ethnic cultural tradition united. These churches are the Church of Greece, the patriarchate of Constantinople (in part because it is also the international center of world Orthodoxy), the patriarchate of Alexandria, the patriarchate of Jerusalem, the Church of Cyprus, and the ethnic Greek diaspora jurisdictions throughout the world.

**The Church of Greece.** The most restricted meaning of Greek Orthodox church refers to the autocephalous Church of Greece. Prior to the Greek War of Independence, which began in 1821, Christianity in what is now known as Greece was, for most of its history, part of the ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople. Even though the church was self-declared autocephalous in 1833, it understands itself to be in direct continuity with the founding of Christianity in Thessalonica, Philippi, Corinth, Athens, Nicopolis, and other Greek cities by the apostle Paul. Given the Orthodox tradition that ecclesial order often follows civil governmental patterns, over the centuries the church in Greece has come under various patterns of ecclesial jurisdiction. Following the early period, when metropolitan sees had been established in the major cities, Greece came under Constantinople, where it stayed—with a few interruptions—until the nineteenth century. Originally, the autocephalous Church of Greece included only the southern part of the modern nation of Greece, since only that area was liberated in 1830. Over the years, as the Greek nation expanded, the church also grew in territorial size and numbers. But this equation of the boundaries of the state and the jurisdiction of the Church of Greece is not absolute. Several areas of the nation of Greece are ecclesiastically under the control of the ecumeni-

cal patriarchate: the Dodecanese, Crete, and Mount Athos. The Orthodox church is the official church of Greece, while at the same time freedom of religion is guaranteed by the constitution. The vast majority of Greece's population of over ten million people are baptized Orthodox Christians. In addition to the archbishop of Athens, there are eighty-five bishops in seventy-seven dioceses and almost seventy-five hundred parishes.

**The patriarchate of Constantinople.** With the establishment of the modern secular Turkish state in 1921, under Kemal Atatürk, the position of the patriarchate of Constantinople has suffered severe weakening. Following the destruction of the Greek military forces in the Greco-Turkish war of 1922, an erosion of the Greek population of Asia Minor has continued unabated. It began with the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey as mandated in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne. Only the Greek population located in western Thrace and Constantinople (Istanbul) was exempted from the removal to Greece. The treaty also guaranteed the independence, freedom, and permanence of the patriarchate in its location in Constantinople, but it soon became a pawn in the political conflicts of Greece and Turkey. The conflict of Turkish and Greek interests in Cyprus has been the occasion for the patriarchate to become a pressure point against Greek interests.

In 1955, after years of general harassment, government-inspired riots wrought havoc on the Greek community of Istanbul, in which not only private homes and shops but churches, cemeteries, schools, and other institutions were vandalized and destroyed. Economic and administrative pressures forced a large part of the Greek Orthodox population to leave the last remaining enclave of Greek Orthodoxy in Turkey. Only a couple thousand now remain, as the patriarchate clings to its legal rights to remain in its historic city.

The patriarchate's numerical strength resides in the numerous Greek Orthodox dioceses, or eparchies, within its jurisdiction in the diaspora. In addition to four eparchies in Turkey, the Patriarchate of Constantinople exercises jurisdiction over the Archdiocese of Crete, with eight metropolitan sees; the four metropolitan sees of the Dodecanese; the historic monasteries of Patmos and Mount Athos; the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, with ten dioceses; the Archdiocese of Australia, with five archdiocesan districts; the Archdiocese of Thyateira and Great Britain and the Exarchate for Western Europe, Ireland, and Malta, with eight bishops, in addition to the archbishop; the Metropolis of France and the Exarchate of Iberia, with three metropolitan regions; the Metropolis of Germany and the Exarchate of Central Europe, with three bishops and the archbishop; the Metropolis of Austria and the Exarchate for Italy and Hungary; the Metropolis of Belgium and the Exarchate for the Low Countries, with the archbishop and one bishop; the Metropolis of Sweden, Scandinavia, and the Northern Lands, with one bishop; the Metropolis of New Zealand and the Exarchate for India, Korea, Japan, the Phil-

ippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and Hong Kong, with the archbishop; the Metropolis of Switzerland and the Exarchate of Europe, with the metropolitan who also presides over the Orthodox Center at Chambes, Switzerland. The Ecumenical Patriarchate maintains a permanent representative at the World Council of Churches in Geneva. Although there are some exceptions, nearly all of the people making up the congregations of these ecclesiastical jurisdictions are of Greek background.

**The patriarchate of Alexandria.** Egypt was one of the first areas to come under the influence of Islam in the eighth century. The larger portion of the Christian population that survived belonged to the Coptic church. Nevertheless, the Greek Orthodox patriarchate of Alexandria continued to exist in Egypt throughout the centuries. Its major constituency consisted of a well-organized Greek community that was strongly entrenched in leadership positions in commerce, finance, and education. Numerous educational and cultural institutions were supported by the Greek community. In addition the patriarchate of Alexandria had canonical control over all of Orthodoxy on the African continent. By and large these jurisdictions were composed of Greeks in the various African nations and some missionary churches. The numerical strength of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate in Egypt was broken with the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954. The Greek population of Egypt lost much of its economic and social status and began to emigrate. Nevertheless, in 2002 the patriarchate continued to serve about 350,000 Orthodox Christians whose members worship in the Greek, Arabic, and several native East African languages. There are thirteen metropolitan sees.

**The patriarchate of Jerusalem.** Though severely tried throughout the years of the Muslim conquests of the Holy Land, the patriarchate of Jerusalem was able to sustain itself until the Crusaders conquered the city of Jerusalem in 1099. The Greek Orthodox patriarch was expelled and replaced with a Latin patriarch. This situation lasted until 1177. In 1517 the area came under the control of the sultan in Constantinople while the church continued to struggle to maintain its rights to the holy places of Jerusalem. In the mid-nineteenth century, international agreements affirmed the rights of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate over the ancient churches of the Holy Sepulcher. Changing political circumstances in the area have required the negotiation of agreements regarding the status of the patriarchate with the British, Jordanians, and Israelis. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the patriarchate counted 130,000 members with sixteen bishops and maintained under its jurisdiction the archdiocese of Sinai, in present-day Egypt.

**The Church of Cyprus.** The Church of Cyprus, consisting exclusively of Greek Cypriots, received its independence as an autocephalous church through the eighth canon of the Council of Ephesus (431), but its history goes back to New Testament times (*Acts* 11:19). Its bishops participated in the Council of Nicaea (325). Although the Orthodox



church suffered severe repression during the period of Latin domination (1191–1571), it retained its Greek Orthodox character. Under the Turks (1571–1878) the Orthodox hierarchy was fully acknowledged. The Orthodox church is very close to the people of Cyprus, especially since the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island nation when almost half of its members were made refugees in their own land. In 2002, the Church of Cyprus counted more than 442,000 members with six dioceses, seven bishops, and twelve hundred priests.

**The Greek Orthodox diaspora.** The Greek Orthodox Christians found throughout the world today in traditionally non-Orthodox lands are primarily under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The various ecclesial jurisdictions are mentioned above. Those in English-speaking lands are the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, the Archdiocese of Australia, the Archdiocese of Thyateira and Great Britain, and the Metropolis of New Zealand. Of these, the American jurisdiction is the largest.

The Archdiocese of North and South America was established in 1922. Sixty years later it consisted of the archdiocese and ten dioceses with 488 parishes, 569 churches, 530 priests, and 670,000 duly recorded members, although it serves a much larger number of persons who identify themselves as Greek Orthodox Christians. It supported 24 parochial schools and 412 afternoon Greek schools. The church also has two institutions of higher learning, Hellenic College and Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology. It maintains an orphanage and several old-age homes. In 1984 it supported 518 catechetical schools for children and 186 adult religious education programs. By 2002 the archdiocese counted 540 parishes and 800 priests, and a membership estimated at 1.5 million. Nearly every parish has a “Philoptohos [Friends of the Poor] Society” and one or more youth groups. It publishes a bimonthly newspaper, *The Orthodox Observer*, and a scholarly theological journal, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, through the Holy Cross School of Theology. This pattern of organization and functioning is the model for the other churches of the Greek Orthodox diaspora.

**SEE ALSO** Eastern Christianity; Russian Orthodox Church; Schism, article on Christian Schism.

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**GREEK RELIGION [FIRST EDITION].** [*This entry focuses on Greek religion during the Archaic and Classical periods, from the eighth to the fourth century BCE. Other religious systems of the ancient Mediterranean region are treated in Aegean Religions, which discusses the earlier cultures of Cycladic, Minoan, and Mycenaean peoples, and in Hellenistic Religions, which surveys the later history of religions in the Greek-speaking world.*]

The Greek religion of the Archaic and Classical periods (eighth–fourth century BCE) presented several characteristic traits that should be borne in mind. Like other polytheistic cults, Greek religion was a stranger to any form of revelation: it knew neither prophet nor messiah. It was deeply rooted in a tradition in which religion was intimately interwoven with all the other elements of Hellenic civilization, all that gave to the Greece of the city-states its distinctive character: from the language, the gestures, and the manner of living, feeling, and thinking to the system of values and the rules of communal life. This religious tradition was neither uniform nor strictly defined; its nature was not dogmatic in any way. It had no sacerdotal cast, no specialized clergy, no church, and no sacred book in which the truth was fixed once and for all. It had no creed that gave the faithful a coherent set of beliefs about the beyond.

**MYTHOLOGY AND RELIGION.** On what basis, then, did the deep-seated religious convictions of the Greeks lie, and how

were they expressed? As their beliefs were not based on doctrine, they did not entail for the devout any obligation to adhere, for fear of impiety, on all points and to the letter to a body of defined truths. It sufficed for a person performing rites to give credence to a vast repertory of stories learned in childhood. Each of these stories existed in many versions, allowing a wide margin of interpretation. It was within the context of this narrative tradition that beliefs about the gods developed and that a consensus emerged as to their nature, their role, and their requirements. Rejecting this core of common beliefs would have been, for a Greek, like giving up the Greek language or the Greek way of life. However, for all that, the Greeks were fully aware that other languages and other religions existed. They could, without falling into disbelief, remain objective enough about their own religious system to engage in a free and critical reflection on it, and they did not hesitate to do so.

But how did they preserve and transmit this mass of traditional “knowledge” about the social reality of the otherworld—the families of the gods, their genealogies, their adventures, their conflicts or agreements, their powers, their spheres and modes of action, their prerogatives, and the honors that were due them? Where language was concerned, essentially in two ways. First, through a purely oral tradition maintained in each household, especially by women: nurses’ tales or old grandmothers’ fables, as Plato called them, were absorbed by children from the cradle. These stories, or *muthoi*—which were all the more familiar for having been heard by children at the age when they were learning to speak—helped shape the mental framework in which the Greeks imagined the divine, situated it, and conceived it.

As adults, the Greeks learned about the world of the gods through the voices of the poets. Through the tales about the gods, the remoteness and strangeness of the otherworld took a familiar, intelligible form. Performed with a musical instrument, the poets’ songs were not heard in private, intimate surroundings, as were the tales told to children, but at banquets, official festivities, and important competitions and games. The rise of a written narrative tradition modified and preserved the very ancient tradition of oral poetry and came to occupy a central place in the social and spiritual life of Greece. The poets’ songs were not a luxury reserved for the learned elite, nor were they merely personal entertainment for an audience; they functioned as a real institution that kept alive the social memory, as an instrument for the preservation and communication of knowledge. As a verbal form that could be memorized easily, poetry expressed and fixed the fundamental traits that went beyond the particularities of each city and were the foundation of a common culture for all of Hellas—especially those traits reflected in religious representations of the gods proper, daemons, heroes, or the dead. Had it not been for all the works of the epic, lyrical, and dramatic poetry, we could speak of Greek cults in the plural instead of a unified Greek religion. In this respect, Homer and Hesiod played prominent roles: their narratives

about the divine beings acquired an almost canonical value and functioned as sources of reference for the authors who came after them as well as for the public that listened to or read them.

Certainly, the poets that succeeded Homer and Hesiod were not as influential. As long as the city-state remained alive, however, poetic activity continued to act as a mirror, reflecting the image of the inhabitants and allowing them to perceive their dependence on the sacred and to define themselves with reference to the immortal. Poetic activity gave the community of mortals its cohesiveness, its continuity, and its permanence.

Consequently, a problem arises for the historian of religions. If poetry was the vehicle through which the attributes of divine creatures, their roles, and their relationships with mortal creatures were expressed, and if it fell to each poet to present, with occasional modifications, the divine and heroic legends that, taken together, constituted an encyclopedia of knowledge about the otherworld, should these poetic tales and dramatized narrations be considered as religious documents or be given a purely literary value? That is, do myths and mythology, in the forms given them by Greek civilization, belong to the field of religion or to that of literary history?

For the scholars of the Renaissance, as for the great majority of the scholars of the nineteenth century, the reply was self-evident. In their eyes, Greek religion was, above all, an abundant treasure of legendary tales transmitted to us by the Greek authors (assisted by the Romans) in which the spirit of paganism remained alive long enough to offer the modern reader in a Christian world the surest path to a clear view of ancient polytheism.

Actually, in taking this standpoint, they simply walked in the footsteps of the ancients. In the sixth century BCE, Theagenes of Rhegium and Hekataios inaugurated a critical approach to the traditional myths, as recounted by Homer in particular. They subjected these stories to a reasoned examination or applied to them a method of allegorical exegesis. In the fifth century, work was begun that would be systematically pursued in essentially two directions. First, chroniclers undertook the collection and inventory of all the legendary oral traditions peculiar to a city or a sanctuary. Like the *athidographs* of Athens, these scholars attempted to set down in writing the history of a city and its people from its earliest beginnings, going back to the fabulous time when the gods mingled with men, intervening directly in their affairs to found cities and to beget the first reigning dynasties. Thus was made possible, from the Hellenistic period onward, the enterprise of scholarly compilation that led to the drafting of veritable repertories of mythology: the *Bibliotheca* of “Apollodorus,” the *Fabulae* and *Poetica Astronomica* of Hyginus, book 5 of the *Bibliotheca historica* of Diodorus Siculus, the *Metamorphoses* of Antoninus Liberalis, the three miscellaneous collections known as the *Mythographi Vaticani*.

Parallel to this effort, which aimed at a systematic summary of the legends common to all Greeks, there became apparent a certain hesitation and uneasiness—already perceptible among the poets—about how much credit should be accorded to the scandalous episodes that seemed incompatible with the eminent dignity of the divine. But it was with the development of history and philosophy that interrogation reached full scale; from then on criticism assailed myth in general. Subjected to the investigations of the historian and the reasonings of the philosopher, the fable, as fable, was deemed incompetent to speak of the divine in a valid and authentic fashion. Thus, at the same time that they applied themselves, with the greatest care, to setting down their legendary heritage, the Greeks were led to challenge the myths, sometimes in the most radical manner, and to raise the problem of the truth—or falsehood—of the myth. The solutions varied from rejection, or pure and simple negation, of the myths to the multiple forms of interpretation that permitted them to be “saved”; for example, a banal reading might be replaced with learned hermeneutics that brought to light a secret lesson underlying a narrative and analogous to those fundamental truths—the privilege of the wise—which, when known, reveal the only real sure access to the divine. Yet, from one point of view, no matter if the ancients were carefully collecting myths, if they interpreted or criticized them or even rejected them in the name of another, truer kind of knowledge—it all came down to recognizing the role generally assigned to myths in the Greek city-state, namely, to function as instruments of information about the other-world.

During the first half of the twentieth century, however, historians of Greek religion took a new direction. Many refused to consider the legendary traditions as strictly religious documents that could be useful as evidence of the real state of the beliefs and feelings of the faithful. For these scholars, religion lay in the organization of the cult, the calendar of sacred festivals, the liturgies celebrated for each god in his sanctuaries. Next to these ritual practices, which constitute the “real” religious comportments, the myth appears as a literary outgrowth, a mere fabulation. As a more or less gratuitous fantasy of the poets, myth could be only remotely related to the inner convictions of the believer, who was engaged in the concrete practice of cult ceremonies and in a series of daily acts that brought him into direct contact with the sacred and made him a pious man.

In the chapter on Greece in *Histoire générale des religions* (1944), A.-J. Festugière warned the reader in these terms:

No doubt poets and sculptors, obeying the requisites of their art, were inclined to represent a society of highly characterized gods; form, attributes, genealogy, history, everything is clearly defined, but the cult and popular feeling reveal other tendencies. Thus, from the beginning, the field of the religious is enclosed. In order to understand fully the true Greek religion, forgetting therefore the mythology of the poets and of art, let us turn to the cult—to the earliest cults.

What are the reasons for this exclusive bias in favor of the cult and for the importance attributed to its most archaic elements? There are two, very distinct reasons. The first is of a general nature and has to do with the personal philosophy of the scholar and with his idea of religion. The second is a response to more technical requirements: the progress of classical studies—in particular, the strides made in archaeology and epigraphy—opened new areas of investigation, besides the mythological field, to students of antiquity. These advances led scholars to call into question, and sometimes even modify profoundly, the image of Greek religion furnished by literary tradition alone.

Today, the rejection of mythology is based on an anti-intellectualist presumption in religious matters. Scholars of this standpoint believe that behind the diversity of religions—just as beyond the plurality of the gods of polytheism—lies a common element that forms the primitive and universal core of all religious experience. This common element, of course, cannot be found in the always multiple and varying constructions that the mind elaborates in its attempt to picture the divine; it is placed, therefore, outside of intelligence, in the sacred terror that a human being feels each time he or she is compelled to recognize, in its irrecusable strangeness, the presence of the supernatural. The Greeks had a word for this effective, immediate, and irrational reaction in the presence of the sacred: *thambos* (“reverential awe”). Such awe would be the basis of the earliest cults, the diverse forms taken by the rites answering, from the same origin, to the multiplicity of circumstances and human needs.

Similarly, it is supposed that behind the variety of names, figures, and functions proper to each divinity, a ritual brought into play the same general experience of the divine, considered a suprahuman power (*kreitton*). This indeterminate divine being (Gr., *theion*, or *daimonion*), underlying the specific manifestations of particular gods, took diverse forms according to the desires and fears to which the cult had to respond. From this common fabric of the divine, the poets, in turn, cut singular characters; they brought them to life, imagining for each a series of dramatic adventures in what Festugière does not hesitate to call a “divine novel.” On the other hand, for every act of the cult, there is no other god but the one invoked. From the moment he is addressed, “in him is concentrated all divine force; he alone is considered. Most certainly, in theory he is not the only god since there are others and one knows it. But in practice, in the actual state of mind of the worshiper, the god invoked supplants at that moment all the others” (Festugière, 1944, p. 50).

Thus the refusal of some scholars to take myth into account becomes clear: it leads exactly to that which from the beginning was meant, more or less consciously, to be proved. By effacing the differences and the oppositions that distinguish the gods from one another, any true difference is effaced between polytheisms of the Greek type and Christian monotheism, which then becomes a model. This flattening out of religious realities to make them fit a single mold can-

not satisfy the historian. Must not his first concern be, on the contrary, to define the specific traits that give each great religion a character of its own and that make it, in its unicity, an entirely original system? Apart from reverential awe and a diffused feeling of the divine, the Greek religion presents itself as a vast symbolic construction, complex and coherent, that allows room for thought, as well as feeling, on all levels and in all aspects, including the cult. Myth played its part in this system in the same way as ritual practices and representations of the divine. Indeed, myth, rite, and figurative portrayals were the three modes of expression—verbal, gestural, and iconic—by which the Greeks manifested their religious experience. Each constituted a specific language that, even in its association with the two others, responded to particular needs and functioned autonomously.

The work of Georges Dumézil and Claude Lévi-Strauss on myth led to a totally different presentation of the problem of Greek mythology: How should the texts be read? What status did they assume in Greek religious life? The days when one could discuss myth as if it were a poet's individual fantasy, a free and gratuitous romantic invention, are gone. Even in the variations to which it lent itself, a myth obeyed the severe constraints of the community. During the Hellenistic period, when an author, such as Callimachus, wrote a new version of a legendary theme, he was not free to modify the elements or to recompose the scenario as he pleased. He belonged to a tradition; whether he conformed to it exactly or deviated on a certain point, he was restrained and supported by it and had to refer to it, at least implicitly, if he wanted the public to hear his tale. As Louis Gernet (1932) noted, even when a narrator seemed to have completely invented a tale, he was actually working according to the rules of a "legendary imagination" that had its own functioning, internal necessities, and coherence. Without even knowing it, the author was obliged to submit to the rules of the play of associations, oppositions, and homologies that had been established by a series of previous versions of the tale and that composed the conceptual framework common to the type of narrative. To have meaning, each variation of a myth had to be linked to, as well as compared with, the other variations. Together, they composed one semantic space, whose particular configuration appears as the characteristic mark of Greek legendary tradition. By analyzing a myth in all its versions, or a corpus of diverse myths centered around the same theme, we are able to explore this structured and organized mental space.

Interpretation of a myth, therefore, operates along lines different from those characterizing the study of literature and must meet other goals. It seeks to determine the conceptual architecture of the very composition of the fable, the important frameworks of classification that are involved, the choices made in the division and the coding of reality, and the network of relationships that the story, by its narrative procedures, establishes between the various elements of the plot. In short, the mythologist seeks to reconstitute what Dumézil calls the "ideology," that is, the conceptualization

and appreciation of the great forces that in their mutual relationships and their perfect equilibrium govern the natural and supernatural worlds and human society and makes them what they ought to be.

In this sense myth, which should not be confused with ritual or subordinated to it, does not conflict with ritual as much as has been supposed. In its verbal form, myth is more explicit than rite, more didactic, more apt to theorize. It thus contains the germ of that knowledge that—on another level of language and thought—is the concern of philosophy when it formulates its assertions using concepts and terms that are removed from any reference to the gods of the common religion. The cult is more engaged in considerations of a utilitarian nature. But it is no less symbolic: a ritual ceremony unfolds according to a scenario whose episodes are as strictly organized and as fraught with meaning as the sequences of a narrative. Every detail of this *mise-en-scène*, in which the worshiper in defined circumstances undertakes to act out his relationship with one god or another, has an intellectual dimension and goal: it implies a certain idea of the god, the conditions for his approach, and the results that the various participants, according to their role and status, have the right to expect from this means of entering into symbolic commerce with the divinity.

Figurative representation is of the same nature. Although it is true that during the Classical period the Greeks gave a privileged place in their temples to the great anthropomorphic statues of the gods, they were familiar with all the forms of divine manifestation: aniconic symbols, either natural objects, such as a tree or a rough stone, or products shaped by the human hand (e.g., a post, a pillar, a scepter); diverse iconic figures, such as a small, rough-hewn idol whose form was completely hidden by clothes; monstrous figures mingling the bestial and the human; a simple mask whose hollow face and fascinating eyes evoked the divine; a fully human statue. These figures were not all equivalent, nor were they indiscriminately suited to all the gods or to all aspects of the same god. Each had its own way of translating certain aspects of the divine, of "making present" the beyond, of locating and inserting the sacred in the space of the here and now. Thus, a pillar or post driven into the ground had neither the same function nor the same symbolic value as an idol that was ritually moved from one place to another; as an image locked away in a secret repository, its legs bound to prevent its escape; or as a great cult statue whose permanent installation in a temple demonstrated the lasting presence of the god in his house. Each form of representation implied for the specific divinity a particular way of making himself known to man and of exercising, through his images, his supernatural powers.

If, following various modalities, myth, image, and ritual all operate on the same level of symbolic thought, it is understandable that they combine to make each religion a complete whole in which, to quote Dumézil in *L'héritage indo-européen à Rome* (Paris, 1949, p. 64), "concepts, images and

actions fit together and by their relations form a kind of net in which, potentially, all the matter of human experience must be caught and distributed.”

**THE WORLD OF THE GODS.** To find the lines of the net, to pick out the configurations shaped by its meshes: such must be the historian’s task. In the case of Greek religion, this proves to be far more difficult than with the other Indo-European religions, in which the pattern of the three functions—sovereignty, war, and fertility—is maintained. Where it is clearly attested, this structure serves as the framework and keystone of the entire edifice and provides a unity that seems to be lacking in Greek religion.

Indeed, Greek religion presents an organization so complex that it excludes recourse to a single reading code for the entire system. To be sure, a Greek god is defined by the set of relationships that unite or put him in opposition to other divinities of the pantheon, but the theological structures thus brought to light are too numerous and, especially, too diverse to be integrated into the same pattern. According to the city, the sanctuary, or the moment, each god enters into a varied network of combinations with the others. Groups of gods do not conform to a single model that is more important than others; they are organized into a plurality of configurations that do not correspond exactly but compose a table with several entries and many axes, the reading of which varies according to the starting point and the perspective adopted.

Take the example of Zeus. His name clearly reveals his origin, based on the same Indo-European root (meaning “to shine”) as Latin *dies/deus* and the Vedic *dyeus*. Like the Indian Dyaus Pitṛ or the Roman Jupiter (Iovpater), Father Zeus (Zeus Pater) is the direct descendant of the great Indo-European sky god. However, the gap between the status of the Zeus of Greece and that of his corresponding manifestations in India and in Rome is so evident, so marked, that even when comparing the most assuredly similar gods one is compelled to recognize that the Indo-European tradition has completely disappeared from the Greek religious system.

Zeus does not appear in any trifunctional group comparable to the pre-Capitoline Jupiter-Mars-Quirinus, in which sovereignty (Jupiter) is contrasted with the action of the warrior (Mars) and the functions of fertility and prosperity (Quirinus). Nor is he associated, as Mitra is with Varuṇa, with a sovereign power that expresses not only legal and juridical aspects but also the values of magic and violence. Ouranos, the dark night sky, who has sometimes been compared with Varuṇa, is paired in myth with Gaia, the earth, not with Zeus.

As sovereign, Zeus embodies greater strength than all the other gods. He is the supreme power: with Zeus on one side and all the assembled Olympians on the other, it is Zeus who prevails. Confronted by Kronos, whom he dethroned, and the Titan gods, whom he fought and imprisoned, Zeus represents justice, the fair distribution of honors and offices, respect for the privileges to which each person is entitled,

concern for what is due even to the weakest. In him and by him, order and power, law and violence are reconciled and conjoined. “All kings come from Zeus,” wrote Hesiod in the seventh century BCE, not to oppose monarch, warrior, and peasant, but to affirm that there is no true king who does not set himself the task of quietly making justice triumph. “From Zeus are the kings,” echoes Callimachus four centuries later, but this kinship between kings and the royalty of Zeus does not fit into a trifunctional framework. It crowns a series of similar statements that link a particular category of men to the divinity who acts as its patron: blacksmiths to Hephaistos, soldiers to Ares, hunters to Artemis, and singers accompanied by the lyre to Phoibos (Apollo).

When Zeus enters into the composition of a triad, as he does with Poseidon and Hades, it is to delimit by their apportionment the cosmic levels, or domains: the heavens to Zeus, the sea to Poseidon, the subterranean world to Hades, the surface of the earth to all three. When he is paired with a goddess, the dyad thus formed brings out different aspects of the sovereign god, depending on the female divinity who is his counterpart. Joined with Gaia (“earth”), for example, Zeus is the celestial principle, male and generative, whose fertilizing rain reaches deep in the ground to animate young sprouts of vegetation. United with Hera in a lawful marriage that engenders a legitimate line, Zeus becomes the patron of the institution of matrimony, which, by civilizing the union of man and woman, serves as the foundation of every social organization; the couple formed by the king and queen is the exemplary model. Associated with Metis, his first wife (whom he swallowed and assimilated entirely), Zeus the king is identified with cunning intelligence and with the underhanded shrewdness needed to win power and to keep it. He is able to ensure the permanence of his reign and to protect his throne from traps, snares, and surprises, for he is always prompt to foresee the unexpected and to ward off dangers. Taking Themis for his second wife, he fixes, once and for all, the order of the seasons, the balance of human groups in the city (order and balance represented by the Horai, daughters of Zeus and Themis), and the ineluctable course of the Fates (the Moirai). He becomes cosmic law, social harmony, and destiny.

Father of the gods and humankind, as he is designated already in the *Iliad*—not because he sired or created all beings but because he exercises over each of them an authority as absolute as that of the head of a family over his household—Zeus shares with Apollo the epithet *patrōios* (“the ancestral”). Together with Athena Apatouria, Zeus, as Phratrios, ensures the integration of individuals into the diverse groups that compose the civic community. In the cities of Ionia, he makes of all the citizens authentic brothers, celebrating in their respective phratries, as in one family, the festival of the Apatouria, that is, of those who acknowledge themselves children of the same father. In Athens, joined with Athena Polias, Zeus is Polieus, patron of the city. Master and guarantor of political life, Zeus forms a couple with



the goddess, whose function as titular power of Athens is more precise and, one might say, more localized. Athena watches over her city as a particular city distinguished from the other Greek city-states. She favors Athens, according to the dual privileges of concord within the city and victory outside of it.

Celestial and judicious wielder of supreme power, founder of order, guarantor of justice, governor of marriage, father and ancestor, and patron of the city, the tableau of the sovereignty of Zeus includes still other dimensions. His authority is domestic as well as political. In close connivance with Hestia, Zeus has supreme control not only over each private hearth—that fixed center where the family has its roots—but also over the common household of the state in the heart of the city, the Hestia Koinē, where the ruling magistrates keep watch. Zeus Herkeios, the god of the courtyard and the household, circumscribes the domain within which the head of the house has the right to exercise his power; Zeus Klarios, the divider of estates, delineates and sets boundaries, leaving Apollo and Hermes in charge of protecting the gates and controlling the entries.

As Zeus Hikesios and Zeus Xenios, he receives the suppliant and the guest, introduces them into the unfamiliar house, and ensures their safety by welcoming them to the household altar, although he does not assimilate them entirely to the members of the family. Zeus Ktesios, the guardian of possession and wealth, watches over the property of the head of the house. As an Olympian and a celestial god, Zeus opposes Hades; yet as Ktesios, Zeus's altar is deep in the cellar, and he takes on the appearance of a serpent, the most chthonic of animals. The sovereign can thus incorporate that chthonic part of the universe normally controlled by the powers of the underworld but occasionally incarnated by Zeus himself in a kind of internal tension, polarity, or even a double image. The celestial Zeus, who sits at the summit of the shining ether, is mirrored by a Zeus Chthonios, Zeus Katachthonios, Zeus Meilichios, a Zeus of the dark underworld, who is present in the depths of the earth where he nurtures, in the proximity of the dead, the riches or retributions that are ready, if he is willing, to surge into the light led by the chthonic Hermes.

Zeus connects heaven and earth by means of the rain (Zeus Ombrios, Huetios, Ikmaios, "rainy," "damp"), the winds (Zeus Ourios, Euanemos, "windy," "of a good wind"), and the lightning (Zeus Astrapaios, Bronton, Keraunios, "wielder of thunderbolts," "thunderer"). He ensures communication between high and low through signs and oracles, which transmit messages from the gods of heaven to mortals on the earth. According to the Greeks, their most ancient oracle was an oracle of Zeus at Dodona. There he established his sanctuary at the site of a great oak, which belonged to him and which rose straight as the tallest column toward heaven. The rustling of the leaves of the sacred oak above their heads provided the consultants with the answer to their questions to the sovereign of heaven. Moreover, when Apollo pro-

nounces his oracles in the sanctuary of Delphi, he speaks not so much for himself as in the name of his father, with whom he remains associated and, in his oracular function, seems to obey. Apollo is a prophet, but he is the prophet of Zeus: he voices only the will and decrees of the Olympian so that here—at the navel of the world—the word of the king and father may resound in the ears of those who can hear.

The different epithets of Zeus, wide as their range may be, are not incompatible. They all belong to one field and emphasize its multiple dimensions. Taken together, they define the contours of divine sovereignty as conceived by the Greeks; they mark its boundaries and delimit its constituent domains; they indicate the various aspects that the power of the king-god may assume and exercise in more or less close alliance (according to circumstances) with the other divinities.

An entirely different matter is the Zeus of Crete, the Kretagenes, Diktaios, or Idaios, the youthful god whose infancy was associated with the Curetes, with their dances and orgiastic rites and the din of their clashing weapons. It was said of this Zeus that he was born in Crete and that he also died there; his tomb was shown on the island. But the Greek Zeus, in spite of his many facets, can have nothing in common with a dying god. In the *Hymn to Zeus*, Callimachus firmly rejects the tradition of these stories as foreign to his god, "ever great, ever king." The real Zeus was not born in Crete, as those lying Cretans told it: "They have gone so far as to build you a tomb, O King; Nay, you never died; You are for eternity."

In the eyes of the Greeks, immortality, which sets a rigorous boundary between the gods and mortals, was such a fundamental trait of the divine that the ruler of Olympus could in no way be likened to one of the Oriental deities who die and are reborn. During the second millennium, the framework of the Indo-European religious system, whose influence is reflected in the name of Zeus, may well have collapsed among those people speaking a Greek dialect, who came in successive waves to settle Helladic soil and whose presence is attested as far as Knossos in Crete from the end of the fifteenth century BCE. Contacts, exchanges, and intermixing were numerous and continuous. There were borrowings from the Aegean and Minoan religions, just as there were from the Oriental and Thracio-Phrygian cults when the Greeks later expanded throughout the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, between the fourteenth and the twelfth centuries, most of the gods revered by the Achaeans—and whose names figure on the Linear B tablets from Knossos and Pylos—are the same ones encountered in the classical Greek pantheon: Zeus, Poseidon, Eualios (Ares), Paeon (Apollo), Dionysos, Hera, Athena, Artemis, and the Two Queens, that is, Demeter and Kore.

The religious world of the Indo-European invaders of Greece could well have been modified and opened to foreign influences, but while it assimilated some concepts, it kept its specificity and the distinctive features of its own gods. From

the religion of the Mycenaeans to that of the age of Homer, during those obscure centuries that followed the fall or the decline of the Achaean kingdoms after the twelfth century, continuity was not only marked by the persistence of the names of the gods and cult places. The continuity of certain festivals celebrated by the Ionians on both shores of the Mediterranean proves that these festivals must already have been customary in the eleventh century at the outset of the first wave of colonization, whose point of departure may have been Athens, the only Mycenaean site to remain intact, and which established groups of emigrants on the coast of Asia Minor to found Greek cities.

This permanence of Greek religion must not be misleading, however. The religious world evoked by Homer is no more representative of the religion of an earlier period than the world of the Homeric poems is representative of the world of the Mycenaean kings, whose exploits the bard, after an interval of four centuries, undertook to evoke. During this time a whole series of changes and innovations were introduced: behind apparent continuities was a veritable rupture (that the epic text effaces but whose extent can be measured through archaeological research and a reading of the tablets).

**THE CIVIC RELIGION.** Between the eleventh and eighth centuries, technical, economic, and demographic changes led to what the English archaeologist Anthony Snodgrass called the “structural revolution,” which gave rise to the city-state (*polis*). The Greek religious system was profoundly reorganized during this time in response to the new forms of social life introduced by the *polis*. Within the context of a religion that from then on was essentially civic, remodeled beliefs and rites satisfied a dual and complementary obligation. First of all, they fulfilled the specific needs of each group of people, who constituted a city bound to a specific territory. The city was placed under the patronage of its own special gods, who endowed it with a unique religious physiognomy. Every city had its own divinity or divinities, whose functions were to cement the body of citizens into a true community; to unite into one whole all the civic space, including the urban center and the *chora*, or rural area; and to look after the integrity of the state—the people and the land—in the presence of other cities. Second, the development of an epic literature cut off from any local roots, the construction of great common sanctuaries, and the institution of pan-Hellenic games and panegyrics established and reinforced, on a religious level, legendary traditions, cycles of festivals, and a pantheon that would be recognized equally throughout all of Hellas.

Without assessing all the religious innovations brought about during the Archaic period, the most important should be mentioned. The first was the emergence of the temple as a construction independent of the human habitat, whether houses or royal palaces. With its walls delimiting a sacred enclosure (*temenos*) and its exterior altar, the temple became an edifice separated from profane ground. The god came to reside there permanently through the intermediacy of his great anthropomorphic cult statue. Unlike domestic altars and pri-

vate sanctuaries, this house of the god was the common property of all citizens.

To mark and confirm its legitimate authority over a territory, each city built a temple in a precise place: in the center of the city, the *acropolis* or *agora*, the gates of the walls surrounding the urban area, or in the zone of the *agros* and the *eschatiai*—the wilderness that separated each Greek city from its neighbors. The construction of a network of sanctuaries within, around, and outside the city not only punctuated the space with holy places but also marked the course of ritual processions, from the center to the periphery and back. These processions, which mobilized all or a part of the population on fixed dates, aimed at shaping the surface of the land according to a religious order.

Through the mediation of its civic gods (installed in their temples), the community established a kind of symbiosis between the people and their land, as if the citizens were the children of an earth from which they had sprung forth in the beginning and which, by virtue of this relationship with those who inhabited it, was itself promoted to the rank of “earth of the city.” This explains the bitterness of the conflicts, between the eighth and the sixth centuries, that pitted neighboring cities against each other in the appropriation of cult places on those borders that were held in common by more than one *polis*. The occupation of the sanctuary and its religious annexation to the urban center were equivalent to legitimate possession. When it founded its temples, the *polis* rooted them firmly in the world of the gods so that its territorial base would have an unshakable foundation.

Another innovation with partly comparable significance left its mark on the religious system. During the eighth century, it became customary to put into service Mycenaean buildings, usually funerary, that had been abandoned for centuries. Once they were fitted out, they served as cult places where funeral honors were rendered to legendary figures who, although they usually had no relationship to these edifices, were claimed as ancestors by their “progeny,” noble families or groups of *phratries*. Like the epic heroes whose names they carried, these mythical ancestors belonged to a distant past, to a time different from the present, and constituted a category of supernatural powers distinct from both the *theoi*, or gods proper, and the ordinary dead. Even more than the cult of the gods (even the civic gods), the cult of heroes had both civic and territorial value. It was associated with a specific place, a tomb with the subterranean presence of the dead person, whose remains were often brought home from a distant land.

The tombs and cults of the hero, through the prestige of the figure honored, served as glorious symbols and talismans for the community. The location of the tombs was sometimes kept secret because the welfare of the state depended on their safety. Installed in the heart of the city in the middle of the *agora*, they gave substance to the memory of the legendary founder of the city (the tutelary hero or, in the case of a colony, the colonizing hero), or they patronized

the various components of the civic body (tribes, phratries, and demes). Disseminated to various points of the territory, the cults consecrated the affinities that united the members of the rural areas and villages (the *kōmai*). In all cases their function was to assemble a group around an exclusive cult that appears to have been strictly implanted in precise points of the land.

The spread of the cult of the hero did not just comply with the new social needs that arose with the city; the adoration of the heroes had a properly religious significance. Different from the divine cult, which was obligatory for everyone and permanent in character, and also from the funerary rites, which were limited in time as well as to a narrow circle of relatives, the heroic institution affected the general stability of the cult system.

For the Greeks, there was a radical opposition between the gods, who were the beneficiaries of the cult, and mortals, who were its servants. Strangers to the transience that defines the existence of mortals, the gods were the *athanatoi* ("the immortals"). Humans, on the other hand, were the *brotoi* ("the mortals"), doomed to sickness, old age, and death. Consequently, the funeral honors paid to the dead were placed on a different level from the sacrifices and devotions demanded by the gods as their share of honor, their special privilege. The narrow strips of material decorating the tombs, the offerings of cakes for the dead person, the libations of water, milk, honey, or wine that had to be renewed on the third, ninth, and thirtieth day after the funeral and again each year on the festival of the Genesia appear to have been the temporary continuation of the funeral ceremony and mourning practices rather than acts of veneration toward the higher powers. The intent of opening the doors of Hades to the dead person was to make him disappear forever from this world, where he no longer had a place. At the same time, through the various procedures of commemoration, the funeral transformed his absence into a presence in the memory of the survivors—an ambiguous, paradoxical presence, as of one who is absent, relegated to the realm of shadows, reduced henceforth to the social status of a dead man by the funeral rites. Even this status, however, is destined to sink into oblivion as the cycle of generations is renewed.

The heroes were quite another matter. To be sure, they belonged to the humankind and thus knew suffering and death. But a whole series of traits distinguished them, even in death, from the throng of ordinary dead. The heroes had lived during the period that constituted the "old days" for the Greeks, a bygone era when men were taller, stronger, more beautiful. Thus the bones of a hero could be recognized by their gigantic size. It was this race of men, later extinct, whose exploits were sung in epic poetry. Celebrated by the bards, the names of the heroes—unlike the names of ordinary people, which faded into the indistinct and forgotten mass of the nameless—remained alive forever, in radiant glory, in the memory of all the Greeks. The race of heroes formed the legendary past of the Greece of the city-states and

the roots of the families, groups, and communities of the Hellenes.

Although they were mortals, these ancestors seemed in many ways nearer to the gods, less cut off from the divine, than the rest of humanity. In their day, the gods still mingled readily with mortals, inviting themselves to their homes, eating at their tables, and even slipping into their beds to unite with them and—by mixing the two races, the mortal and the immortal—to beget beautiful children. The heroic figures whose names survived and whose cults were celebrated at their tombs were very often presented as the fruit of these amorous encounters between the divinities and human beings of both sexes. They were, as Hesiod said, "the divine race of heroes called demigods." If their birth sometimes endowed them with a semidivine origin, their death also placed them above the human condition. Instead of descending into the darkness of Hades, they were "abducted" or transported by means of divine favor—some during their lifetime but most of them after death—to a special, separate place on the Isles of the Blessed, where they continued to enjoy in permanent felicity a life comparable to that of the gods.

Although it did not bridge the immeasurable gulf that separates mortals from the gods, heroic status seemed to open the prospect of the promotion of a mortal to a rank that, if not divine, was at least close to divinity. However, during the entire Classical period, this possibility remained strictly confined to a narrow sector. It was thwarted, not to say repressed, by the religious system itself. Indeed, piety, like wisdom, enjoined mortals not to pretend to be the equal of a god; the precepts of Delphi—"know who you are, know thyself"—have no other meaning than that. Humanity must accept its limits. Therefore, apart from the great legendary figures, such as Achilles, Theseus, Orestes, and Herakles, the status of the hero was restricted to the first founders of the colonies or to persons, such as Lysander of Samos and Timoleon of Syracuse, who had acquired exemplary symbolic worth in the eyes of a city.

We know of few cases of men who were heroized during the Classical period. They never concerned a living person but always one who after his death appeared to bear a *numen* (or formidable sacral power) because of his extraordinary physical characteristics (size, strength, and beauty), the circumstances of his death (if he had been struck by lightning or had disappeared leaving no trace), or the misdeeds attributed to his ghost, which it seemed necessary to appease. For example, in the middle of the fifth century, the boxer Cleomedes of Astypalaia, who was exceptionally strong, killed his adversary in combat. Denied a prize by the decision of the jury, he returned home mad with rage. He vented his fury on a pillar that held up the ceiling of a school, and the roof caved in on the children. Pursued by a crowd that wanted to stone him, Cleomedes hid in a chest in the sanctuary of Athena, locking the lid on himself. His pursuers succeeded in forcing it open, but the chest was empty: no Cleomedes, living or dead, was to be found. The Pythia, when consulted,

advised the establishment of a hero cult in honor of the boxer, whose strength, fury, misdeeds, and death set him above ordinary mortals. Sacrifices were to be made to him as “no longer a mortal.” But the oracle manifested her reservations by also proclaiming that Cleomedes was the last of the heroes.

However much the heroes constituted, through the honors paid to them, a category of superior beings, their role, their power, and the domains in which they intervened did not interfere with those of the gods. They never played the role of intermediary between earth and heaven; they were not intercessors but indigenous powers, bound to the spot of ground where they had their subterranean homes. Their efficacy adhered to their tombs and to their bones; there were anonymous heroes designated only by the names of the places where their tombs were established, such as the hero of Marathon. This local quality was accompanied by a strict specialization. Many heroes had no other realities than the narrow function to which they were dedicated and which defined them entirely. For example, at Olympia, at the bend of the track, competitors offered sacrifices at the tomb of the hero Taraxippos, the Frightener of Horses. Similarly, there were doctor heroes, doormen, cook, fly-catcher heroes, a hero of meals, of the broad bean, of saffron, a hero to mix water and wine or to grind the grain.

If the city could group into the same category of cults the highly individualized figures of heroes of long ago, whose legendary biographies were fixed in their epics, of exceptional contemporaries, of anonymous dead of whom all that remained were funerary monuments, and of all sorts of functional daemons, it was because inside their tombs they manifested the same contacts with the subterranean powers, shared the same characteristic of territorial localization, and could be used as political symbols. Instituted by the emerging city, bound to the land that it protected and to the groups of citizens that it patronized, the cult of the hero did not, in the Hellenistic period, lead to the divinization of human figures, nor did it lead to the establishment of a cult of sovereigns: these phenomena were the product of a different religious mentality. Inseparable from the *polis*, the hero cult declined with it.

The appearance of the hero cult, however, was not without consequences. By its newness it led to an effort to define and categorize more strictly the various supernatural powers. Plutarch noted that Hesiod was the first, in the seventh century, to make a clear distinction between the different classes of divine beings, which he divided into four groups: gods, daemons, heroes, and the dead. Taken up again by the Pythagoreans and by Plato, this nomenclature of the divinities to whom men owed veneration was common enough in the fourth century to appear in the requests that the consultants addressed to the oracle of Dodona. On one of the inscriptions that have been found, a certain Euandros and his wife question the oracle about which “of the gods, or heroes, or daemons” they must sacrifice to and address their prayers to.

**THE SACRIFICIAL PRACTICES.** To find his bearings in the practice of the cult, the believer, therefore, had to take into account the hierarchical order that presided in the society of the beyond. At the top of the hierarchy were the *theoi*, both great and small, who made up the race of the blessed immortals. These were the Olympians, grouped under the authority of Zeus. As a rule they were celestial divinities, although some of them, such as Poseidon and Demeter, bore chthonic aspects. There was indeed a god of the underworld (Hades), but he was in fact the only one who had neither temple nor cult. The gods were made present in this world in the spaces that belonged to them: first of all, in the temples where they resided but also in the places and the objects that were consecrated to them and that, specified as *hiera* (“sacred”), could be subject to interdiction. These include the sacred groves, springs, and mountain peaks; an area surrounded by walls or boundary markers (*temenos*); crossroads, trees, stones, and obelisks. The temple, the building reserved as the dwelling of the god, did not serve as a place of worship. The faithful assembled to celebrate the rites at the exterior altar (*bōmos*), a square block of masonry. Around it and upon it was performed the central rite of the Greek religion, the burnt offering (*thusia*), the analysis of which is essential.

This was normally a blood sacrifice implying the eating of the victim: a domestic animal, crowned and decked with ribbons, was led in procession to the altar to the sound of flutes. It was showered with water and fistfuls of barley seeds, which were scattered on the ground and on the altar as well as on the participants, who also wore crowns. The head of the victim was then lifted up and its throat cut with a *machaira*, a large knife concealed under the seeds in the *kanoun*, or ritual basket. The blood that gushed onto the altar was caught in a receptacle. The animal was cut open and its entrails, especially the liver, were drawn out and examined to see if the gods accepted the sacrifice. If accepted, the victim was immediately carved. The long bones, entirely stripped of flesh, were laid on the altar. Covered with fat, they were consumed with herbs and spices by the flames and, in the form of sweet-smelling smoke, rose toward heaven and the gods. Certain internal morsels (*splagchna*) were put on spits and roasted over the same fire that had sent to the divinity his share, thus establishing a link between the sacred powers for whom the sacrifice was intended and the performers of the rite for whom the roasted meat was reserved. The rest of the meat was boiled in caldrons, divided into equal parts, and eaten by the participants on the spot, taken home, or distributed outside to the community at large. The parts that were thought to confer honor, such as the tongue or the hide, went to the priest who presided at the ceremony, though his presence was not always indispensable.

As a rule, any citizen, if he was not impure, had full authority to perform sacrifices. The religious significance of this must be defined by bringing out its theological implications. From the start, however, several points are essential. Certain divinities and certain rituals, such as that of Apollo



Genetor in Delphi and Zeus Hupatos in Attica, required, instead of a blood sacrifice, food oblations: fruit, palms, grain, porridge (*pelanos*), and cakes sprinkled with water, milk, honey, or oil; no blood or even wine was offered. There were cases in which this type of offering, usually consumed by fire but sometimes simply deposited on the altar without being burned (*apura*), was characterized by marked opposition to customary practice. Considered pure sacrifices, unlike those involving the killing of living creatures, they served as models for sectarian movements. Orphics and Pythagoreans referred to them in advocating a ritual behavior and an attitude toward the divine that, in rejecting the blood sacrifice as impious, diverged from the official cult and appeared foreign to the civic religion.

In addition, blood sacrifice itself took two different forms according to whether it addressed the heavenly and Olympian gods or the chthonic and infernal ones. The language already made a distinction between them: for the first, the Greeks employed the term *thuein*; for the second, *enagizein* or *sphattein*.

The *thusia*, as we have seen, was centered on an elevated altar, the *bōmos*. The chthonic sacrifice had only a low altar (the *eschara*) with a hole in it to let the blood pour out into the earth. Normally the celebration took place at night over a ritual pit (*bothros*) that opened the way to the underworld. The animal was immolated with its head lowered toward the earth, which would be inundated with its blood. Once its throat was cut, the victim was no longer the object of ritual handling; because it was offered in holocaust, it was burned entirely without the celebrants having the right to touch it or to eat it. In this kind of rite, in which the offering is destroyed in order to be delivered in its entirety to the beyond, it was less a matter of establishing with the divinity a regular commerce of exchange in mutual confidence than of warding off the sinister forces, of placating a formidable power who would approach without harm only if defenses and precautions were taken. One might say that it was a ritual of aversion rather than one of reconciliation or contact. Understandably, its use was reserved for the cult of the chthonic and infernal deities, for expiatory rites, or for sacrifices offered to heroes and to the dead in their tombs.

In the Olympian sacrifice, the orientation toward the heavenly divinities was marked not only by the light of day, the presence of an altar, and the blood gushing upward when the throat of the victim was cut. A fundamental feature of the ritual was that it was inseparably an offering to the gods and a festive meal for the human participants. Although the climax of the event was undoubtedly the moment that, punctuated by the ritual cry (*ololugmos*), life abandoned the animal and passed into the world of the gods, all the parts of the animal, carefully gathered and treated, were meant for the people, who ate them together. The immolation itself took place in an atmosphere of sumptuous and joyful ceremony. The entire staging of the ritual—from the procession in which the untied animal was led freely and in great pomp

to the concealment of the knife in the basket to the shudder by which the sprayed animal, sprinkled with an ablution, was supposed to give its assent to the immolation—was designed to efface any traces of violence and murder and to bring to the fore aspects of peaceful solemnity and happy festivity. Furthermore, in the economy of the *thusia*, the procedures for cutting up the victim, for roasting or boiling the pieces, for their orderly distribution in equal parts, and for their consumption, either on the spot or elsewhere, were no less important than the ritual killing. The alimentary function of the rite is expressed in a vocabulary that makes no distinction between sacrificer and butcher. The word *hiereion*, which designates an animal as sacrificial victim, at the same time qualifies it as an animal to be butchered, as one suitable for eating. Since the Greeks ate meat only on the occasion of sacrifices and in conformity with sacrificial rules, the *thusia* was simultaneously a religious ceremony in which a pious offering, often accompanied by prayer, was addressed to the gods; a ritualized cooking of food according to the norms that the gods required of humans; and an act of social communion that reinforced, through the consumption of the parts of one victim, the bonds that were to unite all citizens and make them equal.

As the central moment of the cult, the sacrifice was an indispensable part of communal life (whether family or state) and illustrated the tight interdependence of the religious and the social orders in the Greece of the city-states. The function of the sacrifice was not to wrest the sacrificer or the participants away from their families and civic groups or from their ordinary activities in the human world but, on the contrary, to install them in the requisite positions and patterns, to integrate them into the city and mundane existence in conformity with an order of the world presided over by the gods (i.e., “intraworld” religion, in the sense given by Max Weber, or “political” religion, in the Greek understanding of the term). The sacred and the profane did not constitute two radically opposite, mutually exclusive categories. Between the “sacred” in its entirely forbidden aspect and its fully accessible one a multiplicity of configurations and gradations existed. In addition to those realities dedicated to a god and reserved for his use, the sacred was also to be experienced by way of objects, living creatures, natural phenomena, and both the everyday events of private life—eating a meal, departing on a journey, welcoming a guest—and the more solemn occasions of public life. Without any special preparation, every head of a family was qualified to assume religious functions in his home. Each head of a household was pure as long as he had not committed any misdeed that defiled him. In this sense, purity did not have to be acquired or obtained; it constituted the normal state of the citizen.

As far as the city was concerned, there was no division between the priesthood and the magistracy. There were priesthoods that were devolved and practiced as magistracies, and every magistrate was endowed by virtue of his duties with a character of holiness. For any political power to be



exercised, for any common decision to be valid, a sacrifice was required. In war as in peace, before giving battle as well as when convening an assembly or inaugurating a magistrate, the performance of a sacrifice was just as necessary as it was during the great religious festivals of the sacred calendar. As Marcel Detienne so accurately observes in *La cuisine du sacrifice en pays grec*: “Until a late period, a city such as Athens maintained the office of archon-king—one of whose major functions was to administer all of the sacrifices instituted by the ancestors, that is, all the ritual gestures that guaranteed the harmonious operation of society” (Detienne, 1980, p. 10).

If the *thusia* was indispensable for ensuring the validity of social undertakings, it was because the sacrificial fire, by causing the fragrant smoke of the burning fat and bones to rise toward heaven while at the same time cooking food for people, opened the lines of communication between the gods and the participants in the rites. By immolating a victim, burning the bones, and eating the flesh according to ritual rules, the Greeks instituted and maintained with the divine a contact without which their entire existence, left to itself and emptied of meaning, would have collapsed. This contact was not a communion; even in a symbolic form, the Greeks did not eat the god in order to identify with him and to participate in his strength. They consumed a victim, a domestic animal, and ate a part different from that offered to the gods. The link established by the sacrifice emphasized and confirmed the extreme distance that separated mortals and immortals, even when they communicated.

Myths about the origin of the sacrifice are most precise in this respect. They bring to light the theological meanings of the ritual. It was the Titan Prometheus, son of Iapetus, who was said to have instituted the first sacrifice, thus establishing forever the model to which humans were to conform in honoring the gods. This took place during the time when gods and men were not yet separate but lived together, feasted at the same tables, and shared the same felicity far from all evils and afflictions. Men were still unacquainted with the necessity of work, sickness, old age, fatigue, death, and women. Zeus had been promoted king of heaven and had carried out an equitable distribution of honors and privileges. The time had come to define in precise terms the forms of life appropriate for men and for gods.

Prometheus was assigned the task. He brought before the assembled gods and men a great steer, killed it, and cut it up. The boundary that exists between gods and mortals follows, therefore, the line of division between the parts of the immolated beast that went to the gods and those that went to men. The sacrifice thus appears as the act that, as its first accomplishment, consecrated the distinction of divine and human status. But Prometheus, in rebellion against the king of the gods, tried to deceive him for the benefit of men. Each of the two parts prepared by the Titan was a ruse, a lure. The first, camouflaged in appetizing fat, contained only the bare bones; the second, concealed in the skin

and stomach and disgusting in appearance, constituted all that was edible in the animal.

Honor to whom honor is due: it was for Zeus, in the name of the gods, to be the first to choose a portion of the sacrifice. He saw the trap but pretended to be tricked, the better to take his revenge. He chose, therefore, the outwardly enticing portion, the one that concealed the inedible bones under a thin covering of fat. For this reason, men burned the white bones of the victim for the gods, then divided the meat, the portion that Zeus did not choose, among themselves. Prometheus had imagined that in allotting the flesh to humans he was reserving the best part for them. But shrewd as he was, he failed to suspect that he was giving them a poisoned gift. By eating the meat, men sentenced themselves to death. Driven by their hunger, they behaved from then on like all the animals that inhabit the earth, the water, or the air. If they take pleasure in devouring the flesh of an animal that has lost its life, if they have an imperious need for food, it is because their hunger, never appeased but constantly renewed, is the mark of a creature whose strength fails gradually, who is doomed to weariness, old age, and death. By contenting themselves with the smoke from the bones and living off smells and fragrances, the gods bore witness that they belonged to a race whose nature was entirely different from that of men. They, the immortals, were everlasting and eternally young; their being contained nothing perishable and had no contact with the realm of the corruptible.

But the vengeance of the angry Zeus did not stop here. Even before he created out of the earth and water the first woman, Pandora, who introduced among men all the woes hitherto unknown to them—birth from procreation, fatigue, toil, sickness, age, and death—he decided, as retribution for the Titan’s partiality toward mankind, to never again allow men access to the celestial fire. Deprived of fire, were men thus obliged to eat raw meat like beasts? Prometheus then stole a spark, a seed of fire, in the hollow of a stick, and brought it down to earth. Although they would no longer have the flash of the thunderbolt at their disposal, men were given a technical fire, more fragile and mortal, one that would have to be preserved by constant feeding. By cooking their food, this second fire—contingent and artificial, in comparison with the heavenly fire—differentiates humans from animals and establishes them in a civilized life. Of all the animals, only men share the possession of fire with the gods. Thus it is fire that unites man to the divine by rising toward heaven from the lighted altars. But this fire, celestial in origin and destination, is also, in its all-consuming ardor, as perishable as the living creatures subjected to the necessity of eating. The frontier between gods and men is both bridged by the sacrificial fire, which unites them, and accentuated by the contrast between the heavenly fire in the hands of Zeus and the fire that Prometheus’s theft made available to mankind. Furthermore, the function of the sacrificial fire is to mark the portion of the victim belonging to the gods (totally consumed in the flames) and that of men (cooked just enough not to be eaten raw).

The ambiguous relationship between men and gods in the sacrifice was coupled with an equally equivocal relationship between men and animals. In order to live, both must eat, whether their food be animal or vegetable, and so they are equally perishable. But it is only man who eats his food cooked according to rules and after having offered in honor to the gods the animal's life, dedicated to them with the bones. If the barley seeds showered on the head of the victim and on the altar were associated with the blood sacrifice, the reason was that cereals, as a specifically human food involving agricultural labor, represented in the Greek view the paradigm of cultivated plants symbolizing, in contrast to a savage existence, civilized life. Cooked three times (by an internal process that assists the cultivation, by the action of the sun, and by the human hand that turns it into bread), cereal was an analogue to the sacrificial victim, the domestic animal whose flesh had to be ritually roasted or boiled before it was eaten.

In the Promethean myth, sacrifice comes into being as the result of the Titan's rebellion against Zeus at a time when men and gods needed to separate and establish their respective destinies. The moral of the story states that one could not hope to dupe the sovereign god. Prometheus tried to deceive Zeus; man must pay the price of his failure. To perform a sacrifice was both to commemorate the adventure of the Titan, the founder of the rite, and to accept its lesson. It was to recognize that through the accomplishment of the sacrifice and all that it entailed—the Promethean fire, the necessity of work and of women and marriage in order to have children, the condition of suffering, old age, and death—Zeus situated man between animals and gods for all time. In the sacrifice, man submitted to the will of Zeus, who made of mortals and immortals two separate and distinct races. Communication with the divine was instituted in the course of a festive ceremonial, a meal recalling the fact that the commensality of former times was no more: gods and men no longer lived together, no longer ate at the same tables. Man could not sacrifice according to the model established by Prometheus and at the same time pretend in any way to equal the gods. The rite itself, the object of which was to join gods and men together, sanctioned the insurmountable barrier that separated them.

By means of its alimentary rules, sacrifice established man in his proper state, midway between the savagery of animals that devour one another's raw flesh and the perpetual bliss of the gods, who never know hunger, weariness, or death because they find nourishment in sweet smells and ambrosia. This concern for precise delimitations, for exact apportionment, closely unites the sacrifice, both in ritual and in myth, to cereal agriculture and to marriage, both of which likewise define the particular position of civilized man. Just as, to survive, he must eat the cooked meat of a domestic animal sacrificed according to the rules, so man must feed on *sitos*, the cooked flour of regularly cultivated domestic plants. In order to survive as a race, man must father a son by union

with a woman, whom marriage has drawn out of savagery and domesticated by setting her in the conjugal home. By reason of this same exigency of equilibrium in the Greek sacrifice, the sacrificer, the victim, and the god—although associated in the rite—were never confused.

The fact that this powerful theology should have its base on the level of alimentary procedures indicates that the dietary vagaries of the Orphics and Pythagoreans, as well as certain Dionysian practices, had a specifically theological significance and constituted profound divergences in religious orientation. Vegetarianism was a rejection of blood sacrifice, which was believed to be like the murder of a close relation; *omophagia* and *diasparagmos* of the Bacchantes—that is, the devouring of the raw flesh of a hunted animal that had been torn to pieces while still alive—inverted the normal values of sacrifice. But whether sacrifice was circumvented, on the one hand, by feeding like the gods on entirely pure dishes and even on smells or, on the other, by destroying the barriers between men and animals maintained by sacrificial practice, so that a state of complete communion was realized—one that could be called either a return to the sweet familiarity of all creatures during the Golden Age or a fall into the chaotic confusion of savagery—in either case, it was a question of instituting, whether by individual asceticism or by collective frenzy, a type of relationship with the divine that the official religion excluded and forbade. Furthermore, although employing opposing means with opposite implications, the normal distinctions between sacrificer, victim, and divinity became blurred and disappeared. The analysis of sacrificial cuisine thus leads to an understanding of the more or less eccentric—sometimes integrated and sometimes marginal—positions occupied by various sects, religious movements, or philosophical attitudes, all of which were at odds both with the regular forms of the traditional cult and with the institutional framework of the city-state and all that it implied concerning the religious and social status of man.

**GREEK MYSTICISM.** Blood sacrifice and public cult were not the only expressions of Greek piety. Various movements and groups, more or less deviant and marginal, more or less closed and secret, expressed different religious aspirations. Some were entirely or partly integrated into the civic cult; others remained foreign to it. All of them contributed in various ways to paving the way toward a Greek "mysticism" marked by the search for a more direct, more intimate, and more personal contact with the gods. This mysticism was sometimes associated with the quest for immortality, which was either granted after death through the special favor of a divinity or obtained by the observance of the discipline of a pure life reserved for the initiated and giving them the privilege of liberating, even during their earthly existence, the particle of the divine present in each.

In this context, a clear distinction must be made between three kinds of religious phenomena during the Classical period. Certain terms, such as *teletē*, *orgia*, *mustai*, and *bakchoi*, are used in reference to all three, yet the phenomena

they designate cannot in any way be considered identical. Despite some points of contact, they were not religious realities of the same order; nor did they have the same status or the same goals.

First, there were the mysteries. Those of Eleusis, exemplary in their prestige and their widespread influence, constituted in Attica a well-defined group of cults. Officially recognized by the city, they were organized under its control and supervision. They remained, however, on the fringe of the state because of their initiatory and secret nature and their mode of recruiting (they were open to all Greeks and based not on social status but on the personal choice of the individual).

Next there was the Dionysian religion. The cults associated with Dionysos were an integral part of the civic religion, and the festivals in honor of the god had their place like any other in the sacred calendar. But as god of *mania*, or divine madness—because of his way of taking possession of his followers through the collective trance ritually practiced in the *thiasoi* and because of his sudden intrusion here below in epiphanic revelation—Dionysos introduced into the very heart of the religion of which he was a part an experience of the supernatural that was foreign and, in many ways, contrary to the spirit of the official cult.

Finally, there was what is called Orphism. Orphism involved neither a specific cult, nor devotion to an individual deity, nor a community of believers organized into a sect as in Pythagoreanism, whatever links might have existed between the two movements. Orphism was a nebulous phenomenon that included, on the one hand, a tradition of sacred books attributed to Orpheus and Musaios (comprising theogonies, cosmogonies, and heterodox anthropogonies) and, on the other, the appearance of itinerant priests who advocated a style of existence that was contrary to the norm, a vegetarian diet, and who had at their disposal healing techniques and formulas for purification in this life and salvation in the next. In these circles, the central preoccupation and discussion focused on the destiny of the soul after death, a subject to which the Greeks were not accustomed.

What was the relationship of each of these three great religious phenomena to a cult system based on the respect of *nomoi*, the socially recognized rules of the city? Neither in beliefs nor in practices did the mysteries contradict the civic religion. Instead, they completed it by adding a new dimension suited to satisfying needs that the civic religion could not fulfill. The goddesses Demeter and Kore (Persephone), who together with several acolytes patronized the Eleusinian cycle, were great figures of the pantheon, and the narrative of the abduction of Kore by Hades, with all its consequences (including the founding of the *orgia*, the secret rites of Eleusis), is one of the basic legends of the Greeks. The candidate had to take a series of steps to attain the ultimate goal of initiation—from the preliminary stage of the Lesser Mysteries of Agrai to renewed participation in the Greater Mysteries at Eleusis, the *mustēs* having to wait until the fol-

lowing year to acquire the rank of *epoptēs*. The entire ceremony (at Athens itself, at Phaleron for the ritual bath in the sea, and on the road from Athens to Eleusis in a procession that followed the sacred objects and included the Eleusinian clergy, the magistrates of Athens, the *mustai*, foreign delegations, and throngs of spectators) took place in full daylight before the eyes of everyone. The archon-king, in the name of the state, was in charge of the public celebration of the Greater Mysteries, and even the traditional families of the Eumolpides and the Kerukes, who had a special relationship with the two goddesses, were responsible to the city, which had the authority to regulate by decree the details of the festivities.

Only when the *mustai* had entered the sanctuary was secrecy imposed and nothing allowed to escape to the outside world. The interdiction was sufficiently powerful to be respected for centuries. But although the mysteries have kept some of their secrets till this day, some points about them can be considered certain. There was no teaching, nothing resembling an esoteric doctrine, at Eleusis. Aristotle's testimony on this subject is decisive: "Those who are initiated have not to learn something but to feel emotions and to be in a certain frame of mind." Plutarch describes the mood of the initiates, which ranged from anxiety to rapture. Such inner emotional upheaval was brought about by the *drōmena*, things played and mimed; by the *legomena*, ritual formulas that were pronounced; and by the *deiknumena*, things shown and exhibited. It is probable that they were related to the passion of Demeter, the descent of Kore into the underworld, and the fate of the dead in Hades. It is certain that after the final illumination at the end of initiation, the believer felt that he had been inwardly transformed. From then on, he was bound to the goddesses in a close personal relationship of intimate connivance and familiarity. He had become one of the elect, certain to have a fate different from the ordinary in this life and in the next. Blessed, asserts the *Hymn to Demeter*, is he who has had the full vision of these mysteries; the uninitiated, the profane, would not know such a destiny after they died and went to the realm of the shades. Although they neither presented a new conception of the soul nor broke with the traditional image of Hades, the mysteries opened the prospect of continuing a happier existence in the underworld. This privilege was available to believers who freely decided to submit to initiation and to follow a ritual course, each stage of which marked a new progress toward a state of religious purity.

On returning home to his family and to his professional and civic activities, nothing distinguished the initiate either from what he had been before or from those who had not undergone initiation—no external sign, no mark of recognition, not even a slight modification in his way of life. He returned to the city and settled down again to do what he had always done with no other change but his conviction that through this religious experience he would be among the elect after his death: for him, there would be light, joy, danc-

ing, and song in the world of darkness. These hopes concerning the hereafter would later be nourished and developed among the sects, which would also borrow the symbolism of the mysteries, their secrecy, and their hierarchical system. But in the city that patronized them, the mysteries became part of the official religion.

At first glance, the status of Dionysism may seem comparable to that of the mysteries. This cult also consisted of *teletai* and *orgia*, initiations and secret rites open only to those who were invested as *bakchoi*. But the winter festivals of Dionysos at Athens—Oschoporia, rural Dionysia, Lenaea, Anthesteria, urban Dionysia—did not form a coherent and self-contained whole or a closed cycle as they did at Eleusis; they were instead a discontinuous series spread throughout the calendar along with the festivals of the other gods and revealing the same norms of celebration. All of them were official ceremonies, fully civic in character. Some of them carried an element of secrecy and required specialized religious personnel, for example, the annual marriage of the queen, the wife of the archon-king, to Dionysos, which was performed in the Boucoleion during the Anthesteria. The Gerarai, a group of fourteen women, who assisted the queen in her role as wife of the god, performed secret rites in the sanctuary of Dionysos in the marshes, but they did this “in the name of the city” and “following its traditions.” The people themselves prescribed the procedures of the wedding and ensured their safety by having them engraved on a stele. Thus the queen’s secret marriage was equivalent to the official recognition by the city of the divinity of Dionysos. It consecrated the union of the civic community with the god and represented his integration into the religious order of the community.

The Thyiads, or Bacchantes, of Athens, women who participated in the orgiastic rites of Dionysos, met their counterparts from Delphi at Mount Parnassus every three years. They performed their secret rites in the name of the city. They were not a segregated group of initiates, a marginal sisterhood of the elect, or a sect of deviants: they formed an official female cult, entrusted by the city with the task of representing it before the Delphians. They operated according to the framework of the cult rendered to Dionysos in the sanctuary of Apollo. There is no evidence of private Dionysian associations that recruited adepts to celebrate secretly a specific cult under the protection of the god in Attica, or even in continental Greece, in the fifth century, as was the case several centuries later with the Iobakchoi. Toward the fifth century, when the city of Magnesia, on the Meander River, decided to organize a cult dedicated to Dionysos, it founded, after consulting Delphi, three *thiasoi* (three official female colleges placed under the direction of qualified priestesses who had come from Thebes especially for that purpose).

What then constituted, in comparison with the other gods, the originality of Dionysos and his cult? Dionysism, unlike the mysteries, did not exist as an extension of the civic

religion. Instead, it expressed the city’s official recognition of a religion that in many ways eluded the city, contradicting it and going beyond its control. It established, in the midst of public life, a religious behavior that displayed aspects of eccentricity in an allusive, symbolic form or in an open manner.

Even in the world of the Olympian gods, to which he had been admitted, Dionysos personified, as expressed so well by Louis Gernet, the presence of the Other. He did not confirm and reinforce the human and social order by making it sacred. Dionysos called this order into question; indeed, he shattered it. In so doing he revealed another side of the sacred, one that was no longer regular, stable, and defined but strange, elusive, and disconcerting. As the only Greek god endowed with the power of *māyā* (“magic”), Dionysos transcends all forms and evades all definitions; he assumes all aspects without confining himself to any one. Like a conjurer, he plays with appearances and blurs the boundaries between the fantastic and the real. Ubiquitous, he is never to be found where he is but always here, there, and nowhere at the same time. As soon as he appears, the distinct categories and clear oppositions that give the world its coherence and rationality fade, merge, and pass from one to the other. He is at once both male and female. By suddenly appearing among mortals, he introduces the supernatural in the midst of the natural and unites heaven and earth. Young and old, wild and civilized, near and far, beyond and here-below are joined in him and by him. Even more, he abolishes the distance that separates the gods from humans and humans from animals.

When the Maenads give themselves over to the frenzy of the trance, the god takes possession of them, subjugating and directing them as he pleases. In frenzy and enthusiasm, the human creature plays the god, and the god, who is within the believer, plays the human. The frontiers between them are suddenly blurred or obliterated in a proximity through which humans are estranged from their daily existence or ordinary life, alienated from themselves, and transported to a distant elsewhere. This contiguity with the divine, accomplished by the trance, is accompanied by a new familiarity with animal savagery. On the mountains and in the woods, far from their homes and from cities and cultivated lands, the Maenads play with serpents and suckle the young of animals as their own, but they also pursue, attack, and tear to pieces living animals (*diasparagmos*) and devour their raw flesh (*omophagia*). Through their eating behavior, they assimilate themselves to wild beasts that—unlike human beings, who eat bread and the cooked meat of ritually sacrificed domestic animals—eat one another and lap up each other’s blood, knowing no rule or law but only the hunger that drives them.

Maenadism, which was limited to women, carried in its sudden outburst two opposing aspects. For the faithful, in happy communion with the god, it brought the supernatural joy of momentary escape to a kind of Golden Age where all

living creatures meet again, mingled like brothers and sisters. However, for those women (and cities) who rejected the god and who had to be constrained by punishment, *mania* led to the horror and madness of the most atrocious of pollutions: a return to the chaos of a lawless world in which maddened women tear apart the bodies of their own children as if the children were animals and devour their flesh. A dual god, combining in his person two facets, Dionysos, as he proclaims in *The Bacchae* of Euripides, is both “the most terrible and the most gentle.”

In order that he may show himself beneficent in his gentleness, Dionysos—whose strangeness, irrepressible exuberance, and intrusive dynamism seem to threaten the stability of the civic religion—must be welcomed into the city, acknowledged as belonging to it, and assured a place beside the other gods in the public cult. The entire community must solemnly celebrate the festivals of Dionysos: for its women, it must organize a form of controlled and ritualized trance within the framework of the official *thiasoi*, promoted public institutions; for its men, an estrangement from the normal course of things in the joyfulness of a revelry consisting of wine and drunkenness, games and festivities, masquerades and disguises; and, finally, it must found the theater on whose stage illusion acquires substance and comes to life and the imaginary is displayed as if it were reality. In each case, the integration of Dionysos into the city and its religion meant installing the Other, with all honors, in the heart of the social establishment.

Ecstasy, enthusiasm, and possession; the joy of wine and festival; the pleasures of love; the exaltation of life in its outpouring and unexpectedness; the gaiety of masks and disguises; the happiness of everyday life—Dionysos can bring all of these if men and cities are willing to recognize him. But never does he come to announce a better fate in the hereafter. He does not advocate flight from the world, nor does he teach renunciation or offer the soul access to immortality through an ascetic way of life. He conjures up the many faces of the Other in this life and world, around us and within us. He opens before us, on this earth and even in the framework of the city, the way of escape toward a disconcerting strangeness. Dionysos teaches or forces us to become other than what we ordinarily are.

Undoubtedly, it was this need to escape, this nostalgia for a complete union with the divine, that—even more than his descent into the underworld in search of his mother, Semele—explains the fact that Dionysos could be associated, sometimes quite closely, with the mysteries of the two Eleusinian goddesses. When the wife of the archon-king went to celebrate her marriage with Dionysos, she was assisted by the sacred herald of Eleusis; and, at the Lenaea, perhaps the most ancient of the Attic festivals of Dionysos, it was the torchbearer of Eleusis who led the invocation taken up by the public: “Iacchos, son of Semele.” The god was present at Eleusis as early as the fifth century and had a discreet presence and a minor role even in those places where he had neither tem-

ple nor priest. He intervened as the figure of Iacchos, to whom he was assimilated and whose function was to preside over the procession from Athens to Eleusis during the Greater Mysteries. Iacchos was the personification of the joyful ritual cry given by the cortege of *mustai* in an atmosphere of hope and festivity. In the representations of a hereafter to which the faithful of the god of *mania* seemed quite indifferent (with the exception perhaps of those in southern Italy), Iacchos was imagined as leading the blessed chorus of initiates in the underworld while Dionysos led his *thiasoi* of Bacchantes on earth.

The problems of Orphism are of another order. This religious movement, in all of its diverse forms, belonged essentially to late Hellenism, in the course of which it took on increasing importance. But several discoveries during the twentieth century have confirmed that Orphism had a role in the religion of the Classical period. Let us begin with the first aspect of Orphism: a tradition of written texts and sacred books. The papyrus of Derveni, found in 1962 in a tomb near Salonika, proves that theogonies from the sixth century may have been known to pre-Socratic philosophers and to have partly inspired Empedocles. Thus Orphism’s principal feature appears from its beginning: a doctrinal form that opposed it to the mysteries and to Dionysian religion, as well as to the official cult, while relating it to philosophy. These theogonies are known to us in many versions, but the basic orientation is the same: they take an opposite view from that of the Hesiodic tradition. For Hesiod, the divine world is organized in a linear progression leading from disorder to order, from an original state of indistinct confusion to a differentiated world organized into a hierarchy under the immutable authority of Zeus. For the followers of Orphism, the reverse was true: in the beginning the first principle, primordial Egg or Night, expresses perfect unity, the plenitude of a self-contained totality. But the nature of “being” deteriorates as its unity is divided and dislocated, producing distinct forms and separate individuals. To this cycle of dispersion there must succeed a cycle during which the parts are reintegrated into the unity of the whole. This is to take place during the sixth generation with the coming of the Orphic Dionysos, whose reign represents a restoration of the One, the recovery of the lost plenitude.

But Dionysos does not just play a part in a theogony that substitutes for the progressive emergence of a differentiated order a fall into division, followed (as if redeemed) by a reintegration into the whole. According to one tale, Dionysos, who had been dismembered and devoured by the Titans, was reconstituted from his heart, which had been preserved intact; the Titans were then struck down by Zeus’s thunderbolt, and the human race was born from their ashes. This story, to which Pindar, Herodotus, and Plato seem to make allusions, is attested in the Hellenistic period. In it, Dionysos himself assumes the double cycle of dispersion and reunification in the course of a “passion” that directly engages the life of humankind since it mythically founds the misfortune of



the human condition and, at the same time, offers mortals the prospect of salvation. Born from the ashes of the Titans, the human race carries as a legacy the guilt of having dismembered the body of the god. But by purifying himself of the ancestral offense by performing rites and observing the Orphic way of life, by abstaining from all meat to avoid the impurity of the blood sacrifice—which the city sanctifies but which recalls for the Orphics the monstrous feast of the Titans—each man, having kept within himself a particle of Dionysos, can return to the lost unity, join the god, and find a Golden Age type of life in the hereafter.

The Orphic theogonies therefore led to an anthropology and a soteriology that gave them their true meaning. In the sacred literature of Orphism, the doctrinal aspect cannot be separated from the quest for salvation: the adoption of a pure life, the avoidance of any kind of pollution, and the choice of a vegetarian diet expressed the desire to escape the common fate of finitude and death and to be wholly united with the divine. The refusal of blood sacrifice was more than just a deviance from common practice, for vegetarianism contradicted precisely what sacrifice implied: the existence of an impassable gulf between humans and gods, even in the ritual through which they communicate. The individual search for salvation was situated outside the civic religion. As a spiritual movement, Orphism was external and foreign to the city, to its rules and to its values.

Its influence was nonetheless exercised along several lines. From the fifth century on, certain Orphic writings seem to have concerned Eleusis, and whatever the differences, or rather the oppositions, between the Dionysos of the official cult and the one of the Orphic writings, assimilation between the two might have occurred quite early. In *Hippolytus*, Euripides suggests such an assimilation when he makes Theseus speak of the young man “playing the Bacchant under the direction of Orpheus,” and Herodotus attributes the interdiction from being buried in woolen clothes to “the cults called orphic and bacchic.” These convergences are not decisive, however, as the term *Bacchic* is not reserved exclusively for Dionysian rituals. The only evidence of a direct encounter between Dionysos and the Orphics, and at the same time of an eschatological dimension to Dionysos, is to be found on the fringes of Greece, on the edges of the Black Sea, in the Olbia of the fifth century. Here, the words *Dionusos Orphikoi*, followed by *bios thanatos bios* (“life death life”), were discovered on bone plates. But, as has been observed, this puzzle remains more enigmatic than enlightening, and in the present state of documentation, its singular character attests to the peculiarities of religious life in the Scythian environment of the colony of Olbia.

In fact, Orphism had two major impacts on the religious mentality of the Greeks during the Classical period. On the level of popular piety, it nourished the anxieties and the practices of the superstitious, who were obsessed with the fear of impurity and disease. Theophrastus, in his *The Superstitious Man*, shows the protagonist going every month to

renew his initiation and discovering, together with his wife and children, the Orpheotelestai. Plato, for his part, described the Orpheotelestai as beggar priests and itinerant holy men who took money for their alleged competence in performing purifications and initiations (*katharmoi* and *teletai*) for both the living and the dead. These marginal priests, who made their way from city to city and based their science of secret rites and incantations on the authority of the books of Musaios and Orpheus, were readily identified as a band of magicians and charlatans who exploited public credibility.

But on another, more intellectual level, the Orphic writings belonged, along with others, to the movement that, in modifying the framework of the religious experience, shifted the direction of Greek spiritual life. Orphism, like Pythagoreanism, belonged to a tradition of outstanding figures with exceptional prestige and powers. From the seventh century on, these “god-men” used their abilities to purify the cities; they have sometimes been defined as representing a Greek version of shamanism. In the middle of the fifth century, Empedocles testified to the vitality of these maguses, who were capable of commanding the winds and of bringing the dead back from Hades and who presented themselves, not as mortals, but as gods. A striking characteristic of these singular figures—who included not only Epimenides and Empedocles but also a number of inspired and more or less legendary missionaries, such as Abaris, Aristreas, and Hermotimos—was that their disciplined lives, spiritual exercises in the control and concentration of their breathing, and techniques of asceticism and recollection of former lives placed them under the patronage, not of Dionysos, but of Apollo, a Hyperborean Apollo, the god of ecstatic inspiration and purifications.

In the collective trance of the Dionysian *thiasos*, the god came down to take possession of his group of worshippers, riding them and making them dance and jump about according to his will. Those who were possessed did not leave this world, but they were made different by the power that inhabited them. In contrast, among the god-men, for all their diversity, it was the human individual who took the initiative, set the tone, and passed to the other side. Thanks to the exceptional powers that he had succeeded in acquiring, a god-man could leave his body, abandoned as if in a cataleptic sleep, and travel freely into the other world, then return with the memory of all that he had seen in the beyond.

This type of man, by the way of life that he had chosen and his techniques of ecstasy, demonstrated the presence of a supernatural element within him, an element foreign to earthly life, a being from another world, in exile, a soul (*psuchē*) who was no longer, as in Homer, a shadow without force or an insubstantial reflection but instead a *daimon*, or “spirit,” a power related to the divine and longing to return to it.

To possess the control and mastery of this *psuchē*, to isolate it from the body, to focus it in itself, to purify it, to liber-

ate it, and by means of it to return to the heavenly place for which the heart still yearns—such may have been the object and the end of the religious experience in this tradition of thought. However, as long as the city-state remained alive, no sect, religious practice, or organized group expressed the need to leave the body and to flee the world in order to achieve an intimate and personal union with the divine. The renouncer was unknown to the traditional Greek religion. It was philosophy that relayed this concept by interpreting in its own terms the themes of asceticism and of purification of the soul and its immortality.

For the oracle of Delphi, “know thyself” meant “know that you are not a god and do not commit the sin of pretending to become one.” For Socrates and Plato, who adopted the maxim as their own, it meant: know the god who, in you, is yourself; try to become, as much as is possible, a likeness of the god.

**SEE ALSO** Dionysos; Fire; Mystery Religions; Omophagia; Orpheus; Shamanism.

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**GREEK RELIGION [FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS].**

The most important religion for Western European scholars attempting to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of religion has long been the Greek. Great historians of religion, from Vico and Herder to Friedrich Max Müller, Jane Ellen Harrison, and Sir James Frazer of *The Golden Bough*, all steeped themselves in the religious legacy of the Greeks, whom they considered superior to all other nations of the past. The study of Greek religion, then, is already several centuries old. The persistent efforts of classicists to collect and analyze the ancient Greek sources—coins, texts, vases, statues, inscriptions, and excavations—have supplied a basis that is more firm and varied than is available for the study of any other ancient religion.

The basic character of Greek religion is clear. Like the other religions of the ancient Mediterranean and Near East, Greek religion was embedded. In other words, there was no sphere of life without a religious aspect. “Church” and “state” were not yet separated, as is the rule in the modern world, with the exception of a number of countries, such as Islamic Iran and Saudi Arabia or the Roman Catholic Philippines. Consequently, there is no Greek term for “religion,” which as a concept is the product of eighteenth-century Europe. This absence also meant that there was no strong distinction between sacred and profane, as became conceptualized only in Western Europe around 1900. The Greeks did not even have a term for “profane,” although they had a relatively large vocabulary for “holy.” The most important term was *hieros*, which is everything that has to do with sacred objects, sacred times, and sacred buildings; in the felicitous formulation of Walter Burkert, *hieros* is “as it were the shadow cast by divinity.” This is also the term that lies at the basis for the Greek word for priest, *hierous*, which is already found in Mycenaean times. At the same time, this “embeddedness” also meant the absence of atheism. People could and did question the existence of the gods, but, unlike in modern times, as an ideology atheism remained unthinkable.

Religion was a public affair. Unlike modern European society, where religion seems more and more to become a matter of the private sphere, Greek cult was always a public, communal activity. Worship outside that framework was suspect, and magic became conceptualized only in the fifth century. Yet there was an enormous difference with the adjacent countries of the Near East. Among the Greeks, religion was not used to support theocracies, as in Babylon or Egypt, or to limit access to the sacred to the aristocracy, as was the case in Rome. In Greece any citizen could bring sacrifices, and there never developed a professional priestly class, like the Israelite priests, the Indian Brāhman̄s, the Celtic Druids, or the Iranian mullahs.

Like Islam, Orthodox Judaism, and Christianity, Greek religion was very much male dominated. The inferior position of women manifested itself in the modest place they occupied in the rituals but also in the fact that women were considered to be more impure than men. Giving birth was

sometimes linked with urinating and defecating as taboos in sanctuaries. Women were denied access to sanctuaries of macho gods and heroes like Poseidon and Herakles, and even statues of goddesses were washed more often than those of male gods.

Unlike Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, Greek religion was polytheistic. However, the gods were not just separate individuals but all belonged to a pantheon that was supported by a Greek city, the polis. Admittedly, the great early poets, such as Homer and Hesiod (both probably living in the seventh century BCE), had created a kind of unity in that all these gods were accepted and recognizable all over Greece. Moreover, important cultural and cultic centers, like Olympia and Delphi, helped to establish a degree of homogeneity in worship. Yet every polis worshiped its own pantheon that, to a certain extent, was unique. In Sicily, for example, Demeter was the most prominent divinity; in Athens, Athena; and on Chios, Dionysos. Moreover, small cities could support only a small pantheon, but a big city like Athens had dozens of sanctuaries with their corresponding divinities. Our model, then, is basically a Panhellenic one, and the investigation of local religion as a reflection of local identity is still in its initial stages.

It was typical of polytheism that its gods covered only a limited area of life. Unlike God, Jehovah, or Allāh they were not loving, omnipresent, or omnipotent. That is why piety never meant devotion to one god but rather the proper performance of religious ritual. As the fourth-century politician Isocrates (7.30) observed: “piety consists not in expensive expenditures, but in changing nothing of what our ancestors have handed down.” Impiety, on the other hand, came closer to our own ideas. It included temple robbery, killing suppliants, and the introduction of religious innovations without the consent of the community. Socrates, for example, was executed on the charge of proposing new gods. Tolerance is not a great virtue of either polytheism or monotheism.

The many gods were also useful in explaining the vicissitudes of life in an age without insurance or social welfare. Dreams, accidents shipwrecks, plagues, and earthquakes—all could be traced to particular gods and thus be given a place in the Greek worldview. And when the known gods failed, there were always the anonymous gods to take their places, in particular when the gods requested a human sacrifice, with which Greek mythology abounds but which does not seem to have been practiced in historical times.

The gods set boundaries that people should not overstep. If they nevertheless did so, the most important consequence was the incurring of pollution. In the Greek world, fear of pollution helped to keep the social and religious order intact, even though purity did not play the same role it does in normative Judaism and Islam. Overstepping the divine boundaries could have even cosmic effects, as the Greeks did not yet separate the human and divine spheres, as in modern Christianity. Grave crimes, like incest or murder, could have

the effect that the gods intervened by sending a plague, as was the case when Oedipus married his mother and Agamemnon offended Apollo's priest Chryses. Pollution was even invoked by the Greeks in cases where modern society would use a rather different kind of vocabulary. Men who practiced passive homosexuality or women who prostituted themselves were considered impure and thus refused entry into sanctuaries.

Like older Judaism, but unlike medieval Christianity and Islam, Greek life was decidedly directed at this life, not that of the hereafter. In fact, the early Greeks had hardly developed a view of the afterlife. This changed in some circles in Classical times, but the percentage of Greeks strongly interested in the destination of their soul always remained small. Moreover, as the Greeks had no *holy* book or dogmas, it was especially in this area that idiosyncratic ideas could flourish. In other areas of life, religion was fairly traditional. Religious education was a "hands-on" business that children received in the family. As they grew up, they were gradually socialized in the festivals and rituals of men and women, which only slowly adapted themselves to changing times. New ideas were long the territory of the poets who did the circuit of aristocratic courts and wove new ideas about the afterlife or unusual themes from the Near East into their poems. For example, in his *Iliad* Homer adapted cosmogonic themes from the great Near Eastern epics *Atrahasis* and *Enuma elish*, and the poet Pindar clearly adapted Orphic (below) views in his first *Olympian Ode*. Yet, on the whole, Greek religion changed only slowly during the archaic and Classical periods (c. 800–300 BCE).

**MYCENAEAN RELIGION.** Mycenaean religion (c. 1400–1200 BCE) is the oldest stage of Greek religion that we can reconstruct with some confidence. The many excavations and the decipherment of the Greek language of the period, the so-called Linear B, enable us to see that many of the Greek divinities already go back to the second millennium. The tablets that survived through the fires that destroyed the palaces in Pylos, Thebes, and on Crete have given us the names of Zeus, Hera, Athena, Artemis, Dionysos, and Hermes, but not Apollo. Even relatively small gods, such as Paiaon and Enyalios, already existed. On the other hand, some divinities did disappear in the course of time. Zeus's wife Diwija and Poseidon's other half Posidaeja no longer existed in the Classical period. As one tablet mentions Zeus, Hera, and "Drimios, son of Zeus," we may also safely accept some kind of Mycenaean mythology; the existence of several Indo-European themes in Classical Greek mythology, such as the kidnapping of Helen, points in the same direction.

Continuity of names, though, is no guarantee for continuity in practices. There are very few cult places that can be demonstrated to have survived as such into Classical times, and the Mycenaean ritual is hard to recover in the absence of detailed descriptions. There is some evidence for the dedication of objects but hardly for burnt offerings. Sanctuaries did not yet have temples, which arrived in Greece only in

the eighth century BCE, although the Linear B tablets mention servants, priests, and priestesses. Unlike Classical times, the sanctuaries were clearly controlled by the palaces and were thus comparable to, if not influenced by, the contemporary Near Eastern states.

**HOMERIC RELIGION.** Homeric religion may have preserved some of these older stages, but scholars have increasingly become reticent in postulating them. Contemporary attention is directed especially toward the influence of the Near East and the function of the gods in the epics. The latter have a clear narrative role in that they help to organize the poems and its plots, but they also create a kind of antiworld in which the gods feast on Olympus free from human toils and troubles and thus emphasize the difference between mortals and immortals. Gods and goddesses can intervene in the human world, even start relationships with them or form special friendships with individual humans, like Athena with Odysseus. Yet they cannot change the natural course of things and save their favorites from death. The gods, too, are subject to Moira, the embodiment of fate.

As poets had to be able to recite and revise the poems of Homer all over Greece, the poems contain few specific ritual names, such as festivals or months, and clearly give a highly stylized picture of contemporary religion. They mention those rituals that were widespread, such as sacrifice, prayer, or the funerary rituals, but leave rites of initiation, which must have been still very much alive in the early archaic period, in the background. On the other hand, they avoid as much as possible mention of rites that later times called magical, and neither do they report those strange details that make studies of local religion often so fascinating. Occasionally, the poets may have even invented rituals, such as the human sacrifice performed by Achilles in honor of his friend Patroclus.

**ARCHAIC AND CLASSICAL RELIGION.** Archaic and Classical religion received its specific "color" from the gods, whose statues were everywhere and whose exploits could be seen on the thousands of vases that ornamented Greek homes. The distinctive nature of a god was determined by various aspects. First, there was his name, which was often further determined by his epithet, a typically Greek habit, although not unknown in Rome too. Some divinities received the epithet from their place of worship, if they dominated that place, such as Apollo Anaphaios (the small Cycladic island of Anaphe), Artemis Ephesia (Ephesus), Demeter Eleusinia (Eleusis), or Herakles Thasios (Thasos). Other epithets indicated the function of the god: Artemis Phosphoros ("Bringer of light, salvation"), Hermes Agoraios ("Of the market"), or Zeus Ktesios ("Protector of possessions"). Second, the myths about the divinities related their families and deeds. The *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, for example, detailed the kidnapping of Persephone by Hades and the ways Demeter responded by instituting the Eleusinian mysteries. The myth thus closely connected Demeter with the institution that glorified her. Myth also told that the goddess Leto had two children, Arte-



mis and Apollo. As all three divinities were connected with initiation, this function probably helped to create their family; at the same time, all three were also closely connected to (southwestern) Anatolia, and their probable geographical origin may have also contributed to their being a family. Art must have helped to visualize the gods. Vases, statues, and mirrors were highly standardized and in this way helped to create a mental image of the gods: Zeus with his lightning, Athena with the owl, and Poseidon with his trident. In addition, all kinds of ritual aspects, such as the place of a divinity's festival in the calendar, the location of the sanctuary, and the nature of the sacrifices received, contributed to the place of the divinity in the community. It was the sum total of all these factors that created the persona of a Greek divinity.

Unlike the Egyptian gods, Greek gods were very much anthropomorphic. Their frivolous adventures were popular themes in Greek poems, and their uncanny behavior was frequently explored in tragedy. Hesiod related their genealogy in his *Theogony*, in which he was heavily dependent on the epics of the ancient Near East. His poem established the classic family relationship in which Zeus and Hera were the leading divinities who, together with their brothers, sisters, and (half-)children, live on Olympus. Later times liked to think of them as a group of twelve, of whom Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, Demeter, Athena, Aphrodite, Apollo, and Artemis are always mentioned, but Dionysos, Herakles, and Hestia less regularly. Their parents Kronos and Rhea were relatively unimportant, as were their grandparents Tethys and the castrated Ouranos; their great-grandmother Gaia is only a shadowy figure. The occurrence of Near Eastern motifs in the *Theogony* makes it likely that this genealogical system is relatively late and almost certainly postdates the Mycenaean era.

The gods have been systematized in various ways. The Greeks themselves opposed the heavenly gods to the subterranean ones, in particular Hades and his wife Persephone, who, due to their inferior position, hardly receive cultic honors. Late antiquity introduced the opposition Olympian and chthonic, which it associated with different altars and types of worship. Yet recent scholarship has increasingly seen that the distinction is not supported by the pre-Hellenistic evidence. That is why we opt for a distinction between "orderly" and "disorderly" or "central" and "ec-centric" gods: gods who support the social order and gods who are more removed from or in opposition to that order.

The most important Greek god was undoubtedly Zeus, one of the few Greek gods with an uncontested Indo-European name. At one point he must have progressed from a position as weather god to the supreme divine ruler. It seems likely that some Anatolian influence played a role, but gods do not exist separate from their worshipers and the mechanics of these shifts in the Greek pantheon (or other *panthea*) are still only dimly understood. It is clear, though, that his promotion to the top took place relatively late, as he had only a few festivals and hardly any months named after him. He never occupied the same position in cult that we can see in the case of Roman Jupiter or Babylonian Marduk.

Just as Poseidon had a wife, Posidaea ("Mrs. Poseidon"), in Mycenaean times, so Zeus's first wife must have been Dione ("Mrs. Zeus"), a goddess later worshiped only at the edges of the Greek world. In Homer, though, Hera is already his permanent wife, even though the relationship is not pictured as a happy one. In the *Iliad*, Hera is jealous and Zeus regularly has to penalize her. The difficult relationship perhaps reflects the ambivalent position of Hera within the social order. On the one hand, she is the goddess who "keeps the keys of wedlock," as Aristophanes says in his *Thesmophoriazusa* (973), but that function seems to have been the consequence of her position as wife of Zeus; her cult as goddess of marriage was certainly Panhellenic but not prominent. An older layer becomes visible in the centers of her worship, Argos and Samos. Here Hera's festivals display strong signs of ancient New Year festivals. Moreover, here she is also closely connected with the coming of age of both boys and girls, who perhaps demonstrated the newly acquired status of adulthood during the New Year festivals. In the course of time this older function receded for the newly found one of goddess of marriage.

The divinity closest to Zeus was Athena, who was born from his head. The myth surely reflects the aspect of intelligence that is prominent in Athena: she is closely connected with women's crafts like weaving and male artisans like the smiths; even the Trojan horse was built by a carpenter under her supervision. Originally, Athena seems to have been a tutelary goddess of cities, which is probably her oldest recoverable layer, as in Mycenaean times she received the title Potnia, "Mistress." Her temple is attested on many an acropolis, the strategic heart of a Greek city. Her statuette, the Palladium, the name of which comes from her still unexplained title, Pallas, functioned as a polis talisman and as such even played a role in Vergil's *Aeneid*. It is not surprising, then, that she often received the epithet Polias or, more literary, Poliouchos. Given this protective role of the city, Athena, like Hera, is also associated with the growing up of the young generation, especially in Athens.

Apollo's name has been tied to the yearly Doric assembly, the *apellai*, in recent decades, but etymological rules and the geographical distribution of his name make this less likely. As he was still absent from the Mycenaean tablets, he probably entered Greece from Lycia, where his mother, Leto, was a highly prominent goddess. His connection with initiation has clearly shaped his divine nature to an extent that is hard to parallel with other gods. Aristocratic male youths had to be able to sing, dance, and play the lyre, and this explains why Apollo was closely connected with these activities. Male initiation also meant the entering of a new stage of life in which political activities were highly important. That is why Apollo is often associated with the center of political institutions of the polis. In this role he is regularly worshiped as Apollo Lykeios or Delphinios; the latter non-Indo-European epithet even strongly suggests that in this capacity Apollo had taken over pre-Greek institutions. Finally, the comple-

tion of the male initiatory ritual was often celebrated in a kind of New Year festival. That is why Apollo was also the god of the new beginning, be it the god of the new moon, the god of purification, the god of healing, or the god of divination, which often made an end to a period of confusion and uncertainty.

Apollo's sister Artemis goes back to a time in which hunting was still of prime importance; witness her title "Mistress of the Animals." Such protecting goddesses were often also initiatory divinities, as was the indeed the case with Artemis. She was in particular associated with the raising of girls at the margin of civilization in areas that were well watered or near rivers or lakes. Their lush nature reflected that of the maturing maidens whose beauty the male Greeks so highly admired. Rather strikingly, these areas were also often border areas, and just as initiates were on the critical border between youth and adulthood, so Artemis also functioned in other decisive moments like the critical phase of a battle, where she was the one to give victory.

If Zeus, Athena, and Apollo were the gods who stood in the center of the Greek polis, other gods were more "off center." Poseidon must once have been a very powerful god, but in the course of the post-Mycenaean age he was displaced by Zeus. He was the ancestor of several tribes and associated with men's associations, such as the pan-Ionic league. This function also connected him to male initiation in some places. Moreover, Poseidon was the god of brute force in men and animals. That is why he was also considered to be the god of earthquakes and such powerful animals as horses. That is also why in more settled times Poseidon's domain was largely relegated to the sea, the area of the marginal fishermen but also the area that was feared by the Greeks because of its dangers and unpredictability.

In many places Poseidon was closely connected with Demeter. The association must go back to an early stage in Greek religion, as is illustrated by Poseidon's metamorphosis into a stallion when Demeter tried to flee from him in the shape of a mare—a type of myth that has clear Indo-European parallels. Poseidon's ancient political side probably explains why at various places Demeter was also connected with political power; she even seems to have been connected with initiation in some places before the rise of the mysteries (below). However, Demeter was celebrated in particular during the festival of the Thesmophoria, the most popular women's festival in ancient Greece. During several days all the women of the community assembled to celebrate this fertility festival, from which men were excluded. The occasional symbolic exclusion from power made men nervous, and they saw to it that the women assembled only in local communities and never in cities as a whole.

If Demeter is certainly "ec-centric," the god of the "anti-order" par excellence was Dionysos. Myth designated him as the stranger among the gods, as it related his arrival from Thrace. Earlier generations of scholars usually interpreted these stories as reflections of a historical development, but

a more recently published Linear B tablet has shown that Dionysos was already worshiped in Mycenaean Crete. Consequently, these myths of arrival are better interpreted as ways of expressing the nature of Dionysos as "stranger" in the Greek world. This aspect of his nature becomes apparent from his festivals, where we can find the split-up of society in its two gender halves, the equality of slaves, or the prominence of the phallus in a procession. In some communities, Dionysos was even associated with human sacrifice (in myth, not reality). In this capacity he was worshiped on Lesbos as Dionysos Omestes, "Eater of Raw Meat." A similar "antisocial" nature appears from Dionysos's mythical followers, the satyrs and maenads. The latter could commit heinous crimes, as Euripides' *Bacchae* so well illustrates. The former showed themselves on the Greek vases in such antisocial activities as masturbation and sex with animals. Dionysos was a more problematic god than the many scenes of him happily drinking suggest.

Other gods were less influential. Hephaestus was the god of the smiths, who seems to have played a more important role in the early archaic period than in later times. His main place of worship was Lemnos, an island where the inhabitants once spoke a language related to Etruscan and that was conquered only in the late sixth century by the Greeks. This means that originally Hephaestus was the god of a pre-Greek population.

Hermes was the messenger of the gods and thus also moved between the upper world and the underworld. In many ways he is the personification of the more marginal persons in ancient Greece, such as the wanderers and the merchants. He was sometimes connected with Aphrodite, the goddess of love, who had a clear background in ancient Near Eastern goddesses like Ishtar. However, this love was not only physical but also political. Aphrodite was often associated with the people as a whole or with smaller councils of magistrates. Her worship supposedly promoted the harmony and unity of those concerned. It is the Near Eastern connection that made her also into a goddess of military affairs, and in several cities her statue was armed. The connection also received expression on a mythological level: Aphrodite was the beloved of Ares, the god of war.

Like Dionysos, Ares was also reputed to come from Thrace to express his outsider position in the Greek pantheon. In Homer, Ares is already closely identified with another war god, Enyalios, but in cult the two remained separated. Ares was the god of the bloodthirsty side of war. This made him an unpopular god who had few cults and whose sacrificial animal, the dog, was not normally eaten at sacrificial banquets.

The gods of the underworld, Hades and his wife, Persephone, mainly had a mythological life. There were no temples for them, and their place in Greek cult was negligible.

In addition to these major divinities there were also smaller ones, like Gaia, ("Earth"), Hestia ("Hearth"), Eirene

(“Peace”), Thanatos (“Death”), Arete (“Virtue”), and other personifications. Yet the Greek pantheon was much smaller than, say, the Hittite or Roman one. The reason for these differences is still unexplored, just as the nature of polytheism and the implications of the difference with monotheism are still largely terra incognita.

On the other hand, we have reached a better understanding of the mutual relations within the pantheon. Although divinities have each their own sphere or mode of action, they can also combine their influence or display their powers in opposition to other gods. For example, the fact that Apollo and Artemis are siblings cannot be separated from their connection with initiation (above). Hera and Aphrodite are both associated with love and marriage, but whereas Hera is responsible for the protection of marriage as such, Aphrodite promotes its sexual part. Ares and Aphrodite were already a pair in Homer. Both divinities were at the margin of the pantheon but also each other’s opposites. There is a Poseidon Hippios and an Athena Hippia. Both divinities are clearly concerned with horses, but whereas Poseidon is responsible for the power and fierceness of horses, Athena is the goddess who gives man the power to use the animal in an intelligent manner. It becomes more complicated when we see that the Athenian ephebes worshiped Ares and Athena Areia. Evidently, Ares was responsible for their courageous behavior in battle, but Athena must have helped them to do this in a strategically intelligent manner. In a different way, myth often told of Poseidon’s defeat by other gods, in particular Apollo and Athena. This shows that Greek gods were not only persons but also embodied powers, as in this case Poseidon’s defeat symbolized the conquest of “chaos” by the powers of order, intelligence, and civilization. Both the aspect of “person” and of “power” should always be taken into account when looking at individual Greek gods.

**HEROES.** It is hard to find parallels to heroes, the “demigods” between gods and men, in other religions. Their origin has been much discussed but rarely with the right attention to an important terminological question. Surely, it is impossible to speak of a hero cult before there was a category of heroes named and conceptualized in opposition to the category of the gods. Unfortunately, this simple truth is rarely taken into account in scholarly literature. Yet the religious meaning of the Greek word *herôs* as “demigod” did not start to materialize before the last decades of the sixth century. In fact, the order gods-heroes-men does not occur in extant Greek literature before Pindar’s *Second Olympian Ode* (2) of 476 BCE, in which the poet wonders: “What god, what hero and what man should we celebrate?” It is not easy to explain this development, but it is clear that in the later sixth century BCE a gradual hardening took place of the division between the main gods of the Greeks and all other (for lack of a better word) supernatural beings worthy of worship. This development was perhaps the result of the growing status of Homer, but as there was no independent authority to decide who belonged where, some heroes stayed hovering on the edge, such

as Achilles and Herakles, whose precise status—hero or god?—remained debated. The development took a long time to materialize fully and should not be retrojected into earlier centuries. In that period we have tomb cults, cults of the ancestors, and cults of founders of cities, but it is only from the late archaic period onward that we start to have hero cults in the technical sense of the word. Consequently, we should avoid speaking of hero cult in the earlier archaic period.

Because of their origin, the category of the heroes turned out to be the lowest common denominator of a motley group of “supernatural beings,” such as faded goddesses like Helen, culture heroes like Prometheus, and mythological supermen like Herakles. In the later fifth century the category became expanded to fallen generals like the Spartan Brasidas, who was killed in action in 422 BCE. As time went on, the Greeks started to connect their great mythological heroes, like Agamemnon and Odysseus, with older graves or grottoes, and scholars have all too long thought that these late connections also implied age-old continuities.

Yet the connection with graves does point to an important quality of the heroes: their local association. Unlike the gods, heroes are nearly always associated with a family, a political or social group, or a city. Many people gave regular greetings and offerings to the shrine of their neighborly hero and clearly expected something positive in return. Armies could see heroes on their side, just as in the First World War German and English soldiers saw angels coming to their assistance. The Locrians even left a gap in their phalanx where Ajax was supposed to defend the ranks. However, heroes could also be nasty and mean. The chorus of Aristophanes’ *Heroes* sings: “we are the guardians of good things and ill; we watch out for the unjust, for robbers and footpads, and send them diseases—spleen, coughs, dropsy, catarrh, scab, gout madness, lichens, swellings, ague, fever [some words missing]. That’s what we give to thieves” (tr. Robert Parker). There is always something ambivalent about the heroes, as there is about the gods.

**RITUAL.** Ritual was the basis of Greek religion, although the all-embracing category “ritual” is a relatively modern invention that originated around 1890. The Greeks did not yet have such a term but called their rituals *teletai* (connected to Greek *telos*, “goal”), *drômena*, “what is done,” or *nomizomena*, “what is customary.” Rituals accompanied the most important stages of Greek lives, such as the birth, coming of age, the wedding, and death, but also political activities, entertainment such as the symposium, divination, or purifications from pollutions. In addition, the Greek year was interspersed with festivals, if more in winter than in summer. In this short compass it is impossible to pay attention to all manifestations of ritual. We therefore just mention hymns, dances, and processions and limit the discussion to a more detailed extension of sacrifice (the most important ritual), to sanctuaries (the places where many of the rituals took place), prayer, and the main women’s festival, the Thesmophoria.

Sacrifices already abound in the oldest literary source, Homer (c. 700 BCE). His preferred victim is the cow, the largest domesticated animal available and the predominant victim in literature and art. Yet after the Dark Age most sacrifices were not of cattle, and smaller animals were the rule for small communities and private sacrifice. As a symbolic statement, cattle remained the preferred animal, and Athenian colonies and allies had to send a sacrificial cow to the festival of the Panathenaia. The next expensive full-grown sacrificial victim was the pig, although it was not the most popular animal in sacrifice. Pigs were not much employed in the great sanctuaries, except perhaps in Cypriot sanctuaries of Aphrodite, and no god was connected with the pig in particular. The main exceptions were Demeter and Dionysos, both divinities in some opposition to the social order, as we have seen. The low appreciation of the pig was not only shared by the Jews, whose abhorrence of the pig is well known, but also by the ancient Egyptians and, later, Islam. It thus fits a larger Mediterranean and Near Eastern phenomenon.

The predominant sacrificial victims were sheep and goats, animals whose bones are often very difficult to distinguish. In the case of Aphrodite, even cheaper offerings were quite normal, and the sacrifice of kids and lambs fits this picture. There were also a number of more marginal animals. Dogs were used for purificatory purposes but not normally eaten, except at the margin of the Greek world, such as Didyma and Cyprus. The Greeks themselves thought of this sacrifice as typical of foreigners, such as Carians and Thracians, and used it to differentiate cruel Ares and spooky Hekate from the more civilized gods. Birds were brought to Aphrodite, and cockerels to Asklepios—both less important gods, whose status reflected itself in the gifts they received. Basically, then, the Greeks selected only domesticated cattle for their sacrifice, and the origin of sacrifice does indeed not seem to go back before the time when cattle became domesticated in the ancient Near East. Yet in Artemis's sanctuary in Kalapodi, excavators have found bones of boars and deer; the latter have also come to light in the Theban Kabirion and the Samian Heraion. In ancient Israel, too, excavations have demonstrated incidental sacrifices of fallow deer. Evidently, there were sometimes fuzzy edges at the boundaries of the accepted sacrificial victims in order to include the most popular game.

In addition to the nature and age of the victim, worshippers also had to make decisions about the sex and color of the victims. In general, male gods preferred male victims, whereas goddesses rather had female ones. Yet this was not a fixed law but rather a rule with notable exceptions, as in the Samian Heraion bones of bulls, rams, and boars have been found. Sacrificial regulations also often specified the color of the victim, black being the preferred color for chthonic deities.

Sacrifice was a festal moment. Victims were adorned with ribbons and garlands around their heads and bellies, and the sacrificers took a bath, put on festive white clothes, and, similarly, wreathed themselves. The Classical period

had clearly dramatized the beginning of sacrifice by the organization of a sacrificial procession. At the front an aristocratic girl (the *kanêphoros*) walked with a beautiful basket on her head, which contained the sacrificial knife covered up by barley groats and ribbons. Male adolescents led along the victim, and a male or female piper played the music indicating the walking rhythm. Music had become such an integral part of the ritual in post-Homeric times that the fifth-century historian Herodotos (1.132) was struck by its absence in Persian sacrifice. Then adult males and females followed in a throng. The whole community played a part in this ritual of rituals. When the actual sacrifice began, the sacrificer purified the participants, the altar, and the sacrificial victim. This inaugural act separated the sacrificial participants from the rest of the population and constituted them as a distinct social group.

After a prayer, the officiant took the knife and cut a few hairs from the brow and threw them in the fire, the beginning of the actual killing. In the meantime, the victim had given its consent by shaking its head. Voluntariness of the victim was an important part of the Greek sacrificial ideology, which stressed that the victim was pleased to go up to the altar, sometimes could even hardly wait to be sacrificed. Obviously, ideology and practice did not always concur, and vases show us ephebes struggling with the victim or the ropes tied to its head or legs in order to restrain it. The participants to the sacrifice now lifted up the (sometimes stunned) victim with its head up high, toward heaven, and a priest or another officiant cut the throat with the sacrificial knife. At this very emotional moment the women present raised their high, piercing cry, *ololyge*, which Aeschylus in the *Seven against Thebes* (269) calls the "Greek custom of the sacrifice cry" (*ololygmos*). Great care was taken not to spill the blood of the victim on the ground. In the Classical period the blood is prominently present on the altars as many vase paintings show—the lasting proof of the otherwise perishable gifts to the gods.

It was now time to skin the victim and carve it up. In addition to the thigh bones, the gods also received some other parts, such as the gallbladder and the tail. In Classical times the gods also seem to have received a share of the innards, *splanchna*, in which the Greeks included the spleen, kidneys, liver, and probably the heart and lungs. These parts of the victim were the first to be eaten. Together with the food, the gods received a libation of mixed wine. The meat was evenly divided between the participants, and egalitarian inclusiveness was very important for the Greeks: for the Jews the purity of sacrifice became an important guardian of monolatrous Yahwism, but foreigners were always invited to partake of Greek sacrifice.

There were also sacrifices where food was absent or on purpose denied to the sacrificial participants. First, the victim could be drowned: the Argives submerged a horse with bridle in the sea for Poseidon, and the Rhodians, wealthy as they were, a chariot with four horses for Helios. These costly

sacrifices must always have been rare, and they seem to go back to great antiquity. Second, there were extremely cheap, purificatory sacrifices, usually piglets, who after the sacrifice were thrown out in order to carry away the pollutions. Piglets were also sometimes used for a preliminary sacrifice, in which case they were burned whole. Third, the Greeks often swore an oath while grasping an object, the *horkos* (which gave its name to the Greek *oath*), embodying the powers invoked; so the gods swore holding a jug with water from the Styx. Four, sometimes a pregnant animal was sacrificed. This happened especially in the cult of Demeter and, seemingly, in some maturation rituals. The victims were probably burned whole, a practice the Greeks had taken over from the Syro-Palestine area. In all these sacrifices the most plausible explanation is that they lacked the required relaxed atmosphere of a good banquet. Banquets were naturally also absent from other emotionally laden sacrifices, such as that just before a battle. On the other hand, epigraphical evidence has increasingly made clear that sacrifices to heroes, the so-called chthonic sacrifices, which many generations of scholars supposed to have been burned whole, normally ended in a happy banquet. The whole notion of chthonic sacrifice, like the one of chthonic gods, is in urgent need of revision. That is not to say that sacrifices for gods were always totally similar to those for heroes. The latter received more often cakes and fruit.

Finally, what did the collective imagination as expressed in myth single out as significant? Hesiod's *Theogony* (535–561) connects the origin of sacrifice with the invention of fire and the creation of woman. In order to settle a quarrel between gods and mortals, Prometheus took refuge in a trick. He let Zeus choose between, on the one hand, the flesh and fatty entrails of a slaughtered bull and, on the other, the white bones covered with glistening fat. Zeus opted intentionally for the bones, and “since then the race of men on earth burn white bones for the immortals on smoking altars.” Hesiod's account locates the origin of sacrifice at the precise moment that gods and mortals were in the process of parting their common ways. Clearly, sacrifice was *the* preeminent act of the “*condition humaine*,” which definitively established and continued the present world order, in which man dies and immortals have to be worshiped.

Sacrifice took mostly place in sanctuaries. Unlike Christian churches, Islamic mosques, or Jewish synagogues, these need not always have been proper buildings. For the Greeks only the presence of an altar was essential, but sanctuaries often had a sacred grove, water for purification, and a temple. Priests were useful but not indispensable, except in the larger sanctuaries. Vases often portray them in white robes, and priestesses often carry a big key, the symbol of their supervision of the sanctuary. In addition to priests, there were also seers, but they were often less officially connected with sanctuaries, even though two seer families officiated in Olympia. Many seers wandered through Greece, and their status was often not very high, with the exception of the military seers

who could rise to great fame through their strategic insights. Instead of seers, many people consulted the main oracles, Delphi and Dodona, which were situated at quite a distance from important cities, as divination had to look objective to be credible. As in many cultures, their function was more to help to make a choice or to set a seal on decisions than to forecast the future.

The temples contained the statues of the gods but also the many votives of the worshipers, ranging from precious golden objects to the anatomical votives of vulvae and phal-luses after a successful healing; in addition they functioned as banks and often received asylum seekers onto their sometimes extensive lands: like the medieval church, some Greek sanctuaries were the largest landowners of ancient Greece.

The location of sanctuaries once again reflected the nature of their gods: Zeus, Athena, and Apollo usually had temples in the center of the polis, Apollo and Demeter were more often located away from the center, and Hera, Poseidon, Artemis, and Dionysos were usually located out of the city. The location of heroic sanctuaries also depended on the place of the hero in the community. For example, if he was the founder of the city, his heroön (sanctuary) would be on the agora in the center of the city, but Trophonios, the owner of an oracle, was worshiped away from the civilized world.

**PRAYER.** Prayer had a place in many rituals and usually followed a standard structure of invocation, claim for attention, and request. Moreover, the earlier Greeks never kneeled for their prayers, like Christians in several churches still do, but they prayed standing erect with hands raised. In principle everybody (man and women, old and young, slaves and free) could pray everywhere—at home, in a sanctuary, or on a ship. However, prayers were often pronounced on behalf of the city or a smaller social group by priests or heralds. Unlike the Christian God, Greek deities were not omnipresent and the worshipers had to call out for their attention. Thus, a prayer often contained the invitations “hear” and “come”; moreover, it was important to mention the name of the divinity and his or her epithet. Yet to be absolutely certain that the right divinity would hear their prayers, worshipers often visited a temple and prayed in front of the deity's statue, often in its very ear. When praying, the Greeks could freely improvise and, unlike Rome or India, they did not have archaic fixed-prayer formulae. In their prayers there was a strong element of reciprocity. The worshiper referred to earlier sacrifices or made a small gift that enlarged the chances of being heard. Unlike Jewish and Christian prayers, Greek prayers therefore rarely contained a feeling of gratitude. What did people pray for? Strangely, very few nonliterary prayers have survived, and our knowledge about the content of Greek prayers is almost exclusively literary. Perhaps in opposition to many modern prayers, the Greeks did not shrink from praying that the worst might befall their enemies, but they certainly mostly prayed for their own good. Unlike modern Christian attitudes, they would rarely pray for others, and Herodotos (1.132) expresses amazement about the



fact that the Persians prayed for the well-being of their king. Finally, although Christians, Jews, and Muslims often pray aloud in public or religious services, silent prayers are perhaps the norm for the modern individual. In Greece praying aloud was the norm, but antisocial and magical prayers were probably performed in silence.

**FESTIVALS.** Festivals were the main religious occasions at which the community (the city but also subdivisions of the city and the family) manifested itself. Festivals derived their names from the most striking parts of the festivities, such as the Plynteria from the “washing” of a statue, or from the names of the gods, such as the Kronia, the festival for Kronos. In turn, months often took their names from the festivals, such as the Ionian month Anthesterion from the name of the festival Anthesteria. As with Greek religion in general, local calendars regularly differed, and festivals could change places in the calendar in the course of history.

There were several types of festivals. Some were connected with the rites of initiation, such as the Spartan Hyakinthia and Karneia or the Cretan Ekdysia. In these festivals the youths of the cities demonstrated their prowess or beauty. Others celebrated New Year, everywhere an important festival and perhaps in Greece even influenced by those of the ancient Near East. In Athens it can best be seen as a complex that lasted for three months. In the penultimate month of the year, Thargelion, the so-called scapegoat ritual purified the city; in the ultimate month, Skirophorion, several festivals took place away from the political center, the acropolis; and the first festival of the first month of the new year, Hekatombaion, was the Kronia, in which the social order was reversed, as slaves and masters dined at equal footing. The celebration of the city’s foundation in the Synoikia and the Panathenaia, Athen’s most prestigious festival, reestablished the social, political, and religious order. Festivals, then, were often related to one another, and a proper study should always look at the whole festive cycle.

The most important women’s festival was the Thesmophoria, a three-day festival for Demeter. The exclusive female participation made the festival somewhat suspect in male eyes, and several stories told of males spying on the women during the rituals. Male suspicion probably also meant that in Athens the women could not celebrate their festival in one sanctuary but only separately in the demes. Its “ec-centric” character was indicated by several oppositions with normality. The women did not live in houses but in huts, slept on antaphrodisiac plants, and sacrificed pigs, whereas as a rule the males were the sacrificers in Greece. On the second day Athens suspended court sessions and council meetings; other places in Greece may well have done the same. There probably also was ritual fasting, sham fights, and indecent speech on this day. After all this “abnormal” behavior, women returned to “normality” on the third day. On this last day, which was called Kalligeneia, “Beautiful birth,” the women fetched the decayed remains of piglets from subterranean pits and placed them on altars as future manure. As the festival

took place at sowing time, the women clearly celebrated human and agricultural fertility at the same time.

**MYSTERIES.** Mysteries originally was the name of the festival celebrated in the sanctuary of Demeter outside Eleusis in the month Boedromion in early autumn. From there the Greeks applied the name also to cults with a related structure, such as the cults of the Kabeiroi in Thebes and of the Megaloi Theoi of Samothrace. Unfortunately, it was a characteristic of the mysteries, and hence our use of the term, that the initiates were not allowed to divulge the secrets of the rites. The Eleusinian sanctuary dates from the late eighth century BCE, and the widespread occurrence of Demeter Eleusinia in Ionia and the Peloponnese demonstrates an early popularity of her cult. The combined evidence of the Peloponnesian and Ionian cults does point into the direction of an initiatory cult of an aristocratic family; iconographic evidence from the sanctuary of the Theban Kabeiroi points in the same direction. Apparently, the ritual became restructured and reinterpreted after the disintegration of the archaic puberty rites at the end of the seventh century, as the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (c. 650 BCE) is evidently related to the Eleusinian mysteries. However, without corroborating evidence it is impossible to reconstruct the mysteries from the *Hymn*. It is only in Christian times that former pagans start to communicate the details that give us an impression of what happened in that era; whether we can retroject these details into Classical times remains a matter of debate. The earlier Eleusinian mysteries very much remain a mystery.

The main rituals started with a procession from Athens to Eleusis along the still existing Sacred Way. After preparatory rites of purification and fasting, the climax took place in the Telesterion (“House of rituals”), which survived well into Roman times. It was a fifty-one-square-meter roofed building that evidently cannot have held that many initiates at the same time. At night, light effects must have played a role, and texts suggest a plurality of emotions. The high point seems to have been the moment when the hierophant showed a “single harvested ear of grain” and shouted out at the top of his voice: “the Mistress has given birth to a holy child, Brimo to Brimos,” as the Church Father Hippolytus informs us. The ear must have been symbolic of the gift of corn, which the Athenians had associated with the mythological Eleusinian king Triptolemus. In the heyday of the Athenian empire the Athenians evidently claimed the invention of agriculture, which for the Greeks signaled the arrival of the present cultural order. After the decline of the empire, the emphasis of the mysteries shifted to eschatological promises: the Eleusinian priests were clever entrepreneurs who kept their mysteries moving with the times.

The relative late rise of eschatology as an important motif in the mysteries is also confirmed by its absence from the mysteries of Thebes and the islands Lemnos and Samothrace. In the latter, we can see a triad of two males with a Great Goddess. Its geographical location and the details of the ritual point to a pre-Greek background in the world of

initiation and men's societies, which on the island of Lemnos seems to have developed into a society of smiths and their god Hephaestus. Both on Lemnos and in Thebes remnants have been found of wine amphorae suggesting communal drinking rituals, but on Samothrace the emphasis seems to have been reoriented to salvation at sea.

The immediate success of the Eleusinian mysteries may well have been the stimulus for the development of a different type of mysteries that were not tied to one particular sanctuary. From about 500 BCE we hear of Bacchic mysteries that were propagated by what Plato and Theophrastus call Orpheotelestai, "Initiators of Orpheus." These wandering priests and priestesses apparently initiated people, men and, it seems, especially women, against payment into small cultic groups that practiced the Dionysiac ecstasy but presented their views under the aegis of Orpheus, who at the time was the most famous Greek singer. Orphism presented an origin of humankind, whereas traditionally the Greeks had very few anthropogonic myths. It also had developed a view of an attractive afterlife that had been absent so far in Greek religion and that eventually would influence Jewish and Christian ideas of the afterlife. Moreover, it developed the idea of a kind of "original sin" by stating that Dionysos had been murdered by the Titans, our ancestors. In order to atone for this murder the Orphics had to live a life of purity and to practice vegetarianism. Only in this way they would be acceptable to Persephone.

Recent decades have given us not only a new papyrus with a commentary on an Orphic cosmogony (the Derveni papyrus), but also a number of the so-called Orphic gold leaves, minute tablets that were, so to speak, passports to the underworld and taught the deceased how to behave when meeting Persephone. Unfortunately the literary evidence for the Bacchic mysteries is rather poor, and it remains virtually impossible to reconstruct the rituals of these mysteries in any detail and with any certainty. It seems that we must reckon with a whole spectrum of local varieties, but unless new evidence turns up we will remain groping in the dark for these Bacchic mysteries despite our increased knowledge of Orphism.

**PHILOSOPHY.** Philosophers started to question the traditional views of Greek religion from about 500 BCE. They give us a valuable insider view of what intellectuals thought of the traditional myths, rituals, and cosmological and cosmogonical concepts. Xenophanes of Colophon (on the west coast of modern Turkey) no longer accepted tradition but propagated "what is fitting." He radically polemicized against the leading poets Homer and Hesiod and questioned the anthropomorphic form of the gods by pointing out that the Thracians and Ethiopians imagined their gods to look like themselves. He did not do away with the gods, though, but already tried to reduce the number of gods by claiming "One god is greatest among god and men." Misgivings about traditional polytheism were clearly in the air, since Orphism, according to the Derveni papyrus, stressed the position of

Zeus: "Zeus is the head, Zeus the middle, through Zeus all things come to pass." Pythagoras, their contemporary, went even further. His prescriptions meant the first total break with traditional Greek lifestyle, and gods hardly seem to have played a role in his teachings. Nor did ritual come away unscathed, as Heraclitus of Ephesus attacked purification rituals and praying before the statues of the gods, as if one could converse "with houses," as absurd.

The seeds of these philosophies came to fruition in the second half of the fifth century through the so-called Sophists. These wandering teachers exercised a great fascination on the Greek *jeunesse dorée*, and their influence can hardly be exaggerated. Among them, Prodicus from the island of Keos introduced a completely new view about the gods by claiming that "primitive man, [out of admiration, deified] the fruits of the earth and virtually everything that contributed to his subsistence." In other words, the gods had not been there all along as immortal beings, but they were the product of human imagination. Protagoras of Abdera even went further and stated that we cannot have any certain knowledge about the gods. It is not surprising that atheistic positions now became debated in Athenian tragedy, even if preferentially through the mouth of young males, not sensible older men.

With Plato these tendencies became part and parcel of the enlightened Greeks. He rejected the teachings about the gods by the poets and traditional piety. The divine adulteries, their fantastic genealogies, the gods as the causes of our evils—all that is fit only for children and old women, according to Plato. Equally, the thought that prayers or sacrifices could influence the gods without a corresponding proper moral behavior is completely rejected. God is now proclaimed to be absolutely good, but also without lies, always the same, without envy, omnipresent, that is, an intellectually satisfactory but bloodless being that is so much above us that it is hard to speak about him with any certainty. In his *Timaeus* Plato even introduced a creator god, an idea totally alien to traditional Greek religion. These ideas transformed the ways people would think about religion. Greek rituals may still have been practiced for many a century, but the traditional views of Greek religion would never recover from the attacks of the Greek philosophers.

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JAN N. BREMMER (2005)

**GREGORY I** (c. 540–604), called the Great, was bishop of Rome from 590 until his death, and one of the most remarkable figures to occupy the Roman see. Gregory was born into a landowning, aristocratic Roman family; he was related to popes Agapetus I (r. 535–536) and Felix III (r. 483–492). There is no direct evidence about his early life and education, but his correspondence, the main historical source, suggests that he received sound legal training and acquired wide experience in the management of landed estates. Gregory's own testimony relates that he spent some years in a public career as prefect of the city of Rome. Although one must assume that his education brought him into contact with Latin classical authors, there are few echoes of their works in Gregory's writings; in this he was very different from Jerome and Augustine. What is known about his origins suggests a pious family background in which Christian authors and values prevailed.

During his term as prefect he apparently felt called to become a more perfect Christian by embracing the monastic life. He speaks of having delayed his "conversion" for a long time. When the decision was finally made—probably after his father's death—he established a monastery dedicated to Saint Andrew in his paternal home, where he gathered a community and appointed an abbot, and where he himself lived, by his own choice, as a monk. Despite the traditional view that Gregory was a Benedictine monk, it is by no means certain that the rule of Saint Benedict governed the life of this new monastic house.

Gregory's skills as administrator and negotiator were too widely known to be eclipsed by his entry into seclusion. Pelagius II was no sooner elected bishop of Rome (r. 579–590) than he summoned Gregory from his monastery, ordained him deacon, and sent him as papal representative (*apocrisarius*) to Constantinople. Gregory apparently accepted this mission on the condition that he could take monks from Saint Andrew's with him and set up a quasi-monastic household in the imperial city. Gregory remained in the East until about 586, when he returned to Rome to resume his monastic life and to assist and advise Pelagius II, even drafting some of the pope's later letters.

Without much delay, and without waiting for the imperial consent, the Senate, clergy, and populace elected Gregory bishop of Rome after Pelagius's death in 590. Later tradition maintained that Gregory fled the city to avoid this burden

but was captured after three days and brought back. Gregory always lamented the imposition of this heavy burden, which deprived him of his "beloved solitude," but he continued to view himself as a monk and aimed to set up his household, as at Constantinople, in the form of a small community made up of monks and clerics who would live together and share all things in common.

The fourteen years of Gregory's pontificate (590–604) are well documented, particularly on the strength of his correspondence, which depicts a man who showed a superb command of estate and personnel management and from whom emanated good sense, moderation, and tact, allied to shrewd, businesslike efficiency. He was fully conversant with the laws of the imperial code but could temper them with goodwill and humanity. He exhibited a firmness allied to fairness that was in the best Roman tradition. These qualities were constantly at play in Gregory's attempts to introduce greater order and efficiency into the administration of the patrimony of Peter (the possessions held by the church of Rome not only in Italy and Sicily but also in Gaul, Africa, and elsewhere), and in his handling of the affairs of dioceses and monasteries, and ecclesiastical disputes of all kinds. The correspondence also gives rise to the impression that in becoming bishop of Rome Gregory was in fact assuming again some of the duties of the prefect of Rome, concerning himself with food and water supplies, appointing commanders and paying for troops, and taking a leading role in negotiating truces and treaties with the threatening Lombard invaders. Although there had been previous occasions when popes assumed leadership of the city of Rome, particularly in crisis, Gregory's pontificate is the first and best example of ecclesiastical authority replacing, throughout the machinery of government, the political power of a declining state.

Here and there in his letters a note of rigor and acerbity emerges perhaps native to the Roman patrician and professional administrator, but for the most part these elements were held in check by Gregory's reverence for the gospel teaching of humility and charity, in whose light he constantly examined and formed his own conduct. His preoccupation with saving souls and helping the poor is ever present. John the Deacon, Gregory's biographer, refers to a "very large papyrus volume" (the first of its kind to be drawn up by a bishop of Rome), in which Gregory, with his usual efficiency, caused all pensions, rent reductions, subsidies, and charitable outlays to be recorded so that none would be forgotten or overlooked in future years. Gregory's concern for the good of souls likewise appeared in missionary activities directed toward heretics or pagans, the most noteworthy being his sending, in 596 and 601, groups of monks from his own monastery, under the leadership of Augustine, to evangelize the Anglo-Saxons.

Despite the incessant preoccupations of his years as bishop of Rome, and despite a debilitating malady that seems to have afflicted him for years, Gregory consistently found time to pursue the activity that lay nearest his heart, namely,

to study and interpret holy scripture for the group of close associates with whom he lived, in an effort to bring out its hidden meaning as a guide for moral life. Gregory had begun such a discourse, on the *Book of Job*, during his stay at Constantinople. In the period between his return to Rome from the East (586) and his election as bishop (590), he reorganized these spontaneous discourses into book form. The result was the vast *Magna moralia in Job*, a work in thirty-five books divided into six codices, which had a lasting influence on the whole Middle Ages. During the first years of his pontificate he discoursed in church and before the people not only on the gospel lessons of the day but also on the opening and final chapters of *Ezekiel*, chapters that seemed particularly relevant in those grim years when events seemed to presage the end of the world. However, he found talking to a large audience in church a trying experience that overtaxed his health. After his first years as pope he gave up the practice, but continued to discourse to a smaller group of intimates. He himself listed the books on which he spoke: *Proverbs*, *Song of Songs*, the books of the prophets, *Kings*, and the *Hep-tateuch*. Only the commentary on *1 Kings* and two homilies on *Song of Songs* are extant.

In addition to his scriptural works and his letters, Gregory also wrote a book of dialogues (between himself and his deacon Peter), recounting the miracles performed through God's power in Italy in his own time. The aim of this work was to revive the religious faith of the Roman people, beset at that time by war, plague, and famine. The second book of the *Dialogues* is devoted entirely to one figure, Benedict, the founder of Monte Cassino and author of the Benedictine rule; it embodies the earliest traditions about Benedict, including stories gathered by Gregory from Benedict's own disciples.

His *Regula pastoralis* (Pastoral rule), probably the best known and most used of Gregory's works in the Middle Ages, was the first work of his pontificate. No sooner had he been consecrated in 590 than he set about constructing a standard of conduct for the ideal shepherd of souls. In this one can perhaps perceive an attempt to redefine his own insights as a skilled administrator and negotiator on a level higher than that of practical affairs; that is, on a universal, spiritual plane. Gregory always maintained that if bishops lived up to their true ideal the church of Christ, spread throughout the world, would prosper. In writing the *Regula pastoralis* he sought to instruct himself as well as others.

As the years of his pontificate proceeded, Gregory continued to reflect on the implications of his position as bishop of Rome, a see that claimed preeminence in the church over all other sees, including those that were also patriarchal. Here he reached views that differ markedly from those that later formed the traditional papal attitude. Gregory sought to limit the Roman claim to what he considered its essential elements. He believed that a supreme authority was needed in the church, but only so that things might be put right if they went wrong; if simony were practiced in Gaul or in Alexan-

dria, it was his duty to remonstrate, "but when fault does not intervene, we [bishops] are all equal by reason of humility." Gregory was tireless in underlining the danger of pride and the need for humility in those who govern the church. For this reason, he rejected the title of ecumenical patriarch, not only when applied to the patriarch of Constantinople but also for himself. Ecumenical means universal, and he who is universal has no rivals in rank; on that level, others have no standing. Therefore, he wrote to his friend Eulogius, patriarch of Alexandria, "you deny your own standing as bishop when you assert that I am universal as bishop and pope." On the level of custom and usage, including liturgical usage, Gregory did not believe that the Roman see held any monopoly of good things. It is here that he contrasts most markedly with his predecessor Innocent I, who maintained that all the churches in the West needed to follow Roman usage. Gregory's legal training had familiarized him with customary law, and he had observed that good things might be found everywhere. "We should love places because of the good things they possess and not things because of the places from which they come," he wrote to Augustine of Canterbury in his so-called *Libellus responsionum*, urging him to borrow liturgical usages from Gaul as well as from his native Rome for the newly converted Anglo-Saxons. Such a statement fitted into Gregory's larger view that claims to monopoly were detrimental to charity, which was fostered by diversity and interchange. Diversity on the level of custom was allowable and even desirable, as long as unity was always maintained in Christian faith. The medieval papacy would have evolved very differently if Gregory's precepts in these matters had prevailed.

It is now recognized that Gregory the Great had relatively little to do with the sacramentary or with the chant that still bears his name. He unquestionably composed certain prayers and prefaces that eventually found their way into the Roman sacramentary, but these are limited in number, a total of 82 out of 927 formulas. The liturgical traditions associated with Gregory's name go back to Carolingian times and derive from Gregory II rather than Gregory the Great.

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The view that there was little originality in Gregory's spiritual teaching has been dispelled by numerous recent studies. A pioneer effort is Michael Frickel's *Deus totus ubique simul: Untersuchungen zur allgemein Gottgegenwart im Rahmen der Gotteslehre Gregors des Grossen* (Freiburg, 1956), which demonstrates that Gregory's special vocabulary could provide a key to his thought; his temperament was introspective by nature, and his originality lies mainly in exploring the inward dimensions of Christian behavior. For Gregory's motives in sending missionaries to England, see Robert A. Markus's “Gregory the Great and a Papal Missionary Strategy,” *Studies in Church History* (Cambridge U.K.) 6 (1970): 29–38, and “Gregory the Great's Europe,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series 31 (1981): 21–36. On the authenticity of the *Libellus responsionum* connected with this mission, see my essays “Diversity within Unity, a Gregorian Theme,” and “Bede's Text of the *Libellus responsionum* of Gregory the Great to Augustine of Canterbury,” in my *Bene-*

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Gregory was the only pope to win the admiration, even the affection, of some Protestant reformers; see the references in L. K. Little's “Calvin's Appreciation of Gregory the Great,” *Harvard Theological Review* 56 (April 1963): 145–157, and my “Gregory the Great and the Theme of Authority,” in *Benedict, Gregory, Bede and Others* (cited above).

PAUL MEYVAERT (1987)

**GREGORY VII** (Hildebrand, c. 1020–1085), pope of the Roman Catholic Church (1073–1085). The facts of Hildebrand's youth and education are hazy. He was born in Tuscany, perhaps at Soana, at an undetermined date: c.1015 according to Cowdrey; Blumenthal says 1020/1025. He went to Rome early in his life and became a professed religious. The tradition that Hildebrand was a monk, perhaps at the Benedictine house of Santa Maria del Priorato on the Aventine, is strong, although recently Blumenthal suggested that he was instead a regular canon. For a time he was a student of the learned and exiled Bishop Laurentius of Amalfi, and also was active in the service of Pope Gregory VI (1045–1046), with whom he had a familial connection. In January 1047, Hildebrand accompanied this pontiff into exile in Germany, after Gregory's deposition by Emperor Henry III and the Synod of Sutri (December 1046). That exile is the first precisely datable event in the future pope's life. A later tradition that Hildebrand became a monk at Cluny almost certainly is erroneous, although he may well have stayed in that house for a time before his return south. That return occurred in the company of Bishop Bruno of Toul, who in 1049 journeyed to Rome to become Pope Leo IX (1049–1054).

Leo's pontificate is generally considered to mark the emergence of a reform movement centered on Rome and which became predominant among other initiatives for renewal in the eleventh-century church. Pope Leo brought to Rome a group of reform-minded churchmen from both Italy and the north, and Hildebrand's career developed in conjunction with important individuals such as Peter Damian and Humbert of Moyenmoutier. He was designated by Leo as abbot and rector of the Benedictine house of San Paulo fuori le Mura, and his importance in the evolving administrative operations of the church is seen in his appointment several times in the 1050s as a papal legate north of the Alps. During one such legation, in 1054 in France, Hildebrand presided over a synod at Tours that considered the question of the eucharistic views of Berengar of Tours, whose career would stretch into the 1070s and who would be called to Rome during Gregory's pontificate for an examination of his teachings. It would be a mistake to view Hildebrand as the chief papal adviser at this juncture, but with appointment as

archdeacon under Nicholas II (1059–1061), and with the death of Humbert and the election of Alexander II in 1061, his importance grew. During Alexander's long reign he has been considered, perhaps with only slight exaggeration, as the power behind the papal throne.

Alexander II died on April 21, 1073. During the ceremony for his burial Hildebrand was acclaimed by the Roman populace as Alexander's successor. That public display was at variance with the terms of the well-known decree of Pope Nicholas II (1059), which placed the choice of a pope essentially in the hands of the cardinal bishops. In the spring of 1073 public acclaim preceded selection by the cardinals, and this variance with the decree of 1059 later opened Hildebrand to the charge that his elevation to the papacy was illegitimate. He chose the papal name Gregory, probably in honor both of Gregory I, one of the fathers of Latin Christianity and a venerable monastic pope, and of his relative and onetime patron, Gregory VI. Gregory's consecration as bishop of Rome was on June 30, 1073, a date carefully selected for it is the feast day of the two great saints of the Roman church, Peter and Paul.

The significance of Gregory VII's twelve-year reign must be assessed within the framework of the reforming movements underway at the time throughout Latin Christendom. For decades sensitive churchmen had criticized abuses in religious structure and administration. Chief among those problems was simony, the gaining of an ecclesiastical office by means of payment rather than according to canonical norms. Various circles of ecclesiastical reform in the eleventh century were also adamant in condemning sexual incontinence among the higher orders of the clergy. The offensive against simony and clerical sexual activity marked an effort to purify the hierarchy and the sacramental life of the Latin church, and the notion of *puritas ecclesiae* ("purity of the church") became a common reform theme.

From the pontificate of Leo IX, however, and especially from the reign of Nicholas II, the papacy was increasingly in a position of leadership in these efforts to purify the church. Repeatedly, in papal letters, conciliar decrees, and through legatine missions, the Roman church fostered reform, aiming particularly at eradicating the aforementioned abuses. It must be stressed, however, that these initiatives did not involve merely administrative changes in the ecclesiastical structure. The theological and practical importance of the changes being sought reached deep into the religious mentality of Latin Christendom, and had profound effects on eucharistic theology, the cult of saints, attitudes toward property, and the role of laymen in designating appointees to church positions. Concomitant with this evolving reform activity an ecclesiology developed centering on the Roman see. The roots of this doctrine reach deep into the history of Latin Christianity, but from the mid-eleventh century the potential and the prerogatives of the Roman church gained increased attention as reform progressed.

Reform of the church in general and increased visibility and power for the Roman church occurred side by side. This new perception of Roman authority was not, however, the invention of eleventh-century thinkers. The dossiers of claims, traditions, and incidents on which Roman leadership rested reach as far into the past as the New Testament and the so-called Petrine passages (*Mt.* 16:13–19). Popes such as Leo I, Gelasius I, and Gregory I were pivotal figures in antiquity who advanced claims that contributed to the special status of the Roman church and its bishop; and in the ninth century Pope Nicholas I was a vigorous proponent of those claims and that status. Yet in the eleventh century from the reign of Leo IX onward the uniqueness and the authority of Rome was stressed increasingly and with new vigor. As the reformers, now in control of the papal office, sought to promote their aims, the prestige and potential of the Roman church became a vehicle for this strategy. As the reform progressed the theoretical authority believed for centuries to be vested in the Roman church became increasingly real, and attention was given in practice as well as theory to the rights and powers of Rome, its clergy, and its bishop.

Such was the general situation confronting Gregory VII at the beginning of his reign. Given his long association with papal reform, it was to be expected that the initiatives for purity in the church would continue. Yet these policies, along with the pope's strong personality and intense devotion to the Roman church, were on a collision course with events growing out of the final years of the pontificate of Alexander II. King Henry IV of Germany, having reached maturity, was determined to exercise control over affairs within his sphere of influence. At issue specifically were claims to authority in both secular and church matters in important cities in northern Italy, especially in Milan. Thus in the early 1070s Henry supported one candidate for the archbishopric of that city while the papacy supported another. There were two questions. Did Henry have a right to grant churches on his own, to whomever he chose; and could Henry ignore directives about ecclesiastical matters from the Roman church and its bishop?

Historians are fortunate to possess from Gregory VII an official papal register—a unique survival from the eleventh-century papacy—in which the development of events and ideas often can be followed in detail. In the register, under March, 1075, appears a series of twenty-seven epigrammatic statements that were drafted by Gregory and his advisers (the so-called *Dictatus papae*), perhaps as titles for a new canon law collection where texts would have been presented from the canonical tradition to support each proposition. The unusual form and special content of these texts has received much attention from historians, for contained therein is a series of strong statements asserting the superiority of ecclesiastical over secular authority, and the absolute authority of the Roman church and its bishop over all churches and bishops. Here is found, for example, in number 12, the statement that the pope may depose emperors, and in number 27, the claim

that the pope may absolve subjects of unjust men from their fealty. From the outset of his reign, therefore, Gregory VII was concerned not only to advance policies to bring about *puritas ecclesiae*, but also, as part of a larger plan, he was eager to define and command obedience to the policies of the Roman church.

The decade between 1075 and Gregory's death in 1085 saw the genesis and development of a church-state controversy between Gregory and Henry that would outlive both leaders. Issues arose about the interaction of the ecclesiastical and secular realms of society that would be debated for centuries. Gregory maintained that he had the right to remove Henry's kingship and to release his subjects from their oaths of loyalty. Henry, on the other hand, claimed that he reigned by the grace of God, not of the pope, and that he possessed the right to control the churches in his realm. Because of what he saw as the indefensible novelty of Gregory's positions he condemned him as a "false monk" and usurper of the papal throne. The battle extended beyond rhetoric and exchanges of letters. In 1076 Gregory excommunicated Henry and forbade him to exercise his royal duties. After a period of complicated diplomatic maneuvering, however, in the early 1080s Henry invaded Italy, drove Gregory from Rome into Norman territory in the south, and installed in his place another pontiff, the so-called antipope, Clement III (Archbishop Wibert of Ravenna). The controversy offers historians compelling vignettes such as the famous episode that occurred in January, 1077, at Canossa in northern Italy. At this crucial stage of the dispute Henry, beleaguered in both Germany and Italy, presented himself to Gregory as a penitent, parading barefoot in the snow to seek forgiveness from the pope. After watching that performance from within the castle for three days, Gregory forgave Henry, and lifted the sentence of excommunication (but probably did not intend to reinstate him as king). What political advantage was gained or lost on each side has been much debated, but Gregory's action in forgiving Henry was the response of a pastor of souls and not of a power-crazed fanatic.

The prohibitions that Gregory formulated against laymen investing individuals with bishoprics and abbeys have been accorded a great deal of attention. In fact, the term Investiture Conflict has sometimes awkwardly been applied to the entire eleventh-century papal reform movement, with the controversy about lay investiture, especially in the German empire, wrongly seen as the cornerstone of Gregory's policy to promote reform. Gregory's decree against lay investiture was probably issued first not in 1075 as once was assumed but only in 1078. The transmission of these rulings must be closely examined to determine the extent to which they were promulgated and applicable at different points throughout Latin Christendom, for the programs of the reformers were not disseminated everywhere in the same manner.

An assessment of Gregory's policies must be given within the general history of the eleventh-century reform and

from the perspective of his fascination with and devotion to the Roman church and the papal office. From that perspective the events and the turmoil of his reign appear as outcroppings of a desire to continue the reforming work of his predecessors, and also to establish what he deemed to be the proper order of Christian society. Using the Bible as his chief source, and infused with religious fervor and a deep sense of Roman ecclesiastical possibilities, Gregory believed that the whole world ought to be subject to the leadership of the church, for churchmen were responsible for promoting the kingdom of God on earth and would be held accountable for human souls on judgment day. It was Peter, the founder of the Roman church, to whom Christ gave supreme authority over the terrestrial church, and thus Peter's vicar, the bishop of Rome, was to be obeyed as the supreme authority on earth and must be prime in both ecclesiastical and secular domains. Both realms—the secular (*regnum*) and the religious (*sacerdotium*)—should attend to its own proper duties, but by seeking to do God's will under the headship of the church and ultimately under its chief bishop.

No less than laymen, Gregory expected churchmen to be loyal devotees of Peter and his vicar. The papal office, furthermore, was an awesome responsibility. Gregory believed that it was his divinely enjoined duty not only to protect the church from the stain of abuses such as simony, but also to free it from every distraction that would impede the performance of God's work in the world. The desire for *puritas* blended into a drive for the liberty of the church (*liberts ecclesiae*). It often was necessary, consequently, to instruct and admonish all sectors of society about their duties in the world, and about proper reverence for and obedience to Peter and his successors. Gregory prohibited lay investiture, promoted closer ties between Rome and outlying bishoprics and abbeys, granted detailed powers to papal legates, stressed the need for liturgical harmony with Roman usages, ordered special commissions to investigate the eucharistic teachings of Berengar of Tours, and even proposed early in his pontificate an expedition to the East to beat back the infidel from the Holy Land. Gregory was neither a canon lawyer nor a theologian, although he was concerned with both areas, and he insisted that he was not an innovator. Perhaps he can be understood best as an eleventh-century monk (or regular canon) of intense devotion and energy. He sought to realize what he considered a properly structured Christian society and used the expanded authority of the papal office in his efforts.

At the time of his death in 1085 Gregory was an exile from Rome, driven to southern Italy by Henry IV and an irate Roman populace. He had been deserted by many of his supporters, and many reforming churchmen thought he had gone too far in his battle with Henry. By reason of that battle, however, and because of his powerful personality, Gregory's name has been attached to the entire reform movement of the age, and the term Gregorian Reform is well-known to those who study medieval history. Although his importance is undeniable, the extent to which the cause of church

reform was aided or hindered by his pontificate is a complicated issue. Many twelfth-century writers remembered Pope Urban II (1088–1099), not Gregory, as the great figure of the preceding age of reform. Even so, Urban forcefully acknowledged himself to be a disciple of Gregory, although the extent to which Urban is a true “Gregorian” can be debated. As decades passed Gregory would be cited less and less frequently by his successors and by canon lawyers, but the issues that dominated his reign could not be ignored. Because of the claims that Gregory made, particularly those detailing the relation between secular and ecclesiastical authority, medieval church-state relations had been fundamentally altered and could never again be seen as had been the case prior to 1075.

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ROBERT SOMERVILLE (1987 AND 2005)

**GREGORY OF CYPRUS** (1241–1290), known as Gregory II, was a patriarch of Constantinople. Born in Frankish-occupied Cyprus, Gregory traveled to Ephesus, Nicaea, and finally Constantinople, where he studied under Gregory Akropolites. His exceptional proclivity toward humanism gained for him a place in the select circle of academi-

cians at the patriarchal school where he lectured on the Pauline letters. As one of the more creative personalities of the late thirteenth century, he was the very embodiment of the Paleologian renaissance that synthesized a renewal of ascetic spirituality and classical learning.

Upon his ascendancy to the patriarchate in 1283, Gregory inherited the political and religious problems that had been festering since the Fourth Crusade (1204) and the Council of Lyons (1274). Under the aggressive unionist attempts of Emperor Michael VIII and Patriarch John XI Beccus (r. 1275–1282), these issues became entangled with the *filioque* controversy.

The Synod of Blachernae (spring 1285) proved to be a short-lived victory for Gregory in his efforts to reconcile the Arsenites (the hard-line conservatives) with the unionists. The importance of this synod, however, was, by way of its condemnation of Beccus, its reaction to and rejection of the 1274 Roman formulation. Gregory’s role was pivotal because of his synodal paper (*Tome*), which, however, was not subsequently recognized for what it was—the definitive refutation of Beccus’s theological innovation. Gregory’s subsequent writings (among them the *Pittakion*, which was addressed to his benefactor and supporter, Andronicus II Palaeologus) constitute a defense of his stand against the *filioque*.

Gregory’s theological contribution offered an insightful solution to the *filioque* debate. Rather than being one of provisional accommodation (Beccus) or of rigorous adherence to the formulations of Photios and Athanasius, his solution worked out the implications of the Cappadocians and of John of Damascus on the procession of the Holy Spirit. For Gregory, it was not enough to accept the authenticity of a particular scriptural or patristic reference; its correct interpretation was essential as well.

Gregory addressed Photios’s thesis that the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father alone by raising the question of the relationship of the Spirit and the Son outside of time, as expressed in the formula “through the Son.” His argument distinguishes between the essence and energies of God, or between God’s unknowability and his perceivable manifestation in the world. By emphasizing the notion of energetic revelation in Greek patristic thought, Gregory remained, indeed, in the mainstream of Byzantine apophatism and also became the forerunner of fourteenth-century Palamite theology.

The impact of Gregory’s insights on the Palamite synthesis as well as his solution to the *filioque* debate is increasingly recognized by scholars as being far more valuable and genuine than the theology of unionism. Unfortunately, Gregory’s contemporaries, unlike his successors, did not share the same sentiments toward their prelate. Even though they tacitly accepted his orthodoxy, they insisted that he resign and solemnly removed his name from the hierarchical list of the *sunodikon*. Was his self-imposed abdication from

the patriarchate the most prudent action to take against a small yet influential band of opponents? That he did so proves not his weakness but his pastoral sensitivity to the importance of healing the political divisions that had torn the church during his lifetime.

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JOHN TRAVIS (1987)

**GREGORY OF DATEV** (1346–1410), or, in Armenian, Grigor Tatevatsi, was a Christian theologian, philosopher, and saint of the Armenian church. Gregory of Datev was born in T'mkaber, a city in the province of Vayots Dzor, in northeastern Armenia. At the age of fifteen, he entered the Monastery of Aprakunik' to study under the famous philosopher and theologian Hovhannes of Orot'n (1315–1388), with whom he remained for twenty-eight years. With his teacher, Gregory traveled in 1373 to Jerusalem, where he was ordained a celibate priest. He received the degree of doctor of the church in Erzinka (present-day Erzincan, eastern Turkey) and in 1387 was elevated to the rank of supreme doctor of the church at the Monastery of Aprakunik'. At the death of Hovhannes and upon his express wish, Gregory became the dean of the theological school, which in 1390 moved to the Monastery of Datev.

In addition to classical Greek philosophy, biblical exegesis, and both Greek and Latin patristic thought, Gregory's students were also introduced to music, calligraphy, and the art of painting illuminated manuscripts. An erudite thinker, Gregory knew Greek, Latin, and Arabic. He died at the Monastery of Datev at the age of sixty-four and was buried there, where his tomb lies to this day. Venerated by following generations as "Second Illuminator," "eternally shining sun," "heavenly champion," and "great teacher," Gregory of Datev dominated the thought and orientation of the Armenian church in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as monk, author, educator, theologian, philosopher, scientist, orator, apologist, painter, calligrapher, and polyglot.

Well versed in the scholastic manner of demonstration, Gregory used syllogistic argumentation throughout his

works with the intention of eventually manifesting the orthodoxy of the Armenian church against the unitive attempts of Rome. His most important theological tracts are *Girk' Hartsmans* (Book of questions; 1397) and *Oskep' orik* (Book of golden content; 1407). In these Gregory addresses himself to such topics as the Holy Trinity, the divinity of Christ, and Christ's birth, baptism, death, and resurrection. In *Oskep' orik*, Gregory taught that rational examination can prove the existence of God without recourse to faith, because the existence of creatures implies the reality of the creator. In this work he also formulated a profession of the Orthodox faith based on the creeds of the councils of Nicaea and Constantinople and included the teachings of the Armenian church and its early fathers, especially Gregory the Illuminator (c. 239–c. 326). In continuous use, this credo is recited also during ordination ceremonies by the ordinand.

Criticizing Plato, Gregory taught in his *About the Structure of Man* that the spirit does not exist prior to the corporeal (body or matter) nor apart from it but issues concurrently and works through the mechanisms that the corporeal provides. There are different types of spirit—the vegetative, the animal, and the rational. Through the initiative of God, the corporeal, whether body or matter, contains "formative power" or spirit, which is immortal, and which has heat, motion, and action. According to Gregory, faith and science do not exclude each other but belong properly to two different realms. Science is bereft of the means to consider the supernatural realm and by faith alone one cannot understand nature. Knowledge of the natural world is acquired through reason, training, and experience (by way of the five senses). The rational spirit of humankind is like a clean parchment and receives whatever is impressed on it, whereas through God's grace one can understand theological truths.

An industrious writer, Gregory produced twenty-eight volumes on biblical, liturgical, pastoral, theological, and philosophical topics. Most of his works have not had a comprehensive critical evaluation. Such a task would enhance the proper understanding of the beliefs of the Armenian church through the writings of one of its most loyal sons.

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AVAK ASADOURIAN (1987)

**GREGORY OF NAREK** (c. 945–c. 1010), or, in Armenian, Grigory Narekatsi, was a Christian mystic, poet, and saint of the Armenian church. Gregory was born in the village of Narek in the region of Vaspourakan (present-day Van, eastern Turkey). His father, Khosrov Antsevsatsi, bishop of the nearby province of Antsevsatsik', built a monastery, where Gregory obtained his elementary schooling. He continued his education in the Monastery of Narek, where after ordination he spent the remainder of his life.

The rulers of the kingdom of Vaspourakan favored ties with Byzantium. Consequently, the Monastery of Narek trained its novices in the trivium and quadrivium, having incorporated the syllabi used in the educational centers throughout the Eastern Christian empire. Thus Gregory was well versed in Greek philosophy, especially in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonic school, which by the tenth century had been clothed in Christian garb. Gregory was also well read in the Armenian church fathers of the fourth through seventh centuries and was familiar with the thought of Ignatius of Antioch, the Cappadocian fathers, and Chrysostom.

Gregory's major work, the *Book of Lamentation*, popularly known as *Narek*, is a prayer book still much venerated. In it the penitent is made aware of the total otherness of God and of humanity's utter dependence on God, who is the source of all reality. The *Book of Lamentation* is an analysis of Gregory's own spiritual progress, realized through a fundamental knowledge of Christ and a radical knowledge of himself as sinner. The work also exhibits detailed knowledge of the scriptures and familiarity with agriculture, architecture, mathematics, astronomy, nautical art, and medicine. Among his other literary achievements are twenty-one hymns, or odes; four panegyric orations, containing historical accounts of the era; and ten discourses, actually spiritual songs, consisting of invocations and supplications. Of special interest is the historical information these discourses contain concerning the stratification of society during the times of Gregory.

Gregory was and remains the mystic of the Armenian church. Central to his mysticism is the belief in a cathartic process that ultimately would lead humankind to a reacquisition of divine similitude, or the likeness of God. The mysticism espoused by Gregory is a uniquely human undertaking whereby humanity tries to encounter God. To meet the Almighty, humanity must rid itself of transgressions. In order to encounter God, who transcends all being and all knowledge, it becomes necessary to renounce all sense gathered through the workings of reason. This apophatic approach to knowledge of God takes the form of negating all meaning in order to emphasize the absolute unknowability of God. According to Gregory, God is incomprehensible, invisible, ineffable, beyond totality, unspeakable, unobservable, without beginning, and without time.

Gregory, however, also embraced the cataphatic approach to God by stressing God's actions in history, which manifest God's love and concern for humankind. In the *Commentary on the Song of Songs of Solomon*, Gregory emphasizes the parallelism between the union of Yahveh with Israel and the marriage of the incarnate Logos with the church. As the Lord of compassion and mercy, the Christian God is distinctly a God of action, that is, a living God. Gregory began all his prayers by declaring, "from the depth of heart, a conversation with God."

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AVAK ASADOURIAN (1987)

**GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS** (c. 329–c. 391) was one of the Cappadocian fathers, known to Christian tradition as "the Theologian" by virtue of his rhetorical erudition and the consummate skill with which he combated the perceived heresies of those who in any way detracted from or denied the validity of the established orthodoxy of his day. One of those "heretics" was his own father, Gregory the

Elder, who in his youth had been a member of an obscure but apparently popular sect known as the Hyspistarii. But inasmuch as his father was later converted to orthodoxy and subsequently consecrated bishop, his son could say of him that he was one whose “character anticipates their faith” (Oration 18) and that he was “well grafted out of the wild olive tree into the good one” (Or. 7). It was by his mother, Nonna, however, that Gregory was to be most enduringly influenced, for it was she who, by her tears and by her prayers, persuaded him to embrace the ascetic life. Gregory said of her, “Who had a greater love of virginity, though patient herself of the marriage bond?” (Or. 18). Gregory was one of three children; Gorgonia, his older sister (“One red tint was dear to her, the blush of modesty,” Or. 8), and a younger brother, Caesarius (“Neither by his fame [as a physician] nor by the luxury which surrounded him was his nobility of soul corrupted,” Or. 7), both predeceased Gregory. The funeral orations Gregory preached for his sister and brother remain classics of their genre, panegyrics of the most elaborate sort.

Gregory’s education was undertaken at Cappadocian Caesarea, at Palestinian Caesarea, at Alexandria, and finally at Athens. Upon completion of these extensive studies, Gregory had hoped to retire to a life of contemplative solitude (“with no contact with human affairs except when necessary,” Or. 2), but this desire was thwarted when his father, now a bishop, ordained him priest and set him on the stormy road of pastoral and ecclesiastical responsibilities. The “tyranny” he experienced at his father’s hand was repeated when his close friend Basil of Caesarea consecrated him suffragan bishop of the “exceptionally abominable and narrow little village” (Or. 10) of Sasima. Upon his father’s death, however, Gregory returned to Nazianzus to pursue what he hoped would be a quiet and undisturbed episcopate.

This was not to be so. During the “heretical” emperor Valens’s reign, the Arian party had gained strength, so Gregory was (again reluctantly) persuaded to go to Constantinople, the capital city, and preach on behalf of the outnumbered “orthodox.” Arius and his followers had called into question the eternal divinity of Christ (a dogma that the Council of Nicaea, in 325, had promulgated in direct opposition to Arius), while others had denied the full divinity of the Holy Spirit. Such views offended Gregory deeply, so he set out in a series of five long discourses, commonly known as his *Theological Orations* (Or. 27–31), to articulate, with both depth of learning and clarity of thought, what he believed to be the true doctrine of the Trinity. The core of his teaching consisted in his assertion that the salvation of humankind is possible only if the agents of that salvation (i.e., Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) share fully in the divinity of the one godhead. Defending the so-called Nicene faith against its Arian detractors, however, took its toll on Gregory, as did his other episcopal duties, including his unwilling participation in ecclesiastical politics. It is no surprise, then, that during the Council of Constantinople in 381 (where

many of his views were adopted) he retired to the contemplative life that he had so fervently desired from the beginning.

But Gregory’s retirement years, as his extant letters clearly indicate, were far from idle. Chief among his concerns during this period of his life was yet another “heresy,” this time authored by Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea. In an attempt to solve the question of how the Son of God (or Word) could become incarnate in the human Jesus, Apollinaris suggested that the Word (Gr., *logos*) took the place of Jesus’ mind (or rational faculty), thus ensuring the unity of the incarnate person and also implying that everything Jesus did or said could be attributed to divine authorship. Gregory, in three closely argued dogmatic letters (101, 102, 202), called this a “mindless” Christology, insisting—again, out of a concern for the need for salvation and for humanity’s ultimate goal of union with God—that “only that which is assumed [i.e., by the Logos] can be saved.” It must be the whole person, the mind included, that was assumed by the Word at the time of the incarnation, if the whole person is to be saved. If the whole person is not assumed, then salvation itself is imperiled. Gregory’s powerful and incisive arguments won the day, and Apollinaris’s bold attempts to explain the incomprehensible were condemned.

If Gregory were to be remembered, within the relatively narrow confines of the history of doctrine, only as “the Theologian,” and if he were understood solely as the defender of true faith against heretical encroachments, it would be doing him an injustice. As important as his Christological and Trinitarian concepts were to the debates of his day, his more enduring (and often overlooked) significance may lie elsewhere. Caught, as he was, between the desire for solitary retirement (“For me the greatest business is to be free of business,” Epistle 49) and his vehement dislike of ecclesiastical and political machinations (“For my part . . . my inclination is to avoid all assemblies of bishops, because I have never seen a council come to a good end or turn out to be a solution for evils,” Ep. 130), he nevertheless manifested in his own person a delicate balance between a genuine concern for his fellow Christians’ spiritual well-being and an intuitive grasp of those divine mysteries that transcend logical or rational boundaries. This balance is seen less in his exclusively doctrinal discourses than in his poetry, for it is in the latter that one glimpses a sensitivity at once aesthetic and mystical.

While Gregory’s orations address theological issues with precision and directness, his poems—many of them no less theological—are less rigid, more given to deep self-understanding and to a broad, inclusive generosity of spirit. Gregory may be one of the earliest Christian theologians to realize, instinctively, that poetry is a more appropriate medium for theological articulation than is prose, however well ordered, systematic, and architectonic that prose might be. He would have delighted, one dares suppose, in the claim of the nineteenth-century Scottish poet John Campbell Shairp that “whenever we come face to face with truth then poetry begins.” It is as if Gregory’s dogmatic discourses were

true to his (albeit grudging) acceptance of the ecclesial responsibilities laid on him, whereas his poems gave voice to his capacity for a deep inner awareness of his relationship to God, a relationship of which both his constancy in ascetic discipline and his unending search after truth were genuine symbols. The balance, then, between theological precision in the interests of orthodoxy and his poetic sensitivities was, for Gregory, perhaps more of a tension than a balance. Yet he had a vision of the future state in which the balance would be restored and the tension resolved. And this he could express both poetically and theologically:

No longer from afar will I behold the truth,  
As if in a mirror reflected on the water's surface.  
Rather, the truth itself will I see with eyes unveiled,  
The truth whose first and primary mark the Trinity is,  
God as One adored, a single light in tri-equal beams.

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DONALD F. WINSLOW (1987)

**GREGORY OF NYSSA** (c. 335–c. 395), also known as Gregory Nyssen, was a Christian theologian. With his elder brother, Basil of Caesarea (c. 329–379), and Basil's lifelong friend, Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329–c. 391), Gregory of Nyssa was a principal architect and interpreter both of the trinitarian settlement canonized by the ecumenical Council of Constantinople (381) and, in his later years, of the ascetic and mystical tradition of Eastern monasticism.

Little is known of the details of Gregory's life. The child of an aristocratic Christian family of Cappadocia, he had two bishops among his brothers, while his elder sister, Macrina, whose biography is numbered among his works, was a noted

and saintly ascetic. Destined for an ecclesiastical career, Gregory was early made a lector in the church and was educated in the local schools at Caesarea, thus missing the opportunity to study, as Basil had, at one or more of the great cosmopolitan centers of learning. Nevertheless, Gregory decided in favor of marriage (with a woman named Theosebeia) and the career of a professional rhetorician, which he took up in earnest around 365.

Gregory's first known work was the treatise *On Virginity*, which he wrote in defense of the ascetic life, apparently at the behest of Basil. Shortly after its composition, Basil, now the metropolitan bishop of Caesarea, found himself badly in need of episcopal allies in his struggle with the Arian orthodoxy of the imperial court. Accordingly, he induced Gregory to be ordained bishop of Nyssa (371), a small town on the river Halys, some eighty miles northwest of Caesarea. The job fit neither Gregory's tastes nor his talents, but he carried on until a synod of Arian bishops, assembled at Nyssa in his absence, deposed him (376) on a charge of maladministration of funds.

The year 379, which saw both the death of Basil and the accession of an anti-Arian, pro-Nicene emperor in the person of Theodosius I, marked a turning point in Gregory's life. For one thing, it raised him to prominence in the life of the church: He was chosen (though by his own choice he did not long remain) the metropolitan bishop of Sebaste in Armenia I; he figured prominently at the Council of Constantinople in 381; and he functioned as a regular "special preacher" in Theodosius's capital.

More important still, Gregory, on the death of Basil, took up the cudgels against his brother's principal theological opponent, the radical Arian Eunomius. In all he composed four treatises entitled *Against Eunomius* during the years 380–383. His continuation of his brother's work in the debate with Arianism was paralleled by his completion of Basil's exegetical homilies on the creation story of *Genesis* 1. To this end Gregory wrote a lengthy treatise, *On the Making of Man*, many of whose themes and issues are echoed in his contemporary *Dialogue on the Soul and the Resurrection*, which he presents as a conversation between himself and his dying sister Macrina. In all of these works Gregory exhibits a remarkable knowledge not only of the Origenist tradition in Christian theology, which Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus had "rediscovered," but also of pagan philosophy in the Neoplatonic idiom; and his indebtedness to these traditions is not the less obvious because he is critically aware of the problems they created for Christian theology.

In his defense of the orthodoxy of the Nicene tradition (i.e., of the doctrine that Son and Spirit are "of one being" with God), Gregory insists, with Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus, that the three hypostases of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share a single being or substance (*ousia*): Each is all that the others are. Furthermore, every action or operation of God is one in which all three hypostases share: As there is one divine being, so there is one divine *energeia*. What differ-

entiate the “persons” is solely the relations of causation or origination in which they stand to one another. God appears in Gregory’s thought as a single being that is articulated through relations of strict self-reproduction.

In taking this stand, Gregory repudiated the Arian hierarchy of divine hypostases, which established the identity of the Son, or Word, and the Spirit by insisting that they were things of a different (and inferior) order in relation to God, mediating between God and world. The fundamental error in this Arian position, as Gregory saw it, lay in the belief that the being of God is definable and hence limited: that Son and Spirit can be distinguished from God because their definitions are different from God’s. He insists, on the contrary, that no human words or ideas grasp the *ousia* of God, which is infinite and illimitable Good; and for this reason the distinction of Father, Son, and Spirit belongs not to the order of being but to that of cause or relation.

This doctrine of the divine infinity is closely related to a central anthropological theme that appears in Gregory’s treatise *On the Making of Man* as well as in certain of his later ascetic works. As might be expected in one whose thought was so closely allied to Platonist and Christian-Platonist traditions, Gregory, like Origen before him, has difficulties about the bodily dimension of the human being. On this score he corrects Origen by insisting that soul and body come simultaneously into being and that embodiment is no product of a previous fall. Nevertheless he makes this critical move with a caution that reveals his sympathy with Origen’s deprecation of the body. Where he corrects Origen most firmly is in the latter’s treatment of human finitude and mutability. For Gregory, mutability, the capacity for unending change, is the characteristic of the human creature that corresponds to divine infinity and incomprehensibility. It is envisaged not primarily as the ever-present possibility of departure from God, but even more as the condition of eternal progress into the infinite Good—Gregory’s definition of salvation.

These theological themes are developed in Gregory’s later ascetic writings (especially in his *Life of Moses* and his fifteen *Homilies on the Song of Songs*) into the beginnings of a mystical doctrine that is closely integrated with his understanding of baptism and the life that it initiates. For him the processes of moral purification and spiritual illumination come to no final end precisely because there is no end to the Good that they seek. They issue, as did Moses’ pilgrimage, in an entrance into “the cloud” that symbolizes divine incomprehensibility and infinity. In Gregory’s spiritual teaching, therefore, there is an anticipation of the path that apophatic mysticism was to take in the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite.

**SEE ALSO** Basil of Caesarea; Gregory of Nazianzus.

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RICHARD A. NORRIS (1987)

**GREGORY OF SINAI** (d. 1347) was an ascetic and mystic canonized by the Eastern Orthodox church. The Greek church commemorates his life on February 11 and the Slavic churches on August 8. Much of the life and writings of this great church father is known from the life composed by his disciple Kallistos I, patriarch of Constantinople.

Born in Asia Minor, Gregory took his monastic vows on Mount Sinai. After travels to Cyprus and Crete he came to Mount Athos. Disturbed to find the holy men of Athos in ignorance of true silence and contemplation, he undertook to instruct both monks and solitaries in the contemplative art. Further travels took him to Constantinople and to Thrace, where he founded monasteries and taught the techniques of mental prayer.

Gregory did not write extensively. Most of his works are concerned with mental prayer and hesychasm, the spiritual life of inner wakefulness. He taught that through obedience, mourning, tears, and the power of pure contemplation the mind is cleansed and led to a vision of the “uncreated light” of God. Spiritual perfection is finally achieved in deification (*theōsis*).

The contemplative art practiced and taught by Gregory is known as “prayer of the heart.” In his *Instructions to Hesychasts* he describes a method whereby the mind is forced to descend from head to heart and is then held in repeated invocation of the name of Jesus Christ. Mental prayer is thus remembrance of God through a pure and imageless contemplation. He urged his disciples to keep their minds “colorless, formless, and imageless” and emphasized the use of such physical aids as rhythmic breathing for attainment of inner stillness. But, because human effort alone cannot accomplish meditative union, he urged that “no one can hold the mind by himself, if it be not held by the Spirit.” As humans work at prayer, the prayer works in them, and the mind rejoices with the presence of the Holy Spirit and is strengthened in its striving for perfection.

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GEORGE S. BEBIS (1987)

**GREGORY PALAMAS** (1296–1359) was the most important Orthodox theologian of the fourteenth century and one of the greatest theologians in the history of the Orthodox church. Raised in the Byzantine imperial court, he later became a monk and wrote important theological works that refer primarily to the experience of communion with God. He was elected archbishop of Thessalonica and immediately following his death was recognized as a saint of the Orthodox church. Gregory's memory is celebrated twice per year: on November 14, the day of his death, and on the second Sunday of Lent. This second celebration, which serves in effect as an extension of the Sunday of Orthodoxy, reveals the special importance the Orthodox church attaches to his person and teachings.

The works of Gregory Palamas summarize the entire earlier patristic tradition, offering it in a new synthesis that has as its central theme the *theōsis* (deification) of humanity. This *theōsis* is realized through the participation of humankind in the uncreated energies of God. For this reason, the rejection of the uncreated energies of God, which has as a consequence the rejection of the possibility for humankind to achieve *theōsis*, was not considered by Palamas to be merely another typical Christian heresy but rather the summarization of all heresies, and, ultimately, the negation of the God who is revealed in the scriptures and the church.

Gregory was born in 1296 in Constantinople. When he was seven years old he lost his father, Constantine, but he continued to reside in the imperial court in Constantinople under the protection of the emperor Andronicus II Palaeologus. He received a rich education there, particularly in philosophy. Even though the emperor had destined him for high public office, the young Gregory had become increasingly occupied with ascetic practices and noetic prayer, and he eventually chose to enter the monastic life. At the age of twenty, he left with his two younger brothers for the monastic center of Mount Athos. He remained there first with a hesychast in the vicinity of Vatopediou Monastery, then as a member of the *koinobion* (brotherhood) of the great monastery of the Lavra, and finally in the hermitage of Glossia.

In 1325, Turkish incursions compelled him and other monks to leave the Holy Mountain. While on a visit to Thessalonica, he was ordained a priest; he left soon after for Beroea, where he lived for five years at a hermitage outside the city, under even more austere conditions of asceticism. In 1331, Serbian raids became a serious threat, and he was forced to abandon Beroea and return to Mount Athos. Resuming again the hesychast life, he resided for the most part at the hermitage of Saint Sabbas, near the great monastery of the Lavra, except for one year, during which he served as abbot of the monastery of Esphigmenou.

It was at Saint Sabbas that Gregory first was exposed to the antihesychast opinions of Barlaam of Calabria, a monk and philosopher of Greek ancestry from southern Italy. While representing the Orthodox church during preparatory

discussions with papal legates on the question of church union during the years 1333–1334, Barlaam had refuted the *filioque* by invoking the unapproachability and unknowability of God. The agnostic character of Barlaam's theology disturbed many Orthodox theologians, including Gregory. He composed his *Apodictic Treatises concerning the Procession of the Holy Spirit* (1335) without, however, ever referring to Barlaam by name. It was the attack of Barlaam against the ascetic method of the hesychasts that eventually provoked an open rift between him and Gregory. Relying on simplistic and incomplete information concerning the psychosomatic method of prayer used by the hesychasts, Barlaam assailed them in the most severe terms, characterizing them as *omphalopsuchoi* ("men with their souls in their navels") and as Massalians, a heretical group that claimed salvation is obtained only through the power of prayer and not through the sacraments of the church. The defense of the hesychasts was undertaken by Gregory. It was for this purpose that he wrote his famous work *Triads in Defense of the Holy Hesychasts* (c. 1338). The positions taken by Gregory were approved from the beginning by the church. They were sanctioned as well by various synodal decisions, which have a special importance for Orthodoxy.

The first official recognition of Gregory's teachings, with a parallel condemnation of the views of Barlaam, came about through the approval of the *Hagioretic Tome*, which Gregory himself wrote in 1340 and which was signed by representatives of the monasteries of Mount Athos. In June 1341, a council was convened in Constantinople that condemned the positions taken by Barlaam, who confessed his error and finally was compelled to return to the West.

The definitive resolution of the debate was delayed, however, by the untimely death of the emperor, Andronicus III Palaeologus, which occurred immediately following the conclusion of the work of the council and before he had had a chance to sign its decisions. The situation was complicated by the political controversy that soon arose over the question of the imperial succession and that led to a civil war. Thus, a new period of struggle began for Gregory, a struggle that lasted until 1347. His new opponent was Gregory Akindynos. During this period, when the strong man in Constantinople was Patriarch John Calecas, Gregory was banished, imprisoned, and excommunicated from the church (1344), while his adversary Akindynos, who had already been condemned by the church for his views (August 1341), was gradually restored to prominence and even ordained a priest. Calecas's tactic, however, eventually undermined his position. Anne of Savoy, mother of the underage emperor John V Palaeologus, had set Gregory free. A new council, convened at the beginning of 1347, condemned Patriarch Calecas at the same time that the victorious John VI Cantacuzenus was entering the city as coemperor. The patriarchal throne was assumed by the hesychast Isidore, and Gregory was elected archbishop of Thessalonica. However, the zealots, who were occupying Thessalonica and who refused to



recognize the legitimacy of Cantacuzenus, prevented the new bishop from entering his see. Thus, Gregory only formally undertook his pastoral responsibilities at the beginning of 1350, after Cantacuzenus had captured that city as well.

Gregory's first act as archbishop of Thessalonica was to reestablish peace within his flock. In the meantime, he had to contend with a new attack against the hesychasts, this time from the Byzantine humanist Nikephoros Gregoras. A new council, called in Constantinople in 1351, decided once again in favor of Gregory and reconfirmed his teachings, especially those having to do with the distinction between essence and energy in God. In 1354, while traveling to Constantinople, Gregory was captured by the Turks and remained their prisoner for approximately one year in Turkish-occupied areas of Asia Minor. There he had the opportunity to come into contact with local Christian communities, as well as to converse with Muslim theologians. After the payment of a ransom, he was set free by the Turks. While passing through Constantinople, he held public debates with Nikephoros Gregoras, against whom he also composed several new treatises. In 1355 he returned to Thessalonica, where he continued his pastoral work. He died on November 14, 1359.

Gregory left numerous writings, which are preserved in many manuscript codices. For the most part, these have been published. His dogmatic and apologetic writings include the *Apodictic Treatises*, in which Gregory propounds his compromise with the Latin teaching on the *filioque* by stating that the Holy Spirit, who proceeds eternally from the Father, is poured out on the faithful also from the Son. In his *Triads* he discusses the value of secular studies, various aspects of prayer (including the participation of the human body in prayer and the vision of the uncreated light), and the impossibility of participation in the imparticipable essence of God. Finally, the *Hagioretic Tome* presents God's unfolding revelation and the need for obedience to the saints who have had the experience of the mystical energies of the Holy Spirit.

Gregory's writings on the spiritual life include *The Life of Peter the Athonite* (1334); *One Hundred and Fifty Physical, Theological, Moral and Practical Chapters* (1347), in which basic dogmatic, anthropological, moral, and ascetic themes are presented; *To Xenii* (1345), which analyzes the anthropological and theological presuppositions of the spiritual life; and *Exposition of the Decalogue*, a synopsis of Christian morality. Most of the sixty-three homilies of Gregory that have survived were preached during his tenure as archbishop of Thessalonica. These sermons help to reveal the multifaceted personality of Gregory—his lively interest in the spiritual uplifting of his flock, as well as his concern for peace, social justice, and the everyday problems of the faithful. Some of these homilies, such as the sixteenth and the fifty-third, are complete theological treatises. Most of his letters have been preserved, as well as numerous other theological treatises.

The theology of Gregory has an empirical character. The prophets, the apostles, and the fathers of the church

based their theology on the experience of the revelation of God within history. However, true theology is also organically combined with the vision of God; it is the fruit and expression of this vision.

The vision of God is possible because God, who is unapproachable and imparticipable according to his essence, becomes accessible to human beings through his uncreated grace or energy. To have the vision of God, a person must cleanse his or her heart from the stain of sin. Before the incarnation of Christ, the uncreated grace of God illumined the just from without. After the incarnation, God is united to humankind through the sacrament of the Eucharist and is manifested as light within one's inner being—provided that the person has tried, through prayerful contemplation, to collect his or her Nous (intellect), which is usually distracted by the things of this world, and to cleanse it from sin. This interpretation of the theory of the uncreated light can be found not only among the hesychast monks, but, more generally, in the teaching of the Orthodox church regarding the renewal and *theōsis* (deification) of humanity. By participating in the uncreated grace or energy of God, humankind becomes itself a god by grace. The experience of *theōsis* begins already in this life and is fulfilled in the kingdom of God. Christ, who is the Son of God become man and who came into the world as the brother of all human beings, is at the same time also the father of all in the faith, who leads them into the eternal and everlasting glory of the kingdom of God: "for in the glory of the Father, Christ is come, and in the glory of their Father Christ, the righteous shine as the sun and will become light and see light, the pleasing and all-holy vision which is only accessible to the purified heart" (Christou, ed., vol. 1, p. 599).

The influence of the theology of Gregory on Eastern Orthodoxy remains historically important. His tradition of theology served as the best source of counsel for the life of the Orthodox during the dark period of Turkish domination. His teaching, as well as the hesychast tradition, was propagated not only within the bounds of the Byzantine Empire but also throughout the entire Orthodox world, giving new inspiration to ascetic and ecclesiastical life. The basic principles of Palamite theology, revived in the early twentieth century by the publication of more of his works as well as numerous studies, has become the starting point for the renewal of Orthodox theology and spiritual life, which, during recent centuries, has sustained intense influence from the West.

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GEORGIOS I. MANTZARIS (1987)  
Translated from Greek by Christopher H. Bender

**GREGORY THE ILLUMINATOR** was the chief bishop of Armenia from circa 314 to 325, one of the major saints of the Armenian church, and author of the conversion of the Armenian people to Christianity. Information about him derives mainly from two fifth-century sources, Agathangelos's *History of the Armenians* and the Greek *Life of Gregory*.

According to Agathangelos's legendary account, Gregory was the son of the Parthian prince Anak who killed his kinsman King Khosrov of Armenia. The Armenians retaliated by killing Anak's family, Gregory being the sole survivor. He was taken to Caesarea Mazaca (modern Kayseri, Turkey), where he was raised a Christian. There he married a Christian woman with whom he had two sons. He entered the service of King Tiridates III of Armenia (298–330), accompanying him to Greater Armenia in 298 when the Romans restored the king to the throne of his ancestors. Gregory's refusal to offer sacrifice to the idol of the goddess Anahita provoked the king to torture him and condemn him to imprisonment in the Khor Virap ("deep pit") of Artashat. There Gregory miraculously survived for thirteen years until he was released to cure the king of a severe ailment. Succeeding in his mission, Gregory converted the king, the royal family, and the army, and set out to proselytize the Armenian nation. He destroyed six major shrines of the prevailing deities of ancient Armenia, erected crosses throughout the country, and built baldachins over the graves of the forty Christian virgins martyred by Tiridates III.

About 314 Gregory received episcopal ordination in Caesarea. Returning to Armenia, he destroyed the pagan shrine at Ashtishat and founded the first church in Armenia. Tradition reports that he baptized the entire Armenian nation in the waters of the Arsenias River, built several churches, founded monasteries, and ordained bishops. Finally, after handing over his episcopal duties to his younger son, Aristakes, he retired to a solitary life. The office of the chief bishop of Armenia became intermittently hereditary in his family until 439. The cult of Gregory and the veneration of his relics became popular in the second half of the fifth and especially in the sixth and seventh centuries.

The Armenian tradition ascribes to Gregory the authorship of canons, a book of homilies (the *Yachakhapatum*), and the liturgical books that are used in the Armenian church. Modern scholarship, however, has shown that none of these works could have been composed before the fifth century.

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KRIKOR H. MAKSOUDIAN (1987)

**GRIAULE, MARCEL.** Marcel Griaule (1898–1956) was a pioneer of French ethnographic research in Africa, an emblematic figure of French ethnography, and a catalyst to the emerging discipline's professionalization. After serving in World War I as an air force pilot, he obtained a degree in living Oriental languages (Amharic and Gueze) before studying with sociologist Marcel Mauss. Griaule was among the first ethnographers trained by the Institute of Ethnology at the Sorbonne, and his career paralleled every stage of the discipline's development. An energetic promoter of innovative technological aids, Griaule introduced the ethnographic film. He also founded the Société des Africanistes and its journal. In 1942, he was named the first chair of ethnology at the University of Paris. Like the discipline itself, Griaule's career took progressive distance from colonial interests. As an advisor to the French Union and the president of France's Commission on Cultural Affairs, Griaule championed respect for African culture and criticized the politics of cultural assimilation.

In the first ten years of his career, Griaule led the principal French ethnographic expeditions to Africa. His first expedition was a year-long mission to Ethiopia in 1928, but his most celebrated journey was the Dakar-Djibouti mission. Over twenty-one months (1931–1933), it traversed sub-Saharan Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. Enthusiastically followed by the French press, the mission also forged links with the literary and artistic avant-garde. Griaule gathered an imposing ethnographic harvest—more than 3,600 objects to enrich the holdings of the Trocadéro Museum, plus thousands of photographs, films, and recordings.

During this mission Griaule encountered the Dogon at the bend of the Niger River. Favoring intensive study of individual societies, Griaule and his colleagues subsequently made regular expeditions to pursue research on Dogon culture as a team. A sense of urgency to archive and safeguard

disappearing cultures provoked a method of collaborative interdisciplinary investigation. Teamwork provided multiple accounts of an event for analysis, and also enabled the same cultural phenomenon to be considered from various frames of expertise, a factor Griaule termed “plural observation.” Splicing observations into a “synoptic account” verified by informants, the method purportedly reconstructed a “typical” instance, purged of modifications that would destroy what Griaule called “its ideal harmony” (Jolly, 2001, p. 164). Griaule progressively extended his team to include “native collaborators,” whom he described as “precious auxiliary.” The project, beginning in 1935 and spanning five decades, made the Dogon one of the best-known societies on the continent.

In the initial period of his career, Griaule avoided infusing explanation into data, and he approached the ethnographic object as the only reliable “witness” to a society’s meanings. Minute documentation characterized his doctoral thesis, which produced two outstanding works, a study of masks, *Masques dogons* (1938), and games, *Jeux dogons* (1938).

Deprived of the opportunity for fieldwork for six years during World War II, Griaule elaborated his theory of mythology as an “ordered system” reflected in social organization. His return to Africa in 1946 reinforced this shift. At the behest of Dogon elders, a blind old sage, Ogotemméli, was charged with revealing to Griaule a deeper, esoteric level of mythological knowledge, reserved for initiates. This post-war phase of Griaule’s career was therefore governed by dialogue and a new conception of the ethnographic inquiry as initiation. Griaule focused his research on the complex cosmogony Ogotemméli expounded, asserting it amounted to “a metaphysic, a religion that puts them on the same level as the peoples of Antiquity.”

Presented as a daily chronicle of the old man’s revelations in an accessible style, Griaule’s account, *Dieu d’eau* (1948), translated as *Conversations with Ogotemméli*, became a bestseller. Foreshadowing a postmodern self-consciousness, Griaule injected himself into the narrative as “the European,” “the Stranger,” and “the Nazarene.” This literary device suggests a frank acknowledgment of roles ascribed to him in the ethnographic situation. Nevertheless, of Griaule’s 170 publications, it is the most contested. The book’s critics contend that it amounts to unrepresentative theological speculations or mythopoetic invention (Goody, 1967).

After Griaule’s untimely death in 1956, his close associate, Germaine Dieterlen, furthered work on Dogon myth and religion, publishing under both their names the monumental synthesis of cosmology, *Le renard pâle* (1965).

The work of Marcel Griaule and his followers is “one of the classic achievements of twentieth-century ethnography,” self-conscious about method and unparalleled in its comprehensive detail (Clifford, 1983, p. 124). However, Griaule’s oeuvre has come under sharp scrutiny since the

1960s, criticized for essentializing cultural patterns and privileging a romanticized past over a historically conditioned present. A constant refrain of Griaule’s detractors is that he reified “the Dogon.”

British anthropologists were especially skeptical of Griaule’s reliance on translators and select informants; they charge that he neglected case histories and details of daily existence in favor of metaphysics, which presents a “too perfectly ordered vision of Dogon reality” (Richards, 1967; Douglas, 1967; Goody, 1967). Dutch anthropologist Walter van Beek (1991) continued the polemic, attempting to debunk Griaule’s fieldwork with his own contemporary data; however, van Beek’s own lack of accountability weakened his verdict. James Clifford explored the complex role played by a group of influential Dogon in the evolution of Griaule’s work with greater sophistication, concluding that Griaule’s writings “express a Dogon truth, a complex, negotiated, historically contingent truth specific to certain relations of textual production” (1983, p. 125).

That the Dogon celebrated exceptional funerary rites in Griaule’s honor proves the degree to which they held the researcher in esteem, recognizing him as one of their own.

**SEE ALSO** Dieterlen, Germaine.

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LAURA S. GRILLO (2005)

**GRIMM BROTHERS.** Jakob Ludwig Karl Grimm (1785–1863) and his brother Wilhelm Karl (1786–1859) were born in Hanau, Germany, where their father was town clerk and later *Amtmann* (local administrator). Their happy childhood ended with his death in 1796; thereafter they had a constant struggle against poverty, with several younger children to support. The brothers worked in close harmony all their lives, and their researches into early Germanic language, literature, antiquities, and religion formed the basis for future studies in these fields.

At the university in Marburg the brothers became interested in medieval literature. The family moved to Kassel, and Jakob worked as a clerk in the War Office and later as secretary to the legation in the war against Napoleon. Finally both brothers were employed in the library of the elector of Hanover. From about 1806 they were collecting popular tales and encouraging their friends to do so, believing that this material, never previously taken seriously by scholars, was essential for the study of Germanic mythology. The first volume of *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* (Household and children's tales) appeared in 1812. The brothers worked unceasingly, reading manuscripts, recording oral material, and continually exploring new fields. They published poems from the Icelandic Eddas, corresponded with Walter Scott (with whom they compared Scottish and Danish ballads), and worked on runic inscriptions and Slavic languages. In 1816 and 1818 they brought out *Deutsche Sagen* (German legends) taken from printed and oral sources. Jakob concentrated on philology and early law, publishing *Deutsche Grammatik* (German grammar) in 1819 and *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer* (German legal antiquities) in 1828. Wilhelm worked mainly on medieval German literature and the heroic epics, and brought out *Die deutschen Heldensagen* (The German heroic sagas) in 1829.

At first they refused teaching posts, but unsympathetic treatment by the elector forced Jakob to become professor of philology at Göttingen in 1830; Wilhelm joined him there and proved a brilliant lecturer. Wilhelm married Dorothea Wild in 1825; it was a happy marriage, and Jakob continued to live with his brother and sister-in-law. In 1835

Jakob published *Deutsche Mythologie* (Germanic mythology), which established the link between German and Scandinavian myth and led to a new interest in Germanic antiquity throughout Europe. Many English students came to Göttingen, among them the Anglo-Saxon scholar John Kemble. However, once more the brothers had to leave when the reactionary duke of Cumberland became king of Hanover.

They were invited to work in Saxony on a comprehensive dictionary of the German language, and when the liberal Friedrich Wilhelm became king of Prussia in 1840 he persuaded them to move to Berlin, to live in financial security and lecture at the university and the academy. This meant a great change in their lives, but a happy one, and both brothers worked indefatigably until the end, Jakob surviving Wilhelm by four years. By their lives of devoted scholarship they made a major contribution to the serious study of folk tales and comparative mythology, and showed how language could be studied scientifically as a means of exploring humankind's early religious beliefs.

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HILDA R. ELLIS DAVIDSON (1987)  
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**GROOT, J. J. M. DE** (1854–1921), Dutch Sinologist and ethnographer. Born in Schiedam, Holland, Johannes Jacobus Maria de Groot enrolled in the polytechnic school at Delft in 1872. He subsequently studied Chinese with Gustave Schlegel at the University of Leiden.

In 1876 de Groot went to Amoy (present-day Xiamen, China) to continue his study of Chinese, and his stay in Amoy led to the publication of his first book, *Les fêtes annuellement célébrées à Emoui (Amoy): Étude concernant la religion populaire des Chinois* (translated from Dutch into French by Édouard Chavannes and published in 1886). From 1878 to

1883 de Groot traveled through Java and Borneo working as a Chinese interpreter. De Groot returned to Holland in 1883, but was likely working for the government of the Dutch East Indian Colonies since 1878, and in their employ he returned to China and lived there from 1886 to 1890, collecting the data later published in six volumes as *The Religious System of China: Its Ancient Forms, Evolution, History and Present Aspect; Manners, Customs and Social Institutions Connected Therewith* (1892–1910).

De Groot was appointed professor of ethnography at the University of Leiden in 1891. In 1904 he succeeded his mentor Schlegel as professor of Chinese, and in 1912 he assumed the chair of professor of Chinese at the University of Berlin.

De Groot was made a corresponding member of the Netherlands Royal Academy of Sciences in 1887 and a full member in 1891. His election to membership in the Dutch Society of Literature came in 1893. In 1894 de Groot shared the prestigious Stanislas Julien Prize with Édouard Chavannes. He was named *correspondant de l'institut* by the French Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres in 1908. In 1910–1911 de Groot came to the United States to deliver the American Lectures on the History of Religions, a traveling lecture series, and at that time was awarded an honorary doctorate by Princeton University. In 1918 the kaiser presented him with the Service Cross for his help during World War I.

De Groot's two most important works are *The Religious System of China* and *Religion in China: Universalism, a Key to the Study of Taoism and Confucianism* (1912; a revised and enlarged edition appeared in German in 1918), which is the published form of the lectures delivered in the United States in 1910–1911. The former is a detailed description of the funeral customs of the Chinese and of their ideas concerning the soul. It remains an important source of information on funeral rites, ancestor worship, geomancy (*feng-shui*), exorcism, and possession. In *Religion in China: Universalism*, de Groot argues that worship of the universe and its ways, its fluctuations between yin and yang, constitutes the root religion of the Chinese, from which Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism developed as three branches from a common stem. When Confucianism assumed the dominant position during the Han dynasty, it failed to develop as a religion and prevented religious growth of Daoism and Buddhism as well.

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ROBERT G. HENRICKS (1987)

**GROTIUS, HUGO** (1583–1645), or Huigh de Groot, was a Dutch lawyer, diplomat, historian, poet, philologist, and theologian. Grotius was born at Delft on April 10, 1583, into a socially and politically influential family. Following three years at the University at Leiden and a brief period accompanying a diplomatic embassy to Paris, he returned to Holland at the age of sixteen to become an advocate at the courts of the Hague. In 1607 Grotius was appointed to the office of Advocate-Fiscal (attorney general) of Holland. He married Maria van Reigersberch in 1608.

As a result of an association with the Dutch East India Company, Grotius wrote his first major legal treatise, *De jure praedae* (On the law of prize, 1604–1605), which presents a theory of natural law based on divine will. In 1625 he published his most important book, *De jure belli ac pacis* (On the law of war and peace), in which he again pursued the topic of natural law and its role in international relations. Here Grotius reveals his concern for the lack of restraint in waging war in the Christian world. He examines the theoretical justification for war and the rules that govern the actual waging of war. He then distinguishes natural law (identical with the law of God but knowable apart from divine revelation) from the voluntary laws of nations that exist between civil communities. Both these types of law he finds binding in relations between states. In the case of a conflict between natural and voluntary law, the law of nature should prevail, although the application of this principle is qualified. In addition to delineating the conditions of waging a just war, Grotius also advocates *temperamenta*, or mitigations, in the conduct of war. To avoid unnecessary suffering, he counsels communities to circumscribe their tactics in keeping with the perfect law of Christ, which, though itself not a basis of law, provides an ideal.

Grotius was also involved in the religious affairs of his day and strongly committed to the cause of Protestant unity. In his 1612 correspondence with Isaac Casaubon at the court of James I of England, he advocated a synod of Protestant churches in order to establish a common confession of faith that would protect against the development of heresy in the individual churches, help them present a united front against any papal aggressions, and yet allow moderate Roman Catholics to see their integrity. Grotius's hopes for such a meeting were, however, disappointed, in part because he was already involved in a heated religious and political controversy. He represented the States of Holland in a conflict that began with the appointment of a professor of theology and escalated into a major battle between church and state and between the local and the central governments within the Republic of the United Netherlands.

After Prince Maurits came to power Grotius was sentenced to life imprisonment (May 18, 1619). While in prison he wrote *Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland, Annotations of the Gospels*, and *On the Truth of the Christian Religion*, an apologetic work in which he attempts to prove the truth of the Christian faith based on reason and the testi-



many of works outside the Christian tradition. On March 22, 1621, his wife Maria contrived to smuggle Grotius out of prison in a chest used to transport books, and he fled to Paris. Grotius subsequently held various diplomatic and legal positions including the office of Swedish ambassador to France. In March of 1645, he was permitted to visit Rotterdam and Amsterdam on his way from Paris to Stockholm. On August 28 of that same year Grotius died while traveling from Stockholm to Lübeck.

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ANNE CLARKE (1987)

**GRUNDTVIG, NIKOLAI FREDERIK SEVERIN.** Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783–1872) was an influential Danish theologian, philosopher, historian, educationist, and writer. Each of his writings expresses one of his numerous professional voices, centered in his own heart. His childhood, the often turbulent course of his life, and his relationships with women, men, children, and diverse contemporary groups are all reflected in his authorial voices. His life was inseparably linked with the natural landscape, geography, and cultural milieu of Denmark-Norway, which he viewed from the perspective of a distinctive historical and universal consciousness. Grundtvig was founder of much that in the spheres of church, “folk,” and politics is today perceived as characteristically Danish.

**BIOGRAPHY.** Born into a clerical family in Udby in eastern Denmark, Grundtvig was influenced by his upbringing in an orthodox Lutheran, pietistic parsonage. However, his theological studies (1800–1803) led him eventually to a rationalistic theistic faith. When working as a private tutor on the Egeløkke estate on the island of Langeland, he fell in love with a married woman, and this experience of the challenging power of love created a new crisis, leading to a romantic awakening. Through this experience his interest in Nordic mythology and romanticism was created and confirmed. From 1808 to 1811 he worked as a secondary school teacher in Copenhagen, where he went through another crisis of faith. This led him back to his roots, both theologically and physically, insofar as he accepted in 1811 his father's wish

to be an assistant pastor in Udby. But in 1813 he went back to Copenhagen, where he lived from 1816 to 1821 exclusively as a writer. From 1821 onwards he worked as a priest and discovered his own theological foundation, expressed as a “peerless discovery.” He realized that the foundation of the church is not the Bible but the living Christ himself, present in a living, historical tradition, with baptism and the Eucharist as sacramental signs of his presence. His pamphlet *Kirkens gienmæle* (The church's retort), directed against Henrik Nikolai Clausen, a theologian at the University of Copenhagen, gives strong expression to this fundamental approach. But he was censured for this work and had to become a freelance writer.

Grundtvig made four trips to England (three between 1829 and 1831). English literature (*Beowulf*, *Exeter Book*, etc.) and the nation's mentality made a considerable impression on him. After 1832 his censure was lifted, and in 1839 he agreed to become a pastor at the Spital Church at Vartov in Copenhagen. From 1848 to 1858 he was also a member of Parliament. Grundtvig had a close relationship to Norway, and for some time he considered emigrating there. Norway had been a part of Denmark during large parts of its history, but in 1814 Norway separated from Denmark, a political development that Grundtvig deeply regretted.

Grundtvig was married three times and the father of five children. Until his death in 1872 he went on writing. One of his last poems, *Gammel nok jeg nu er blevet* (Long enough now has my life run, 1872), stands as a permanent sign of his way of living through writing and of writing his whole life into his work.

**GRUNDTVIG'S THEOLOGY OF THE HEART'S DIFFERENT VOICES.** With extraordinary symbolic power, Grundtvig recreated in his writings a traditional concept of heart-rhetoric, closely connected with the dynamic theological concept of the Christian idea of “the Living Word.” “Heart” refers to all thinkable levels and subjects within his wide-ranging engagements, where diverse voices express themselves and demand new expressions, mediated through his texts.

Grundtvig belongs inseparably within the nineteenth-century Romantic period, yet he also stands in contrast to romanticism, pointing both backwards and forwards in time. This is apparent not least in his anthropology. For him, the human being is a divine experiment. His religious philosophy is characterized by a poetic micro/macro pattern of thinking, with humankind at the center, created in God's image, in a heart-relationship with God, created and creative. Human existence is therefore a graced condition, and life amid God's material creation is a time not of religious penance as the way to Christ but of creative fulfillment of God-granted human potential: *Menneske først, kristen så*, “first a human being, then a Christian.”

In his philosophy of history, as expressed, for example, in *Christenhedens Syvstjerne* (The seven stars [or pleiades] of Christendom) (1860) and *Sang-Værk til den Danske Kirke*

(Song-work [or carillon] for the Danish church) (1836–1837), we find in coded form those historical-cultural voices out of which he constructs his narratives concerning the past. He speaks of a cultural and religious community of tongues in interactive entities (*Sangskoler*, “song-schools”), which between them chart the historical progress of Christendom. They proceed like a chorus of voices: the Hebrew “song-school,” the Greek, the Roman, the Anglo-Saxon, the German, the Nordic, and—the seventh and last—the future, or the “unknown,” which Grundtvig may have expected to be the Indian voice from Asia. A chief warranty of each of these voices is that they articulate themselves in the true language of the heart, the local mother tongue.

Grundtvig’s concept of love gathers all his thinking into one domain. He perceived love as the center of all life that is lived, its wellspring, way, meaning, and goal. In some fifteen hundred hymns he interpreted and renewed the Nordic-European ecumenical hymn rhetoric in order to mediate his existentialist-nuanced philosophy of love. He developed in new directions the metaphorical, gendered mode of expressing the divine, with special focus upon the relationship with God, in a comprehensive relationship discourse. The human being in the world is a loving and loved microcosm. Language, gender, body, continuity, process, and metamorphosis—all have a central place in the hymn rhetoric, in which he gave fresh currency to the spiritualized erotic and to erotic spirituality without ignoring the hazard of sexism. As one of the most frequently used words in his hymns, *heart* embodies both the center and wellspring of the human body and of the written texts.

In his liturgy-shaping hymn texts, Grundtvig’s gendered language of the human relationship with God comes fully into its own. He envisages the relationship with God in three main models of a dialogue modulated by the heart: the relationships between parent and child, between friends, and between lovers. This entails his construing the Trinity in different ways, to mirror human life as truly and flexibly as possible, characterized not only by multiple relational models but by androgynous conceptual models and by reciprocity as an ideal.

With the creative principle as his primary category, he re-created and renewed the European hymn tradition in a comprehensive gift rhetoric. The individual praising God in psalmody is, in Grundtvig’s linguistic-philosophical and intertextual hymn rhetoric, a representative microcosm that mirrors the macrocosm. We also meet representations of “The Daughter of God” equivalent to “The Son of God” within his experimental concept of the Trinity. In an 1870 sermon he argued—with the help of his evolved classical, gendered rhetoric of “the heart”—for women priests. A crucial point in his argument is that the absence of thoughts and feelings, germane to women and springing from the heart, harms the church at the core of its own heart.

**THE CONTRIBUTION OF HIS HYMNS.** Grundtvig’s hymns have exercised a wide, profound influence in Denmark and

beyond, notably in Norway, where they are reckoned as the country’s own cultural treasure, together with the legacy of two other great Danish hymn writers, Thomas Kingo (1634–1703, orthodoxy) and Hans Adolf Brorson (1694–1764, pietism). In the Danish *Hymnal*, Grundtvig is represented by over 250 original and reworked hymns; in the Norwegian *Hymnal*, by more than 40. The Danish hymn tradition stands in direct descent from Martin Luther’s musical-poetical hymn project used as a medium of reformation in the 1500s. The vital, musical, and ecstatic word, in glorification of the life force and in protection against the power of death, is the primary impulse in Grundtvig’s contribution to this Protestant and popular aesthetic.

**LASTING INFLUENCE AND SIGNIFICANCE.** Through his countless textual voices and his cultural, political, educational, and church activities, Grundtvig wrote himself into Danish history with a distinctive Nordic, European, and universal rhetoric. He has exercised an enormous influence on Scandinavian liturgical practice, theology, and education. In the present time, his influence on educational matters has also increased outside Scandinavia through the so-called Grundtvig Initiative, which is part of the European Union’s adult educational initiative and represents a concept that, in the modern search for popular models of social participation in a global context, has gained a substantial international foothold.

**SEE ALSO** Christianity, article on Christianity in Western Europe; Music, article on Music and Religion.

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*christelige Børnelærdom* (Christian instruction for children; 1868), the mature theologian declares himself. The church-historical visionary poet reveals himself most clearly in *Christenhedens Syvstjerne* (The seven stars [or pleiades] of Christendom; 1860). The philosophy of history that permeates this work is the same as that forming the foundation of the structure and strategy of *Sang-Værk til den Danske Kirke*. Finally, the confessional Grundtvig speaks through many sermons, for example in the three-volume collection *Christelige Prædikener eller Søndags-Bog* (Christian sermons, or the Sunday book; 1827–1830).

### Secondary Sources

Since 1963 Grundtvig scholarship has been dominated by the work of Kaj Thaning, principally his three-volume *Menneske først—Grundtvigs opgør med sig selv* (First a human—Grundtvig's battle with himself; Copenhagen, 1963), but current scholarship increasingly dissents from Thaning's interpretation. Leading works on Grundtvig's educational ideas and on Grundtvig as poet in the early nineteenth-century context are, respectively, K. E. Bugge's *Skolen for Livet. Studier over N. F. S. Grundtvigs pædagogiske tanker* (School for life: studies in N. F. S. Grundtvig's pedagogic thinking; Copenhagen, 1965), and Flemming Lundgreen-Nielsen's *Det handlende ord. N. F. S. Grundtvigs digtning, litteratur-kritik og poetik, 1798–1819* (The operative word: N. F. S. Grundtvig's authorship, literary criticism and poetics, 1798–1819; Copenhagen, 1980).

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SYNNØVE HEGGEM (2005)

**GUÉNON, RENÉ** (1886–1951), French traditionalist, metaphysician, and scholar of religions. René Guénon was born in Blois, the son of an architect. He carried out his early studies in his place of birth and went to Paris in 1904 where he pursued the field of mathematics and then philosophy, which he was later to teach. During his youth, Guénon was attracted to various occultist circles and to Freemasonry; he entered several of these orders, including the Hermetic Ordre Martiniste and the Église Gnostique. As a member of this “gnostic church” he adopted the name of Palingenius (under which he wrote several articles in the review *La gnose*) and encountered Léon Champrenaud (who had been initiated into Sufism under the name of Abdul-Haqq) and Albert de Pounourville (who had received Daoist initiation and was known as Matgioi).

Guénon left Parisian occultist circles as he became more and more aware of Eastern doctrines. In 1912 he embraced

Islam, receiving through Abdul-Hadi, a Swedish initiate, initiation and the blessing of the Egyptian Sūfī master Shaykh ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿIllaysh al-Kabīr. Guénon continued, however, to be deeply involved in the intellectual life of Paris, encountering such well-known figures as Jacques Maritain, René Grousset, and others; in 1921 he published his first book, *Introduction générale à l'étude des doctrines hindoues*, a work originally prepared as a doctoral thesis at the Sorbonne, a work that marked a major turning point in the study of Eastern doctrines in the West.

In 1930 after the death of his French wife, Guénon set out for Egypt. He spent the rest of his days in Cairo living as a Muslim and was known as Shaykh ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Yahyā. There he was to take an Egyptian wife, by whom he had two daughters and two sons. He associated closely with certain eminent Muslim authorities of Egypt, such as Shaykh ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd, later to become Shaykh al-Azhar. Guénon also carried out extensive correspondence with scholars and traditional authorities throughout the world, including Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Marco Pallis, Leopold Ziegler, Giulio Evola, and Titus Burckhardt. He was also visited by many Westerners in search of traditional teachings and by some of those in the West who, like him, were seeking to revive tradition. Foremost among the latter group was Frithjof Schuon, who visited Guénon twice in Cairo and who corresponded with him until the end of Guénon's life. During the night of January 7, 1951, Guénon died after a period of illness and was buried according to Islamic rites in a cemetery outside of Cairo.

While in Cairo, Guénon continued the incredibly fruitful intellectual life that he had begun in France, and numerous books, articles, and reviews continued to flow from his pen. The articles appeared mostly in the journal *Le Voile d'Isis*, which changed its name to *Les études traditionnelles*. The writings of Guénon include some twenty-nine books and some five hundred articles and reviews ranging over the domains of religion, metaphysics, the traditional sciences, sacred art and symbolism, occultism and esotericism, and the criticism of the modern world.

The monumental corpus of the writings of Guénon can be classified into several categories, though because of the traditional nature of his thought there is an interrelation among his various books. The *Introduction générale à l'étude des doctrines hindoues* was not simply his first work to be published; it also serves as a general introduction to all the major themes of his writings including his exposition of tradition, his criticism of the modern world, and his discussion of Eastern doctrines based upon the purely metaphysical aspects of their teachings.

A number of books by Guénon are devoted more specifically to the criticism of the modern world and to the discussion of the significance of Eastern traditions in the process of rediscovery of tradition in the West. They include *Orient et occident* (1924), *La crise du monde moderne* (1927), and *La regne de la quantité et les signes des temps* (1945). A group of

his books turn to the study of initiation and esotericism as well as the criticism of occultism and “spiritualism” as distortions and caricatures of authentic esoterism. These include *Aperçus sur l’initiation* (1946), *Le théosophisme: Histoire d’une pseudo-religion* (1921), *L’erreur spirite* (1923), and *Initiation et réalisation spirituelle* (1952). The works of Guénon dealing with metaphysics and Eastern doctrines include *L’homme et son devenir selon le Védānta* (1925), *La métaphysique orientale* (1939), *Le symbolisme de la croix* (1931), *Les états multiple de l’Être* (1932), and posthumous collections of articles such as *Études sur l’hindouisme* (1968) and *Aperçus sur l’ésotérisme islamique et le taoïsme* (1973). Guénon also wrote a number of major works on the traditional and modern sciences from the traditional point of view, such as *La grande triade* (1946), *Les principes du calcul infinitésimal* (1946), and the posthumous collections of essays, *Symboles fondamentaux de la science sacré* (1962) and *Formes traditionnelles et cycles cosmiques* (1970). Furthermore, Guénon dealt with the social and political dimensions of tradition, devoting many essays as well as his books *Autorité spirituelle et pouvoir temporel* (1929) and *Le roi du monde* (1927) to this subject. The latter work, dealing with the supreme center of tradition in this world, has remained Guénon’s most enigmatic and controversial book for later traditionalist thinkers.

In treating various traditions Guénon concentrated most of all upon the East, dealing especially with Hinduism, Daoism, and Islam (though hardly at all with Buddhism, whose traditional character he did not confirm until later in his life). But Guénon did also concern himself with the Christian tradition although not orthodoxy, devoting such works as *Aperçus sur l’ésotérisme chrétien* (1954), *L’ésotérisme de Dante* (1925), and *Saint Bernard* (1929) to specifically Christian themes. Guénon, however, identified Christian esoterism mostly with the hermetic and other esoteric currents that became integrated into the Christian tradition rather than with the Christ-given initiation at the heart of Christian rites.

Guénon’s influence continues to expand as the decades go by. His works are marked by emphasis upon tradition, universality, orthodoxy, and essentiality. Guénon appeared suddenly on the intellectual stage of Europe and sought to sweep aside with an unprecedented intellectual rigor and an iconoclastic zeal all the “isms” prevalent in modern thought ranging from rationalism to existentialism. To present the truth of tradition, he believed, he had to clear away completely all those conceptual schemes that have cluttered the mind of Western scholars the end of the Middle Ages and that have prevented them from understanding the perennial truths of tradition. Against the relativism of the day, Guénon understood these truths as principles of a divine and sacred nature from which have issued the great civilizations of East and West, including the Far Eastern, Hindu, Islamic, and traditional Christian civilizations. For Guénon the central concept of tradition does not refer to custom or habit but rather to truths rooted in ultimate reality and the spiritual

world, and to the ramifications, applications, and historical unfolding of these truths, which are made available to human beings through the revelation that lies at the heart of all religions. Guénon distinguishes between the esoteric and exoteric dimensions of tradition and asserts the necessity of the existence of both dimensions. He also distinguishes between reason and intellect and insists upon the centrality of pure intellectuality, which for him is practically synonymous with spirituality.

Guénon, moreover, insists upon the universal nature of traditional truth, which lies at the heart of diverse religious forms. He refers repeatedly to the inner unity of truth and of traditional forms, standing united in opposition to the modern world, which is based upon the forgetting of the principles of tradition.

Guénon also emphasizes the importance of orthodoxy, which he does not limit to the exoteric realm. For him tradition and orthodoxy are inseparable. To understand tradition means to grasp the significance of orthodoxy and the necessity of remaining within its fold. Guénon’s whole message is in fact based upon not only the theoretical grasp of tradition but the necessity of living within an orthodox, traditional way, without which no metaphysical truth can possess efficacy even if it is understood theoretically. There is for him no spiritual realization possible outside tradition and orthodoxy.

Guénon was also concerned with the essence of doctrines, ideas, forms, images, and symbols. His writings shed a penetrating light upon doctrines and symbols that have become opaque and meaningless in the West as a result of the loss of metaphysical knowledge. He bestowed once again upon traditional concepts and symbols their essential meaning lost for the most part in the West since the Renaissance. He also presented to the West for the first time the essential teachings of the Eastern traditions in an authentic manner, and his presentation was accepted by the living authorities of those traditions. Moreover, Guénon sought to revive tradition in the West in the light of essential, metaphysical truth and to provide the weapons necessary to combat the errors of the modern world.

Guénon must be considered as the first expositor in the West of the traditionalist school in its fullness, a school that is also identified with “perennial philosophy.” He was followed in his task of reviving traditional teachings in the West by many others, chief among them Coomaraswamy and Schuon, whose writings perfected the exposition of the *sophia perennis* and of traditional doctrines. The influence of Guénon has, furthermore, gone beyond the traditionalist school to touch numerous scholars of religion, theologians, and philosophers who often without acknowledgment have adopted some of his doctrines and teachings.

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SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR (1987 AND 2005)

**GUHYASAMĀJA.** The term *Guhyasamāja* (“Secret Assembly”) applies to the Tantra so-named, the assembly of deities in the *maṇḍala* described in this text, and sometimes to the *maṇḍala*'s central deity. The *Guhyasamāja Tantra* was composed in India by the early eighth century. The earliest datable reference to the Tantra is in a text written by Amoghavajra, a Sogdian monk active in China, namely his *Index of the Vajrasāekhara Sūtra Yoga in Eighteen Sections (Jing-gang-ding yu-qie shi-ba-hui zhi-gui*, T. 869), which he composed during the mid-eighth century. In it, Amoghavajra lists a text called the *Guhyasamāja Yoga (mi-mi-hui yu-qie)*, his description of which is clearly identifiable with portions of the Tantra. Most likely the text at this period was somewhat shorter than the ultimate version, which was established by the late tenth century when it was translated into Chinese and Tibetan.

The *Guhyasamāja Tantra* consists of eighteen chapters, the last of which is clearly a late addition and is often treated as a separate text titled the *Uttara Tantra*. It is notable for its erotic language and its avocation of transgressive practices, including the sacramental consumption of sexual fluids, as well as the consumption of other substances deemed impure by contemporary Indian society, such as feces. The *Guhyasamāja* is also one of the first Buddhist Tantras to depict its central buddhas in sexual union with consorts. The *Guhyasamāja maṇḍala* is built upon the foundation established by the *Sarvatathagāta-Tattvasamgraha*, taking the core of that *maṇḍala*, a central buddha surrounded by four other buddhas in the cardinal directions, and giving each a consort. The *maṇḍala* is thus centered upon five deity couples in sexual union. Matching this imagery, the text is replete with erotic language, most notably in its infamous opening verse: “Thus have I heard: At one time the Blessed Lord resided in the vulvas of the Adamantine Ladies [*vajrayoṣidbhageṣu*], the essence of the Body, Speech, and Mind of all *Tathāgatas*.”

The *Guhyasamāja Tantra* was revolutionary in being one of the earliest Buddhist Tantras to openly proclaim the

teaching that human sexuality could be an important or even essential component of the spiritual path. This teaching was highly controversial, as the text itself admits in chapter one, when it states that it “is a cause of doubt even for all *Tathāgatas*.” Because the literal interpretation of these textual passages was considered problematic in the Mahāyāna Buddhist monastic settings in which the Tantra has long been studied and put into practice, Indian Buddhists developed a complex hermeneutical system for the interpretation of this and other related Tantric texts. These systems were based upon the premise that the true import of the text is often not the literal meaning, but rather the secret or symbolic meanings accessible via systems of interpretation handed down in lineage instructions by masters of the traditions.

There were two traditions of exegesis and practice centering upon the *Guhyasamāja Tantra* that developed in India. The first is called the Jñānapāda school, named after its founder, Buddhajñānapāda, who lived in India during the eighth century. While not an important tradition from the perspective of contemporary Tibetan Buddhist practice, it is an important tradition historically because the writings of Buddhajñānapāda and his students contain numerous quotations from the root scripture, demonstrating that it was established by the late eighth century. The *maṇḍala* of this tradition is a relatively simple one, centering around the Buddha Mañjuvajra, who is in turn surrounded by four other buddhas: Vairocana (east), Ratnaketu (south), Amitābha (west), and Amoghasiddhi (north)—together with their consorts, Locanā, Māmakī, Pāṇḍarā, and Tārā. This inner circle is in turn surrounded by the ten “Fierce Kings,” *krodharājas*, for a total of nineteen deities.

The second school, which developed somewhat later, is known as the “Noble” (*ārya*) school, since its primary texts are attributed to Nāgārjuna (second century CE), Āryadeva (c. 170–270 CE), and Candrakīrti (c. 600–650 E). It superseded the former school, and also advocated an expanded *maṇḍala* with thirty-two deities. Its central deity is Akṣobhya Buddha, in sexual union with his consort, Sparśavajrā. In addition to the four buddha couples and ten Fierce Kings, it also added eight *bodhisattvas* and four additional goddesses. It was this school that was primarily responsible for the sophisticated system of hermeneutics that became greatly influential in Tibetan Buddhist circles.

While the *Guhyasamāja* tradition, like all other Buddhist traditions, disappeared in India during the late medieval period, its texts and practice was preserved in Nepal. In addition, the tradition was also disseminated to Tibet and East Asia. The *Guhyasamāja Tantra* was translated into Chinese by Dānapāla around 1002 CE. The ritual and practice tradition associated with it, however, did not take root in East Asia. The tradition was successfully transmitted to Tibet. The standard Tibetan version was translated by the Tibetan scholar Rin chen bzang po (Rinchen Zangpo, 958–1055 CE) and the Kāśmīri scholar Śradhākara varman around the same time, circa 1000 CE. From Tibet it was also



transmitted to Mongolia, where it remained an important and popular tradition up until the decimation of Buddhism there under the Communists. In Tibet it remained an important element of contemporary Buddhist practice. It is studied and practiced by all Tibetan Buddhist schools, although it is particularly emphasized by the Dge lugs (Gelug) school. While Buddhism in Tibet has suffered under Communist Chinese rule, the tradition remains in practice among Tibetan communities in diaspora, as well as among the Buddhist groups founded by Tibetan lamas in exile around the world.

SEE ALSO Tantrism.

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DAVID B. GRAY (2005)

#### GUIDE, SPIRITUAL SEE SPIRITUAL GUIDE

#### GUILT SEE SIN AND GUILT

**GUNAS.** *Guṇa* is a Sanskrit word etymologically suggesting a "strand" or "thread," several of which when intertwined make up a rope. The term is defined and applied in numerous ways, depending on the governing systematic assumptions and/or philosophical contexts. Four of the most common usages are described below.

The *guṇas* or "virtues" of an animate or inanimate object can be contrasted with its *doṣas*, or "faults." This sense

of the word is found in medical parlance but is not confined to that context. It is also found in Mimamsa exegesis of the merits of action, including mental and verbal activities.

Perhaps related to the foregoing, Sāṃkhya metaphysics postulates three *guṇas* as the constituents of *prakṛti*, or material nature. These three qualities are known as *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, terms that are somewhat difficult to translate into simple English. *Sattva* connotes the bright, light, buoyant, wise, good, transparent aspects of nature and all creations. *Tamas* connotes their opposites, hence what is dark, heavy, dull, bad, opaque. *Rajas* is viewed in Sāṃkhya as the catalytic or dynamic principle in things that accounts for all spiritual and material change and activity. According to Sāṃkhya, all substance, whether mental or physical, consists of a mixture of these three *guṇas* in certain proportions. During *pralaya*, the period when the material universe is reabsorbed into its unmanifest state, the three *guṇas* are in equilibrium. At the time of creation, that is, at the onset of another cycle of manifestation of the universe, an imbalance among the *guṇas* occurs, and thus differentiation takes place.

In the Vaiśeṣika system of classification, *guṇa* is the name of the second of seven categories of being. A *guṇa* in this system is a particular characteristic of an individual substance, for example, the specific patch of color that is displayed in a certain piece of cloth at a given instant. A *guṇa* for Vaisesika is a fleeting quality related for only a few moments to its possessor, which must be a substance (*dravya*). Particular colors, tastes, sounds, smells, and textures are *guṇas*; so too are numbers, contacts and disjunctions, desires and aversions, effort and awareness, as well as karmic and memory traces.

In Jainism, *guṇa* is one of three inherent qualities of every material thing (*pudgala*). Each bit of matter is a *dravya* possessing certain kinds of features (*guṇas*) that are presented in various modes (*paryāyas*). Thus a *guṇa* in Jainism is not substantial, as Sāṃkhya *guṇas* are, but neither is it adventitious or evanescent, as are Vaisesika *guṇas*. A Jain *guṇa* is a generic feature of the kind of substance comprising an individual object—earthy, hot, and so forth. The quantitative and qualitative variations of these features are their modes.

SEE ALSO Prakṛti; Sāṃkhya; Vaiśeṣika.

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KARL H. POTTER (1987)

**GUO XIANG** (d. 312 CE), Chinese thinker associated with the *xuanxue* (“dark learning” or “school of mystery”) movement. A rationalist mystic and naturalist pantheist, Guo Xiang is the author of a commentary on the *Zhuangzi*, the only text of his still extant and the best known and oldest of all the *Zhuangzi* commentaries still in existence. Guo Xiang also edited the text of the *Zhuangzi* itself. In establishing the version we have today he reduced the size of the text, chose what seemed to him to be “the best and most complete parts” to make a coherent whole, rejected some parts, and arranged the whole in thirty-three chapters. All the complete versions of the *Zhuangzi* known at present are derived from his.

Guo Xiang’s commentary both develops a personal philosophy and makes a radical reinterpretation of the *Zhuangzi*. That the universe produces itself and is not produced by another is the starting point and the central concept of Guo Xiang’s system. The universe contains all the attributes of the Absolute: it exists eternally and necessarily and is self-sufficient. Beings come into existence of themselves; their true nature is their self-beingness. They are defined as identical to themselves, and this identity is identical in each of them: thus Guo Xiang understands *Zhuangzi*’s “identity of beings” as a type of monism. The Great One (*tai*) or, sometimes, the Ether (*qi*) is the universal force that is the source of the self-production of beings; every phenomenon represents a varying state of dispersion or condensation of the Ether. But Guo Xiang escapes complete monism by admitting the notion of *fen*, “allotment” or “limit.” Beings are differentiated by the congenital limitations of their existential and social possibilities (their span of life, their natural endowment, their place in society). These limitations assign the place they must take in society and the universe, which place in turn actualizes and manifests their being. The relation that obtains between these limitations of beings (*fen*) follows a natural pattern (*li*), an immanent principle of order that is established spontaneously (*ziran*) without any external agent. In order to achieve their own totality, individuals must accept the elements that compose their being: spontaneity (a universal, natural, and nonpersonal force that lies within each of us and is distinct from the ego), limitations in time and society (*fen*), and, finally, “daily renewal” (an incessant state of change characteristic of all beings). In this way, individuals enter into a “marvelous coincidence” with themselves and with the oneness of the world, into that mystic fusion with the immanent force that produces everything and has no beginning or end.

Guo Xiang was not a Confucian. He valued Confucian virtues after the fashion of Daoists; he did not believe in a life after death, a denial incompatible with the ancestor cult. He also advocated governing by *wuwei* (noninterference), a Daoist emphasis. If he acknowledged a social life, it was because society was an inescapable fact, but he held that “names” (titles and official functions) in society were external aspects that must be “forgotten” in order to gain union with

the unutterable reality. In avowing that names were an incomplete expression of the hidden source of existence, Guo Xiang was writing against the Confucian perspective as it developed in the “school of names” (*mingjiao*). The “determinism” Guo Xiang showed was nothing more than common sense: we must cope with what is unavoidable. Yet the participation in the world he advocated was a mystical one, very near the Daoist ideal. Guo rejected everything supernatural and by so doing he came close to the Chinese “rationalists” such as Wang Chong, but because he allotted a large place to *xuan*, the Mystery, the undefinable, he is associated with *xuanxue*. Nevertheless, in denying the central role of the concept of *wu* (nonbeing)—Guo Xiang maintains *wu* is a mere negation, that it simply serves to negate the existence of anything that gives birth to beings outside themselves, and that *wu* implies a total absence of a source other than an immanent one—he is at odds with Wang Bi, the movement’s most prominent exponent. By his treatment of some of *Zhuangzi*’s terms, Guo Xiang prepared the way for the diffusion of the *Zhuangzi* among Buddhist thinkers.

**SEE ALSO** Wang Bi; *Zhuangzi*.

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ISABELLE ROBINET (1987)

**GURDJIEFF, G. I.** Georgii Ivanovich Gurdzhiv (1866–1949) was a spiritual teacher of esoteric knowledge who claimed to have discovered specific methods for developing the human consciousness toward a more awakened state. Gurdjieff was born of a Greek father and Armenian mother in Alexandropol in the Cappadocian Greek quarter on the Russian side of the Russian-Finnish border. The date of his birth is disputed to be as much as eleven years later, due perhaps to a mistake on his passport. Gurdjieff himself maintained that he was born in 1866, a date that is corroborated by a number of sources.

The gifted boy, who came to use the Russian name Gurdjieff, was carefully schooled for a career in either the Orthodox priesthood or in medicine. However, even as a teenager he was convinced of the existence of perennial wisdom and secret knowledge that held the answers to life’s ultimate questions. For this reason, Gurdjieff left the academic world

and engaged in a quest that took him to Central Asia, including upper Tibet, and the Middle East. Some of the significant events of this journey are recorded in *Meetings with Remarkable Men* (begun in 1927 and revised over the years; first published in 1963), which British director Peter Brook made into a movie in 1979.

In 1912 Gurdjieff took up residence in Moscow and attracted a circle of students there and in Saint Petersburg. Having previously read the *Tertium Organum* published in Russian in 1911 (1920 in English) by P. D. Ouspensky (1878–1947), Gurdjieff accepted Ouspensky as a pupil in 1915. The musician and composer Thomas de Hartmann (1885–1956) and his wife Olga also joined the circle. To avoid the difficulties of life during the Bolshevik Revolution, Gurdjieff led his followers to the Caucasus and stayed in Tbilisi, Georgia. There in 1919, he accepted the artist Alexandre de Salzmann (1874–1934) and his wife Jeanne as disciples. In collaboration with de Hartmann, Gurdjieff composed music based on an inversion of the Greek diatonic Dorian mode (EDCBAGFE) found in Plato's *Timaeus*. Working with his gifted pupils, Gurdjieff also choreographed 250 ensemble movements of *Sacred Dances*, which illustrated his spiritual teachings and were performed in public. He then traveled to Constantinople and to London, where the prominent editor A. R. Orage (1873–1934) joined his group.

Finally settling in France, Gurdjieff opened the Institute for the Harmonious Development of Man at Prieuré des Basses Loges at Fontainebleau-Avon in 1922. There he attracted international pupils, including the dying author Katherine Mansfield (1888–1923) from New Zealand. In 1924 he toured with a group of dancer-disciples that performed *Sacred Dances* in New York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia. While in the United States he attracted other prominent students, including the editor and writer Jane Heap (1887–1964).

After surviving a near fatal auto accident in 1924 and the trauma of his wife's death in 1926, Gurdjieff continued to teach in Prieuré until financial problems forced its closure in 1933. After another visit to the United States, he settled permanently in Paris. There he constituted an exclusively lesbian group, including the author of *The Nun's Story* (1956), Kathryn Hulme (1900–1981). In 1930 René Daumal (1908–1944) and his wife Vera joined Gurdjieff's other Parisian circle. Gurdjieff remained in Paris during the Nazi occupation. His followers helped hide Jewish members of their group. He continued to teach, and died in 1949 in Neuilly, France.

Gurdjieff remains a mysterious and controversial figure even into the twenty-first century. He has been called everything from a charlatan to a master of wisdom. Those who knew him well considered him to be a profound seeker after truth, which included the meaning in life, the origins and reasons for human existence, and the potentiality for humans to expand their consciousness. In order to achieve these ends, Gurdjieff was willing to break the rules of custom, to live an

unconventional life, and to take great risks in travel and spiritual practice.

The central idea in Gurdjieff's thought is that human consciousness can be awakened to a much greater degree than most people experience. In fact, there is a "Real I" inside all people, which can be uncovered, but only by those who are devoted to finding this divine essence in themselves. His monumental work, *Beelzebub's Tales to His Grandson* (1949), is an allegory of a being in a spaceship who observes the "hell" of life on earth and the misery of the "three-brained beings" who inhabit the planet. Humans are composed of ordinary waking consciousness, which is fictitious; the subconscious, which is closer to reality; and the state of transformation or higher consciousness, which religions might call "spirit" (*pneuma*, *buddhi*, or *ātman*). Beings who live only by the perceptions of waking consciousness are disrespectfully called "slugs" by Beelzebub's grandson, a truth seeker.

Methods for attaining the Real I included meditation at dawn and dusk, meditation on sacred music, and intense self-observation to assess one's automatic, as opposed to truly conscious, actions. The teachers Gurdjieff encountered in Russia and in the Middle and Far East were described as being on the verge of attaining or having attained this higher consciousness. At the end of *Meetings with Remarkable Men*, having discovered a sacred place, Gurdjieff wrote that "among the adepts of this monastery were former Christians, Mohammedans, Buddhists, Lamaists, and even one Shamanist. All were united by God the Truth" (p. 239).

In spite of his emphasis on experience, Gurdjieff's contribution was concerned with cosmology, metaphysics, and evolution. For example, Beelzebub teaches his grandson that all beings were "Rays of Creation" from the "Common Father Endlessness Himself" (one of the many names for the Absolute [God]). According to Gurdjieff, Charles Darwin (1809–1882) had explained little about human evolution because he did not account for the human inner nature as divine emanations. Human beings on the "minor planet earth" have lost touch with their origins and reasons for existence due to mindlessly following conventional religions and political leaders. Humans are actually governed by cosmic laws, which are a part of their psychic makeup. Tragically, humans are caught up in materialism, external success, and the unattainable goal of happiness. They are hopelessly lost unless they can return to the Real I. The final part of the *All and Everything* series, *Life Is Real Only Then, When "I Am"* (1950) deals with aspects of this teaching that are accessible only to his most devoted students. Ouspensky, in his record of Gurdjieff's talks, *In Search of the Miraculous* (1949), explains these ideas further. In 1924 Gurdjieff and Ouspensky broke off their association in spite of their similar teachings.

Gurdjieff's work was carried on by his pupil, Jeanne de Salzmann (1889–1990), who organized the Gurdjieff Foundation in 1953 in New York. The foundation dispenses the teachings of Gurdjieff and Ouspensky in London, Paris, San Francisco, and centers all over the world. The quarterly



*Gurdjieff International Review* publishes essays and commentary about Gurdjieff and his teachings.

SEE ALSO Ouspensky, P. D.

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**GURŪ.** The word *gurū* refers to a spiritual master or teacher whose gift or skill bears an esoteric dimension. Though derived from the Hindu tradition, the term *gurū* has also come to be applied to spiritual masters of other religious traditions, and to masters in other areas of expertise, such as music, dance, and even business. The Sanskrit term *gurū* was originally used in its Vedic context as an adjective meaning "heavy" or "weighty." In the Upaniṣads, it came to refer to a person who had reached the highest state of spiritual real-

ization (*mokṣa*) and who was able to lead others to the same. The *gurū* may be distinguished from a Hindu *sadhu*, in that the role of the *gurū* consists mainly in teaching disciples (*śiṣhyas*), and from an *ācārya* or *paṇḍit* in that the teaching of the *gurū* is based primarily on personal spiritual experiences rather than on traditional religious knowledge. As such, the *gurū*-disciple relationship represents the Hindu form of the phenomenon of spiritual direction that may be found in most religious traditions. The *gurū* may be regarded as the Hindu equivalent to the figure of the *kalyāna mitra* in Theravāda Buddhism, the *roshi* in Zen Buddhism, or the *lama* in Tibetan Buddhism. Parallels to the *gurū* may also be found in the figures of the *tsaddiq* within the Hasidic tradition of Judaism, the *shaykh* or *pir* in Sufism, the *stars* within the Eastern Orthodox tradition of Christianity, or the novice master and spiritual director in Catholic monasticism. In each case, the spiritual master is believed to represent the highest spiritual realization within that particular tradition, and is expected to lead others to that state both by example and by teaching. All spiritual traditions emphasize the importance of the complete surrender of the disciple to the spiritual master as a condition for spiritual growth. While most traditions regard the master-disciple relationship as only one form of religious observance, often reserved for a spiritual elite, within the Hindu religious tradition the figure of the *gurū* has come to play a central role.

**TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE GURŪ.** The importance of the *gurū* within the Hindu tradition is directly related to the pursuit of *mokṣa* (liberation) as the highest and ultimate religious goal. In the Upaniṣads, this state of *mokṣa* is expressed in terms of the realization of the nonduality of *ātman* (deepest Self) and *brahman* (ultimate reality). The *gurū* came to be regarded as the embodiment of this state, and as the only means through which it could be attained. Since the experience of *mokṣa* is considered to be unfathomable in words, it could only be exemplified and pursued through one who had already reached that state.

Thus, the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* states, “nothing that is eternal (not made) can be gained by what is not eternal (made). Let him, in order to understand this, take fuel in his hand and approach a Guru who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman” (1:2:12). In the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* the disciple addresses the *gurū* with the following words: “In this world I am like a frog in a dry well. O Saint, thou art my way, thou art my way” (1:4). Thus, the figure of the *gurū* effectively became, as David Miller put it, the “centre of sacredness” in Hinduism.

As the embodiment of the ultimate state of realization, the *gurū* came to be endowed with divine attributes. In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* it is said that “he who knows that highest Brahman, becomes even Brahman” (3:2:9). There is no higher authority in Hinduism than the one who has attained the knowledge of *brahman*. The *gurū* thus came to be regarded as God, and recognition of the divinity of the *gurū* was seen as a condition for reaching liberation: “If these truths

have been told to a high-minded man, who feels the highest devotion for God, and for his Guru as for God, then they will shine forth,—then they will shine forth indeed” (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 6:23). Disciples generally recognize the teachings of a *gurū* as the ultimate truth. While Hindu *gurūs* acknowledge the authority of the Hindu scriptures, they are autonomous in interpreting these scriptures. This explains the rich diversity of teaching traditions within Hinduism.

While a *gurū* may be regarded as God in the Hindu tradition, the authority of the *gurū* is still constituted solely by a disciple’s recognition of this divinity. It is often said in Hinduism that it is the disciple who makes the *gurū*. In the Upaniṣads, a disciple approached the *gurū* with fuel in the hand, expressing a desire to serve the *gurū* (by tending to his sacrificial fire). Upon acceptance, the disciple underwent a formal initiation (*dīkṣhā*) symbolizing a new birth from the *gurū* and incorporation within the *gurū*’s household (*gurūkula*). Disciples often remained with the *gurū* for more than a decade, practicing various forms of asceticism and self-abnegation under the guidance of the *gurū*. In later times, the religious community surrounding a *gurū* came to be called an *āśrama* (ashram). *Āśramas* usually consist of a group of core members who are totally devoted to the *gurū* and have often taken vows of celibacy and renunciation (*sannyāsa*), and of a larger group of followers who may come and stay with the *gurū* for various lengths of time without renouncing the world. However, some *gurūs* may instead adopt a more itinerant lifestyle and visit disciples in their own villages and homes.

From the outset, each relationship between *gurū* and disciple has been regarded as unique or irreplaceable. The *gurū* generally adapts the teaching to the spiritual needs and level of spiritual development of the disciple. This has at times generated an image of the *gurū* as being unpredictable. *Gurūs* often act and relate to disciples in ways that defy common sense. Disciples are expected to uncritically accept the particular teaching and discipline imparted upon them by the *gurū* and to maintain faith in the *gurū*’s capacities of discernment. Since the ultimate goal of the *gurū*-disciple relationship is not the acquisition of objective knowledge but realization of the deepest Self (*ātman*), not only the path, but also the goal of every *gurū*-disciple relationship is considered to be unique. It is only the *gurū* who is able to acknowledge the attainment of self-realization in the disciple, since, as it is said, the one who attains it “does not know, yet he is knowing, though he does not know” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4:3:30). While the attainment of the state of realization marks the end of the *gurū*-disciple relationship, Hindus generally maintain a reverence for their *gurū* throughout their lives.

The *gurū*-disciple relationship has formed the basis for the development of various teaching traditions (*sampradāyas*) within Hinduism. Each *sampradāya* is based on a lineage of teachers (*gurūparamparā*) in which the authority of a *gurū*



is legitimated by the previous *gurūs*. In the end, however, it is the capacity of a *gurū* to generate and maintain a religious commitment from disciples that sustains a tradition. Teaching traditions may disappear and new ones may emerge at any given time.

**DIFFERENT ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GURŪ.** The status and role of the *gurū* may be variously defined and legitimated within any particular teaching tradition. Certain general characteristics distinguish the conception of the *gurū* within the traditions of Advaita Vedānta, Bhakti, and Tantrism. Within Advaita Vedānta, the *gurū* is predominantly regarded as a teacher who imparts spiritual wisdom to the disciple. Śaṅkara (788–820), the founder of this tradition, framed the relationship between *gurū* and disciple in terms of *śravaṇa* (listening), *manana* (contemplation), and *nididhyāsana* (meditation). High demands are put upon a disciple who must be “a seeker after final release whose mind has been calmed, whose senses have been controlled, whose faults have been abandoned, who is acting as prescribed [in the scriptures], who is endowed with virtues, and who is always obedient” (*Upadeśasāhasrī* 1:16:72). The *gurū*, on the other hand, must be endowed with tranquility, self-control, lack of attachment to enjoyments “visible and invisible,” and freedom from faults such as “deceit, pride, trickery, wickedness, fraud, jealousy, falsehood, egotism, [and] self-interest” (*Upadeśasāhasrī* 2:1:6). The *gurū* must not only be liberated (*jīvanmukti*) but also filled with compassion and a willingness to share spiritual knowledge with others. Śaṅkara institutionalized the *gurū*-disciple relationship through the establishment of five monasteries (*maṭhas*) in Sringeri, Kanchi, Dwaraka, Puri, and Badrinath. The heads of these monasteries are called *jagadgurūs*, or “world teachers.” These teachers differ from other *gurūs* in that their responsibilities also include administration and their authority generally extends beyond their own immediate group of disciples.

Within the devotional (*bhakti*) traditions of Hinduism, the relationship between *gurū* and disciple is generally of a more affective nature. It is the love and grace of the *gurū* that is here regarded as the principal means of salvation. The *gurū* may be regarded as a divine incarnation or *avatāra*, who has the capacity to remove spiritual obstacles in the disciple. Much of the spiritual practice consists of expressions of loving devotion to the *gurū*, who is worshiped as a God. In the absence of the *gurū*, it is customary to worship the slippers, seat, statue, or picture of the *gurū*.

In the Tantric tradition, the role of the *gurū* is concentrated in the imparting of *dīkshā*, or initiation. It is here that the idea of the indispensability of the *gurū* reaches its highest expression. A disciple cannot conceive of the possibility of liberation without receiving a *mantra* and the transmission of power (*śaktipāt*) from the *gurū*. In the tradition of Kashmir Śaivism, this power is believed to awaken the spiritual energy (*kuṇḍalinī*) in the disciple, transforming him or her from within. Here, the *gurū* is often regarded as superior to God. The refrain of the *Gurū Gītā*, a text widely used within

the Tantric tradition, states, “There is nothing greater than the *gurū*.”

All three functions of the *gurū*—teaching, initiation, and imparting love and grace—may be found to various degrees in any particular *gurū*. While some *gurūs* may be clearly situated within one or the other tradition of Hinduism, most combine elements from the different Hindu traditions and even from other religious traditions within their teachings and practices.

Because of the absolute authority of the *gurū*, the Hindu tradition has always been conscious of the possibility of abuse of this authority by false *gurūs* or pseudo-*gurūs* who exploit disciples for their own purposes. In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, one is warned of “fools dwelling in darkness, wise in their own conceit, and puffed up with vain knowledge, [who] go round and round staggering to and fro, like blind men led by the blind” (1:2:8). This is why many Hindu texts enumerate in great detail the various qualities that characterize a real *gurū*. Among these, complete freedom from desire and from conceit plays a central role.

The *gurū* is of central importance in Sikhism, which is based on a lineage of ten human *gurūs*, from Sikhism’s founder Gurū Nānak (1469–1539) to its tenth leader, Gurū Gobind Singh (1666–1708), after whom *gurū*ship became enshrined in the collection of hymns known as the *Gurū Granth Sāhib*, or Sikh scriptures. God is considered as the “*Gurū* of *Gurūs*,” and some Sikhs also believe in a living *gurū*.

**MODERN DEVELOPMENTS.** Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the concept of the *gurū* has undergone a number of changes. While the function of the *gurū* was traditionally limited to the spiritual sphere, *gurūs* have become increasingly more active in the political and social realm, contributing to Indian nationalist movements and causes. Figures such as Swami Dayananda Saraswati, founder of Ārya Samāj, formulated an ideology in which spirituality was inseparable from national identity. The combination of spiritual and political authority was also evident in a figure like Mohandas Gandhi. Many Hindu *gurūs* are actively involved in the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the religious or ideological branch of the political Bharatiya Janatha Party (BJP). While *gurūs* traditionally focused on individual and purely spiritual relationships with disciples, these *gurūs* have developed more public roles as advisors to political leaders and advocates of political agendas.

A second development has been the internationalization of the mission and following of Hindu *gurūs*. The popularity of a number of Hindu *gurūs* (Rāmākrishna Paramahansa, Aurobindo Ghose, Ramana Maharshi, Paramahansa Yogānanda, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, Swami Muktaṇanda, Krishnamurti, Bhagavan Shree Rajneesh, Sathya Sai Baba, etc.) has led to the development of *āśramas* and centers in many countries outside India and to new challenges of tending to the spiritual needs of disciples from very different cul-

tural and religious backgrounds, including many who live a great distance from the *gurū*. While most of the more famous *gurūs* have come to spend much of their time traveling throughout the world visiting disciples who gather in large numbers to receive their *darśan* (vision), others remain in India and have disciples from all over the world visit them there. The international outreach of some *gurūs* and the increase in funds and material support has also led to new styles of teaching through high-tech means of communication. This has led to shifts in the traditional concept of the *gurū*-disciple relationship. Whereas a personal relationship with the *gurū* was traditionally regarded as an essential dimension of spiritual growth, such intimacy and personal guidance has come to be replaced by very brief moments of nonverbal exchange. In most cases, however, the belief that the *gurū* knows each disciple personally and attends from a distance to his or her spiritual needs has been preserved. Another result of the internationalization of Hindu *gurūs* is the rise of non-Indian disciples to the status of *gurū*. This may occur through appointment and succession within an established lineage of *gurūs*, or through independent forms of imitation of the Indian *gurū*-disciple relationship. Such developments have raised questions regarding the traditional understanding of Hindu identity.

One of the most remarkable developments of the twentieth century was the emergence of female *gurūs*. While women were never explicitly excluded from the possibility of assuming spiritual authority in Hindu texts, and while a number of women have been recognized as important Hindu saints in the course of history, women did not assumed roles of spiritual leadership until the beginning of the twentieth century. One of the first renowned female *gurūs* was Ānandamayī Mā (1896–1982). Though a wandering ascetic, she came to be widely sought out for spiritual direction and advice. Numerous other female *gurūs* have since gained popularity and fame, including outside India. Some of these female *gurūs* were appointed as successor to their own male *gurū*. But some became recognized purely on the basis of their own spiritual power and authority. Though female *gurūs* are generally considered to be beyond gender, they are more often identified with the goddesses of India, and their affection for disciples is often expressed in explicitly nurturing gestures (such as touching or hugging). Female *gurūs* may be found in all strands of Hinduism, from the contemplative and nondualist traditions and the Tantric schools to the more devotional traditions. They continue the long Hindu tradition of the importance of personal spiritual experience and realization, and enrich that tradition with a distinctive form and flavor. The figure of the *gurū* thus remains at the heart of Hinduism, even as this religion and its concept of the *gurū* continue to change over time.

**SEE ALSO** Ashram; Avatāra; Bhakti; Brahman; Gurū Granth Sāhib; Kuṇḍalinī; Mantra; Mokṣa; Nānak; Saṁnyāsa; Sikhism; Tantrism, overview article.

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CATHERINE CORNILLE (2005)

## GURŪ GOBIND SINGH SEE SINGH, GOBIND

**GURŪ GRANTH SĀHIB.** The Sikhs' full title for their scripture, the *Ādi Granth*, is *Ādi Srī Gurū Granth Sāhibjī*. More generally they refer to it as *Gurū Granth Sāhib*. *Srī*, *Sāhib*, and *jī* are all honorifics, conveying the Sikhs' reverence for this volume of scripture. This entry complements the encyclopedia's *Ādi Granth* entry by focusing upon the text as *Gurū* and the practical implications of this status,

rather than upon its content, structure, and message. Sikhs regard the *Ādi Granth* as their living Gurū in succession, at his command, to Gurū Gobind Singh and his nine human predecessors, starting with Gurū Nānak. According to his follower, Bhāi Nand Lāl, Gurū Gobind Singh's last words before his death in 1708 were: "Whoever wishes to hear the Gurū's word should wholeheartedly read the *Granth* or listen to the *Granth* being read." Whereas the word *gurū* in Hindu usage refers to teachers generally, and in contemporary parlance more widely it is applied to any expert, Sikhs reserve the word for their ten Gurūs, for the *Gurū Granth Sāhib*, and for God—hence the need for a capital *G* in the Roman alphabet.

The Sikhs' place of worship, the *gurdwārā* (i.e., "doorway of the Gurū"), is such only by virtue of the presence of the Gurū in the form of the *Gurū Granth Sāhib*. Conversely, any room in which the *Gurū Granth Sāhib* is appropriately installed is a *gurdwārā*. Those who enter do so only after taking off their footwear and covering their heads (if they are not already wearing a turban).

**USE OF TEXT IN WORSHIP.** The text of the scripture plays several roles in Sikh worship. Each day the pages are opened at random for a *vāk* (utterance) or *hukam* (order) that is regarded as guidance for the day. The passage that is read is the first stanza on the left hand page, which will be read from the beginning even if this is on the previous page. The *vāk* from Sikhs' holiest shrine, the Harmandir Sāhib (the Golden Temple) in Amritsar (Punjab, India) is now disseminated worldwide by the internet, as the daily *hukam-nāmā* (command, edict). Some of the *vāks* from the Harmandir Sāhib have attained historic status because of their pertinence to a particular situation. In 1920, for example, a *vāk* resolved (in the affirmative) the question of whether converts from the lowest caste should be allowed to offer *prasād* (blessed food) that is distributed to the congregation.

The scriptures are read aloud in worship and also sung. Almost the entire text is arranged according to musical modes (*rāgs*, i.e., *rāgas*). The *shabads* (hymns) are sung by *rāgīs* (musicians) to the accompaniment of instruments. These usually include the *tablā* (pair of hand drums) and at least one harmonium, and often a *saurangī* (similar to a violin) and a *chimtā* (literally "fire tongs") that is inset with disks like those in a tambourine. By singing and listening one is steeped in the *gurbānī* (the Gurū's utterance) and so this is a form of *nām simaran* (i.e., remembrance of the Name, in the sense of divine reality encapsulated). Musical rendering of the scripture is known as *kīrtan* and in this way Sikhs express their devotion.

*Pāth* (pronounced like English *part*) is the word for a reading of the scripture. *Akhand pāth* means unbroken reading and so denotes a forty-eight-hour reading of the entire *Gurū Granth Sāhib*. Such readings are held to mark both happy and sad occasions. Most people gather for the commencement and the culmination of the reading. Individual

readers take turns to read in shifts, and the family who organize the *akhand pāth* provides food for all who read or attend.

The *Gurū Granth Sāhib* plays a part at significant life cycle rites, commencing with the naming of infants. When parents bring their baby to the *gurdwārā*, the *granthī* opens the volume at random, as for a *vāk*, and reads out the initial for the child's forename. This is the first letter of the stanza with which the left hand page starts.

A Sikh couple is deemed to be married when they have completed the central marriage rite of circumambulating the volume four times. In this way the *Gurū Granth Sāhib* is at the heart of the ceremony, as its witness. Moreover, it provides the Lāvān hymns that are read and then sung as the couple proceeds round. The Lāvān, composed by the fourth Gurū, Rām Dās, celebrate the soul's movement towards full union with God.

Although the *Gurū Granth Sāhib* is not present at a cremation, it is the Sohilā, the hymns from the *Gurū Granth Sāhib* that mark the close of the day, that will be sung at this time. It is also customary for a complete reading of the scriptures to take place following a death. The reading may be an *akhand pāth* or may be an intermittent reading over seven or ten days.

Like the life cycle, daily life too is punctuated by the reading or hearing of select passages of scripture. Devout Sikhs begin each day by bathing (between 3:00 and 6:00 AM) and singing or chanting Gurū Nānak's Japjī. A selection of hymns, known as Sodar Rahirās, is recited in the early evening and the day ends with the selection of hymns entitled Sohilā.

Sikhs' annual festivals are preceded by an *akhand pāth*, which concludes on the morning of the festival day, and the largest-scale celebrations involve bearing the *Gurū Granth Sāhib* in a procession, known as a *nagar kīrtan*, through the streets. Often the volume is carried in a vehicle serving as a temporary mobile *gurdwārā*.

**GURŪ GRANTH SĀHIB AS THE GURŪ'S EMBODIMENT.** The litany at the conclusion of Sikhs' principal congregational prayer, the Ardās, affirms that the scriptures are "*paragat gurān kī deh*," "the Gurū's body made manifest." This dictates the physical treatment of the volume in ways appropriate for a revered Indian spiritual teacher. Account is taken of whether it is day or night, and other details such as seasonal temperature may also be considered in deciding where the volume is placed at night or how warmly it is covered. The *Gurū Granth Sāhib* spends the day reposing on a cushioned, canopied stand, the *pālkī* (literally palanquin). When not being read it is covered by *rumālās*, brightly colored covers which devotees make from velvety or satiny fabric. When open the volume is fanned by an attendant who waves a *chaur* (*chaurī* or *chanwar*) above it. The *chaur* usually consists of a switch of silvery hair from a horse or yak's tail that is mounted in a wooden or metal handle. Like the *pālkī* and *chananī* (canopy) this has come to symbolize sovereign au-



thority, because in the heat of India in the days before electricity dignitaries would be kept cool by being fanned in this way by a servant.

In the late evening the *Gurū Granth Sāhib* is carried ceremonially (on a Sikh's head) to its place of rest. This is often a room in which the volume is literally put to bed. For this bedroom the name is *sach-khand*, the realm of truth, a name which it shares with the last stage of the spiritual journey as mapped out by Gurū Nānak.

Because the *Gurū Granth Sāhib* is treated as a living Gurū relatively few Sikhs have a copy at home, unless they can set aside a room for its use. Instead Sikhs usually keep a *gutkā* (handbook) containing the *nitnem*—that is, those passages from the *Ādi Granth* and from the *Dasam Granth* (the scripture traditionally attributed to Gurū Gobind Singh) that are used liturgically. If a family holds an *akband pāth* at home, a room will be cleared of furniture, the *Gurū Granth Sāhib* is brought from the *gurdwārā* and installed under a canopy. While the Gurū is in the house no nonvegetarian food is cooked, and before coming into the Gurū's room people remove footwear and cover their heads.

The sanctity of the *Ādi Granth* as the Gurū's physical embodiment means that the scripture is printed, bound, and transported with special care. Employees of the press in Gurdwārā Rāmsar, Amritsar, undertake to abstain from tobacco and alcohol. Any "waste paper" is cremated in accordance with Sikh tradition. The bound copies are individually wrapped in a *rumālā* and transported to *gurdwārās* in specially appointed luxury buses.

**TEXTUAL SCHOLARSHIP AND TRANSLATION.** Sikhs' reverence for the scripture as the living Gurū has discouraged scholarly analysis of the text. During the latter half of the twentieth century, however, some scholars, including Gurinder Singh Mann, sought to understand the complexities of the *Ādi Granth's* compilation. Textual study by Hew McLeod from New Zealand and the Sikh scholars Piar Singh and Pashaura Singh resulted in hostile outbursts from some Sikhs and the boycotting of the scholars concerned. The sense of outrage has to be understood in the context not only of Sikhs' veneration of the *Gurū Granth Sāhib* as the Gurū's living embodiment, but also of their insecurity as a religious minority during a period (the 1980s and 1990s) of violent political instability in Punjab.

One controversial textual issue is why there are discrepancies between different recensions (*bīrs*) of the *Ādi Granth*—that is, between the early-seventeenth-century Kartārpur *bīr* and the early-eighteenth-century Damdamā *bīr*, on the one hand, and on the other hand another seventeenth-century recension known as the Banno *bīr*, which came to be widely respected by eighteenth-century Sikhs. According to a long-accepted view, while the Kartārpur *bīr* was being taken for binding to Lahore, another was prepared by Bhāi Banno, but his additions were not approved by Gurū Arjan Dev. Another theory (Pashaura Singh's on the basis of

extensive study) is that the Banno group, who held to a less militant style of Sikhism than was emerging after the fifth Gurū's violent death, supported the Banno *bīr* which omitted *dhunīs* (heroic tunes) and included, *inter alia*, a verse by Mīrā Bāī, a woman devotee of Kṛṣṇa, and a poem mentioning a Hindu head-shaving rite.

Translation of the text also began contentiously as Ernst Trumpp, the first translator, was conspicuously insensitive to Sikh sentiment. Subsequently, and thanks in no small part to the devoted labors of the next translator, Arthur Max Macauliffe, translation has been less controversial than textual criticism. English translations of the entire text have been appearing since Trumpp's 1877 version but not for liturgical use. The *Gurū Granth Sāhib* that is installed in *gurdwārās* is always the 1,430-page *Gurmukhī* text, in fact a copy of the *Damdāmā bīr*. (*Gurmukhī*, literally "from the mouth of the Gurū," is the name for the script used both by the Sikh scripture and for the modern Punjabi language.)

Some attempts to translate the *Gurū Granth Sāhib's* medieval mystical verse into a contemporary non-Indic language have produced stilted English and/or a skewing of underlying concepts. The fact that the opening formula "*ik oan kāṛ*" can—arguably less tendentiously—be translated as "One reality is" (Nikky-Guninder Kaur Singh) as well as the popularly accepted "There is one God," epitomizes the difficulty for translators. The gendering of language about the divine reality by successive translators has conveyed the impression of a male God, which Nikky-Guninder Kaur Singh and other contemporary scholars have challenged. For example, the original text contains no equivalent to the English words *he* and *his*, which are introduced by most translators in the interests of a fluent English rendering of many verses about the divine principle.

**SEE ALSO** *Ādi Granth*; *Dasam Granth*; Gender and Religion, article on Gender and Sikhism; Gurū; Nānak.

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**Internet Resources**

English renderings are of the *Gurū Granth Sāhib* are available on the internet at [www.sikhnet.com/sggs/translation/0005.html](http://www.sikhnet.com/sggs/translation/0005.html) and [www.sikhs.org/english/frame.html](http://www.sikhs.org/english/frame.html).

ELEANOR NESBITT (2005)

**GURŪ NĀNAK** SEE NĀNAK

**GU YANWU** (*tzu*, Ningren; *hao*, Tinglin; 1613–1682), a founder of the “school of evidential research” (*kaozheng*). Gu Yanwu was born to the scholarly life. He was from Kunshan, Jiangsu province, in Southeast China, a region renowned for its historians and philosophers. His forebears were distinguished intellectuals, passionate readers and collectors of books. From the age of eleven, Gu was taught to read the encyclopedic originals of historical works rather than the standard abridgments. His upbringing instilled in him the highest standards of Confucian moral conduct.

At an early age, Gu’s parents sent him to be adopted as the heir of his father’s cousin, who had died in his teens. He was raised by his adoptive grandfather and by the fiancée of the deceased cousin, who insisted on living as his widow. This woman’s extraordinary devotion to her fiancé’s family won her public recognition and an imperial title, “Chaste and Filial.” Gu Yanwu later expressed his admiration for his foster mother in a laudatory biography.

In 1644 the Manchus conquered North China, bringing an end to the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The next year they drove south and conquered Jiangsu. During the siege, in which several of his relatives were killed or wounded, Gu fled with his foster mother to a remote village. When the Manchu victory was imminent, his mother starved herself to death as an act of loyalty to the Ming, exacting from her son a vow never to serve the Manchus.

In the early years of Manchu rule, Gu Yanwu, like many in the Southeast, resented the Manchus and clung to the hope that the Ming might be restored. Gu may even have covertly aided the resistance government headed by an exiled Ming prince. As time passed, many accepted the finality of the Ming defeat and made their peace with the new regime. The Manchus, for their part, courted the holdouts by means of the *boxue hongci*, a special examination in 1679 to select candidates for a lavish imperial project on Ming history. The court invited the support of leading intellectuals to dissipate the last vestiges of resistance in the Southeast; the “invitation” was in fact a command performance. Gu Yanwu was one of the few who did not take this examination; he escaped by working behind the scenes to have friends remove his name from the invitation list. Even after he had personally accepted the finality of the Ming defeat, he felt bound to honor his vow to his mother.

In 1657, Gu Yanwu narrowly escaped assassination by a personal enemy with whom he had been embroiled in a

land dispute. To avert further harassment, Gu moved north and spent the remainder of his life separated from family and regional friends. In earlier years, he had turned in times of trouble to ancestral veneration, both to honor the heritage of his ancestors and to seek their guidance. In the North, he worshiped regularly at the tombs of the Ming imperial family, ritually renewing his commitment never to serve the Manchus, and hence honoring the memory of his mother.

The values and ritual practices of Confucianism gave meaning and structure to the life of Gu Yanwu. His scholarship was inspired and informed by his deep personal commitment to the Confucian Way.

Gu Yanwu charged that Confucian scholarship of the Song (960–1279) and Ming was so speculative and tainted by Buddhism that it lost sight of the core of the tradition. He echoed the scholars of the late Ming in their call for practical learning (*shixue*). Confucian scholarship could be effective only if it were solidly grounded in the authentic Way of the sages, which was expounded in the Confucian classics. For many centuries, however, Confucians, while venerating the classics as a kind of sacred canon, had distorted their true meaning by citing passages out of context or fabricating baseless interpretations. Inspired by Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) commentaries, Gu advocated a close reexamination of the classics, seeking to reconstruct the actual pronunciations and meanings of the original texts. He built on late Ming scholarship in phonology and philology, broadening the method by bringing to bear an enormous range of evidence. His work became the benchmark of evidential research.

Gu extended the methodology of *kaozheng* beyond classical studies. The broad-ranging collection of evidence and meticulous cross-checking of data were applied to such areas as water management, geography, and epigraphy. Gu did not limit his research to written materials; he made use of artifacts, interviews, and trips to the field. His energetic scholarship inspired several generations of intellectuals, many of whom did not appreciate the commitment to the Confucian Way that motivated his work.

Scholars have compared the legacy of *kaozheng* to the European Renaissance (Liang, 1959, p. 11, and Yü, 1975, p. 128) or to the Reformation (Hou, 1962–1963, p. 250). A more appropriate comparison might be made to the historical-critical movement in biblical scholarship, which arose alongside the European Enlightenment. Both movements claimed that misinterpretations of the canon had obscured the true teachings and exposed their traditions to dangers and heresies. Both sought to recover the true core of the teachings by means of the most rigorous historical and critical tools available. Both were occasionally misconstrued as secularizations of their traditions. Gu Yanwu devoted himself to rigorous scholarship in order to recover the solid foundations of the Way of the sages.

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search. His broader scholarly approach is best embodied in his *Rizhi lu* in 32 *juan*, "Guoxue jiben congshu," vol. 14, edited by Wang Yunwu (Taipei, 1968), a collection of erudite notes on a wide range of subjects that were revised throughout his life whenever he found a new bit of relevant information. The *Gu Tinglin shi wenji*, "Guoxue jiben congshu," vol. 317, edited by Wang Yunwu (Taipei, 1968), contains important letters and prefaces that articulate in succinct form the principles behind his scholarly approach.

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JUDITH A. BERLING (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**GYNOCENTRISM** (derived from the Greek *gyno*, meaning "woman," and *kentron*, meaning "center") is a radical feminist discourse that champions woman-centered beliefs, identities, and social organization. It also challenges the androcentric promotion of masculine standards as normative, and the presentation of those standards as neutral rather than gendered. Consequently, from a gynocentric perspective, the assumption of masculine-neutral norms has meant that femininity has traditionally been presented as deficient, secondary, and lacking. Gynocentric feminism is concerned, therefore, to revalue sexual difference and femininity positively.

**THEORIES OF GYNOCENTRISM.** The literary scholar Elaine Showalter was one of the first feminists to develop a systematic program that was critical of the androcentrism of mainstream literary studies and that sought instead to illuminate the "subculture" of women writers and readers. She coined the term *gynocritics* to refer to this project, suggesting in her article "Towards a Feminist Poetics" (1986) that:

The program of gynocritics is to construct a female framework for the analysis of women's literature, to develop new models based on the study of female experience, rather than to adapt male models and theories. Gynocritics begins at the point when we free ourselves from the linear absolutes of male literary history, stop trying to fit women between the lines of male tradition, and focus instead on the new visible world of female culture. (p. 131)

Showalter thus argued for the realignment of the conceptual standpoints of literary studies by seeing women's writing as primary, rather than as marginal. For her, it was a matter of identifying the difference in women's writing and of demonstrating how the psychodynamics of female creativity shaped women's literary productions and readings differently from those of men. In order to identify female difference, the gynocritical approach sought to study the history, styles, themes, genres, and structures of writing by women, as well as the constraints on, and impact of, female literary traditions. The aim of gynocritics was the transformation and redefinition of the androcentric parameters of the study of literature.

Showalter's gynocritical approach coincided with, and reflected, a shift in second wave feminism away from the promotion of the humanist ideal of gender-neutral equality, towards a model of liberation that affirmed female experience. Iris Marion Young, in her essay "Humanism, Gynocentrism, and Feminist Politics" (1990), outlines the benefits of this change in emphasis, arguing that:

[G]ynocentric feminism finds in women's bodies and traditional feminine activity the source of more positive values. Women's reproductive processes keep us linked with nature and the promotion of life to a greater degree than men's. Female eroticism is more fluid, diffuse, and loving than violence-prone male sexuality. Our feminine socialization and traditional roles as mothers give us a capacity to nurture and a sense of social cooperation that may be the only salvation of the planet. (p. 79)

Gynocentric feminism thus promoted a vision of femininity at odds with traditional androcentric and misogynist formulations, neatly reversing the values that had been traditionally assigned to women. In doing so, it simultaneously rehabilitated those aspects of femininity that were historically belittled or maligned, and articulated a theory of female difference in contrast to, and against, a masculine logic of neutrality.

For Showalter, writers like Adrienne Rich and Susan Griffin have exemplified gynocritical writing, as has Hélène

Cixous's theorization of *l'écriture féminine* (feminine writing and language). Within religious studies, the gynocentric approach has been epitomized by the feminist theologian Mary Daly, and by Goddess feminists who have argued that patriarchal religions have promoted detrimental and erroneous models of femininity, which can only be corrected by developing an inspirational, woman-centered ontology rooted in female experience.

**CRITIQUES OF GYNOCENTRISM.** However important the restoration of dignity to women may have been for many feminists, the viability of the gynocentric approach has been subject to sustained criticism for some time. The most common critique has been the suggestion that reliance on a theory of sexual difference—where femininity is promoted as the source of values by which to criticize androcentrism and to realize a better society—is problematic in that it depends on ahistorical, essentialist, and universalist ideas about gender attributes. Moreover, it is contradictory for feminists to advocate binary thought (in this case male/female, with the qualities that accrue to each member of the pair simply reversed). The idea of an essentialized femininity confronting an equally essentialized masculinity is not a coherent feminist strategy for the defeat of misogyny; on the contrary, it reifies the very system it seeks to undo by invoking the dichotomous logic that many feminists have argued is the mechanism by which male-dominant hierarchies are sustained (see Moi, 1989, pp. 125–126; and Young, 1990, pp. 87–90, for a more detailed critique of gynocentric feminism). Gynocentrism is perhaps best seen as a transitional phase in feminist theory, one that was probably necessary for addressing the wholesale marginalization of women's voices, but which has been critically adjusted as gender theory has emerged as a preferable mode for understanding sexual identity and for challenging notions of gender neutrality.

**SEE ALSO** Androcentrism; Feminism, article on Feminism, Gender Studies, and Religion.

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**GYŌGI** (670–749), born Koshi no Obito, was a Buddhist monk who popularized Japanese Buddhism during the Nara period (710–784). According to the *Genkō shakusho*, a collection of biographies of priests, Koshi no Obito was born in the Kubiki district of Echigo (present-day Niigata prefecture) to a family that claimed to be descended from Korean royalty. In his youth, because he was so often in the company of birds and cows, he was called Ushitori ("cowbird"), but he soon began to concern himself instead with the needs of his fellow people. His ministrations on behalf of common people attracted hundreds of followers. At the age of fifteen, he "left the world" (i.e., took mendicant orders) and entered Yakushiji, one of the seven great Nara temples. Under the guidance of the monks Eki, Dōshō, and Gien he became acquainted with the doctrines of the Hossō (Skt., Yogācāra) school of Buddhism.

In 694 Gyōgi was ordained a monk by Tokuei, who administered the 250 full monastic precepts (*gusokukai*; Skt., *upasampadā*). He later retired with his mother to Mount Ikona in order to practice austerities. In this action Gyōgi, whose religious name means "foundation of ascetics," followed the example of the mountain ascetic (*hijiri*) En no Gyōja, who had done the same a few decades earlier.

Gyōgi did not persist in this life of retreat, however. Soon he started to travel extensively and to propagate Buddhism, not only in its religious, but also in its magical aspects. At the same time he undertook numerous projects that demanded strenuous physical labor: He constructed roads, built bridges and dikes, and planned and dug out irrigation canals. Gyōgi was a remarkable sculptor and artisan; he in-

vented a new kind of earthenware and is credited with the introduction of the potter's wheel. Also active in welfare work, he built free clinics and lodging houses. In the province of Kii he built forty-nine Buddhist temples. In all these activities he was convinced that his engagement in manual labor was an "expedient means" (*upāya*) to *nirvāna*. Hence his testimony: "That I have attained [understanding of] the *Lotus Sūtra* was possible only through making firewood, gathering herbs, drawing water, and laboring thus." In his sermons he stressed that there was no antagonism between Shintō and Buddhism, and he tried to reconcile Shintō gods and buddhas. It is not accurate, however, to trace to Gyōgi the origin of Ryōbu Shintō, or Shintō-Buddhist syncretism.

Gyōgi's activities and sermons earned the high esteem of Emperor Shōmu (r. 724–749). In 745 he appointed Gyōgi to the office of *daisōjō*, the highest office in the Buddhist hierarchy. At that time, Gyōgi was also sent by the emperor to the sun goddess Amaterasu's shrine at Ise, bearing a Buddhist relic as a present to the deity. By that gift he hoped to receive her approval for the construction of a huge statue of Buddha Vairocana (the Daibutsu) to be erected in the Tōdaiji in Nara, a large temple that had been completed a few years earlier. In a dream Shōmu received the answer of the sun goddess, who said: "This land is the country of the gods. [The people] should worship them. But the wheel of the sun is Dainichi Nyorai [Skt., Mahāvairocana]." With these words Amaterasu identified herself with Buddha Vairocana. Thereupon, Gyōgi traveled about the country to collect money and gold for the construction of the Daibutsu. Although in his lifetime Gyōgi was already considered a *bodhisattva*, he was not granted this title by the emperor until the year of his death. He is considered to be the manifestation of Mañjuśrī, the *bodhisattva* of divine wisdom. Gyōgi died in Tōnanin Hall of Sugiwarara Temple in 749.

**SEE ALSO** En no Gyōja.

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J. H. KAMSTRA (1987)



# H

**HAAVIO, MARTTI** (1899–1973) was a Finnish poet, folklorist, and scholar of comparative mythology and phenomenology of religion whose multifaceted career and comprehensive scholarship stemmed from a deep knowledge of Finnish history. After a childhood spent in Lutheran vicarages in Ostrobothnia, Tavastia, and southwestern Finland, which gave him a taste of the diversity of Finnish folklife, he became one of its leading scholars, analyzing Finnish language, literature, folklore, religion, and culture. As a poet who published under the pseudonym P. Mustapää, Haavio also introduced modernism into Finnish poetry while emphasizing its roots in the past.

Haavio began his scholarly work as a student of Kaarle Krohn, who was the University of Helsinki's first professor of Finnish and comparative folklore, in 1908. Haavio's doctoral dissertation *Kettenmärchenstudien* was based on the principles set forth in Krohn's *Der finnische Arbeitsmethode* (The Finnish work method). The dissertation was published in *Folklore Fellows Communications* (FFC) in 1929, a long-standing folklore series that was later edited by Haavio himself.

In the 1930s field experience and work as director of the Folklore Archives of the Finnish Literature Society made Haavio an expert on various folklore genres, both prose narrative and oral poetry as well as folk beliefs. The genre of Karelian saints legends was introduced as a result of his fieldwork with Nastja Rantsi, a narrator and singer of saints' legends in Onega. Haavio's archive-oriented research produced numerous titles, including *Suomalaisen muinaisrunouden maailma* (The world of Finnish old poetry, 1935); *Suomalaiset kodinhaltijat* (Finnish guardian spirits, 1942), a geographical and psychological study of Finnish folk belief; and *Viimeiset runonlaulajat* (The last rune singers, 1943).

Haavio's rich scholarly output deserves a more thorough presentation than this brief article can undertake. Unfortunately the bulk of his work remains untranslated, despite its many valuable insights into the study of comparative religions. The few samples translated include *Väinämöinen, Eternal Sage* (FFC 144, 1952), a study on the roles of the main hero of the Kalevala (the Finnish national epic) as Orpheus, creator god, and shaman and the oral tradition behind them; *Essais folkloriques* (Studia Fennica 8, 1959), a comparison

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CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT CORNER. *Vitruvian Man* by Leonardo da Vinci, c. 1490. [©Bettmann/Corbis]; Thirteenth-century relief of the wheel of the sun chariot from Sūrya Temple in Konarak, India. [The Art Archive/Dagli Orti]; Wooden figures of gods at Marae, a temple site near Honaunau, Hawai'i. [©Werner Forman/Art Resource, N.Y.]; The ancient Egyptian god Horus, at Edfu, Egypt. [©Christine Osborne/Corbis]; Eighth-century Chinese horse. [©Royal Ontario Museum/Corbis].

of Finnish sacred vocabulary with Homer, the *Edda*, and other mythological traditions; *Heilige Haine in Ingermanland* (FFC 189, 1963), which compares regional phenomenology of religion on Ingrian sacred groves to Greek *temenos* and Egyptian Osiris.

Haavio's contributions to the disciplines of comparative religion, mythology, and phenomenology of religion in particular could be better appreciated if more of his research were translated. His ability to analyze and write is comparable to that of the well-known religious historian Mircea Eliade. What unites these two scholars is their shared ability to build an intuitive bridge from a single mythical symbol or sacred space to universal spheres of meaning and comprehension.

In his fieldwork Haavio was a master of qualitative methods. He rejected the quantification typical of Krohn and the Finnish Folklore School as well as the sociological approach that emerged after World War II. His emphasis on field observations as purely individual experiences that could not be replicated by any other observer stem from his training in Finnish ethnography but are also related to his perspective as a mainstream scholar and poet.

Haavio's first memoir *Nuoruusvuodet* (Years of youth) is a chronicle of the years 1906 to 1924, but it was not published until 1972. After his death in 1973, his notes and correspondence were compiled by his wife, Aale Tynni, an Ingrian-born poet, and his daughter Katariina Eskola completed their publication through 2003 as a series of books of his correspondence with *Autius lehtipuissa*, a unique narrative history of Finland, filtered through the life and times of a multitalented man.

**SEE ALSO** Finno-Ugric Religions.

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JUHA PENTIKÄINEN (2005)

**HABOUS** SEE WAQF

**HADAD** SEE ADAD

**HADES** is the Greek name for the underworld and its ruler. The spelling of the name sometimes varies (Aides, Hades, Aidoneus), but the etymology seems now reasonably clear. Appropriately, it is linked to the root *\*a-wid-* (invisible, unseen): Hades' wolf's cap is worn by the goddess Athena in the *Iliad* and makes her invisible (5.844–845). Most likely, Hades first denoted a place name and was personified only later.

Hades is a shadowy god in Greece. He has few myths, fewer cults, and is not even represented with certainty on archaic Greek vases. Homer (*Iliad* 15.187–193) mentions that Hades acquired the underworld through a lottery with his brothers Zeus and Poseidon. The passage is one more example of the increasingly recognized Oriental influence on early Greek literature, since it ultimately derives from the Akkadian epic *Atrahasis*. There is an obscure allusion in the *Iliad* (5.395–397) that Hades was wounded by Heracles "at Pylos among the dead." This myth is probably part of Heracles' function as Master of Animals and suggests that the personification of Hades dates back to the Bronze Age.

However, the most famous myth of Hades is his abduction of Persephone, which was localized at various spots in the Greek world. The oldest version is related by the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, which probably dates from the first half of the sixth century BCE. When Persephone was frolicking with her friends, "the deep-bosomed daughters of Ocean," on a meadow, picking flowers, Hades carried her off on his golden chariot. Her mother, Demeter, went everywhere to search for her daughter, but eventually it was Hermes who persuaded Hades to release Persephone. However, before doing so, he tricked her into eating seeds of the pomegranate. This meant that she had to spend part of the year with Hades in the underworld and part of the year with her mother in the upper world. The couple became worshiped as Plouton and Kore or, as in Eleusis, Theos and Thea. Understandably, the Greeks could not imagine them to be with children, as the underworld was imagined to be an infertile place. As Persephone was also associated with love and marriage and an abduction was part of Spartan wedding rites, the myth would originally have been a narrative representation of prenuptial girls' rites, although at some point it had become connected with the Eleusinian mysteries.

A god like Hades could hardly receive a cult, and Elis seems to have been the only place that worshiped him in a temple, which could be opened only once a year, with only the priest having access to the temple. Hades was indifferent to offerings and not moved by prayer. His connection with the underworld made him "horrible" (*Iliad* 8.368) and even an eater of corpses (Sophocles, *Electra* 542–543). Fear made people euphemistically refer to him as, for example, "Zeus of the Underworld" (*Iliad* 9.457), "the chthonian god" (Aes-



chylus, *Persians* 629), or even “the god below” (Sophocles, *Ajax* 571).

Evidently, there was not an authoritative tradition about Hades’ appearance. In his *Alcestis* (259–262) Euripides lets the homonymous heroine exclaim: “He stares at me from under his dark-eyed brow. He has wings: it’s Hades,” but normally Hades was wingless in Greek art. In representations of the kidnapping of Persephone, Hades is sometimes depicted as a young man, but he can equally be mature or even old. His positive side comes to the fore in later representations through his holding the cornucopia. Typically, he is sometimes looking away from the other gods—even they did not like him.

In the *Iliad* a soul of the dead goes straight to the underworld, whose gates are guarded by the canine Kerberos (*Iliad* 5.646). The underworld is situated under the earth, but also in the west—perhaps a sign of a conflation of different ideas about the underworld; its deepest part is called the Tartaros. The soul can reach this “mirthless place” (*Odyssey* 11.94) only by crossing a river, the Styx. The picture of the underworld is bleak and somber, as dead Achilles says: “do not try to make light of death to me; I would sooner be bound to the soil in the hire of another man, a man without lot and without much to live on, than be ruler over all the perished dead” (*Odyssey* 11.489–491). It is only somewhat later that we hear of the old (youth is out of place in the gloomy underworld) ferryman of the dead, Charon, and of Hermes as the guide of the dead.

Death was considered to be “common to all men” (*Iliad* 3.236–238). In contemporary mythology, personified death (Thanatos) is the brother of personified sleep (Hypnos). This appears to be another way to express the feeling that death is something natural. Yet these rather bleak pictures could not satisfy everybody, and in Book 4 of the *Odyssey* we already hear of an abode for select dead, “the Elysian Plain at the ends of the earth” (563–567). The somewhat later Hesiodic *Works and Days* (167–173) mentions the Islands of the Blessed, the destination of many heroes at the end of their lives on earth. This changing conception of the underworld went concomitant with a growing interest in the afterlife that reflected itself in accounts of a descent into the underworld, as in the myths of Heracles, Theseus, and Orpheus.

In the same process the underworld also gradually became “upgraded.” At the Eleusinian mysteries there had long been a promise of a better life in the hereafter, as is illustrated by Sophocles’ words: “Thrice blessed are those mortals who have seen these rites and thus enter Hades: for them alone there is life, for the others all is misery” (frag. 837, Radt). In Pythagorean and Orphic circles, however, the idea arose of a “symposium of the pure” (Plato, *Republic* 2.363c). At the same time, the Orphics developed the idea of a kind of hell, where sinners had to wallow in the mud. Hades only now developed into a judge of the dead.

This reevaluation of the afterlife reflected itself also in the early fifth century when Hades became identified with an

originally different god, Plouton, “wealth” personified, who was related to the Eleusinian cult figure Ploutos, and in this capacity even received a priestess. Hades now became the god who sent up “good things” to the mortals from below. The connection between the underworld and material wealth also reflected itself in new terms to denote the dead. Whereas in Homer the dead were preferably called the “feeble heads of the dead,” they now become the “blessed” in a materialistic sense: the dead were people blessed with material goods and better off than the living. In the later fifth century these ideas about the “good life” in the underworld were even exploited by Athenian comedy, which portrayed the world of Hades as a Land of Cockaigne with beautiful maidens and boisterous banquets.

Yet on the whole the Athenian public did not firmly believe in rewards or punishments after death. In fact, they do not seem to have expected very much at all. “After death every man is earth and shadow: nothing goes to nothing,” states a character in Euripides’ *Meleagros* (frag. 532, Nauck, 2d ed.). In Plato’s *Phaedo* Simmias even claims that it is the fear of the majority that their soul is scattered at death “and this is their end” (77b). Most Athenians may therefore have agreed with the statement in Euripides’ *Hypsipyle* that: “One buries children, one gains new children, one dies oneself. Mortals do take this heavily, carrying earth to earth. But it is necessary to harvest life like a fruitbearing ear of corn, and that the one be, the other not” (vv. 234–238, in the edition by J. Diggle).

The early Greek ideas about the afterlife remarkably resemble those of Rome and ancient Israel. In ancient Rome people seem hardly to have believed in a life after death at all, even if they worshiped their ancestors at certain festivals; the Etruscans certainly took over Hades from the Greeks in the shape of their Aita, but lack of texts (albeit plenty of illustrations) does not allow us to reconstruct their “infernal” ideas. It was perhaps not that different in ancient Israel. In historical times the hereafter was called She’ol, which in the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, the Septuagint, normally is translated as *Hades*. Yet in the oldest Israelite ideas the grave must have played an important role, since “to go down into the grave” (*Ps.* 16:10, 28:1, etc.) is equivalent to “to go down into She’ol” (*Gn.* 37:35, 42:38, etc.). She’ol was located beneath the earth (*Ps.* 63:10), filled with worms and dust (*Is.* 14:11, 26:19), and impossible to escape from (*Jb.* 7:9ff). Its shadowlike (*Is.* 14:9) inhabitants no longer thought of the living (*Jb.* 21:21), or even of God himself (*Ps.* 88:13). It is only in a relatively late prophet like Ezekiel (*Ez.* 32:19–28) that we hear about different areas of She’ol for different orders of dead. However, it would still be quite a while before radical new ideas about the resurrection from the dead would take shape.

The dominant idea of the underworld in the ancient Mediterranean, then, seems to have been a relatively dim underworld with people focusing on life on this earth. This attitude proved to be highly tenacious, and, even if minority

views existed about a happier hereafter, it lasted well into Byzantine times before the more joyful ideas about the Christian heaven started to prevail over the traditional, grimmer views of the ancient Hades.

**SEE ALSO** Afterlife, overview article, article on Greek and Roman Concepts; Death; Demeter and Persephone.

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JAN N. BREMMER (2005)

**HADĪTH.** The Arabic word *ḥadīth* literally means *speech* and also *new*: because speech is created as it is uttered, it is always new. Following Prophet Muḥammad's death (632 CE), people engaged in speech about him so much that the word *ḥadīth* was eventually reserved for speech related to the Prophet, including his own speech; it then came to refer to the sayings of the Prophet and his companions, and finally only to the sayings of the Prophet himself.

*Sunnah* (lit., a beaten track) is a parallel word to *ḥadīth*, as both refer to the speech and conduct of the Prophet, yet the two usages initially signified different shades of meaning. *Ḥadīth* denoted speech or word whereas *sunnah* signified actual conduct, or the way of doing something. It was, however, difficult to draw a clear line between words and deeds, especially in light of the fact that the narrations of compan-

ions referred to both the sayings and the deeds of the Prophet. Hence the difference between *sunnah* and *ḥadīth* gradually faded and they became synonymous. This was further confirmed by Imām Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī (d. 820), who maintained that no *sunnah* could be proven without a valid *ḥadīth*, and the view thus prevailed that *ḥadīth* signifies not only the speech but also the acts and conduct of the Prophet. A technical difference that still remains, however, is that *sunnah* refers to the law or value that is contained in a *ḥadīth*; hence, a *ḥadīth* does not necessarily contain a *sunnah*. *Sunnah* (or *ḥadīth*) is the most authoritative source of Islam next to the Qur'ān; it is both explanatory in relation to the Qur'ān and a source in its own right. The Qur'ān provides the affirmation that "he (the Prophet) speaks not of his desire and what he says is based on revelation And whatever the Messenger brings to you, take it, and whatever he forbids you, abstain from it" (53:3). Elsewhere the Qur'ān also makes it a religious obligation of every Muslim to obey the Prophet (4:59; 59:7). To this al-Shāfi'ī (d.820) added the argument, which seems to have been current before this time, that when the Qur'ān spoke of "the Book and the Wisdom (*al-kitāb wa'l-hikmah*)," which it does on seven occasions in this order, it meant Qur'ān and Sunnah. The *ḥadīth* thus represented divine guidance, and the conclusion was drawn that all authentic *ḥadīths* must be unquestioningly accepted and obeyed.

*Khabar* (lit., "news"; pl. *akhbār*) is also synonymous with *ḥadīth*, especially among the Shī'ī writers, as they include not only *ḥadīths* but also the sayings of their recognized *imāms* within the meaning of *khabar*. The Shī'ī *imām*, being a member of the Prophet's family (i.e., the *ahl al-bayt*) is deemed to have inherent knowledge (*al-'ilm al-ladunni*) of the Sunnah of the Prophet, transmitted from father to son down the line of descent. There is, however, a tendency among Shī'ī writers, too, to reserve *Sunnah* for the Sunnah of the Prophet alone, whereas *khabar*, and *ḥadīth* can include both the *ḥadīth* proper as well as the sayings of the *imām*.

Lastly, *āthār* (lit., "vestige") refers to the sayings, opinion (*fatwa*), and precedent of the companions. The phrase *'ilm al-ḥadīth* ("science of *ḥadīth*") refers to *ḥadīth* literature as well as to the methodology and critical standards used to authenticate the *ḥadīth*.

*Ḥadīth qudsī* ("sacred *ḥadīth*") is the name given to a unique variety of *ḥadīth* wherein the Prophet attributes what he says directly to God. In the eleventh century CE, the question arose whether the *ḥadīth qudsī* was to be regarded as part of the Qur'ān, which by definition consisted of the revealed speech of God, or was to be attributed to the Prophet. *Ḥadīth* scholars concluded that while the message of the *ḥadīth qudsī* comes from God, it is in the words of the Prophet—and thus cannot be considered part of the Qur'ān. For this reason only the Qur'ān, and not the *ḥadīth qudsī*, may be recited during ritual prayer (*ṣalāh*). Even so, *ḥadīth* scholars generally treat the *ḥadīth qudsī* as a superior class of *ḥadīth*. A total of about one hundred *ḥadīth qudsī* have

been recorded, and their authenticity is measured by the same criteria and standard as are applied to *ḥadīths* generally. Muhyī al-Dīn ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 1240) compiled a collection of 101 *qudsi ḥadīths* bearing the title *Mishkat al-Anwar*. Later Mulla ‘Alī al-Qari (d. 1605) selected forty such *ḥadīths*, and this collection has become widely adopted by many subsequent authors.

**RECEPTION AND DOCUMENTATION.** As a general rule, every *ḥadīth* must be supported by a reliable *isnād* (chain of transmission) consisting of the names and identity of its transmitters. The number of transmitters in the *isnād* tends to increase with every successive generation. Sometimes a *ḥadīth* that is transmitted by one companion is then transmitted by a number of persons in the next generation who may happen to be residing in different localities. This raises the question of how the particular transmitter obtained the information from his immediate source. Was it through direct hearing (*samā’*) and personal contact, or through other means of communication? Various methods of reception (*tahammul*) have thus been identified, which include, in addition to *samā’*, such methods as submission (*‘ard*) and recitation (*qirā’at*) of a *ḥadīth* to the master for his approval, permission (*ijāza*) to transmit *ḥadīth*, handing over (*munawala*) of the master’s materials to the student, correspondence (*mukataba*), declaration (*i’lam*) by the master of his own source, bequest (*wasiyya*), and finding (*wijada*) by the student of *ḥadīth* in the master’s handwriting. Following the large-scale documentation of *ḥadīths* in the ninth century, most *ḥadīth* scholars began to employ special terms in the *isnād* literature that indicate the method by which the *ḥadīth* had been transmitted; this has remained the most common method to this day. Most people nowadays find *ḥadīths* in one of the standard collections and when quoting them make reference to the latter.

*Isnāds* can consist of one or two links, or of as many as half a dozen or more; the smaller the number of links, the shorter the time lag between the demise of the Prophet and the transmission of the *ḥadīth*. Thus *isnāds* are divided into two types, namely *elevated* (*al-isnād al-‘alī*), which consist of fewer links and transmitters, and *descended* (*al-isnād al-nāzil*), which may involve a large number of transmitters. Most *ḥadīths* were compiled long after the time of the Prophet, but some were compiled relatively early. Ḥammām ibn al-Manabbih (d. 722), for instance, recorded his collection (*sahīfa*) around 672. His *ḥadīths* consisted mainly of one link, namely a companion. Imām Mālik (d. 796) related *ḥadīths* in his *Muwatta* (Straightened path) that had been told to him by Nāfi’, who had heard them from ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Umar, who had heard them from the Prophet, thus making for two intervening links. Elevated *isnāds* of this kind are also frequent in the collection of *ḥadīths* compiled by the renowned Muḥammad ibn Muslim ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 742). Shorter *isnāds* are naturally preferable, which is why some of them have been variously labeled *silsilat al-dhahab* (“golden chain”), or *asahh al-asānid* (“soundest of *isnāds*”) and so forth. *Ḥadīth* scholars are of the view that because

*isnād* is the conveyor of the teachings of the Prophet, it is a part of the religion. Hence a diligent and conscientious rendering of *isnād* is believed to be an act of merit that gains the pleasure of God.

The Prophet is reported to have discouraged documentation of his own sayings in order to prevent confusion between the Qur’ān and *ḥadīth*. Many of his leading companions were consequently against documentation of *ḥadīth*; at the same time, however, many others among them considered it permissible and actually wrote *ḥadīths* for their own collections. There are also reports that during the latter part of his ministry, that is, when much of the Qur’ān had already been documented, the Prophet permitted some of his companions to write *ḥadīths*, and even instructed them “to preserve knowledge through writing.” It seems, then, that after an initial period of hesitation, the basic permissibility of writing and documenting *ḥadīths* was accepted and this activity became, in due course, a major preoccupation of the ‘ulamā’ during the second and third centuries of Islam. But even in the early stages, renowned companions such as ‘Alī ibn Abī-Ṭālib (d. 661), ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Umar (d. 690), Sa’d ibn ‘Ubada (d. 671), and Samura ibn Jundub (d. 681) are known to have documented *ḥadīths* in small booklets, or *sahīfas*. Jābir ibn ‘Abd Allāh (d. 699) compiled a larger *sahīfa*, and ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ (d. 681) compiled one that became known as *al-sahīfa al-sādiqa* (“the true collection”). One of the earliest documented *ḥadīths* of that period to have survived in its original form is the renowned *Constitution of Madina* (*Dustūr al-Madina*, c. 622).

Recent research by Muslim scholars concerning the early documentation of *ḥadīths* has suggested the need for a revision of some of the negative conclusions Western Islamologists have drawn regarding the time frame and authenticity of the early collections. Twentieth-century scholars including Muḥammad Hamīdullāh, Subhī al-Sālih, Abul Ḥasan al-Nadwī, and Muḥammad Muṣṭafā A‘zamī have questioned the conclusions of Ignác Goldziher, Joseph Schacht, G. H. A. Juynboll, and others who cast doubt on the authenticity of the bulk of *ḥadīths*. The most extreme position on the authenticity of the *ḥadīths* is that of Joseph Schacht, who took Goldziher’s observations a step further to conclude that “every legal tradition from the Prophet, until the contrary is proved, must be taken, not as an authentic . . . statement . . . but as a fictitious expression of a legal doctrine formulated at a later stage” (*The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, 1950, p. 149). For their part, Muslim commentators have maintained that documentation of *ḥadīths* took place much earlier than suggested by Schacht and others. Two decades after the publication of *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, Nabia Abbott tried to balance Schacht’s somewhat sweeping conclusions. Based on a group of papyri dealing with *ḥadīths*, she concluded that several thousand authentic *ḥadīths* had been documented during the first century of Islam. Her study also emphasized the attentiveness and care of important *ḥadīth* scholars, such as

al-Zuhrī and others after him. A more direct rebuttal of Schacht's position can be found in Muḥammad Muṣṭafā A'zamī's *On Schacht's Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (1985), which argues that many of Schacht's conclusions on the authenticity and documentation of *ḥadīths* are exaggerated and unreliable.

**TYPES OF HADĪTH.** The pious Umayyad Caliph 'Umar II (d. 711) asked the leading scholars of Mādina, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Ḥazm (d. 715), al-Qasim Muḥammad ibn Abū Bakr (d. 728), and al-Zuhrī to collect and document *ḥadīths*, while taking care to "accept nothing other than the *ḥadīth* of the Prophet." But the caliph died soon afterwards and it was al-Zuhrī, the teacher of Imām Mālik, who persisted and attempted what proved to be the first major documented collection of *ḥadīths*. Al-Zuhrī's work marked the beginning of a movement that was to be continued by many others in the eighth and ninth centuries. Yet al-Zuhrī's own collection was subject-oriented and consisted of separate booklets for individual subjects that were neither well consolidated nor classified. He documented all the information that he had received from the companions and followers (*tābi'ūn*) concerning *ḥadīths*, and often integrated the companion's own statement into the prophetic *ḥadīths*. This manner of treatment can also be seen in Imām Mālik's *Muwatta*, one of the earliest collections of *ḥadīths* after al-Zuhrī's, which would probably have been the most authoritative, even among the standard collections, had it not been for its tendency to confound the *ḥadīth* with the *āḥbār* of companions. To distinguish these two and separate them from one another became one of the principal preoccupations of collections from later periods. The major ninth-century collections, discussed below, employed new methodology and critical standards. They attempted to more carefully verify the reliability of the *isnāds* and began to classify and distinguish the *sahīh* ("sound," "reliable") *ḥadīth* from the *da'if* ("weak") *ḥadīth*.

*Ḥadīth* literature has developed in several stages, each marking some new development in the writing methods and classification of *ḥadīths*. The *sahīfa* collections, to which reference has already been made, contained the earliest documented *ḥadīths* on record, but were not classified; they consisted simply of written records of *ḥadīths* on a variety of subjects, and were mainly written for the personal use of their authors. Many companions recorded *ḥadīths* in this form, which naturally come first in order of reliability and closeness to the source. Next came the *musannaf* ("classified") collections, which collated *ḥadīths* on separate themes, organizing them under headings and into chapters. Famous in the *musannaf* category were the *Muwatta* of Imām Mālik, the *Musannaf* of Ma'mar ibn Rāshid (d. 770), and the *Musannaf* of 'Abd al-Razzāq ibn Humam al-San'ani (d. 827).

Then followed the *musnad* (lit., "supported") collections, which favored *isnāds* that linked a *ḥadīth* to the Prophet through the reports of companions. All *ḥadīths* that were

narrated by one companion, regardless of subject matter, were put under his or her name, the main purpose being to preserve the largest possible number of *ḥadīths*. Famous in this category was the *Musnad* of Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855), which contains about 40,000 *ḥadīths*, including 10,000 repetitions, reported by about seven hundred companions. Other works in this category include the *Musnad* of Abū Dāwūd Sulaymān al Ṭayālīsī (d. 819), and the *Musnad* of ibn Najjār (d. 876), among many others. Some of the *musnad* works are arranged alphabetically and some according to region and tribe. Although considered to be richest of all in scope and content, the *musnad* collections are not easy to use because they are not classified by subject.

The *sahīh* ("sound," "reliable") collections marked the fourth and basically the last stage in the development of *ḥadīth* literature. The six standard Sunnī collections of *ḥadīths*, known as *al-sihāh al-sitta*, were all compiled around the mid-ninth century and have remained the most authoritative to this day. *Sahīh al-Bukhārī* and *Sahīh Muslim* are often referred to collectively as *sahīhayn* ("the two sound collections"), but even so, they do not include all the *sahīh ḥadīths* on record, as some have appeared in other collections. Because their compilers, Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il al-Bukhārī (d. 870) and Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj (d. 875), did not set out to include every *sahīh ḥadīth* in their collections, it follows that a *ḥadīth* may not be labeled unsound or unreliable simply because it did not appear in either of these two collections.

Before discussing the six standard *ḥadīth* collections in some detail, it is necessary to introduce the three-fold classification of *ḥadīths* into the *sahīh*, *ḥasan*, and *da'if* categories.

The *sahīh ḥadīth* is defined as one with an unbroken chain of transmission, consisting of upright persons who also possessed retentive memory, going all the way back to the Prophet or a companion; its content is not outlandish (*shādh*)—in the sense that it does not contradict another reliable *ḥadīth*—and it is free of both obvious and subtle defects. It is, in other words, a *ḥadīth* that is free of defects in respect both to its *isnād* and its content (*matn*). *Sahīh ḥadīth* are also subdivided into those on which there is general agreement, and those on which the 'ulamā' have disagreed. Furthermore a *ḥadīth* may be *sahīh* in its own right (*sahīh li-dhātih*), in that it fulfills all the requirements of *sahīh*, or it may be *sahīh* due to an extraneous factor (*sahīh li-ghayrih*), as in cases where doubts about the memory of a *ḥadīth*'s narrator have been removed due to confirmation from another source.

*Ḥadīth* transmitters have been classified into a number of categories, with respect to their uprightness, reliability, and retentiveness. Without entering into technical details, it can be said that a *sahīh ḥadīth* is one for which the transmitters belong to the first three most reliable classes of narrators: the companions, the renowned *imāms*, and scholars of *ḥadīths*. As opposed to this, a *ḥasan* ("fair") *ḥadīth* is one for which the transmitters belong to the next three categories, consisting of those who are not among the most prominent



and about whom some doubt persists concerning the retentiveness of their memory and the accuracy (*dabt*) of their reports. A *daʿif* (weak) *ḥadīth* is defined as one that fails to meet the requirements of the *sahīh* and *ḥasan* classifications, and its transmitters include one or more persons of questionable reliability. The weakness in a *daʿif ḥadīth* may be in the *isnād* or in the text. There are many subvarieties of the *daʿif* category. The term *mursal* (lit., “sent free”), for example, refers to a *ḥadīth* with an *isnād* that is missing a link at the level of a companion—in other words, a follower (*tābiʿī*) has directly relayed it from the Prophet. But even the *mursal* is sometimes accepted if it is reported by a highly reliable person, such as the *imāms* al-Shāfiʿī or Mālik.

*Ḥadīths* have also been classified into three types based on the number of their narrators. The first of these is the *mutawatir* (“continuously recurrent”) type, those that have been reported by a large enough number of people to preclude the possibility of collusion or fabrication. A *ḥadīth* that is reported by only a small group of individuals is known as an *aḥad*, or solitary *ḥadīth*, and, finally, a *ḥadīth* that is called *mashhūr* (“well-known”) is one that became widespread during the first three generations following the demise of the Prophet.

**THE SIX STANDARD COLLECTIONS.** The compiler of the *Sahīh al-Bukhārī*, al-Bukhārī, came from Bukhara in Asia Minor. He traveled widely and devoted some sixteen years to the compilation of his *Sahīh*. He interviewed over a thousand *ḥadīth* transmitters in the Hijāz, Egypt, Iraq, and Persia and collected as vast number of about 600,000 *ḥadīths*, from which he selected 9,082 *ḥadīths*. Discounting all the repetitions, *Sahīh al-Bukhārī* contains 2,602 *ḥadīths*, divided into 106 chapters and under numerous subheadings. The repetitions here, as in other collections of *ḥadīths*, occur on account of the presence of more than one chain of *isnād* for one and the same *ḥadīth*. They are all listed on the assumption that multiple *isnāds* add to the reliability of a *ḥadīth*. It was al-Bukhārī’s declared purpose to include in his collection only *sahīh ḥadīths* narrated by upright and retentive individuals who had met with one another within the same generation or within two adjoining generations. Al-Bukhārī followed al-Zuhrī’s methodology and criteria in the selection of *ḥadīths*. The first link in al-Bukhārī’s *isnād* is usually a verified companion. This is followed, in turn, by two upright followers, or by one follower who is verified by at least two other narrators. The third link in al-Bukhārī’s chain of *isnād* usually consists of an upright and retentive successor (*tābiʿī tābiʿī*) from whom other narrators have also reported. The fifth link in al-Bukhārī’s *isnād* is likely to be his own teacher, or *shaykh*. It was important for al-Bukhārī to ensure that at any stage of the *isnād* a *ḥadīth* had been narrated by at least two people, be it a companion, follower, or successor. This is only a general characterization of al-Bukhārī’s *isnād*, as exceptions are found—for example, in the case of a companion, Midras al-Aslamī, whose *ḥadīths* al-Bukhārī included, even though only one person, Qays ibn Hazim, has reported *ḥadīths* from him.

Al-Bukhārī himself entitled his work *al-Jamīʿ al-Sahīh al-Musnad al-Mukhtasr min Ḥadīth Rasūl Allāh wa Sunanih wa Ayyamih*. This name is indicative of al-Bukhārī’s methodology and approach: the word *al-Jamīʿ* (lit., “comprehensive”) signifies that the work’s coverage extends to eight areas. These are dogmatics (*ʿaqāʿid*), legal rules (*ahkām*), moral teachings (*al-riqāq*), the etiquette of eating and drinking (*adab al-taʿam waʿl-sharāb*), Qurʾanic commentary, the history and biography of the Prophet (*al-tafsīr, waʿl-tārīkh waʿl-siyar*), travel and movement (*al-safar waʿl-qiyām waʿl-quʿud*), turmoil and tumults (*al-fitān*), and the virtues of the Prophet and his companions (*al-manāqib*). The word *al-Sahīh* in al-Bukhārī’s title signifies that he did not knowingly include a weak (*daʿif*) *ḥadīth* in his collection, whereas the word *al-Musnad* implies that all the *ḥadīths* he compiled were supported by verified *isnāds* going all the way back to the Prophet. Al-Bukhārī was the first to compile a comprehensive collection of this kind, and his methodology was generally followed by Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj.

Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj’s *Sahīh Muslim* is the next most authoritative of the six collections of *ḥadīths* that are currently in use, except in North Africa and the Maghreb, where *Sahīh Muslim* is ranked first. This reverse order of ranking is basically due to *Sahīh Muslim*’s superior classification system, which makes it easier to use than *al-Bukhārī*. *Sahīh Muslim* consists of 10,000 *ḥadīths* that can be reduced to just over 3,000 without the repetitions. Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj also traveled extensively in search of *ḥadīths* and interviewed a large number of transmitters over a period of fifteen years. Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj went on record to say, in the introduction to his *Sahīh Muslim*, that he showed his work to Abū Zaurʿa al-Rāzī, the renowned scholar and teacher of *ḥadīth* of his time and that Al-Rāzī had criticized some *ḥadīth* transmitters that Muslim had included in his chains of *isnad* as being unreliable and that al-Rāzī had found a hidden defect (*ʿillah*) in others. Muslim then added that he removed what al-Rāzī had criticized and doubted and included everything he had approved as *sahīh* (sound) *ḥadīths*. He also wrote that he intended to purify the *ḥadīths* of the accretions of storytellers, the input of those who were moved by ignorance and prejudice, and the influence of heretics.

A point of difference between al-Bukhārī and Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj can be noted with regard to their respective treatment of the *isnād*. Al-Bukhārī not only verified that contiguous links in the *isnād* were contemporaries, he also made sure that they had actually met. For Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj it was sufficient if the two were contemporaries, even if he could not prove they had not actually met. Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj was content, in other words, with the possibility of an actual encounter between teacher and disciple.

Commentators have noted that more of al-Bukhārī’s narrators meet the requirements of just character (*ʿadala*) and retentiveness (*dabt*) than do those of Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj. Of the total of 430 or so of al-Bukhārī’s narrators, the critics have identified 80 as being of questionable stand-



ing or weak, whereas 160 of the total of 620 of Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj's narrators are said to be weak. About 89 of al-Bukhārī's *ḥadīths* have been identified as having some defect, whereas for Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj the figure stands at one hundred.

The *Sunan* (pl. of *sunnah*, lit., “beaten track”) collections specialize in legal *ḥadīths*, known as *ahādīth al-abkām*. The various chapters of *sunan* works are thus devoted to topics such as rules pertaining to cleanliness, prayers, fasting, and the *ḥajj* pilgrimage, as well as marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and so forth. The *Sunan Abū Dāwūd* of Sulaymān ibn Ash'ath al-Sijistānī (d. 888), which consists of 4,800 *ḥadīths*, stands out for its comprehensive treatment of legal *ḥadīths*. Abū Dāwūd did not confine his *Sunan* to the compilation of *sahīh ḥadīths*, but also included *ḥadīths* in the *ḥasan* (“fair”) category. Abū Dāwūd claimed, however, that whenever a *ḥadīth* seemed weak to him, he identified it as such and specified its point of weakness. This would imply that when he did not specify any weakness in a *ḥadīth*, it was deemed to be *sahīh*. *Sunan Abū Dāwūd* has been ranked third in order of reliability after *al-Bukhārī* and *Muslim*. Abū Dāwūd also traveled widely in his quest to collect and verify *ḥadīths* and acquired such a reputation as a teacher of *ḥadīths* that students came to him from wide and far.

The *Sunan al-Nasā'ī* of Ḥāfiz Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān Aḥmad ibn Shy'ayb al-Nasā'ī (d. 915) stands next in order of ranking to after the *Sunan Abū Dāwūd*, and consists of 5,000 legal *ḥadīths*, of which a great deal had already appeared in previous collections. Nasā'ī wrote his *Sunan* in two stages. His initial collection, entitled *Al-Sunan al-Kubrā* (the greater *sunan*), contained *ḥadīths* in the three categories of Sound, Fair, and Weak, and was presented to the Abbasid ruler of Ramla in Palestine. Nasā'ī was then asked to compile a work that only contained *sahīh ḥadīths*, and so he winnowed the *Al-Sunan al-Kubrā* down to a smaller collection named *Al-Mujtaba min al-Sunan* (The select from the *sunan*). This version is the one currently in use and is said to contain very few defective or weak *ḥadīths*. *Al-Nasā'ī* is ranked equally with the *Sunan Abū Dāwūd*, yet the latter is preferred as it provides additional insights of interest to jurists.

Next in the *sunan* category is *Sunan al-Tirmidhī* by Abū 'Isā Muḥammad al-Tirmidhī (d. 915), which is also included among the six standard collections. *Ḥadīth* scholars have placed this work in the *sunan* category due to its arrangement and the style of its chapters, which are both in line with works of jurisprudence (*fiqh*). Some have also placed *al-Tirmidhī* in the *jamī'* (“comprehensive”) category, as it is not strictly confined to legal *ḥadīths*. One of the distinctive features of this work is that it first gives the principle *isnād* of a *ḥadīth*, and then gives other alternative *isnāds*. It focuses on *ḥadīths* that were practiced and generally accepted by Muslim jurists, and is thus thought to be free of spurious *ḥadīths*, even though it is not totally devoid of ones that are weak or defective.

The last of the *sunan* among the six standard collections is *Sunan Ibn Mājah*, by Muḥammad ibn Yazīd al-Qazwīnī, better known as ibn Mājah (d. 886). The book contains 4,341 *ḥadīths*, of which 3,002 had been recorded by previous authors, leaving 1,339 *ḥadīths* recorded by ibn Mājah alone. *Sunan Ibn Mājah* contains *ḥadīths* in all three categories of Sound, Fair, and Weak, which is why it was not included among the six standard collections until the early twelfth century, when Muḥammad ibn Ṭāhir al-Maqīsi (d. 1227) included it among a list of reliable works—after which other writers followed suit. Until that time, the *Muwatta* of Imām Mālik had been ranked as the sixth of the leading *ḥadīth* collections, but the *Muwatta* contained very little that was not already known, and thus came to be considered less important than the *Ibn Mājah*.

**CRITICISM.** The main purpose of *ḥadīth* criticism is to verify the authenticity of a *ḥadīth* through methods of enquiry that roughly resemble double-checking and cross-examination. The Prophet is reported to have said in a *ḥadīth*, “One who intentionally tells a lie about me, let him be sure of his place in Fire (of Hell).” This and other similar prophetic warnings led to a cautious approach on the part of the companions and other *ḥadīth* transmitters, who were mostly careful not to narrate *ḥadīths* about which they had doubts. The four early Islamic caliphs (*khulafā' rāshidūn*) made a point of criticizing some of their fellow companions who narrated *ḥadīths* that were not directly known to them, or that they had doubts about. Some of the less reliable seeming were asked to produce evidence of the veracity of their reports. The subsequent spread of *ḥadīths* to remote parts of the Islamic domain also gave rise to apprehensions about the presence of error and distortion in *ḥadīths*. A separate branch of *ḥadīth* studies, known as *al-jarḥ wa'l-ta'dīl* (“impugnment and validation,” also known as *naqd al-ḥadīth*, or *ḥadīth* criticism), was developed as a result, and numerous writers in almost every period contributed to its growth. Yaḥyā ibn Ma'īn (d. 847), 'Alī al-Madīnī (d. 848), and Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal were the early pioneers, after which almost every leading scholars of *ḥadīths*, including al-Bukhārī, Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj, Abū Dāwūd, Nasā'ī, and others wrote one or more books on the biographies of *ḥadīth* transmitters, their strengths and weaknesses, and factors that influenced the reliability of their reports. A vast body of biographical literature, known as *asmā' al-rijāl* (lit., “names of authorities”) and *tabaqāt* (“generations of *ḥadīth* transmitters”), developed as a result.

Whenever the reliability of a *ḥadīth* transmitter is questioned, two approaches are possible: one is to attempt a validation (*al-ta'dīl*) of the transmitter's reliability and uprightness, the other is to enter into a process of disqualification known as *al-jarḥ* (lit., “wounding,” “impugnment”). The methods by which impugnment is attempted are, on the whole, more rigorous than what is usually required for validation. *Ḥadīth* scholars have employed special terms that indicate grades of reliability, and also ones that suggest degrees of weakness. Terms such as *thabṭun* (“proof”), *hujjatun* (“strong,” “firm”), *ḥāfiz* (“retentive”), and *dabīṭ* (“accurate”),

in reference to transmitters, indicate the first degree of *ta' dīl*, whereas expressions such as *ṣadūq* ("truthful"), *sāliḥ al-ḥadīth* ("fit to narrate ḥadīth"), and *la bā sa bibi* ("no objection") tend to come next in ranking. Impugnment is established through the use of terms such as *majhūl* ("obscure"), *dā'if* ("weak"), *matruk* ("abandoned"), *mut-taham bi'l-kidhb* ("accused of lying"), and *kadhḥāb/waddā'* ("liar," "forger"). Broadly speaking, specifying the grounds for one's assessment is necessary for impugnment, but not for validation. *Ḥadīth* scholars thus tend to validate transmitters in a few words without elaborating on their good qualities, whereas brevity of this kind is not enough for purposes of impugnment.

Comparison of sources and checking on dates and localities are among the most commonly employed methods of *ḥadīth* criticism. To verify the accuracy of a doubtful *ḥadīth*, comparison is attempted between the various versions of the *ḥadīth* reported by different students of one scholar, or between statements made by the same scholar at different times, or between the *ḥadīth* and the relevant text of the Qur'ān, and so forth. In some cases where a disciple claims to have received a *ḥadīth* directly from a teacher, further examination of their respective localities and dates proves that the two could not have met. Some other grounds of impugnment that *ḥadīth* scholars have listed include:

1. Attribution of lies and falsehood to the Prophet.
2. A reputation for telling lies, even if no specific charge is proven.
3. A reputation for negligence and mistakes.
4. Sinful conduct, whether consisting of words or acts.
5. A reputation for making improbable statements and indulgence of the imagination (*wahm*).
6. Disagreement with reliable authorities and narrators.
7. Obscurity and lack of clear personal identification.
8. Advocacy of pernicious innovation (*bid' ah*).
9. Bad memory.

Validation and impugnment are only acceptable from qualified and impartial persons. Although backbiting (*ghība*) is normally forbidden, *ḥadīth* scholars have generally held it to be permissible to the extent that it is necessary in the context of impugnment.

**AUTHENTICITY.** The prerequisites that every *sahīh ḥadīth* must fulfill to be considered authentic may be summarized as follows:

1. The *ḥadīth* must be supported by a sound and verified *isnād*.
2. It is required that every link in the *isnād* was known as an upright and respected person (*'adl*) at the time they reported the *ḥadīth*, even if they did not yet have that reputation when they received it. The minimum requirement of uprightness (*'adala*) is that the person be

free of grave sins (*kabā'ir*) and not have persisted in committing minor sins (*saghā'ir*) or degrading or profane acts, such as associating with persons of ill-repute, making silly jokes, or exhibiting antisocial behavior. The fundamental positive behaviors that *'adala* is associated with are observance of religious duties and personal decorum (*murū'a*). The different schools of law tend to differ on such issues as whether or not the holding of views that amount to pernicious innovation (*bid' ah*) or caprice (*hawā'*) is grounds for disqualification—though generally such views are permitted in a narrator, unless the person is actively engaged in inviting others to embrace them. Various methods have been identified by which to verify the probity of person, including, for example, *tazkiya* (lit., "purging"), which may consist of testimony from witnesses, character references from colleagues, or consideration of general local reputation.

3. None of the transmitters in an *isnād* can be implicated in forgery, or in sectarian, political, or theological disputes, especially in cases where such disputes are actually related to the theme of the *ḥadīth*.
4. The transmitter must be a contemporary of the teacher on whose authority he related the *ḥadīth*. As mentioned above, al-Bukhārī further stipulated that the two must have actually met. Some have also specified that it is necessary for the narrator to have been certain of the reliability of his teacher.
5. The transmitter must qualify as *dabt*—that is, they must possess a retentive memory and be capable of accurate renderings of *ḥadīths*.
6. The transmitter must not be obscure or unknown (*majhūl*): at least two upright persons must have narrated a *ḥadīth* from them. Only the companions are exempt from this requirement.
7. The text (*matn*) of a *ḥadīth* must be in the dignified style of the prophetic language. The presence, therefore, of obscene, ridiculous, or objectionable elements is taken as a sign of forgery.
8. The text and message of a *ḥadīth* must be consistent with the Qur'ān. A clear and irreconcilable conflict with the Qur'ān would thus render the *ḥadīth* unacceptable.
9. A *ḥadīth* is also rejected if it fails the test of historical evidence. A *ḥadīth*—for example, that the Prophet said such and such in a public bath in Medina—is rejected simply because no public bath existed in Medina at the time.
10. The text of a *ḥadīth* must not be contrary to reason. For instance, a *ḥadīth* claiming that the parents of the prophet Muḥammad rose from the dead to embrace Islam would be rejected.

**MODERN ATTITUDES.** Modern Islamic scholars and the majority of Muslims continue to consider *ḥadīths* a part of es-

tablished dogma, and authoritative proof of the tenets, laws, and values of Islam, next only to the Qurʾān in importance. The spread of a modern scientific mindset has, however, led to much discussion of the authenticity of individual *ḥadīths*. The presence of forgery in the larger mass of *ḥadīths* is not denied, and many *ḥadīth* scholars have been involved in painstaking efforts to identify and isolate unreliable *ḥadīths*, which have been gathered together in collections under the general heading *mawduʿat* (“forgeries”). Despite this meticulous work, however, doubts remain.

While acknowledging that most of the forged *ḥadīths* had been isolated in the *mawduʿat* literature, Muḥammad Zubayr Siddīqī, writing in 1962, argued that there were still “some weak or forged” *ḥadīths* in the standard collections, which he identified with certain topics, such as the antichrist (*dajjāl*) and the last guide (*mahdī*). Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 1993) drew attention to *ḥadīths* in the standard collections that are at odds with the Qurʾān. He then categorized a number of such *ḥadīths* as “rejected” or “discarded” (*al-aḥadīth al-marduda*).

The late Shaykh of al-Azhar, Maḥmūd Shaltūt, criticized (c. 1965) the “strange phenomenon” of *ḥadīths* being labeled *mutawatir* (“continuously recurrent”) even though they do not meet the requirements of that category, simply because of their diffusion and frequent occurrence in scholarly works. This tendency can even be observed in some of the Qurʾān commentaries, in which weak *ḥadīths* are sometimes labeled *mutawatir*.

The contemporary scholar Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī has drawn attention to *ḥadīths* in the category of *al-tarḥīb waʿl-tarḥīb* (“encouragement and warning”), which *ḥadīth* scholars have often uncritically accepted, thus undermining the reliability of *ḥadīths* generally. This is because scholars have often neglected to apply the conditions of admissibility to this category of *ḥadīth*—on the assumption that they consist of moral advice and are in any case optional. Works of Qurʾān exegesis are also not free of weak and even forged *ḥadīths* on such topics as the relative superiority and virtues of the various chapters and verses of the Qurʾān. Even prominent Qurʾān commentators “such as al-Zamakhsharī, al-Thaʿālibī, al-Bayḍāwī and others have persisted in quoting fabricated statements in the name of *ḥadīth*” (al-Qaradāwī, *Kayfa Nataʿamalū maʿ al-Sunna al-Nabawiyah*, p. 36).

Writing in 1961, the Shīʿī author Muḥammad Najmī Zanjānī offered an evaluation representative of both Shīʿī and Sunnī opinion when he claimed that *ḥadīth* scholars have generally placed much emphasis on *isnāds* and the reliability of *ḥadīth* transmitters, but not enough on the text and message of *ḥadīths*. The Egyptian scholar Fahmī Huwaydī, while acknowledging (1989) this weakness of the *ḥadīth* collections, pointed out that many unqualified people with little insight into *ḥadīth* methodology have lightly dismissed *ḥadīths* and advanced ill-considered views in the name of reform and *ijtihād* (“independent reasoning”). Huwaydī ex-

tended this critique to the work of scholars at some Egyptian universities, including the renowned al-Azhar.

Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī has stressed the need for compilation of no less than three comprehensive encyclopedias on *ḥadīths*, one on *ḥadīth* narrators and their biographies, another containing the text (*matn*) of *ḥadīths*, and a third one to be drawn from the first two and devoted exclusively to *ḥadīths* in the *sahīh* and *ḥasan* categories. Selection of material should be made strictly according to the scientific criteria that leading *ḥadīth* scholars have developed, and modern research tools, such as computers and comprehensive indices, should be employed.

In *Ḥadīth Methodology* (2002) the present writer observed that the existing methodology and criteria of *ḥadīth* criticism were basically adequate and that *ḥadīth* scholars were also reasonably successful in their efforts to isolate the fabricated matter in their *mawduʿat* collections. However, much of the *mawduʿat* literature was written long after the standard collections of al-Bukhārī and Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj. In addition, some of the more refined methods of *ḥadīth* criticism were developed after the time of al-Bukhārī and Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj. There is good reason, therefore, to undertake an extensive review and consolidation of *ḥadīths* with the aid both of the existing *ḥadīth* methodologies and of more modern means and methods of research.

**SHĪʿĪ HADĪTH.** The Shīʿah Ithna Ashariyah (or the Twelver Shīʿah), who represent the largest group of Shīʿah and mainly reside in Iran and Iraq, rely on their own collections of *ḥadīths*. Of the four most authoritative Shīʿī collections, *Al-Kāfī fī ʿIlm al-Dīn* (What is sufficient for knowledge of religion) by Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad al-Kulaynī (d. 939) is rated first, followed, in order of priority, by the *Man lā Yahduruhu al-Faqīh* (One who is not visited by a jurist) of Ibn Bābawayhi (al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq ibn Bābūyah al-Qummī; d. 991), and by the two works of Shaykh Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (d. 1067), namely *Al-Istibsār fīmā Ukhṭulifa min al-Akḥbār* (Examination of what is in dispute among the reports) and *Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām* (Verified rulings). *Al-Kāfī* has 326 chapters and 16,199 *ḥadīths* from the Prophet and the *imāms*. It deals with three basic themes, namely, theology and the imamate, which are the basics of religion (*uṣūl*); the *furūʿ*, or details of positive law; and *al-rawḍa min al-Kāfī* (“flowers from *al-Kāfī*”), which include miscellaneous topics related to *fiqh*. Ibn Bābawayhi’s collection, which records 5,963 *ḥadīths*, was compiled with the goal, as the title suggests, of diminishing the reader’s need to consult a jurist. Al-Ṭūsī’s *Tahdhīb* is the next largest of the four collections, containing 13,590 *ḥadīths*, while *Al-Istibsār* contains 5,511 *ḥadīths*. The former lays greater emphasis on methodology in its verification of the rulings of *ḥadīths*, whereas the latter was basically intended to be a supplement to *Tahdhīb*. Whereas the leading Sunnī scholars, such as al-Shāfiʿī, emphasized accuracy in the *isnād* and text of *ḥadīths*, al-Ṭūsī was largely concerned with the practicableness of the *ḥadīths*’ contents. All four collections rely on *isnāds* reaching



back only to the recognized Shī'ī *imāms*. Two of the *imāms* who feature most prominently in these works are the fifth and sixth *imāms*, Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 735) and Ja'far al-Šādiq (d. 765), esteemed members of the Prophet's household who are credited with having changed Shiism from a primarily political movement into something with a juridical and scholastic focus.

Unlike their Sunnī counterparts, Shī'ī scholars were not preoccupied with the search for sound *isnāds* reaching back to the Prophet, because the infallibility (*‘iṣmah*) of the *imāms* precluded the need for such verification. Shī'ī *ḥadīths* were mainly collected in the tenth through eleventh centuries, in part because of the “occultation” of the Shī'ah's living *imām* in 873, and also because the Buyid rulers who were friendly to the Shī'ah only came to power in 945. Although a great deal of the Sunnī and Shī'ī *ḥadīths* are similar in content and message, Sunnī and Shī'ī scholars tend to differ widely in their respective approaches to authenticity and *isnād*. A four-fold classification of *ḥadīths* is employed in Shī'ī collections:

1. The *sahīh* or sound *ḥadīth* is one with an *isnād* that connects it without a break to one of the *imāms*.
2. The *mūwaththaq*, or reliable, *ḥadīth* is one supported by an *isnād* in which the companion of an *imām* unequivocally declares it acceptable.
3. The *ḥasan*, or Fair, *ḥadīth* is one with an *isnād* including a transmitter (from the *imām*) whose uprightness (*‘adala*) is not unequivocally established.
4. The *da‘if*, or weak, *ḥadīth* is one that does not fall within the first three categories.

Like their Sunnī counterparts, Shī'ī scholars have expressed reservations about the reliability of some material in their *ḥadīth* collections. They have also questioned the reliability of using *aḥad* (solitary) *ḥadīths* to establish a decisive legal or religious ruling. Like most Sunnī scholars, the Shī'ah maintain that all the obligatory rulings of *ḥadīths* must be proven as a matter of certainty. Because *aḥad ḥadīths*, those reported by a small number of unconnected individuals, do not qualify as *mutawatir*, they are not enough to establish a decisive *sharī‘ah* ruling.

SEE ALSO Islamic Law, article on Sharī‘ah; Sunnah; Tafsīr.

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useful works on *ḥadīths* available in Arabic. Subhī al-Sālih's *‘Ulūm al-Ḥadīth wa-Mustalahub* (Beirut, 1966), Mannā‘ Kalīl al-Qattān's *Mabāhith fī ‘Ulūm al-Ḥadīth* (Cairo, 1992), and Muṣṭafā Dīb al-Bughā's *Buhūth fī ‘Ulūm al-Ḥadīth wa Nususuh* (Damascus, 1990) are all concise, yet comprehensive, and stay clear of burdensome extrapolations. A more detailed treatment of the entire range of *ḥadīth* sciences can be found in Muḥammad Abū Shahba's *Al-Wasit fī ‘Ulūm wa Mustalah al-Ḥadīth* (Jeddah, 1983). *An Introduction to the Science of Tradition*, edited and translated by James Robson (London, 1953) from a work of al-Hākīm al-Nīshāpūrī, and Aḥmad Amīn's *Fajr al-Islām*, 14th ed. (Cairo, 1986), both provide information on early developments in the *ḥadīth*. Fazlur Rahman's *Islamic Methodology in History* (Karachi, 1965) and Muḥammad Muṣṭafā A‘zami's *Studies in Ḥadīth Methodology and Literature* (Indianapolis, 1977) are informative on modern *ḥadīth* issues as well as on the Orientalist critique concerning the authenticity of *ḥadīths*. A‘zami's second and now well-recognized work, *On Schacht's Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (Riyadh, 1985), is highly critical of, and manages to successfully refute, many of Schacht's conclusions concerning the authenticity of *ḥadīths*. Muḥammad Hamīdullāh's *The Emergence of Islam: Lectures on the Development of Islamic World-View, Intellectual Tradition, and Polity* (Islamabad, Pakistan, 1993) and Fazlur Rahman's *Islam* (Chicago and London, 1979) both contain concise and readable chapters on the history of the *ḥadīth* and on issues concerning the documentation and authenticity of *ḥadīths*. Coverage of modern debates and contemporary concerns vis-à-vis *ḥadīths*, especially in the Egyptian context, can be found in G. H. A. Juynboll's *The Authenticity of Tradition Literature: Discussions in Modern Egypt* (Leiden, 1969).

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A brief but sound discussion of Shī'ī *ḥadīths* can be found in Murtazā Mutahharī's *Jurisprudence and Its Principles*, translated from Persian by Mohammad Salam Tawheedi (Elmhurst, N.Y., 1981). Muḥammad Najmī Zanjānī's *Tārīkh-e Firāq-e Islāmī* (Tehran, 1961) provides a more detailed treatment of the subject, as well as a survey of modern studies and significant issues concerning the Shī'ī *ḥadīth*. Dwight M. Donaldson's *The Shi'ite Religion* (London, 1933) contains information on the *ḥadīth*.

MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI (2005)

HAFETS HAYYIM SEE KAGAN, YISRA'EL ME'IR

HĀFIZ SHĪRĀZĪ (AH c. 726–792/c. 1326–1390 CE), in fuller form Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ḥāfīz-i Shīrāzī,

was a Persian lyric poet and panegyrist, supreme master of the *ghazal*. He was born in Shīrāz, spent the greater part of his life in the area, and died there as well; his tomb is now a showplace. Much of his career was in the service or the ambience of a minor dynasty, the Muzaffarids, whose overall reign was approximately coeval with his own life-span. As usual with Persian literary figures, Ḥāfiz's exact dates and the details of his life are much disputed: The traditional biography leans heavily on anecdotal pieties, casual references in a variety of sources, and possible allusions in his own corpus, the text of which is still far from being in a definitive form.

He is said to have had an impoverished childhood, part of it as an orphan, and to have worked at various menial tasks, but in the culture of the time these circumstances were no obstacle to his acquiring a sound education in the traditional disciplines. His pen name, Ḥāfiz, ostensibly signifies that he had memorized the Qurʾān, and his poetry itself displays a confident acquaintance with Arabic, the so-called Islamic sciences, various branches of secular knowledge, and Persian literature to his own day. By the age of thirty he appears to have gained some acceptance as a panegyrist to princes and influential ministers of state, and he continued thus—with various vicissitudes of fortune—for most of his life. At no time, however, does he seem to have enjoyed a regular appointment or any considerable wealth. Indeed, because some of his patrons were rigidly orthodox Sunnīs, his generally libertine and laissez-faire attitudes—whether actual or merely professed—often landed him in a measure of disgrace, if not in outright persecution.

It has sometimes been suggested, and as often denied, that Ḥāfiz was even of Shīʿī allegiance, and certainly various passages in the poems can be read in this sense. Nor, in the light of modern scholarship, would his celebrated Šūfī leanings necessarily conflict with such loyalties. The precise truth can hardly be discovered at this date, especially because ambiguity is in the nature of the case for any poet beholden to an establishment: In this case, Ḥāfiz would have had to be extremely ambiguous in his poetry in order to avoid offending various religious, political, or social interests. What seems clear, however, is that he generally carried, and made frequent reference to, a reputation for aggressive non-conformity.

Ḥāfiz's unique literary position rests on his *Dīvān*, the collection of his poems, practically all in the *ghazal* form (a sort of ode, ranging from a few monorhyming couplets to twelve, fifteen, or more). Unfortunately, no more than a few brief excerpts in translation can be cited here, but perhaps these opening lines from three separate *ghazals* will give the reader a sense of Ḥāfiz's work:

If that Shīrāzī Turk will take my heart into his hand  
I'll give up, for his Indian beauty spot, all Samarkand and  
Bukhara.

The green fields of heaven I saw and the new moon's  
sickle

And I was minded of what I'd sown and the reaping day  
to come.

I'll hold not my hand from wanting till my desire is  
realized;

Either my body attains my heart's beloved, or my heart  
will leave my body.

Ḥāfiz is said to have produced his own definitive recension some twenty years before his death, but no manuscript of this has ever come to light (and given the constant wear and tear on this particular poet's work over the centuries, it seems unlikely that any ever will). All known versions are believed to depend on an edition allegedly produced at some point after his death by a disciple. Whatever Ḥāfiz's own intentions may have been (at an earlier date or at various later times), the actual textual situation, quite apart from variant readings, is extraordinarily chaotic. In the thousands of extant manuscripts from all periods and places, and consequently in the more than a hundred printed editions, the number of poems ranges from about five hundred to almost one thousand, although the lower figures are commonly taken to be the more reliable. Moreover, in these recensions the order and number of lines in any particular poem can vary greatly, with virtually only the first (the internally rhymed quote-line) and the last (containing the poet's name) remaining stable. This is not at all abnormal in classical Persian poetry, where each line is designed to have a degree of self-containment and "finish" unfamiliar in Western literatures. What is unusual in the present case is the extent of variability, and this feature has given rise to a whole critical literature in its own right. Other factors of confusion are the idiosyncratic cultural tendencies for lesser poets to father their works onto famous names, or for all writers to borrow freely from each other where a line or two may seem particularly apt. Nor, in a culture where memory and oral tradition also play an important part, can the standard methods of scholarship (the oldest manuscript is normally the best, the simplest solution is likely to be wrong, and so forth) be applied with full confidence. In short, the text as it stands is neither authoritative in itself nor reliable in its possible relationship to the poet's life, and it may never become so.

Once this is said, and the rich (but often falsely romantic) accretions draped around the figure of Ḥāfiz in Western renderings have been stripped away as far as possible, one is still left with a body of poetic utterance that is regarded by Persian-speakers as sublime to the point of near-sacredness. Ḥāfiz's *Dīvān* is read or memorized, and quoted, at all levels of society, but it is also used—by those who call it a "Qurʾān in Persian"—in all solemnity to take random auguries at such important moments in life as a projected marriage, a business or medical decision, the start of a lengthy journey, and so on. Persian-speakers may or may not fully appreciate the linguistic and literary mastery Ḥāfiz constantly displays; they may not always relish his ambiguities and the alternating and interpenetrating themes—mystical, melancholy, pessimistic, hedonistic, or panegyric—but they all believe they



hear in him a voice of infinite wisdom and transcendence. Nor does this apply only to those whose usual language or mother tongue is Persian, for Ḥāfīz was for centuries as revered in regions where Turkish (the Ottoman Empire) and Urdu (various princely states of India) were the local languages. Indeed, many of the best earlier studies, translations, and commentaries have emanated from those centers, because Iranian scholarship as such in Ḥafiziana is largely a twentieth-century development and is in some degree indebted to these as well as to the West.

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Ḥāfīz naturally receives major and special treatment in the standard reference works, including both editions of *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (different articles) and the several Western histories of Persian literature. Editions in Persian (none of them fully satisfactory) are numerous, while studies on him and translations of many of the poems abound in most Western languages. Unfortunately, a high proportion of the latter are of indifferent scholarly quality or make no claim to be more than popular and imaginative reworkings; most of them are in any case long since out of print. Some of the best critical studies are recent ones in Persian, and these have not been translated.

Two useful and accessible works are Michael C. Hillmann's *Unity in the Ghazals of Hafez*, *Studies in Middle Eastern Literatures*, no. 6 (Minneapolis, 1976), and A. J. Arberry's *Fifty Poems of Ḥāfīz*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, U.K., 1962). Both of these include bibliographies, and Hillmann's is comprehensive.

G. M. WICKENS (1987)

**HAIDA RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS.** The Xaada Gwaay or Haida Gwaii, the island of the Haida people, is a land of intense natural beauty, a misty archipelago composed of two large islands, Graham and Moresby, and some 150 small islands on the borderlands between southern Alaska and northern British Columbia. The intensity and subtlety of the territory is apparent in its dense rain forests, miles of pristine sandy shores, craggy mountain cliffs, and unpredictable weather patterns.

The elaborate Haida culture is as rich in mythological heritage as it is in natural beauty and resources. This complex mythological landscape parallels and represents the complexity of traditional Haida religious practice and its influences in contemporary Haida society. It is the land and the spirits of the land that inspired Haida stories and myths.

Though their islands were inhabited by many villages in traditional times, there are three remaining Haida villages in the contemporary landscape: Old Massett Village and Skidegate, both on the Queen Charlotte Islands in British Columbia, and Hydagberg, on the southeastern tip of Alaska.

Just as the land provides the source of inspiration for myth, traditional mythological elements of the Haida culture

are inextricably linked in ancient and modern society to the social, political, and economic lives of the Haida people. Myths provide the foundation for ancient religious practices and influence many aspects of the contemporary life of the Haida people.

**THE SUPERNATURAL.** In his *Contributions to the Ethnology of the Haida* (1905) and *Haida Tests, Masset Dialect* (1908), John R. Swanton provides the earliest comprehensive texts documenting Haida myths and stories. His interpretations describe the ever-changing nature of what he calls "Haida spirit theory." There is such a close relationship between all of the forces of the natural world that they are easily interchangeable. The world of the Haida is characterized by allusion and pun and the nature and character of the land and Haida mythological powers can be described as intelligent, unpredictable, creative, ambiguous, dangerous, friendly, and transformative. Supernatural beings have a great deal of power and can easily disguise themselves to become Salmon People, Herring People, Forest People, Bear People, Ocean People, Mouse People, or any number of other "supernatural" beings.

To the Haida, the world is one seamless existence. Natural and supernatural are categories in which nature rules. Phenomena change rapidly depending on the time and space of perception, the weather, the occasion. In ritual space, natural and supernatural beings and creators come very close and are perceived in elaborate masks, dances, musical expressions, and poetic oratory. Supernatural beings can play with humans, harm them, marry them, and appear and disappear at a moment's notice, depending on their moods.

**HAIDA MYTHS AND STORIES.** The Haida creation story plays a prominent role in their mythological belief system. Raven created the world by teasing the humans into existence while they cowered on the beach under a clam shell. Raven is a sacred trickster and transformer who sings, plays, teases, and even lies to inspire deep transformation. There are numerous versions of Raven stories and new ones are being created every day. One of the most famous is Bill Reid's well-known interpretation *Raven Steals the Light* (1984). This retelling of the Raven myth is widely read and has been translated into several languages.

Killer Whale is another important mythological character. Because the Haida relied heavily on the abundance of the sea for their sustenance, they have many stories about Killer Whale's power and ability to rule the sea creatures. Many Killer Whale stories describe the loss of lives at sea and the transformation of humans into sea creatures who will later support or harm fishermen.

**THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF HAIDA SOCIETY.** The matrilineal social structure of the Haida reflects mythological characters in the form of clans. A clan system assigns associative categories between animals and human beings, who can obtain powers through these associations. The two primary clans are Raven and Eagle. Each clan is further organized

around family crests that are also associated with animals prevalent in Haida territory.

Traditionally, Haida were not allowed to marry within their own clan. This system of intermarriage used moieties to govern marital alliances, economic structures of reciprocity and ownership of property. This system of organization also included the supernatural beings associated with human clan systems. "This dual classification imposes order on the universe not only in the sense of categorizing nature in analogy to human society, but also in the sense of perceiving things as belonging, in the double sense of being owned and being part of" (Boelscher, p. 29).

In the past, these clans played a dominant role in the management of tribal affairs. In contemporary society, they function as influential family affiliations in an electoral governance system established during the period of colonization. The political life of the Haida is also complex. In this hybrid governance system, elements of the secular and the sacred interact. Elected chiefs and hereditary chiefs share the responsibilities of leadership in Haida communities and serve as models for ethical lives based on generosity, strength of character, and strong family ties. Haida ethics are based in reciprocity that is expressed on a daily basis through generous gift giving, especially during the potlatches. Gift giving also functions to maintain a fair distribution of wealth in the community.

**THE POTLATCH.** Haida have many elaborate ceremonies and rituals. These events are generally categorized as potlatches, ceremonial events in which generosity is expressed by the giving of gifts, feasting, and traditional Haida dancing and singing. Though potlatch was forbidden during the period of colonization, the revitalization of traditional Haida customs that began in the 1970s reinstated the practice, and potlatches are frequently organized in all three Haida villages. They are occasions in which to express and reinforce the communal values and beliefs of the people, to socialize as a community, to grieve loss or celebrate birth, to commemorate great leaders, and other occasions.

In traditional Haida societies, there were many ceremonies to acknowledge the passing of community members into the spirit world. Mortuary poles were commissioned and potlatches were attended by relatives and friends who traveled great distances to participate. In contemporary Haida society, the ritual of the memorial feast, which is held one year after the death of a family member, includes the moving of the headstone onto the grave, blessings, a potlatch, and speeches honoring the Haida who has passed into the spirit world. At these memorial feasts, participants are instructed by religious leaders and elders to "put aside the grief" because it is the end of the official one-year mourning period (Kenny, p. 1218).

Haida also believe in the constant presence of the ancestors. Rituals are powerful ceremonies, even in contemporary times, reminding the Haida of their ancient roots, their elab-

orate belief systems, and the importance of strong relationships among the people.

**THE RENAISSANCE OF HAIDA CULTURE.** The creation of art is an important functional aspect of Haida identity and serves as the primary mechanism for the expression of an important set of beliefs about the world. Many Haida artists will say the "art is who we are" (Kenny, p. 1219). There is no word for *art* in the Haida language because the arts are embedded in the daily lives of the Haida people. The Haida and their vision of the world were rejected during the period of colonization. Haida leader Ernie Collison explains:

Over the years, since the time of colonization, the visual arts suffered because of the potlatch laws and with the introduction of Christianity. There was a banishment of visual icons of Haida. . . . Those influences manipulated the view of the Haidas about their traditional civilization, with the "art," the Haida passion for identifying and decorating everything with drawings and paintings and carving, and it went underground. Objects and ceremonies were kept out of sight of the missionaries and government agents. (Kenny, p. 1219)

Historically, the bounty of the land and sea was reflected in the lavishness of Haida ceremonies, which have grown over the years in spite of many efforts to eliminate their presence in the community. In contemporary society, the Haida mystical vision of the world and its powers, as represented in their arts, has reemerged. "Their passion for carving, sculpting, painting, and weaving and for decoration generally overflowed onto the most utilitarian of objects" (Dickason, p. 212).

Totem poles were used to protect homes and longhouses or community gathering structures. Fragments of the ancient totem poles can still be viewed along the coastal beaches and in the forests of the Haida territory. Archaeologists also excavated many Haida poles and relocated them to museums around the world. The Haida are attempting to repatriate many of these poles, often with the help of modern archaeologists who work in conjunction with them to create museums on Haida territory that are managed by the Haida themselves.

In an ongoing revitalization process that began in the 1970s, Haida arts play prominently in recovering the health and well-being of the people through an open expression of their identities and mystical beliefs. Northwest coast arts, and particularly Haida arts, are probably the most heavily represented of any of the tribal arts in the world and can be viewed in museums around the world. Haida sculptures in argillite, carved jewelry in silver and gold, and contemporary Haida masks draw thousands of dollars in the world market. The marketing of these products brings an aspect of economic sustainability to Haida artists. Haida artists such as Bill Reid and Robert Davidson have been central in bringing Haida art into the most sophisticated art circles around the world.

The revitalization process is recovering many totem poles and other precious cultural objects from museums, uni-

versities, and private collections for repatriation to the Haida nations. There is also a successful process of repatriation for ancestral remains. Representatives of the Haida nations travel around the world to gather the remains of their ancestors and bring them home. Many ceremonies surround the repatriation of ancestral remains, including welcoming the ancestors into the arms of the people upon receipt of the remains and reburial in traditional territory. Repatriation ceremonies have brought back many traditional religious practices, but in a modern context. Many of these ceremonies remain private.

In contemporary society, Haida religious practices often combine elements of the old ways with practices in the Anglican, Catholic, or United churches. By the end of the twentieth century there were very few remaining Haida elders who remembered things as they were at the beginning of the twentieth century. Because of the remoteness of the Haida Gwaii, the Haida people were protected from early contact with European settlers and were able to maintain their religious and cultural practices for much longer than many indigenous peoples in the Americas. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the remaining Haida elders are involved in the renewal of the old ways. Many are dedicated to saving the Haida linguistic, religious, and cultural traditions.

Yet, many did attend residential schools that forbade them to exercise their rights to a distinct and unique culture. In residential schools children were often punished severely for speaking their native language or making any reference to religious beliefs associated with their native culture. In modern society, these elders and their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and great-great-grandchildren, along with a few academics, are rebuilding the Haida culture, bringing it from its underground existence into the fullness of expression in a modern world.

Haida often join with other Northwest coast native peoples in the rebuilding of their cultures. They have also joined the International Indigenous Peoples movement and travel to conferences and gatherings for cultural exchange. The Haida are on the internet and are in constant communication with indigenous peoples around the world. This initiative serves to showcase the identity and strength of the Haida people in the modern world.

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CAROLYN BEREZNAK KENNY (2005)

**H'AI GAON** (939–1038), Babylonian halakhist. H'ai succeeded his father, Sherira', as head of the academy at Pumbedita and occupied the post for forty years, during which time he penned hundreds of *responsa*, composed significant halakhic monographs, and trained Jewish students from all over the world. The Geonic period reached its apogee with H'ai, who as its crowning figure also witnessed its irreversible decline.

The quantity of H'ai's *responsa*—about one-third of all preserved Geonic *responsa* are attributed to him—indicates that he was considered the leading legal authority of his time, a status underscored by the far-flung provenance of his correspondence and the fact that he was appealed to by scholars of the first rank. In eleventh- and twelfth-century rabbinic writing, "the gaon" invariably means H'ai. He saw the Talmud as the decisive factor in all Jewish law (the characteristic posture of all Geonim), after which ranked the decisions and enactments of his Geonic predecessors, and the force of custom. In addition to *responsa*, H'ai also wrote major halakhic monographs in both civil and religious law; here he ordered the welter of Talmudic discussion into topically organized units and brought this Geonic literary form to a height surpassed only by Maimonides.

H'ai's attitude toward Talmudic legend and his theological comments combine a moderate rationalism with mystical interests. Continuing the philosophical tradition of Sa'adyah, H'ai reinterpreted legends with anthropomorphic features, argued for a nonliteralistic approach to *aggadot*, and in general denied the authoritative status of these rabbinic materials. At the same time, he recoiled from the suggestion of Shemu'el ben Hofni (his father-in-law) that the Witch of Endor had simply tricked Saul into thinking she had raised the ghost of Samuel (*I Sm.* 28). H'ai also wrote a short treatise on the nature of the messianic redemption and discussed the esoteric teachings of *merkavah* mysticism.

**SEE ALSO** Halakhah; Judaism, article on Judaism in the Middle East and North Africa to 1492.

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**HAIR.** Words are related to the things they denote only by the conventions of language, but symbols, unlike words, are inherently appropriate to what they signify. Thus, since most animals are much hairier than human beings, some cultures may use this difference to express the distinction between the realms of nature and culture, as in myths that describe the first men as very hairy, and also as ignorant of fire and of the rules of correct behavior toward their kin. But symbolic meanings are not simple reflections of natural phenomena. So, in other societies, the symbolic opposition between “hairy” and “hairless” may be related not to the distinction between nature and culture but rather to the categories of youth and age; in this case “hairy” will symbolize the health and vitality of young people, whereas “hairless” will signify the baldness and infirmity of old age. Again, we may find that long hair is considered appropriate to the female sex because it appears soft and rounded, while close-cropped hair is associated with males because it allows the shape of the skull to appear, giving an appropriately hard and angular appearance. Or again, short hair may express puritan values, and long hair their opposite. So, opposition between the hairy and the hairless may symbolize such diverse categorical relations as animal and human, youth and age, male and female, and puritan and worldly. It is also quite possible for one and the same symbolic use of hair to have several different meanings simultaneously.

All symbolism accommodates to the natural properties and associations of objects, but it also assimilates these prop-

erties and associations into cultural systems of meaning in a selective, creative, and coherent way. Because symbols are derived from man's interaction with the physical world, we must also be alert to the possibility that an apparently symbolic custom is really nothing more than a practical expedient. In some African societies, for example, the shaving of children's heads has no symbolic meaning and is merely undertaken to prevent lice. On the other hand, we must not assume too readily that practical explanations such as hygiene will normally be adequate to explain the symbolic uses of hair.

In attempting to explain the different symbolic uses of hair, then, we must keep in mind its basic properties and associations, especially its associations with animals, with growth and vitality, and with youth and puberty as opposed to old age. That it has great potential for manipulation, can be cut painlessly, and is closely associated with two socially significant areas of the body—the head and the genitals—is also of great importance. Because of this variety of properties and associations, no single theory can account for all symbolic uses of hair. But there are, nevertheless, a limited number of themes in hair symbolism that are found all over the world.

**HAIR SYMBOLISM IN FREUDIAN THEORY.** Freudian theory maintains that the head is a phallic symbol, that the hair symbolizes semen, and that haircutting is a symbolic castration. In some instances, the head and its hair do clearly have explicit sexual associations. In ancient Greek and Roman belief, the head was the source of semen in the form of cerebrospinal fluid, and hair was an indication of sexual vigor. The same belief is held by the Punjabis of India, who suppose that true ascetics are able to store up their semen and concentrate it in the form of spiritual power at the top of their heads. Quite apart from these physiological beliefs, the head resembles the genitoanal region because these are the only two areas of the body with orifices, and each embraces radically opposed functions: social relations on the one hand, and physical functions on the other. Because the realm of nature confronts that of the social and the intellectual so blatantly in these two regions, it is not surprising that they can be substituted for one another in humor, in magical and religious contexts, and in popular and prescientific sexual lore. Thus the nose and tongue become analogues of the penis; the eyes represent the testicles; the mouth and ear correspond to the vagina or anus; and head hair corresponds to pubic hair. It may be for this reason that among the Chickrí of central Brazil a woman may wear her hair long only after the birth of her first child and that in traditional Dobuan society of the western Pacific an adulterer would publicly cut the hair of a woman he had seduced if he wished to defy her husband. In that society care of the hair is a reciprocal service between spouses and is associated with sexual intercourse.

Sexual potency, however, is only one aspect of vitality, physical strength, and animality in general. Samson's strength lay in his hair, but we have no warrant for attribut-

ing any narrowly sexual significance to the association, nor for regarding the cutting of his hair as castration. There are, in addition, numerous symbolic acts of haircutting that are even less plausibly interpreted as castration, such as cutting women's hair at marriage and the shaving of infant boys, slaves, military recruits, pilgrims, and returning travelers. Further, we find certain categories of persons, such as religious ascetics, who do not cut their hair but who conventionally abstain from all sexual relations, while the stereotype of the long-haired intellectual in our own culture is entirely free of any erotic association. The Freudian hypothesis cannot therefore be supported by the facts, except in a few instances.

**HAIR AS A SYMBOL OF ANIMALITY, STRENGTH, AND THE SUPERNATURAL.** As already noted, hair is a prominent feature of animals, and the persistent growth of hair, most noticeably on the head, is analogous to the growth of vegetation. Not surprisingly, therefore, hair is a common symbol of vitality, physical strength, nature, and supernatural beings or forces closely associated with nature. The culture hero *Dribidu* of the Lugbara tribe of Uganda is a good example of this association. The culture heroes were not members of clans, like modern Lugbara, but lived in isolation in a world without clans. *Dribidu* means "the hairy one," for this culture hero had long hair over most of his body. He was also known as Banyale ("eater of men"), since he ate his own children. In a myth of the Kukukuku of Papua, men at first had long hair all over their bodies and were ignorant of fire, cooking their food over women's genitals. When they were shown how to make fire and to cook their food over it in the ordinary way, the long hair fell off their bodies and they became fully human.

In Stith Thompson's *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature* (Copenhagen, 1955), there are twenty instances of hairiness associated with supernatural or half-human beings such as fairies, dwarfs, giants, water and wood spirits, devils, and mermaids; seven associations with animal-human relationships; three with vegetable-human relationships; three with witches; seven with the soul or vitality; and six with asceticism. The ascetic, particularly the solitary anchorite of fourth-century Egypt and Syria or the Hindu *samnyāsīn*, abandons ordinary society and even the company of fellow ascetics to lead a completely solitary life, frequently naked and unkempt. In *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776–1788), the historian Edward Gibbon wrote of the anchorites of the Egyptian desert:

All superfluous incumbrance of dress they contemptuously cast away, and some savage saints of both sexes have been admired, whose naked bodies were only covered with their long hair. They aspired to reduce themselves to the rude and miserable state in which the human brute is scarcely distinguished above his kindred animals. . . . They often usurped the den of some wild beast whom they affected to resemble. (chap. 37)

Hair, particularly of the head and beard, is often believed to be the seat of physical strength and supernatural

power, the two of which may not be clearly differentiated. The early Frankish kings, who were essentially warriors, were celebrated for their long hair, which was a distinctive mark of their royal status, so that cutting the hair disqualified a member of the royal family from succession to the throne. Maori chiefs were also forbidden to cut their hair, as were the priests of a number of societies, such as the Aztec and the two moieties of the Borana Galla of Ethiopia. Divine beings may likewise be represented as long-haired. The Aryans so depicted the sun, whom they also described as having flaming or golden hair. The Egyptians referred to the sun god Re as adorned with golden locks. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the persecution of witches was at its height in Europe, it was believed that the power to bewitch lay especially in the hair. Accordingly, it was standard practice not only to shave witches' heads but to depilate their entire bodies in order to render them harmless before execution. For centuries it was also customary to shave the heads and bodies of the insane.

**HAIRCUTTING, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND INITIATION.** Insofar as the hair is an expression of life, strength, and magical and religious power or is associated with animality or the condition of being in some way outside society, cutting or shaving the hair is an appropriate symbol for the imposition of some form of social discipline or restraint and is also a means of signifying a person's transition from one social status to another. In this context haircutting, like the cooking of food, is a fitting metaphor for the imposition of social control on nature, and also for transition and rites of passage in general.

Orlando Patterson, in his *Slavery and Social Death* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), notes the ubiquity of the shorn head as the mark of the slave:

In Africa we find the shorn head associated with slaves among peoples as varied as the Ila and the Somali. In China, in highland Burma, among the primitive Germanic peoples, the nineteenth century Russians, the Indians of the northwest coast, and several of the South American and Caribbean tribes, the heads of slaves were shorn (in the ancient Near East so was the pubic hair of female slaves). In India and pharaonic Egypt slaves wore their hair shorn except for a pigtail dangling from the crown. (p.60)

In the Americas, however, slaves were not shorn, because the characteristic hair type of the African was a more effective indicator of servile status. The shaving of the head has also been prominently associated with the punishment of criminals, as in the pillory, and as a mark of convict status. In modern times it has been closely associated with military discipline, especially as an initiation rite for recruits, and in tribal societies boys often have their hair cut as part of their initiation into adult status.

Haircutting may also be an initiation into society. When a son is born to him, a Muslim has seven obligations, according to Julian Morgenstern: to give the newborn a name; to cut his hair; to give as alms the weight of the hair



in silver or gold; to sacrifice an animal; to smear the baby's head with saffron; to circumcise him; and to distribute to the neighbors portions of the animal sacrificed (Morgenstern, 1966, p. 41). The convert to Islam from an unsanctified religion, in addition to being washed or anointed with water, might also have his hair cut off. Muslim travelers returning from long and dangerous journeys, as well as pilgrims, cut off their hair. Participation in sacred events may have been regarded in some societies as taking place outside society; thus it was forbidden to cut one's hair until the end of the Passover and Sukkot festivals, and a traditional English superstition held that it was unlucky to cut one's hair on a Sunday.

The Bible provides a number of instances of hair symbolism in which hairiness is associated with the life of the hunter, wild beasts, physical strength, rebellion, or special sanctity, while cutting or shaving the head is associated with rejoining society, with submission to some specific authority within society, or with a rite of passage. Esau, the hunter of wild beasts, was a hairy man, while his brother Jacob, a herdsman dwelling in tents, was a smooth man (*Gn.* 25:23–27). In *Leviticus*, it is prescribed that when a leper, by definition an outcast, is cured and ready to be reincorporated into society, he shall have all his hair shaved off (*Lv.* 14:8–9). The Nazarenes, who consecrated themselves unto the Lord by a vow, allowed their hair to grow until the end of the period of their vow, when it was formally shaved off at the Tabernacle (*Nm.* 6:1–18). Female prisoners of war, if made wives, were required to pare their nails and shave their heads (*Dt.* 21:10–14). Samson's strength lay in his hair; when it was cut off, he was as weak as any other man (*Jgs.* 16:17–19). Absalom, who rebelled against David, his father and sovereign, was remarkable for his long hair (*2 Sm.* 14:26). When Nebuchadnezzar was overthrown and made an outcast, "he was driven from men, and did eat grass as oxen, and his body was wet with the dew of heaven, till his hairs were grown like eagles' feathers, and his nails like birds' claws" (*Dn.* 4:33). For women, uncovered hair was symbolic of maidenhood, while the covering of the hair was symbolic of marriage and the acceptance of the husband's authority; it was also an ancient Jewish custom to cut off a woman's hair at marriage.

The imposition of authority is not necessarily symbolized by the cutting of hair, however. On the Pacific island of Tikopia, commoners loosen their hair to express submission to a chief, because in so doing, they signify their openness to control and influence. (On the same island, women cut their hair short, and men wear theirs long.)

**THE USE OF HAIR IN MAGIC, SACRIFICE, AND MOURNING.** Magical and sacrificial uses of hair seem to form a somewhat separate category from those considered so far, since they involve the nature of something detached from the body. One of the commonest uses of hair is in hostile magic, when the hair clippings of an intended victim are obtained and ensorcelled, together with, or as an alternative to, nail parings, blood, saliva, semen, or other bodily secretions. In primitive

thought, we frequently find that the human person is believed to have "extensions" that may include not only hair and the other bodily secretions but also personal names and belongings such as garments, shadows, and even footprints, all of which may be used to cast spells on a victim. In some societies, a sorcerer may cast a spell by including one of his own hairs in something given to the intended victim. Thus, in Papua a man may put one of his pubic hairs in a cigarette and give it to a woman who, it is believed, will then form a passionate attachment to him.

In many societies, fear of sorcery leads to the burning, burying, or hiding of hair. The Konso of Ethiopia take great care to hide these clippings: they cannot burn them since, according to their belief, doing so will cause their own sickness or death. As an alternative, in some cultures the cutting of hair or nails is forbidden for infants or others thought to be specially vulnerable to magical dangers.

Hair may also be used to transfer disease to another person, animal, or thing. In the Hebrides, it was the custom to cure epilepsy by burying a black cock with some clippings of hair and nails from the patient. In Devon and Yorkshire, the hair of a child with whooping cough was placed between two slices of bread and given to a dog; when the dog coughed, it was a sign that the disease had been successfully transferred. Conversely, the hair of a sick person might be put into a hole or hung in the branches of a healthy tree, so that the patient might derive health from the tree.

A related use of hair is in sacrifice. This was once very common, particularly among the ancient Greeks and Romans, who established relations with various gods by placing locks of hair on their altars. On reaching manhood, youths offered their first beard to Apollo, one of whose functions was to promote the fertility of crops, or gave their hair to the local river god. Nero offered his first beard to Jupiter, and Phoenician women sacrificed their hair to Adonis at the annual spring festival. Greek women offered their hair to deities before marriage, while Hygieia, goddess of health, was given offerings of women's hair before or after childbirth.

Hair is also used in a number of cultures to maintain a relationship with the dead; it may be placed with the corpse or on the tomb. In Islamic society, boys who had been dedicated to a saint at birth had their heads shaved sometime between eight and twelve years of age, and their hair was placed on the saint's tomb. Conversely, among the Iroquois, a lock of hair from the dead was given to the nearest relative of the deceased, while the Zuni believed that to burn the hair of a deceased friend and inhale the smoke would produce good health. Among the Arabs, the hair or beard is regarded as the seat of vitality and thus is specially suited to serve as the substitute for a life. As part of a reconciliation ceremony, a murderer has some of his hair or beard shaved off, as a token of the life that might have been demanded.

The cutting or tearing out of hair in mourning is one of the most commonly reported uses of hair. Since it is al-

most invariably associated with other forms of bodily mutilation, such as the gashing of the skin or even the severing of finger joints, it is most simply interpreted as self-directed aggression produced by grief. Mourning may also be signified by disheveling the hair or by covering it with dirt, ashes, mud, and so on. In all such cases the hair is also a convenient symbol indicating that the mourners temporarily hold a special status.

In hair symbolism, then, a relatively small number of basic themes constantly recur in the mythology, ritual, and social relations of peoples all over the world. But these themes are only a general guide; each case must be analyzed within the context of the particular culture in which it occurs.

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#### ĤĀJJ SEE PILGRIMAGE, *ARTICLE ON MUSLIM PILGRIMAGE*

**HAKUIN** (1686–1769), more fully Hakuin Ekaku, was a mid-Tokugawa period (1603–1868) reviver of Rinzai Zen. Hakuin was born to a commoner family in Hara, present-day Shizuoka prefecture. Entering Buddhism at an early age, he studied widely both Buddhist canonical works and Zen literature. He was also well versed in the secular literature of China and Japan, and in popular Japanese poetry and song. At age twenty-two he set out on his studies, visiting a succession of Zen masters and practicing meditation at various temples. At twenty-four he visited the Zen master Shōju Rōjin (Dōkyō Etan, 1643–1721), and after an arduous eight-month stay, was granted his teacher's sanction. For the next eight years Hakuin traveled to various temples, perfecting his understanding of Zen, eventually returning to his temple, the Shōinji in Hara, in 1718. Here he concentrated on teaching a considerable number of disciples. Hakuin also devoted much time to itinerant preaching and lecturing and to the instruction of laymen. He passed away in 1769.

Shortly after its inception the Tokugawa shogunate established strict control over all Buddhist sects, establishing a system of main and branch temples and in many ways restricting the activities of the Buddhist clergy. Buddhism in the Tokugawa period is generally described as effete and corrupt, yet in many respects it flourished greatly. Their activities severely restricted, some Buddhist priests turned to scholarship and study; others sought to reform and revitalize their teachings. This trend was especially evident in Zen: The Sōtō sect underwent reforms at the hands of a group of scholar-priests; Rinzai was revitalized by Hakuin and his heirs.

In Hakuin's time, Zen study and practice had degenerated into a sterile and formalized *kōan* study or had moved toward a popular Zen that rejected the *kōan*, minimized meditation practice, and frequently admitted elements of Pure Land Buddhism. Hakuin revolted against these tendencies. Turning back to the Zen that had been introduced to Japan from Song China in the early Kamakura period (1185–1333), Hakuin taught a strict form of *kōan* Zen based on the teachings of Nampo Jōmin (Daiō Kokushi, 1235–1308), Shūhō Myōchō (Daitō Kokushi, 1282–1337), and

Kanzan Egen (Musō Daishi, 1277–1360) and the school centered at the Daitokuji and Myōshinji temples in Kyoto (known after its founders as the O-Tō-Kan school). The exact details of the *kōan* system Hakuin used are not clear; his descendants in the second generation, Inzan Ien (1751–1814) and Takuju Kōsen (1760–1833), established a formalized system of *kōan* study that persists to this day. Under this system, students were required to meditate on and respond to a specific series of *kōans*. Often, as the monk progressed he would reinvestigate *kōans* previously studied, until those few who survived the rigorous, lengthy training were themselves sanctioned as teachers. Before taking up teaching duties it was customary for the priest to spend several years in isolation, perfecting his own understanding.

In his teaching Hakuin emphasized disciplined meditation under a teacher's guidance, "see into one's own true nature" (*kenshō*). He emphasized meditation in the midst of activity, or meditation at all times and in all places, in contrast to quiet sitting in secluded areas, a practice that he vehemently condemned. Hakuin was opposed to all methods of Zen other than his own and inveighed against popular forms that simplified his teaching.

Hakuin was a prolific writer, adept in a variety of genres. For the practicing monk he wrote several major works, highly technical in nature, designed as aids to their studies. A large body of his writing consists of letters to feudal lords and to other priests and nuns in which he champions the virtues of Zen and calls strongly for humane government and adequate consideration for farmers. Some of his works are simple preachings on Buddhism in general, directed toward his lay followers; other works imitate popular songs or recitations of the day. Of great popularity were several pieces, including *Yasen kanna* (Talks on a boat in the evening) and parts of *Orategama* (Embossed teakettle), that deal with Hakuin's theories for nurturing health and prolonging life.

Hakuin is noted for his painting and calligraphy, of which many specimens remain. His work is bold and amusing and includes caricatures of his parishioners, brushstroke drawings of Zen figures, poems, Zen sayings, and single characters, all boldly drawn in his untrained yet original hand.

Hakuin is the dominant figure in the history of Rinzai Zen in Japan. By turning back to the Song-era Zen that had been introduced in the Kamakura period he organized a strict and austere course of *kōan* study and provided for a revival of Rinzai Zen that had hitherto been in extreme disarray. All Rinzai masters practicing today trace their lineage to Hakuin.

SEE ALSO Zen.

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*Revised Bibliography*

## HALAKHAH

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

HISTORY OF HALAKHAH  
STRUCTURE OF HALAKHAH

### HALAKHAH: HISTORY OF HALAKHAH

Jewish law (*halakhah*) was the major integrative factor in Jewish life from early geonic times (eighth century) until the onset of the modern era. With Jewry's ever-increasing geographic dispersion and political incapacity, Jewish identity was shaped increasingly by Jewish law. It defined the broad sphere of religious observance and significantly influenced the norms and practice of communal governance, and its study was a central spiritual and intellectual experience. Jewish law was created in rabbinic academies and courts by individual scholars and by communal custom and enactment. Until the modern period, Jewish law responded to the major challenges in Jewish life, and the historical-geographic grid of legal creativity paralleled the development of the major centers of Jewish life.

**CHRONOLOGICAL PERIODS, GEOGRAPHIC CENTERS, AND AUTHORITIES.** The geonic period most likely begins with the Islamic conquest of Babylon in about 650; indeed it seems that the establishment of this more centralized Muslim administration was paralleled in the Jewish institutional structure. The gaonate (sg., *ga'on*, "splendor," derived from the formal name of the academy in Sura, Splendor of Ya'aqov) shared the governance of Babylonian Jewish society with the exilarch and claimed halakhic and spiritual authority over world Jewry. The central academies of Sura and Pumbedita (both in the general vicinity of Baghdad and eventually located in that city) were each headed by a gaon; all other scholars have remained anonymous in the literature. The major contribution of the geonic period to the development of Jewish law lies in the stabilization and standardization it brought to the relatively fluid situation in Talmudic times.

The gaonate successfully asserted the supremacy of the Babylonian over the Palestinian Talmud (a reflection of the

historical ascendancy of Babylonian Jewry) and brought much indecisive Talmudic discussion to a binding conclusion. The liturgy, in particular, reached a high degree of regulation with the publication of prayer-texts and rules in the *siddurim* of ‘Amram (fl. 856) and Sa’adyah (fl. 928). Geonic pressures toward standardization in this and other ritualistic areas were especially stimulated by the need to combat the competing Karaite movement and other sectarian groups. The growing urbanization of Jewish society and its commercial involvement also required, and received, legal guidance through the elaboration of Talmudic materials and explicit enactment, such as that enabling debtors to collect from the movable properties of orphans. Leading geonic figures include Yehud’ai, Naṭron’ai, ‘Amram, Sa’adyah, and Shemu’el ben Ḥofni, all of Sura; Paṭṭoi, Sherira’, and H’ai, all of Pumbedita. An auxiliary center of legal study during this period developed in North Africa; its central figure was Ḥanan’el, who was heavily influenced by H’ai.

Though geonic activity continued after the eleventh century (the twelfth-century Maimonides engaged in correspondence with the Baghdad gaonate), the weight of legal development passed to western Europe as the period of the *ri’shonim* (“first ones, early ones”) began. The death of the Babylonian H’ai in 1038 and the birth of Rashi (Shelomoh ben Yitshaq) in France in 1040 conveniently symbolize the shift. Perhaps paralleling the political decentralization of Christian Europe, rabbinic authority in Ashkenazic Europe was not centralized or even institutionalized—a striking contrast to the geonic structure. Scholars reached eminence by popular acknowledgement of their authority, not by appointment or election; law derived largely from learning, not from institutionalized structure. Men like Gershom ben Yehudah, Rashi, his grandson Ya’aqov ben Me’ir Tam, Eli’ezer ben Natan, Yesha’yah di Trani, Me’ir ben Barukh of Rothenburg, and his student Asher ben Yehi’el were the leading teachers of their time, but neither they nor their schools had any official status; at the most, some might have been judges in communal courts.

The *ri’shonim* generally continued the explication and development of Talmudic law, though certain topics—mercantile law, Jewish-Gentile relations, and communal governance—did demand more original treatment. The desire to base communal governance on Jewish law and its principles forced legists to hammer out basic political issues, such as the rights of majority and minority, equity in tax law, and election procedures, with little in the way of Talmudic precedent to guide them. Halakhic development in Provence and Spain may be characterized in a similar fashion, though the Sefardic rabbinate of the Iberian Peninsula during the Christian reconquest, reflecting the general political situation, was more centralized than its Ashkenazic counterpart and also more influenced by geonic legal patterns. Men like Avraham ben Yitshaq and Avraham ben David of Posquières; Yitshaq ben Ya’aqov Alfasi in North Africa; Moses Maimonides in Egypt; and Me’ir Abulafia, Moses Nahmanides, Shelomoh

moh ibn Adret, and Nissim Gerondi in Spain were teachers and judges whose commentaries and *responsa* carried their decisions and opinions around the world.

The work of the geonim and *ri’shonim* was brought to authoritative and influential summation by Ya’aqov ben Asher (d. 1343) in his *Arba’ah ṭurim* (*Ṭur*). The period from its appearance till the publication (in 1550–1571) of the *Shulḥan ‘arukh* of Yosef Karo and Mosheh Isserles is one of transition to the period of the *aḥaronim* (“later ones”) and also marks the migration of Jewry and its legal centers eastward: Ashkenazic Jewry to eastern Europe and Sefardic Jewry, after the 1492 expulsion from Spain, to Greece, Turkey, and the Land of Israel. The halakhic achievement of the *aḥaronim*, especially in the ranks of Ashkenazic legists, tends to the derivative. (This was despite the influence of Yisra’el Isserlein of Austria and the originality of Yosef Qolon of Italy in the fourteenth century; the achievement and influence of Ya’aqov Weill, Ya’aqov Landau and Yisra’el Bruna, all in the fifteenth century, were in the area of religious custom rather than in creative legal thought.) It is possible that continual political harassment, capped by pogroms and expulsions in the wake of the Black Death, sapped the intellectual energies of Ashkenazic Jewry. Furthermore, influential masters such as Ya’aqov Pollack and Shalom Shakhna preferred not to publish at all, arguing for a return to the more pristine concept of oral law, but their impact was to be felt in the revival of the sixteenth century. Sefardic halakhists, however, met new problems raised by commercial advance in the eastern Mediterranean region and the difficulties that emerged after the expulsion from Spain and Portugal such as the reabsorption of converts, fixing of personal status, and the forging of common patterns of governance and practice from the disparate communal traditions of the sixteenth century.

After 1492 the Sefardic settlements in Greece, Turkey, Egypt, and the Land of Israel constituted a single sphere of intellectual discourse and enjoyed an impressive level of halakhic activity. Foremost among the scholars of this era were David ibn Zimra’, Levi ben Ḥaviv, and Yosef Karo, all born in Spain before the expulsion; Mosheh di Trani, Yosef ben Lev, and Shemu’el de Medina. By the mid-sixteenth century, Ashkenazic Jewry had achieved a large degree of stability in Poland and Lithuania, and its halakhic focus was found in cities like Cracow and Lublin, where authorities such as Shelomoh Luria (c. 1510–1574), Mosheh Isserles, and Mordekhai Jaffe taught and wrote.

The publication of the *Shulḥan ‘arukh* by Karo and its annotation by Isserles marks the most significant watershed in the codification of *halakhah* until modern times. The bulk of the work was published by Karo (a member of the Safad community of mystics and halakhists) as a self-contained entity in 1565–1566; he had already collated the Talmudic and medieval sources in his massive commentary to the *Ṭur*, *Beit Yosef* (House of Joseph), which also frequently indicates the direction in which he would move as an authority in rabbinic law. Isserles, rabbi in Cracow, published glosses (the *mappah*,



“tablecloth,” to the *Shulḥan ʿarukh* in 1571 that registered the Ashkenazic variants to the Sephardic traditions of Karo and gave greater weight to the force of communal custom than Karo’s work alone had done. Isserles’s glosses also constituted an approval of Karo’s work, which overcame in a fairly short period its antagonists—legists of stature, such as Yosef ben Lev and Yehudah Löw ben Betsal’el, who opposed the reduction of rich tradition to the bare paragraphs of an authoritative code—and its competitors. The times were ripe for a new summation, as was evidenced by the existence of other, if more prolix, attempts: the *Levushim* (Garments) of Jaffe, and the *Yam shel Shelomoh* (Sea of Solomon) of Luria. Rabbinic scholarship now set about producing commentaries and supercommentaries on the *Shulḥan ʿarukh* in a process that both legitimated the code and made it a central document in the study and practice of Jewish law.

Despite the overall decline in the physical conditions of Jewish life by the late eighteenth century and its religious and ideological fissures, the period of the *aḥaronim* produced an extensive halakhic literature. Three characteristics deserve mention. (1) With the rise of the nation-state and the concomitant elimination of self-governing estates and religious communities, halakhists have addressed themselves less and less (except for textual or theoretical discussions) to issues of civil or criminal law. (2) With the rise of the Reform movement, Ashkenazic halakhists of the modern period have become more defensive and hence more conservative than their predecessors. (3) Communication and interaction between Ashkenazic and Sephardic halakhists have declined. It is too early to judge whether the existence of Israel as a Jewish state will have any effect on these tendencies.

Since the publication of the *Shulḥan ʿarukh*, the two major avenues of practical halakhic development in modern times have been the commentatorial activity centered on the *Shulḥan ʿarukh* and the *responsa* literature. Major commentaries were written on different sections of the code by Yehoshu’a Falk, David ha-Levi, Shabbetai Kohen, Yitshaq Lima, Shemu’el Feibish, and Ḥizqiyah di Silow, among others. These works explicate the code but also deal with issues growing out of its rulings and occasionally prefer their own opinions based on alternative sources. This tendency may also be noted in the work of Eliyahu ben Shelomoh Zalman of Vilna, which is devoted especially to tracing critically the Talmudic sources of the code. Subsequently, a more popular literature developed, which presented the results of these discussions in digest form, focusing especially on ritual law: *Hayyei adam* (Man’s Life) and *Hokhmat adam* (Man’s Wisdom) by Avraham Danzig and *Qitsur Shulḥan ʿarukh* (Short *Shulḥan ʿarukh*) by Shelomoh Ganzfried of Hungary, for example. A more expansive format is found in the works of Yisra’el Me’ir Kagan (for example, in *Mishnah berurah*), and Ya’aqov Sofer (in *Kaf ha-ḥayyim*), which have molded the consensus of Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jewries, respectively, in the area of ritual law.

Halakhic authorities, many of whom were communal rabbis or judges on the communal religious court, continued

to influence the course of *halakhah* in their *responsa*. Representative figures from the seventeenth century are Ḥayyim Ya’ir Bachrach of Germany, Yosef ben Mosheh di Trani of Turkey, and Shemu’el Aboab of Italy; from the eighteenth century, Ya’aqov Emden of Germany and Yehezqel Landau of Poland, Mosheh Hagiz and Yom-Ṭov Algazi of the Land of Israel, and Yehudah Ayash of North Africa; from the nineteenth century, ‘Aqiva’ Eiger of Germany, Mosheh Sofer of Hungary, Yitshaq Elḥanan Spektor of Russia, and Yosef Ḥayyim al-Ḥakham of Iraq. Sofer (known as Ḥatam Sofer) was a crucial figure in the nineteenth-century Orthodox response to Reform, coining the motto that in matters of law “novelty is forbidden by the Torah.”

Halakhic activity in the modern period reflects the historic fortunes of the people: Ashkenazic Jewry witnessed a flowering in eastern Europe (Poland, Lithuania, Galicia, Hungary) and a relative decline in western Europe; Sephardic Jewry continued its development in the Balkans, North Africa, and Iraq. Since the destruction of Jewries in World War II and the exodus from Arab lands after 1948, Israel and the United States have become the centers of halakhic creativity, buttressed by the revival of learning and observance in the latter half of the twentieth century. Much current halakhic activity simply elaborates medieval doctrine, but the rise of modern technologies has stimulated halakhic thinking in the areas of Sabbath law and medical ethics. The most major change in modern Jewish existence, namely the secularization of the mass of Jewish people, has not yet significantly affected the halakhic system.

**LITERARY GENRES AND INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS.** With the onset of the geonic period, halakhic literature developed in genres that have remained fairly constant until modern times: (1) monograph-code, (2) commentary, and (3) *responsa*. The antecedents of the first two genres are essentially Talmudic: the Talmud frequently undertakes to comment on and explicate the Mishnah, while the Mishnah, especially as it detached itself from scripture and Midrash, was formed as a monograph-code. A fourth genre—communal enactments—is more representative of the interaction of lay and rabbinical leadership. These different genres reflect different intellectual postures and tasks. Different geographic centers also devote themselves with varying intensity to one genre or another, yet no center or historical period abandoned any one of the genres, so that the materials found in each were in a state of constant interaction, and a substantial body of substance and method was shared by all.

**Monograph-codes.** The monograph-code of the geonic period had a functional goal: it was meant to provide for the crystallization of normative, standard practice and make this practice accessible to students, judges, and religious leaders. The geonim developed rules by which Talmudic literature was sifted and compiled the results of this process. From a substantive point of view, the major achievement of the geonic monograph-code lies in its reduction of Talmudic discussion to geonic decision. From a structural point of



view, the basic challenge lay in the reorganization of the material contained in the Talmudic debate into topical units; this process demanded not only the paring down of Talmudic pericopes but, in the more advanced monograph-code, the development of new topics.

A classic and early monograph-code is the ninth-century *Halakhot gedolot* (Major *Halakhot*), variously assigned to Shim'on Qayyara and Yehud'ai Gaon. The extensive Talmudic discussion is considerably reduced and canalized into a conclusive decision. The basic outline is Talmudic, but new topical units are occasionally introduced to unite scattered Talmudic materials into a new framework. Virtually all inoperative law, such as laws of sacrifices, purities, and impurities, is eliminated. Despite its new features, *Halakhot gedolot* is, in essence, an abridgment of the Talmud, a form that reaches its apogee in the eleventh-century *Halakhot* of Alfasi. Other geonic monographs are radical departures from the Talmudic model. The *Sefer ha-miqqah ve-ha-mimkar* (Book of Purchase and Sale) of H'ai, for example, a work on oaths, and the monograph on benedictions by Shemu'el ben Hofni both reorganize Talmudic law, which is presented in coherent form as a rule-structured system. The author elicits the rule underlying the concrete Talmudic discussion and strives for maximal generalization. At the same time, he usually retains the legitimating Talmudic source.

The geonic monograph-code reached fullest expression in Maimonides' *Mishneh Torah* (Second Torah; 1187), which is probably the single most prominent work in all post-Talmudic halakhic literature. In addition to bringing this traditional form to perfection through an architectonic vision of the entirety of Jewish law, Maimonides' code also served as an innovating document: the codified law is completely detached from Talmudic authorities and citations; Mishnaic Hebrew is revived to serve as the language of a new code; matters of belief, ideology, and metaphysics are integrated as normative aspects of Jewish law; and new topics are fashioned (for example, "Laws of Repentance," "Laws of Kings and Their Wars").

While Maimonides' immediate purpose in compiling his code was to provide a practical summary of law for the use of both layman and judge in what he considered a period of intellectual decline, *Mishneh Torah* is also a statement of the content and nature of Judaism as he saw it. Maimonides' code has become a central document in halakhic discussion, but it has not brought an end to the process of further development outside it. Prominent halakhists have always claimed that codes freeze the open-ended Talmudic process and are a stultifying concession to mediocrity, and Maimonides' elimination of the Talmudic bases for his decisions raised the hackles of his contemporaries (such as Avraham ben David of Posquières) even more. Subsequent codes, such as the *Arba'ah turim* of Ya'aqov ben Asher and Karo and Isserles's *Shulhan 'arukh*, lowered their sights considerably: the sense of an ordering structure declines considerably, purity of line is lost, and Temple-oriented topics as well as metaphysics

and beliefs are eliminated. No new codes have been produced since the sixteenth century, though the *Shulhan 'arukh* has been rewritten twice in attempts to integrate new materials or to combine the code with its earlier sources: see the *Shulhan 'arukh* of Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady (1745–1813) and the *'Arukh ha-shulhan* of Yehi'el M. Epstein (1829–1908).

**Commentary.** In geonic times commentary was, of course, commentary on the Talmud. So as to facilitate study of this protean and involuted document, geonim produced lexicographical aids that explained difficult terms and wrote explanatory material to clarify difficult Talmudic pericopes and chapters. Thus we possess H'ai's lexicographical commentary to *Tohorot* as well as parts of his running commentary to tractate *Berakhot*. The classic running commentary to the entire Talmud was written in France by Rashi. Based on oral traditions, Rashi's explication made the Talmud accessible to all students.

Rashi's grandchildren (the most prominent of whom was Ya'aqov ben Me'ir Tam) inaugurated the tosafist ("additions") school. Now commentary no longer addressed itself to the words and sentences of one specific text and context but undertook a synthetic analysis of all related Talmudic passages. This seminal work was based on a thorough mastery of the entire Talmud, an acute analytical sensibility, and the intellectual boldness necessary to produce novel concepts. In a sense, the tosafists continued the Talmudic process itself, producing new legal doctrines in the course of harmonizing disparate Talmudic opinions. Their techniques and results quickly spread to Spain and Italy: men like Nahmanides (and his students) in the thirteenth century and Yesha'yah di Trani absorbed the new mode. By the fourteenth century, analysis of Rashi was no longer a springboard for tosafist revision alone but became a subject in its own right in the work of Yom Tov Ashbilli.

Maimonides' code received the first of many sustained commentaries in Vidal di Tortosa's *Maggid mishneh* (The second speaker), a work that struggles with the code's relationship to Talmudic sources. Maimonidean commentary grew to the dimensions of a subdiscipline, an ironic outcome for a code perhaps designed to be a final statement of Jewish law.

New trends also asserted themselves: Isaac Campanton of Castile (late fifteenth century) pioneered a return to close reading of specific Talmudic texts utilizing categories of medieval logic; German and Polish Talmudists of the sixteenth century extended tosafist dialectic to a *pilpul* (lit., "pepper," in the sense of casuistry) based on subtle and frequently artificial comparisons and contrasts. Two modes of halakhic scholarship have become prominent in modern times: the analytic school that is identified with Hayyim Soloveichik of Brest-Litovsk but that had its inspiration in the *Qetsot ha-hoshen* (Ends of the breastplate) of Aryeh Leib ha-Kohen and, ultimately, in aspects of tosafist thought, and the text-critical and historical studies that derive in part from similar

models of Western scholarship. This latter mode, however, has made little impact on devotees of halakhic study.

**Responsa.** In contrast to commentary, *responsa*—along with the codes and their related literature—are attempts to mold halakhic practice by responding to specific problems as they arise. This genre developed massively in the geonic period. While both commentary and code are basically explanations or restatements of Talmudic law, the *responsum* applies that law to a new, concrete situation as the respondent functions at the intersection of law and practical reality. The *responsum* was the major instrument of direct geonic authority, and thousands of geonic responses to their far-flung questioners have been preserved. The *responsa* are the case law of the halakhic system, and the centrality of halakhic figures can often be gauged by their position in the *responsa* network. The decision rendered in a concrete situation is considered by many experts to be more authoritative than the codified generalization.

Two overall tendencies of this genre ought to be noted. (1) Inasmuch as a respondent was questioned in matters of conflict or situations reflecting new conditions, the bulk of *responsa* till the modern period focused on civil law, matters of personal status, and the application of halakhic categories to new economic conditions. Ritual law became a dominant subject of this literature only in relatively modern times, as Jews began to turn to the civil authorities for melioration of many of the problems listed above. (2) From the fifteenth century on (probably beginning with the *Terumat ha-deshen* [The Collected Ashes] of Yisra'el Isserlein), the *responsum* also became an artificial literary form in which a scholar elaborated on any problem of interest to him rather than communicating to an actual questioner. Thus the *responsa* literature includes central works of halakhic theory, such as the *Responsa sha'agat Aryeh* (Lion's roar) of Aryeh Leib of Mez. (A similar phenomenon is present in Maimonidean commentary, which has been used as a literary framework for discussion of general problems of Talmudic law.) This development notwithstanding, *responsa* remain the major forum in which modern halakhists consider the varied problems raised by contemporary civilization, as is seen in the multivolume works of Moshe Feinstein (1895–1986) of the United States and 'Ovadyah Yosef (b. 1920) of Israel. The *responsa* is well suited to *halakhah*: it allows a focus on the specific and the concrete; and inasmuch as the respondent is approached by virtue of his scholarship and reputation, *responsa* function in the absence of a formal hierarchical structure.

**Enactments.** Works classified as enactments (*taqqanot*) could be communal, rabbinical, or, frequently, authorized by both lay and rabbinical leadership. Enactments included in the Talmud are assumed to have universal application, and some medieval enactments have also achieved very wide observance (thus the ban [*herem*] on polygyny). But the vast majority of *taqqanot* were local in scope and origin. They were often communal or rabbinical responses to acute problems and carried communal sanctions. More than any other

aspect of the halakhic system, *taqqanot* (called *haskamot*, “agreements,” in the Sephardic sphere) represent *vox populi*; they would often be signed by the lay leadership (with the rabbinate concurring) and were frequently adopted by communal oath in the synagogue. *Taqqanot* are often preserved as independent documents or in communal registers and so constitute a literary genre of their own.

**MODERN SCHOLARSHIP.** Modern scholarly treatment of the history of medieval and modern *halakhah* has passed through a number of phases. Nineteenth-century historians, who often placed Jewish literary culture at the center of their interest, also focused on the careers of the great halakhists. But this focus often spent itself on biographical and literary issues; the history of law and legal theory was barely touched. With the rise of twentieth-century historiography, the major focus moved to the social, economic, and geopolitical aspects of Jewish life; now halakhic materials were combed as sources of historical data. A considerable amount of work was also devoted to the impact of general historic conditions of halakhic rulings and was often designed to show how flexible earlier halakhists had been. In recent decades, scholarship has looked for the complex interactions of legal theory and practice with historical reality as well as the internal dynamic of the halakhic system.

Modern scholarship has been able to utilize manuscript materials to gain a fuller picture of the past. Although no scientific editions of any medieval or modern halakhic text exist as yet, many new sources have been published or are consulted by scholars. The rich *genizah* (“storehouse”) of Cairo, in particular, has yielded much material emanating from the Babylonian and, even more important, from the obscure Palestinian gaonate. For example, by studying the legal documents found in the *genizah*, Mordecai A. Friedman has been able to reconstruct Palestinian marriage law, which went further in equalizing the rights of husband and wife than did Babylonian law (*Jewish Marriage in Palestine*, 2 vols., Tel Aviv, 1980).

The sociological investigation of Jewish law has been pioneered principally by Jacob Katz. Katz utilizes halakhic sources to shed light on social processes, but in his work on law governing Jewish-gentile relations (*Exclusiveness and Tolerance*, London, 1961) and in a number of papers on Jewish ritual law, he has also shown how social realities have affected the halakhic process. Recently, though, Haym Soloveitchik has indicated that the halakhic response has not always accommodated the social or economic need (see, for example, his paper “Can Halakhic Texts Talk History?” in *AJS Review* 3, 1978, pp. 152–196) but has developed through the interpretation of its textual traditions as well. Since Jewish legists generally functioned in close proximity to their Christian and Muslim contemporaries, the question of mutual influence arises. It appears that Jewish legists absorbed terminology and occasionally legal theory from their surroundings. A more substantive claim for the impact of Christian marriage law has been made by Ze'ev W. Falk in *Jewish Matrimonial*

*Law in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1966), and that for Muslim law of prayer has been made by Naftali Wieder in *Islamic Influences on the Jewish Worship* (Oxford, 1947; in Hebrew). This area of research is in its infancy.

The issue of halakhic openness arises in other contexts as well, for example, regarding the impact of Jewish pietistic movements on Jewish law and the degree to which legists integrate their other intellectual commitments into their legal views. The researches into Maimonidean *halakhah* by Jacob Levinger (*Darkhei hamahshavah ha-hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam*, Jerusalem, 1965) and Isadore Twersky (*Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, New Haven, 1980) indicate that Maimonides' halakhic corpus is conditioned by his philosophic attitudes. Katz's work on the relationship of Qabbalah to *halakhah* reveals, as well, the influence of spiritualism on certain aspects of Jewish law (see, for example, his Hebrew papers in *Tarbiz* 50, 1980–1981, pp. 405–422; 51, 1982, pp. 59–106; and in *Da'at*, 1981, pp. 37–68). Nonetheless, the halakhic system has retained a great measure of integrity as a self-contained system.

The most rounded analysis of the history of *halakhah*, treating both systemic-conceptual development and the place of law in society and history, is that associated with the school of *mishpat 'ivri* ("Hebrew law") in Israel. Although its scholarly and ideological assumptions have been subjected to sharp disagreement (see the debate between Izhak Engeland and Menachem Elon in *The Jewish Law Annual, Supplement 1*, 1980), this school surveys topics of Jewish law in fuller scope than do other methods. Significant work produced by its historians includes Aaron Freimann's study of conditional marriage, M. Elon on the freedom of the debtor's person, and Shmuel Shiloh on Jewish reception of non-Jewish law. A fine English-language exemplar of this method is David Feldman's *Birth Control in Jewish Law* (New York, 1968), which surveys Jewish law on birth control and abortion from biblical times until the present.

SEE ALSO Tosafot.

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of this series are also liberally peppered with references to halakhic history. Simḥa Assaf, in *Te-qufat ha-ge'onim ve-sifrutah* (Jerusalem, 1955), surveys the geonic period with a heavy stress on the halakhic development.

There are a number of outstanding treatments of individual figures or specific movements: E. E. Urbach's *Ba'alei ha-tosafot*, 4th ed. (Jerusalem, 1980), details the milieu and contribution of the seminal tosafist movement; Isadore Twersky's *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides* (New Haven, Conn., 1980) is a magisterial analysis of various literary aspects of the code and the relationship of Maimonides' *halakhah* and his philosophical views. Louis Finkelstein provides translation and discussion of the major European *taqqanot* until the fifteenth century in his *Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages* (1924; reprint, Westport, Conn., 1972), and Solomon B. Freehof's *The Responsa Literature* (Philadelphia, 1955), is an informative introduction to this genre.

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#### HALAKHAH: STRUCTURE OF HALAKHAH

*Halakhah*, in the general sense of the word, is the entire body of Jewish law, from scripture to the latest rabbinical rulings. It is a complete system of law governing every aspect of human life. It has been traditionally viewed as wholly rooted in God's revealed will (B. T., *Hag.* 3b) but subject to the ongoing interpretation of the Jewish jurists (B. T., *B. M.* 59b).

In its more specific sense *halakhah* (pl., *halakhot*) refers to those laws that were traditionally observed by the Jewish people as if they were scriptural commandments (*mitsvot*) even though they were nowhere explicitly found in scripture. The term itself, according to Saul Lieberman in *Hellenism in Jewish Palestine* (New York, 1962), seems to refer to the statement of a juristic norm as opposed to actual case law. The task of much rabbinic exegesis, especially during the tannaitic period (c. 70–200 CE), was to show that through the use of proper hermeneutics the *halakhot* could be derived from the text of scripture, especially the Pentateuch. When this could not be done, the specific *halakhah* was termed "a law of Moses from Sinai."

**ORIGINS.** Concerning the origins of *halakhah* there are three main theories.

The first, the traditional, rabbinic approach, is founded on the literal meaning of "a law of Moses from Sinai," namely, that Moses received two sets of teachings at Mount Sinai, one written (the Pentateuch) and the other oral (*torah she-be'al peh*), and that the oral Torah is the authoritative explanation of the written Torah (B. T., *Ber.* 5a). Thus all subsequent interpretation is in effect recollection of what had already been revealed at Sinai (J. T., *Meg.* 4.1.74d). This theory explains that the constant rabbinical disputes over vir-



tually every point of *halakhah* are due not to any inherent ambiguity in the tradition itself but, rather, to insufficient mastery of the tradition by the rabbis (Tosefta, *Soṭ.* 14.10).

The second theory is that of Moses Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon, 1135/8–1204). Although he too reiterated the literal meaning of the totally Mosaic origin of *halakhah*, in his specific treatment of the constitution of halakhic authority he states that *halakhah* is based on scripture and, equally, on the rulings of the Great Court in Jerusalem (*Mishneh Torah*, Rebels 1.1ff.). This is Mosaic law in that the members of the Great Court are Moses' authoritative successors. Maimonides explains the fact of constant rabbinical disputes in *halakhah* as due to the loss of political sovereignty, which led to the demise of the Great Court's jurisdiction. By this theory Maimonides places both rabbinical legislation and traditional *halakhah* on the same level.

The third theory is that of Zacharias Frankel (1801–1875). Expanding certain medieval comments into a more general theory, Frankel, in *Darkhei ha-Mishnah* (Leipzig, 1859), saw the term “a law of Moses from Sinai” as primarily referring to ancient laws that had become widespread in Jewish practice and whose origins were obscure. They were regarded as if they had come from the actual time of Moses. Frankel's theory, which received severe criticism from more orthodox scholars, reflected the growing historical consciousness of nineteenth-century Jewish scholarship and, also, stimulated research into the different historical origins of various *halakhot*. Frankel, then, along with other scholars of his time, laid the foundation for the historical understanding of *halakhah* as a developmental phenomenon.

**SCRIPTURAL EXEGESIS.** Because of the Pharisaic and rabbinic emphasis on the essential unity of the written Torah and the *halakhah*, in contradistinction to the Sadducean, which accepted only the former as authoritative (B. T., *Hor.* 4a), an elaborate hermeneutical system was worked out to derive as many of the *halakhot* as possible from the words of scripture, which was considered normatively unintelligible without the process of specifically relating it to the *halakhah* (B. T., *Shab.* 31a). This entire process was called *midrash*, literally meaning “inquiry” into scripture. The most important statement of this rabbinic hermeneutic is the “Thirteen Methods of Rabbi Yishma‘el” (*Sifra*, intro.). The most widely used of these methods and the most typical was the *gezerah shavah*; namely, the process by which a word in one scriptural context was interpreted according to its meaning in another context. Since this type of interpretation was only for buttressing already normative *halakhot*, what it accomplished was a much wider latitude for tradition to determine the meaning of scripture (J. T., *Pes.* 6.1, 33a). However, not only did such hermeneutical methods support already normative *halakhot*, but they also led to the formulation of new norms. The most prominent proponent of this constructive exegesis was the second-century sage ‘Aqiva ben Yosef, although his oftentimes daring interpretations elicited the criticism of his more conservative teachers and colleagues (B. T., *Men.* 89a).

In tannaitic texts a distinction is made between direct scriptural exegesis (*derashah*) and indirect exegesis. In a purely normative sense, however, it is difficult to see any authoritative difference between laws buttressed by the latter as opposed to the former. Both sets of laws were regarded as traditional *halakhot*; the only difference is that the former were more satisfactorily based on scripture.

**RABBINIC LAW.** In the amoraic period (c. 220–c. 500) there emerged a more clear-cut distinction between laws considered scriptural (*de-oraita*) and laws considered rabbinic (*de-rabbanan*). The difference between scriptural law and rabbinic law by this time was that the latter was considered to be evidently rational. As for scriptural law, despite attempts to discover “reasons for the commandments” (*ta‘amei ha-mitsvot*), God's will was considered sufficient reason for it. “I have made a statute; I have decreed a decree; you are not permitted to violate my decrees” (*Nm. Rab.* 19.1). This phrase was used to refute any suggestion that only those laws whose reasons were evident were authoritative. In fact, certain scriptural laws were admitted to be rationally incomprehensible, but their authority was nevertheless emphasized as being because “my father in heaven has decreed such for me” (*Sifra*, Shemini, ed. Weiss, 93b).

Rabbinic law, although occasionally justified by indirect scriptural exegesis (*asmakhta*), was then usually justified as being for the fulfillment of some religious or social need (B. T., *Ber.* 23b). This developed to such an extent that it was claimed that there were only three rabbinic laws for which no reason could be immediately discerned (B. T., *Git.* 14a). Furthermore, the lines between direct and indirect exegesis were considerably blurred (B. T., *Pes.* 39b). Finally, Rava, a fourth-century Babylonian sage who became the most prominent advocate of rational jurisprudence, indicated that the rabbis actually had more legislative power than even scripture (B. T., *Mak.* 22b). Nevertheless, although in theory the punishment for the violation of rabbinic law could be even more severe than that for the violation of scriptural law (*San.* 11.3), in reality it was almost always more lenient (*Naz.* 4.3). In case of doubt, in matters concerning scriptural law the benefit of the doubt favored the law, but in rabbinic law it favored the accused (B. T., *Beits.* 3b).

The question of the extent of scriptural law versus rabbinic law was deeply debated among the medieval Jewish jurists. Maimonides, following the Talmudic opinion that scriptural law is limited to 613 Pentateuchal commandments (B. T., *Mak.* 23b), considered any other laws, whether traditional or formulated through exegesis or rabbinical legislation, as having the status of rabbinic laws (*Sefer ha-mitsvot*, intro., sec. 2). Moses Nahmanides (Mosheh ben Naḥman, c. 1194–1270), on the other hand, was of the opinion that anything designated by the rabbis as scriptural law, especially those laws derived hermeneutically in rabbinic literature, has the status of scriptural law. Only those laws specifically designated by the rabbis as rabbinic are to be considered as such. This difference of opinion concerning the very character of

*halakhab* is philosophical. Maimonides' prime concern seems to have been with the process of legislation, that is, with the ability of the duly constituted authorities to make new laws and repeal old ones. Nahmanides' prime concern seems to have been with a revival of the whole process of rabbinical exegesis. This distinction can be seen in the fact that Maimonides' chief halakhic contribution was that of a highly innovative codifier, whereas Nahmanides' was that of an exegete. This difference of approach can be seen in the Talmud and throughout the history of the *halakhab*, namely, the apodictic approach (B. T., *Nid.* 73a) as contrasted with the expository approach (B. T., *B. M.* 33a).

Rabbinical legislation was considered the original prerogative of the Great Court in Jerusalem (*Sifrei*, Shoftim, ed. Finkelstein, no. 144). With the diminution of its powers even before the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE and its full demise at that time, how much of its power could be transferred to subsequent courts became the subject of considerable discussion.

Sometimes Jewish juridical power was limited because of the lack of political sovereignty; however, internal Jewish political considerations played an even more important role in determining the extent of juridical authority in certain times and places. Despite the destruction of the Second Temple and the demise of the Great Court, there was a strong attempt to retain prime rabbinical authority in the Land of Israel. Thus unqualified rabbinical ordination (*semikhah*), which was seen as an institution originating with Moses himself, was limited to those rabbis who functioned in the Land of Israel. When in the third century Rav (Abba' bar Ayyvu) left Israel for Babylonia, where he led the revival of the Jewish community, he was granted a qualified ordination, with authorization to adjudicate only in certain questions of law (B. T., *San.* 5a). Nevertheless, with the exception of adjudicating in the area of scripturally fixed fines (*qenasot*, B. T., *B. Q.* 84b), as the Babylonian community grew and developed its own institutions, its rabbis began to claim virtually all of the halakhic prerogatives of the rabbinate of the Land of Israel (B. T., *Git.* 88b). Generally, this set the pattern for subsequent rabbinical authority, namely, that the rabbis in every time and place exercised as much halakhic authority as political and religious conditions both allowed and required (Tosefta, *R. ha-Sh.* 1.18). Moreover, it was recognized that in emergency situations the rabbis had the right to override existing laws temporarily (*hora'at sha'ah*), even scriptural ones (B. T., *Yev.* 90b). Finally, it was recognized that the rabbis even had the power to abrogate certain aspects of scriptural laws, although this power was considerably qualified (*ibid.*, 89b).

**Types of rabbinical legislation.** Rabbinical legislation can generally be divided into two classes: decrees (*gezerot*) and enactments (*taqqanot*).

Decrees were justified by the principle traced back to the period of Ezra (sixth century BCE) that "a fence is to be made around the Torah" (*Avot* 1.1). This "fence" consists of

prohibitions designed to protect scriptural law from probable transgression. Thus, for example, numerous additional restrictions (*shevut*) were enacted to protect the thirty-nine scriptural prohibitions of Sabbath labor from being carelessly violated, to enhance the overall sanctity of the day, and to guard against behavior that the rabbis saw as inconsistent with the spirit of the law (*Beits.* 5.2). However, to distinguish rabbinical legislation from scriptural law and to prevent an infinite multiplication of strictures, the rabbis emphasized that laws were not to be enacted to protect their laws (B. T., *Beits.* 3a).

Rabbinical enactments were justified by the scriptural prescription that "you not deviate from what the judges will tell you" (*Deut.* 17:11). Although this probably refers to the simple necessity of applying scriptural law, the rabbis saw it as mandating their power to add to it if circumstances warranted doing so. These enactments were of three kinds.

1. Enactments were made to commemorate postbiblical Jewish events. Thus, for example, the recitation of the liturgical formula "Blessed are you, Lord . . . who has commanded us" was justified for the ritual of kindling Hanukkah lights on the grounds that the rabbinical legislation that mandated it is itself prescribed by scripture (B. T., *Shab.* 23a). As the rabbis often put it, "It is a commandment to listen to the words of the sages" (B. T., *Yev.* 20a).
2. Enactments were made to alleviate hardships arising from the widening gap between scriptural law and social and economic realities. Thus, for example, the scriptural law prescribing the cancellation of debts every seventh year (*Deut.* 15:1ff.) proved to be a deterrent to lending money to those who needed it most in a commercial economy, where longterm loans were becoming more and more common. To alleviate this situation, in accordance with the overall purpose of the Torah, that is, to promote social justice and well-being, Hillel the Elder (first century CE) enacted the institution of *prozbul*, whereby a creditor handed over his note to a court. Since the court collected the debt, the lender avoided the prohibition of personally collecting the debt after the Sabbatical year (*Git.* 4.3).
3. Enactments were made to curtail individual rights, the exercise of which was seen as contrary to the common good. Thus, for example, the third-century Babylonian sage 'Ula' ruled that although scripture permitted repayment of a debt with merchandise of any quality (*Deut.* 24:11), the debtor must repay a debt with at least medium-grade merchandise so as not to discourage lending (B. T., *Git.* 50a). This same type of curb on what was perceived to be the antisocial exercise of individual privileges was the basis of the numerous laws enacted in medieval communities (*taqqanot ha-qehillot*). The most famous of these was the ban on polygyny issued for Ashkenazic (northern European) Jewry by Gershom ben



Yehudah of Mainz (c. 965–1028) even though both the Bible and the Talmud permit the practice.

**Rabbinic legal procedures.** Rabbinical legislation was conducted according to a number of procedural rules. Although the reason for a specific rabbinical enactment did not have to be immediately publicized (B. T., *A. Z.* 35a), there certainly had to be a clear and compelling religious or social need for it to be enacted. Rabbinical legislation was considered general in scope and was not to be formulated as case law (B. T., *Eruv.* 63b).

The question of how long a rabbinical enactment was considered binding and what power of repeal subsequent rabbis have is a complicated one and is debated by scholars. Thus an important passage in the Mishnah states that “one court may not repeal [*mevatef*] the decrees of a fellow court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in numbers” (*Eduy.* 1.5). Some scholars have interpreted this as applying to a contemporary court only. Others have interpreted it as applying to a subsequent court. “Greater in numbers” has been interpreted to mean a greater number of disciples. However, it was highly unusual for a subsequent court to regard itself as wiser than an earlier one. The rabbis generally were too reverent of tradition to attempt to repeal it overtly. The Talmudic statement “If earlier generations were angels, we are but men” (B. T., *Shab.* 112b) reflects this typical attitude. Therefore, repeal usually took the form of more subtle reinterpretation of earlier enactments. However, even when the reason for an enactment was no longer extant, it was still considered binding unless there was a strong reason for reinterpretation.

The question of rejection of a rabbinical enactment by the people was debated in the Middle Ages. The Talmud states that “a decree is not to be made unless the majority of the community are able to abide by it” (B. T., *A. Z.* 36a), and this was interpreted to mean that it had to have been accepted as normative by the majority of the community. (There does not seem to have been, however, any procedure for an actual plebiscite.) Rashi (Rabbi Shelomoh ben Yitshaq, 1040–1105) restricts this right to the generation of the enactment itself; that is, if they accept it the enactment is binding irrespective of the possible rejection by subsequent generations. Maimonides, on the other hand, extends the right of rejection even to subsequent generations; that is, if an earlier rabbinical enactment had fallen into disuse, then a subsequent court may regard it as no longer binding (*Mishneh Torah*, Rebels 2.7). Following the same logic, in another ruling Maimonides opts for the ancient Babylonian practice of publicly reading the Torah in the synagogue in an annual cycle over the ancient Palestinian practice of reading it in a triennial cycle, simply because the former practice had acquired universal Jewish acceptance.

**CUSTOM.** *Minhag* (“custom”) is the third constituent element in *halakhah*, after scriptural exegesis and rabbinic law. It basically has three functions.

1. Custom is invoked when the law itself is ambiguous. If

there are two reputable opinions as to what a law is, then there are two ways of deciding what is to be done. Either the majority view of the sages is followed (B. T., *Hul.* 11a), or the popular practice of the people is consulted and followed (J. T., *Pe'ah* 8.2, 20c). In the latter situation custom does not establish law but distinguishes between which law is considered normative (*halakhah le-ma'aseh*) and which law is considered only theoretical (*ein morin ken*, J. T., *Yev.* 12.1, 12c). Popular acceptance of one practice over another is considered a valid criterion of juridical choice because “if the people of Israel are not prophets, they are the children of prophets” (J. T., *Pes.* 6.1, 33a). In other words, popular practice is indicative of an unbroken chain of tradition.

2. Custom is considered a valid form of law, supplementing scriptural commandments and formal rabbinical legislation. Certain customs are considered universally Jewish. For example, the Orthodox objection to the modern practice of men and women sitting together in non-Orthodox synagogues, although some have attempted to find formal halakhic objections to it, is actually based on the fact that theretofore separation of the sexes in the synagogue was undoubtedly universal Jewish custom. Earlier in the nineteenth century the same invocation of the authority of custom was used to object to the introduction of the organ into synagogues in western Europe, with the additional point that such a practice constituted “walking in the ways of the Gentiles.”

Other customs are considered local and binding only on members of a particular locality. Generally, the rule is that if one is in a different locality from one's own, one should do nothing there to cause any scandal or controversy (*Pes.* 4.1). The force of the authority of local custom can be seen, especially, in the diversity of liturgical rites among Jews even to this day. These differences of custom to a large extent reflect differences of local environment and the social, political, and economic conditions within the respective Jewish communities. In new localities, where there are Jews from varying backgrounds, the general approach is to attempt to devise a unified rite so that there not be numerous groups (B. T., *Yev.* 13b). More frequently than not the rites of the more dominant group in the new locality prevail over everyone.

3. Custom sometimes takes precedence over established Jewish practice even when it has no foundation in *halakhah*. Usually this power of custom was used to rescind privileges the *halakhah* had earlier granted (Elon, 1978, pp. 732ff.). However, sometimes custom even had the power to abrogate, *de facto*, scriptural law. For example, the law that certain portions of slaughtered animals be given to descendants of Aaronic priests irrespective of time and place was not considered binding because of customary neglect.

**EXTRAHALAKHIC FACTORS.** The role extrahalakhic factors have played in the development of the *halakhah* is one of considerable debate among scholars. Aside from the question of the influence of history and general philosophy, which could be seen as extraneous modes of thought, there is the question of the influence of the nonlegal body of rabbinic thought, largely theological, known as *aggadah*. Generally it was held that one could not decide the law based on *aggadah* alone. Nevertheless, it can be shown that aggadic factors were influential in formulating halakhic opinions. This becomes evident when the views of the various rabbis, who were both halakhists and aggadists, are examined.

Thus, for example, 'Aqiva', in a discussion of capital punishment, states that had he been a member of the Sanhedrin when capital punishment was practiced, no one would have ever been executed (*Mak.* 1.10). The Talmud attempts to find a legal basis for this opinion inasmuch as capital punishment is prescribed by scripture for a number of crimes. The halakhic conclusion (written long after the time of 'Aqiva') is that he would have interpreted the laws of evidence so strictly as to make conviction for a crime punishable by death a practical impossibility (B. T., *Mak.* 7a). However, one can find an aggadic statement, recorded in the name of 'Aqiva' himself, that "whoever sheds human blood diminishes the divine image" (Tosefta, *Yev.* 8.7). Since even a convicted criminal has not forfeited that divine image (Tosefta, *San.* 9.7), one can see that 'Aqiva' had theological objections against any sort of bloodshed. It would seem that his theology was the authentic influence on his halakhic opinion, although subsequent legalists had to find a halakhic reason for it lest the authority of the law be reduced to theological opinion, something that was generally avoided (J. T., *Hor.* 3.9, 48c).

One can see further evidence of this in the relation between *halakhah* and Qabbalah (Jewish mystical literature), especially if Qabbalah is taken to be a subsequent development of *aggadah*. On the one hand, despite the growing popularity in the Middle Ages of the *Zohar* (the most important qabbalistic text), there were halakhists who regarded it as nonauthoritative, whether or not they approved of its theology. On the other hand, there were legalists who regarded it as divine revelation and *ipso facto* authoritative. A compromise was reached between these two opinions by David ibn Avi Zimra' (1479–1573), who ruled that when the Talmud was inconclusively divided on a certain law, the *Zohar* could be invoked to decide in favor of one of the Talmudic opinions. However, the *Zohar* could not be so invoked when the Talmud was conclusive.

**SUBDIVISIONS OF HALAKHAH.** For descriptive purposes it is helpful to see *halakhah* as divided into the following areas: (1) ritual law, (2) law of familial and personal status, (3) civil law, (4) criminal law, and (5) law pertaining to non-Jews.

**Ritual law.** Although including inoperative laws pertaining to the Temple cult and most matters of ritual purity, ritual law can be seen today as confined to matters of wor-

ship, the Sabbath and festivals, diet, clothing, and sex. In the four-part *Shulhan 'arukh* of Yosef Karo (1488–1575), which has become the most authoritative halakhic code, ritual law is the subject of all of the first part, *Orah hayyim*, and most of the second part, *Yoreh de'ah*.

One of the most important principles to emerge in the development of ritual *halakhah* is that in cases where the observance of the law poses a distinct danger to human life, the law is not to be observed. The origins of this seminal principle can be seen as early as the Maccabean revolt against the Seleucid rulers of the Land of Israel (166–164 BCE). In that revolt the pietists refused to fight on the Sabbath. This led to their being frequently massacred on the Sabbath by their enemies, who quickly became aware of this restriction. It was argued (*1 Mc.* 2.39–42) that this insistence on unqualified Sabbath observance would lead to the total extermination of the Jewish people. In the early second century, under similarly oppressive circumstances, the rabbis meeting secretly at Lod ruled that one was to transgress the law rather than die a martyr's death. The only exceptions were if one were ordered on pain of death to practice idolatry overtly, commit murder, or initiate an act of adultery, homosexuality, or bestiality (B. T., *San.* 74a). All of this was based on the scriptural command "You shall live through them" (*Lv.* 18:5), which was interpreted to mean "You shall live through them but not die because of them" (*Sifra*, Aḥarei-mot, 86b). This principle, in one form or another, was invoked on numerous occasions and led to such corollaries as "Danger to life takes precedence over a ritual infraction" (B. T., *Hul.* 10a).

**Law of familial and personal status.** The law of familial and personal status is the subject of *Even ha'ezer*, the third part of the *Shulhan 'arukh*, and of some sections of *Yoreh de'ah*, the second part. In this area of *halakhah* the question that has become the subject of widest discussion and deepest controversy since 1948 is that of who is a Jew.

**Jewish identity.** According to scriptural law it would seem that Jewish identity is patrilineal, as suggested by such statements as "The whole community were registered by the clans of their ancestral houses [*le-veit avotam*; lit., 'the houses of their fathers']" (*Nm.* 1:18; J. T., *Qid.* 64d). Furthermore, when Ruth the Moabite married the Israelite leader Boaz, without specific mention of any formal conversion, her descendants were automatically considered as following her husband's patrimony (*Ru.* 4:21–22). Nevertheless, according to the Talmud Jewish identity is considered matrilineal (B. T., *Qid.* 68b). The origins of this approach can perhaps be seen in the beginnings of the postexilic period (c. 516 BCE), when at the urging of Ezra the people banished not only their non-Jewish wives but also "those born of them" (*Ezr.* 10:3).

Once one is born of a Jewish mother, or he or she has properly converted to Judaism, that status is considered irrevocable (B. T., *San.* 44a, *Yev.* 47b). However, the community can revoke various privileges of Jewish status from apos-

tates and other persons as well who have removed themselves from basic Jewish identification and observance.

**Marriage and divorce.** The subject of the most extensive halakhic structure is marriage and divorce. Marriage originally consisted of two parts. The first part, *erusin* (“betrothal”), was initiated when the man, with the consent of the woman, designated her as his wife before at least two bona fide witnesses, usually by giving her an article of stipulated value (*Qid.* 1.1). The woman, however, continued to live with her parents; her father now had joint responsibility for her, along with her husband. After a period of time, usually one year, the bride left her parental home and went to live with the groom (*nissu’in*), and the couple consummated the marriage. The status of the woman was greatly enhanced by the marriage contract (*ketubbah*), which provided a considerable payment in the event of her being divorced or widowed (Epstein, 1927).

Divorce required that the husband present his wife with a formal bill of divorce (*get*), drawn up at his instigation by a rabbinical court. Although the school of Shammai made adultery the only grounds for divorce, the *halakhah* followed the more lenient view of the school of Hillel, which made virtually any incompatibility sufficient for divorce to be effected (*Git.* 9.10). Although the woman herself could not instigate divorce proceedings, she could, nevertheless, when there was clearly sufficient incompatibility, request that a rabbinical court force her husband to grant her a divorce (*Ket.* 7.10). Indeed, nonfulfillment of the basic husbandly duties of support and regular sexual intercourse obligated a man to do so (*Ket.* 5.6).

**Civil law.** Jewish civil law regulates all areas of life involving property. It is the subject of the greatest discussion in *Hoshen mishpat*, the fourth part of the *Shulhan ’arukh*.

Of all the areas of *halakhah*, civil law has been the most flexible. The underlying basis of this flexibility is perhaps best expressed in the rabbinic dictum “The Torah cares about property of Israel” (*Neg.* 12.5). In other words, although there was a consistent commitment to general principles of justice, it was understood that the law, especially in the unstable and diversified area of economics, must be responsive to the needs of the times. This characteristic, it might be added, was limited to the area of civil law, and for this reason one could not apply most of the principles developed there to the more conservative area of ritual law (B. T., *Ber.* 19b).

Although the *halakhah* developed its own standards for various commercial activities, the operative principle is “Everything is according to the practice [*minhag*] of the locality” (*B. M.* 7.1). Thus, even conditions contrary to the law of the Torah, which under all other circumstances are null and void, in monetary matters are considered valid if freely agreed upon by both parties to a contract (B. T., *Qid.* 19b), except where the prohibition of one Jew taking interest from another Jew is involved. However, even here the *halakhah*

eventually evolved a procedure (*better ’isqa*) whereby interest could be charged for commercial loans using the legal fiction of designating the creditor as a partner of the debtor in a joint venture (Elon, 1975, pp. 504–505). Furthermore, flexibility in this area of *halakhah* is evidenced by the fact that in monetary disputes informal arbitration was encouraged in lieu of formal adjudication.

Private property was not considered an absolute right by the *halakhah*. Although there is an elaborate system of adjudicating claims and counterclaims between private parties in such areas as torts and contracts, the court had the power to declare private property ownerless (*hefker*) if this was in the interest of the common good (B. T., *Yev.* 89b). It must be added, however, that this principle was used sparingly, and it seems as though for the *halakhah* a limited free-enterprise system is considered both the norm and the desideratum.

**Criminal law.** Jewish criminal law, also dealt with in *Hoshen mishpat*, is concerned with capital and corporal punishment. Capital punishment is mandated for such interpersonal acts as murder and adultery as well as for such ritual acts as public violation of the Sabbath. Corporal punishment (lashing) is mandated for various ritual infractions (*Mak.* 3.1ff.). Most personal injury, however, was treated as a civil tort rather than as a criminal act per se. Thus the scriptural *lex talionis* (“an eye for an eye,” *Ex.* 21:24) was interpreted by the rabbis as prescribing monetary compensation for the victim rather than the actual mutilation of the perpetrator.

Even after the Roman rulers of the Land of Israel had removed the power of the Jewish courts to administer capital punishment, sometime before 70 CE, the rabbis were sharply divided about its desirability. Although the institution itself, because it was scripturally prescribed, could not be explicitly abrogated, a number of rabbis were obviously opposed to it in practice if not in principle (B. T., *San.* 71a). This tendency to oppose capital punishment is also seen in the rabbinic institution of *hatra’ah*, according to which one could not be convicted of a capital crime unless he or she had been explicitly forewarned by the same two witnesses who actually saw the crime and the criminal had explicitly indicated that he or she was aware of both the criminal status of the act to be done and the exact type of capital punishment it entailed (B. T., *San.* 40b–41a). Such an institution would seem to limit sharply the number of legal executions. Whether *hatra’ah* was actually practiced when the Jewish courts had the power of capital punishment is questioned by some modern scholars. Nevertheless, it does reflect a definite tendency in rabbinic theory if not in actual practice.

On the other hand, a number of prominent and influential halakhists expressed the view of the second-century sage Shim’on ben Gamli’el II that capital punishment is necessary to maintain social order (*Mak.* 1.10). Indeed, the Talmud is followed by many subsequent authorities in advocating capital punishment even for crimes not specified as capital crimes in the legal sources if the court believed that



“the hour required such” in cases of gross public provocation. In the thirteenth century the important halakhist Shelomoh ben Avraham Adret stated that were all the traditional qualifications of capital punishment in the *halakhah* to be followed, “society would be destroyed.” His statement, furthermore, was probably not just theoretical in that it is known that Spanish Jewish communities at that time did have the power to execute criminals (Elon, 1978, p. 9).

The actual practice of Jewish criminal law, and to a large extent Jewish civil law as well, has frequently required the type of political sovereignty that Jews did not have. Thus in the third century the Babylonian authority Shemu’el of Nehardea formulated the seminal juridical principle that “the law of the kingdom is the law” (B. T., *B. B.* 54b). This principle was justified in several ways; the most cogent is that the Jewish court has the power to transfer its authority in civil and criminal matters. Historically this relegated all Jewish criminal law and much Jewish civil law to the realm of the theoretical. Thus some medieval authorities seem to have thought that this principle was too radical in that it gave away too much Jewish legal sovereignty. It is still too early for the most part to see if and how Jewish criminal and civil law can be revived in the state of Israel, which, at the present time at least, is constituted as a secular state not subject to the authority of the *halakhah* except in limited areas (see below).

**Law regarding non-Jews.** The area of Jewish law pertaining to non-Jews has been called “the seven commandments of the sons of Noah” (Tosefta, *A. Z.* 8.4). These commandments are (1) the obligation to adjudicate cases according to defined statutes and the prohibitions of (2) blasphemy, (3) idolatry, (4) homicide, (5) adultery, homosexuality, and bestiality, (6) robbery, and (7) eating a limb torn from a living animal. A number of commentators saw these seven commandments as seven general legal categories rather than seven specific norms.

One of the most important historical questions about this area of *halakhah* is whether or not it was actually enforced among non-Jews. Some scholars consider this highly unlikely inasmuch as no actual case is reported in the rabbinic sources, where these laws were the basis of adjudication, and there do not seem to have been free Gentiles living under Jewish legal jurisdiction in the rabbinic period. Indeed, only in Maimonides’ *Mishneh Torah* (Code of Law), which deals with every area of *halakhah*, even those no longer (if ever) operative, are the Noachic laws systematically presented and discussed (Kings and Wars 8.10ff.). It is, moreover, important to note that non-Jewish slaves, who were certainly owned by Jews at that time, were subject to a body of law containing many more distinctly Jewish practices and prohibitions than the Noachic laws (B. T., *Hag.* 4a).

Nevertheless, the concept of a law governing non-Jews, which was considered to have been normative for Jews as well before the Sinaitic revelation of the 613 commandments of the Mosaic Torah, had a profound effect on the development

of Judaism. In terms of *halakhah* the Noachic laws were considered to be the minimal normative standards upon which the Mosaic Torah was based. Thus the Talmud in more than one place states that “there is nothing prohibited to non-Jews that is permitted to Jews” (B. T., *San.* 59a). In another place it states that Jewish law must be stricter lest it appear as “a lower form of sanctity” (B. T., *Yev.* 22a).

In terms of Jewish-Gentile relations the Noachic prohibition of idolatry became the basis of determining which non-Jewish societies were actually idolatrous and which were merely following “ancestral custom” (B. T., *Hul.* 13b). This distinction had great practical importance in that Jewish dealings with confirmed Gentile idolators were proscribed in many areas, including in various business transactions (*A. Z.* 1.1). In the Middle Ages the Noachic prohibition of idolatry became the standard for determining the Jewish view, both theoretical and practical, of Christianity and Islam. Islamic monotheism was, of course, much easier to justify on Jewish grounds than were Christian incarnationism and trinitarianism. Indeed, a number of medieval halakhists, usually themselves living under Muslim regimes, considered Christianity a form of idolatry entailing all the Talmudic proscriptions pertaining to idolatry and idolators. However, other legalists, usually living under Christian regimes, drew upon earlier Talmudic distinctions between stricter criteria for Jews than for Gentiles, especially in areas of religious conviction, and so considered Christianity a mediated monotheism.

In those democratic countries where Jews are full participants, there has been renewed interest in this area of *halakhah* as a source for determining “the Jewish point of view” on various issues of public concern as widely divergent as abortion, capital punishment, and prayer in American public schools. How pertinent, however, many of these sources are to the areas of public concern to which they have been related, without thorough critical historical and philosophical examination and reinterpretation, is itself a source of great difference of opinion among contemporary Jewish thinkers.

**CURRENT ROLE OF HALAKHAH.** Although *halakhah* is a system of law governing every aspect of personal and communal life, there is no Jewish community in the world today where *halakhah* is the sole basis of governance. This inherent paradox—namely, a total system of law forced by historical reality to share legal authority with another system of law, if not to be actually subordinate to it—has led to a number of tensions both in the state of Israel and in the Diaspora.

**Halakhah in the state of Israel.** In the state of Israel, *halakhah*, as adjudicated by the rabbinical courts, is recognized as the law governing all aspects of public Jewish religious ritual and all areas of marriage and divorce. (The same privilege is extended to the respective systems of law of the various non-Jewish religious communities there.) This political arrangement has led to a number of areas of tension. Thus many secularist Israeli Jews object to having to submit in

questions of personal and familial status to the authority of religious courts, whose very religious justification they do not accept. This conflict has manifested itself in the demand by many secularist Israelis for civil marriage and divorce in the state of Israel, something that *halakhah* rejects as unacceptable for Jews. Even more profound is the fact that there is a conflict between *halakhah* and Israeli law on the most basic question of Jewish identity, that is, who is a Jew. According to *halakhah*, anyone born of a Jewish mother or himself or herself converted to Judaism is considered a Jew. According to the Israeli Law of Return (Hoq ha-Shevut), any Jew (with the exception of one convicted of a crime in another country) has the right of Israeli domicile and Israeli citizenship. However, in 1962 in a famous decision the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that Oswald Rufeisen, a Jewish convert to Christianity and a Roman Catholic monk, was not entitled to Israeli citizenship as a Jew because in the popular sense of the term he was not a Jew even though he was one in the technical, halakhic sense. On the other hand, in 1968, in another famous decision, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the wife and children of an Israeli Jew, Binyamin Shalit, were not to be considered Jews for purposes of Israeli citizenship because they had not been converted to Judaism, even though they identified themselves as Israeli Jews in the secular sense of the term. In this case, unlike the earlier one, the court accepted a halakhic definition of who is a Jew.

At the present time, furthermore, there is considerable debate in the state of Israel and the Diaspora about what actually constitutes valid conversion to Judaism. All Orthodox and most Conservative halakhists have rejected the conversions performed under Reform auspices because in the great majority of such cases the objective halakhic criteria of conversion—circumcision for males and immersion in a ritual bath (*mikveh*) for both males and females (B. T., *Yev.* 47b)—have not been fulfilled. Even the conversions performed under Conservative auspices, although fulfilling these objective criteria, are also rejected by many Orthodox legalists, who claim that Conservative rabbis lack the requisite commitment to *halakhah* to function as acceptable rabbinical judges. All of this is evidence of the widening division among the branches of contemporary Judaism.

**Halakhah in the Diaspora.** In the Diaspora, where adherence to *halakhah* is a matter of individual choice in practically every country that Judaism may be freely practiced, there is little ability to enforce the communal authority inherent in the halakhic system itself. This has led to a number of vexing problems. For example, the Talmud empowers a rabbinical court to force a man to divorce his wife for a variety of objective reasons that make normal married life impossible. When Jewish communities enjoyed relative internal autonomy, such enforcement could be carried out regularly. However, today, because of the loss of such communal autonomy, such enforcement is impossible, and many Jewish women, although already civilly divorced and no longer living with their former husbands, are still considered married

according to *halakhah* and are unable to remarry because of the refusal of their former husbands to comply with the order of a rabbinical court.

This growing problem in societies where mobility and anonymity are facts of life has led to basically three different approaches. Many in the Orthodox community have attempted to resort to legal measures in the civil courts to force compliance with *halakhah*. In addition to a lack of success heretofore, this has raised, especially in the United States, the constitutional issue of governmental interference in private religious matters. On the other hand, the Conservative movement since 1968 has revived the ancient rabbinical privilege of retroactive annulment (B. T., *Git.* 33a) in cases where it is impossible to obtain a Jewish divorce from the husband. The Reform movement, not being bound by the authority of *halakhah*, accepts a civil divorce as sufficient termination of a Jewish marriage. These three widely divergent approaches to a major halakhic problem are further evidence of the growing divisiveness in the Jewish religious community in both the state of Israel and the Diaspora.

**Reconstitution of the Sanhedrin.** The only chance for effecting any halakhic unanimity among the Jewish people would be the reconstitution of the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem as the universal Jewish legislature and supreme court. This proposal was actually made by the first minister of religious affairs in the state of Israel, Judah Leib Maimon (1875–1962). However, considering the fact that this reconstitution itself presupposes much of the very unanimity it is to effect, it would seem that it is rather utopian, something the Talmud euphemistically called “messianic *halakhah*” (B. T., *Zev.* 45a).

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The most comprehensive treatment of halakhic institutions in English is *The Principles of Jewish Law*, edited by Menachem Elon (Jerusalem, 1975), although more detailed questions are dealt with in Elon’s Hebrew work, *Ha-mishpat ha-ivri*, 2d ed. (Jerusalem, 1978). Another helpful work, especially regarding Jewish civil law, is Isaac H. Herzog’s *The Main Institutions of Jewish Law*, 2 vols., 2d ed. (New York, 1965).



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The number of good monographs on halakhic topics in English is steadily growing. One can read and consult with profit the following finely researched and written works: Boaz Cohen's *Jewish and Roman Law: A Comparative Study*, 2 vols. (New York, 1966); Louis M. Epstein's *The Jewish Marriage Contract* (1927; reprint, New York, 1973); David M. Feldman's *Birth Control in Jewish Law* (New York, 1968); Solomon B. Freehof's *The Responsa Literature* (Philadelphia, 1955); Aaron Kirschenbaum's *Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law* (New York, 1970); Isaac Klein's *A Guide to Jewish Religious Practice* (New York, 1979); Leo Landman's *Jewish Law in the Diaspora* (Philadelphia, 1968); Samuel Mendelsohn's *The Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews* (Baltimore, Md., 1891); and my own *The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism* (New York, 1983).

The articles in *The Jewish Law Annual*, vols. 1–4, edited by Bernard S. Jackson (Leiden, 1978–1981), generally represent some of the best critical scholarship on halakhic topics in English today. A good sampling of the current theological debate over the authority and scope of *halakhah* can be found in a symposium in *Judaism* 29 (Winter 1980).

DAVID NOVAK (1987)

## HALEVY, JUDAH SEE YEHUDAH HA-LEVI

**HALL, G. STANLEY** (1844–1924), was an American psychologist and educator. Granville Stanley Hall was born in western Massachusetts, in a conservative Protestant environment. He was educated at Williams College, at Union Theological Seminary (New York), at several institutions in Germany, and finally at Harvard, where he studied under William James. Hall was a significant figure in the early period of American psychology. He is remembered primarily as an organizer, teacher, and editor, and as the president of Clark University. He founded North America's first formally accepted university psychology laboratory, the continent's first psychology journal, and its first professional organization for psychologists.

Early in his career, Hall was influential in promoting experimental over "philosophical" methods in psychology. He was a key figure in the "child study" movement, which was influential in introducing questionnaire techniques and the direct observation of children into psychology, and which also spurred the development of "progressive" educational methods. With his two-volume work *Adolescence* (1904), Hall gave the psychological concept of adolescence its first

formal articulation. He was instrumental in bringing psychoanalysis to American attention by inviting Freud for his only visit to the New World.

Through his own work and, more importantly, through the work of his students E. D. Starbuck and James Leuba, Hall was influential in creating psychology of religion as an empirical discipline. He pioneered the empirical study of individual religious experience by assembling data on the religious experiences of children, and in 1904 he founded *The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*. Hall's most important substantive contribution to the psychology of religion was his observation that most conversions occur in adolescence. This observation developed into a characteristic theme in Hall's work: the linking of adolescence, conversion, and the life of Jesus. Hall argued that to complete adolescence successfully, a person must undergo a transformation in which "the older, lower selfish self is molted and a new and higher life of love and service emerges." Religious conversion is the most effective and "natural" vehicle of this transformation and "the Gospel story is the most adequate and classic, dramatic representation of . . . [this] most critical revolution of life" (*Adolescence*, vol. 2, p. 337).

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**HALLĀJ, AL-** ("the cotton carder"), al-Husayn ibn Manṣūr (AH 244–309/857–922 CE), was known among Muslims as "the martyr of mystical love." Although he has been maligned in some circles for his "heretical" teachings and his alleged claim to divinity, his place in the world of Islamic poetry is undisputed: There, the name al-Husayn ibn Manṣūr, or simply Manṣūr, stands as one of the major symbols of mystical union and of suffering in love.

Born in southern Iran, he spent some of his youth with Sahl al-Tustarī, the mystic to whom Sufism owes the first

systematic theory of *nūr Muḥammad* (“the light of Muḥammad”), which forms an important aspect of al-Ḥallāj’s later thought. From Basra, al-Ḥallāj proceeded to Baghdad, the center of mystical learning during the late ninth century, and frequented such Ṣūfī masters as al-Junayd. This mystic, a representative of the so-called sober trend in Sufism, had developed the art of speaking in *ishārāt* (“hints”), lest the orthodox take offense at the teachings of mystical *taḥḥīd* (unification with God). Al-Ḥallāj married a Ṣūfī’s daughter but fell out with other mystics in Basra. Setting out for Mecca on his first pilgrimage, he performed extraordinary ascetic feats, but according to legend, the decisive incident of his life occurred after his return. When he knocked at al-Junayd’s door, he was asked who was there; he answered, “Anā al-ḥaqq” (“I am the Creative Truth”). The accuracy of this legend cannot be ascertained, but the phrase “Anā al-ḥaqq” appears in an important context in his *Kitāb al-ṭawāsīn*, which he composed toward the end of his life.

After the clash with al-Junayd, or for other reasons, al-Ḥallāj discarded the Ṣūfī gown and wandered through Iran and Khorasan before making his second pilgrimage, along with four hundred disciples. He next set out for India, “to learn magic,” according to his adversaries, “to call the people to God,” by his own account. From Gujarat he wandered through Sind and the Punjab and reached Turfan, probably via Kashmir. When he returned to Baghdad, he was met with even greater hostility from both the orthodox and the Ṣūfīs, and he undertook a third pilgrimage. Apprehended on the road to Sūs, he was exposed on a pillory and finally imprisoned in Baghdad in 913. The protection of the chamberlain Naṣr al-Qashūrī and the friendship of the mother of the infant caliph al-Muqtadir made his life in prison tolerable, and quite a few miracles are recounted for this period. Of his visitors in prison, the last was Ibn Khafīf, a young ascetic from Shiraz who noted down some of his sayings and who can therefore be considered the first link in the spiritual chain that leads to Rūzbihān-i Baqlī of Shiraz (d. 1209), the commentator on the *shahīdyāt* (“theopathic locutions”) of al-Ḥallāj and other Ṣūfīs.

In March 922, the government succeeded in drawing up a death sentence for al-Ḥallāj and declaring it “lawful to shed his blood.” The Persian writer ‘Aṭṭār (d. 1221) sums up al-Ḥallāj’s end in his *Tadhkirat al-awliyā* (Biographies of the Saints): “A dervish asked him, ‘What is love?’ He answered, ‘You will see it today and tomorrow and day after tomorrow.’ That day they killed him, the next day they burned him, and the third day they gave his ashes to the wind.” Al-Ḥallāj went dancing in his chains to the gallows, and his last words were “All that matters for the ecstatic is that the Unique should reduce him to Unity.” He died on March 26, 922 (24 Dhū al-Qa’dah 309), and many decades later people in Baghdad were still seen waiting for his return at the banks of the Tigris, on whose waves his ashes had formed the words *anā al-ḥaqq*.

The explanations for al-Ḥallāj’s execution are manifold. The Ṣūfī tradition claims that his death was a punishment

for *ifshā’ al-sirr* (“divulging the secret”), for it is not permissible that a mortal should speak up and say “I am the Creative Truth, or,” as *ḥaqq* was usually translated, “I am God.” That is against the law of love, where secrecy is a most important ingredient. One may doubt, however, whether the famous statement “Anā al-ḥaqq” was really the reason for the government’s decision; political and practical problems certainly played an important role. The French scholar Louis Massignon has shown how confused the political situation in Baghdad was during those decades; the caliphs were powerless and the viziers, in whose hands the true power lay, changed frequently. Sunnī and Shī‘ī allegiances were played out against each other, and fear of the Qarāmiṭah, who threatened the Abbasid empire from their stronghold in Bahrain, made unusual religious claims appear particularly dangerous.

Was it not possible, so the authorities asked, that al-Ḥallāj had been in touch with the Qarāmiṭah, who had just founded a principality in Multan and who ruled northern Sind? Besides, the letters that al-Ḥallāj received from various parts of the Islamic world addressed him with strange-sounding titles, and some of them were beautifully decorated and written in mysterious characters, similar to the Manichean books from Inner Asia. There is also no doubt that al-Ḥallāj, like his friend the chamberlain Naṣr, was in favor of more equitable taxation; even worse, he had spoken publicly of the *isqāt al-farā’id*, the possibility of making substitutions for the personal obligations of fasting or even the pilgrimage. Such ideas were anathema to orthodox Muslims.

It was also told that al-Ḥallāj, preaching in the mosques of Baghdad, would call people to God, to a deeper personal realization of the mysteries of faith, and that he would then implore them to kill him, for thus, he said, he would be rescued from this life and they would receive recompense for killing a heretic. Such eccentric behavior, coupled with extreme asceticism and the punctual performance of religious duties, was difficult for ordinary believers to accept. Furthermore, al-Ḥallāj’s burning love of God, which he expressed in short, tender verses, aroused the anger of the Zāhirīyah, who denied the possibility of real love between humans and God. Thus, almost all factions in the religious circles of Baghdad were against al-Ḥallāj for various reasons, and many regarded him as a crafty man who practiced magic and tried to seduce people, nay, even went so far as to lay claim to divinity.

In later centuries, especially in the folk and high poetry of Persianate countries, al-Ḥallāj was considered the foremost representative of *waḥdat al-wujūd* (“unity of being”), someone who, as Friedrich A. G. Tholuck (1821) said, “with incredible audacity tore away the curtain from pantheism.” Massignon, however, has proved that al-Ḥallāj was anything but a pantheist; rather, he represents the *waḥdat al-shuhūd* (“unity of witness”). To understand his attitude it suffices to read his long, touching prayers in which he tries to circumscribe the primordial and eternal God who is forever separat-

ed by his *qidam*, his pre-eternal being, from human being, which is created in time.

How can one describe him who is too high to be reached by human eyes and yet is evident everywhere? Al-Ḥallāj's prayer-poems oscillate between the burning longing for the transcendent God who is separated from him by the little human "I" and the consoling experience of this God's presence in the human heart, "flowing between the heart and its sheath as tears flow from the eyelids." In rare moments of ecstasy, the uncreated divine spirit can enwrap the created human spirit and speak through the human tongue, as God once spoke through a burning bush. Then the mystic feels that "my spirit has mingled with thine like water and wine" or "like amber and musk" (for such claims, al-Ḥallāj was accused of believing in *ḥulūl*, "incarnation"). The painful feeling of duality is wiped out, and God attests his unity through the tongue of the lover, for, as Abū Bakr al-Kharrāz (d. 890/9) had stated, "No one has the right to say 'I' but God." In such moments the saint becomes the living witness of God (*huwa huwa*, "he is He"), and he can exclaim "Anā al-ḥaqq" as the true witness of God's unity because God has taken away from him everything, including his "I."

Al-Ḥallāj tried to awaken the sense of personal relationship between the believer and God, and his whole life was devoted to the realization of the deepest truth of *islam*, complete surrender to the one God. The numerous anecdotes collected in the *Akbbār al-Ḥallāj* reveal this feeling (with some embarrassing details), and his poetry, though sometimes using mystical letter symbolism, is pure and completely devoid of sensuality. Some of his verses, such as his *qaṣīdah* "Uqtulūnī,"

Kill me, O my trustworthy friends,  
for in my being killed is my life . . .

have been quoted by later authors time and again (by Rūmī, for example). Only a few fragments of al-Ḥallāj's interpretation of the Qur'ān are preserved, among them the statement that seems to sum up the secret of his life: "Happiness comes from God, but affliction is he himself." There are also his *riwāyāt*, the *ḥadīth* whose contents are perfectly orthodox but whose chains of transmission go not through human transmitters but through mythical and heavenly creatures.

The only book by al-Ḥallāj that has been preserved in full is his *Kitāb al-ṭawāsīn* (alluding to *ṭa* and *sīn*, the mysterious letters at the beginning of surah 27 of the Qur'ān). In this small treatise, probably written while he was in prison, al-Ḥallāj introduces into Sufism the parable of the moth and candle: The moth that sees the light, feels the heat, and finally immolates itself in the flame, never to return to its peers, is the model for the lover who has found "the reality of Reality." This image was to become a favorite with Persianate poets and reached Europe through translations around 1800; Goethe used it in his famous poem "Selige Sehnsucht" in *West-östlicher Divan* (1819) to express the mystery of "dying before one dies."

The *Kitāb al-ṭawāsīn* also contains one of the finest early descriptions of the Prophet, who is celebrated in exquisite rhyming prose as light from the divine light and source of the lights of the prophets. But there is also the embarrassing chapter in which al-Ḥallāj confronts himself with Pharaoh and Iblīs and claims that he will not recant from his "Anā al-ḥaqq" any more than Pharaoh will recant from his statement "I am your highest Lord" (surah 79:24) or Satan from his remark vis-à-vis Adam that "I am better than he" (surah 7:11). Small wonder that such sentences shocked the Muslims of Baghdad and that more than once it was asked what, then, was the difference between the "I" of al-Ḥallāj and that of Pharaoh. Rūmī answered in his *Mathnavī* that "Pharaoh saw only himself while al-Ḥallāj saw only God—hence his claim was a sign of grace while Pharaoh's claim turned into a curse."

Al-Ḥallāj's Satanology has deeply impressed one trend in later Sufism (including Aḥmad al-Ghazālī, Sarmad, and Shāh 'Abd al-Laṭīf, among others). He sees Iblīs caught between the divine order to fall down before the newly created Adam and the divine will that nothing besides God himself should be worshiped. Iblīs prefers to obey the divine will and to prove himself as the true monotheist who looks only at God, as a faithful lover who happily wears the garment of curse that is given him as a result of his obstinacy, although he avers, according to al-Ḥallāj, "Juḥūdī laka taqdīs" ("My rebellion means to declare thee holy").

It has been said that al-Ḥallāj tried to live in accordance with the Qur'anic description of Jesus, and his use of such Christian theological terms as *nāsūt* ("humanity") and *lāhūt* ("divinity") in speaking of God has led several scholars in East and West to believe that he was a crypto-Christian. His death on the gallows, as on the cross, would fit well into this picture.

Šūfīs of the following generations often quoted the sayings of al-Ḥallāj without identifying him, but, on a larger scale, his true revival began in the twelfth century. Rūzbihān-i Baqlī continued the tradition that must have been alive in Shiraz thanks to Ibn Khafīf, and in northeastern Iran, 'Aṭṭār was initiated into Sufism by the spirit of al-Ḥallāj. 'Aṭṭār devoted the most moving chapter of his *Tadhkirat al-awliyā'* to the martyr-mystic and succeeded in conveying to his readers al-Ḥallāj's daring love and willingness to suffer. This chapter became the source for virtually all later descriptions of al-Ḥallāj's life and death in the Persianate world, be it in Persian verse, Sindhi drama, or Turkish poetry. The great mystical poets quoted him, although Rūmī held that his master, Shams al-Dīn, was much superior to al-Ḥallāj, who, he said, was only a lover, not a beloved. The sober Šūfī orders likewise remained critical of him; they accused him of not having reached true annihilation, for "the water makes noise only so long as it does not yet boil," and they pointed out that the vessel of his spirit was too shallow to keep the contents of love as it behoves.



But wherever the dangerous power of love is described, the name *Manṣūr* appears. Interestingly, it is most prominent in the folk poetry of Sind and the areas through which al-Ḥallāj wandered shortly after 900 (even in the Ismaʿīlī verses called *gināns*). There, the bards sing how “the gallows became his bridal bed” and praise him as the one who drank and dispensed intoxicating spiritual wine, the wine of unity. In the Turkish tradition, his name is particularly connected with the Bektashī order of Ṣūfīs, whose initiation takes place at the *dār-i Manṣūr* (“Manṣūr’s gallows”), for the novice has to die within himself before being revived in the order. Popular Arabic tradition invokes Manṣūr’s name less frequently than does Persianate mystical poetry, but everywhere he was used as a model of “pantheistic” Sufism—hence the aversion of the orthodox (headed by Ibn Taymīyah) to him.

It was thanks to Massignon’s lifelong studies that a new approach to al-Ḥallāj’s personality developed in the Islamic countries as well as in the West. The Indian thinker Muhammad Iqbal, the first to rediscover al-Ḥallāj’s “dynamic” teachings, praised him in his *Jāvidnāmāh* (1932) as a kind of forerunner of himself, “who brought resurrection to the spiritually dead.” After World War II, al-Ḥallāj became more prominent among the Arabs. Classified as an “Islamic Kierkegaard” by ʿAbd al-Rahmān Badawī, he figures in the works of progressive Arab writers as an important symbol of freedom and struggle against the establishment. In a drama devoted to him, *Māʿsat al-Ḥallāj* (1964) by Ṣalāḥ ʿAbd al-Ṣabūr, his social engagement is emphasized, and in the verse of Adonīs and al-Bayatī he appears in surrealist, paradoxical forms. In the Indian subcontinent, his name and numerous allusions to gallows and rope have been used to point to those who fought for freedom from colonial powers or against unjust governments. In Iran, the name Ḥusayn ibn Manṣūr is uttered along with that of Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, the Prophet’s grandson, in Shīʿī Muḥarrām processions.

Thus, al-Ḥallāj, “who left the pulpit and spoke out his heart’s secret on the gallows,” is still very much alive. Even though much of his subtle theology is not properly understood by the general populace, his joy in suffering for love of God has made him a favorite symbol for those who believe in personal piety rather than dry legalism and for those who are willing to suffer for their ideals, be they political or religious.

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Further, chapters on al-Ḥallāj can be found in every history of Sufism, from Friedrich A. D. Tholuck’s *Sufismussive theosophia Persarum pantheistica* (Berlin, 1821) to my own *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1975). I have also made a survey of al-Ḥallāj’s life and work and of his survival in Muslim poetry in *Al-Halladsch, Märtyrer der Gottesliebe* (Cologne, 1968), and I have devoted a number of articles to al-Ḥallāj’s survival in Sindhi, Indo-Persian, and Urdu poetry. The question of al-Ḥallāj’s Satanology is discussed extensively in Peter J. Awn’s *Satan’s Fall and Redemption* (Leiden, 1983). The problem of his *shathīyāt*, or “theopathic locutions,” is treated in Carl W. Ernst’s *Words of Ecstasy in Sufism* (Albany, N.Y., 1985); indispensable for the understanding of the *shathīyāt* is Rūzbihān-i Baqlī’s *Sharḥ-i shathīyāt*, edited by Henry Corbin (Tehran and Paris, 1966).

ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL (1987)

**HALLOWEEN**, or Allhallows Eve, is a festival celebrated on October 31, the evening prior to the Christian Feast of All Saints (All Saints’ Day). Halloween is the name for the eve of Samhain, a celebration marking the beginning of winter as well as the first day of the New Year within the ancient Celtic culture of the British Isles. The time of Samhain consisted of the eve of the feast and the day itself (October 31 and November 1). This event was a crucial seam in the social and religious fabric of the Celtic year, and the eve of Samhain set the tone for the annual celebration as a threatening, fantastic, mysterious rite of passage to a new year.

The religious beliefs of the Celts emphasized pastoral deities, and Celtic festivals stressed seasonal transitions. Beltene, the beginning of summer, was celebrated at the end of April and the beginning of May. Samhain signaled the commencement of winter and, together with Beltene, divided the year into cold and hot seasons. Samhain marked the end of preparations for winter, when flocks and herds had been secured and harvested crops had been stored.

The eve of this festival brought with it another kind of harvest. On this occasion, it was believed that a gathering of supernatural forces occurred as during no other period of the year. The eve and day of Samhain were characterized as a time when the barriers between the human and supernatural worlds were broken. Otherworldly entities, such as the souls of the dead, were able to visit earthly inhabitants, and humans could take the opportunity to penetrate the domains of the gods and supernatural creatures. Fiery tributes and sacrifices of animals, crops, and possibly human beings were made to appease supernatural powers who controlled the fertility of the land. Not a festival honoring any particular Celtic deity, Samhain acknowledged the entire spectrum of non-human forces that roamed the earth during that period.

Given the upheaval of normal human activities and expectations on the eve and day of Samhain, it was also thought to be an especially propitious time for ascertaining information about the future course of one’s life. Various methods

of divination were used by individuals attempting to discover their fortunes, good or ill, and to foretell events such as marriage, sickness, or death.

Samhain remained a popular festival among the Celtic people throughout the Christianization of Great Britain. The British church attempted to divert this interest in pagan customs by adding a Christian celebration to the calendar on the same date as Samhain. The Christian festival, the Feast of All Saints, commemorates the known and unknown saints of the Christian religion just as Samhain had acknowledged and paid tribute to the Celtic deities. The eve of the Celtic festival was also Christianized, becoming the Vigil of All Saints or Allhallows Eve (with special offices existing in both the Anglican and Roman churches). The medieval British commemoration of All Saints' Day may have prompted the universal celebration of this feast throughout the Christian church.

The customs of Samhain survived independently of the Christian holy day. Gradually, the eve of Allhallows (Halloween) lost much of its Celtic religious significance for the masses, and it became a secular observance, although many traditionally Celtic ideas continued to be associated with the evening. Divination activities remained a popular practice. Adults, dressed in fantastic disguises and masks, imitated supernatural beings and visited homes where occupants would offer tributes of food and drink to them. A fear of nocturnal creatures, such as bats and owls, persisted, because these animals were believed to communicate with the spirits of the dead.

Halloween was celebrated only in the Celtic areas of Great Britain: Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and northern rural England. In non-Celtic England, many of the customs of Halloween were assimilated into a commemorative festival that arose in the seventeenth century as the celebration of Guy Fawkes Day (November 5). English Protestant settlers in the New World did not bring the custom of Halloween with them. Irish and Scottish immigrants introduced scattered Allhallows Eve observances to America, but it was only in the years after the massive immigration of the Irish to the United States during the potato famine (1845–1846) that Halloween became a national event.

Modern Halloween activities have centered on mischief making and masquerading in costumes, often resembling otherworldly characters. Folk customs, now treated as games (such as bobbing for apples), have continued from the various divination practices of the ancient celebrants of this occasion. Supernatural figures (such as the ghost, the witch, the vampire, the devil) play a key role in supplying an aura of the mysterious to the evening, whether or not they originally had an association with the festival. Children are particularly susceptible to the imagery of Halloween, as can be seen in their fascination with the demonic likeness of a carved and illuminated pumpkin, known as the jack-o'-lantern. In recent times, children have taken up the practice of dressing in Halloween costumes and visiting homes in search of edible

and monetary treats, lightly threatening to play a trick on the owner if a treat is not produced. There also has been renewed interest in Halloween as a time when adults can also cross cultural boundaries and shed their identities by indulging in an uninhibited evening of frivolity. Thus, the basic Celtic quality of the festival as an evening of annual escape from normal realities and expectations has remained into the present.

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LEONARD NORMAN PRIMIANO (1987)

#### HALLUCINOGENS SEE PSYCHEDELIC DRUGS

#### HALO SEE NIMBUS

**HANĀBILAH** (sg., Ḥanbālī) is the name used to denote the followers of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, just as the names Shāfi'īyah, Mālikīyah, and Ḥanafīyah are used to denote the followers of al-Shāfi'ī, Mālik, and Abū Ḥanīfah, respectively. Of these four groups, the Ḥanābilah has been considered anomalous, and rightly so, although not for the reasons usually given. Western writers have reiterated that this group was the smallest of the four; that it fought against the theology of *kalām*, which is quite true; that it fought against Sufism, which is definitely false. It is clear that the Ḥanābilah fought against philosophical theology (*kalām*) and philosophical Sufism (monism, incarnationism), but certainly not against theology in its juridical form, nor against Sufism in its traditionalist, ascetic form. Some writers have described the Ḥanābilah as conservative; others, echoing the biased sources they use, have resorted to a wide range of pejorative epithets: fanatical, inflexible, anthropomorphic, obstructionist, intolerant, insignificant, and the like.

**EMERGENCE OF THE MADHHAB.** The Ḥanābilah, like the Ḥanafīyah, Mālikīyah, and Shāfi'īyah, maintained schools



in which it taught law as the principal subject. Nonetheless, the group called Ḥanābilah cannot be understood in its historical genesis and development as merely a “school of law,” as it has been characterized heretofore. In modern Arabic, the term for “school of law” would be expressed by a literal equivalent of the English, something like *madrasat al-fiqh*. The classical Arabic term is *madhhab*, which means “a way of going,” “direction,” and, technically, “thesis” or “opinion.” Each *madhhab* of law had institutions of learning—colleges of law—exclusively for its own members. This institution was at first the noncongregational mosque, or *masjid*, and later the *madrasah*, a term that in modern Arabic means “school.” The *madhhab* itself was not a school; it was a guild in whose name schools were maintained.

“**Personal schools.**” The emergence of these guilds of jurists dates from around the middle of the ninth century. Before that time, the jurists were grouped geographically, as, for instance, the Iraqis, the Medinese, the Kufans, the Basrans, and the Syrians. The groups that came to be identified by the names of persons after the mid-ninth century have been referred to as “personal schools,” to distinguish them from the earlier “geographical schools.” The natural tendency has been to associate their chronological emergence with the dates of their eponyms: Abū Ḥanīfah (699–767), Mālik (707–795), al-Shāfi‘ī (767–820), and Ibn Ḥanbal (780–855).

The historical reality was somewhat different; in fact, it may well have followed the exact reverse of this order. The “personal schools,” according to Joseph Schacht, were so designated “soon after the time of Shāfi‘ī,” beginning with the Shāfi‘ī *madhhab*. Henri Laoust placed the constitution of the Ḥanbālī *madhhab* “during the period from the Sunni reactionary movement of [Caliph] al-Mutawakkil (232–47/847–61) to the advent of the Buyids in 334/945.” There is, of course, no way to determine the precise date of the emergence of a *madhhab* of law, or that of its extinction: The *madhhab*, though a guild, was neither founded nor dissolved by a formal act; its colleges of law were founded by such a formal act, the *waqf*, as charitable trusts, but not the *madhhab*. Its disappearance could, however, be determined through the disappearance of its representatives in a given locality—when the biographer of a jurist of a given *madhhab* declares that the biographee was the last member of that *madhhab* in his locality—but the date of death would indicate the date of the *madhhab*'s extinction in that locality, not the date of the loss of its effectiveness, which no doubt had already taken place.

A *madhhab* came into existence because its members had interests to protect and to advance. What could these common interests have been for the Ḥanbālī *madhhab*? It was, like the three other surviving Sunnī *madhhabs*, a *madhhab* of law; as such it simply served the purpose of bringing together its member-jurists. Consensus, *ijmā‘*, was constituted on the basis of the legal opinions of the jurists. But a legal opinion was issued by an individual jurist

consult, not by a “school” of jurists, or even by a committee. Similarly, the practice of *ijtihād*—consulting the sources of the law to arrive at a solution for a legal question—was carried out by a single jurist acting as an independent free agent.

**Religious issues: traditionalism vs. rationalism.** The *madhhabs* were guilds of law, but their genesis was due to reasons of religious philosophy. They issued from, and represented, the traditionalist movement, in opposition to the movement of rationalism in Islam. Were it not for this antagonism, the *madhhabs* of law might not have emerged as they did. Their traditionalism is indicated by their emulation of the Prophet. The founding members of the *madhhab* chose a great imam as their eponym and referred to themselves as his companions, in emulation of the greatest imam, the Prophet, and his companions.

The supreme struggle between traditionalists and rationalists came about in the Inquisition (*mihnah*) of the ninth century. It hinged on the question of whether the Qur‘ān was the created or uncreated word of God. The inquisitors belonged to the rationalist theological movement of the Mu‘tazilah. The Mu‘tazilī thesis was that the Qur‘ān is the created word of God; to say that it is his uncreated word would make it coeternal with God, a violation of God’s unicity (*tawḥīd*) and hence of the very monotheistic character of Islam itself. The traditionalist thesis was that God’s word is eternal. His *fiat* (“*kun!*”) could not itself be created, because it is by this, his word, that God creates; a created thing could not bring other things into existence.

When the end of the Inquisition in 848 brought an end to the Mu‘tazilah as a political force, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, flogged severely and imprisoned for refusing to adopt the Mu‘tazilī thesis, emerged as the charismatic hero of Islam. The struggle that Ibn Ḥanbal undertook and carried to its termination had already been started by al-Shāfi‘ī, a long-time foe of the Mu‘tazilah whose life’s work was dedicated chiefly to supporting the traditionalist movement. Al-Shāfi‘ī did not live to see the end of the Mu‘tazilī menace. The period following his death was witness to the apex of the Mu‘tazilah’s political power. But by the time of Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855), who followed in his traditionalist footsteps, the formidable foe met its decisive downfall.

The Inquisition cleared the way for the rise of the *madhhabs*, which began to flourish, organizing the traditionalist movement. Many such guilds of law were founded; many disappeared from the scene, their membership absorbed by other guilds. In the eleventh century their number crystallized into the four *madhhabs* surviving today.

In a period of two centuries (mid-ninth to mid-eleventh), the mainstream of Muslim history moved relentlessly in the direction of traditionalism, engulfing all obstructions set up against it. The landmarks of this mainstream are unmistakable.

1. *Al-Shāfi‘ī’s Risālah (before 813/4)*. From elements for the most part already at hand, al-Shāfi‘ī forged a new sci-

ence, a juridical theology, namely a study of God's law, with which he meant to replace *kalām*, a study of God himself. Juridical theology studies God's commands and prohibitions, not whether God is, or what he is. It deals with the fundamentals of obedience to God (religion), not just idle words (*kalām*) about God himself, which may well lead to perdition.

2. *The Inquisition (833–848)*. The Inquisition ended with the decisive political demise of its masters and the victory of its victims.

3. *The Professions of Faith ('aqā'id; sg., 'aqīdah)*. The period following the Inquisition brought in a rich harvest of creeds by members of the traditionalist movement, headed by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, six of whose creeds have survived. He apparently took his lead from al-Shāfi'ī, one of whose creeds has come down to the present. Among subsequent creeds, two are of particular significance, belonging as they do to the fundamental teachings of traditionalism: one by the great mystic al-Ḥallāj (d. 922), the other by al-Ash'arī (d. 936?).

4. *The Retraction of Ibn Shannabūdh (935)*. Ibn Shannabūdh abjured his Qur'anic variant readings as aberrant and unlawful. His retraction emphasized the sacred character of the Qur'ān in the Vulgate of the caliph 'Uthmān, and pointed to the success of the traditionalist thesis vindicated by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal during the Inquisition.

5. *The Defection of al-Ash'arī*. Forsaking the teachings of Mu'tazilī rationalism, al-Ash'arī rallied to the doctrines of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and placed himself squarely under the Hanbālī banner.

6. *The Qādirī Creed (first third of the eleventh century)*. Proclamations of the caliph al-Qādir in 1017, 1018, and 1029 culminated in a profession of faith bearing the name of the caliph, Al-i'tiqād al-Qādirī, read by order of the caliph in 1040/1. Its contents, steeped in traditionalism, are directed chiefly against the Mu'tazilah, the Ash'ariyah, and the Shī'ah. In contrast with Ma'mūn's inauguration of the Inquisition, the Qādirī creed, formulated two centuries later, dramatizes the distance traveled by traditionalism and proclaims its triumph in very clear terms.

7. *The Organization of Knowledge*. The success of traditionalism is clearly manifested in the development of the institutions of learning following the failure of the Inquisition. By the middle of the eleventh century, the rationalist institutions (*dār al-'ilm* and others), essentially libraries where books on the "foreign sciences," such as Greek philosophy, were available for reading and discussion, had disappeared from the scene. Libraries became annexed to the *madrasas*, where books on the "foreign sciences" could be read privately but never formed part of the regular curriculum.

All "personal schools" of law emerged from the traditionalist movement of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* (literally, "people of the *ḥadīth*," traditionalists). The transition from "geographical" to "personal" *madhhabs* came in response to the threat of the philosophical theologians, who had succeeded in gain-

ing the support of the central power. The task of the traditionalists was not merely to counterbalance the force of their opponents but to tilt the scales in their own favor.

**Economic issues: the waqf.** To this religious weapon the traditionalists added an economic one: the charitable trust (*waqf*). As lawyers they were both the interpreters and the guardians of its law. A basic principle of its law was that nothing could be based on *waqf* that would be inimical to the tenets of Islam. Through their legal opinions they determined what was, and what was not, inimical. Furthermore, *waqfs* were founded by Muslim individuals, with individually owned private property. When caliphs, sultans, emirs, viziers, or any other official or functionary instituted *waqfs*, they did so as private Muslim individuals. There was no provision in the law for "official" *waqfs*. The object of *waqf* was charitable, immediately or eventually, and the founder's chief motive was *qurbah*, to draw near to God, through good works endowed in perpetuity.

All institutionalized learning in Islam was funded through such religious foundations. The lawyers designated as inimical to Islamic beliefs Greek philosophy, the foreign sciences, and *kalām*-theology, which, they felt, was tainted with philosophy. The *kalām*-theologians were thus excluded as such from the curriculum of the *madrasas* and cognate institutions; eventually, the *dār al-'ilm* and its cognates, libraries that were meeting places of the rationalists, ceased to exist.

The exclusionary rule of *waqf* left out the philosophers and philosophical theologians. No longer in a position to beat the traditionalists, they joined them by infiltrating the juridical *madhhabs* as jurisconsults. The Mu'tazilī theologians found a home in the Ḥanafī *madhhab*, and later the Ash'ariyah found theirs in the Shāfi'ī *madhhab* (there were some rare instances where a Mu'tazilī theologian was a Shāfi'ī jurisconsult and an Ash'arī theologian, a Ḥanafī jurisconsult). One's Sunnī orthodox identity was determined by his membership in one of the Sunnī *madhhabs*. The *madhhabs* accepted one another; transfers from one to any other was unrestricted at any point in a member's lifetime.

**Misconceptions concerning the Ḥanābilah.** One particular misconception concerning the Hanbālī *madhhab* was its relatively reduced representation in the Islamic world when compared with the other *madhhabs*. This fact kept cropping up in the early studies on the Ḥanābilah, and its repeated mention is indicative of the scholars' perplexity when they were confronted with what appears to be the disproportionate attention this *madhhab* received from the annalistic sources in descriptions of riots. The explanation lies in its makeup in comparison with the Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī *madhhabs*. (The Mālikī *madhhab* had a sparse membership in tenth-century Baghdad, and its last representative there left for points west in the eleventh century.) The Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī *madhhabs*, as already mentioned, were infiltrated by the Mu'tazilah and Ash'ariyah, respectively. This situation gave each of these two *madhhabs* an internal structure made

up of two antagonistic groups, fundamentally opposed to each other on the theological level: one group belonging to the *ahl al-ḥadīth* (traditionalists) from which it issued, and the other belonging to the *ahl al-kalām* (rationalists). In Baghdad, there remained only one Sunnī *madhhab* representative of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* alone, free of infiltration by either group of *ahl al-kalām*: the Ḥanbālī *madhhab*.

Another factor to be considered is the reluctance of the religious intellectual to attack a fellow intellectual belonging to the same *madhhab*. This inhibition, from which a Ḥanafī or Shāfi'ī jurisconsult might suffer vis-à-vis a fellow jurisconsult of the same *madhhab* who happened to be also a philosophical theologian, did not afflict the Ḥanbālī jurisconsult. He felt free to fight not only any signs of rationalistic tendencies within his own *madhhab*, but also any and all groups hostile to the *ahl al-ḥadīth*. The Ḥanābilah fought as members of the *ahl al-ḥadīth*. Though their numbers were relatively small as members of the Ḥanbālī *madhhab*, they represented the overwhelming majority of Sunnī Islam as members of the traditionalist movement. Many a Shāfi'ī and Ḥanafī traditionalist passed undetected in the ranks of the *ahl al-ḥadīth*. A perusal of the biographical dictionaries of Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī jurisconsults would show the preponderance of traditionalist jurisconsults in their ranks, as compared with philosophical theologians.

The annalists, referring to struggles between antagonistic socioreligious groups, are apt to throw the historian off track by the way they identify the groups. The terms used may well hide their true identity. *Ḥanafī* may be used for *Mu'tazilī*, and *Shāfi'ī* for *Ash'arī*, while *Ḥanbālī* remains a constant. This is why the Ḥanābilah must be seen in the light of their membership in the traditionalist movement, which encompassed all four *madhhabs*. In this movement, the Ḥanābilah played the role of spearhead. Because of the uniform structure of their *madhhab*, they were the group most frequently mentioned in the annals. It was easy to arrive at the conclusion that of all the groups they were the most contentious, considering the relatively small size of their *madhhab*. In reality they were but a fraction of the traditionalist movement, the mere tip of the iceberg.

Other misconceptions regarding the Ḥanbālī school that have developed in Islamic studies over the years arise from the uncritical use of sources hostile to the Ḥanābilah and from the neglect of sources that could have been used to provide some control and a more balanced account. The following misconceptions are perhaps those that die the hardest.

Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal is often represented as a disciple of al-Shāfi'ī, a notion that can be construed to give two opposing views of their relationship. One—which would be true—is that there was a kinship of spirit between the two great imams. The other—which would be false—is that Aḥmad must have had a falling-out with al-Shāfi'ī and that he must have rejected the Shāfi'ī school in order to found one of his own. Both imams belonged to the traditionalist *ahl al-ḥadīth*

movement from which all the *madhhabs* emerged. Aḥmad and al-Shāfi'ī were the “patron saints” of two traditionalist *madhhab* guilds whose chief concern was not only to raise the prophetic traditions to the level of sacred scripture—in this, al-Shāfi'ī led the way, and Aḥmad followed in his footsteps—but also to fight for the primacy of faith and thus put a stop to the spread of rationalism.

The Ḥanbālī outlook is often regarded as basically legalistic and therefore incompatible with the interior life of Ṣūfī mysticism. The hostile attitude of Ibn Ḥanbal and his followers, particularly Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Taymīyah, seemingly gives credence to such a view. But such hostility, when it existed, was directed toward certain Ṣūfīs and certain Ṣūfī practices. At no time has the Ḥanbālī *madhhab*, or the followers just mentioned, condemned Sufism as such, or all adepts of Sufism. The reason for this is clear and rather simple. Sufism, like the Ḥanābilah, issued from the *ahl al-ḥadīth* movement, and the Ḥanbālī *madhhab* boasted of many Ṣūfīs. Close to a third of the notices in Ibn Rajab's biographical work on the Ḥanbālī *madhhab* are devoted to Ṣūfīs. Among the great Ḥanbālī Ṣūfīs are Ibn Sam'ūn (d. 997), al-Ḥarawī al-Anṣārī (d. 1088), and 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 1166), head of the first Ṣūfī order in Islam that has come down to this day, which included among its members Ibn Taymīyah, a so-called enemy of Sufism. What the Ḥanābilah did indeed condemn in Sufism were Ṣūfīs steeped in pantheism (*ittiḥādīyah*) or incarnationism (*ḥulūṭīyah*).

Members of the Ḥanbālī *madhhab* have been criticized as rigidly opposed to reason, as partisans of a literalist interpretation of the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, professing the most rigidly dogmatic doctrines in comparison with the other *madhhabs*, as steeped in obscurantism and crass anthropomorphism, as fanatical and intolerant. These judgments by Western Orientalists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are in great measure attributable to the paucity of printed sources available at the time and to the one-sidedness of these sources, hostile to the Ḥanābilah and utilized without testing the authors' bias.

**AḤMAD IBN ḤANBAL.** Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, like al-Shāfi'ī before him, was of pure Arab stock, and like al-Shāfi'ī, whom he greatly admired, he gave a preponderant place to the *sunnah* of the Prophet as sacred scripture alongside the book of God, the Qur'ān. His teachings form the doctrinal basis of the *madhhab* that bears his name.

**Life.** Born in Baghdad in December 780, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal died there in July 855. A biographer says of him: “He left Merv in his mother's womb, was born in Baghdad, grew up there, and died there.” He was known as “the imam of Baghdad.” Profoundly interested in the study of *ḥadīth*, he began to devote himself to it at the age of fifteen and made his way throughout the lands of the eastern caliphate in search of its authoritative transmitters. He traveled in Iraq (Kufa, and especially Basra), the Hejaz, Yemen, and Syria, the regions of the so-called geographical schools of law. Between the ages of twenty-three and thirty-four he made the



pilgrimage to Mecca five times, along with two pious retreats in Medina.

Though a great admirer of al-Shāfiʿī, and one who was ready to lay down his life for the same religious ideals, Ibn Ḥanbal cannot be considered simply as the disciple of the great imam. He studied under a great number of *ḥadīth* experts of this day, and many transmitted *ḥadīths* on his authority, among them the authors of the “six books” of *ḥadīth*: al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and Abū Dāwūd directly; al-Tirmidhī, al-Nasāʿī, and Ibn Mājah indirectly, through his disciples. Al-Shāfiʿī himself is said to have transmitted on Ibn Ḥanbal’s authority. Ibn al-Jawzī, in his biography of Ibn Ḥanbal, gives the names of his teachers of law: Hushaym ibn Bashīr (d. 799), a disciple of Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, and after Hushaym’s death, Sufyān ibn ʿUyaynah (d. 814). Among Ibn Ḥanbal’s other important teachers was ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Mahdī (d. 814), in answer to whose request al-Shāfiʿī had written his famous *Epistle*.

Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal’s persistent passive resistance to the Inquisition earned him the undying respect and admiration of the following generations down to this day. His funeral, the scene of genuine popular emotion, was followed by a procession that numbered in the hundreds of thousands. His tomb became one of the most visited places of pilgrimage. Poets hailed him as the hero (*fatā*) of Islam. The scars he carried to his grave were the badges of his bravery.

**Works.** Among Aḥmad’s works are the *Radd ʿalā al-jahmiyah wa-al-zanādiqah*, *Kitāb al-sunnah*, and *Kitāb al-masāʿil*, which present answers to questions addressed to him on dogmatics, law, and ethics, and the *Kitāb al-ṣalāt*, on ritual prayer and its performance. The *Kitāb al-waraʿ*, on asceticism, is quoted extensively by Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī in his *Qūt al-qulūb* (Sustenance of the souls), and again by al-Ghazālī, whose *Ihyāʿ ʿulūm al-dīn* (Revivification of the religious sciences) is based on al-Makkī’s work.

By far the most celebrated work of Ibn Ḥanbal is his *Musnad*, a title that designates a collection of *ḥadīths* resting on the authority of the persons by whom they have been transmitted, traced back to the Prophet himself and arranged under the names of the first guarantor of the *ḥadīths*. This arrangement is distinguished from the one followed by the generation after that of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and referred to as the *Ṣaḥīḥs*, or collections of “sound” *ḥadīths*. It has often been said that these books constitute a codification of *ḥadīths* in Islam, and because the *Musnad* of Ibn Ḥanbal is not included among the “six books,” the implication is that its contents were not reliable. In contrast, the two *ṣaḥīḥs* of al-Bukhārī and Muslim were seen as the most important works on *ḥadīth* and the most “sound.” This interpretation is misleading.

In fact, legal studies were in the process of development in the newly founded colleges of law that were flourishing at the time. Because of the recent achievements of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Ḥanbal, institutionalized education had taken on a

strong traditionalist orientation, and law, based heavily on the study of *ḥadīth*, had become the queen of the Islamic sciences. To make the collections of *ḥadīths* more easily studied for their legal content, the order was changed to accommodate students of law. Instead of arranging *ḥadīths* according to their chains of transmitters (*isnād*, whence the term *musnad*), they were chosen for their legal content and arranged according to the chapters of books on law. The new collections were referred to as “sound” (*ṣaḥīḥ*), not in the sense that former collections were less so, but rather to emphasize that the new collections were also sound, in spite of their innovative arrangement according to subject, rather than according to their authoritative transmitters.

Great *musnad* collections date after as well as before the so-called Six Books, and they specialize in one or more transmitters or groups of transmitters. Aḥmad’s *Musnad* is a collection of several *musnads* including those of the first four “Rightly Guided” (Rāshidūn) caliphs, the principal companions of the Prophet, the Anṣār, the Meccans, the Medinese, the Kufans, the Basrans, and the Syrians.

**Followers of Ibn Ḥanbal.** Aḥmad left two sons, who were half brothers: Ṣāliḥ (818–880), *qāḍī* (“judge”) of Isfahan and a transmitter of his father’s legal opinions; and ʿAbd Allāh (828–903), a transmitter of most of his father’s works. In addition to the sons, a number of disciples carried on the transmission of Aḥmad’s legal thought contained in his *masāʿil*, including: (1) al-Kawsaj, a native of Merv who settled in Nishapur and died there in 865; he was a source for al-Bukhārī, al-Tirmidhī, and Ishāq ibn Rāhawayh; (2) al-Athram (d. 874 or 875), who arranged what he collected of the *masāʿil* according to the chapters of law books; (3) Ḥanbal ibn Ishāq (d. 886), Aḥmad’s first cousin; (4) al-Maymūnī (d. 887), of Raqqah, a disciple of Aḥmad from 820 to 842 (al-Mardāwī, in his *Inṣāf*, attributes to al-Maymūnī one sixteen-volume work and two other large volumes, containing Aḥmad’s *masāʿil*); (5) al-Marwazī (d. 888), one of Aḥmad’s favorite disciples and the transmitter of his *Kitāb al-waraʿ*; (6) Abū Dāʿūd al-Sijistānī (d. 888), author of *Kitāb al-sunan*, one of the “six books,” so highly regarded that he was often compared with his professor Aḥmad in learning and piety; (7) Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 890), author of a characteristically Ḥanbalī traditionalist profession of faith (*ʿaqīdah*) against the legitimacy of philosophical theology (*kalām*); (8) Ḥarb al-Kirmānī (d. 893), a Ṣūfī, who transmitted *masāʿil* of Aḥmad and of Ibn Rāhawayh; (9) Ibrāhīm al-Ḥarbī (d. 898), a philologist and *ḥadīth* expert who was Aḥmad’s disciple for twenty years and was often compared with him in learning and piety.

**Tenth century.** The tenth century ushered in the rise of Ḥanbalī literature. The name that dominates the early part of this period is that of Abū Bakr al-Khallāl (d. 923). He was a student of al-Marwazī, had a teaching post in the mosque of al-Mahdī, and knew Aḥmad’s son ʿAbd Allāh personally. It is to his scholarship that the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* owes its first *corpus juris* and the first biographical history of the *mad-*

*hhab*, *Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābilah*, of which some folios have survived and are preserved in the *Zāhiriyyah*, the National Library of Damascus.

Two other names dominate the first half of this period: al-Barbahārī and al-Khiraqī. Al-Barbahārī (d. 941), a disciple of al-Marwazī and the Ṣūfī Sahl al-Tustarī, was an activist who struggled against the Shīʿah and the Muʿtazilah and fought for the reform of the Sunnī caliphate, now under the influence of the Buyids. A true traditionalist, al-Barbahārī was hostile to *kalām* and opposed al-Ashʿarī, his contemporary. It is said that al-Ashʿarī wrote his *Ibānah* after a discussion with al-Barbahārī, which, if true, would explain partly al-Ashʿarī's rallying to the banner of Ibn Ḥanbal. Al-Barbahārī is a key figure in the social and political history of this period.

Al-Khiraqī (d. 946) gave the Ḥanābilah one of its most important works, *Al-mukhtaṣar fī al-fiqh* (The Epitome on Law), on which the fifteenth-century Ḥanbālī Yūsuf ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī reports that three hundred commentaries were written over the centuries. Al-Khiraqī is said to have written many other works that did not enjoy wide diffusion. The reason given is that he had left Baghdad, and his books, apparently lacking the diffusion they would have received had he remained there, were eventually destroyed when his house burned. Among his disciples were three members of the Ḥanābilah famous in their day: Ibn Baṭṭah, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Tamīmī, and Ibn Samʿūn.

Other Ḥanbālī followers of repute belonging to this period include Abū Bakr al-Sijistānī (d. 928), Abū Muḥammad al-Rāzī (d. 939), and Abū Bakr al-Najjād (d. 959), a Ṣūfī and *ḥadīth* expert. This period also witnessed some of the most fervently Sunnī professions of faith (*ʿaqīdahs*), a constant in Ḥanbālī history.

The names that stand out in the second half of this century are those of Ibn Samʿūn, Ibn Baṭṭah, and Ibn Ḥāmid. Ibn Samʿūn was a famous Ḥanbālī Ṣūfī who had studied under the direction of a number of Ṣūfīs, among them Abū Bakr al-Shiblī and al-Ḥuṣrī (d. 981). Ibn Samʿūn studied *ḥadīth* under Ibn Abī Dāwūd, and held a number of sessions in which he dictated *ḥadīths*. Highly regarded in his own *madhhab*, he had a reputation—and disciples—far beyond it. He is mentioned in the twenty-first of the *Maqāmāt* (Assemblies) of al-Ḥarīrī, “Al-Rāzīyah.” The two Ashʿarī scholars, al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013) and al-Isfarāʿīnī (d. 1027), as a mark of high respect when greeting him, used to kiss his hand. Ibn Baṭṭah is known especially for his two works *Al-ibānah al-kubrā* and *Al-ibānah al-ṣuḡhrā*, the second of which was translated and studied by the eminent Islamicist Henri Laoust. Other important Ḥanbālī personalities of this period include Abū Bakr al-Ājurrī (d. 971) and al-Ṭabaranī (d. 971). Al-Ājurrī, a Ṣūfī and *ḥadīth* expert, is claimed by both the Ḥanbālī and Shāfīʿī *madhhabs*, a phenomenon of rather frequent occurrence, because both *madhhabs* are profoundly traditionalist and may well have come into existence as “personal *madhhabs*” at approximately the same time.

Al-Ājurrī authored a *Kitāb al-sharīʿah* on Islamic law. Al-Ṭabaranī wrote three famous *muʿjams*, a *Kitāb al-sunnah*, and a *musnad* of the Syrian *ḥadīth* experts.

**Eleventh century.** The eleventh century ushered in the final phase of the period that brought about the restoration of Sunnī traditionalism following the collapse of the rationalist-inspired Inquisition. It was a century that witnessed the emergence of the Ḥanābilah at the head of a movement that was the mainstay of the caliphate. A Ḥanbālī of this century, Ibn Baqqāl (d. 1048), expressed the matter in this statement made in the caliphal court in the presence of the vizier Ḥājib al-Nuʿmān: “The caliphate is a tent, and the Ḥanābilah are its tent ropes; should the tent ropes fall down, the tent would topple over.” The implication was clear. The caliphate must give its support to traditionalism, whose adherents are the guardians of the source of its legitimacy.

The name that leads the first half of this century is that of Ibn Ḥāmid (d. 1012), the greatest Ḥanbālī master and jurisconsult of his time. His *Kitāb al-jāmiʿ*, in four hundred volumes, treated the divergences in legal opinions among the jurisconsults. He wrote extensively on theology and on law and its theory and methodology, but none of his works is extant.

Al-Sharīf Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥāshimī (d. 1037), a disciple of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Tamīmī, wrote many works, among them *Kitāb al-irshād* on law, and a commentary on al-Khiraqī's epitome on law. He had a study circle in the mosque of Manṣūr for legal opinions and notarial work. His *ʿaqīdah* has been preserved in his biographical notices.

Abū ʿAlī al-ʿUkbarī, known as Ibn Shihāb (d. 1037), a disciple of Ibn Baṭṭah, was a Ḥanbālī of broad culture, expert in the fields of law, belles lettres, Qurʾanic science, *ḥadīth*, and poetry, and was known for his legal opinions. He was also a copyist, a profession that did not simply furnish him with his livelihood but actually made him rich. In his will he left one-third of his property for the benefit of Ḥanbālī students of law, but they received none of it: The sultan is said to have confiscated the estate. Al-ʿUkbarī, in an autobiographical note, said that he earned 25,000 dirhams from copying manuscripts, a good part of this coming from his specialty of copying the *Dīwān* (Collected works) of the poet al-Mutanabbī in three nights, on paper that cost him five dirhams, which he would then sell for a sum between 150 and 200 dirhams.

The second half of this century is led by Qādī Abū Yaʿlā (d. 1066), whose name is cited extensively in the works of his successors. He was a favorite disciple of Ibn Ḥāmid, who chose him from among his students to teach the others during the master's absence on the pilgrimage to Mecca. With Abū Yaʿlā is at the beginning of the period of Ḥanbālī history better served by the sources: More of its literature has been preserved in the libraries of the Islamic and Western worlds. Abū Yaʿlā was a successful master jurisconsult under whose direction some of the great Ḥanbālī intellectuals studied and



became master jurisconsults in turn. It is in this period that *madrasabs* began to flourish in Baghdad. This is also the period in which rationalist influences succeeded in getting a hearing among some of the leading lights of the Ḥanābilah. Abū Yaʿlā is one, and Ibn ʿAqīl, who belongs to this period and the next, is another. The parents of both intellectuals were of the Ḥanafī *madhhab*, where the ideas of the Muʿtazilah may well have been familiar to members of the family circles. That Abū Yaʿlā was influenced by *kalām*-theology may be clearly seen in his *Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn* (The reliable book on the fundamentals of religion), where the influence of Ashʿarī doctrines is palpable, although the author avoids the term *kalām* in the title and uses the more traditionalist term *uṣūl al-dīn* for “theology.”

Among Abū Yaʿlā’s many works, *Al-muʿtamad* survives only in his abridged version; other important writings include *Al-ahkām al-sulṭānīyah*, a treatise on government and public administration with the same title and, for the most part, the same text as the work of al-Māwardī (d. 1058); *Al-ʿumdah fī uṣūl al-fiqh*, on legal theory and methodology, still in manuscript (Cairo); and *Kitāb al-riwāyatayn*, on positive law and also unpublished (Istanbul). Abū Yaʿlā’s standing in the Ḥanbālī *madhhab* is such that he came to be referred to simply as “the judge” (*al-qāḍī*), the organizer of his *madhhab* and one of its great teachers.

Two of Abū Yaʿlā’s students especially helped to spread the *madhhab* beyond the confines of Baghdad. Qāḍī Ḥarrān (d. 1083), whom Abū Yaʿlā appointed as his judicial representative in Ḥarrān, was the author of works on law, legal theory and methodology, and theology, none of which has survived. Abū al-Faraj al-Shīrāzī (d. 1094), who is credited with carrying the Ḥanbālī *madhhab* to Jerusalem and Damascus, wrote on law and legal theory and methodology, as well as on traditionalist theology, which involved him in recurrent altercations with Syrian rationalists of the Ashʿarī movement. Al-Shīrāzī stands at the head of a long line of Ḥanbālī descendants known collectively as “the family of Ibn al-Ḥanbālī.”

One of Abū Yaʿlā’s students who deserves special mention is the *sharīf* Abū Jaʿfar (d. 1077), an activist of the stamp of al-Barbahārī who was in constant struggle against what he considered to be the heretical innovations of his period. His fight against corrupt practices—prostitution and illicit alcoholic beverages—brought him into conflict with officials of the Seljuk sultan, as well as with those of the caliph, who was his first cousin. He was intransigent in his attitude against the two rationalist movements, the Muʿtazilah and the Ashʿarīyah, in their attempt to strengthen their footholds in the capital. Among his writings, the best known is his *Ruʿūs al-masāʾil*, a work on positive law in which he argues in favor of the legal opinions of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, a manuscript of which is in the Zāhirīyah in Damascus. Ibn ʿAqīl, in his *Kitāb al-funūn*, has preserved a legal opinion of Sharīf Abū Jaʿfar that throws some light on the Seljuk forces who invaded Baghdad in mid-century, long hailed as the saviors of

Sunnism against the Buyid Shīʿah. The Seljuks pillaging the inhabitants of Baghdad in 1055, said the *sharīf*, should be brought to justice as highway robbers, because the inhabitants had no defense against them. Abū Jaʿfar led a turbulent life, which often put him under house arrest or in prison. His biographers seem to think that he did not die a natural death. At his funeral, the popular masses, his powerful arm against enemies, cried out during the procession: “Invoke God’s mercy upon the *sharīf*—martyred, assassinated, poisoned.”

The other students of Abū Yaʿlā finished their careers in the first half of the twelfth century. Some who had begun their legal studies with him completed them after his death with one or another of his older disciples. Among the Ḥanābilah of this period are Abū al-Fath al-Ḥulwānī, al-Mukharrimī, and Ibn Abī Yaʿlā. Al-Ḥulwānī (d. 1112), like Abū Jaʿfar, was a jurisconsult and ascetic. He studied law first with Abū Yaʿlā, then with the *sharīf* and Yaʿqūb al-Barzabānī. He is the author of the *Kitāb al-mubtadī fī al-fiqh*, a textbook on law for beginners. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā (“son of Abū Yaʿlā,” d. 1131) was the second of Abū Yaʿlā’s three sons, and his name attests to the great renown of the father as well as to that of this particular son. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā is known especially for his biobibliographical history of the Ḥanbālī *madhhab* from its beginnings down to his day.

A great Ḥanbālī mystic of this period is the celebrated ʿAbd Allāh al-Anṣārī al-Ḥarawī (d. 1088), of Herat (Persia) as indicated by his name. He studied in his hometown and also in Nishapur, Ṭūs, Bisṭām, and Rayy. The origins of his membership in the Ḥanbālī *madhhab* are not known, but there is no doubt that he was a Ḥanbālī, and a pugnacious one to boot. He made this clear in his declarations, as well as in his writings, which include *Dhamm al-kalām*, a condemnation of *kalām*-theology; *Manāqib al-Imām Aḥmad*, a biographical work extolling the excellence of Ibn Ḥanbal’s virtues; and *Manāzil al-sāʾirīn*, the most important Ḥanbālī treatise on mysticism. The last-named work attracted many commentaries, including one by the Ḥanbālī jurisconsult and mystic Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, the disciple of Ibn Tay-mīyah, himself a jurisconsult and theologian, and a member of the Qādirīyah Ṣūfī order. Al-Anṣārī also wrote a *Qaṣīdah dālīyah* (Ode rhyming in dāl [the eighth letter of the alphabet]), a profession of faith in defense of Ḥanbālī beliefs; the title was later taken up by al-Kalwadhānī for the same purpose. The biographer Ibn Rajab cites some of al-Anṣārī’s other verses in which he declares that “My *madhhab* is the Ḥanbālī *madhhab*,” and again, “I am a Ḥanbālī and shall be one as long as I live, and, on my death bed, my last will and testament to my fellow Muslims will be that they follow the principles of Ibn Ḥanbal.” What al-Anṣārī meant was that they should become traditionalists in opposition to the rationalism of the Ashʿarī movement that he opposed: “Our God shall be seen sitting on his throne [i. e., beatific vision]; his word is eternal [i. e., the Qurʾān is not created]; his prophet is Arab. Anyone who says other than this is an Ashʿarī!”

Ya'qūb al-Barzabīnī (d. 1093) was a classmate of Sharīf Abū Ja'far. They completed their legal studies together, were both received as notaries by the chief *qāḍī* Damaghanī, and then began to teach law during the lifetime of their master, Abū Ya'lā. Al-Barzabīnī wrote a *ta'līqah (summa)* that was the abridgment of that of his teacher Abū Ya'lā; extracts from it appear in the *Dhayl* of Ibn Rajab. Ṭalḥah al-Āqūlī (d. 1118), who began his legal studies under Abū Ya'lā, was one of al-Barzabīnī's first students. Like both his teachers, he too became a *qāḍī* and professor of law; he taught two works of Abū Ya'lā on the latter's formal authorization and had a post in the mosque of Manṣūr, where he held sessions of legal disputation. Ibn Qudāmah cites him in the *Mughnī* and his *Kāfī*.

Abū Sa'd al-Mukharrimī (d. 1119), jurisconsult and Ṣūfī, headed the first Ḥanbālī *madrasah* in Baghdad; heretofore the *madhhab*'s institutions of learning had been mainly mosque-colleges (*maṣjids*). His legal studies took place with the *qāḍī* Abū Ya'lā, then with the *sharīf* Abū Ja'far, and finally with the *qāḍī* Ya'qūb al-Barzabīnī. He too was a *qāḍī* in the Bāb al-Azaj quarter on Baghdad's east side, where he built his *madrasah* sometime between 1102 and 1117. This was the *madrasah* that later became known as that of the Ḥanbālī Ṣūfī 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī. Al-Jilānī enlarged it and made it into a *madrasah* and *ribāṭ* (monastery) for jurisconsults and Ṣūfis. Ibn Rajab emphasizes that Abū Sa'd al-Mukharrimī stood at the head of a long line of Ṣūfis, ascetics, and *ḥadīth* masters. His name occurs in the Ṣūfī pedigrees of later Ḥanbālī scholars.

Abū Khāzim ibn Abī Ya'lā (d. 1133), born one year before the death of his famous father, was the last of Abū Ya'lā's three sons and bore the name of his paternal uncle, Abū Khāzim. He studied law, the disputed questions, and legal theory and methodology with al-Barzabīnī. He wrote on the disputed questions and issued a commentary on al-Khiraqī's *Epitome*.

Abū al-Khaṭṭab al-Kalwadhānī (d. 1116) was one of the great disciples of Abū Ya'lā. Essentially a jurisconsult, al-Kalwadhānī excelled in law and its disputed questions. His reputation in law was so great that the celebrated Shāfi'ī jurisconsult and ambassador of the sultan Burkiyārūq to the caliph would exclaim at the approach of al-Kalwadhānī: "Here comes Law." His writings include the unpublished *Al-tambīd* on legal theory and methodology (Zahiriyyah) and *Al-tahdhīb fī al-farā'id*, on decedents' estates, also unpublished (Munich), which was criticized by the Ḥanbālī vizier Ibn Yūnus (d. 1197) in his *Awhām Abī al-Khaṭṭab*. Among his other works are the "Ode rhyming in dāl" (Damascus, 1908), the profession of faith that is his only known work treating of theology, and numerous treatments of positive law.

The most brilliant and successful student of al-Kalwadhānī was Abū Bakr al-Dīnawarī (d. 1138), who was in turn the professor of law of the well-known polymath Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 1200), as well as of Ibn al-Munā (d. 1187) and

the Ḥanbālī vizier Ibn Hubayrah (d. 1165). The caliph al-Mustazhir appointed al-Dīnawarī to the chair vacated by the death of his professor al-Kalwadhānī in the mosque of Manṣūr, and the event is reported by Ibn 'Aqīl along with the disputations on law that usually took place in honor of the inauguration of the new professor of law.

Abū al-Ḥasan al-Zāghūnī (d. 1132), a contemporary of Ibn 'Aqīl, was the Ḥanbālī master jurisconsult who came closest to Ibn 'Aqīl in breadth of knowledge. The extensive list of his books given by Ibn Rajab includes works on positive law, disputed questions of law, decedents' estates, theology, and legal theory and methodology, a collection of his academic sermons, a history, collections of legal opinions (*fatāwā*), and *ḥadīth*, none of which has survived. He had a chair for legal disputations and academic sermons in the mosque of Manṣūr. Two great Ḥanbālī scholars were his students: Ṣadaqah ibn al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Jawzī.

Among the original minds of the century stood the towering figure of Ibn 'Aqīl (d. 1119). His family background was Ḥanafī-Mu'tazilī. At the age of sixteen he began his legal studies in the Ḥanbālī *madhhab*. During his graduate years he studied Mu'tazilī *kalām*-theology privately and in secret. After the death of his rich and powerful Ḥanbālī patron, Abū Manṣūr ibn Yūsuf, in 1067, he was pursued by a faction of his Ḥanbālī *madhhab* and was forced to go into hiding for a period of five years. Finally in 1072, in order to regain his freedom, he signed a retraction in which he abjured the Mu'tazilah and the veneration he had shown for the great mystic al-Ḥallāj in a treatise. Reflecting on this retraction in later life, Ibn 'Aqīl said that his companions had misunderstood his intention in studying under the direction of Mu'tazilī masters: "My Ḥanbālī companions demanded that I cease my relations with a certain group of intellectuals, and this prevented me from acquiring useful knowledge." As for his treatise in veneration of al-Ḥallāj, it appears to have remained in circulation among Ṣūfis of the Ḥanbālī *madhhab*.

With Ibn 'Aqīl traditionalist thought reached new heights of achievement. His writings give evidence of a genuine attempt to achieve harmony between faith and reason. His two outstanding works are *Kitāb al-funūn*, of which only one of two hundred volumes has survived, and *Al-wāḍiḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh*, a *summa* on legal theory and methodology written according to the scholastic method later to be used in the Christian West.

Besides the schools of Harran, Damascus, and Herat, the Ḥanābilah, by this time, had also spread to Isfahan, where 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Mandah (d. 1077) was as much an activist as the Ṣūfī al-Ḥarawī al-Anṣārī was in Herat. Among Ibn Mandah's works is a refutation of the Jahmīyah.

*Twelfth century.* The Ḥanbālī names that dominate the twelfth century are those of Ibn Hubayrah, 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī, and Ibn al-Jawzī. Less famous, but no less interesting because of his membership in the Ḥanbālī *madhhab*, is the unusual figure of Ṣadaqah ibn al-Ḥusayn.

Ibn Hubayrah received his Ḥanbālī education under Abū al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Farrā' (d. 1132), Ibn al-Zāghūnī, and Abū Bakr al-Dīnawarī and studied the literary arts under al-Jawālīqī, the Ḥanbālī grammarian who succeeded his master al-Tibrizī to the post of grammarian in the Madrasah Niẓāmīyah. Ibn Hubayrah became vizier of Caliph al-Muqtafī in 1149 and remained in that post under al-Mustanjid for a total of sixteen years, until his death in 1165. He founded a *madrasah*, endowed it, and established his own library in it as a *waqf* in perpetuity. He wrote a work on grammar, *Al-muqtaṣid*, an epitome of Ibn al-Sikkīt's *Iṣlāḥ al-manṭiq*, and a work on the five pillars of Islamic worship, *Al-ʿibādāt al-khams*. But his most important work is his *Kitāb al-iṣṣāḥ* (Aleppo, 1928), a commentary on the *ḥadīth* collections of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, within which a whole independent work on law was written as commentary on a single one of its *ḥadīths*. In preparation for the writing of *Kitāb al-iṣṣāḥ*, the vizier spent 113,000 dinars to invite scholars from all parts for discussions on law. The work contains those doctrines on which there was unanimity among the four eponymous imams of the Sunnī *madhhabs* as well as questions that remained in dispute. The *Kitāb al-iṣṣāḥ* was copied and used far and wide.

ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī is the famous Ḥanbālī Ṣūfī whose Ṣūfī brotherhood is still prosperous in the present day. He studied law under al-Mukharrimī, al-Kalwadhānī, Ibn ʿAqīl, and Abū al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Farrā'. In a recently published Ṣūfī *silsilah* ("chain") of initiation for Ibn Qudāmāh, al-Mukharrimī, previously known only as a jurisconsult, appears for the first time as the Ṣūfī who passed on the Ṣūfī cloak (*khirqah*) of initiation to ʿAbd al-Qādir. It was also the *madrasah* of al-Mukharrimī to which ʿAbd al-Qādir succeeded as administrator, professor of law, and Ṣūfī master; under his direction the institution was enlarged, and it has been maintained on Baghdad's east side down to this day. He studied Sufism under the Ṣūfī shaykh Ḥammād al-Dabbās (d. 1131), who was severely criticized by Ibn ʿAqīl. ʿAbd al-Qādir wrote two well-known works: *Al-ghunyah li-ṭālībī ṭariq al-ḥaqq* (The seeker's sufficiency in search of the truth), in which, basing his teachings on the Qurʾān and the *sunnah*, he included an *ʿaqīdah* of profoundly orthodox inspiration that is a succinct presentation of Ḥanbālī traditionalist beliefs. He was severely criticized by his Ḥanbālī contemporary Ibn al-Jawzī, no doubt because of scholarly rivalry, but was ably defended by ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Maqdisī, Ibn Qudāmāh, and Ibn Taymīyah. The last two are known to have belonged to the Ṣūfī order of ʿAbd al-Qādir, and perhaps also ʿAbd al-Ghanī, who, with his cousin Ibn Qudāmāh, had studied with ʿAbd al-Qādir for the period of forty days that preceded the Ṣūfī master's death.

Ibn al-Jawzī, whose life spanned all but thirteen years of this twelfth century, was a jurisconsult, *ḥadīth* expert, historian, preacher, and polemist. A prolific author, he wrote his first work—a "bibliography of works pertaining to the

Qurʾān and its sciences," according to an autobiographical note—at the age of thirteen. A famous preacher and sermon writer whose talents were highly praised by the Spanish Muslim traveler Ibn Jubayr, Ibn al-Jawzī said he preached his first sermon at the age of seventeen. Into the works of this polymath passed a great amount of the writings of Ibn ʿAqīl, Ibn Hubayrah, and others otherwise lost. He first studied law under the direction of Ibn al-Zāghūnī, whom he was later to criticize; after Ibn al-Zāghūnī's death he studied with al-Dīnawarī, Abū Yaʿlā the Minor, grandson of Qādī Abū Yaʿlā, and al-Nahrawānī, under whom he worked as repetitor (*muʿīd*), and whom he succeeded as professor of law in his two *madrasahs*. By the year 1179, he held five professorships of law in *madrasahs* of which he was also the administrator. That date also coincides with the date his history of Baghdad, *Al-muntaẓam*, is terminated. With Ibn al-Jawzī, the Ḥanbālī *madhhab* reached the apex of its influence in the Abbasid capital, owing in large measure to his own weight with the caliph. Under the vizierate of the Ḥanbālī Ibn Yūnus (d. 1197), Ibn al-Jawzī was once again active in public life, but he lived the life of an exile in Wāsiṭ from 1194 to 1199, when he was allowed, through the intervention of the caliph's mother, to return to Baghdad. He died two years later.

Ṣadaqaḥ ibn al-Husayn was the most atypical Ḥanbālī intellectual, a veritable maverick of his *madhhab*. He was a jurisconsult, belletrist, poet, philosophical theologian, and historian. Unfortunately, none of his works are extant. He studied dialectic, *kalām*, decedents' estates, and, in secret, logic and philosophy. Unlike his contemporary Ibn al-Jawzī, he lived a secluded life teaching in his mosque-college in the Badrīyah quarter (Bāb Badr) on Baghdad's east side, where he led the people in prayer, issued legal opinions to those who solicited them from him, and taught various subjects to students who frequented his mosque. One of his works, on theology, is entitled *Ḍawʿ al-sārī fī maʿrifat al-Bārī* (A torch in the night to light the way toward God); his history is a continuation of that of his teacher Ibn al-Zāghūnī covering the period from the latter's death in 1132 to a period close to his own death. Like the *Muntaẓam* of Ibn al-Jawzī, it was an annalistic and biographical work.

*Later period.* From this point to the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in the middle of the thirteenth century, the Ḥanābilah no longer boast of names comparable in reputation to those just treated. Nevertheless, there are some figures worthy of a place in the history of Ḥanbālī thought. Ibn al-Ghazzāl (d. 1218), known as a sermon writer, wrote a treatise on the mystic al-Ḥallāj in which he made use of Ibn ʿAqīl's earlier work on this mystic. Ibn Nuqṭah (d. 1232) was a *ḥadīth* expert and historian whose history, not extant, is often cited as a source. Al-Qaṭīʿī (d. 1237), a disciple of Ibn al-Jawzī, wrote a continuation of al-Samʿānī's (d. 1168) continuation of the *History of Baghdad* of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 1071). Al-ʿUlthī (d. 1237) was a pious ascetic who criticized the policies of Caliph al-Nāṣir, the Ṣūfī practices of a



disciple of 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, and Ibn al-Jawzī's allegorical interpretation of the divine attributes. Muḥyī al-Dīn Yūsuf (d. 1258), son of Ibn al-Jawzī, was a Ṣūfī and held the post of *muhṭasib* (market superintendent) of Baghdad under Caliph al-Nāṣir. He was considered more expert than his father in jurisprudence and dialectic. He wrote several works, including *Al-īdāh fī al-jadal* (Dialectic Made Clear), which is still in manuscript. While on an official visit in Damascus in 1254, he founded a *madrasah* called al-Jawzīyah. Returning to Baghdad, he was killed, with his three sons, during the Mongol invasion four years later.

With the fall of Baghdad, Damascus became the center of learning for the Ḥanbālī *madhhab*, whose masters had perfected their studies in Baghdad. Important Ḥanbālī intellectual dynasties developed in Damascus over the years: the descendants of the eleventh-century al-Shīrāzī who became known as the family of "Ibn al-Hanbālī," the Munajjā family founded by Wajih al-Dīn As'ad ibn Munajjā (d. 1209), and the Qudāmah family, also referred to as the Maqādisah (sg., Maqdisī), meaning those who came to Damascus from Palestine (Jammā'īl, a place near Jerusalem, Bayt al-Maqdis). The most well-known member of the third family is Muwaffaq al-Dīn ibn Qudāmah (d. 1223). Ḍiyā' al-Dīn al-Maqdisī (d. 1245), who had gone to Baghdad to perfect his studies, brought back to Damascus works with which he later endowed the *madrasah* he founded in Baghdad called the *Ḍiyā'īyah*. Many of the works of this *madrasah* are now in the Zāhirīyah in Damascus.

Another exodus from Ḥarrān brought to Damascus the Taymīyah family, the most illustrious member of which was Aḥmad ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328). Two other members of the family were Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Taymīyah (d. 1226), a disciple of Ibn al-Jawzī and professor of law in the *madrasah* founded by Nūr al-Dīn in Harran; and Majd al-Dīn ibn Taymīyah (d. 1254), nephew of Fakhr al-Dīn and grandfather of the famous Ibn Taymīyah. The son, 'Abd al-Ḥalīm (d. 1283), *qāḍī* of Harran, was the one who fled from the Mongols and took the family to Damascus. The famous son, Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymīyah, the father, and the grandfather collaborated, each after the other, on a work in the field of legal theory and methodology called *Al-musawwadah* (The draft), of which Aḥmad ibn Taymīyah's disciple, Shihāb al-dīn Aḥmad al-Ḥarrānī al-Dimashqī (d. 1344), made a fair copy, distinguishing between the contributions of the three authors (Damascus, 1964).

Among Aḥmad ibn Taymīyah's disciples, by far the most famous was Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, a Ṣūfī like Ibn Taymīyah. Just as Ibn Taymīyah wrote a commentary on the Ṣūfī work of 'Abd al-Qādir, *Futūḥ al-ghayb*, Ibn Qayyim commented on the *Manāzil al-sā'irīn* of al-Anṣārī al-Ḥarawī. He also wrote *I'lām al-muwaqqi'īn*, on legal theory and methodology, and a profession of faith in verse (rhyming in the letter *nūn*), *Al-nūnīyah*. Ibn Rajab, a disciple of Ibn Qayyim, wrote the well-known history of the Ḥanābilah from 1068 as a continuation of Ibn Abī Ya'lā. His

*Qawā'id* (Cairo, 1933) is an important work on jurisprudence.

Of the Mufliḥ family, Shams al-Dīn ibn Mufliḥ (d. 1361), a student of Ibn Taymīyah, is the author of *Al-ādāb al-sbar'īyah* (3 vols., Cairo, 1929–1930), and the chief *qāḍī* Burhān al-Dīn ibn Mufliḥ (d. 1480) authored a history of the Ḥanābilah, not extant. A member of the 'Abd al-Hādī family also deserves mention: Yūsuf ibn 'Abd al-Hādī (d. 1503), a prolific author, many of whose works are preserved in the Zāhirīyah. He was a voracious reader, and his signature is found on the margins of a great many manuscripts in that library and elsewhere. One of his students in *ḥadīth*, the Ḥanafī historian Ibn Ṭūlūn (d. 1546), wrote his biography. Among the other Ḥanbālī scholars worthy of mention, the following may be cited: al-Mardāwī (d. 1481), author of *Kitāb al-inṣāf*; a twelve-volume work on law, and *Kitāb al-taḥrīr*, on legal theory and methodology; al-Hujawī (d. 1561), whose *Iqnā'* is a basic manual on Ḥanbālī law; al-Bahūtī (d. 1641), the well-known Ḥanbālī author who taught at al-Azhar; Ibn al-'Imād (d. 1679), author of a history, mainly biographical, from the year AH 1 to the year AH 1000 (622–1592 CE); 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ba'ī (d. 1778), Ṣūfī disciple of 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulūsī who introduced him to the Sufism of Ibn 'ArAbī and Ibn al-Fāriḍ.

The Ḥanābilah, through Ibn Taymīyah, influenced two modern movements, the Wahhābīyah and the Salafīyah. It is through these two movements, in Arabia and Egypt respectively, that works of the Ḥanābilah and their teachings, especially those of Ibn Taymīyah, were made known. And it is in connection with the Wahhābī movement, which was misrepresented and opposed by the Ottomans, that misconceptions developed among modern scholars regarding the Ḥanābilah.

**SEE ALSO** Ash'arīyah; Ḥadīth; Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, Muḥammad; Ibn Taymīyah; Kalām; Madhhab; Mu'tazilah; Shāfī'ī, al-; Wahhābīyah; Waqf.

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GEORGE MAKDISI (1987)

**HANDS** are a key factor in what it means to be human, because they interact with the intelligence in probing, manipulating, and transforming matter for cultural ends. The hands are also the most expressive and versatile members of the body for symbolic and ritual gestures and tasks, whether social, religious, or magical. Hands give and receive, grasp and relinquish; they strike, protect, punish, and caress. Hands beckon, greet, and wave goodbye; they warn, admonish, and direct; they also pull apart and dismantle, heal and repair, assemble, divide and gather.

**AS SYMBOLS OF DEITY.** The Qurʾān speaks of God’s hand bestowing bounty and blessing as well as exercising power over all things (67:1). The hand is mentioned often in the Bible as a symbol of God’s power and guidance. In Hindu iconography, some representations of deity—preeminently Śiva Nāṭarāja, lord of the dance—have multiple hands and arms, symbolizing omnicompetence; this meaning is further enriched by the precise symbolism in Hindu thought of fingers, palms, and other parts of the hand.

In religious iconography overall, hands occur in a wide variety of gestures. For example, Christ as cosmic ruler is depicted with raised right hand, palm facing outward in a gesture of benediction and peace. Images and pictures of the Buddha feature various *mudrās*, that is, signs or gestures made by the hands—such as the “fear not” position, which resembles the blessing of Christ. Other *mudrās* include extending the hand toward the ground to call the earth to witness and “preaching the Dharma,” both hands raised in front of the chest. Even in aniconic Islam, the talisman known sometimes as the ‘Hand of Faṭimah’ is a prominent anthropomorphic symbol of divine protection. Depending on whether one is Sunnī or Shīʿī, the fingers represent either

the Five Pillars of Islam (*shahādah*, “testifying” to the unity of God and the apostlehood of Muhammad; *ṣalāt*, “ritual prayer”; *zakāt*, “almsgiving”; *ṣawm*, “fasting”; *ḥajj*, “pilgrimage”) or the five holy personages (Muḥammad, Faṭimah, ʿAlī, Ḥasan, and Ḥusayn).

The frequent attribution of hands to deity in religions both ancient and contemporary bears witness to a peculiar anthropomorphic persistence. In the Hindu religion, the arms and hands of Śiva seem furthermore to challenge the preeminence of the primordial and creative word, which is also at the core of creation in the Abrahamic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Similarly, although God is depicted as creating by means of speech in both the Bible and the Qurʾān, in both he is also represented as having created humankind, alone among creatures, with his hands. “When thy Lord said to the angels, ‘See, I am creating a mortal of a clay. When I have shaped him, and breathed my spirit in him, fall you down, bowing before him!’ Then the angels bowed themselves all together, save Iblīs; he waxed proud, and was one of the unbelievers. Said he, ‘Iblīs, what prevented thee to bow thyself before that I created with my own hands?’” (Qurʾān 38:72–76). Regardless of whether this passage is interpreted literally or symbolically, it testifies to a special link between God and humankind in which spirit, clay, and molding hands figure centrally.

**WORSHIP, PRAYER, AND MEDITATION.** The most general use of hands ritually is in prayer. In the Christian tradition, many Protestants hold the hands palm to palm with fingers interlocked, as did ancient Romans and Sumerians. Roman Catholics have often preferred to place the palms together with fingers pointing upward, a position found also in Hindu and Buddhist piety. Romans and Greeks prayed to the deities of the underworld with hands pointing downward. Many peoples touch altars and shrines with their hands while praying for blessings. Ancient Christians in the catacombs are known to have prayed with arms and hands stretched out to the sides in imitation of crucifixion. In Muslim petitionary prayer (*duʿāʾ*), the hands are held out in front of the body with palms open upward; after the words have been uttered, the palms are rubbed across the face. The clapping of hands in praise was known among the ancient Hebrews and Egyptians, and it is still practiced in certain ritual contexts by Africans, Chinese, and Japanese. The Sioux were known to raise their arms with the palms of the hands turned toward a sacred presence, after which they would lower the hands toward the earth. Raising the hands has sometimes been a gesture of adoration of deity, for example, when the priest raises the Host and the chalice during the celebration of the Christian Eucharist. Ancient Egyptians raised both hands with palms facing the shrine.

The Hindu and Buddhist ritual hand gestures known as *mudrās* are the most highly elaborated in religious history. *Mudrā* as a sacred hand language is widely employed in the ritual, dance, drama, and iconography of South and Southeast Asia. The great Vajrayāna stupa of Borobudur, in Cen-



tral Java, contains hundreds of sculptures and reliefs portraying Buddhas whose hands form *mudrās* symbolizing the whole range of Buddhist teachings.

**BLESSINGS, OATHS, AND CONSECRATIONS.** The use of the hand in blessing is widely known. In the Bible, the hand is raised over or toward those to be blessed (*Lv.* 9) and sometimes placed on the head of a person (*Gn.* 48:14). A central Christian blessing is the sign of the cross made with the hands, a gesture performed slightly differently by Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox: The former move the hand from the forehead to the breast and then from the left to the right shoulder, whereas the latter perform the final motion from right to left shoulder. The hand is also used in Christianity to sprinkle holy water, to baptize either by sprinkling or pouring, and to anoint.

The laying on of hands in ordinations and other forms of consecration is known from the Bible and other sources. A similar gesture was performed in ancient Egypt, where the gods were believed to lay their hands on the head of the new pharaoh. In some Christian groups, for example, among Baptists, a “right hand of fellowship” is extended by the members of the congregation to newly baptized communicants.

A very prominent and widespread category of hand gestures has existed in connection with oath taking; among these are raising the hand, touching a sacred object (e.g., Bible, altar, scepter, weapon), clapping hands, pointing at a holy thing, and touching one’s own breast. In medieval Islam, new caliphs were acknowledged and legitimized by the *bay‘ah*, a survival of an ancient Arabian oath of allegiance symbolized by raising the right hand and then clapping the hand of the ruler or his designated representative, with God as witness.

**APOTROPAIC AND MAGICAL USES.** The sign of the cross has been made for a great variety of reasons, not the least of which has been to ward off demons and other evils. Another potent hand gesture has been the sign of the “horns,” a fist with the index and little finger extended, thought to be efficacious against harmful spells and persons. Alternatively, a person who felt threatened by an occult danger might extend all the fingers of a hand toward the antagonist (real or imagined) and say, “Five in the eye!” This archaic apotropaic gesture of the Mediterranean Basin is often expressed in North Africa and Egypt by means of a talisman in the shape of a hand or by grains of wheat.

Positive and negative imprints of human hands, for example, in red ochre, appear frequently in prehistoric cave art as well as in many contexts since. Such imprints are often thought to protect against the evil eye and other misfortunes.

Magical healing often features hand gestures and touches. Christ is reported to have healed by his touch (see, e.g., *Mt.* 9:20). Royal personages have also been known to heal with their hands, as for example the British monarch Charles II’s famous cures of scrofula. Even the hands of dead persons

have been used in healing as well as in other magical operations.

Decoration of the hands, such as by tattooing, is known widely. Men of the Mentawai Islands, near Sumatra, tattoo their hands in order to wipe out the evil influences of blood spilled in their village. Coptic Christians in Egypt have traditionally worn on the back of the hand or on the wrist a tattooed cross, employed for identification as a Christian in case of death among strangers in that predominantly Muslim country. At festive times, such as Arabian tribal weddings, women sometimes color their hands with henna. In many parts of India as well, women decorate their hands with henna on festive occasions. Hands are also frequently adorned with rings, intended for protection as well as for fashion. In Java, men wear rings set with various stones believed to act as powerful amulets against harmful spirits and spells as well as against more tangible dangers such as poisonous snakebite. Javanese men commonly allow their thumbnails to grow very long in imitation of a mythical hero, Warkudara, who persisted steadfastly in all endeavors and could not be cheated. He is depicted in shadow puppetry (*wayang kulit*) with bladelike thumbnails, symbols of his valor and fighting skills.

**RITUAL AVOIDANCES AND MUTILATIONS.** Washing the hands has been a widespread symbol of cleansing the self of sin and guilt, and a symbol of ritual purity generally. Veiling the hands has also been practiced, usually because their uncleanness in the presence of sacred things threatens the efficacy of ritual. Sometimes covering the hands has symbolized a person’s inferior social or ritual status.

The left hand is widely considered to be unclean, and performing a task or keeping something in place with this hand is generally considered inappropriate. The reasons are probably not so simple as that the left hand is reserved for humble tasks, such as the toilet; perhaps such use is recommended because the left hand and the left side of the body generally are thought to be inherently inferior to the right. The predominance of the right hand among all peoples is well known, and even when a child’s natural preference may be for the left hand, he or she is often trained to use the right hand instead. The auspicious character of the right hand is maintained in the English word *dexterous* (Lat., *dextra*, “right”); the word *sinister* (Lat., *sinistra*, “left”), too, speaks for itself.

In predominantly Muslim regions such as Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as in other Islamic countries, the right hand is used for greeting, gesturing, handing over or receiving objects, and touching others. It is considered extremely rude as well as inauspicious to use the left hand for any of those functions. In the Qur’ān, God is said to give, on Resurrection Day, each person’s book of deeds either into the right hand, symbolizing salvation, or into the left, indicating damnation (69:19). When eating, especially from a common dish, Muslims use only the right hand. According to the Islamic *sharī‘ah*, or law, the strict punishment for the habitual

thief is amputation of the right hand, which precipitates a shameful condition that persists for life and in certain social groups condemns the guilty person to eating alone.

Prehistoric imprints of human hands sometimes show loss of fingers or joints, evidence perhaps of ritual deformation of the hand, either undergone voluntarily or performed as a punishment on captured enemies; both forms are known in ethnography. The severed hands or fingers both of dead persons, such as those killed in battle or by execution or assassination, and of children who died in the womb or at birth have been thought to possess extraordinary powers and therefore have been used in a variety of magical rituals by witches, medicine men, conjurers, and others. American Indians used to wear the hands or fingers of vanquished enemies as powerful medicine. In West Africa, the hand or finger of a deceased relative was often kept as a potent ingredient in magical charms and spells. There are many other magical and superstitious ideas and practices that involve the hands and that have only remote relevance, if any, to religious belief and symbolism, but closer connections with the hands' quite remarkable profane qualities and abilities: One example is chiromancy, the practice of "reading" the hand and especially the palm for purposes of divining the future fate of an individual—a tradition based upon the belief that the hand is the person in miniature.

**SEE ALSO** Human Body; Left and Right; Mudrā; Touching.

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FREDERICK MATHEWSON DENNY (1987)

**HANDSOME LAKE** (1735–1815) was a Seneca shaman, prophet, and sachem of the Six Nations of the Iroquois; known in Iroquois as Ganio' Daí Io'. He was born on the Genesee River opposite modern-day Avon, Livingston County, New York. Handsome Lake's life mirrors the history of the Iroquois people. Born at the zenith of Iroquois power and influence, he participated in major battles against Indian and American opponents and witnessed his people's

loss of land and pride following the Revolutionary War. He later suffered a debilitating illness, exacerbated by bouts of drunkenness, but was revived by a series of dream-vision experiences and led the way to a national revitalization of Indian values.

Early in 1799 Handsome Lake was confined to bed with a serious illness and seemed near death. During a series of dream-vision experiences in June and August 1799 he received many messages from the Creator through four intermediaries whom the prophet referred to as the Four Messengers or the Four Angels. They instructed him about his mission, guided him on a sky journey to the land of the damned and the blessed, and promised him shamanic powers. Handsome Lake recovered, and his sense of physical and spiritual rebirth intensified as he preached and worked for reform.

The earliest messages the prophet received condemned alcohol, witchcraft, abortion, and charms. The Creator was also displeased with wife beating and desertion by husbands, as well as by adultery, undisclosed multimarriages, interference in marriages by mothers-in-law, and the neglect and abuse of children and the elderly. Such activities reflected a serious breakdown in the traditional Iroquois way of life. Handsome Lake now called for a breakup of the longhouse dwelling and instituted the building of single-family houses following the Quaker model. More radically, he preached that men must give up their rapidly declining occupations of hunting and waging war and instead take up farming, the traditional domain of women. At the same time, he warned against the private ownership of property as destructive of traditional Iroquois values, and he encouraged cooperative farming and other communal activities. He also condemned the cruelty to farm animals evident among many whites. Fearful of the corrosive effects of white education on Iroquois traditions, he said that only a few Iroquois children should be educated, and those for the express purpose of enabling the Iroquois to deal with the whites in legal and political matters.

As a prophet, Handsome Lake differed from the Native American cultic and nativistic prophets. The cultic prophets claimed that renewal would occur only when the people returned to the sacrifices and rituals they had neglected. The divine would then send forth its power and restore them. The nativistic prophets proclaimed that the whites would be destroyed if the people rejected all white influences and returned to the old ways. In contrast, Handsome Lake was an ethical-eschatological prophet. He spoke in the name of a transcendent moral being who was seriously displeased with the sins of his people and would either reward them or punish them after death depending on whether they reformed themselves. The Creator did not promise that the whites would be destroyed or driven away but rather said that personal and social reforms would enable the Iroquois to be strong enough to maintain their own independence and to survive in a world increasingly controlled by whites. Reject-

ing both the assimilationism of the Mohawk Joseph Grant and the nativism of the Seneca Red Jacket, Handsome Lake presented the Iroquois with the will of the Creator: They must either accept the *gaiwio* (“good word”), that is, the revelations and injunctions received by Handsome Lake, by repenting their deeds and embracing personal and social reform, or be lost in both a personal-eschatological and a sociohistorical sense.

Unlike the biblical prophets, Handsome Lake’s concern with ethical behavior and eschatology was not accompanied by a desacralization of nature. Although he rejected any cultic prescription for the ills of his people, Handsome Lake affirmed as integral to the Iroquois tradition the necessity of maintaining correct relationships with the spirit forces through ceremonial life. Only by enacting the moral and socioeconomic reforms enjoined by the *gaiwio* could the Indian tradition be fully effective.

Corresponding to Handsome Lake’s integration of eschatological and cosmic elements was his idea of the holy as both a transcendent moral being and an immanent presence and power. The present-day Longhouse religion, or Handsome Lake religion, while basing itself on the prophet’s teachings, incorporates them into a religious structure that includes shamanic institutions and practices, agricultural and gathering ceremonies, and organizational meetings such as the Six Nations Conference.

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DONALD P. ST. JOHN (1987)

#### HAN FEI-TZU SEE HAN FEI ZI

**HAN FEI ZI** (c. 280–233 BCE), or Master Han Fei, a Chinese philosopher of the late Warring States period (403–221 BCE), was important as the main consolidator and most forceful advocate of a set of earlier ideas later to be given the label of “legalism” (*fajia*). Historical accounts tell us that he was a noble scion of the relatively weak state of Han, and that he created his writings in response to the ineptitude of Han’s governance after failing to gain the ear of its ruler. He would later be sent as an envoy to the powerful western state of Qin, where he would eventually succumb to political intrigue and be forced to commit suicide just twelve years prior to the Qin’s unification of the Chinese world. The book of Han Fei Zi is comprised of fifty-five individual essays and anecdotal collections, most of which were likely written by Han Fei prior to his journey to Qin and eventually compiled into a single work bearing the author’s name; with a few exceptions, the bulk of the work is considered to be authentic. Han Fei is known as much for his lucid writing and persuasive style of argumentation as for his philosophy itself, and his writings are full of some of early China’s most engaging and illustrative stories and analogies.

Han Fei’s main “legalist” precursors included Shang Yang (c. 390–338 BCE), Shen Buhai (c. 400–337 BCE), and Shen Dao (fl. fourth century BCE), who, in the traditional, if overly neat, categorization of their main ideas, respectively proffered such notions as rulership through strict enforcement of clear laws (*fa*), management of officials through bureaucratic method (*shu*), and reliance on advantageous position (*shi*), all of which would, to one degree or another, find their way into Han Fei’s thought. Han Fei was also loosely associated with the Huang-Lao tradition, and he was influenced by the book of Laozi (*Dao de jing*), from which he and his predecessors borrowed the term *nonaction* (*wuwei*) to describe the stance of the ideal ruler. Most directly, Han Fei was also ostensibly a student of the Confucian philosopher Xunzi, though if this is true he would end up radically departing from his teacher on many fronts.

If Han Fei inherited anything from Xunzi, it was certainly the idea that human nature, if left to its own devices, would only lead the people toward struggle and chaos, as humans tended to act out of their own self-interest (as demonstrated, for Han Fei, by the fact that people normally congratulated each other when a son was born, but sometimes killed the child if it was a “useless” daughter). Both employed the analogy that one rarely finds perfectly straight or perfectly rounded wood in nature, and so just as one needs carpen-

try tools to fashion wood into arrows or wheels, the ruler likewise needs analogous devices to mold human behavior in order to achieve political order and stability. Yet whereas for Xunzi such devices lay first and foremost in education through ritual, music, and moral suasion, for Han Fei it was only the coercive force of punishments and the attraction of rewards that would do the trick, as he viewed the Confucian virtues of humanity and propriety (*renyi*) as unteachable aspects of human nature that only a small minority of people possessed. Thus only the rule of might could possibly bring the whole state in line: “For the sage rules not by relying on people to do good for him, but rather utilizes their inability to do wrong. . . . The ruler of method does not follow after chance goodness, but rather implements the way of inevitability” (*Xianxue*). Likewise, Han Fei cautions the ruler against aiming to “win over the people’s hearts,” because the people, like children, do not understand what is ultimately good for them and what hardships must be endured in order to achieve it.

Han Fei’s writings often take the form of polemic against common views and practices supported or encouraged by his opponents, and they concentrate on showing the contradictions inherent in these rival philosophies, the two most prominent being those of the Confucians and the Mohists. For instance, Han Fei vigorously called into question their common insistence that the rulers of the present adhere to the ways of the ancient sage kings, on the grounds both that those ways were too remote to be known (as evidenced by their contradictory philosophies attributed to the same ancient models) and that it was foolish to blindly follow the ways of the past in the first place, given that former circumstances no longer hold true today. “Thus the sage aims neither to cultivate the ancient nor to emulate anything of constant admissibility” (*Wudu*); by showing how circumstances continually change and have always done so, Han Fei advocates a sense of historical perspective over against his rivals’ views of historical constancy. Thus, rather than wasting time listening to the praises of the former kings, Han Fei’s ruler would give credence only to practical wisdom on how to achieve order in the present. Indeed, Han Fei saw it as a common tendency for rulers to become beguiled by clever persuaders acting out of their own self-interest and thereby reward values and promote characteristics that did not serve the good of the state, an obvious recipe for chaos. Given this, the issue of practical applicability was always his litmus test by which to judge the value of any doctrine. An example of this is his argument against the policy of welfare, one that fails because taxing the wealthy to give to the poor only encourages wastefulness and indolence at the expense of industriousness and frugality; in similar fashion, he also decries the valuing of personal integrity to the detriment of social good, scholastic erudition at the cost of agricultural production, and private vengeance at the expense of military valor.

At the heart of Han Fei’s own program for wealth, strength, and social order lay a clear set of laws and an invari-

able system of rewards and punishments—the “two handles” of the state—strictly applied to all members of society. If people inherently tended to act out of their own self-interest, then surely it was only the enticement of rewards or abhorrence for punishments that would encourage them to take appropriate action or deter them from committing misdeeds. Equally crucial, according to Han Fei, was that these “two handles” lie firmly within the grasp of the ruler himself, and that none of his real power ever be relegated to his ministers. The method by which the ruler could thus take full advantage of his might and position involved the practice of matching “names” with “realities” (*xingming*), of letting the ministers do all the work within their specifically delimited jurisdictions—each appropriate to his individual talents—and judging their performances solely on how well their actual accomplishments lived up to their proposals or allotted tasks. And to ensure the efficacy of this method and thus avoid the possibility that ministers would act out of interests other than those of the ruler, an impartial and invariable system of promotion and censure based wholly on this method was required.

Thus the key to successful rulership for Han Fei lay in the ruler acting at all times in accordance with inviolable standards and never involving himself in hands-on administration or making political decisions on a personal basis. The legal methods at the ruler’s disposal are the precision tools of governance that even the wisest of rulers may not forsake, lest he risk the loss of his power and stability. In this regard, Han Fei (following Shen Buhai) took the Dao and nonaction of the Laozi and made them even more explicitly stand for the principles of wise governance, in which he poetically described the ideal ruler as a purposefully mysterious and unknowable entity who simply waited in quiescent tranquility for affairs to take care of themselves: “Empty, he knows the true nature of realities; still, he is the source of rectitude for those in motion” (*Zhu dao*). For Han Fei, such terms by no means symbolized a state of lofty nebulousness—something he expressly opposed—but always translated into a concrete and effective means of political orchestration.

Although Han Fei himself would meet with an unfortunate end in Qin, many of the ideas espoused in his writings would later be adopted into the “legalist” policies of the short-lived Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE). After undergoing a certain amount of modification, they would soon come to be reconciled and blended with Confucian thought to form a core component of the orthodox “Confucianism” of the Western Han (206 BCE–9 CE) and subsequent dynasties, thereby living on, in a somewhat different form, to carry their influence throughout imperial China, and even, in yet other forms, on into the present day.

**SEE ALSO** Legalism.

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SCOTT COOK (2005)

**HANUKKAH** ("dedication") is the Jewish winter festival that falls on the twenty-fifth of the month of Kislev and lasts for eight days. It celebrates the victory of the Maccabees over the forces of Antiochus after a three-year battle in the second century BCE. The major sources on the festival's origin are two apocryphal books, *1 Maccabees* and *2 Maccabees*. It is stated there (*2 Mc.* 10:6–8) that the altar was rededicated and the festival of eight days introduced because during the war the Jews were unable to celebrate the eight-day festival of Sukkot. Thus in the earliest period there is no reference to Hanukkah as a feast of lights. That it became such is due to the Talmudic legend (B.T., *Shab.* 21b) that the Maccabees found only one small jar of oil for the kindling of the menorah ("candelabrum") in the Temple. This was sealed with the seal of the high priest but contained only sufficient oil to burn for a single night. By a miracle the oil lasted for eight nights. It was consequently ordained that lights be kindled on the eight nights of Hanukkah. However, it is stated in the Talmud (B.T., *Shab.* 21b) that the Shammites and Hillelites, at the beginning of the present era, debated whether the lights were to be kindled in descending order (eight the first night, seven the second, etc.) or in ascending order (one the first night, two the second, etc.). If this statement is historically correct, it demonstrates either that the legend of the oil was already known at that time or that, at least, there was an association of Hanukkah and light even at this early period. According to some historians, the origin of the festival

is to be found in pagan festivals of light in midwinter. The prayers for Hanukkah refer only to the victory, but in practice the kindling of the lights is the main feature of the festival.

It has long been the custom for each member of the household to kindle the Hanukkah lights in an eight-branched candelabrum frequently called a menorah (though the menorah in the Temple had only seven branches) but nowadays also known as a *hanukkiyyah*. The lights are kindled in the synagogue as well as in the home. The older practice was to use only olive oil, and this is still customary among the more pious, but the majority of Jews use candles for the Hanukkah lights. Rabbinical authorities have discussed whether electric lights may be used for this purpose, the consensus being to permit them. One light is kindled on the first night, two on the second night, three on the third night, and so on until all eight are lit. In order to avoid lighting the candles one from the other, an additional candle known as the *shammash* ("retainer") is used to light the others. A declaration is recited:

We kindle these lights on account of the miracles, the deliverances, and the wonders which thou didst work for our ancestors, by means of thy holy priests. During all the eight days of Hanukkah these lights are sacred, neither is it permitted to make any profane use of them; but we are only to look at them, in order that we may give thanks unto thy name for thy miracles, deliverances, and wonders.

A popular Hanukkah hymn is *Ma'oz tsur* (O fortress rock), sung to a familiar melody said to have been originally that of a German drinking song.

Medieval Jewish thinkers understood the Hanukkah lights as representing spiritual illumination. The festival is a time for intensive study of the Torah as well as for almsgiving. Hanukkah is consequently treated as a more "spiritual" festival than the boisterous Purim, so that although fasting is forbidden on Hanukkah, there is no special festive meal. The Torah is read on each day of the festival; the passages chosen are from the account of the gifts brought by the princes at the dedication of the Tabernacle (*Nm.* 7) and the command to kindle the light of the menorah (*Nm.* 8:1–7). The Prophetic reading on the Sabbath of Hanukkah is from the vision of the menorah seen by Zechariah (*Zec.* 2). An addition to each of the daily prayers thanks God for delivering the strong into the hands of the weak, the many into the hands of the few, the impure into the hands of the pure, and the wicked into the hands of the righteous.

It is nowadays customary for Hanukkah presents to be given to children. This practice is found in none of the early sources and seems certain to have been introduced to offset the giving of Christmas presents at this season of the year.

Children and some adults play a game with a spinning top (dreidel) on each side of which is a different letter representing a move in the game. These letters are the initial letters of the Hebrew words making up the sentence "A great



miracle happened there.” To the consternation of the more conventional rabbis, cardplaying is often indulged in on Hanukkah.

The Talmudic rabbis stress the need for proclaiming the miracle by kindling the Hanukkah lights outside the door of the home, but eventually this practice was discouraged because it could be misinterpreted by non-Jews as a desire to demonstrate Jewish reluctance to live among their gentile neighbors. The less obtrusive practice of kindling the lights near the door but inside the home became the norm. In modern Israel it is far from unusual to see huge Hanukkah candelabra on top of public buildings and synagogues.

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LOUIS JACOBS (1987)

**HANUMĀN** is the name of a Hindu monkey god widely venerated throughout India. One of the principal characters of the Hindu epic *Rāmāyaṇa*, Hanumān is also called Sundara (“beautiful”), and the fifth book of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, in which Hanumān plays a central role, is called *Sundara Kāṇḍa* (Book of the Beautiful One). Here Hanumān, a minister for the monkey king Sugrīva, first comes to know of Rāma, who is searching for his wife, Sītā, who has been kidnapped. Hanumān negotiates friendship between Rāma and Sugrīva and later flies across the ocean to Lanka in order to locate Sītā. Finding her under an *asoka* tree, he presents Rāma’s signet ring as a token of recognition, conveys Rāma’s message of consolation, and assures her that Rāma will come to rescue her. He then destroys a large part of Lanka, but is captured and brought before the demon king Rāvaṇa. When Hanumān coils his long tail and sits on it at a level higher than that of Rāvaṇa, the king orders that an oil-soaked cloth be wrapped around Hanumān’s tail and then ignited. Hanumān flies about with his fiery tail and burns large parts of the city. He returns to Rāma to bring the message from Sītā. During the ensuing battle, Hanumān is sent to the mountains to bring *sanjīvini* (“reviving”) herbs for Rāma’s brother Lakṣmaṇa, who is wounded. Unable to identify the herbs, Hanumān brings the entire mountain.

There are several stories of Hanumān’s miraculous and divine birth. His mother was the *apsaras* Anjanā, who was married to Kesari, but who conceived Hanumān when Vāyu, the wind god, overcome by her beauty, made love to her. Another story tells of Vāyu entering into Anjanā’s body through her ear, thus causing Hanumān’s conception.

When Hanumān was born he was so hungry that his mother’s milk could not satisfy him. He therefore flew into the sky to eat the sun, which he thought was a fruit. The god

Indra threw his thunderbolt to stop him, injuring the boy’s chin. Angered by this act, the wind god took Hanumān into a cave to shelter him. But when Vāyu disappeared the people in the world were no longer able to breathe. At the request of the gods, Brahmā entered the cave and healed Hanumān’s wounds. The other gods also blessed Hanumān and conferred on him various boons, including eloquence of expression. Because of his injury, which left his jaw swollen, the child was known as Hanumān, “having a large jaw.”

In folk traditions Hanumān is worshiped as a deity with magical powers and the ability to conquer evil spirits. As an unmarried god who never spilled his seed he is especially popular with body builders, because it is believed that one must be celibate in order to have a strong body. In the Jain *Rāmāyaṇas*, Hanumān is not a bachelor, but is married to the daughters of Khara and Sugrīva. Whereas in the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki Hanumān plays the role of the minister, the messenger, and the trusted servant of Rāma, in the later *bhakti* *Rāmāyaṇas* Hanumān is described as the supreme devotee of Rāma, and is therefore considered the model of devotion. It is believed that Hanumān first wrote the story of Rāma, but that he threw it into the ocean to give an opportunity for Vālmīki’s *Rāmāyaṇa* to gain prominence.

SEE ALSO *Rāmāyaṇa*.

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VELCHERU NARAYANA RAO (1987)  
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**HAOMA.** Both a “being worthy of worship” (*yazata*), or deified personification, and a substance ingested during Zoroastrian ritual sacrifices, *haoma* has an exact parallel in the *soma* of ancient India: *\*sauma*, from the verb *sav* (“to press, to crush”), is the reconstructed Indo-Iranian form. What the substance was originally—a plant or its sap, or a hallucinogenic mushroom such as *Amanita muscaria* (Wasson, 1968)—is not certain. What is certain, however, is that the Indo-Iranian form serves as evidence of a common ritual background in Iran and India. We also know that in both countries the original substance has been substituted with another; for centuries Zoroastrians have continued to use a species of *Ephedra* in their ritual sacrifices. This plant grows in many regions of Central Asia and Iran and yields a juice with hallucinogenic properties. *Haoma* must have been both a hallucinogen and a stimulant: it was reported in the ancient texts to give strength, victory, health, and wisdom and to induce an ecstatic state.

The cult of *haoma*, later to become an essential part of Zoroastrian rites, was originally denounced by Zarathushtra, who refers to it in the *Gāthās* in negative terms: *Haoma* is the “urine” of an intoxicating drug (*Yasna* 48.10). Several scholars have opposed such an interpretation, maintaining that neither animal sacrifice nor *haoma* was ever denounced by the prophet (R. C. Zaehner, Marijan Molé, and Mary Boyce), but their arguments are not convincing. The complex of rites, myths, and legends connected with *haoma* belongs to the pre-Zoroastrian Indo-Iranian tradition and is at the center of a scenario dominated by the warlike god Indra, who, in Zoroastrianism, was relegated to the rank of demon. It is most likely, then, that the acceptance and use of the drug was a reintegration that occurred in the religion after the time of the prophet. In the later texts of the Avesta, *Haoma*, like other beings readmitted to the cult, is a *yazata* to whom a hymn, the *Hōm Yasht* (*Yasna* 9–11), is dedicated. The hymn is recited during one of the most important parts of the complex ceremony of the *Yasna*. At the end of the recitation, the officiating priest drinks *haoma* that has already been prepared and consecrated ritually according to meticulous rules of purification, presumably in order to induce an ecstatic state.

SEE ALSO Soma.

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Translated from Italian by Roger DeGaris

HAQĪQAḤ MUḤAMMADĪYAH SEE NŪR  
MUḤAMMAD

**HARAM AND HAWṬAH.** Arabian society may be described as a conglomeration of individual tribal units normally in a state of war, truce, or alliance with other tribal units, whether these tribes are settled in villages and towns or are migratory herders. Unarmed traders, artisans, and peasants are subject to the noble (*sharīf*) tribes, who consider them weak (*daʿīf*) and ignoble. Occasions inevitably arise when tribes, even if at war, must meet on neutral ground in physical security: to attend markets, to make political arrangements such as a truce, and for purposes of religion. Since tribal lords find it hard to accept the authority of their peers, when it becomes necessary for someone to preside over tribal arbitrations, to provide a secure forum for their meetings and even to impose certain sanctions upon them, they require an authority with supernatural backing to preside in territory not subject to tribal law. Consequently, they turn to a family regarded as having holy attributes, deriving supreme authority from a divine source, and so exercising the functions committed to it through a prophet or saint.

The institution known in ancient Arabia as *ḥaram* (and probably also *maḥram*), and in parts of contemporary south Arabia as *ḥawṭah*, is closely associated with such holy houses. It is a sacred enclave containing a shrine, administered in Shāfiʿī territory by a lord called a *manṣab* (or sometimes *manṣūb*), subject to divine law and independent of the surrounding tribal territory (*aḥ-bāʿ*). The inviolability of the sacred enclave is guaranteed by its tribal supporters (*anṣār*) as in the case of Medina and, for example, Anṣār Mawlā al-Dawīlah in Wādī Ḥaḍramawt. *Ḥaram* and *ḥawṭah*, the terms for the inviolable sacred enclave, appear to be related semantically to *maḥjar* and *ḥimā*, terms for interdicted pastures: the root of each of these commences with the root letter *ḥāʾ*. In addition, the *ḥimā* of al-Ṭāʿif appears to have had religious associations.

The *ḥijrah* of northern Zaydi Yemen, while distinct from *ḥaram* and *ḥawṭah*, is an institution of related pattern. Although it is not attested in the first Islamic centuries, it seems to be foreshadowed in certain pre-Islamic inscriptions. For example, in the expression “wbʾshʾb dhhmdn whgrhmw wʾrbhmw” (“the tribes of Hamdan and their protected persons [*ḥijrah*] and their tribal [bedouin] Arabs”), the term *ḥijrah* (sg., *ḥijrah*) means both the protected persons and the place where they reside.

The sacred enclave in its most primitive form is probably exemplified by the *ḥawṭah* of Mughshin (northeast of Ṣafār, on the edge of the Arabian sands), where to cut bush or to kill hares brings misfortune. As in the simple desert *ḥawṭah*, bush may not be cut nor may birds or animals be slain in the Meccan *ḥaram*, a highly developed institution.

*Ḥrm* and *mḥrm*, translated as “sanctuary,” are attested in the *Sabaic Dictionary* (Louvain, 1982). Maḥram Bilqīs, the name the Arabs give to the ruins of the pre-Islamic temple of Ilumquh at Mārib, is well known. The sanctuary of the god Dhū Samāwī at al-Ḥazm of the Yemenite Jawf was set in a sacred enclave: the inscription identifying it refers to

a *maḥram* and *mnṣbt*. *Mnṣbt* means a place of *anṣāb* or boundary stones which, as is known, marked the Meccan *ḥaram*, and when Muḥammad founded the *ḥaram* at Yathrib (the pre-Islamic name of Medina) he had its bounds marked out in the same way. Oaths were taken by the Anṣāb al-Ka'bah and sacrifices made to them. The *ḥawṭah* is also marked out with boundary cairns, and on entering it one dismounts out of respect for it.

**INVIOLABILITY OF THE ENCLAVES.** The tribes recognized the inviolability of the *ḥaram* or *ḥawṭah* to such an extent that in ancient times the Quraysh would raid outside Mecca but find safety by returning to its *ḥaram*, a pattern also followed by the tribes of Musaylimah's *ḥaram*. It cannot, however, be assumed that they thereby escaped scot-free, for, to judge from procedure at the *ḥawṭah* in our times, a case would still be brought by the injured party against those tribes; this may indeed almost be deduced from episodes connected with Musaylimah's *ḥaram*.

The deed of Muḥammad's foundation of the Yathrib *ḥaram*, which subsequently became Madīnat al-Nabī, "the prophet's town," is conveyed in documents F and H of the "Eight Documents" (the so-called Constitution of Medina). The regulations they contain, along with those quoted by the historian Wāqidi and the geographer Yāqūt, can also reasonably be considered to represent the law of the pre-Islamic era. Document F states that "this writing does not intervene between a wrongdoer and one committing a criminal act." In his geographical dictionary the Mu'jam, Yāqūt says, "Who-soever enters it [the Meccan *ḥaram*] is secure, and he who commits an aggression in any other territory, and then takes refuge in it, is safe when he enters it and when he leaves it the punishments are applied to him." Similarly, the *manṣab* will take a murderer who has sought refuge in the *ḥawṭah* under his protection and conduct the man back to his tribe; the two tribes affected will then have the case brought to the *manṣab* for arbitration.

Murder in the *ḥaram* or *ḥawṭah* is a heinous crime: the murder of the caliph 'Uthmān in the Medinese *ḥaram* was pointed to as a major offense by his relative Mu'āwiyah. In such a case the *manṣab* of the *ḥawṭah* writes to the chief of the offending clan and the chiefs of all of the other tribes, making them responsible for dealing with the crime. The guilty clan hastily sends the *manṣab* a propitiatory gift, *suqtān* (corresponding to *sarf wa-'adl* in the "Eight Documents"). All the *ḥawṭah* tribes then assemble at the *manṣab*'s house, and the headman of the guilty clan, or even the *manṣab* himself, will take the murderer's dagger and slash his brow with it until it bleeds, to demonstrate that the man's honor (*wijh*) has been besmirched. This symbolic action is referred to in a Minean inscription and also in the biography (*sīrah*) of the prophet Muḥammad, where it is called *tajbīh* and is accompanied by blackening the face. To expiate the offense the guilty tribe must execute one of its own members, not necessarily the murderer, or else all of the other tribes will unite to attack it until atonement is exacted by slayings adequate to the seriousness of the crime of violation.

As any offense against the *manṣab* or persons under his protection is regarded as infringing on respect to him, an astute *manṣab* can attain great power by playing off one tribe against another. He may even succeed in forming a small theocratic state. Given the tribes' need for a supreme authority deriving power from a divine source, the theocratic state seems a natural development in Arabia, and it is thought that the pre-Islamic *mukarribs* ruled over theocracies. Leaving aside questions of revelation, there are obvious political parallels between this pattern and the process whereby Muḥammad established himself in Yathrib.

**HIJRAH.** At this point the *hijrah* must be reconsidered in terms of its Yemeni usage and as Muḥammad's Hijrah, nowadays usually translated as his "migration" from Mecca to Medina. "Muḥammad's *hijrah* chiefly involves the concept of seeking protection with powerful armed tribes, even if *hijrah* does [also] mean one's physical transference from one place to another" (Serjeant and Lewcock, 1983, p. 40b). He left the protection of his own tribe, Quraysh, for that of the arms-bearing tribes of Yathrib. In the Yemen sayyids or others (e.g. the Mashāyikh Bayt al-Aḥmar, who are the *hijrah* of the Ḥāshid confederation) may seek tribal protection. The tribes assemble and decide to grant *hijrah* on the basis of the applicant's sanctity, learning, and other qualities. A person thus protected does not fight or contribute to blood-wit or any levy (*ghurm*) the tribe imposes on itself for war, blood-wit, or entertainment. The *hijrah*, if a man of religion, is considered an ultimate arbiter (*marja'*) and an example to be imitated (*qudwah*), judging in quarrels, marriage, and divorce, and writing amulets for people and cattle. So *hijrabs* often become centers of religious learning. Sanaa city is *muhajjar*, that is, protected by seven large tribal groups in its vicinity. A tribesman slaying there must restore the city's respect (*tahjīr*) by paying a fine and slaughtering an *'aqirah* ("sacrificial animal") at the gate of the city. The prophet Muḥammad became the ultimate arbiter (*marja'*) at Yathrib, exercising functions not dissimilar to those of the *hijrah* sayyids and *manṣabs* of *ḥawṭahs*, although he did not write amulets.

The pre-Islamic *ḥaram* would be protected by the god whose shrine it contained. In Mecca this was the Ka'bah, which the *ḥadīth* suggests was a tent, probably a symbolic form of the square black tent known in the south as *karbah*. It was the sanctuary of Allāh of Quraysh, known as Quraysh Allāh. With the growth of Quraysh power in Arabia a pantheon seems to have accrued to the original cult. Infringement of the *ḥaram* laws brought divine punishment because the *ḥaram* was regarded as able to defend itself by supernatural means, as Yathrib did at the Battle of the Trench, following which the Prophet established his *ḥaram* there.

The annual pilgrimage to the Meccan *ḥaram* was the major event of the year; entertainment was provided through a tax levied for the purpose and through private contributions. The pilgrims came in chanting the *talbiyah*, verses addressing the god, as today they would call out "Ya Hūd!" and



chant the *tabwīd* to the prophet Hūd at his annual pilgrimage. The Meccan pilgrimage was of a pattern common to the Arabian Peninsula to judge by an inscription which details regulations for the pilgrimage to Almaḡah at Mārib. There the god Ta'lab is to receive tithes from which he will provide a banquet. Animals under Ta'lab's protection are not to be hunted.

Islam abolished the gods of paganism and left no partner to Allāh, but the sacred enclaves have remained, the *ḥawṭabs* with their pilgrimages. Those pilgrimages are either annual events or are made out of season for special private requests of the saints whose tombs are usually found in the *ḥawṭabs*: the pilgrims circumambulate the tombs, grasping the four corner-posts as they pass. To this day also the *manṣab* must provide from his revenues for a feast at pilgrimage time and entertain visitors throughout the year.

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R. B. SERJEANT (1987)

#### HARAPPA SEE INDUS VALLEY RELIGION

**HARNACK, ADOLF VON** (1851–1930), was a German Protestant church historian and theologian. Carl Gustav Adolf von Harnack was born in Dorpat (now Tartu), in the Russian province of Livonia, where his father, Theodosius Harnack (1817–1889), was a professor of theology at the German-dominated university. He was educated at the universities of Dorpat and Leipzig, received the Ph.D. in 1873, and began lecturing on church history at Leipzig in 1874. In 1879 he went, as full professor, to Giessen, in 1886 to Marburg, and in 1888 to the University of Berlin, where he taught until his retirement in 1921, thereafter lecturing as emeritus professor until the spring of 1929.

Harnack was the premier historian in modern times of early Christianity and, with Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923), the foremost spokesman of a liberal Protestantism that sought to "overcome dogma by history." He insisted that the rise and development of Christianity could be understood

solely by the use of the historical-critical method, that is, by impartial study of the extant Christian literature, to the exclusion of all metahistorical sources and standards of judgment such as authoritative church dogma or belief in an infallible teaching office or an inerrant Bible.

History, for Harnack, meant above all documentary history. Building on the seminal studies of early Christianity by F. C. Baur (1792–1860) and Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889), he established early church history on secure textual foundations. Many of his more than sixteen hundred publications were critical editions of patristic texts, and he supervised the publication of hundreds of others, chiefly in the series "Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur" (1882–), of which he was a founder. He summarized the results of this textual scholarship in his *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius* (1893–1904).

Harnack wrote penetrating studies of monasticism and of church polity in Christianity's first two centuries. He also wrote what is still the foundational history of the early Christian missionary enterprise, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (1902; translated as *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*, 1908). His true métier, however, was not institutional history but the history of doctrine—research that culminated in his monumental *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (1885–1890; translated as *History of Dogma*, 1894–1899). Dogma, in Harnack's narrow definition, referred exclusively to the trinitarian and christological dogmas formulated by general church councils in the fourth and fifth centuries. Whereas Ritschl had stressed the gradual de-judaization of Christianity as the central factor in the development of early Christian doctrine, Harnack emphasized the progressive hellenization of Christianity, holding that Christian dogma was "a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the gospel." This did not mean that the gospel (the original teaching of Jesus) had entirely disappeared into dogma, or that the dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation were sheer speculation, but that Greek philosophy of religion and its attendant intellectualism had shaped Christian dogmatic thought from its inception. Thus Christian faith came to be dependent on metaphysics and, most shocking of all to Harnack, a "fancied Christ" had been put in the place of the real, historical one.

In Harnack's judgment, moreover, the mainline Protestant reformers had failed to break decisively with "dogmatic Christianity," though their root religious principles actually undermined the authority of all dogma. Martin Luther, for example, had delivered the Christian faith from moralism, ritualism, hierarchicalism, and philosophical speculation, yet he continued to adhere to the old dogmas, even grounding his piety on them, and thus gave them a new vitality and authority within the Evangelical church. The result of this "unfinished Reformation" was a Protestantism beset by ordinance, doctrine, and ceremony. What was urgently required, therefore, was a "critical reduction of dogma," to be carried

out in fidelity to the animating concerns of Reformation religion and to be achieved by a rigorous historical criticism that would distinguish between the timeless “kernel” of Christianity and its timebound “husks.” Harnack took up this task in his most popular book, *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1900; translated as *What Is Christianity?*, 1903), based on lectures to students of all faculties at Berlin in 1899–1900.

The “essence of Christianity”—its element of permanent validity as distinguished from its transient historical forms—is the gospel, above all as Jesus proclaimed it but also as it has repeatedly found expression in the course of Christian history. Appropriating the leading theological themes of his mentor, Ritschl, Harnack contended that the gospel is a simple and self-authenticating phenomenon, centering on the rule of the holy God in the trusting heart, on the experience of God as loving father and thus the assurance of the infinite value of the human soul, and on an ethical life marked by an abiding disposition to the good, under God’s grace, and by neighborly love and mercy. Hence the gospel is essentially timeless, and it addresses a human nature that, religiously viewed, is also unchanging—ever yearning for “the presence of the Eternal in time” and so for a vindication of the ultimate worth of the human spirit over against an indifferent natural order. This gospel, accordingly, requires no metaphysical foundations, no articulation in binding dogmas, no elaborate ritual, and no institutional guarantees. The religion of the Christian gospel, Harnack concluded, is not only “undogmatic” and “perennial,” but also shows itself to be a “cultural” religion in the proper sense, namely, one uniquely responsive to modern humanity’s insistent quest for the meaning of life.

Controversy surrounded Harnack throughout his career. The most bitter conflict broke out in 1892, when he proposed that the Apostles’ Creed be replaced in liturgical worship by a shorter confession of faith based on Reformation principles and on the results of modern historical scholarship. Though denied all official recognition by the Evangelical church, he was the most widely honored theologian of his time. In 1890 he was elected to the Prussian Academy of Sciences and in 1900, on the occasion of its two-hundredth anniversary, he wrote the academy’s official history. He was a founder and the first president (1903–1911) of the Evangelical-Social Congress. From 1905 to 1921 he was director general of the Royal Library in Berlin. He served as the first president (1911–1930) of the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft for the Advancement of the Sciences (now called the Max Planck Gesellschaft). In 1914 he was raised to the dignity of hereditary nobility by Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Harnack’s theology went into eclipse soon after his death, largely owing to its repudiation by Karl Barth (1886–1968) and other leaders of the regnant Protestant neoorthodoxy. Church historians and theologians otherwise sympathetic to Harnack’s program have criticized his narrow definition of dogma, his thesis of hellenization, and his cardinal notion of a “timeless gospel” for a “timeless humanity.” Nev-

ertheless, his reputation as the greatest modern student of the ancient church is secure, and his insistence that Christianity must be interpreted by the historical method has been upheld.

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DAVID W. LOTZ (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**HARRIS, WILLIAM WADE** (c. 1865–1928), was the leader of a mass movement to Christianity in Africa that



inspired creation of an African Christian church. The prophet Harris created the largest mass movement to Christianity in the history of the African continent and revolutionized the religious life of the southern Ivory Coast. He paved the way for the growth of the Catholic church and the establishment of the Protestant church and for the creation of several indigenous religious institutions. Most significant among these is the Harrist Church of the Ivory Coast, which institutionalized his teachings. His impact was unique among the movements to Christianity led by African prophets in that it reflected totally indigenous initiative in a population not previously Christianized by missionaries.

A Grebo from southeastern Liberia, Harris was familiar with Western customs and literate in both English and Grebo as a result of mission schooling. He became an Episcopalian lay preacher, taught in a mission school, directed a boarding school, and worked as a government interpreter.

When antagonism between the Grebo and the Liberian government broke out, Harris led several acts of rebellion against the government. In 1909 he was imprisoned for treason for leading an alleged coup d'état attempt. During his imprisonment he had a vision of the angel Gabriel that convinced him he was God's last prophet, charged with the divine mission of bringing Christianity to all those people not yet converted. In 1913, after his release from prison, Harris went to the Ivory Coast, where his message was well received. The Ivoirians, who found their traditional spiritual guardians ineffective in warding off the colonial onslaught, welcomed Harris's message of a stronger spiritual force.

Harris told them to destroy the altars, masks, and other material representations associated with their indigenous religion and to worship the Christian god as he taught them. In little more than one year, he had baptized what colonial officials estimated at from 100,000 to 120,000 people; Catholic missionaries, who had been summoned by the colonial government to inculcate loyalty to France among its new subjects, had succeeded in baptizing only four hundred people in the previous two decades.

To complete the Christianization of those he baptized, Harris sent them to the Catholic missions and to his Protestant disciples from Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast (now Ghana) who were working in the Ivory Coast. In areas where there were neither missions nor disciples, Harris delegated village leaders to teach their fellow villagers what they had learned from him.

The Catholic missions were inundated with Harris's converts, and his African Protestant disciples continued to convert and teach multitudes in the prophet's name. When a Protestant missionary from Europe arrived in the Ivory Coast in 1924, expecting to find no Ivoirian Protestants because there had been no European Protestant missionaries there, he encountered tens of thousands of Ivoirians worshipping autonomously, calling themselves Harrist Protestants and exhorting him to send the "teachers with Bibles" Harris had said would come to teach them the word of God.

Although some of the Ivoirians who had been worshipping autonomously were initially drawn to the Protestant missionaries, they became disaffected when the Protestants attacked fundamental social institutions such as polygamy and sought to undermine the power of Harris's disciples. In 1926 a Protestant delegation returned from a visit to Harris in Liberia with a message telling his converts to join the Protestant church, but in 1928 an Ivoirian delegation went to tell the prophet of their grievances against the missionaries. This group returned from Liberia with a "last will and testament" from Harris that supported their desire to worship independently. John Ahui, the young member of the delegation whom Harris chose to continue his mission, perpetuated the prophet's teachings and founded the Harrist Church of the Ivory Coast, of which he remains the patriarch.

Harris's message to the Ivoirians was both spiritual and secular. He urged them to stop worshipping the nature spirits that had failed to protect them from conquest by the French and instead to worship the omnipotent creator god who would bring them prosperity, a return to their state of sovereignty, and access to the knowledge and technology of their conquerors. He offered them his own example as an African who, as a result of his schooling and resultant professional positions, could function in the world of the Europeans and Americans as well as in an African milieu. Thus the unprecedented movement of religious conversion that missionaries characterized as a "tidal wave" or "avalanche" to Christianity also had a secular influence; Harris's movement inspired Ivoirians to learn the pragmatic tactics necessary to regain their sovereignty and to create new institutions within which to do so.

Because he inspired Ivoirians to such manifestations of collective indigenous initiative, which the colonial administration perceived as a direct threat to its control over its subjects, Harris was expelled from the Ivory Coast in 1914. Those who persevered in worshipping as Harris had taught them were persecuted by the colonial officials, often with the assistance of the Catholic missionaries.

The Harrist church appealed to Ivoirians because it represented a form of Christianity based on indigenous organizational, conceptual, and ritual structures. Harris had such appeal to the Ivoirians not only because he considered the conceptual structures and preoccupations of the traditional religion but also because he offered desirable solutions to the immediate problems engendered by the colonial situation. Additionally, Harris's style of presentation corresponded to the indigenous mold pioneered by priests of the traditional nature spirits.

That the prophet Harris was a native Liberian is significant because of Liberia's special meaning in Africa. Created by African Americans seeking freedom from the oppression of American racism, Liberia was a symbol of the possibility of the redemption of Africa from European exploitation by and for Africans and their descendants abroad.

Influential African American leaders in Liberia, such as Edward Wilmot Blyden, believed that African Americans could share with the Africans the benefits of Western knowledge and experience, to be synthesized with the Africans' own wisdom and techniques for the creation of a new sovereignty. It is therefore particularly appropriate that William Wade Harris, a symbol of African potential for the Ivoirians, should have brought his message from Liberia, a symbol of African potential and freedom from oppression.

SEE ALSO African Religions, article on New Religious Movements.

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SHEILA S. WALKER (1987)

**HARRISON, JANE E.** (1850–1928), English authority on ancient Greek religion. Harrison, one of the first female students of the University of Cambridge, taught classics throughout her career at Newnham College, Cambridge. Her reputation rests primarily on three works: *Prolegomena to the History of Greek Religion* (1903), *Themis* (1912), and *Epilegomena* (1921).

*Prolegomena*, published when its author was fifty-three years old, testifies to her recognition of the importance of the still comparatively new disciplines of archaeology and anthropology at a time when most teachers of the Greek and Latin classics were convinced not only that the objects of their study contained nothing of the "primitive" but also that the behavior of "primitive" societies could teach them nothing relevant to their studies. For Harrison, the living essence of Greek religion was not the Olympians, so prominent in the literature and in the major temples of Greece, but the ancient rituals, performed long after their original significance was forgotten. In the spirit of the anthropology of her day, she was both evolutionist and comparatist, but for her, evo-

lution did not necessarily result in progress. In the introduction to *Themis* she characterized the gods of Homer, the sculptors, and the mythographers as "like a bouquet of cut flowers, whose bloom is brief, because they have been severed from their roots." The goal of *Prolegomena* was to discover those roots.

Harrison was always open to new influences: in the introduction to *Themis* Bergson and Durkheim appear, joined in the preface to the second edition (1927) by Freud, who, together with Gilbert Murray, had convinced her that "the full-blown god, the Olympian, has a biological function which could never be adequately filled by the [eniautos-] daimon [that is, the 'year-spirit'] who lies behind each and every primitive god." The analysis of the year-spirit, together with his ritual, is the goal of *Themis*. Harrison did not abandon belief in the *eniautos-daimon*, of whose importance field anthropologists were by this time supplying evidence, but she now acknowledged that the Olympians were not merely the products of art and literature and that they served a religious function. The balance had already been corrected in *Epilegomena*, whose publication preceded the second edition of *Themis*. In *Epilegomena* the influence of Freud and Jung is everywhere apparent, together with that of "the greatest of Russian philosophers," Vladimir Solov'ev.

For a variety of reasons *Themis* was not well received. It presented so many new ideas, and drew on so many disciplines, that even workers in the field who sympathized with Harrison's approach to her subject confessed themselves puzzled by some of the work. The introduction to *Themis* claims to give a simple account of the book's contents, but the account merely highlights the complexity. Harrison had an insatiable appetite for new material, for fresh light on the world and its ways. When she wrote *Themis* her ideas, stimulated by the new material, were still in ferment. The book's plan and argument are less clear than its author supposed at the time of publication. In addition, some readers found the book threatening. *Prolegomena* concerns ancient Greece, and indeed a period long antedating the Greek classics. *Themis* may be concerned with explaining certain Greek cults and rituals, but its thesis of the development of deities from the collective representations of group rituals evidently had a wider relevance. Harrison, an agnostic and a lifelong member of the Rationalist Association, had come to value the religious impulse as an attempt to "apprehend life as one, as indivisible, yet as perennial movement and change." But all dogmas and creeds and the gods associated with them were in her eyes "the *eidola* of man's marketplace . . . dead men, hollow ghosts."

*Epilegomena* exhibits a change. Its preface states the book's goal as not merely to summarize the results of many years' work on the origins of Greek religion but to indicate the bearing of these results on religious questions of today. Its third chapter, "The Religion of Today," presents an ascetic view of life which commands her approval. *Epilegomena* most clearly charts Harrison's intellectual development; read

before *Prolegomena* and *Themis*, it clarifies the views expressed in her earlier books.

Breadth of vision, empathy, and enthusiasm characterize Harrison's work. Its fate is inevitably linked with that of the anthropologists, psychologists, and philosophers whose thought stimulated and molded her own. Some of her conclusions, inevitably, are now of merely historic interest, but the subsequent development of the study of Greek religion has been profoundly influenced by her work.

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A. W. H. ADKINS (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**HARTLAND, E. SIDNEY** (1848–1927), was an English folklorist and armchair anthropologist. Hartland is a good example of the polymaths produced by the Victorian era, contributing prolifically to a wide range of topics but practically forgotten today. Although he wrote books on primitive law, primitive society, and the priority of matrilineal kinship, Hartland's favorite subject was religion, and his opinions obtained attention not only in his native Britain but from such leading figures of the day as the French comparativist Marcel Mauss and the Austrian theorist and historian of religion Wilhelm Schmidt.

Among Hartland's contributions to the study of religion may be mentioned his theory of magic and religion. He considered that the early humans' awe and wonder were aroused by their sense of a power behind appearances. Through personification early humankind shaped gods or spirits with humanlike dispositions, making it natural to attempt to placate or control them ritually. Thus, although magic and religion can be distinguished—the one using coercive ritual procedures, the other propitiatory—they spring from the same psychological root and are interwoven in human practice.

A like reductionism appears in Hartland's study of Celtic and Teutonic fairy tales. Assuming the unity of the human imagination, he held that questions concerning the nature and distribution of these tales lead into the domain of psy-

chology. But it is a psychology that must be reconstructed from the simplest and most archaic phenomena that anthropological research can discover. The pursuit of this method led Hartland from Celts and Teutons to other European peoples and, beyond them, to Pacific islanders and American Indians, among others. The result was that stories familiar to some of Hartland's Western contemporaries were traced to a more primitive state of society and a more archaic plane of thought.

In criticizing such writers as Hartland, Mauss pointed out that they explained the form of religious institutions by appealing to individual mental processes to the neglect of social needs and interrelationships among institutions. This premise fell into disfavor late in Hartland's life with the rise of a socially and culturally oriented anthropology. Similarly the emphasis on intensive local fieldwork made the comparative method applied by Hartland seem antiquated.

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*The Science of Fairy Tales* (London, 1891) offers a most readable entry to Hartland's thinking about traditional oral literature and to his application of the comparative method, while the three volumes of *The Legend of Perseus* (London, 1894–1896) show his sustained and detailed attempt to trace the appearances of a single story and to relate them to "custom" and "superstition." Both these early works invite comparison with later ventures toward a science of mythology. Hartland's opinions on a range of religious topics are conveniently collected in *Ritual and Belief: Studies in the History of Religion* (London, 1914).

KENNETH MADDOCK (1987)

**HARVA, UNO** (1882–1949), was a Finnish scholar of religion and a specialist in the religious traditions of Finno-Ugric and Siberian peoples. Harva became one of the first advocates for comparative religion studies in Finland during the first decade of the twentieth century (Finland was a grand duchy of Russia until 1917). Harva dedicated his academic endeavors to advance pluralistic cultural values in the name of the Enlightenment and an awareness of the accomplishments of the Finns and other Finno-Ugric peoples as agents of history. Under the tutelage of Edward Westermarck, Harva was introduced to the theories of cultural evolution and the methods of ethnographic fieldwork prevalent in contemporary British social anthropology. Westermarck, who held positions at both the University of Helsinki and the London School of Economics, had carried out extensive fieldwork in Morocco, beginning in 1898. Westermarck had worked closely with such prominent figures in anthropology as Charles Seligman and Alfred Cort Haddon; he instructed his Finnish disciples to collect firsthand ethnographic data on which to base comparative analyses of ethnoreligious materials. Unlike his fellow Finnish Westermarckians who embarked on anthropological studies of non-European cultures, Harva chose to specialize in the oral traditions and ethnic re-

ligions of peoples belonging to the Uralic language family. In addition, the science of ethnography had become a standard approach in Finland in the 1830s, when Finnish linguists traveled in Russia and Siberia to collect linguistic data with which to substantiate the theory of M. A. Castrén of the Altaic origin of Finnish language.

Harva was initiated into Finno-Ugric studies by Kaarle Krohn, a professor of folklore at the University of Helsinki between 1898 and 1928. Krohn's paradigmatic Finnish, geographic-historical method had received worldwide attention among folklore scholars. Harva was an adherent of both the Krohnian geographic-historical paradigm and the Westermarckian empiricism and comparativism. His aim was to unravel the origins and development of early forms of religion among the peoples speaking Uralic languages. He adopted the theory that the kinship between different Finno-Ugric peoples was based not only on language but also on other cultural factors. The theory implied that the beliefs and practices that still prevailed among other technologically and socially "less developed" Finno-Ugric peoples living in Russia and in Siberia could shed light on religious evolution among the Finns and Hungarians. Harva created a comparative-typological method by which to explore the forms and structures of religious expression and the processes of transition from the cultural stage of hunting and fishing to the agricultural stage. The theory was concerned with indigenous religious elements; only marginal attention was given to the spread of organized world religions. Geographically, Harva's field of vision extended from the Finnic peoples in the cultural area of the Baltic Sea and the Saami living in the Lapland territory across northern Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia to the Permians (Udmurt and Komi), the Volga Finns (Meadow and Hill Mari), and Mordvinians (Ersä and Moksa) as well as the Ob-Ugrian ethnic groups (Khanty and Mansi) in Siberia. Harva conducted fieldwork among the Udmurt (previously Votyaks) and the Mari (Cheremiss) in 1911 and 1913 and among the Ket (Yenisei Ostiaks) and the Evenk (Tungus) in Siberia in 1917.

Born in 1882 in Ypäjä, in southwestern Finland, Harva first trained as a theologian and even served as a priest for one year in a small parish in central Finland. His father was a minister of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and an active member of the evangelical revivalist movement. Harva, however, experienced a spiritual crisis and resigned his position in 1907 to return to Helsinki to pursue further academic studies in comparative religion. In addition to participating in a seminar led by Westermarck, Harva was invited by Kaarle Krohn to contribute articles on Saami (Lapp) shamanism to the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (1928). The editor of the encyclopedia, James Hastings, had approached Kaarle Krohn in 1904 as "the highest authority on the ancient religions of the Finns" to contribute to the encyclopedia. (Letters of Kaarle Krohn, James Hastings to Kaarle Krohn, June 10, 1904).

Krohn organized opportunities for other scholars as well and signed a contract with one of the major publishing com-

panies in Helsinki to produce a series of monographs on the indigenous religions of the peoples related to the Finns (in Finnish, *Suomen suvun uskonnot*, 1918). Krohn asked Harva to write three volumes—on the religions of the Permians, the Mari (Cheremiss), and the Saami (Lapp) peoples. The first two monographs were published in Finnish in 1914 and the one on the Saami in 1915. In 1913 Harva defended his doctoral dissertation, a study of the water gods of the Finno-Ugric peoples (*Die Wassergöttheiten der finnisch-ugrischen Völker*; 1913). After the intense and extremely productive first years of his academic career, Harva was invited to contribute to the *Mythology of All Races* (1916). The volume on Finno-Ugric and Siberian mythology was written by the spring of 1916 but was not published until 1927.

Harva was a historian of religion, an ethnologist, and a folklorist. He explored mythic structures in the ancient cosmologies of peoples living in the vast geographical area extending from Scandinavia in the west to the Bering Straits in the east and to the old areas of Central Asia and Asia Minor in the south. He showed morphologically related themes in the mythic narratives of shamanic hunters, cattle-breeding agriculturalists, and nomadic pastoralists. These included center of the world (*axis mundi*) symbolism and analyses of motives in Mother Goddess (Magna Mater) traditions; they also dealt with themes and motives in shamanistic traditions, such as the significance of the shaman costume, the shaman's tree, and his ascent to the sky. Harva's achievements as a student of myth, cosmology, and ritual have been valued highly by Mircea Eliade, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Weston LaBarre among others.

In his works *Der Baum des Lebens* (1922); *Finno-Ugric, Siberian [Mythology]* (1927); and *Die religiösen Vorstellungen der altaischen Völker* (1938; translated into French in 1954 and 1959 and into Japanese in 1971 and 1981), Harva created a distinctive way of systematizing mythological and religious materials. He identified in the traditional religions of all peoples a fundamental body of structure beliefs that dominated premodern thought and behavior. Harva did not draw a sharp distinction between the notion of religion and that of tradition. According to him, any popular, or nontheological, religion is based on the oral transmission of local knowledge revolving around ritual interaction between people and invisible terrestrial and celestial forces. Such components as beliefs in gods and souls, veneration of the dead, hero cults, animated and anthropomorphized natural phenomena, genius loci of sacred places in inhabited and uninhabited areas, or the location of ritual behavior during the critical boundary points of the annual economic cycle are integral to any indigenous religious tradition.

Harva was a rationalist who looked for order and systematic structure in the empirical materials under scrutiny. In his mature years he felt a reluctance to engage in theoretical discussions of religion. However, he was not methodologically naive. His work reflected the anthropogeographic ideas put forward by the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel

(1844–1904), and he became an adherent of the culture-historical school in ethnology. He adopted the tenets of logical empiricism as his epistemological point of departure. He was fascinated by the idea of finding an explanation of folk-religious beliefs and practices in the work of biologists. On some occasions, however, this fascination led him astray. Drawing on association psychology, he believed he could uncover the working of the ordinary mind. In explaining, for instance, folk narratives about a mythical milk-stealing being in the Finnish and Scandinavian agrarian belief tradition, he reduced the belief to the perception of ball lightning. Similarly, beliefs in haunting by dead beings were generated by the sounds of specific birds. Harva considered that belief traditions are firmly founded on human auditions and visions; due to a lack of real (i.e., scientific) knowledge about phenomena in the biotic world, however, people tend to draw false conclusions about the origin of such phenomena.

Harva's remarkable contributions to comparative religion led to a discussion regarding the establishment of a university chair in the discipline in Finland. This did not happen, however, and the only permanent position Harva held during his academic career was a professorship in sociology at the University of Turku between 1926 and 1949. After being invited to the professorship in 1926, he abandoned his Swedish name, Holmberg, and changed it to Harva in 1927. As a sociologist he lectured and wrote on Finno-Ugric systems of relationship, on marriage customs (especially the relationship between the kin of the bride and the bridegroom), on gender distinctions and the position of women in the social structure of various Finno-Ugric societies, and most specifically on calendar systems and the popular reckoning of time. Harva's major theoretical concern was the relationship between the individual and the social collective in archaic societies. While he emphasized the collective nature of social life in archaic cultures in the manner of Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), he was nevertheless more influenced by the work of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939).

SEE ALSO Finno-Ugric Religions.

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VEIKKO ANTTONEN (2005)

#### ḤASAN AL-BAŞRĪ

(AH 21–110/642–728 CE) was a famous Muslim ascetic of the generation following the prophet Muḥammad. The son of a freed slave, he was born in Medina and brought up in nearby Wādī al-Qurā. During the First Civil War, which resulted in the rise of the Umayyad caliphate, Ḥasan moved to Basra, where he settled permanently after a brief career as holy warrior in what is now Afghanistan and as secretary to the governor of Khorasan.

To a simple religious spirit such as Ḥasan, the social and economic changes accompanying the schisms and *coups d'état* within Islam amounted to an excess of worldliness. Thus he reacted much more sharply to this disease in the hearts and behavior of the people than he did to the tyranny of the Umayyad government, then personified in al-Ḥajjāj, the governor of Iraq. Though openly critical of the Umayyads, Ḥasan refused to "bid them good and forbid them evil" (because, he said, their swords were faster than our tongues) or to participate in uprisings against them. Likewise, he advised others not to oppose by the sword a punishment or test from God, such as the tyrant al-Ḥajjāj, but to face it with patience and repentance: God, said Ḥasan, brings change and relief through these means rather than through hasty resort to violence. Thus, a Khārījī who tries to right a wrong (through violence) commits a greater wrong.



Although he was an acknowledged expert in the Islamic religious sciences of *tafsīr* (Qur'anic exegesis), *fiqh* (jurisprudence), and *ḥadīth* (traditions of the Prophet), and he was also said to have lectured and written books on these subjects, Ḥasan's fame rests on his pietistic and dogmatic concerns. Here his interest lay not in theological doctrine but in the quality of faith and action, in the inner, genuinely sincere, pious life of the heart translated into an outer, morally upright, ascetic mode of living. Equipped with extensive knowledge and a living memory of the practice of the Prophet's companions, an attractive personality, an eloquent tongue, and most of all, a fearful heart and an upright character, Ḥasan engaged in preaching against worldliness and its resulting hypocrisy. His sermons and letters are grim reminders of the transience of worldly life, the permanent value of the life in the hereafter, and the inevitability of death and divine retribution, as well as moving exhortations to fear God and foster sincere faith and upright conduct. The *munāfiqūn*, those worldlings with skin-deep faith and readiness to sin, were morally aberrant believers in acute danger of hellfire and hence urgently in need of help.

Ḥasan's doctrine of *qadar* (free will) was also morally inspired, directed as it was against the sinners' deterministic rationalizations. Challenged by Caliph 'Abd al-Malik to defend and define his position, he indicated that humans have power (*qudrāh*) to choose freely; that good and guidance come from God, who has foreknowledge of both good and evil (the latter coming from humans or the devil); that God's predestination is not coercive nor his foreknowledge prohibitive for human free choice. The reports that Ḥasan recanted his belief in free will were probably later attempts by the orthodox Sunnīs to clear his reputation of what had come to be regarded as heresy, although the possibility remains that he did partially modify his position.

The fact that both the Šūfīs and the Mu'tazilah regarded Ḥasan as one of their forerunners is a mark of his importance and influence as an ascetic and a theologian. It is even more remarkable that the Sunnīs take pains to count him among their own predecessors despite his novel attitudes in matters of piety and dogma. And it is a measure of his immediate impact that on the day Ḥasan died, evening prayers could not be held in the mosques because the whole city of Basra was busy attending his funeral.

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Besides numerous fragments of sermons (*mawā'iz*) and a few bits and pieces of his Qur'anic exegesis, some of Ḥasan's letters (*rasa'il*) have survived, including those addressed to caliphs 'Abd al-Malik and 'Umar II. In addition, Ḥasan has been frequently quoted as an authority in *tafsīr*, *ḥadīth*, and *fiqh* literature, as well as *ādāb* (belles lettres) and *akhlāq* (ethics, particularly exhortative).

The earliest basic source on Ḥasan's life and thought is Ibn Sa'd's *Kitāb al-ṭabaqāt al-kabīr*, edited by Edward Sachau and others as *Biographien Muḥammads, seiner Gefährten und der späteren Träger des Islams bis zum Jahre 320 des Flucht*, vol.

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HASAN QASIM MURAD (1987)

## HASIDISM

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

AN OVERVIEW  
HABAD HASIDISM  
SATMAR HASIDISM

### HASIDISM: AN OVERVIEW

Hasidism is the common appellation of a Jewish pietistic movement that developed in eastern Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century, became, before the end of that century, a major force in modern Judaism, and has remained as such. Previous Hasidic movements in Jewish history—mainly the Ashkenazic Hasidism of medieval Germany (twelfth–thirteenth centuries) and the early *ḥasidim* of the tannaitic period (first–second centuries CE)—will not be discussed here. Rather, the movement at hand is that called, in the writings of the opponents of Hasidism and some historians, "Beshtian Hasidism," a sobriquet that refers to the movement's founder, Yisra'el ben Eli'ezer, known as the BeSHT (an acronym for Ba'al Shem Tov, "Master of the Good Name").

**ROOTS OF THE MOVEMENT.** Hasidism did not emerge, as most other Jewish religious movements did, from the schools of the higher social strata and leading intellectuals. Its first teachers belonged to a social group of popular preachers who used to wander from one community to the other, usually among the smaller and poorer Jewish communities in Podolia and the neighboring areas. Many of these preachers were suspected of Shabbatean tendencies, and they found their audience among the small merchants and the poor in peripheral areas. This fact influenced the later development of the Hasidic movement. Even after Hasidism grew dominant in larger communities, it remained faithful to the social groups that supported it in its early beginnings, and an awareness of the religious needs of the uneducated and the poor became one of the traits of the movement.

Attempts to describe Hasidism as a movement of social rebellion of the poor against the rich, the downtrodden masses against the leaders, have failed. There is no evidence that the Hasidic teachers intended to change the social structure

of Jewish communities. But Hasidism did emphasize the ability of the lower social groups to actively participate and achieve a high position in Jewish religious practice.

The religious background for the appearance of the Hasidic movement is the Shabbatean crisis. While various historians differ in their descriptions of the main reasons for the emergence of Hasidism and in their evaluation of the social and cultural reasons for its success, there is little doubt that the movement served as an answer to the most profound religious crisis that affected Judaism from the late seventeenth through the eighteenth centuries. Gershom Scholem described Hasidism as the neutralization of the messianic element in Judaism after the Shabbatean crisis, and while some scholars insisted that there are messianic elements in Hasidism, none disputed the direct relationship between Hasidic theology and the Shabbatean sects that flourished in eastern Europe in the eighteenth century.

Jewish theologians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many of whom persisted in believing in the messianism of Shabbetai Tsevi, had to develop a theology that would explain the paradox of a messiah committing the worst possible transgression against orthodox Judaism—Shabbetai Tsevi's conversion to Islam in 1666. Various theologies were developed, some of which called upon the believers to follow the messiah and convert to Islam, thereby creating a "coalition" between Judaism and Islam against Christianity; others maintained that belief in Shabbetai Tsevi could be continued within Judaism provided the believer express his attachment to the new messianic, redemptive period that began with the appearance of Shabbetai Tsevi. These expressions eventually covered a whole range of possibilities, from the most anarchistic, antinomian ones of the Frankist movement in Poland in the middle of the eighteenth century to the mild celebrations of Tish'ah be-Av (the ninth day of the month of Av, the day of the destruction of the Temple and a day of fasting, which the Shabbateans turned into a celebration of Shabbetai Tsevi's birthday).

Among the various expressions of the continued belief in Shabbetai Tsevi as the Messiah, two are of interest in understanding the beginnings of Hasidism: the most radical one and the most orthodox one. The radical Frankist movement, which proclaimed that in the new messianic world the way to preserve the Torah was to destroy it, was regarded as a sign of a deep crisis in Jewish religion and education. The Frankists, before converting to Christianity, participated in a religious dispute (in Kamenets in 1757 and in Lvov in 1759) during which they were reported to have directed a blood libel (accusation of a murder for ritual purposes) against their Jewish coreligionists. This aberrational movement, which included some very tempting ideas that captured the hearts of many, signified the need for a reformulation of Jewish organized religious life as well as for the formulation of new answers to basic theological questions, especially the interpretation of qabbalistic symbols from the thirteenth century Zohar and from the teachings of Isaac

Luria of Safad (1534–1572) that were used extensively by the Shabbateans.

The other side of the Shabbatean response to the conversion was a retreat to ultraorthodoxy or cryptoorthodoxy, often with some pietistic ("Hasidic") elements. Explaining that the crisis of the Shabbatean endeavor was caused by the insufficient spiritual support the messiah received from his followers, these Shabbateans adopted a way of life that emphasized continued practice of repentance, self-negation, and insistence on strict adherence to every detail of Jewish religious law. Groups of such *hasidim* appeared in several Jewish communities in eastern Europe that were the centers for spiritual seeking. Not all of their members were Shabbateans, and the Shabbateans themselves were divided in many ways. But when the new Hasidic movement emerged, it did so against the background of several groups or sects of *hasidim* that had already become a common phenomenon in the major centers of Jewish culture in eastern Europe.

The relationship of Hasidism to Shabbateanism and the Frankist movement is complicated. On the one hand, an early Hasidic legend tells how in the BeSHT's participation in the Lvov disputation of 1759, he defended Judaism from the accusations of the Frankists. On the other hand, another Hasidic tradition quotes the BeSHT as lamenting the conversion of the Frankists following that disputation, claiming that as long as a limb is connected to the divine body of the Shekhinah it can be cured, but once severed it is lost forever. In a similar vein, there are found motifs of understanding and closeness to the Shabbatean experience coupled with fierce negation and rejection of the Shabbatean message. The BeSHT is described as trying to save the soul of Shabbetai Tsevi from Hell, where he saw him stretched out on a table with Jesus Christ; Shabbetai Tsevi then tried to pull the Besht down, and only by a great effort did the BeSHT succeed in extricating himself. It seems that though the condemnation of Shabbateanism by the Hasidim was absolute, the idea that the Shabbateans could and should be saved also persisted in Hasidic circles. Members of the Bratslav sect of Hasidism believed that their leader, Nahman of Bratslav, was destined to correct the religious damage done by the Shabbatean movement.

**HISTORY.** The history of the early Hasidic movement can be divided into four main periods, each a major step in its development.

**1. The circle of the BeSHT (c. 1740–1760).** The BeSHT seems to have been in contact with a group of wandering preachers, like himself, who in their homiletics preached a new kind of worship and presented a new conception of the role of the elect in Jewish religion. They were qabbalists, following the main mystical symbols of the Lurianic school but emphasizing the achievements of the individual and his ability to assist his brethren in religious matters. *Devequt* (communion with God) was one of the main subjects they preached, stressing humankind's ability to attain constant communion with God. It is possible that parallel to the

BeSHT's circle of adherents there were other pietistic groups in some of the major centers of Jewish culture in eastern Europe. Some of these circles were influenced by various Shabbatean ideas; all were aware of the Shabbatean crisis.

**2. The first Hasidic center in Mezhirich (1760–1772).** After the BeSHT's death, the leadership of the Hasidic movement was assumed by his disciple, Dov Ber of Mezhirich (now Międzyrzecz, Poland). He held "court" in his home, where many young Jewish intellectuals as well as common people gathered to listen to his sermons. These were transcribed by his disciples and later published in several versions. The court of Dov Ber (called the *maggid*, i.e., "preacher") was described, among others, in the autobiography of Salomon Maimon, who had visited it in his youth. In this period begins the history of Hasidism as an organized movement, led by an accepted authority.

**3. The disciples of Dov Ber (1773–1812).** This is the most important period, in which Hasidism became a major force within Judaism. Several of Dov Ber's disciples created "courts" like that of their teacher, and led *'edot* ("communities"), around which thousands, and then tens of thousands, of adherents gathered, accepting the leadership of that disciple and making their community an alternative social and religious organization of Jews, distinct from the hegemony of the traditional rabbinate. Elimelekh of Lizhensk (now Lezajsk, Poland), Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady (Belarus), Menahem Mendel of Vitebsk, and, to some extent, Nahman of Bratslav belong to this category. In this period of Hasidic theory of the *tsaddiq* was developed and began to shape both Hasidic thought and social organization. At this same time the *Hasidim* became a distinct group, not only because of the internal development of Hasidism, but also because of the growing opposition to it from the school of Eliyahu ben Shelomoh Zalman, the "Gaon of Vilna," which published several pamphlets against Hasidic ideology and practice, denouncing them as heretics and excommunicating them, even trying to enlist the help of the Russian government against their leaders (especially Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady, founder of the Habad sect). This fierce opposition was motivated both by fears that the *Hasidim* were going to undermine the traditional Jewish social structure, which was based on the prestige of the scholars and Talmudists, and by the fear of another Shabbatean movement. There is no doubt that the growing opposition to Hasidism contributed significantly to the internal cohesion of the Hasidic communities and created clear lines of demarcation between areas in which the *Hasidim* became dominant and areas governed by their opponents.

It was in this period that Hasidic literature was initially published. The first works were those of Ya'aqov Yosef of Polonnoye, the BeSHT's greatest disciple, whose voluminous collections of sermons include most of the existing material concerning the teachings of the BeSHT (the first Hasidic work published was Ya'aqov Yosef's *Toledot Ya'aqov Yosef*, Korets, 1780). These were followed by the sermons of

Dov Ber, published by his disciples, and then many other collections of sermons by his followers. The only work published in this period in the form of an ethical work and not the usual collection of sermons was Shne'ur Zalman's *Tanya*' (see below). By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Hasidic movement had an organized leadership, prolific literature, well-defined communities and areas of influence, and an established standing in the general framework of Jewish life.

**4. The development of Hasidic "houses" or "lines of succession" (*shoshalot*).** To a very large extent this process has continued to the present. Many of Dov Ber's disciples served as founders of several Hasidic communities when their disciples scattered and each established his own "house" and community. The custom of passing Hasidic leadership from father to son or, in some cases, son-in-law, became more and more frequent, until it was universally accepted that the new leader had to be from the family of the previous leader. These "houses" usually bore the names of the towns in which they were established, even after the center was moved to another country—Poland, for instance, where many centers were located in Warsaw before the Second World War—or to another continent such as to the United States or Israel, where many of the centers are today. The history of Hasidism has since fragmented into the separate histories of various houses or schools. Only two of the communities have preserved their specific ideological and organizational profile, remaining distinct from all others, throughout this period—Habad Hasidism, founded by Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady, and Bratslav Hasidism, the followers of Nahman of Bratslav, the BeSHT's great-grandson. The rift between *Hasidim* and their opponents has obtained until this day; most Jews of east European descent belong to family lines of either *Hasidim* or *mitnaggedim* ("opponents").

**SPREAD OF THE MOVEMENT.** The spread of Hasidism after the death of Dov Ber in 1772 occurred at the same time that the opposition to the emerging Hasidic movement was growing. After that year, for a period of nearly fifty years, their opponents orchestrated repeated declarations excommunicating the Hasidic leaders and several times enlisted the help of the Russian government in their efforts, claiming that the *Hasidim*, as heretics, were undermining the foundations of the state. The documents concerning this organized opposition have been collected by Mordecai Wilensky and analyzed in a detailed, two-volume study.

The persecution by their opponents did not halt the spread of the movement, which gathered momentum and gained new communities and adherents in the end of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century. The disciples of Dov Ber and their disciples established the great Hasidic houses. Levi Yitshaq established an important Hasidic community in Berdichev, while Menahem Nahum built the house of Chernobyl, which was continued by his son, Mordechai Twersky, and went on for many gen-



erations. Yisra'el of Rizhyn (now Ruzhin, Ukraine), a descendant of Dov Ber, built the Rizhyn-Sadigora house; his four sons who followed him made it into one of the most important and eminent Hasidic communities in Russia. Moshe Hayyim Efrayim of Sedlikov (now Sudytkow, Poland), a grandson of the BeSHT, did not lead a community, but his book, *Degel mahaneh Efrayim*, a work of Hasidic sermons that often relies on direct traditions of the BeSHT, was influential. In Poland and Lithuania Hasidism became a major force through the work of Shelomoh ben Me'ir of Karlin and Hayyim Haiqel of Amdur (Indura). Hasidic communities in the Land of Israel were established in Safad and Tiberias by Manaḥem Mendel of Vitebsk and Avraham ben Aleksander Kats of Kalisz who migrated to the Land of Israel in 1777. In the beginning of the nineteenth century a group of great leaders gave renewed impetus to the spread of Hasidism, among them Ya'aqov Yitshaq ("the Seer of Lublin"), Ya'aqov Yitshaq ben Asher of Pshischa (now Przysucha, Poland), and Avraham Yehoshu'a Heschel of Apt in Moldavia (now Opotow, Poland). Manaḥem Morgenstern established the great house of Pshischa-Kozk, and Shalom Rokeah the Belz Hasidim. Moshe Teitelbaum, a disciple of Ya'aqov Yitshaq of Lublin, created the powerful and influential Satmar Hasidism in Hungary. By the middle of the nineteenth century Hasidism was the dominant force in most Jewish communities in eastern Europe, and most Hasidic houses continued their existence and development until the Holocaust.

**THEOLOGY AND ETHICS.** It is nearly impossible to describe Hasidic theology and ethics as being distinct from previous Jewish ideologies because Hasidic teachers preached their ideas in the form of sermons, which included all layers of earlier Jewish thought. Almost all the main ideas and trends found in early-eighteenth-century Hebrew homiletical literature also appear in Hasidic thought, and attempts to define specifically Hasidic ideas, or even emphases, usually fail because similar examples can easily be produced from earlier homiletical literature. A second difficulty is that every Hasidic teacher developed his own theology and ethics and his own list of priorities that may distinguish him or his group but never characterize all the hundreds of teachers and writers who created Hasidic literature. It is unfeasible to generalize from one or a group of Hasidic teachers to the movement as a whole. Every definition is therefore a necessarily subjective one. Thus only a few general outlines, qualified by the preceding statements, can be presented concerning Hasidic theology.

**Relationship to Lurianic Qabbalah.** Hasidism relies on qabbalistic terminology and is largely based on Lurianic Qabbalah. In many specific formulations, however, the Hasidim seem to have preferred the simpler symbolism of the Zohar (the main qabbalistic work written in northern Spain in the late thirteenth century) to that of Hayyim Vital (1543–1620), the disciple of Luria who wrote the main body of Lurianic teachings.

Hasidic theology, like other qabbalistic schools of the eighteenth century, downplayed the most dramatic mythical

symbols of Lurianic mysticism, especially that of *shevirat ha-kelim* ("the breaking of the divine vessels"), the description of the catastrophe within the divine world that is the origin of evil, according to Luria. The idea of *tsimtsum* (divine self-contraction) was elaborated by the Hasidim (especially by Dov Ber), but in a completely different manner than in Luria's original thought. According to Luria, this was the drastic process of divine contraction away from the world, which vacated the space in which the cosmos was going to be created from the divine light of the godhead, the first exile of God. According to Hasidism, however, this was a necessary process, for the world could not absorb the full power of the undiluted divine light. The act of *tsimtsum*, the contraction of that light, was intended to facilitate the acceptance of divine light, in a less concentrated form, by the righteous in the created world. Instead of the original Lurianic idea of a mythological catastrophe, the Hasidim presented a theology in which this process was the result of divine benevolence toward the faithful.

The Hasidim also deemphasized the Lurianic concept of *tiqqun* (restoration), the process by which messianic redemption is enhanced by the collective efforts of the Jewish people as a whole; they preferred instead the concept of *devequt* (communion with God), a process of individual redemption by which a person uplifts his own soul into contact with the divine powers. The description of the ten qabbalistic sefirot, the ten divine hypostases, is closer in Hasidic works to the thirteenth-century system of the Zohar than to the much more complicated system of Luria.

**Extent of messianism in Hasidism.** There is an emphasis in Hasidic literature on personal religious achievement rather than on the general, national, and cosmic impact of religious life. The redemptive element, while still strong in Hasidism, often emphasizes the redemption of the individual's soul rather than that of the nation or of the cosmos as a whole. This is a slight departure from Lurianic Qabbalah, but not all Hasidic teachers shared this view, and some non-Hasidic writers, who either predated Hasidism or belonged to the opponents of Hasidism, also often stressed the emphasis on the individual in qabbalistic symbolism.

The place of the messianic element in Hasidic thought has been a subject of controversy among contemporary scholars. In a detailed study in 1955, Ben Zion Dinur tried to prove that the Hasidim, following the BeSHT himself, developed an esoteric messianic system that was hidden in most of their works but served as the main purpose and drive behind Hasidic preaching and the expansion of its influence. This approach was severely criticized by Gershom Scholem, who saw in Hasidism the neutralization of the Lurianic and Shabbatean acute messianism and a new emphasis on individual redemption through the process of communion with God. Isaiah Tishby recently analyzed early Hasidic texts and found that many of them include more messianic elements than Scholem suggested. There is no doubt that, on the whole, early Hasidism rejected the more extreme messianic

tendencies; the works of Dov Ber can be characterized as neutralizing the messianic drive. But Hasidic teachers in their various works reveal differing attitudes, and some of them may have had stronger messianic inclinations than the Maggid and even the BeSHT.

In the early nineteenth century there was a renewed messianic enthusiasm with Hasidism. Naḥman of Bratslav developed a messianic system (see below), and under the impact of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 are found several Hasidic leaders engaged in messianic activity. In contemporary Hasidism the Habad sect seems to be deeply motivated by an acute belief in an imminent messianic redemption, concentrating its activities on enhancing this process by strict adherence to religious commandments.

**Hasidic approach to God.** In early Hasidic literature there is an emphasis on direct, emotional worship of God and a deemphasis on contact with God through constant study of the Torah and Talmud and diligent observance of the particulars concerning the performance of the *mitsvot*. This does not mean that the Ḥasidim did not study the Torah or that they disregarded the *mitsvot*, as their opponents often claimed; rather, the Ḥasidim stressed the importance of mystical contact with God through *devequt*, usually attained while praying but also achieved when a person is working for his livelihood or engaged in any other physical activity.

There are many precedents for this attitude in pre-Hasidic Jewish thought, and there are many exceptions to it among Hasidic teachers. Still, it seems that on the whole, Ḥasidim perceived a wider range of modes of worship as acceptable and commendable than did their detractors, and that the mystical aspect of everyday religious life is more prominent among the Ḥasidim. This attitude led to the prevailing conception of Hasidism as oriented toward the needs of the simple believers, the uneducated, and even the ignorant—a conception based primarily on very late (end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) collections of stories and one that is considerably exaggerated.

**Good and evil.** Hasidic teachers, more than non-Ḥasidim, contributed to the development of a conception of the way to fight evil within one's soul that is different from the prevailing Lurianic one. On the one hand, Lurianic theology described a common source for good and evil, claiming that both emanate from the godhead; but, according to Luria, evil cannot exist unless it is in close contact with the good and derives sustenance from it. In order to overcome evil, the righteous must separate good from evil, thus making the latter's existence impossible. Shabbatean thinkers, on the other hand, emphasized that evil can be overcome from within by correcting it. Dov Ber of Mezhrich and other Hasidic teachers insisted that evil can and should be overcome by absorbing it, uplifting and making it again a part of goodness, believing that the spiritual stature of the "corrected" or "repentant" evil is higher than that of the elements that were always good. In early Hasidic works this theory is presented

as teachings accessible to everybody and offered to all righteous Jews; later it was merged with the doctrine of the *tsaddiq*.

**Hasidism as revival of traditional spirituality.** The spiritual side of religious life holds a central place in Hasidic teachings, following the traditions of medieval Hebrew ethical and homiletical literature. Great emphasis is placed on the correct qabbalistic intentions in prayers (*kavvanot*), on spiritual repentance, on the love and fear of God, and on social justice and love for fellow people. While very few new ideas on these subjects are to be found in the vast Hasidic literature, the movement undoubtedly represents a revival of these spiritual values within the framework of everyday religious life. In this respect, then, there is no basis to the frequent descriptions of Hasidism as an original phenomenon that changed the face of traditional Judaism; but it can be claimed that the Ḥasidim collected many spiritualistic ideas and practices from previous Jewish sources and brought them to the foreground of their teachings and Jewish worship in a more central way than before. In this sense their endeavor can be described as "revivalistic."

**THE DOCTRINE OF THE *TSADDIQ*.** While these ideas characterize Hasidism, they do not distinguish the Hasidic movement from previous Jewish religious movements or from the other religious movements of that time, even that of the *mitnaggedim*. Many of these ideas are found, and emphasized, in late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century non-Hasidic Jewish works of ethics and homiletics. Hasidism, however, can be defined as a separate movement, different from all others preceding or contemporary to it, because of its doctrine of the *tsaddiq* ("righteous man"), which sets clear boundaries, in theory and in practice, between Ḥasidim and non-Ḥasidim.

The theory of the *tsaddiq* presented Judaism with a new concept of religious leadership that was both charismatic and mystically motivated. According to this theory, in every generation there are some righteous persons who can and should, by their outstanding mystical worship, correct the sins and transgressions of lesser-endowed people. The Ḥasid (follower) has only limited ability to approach the godhead and to carry out difficult religious tasks, especially the correction of evil, including that in his own thoughts and deeds. The leader, the righteous *tsaddiq*, whose soul emanated from a very high place in the divine realm, is the one to carry out these tasks for his generation and especially for his followers, the members of the Hasidic community that he leads. Thus the *tsaddiq* is an intermediary between the Hasid and God, bringing before the heavenly powers (the qabbalistic *sefirot*) the prayers and religious achievements of his community. He receives forgiveness for the sins of his followers and effects the elevation of the evil within them, transmuting it into good at the common source of both in the divine realm.

The *tsaddiq* himself does not contain any evil; the sins he uplifts and corrects are those of his community. One description of this transaction—found in the works of the great



formulator of this theory, Elimelekh of Lizhensk, a disciple of Dov Ber—is that the sins of the community appear to the *tsaddiq* as evil thoughts that he then uplifts and rehabilitates into good thoughts. This theory demands that the *tsaddiq* be in constant movement between good and evil, heaven and earth (*ratso' va-shov*, “ran and returned,” after *Ezekiel* 1:14). He has to be close to the evil that he is to correct, subjecting himself to the process of a “fall” (*yeridah*) or “smallness” (*qatnut*, a term used in Lurianic theology only to refer to the divine powers when they descend from their high dominion). When he uplifts evil and turns it into goodness, he is united with the divine powers in a state of “greatness” (*gadlut*). This dynamism is the most characteristic aspect of the *tsaddiq* concept, and there is no difficulty in ascertaining the source from which the Ḥasidim, probably unwittingly, derived it.

Even before Shabbetai Tsevi's conversion to Islam, his “prophet,” Natan of Gaza, described his messianic role as an intermediary between the godhead and evil on earth. The changing moods of Shabbetai Tsevi, probably caused by a manic-depressive state, were explained as resulting from his constant movement between his source and origin among the *sefirot* and the realm of the devil on earth. After his conversion, Shabbatean theologians explained that in order to overcome evil the Messiah had to merge with it and destroy or correct it from within. There are close parallels between the Shabbatean concept of the Messiah and the Hasidic concept of the *tsaddiq*, and there can be little doubt that the Ḥasidim created their system on the heels of Shabbatean theology.

Nevertheless, the Hasidic concept of the *tsaddiq* is not messianic in the same sense as its Shabbatean precursor. The *tsaddiq* is undoubtedly a quasi-messianic figure, but his influence is limited in time and place—he “redeems” only his own community in his own lifetime. The redemption that the *tsaddiq* accomplishes is not the general, national, and cosmic redemption of Shabbateanism. Rather, he effects individual redemption of the souls in his community—those of his followers—only while he is alive; after his death his successor (his son or relative) will continue in this task, while at the same time dozens of other *tsaddiqim* are performing the same task for other communities in other places. It may be stated that Hasidism broke down the Shabbatean concept of the messiah into small fragments, each of which is the *tsaddiq* for his own time and place. Instead of one messianic figure who inaugurates the historical redemption, Hasidism provides a process of constant redemption of the souls of the believers, a process carried out by every *tsaddiq* within the boundaries of his time and place. When viewed in terms of a messianic movement, Hasidism destroyed the basis for any large, messianic upsurge, replacing it with the small, everyday process of individual redemption. It is possible that the vehement opposition of the Hasidic movement as a whole, with very few exceptions, to modern Jewish nationalism and Zionism should be understood in this light. If individual redemption is assured by faithfulness to the *tsaddiq*, the importance of national redemption is diminished.

The theory of the *tsaddiq* was the focal point of Hasidic theology, shaping to a very large extent Hasidic social organizations and ways of worship as well. According to this theory, the *tsaddiq* not only provides the Ḥasidim with spiritual redemption for their souls but also promises them the basic earthly needs—their livelihood, delivery from illness, and assurances that they will have children (*banei, hayyei, mezonei*; literally, “my sons, my life, my food”). The Ḥasidim, for their part, have to give the *tsaddiq* spiritual support; their belief in his superhuman role enables him to achieve his spiritual tasks. They are also obligated to supply the *tsaddiq's* everyday needs so that he may support himself and his family.

The *tsaddiq* became the center of the Hasidic community. His court was their meeting place several times each year; his room became the place where they brought their complaints and requests; his blessing was believed to ensure both earthly and heavenly success. The Ḥasidim congregated to listen to the *tsaddiq's* prayers and sermons, worshiped with him with great qabbalistic “intentions” (*kavvanot*), and practiced the religious commandments, often with joy and happiness. The task of uplifting evil was thus taken from the shoulders of the individual Jew and consigned to the *tsaddiq* as the representative of the community and the intermediary power between heaven and earth.

Not all the *tsaddiqim* accepted this role. There were several leaders who were uncomfortable with this mode of worship; they left their communities and secluded themselves. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the basic Hasidic attitudes to social organization and everyday worship were developed according to the lines drawn by the doctrine of the *tsaddiq*.

The most important variant to this doctrine grew out of Bratslav Hasidism, founded by Naḥman of Bratslav (1772–1810), the grandson of the BeSHT's daughter. Naḥman's life passed in conflict with other *tsaddiqim*; he refused to accept their authority even over their own communities. When he died his followers chose not to nominate another *tsaddiq* but continue, to this very day, to believe that Naḥman was the “true *tsaddiq*” (*tsaddiq ha-emet*) and that the Messiah, who will redeem Israel, will be his reincarnation. In the Bratslav doctrine of the *tsaddiq* there is, to a very large extent, a return to the Shabbatean concept of one redeemer for all; the redemption therefore assumes historical dimensions.

Another important variant is that of the Habad Hasidism, founded by Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady (1745–1813), a disciple of Dov Ber. From this school is obtained the most detailed information concerning the organization of a *tsaddiq's* court. At the same time, Habad Hasidic works seem to minimize the redemptive role of the *tsaddiq*, especially as outlined in the works offered to the public as a whole, such as Shne'ur Zalman's *Tanya*. Habad developed a highly centralized global organization headed by the *tsaddiq*, with an emphasis on the teaching of Jewish ethics and practice of the *mitsvot* and basic qabbalistic theology, relegating the more

developed messianic and redemptive elements in their theology to esoteric groups among the Habad adherents. Habad is reputed to insist on a more intellectual version of Hasidism, but many other communities share this same trend.

The doctrine of the *tsaddiq* also contributed to the emergence of a special kind of hagiographic literature, for the *tsaddiq* could easily serve as a religious hero to stories of this kind. A body of legends in which the BeSHT was a central hero was collected early in the nineteenth century under the title *Shivhei ha-Beshṭ* (In praise of the BeSHT), following the earlier example of *Shivhei ha-Ari*, which was about Isaac Luria. The tales told by Naḥman of Bratslav in his last years were published as *Sippurei ha-ma'asiot le-rabbi Naḥman*, stories describing in a veiled manner the spiritual conflicts and messianic drives of Naḥman. Many stories were told by the Hasidim about their leaders, but these began to be published only in the last third of the nineteenth century, mostly by non-Hasidic authors, editors, and publishers, and later by some Hasidic publishers. Many of these stories are nothing but adaptations of ancient Jewish folktales in which the specific *tsaddiqim* are inserted as heroes. Hasidism throughout its history, including contemporary Hasidism, chose the sermon to be its basic literary genre and mode of expression. This vast body of homiletical literature is the basic and often the only source for Hasidic theology and practice. Some *tsaddiqim* prepared, or their disciples collected, brief anthologies of the sayings of the leaders, and a few *tsaddiqim* wrote ethical works, such as *Tanya*, but the dominance of homiletical literature in authentic Hasidic literature is uncontested.

**MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT HASIDISM.** In popular works about Hasidism that focus on material derived from late Hasidic hagiography and collections of sayings of Hasidic teachers culled from their homiletical works and sermons, Hasidism is often described as a popular movement concentrated around charismatic leaders who impress their believers by various miracles and exemplary ethical behavior, without any theological or mystical basis. In some accounts even the strict adherence of Hasidim to the commandments of Judaism is missing, and Hasidism appears as a kind of “ethical Judaism” based on enthusiastic celebration of festivals and social ethics.

This erroneous image of Hasidism is the product of the literature written by Jewish writers in Hebrew and Yiddish in the early twentieth century, such as Shalom Asch, Yitshaq Loeb Perez, and Yehudah Steinberg, who portrayed Hasidism in nostalgic terms after having left traditional Judaism and embraced Western ways of life. Some scholars and writers, from Martin Buber to Elie Wiesel, followed them to an extent, perpetuating the image of Hasidism as pure, spiritual Judaism that expresses love of Israel, love of God, and love toward every human being. In their descriptions, modern writers have tended to emphasize public behavior in the Hasidic courts and to neglect the mystical, qabbalistic theology and the theoretical basis of the worship of the *tsaddiq* in Hasidism.

The studies of scholars such as Gershom Scholem, Joseph G. Weiss, Isaiah Tishby, Mendel Pierkaz, and others in the last generation restored the serious study of Hasidism and based it on philological, historical, and ideological scrutiny of the Hasidic texts themselves. Hasidism is the latest chapter in the history of Jewish mysticism, in which qabbalistic symbols became central to a wide, popular movement that produced a new type of religious leadership and introduced religious-mystical values to modern Orthodox Judaism.

**SEE ALSO** Judaism, article on Judaism in Northern and Eastern Europe to 1500.

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JOSEPH DAN (1987)  
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#### HASIDISM: HABAD HASIDISM

Habad is a distinctive Hasidic school founded by Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady (1745–1813) and led by a dynasty of his descendants, the Schneerson family. Because his son Dov Ber (1773–1827) settled in the Belorussian town of Lubavitch and established a Hasidic center there, the Habad movement is also widely known as Lubavitcher Hasidism. The most recent head of the movement was Menachem Mendel Schneerson (1902–1994), seventh in the line of succession. There has been no replacement. Given the movement's belief in Schneerson as a messianic figure, a future replacement is unlikely. From its New York headquarters the movement directs a vast array of religious, educational, and media ventures throughout the world.

As a theological system, Habad represents the apex of a cosmic mysticism within Judaism. Only God has real existence; all else, including the existence of the person as a separate being, is illusory. The purpose of the spiritual life, assiduously and systematically cultivated in Habad, is to bring the devotee to the realization of this truth in heart and conduct as well as in mind. Habad teaches, however, that the true conversion is first and foremost an intellectual one. Whereas other Hasidic leaders emphasized the emotional experience of God through practice, the moral life, and the virtues of simplicity, Shne'ur Zalman and his followers taught a highly abstract mystical theology and praised the virtues of contemplation and detachment. The name *Habad* (H̄aBaD), which is an acronym for *hokhmah*, *binah*, and *da'at* (three aspects of the mental function), is indicative of this.

Habad thought teaches that divinity is equally present throughout the universe, and that the existence of the universe itself is but an effulgence of light that comes from the eternal and unchanged One. This radiance, also identified with the creative speech of God, takes on the form of creation, and through it the One dons the garb of multiplicity. It does so in order that the presence of divinity will be confirmed even in the seemingly "lowliest" places, a gradation that would have no meaning if not for the existence of the corporeal world. The spreading forth of divine energy into the furthest corners of being is a constant process, without which the universe would lose even its semblance of reality.

The religious life is both a participation in this constant spreading forth of divinity, through the bodily fulfillment of the divine commandments, and a reversal of the process, in which all things are "uplifted" and returned to their source in God through inward devotion and contemplative prayer. Habad is in part a reaction to the extreme early Hasidic emphasis on prayer and inwardness alone as religious values. It insists that the physical enactment of the commandments, even without understanding, has cosmic implications. There is also a great emphasis on Torah study in Habad circles, including the study of Habad theological works, again in contrast to the conduct of some other Hasidic groups. Study and deed are taken as the activist side of the religious life, ever to be balanced with inwardness and contemplation.



Beginning in the early twentieth century, Habad took a leading role in the preservation of traditional piety, whose hold over Jewry was weakening, and in providing an avenue of return to tradition for Jews reared outside it. The previous Lubavitcher *rebbe*, Yosef Yitsh'aq Schneersohn (1880–1950), was the leading rabbinic figure in Russia after sovietization and fought valiantly for the survival of religious Jewry there. After his exile in 1927 and a period of residence in Latvia and Poland, the Lubavitch community settled in Brooklyn in 1941 and later in the town of Kefar Habad in Israel. Both centers remain vibrant. Particularly since the mid-1960s, large numbers of previously unaffiliated American Jews have joined to swell the ranks of this movement, making it the most prominent Hasidic group on the American scene. During that same period, an openness to the uses of technology, the integration of modern techniques of education and public relations, and a vague modernization of style, though carefully circumscribed within the bounds of Jewish law, have raised questions about Habad in some more traditionalist Hasidic circles.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, Habad invested much of its energy in promoting the impending messianic era, touting its leader Schneersohn as the messiah. This activity increased as their leader became infirm and no longer able to communicate. Schneersohn's own position on his messianic vocation has never been clarified. After his death on June 12, 1994, the movement underwent a spiritual crisis. One faction continued to believe he was the messiah and would "rise up" and redeem Israel and the world. Another faction took a more agnostic approach. Few in leadership positions in contemporary Habad openly state that their *rebbe* was (and is) not the messiah. The development and consequences of this remain to be seen.

This situation has sparked a vehement debate in Orthodox Jewish circles about whether Habad messianism now constitutes a Jewish heresy. David Berger, an Orthodox Jewish historian, penned a fiercely polemical book, *The Rebbe, the Messiah, and the Scandal of Orthodox Indifference* (2001), arguing that Habad messianism is indeed a Jewish heresy and should be shunned by all those who adhere to traditional Judaism. Habad countered with a book-length rebuttal of Berger's accusations, *The Messiah Problem: Berger, the Angel, and the Scandal of Reckless Indiscrimination* (2002). The controversy constitutes one of the most serious and substantive debates in traditional Judaism.

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ARTHUR GREEN (1987)  
SHAUL MAGID (2005)

#### HASIDISM: SATMAR HASIDISM

The school of Hasidic practice known as Satmar Hasidism arose in Satu-Mare (Satmar), Transylvania, in the decades immediately preceding the Holocaust and rose to prominence primarily in the postwar years. It is identified chiefly with the personality of Yo'el Teitelbaum (1888–1982), who was rabbi in Satmar and, after his rescue from Hungary in 1944, in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York.

In a larger sense, Satmar may be said to represent the distinctive Hasidic style that developed in northern Hungary and Transylvania in the nineteenth century. Lying outside the original heartland of Hasidism, Hungarian Jewry was dominated by a learned and pious rabbinate that saw itself locked in a life-and-death struggle with the forces of assimilation and religious reform, forces that were far stronger in Western-looking Hungary than they were in Poland and the Ukraine. Here Hasidism served as a goad to the revitalization of Orthodoxy, resulting in a bitter and sometimes fanatical tone that was absent from Hasidism in other areas.

After the Holocaust, the Satmar rabbinical court in Brooklyn became a center for the many thousands of pious Hungarian Jews who had escaped the war only by the coincidence of living in the last country to come under the dominance of the "final solution" and its executors. In Brooklyn, the Jewish life of prewar Hungary was reestablished almost unchanged, and the Satmar rabbi was especially known for his generous aid in the resettling of this Jewry. He was also known for his unswerving and increasingly bitter opposition to Zionism, the state of Israel, and all forms of Judaism that differed from his own ultraorthodox way of life. His writings, while reflecting great rabbinic erudition, are polemical in character, including the often repeated charge that the Holocaust was divine punishment for the evil deeds of Zionist and assimilationist Jews. In this sense Satmar represents a "last stand" of certain traditional Jewish attitudes, but he is looked upon with hostility by most other Jewish groups, including other Hasidim, as being overly self-righteous and unrealistically antagonistic to the modern world.

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**HASIDUT ASHKENAZ** SEE ASHKENAZIC  
HASIDISM

**HASKALAH** SEE JEWISH THOUGHT AND  
PHILOSOPHY, *ARTICLE ON MODERN THOUGHT*

**HASTINGS, JAMES** (1852–1922), was a Scottish Presbyterian minister and compiler and editor of voluminous works dealing with Christian texts and the subject matter of religions. Born in Aberdeen, Scotland, Hastings attended the University of Aberdeen and was ordained a Presbyterian minister in 1884; he later held pastorates in Free Church parishes in Kincardineshire and Dundee. Founder of the *Expository Times*, he is best known for his indefatigable zeal as an editor of numerous works, which may be grouped into four types.

First are those comprising articles dealing with the texts of early Christianity (e.g., *A Dictionary of the Bible*, 1898–1904; *A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, 1906–1908; and the *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, 1915–1918). Exegetical and expository in character and intended to provide students of biblical literature with the most recent findings of scholarship, the articles in these volumes were written by established (largely theologically conservative) scholars in command of the most recent methods of historical and textual criticism and philological analysis and exegesis, and their work represented a distinct advance in this field. Second are the works that are primarily homiletical in character (e.g., *Great Texts of the Bible*, 1914, and *Greater Men and Women of the Bible*, 1914). Third is a series of works on Christian doctrines, including the *Christian Doctrine of Prayer* (1915), *The Christian Doctrine of Faith* (1919), and *The Christian Doctrine of Peace* (1922).

Fourth is the renowned *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (13 vols., 1908–1926). This work, grand in vision and impressive in accomplishment, represents a scholarly achievement of the first importance. Intended to provide an account of the various aspects of religion (beliefs, rituals, philosophies, theologies, ethics) among peoples the world over and in all ages, the encyclopedia became a reference work with no compeer for more than half a century. Exemplary of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century interest in producing encyclopedic collections of knowledge in various fields, the encyclopedia became both a resource for reviewing the results of scholarship concerning the study of re-

ligion and an impetus for the extension of knowledge of peoples and cultures the world over, thus transcending the prior provincialism of much of Western scholarship.

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*A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*. 2 vols. New York, 1906–1908.

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**HATAM SOFER** SEE SOFER, MOSHEH

**HATĦAYOGA** is historically the most influential, and today the best known, of the several schools of yoga derived from the classical Yoga of Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtra*. *Haṭḥayoga* differs from classical Yoga, and from its sister schools, principally in the special emphasis that it gives to certain aspects of yoga doctrine and practices. Classical Yoga depends heavily on Sāṃkhya metaphysics and tries to strike a balance between physical exercises and meditation. *Haṭḥayoga* tends to prefer esoteric mysticism to systematic metaphysics and emphasizes physical exercises over meditation. It also pays particular attention to the acquisition of supernatural powers and the conquest of disease and death. The set of mystical, supraphysical concepts contained in *haṭḥayoga* texts make it one of the principal constituents and markers of the current of Hinduism known as Tantrism.

Many of the aspects of yoga that are especially associated with *haṭḥayoga* appear to be quite ancient. As early as the *R̥gveda* (10.136) is found a description of *munis* (ascetics) who possess the power of flying on the wind. Yogic practices and concepts such as those elaborated in *haṭḥayoga* texts already are mentioned prominently in the early Upaniṣads. The supraphysical "veins" (*nāḍīs*) of the human body, which become a central feature of the mystical anatomy of *haṭḥayoga*, appear in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (8.6.6). In-



cluded among these is a central vein leading to the crown of the head. Breath control is referred to, somewhat elliptically, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (1.5.23). The later *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (2.8–15) describes the practices of yoga, including breath control, in some detail and notes that “he who has attained a body made of the fire of yoga will not be subject to sickness, old age or death” (2.12).

Most of the elements of *hathayoga* appear in a more developed form in the descriptions of Tantric ascetics found in the *Mālatī-mādhava* of Bhavabhūti (c. 725) and in the *Harṣacarita* of Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa (c. 650). The majority of the extant texts of *hathayoga*, however, are associated with the somewhat later sect of the Kānpaṭa Yogis, sometimes called Nāths or Nāth Siddhas. In the South the so-called Tamil Siddhas of about the tenth to fifteenth century wrote poems grounded in the concepts and vocabulary of *hathayoga*. These same concepts and vocabulary also pervade the works of Tantric Buddhism and even infiltrate the yoga literature of the austere Jains. Because of the great religious and linguistic diversity of the literature, often coupled with an intentionally hermetic style, scholarly understanding of its overall structure and history remains incomplete.

The idea of a supraphysical subtle body with its own anatomy forms the conceptual heart of *hathayoga*. Although different texts describe this mystical anatomy somewhat differently, most mention seven *cakras*, or “centers,” located in the trunk and head, connected by a network of *nāḍīs*, or “veins.” Each of these *cakras* takes the form of a lotus and is associated with a particular *yantra*, or mystical diagram; *mantra*, or mystical invocation; and god or pair of gods.

The first *cakra*, called the *mūlādhāra*, or “root,” is a lotus of four petals located in the perineal area between the anus and the sexual organs. Its *yantra* is an inverted triangle with a *liṅga* of Śiva in its center together with the *mantra* “om” and the elephant-headed god Gaṇeṣa. Coiled around the *liṅga* is a sleeping snake called Kuṇḍalinī, who blocks the top of the *liṅga* with her mouth. This Kuṇḍalinī represents the energy (*śakti*) of Śiva. The yogin attempts to awaken her and make her ascend through the central *nāḍī*, called the *suṣūmnā*, passing through each of the remaining *cakras* until she reaches the highest, called the *sahasrāra* (“lotus of a thousand petals”) or *brahmarandhra* (“opening of *brahman*”), located on the top of the head. There Kuṇḍalinī unites with Śiva, an act that produces the supernatural powers and immortality that the yogin seeks. Ultimately this union is identical with the experience of enlightenment itself.

The various physical and meditative techniques employed by the adepts of *hathayoga* to achieve this experience involve the parallel immobilization of breath, semen, and mental activity. The term *haṭha*, in fact, means “forceful suppression.” Thus, *hathayoga* is that meditative technique that involves the forceful suppression of one’s senses and control of one’s bodily processes. These techniques are described in such texts as the *Hathayoga Pradīpikā* of Svātmārāma, the *Gheraṇḍa Saṃhitā*, the *Gorakṣa Śataka*, and the

*Siddhasiddhānta Paddhati*. One of the most important of these techniques is the *khecari* (“she who moves in the sky”). The yogin inserts his tongue in his throat, thus blocking both respiration and the descent of saliva. On the plane of the subtle body, it is said that this practice blocks the descent of the nectar of immortality produced by the moon located beneath the *sahasrāra cakra*. Normally this nectar falls into the fire of the sun located in the lower body. The practice of the *khecari* enables the yogin, according to the *Hathayoga Pradīpikā*, to “drink” this nectar and thus “live many years, free of disease and with a body as soft as the stem of a lotus.”

**SEE ALSO** Cakras; Flight; Gorakhnāth; Kuṇḍalinī; Patañjali the Grammarian; Yoga.

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**HATHOR** was an ancient Egyptian mother-goddess figure whose cult center was at Dendera in Upper Egypt. Represented as partially or totally bovine, Hathor the Great was probably an assimilation of several goddesses with similar attributes.

In the Old Kingdom Pyramid Texts (c. 2475 BCE for the earliest copy) Hathor, whose name means “house of Horus,” personified the entire Heliopolitan ennead, or family of gods, which provided the principal genealogy of the Horus-king of Egypt. These nine gods began with Atum and proceeded through three more generations to Osiris and Isis, the parents of Horus. With Hathor personifying this whole group of gods, Horus became her son and the son of her spouse, Re, the sun god, who had come to the fore by the fifth dynasty.

Hathor also figured prominently in the royal imagery, particularly in the New Kingdom, when she was frequently depicted as the cow suckling a young pharaoh, and often had shrines or chapels dedicated to her. Her great temple at Dendera, erected in the Ptolemaic and Roman periods, is unique in several respects, including its many subterranean passages and the so-called zodiacal ceiling of its roof’s kiosk.

Another small cult temple of Hathor was founded by Ptolemy IV at Deir al-Madīnah, where many earlier tombs show the “lady of the west,” a cow coming from the Theban mountain known as the Qurn. Thus as early as the New Kingdom she was associated with the necropolis of that area. “Hathor of the sycamore” is a frequent epithet, and a temple is known as far away as Sinai. There are several references in literary and medico-magical texts to the assistance rendered at birth by the seven Hathors and also to the fates they ordain for the newborn. Hathor “the golden one” was known in love poetry as goddess of love and patroness of lovers.

The sistrum is a musical instrument commonly associated with the worship of Hathor, and her son Ihy was a musician deity. Priestesses of Hathor are known from all periods, although in the later periods there was a tendency to assimilate Hathor and Isis.

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**HAWAIIAN RELIGION.** The traditional religion of the Hawaiians was based on that of their Polynesian ancestors, who as fishermen and horticulturalists became long distance navigators and explorers. These were the first to settle, perhaps between the first and the seventh centuries CE, the fertile and geographically isolated Hawaiian Islands. Although inhabitants of the islands from Hawai‘i to Kaua‘i had altered some of the ancestral beliefs and practices, the similarities between Hawaiian and other Polynesian religions impressed Captain James Cook, who in 1778 was the first European to visit the islands.

Believing that supernatural forces filled sea, sky, and earth, the Hawaiians personified them in countless named and individualized deities, who controlled nature and humankind through their *mana*, or supernatural power. The people retained cosmogonic gods from the homeland, such as Kāne, Kanaloa, Kū, Lono, and goddesses like Hina and Haumea, but they added aspects to these gods and included the deified dead, beings like the volcano goddess Pele, and temperamental local spirits in their pantheon of supernatural beings. This pantheon provided the inherited or acquired guardian gods, or *‘aumakua*, of each individual, family, occupation, and profession. A god communicated its will through dreams, images, something in nature such as a shark or thunder, or a human prophet.

**PRIESTHOODS AND WORSHIP PLACES.** The priests, or *kahuna*, who mediated between gods and people, were professional specialists trained in the material techniques and rit-

uals essential for success in their calling. Upon the arrival of Captain Cook, there had evolved two major and competing priestly orders to guide the ruling chief in temple worship. The priests of the order of Kanalu were dedicated to the god Kū (mo‘oKū), and their rituals were considered to be strict and demanding. The other priestly order of Paliku was dedicated to the god Lono. Their rituals were considered more flexible and relaxed. The principal god of each order was a national god upon whose favor the expansion and prosperity of the kingdom depended. Each order’s high priest, the *kahuna nui*, was considered to be its founder’s direct descendant and an expert in every branch of religion. The high priest wielded political power by advising the ruler on how to win divine support. Failure was attributed to errors in worship, to counter-magic, or to hidden infractions of *kapu* (taboo). A system of religiously sanctioned permanent and temporary *kapu* controlled every phase of society and everyone’s life regardless of rank. The system began, tradition states, when Wākea got away from his wife Papa—giving Wākea the opportunity to seduce their daughter—by having a *kahuna* declare that the gods had made *kapu* two nights, during which husband and wife were required to separate.

Public worship took place at *heiau*, or open-air religious centers. The form, size, equipment, and location of a *heiau* depended on a chief’s power to command labor and on the *kahuna*-architect’s traditionalism or creativity. A simple un-walled rectangular *heiau* had an altar, images, and a raised platform. A complex type excluded the populace with stone or palisaded walls that enclosed several terraces, an altar, consecrated images, refuse pits, burial grounds, an oracle tower covered by a *kapa* or bark cloth (an architectural feature unique to these islands, as Captain Cook observed), and houses for a drum, other sacred objects, an earth oven, and—during *kapu* periods—for the ruler and important priests. Outside the walls was a structure called the “house of Papa,” where the highest-ranking female chiefs, who were themselves considered to be earthly goddesses, worshiped the prolific and ever-reborn Haumea (often identified with or as Papa) and the water-spirit form of a deified female chief from Maui (who was called Kihawahine), as well as other divine beings.

The walled, exclusive type of *heiau* was introduced, tradition states, by the high priest Pā‘ao, probably a Tahitian who arrived in about the twelfth century. Pā‘ao also introduced the practice of human sacrifice, a strict priestly order and ritual for Kū, and his personal god Kā‘li, who as Kū-kā‘ili-moku (“Kū the island-snatcher”) became Kamehameha I the Great’s (1758?–1819) inherited *‘aumakua* and war god. Pā‘ao widened the existing gap between chiefs and commoners by introducing new sacred royal symbols, such as the red-feather girdle, taboo standards (tapa-covered balls on sticks that were carried before chiefs as insignia of taboo), and compulsory prostration (*kapu moe*) before those male and female chiefs who were believed to be directly descended from the gods.

Only a paramount chief could build the most sacred type of *heiau*, where burned human sacrifices were offered to the highest Kū gods. This functional type of *heiau*, called a *luakini* (“many refuse pits”) or *po’okanaka* (“men’s heads”), was used at times to pray for royal health and national prosperity; but essentially it was a war temple (if a subordinate chief built one, it was a sign of rebellion). The general term *waihau* referred to “comfortable” *heiau* where less complex rituals, without human sacrifice, were conducted. Most *heiau* had economic functions relating to farming, fishing, healing, rain, tapa-making (which was women’s work), and so on. A chief had a religious duty to build these *heiau* in which to pray for divine aid for his chiefdom or to give thanks. Each deity had specific requirements as to size, number, and color of offerings. Dissatisfied gods sent drought and disease, and commoners would then abandon the chief to seek one who was more religious. But if all went well, people built smaller *heiau* on their allotted land to further enliven the earth.

**MAJOR DEITIES AND ASSOCIATED RITES.** Dominating the pantheon for chief and commoner alike were Kanaloa, Kāne, Lono, and Kū. Each, in particular but overlapping ways, fostered health, abundance, rain, and fertility. Only Kū had a destructive side. To each name, except that of Kanaloa, Hawaiians attached dozens of descriptive phrases to signify the god’s varied aspects or his subordinate gods.

**Kanaloa.** Called Tangaroa or one of many other cognate names (e.g., Tangaloa, Ta’aroa) elsewhere in Polynesia, Kanaloa was Kāne’s younger brother. For Hawaiians he was the god of squid and, because of a play on words, also sometimes associated with healing (the Hawaiian word *he’e* means both “squid” and “to put to flight”). Kanaloa rarely had his own shrine or *heiau*, but in prayers he was often named along with Kāne, Lono, and Kū, and like them he was assigned a period in the lunar month during which he was due special homage. His precise role and function in Hawai’i is obscure, partly due to some synchronistic writings of scholarly nineteenth-century Hawaiian Christian converts.

**Kāne.** Called Tane in southeastern Polynesia, Kāne, whose name connotes “male,” was the most approachable, forgiving, and revered of the four major gods. One worshiper in his prayer would chant, “You and I warm to each other, Kāne,” and other worshipers would often say, “Life is sacred to Kāne.” According to more than one myth, Kāne, while dwelling on earth with Kanaloa, had plunged his digging stick into the ground to release springs of fresh water to mix with his and Kanaloa’s *awa* or *kava* (a narcotic drink made from the pounded root of the shrub *Piper methysticum*). The release of fresh water by Kāne-of-the-water-of-life, as he was frequently called, was a symbolic sexual act, for the gesture served to fructify the earth. Before ritually consuming their offering of pork and *awa*, men prayed for forgiveness of broken taboos or for revenge for sorcery at their family’s phallic “stone of Kāne,” a single, high, conical stone situated near a stream. Sweet potato farmers prayed to their Kāne *au-*

*makua*-of-the-rain-filled-clouds; grateful fishermen left fish for Kāne and sometimes for Kanaloa at a shrine, which was usually only a rock or a pile of rocks. And after prescribed rituals that took place during an earth-shaking storm, the dead of a ruling family of the island of Maui, who considered themselves descendants of Kāne-hekili (“Kāne-thunder”), were transfigured by their ancestors and *aumakua* into thunder and lightning.

Early in the twentieth century, Robert Luahiwa, an elderly Hawaiian from the island of Kaua’i, described a ceremony that called on Kāne to bring rain and life to the land, and Luahiwa recited the prayers used by the high priest. The congregation sat silent and motionless on a *heiau* terrace until Kāne’s high priest (on a higher terrace) had, after five long prayers, lifted the taboo. The priest had invoked some seventy forms of Kāne—in clouds, rain, and forest growth—as well as the other three great gods and the goddesses of hula and of the forest greenery that decorated the *heiau* (Laka, Hi’iaka, the latter’s sister Kapo, and their oldest sister Pele, who became violent if ignored). The priest’s last prayer, heard only by the chief at his side, was delivered on the third, highest, and most sacred stage of the oracle tower, where the god revealed his will. Earlier nineteenth-century Hawaiian scholars reported that the commoners were gathered outside of the central temple, where they could only hear the prayers of the *kahuna*. The congregation would be seated in single-file rows and during certain prayers, which were voiced in unison, they would raise their right hands, remaining in that position until the prayer was completed. These scholars emphasized that the carved images of the *luakinilheiau* were never worshiped, for the images were considered to be only representations of the god.

**Lono.** The god of two related sources of abundance—peace and seasonal winter storms—Lono (called Rongo or Ro’o in southeastern Polynesia) was also a god of healing. He had numerous *heiau*, called “houses of Lono,” devoted to rainmaking and medical purposes. There was a chief with the same name, Lono, who established the Makahiki, the longest ceremonial period, which involved everyone in celebrating Lono’s annual (*makahiki*) return for four months of the rainy season to preside over rituals for health and ample rain, and over the ritualized collection of taxes, recreation, and release from work. The celebration became a focal point for the order and rituals of the priest dedicated to the god Lono, resulting in a merging or confusion of Lono the god and Lono the chief. When Captain Cook arrived in 1778, he was greeted as Lono-i-ka-makahiki the god/chief because he arrived during this period and anchored at the bay called Kealakekua (“the path of the god,” i.e., Lono), and because his masted sails resembled the Lono symbol that led the procession of tax collectors and celebratory sports on their coastal circuit of the island.

The reexamination of both native and nonnative primary sources has been reopened by anthropologists Marshall Sahlins and Gananath Obeyesekere to focus upon how Ha-



waiians interpreted Cook's presence and divinity. Although the rhetoric of their arguments developed into a larger issue about research and indigenous peoples, this reexamination has nonetheless brought intriguing and valuable analyses and insights not considered before about the first cultural encounter between the foreigners and natives.

The Lono symbol was a long staff topped with a carved human image across whose neck a crosspiece supported a rectangular white tapa flag and other sacred objects. A shorter staff led a procession in the opposite direction. The principal procession stopped at each district boundary to collect taxes placed near an altar that held another Lono symbol, a carved wooden head of a pig, representing fertility. If the collectors were satisfied with the proffered amount of pigs, dogs, vegetables, *'awa*, and the like, the Lono priest blessed the district, and the party moved on. At the ruler's compound the party was given a feast. Rites included the ruler putting a valuable whale-tooth necklace on the Lono figure, and the ruler's wife draping it with fine white tapa. Later the ruler redistributed the taxes to his subordinate chiefs who supported him in battle and who held land as a reward for their service.

While the ruler, the Lono priests, and their attendants were busy with numerous rituals for the general welfare, the populace engaged in hula, sports, and games, each activity having its guardian gods. Wrestling and boxing matches recalled that when Lono the chief learned, after killing his human wife, that she had not been unfaithful, he became for a time insane and fought violent matches. Finally he left the islands in his canoe, promising to return. To signal that the Makahiki was over and that people should return to work and chiefs could go to war again, the priests dismantled the Lono staffs and set adrift a canoe full of gifts to ensure Lono's return the next year. The ritual functions were then turned over to the priests of the order of Kū, now personified in the local ruling chief, rather than the departed god/chief.

Each morning and evening the head of a family took down the net-covered "gourd of Lono" encircling the neck of the image on the altar in the men's eating house. He prayed for his family, the commoners, and the chiefs, and he ritually ate from the gourd, the bowl of which represented the earth and its bounty; the cover, the heavens; and the handle, the rainbow. To lift the taboo on eating a new crop, he or a *kahuna* performed first-fruits rites, then put the gourd of Lono in the midst of the male guests invited to feast. He invited them again when, after weaning, his son entered the men's house, never again to eat with women. Placing a roasted pig's head on the altar and a pig's ear in the gourd of Lono (so Lono would listen), the *kahuna* prayed that the boy would thrive and bear fruit like the gourd vine. Later the boy would be subincised and ceremonially initiated into eating pork, which was men's food and taboo to women.

**Kū and Hina.** There were many gods in the class called Kū (Tu was the southern Polynesian cognate of the name). Hawaiians regarded the Kū gods either as independent gods or as aspects of a single Kū. Usually, an epithet attached to

the name suggested the special function or distinctive trait of each particular Kū god. The same principle applies to the class of goddesses called Hina (cognates of the name elsewhere in Polynesia are Hine, Sina, and 'Ina). Some Hinas had more than one name. Hina-of-the-moon is also known as Maimed Lono because, according to myth, her husband tore off her leg as she fled to the moon. Pele's sacred name is Hina-of-the-fire, and Lea's other name is Hina-of-the-*'ohi'a*-growth. (The *'ohi'a* is a kind of tree.)

Kū and Hina, as well as their varied aspects, functioned as man and wife in daily rites performed by the populace. With his sister-wife Hina (whose name means "prostrate"), Kū (meaning "upright") united the people into a single stock, for Kū and Hina represented the male and female reproductive principles. Kū also symbolized the east, the sunrise, and the right hand; while Hina symbolized the west, the sunset, and the left hand. Such antithesis was common. The couple was invoked in pregnancy and child care; their subordinate gods or aspects presided over many activities on land and sea. Kū'ula-kai (red Kū of the sea) was the fishermen's chief god, and fishing *heiau* were named *kū'ula* for him. His wife was Hina-the-sea-fossicker. Their siblings lived on upland farms and in forests. The chief forest god was Kū-moku-hālī'i (Kū the island spreader), the husband of Lea, who warned woodsmen of decayed trees by taking the form of an *'elepaio* (a flycatcher) and pecking at trees to look for insects. Kū-moku-hālī'i was also the chief god of canoe makers, whose *kahuna* conducted rites at the foot of a chosen tree, usually a koa (*Acacia koa*). Farmers venerated Kū-of-the-digging-stick. Each occupation had numerous Kū gods.

The highest form of Kū gods was invoked during national crises—war, famine, disease—after the king had first built or rebuilt a *luakini* where harsh and complex rituals called upon the Kū gods for aid. Kū-nui-ākea ("the supreme Kū") manifested himself in the ceremonies as the Kū gods of war, sorcery, and the binding of conquered chiefdoms into a kingdom. A ten-day, four-part *luakini* service required numerous men and pigs as sacrifices, and additional pigs to feed the highborn worshipers and priests. If *kapu*-breakers, war captives, or slaves were unavailable to be used as burned sacrifices, large *ulua* fish (*Carangidae*) were substituted.

The first set of rites, held in the presence of chiefs and workmen in the refurbished *luakini*, centered on a stylized parade led by a *kahuna* with a *kapu*-standard (followed by a naked man who impersonated the god Kahoali'i) and by feather-covered wicker images of gods (a Hawaiian innovation) carried by their keepers. The workers then went home. The second set of rites took the king, the "feather gods" (as the wicker images were called), and the *kahuna* to a forest, where they ritually cut *'ohi'a* trees for new images. A *kapu*-breaker was sacrificed in rites that accompanied the cutting of the first tree, and from this tree came a block of wood that would represent Kū on the altar. Marching back to the *heiau* with their logs, the members of the procession shouted loud-

ly and seized human victims along their route. After the images had been carved, dressed in red *malo* (loincloths), and consecrated, the *kahuna*, in the ceremony's third phase, chanted all night long while worshipers listened. In the fourth part of the rite, a *kahuna* prayed for an hour while the motionless worshipers, arranged in rows behind the images, sat with bowed heads and sometimes with upraised arms. The concluding rites were held in the "house of Papa," where a *kahuna* and the highest female chiefs freed the worshipers from taboo before they returned to secular life.

**GENDER TABOOS, ILLNESS, AND DEATH.** Women were considered to be polluted from menstruation, and thus were excluded from all men's *heiau* and shrines. Although history includes three female chiefs of the highest rank and status, they were exceptions. One was Keakea-lani-wahine, who, upon succeeding her mother as ruler of Hawai'i, had charge of all its *heiau* and in each *luakini* made human and pig sacrifices and other offerings. Nevertheless, she took her ritual meals apart from the men and ate no pork, bananas, coconuts, or other foods taboo to women. Food-related *kapu* were associated with the separation of Wākea and Papa and required all men and women to take meals separately and to eat food proper to their sex. All cooking was performed by men, who used separate ovens for men's and women's food. *Kapu*-breakers were slain or mutilated. (Persons threatened with death for any reason were spared, however, if they reached certain *heiau* or sites designated as places of refuge.)

Medical *kahuna* were specialists in treating particular diseases through different forms of diagnosis. They believed that an illness that proved resistant to ordinary treatment, such as by herbs, was due to an *'aumakua's* anger at broken *kapu* and therefore required prayers and offerings. Most *kahuna*, however, specialized in problems related to infertility and pregnancy and in the treatment of children's diseases.

In death a person's soul was prevented from falling into Milu (the underworld), a realm of eternal darkness, by its *'aumakua*, who ushered it to its ancestors' part of a happy realm in Pō (darkness or night). A soul without an *'aumakua* wandered homeless on earth, ate spiders and moths, and became a malevolent ghost. A soul with an ancestral god from the Pele family might be transfigured into a volcanic flame if a priest, having prayed and made offerings, cast the corpse or part of it into the crater. Other souls might be transfigured into embodiments (*kinolau*) of their gods—a shark, thunder, a water spirit, a bird, or something else. Transfigured male and female chiefs became their descendants' gods. The deification and transfiguration of ancestors is a primary example of the power of the nonpriest-based religious system that coexisted with the state or national religion that was headed by the ruling chief and the priestly orders. The nonpriest system was also manifested in family prayers, rituals involving the *pohaku o Kāne* (stone of Kāne), rituals and prayers for farming and fishing, and other religious expressions that did not require a specialized and trained *kahuna*.

Dead commoners were buried wherever it was convenient. The cleaned bones of some royalty were hidden in caves to prevent enemies from using them for fishhooks; the bones of other royalty were encased in plaited sennit caskets (*ka'ai*) of humanoid shape and deposited in the mausoleum Hale-o-Keawe on the island of Hawai'i. Sorcery was always suspected when a highborn person died. A *kahuna* trained to identify sorcerers held a *kuni* ("burn") ceremony in which he burned part of the victim's corpse. When the *kahuna's* god had revealed the sorcerer's name, the accused—even if a chief—was killed and burned.

**THE STATE RELIGION AND ITS DEMISE.** At his death in 1819, Kamehameha I, who believed his many gods had made him head of a unified feudal kingdom, left a state religion based on the *kapu* system that protected the *mana* and authority of the gods and their chiefly descendants from spiritual contamination and consequent weakness. That same year, however, Kamehameha's son Liholiho (1797–1824) took power, adopted the title Kamehameha II, and abolished both the *kapu* system of restrictions and rank and the official religion without replacing it with another. This decision, which was only reluctantly accepted by Liholiho, had principally been made by the most politically powerful of his father's wives, by his mother who was herself a sacred chief, and by the highest priest of the Kū order. Liholiho signaled the overthrow of the *kapu* system by publicly sharing a meal (consisting of food cooked in one oven) with his father's wife and his mother. Later, the Kū priests, after consulting with Liholiho, began destroying *heiau* and images. Some adherents of the traditions hid their images and worshiped in secret. Not all customs and beliefs vanished: even today, faith in the *'aumakua*, for example, lingers on. The only military resistance to the abolition of the religion came from Liholiho's cousin, who had inherited the god Kū-kā'ili-moku, but the resistance ended when the cousin lost his life in battle.

The reasons, still debated, for the overthrow of the religion have ranged from weariness of the burden of *kapu* on chiefs and commoners and on men and women, and, of course, the changes that had been wrought by Europeans and Americans. Particularly instrumental had been the introduction of a market economy, which was hampered by the chiefs' religious, social, and economic obligations to their people—a system of obligations that was based on the ancient and successful subsistence economy. Arguments have also been made that the practitioners themselves became disenchanted with the religious system when the death of Kamehameha I could not be prevented. A few months after Liholiho's act, the first band of American Protestant missionaries arrived from Boston; they were unaware of Liholiho's abolition of the traditional *kapu* system and religion until their ship was off Hawai'i's shore.

**SEE ALSO** Polynesian Religions; Tangaroa.

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Many of the volumes listed below are classics. Although David Malo, Samuel Kamakau, John Papa 'Ōi, and Kepelino be-



came Christian converts whose adopted religion sometimes colors their views of the indigenous culture, they were personally familiar with the tradition, and they also learned a great deal from their elders. 'Ōi, for example, as a boy had been an attendant of Liholiho (later Kamehameha II) and as an adult he held important positions in the government of the kingdom. Malo was born during the transitional period after arrival of Captain Cook and before the death of Kamehameha I. He was trained primarily as a genealogist or historian. Kamakau traveled extensively throughout the islands, interviewing elders and eyewitnesses of various events. The translators and editors of these works have added important explanatory notes. Martha Warren Beckwith's translation and chapters of annotation of the *Kumulipo*, the creation and genealogical chant of King Kalakaua and his sister Queen Lili'uokalani, help make the magnificent but cryptic chant comprehensible. It presents different interpretations by modern Hawaiians and discusses the importance nobility placed on descent. Beckwith's *Hawaiian Mythology* is irreplaceable as a comprehensive reference to the pantheon, and for many years it established the prevailing overview of Hawaiian religion, with its descriptions of demigods, romantic characters, and others. This work has the additional value of containing comparisons with other Pacific traditions, putting the material into cross-cultural perspective. Abraham Fornander, a nineteenth-century judge who married a Hawaiian chief, gathered an unparalleled collection of myths, traditions, tales, poems, prayers, and descriptions of religion; Thomas G. Thrum's notes shed light on obscure references. E. S. Craighill Handy's *Polynesian Religion* brilliantly discusses the interrelationships of indigenous Polynesian religions, including the Hawaiian, and illustrates the major concepts they share.

June Gutmanis published a major collection of ancient Hawaiian prayers selected from previously published and unpublished sources. Hawaiian texts are accompanied by English translations (and retractions) and by commentaries. Mary Kawena Pukui's book is written for social workers and other "members of the helping professions." Pukui, a Hawaiian, draws on her other published writings, her personal experiences, and her wide reading; with the psychiatrist E. W. Haertig, she discusses Hawaiian customs, beliefs, and rites as they relate to interpersonal relationships and the life cycle. The book includes modern case histories. The structural analysis of Marshall Sahlins and Valerio Valeri of Cook's arrival, the Makahiki celebrations, and temple worship provide provocative interpretations from primary source materials and suggest a reevaluation of the how Hawaiian religion functioned.

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KATHARINE LUOMALA (1987)  
MALCOLM NĀEA CHUN (2005)

**HAWKS** SEE EAGLES AND HAWKS

**ḤAWṬĀḤ** SEE ḤARAM AND ḤAWṬĀḤ

**HAWZAH**, which comes from *hawz*, is an Arabic word that literally means "the place surrounded by a swelling border." Technically it is applied to the traditional religious institution in the Shī'ī world known as Hawzah-e Ilmiyyah (Islamic seminary). The hawzah seeks to attain two major missions: (1) training the clerics to preach the principles and practices of Islam, particularly that of the Shī'ah; and (2) training the experts in religious sciences, ones who can deduce Islamic rules from the related sources. In the early twenty-first century this Shī'ī institution works in the countries where the Shī'ah population is considerable, such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India, and Lebanon. Throughout history Najaf, Hillah, Karbala, and Samirra in Iraq and Isfahan, Qom, Shiraz, and Mashhad in Iran have alternately assumed the central leadership role of the Shī'ī hawzah.

It is said that the establishment of the first hawzah goes historically back to the year 1054, when Muḥammad ibn

Ḥasan Ṭusī, known as Shaykh-e Ṭusī, settled in Najaf, a holy city of Iraq. Shaykh-e Ṭusī began training students in various branches of Islamic studies, such as jurisprudence (*fiqh*), theology (*kalām*), tradition (*ḥadīth*), and the interpretation of the Qurʾān (*tafsīr*). Accordingly the Iraqi cities Hillah, Karbala, and Samarra held a considerable position in the history of the hawzah after Najaf. During two periods (1202–1542 and 1737–1797) the hawzahs of Hillah and Karbala replaced Najaf in the premier position. Before the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979), Najaf was the most important center of religious sciences in the world for the Shīʿah. Nonetheless the Baʿth government attempted to weaken the authority of the hawzah and the marjīʿiyyat (supreme religious authority) in Najaf. Many senior clerics were arrested, killed or exiled. During that period the number of religious students in Najaf fell from ten thousand to two thousand. At that point the central leadership of the Shīʿah was transferred from Najaf to Qom. After Ṣaddām Ḥusayn's fall from power, many Iraqi clerics hoped Najaf would regain its former status.

**HAWZAH IN IRAN.** Iran has also had an extensive history regarding the Shīʿī hawzah. At the time of the Al-e Buyah dynasty (930–1054) a considerable number of *madrasahs* (religious schools) were built in Qom and Ray—the two ancient cities located near Tehran—and eminent scholars, such as Shaykh-e Saduq and his father, were there at that time. The history of the hawzah in Iran as an official institution goes back to the Safavid era (1502–1736). Isfahan, the capital of the Safavid Empire, was the most glorious center for Islamic sciences and arts in the world. Prominent scholars, such as Mullah Sadra Shirazi, ʿAllamah Majlisi, and Muhaqqiq Karaki, had significant chairs in philosophy, tradition (*ḥadīth*), and jurisprudence (*fiqh*).

Similarly the hawzah of Qom regained its previous position after a long time of stagnation. Madrasah-e Fayziyyah, the ancient and famous religious school of Qom, was established in 1524 by the order of Shah Tahmasb I. After the Safavid era the hawzah of Qom was inactive, except for a short period (1200–1231) during the time of Mirza Abul Qasim Qomi, until the twentieth century, when Grand Āyatullāh ʿAbd al-Karim Haʿiri settled in Qom in 1920 and reestablished the hawzah in Qom.

**EDUCATIONAL SCHEDULE IN HAWZAH.** The major educational schedule in the hawzah is comprised of three stages: (1) the preliminary stage (*muqaddamat*), which contains some courses in Arabic literature and logic and lasts two to three years; (2) the intermediate stage (*sutuh*), which requires learning from textbooks in *fiqh* (jurisprudence), *uṣūl* (the basic principles of jurisprudence), and philosophy and lasts four to six years; and (3) the higher stage (*dars-e kharij*), which is devoted to *fiqh* and *uṣūl*. Unlike the first and second stages, education at the third level is not restricted to textbooks. Rather, instructors give analytical lectures presenting significant views on the subject matter and evaluating those positions. This stage is intended to increase the intellectual

power of the students. One who wants to attain the qualification of *ijtihād* (expertise in *fiqh*), should pass this course, which lasts from seven to ten years depending on the amount of effort displayed by the student. One who successfully completes this stage is then called a *mujtahid* (expert in *fiqh*).

A brief look at the educational schedule of the hawzah shows that *fiqh* and *uṣūl* have been the main courses since the Safavid era. Thus the other branches of Islamic studies have not developed in Shiism. It should be noted that ʿAllamah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tabatabaʿi (d. 1982) revived Islamic philosophy and Qurʾanic interpretation (*tafsīr*) in Qom, and twenty-first-century students continue to study his way. After the Iranian revolution, some institutions established departments of psychology, sociology, economics, and politics in the hawzahs of Qom believing they can teach an Islamic approach to these sciences.

**HIERARCHICAL ORDER IN HAWZAH.** There are three major ranks in the hawzah: (1) *talabah* (religious student), (2) *mujtahid* (an expert in *fiqh*), and (3) *marjaʿ* (supreme religious leader). *Talabah* (the one who seeks to learn knowledge) is the name for a student of a hawzah and means the one who seeks to learn Islamic sciences. *Mujtahid* refers to the one who can derive and deduce the laws and decrees from the authentic sources of Islam, namely the Qurʾān, the *ḥadīths*, reasoning (intellect), and the consensus of ʿ*ulamāʿ* (religious scholars). Those who complete the higher education may reach this rank. A cleric before *ijtihād* is usually called *hujjatul-Islām* (the proof of Islam) and after *ijtihād* is called Āyatullāh (the sign of God).

*Marjaʿ* refers to the person who has attained the high level of piety and justice in addition to *ijtihād* and can attract a number of followers among laypeople. According to Shīʿī jurisprudence, everyone reaching adolescence should start following a fully qualified *marjaʿ*. A *marjaʿ* is normally called by the title *Āyatullāh al-uzma* (the biggest sign of God).

*Marjaʿiyyat* is the office of supreme religious authority in Shiism, and *marajīʿ* are in charge of the hawzahs, supporting the students both spiritually and financially. Shīʿah people pay them their religious tax, known as *khums* (one fifth of the annual income), and they manage the hawzahs financially with it. Traditionally, due to this direct contribution from the people, the Shīʿī hawzahs have rejected government financial help in order to keep their independence. Thus the history of the hawzah shows that Shīʿī scholars could freely declare their ideas against the governments in their countries. But after the Islamic revolution of Iran, with the direct involvement of clerics in ruling the state and in executive affairs and with the financial support of the government, the hawzah of Iran has somewhat lost its independence. There is a good chance that the hawzah of Najaf, in the post-Ṣaddām regime, will revive its independent hawzah of the Shīʿah, especially as the Najaf school does not interpret *Vilāyat-e Faqih* (the guardianship of the religious jurist) as the direct intervention of religion in politics.

Qom, with many prominent scholars in various branches of religious sciences and nearly forty thousand students, holds a unique position among Shī'ī hawzahs because only two thousand students are studying in Najaf in the early twenty-first century. Nevertheless, as a consequence of Ṣaddām's fall from power, Najaf has a valuable opportunity to regain its former glory.

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MUHAMMAD KAZEM SHAKER (2005)

**HAYASHI RAZAN** (1583–1657), also commonly referred to as Hayashi Dōshun; Japanese Confucian thinker of the early Tokugawa period. Hayashi Razan was born and raised in Kyoto as the scion of a family of samurai turned urban merchants. He was sent as a child to study at Kenninji, a Zen temple, but he resisted suggestions that he become a priest. Instead, from his mid-teens he committed himself to the study of Confucianism and Chinese secular learning. He began his career as a Confucian in 1603 at the age of twenty-one by conducting public lectures on the *Analects* of Confucius as explicated by the Chinese Song Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi. In this manner Razan sought to establish Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism as a public teaching independent of both the hermetic traditions of medieval scholarship and the Zen-accented Confucianism that flourished in the major Zen temples of the Muromachi period. Toward the same end, affiliating himself with Fujiwara Seika, Razan adopted the latter's hallmark of a scholar's garb patterned after that of the scholar-official class of China.

However, Razan's career as an independent scholar was relatively short. In 1605 he came to the attention of Tokugawa Ieyasu, founder of the Tokugawa shogunate, and in 1607 he entered the service of the shogun. Earlier military rulers had employed monks to draft legislation and handle other government matters requiring erudition and writing skills beyond the ordinary. In accordance with that tradition, one of the conditions for Razan's employment was that he shave his head and assume priestly garb and the priestlike name of Dōshun. These conditions remained in effect for the duration of his employment, which continued until his death fifty years later.

Razan's employment by the shogunate is often taken as a symbol of Ieyasu's intent to establish Zhu Xi Neo-

Confucianism as the official ideology. But as the conditions of his employment suggest, Razan was taken into service because of his general erudition rather than because of any particular expertise in Neo-Confucianism, and his official duties had little to do with the spread of Confucian teachings. Together with the Buddhist priests in shogunal employ, he oversaw the shogunal library, drafted diplomatic correspondence between the Tokugawa and the rulers of other countries, and participated in the drafting of laws and the compilation of the genealogical records of shogunal vassals. He also embarked on the writing of a major history of Japan, eventually completed after his death by his son Gahō, who inherited Razan's position with the shogunate.

Of more relevance to his background as a Confucian scholar, Razan established a private school and shrine to Confucius that eventually received shogunal support, although not on the scale of shogunal patronage of various Buddhist institutions. He wrote works elucidating various points of Zhu Xi's teachings and polemics against Christianity and Buddhism, which, in the Confucian vein, he attacked as socially disruptive and therefore immoral religions, alike in their practiced deception of a credulous, ignorant populace. At the same time, arguing that the Confucian way of government and Shintō were the same in essence, he asserted that to establish Confucianism in Tokugawa life was to restore Shintō to its true place in Japanese society.

However, by and large Razan was more noted for his wide-ranging knowledge than for the originality or compelling nature of his interpretation of Confucianism. He did not found a distinctive school comparable to that of Yamazaki Ansai or the later Ogyū Sorai. In the area of Shintō studies, his influence was also relatively slight. Perhaps out of rivalry with the Buddhist monks associated with the shogunate, who had succeeded in gaining the latter's support for their own more traditional fusion of Buddhism and Shintō (this support was reflected most graphically in the shogunate's sponsoring of the posthumous apotheosis of Tokugawa Ieyasu as a Buddhist-Shintō deity), Razan sought to establish his particular fusion of Confucianism and Shintō as the special hermetic tradition of his house. But his successors did not continue his efforts.

Thus Razan's main contribution to the establishment of Confucianism in Tokugawa life lay in his carving out a position for the professional scholar as a government adviser. At the same time, however, he was condemned by many other Tokugawa Confucians for his readiness to compromise his principles in the process of winning a place for himself. Both Yamazaki Ansai and Nakae Tōju began their careers as Confucians by denouncing Razan's acceptance of treatment as a priest despite his recognition of the evils of Buddhism. Others objected to the precedent he established for the treatment of the Confucian as a professional scholar differentiated from and subordinate to those responsible for the actual business of government. In the eyes of many Tokugawa Confucians, the career pattern for the Confucian scholar pioneered by

Razan contravened the traditional ideal of the Confucian playing a central role in society and thereby bringing his education and moral rectitude to bear on the transformation of society.

SEE ALSO Confucianism in Japan.

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KATE WILDMAN NAKAI (1987 AND 2005)

**HAYDON, A. EUSTACE** (1880–1975), was a Canadian historian of religions and a founder of the modern humanist movement in North America. Born in Brampton, Ontario, Albert Eustace Haydon attended McMaster University, where he received his B. A., Th.B., B.D., and M.A. degrees; the University of Saskatchewan, where he received another master's degree; and the University of Chicago, where he received his Ph.D. After serving as a Baptist pastor in Canada (1903–1913), a YMCA general secretary (1913–1916), and a Unitarian minister (1918–1924), Haydon joined the faculty of the University of Chicago in 1919; he became chairman of the department of comparative religion there in 1921 and a full professor in 1929, and he stayed at Chicago until his retirement in 1945.

Haydon was critical of theories of religion that understood it to be grounded in “religious consciousness” or in a response to a trans-human religious object or power, and of prior appropriations of the comparative method in the study of religion, which he saw to be apologetic in character; he in turn articulated a theory of religion that was influenced by the social sciences. Rejecting efforts to discover a unilinear evolutionary theory of religion as misdirected quests for origins, he considered religion to be basically social in character. In a manner consistent with his functionalist approach to religion, Haydon saw the religious sensibility as characterized by a shared social quest for the good (that is, the completely satisfying) life. The study of the history of religions became for him the continuing effort to describe the various manifestations of the persistent human quest to realize idealized values of the good life in diverse cultural contexts.

There were, he suggested, three components of religion: a socially envisioned set of ideal values, a program for the realization of these values, and a worldview in which the quest for these values is related to the natural and human environments. In his scholarly publications, Haydon implemented his understanding of the task of the historian of religions by describing the ways in which this human quest has been manifested in the particular religions that appear, in concrete

forms, in diverse and endlessly varied cultural and conditioning environments. He understood humanism to have an essentially religious dimension. Haydon was one of the authors of both the Humanist Manifesto of 1933 and of the revised Humanist Manifesto of 1973.

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**ḤAYYIM VITAL** SEE VITAL, ḤAYYIM

#### HEAD

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

SYMBOLISM AND RITUAL USE  
THE CELTIC HEAD CULT

#### HEAD: SYMBOLISM AND RITUAL USE

The symbolic and religious value of the head is attested by various myths that stress the theme of many-headedness



(thus calling attention to assorted aspects of divine power) as well as by numerous rituals, dating to prehistoric times, in which the human head is hunted, offered as a sacrifice, preserved, and venerated. Whatever exact meaning these myths and rites ascribe to the head, they all rest on a common, and certainly very ancient, valorization that must not be overintellectualized. In the most archaic psychology the forces of courage as well as the impulses of anger and violence have their base in the head. The Greeks of the Homeric age considered it the location of a *psuchē* difficult to control and opposed to reason and judgment, which were located in the chest and heart. In agreement with Alcmaeon of Croton, the Pythagoreans localized sperm in the head. From that localization of life force came the belief that the vital and spiritual element of a victim could be assimilated by eating his brain.

As a source of power, the skull naturally became an object of worship: its magical value came from the fact that it was supposed to be the center of life. Among the Celts, for example, the head was the container of a sacred force, whereas in other ancient and traditional cultures, the head is conceived of as the seat of vital energy, the active principle of the whole individual. From such beliefs come headhunting rituals, the offering of skulls in sacrifice, and veneration for ancestors' skulls, as well as the apotropaic talismanic value attributed to the head.

**MULTIPLE HEADS.** Indo-European mythologies represented the diverse fields of application of the divine power by endowing the gods with three heads. Hinduism recognizes the *trimūrti*, a figure with three faces on the same head, representing Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva; in other words, the creating, preserving, and destroying power of the divine One.

Śiva is often shown with three or five faces and many arms, a sign of his omnipotence. Agni (Fire), accomplishing the will of Indra in the world, is endowed with three heads. Indra, "the leader of all the gods and lord of light," will struggle against Triśiras, the son of Traṣṭr the demiurge, a young ascetic Brahmāṇ also possessing three heads: with one he reads the Vedas, with the second he eats, and thanks to the third, he surveys the whole universe. He was endowed with a threefold knowledge and a threefold will and thus risked upsetting the divine equilibrium. Indra therefore struck Triśiras with his thunderbolt and had a woodcutter chop off his three heads. In the Greek world, Hekate, the lunar goddess of night and of crossroads, has three heads: a horse's or cow's head and a dog's head that together frame the head of a young girl. She possesses an abundance of magical charms. In the same nocturnal register there corresponds the dog Kerberos, with three heads and tails of a serpent. Kerberos is the guardian of Hell, and his monstrous voracity, born of the imagination, is the incarnation of the greed of devouring death.

The Hindu god Aditi has two faces, for it is he who begins and ends each liturgical act (*Śatapatha Brahmana* 3.2.4.16). Like him, the Bifrons Janus of the Romans has a double face, for he is the god of passage in time as well as

space. His face is double, as his functions as overseer and protector of time are ambivalent. Among the Celts, the three-headed god, often identified by the Gallo-Romans with Mercury, had many representations in Aedui country and in the northeast of Gaul. Certain Celtic myths feature animal gods with three heads or three horns. This repetition signifies, as in Hinduism, the desire to represent, and thereby augment, the divine power. It is the same for the Thracian Rider, often endowed with three heads. In the nineteenth century, thousands of representations of anthropomorphic divinities with three or seven heads were destroyed during the evangelization of the Samoyeds. This many-headedness recalls the faculty of seeing and knowing everything that the Finno-Ugrians assigned to the sun, which was the principal manifestation of the god Num.

**BEHEADING.** Numerous discoveries in mountain caves have revealed the existence during the last interglacial period (150,000 years ago) of rites in which the skulls of bears were placed with long bones and preserved as if they were an offering to a divinity in charge of dispensing the spoils of the hunt. This rite seems analogous to one practiced not so long ago by the Inuit (Eskimo) of King William Island and to another rite practiced by the Samoyeds, in which a reindeer's head and long bones were exposed on some branches as an offering to Num, their supreme god. The discovery in Silesia of the skull of a young bear whose incisors and canines had been sawed and filed has been compared to a rite practiced by the Gilyak of Sakhalin Island and by the Ainu of Yezo, present-day Hokkaidō. This offering of an animal's skull and long bones appears very characteristic of hunting peoples. However, if the fact of their belief in a supreme being who is lord of the animals can be contested because of the lack of unambiguous documents, the religious character of this offering seems certain from the time of the late Paleolithic age.

It is difficult to ascertain whether it is a question here of a sacrifice of firstlings in which the brain and the marrow are offered to the god (the thesis of Alexander Gahs, 1928) or of a belief that the killed animal will not be reincarnated into another similar animal unless its bones remain intact (according to Karl Meuli's hypothesis in *Griechische Opferbräuche*, Basel, 1945). It is possible to state, however, that the idea of a ritual intended to assure the quantitative renewal of game rests upon an identical belief observed in a large zone extending from the Caucasus to Tibet, and in the entire Arctic European and North American zone. Similar indications have been found in Mesopotamia, in ancient Ugarit at the time of the Aqhat epic, as well as in the Egyptian *Book of Going Forth by Day*. Applied to the hunted animal (bear or reindeer) the belief is that life resides in the "soul of the bones," and that in offering the skull it is the whole animal, in its most vital part, that is thus consecrated to the god.

One finds the same belief, but now applied to man, in founding rituals that mention certain myths: the first decapitation is the sacrifice that founds the order of the created

world. According to the Chaldean priest Berossus (third century BCE), the god Marduk ordered the head of the first (primordial) man cut off. From a mixture of the spurting blood and the earth, Marduk then fashioned all humans and animals. The construction of a city or a temple is also found to be linked to a sacrificial decapitation in certain myths about the Kotoko of Chad.

Pliny reports (*Natural History* 23.4) that when the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus was constructed at Rome, a gigantic human skull was found during the laying of the foundations. This was interpreted as a favorable portent that Rome would be the head of the world and the capitol the seat of its power. We should also recall the Christian legend of Adam's skull, found at the very place where the cross of Christ was raised at Golgotha, "the place of the skull," as if to mark the foundation by the new Adam of the new Jerusalem of redeemed men. A completely different meaning, closer to that of hunting peoples, appears in the Aztec ritual of beheading during the sacrifice to Chicomecoatl-Xilonen, the goddess of young corn, and to Teteoinnan (Toci), the mother goddess of fertility and vegetal plenty. It should be noted that the same word, *quehcotona*, designates both sacrificial decapitation and the gathering of ears of corn.

The head-hunt, a rather common practice, is the necessary condition for being recognized as an adult and being deemed suitable for marriage. This practice is more like a ritualized war expedition than a sacrifice to the gods. It is well documented among Indo-European peoples such as the Scythians, who suspended the heads of enemies they had killed around the necks of their horses (Herodotos, 4.6.4). In ancient Greece the head hunt was an obligatory rite for initiation into the brotherhood of animal-men: Dolon the Trojan dressed himself in a wolf skin and tried one night to bring back the heads of Odysseus and Agamemnon; when he was discovered, his own head was cut off by Odysseus and Diomedes (*Iliad* 208ff.). The skull hunt was commonly practiced by the Celts. The Gauls hung the trophy skulls in their homes or nailed them to the main door after having rubbed them with cedar oil (Strabo, 4.4.5; Diodorus Siculus, 5.29.4–5). Sometimes these skulls, glazed with a thin layer of gold, served as sacred vessels for human blood libations to Teutates, and as cups strictly reserved for use by the druids and the chiefs (Livy, 23.24.12). This custom was to be maintained in Celtic Ireland and in the country of the Gauls. Gallic coins from Armorica pictured chopped-off heads as a victory symbol evoking the hero Cú Chulainn, the son of the god Lugh who brandished decapitated enemy heads in battle in order to frighten the enemy. He himself died in single combat with Lugard, who cleaved his head, since in the Celtic world death took effect only if the membranes of the brain, the adversary's seat of life and force, were reached.

In certain Semitic cultures, or cultures influenced by Semitic peoples, the head hunt is associated with the hunt for genital parts. Whether practiced in ancient Israel (*1 Sm.* 18.25–27, *2 Sm.* 3.14) or by ethnic groups in northern East

Africa, the trophy brought back is, along with the head, the foreskin or male member. Among the American Plains Indians, scalps have always been war trophies that the Cheyenne or Blackfeet hung at the tip of a pole around which they danced in honor of the forces of nature. Joseph François Lafitau (*Mœurs des sauvages américains*, vol. 2, *De la guerre*, 1724) says that the Iroquois exposed the severed head of an enemy caught apart before the battle in order to frighten their opponents, but that afterward they only scalped those who were dead or left for dead. This scalp was prepared like the skin of an animal taken in the hunt and exhibited at the end of a pole. Lafitau compares this practice to that of the Scythians and the Gauls.

In the whole Malay archipelago, the head hunt and human sacrifice have been so closely linked that among the Niassans, the same word, *binu*, designates both. Among the Dayak in central Borneo, the ideal booty consists of the head because it contains "the substance of the soul." The victims of this hunt are excluded from the kingdom of the dead, as are the hanged, those struck by lightning, and those who died in an accident. On the other hand, victorious hunters and heroes who fall in the course of a head hunt are noble, and their souls will live at the summit of high mountains in the company of the Kamangs, their ancestors. A similar practice was more recently extended to the mountainous populations of Indochina, to the Nagas studied by J. P. Mills (1926–1937), as well as to the Jivaroan people of Latin America and the Mundurum of Brazil, who carefully preserved the heads of decapitated enemies, sometimes by shrinking. Head hunts are conducted on the occasions of rites of passage and initiation, or during the foundation rites for a common house, the chief's house, or the village temple.

The close connection between the skull hunt and human sacrifice has also been noted in Assam and Burma. Under the influence of Śaiva Tantrism, the ritualistic and symbolic role of the skull in Tibetan Buddhism has often been superimposed on a very ancient stratum of local beliefs, culminating in a revalorization of prehistoric practices in a type of Tantric yoga. Such was the case with the Aghorins, Śaiva ascetics who ate from human skulls and meditated while seated on cadavers, and who also practiced ritual cannibalism up to the end of the nineteenth century. They were the successors of the Kāpālikas, or "carriers of skulls," who had certain orgiastic practices and were worshipers of Śiva the great destroyer (*Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad* 6.8). Forgetting the yogic significance of the corpse and the skeleton, these Aghori naturally rediscovered the most ancient practice of the cannibalistic headhunters (Mircea Eliade, *Yoga*, New York, 1958, pp. 296–298).

The Aztec decapitation ritual took place after the human sacrifice. The head, separated from the body from which the heart and the lungs had already been removed, was impaled and publicly displayed on the *tzompantli*. The skulls, perforated transversally at the level of the temples, remained there a long time. This ritual was ordinarily practiced

at the time of the sacrifices to the warrior gods, the hunting gods, or the agrarian gods, but we have not been able to uncover the deepest reason for such a practice. In a single Mexican village, Fray Bernardino de Sahagún saw seven *tzompantli* (*Florentine Codex*, appendix 2) and the conquistadors counted between 80,000 and 136,000 human heads exposed in this way, among which Cortés recognized those of fifty-three of his companions next to four heads of the first horses put to death. It is not certain that these “skull walls,” which inspired respect mixed with fear, were the result of the worship of the god of death. But it is certain that the head was a sacrificial trophy that was displayed as the personal property of the Aztec collectivity, since the handling of these heads seems always to have been reserved for the priests and dignitaries of the Aztec people (*Florentine Codex* 3.53).

Certain African ethnic groups link the skull to initiation rituals; thus, in the blood-pact rite in Benin, the skull of a traitor or one who died by accident serves as the receptacle for a beverage made of the cointiates' blood. Those who betray their oath will experience the same ignominious death as the skull's owner. In the rite of initiation into Haitian Vodou, the concepts of *por-tête*, *mait-tête*, and *lav'tête* have quasi-magic importance, as the place where the initiate, whose head hair, body hair, and nails have been gathered, unites with the *lwa*, or spirit, received at the time of initiation.

**THE HONORED HEAD.** Discoveries from the Middle and Upper Paleolithic ages, in Europe as well as in the Middle East, or in Australia, show the importance of the cult of the skulls of the ancestors. Their heads were prepared with great care and preserved. These skulls have undergone an enlargement of the occipital orifice, have been colored with red ocher, a substitute for blood as the symbol of life, and have been preserved according to a precise ritual orientation exactly like that practiced not long ago in Sulawesi. Likewise, the Aborigines of Australia preserve their relatives' skulls with great care, in order to venerate them and carry them along with them on their pilgrimages. The same care in decorating and preserving the ancestors' skulls is also found among the Andamanese of the Bay of Bengal, the Papuans of New Guinea, and the Indians of Bolivia. All of them believe that the “soul of the dead” resides in his skull and that it protects them.

In the same way, the Celts preserved the skulls of their next of kin on “encephalic” pillars with hollowed-out niches, such as those of Roquepertuse, Entremont, and Glanum. This custom was maintained for a long time in the Danube Basin where the ancestors' skulls, separated from their skeletons, were preserved under the main altar in churches. Every year, during the rites of passage, the young men took them out and wore them around their necks. Certain African ethnic groups, like the Bamileke, bring the skull of the deceased back into the home and deposit it near the family altar, where it is invoked in prayers of benediction and protection. This is because the skull, as a vessel for sacred power of divine

origin, protects its possessor against all kinds of peril and gives him health, wealth, and victory.

Belief in the oracular powers of the head follows from this worship of the ancestors' skulls. Because the head is the seat of life, it is believed that one can easily enter into a relationship with the dead by means of the skull. Those of ancestors permit one to question the spirits, a common practice in Melanesia and Polynesia. Among certain Indian ethnic groups of Latin America, the Jivaroan people in particular, the spirits manifest themselves in the shape of skulls, formidable if they belong to ancient shamans. The Inuit of Iglulik believe in the existence of tattooed flying heads, the manifestation of spirits who have taught language to the Inuit. In ancient Israel, the *terafim* show the relation between the worship of skulls and divination: small anthropomorphic domestic idols become the instrument of divination (*Gn.* 31:19; *I Sm.*, 15:23, 19:13, etc.). Commenting on these texts, medieval rabbis affirmed that the *terafim* were made from the decapitated head of a firstborn son from which the hair had been removed. The head, sprinkled with salt and castor oil, was preserved and questioned about the future according to a ritual analogous to the one reported in the tenth century among the natives of Hauran. The Greeks likewise were acquainted with the existence of oracular heads: that of Orpheus at Lesbos (Philostratus, *Heroicus* 5.704) and that of Archonides preserved by Cleomenes of Sparta (Aelianus, 12.8).

But it is especially in Celtic literature that the theme of the oracular head comes to its fullest expression. Separated from the body, heads continue to act and speak as if they preserved the vital breath they once contained, like Brân's head in the *Mabinogi*, or those of the Roman Arthurians who take up the old theme of *Fledh Bhricrenn*, in which the hero Cú Chulainn is the prototype of the knight Gawain. The Celtic theme of the severed head, still living and speaking, is the foundation of Christian legends of cephalophoric saints, the most famous of which is Saint Denis, the bishop of Paris. All these legends originated in northern Gaul, in Celtic country, and do not illustrate, as was long believed, the affirmation of Chrysostom concerning the martyrs who could present themselves with confidence at God's tribunal “carrying their cut-off heads as a testimony of their martyrdom.” It is always the same sacred power, vital and of divine origin, that is expressed by the severed head testifying to its religious faith.

**SEE ALSO** Bones; Crown; Human Sacrifice, overview article; Nimbus.

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MICHEL MESLIN (1987)

*Translated from French by Kristine Anderson*

## HEAD: THE CELTIC HEAD CULT

Head-hunting as a proof of prowess and the veneration of the head as the seat of the soul and the source of spiritual potency are both far older than the dawn of the historical period. In Europe there is fairly clear evidence for them as far back as Mesolithic times. They were therefore part of the European heritage long before the Celts emerged as a distinct cultural entity. But here, as in so many other instances, what the Celts borrowed or inherited from others they soon made peculiarly their own. The veneration of the head became a central element of their ideology, a deep-set preoccupation which lasted from the birth of the Celtic peoples to their final conquest, one which left its imprint ubiquitously on their art and on their mythology.

The archaeological and artistic evidence for the head cult among the Celts is too extensive to catalog briefly. For example, at the Celto-Ligurian sanctuary of Entremont in southern Gaul (Provence), fifteen male skulls were found, several of them still bearing the marks of the spikes with which they had been fixed for display, and at Bredon Hill in Gloucestershire, England, a row of skulls uncovered near the entrance seem to have fallen from above the gate of the fort. At Entremont there are many examples of severed heads sculpted on blocks of stone, while Roquepertuse, also in Provence, has its famous decorated portico with niches in which human skulls were placed. There is also a wealth of heads sculpted in stone or carved in metal which, while not explicitly identified as severed heads, reflect clearly and sometimes very dramatically the importance accorded the head as a symbol of extraordinary power and divinity: for example, those from Heidelberg or from Mšecké-Žehrovice in Bohemia, or the pear-shaped heads on the Pfalzfeld Pillar, or the three-faced head from Corleck, County Cavan, Ireland.

Classical authors confirm the archaeological testimony. According to Posidonius, as reported by Diodorus Siculus (5.29.4–5) and Strabo (4.4.5), the Celts returned from battle with the heads of their defeated enemies hanging from the necks of their horses. The heads of their most distinguished

opponents they embalmed in cedar oil and stored carefully in a chest to be displayed proudly to their visitors, and in some instances they used the skull of a distinguished enemy as a vessel for sacred libations. These and other similar references are supported by the insular Celtic literatures, where the return of the hero carrying the heads of his foes as trophies is commonplace. Cormac's *Glossary*, which dates from around 900 CE, defines the term *mesradh Machae*, "the nut harvest of Macha (the war goddess)," as "the heads of men after they have been cut down."

But the cult of the head went far beyond the pursuit of martial glory. The head was not only a prized heroic trophy but also a profoundly religious symbol, sometimes evidently representative of a deity and generally suggestive of supernatural wisdom and power. It was a source of prosperity, fertility, and healing as well as an apotropaic agent to ward off evil from the individual and from the community as a whole. Severed heads are often associated with sacred wells—themselves instruments of healing—in the archaeological record, in the early insular literature, and in modern oral tradition, and this association was carried over into the legends of the Christian saints. There are many instances in the literature of heads continuing to live—speaking, directing, entertaining—long after they have been separated from the body. Perhaps the most striking example is that of Bendigeidvran (Brân the Blessed), whose head presided over the otherworld and protected the island of Britain since its burial at the White Mount in London. Indeed so widespread and so persistent is the image of the head in its various aspects that Anne Ross has seen fit to describe it as "the most typical Celtic religious symbol."

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PROINSIAS MAC CANA (1987 AND 2005)

## HEALING AND MEDICINE

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

AN OVERVIEW  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN AFRICA  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN THE AFRICAN DIASPORA  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN JUDAISM  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN ISLAMIC TEXTS AND TRADITIONS  
 POPULAR HEALING PRACTICES IN MIDDLE EASTERN CULTURES  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN GREECE AND ROME  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN CHRISTIANITY  
 ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE IN THE NEW AGE  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN ĀYURVEDA AND SOUTH ASIA  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN CHINA  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN TIBET  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN JAPAN  
 HEALING AND MEDICINE IN INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIA

### HEALING AND MEDICINE: AN OVERVIEW

Healing occupies a singular and prominent place in religious experience throughout the world. Often the most important figure or symbol in any given religious tradition is the source of healing, and illness tends to function as a magnet for many and varied ritual responses. In addition, the existence of personal suffering in the world may serve as a springboard for theological and mythological exploration and explanation.

The aims of religious healing are consonant with the overall goals of religious life in a culture. Healing may be directed toward reestablishing ritual order, life in abundance, the expulsion of disorder and evil, redemption from condemnation, salvation from guilt and sin, liberation from existence, or extinction of existence itself. Sickness reminds religious beings to assume their peculiar role in the world, one cognizant of sacred realities and coordinated with the cosmos. Rituals of healing redress the fragmented social, personal, temporal, physical, and metaphysical tissues constituting the whole of the universe. All this is possible because the human body and its experiences comprise a knowable world of physical, spiritual, mental, cognitive, and emotional forces that reveal supernatural structures of creation. Religious healing clarifies the ways in which the individual human body lies at the center of sacred meaning.

The meaning and value of ideas and experiences associated with healing become most clear in the specific religious contexts in which they arise. Thus, for example, the passion of physical suffering has different meanings in the self-sacrifice of the Buddhist Bodhisattva Kṣemadatta who burned his own hand to become a living lamp; in the crucifixion of Christ, necessary for those who believe in him to gain everlasting life; and in the death of al-Ḥallāj (d. 922), the Muslim mystical poet who saw the human condition in both its love and painful separation of absence and death as a mirror of the divine nature and its attributes.

The following discussion deals with religious healing from a comparative perspective. The outline roughly follows the hypothetical contours of an incident of sickness and cure, moving from the origins of the disease and techniques of cure through the discovery of symptoms, their diagnosis, choice of therapy, the actions of cure, and the aftereffects of healing. Information on healing in particular religious traditions and culture areas can be found in the articles immediately following this overview.

**MYTHS OF THE ORIGINS OF DISEASE.** Images and symbols of the origins of disease help justify and rationalize sickness and exculpate (or blame) the victim of illness. They also help the community to think about the condition of sickness. However, the importance of myths of the origins of disease goes beyond the social and cognitive in that they help locate sickness as an ontological condition—a mode of being.

The supreme being itself may send afflictions. In keeping with their absolute and total character, celestial supreme beings dispatch people with summary diseases and capital punishments. The Semang of Kedah (Malaysia), for example, believe that the supreme being Kari, who created most of the universe, is omniscient and sees every offense from his dwelling place on high. He punishes wrongdoers by dropping a flower from a mysterious plant on them. Wherever the flower falls, fatal lightning strikes. Often, congenital diseases are attributed to the creator. The Mondari of southern Sudan attribute the origin of certain nervous disorders and mental sickness to Ngun Ki (Spirit-of-the-Above). Symptoms of such diseases include sudden onset, an indication that the power from above has fallen hard and swiftly. Alternately, mental incapacity that appears to be congenital is also attributed to the authorship of the creator, for the afflicted are considered bad creations that were broken or spoiled in the making.

Supreme beings and creators not only set in motion fatal and incurable diseases, they can indirectly unleash a flood of pathogenic substances on the world. This is especially the case when creators destroy their own creations through universal flood, fire, petrification, darkness, or earthquake. These catastrophes generally leave toxic residues. Left over and only partially destroyed, such fragments of the primordial world cause disease in those who come into contact with them (if these fragments should be inert substances like poisons, ashes, or brackish primordial waters) or who are attacked by

them, as in the case of leftover primordial monsters continuing to devour victims in today's world.

In the northwest Amazon area of South America, in the upper Río Negro region, the Baniwa people believe that many diseases originated when the culture hero Kuai was consumed by the fire that swept through the world at the beginning of time. From Kuai's mouth and other body orifices streamed saliva and fluids that became the poisons of this world, and from the fur on his body came the pathogenic darts and slivers that invade human beings.

At times, a co-creator, one who competes with or thwarts the efforts of the divine creative partner, introduces disease into the world. According to the Mazdean theology of the Iranian *Dēnkard* (9.37.5), the world was once perfect, immortal, and immaterial (*menog*). Even the material creation (*getig*) made by Ohrmazd, the good creator, was perfect. Only when Ahriman creates finite space does he corrupt the world with evil and sickness, a state of confusion (*gumezishm*) that will endure until the end of time. Ahriman's demonic creations inhabit human bodies, where they lodge themselves as diseases.

Often a more ambiguous divine figure introduces disease. Divine culture heroes or mythical tricksters collaborate in creation with the supreme being. However, they are rarely equal in power or status with the high god. They are usually deputies commissioned to carry out the will of the creator. In the course of discharging their duties, however, they bungle the job or meet with misadventure that lets loose disease. Bauro, the hero of Tucano-speakers of southern Colombia, for example, was entrusted with the gourd of night. This gourd would allow people to dream and to perform ceremonies if it was opened with due care. Unfortunately, the hero was unable to prevent meddlers from opening the container prematurely. Its contents flooded the earth with penetrating darkness, accompanied by the diseases of noxious vermin, stinging insects, and venomous reptiles.

In some cases, the divine or supernatural body itself gives rise to disease. This is especially true among mythic figures whose slain cadavers are dismembered to bring into being various species of plants or animals. Consumptive realities (i.e., substances to be consumed) appear not only in the forms of food but in the guise of diseases.

Ancient Daoist texts (*Huainanzi*, chaps. 2, 4; *Zhuangzi*, chap. 9; and *Shanhai jing*, chap. 13) describe the origins of madness. Ancient gods of the time of paradise drummed their bellies and created a rumble-guts of thunder and lightning, shattering the world with a primordial deluge. The belly is the location of the Yellow Court, the center of meditative techniques and mystical experiences that transmute the body, rid it of impurities, and reconceive the individual as a holy and immortal embryo. The individual who suffers madness in this way is said to know with his or her belly the ancestral gods who drummed at the time of creation.

Many diseases result from the incomplete condition of creation. According to a myth reporting the emergence of the

Navajo peoples at the beginning of time, colors were kept separate from one another in different world levels and in the baskets located at each of the cardinal directions. In the center of the universe was placed a covered basket containing whooping cough, smallpox, nervous disorders, and all manner of sickness. The basket also contained the first human being and his companions. When the mythical people emerged through the various layers of the primordial world and ascended into this one, they gradually accumulated a riot of confused colors collected from all the various world layers they had passed through. They also brought along the basket of ills. Creation, increasingly complicated over time, maintains its order only with difficulty. In the Navajo case, the failure to intercalate the myriad orders of sounds, colors, directions, supernatural beings, plants, stones, and qualities of light accumulated during the ascent through multiple worlds, brings on disorder reflected in the body as sickness.

Finally, disease can enter the world through the disobedience of a creature. Instructed by the supreme being, creator, or culture hero to keep silent, maintain vigil, stand motionless, or observe dietary restrictions, the first people disobeyed. For example, consider the story in chapter 3 of the book of *Genesis*, in which Adam and Eve fall into sin and death because of their disobedience to Yahweh.

These mythic scenarios do not exhaust the kinds of episodes portraying the origins of disease. The point is that religious healing rarely, if ever, confronts a merely biological disorder located exclusively in the body of the patient. Religious healing encounters a primordial reality: battles with supernatural forces that have existed from the beginnings of time. Healing must be an act of recreation, corrective creation, or cosmic battle waged to triumph over or annihilate miscreant primordial powers. The healer must be cognizant of the origins and nature of the realities he or she confronts through the experience of the patient. Disease forces the religious healer to reckon with the creation of the world.

**PROXIMATE CAUSES OF ILLNESS.** The mythic origins of illness serve as the ideological background for the diagnostic procedures that determine the proximate causes of illness in specific instances. In most cases, the proximate causes of illness are more immediately relevant for the diviner or diagnostician and certainly more relevant for the patient. After all, these causes are specific and individual and can be treated in the here and now. The immediate causes of the disease may be due to the castigating action of ancestors or Gods as a response to sin or moral failing of the individual. This castigation often is construed as educational in value: The affliction causes the individual to change his or her behavior for the better. In these instances, the illness may be construed as a spiritual "wake-up call" or as an opportunity to make amends and start over.

Sometimes illness is caused by the hidden malevolence of neighbors or relatives or by nasty ghosts or spirits. In traditional European societies, the evil eye was believed to cause a variety of illnesses and other misfortunes. Those who give

others the evil eye often are understood to behave out of envy, although that envy sometimes is unintentional rather than purposefully malicious.

Another frequent proximate cause of illness is the poor performance of ritual acts, such as inattention to ancestors or incorrect ceremonial etiquette. Paul, for example, pointed out to the Christians of Corinth this cause of their illnesses: "For any one who eats and drinks without discerning the body eats and drinks judgment upon himself. That is why so many of you are weak and ill and others of you have died" (1 Cor. 11:29–30). Impurity is another frequent cause of illness. Impurity sometimes is the result of ritual failings, but often is the consequence of contamination of one sort or another. Inappropriate sexuality and contact with strangers, certain animals, menstruating women, and the dead are common sources of impurity.

A particularly common cause of illness falls into the general category of bad social relations. Illness may be construed as triggered by anger or jealousy or as a manifestation of overly strong emotions. In cultures characterized by rigid gender hierarchies, illness in women often is interpreted as triggered by their rebellion or disrespect toward their husbands, fathers, or other socially dominant men.

The Malays believe that human beings are composed of minds, bodies, souls, and two other elements: *semangat*, the universal spirit that dwells in all creation and when startled may leave its container, and *angina*, the Inner Winds inherited from one's parents. These Inner Winds govern individual talent and personality. If strong Winds are not expressed in daily life, they accumulate in the body, causing physical and emotional pain. Stifled Inner Winds are suspected to be the cause of intractable illness that has not responded to straightforward medicine or simple spells.

**DIAGNOSIS.** When people fall ill and suspect that their affliction has a supernatural cause, they seek expert advice. In many social settings there is an informal but ordered network of people who help the sick person choose the best course of action. Such a therapy management group often consists of relatives, friends, neighbors, and local authorities. The group helps decide how serious the crisis is and how to face it. Should the illness endure, interrupting the productive relations of the individual and the community, special assistance is sought from someone familiar with the meaning of the symptoms. The individual who diagnoses sickness may serve as a referral center to medical practitioners specializing in one disease or another. Alternately, the diagnostician may both discern the disease and cure it. The diagnostician reads the signs of the disease manifest as symptoms and reconstructs both the mythic and social history of the sickness.

Prior to Christian evangelization, the Kaluli people of the tropical forest north of Mount Bosavi on the island of New Guinea believed the forest around them was coincident with an invisible world of spirits with whom human beings could communicate through mediums. Spirit séances would

be held to cure the sick, investigate witchcraft, uncover the cause of death, or locate lost pigs. According to Edward Schieffelin (1996), Kaluli believe illness to be caused when the invisible spirit-counterpart of a person's body is dismembered by a witch or injured by other circumstances in the spirit world. The person can be treated by asking the spirits, through a medium, to locate the patient's body-counterpart in the spirit world and repair the damage.

The competence of the diagnostician may stem from his or her personal experiences of sickness from similar diseases, from innate gifts or talents (e.g., clairvoyance), acquired techniques (e.g., special objects of power), or familiarity with spirits. Diviners sometimes master elaborate symbolic schemes accounting for the elemental substances, forces, and processes at work throughout the cosmos. Such systems of correspondence reduce the infinitely complex circumstances of mythic, cosmic, social, and personal history to a relatively few combinations of symbolic items. Some African systems of correspondence have given evidence of astounding complexity. Reputedly revealed by divinities at the beginning of time, Yoruba divinatory techniques reveal the correspondences that exist between patterns of nuts or shells cast on the ground and hundreds of lengthy, enigmatic verses memorized by the diviner. The diviner must know the nuances of meaning in the poems and be expert in applying them to new situations. The verses allude to mythic personages and events that shaped the world. The current condition of the patient is brought into line with some primordial condition of creation revealed in the poem. The sickness, its origin, and the conditions of its cure are revealed when the diviner recognizes the suitable pattern of shells, the proper verse, and its fitting interpretation. Versions of this elaborate system of correspondence have spread throughout West Africa and the Americas. Not only do diviners have keen memories and sharp intuitions; they are shrewd social analysts whose probing questions unveil the patient's medical history and uncover sources of tension and anxiety in the community.

In the Peruvian Andes, diviners use *mesas* to diagnose sickness. *Mesas* are ground cloths, tables, or boards whose divisions reflect the principle structures of the universe, namely, the three levels of the world (the heavenly realm, the inner earth, and the central world inhabited by humans) as well as the elemental structures of time (the seasons, years, night, day, and hours). On the *mesa*, the diviner locates objects representing and embodying supernatural forces with which he or she is familiar. During a nightlong ceremony in which he asks the patient a series of questions concerning the sick person's physical and social condition, the diviner arrives at a judgment concerning the nature of the sickness and the course of therapy. By successfully locating the patient in space and time, he or she defines the key supernatural relations that condition the patient's existence, including the current illness.

Other systems of correspondence use the symbolism of colors, sounds, movements, or the disposition of sacrificed

body parts such as lungs, liver, or bones. They may also use dreams and other experiences of the diviner or patient to connect the hidden conditions of the sick person to the more legible outward signs of the manifest world. The point is that all creation is isomorphic; each part bears the same arrangement of forces, qualities, and substances. If the diviner can clarify the working order or disorder of any one part of creation, he or she can see more clearly the same conditions obtaining in other areas of existence such as the affected space of the patient's body.

**MYTHS OF THE ORIGINS OF CURE.** The time of creation also proves to be important for the origins of techniques of cure. These myths of origin play a directly therapeutic role in episodes of sickness and healing. Thus, for example, in healing a newborn infant, a specialist among the Manus fisher folk of the Admiralty Islands intones the origin myths of the ginger and aromatic herbs that he passes around from one person to another during the ceremony. The myths of origin of these herbs is rather lengthy. It is sung several times, tracing the history of the curative substances from the beginning of time to the more recent period when it was acquired by the medical specialist who does the singing.

Myths of the origins of cure are often recited in the presence of the ailing patient, for only then can the therapy be effective. The rite of cure clarifies the mythic origins of the medicine that is always embedded in a cosmogonic myth. A formulaic chant-remedy for toothache in ancient Assyria begins with the time when Anu, the creator, made the heavens. In their turn, the heavens created the earth; the earth, the rivers; the rivers, the canals; and the canals made smaller pools. Eventually, the pools gave birth to the Worm of Sickness. Weeping with hunger, this pathogenic Worm went to ask the supernatural beings Shamash and Ea for something to consume. No fruits of the earth would do; the Worm would satisfy itself only with human teeth. Even while the worm is given license to devour human teeth and cause decay, it is cursed and destroyed by Ea. In times of need, the myth was recited in a ritual fashion to reenact the origins of the world and the origins of toothache and its cure. As sure as the world and dental decay exist, so too does the power, made present through the performance of the myth, to overcome the pain and its corrosive cause.

The important issue is that, at some time in the mythic past, a supernatural power of cure has vanquished the power of affliction in question. Not only does this sacred act set a precedent for healing the disease, through recitation of the myth of cure, the healer makes present once again the ancient supernatural powers and events that conquered the disorder at the beginning of time. Thus, the healer's words and deeds are effective.

The accounts of the origins of cure open up the universe of meaning that binds a culture and stimulates its creativity in the face of sickness. Each category of *materia medica* has its own origin. For centuries, Qolla-huaya healers in the Bolivian Andes, for example, have been remarkable herbal

curers. They possess a pharmacopoeia of nearly nine hundred medicinal plants, carefully classified according to local symbolic orders. This extraordinary feat seems motivated and organized by the fact that the plants are vehicles for the fluids, especially fat, blood, and water, that come from the body of Pachamama (Mother Earth), who is a divine being. She gives life to the human offspring who dwell on her mountainside. Curative powers are transferred from the body of Mother Earth to the circulatory systems of her children through the various species of plants. They are gifts of Mother Earth, and their energies are released when the plant leaves are steeped in water as a tea and drunk by the patient.

Rattles, drums, costumes, songs, and the implements and techniques of cure may have mythic origins that account for their power. In Eurasia, for example, drums are a part of the religious healer's curing practice. The studies of L. P. Potapov (1968), S. I. Vajnsstejn (1968), and Marcell Jankovics (1984) show that the myths of origins of these drums and the powers that fill them when they are played take concrete expression in their structural design and in the drawings depicted on the hides of the drumhead. The drums of Altaic peoples, such as the Shor, Teleut, and Kumandin, often depict mythic beings associated with constellations of the zodiac. Uralic peoples, such as the Selkup, Ket, Dolgans, Nganasani, Evenki, and Eveny, draw maps of the sky, centered often on the Milky Way, the supernatural path along which the healer travels to enter the original world of celestial powers. These skymaps illustrate a mythic geography and locate the principal powers pertinent to the ecstatic healer's practice.

**HEALING TECHNIQUES.** Just as myths of the origin of disease are given immediate meaning via specific understandings of the cause of particular illness episodes, myths of the origin of cures are actualized through a variety of healing techniques. Given the avidity with which human beings seek out healing and the diversity of understandings of the origins and proximate causes of illness, a comprehensive list of ritual healing techniques and procedures would be an impossibility. There are, however, several categories that can, in one form or another, be identified in many cultural settings. Although this is far from a hard and fast rule, it often is the case that the pursuit of healing begins with simpler or more straightforward (less expensive, less elaborate, less specialized) rituals and progressively moves on to more complex ones.

First, one of the simpler clusters of healing techniques centers on the manipulation of sacred or symbolic objects. This cluster was addressed prominently in the writings of early anthropologists who identified subcategories of contagious magic (i.e., contact with objects understood to carry particular power) and sympathetic magic (i.e., the use of objects understood to resemble the desired effect). Although the pejorative meanings often associated with the term *magic* are not particularly useful, the recognition that objects are ritually manipulated in particular ways is quite useful. Con-



tagious magic may include ritual healing techniques such as wearing an amulet that has been written, blessed, or manufactured by a saint or other holy person. Sympathetic magic may include ritual healing techniques such as the use of *milagros* (charms with tiny legs, arms, hearts, etc.) representing the body parts or organs in need of healing that are placed into receptacles at Catholic shrines and churches in Mexico and Texas.

A second category of healing relates particular saints to specific illnesses. In towns and villages on the north coast of Portugal, different saints are connected to the healing of different parts of the body. Saint Bras is called on for a sore throat; Saint Bento, to cure warts and rashes; and Saint Luzja, for eye diseases. Lena Gemzoe relates this explanation given her by a woman in one small town:

Not long ago I had an illness, it was chicken-pox; that came all over. . . . I got it and very, very badly. First my children, then since I was with them, it struck me. . . . I was very, very sick because I had sores on my head, on my back, on my legs. . . . I clung to Saint Bento and asked: "Oh, blessed Saint Bento, liberate me, God, from become scarred"—because it looks so ugly. If he would clean my whole body and clean my children, when the day of his feast comes I will go there and I will offer, for example a head of wax or a bust of a woman or . . . I asked for my children, I would give an entire child, two entire children of wax. (Gemzoe, 2000, p. 81)

Another cluster of healing techniques centers on prayer and meditation. The variations within this cluster are many. Who prays—the individual in need of healing or someone else on that individual's behalf? Is the prayer spontaneous and idiosyncratic, or does it follow a set liturgical formula? Is the prayer understood to be effective because it elicits divine response, or because it calms the emotions or centers the mind of the person who prays or meditates? Is the ritual silent and private or recited aloud? In contemporary American society, healing prayers occur privately, recited under the breath by millions of people going into surgery, as part of public extravaganzas, like revival meetings of various sorts, and electronically, over the internet and on television.

A third cluster of healing rituals have to do with removing the object, experience, emotion, force, spirit, or person that is understood to cause illness. Roughly speaking, this cluster includes confession, exorcism, and purification of various sorts. In many settings the removal is verbal, narrative, metaphorical, or symbolic. Public and private—and voluntary and forced—confessions of sins and misdeeds are other manifestations of extraction techniques: The sickness-causing information, guilty feeling, or wicked or aberrant thought is removed from inside the individual and, in one sense or another, dissipated or neutralized.

Sucking is a widespread technique of cure. The healer may use some technical device such as a goat's horn for cupping or a leech for drawing out blood. More often, the healer

sucks out the intruding pathogen with his or her own mouth. In such cases, the healer's mouth is a medical instrument, a womb of transformation that changes the sickening substance into something harmless or even helpful. Sucking can be a stunning spectacle. Several investigators have commented on the violence, noise, and aggressive suction that draws blood from different places on the patient's body. The healer's mouth, throat, and stomach possess special powers. The Tapirape healer of Brazil, for example, intoxicates himself with great gulps of tobacco smoke from his pipe. He deliberately makes himself sick so that he begins to vomit, but he sucks his own vomitus and accumulated saliva into his mouth. Throughout this noisy performance, he stops intermittently to suck on the body of his patient. Finally he vomits up the entire mess and searches for the intrusive object that has provoked sickness. Sometimes several healers carry on cures of this sort in joint practice and at the same time. On these occasions the sound of violent vomiting reverberates throughout the village.

Purification techniques include physical cleansing practices such as washing and spiritual practices such a meditation that eliminates impure thoughts. Often, the physical and spiritual aspects of purificatory rituals are inseparable as in the case of biblical laws of ritual immersion after menstruation or contact with the dead. Clearly, immersion in water washes away blood and other bodily effluvia. Yet the immersion also is understood to transform the individual into a spiritual state in which he or she can participate in the religious life of the community. When outsiders are targeted as the source of sickness in the body social, as has happened historically in response to some immigrant groups, the larger collective may erupt into violence and adopt ritualized forms of quarantine or expulsion—often unjustly—with the idea of purifying and healing itself.

A fourth cluster of healing techniques involve inserting something into the person in need of healing. The most obvious examples in this cluster involve the ingestion of medicine of one sort or another. The ritual aspects of this cluster take a variety of forms: techniques of ingestion, techniques of collecting or preparing the medicine, and so on. In some instances the substance that is ingested or inserted is clearly material in nature and understood to work on fairly straightforward biological principles as with an herbal tea, for example. In other instances, the substance has both material and spiritual aspects (e.g., drinking water in which a paper with a verse from the Qur'ān, a Buddhist sūtra, or the Bible has soaked). Even substances that may seem to be material can be understood to work in a nonmaterial way, such as homeopathy in which the pills that are ingested are understood to work on an energetic level. The insertion of devices like acupuncture needles adds an additional tangibility to the concept of insertion, coupled with energy manipulation, and occurs in the context of a set process. The practitioner reads the patient's pulse, looks at his or her tongue, and listens to the narrative of symptoms prior to needling.

A fifth cluster of techniques involve touch. At the most basic level, touch simply is the common human act of rubbing a body part that hurts. At the other end of the spectrum, touch is done on the astral or energetic level rather than through direct contact with the patient's skin. Reiki healing is a good example of nonphysical touch. As a healing technique, touch is particularly multivalent. Its effectiveness can be understood in physical terms such as relaxing muscles or increasing blood flow, in emotional or social terms such as creating warm and healing interpersonal connections, and in spiritual terms such as channeling the power of divine entities.

A sixth, and one of the largest, cluster of healing techniques has to do with the induction of trance and other altered states of consciousness. In many cultures either the sick individual or the healer carries out some sort of practice that results in the elicitation of healing dreams (in which the dream itself heals or healing knowledge is revealed in the dream). Healing trance and spirit possession as in, for example, the *zaar* rituals in parts of Africa are elicited through drumming and dancing. In other contexts, altered states of consciousness in the healer, the patient, or both are elicited through substances such as mushrooms or tobacco, sleep or sensory deprivation, repetitive or hypnotic types of motions, singing or chanting, or meditation.

A final cluster of ritual techniques highlight some form of cognitive restructuring (i.e., practices that encourage the patient or other participants to see or construe their affliction in a new or healthier way). Storytelling often is the means by which the cognitive restructuring is effected. Through the recitation of myths and tales that have cultural or spiritual resonance, the patient comes to see his or her own suffering as a part of a larger cosmic unfolding. Christian Science offers a clear example of cognitive restructuring: The work of the Christian Science healer is to help the patient understand that his or her suffering is not real.

**HEALERS.** The power of healers often is associated with a god or culture hero who introduced healing techniques or is understood to be the prototypical healer. In the Christian tradition, the miraculous cures of Jesus are the distinctive sign that the Messiah has come and that the new age of the kingdom of God has dawned (*Mt.* 4:23–25; 10:1; 10:7–8; 11:4–5). As the divine physician, Jesus instructs his disciples how to cure all kinds of diseases, especially by casting out unclean spirits. Any given culture may recognize a range of religious healing specialists. The diversity of religious healers is an outgrowth of the intricate and varied sets of relationships with supernatural beings who are subtly different from one another and a reflection of power relations and the importance of social hierarchies in particular settings.

The types of religious healers are many in number and diverse in style. Some are specialists in simple instrumental cure such as bonesetting, herbal remedies, and dietary prescriptions. They master a finite canon of pharmacopoeia or therapeutic protocols. Their training is often scholastic and

routinized. Of greater religious significance are the healers specialized in confronting disease through symbolic dramas, especially rituals of cure. Such healers are called to their vocations through a number of different means. Sickness is often a sign of election by a supernatural agent of cure. The isolation of serious illness, the sufferings that the candidates endure, and the deliriums they undergo can all be interpreted as an initiation to the office of healer.

The Aztec at the time of the Spanish conquest distinguished among several medical specialties. A number of sixteenth-century texts document these specialties and their procedures. The *tetonalmacani*, *tetonaltiqui*, or *tetonalliqui* cared for those patients, especially young children, who had lost their *tonalli*, a species of soul. The *teapatiani* (“healer of the crown of the head”) applied pressure to the palate of infants, massaging it in such a way as to close the fontanel in a propitious manner. Another practitioner designed figures on the body of the patient before bleeding the victim suffering dysentery. Some healers sucked out sickness and transformed the intruding pathogen into a piece of parchment, flint, pebble, or some other object. Other Aztec clinicians included bonesetters and curers of scorpion bites, gynecological disorders, and sicknesses suffered during the rites of passage through the life cycle.

Aztec mystical healers were called to their vocation when struck by lightning. Midwives demonstrated their power by dancing publicly during the great religious feasts. Deep massagers cured by warming their feet directly in fire and then walking on the affected muscles of the patient. The most esteemed specialist in the Aztec tradition was the herbalist, and the most despised was the *tetlaxiliqui*, the abortionist. In their dreams and visions, shamans of the Tunguz, Buriats, and other Siberian peoples see their own bodies tortured, pierced, cut into pieces with knives, boiled down to their bones, and then reconstituted. This mystical experience of death and resurrection qualifies them as future healers. In a concrete way, their own body has overcome death and disease. Traveling to other worlds in their ecstasies, these healers bring back medical materials (crystals, herbs, rattles, pieces of bones) as signs of their powerful relationship with sacred beings. One Siberian shaman, for example, fashioned a drum from three boughs he took from the mythical tree growing at the center of the world. That cosmic tree transects every spatial and temporal layer of the universe. During treatment, the sound of the drum transports the patient's soul through space and time to the moment and place where creation began.

The retrieval of the lost soul of the sick person is a dangerous task requiring that the healer's soul exit his or her body and travel to the margins of the universe, to the heights of heaven, or to the depths of the underworld. Ecstatic healers are frequently clairvoyants. Their vision penetrates the opaque matter of the patient's body and of the material world during their quest for the lost soul. Perilous ordeals that jeopardize the soul of the healer fill the journey to fetch

back the soul. Often, the battles that take place in the outer regions of the cosmos are acted out in the center of the healing arena or, if the healer has fallen dead while his soul journeys on high, the epic adventure is recounted in exciting detail later.

Exorcists also have previous acquaintance with spirits afflicting their patients. Although they may not have contracted the disease, they have encountered the supernatural beings who possess the sick. In their initial confrontation, exorcists learn to recognize the voice of the pathogenic spirit. That first meeting of the exorcist and the spirit of affliction amounts to a time of trial in which he or she exercises the techniques needed to expel the possessing spirit. Very frequently exorcists establish a dialogue with the disease-bearing being. In the course of the conversation and interrogation, the possessor reveals its identity either through its voice or by announcing its name. During the dialogue, the spirit also reveals to the exorcist the manner in which it may be expelled. Often the sounds of exorcism that the healer recites are the very sonic structures of the afflicting spirit. The names, songs, babbling sounds, or poems are the outward manifestations of invisible forces.

The *mau tham* (“experts in reciting words”) are exorcists in the Buddhist communities of northeast Thailand. They specialize in magic uses of sacred sound. During apprenticeship, they fall into trance, trembling and losing consciousness, while sacred Buddhist words are recited. While entranced, their teacher interrogates them and learns which sacred verses the disciples need to know to expel spirits. The spirits (*phi*) become identified with the totally incomprehensible sounds, which represent verses from Buddhist texts. The *mau tham* lives a life of strict observance and restriction. Should he or she eat forbidden foods, the knowledge inside him or her, in the form of sonic images of words, would turn into the afflicting enemies that he battles and exorcises in his patients. Exorcism has a slight twist to it because the *phi*, the possessing spirit, actually inhabits the body of a neighbor in the village. From the body of its host, it attacks the patient of the exorcist. During the ceremony, the exorcist forces the patient to pronounce the name of the person in whom the afflicting spirit resides. Then the *mau tham*, recognizing the spirit in question, forces it to leave by reciting its sounds.

In many situations, the relationship between the healer and the patient is dramatically hierarchical (although this hierarchy does not necessarily carry over into other aspects of life). Healing hierarchy can be expressed in various ways: The healer is healthy, and the patient is sick; the healer has inherent healing powers, and the patient does not; the healer has acquired specialized healing knowledge (in a variety of ways), and lay people do not have this knowledge; and the healer has a special ability to communicate with the gods or to channel divine energy, and lay people do not. The high ritual status of the healer is made known through diplomas, lingo, insignia, special clothing, and honorific titles. In many ways, the Western biomedical physician epitomizes this mode.

Years of specialized training and apprenticeship induct him or her into the culture of biomedicine, in which he or she acquires the knowledge and skills related to the practice of medicine—how to “work up” a patient, formulate a case history, arrive at a differential diagnosis, manage a case, work within a medical team, and assume the mantle of authority conferred on physicians, symbolized in the white coat. What differentiates the biomedical physician from some other types of healer is the careful distancing, on the part of biomedicine as a whole, from the notion that the physician taps into communication with the sacred. What takes its place is the power of physical evidence, understood to hold sway even as it is susceptible to the surfacing of new and more compelling data. As a concept, however, evidence functions as a quasi-absolute.

In other situations the relationship between the patient and healer is quite egalitarian with the healer serving as more of a facilitator of the patient’s own healing powers than as an expert who actually carries out the healing. A contemporary example of this mode comes from the world of hospices, hospital chaplains, and congregational nurses, many of whom describe their work as a “ministry of presence”—as simply “being there” with the one who is ill. In this minor mode, the healer accompanies patient, witnesses patient’s suffering, and supports the patient in his or her healing process.

**THE SOCIAL BODY.** With all of these techniques, the practice of religious medicine becomes public theater. The fallen condition of the physical body serves the cause of high religious drama. On the tragic or comic outcome hangs the fate of individuals and communities. Furthermore, the symbolic actions of cure—the episodic structure of the healing séance marked by shifts in music, style, color symbolism, body postures, and changes in symptoms—reveal the meaning of the sacred as it impinges on concrete existence. For this reason, religious healing rituals are well-attended event, spectacles from which flow important symbolic languages used to understand and order the world.

The role played by the community in healing rituals is highly variable. In contemporary American twelve-step programs, the community is essential to the healing process. It is the very fact of the community gathering together that effects the healing. In this maximal mode, illness in the individual often is conceptualized as a reflection of illness in the social body, thus healing must occur at the communal level. The notion that gathering in community is necessary for healing to take place has been well developed by Edith Turner and Victor Turner.

In the Mediterranean area, Western Europe, and the Balkans of Eastern Europe, medicinal dances performed by the entire community heal the sick. The whole group becomes a manifestation of the sacred displayed at their public ceremony. In quite different ways, Sūfī brotherhoods of Morocco, the Macedonian Rusalija, Serbian Kraljice-Rusalje, Romanian Calus, and peasants of southern Italy, from the

classical period of Magna Graecia into the twenty-first century, cure through the power of group dances that battle with supernatural causes of disease and death. At times, the sick patient is forced to arise and dance and, in that way, manifests the healing power in his or her own body. Curative dancing practices are ancient among these cultures. Similar group therapies exist throughout the world. Musicians, especially drummers and percussionists, play a key role. Using their ability to discern the movements of spirits, accompanists guide the community through the episodes of the cure, carefully judging the endurance of the dancers, the emotional state of the ensemble, the mood of the spectators, the nature of the supernatural powers present, and the reactions of the ailing patient.

Janet Hoskins has studied healing among the Kodi people of Sumba in eastern Indonesia. At the time of her fieldwork in the 1980s, the majority of the fifty thousand Kodi people were followers of the indigenous religion that centered on the worship of ancestors, spirits, and deities who live in the tombs, gardens, and houses along the western coast of the island. Kodi society is characterized by intense attention to exchange obligations stretching back into the past. These obligations often become the cause of social tension. Hoskins notes, "Some forms of illness and injury are diagnosed as 'social diseases'" (Hoskins, 1996, p. 273). Cure of these diseases requires elaborate performances that involve a network of kin and affines. Healers whose work is aimed at resolving these kinds of diseases enact what Hoskins calls

"talking cure" whereby all the possible causes [of the disease] are exposed in a divination, as spirits are interrogated in turn and the reasons for their anger are determined. Divination occurs in a group setting, usually with all family members sitting near the right front pillar of the house, as the diviner constructs his interpretation of the spirits' anger. . . . In many ways, his role seems more that of the catalyst for a group-therapy session than of an independent diagnostician, since after each revelation he goes back to the family members, who discuss and evaluate it and provide him with more information to continue the [divination]. (Hoskins, 1996, pp. 275–276)

The fact that the community gathers together does not necessarily mean that the role of the community is to support the patient. Although in many instances all family members gather around the bedside of one who is about to pass over into the next world and the family presence eases and facilitates that final healing, in many other instances, the role of the community is accusative. The American Christian evangelical anti-gay movement, like other deprogramming settings, falls within this category.

The role of disease and cure in reorganizing personal and social experience often leads to the reshaping of worldviews and recasting of social orders. Because sickness is regarded as an adverse form of change, resulting from the ambivalent presence of a new or unwelcome mode of being, the language of disease and cure frequently inserts itself into at-

tempts at innovation or reappraisal of tradition. In the 1560s, for example, local divinities in the Peruvian Andes reportedly swept down from the sky or rose out of their earthen shrines to enter the native population and afflict them with uncontrollable dancing diseases. The frenzied dance was expected to bring on the end of the world, overthrow Spanish overlordship, and restore power to local people and gods. By the thousands, Andean Indians became savior-gods incarnate and danced the *Taqui Onqoy* ("the dance of the Pleiades"). After nearly a decade, Spanish authorities crushed the movement and condemned some eight thousand leaders to corporal punishment or exile.

Because powers of affliction strike their victims without their consent, disease becomes a vehicle of social change, resistance, and unrest for which the restless cannot be held accountable, for they are victims themselves. In this way, symptomatology and epidemiology can indicate far-reaching social stirrings and help pinpoint latent motives for them. Conversely, cults of disease can be ways of carrying forward ancient religious traditions or sociopolitical structures in the face of the overwhelming power of a dominant religion or political authority. This is the light in which Ernesto de Martino (1957) interprets certain folk diseases and rites of musical cure in rural Italy.

At times, the language of disease and cure appears to be a vehicle for the creation of new religious forms and experiences. The spontaneity of disease, circumventing the process of institutional permissions, prompts lay people to experiment with new religious forms and combine elements of traditions that appear to be quite disparate. Many of the independent Christian churches of Africa provide an important forum for the religious interpretation of disease and rites of cure. These churches maintain long-standing traditions of African religiosity while, at the same time, they give new life and meaning to the Christianity brought by European missionaries. In Douala, Cameroon, a growing group of devotees follow two prophetic women leaders. The two prophetesses call their disciples the "sick ones of the Father" and divide them into groups, according to the categories of the sick mentioned in the Gospels: the blind, the paralyzed, the epileptic, the deaf, and the dumb, although the disciples do not actually manifest these symptoms. Eric de Rosny (1986) points out that many of them do not appear to be sick at all, but, deep within themselves, they must identify with these diseases in their inner being to qualify for participation in the group of the elect. The two prophetesses deliver lengthy discourses that reweave the imagery and understanding of traditional African and Christian belief. It is the experience of their peculiar illnesses that provides the basis for this social reshaping and rethinking.

**SEE ALSO** Affliction, overview article; Drums; Exorcism; Fall, The; Health and Religion; Incantation; Medical Ethics; Psychology, article on Psychotherapy and Religion; Shamanism, overview articles; Soteriology.



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LAWRENCE E. SULLIVAN (2005)  
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## HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN AFRICA

Traditional African healing falls into three basic categories of treatment: common folk remedies known to most family members that usually do not require ritual observances; secret remedies handed down from mother to daughter or from father to son; and treatments administered only by priests or other specialized healers. These specialists, including priests, undergo training periods and initiations, and receive payment for their services. Africans do not distinguish between body and mind as far as treatment for illness is concerned. While much of African healing is based on practical knowledge and experience, it is also situated within specific social and religious contexts that frequently require ritual actions.

**RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND.** All African religions are monotheistic; that is, they are based on belief in a single divine being (Smith, 1950), but in most cases this Creator or Architect has lost interest in the everyday affairs of human beings. Thus, when people call on this being for help or approach him for healing or blessings, they usually make their supplications through or to intermediaries. In some cases the belief system includes other beings, the result being a pantheon of gods or more frequently a collection of spirits and shades. Some writers refer to the shades as ancestors, ancestor spirits, or the living dead who serve as intercessors.

African cultures and their associated religions should be understood within their respective geographical and ecological contexts. West Africa differs in many respects from the rest of Africa, while lesser features distinguish between east-central and southern Africa. These differences were originally highlighted in Melville J. Herskovits's discussion of culture areas in Africa, but are also obvious in the religious structure. Geoffrey Parrinder explained in his 1949 study of West Afri-

can religion that the supreme being frequently emerges as the first among equals. Examples include Onyame among the Akan people, which includes the Asante of Ghana and the Ivory Coast; Mawu among the Fon and Ewe of Benin; or Olorun among the Nigerian Yoruba. Below the supreme being are intermediary deities or chief divinities that are non-human in origin and often associated with natural forces. These gods require temporary dwelling places and priestly service. Spirits and shades, who are closer to living people than either the supreme god or lesser deities, are on the third level. Below the shades is a fourth level of sacred charms and amulets with special powers.

People in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa hold a very strong belief in deceased family members who have been ritually set apart as shades. They may ask these deceased relatives to intercede with the supreme being, who is known as Mulungu among the Kamba and uMvelinqangi (the First Being) or uNkulunkulu (the Great-Great One) among the Zulu. The Kamba recognize Mulungu as a creator and preserver, and they venerate the spirits of the departed. These people believe that their ancestors play a major role in maintaining their physical and mental health. Normally they offer the shades sacrifices or food gifts accompanied by requests for blessings, health, and cures. There need not be a special meeting, a formal setting, or a religious gathering for offerings and prayers. When people take a meal, they flick small pieces of food over the shoulder, pour out a few drops of beer, give thanks, or make a short specific request of the shades. They may also invoke the shades in praise songs and formal addresses when they offer sacrifices or perform other rituals. They may eulogize, plead with, or even threaten the shades—as when a Zulu warns an ancestor to cure or bless him by saying, “If I die, there will be no one to bring you sacrifices.”

Healing in Africa represents an attempt to answer two basic questions: How did the illness or traumatic accident happen? And why did it happen (to me or to my family)? The unseen world also contains forces, both good and evil, that must be controlled or employed by specialists in healing. An exception to this rule might be the Nuer of Sudan, who believe that all misfortunes derive from God. In fact the members of this group have very few medications and doubt even their efficacy (Evans-Pritchard, 1956).

**HEALTH.** An absence of health and well-being suggests illness (a cultural concept) or disease (a pathological concept). Patients suffer illnesses, but modern physicians diagnose and treat diseases. Traditional healers address the illness while attempting to cure the disease. In all of Africa, an imbalance in the body, or between the body and the social or natural environment, is caused by sorcery and witchcraft, which operate in the religio-magical field.

The Akan hold a representative West African concept of health in that they understand it as a correct relationship with one's environment, both natural and social (Appiah-Kubi, 1981). The Akan regard health and disease as inextricably

connected to social behavior and moral conduct. Illness represents an unbalanced relationship with the environment, although it may also result from the malevolence of an evil spirit or witch. The essential person for treating illness in this context is the priest-healer.

The Kamba of eastern Africa distinguish between God-given and natural diseases. “‘Witchcraft’ (merged conceptually with sorcery) has become a ‘catch-all’ explanation for myriad disorders in interpersonal relations. It was also a widely acceptable cause of personal failings ranging from lack of success in business, love, and school to sudden illness or strange disease, and especially barrenness and impotency” (Good, 1987, p. 223). Among the Taita, however, religious practices are directed toward turning away anger in any form and restoring peace, health, and general well-being. The Swahili regard restoration to health as the result of correcting an imbalance in the body. This view is related to the beliefs of other Muslim groups in West and East Africa (Trimmingham, 1969; du Toit and Abdalla, 1985).

The Zulu of southern Africa are representative of a wide range of Bantu-speaking peoples. The term *isifo* refers to disease manifested in somatic symptoms, various forms of misfortune, and a general state of vulnerability to misfortune and disease. Harriet Ngubane (1977) explains that illnesses among the Zulu fall into two categories. The first group is caused by biological factors associated with living and aging. Diseases in this category are not the patient's fault and can be treated or cured by potent nonritual means, including Western medicine. Diseases in the second category result from imbalances between a person and the natural environment, or in the sufferer's interpersonal relations. Treatment requires the restoration of order and balance. Good health flows from the internal and external harmony of a person's life with the social as well as the physical universe. Ideally a person is in harmony internally, in external social relationships, and in relation to nature.

**HEALING.** Illness does not necessarily involve an individual event as much as it reflects a disturbance in social relations. The effect of such disturbances in the body or the social setting may result in illness without disease. Disorder may manifest itself in physical, emotional, spiritual, or social discomfort. Treatment must therefore involve restoration of the body or of the person's overall human nature, and it must occur in the familiar social setting. The personnel involved in healing span the range from diagnosticians and healers in contact with spirits to ethnobotanical specialists and applied psychologists. In West Africa the Akan distinguish among priests or priestesses, herbalists, bonesetters, and birth attendants. The Yoruba of Nigeria differentiate between priests of the Ifá cult, the *babaláwo* who specialize in divination and psychotherapy, and *oníṣẹ̀gùn* or herbalists. It is common in East Africa to find healers categorized as diagnosticians, herbalists, birth attendants, and surgeons who perform male and female circumcisions. In southern Africa diagnosticians and herbalists are the major categories of healers, although individual practitioners may become specialists.

**Diviner-diagnostics.** Throughout Africa the diviner-diagnosticsian is essentially the person who receives and interprets communications from the supernatural world. Appiah-Kubi states that “Traditional Akan practitioners often determine the cause of disease . . . [now] patients complain that it is they who make their own diagnosis, while the modern doctor merely puts a label on their disease” (1981, p. 75). In many cases material objects are employed as receivers of messages from the spirit world. Diagnosticsians may make use of divining bones, as among the Sotho and Tonga; divining bowls, as among the Venda; or direct communication with the spirits, as among the Nguni-speakers. Nguni-speaking diagnosticsians may listen for voices or ask the patient to respond to questions. While asking the questions, the diviner is in fact watching the dilation of the patient’s eyes, listening to respirations, and touching the patient to note changes in body temperature. Edgerton (1971) describes the questions that were asked by Abedi, a psychiatrist among the Hehe of Tanzania. “Abedi was probing carefully for an understanding of the social context of the illness. Who might be an enemy? What is the patient fearful about?” (p. 296).

The peoples of West Africa distinguish among priests and assistants who are dedicated to the service of a particular god, seers, and herbalists. The priest or priestess, who is also called a medium, is found in Asante, Ewe, Fon, Yoruba and other societies. The medium enters a trance state and sits in front of the shrine while communicating with the god residing in the shrine. Among the Ga such mediums, if married, must leave their families—although male mediums are allowed to remarry following their training. The medium is appointed by the village chief or priest. Training takes two to three years and is accompanied by strict discipline. The Fon and Yoruba have “convents” for the training of mediums: the course of instruction takes nine months for a boy but three years for a girl. The Bariba of Benin regard healing at the domestic level as an extension of the nurturing role. Thus they prepare medicines for skin diseases, respiratory disorders, and gastrointestinal ailments for children and even adult members of the family. They also treat themselves for malaria or diarrhea. The adults consult female or male healers called medicine people for more severe disorders. The male medicine people, however, are always considered senior to the females. There is also a widespread belief that women of childbearing age are dangerous and may contaminate medicines; consequently only men or postmenopausal women may administer strong medicines to combat dangerous or stubborn afflictions.

In eastern, central, and southern Africa there exists a widespread therapeutic tradition based on the role of diviner-diagnosticsians. These healers’ names are variations on the root *ngoma*. The term is associated with drums and the rhythms of song and dance. Thus Victor Turner titled his 1968 study of the Zambian Ndembu therapies *The Drums of Affliction*. Typical health problems treated with *Ngoma* therapy include impotence in men, infertility in women, epi-

lepsy, snake bites (in Tanzania), the testing of dreams and visions, and personal difficulties of human or spirit origin. Some forms of *Ngoma* therapy are effective variations of psychotherapy.

A clear pattern exists in East Africa, where the Kamba recognize a category of religio-medical specialists. Although this group includes both genders, medicine women are more common than medicine men. Aided by supernatural powers, they practice divination, curing the sick, and invoking ritual protection for livestock and fields. The Giriama of Kenya recognize diviners, mostly women, who are innocent mediums through whom powerful Islamic and other foreign spirits communicate. These women practice diagnosis as well as divination. Among the Swahili the “spirit doctor” is consulted by patients who suspect that their illnesses are produced by sorcery.

Diviner-diagnosticsians among the Sotho peoples of southern Africa employ divining bones. Among the Nguni, including the Zulu, the ancestral shades are said to guide the diviner. The diviner’s profession is not hereditary. Any person can become ill, which is a sign of calling, and undergo a lengthy initiation. While the author was carrying out research in an urban area outside of Durban in 1974, a boy about thirteen years of age had dreams about the neighbors. Time and again these dreams proved uncannily correct. A short while later the author was invited to a sacrifice and farewell for the boy, who had obviously been “called” by the shades and was being sent to northern KwaZulu-Natal for traditional training. Diviners, however, are usually women who do not choose to become diviners but are chosen by the shades. The shades do not take possession of the diviner’s body but “sit” on her shoulders and whisper into her ears. Among the neighboring Swazi, the shades may also “call” an apprentice. The diviner’s training lasts an average of three years and costs several hundred dollars in cash as well as one or more cows and goats for sacrifice to the shades.

**Herbalists.** Most African societies recognize persons with specialized knowledge concerning plants and their therapeutic properties as well as diviners and spirit doctors. What is meant by pharmacopoeia in Africa, however, is best described as faith in the curative properties of compounds with a vegetal base. What these products lack in curative value is compensated by the ritual that enhances the patient’s faith. African healers have an extensive knowledge of the properties of barks, roots, leaves, and herbs, as well as the catalytic effects of plant combinations or mixtures. Every African society has a category of herbalists who dispense remedies on the basis of either spirit guidance or symptom recognition. Such plant-based remedies may be administered as plasters, sedatives, purges, or cures. Their success requires two basic ingredients: the power of the practitioner’s thought and will, and the patient’s faith. Herbalists, who may be either men or women, are “called” by the shades in dreams, visions, or waking summons.

As in many other contexts, medicinal plants in West Africa may be personified. Before digging a root or cutting a branch or leaf for treatment purposes, the herbalist must put down some eggs, a mashed yam, or a sacrificial bird; otherwise the plant will lose its potency. Among the Azande of Sudan a young person who feels called to be a herbalist will start a long and costly training period. The teacher scrutinizes the student's intent to provide medicine to strengthen the soul and confer special powers. When the training has been completed, the candidate is admitted to the society of his or her colleagues. Among the Azande, this ceremonial reception involves undergoing a public burial after which the initiate joins the association of medicine people. As long as Africans regard sickness and misfortune as religious or spiritual experiences, traditional curers will continue to practice their callings.

Herbal remedies may be selected for a variety of reasons. Their efficacy may be related to such qualities as taste, smell, appearance, and texture. Color is among the most common signatures of effectiveness. The Hausa of northern Nigeria use red plants (including henna, red root, and blood root) to treat wounds and to fortify the blood. Such yellow plants as goldthread or goldenrod are used to treat jaundice. Milky latex is used to stimulate lactation in women after childbirth. One of the most important problems that traditional doctors confront is infertility. Plants that produce copious amounts of flowers, fruits, or seeds are used as fertility enhancers in the same way that plants which readily shed their ripe fruit are used to ease the process of childbirth.

The Giriama of Kenya use the term *muganga* for both diviners and herbalists, although they also indicate a healer's field of specialization within this generic classification. Examples include a diviner who is called a "doctor of the head" and a herbalist who is called a "healer of the basket." This differentiation underscores the belief that both practitioners are doctors whose healing skills range quite widely. Swahili herbal doctors learn their profession from their fathers. They share a basic belief in the balance theory of illness with Muslims beyond Africa. The concept of balance is not limited to the body and its functions but extends to social morality as well.

The basic term for herbalist, based on the root *-nga*, appears throughout eastern, central, and southern Africa, although the specific distinctions between diagnosticians and herbalists may have become blurred in some instances. Thus the Shona (Gelfand, 1962) distinguish between *nganga* who use divining bones and *nganga* who treat ailments with herbs and other medicaments. Many groups, however, combine these healing functions in one person. Good (1987) speaks of the East African *mganga*. Elsewhere, the Shona refer to *nganga*, speakers of Sotho to *ngaka*, and speakers of Nguni to *nyanga*. These healers are called by the shades and undergo apprenticeships in which botanical and ritual knowledge is passed from mother to daughter or from father to son. Treatments or prescriptions may call for sacrifices to placate the

spirits or shades who may have been afflicting the patient with bad luck or poor health. The first form of treatment administered is purification through administration of an enema or induced vomiting. The second is the use of herbal medicines. The Zulu word *umuthi* (literally "tree" or "shrub") applies to noxious as well as curative substances of vegetable origin. The same root for *tree* is found throughout the Bantu-speaking world—*umuti* among the Lamba of Zambia, *muti* among the Shona of Zimbabwe, and *amuti* among the Herero of Namibia—and points to the vegetative base of all healing. A researcher among the Zambian Bemba explains, "I know no Bemba charm which does not contain the roots, bark, or leaves of at least two different trees" (Richards, 1961, p. 232).

**Social context.** African patients rarely consult a diagnostician or healer unless they are accompanied by a family or village member. Sickness occurs in the social setting, and therefore curing must also take place in that setting. Referring to these support groups, Charles Good (1987) refers to the "significant others," while Jan Janzen, writing in 1978 about the people of lower Zaïre (now Congo), illustrated the importance of the "therapy managing group" who must be part of the diagnosis and treatment. Members of this support group accompany the patient to consultations with the diagnostician and are involved in the rituals and administration of medications that follow such meetings.

**Childbirth.** Among the Bariba of Benin practicing midwives are usually postmenopausal women with several living children. The midwives occupy a curious position in the hierarchy of healers. Some women serve as informal assistants at problematic deliveries of neighbors and kin. Women who have served an apprenticeship under a midwife, however, may employ ritual incantations, gestures, and sympathetic magic as well as herbal medicines when they assist a woman in labor. Some Africans view midwives as true healers while others regard them as technicians.

Islamic influences are clearly present among the Wolof of Senegal and Gambia. Before a newborn infant is allowed to suckle, the child must drink a potion made from washing off a verse from the Qur'an that had been written on a wooden slate. This verse is meant to keep away malevolent spirits. A goat is also sacrificed. Rituals surrounding birth are performed not only to strengthen the mother and child, but also to keep evil forces at bay. In addition, powers in the supernatural realm always receive recognition. The Gikuyu in Kenya recognize a normal birth by secluding the mother for a few days, following which she shaves her head and the father sacrifices a sheep in thanksgiving to God and the shades. This act of sacrifice, accompanied by brewing beer, is also performed to mark the birth of a Zulu child.

**Surgery.** Traditional African healers possess an extensive knowledge of human anatomy. Some of this knowledge is gleaned from observing the carcasses of hunted or domestic animals, while other anatomical information is obtained from treating human victims of hostilities or accidents.



One form of specialization among the Akan in West Africa was the bonesetter. Such a person was skilled in treating patients with rheumatism and arthritis. The bonesetter also functioned as an orthopedic surgeon, helping to repair broken limbs.

The most common forms of surgery are related to life-cycle changes. These procedures may involve extracting the incisor teeth; scarification; and various forms of circumcision of males (removal of the prepuce, subincision, or superincision) and females (removal of the prepuce of the clitoris, clitoridectomy, or infibulation). In many societies these latter events take place in the context of elaborate rituals presenting the initiates to the shades. The addresses made on these occasions are prayers complete with supplication, praise, and personal commentary. Postsurgical treatment of patients involves herbs, poultices, and wraps with astringent or disinfectant properties.

A number of societies employ cupping, or placing a horn over a bleeding incision, as a form of therapy. The Kamba and Maasai of Kenya used thorns to suture incisions. The former of these groups are reported to have removed the uvula of patients, while the Maasai also perform amputations of limbs with hopelessly complicated fractures. The Zimbabwean Shona fill a bleeding wound with spider webs. The resulting contraction of blood vessels stanches the flow of blood. Trephination is performed in Uganda and Nigeria. Robert Anderson (1996, p. 360) recounts the method of carrying out this procedure among the East African Kisii and Bakuria. Following severe trauma to the head resulting in fracture, the patient's head is shaved and a cut made through the skin, muscle, and underlying connective tissue. Bleeding is controlled by the application of herbal powders and charcoal. The surgeon scrapes away the bone with a sharp knife, taking care to avoid penetrating the *dura mater*, which is the outermost of three layers of protective membrane surrounding the brain and spinal cord.

**Protection.** Protection may simply refer to maintaining the personal and environmental balance essential to health. It may involve matching hot and cold items, or sour and sweet substances. Rituals for protection are performed for both persons and residences. In the case of persons, such rituals are prophylactic and normally take the form of taboos. These may include meticulous avoidance of forbidden objects and the careful execution of ritual observances. A taboo limits contact between people and objects that may be defiling or between healthy persons and those who are either contaminated or weak, such as postpartum mothers, newborn infants, and others in various marginal conditions. The Yoruba have a smallpox deity served by a priest who is immune to the disease following recovery from it. They also use their left hand to handle dirty objects in order to keep the right hand clean for eating. In African villages, disease and misfortune are religious experiences and must be approached from a religious perspective. That is why these same protection rituals are currently being performed for Christians (Oosthuizen et al., 1988).

The Yoruba use the same word *oogùn* for medicine and charm. A good doctor is an *oniṣẹ̀gùn*, while a witch (the owner of medicine) is an *oloogùn*. Medicines cure while charms ward off danger. The most powerful protective charm found among the Asante as well as among the peoples of Benin and Nigeria, is a small broom of palm fibers with sacred objects attached. It is the object of sacrifices and takes evils upon itself. Most houses are protected by charms hanging above the doorway. Muslims use yellowed and dusty pieces of paper floating from the roof inscribed with texts from the Qur'ān. Nearly all the fields are protected with charms as well as the entrances to villages. Travelers in the area frequently enter a village by passing under a protective arch. The Ndebele medicine men supply medicated pegs for the gates of a new homestead. It is common to find a plant called *inthelezi* growing outside a Zulu home. These objects serve to safeguard the home and its inhabitants against sorcery, witchcraft, and, in Ethiopia, the evil eye.

**HEALING MIND AND BODY.** The mind and the body are separately recognized and treated using mystical powers. The mind can also be treated directly employing therapies, herbal preparations, and consciousness altering substances.

**Witchcraft and sorcery.** A study of African health would be incomplete without recognizing the role of mystical powers that may be manipulated by diviners and other specialists. Witchcraft and sorcery occur when people are under severe stresses and strains in life, or when they experience tension, whether actual or potential. People may believe themselves to be victims of witchcraft, or they may employ it against their competitors or enemies. The well-known Africanist Mary Douglas remarks that "the African is almost as liable to die from a poisonous idea put into his head as a poisonous herb put into his food" (quoted in Nottingham, 1959, p. 7). Such beliefs may produce illness in a person without an identifiable disease agent. (The opposite, disease without illness, is finding expression in the pandemic of HIV/AIDS.) From the point of health, sorcery and witchcraft enable people to deal with their failures and frustrations. The witch is generally believed to be inhabited by a power more evil than good that directs her or his nefarious acts. The sorcerer is a person who knowingly directs injurious magic to other persons. Magic may be either good or evil. The medicine man uses good magic essentially for the benefit of a patient, village, or society. When this power is employed maliciously it becomes black magic, evil magic, or sorcery. These terms allow people to explain away their failures or blame them on unseen evil forces or other persons employing these forces. M. G. Marwick describes the social context of sorcery in his masterful 1965 study of the Cewa of Zambia.

**Ethnopsychiatry.** "Medicine-men," says John Mbiti, "are the friends, pastors, psychiatrists and doctors of traditional African villages and communities" (1969, p. 171). For this reason, one cannot speak of ethnomedicine without also considering ethnopsychiatry. This form of treatment completes the holistic approach to illness-disease-sickness, anxi-

ety-relief, grief-causality, foreboding-interpretation, and stress-relaxation. Ethnopsychiatry is a specialty that deals with culturally defined forms of social deviance. Africans live in a world peopled by vengeful ghosts and spirits, witches and sorcerers, and angry or jealous relatives and neighbors. Akan society has cultural mechanisms that allow it to absorb most forms of psychiatric disturbance. One mechanism that is found very widely in Africa is confession, which lowers guilt and stress levels, removes social tensions and accusations, and usually decreases symptoms. The traditional healer as psychiatrist explains the causes of illness in animistic terms familiar to patients who grew up in a world peopled by spirits. The medicines that are prescribed for psychiatric problems frequently produce psychopharmacological effects. In West Africa emetics and purgatives are followed by herbal compounds that act as tranquilizers and sedatives. According to one study, however, some Yoruba patients complained that they were given “poisons” to make their madness worse so that the healer could charge higher fees. The plant that was used is a species of the genus *Datura* that contains hyoscine, or scopolamine—a hallucinogenic agent. The Yoruba also employ Rauwolfia, which is the source of reserpine. Mind-altering substances are also employed in other parts of Africa; *Cannabis sativa*, for example, is used during childbirth among the Sotho.

Robert Edgerton (1966) conducted some of the early research in East Africa dealing with this subject. Among the Hehe of Tanzania, the Sebei of Uganda, and the Pokot and Kamba of Kenya, village members can list culturally defined behaviors that identify a person as psychotic. Among these are violent actions, sleeping or hiding in the bush, wandering around naked, and talking nonsense. Edgerton explains that the social group, rather than a diagnostic label, defines abnormality. He illustrates how the negotiations among patients, healers, family members, and friends structure the definition of mental illness. It is also this group that recognizes, defines, and responds to psychosis through a process of interpersonal relations.

One of the classic cases of psychiatric treatment is derived from the work of the Nigerian psychiatrist T. A. Lambo (1964). He found numerous individuals suffering from schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders on his visits to Nigerian villages. These persons were not institutionalized but considered a part of everyday village life. In October 1954 two projects were started at a village named Aro. The first project was a day hospital that allowed patients to go home at night. This phase lasted for two years. The second phase involved extending the day hospital to a village care service. The advantages of community involvement and social acceptance of healers and patients were so clearly evident that this village hospital model was expanded to other countries. Lambo believes that cooperation with indigenous healers contributed to the understanding of psychopathology and the psychodynamics of mental illness in Africa in relation to cultural and social variables.

**SEE ALSO** Affliction, article on African Cults of Affliction; African Religions, overview article.

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BRIAN M. DU TOIT (2005)

#### HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN THE AFRICAN DIASPORA

For more than a century, African-based religions in the Americas have been dismissed as mere superstition or titillating witchcraft. The racism that feeds such caricatures has endured into the twenty-first century even though these religions are now neither rare nor out of reach. Palo Monte, Santería, Vodou, and Rastafarianism are likely to be found in every sizeable city in Europe and the United States—as are the variety of contemporary religious practices known as Yoruba revival. Traditions such as Umbanda, Candomblé, and Shango may be scarcer, but they also have some international presence.

African-based religions are eclectic by default and in ways that emphasize both their developmental history and their innate flexibility, which has made it possible for them to survive. Broad African perspectives dominate in the diverse group of religions born from chattel slavery, but they also have absorbed South American and Caribbean autochthonous religious practices. Colonial Christianity has also had a substantial influence on African diaspora religions. Without giving up their primary focus on African-based religion, most contemporary followers of Vodou or Santería—whether in Haiti, Cuba, or New York City—publicly identify themselves as Christians. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, in both the United States and the Caribbean, attendance at Catholic churches is part of the ritual life of an initiate of Santería or Vodou.

African-based religions were shaped by two powerful forces: the cruel and dehumanizing social structures that characterized transatlantic slavery and the creative responses of the enslaved who mustered to the cause resistance, flexibility, humor, strength, and endurance.

**HEALING WITH LEAVES.** Virtually all African-based religions emanating from South America and the Caribbean are focused on healing. These religious practices present a more diverse interpretation of illness and well-being than Western allopathic medicine provides. A leader/healer in Vodou, Candomblé, Umbanda, Santería, or Palo Monte is expected to function in diverse ways, including as a stand-in parent, a psychologist, a social worker, a priest, and, very likely, an herbal doctor. All African diaspora priests are not equally educated about medicinal plants; however, those with skills in healing commonly use leaves in the curative process in one form or another.

Healing with leaves is a common theme among African diaspora religions. Herbs, most often referred to as leaves, can be a curative agent in many ways, varying from being the source of medicinal tea to serving as an important ingredient in spiritual charms or talismans. Sacred leaves are also brushed across the human body in an act of spiritual cleansing or exorcism. They can also be kneaded in water and applied to the body as a poultice. In treating something like a headache, whole leaves fresh from the bush can be laid on the forehead and secured with a scarf. In Brazil, herbal baths are administered by the *mae de santo* (mother of the saints) or the *pai de santo* (father of the saints), whereas in Jersey City, New Jersey, *santeros* administer similar baths to those awaiting initiation, and in Cuba the *casa de santo* (house of the spirit) is spiritually cleaned by sprinkling the floor with a leaf infusion, heavy with the perfume of basil. A carefully constructed series of cleansing baths followed by strengthening baths, made from leaf infusions and other ingredients such as powders, perfumes, fruits and liquors, is as likely to be prescribed for trouble in the workplace as it is for a disease. All problems—physical, spiritual or magical—can profit from herbal treatment.

#### **DIAGNOSIS AND THE THEORY OF PARALLEL CAUSALITIES.**

Diaspora priests offer healing to clients for a wide range of ailments and their causes, including professional, social, spiritual, amorous, monetary, familial, or even political. As in allopathic healing, curing begins with diagnosis and, in the African diaspora, diagnosis comes through divination. Tossing cowrie shells, gazing into water-filled glasses or burning candles, going into possession, and card reading are among African diaspora divining techniques. African diaspora divination is more of a discerning mechanism than a crystal ball, and although divination techniques are diverse, they usually work on a theory of parallel causalities. Vodou card reading provides an example: A client who goes to a Haitian *manbo* (priestess) for a card reading will not hear a prediction of the future. Instead the *manbo* will engage the client in a series of questions and answers designed to unlock the secrets of the present and reveal important things in the past that have been forgotten. The *manbo* will lay out the cards twice—once to determine what is happening among the living and a second time to see if spirits or ancestors are involved. In most traditions a particular physical ailment has no connection to a specific spiritual problem. Therefore, a connection between, for example, the inability to sleep and a troubled ancestor would emerge only through the divination process.

Once a problem is revealed, treatment will proceed on both human and spiritual levels. For insomnia, the *manbo* might suggest an herbal tea, an over-the-counter sleeping pill, or even a trip to a medical doctor. Most healers in the African diaspora tradition have accepted the skills and powers of Western allopathic medicine, and they counsel their clients to take advantage of the help a medical doctor can provide. For the *manbo*, the spiritual connection revealed in divination amounts to a second layer of causality. For her, this dimension of the client's problem is more serious—and needs more attention—than the physical problem. The *manbo's* prescriptions for healing the spiritual level of the problem might include such things as *wanga* (a charm designed to change a dysfunctional relationship), herbal baths, and even elaborate rituals such as a Catholic Mass for the dead to honor an unhappy ancestor. A strong sense of family lingers in African diaspora healing practices. It is not unusual for a client to be told that the cause of the problem is an event in the family that happened before he or she was born.

Physical ailments are sometimes diagnosed as messages from the spirits. This genre of diagnosis that is familiar to almost every individual in the African diaspora. By tracing an illness or a social problem along parallel causal paths through the land of the living and the land of spirits, that problem is firmly located in a relational connection rather than in an individual person. Guilt is thus diffused and community ties are reinforced through the palliative rituals prescribed by the healer. The client's sense of helplessness is abated, and, most important, suffering is given meaning. It is common for a religious leader to be called to his or her healing vocation through a manifestation of prolonged phys-

ical illness. The authority of any diagnosis that includes the intervention of the spirits is assured when the illness at issue is one that Western medicine can neither diagnose nor cure.

**HEATING THINGS UP: RAISING ASHE.** African diaspora religions configure the world as a web of relationships connecting the living, the ancestors, and the spirits. Each group has a role to play and each group needs the other two, thus the exchanges among them are ideally kept in an active balance, one that is simultaneously dynamic and equilibrating. *Ashe*, a common Yoruba term in Santería and Candomblé (it has similar meaning in other African diaspora religious traditions) can be translated as vital energy or divine energy. *Ashe* flows through the web connecting the living, the dead, and the spirits, thus effecting healing. *Ashe* is present in people and can be raised by many means—especially spirited dancing and drumming. In Haitian Vodou, it is said that no spirits will come and possess the vodouisants unless the gathered group does not first *echofe* the ritual event itself. Accordingly, every ceremony becomes a context for community healing. *Ashe* is also in the juices of healing leaves and the blood of sacrificial animals. Healing through leaves and blood sacrifice necessarily includes reciprocity with plants and animals. Thus, the person who kills an animal may first offer it a bit of food. If the animal agrees to eat, it agrees to be sacrificed. In a similar way, when the chicken, goat, cow or pig has been killed, priests pour libations on its body in exchange for the sacrifice, much as “leaf doctors” leave a few coins on the spot where they collect their healing leaves.

**MAKING WANGA.** African diaspora healers tend to extrude the problems at hand. Healers make models of troubled relationships to “work” with them. For example, an unfaithful husband is made manifest through a male cloth doll. The doll may be stuffed with leaves, powders, coins and, most likely, a piece of paper bearing the name of the offending husband. The work then begins. A length of copper wire is used to tie the husband’s image into a doll-sized chair. A padlock secures the wire. The wife is given the key and instructed to throw it away where no one, including herself, will ever find it. This is called making a *wanga*, a somewhat generic term for charms and talismans in Caribbean culture. The manufacture of the charm articulates and activates the human situation, thus opening the possibility of change. The next step, “working the *wanga*,” brings the spirits into the process. The doll, bound in his chair, is situated to face a mirror. Between the mirror and the doll, an oil lamp burns twenty-four hours a day. The unhappy wife feeds the wick and instructs the spirits to make her husband see himself clearly and thus see how much damage he is doing to his family. She works the *wanga* two or three times a day. Working the *wanga* is one way to heat things up, that is, to raise *ashe*.

There is a rich repertoire of charms in the African diaspora. Protective charms designed to secure a house are common. They are either buried in the yard or hung in the house rafters. One version of what Vodou practitioners call a *gad*

(guard) is an herbal mixture placed under the skin of the upper arm. This particular charm functions as a look-out that warns the person of immanent dangers by inducing a tremor in the arm. Jamaicans talk about the activation of a malevolent charm as “planting” something. Charms of that sort are thought to be capable of remaining maliciously potent for generations. By contrast, there are many charms known in the African diaspora that anyone can make in a minute without the help of a healer, and most are not expected to function beyond the immediate situation. For example, small packets of meaningful leaves in the shoes can “heat up” in the very act of walking. This is yet another way of activating the *ashe* in leaves. About to face a judge, the accused may place honey on his tongue before leaving the house, and once in court, he may memorize the names of the judge and the lawyers, to be used for another sort of *wanga*.

**POISONS THAT HEAL.** A few contemporary African diaspora healers with extensive botanical knowledge may still know how to administer a variety of poisons. Poisoning techniques have been passed down from healer to healer for generations. By the turn of the twenty-first century, these recipes had become quaint memories, but during the time of the slave colonies, poisoning was a powerful weapon, one of the few that slaves had. It was a serious—although exaggerated and politicized—issue throughout the colonial era. When slaves actually used it as an act of resistance, they could and did throw the white population into a headlong panic, which often produced hideous punishments. Gifted healers among the slaves were known to be hanged, shot, and even burned alive—some for no reason other than their suspicious herbal knowledge. It is likely that during the period of chattel slavery most slaves who knew about leaves were likely to know how to concoct poisons. Most did nothing with these recipes. Perhaps, those who did thought of their use as a continuation of a spirit-fueled healing tradition. When slavery is the context and survival is at stake, poisoning could well be seen as a community healing agent.

It is certain that the white colonial population did not think of poisoning by slaves as a positive contribution to the community. During the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, when the enslaved people laboring in Haiti began their uniquely successful bid for freedom, the colonial population in the Caribbean was already ill at ease in the company of so many angry black men and women. Fear, hatred, and ignorance among the white colonial population fueled the fires of suspicion. Whites had little understanding of African diaspora religious practices. They passed laws that related the making of healing charms with the manufacture of poisons. At times, the punishment for making *wanga* was death. Ironically, the antisuperstition laws in place before the Haitian Revolution remained after liberation; however, in the aftermath of the revolution, the political valence of laws against the making of *wanga* changed: Legislation that resulted from a witch-hunt for poisoners in colonial Haiti was co-opted by politicians who wanted Haiti to appear to the larger world as a “civilized” Catholic country.

SEE ALSO African American Religions, overview article; African Religions, overview article; Syncretism.

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KAREN MCCARTHY BROWN (2005)

#### HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST

Distinctions among religion, magic and nature, and rational thought, when referring to an ancient society that did not use those descriptive categories, are ultimately regarded as inadequate by the majority of scholars who study ancient Near East societies. Therefore, the terms "empirical" and "exorcistic" will be used throughout this entry to define the various aspects of the art of healing in the ancient Near East.

**CUNEIFORM SCRIPT AREA: MESOPOTAMIA.** Two different kinds of healers are mentioned in the earliest records: the *azu* (usually translated as "doctor"), found during the first half of the third millennium BCE, and the *ashipu* (usually translated as "exorcist"), also in evidence during the same period, and more commonly after the second millennium BCE. The latter term was derived from the active participle of the root *wshp*: "to conjure." Scholars have tried, without much success, to differentiate these two professions from each other. Texts show that the two roles overlapped, and both types of healers used the same methods, prayers, and exorcism formulas. Scurlock (1999) has recently proposed a satisfactory explanation, however: *ashipu* was similar to a doctor and the *azu* resembled a pharmacist, although the *azu* was also able to perform minor surgical operations. This explanation has been confirmed by P. Abrahams (2003), who has managed to place these two professions in the context of Mesopotamian cosmological thought. The exorcist (*ashipu*) possessed essential knowledge which originated directly from the god Enki/Ea and was given to humans by the goddess Nininsina (literally, "Lady of [the city of] Isin"). He or she warded off evil by uttering formulas and performing rituals and treatments. The skills of the *azu* in contrast came directly from the goddess Nininsina alone (a lesser-ranking but important deity) and from her son Damu.

Evidence of an herbalist tradition exists in cuneiform texts from Ebla, in northern Syria dating from the twenty-

fifth century BCE; the skills of the *azu* emerged from this tradition (in fact, the profession's title is mentioned in the texts). It is reasonable to suppose, however, that the *azu* did not restrict his activities to the therapeutic use of plants, because the presence of small instruments may suggest that he performed surgery (D'Agostino 2003).

Collections of exorcistic texts from this period reveal the beginnings of a rich literary tradition which would continue until the end of Mesopotamian civilization. One line of exorcistic tradition runs throughout the third millennium BCE; from the second millennium BCE onwards, although the previous tradition continued, new trends also developed (Michalowski 1992). In this later literary tradition, the choice of particular material, drawn from an oral legacy and written down, gave rise to the distinct tradition of "academic" knowledge (typical of the schools of scribes and literary specialists), which would eventually take on a life and procedures of its own (Michalowski 1992 and Biggs 1995). Thus, the authority of academic tradition came to define the role of the healer in the second millennium BCE as the preeminent opponent of evil. This role was principally centered upon the figure of the "exorcist" (*ashipu*), a priest who belonged to the temple; while ancient sorcerers and witches were restricted to the negative role of agents responsible for evil, thus excluding them from any role as healers (Abusch 2002).

Ancient Mesopotamians would consider themselves to have had a "happy" life if they enjoyed the favor of the gods (and especially of their personal god), if they had a long life, raised plenty of children, and enjoyed the respect of their fellow citizens (Biggs 1995). They believed illnesses were caused by demons, ghosts, gods, witches, or warlocks. In particular, many illnesses were caused by the "hand" of a divinity or a spirit. The main reason for misfortune or illness, therefore, consisted in falling out of favor with the gods. The sick person was thought to have committed some sin, either deliberately or unintentionally, that had offended the gods. Demons, spirits, and magical spells could also cause illness, but their outbreak in the patient's life was in some way the result of a loss of divine favor, since that was considered to provide absolute protection against every misfortune. In this respect, the life of the individual corresponded to the life of the kingdom. Because loss of divine goodwill resulted in all kinds of misfortune, individual bad luck was linked to the global cosmological picture—as conceived by the Mesopotamian culture—from which were resulting every aspect of life. An example of this context is the cuneiform text "The Worm and the Toothache" (probably referring to the nerve of the pulp canal): the spell consists of only twenty-one verses—two-thirds of them describe the mythological origin and creation of the worm, and only the final seven verses give instructions on reciting the spell, the medicine, and method of treatment. (Biggs 1995).

Naturally, the ancient Mesopotamians knew contingent causes of illness in everyday living, such as wounds, overexposure to the sun or the cold, overeating, proximity to some-



one sick (contagion), or insect bites; still, they used spells and rituals to cure or prevent ailments.

This entry's description of the exorcist relates only those characteristics that are relevant to the modern concept of medicine. Because of their specific character, the potency incantations are the only exorcistic text to be mentioned here, for the inclusion in the ritualistic context of practical remedies (Biggs 1967).

The oldest treatises on medicine are pharmacological texts dating from the third millennium BCE (Civil 1960 and Fronzaroli 1988), but scholars have been unable to identify the plants and minerals mentioned in them, thus preventing deeper study of ancient prescriptions (Biggs 1995). Three kinds of prescriptions exist: lexical texts, which list the names of plants, minerals, and ingredients; descriptive texts, which also describe therapeutic properties; and abstracts, which list the plants' names and specify the parts that should be used for treatment. In addition to these, scholars have also identified a text which provides details of how to preserve the ingredients. The city of Nippur had a central grocery store that stocked rare plants, but the most important center in terms of healing arts was the city of Isin; the temple of the city's patron goddess, Nininsina (or Gula), housed the most important school of medicine in Mesopotamia. Excavations of exorcist rooms, have unearthed collections of pharmacological texts, as well as cuneiforms texts concerning the art of healing. Even these pharmacological texts, however, emphasize the ritual element, as does the wider sphere of exorcistic literature. However, the existence of medical texts without any "magical" prescriptions has been reported from the first half of the second millennium BCE (Finkel 2004).

Contrary to pharmacological texts, the remaining literature that addresses curing physical ailments was written in the second and first millennia BCE. This material includes therapeutic texts and diagnostic texts. (Stol 2001).

The most well-known therapeutic manual takes its title from its opening words: "if there is fever in a person's skull"; the final version consisted of forty-five tablets. This text describes symptoms of ailments, includes prescriptions of the substances to be used in treatment, and explains how to make the required potions.

In addition to the therapeutic manual, a diagnostic manual of five chapters (contained in forty tablets) has also been preserved. This text bears the name of a scholar who lived in Babylon around 1050 BCE (Finkel 1988): he not only systematically catalogued various diagnoses and prognoses, arranging them by type of divination, but he also compiled a handbook on morphoscopy in which the characteristics of healthy people were used to predict outcomes (Böck 2000).

This sort of literature is closely linked to the practice of divination. For example, the treatise on diagnosis and prognosis also contains guidelines for the doctor to interpret the signs which manifest while the patient recuperates.

Indirect evidence on healing arts comes from texts that list penalties for the negligent surgeon within the corpus of

laws, and epistolographic evidence contains many descriptions of the activity of healers (either *azu* or *ashipu*).

It is difficult, therefore, to understand Herodotus's (I § 197; Herrero 1984) claim that there were no doctors in Babylon; instead, it is reasonable to conclude that the Greek historian had misunderstood his source. In the early twenty-first century, many scholars are studying the medical history concerning Mesopotamia, as evidenced by the establishment of *Le journal des médecines cunéiformes*.

**CUNEIFORM SCRIPT AREA: HITTITES (HATTI LAND).** The gap in evidence from Mesopotamia, after the Old-Babylonian period (twentieth through sixteenth centuries BCE) and before the beginning of the first millennium BCE, is filled by the cuneiform texts from Bogazköy (ancient Hattushash), which preserved and continued the Babylonian heritage of medical tradition. Numerous texts of Mesopotamian tradition from the city's archives often contain Hittite or Luwian terms, but the texts were written in Akkadian. Scholars have yet to fully understand the Anatolian medical practices, however, primarily because of the incomplete nature of these texts and the uncertain meaning of some Hittite terms (Burde 1974).

Texts of various kinds often provide details of Hattushash inviting doctors from elsewhere, reflecting the primitive state of health care in the region. A letter from the Hittite king Hattushilish III (r. 1275–1260 BCE) to the Babylonian king Kadashman-Enlil II (r. 1263–1255 BCE) mentions the arrival of two doctors in Anatolia while professional medical help was sought from Egypt, the usual source of doctors for the Hittite court (Edel 1976).

Although the Hittite term for "doctor" is unknown (the texts use both the Sumerian ideogram *a-zu* and the Akkadian *azu*), the profession appears to have been very well organized. Various documents contain the names of several doctors; these healers participated in ritual celebrations in addition to therapeutic activities. In fact, the healer who cared for king Hattushilish III as a young man was not called "doctor"—he was the chief scribe.

As had Babylon law, Hittite legislation also regulated health provision. A notable paragraph in Old Hittite laws required those who had committed an act of violence pay the medical expenses incurred by their victims.

Scholars also have studied details of illnesses suffered by historical figures and public health epidemics. The Hittite king Murshilish II composed a dramatic prayer to the storm god and the land gods, asking them to end an epidemic which had lasted twenty years. In the text, he refers his divination attempts to discover the reason for the gods' anger: he had found out that his father, the king, had promised the gods that he would not attack the Egyptians and then broken his vow. The epidemic began when the first prisoners of war arrived in Anatolia. The admission of guilt (although his father's and not his own) is a central aspect of this prayer, seen as necessary to placate the gods.

**NON-CUNEIFORM SCRIPT AREA: EGYPT** Scholars derive knowledge of ancient Egyptian medicine from a variety of sources, including artistic illustrations, treatises and medical instruments, references in literary sources and, not least, on the examination of bodies preserved by the ancient Egyptians. These sources portray a relatively accurate picture of the illnesses from which the Egyptians suffered and the theories and remedies devised to counteract them.

The oldest surviving manuscript from this period is the Kahun Papyrus, dating from the XIIth dynasty (c. 1850 BCE), which contains a number of gynecological and veterinary treatments (Griffith 1898).

One important medical text, dating from the New Kingdom but containing material originating from the Old Kingdom, is the Edwin Smith Papyrus (Braested 1930 and Bardinnet 1992), which is kept at the New York Academy of Sciences. The text describes in some detail vertebral contusions, dislocations of the jaw, and various fractures (of the shoulder blade, humerus, ribs, nose, and skull); in the forty-eight cases examined a rigorous diagnostic method is applied. Each case begins with the phrase “If you examine someone who has. . .” and then lists symptoms in detail. After examining the sick person, the doctor is advised to state his diagnosis and prognosis, or whether the patient will survive “an ailment which I will treat.” In less fortunate cases, for example, a patient suffering from a severe dislocation of a vertebra with a lesion of the spinal cord, the doctor must recognize that this is beyond his capabilities: “an ailment for which nothing can be done.”

While the Edwin Smith Papyrus concentrates on external traumas, the contemporary Ebers Papyrus describes the vascular system and the causes and development of internal ailments (Wreszinski 1913 and Bardinnet 1992). This treatise demonstrates a rudimentary understanding of the circulatory system, considering it as a network of veins originating at the heart, extending to the organs, and passing through every part of the body.

This system circulated not only blood, but also air, water, sperm, and a bodily substance called *ukhedu*. The concept of *ukhedu* characterizes one of the oldest historical theories for illnesses; it attempts to explain in rational terms the causes of illnesses, old age, and death. In practice, the doctor checked that the circulation was working properly by feeling various parts of the patient’s body. Excess *ukhedu*, would eventually manifest in a patient as pus and blisters, and produce internal disease. Furthermore, the natural buildup of *ukhedu* during the course of life resulted in aging tissues and ultimately in death. In addition, embalmers attempted to preserve corpses by dehydrating the body and draining off bodily fluids; these efforts were necessary to eliminate the *ukhedu*.

For healing preparations, Egyptian doctors used animals, vegetables, and minerals. Acacia, date, juniper, fig, garlic, onion, lotus, honey, milk, wax, arsenic, and other prod-

ucts were often used in their recipes, along with more extravagant substances, such as pelican, hippopotamus, and fly excrement. Such preparations could be delivered in various forms: decoctions, infusions, potions, pills, inhalations, fumigations, suppositories, lotions, and eye-baths.

The ancient Egyptians believed that illnesses—especially infectious diseases, fevers, or other ailments that did not appear to be caused by a cut or a wound—were due to a “blow” inflicted by a god, evil spirits, or the restless dead (Ritner 1993). Hence, Egyptian medicine frequently resorted to magic. This civilization viewed magic and rational methods as complementary rather than contradictory, as is expressed in the opening lines of the Ebers Papyrus: “Magical formulas which act in concert with medication are useful, as likewise is medication that acts in concert with magical formulas.”

The link between medicine, magic and religion is clear, in that the Egyptian term for “magic potion,” *pekhet*, is also used indiscriminately to mean “medical prescription” (Ritner 1993). Religion, magic, and medicine continually intermingled. Through a kind of ritual magical transference, the Egyptians thought particular animals possessed therapeutic values linked to their characteristics; the skin of deer, for example, could cure gout if tied to a person’s foot; a fried fish head could draw out a headache and a pig’s eye prevented blindness. Other substances owed their reputation to mythology, such as the milk of a mother who bore a male child, recalling the goddess Isis and her son Horus. Disgusting substances, especially excrement, also were believed to ward off evil spirits, a frequent suspected cause of illnesses.

The gods could not only send an illness, but they could also cure it. Medicine, therefore, was controlled from the world of the gods, and various gods were considered healers, including Amon, “the doctor (*swmw*) who heals without any remedy” (Zandee 1948); Isis; the deified Imenhotep, architect of the Step Pyramid at Djoser (IIIrd dynasty); and Amenhotep, the son of Hapu (Wildung 1977). Patients often appealed to “Horus-*swmw-nfr*,” or “Horus the good doctor,” whose “word” “repels death,” whose “speech cures the sting of the scorpion” and whose “magic soothes inflammation” (Ritner 1993). The priests of all these benevolent divinities were considered to be the best healers, even if the most important priest-doctors were those connected to two potentially dangerous goddesses, the lioness Sekhmet and the scorpion Serqet (von Känel 1984). A priest of Sekhmet, a goddess who could send plague, is mentioned in the Ebers papyrus alongside ordinary doctors (*swmw*) and “amulet sellers” (*saw*) (von Känel 1984). The latter could be employed by the state; and we know of a “seller of amulets of the king of Upper and Lower Egypt.” The “officials of Serqet” were particularly sought after to heal scorpion stings and snake bites (von Känel 1984). Most of these priest-doctors practiced magic, and they were often enlisted for trips into the desert, where these deadly animals represented a constant danger.

Although Egyptian medicine seems to have been contaminated by magic and many of its treatments do not seem to have been particularly effective, its doctors were good observers and at times their healing approaches worked. Moreover, Egyptian medical knowledge earned an excellent reputation in Asia Minor and Greece; both Hippocrates and Galen attributed much of their knowledge to works they had consulted in the temple of Imenhotep at Memphis.

**SEE ALSO** Dumuzi; Egyptian Religion, overview article; Hittite Religion; Kingship, article on Kingship in the Ancient Mediterranean World; Mesopotamian Religions, overview article; Soul, article on Ancient Near Eastern Concepts.

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## HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN JUDAISM

Jewish sacred texts, in particular the Hebrew Bible, Apocrypha (noncanonic, postbiblical writings), rabbinic literature from the late Roman era (the Talmud and midrash), the *Mishnāh Torah* (Repetition of the law; a twelfth-century CE classification of religious subjects), and the *Shulhan Arukh* (The prepared table; a sixteenth-century CE codebook of Jewish law), all touch upon sickness, recovery, and health. Excerpts on health from holy books and their influence on Jewish culture can be arranged readily into the following six subjects:

1. divine healing,
2. health wisdom,
3. visiting the sick,
4. religious law (*halakbah*),
5. folk healing,
6. professional medicine.

**DIVINE HEALING.** In the Bible (c. sixth century BCE), God is the force responsible for both sickening and healing: “I deal death and give life; I wounded and I heal” (*Dt.* 32:39). Accordingly, God inflicts plagues, heals Hezekiah’s intestinal ailment, and tests Job with boils and other misfortunes. The psalmist appeals directly for “rescue” and “deliverance” to God, who is “compassionate and gracious”; other biblical figures seek out God’s prophets, as the woman of Shunem called on Elisha to revive her dead son (*2 Kgs.* 4:8). A certain skin disfigurement (*tsara’at*) is always a mark of divine disfavor (*Lv.* 13). Thus when Moses’ sister Miriam contracts *tsara’at*, he cries out, “O God, pray heal her! [*Eil na r’fah na lah!*]” (*Nm.* 12:13).

Jewish healing prayers follow a biblical model. *Jeremiah* is the source of the ancient prayer recited still in daily Jewish liturgy: “Heal us, O Lord, and we shall be healed” (*Jer.* 17:14). Psalms are recited daily for someone who is critically ill; the *Mi SheBerakh* (May the one who blessed) prayer is sung for “healing, courage, and faith” in front of the opened Torah; late-medieval Yiddish prayers (*tekhines*) written by Jewish mothers ask God for safe pregnancies and well children; and modern prayers—prayer writing continues to be a vital religious activity—request strength and calm, “healing of body and mind.” A prayer’s soothing effect comes not just from the words alone; just as important are davening (a Yiddish term meaning fervent recitation, often while standing and swaying), cadence, melody, chant, and the consoling context of the daily or Sabbath service liturgy, held in communion with clergy, family, and friends.

Except for prayer, Judaism has no required rite for restoring health, nor do the relics, saints, pilgrimages, or exorcisms that are features of other religious traditions. The Jerusalem Temple did not offer treatment directly, as did the contemporaneous healing temples of Aesklepios, even though sick people surely must have come there to offer petitionary and thanksgiving sacrifice. After the Temple was destroyed in 70 CE, the Talmud declared that there is no healing in shrines, perhaps referring to pagan or Christian sites but also precluding Jewish sacerdotal healing (*Abodah Zarah* 55a).

**HEALTH WISDOM.** Jewish religious texts explicitly promote mental and physical health. They take their cue from the *Book of Proverbs*, which itself follows the more ancient tradition of “wisdom literature,” a stream of aphorisms, poems, and fables that give pragmatic guidance on how to live long and successfully. “A man’s spirit can sustain him through illness,” *Proverbs* says, “but low spirits . . . who can bear them” (*Prov.* 18:14). The *Proverbs*-like Apocrypha text *Ben Sira* (*Ecclesiasticus* in the Jerusalem Bible) states, “Better a poor man healthy and fit than a rich man tormented in body” (*Ben Sira* 30:14), and it condemns gluttony and drunkenness. The Talmud encourages bathing and washing after meals, bodily cleanliness being inseparable from spiritual purity (*Abodah Zarah* 20a). The *Mishneh Torah* and the *Shulhan Arukh* have entire chapters on dietetics, exercise, rest, and sexual temperance, through which they elevate practical hygienic advice into religious obligation.

In the opinion of some scholars, dietary laws (*kasrut*) from *Leviticus*, assiduously followed by traditional Jews, were originally intended to promote healthiness. Moreover, they argue, dietary laws together with rules of Sabbath observance, pregnancy, menstruation, penile discharge, childbirth, excretion, cadavers, sexuality, and *tsara’at* constitute a program of public health. The Bible itself makes no such claim. Nevertheless, for millennia observant Jews have thought them to be rules of hygiene. Indeed, it has been said that because of hygienic practices, medieval Jewish populations avoided the worst ravages of bubonic plagues.

**VISITING THE SICK.** Job’s friends sat quietly with him for a week, until he was ready to speak. *Ben Sira* (second century BCE) urges, “Do not shrink from visiting the sick” (*Ben Sira* 7:35). The Talmud (second–sixth centuries CE) made this ancient courtesy into a solemn commandment, grounded on the biblical story of the three messengers from God who came to visit Abraham after he was circumcised. Visiting the sick, the sages state with emphasis, is among the highest religious obligations, and visiting does indeed heal, especially “if they (the visitors) loved him like themselves” (*Midrash Rabbah Leviticus* 34:1). The Talmud declares, “He who visits the sick causes him to live,” and he who does not is “a shedder of blood” (a murderer). Because the Divine Presence “rests above the invalid’s bed,” as he or she wavers between death and life, the sickroom is to be regarded as awesome and sacred. However, the visitor must not come when the sick per-

son is indisposed, lest they be exhausted or humiliated (*Nedarim* 39a). Everyone, rich or poor, must visit the sick, especially if the illness has come on suddenly, and they should “pray for his recovery and depart” (*Mishneh Torah* 14:4:14). The *Shulhan Arukh* adds, “one must visit the sick of the Gentiles in the interest of peace” (*Yorah Deah* 335).

Few other commandments (*mitsvot*) shape Jewish culture as profoundly. Visiting is an imperative for family and friends and among the most important duties for a congregational rabbi. Autonomous visiting the sick (*Bikkur Cholim*) societies, synagogue volunteers, and hospital chaplains ensure that every sick person has company. Traditional rabbis shape their calls mindful of detailed visiting rules set forth in the *Shulhan Arukh*.

**RELIGIOUS LAW (HALAKHAH).** Mainstream Jewish spiritual practice follows laws found in the Bible and the Talmud together with later refinements and corrections. What sets the precept to visit the sick apart is its therapeutic intent. Most rules concerning patients are excusatory; that is, they relieve the sick person of possibly harmful obligations, such as fasting on the Day of Atonement. Preserving or saving someone’s life overrides any other duty. However, when life is not threatened, a broken bone, for instance, medical care might be put off. Centuries of rabbinical commentary (*responsa*) have dealt with other difficulties, like observing commandments during a plague, so there has been an substantial accumulation of legal precedents (medical *halakhah*).

Moral dilemmas in contemporary medical care, notably surrounding abortion, euthanasia, genetic engineering, and prolongation of life, are stimulating interest in pertinent Jewish law. In 1959 Rabbi Immanuel Jacobovitz defined the subject and scope of modern Jewish medical ethics, and subsequently prominent rabbis and physicians have added casuistic (moral) analysis in numerous articles and books on the subject. The premises of Jewish medical ethics are that life is sacred and that all actions must be in accordance with morality in the Talmudic tradition. Ethicists distinguish the Jewish emphasis on the individual’s moral obligations, especially to choose life, from the secular emphasis on the individual’s autonomy, even to choose death. However, medical-ethical dilemmas are as contentious for Jewish ethicists as for their non-Jewish counterparts.

**FOLK HEALING.** Throughout history, Judaism has had a rich tradition of healing folklore. Isaiah treated King Hezekiah for intestinal illness with an application of figs (*Is.* 38:21). According to ancient legend, King Solomon acquired knowledge of healing from God, then wrote a healing text, which was later followed by a school of Jewish folk practitioners (Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, bk. 8, chap. 2). In addition, Solomon was said to be a sorcerer-astrologist who could banish illness demons (*The Testament of Solomon*). Folk belief also has it that the angel Rafael stands guard at night over the sickbed.

The Talmud devotes pages to *materia medica* that came from ancient Babylonia concerning the warding off of de-

mons, the evil eye, and other causes of illness with charms, amulets, potions, and incantations. To cite one Talmudic remedy, “For migraine one should take a woodcock and cut its throat with a white zuz over the side of his head on which he has pain” (*Gittin* 69a). This, the rabbis knew, was magical, but they declared as principle that “nothing done for the purpose of healing is forbidden on grounds of superstition.” By the Middle Ages, however, rabbis came to believe that Talmudic medicine was archaic and counseled their followers not to use it. Nevertheless, it is still published.

According to stories in the Talmud (*aggadah*), certain rabbis were healers. “Give me your hand,” said Rabbi Johanna to Rabbi Hiyya, who was ill. “He gave him his and he raised him” (*Berakoth* 5b). In every generation, even in the early twenty-first century, some teachers (*rebbe*s) have been folk healers and experts in Jewish medicinal lore.

Jewish folklore derives its particularity from the letters, symbols, pictures, prayers, stories, incantations, and passages that come from holy sources. They derive healing power from Hebrew, the language of the Bible and so of God. Hebrew letters and verses are placed in amulets to be worn around the neck, carried in one’s pocket, and placed at sick beds. On their home’s front entry and doorways within, many Jews place a prayer case (*mezuzah*), which contains a parchment scroll with protective biblical sayings. Changing the name of a sick person to Chaim (“life”), Rafael (“may God cure”), or the like and thereby changing his or her identity deflects the divine decree of death. Herbs from Sabbath services or unleavened bread from a Passover Seder can be medicinal. Some folk recipes, such as chicken soup, a common restorative since medieval times, may have had a more rational basis. These are but a few examples of Jewish healing practices that are still prevalent, especially in traditional communities, though marginalized like other forms of “alternative medicine.”

**PROFESSIONAL MEDICINE.** The attitudes of Jewish religious texts toward physicians changed from initial disdain to respect, even reverence. The Bible is scornful; it remarks sarcastically that before King Asa died, he “did not turn to the Lord but to physicians” (*2 Chr.* 16:11). However, the post-biblical text *Ben Sira*, written two centuries after Hippocrates (fourth century BCE), praises physicians. “From God the doctor has his wisdom,” *Ben Sira* says, and “God makes the earth yield healing herbs” (*Ben Sira* 38). Following *Ben Sira*, the Talmud acknowledges that the physician has been “given permission to heal” (*Mishnah Kaddushin* 82a). It allows physicians to set fees and urges people to settle in a town where a physician resides and to consult doctors when they are in pain. Furthermore, it discusses the issue of whether a patient should follow a doctor’s advice when the patient disagrees. With finality, the *Shulhan Arukh* declares that physicians have, “under the rule of saving an endangered life,” not just permission to heal but, more importantly, an obligation, a religious duty to do so (*Yorah Deah* 335).



Since the early Middle Ages, Jews have held Western medicine and physicians in high esteem. Historically, Western medicine stems from the writings of Hippocrates and Galen, and it is based not on divine intervention or superstition but on a rational, book-learned science of observation, experiment, and theory. In the sixth century the otherwise unknown Asaph wrote the earliest Jewish medical text, which intermingles Hippocratic ethics with faith in God. In the tenth century the Moroccan physician Isaac Israeli authored treatises based on Galenic and Arabic medicine that became standard teaching texts throughout Islamic and Christian lands. In the twelfth century the author of the *Mishneh Torah*, Moses Maimonides, who practiced medicine at the court of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, achieved such notoriety as a clinician and writer that even for Islamic historians he typifies the remarkable accomplishments of an innovative era of Islamic medicine. Like him, learned Jews, even rabbis, became physicians not only to their own people but also to caliphs, sultans, popes, and Christian rulers. Following this professional tradition, many Jews, then and now, have regarded scientific medicine as a spiritual calling, second only to the work of a rabbi.

Since the Enlightenment, Jews have entered the health professions in greatly disproportionate numbers and have made many important contributions to medical thought and science. Hospitals in the United States created in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for Jewish doctors and observant patients are now renowned medical centers. In its short existence, Israel has created a universal medical system in which care, teaching, and research are as advanced as any in the world.

The earliest Jewish physicians were inclined to write about professional excellence—to consider, that is, the question of what makes a doctor consummate—and thereby, like Asaph, to blend faith and profession. At a time of no medical licensure, no formal medical education, and no standardized professional standards, Isaac Israeli authored a book of moral and professional maxims, which includes the directive “Be especially concerned with visiting and treating the poor and needy sick for you cannot assume a more rewarding work.” In a medical treatise, Maimonides emphasized that one should consult only the best physicians, meaning those who have thoroughly learned medical science and have extensive practical experience. Later Jewish physicians composed personal oaths, among them the famous Prayer of Maimonides, which though attributed to Maimonides, was written by a prominent eighteenth-century German physician. “Almighty God,” it begins, “. . . inspire me with love for my art and for thy creatures. Do not allow thirst for profit, ambition for renown and admiration, to interfere with my profession.”

**RELIGION AND HEALTH.** The basis of Jewish concern for healing is the belief that healthiness is a spiritual virtue. Jewish attitudes toward the body derive from the belief that the human body-soul, whether a unity or a dyad, is God’s cre-

ation; it must be preserved to fulfill God’s will on earth. Life is sacred; death is evil, although there will be, in some form, afterlife in messianic times. Jewish teaching sanctifies deeds and behaviors more than a transcendent spirit and so does not privilege soul over body; accordingly, Judaism disapproves of self-inducing illness by mortification and asceticism.

Judaism has no overarching healing concept; indeed the etiologic premises of the miracle, scientific medicine, and folklore are irreconcilable. Maimonides offers the only systematic formulation of the relationship of health to Jewish spirituality. His health concepts stem from the translated writings of the ancient Greek writers Aristotle, Hippocrates, and Galen, which he refined; his spiritual beliefs stem of course from the Hebrew Bible and the Talmud; therefore, with respect to medicine and healing, he tried to harmonize the literary heritages of Greece and Israel. A person’s spiritual need, Maimonides wrote, is to acquire knowledge of God, and all actions in life should be directed toward that goal. Consequently, “the purpose of [the] body’s health is that the soul might find its instruments healthy and sound that it can be directed toward the sciences and toward acquiring the moral and rational virtues. . . . On the basis of this reasoning, the art of medicine is given a very large role with respect to the virtues. . . . To study it diligently is among the greatest acts of worship” (*Commentary on the Mishnah*, chap. 5). In other words, good health is necessary, even sacred, in Jewish life but never as an end in itself; rather, it is subordinate to the end of leading a life consecrated to God. Good health makes possible a good life, which for the religious Jew consists of worship, study, and *mitsvot*.

Conversely, Jewish sources suggest that a good life may promote good health or at least emotional well-being. *Proverbs* advises: “Fear the Lord and shun evil. It will be a cure for your body” (*Prov.* 3:7). And if someone feels pain, the Talmud says, “let him engage in the study of Torah” (*Erubin* 54a). Maimonides told an Arab prince that “passions of the psyche produce changes in the body.” To gain “strength of mind,” study philosophy and follow the “admonitions and disciplines of the Law” (*Regimen of Health*). According to Rebbe Nachman of Breslov (1722–1810), “joy and dance,” elements of Hasidic religiosity, relieve distress. The person utterly imbued with faith, in the words of a modern Orthodox theologian, “knows no fear or dread in the full sense of the term . . . [and] vanquishes even the fear of death” (Soloveitchik, 1983).

**SICKNESS AND SPIRITUALITY: CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS.** How do Jewish healing traditions have relevance in the early twenty-first century for the person who is ill? Many people still find comfort and inspiration in biblical writings, especially in *Psalms*. The Bible voices, acknowledges, and shares the sufferer’s inner storm of anger, dread, pain, shame, bewilderment, and tears, and it holds out hope, order, and coherence. Family, fellowship, prayer, and communal support from congregations and social service agencies mitigate

the lonesomeness, bitterness, and devitalization that often accompany chronic disease. Clergy who are trained in hospitals as pastoral counselors offer solace, perspective, and attentive listening. Jewish medical ethics is a vital field of literature and education and the subject of an ongoing dialogue between physicians and rabbis. Finally, many Jewish practitioners in the healing professions have internalized their spiritual heritage, write about it, and exhibit it in their daily work.

SEE ALSO Judaism, overview article.

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#### HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN ISLAMIC TEXTS AND TRADITIONS

In Islamic theology, God created nature, which functions in harmony and unity according to natural law. God also created human beings, who must submit to both God's law and natural law in order to function in harmony and unity in the universe. Therefore human beings are above animals because they alone can worship God and can redeem themselves through piety and good works. When harmony is disturbed by immoral or unhealthy behavior, a virus or microbe, an accident, or a personal or societal catastrophe, physical or mental disease may result. When a person's physical and mental functioning is impaired, he or she is considered sick and should seek treatment. In the Islamic worldview, good health is a sign of both a wholesome lifestyle and divine favor, and the healer or medical practitioner plays an important and highly valued role in the social order by restoring the physical or mental well-being of the patient. The physician must determine the malady and prescribe the remedy, which should be directed at the source, whether a microbe, injury, malnutrition, personal problem, societal disorder, or divine ill favor.

The Qur'an contains many verses that pertain to health and healing and is considered the ultimate guide to good health. Verse 41:44 states, "Say: 'To the believers it [the

Qur'an] is a guidance, and a healing.'" Similarly, according to verse 10:57, "O men, now there has come to us an admonition [Qur'anic revelation] from your Lord, and a healing for what is in the breast, and a guidance, and a mercy to the believers." Verse 26:80 quotes the words of Abraham and makes it clear that God is the ultimate curer of illness: "Lord of all Being who created me, and Himself guides me, and Himself gives me to eat and drink, and, whenever I am sick heals me, who makes me to die, then gives me life, and who I am eager shall forgive me my offence on the day of doom." The Qur'an (2:219; 2:168; 2:180; 5:90) recommends a wholesome lifestyle, forbids intoxicants, and mercifully absolves the ill from fasting during Ramaḍān. Honey is one of many proofs of God's majesty and is the only remedy for ill health in the Qur'an: "Then comes there forth out of (Bees') bellies a drink of diverse hues wherein is healing for men. Surely in that is a sign for a people who reflect" (16:72).

The *ḥadīth*, or sayings and doings of the Prophet collected and compiled after Muḥammad's death, offer extensive commentary on disease and medicine. In a much-quoted *ḥadīth* Muḥammad stated, "God has not sent down a disease without sending down a remedy for it." Bukhari transmitted it. Jabir reported God's messenger as saying, "There is a medicine for every disease and when the medicine is applied to the disease it is cured by God's permission." Muslim transmitted it." (*Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ*, Vol. III, p. 945). Other well-known *ḥadīth* urge believers to seek treatment: "Usama b. Sharik told that when God's messenger was asked whether they should make use of medical treatment he replied, 'Yes, servants of God, make use of medical treatment, for God has not made a disease without appointing a remedy for it, with the exception of one disease, viz., old age.' Ahmad, Tirmidhi, and Abu Dawud transmitted it." (*Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ*, Vol. III, p. 947.) According to Tirmidhi, "when God's messenger was asked whether [believers] should make use of medical treatment, he replied: 'Yes servants of God, make use of medical treatment for God has not made a disease without appointing a remedy for it, with the exception of one disease, namely old age'" (*Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ*, Vol. III, p. 947).

Often, *ḥadīth* medical advice centers on the importance of cleanliness in food, drink, and personal hygiene. In some *ḥadīth* disease is a test, trial, or punishment to be dealt with patiently, and those who die from certain diseases or in childbirth may achieve martyrdom and heavenly reward. The Qur'an explicitly rejects magic, but many *ḥadīth* recommend amulets or other talismans and charms to ward off disease. Belief in the evil eye as a cause of disease and other afflictions is common throughout and beyond the Muslim world.

Both Sunnī and Shī'ī texts stress the value of prayer in healing. In both traditions, Šūfī or mystical texts recommend healing through prayer and other devotional rituals. There are, however, substantial differences between Sunnī and Shī'ī *ḥadīth*. Shī'ī Islam values suffering and martyrdom far more than Sunnī Islam, so the Akhbārī (Shī'ī

*ḥadīth*) literature recommends that the patient suffer through the ailment and seek medical attention only in emergencies.

**GRECO-ISLAMIC MEDICINE.** When Muslims brought Islam to the Byzantine and Sassanid (Iranian) regions, they sought knowledge from the peoples they encountered. The first translators were mostly Christians who translated works from Greek into Syriac and then into Arabic. Persian and Indian medical texts were also translated into Arabic. The formal tradition of Islamic medicine was based on Galen's (129–c. 199 CE) descriptions of elements and humors. The basic elements were earth, fire, air, and water. Each element had a temperament: earth was dry and cold, fire was dry and hot, air was humid and hot, and water was humid and cold. The temperaments corresponded to the humors of the body: blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. When the humors were in balance, the body was healthy. When the humors were out of balance, the result was disease, which the physician or patient could treat through appropriate food or drink, drugs, or temperature adjustment. Islamic physicians generally distinguished between the body and the spirit or soul (*rūḥ*), and they believed God worked through the *rūḥ* to cure the patient. The physician was to take care to address the state of the patient's *rūḥ* in determining a treatment. While some of the physicians denounced it, astrological medicine was much practiced. Many medical texts had sections on astrological influences on disease causation, and most astrological manuals had sections giving medical advice.

By the ninth century, Muslim physicians were synthesizing and adding to the Greek, Persian, and Indian medical traditions, and healthcare was becoming a major institution. Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd (d. 809 CE) built the first *bimaristan* (hospital) in Baghdad along the lines of the famous medical institution at Jundishapur. It was soon followed by other hospitals with physiologists, oculists, surgeons, and bonesetters on their staffs. In Cairo the Mamlūk ruler Mansur Qalawun (d. 1290) built the Mansuri Hospital in 1284–1285. The hospital complex had a substantial religious endowment (*waqf*) and served thousands of patients. According to the founding *waqf* document:

The [hospital] is for kings or subjects, old or young, free or slave, male or female. Upon recovery patients shall receive clothing while the deceased shall receive burial shrouds and all funeral expenses will be paid. Funds are allocated for herbalists, surgeons, bonesetters, ophthalmologists, and general practitioners, and for all patients, whether male or female, and their caregivers. Funds are available for beds, bedding, patient hygiene, and general sanitation. . . . Funds are also available for outpatients for food and medicine. (Isa, pp. 86–88)

The Mansuri Hospital had rooms for specialized cases including fevers, eye diseases, and wounds, and a separate wing for women. It contained a kitchen, a dispensary, a laboratory for medicine, a library, and an auditorium where the chief physician lectured his students. The mosque and *madrasah*

(school) that formed part of the complex still stand though the hospital building was replaced in 1920. It was used as an ophthalmic clinic until the 1992 earthquake damaged it. The complex is currently undergoing extensive restoration.

Only a few of the renowned physicians can be mentioned here in order to demonstrate their contributions to the received medical tradition. Abū Muḥammad al-Rāzī (Rhazes; d. 930 CE) was born in Rayy near Tehran but worked mostly in Baghdad. He was the first to describe the clinical symptoms of smallpox as distinguished from measles. He also wrote cheerful essays, such as “Why Ignorant Physicians, Common Folk, and Women in the Cities Are More Successful Than Scientists in Treating Certain Diseases—and the Physician's Excuse for This.”

‘Ali ibn al-‘Abbas al-Majusi, or Haly Abbas (d. 994 CE), the director of the Adud-dawlah Hospital in Baghdad, compiled the *Kitāb Kamil al-Sina al-Tibbiyya* (The complete book of the medical art), also known as *al-Kitāb al-Maliki* (The royal book). This famous text has one volume on theoretical medicine and another on practical medicine and is a concise and well-organized summary of Greco-Islamic medical knowledge.

Abū ‘Alī Ibn Sīnā or Avicenna (980–1037) identified diseases such as meningitis and discovered new remedies, but his greatest contribution was his system of medicine, in which medical practice was combined with physical and psychological factors, drugs, and diets—or “holistic” medicine. His *Canon of Medicine* was translated into Latin and was used more than Hippocrates and Galen in Europe.

Abū ‘Alī al-Hasan ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen; d. 1040) worked mostly in Cairo. He is known for his seven-volume treatise on optics, *Kitāb al-Manazir*, which built on Ptolemy's theories but demonstrated through experimental evidence that in vision light is reflected from an object into the eye, thus reversing the received theory.

Ibn Nafis (d. 1288) studied medicine in Damascus and became director of the Mansuri Hospital in Cairo. His *Mujiz*, a widely used commentary on Ibn Sīnā's *Canon*, contains his famous theory of the pulmonary or lesser circulation of the blood, which was subsequently proved correct.

**CUSTOMARY MEDICINE.** Customary, or empirical, medicine was probably the most widely used type of medical intervention in everyday life. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406), the famous historian and sociologist, carefully distinguished between empirical medicine, Greco-Islamic or humoral medicine, and religious doctrine:

Civilized Bedouins have a kind of medicine that is mainly based upon individual experience. They inherit its use from the shaykhs and old women of the tribe. Some of it may occasionally be correct. However, it is not based upon any natural norm or upon any conformity [of the treatment] to the temper of the humors. Much of this sort of medicine existed among the Arabs. The medicine mentioned in religious tradition is of the



Bedouin type. It is in no way part of the divine revelation. [Such medical matters] were merely part of Arab custom and happened to be mentioned in connection with the circumstances of the Prophet, like other things that were customary in his generation. They were not mentioned in order to imply that that particular way of practicing medicine is stipulated by the religious law. Muḥammad was sent to teach us the religious law. He was not sent to teach us medicine or any other ordinary matter. None of the statements concerning medicine that occur in sound traditions should be considered as [having the force] of law. The only thing is that if that type of medicine is used for the sake of a divine blessing and in true religious faith, it may be very useful. However, that would have nothing to do with humoral medicine but be the result of true faith. (Ibn Khaldūn, p. 387)

For Ibn Khaldūn, the humoral medicine of the Greco-Islamic tradition was scientific and therefore valid; faith, if sincere, might be helpful; and empirical medicine might be useful in a haphazard way.

**PROPHETIC MEDICINE.** Prophetic medicine (*tibb al-nabawi*) developed alongside the formal medical tradition. The authors of prophetic medicine were generally not practicing physicians or scientists but rather ‘*ulamā*’ (specialists of Islamic theological and legal sciences) who worked out “religiously correct” compendiums of medical lore that blended empirical medicine, religious formulas, and sometimes Greco-Islamic ideas. Prophetic medical texts typically list both physical and spiritual diseases (fevers, leprosy, plague, poisonous insect and snake bites, melancholy) and offer remedies drawn from the Qur’ān and *ḥadīth*. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dhahabī (d. 1348) cites several major Greek and Islamic medical authorities, empirical medicine, and the Qur’ān and *ḥadīth* as his sources. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505), however, based his prophetic medical book on what was known of the medicine of the Arabian Peninsula, the Qur’ān, and the *ḥadīth* but not the Greco-Islamic tradition. Suyūṭī recommended prayers and invocations, amulets and talismans, but did not mention surgery. Much of his medical advice was preventive and recommended moderate habits and the avoidance of intoxicants. Perhaps the most famous of the prophetic medical compendiums, *Medicine of the Prophet* (1998) by Abū Bakr ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292–1350), has been published in English translation. Its medical advice relies more on piety than on Greco-Islamic medical theory and contains much information on medical beliefs and practices of ordinary people in the fourteenth century.

**MODERN MEDICINE.** Muslim physicians did not hesitate to borrow from European physicians, particularly for unfamiliar diseases. Dāwūd ibn Umar al-Antaki (d. 1599) includes the standard mercury treatment for syphilis used in Europe at the time. Syphilis was unknown in North African and the Middle East until the late fifteenth century or early sixteenth century. Ottoman physicians began translating selected medical works from European languages in the early nineteenth

century. During that century cholera spread from India, where it was endemic, via long-distance transportation to port cities and elsewhere in the Muslim world. In 1831 Mustafa Behcet (d. 1833), head of the medical college in Istanbul, published a treatise on cholera based on an Austrian source that Ottoman authorities distributed free throughout the empire. Ottoman authorities established a quarantine service in about 1832 and had religious leaders publish treatises showing that quarantines were not contrary to Islamic law.

Today Western medicine is well established throughout the Muslim world. In several South Asian nations it is possible to study and be certified in Greco-Islamic medicine. Institutes in Cairo and elsewhere study remedies recommended in the *ḥadīth*, such as “black seed,” to determine their effectiveness in treating various diseases. Inexpensive compendiums of prophetic medicine can be purchased in bookshops throughout the region and may be consulted for informal or alternate treatments. Those with serious illnesses and adequate resources, however, generally prefer to consult reputable specialists trained in the Western medical tradition.

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## HEALING AND MEDICINE: POPULAR HEALING PRACTICES IN MIDDLE EASTERN CULTURES

Despite widespread Western misconceptions about technological “backwardness” in the Middle Eastern world, the Middle East is home to thoroughly modern, high-tech, Western-based biomedicine, often delivered in gleaming private hospitals and medical centers throughout the region. Technologies such as coronary bypass surgery, organ transplantation services, and the latest forms of in vitro fertilization are widely available in urban centers. Thus middle- to upper-class Middle Eastern patients can avail themselves of medical diagnosis and treatment services in cities such as Jiddah, Saudi Arabia; Cairo, Egypt; Tehran, Iran; or Beirut, Lebanon, with expectations that the services rendered will be on a par with those offered in the best medical centers in the West.

Bearing this medical modernity in mind, it is also important to acknowledge that popular healing traditions still exist in the Middle East, providing a less expensive alternative to biomedicine among rural populations and the urban underclass, as well as a spiritual connection to Islam and to earlier literate medical traditions in the region. The Middle East is home to a rich medical history and is one of the few regions of the world in which written materials concerning health-related ideologies, practices, and professional standards date back literally five thousand years. Many of these records provide an exquisitely detailed account of the medical systems and accompanying ideologies that gained hegemony in this region through the millennia, as well as the cultural and socioeconomic milieus in which they existed (Gran, 1979; Inhorn Millar and Lane, 1988). Furthermore, these records from the past show that popular healing practices found throughout Middle Eastern countries are deeply embedded in three ancient healing traditions—pharaonic (Egyptian), *yunāni* (Hellenic), and prophetic (Islamic)—all of which gained ascendancy before the rise of Western biomedicine in the region during the nineteenth-century colonial period (Adib, 2004; Inhorn, 1994a). Indeed, biomedicine can be thought of as a historical newcomer to this region of the world. It is not surprising, therefore, that previous traditions live on—not as organized medical systems per se, but rather as numerous syncretic healing philosophies characterized by a multifaceted array of etiological, diagnostic, and therapeutic beliefs and practices regarding the nature of health and illness and the treatment of various forms of sickness.

**HISTORY OF PROPHETIC (ISLAMIC) MEDICINE.** It is these popular healing traditions and their connection to Islam that represent the substance of this brief essay. Although pharaonic medicine and later *yunāni* medicine were extremely important literate medical traditions in this region of the world, this essay begins with a brief history of prophetic (Islamic) medicine, which arose during the period following the Prophet Muḥammad’s death in 632 CE and which still repre-

sents an extremely influential healing tradition throughout the region.

Historically prophetic medicine constituted a quasi-medical “religious medicine” based exclusively (at least putatively) on passages in the Islamic Scriptures (Dols, 1984). After the Prophet’s death, Muslim believers, such as Al-Suyūṭī in his *Tibb-ul-Nabbi* (Medicine of the Prophet), collected everything the Prophet was reported to have said about hygiene, alcohol consumption, circumcision, menstruation, breast-feeding, sanitation, and various diseases and then institutionalized these sayings into a form of medical practice (Gran, 1979).

According to medical historians, however, prophetic medicine was actually a syncretic blend of biblical Jewish medicine as contained in the *Book of Leviticus*; Persian medicine as taught in the famous medical school of Gondeshapur, which was attended by several of the Prophet’s relatives; nomadic Bedouin medicine as practiced in Arabia (particularly in Medina and Mecca) during the Prophet’s lifetime; and Hippocratic-Galenic *yunāni* medicine from Greece. Furthermore, as Manfred Ullman (1978) has argued, many of the *ḥadīth* (sayings and traditions of the prophet Muḥammad), upon which prophetic medicine was supposedly based, were actually inauthentic, prescribing pre-Islamic folk practices that were later reinterpreted using concepts from *yunāni* medicine.

Nonetheless, prophetic medicine acquired great significance during later Islamic history and, in some cases, came to counter and supersede the then powerful *yunāni* medical system, which was suspected as being a science of heathen origin. Prophetic medicine was also popular with the people, for it incorporated traditional concepts and practices from Arab folk medicine, such as the writing of religious sayings in curative amulets, belief in the evil eye, and the practice of cupping (application of heated cups on the skin), all of which continue to be widely practiced in many parts of the Middle East in the early twenty-first century.

By the sixteenth-century, cults of popular Islamic mystics, known as Ṣūfīs or marabouts, began to proliferate in the countries of North Africa. As Peter Gran (1979) points out, the Ṣūfī cults and their shrines flourished in countries such as Egypt because they catered to the spiritual, psychological, and political needs of the lower classes as well as to their medical complaints. Cults also offered medical specialization; for example, some dealt specifically with the ailments of women, whereas others specialized in psychiatric problems, which were usually attributed to spirit possession.

**SAINT VENERATION AND HEALING PILGRIMAGES.** Prophetic and Ṣūfī healing traditions continue to flourish in many parts of the Middle East, particularly in the countries of North Africa. Thousands of Muslim pilgrims make *ziyārāt*, or visits, to saints’ shrines, some large, some small, dotting the urban and rural landscapes of countries like Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt but also in Middle Eastern countries out-



side the Arab world, including Turkey and Iran. Most of these shrines contain the tombs of dead saints, and some, especially the relatively famous ones, host magnificent mosque-tomb complexes. Most of these shrines are associated in some way with a dead “pious one” (Eickelman, 1998), either a *sayyid* (a descendant of the prophet Muḥammad); a renowned cleric regarded as pious for the quality of his learning; a founder or descendant of a founder of a Šūfī religious brotherhood; or a holy person, male or female, known for exceptional religiosity and the demonstrated ability during his or her lifetime to perform miracles. For the masses of rural and urban poor people who visit these sites as pilgrims—given that healing pilgrimage of this sort tends to be a class-based phenomenon in the Middle East these dead saints are believed to radiate *barakah*, a living form of beneficial power associated with divine blessing, grace, or holiness that is transferable to their descendants, followers, and visitors (Biegman, 1990).

Even though saint worship has always been frowned upon as *shirk*, or polytheism, by more scripturally minded, orthodox Muslims (Doumato, 2000), belief in the miraculous *barakah* of saints, the formation of cults involved in the veneration of such saints, and the subsequent movement of thousands of miracle-seeking pilgrims to and from saints’ shrines are considered to be among the major hallmarks of North African Islam.

**WOMEN, PILGRIMAGE, AND HEALING.** From their beginnings in the tenth century, these cults were involved in healing, especially among the poor and among women. In the early twenty-first century, the poor, and poor women in particular, continue to worship dead, miracle-working saints whose tombs, if relatively accessible, they may visit on a regular basis. Indeed, it is women—not men—who are most actively involved in saint veneration and who are, therefore, the primary participants in the salvation-oriented *ziyārāt* to local and regional saints’ tombs. The essentially “female character” of local pilgrimage in the Middle East (Betteridge, 1983)—and men’s accompanying embarrassment and even disdain regarding this activity—has been noted by a number of scholars working in various regions of the Middle East (Crapanzano, 1973; Doumato, 2000; Dwyer, 1978; Mernissi, 1977; Tapper, 1990).

For women in the Middle East, healing as well as the solution of other difficult life problems is a primary impetus for *ziyārāt* to saints’ shrines. Such healing furthermore may be multifaceted. On the one hand, belief in *barakah* and the abilities of *barakah*-bestowing dead saints to perform miraculous cures, including the restoration of fecundity to the infertile (Inhorn, 1994a), brings hope to those whose health problems seem intractable or who have failed to find relief in other therapeutic venues. In addition, the activities of the pilgrimage itself—including the respite from everyday routine; the exhilaration of travel to a spiritually “magnetic” center (Preston, 1992); the cathartic effects of unburdening one’s “private heartaches” (Tapper, 1990) on a nonjudgmen-

tal but responsive holy one who can be requested to act on one’s behalf; the ability to be part of a sympathetic, experienced community of female sufferers who often congregate at these shrines (Mernissi, 1977); and the ministrations of the living, *barakah*-bestowing *shaiḳhs* who often attend to these shrines and who pray and write healing amulets for suffering pilgrims—are part and parcel of the healing process. Thus even if miraculous cures do not eventuate, the pilgrimage itself may bring relief and psychological relaxation as well as spiritual renewal through contact with divinity.

Furthermore as Fatima Mernissi (1977) has noted, Middle Eastern women’s pilgrimages to holy sanctuaries are “power operations,” means by which subaltern women can seek control over their sexuality, fertility, health, and general well-being in societies that tend to be decidedly patriarchal (Inhorn, 1996). Pilgrimages to saints’ tombs allow women to reaffirm, if only temporarily, control over their lives and their personal well-being through actions that are autonomous from men. Typically, *ziyārāt* to the mosque-tombs of blessed saints are journeys that women make alone, allowing them the opportunity to demonstrate their agency and independence. Even though women’s *ziyārāt* often require money from husbands and, in most cases, permission to travel by husbands or other family members, the pilgrimage typically remains an exclusively female activity, with shrines often serving as protected “female turf” (Betteridge, 1983).

Although women are barred in many ways from formal public ritual practice, including participation in Friday communal prayers at mosques, many of the popular healing rituals and pilgrimages practiced in the Middle East are nonetheless carried out by women within the framework of the Islamic ritual cycle. In many cases, pilgrimages and healing rituals are undertaken during the exact hour of the Friday communal noon prayer—the most important one in the Islamic weekly cycle of thirty-five prayers. This syncretic association of healing practice with Islamic prayer ritual is extremely significant, even though it is disdained by religiously literate orthodox Muslims.

**ISLAM AND POPULAR HEALING.** In the Middle East in the early twenty-first century, opposition to popular healing rituals does not come mainly from biomedical quarters. Islamic religious leaders and groups are increasingly spreading the word that popular healing practices, especially those that involve saint worship, are a form of *shirk*, or polytheism, which is *ḥaram*, or forbidden in the religion. Whereas biomedicine is viewed for the most part as being *ḥalāl*, or compatible with Islamic doctrine, many alternative healing practices are considered *ḥaram* by religiously literate Muslims and conservative Islamists (so-called fundamentalists), who see these practices as being “against God,” “against the religion,” or “like believing in something besides God.” This religious argument is becoming increasingly apparent as a result of the contemporary Islamic revival in many parts of the Middle East and, according to Eleanor Abdella Doumato (2000), has severely restricted women’s healing practices in Saudi Arabia,

regarded as the home of Islam and the site of the annual Islamic pilgrimage, or *hājjī*.

Yet despite official Islamic opposition, popular healing practices continue unabated, attesting to their power and importance in the minds of ordinary Muslims. Under the rubric of *wasfāt baladī* (traditional remedies) or *it ṭibb il-ʿarabī* (Arabic medicine), popular healing in the Middle East comes in many forms other than saint veneration. Given the incredible diversity of the region, the Middle East is home to a rich armamentarium of popular healing practices delivered by multiple types of healers. In Egypt, for example, there are four major categories of traditional healers, including *dāyāt* (lay midwives), who deliver babies and provide many types of “ethnogynecological” care to lower-class women patients (Inhorn, 1994a); *ʿaṭṭārīn* (herbalists), who work with a rich ethnopharmacopeia of herbal and mineral substances and are often skilled ethnobotanists in their own right; *munaggiṣīn* (spiritist healers), who are known for specializing in diagnostic clairvoyance and the treatment of the more difficult, socially mediated causes of ill health (e.g., infertility, impotence), including angered spirits and the sorcery acts of enemies; and *shuyūkh bil-baraka* (blessed *shaiḫhs*), who are typically, but not necessarily, associated with Ṣūfī orders and who bestow their own inherited or acquired *barakah* on patients through faith healing (i.e., laying on of hands, reading of the Qurʾān, writing healing amulets with religious inscriptions, and praying over the afflicted). In the neighboring countries of the Arab Gulf and Levant (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan), *ḥukamā ʿarabī* (Arabic doctors) may provide a variety of herbal, spiritual, and other physical remedies for difficult afflictions, such as male infertility and impotence, sometimes operating out of their own clinics and charging high prices for their services.

As suggested by this great variety of popular healers, ethnomedical beliefs about the causes of ill health and its treatment are multifaceted and complex in the Middle East, defying easy categorization. Nonetheless, etiological beliefs about illness range from naturalistic (physical) to personalistic (social), to supernatural (spiritual), as is also common in many other parts of the world. To take one example from the Middle East, Egyptian ethnomedical beliefs about the causes of infertility range from humidity to sorcery and include the possibilities of an open back, a shock, a polluting entrance, an angered spirit-sister under the ground, and the ultimate cause, which is always God’s will. To counter these various etiological possibilities, lower-class infertile women often undertake relentless “quests for conception,” in which they engage simultaneously in arduous ethnomedical and biomedical therapeutic rituals (Inhorn, 1994a). Ethnomedical therapies for female infertility in Egypt include vaginal suppositories with various herbal and mineral substances; cupping on the lower back; vapor sitz baths; cauterization of the skin with a heated rod; sewing of the skin of the lower back; wearing a belt and padlock; countershocking the infertile woman who has been shocked; sorcery nullification; spirit

appeasement; and elaborate rituals for a culture-bound syndrome known in Egypt as *mushāhara* or *kabsa*, which is thought to be the major cause of infertility in women. In short, the ethnomedical treatments for infertility alone in one Middle Eastern country are amazingly diverse and complex, suggesting the richness of popular healing beliefs and practices in this part of the world.

**EXAMPLES OF POPULAR HEALING PRACTICES.** Although it is important to emphasize the rich diversity of popular healing practices in the Middle East, a number of main types of healing practices stand out as particularly relevant and representative of the region. For this reason, they provide notable examples.

**Cupping and cautery.** The practices of cupping and cautery were the most common healing methods employed in pre-Islamic times, according to medical historians (Ullman, 1978). However, with the coming of Islam to the region, the prophet Muḥammad is said to have forbidden cauterization as a pre-Islamic, Bedouin practice of heathen origin (Doumato, 2000; Ullman, 1978). Despite this prophetic denouncement, both cupping and cautery are found widely throughout the Middle Eastern region in the early twenty-first century. Cautery is reportedly practiced in Morocco, Sudan, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and among Palestinian Bedouins in Israel. Although cupping has been reported for other parts of the Middle East as well, it is described much more frequently than cautery in reports on Egypt.

Cupping (*kasr* or *kaʿsāt hawāʿ*) involves two objects—one to be lit (usually a piece of cloth dipped in a flammable liquid, a candle, or a corncob), and one to be used as a sort of suction cup (usually a glass jar, a pottery vessel, a mortar, or a cup). When the vessel is placed over the flame, it extinguishes the flame and causes vapor to rise. Adhered like a suction cup to the patient’s skin, the healing vessel is said to “grab,” “suck,” or “collect” excess cold moisture inside the body, or to “gather” parts of the body that have become divided (e.g., the muscles in an “open” back). Given its perceived efficacy in the treatment of rheumatic, muscular, and gynecological complaints, cupping is widely performed by both lay cupping (*kasr* or *kaʿsāt hawāʿ*) persons and ethnomedical healers such as midwives in countries such as Egypt.

Cautery (*kawī*, *kayy*, *makwa*, *ḥadīd*) involves placing a heated metal object, usually a nail or a small rod much like a branding iron, on the patient’s skin. The procedure is painful, burning the skin and leaving a permanent scar. Cautery may be used directly on the site of a patient’s bodily complaint (e.g., lower back, arm or leg joints), or it may be used on other sites of the body to “tighten” relaxed nerves and muscles. For this reason, cautery is thought to be extremely useful for male infertility and impotence, both of which may be attributed to “weak nerves” in the back (Inhorn, 1994a). In Saudi Arabia, cautery has also been used historically as a favored technique to chase malevolent spirits causing emo-

tional or physical illness out of the body, including spirits causing madness (Doumato, 2000).

**Amulets and evil eye.** As with cupping and cautery, the use of prophylactic and curative amulets dates to pre-Islamic Arabic folk medicine; however, the use of amulets was not denounced by the prophet Muḥammad and was eventually incorporated into prophetic medicine. In the early twenty-first century, amulets are widely used throughout the Middle East for three primary purposes: (1) to prevent the deleterious envy (evil eye) that can destroy objects and lead to illness; (2) to nullify acts of sorcery, which are also thought to cause illnesses such as impotence; and (3) on a more mundane level, to treat physical complaints, ranging from headaches to fever.

Amulets often consist of small pieces of paper, sometimes folded, upon which indecipherable formulas or religious verses have been inscribed by a *shaikh bil-barakah* or quasi-religious male healer. Healers often provide special instructions on how the written amulet is to be utilized (e.g., in bath water, in drinking water, worn next to the body, slept on, stepped over, or burned with incense, which in and of itself is deemed protective against harmful forces). Amulets may also be store-bought, such as small charms made of gold, silver, or other metals, or they may be made of brightly colored pieces of cloth, sometimes adorned with shiny metallic coins.

Throughout the Middle East the most pervasive amulet is the so-called hand of Fatima, a down-turned, stylized, five-fingered hand often made of silver or blue pottery (or both) and often incorporating Qur'anic verses or representations of a human eye. Middle Eastern citizens may adorn their most prized possessions (e.g., homes, automobiles) with the hand of Fatima to ward off the deleterious effects of envy. Wearing a hand of Fatima as a piece of jewelry is thought to prevent human harm and illness.

Belief in the power of the envious glance to cause harm is widespread throughout the Middle East, a region considered one of the “core areas” where evil eye beliefs are found (although they are also found in other parts of the world) (Dundes, 1992; Maloney, 1976). The “evil of an envier” is mentioned directly in the Qur'ān, but the belief in evil eye predates Islam, appearing in both the Bible and in Sumerian texts as early as five thousand years ago (Dundes, 1992).

In the early twenty-first century in the Middle East, there are two recurrent features of evil eye belief and practice that are relevant to a discussion of health and healing. First, children—and particularly more highly valued male children—are believed to be one of the main targets of the evil eye, with their sickness, injury, and even death constituting possible outcomes. Thus, in many settings in the Middle East, belief in the evil eye serves as a primary explanatory model for infant and child morbidity and mortality (Harfouche, 1992). For this reason amulets often adorn the clothing of infants and young children.

Second, given these beliefs concerning child health, it is not surprising that women—and particularly reproductively troubled women incapable of fulfilling their motherhood expectations and desires—are deemed particularly likely to cast the evil eye on children for the simple reason that women deprived of children cannot help but to envy them. Furthermore infertile women are considered to be dangerous to fertile women, especially those who are pregnant, who have demonstrated their reproductive success repeatedly, or who have finally achieved a coveted pregnancy through technological means such as in vitro fertilization.

**Spirit possession and the *zār* cult.** Women who are reproductively troubled and who may be blamed for the evil eye seek refuge in the *zār* cult in some parts of the Middle East. The *zār* is a women's spirit possession cult, found primarily in Egypt, Sudan, and the Arab Gulf or the regions closest to East Africa, where the *zār* cult probably originated. According to Doumato (2000), in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century the *zār* cult could be found virtually everywhere in the Arabic-speaking world and was integrated into the lives of women of all social classes.

In the early twenty-first century the *zār* is found primarily among the socially marginalized, who seek refuge in a healing fellowship with others who are similarly afflicted. For example, in Arabic-speaking northern Sudan, where *zār* is actively practiced, infertile women suffering from poor self-images are the primarily members of the *zār* cult. Through the *zār* they find a social etiology for their suffering (i.e., harmful spirits), a sense of community solidarity with other similarly afflicted women, and a way to press for demands (e.g., new clothing, jewelry, feasts) through the idiom of spirit possession and the invocation of these spirits through joyful music and dance. Indeed *zār* has been described by some scholars as a proto-feminist challenge to women's objectification and subordination (Boddy, 1989), a way to challenge authority and compensate for exclusion from formal religion in the Muslim world (Doumato, 2000).

Although women's *zār* cults have been suppressed in some Middle Eastern societies by conservative religious forces, the *zār* is experiencing a revival in parts of the Arab Gulf, particularly among socially isolated tribal communities (Doumato, 2000). Furthermore beliefs in harmful spirits and spirit possession are found across the Middle Eastern region, from Morocco to Iran. In Egypt, for example, a class of spiritist healers known as *munaggimīn*, who may be either male or female, specialize in diagnostic clairvoyance and the treatment of angered spirits. They do so either as “possessed” individuals, who use their own spirits to diagnose and treat other spirit-troubled individuals, or as skillful agents of spirit invocation, who make the wishes of others' spirits known, then appease those spirits through communal *zār* rituals or private rituals of animal sacrifice and the provision of gifts to the spirit world.

**FUTURE DIRECTIONS.** As noted at the beginning of this essay, high-tech biomedical therapies such as in vitro fertil-



ization exist simultaneously in the Middle East with popular healing practices such as the *zār* cult. Neither domain has been well studied by social scientists or historians. Healing, both new and old, is clearly a rich area for future scholarship, as suggested by the brief examples provided in this essay. Furthermore, such research is timely, given calls for an “Islamic alternative” to the hegemony of postcolonial Western biomedicine in the region. Although some contemporary Islamists are calling for a return to prophetic-Islamic medicine—with its promotion of dietary and lifestyle changes as well as faith healing through prayer, writing of religious amulets, laying on of hands, and recitation of holy verses from the Qurʾān (Adib, 2004)—it is important to remember that these are among the very practices that have been employed for centuries in popular healing rituals throughout the region. It is fair to conclude that Islam—at least in its more populist form—has always been a major influence on the healing practices, pilgrimages, and rituals that continue, unabated, among the poorer urban and rural communities in the Middle East in the early twenty-first century.

SEE ALSO Islam; Pilgrimage, article on Muslim Pilgrimage.

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MARCIA C. INHORN (2005)

## HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN GREECE AND ROME

In the ancient world there were four models of disease causation. The first viewed disease as retributive, caused directly by a divinity, usually a god or gods. The second postulated a demonic force as being responsible for inflicting disease on individuals. The third explained disease as the result of magic, often brought by sorcerers or magicians. Finally, the ancients ascribed some disease to natural causes. These etiological models were not mutually exclusive. In most ancient societies, in fact, they were complementary. But the treatment prescribed differed according to the perceived causative factors. When gods were assumed to be responsible, a religious response (e.g., prayer, sacrifice, or purification) was required. When demonic causation was assumed, exorcism or divine healing was called for. If illness was attributed to magical forces, counter-magic was expected to be efficacious. If disease was thought to be the result of natural causes, medical treatment was ordinarily sought. Throughout the period of classical antiquity (c. 800 BCE–c. 500 CE), one finds all four models manifesting themselves in different times, often in a harmonious or complementary relationship, as they reflected the changing spirit of the age.

**GREECE.** The earliest Greek literary works that have come down to modern readers are the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, traditionally ascribed to Homer, who probably lived between about 750 and 650 BCE. Although the historical setting of these epic poems is that of the Trojan War, which the Greeks dated to about 1200 BCE, it is widely held that much of the social and cultural backdrop is that of the Dark Age in Greece (c. 1200–800 BCE). In the Homeric epics the gods play an active role in every area of life, including health and sickness. Apollo sends arrows that cause disease and death

(*Iliad* 1.9–52), whereas *daimones* (unseen supernatural powers) might cause them as well (*Odyssey* 5.394–97). The early Greeks regarded disease as retributive, the result of having offended a god or violated a sacred taboo. Only after the offense was removed, the community purified, and the gods propitiated would the disease be averted. Hesiod (eighth century BCE), an epic poet who was perhaps a late contemporary of Homer, offers an alternative explanation. Diseases are *daimones* that escaped from Pandora's box and move of their own accord throughout the world (*Works and Days* 100–104). Greeks sought healing of supernaturally caused diseases from *iatromanteis*, shaman-like healers. *Iatromanteis* traveled from city to city and purified communities from divine pollution, as in the early sixth century BCE did the Cretan Epimenides, who purified Athens, thus ending a plague that had fallen on the city because a magistrate had committed a sacrilege when he killed several men who had taken sanctuary in an Athenian temple.

But the Homeric epics speak also of an empirical approach to medicine. According to the *Odyssey* a group of physicians existed called *demiourgoi*, who were itinerant members of a medical craft. They relied on their experience and skill to treat wounds, broken bones, and diseases symptomatically by employing traditional treatment that was passed on by apprenticeship. In the sixth century BCE, groups of physicians began to assemble in several cities throughout the Mediterranean. Although they did not train physicians, they offered apprenticeship to aspiring doctors. Associated with one of the best known of these medical "schools," that of Cos, off the coast of Asia Minor, was the physician Hippocrates (c. 460–c. 380 BCE). Although he acquired the reputation as the father of medicine, little is known about Hippocrates. There exist only two contemporary references to him (both by Plato), but he became the subject of much idealized legend after his death.

In the fifth century BCE, Greek medicine began to develop beyond mere craftsmanship into a science that possessed a body of theoretical knowledge. The craftsman or empiric was often skilled in practical knowledge and the application of traditional methods. However, the addition of theory to practice actually created scientific medicine. The physician (*iatros*) attempted to understand disease and its causes in terms of natural processes. To do so he turned to philosophy, from which he borrowed the ability to frame universal formulations. The Hippocratic Corpus is the earliest attempt to provide a theoretical basis for medicine. The collection consists of about seventy treatises, most of which were written in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. The treatises eschew magical or divine factors in accounting for disease, rather employing naturalistic theories of disease that were taken over from the pre-Socratic philosophers. The best known is the theory of the four humors, which was borrowed from Empedocles.

The writer of *On the Sacred Disease* argues that epilepsy, commonly attributed to divine possession, is not more sacred



than any other disease but has a natural cause. He writes, "There is no need to put the disease in a special class and to consider it more divine than the others; they are all divine and all human. Each has a nature and power of its own; none is hopeless or incapable of treatment" (*On Sacred Disease*, ch. 21). Although the Hippocratic treatises generally espouse a naturalistic explanation of disease, there is no evidence that this approach was regarded as atheistic. Hippocratic writers regarded nature as divine and medicine as a gift of the gods. Nor did they reject appeal to the gods for healing. "Prayer indeed is good, but while calling on the gods a man should himself lend a hand" (*Decorum* 87).

Hippocratic medicine spread rapidly in the late fifth and fourth centuries BCE. But alongside this rational or speculative medicine, which assumed natural causes of illness and sought to heal by natural means, there existed a tradition of religious healing. Those suffering from illness sought divine healing from gods, demigods, and heroes. Initially cures might be sought at the temple of any god or at the shrines of local heroes, but in the fifth century Asklepios emerged as the chief healing deity of Greece. In the *Iliad* Asklepios is the "blameless physician" to whom the centaur Chiron taught medicine. He is said in later legend to have been a god. His cult initially came from Tricca in Thessaly (in northern Greece), but it spread to Epidaurus (in the Peloponnese), which became the most important cult center of Asklepios. It was carried throughout the Mediterranean world to Athens, Pergamum in Asia Minor, Crete, Cyrene in North Africa, and Rome in 291 BCE, where the god was worshiped as Aesculapius.

The temples of Asklepios, known as Asclepieia, attracted large numbers of the sick who sought miraculous healing. At Epidaurus those seeking healing underwent a rite of ritual purification before offering simple sacrifices of cakes or fruit. The focal point of the pilgrimage was incubation, in which pilgrims spent a night in the abaton (inner sanctum) at the center of the temple. Lying on a couch, they would await a dream or vision from the god, who appeared with a caduceus (a staff around which a snake was coiled), which later became the symbol of modern medical healing. The healing process was varied to suit the pilgrim. Asklepios might merely touch the patient, or he might perform surgery or administer a healing drug. Sometimes a serpent or dog would bring healing by licking the wound. Whatever the means, when the incubants awoke the next morning, they expected to have been healed.

That many were cured of their illnesses or physical disabilities is evident from the several tablets, called *iamata*, that were posted at the temple site at Epidaurus, which recorded case histories of pilgrims who had been healed. These testimonials were doubtless meant to encourage pilgrims to trust that they too might experience the god's favor. Some of the testimonials were fictional or based on significant misunderstandings (such as that of a woman who delivered a baby that she thought she had carried for five years), whereas others

were convincing. At this distance in time, to explain fully how pilgrims were healed is impossible; rationalistic approaches are unconvincing. Perhaps many of the pilgrims suffered from chronic diseases that doctors could not successfully treat. Others probably suffered from hysteria that was susceptible of psychotherapy. The Asclepieion at Epidaurus grew over time to become a complex of buildings that included guest houses for pilgrims, gymnasiums, theaters, stadiums, and baths—all of which provided a sanatorium-like setting that offered a peaceful retreat and therapeutic environment for physical healing and recuperation.

Asklepios was both the dispenser of divine healing through incubation and the patron of physicians. Galen (129–c. 210 CE), the great physician and polymath, referred to himself as a servant of Asklepios, who had healed him when ill with a life-threatening abscess. Physicians did not doubt the god's ability to heal in any way he wished, whether miraculously or by natural means. They viewed religious healing as complementary to medicine. When they could offer no further medical help to their patients, they had no objection to their seeking supernatural healing at the shrine of Asklepios. Because Asklepios was their patron, who blessed their efforts as medical practitioners, physicians saw no conflict with his healing supernaturally in temples. They regarded both secular and temple medicine as legitimate means of healing, and they existed in relative harmony, but probably with little contact. The rapid spread of the cult of Asklepios in the fourth century BCE coincided with the decline of the older civic religions, and the cult appealed to the growing individualism of Greek religion. He was regarded as a philanthropic god and had an appeal to ordinary individuals that the great Olympian deities lacked. The poor, who could not afford physicians' fees, sought treatment at his temples. So popular was the worship of Asklepios that more than four hundred temples and shrines were devoted to his worship in the Greco-Roman world.

Following the conquest of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great (356–323 BCE; ruled 336–323 BCE), foreign cults poured into Greece from Egypt and Asia, brought back by soldiers returning from his campaigns. The Greek world itself was enlarged and now comprised the eastern Mediterranean, including the Hellenistic kingdoms of Macedonia, Egypt, and the Seleucid Empire in Asia. The mystery religions, as they have been called, offered a sense of personal union with the deity that was often formalized in a rite of initiation. Enormously popular during the Hellenistic period (323–30 BCE), they supplemented the official cults that were maintained by the Greek city-states as the focal point of public worship. Many of them offered healing, which adherents of almost any Greek or foreign deity, demigod, or hero might expect. Incubation was the most common means of temple healing, but other forms existed as well. The use of magical practices in Greek medicine, common in Homeric and archaic Greece, did not play a major role from the middle of the fourth century BCE until the second century CE. Although

some physicians might resort to chants, amulets, or sympathetic magic, in general magical practices were the preserve of magicians, not of physicians. Indeed Greek medicine differs significantly from Mesopotamian and Egyptian medicine, which routinely incorporated magical practices.

**ROME.** For the first six centuries of their history (Rome was, according to tradition, founded in 753 BCE), the Romans lived without either rational medicine or physicians. They used native folk remedies, which they supplemented with magic and divination that they inherited from the Etruscans. The *paterfamilias* (the eldest male member of the household, which included slaves and up to three generations) administered folk remedies to his household. A well-known example of such a family practitioner was Cato the Elder (234–149 BCE). According to Plutarch (before 50–after 120 CE),

[Cato] compiled a book of recipes that he used for the treatment of members of his household who fell ill. He never made his patients fast, but allowed them to eat herbs and morsels of duck, pigeon, or hare. He maintained that this diet was light and thoroughly suitable for sick people, apart from the fact that it often produced nightmares, and he claimed that by following it he kept both himself and his family in perfect health. (Plutarch, *Life of Cato* 23)

Cato relied on folk remedies, together with prayers, sacrifices, magical incantations, and rituals, to protect his family, crops, and herds. He was renowned for his advocacy and use of cabbage in medicinal recipes and for his contempt of Greek medical theories and practitioners.

The Romans initially worshiped spiritual powers without defined personalities that they called *numina*. Under the influence of the Etruscans, they came over time to represent *numina* as gods, many of whom they identified with Greek gods of similar characteristics, but animistic elements remained. Roman religion was a state cult, staffed by unpaid priests who carried out formal observances that maintained the *pax deorum* (peace of the gods) and guaranteed the continuing divine favor to the city and its fortunes. The Romans believed that if they neglected to observe formal religious obligations, the gods would send disasters. Hence public disasters like epidemics, droughts, and defeats in battle were explained as being sent from the gods, and great care was taken to propitiate them to avert their anger. The earliest Romans had no specific gods associated with disease or healing, although specific deities might be appealed to if they were thought to be especially concerned with bodily parts or functions. Sometimes, if prayers to Roman gods had failed to produce the desired effect, the Romans introduced foreign deities. Thus in 433 BCE the Romans built a temple to the Greek god Apollo, whom they credited with ending a plague that had lasted for two years. They worshiped him as Apollo Medicus (Apollo the Physician). In 293 BCE, during a pestilence, the Romans consulted the oracular Sibylline Books, which directed them to send a mission to Epidaurus to bring the god Asklepios to Rome. Two years later they did so. According to the legend, Asklepios took the form of a serpent

and boarded the Roman ship, which carried him to Rome, where he disembarked onto the Tiber Island. The Romans built a temple for him and he came to be worshiped as Aesculapius.

The Romans also personified forces like Febris (Fever), which came to be represented as a goddess whose anger might be propitiated for remedies from disease. The Romans believed that every natural function was under the protection of a particular deity. Hence every stage of life, including conception, gestation, and birth was subject to a *numen*, and the protection of the appropriate spirit or deity was sought. Given the dangers of childbearing, which claimed the lives of many women, a Roman matron might appeal to any number of Roman goddesses in childbirth, although through a process of syncretism Juno Lucina and Diana came to replace most of the others. Incantations and magical formulas were often recited, together with the laying on of hands, which was thought to transfer the power of a deity and provide safety in childbearing or healing.

The first physician to practice medicine in Rome was Archagathus, a Greek who settled in Rome in 219 BCE. Although he was initially well received, he relied heavily on surgery and cautery, which damaged his reputation and gained for him the title of *carnifex* (the executioner). Many subsequent Greek physicians were attracted to Rome, where they enjoyed great popularity in a city that had never before had professional medical practitioners. Yet some Romans, like Cato the Elder and the encyclopedist Pliny the Elder (23/24–79 CE,) distrusted physicians and relied on popular folk medicine long after the introduction and widespread acceptance of rational Greek medicine. Pliny included many folk and magical remedies in his influential *Natural History*.

As Rome conquered the Mediterranean world in the second and first centuries BCE, Roman culture underwent many rapid changes owing to Eastern influences and Greek thought. Some Romans abandoned traditional religion for philosophy or skepticism, whereas others supplemented the mechanical and formal civic religion with Eastern religions. The influence of foreign beliefs, such as astrology and magic, spread throughout Italy as soldiers returned from foreign campaigns and slaves were brought to Italy. Although amulets had always been worn to ward off disease and personal disaster, magicians now abounded, selling charms and incantations to exorcize demons or to heal diseases. The belief that certain animals, plants, and precious stones possessed occult properties, which released magical forces through manipulation, influenced healing practices. Astrologers, too, had become popular in Rome by the first century CE, and some physicians began to integrate astrology into their medicine. Galen, for example, held that the condition of patients was affected by the course of the moon and the planets.

However, it was the popularity of mystery religions that more than any other factor produced new forms of popular religious belief. From Egypt and Asia Minor came many cults that offered a personal satisfaction not found in the for-

mal religion of Rome. They were often modified and Westernized by their contact with the Greeks. The most prominent were those of Isis and Serapis from Egypt, Mithra from Persia, and Magna Mater (the Great Mother) from Asia Minor. These cults sometimes offered healing in a supernatural fashion, most commonly by means of astrology, magic, divination, or the use of herbs. Although the cult of Asklepios was introduced into Rome in 291 BCE, it was not until the first century CE that his temple on the Tiber Island came to be a popular healing site. By the second century CE Pergamum in Asia Minor had replaced Epidaurus as the center of healing by Asklepios. Moreover, the nature of the cures performed by Asklepios underwent change. Miraculous healing by the god was replaced by therapeutics that were not in many respects very different from those that a physician might prescribe. Instead of supernatural cures through incubation, Asklepios's priests often recommended practical regimens of exercise, swimming, diet, and purgatives to incubants.

Among the Eastern influences that became prominent in the imperial period was belief in the power of demons. In ancient Middle Eastern cultures like Mesopotamia and Egypt, demons had been an important part of the religious framework, and diseases were often attributed to them. In Greek and Roman culture, belief in the demonic etiology of disease, although always present, was less common, especially after the advent of rational medicine with its naturalistic understanding of disease. But in the mid-second century CE, the mood began to change. Diseases were attributed to demons by an increasing number of people, who believed that they consequently could be cured only by supernatural means. For example, the Gnostics believed that diseases themselves were demons that might be expelled by the use of magical formulas (Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.9.14), a view that was widely held in the late Empire. Hence ritual purification, on which the mystery religions placed much importance, was used to exorcise evil spirits.

**CONCLUSION.** Throughout the history of Greek and Roman cultures, a medical pluralism prevailed. There were always healing cults of various gods and heroes available, including both indigenous and foreign deities. The most significant was Asklepios. The extent of belief in magic, astrology, and demonic activity varied over the centuries of classical antiquity. At all times natural healing, whether by empirics or by practitioners of rational medicine, was an accepted, but not an exclusive, means of healing. Beginning in the fifth century BCE, physicians appropriated constructs of natural philosophy to provide a theoretical understanding of health and disease. Although many physicians considered Asklepios their patron, the medicine they practiced was devoid of religious or magical elements. Many sources besides medical authors attest—usually indirectly but sometimes directly—to this expectation in classical antiquity. For example, the tragedian Sophocles (496–406 BCE) makes one of his characters say, “No good physician (*iatros*) chants incantations over a malady that needs the knife” (*Ajax* 581–2).

Over six centuries later, the greatest Roman jurist, Ulpian (d. 228 CE), when discussing the qualifications necessary to sue for unpaid remuneration for services, says regarding physicians (*medici*), “But one must not include people who make incantations or imprecations or, to use the common expression of impostors, exorcisms. For these are not branches of medicine, even though people exist who forcibly assert that such people have helped them” (*Digest* 50.13.1.3). Neither Sophocles nor Ulpian was implicitly denying that alternative healing practices may have proven efficacious under some circumstances. Furthermore, both make it evident that those who called themselves physicians were not effective physicians or even physicians at all if they engaged in the practices specified. One of the greatest legacies of classical culture was a scientifically based medicine that, irrespective of the enormous changes and developments in its theoretical and practical aspects over the past two and a half millennia, has been the expectation of those in Western cultures who have chosen to consult a physician or surgeon rather than an alternative healer.

**SEE ALSO** Amulets and Talismans; Asklepios; Galen; Greek Religion; Hippocrates; Roman Religion, articles on The Early Period and The Imperial Period.

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## HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN CHRISTIANITY

The four Gospels recount the career of Jesus of Nazareth (c. 4 BCE–c. 29 CE), the founder of Christianity. Jesus is recorded as having performed many miraculous healings, which included restoring to health (among others) the blind, the dumb, the deaf, the lame, and lepers. The Gospels describe Jesus' miracles as signs that provided evidence of his messianic identity, as well as a manifestation of the presence of the kingdom of God and a fulfillment of Hebrew prophecy (e.g., *Mt.* 11:4–5, which echoes *Is.* 35:4–6; 61:1). The *Gospel of John* declares that Jesus himself maintained that his miracles were evidence of his messiahship (*Jn.* 10:37–38). The Gospels differentiate Jesus' miracles from the miracles of exorcists and magicians. Moreover, although Jesus is said to have cast out demons, the Gospels invariably distinguish between exorcism and healing (e.g., *Mt.* 8:16; cf. *Mk.* 6:12; *Acts* 19:12). Nor does it appear that either he or his disciples considered demons to be the cause of disease. One finds several medical conditions described in the Gospels, mostly ordinary diseases or congenital conditions for which a natural cause appears to have been assumed by those who suffered from them. The Gospels distinguish the symptoms of such conditions from those that accompanied demonic possession, which usually manifested erratic or abnormal behavior. Whether those who approached Jesus for healing had already sought assistance from physicians is not indicated except in one incident in which medical treatment had been unsuccessful (*Mk.* 5:24–34).

Outside the Gospels, one finds little reference to miraculous healing in the New Testament. The *Book of Acts* describes a relatively small number of healings that are attributed to Jesus' disciples (*Acts* 3:1–11; 9:33–34; 14:8–10). They belong to the category of "signs and wonders" that confirm the disciples' apostolic credentials (*Acts* 14:3). The diseases healed are natural conditions, and none are attributed to demonic etiology. In the epistles, there are no sicknesses that are either healed miraculously or attributed to demonic causation. The *Epistle of James* (5:13–15) prescribes a rite of healing in which the presbyters of the church anoint the sick and pray for their recovery. But there is no evidence that anointing for healing was employed in the church before the third century, and it is possible that the passage refers to prayers for those who are spiritually rather than physically ill. In fact, the epistles suggest that first-century Christians suffered from ordinary illnesses from which they sometimes recovered gradually (e.g., *Phil.* 2:25–27) and sometimes did not recover (e.g., *2 Tm.* 4:20). They typically did not seem to expect that their diseases would be miraculously healed. The New Testament repeatedly speaks of suffering as intended by God to produce spiritual maturity (e.g., *Heb.* 12:7–11, *1 Pt.* 4:12). Faith and trust in God could transform suffering into a positive experience and nurture Christian graces such as humility, patience, and dependence on Christ (e.g., *Rom.* 5:2–5; *Jas.* 5:10–11; *2 Cor.* 12:7–10). Such suffering includes sickness and disability.

**THE POST-NEW TESTAMENT CHURCH.** Leading Christian writers of the earliest centuries of Christianity for the most part exhibit positive views of medicine. Thus Origen (c. 185–c. 254) considered medicine "beneficial and essential to mankind" (*Contra Celsum* 3.12), and Tertullian (c. 200 CE), who was fond of employing medical analogies in his writings, believed that medicine was appropriate for Christians to use. The theme of Jesus as the Great Physician (*Christus medicus*) was popular in the writings of the Church Fathers, who used the expression in a metaphorical sense to describe him as the savior of sin-sick souls, not as a healer of physical ills. Medical care, far from being rejected by early Christians, was regarded as a model of the care of the soul.

Early Christians regarded disease as a material, rather than a moral, evil that had resulted from the fall. Within the theistic context they had inherited from Judaism, they typically viewed illness as the result of natural, although providential, causes that could be treated by physicians or other healers, to whom they could legitimately have recourse so long as they did not employ pagan religious practices. Christians were encouraged, of course, to pray that God would heal, whether by medical means or without them. When medicine did not avail, they might still seek healing by prayer, but recognized that they were to submit patiently to God's will.

By the late fourth century, there was a marked increase in claims of divine healing. The growing veneration of relics associated with Christian martyrs and the new importance that Christian leaders like Ambrose (374–397) and Augustine (354–430) placed on miracles of healing signaled a major change in Christian approaches to healing. The burgeoning fascination with demonic activity did not, however, preclude a sustained belief by many in naturalistic explanations of disease. For example, Augustine's delight in describing spectacularly miraculous cures (*City of God* 22.8) was not diminished by his assumption of a natural etiology for every case mentioned. Indeed, the rapid spread of hospitals at the end of the fourth century suggests that Christians still sought medical assistance for their illnesses, perhaps resorting to religious cures primarily when physicians had failed them.

From the beginning Christians had exhibited a philanthropic spirit that was evident in their concern, both personally and corporately, for those in physical need. This spirit was in marked contrast with that of the classical world, in which there was little or no religious basis for charity that expressed itself in a personal or organized concern for those who suffered physical distress. Christian concepts of philanthropy were motivated by *agape*, a self-sacrificing love of others that bore witness to the love of Christ as reflected in his incarnation and redemptive work on the cross (e.g., *Mt.* 25:35–40, *Jas.* 1:27). Christians were encouraged to visit the sick privately, and deacons (whose duties largely consisted of the relief of physical want and suffering) were expected to visit the ill.

In the third century, as Christianity grew rapidly in the large cities of the Roman Empire, extensive benevolent work was organized and centered in the local congregation. Minor ecclesiastical orders were created to assist deacons in their charitable work. In Rome, for example, by 251 the Christian church had divided the city into seven districts, each under the responsibility of a deacon and his assisting clergy. According to Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 260–c. 330), the church supported 1,500 widows and others, including the ill, who experienced suffering and want (*Eccles. Hist.* 6.43). Adolf Harnack (1851–1930) estimated that the Roman church at this time spent an amount between 500,000 and 1 million sesterces (Roman coins) each year in support of its charitable ministry. Other churches in the large cities of the Roman Empire spent similar sums on charities, which were administered by bishops or presbyters.

Beginning in 250, the cities of the Roman Empire experienced a major plague that lasted for fifteen to twenty years and reached epidemic proportions. Because the civic authorities did little to deal with the plague, the Christian churches undertook the systematic care of both pagan and Christian plague victims and the burial of the dead, despite the fact that Christians were at the time a persecuted minority. Descriptions exist of the organization of the care of the sick in Rome, Carthage, and Pontus. In Alexandria, a medical corps known as the *parabalani* was formed to transport and nurse the sick under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Alexandria. Although the *parabalani* are first mentioned in the fifth century, they may date from the time of an earlier plague. During a plague in 312, Christians in many cities in the East performed public medical charity of the kind carried out later by the *parabalani*.

The legalization of Christianity by Constantine in 313 resulted in major changes in the church's administration of medical philanthropy. The role of individual congregations and of the laity declined, whereas that of bishops who administered the charitable programs grew. In the 370s Christians created the hospital (*xenodochium*), a specifically Christian institution that arose out of the philanthropic ideals of the early church. No similar organization existed in the classical world; Roman infirmaries (*valetudinaria*) for soldiers and for slaves on plantation estates were not philanthropic in nature. The hospital often included an orphanage and houses for the poor and aged in a single complex. One of the earliest and most celebrated was the Basileias, founded by Basil the Great, bishop of Caesarea (in modern Turkey), about 372. Hospitals modeled on the Basileias spread quickly in the East and somewhat later to the West. The first hospital in the West was founded in Rome by Fabiola, whose friend Jerome describes how she gathered the sick from the public squares of Rome (where the homeless ill could often be found in the ancient world) and nursed the most seriously ill herself (*Epistle* 77.6.1–2).

Many of the early Christian hospitals were staffed by monks. Monasticism, which originated in the deserts of

Egypt, Palestine, and Syria in the third century, grew out of attempts to deepen the spiritual life by the renunciation of the world and the practice of self-mortification. The founders of the movement were anchorites or hermits who sought solitude in the desert, but by the fourth century anchoritic monasticism had largely given way to cenobitic monasticism in which monks and nuns lived in ordered communities. The creation of the hospital represents the culmination of three centuries of medical philanthropy, during which time the church maintained an extensive program of caring for the sick. During the first two centuries of its existence, the church carried on its medical charity through the voluntary efforts of local congregations, which were supervised by presbyters and deacons. In the third century widespread plagues throughout the Roman Empire led Christians to establish emergency care for the community in the large urban areas. Organized medical attendants began to appear in the early fourth century, and the creation of the hospital followed later in the century.

Christianity had gradually spread in the first two centuries throughout the Roman Empire to diverse peoples who shared a common culture and a knowledge of Greek as a universal language. In the third century, a change began to occur that by late antiquity eventuated in a cultural cleavage between the East and the West. The division of the Roman Empire into eastern and western halves in 395 contributed to this development, with Latin as the common language of the West. After a century and a half of barbarian invasions, the last emperor of the western Empire was dethroned in 476. Already the West was slowly being drawn into an emerging European rather than a strictly Mediterranean ethos, whereas the eastern Empire was developing into the Byzantine Empire. Christianity in the East and West were to follow different courses.

**EASTERN ORTHODOXY.** Eastern Orthodoxy encompasses the largest body of churches that originated in the eastern Mediterranean world. Over time it took on a very different identity from that of the Western (later Roman Catholic) church, and the two separated in a formal schism in 1054. Within modern Orthodoxy are several *autocephalus* (self-governing) churches, with their patriarchs centered respectively in Constantinople (Greek), Antioch (Syrian), Moscow (Russian), and various capitals in Eastern Europe.

Central to the specifically Orthodox approach to healing and medicine has been the concept of *philanthropia* (kindness or love toward others), especially as it was manifested in monasticism. The ascetic tradition was a major force in the eastern Mediterranean from the third century on and an important component in Orthodoxy both in its anchoritic (hermit) and cenobitic (communal) forms. Within Orthodoxy, monasteries have always been regarded as repositories of spirituality, holiness, and wisdom. Ascetics believed that the gospel required that they actively pursue the charitable care of the ill. As previously noted, this motivating force led to the establishment of the earliest Christian hospitals



(*xenodochia*) in the eastern Mediterranean and such groups as the *parabalani* and, later, the *philoponoï* (lovers of labor) and *spoudaioi* (the zealous ones), which also arose in the large cities of the eastern Mediterranean. Composed of lay people who were without medical training and drawn from the lowest class, they flourished in the sixth and seventh centuries, giving assistance to the sick, especially to the urban poor. They bathed and anointed them, but they offered no professional medical assistance. These lay orders were attached to large churches and came to be recognized over time as an intermediate order between the clergy and laity.

The Byzantine Empire maintained a much greater cultural continuity with its classical past than did the West. Because the tradition of medical research and writing continued in the East, monastic physicians were in a position to appreciate classical medicine and to use it. Imperial troubles within Orthodoxy in the seventh century led to a decline of clerical medicine, an anti-intellectualism that remained for centuries, a growing spirit of mysticism, and a new emphasis on the ability of saints to heal. The last had been a continuing aspect of the eastern Empire since the fourth century. Nevertheless, hospitals and healing shrines, as well as physicians and holy men, continued to work in tandem and relatively without tension. In the thirteenth century, as the Byzantine Empire shrank and resources for supporting hospitals declined, sacramental anointing for healing became widespread. All these components continued in diminished form after the Turkish conquest of Constantinople in 1453, including the tradition of clerical physicians and the belief that *philanthropia* is an essential component of the Christian gospel.

**MEDIEVAL CATHOLICISM.** The barbarian invasions of the fifth century (most of them Germanic) brought about the breakup of the Western Roman Empire by 476. The political and social break was definitive and western Europe declined into chaos, poverty, and disorder. Cities declined or disappeared as centers of population, and the preservation and transmission of literacy and learning came to be centered in monasteries. The Germanic settlers brought with them into what had been the Western Roman Empire their folk paganism that threatened to overwhelm traditional medical approaches to illness. Although missionaries to western and northern Europe tried to eradicate these folk practices, many of them were employed as alternatives to Christian practices. Features of late Roman culture, such as the growing practice of healing through the cult of saints and relics, found fertile soil in the cultures that succeeded the dissolution of the empire. Christian missionaries to northern Europe encouraged the adoption of these practices, finding them useful in winning semi-Christianized pagans away from traditional animism. For a thousand years the cult of saints and relics dominated Western Christianity.

Although sacramental healing, especially by anointing, had already become widespread among Christians in late antiquity, it could not compete in popularity with miraculous

healing offered at the shrines of saints. Miracles became part of ordinary life. Most of them were claimed for the healing of a physical affliction. Pilgrimages to these shrines, which had begun in late antiquity, became enormously popular in the Middle Ages and beyond. At some pilgrimage centers, clergy, who had limited knowledge of medicine but access to a good library of medical works, were available to treat medically those who came. Popular too were quasi-medical practices of the kind described in Marcellus of Bordeaux's fifth-century work *De Medicamentis* (On Remedies), which mingled pharmacology, herbal lore, and spells (both Celtic and Roman) to help individuals treat their own illnesses. The church opposed this magico-medical approach, which combined spells and incantations with the occult properties of gems and herbs, and it attempted, not always successfully, to substitute for pagan incantations specifically Christian formulas like the Lord's Prayer and the Creed.

Although many people resorted to folk remedies, a tradition of secular medicine was transmitted from classical antiquity to the Middle Ages. There were two kinds of physicians, secular practitioners and clerical physicians, the latter usually being monks who had been trained by apprenticeship. Hospitals that had survived the chaos of the Germanic invasions became the property of monasteries and several reportedly had very skilled physicians in residence. Educated men continued to read classical medical literature, for medicine was a part of the curriculum studied in monastic schools. Nearly all who received an education in the early Middle Ages were trained in monasteries and became members of the clergy. Gregory of Tours (c. 540–594) was typical of scholars of the early Middle Ages in his credulity regarding miracles. He frequently alludes to the sick whose physicians had failed to heal them but who later found healing at the shrine of Saint Martin. However, he was not opposed to medicine for he regularly consulted medical and pharmacological handbooks. Pope Gregory I (590–604) encouraged the cult of saints and relics, miraculous healing, and the study of demonology, yet had a life-long interest in medicine and retained a personal physician. Both are typical of educated men who found a place in their thinking for both traditional medicine and miraculous healing and for both natural and demonic causality.

Given the fact that the clergy, especially monks, were responsible for much of the medicine practiced, not surprisingly the literature of the period emphasizes medical charity, citing biblical passages that admonish the care of those in need. Benedict of Nursia (c. 480–c. 547) and Cassiodorus (c. 485–580), both of whom founded monasteries in the sixth century, urged physician-monks to take the greatest care of the sick whom they treat. Monasteries, especially those that maintained *xenodochia*, became a refuge for the sick, not merely for Christians but for non-Christians (Jews and pagans) as well. Monks produced medical treatises to advise the poor how to find medically efficacious herbs. Because so many clergy practiced medicine, the church eventu-

ally passed a good deal of legislation to regulate them, for example, to limit the opportunities for avarice among clerical physicians who might be tempted to neglect their spiritual duties for a more remunerative career in medicine. Numerous treatises appeared as well that dealt with medical ethics and etiquette, as their authors (mostly monks) encouraged physicians, whether clerical or secular, to model Christian ideals in their character and medical practice.

As Europe began to change from a largely rural and manor-based society to an urbanized one in the eleventh century, medicine developed into a profession and the clergy's role was diminished over time. The growing sense of professionalism among secular physicians led to the creation of licensure requirements for the protection of the public against incompetent medical practitioners (the first were promulgated by Roger II of Sicily in 1140) and to the organization of medical and surgical guilds for the purpose of ensuring a monopoly of practice. As an authoritative international body, the church routinely extended its jurisdiction over guilds by granting charters and enforcing them.

**PROTESTANTISM.** When Martin Luther (1483–1546) nailed his “Ninety-Five Theses” to the door of the castle church at Wittenburg, he inaugurated not merely a schism, but a very different way of conceiving of humans’ relationship with God. Out of the Protestant Reformation there arose four separate traditions—Lutheran, Reformed (Presbyterian), Anabaptist, and Anglican (Episcopal)—united to a large degree in their basic differences with Rome, but by no means constituting a uniform movement.

Protestants differed from Catholics in their approach to the Christian life. The Catholic tradition saw in the ascetic or reclusive life the Christian ideal, whereas Protestants encouraged a life of active participation in the world. In Catholic thought the world was divided into temporal and spiritual estates. Catholics who desired wholeheartedly to serve God entered holy orders, and they considered secular professions to be of secondary importance. Martin Luther and John Calvin (1509–1564) abolished the distinction between secular and sacred callings. They broadened the idea of vocation (in medieval terms, a call to a contemplative life) by incorporating into it the secular professions. A physician or a nurse might glorify God in treating others medically as much as a priest might do so in caring for souls. The reformers’ desire was to extend God’s redeeming grace into every activity of life.

Given the reformers’ rejection of the medieval superstitions of Catholic saints, relics, and pilgrimages, not surprisingly Protestants also rejected the miraculous healing practices associated with them. The reformers respected medicine, as indeed they did the natural sciences; empiricism in the search for natural causes and the rejection of deductive Scholasticism were regarded as an extension of the theological ideas of Protestantism. There was no tension between faith and medicine in the view of the reformers, who regarded medicine as a gift of God for the healing of illness. Physi-

cians enjoyed a high status in most Protestant countries owing to the Protestants’ respect for learning and the value they placed on the professions as an area for spiritual cultivation. In eighteenth-century Edinburgh, the center of a strong Presbyterian (Calvinist) tradition, the Scots established what became one of the most celebrated medical faculties in Europe.

Because medicine was regarded as a sacred calling, medical literature before the nineteenth century describes the ideals of the profession in terms of religious and moral values. The physician was expected to be educated and a person of impeccable character and behavior. Christians had always seen affinities between the care of the body and the care of the soul. The practice of medicine provided opportunities for the physician to give spiritual counsel and to provide religious comfort, assurance, and admonition. Clergy-physicians played an important role among Protestant ministers from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. In an age in which trained physicians were especially uncommon in villages and rural areas, the Protestant belief in an educated clergy ensured a supply of persons who had both the leisure and the learning to read medical books. John Wesley (1703–1791) took a course in medicine so that as a minister he could be of help to those who had no regular physician. In 1746 he opened a dispensary and in the next year published a lay medical guide, *Primitive Physick*. Clerical physicians were common in colonial New England, where Cotton Mather (1663–1728), a Bostonian minister who himself practiced medicine, called the combination of the care of soul and body the “angelical conjunction.” During an epidemic of smallpox in 1721, many physicians (together with members of the local press) opposed inoculation as a hazard to health and a rejection of divine providence. Mather defended the practice, maintaining that any medical procedure might invite the same kind of objections. He was supported by five other prominent clergymen.

The nature of authority for Protestants is different from that of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches. The reformers rested religious authority not on ecclesiastical tradition but on scripture alone (*sola scriptura*). The Bible enjoyed primacy over all human traditions and institutions, even over the church itself. Scripture was the medium of God’s special revelation as it was interpreted with the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Hence it was the touchstone for judging all matters of theology, morals, and practice. However, Protestantism was not a monolithic tradition, and there remained a good deal of diversity between confessional bodies as well as theologians. Protestantism has never had a locus for the definitive formulation of matters of faith and morals like the magisterium (teaching authority) of the Roman Catholic Church. Moreover, the Protestant belief in the priesthood of all believers has meant that much theological controversy has involved individual opinion. Protestants for the most part, perhaps in reaction to the Roman Catholic tradition of natural law, never developed a system of casuistic ethics. Instead,

Protestants made commandment and conscience the twin pillars of ethics. An emphasis of Protestantism historically has been the cultivation of the individual conscience, which seeks to apply biblical principles and specific texts to particular ethical situations. In practice, this has meant that Protestants have been less willing to insist on a single authoritative Protestant position on complex medical-ethical issues that might inhibit the exercise of private conscience. Paul Tillich (1886–1965) called this refusal to absolutize the relative the “Protestant principle.” Thus on questions such as whether suicide always precludes God’s forgiveness (Augustine’s view) or whether abortion is ever justified, there has been some disagreement among Protestants because the biblical evidence is not clear enough to permit a definitive solution.

**FAITH HEALING.** Belief in miraculous healing has always existed in Christianity, sometimes within the mainstream and sometimes on the sectarian fringe of the movement. Although there is little evidence that it was prominent in the first three centuries, by the fourth it had emerged as a significant component of the Christian view of illness. Claims of miraculous healing were ubiquitous in the Middle Ages. The Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches continue to teach that miraculous healing is an ongoing phenomenon and a demonstration of God’s working in the church. Protestants have historically claimed that miracles ended with the apostolic age. Although they have maintained that God heals in answer to prayer (i.e., as a special providence), they have considered supernatural healing (i.e., healing apart from means) to be rare. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, faith healing became prominent in American Protestantism largely through Methodist and Holiness influences. Some prominent Pietist preachers in Europe (e.g., Christoph Blumhardt in Germany and Otto Stockmayer in Switzerland) and evangelical ministers in the United States (e.g., A. B. Simpson and A. J. Gordon) sought to reclaim a healing ministry for the church.

At the turn of the twentieth century a new movement, Pentecostalism, claimed that the supernatural gifts of the Holy Spirit described in *1 Corinthians* 12 and 14 (particularly supernatural healing and *glossolalia* or speaking in unknown languages) were normative for the church in every age. The movement began in 1901 with Charles Fox Parham, a faith healer, whose teachings spread to Los Angeles, where they led to the celebrated Azusa Street revival. Pentecostalism, which grew rapidly in the first two decades of the twentieth century, taught that Jesus’ death on the cross atoned not only for sin but for disease as well. Hence Christians could seek supernatural healing by the “prayer of faith.” Pentecostalism produced many itinerant healers who claimed to possess the gift of miraculous healing. Some practiced exorcism, regarding demons as the cause of illness. A minority of Pentecostals recognized medicine as an alternative to supernatural healing, albeit an inferior one. The majority rejected it as unfaithful to God’s unconditional promise to heal. In the last third of the twentieth century some Pentecostals modified their categorical rejection of medicine.

Since the 1950s Pentecostal influences, usually without their sectarian flavor, influenced mainstream Protestant and even Roman Catholic churches. The charismatic renewal, as it came to be called, gained widespread influence as it introduced healing, sometimes in a sacramental fashion, to churches that had not traditionally practiced it.

**ROMAN CATHOLICISM SINCE TRENT.** The late medieval corruption of the Catholic church, which led to the separation of Protestants in the sixteenth century, was seriously addressed by the Council of Trent (1545–1563). The Council introduced long-needed reforms and firmly restated every doctrine that had been challenged by the Protestant Reformers. The results of the Counter or Catholic Reformation were a conservative theology, a strict discipline, and a centralization of the church that remained in place until the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). By contrast, Vatican II opened the floodgates to the liberalization and modernization of the church. Among those practices that were retained after Vatican II was a ban on artificial contraception, which was confirmed by Pope Paul VI in his encyclical *Humanae Vitae* (1968).

Many popular forms of Catholic piety have remained outside the control of the institutional structure of the church. There has existed within the church a tendency, which was not limited to post-tridentine Catholicism, to blur the distinction between officially sanctioned rites and popular practices. The officially sanctioned practices of venerating relics and blessing animals, for example, seemed to many Catholics not very different from popular cults that attributed supernatural healing to statues of the Virgin Mary. Although educated Catholics might consider some manifestations of Catholic piety that syncretized pagan survivals as superstitious, they reflected an important aspect of the Catholic faith. Hence there remained within the larger confines of the church as much a place for supernatural healing as existed within Protestant Pentecostalism. Chief among them was the miraculous healing offered at pilgrimage sites. Lourdes in France, Fatima in Portugal, and Guadalupe in Mexico continued to draw large numbers of pilgrims year after year despite modern advances in medicine that would seem to render them less attractive to pilgrims than in previous centuries.

At the same time post-tridentine Catholicism retained and enlarged its vast reservoir of medical philanthropy. The Sisters of Charity, founded by Saint Vincent de Paul (1580–1660), became a major force in caring for the sick. Catholics excelled in organizing and institutionalizing their medical charities, including hospitals, most of which were maintained by religious orders of women. Similarly missionaries to colonial areas often included a medical component and much of their work focused on the founding of hospitals, leprosaria, and other health-related institutions.

**CENTRAL THEMES IN CHRISTIAN HEALING.** The relationship between Christianity and medicine is a complex one that is marked by a number of relatively consistent themes.

In general, Christians have considered the body as a relative, not an absolute, good. They have viewed health as a blessing given by God, not (as did the Greeks) a virtue. Disease and pain were material, although not moral, evils, the result of the fall of humanity, but they were often used under God's providential care to produce spiritual good. Hence a place existed in God's world for suffering, as many spiritual writers have observed. Few serious Christians could anticipate a future in this life in which bodily affliction would be completely eliminated. In a world of sin, the curse of disease and physical suffering would always be present. Christians anticipated the resurrection of the body, in which illness and death, the final enemy, would be conquered.

The majority of Christians at most times have considered medicine a gift of God, offering relief to sufferers of illness. In nearly every era, miraculous healing has either complemented medicine or, among a small minority who repudiated all medicine as contrary to God's will, replaced it. Most Christians have not considered the use of medicine and the practice of healing through prayer to be incompatible. Believing that God is sovereign over life and death and that God most often works through natural means, they have prayed for healing through the use of medicine or, when it has failed, by miraculous means. When both have failed, Christians have always been encouraged to pray for patient endurance of their suffering.

The New Testament and early Christian literature enjoined Christian care, both on the individual and the corporate level, for those who were suffering from physical ills. Already in the first century, the early church organized a systematic effort to care for the sick through voluntary assistance. It became so successful that it formed the basis for the hospital, created at the end of the fourth century. Medical philanthropy has played a paramount role in Christian charity among Christians of all persuasions. Historically, it has been the greatest contribution of Christianity to health care.

The impulse to philanthropy reflected the conviction that human beings were created in the image of God, which gave to every individual an inherent worth. This, in turn, formed the basis for a respect for life from conception to death, which clearly distinguished the ethics of Christian physicians from the prevailing medical ethics of classical polytheistic pluralism as it does in the twenty-first century from the bioethical consequentialism of secular pluralism.

**SEE ALSO** Christian Social Movements; Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity; Protestantism; Reformation; Roman Catholicism; Science and Religion.

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#### HEALING AND MEDICINE: ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE IN THE NEW AGE

Healing is a profoundly cultural activity. The labeling and treating of a disease reflect a culture's deepest understandings of the causal powers affecting human well-being. For this reason, the notion of orthodoxy pertains to medical systems as surely as it does to religious or political traditions. Ever since the Enlightenment, medical orthodoxy has been defined by a commitment to the causal role of "material" factors in the etiology of disease. Western medical science thus emerged in direct opposition to the pre-Enlightenment worldview within which the church supplied culturally compelling explanations of nonmaterial or spiritual causes of disease (e.g., sin or spirit possession), as well as corresponding strategies for therapeutic intervention (e.g., confession or exorcism). The continual successes of medical science have understandably garnered wide cultural support for its underlying worldview. As a consequence, most educated Westerners have implicitly endorsed a clear-cut division of labor whereby religion continues its age-old practice of the cure of souls, while scientific medicine uses its secular methods for healing the body.

The fact that a wide array of contemporary medical systems continue to espouse theories that defy scientific ortho-

doxy is therefore of particular interest to religious and cultural historians. Popular interest in alternative healing systems, such as holistic healing methods, twelve-step programs, and Asian systems for self-purification, seems to indicate that a fairly large number of Westerners subscribe to beliefs that belong neither to science nor to the more genteel theologies of our mainstream churches. Because these unorthodox healing systems contradict the materialistic assumptions underlying medical science, they are often taken to be propounding irrational understandings of health and healing. Yet, strictly speaking, any healing system is rational insofar as its methods of treatment are logically entailed by its fundamental premises or assumptions about the nature of disease. We might, for example, recognize at least four different types of explanations that could “rationally” be used to describe the cause of disease and, therefore, healing: physiological, environmental, attitudinal or psychological, and spiritual or metaphysical (i.e., caused by the activity of entities or forces that are considered to be both extrasomatic and extrapsychological). Those propounding “metaphysical-cause” explanations of healing are thus not necessarily less rational than those engaged in medical science. They are, however, advancing an ontological claim concerning the existence of causal forces not recognized by contemporary scientific theory.

Alternative healing systems thrive in contemporary culture precisely owing to their unorthodox articulation of a religiously charged interpretation of reality. Indeed, from a cross-cultural perspective it is clear that one of the most important functions of healing rituals is their capacity to induce an existential encounter with a sacred reality. In traditional societies, healing rituals involve participants in the reenactment of cosmological dramas: the shaman is both a healer and mediator between the divine and human realms. And in the case of Christianity, Jesus’ healing was thought to be a sign of his divine nature and has subsequently been institutionalized as a function of Christian proclamation and ministry. Yet, with the gradual divorce of physical healing from the church’s routine activities, this means of introducing individuals to a higher spiritual reality necessarily shifted to “alternative” religious and medical traditions, such as those found in the New Age movement.

**HEALTH AND HEALING IN NEW AGE METAPHYSICS.** The term *New Age* defies strict definition. One can, however, identify many of the basic themes in today’s alternative spiritual practices by tracing their historical origin in a cluster of nineteenth-century “metaphysical movements.” Transcendentalism, Swedenborgianism, mesmerism, Mind Cure, New Thought, Spiritualism, and Theosophy all claimed to have made bold new discoveries concerning humanity’s connection with a higher spiritual order. Their teachings especially appealed to progressive-minded persons who yearned to reconcile their scientific and religious interests within a single metaphysical system.

Common to these nineteenth-century metaphysical movements was their belief in the lawful “correspondence”

between the many dimensions that make up the universe. Closely connected with this doctrine of correspondence was a corollary belief in the possibility of spiritual “influx.” That is, it was believed that when a particularly harmonious relationship or rapport is achieved between two dimensions, energies from the “higher” dimension flow automatically into—and exert positive influence within—the “lower” dimension. Each of the United States’ many metaphysical systems brought a distinct vocabulary to the explanation of these twin doctrines of correspondence and influx. The American public, however, took little effort to discriminate between these metaphysical teachings and gradually blended them together to create a form of unchurched spirituality that might be termed *harmonial piety*. As described by religious historian Sydney Ahlstrom, harmonial piety consists of all forms of belief and practice predicated upon the assumption that physical health, spiritual composure, and even economic well-being flow automatically from a person’s rapport with the cosmos. This harmonial piety, anchored as it was in metaphysical understandings of the correspondence and influx, defined the core commitments of the New Age movement that came into cultural prominence during the 1970s and 1980s. Contemporary systems of alternative healing, such as chiropractic, twelve-step programs, Therapeutic Touch, crystal healing, and sundry holistic therapies, all in some way utilize notions of health and healing born of this metaphysical tradition.

The best example of how the twin doctrines of correspondence and influx gave rise to alternative medicine is the gradual diffusion of mesmerism into the vocabulary of middle-class Americans. Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815), a Viennese physician, claimed to have detected the existence of a superfine substance or fluid that had until then eluded scientific notice. Mesmer referred to this invisible fluid as *animal magnetism*, owing to the fact that it is found in all living creatures and seems to respond to the influence of magnets. He postulated that animal magnetism permeates the physical universe. He further conjectured that it forms the medium through which forces of every kind—light, heat, magnetism, electricity—pass as they travel from one physical object to another. If for any reason an individual’s supply of animal magnetism was thrown out of equilibrium, one or more bodily organs would consequently be deprived of sufficient amounts of this vital force and would begin to falter. “There is,” Mesmer reasoned, “only one illness and one healing.” Therefore, because any and all illness can ultimately be traced to a disturbance in the body’s supply of animal magnetism, medical science can be reduced to a set of simple procedures aimed at supercharging a patient’s nervous system with this mysterious life-giving energy.

Mesmer and his followers were intrigued by the fact that their patients routinely entered into a hypnotic-like trance as magnets were passed over their bodies in an effort to induce the inflow of animal magnetism into their physical systems. “Mesmerized” patients fell into a peaceful trance and,



upon awakening, pronounced themselves cured of their physical and emotional ailments. Many mesmerized patients also displayed paranormal mental powers, such as telepathy, clairvoyance, and even communication with the spirit world. Proponents extolled mesmerism as a spiritual technique for producing the very condition of “correspondence” that transcendentalists and Swedenborgians had already claimed makes people susceptible to the influx of the currents of “universal being.” The mesmerists thus succeeded in giving succinct medical expression to the harmonial vision. Illness was understood to be the lack of mental or psychological correspondence with higher spiritual dimension. Healing simply requires the use of physical and psychological techniques for reestablishing this correspondence and thereby permitting the inflow of the subtle energies that impart vitality and progressive movement throughout the universe.

One American mesmerist, Phineas P. Quimby (1802–1866), reasoned that people’s thoughts function something like shunting valves that either connect them with or close them off from animal magnetism, which he variously referred to as “vital force” or “divine spirit.” He concluded that “disease is the effect of a wrong direction given to the mind.” If people think spiritually and optimistically, they remain inwardly receptive to the spiritual world and thereby maintain physical vigor. If, however, they become embroiled in pessimism, materialism, or fear, they fall out of harmony with higher spiritual influences and fall victim to physical disease. Quimby taught thousands of patients that by making appropriate adjustments in their own thoughts they could establish rapport with the very spiritual power that makes for health and overall prosperity. One such patient, Mary Baker Eddy (1821–1910), transformed Quimby’s teachings into Christian Science. Others, including Warren Felt Evans (1817–1889), expanded Quimby’s teachings into what became known as the Mind Cure (or New Thought) movement. The latter advocated not only positive thinking but also the cultivation of certain mystical states to reestablish inner correspondence with higher spiritual realms (and the healing energies that flow automatically once such correspondence is established). In so doing, advocates of Mind Cure and New Thought injected a metaphysical vocabulary into popular American culture that would be rediscovered in the last decades of the twentieth century by proponents of New Age healing systems.

Mesmerism, as with other metaphysical movements such as Spiritualism and Theosophy, was thus a forerunner of the many New Age healing systems proclaiming belief in the causal power of “subtle energies.” Historian Catherine Albanese suggests that belief in the subtle energies of spirit is the most distinctive feature of New Age spirituality. In the New Age movement, to be spiritual is equivalent to being sensitive to subtle energies and responding to them both by cultivating states of inner receptivity and by cultivating mental attitudes that utilize these energies to create bodily and worldly prosperity. The sustained presence of metaphysical

healing systems in the United States thus goes well beyond the explanation typically given by social scientists when they draw attention to the fact that these systems treat the whole person (as opposed to scientific medicine’s tendency to treat relatively isolated biophysical symptoms). Indeed, the ongoing popularity of metaphysical New Age systems is rooted squarely in their ability to bring explicitly religious understandings to the issue of health and healing.

**NEW AGE ENERGY MEDICINE.** The metaphysical notions of correspondence and influx have supported a variety of healing systems based on belief in the existence and healing power of subtle spiritual energies. A perfect example can be found in the emergence of the alternative healing system that has gained the widest following, chiropractic medicine. Its founder, Daniel David Palmer (1845–1913), had studied both Spiritualism and mesmerism before concluding that there is a vital energy at work in the universe that is the ultimate source of the body’s health and vitality. This energy, which he termed *Innate*, is itself a segment of god or the universal intelligence that fills the universe. Palmer reasoned that humans remain in perfect health so long as this vital energy flows from the brain to the various organs of the body. But when the flow of this energy is blocked due to misaligned spinal vertebrae, one or more parts of the body will begin to falter. Palmer, like Mesmer, thus concluded that there is one ultimate cause of illness and one ultimate cause of all healing—the restoration of the flow of subtle spiritual energies. Palmer called his new medical philosophy *chiropractic* from the Greek words *cheiro* (hand) and *praktos* (done or performed). At least nine million persons visit the forty thousand chiropractic physicians currently practicing in the United States. And although the majority of these patients receive little or no instruction about the healing power of *Innate*, chiropractic medicine nonetheless remains a principal source from which millions of Americans have been introduced to the healing power of spiritual energies not recognized by scientific medicine.

A second example of New Age “energy medicine” is the system of Therapeutic Touch. Dolores Krieger, a nursing instructor at New York University and student of Theosophical teachings, working with Dora Kunz, former president of the Theosophical Society in America, developed a healing technique predicated upon the existence of a universal energy underlying all life processes. Krieger explains that this energy, which she refers to by using the Hindu term *prana*, naturally instills a higher spiritual dimension into every living organism. So long as individuals remain inwardly receptive to the inflow of this vital energy they will remain healthy; illness ensues when *prana* is no longer flowing freely into the physical system.

Recapitulating Mesmer’s science of animal magnetism in nearly every detail, Krieger devised a system of practices for nurses to use in their efforts to “channel” *prana* into patients. She explains that healers must themselves become inwardly receptive to the flow of this spiritual energy. New-

comers to the field are guided along an “archetypal journey,” whereby they learn to explore the farther reaches of the psyche. Nurses trained in medical science are encouraged to read books on yoga, Tibetan mysticism, and the relationship between the “new physics” and Eastern religious traditions. The goal is to help them open up their own internal energy centers (referred to as *chakras*, a term drawn from esoteric forms of yoga and largely introduced to Western culture through Theosophy-inspired movements) and to become more receptive to the inflow of *prana* into their own systems so that they might in turn channel it to their patients.

This interest in helping persons release subtle healing energies by opening their *chakras* is common to most forms of New Age medicine. For example, Caroline Myss has synthesized her knowledge of Theosophy, the work of Dolores Krieger, and the trance-channeled wisdom of *A Course in Miracles* into a healing philosophy predicated upon the causal role of the *chakras*. Myss has published several best-selling books and videotapes that explain how each *chakra* is associated with specific emotional issues. By helping people gain insight into their “energy anatomy,” Myss believes they can learn to open their *chakras* and facilitate the flow of the energy needed to sustain physical health, emotional well-being, and sustained growth toward higher levels of spiritual consciousness.

Other New Age energy healers make use of rock crystals. Belief in the healing properties of crystals is frequently associated with shamanic traditions, including those of Native Americans. Western interest in the occult powers of crystals, however, is more directly linked with Baron Charles von Reichenbach’s studies in the 1840s and 1850s. Reichenbach took up the scientific study of Mesmer’s theory of animal magnetism and ultimately devised his own theory concerning the power of quartz crystals to restore the flow of a subtle healing energy throughout the body. Today’s crystal healers are likely to extol the ability of quartz crystals to capacitate and refract the spiritual energies that enter humans through their *chakras*. Many New Age healers combine the use of crystals with various forms of meditation, believing that the crystals amplify the mind’s innate powers to make contact with the higher spiritual dimensions from which spiritual healing energies flow.

**THE HOLISTIC HEALTH AND HUMAN POTENTIAL MOVEMENTS.** Ever since Quimby and the nineteenth-century Mind Cure movement, there has been an identifiable subculture in Western nations that has explored novel systems for integrating the mind, body, and spirit. The 1970s witnessed a revival of such interest as a variety of new systems appeared, all aiming to help persons achieve optimal health and all rife with imagery drawn from Western metaphysical traditions. Many of these systems sought to distinguish themselves from scientific medicine by invoking the notion of “holistic healing.” Part of the appeal of holistic approaches to healing was their pronounced concern for individuals as both physical and emotional beings, in contrast to the depersonalized na-

ture of many medical treatments. Yet many holistic healing systems have gone further still and addressed themselves to the treatment of the body, mind, emotions, and spirit. The introduction of the term *spirit* alongside *body*, *mind*, and *emotions* takes holistic conceptions of healing well beyond psychosomatic models and stakes out a bold metaphysical understanding of reality. In some cases this amounts to little more than a romanticization of the body’s self-regenerative and self-reparative tendencies. Yet in other cases it also includes a bolder ontological claim that the whole of nature is suffused with an immanent spiritual force. And, in still other cases, metaphysical conceptions of the human psyche are invoked to suggest the human system is susceptible to the influx of higher spiritual powers.

Among the best-known spokespersons for holistic healing in the late twentieth century were Norman Cousins and Bernard Siegel. Both offered inspiring visions of humanity’s potential for self-regeneration that broadly hinted at the mind’s susceptibility to influence from metaphysical forces. Cousins, for example, suggested that his studies of the mind’s full potential to avail itself of cosmic healing energies also suggests new directions and new possibilities in future human evolution. Siegel was even more forceful in linking holistic healing with a decidedly metaphysical conception of the human condition. He had cancer patients read books on meditation and psychic phenomena so that they might awaken their own latent abilities to tap into higher healing energies. According to Siegel, we are not far from the creation of a “theophysics” that will demonstrate how all people have a divine energy available to them through a collective unconscious, and if they open themselves to this energy there is no limit to the health and vitality they can express in their lives.

Perhaps the most successful of all holistic health systems is Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and the many twelve-step programs it has launched. The founder of AA, Bill W., appropriated the psychological theories of both William James and Carl Jung to explain how every person might make inner connection with a higher spiritual power. Describing AA as “a spiritual rather than a religious program,” Bill W. contended that the restoration of personal wholeness is impossible without letting go of our personal will and finding inner harmony with a spiritual power he preferred to describe in metaphysical rather than biblical terms.

There are numerous other varieties of holistic systems that utilize metaphysical explanations of the causal forces responsible for healing: acupuncture, iridology, massage and various forms of “bodywork,” meditation and visualization, Ayurvedic medicine, *shiatsu*, transpersonal psychologies, and New Age shamanism. Many of these might also be described as constituting the Human Potential movement that also has roots in the Western esoteric and metaphysical traditions. Common to these systems is the belief that conformity to societal expectations comes at a price. Modern individuals have lost awareness of their deeper selves and their deeper potentials for creativity and transcendence. Full human health

therefore requires far more than just eliminating illness. It also requires utilizing physical and psychological techniques for promoting awareness of the full range of one's creative powers, including the power for complete spiritual enlightenment and union with the godhead.

**ALTERNATIVE HEALING, ALTERNATIVE SPIRITUALITY.** Most of the alternative healing systems that have attracted popular followings proclaim the existence and causal power of spiritual energies unrecognized by either scientific or religious orthodoxy. Adherents of these groups are typically white, urban or suburban, and have more education and higher incomes than the general population. The impress of secularization has made biblical religion problematic to them, and yet scientific rationality has failed to sustain their general optimism or to meet their desire for experiential connection with the sacred. Alternative healing systems have thrived in a particular cultural niche, appealing to persons who yearn to find spiritual fulfillment while reluctant to join established religious institutions. Their doctrines (myths) and therapeutic techniques (rituals) function much like the initiation rites of archaic religions and mystery cults in that they provide an experiential encounter with a more-than-physical reality. Newcomers are helped to discard a no-longer functional identity and to discover new and unsuspected sources of comfort and power. The existence and continued popularity of New Age healing systems testifies to their enduring capacity to enable otherwise secular persons to symbolize what, at the deepest level of mystery, is the ultimate source and meaning of their lives.

**SEE ALSO** Christian Science; Eddy, Mary Baker; New Age Movement; New Thought Movement; Spiritualism; Swedenborgianism; Theosophical Society; Transcendental Meditation.

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#### HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN ĀYURVEDA AND SOUTH ASIA

Āyurveda is one of several traditional medical systems that originate from the Indian subcontinent. It is now represented as the indigenous Indian medical tradition *par excellence*. As is the case with other Indian medical systems, the origins of Āyurveda long predate the formation of an Indian nation and are not necessarily set within its geographical boundaries. In the context of the history of medicine, therefore, "Indian" often denotes quite a large area within South Asia. A second great tradition of medicine, called Siddha, developed in the south of India. It is less well known outside of India, but of similar antiquity and authority to Āyurveda. Other medical systems, originating from countries outside the Indian subcontinent, have been integrated into its cultures and now form part of its medical traditions. The earliest, and perhaps most important of these systems to be imported and acculturated is Ūnānī medicine. Much later, but equally significant, additions were homeopathy and naturopathy. A different development has taken place in the case of Yoga. Here, an indigenous knowledge system has been reinterpreted as the focus has shifted from the philosophical tradition to the health-related aspects of postural and meditative Yoga practice. The developments within the old traditions with their long and varied histories, the addition of new traditions to the established ones, their interrelations and the interweaving of medical thought with a changing religious, political, and cultural climate, all form a rich and complicated pattern of medical and social history. The developments starting in the early twentieth century toward the modernization and professionalization of medicine have brought these and other medical systems into a common frame of health policy and legislation, as health has become the responsibility of the government. Thus, the more recent history of traditional Indian medicine is shaped by health politics. At the same time, the sphere of its influence has widened, as Āyurveda and other traditional medical systems have come to the attention of an international public, taking a position beside other complementary and alternative therapies.

**THE TEXTUAL TRADITION OF ĀYURVEDA.** The Āyurvedic medical tradition has a lively history of more than 2,000 years, during which it has continually developed. This development has been accompanied by continuous textual production, resulting in an enormous corpus of literature. Āyurvedic literature not only makes it possible to reconstruct the history of Āyurvedic thought and practice, it also adds to the general understanding of Indian history from its antiquity to the present. It encompasses a wide range of topics that go beyond simple medical instructions, constructing a complex worldview from philosophical, religious, political, and social perspectives.

Āyurveda's beginnings, as known from early classical Sanskrit treatises, are predated by instances of medical knowledge found in Vedic literature. Āyurvedic tradition postulates a direct lineage with Vedic medicine and refers to its medical system as an appendix to the *Atharvaveda*. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, in *Science and Society in Ancient India* (1977), was the first to contest the traditional view that Āyurveda developed directly from the medicine of the Vedas, pointing to strong conceptual and epistemological differences between Vedic and Āyurvedic medicine. Kenneth G. Zysk, in *Asceticism and Healing in Ancient India* (1998), has subsequently shown that Āyurvedic theory generally does not rely on Vedic medicine although Āyurvedic literature uses Vedic imagery and mythology to evoke a sense of continuity with the past and to establish legitimacy in a society dominated by Brahmanic ideology. According to Zysk, the roots of Āyurveda lie in the medical knowledge of wandering ascetics, most notably Buddhist monks. This is corroborated by the fact that Buddhist texts reveal the first glimpses of a systematized medicine similar to Āyurvedic theories expounded in the classical treatises.

The classical era of Āyurveda begins with the medical treatise of Caraka—the *Caraka Saṃhitā*—which is written in Sanskrit and dates to about the first century CE, though its foundations most likely go back to a much earlier time. Caraka (*Sūtrasthāna* 30.28) presents the first systematized medical theory of Indian antiquity, formally dividing medicine into eight branches (Skt., *aṣṭāṅga*):

1. Kāyacikitsā (devoted to general medicine).
2. Śālākya (devoted to the surgical treatment of body parts above the shoulders).
3. Śalyāpahartṛka (devoted to the removal of foreign bodies—surgery).
4. Viṣagaravairodhikapraśamana (devoted to toxicology).
5. Bhūtavidyā (devoted to the treatment of possession by various supernatural beings).
6. Komārabhṛtyaka (devoted to pediatrics).
7. Rasāyana (devoted to the preparation of life-prolonging tonics).
8. Vājīkaraṇa (devoted to aphrodisiacs and treatments relating to virility).

While later texts do not slavishly follow this division into eight general subjects, the term *aṣṭāṅga* thereafter becomes a synonym for medicine. Later works often refer to Caraka, and today the *Caraka Saṃhitā* is part of the curriculum taught in modern Āyurvedic colleges in India.

The *Caraka Saṃhitā* is chronologically followed by the *Suśruta Saṃhitā*, which probably reached its present form around the third century CE. Its most important addition to medical history is its information on surgical operations. These very advanced surgical methods are neither mentioned in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* nor in later Āyurvedic works.

The only other surviving treatise that belongs to this early period is the *Bhela Saṃhitā*, which is quoted in pre-

modern Āyurvedic texts. However, only one manuscript of this work survives and its importance for the development of Āyurvedic thought does not parallel that of the treatises of Caraka and Suśruta.

Chronologically, next to be mentioned is the collection of medical and divinatory texts dated to the sixth century, now commonly referred to as the “Bower Manuscripts.” The manuscripts were found buried close to a monastery situated near the old Silk Route trading stop of Kuqa, which testifies to the presence of Indian medicine in Inner Asia in the early sixth century CE.

A work of major importance was composed by Vāgbhaṭa in the early seventh century. Together with the two older treatises, it is part of the “great threesome” (Skt., *bṛhatrayī*) of Āyurveda. Vāgbhaṭa's treatise, the *Aṣṭāṅgabhṛdaya Saṃhitā* (The heart of medicine), is a summary of medical knowledge, extracting the essence of medicine, as its title suggests, from previous works in an attempt to synthesize, unify, and put into order their contents. This textbook soon gained great popularity and was widely disseminated throughout India and beyond. Foreign translations of the *Aṣṭāṅgabhṛdaya Saṃhitā* were appearing within a century of its composition and copies of the medical textbook are found in abundance in manuscript libraries both in North and in South India. The *Aṣṭāṅgabhṛdaya Saṃhitā* is in many ways the most important Āyurvedic text. Its doctrines are widely regarded as authoritative and form an integral part of modern Āyurvedic education and practice.

Three later works have similar status to that of the “great threesome” and are called the “lesser threesome.” These are the works of Mādhava (c. 700 CE), Śārṅgadharma (c. 1300), and Bhāvamiśra (sixteenth century). Mādhava's work on the causes and symptoms of diseases was widely read and set the pattern for later systematic descriptions of diseases. It is cited by al-Ṭabarī in the *Firdaws al-Ḥikmah*. Śārṅgadharma's compendium is one of the most successful Āyurvedic books ever written, as the great number of copies found in libraries across India testifies. More recently, the pharmaceutical industry has made use of its recipes in the manufacture of Āyurvedic products. Bhāvamiśra's work is innovative in several respects. It is perhaps most noteworthy that he introduced the subject of syphilis to Indian medicine.

Translations of passages in the above-mentioned works can be found in Dominik Wujastyk's *Roots of Āyurveda* (2003). However, this selection of medical works only forms the tip of the iceberg. To give just a few examples, further remarkable works include the numerous encyclopedias and dictionaries containing Āyurvedic material, such as the *Mānasollāsa* (twelfth century), the *Lakṣmaṇotsava* (fifteenth century), the *Āyurveda saukhya* of the *Ṭoḍarānanda* (sixteenth century), the *Vīramitrodaya* (seventeenth century), the *Śivatattvaratnākara* (early eighteenth century), the *Vaidyakaśabdāsindhu* (late nineteenth century), and the *Bṛhannighaṇṭurātṇākara* (late nineteenth to early twentieth century).



Julius Jolly's *Indian Medicine* (1994) is still a useful reference for the Āyurvedic textual tradition. However, Gerrit Jan Meulenbeld's *History of Indian Medical Literature* (1999–2002) offers the most comprehensive and thorough overview. This magnum opus is an invaluable source for Āyurvedic studies and certainly the most important work of its kind to date. Other reference works are written in Indian vernacular languages, as for example the Hindi *Āyurved kā Vaijñānik Itihās* (1975) by P. V. Sharma.

**THE PRINCIPLES OF ĀYURVEDA.** Far from comprising a uniform theoretical body, the various Āyurvedic sources differ considerably in their statements on the fundamental principles of Āyurveda. Given Āyurveda's large and varied literature, and that it is a living and changing tradition that looks back at more than 2,000 years of development, this is hardly surprising. New theories and treatment methods evolved, old ones were mostly recounted with respect, but sometimes openly disputed and sometimes silently replaced. The use of the *materia medica* changed due to the availability of plants and of other resources, and new environments and ways of living changed the basic assumptions of the older texts. Thus, though the sources certainly share common features that make it possible to define them as part of the Āyurvedic medical system, any overall definition of the basic tenets of Āyurveda is necessarily a selective construct. To arrive at more precise and coherent definitions of Āyurvedic theories, research often focuses on a certain period of time or on certain texts. Here, the main sources used to represent the Āyurvedic opinion will be the treatises of Caraka and Suśruta and Vāgbhaṭa's *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya Saṃhitā*, with a strong emphasis on the latter text. It should be kept in mind, however, that there exist other versions of the Āyurvedic doctrines presented here, as well as altogether different approaches.

The term *Āyurveda* translates as “the knowledge [Skt., *veda*] of longevity [Skt., *āyus*].” This name points to a fundamental characteristic of Āyurvedic medicine expressed in the classical texts, namely that its emphasis is on establishing ideal conditions for living a long life. Health is not only a goal in itself, but, perhaps more importantly, the means by which to achieve longevity. According to Caraka (*Sūtrasthāna* 1:15), a long life offers the human being the opportunity to fulfill the “four duties” (Skt., *caturvarga*)—namely *kāma*, *artha*, *dharma*, and *mokṣa*. The connections between the *trivarga* (excluding *mokṣa*)—or *caturvarga*—and medical theory are discussed by Arion Roşu in “Études āyurvédiques: Le *trivarga* dans l'āyurveda” (1978). The responsibility to fulfill these duties can be extended to maintaining health: each person is an active participant in establishing the grounds for a long life (or the reverse) by living (or not living) according to certain standards, which are defined in the Āyurvedic texts. The medical manuals not only provide the professional physician with specialized instructions on medical practice, but also offer the general public a wide range of practical advice on different aspects of life. The physician's role is complementary to the efforts made by those afflicted with disease and by the healthy alike. Ideal-

ly motivated by compassion for his suffering fellow beings, the physician's task is to alleviate bodily and mental discomfort and to help restore health through administering medicine or providing other forms of therapy. The other very important part of the profession would be to give advice on the prevention of disease: that is, on how to lead a good and healthy life, broadly understood.

Health is interpreted not only as the absence of illness but as a state of complete well-being. The individual's condition can only be fully understood within the context of society at large and of the person's environment. This has been discussed by Francis Zimmermann in his groundbreaking book *The Jungle and the Aroma of Meats* (1987). Caraka (*Śārīrasthāna* 5.3) defines the connection of humans with nature as one mirroring the other. The microcosmic human reflects the macrocosm of the universe and ultimately of all there is, and vice versa—a concept that already appears at an early stage of Vedic literature as the conceptual basis of sacrifice.

Within the physical body of the human, health is understood as the proper functioning of certain processes that are based on the body's inherent structure of fluids and channels. The Āyurvedic view of the human body differs substantially from the biomedical understanding of anatomy. Thus, the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya Saṃhitā* states that *doṣas*, *dhātus*, and *malas* are the root of the body (*Sūtrasthāna* 11.2). These three Sanskrit technical terms are used to describe the physical and (to a limited extent) the mental processes involved in the causing of health and disease. Their translation presents a set of difficulties, as their literal translation does not fully convey their meaning. The word *doṣa*, for example, is derived from the causative of the verb root *duṣ*, which literally translates as “to spoil” or “to corrupt” (Monier-Williams et al., 1899, p. 488). The negative connotation of something that causes damage is definitely inherent to the understanding of the *doṣas*, but as the above citation of the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya Saṃhitā* shows, they are also positively interpreted as an essential part of the body. Translations often use the term *humor* for *doṣa*, as there are strong parallels (if also differences) between the *doṣa* theory and the Greek humoral system. Generally, a *doṣa* is a substance that flows or circulates within the body and fulfills particular functions within it. Āyurvedic theory usually speaks of three *doṣas*, namely wind (*vāta*), bile (*pitta*), and phlegm (*kapha* or *śleśman*), often also glossed somewhat more glamorously as wind, fire, and water, in analogy to their presumed properties. There are also occasional references to four *doṣas*, most notably in the *Suśruta Saṃhitā* (*Sūtrasthāna* 21.28), blood being added as the fourth. Each of these *doṣas* is located mainly in a particular area of the body, though they can also move around along special channels without causing damage. Thus, *vāta* is mostly situated in the large intestine, *pitta* in the navel, and *kapha* in the chest and above. Their functions are summarized in the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya Saṃhitā* (*Sūtrasthāna* 1.1–3) as follows: *Vāta* gives the body strength, activates speech, body, and mind,



induces the evacuation of the intestinal tract, supports the *dhātus*, and sharpens the senses. *Pitta* regulates digestion, body heat, sight, hunger, thirst, and appetite. It makes the body soft and supple. On a mental level it gives understanding, intelligence, and courage. *Kapha* gives the body firmness and smoothness and holds the joints together. Its psychological quality is patience.

Disease is often defined as an imbalance of the *doṣas*. However, this is only part of the picture and does not represent the full Āyurvedic explanation of how the *doṣas* cause disease, as a closer look at the specifications of the texts reveals. Vāgbhaṭa, for example, uses the metaphor of balance and imbalance, but explains that imbalance denotes a change in quantity as well as the dislocation of a *doṣa*. The quantity of a *doṣa* can both increase and decrease, which leads to various symptoms of disease. The increase of a *doṣa* is a process that evolves in two stages: its accumulation (Skt., *caya*) and its subsequent surge (Skt., *kopa*), in which the *doṣa* leaves its own area. The symptoms for accumulation are different from those for the surge, which causes a graver condition of disease that is more difficult to treat. Thus, the state of the *doṣas*—that is, whether they are increased or decreased, in a stage of accumulation, or in surge—is relevant for treatment, as they require different measures. However, differences in treatment based on distinctions between decrease and increase, accumulation and surge, are so subtle as to nearly justify the sweeping statement that the imbalance of the *doṣas* causes disease.

The second component the *Aṣṭāṅgahr̥daya Saṃhitā* names as the root of the body is the *dhātus*, literally “constituent parts” or “elements.” In a medical context, these are defined as elements or essential ingredients of the body, namely chyle (i.e., food that has undergone the first process of digestion), blood, flesh, fat, bone, marrow, and semen. To this list of seven *dhātus*, hair, skin, and sinews are sometimes added. The *dhātus* are thought to evolve in succession from each other: semen from marrow, marrow from bone, bone from fat, and so on. Confusingly, the *doṣas* are also sometimes called *dhātu*, particularly to denote their positive quality of sustaining the body. This has been addressed by Hartmut Scharfe in “The Doctrine of the Three Humors in Traditional Indian Medicine and the Alleged Antiquity of Tamil Siddha Medicine” (1999), in which he argues that the usage of *dhātu* in lieu of *doṣa* goes back to an older understanding of the *doṣas* found in the Buddhist Pali canon, in which *doṣa* unambiguously denotes a negative force causing disease.

The *dhātus* shape the physical body but also have separate functions that are specified in the *Aṣṭāṅgahr̥daya Saṃhitā* (*Sūtrasthāna* 11.4) as follows: chyle causes the sensation of delight, blood is a stimulant and increases the life force, meat covers the bones, fat regulates the greasiness (for example of the eyes), the bones keep the body upright, marrow fills the bone, and semen is responsible for procreation. Parallel to the *doṣas*, the *dhātus* also can increase or decrease, causing

various symptoms of illness. The increase or decrease of a *dhātu* effects the *dhātu* chain, one *dhātu* vitiating the next, which in turn leads to conflicting symptoms and complicates diagnosis. The treatment of *dhātu*-related illnesses is fairly straightforward in contrast to their diagnosis: an illness that is diagnosed as an excess of blood is countered with bloodletting; an excess of flesh, (e.g., a tumor), with its removal. The decrease of *dhātus* on the other hand, is counteracted with appropriate nutrition, based on the principle that what has been lost should be added again.

The *malas* are called the third root of the body. *Mala* as a medical term denotes any bodily excretion or secretion—that is, urine, feces, and sweat, but also mucus, earwax, and tears. The *Aṣṭāṅgahr̥daya Saṃhitā* (*Sūtrasthāna* 11.5) explains that feces sustain the body, urine evacuates the fluids, and sweat holds the fluids inside. The treatment of *mala*-related illnesses corresponds to the treatment of the *doṣas* in that the *malas* increase and decrease, but also because the *doṣas* are seen as the underlying cause of the increase or decrease of the *malas*.

There are, however, also other forces at work on the body. One central concept is that of *āma*, which is the product of improperly digested food that has turned to poison in the body. As a poison, it vitiates the *doṣas* and the *dhātus* and causes the disruption of their course of flow or development. The descriptions of what the vitiation of a *doṣa* means or of how exactly the disruption of flow is effected are somewhat vague. The general concept is that *āma* can in various ways block the channels through which the *doṣas* are meant to move. Treatment aims at ridding the body of this unwanted substance and consequently focuses on cathartic procedures using purgatives, enemas, and emetics.

It has been mentioned above how the theory of the three *doṣas* affects treatment. An interesting aspect of Āyurvedic medical practice, however, is that treatment is in many cases not necessarily dependent on theory. An infection of the urethra, for example, will commonly be treated with turmeric. In modern Āyurvedic treatment, the identification of the urethra as the site of infection and the understanding of infection are based on modern medical conceptions that do not occur in classical Āyurvedic literature. However, stereotyped diagnosis and treatment disregarding the theory of the individual constitution also forms an intrinsic part of premodern Āyurvedic medicine, as Gerrit Jan Meulenbeld has pointed out in “The Surveying of Sanskrit Medical Literature” (1984; pp. 44–46). A urethra infection can be explained as the symptom of excess *pitta* and the use of turmeric as counteractive to the heat-related *doṣa* because of its cooling properties. This, however, does not influence the primary prescription that pain in the urinary tract should be treated with turmeric.

In short, Āyurveda offers more than one solution to medical problems. While the abundance of often conflicting material on Āyurveda is vexing for the historian or the sociologist trying to delineate Āyurvedic theory, the maxim “whatever works is right” seems to have been sufficient for the

Āyurvedic practitioners who have continued and developed the tradition of Āyurveda from its beginnings.

The best overview of Āyurvedic theory and treatment procedures is probably still Jolly's *Indian Medicine*. Wujastyk's *Roots of Āyurveda* offers a good selection of translated texts pertaining to Āyurvedic principles and procedures and Guy Mazars in *La médecine indienne* (1995) gives a very concise and accessible introduction to Āyurveda. S. K. Ramachandra Rao's *Encyclopedia of Indian Medicine* deals with Āyurvedic theory in more detail. However, for an in-depth understanding of Āyurveda, the primary sources themselves, which are increasingly available in translation, are of fundamental importance.

**THE POLITICS OF ĀYURVEDA.** In 1970 the Indian parliament passed the Indian Medicine Central Council Act (IMCCA), setting up a central council for the indigenous medical systems of Āyurveda, Siddha, and Ūnānī. The council is responsible for laying down and maintaining uniform standards of education and for regulating practice in these systems. It also prescribes the standards of professional conduct and etiquette, and the code of ethics for practitioners of Indian Systems of Medicine (ISM). The IMCCA of 1973 added homeopathy to the list, changing ISM to Indian Systems of Medicine and Homeopathy (ISM&H). Yoga and naturopathy (and a number of local health traditions) are recognized as ISM by the Indian government, but do not receive the same amount of funding and also are not centrally regulated by the Indian Medicine Central Council (IMCC). Yoga was included as a research subject by the Central Council for Research in Indian Medicine and Homeopathy (CCRIM&H), founded in 1969, and naturopathy was added as a research subject in 1978, when the CCRIM&H was divided into separate councils, isolating homeopathy and Ūnānī and coupling Āyurveda with Siddha and Yoga with naturopathy. S. K. Mishra outlines these developments in his article "Āyurveda, Unani, and Siddha Systems: An Overview and Their Present Status" (2001).

Thus, with the IMCCA of 1970, the Indian government for the first time officially recognized Āyurveda, Siddha, and Ūnānī as national systems of medicine, and at the same time it centralized their administration in order to set an all-India standard. The Central Council Act was the result of a series of discussions concerning Indian health policies that were made both before and following Indian Independence in 1947. Paul Brass has pointed out in "The Politics of Āyurvedic Education" (1972) that as early as 1946 a resolution had been passed by the First Health Ministers' Conference, giving recognition to indigenous systems of medicine by recommending that practitioners trained in these systems should be utilized in federal state health programs. State responses were varied, with some giving considerable support to the indigenous systems while others ignored the health ministers' recommendation, preferring modern medicine to the traditional systems. No state government, however, declared Āyurveda or any other indigenous system as its state system of medicine.

Debates on the role and position of indigenous medical systems within Indian health policy have a long history, which is interlinked with colonial health policies on the one side and Indian nationalism on the other. Among the indigenous medical systems, Āyurveda takes the first place (followed by Ūnānī), as measured by the number of its practitioners, institutions, manufacturers, and political bodies. While the well-developed infrastructure testifies to its success, the professionalization and institutionalization of Āyurveda has been a long and troubled process. In the first third of the nineteenth century, British health and education policy started to emphasize support for the modern system of biomedicine. This resulted in the patronage of modern medical colleges and hospitals and ultimately produced a number of practitioners with a medical reputation superior to that of traditional practitioners. The direct effects of British policy on indigenous medicine, however, date to a much later period, when Indians were admitted to the biomedical colleges and health services were extended to the Indian public. To meet the competition of the new system and to show the value of their science, traditional practitioners needed to (re)define the theoretical foundations of their medical system and to formulate their professional identity. In the case of Āyurveda this meant the birth of a new era, as Āyurvedic practitioners had never before organized themselves into one uniform body. The traditional education system, which is still predominant in religious teaching and in other disciplines in India today, had been that of pupilage; that is, the passing down of knowledge from teacher to one or several pupils, from father to son, or from uncle to nephew. This led to the formation of medical lineages or schools, as famous teachers could have quite a large following.

One step toward a modernized Āyurveda, therefore, had to be a break with the educational tradition of pupilage toward an expanded college system, in order to keep up with the growing number of graduates and license holders that the biomedical colleges were producing. Another was to form a unified theory of the Āyurvedic medical system, to present as the voice of Āyurveda at a political and ideological level and to shape the curriculum of the colleges. Following the Orientalist ideology that the "purest" and most original forms of Āyurveda must be found in the oldest texts, it was widely agreed among the advocates of Āyurveda that the traditional Āyurvedic treatises offered a reasonable basis for a common identity and a unified medical system. The goal, then, was to restore and to revive the ancient tradition and its presumed past glory rather than to maintain contemporary traditional practices, which were often labeled "degenerate." Accordingly, a distinction was made between an idealized Āyurveda based on the classical texts, and traditional practice based on later texts and folk medicine. While Orientalist rhetoric may have been a major component in revivalist ideology, it would not be true to say that it was the cause of the decision to present the teachings of the classical texts as the basis of Āyurvedic theory. Traditional families of Āyurvedic practitioners had been using these texts as the

basis of their practice long before official debates on the theoretical foundations of Āyurveda started. However, Āyurvedic practitioners not only made use of the oldest treatises, but also of a multitude of texts that were composed after the classical texts. The wide publication of later Āyurvedic texts, edited from the late nineteenth century onwards by Āyurvedic scholars like Jīvananda Vidyāsāgara Bhaṭṭācārya, Jīvarāma Kālidāsa Śāstri, Dattarāma Kṛṣṇalāla Māthura, and Yādavji Trikamji Ācārya, testifies that such texts were considered important.

Modern Āyurvedists needed not only to overcome sectarian and regional differences (including language barriers and diverging religious identities) in search of a uniform identity, but were also confronted with new educational methods and technology for diagnosis and research introduced to India by the British. The dominant form of Āyurvedic education that developed from this background at the end of the nineteenth century was an integrated or concurrent education system, which included both Āyurveda and modern medical subjects in varying proportions. The basic education in modern medicine was meant to enable students to play a role in public health programs. The question of the proportional distribution of Āyurveda and modern medicine within the curriculum—that is, which system should be the main focus of education and which should be taught as the complementary system—had from the beginning been a bone of contention among the supporters of the integrated system. Furthermore, the concept of the integrated system, as such, received heavy criticism both from biomedical advocacy groups and from other factions within the Āyurvedic movement as having produced practitioners qualified in neither system of medicine. The defects of the integrated system, made apparent by recurring student strikes and low enrollment numbers, and by divisions within its support group, strengthened the case of the rivaling interest group arguing for a *śuddha* (pure) Āyurveda that would be true to its tradition and ideologically free from Western influence.

Charles Leslie has pointed out in “Interpretations of Illness: Syncretism in Modern Āyurveda” (1992) how these issues became increasingly politicized, as the Āyurvedic movement divided into two main advocacy organizations: the Āyurvedic Congress, founded in 1907 and representing the *śuddha* faction, and the Council of State Boards and Faculties of Indian Systems of Medicine, founded in 1952 as a result of a split in the Āyurvedic Congress and representing the integrated view. As a voluntary advocacy organization, the Congress was constituted of individual practitioners and of local, provincial Āyurvedic associations. Its leading personality was Pandit Shiv Sharma. The council on the other hand was a “semi-official agency, whose members include[d] the heads of the Āyurvedic Colleges, the members of the state faculties and boards of Indian medicine, and the directors of Āyurveda in the health administrations of the several states” (Brass, 1972, p. 358). The leading personalities of the

integrated system were Kaviraj Gananath Sen and later Chandragiri Dwarkanath. The council therefore represented the established educational system, which would seem to suggest it was the more powerful organization. However, the members of the Congress also had considerable political influence and powerful support in the central government. Thus, in 1962, Pandit Shiv Sharma was able to exert his influence as the appointed honorary advisor on the decisions made at the annual meeting of Central Council of Health. The resulting Vyas Committee report advised that Āyurvedic education and practice be developed on “purely ayurvedic lines, involving deep and intense study of the Classical Ayurvedic literature including its materia medica and pharmacy” and not to include “any subject of modern medicine or allied sciences in any form or language” (Brass, 1972, p. 360). Although the government of India and the state health ministers ultimately accepted the recommendations of the Vyas Committee, the implementation of the new policy did not proceed smoothly, due to inconsistent policies regarding the use of modern technology, resistance on part of the state governments, and the low enrollment numbers of students.

The debate on the educational system of Āyurveda (and of the other Indian systems of medicine) and its implementation into public health schemes is far from resolved even today. Despite all decisions from the government as recorded in the various IMCC acts, the failure of the Āyurvedists to agree among themselves on the goals to be pursued and on the appropriate standards for education, practice, and research has so far led to the inability of Āyurveda to compete with modern medicine and to fulfill its potential as a national system of medicine.

Overviews and more detailed surveys dealing with the politics and epistemological context of Āyurveda, its eminent advocates and opponents, and the modernization of traditional medical systems in general can be found in Mishra (2001); Gupta (1998); Leslie (1992, 1983, 1975, 1998a); Brass (1972); Jeffery (1988); Shankar (1995); Stepan (1983); Taylor (1998); Zimmermann (1992); Zysk (2001), and Phillips (1990).

**SEE ALSO** Health and Religion.

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DAGMAR BENNER (2005)

## HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN CHINA

In modern Western societies people tend to demarcate disciplines of healing as they divide the self: biomedicine for the body, psychology for the mind, and religion for the spirit. If the popularity of holistic alternative healing systems suggests that these categories do not sit entirely well even with modern Westerners, they are even more inadequate to China. Historically and still today in China, the management of sickness and health is rooted in different views of self, different social and institutional configurations, and different healing traditions.

**PATIENTS: DISORDERED SELVES.** Chinese sources do make distinctions not dissimilar to those of body, mind, and spirit: they speak of the body as physical form. They speak of the person's spirit, of multiple bodily spirits, and of yin and yang souls. People are known to think and to have emotions, and medical sources speak of these states as both normal functions and, when out of balance, illness. These categories, however, are subsidiary in the organization of understandings of health and treatment of disease. Medicinal therapies are ingested for ailments related to emotional excess and to the destabilization or detachment of the body's spirits. Herbal and ritual therapies are applied to prevent attack by animals as well as demons, and to treat gross bodily pathologies. Affects are not only implicated in, they are integral to both the origins and processes of bodily disorders, and to their healing. Major Chinese categories and practices distinguish four modes for imagining the healthy self, and illness as deviation from it: the *resonating* self, the *dissipating* self, the *moral* self, and the *ecological* self.

The resonating self is the mode most characteristic of Chinese canonical medicine, but it also came to powerfully shape everyday Chinese views of the body, and to contribute to nonmedical styles of healing. The core features of this physiology developed in the fourth to first centuries BCE and have remained fairly stable, albeit with elaboration and variation along the way, over the following two millennia. In this view, the person, polity, and cosmos operate as a series of nested microcosms and macrocosms according to the cyclical, dynamic, and complementary principles of yin and yang and the Five Phases. The emperor and his bureaucratic representatives stand at a critical nexus of responsibility for order in these realms. If they do not properly align their behavior to the normative cycles of the cosmos, heaven and earth resonate, producing floods, drought, and epidemics. The people resonate, straying from their socially appropriate roles, even as far as banditry and rebellion. As emperor and officials must match their policies and ritual to cosmic cycles, so must individuals harmonize their activities, whether sleep, work, diet, or sex, to the appropriate phases of the day and year. Discordant activity can produce illness.

Yin and yang and the Five Phases, then, were understood to pattern and resonate through all phenomena. From the Han period (206 BCE–220 CE) the Five Phases mapped,

for example, the seasons, directions, colors, virtues, and musical notes, as well as different aspects of physiology. The last included organ systems, sense organs, affects, the tracts (also translated *vessels* or *meridians*) through which *qi* (pronounced “chee” and also sometimes spelled *ch'i*, here vapor and vitality) flows, and nodal points along them through which *qi* might be affected (see Tables 1 and 2). Physiological patterns could be felt through the pulse, most commonly felt through three spots at the left and right wrists. Changes in one system will manifest in multiple associated registers: in changes in emotion, perception and sensation, color, smell, and discharge of bodily fluids.

In this modality, the integrity of physical structures was considered an essential precondition of health, but intervention was more concerned with alterations that occurred prior to gross corporeal change. Tracts mapped not visible anatomical structures, but felt flows of *qi*. Organs were of interest less for their size, shape, and location than as systems of function for which the physical organs might be considered substrates. Each of the Five Phases and its associated organ system is also linked to every other Phase and organ system through either a “promoting relationship,” such that it is nourished by one system and nourishes another, or a “controlling” relationship, such that it is restrained by one system and restrains another. Thus, excessive or deficient activity in one system can propagate stagnation, repleteness, and imbalance in other systems (see Table 3).

The medium of this resonance is *qi*, which could refer multivalently or in different contexts to air, vapor, breath, vitality, vitality in its yang aspect, and something akin to “the psychophysical stuff and energy” that constitutes all phenomena. Besides resonating, *qi* could also dissipate. The dissipating self was understood as being born with a full endowment of vitality, or “original *qi*,” which dissipates through the course of life. Health and longevity could be enhanced by replenishing *qi*, or by slowing its dispersal. This could be affected most commonly through ingestion of tonifying medicines, a range of “cultivating vitality” practices (see below), or by avoiding particularly *qi*-draining activities. For men, a special focus of concern was the expenditure of the most concentrated essence of yang vitality, semen, in sexual intercourse. Women were particularly vulnerable to the draining of yin vitality, blood, through menstruation.

Despite these sex-specific sources of danger, canonical medicine did not take gender as a fundamental human or medical division. Gender tended to be constructed according to social function rather than biological essence. While femininity was yin and masculinity was yang, both male and female bodies operated according to these principles and the circulation of both yin blood and yang *qi*. Women and men were not absolutely yin and yang, but contingently yin and yang in relation to each other, on a continuum rather than radically distinct. While medical texts did include separate sections on disorders related to the uniquely female functions of gestation and childbirth, it was only in the learned medi-



Yin and Yang Aspects in Physiology						
<b>Yin</b>	Inner, Outward Movement	Upper Ascent	Dorsal	<i>Qi</i> (as Yang Vitality)	Stimulation	Increase
<b>Yang</b>	Outer, Inward Movement	Lower Descent	Ventral	Blood (as Yin Vitality)	Restraint	Decrease

TABLE 1. *Illustration courtesy of the author.*

cine of the Song period (960–1279 CE) that therapies for non-gender-specific disorders came to be constructed on the basis of gender-differentiated bodies. Female physiology was set apart from male here by the dominance of blood (yin vitality) over *qi* (yang vitality), not absence of the latter. While this therapeutic distinction fell out of practice in later centuries, the approach generated attention to menstrual regulation as a basis of health and of the essential social function of fertility, concerns that continue today.

While this cosmos operates according to rationalistic principles of yin, yang, and the Five Phases, it is also both inherently moral and animated. The emperor can provoke disastrous weather and social disturbances through unrighteous behavior, not only by failing to perform rituals and enact policies that are synchronized to the phases of the cosmos. Besides cosmic resonance, the moral self can become ill in retribution for misdeeds. From the Han period, as the spirit world came to be seen as dominated by a celestial pantheon modeled on the human imperial bureaucracy, illness also came to be seen as resulting from celestially administered punishment. Aggrieved spirits could make people ill by directly attacking them, or from medieval times often through litigation in the courts of the afterlife. As in the worldly legal system, punishment could extend to family members, so that for the sources of ailments one might need to address the crimes of a forebear. With the spread of Buddhist ideas, illnesses and other misfortune could also be understood as karmic consequence for the misdeeds of a previous life.

As in most of the world's societies, the self was not conceived as a thing utterly detached from the world around it; it was permeable to and an organically integral part of its environment. The ecological self not only responds to the world through cosmic resonance, it is acted upon by agents, things, and events in its internal and external social, spiritual, and physical environments. The outer world provides nurture, but again poses threats to one's well-being, for example through the stress and violence of interpersonal conflict, improper diet, poisons, and physical attack or accidental injury.

Besides dangerous animals and people, vectors of violence included spirits and ghosts. Although ancestors, when ritually cared for, looked after their descendants, if not attended to they could punish their neglectful offspring. The pores and orifices expose the self to invasion by poisonous

substances, noxious fumes, and demons or ghosts. Prior to the twentieth century, small demonic creatures were understood as capable of infesting the body, sometimes entering as ethereal spirits but taking form within as gnawing insects or worms. With the acceptance of germ theory in the twentieth century, infecting parasites, viruses, and bacteria joined with or replaced this list of external hazards.

This ecosystem extended to the body's internal and numinously populated landscape. Han period texts describe a yin and a yang soul. After the Han, especially but not exclusively in Daoist texts, we find descriptions of three yang and seven yin souls, spirits associated with the various organ systems, and the "three corpse worms." Most of the souls and spirits of the body are responsible for its healthy function, and not unlike bureaucratic officials, can produce disorder if they do not attend to their posts properly. Dreams, often understood as the roaming of the yang soul, are considered an occasion of particular vulnerability. The three corpse worms are demonic agents that are, like the body spirits, born within the person, in this case located in the three cinnabar fields, centers of vitality located in the head, chest, and lower abdomen. These body spirits seek release from their host by his or her death, and expedite this by inciting *qi*-squandering behaviors, such as sexual indulgence, gluttony, and immoderate ambition; by conspiring with external demons to infest the person and bring about illness; and by reporting to the Celestial Jade Emperor on the person's misdeeds so that compensatory time is deducted from their allotted lifespan.

Healthy selves, then, would resonate harmoniously with a properly aligned polity and cosmos, would retain or only slowly dissipate their vitalities, would be morally upright, and would harmonize with both internal and external environments, maintaining strong relationships with good people and spirits, and avoiding dangerous people, spirits, and situations. Selves could be disordered in resonance with cosmic discord; could be weakened by draining vitalities; could face consequences for misdeeds in this or in previous lives, or even for the crimes of their forefathers; and could suffer distress or violence from within or without. These views of the self contribute to organizing approaches to health management, and inform the choices people make among healers and healers' therapeutic recommendations. These choices,

Five Phases in Physiology					
Phase	Wood	Fire	Earth	Metal	Water
<b>Field</b>					
Direction	East	South	Center	West	North
Color	Green/Blue	Red	Yellow	White	Black
Season	Spring	Summer	Mid-Summer	Autumn	Winter
Yin Organ Systems	Heart	Liver	Spleen	Lung	Kidney
Associated Tracts	Hand Lesser Yin	Foot Reverting Yin	Foot Greater Yin	Hand Greater Yin	Foot Lesser Yin
Yang Organ Systems	Small Intestine	Gallbladder	Stomach	Large Intestine	Bladder
Associated Tracts	Hand Greater Yang	Foot Lesser Yang	Foot Yang Brightness	Hand Yang Brightness	Foot Greater Yang
Affect	Joy	Anger	Cogitation	Grief	Fear
Sense Organ/Orifice	Tongue	Eyes	Mouth	Nose	Ear, Genitals, Anus

TABLE 2. Illustration courtesy of the author.

however, are also significantly shaped by social context and by available choices in healing specialists.

**PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF HEALTH MANAGEMENT.** Social contexts of health management correspond to spheres expanding from the individual to the family, community, and polity. Structuring these arenas are hierarchical relationships, such as those based on patriarchy and class.

**Self.** From the mid-fourth century BCE we have texts describing methods for cultivating vitality geared both toward slowing its dissipation and toward harmonizing it with the cosmic cycles. Practices included meditation, regulation of breath/*qi*/vitality and its circulation around the body, gymnastic movements for “guiding and pulling” *qi* in the body, retention and recirculation of seminal essence during intercourse in order to prevent the attendant loss of original *qi*, dietary restrictions, and absorption of vitalities from sexual partners or from the outside world. These practices seem to have been widespread among the Han elite, and were associated during that period with Huang-Lao, practices of the mythic figures of the Yellow Emperor and Laozi, and with the pursuit of transcendence. The descriptions of physiology developed through these practices contributed greatly to the canonical medical tradition. In later centuries, while some moderate breathing and dietary practices remained part of the elites’ repertoires of healthcare, more esoteric practice came to be associated with religious Daoists.

From the Han and continuing into the seventh or eighth centuries, Daoist cultivation included the ritual con-

coction of elixirs, the process recapitulating a reverse cosmogony in both the elixir cauldron and in the self. In later centuries, the imagery of this “external alchemy” remained a part of “internal alchemy,” cultivation of vitality primarily through breathing and visualization, without the actual production and ingestion of elixirs. This includes the cinnabar (a mercuric sulfide that also gives East Asian lacquerware its distinctive red) that also stands synecdochically for both elixir and Daoist alchemy.

While women also participated in these practices, it is only from the seventeenth century that texts describing a distinct style of cultivation geared to female physiology and for the guidance of women practitioners appear. These were written by men, and aimed in part at supporting practice by women in the home, and discouraging them from seeking guidance by leaving the home or by bringing in teachers who elite men saw as potentially corrupting. Among its distinctive characteristics, this practice aimed at “beheading the red dragon,” or stopping the menses and returning the body to a prepubescent state.

**Family, community, and state.** As in most societies, the primary locus for managing health in China was the family. The first to care for the sick were usually the adult women of the family, although especially from around the Song period elite men often also took an interest in medical learning and sometimes practiced in an amateur capacity on their friends and families. Women left their natal families upon marriage, bringing with them and exchanging with




TABLE 3. Illustration courtesy of the author.

their new families practical everyday knowledge about healthcare, including management of diet, methods of massage, herbal remedies, and avoidance of pollution or contagion. With the spread of commercial printing from the eleventh century, some of this household lore, as well as specialist medical works, made their way into publication, increasing the circulation of knowledge about health and healing.

When illnesses seemed to warrant specialist attention, the decision of whom to consult was often made in consultation with members of the extended family and local community. In the large and complex households of wealthier families, which could contain multiple generations, several subsidiary wives, and numerous servants, decision-making could involve negotiation among the preferences of competing parties. In general, elite men of late imperial times (roughly, the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries) seem to have favored the services of elite scholar-physicians, while women tended to prefer the more eclectic and hands-on ritual, massage, moxibustion, acupuncture, and also herbal and dietary treatments of female and other lower-status specialists.

Households and communities were also a basic unit for containing or repelling contagion. When someone was thought to bear a contagious illness, they might be isolated in their room, with their care charged to a specialist healer. Outsiders would avoid visiting a family or village so stricken, and in severe cases members of the family and community might flee the area, leaving the sick behind. The windows, doorways, and circumference of a household might also be ritually sealed to prevent the entrance of plague-spreading demons. Early texts contain references to annual exorcistic festivals for cleansing the community, or in some cases the

palace or capital, of demons responsible for disease. In later periods, for which more is known, other annual festivals, such as the Dragon Boat Festival, also had such apotropaic functions, and special rites could be commissioned to prevent or expel particular plagues.

Monasteries (especially from the fifth century) or local gentry (especially between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries), often with administrative help from officials, would also organize food, shelter, burial, and medical relief for the indigent during disasters. Monasteries also built hospitals with state cooperation in the eighth century. After confiscation of monastery properties in the 840s, these were shifted to state administration. In response to disasters, emperors often granted tax abatements and distributed relief on an ad hoc basis. It became more common in the Northern Song period (960–1127 CE) for officials to distribute medicines during epidemics, and later in the period state-run subsidized pharmacies and hospitals were set up in the capital and in some prefectural seats. Christian missionaries began to set up clinics and hospitals providing Western-style medical care beginning in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, the state again became the primary builder of both biomedical and Chinese medical hospitals.

While most healing, healthcare, and disease prevention has always taken place without the aid of specialist healers, extant writings tend to leave better records by and about these figures.

**HEALERS.** Disorders of different types might suggest particular healing specialties, but often a given ailment might be considered susceptible to multiple avenues of attack. Ecstatic and ritual specialists were concerned with expelling demons, with moral management and consequences, and with alignment with cosmic cycles. Canonical medical traditions were concerned primarily with patients' disharmonies and the dissipation of their vitalities, but also sought to buttress defenses against violation by external noxious agents. Experts in esoteric practices of cultivating vitality shared these concerns, good health being prerequisite to higher goals of transcendence, but additionally advised devotees in methods of alchemical refinement and transformation.

**Ecstatic and ritual healers.** Analysis of the earliest surviving written references to disease and healing, from Shang period (c. 1500–1050 BCE) oracle inscriptions, suggests that at this time, in what today is northern China, Shang royalty attributed at least some disease to the dead and to demons. They responded by communicating with and propitiating their ancestors or expelling disease demons through *wu*, often translated as "shaman" or "spirit-medium." As Chinese-writing empires spread, the ecstatic and religious healers of diverse peoples came to be identified in literature as *wu*, the once-respected term taking on senses of exoticism and derogation close to "witch doctor." While in many dynasties through history *wu* enjoyed the court's favor and high status, they came under attack from competitor physicians, from Daoists and Buddhists beginning in the third to fourth cen-

turies, from Confucian officials as early as the Han but especially in the eleventh century, from local gentry between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries, and from the state-building Nationalist and Communist governments in the twentieth century. Despite these periods of suppression, however, ecstatic healers are active in Taiwan and China today.

Priests of the Daoist religion could intervene for parishioners in illnesses produced by litigation from beyond the grave, submitting counter-petitions and countersuits on their behalf. They also guided parishioners in confessing and purifying themselves of their misdeeds, performing exorcisms and communal rituals, and providing talismans for the expulsion of evil spirits for pasting on doorways or for ingesting.

Whereas Daoist cultivation tended to take the health of the whole self, including the physical body, as a precondition for soteriological goals, Buddhists took the illusory nature of the phenomenal world, including bodily illness, as a central tenet. The rigors of monastic practice in fact were known to be hard on health. On the other hand, Buddhists taught compassionate concern for the suffering of others, and introduced new therapeutic and institutional approaches to the treatment of illness. The idea of karmic causality and the provision of medical and disaster relief were mentioned above. Buddhist missionaries introduced South Asian drugs and therapies, including cataract surgery, to China. Buddhists also introduced practices that were applied to prevent or treat illness, including *mudrās* and *mantras*, new types of incantations and rituals, and new approaches to meditation. Certain South Asian ideas about illness, such as the Four Elements, also occasionally appear in Chinese medical texts, notably Sun Simiao's (581–c. 682) *Beiji qianjin yaofang* (Essential prescriptions worth a thousand in gold for preparing for emergencies). Over the long term, however, these do not seem to have fundamentally reshaped Chinese medical approaches to etiology, nosology, diagnosis, or therapeutics.

**Drug sellers.** From at least the Han we also have records of specialized drug sellers. They were sometimes associated with Daoist transcendents, and drugs were stored in gourds or gourd-shaped containers, an image of primordial chaos in Daoism. With the expansion of commerce from the eleventh century, commercial pharmacies and itinerant drug sellers became more widely available as sources of both medicines and medical advice.

**Hereditary doctors, scholar-physicians, and specialists.** The fourth to first centuries BCE saw the emergence of literate medical practitioners who distinguished themselves from other healers with the development of distinctive textual traditions and practices based on the cosmologically resonating and vitality-dissipating models of physiology developed at the same time by cultivating vitality practitioners. They did not, however, entirely eschew ritual therapies or demonic views of disease.

These physicians tended to pass their knowledge and texts to sons or to duly recommended outsiders deemed wor-

thy. Although literate, these were not those family lines with access to the highest levels of office. In the late tenth and eleventh centuries, however, expansion of imperial involvement in producing and disseminating medical texts and in medical relief raised the status of medicine. The period also saw increased socializing between literati and physicians, and literati and official compilation and publication of prescription texts. Between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, as office became accessible to a larger and more fluid stratum and chances of actual attainment to this coveted status became increasingly rare, pursuit of medicine as avocation and eventually occupation became a socially accepted alternative for elites. Reacting both to the more eclectic practices of hereditary physicians and to the standardized prescriptions of eleventh-century official relief efforts, these scholar-physicians developed styles of medicine based more strictly on canonical texts, such as the *Inner Canon of the Yellow Emperor* (second to first century BCE), and followed more individualized and dynamic approaches to diagnosis and treatment. They focused on the treatment of underlying physiological conditions rather than “superficial” manifestations, and they might, for example, leave the treatment of lumps or lesions to specialists in external medicine. Scholar-physicians employed complex and individually tailored herbal prescriptions, eschewing those therapies that were considered both less subtle and less suitable to their social standing, such as acupuncture, moxibustion, and massage.

These therapies became the preserve of lower-status healers. Besides specialists in particular diseases or therapies, these included shamans, diviners, and other religious figures; itinerant healers; and in general female healers and midwives. Ironically, the stricter segregation of genders in the late imperial period increased demand for female experts. Besides those who practiced a more eclectic mix of skills, female physicians who were trained in their family's hereditary learned medicine also practiced in elite circles, including at court.

In the twentieth century, as “modernity” and “science” came to be broadly valued in China, and as a result of nation-building efforts and anxiety about Chinese culture, indigenous healing practices came under attack as “superstitious.” Both in order to stave off threats to their legitimacy and to make their practices more modern, practitioners experimented with different approaches to reforming Chinese medicine: mapping tracts and disorders onto Western-style anatomical structures and biomedical disease categories; dropping minor surgery from the repertoire of what we know as acupuncture; emphasizing aspects of the tradition that resembled biomedicine in some way; shedding the more elaborate cosmological frameworks; emphasizing the empirical foundations of Chinese medicine; integrating Chinese and Western medical practices; and asserting the scientific legitimacy of a newly emphasized “differentiation of manifestation types” in opposition to Western “distinguishing of diseases.”

For a time it was anticipated that these modern transformations, confusingly referred to as *traditional Chinese medi-*

*cine*, would leave these traditions completely subsumed under biomedical paradigms. The utility of acupuncture would be disproved or explained in relation to nerves and the endocrine system. The active components of individual herbs would be isolated and their efficacy would be identified by biomedical procedures. Complex diagnoses and herbal prescriptions would be eliminated. Instead, the styles of Chinese medicine have proliferated with the revival of respect for the virtuosity of older masters, with the increasing popularity of “complementary and alternative medicine” around the world, and with variations brought about by attempts to adapt Chinese styles of healing to diverse environments. Attempts to test the efficacy of Chinese medical systems in randomized trials have been stymied by their very diversity, by the individual tailoring of much practice, and by the failure of attempts to map Chinese onto biomedical physiology or diagnoses.

Health and illness in China must be understood in relation to Chinese understandings of self. Their management is shaped both by the social context of care, and by the available range of healing resources. While institutions of the last century have tended to support the separation of biomedicine from Chinese medicine, and the dominance of the former and standardizing of the latter, the preferences of both healthcare consumers and providers for eclecticism have kept multiple indigenous traditions alive and changing.

SEE ALSO Chinese Religion; Qi.

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TJ HINRICHS (2005)

#### HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN TIBET

Premodern Tibetan ideas about healing and medicine, like those of other Buddhist societies of Asia, derived from disparate sources. These included local versions of widespread Asian concepts regarding spirit-causation of illness and soul-loss, Indian and Chinese-derived ideas about good fortune and astrological influences, the various major medical traditions of Asia (Āyurvedic, Islamic, and Chinese), and Buddhism itself, with its understandings of the suffering implicit in life within the universe of cyclic existence (*samsāra*) and its body of ritual techniques to relieve that suffering and promote the well-being of its followers. A range of discourses and approaches arose from these various sources and these underlie both popular and elite understandings of illness and healing. This entry covers healing specialists; spirit causation of illness; life-force, soul, well-being, and related concepts; astrology; the Tibetan medical tradition; Buddhist Tantric medicine; Buddhist attitudes toward illness; death and dying; and the effects of modernity.

**HEALING SPECIALISTS.** Depending on how a particular illness is understood, Tibetans may approach a traditional Tibetan doctor (*a mchi*), a folk shaman, spirit-medium or other folk diviner (*lha pa*, *dpa' bo*, *mkha' 'gro ma*, etc.), or a lama (*bla ma*) for assistance. Traditional Tibetan doctors practice a humorally-based medical system closely related to the Indian Āyurvedic medicine. Shamans or spirit-mediums are men or women who act as mediums through which local gods communicate; some also perform folk rituals of healing. Lamas may be monks or lay people but are almost always male. They belong to one of the four main Buddhist traditions or to the Bon tradition, which claims pre-Buddhist origins but is in most respects similar to the Buddhist traditions. All five traditions possess a similar range of divinatory techniques and ritual countermeasures, mostly deriving from the Tantric (Vajrayāna) Buddhism of India. Patients may also try more than one kind of practitioner, and in the contemporary situation both in the People's Republic of China and among Tibetan refugees such medical pluralism is extended to include Western-style biomedicine.

**SPIRIT CAUSATION OF ILLNESS.** Illness can be caused by spirits, typically local deities who have taken offense at some unintentional action. Thus a class of spirits living in streams or trees (*klu*, equated by Tibetan scholars to the Indian *nāga*) may cause boils, skin diseases, or leprosy if their homes are dirtied or polluted, while another class of spirits (*gza'*, equated with Sanskrit *grāha*) cause strokes and partial paralysis if offended. In many such cases, Tibetans will recognize from



the nature of the complaint the kind of spirit involved. A lama or spirit-medium may be consulted to discover the nature of the offense and the best approach for remedy. The remedy may include purificatory actions using empowered water and other consecrated substances, avoiding “dirty” foods, and making offerings to the offended spirit.

**LIFE-FORCE, SOUL, WELL-BEING, AND RELATED CONCEPTS.** A series of folk concepts (*dbang thang*, *rlung rta*) refer to various aspects of health, vitality, well-being, and good fortune. These can be strong or weak, and their loss can threaten illness, misfortune, or death. Probably the most significant of these is *bla*, and Tibetan ideas regarding the loss of *bla* parallel those found in many of the neighboring Himalayan and Southeast Asian peoples (e.g., Thai *khwan*). As elsewhere, there are ritual techniques to recall the *bla* and reintegrate it with the body, and both lamas and the idea that the vitality or “soul” (*bla*) of the human organism may be lost or scattered. Both lamas and spirit-mediums can perform rituals to recover the lost “soul” in cases where illness is attributed to such sources.

Other personal qualities (*tshe* or life-span, *dbang thang* or personal power, etc.) can also be partially or wholly lost. Such loss may be due to spiritual contamination (*grib*) resulting from contact with polluting situations such as death or childbirth. It can also be due to the action of witches or sorcerers. Ideas of loss of health or vitality shade into concepts of spirit-attack, since a weakened vitality can leave a person open to such attack. An important function of the lamas, dramatized in particular through major monastic ritual festivals attended by the local lay community, is to defend the community against spirit-attack. They also maintain the strength and vitality of the community through life-empowerment (*tshe sgrub*) rituals on these and other occasions. Rituals to maintain or recover good fortune may be performed by lay people or lamas.

**ASTROLOGY.** Tibetan astrology derives from both Indian (*dkar rtsis*) and Chinese (*nag rtsis*) sources. The Chinese system, also known as *'byung rtsis* or elemental astrology, is based on the daily variation of five personal quantities in astrologically determined cycles, which are correlated with the five elements (iron, wood, water, fire, air) and the Chinese twelve-animal cycle. The five quantities are *bla* (life-force), *srog* (vitality), *dbang thang* (strength or personal power), *rlung rta* (good fortune), and *lus* (bodily force); *'byung rtsis* can be regarded as a systematized version of folk ideas regarding soul-loss, and good and bad fortune. Printed almanacs, which trace the variation of these quantities and predict good and bad days for various activities, are popularly available.

**THE TIBETAN MEDICAL TRADITION (A MCHI MEDICINE).** The principal textual basis for the Tibetan medical tradition is the *Rgyud bzhi* (Four medical Tantras), which was probably compiled in the eleventh century by the famous physician G'yu thog Yon tan Mgon po [Yut'ok Yönten Gonpo] (1112–1203). While the framework of this text is a dialogue between emanations of the medicine buddha Bhaiṣajyaguru,

large parts of the content are adapted from the Tibetan translation of a well-known Āyurvedic text, the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasambhitā* of Vāgbhata. Other sections indicate borrowings from Chinese and perhaps also Islamic medicine, as well as indigenous Tibetan developments. An alternative textual tradition associated with the Tibetan Bon religion varies only in details.

A series of commentaries were composed to the *Rgyud bzhi*, of which the best-known is the *Vaidūrya sngon po* (Blue beryl) by Sangs rgyas Rgya mtsho (Sanggye Gyats'o; 1653–1705), *sde srid* or regent to the fifth Dalai Lama. A substantial literature of other medical works has also been written by Tibetan doctors and scholars.

Sde srid Sangs rgyas Rgya mtsho was also responsible for the foundation in 1696 of the main Tibetan medical college, named Lcags po ri (Chakpori) after the hill in Lhasa where it was situated. A second college, the Sman-rtsis-khang, was founded in Lhasa by the thirteenth Dalai Lama in the early twentieth century, and the *Rgyud bzhi* system is now taught in more or less modernized versions by training institutions in Chinese-controlled Tibet and among the refugees, as well as in Europe and the United States. There are also many local versions of the Tibetan medical tradition, often passed down hereditarily, also for the most part derived from the *Rgyud bzhi*. Doctors may be lay people or monks. In the past, they were almost all men, but there have been some notable women doctors in recent years, and the profession is becoming increasingly open to women.

The *Rgyud bzhi* texts have been widely studied in the West, often in conjunction with the works of Sde srid Sangs rgyas Rgya mtsho, and many Western presentations of Tibetan medicine are little more than paraphrases of these texts. This material, however, does not necessarily relate closely to current medical practice. While memorizing all or part of the *Rgyud bzhi* remains central to the training process, other texts are also studied, and doctors undoubtedly acquire much of their knowledge and clinical expertise through subsequent apprenticeship with a practicing doctor.

The Tibetan medical tradition today employs the three Āyurvedic *doṣa* or “humors” (*nyes pa*) as basic theoretical and diagnostic categories. The three *nyes pa* are *rlung* (wind; Skt., *vāta*), *mkhris pa* (bile; Skt., *pitta*), and *bad kan* (phlegm; Skt., *kapha*). Thus illness can be understood in terms of one or more of these *nyes pa*, which are residues of the ongoing processes of bodily existence, being present in excessive or inappropriate quantity. The *Rgyud bzhi*'s opening sections link the *nyes pa* to the three poisons of samsaric existence (ignorance, desire, and hatred), thus providing a Buddhist foundation to Tibetan medical theory. The importance of the *nyes pa* can nevertheless be exaggerated. In practice, much of Tibetan medicine operates in terms of the identification of one or another named illness category, each corresponding to a specific mode of treatment, rather than on restoring the system as whole to a state of balance. Diagnosis employs examination of pulse and urine, as well as observation. Pills (*ril bu*),

made of complex compounds of substances of herbal, mineral, and animal origins, are used for healing. Use is also made of diet, and of techniques of cupping and moxibustion.

**BUDDHIST TANTRIC MEDICINE AND DIVINATION.** Tantric (Vajrayāna) Buddhism in Tibet, while centered on the achievement of buddhahood, includes a wide variety of ritual techniques to bring about this-worldly results. In some of these, lamas mediate the powers of Tantric healing or long-life deities (such as Bhaiṣajyaguru, Amitāyus, and White Tārā), conferring healing power on lay followers directly or through empowered substances, often pills (*ril bu*) similar to those used in *a mchi* medicine. Life-empowerment rituals of this kind were regularly performed by most major Tibetan monasteries, forming part of annual community festivals. Consecrated substances, empowered water, and the like are still widely used in cases of illness. They may also be used prophylactically in situations of perceived risk (for example, the selling of sweaters by Tibetan refugees on dirty, polluted Indian streets). Situations of *grib* (pollution, spiritual contamination) may arise from a variety of causes and will often be countered through the use of empowered substances.

Other Vajrayāna techniques derive from the alchemical traditions of eighth- to twelfth-century India, which were closely linked with Tantric Buddhism. In these, complex medical compounds are prepared and further empowered through Tantric ritual. These “precious pills” (*rin chen ril bu*) are expensive, highly valued, and frequently used by lay people either on the recommendation of a lama or *a mchi* or on their own initiative. Ideally, they are taken under ritually-prescribed conditions and accompanied by prayers and *mantra* recitation.

Lamas also have an important role as diviners, again using techniques derived in part from Vajrayāna sources. Divinations (*mo*) are frequently sought in cases of illness in order to ascertain the most appropriate mode of treatment. Other health choices (e.g., the most suitable location for childbirth) may also be made by recourse to divination. In addition, some lay people have a reputation as diviners, and spirit-mediums can also be asked for divination.

**BUDDHIST ATTITUDES TOWARD ILLNESS.** Beyond all this, we can ask about the effects of Buddhist teachings on popular attitudes toward illness and health. Suffering and the transitoriness of life are central themes for Buddhism in Tibet as elsewhere. As in other Buddhist countries, however, most Buddhists in Tibet regard the attainment of Buddhist enlightenment as beyond their reach, at least in their present lives, so lay Buddhist religious practice is focused mainly on future lives and on the performance of morally positive actions that will lead to a good rebirth in the future.

Lay Tibetans are also interested in this-worldly success and prosperity, and this is largely the domain of the various regional and local deities (Yul lha, Sa bdag, Klu, etc). Much lay ritual, such as the widely practiced *bsangs*, fire-offerings of fragrant wood, herbs, milk, butter, yogurt, etc., are directed towards these local gods. Vajrayāna Buddhist ritual tech-

niques give the lamas control over the local gods and spirits, providing the basis of the Buddhist role in village affairs. However, the Buddhist stress on the illusory nature of apparent reality and the inevitability of suffering within *samsāra* undoubtedly serves to relativize Tibetans' attractions to this-worldly matters. As David Lichter and Lawrence Epstein (1983) have noted, most Tibetans look for worldly success but maintain a “slightly ironic detachment” from a happiness that is at best impermanent.

Death and dying are particularly associated with Buddhism, and a consideration of healing should perhaps also encompass how terminal illness is dealt with. The *Bar do thos grol* (*Tibetan Book of the Dead*) texts have become well known in the West, and provide a liturgy based on guiding the consciousness of the dead person through the after-death states. Equally or more significant are the *'pho ba* practices, which are aimed at achieving rebirth in a buddha realm (usually that of Amitābha) at the time of death. These techniques, which have received little study from Western scholars, are often taught nowadays to lay people, and offer dying people a way of dealing positively with the final moments of life.

**THE EFFECTS OF MODERNITY.** The various discourses and modes of healing discussed above were never separate, hermetically sealed modes of explanation. They overlapped and intersected in a variety of ways and continue to do so today. Thus *grib*, spirit attack, and soul loss are not always separable categories, and a particular illness may be dealt with by a combination of *a mchi* medicine, Tantric purificatory rituals, and spirit-medium consultations. In Chinese-controlled Tibet, in traditionally Tibetan areas of Indian and Nepal, and among Tibetan refugees, traditional Tibetan approaches to healing continue to be used situationally, often in combination with ideas from Western medicine (usually known among Tibetans in South Asia as *rgya gar sman*, literally “Indian medicine”).

**SEE ALSO** Āyurveda; Tibetan Religions, overview article.

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## HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN JAPAN

This article is confined to healing and medicine among the Japanese. For lack of space, no specific discussion on minorities in Japan, such as the Ainu, Koreans, Chinese, and Okinawans, is included. Neither is the vast variation in practices among the Japanese specifically addressed. Excluded are the medical dimensions of the so-called new religions (*shinkō*), shamanism, and ancestor worship. Numerous new religions mushroomed in Japan after World War II. Although they have many adherents and health-related matters often occupy a central place in their beliefs and practices, their role in health care is limited to their memberships. Once a powerful nonformalized religion in Japan, shamanism used to play a significant role in the health care of the people, but much of it has now been transformed and absorbed into new religions. Consequently, its importance for the general public has been significantly reduced. So-called ancestor worship remains perhaps the most important aspect of the religiosity of contemporary Japanese, including urbanites, regardless of

class. However, the role of ancestors is to look after the living in very general and diffused ways and thus it is not covered here.

**MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE NOTION OF HEALTH/ILLNESS/HEALING.** Several major concepts that characterize the notions of health, illness, and healing are: health as an ephemeral state; the importance of the notion of balance, with imbalance leading to illness; the principle of purity (health/balance) and impurity (illness/imbalance); and the importance of the intactness of the body.

Upon birth, one receives a body with all its weaknesses, including one's *taishitsu*, "inborn constitution," and *jibyō*, a chronic illness one is born with. The most commonly recognized *taishitsu* are "strong" (*jōbu*); "ordinary" (*futsu'u*); "weak" (*kyojaku*); "nonenergetic and constitutionally susceptible to illness" (*senbyōshitsu*); "very weak" (*horyūshitsu*); and "extra-sensitive" (*shinkeishitsu*). Others referring only to somatic characteristics of a particular body part include "chilling disposition" (feeling of chill in the stomach and the legs), "tendency to get tired easily," and others.

*Jibyō* means an illness or illnesses that a person carries throughout life and suffers at some times more acutely than at others. The word is written in two characters, the first one meaning "carrying" and the second one "illness." Common *jibyō* are rheumatism (*ryūmachi*), "weak stomach" (*ijaku*), "descended stomach" (*ikasui*), gastritis (*ikeiren*), excess stomach acid (*isankata*), and high/low blood pressure.

Many Japanese are quite aware of their own *taishitsu* and *jibyō*. Parents are especially keen on being watchful over their offspring's departures from health by, for example, not allowing a child with weak *taishitsu* to exert him- or herself. One nurtures the body given at birth rather than trying to conquer and alter it, while constantly monitoring minute fluctuations of the body. Even with the diffusion of jogging and other health care practices from the United States, perfect health is seen as ephemeral and ordinary health is a condition that fluctuates.

This fluctuation is caused by an ever fluid system of bodily balance and imbalance, the latter inviting an illness to take over the body, as further detailed in the section on *kampō*. Bodily imbalance is a state of impurity, whereas its balance/health is assigned the value of purity. The purity/impurity opposition is an important principle that governs daily hygiene and notions of health and illness, as well as contemporary practices of shrines and temples.

Some of the most important early socialization training for Japanese children is to take their shoes off, wash their hands, and, in some families, gargle when they come into the house from outside. The Japanese explain this custom by stating that one gets dirty from germs outside. Although the concept is expressed as "germs" in biomedical terms, it is the symbolic association of the spatial "outside" with culturally defined "dirt." To keep oneself clean and healthy "inside" one's living quarters, one must get rid of this dirt through



cleaning/purification of impurity. Thus, even after Western-style housing, including apartments, were introduced, all homes have a *genkan*, a square or rectangular space at the entrance where people take their shoes off. Many overseas Japanese continue to adhere to this practice wherever they go. The “inside” includes seats on taxis, trains, and buses, where children must take their shoes off if they wish to sit to look out the window. The strikingly white starched covers on the seat of taxis and bullet trains are a symbolic expression of “inside,” and people are expected to treat them as such.

That the welfare of the body is essential to the welfare of the soul is clearly expressed in the two most important and interrelated characteristics of the Japanese concept of the body: the intactness of the body (*gotai*) and nonviolence to the body. Together these notions lead to the Japanese emphasis on the “natural” state of the body or the “natural” course of life.

**PLURALISTIC SYSTEM OF MEDICINE AND HEALING IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN.** The perspective taken in this article is the folk perspective of everyday health care rather than the institutional or doctrinal perspective of Shintoism and Buddhism—two major institutional religions of Japan. The major characteristic of the Japanese system of medicine and healing is that it is pluralistic. The system includes: *kampō* (the Japanese system of healing with Chinese origin), healing at the religious institutions of shrines (Shintoism) and temples (Buddhism), and biomedicine, of which only the first two are introduced here because they are embedded in religions and the worldview of the Japanese. Their peaceful coexistence, as it were, is striking, since in terms of their basic premise they are contradictory to each other. In addition, despite their basic differences, each absorbed others so that biomedical health care makes room for *kampō* and religious elements. It is the people who adopted these different systems and somehow made them into their own and use all of them simultaneously.

**CHINESE-DERIVED JAPANESE HEALING: *KAMPŌ*.** As with other humoral medicines, traditional Chinese medicine is based on “a system of correspondence,” rather than “a system of causation,” which characterizes biomedicine. For the Japanese traditional medicine of *kampō*, derived from Chinese medicine, the basic premise of medical treatment is restoration of the balance of the body, which then would remove etiologial conditions and therefore pathogens as well. Its basic premise, therefore, is very similar to the Japanese folk’s understanding of health, illness, and healing.

Given the premise, then, treatment is not aimed directly at removing the pathogen, and thus surgery is the polar opposite of the notion of treatment and is actually seen to further aggravate the body’s imbalance. Therefore, despite the prestige and glory accorded biomedicine in Japan, the Japanese have been quite cautious and selective about adopting surgery. For the Japanese, who avoid going outside after taking a bath so as not to shock the body by the cold air and who have not practiced body mutilations for aesthetic pur-

poses (until recently, under American influence), surgery is an extreme form of violence to the body, although its popularity has rapidly increased in the last couple of decades. The enormous hesitancy of the Japanese to adopt organ transplantation relates to this aversion to violence to the body, as well as to the importance they place upon the intactness of the body, both for the living and for the dead; peaceful afterlife is predicated upon the intactness of the body of the deceased.

In contemporary Japan *kampō* comes in all shades, from orthodox practice to mass-produced and prepackaged extracts of herbs to street-corner computer diagnoses. The orthodox *kampō* practice today is a medicinal system developed in Japan after its introduction from China. In a radical departure from biomedicine, *kampō* does not recognize categories of illness. Diagnosis does not consist of labeling the illness. Each departure from health is diagnosed on the basis of the combined total of symptoms the patient experiences and those the *kampō* doctor detects. The sum total, called *shōkōgun*, is carefully evaluated against the sex, age, and constitution of the patient and the climate in which the patient resides in order to reach a proper prescription for treatment. A *kampō* doctor, using auditory, tactile, olfactory, and visual faculties in reading the patient’s condition, prescribes a specific treatment. Its treatment consists of moxibustion (burning of the cones of dried young mugwort leaves), acupuncture, and herbal and animal medicine. In the case of herbs, it is a mixture consisting of a dozen or so, which the patient brews in an earthen kettle for a long time and drinks. Every patient therefore has a unique illness and requires a unique set of treatments.

Even though the American Occupational Forces prohibited moxibustion and acupuncture at the end of the World War II and they went underground, in contemporary Japan not only has *kampō* become enormously popular among laypeople but also the government has supported this system of medicine by financially supporting research in *kampō* and gradually adding *kampō* treatments under health insurance coverage. It exists in a symbiotic mode with biomedicine in that it specializes in chronic illnesses, especially those accompanied by chronic pain; new types of illnesses, including gerontological illnesses; and illnesses resulting from environmental pollution and traffic and industrial accidents, none of which biomedicine has been successful in treating. Its popularity is also in part the result of reaction to the negative side effects of biomedicine.

**RELIGIOUS HEALING: THE ROLE OF TEMPLES AND SHRINES IN HEALTH CARE.** Except for native Shintoism, other religions were introduced from abroad: Buddhism from India via Central Asia, China, and Korea; Confucianism, Daoism, and several other religions from China; and Korean shamanism. These religions have permeated the daily lives of the Japanese; they have become part of their customs without requiring any psychological commitment on the part of the individual to any one of them. Most Japanese subscribe to

more than one religion, often without consciously realizing it. They go through Shintō rituals related to life, such as births and marriages, but most funerals and the rituals related to the deceased are Buddhist. The annual statistics on Japanese religious affiliation consistently list the total membership in various religious organizations as one and a half times the total population of Japan. In other words, over half of the people in Japan belong to more than one religious organization.

The current popularity of temples and shrines in Japan is phenomenal and in fact has been increasing for some time. Many temples and shrines throughout Japan attract literally millions of people a year for a number of reasons, including pure tourism. They go to these religious institutions by tour buses, with friends and families, or alone. Temples and shrines provide healing of illness, promotion of the general welfare of the people, or promise of the fulfillment of wishes.

**Healing of illnesses.** Some temples and shrines are known for their efficacious administration of moxibustion or acupuncture so that it is hard to draw a line between *kampō* and healing at these religious institutions. On the other hand, people go to most of these institutions to purchase amulets and talismans that are thought to have healing power, and they write their prayers/wishes on votive plaques.

Some of these institutions are so popular that bus companies operate regular tour buses that take people to them. The tours for older people target temples and shrines that specialize in illnesses of older people, such as strokes and hemorrhoids. On the other hand, medical and other uses of temples and shrines are by no means confined to the aged. With an increase in the cancer rate, those that specialize in the cure of cancer are visited by people of all walks of life and of all ages. For example, the deity enshrined at Ishikiri Shrine to the northeast of Osaka used to be good for various kinds of boils and growths, but its major appeal at present is its efficacy in treating cancer. Visitors here are not confined to the aged, although young people are fewer because cancer afflicts mostly older people.

A number of temples and shrines are known for their power to guarantee safe and easy childbirth and illnesses related to childbirth, which is not considered illness in itself. A brief description of Nakayama-dera near Osaka shows the role of religion among people in their day-to-day lives. The major hall (*bondō*) of the temple is situated on top of a hill and flanked by numerous *jizō*, the guardian buddha of children, on the hillside. On both sides of this central pathway are separate temples enshrining various buddhas, each specializing in a certain function. One is a temple that specializes in success in the university entrance examination. Another temple enshrines a buddha who specializes in taking care of infants who have temper tantrums, do not sleep, cry at night, or are constitutionally very weak. Another temple, which bears a sign in front for traffic safety and the naming of newborn infants, also houses *Mizuko Jizō* (the *jizō* buddha for aborted fetuses). Inside this temple are many *jizō* for

aborted fetuses, and numerous votive plaques are hung on two wooden structures. Often apologies, such as “Please forgive me/us,” are written and signed by the mother or by the couple. “Please sleep peacefully” is another common prayer on these plaques.

At the top of the hill, in front of the main hall, is a large metal incense burner. People buy bundles of incense, light them, and place them in the burner; many then “scoop” up the smoke with a hand and bring it onto an ailing part, such as the hip, to apply its “healing power.” Visitors, especially women with infants, also purchase white bibs, write prayers and their names and addresses on them, and hang them on a stake around the buddha in front of the main hall. The main hall itself houses two offices. On the right side is a small office where the temple employees sell sashes. Many pregnant women in Japan continue to wear the traditional long white sash (*iwata obi*) over the stomach during pregnancy. After purchasing a sash, a woman would ask the priest of the temple to write a *sūtra* on it. They then take it to their biomedical obstetrician, who writes a character for happiness in red on the sash. On the left is another small office where used sashes must be returned.

The composition of visitors to Nakayama Temple also reflects the complex human network involved in childbirth. Although pregnant women and mothers with young children comprise the core of the visitors, many are accompanied by older women and sometimes by older men. A number of women are accompanied by their husbands, reflecting the recently increased emphasis on the conjugal bond and the nuclear family.

The central focus of the temple is childbirth and matters related to infancy, including easy and safe delivery, the healthy growth of children, and memorial services for aborted fetuses. The temple has long served also as a place for the *shichigo-san* celebration—a celebration marked by a visit to a shrine, usually on November 15, when a child is three, five, and seven years old (*shichigo-san* means seven, five, and three).

**General welfare and prayers for wishes.** Young people may go to temples and shrines less for illnesses than for other reasons; most common are success in entrance examinations and luck in finding a boy- or girlfriend. These wishes are written on votive plaques and hung on a wooden structure provided for them. Similarly, with a strong emphasis on school trips in Japanese schools, one often sees school tours at temples and shrines, with elementary, middle, and high school students flocking to buy amulets, charms, and other souvenirs for themselves and for their families. The youngsters today hang the amulets and charms for protection from traffic accidents on their knapsacks or pocketbooks, just as every taxi and private car, even those driven by young people, has an amulet for traffic safety hanging from the rearview mirror.

One of the most popular uses of shrines and temples in contemporary Japan is for the purification of automobiles on



New Year's Day. With the rapid increase in private car ownership, "my car"—a term borrowed from English and pronounced in Japanese as "mai ka"—is both a popular word and a symbol of a new way of life, symbolizing the new emphasis on nuclear families and the image of young parents with strong conjugal bonds, contrary to the image of the traditional extended family. Despite the modern image of these "my car" owners, who are usually young or middle-aged, all flock to shrines and temples on New Year's Day to have their cars purified. This is the time when the Japanese engage in all sorts of activities to get rid of impurity accumulated during the past year, but the purification of "my car" is a new addition. The purification service includes a purification rite, a prayer, amulets, and bumper stickers. The service has become so profitable for temples and shrines that some of them have constructed extra parking space and other facilities to accommodate "mass" purification rites.

**Goriyaku: "Occupational specializations" of deities and buddhas.** To the Japanese, perhaps the most meaningful feature of the multitude of deities, buddhas, and other supernaturals is their *goriyaku*—the benevolent functions they perform. The lives and fates of these deities do indeed reflect the major concerns of people of the time. Outmoded specializations are often discarded or transformed into new, more meaningful roles. The roles related to childbirth, child welfare, and general matters of illness and health comprise over half of the specializations of temples and shrines in general, indicating that these are perennial concerns of the people. In contrast, functions related to calamities, including traffic accidents, are much fewer in number, and their nature changes over time. For example, natural disasters and fire were major concerns in the past and were reflected in the specializations of deities and buddhas at the time. Contemporary Japanese seem to place more emphasis on luck and success in life. Of paramount importance in the past, the deity of smallpox is no longer meaningful in contemporary Japan, and its function had been expanded to incorporate contagious diseases in general. Likewise, the Deity of Coughing was originally a very popular deity when influenza was a major threat. Since influenza is better controlled in contemporary Japan, the deity is now also consulted for chronic respiratory illnesses, including asthma.

**SUMMARY.** The roles played by religions in contemporary Japan offer an example of how religions remain important in people's lives, including the young, in contrast to a view of unilinear "progression" in which religion is replaced by science. Japan's case is by no means unique, as Americans remain profoundly religious, though not in the same way the Japanese are, and in many postindustrial European countries, such as France and Italy, folk religions—religions as practiced by the folk—remain important in their medicine and healing.

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EMIKO OHNUKI-TIERNEY (2005)

#### HEALING AND MEDICINE: HEALING AND MEDICINE IN INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIA

The indigenous peoples of Australia, the Australian Aborigines, settled the continent more than forty thousand years ago, with some archaeological estimates placing their occupancy at well over fifty thousand years ago. It is most likely that their forebears crossed from Southeast Asia during the Pleistocene period, coming first to the northwest coast and migrating south and east. By the time European explorers and then settlers arrived on Australia's shores in the late eighteenth century, Aboriginal societies, although sharing an economy based on hunting and food gathering, were linguistically and culturally diverse, living across the continent in environments of distinctive ecology and climate. These ranged from inland desert to tropical and temperate coastal zones and alpine regions. Although self-contained for most purposes, neighboring clans gathered for major ceremonies, and localized tribal groupings participated in the trade of goods (such as stone tools, pearl shell, and native tobacco) across hundreds, sometimes thousands, of kilometers.

The health of Aborigines in precolonial times can only be extrapolated from the descriptions of early explorers, settlers, and missionaries, and from knowledge of the traditional diet and lifestyle. It is generally accepted that individuals

were in good health, lean and fit, and that the greatest risks lay in periods of famine, accidents, drownings, fighting between clans, childbirth, predation (by, for instance, sharks or crocodiles), bites by poisonous snakes and spiders, and such diseases or conditions as treponematosi, arthritis, congenital malformations, and some cancers (Webb, 1995). In this context, despite a richly differentiated suite of about 250 languages and local cultural and religious traditions, broadly similar systems of indigenous medical practice and belief—again with local elaboration and variation—developed across the continent and Tasmania.

There are few written descriptions of Australian indigenous concepts of health, what it means, or how it can be maintained. Greater emphasis is given to the causes and treatment of illness. The Kukatja of the Western Desert, as described by Anthony Peile (1997, p. 130), hold that health, in the popular sense, consists of the body being “cold” and “dry,” and, in the spiritual sense, of having the spirit in the area of the navel and the stomach. Such a feeling of “cold” is different from coldness caused by wind, sickness, or sorcery, which makes a person’s spirit shiver. Several authors document ideas of health as encompassing the person and his or her spiritual well-being and home country. Health is also characterized by strength, happiness, and “safety,” in the sense of obeying the laws of the community and being cared for (Mobbs, 1991). In an urban setting ideas of fitness, bright eyes, shiny hair, cheerfulness, looking after one self, and not drinking too much alcohol are all expressed as qualities of a healthy person (Nathan, 1980).

The attributed causes of illness and injury had parallel modes of treatment and response, based primarily on symptoms and severity. All maladies except death by old age or in early infancy were interpreted as the consequence of breaches of social or religious proscriptions and commandments. The women of each language group were the primary keepers of extensive traditional pharmacopoeia—or in English, “bush medicines”—employed to treat identifiable symptoms or injuries that responded to herbal treatment. It is likely that in all communities there were spiritual healers. They were generally men, if the written reports are taken as representative. Their skills were engaged where herbal and other “natural” treatments did not work, or when the causes of the condition were thought to be supernatural in origin, be they malign or angry spirits or human sorcerers able to draw upon extra-human powers.

Almost all premature deaths would have been, and still are in many communities, subject to forensic speculation and inquiry about the cause, the responsible persons or agents, the reasons, and in some cases the appropriate retribution. Each of these domains of illness, bodily harm, healing, and explanation, although diverse and complex, have been described in journals and ethnographies from the late eighteenth century onwards.

**SORCERY.** The figure of the skilled and secretive human sorcerer remains ubiquitous across Aboriginal communities in

the Central Desert and tropical north of Australia, where indigenous language, religion, and concepts of being are still strongly held. These are the communities that were least affected by what many now describe as the invasion and appropriation of traditionally owned lands, the forcible resettlement of Aborigines on missions and government reserves, the “stolen generation” (young children taken from their families to group “homes” for reeducation and Anglicization), massacres, and the devastating impact of waves of infectious diseases. For communities that were not as harshly subject to such violence, suffering, upheaval, and repression of language and culture, indigenous frameworks continue to be powerful sources of explanation and interpretation.

Central Australian groups widely invoke the *kadaitcha* (or *kwertatye*), an Arrernte word meaning “evil person walking about.” The term can refer both to men who are secret killers and to the feathered slippers they wear to hide their footprints and silence their footfall as they track their victims. Among the Aranda/Anmatjirra Central Desert people, illness caused by *kadaitcha* and others who have acquired the requisite knowledge or powers is known as *arrenkwelthe*. *Kadaitcha* executions by “singing,” “boning,” or other dangerous modalities are assumed to be carried out for offenses relating to secret ritual and religious knowledge and ceremonies, desecration or trespass in sacred areas (i.e., those associated with “Dreaming” or creation stories), killings and assaults, or other serious breaches of the social or religious order.

A parallel figure is the *galika* of northeast Arnhem Land in the high northern tropics of Australia (Reid, 1983). *Galika* are individuals who have acquired the power and training to kill by stealth. One of the most detailed descriptions of the way *galika* attack, immobilize, and operate on their victims was given to Lloyd Warner (1958) in the 1930s by community members and by a self-confessed sorcerer who claimed to have killed several people using elaborate and magical “surgery.” Today most people will claim that *galika* come from distant and potentially hostile groups, rather than from within.

*Galika* attacks typically have four phases. First, the perpetrator is believed either to waylay solitary victims in an isolated spot or to draw victims to a secluded location where they will not be disturbed. Second, the *galika* puts the victim to sleep, cuts the body open, removes or mutilates certain organs, and drains away the victim’s blood. The *galika* may insert stones or objects in place of organs or blood. Third, the *galika* induces amnesia in victims to ensure that they are either unable to remember or unable to recount anything about the attack. Fourth, the victim dies, usually within hours or days of returning home.

The source of a *galika*’s power may be tutelage by other sorcerers, or it may come from association with death or the spirits of the dead. The *galika*’s acquired techniques are several, although in this area there are as many reported variations of these weapons or techniques as there are people willing to

talk about them. One frequently mentioned weapon across Australia is a sharpened object, such as a bone taken from a victim's arm, a stingray barb, or a piece of hardwood that has been rubbed with the blood or flesh of a dead body. The weapon is pointed at the victim, with incantations or songs, whereupon the victim slowly sickens and dies. "Image magic" is also designed to "kill a person's spirit." The intended victim's image or name is drawn in a sacred and powerful place, and spells are uttered according to the areas of the body being targeted. Alternately, the *galka* may follow a person, piercing his footprints with a spear or hot object and willing an illness upon him (such as leprosy), which slowly penetrates and "rots" the body. Individuals are usually careful about disposing of hair and nail clippings, excreta, blood, or personal clothing infused with sweat or bodily fluids, since it is believed that a sorcerer who obtains any of these can heat, burn, or bury them to cause a debilitating or deadly condition. In contemporary society it is sometimes held that *galka* can extend their arsenal of weapons by using modified bullets, battery acid, flashlights, or other items with similar spells and effects.

The transgressions or enmities said to provoke attacks of these kinds are broadly similar across Australia, although they differ in detail and description from place to place. All transgressions center on conflicts or acute mistrust between individuals and groups, on breaches of social and religious laws that cannot go unpunished, or on deaths, theft, or violence that must be avenged. For instance, if a man reveals secret religious knowledge that is not his to pass on, or if a woman enters a sacred area or views a religious object without permission or the authority of age and standing in the community, the offender may be punished by sorcery. A failure to honor the webs of ritual and social or economic obligations that exist between tribal groups and individuals may be considered sufficient cause for retribution.

The theft of land, ritual objects or ceremonial body painting designs, trespass on others' sacred sites or the unauthorized use of others' creation myths and songs, are all given as a legitimate reason for seeking revenge, as are personal grievances arising out of broken marriages or adultery. Forbidden or inappropriate love affairs cause serious tensions, especially in societies where marriage and relationships are strictly governed by kin relationships, some of which may be prohibited to the point of actual avoidance of each other by individuals who are related in specific ways. Where betrothals are negotiated between families for their children, and girls are "promised" as marriage partners in infancy (or even before birth), particular tensions will arise if either future partner breaks the agreement by marrying or consorting with someone else. In addition to matters of family and the heart, jealousy over achievements, position, or power may be seen as motivation for the contracting of a sorcerer to cause a serious illness or death.

Everyone can trace grievances, conflicts, or offences in his or her own extended family, recent or longstanding, to

which serious misfortune, illness, or death could ultimately be attributed. Murder, of course, is reason for revenge, either directly by the responsible kin of the deceased or by contracting the services of a skilled sorcerer.

From the point of view of an outsider, it is impossible to say whether *kadaitcha*, *galka*, or other workers of malign magic actually exist or are solely part of an explanatory framework for the misfortunes that strike individuals and constitute an acute threat not only to the sufferer but to family and community. Certainly some individuals have claimed to be sorcerers, have shown sorcery items to inquirers, or have described their feats (e.g., Warner, 1958). A 1993 paper from the Aboriginal Resource and Development Services warned of an increase in sorcery in northern Australia, describing it as a "real" phenomenon, not solely an explanation for misfortune. Whatever the interpretation of sorcery fears and accusations, they do address the *why* of illness and death, not just the *what*.

In contemporary society Aboriginal people are usually familiar with Western medical notions of pathology, injury, pathogens, and organ failure (such as heart disease). Indeed Aborigines today, like many fourth-world peoples, suffer very high rates of degenerative illness (such as diabetes, kidney failure, heart disease, and cancer), familial and intercommunity violence, midlife mortality, alcoholism, and substance abuse. There are far too many occasions in which people are impelled to search desperately for meaning and causation in the early death of a relative from illness or injury, sifting through signs, symptoms, and circumstances for an answer. The bereaved may understand and accept a medical explanation of the proximate cause, such as bleeding on the brain from a blow to the head, injury in a car accident, a crocodile attack, a heart attack, pneumonia, or renal failure, but they still invoke an ultimate cause that relies on their own understanding of the dangerous forces at work in human affairs and the sacred domain. For example, they may consider the cause to be that the dead person was "doomed" by sorcery to be bitten by a snake (Roth, 1903, p. 28). Even in communities where the language and traditional culture have been overwhelmed by white colonization, such beliefs continue to be held in attenuated forms (Clarke, 1999).

Human agency is not the only possible cause of affliction. Misfortune may also be visited directly on a victim as a result of breaches of the conventions and laws surrounding the Dreaming, or those governing sacred places and their resident spirits, religious rituals, and sources of supernatural power, such as key locations or ceremonial objects (Biernoff, 1978; Morphy, 1991, p. 261). Evil spirits are recognized in many Aboriginal language groups by various names: for example, *ju ju* (Warlpiri), *arrentye* (Aranda), and *mamu* (Pitjantjatjara). Most groups also recognize spirits of the dead and spirit custodians of sacred places (Nathan and Japanangka, 1983). A trespasser in a dangerous ("poison") or forbidden location, particularly a person who is not the owner of the area or otherwise authorized to be there, may contract

boils, leprosy, or weakness, may sustain bone fractures, or may even have his or her spirit stolen by the guardian, creation, or ancestral spirit that dwells there (Berndt, 1982).

Similarly, if an uninitiated person approaches too close to or handles sacred objects, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the power inherent in those objects may be released and cause harm, either directly to the transgressor or to those nearby. Epidemics or illnesses may be linked to such a breach. Illnesses may also be linked to the flouting of food taboos related to menarche, pregnancy, and birth. Such food taboos may also be linked to religious occasions and rites of passage, and include the right to eat or proscriptions against eating animals that are totems for a particular clan or extended family (Spencer and Gillen, 1968). Some bush foods are, in fact, poisonous and cannot be eaten at all or unless properly prepared. Women are expected to be particularly careful with their diet in order not to cause birth complications or deformity in an unborn child; mothers may also observe dietary restrictions in the early months of a child's life.

**HEALERS.** Throughout Australia the figure of the traditional healer, called a "clever man," "medicine man," or occasionally "medicine woman" (Bell, 1983; Peile, 1997, pp. 174–175), is a powerful and often reassuring counterbalance or antidote to the threat of inexplicable or life-threatening illness (see Elkin, 1945; Spencer and Gillen, 1968; Warner, 1958). Central Australian healers called *ngangkere*, while having at their disposal the means to inflict death, primarily practice counter-sorcery. *Ngangkere* may remove objects inserted into the victim's body by a sorcerer, restore the lost or disturbed spirit of a person who has been "sung" or "boned," diagnose illness, converse with spirits, read minds, dream travel, see into a person's body, endure psychic terrors, exercise telepathic powers (Elkin, 1945), preside over inquests into deaths, and identify a murderer (Nathan and Japanangka, 1983). The *mabarn* of the Western Desert similarly has the power to cure illness, influence the weather, and chase away evil spirits (Tonkinson, 1982). The source of the *mabarn*'s power is in magical objects that are usually kept in the stomach or, less often, in the arms, thigh, or head and removed when needed for healing activities.

However they work, these healers all have in common extraordinary powers, wisdom, and skills that enable them to diagnose and cure sickness. In Western Desert communities the healers are often sons or brothers of other healers, and it is generally held that they are born with their powers. Such powers are considered to be *djugurdanidjanu* (from the Dreamtime). However, in most areas for which there is written information, an aspiring healer must pass through a form of initiation that may involve isolation, encounters with the spirit world, an experience of being ritually "killed" and revived, transportation to secret and powerful places in dreams, encounters with the dead, and other often frightening experiences (Elkin, 1945; Reid, 1983; Roth, 1903). Powers to heal are associated with certain sites of significance, ancestral beings, or totems. These powers are manifested in the treat-

ment of the sufferer through touch, sucking, massage, and pressure on certain parts of the body, during which the *mabarn*'s own objects of power may be inserted into the patient's body, or objects of sorcery may be removed. The healer's spirit helpers may be summoned to assist in the treatment. An alternate modality is the use of dream travel or dream consultations with spirit beings or helpers.

Treatment sessions are almost always public, with the healer talking to the patient, the family, and onlookers as he works, while explaining, reassuring, and talking through his diagnosis, remedial activity, and insights into the cause and its removal. The *mabarn*'s challenge is to counter the work of the sorcerer (called *djinagarbil* in the Western Desert), the same challenge facing such healers as the *marrnggitj* of northeast Arnhem Land (Reid, 1983), the *margidjbu* of western Arnhem Land (Berndt, 1982), or the *ngangkere* (*ngangkayi*) of the Central Desert. The *djinagarbil* are men who travel from distant places, enter a community in darkness, find the victim (who will usually be away from camp when captured), stun the person, and insert a lethal item into his or her body; the *djinagarbil* then revives the victim, who returns to camp unaware of the attack, then sickens and dies. People in the Western Desert area are also at risk of attacks by malevolent spirits (*marlbu*), and the loss of the *nunu* (soul), both of which may be discerned and treated by a *mabarn*.

Like the *mabarn*, the *marrnggitj* of northeast Arnhem Land has been described as "the reverse of the coin on whose other surface appears the black sorcerer" (Warner, 1958). *Marrnggitj* are generally ordinary members of the community, differentiated only by their possession of special powers acquired through dramatic rites of passage or the patronage of spirit familiars who assist and empower them.

In a 2003 story, the journalist Nicolas Rothwell described an encounter he had with a *maparnjarra* (*mabarn*) in Central Australia. The *maparnjarra* described to Rothwell the experience of dying spiritually and being reborn with the ability to see at night, to receive charged dreams, to roam in other realms, to see a person's spirit, to look inside a person's body, and to project his body through space. The work of healers today, in areas where they still practice, is intertwined with that of Western healthcare providers, some of whom work in tandem with healers, recognizing their powerful influence and standing with their communities—and the faith their communities place in them. The ill or seriously troubled are often pragmatic in their choices of treatment, depending on the symptoms, severity, or duration of the illness. They will try various treatments in both medical systems for relief and recovery, in much the same way that people the world over use both conventional and alternative therapies in the pursuit of good health or a cure for intractable illness, chronic pain, and suffering (Mobbs, 1991). Indeed, in Christianized communities in Australia the boundaries between Christian and indigenous beliefs blur, with the power of Jesus, the Holy Spirit, angels, or the apostles conflated with that of the *mabarn* in the healing quest (McDonald,

2001, pp. 142–146). In fact, the *marrnggitj*, *mabarn*, *ngangkere*, and spiritual healers from other regions “perform several of the functions associated in Western society with the doctor (healing the body), the therapist (healing the mind), the priest (comforting and instilling faith), and the coroner (determining the cause of death)” (Reid, 1983, p. 78).

**OTHER HEALING PRACTICES.** “Bush medicines,” as they are described in English, were, and in some areas still are, used to treat a wide range of injuries and ailments. Most such medicines are derived from the bark, roots, or leaves of plants, but people may also use sea flora or invertebrates, earths and clays, insects, insect nests, charcoal, molds, and fungi. A wide range of remedies exists for the treatment of skin conditions, toothache, bites and stings, wounds, burns, general malaise and pain, and eye, gastrointestinal, and upper respiratory tract infections (Roth, 1903, pp. 38–42; Siggers and Gray, 1991, pp. 43–45). The Warlpiri of central Australia classify remedies as intended for rubbing, drinking, tying, sniffing, chewing, and smoking (blowing the smoke of a burning plant over the patient). One study of Yolngu medicines (northern Australia) documented the indigenous and botanical names, preparation, and application of over one hundred plants (Scarlett et al., 1982).

In general, stewardship of local pharmaceutical knowledge rests with the women of the community, although all community members will be broadly familiar with common medicines and are able to find and use them when needed. Women care for, wash, massage, and minister to the sick. Diane Bell describes how female relatives of a sick Warlpiri person may prepare goanna and witchetty grub fat and red ochre, then massage the patient in much the same way as a *ngangkayi* (traditional healer) might. They may also sing Dreaming songs. According to Bell, women’s health-giving ceremonies, practices, and religious songs give “love, care and power” (1983, p. 161). Women control the collection and preparation of medicines relating to menarche, menopause, pregnancy, childbirth, contraception, abortion, and breastfeeding, all described in English as “women’s business.” In contemporary communities, however, much of women’s knowledge and authority in childbirth and infant care has been usurped by health professionals using Western medicine, and traditional medicines and rituals have become less central.

Not all illnesses are attributed to supernatural causes. It is well understood that some conditions are self-limiting and not serious. Some may be the result of contagion, emotional upset, foods, heredity, old age, predation, pregnancy, neglect (of self or by others), self harm, or even exposure to very hot, wet, cold, or windy weather. Today other risks and threats have emerged in the abuse of alcohol, tobacco, and drugs (including the sniffing of gasoline), as well as in motor vehicle accidents, poor nutrition, poverty, unsanitary living conditions, and family violence. These are all typical of patterns of deprivation and illness suffered by indigenous peoples in many countries, whose land, resources, and identity have been affected by colonization and dispossession.

Aboriginal medical beliefs and practices constitute internally logical and powerful systems of explanation and healing, which both draw upon and reinforce the social and religious orders. Traditional Australian medical practices have been adapted to contemporary realities and have absorbed Western medical ideas and treatments, but in many communities they retain their underlying integrity and force, providing a framework for interpreting and gaining some sense of mastery in an unpredictable and threatening world.

**SEE ALSO** Australian Indigenous Religions.

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JANICE REID (2005)

**HEALTH AND RELIGION.** Since the mid-1980s, there has been increasing interest in the relationship between religion and health. Consider that a MEDLINE search of all scientific literature on religion or spirituality and health between 1980 and 1982 revealed forty-six articles; between 2000 and 2002, however, that number had increased to 393 articles. Similarly, a PSYCHLIT search of the psychological literature on religion or spirituality between 1980 and 1982 revealed 101 articles; between 2000 and 2002 the number had increased more than tenfold to 1,108 articles. Although much of the research on religion and health has been conducted in the United States, hundreds of studies have also been reported from other areas of the world, including Canada, Great Britain, Australia, continental Europe, Norway and Sweden, India, Israel and other parts of the Middle East, China, Korea, and Japan (see Koenig et al., 2001). Many of these studies found similar relationships between religion and health. Nevertheless, this research, in the United States and elsewhere, has with good reason come under criticism by some researchers, who also question how the findings should be applied clinically.

**HISTORICAL CONNECTION.** Western concepts of health care have their origins in the values and activities of religious organizations. The first large hospital in the Western world was built by the Christian church in the late fourth century CE, and for the next one thousand years the church built and staffed hospitals throughout western Europe and England. The first nurses were members of religious orders—the Catholic Sisters of Charity and, later, the Protestant Deaconesses—and they provided most of the nursing care in Western hospitals till the early 1900s. Many physicians during this time were also clergy, a tradition that carried over into the United States during colonial times.

After the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, however, medicine became more and more separated from religious influences. Despite this trend, many hospitals continued to be affiliated with and supported by religious institutions, both in the United States and western Europe. With the rise of science in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the separation between religion and medicine became complete. In the early twentieth century, Sigmund Freud wrote prolifically about the neurotic aspects of religion, influencing both the field of psychology and medicine. As a result, religion came to be seen within the scientific health-care profession as either irrelevant to health or inimical to it. This was before systematic, large-scale research studies began to objectively examine the relationships between health and religious belief and practice.

**RELIGION VERSUS SPIRITUALITY.** In the late 1980s the term *spirituality* began to be used in preference to the word *religion*, since *religion* suggested doctrine, divisiveness, and institutional power, whereas *spirituality* was seen as more personal and inclusive. For the purposes of this entry, *religion* is defined as an organized system of beliefs, practices, and rituals designed to connect a person to the sacred or transcendent (god, ultimate truth, ultimate reality), and to promote one's relationship and responsibility to others within the context of a faith community. *Spirituality*, on the other hand, is understood as a personal quest to understand the answers to ultimate questions about life, about meaning, and about one's relationship to the sacred, which might or might not lead to religious doctrines, rituals, or a faith community. Because spirituality is such a broad concept, however, researchers have had difficulty measuring it as distinct from religion; thus, most studies have measured spirituality in terms of religious beliefs or practices, and most research that examines the relationship with health has examined religion, not spirituality. For that reason, the word *religion* will be used throughout this discussion.

**RELIGION AND MENTAL HEALTH.** A systematic review of research conducted prior to 2000 identified 724 quantitative studies of the relationship between religion and mental health. Of those, 478 (66%) found a statistically significant relationship between religious involvement and better mental health, greater social support, and less substance abuse. Nearly 80 percent of studies examining the association between religion and well-being reported one or more significant positive correlations between these variables. This was particularly true for optimism, meaning and purpose, and hope in the future. The majority of studies examining the relationship between religion and self-esteem also reported greater feelings of self-worth among the more religious.

Similar associations were also found in studies of mental disorder. Of ninety-three cross-sectional and prospective studies, sixty (65%) found lower rates of depression or depressive symptoms and faster speed of remission from depression among those who were more religious. In fact, at least three clinical trials demonstrated faster recovery from

depression, anxiety, and grief associated with bereavement among religious persons receiving religious-based psychotherapies. These findings came not only from the United States, but also from the Netherlands and Malaysia, and involved not only Christians but also Muslims and Buddhists. Furthermore, more negative attitudes toward suicide and lower rates of suicide among the religious were found in fifty-seven of sixty-eight studies performed during the twentieth century, which is consistent with research showing lower rates of depression and greater well-being.

Greater social support (nineteen of twenty studies), less loneliness, and less substance abuse (drugs, alcohol, smoking; 121 out of 145 studies) have also been documented among the more religious. Greater marital stability, lower delinquency, and more pro-social activities (volunteering, for example) are other common findings. At least 75 percent of research on substance abuse has been in adolescents and college students, whose drug and alcohol use behaviors are likely to affect health over a lifetime. New research conducted since that systematic review has largely confirmed these findings.

This does not mean, however, that religious beliefs and practices are never associated with worse mental health, particularly in individual cases. Religious beliefs and practices can foster rigid thinking and excessive guilt, and may drive some persons away from seeking health-care services that they need. In general, however, data from cross-sectional, prospective, and clinical trial research are increasingly dispelling past notions that religion typically fosters mental or emotional instability.

**RELIGION AND PHYSICAL HEALTH.** The relationships between religion and better mental health, greater social support and marital stability, and lower rates of substance abuse and delinquency, are likely to have physical health consequences. This would be expected, given the well-established connections between psychosocial factors and neurological, endocrine, and immune functioning. Although studies of religion and physical health are less common than those of mental health, a similar pattern of results emerges.

Several studies have examined associations between religion and immune functioning, blood pressure, heart disease, cancer, overall mortality, and disability level. Five studies that examined the relationship between religion and immune functioning all reported associations. Two of these studies were conducted on persons with HIV/AIDS, two in older adults with immune senescence with aging, and one in women with metastatic breast cancer. Whether immune function is measured in terms of interleukin-6 levels, CD-4 and total lymphocyte counts, or natural killer-cell numbers, the findings favor the more religious. Lower serum cortisol levels have also been linked to greater religiousness, which may help to explain the immune findings.

Of twenty-three studies examining the relationship between religiousness and blood pressure, fourteen found lower rates of hypertension or lower blood pressure among those

who were more actively religious. The association appears to be particularly strong for diastolic blood pressure, compared to systolic blood pressure, and therefore may be of special importance given the influence of diastolic hypertension on myocardial infarction (heart attack) and stroke. Consequently, it is not surprising that eleven of sixteen studies examining the associations between religious activity and heart disease found lower rates of myocardial infarction, death from coronary artery disease, and longer survival after open-heart surgery among the more religious. At least one study has found lower rates of stroke among more frequent church attendees.

Of six studies examining cancer, four found lower mortality in the more religious, a finding consistent with the influence of neuroendocrine and immune function on the development and course of cancer. Whether in persons with cancer or other health conditions, survival in general appears to be longer among persons who are more religiously active. Of fifty-two studies examining that relationship, thirty-nine reported significantly longer survival among those who attended religious services more often, prayed more frequently, or demonstrated more commitment to religious beliefs. The effects are particularly strong for religious attendance, even when the effects of social support and the ability to physically attend church are statistically controlled for. In one of the largest studies, involving 21,000 randomly selected persons of all ages across the United States, Robert Hummer and colleagues (1999) found that persons who attended religious services more than weekly survived an average of seven years longer than persons who did not attend services; for African Americans, the difference in survival was fourteen years.

Some criticize these studies by pointing out that people who are sicker are physically less able to attend church services. While being physically disabled can adversely impact religious attendance during the short term, Ellen Idler and colleagues (1997) at Yale found that the effects of attendance on preventing the development of disability over the long run are substantially stronger. Religiousness may impact the perception of disability, so that at any given level of objective physical illness, those who are more religious may be less likely to perceive themselves as disabled, compared to those who are less religious. Perception of disability may be influenced by the optimism, hope, and meaning that people derive from religious beliefs.

**CONCERNS OF CRITICS.** Although critics of the religion-health relationship are few, they are particularly vocal and articulate in their arguments. Richard Sloan and colleagues have stressed that the research linking religion with physical health is weak and inconsistent. They voice ethical concerns about the implications of that research for the practice of medicine. "Should Physicians Prescribe Religious Activities?" (2000) is the title of one such article in which the authors claim that the research is not strong enough to warrant prescribing religion to helpless patients. Instead, they say that health professionals should stay out of the religious lives of patients, emphasizing that health professionals other than

chaplains are not trained to address religious or spiritual issues, and bringing up such issues could make patients feel guilty or feel responsible for causing their own illnesses. In some countries, such as Australia, critics claim that religion is not as important to patients as in the United States. These are important points that require careful consideration.

Advocates in favor of health professionals addressing spiritual issues in patient care counter these claims by saying that while physicians or nurses should never prescribe religion to those who are not religious, there is much they can and should do. In particular, they could take a spiritual history to learn if the patient is religious and how that might affect his or her medical care. If the patient is religious, the doctor or nurse could orchestrate the meeting of the patient's spiritual needs, utilizing the patient's religious resources to facilitate healing. Advocates would agree that most of the research, while consistently showing that the religious tend to be healthier, has not shown that becoming religious for health reasons alone (rather than for religious motivations) is likely to result in better health. Clinical trials demonstrating such an effect do not exist. Therefore, there is little evidence to justify physicians encouraging religious conversion as a route to better health. Even if such evidence did emerge in future research, the ethical implications of health-care professionals promoting religion among those who are not already religious would be legion.

**CONCLUSION.** There is growing evidence of a relationship between religion and better mental health, social functioning, and health-promoting behaviors. Because of the increasingly well-established connections between the emotions, physiology, and body functions, there is every reason to expect an association between religion and physical health. Although research on religion and physical health is growing, and several clinical trials to establish the causal nature of this relationship are underway, the evidence remains largely preliminary at this point and there is much further work to do. The preliminary evidence based on epidemiological findings thus far, however, fits a pattern that investigators have seen for other psychological and sociodemographic factors that have later been proven to influence physical health. Certainly these findings deserve further attention by researchers and they deserved to be studied in more sophisticated ways to demonstrate if and in what circumstances religion may influence health for better or for worse. Cautious and sensible application to clinical practice of what is already known would also seem warranted.

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HAROLD G. KOENIG (2005)

**HEALTHY, HAPPY, HOLY ORGANIZATION (3HO).** In 1969, Harbhajan Singh Puri (b. August 26, 1929), now known as Yogi Bhanjan, came to California. A Sikh from India, he started teaching Kuṇḍalinī Yoga and founded the Healthy, Happy, Holy Organization, also called the 3HO Foundation.

Yogi Bhanjan had worked as a customs officer before he moved to North America in 1968. After a brief stay in Canada, he traveled to Los Angeles where he began teaching yoga at the YMCA and the East-West Cultural Center. His classes attracted students, some from the counterculture, who were in the process of seeking alternative lifestyles and higher consciousness.

Several of these early students joined with Bhanjan to establish an ashram (center) in Los Angeles and to found 3HO. Bhanjan encouraged students to become Kuṇḍalinī Yoga teachers themselves and to establish new ashrams. Early ashram sites were established in New Mexico, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vancouver, and Washington, D.C., as well as a number of California locations. By 1972 there were ninety-four ashrams. Residents practiced yoga, community living, and a healthy lifestyle. Yogi Bhanjan traveled to the new centers, teaching yoga and lecturing at nearby universities and colleges. Some of his students soon began teaching on college campuses as well. Students were typically in their teens or early twenties—the "baby boomer" generation. Most of the early ashrams offered communal housing, and residents often worked together in businesses started by other students.

A few of Yogi Bhajan's Los Angeles students began to study the Sikh religion because of his example, and in 1970 a group traveled with him to India, where some became baptized Sikhs, taking part in the traditional Amrit ceremony, *khande di pahul*, at the Akal Takhār, the seat of the Sikh religion. Yogi Bhajan met with officials of the major Sikh administrative body there and received official recognition. Sikh studies and practices rapidly spread through the ashrams, and students created their first *gurdwara* (place of worship) in Los Angeles in 1972. Devotees began to read the *Gurū Granth Sāhib*, the Sikh sacred text, in translation, and many also began to learn Punjabi and to read Gurmukhī, the script in which the *Granth Sāhib* is written. Bhajan established a ministry for Sikh Dharma. New ministers take vows, which include the worship of only one God, bowing only to the *Granth Sāhib* as the word of God and not worshipping any person or personality as *gurū*. They practice vegetarianism, monogamy, and abstinence from alcohol, tobacco, or drugs (unless prescribed by a physician).

The early and mid-1970s were a period of rapid expansion, but growth tapered off toward the end of the decade. The organization sought to solidify its base, and members focused on deepening their understanding of and their practice of Sikh beliefs and traditions and on creating individual "prosperity consciousness." More members created community-oriented businesses. Others furthered their formal education, several entering the health-care profession. Many married and started families.

In 1973 Harbhajan Singh Puri (his legal name became Harbhajan Singh Khālsā Yogiji in 1976 after obtaining U.S. citizenship) legally incorporated the Sikh Dharma Brotherhood. Regional governing units and a central Khālsā Council were established in 1974 and added to the corporation's legal structure.

Sikh Dharma and 3HO were, and are, separate organizations. Although membership overlaps, there are many 3HO practitioners who are not Sikhs. 3HO sponsors classes in yoga, meditation, and nutrition, as well as summer and winter solstice celebrations, preschools and Montessori schools, and summer camps for youth and for women. Sikh Dharma is incorporated under the laws of the United States as a recognized religion. It consists of congregations, an ordained ministry that has grown to more than four hundred ministers, regional authorities, and the Khālsā Council, its advisory body.

In the 1980s, ashrams were consolidated and many people relocated from urban to suburban or rural locations as new parents sought space and safety for their children. Individuals and families grew more autonomous and communal arrangements less common. Many children of grade-school age went to India for their schooling.

**WORLDVIEW AND BELIEFS.** While the Punjab region of India is the home and major center of the Sikh religion, Sikhs have a history of migration and a strong presence in both

Canada and the United States. They have established *gurdwaras* and a number of support organizations. The Sikh religion is based on the teachings of ten *gurūs*. The first, Gurū Nānak, lived from 1469 to 1539. His was a devotional approach to the divine, an approach that called for meditation on the divine name (*nām simran*) and an understanding of divinity as timeless and beyond all categories or descriptions. Gurū Nānak is often depicted as a gentle mystic, but he was also a practical leader who established a community of believers and discouraged withdrawal from the world. Gurū Arjan (1563–1606), the fifth *gurū*, himself a poet, compiled the hymns of Gurū Nānak and the other *gurūs*, his own compositions, and other writings, creating the *Ādi Granth*, the primal scripture of the Sikhs. The tenth *gurū*, Gurū Gobind Singh (1666–1708), established initiatory rites. Today, those who receive these rites are referred to as the Khālsā ("the pure ones") or Khālsā Sikhs. Gurū Gobind Singh added to and finalized the compilation of writings that Sikhs look to as their living *gurū*. Members of Sikh Dharma have adopted the basic Sikh beliefs and prayers, and many have been initiated into the Khālsā.

Yogi Bhajan's students refer to him as Yogiji and consider him to be the Mahan Tantric, or "Master of White Tantric Yoga." He teaches courses referred to as Kuṇḍalinī Yoga classes and courses in "White Tantric Yoga." Kuṇḍalinī Yoga can be practiced daily and may be taught to the public by 3HO members, but only Yogi Bhajan leads White Tantric Yoga.

In a White Tantric Yoga course people sit in long lines, and each faces a partner. Participants are guided in various physical yoga postures, use deep-breathing techniques, chant mantras, and use *mudrās* (yogic hand positions). White Tantric Yoga is said to purify the consciousness and, in the words of a 3HO teacher, Shakti Parwha Kaur, in *Kundalini Yoga: The Flow of Eternal Power* (1996), to "accelerate the psychological transformation of the individual, dissolving deep-rooted subconscious neuroses" (p. 179).

The goal of the yoga postures and breathing techniques employed in Kuṇḍalinī Yoga as taught by Yogi Bhajan is to raise *kuṇḍalinī* energy, which is said to reside at the base of the spine. It should rise up through the central energy channel of the spine, stimulating energy centers or *chakras*, and over time the practice should culminate in a life of higher consciousness. The yoga is said to cleanse and heal, especially by strengthening the nervous system and balancing the glandular systems, and to empower the practitioner to manage his or her own energy wisely. Additionally, different yoga *kriyas* (sequences of postures, breath, and sounds; in 3HO these are intended to manifest a particular state of mind) are said to perform various practical functions, such as easing stress, enhancing stamina, and improving digestion.

There is a strong group culture with distinctive values and beliefs. Sikhs born in the West have espoused orthodox Sikh traditions and incorporated yogic traditions, but have also included American middle-class norms, New Age per-

spectives, and lingering counterculture values. Values include “keeping up,” empowerment, healthy living, and service in a difficult time of transition. “Keeping up” refers to maintaining a positive attitude and persevering when faced by challenges and adversity, and, in general, 3HO practitioners and Sikh Dharma adherents aim to be proactive in their lives and to control and alter their environments for the better. They seek to maintain fitness, mental clarity, and spiritual awareness through yoga, diet, and avoidance of caffeine, alcohol, and tobacco. The group has retained the New Age idea that the world is moving into the Aquarian Age. Yogi Bhanan says that this is a very difficult transition and urges people in 3HO and Sikh Dharma to strengthen themselves through spiritual and yogic practice in order to survive it and help others to weather it.

**PRACTICES AND RITUALS.** Daily *sādhana* (spiritual practice) is the central practice. It should include prayer, meditation, and exercise. Devotees are encouraged to rise before dawn and give the early morning hours to God. *Sādhana* may be performed individually or in a group, although a group *sādhana* is considered more desirable. It will typically begin with recitation of *Japji* (a prayer introduced by Gurū Nānak), Kuṇḍalinī Yoga, and the chanting of mantras, and then progress through meditation, deep relaxation, and devotional singing (*kīrtan*). People in Sikh Dharma have also established daily and weekly Sikh *gurdwara* services and provide *langar*, a traditional shared vegetarian meal, for all attendees.

3HO sponsors solstice gatherings in New Mexico and in Florida. These provide an opportunity for yoga students from all over the world to gather. Participants focus on spiritual practices and participate in White Tantric Yoga (now presented on video). Since 1987 there has been an Interfaith Peace Prayer Day celebration sponsored jointly by Sikh Dharma and 3HO at the time of summer solstice.

Clothing and naming are important aspects of identity. Members of Sikh Dharma are readily identifiable. They frequently wear white clothing (said to have a pure vibration) and have adopted their own version of Punjabi garb. Both men and women wear turbans, although in the Punjab it is generally only men who wear them. The women sometimes wear a *chuni* (a long flowing scarf) over the turban, for formal attire. Both men and women have taken the last name of Khālsā, and the women, like Sikhs in the Punjab, have the middle name of Kaur (princess) while the men, again like their Indian Sikh counterparts, use Singh (lion).

Sikhs emphasize family life. In the early days, many of their marriages were arranged. Yogi Bhanan suggested a spouse for an individual, or two people asked for approval when they wished to marry. Marriage ceremonies follow the traditional Sikh form.

**GENDER ROLES.** As is the case in many of the new religions, gender roles tend to be traditional. While both genders work, women generally have primary responsibility for the domestic sphere. Though women are said to be nurturing by na-

ture, they are also expected to be strong and to complement the partnership with their husbands. Women are understood to be more intuitive, spiritual, and changeable than their male counterparts. Their role as mothers is said to render women especially creative. They are called *shaktis*, a term referring to the female aspect of divinity, “God’s power in manifestation.” Men are thought to be the more steady and consistent sex. They are expected to be active in the world, although their role as fathers is also emphasized. Both men and women are said to have suffered from aspects of American culture—men from too much pressure to achieve and succeed, and women from a general disrespect for their gender and the tendency of the American media to turn women into sex objects. This treatment is said to have alienated women from their natural spirituality, grace, confidence, and self-respect. Many of the teachings about women were developed at the time of the women’s movement and led to the establishment of the Khālsā Women’s Training Camp, which is intended to offer women a break from routines, with time to focus on spiritual growth and to pursue personal interests. Activities include regular yoga, workshops that enable participants to pursue a variety of interests in fields such as dance, counseling, and religious practices, *gatka* (a martial art), and meditation. Both men and women serve as ministers, as yoga teachers, and on administrative councils, and women hold leadership positions in businesses.

**CONTROVERSIES AND ISSUES.** Historically, there has been tension between older established Sikh organizations and Sikh Dharma. Ethnic Sikhs have criticized the linking of the Sikh religion to yoga. They have criticized the hierarchical nature of Sikh Dharma with its variety of titles and positions. Many question the devotion that Yogi Bhanan receives from his students. Members of Sikh Dharma, in turn, have criticized ethnic Sikhs for bringing caste and politics into their *gurdwaras*, or for laxity in their practices. These tensions were more prominent in earlier years than they are now, however.

Sikhs have experienced discrimination based on their mode of dress. People in Sikh Dharma have successfully gone to court in order to be able to wear the turban in their daily occupations in industries with strict dress codes.

As in other new religions, there have been instances of businesses and individuals indicted for dishonest practices. Yogi Bhanan was accused of sexual misconduct in a suit that was filed in 1986, but the suit was dropped.

**RECENT HISTORY.** Sikh Dharma has evolved and grown since its founding, as has the 3HO Foundation, which now has trained over three thousand teachers living in more than thirty-eight countries worldwide. Although the Indian Sikhs do not have an organized ministry, Sikh Dharma of the Western Hemisphere does, adhering to legal requirements for an organized religion in the United States.

Despite opposition, a group of Sikh American women, seeking to open such opportunities to their gender, performed *seva* (service) at the Golden Temple in Amritsar,



India, in 1996. Karen Leonard reports that the relevant authority (the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee) ruled that women would in the future be allowed to serve such functions as priests and hymn singers (1999, p. 281).

As of 2002 there were major centers in the United States, Canada, and Europe, and smaller ones in other locations. A center for meditation and the training of yoga teachers has opened in India. Larger businesses, begun and operated by Western Sikh entrepreneurs, include a successful security firm and tea and cereal companies. Sikh individuals also thrive as doctors, attorneys, accountants, writers, landscapers, artists, and counselors, and in other occupations. A new generation has reached maturity, married, and started families. Youth are a major focus of attention, with mentoring programs and expanded educational facilities being planned. About one hundred students (grades one through twelve) representing eleven countries attended Miri Piri Academy in Amritsar, India, in 2003.

SEE ALSO Sikhism.

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CONSTANCE W. ELSBERG (2005)

**HEART.** Analysis of the symbolic values attached to the heart shows an unquestionable distance between the heart as a source of biological life and its diverse meanings for the emotional, moral, and religious life. The word *heart* may be specific, but the symbol is as multifarious as the polysemy of the term is rich. The range of meanings of *heart* is, indeed, at once based on a physiological reality (which entails a certain animistic conception of the individual) and on spiritual and mystical meditations—two sources that are intimately linked in most cultures.

It seems certain that the vitalistic conception of the heart as the seat of courage, strength, and life is represented by the presence in a great number of ancient societies of the custom of eating the heart of one's enemy to acquire his strength. Likewise, the notion of the heart as the source of life is the basis of the sacrifice usually practiced by the Aztec and earlier by the Maya. In the Inca empire, for instance, the heart was torn out, still beating, resulting in a copious hemorrhage. The flowing blood was nourishment for the Sun (symbolized by the eagle) and an invigorating drink for Tlaltecuctli, the lord of the earth. The heart was considered the most precious part of the person; therefore it was the offering of life itself, a gift from the gods, that was achieved in the removal of a living heart and by the shedding of human blood.

The great symbolic themes relating to the heart were posed by the ancient Egyptians. It is the principal organ of physical life, and is well described in the medical papyri. It is also the center of emotional life, courage, and spiritual life. Thought, will, and wisdom reside there. The heart thus becomes the very locus of personality, capable of prayer to and love for the gods. But the heart is also man's memory, the witness to the deeds he accomplishes during his life. This is why, after death, hearts are weighed with Maat, the goddess of truth and justice, as a counterweight. The heart has a major role in the judgment of the dead, in which man's fidelity to moral prescriptions and social rules is examined. It is the dwelling place of Sia, the god of understanding, knowledge of the past, and creative imagination. If the dead person is "justified by his heart," if the judgment is in his favor, he then experiences union with the god: "Your heart is Re's heart," says the *Book of Respiration* (2.10), for in man's heart abides "the god who lives" in him, a kind of personal genius who determines the existence and the behavior of each individual. The heart is simultaneously soul, life, thought, witness of man's deeds, and the place where the god resides in order to guide man on this earth and to give an account in the afterlife of his actions. In the human heart, as necessary for life on earth as for survival after death, man may meet the divine.

According to the Egyptians, the gods also have a heart. The stela of King Shabaka, recapitulating an old theology of Memphis, shows that Ptah's heart is the seat of creative activity and the center of his imagination. All that was created by

Ptah (the cosmic demiurge) was thought in his heart and came to life through the intermediary of his creating word.

The heart occupies an important place in the sacred texts of Hinduism, as well as in its techniques of spiritual meditation. The natural symbolism of the heart as the center of life and the psychological faculties appears in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (3.20–25). The heart is there described as the place where everything that exists takes shape: faith, suprainTELlectual knowledge, ontological truth, speech, and biological life (for "the sperm rests on the heart"). Even though the heart is hardly mentioned in the Vedas, which stress sacrificial ritual and praise of the divine, the outline of a "liturgy of the heart" can be seen in the oldest Upaniṣads. There it is conceived of as central in the activity of the *ṛṣis*, those seers who intuitively perceive the divine and express it in hymns. The heart is the secret place of their inspiration, where hymns are prepared to offer the gods, but it is also the critical authority that monitors the hymns' value. The heart thus becomes the place of divine vision, which is only given by grace to those who practice self-renunciation. It is understood that the heart's knowledge is *satya*, real and true, since it alone can enable one to pass from the unreal and the illusory to the real. Such knowledge is transformative, for it discovers, by means of the heart, the divine immanence within man. In *bhakti*, the heart is the seat of an aspiration to join the god and the center of a desire that "binds man at the level of his heart." Man should also reject the desire of natural and illusory realities in favor of the enjoyment of bliss and union with *brahman*. It is necessary to clear this heart by way of renunciation in order to become "a polished mirror" in which the god can be reflected. "When all the desires he carries in his heart have been cast away, then the mortal becomes immortal and from that time onward he delights in *brahman*," says the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.4.7).

The heart is thus the symbol of divine inhabitation in man. Four terms most often define this heart, citadel of the divine, of *brahman*: the grotto (*Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* 201, 469), the bird's nest (*Hamsa Upaniṣad* 13), the ritual hearth, and especially the lotus, an ancient cosmogonic symbol on which the moralizing values of the pure and the impure, the emotional and the intellectual, are grafted (*Dhyānabindu Upaniṣad* 33–35 and 93). But what lives in this place? An impersonal, transcendent principle, the *ātman* (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.3.3), which exists and senses; the authority that perceives through the senses and that is the interior light in every human being; or else the image itself of the power of a personal god such as Śiva, Hari, Indra, the Everlasting, the Supreme (*Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* 269). The heart can thus become, by divine grace, the place for the vision of the god: "The man who is free from desire, all pain having vanished by grace of the creator, sees the Lord and his majesty" (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.20). Thus the heart is the place of passage from duality to unity, from formlessness to form, from the unreal to the real (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.1.2–3; 8.3.1–2). The path of the heart, simultaneously one

of meditation and renunciation, of the reversal of passions and desire for union, is thus the route from the carnal to the subtle, from the mortal to the immortal (*Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 4.16.20).

The ancient Greek world had a rather undifferentiated psychological knowledge of the heart. In the writings of Homer, Hesiod, and the tragedians, *kardia* designates the place of the soul's life, the affects, the emotions, and the feelings. It is the place of secret thoughts and tactical intelligence. By a process of metonymy, the word *stēthos* (chest) is used in the sense of heart; *thumos* (the breath contained in the chest) designates the ardor that animates the feelings that lie in the heart and the thoughts that are formed there. It is this term, *thumos*, less concrete and more subtle, that predominates in the Classical age, but the philosophers introduced an important distinction. In agreement with doctors and certain philosophers like Empedocles (fifth century BCE), who defined the heart as the seat of thought, the Epicureans and then the Stoics located intelligence there. Chrysippus asserted that the heart is the seat of *dianoia*, the source of language (*Stoicorum vererum fragmenta* 837, 838, 879). In response, Plato developed the theory of a tripartite soul: above the diaphragm is the mortal soul, the *thumos* that inspires good deeds; below are the passions, and the immortal principle of the soul is in the head. Therefore, only the ardor of generous deeds is found in the zone of the heart (*Republic*, book 4). Aristotle, however, situated sensations, sensory knowledge, memory, and imagination in the heart, but not the *nous*, or intelligence. Impossible to locate, the *nous* is not attached to any physical organ (*Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a). With Plotinus, all the metaphorical uses of *kardia* and *thumos* disappear in a distinct shift toward intellectualization, which will counterbalance any Judeo-Christian influence.

In the Bible, the word *lev* (heart) occurs 1,024 times, a frequency that testifies to the multivalence of a term common to the Hebrews and the ancient Semites, for whom the heart was an organ indispensable to life, the place for concentration of all the vital forces. If it beat more or less rapidly with respect to emotions felt, it was because, as the center of knowledge, it was an organ both receptive and active. The heart is the locus not only of the whole psychological and intellectual life but also of the moral life. It is man's interior, or *qerev*: "I shall put my law within them and write it on their hearts," says Yahveh (*Jer.* 31:33). This heart that permits understanding of divine things is, at first, recollection and remembrance of Yahveh's goodness. The expression "ascends to the heart" designates the necessary recollection: "From afar remember Yahveh and that Jerusalem ascends to your heart" (*Jer.* 51:50). The heart is therefore an active center where the ideas and impressions received are transformed into deeds; the heart thinks out man's projects and is the seat of the individual's creative power in the form of consciousness. Not only is the heart the center of moral life, but finally the center of religious life as well. It is the heart that experiences the fear of God and keeps faith to the alliance with

Yahveh: the faithful heart belongs entirely to God, in whom it is fixed (*1 Chr.* 29:18).

During the Hellenistic age, when the Bible proliferated in the Greek translation, the word *kardia*, used to translate *lev*, was weighted with all the Semitic values of the heart and took on a new meaning to the extent that the association between heart, thought, and memory became commonplace. In the New Testament writings, a synthesis between Greek and biblical values of *heart* is achieved. The famous formula defining the ideal community of the first Christians "which has but one heart and one soul" (*Acts* 4:32) associates the new heart promised by Yahveh (*Ez.* 11:19) with a Greek proverb cited by Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics* 9.8.2) and used again by Cicero in order to define friendship (*De amicitia* 21.81). *Heart* is thus taken in its metaphorical sense in order to designate man's inner self, the place where his spiritual life is born and develops. But the third-century hellenization of an expression from the Christian faith makes more specific the use of *heart*, which loses its meaning of "understanding." Commenting on the beatitude of pure hearts (*Mt.* 5:8), Origen explains that to see God with the heart means to understand him with the spirit (*De principiis* 1.1.9). For Origen, the heart equals understanding; when the scripture says "heart," this is only a metaphor for emphasizing the "passage from the visible order to the invisible order." A similar Platonism will be developed later, more clearly, in the fourth century by Gregory of Nyssa, who explains the famous passage of the *Song of Songs*—"I sleep but my heart waketh" (5.2)—by bringing up the *psuchē* and the *dianoia* of the soul and of the intelligence in order to explain the word *heart*.

In the West, the term *cor* keeps the sense of the Hebrew *lev*, but Augustine enriches it with his psychological analyses in the *Confessions*. For him, the heart is the place of interiority and religious experience, which defines individuality: "My heart is where I am, such as I am" (*Confessions* 10.3.4). Little by little, however, in the Christian West the word *heart* becomes a simple metaphor for the whole emotional life, while in the East it keeps the meaning of spirit liberated from the passions and the affections and of the place for the understanding of divine things and the love of God.

A fundamental vein of Christian mysticism is that in which the divine heart and the human heart unite in an exchange of love. This mystical view of the heart, which appears in the West around the beginning of the eleventh century, is linked to a spirituality centered on the suffering humanity of Jesus Christ, as if devotion to the divine heart could not exist without an emotional reference to Jesus' heart of flesh and the shedding of his blood, which constitutes tangible proof of the love of a suffering and crucified God. In this heart of flesh, bared by the wound inflicted on the cross, the Christian mystics contemplated the same mystery of God's love, trying to specify its meaning in this heart, which had been pierced although it had already stopped beating. (*Jn.* 19:34). It was undoubtedly Anselm (1033–1109) who, meditating on the passion of Christ, was the first to glimpse

this pierced heart as a revelation of God's love (*Patrologia Latina* 158.761–762).

The same idea is found in the writings of the Cistercian William of Saint-Thierry and of Bernard of Clairvaux (*Patrologia Latina* 183.1072). The emotionally pious individual ponders the wound in the divine heart and, confronted with its proof of God's love, wishes to penetrate it and lose himself in it. Such a desire for union, a desire to respond to God's love, has given rise to numerous mystical experiences: that of Lutgard of Aywières at the beginning of the thirteenth century, who was a "sympathetic" participant in the sufferings of the Passion and who "struck at the very heart of Jesus a tenderness so strong that she was forever strengthened"; or those mystical experiences of the cloistered nuns of Hefta in Saxony. Mechthild of Magdeburg (1207–1282) describes in detail how God put her own heart into his divine one burning with love, the two making but a single heart "as the water loses itself in the wine." God's heart is thus the place of sharing and joy while the mystic, like the apostle John, rests on the very breast of Jesus (*Das fliessende Licht der Gottheit* 2.38).

From this monastery in Hefta, where other nuns shared the devotion to Jesus' heart shown by Saint Gertrude (1256–1334), the custom passed to the Franciscans. The memory of their founder's stigmata and their popular emotional preaching developed a piety founded on the contemplation of the afflictions of the crucified one and his wounded heart. In his *Vitis mystica*, Bonaventure (1221–1274) praises "the good Jesus' heart" and stresses the love, revealed by Christ in his incarnation, that is sensitive to human nature. This wounded heart is the vital and tangible expression of God's blessings. But it is also the place into which the human soul must penetrate "as if into a promised land where he will find sweetness, purity, and even God's love," says Ubertino da Casale (*Arbor vitae crucifixae Jesu*, c. 1320). This desire for union with Jesus' heart is so great that, through many repetitions in the course of these unifying experiences, an exchange of hearts between Christ and the mystic is effected, as in the cases of Lutgard, Catherine of Siena, Dorothy of Montau, and, later, Marguerite-Marie Alacoque. It is a symbolic exchange, of course, in which God's will is voluntarily substituted by a human being for his or her own and which is the sign of a transforming union born of that "new spirit and that new heart" prophesied by Ezekiel (36:26–27). This symbol of Christ's heart replacing that of the mystic represents "the union of the uncreated spirit and the created spirit that is realized by the preeminence of grace," explains Thomas of Cantimpré in the *Life of Lutgard* (*Acta sanctorum*, June, vol. 4, p. 193). The heart is the whole human being, who always wishes to unite more fully with the person of the word incarnate himself perceived in a heart, which is the sign of his love and the center "where all the virtue of divinity is enclosed."

In the Christian East, the "prayer of the heart," from the time of the Desert Fathers to our own time, has combined an ancient technique of breath control with the invocation

of Jesus' name, in order to "make the spirit descend into the heart." By concentrating his gaze on the interior of his heart, one discovers it as the locus of emotional life, desires, and love. Then one must melt one's perceptual and intellectual thoughts there, as if in a brazier, and let them heat up and burn until a cry breaks out in one's heart, a call to Jesus, the unique source of that love. The heart is thus the space where the body and soul penetrate each other and coexist, just as the inhaled air mixes with the very breath of life. The discovery of the heart therefore reestablishes human nature in its original state, before the Fall, in rediscovering the energy of the Holy Spirit given by baptism, and in becoming the temple of God once again. The expression "prayer of the heart" is therefore metonymical, although the method of prayer described appears to link it to a specific respiratory technique. Hesychast spirituality insists on the necessity of asceticism to purify the heart of man, who may then come back to the reason why he was created and discover truth. Man then receives illumination from the sun of justice, whose light shines in his heart, which thus becomes the place where God reveals himself and the place of God's desire, where the created being lets the Lord live, and finally knows *hēsuchia*: the eternal joy of being united with him forever (*Mt.* 17:4).

Exactly this conception of the heart as the place of God's desire and the organ of prayer and knowledge of divine things is found again in Pascal in seventeenth-century France, where the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus proliferated, with such devotees as Marie des Vallées, Jean Eudes, and Marguerite-Marie Alacoque. Indeed, the Pascalian heart is the center of neither the emotions nor the faculties of the soul; it is the place of resolution and adherence. It is will, and through it the individual is defined and expressed. But it is, in addition, the organ that knows an order superior to that of reason: "It is the heart that feels God and not reason: this is what faith is, God susceptible to the heart and not to reason" (*Pensées* 278). Pascal meant that reason is not useless, but that it remains insufficient, for it belongs to the natural order, whereas "the heart has reasons that reason knows not" (*ibid.*, 277). The knowledge of God is not an abstract thought; it emerges from the very existence of man, and it resides in the desire for abundance: "My whole heart reaches out to know where the true good is in order to follow it." For, as Pascal wrote in 1658 in his *Art of Persuasion*, "man discovers the truth of which he speaks inside himself." Thus, in diverse cultures and religious traditions, the heart has the profound value of symbolizing and structuring all of human life, the spiritual as much as the physical.

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**HEAVEN AND HELL.** As symbolic expressions found in various religious traditions, heaven and hell suggest polar components of a religious vision: a state of bliss and/or an abode of deity or sacred reality on the one hand, and a state of spiritual impoverishment and/or an abode of evil or demonic spirits on the other. As a spatial referent, Heaven is generally considered to be “above,” informed by the human experience of the sky as the expansive space or dome encompassing the earth and also including the sun, moon, and stars. Just as Heaven is “above” the earth, so then is deity “higher” than the human or earthly plane for those traditions in which Heaven is viewed as the abode of deity. On the contrary, Hell is generally regarded as a realm “below,” a meaning reflected in the derivation of the English *hell* from the Old English, *helan*, with a root meaning of “hide,” “cover,” or “conceal.” Thus, Heaven is often symbolized by light or brightness as a realm of bliss, whereas Hell is characterized as dark or shadowy, a realm of anguish and suffering.

**JUDAISM.** The worldview of the ancient Hebrews, as reflected in the Hebrew scriptures, distinguished between the world above, the “heavens” (*shamayin*), as the dwelling place of Yahveh, and the earth, the two comprising the universe of God’s creation. The creation narrative of *Genesis* 1–3 portrays the heavens and the earth as the whole of God’s creation. Under the earth was She’ol; the ambiguous term *she’ol* was used at times to refer to the grave or tomb itself and at other times to indicate an obscure land of shadows, the realm of the dead. Existence there was understood in largely negative terms, since in She’ol the “spirit” or “breath of life” (*ruah*) through which human beings were endowed by God with life was thought to have departed. Prior to the Babylonian exile of 597 BCE, the dead were not thought of as having an existence in which individual identity was preserved beyond life on earth but rather were conceived as a faceless collective existing in a joyless realm.

With the rise of Judaism in the period following the fifth century BCE, the Jewish understanding of heaven as an ideal relationship of the righteous with God was informed both by intercultural influences and by continuing efforts to unfold the meaning and import of the covenant relationship between the community and God. For example, life after death had been clearly and definitively envisioned by the Zoroastrians of Persia as involving a judgment of individuals at death: the righteous were destined to enjoy forever the presence of God in a realm of unending light, while the unrighteous were condemned to a torturous hell. The Greeks, both in religions such as the Orphic cults and in the thought of major philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, stressed the immortality of the soul. By the second century BCE, both the resurrection of the dead and an event of final judgment were

affirmed in some circles of Jewish thought. Heaven came to be regarded as the destiny of the righteous, those in vital covenant relationship with God. Multiple heavens (seven or ten) are mentioned in Jewish apocryphal literature and in teachings preserved in the rabbinical tradition. Paradise, a state of spiritual fulfillment in which the covenantal righteous enjoy an ideal relationship with God, is variously referred to as the third of seven or the seventh of ten heavens. Messianic expectations, which developed in the centuries immediately before and following the dawning of the common era, were often associated with affirmations of the resurrection of the dead and a final judgment, with the righteous destined for a heavenly paradise. In association with these developments, a place of punishment, Gehenna, was thought to await the unrighteous after death, though the period of punishment was limited in accordance with the degree of seriousness of one’s transgressions.

Traditional Judaism views the final destiny of humans in terms of the three doctrines of recompense, immortality, and resurrection. Informed by the demand of conscience that virtue be rewarded and wickedness punished, the tradition holds that even if one does not encounter equity during the earthly life, it will nonetheless be met with afterward. The interpretation of the actual form of immortality, however, is permitted wide latitude in the tradition, with deathlessness envisaged as preserving individual identity and awareness (with the attending literal images of Paradise and Gehenna) or, alternatively, as a state that is impersonal and without consciousness. Similarly, resurrection has been understood as a climactic event physically reanimating the dead and including the final judgment of bliss or damnation and also as an eternal event through which the corporeality of the resurrected is transfigured into a pure spirituality.

**CHRISTIANITY.** The cardinal import of heaven and hell as components of the Christian religious vision is clearly evident in the New Testament portrayal of the completion of God’s redemptive activity consummated in the manifestation of a new heaven and a new earth (*Rv.* 21). Not only is heaven envisioned in early Christianity as the fulfilling state of bliss and reconciled relationship with God of which the followers of Jesus are assured, but it is also the abode of the divine, where Jesus dwelled before his earthly life and to which he proceeded following his death and resurrection. Essential to the Christian confidence in a heavenly life after death in which the total uniqueness of human personality is preserved is the concomitant affirmation that God will make possible the resurrection of the dead. This belief is to be distinguished from the Greek notion (especially of Plato and Aristotle) of the immortality of the soul understood as rationality. The reality of hell as the arena presided over by Satan and his angels and as the destiny of the “cursed” was assumed by early Christians and frequently appears in the New Testament writings (e.g., *Mt.* 25:1–46). This teaching has been taken literally by many Christian thinkers through the centuries, though alternative views have occasionally been expressed. Origen (third century BCE), for example, understood



hell to involve not the eternal punishment of the cursed, but punishment of such duration as was necessary to provide for the restoration of all to the presence of God.

In Roman Catholic Christianity hell is deemed to be a state of unending punishment for the unrepentant who die without the grace of God as transmitted through the sacraments. This state is characterized both by absence from God's presence (*poena damni*) and by the suffering of fire and other tortures (*poena sensus*). The Roman Catholic concept of purgatory, defined by the councils of Florence (1439) and Trent (1545–1563), envisions an intermediate state after death during which there is opportunity for the expiation of venial sins and compensatory punishment for mortal sins, thus providing for the ultimate restoration of fellowship with God. This teaching, likely informed by the Jewish notion of Gehenna and the Greek notion of the realm of Hades, is correlative with rituals for the dead (prayers, oblations) intended to assure their full expiation. Salvation is understood in the Roman Catholic tradition to be a process, begun in earthly life and continuing in life beyond death, through which there will ultimately be a realization of the "beatific vision," a heavenly state of full and unqualified awareness of the presence of God, a state of spiritual perfection that cannot be attained during the earthly pilgrimage. The significance and import of the Christian teaching about heaven and hell has nowhere been given more powerful aesthetic and imaginative expression than in Dante's masterful poem the *Commedia* (completed 1321). Eastern Orthodox Christianity, in sharing the teaching that hell is a destiny of eternal fire and punishment awaiting the cursed and unredeemed following the Last Judgment and that heaven is the ultimate destiny of the redeemed, has placed focal emphasis on the resurrection of Jesus as assuring the resurrection of the faithful.

Protestant Christianity, though generally lacking the teaching on purgatory or intermediate states, has retained the traditional Christian teachings respecting heaven and hell, while reinterpreting theological understandings of grace and faith as they are pertinent to salvation. With the dominance of the scientific worldview in the modern era and the theories proffered by the psychological and social sciences, literal and spatial interpretations of heaven and hell have been found untenable by some Protestant thinkers. In terms of theological argument, it is contended that it is contradictory to posit hell as eternal punishment while affirming God as one who is loving and merciful and wills all to be saved and forever seeks the lost. Karl Barth (1886–1968), for example, rejected the entire notion of eternal damnation, and instead maintained that the central message of the church is the election of all of humanity in Jesus Christ. Heaven and hell have been reinterpreted by such thinkers as indicative of qualities of life that are conducive to or detract from the realization of the full potential of persons or, alternatively, as symbols that underscore the fundamental character of the decision of faith, in which the whole of the individual is at stake, and the freedom of that decision, through which one may choose to re-

ject God's presence or seek a full union extending beyond the confines of the earthly life.

**ISLAM.** In the Qur'an and the traditions of Islam are manifold descriptions of Heaven and Hell that are expressive of the centrality of judgment as an aspect of Muslim religious anthropology. Perfect justice, one of the attributes of God, will be disclosed at the Last Judgment following resurrection. God's judgment will be pronounced on the basis of an expansive record of each person's deeds. Overriding the demerits of every believer's evil deeds will be the support provided by the Muslim confession subscribed to from the heart ("There is no god but God, and Muḥammad is his prophet.") That judgment in turn will be followed by the entrance of the believers into Heaven and the relegation of the infidels to Hell. In a manner reminiscent of the Zoroastrian Chinvat Bridge, each person will proceed across the bridge of al-Aaraf following the judgment. This will be a felicitous crossing for the true Muslim but a travesty for the infidel, whose fall from the bridge into the pits of Hell is assured. In accordance with the will of God, Muḥammad will, however, recover some who fall. The portrayals of Paradise in the Qur'an and the traditions are graphically idyllic, in no way lacking the enjoyment of sensuous pleasures and bountiful surroundings:

This is a Remembrance; and for the godfearing is a fair resort, Gardens of Eden, whereof the gates are open to them, wherein they recline, and wherein they call for fruits abundant, and sweet potions, and with them maidens restraining their glances of equal age. This is what you were promised for the Day of Reckoning; this is Our provision, unto which there is no end. (*sūrah* 38:50–54)

Interpreters of the Muslim tradition such as al-Ghazali (d. 1111) have called attention to the accompanying spiritual components of heavenly existence, viewing all other of the manifold pleasures of Paradise to be overshadowed by the ecstatic awareness of being with God. Equally graphic are the Qur'anic descriptions of punishment and torture in Gehenna, as indicated in the following passage:

All this; but for the insolent awaits an ill resort, Gehenna, wherein they are roasted—an evil cradling! All this; so let them taste it—boiling water and pus, and other torments of the like kind coupled together. (*sūrah* 38:55–58)

Traditional Islam adheres to a conviction that the sufferings in Hell will be unending, though there are suggestions of a purgatorial realm from which, after a time, Muslims in need of purificatory restitution to the *ummah* (the Muslim community) will be recovered. Both Heaven and Hell are subdivided into seven regions in Muslim teaching, with an eighth region added to the heavenly realm of the blessed.

**HINDUISM.** The religious symbolisms of heaven and hell as given expression in the religious traditions of India have a distinctive role and significance when contrasted with their multiple meanings within the contexts of the religions of West Asia and Western civilizations. The ancient Vedic liter-

ature (1500–1200 BCE), especially the *Rgveda* (a collection of hymns associated with funeral rituals), portrays a heaven regarded as the realm of the fathers, who proceed there after death in order to be with the gods. As the practice of the funeral rite of cremation gained prominence, Agni, god of fire, was called upon to provide for the purification of the deceased. Yama, who was the first human to die and who was also the god of the dead, oversees the heavenly realm. This realm was associated with the sky and the dead were associated with the stars. Among the gods in the heavenly realm is Varuṇa, god of the high-arched sky and a source of the order in the earthly realm. The welfare of those who have passed beyond death to heaven was associated with their participation in rituals, sacrifices, and offerings to the gods while on earth.

In heaven, the distinctiveness of personal identity is preserved, and, in close communion with the gods, those who have entered heaven enjoy the pleasures and goods they have known on earth, but in full measure. Priests and warriors were portrayed among those who enter the heavenly realm, though there was no comprehensive and systematic indexing of those who do and those who do not enjoy the goods of heaven. Though there is much ambiguity regarding human destiny in the literature of the earliest Vedas, there are suggestions that the fate of those who did not achieve a heavenly state (presumably because of a neglect of proper ritual participation, since no moral tests for entrance into heaven were suggested) is either extinction or relegation to a realm of darkness under the earth (hence, hell). In later elaborate ceremonial works, specifically the Brāhmaṇas composed primarily for the ritual performances of the priests, there was presented a more definitive characterization of heaven as an abode in which were experienced the joys and goodness of earthly existence, but greatly enhanced and without the limitations known before death. The quality of heavenly life was viewed as correlative with efficacious ritual performance on earth since association with the gods of sacramental ritual communion (Agni, Varuṇa, Indra, et al.) was assured. Hell was likewise presented as a realm of retribution for ritual deficiencies.

By the era of the rise of Hinduism proper (third century BCE), a quite different worldview had come to dominate the Indian scene, shaped fundamentally by the philosophical and religious ideas of the Upaniṣads (sixth to first centuries BCE). A cyclical worldview had been given sophisticated expression. The notions of transmigration and reincarnation informed a pervasive understanding of human existence as involving, in cyclic continuity, a series of lives, deaths, and rebirths and had come to dominate a comprehensive interpretation of human existence.

Heaven and hell came to be viewed not as a vision of ultimate fulfillment or destiny, but as intermediate states intermittent with a series of earthly existences in a cycle of births and deaths (*saṃsāra*). One's *karman* (Pali, *kamma*), the reservoir of the consequences of thoughts, words, and

deeds cumulative over the entire series of one's existences, determines the nature of the soul's passage from one earthly existence to another through one of the several levels of heaven or hell, which are thus intermediate states of varying degrees of suffering or relative bliss. In traditional Hindu cosmology, three realms (*lokas*)—heaven, the earth, and a netherworld (sky)—are supplemented by a vision of fourteen additional realms, seven of which rise above the earth ("heavens") and seven of which (or, in some instances, multiples of seven, such as twenty-one) are below the earth.

The goal of the continuing human pilgrimage was liberation and release (*mokṣa*) from the suffering associated with attachment to the samsaric cycle to the unqualified enjoyment and ultimate fulfillment of the bliss of *nirvāṇa*. *Nirvāṇa*, which is held to be resistant to definition but is accessible to experience, has been variously envisioned as the union of the soul (*ātman*) with the ultimate divine reality, *brahman* (Śāṅkara, eighth to ninth century CE, and the school of Advaita Vedānta), or as an unqualified communion of the soul with God (Rāmānuja, eleventh to twelfth century CE, and the school of Viṣṭadvaita). Such fulfillment was to be achieved by the spiritual discipline of one of the pathways (*mārgas*, *yogas*), or some combination thereof, of traditional Hinduism: *jñānayoga* (liberating wisdom), *karmayoga* (actions), *rājāyoga* (contemplative discipline), or *bhakti* (loving devotion, adoration of God, *pūjā*).

The twice-born castes (*brāhmaṇas*, *kṣatriyas*, *vaiśyas*) had fullest access to these pathways of spiritual practice, especially the first three pathways mentioned. The *bhakti* movements in Hinduism stressed a mode of religious life that involved devotional and ritual practices in which adoration was centered on one of the gods of Hinduism, primarily Śiva or Viṣṇu, or one of their *avatāras* (incarnations) or consorts. The rich corpus of Hindu religious literature provided an abundant resource for the edification and inspiration of *bhakti* devotees. The *Bhagavadgītā* (Song of the Blessed Lord; c. first century CE), a portion of the expansive epic *Mahābhārata*, portrays Kṛṣṇa (an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu, the "preserver") as worthy of a devotee's total devotion, while stressing the ideal of responsible yet disinterested action in the world. Some scholars hold that the importance of the *Bhagavadgītā* lies in part in its recognition of the legitimacy of *bhakti* as a pathway to liberation alongside of *jñāna*-, *karma*-, and *rājāyoga*. The other great Indian epic, the *Rāmāyaṇa* (c. fourth century BCE, with the first and last of seven chapters presumed to be later additions), portrays Rāma as another *avatāra* of Viṣṇu worthy of devotional adoration, the accomplished practice of which results in intermediate stays in one of the heavens until the perfection of the practice leads to the perfect bliss of unqualified and unendingly blissful adoration of and communion with God (*nirvāṇa*).

**BUDDHISM.** With the Hindu tradition Buddhism shares a cyclical view of history and of individual existence. The world of time and space and history, the realm of samsaric

cycles, is transitory and constantly in flux. Heaven and hell are seen as parts of that transitory world, as intermediate and temporary states between one earthly existence and another. Death is thus but a transition from one earthly existence through an intermediate level of one of the heavens or hells to rebirth in yet another earthly existence. The attachment of beings to the samsaric cycle, often referred to as the “wheel of existence” and characterized by *duḥkha* (suffering, unsatisfactoriness), is caused by *tr̥ṣṇā* (clinging, grasping, desiring) conditioned by ignorance (*avidyā*) of the Dharma, or the truth of the Middle Path as taught by the Buddha. Though *tr̥ṣṇā*, in the early Buddhism of India and the later Theravāda of Southeast Asia, is the ultimate cause of rebirth, one’s *karman* determines the type and level of rebirth. In this tradition, only the enlightened ones, the *arhats*, are free from the cycle of rebirths to enjoy the equanimity and the bliss of *nirvāṇa*.

The temporary aggregation of the components of ordinary experience (the *skandhas*: form, sensation, perception, dispositions and volitions, and consciousness, including self-consciousness) that prompt the presumption of separate person or self is dissipated at death following the experience of liberation (*mokṣa*). Short of enlightenment, there is no surcease of the continuous round of rebirths. The having-beenness of one life, with its repository of *karman*, leads to the coming-into-being of another life in another realm, though it is denied that any *ātman*, soul or self, as a separate entity transmigrates (known as the Buddhist teaching of *anātman*). Rebirth may occur in any one of the various heavens or hells, and one may be reborn as an animal, again as a human being, or in the *preta* realm, the realm of ghosts.

There is no one completely systematic account of the various hells in the Pali canon, the corpus of Theravāda texts known as the Tipiṭaka. Generally, the realm of *kāmaloka*, of the lower universe of sensuality, includes the various hells and the six lower heavens. The Pali Abhidhamma Piṭaka reports eight “hot” hells below the earth, each involving differing forms of suffering by which the consequences of bad *kamma* are consumed. In addition, there are sixteen minor hells attached to each of these hells. The duration of a passage through any one of these hells is not definitively established, each being correlative with the measure of the evil *kamma* to be consumed. Other Hīnayāna canons preserve more systematic and detailed cosmologies.

The structure of the heavenly realms in Buddhism draws upon non-Buddhist and Hindu sources, though they are reinterpreted within the Buddhist context. The six heavens of the sensual realm of *kāmaloka* are inhabited by the kings and gods who manifest their power through various forms of sensual experience. Included in this group is the Tuṣita Heaven, from which Gautama is said to have come upon entering his last earthly existence in which he experienced enlightenment, as well as the *bodhisattvas* of exemplary compassion and saving power.

The Buddhist heavens of the other two realms, *rūpaloka* (the world of form) and *arūpaloka* (the formless world, often referred to as the world of mind or consciousness), are accessible only by those accomplished in the practice of the discipline of meditation and spiritual endeavors. The heavens of *rūpaloka* are material and are inhabited by the gods who are free from sensual yearnings. They are variously numbered in different lists, in some texts enumerated as thirteen while in other texts listed as being from sixteen to eighteen, distributed in four different groups correlative with four *dhyānas* (modes of meditation). The heavens of *arūpaloka* are likewise structured in four groups, each characterized by stages or levels of meditative attainment. For Buddhism, life in the heavenly realms is not free from involvement in the conditioned existence of samsaric cycles. The ultimate goal of enlightenment and fulfillment transcends even the highest of the heavens.

The *bodhisattva* motif of Mahāyāna Buddhism qualifies the ideas of both heavens and hells in the Buddhism of the “large vehicle.” The *bodhisattvas*, moved by compassion for all beings involved in suffering (*duḥkha*), are beings who have taken a vow not to enter *nirvāṇa* until all sentient beings can do so. They are able to manifest themselves through diverse forms and beings and in any of the realms in which there are suffering beings, even into the depths of the lowest hell, to share their merit with all who are in need of liberation and enlightenment.

In no movement of the Buddhist traditions is this emphasis on the saving power of *bodhisattvas* and Buddha figures more vividly expressed than in the Pure Land schools of China, Korea, and Japan. Central to this popular Buddhist movement is the figure of Amitābha (Chin., O-mi-t’o-fo; Jpn., Amida), a Buddha who has gained inexhaustible merit through countless ages of Buddhist practice and who, as a consequence, possesses infinite saving power dedicated to the salvation of all. This Lord of the Western Paradise responds beneficently to all who invoke his name, assuring them of both protection in earthly life and passage at death to the Land of the Western Paradise, whence their full enlightenment and entry into *nirvāṇa* is assured.

The quest for immortality had developed in Chinese religious Daoism; and with its associated belief in heavens, it made for fruitful interaction with Chinese Buddhism of the Pure Land. A notable figure who did much to extend the influence of Pure Land Buddhism in China was Tanluan (c. 488–c. 554) who had turned to this form of Buddhism after an extended Daoist search for the elixir of immortality. All mortals, he held, could be assured of salvation by faith in Amitābha, given expression through the recitation of his name, thus relying on his saving power.

The dominant Pure Land schools of Japan, the Jōdoshū, founded by Hōnen (d. 1212), and the Shinshū, formed by followers of a disciple of Hōnen, Shinran (d. 1263), attest to the wide appeal of this form of Buddhism, with its inviting vision of the Western Paradise. Pure Land texts, especially



*Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (Jpn., *Hokekyō*) and the *Sukhāvativyūha*, contain graphic and imaginative descriptions of the Western Paradise: a bountiful land without pain or suffering; abounding in pleasure and beautiful natural surroundings, with flowing rivers and lotus-filled lakes, permeated by pleasant music, adorned by exquisite gems, and where neither a notion of nor a word for hell is to be found.

**CHINESE TRADITIONS.** The aspiration to achieve harmony in society that has characterized all of Chinese religion and philosophy has given to Chinese understandings of heaven a unique aspect. Rooted in the most ancient traditions of China, the worship of Heaven as well as the ruler of Heaven, Shangdi, is evident as early as the Shang dynasty (1532–1027 BCE). During the period of the Zhou dynasty (1027–256 BCE) the worship of Heaven, Tian, was regarded as essential for the maintenance of harmony between Heaven and earth. It is in the Confucian tradition, which formatively shaped the essential character of Chinese civilization through many centuries of relative stability, that a sophisticated articulation is found of the nature and place of Heaven.

Although Confucius's teachings and the Confucian tradition advocated the quest for harmony in human affairs, especially through the five relationships (ruler-subject, father-son, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother, and friend-friend), as the way to perfect harmony in the cosmos, there is no doubt that basic presumptions regarding Heaven provided an ontological ground for the moral teachings to be manifest in the perfection of the *junzi* (sage, ideal gentleman). The focus was placed on human affairs; human beings should begin by seeking harmony in the relationships that immediately address them. Yet the underlying conviction was that if harmony is achieved in human affairs, harmony with Heaven will be assured. Thus, the full practice of *li* (tradition, propriety) informed by *ren* (human beings in relationship with each other) in the spirit of *shu* (reciprocity) along with the honoring of *xiao* (filial piety) will manifest the kind of *de* (perfect moral virtue and power) that is the ideal of the *junzi*. This is, for Confucianism, the way (*tao*) of Heaven in human affairs, and the very nature and structure of the cosmos as determined by Heaven is such that all will be well if ruler and subject both revere and follow (i.e., practice) this way. Thus, though it appears that the thought of Confucianism can most accurately be characterized as primarily a social ethic, there are nonetheless cosmic and ontological dimensions grounded in its notion of Heaven. The will of heaven (*tianzhi*) is the primary reality and the ultimate basis of Confucian thought. Whatever happens that is not the direct responsibility of human beings is attributed to the will of Heaven.

Unrestrained speculation about the nature of Heaven was not characteristic of Confucian thought, as evidenced in the texts of the Four Books, that is, the *Lunyu* (Analects), the *Daxue* (Great Learning), the *Zhong yong* (Doctrine of the Mean), and the *Mengzi* (Book of Mencius). In certain passages it does seem to be presumed that Heaven is an imper-

sonal force underlying the cosmos, the ultimate source of order and morality. Yet in other passages Heaven is presumed to have the capacity to understand the plight and situation of human beings, indicating a seemingly personal dimension to heaven.

Though Confucian thought was not inclined to speculate about Heaven as a destiny awaiting human beings beyond death, its emphasis on the centrality of the family afforded a natural sympathy with ritual practices of ancestral reverence. Propriety in honoring the ancestors, whose spirits survived death and whose welfare was reciprocally related to that of living persons, became an essential component of *li*. As indicated earlier, both Buddhists who presided over masses for the dead and religious Daoists in China subscribed to a cosmology that included levels of heavens above and hells below the earth.

**JAPANESE TRADITIONS.** There are, in indigenous traditions of Japan, concepts analogous to those of heaven and hell in other religions. The oldest traditions recorded in the *Nihongi* and the *Kojiki* contained only nascent suggestions concerning the possibility of life beyond death, though this itself was associated with the grave. Following the sixth century, Chinese and Buddhist influences contributed to further development of religion in Japan. References are made to a realm beneath, one term for which was Yomi (literally, "darkness"). Though characterized as an undesirable realm from which beings threaten the welfare of the living, it is not clear that it is a repository of the dead. Gods dwell there, but they represent negative powers of death and disease. Later Yomi came to be conceived as a realm of punishment. More definite in later Japanese texts are the notions about a realm analogous to heaven, Ame. This is the dwelling place of the gods, and notable persons are thought to proceed there after death. Ame is a bounteous realm above the earth, made attractive by the presence of trees, flowers, and streams; its beauty is beyond anything known on earth. The importance Ame came to have is underscored by the tradition that Amaterasu, the sun goddess, visited there as well as Izanagi after his failure to recover his wife, Izanami. Japanese Buddhism shared as well the normative Mahāyāna visions of various levels of heaven and hell as intermediate states.

**SEE ALSO** Ancestors; Cosmology; Judgment of the Dead; Paradise; Resurrection; Underworld.

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- HEAVEN'S GATE**, a small American UFO cult, achieved worldwide notoriety in March 1997 when the leader and his thirty-eight followers committed mass suicide in Rancho Santa Fe, California. The bodies, dressed in black uniforms and covered with purple shrouds, were found lying on bunk beds and mattresses throughout the group's seven-bedroom mansion. The suicides had been carefully planned, and law enforcement investigators found no evidence of violence or coercion. After ingesting barbiturates and alcohol to induce drowsiness, the members had pulled plastic bags over their heads and suffocated as they fell asleep. Once free of their human "containers," they expected their souls to be lifted up to a spacecraft that would take them to a physical heaven, the Level above Human. There they would be given new androgynous bodies and assume the task of guiding the evolution of life on other planets throughout the universe.
- ORIGINS.** The leader of Heaven's Gate, a sixty-six-year-old man named Do, claimed to be God's sole representative on the planet. Originally he had shared leadership with a woman, Ti, but she died of liver cancer in 1985. Ti and Do met in Houston, Texas, in 1972. Ti, whose given name was Bonnie Lu Nettles (b. 1924), was a registered nurse and a student of metaphysics, including Theosophy. Do, then Marshall Herff Applewhite (b. 1931), was a former music professor and lapsed Presbyterian.
- Applewhite had lost two university teaching positions because of problems stemming from confusion over his sexual identity. In 1965 he was dismissed from the University of Alabama and divorced by his wife following a homosexual affair with a student, and in 1970 he was fired from Saint Thomas University in Houston after his fiancée, a female student, attempted suicide when he broke off their engagement. Applewhite lamented his inability to form a lasting relationship, and though yearning for a soulmate to help him achieve his potential, he contemplated renouncing sexuality altogether.
- Shortly after the Saint Thomas incident, Applewhite began having visions, including one in which he was told



that he had been chosen for a Christlike messianic role. It was during this period that Applewhite met Nettles. Still active in theater circles, Applewhite offered her an exciting escape from an unhappy marriage, and she gave him the confidence and metaphysical knowledge he needed to begin making sense of his experiences. Believing they had known each other in a previous lifetime, they immediately formed an intense, though platonic, relationship, which led to the breakup of Nettles's marriage.

Early in 1973, Applewhite and Nettles left Houston, hoping to free themselves from worldly commitments in order to discover why God had brought them together. The answer came in a revelation six months later: They were the "two witnesses" in *Revelation* 11 who, after being martyred, would resurrect and ascend to heaven in a cloud. Like Jesus, they had come from the Kingdom of Heaven to show humans how to achieve eternal life, and like Jesus they would return in a spacecraft. Jesus had failed in his mission, so Applewhite had been sent to try again, this time with a helper because of the negativity on the planet, which was controlled by Satan.

To become eligible for membership in the Next Level, humans would have to follow the same path Applewhite and Nettles had taken by shedding their attachments to the human level, including their sexuality. The overcoming process would initiate a biological transformation of their bodies that would be completed upon reaching the Next Level, where they would become immortal, androgynous beings. Paradoxically, in light of the mass suicide to come, Applewhite and Nettles claimed that seekers had to board the spacecraft in living, physical bodies. Death would ensure another incarnation as a human.

In April 1975, after much fruitless proselytizing, Applewhite and Nettles recruited twenty-four followers in Hollywood, California. Now with a flock, they called themselves Bo and Peep. Their new group came to be known as Human Individual Metamorphosis (HIM), referring to the transformation of the body brought about by the overcoming process.

Bo and Peep began presenting their message in public meetings, and by the end of 1975, they had over two hundred followers. Most were young, single spiritual seekers with weak attachments to conventional institutions, although some had left families, homes, and careers. Typically they vanished abruptly within days of hearing the message, disappearing so completely that even private detectives were unable to find them. The disappearances made national headlines, and syndicated news stories about HIM appeared sporadically for several months.

**FROM HIM TO TOTAL OVERCOMERS ANONYMOUS.** The group reached its maximum size in the fall of 1975, but membership declined rapidly because the defection rate was high and fewer people were joining. Early in 1976, with about one hundred members remaining, Bo and Peep

stopped recruiting, and the media lost interest in HIM. Bo and Peep inaugurated a new phase called the Classroom, which they compared to astronaut training. Less committed "students" were encouraged to leave, and late in 1976 nineteen were expelled. Bo and Peep changed their names again, this time to Do and Ti, with Ti's name spoken first, indicating her superior position in the "chain of mind" connecting the students with the Next Level.

The Classroom coupled extreme isolation with demanding discipline. Moving every six months, the Class initially lived in remote campgrounds, and later in expensive suburban neighborhoods. Isolation from humans was virtually complete during the camping phase because the Class was supported by a student's trust fund, but members remained insulated even after moving into houses. In 1978, forty-eight members moved into a single house, or "craft," without their neighbors' knowledge. Only certain students were allowed outside and "intercepts" were designated to greet visitors. After the trust fund ran out, some students got jobs waiting tables and doing computer work, but they maintained their distance from other people by identifying themselves as members of a celibate religious order. Not until 1982 were students allowed to call home. Some eventually visited their families, but they divulged few details about their activities and never revealed the group's location.

Everyday life was governed by strict schedules and procedures. The most demanding routine required students to check in throughout the day at a central location in staggered eleven-minute intervals. Arriving two at a time, they would stand prayerfully for one minute, then go back to their business, returning eleven minutes later, and so on until bedtime. This discipline was practiced, with occasional breaks, for months at a time. Procedure manuals prescribed the most mundane activities, from shaving to buttering bread, and each student was assigned a "check partner" to make sure the rules were followed. To help eliminate their humanness, sex and private property were forbidden, and except when sleeping or engaged in "out-of-craft tasks," students wore hooded uniforms that concealed their faces. Lingering human traits were addressed in slippage meetings, a form of mutual criticism. During free periods students studied astrology, worked puzzles, and watched television game shows to exercise their minds. Every night students took shifts scanning the heavens for UFOs.

Early in the 1980s, Ti and Do realized that their students were not, as they had thought, humans who would physically change their bodies into Next Level vehicles. Instead they were members of the Kingdom of Heaven who were temporarily occupying human vehicles for a training mission, which included exemplifying celibacy for humans. This new understanding helped cushion the blow when Ti died of cancer in 1985. Do explained that Ti, having completed her task of getting him started on his mission, had left her vehicle and returned to the Next Level, where she received a new body, like changing clothes. The separation of

self and body escalated in 1988 when Do broached the idea of castration as a way for the males to eliminate the sexuality of their vehicles. Eventually eight men, including Do, had themselves castrated.

In 1988 the Class tentatively resumed proselytizing by mailing a statement by Do to UFO experts and New Age centers. Do elaborated on his belief in Satan by describing a "Luciferian" army of evil space aliens pitted against the Next Level. Subsequent videotapes produced by the Class expanded on Lucifer's activities and announced that the end-time was approaching. But not until 1992, in a *USA Today* advertisement warning that earth's civilization was about to be "spaded under," did the Class stress the urgency of the situation. In 1994 the Class, with only twenty-six students remaining and now calling itself Total Overcomers Anonymous, embarked on a series of sixty-four public lectures to present the message one last time. The group doubled in size, but most of the newcomers dropped out within a few months.

**THE SUICIDES.** Discouraged, Do grew increasingly concerned about Luciferian interference with his mission. After the 1993 assault on the Branch Davidian residence near Waco, Texas, Do worried that the Class might be under government surveillance, so he moved his students to New Mexico, where they began building a fortified compound. However, the project was never completed, and Do began sending students to other countries in an unsuccessful attempt to find a more compatible location for the Class. Proselytizing continued over the Internet, but the main response was ridicule, and Do admitted to growing weary of his mission.

In this context, the Class began discussing the possibility of "exiting" their vehicles, as Ti had done. The discussion was hypothetical at first, but it turned serious in September 1994 when Do asked the students how they would feel about leaving their bodies if this required nothing more than drinking a pleasant-tasting liquid and falling asleep. A few balked, but only one left the Class. In 1996 the Class began posting messages on its website that strongly implied that suicide was imminent. Erroneously, Do had come to believe that, like Ti, he was dying of cancer, and in November the Class liquidated nearly all its possessions.

By 1997 the number of students had dropped to thirty-eight, all of whom would die by suicide along with Do. The Class, now calling itself Heaven's Gate, had rented a hilltop mansion in Rancho Santa Fe, a wealthy suburb of San Diego. While several students still worked at out-of-craft tasks, many now worked "in-craft" for the group's web design business, Higher Source. Neighbors were generally unaware that a religious group lived in the house, and the few outsiders who became acquainted with the students described them as friendly, but reclusive.

Finally, in March, a flashing "RED ALERT!" was added to the group's web page announcing that the moment of departure was imminent. Although the medical examiner was

unable to determine exactly when the suicides began, they appear to have started on March 23, the day after the Hale-Bopp comet—the brightest of the twentieth century—made its closest approach to earth. Do had concluded that Ti was coming back in a spacecraft concealed behind the comet's tail. Given Do's belief that he had been sent to complete the task assigned to Jesus, it may be significant that Easter, symbolizing Jesus' departure, was just seven days away.

Consistent with the group's meticulous attention to detail, the suicides followed a written plan. While some details remain unclear, it appears that the deaths took place over a three-day period, and that Do was among the last to die. In a videotape made just before the suicides, the students overflowed with gratitude toward Ti and Do, relieved and excited to finally be leaving their human containers for the Kingdom of Heaven.

**THE AFTERMATH.** As the largest mass suicide on American soil, the deaths triggered sensational headlines around the world. Most ex-members were shocked by the suicides because only a few were aware that their former classmates no longer believed that a physical body was required to enter the Next Level. Subsequently two ex-members took their lives in hopes of joining the Class aboard the spacecraft, bringing the death toll to forty-one. Although a few ex-members continued to believe that Ti and Do had come from the Next Level, none expressed any desire to carry on the Class. Only another Representative from the Next Level could do that. In their minds, Heaven's Gate ceased to exist when Do and his students exited their vehicles.

**SEE ALSO** Branch Davidians; New Religious Movements, article on New Religious Movements in the United States; Theosophical Society; UFO New Religions.

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## HEBREW SCRIPTURES SEE BIBLICAL LITERATURE

## HECATE SEE HEKATE

**HEDGEHOGS.** In the myths and legends of Inner Asia and eastern Europe, the hedgehog enjoys considerable respect because of its amazing wisdom. It is often described as being superior in wisdom even to the apparently omniscient God. Moreover, the hedgehog is sometimes a culture hero, instructing people in the various arts of life such as fire making, agriculture, and marriage customs.

In several cultures, the hedgehog has been thought wise enough to have assisted God in his work of creation. As a Romanian cosmogonic myth tells it, during creation the earth had spread out so far that there was no more room for the waters. God did not know what to do, so he sent the bee to the hedgehog, the wisest of all animals, to ask advice. It refused, however, to help, giving the excuse that God was all-knowing. The bee, knowing that the hedgehog is in the habit of talking to itself, stole back up to it and heard it murmuring, "God does not know that he must create valleys and mountains in order to make room for the waters." The bee hurried back to God with this advice, enabling him to complete his creation. Bulgarians have similar stories. In a Lettish version, God himself tells the hedgehog of his cosmogonic dilemma and obtains advice from it. To reward the hedgehog, God gives it a coat made of needles.

The Buriats have preserved a story about how the Lord of the Earth once visited Khormusta Tengri, one of the gods of heaven. On leaving, the Lord of the Earth begged for the sun and the moon as presents. Hospitality did not allow Khormusta Tengri to refuse, so the Lord of the Earth took the lights of the sky with him and shut them up in a box. The whole universe became dark. Distressed, Khormusta Tengri turned to the hedgehog. Using its profound wisdom, the hedgehog was able to return the sun and the moon to their heavenly orbits. In another Buriat version, the two divine beings are Kān-Čurmasan and Lusat, god of the ocean, with the hedgehog playing the same role.

According to the Buriats, fire making originated with the hedgehog. In the beginning, neither gods nor humans

could make fire; only Hedgehog, who was then a human being, could. One day, a crowd gathered around Hedgehog to hear the secret of making fire. But the young girls, seeing his strange shape, began to laugh, and this angered him so much that he decided to tell his secret only to his wife, and even then only under a promise of silence. But the hawk overheard him explaining the secret and told it to the gods. From the gods humans in turn learned the art of making fire. Later, the descendants of Hedgehog were transformed into hedgehogs. Similar stories are known among some eastern European peoples: According to the Udmurts and the Mari, it is the hedgehog that showed humans and animals how to make fire using stone, steel, and tinder. They also say that the hedgehog instructed people in using the iron plow to till the soil.

The idea that the hedgehog is a clever animal is still alive, too, in the folklore of western Europe. A German folktale tells of a race between the hedgehog and the hare from which the hedgehog, by a trick, emerges victorious.

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*Revised Bibliography*

**HEGEL, G. W. F.** (1770–1831), was a German philosopher, the culminating figure in the philosophical movement known as German Idealism. Born in Stuttgart, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was given a thorough grounding in the humanities, with strong emphasis on literature and history. From his earliest years he was keenly aware of the cultural disintegration of western Europe—moral and religious, sociopolitical, and intellectual. He felt strongly that he was called to be a scholar and educator who would contribute to the reintegration of German culture, initially through emphasis on religious renewal. Thus, in 1788 he was enrolled in the Lutheran seminary at Tübingen, where, from 1788 to 1790, he studied philosophy and, from 1790 to 1793, theology. From this he turned to political thinking, seeking to analyze the moral prerequisites of an authentic political society. Finally he became convinced that only as a philosopher could he secure the intellectual underpinnings necessary for religious and sociopolitical renewal. From 1793 to 1796 he served as private tutor in Bern, Switzerland, and from 1797 to 1801 he filled the same position in Frankfurt am Main,

Germany. In 1801 he moved to Jena, where he defended his dissertation (*De orbitis planetarum*) and began his professional career at the university.

In 1807 Hegel's first major work, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, was published, and he began a short-lived career as a newspaper editor in Bamberg. From 1808 to 1816 he held the post of director of a *Gymnasium* (secondary school) in Nuremberg, where he published his second major work, *Science of Logic*. In 1816 he was named professor of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, where, in 1817, he published his third major work, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (2d and 3d eds., Berlin, 1827 and 1830). In 1818 he was appointed professor in Berlin, where he remained until his death in 1831. The last work by Hegel to be published during his lifetime was *Philosophy of Right*, which appeared in 1821. The bulk of his writings—on art, religion, history of philosophy, and philosophy of history—were published posthumously, based on a combination of his lecture notes and notes taken by his students.

**UNDERSTANDING HEGEL.** It can safely be said that no major figure in the whole of Western philosophy has been more difficult to understand than Hegel; indeed, to understand him is the task of a lifetime. The reasons for the difficulty are many, but they can be summed up, generally, as five: his encyclopedic vision, his enormous erudition, his language, his dialectical method, and his extraordinarily systematic thinking.

**1. Encyclopedic vision.** In a certain sense Hegel's intellectual quest is a continuous act of faith in reason. He seeks to articulate this faith in such a way that reason itself validates its claim that no truth is recalcitrant to it—not in the sense that human reason can, as merely finite activity, discover all truth, but in the sense that given truth, reason can comprehend the rationality of it, that is, the rational necessity underlying even existential contingency. As Hegel sees it, reason is truly reason only if it is ultimately absolute and infinite, that is, if it is absolute Spirit. This absolute Spirit, conceived as concretely real and not as some vague abstraction, will be seen to be God. Human reason is, it is true, finite, but it is reason at all only insofar as it is a sharing in infinite, divine Spirit, whose object is the infinite totality of reality.

**2. Enormous erudition.** Hegel's was a lifetime of intense and insatiable intellectual curiosity; he was not only an omnivorous student but also one who thoroughly enjoyed every intellectual challenge he met, one who did not, however, indulge in intellectual games. What he sought was a knowledge that is not only true but that truly makes a difference in life—not truth simply for its own sake but for the sake of life. He was not a mere technician in the handling of concepts but a thinker who sought rational grounds for a way of life, not merely an intellectual life but a life that is moral, religious, social, and political—in short, authentically human.

**3. Language.** Hegel uses a language that is both allusive and elusive; he uses language to say what only pure thought

can think, and in so doing he stretches language, perhaps beyond its limits, refusing to let grammar be a straitjacket. One must be careful not to read Hegel in such a way as to take his meaning to be what the reader would mean if he or she said the same.

**4. Dialectical method.** Hegel claims that he has not arbitrarily chosen to think and speak dialectically, but that the dynamic character of reality itself demands just this method of dynamic thinking. At the very beginning of his *Science of Logic*, he affirms that to think at all is to think being, but that to think being necessarily entails thinking its opposite, nonbeing, and that to think the relationship between being and nonbeing entails thinking becoming. If is added to this the basic Hegelian contention that what truly rational thought cannot but think to be true cannot but be true, one comes to the conclusion that reality is necessarily dynamic and can be thought truly only in a thinking that is dynamic. Incidentally, the oft-repeated description of the Hegelian dialectic in terms of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis is not Hegel's own description, and in fact is not part of Hegel's mature vocabulary at all.

**5. Extraordinarily systematic thinking.** The comprehensive grasp of any truth implies, for Hegel, the whole of truth; similarly, an adequate grasp of anything Hegel says demands a comprehensive grasp of all he says, which makes for enormous difficulty of comprehension. Strictly speaking, no work by Hegel can be comprehended simply by itself. To understand *Phenomenology of Spirit*, one must see it as an application of the dynamic methodology elaborated in *Science of Logic*, and the latter must be read in light of the progressive development of rational thinking traced in the former. When he writes of morality, of law, of social-political structures, of art, religion, or philosophy, all must be situated in the framework of the systematic structure articulated in *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Whatever is to be understood must be understood in the dynamic matrix of historical development.

**HEGEL AND RELIGION.** With the difficulty acknowledged of coming to grips with the complexities of Hegel's highly intricate thought patterns, it remains true that no modern thinker has had more influence than Hegel—and that influence is on the increase—on moral, legal, social-political, aesthetic, religious, and philosophical thought. This article confines itself here, however, to Hegel's influence on subsequent religious and theological thinking—both Catholic and Protestant. It is important to note in this connection that, for Hegel, religious consciousness, a uniquely human phenomenon, has characterized human society as far back as any records will take us, and that it has borne eloquent testimony to the progressive sophistication of human consciousness of the divine, known in Hegel's writings as the Absolute.

Historically speaking, that consciousness has manifested itself, initially in its most primitive form, in the deification of the cosmic forces of nature, with mounting refinement through efforts on the part of humankind to portray the di-

vine in plastic, mythic, and poetic form, culminating in what it sees as “absolute religion,” or “religion of revelation,” in which God, the absolute Spirit, reveals himself to the human spirit by taking on human form. Clearly Hegel has in mind here the Christian religion, which he calls, in fact, in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, “absolute religion.” It should be noted, however, that, for Hegel, in every form of religion, even the most primitive, religious consciousness is more than a projection on the part of humanity of human ideals; in every form it is a self-manifestation—a self-revelation—of the Absolute, which is spirit and only spirit.

For Hegel, then, religion and revelation are inseparable, but revelation can take progressively more adequate forms—remembering, of course, that in all its forms it is revelation to humankind as thinking spirit. Thus God reveals himself to humankind in nature, but only if humans think of nature in such a way as to receive the revelation. By the same token God reveals himself not only to but also in finite spirit, provided that humans see in finite spirit the necessity of infinite Spirit. God, moreover, speaks to humanity in the words of scripture, not so much, however, in the words themselves as in the story the words tell.

Thus, when Hegel speaks, as he does in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, of a “spiritual interpretation” of Christian teachings—an interpretation sometimes confused with “demythologization”—he is saying that if what revelation says of God is true, grasped as true through the mediation of the inner light of the Spirit, then what it affirms to be true is necessarily true, and this truth can be articulated in reason. Then God speaks to humankind not only in words but in person, in the person who is the Word. Finally, God speaks to humankind in the person of the Spirit who dwells in humans—in the community of believers and in the individual believer. To find where Hegel says all this one must turn chiefly to his *Phenomenology*, chapter 7, “Religion”; to his *Encyclopedia*, part 3, section 3, “Philosophy of Absolute Spirit” (with “additions”); to his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*; to his *Lectures on Aesthetics*; and to his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*.

Here it is important to come to grips with the Hegelian concept of the “objectively rational.” When the human spirit affirms what God has revealed, it affirms what is not only true but also necessarily true, even though the affirmation has not been arrived at as the result of a strictly rational (or logical) process of thinking. Thus, what is affirmed is objectively rational. Hegel’s further contention is, however—and this is where he meets the greatest opposition—that given the truth of what is revealed, human reason can see the rational necessity of it. Whatever is true of God is necessarily true, and thus there can be no contradiction between what reason sees and what religion believes, even though it may well be that reason will not see it until faith presents it. Thus, God’s being and God’s activity are identical, the latter as necessary as the former, without prejudice to God’s freedom, that is, his absolute self-determination.

It can be seen from what has been said thus far that Hegel is far more interested in the object of religious affirmation than he is in the subjective character of the affirmation. Nor is he concerned with the affirmation simply as an intellectual act: Much more his concern is with the response of the whole human person to God, who is truth. Nevertheless, he contends that the response is adequately human only if it proceeds from what is most characteristically human in humankind, that is, reason, but not reason conceived in narrowly “rationalistic” terms. Here it is that Hegel has frequently been accused of making the religious relationship far too rational, of being panlogistic, if not pantheistic, of allowing religion to be swallowed up in philosophy. It is true, of course, that he does say that art presents the Absolute in the form of the sensibly perceptible, that religion represents the Absolute in the form of imaginative thinking, and that philosophy renders the Absolute present in its most proper form, that of pure thought, but it remains to be seen whether this, in fact, either dilutes the religious response or renders it no longer religious.

Whether or not Hegel succeeded in what he set out to do is a question that has elicited a variety of answers—depending for the most part on the predispositions of those who seek to answer the question. It scarcely seems open to question, however, that what Hegel intended was not to cancel out either the revelation in which absolute truth is presented, or the faith in which it is received, or the religious life that is consequent on both. When “speculative philosophy” thinks out the content of religious consciousness, philosophy does not supplant religion; it completes religion by thinking its content in the form most proper both to its exalted object and to the human subject, who is essentially rational. As Hegel sees it, it is absolute Spirit that bears witness in the human spirit to absolute truth, whether that be the truth of religion, of morality, of law, or of philosophy. Not only need not every believer become a philosopher, but the philosopher need not—must not—abrogate the faith that is at once the necessary precondition to and the constant underpinning of philosophical reflection.

Although it is true that in the final chapter of his *Phenomenology* Hegel sees “absolute knowing” as the culmination of human spiritual development, this affirmation must be seen against the backdrop of his contention that all human knowledge of truth is the work of absolute Spirit bearing witness in finite form to infinite truth. What philosophy can do, then, is to recognize that the presence of truth—even particular, finite truth—bespeaks the witness of absolute Spirit in human thinking. Both religion and philosophy are finite human activities, but they are more than that; because these finite activities ascend (are elevated) to the infinite object who is God, they are infinitized in the communion of the human and the divine.

Here it is important to emphasize the moral dimensions of Hegel’s thought. Whether the ascent of the human spirit to God be religious or philosophical or both, neither mere



intellectual interest nor fascination with the wonders of nature, nor awe before the extraordinary capacity of the human mind to think, will trigger that ascent; the orientation of the human spirit to God, the Absolute, will be effectively realized only if that orientation coincides with the striving toward moral goodness, in which alone the self-realization of the human spirit can be accomplished. For Hegel thought is not thought in the fullest sense if it is not oriented to the good, not merely in the sense of good thinking but, more importantly, in the sense of good living: It is, he contends, irrational to be immoral. God, then, is the ultimate goal of moral striving, not, it is true, as some vague, indeterminate “moral order” of the universe, but as the concrete, personal foundation for all moral order. Thus, there will be no religion in any significant sense where there is no longing for moral goodness that leads to religious consciousness of God as fulfillment of that longing. This, in turn, ultimately demands that the orientation be not merely emotional, even though knowing God is inseparable from an emotional response to the God who is known, the one God of both religion and philosophy.

**HEGEL AND “HEGELIANISM.”** It would be misleading here not to acknowledge that there has been and continues to be considerable dispute among scholars as to whether Hegel quite literally intended that absolute Spirit, which he sees as the concrete unified source of all thought and of all spiritual activity, and absolute Idea, the unified concrete object of all thought, should be identified with the God of religion. In addition, there has been and continues to be dispute as to whether, no matter what Hegel intended, the God of whom he speaks can legitimately be identified with the God of Christianity. All disputes aside, however, if one is to take Hegel at his word, he quite clearly says that because there is only one God, then the God of philosophy and the God of (Christian) religion are one and the same—if not, then the God of philosophy would be but an abstract God, that is, no God at all.

As late as 1830 (shortly before his death), in the preface to the third edition of his *Encyclopedia*, he indulges in one of his few emotional outbursts against those who take it upon themselves to say that he is not Christian. He also says quite clearly in more than one place that if philosophy is to be true to its vocation, it cannot fail to be theology. Thus, for Hegel, there is no area of philosophical thought that does not have as the goal of its striving the Absolute, or God—not so much, however, as simply an object of contemplation but, more significantly, as an ideal for will, where the ideal is conceived as concrete, personal Spirit. Thus, because philosophical thinking is the activity of the human spirit, the subject matter of philosophy is not, properly speaking, God as transcendent object; rather it is the human spirit in its intimate relation to divine Spirit, without which the former cannot realize in itself all that it is to be human.

It thus becomes impossible to speak in any precise way of the concept of “Hegelianism.” There is a Hegelian con-

tent, call it “absolute idealism” (an idealism oriented to and rooted in the Absolute); and there is a Hegelian method, call it “systematic dialectic.” Those who came after Hegel and were influenced by him can be classified in three groups: Hegelians of the right, of the left, and of the center. To be “Hegelian” at all was to employ to a greater or lesser extent Hegel’s method. The divisions concern the content of Hegel’s thinking and focus primarily on the interpretation of his religious thinking: The “left,” rejecting all that he has to say about God and, above all, about the person of Jesus, makes do with the method, more or less loosely employed; the “right” employs the method to articulate Christian belief; the “center” does the same as the “right” but interprets Hegel’s language in more or less metaphorical ways. The lasting (and growing) influence of Hegel, however, cannot be encapsulated in facile catchphrases.

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QUENTIN LAUER (1987)

**HEIDEGGER, MARTIN** (1889–1976), was a German philosopher. Young Heidegger’s concern with the meaning of holy scripture was matched by his interest in the question of the meaning of being. Raised as a strict Roman Catholic, he studied for the priesthood for two years before deciding to pursue philosophy at the University of Freiburg. After receiving his Ph.D. in 1915, he stayed on at the university to work with Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. During the years 1916 to 1919, Heidegger came to

find Catholic dogma too rigid and moved toward liberal Protestantism. In the 1920s he appears to have abandoned his faith altogether, yet throughout his life he remained deeply involved with religious and spiritual issues. From 1923 to 1928, he taught at the University of Marburg, where he was a colleague of Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, and Rudolf Otto. Then he returned to Freiburg to replace the aging Husserl as professor of philosophy. In 1933–1934, while rector of the university, he openly supported National Socialism, but he soon changed his position and began challenging Nazi views in his classes. As a result, he was eventually declared expendable and was sent to work on the Rhine dikes. After World War II, he returned to Freiburg, where he spent the rest of his life teaching and writing as a professor of philosophy. Heidegger's thought can be divided into an early and a late phase. The late phase, the so-called turn, began in the late 1930s. This "turn" was not a radical shift in his thinking but rather the mature expression of insights he had voiced earlier.

**HEIDEGGER'S EARLY THOUGHT.** In his major work, *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger claims that human existence, or *Dasein*, constitutes the temporal-historical clearing in which beings can manifest themselves, or "be." For Heidegger, being does not mean the metaphysical ground of reality, a role traditionally assigned to God, but instead the finite presencing or manifesting of entities as entities, as things that are. One's ability to use the word is shows that one understands the difference between being (presencing) and entities (things that present or reveal themselves). Because one is constantly understanding and interpreting what it means for oneself and other beings "to be," Heidegger concludes that human existence is essentially hermeneutical. Although one often understand oneself as a thing, such as an ego or thinking subject, Heidegger argues that humans are not things at all. Instead, they are the finite openness in which things, such as subjects and objects, can first manifest themselves, or "be." Each person must decide how to be this openness, whether inauthentically or authentically. As inauthentic, human *Dasein* conceals the fact that it is mortal openness and interprets itself as an enduring thing, like an ego or a soul. Yet, the mood of anxiety can at any time reveal that *Dasein* is not a thinglike substance, but instead finite openness for the being of beings. This revelation invites *Dasein* to halt its flight into distractions and roles that conceal who *Dasein* really is. In the moment of authenticity, *Dasein* resolves to undergo a radical change in its temporal openness. As a result of this change, *Dasein* no longer understands itself as an ego bent on avoiding death, but instead as a finite individual called on to take responsibility for its own limited possibilities and to act in concert with others to promote the community's heritage. Authenticity, then, is not merely a personal matter, but an event that aligns one with the destiny of one's people. For Heidegger, authenticity is a prerequisite for genuine philosophical understanding of being. Influenced by Augustine, Pascal, Luther, Kierkegaard, Dostoevskii, and Nietzsche, he maintains that theoretical knowledge must be

rooted in the personal experience of authentic human existence. Only such experience promotes the fulfillment of Western philosophy: to understand the being of beings.

**HEIDEGGER'S LATER THINKING AND ITS IMPACT ON THEOLOGY.** In *Being and Time*, Heidegger approaches being by analyzing the being (human *Dasein*) who understands being; in his later works, however, he approached being in other ways. For example, he meditated on the role played by language in the self-revealing, or being, of beings. Moreover, he no longer spoke of authenticity in voluntaristic terms, such as "resoluteness," but instead described it as "releasement" (*Gelassenheit*) from will, ego, and subjectivism. This turn in his thinking, which took on a mystical element influenced by Meister Eckhart, revealed new possibilities for a dialogue between philosophy and theology. The idea of releasement, for instance, has clear affinities with the Christian doctrine of grace. Heinrich Ott, a student of both Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth, was one of the first to point out the theological implications of Heidegger's later thought. Although the analysis in *Being and Time* of human *Dasein* had been inspired in part by Barth's work on the apostle Paul, Barth rejected Heidegger's philosophy because it overemphasized human understanding and did not properly address the being of God. Bultmann's theology supposedly suffered from a similar problem. But Ott argues that the later Heidegger corrected his early overemphasis on the human and spoke instead of humanity's need to be "appropriated" (*ereignet*) by and for the "event" (*Ereignis*) that "gives" being to us. Preparing for such appropriation requires a thinking that is more fundamental than science, that is, thinking that lets being reveal itself. True thinking discloses that language is not a tool one possesses to dominate entities; instead, one is "owned" by language. Language is the "house of being," the gathering and sheltering that lets entities reveal themselves in their own terms, not merely as objects for human use. In Ott's view, Heidegger's talk of responding to the presencing of entities through language may be analogous to Barth's claim that faith demands a response to the Word of God: Philosophy is to being as theology is to the self-manifesting Word of God.

Heidegger himself always warned of the dangers of misusing his thought for theological purposes. In 1928, he distinguished sharply between philosophy and theology. Much later, he claimed that if he were taken by faith, he would have to give up philosophy. He maintained that Christian faith cannot be fully understood in ontological terms; it must be rooted, instead, in the historical events of Christ's death and resurrection. Hence, he had doubts about the implications for faith of Bultmann's demythologizing. Although indebted to motifs drawn from the Judeo-Christian tradition, Heidegger did not intend to revive it. His call for a return of the gods shows his abiding concern for the sacred, but he denied that being can be identified with God. God is a kind of being, but being, as such, refers to the historically different ways in which entities reveal or manifest themselves. He hoped that, in the current dark time, the "destiny of being"

would bring forth a new world in which the gods would reappear. It is not clear how he could have such hope in being, however, because it lacks a personal dimension. Still, his impact on modern theology has been great. Heidegger's early concern with hermeneutics was transmitted to theology by his student Hans-Georg Gadamer as well as by Bultmann. Furthermore, by offering an alternative to the dualistic understanding of human existence, by calling for a nonobjectifying way of speaking of the holy, and by urging us to remain open for a return of the sacred, Heidegger provided much insight not only for such Protestant theologians as Bultmann, Tillich, Gogarten, Fuchs, Ebeling, and Macquarrie, but also for such Catholic theologians as Karl Rahner.

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Analysis of authenticity in light of Heidegger's religious-spiritual concerns.

MICHAEL E. ZIMMERMAN (1987)

**HEILER, FRIEDRICH** (1892–1967), German theologian and historian of religions. Born into a pious Roman Catholic family in Munich, Heiler studied theology, philosophy, Asian languages, and psychology at the University of Munich and received his doctorate in 1917 with a study of prayer that is still a classic, *Das Gebet*. One year later he published *Die buddhistische Versenkung* (Munich, 1918), a study of Buddhist contemplation. His work attracted the interest of the Swedish archbishop Nathan Söderblom, who invited him to Sweden. There he became active in the Lutheran church. In 1920 he accepted a professorship in comparative religion at the University of Marburg, where he remained until his retirement. During the Nazi era he was transferred from the Faculty of Theology into the Faculty of Arts and became its first dean after 1945.

Heiler's book on prayer shows his talent for explaining a central religious phenomenon in a purely inductive way, free of any philosophical presuppositions. Without losing sight of historical relationships, the book provides a phenomenological exposition not only of non-Christian religions but also of the Christian churches and their leaders, whose personalities Heiler interprets within the framework of the general history and phenomenology of religion. This achievement prevails in all of his writings down to his last major work, an introduction to the phenomenology of religion, *Erscheinungsformen und Wesen der Religion* (Stuttgart, 1961).

Heiler's double allegiance to the Catholic church and his new, Lutheran affiliation was never completely resolved, as his correspondence with Söderblom shows. In order to bridge the gap, he founded a high church movement, and he was later consecrated as a bishop in the Gallican succession. As much as he was critical of the historical development of the Roman church, the celebration of the Mass according to the ancient Christian rite remained central to Heiler's spiritual life. This orientation is evident from *Der Katholizismus* (1923; new ed., Munich, 1970), which provoked much controversy, and from two of his later studies, *Urkirche und Ostkirche* (Munich, 1937), on the development of the Eastern rites from earliest times, and *Altkirchliche Autonomie und päpstlicher Zentralismus* (Munich, 1941), on the Roman rite and its centralizing tendencies. His early interest in the modernist movement, which influenced him considerably, prompted him to write a biography of one of its leaders: *Alfred Loisy, 1857–1940, der Vater des katholischen Modernismus* (Munich, 1947).

Heiler had both a liberal attitude and a strong mystical bent. Opposed as much to Bultmann's demythologization as to Barth's radical theology, he saw in Christianity a microcosm of the world of religions in general, and he believed in

the presence of the ever-working *Logos Spermaticos*. His personal piety was shaped by the ideals of Franciscan devotion as he experienced it in relations with his Italian Franciscan friends. Like the medieval Franciscans, he hoped for the *Papa angelicus* who would usher in the age of the Holy Spirit and the one holy church. Toward this end, he worked all his life, devoting numerous articles, many lectures, and his editorship of a journal, *Eine heilige Kirche* (Munich, 1919–1941), to bringing it about.

The ideal of the one church Heiler extended to non-Christian religions as well, for he saw in them manifestations of the same basic religious truths he found in Christianity. He was particularly inclined toward Buddhism, especially the figure of the compassionate Buddha, and toward mystical Hinduism, which is demonstrated in *Die Mystik in den Upanishaden* (Munich, 1925). Eventually he was to defend Sadhu Sundar Singh in a long literary feud with the critics of this convert from Sikhism to Christianity. In both his writing and his teaching, Heiler always emphasized the role of women in religion. His numerous sermons combine wide knowledge of religious history with his very personal faith in the God who manifests himself as love.

Although Heiler was misunderstood in various quarters during his lifetime, many of his ideas were realized after his death. His major books, which demonstrate his philological erudition and which provide an immense wealth of bibliographic sources, will remain standard works in the history of religions and in the study of early Christianity. Taking up and enlarging the promise evident in his first masterwork on prayer, Heiler's later works reflect his ideal of an "evangelical catholicity" and his hope for a synthesis (rather than syncretism) of the world's religions and their highest ideals.

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ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL (1987)

**HEIMDALLR** is a Scandinavian deity who is the watchman of the Æsir, the dominant group of gods. Rarely men-

tioned in Norse court poetry, Heimdallr appears frequently in Eddic poetry. According to *Grimnismál* (st. 13) he lives in Himinbjörg, the "celestial shelter" from which he guards the abode of the gods, happily drinking mead while performing his task. The giant Loki claims (*Lokasenna*, st. 48), however, that Heimdallr was fated to an awful life and will forever stand watch with a muddy back due to his constant exposure to foul weather. According to *Prymskviða* (st. 15), Heimdallr is the "whitest of the gods" and able to predict the future. The eddic poem *Völuspá* mentions that men are called "Heimdallr's children" (st. 1); similarly, the medieval scribe of *Rígspula*, a poem explaining how the classes of society arose from the three sons of a being named Rígr, identifies Rígr as Heimdallr. *Völuspá* (st. 46) also states that Heimdallr will blow his horn to warn the gods of the start of Ragnarök, their last battle against the giants and monsters. This instrument is named *Gjallarhorn* (loud-sounding horn) and can be heard throughout the nine worlds.

Snorri Sturluson (1179–1241) provides some additional details: Heimdallr is great and holy, and is also known as Hallinskíði, a poetic term that also designates the ram (perhaps because both a ram and Heimdallr are known for their horns). Heimdallr was possibly associated with the ram, as Þórr is associated with goats and Freyr with his boar. Heimdallr has a third cognomen, Gullintanni (Golden Tooth), because he had teeth of gold. The function of this brilliant appearance is unexplained. Heimdallr's horse is called Gulltoppr (Gold Tuft), and his home is located next to Bifröst, the rainbow bridge at the edge of heaven that he guards against invasion by the mountain giants. Heimdallr is the ideal watchman: needing less sleep than a bird, he is able to see for a distance of one hundred leagues by day or by night and to hear the grass growing on the earth, the wool growing on the sheep, or any other noise, an ability for which he pledged or hid an ear below the world tree (*Völuspá*, sts. 27–28), just as Óðinn gives up an eye to gain knowledge at Mímir's well.

*Völuspá hin skamma* (Short prophecy of the seeress) ascribes his birth to nine mothers, all giant maidens who bore and breast-fed him at the edge of the world, a tradition confirmed by the poem *Heimdallargaldr* (The magic song of Heimdallr). The nine mothers who are also sisters might, in addition, be the waves of the sea, who give birth to him on the seashore, the "edge of the earth." The tenth-century Icelandic poet Úlfr Uggason describes Loki fighting with the "son of nine mothers" (*Húsdrápa*, st. 2) for the possession of a beautiful *hafnyra* (literally "sea kidney," but meaning "a piece of amber"); Snorri explains that Loki's adversary was Heimdallr and that they fought in the shape of seals for this object, which Snorri identifies with the Necklace of the Brising. Snorri also explains the poetic circumlocution "Heimdallr's head" for "sword," which comes from the fact that a blow from a human head caused Heimdallr's death. It is not clear how this fits in with the tradition of his last fatal fight with his arch-foe Loki at Ragnarök. Another detail strength-

ens the depiction of Heimdallr and Loki as opposing parallels: according to *Völuspá hin skamma*, both are said to have become either figuratively or literally pregnant. Heimdallr was made potent or pregnant with the power of the earth, and Loki ate the half-roasted heart of a witch, from which he became pregnant with the race of ogresses.

Linguistic analysis of Heimdallr's name scarcely elucidates his basic character. The first element is usually identified with *heimr* (homeland, world), a cognate of the English word *home*; the second is a masculine noun *dallr* (of which the feminine equivalent, *döll*, appears as the second component of one of Freyja's names, *Mardöll*). It has been connected with the Old English *deall* (brilliant, bright, proud), and thus may refer to Heimdallr's shining whiteness. This interpretation is supported by another etymology that connects his name with the Old Frisian *hentiacht* (brilliantly luminous). However, Jan de Vries's *Altnordisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (1961) is probably correct in considering the Old Norse *dallr/döll* as developments of the Germanic \**dalþu-* (blooming, flourishing), with a root appearing also in the Greek word *thállo* (bloom, be luxuriant) and the Gothic *duls* (festival), originally connected with the renewal of nature. According to Gabriel Turville-Petre's *Myth and Religion of the North* (vol. 1, 1964), the Early Modern Icelandic word *dallur* is glossed as *arbor prolifera* (prolific tree) by the nineteenth-century lexicographer Björn Halldórsson. This would point to a special relationship between Heimdallr and the cosmic tree, which is said to be drenched with white mud (*Völuspá*, st. 19), the same substance that Loki says covers Heimdallr's back. This would also corroborate the etymology of *Heimdallr* as "god of the world." Despite these investigations, Heimdallr remains an enigmatic god. In addition to the many Celtic elements of his story, he is like Óðinn in leaving something at the foot of Yggdrasil in exchange for special powers. Like Þórr, he is a defender of the world of the gods and is associated with a male domestic animal; like St. Michael, he will blow his horn at the end of time. Evidently, the memory of Heimdallr had faded by the time the extant sources were composed.

SEE ALSO Eddas; Germanic Religion.

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**HEKATE** is best known as the mistress of threatening, restless ghosts because Greek and Roman literature empha-

sized this sensational aspect of her personality beginning in the fifth century BCE (e.g., Euripides *Helen* 569–570). This role led to Hekate's association with magic, which often relied on the cooperation of the ghosts whom she controlled (Euripides *Medea* 397; Horace *Satires* 1.8.33). Later authors followed suit; for example, Shakespeare's *Macbeth* makes her the leader of a band of witches. Her association with ghosts and the darker side of magic also led to her portrayal, in later antiquity, as a threatening and horrible creature who might look like a snake, howl like a dog, and make her meals among the graves (*Papyri Graecae Magicae* IV.2549, 2856–2869).

However, other Greek and Roman sources, some of which go back to before the fifth century BCE, suggest that in antiquity Hekate was usually viewed as a normal, even benign, goddess. Hesiod (*Theogony* 404–492) lauds her as a powerful older divinity who is willing to benefit many kinds of worshipers, including mothers, kings and fishermen. Pindar (*Paeon* 2.73–2.77) describes Hekate as a "kindly messenger." In art she is free of frightening traits; a late-sixth-century BCE votive statuette shows her seated, dressed in the same style as other goddesses (Berlin Staatl. Mus. TC 7729 = [5] #105), and vase paintings show her as a girlish figure carrying torches to celebrate weddings (see Sarien 1992: #44, 45, 46 with commentary).

**OTHER ASSOCIATIONS.** It is likely that Hekate's association with restless souls, and thence magic, arose from two other concerns she held from early times. The first was her interest in girls' transitions from virginity to marriage and in the childbirth and child nurture that follow marriage (Euripides *Trojan Women* 323; Aeschylus *Suppliants* 676; Antoninus Liberalis 29; Hesiod *Theogony* 450–451; scholiast on Aristophanes *Wasps* 804; see Johnston 1999, chapter 6). Girls who died unmarried and women who died without successfully rearing children were considered to have died "untimely" (*aoros*), and their souls were imagined to wander with Hekate, wreaking havoc on the world of the living out of envy and frustration; magicians sometimes invoked these unhappy souls to do their bidding. It was probably also Hekate's association with dying virgins that led to her identification during the archaic period with Iphigeneia, the most famous mythic maiden who died before marriage (Stesichorus fr. 215; Hesiod *Catalogue* fr. 23a 17–26 cf. 23b; Proclus, summary of the *Cypria* 55–64; further at Johnston 1999, chapter 6). Hekate's only other prominent mythic role, as the goddess involved with Persephone's journey to and from the Underworld, similarly connects her with a maiden who dies and "returns" (*Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 24, 52–59, 438–440; Callimachus fr. 466; Orphic fr. 41–42). In addition, Hekate herself is almost always imagined as virginal.

The second role that contributed to Hekate's association with ghosts in Greece was her guardianship of entrances and other liminal places, both civic and domestic, where ghosts were imagined to lurk (Johnston 1991; Johnston 1999, chapter 6). In Greece, shrines or statuettes of Hekate (*hekataia*) were placed at entrances and at the junctions of



three roads (*triadoi*) to seek her protection. “Suppers” (*deipna*) were left for Hekate and ghosts at the junctions, especially on the night of the new moon (Aeschylus fr. 388; Aristophanes *Wasps* 804; Aristophanes *Plutus* 594 with scholia; Demosthenes LIV.39; Plutarch *Greek Questions* 708f; Apollodorus of Athens *Fragments of Greek History* 244 F 110). The polluted remains of domestic purification rites also were deposited at the road junctions (Plutarch *Roman Questions* 280c, 290d; Lucian *Dialogues of the Dead* 1.1); in later antiquity, these were already sometimes confused with the suppers for Hekate, but originally they were distinct (see Johnston 1991). Hekate’s close connection to the road junctions is reflected by her Greek epithet, *trioidios*; her Roman name, Trivia; and her frequent sculptural portrayal, from the classical period on, as a goddess with three heads or even three bodies. Over time, Hekate collected many other epithets that reflected her triplicity; Chariclides (fr. 1) offers a tongue-in-cheek collection of them.

The association of the dog with Hekate, including its sacrifice to her (Euripides fr. 968; Aristophanes fr. 608; scholiast on Aristophanes *Peace* 276), probably began as a reflection of Hekate’s role as birth goddess; birth goddesses commonly received sacrifices of dogs. However, by the end of the classical period the dog also took on Hekate’s frightening nature; bands of howling dogs, imagined to be souls of the dead, followed Hekate on her nightly prowls or heralded her arrival (Theocritus *Idyll* 2.12–13, 2.35–36; Vergil *Aeneid* 6.255–258). These souls that followed Hekate inflicted insanity or night terrors (Hippocrates *On the Sacred Illness* 4.30–33), which explains the worship of Hekate in mysteries that promised, among other things, to cure madness (Aristophanes *Wasps* 122; Pausanias 2.30.2; Dio Chrysostom *Oration* 4.90; Aristotle *Mirabilia* 173; see Johnston 1999, chapter 4).

**ORIGINS AND ASSOCIATIONS IN OTHER MYTHOLOGIES.** Hekate probably originated in Caria, in Asia Minor, whence she traveled into mainland Greece during the archaic period. Her worship in Caria and other places in Asia Minor continued strongly into the imperial period (Kraus 1960), even as it spread throughout the rest of the Greek world. Sources vary considerably on Hekate’s parentage; the most influential source, Hesiod (*Theogony* 409–411), made her the daughter of Titans Asterie and Perses and thus the cousin of Artemis and Apollo (see also scholiast on Apollonius of Rhodes *Argonautica* 3.467). Her name appears to be cognate with Apollo’s epithets Hekatos and Hekatobolos, which suggests that it has something to do with “from afar,” but the meaning is unclear.

Hekate was conflated in cult, myth, and iconography with a number of other goddesses, notably Artemis (Aeschylus *Suppliants* 676; *Inscriptions Graecae* 13 383.125–127), with whom she shared an interest in girls’ transitions and childbirth and the iconographic feature of carrying torches; Selene, the goddess of the moon (Plutarch *On the Obsolescence of Oracles* 416e–f; Johnston 1990, chapter 2); and En-

odia (Sophocles fr. 535), a Thessalian goddess who shared Hekate’s interest in childbirth and in guardianship of entrances (*Inscriptions Graecae* IX 575–576, 578; Johnston 1999, chapter 6; Kraus 1960, 57–83). In the magical papyri, Hekate often was equated with Ereshkigal, the Mesopotamian goddess of the Underworld (*Papyri Graecae Magicae* LXX.4–25). In late antiquity Hekate’s role as a birth goddess and guardian of passages and transitions also led to her appointment as a savior goddess in theurgy, where she was identified with the Platonic Cosmic Soul, which was imagined to divide the material (earthly) realm from the noetic (heavenly) realm. She facilitated the passages of individual souls downward into bodies and upward again for union with the divine, and she sent oracles to the theurgists that taught them how to perform further rituals that would improve their souls (see Johnston 1990).

**SEE ALSO** Artemis; Dogs; Magic, article on Magic in Greco-Roman Antiquity; Moon.

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**HELL** SEE HEAVEN AND HELL; UNDERWORLD

**HELLENISTIC RELIGIONS.** Whereas religion is never a mere reflex of political, economic, and social conditions, there are periods in history when these factors exert a palpably strong influence on religious thinking. The Hellenistic age was certainly such a period. Its early phase, which began with the conquests of Alexander the Great in 334 BCE and continued with the rule of his successors, brought military and political upheaval to many peoples. When Roman imperialism later became the dominating power, there was greater apparent political stability, and the consciousness of a unified world, which Alexander’s victories had furthered, was enhanced. The thought of one world does not necessarily lead to the idea of one God, but it does raise questions about a possible spiritual unity behind the manifold manifestations of religious experience.

Culturally this was a world that gave primacy to the Greek language, and Alexander himself, although a Macedonian, was a fervent disseminator of Greek culture. Within his empire other languages continued to flourish, including Ara-

maic, Hebrew, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Latin, but it was Greek that bore the official stamp of the ruling powers. Alexandria largely replaced Athens as the world's cultural capital, with Pergamum in northwestern Asia Minor as a splendid rival. Alexandria gave a Greek form to its glittering artistic and intellectual achievement, although it harbored several other cultural and religious groups, not the least of which were the Alexandrian Jews. In philosophy, however, Athens retained some of its pristine vigor because it was there that the new schools of Epicureanism and Stoicism first found a footing. In different ways both Epicurus and Zeno, the founders of these schools, were reacting to the broadened horizons created by Alexander's achievements. Even before this the Greek world was no narrow enclave, for Greek colonies had long since spread to Asia Minor and the Black Sea area, to Egypt and North Africa, and to southern Italy, Sicily, Spain, and Gaul. What was new in the Greek dimension of Alexander's conquests was the thrust in an easterly direction to Syria and Palestine, to Persia and Babylon, and through Central Asia to parts of northern India. In the wake of the military thrust, Greek settlements and cities were established in many non-Greek areas. Eventually the force of the population impact weakened, although Alexander's successors continued to hold sway for several centuries. An encounter with very diverse cultures ensued, and the traditional division between Greeks and barbarians underwent radical revision. In terms of religion the resulting counterthrust of Eastern traditions meant that the Greeks received more than they gave.

It was not the brute power of military aggression that brought about the change in outlook. In his *Alexander the Great* (Cambridge, 1948), Sir William Tarn argues that Alexander himself had a dream of the unity and reconciliation of all peoples, but the sources are more faithfully interpreted as recording a prayer by him for the cooperation of Greeks and Persians as ruling imperial partners. Yet the aftermath of his victories brought a realization of the unity of East and West.

**NEW TRENDS IN STATE-SUPPORTED RELIGION.** In spite of the great change in worldview thus effected, the old order was not swept away quickly. In Greece itself the city-states continued to function after the Macedonian conquests, and this meant that the official religious cults espoused by these states were still maintained. Politically, however, the citizens were aware that they were carrying on under the shadow of Macedonian imperialism and that the substance of their political power, particularly in foreign policy, had much diminished. This sense of insignificance must have demeaned the quality of their religious worship. The Athenians continued to honor their patron goddess Athena, especially as Athena Promachos ("defender"), but they knew very well that they were subject now to whatever Macedonian dynast was in power in the area. Such a situation threw the citizens back on their own spiritual resources so that their concerns as individuals counted correspondingly more. In later ages the emphasis on the individual might often seem to be at the very heart of religion, as in A. N. Whitehead's well-known defini-

tion of it: "Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness." The ancient world, in contrast, viewed religion as something essentially communal that was realized, above all, in public activities arranged by the state. In the Hellenistic age these activities continued to some extent, but in other ways there was a marked focus on the concerns of the individual.

Not that the social urges suffered atrophy: A popular feature of the religious life of this age was the great vitality of the associations or clubs formed by adherents of the various cults, with or without the sanction of the state. While these associations were often allowed the use of sacred premises, their main activities were usually convivial and charitable. They provided good cheer in the way of wine, beer, and banquets and also a good deal of help to needy members. Naturally the religious element was not ignored, and the name of the patron deity normally appears in records of their proceedings. The evidence concerning them derives from a great part of the Greek world. Prominent in this evidence are towns that were centers of trade and therefore rather cosmopolitan in character, such as Rhodes, Delos, and Piraeus (the harbor town of Athens). Abundant testimony has also been forthcoming from centers of the native cults in Egypt, and at that time these cults, especially those connected with Isis, were spreading to other countries. Thus at the end of the first century CE there was a club of this kind attached to a temple of Isis in London.

Emphasis on the importance of the individual came from a quarter that at first sight might seem surprising: the belief in astrology, which was then so fashionable. Its origins were in Babylon, where astronomy had also been pioneered. The Babylonians had shown that the heavenly bodies moved in a fixed order that could be scientifically forecast. Then their astrologers, who were also astronomers (the two fields had not yet diverged), introduced the belief that events in the world were somehow linked to events among the stars. It followed that worldly events could also be prophesied since they too had been ordained beforehand. Under the Roman emperors astrologers were several times banned and expelled; yet many of the emperors themselves had recourse to them. When applied to the individual, astrology meant that everything depended on the personal horoscope, which was based on the exact date and hour of birth and on the planet then in the ascendant and on its relation to the zodiac. The effect of the prognosis could be depressing, even terrifying. In a Greek magical papyrus (found in the corpus of Preisendanz, 13.708ff), the astrologer thus advises his anxious client:

You must enquire, "Lord, what is fated for me?" And he will tell you of your star and the nature of your Daemon [guiding spirit] and your horoscope and where you shall live and where you shall die. But if you hear something bad, do not break into screams and tears. Ask him, rather, to cancel it himself or to change its course. For this god has power to do everything.

Here the astrologer is invoking the aid of religion with his allusion to a god who can change the prognosis. But a

fatalistic acceptance is more often indicated. What is clear, in any case, is that the personal horoscope is the basis of the procedure. The fate of the individual is the center of attention.

A new development that imparted fresh vitality, albeit of dubious sincerity, to the official state worship was the gradual establishment of the cult of the ruler, whether king or emperor. The first clear instance of it in this period was the worship of Alexander the Great as a divine person. In his case it was conspicuously an upshot of religious practices long prevalent in the Eastern countries that he had conquered. In the nations of Mesopotamia the king had regularly been associated with the gods. He had not been defined theologically as a god, but there was an aura of divinity about him. A victory stela of Naram-Sin of Akkad shows him towering above his followers, with a clear suggestion of his superhuman standing. In Egypt, on the other hand, the pharaoh was given an official status of divinity. When alive he was equated with the god Horus, and in death he became the god Osiris, father of Horus. He was also called "the son of Re" (the sun god). The distinctions are well delineated by Henri Frankfort in his *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago, 1948).

It is significant that the initial divinization of Alexander was associated with Egypt. According to ancient historians he visited the oracle of Amun at Siwa in the Libyan desert some four hundred miles southwest of what was later Alexandria. There, in 331 BCE, an Egyptian priest accosted him as the "son of Amun" in a way that corresponded to traditional Egyptian practice. To be regarded as the son of a god must have appealed to Alexander, and from that moment on he seems to have pressed the idea purposively, demanding obeisance and worship in many countries. Greeks and Macedonians did not take easily to the idea, yet there was a strand within the Greek tradition that allowed the divinization of dead heroes and eventually of living rulers. This contributed to the cult of the dead Alexander in Egypt and, in the time of his successors there, led to the worship of the living king and his queen, a practice started by Ptolemy II and his wife Arsinoë, who assumed the title *theoi adelphoi*, "the brother-sister gods." (The Ptolemaic kings regularly married their sisters.) Less thoroughgoing modes of the ruler cult prevailed in the other regions of Alexander's empire. By gradual steps the Seleucids of Syria and the Attalids of Pergamum eventually followed the practice, although the Attalids were accorded full divinity only after death. The Macedonians were slower still in coming to it, perhaps because of skeptical resistance.

To assess the depth or sincerity of the worship produced by the ruler cult is difficult since it soon came to be a test of political loyalty. In 307 BCE the Athenians paid divine honors to Demetrius Poliorcetes, the ambitious Macedonian soldier-king. Their hymn of praise to him couples him with the goddess Demeter and describes him as the son of Poseidon, god of the sea, and of Aphrodite, goddess of love. Then it contrasts his nearness with the distance of the traditional

gods: "Other gods are far removed or do not listen; or they do not really exist or do not heed us at all. But thou are here with us; we can behold thee, not shaped in wood or stone, but here in person. And thus we pray to thee." In spite of some military successes, Demetrius was a rake and a scoundrel. It may therefore safely be assumed that the fulsome language of the hymn disguised a degree of disgust.

When the Romans took up the ruler cult, Egypt was again influential in the early stages, and there was a measure of continued tradition; yet in Rome itself there had been antecedents in relation to "the divine Julius" (Julius Caesar.) The full-scale cult was at first enacted in the provinces only, but eventually it was insisted on as a test of loyalty. To adherents of the many polytheistic religions there was no problem in this claim, since it merely meant that the divinized emperor was to be added to the variegated pantheon already in existence. Even followers of the mystery religions were not embarrassed by the claim, for the demands of these religions were by no means exclusive. Those in serious trouble were the adherents of Judaism and Christianity, two religions of uncompromising monotheism. "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" may not imply strict monotheism, since the commandment does not necessarily deny the existence of other gods, but rather demands the exclusive worship of Yahveh. By the Hellenistic era, however, Judaism had become unequivocally monotheistic, and Christianity inherited its unbending stance. To upholders of the polytheistic tradition it seemed a form of fanatical intolerance, and it sometimes provoked very harsh reactions.

An aspect of the ruler cult that was more serious than the superficial matter of expressing political allegiance was the whole question of divine incarnation. Was it possible to conceive of the divine taking human form? In early Greek thought it is sometimes suggested that the gulf between human and god is not wide and that an affinity exists between them. In the early fifth century BCE Pindar expresses it thus: "Of one stock are men and gods, and from one mother do we draw our breath" (*Nemean Odes* 6.1). Some of the heroes of Greek mythology were deemed to be offspring of mixed unions, the father being divine and the mother mortal. Herakles is in this category, for his father was said to be Zeus and his mother the mortal Alkmene, daughter of a king of Mycenae. Zeus was not able to achieve union with her until he disguised himself as a victorious warrior.

Rather different is the process by which historical heroes came to be worshiped after death. Their historicity cannot always be demonstrated, but the likely evolution followed from a lively memory of their deeds. One might rephrase Shakespeare to explain the distinctions enacted: "Some men are born divine, some achieve divinity, and some have divinity thrust upon them." The hero worship that developed among the Greeks outside mythology is akin to the second category; it involved outstanding individuals who by their own merit and fame came to be especially honored after death. The triumphant commander who "liberated" or

“saved” a city naturally qualified for special honors akin to those paid to divinity. An early and successful candidate was the Spartan commander Lysander, whose deeds secured for him this type of apotheosis even during his lifetime. But Alexander decisively outshone heroes of such caliber since his deeds encompassed not only the Greek world but much else as well. Quite apart, therefore, from his experience at Siwa, which gave him an Egyptian passport to divinity, he qualified splendidly according to the criterion of Greek hero worship. When his cult was established in Egypt, followed by that of the Ptolemies, several of the new royal divinities were inevitably ill qualified to attract real worship. They might be said to have had divinity thrust upon them automatically.

Behind the developments in Egypt stood the long-standing dogma of the god-human, and its influence in the Hellenistic world went beyond the particular instances of divine dynasty. This dogma became prominent in the New Kingdom (1551–1070 BCE) when the claim was made that the pharaoh had a mortal mother but a divine father. His procreation was explicitly, albeit tastefully, described as a visit by the god Amun to the queen. In so doing the god was said to take on the guise of the living pharaoh, so that what was ostensibly a natural process was given a supernatural interpretation.

A story told about Nectanebo, the last pharaonic king of Egypt, gives prominence to this doctrine. The Greek work called the *Alexander Romance* relates how Nectanebo, in spite of his vaunted magical power, was defeated by the Persians and fled to Pella in Macedonia after suitably changing his appearance. A prophecy from Memphis announced that he would return to Egypt as a young man who would overthrow his enemies and conquer the world (a reference, of course, to Alexander). Furthermore Alexander’s mother, Queen Olympias, is said to have welcomed Nectanebo in Macedonia because of his fame as a magician, and he at once fell in love with her. When the queen informed him that her husband, Philip, being then away at war, was said to be beguiled by another woman, Nectanebo confirmed the rumor and told her that a god would visit her in a dream and have intercourse with her and that from this union would come a son who would avenge her on Philip. The god was to be the Libyan Amun, with golden hair and ram’s horns. Olympias duly experienced the divine visit in a dream but then declared that she wanted not merely a dream but the real thing, whereupon Nectanebo impersonated the god and had intercourse with her himself. The son who was born of the union was naturally deemed to be Alexander, thus marked out as of divine origin. Although Alexander was said to have caused the death of Nectanebo, he was also said to have recognized him as his father and to have buried him with honor. The Greek writer of this story has told it with a sense of skeptical irony, yet it points to the fact that the people of the age were engrossed with the idea of the god-human and with the possibility that the divine could break into the sphere of human life through incarnation.

**MAGIC, MYTH, AND MIRACLE.** According to the Pauline saying, it was the Jews who demanded signs (that is, wonders or miracles) while the Greeks sought wisdom. In fact, it was not only the Jews who demanded miracles; the majority of the Greeks did also, and so did the majority of other peoples. From time immemorial religion had been mingled with magic, and the power to produce miraculous events was regarded as the mark of godhead acting either in a direct intervention or through chosen intermediaries.

In considering ancient magic, one must avoid any notion of conjuring tricks made possible by sleight of hand or by various illusionary processes. Some charlatans did resort to such stratagems, but the true medium of divine power did not approach this task thus. In the oldest myths of many nations, the creation of the world itself is the result of miraculous divine actions, and the teasing thought of what lay beyond the beginning of things often produced the image of one creator god, who was unbegotten and who had to initiate a process of creation without the help of a spouse. The early Greeks who followed the Orphic teaching believed that a cosmic egg was the source of everything. This idea might appear to derive from a natural symbol, but probably it came to the Greeks from Egypt, although the Egyptians had several other theories of creation. By the Hellenistic age some Greeks had become familiar with a similar doctrine that had spread from Iran.

Strangely enough, the Greeks did not regard their supreme god, Zeus, as a creator god. Yet their myths about him are replete with miracles, especially when his many dealings with mortal women are portrayed. For instance, having fallen in love with Io, a priestess at Argos, Zeus changed her into a heifer in order to hide her from his wife Hera. Metamorphosis became a frequent medium of miraculous intervention by gods. Early in the first century CE, the Roman poet Ovid devoted a whole cycle of poems to this theme, and in the next century it was the central motif of the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius, an entertaining and often ribald novel that nevertheless conveys a deeply religious vision.

It tells the story of Lucius of Corinth, a Greek who was changed into a donkey through a mistake made in the employment of magic. After many strange adventures in asinine form, he is restored to human form by the goddess Isis at Cenchreae, the harbor of Corinth, during the spring ritual of the Ship of Isis. The last part of the novel movingly portrays his devotion to this new religion.

Unlike the immortal gods, however, heroes are not usually invested with miraculous powers, in spite of their divine associations. Herakles achieves his great deeds with might and main, and Prometheus, while he sometimes deploys a kind of low cunning, is a culture hero intent on benefiting humankind.

Removed from the category of gods and heroes was the human purveyor of magic and miracle. At his best he had to be a knowledgeable person. Astrology was often within his

professed prowess, and the secrets of astrology were not available to any ignoramus. His attitude to the gods seems to have varied. Respect and devout loyalty characterized him in the role of their chosen instrument. Yet sometimes the magician was expected to compel the gods to act in a certain way, and a number of magical spells are extant in which the gods are fiercely threatened unless they comply. But it was important to use the correct formula and to know the functions and mythology of the deity concerned. In the Hellenistic era magic was especially used for treating disease.

Here the doctrine of demons was often basic. Regarded as intermediate between human and god, demons (spirits) were divided into good and evil categories, with the possibility that good demons could be promoted to the rank of gods. Under the influence of Iran this system was sometimes developed into a thoroughgoing dualism connoting a hierarchy of both angels and devils but with devils headed by a supreme figure of evil. This view regarded all disease as the creation of evil demons. To conquer the disease therefore demanded the defeat and expulsion of the baleful spirit that had taken possession of the victim. A person's good demon, on the other hand, acted as his guardian angel. Yet the good demon was not normally regarded as potent enough to deal with an evil demon who had entered a person. A spiritual power from outside was needed, and the first task was one of diagnosis, which meant the correct identification of the occupying demon. The magician was expected to announce the name of the hostile power and to order its expulsion in the name of a superior and beneficent power; there are familiar examples in the New Testament. Treatment of disease in both the Jewish and the pagan world was often colored by these concepts.

This was not, however, the only technique practiced by magicians and priests. Instead of a frontal attack on the demon, a mollifying approach was sometimes adopted, as when insanity was treated by the playing of soft music. A multitude of medical charms have come down to the present, and they combine popular medicine with magical rites. Central to these, very often, is the power of the spoken word of the magician himself, whose incantations are recorded, for purposes of reading and imitation, in Greek and Egyptian magical papyri. Moreover, the direct interventions of the gods of healing, particularly of Asklepios, Isis, and Sarapis, are often lauded.

In origin Asklepios was perhaps a hero; later he was raised to the rank of a divinity and became the foremost god of healing in the Hellenistic world, with temples at Epidaurus in the Peloponnese and at Athens, Rome, and Pergamum; the most celebrated of his temples was on the island of Kos, northwest of Rhodes, the home of a famous Greek medical school. Numerous inscriptions set up in the temples of Asklepios record the gratitude of worshippers for the cures obtained, which were frequently regarded as completely miraculous. Yet some of the techniques used partook of current orthodox medical practice, for example, prescribed dietetic

rules, hot and cold baths, and various types of exercise. Special use was also made of incubation, whereby the worshiper slept in the temple of the god in order to experience a visitation from him through a dream or vision; such a visitation could bring both a cure for the disease (or advice as to how a cure might be obtained) and a revelation of a spiritual nature. The grateful records do not refer often to medical prescriptions or details of diet, so one may infer that psychological processes were involved: autosuggestion, experiences of spiritual illumination, and a sense of serenity deriving from a loving relationship. The term *faith healing* could well be applied to such felicitous procedures. What is particularly impressive, as well as eminently consonant with the temper of the Hellenistic age, is the fervent personal relationship with the god that ensued and the worshiper's sense of trust and devotion. There exists, fortunately, one intimate record of these experiences in the *Hieroi Logoi* (Sacred Stories) of Publius Aelius Aristides, a rhetorician of the second century CE.

Magic is customarily divided into the categories of "black" and "white," a division that can certainly be applied to the practice of it by the Greeks. In early prototypes, such as Circe and Medea, the two aspects appear. The Homeric Circe, semidivine in origin, is a powerful magician who uses potions and salves and also teaches Odysseus to summon the spirits of the dead. Medea was the outstanding enchantress of the myths used in Greek tragedy. She enabled the Argonauts to get the golden fleece by putting the dragon of Colchis to sleep; moreover, she possessed the evil eye and could make warriors invulnerable. Orpheus was another master of magic. Son of the muse Calliope, he rendered wild beasts spellbound with his music.

The two words most often used for "miracle" were *thau-ma* ("wonder") and *sēmeion* ("sign"). Obviously the two aspects could be embraced by either word. A miraculous event that astonishes people can be pleasing or punishing in intent and can be a sign, or omen, from the gods as an expression of their power but with a similar possible duality of purpose. Religion in ancient times had a bias toward beneficent magic, its prayers normally being expressions of devotion and appeals for help. But the appeal might concern the destruction of an enemy, which could involve harsh miraculous intervention by the gods. At the same time divine intervention could inflict moral retribution on individuals. Even the kindly Isis, whose magic was mainly beneficent, sometimes inflicted blindness on sinners.

When a beneficent miracle was enacted in public, it was regularly followed by an expression of blessing or felicitation, the macarism. Thus when Isis restores Lucius from asinine to human form in the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius (also called *The Golden Ass* and written about 170 CE), the people who see the event declare:

This is the man who has been today restored to human shape through the splendid divinity of the all-powerful goddess. Happy is he, by heaven, and thrice blessed, to



have clearly deserved, by the purity of his former life and his pious loyalty, such a wondrous favor from heaven that he is, as it were, born again and has at once pledged himself to service in the sacred rites. (11.16)

Although the priests of Isis have taken part in the miracle, as for instance in providing the garland of roses to be eaten by the ass-man, it is the goddess herself who naturally receives the acclaim.

Sometimes, nevertheless, the human agents were not averse to claiming a measure of glory. Among the rhetorical practitioners of the second sophistic movement, which flourished in the first and second centuries CE, especially at Athens, Smyrna, and Ephesus, were a few literati who combined their philosophical and oratorical gifts, which they displayed as peripatetic lecturers, with a keen interest in magic. One was Apuleius, whose interest in magic is evident in much of his work, especially the *Metamorphoses*. Early in his career, however, he was accused of using magic to gain the hand of a rich widow in marriage. Although acquitted, thereafter he was reluctant to practice any form of the art.

In the context of magic and miracle the most remarkable person in the second sophistic movement was undoubtedly Apollonius of Tyana, who lived in the first century CE and came from Cappadocia in Asia Minor. An account of his life, written about 217 CE by another Sophist, Philostratus, presents him as a wandering scholar whose travels embraced Babylon, India, Egypt, and Ethiopia. In spite of his fame, his life was ascetic and disciplined and modeled on Pythagorean ideals. In addition, however, he frequently performed miracles that included acts of healing, magical disappearances, and even raising the dead, deeds that recall the claims made for Jesus of Nazareth.

The trustworthiness of Philostratus, however, has been much impugned. He cast his life of Apollonius in the form of a Greek travel romance, which suggests a fictitious element. Further, he wrote the book at the request of Julia Domna, the second wife of the emperor Septimius Severus, so that the possibility of anti-Christian animus and parody cannot be excluded. It is likely, then, that some more modest deeds by Apollonius provided a basis for the heightened account presented. The simple asceticism of his mode of life must also have impressed people, although Philostratus exaggerates even here, as when he says that Apollonius was “a more inspired student of wisdom than Pythagoras” (1.2).

One of the faculties ascribed to Apollonius was clairvoyance. At Ephesus in 96 CE, he is said to have had a miraculous vision of the emperor Domitian being murdered in distant Rome, a vision whose validity was afterward confirmed. The event is related by both Philostratus and the historian Dio Cassius, so that its truth need not be questioned. Even the less sophisticated type of magician was expected to indulge in processes of divination that would let him foretell the future. This did not usually imply powers of prophecy in a general sense but, rather, the ability to judge and foretell the outcome of a particular problem or issue. Methods of divination

included dreams, incubation (sleeping in a temple), auguries based on observation of birds, extispicy (especially the inspection of the entrails of animals killed specifically for this purpose), and the interpretation of weather signs, not to mention the whole area of astrology. Several of these methods had been developed originally in Babylon and Egypt.

Another important divinatory method was by oracle. In the Greek tradition the personal mouthpiece of the god of the oracle was the *prophētēs*, who might be a man or a woman. He or she was thought to be possessed by a divine power, a process that Plato compared to poetic inspiration. The medium became *entheos* (“full of the god”) and was in a state of *ekstasis* (“standing out of oneself”). In the oracles the power of prophecy was linked to special sites and to particular gods. Here a paradox emerges: The Greeks are famed for their rationalism and are regarded as the pioneers of intellectual enquiry and scientific thinking, yet their belief in oracles belies this approach. To some extent, the inconsistency can be explained through social division: The credulous majority trusted oracles while the educated elite evinced skepticism, the latter trend becoming more pronounced in the Hellenistic era, as Plutarch showed in the first and second centuries CE.

The paradox reveals itself to some degree in the figure of Apollo himself. He is the god of light and reason, yet he is the dominant god at Delphi, seat of the most celebrated oracle. In his *Birth of Tragedy*, the philosopher Nietzsche contrasts Apollo and Dionysos, the one representing the cool temper of rationalism, the other the passionate surrender to ecstasy. Certainly this antithesis is at the heart of Greek thinking.

One noted feature of Greek oracles was the ambiguity of their response. Statements that could be interpreted in more than one way were often forthcoming. Among the problems posed on behalf of states were political issues, and this meant that some oracles, particularly the one at Delphi, exerted considerable influence on the states’ policies. But the Hellenistic age saw the decline of Delphi and the rising prestige of other oracles, such as those of Asklepios at Epidaurus and Rome and that of Trophonios in central Greece.

Oracles in other countries were also much frequented, such as that of Zeus Amun in Libyan Siwa, where Alexander had a significant personal experience. Sometimes the questions raised were those of individuals, reflecting the private problems of simple people: A man is anxious to know whether his wife will give him a child, a woman wants to be cured of a disease, someone asks a commercial question about the best use of property, or a man wonders whether the child his wife is carrying is his own.

In his work *On the Obsolescence of Oracles*, Plutarch (c. 46–125 CE) discusses why so many oracles in Greece have ceased to function. Various answers are supplied in a discussion presented in the form of a dialogue. The population had decreased, says Plutarch, and there is some atrophy of belief.

There is also the theory, seemingly endorsed by Plutarch himself, that in the oracles it is not the gods but beneficent demons who are at work.

Another writer who provides a revealing picture of what goes on at an oracle is Pausanias, who flourished about 150 CE. In his *Description of Greece* (9.39) he gives many details of the procedures at the oracle of Trophonios in Lebadea (modern Levadhia) in Boeotia. Regarded as relating to the hero cult, Trophonios may have been in origin a fertility god with chthonic associations; his sanctuary was built over an alleged entrance to the underworld. The person who wished to consult the oracle had to first wait quietly in the house of Agathos Daimon (“gracious divine being”), where various rites of purification and dietetic regimen were observed. Then came whippings, various offerings and sacrifices, an anointing with oil, bathing in a river, a special drink, and a prayer, after which the inquirer was dressed in a linen tunic and pulled through a narrow hole into a subterranean cave where he was terrified by snakes but able to calm them with honey cakes. Only then did he see or hear Trophonios and become enlightened concerning his future, after which priests explained his experiences. It was said that the inquirer always came out of the cave of Trophonios dejected and pale. Psychologically the treatment was rigorous and searching; modern parallels might be sought in regimes using drugs such as methedrine with stringent concomitants. In ancient times the initiations in the mystery religions provide the nearest parallel.

**UNIVERSALISM AND SYNCRETISM.** Although Alexander the Great did not establish a world state in the world as then known, his empire transcended the national states and induced a sense of cohesion and interdependence. It was in this era that the word *kosmopolitēs* (“citizen of the world”) came into vogue. The idea had occasionally appeared before this. Democritus of Abdera had said in the fifth century BCE, “To the wise every land is open; the good soul looks on the whole world as his country.” More pointed and forceful expression was given to the idea by Diogenes the Cynic (c. 400–325 BCE), founder of the Cynic sect. He came from Sinope on the southern shore of the Black Sea but spent much of his life in Athens. He was given the nickname of “the Dog,” while his followers were similarly called “Dog Philosophers” or Cynics, from the snarling way in which they and their master condemned accepted conventions and defied civilized life, embracing instead a style of extreme poverty, simplicity, and hardship. Among the conventions that Diogenes rejected was attachment to the polis, or city-state. His rejection was practical in that he wandered from one country to another without accredited citizenship or a settled home (in Athens he lived in a tub). In principle he was a kind of anarchist. He called himself a “citizen of the world,” but this did not imply any politically defined belief. It was in effect a negative claim denying the value of the city-state.

It was the Stoics, however, who succeeded in giving to this approach a more positive and meaningful basis. Initially

they were intellectually indebted to the Cynics, but Zeno of Citium in Cyprus (335–263 BCE) went far beyond them and included a religious interpretation in his cosmopolitanism. According to Zeno the whole universe is governed by divine reason, and people should therefore live in conformity with it and with the order of nature established by it. A saying of Zeno that Plutarch has recorded presents the view that people should not live in a state of division according to separate cities and peoples and differing rules of justice; rather, all people should be viewed as belonging to one state and community and sharing one life and order. Plutarch wryly adds that in writing thus in his much-admired book *The State*, Zeno was presenting a dream or ideal of a well-ordered philosophical world.

It was indeed an age when several “utopias” were written. Plato had set an example with his *Republic*, but later writers in this genre deployed a good deal more fantasy, as when Iambulus in the early second century BCE wrote of his voyage to the southern seas, where he stayed for seven years in the seven “Islands of the Sun.” He painted an idyllic picture of the islands: Their climate is perfect and their land ever fruitful; the inhabitants are all supermen and there is no distinction between slave and free; property is shared and women and children are held in common; there is no strife of any kind, and their deities are the powers of nature—the sun, the heavenly bodies, and the sky.

There were a few practical ventures, too, in utopianism. Alexarchus, brother of King Cassander of Macedonia, after being given some land on the Athos peninsula, built a big city that he called Ouranopolis (“city of heaven”), where the citizens were called Ouranidai (“children of heaven”), and the coinage was adorned with figures of the sun, moon, and stars. Rather similar was the concept implemented briefly by Aristonicus of Pergamum (in 133–130 BCE), who led a popular rising against Rome. He planned a state called Heliopolis (“city of the sun”), whose inhabitants he called Heliopolitai (“citizens of the sun”); but after some initial successes he was captured and killed by the Romans. The Greek satirist Lucian, who wrote in the second century CE, provided a witty parody of literary utopias in *A True Story*, a travel romance full of irony and burlesque, of which Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels* is a modern descendant.

In the context of Stoic philosophy the doctrine of world citizenship was elaborated somewhat by Chrysippus (c. 280–207 BCE), who noted that the word *polis* was given two senses: the city in which one lived; the citizens and the state machinery. Similarly, he argued, the universe is a *polis* that embraces gods and human, the former wielding sovereignty while the latter obey; yet gods and humans, for all their difference in status, have a means of contact and converse since they both use reason, which is “law by nature.” In the last phrase he is overturning a contrast present in previous political thought. A later Stoic, Panaetius (c. 185–109 BCE), was more pragmatic in his approach. A world state seemed no longer within practical reach, but he continued to believe in

the general unity of all humankind. At the same time he restored to the city-state a certain secondary role, admitting its usefulness in a realistic sense while denying its claim to decide in any final sense, matters of right and wrong; such decisions were to remain in the domain of reason and nature.

It thus appears that the idea of being a citizen of the world, vague and ill defined as it often was, came to include, under Stoic inspiration, the religious concept of a ruling divine reason. Although the reality of a world state was missing, the idea of humankind as one community had a powerful spiritual effect. Whereas it cannot be assumed that everyone, or even the majority, embraced the idea fully and fervently, there are many signs that thinking people accepted it. A sharp division had existed previously in attitudes toward other nations: Pride and prejudice were clearly present in the categories of Greeks versus barbarians or Jews versus gentiles. Certain nations enjoyed more power than others since, in the empire bequeathed by Alexander, Macedonians, Greeks, and Persians were in the ascendancy until Rome took control. In religious matters, nonetheless, the great variety of national traditions was often regarded as a common heritage of humanity. This is the attitude taken by Plutarch when he argues, doubtless under the influence of Stoicism, that the gods of Egypt should be preserved as "our common heritage" and not made the peculiar property of the Egyptians. In chapter 67 of his treatise *Isis and Osiris* he states his belief that the gods of the various nations, in spite of their differing names, are essentially the same and that behind the divergent forms there is a universal reason and providence:

Nor do we regard the gods as different among different peoples nor as barbarian and Greek and as southern and northern. But just as the sun, moon, heaven, earth and sea are common to all, though they are given various names by the varying peoples, so it is with the one reason [logos] which orders these things and the one providence which has charge of them, and the assistant powers which are assigned to everything: They are given different honours and modes of address among different peoples according to custom, and they use hallowed symbols, some of which are obscure and others clearer, directing the thought towards the divine, though not without danger. For some, erring completely, have slipped into superstition, and others, shunning it like a marsh, have unwittingly fallen in turn over the precipice of atheism.

At the same time, Plutarch is occasionally ready, within the same work, to accept the Iranian doctrine about the happy end of the world, when Areimanius (Angra Mainyu), the god of evil, will be utterly obliterated by the gods who follow Horomazes (Ahura Mazda), lord of light and good. The happy final state will reflect the blessed unity of humankind: "The earth shall be flat and level, and one way of life and one government shall arise of all men, who shall be happy and speak the same language" (chap. 47). Here the universalism envisaged is somewhat colorless and depressing; it accords with Iranian sources, one of which (*Bundahishn*

30.33) declares that when the universe is renewed, "this earth becomes an iceless, shapeless plain." According to this teaching, mountains were created by the Spirit of Evil and will disappear with his overthrow; *Isaiah* 40:4 reflects the same viewpoint when the prophet announces, as part of a serene vision, that "every mountain and hill shall be made low" and "every valley shall be exalted," thus achieving the uniform flatness of Plutarch's Iranian dictum.

The union and solidarity of the human race are also a part of the Iranian teaching, for the *Dēnkard* (9–18), a Pahlavi book of the ninth or tenth century CE that probably preserves earlier ideas, prophesies a final outcome in these terms: "At the final Rehabilitation the whole of mankind will be firmly and unchangeably linked in mutual love, and this will mean that the demons will utterly despair of ever being able to harm man again. . . . Then there will be a universal joy for the whole of creation for all eternity; and fear will be no more" (trans. R. C. Zaehner, in *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism*, London, 1961, pp. 280f.)

Stoicism may well have influenced the idea of "one government of men," but Stoic sources apparently do not mention the use of one language as a requirement of the cosmopolis. The inherited traditions vary on the question of languages. In chapter 11 of *Genesis* the story of the tower of Babel points to an original state of bliss when all people spoke one common language, and a Babylonian legend sees the multiplication of tongues as a cause of discord. Egyptian tradition, on the other hand, praised Thoth as the creator of languages and viewed his act as contributing to the rich variety of creation in general, with its many races and kinds of living beings. The Christian tradition, as in *Revelation* 7:9 with its allusion to "a great multitude of all tribes and peoples and tongues," certainly envisages a universalism in which diversity is present in unity and humanity is a "community of communities."

Whatever the variety of the traditions so freely transmitted in the Hellenistic age, in religious matters there was usually a readiness to acknowledge and respect diverging ways of belief, worship, and ritual. A process that went even beyond this was that of syncretism, a term often hailed as the hallmark of the age. In origin a Greek word, it was not used by the Greeks with the exact meaning assigned to it today. It derives from the verb *sugkretizo*, which itself derives from *Kres*, "a Cretan"; it was used politically of two parties combining against a common enemy, while the noun *sugkretismos* was used of a federation or union of Cretan communities.

In English and other modern languages the noun denotes the attempted union or reconciliation of diverse or opposite tenets or practices, especially in the philosophy of religion. The usage is also often extended to include the equation or identification of diverse deities and the combination or fusion of their cults, the latter practice being a specifically Hellenistic development. Earlier experience was indeed fully conversant with the equation of deities.

In ancient religions the most thorough process of syncretism in this sense is found in the developed phase of Roman religion, when Roman deities were identified with Greek counterparts—Jupiter with Zeus, Juno with Hera, Venus with Aphrodite, Ceres with Demeter, Mars with Ares, and so on. In some cases this conscious process found no easy counterpart: Janus, the god of the door, was a distinctively Roman concept. In other cases a Greek deity was adopted without any attempted assimilation. Thus the Greek god Apollo was worshiped in Italy by the Etruscans and was afterward much revered by the Romans, becoming a favorite god of the emperor Augustus. A simple act of comparison could lead to syncretism of this kind: One community compares its own gods with those of another; when similar powers or functions are recognized, the comparison may lead to identification. Of course, this process is valid only with polytheistic communities since monotheism rejects comparisons. Nor does the process arise when there is no contact between communities and therefore no need to make comparisons, except in instances where a plurality of deities within communities of the same culture invites an equation of functions. This may lead to assimilation and the use of one divine name instead of several. Thus it appears that among the Greek communities there were several forms of the corn mother, but eventually the name of Demeter, best known, was applied to most of them. Even so, local varieties persisted in several of the cults. The “Black” Demeter of Phigalia, a town of Arcadia, for instance, was very different from the Demeter of Eleusis. In Phigalia the Black Demeter was said to be the consort of a horse-shaped Poseidon.

In the fifth century BCE the Greek historian Herodotus indulged freely in the kind of syncretism that meant identifying the gods of different nations. In his second book, which deals with Egypt, he consistently identifies the Egyptian Osiris with the Greek Dionysos and the Egyptian Isis with the Greek Demeter. Probably this was prompted only by recognition of their similar functions, although he does refer to festivals. Later, however, in Hellenistic times, the cults of these deities influenced one another. Isis, for example, was often depicted with ears of wheat on her headdress in a manner traditionally associated with Demeter, while ivy, the plant of Dionysos, figured in the rites of Osiris. Again, the phallus was sometimes carried now in processions of Osiris in Egypt, as it had been regularly in the rites of Dionysos among the Greeks; the Egyptian tradition had previously known nothing of this. Another good instance of active syncretism was the god Sarapis, worshiped in Egypt and elsewhere under the Ptolemies. He derived from the Egyptian god Osir-Api (Osiris-Apis) but was now represented in Greek style in a form rather like that of Zeus (but with the *modius*, a measuring vessel, on his head). He was identified with Zeus and with Helios. He was not, however, a new creation; his emergence points to amalgamation and adaptation.

Increasingly in Hellenistic times, the cults of Oriental deities were introduced to the cities of the Greek world and

Italy. Such a procedure had been very difficult, and indeed dangerous, in previous ages, for the orgiastic nature of some of these cults was much feared, and all public cults were rigidly controlled by the state. But a radical change of attitude came in Hellenistic times. State control remained, but often it now actively supported foreign cults, as for instance the cult of Dionysos in Ptolemaic Egypt. When Stratonice, the wife of Seleucus Nicator in Syria, resettled the city of Bamyce as Hierapolis in about 300 BCE, one feature of the worship sanctioned there was the fusion of the great Syrian goddess Atargatis with the Hellenic goddesses Artemis, Hera, and Aphrodite. In Egypt this type of cult syncretism was furthered by the system of the *sunnaoi theoi* (“temple-sharing gods”). This was used principally to advance the claims of the Ptolemaic kings and queens as divine beings in temples throughout Egypt in the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus and afterward; the names of the royal divinities were added as gods who shared the temple with the main deity worshiped there. The reigning Ptolemies and their wives were thus promoted to an honored position on a par with that of the traditionally accepted deities.

Usually the Greeks raised a temple in honor of one particular deity, as Athena was honored in the Parthenon at Athens, Zeus in the great temple at Olympia, and Apollo in his temples at Delphi and Delos. Yet it was very natural that associated deities, especially those connected in myth, legend, and cult, should be represented and worshiped in the same temple. Thus Artemis was honored with Apollo as his twin sister, just as Hadad was honored with the Syrian goddess Atargatis as her consort.

Hellenistic practice went a good deal further than this in the mingling of gods, which the Greeks termed *theokrasia*. One is at first surprised to read in Apuleius’s *Metamorphoses*, when he describes the preparations for the initiation of Lucius into the cult of Isis, that the high priest in charge of the rites is called Mithra and that he is linked to the initiand “by a certain divine association of constellations.” A close and friendly attitude toward Mithraism is clearly indicated, and astrological lore is also openly deployed. Furthermore, when the temple of Mithra was discovered in the Walbrook area of London by W. F. Grimes in 1954, the finest work of statuary to come to light was of the Egyptian god Sarapis. Nor does the evidence of inscriptions and literature suggest anything other than an attitude of sympathetic cooperation between these and other religions.

There was, of course, no claim of exclusiveness to prevent such an attitude, as was the case with Judaism and Christianity. Well-known instances indicate that even priesthoods of different religions could be held by the same person. Plutarch’s friend Clea, to whom he dedicated his study of the Egyptian cults, was a priestess of Dionysos and also of Isis and Osiris. Similarly, in the fourth century CE one Vettius Agorius Praetextatus was initiated into the Dionysian, Eleusinian, and Mithraic mysteries.

Popular religious practice and belief are undoubtedly best reflected in inscriptions, whether in temples, on tombstones, or on amulets, and in magical incantations. Often the gods of different countries are named together in dedications and formulaic expressions of thanksgiving. This is also true of inscriptions that are official and public in character. Thus, in an inscription dated between 50 and 35 BCE, Antiochus I of Commagene, a small kingdom north of Syria, presents an exposition of his religion. He begins by calling himself “the God, the righteous God” and “friend of Romans and Greeks,” and then declares that he has made his kingdom “the common dwelling place of all the gods.” He alludes to the ancient doctrine of Persians and Greeks and refers with reverence to Zeus-Oromasdes, to Apollo-Mithra-Helios-Hermes, and to Artagnes-Herakles-Ares. This showpiece of syncretism contains an element of political expediency: The king is eager to pander to both Romans and Greeks (the Seleucid rulers); his religion is basically Iranian but with Greek embellishments.

In contrast, the easy and fluid permutations of popular magical texts indicate a general readiness to mix varying religious traditions very freely. Two frequent names are the Greek *Zeus* and the Jewish *Iao* (*Yahveh*). In the case of *Zeus* one cannot always be sure whether the name conceals a Mesopotamian or Egyptian deity since these brief formulas rarely reveal the double personality expressed in Antiochus’s *Zeus-Oromasdes*, where the second element is obviously more important than the first. Sometimes the Jewish *Iao* is identified with Zeus or Dionysos.

Nor does the resulting fusion always refrain from a conflation of myths. Thus a magical papyrus now in Oslo (Papyrus Oslo 1.105–109) addresses the god Seth-Typhon, whose name combines Egyptian and Greek deities. The papyrus goes on to say that the god’s mother is a white sow, an allusion to an Egyptian myth about Seth and the goddess Nut. It then hails the god as “thou who dost hold in Heliopolis an iron staff with which thou didst barricade the sea and enable them to pass through.” Heliopolis here is the city of the sun god in Egypt, but the “iron staff” is apparently that of *Psalms* 2:9, “Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron,” while the words that follow allude to the passage of the Hebrews through the Red Sea. The god addressed is therefore a fusion of the deities of three nations, including the Jewish *Yahveh*, and it is *Yahveh* who dominates the last part of the invocation.

One of the results of syncretism in religion was a sense of tolerance and sympathy. People who are ready to borrow from other religions are clearly not about to condemn them. Judaism and Christianity are again the exceptions, and their fervid intolerance was a source of strength in the struggle for survival. Only very rarely does a sense of conflict and hostility appear among the adherents of the pagan religions. Plutarch sometimes inveighs against the primitive cruelties unveiled in facets of mythology; his method is fairly radical in that he is prepared to reject such elements as unworthy of the gods.

In his novel about the ass-man rescued by Isis, Apuleius is appreciative and respectful in his allusions to most other religions. Here there was almost a logical imperative operating since Isis, as he often stresses, combined the attributes of all other goddesses. Yet there are two glaring exceptions to his tolerant attitude. One is the portrait of the baker’s wife (9.14), who is described as a retailer of all the vices and as one who “scorned and spurned divine beings and instead of accepting a definite faith . . . falsely and blasphemously professed belief in a god whom she regarded as the one and only god.” The description might apply to the Jewish or Christian faith, but the list of vices corresponds rather closely to those named in *1 Corinthians* 5:11, so that a Christian allusion is a little more likely. Even more hostile is Apuleius’s withering depiction (8.24ff., 9.3ff.) of the priests of the Syrian goddess Atargatis. They are said to be addicted to homosexual practices, to crude begging, to flagrant pilfering (they steal even the golden cup from the temple of the mother of the gods), and to unscrupulous manipulation of an oracle. Doubtless the praise of Isis was heightened by this attack, and for once the age seems to be characterized by competing and conflicting religions.

In general, syncretism tended to induce a belief in pantheism. The free mingling of many varying divinities suggested to some minds that the world was full of God in some form or another. Aratus of Soli (c. 315–240 BCE), in his astronomical poem *Phaenomena*, said that “all the ways are full of God, and all the meeting-places of men, the sea and the harbors; and at every turn we all need God, for we are related to him” (the Greek has *Zeus* for *God*). The last clause was quoted by Paul in his address at Athens (*Acts* 17:28): “As some of your own poets have said, ‘We are also his offspring.’” At the same time syncretism furthered the quest for the unity of the divine. Earlier Greek philosophers had been concerned with the idea that there was one god behind the many names and forms. Now that the deities of divergent national traditions were being actively equated and fused, the idea of one divine reality was becoming still more widespread.

**THE REJECTION OF RELIGION.** It may seem a paradox that, in spite of the religious tendencies delineated, the direct or indirect rejection of religion was also a feature of Hellenistic thinking. Direct rejection was restricted to a small minority of philosophers, but its intellectual vitality is manifest, although it was not a completely new development. Several of the Sophists of the fifth century BCE had propagated a doctrine that questioned accepted religious beliefs. Before the Sophists, Anaxagoras had done the same. While he may not have plainly denied the existence of God or the gods, his belief that mechanistic laws were behind the workings of the universe excluded a divine causation or operation, even in Mind (*Nous*) was seen by him as the initiator of cosmic motion.

Among the Sophists, Protagoras was broadly in the same category. He once said concerning the gods: “I am unable



to know whether they exist or do not exist, nor what they are like in form; for the factors obstructing knowledge are many: the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life." The relativism of Protagoras also tended in this direction, for it was he who said, "The measure of all things is man." If Protagoras may thus be rightly classified as an agnostic, Diagoras of Melos, also of the fifth century BCE, was definitely an atheist; indeed, he was called *ho Atheos*. Like Protagoras, he was condemned for impiety, but trials and convictions for this are not always clear indications of a denial of the gods. Diagoras wrote a book in which he attacked the Eleusinian mysteries, and with these remarks he doubtless caused great offense. The main thesis of his book went a good deal further, declaring that the gods did not exist at all. What he saw as the obvious absence of divine punishment in human life was the ground for his denial. He is the first uncompromising atheist in the history of European thought.

In the Hellenistic age Euhemerus of Messene, who for a time (311–298 BCE) served Cassander, king of Macedon, can also be listed as an atheist, although his attacks on traditional religion were more of a rationalizing reductionism than a frontal assault. In his travel romance *Sacred History*, which idealized life on the island of Panchaea in the Indian Ocean, he tells of an inscribed record of the deeds of the gods Ouranos, Kronos, and Zeus. According to the record, these mighty deities had originally been human kings whom their appreciative subjects elevated to the rank of divinity. Clearly this approach could be interpreted as a defense of contemporary ruler cults, but when generalized in relation to gods everywhere, it meant that real divinity disappeared in the postulated human origins. The Greek hero cults also fitted the theory. It is easy to understand why "euhemerism" is still an influential force in the study of religions.

It is not surprising that the Cynics, who tended to oppose all established values, sometimes included religion in their abuse. Diogenes of Sinope expressed contempt for the Eleusinian mysteries. A man who could defend stealing from temples, cannibalism, and incest obviously took pleasure in destructive challenge. Yet his teacher Antisthenes, who attacked all religious conventions and the belief in a multitude of gods, maintained that there existed one God beyond all visible phenomena. The Hellenistic Cynics developed the popular and hard-hitting speech form called the *diatribē*, which combined comic effects with satire that was often abusive. Yet in spite of the Cynics, continued attacks on religious conventions, it is doubtful whether a full-fledged atheism should be ascribed to them.

Features of the Cynic tradition can be recognized in the works of Lucian (120–180 CE), who ridiculed both religion and philosophy; under the latter heading he especially attacked the Cynics, indebted though he was to them. His attacks on religion are well exemplified in his comic picture of Zeus struggling at a celestial reception desk to cope with the countless prayers of humanity. Nor does Christianity escape

his lash. He says of Christians that "the poor beggars have persuaded themselves that they will be absolutely immortal and live everlastingly, and for this reason they scorn death and willingly surrender when arrested" (*Peregrinus* 13); they are "simple-minded people," he adds, who can be easily imposed upon by any charlatan or trickster.

A certain criticism of religion emerges also in the works of the philosophers called Skeptics. Their main emphasis was on the reservation or suspension of judgment, but this was applied in a general sense to the validity of sense perceptions and thus to the uncertain claim that knowledge of things can be attained. Specific problems concerning religion were discussed by Sextus Empiricus (c. 160–210 CE), who noted the vast amount of disagreement on the subject that prevailed. The very existence of the gods or of God, the propriety or otherwise of animal sacrifices and dietetic rules, the problem of how the dead should be treated, the right attitude toward death itself—all these matters produced debate and radically differing views. He argues that relativism is inherent in these areas: "All are matters of custom." Therefore, he concludes, judgment on questions of religious belief and practice must also be suspended.

**PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.** The two most popular and influential philosophical schools of Hellenistic times were those of the Epicureans and the Stoics, both of which originated in the period immediately following Alexander's conquests. Both were also much affected, albeit in very different ways, by the radical political changes of the age as well as by the new international horizons. To some extent, both took up attitudes that were critical of traditional religious beliefs. Indeed, some would describe them, particularly the Epicureans, as rejecting religion, but this would be misleading.

Epicurus (341–270 BCE) was born in Samos but spent much of his life in Athens, where he bought a house with a garden (his school was eventually called "the Garden"). For him, the aim of philosophy is to secure a happy life; "pleasure is the beginning and end of living happily." Pleasure of the soul is valued above bodily pleasure, and the ideal is *ataraxia*, "freedom from disturbance."

Epicureans were often accused of profligacy, but they lived a modest and simple life of seclusion. Women and slaves were allowed into the Garden, and among the women were several courtesans (*hetairai*), who obviously became a pretext for some of the accusations made against the Epicureans of gross sexual immorality and of overindulgence in wine and food. Such charges came mainly from adherents who later abandoned the school.

In his moral doctrine and spiritual temper Epicurus paid great attention to the idea of friendship (*philia*, for which Lucretius, the Roman Epicurean, used the word *amicitia*); and there is every reason to believe that he strove to follow his noble ideal. He says of friendship: "Of all things which wisdom supplies to make life entirely happy, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship." Again: "Friend-

ship must always be sought for its own sake, although it has its origins in the need for help." And yet again: "That is also very beautiful, the sight of those near and dear to us, when to the bonds of kinship is joined a union of hearts." In his book *The Faith of Epicurus* (London, 1967), Benjamin Farrington aptly compares the saying of William Blake, "The bird a nest, the spider a web, man friendship" (p. 23), and even more appositely since its context is not far removed in time, cites the dictum of Aristotle: "Moreover friendship [*philia*] seems to hold states together and lawgivers are more concerned about friendship than about justice. For concord seems to be akin to friendship . . . , and when men are friends there is no need of justice" (p. 29; *Nichomachean Ethics* 1155a). Friendship is seen, then, not only as a personal tie between individuals but also as the motivating force of a healthy society.

If these ideas indicate the quality of Epicurus's spirituality, his precise attitude to religion must be examined. This is well expressed in his *Letter of Menoecus*, a letter to a disciple of his to whom he wished to explain the basic principles of his creed. First of all, one must believe that "God is a being immortal and blessed"; then, a little later, he says that "gods certainly exist, since our perception of them is clear." The apparent contradiction here between "God" and "gods" is familiar in previous Greek writing, especially in the works of Plato, who combines a suggestion of monotheism with the traditional polytheism.

Epicurus goes on to say that many false ideas are current about the gods, in particular the popular concept of reward and punishment whereby the injuries suffered by the wicked and the blessings enjoyed by the good are directly conferred by the gods. He then passes on to discuss death, a subject he often broaches in connection with religion. He tells Menoecus that it is important to realize that death means nothing because it deprives one of all sensation. To realize this makes mortal life more enjoyable in that the desire for immortality is removed. The fear of death and of what may follow it is groundless; the wise man will think reverently of the gods and will be entirely fearless of death. Indeed, he will preserve his peace of mind and "live like a god among men." The life of the gods, as other Epicurean writings make clear, is regarded as one of calm beatitude. They enjoy a blissful existence far away from the turmoil of the human world, free of pain and peril. They take no interest in human affairs and are content with the immortality and supreme blessedness that is theirs.

Perhaps it is Lucretius (94–55 BCE), the Roman exponent of Epicureanism, who has given the most attractive expression to these ideas, both in his depiction of the bliss enjoyed by the gods in their remote paradise and in his searing attacks on popular notions of punishments after death, which were associated with the divine control of Hades. Some of the attacks made by Lucretius on these popular misconceptions sound very much like a condemnation of religion *in toto*. After a breathlessly pathetic picture of Agamem-

non sacrificing his own daughter Iphigenia to satisfy the claims of religion, the poet declares, "So many evils was religion able to instigate" (*De rerum natura* 101).

Epicurus himself, on the other hand, is careful to point out that he regularly follows traditional religious observances: "Let it be enough to state now that the divine is in need of no mark of honor, but that it is natural for us to honor it, especially by having pious conceptions of it and secondly, by presenting to all the gods in turn the traditional sacrifices" (Philodemus, *De musica* 4.6, quoting Epicurus). At first sight a palpable contradiction occurs here. If the gods are not concerned with human life, why should human beings bother to honor them with prayer and sacrifice? Do not these religious acts imply a constant concern on both sides? To resolve this dilemma, it seems, one should ascribe to Epicurus the highest form of worship, the utterly disinterested adoration of the divine which expects nothing in return but has the joy of sharing in the divine happiness. Prayer and sacrifice enable such a worshiper to take part in the blessedness of the gods. It was said of Epicurus, "He appeals to the Completely Happy so as to strengthen his own blessedness." It could be argued that he is, therefore, receiving something from the gods, even though the gift is purely spiritual in character, and that the gods are ready to bestow it, thus belying the concept that they are a remote community of beings who have no care or concern for humanity.

Epicurus also recommended prayer because it enabled one to participate in the religious life of one's own country; he viewed it as natural and proper. This contrasts sharply with his constant advice to withdraw completely from political and public activity. But if there is a measure of inconsistency in his sanction of traditional religious rites, his condemnation of the astral religion propagated by Plato in his later years is perfectly consonant with the lofty view of the divine that Epicurus always tried to maintain. His creed is well summed up in the saying of Diogenes of Oenoanda in Asia Minor, who lived in the second century CE: "Nothing to fear in God. Nothing to feel in death."

In one respect the Stoics differed firmly from the Epicureans: They urged active participation in public life, not a retreat from it. While favoring the idea of a world state, they did not shrink from service to their own. Their basic teachings also differed. For them it was virtue, not pleasure, that was the supreme value in life; knowledge was important in the quest for virtue, but the essential thing was to live in agreement with nature since nature leads to virtue. In modern parlance, to follow nature may often imply an uninhibited pursuit of the natural instincts and their pleasures, but the Stoics' interpretation is quite different. For them the formative and guiding principle in nature is reason (*logos*), which is identified with God himself and is said to manifest itself as fate or necessity and as providence. Another special manifestation is human reason, whose guidance it is one's duty to obey. For rational beings such as humans virtue alone is the vital possession, and from virtue alone comes happiness.

Pleasure, on the other hand, is regarded as only a by-product of virtuous living and not as a proper end in itself. Like the Epicureans, the Stoics valued “freedom from disturbance” (*ataraxia*) as a desirable state, as well as “freedom from emotion” (*apatheia*) and “inward independence” (*autarkeia*). The founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium (335–263 BCE), was highly regarded for his integrity, and it was said of him that “he made his life a pattern to all, for he followed his own teaching.” He was succeeded as leader of the school by Cleanthes (331–232 BCE), who was followed in turn by Chrysippus (280–207 BCE). These philosophers showed varied emphases in their teachings, much more so than did the followers of Epicurus, who adhered closely to the precepts of their founding father and gave him almost divine status.

Among the Stoics, Cleanthes was the most concerned with religion. He is renowned for his beautiful *Hymn to Zeus*, where the god is addressed as the creator of the world and the universe and as a ruling spirit who continues to dwell in the whole of his creation. When this hymn is compared with previous Greek praises of the god, what is striking is the absence of any specific allusions to the mythology or cult of Zeus, and some of the mythology was quite scandalous. Instead, Zeus has become to Cleanthes an abstract figure standing for divine creativity, reason, law, and providence. He does refer to the thunderbolt of Zeus, but he links it to the Stoic doctrine of the conflagration that will end the world: “Nature’s own stroke brings all things to their end.” He also gives it a moral force, urging Zeus to use it to dispel darkness from the souls of humans.

Both Cleanthes and Chrysippus assembled arguments to prove the existence of God, giving prominence to the argument from design: The order and regularity of the heavenly bodies could not be produced by humanity, it is urged; they must have been produced by something better than humans. “And what name other than God would one give to this?” (Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.16, quoting Chrysippus). As has been seen, in its whole view of nature and man early Stoicism assigns a built-in importance to religion. A moral earnestness is also evident in the writings of Stoics in the Roman imperial era, especially those of Seneca (5 BCE–65 CE) and Epictetus (55–135 CE), whose idea of God is practically monotheistic. In their attitude to the gods of tradition, the Stoics were often charged with a pallid reductionism. They tended to equate the gods with the functions associated with them. Plutarch, a middle Platonist not unfriendly to Stoicism, complains in the early second century CE of the facile way in which gods were labeled according to their physical associations; Osiris was thus related to natural fertility while Dionysos was explained as wine and Demeter as grain. Another kind of reductionism was employed by the Stoics to explain myths whose primitive crudities offended them, namely, a wholesale use of allegory. Plutarch himself was prepared to use this method liberally. The Platonist school that he favored continued to flourish, but it had abandoned orthodoxy in its espousal of an open eclecticism.

The philosophical creeds with their variety of religious ingredients appealed, of course, only to an educated elite. Their quiet colonnades were far removed from the rough-and-tumble of the marketplace, as was the Epicurean Garden. Many confusing cries accosted common people in the marketplace, and they often found it most satisfying, as far as religion was concerned, to follow the emotional uplift and the offer of salvation presented by the mystery religions and by Christianity.

**SEE ALSO** Apostles; Apotheosis; Astrology; Divination; Emperor’s Cult; Gnosticism; Hermetism; Heroes; Incarnation; Jesus; Kingship; Manichaeism; Mystery Religions; Neoplatonism; Oracles; Paul the Apostle; Rabbinic Judaism in Late Antiquity; Roman Religion, article on The Imperial Period; Shape Shifting; Sceptics and Scepticism; Syncretism.

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J. GWYN GRIFFITHS (1987)

**HENOTHEISM**, a term coined from the Greek *henos* (“one”) and *theos* (“god”), was for some time used by F. Max Müller interchangeably with *kathenotheism*, derived from the Greek *kath’hena* (“one by one”). It was Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) who first used the word *henotheism* in his study of mythology to indicate “relative, rudimentary monotheism,” which he supposed was the idea of God in prehistoric consciousness (*Philosophie der Mythologie und der Offenbarung*, 1842). F. Max Müller (1823–1900), in his attempt at “tracing the origin and first growth of human thought,” employed the word as a technical term of *Religionswissenschaft* to designate a peculiar form of polytheism that in his view was characteristic of the description of the gods in the *R̥gveda*. He observed that in the Vedas—the oldest Indian religious literature—although deities are invoked by a variety of names, such as *Agni* (“fire”), *Sūrya* (“the sun”), *Uṣas* (“dawn”), *Maruts* (“the storms”), *Prthvī* (“the earth”), *Āp* (“the waters”), and *Nadī* (“the rivers”), that are closely connected with nature, as well as by proper names, such as *Varuṇa*, *Mitra*, *Indra*, and *Aditi*, “to the mind of the suppliant” each god is “at the time a real divinity, supreme and absolute,” and not limited by the powers of any other gods. Müller called this “belief in single gods” *henotheism* or *kathenotheism*, “a worship of one god after another” (Müller, 1881, pp. 136–137). In his lectures of 1882 he noted that rather than the term *kathenotheism* the “shorter term *henotheism* has found more general acceptance, as conveying more definitely the opposition between *monotheism*, the worship of only one God, and *henotheism*, the worship of single gods” (Müller, 1896, pp. 146–147).

Müller distinguished this Vedic plurality of gods from the idea of polytheism, which, as he pointed out, derived chiefly from Greek and Roman antiquity and designated “a certain more or less organized system of gods, different in power and rank, and all subordinate to a supreme God, a Zeus or Jupiter” (Müller, 1896, pp. 145–146).

Partly in opposition to the thesis of Ernest Renan (1823–1892) that monotheism was a unique tendency of the Semitic race, Müller suggested that a “henotheistic phase” was “a peculiar phase of religion” that was found probably everywhere preceding either polytheism or monotheism (Müller, 1873, p. 142; cf. Müller, 1881, p. 414). He asserted that such a phase existed not only in India but in Greece, Italy, Germany, and elsewhere (Müller, 1879, p. 275; cf.

Müller, 1896, p. 163). Müller maintained that this henotheistic phase “tended to become a belief in *one* God, presiding over the other no longer supreme gods—*polytheism*; or a belief in one god, excluding the very possibility of other gods—*monotheism*” (Müller, 1879, p. 362; cf. Müller, 1896, p. 163). In comparing monotheism and henotheism, Müller made the following observation: “There is one kind of oneness which does not exclude the idea of plurality,” i.e., henotheism, and “there is another which does” exclude the idea of plurality, i.e., monotheism (Müller, 1881, p. 415).

The association of henotheism with the idea of “rudimentary monotheism,” however, never completely disappeared from the minds of some scholars of religion. Thus, henotheism was sometimes confused with monolatry, a term best applied to the religion of ancient Israel before it attained monotheism, when the existence of gods other than Yahveh was admitted but their worship was strictly forbidden (see *Ex. 22:20*). Friedrich Heiler (1961, p. 323) and others have pointed out, however, that monolatry—the exclusive worship of a god by a certain social group—clearly differs from the idea of henotheism expounded by Müller.

Müller’s idea of henotheism has a speculative dimension that deals with how a divine reality reveals itself to humans. He recognized in the Vedas a “breaking forth” of the awareness “that all the deities are but different names of one and the same godhead” and that “the primitive intuition of the godhead”—“the main-spring of all later religion”—“is neither monotheistic nor polytheistic. . . . God is God” (Müller, 1881, pp. 136–137 and 414–415). Thus, he asserted that “the unity of the Divine” was at the basis of the henotheistic mode of expression (Müller, 1896, p. 144). From his study of the Vedas Müller concluded that “we learn a lesson—the lesson *how gods were made and unmade*—how the Beyond or the Infinite was named by different names in order to bring it near to the mind of [hu]man [beings], to make it for a time comprehensible, until, when name after name had proved of no avail, a nameless God was felt to answer best the restless cravings of the human heart” (Müller, 1896, p. 163). However, if one disregards these metaphysical assertions, Müller’s idea of henotheism appears to be yet another term that designates a certain plurality of gods, entailing a possible confusion with such terms as *monotheism*, *polytheism*, and *monolatry*.

The idea of henotheism proposed by Müller is twofold: (1) it designates a certain developmental stage within a religion preceding polytheism or monotheism, and (2) a unique, qualitative “kairological moment,” or aspect, of human religious awareness itself (cf. Panikkar, p. 266). Heiler, for one, employs the word *henotheism* for its psychological significance, equating it with “subjective theism,” which in his view paves a way to objective monotheism (Heiler, p. 460). The primordial religious intuition that attracted Müller’s attention may be compared with one of the two modes of thinking Heidegger identifies, namely with the *besinnliches Denken*, or meditative thinking, as opposed to *rechnendes Denken*, or calculative thinking.

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MICHIKO YUSA (1987 AND 2005)

**HERA** was the wife of Zeus and, in literature, the most prominent Greek goddess, although her cultic importance was limited. Hera was an ancient goddess, whose name is already attested in Mycenaean times. Etymologically, a relation with the word *heros* seems probable. As the latter most likely means something like "Lord," Hera's name may be interpreted as "Lady," even if certainty is not attainable.

Zeus's first wife was called Dione, who survived only at the margins of the Greek world, yet Hera had already supplanted her in Mycenaean times—a Linear-B tablet of Pylos mentions the combination "Zeus, Hera, Drimios, the son of Zeus." The role of Hera in Homer's *Iliad*, the oldest and most detailed source in the Archaic Age, is threefold. First, she is the wedded wife of Zeus (she was also his eldest sister). Hera sits "on the golden throne" and holds the scepter, and there is no doubt about her importance. Second, the picture of the divinely consummated marriage with Zeus made Hera into a goddess of weddings and marriage throughout Greece. Third, she appears as the jealous wife par excellence, whose unruly behavior is a source of continuous concern for the supreme god. He beats her, threatens her with violence, and even penalizes her by hanging her in the sky with anvils on her feet (*Iliad* 1.566–7, 588; 8.403–5; 16.18–31).

Hera's position as the wife of Zeus most likely goes back to her prominent position in Argos. Even though her name eventually became limited to the city on the Peloponnese, it must have been her position as city goddess of one of the most powerful Mycenaean cities that made it possible for her to supplant Zeus's first wife.

**THE EDUCATION OF GIRLS AND MARRIAGE.** The education of girls was the sphere of action of several Greek divinities, including Apollo, Artemis, Aphrodite, and Hera. In the case of the latter, it is striking that virginity is often emphasized. Hera herself was worshipped as Parthenos (Virgin) in Hermione and Arcadian Stymphalos. The island of Samos was once called Parthenie (the Maidenly), and the river Imbrasos by the sanctuary was also called Parthenios. Yet this pre-matrimonial association of Hera is only dimly visible.

On the other hand, Hera's position as the goddess of marriage is clear. As Hera Teleia, she "keeps the keys of wedlock," as Aristophanes expressed it in his *Thesmophoriazousae* (973). The epithet was already explained in antiquity by a commentator on line 974 of the play: "Hera Teleia and Zeus Teleios were honored in wedding ceremonies, since they were in charge of weddings." As Teleia, Hera was the "fulfilled" woman par excellence because the Greeks saw the wedding as a girl's life's fulfillment. The relation of the epithet to the wedding also clearly appears from her temple at Plataea. Here, Hera had two statues and two epithets, Nymphenomenê (she who is led as bride during the wedding day), and Teleia (the fulfilled). The wedding of Zeus and Hera was considered to be so important that several Greek communities—such as various cities on Euboea or Cretan Knossos—claimed it took place in their area. The inhabitants of these cities would imitate the wedding near a river at the annual sacrificial festival. The Athenians, as well, remembered the marriage of Zeus and Hera in the month Gamelion, in late winter. Husbands even celebrated the central mystery of this festival, the *Hieros Gamos*, or *Theogamia*, by (rather unusually) staying home and spending an evening with their wives.

Although Plutarch (fragment 157, Sandbach) mentions that in sacrifices to Hera Gamelia the gall was not offered "so that married life might be without bitterness," the goddess's unruly and jealous behavior is often alluded to in the *Iliad*. Hera was also anything but a good mother: in a fit of rage she hurled her son Hephaistos, the divine smith, from Olympus into the sea. The close connection between Hera and Hephaistos is striking and may have something to do with the position of the goddess outside the centers of civilization, just as the smith is at the margin of the civilized and political community.

The negative picture of Hera in Greek mythology can hardly be separated from her role in Greek cult, where both her rituals and the location of her sanctuaries point to a position away from the central social order. In some rituals, this jealousy was actually closely connected to the ritual. In Boeotian Plataea, every ten years a great festival took place—the Daidala—of which the meaning is not at all clear. The myth



told how Hera had withdrawn to neighboring Euboea out of jealousy, but returned when Zeus dressed up a wooden doll as his bride and pretended to marry her. The ritual ended with the ceremonial burning of the doll, the sacrificial meat, and the wooden altar (a variant of the widespread fire sacrifices that always carry a slightly unpleasant meaning).

**HERA'S CULT ON ARGOS.** Hera's cult was especially prominent in Argos and on Samos. In Argos, Hera's sanctuary—the Heraion—can be traced from about 800 BCE. It was situated about eighteen kilometers from Argos and five kilometers from Mycenae, and does not seem to have gained importance before the last third of the eighth century BCE. It is only from around 700 BCE that traces of a stone altar are discovered. The temple proper seems to have been built only a few decades later, and it perished in a fire in 423 BCE. Hera's Argive cult was well-known for its priestesses, who seem to have served her for the entirety of their lives—a rather unusual feat in ancient Greece. The presence of innumerable fibulae shows the importance of the cult for the life of the women, who dedicated their clothes at this sanctuary. The main festival, which was called Heraia and Hecatombaia, was celebrated in the month Panamos, the first month of the Argive year. The festival thus falls within the category of New Year festivals.

During the festival there was a procession from the city to the sanctuary. The procession included Hera's priestess—who traveled the distance in an old-fashioned oxcart—as well as, most likely, the maidens who had woven the new peplos for Hera, whose presentation formed part of the festival. However, as an ancient collection of Greek proverbs says, “those in Argos who had kept their boyhood pure and blameless took up a sacred shield and led the procession: this was their honor according to ancient tradition” (Plutarch, 1.44). Evidently, the festival marked the last stage of the initiation, during which the new male citizens showed themselves to the community.

The initiatory function of Hera also appears from the many votives that represent a kourotrophic goddess. On the island of Lesbos, beauty contests took place in front of Hera's temple, and similar contests in other Greek communities demonstrate that these took place just before the formal adulthood of Greek girls. Such initiations are virtually always the prerogative of the upper class; the many dedications of figurines of Amazons on horses also seem to point to the horse-riding aristocracy. Dedications from central Italy in Hera's sanctuary show the great radius of Hera's Argive cult.

**HERA'S CULT ON SAMOS.** The second center of Hera's cult was Samos. Here the Heraion was situated about eight kilometers west of the city of Samos. The first temple was built in the eighth century BCE, and the final, impressive temple by Polycrates, the powerful ruler of independent Samos before the island was conquered by the Persians, was built at the end of the sixth century BCE. The oldest stage of Hera's cult must have been dominated by women; the typical male features—such as the dedications of miniature boats—

appear at a later time. Given the prominence of the shield in Argos, it should be noted that many miniature shields were found in the sanctuary—sure signs of male initiation. As in Argos, Hera was apparently the goddess who supervised the coming of age of the new generation of citizens, both male and female.

The most important festival of Hera was the Tonia. The myth related the capture of her statue by Etruscan pirates and its subsequent recovery. The story reflects the leaving of the temple by the statue. During the festival the statue was most likely exhibited near the holy *agnus castus*—a negative tree in ancient Greece—where it would have been washed and redressed. Coins from the Roman period show that Hera's statue was tethered; such tethered statues indicated that the relevant divinity was connected with the dissolution of the social order. It is unfortunate, however, that the exact position of the festival in the Samian year is not known, and so its precise function remains obscure.

**HERA'S CULT IN SOUTHERN ITALY.** The goddess Hera was also popular in Southern Italy, where excavations in Foce del Sele, at the estuary of the river Sele, have revealed an important sixth-century sanctuary of Hera. Many objects from the life of women have been found there, such as weights for weaving and perfume bottles. This female character is also evident in Croton, where, because of Pythagoras, the women of Croton no longer dared wear expensive clothes; instead, they dedicated them in the most prominent sanctuary of the town, the temple of Hera Lacinia.

Excavations have shown that this sanctuary in Foca del Sele received dedications from throughout the Greek world and therefore must have been held in high standing. There is little information, however, about Hera's sixth-century temple in Paestum/Posidonia, although the miniature arms found once again seem to point into the direction of initiation. In her sanctuary in Santa Venera, at the border of the urban area of Paestum, Hera was also worshipped (along with Iovia, a kind of Venus of the Italic Lucani). Though scarce, the data available points to Hera as the goddess who presided over both male and female maturation, as well as the wedding. In ways specific to local customs, this must have been Hera's function throughout Greece.

**SEE ALSO** Artemis; Dionysos; Divination, article on Greek and Roman Divination; Family; Goddess Worship, overview article; Hesiod; Homer; Juno; Marriage; Zeus.

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in the *Iliad* (Lanham, Md., 1993); and Reinhard Häussler's *Hera und Juno: Wandlungen und Beharrung einer Göttin* (Stuttgart, Germany, 1995), are not that helpful. The best modern synthesis is Walter Burkert's *Greek Religion* (Oxford, 1985), 131–35; 400–401, which has to be supplemented on the connection between Hera and initiation by Claude Calame, *Choruses of Young Women in Ancient Greece: Their Morphology, Religious Role, and Social Functions* (Lanham, England, 1997), 113–23. *Héra: Images, Espaces, Cultes*, edited by J. de La Genière (Naples, 1997), is an especially useful update of the archaeological evidence.

JAN N. BREMMER (2005)

**HERAKLES**, the son of Zeus and the Theban queen Alcmena, is the most prominent Greek hero, despite the fact that no poem on his labors is preserved—numerous images, several preserved tragedies, and countless allusions to his myths and cults in Greek and Latin literature attest to his importance. But although he has a mortal mother and dies himself, he is no typical hero. He lacks the close connection with a single city, or with a grave as the focus of his cult. Instead, his mythology connects him especially with the cities of Thebes and Argos, and his cult is panhellenic and makes him appear much more like a god than a hero. One can understand why the poet Pindar (c. 522–438 BCE) blurred the categories and called him a “hero god,” (*hērōs theos*; *Nemean Ode* 3.22).

**NAME.** Ancient authors, as well as some modern scholars, connected his name with that of the goddess Hera. His name takes the very common form of Greek personal names that are easily understandable as composite nouns: *Hera-kles* means “the glory of Hera,” as *Dio-kles* is “the glory of Zeus,” or *Patro-klos* “He who brings glory to his father.” In mythology, however, such a positive connection with Hera does not exist. He is, after all, the illegitimate son of her husband and a local queen, and in Homeric poetry this turned Hera into Herakles’ most bitter enemy (see, for example, *Iliad* 15.25–28). Only after his elevation into Olympus did Hera accept Herakles as an adoptive son. The ancient explanation—that it was none other than the constant persecution by Hera that set Herakles on his steady course to glory (see Pindar, *Fragment* 291)—seems rather farfetched, as is the claim that his first name had been Alcides (“strongman”). In reality, the name Alcides designates Herakles as the grandson of Alkaios, father of Herakles’ stepfather, Amphitryon. But modern explanations are not much better; the repeated effort to understand *hērōs* as “young man” rests on no firm linguistic grounds, although Herakles was, among other things, a protector of young warriors.

**MYTHOLOGY.** Zeus fell in love with the beautiful queen of Thebes, Alcmena. When her husband Amphitryon (grandson of Zeus’s son Perseus) was away on a military campaign, Zeus took Amphitryon’s shape and seduced her; in order to extend his pleasures, he interrupted the sun’s course for three days. The complications that resulted from Zeus’s disguise

were exploited in late classical drama; the preserved adaptation of a Greek tragedy for the Roman comic stage, Plautus’s *Amphitruo* (after 200 BCE), became the first in a long series of early plays in European literature.

Zeus’s ever-jealous wife Hera pursued the unborn baby. When, immediately before Herakles’ birth, Zeus declared that an offspring of Perseus would become king of Mycenae, Hera hindered Herakles’ birth in favor of that of another offspring, Eurystheus, whom Herakles would have to serve for many years. Herakles also had a twin half-brother, Iphicles, the son of Amphitryon, and this brother’s son, Iolaos, became Herakles’ devoted friend and companion.

In the service of Eurystheus, Herakles performed twelve labors. The series begins in the Peloponnesian neighborhood of Argos, the Iron Age successor of the Bronze Age site Mycenae. He killed the lion of Nemea (near Argos), a monstrous beast with a skin that weapons could not penetrate. Herakles strangled him and turned the hide into his signal armor. With Iolaos’s help, he killed the Hydra of Lerna (another town near Argos), a snakelike monster whose many heads regrew as soon as he had cut off one; he used the Hydra’s poison on the tips of his arrowheads. He caught the Cerynthian hind, a female deer with golden antlers that was living in Arcadia, and the Erymanthean boar, another Arcadian wild animal. He shot the man-eating birds that were living in the swamps of Stymphalos in Arcadia, and he cleaned the stables of Augias, king of Elis, in southwestern Peloponnese.

The other six adventures expand the geographical frame. To the south of the Peloponnese, he caught the bull that Poseidon had given as a present to the Cretan king Minos and that later was devastating the island; in the north, he tamed the man-eating wild horses of the Thracian king Diomedes. Turning east, he asked for and received the belt of the Amazon queen Hippolyte; in the far west, he abducted the cattle of Geryoneus on an island on the western shore of the Oceanus, and he received, with the help of the giant Atlas, the apples of the Hesperides (“evening girls”); and finally, he descended into the underworld and brought back the three-headed hound of hell, Cerberus. This cycle was fully established before 460 BCE, when it was represented on the temple of Zeus in Olympia.

Other exploits include his service, in female dress, at the court of queen Omphale in Lydia; his fight with death to gain back Alcestis, the wife of his host Admetus; the founding of the Olympian games; his part in a first Trojan war, which preceded the more famous Greek expedition and in which Herakles punished the treacherous Trojan king Laomedon, and a short participation in the voyage of the Argonauts; an often-represented brawl with Apollo over the Delphian tripod; and the shooting of the centaur Nessus when the beast tried to rape Herakles’ wife Deianira (with whom Herakles had a son, Hyllus). When Herakles years later abducted young Iole, with whom he had fallen in love, Deianira used the advice of Nessus to impregnate a shirt with Nessus’s blood—which was tainted with the Hydra’s poi-

son—to use as a love charm. The shirt caused so much pain to Herakles that he burned himself alive on top of Mount Oeta. After his death, he was received among the Olympian gods and married to Hebe (“youth”).

The story of Herakles, the mighty, albeit somewhat flawed, mortal who subjects himself to a much weaker person, cleanses the earth from frightful monsters, and finally is rewarded by being made a god, attracted a moralistic reading. In the allegorical interpretation of Stoic philosophers, Herakles became the exemplar of the ideal Stoic sage whose labor and dedication earns him a godlike position. In royal ideology, from Alexander the Great (356–323 BCE) to the emperor Charles V (1500–1558), Herakles more specifically became the embodiment of royal virtues. The personal motto of Charles V depicts the pillars of Herakles at the Strait of Gibraltar with the proud caption *plus ultra* (more beyond)—thus the ruler whose empire included the Americas claimed to have outdone the Greek hero. The myth of Herakles at the crossroads, created in the fifth century BCE by Prodicus, confronts the young hero with Dame Virtue and Dame Lust and makes him opt for the former, despite the latter’s many promises; the story survives well into the European Renaissance and the baroque age.

**CULTS.** In most Greek cities, Herakles had cult followers, although he had very few major sanctuaries. An open-air sanctuary on top of Mount Oeta, where myth placed the pyre in which Herakles burned himself, is archaeologically attested as early as the Archaic Age, and it was the site of an athletic contest. It is the only sanctuary of Herakles that served more than one city. He also had a major city sanctuary on the island of Thasos. Its archaeological exploration points to the importance of ritual (by definition, all-male) banquets in Herakles’ cult (myth consistently represented him as an avid eater and even more avid drinker and womanizer). He was among the foremost divine protectors of the city—a relief on a city gate represents him as an archer poised to shoot towards any evil that might approach. In many other cities, especially of the Greek East, he is connected with the military protection of the city and with the able-bodied young male citizens who constituted the city’s army; this connection is responsible for Herakles’ epithet *kallinikos* (He of the Beautiful Victory). In Athens, he presided over the coming-of-age rituals of young men, who offered him a large libation of wine.

The birth story of Herakles, with the nightly visit of the supreme god to the ruling king’s wife, derives from Egyptian royal ideology, although there are no other traces of such a claim in historical Thebes. The Dorian states of the Peloponnese, especially the Spartan royal lineages, regarded him as their divine ancestor whose son, Hyllos, was the ancestor of one of the three traditional Doric tribes. Other aristocratic and royal families claimed him as their ancestor as well, such as the dynasty of the Lydian king Croesus, or the Macedonian royal family. Such claims inevitably involved a cult whose details, however, mostly elude us.

In private cult, Herakles was addressed as a powerful protector; a very common epithet is *alexikakos* (“He Who Protects from Evil”). Like other private protectors such as Isis, he received dedications after he manifested himself in a dream. In Athens he was identified with the healing hero Pancrates (“All-powerful”), who had a small sanctuary in the city. Throughout antiquity, the entrance of houses was guarded either by a symbol of Herakles, such as his club, or a verse written on the lintel: “The son of Zeus Herakles *kallinikos* is living here: no evil may enter.”

In the course of the Greek colonization of southern Italy during the eighth and seventh centuries BCE, his cult also came to Italy, and especially to Rome, where he was worshiped as Hercules (a form of his name that presumably developed through the Etruscan name *Herclē*). In Rome he had an open-air altar, the Ara Maxima (Very Large Altar) near the spot where, in archaic times, the Tiber could be traversed in a ford; the cult dates back to the Archaic Age, as does the pediment sculpture of a temple on the nearby Forum Boarium (Cattle Market) that represents his introduction into Olympus. His connection with cattle and its transhumance through the mountains of Italy seem to be old and constant; the connection is also the backdrop to the Greek myth of Geryoneus and its Roman continuation, the killing of the local Roman cattle-rustling monster Cacus. Throughout Italy, women were excluded from Herakles’ cult (which in Greece was already concentrating on males). Other cultic roles are less well attested; somewhat by chance we learn that Herakles possessed a lot oracle in the Roman port city of Ostia.

**IDENTIFICATIONS.** Herakles is identified with a wide variety of local gods, such as the Cilician Santas/Sandon, whose cult centers on an annual fire ritual reminiscent of Herakles’ self-destruction on Mount Oeta. Most important was the identification with the Phoenician Melqart, who has his main sanctuary in Tyre and another important cult on the peninsula of Gades (Cádiz) in southwestern Spain. The Greek historian Herodotos claimed that some Greek cults of Herakles derived from Tyre’s Melqart, and a few modern scholars followed this theory and extended it to the cult of the Roman Ara Maxima, but the evidence does not seem to bear them out.

**SEE ALSO** Apotheosis; Cattle; Dragons; Fire; Heroes; Melqart; Monsters; Ninurta; Quests; Reshef; Vřtra.

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FRITZ GRAF (2005)

**HERDER, JOHANN GOTTFRIED** (1744–1803), was a German pastor and theologian, a literary critic, and a philosopher of history. The unity underlying Herder's many and varied academic endeavors, which resulted in a seemingly unending flow of publications, stems from his consistently historical approach to the topics he studied. Historical awareness sets him apart most noticeably from the prevalent thought patterns of the ahistorical Enlightenment authors of his time and makes him a pivotal figure in eighteenth-century German intellectual life.

While Herder's significance is easily established in such disciplines as literature and literary criticism, cultural history, and philosophy of history or anthropology, it is much more difficult to define the influence he has exerted through his many contributions to the development of contemporary religious thought. In part this is due to the fact that Herder's approach often is more that of a sweeping questioner than a systematic thinker, and in part this is the case because religious views underlie all of his writings, most clearly his anthropological essays. Understanding the human being as made in the image of God was what moved him, not considerations of theological orthodoxy. Herder, the forceful critic of Enlightenment rationalism in general, favored an emphasis on divine revelation in creation and Scripture over dogma and systematic theology. In his *Briefe an Theophron; Briefe,*

*das Studium der Theologie betreffend, Fünfter Theil (Letters to Theophron; Letters Concerning the Study of Theology, Part V, 1781)*, Herder states this principle when he says that "the entire purpose of Christianity is something other than erudite exegesis and dogmatism, no matter how invaluable these might be" (*Herder's Sämmtliche Werke*, XI, 194). Given his love for literature, Herder extolled the poetic power of the Bible and, in keeping with his Pietistic heritage, wanted the Bible to speak directly to the individual reader. Living faith, according to Herder, defines true orthodoxy, rather than the other way around.

**HERDER'S BACKGROUND.** Herder was a contemporary of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788). Like them he grew up in the province of East Prussia and studied in Königsberg (present-day Kaliningrad), where Kant was his teacher at the university and where Hamann became his friend and private tutor, introducing the young student to English language and literature, especially John Milton and William Shakespeare. Following a brief period of formal university studies (1762–1764), Herder assumed a teaching position at the German secondary school in Riga, Latvia, before he was installed in 1767 into the ministry. For the rest of his life he remained in the pastorate. He served three Lutheran churches, first in Riga (1767–1769), then in Bückeburg (1770–1776), and finally in Weimar (1776–1803), interrupted only by a study tour through the Netherlands and France in 1769–1770. Those two years of travel included a memorable voyage of five weeks on the North Sea, which he described in a catalog of new ideas and study plans published posthumously as *Journal meiner Reise im Jahr 1769* (Journal of my travels in the year 1769, 1846), and a period of extremely vigorous and intense discourse with a group of young German poets, the *Sturm und Drang* circle around Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in Strasbourg. Goethe, immediately upon his own move to Weimar in 1775, used his influence with the court there to secure for Herder a high ecclesiastical position in that small German principality. Herder's fame as a preacher never waned. He fused religiosity with his philosophy of humanism in ways that made his sermons easily understood and commonly admired.

**HERDER'S PHILOSOPHY.** Herder's first major publication, *Über die neuere deutsche Literatur, Fragmente* (On the new German literature, fragments, 1766–1767), contains his important views on language and expresses his love for idiomatic expressions and inverted word order, qualities he deemed essential to poetry. Shakespeare became his model. Shakespeare's use of Nordic mythology impressed Herder and led him to demand that one must seek to understand the cultural and intellectual environment in which a poet lived before attempting to interpret a given work of literature. The psychological-historical approach became a hallmark of Herder's criticism, whether he dealt with the poetry of the Hebrew Scriptures or with Latvian folk songs. In *Kritische Wälder* (Critical forests, 1769) Herder disputes G. E. Lessing's attempt to establish objective criteria for artistic production.

Whereas Lessing saw Homer as the world's greatest poet, Herder considered Homer merely the greatest among the Greeks, claiming instead that individual circumstances, such as national language and ethnic peculiarities, determine appropriate criteria for judgment of works of art.

With *Über den Ursprung der Sprache* (On the origin of language, 1771) Herder joined the debate as to whether language was divinely given or a human invention, attempting to show that there cannot be a satisfactory answer to that question because language and human existence are synonymous. Herder wrote this essay for a contest sponsored by the Berlin Academy and won the prize. In 1774 Herder was awarded another academy prize with his entry "Auch eine Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit" (Another philosophy of history). Instead of delineating the development of the human race from primitive beginnings to a sophisticated and mature present stage (a practice common among Enlightenment authors), Herder denied such absolute progress and looked upon history as a window through which one can observe humanity's progression toward the goal God has established for it. He saw no justification for his contemporaries to consider earlier epochs to be morally, aesthetically, or intellectually inferior. In fact, he had praise for the "darkness" of the Middle Ages, during which virtue, honor, and love were of the utmost importance, and he chastised his own age for lacking in those human qualities. Herder believes that history is the revelation of God's plan for mankind; he eventually defined his own understanding of this plan more and more clearly as the number of his historical investigations grew. His works *Wie die deutschen Bischöfe Landstände wurden* (How the German bishops became an estate of the realm, 1774) and *Ursachen des gesunkenen Geschmacks bei den verschiedenen Völkern da er geblühet* (Causes of the decay of taste in the various nations where it once flourished, 1775) are two examples of his many historical writings.

**HERDER'S THEOLOGY** Herder's love for biblical hermeneutics was directed mainly at the Old Testament, in which the sense of history and the beauty of poetry he found attractive are especially in evidence. His *Älteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts* (The oldest document of the human race, 1774–1776) offers an interpretation of the first few chapters of the Bible. Herder, the knowledgeable literary critic, builds a convincing case for an allegorical interpretation of *Genesis* 3, only to declare that such a reading is insufficient and leads merely to superficial moral teachings. Instead, he reads the account of the fall as history, maintaining, unlike many eighteenth-century theologians, the truth of original sin as an anthropological fact. His major contribution to the philosophy of history, the famous *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (Ideas for a philosophy of the history of mankind, 1784–1791), seeks to establish the purpose of the human race from a Christian metaphysical point of view and to define that purpose as the practical application of humanitarian ideals.

While Herder continued to write about many aspects of the arts and letters and devoted himself (frequently in co-

operation with Goethe) to careful study of the natural sciences, during his Weimar years he published with increasing frequency works specifically on religion. His book *Maran Atha, das Buch von der Zukunft des Herrn* (Maran Atha: The book of the coming of the Lord, 1779) represents Herder's poetic explanation of *Revelation*, one of the books in the Bible that rationalistic theologians found quite unacceptable. He wrote *Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend* (Letters concerning the study of theology, 1780–1781) to serve as a handbook for students of theology, offering exegetical insights into the Old and New Testaments. Herder had become much more orthodox during his Bückeburg years, although questions of dogma never occupied a place of great importance in his scheme of thought. The study *Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie* (On the spirit of Hebrew poetry, 1782–1783) views the Old Testament as the greatest poetry given to humankind and therefore as a revelation of the ultimate truth. Pietistic influences were in part responsible for this view. Such influences were strong in Herder's youth and were renewed through his conversations and correspondence with Countess Maria Eleanora of Schaumburg-Lippe in Bückeburg and the Swiss pastor Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741–1801), both Pietists. Although Herder in *Gott: Einige Gespräche* (God: Some conversations, 1787) appears to embrace the ideas of Barukh Spinoza (1632–1677), there is widespread agreement that he was not a Spinozist because of his decisive disagreement with the deists. Rather, it is agreed that he used Spinoza's thoughts to clarify his understanding of God. Herder saw God as existing in the world, yet he refused to limit God's existence to this world. This was Herder's method in most of his writings. He reacted critically to what others had written and offered his own insights, yet he rarely presented his ideas in a systematic fashion. His was the role of a fruitful critic more than that of a builder of a complete worldview. The fact that others have seized upon his ideas and developed them constitutes his contribution and his significance.

**SEE ALSO** Pietism.

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## HERESY

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

AN OVERVIEW  
CHRISTIAN CONCEPTS

### HERESY: AN OVERVIEW

The term *heresy* derives from the Greek *hairesis*. In classical Greek this word has a variety of meanings, all based on the verb *haireo*: "seizure" (of a city), "choice," "election," and "decision or purposive effort." This last meaning is the starting point for the Hellenistic and Christian use of the term to mean "doctrine," "school," or "received opinion," emphasizing the idea of a free decision or free choice of a doctrine or doctrinal authority. The word thus becomes a technical term for a philosophical school, a party, or a religious doctrinal system and its adherents. The term is applied to Stoics, Pythagoreans, Sadducees, Essenes, Pharisees, and Christians (see *Acts* 5:17, 24:5, 24:14, 26:5, 28:22). Neither in Greek nor in Hellenistic Jewish usage does the word have a negative, derogatory sense; it is an entirely value-free designation.

This situation changes with dramatic suddenness, however, with the rise of Christian literature. The New Testament already uses *hairesis* in a negative sense (see *1 Cor.* 11:19, *Gal.* 5:20, *2 Pt.* 2:1); the word therefore conveys suspicion, according to Heinrich Schlier. The semantic development in the direction of "sect, division, erroneous teaching" that is thus initiated continues in the early church; *hairesis* becomes a technical term for "heresy" and is applied primarily to the gnostics but also to Greek and Jewish "sects." (The older meaning of "doctrinal opinion, received view" is inflected, not completely but in large measure, in the direction of "erroneous teaching, false belief.") As Schlier says, "Hence the concept does not owe its meaning to the development of an orthodoxy. The basis of the Christian concept of *hairesis* is to be found in the new situation created by the introduction of the christian *ekklesia*. *Ekklesia* and *hairesis* are material opposites" (Schlier, 1964, vol. 1, pp. 182–183).

Despite this, the concept of heresy acquired sharp definition only gradually from the second century on; its distinction from the concept of schism took even longer. Furthermore, the process here described was not entirely comparable to the development in Judaism, although there was a strict temporal parallelism: From the end of the first century *hairesis* and the corresponding Hebrew word *min* were used in the derogatory sense of "heresy" and were applied to Christians and Gnostics, among others. One presupposition of this development was the emergence of rabbinical orthodoxy after Jamnia (c. 100).

This brief history of the term, the details of which are fascinating but cannot be presented here, shows in archetypal fashion the characteristic elements in the Christian understanding of heresy. This understanding was already present in the New Testament and did not have to wait for the coming of the later orthodox great church, although because of the "apostolic" authority the church had acquired in regard to doctrine, scripture, and episcopal office, the distinction between heresy and orthodoxy came to be more clearly drawn as the church developed, thus allowing the opposition to emerge with full clarity.

**SCHOLARLY THEORIES ABOUT HERESY.** The science of religions borrowed the term *heresy* from Christian usage as fixed in canon law and, as a result, has been very much influenced by the history of the Christian church. The traditional view of "orthodoxy" and "heresy" as equivalent to "true" and "false" was first challenged by Martin Luther in his disputation with Johannes Eck at Leipzig (1517), where he let himself be drawn into saying that even councils (of the church) can err, as they did in the case of Jan Hus. Luther and his disciples, though themselves branded as heretics by Rome, did not further develop this aspect of their critical revision of church history. As a result, the opposition of orthodoxy and heresy reappeared within Protestantism itself (the terminology used by the early church in dealing with heretics served as justification). Only after the appalling experience of the seventeenth-century religious wars were minds ready for another view of the matter.

In his *Unparteiische Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie von Anfang des Neuen Testaments bis 1688* (Impartial History of the Church and Heresy from the Beginning of the New Testament to 1688, published in 1699), Gottfried Arnold (1666–1714), a German Pietist theologian, attempted to show that Christian truth is to be found among heretics, schismatics, and sectarians (mystics), and not in the great church itself or in orthodoxy. Although Arnold simply offered a kind of inverted church history in which heresy, especially the views of the mystics, and not orthodoxy was given the seal of approval (by "impartial" Arnold meant "nonconfessional"), his book exercised an important and mellowing influence and blazed a trail for the ensuing period. Among his successors were J. L. von Mosheim (*Ketzergeschichte*, 1746–1748), C. W. F. Walch (*Historie der Ketzerzeiten*, 1762–1785), F. C. Baur (*Die christliche Gnosis*, 1835; *Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte*, 1847, 1858; *Das Christentum und die christliche Kirche der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, 1853, 1963), Adolf von Harnack (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 1886, 1909), and Adolf Hilgenfeld (*Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristentums*, 1884).

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the work of the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule paved the way for a still more penetrating historical view of heresy and orthodoxy, not only because early Christianity came to be understood and interpreted in the context of its environment, but also because the barrier raised by the canon (considered to be the

New Testament) was dismantled, and the New Testament was increasingly recognized as presenting only some of the many theological concepts and ideas of early Christianity. It became increasingly difficult to make a distinction between heresy and orthodoxy. The multiplicity of competing statements of faith regarding the “saving event” in Jesus Christ and its theological explanation showed ever more clearly that at the beginning of the church’s history neither heresy nor orthodoxy was sharply defined or patent; both were concepts developed later.

This view of the matter has been presented most notably by Walter Bauer in his well-known book *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum* (1934; *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity*, Eng. trans. of 2d ed., 1971). A critical study of the early sources for the history of Christianity in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and Greece shows that in these ancient Christian centers the Gnosticism later judged to be heresy was evidently regarded as Christianity. An orthodoxy came into being as the result of a lengthy historical and theological process. From a confrontation with other doctrines and practices something emerged that was to be regarded as the orthodox doctrine and practice: a canon, an episcopal office that drew its legitimacy from succession to the apostles (who were subsequently promoted to be the founders of the principal episcopal sees), baptism, imposition of hands, and eucharist.

**A MORPHOLOGY OF HERESY.** This understanding of the origin of heresy and orthodoxy derived from the history of the Christian church is to a great extent valid for the history of religions. Bauer’s thesis is therefore important also for the general study of religions. To that extent the unreflective, traditional concept of heresy is no longer applicable today; it must yield its place to the historical insight that *heresy* and *orthodoxy* are relative terms for religio-historical processes of quite different kinds. In any case the history of religions has no room for a theological and dogmatic judgment of these processes. It uses the concepts as purely historical categories or, better, as umbrella terms that make it possible to manage, in some degree, the multiplicity of contents presented by the history of religions. The history of religions cannot indeed bring about a revision of historical writing that would discard concepts that bear the mark of history. It can, however, exert a very healthy influence on the discussion of this subject by giving a critical presentation of historical events and causes that have led to oppositions between heresy and orthodoxy, which, in turn, have so often had tragic consequences. From the standpoint of comparative religion, an understanding of the applicability of the concept of heresy can shed light on the concept itself.

**Religions in which heresy does not appear.** Strictly speaking, it is possible to speak of “heresy,” “schism,” or “sect” only in connection with a certain type of religion, namely, religions founded by an individual or, as this author prefers to call them, “confessional religions.” For in all the ancient popular religions that were not explicitly traced back

to a founder or that did not have their own canonical document containing a revelation (as, for example, do Zoroastrianism and Judaism) there was no such thing as a “schism” or a “heresy” in a strict and specifically religious sense. This is to be accounted for by the fact that in these religions the particular religion or cult of the gods was coextensive with the people as a whole, that is, religion and national community were inseparable. An “apostasy” from the official cult binding on all meant a withdrawal from the nation; in other words, apostasy brought exclusion from the civic community (for the Germanic community this meant “outlawry”). Furthermore, the idea of a binding confession in the sense of a kind of rule or norm of faith was wholly alien to such a national or popular religion. As a result, divergent views on, for example, the nature of the gods or similar subjects did not immediately lead to a break with tradition and thus to divisions. Popular religions were therefore essentially tolerant and as long as there was no attack on the central cultic life showed themselves liberal toward the cults of other gods.

For illustration of this spirit one need only recall the *interpretatio* of foreign gods, a tested means of adapting and of establishing equivalences. Communities or associations were of course to be found within popular religions, but they were for the most part simply specific manifestations of religio-social life, as, for example, the mysteries based on the ancient cults of the gods. There was no place for “orthodoxy” and “heresy” in the mysteries; indeed, a person could become an initiate in several mysteries. Nor do the groups and associations found in the religions of illiterate tribes form an exception to this rule. When there are no fixed norms set down in the doctrine of an exclusive community there is no room for “heresy.”

In this world of national and tribal religions there was, however, an area that served as a very sensitive touchstone of orthodoxy in a broad sense of the term: the area of cult or worship. Here there was indeed the basis for a parting of the ways. It can be said that in a national or popular religion heresies and schisms in the narrow sense did not arise, because the necessary presupposition was lacking, but that on the other hand an individual could bring about a reordering, restructuring, or reformation, which then led to the founding of an entirely new religion or to a new cult. The occasion for such an innovation was almost always a radical critique of the traditional cult and of the sacred tradition closely connected with it. Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), the Buddha, and Muḥammad are the outstanding examples of this phenomenon. In the case of the Buddha, it is true, his community was initially only one philosophico-ascetical group among others. Also to be mentioned here is the pharaoh Akhenaton (Amunhotep IV), who failed in his attempt to introduce monolatry into Egypt.

There was still another area in national or popular religions in which divisions and formations of schools could arise: the area of philosophy, in Greece or ancient India, for example. The formation of new philosophical schools repre-

sented an “apostasy,” or deviation from a doctrine; in fact, the Greco-Christian concepts of “heresy,” “schism,” and “sect” were derived precisely from this area of ancient cultural life. The concepts belong primarily to the philosophical and not the religious tradition. It is remarkable how ingenious Hinduism has been in reincorporating the “heresies” that spring from attitudes toward the Vedas. Hinduism is a popular religion (it may be said to be the only Indo-European one still in existence) that has a religious authority, namely the Vedas, as its guiding principle. As a result, a distinction is made between “orthodox” heretics and radical negators such as the Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs. It is clear from this that the formation of heresies or schisms is connected with an authoritative revelation, whether this takes the form of a canonical document or a person.

**Religions that give rise to heresy.** Turning to religions that have a founder, one finds a radically different situation. (These “confessional religions” are not, it should be noted, identical with “world religions,” and it is better to avoid the unfortunate term *revealed religions*, because it has too many theological associations.) All of the religions in question—Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Christianity, Manichaeism, and Islam—lay claim in one way or other to a normative doctrine. This does not from the outset always take the form of a fixed confession of faith, but there is at least a definite conception of faith and doctrine or, better, a central nucleus of doctrine that is used to separate “true” from “false” and that has taken written form in a sacred canon (thus “religions of the Book”). Such doctrines are, for example, monotheism or Yahvistic henotheism in Israel; the ethical dualism of Zarathushtra; the Buddha’s knowledge and practice that lead to deliverance; faith in Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ; the ontological and anticomic dualism of Mani; the confession of Allāh and of Muḥammad as his messenger.

The historian of the “confessional religions” mentioned above is familiar also with their slow maturation from preliminary stages and their development of a central doctrinal core that then became a distinguishing orthodoxy or orthopraxis. Orthodoxy is not present from the beginning as a fixed quantity (Islam is no exception here, though it might seem such at first glance). It is always a secondary development, establishing itself in the confrontation of divergent interpretations of the founder’s “original teaching.” Walter Bauer’s thesis regarding the slow development of Christian orthodoxy from a number of divergent but, in the beginning, equally acceptable trends in early Christianity is to a large extent valid for the history of religions in general. Orthodoxy is in every case an interpretation of the doctrine or message that the founder has left behind and that frequently shows a lack of internal harmony, to say nothing of the fact that it is usually transmitted only in oral form. On the one hand, it is this state of the founder’s teaching that leads to a struggle among the groups that subsequently form within the religious community. Local and social differences also play a

part. On the other hand, while the preaching of a founder is indeed open to numerous interpretations in matters of detail, the fact is that once the tradition originating with him has been fixed in writing, his teachings as a whole take on a particular shape and form. The result is a certain uniformity among all his followers in regard to the basic norms of doctrine, belief, and behavior.

**How heresy develops.** In those religions that give rise to the development of heresy, a number of stages mark the process. Even in the lifetime of a founder there may already be disagreements on matters of doctrine or behavior (e.g., between the Buddha and Devadatta on questions of asceticism). The many-sidedness and occasional lack of clarity in the founder’s teachings lead, especially after his death, to the formation of groups in the original community (groups that initially had more or less equal standing). In the struggle among these groups, one group emerges—often as the result of a compromise—that interprets and transmits the founder’s heritage in an “orthodox” way. As a result, a point is reached at which there can be heresies or the formation of sects in the strict sense of these terms. (It has been seen in the case of the Christian concept of heresy that the existence of a “church” plays a normative role even before the rise of an “orthodoxy.”)

It is difficult at times to determine how one particular movement is able to establish itself as orthodox. In most cases this movement or school preserves the heritage of the founder in a balanced and fully satisfactory way. In some cases only a rough determination of orthodoxy is reached; the result is the continued existence of groups with equal standing (as in early Indian Buddhism and the later Buddhism of East Asia; also in earlier Zoroastrianism as opposed to the official Zoroastrianism of the Sasanids). Islam too may be mentioned in this context because there is no “church” with an attendant hierarchy. The consensus of scholars who act as representatives of the community of believers becomes a regulating agency (the same holds for Judaism). Ideally, however, it is for the caliph as head of the community (*ummah*) to suppress heretics (*kāfirs*) and innovators (*mubtadi*’).

A tense opposition between “orthodoxy” and “heresy,” “church” and “sect,” marks the entire history of the founded religions and is also one of their fruitful major themes. Using the history of the Christian church as an example, Ernst Troeltsch has very impressively described this process as one of conflict between the institutional principle and the principle of voluntarism, both of which are contained in the gospel.

**Causes of the rise of heresy.** In parallel fashion it is possible to distinguish the following causes that lead to some typical forms of heresy:

1. *Dogmatico-theological questions* understood as problems of doctrinal tradition and their interpretation (personal factors may at times play a role here, e.g., the apostasy of disciples). This cause is admittedly seldom found in a pure form

(as Troeltsch established in connection with Christianity), but it is a main factor in almost all confessional religions (think of Jewish Christianity or Marcionism). Doctrinal questions supply the ideological backbone of almost all heresies and sects (e.g., Mazdaism or the Islamic Shī'ah sects); every "heresy" seeks doctrinal justification as an expression of its immediate self-consciousness.

2. *Questions of lifestyle* or, if the reader will, of ethics and morality (in any case, problems of practice). Frequently these are directly connected with the questions mentioned above or else are consequences of divergent doctrines. In most instances sects follow a "radical" line and thus tend to extremism (e.g., in questions of asceticism or discipline in religious orders, as in Buddhism and also in Christianity).

3. *Questions of ritual and cultic observance.* Once again, these are usually connected with doctrinal problems but rarely in "book religions" as distinguished from "cultic religions." Even Christianity, a book religion, has known such cases: The controversy over the date of Easter in the second century, for example.

4. *Social problems*, which are closely connected with moral and ethical problems. Socio-revolutionary movements come under this heading. Marxist analysis and more recent sociological analyses have shed a great deal of light on this area, showing that a good many heresies have been the expression of critical situations in society (e.g., medieval heretical movements in Christianity and Islam, or the recent "religions of imminent salvation" in nonliterate cultures). Following Troeltsch, English sociologist of religion Bryan R. Wilson has interpreted modern sectary movements within Christianity, especially in the Anglo-American world, as expressions specifically of social protest and has once again shown that periods of social unrest are privileged times for the rise of sects. Social tensions and pressures in a society that is sustained and given its impress by an "established church" lead to movements of religious protest directed against state and church as a single undivided power. In the Middle Ages such movements appeared as "critical" manifestations within feudalism and asserted themselves most clearly in "heretical" movements (Bogomils, Albigensians, Waldensians, and so on). The important part played by this sort of background should not, however, lead one to interpret every religious sect or heresy as a crypto-revolutionary movement. There is good reason to reject the old ahistorical underestimation of such causes, but one should not replace it with a one-sided overestimation of them.

5. *Political causes.* These are often closely connected with the social causes described above, because the politico-religious ambitions of a stratum or class usually also involve social interests that can lead to divisions within an established religion of the type being discussed here. In Islam, for example, the vast majority of Shī'ī and other sects or heresies are religio-political movements that have been sparked by concrete disputes concerning, for instance, the position of

the community leader. Or, they are simply a consequence of the overall structure of Islam.

6. *Cultural, anthropological (racial), and ethnic factors* that are evident in Islam, in the history of the Eastern Christian church, and, to some extent, in Buddhism, for example, are factors that do not, of course, operate in isolation. Also to be mentioned under this heading is the continued influence of past forms of religion, the various forms of "paganism," for instance, which either give the impulse to emerging heresies and divisions or at least supply them with ideological material. Striking examples are Gnosticism, Manichaeism in the Iranian world, and the rise of the Nusayriyah and the Druze in the Islamic world.

7. *The figure of a charismatic leader* often plays a role that should not be underestimated in the separate or combined operation of these various factors. The leader has an important part in shaping a heresy and its further course. The leader can develop from the founder of a sect into the founder of a new religion.

**A HISTORICAL EXAMPLE: GNOSTICISM.** One of the most striking examples of a heresy that had its own original worldview but on encountering another religion (Christianity) became part of its history, is Gnosticism, or Gnosis. In it one is confronted with a cosmopolitan or ecumenical form of religion that is largely parasitical in character. By way of lay intellectuals it made its way into the Christian community as early as the time of Paul or, to put it differently, it attached itself to certain Christian ideas. The result was a development that turned a pre-Christian religious movement into a Christian heresy or, more exactly, a distinct movement or sect in the church. There can be no doubt of this in view of the different roles played in Gnostic systems by the spiritual man who founds a Gnostic sect and by Jesus Christ as authoritative bringer of revelation, and in view, too, of Gnosticism's very different soteriology. But before the point was reached at which Gnosticism became a heresy or sect, it was in many places the church itself, with its own scriptural tradition and exegesis. It is known from numerous Gnostic writings that the Gnostics regarded themselves as the real Christians and intended to be the true church. To Celsus, of course, the Gnostics were Christians. There were groups of Gnostics who formed tightly knit churches, as the letters of Paul, the *Gospel of John*, and the Nag Hammadi writings show in their different ways; even Irenaeus, a father of the church, admits this. Gnosticism was therefore not natively an anti-Christian or antiecclesial movement. Its entire exegesis of scripture disproves this interpretation. It was turned into such by the heresiologists, who, like Paul before them, initiated a process of elimination to which Gnosticism finally fell victim.

The reaction of Irenaeus provides a good mirror in which to study this development. He equates gnosis with paganism; in fact, he attacks the Gnostics as worse than the pagans, a view fully justified from a historical standpoint. He sees them as imitators of the pagans and yet not as genuine *pagani* but rather heretics of the Christian age who disagree



with the church on the real origin of things and on true Christian doctrine. Unlike Hegeppus and Hippolytus, Irenaeus knows nothing of an earlier prehistory of gnosticism and is familiar only with Simon Magus as founder and first heretic. To a great extent, Irenaeus's view of the matter determined the course followed by subsequent heresiologists: They knew Gnosticism only as a Christian heresy (a conception that only slowly yielded its place to another during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).

It was in the confrontation with gnosticism (including Marcionism) that ecclesial orthodoxy took form. Scholars have always realized that this process of distinction and separation was of radical importance, but they have not always understood what the process meant for both sides. It is more than a simple coincidence that to a great extent both the church and the Gnostic "heretics" used the same arguments in their disputes, especially the arguments from tradition and from the unbroken line of witnesses. Both sides made use of the same proofs, as a study of Irenaeus and the texts of the Christian Gnostics shows; these proofs were those of apostolic authority, scriptural exegesis, and tradition. Tradition provided the Gnostics with an impregnable fortress: the secret tradition that is for practical purposes identical with liberating knowledge and that has been entrusted solely to spiritual persons or initiates, and is completely kept from the ignorant (see, for instance, the *Gospel of Thomas*). Recent studies have shown that on certain points of his terminology for the church, Irenaeus was dependent on the gnostics; for example, *diadoche* and *paradosis*, used in connection with the principle of succession, were already current terms among the gnostics. This is why Irenaeus was unable to get the better of the Gnostics with arguments of this kind, even though he repeatedly attempted to do so.

Irenaeus's principal weapon, however, was the concept of gnosis itself: "Irenaeus uses the concept of gnosis to distinguish between Church and heretics by focusing the entire dispute on the fundamental and always presupposed attitude of the human person to revelation and God" (Norbert Brox, *Offenbarung, Gnosis und gnostischer Mythos bei Irenaeus von Lyon*, Salzburg, 1966, p. 170). Another and quite different way of attaining true gnosis, a way essentially different from that of the Gnostics, is available to human beings: the way of humble knowledge of the order of salvation that is attested in scripture, handed on by the apostles, and described in the church's teaching and preaching and that is explained, of course, by Irenaeus himself. True (ecclesiastical) gnosis thus becomes a standard by which heretical gnosis is shown to be an erroneous figment of the imagination. This example makes clear the complicated way in which the distinction between heresy and orthodoxy was achieved and how the two could not become distinct without having first fertilized one another.

Similar processes are to be seen at work in other sectors of the history of religions. Islamic orthodoxy took over to a large extent the philosophical terminology, though classified

as heretical, of the Mu'tazilah who had assimilated the Hellenistic heritage. Both Shi'is and Sunnis developed their own *sunnah* or religio-legal tradition and claimed justification for it in Muhammad (in the case of the Shi'ah, by way of 'Alī, Fātimah, and their sons as the Prophet's spokesmen). In Zoroastrianism the problems of monotheism and dualism, which had their basis in the theology of Zarathushtra, led alternately to orthodoxy and heresy, a process in which the civil authorities played a part. Thus the religion of the god of time (Zurwān) was dominant in the later Arsacid and early Sasanid periods as the accepted interpretation of the Zoroastrian tradition. Later on, however, especially once the Zoroastrian religion had been outlawed, this form became a heresy to be bitterly opposed, and modern Persis even reject as non-Zoroastrian a dualist interpretation of the message of Zarathushtra. Thus it is made repeatedly clear that the relation between heresy and orthodoxy is one of interplay that does not permit historians of religion to pass any clear value judgment on the matter; rather they see in this situation clear evidence of the dynamism and vitality of religion.

**SEE ALSO** Apostasy; Cults and Sects; Esotericism; Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy; Schism; Syncretism; Zurvanism.

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Revised Bibliography

## HERESY: CHRISTIAN CONCEPTS

Heresy is one of the most explosive terms in Christian vocabulary. Although the term has served a constructive role in Christian self-definition almost from the first days of the movement, modern sentiments have tended to view this label as offensive, unhelpful, and unnecessary.

The problem is that terms of self-definition are coined to describe perceptions of boundaries from the viewpoint of insiders, and, in the customary use of the terms, from the perception of the winners. The terms, then, are not neutral and unbiased, nor do disinterested observers determine their use. The debates between heretics and the orthodox are disputes over the adequacy and accuracy of a tradition's essential boundaries by those who have a vested interest in the tradition. The losers will protest any label that marks them as outsiders. Such disputes are customary in the process of self-definition of ideologically defined systems.

In religious communities, the inside is frequently labeled *orthodox*, which in the Christian tradition has tended to identify Roman Catholic (including its breakaway subspecies, Protestant) and Eastern or Greek Orthodox churches. In the discussion that follows, this broad tradition will be identified by the term *church*. This use of the word *church* is somewhat problematic, for both the heretic and the orthodox claim the title as rightfully theirs. But scholarship has been unable to come up with acceptable neutral replacement terms. Since the Catholic and Orthodox churches have rep-

resented the majority of Christians throughout most of Christian history, and since they are heirs of the early tradition that began to distinguish between orthodoxy and heresy, the application of the label *church* to these churches is appropriate.

The word *heresy* (Greek, *hairesis*) occurs nine times in the New Testament; the word *heretic* occurs once. The term *heresy* occurs elsewhere throughout early Christian literature, in Jewish writings of the period (LXX, Philo, Josephus), and in wider Greek literature. Its earliest meaning was choice; it came to mean party or school and sometimes, more pejoratively, a faction or sect. Ecclesiastical use took the term even further in that negative direction, where it came to be used almost exclusively for heresy or heretical group. But whatever the nuance, from neutral to hostile, *hairesis* primarily distinguished groups from others of similar kind; in each of its uses, the idea of boundaries is clear, if not central.

Modern discussions of heresy routinely point out that the Greek term for heresy originally simply meant choice. Some have implied, based on a common fallacy that a word's etymology is the best clue to its meaning, that the negative connotation the term *heresy* came to carry in Christian use is a betrayal of the original neutral sense of the word. But the meaning of a word is more accurately determined by its use in context, not in some etymological quest. Thus, a word means whatever it is made to mean by a particular community. The concern to downplay the negative meaning that Christian use has given the term *heresy* reflects the modern agenda, which generally finds the term distasteful; it does not uncover a supposedly right or better meaning of the term.

Heresy is one of several conditions labeled by the church as hazardous. Schism, apostasy, and belief in another religion or in no religion are others. Heretics, apostates, and schismatics are more closely related to the church than others, for they had at one time been insiders. Heretics still consider themselves insiders, although the church rejects them for having willfully rejected some essential element of faith. Apostates, like heretics, were once insiders, but they have rejected the faith, willfully and in toto. They chose to be outsiders, and they are so counted by the church. Schismatics had also once been insiders. Unlike heretics and apostates, however, schismatics have not rejected essential elements of the faith either in part or in full; rather, they have rejected the recognized authoritative apparatus and discipline of the church in some way. Pagans (or heathens or infidels) and atheists, unlike the other three groups, are not defined in terms of a past association with the church. The church's most difficult labeling has been whether to judge a group as schismatic or heretical; all the other categories are clear.

**THE EARLY ASSESSMENT OF HERESY.** From the early church's viewpoint, heresy and heretics were as dangerous a foe as the church would encounter, for heresy targeted the essentials by which the group's self-understanding had significance and substance. From the earliest Christian writers who addressed perceived dangerous deviations in beliefs, unmis-

takably sharp language was used routinely. Those who distorted the truth were "ravening wolves," according to the author of *Acts* (20:28–31). Ignatius of Antioch (c. 35–c. 107) called teachers of error "tombstones and sepulchers" (*Letter to the Philadelphians* 6.1). Their beliefs were "not the planting of the Father" (*Letter to the Philadelphians* 3.1); rather, they were "wicked offshoots, which bear deadly fruit" (*Letter to the Trallians* 9.1). The fate of heretical teachers and their followers is "unquenchable fire" (*Letter to the Ephesians* 16.2).

By the latter part of the second century, numerous books attacking Christian heretics circulated. The best known of these was written by Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons. His massive treatise against Gnosticism, *Detection and Overthrow of the Pretended but False Gnosis* (more often referred to simply as *Against Heresies*), became a template for other refutations of heresy.

The church claimed to possess "the faith that was once delivered to the saints" (*Jude* 1:3)—the true apostolic faith. Early Christian leaders recognized the need to trace heresy to another source, one more hostile and foreign to the circle of Jesus and the apostles, for if the heretics could successfully press their claim that their traditions stemmed from Jesus or the apostles, the heretics might be the faithful bearers of truth and the church itself the heretic. Christian heretical groups understood this principle as keenly as the orthodox did, and they made every effort to locate their traditions in *Letter to the Ephesians* teaching or that of Jesus' close associates. The Gnostics, for example, spoke of secret knowledge that had been handed down privately by Jesus to a few select disciples, and finally to the Gnostics. But the church countered, tracing Gnostic heresies back to the arch-heretic Simon Magus, who according to early Christian tradition was condemned by Peter himself (*Acts* 8:9–25).

The church, largely through its antiheresy writers, presented a strict schema of the relationship between orthodoxy and heresy. Orthodoxy came first; heresy, a deviation from the truth, came later. As Origen, the leading theologian of the third century, declared: "All heretics at first are believers; then later they swerve from the rule of faith." That view was taken up in Bishop Eusebius's *Church History*. His work, which covered Christianity's first three hundred years, informed Christian understanding for centuries after that.

**TOOLS AGAINST HERESY.** Given that heresy was perceived to endanger the essence of Christian faith, the church quickly developed tools by which to identify and curb heresy. During the second century, four tools began to be refined: canon, creed, clergy, and councils. By the fourth century, these had reached a fairly stable structure.

**Canon.** The canon (scripture) was the collection of approved writings judged to have authoritative status. By the end of the first century, many of Paul's letters had been collected and were in distribution. By the end of the second century, a collection not unlike the present New Testament was

in wide use. Two concerns prompted the establishment of a canon. Some groups, such as the Marcionites, rejected documents that were treated by the church as authoritative. Other groups, such as the Gnostics, promoted new documents to support their novel theological positions, and they presented these documents as authoritative. Against such interests, the church approved a formal canon, which specified the books that had authoritative status and from which the church could distinguish orthodox from heretical beliefs. The claim was that the church's canon had apostolic authorship or authority.

**Creed.** The creed (from the Latin *credo*, "I believe") was a condensed statement of essential beliefs, and in substance and structure reflected the Rule of Faith referred to in second- and third-century writings. The interrogatory form of the creed ("Do you believe. . .") appears to have been the earlier, being used as a test of the orthodoxy of a candidate prior to baptism; from the mid-fourth century, the declaratory form ("I believe. . .") became more familiar. The primary creed (Niceno-Constantinopolitan, or more simply Nicene) was established by the councils at Nicaea (325 CE) and Constantinople (381 CE), and confirmed at Chalcedon (451 CE). The creed helped to consolidate the core beliefs of widely dispersed churches, and it provided a condensed test by which to distinguish the heretic from the orthodox.

**Clergy.** By the early second century, principal authority was being consolidated in the hands of the local bishops, under whom were presbyters (priests) and deacons. Toward the end of the century the concept of apostolic succession was developed. This linked the bishops in a line back to the apostles; through this line of bishops the truth was passed on and guaranteed. The church argued that those outside the bishop's church could make no comparable claim or offer such certain guarantee.

**Councils.** Bishops frequently met in councils to regulate the faith. Creeds were approved there, and individuals were frequently tried and condemned as heretics at the sessions. Bishops were expected to enforce the council's judgment against people in their own territories who confessed the condemned belief. The effectiveness of this repression often depended on which side a bishop or the emperor supported. The Arian-Nicene conflicts of the fourth century illustrate that a decision by a council did not always bring about immediate conformity.

These early tools were so effective that they continued to be used as the principle machinery for identifying and confronting heresy well into the modern period.

**TREATMENT OF HERETICS.** In the early centuries, the charge of heresy would have brought social stigma within the Christian circle, but little else. The earliest punishment for heresy was excommunication, which meant that heretics were excluded from the fundamental rite of the church, the Eucharist. Such exclusion was often, in itself, the most effective tool by which to recover erring members.

In the early 300s, Emperor Constantine converted to Christianity. The state and church became allied in common cause, and the power of the church increased considerably. Under a Christian empire, the charge of heresy brought serious legal jeopardy, as well as social stigma. In the interests of consensus, Constantine called the first Ecumenical (universal) Council at Nicaea in 325 CE to deal with what came to be known as Arianism, part of the broader trinitarian controversy. This debate focused on the relationship of the Son (Logos) to the Father. Arianism, the loser in the debate, came to be viewed as the archetypical heresy. Many of the beliefs that were condemned as heresy following the Arian controversy were responses to questions that arose from the Arian debate; most therefore dealt with some question about the nature of Jesus (Monophysitism, Nestorianism, Monothelism, together referred to as the Christological controversies).

The Christian state treated heretics much the same as the pagan state had treated all Christians prior to Constantine's conversion. In each case, the condemned faced serious legal jeopardy, with potential loss of property, and exile or execution. Heresy was pronounced a capital crime in 380, and by the 1200s burning at the stake had become the common fate of heretics.

At times, the interests of the church and state clashed, and sometimes the political leaders were more sympathetic with the theologically losing side (the heretics), which then placed the orthodox in jeopardy. But, in theory, church and state saw themselves with common interests and allied in a common cause. In the modern period, few church-state alliances exist, and individuals now judged as heretics are at risk of excommunication by the church, but little more.

It may seem that the church was often involved in the suppression of heretics. In theory, however, it was difficult for someone to earn the label "heretic." One must not only have held a heretical belief; one must have held it willfully and obstinately. To distinguish between degrees of heresy, the church spoke of objective (material) heresy and the more serious kind, formal heresy.

**MEDIEVAL HERESIES.** After the great trinitarian and Christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries, the fight with heresy subsided, as such beliefs were largely vanquished (as with Arianism) or were located in lands no longer under the church's control (as with Monophysitism and Nestorianism, which largely had come under the new Muslim empire in the 600s). Muslims became the more serious threat to both eastern and western Christians.

By the 1100s the western church and papacy were at the height of their power. At the same time, scholastic speculation flourished as Europe became reacquainted with lost elements of classical learning, new reformist monastic orders and lay movements challenged the norm, and a sense of truth and error was sharpened from European Christendom's conflict with Islam. Crusades against the Muslim infidels in the Holy Land were easily turned to crusades against Christian

heretics within Europe as a developing medieval consensus brought a reinvigorated scrutiny of ideas.

The medieval approach to heresy differed from ancient practice. Suspect beliefs were simply associated with some ancient error, which had already been stamped as heretical by the ancient church. Such was the case with the dualism of the Cathars in southern France, condemned as a revival of Gnostic and Manichaean ideas rejected by the church a thousand years earlier. Once a contemporary belief had been linked to an ancient heresy, the church could act to suppress the group that espoused such views without engaging in the kinds of debates by which the ancient church had worked out boundaries between orthodoxy and heresy.

The zeal against heresy and the techniques employed by orthodox authorities varied from place to place. The Spanish Inquisition and the crusades against the Cathars mark what are viewed as the most notorious aspects of the medieval church's suppression of heresy (with witnesses coerced and confessions gained under torture). Other efforts included the establishment of the Dominican order in the early 1200s; its mission was to correct heretical beliefs by focused and informed preaching. Shortly after the rise of Protestantism, the Catholic Church formed the Congregation of the Holy Office (now called the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) to deal with heresy. To help check the spread of heretical ideas, it developed an Index of Forbidden Books (which had force from 1559 to 1966).

**HERETICS RECONSIDERED.** The charge of heresy was frequently brought against reforming critics of the church, as well as against those whose theological stances departed from the core of Christian faith. Such treatment often emboldened the critics, who charged that the ecclesiastical elite were the real heretics and enemies of Christ. Indeed, the fourteenth-century English reformer John Wyclif spoke of the pope as antichrist, as did various monastic reformers. Many were burned at the stake for such opinions.

In the early 1500s the situation changed with the rise of Protestantism. Although the church quickly labeled Protestants heretics, the political environment worked in their favor. Local princes, often in sympathy with the Protestant cause, protected the reformers from the usual fate of heretics, and Emperor Charles V, a zealous Catholic, had too many political worries to focus his attention on an insignificant monk such as Martin Luther. Within two decades of Luther's initial protest in the early 1500s, many of the nations and principalities of Europe had Protestant governments. These lands became zones of safety for the new Protestant heretics. This marks the beginning of a pluralism that broke apart the Western medieval consensus. Only in the older, ecclesiastically uniform society had there been sufficient power in the mere labeling of heresy to guarantee effective action against such beliefs.

Interestingly, Protestantism retained, largely intact, the concept of heresy held by the Catholics, for Protestants were

as keenly aware of the importance of boundaries. Although at points they disagreed with Catholics as to what constituted heresy, Protestants generally used the same tools by which Catholics had marked off boundaries. Protestants accepted the canon (though they excluded the Apocrypha), and they retained the Creed. The developed hierarchical structure of the church posed more difficulty, particularly regarding the authority of the bishop of Rome, though with some modification Protestants retained clergy and councils, for they feared heresy as much as Catholics did, and they needed appropriate tools to suppress it. John Calvin's approval of the burning of Michael Servetus for Arian-like beliefs and the general Protestant suppression of Anabaptists suggest that the Catholic and Protestant understandings of heresy differed very little. Further, both Catholics and Protestants agreed with the early church's labeling of the ancient Christian heretics. They differed only in regard to which early heresy they accused the other side of espousing.

Some within the Protestant movement developed a more sympathetic reconsideration of groups that had fallen under the judgment of the church. In 1699, Gottfried Arnold, a German Pietist, put forward a daring reassessment of the past in his *Impartial History of the Church and Heresy from the Beginning of the New Testament to 1688*. Emphasizing practical piety over dogma, Arnold reversed the labels: those previously branded as heretics were approved; their orthodox oppressors stood condemned. Some later histories reflect his influence.

**Early Christianity reconsidered.** More significant challenges to the church's use of the term *heresy* came in the 1800s and 1900s. Although the challenges were quite diverse, all provided grounds for challenging the church's claim that its faith had remained unchanged from the beginning. This muted the church's dismissal of supposedly heretical beliefs on the grounds that heretical beliefs were not identical with the faith of the apostles, for the church's own beliefs were found to reflect development and change.

Four modern reconstructions of Christianity's early period were influential. First, Ferdinand Christian Baur and the Tübingen School argued that second-century Christianity reflected a synthesis of opposing first-century Petrine and Pauline interpretations of the Christian message. Second, theories of Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch allowed orthodoxy to be treated by many as an unfortunate institutionalization of Christianity, contrary to the spirit of Christianity's original charismatic structures. Third, Walter Bauer argued that in many areas of the Roman Empire the so-called heretical forms of Christianity came first. For Bauer, the concept of an original apostolic orthodoxy was a fiction of the church at Rome, which that church developed in the second century to extend its influence throughout the empire. Fourth, under Bauer's influence, scholars began to speak of the multiple forms of Christianity in the first century, tracing trajectories from each of these into later centuries. That gave heresy roots as ancient as orthodoxy could claim.

These reconstructions challenged the traditional definition of orthodoxy—what was believed everywhere by everyone at all times—expressed by Vincent of Lerins in the 400s. If Christianity never had an original uniform message that preceded all other interpretations of the Christian message, then the terms *orthodoxy* and *heresy* appear to lose their power as markers of the inside and the outside. Orthodoxy would become, as Bauer contended, merely the heresy that won out. All beliefs would seem to have an equal claim to authenticity within the Christian circle.

**The label *heresy* reconsidered.** Many modern scholars object to the use of the term *heresy*, finding it problematic for numerous reasons. First, high stakes are connected to the labeling, for those outside the church are considered to be in deadly error and damned. That judgment seems too uncompromising in the modern world, where societal consensus is rarely achieved and where diversity is the norm and toleration is applauded. Second, the use of the label has shifted over time and place, raising questions about the validity of the application of such a term as a reliable boundary marker for what the church claims to identify: truth from error. Third, the labeling is one-sided, and those marked as heretics have routinely protested, for their perceptions of the boundaries are different, and they claim to be as much a part of the Christian inside as anyone else. Fourth, even though the church framed its debate against heresy in terms of truth and error, it is clear that the labeling of heresy was frequently usurped in the interests of political or social agendas, for common cause against movements of protest or rebellion was often more easily marshaled if the action was seen primarily as a suppression of heresy.

Modern scholars, both ecclesiastical and secular, are rarely interested in the accuracy of the various claims to truth and accusations of error that have marked the Christian discussion of orthodoxy and heresy. Rather, they are curious about the process and players in labeling and drawing of boundaries, and they usually emphasize the political and social aspects in the suppression of heresy, which undeniably were there. In this context, sociological theories of deviance may be particularly illuminating. Matters of social control, power relationships, consensus, and the labeling of normality and deviance are intelligible to both the church and its scholarly critics, for the church's drawing of boundaries to mark off heresy parallels in many ways the drawing of boundaries that most societies engage in to mark off deviance.

In illuminating Christian treatment of heresy, the paradigm of deviance works best, however, for the period of the imperial church and later. For the initial stages of Christian self-definition, the church's fixation on truth and error remains something of an enigma. The modern discussion has shown little capacity to appreciate this interest, which the church has always claimed marked one of its primary concerns.

**CONCLUSION.** The term *heresy* carries the weight of two millennia of Christian use. It is used less often now, as the Chris-

tian church has come to recognize the shifting boundaries of orthodoxy over the ages and the excesses that the regulation of belief has fostered. Increasingly, the tendency has been to expand the inside, to admit a wider pluralism within the boundaries of authentic Christianity. The devastating religious wars of the 1600s, the relativizing influences of the Enlightenment of the 1700s, the ecumenical efforts of the 1800s and 1900s, and modern scholarly reconstructions of earliest Christianity have led many Christian groups to emphasize the commonalities rather than the differences among Christian communities. The positions espoused by the World Council of Churches (founded in 1948) and by Vatican II (1962–1965) reflect the new attitudes.

In the modern period, heresy is out of vogue. Without broad social consensus, the charge of heresy is neither effective nor feared; it brings no legal jeopardy and little, if any, social stigma. In this context, Christianity struggles to maintain a balance between absolute relativity, where concepts of truth and error have little substance, and dogmatic certitude, which has a tainted past.

**SEE ALSO** Arianism; Cathari; Docetism; Donatism; Ebionites; Gnosticism, article on Gnosticism as a Christian Heresy; Manichaeism, article on Manichaeism and Christianity; Marcionism; Monophysitism; Montanism; Nestorianism; Pelagianism; Waldensians.

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THOMAS A. ROBINSON (2005)

**HERMENEUTICS.** The term *hermeneutics* is derived from the Greek verb *hermēneuein* ("to interpret") and refers to the intellectual discipline concerned with the nature and presuppositions of the interpretation of human expressions.

**INTRODUCTION.** The Greek term has etymological associations with the name of the Greek god Hermes, the messenger of the gods and the deity of boundaries. Some have seen this association as reflecting the inherently triadic structure of the act of interpretation: (1) a sign, message, or text from some source requires (2) a mediator or interpreter (Hermes) to (3) convey it to some audience. So considered, this deceptively simple triadic structure implicitly contains the major conceptual issues with which hermeneutics deals: (1) the nature of a text; (2) what it means to understand a text; and (3) how understanding and interpretation are determined by the presuppositions and beliefs (the horizon) of the audience to which the text is being interpreted. Serious reflection on any of these three issues reveals why interpretation is itself a philosophical issue and a subject of interpretation.

Since interpretation is fundamental to all the intellectual disciplines—to the natural sciences as well as the humanities—one might have expected hermeneutics to have arisen earlier in Western culture than it did. Although there were many controversies within Judaism and Christianity concerning the interpretation of the Bible—just as pre-Reformation humanists were concerned with the exegesis of the texts of antiquity—it was not until the middle of the last century that modern hermeneutics was born. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) is generally acknowledged to be the founder of modern hermeneutics, but it was Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) who first dreamed of developing a foundational discipline for the cultural sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) that would render their conclusions as objective and as valid as those of the natural sciences.

Dilthey's dream was overtaken by the rapid emergence and proliferation of the many specialized disciplines that are now recognized and preserved by the organizational structure of the modern university—art history, anthropology, economics, history, the various literatures, political science, psychology, philosophy, and so on. Each of these disciplines rapidly developed its own intellectual interests and normative procedures for the presentation and adjudication of arguments within them. Methodologies rather than hermeneutics dominated intellectual life.

In recent years, however, powerful intellectual currents have brought hermeneutics once again to the fore, so that interest in it has burgeoned among literary critics, sociologists, historians, anthropologists, theologians, philosophers, and students of religion. These currents include (1) new theories of human behavior in the psychological and social sciences in which human cultural expressions are regarded as manifestations of unconscious and instinctual drives or as reflections of class interests; (2) developments in epistemology and the philosophy of language that have led to claims that what counts as reality for a given culture is a function of the linguistic structures superimposed on experience; and (3) the arguments advanced by philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger that all human experience is basically interpretative, and that all judgments take place within a context of interpretation mediated by culture and language behind which it is impossible to go. Underlying all these currents is the assumption that human consciousness is situated in history and cannot transcend it—an assumption that raises important questions concerning the role of cultural conditioning in any understanding.

It would be an error, however, to conclude from this new interest in hermeneutics that Dilthey's dream of a universal foundational discipline for the cultural sciences is about to be realized. Even a superficial glance at the contemporary intellectual scene reveals little agreement concerning how hermeneutics is conceived or how the discipline should proceed. The intellectual disciplines constituting the modern university have themselves been fractured into parties, each of which has its own method and mode of interpretation. In psychology, for example, there are behaviorists, cognitive psychologists, Freudians, Jungians, and Gestaltists, just as in the social sciences there are functionalists, structuralists, ethnomethodologists, and Marxists.

Paradoxically, it is just this proliferation of parties that partially accounts for the resurgence of interest in hermeneutics in the early twenty-first century. Diversity and conflict of interpretations historically have provided the stimulus and the urgency for acquiring understanding and agreement. Dilthey pointed out, for example, how the rise of modern hermeneutics was itself closely connected with the post-Reformation debates among Protestants and Catholics over the interpretation of Scripture, just as Schleiermacher's own attempt to establish a universal hermeneutics was admittedly prompted by the attempt to overcome misunderstanding.

The incommensurate perspectives that disciplines may adopt concerning the same object (such as a text, language, or human nature) raise profound questions about the nature of human conceptualization, objectivity, understanding, explanation, and translation. Hence it is not surprising that, for many intellectuals, hermeneutics is increasingly coming to occupy the role that epistemology did a few decades ago.

The problems of hermeneutics are more unavoidable in the scholarly study of religion than in many other academic disciplines, for reasons both conceptual and historical. Conceptually, religions themselves may be regarded as communities of interpretation, so that the scholarly study of them takes the form of an interpretation of an interpretation. Since the scholarly interpretation of religion most often rests on different assumptions than the religious interpretation itself, the religious participant frequently regards the scholar's interpretation as reductionistic and alien. Hence there is a perennial debate among scholars of religion regarding the degree to which the scholarly interpretation of religion must do justice to the believer's own point of view.

Historically, the scholarly study of religion—as well as the rise of modern hermeneutics—is closely associated with the religious tradition of liberal Protestantism. Indeed, liberal Protestantism might be said to have emerged through a series of bitter hermeneutical debates concerning the application of historical-critical methods to the Christian Bible. These debates illustrate the phenomena discussed at the beginning of this paragraph, since orthodox Christians regarded the application of these methods to the Bible as an alien mode of interpretation. Liberal Protestantism resolved the issue by defining the essence of religious faith as experience rather than doctrine or historical belief.

Schleiermacher, the founder of hermeneutics as well as of liberal Protestantism, was particularly influential in articulating the outlines of this compromise. He regarded the various religions as culturally conditioned forms of an underlying and universal religious sensibility. Thus he not only moved the locus of faith from belief to experience, but also laid the foundations for a descriptive science of religion to which Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), Joachim Wach (1898–1955), and others were to contribute. This close connection between liberal Protestantism and the scholarly study of religion partially accounts for the fact that liberal theologians have been particularly sensitive to theories of interpretation.

Many scholars would insist that, to answer the many questions arising from the activity of interpretation, it is important to have a hermeneutical theory. Others, however, would insist that the great mistake distorting all modern hermeneutics is precisely the lust for some such theory. Rather than prejudice the issue from the outside by describing alternative hermeneutical theories, this article shall roughly delineate four ways in which modern hermeneutics may be conceived, each of which is dominated by a distinctive question:

1. What is it to understand a text and what are the conditions of its possibility?

2. How are the cultural sciences distinct in method and form from the natural sciences?
3. What are the conditions that make any sort of human understanding possible?
4. How can one resolve certain conceptual puzzles associated with concepts like *understanding* and *meaning*, and how might such a resolution help one to understand the task of interpretation?

Each of these questions, and the conception of hermeneutics it yields, often overlaps with the others, and a theorist of one type may also deal with issues characteristic of another. Nevertheless, these four ways are sufficiently distinctive to be a useful heuristic device for organizing what follows.

**HERMENEUTICS AS INQUIRY INTO THE INTERPRETATION OF TEXTS.** Modern hermeneutics had its origins in attempts to solve problems and conflicts concerning the interpretation of texts; Schleiermacher is usually regarded as the originating figure. Although there were debates before his time concerning the difference between sacred and profane interpretation, it was Schleiermacher whom Dilthey properly called the “Kant of hermeneutics,” because Schleiermacher argued that Scripture required no special type of interpretative procedure, and grasped that the fundamental issue was to develop the basic grammatical and psychological conditions necessary for the understanding of any text whatsoever. It was Schleiermacher again who saw that the nature of language was the crucial theoretical issue confronting hermeneutical theory, because one could gain access to another person's meaning only through the medium of language.

**Authorial Intention.** Schleiermacher's hermeneutical theory is organized around two foci: (1) the grammatical understanding of any characteristic modes of expression and the linguistic forms of the culture in which a given author lived and which conditioned that author's thinking and (2) the technical or psychological understanding of the unique subjectivity or creative genius of that author. Both these foci reflect Schleiermacher's own indebtedness to Romantic thinkers who had argued that any individual's mode of expression, however unique, necessarily reflects a wider cultural sensibility or spirit (*Geist*). A correct interpretation requires not only an understanding of the cultural and historical context of an author, but a grasp of the latter's unique subjectivity. This can be accomplished only by an “act of divination”—an intuitive leap by which the interpreter “relives” the consciousness of the author. By seeing this consciousness in the larger cultural context, the interpreter comes to understand the author better than the author understands himself or herself.

Schleiermacher's hermeneutics have not had a great influence on secular literary criticism in either England or the United States, although most literary criticism until the 1920s generally assumed that the aim of interpretation was to discover the intention of the author. In the last several decades, however, most literary criticism has been built on the assumption—classically enunciated by T. S. Eliot in his essay

“Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919) but argued on other grounds by Freudians, Marxists, New Critics, structuralists, and deconstructionists—that a literary text has its own afterlife independent of the author, and that to understand it has little or no relationship to understanding the author’s intentions when writing it. In recent years, however, some critics have rediscovered Schleiermacher and reaffirmed his view that some form of authorial intent must be the foundation of a theory of objective meaning. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., for example, has argued in *Validity in Interpretation* (1967) that, if interpretation is to avoid pure subjectivity and arbitrariness, there must be some criteria for determining the correct meaning of a text. This in turn, says Hirsch, requires some theory of determinate meaning. Anyone concerned with objectivity will be driven logically to some discriminating norm, and “the only compelling normative principle that has ever been brought forward is the old-fashioned ideal of rightly understanding what the author meant” (p. 26). This has led Hirsch and others to deal with the many problems this position raises. However, while this view represents the common sense of most laypersons, it is not now widely shared by most literary critics, who have developed hermeneutical theories rejecting authorial intent as the norm of meaning.

#### Schleiermacher and the Interpretation of Religion.

So far as the interpretation of religion is concerned, Schleiermacher’s influence is to be found less in his hermeneutical theory, which is dominated by the problem of recovering the author’s meaning, than in his views that (1) religiosity is an essential and *a priori* aspect of human nature and (2) language is the medium of all understanding. The first assumption has elicited many attempts to develop what Paul Ricoeur has called a “regional hermeneutics”: rules governing the interpretation of religious expressions as a unique and autonomous type. One of the earliest and most influential of these attempts was Rudolf Otto’s analysis of the “numinous” in his famous book *Das Heilige* (1917; Eng. trans., *The Idea of the Holy*).

Less explicitly indebted to Schleiermacher, but based on the same assumption of the universality of human religiosity, was the very influential work of Mircea Eliade. He argued that the basic structure of religiosity can be seen most clearly in archaic religions in which human life is regarded as part of a living cosmos. Profound connections are said to exist between the rhythms of human and cosmic life. Myths and religious symbols are systems of micro-macrocosmic correspondences and analogies. Human fecundity, for example, is seen as recapitulating the pattern of divine fecundity. All human activities are thus sanctified and made meaningful. This assumption led Eliade to explore the many variants of certain recurring symbols in the world’s religions, as for instance the sacred tree, stones, snakes, fish, and water.

**HERMENEUTICS AS FOUNDATION FOR THE CULTURAL SCIENCES.** A second way of thinking about hermeneutics is to regard it as providing a foundational discipline for the cultural in contrast to the natural sciences. This discipline would

presumably establish the boundary lines separating the various generic types of interpretation—literary, artistic, philosophical, legal, religious, and so forth—and would establish the methods and normative canons of objectivity and validity for each type. It would, in short, be a universal hermeneutics. Wilhelm Dilthey is generally regarded as the most important exponent of this view of hermeneutics, and the Italian historian of law Emilio Betti is perhaps its best-known contemporary advocate. Although profoundly influenced by Schleiermacher—at an early age he wrote a prize essay on Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, and later a monumental biography of him—Dilthey rejected Schleiermacher’s assumption that every work of an author is an outgrowth of an implicit principle contained in the author’s mind. Dilthey considered this assumption to be profoundly antihistorical, because it does not sufficiently take account of the external influences at work or the author’s development. Moreover, Dilthey thought that a universal hermeneutics required the elaboration of epistemological principles that would serve the cultural sciences in the way that Kant’s principles accounted for Newtonian physics. If Kant developed a “critique of pure reason,” then Dilthey devoted his life to a “critique of historical reason.”

**Cultural versus Natural Sciences.** Dilthey’s hermeneutics quite obviously rests on a sharp distinction between the methods of the cultural and those of the natural sciences. The distinctive method of the cultural sciences is understanding (*Verstehen*), whereas that of the natural sciences is explanation (*Erklärung*). The natural scientist explains events by employing universal laws, whereas the historian neither discovers nor employs such laws but, rather, seeks to understand the actions of agents by discovering their intentions, purposes, wishes, and character traits. Such action is intelligible because human actions, in contrast to natural events, have an “inside” that others can understand because they too are persons. Understanding, then, is the discovery of the “I” in the “Thou,” and it is possible because of a shared universal human nature.

Insofar as Dilthey’s hermeneutics rests on understanding as a distinctive act that requires an imaginative identification with past persons, one can discern the influence of Schleiermacher. But Dilthey developed an elaborate and complex theory of experience (*Erlebnis*) and its relationship to various forms of expression that constitutes nothing less than the philosophical anthropology and epistemology he thought necessary to establish hermeneutics as a foundational discipline of the cultural sciences. Dilthey was never able to complete this enterprise in a way satisfactory to himself or others, and its complexities defy any brief exposition here. Suffice it to say that it contained a sophisticated analysis of the temporality of experience and the way in which human experience is bound together by units of meaning that are subconscious and prereflective. These meanings become objectified in human expressions. He held that one’s knowledge of one’s own experience as well as of the experience of others

is available only through these objectified expressions. Consequently, one comes to know human nature through historical knowledge, that is, through understanding the varieties of objectified forms in which humanity has expressed its own experience of life. Ultimately, history is the variety of ways in which human life has expressed itself over time. Indeed, one can grasp one's own possibilities only through historical reconstruction and understanding. Through understanding (*Verstehen*) of the life-expressions (*Lebensäußerungen* and *Erlebnisausdrücke*) of past persons, one comes to understand the humanity of which one is a part.

**Weber and Wach.** Like Dilthey, the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) was preoccupied with establishing the objectivity of the results of the cultural sciences, but he was even more interested in the status of generalizations in political economy and sociology. His work therefore stands at the juncture between the humanities and the social sciences. He was interested in the logical relationships between understanding and explanation. Though sympathetic to Dilthey's attempts to establish the autonomy of understanding, he was also interested in generalizations about human collective actions—generalizations he hoped could be made as objective and scientific as those in the natural sciences. His analysis and classification of types of social actions, and his delineation of ideal types, are attempts to solve these conceptual problems. Unlike Dilthey, he was especially interested in the interpretation of religion. His *Sociology of Religion* (1904–1905) is one of the great works in the comparative study of religion, and his *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1922), although now dated in important respects, is one of the influential books in modern sociology.

The significance of Dilthey and Weber for hermeneutics lies primarily in (1) their minimalization of the concern for recovering the author of the text, and their extension of hermeneutics to cover all forms of cultural expression and actions; (2) their efforts to work out the logic of understanding as an activity unique to the cultural sciences; and (3) their attempts to ground the possibility of understanding in some theory of the structure of human nature and its expressions (Dilthey) or of types of social action (Weber).

The hermeneutical theories of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Weber deeply influenced the work of Joachim Wach, a German sociologist of religion who immigrated to the United States in 1935. Wach wanted to establish the interpretation of religion as an objective descriptive discipline free of the normative claims of Christian theology. For him as for Dilthey, the proper starting point for such a discipline was the establishment of the necessary conditions for understanding (*Verstehen*). Wach, like Schleiermacher, believed that *Verstehen* generally requires a type of empathy, but that in religion it specifically presupposes a basic "sense for religion" that Wach then explicated in terms of Schleiermacher's notion of an inherent religious propensity in human nature. Wach argued that religions are the expressions of this sense for religion. The challenge of religious studies, then, is to de-

velop a logic of the forms of religious expression, a theory of religious symbolism and language. Wach himself concentrated on arranging and classifying the forms of religious expressions—for example, the theoretical, practical, and sociological, which he then further subdivided and explored.

The attempt to construct a universal hermeneutics for the cultural sciences inevitably leads the theorist to propound some theory of human nature and its expressions. Having uncovered the radically different forms of consciousness and belief exemplified in history, for example, Dilthey then thought it important to develop a psychology that would account for this diversity of worldviews while affirming the "unity of human nature" that made it possible for an interpreter in one culture to understand a person in a strange and different culture. But, it may be asked, how can the appeal to some abstract principle such as the "unity of human nature" aid an interpreter who is actually confronted with cultural expressions so different and strange that a sympathetic act of understanding seems impossible? Dilthey never solved this problem.

**Psychological Theories.** The degree to which one's hermeneutics is a function of one's view of human nature is most dramatically illustrated by modern psychological theories such as those of Freud and Jung. Here human expression and behavior are explained and understood in terms of unconscious psychical forces. As Paul Ricoeur has shown, Freud's theory of the unconscious led him not only to broaden the theory of human expressions so as to include dreams and slips of the tongue as "texts" but also to propose a hermeneutics in which art and religion were also seen as containing unconscious meaning. According to Freud, for example, religion is best understood as the expression of unconscious wishes rooted in infantile helplessness and molded by the "family romance" in which Oedipal sexual wishes play an important role. Consequently, religion is regarded as a collective neurosis and evaluated negatively. Thus not only does Freud's hermeneutics reject "authorial intent" as a superficial category, but it proposes a different meaning for the classical hermeneutical dictum that the interpreter can better understand an author than the author understands himself. For Schleiermacher and Dilthey, this dictum meant that the interpreter better understands the cultural and linguistic context that conditions the author, and of which the author is unaware. For Freud, this dictum means that the interpreter has the theoretical key to unlock the unconscious meanings of which no past author could possibly be aware. The interpreter understands more scientifically the unconscious drives, instincts, and mechanisms of repression that determine a given form of expression. Texts are semiotic codes for which the scientific interpreter alone holds the key.

**HERMENEUTICS AS REFLECTION ON THE CONDITIONS OF ALL UNDERSTANDING.** Given the way in which reflection on understanding necessarily drives one to consider basic epistemological and anthropological issues, it should not be surprising that the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889–

1976) has been so influential at the turn of the twenty-first century. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger, although profoundly influenced by Dilthey, argues that Dilthey was finally unable to overcome the subjectivistic tendencies of Western thought since Descartes—tendencies that have led to a peculiar dilemma in epistemology, and to a seductive preoccupation with the cognitive ideals of the natural sciences and technology. Crucial to Heidegger's analysis is the argument that human beings already find themselves in a world made intelligible to them by virtue of what he called "the forestructure" of understanding, that is, the assumptions, expectations, and categories that one prereflectively projects on experience and that constitute the "horizon" of any particular act of understanding. An analysis of "everydayness" reveals that what is regarded as problematic as well as intelligible becomes so only against the backdrop of the tacit, prereflective understanding one already possesses. In all explanation one discovers, as it were, an understanding that one cannot understand; which is to say, every interpretation is already shaped by a set of assumptions and presuppositions about the whole of experience. Heidegger calls this the hermeneutical situation. He means that human existence itself has a hermeneutical structure that underlies all one's regional interpretations, even those in the natural sciences. One's prereflective understandings are modified and corrected as they become more self-conscious in the encounter with texts, objects, and other interpretations.

Heidegger's thought has been influential in several directions, two of which are important for religious studies: the interpretation of religion and the conception of hermeneutics generally. Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976), a German New Testament scholar and theologian, saw in Heidegger's analysis of human existence the conceptual basis for an exegesis of the New Testament whereby its basic religious insights could be extracted from the mythical thought-forms of the first century, in which it was originally expressed. To the complaint that this exegesis employed modern presuppositions, Bultmann replied that all exegesis is determined by certain philosophical presuppositions; the only question is whether these are correct. He believed Heidegger to be correct because Heidegger had discovered the inherent historicity of human existence; that is, how it is essentially constituted by acts of decision rooted in a self-understanding oriented toward the future. Moreover, Heidegger had shown that genuine historical understanding requires the encounter with past expressions of human self-understanding that can modify one's own. In this sense, the act of historical understanding has an element that resembles the act of appropriation of a religious message. Although Bultmann was primarily interested in the implication of Heidegger's work for the interpretation of the New Testament understanding of faith, the same hermeneutical procedure could be employed on other religious phenomena, as Hans Jonas has done in his well-known work *The Gnostic Religion* (1958).

It is Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002), however, who in a major work, *Truth and Method* (1960), has done more

than any other thinker to reconceive hermeneutics along Heideggerian lines. His theory also involves a criticism of previous conceptions of hermeneutics such as those of Schleiermacher and Dilthey. The difficulty with Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, apart from its limitation to the interpretation of texts, is that Schleiermacher (and Dilthey too) assumed that the historical and cultural distance of the interpreter from the phenomena being interpreted necessarily occasions misunderstanding. Gadamer argues, following Heidegger, that interpretation also assumes a context of intelligibility, and that the presuppositions and assumptions—one might say prejudices—of the interpreter are precisely what enable understanding as well as misunderstanding. Consequently, one's own assumptions and beliefs are not necessarily barriers to understanding but preconditions of it. The quest for a presuppositionless understanding is futile. Every text or object is interpreted from some standpoint in a tradition that constitutes the horizon within which anything becomes intelligible. This horizon is continually modified as it encounters objects, but there is no final and objective interpretation.

Gadamer has been criticized by Emilio Betti for destroying any possibility of distinguishing between a subjective and a universally valid interpretation. Betti argues that texts and cultural expressions have meanings independent of the interpreter's opinions, and that the interpreter can provide no canon for distinguishing right from wrong interpretations. Gadamer replies that the task is not to provide norms and rules for interpretation but to analyze the inherent structure of understanding itself—an analysis that reveals interpretation to be as Gadamer describes it.

**HERMENEUTICS AS AN ANALYTIC AND MEDIATING PRACTICE.** There is a fourth way of thinking about hermeneutics that is less easily characterized than the others, because it involves no theory of hermeneutics. Those who think in this fashion are not interested in establishing rules for the interpretation of texts nor in providing foundations for the cultural sciences. Their aims appear to be more piecemeal: to analyze, to clarify, and if possible to resolve conceptual issues surrounding *explanation* and *interpretation* in the various contexts in which they are employed; to establish the logical connections between *meaning*, *truth*, and *validity*; to discover the various normative uses of language; to ascertain what is meant by *rationality* and *irrationality*, especially as it bears on the possibility of translation and the problem of relativism. No one of the various thinkers who think and work in this way may necessarily discuss all these problems systematically, yet the various proposed solutions often bear directly on those problems normally associated with classical hermeneutical theory. For example, some thinkers concerned with the philosophy of science, such as Mary Hesse, have argued that no sharp distinction can legitimately be drawn between explanation and interpretation, since explanations in the natural sciences are as interpretative as those in the cultural sciences. Or again, some philosophers have argued that, since there is no realm of the given to which theories can corre-



spond, the attempt by philosophers since Kant to formulate epistemological theories is a mistake. There is no one right or wrong way to interpret anything, including texts, hence the quest for agreement is not a desideratum.

Generally, this type of thinking about hermeneutics owes much to the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), whose later works deal extensively with issues such as “What does it mean to understand?” and “How does one know that another person is in pain?” It was characteristic of Wittgenstein’s approach that no simple summary of his views can be given, since he argued that the function of a philosopher is to analyze carefully the concrete uses in specific contexts of words like *understanding*. He believed that it was a mistake to attempt to provide a general theory of understanding. The mind easily becomes bewitched by such general theories, and this bewitchment is itself the source of most philosophical difficulties and illusions. Instead, one should look at how such words are actually employed and embedded in concrete practices. A few students of religion have argued that this approach has important implications for the interpretation of religion. For example, it has been asserted that the hermeneutical theory of Joachim Wach has excessively constricted interpretation by superimposing a single model upon it.

Although Wittgenstein’s philosophy is often said to be alien to Heidegger’s, there are affinities at surprising points, not the least of which is the notion that explanation and interpretation make sense only within a horizon of presuppositions, practices, and assumptions that individuals’ culture mediates to them—their tradition, so to speak. Wittgenstein, like Heidegger, also saw the human situation itself to be hermeneutical. But unlike Heidegger, he did not think this fact justified the construction of an ontology. Rather, he felt it should be the occasion for the painstaking exploration of the concrete forms of discourse—“language games”—in which human beings engage. There can be only regional explorations of the grammar governing specific forms of expression. Presumably, then, the interpretation of religion ought to devote itself to carefully mapping and exploring those characteristics of the distinctively human form of life one calls religious: its structure, presuppositions, and forms of expression.

**SEE ALSO** Anthropology, Ethnology, and Religion; Biblical Exegesis; Buddhist Books and Texts, article on Exegesis and Hermeneutics; Literature, article on Literature and Religion; Phenomenology of Religion; Structuralism; Study of Religion; Tafsir; Women’s Studies in Religion.

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**HERMES** was recognized in Mycenaean tablets, and his nature was described in early Greek poems as that of a clever mediator among the gods or between gods and men, or as an archetypal messenger. Hermes gave the kings of Mycenae the scepter of Zeus (Homer, *Iliad* 100–108) and the lamb with the golden fleece, a fatal pledge of royalty for the Pelopides (Euripides, *Orestes* 995–1000). The ancient authors show the Peloponnesus as the most ancient and important environment where Hermes' cult had developed, but inscriptions and monuments show him worshiped everywhere in the Greek world. The Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* describes him as the son of Zeus and the nymph Maia, locates his abode in a cave of Cyllene, and ascribes to him the invention of the lyre, made from a tortoise shell.

Hermes is also reported to have stolen fifty sacred cows from Apollo's herd—he hid the theft by forcing the cows to walk backwards in order to produce reversed tracks. Hermes then discovered a means to light a fire, ritually sacrificed two of the cows, then returned to his cave. Apollo discovered the thief in spite of all Hermes' tricks, but his wrath was assuaged when he saw the lyre and accepted it in exchange for the two cows Hermes had sacrificed. This trade was considered to be the beginning of commerce.

Apollo granted Hermes the power of prophecy known to three sacred women at Delphi, and Zeus made him the lord of every herd and the only messenger to Hades (Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* 550–572). The same myth also appears in the *Ichneutai* of Sophocles (fr. 314 Radt) and a Persian version of a Hellenistic novel, the *Vamiz and Adhra* (see Hägg, 1989). Hermes' symbol is the herald's staff and his speed is symbolized by little wings on his boots and cap. The ancestry of the Attic priests Kerykes (literally, "heralds") descended from Hermes (e.g., Pausanias 1.38.3).

Hermes was also worshiped by shepherds (Semonides, fr.18 Diehl; Homer, *Odyssey* 14.435–436); Pan, the god of sheep farming, was his son. Statues of Hermes often depict him with a ram. In addition, Hermes granted fertility to cattle and was thus often represented as a phallus (Paus. 6.26.5) or as a phallic stele called a *herma*. Like Hercules, Hermes stole cattle from the world of gods in order to take them to the world of humans.

Hermes was worshiped by travelers, whom he protected and guided, and he was the focus of a cult in which heaps of stones where piled near roads (Hesychius, s.v. *hermaioi lophoi*). The mythic origin of these heaps was the trial of Hermes, who was judged by the gods after he had killed Argos, the Argive cowherd, causing Io, a priestess of Hera who had been transformed into a cow, to run away from the herd.

Hermes was charged for this murder, but he was carrying out an order of Zeus when he killed Argos, and the gods voted to acquit Hermes by throwing stones, forming the first hermaic heap. Thus, Hermes was called the Argiphontes (Killer of Argos). The murder of Argos was another crime that caused the passage of cattle from the herd of a god (Hera in this case) to the world of humans. In fact, the temples of Hera at Argos and in other towns owned sacred cows, which were used for sacrifices. The astuteness of Hermes and his friendship with humans earned for him the character of a trickster, a clever inferior god who gave people every means of civilization (Burkert, 1984). Hermes was venerated as a giver of fortune—the adjective *hermaios* meant gainful and the noun *hermaion* referred to an unexpected piece of luck.

The cave of Hermes was a passageway to the netherworld. In the *Odyssey* (24.1–14) Hermes acts as the psychopomp and leads by his staff the souls of the Proci through the cave to the doors of Helios and the asphodel meadows, abode of deceased souls. As messenger of the underground realms, Hermes is often appealed to in curse tablets, or *defixiones*, together with Hades and Persephone. Hermes was sometimes considered an inferior or servant god (Aeschylus, *Prometheus* 954, 966, 983) and his cult included subordinate people and even slaves (Athenaeus 14.636 B), although free people and kings (e.g., Odysseus in Homer, *Odyssey* 10.275–306) were helped by him as well.

Hermes played a role in the rituals that preceded weddings; together with the nymphs, Pan, and Aphrodite, he was worshiped by brides (Torelli, 1977, p. 166). At Samothracia, Hermes was identified with one of the Kabeiroi (*Scholium* to Apollonius Rhodius 1.916), and Herodotus (2.51) maintains that the Athenian phallic *hermae* derived from a Samothracian tradition. Hermes was also worshiped in the mysteries of Andania in Messenia (*Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* 736). By the spring of Salmakis, near Halicarnassos, Hermes and Aphrodite were thought to be the parents of a beautiful boy who was beloved by the nymph of a spring; the boy refused the spring's love, but when he entered the water of Salmakis she embraced him and together they transformed into Hermaphroditos (Ovidius, *Metamorphoses* 4.285–388).

According to Apollodorus (3, 28) and many Greek statues, the child Dionysos was entrusted to Hermes to protect him from the wrath of Hera. Hermes became increasingly important in the education of youth; his image and that of Heracles were the most frequently dedicated in gymnasia. The feature of Hermes as the *hermeneus*, the divine interpreter and god of wisdom, underwent much development after the teaching of Plato (*Cratylus* 407 E–408 B). Thus Hermes became the medium between gods and humans, a medium often thought of as the Logos, the word of god (Diogenes of Babylon, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, III, 234–235), the divine revelation, and even the donor of language to humans.

Hermes' image and mythology were lent to the Roman and Italic god Mercurius, who was called Turms in Etruria.

The Falisci worshiped him as Titus Mercus, the Campani as Mirikus. His name indicates that Mercurius was the god of the *merx*, the wares, a god to whom *mercatores* (merchants) were especially devoted. In this capacity, Hermes was normally depicted as holding a money bag. The character of the ancient Mercurius cult in Rome was plebeian; his temple near the Circus Maximus was dedicated in 495 BCE by the plebeian centurion Laetorius (Livius 2, 27, 5–6), and his festival was celebrated on May 15. At Mercurius's spring near Porta Capena, merchants ritually purified themselves and their wares (Ovidius, *Fasti* 5.663–692). The cult was entrusted to the fraternity of the Mercuriales, who were guarantors of commercial law, as the Fetiales were of the law of war.

In the second and first centuries BCE the community of Italic merchants at Delos organized a cult of thanks to the Hermaistai, a body of six magistri (Bruneau, 1970, pp. 585–589). Colleges of Mercuriales were often engaged in the cult of the emperor. In a private cult, Hermes was worshiped and represented in the Lararia. He was thought to be the father of the two Lares, born of Lara, a nymph whom Hermes raped as he led her to the netherworld. Hermes was also reputed to be the lover of the prophetic nymph Carmenta, and with her the father of Evander. People seeking profits threw stones into heaps at crossroads in honor of Mercurius (Martin of Bracara, *Correction of the Peasants* 7). In imperial times Hermes' staff also became a symbol of peace (Gellius 10, 27, 3) and reason (Julian, *Contra Heraclion* 234 B; Ammianus 25, 4, 14).

Hermes granted his image, his name, and his myth to a number of local gods of other cultures so that they could be reconceived in a Greek or Roman fashion. A local Hermes was recognized by Herodotus (5, 7) as the god worshiped by Thracian kings. Among the Germans, Mercurius (identified with Wodan) was worshiped with human sacrifices (Tacitus, *Germania* 9). Among the Gauls, Mercurius was widely worshiped (Caesar, *De bello Gall.* 6, 17, 1), and the Church Fathers condemned human sacrifices in his honor (Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 6, 1; Tertullianus, *Apology* 9; *Scorpiace* 7). The personality of the Roman Mercurius, god of roads and merchants, perhaps also concealed the figure of Teutates, ancient god of the community, who introduced civilization.

In the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire the tendency toward a solar henotheism, supported by Chaldaeans and Stoics, gave Hermes the solar character we find particularly at Baalbek-Heliopolis. Here Mercurius Heliopolitanus was worshiped in a triad composed of him, Jupiter, and Venus; and Hermes was seen as a solar god who protected cattle and vegetation. Hermes was also identified with the morning star, the messenger of the sun called Azizos at Edessa (Julian, *Hymn to Helios* 34). In the Mithraic religion the planetary god Mercurius protected the first initiatic grade and was symbolized by the raven, considered to be the herald of the sun god. The initiates of this grade served as waiters at sacred dinners, according to the function of the god in Olympus.

In Egypt Hermes was identified with Thot, the god of wisdom and the scribe of the gods. Later in imperial times, a new god, Hermanubis, was created in order to identify Hermes with Anubis, who prepared the dead for their travel to the netherworld. Like Hermes, both Thot and Hermanubis hold a herald's staff.

SEE ALSO Soul, article on Greek and Hellenistic Concepts.

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ATTILIO MASTROCINQUE (2005)

**HERMES TRISMEGISTOS.** Identified with Hermes in the *Histories* of Herodotos (fifth century BCE), the Egyptian god Thoth was sometimes called *aa aa ur* (or *paa paa paa*). In the Egypt of the Ptolemies at the beginning of the second century BCE, this epithet was rendered approxi-

mately as *megistos kai megistos theos, megas Hermēs* ("greatest and greatest god, great Hermes") or, more succinctly, as *Hermes Trismegistos* ("thrice greatest Hermes"; Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 1, p. 1; vol. 2, p. 469).

Because this meaning soon became obscured, the title was reinterpreted in various ways. According to the eighth-century historian George Syncellus, who in part is confirmed by Augustine (354–430 CE), Manethon (third century BCE) supposedly taught that *trismegistos* is the surname of the second Hermes, son of Agathodemon (the Hellenized name of the god Khnum or Kneph) and the father of Tat (another version of Thoth), who is said to have transcribed the teachings of Thoth, the first Hermes, and stored them in Egyptian sanctuaries (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vol. 3, p. 163). These teachings, which had been engraved on tablets by the first Hermes, his grandfather, before the flood, were supposedly discovered and made available in Greek by Ptolemy II Philadelphus (308–246 BCE). Later, a tradition preserved especially by Hermias of Alexandria (fifth century CE) justifies the title *trismegistos* on the basis that Hermes, after three successive reincarnations in Egypt, had "remembered himself" and "recognized himself" (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, pp. 474–475), a factor that had to be connected to the Hermetic doctrine of rebirth (i.e., *palingenesis*; cf. *Corpus Hermeticum* 13 and Nag Hammadi codex 6.57–59). It must be noted that the title *trismegistos* is bestowed also by Osiris upon Agathodemon (*Fragments Hermetica* 32B).

Thus, that literature in Greek, translated supposedly from the Egyptian (*Corpus Hermeticum* 16.2), that claims to be the teachings of Thoth, the first Hermes, and of his disciples or descendants is called Hermetic. In addition to the names already cited, Hermes Trismegistos converses also with his master Poimandres-Nous ("intellect"; cf. *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.11) and with his disciples Ammon and Asclepius (*Asclepius* 1), grandson of Asclepius-Imhouthes (*Asclepius* 37), himself the son of Ptah-Hephaistos (*Stobaei Hermetica* 23.6). In addition, Isis discusses with her son Horus a revelation from the first Hermes that was given to her by her grandfather Kamephis (*ibid.*, 23.33), probably distinct from Kneph-Agathodemon (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vol. 3, p. 164).

#### INVENTORY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HERMETIC LITERATURE.

To Thoth, the inventor of writing, the ancient Egyptians attributed all sorts of books, especially magical writings, secret techniques employed in temple workshops (e.g., the gilding of statues or the dyeing of fabrics), and theological writings recopied or composed by the priests in the "house of life" (*pransh*; Nag Hammadi codex 6.61.20). Thus the Greek Hermetica that have come down to the present can be divided into two categories: works of occult sciences and philosophical works.

1. Among the works of occult sciences, A.-J. Festugière (1942–1953, vol. 1, pp. 77, 240, 283) distinguishes three kinds: (1) astrology, beginning in the third or second century BCE, (2) alchemy, beginning in the second or first century

BCE, and (3) magic, recorded in papyri of the fourth to seventh centuries CE that reproduce sources obviously much more ancient. The interested reader may turn to Festugière (*ibid.*) for a thorough exposition of this occult literature in all its abundance and great complexity.

2. The philosophical works were originally grouped as collections of the discourses of Hermes with his various disciples or of them among themselves. Of this undoubtedly very abundant literature, still preserved are only some fragments and the texts of a few discourses that have come down to the present through subsequent intermediaries. These may be grouped into chronological order as follows:

- (1) *Fragmenta Hermetica* 1–36 (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vol. 4): various fragments quoted in Greek, Latin, or Syriac by several authors, from Tertullian (second-third century CE) to Bar Hebraeus (1226–1286). To these fragments should be added the Papyri Vindobonenses Graecae 29456r and 29828r (Oellacher, 1951; Mahé, 1984), as well as an Armenian fragment (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, p. 346; parallel with John Malalas, in Scott, 1924–1936, vol. 4, p. 233) and several Syriac fragments (Brock, 1983, 1984, with some Greek parallels).
- (2) *Asclepius* 1–41 (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vol. 2): a Latin adaptation of *Logos Teleios*, finished probably after 320 and before 410.
- (3) Nag Hammadi codex 6 (Mahé, 1978–1982): codex 6 of the Nag Hammadi collection (c. 340–370 CE), containing Coptic translations of three treatises:
  - (a) Nag Hammadi codex 6.6, preserved without title and currently called *The Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth*;
  - (b) Nag Hammadi codex 6.7, *The Prayer That They Spoke*, parallel to *Asclepius* 41 and to the Papyrus Mimaut (Greek) of Paris;
  - (c) Nag Hammadi codex 6.8, without title, a fragment of *Logos Teleios* parallel to *Asclepius* 21–29 and to three Greek quotations cited by Lactantius around 320, Cyril of Alexandria around 435, and Joannes Stobaios around 500. The allusions of John Lydus (sixth century CE) to this same text can hardly be regarded as mere quotations.
- (4) *Stobaei Hermetica* 1–29 (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vols. 3–4): fragments or treatises quoted in Greek by Joannes Stobaios in his *Florilegium*, which he compiled around 500 for the education of his son.
- (5) *Definitions of Hermes Trismegistos for Asclepius* (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2), translated from Greek into Armenian, probably in the second half of the sixth century CE. *Definitions* 10.7 repeats *Stobaei Hermetica* 19.1; *Definitions* 11 is an interpolation drawn from Nemesius (c. 390 CE).
- (6) *Corpus Hermeticum* 1–14 and 16–18 (Nock and Festu-

gière, 1945–1954, vols. 1–2): a compilation of Hermetic treatises done after Stobaios and before Michael Constantine Psellus (eleventh century BCE). The connection of *Corpus Hermeticum* 18 to Hermetism is debated.

The Arabic Hermetic writings described by Louis Massignou (in Festugière, 1942–1953, vol. 1, pp. 384–400) are mostly original compositions without any direct ties to the Greek Hermetica.

Outside of *Asclepius*, the Middle Ages knew nothing of the philosophical works of Hermes except for some fragments mentioned by a very few Hellenists: *Corpus Hermeticum* 1–14 was translated into Latin by Marsilio Ficino in 1463; *Corpus Hermeticum* 16–18 and a part of the *Stobaei Hermetica* were published shortly thereafter in the sixteenth century; Nag Hammadi codex 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8 were discovered in 1945 but were not made available to scholars until 1970; *Definitions of Hermes Trismegistos for Asclepius* was published for the first time in 1956 in Yerevan, Armenia.

As for dating the composition of the various treatises, the *Logos Teleios* (*Asclepius*, Nag Hammadi codex 6.7, 6.8) is scarcely older than the third century CE. Most of the Greek texts seem to have been written in the second century BCE, yet they rest upon even older sources. Indeed, it is sometimes a case of works or compilations that longer survives such as the *Sayings of Agathodemon* (*Corpus Hermeticum* 10.25, 12.1, 12.8), the *General Discourses* (*Corpus Hermeticum* 10.1, 10.7, 13.1; *Stobaei Hermetica* 4a.1; *Stobaei Hermetica* 6.1; Nag Hammadi codex 6.63.2; *Papyri Vindobonenses Graecae* 29456r and 29828r), the *Diexodica* (*Fragmenta Hermetica* 30; *Asclepius* 1 corr.; Nag Hammadi codex 6.63.3 corr.). In addition, the cited Papyri Vindobonenses Graecae, copied at the end of the second century CE, reveals that at that time a collection of the *logoi* of Hermes to Tat, comprising at least ten treatises, had already been made. Going further, Strabo, on a visit to Egypt in 24–20 BCE, mentions some Hermetic literature that was not only astrological but also philosophical (Festugière, 1942–1953, vol. 1, p. 78). Finally, because *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.31 contains precise allusions to Jewish liturgy, it probably precedes the expulsion of Jews from Egypt after the revolt of 115–117. Yet because *Definitions of Hermes Trismegistos for Asclepius* 9.4 is the source of *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.18, it dates at the latest from the first century CE and could well go back even further (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, p. 278).

**ORIGINS AND ORIENTATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHICA OF HERMES.** Although the distinction between the Hermetic writings on the occult sciences and the philosophical works is easily supported by their differences in tone and content, the break is not total between the two genres. The prayer of *Asclepius* 41 (Nag Hammadi codex 6.7) also appears at the end of a magical formula for union with the sun (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 1, p. 141), and the magical papyri often contain invocations or myths comparable to those included in the philosophical writings (Festugière, 1942–1953, vol. 1, pp. 296–308; compare with the prayers of *Corpus Herme-*



*ticum* 5, 13, and Nag Hammadi codex 6.6, and with the myths of *Corpus Hermeticum* 1, *Asclepius*, and *Stobaei Hermetica* 23). Furthermore, the alchemical writings contain sentences also found in the philosophical writings (Mahé, 1978–1981, vol. 2, pp. 309–310). Finally, certain philosophical treatises contain magical words and symbols (Nag Hammadi codex 6.56.17f., 6.61.10f., 6.62.10f.), while *Stobaei Hermetica* 6 (to Tat, on the decans) is hardly distinguished from an astrological text except by its parenetic epilogue.

Composed in different periods by different authors, the Hermetic philosophical works do not present a consistent teaching. They can be divided according to two tendencies: The one, which is the greater part, is optimistic; the other inclines toward a rather pessimistic and Gnostic dualism (such as *Corpus Hermeticum* 1, 4, 13; or some passages of *Asclepius*). Furthermore, the origin of this literature poses a complex problem. It cannot be conceded that the Greek texts are translations of ancient Egyptian writings. Indeed, nothing that is directly comparable has been preserved either in hieroglyphic or in demotic Egyptian. The documents that Eve A. E. Reymond calls “ancient Egyptian Hermetic writings” (Reymond, 1977) are simply secret writings that show no verbal parallels or perhaps even no lexical affinities with the Greek *Hermetica* (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, pp. 478–481).

Moreover, the content of the Greek writings betrays a composite origin in which Egyptian inspiration combines with Hellenic and Jewish influences. Festugière has shown how the decline of Greek rationalism led to disguising traditional philosophical teachings as divine revelations attributed to sages of Egypt or the Orient. Thus, the philosophy of Trismegistos reflects the fundamental themes of Alexandrian Hellenism concerning anthropogony, the origin and final ends of the soul (Festugière, 1942–1953, vol. 3), and the opposition between the cosmic god (*ibid.*, vol. 2) and the unknown god of gnosis (*ibid.*, vol. 4). In addition, many specific arguments are borrowed from Greek philosophy. Thus, *Stobaei Hermetica* 1 illustrates a maxim of Protagoras (fifth century BCE), repeated by Plato (*Timaeus* 28c), that it is impossible to say anything about the divine essence. *Stobaei Hermetica* 2A interprets, with the help of the doctrine of the four elements, the Platonic dogma that nothing exists by itself on earth. *Stobaei Hermetica* 3.1 cites *Phaedrus* 245c and elaborates, along with *Stobaei Hermetica* 4–5, a physical theory of forces and movement, of a very Hellenic inspiration.

The influence of Judaism is equally certain. This is revealed by the use of a vocabulary that is characteristic of the Greek Bible. Thus, God is termed *kurios kai pater* (“lord and father”) in *Corpus Hermeticum* 5.2 and 13.21, *Asclepius* 26, Nag Hammadi codex 6.73.24, and *Fragmenta Hermetica* 23. However, these Judaic influences are unequally distributed: They are very strong in some treatises, sporadic elsewhere, and nonexistent in some. Thus *Corpus Hermeticum* 1 (*Poimandres*) contains not only a cosmogony inspired by the

*Book of Genesis* (likewise *Corpus Hermeticum* 3) but also an apocalyptic scheme comparable to that of the Slavonic *Apocalypse of Enoch* (2 *Enoch*). It also contains allusions to the Eighteen Blessings in the Jewish liturgy as well as to the recitation of the Shema’ (*Dt.* 6:4–9). *Corpus Hermeticum* 13 and Nag Hammadi codex 6.6 are close to the same traditions. Comparison has also been made of the myth of the fall of souls in *Stobaei Hermetica* 23 (*Korē Kosmou*) to that of the fall of the angels in the Ethiopic *Apocalypse of Enoch* (1 *Enoch*), which may also have influenced *Asclepius* 25 (Nag Hammadi codex 6.73.1f.). All these indications point to the influence of the canonical books of the Bible as well as of the apocryphal writings that were current among certain heterodox Jewish circles; some of these may have had Gnostic tendencies, judging from *Corpus Hermeticum* 1; others, perhaps Essene, if indeed a tie can be seen between *Stobaei Hermetica* 23 and 1 *Enoch*. In addition, the Papyri Vindobonenses Graecae, cited earlier, bear on the front the discourse of Hermes with Tat and, on the back, the *Book of Jannes and Jambres*, an apocryphal text or pseudepigraphon of the Old Testament.

The analogies between the teachings of Hermes and those of the Jewish exegete Philo Judaeus (d. 45–50 CE) could be explained by Alexandrian scholarly traditions rather than by reciprocal influence. Indeed, the orientations of the two authors are distinct. Philo could not endorse pantheism, immoderate esteem for astrology, theurgy, or the praise of statues and idolatry, all of which are often expressed in Hermetic writings (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, pp. 318–320). Apart from some allusions to divine mercy in *Corpus Hermeticum* 13.3, 13.8, 13.10 (cf. *Ad Titum* 3.5), a treatise highly influenced by Judaism, the God of Hermetism—“innocent” like that of Plato—sometimes sees to it that the guilty are punished, but, unlike the biblical God, hardly ever thinks to pardon them.

Underlining the importance of Hellenic and Jewish influences in the *Hermetica* does not amount to denying Egyptian inspiration. Contrary to the statement by Festugière (1942–1953, vol. 2, pp. 30f.), it is not Platonic dialogue that lies at the origin of the Hermetic *logoi* but rather the collection of ancient Egyptian wisdom (*sbayt*) sayings (*mtrw*) that were formulated as the teachings of a “father” to his “son,” because scribal and other intellectual functions were hereditary at that time. In the same way, the oldest Hermetic writings are some gnomologies such as *Stobaei Hermetica* 6 or *Definitions of Hermes Trismegistos for Asclepius*. Subsequently, the sentences (which might be either connected to one another simply by conjunctions, or provided with commentaries, or illustrated by myths, or inserted into prayers) give rise to the Hermetic *logoi*. In these the disciple, generally called “my son,” sometimes timidly interrupts the master whom he calls “my father.” *The Wisdom of Any* (thirteenth century BCE) contained already the start of such a dialogue.

As in many Egyptian hymns, the Hermetic God is at once “One and All”; he (or some derivative entity) is also “his

own father” and “his own mother.” He artistically designs the body of man (*Corpus Hermeticum* 5.6–7) with the same care as that of Khnum in the texts of Esna (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, pp. 291–294). In *Stobaei Hermetica* 23.32 Isis receives from the primordial god Kamephis the gift of the “perfect black,” (*to teleion melan*), namely Egypt (*Kah nkēmē*, “black earth”); in *Stobaei Hermetica* 23.42, the lions are termed “sleepless,” an ancient Egyptian tradition (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vol. 3, p. ccvi).

**NEW WRITINGS DISCOVERED AT NAG HAMMADI.** Along with Greek and Jewish influences, several passages of the writings discovered at Nag Hammadi bear the stamp of authentic Egyptian inspiration. Nag Hammadi codex 6.8 (parallel to *Asclepius* 21–29) opens with an evocation of the carnal union of man and woman presented, in accordance with Egyptian paganism, as a proper image of divinity. The refusal, expressed next by Trismegistos, to call “statues” the truly living gods fashioned by men calls to mind the belief in *ba*, the soul of idols. Then comes a prediction by Hermes to Asklepios: Someday, under the pressure of foreign invaders, the Egyptians will cease to adore their gods, who will depart from them. Formerly the image of piety, the country, full of barbarians and emptied of its ancient inhabitants, will become the image of impiety. The soil of Egypt and the waters of the Nile will be impotent in the face of these misfortunes. Because Egypt is “the image of heaven” and “the temple of the universe,” these human disorders will lead to a cosmic catastrophe: People will cease to adore the world and to respect the soul and will invert their values and ally themselves with the bad angels. Therefore the balance of elements will be upset, and evil will triumph until the Demiurge punishes the guilty and creates the world anew, as it was “the first time.” Then returning from the desert of Libya, the gods of Egypt will enter the great “city by the sea,” which lies at the head of Egypt on the side of the sunset.

Without excluding the specific influence of foreign, Jewish, and perhaps Iranian apocalypses, one might see a similarity between this prediction and ancient Egyptian oracles: *Iouper* (twenty-second to eighteenth century BCE), *Neferty* (c. 2000 BCE), *Demotic Chronicle* (third century BCE) and, during the Hellenistic age, the Greek *Oracle of the Lamb* (under Ptolemy III, c. 246–221 BCE) and the *Oracle of the Potter* (c. 130 BCE). Contrary to Jewish traditions, Hermes here is not an ecstatic visionary. He speaks calmly under the influence of wisdom alone. His vibrant praise of Egypt calls to mind *Stobaei Hermetica* 24.11–15, where Egypt, “our most holy country,” is located at the heart of the earth; it is represented, after the image of the god Geb, as a man lying on his back facing the sky. References can be made as well to Nag Hammadi codex 2.122, where Egypt is referred to as an image of paradise. This Egyptian patriotism is countered by the defiance of Philo and other Jews, for whom Egypt is a symbol of idolatry, ignorance, or concupiscence of the flesh (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, pp. 85–88). The end of Nag Hammadi codex 6.8 is a description of Hades that was not included in *Asclepius*, meaning that the former was

entirely unknown before the discovery of the codex. It is essentially an adaptation of Platonic myths in *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, and the *Republic* about the journey and judgment of the soul, giving Hades an aerial location. This has some similarities to Jewish apocalyptic, while the Egyptian element is practically nonexistent. After being examined by the Great Demon seated between heaven and earth, the righteous soul goes to its proper resting place, while the evil soul is handed over to be tormented by strangler demons, who scourge it and cast it in the celestial sea where fire and ice mass together. Yet God is innocent of these torments.

In contrast with Nag Hammadi 6.8, Nag Hammadi 6.6 is a Gnostic treatise very similar to *Corpus Hermeticum* 13, but with a more Egyptian setting. An anonymous disciple reminds Hermes of his promise to carry out his initiation by bearing his thought to the Ogdoad and then to the Ennead, that is, to the eighth and the ninth heavens (as in *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.24–26). In the course of a conversation on spiritual regeneration, the disciple learns to recognize his “brothers” and to pray to the “Father of the All.” Then the two conversants invoke “the invisible god whom one addresses in silence.” Chanting the seven vowels that correspond to the heavenly spheres, they reach the seventh, a symbol of piety according to the divine Law, and exchange a kiss. The power of light then descends upon them, and the first vision of the Ogdoad takes place, if not only for Hermes, at least in an incomplete manner for his disciple. The latter then directs a hymn to his father, during which takes place a second vision, more complete than the first, because the disciple sees the Ogdoad, the Ennead and the One who creates in spirit. He salutes his father with the title *trismegistos*. Then he promises to maintain secrecy and utters a thanksgiving to God, the end of the All, who has allowed him to know Him and to see himself. Next he chants the seven vowels over again and concludes his prayer. Trismegistos orders him to write everything in hieroglyphics on a stela that is to be placed in the open court of the temple of Hermes in Diospolis beneath a specific constellation. The stela will be surrounded by eight guards—the males having the faces of frogs (like the self-generating divinities of the Ogdoad at Hermopolis) and the females having the faces of cats (a solar symbol)—as well as by the “nine of the sun.”

In the imprecatory formula of the conclusion, a celestial hierarchy emerges to guard over the writing: the Unbegotten, the Self-begetting, the Begotten, and the Seven Ousiarchs (i. e., the planetary gods penetrated by the demiurgic spirit). This hierarchy also appears in the report of Hippolytus (second to third century CE) on the Perates, in the *Mysteries of Egypt* by Iamblichus (c. 250–300), and in other writings from Nag Hammadi such as the *Gospel of the Egyptians* (Nag Hammadi codex 3.54). A comparison with the exegesis of *Genesis* 1–8 in *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.1–18 reveals a complex syncretism in which the Unbegotten, the Self-begotten, the Begotten, and the Seven Ousiarchs are identified, respectively, with the Creator, Adam, Seth, and the seven generations

from Seth to Noah (cf. *Genesis* 5.1–29) on the one hand and with the heavenly spheres on the other hand. Thus, reaching the Ogdoad means not only escaping planetary Heimarmene and subjection to the Law but also recovering the likeness and the glorious condition of Seth, the first man who was begotten in the form and image of the Self-begotten (i.e., Adam), who in turn was made in the image of the Unbegotten Creator. Just as God beholds himself in the Self-begotten, according to *Eugnostos the Blessed* (Nag Hammadi codex 3.74–76), the disciple of Hermes is regenerated by the vision of himself, which makes him similar to the primordial man. This Jewish background of the Hermetic *palingenesia* strongly contrasts with the Egyptian setting of the dialogue.

*The Prayer That They Spoke* (Nag Hammadi codex 6.7), represented in codex 6 as the part following Nag Hammadi codex 6.6 yet preserved in other contexts in *Asclepius* 41 and in the *Papyrus Mimaut*, concludes with the formula “Once this prayer was said, they kissed one another and went to eat their food that was pure and without any blood.” One can question at this point whether any Hermetic brotherhoods existed, and Nag Hammadi codex 6.6 and 6.7 leave little doubt about it: Indeed there were gnostics influenced by Judaism who invoked Hermes Trismegistos. They formed communities like the one described in *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.27–31, in which fraternal meals were held, the kiss of peace was exchanged, and initiations were conducted into the mystery of regeneration as described in *Corpus Hermeticum* 13 and Nag Hammadi codex 6.6.

However, it should not be overlooked that philosophical Hermetism originated in scholarly traditions before the gnostics ever thought of laying claim to it, and that it continued to develop independently of these same Gnostics. Thus, *Definitions of Hermes Trismegistos for Asclepius*, a collection of philosophical definitions, served as a source before 115 CE for *Corpus Hermeticum* 1, a Gnostic treatise, and, in the third century, for the *Logos Teleios* with a very different orientation.

As a place of confrontation for the religious beliefs of ancient Egypt, for Greek philosophy, for Judaism, and for gnosis, the philosophical writings of Hermes do not stand for a single doctrine, and they are not the “bible” of any religion. Instead, they reflect the varied spiritual currents in Alexandria during the first three centuries of the common era. Their relative unity is due mainly to their literary genre, in which the ancient gnomic sources always remain recognizable even when the same sentence is commented upon differently in one treatise as compared to another. The poignant fervor and brilliant stylistic success make certain passages, especially prayers, outstanding testimonials to the spiritual concerns of late paganism.

SEE ALSO Hermetism.

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**HERMETISM** designates the pagan corpus (written for the most part in the region of Alexandria) of the so-called *Hermetica*, which contains the pagan writings called *Corpus Hermeticum* (second and third centuries CE) attributed to the legendary figure Hermes Trismegistos (also Trismegistus), otherwise called Mercurius. *Neo-Alexandrian Hermetism* (henceforth often referred to as *Hermetism* also) designates the various philosophically and/or esoterically oriented adaptations and commentaries which that corpus has given rise to, particularly in the modern period (i.e., from the Renaissance up to the present time). Neo-Alexandrian Hermetism constitutes one of the modern esoteric currents and is the subject of most of this article. The term *Hermeticism*, which is more vague, frequently has been used as a synonym for *esotericism* and *alchemy*.

The *Corpus Hermeticum* had a strange destiny. In the Middle Ages, besides the *Asclepius*, only a few rare extracts were known, and yet their supposed author Hermes Trismegistos, clouded by an aura of mystery, never ceased to be a subject of great interest. Not until the dawn of the Renaissance did the writings come back to light, a rediscovery that gave rise to a considerable amount of interest.

**LATE ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE AGES.** The *Corpus Hermeticum* (henceforth referred to as *C.H.*) was written in the second and third centuries CE. It is a collection of eighteen treatises (I–XVIII). Annexed to it is the *Asclepius* (originally known in Greek as *Logos Teleios* and translated into Latin in the fourth century), which in early periods was falsely attributed to Apuleius of Madaura. Unlike the *C.H.* proper, the *Asclepius* has survived in an ancient Latin translation only (the original Greek version has never been found; a large part of it in Coptic translation surfaced only as late as the twentieth century, in the Nag Hammadi Library). The first (numbered I) of these eighteen treatises is the most famous. It deals

with the creation of the world, whereas the rest are devoted to the soul's ascension through the celestial spheres and its divine sojourns, a process supposed to bring about the regeneration of the human being. Hermetism is characterized by an eclectic mentality, a philosophical attitude that favors the concrete and eschews ontological dualism. Philosophically, it stresses the positive, symbolic value of the universe. This can be seen, for example, in the treatise in which Nous (Mind) addresses Hermes, who is taught how to reflect the universe in his own spirit, seizing the divine essence of nature and impressing it on the interior of his soul. This process is made possible by the fact that the human being possesses a divine intellect. The predominate theme is the world as a mirror of the divine and object of contemplation (God is known through the contemplation of the world). Hence the focus of the *C.H.* (and of many of the *Hermetica*, for that matter) on the particular, the *mirabilia*, often to the detriment of the abstract and the general. The *C.H.* invites the reader to undertake the work of regeneration through a reascent, which can be accomplished either by means of the intellect via a connection with intermediary spiritual intelligences (such as intermediate spirits) that are used as spiritual ladders, or by theurgical means, or by both. Explicit in Hermetism is a belief in an astrological cosmos, often viewed as the scene of an initiatory journey.

The long trail of the Christian interpretation of philosophical Hermetism originates in the fourth and fifth centuries, namely with the works of Lactantius and Quodvultdeus on the one hand, and Augustine on the other. These men represent two opposing paradigms of response to the *Asclepius*. In his *Divinae institutiones* (304–313), Lactantius cited numerous fragments from the *Asclepius*. He devoted several laudatory lines to Hermes Trismegistos and detected in him a herald of Christ's coming. Lactantius interpreted the created world (the second god of the Hermetic hierarchy) as the Word made flesh. Augustine, although in agreement with Lactantius about the antiquity of Hermes Trismegistos (he lived "a long time before the wise men and philosophers of Greece"), in his *De civitate Dei* (415–417 CE, *City of God*, VIII, 13–26) he condemned the *Asclepius* because of passages that discuss magical processes intended to animate the statues of gods by making spirits descend into them. Augustine denied that *daimones* (demons) could be regarded as necessary mediators between gods and mortals, and he strongly distinguished Hermetic teachings from "true religion." Despite the unquestioned authority of Augustine, Lactantius's views generally prevailed in the Middle Ages, because the *Tractatus adversus quinque haereses* (c. 430) by Quodvultdeus, bishop of Carthage, who stood in Lactantius's wake, was included in a collection of works written by Augustine and therefore falsely attributed to the latter. Clement of Alexandria also mentioned (*Stromateis* 6.4) Augustine, to whom he attributed a great number of philosophical works.

Hermetism seems to have all but disappeared from the scene of Latin culture in the centuries between the dissolu-



tion of the Roman Empire and the twelfth century. But from the twelfth century on it resurfaced thanks to the few texts that had survived. Alan of Lille (c. 1128–1203) made frequent use of cosmological Hermetic elements. In his *Summa Quoniam homines* and *Contra haereticos*, he extols the Egyptian sage Hermes's knowledge about the unity of God. The *Glosae super Trismegistum* may be attributed, if not to Alan himself, then to someone who stood close to him. In this work, the author proposes that Mercurius, more than other philosophers, reflected upon the mysteries of the heavenly realities. Two texts in the thirteenth century were the subjects of much commentary. First, the *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum*, attributed to Mercurius, contains a summary of definitions of God, as formulated by an assembly of twenty-four sages. It is in part the work of a Christian, who endeavors to demonstrate the congruence of Neoplatonic and Hermetic teachings with those of the Bible and of Catholicism. Second, the *Liber de sex rerum principisi* (written sometime between 1147 and 1175) deals with divine and natural causality and establishes a concord between the Platonic tradition and Arab sources.

Toward the end of the twelfth century, Hermetism underwent some changes. First, a number of theological and cosmogonical pseudo-epigraphs attributed to Mercurius surfaced. Second, translations from the Arabic and the Greek appeared that heralded a different kind of Hermetic literature characterized by an impressive number of writings devoted to forms of operational knowledge—that is, to practices like magic, astrology, alchemy, botany, medicine, and divination. This new trend developed alongside philosophical Hermetism without conflict, except in the works of William of Auvergne. This latter, bishop of Paris (1228–1249), was one of the most erudite theologians in such matters. Well-versed in the literature from Greece and Islam, he sharply criticized Hermetism, taking sides with Augustine against Lactantius (see, for example, his *De Legibus*, 1228), at least with regard to “magical” knowledge.

In the same period, Michael Scot in his *Liber introductorius* (1228–1235) and in his commentary on Giovanni Sacrobosco's *De sphaera* attests to the circulation of the *Asclepius*. Toward the middle of the thirteenth century, Roger Bacon (in his *Opus maius* and *Metaphysica*, both completed in 1267) displayed strong Hermetic leanings and showed himself to be an insightful reader of the *Asclepius*. Similarly, Albertus Magnus (Albert the Great) tried to harmonize the philosophical elements of the *Asclepius* and the image of Hermes, in whom he saw the *magus* who has unveiled the secrets of nature and discovered the correspondence between heaven and earth (see for example his *Liber de intellectu et intelligibili*, 1260; *De animalibus*, c. 1260; *De causis et processu universitatis*, 1263–1267). In the fourteenth century Thomas Bradwardine, the famous mathematician and theologian at Merton College (Oxford), in his *De causa Dei* (1335–1344) cites Hermes as the first authority among the philosophers.

Among the authors of the fifteenth century, Nicholas Cusanus demonstrates a good knowledge of many of the

available texts. His first reference to Mercurius appears in his *Sermo I* (1430), in which, drawing on Lactantius, he credits Hermes with the real knowledge of the divine Word. Moreover, his Christian interpretation of Hermetism is confirmed by numerous autographic glosses placed in the margins of his copy of the *Asclepius* (MS Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale 10054–10056). On several occasions in his *De docta ignorantia* (1440) he extols the Hermetic doctrine of God as “one and everything.”

Finally, another famous text has to be mentioned within this short summary. It is the *Tabula Smaragdina* (*The Emerald Tablet*, or *The Smaragdine Table of Hermes*, henceforth referred to as *T.S.*), also attributed to Hermes Trismegistos. Originally written in Greek (the original version is lost), its earliest extant version (934 CE) is in Arabic, set within a small alchemical and philosophical treatise entitled *The Book of the Secrets of Creation*. *T.S.* has lent itself to innumerable discussions and esoteric commentaries. Hugo Sanctelliensis, bishop of Tarazona (Spain) translated it into Latin from the Arabic for the first time in the twelfth century, along with the *Liber de secretis naturae et occultis rerum causis quem transtulit Apollonius ex libris Hermes Trismegisti*.

**THE REDISCOVERY OF HERMES TRISMEGISTOS IN THE RENAISSANCE.** In Florence in 1450, Cosimo de' Medici the Elder (the ruler of Florence and a great patron of letters) entrusted Marsilio Ficino with the creation of a Platonic academy. One of their intentions was to have the available writings of Plato translated into Latin. Then, around 1460, an event occurred that assured the sudden, unprecedented influence of the Hermetic texts. A monk, Leonardo da Pistoria, brought to Florence a Greek manuscript containing fourteen treatises that constituted most of what would later be called the *C.H.* These treatises had already been gathered together in the eleventh century, and it was in that form that the Byzantine Platonist Psellus had known them. Da Pistoria, who had found the document in Macedonia, presented it to Cosimo de' Medici. The latter, having deemed it more urgent to translate the *C.H.* into Latin than Plato's works, assigned the task to Ficino. His translation of the fourteen treatises (*C.H.* I–XIV) was finished in 1463 and printed at Treviso in 1471 under the title *Mercurii Trismegisti Pimander Liber de potestate et sapientia Dei*, or *Pimander*, together with a prefatory argument (*Argumentum*) by Ficino himself. In his *Argumentum*, Ficino also called attention to the *Asclepius*, which he considered as “the most divine” of this kind of literature (an edition had just been printed in Rome in 1469 as an insert in Apuleius's *Opera*). By 1505 the *C.H.* and the *Asclepius* had been combined in a great number of editions. Later, a series of other Hermetic texts, the so-called *Stobaei Anthologium* (compiled c. 500 CE by Johannes Stobaeus of Macedonia) was added to that corpus (part of the *Anthologium* was published in Venice in 1536, another part in Zurich in 1543, and the rest in Antwerp in 1575).

The *C.H.* (often published under the title of the first treatise, *Poimandres*, rendered as *Pimander* since Ficino's

1471 translation) and the *Asclepius* enjoyed considerable success. Up to 1641, no fewer than twenty-four editions appeared, not counting partial ones or translations into other European languages. They became a central element in Renaissance culture and were most popular among the learned and prominent members of society. Anthony Woodville's English translation of a few of these texts in the anthology *The dyctes or sayengis of the philosophers* (Westminster 1477, the first dated book in the history of English printing), published by William Caxton, bears witness to the early, albeit discreet, presence of the *C.H.* in England. Woodville's anthology was later incorporated into other anthologies.

As had been the case prior to that period, the Hermetic treatises were considered the expression of a philosophy that had been transmitted over the sweep of centuries. Ficino called the philosophy *prisca philosophia*. Later it would be called, albeit in a slightly different sense, *philosophia perennis*. This term was introduced by an Italian Augustinian and Vatican librarian, Agostino Steuco (*De perenni philosophia*, Lyon 1540, new ed. 1590). Although staunchly attached to the Church's magisterium, he too tried to reconstruct the ancient philosophy as a foundation for restoring Christian unity. The *C.H.*, the *Asclepius*, and Hermes Trismegistos were thus thought to belong to a far distant past, namely to the age of Moses or even earlier. Although pagan in character, they were considered to foreshadow Christian truths and so to give new depth to the Christian revelation. In his *Argumentum*, Ficino describes a "genealogy of wisdom"—explicitly referred to as *prisca theologia*—consisting of six main figures: Mercurius (Hermes) Trismegistos, Orpheus, Aglaophemus (an Orphic teacher of Pythagoras), Pythagoras, Philolaus, and Plato. That list was later to undergo various changes depending on the author who presented it. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's *Oratio de hominis dignitate* (1486) begins with a reference to the "Magnum, O Asclepi, miraculum" passage of the *Asclepius* (*Ascl.* 6). Pico combined the Hermetic philosophy with the Qabbalah, which he believed had been entrusted to Moses on Mount Sinai.

On Palm Sunday of 1484, Giovanni da Correggio, in bizarre dress and in strange company, appeared in Rome. On the banks of the Manara he put on a crown bearing the inscription "This is my son Poimandres, whom I have chosen" and made a speech in which he called himself the "angel of Wisdom, Poimandres, in the most sublime manifestation of the Lord Jesus Christ." Then, making his way to the Vatican, he deposited diverse objects on the throne of Saint Peter. In 1496 he turned up again in Florence and then in Lyons. Lodovico Lazzarelli, who saw in Giovanni a new and divine prophet whom he considered as his mentor, has left a vivid description of this event in a manifesto titled *Epistola Enoch*, published probably in Milan c. 1490. Another text by Lazzarelli, *Crater Hermetis* (complete title: *A Dialogue on the Supreme Dignity of Man, Entitled the Way of Christ and the Mixing-Bowl of Hermes* which he wrote probably between 1492 and 1494 (it remained unpublished until Lefèvre d'Étaples

edited it in 1505) is a fictitious conversation (very much in the form of the dialogues contained in *C.H.*) between Lazzarelli, who plays the role of the initiator, and Ferdinand I of Aragon and his prime minister Giovanni Pontano, who are cast in the role of pupils. *Crater Hermetis* may be among the most interesting examples of Hermetic-Christian syncretism written during the Renaissance. It is certainly one of the important Hermetic texts of its time, if not for its direct influence, then at least with regard to the depth and originality of its contents.

In 1482, Lazzarelli, convinced of the equality of the Bible and the Hermetic writings, dedicated to Correggio a manuscript he had just completed. The manuscript consisted of three parts, each one opening with a dedicatory preface. The first part contained Marsilio Ficino's translation of the *Pimander* (1471, i.e., *C.H.* I–XIV). The second contained the *Asclepius*. The third contained the first Latin translation, by Ficino, of *C.H.* XVI–XVIII—that is, three extra treatises which he had apparently discovered in a separate manuscript (unfortunately not preserved). He titled these treatises *Diffinitiones Asclepii ad regem Ammonem*. Lazzarelli appears to be a pure example of a Christian Hermetist in the Renaissance (in addition to being one of the first noteworthy authors instrumental in the early development of a Christian Qabbalah). Strangely enough, Frances A. Yates almost passed over him in her ground-breaking books published in 1964, and not until recently have scholars (in particular, Claudio Moreschini and Wouter J. Hanegraaff) done him justice.

Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples's first edition of his *Pimander* (Paris, 1494) contains, besides Ficino's translation, a series of commentaries (*Argumenta*) of his own (long attributed to Ficino). The second edition (Paris, 1505) was augmented with both the *Asclepius* and Lazzarelli's *Crater Hermetis* (in an abridged version). Interestingly, it was the first time that the *Asclepius* had been published with the *C.H.* Also at this time, Symphorien Champier, an admirer of Ficino and disciple of Lefèvre d'Étaples, did not hesitate to derive all of Greek philosophy from Hermes. He considered the famous passage from the *Asclepius* on magic and animated statues to be an interpolation by Apuleius and thus not to be attributed to Hermes. He goes as far as to include into the tradition of *prisca theologia* the doctrines of the Druids and elements drawn from the Qabbalah. His *Liber de quadruplici vita: Theologia Asclepii Hermetis Trismegisti discipuli cum commentariis . . .* (Lyon, 1507) contains Lazzarelli's translation of *Diffinitiones Asclepii*, among other texts, but Champier substituted a commentary of his own for Lazzarelli's prefaces.

As exemplified by Lefèvre and Champier, the French were generally much more cautious than their Italian or German counterparts regarding the "magical" elements of the *C.H.* and the *Asclepius*. This tendency to downplay the magical in favor of a more noble, essentially philosophical interpretation can be seen also in Pontus de Tyard, bishop of Châlons (*Deux discours*, 1578). Indeed, almost all French adherents of the *prisca theologia* dealt with Hermetism from the

perspective of Christian apologetics. This is reflected, for instance, in Gabriel du Préau's *Mercure Trismégiste ancien Theologien & excellent Philosophe, de la puissance & sapience de Dieu . . . Auecq' un Dialogue de Loys Lazarel poëte chrestien intitulé le Bassin d'Hermès* (Paris, 1549; new ed., 1557), the first edition in French of *C.H.* I–XIV, of the *Asclepius*, and (as the title indicates) of Lazzarelli's *Crater Hermetis*. Du Préau's book also contains abundant commentaries of his own, some of which were designed to establish parallels between the narrative of creation according to Moses and that of *C.H.* I (*Pimander*).

The French Catholic scholar Adrien Turnèbe published the first edition of the *C.H.* (Paris, 1554) in the original Greek, based on the manuscript used by Ficino and accompanied by the latter's Latin translation, as well as by Lazarelli's translation of the additional treatise. A preface by Angelos Vergerius emphasizes the resemblances of Hermetism to Christianity. In the wake of such scholarly publications, François Foix-Candale, bishop of Aire, near Bordeaux, authored another edition in 1574 (*C.H.* I–XIV, accompanied by some other hermetic texts). Five years later he produced very extensive commentaries of his own in French in his *Le Pimandre de Mercure Trismégiste: de la Philosophie Chrestienne, Cognoissance du Verbe Divin . . .* (Bordeaux, 1579, new ed., Paris, 1587), in which the Hermetic texts serve as topics for meditation on a variety of questions, such as the Soul of the World, the spirits of the elements, and the celestial bodies. Among various sources, Foix drew on the *philosophia occulta* of the Renaissance, and his book foreshadows some of the themes that Christian Theosophy would develop from the seventeenth century onward.

Ficino's *Opera omnia* also appeared in this decade (1576). Six years later at Anvers the Huguenot Protestant Philippe du Plessis-Mornay (called the Pope of the Huguenots) published his famous book *De la vérité de la religion chrestienne . . .* (Antwerp, 1581), written at a time when William of Orange was trying to establish religious tolerance at Anvers. Du Plessis-Mornay employed Hermetism in fashioning a religious position that stood above all religious conflicts, and which was close to that of Erasmus—but with an additional esoteric dimension. He compared the *C.H.* with the Zohar and made mention of Orpheus, Zarathushtra, and the sibyls, but especially of Hermes, “the source of them all.” As is common among the French, his Hermetism is mystical and theological. This work was published several times in a Latin translation and proved to be influential in the development of Protestantism in France. Translated into English by Sir Philip Sidney and Arthur Golding in 1587, it is among the main expositions of Hermetism in the tradition of Ficino.

Along with Foix, some other important sixteenth-century authors, such as Giorgio Bruno, and Agrippa, must be counted as influential in later Hermetism and esoteric literature. Francesco Giorgio (or Zorzi), who belonged to the Order of Friars Minor, authored *De Harmonia Mundi totius*

*Cantica tria* (Venice, 1525; Paris, 1545, 1546; French translation by Guy Lefèvre de la Boderie, Paris, 1578) and *In Sacram Scripturam Problemata* (Venice, 1536; Paris, 1622). These two works represent an original construction aimed at making Ficino's Hermetic *prisca theologia* coincide with Neoplatonism, Qabalah, astrology, and even alchemy. *De Harmonia Mundi* would enjoy a lasting success in several milieus, in particular among the representatives of most esoteric currents. Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa and Guillaume Postel would be among his enthusiastic followers.

Giordano Bruno recommended a “new” philosophy founded on Hermetism. In his works he makes frequent use of the Hermetic texts (notably in *Spaccio della bestia trionfante*, 1584). In contrast to that of Ficino and the French, his Hermetism represented an aggressive return to Hermetic magic. Unlike most other Hermeticists of his time, Bruno was not a Christian and did not identify the *intellectus* and *Filius Dei* of the *C.H.* with the second person of the Trinity, and thus he did not share the hope nursed by others that general acceptance of Hermetism might effect a religious reconciliation. In fact, Bruno did not desire a reformed Christendom, but rather a return to the cults or beliefs of ancient Egypt as described in the *C.H.* and particularly in the *Asclepius*. In 1591 he tried to win over to his views Clement VIII in Rome, but his radical interpretations led him to the stake in 1600.

In Germany, some of Sebastian Frank's works attest to an interest in Hermetism. His *Die Güldin Arch* (Augsburg, 1538) presents itself as a collection of biblical sayings and paraphrases, together with extracts from “illuminated pagans and philosophers” such as Hermes Trismegistos. In Basel (1542), Frank translated into German both the *Asclepius* and *C.H.* I–XIV and included long commentaries dealing mostly with commonalities between the Bible and Nature. It remains unpublished; the manuscript is preserved in the Stadtbibliothek Augsburg. In the second half of the sixteenth century, Valentin Weigel, the father of Germanic Theosophy (of which Jakob Boehme was to be the greatest exponent at the beginning of the seventeenth century), cites the name of Hermes Trismegistos more than that of any other author of his time—more than Dionysius the Areopagite, Plato, or Augustine. Like Agrippa, however, Weigel invokes this prestigious name more often than he utilizes the Hermetic texts themselves. Traces of Hermetic influence are also noticeable in Copernicus, who cites Hermes in reference to the sun considered as the visible God. Another German, Henricus Cornelius Agrippa focused on the esoteric side of Hermes Trismegistos. Besides quite a few passages in his famous *De Occulta Philosophia* (1533), several writings of his are devoted to a hermeneutics of the *C.H.*, particularly its third treatise: *Oratio in praelectionem Hermetis Trismegisti de Potestate et Sapientia Dei* (Cologne, 1535; an “oratio” given at the University of Pavia in 1515); *Liber de triplici ratione cognoscendi Dei* (1516); and *Dehortatio gentiles theologiae* (c. 1526, a text that, unlike his other two, distances him from Hermetism).

Despite the presence of a famous name like Agrippa, the Germanic countries in general had little part in the golden age of European Hermetism, which lasted approximately from Ficino to Kircher. Agrippa wrote his main works before the Reformation, and Kircher composed his main ones in Rome. This may be due in part to the fact that during this period humanism made only slight progress in those countries, hampered as it was by the barrier that Lutheranism had erected against it. Therefore, neo-Alexandrian Hermetism, by its very nature a legacy of ancient Greek literature, remained mostly a subject of study for the humanists, even after the *C.H.* had been translated into Latin by the Italian Ficino. As a consequence, over that period almost all the noteworthy commentators of the *C.H.* were French and Italian.

Not until the last two decades of the sixteenth century did two other authors of importance emerge. First, the Italian Capuchin Hannibal Rossel, whose *Pymander Mercurii Trismegisti* at six volumes (Cracovia 1585–1590) is not so much a commentary on the *C.H.* as an encyclopedic roll-call of a variety of philosophical themes, along with a presentation of *C.H.* I–VII and the *Asclepius*. This work was popular enough to require a second issue, this time in one volume (Cologne, 1630). Second, Francesco Patrizi's *Nova de universis philosophia* (Ferrara, 1591) contains *C.H.* I–XIV (as established by Turnèbe and Foix de Candale), the *Asclepius*, *C.H.* XVI–XVIII (*Diffinitiones Asclepii*), the medieval so-called *Theologia Aristotelis*, and a new Latin translation of these texts. In the dedicatory preface, Patrizi asked Pope Gregory XIV to place the *C.H.* on the academic curriculum as an alternative philosophy. Indeed, he sharply criticized Aristotelian philosophy and wanted it to be ousted from Jesuit-run colleges. Patrizi portrayed the true magus as one who is devoted to God, and true *prisca magia* as the true religion. He claimed that a single treatise from the *C.H.* contained more philosophy than all of Aristotle, thereby advocating the study of Plotinus, Proclus, and the early Fathers while discouraging the study of the Scholastics. In the spirit of the Counter-Reformation, he took up the question of a new catechism and recommended the study of the *C.H.* to the Jesuits. He went so far as to suggest to the pope that Hermetic Platonism be assigned in all Christian schools as an aid to converting the Lutherans. In 1592, Clement VIII, won over to some of his ideas, called him to Rome to hold the chair of Platonic philosophy at the University La Sapienza, but once there, Patrizi incurred the displeasure of the Inquisition and his book was placed on the Index. Other reform-minded books followed, such as Mutius Pansa's *De Osculo, seu consensus ethnicae et Christianae philosophiae tractatus* (Marburg, 1605)—the “kiss” mentioned in the title being that which Hermetism and Christianity are supposed to exchange.

Religious Hermetism is Gnostic and irenic by nature. This partly accounts for the fact that in the 1590s, the Puritanism then flourishing in England weakened the theological syncretism that had favored such tendencies. With Edward

VI, the English Protestants had already begun to break with the past, going so far as to destroy books and libraries. Under the reign of Mary, a Hispano-Catholic intolerance went even further in that direction. Puritan Anglicanism under Elizabeth lost all trace of Erasmian tolerance, and Hermetism suffered accordingly, at least in the official milieu of the Anglican Church and the universities. It continued to develop within private circles, however, such as those that formed around Sir Philip Sidney and Queen Elizabeth's astrologer, John Dee. In addition to Sidney and Dee, who were enthusiasts of Hermeticism and esoteric literature, is Richard Hooker, who often cited the *C.H.* in his work *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, which began to appear in 1593. Hooker, however, did not identify himself with the Hermetic tradition as such.

Any overview of neo-Alexandrian Hermetism must also give attention to the *T.S.*, a short text that circulated in a Latin translation as early as the twelfth century. Its first printed edition, also in Latin and titled *Tabula Smaragdina*, appeared in a compilation of alchemical texts, *De Alchemia* (Nurnberg, 1541). Its brevity permits us to quote it here in full:

True it is, without falsehood, certain and most true. That which is above is like to that which is below, and that which is below is like to that which is above, to accomplish the miracles of one thing. And as all things were by contemplation of one, so all things arose from this one thing by a single act of adaptation. The father thereof is the Sun, the mother the Moon, the Wind carried it in its womb, the earth is the nurse thereof. It is he father of all works of wonder throughout the whole world. The power thereof is perfect. If it be cast on to the earth, it will separate the element of earth from that of fire, the subtle from the gross. With great sagacity it doth ascend gently from earth to heaven. Again it doth descent to earth, and uniteth in itself the force from things superior and things inferior. Thus thou wilt possess the glory of the brightness of the whole word, and all obscurity will fly far from thee. This thing is the strong fortitude of all strength, for it overcometh every subtle thing and doth penetrate every solid substance. Thus was this world created. Hence will there be marvellous adaptations achieved, of which the manner is this. For this reason I am called Hermes Trismegistos, because I hold three parts of the wisdom of the whole world. This is which I had to say about the operation of Sol is completed. (Linden, 2003, pp. 27–28)

In the sixteenth century, this rather enigmatic prose poem caused torrents of Hermetic, alchemical, and theosophical ink to flow (Faivre, *Annuaire*. . ., 1985–1997). To mention only a few remarkable commentaries in the esoteric literature of that time, the “*T.S.* tradition” was illustrated and enriched by such authors as Johann Trithemius (see his correspondence with Germain de Ganay in 1505) and Gérard Dorn (*Artificii chymistici*, 1569; often re-edited as *Physica Trismegist*; foreshadows the advent of the Theosophical movement).

**HERMETIC DEVELOPMENTS AND REAPPRAISALS (1614–1706).** Isaac Casaubon, a Protestant minister in Geneva, set out to prove (in a chapter of his *De rebus sacris ecclesiasticis exercitationes XVI*, London, 1614) that the *C.H.* had not been written prior to the second or third centuries CE and was therefore a forgery of the early Christian era. Although Casaubon's name has long been attached to that new dating, recent research (see especially Purnell, 1976; Mulso, 2002) has shown that similar "discoveries" had already been made by other philologists as early as the 1560s. Nonetheless, the claim that the *C.H.* had been erroneously dated could only deal a heavy blow to its authority, since the authority of a text, even at that time, was highly dependent upon its age. But the Hermetic current did not disappear for all that; indeed, from then until now, many esoterically oriented authors and readers have preferred to ignore or to downplay the significance of the new dating of the Hermetic writings.

One of the first highly sympathetic exegetes of the *C.H.* in early seventeenth-century Germany was Heinrich Noll (*Theoria Philosophiae Hermeticae, septem tractatibus*, Hanover, 1617; *Theoria Philosophiae Hermeticae*, Copenhagen, 1617; and *Panergii Philosophici Speculum*, 1623, an initiatic novel). In Italy, Livius Galante, who authored *Christianae theologiae cum platonica comparatio* (Bologna, 1627) is noteworthy. Furthermore, a number of translations of the *C.H.* into European languages appeared. A few extracts were presented in German in "Verba Hermetis in Pimandro" (a section of the anonymous *Occulta Philosophia*, vol. II, Frankfurt, 1613). More importantly, under the title *Sestien boecken* . . . (Amsterdam, 1643; new ed., 1652), Abraham Willemsz van Beyerland published a Dutch version of sixteen treatises of the *C.H.*, based on Patrizi's text. Beyerland, a theosopher who was also a translator of Jakob Boehme, added long, theosophically oriented commentaries of his own. His translation was used by the first translator into German (1706).

John Everard did the first translation of the *C.H.* in English (*The Divine Pymander of Hermes Mercurius Trismegistus, in XVII Books. Translated formerly out of the Arabick into Greek* . . . , London, 1650; new ed., 1657). This Anglican minister, a preacher at Kensington, had already produced in 1640 a detailed commentary (preserved at the Bodleian Library in Oxford) on the *T.S.* He also authored short translations from similar texts and some works of his own (see his *Some Golden Treasures*, London, 1653). The title, and the preface signed J.F., attest to the ignorance of the editor, not least because he claimed that these books were originally in Arabic. The preface deals mostly with the legendary figure of Hermes Trismegistos. Everard's book was very influential in the development of Hermetism in England.

Along with Paracelsianism, Hermetism became part of a medical debate principally represented by one of its proponents, the Dane Olaus Borrichius (Olaf Borch), who composed a vibrant apology for Hermetism and alchemy (*Hermetis Aegyptiorum, et chemicorum sapientia*, Copenhagen, 1674; see also his *De Ortu et progressio chemiae*, Copenhagen,

1688, which contains a detailed history of alchemical literature). *Hermetis Aegyptiorum* was meant as a counter-attack against the German Hermann Conring, in whose *De Hermetica Aegyptiorum vetere et paracelsicorum nova medicina* (Helmstedt, 1648; new ed., 1699) Hermetism and Paracelsianism had come in for their share of harsh criticism. Along these lines, Johann Heinrich Ursinus (in *De Zoroastre bactriano, Hermete Trismegisto, Sanchoniatone Phoenicio, eorumque scriptis, et aliis, contra Mosaicae scripturae antiquitatem*, Nürnberg, 1661) also tried to demonstrate that the *C.H.* was merely a collection of texts plagiarized from Christian sources. Both Conring's and Borrichius's works are of a particular interest because they depend not only on Paracelsianism and Hermetism, but also on alchemical literature. Nevertheless, the *C.H.* was rarely the object of commentaries in the alchemical discourses of the seventeenth century, although Hermes Trismegistos often appeared as the tutelary figure of that science, for instance in Michael Maier's *Symbola Aureae Mensae Duodecim Nationum* (Frankfurt, 1617).

In contrast, the *T.S.* continued to trigger a lot of alchemical commentaries. See, for example, Jacques Nuyssement (*Traictez . . . du Vray Sel*, 1621) and Athanasius Kircher (in volume 2 of his *Oedipus Aegyptiacus*, Rome, 1653; and *Mundus Subterraneus*, Rome, 1664–1665). The German translation (by Johan Schaubert) of the *T.S.* appeared in 1600. Isaac Newton's commentaries on that text are highly developed and appear in the great quantity of alchemical manuscripts he left to posterity (King's College, Cambridge), and they have recently been the object of a number of scholarly studies. Wilhelm Christoph Kriegsmann produced another most original, albeit fantastic, "philological" commentary (*Hermetis Trismegisti . . . Tabula Smaragdina*, 1657).

Throughout the period and ever since, the tendency in Hermetic literature has been to blend Hermetism not only with alchemy, but also with Jewish or Christian Qabbalah, Rosicrucianism, and the *philosophia occulta* inherited from the Renaissance. Stellatus's (that is, Christoph Hirsch's) *Pegasus Firmamenti, sive introductio brevis in Veterum Sapientiam* . . . (n.p., 1618) associates Rosicrucianism with Hermetism, Paracelsianism, pansophy, and alchemy. Opponents of Hermetism also often grouped these currents together. Two examples may serve to illustrate this. First, one year after the new edition of Zorzi's (Giorgio's) *Problemata* (1622), the famous Catholic priest Marin Mersenne, bent on orthodoxy and a famous opponent of such orientations, published his *Observationes et emendationes ad Francisci Giorgii Veneti Problemata* (Paris, 1623) in opposition to Giorgio's work, as well as Hermetism, Rosicrucianism, and the works of Robert Fludd. The second example is Lutheran minister Ehregott Daniel Colberg's *Das Platonisch-Hermetisches [sic] Christenthum* . . . (2 vols., Leipzig, 1690 and 1691; new ed., 1710), which settles scores with the *C.H.* as well as with Rosicrucianism, theosophy, and mysticism, reproaching them for encouraging self-divinization of the human being.



Within esotericism, the Englishman Robert Fludd, particularly in *Utriusque cosmi historia* (Oppenheim, 1617–1621), was instrumental in propagating the “magical” tradition that had been represented by Paracelsus, Agrippa, John Dee, and the Rosicrucian manifestoes of 1614–1615. Fludd did not seem to know about Casaubon’s philological criticism, or at least he pretended not to. He gives as much weight to the *C.H.* and the *Asclepius* as to *Genesis* or the *Gospel of John* (on almost every page of his works one can find a quotation from Ficino’s Latin translation) in, for example, explaining the creation of the world, of which he gives a “chemical” description that draws on *Pimander* (*C.H.* I). He also frequently associates Hermetism with the Qabbalah, in an original synthesis.

Not surprisingly, the *C.H.* and its supposed author Hermes Trismegistos aroused the interest of the Cambridge Neoplatonists. They generally accepted Ficino’s idea of an uninterrupted transmission of ancient wisdom from Moses to Hermes and passing through Zarathushtra, Pythagoras, Plato, and Orpheus. Among the main representatives of that philosophical school, Ralph Cudworth dealt most extensively with the *C.H.* (at least more so than did Henry More). His *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (London, 1678) contains a lengthy commentary on its treatises, with a particular emphasis on cosmogony. In contrast to Casaubon, Cudworth stressed the presence of Egyptian elements, believing that the *C.H.* could well have preserved certain authentic Egyptian teachings. He also considered that in treating the *C.H.* as one single text (whereas it is actually a collection) arguments that discredit the great age of some treatises do not need to discredit the rest of them (least of all the *Asclepius*).

With Woodville and others (Shumaker, 1972, pp. 236–247; Shumaker, 1988), Hermetism had already made its way into English culture in general. For example, John Milton cites Hermes Trismegistos three times (*Il Penseroso*, lines 87ff.; *Ad Joannem Rousum*, line 77; *De Idea Platonica*, lines 33ff.), and one finds many relevant passages in Edmund Spenser’s *The Faerie Queene* (London, 1590–1596). This process continued well into seventeenth-century England, as documented by works of celebrated authors such as Robert Burton (*The Anatomy of Melancholy*, Oxford, 1621), Sir Thomas Browne (*Religio Medici*, 1643), and Sir Walter Raleigh (*History of the Word*, 1614) who were not Hermetists but who gave its ideas a voice, albeit a modest one. Robert Burton mentions Hermes no fewer than thirty times, along with Ficino, Pico, Paracelsus, and Campanella, but he leaves the impression that mention of these names is merely a show of erudition in the context of an enlarged humanism. Sir Thomas Browne, a skeptical scholar as well as contemplator of the infinite, often evokes the famous Hermetic image of the sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere. But he is in no way convinced that the ancient wisdom was superior to the modern. It was merely in his capacity as a collector of information and propagandist

that he cited Hermes Trismegistos: “The severe schools shall never laugh me out of the Philosophy of Hermes, that this visible world is but a Picture of the invisible” (*Works*, ed. Keynes, 1928–1931, vol. 1, p. 17). Indeed, “where I cannot satisfy my reason, I love to humour my fancy.” One finds similar references in the works of William Gilbert (*De magnetete*, 1600) and Henry Reynolds (*Mythomystes*, 1632).

The *C.H.* became part of many discourses marked by Egyptomania. Typical of that trend are works of the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher, notably *Oedipus Aegyptiacus* (Rome, 1652–1654; see also his *Prodromus coptus*, Rome, 1636), in which he assigns almost as much importance to Hermes Trismegistos and the *C.H.* as Fludd does. Kircher’s *Oedipus Aegyptiacus*—one of the first works to stir the Egyptomania that swept Europe over the next three centuries—is replete with quotations borrowed from Ficino’s translation, particularly from the *Asclepius*. Kircher readily associates Qabbalah and Hermetism and, like Ficino, sees Hermes as the inventor of the hieroglyphs. Following the example of Renaissance Hermetism, he interprets hieroglyphs as truths about God and the world, especially since Hermes Trismegistos was supposed to have originally written in hieroglyphs. Not surprisingly, most of the hieroglyphs that Kircher referred to were demystified when Jacques-Joseph Champollion deciphered them in 1824 (this was perhaps the second blow, after Casaubon’s, delivered to the Egyptian myth). Kircher, however, was not a great admirer of the Hermetic literature and regarded Paracelsus, the Rosicrucians, and Robert Fludd with great suspicion. He used the *C.H.* to make Catholicism palatable, mostly with a view to deterring his readers from Protestantism.

Interestingly, the French Jesuits and theologians involved in missionary activities in the Far East, particularly in China, shared a project similar to Kircher’s, though not from an Egyptophile perspective (Walker, 1972, pp. 194–230). Apart from Rapine, these Catholic priests were not interested in Hermetism itself but used it as a tool for converting people to Catholicism. It was a matter of demonstrating that Confucius’s teachings, for example, as well as those of Western pagan philosophers—primarily Plato and Hermes Trismegistos—were compatible with monotheism. This missionary program is exemplified by Paschal Rapine’s *Le Christianisme naissant dans la gentilité* (Paris, 1655–1659), Paul Beurrier’s *Perpetuitas fidei, ab origine mundi*. . . (Paris, 1666; French ed., 1680); Daniel Huet’s *Demonstratio evangelica* (Paris, 1678; several re-editions); Philippe Couplet’s *Confucius Sinarum philosophus* (1687), and several writings by Joachim Bouvet around 1700, notably his correspondence with Leibniz.

**THE PERIOD OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND OF ROMANTICISM.** Like Everard’s English version, the first complete German translation of the seventeen treatises of the *C.H.* was to prove influential on later esoteric literature. Its author, who had had at his disposal the editions of Patrizi and Beyerland, signed himself Aletophilus (perhaps a pen name for Wolf

Metternich) and titled his work *Hermetis Trismegisti Erkännnüsz der Natur und des darin sich offenbahrenden Grossen Gottes* . . . (Hamburg, 1706; new edition, 1855). His long introduction to the book, in which he shows himself to be a Paracelsian, is noteworthy. He endorses the main legends surrounding the *C.H.* and tries to marry Hermetism with alchemy, extolling the Egyptian elements of the text over the Greek ones.

The *T.S.* exerts a strong influence on Aletophilus's book and, not surprisingly, on numerous other alchemical treatises of the period. Three other German works with long commentaries on the *T.S.* stand out: Ehd de Naxagoras's *Aureum Vellus* (2 vols, Frankfurt, 1731–1733); the anonymous *Vernünfftige Erklärung der Smaragdenen Tafel* . . . (s.l., 1760); and above all Hermann Fictuld's *Turba Philosophorum* (s.l., 1763). This latter work, which blends alchemy and theosophical outlooks, is one of the most important esoteric exegeses in the history of the *T.S.* tradition.

The Enlightenment also saw new German translations of the *C.H.* First came Dietrich Tiedemann's (*C.H.* I–XVIII), titled *Poemander, oder von der göttlichen Macht und Weisheit* (Berlin and Stettin, 1781). It was published three years after the first German translation of the *Asclepius*, at the press of Friedrich Nicolai, one of the most celebrated representatives of the German Enlightenment. Tiedemann's commentaries reflect the intellectual tenor of the Enlightenment and are replete with comparisons between the *C.H.* and Plato, Gnosticism, and Jewish Qabbalah.

Alongside these translations appeared more erudite studies. Some were Hermetic in character, like Hermann van der Hardt's "Poemander" (inserted in his book *Antiquitatis Gloria*, Helmstedt, 1737), a long paraphrase of *C.H.* I in which, for example, Jacob's dream (*Gen.* 28) is compared to Hermes's vision in *C.H.* I, 1. Other studies were more scholarly. The two that stand out are Johann Albrecht Fabricius's *Bibliotheca Graeca* (Hamburg, 1705–1728, see vol. I, 1708, lib 1, chapters VII–XII; new enlarged ed., 1790) and Jacob Brucker's *Kurze Fragen aus der hermetischen Historie* (Ulm, 1730–1736) and *Historia critica philosophiae* (Leipzig, 1743; see vol. I, chapters I–IV). Brucker's works provide a wealth of information on theosophical, alchemical, and Rosicrucian literature, including the *C.H.* and all that Brucker knew about the *Hermetica* in general (see notably *Historia critica philosophiae*, vol. I, lib 3. Brucker deals with works appearing as late as the beginning of the eighteenth century. He was not a proponent of any of these currents, but his very detailed—albeit not always unprejudiced—presentation ensured their continued influence, all the more so since the book of 1743 quickly became essential to most good libraries all over Europe.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Hermetism started at the top rung of the literary ladder in Germany with two texts by Johann Gottfried Herder. First, in *Über die älteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts* (Riga, 1774) he claimed he had found in ancient traditions, particularly in

Hermes Trismegistos, keys capable of unlocking a number of mysteries and retrieving a long-lost knowledge. Second, "Hermes und Pymander" (in the journal *Adrastea*, 1801) is a dialogue (inspired by *C.H.* I) between Poimandres and his disciple discussing new scientific discoveries (including those by Isaac Newton) as well as spiritual and material light and the Soul of the World.

In Italy, although Hermetism had all but ceased to exert its presence as an esoteric current, it was still occasionally the object of publications (see for instance an 1820 reprint in Bologna of an edition of the *C.H.* that Carlo Lenzoni published in 1584). In the United States, Ralph Waldo Emerson's *The Dial* (in particular the issues published from 1842 to 1844), a journal expressing the views of the Transcendentalist movement in the United States, published (in vol. IV) a number of "ethnic scriptures," as it called them, including extracts from Everard's translation of the *C.H.* Hermetism seems to have left its imprint, albeit a mostly indirect one, on a number of authors of pre-Romantic and Romantic literature in England and the United States (Tuveson, 1982). Frans von Baader, the main German theosopher in the Romantic period, although not strongly interested in Hermetism or alchemy, nonetheless made frequent use (notably from 1809 to 1839) of some verses from the *T.S.*, commenting on them and merging them with his theosophical approach. The middle of the nineteenth century saw new scholarly studies such as B. J. Hilgers's *De Hermetis Trismegisti Poimandro commentario* (Bonn, 1855) and Gustav Parthey's study of the Greek text of *T.S.*, *Hermetis Trismegisti Poemander* (Berlin, 1854).

**HERMETISM IN THE OCCULTIST CONTEXT.** The occultist current flourished from around 1850 to around 1920 and drew upon the esoteric literature of earlier centuries. Hermetism is part of the referential corpus of the occultists. Marie Ragon de Bettignies's widely disseminated *Maçonnerie occulte, suivie de l'Initiation hermétique* (1853) blends Masonic symbolism, alchemy, mythology, and Hermetism. But the presence of Hermetism within the occultist current appears to be rather limited, except in England. In France, for instance, such important representatives of occultism as Stanislas de Guaita or Papus rarely referred to Hermetism. They did, however, devote many pages to their understanding of the *T.S.*, which they, like so many other representatives of the current, took to be one of the most essential referential documents in Western esotericism and Hermetism (see Stanislas de Guaita's *Le Serpent de la Genèse*, Book II, Paris, 1897). In Italy, the occultist Giuliano Kremmerz authored a long series of commentaries titled "Commento alla Tavola di Smeraldo" (in *Commentarium per le Academia Ermetice* . . ., Bari, 1910).

In Germany, the new edition of Aletophilus's translation of the *C.H.* (1706), along with a new introduction, appeared as *Hermetis Trismegisti Einleitung ins höchste Wissen* (Stuttgart, 1855) in the semi-popular series *Das Kloster* directed by J. Scheible, which from 1849 to 1860 offered new

German editions of texts by Agrippa, Trithemius, Nostradamus, Paracelsus, J. B. Van Helmont, Eliphas Lévi, Catherine Crowe, and many others. Louis Ménard's *Hermès Trismégiste: Traduction complète précédée d'une étude sur l'origine des livres hermétiques* (Paris, 1866, several new editions) influence should not be underestimated. It is a new French translation of *C.H.* I–XIV (relying on Parthey's Greek edition), *Asclepius*, *Kore Kosmou* ("The Virgin of the World," part of Stobaeus's *Anthologium*), and Patrizi's version of the *Diffinitiones Asclepii* (*C.H.* XVI–XVIII). The book also contains a long but sober introduction of 112 pages in which Ménard places these texts in the perspective of a comparative approach to religions. Triggered in part by Ménard's book, a flurry of new English editions of Hermetic treatises appeared, mostly in England and the United States, accompanied by esoterically oriented presentations and/or commentaries. Most of them have little scholarly value, but they are representative of the occultist current, and many were produced by people with a reputation in that field.

The first on this list is a reprinting of Everard's translation by the Rosicrucian Publishing Company in Boston (*Hermes Trismegistus: His Divine Pymander. Also, the Asiatic Mystery, The Smaragdine Tablet, and the Song of Brahm*, repr. Toledo, Oh., 1889). Its editor was the famous Rosicrucian Paschal Beverly Randolph. The strongly Rosicrucian-oriented "Prefatory Note" is signed by Alfred E. Giles and Flora Russell (who also give there a reprinted version of the *Asiatic Mystery*; one of Randolph's Rosicrucian manifestoes). The "Song of Brahm" is a poem by Ralph Waldo Emerson.

There followed a new reprinting of Everard's translation by the Rosicrucian Hargrave Jennings (Madras, 1884, in the *Secret Doctrine Reference* series), who devoted most of his own prefatory text to Hermes Trismegistos and alchemical literature. This book contains the first public mention of the esoteric society the Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor. Almost at the same time there appeared in the same series one of the most influential books of that publishing enterprise, namely *The Virgin of the World of Hermes Mercurius Trismegistus* (London and Madras, 1885), edited by Anna Bonus Kingsford and Edward Maitland, which contains an English version of *Kore Kosmou*, here titled "A Treatise on Initiations" (in fact, a new translation of the *Asclepius*), "The Definitions of Asclepius" (i.e., *C.H.* XVI–XVIII), plus further extracts from Stobaeus's *Anthologium*. In their translation and long introductions, Kingsford and Maitland drew heavily on Ménard's book. They saw in the Hermetic texts a survival of ancient Egypt and believed in a connection between them and Christianity, it being understood that Christianity itself represents, as they say, "a development from or reformulation of a doctrine long pre-existent." Along these lines, they considered their edition to be part of "the revival of Occult Science and Mystical, or Esoteric, philosophy." A new edition of Kingsford and Maitland's anthology soon followed (Bath, 1886), with an appendix on alchemy taken from Mary Anne Atwood's *A Suggestive Inquiry into the Hermetic Mystery*

(1850). The appendix was introduced by the famous John Yarker, author of many works in such domains, particularly in esoteric Freemasonry.

Given the number of such books, it is hardly surprising that Hermetism found expression in several esoteric periodicals. For example, we find *Kore Kosmou* (presented anonymously and in a different translation) in *The Occult Magazine* (Glasgow, see issues of 1885–1886). In 1894, William Wynn Westcott, who along with MacGregor Mathers had created the fringe-Masonic Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn in 1887, inserted into the second volume of his series *Collectanea Hermetica* (London, 1893–1896) the Everard version of the *C.H.*, here titled *The Pymander of Hermes, with a Preface by the Editor*. Westcott's preface, more enthusiastic than critical, emphasizes the commonalities between Hermetism, Freemasonry, and Christianity.

On the scholarly side, *The Theological and Philological Work of Hermes Trismegistus, Christian Neoplatonist, Divine Pymander and Other Writings of Hermes Trismegistus* (Edinburgh, 1882), edited by John D. Chambers, reflects a new scientific approach. But it was mostly George R. S. Mead's enterprise that paved the way for deeper and more extensive scholarly research. Three years before breaking with the Theosophical Society, of which he was a prominent member, the society published in three volumes his *Thrice Greatest Hermes: Studies in Hellenistic Theosophy and Gnosis* (London and Benares, 1906; German trans., Leipzig, 1909). Never before had such a complete ensemble of the *C.H.* been gathered together, accompanied by copious notes, excerpts from *testimonia* of the Fathers of the Theosophical Society, and serious historical studies. Mead distanced himself markedly from the English-speaking occultists by displaying a great deal of objectivity in dealing with his material. That said, he did not disguise the fact that he was an esotericist ("To translate 'Hermes' in Greek," he writes in the introduction, "requires not only a good knowledge of Greek, but also a Knowledge of . . . gnosis."). Like his contemporary Arthur E. Waite, Mead was both a scholar and a full-fledged esotericist. His work, even more than Chambers's, heralds the development of twentieth-century critical research.

The last decades of occultism saw more Hermetically oriented publications, of which a few examples follow. *The Shepherd of Men: An Official Commentary on the Sermon of Hermes Trismegistos* (San Francisco, 1916) is by A. D. Raleigh, who called himself Hierophant of the Mysteries of Isis. Although the title of his book implicitly refers to the famous text of Late Antiquity, *The Shepherd of Hermas*, Raleigh's discourse is pervaded by the idea of a perennial philosophy and is blended with a fantastic history of human races, echoing some of the Theosophical Society's teachings. More situated within "classical" Hermetism is the thin volume *The Divine Pymander of Hermes Trismegistus* (n.l., 1923), which presents a short selection drawn from the Everard, Chambers, and Mead editions, along with some commentaries. It is in fact one of the "manuals" published by the Shrine of Wisdom,

which was a ritual Order that ran a publishing house and a journal. The Shrine of Wisdom was largely inspired by the works of the Platonist Thomas Taylor.

In closing, a final volume must be mentioned: Manly Palmer Hall's oversized folio *An Encyclopaedic Outline of Masonic, Hermetic, Qabbalistic and Rosicrucian Philosophy* (Los Angeles, 1928) is another product of late occultism and one of the most popular *summae* of Western esoteric traditions. Hermetism is almost ubiquitous in that strange encyclopedia.

**SURVIVAL AND DEBATES IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.** Most of the editions of and commentaries on the Hermetic texts published during the height of occultism were reprinted in the second half of the twentieth century, which did not lack for original publications, although they were fewer in number. Among them are *The Gospel of Hermes, edited and translated from the Greek and Latin Hermetica*, introduced by Duncan Greenless and published in 1949 by the Theosophical Publishing Company. More famous is Jan van Rijckenborgh's *De Egyptische oer- gnosie en haar roep in het Eeuwige Nu . . .* (Haarlem, 1960–1965), an interpretation of the *C.H.* in the light of the teachings of an initiatory order (the Lectorium Rosicrucianum, of which he was the founder). In his book, ancient Gnosticism, neo-Catharism, Paracelsianism, and Boehmism are blended in an original way. Since its first publication, van Rijckenborgh's book has gone through countless reprints and translations, sponsored worldwide by the Lectorium Rosicrucianum. Noteworthy is the space he devotes to the *T.S.* He uses the text to support the tenets of his own teachings and does not hesitate to claim that it was written ten thousand years ago.

Thus, neo-Alexandrian Hermetism, as one of the several esoteric currents in modernity (i.e., from the Renaissance until the present), has naturally found itself historically intertwined with alchemy, Christian Qabbalah, Rosicrucianism, occultism, and other esoteric movements. In this respect, it is interesting to see how far and in which directions these relationships have developed. For example, despite their commonalities, Hermetism and Christian theosophy (which appeared later, at the beginning of the seventeenth century) have had few contacts and little influence on each other. One reason is that Hermetism, originally a branch of humanism, remained mainly dependent upon ancient sources, notably Greek ones, whereas the theosophical current is rooted in Paracelsus and Jakob Boehme, who represent a German, "barbaric" trend all but devoid of erudite leanings. Even long after the Renaissance, the foremost representatives of theosophy, such as Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin or Franz von Baader, practically never drew on the Hermetic writings. Although Titus Burckhardt, who stood within the so-called perennialist current (or Traditionalist School) has authored one of the most interesting commentaries of the *T.S.* (in his *Alchemie—Sinn und Weltbild*, Olten/Frieburg, 1960), Hermetism cannot be said to have merged with that perennialist

current. Other representatives of the perennialists, (such as René Guénon and Frithjof Schuon) do not show much interest in Hermetism (or other Western esoteric currents, for that matter).

Hermetism, considered over the sweep of a little over five centuries, is of great interest to the historian of ideas (and of literature), not least because it reflects the various contexts within which it has taken on ever-changing aspects. It is impossible to define it as a set of fixed, unchanging beliefs. Rather, its manifold manifestations evince a spiritual attitude that contains within itself a principle of constant readjustment. Not surprisingly, it has flourished in times and countries hospitable to religious tolerance. Although its representatives have been people desiring to reform religious systems, the reforms they had in mind were not dogmatic in character and very rarely were designed to overthrow established churches. They rather tended to enrich the churches by prompting them to return *ad fontes*, that is, both to ancient foundational texts and to specific forms of meditation. Far from stressing a war between Good and Evil or Light and Darkness, as is often the case in Christian thought, their discourses have expressed a generally optimistic conception of the inborn powers of humankind, which are able to liberate and expand individual consciousness.

Hermetism continues to thrive. One of the prominent members of the Lectorium Rosicrucianum in the Netherlands, Joost R. Ritman, has founded a library in Amsterdam, the Bibliotheca Philosophica Hermetica (open to the public since 1984), which is by far the richest in the world in terms of esoteric literature, including manuscripts from the early Renaissance to the present, not to mention a wealth of more ancient materials. This institution is especially noteworthy because Hermetic literature in the proper sense represents its fundamental core, as demonstrated not only by its holdings, but also by its exhibitions and publications. Its editorial board includes such reputable scholars as Frans A. Janssen and Carlos Gilly.

Furthermore, Hermetism is occasionally revived by philosophers who see in the *C.H.* the paradigm of an alternative philosophy able to enrich mainstream philosophy with new insights, or to replace it. For example, Ralph Liedtke's book *Die Hermetik. Traditionelle Philosophie der Differenz* (Paderborn, 1996) calls for a return to older modes of thinking. The author considers the contents of the *C.H.* to be one of the best possible introductions to a desirable and drastic reappraisal of mainstream contemporary trends in philosophy. The philosopher Françoise Bonardel, who brings together Hermetism and alchemy into one common perspective, sees in a "fertile Hermetism"—and in an attitude of mind that she calls *hermésienne* (hermesian)—"much more than a system of representation among others," for "the amazing continuity of Hermetic thought bears witness to the fecundity of a gnosis which is timeless because it is inherent in an ever reactualized hermeneutics" (Bonardel, 2002, pp. 179–180). And so, just as Renaissance Hermetism brought about re-

forms within the Catholic Church, it has become a means of “reforming” philosophy. Also, efforts are made to use it as a method for the fruitful completion or enrichment of psychology. For example, Lietaert Pierbolte (*Poimandres . . . vertaald met een transpersonalistische beschouwing*, Deventer, 1974) presents *C.H. I* in Dutch and explains why it should be used as a method for practicing the kind of transpersonal psychology that he advocates. Moreover, in a manner reminiscent of the New Age movement, the *T.S.* is occasionally interpreted and commented on as a practical guide to spiritual growth. See, for example, Dennis William Hauck’s *The Emerald Tablet: Alchemy for Personal Transformation* (Harmondsworth, U.K., 1999).

The number of scholarly works on Hermetism increased considerably over the twentieth century and include research by such distinguished historians and philologists as Richard Reitzenstein, Walter Scott, A. D. Nock, A. J. Festugière, Gilles Quispel, Roelof van den Broek, Jean-Pierre Mahé, and Brian P. Copenhaver. Frances A. Yates’s book *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition* (1964) has been highly instrumental in calling attention to the importance and significance of Hermetism in the history of the Renaissance. Although not without precedent, many scholars whose research is dedicated to Renaissance Hermetism stand in its wake. Even when they do not endorse Yates’s views, they are directly or indirectly indebted to her writings. Yates’s book has paved the way for an ongoing academic recognition, even institutionalization, of modern Western esotericism as a specialty in its own right. In addition, it has caused a flurry of debates, first over what Robert S. Westman (1977) called the “Yates Thesis” (concerning the relation between Hermetism and the scientific revolution), and more recently over what Wouter J. Hanegraaff (2001) has referred to as “the Yates paradigm.” As Hanegraaff pointed out, Yates’s book contains a “grand narrative” based on two main assumptions: First, the existence of what she calls “the Hermetic Tradition,” understood as a more or less autonomous tradition based upon a covert reaction against both Christianity and the rise of scientific worldviews. Second, however paradoxical it may seem, the extent to which the tradition of “magic”—which she sees as essentially non-progressive—has been an important factor in the development of the scientific revolution. Now, even if neither of these two tenets has proved resistant to close scrutiny, the opinions that gave rise to the “Yates paradigm” will probably cause more ink to flow.

SEE ALSO Astrology; Esotericism; Hermes Trismegistos; Occultism; Theurgy.

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ANTOINE FAIVRE (1987 AND 2005)

## HERMITS SEE EREMITISM

**HEROES.** It is commonly said that whereas in the twentieth century impersonal forces were believed to make history, in the nineteenth century heroic individuals were believed to make history.

**THE "GREAT MAN" VIEW OF HISTORY.** The epitome of this nineteenth-century outlook was the English writer Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881). His *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History* (1841) celebrates eleven disparate figures grouped into six categories:

- the hero as divinity (Odin)
- the hero as prophet (Mahomet [Mohammed] Muhammad)
- the hero as poet (Dante, Shakespeare)
- the hero as priest (Martin Luther, John Knox)
- the hero as man of letters (Samuel Johnson, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Robert Burns)
- the hero as king (Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon).

Carlyle opens his book with a statement that has come to epitomize the "Great Man" view of history: "For, as I take it, Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here" (Carlyle, 1897, p. 1). Yet for Carlyle heroes are themselves at the mercy of history. He praises heroes for, above all, their insight into the course of society rather than for the direction they impose on it. Heroes ultimately subordinate themselves to history, the course of which is set by God. Furthermore, the period determines the category of hero needed and even possible. Still, Carlyle is crediting heroes with great accomplishments.

Carlyle's concern with outward accomplishment sharply distinguishes his conception of heroism from that of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) in Part 1 of his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–1885). The

achievement of Nietzsche's *Übermensch*, or "overman," is personal, not societal. Rather than praising the *Übermensch* for changing his society, Nietzsche praises the society that produces him.

Carlyle's most vitriolic contemporary critic was the pioneering English sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), for whom the attribution of decisive events to the talents of individuals rather than to the fundamental laws of physical and social evolution is a hopelessly primitive, childish, romantic, and unscientific viewpoint. In Spencer's famous summary phrase in *The Study of Society*, "Before he [the great man] can re-make his society, his society must make him" (Spencer, 1874, p. 35).

Spencer's metaphysical counterpart in the rejection of the influence of great men on history was the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831). In the introduction to his *The Philosophy of History*, Hegel, unlike Spencer, does praise the hero, but for embodying the World Spirit in its predestined course of development. Whereas Hegel, writing before Carlyle, would have commended Carlyle for emphasizing the hero's "insight," he would have belittled Carlyle for making the hero the cause rather than the manifestation of change.

The twentieth century spawned still stronger skepticism toward the impact of heroes, even in the face of the seemingly all too real impact of dictators like Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) and Joseph Stalin (1879–1953). Defenders of heroism nevertheless remain. Best known is American philosopher Sidney Hook (1902–1989), author of *The Hero in History*. Hook argues for a sensible middle ground between crediting heroes with everything, which he assumes Carlyle to be doing, and crediting them with nothing. Unlike Carlyle, for whom heroes can be men of letters as well as of action, Hook is concerned only with heroes of action. He distinguishes between "eventful men," whose actions happen to change history, and "event-making men," whose actions are intended to change history. Eventful men have no special insight, and someone else in their place might have done the same. By contrast, Hook's event-making men, like all of Carlyle's heroes, alone have the insight to make the decisions they do. For example, Hook concedes that no one could have prevented World War I but he also asserts that it was not inevitable that World War I would be fought the way it was. Despite his use of the term "men," Hook includes females in both groups—for example, Catherine II of Russia (1729–1796) as an event-making woman. Because only event-making men and women act on the basis of their talents, only they deserve the epithet "hero."

**HEROES AND GODS.** For Carlyle, heroes are not merely celebrated but "worshiped." Yet he does not mean literal worship. His heroes are not gods. Of the eleven discussed in *On Heroes*, the sole exception is Odin, who after death was deified by his followers. Carlyle attributes the deification partly to the boundlessness of his followers' reverence but also to the loss of records that would have kept Odin tethered to hu-

manity. For Carlyle, subsequent heroes have remained mere humans because records have survived. Consequently, the hero as a divinity is gone forever.

Aptly, Carlyle uses the term “mythic” synonymously with “divine”: “were there no books, any great man would grow *mythic*” (Carlyle, 1897, pp. 25–26). For even if most heroes are not divine, those heroes whose stories constitute myths are. Hero myths are stories about divine heroes—divine in effect, whether or not formally. To be sure, in the academic study of myth it is conventional to distinguish mere heroes, however glorious, from gods. Folklorists in particular categorize the stories about most heroes as legends rather than myths. Yet contrary to convention, heroism can blur the line between the human and the divine—not by demoting gods to humans but by elevating humans to gods. More precisely, heroism, when recounted in myth, retains the distinction between the human and the divine but singles out the hero for making the leap from the one to the other.

Usually, the gap between the human and the divine is insurmountable, especially in Western religions. The most egregious sin in the West is the attempt by humans to become gods, epitomized by the vain efforts of Adam and Eve and of the builders of the Tower of Babel. The hiatus between the human and the divine applies as fully to polytheistic religions as to monotheistic ones. For ancient Greeks, those who dared to seek divinity were killed for their hubris. Those who directly challenged the gods were often consigned to eternal punishment in Tartarus.

Still, the West permits exceptions. In the ancient world the grandest exception was Herakles (Hercules), who, while born to Zeus, was still mortal. Herakles nevertheless accomplished superhuman feats of strength, outmaneuvered death in his last three great feats, and was rewarded with immortality by Zeus for his industry. Yet to some ancient writers such as Herodotos (c. 484—between 430 and 420 BCE) Herakles’ very stature meant that he had been born a god. Greeks did establish cults to worship human heroes, but only after their deaths, when heroes had transcended ordinary constraints (see Farnell, 1921). The grandest exception to the division in the West between humanity and divinity is, of course, Jesus. Yet even his capacity to be at once fully human and fully divine is taken to be a paradox, and a paradox difficult to maintain in practice. Throughout its history, Christianity has often veered between making Jesus merely an ideal human being, as in the Victorian period, and making him a sheer god, as in ancient Gnosticism.

Rather than trying to dissolve the gap between the human and the divine, hero myths transform humans into virtual gods by conferring on them divine qualities. The qualities can range from physical attributes—strength, size, looks—to intangible ones such as intelligence, drive, and integrity. One measure of the humanity of Carlyle’s heroes is the limit of their power: to the extent that they cannot alter history, they are merely human. The difference between humans and gods may be of kind: often, gods can fly, can

change shape, and live forever. Or the difference may be of degree: typically, gods are bigger, stronger, sexier, and smarter than humans. But so great is the difference of degree that it still puts divinity beyond the reach of most. While anyone can aspire to become a Hollywood star, the few who make it are not coincidentally called “gods” and, as “stars,” reside in a heaven far above us. Carlyle himself acknowledges the divine aura of his human heroes and even deems hero worship the source of all religion, including Christianity.

**MODERN HEROES.** Some heroes, or kinds of heroes, fit only certain periods. For example, it is hard to imagine an aristocratic hero like medieval Spain’s Don Juan surviving into the twentieth century. Other heroes do survive, either because their appeal continues or because they are protean enough to adapt to the times. Herakles, the greatest of ancient heroes, was by no means confined to the crude image of him as Rambo-like—the title character in a series of Hollywood films from the 1980s who appeared to be all brawn and no brains—but on the contrary has been depicted as the embodiment of wisdom, the exemplar of virtue, a tragic hero, a glutton, and even a romantic lover (see Galinsky, 1972).

In the twentieth century, as in prior centuries, not only were traditional heroes transformed, but new heroes and new kinds of heroes emerged. If distinctively nineteenth-century heroes were the romantic hero (Lord Byron’s Childe Harold) and the bourgeois hero (Gustave Flaubert’s Emma Bovary), distinctively twentieth-century heroes include the ordinary person as hero (Arthur Miller’s Willy Loman), the comic hero (Philip Roth’s Alexander Portnoy), the schlemiel as hero (Isaac Bashevis Singer’s Gimpel the Fool), and the absurd hero (Samuel Beckett’s Vladimir and Estragon). Far from divine, the contemporary hero is hopelessly human—mortal, powerless, amoral. The present-day hero is often lowly even within the human community—more the outsider than the insider, more the loser than the winner, more the villain than the savior. The contemporary hero is not a once-great figure who has fallen but a figure who never rises. Sisyphus, not Oedipus, let alone Herakles, epitomizes contemporary heroism. Yet Sisyphus is still to be commended for never giving up. Persistence replaces success, survival replaces achievement. Today’s hero, for example, is heroic in persisting without success. Because contemporary heroes scarcely reach the stature of gods, their stories scarcely constitute myths.

Yet it would surely be extreme to argue that traditional heroism has died out. Present-day heroes in sports, entertainment, business, and politics are admired for their success, not for their mere persistence, and the acclaim conferred on them often reaches the same divine plateau as in times past. They are “idolized” and “worshiped.” At most, the notion of heroism as persistence has arisen alongside the traditional notion of heroism as success.

**THEORIES OF HERO MYTHS.** The distinctiveness among theories of hero myths is that they profess to know the nature of all hero myths. Like theories of myth generally, theories

of hero myths claim to answer the main questions about the myths: what is their origin, what is their function, and what is their subject matter?

The study of hero myths goes back at least to 1871, when, in *Primitive Culture*, the pioneering English anthropologist E. B. Tylor argued that many of them follow a uniform plot, or pattern: the hero is exposed at birth, is saved by other humans or animals, and grows up to become a national hero (vol. I, 1871, pp. 254–255). In 1928 the Russian folklorist Vladimir Propp, in *Morphology of the Folktale*, sought to demonstrate that Russian fairy tales follow a common biographical plot, in which the hero goes off on a successful adventure and upon his return marries and gains the throne. Propp's pattern skirts both the birth and the death of the hero.

Of attempts not merely to delineate patterns but also to determine the origin, function, and subject matter of hero myths, the most important have been by the Viennese psychoanalyst Otto Rank (1884–1939), the American mythographer Joseph Campbell (1904–1987), and the English folklorist Lord Raglan (1885–1964). Rank later broke irreparably with Sigmund Freud (1956–1939), but when he wrote *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (1909), he was a Freudian apostle. While Campbell was never a full-fledged Jungian, he wrote *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (1949) as a kindred soul of C. G. Jung (1875–1961). Raglan wrote *The Hero* (1936) as a theoretical ally of J. G. Frazer.

**Otto Rank.** For Rank, following Freud, heroism deals with what Jungians call the first half of life. The first half—birth, childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood—involves the establishment of oneself as an independent person in the external world. The attainment of independence expresses itself concretely in the securing of a job and a mate. The securing of either requires both separation from one's parents and mastery of one's instincts. Freudian problems involve a lingering attachment to either parents or instincts. To depend on one's parents for the satisfaction of instincts or to satisfy instincts in antisocial ways is to be stuck, or fixated, at a childish level of psychological development.

Rank's pattern, which he applies to thirty hero myths, is limited to the first half of life. It goes from the hero's birth to his attainment of a "career":

The hero is the child of most distinguished parents, usually the son of a king. His origin is preceded by difficulties, such as continence, or prolonged barrenness, or secret intercourse of the parents due to external prohibition or obstacles. During or before the pregnancy, there is a prophecy, in the form of a dream or oracle, cautioning against his birth, and usually threatening danger to the father (or his representative). As a rule, he is surrendered to the water, in a box. He is then saved by animals, or by lowly people (shepherds), and is suckled by a female animal or by a humble woman. After he has grown up, he finds his distinguished parents, in a highly versatile fashion. He takes his revenge on his father, on

the one hand, and is acknowledged, on the other. Finally he achieves rank and honors (Rank, 2004, p. 61).

Literally, or consciously, the hero, who is always male, is a historical or legendary figure like Oedipus of Greek mythology. The hero is heroic because he rises from obscurity to the throne. Literally, he is an innocent victim of either his parents or, ultimately, fate. While his parents have yearned for a child and abandon him only to save the father, they nevertheless do abandon him. The hero's revenge, if the parricide is even committed knowingly, is, then, understandable: who would not consider killing one's would-be killer?

Symbolically, or unconsciously, the hero is heroic not because he dares to win a throne but because he dares to kill his father. The killing is definitely intentional, and the cause is not revenge but sexual frustration. The father has refused to surrender his wife—the real object of the son's efforts. Too horrendous to face, the true meaning of the hero myth becomes shielded by the concocted story. Rather than the culprit, the hero becomes an innocent victim or at worst a justified avenger. What the hero seeks is masked as power, not displayed as incest. Most of all, who the hero is becomes some third party, a historical or legendary figure, rather than either the creator of the myth or anyone stirred by it. Identifying himself with the literal hero, the myth maker or reader vicariously revels in the hero's triumph, which in fact is his own. He is the real hero of the myth.

Literally, the myth culminates in the hero's attainment of a throne. Symbolically, the hero gains a mate as well. One might then conclude that the myth fittingly expresses the Freudian goal of the first half of life. In actuality, it expresses the opposite. The wish it fulfills is not for detachment from one's parents and from one's antisocial instincts but, on the contrary, for the most intense possible relationship to one's parents and the most antisocial of urges: parricide and incest, even rape. Taking one's father's job and one's mother's hand does not quite spell independence of them.

The myth maker or reader is an adult, but the wish vented by the myth is that of a child of three to five. The fantasy is the fulfillment of the Oedipal wish to kill one's father in order to gain access to one's mother. The myth fulfills a wish never outgrown by the adult who either invents or uses it. That adult is psychologically an eternal child. Having never developed an ego strong enough to master his instincts, he is neurotic. Since no mere child can overpower his father, the myth maker imagines being old enough to do so. In short, the myth expresses not the Freudian goal of the first half of life but the fixated childhood goal that keeps one from accomplishing it.

**Joseph Campbell.** Whereas for Freud and Rank heroism is limited to the first half of life, for Jung it involves the second half—adulthood—even more. For Freud and Rank, heroism involves relations with parents and instincts. For Jung, heroism in even the first half involves in addition relations with the unconscious. Heroism here means separation

not only from parents and antisocial instincts but even more from the unconscious: every child's managing to forge consciousness is for Jung a supremely heroic feat.

The goal of the uniquely Jungian second half of life is likewise consciousness, but now consciousness of the Jungian unconscious rather than, as in the first half, of the external world. One must return to the unconscious, from which one has invariably become severed, but the ultimate aim is to return in turn to the external world. The ideal is a balance between consciousness of the external world and consciousness of the unconscious. The aim of the second half of life is to supplement, not abandon, the achievements of the first half.

Just as classical Freudian problems involve the failure to establish oneself in the outer world in the form of working and loving, so the distinctively Jungian problems involve the failure to reestablish oneself in the inner world in relation to the unconscious. Freudian problems stem from excessive attachment to the world of childhood; Jungian problems are the result of excessive attachment to the world one enters upon breaking free of childhood: the external world.

Just as Rank confines heroism to the first half of life, so Campbell restricts it to the second half. Rank's scheme begins with the hero's birth; Campbell's, with his adventure. Where Rank's scheme ends, Campbell's begins: with the adult hero ensconced at home. Rank's hero must be young enough for his father and in some cases even his grandfather still to be reigning. Campbell does not specify the age of his hero, but the hero must be no younger than the age at which Rank's hero myth therefore ends: young adulthood. While some of Campbell's own examples are of child heroes, they violate his scheme, according to which heroes must be willing to leave behind all that they have accomplished at home, and violate even more his Jungian meaning, according to which heroes must be fully developed egos ready to encounter the unconscious from which they have largely become separated. Campbell's heroes should, then, be adults.

Rank's hero must be the son of royal or at least distinguished parents. The hero of the egalitarian Campbell need not be, though often is. Whereas Rank's heroes must be male, Campbell's can be female as well, though Campbell inconsistently describes the hero's initiation from an exclusively male point of view. Finally, Campbell's scheme dictates human heroes, even though many of his examples are of divine heroes. Rank's pattern, by contrast, readily allows for divine as well as human heroes.

Whereas Rank's hero returns to his birthplace, Campbell's marches forth to a strange new world, which the hero has never visited or even known existed. This extraordinary world is the world of the gods, and the hero must hail from the human world precisely to be able to experience the distinctiveness of the divine one. The hero enjoys physical relations with the goddess and marries her—the reason the hero must here be male. He clashes with the male god and defeats him—the reason the hero must here be male. Yet with both

gods he becomes mystically one and thereby becomes divine himself.

Whereas Rank's hero returns home to encounter his father and mother, Campbell's hero leaves home to encounter a male and a female god, who are neither his parents nor necessarily even a couple. Yet the two heroes' encounters are seemingly akin. But in fact they are not. Because the goddess is not the hero's mother, sex with her does not constitute incest. And the conflict with the male god is resolved.

When Campbell writes that myths "reveal the benign self-giving aspect of the *archetypal* father," he is using the term in its Jungian sense (Campbell, 1972, pp. 139–140). For Freudians, gods symbolize parents. For Jungians, parents symbolize gods, who in turn symbolize father and mother archetypes, which are components of the hero's personality. A male hero's relationship to these gods symbolizes not, as for Freud and Rank, a son's relationship to other persons (his parents) but the relationship of one side of a male's personality (his ego) to another side (his unconscious). The father and the mother are but two of the archetypes of which the Jungian, or collective, unconscious is composed. Archetypes are unconscious not because they have been repressed but because they have never been conscious. For Jung and Campbell, myth originates and functions not, as for Freud and Rank, to satisfy neurotic urges that cannot be manifested openly but to express normal sides of the personality that have just not had a chance at realization.

By identifying himself with the hero of a myth, Rank's myth maker or reader vicariously lives out in his mind an adventure that, if ever directly fulfilled, would be acted out on his parents themselves. While also identifying himself—or herself—with the hero of a myth, Campbell's myth maker or reader vicariously lives out in the mind an adventure that even when directly fulfilled would still be taking place in the mind. For parts of the mind are what the myth maker or reader is really encountering.

**Lord Raglan.** As a Frazerian, Lord Raglan focuses on the relationship between myth and ritual. Myth provides the script for the ritual, which is the killing and replacement of the king, in whom the soul of the god of vegetation resides and whose soul is thereby transferred to his successor. The soul is then transferred to the body of the next king. The incumbent is killed either at the first sign of weakness or at the end of a fixed term so short as to minimize the chance of illness or death in office. The king is killed to preserve or restore the state of health of the god and thereby of vegetation: as the king goes, so goes the god, and so goes vegetation.

Venturing beyond Frazer, Raglan equates the king with the hero. Raglan turns Frazer's theory of myth in general into a theory of hero myths in particular. Moreover, Raglan introduces his own detailed hero pattern, which he applies to twenty-one hero myths. That pattern extends all the way from the hero's conception to his death. In contrast to Rank's and Campbell's patterns, it therefore covers both halves of life:



1. The hero's mother is a royal virgin;
2. His father is a king, and
3. Often a near relative of his mother, but
4. The circumstances of his conception are unusual, and
5. He is also reputed to be the son of a god.
6. At birth an attempt is made, usually by his father or his maternal grandfather, to kill him, but
7. He is spirited away, and
8. Reared by foster-parents in a far country.
9. We are told nothing of his childhood, but
10. On reaching manhood he returns or goes to his future kingdom.
11. After a victory over the king and/or a giant, dragon, or wild beast,
12. He marries a princess, often the daughter of his predecessor, and
13. Becomes king.
14. For a time he reigns uneventfully, and
15. Prescribes laws, but
16. Later he loses favor with the gods and/or his subjects, and
17. Is driven from the throne and city, after which
18. He meets with a mysterious death,
19. Often at the top of a hill.
20. His children, if any, do not succeed him.
21. His body is not buried, but nevertheless
22. He has one or more holy sepulchres (Raglan, 1990, p. 138).

Clearly, parts one to thirteen correspond roughly to Rank's entire scheme, though Raglan himself never read Rank. The victory that gives the hero the throne is not, however, Oedipal, for the vanquished is not necessarily his father. Parts fourteen to twenty-two do not correspond at all to Campbell's scheme. The hero's exile is loosely akin to the hero's journey, but for Raglan there is no return. For Rank, the heart of the hero pattern is gaining kingship—or other title. For Raglan, the heart is losing kingship. Wherever Campbell's heroes are kings, the heart is their journey while king.

Campbell's hero can be any adult. Raglan's hero must be not only a male but also a king. Campbell's hero must—or should—be human. Raglan's hero can be either divine or human.

For Rank, heroes are heroic because they dare to serve themselves. For both Campbell and Raglan, heroes are heroic because they willingly or unwillingly serve their communities. Heroes serve their communities by their sacrificial deaths. Myths describe the lives—and deaths—of ideal kings. For Campbell, heroes in myth serve their communities by their return home with knowledge of the divine world. Without Raglan's hero, the community would die; without Campbell's, it would remain benighted.

**René Girard.** In *Violence and the Sacred* (1972) and many subsequent works, the contemporary French literary critic René Girard (1923–) offers an ironic twist to the theory of Raglan. Whereas Raglan's hero is heroic because he is willing to die for the sake of the community, Girard's hero is killed or exiled by the community for having caused the present ills of the community. Indeed, the "hero" is initially considered a criminal who deserves to die. Only subsequently is the villain turned into a hero, who, as for Raglan, dies selflessly on behalf of the community. The transformation of Oedipus from reviled exile in Sophocles' *Oedipus the King* to revered benefactor in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* evinces the transformation of outcast into saint. Even though Girard, and also Raglan, are vehemently anti-Freudian, both use Oedipus as their fullest example.

The change from criminal to hero is for Girard only the second half of the process. Originally, violence erupts in the community. The cause is the inclination, innate in human nature, to imitate others and thereby to desire the same objects as those of the imitated. Imitation leads to rivalry, which leads to violence. Desperate to end the violence, the community selects an innocent member to blame for the turmoil and usually kills the victim. The scapegoat can range from the most helpless member of society to the most elevated, including the king or queen. Whereas for Raglan myth directs or inspires the killing of the hero, for Girard myth is created after the killing to hide it. The myth first turns the scapegoat into a criminal who deserved to die but then turns the criminal into a hero, who has died willingly for the good of the community. The scapegoat can even become a criminal and a hero simultaneously. For the figure blamed for the turmoil is also credited with ending it, albeit by death or exile. But the criminal can also become even more of a hero thereafter.

**SEE ALSO** Myth, overview article.

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**HESCHEL, ABRAHAM JOSHUA** (1907–1972), was a Jewish scholar and philosopher of religion. Born and raised in Warsaw, Heschel received his training in the methods of modern scientific research in Berlin, and wrote most

of his mature works in the United States. Heschel was born into an intensely traditional Hasidic milieu: He was descended on his father's side from Dov Ber of Mezhirich, successor of the BeSHT (acronym of the Ba'al Shem Tov, Yisra'el ben Eli'ezer), founder of the Hasidic movement that flourished among eastern European Jews in the eighteenth century; Avraham Yehoshu'a Heschel, known as "the Apter *rebbe*"; and Yisra'el of Rizhyn. On his mother's side, he was descended from Levi Yitshaq of Berdichev and Pinhas of Korets.

As a youth, Heschel received traditional training in Talmud and rabbinic lore, in which he excelled, and immersed himself in the world of Jewish mysticism, the literature of Qabbalah. Having decided to acquire a modern Western education, he enrolled in a secular Yiddish *Realgymnasium* in Vilna (now Vilnius), and in 1927 he moved to Berlin, where he attended the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums and the University of Berlin. His doctoral dissertation (1933), dealing with the phenomenon of prophetic consciousness, was published in 1936 (*Die Prophetie*). After teaching Talmud at the Hochschule, he was appointed Martin Buber's successor at the Central Organization for Jewish Adult Education in Germany and the Jüdische Lehrhaus in Frankfurt in 1937. After his deportation in October 1938 with the rest of the Polish Jews then resident in Germany, Heschel taught for eight months at the Institute for Jewish Studies in Warsaw. He was enabled to leave Poland before the Nazi invasion only by a call to join the faculty of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, Ohio.

Heschel reached the United States, via England, in 1940, and after five years on the faculty of the Hebrew Union College, he taught at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York as professor of ethics and mysticism, until his death. In the last decade of his life, he became actively involved in a number of public issues. He participated in negotiations with Cardinal Bea concerning the formulation of a declaration on the Jews, which emerged from Vatican Council II, and he also took part in the civil rights movement, opposition to the Vietnam War, and the campaign to enable Russian Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

Heschel's philosophy of religion developed under the influences of his traditional Jewish upbringing and the challenges of modern secular philosophy, science, and psychology. He was impressed by the works of the neo-Kantian philosophers, such as his teacher Heinrich Maier (*Philosophie der Wirklichkeit*, Tübingen, 1926), and by the phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler. But against the neo-Kantians he defended the claim of traditional Judaism that God is more than a postulate of reason. From the phenomenologists he learned to analyze the constitutive traits and structures of experienced reality, without reducing them to alien categories that can distort their unique character. Already in his early work on prophecy, later expanded into his English book *The Prophets* (1962), he asserted that the phenomena of biblical prophecy should not be forced into the

categories of Aristotelian metaphysics. The “divine concern” of the living God of the Bible, who takes a passionate interest in his creatures, is the key to Heschel’s philosophy of religion.

Heschel rejected the construction of a “religion of reason” in the spirit of the neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen, because such would substitute philosophy for religion; he rejected the analysis of “religious experience,” as in Schleiermacher and Rudolf Otto, because it would replace religion with the psychology of religion; and he criticized the “reconstruction” of traditional Judaism to conform to modern naturalism in the manner of Mordecai M. Kaplan, because it would transform religion into the sociology of religion. If religion is *sui generis*, it must be studied on its own terms, and the interpreter must focus on the preconceptual, ineffable reality of lived religion and on the dynamic relationship between God and humankind disclosed in the classical documents of Judaism and the lives and experiences of pious men.

Heschel consciously adopted a dual approach in his work both as a scholar who pursued historical research in the sources of classical Jewish thought and as an original and imaginative contemporary philosopher and theologian. This approach enabled him to formulate his own thought as an authentic interpretation of his Judaic heritage in all its richness. Heschel’s scholarly studies, in addition to his seminal work on prophecy, included a biography of Moses Maimonides, published in 1935; various articles on medieval philosophy, Qabbalah, and Hasidism; and a work written in Hebrew on the doctrines of revelation in Talmudic thought, of which two volumes were published in 1962–1965 and a third still awaits publication. A two-volume work on the life and thought of Menahem Mendel of Kotzk, the “Kotzker rebe,” and an English volume about Mendel and Kierkegaard (*A Passion for Truth*) appeared posthumously.

The second strand of Heschel’s work, in which he tried to offer his contemporaries a theology based on the application of the insights of traditional sources to the problems of modernity, is chiefly developed in *Man Is Not Alone* (1951) and its successor volume, *God in Search of Man* (1955). Here religion is defined as an answer to ultimate human questions. Because modern humanity is often estranged from the reality that informs genuine faith, Heschel thought it was futile to present merely traditional answers to these questions. Hence, he tried first and foremost to recover the significant existential questions to which Judaism offers answers, confronting his readers with the living God of the Bible. To the religiously sensitive person, God is an “ontological presupposition,” the ultimate reality, which is later crystallized by discursive thought into the concept of a power, a principle, a cause, or a structure.

Heschel described three ways in which humans can reach an awareness of God. The experience of wonder leads beyond mere facts to an awareness of the grandeur and mystery of reality. Wonder as curiosity becomes the starting

point of science that looks beyond given facts (data) to the laws they exemplify. Wonder as “radical amazement” points to the ground and power that stand behind all facts and perceptions of facts. This “evocative” approach to reality results in a panentheistic outlook: Through created things one becomes aware of the God who is within, but who is also beyond all finite existence.

A second approach to awareness of God is reached by delving into the recesses of one’s own being, realizing that the self is not a discrete, independent, and self-sufficient entity, but part of something greater and more comprehensive than the individual. This approach tends toward a quasi-mystical view, but it stops short of mystical absorption in the godhead, by emphasizing God as the subject of reality and humans as the object whose dignity and worth are derived from their awareness that they are the goal of divine concern and expectation.

In a third way to God, humankind becomes aware of the voice and word of God. The “holy dimension,” discovered by reacting responsively and responsibly to this address, characterizes the biblical view of revelation. By observing the commandments of the transcendent God, Israel entered this holy dimension of challenge and guidance, and by obediently responding to the divine imperative, humanity experiences itself as the object of divine address and concern. The ability to respond to the divine challenge is the root of human freedom; the failures and successes of Israel in responding to God’s call constitute the drama of Jewish history as interpreted by faith. Thus the Bible is not so much human theology as God’s anthropology.

Because of Heschel’s stress on faith as a response to God’s demands, he opposed both the scholastic attempts to identify the biblical God with the Greek notion of “being,” and the modern process philosophies that describe the deity as the power that makes for goodness, the *nisus* of the universe, or the moral dimension of reality. His own concept of “divine pathos” makes the idea of concern, or directed attention, the central category of biblical thought. Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover must give way to the biblical idea of the Most Moved Mover. Humankind responds to divine pathos with sympathy, and by this act of identifying with divine aims, overcomes its egocentric predicament without having to suppress its own needs. A religious person, by acts of empathy with divine goals, converts divine goals and ends into consciously acquired and deeply felt personal needs. Humans, who share “transitive,” outgoing concern with God, not only must have needs but must also be needed, in order to attain true fulfillment.

Heschel’s philosophy is shot through with polarities; the pair he calls “pattern and spontaneity” (*geva’*, *kavvanah*) are basic to life and liturgy and produce a creative tension between, on the one hand, the prescribed and regulated observance of the commandments (*mitsvot*) and, on the other, the novel and individual way in which a Jew ought to respond to the unique experiences of existence. Time and space stand

in a similar dialectical relation where things are frozen processes; life is a unity frozen in the process of gathering the past into itself in memory and faithfulness and of reaching into the future in hope, expectation, and anticipatory celebration. The Sabbath, whose celebration is a weekly commemoration of creation, the renewal of the divine-human covenant, and a foretaste of future redemption, is an edifice in time.

Heschel's latest work on the Kotzker *rebe* mirrors his awareness of the tension between mystery and meaning, between natural and crisis theology, between sacramentalism and utopianism—or, in the language of Qabalah, between the world of unification ('*alma' de-yihuda'*) and the world of separation ('*alma' de-feruda'*). Perhaps Heschel's most important theme is that God is in need of humankind and that humanity's deepest fulfillment can be found by participating in the divine concern.

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**HESIOD** (Gr., Hēsiodos; fl. c. 730–700 BCE) was one of the earliest recorded Greek poets. The earlier of his two surviving poems, *Theogony*, is of interest to students of Greek religion as an attempt to catalog the gods in the form of a genealogy, starting with the beginning of the world and describing the power struggles that led to Zeus's kingship among the gods. The cosmogony begins with Chaos ("yawning space"), Earth, and Eros (the principle of sexual love—a precondition of genealogical development). The first ruler of the world is Ouranos ("heaven"). His persistent intercourse with Earth hinders the birth of his children, the Titans, until Kronos, the youngest, castrates him. Kronos later tries to suppress his own children by swallowing them, but Zeus, the youngest, is saved and makes Kronos regurgitate the others. The younger gods defeat the Titans after a ten-year war and consign them to Tartaros, below the earth, so that they no longer play a part in the world's affairs.

This saga of successive rulers is evidently related to mythical accounts known from older Hittite and Babylonian sources. Hesiod's genealogy names some three hundred gods. Besides cosmic entities (Night, Sea, Rivers, etc.) and gods of myth and cult, it includes personified abstractions such as Strife, Deceit, Victory, and Death. Several alternative theogonies came into existence in the three centuries after Hesiod, but his remained the most widely read.

Hesiod's other poem, *Works and Days*, is a compendium of moral and practical advice. Here Zeus is prominent as the all-seeing god of righteousness who rewards honesty and industry and punishes injustice.

Also attributed to Hesiod was a poem that actually dated only from the sixth century BCE, the *Catalog of Women*, which dealt with heroic genealogies issuing from unions between gods and mortal women. It enjoyed a status similar to that of the *Theogony*, but it survives only in fragments.

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**HESTIA**, the Greek goddess of the domestic and communal hearth, is closely allied to the Roman goddess Vesta. Hestia, the eldest child of Kronos and Rhea, was swallowed by her father at birth, and was the last to emerge from the patriarchal "womb" when Zeus liberated his siblings. The motif of first and last recurs frequently in the traditions associated with her. She receives the first and last libation offered at every feast, no matter what divinity is being honored. Although she was an original member of the Olympian Twelve, there is a tradition that at some point she yielded her place to Dionysos—a tradition but, typically, no story. Indeed, there are almost no stories about this least anthropomorphic of the major Greek divinities.

Hestia's name also served as a common noun designating the hearth and its fire; most essentially, she was the fire at the center of Olympus, of the city-state, the family home, and the soul. She was worshiped not at specially designated temples but at the family hearth; in the Classical period altars originally dedicated to her were rededicated to Zeus Ephesios ("Zeus of the hearth"). Her tranquillity and apparent passivity were understood to be inherent to her character and not externally imposed; her virginity was deliberately chosen. Hestia is represented as shunning all adventure or entanglement. Though she had no children of her own, she bestowed her dispassionate and nondiscriminating motherly love on all alike, but especially on motherless orphans. Though Vesta in Rome was attended by virgins chosen before they were six, the Greek goddess's attendants were most typically elderly women who had once been married. Hestia represented the stability and continuity of communal and familial existence; a new colony was established by bringing a log from the mother city's hearth, a new home by lighting a log brought from the daughter's family hearth.

Hestia was often paired with Hermes: She always self-same, he a shapeshifter; she homebound, he a wayfarer; she ultimately trustworthy, he a trickster. That she was replaced on Olympus by Dionysos suggests the significance of their



complementation: Life in his realm had meaning at the extreme, whereas life in hers had meaning at the center. Hestia embodied the Greek recognition of the sanctity to be found in the most ordinary and familiar things, those too easily ignored, too readily devalued.

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**HESYCHASM** SEE EASTERN CHRISTIANITY; MONASTICISM, *ARTICLE ON CHRISTIAN MONASTICISM*

**HETERODOXY** SEE ORTHODOXY AND HETERODOXY

**HEVAJRA.** The term *Hevajra* is a name of the central male deity of the *maṇḍala* described in the text of that name, the *Hevajra Tantra*. The image of Hevajra, which was relatively common in Indian Buddhist art from the tenth century onward, is that of a yogin. Dark blue in color, he is depicted naked yet covered with numerous ornaments, most noticeably a skull garland, skull staff (*khaṭvāṅga*), ritual scepter (*vajra*), and bell, and with his dreadlocks tied up in the impressive crest preferred by Indian renunciant yogins. An idealized image of a yogin, it is naturally the case that the tradition that gave rise to these images, and also the associated textual and ritual practices, originated among the communi-

ties of renunciants, who constituted what might be termed the "*siddha* movement" and who from the eighth century onward were an important influence on the development Buddhist Tantric traditions.

The *Hevajra Tantra*, while a Buddhist scripture with identifiably Buddhist elements, was heavily influenced by this movement. Composed by the late eighth century, the *Hevajra Tantra* exhibits the charnel-ground culture of the *siddha* movement, with its emphasis on transgressive practices, particularly in the areas of sexuality and food consumption. Classified as a "*Yoginī*" or "Mother" Tantra, it also places great emphasis upon female deities, although it is arguable to what extent, if any, this translated into increased respect for women. Like most Tantras, the majority of the text deals with ritual, with great focus placed upon magical rites employing *mantras*, often for worldly purposes such as affecting the weather. It is also noticeable for its employment of songs written in the Apabramśa dialect, as well as its prescription of a "coded language" (*sandhyā-bhāṣā*) for use by yogins and *yoginīs* in their Tantric feasts. This has been a topic of great interest for scholars, past and present. In traditional Indian and Tibetan Buddhist contexts, the *Hevajra Tantra* played an important role in the development of Tantric hermeneutics, and it thus made an important contribution to Buddhist scholarship from the ninth century onward. This "coded language," which has been previously translated as "twilight language," has also been a serious object of study since the mid-twentieth century, and its interpretation has inspired some controversy.

The *Hevajra Tantra* and its ritual and meditative traditions focus upon a *maṇḍala* as its central iconographic feature. The *maṇḍala* also functions as the premier site for its ritual practices, such as consecration (*abhiṣeka*) ceremonies, and its meditative practice, since many meditations in the tradition require that the adept either visualize himself or herself within the *maṇḍala*, or view the *maṇḍala* as existing within his or her body. While there are many different types of *Hevajra maṇḍalas*, probably the best-known version is the relatively simple "skull cup-bearing" (*kapāladharin*) *maṇḍala*, so called because it centers upon Kapāladharī Hevajra, who in this form has sixteen arms, each of which holds a skull cup. He is depicted as being in sexual union with his consort, Nairātmīyā. They are in turn surrounded by a circle of eight *yoginīs*: Gaurī, Śavarī, Caurī, Caṇḍalī, Vetālī, Ḍombinī, Ghasmarī, and Pukkasī. Because the central deity couple are said to be "nondual," it is described as being a nine-deity *maṇḍala*.

The Hevajra tradition is particularly noted for its theory of the four joys (*caturānanda*) achieved via sexual union in the context of Perfection Stage meditation practices that involve focused attention upon the subtle body, and the manipulation of "winds" of vital energy and "drops" of subtle sexual fluids within this body's channels. Of greatest importance is the fourth of these, the "natural joy" (*sahajānanda*). The concept of the "natural" *sabhaja* state became an impor-

tant element in the discourse of the *siddha* movement in India, and it has retained its significance to this day among communities of Tantric Buddhists, particularly in Nepal, Tibet, Mongolia, and elsewhere in the diaspora.

The *Hevajra Tantra* was translated into Chinese by Dharmapāla (963–1058) in 1055 CE, but like other Buddhist Tantras that were translated into Chinese at this time, its practice does not appear to have taken root in China. It was, however, successfully transmitted to Tibet. It was one of the central teachings that the Tibetan scholar Mar pa (Marpa, 1002/12–1096) received from the Indian saint Nāropa (c. 966–1040), and Mar pa in turn passed it on to his famous disciple Mi la ra pa (Milarepa, 1028/40–1111/23), whose disciples would found the Bka' brgyud (Kagyu) orders of Tibetan Buddhism, which continue to transmit the *Hevajra* tradition as one of their central teachings. It was also transmitted to Tibet by one of Mar pa's contemporaries, the translator-scholar 'Brog mi (Dok-mi, 992–1072), who studied at Vikramaśīla in Northeast India with Ratnākaraśānti (c. eleventh century). He in turn instructed Dkon mchog rgyal po (Könchog Gyalpo, 1034–1102), one of the founders of the Sa skya (Sakya) school of Tibetan Buddhism. The *Hevajra Tantra* would become one of the central teachings of the Sa skya school, and it provides the basis for its "Path and Fruit" (*lam 'bras*) system of Perfection Stage yoga.

The Sa skya school also played an essential role in the dissemination of Buddhism to the Mongols. During the Yuan dynasty, the Mongols achieved hegemony over Tibet and appointed the Tibetan Sa skya Paṇḍita (Sakya Paṇḍita, 1182–1251) to be their governor of Tibet in 1249. His nephew, the Sa skya lama 'Phags pa (Pakpa, 1235–1280), became a friend and advisor of Kublai Khan (1216–1294). Tibetan interactions with the Mongols continued for centuries following the collapse of the Yuan dynasty in 1368 CE, and the *Hevajra Tantra* was among the many texts and traditions successfully transmitted to the Mongols.

SEE ALSO Tantrism.

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**HIERODOULEIA.** Contemporary scholarship uses the questionable expression "sacred prostitution" to refer to a sexual rite practiced in the ancient Near East. In the temples of Ishtar, Astarte, Mā, Anahita, and Aphrodite, for example, women, often virgins, offered themselves sexually to strangers. Sometimes the temples were staffed by such "sacred prostitutes." Their actions were ritual components of the cult of the goddess in question. In ancient Greece, the word for such women was *hierodoulē*, or "sacred servant." The term used here, *hierodouleia* ("sacred service"), refers to the ritual.

This survey will exclude practices associated with such terms as *bacchanalia*, *saturnalia*, and *orgy*, which refer to the temporary loosening of sexual restraints that occurs frequently in many societies all over the world during certain festivals, rites of passage, and other types of religious observances. In the current state of scholarship on the topic of cultic sexual activity, it would be premature to try to establish any correlations between such practices and the more institutionalized forms of cultic sexual activity.

The present discussion is limited to the institution of hierodoulēs, as distinct from profane or exclusively commercial prostitution. The distinction between the two imposes itself on the basis of both historical and ethnographic evidence. One of the earliest existing legal written documents for the ancient Near East is the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, which specifies a severe punishment for a female hierodoulē who goes to a tavern (the word *tavern* is considered by scholars to be synonymous with the word *brothel*). More than three thousand years later, the female servants-cum-courtesans (*devadāsīs*) of the temple of Jagannātha in Puri, Orissa (India), are forbidden still even to walk in the streets frequented by common prostitutes.

The Babylonian evidence indicates that a distinction between cultic and profane sexuality is both ancient and persistent. It is very possible that the distinction became blurred or perhaps even totally obliterated in the minds of most Westerners because in the Hebrew scriptures the term used for the cultic sexual activity of both male and female temple servants—*znh*, "to prostitute oneself"—is also used to refer to apostasy (*Hos.* 2:7, 4:15; *Jer.* 2:20, 3:6, 3:8; *Ez.* 16:15, 23:3, 23:19; *Is.* 57:3). Sexual cultic activity became for the monotheist Yahvists synonymous with abandoning the wor-

ship of Yahveh and turning to false gods. Apostasy in the Bible is considered to be the worst of sins, hence terms referring to cultic sexual activity—*prostitution*, *harlotry*, and *whoredom*—took on extremely negative connotations.

This attitude toward cultic sexual activity seems not, however, to have always existed or to have been established easily. Authors of the Hebrew scriptures mention the existence and activity of hierodoulēs, both male (*qodesh*) and female (*qedushah*), even in the Temple at Jerusalem. Scholarly research has detailed the efforts of the prophets throughout the history of the ancient Israelites to oust such a custom from their midst. It seems to have been finally eradicated only after the fall of Jerusalem (586 BCE) and the Babylonian exile. The eventual triumph of a monotheist Yahvistic religion took place in a polytheistic cultural environment radically different in its religious orientation. According to the Old Testament scholar Walter Kornfeld, the disappearance of this institution was of primary importance to the establishment of the Yahvistic religion. Cultic sexual activity was an essential aspect of religions that venerated a mysterious life-power manifesting itself in a cyclic manner, following the rhythms of nature, which was most often conceived of as feminine. This configuration contrasts markedly with religions that revere a single masculine god who reveals himself at specific moments in history. However, this female life power seems to have survived in altered form in the mystical Jewish tradition in the form of the Shekhinah, the female presence of God. In medieval cabalistic Jewish circles, sacred ritual sexual union between husband and wife was performed to bring about the reunification of the male aspect of God and the Shekhinah.

Some form of cultic sexual activity was practiced by temple servants of both sexes in most of the cultural areas of ancient West Asia. In Mesopotamia the earliest evidence (mostly textual) comes from Sumer, where the cult of the goddess Inanna (Ishtar) was prominent and was associated with such activity. In a hymn written about 2300 BCE by the high priestess of the moon god at Ur and called the *Exaltation of Inanna*, that goddess is referred to as “the hierodule of An” (An was the highest god of Sumer). Other Sumerian texts show that temples to Inanna had at their service many temple prostitutes. The goddess Inanna transformed herself into the Semitic Ishtar with the Akkadian conquest of Sumer during the third millennium BCE, and the women who carried out the sexual aspect of that goddess’s cult were called *ishtaritu*. Given the characterization of Inanna as a hierodoulē, it is likely that the women temple servants were considered to be living embodiments of the goddess. Such a conjecture is reinforced by ethnographic evidence on the *devadāsīs* (female servants of a deity) of India.

In Puri, the *devadāsīs* of the temple of Jagannātha are considered to be the living embodiments of Jagannātha’s wife Lakṣmī. Lakṣmī is a goddess of prosperity, abundance, and well-being, and the *devadāsīs* who, laden with precious ornaments, dance and sing twice daily in the temple are the

visible signs of the goddess’s wealth. Their sexual activity as courtesans links them to well-being, since erotic pleasure is considered one of the foremost expressions of that state. They represent the auspiciousness of the married state and embody the active sexuality of the non-widowed wife.

The textual evidence from Mesopotamia seems to point toward a similar identification between the hierodoulē and the married woman. Both wore a veil in imitation of Ishtar, who is always represented wearing a veil. In India also, both *devadāsīs* and married women cover their heads with the end of their sari, a gesture often described as wearing a veil. In paragraph 127 of the Code of Hammurabi, hierodoulēs are said to be protected from molestation in the same way as a married woman. Another parallel between the institution in Mesopotamia and in India is that in both, the consecrated women live in their own houses. Even though the *devadāsīs* are concubines of the king and the priests, they cannot be said to be part of a male establishment. They invite whom they please to their own houses. The *devadāsīs*, like the *ishtaritu*, are not supposed to procreate; they adopt girls to succeed them. In paragraph 178 and subsequently, the Code of Hammurabi speaks only of the adopted children of the temple servants. Similarly, the prosperity and abundance for which the *devadāsīs* stand are the general prosperity of the land and the well-being of the realm: they are specifically not meant to be fertile. The *devadāsīs* are well versed in the *ars erotica* as well as in music, dance, and literature: a wealth of textual evidence in India depicts them as often extremely well educated not only in the arts but in philosophy as well. In Indian epic literature (c. third century BCE–third century CE), the courtesans embody the wealth, refinement, and culture of the prosperous and well-ruled city.

A similar role is played by a harlot in the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, one of the oldest and most widely diffused works from ancient Mesopotamia (some of its versions date from the beginning of the second millennium BCE). Gilgamesh, the ruler of the city of Uruk, abuses his people; a goddess named Aruru creates a half-man, half-animal creature named Enkidu to subdue Gilgamesh. Enkidu lives in innocence with the animals in the forest. A harlot is sent to humanize him; she makes love to him and teaches him how to behave as a human being. He is brought into the city of Uruk and eventually tames Gilgamesh, who ceases to mistreat his people. Thus the active sexuality of the prostitute results in well-being for the inhabitants of Uruk.

This story has a close parallel in the myth of Ṛṣyśṛṅga, in Indian literature. This sage, who had a horn on his forehead, was born of a female doe who drank the seed a sage had spilled in a pond. Ṛṣyśṛṅga grows up in his father’s forest hermitage, eating berries and roots and never seeing other human beings. In a neighboring kingdom, a terrible drought plagues the realm because of the misconduct of the king. The king is advised that the only way to save the inhabitants from starvation is to bring Ṛṣyśṛṅga into the city. Only the city courtesans are able to do this. One of them cleverly seduces

the horned forest dweller, introducing him not only to erotic pleasure but to cooked food, clothes, and other refinements of city life. When she and *Ṛṣyśṛiṅga* enter the city, rain pours from the sky, to the great joy of the people. The active sexuality of the courtesan is—as in the Mesopotamian example—the instrument that safeguards the well-being of the king and the community.

In both stories, the courtesan represents human culture and is able to transform a semi-wild creature into a civilized human being. The similarity between the two stories may be a result of the archaeologically well-established fact of extensive contacts between ancient Mesopotamia and the Indus Valley civilization of Northwest India (c. fourth to second millennium BCE). Even though more than a millennium separates the end of the Indus Valley civilization from the earlier portions of the epics, scholars have traced many features of later Hindu civilization to the earlier, pre-Aryan, agrarian Indus Valley civilization. The hypothesis that temple prostitution may be one such historical continuity from the earlier period must be entertained, especially in view of the striking similarities between the ancient Mesopotamian practices and the Indian institution.

Another complex of ideas embodied in cultic sexual activity is that of the transference to the king of the fertile power of the goddess. The king, both in ancient Mesopotamia and in Hindu India, was regarded as the guarantor of the fertility of the land and its people, and in general of the prosperity and well-being of the realm. In order to carry out this function, the king had to receive this power from a woman. In ancient Mesopotamia the power was transferred through the sacred marriage (*hieros gamos*) ritual, one of the most widely documented rituals for a period of over two thousand years. The earliest accounts come from Sumer in the early third millennium BCE. Essentially, the rite consisted of ceremonial and public intercourse between the king, representing the goddess's consort Dumuzi (the Akkadian Tammuz), and a representative of Inanna, most likely a high priestess, head of the temple hierodules. The point of the intercourse is not procreation but the assurance of abundant crops and the goddess's endorsement of the king's ability to rule.

In Puri, the king, who before the Muslim and British conquests ruled a large empire (until the second half of the sixteenth century), through the coronation ritual is symbolically infused with female generative powers. More literally, the *devadāsīs*, who are the living embodiments of Lakṣmī, infuse the king with the fertile powers of the goddess. This is accomplished in the sexual act when the woman's sexual fluids, containing her power of life (*śakti*), enter the man's body via his sexual organ. In the Hindu case, the sacred marriage rite is carried out not literally but symbolically during the king's coronation and every year afterward.

Besides cultic sexual activity carried out by females, ancient Mesopotamian texts speak of male hierodoulēs who represented the goddess's consort Dumuzi. These men were

eunuchs who dressed in women's clothes and engaged in cultic homosexual activity. Dumuzi and his transformations into the Phoenician/Canaanite Baal, the Syrian/Greek Adonis, the Phrygian and Lydian Attis, and the Egyptian Osiris were consorts/sons of the goddess. The Mesopotamian Inanna similarly transformed herself into the corresponding figures of Asherah, Astarte/Aphrodite, Cybele, and Isis.

Common to the mythology of these deities is the theme of the self-castration of the male god and his subsequent death and stay in the underworld, from which the goddess rescues him, bringing him back to life. The death of the god often corresponds in the myth to the barrenness of nature, whose fertility is restored by the goddess's reunion with her consort. An early Babylonian hymn likens Tammuz to plants that quickly fade. This theme is carried down through the millennia and finds expression in the Greek ritual celebrating the death of Adonis, called the Adonia, during which female courtesans sowed certain seeds in baskets that they placed on the rooftops. There the plants quickly germinated and grew in the summer heat but just as quickly faded, since their roots had no time to grow strong. These "gardens of Adonis" metaphorically represent the young god's sterility, since the plants wilt before they can bear fruit, thus echoing in concrete ritual action the mythical theme of the god's self-castration. Certain Roman authors (Servius, Ovid) report that in the Phrygian and Lydian (Asia Minor) cult of Cybele and Attis, male devotees castrated themselves during certain festivals while in a state of trance brought about by dance and music. They then became temple servants of the goddess, wore women's clothes, and engaged in cultic homosexual activity.

The cult of Cybele was brought to Rome in 204 BCE by official decree. Following military difficulties with their enemy Hannibal, the Romans consulted the sibylline oracles, who admonished them to bring the image of the West Asian goddess (a black stone) to Rome. This was done with great ceremony, and the goddess was installed on the Palatine hill. Her eunuch priests, called Galli by the Romans, followed the customs of their cult of origin in Asia Minor. The cult of Cybele in Rome survived until the fifth century CE.

The interdiction against transvestism in the Hebrew scriptures (*Dt. 22:5*) is understood by most scholars as being part of the larger movement against fertility cults. The fact that sterile transvestite eunuchs are symbolically linked to the seasonal renewal of the earth's fertility is attested in several of the myths concerning Ishtar and Tammuz. It is also confirmed ethnographically by a similar phenomenon in India, that of the male transvestites generally known as *hijras*. For these transvestites, found all over North and South India, self-castration is a caste duty (*dharma*). It is carried out in a ritual context: the neophyte is seated in front of a picture of the goddess Bahuchara Mata and repeats her name while the operation is being performed. This constitutes the traditional initiation into the *hijra* community. In the myth about this goddess, she cuts off one of her breasts, offering



it in place of her body to bandits who would ravish her. By castrating themselves and dressing as women, her devotees achieve a special identification with her.

Most *hijras* are homosexual prostitutes; their most important religio-cultural function is to sing and dance in houses where a male child has been born. The *hijras* confer fertility, prosperity, and health on the child and its family. The *hijras'* connection to the fertility of the land—and not only to that of the people—is preserved in one of the stories they tell, a story strikingly similar to that of the seduction of the ascetic R̥syśringa by a courtesan. Drought was plaguing a kingdom, and only the personal visit by the king to two *hijras* visiting his city was able to bring about the rains. The parallelism between the institution of the *hijras* and the sacred eunuchs of the ancient eastern Mediterranean is remarkable. As in the case of the parallelism with female cultic sexual activity, the existence at some period in history of contact between the two areas cannot be excluded.

The institution of the transvestite *hijras* and that of the female temple courtesans exhibit the seemingly paradoxical link between sterility and general fertility. The *devadasis* and, according to the available evidence, the ancient West Asian female hierodoulēs are not supposed to procreate; they adopt children but do not give birth to them. The eunuchs have sacrificed to the goddess their reproductive capacity. Their sexual activity is sterile. A study of the rituals and myths of the courtesans of the temple of Jagannatha in Puri leaves no doubt that it is their sexual activity that ensures general well-being and prosperity. The evidence concerning the *hijras* and the ancient West Asian sacred eunuchs points to a similar conclusion. The sacrifice of one's reproductive capacity is symbolically akin to death; the link is particularly clear in the myths of the self-castration of Tammuz, Adonis, and Attis, which is soon followed by death. The paradox of general fertility brought about by the sexual activity of persons who have sacrificed their own fecundity may have to be understood as one symbolic expression of the widespread sacrificial theme of renewed life through death.

The ancient eastern Mediterranean/West Asian region and the Indian subcontinent are not the only areas of the world where sexual cultic activity is practiced. Unfortunately, the reports by ethnographers on the subject are rather spotty, and not enough information is available to attain a satisfactory understanding of these practices. Some form of sacred prostitution has been reported for various groups in West Africa. A. B. Ellis, in *The Ewe-Speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa* (London, 1890), reports that in Dahomey the female priestesses who have been dedicated to a deity are considered to be his wives; they do not marry, and they engage in prostitution. They are known as *kosi*, a term derived from *kono*, meaning “unfruitful,” since a person so dedicated and any child born to her are lost to their natal lineage and belong to the deity. These women wear a special type of dress and cover their breasts, unlike other women, a peculiarity they share with ancient Indian courtesans, the

only women with covered breasts in the painted frescoes of the Ajanta caves (c. seventh and eighth centuries CE). The priestesses of the python god Dangbi are distinguished from those of other deities by having their own organization. Through a trance possession by the python god, any female can join this organization. Her person then becomes sacred and inviolate. These women live together in separate houses and are accorded great personal freedom.

Farther to the east, among the Ibo in what is today Nigeria, the earth goddess had an important shrine in the town of Nguru. Amaury Talbot noted (in *Some Nigerian Fertility Cults*, Oxford, 1927) that about three hundred women had been given to the shrine as virgins. They practiced cultic sexual activity, mostly with sterile men who came to the shrine to pray for increased virility. These women were not supposed to procreate; any child born to them was exposed.

Farther to the west, Ellis reports (in *The Tshi-Speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of West Africa*, London, 1887) the existence of a form of sacred prostitution among the coastal tribes of what is today Ghana. The gods are served by both priests and priestesses. The priests marry, but the priestesses do not, since they are, as in India, considered to be married to the deity. These women dance, enter into trance, and prophesy. They have sexual relations with men of their own choice, who are reported to live with the priestesses for the duration of the relationship. The ethnographic record is spotty on the subject, and these African examples are probably not the only instances of institutionalized cultic sexual activity on that continent.

The presence of both transvestite males engaging in homosexual activity and of women who were sexually free has been reported for pre-Conquest Mesoamerica and for Borneo. In the capital of Teocolhuacán, on the Gulf of California in northwestern Mexico, founded by descendants of the Toltec, temples had attached to them male transvestites and women who engaged in some form of cultic sexual activity. In Borneo, several groups have initiated priests and priestesses into some form of prostitution. Among the Posso-Todjo Toraja, the Olo Nyadju, the Olo Dusun, and the Kayan, most of the initiated priesthood are women. The members of the priesthood receive their ritual knowledge from spirits of the sky world. Both priests and priestesses have specialized knowledge of garden magic and of healing. Priestesses conduct the ghosts of the dead, especially those of chiefs, to the land of the dead. They also perform ceremonies concerned with house building. The priests dress as women and act as homosexual prostitutes, and the priestesses act as public prostitutes.

In addition to forms of cultic sexual activity that are practiced regularly by certain men and women, there are cases in which sexual activity is engaged in only during a certain period. The North African Awlad Nā'il tribe descends from a famous sixteenth-century saint. The women of the tribe are priestesses of saints' shrines. At puberty they go into towns and practice prostitution until they have accumulated



a satisfactory dowry. They then return to their villages and marry; no opprobrium whatsoever is attached to their method of accumulating wealth. Edmond Doutté reports (in *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord*, Algiers, 1908) that when the French colonial administration tried to interfere with such practices, the whole population protested vigorously, insisting that to eradicate or curtail the custom would be detrimental to the production of abundant harvests. This example could represent a historical continuity, since Augustine (*City of God* 2.4) reports that the Semitic mother goddess was worshiped in North Africa under the names of As-tarte and Tanit. During their festival days, female devotees engaged in sacred prostitution. Similarly, Herodotus notes (1.199) that in Paphos (on Cyprus) women used to prostitute themselves in the service of Adonis/Tammuz before marrying, and Justin writes that they did this to accumulate money for a dowry.

The North African premarital exchange of sexual services for wealth is similar to a custom observed in the Palauan archipelago in the western Pacific (part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands). After attaining puberty, young girls are sent by their mothers to serve as concubines in the men's clubhouse of another village for three months to a year. In payment for their services, the men send money to the girls' families. This system of temporary prostitution generates an important network of economic exchanges between villages. The institution is also viewed as a form of magical protection for the village in which the women take up temporary residence. This is conveyed in Palau by placing on the gable of the men's house a statue of a nude female prominently displaying her genitalia. The myth explaining the origin of such a figure states that the woman was a concubine in the men's house and therefore from another village. The men from her natal village are classified as her brothers, and for them to gaze on her nakedness would be a grave sin. The men's clubhouse on which such an image is displayed is therefore protected from raids by the men from the villages of its resident female visitors.

A comparative study of institutions involving cultic sexual activity by males and females, on either a permanent or semi-permanent basis, has not been undertaken. The subject is not free from a negative bias, in all likelihood rooted in the ancient association between apostasy and cultic sexual activity.

**SEE ALSO** Gender Roles; Hieros Gamos; Homosexuality; Sexuality.

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to this topic; in particular, Judith Ochshorn's "Ishtar and Her Cult" (pp. 16–28) deals specifically with the hierodules; Renée Salzman's "Magna Mater: Great Mother of the Roman Empire" (pp. 60–67) has excellent information on Cybele's Roman cult and her eunuch priests; and Steve Davies's "The Canaanite-Hebrew Goddess" is a good introduction to the topic of goddess worship by the ancient Israelites. A general reassessment of the terms usually translated as "prostitute" (mostly "secular prostitute") in the ancient Near East is provided in Julia Assante's "The Kar.Kid/Harimtu: Prostitute or Single Woman? A Reconsideration of the Evidence," *Ugarit-Forschungen* 30 (1998): 5–96; and Gonzalo Rubio's "¿Virgenes o meretrices? La prostitución sagrada en el Oriente antiguo," *Gerión* 17 (1999): 129–148 deals more specifically with cultic prostitution in the ancient Near East. On the Greek rituals of the Adonia carried out by the courtesans of Aphrodite's temple, Marcel Détiénne has written an innovative and fascinating work entitled *The Gardens of Adonis* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1977).

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**HIEROPHANY** (from Greek *hieros*, "sacred," and *phainein*, "to show") is a term designating the manifestation of the sacred. The term involves no further specification. Herein lies its advantage: It refers to any manifestation of the sacred in whatever object throughout history. Whether the sacred appear in a stone, a tree, or an incarnate human being, a hierophany denotes the same act: A reality of an entirely different order than those of this world becomes manifest in an object that is part of the natural or profane sphere.

The sacred manifests itself as a power or force that is quite different from the forces of nature. A sacred tree, for

instance, is not worshiped for being a tree. Neither is a sacred stone adored, in and of itself, for its natural properties as a stone. These objects become the focus of religious veneration because they are hierophanies, revealing something that is no longer botanical or geological, but “wholly other.”

**FORMS OF HIEROPHANY.** The forms of hierophanies vary from one culture to another. The matter is complicated for, throughout the course of history, cultures have recognized hierophanies everywhere in psychological, economic, spiritual, and social life. There is hardly any object, action, psychological function, species of being, or even entertainment that has not become a hierophany at some time. Whatever humans come in contact with can be transformed into a hierophany. Musical instruments, architectural forms, beasts of burden, and vehicles of transportation have all been sacred objects. In the right circumstances, any material object whatever can become a hierophany.

The appearance of the sacred in a hierophany, however, does not eliminate its profane existence. In every religious context some objects in the class of things that convey the sacred (e.g., stone, trees, human beings) always remain profane. No single culture contains within its history all the possible hierophanies. In other words, a hierophany always implies a singling-out. Not all stones are held to be sacred in a culture; only some are venerated, or one, because their properties make them fitting vehicles of the sacred. A hierophany separates the thing that manifests the sacred from everything else around it, from all that remains profane.

The sacred appears in cosmic form as well as in the imaginative life of human beings. Cosmic hierophanies cover the spectrum of cosmic structures. Supreme gods of the sky, such as Num, the sky divinity of the Samoyeds, or Anu, the Babylonian *shar shame* (“sky king”), reflect or share the sacredness attributed to the sky. So do the sovereign gods of the sky who display their power through storm, thunder, and lightning, such as the Greek god Zeus, his Roman counterpart Jupiter, and Yahveh, the Hebrew supreme being.

The sacredness of the earth is an important source of hierophany. Worship of Pachamama, mother goddess of the earth, is an ancient and widespread phenomenon in the South American Andes. Local soil is a sacred presence in countless cultures around the globe. The earth is often an important character in myths about the earliest times of creation. Such is the role of Papa (“earth”) in Maori creation accounts and of Gaia in the Greek myths presented by Hesiod. Frequently the earth, as a hierophany of sacred being, appears as the creative partner of a heavenly being. Such a divine couple, deified sky and earth, figured prominently in the mythologies of Oceania, Micronesia, Africa, and the Americas.

The sun became a powerful manifestation of the sacred in central Mexico (among the Mixtec), in the Peruvian Andes (among the Inca), in ancient Egypt, and elsewhere. Furthermore, important cultural heroes who figure largely in

the mythic history of various societies (e.g., among the Maa-sai of Africa, the Turco-Mongols, and Indo-Europeans) often have essential ties to the sun’s powers.

In many cultures, the fertility of animals and plants is presided over by the sacredness of the moon. Above all others, the hierophanies of the moon convey the sacredness of life’s rhythms: rainy seasons, ocean tides, sowing times, the menstrual cycle. Among Pygmy groups of central Africa, for instance, the moon, called Pe, is the fecund source of new life. Women celebrate her sacredness with drinking and dancing feasts held at the time of the new moon. Through the metamorphosis it undergoes each month, the moon displays its powers of immortality and its ability to regenerate a form of life that even includes the experience of death. Women and snakes become epiphanies of the moon’s sacred power through their periodic loss of life in the form of blood and skin. Menstruation sometimes is perceived not only as a shedding of blood but as a shedding of the “skin” that lines the uterus each month or of the “skin” that envelops the body of a new child if conception occurs that month. Snakes are sometimes thought to shed not only skin but also “blood”: Snake venom is viewed as a species of blood that is “shed” (that is, transmitted from fang to victim) when a snake bites its prey or when venom is consumed in festival brew.

Human physiology itself can become a manifestation of the sacred. Divine kings and the mystical bodies of shamans, transformed by their contact with sacred realities, can themselves become transparent vehicles of sacred powers. Even the breath, soul, blood, pulse, semen, and body warmth of ordinary human beings can be seen as signs of the presence of supernatural forces. In certain yogic traditions, for example, a woman embodies *prakṛti*, the eternal source and limitless creative power of nature. The ritual nakedness of this *yoginī* makes possible the revelation of a cosmic mystery.

Ordinary items such as roots, herbs, and foods may also manifest the sacred in one tradition or another, as may manufactured items, such as swords, ropes, and puppets. Techniques and skills themselves, the processes of manufacture, reveal sacred powers. Ironworking, spinning, and weaving are frequently sacred activities, carried on by consecrated persons in holy places and periods.

The cosmogonic myths of tribal peoples, the Brahmanic tradition of South Asia, the mystical writings of Nichiren and Teresa of Ávila, the enthronement ceremonies of the king in ancient Babylon, the agricultural festivals of Japan, the ritual costumes of dancing shamans in Siberia, the symbolic fixtures of the Borobudur stupa, and initiation rites in various traditions are all hierophanies. They express some modality of the sacred and some moment in its history. Each one of these hierophanies reveals an aspect of the sacred as well as a historical attitude that humans have taken toward the sacred.

**STRUCTURE AND DIALECTIC OF THE SACRED.** At the most general level of analysis, there exists a structure common to

all hierophanies. Whenever the sacred is manifest, it limits itself. Its appearance forms part of a dialectic that occults other possibilities. By appearing in the concrete form of a rock, plant, or incarnate being, the sacred ceases to be absolute, for the object in which it appears remains a part of the worldly environment. In some respect, each hierophany expresses an incomprehensible paradox arising from the great mystery upon which every hierophany is centered: the very fact that the sacred is made manifest at all.

This characteristic structure of manifestation and limitation is common to all hierophanies. The dialectic of appearance and occultation of the sacred becomes a key to understanding religious experience. Once all hierophanies are understood as equivalent in this fundamental respect, two helpful starting points can be found for the study of religious experience. In the first place, all appearances of the sacred, whether sublime or simple, can be seen in terms of the same dialectic of the sacred. In the second place, the entire religious life of humankind is placed on a common footing. Rich and diverse as it is, the religious history of human life evidences no essential discontinuity. The same paradox underlies every hierophany: In making itself manifest, the sacred limits itself.

**THEOPHANY AND KRATOPHANY.** Although *hierophany* is an inclusive term, one can distinguish different types of hierophany. They depend on the form in which the sacred appears, and the meaning with which the sacred imbues the form. In some instances, a hierophany reveals the presence of a divinity. That is, the hierophany is a theophany, the appearance of a god. Theophanies differ widely from one another in form and meaning, depending upon the nature of the divine form appearing in them. A glance at the gods in the pantheon of South Asian mythology or in Aztec mythology shows that divinities can differ markedly in revealing various divine forms of the sacred, even within the same culture. Needless to say, theophanies from different cultures (e.g., Baal, the storm god of the ancient Semites; Viracocha, the creator god of the Inca; and Amaterasu, the Japanese deity of the sun and ancestress of the imperial line) manifest quite different modalities of the sacred. In the form of divine persons, theophanies reveal the distinct religious values of organic life, cosmic order, or the elementary forces of blood and fertility, as well as of purer and more sublime aspects.

A second type of hierophany may be termed a kratophany, a manifestation of power. Kratophanies preserve the sacred in all its ambivalence, both attracting and repelling with its brute power. The unusual, the new, and the strange frequently function as kratophanies. These things, persons, or places can be dangerous and defiling as well as sacred. Corpses, criminals, and the sick often function as kratophanies. Human beings in powerful or ambivalent circumstances (such as women in menses, soldiers, hunters, kings with absolute power, or executioners) are hedged around with taboos and restrictions. People approach sacred foods with etiquette and manners designed to ward off defilement,

sickness, and pollution. The precautions that surround saints, sacrificers, and healers stem from fear of confronting the sacred. Kratophanies emphasize the extent to which the manifestation of the sacred intrudes on the order of things. Kratophanies also bring out the contradictory attitude displayed by human beings in regard to all that is sacred. On the one hand, contact with hierophanies secures, renews, and strengthens one's own reality. On the other hand, total immersion in the sacred (or an improper encounter with it) annihilates one's profane existence, an essential dimension of life.

In any case, a hierophany (whether in the form of a theophany or kratophany) reveals the power, the force, and the holiness of the sacred. Even the forces of nature are revered for their power to sanctify life; that is, to make fertility holy. The forces of nature that appear in divine forms or in certain objects make reproductive life partake of the unbounded power and plenty of the sacred.

**IMPACT ON SPACE AND TIME.** Hierophanies directly affect the situation of human existence, the condition by which humans understand their own nature and grasp their destiny. For example, hierophanies alter the fundamental structures of space and time. Every hierophany transforms the place in which it appears, so that a profane place becomes a sacred precinct. For Aboriginal peoples of Australia, for example, the landscape of their native lands is alive. Its smallest details are charged with the meanings revealed in myth. Because the sacred first appeared in those places (to guarantee a food supply and to teach humans how to feed themselves), they become an inexhaustible source of power and sacrality. Humans can return to these places in each generation, to commune with the power that has revealed itself there. In fact, the Aboriginal peoples express a religious need to remain in direct contact with those sites that are hierophanic. One may say that the hierophany, connected with the transformed place of its appearance, is capable of repeating itself. The conviction is widespread that hierophanies recur in a place where the sacred has once appeared. This explains why human habitations and cities are constructed near sanctuaries. Ceremonies of consecration, ground-breaking, or foundation-laying for temples, shrines, sacred cities, capitals, and even bridges and houses, frequently repeat or echo acts of fundamental hierophanies, such as the creation of the world. At times they even provoke a sign indicating the location of a hierophany (e.g., the release of an animal and the sacrifice of it on the spot where it is later found; or geomancy). These rituals of foundation and construction ensure that the site will perpetuate the presence of a hierophany that first appeared within the bounds of a similarly structured location and event. The precincts for festival and ceremony are frequently consecrated for the occasion in this way. Thus, for example, the Yuin, the Wiradjuri, and the Kamilaroi, Aboriginal groups of Australia, prepare a sacred ground for their initiation ceremonies. The ground represents the camp of Baiame, the supreme being.

Hierophanies also transform time. A hierophany marks a breakthrough from profane to magico-religious time. Just as spaces sacralized by a hierophany may be reconstructed through acts of consecration, so the acts of hierophany are repeated in the sacred calendar of each year. Rituals that repeat the moment of a hierophany recreate the conditions of the world in which the sacred originally appeared, and at that moment when the sacred manifests itself again in the same way, extraordinary power overwhelms the profane succession of time. New Year ceremonies are among the most striking examples of the periodic recreation of the world in a state as fresh, powerful, and promising as it was in the beginning. Any fragment of time (e.g., the phases of the moon, the transitions of the human life cycle, the solstices, the rainy seasons, the breeding cycles of animals, the growth cycles of plants) may at any moment become hierophanic. If it witnesses the occurrence of a kratophany or theophany, the moment itself becomes transfigured or consecrated. It will be remembered and repeated. The rhythms of nature are evaluated for their power as hierophanies; that is, for signs of the power to renew and recommence cosmic life. Furthermore, hierophanic moments of time are not limited to cosmic rhythms of nature or biology. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, human history is transfigured into a theophany. The manifestation of God in time guarantees the religious value of Christian images and symbols such as the cross, the holy mountain of Calvary, and the cosmic tree.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF SYMBOLIC LIFE.** The transfiguration of so many objects into symbols of something else, some sacred reality, has repercussions for understanding the nature of symbols. The study of hierophanies penetrates the meaning of the symbolic life and uncovers the function of symbolism in general. Humans have an innate sense of the symbolic, and all their activities imply symbolism. In particular, religious acts have a symbolic character. From the instant it becomes religious, every act or object is imbued with a significance that is symbolic, referring to supernatural values and realities.

Symbols relate to the sacred in several ways. Sometimes symbolic forms become sacred because they embody directly the spirit or power of transcendent beings (e.g., stones that are the souls of the dead, or represent a god). In these cases the hierophany is effected by a symbolism directly associated with the actual form (i.e., a form apprehended by religious experience, rather than empirical or rational experience) of stone, water, plant, or sky.

At other times the meaning of a religious form may derive from symbolism that is less clear. Religious objects become hierophanies in a less direct way, through the medium of symbolic existence itself. They acquire a religious quality because of the symbolism that imbues them with religious meaning. That is, they become sacred because of their location within a symbolic system. Their sacrality depends upon a consciousness able to make theoretical connections between symbolic expressions. In such cases, the hierophany is

effected by the transformation of concrete forms into a nexus of cosmological principles and powers.

For example, the symbolism that has surrounded the pearl throughout history works to transform it into a “cosmological center” that draws together key religious meanings associated with the moon, women, fertility, and birth. The symbolism of the pearl is quite ancient. Pearls appear in prehistoric graves and have a long history of use in magic and medicine. Careful inspection of myths of pearls in many cultures reveals that water imbues pearls with its generative force. Pearls were included in ritual offerings to river gods. Some pearls have magical power because they were born of the moon. The pearl is like a fetus, and for this reason women wear pearls to come in contact with the fertile powers of hidden creative processes within shells, in amniotic waters, and in the moon. Pearls have also been used in the cure of illnesses associated with the moon. Placed in tombs, pearls renewed the life of the dead by putting them in contact with the powerful regenerative rhythms of the moon, water, and femininity. Covered in pearls, the dead are plunged once more into the cycle of birth, life, death, and rebirth—the career of living forms intimately bound to the moon. In sum, the pearl becomes a hierophany when humans become aware of the cosmological pattern of water, moon, women, and change.

This kind of sacred symbolism has its origins in theory; specifically, a theory of symbols. What gives the sacred object in question (e.g., a pearl) its rich and full religious meaning is the framework of symbolism surrounding it. This is triggered by an awareness of the wider symbolic universe. This conclusion has importance for understanding the role of human reflection in the origin of certain hierophanies. An object becomes sacred, becomes the locus of a hierophany, when humankind becomes aware of the cosmological pattern of principles (e.g., water, moon, change, the cycle of death and birth) centered in it. The theoretical links make possible the experience of the full range of sacrality. The form draws its full meaning from the symbolism that surrounds it and of which it is a part. In fact, symbols extend the range of hierophanies. Objects not directly the locus of a hierophany may become sacred because of their envelopment in a web or pattern of symbolism.

Two related statements should now be made separately. The first consideration is that hierophanies can become symbols. In this respect, symbols are important because they can sustain or even substitute for hierophanies. However, symbols play an even more startling and creative role in religious life: They carry on the process of hierophanization. In fact, the symbol itself is sometimes a hierophany; that is, it reveals a sacred reality that no other manifestation can uncover. A hierophany in its own right, symbolism affords an unbroken solidarity between humankind (*homo symbolicus*) and the sacred. Extending the dialectic of hierophanies, symbolism transforms objects into something other than what they appear to be in the natural sphere. Through symbolism any

worldly item may become a sign of transcendent reality and an embodiment of the sacredness of an entire symbolic system. Indeed, one may say that symbolism itself reflects the human need to extend infinitely the process of hierophany. Looking upon the remarkable number of forms that have manifested the sacred throughout the broad history of religions, one concludes that symbolic life tends to identify the universe as a whole with hierophany and thereby opens human existence to a significant world.

**SEE ALSO** Pearl; Revelation; Sacred and the Profane, The; Symbol and Symbolism.

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**HIEROS GAMOS**, Greek for "sacred marriage," "sacred wedding feast," or "sacred sexual intercourse," is the technical term of a mythical or ritual union between a god and a goddess, more generally a divine and a human being, and most especially a king and a goddess. The term has had its widest use in the study of kingship in the city cultures of the ancient Near East. The fundamental symbolism however is that of the union of man and woman, a set of opposites as general and as readily available as the opposites east and west, north and south, sky and earth. The latter, sky and earth, are often presented as endowed with sexual characteristics and are therefore inseparable from this subject.

It is useful to state in this introductory orientation that a lingering Victorian prudishness in twentieth-century scholarship, embarrassed and at the same time fascinated by sexual symbolism, has occasionally singled out *hieros gamos* configurations for undue attention. It has done so with euphemisms, adumbrations, and unwarranted explanations, oblivious to the fact that in most civilizations other than those of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe and America, sexual references are not matters for this sort of secretiveness. (Typically, in learned translations textual passages with descriptions of pudenda, intercourse, harlots, courtesans, and so on, were translated into Latin until at least the middle of the twentieth century.) It is essential nevertheless to understand sacred marriage symbolism in advanced cultures in the first place as a variation on much older, very general symbolic expressions. The rather mechanistic and blanket explanation of sacred marriage rites as a stimulus or magic for bringing about fertility in people, animals, and fields, in the wake of scholarship by Wilhelm Mannhardt (1831–1880) and James G. Frazer (1854–1941), cannot do full justice to the poetry, profundity, dramatic quality, and complexity of the documents.

**ANCIENT ROOTS.** The French prehistorian André Leroi-Gourhan (b. 1911) was led to the conclusion that certain signs and figures in the art of Paleolithic hunter cultures that stretched from Spain and France into Siberia form a coherent whole in their expressions, in both signs and representations. Among these expressions is the polarity of female and male symbols, for instance, the bison (female) and the horse (male). The American prehistorian Marija Gimbutas has collected a large number of art objects discovered in eastern Europe, dated from c. 7000 to 3500 BCE, hence before the rise of the earliest civilizations in the Near East, and in that large collection the vast majority of objects is conspicuously related to female forms, conjunctions of male and female, and parturition. Details of interpretation are difficult to assess, but researchers are aided by the wide distribution of identical



or comparable symbolizations in later cultures, of which the meaning is clearer; they allow one to see general patterns. These very ancient signs and images presuppose articulate languages and mythologies. Moreover, with respect to the subject under discussion, it may be safely inferred that “sexual” and “marital” topics were focal points in religious expression.

Mention must also be made of the fact that next to a sexual union between heaven and earth, of the type of Ouranos and Gaia in Hesiod’s *Theogony* and Dyaus and Prthivi in the Vedic texts, there exists documentation of supreme beings that are often called “bisexual.” Such a being is both one and two, male and female at the same time. Being two in one, divinities of this type are more properly called “androgynous” than “bisexual.” The ancient Mexican supreme being is Ometecuhtli-Omecihuatl (“father-mother”). The figure of Apna-Apha (“our-mother-our-father”) occurs in a place on Kisar, an island in the Moluccas. The Konyak Nagas of Assam know a supreme being Ga-Wang (“earth-sky”). It is noteworthy that in several of these cases the female or earth element is mentioned first and seems to be the more important aspect, and also that in a number of myths earth and sky are said to have been one in the beginning, and the act of creation consisted in separating the two.

All these imageries from prehistory and from a variety of tribal cultures are essential for an understanding of the *hieros gamos* symbolism as a particularly fertile imagery in several cultures, each with its own historical impulses and developments that, like the earlier symbolisms, have their focus in the fullness of existence. What sets the later *hieros gamos* apart from its earlier forms is a more highly developed dramatic expression and a tangible association with (political and economic) power.

**AGRICULTURE AND SEXUAL SYMBOLISM.** The invention of agriculture, the novelty of a community’s life henceforward depending on grain or rice, represents a tremendous change. Scholars have become reluctant to exaggerate the significance of this change because of the recent work on prehistory; they are now inclined to see more than mere “hunting magic” in prehistoric art forms and to detect in them much more articulateness and subtlety. Hence the sudden emergence of agriculture may appear less as a break with the past and more as a radical transformation. Tilling the soil is an act performed on the (female) earth. Archaic digging sticks are commonly depicted as phalli. Quite literally, the work of the farmer is a sexual ritual. The process of generation, though certainly not unknown before, now becomes a process in which all forms of existence and the preserving and safeguarding of life itself are at stake. The seasons take on a new significance, and the great goddess is the one who rules over the calendar, that is, over time, as well as over the material world.

In the protohistorical civilization of the Indus valley such a goddess played a role, and the artifacts make clear that she and others elsewhere were associated or identified with

the physical expression of vegetational power. The goddess’s power is not necessarily linked with a male partner, and even when she is so linked (as is Devi, the great goddess of Hinduism, with Śiva), her uniqueness, or her transcendental character, is not diminished. She is the one inexhaustible source of all that is. Agricultural production has obviously made its marks on religious expression, yet it would be unwarranted speculation to see even in her a figure completely different from the prehistoric female forms of thousands of years earlier, such as the so-called Venus of Willendorf or the Venus of Lespugue, or to deny all continuity with the past.

The goddess’s power is expressed in her ability to generate all by herself; her characteristic function is that of *generatrix* (Przyluski, 1950), and the participation of a male is secondary or irrelevant. Comparison to “ordinary” motherhood is misleading. One is dealing with a religious symbol, and her giving birth by herself points to what in abstract language would be her essential transcendent reality. Typically, a Vedic text (*Rgveda* 10.125) refers to the goddess Vāc (Speech) as the queen of the land and bringer of treasures, but also as the first to partake of the sacrifice (i.e., before the other deities) and as the one who really moves when any of the principal gods move. In other words, she is the ultimate ruler even over the divine world.

How can such absolute transcendence be grasped? Here the “classical” marital symbolism of the Neolithic and agricultural world, with its own prehistoric roots, makes its force felt. The farmer’s work is the outer circle of a series of concentric circles. In the symbolic expressions sexual and marital imagery form the center.

The economic change brought about by agriculture is the one aspect most immediately visible to a modern spectator. No doubt it is significant that for the first time staple food could be stored. (One understands at once that, from an economic standpoint, this is the birth of a true notion of capital, for without some degree of permanence, “capital” remains a hazy concept.) The ability to store grain creates the conditions necessary for larger communities. These facts are all of significance for the historian, yet they are abstract inferences from situations of which archaeological finds, ancient art objects, icons, temples, and myths speak directly and concretely. For example, in the culture of ancient Greece, grain was stored in vessels that were half buried in the earth, and such vessels were the place where divinities of the earth (chthonic deities) appeared.

The acts of a great goddess, the divine character of the earth, the significance of women, the ritual nature of work on the land and its bond with sexual involvement all amount to a new, total experience of the everyday world and its ultimate foundation. How novel this entire symbolism was can be seen from the frequency and the ferocity with which outsiders have tried to destroy it. The expansion of Indo-European tribes (c. 3000 to 1500 BCE) religiously pastoral rather than agricultural in orientation, set civilization back considerably (Gimbutas, 1982). Various nomadic raids in

Northwest India and also much later conquests by Muslim invaders, who, like the Indo-Europeans, were basically pastoral in their religious orientation, made havoc of temples; the invaders were particularly provoked by sensual imagery (which for Muslims included the unveiled faces of goddesses and nymphs sculptured in sanctuaries).

In its turn, agricultural life itself became established and traditional; sexual rituals persisted. These latter have rightly drawn the attention of well-known scholars (such as Mannhardt, Frazer, J. J. Meyer, and many others) not only to rites in ancient societies but also in continuing folk customs. The power of naked women to increase the harvest is attested by a number of cultic ceremonies. Images of prehistoric, proto-historic, and traditional goddesses show the ancient significance of nudity, as do those of fully dressed goddesses alternating with trees with dense foliage (Przyluski, 1950). Prosperity and abundance are symbolically integrated in the dynamic of ritual life. Mannhardt and Frazer have recorded many instances where the sex act itself was believed to be an effective magic. The explanation of "magic" makes sense if only one bears in mind that it owes its existence to a coherent vision of this world and its divine complement.

Perhaps many older, prehistoric images of goddesses or perhaps many prehistoric artistic designs interweaving male and female characteristics anticipated comparable ideas and hopes. Whatever the likelihood of this suggestion, there is no doubt that full-fledged agricultural societies, even at a very early date, were in a special position to focus on certain aspects of the symbolism.

**EARLY CITY-STATES AND HIERODOULOI.** The *hieros gamos* as a royal ritual is the creation of early city-states built on the wealth provided by agriculture. Far from putting an end to the "primitive" village cults, they expanded and stylized them with forms that were derived from, and were variations of, earlier symbolism. One of these is the sexual union of the king and a "priestess" as an episode in the lengthy ancient Babylonian Akitu (New Year) festival. The model for this rite is already given in Sumerian myths and temple customs. It is true that existing knowledge of religious practices among the common people of the ancient Mesopotamian world is inadequate, but it is known that in this world the main ritual procedures for the entire populace were carried out through the mediation of rulers and religious specialists of various kinds. Around 2100 BCE King Gudea had a temple built for the god Ningirsu, who had appeared to him in a dream. Among the rites performed in the new temple was the sacred wedding ceremony of the god and his consort Baba, lasting seven days. Apparently such a marriage was an expected part in the liturgy for each one of the important deities already present in Sumerian culture, as it was later in Babylonian cults, and still later throughout Assyrian and also West Semitic cults.

The *hieros gamos* rite, attached to the New Year festival and celebrated in various cultic centers, symbolized the union of the king of the city and the city's goddess, repre-

sented sometimes by the king's consort, more often by a *hierodoulē*, a female servant of the sanctuary, a "priestess." (It may be misleadingly derogatory to translate the Sumerian or Akkadian terms as "sacred prostitute.") Many bloody sacrifices were offered, functioning, as has been suggested, as wedding gifts, but certainly losing none of their proper sacrificial value, involving humankind in activities brimming with the risks of encountering the divine world and venturing its existence in the time to come on this encounter. The entire wedding in the ritual is a replica, a visible counterpart, of the celestial union. Not only was the *hierodoulē* the personification of a goddess, but also the king might be said to represent a god, if only some qualifications are made.

An early prototype of the ritual is the Sumerian story of the goddess Inanna and her relation to Dumuzi. The latter is depicted as a shepherd boy with whom the supreme, all-powerful goddess fell in love. In the drama the goddess descends into the netherworld for reasons that are not altogether clear but are certainly related to her ambition to perfect her rule by extending it even over the realm of the dead. She is defeated in her attempt, and her "elder sister," Ereshkigal (the queen of the great below) makes no exception in her case; she fixes "the look of death" on Inanna. Inanna cannot escape unless a substitute is found. She vows to find one. In her absence, Dumuzi, her love, spends his time with all the paraphernalia of wealth and power, occupying the throne. Although Inanna had no intention of consigning him to the netherworld in her place, she now fixes "the look of death" on him and orders the demons to take him away and torture him. The story ends in a compromise, whereby Dumuzi will be on earth for half the year, and the other half in the realm of death.

It is this type of mythological configuration that served as a model for the Sumerian-Akkadian kings, and it is this type of mythology with its many themes, subthemes, and variations that formed the pattern of kingship and religion in the entire world of the ancient Near East. *Ezekiel* 8:14 is one of the texts in the tradition of Israel strongly opposed to most of the religious customs connected with the *hieros gamos*; it tells of women who (ritually) bewailed the fate of Tammuz (Dumuzi) at the gates of the temple. A considerable number of details make it not at all unlikely that also the gospel story of Jesus Christ owes some of its features to the myth of the dying shepherd-god (Kramer, 1969). Dumuzi (Tammuz) is not really presented as a god, and originally he was no god but rather a (human) king whose marriage to the great goddess (Inanna-Ishtar) was required to confer a sacred certainty, a future, and wealth on his land.

It is clear that kingship demanded a sacred foundation that could be provided only through the omnipotence of the great goddess. However, the complexity of the story of Inanna and Dumuzi, even in summary, allows one to see more than a utilitarian purpose, or a mere generalization on an ideology of kingship. The sacred marriage, far from being a mere cerebrally thoughtout, politically effective ceremony, is

a manner of coming to terms with the extreme agonies of human existence: defeat vis-à-vis death, the ultimate frustration of any attempt to amass power or wealth, in spite of the necessity to do so. Both the certainty of death and the uncertainty of power and wealth are not only facts of life; they are experiences in the ultimate drama, to be relived each year. The king's place, and through his mediation, humankind's place in the relationship to the goddess and her partner, allow for an initiation into the mystery of existence. Obviously, this is much more than a clarification concerning a destiny after death or an explanation or stimulus for the sowing and reaping of grain, or a comment on the life and death cycle of cereals.

In Babylonian religion, the rule of the supreme god Marduk, just like that of his divine partner Ishtar (the Akkadian name of Inanna), is not limited to one area. Although the goddess's myth shows her as not altogether successful in her journey to the netherworld, she does return and her rule is emphatically presented as universal. In contrast, in the earliest myths, Dumuzi remains associated with pastoral life, and the impression is given that rule on earth has its limits; this same impression is also given in later times. Such rule, however, must have its basis in the *hieros gamos*.

That the certainty of rule over the land and its wellbeing is of the utmost concern is borne out by the king's determination of destiny. Just as the god Marduk's rule was established when he received the "tablets of fate" (in the *Enuma elish*, the most famous creation myth), the king shows himself as king in fixing the rules and regulations that keep the universe functioning properly. The ritual by which he does so is complex, but it is related to the Akitu festival, and the sacred marriage itself is to be regarded as a "third form for the determination of destiny" (Pallis, 1926). Clearly, the union with the goddess is of paramount importance for rule on earth.

**THE POWER AND LOVE OF THE GODDESS.** It has been seen that the one most striking theme in the mythology and rituals of the sacred marriage is the power of the goddess. It is associated with war and destructive anger but also with irresistible life and with love. This mythology is the root of much love poetry, even in traditions that, with Israel, rejected its symbols and rituals. The words of the *Song of Songs* 8:6, "love is strong as death," derive their force and meaning from the same revolutionary reorientation in the history of humankind that created the *hieros gamos* symbolism.

Although the Mesopotamian imagery of the sacred marriage is the earliest on record, comparable symbolisms have arisen in other religions (e.g., Mexico and India)—always in an agricultural context and in a tropical or temperate region more or less close to the equator. Contrary to ideas that dominated scholarship for a long time, supreme goddesses are not primarily mothers but lovers. When supreme male deities come to the fore, such as Marduk in Babylon or Viṣṇu and Śiva in Hinduism, the devotee turns generally not to the male but to the female partner of the couple, from whom

flows grace, and who in her loving relation provides the perfect bridge. In the devotional experience of Vaiṣṇavism (the religion of the distinctly royal, masculine, yet compassionate god Viṣṇu), the devotee calls instinctively on Lakṣmī (Śrī), Viṣṇu's consort, who is depicted in Hindu literature as accessible, even more accessible than Viṣṇu himself. Through many waves of cultural history and religious change the very early experience of the great goddess's love is still tangible.

Perhaps most noteworthy, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, most especially in Tibet, the goddess Tārā has preserved her popularity, in spite of the traditional prominence of the male element in Buddhism, in which according to an almost general consensus only a final birth as a man can open the way to *nirvāṇa*. Tārā however is ranked on the same level as the *bodhisattvas*, those who are prepared to enter *nirvāṇa* but decide not to do so and decide instead to assist the as yet unsaved world. Again, through the female, bliss is most accessible.

**SEE ALSO** Agriculture; Akitu; Androgynes; Goddess Worship; Hierodouleia; Kingship, article on Kingship in the Ancient Mediterranean World; Marriage; New Year Festivals; Sexuality.

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## HIGH GODS SEE SUPREME BEINGS

**HIJIRI** are Japanese lay ascetics and influential antagonists of priests and monks. The role of the *hijiri* in Japanese folk religion is far more important than that of the ministers of the official religions (priests and monks in Shintō and Buddhism, respectively). The *hijiri* is in many ways the spokesman of the common man. *Hijiri* are the forerunners of the lay leaders of modern Japanese sects, who are considered to embody the spirit of that traditional role. The concept of *hijiri* dates back to the earliest known period of Japanese history, when the *hijiri* (lit., "he who knows the sun") determined and appointed the years, months, and days, and must have been connected with an unofficial and spontaneous cult of the sun goddess Amaterasu. The *hijiri* gradually came to be considered a sage, the one who, like the sun, let the light of his knowledge shine on others. He must have been a charismatic leader, endowed, like a shaman, with supernatural powers and natural skills.

The transmission of Daoism and Confucianism to Japan expanded the meaning of *hijiri* to include the Chinese ideas of the *xian*, the mountain ascetic and hermit, the *shengxian*, the virtuous hermit, and the *shengren*, the holy one or "ultimate man." As the one who is believed to reconcile in himself the opposites of *mu* and *wu*, of nonbeing and being, life and death, male and female, the *hijiri* was considered to live in happiness in the hereafter.

The introduction of Buddhism into Japan in 538 added still other meanings to the notion of *hijiri*. In Buddhism a *hijiri* became in the eyes of the laity the sacred and highly respected antagonist of its official ministers, the monks in their hierarchical ranks. He was believed to be the ideal *ubasoku* (Skt., *upāsaka*, "layman"). In the *Nihonshoki*, one of the oldest Japanese chronicles, two prominent Buddhist lay leaders, the Korean king Song (sixth century) and the Japanese prince regent Shōtoku Taishi (574–622), are depicted as *hijiri*. After Shōtoku Taishi's death the monk Eji cried, "He was verily a great *hijiri*" (Kamstra, 1967, p. 424). As *hijiri*, these leaders combined the old Japanese idea of the wise man and the Chinese ideas of the virtuous, ascetic, and ultimate man with that of the holy *upāsaka*.

A few decades later, people who showed special skill also came to be called *hijiri*. One finds *go no hijiri*, experts in *go*; *waka no hijiri*, experts in *waka* (Japanese poems); and *sake no hijiri*, experts in producing *sake* (rice wine). From the eighth century on, the *hijiri* gradually became protectors of the common people against the *goryōshin*, the angry spirits of those who did not die like decent people. In doing so, they



followed patterns of life different from those of monks and priests: they did not settle down, but wandered in the mountains and from village to village and city to city. They followed one of three kinds of religious and magical practices: *nembutsu* (invocation of the name of the Buddha Amida), Shugendō (mountain asceticism based on Tantrism and Shintō shamanism), and *yin-yang* magic. The most prominent of these three groups were without any doubt the *nembutsu-hijiri*. They served not only to protect against the threat of angry spirits but also performed memorial rites to the spirits of the dead consisting of the recitation of the most powerful *sūtras*. Sometimes they chanted these texts while dancing the *nembutsu* dance. *Hijiri* who gave up their wandering life and settled down lost claim to the title. Some fell to the lowest classes and became producers of bamboo wares, stage actors, or puppet performers. From the fourteenth century onward, the name *hijiri* was also applied to laymen who performed special tasks in Buddhist temples or monasteries. Some of these lay *hijiri* (*zoku hijiri*) served as bell ringers, gardeners, Buddha hall keepers, pagoda keepers, and grave keepers.

SEE ALSO Nianfo; Onmyodo; Shugendō.

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#### HILDEBRAND SEE GREGORY VII

**HILDEGARD OF BINGEN.** Few medieval figures enjoy as much popularity in the contemporary Western world as the German Benedictine abbess Hildegard of Bingen (1098–1179). Her influence reflects the combination of authentic discovery and creative misreading that so often characterizes modern appropriations of religious figures from history. She appears in some ways to be very much a twelfth-century phenomenon in her rationalistic optimism, her persistent interest in questions of cosmology, and her openness to the use of art in the service of theological truths as well as her exaltation of virginity and assertion that women are the weaker sex. Hildegard was a visionary, a theologian, a musician, and a correspondent of popes and princes. She founded two religious houses for women and undertook a number of preaching tours.

In her theological writings Hildegard felt able to explore distinctively feminine aspects of the revelation, which is apparent in her imaginative and repeated use of feminine imagery to express the dynamic and creative qualities of God, who is often depicted as a nurturing mother or as Wisdom. Hildegard had an ability to bring her experience as a woman to bear on some of the major moral and doctrinal themes of the day, and she was happy to reinterpret Christian Scripture from a female perspective without any hint that she might be departing from orthodox readings. The fact that Hildegard had the freedom to develop in this way is a reminder of the extent to which she belongs to the twelfth century—before the period of the increased centralization and clericalization of the church and the rise of the universities that characterized the century that followed.

**HILDEGARD'S LIFE.** Little of Hildegard's background is known, but her biographer records that from her earliest years she possessed an unusual visionary gift of being able to foretell the color of a calf in its mother's womb. This may have prompted Hildegard's parents to offer their tenth child to the nearby Benedictine monastery of Disibodenberg as an oblate. The eight-year-old Hildegard was placed in the care of a noblewoman, Jutta von Spanheim, and together with their servants, Jutta and Hildegard formed the nucleus of the women's community at Disibodenberg.

Hildegard's visions continued throughout her adolescence, but it was not until several years after Jutta's death in 1136, when Hildegard was the *magistra* (leader) of the women's community, that she received what she took to be a divine command to disclose the content of her visions. She confided in the provost of the community, a monk named Volmar, who had responsibility for the nuns' spiritual welfare. Volmar was to play an important role in Hildegard's life, encouraging and supporting her, often in the face of sceptical opposition, and acting as her amanuensis. The sense that she was guided by God through her visions was a pivotal feature of Hildegard's spiritual life. When she resisted the divine command, she became sick and was forced to take up her pen, recording not only her visions but letters of instruction, admonishment, and encouragement both to ordinary people and to the secular and religious leaders of her day.

By 1150 Hildegard's community of nuns had outgrown their cramped quarters on Mount Disibodenberg, and they moved to Rupertsberg in the Rhine Valley opposite the town of Bingen. Here, free of the overweening authority of the abbot, Kuno, Hildegard flourished and produced many of the splendid liturgical works that illustrate her vision of the female monastic vocation, with gorgeously dressed virgins occupying the place of honor while singing and giving glory to God. At the age of sixty, following an illness that preceded most of Hildegard's major decisions and after nearly fifty years enclosed in a convent, Hildegard embarked on the first of four preaching tours. In 1165 Hildegard established a second community of Benedictine nuns on the opposite bank of the Rhine at Eibingen, and the successors of this commu-



nity continue to publish Hildegard's works, sing her anthems, and live according to her inspiration. Hildegard's feast day is celebrated on September 17, the anniversary of her death.

**HILDEGARD'S CONTRIBUTIONS.** Hildegard's personality appears at once complex, appealing, and exasperating. She was imperious toward kings and popes but not free of self-doubt, often taking to her bed for long periods when thwarted or uncertain which way to move. She was deeply touched by God but not free of social snobbery (the communities she founded admitted only highborn women) and possessed a love of finery and dramatic liturgical performance. Her letters reveal her to be both wise and insecure, demanding loyalty and devotion, and peevish when she felt betrayed. Although essentially a conservative figure, indebted to the spirit of orthodoxy and deeply committed to her work as a theologian with a moral and spiritual message, Hildegard also transcended the parameters of her age. Of particular resonance in the twenty-first century is her emphasis on the fertility and fecundity of God, expressed in the recurrent image of *viriditas* or "greenness," a term that encompasses the natural world as the living body of God, the life of the church, the saints in heaven, and the grace given to individual believers.

Although Hildegard has been espoused as an "ecological saint" and in her native Germany is followed for her herbal cures, she is also widely known and appreciated through her musical compositions. For Hildegard, music was not peripheral to the religious life; rather, it invoked the harmony of the celestial spheres. In addition to over seventy liturgical pieces, she wrote an operatic psychodrama composed as part of a healing process for a distressed sister. Two of Hildegard's visionary manuscripts were richly illustrated (although probably not by her hand), and artists have drawn inspiration from the imagery—verbal and pictorial—expressed in these works. It has been suggested that Hildegard's visions are typical of a migraine sufferer, which may also explain her frequent illnesses, but Hildegard's genius is misunderstood if the medium of her visions is confused with the profound and inspirational nature of her theology and art. Hildegard is recognized as a local saint of the Catholic Church, acclaimed by the popular devotion of the people of the Rhineland, and continues to inspire countless people from many nations who rediscover the breadth, beauty, and majesty of her work.

**SEE ALSO** Benedictines; Nuns, article on Christian Nuns.

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FIONA BOWIE (2005)  
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**HILDESHEIMER, ESRIEL** (1820–1899), was a German rabbi and founder of the Orthodox Rabbinical Seminary in Berlin. Hildesheimer was born in Halberstadt, Germany, and was educated in the first Orthodox school in Germany to include secular subjects in its curriculum. He continued his studies with Jacob Ettlinger and Isaac Bernays, rabbis who combined their traditional observance with a receptivity to contemporary thought. Both men encouraged Hildesheimer's interest in secular learning, and under their influence he went on to the universities of Berlin and Halle; from the latter he received in 1846 a Ph.D. for a study of the Septuagint. Hildesheimer emerged from his early years as a staunch opponent of Reform Judaism and a major proponent of the modern Orthodox philosophy of *torah 'im derekh erets*, Samson Raphael Hirsch's slogan that affirmed the worth of modern Western culture and traditional Jewish study and belief.

Hildesheimer's first opportunity to realize his ambitions for the creation of a "cultured Orthodoxy" came in 1851, when he became rabbi of the Jewish community in Eisenstadt, Hungary (now in Austria). There he established the first *yeshivah* in the modern world to have a secular component in its regular course of study. This innovation earned Hildesheimer the wrath of many Orthodox traditionalists in Hungary, and as a result he returned to Germany in 1869. In Berlin he became rabbi of the separatist Orthodox congregation Adass Jisroel. In 1873, with the opening of the Orthodox Rabbinical Seminary, Hildesheimer realized his dream of a school that would train rabbis committed to both Jewish Orthodoxy and *Wissenschaft des Judentums* (the modern scholarly study of Judaism). This institution gained

Hildesheimer a position of leadership among Orthodox Jews, and his institutional accomplishments mark him as a major architect of modern Jewish Orthodoxy.

Hildesheimer himself produced a number of scholarly works; the most prominent is a critical edition (1890) of *Halakhot gedolot*, an important geonic work. In addition, he founded in 1870 a German-language newspaper, *Die jüdische Presse*, for the dissemination of his views. His opinions on contemporary issues are also reflected in his *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (1923), a collection of his major polemical/apologetic essays. His Jewish legal rulings, *Teshuvot Rabbi 'Esri'el* (1969–1976), have appeared in two volumes.

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DAVID ELLENSON (1987)  
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**HILLEL** (c. 50 BCE–early first century CE), Jewish sage and teacher. Although several modern scholars claim that Hillel, known as "the Elder," had Alexandrian roots, there is no reason to doubt the Talmudic tradition that he was a native of Babylonia. Hillel was a disciple of Shema'yah and Avṭalyon, who preceded Hillel and his colleague Shammai as the two leading teachers, or "pairs" (*zugot*), in Jerusalem. The Jerusalem (Palestinian) Talmud reports (*Pes.* 6.1, 33a, where Hillel is called "the Babylonian") that Hillel was designated *nasi'* (patriarch, i.e., head of the court) in recognition for having been able to resolve a difficult question of Jewish law on the basis of a tradition he heard from Shema'yah and Avṭalyon. The later patriarchs were regarded as descendants of Hillel, who in turn was said to have been a scion of the house of David (J.T., *Ta'an.* 4.2, 68a). Most scholars do not take the latter claim seriously, as Davidic ancestry is also assigned to the Hasmonaeans, Herodians, Jesus, Yehuda ha-Nasi', and the Babylonian exilarchs. It is possible that Hillel is to be identified with Pollio (Pollion), the Pharisee who appears in

the *Jewish Antiquities* (15.3, 15.370) of Josephus Flavius (37/8–c.100), but this may be a reference to Avṭalyon.

Talmudic tradition portrays Hillel as a great spiritual leader who embodied the qualities of humility, patience, peace, love of Torah, and social concern. Many of the well-known sayings attributed to Hillel in Mishnah *Avot* (chaps. 1 and 2) emphasize these ideals. For example: "Be of the disciples of Aaron, loving peace and pursuing peace, loving people and bringing them near to the Torah." "A name made great is a name destroyed." "If I am not for myself who is for me? And when I am for myself, what am I? And if not now when?" "Do not separate yourself from the community." "Do not judge your fellow until you are in his position." A popular tradition (B.T., Shab. 31a) illustrates Hillel's forbearance and contrasts it with the impatience of Shammai, who often appears as his foil. Shammai is said to have rebuffed a heathen who demanded of him: "Make me a proselyte on condition that you teach me the entire Torah while I stand on one foot." When approached by the same heathen Hillel responded, "What is hateful to you do not do to your fellow man. That is the whole Torah, the rest is commentary. Go and learn it." This negative formulation of what eventually circulated as the Golden Rule, like many of Hillel's sayings, has parallels in ancient literature (e.g., *Tb.* 4:15), so the intention is not simply to relate the uniqueness or essence of Judaism. Here Hillel appears as the teacher par excellence; in one utterance he conveys that the central ideals of Judaism are easily delineated, but the path to their fulfillment can be discerned only through further study and commitment.

Several social *taqqanot* ("enactments") are associated with Hillel. The most important of these is the *prozbul*, a legal instrument that enabled creditors to claim their debts after the sabbatical year though biblical law (*Dt.* 15.2) prohibited it (*Shevi'it* 10.3). The biblical law was intended to protect the poor in an agricultural society. In later times, when the economy depended upon the free flow of credit, people would refrain from lending as the sabbatical year drew near because they feared the money owed them would not be collectible. By means of the *prozbul*, creditors transferred their bonds to the court, thereby retaining the right to collect after the sabbatical year.

Hillel's interest in the intention of the biblical text and its practical application to daily life may be the reason he is credited (Tosefta *San.* 7.11) with the promulgation of seven exegetical principles (*middot*), several of which were known to have existed earlier. These principles were expanded to thirteen by the second century tanna Yishma'e'l ben Elisha' (*Sifra'*, intro.). While there are very few instances where Hillel (or for that matter, Beit Hillel, the school of thought named after him) is reported to have employed these principles (see B.T., *Pes.* 66a; J.T., *Pes.* 6.1, 33a), their importance increased in the later tannaitic and amoraic periods.

Hillel's significance has been assessed in various ways, all of which acknowledge that he was a pivotal figure in Judaism during the late first century BCE and the early first centu-

ry CE. Joseph Klausner, Alexander Guttmann, and Judah Goldin have regarded the sage as responsible for establishing the importance of intellect and interpretation along with tradition. David Daube has suggested that Hillel created the basis for the development of Jewish law, narrowing the differences between the Pharisees and Sadducees by showing how the oral law is inherent in the written. Jacob Neusner has credited Hillel with the transformation of the Pharisees from a political party to a society of “pious sectarians” committed to “table-fellowship,” that is, to the meticulous observance of tithing laws and the eating of everyday meals in a state of ritual purity.

SEE ALSO Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai.

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**HILLĪ, AL-** (AH 648–726/1250–1326 CE), more fully Jamāl al-Dīn Abū Maṣū'ir al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf ibn 'Alī ibn al-Muṭahhar, known as 'Allāmah (“great scholar” or “sage”) al-Ḥillī after Hillah, a great center of Shī'ī learning in southern Iraq; hence, a number of famous scholars are known as al-Ḥillī.

Al-Ḥillī studied first with his father and then with his famous maternal uncle, Najm al-Dīn Abū al-Qāsim Ja'far ibn Sa'īd al-Ḥillī, known as “the Foremost Scholar” (al-Muḥaqqiq al-Awwal), as well as with a number of other Shī'ī and Sunnī scholars. His mentor in philosophy and theology was the controversial astrologer, theologian, and philosopher Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274).

Al-Ḥillī wrote in all the religious and rational sciences, as well as in biography, Arabic grammar, and rhetoric. He was the first to apply the scientific study (*'ilm*) of the *ḥadīth* (“traditions”) to Shī'ī tradition, and his methodology remains normative in Shī'ī *ḥadīth* scholarship. The method, however, earned him the hostility of the Akhbārī scholars, who accepted all the traditions in the four Shī'ī *ḥadīth* collections as sound.

The majority of al-Ḥillī's works, numbering over one hundred, or according to some accounts five hundred, have been lost. Among his ten published works, all of them standard textbooks in jurisprudence and theology, is *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-I'tiqād*, a commentary on *Tajrīd al-I'tiqād* (Divesting the creed [of all details]), a Shī'ī creed by Ṭūsī. This commentary has superseded all other works on Shī'ī dogmatics. Al-Ḥillī's treatise *Al-bāb al-ḥādī 'ashar* (The eleventh chapter) is an important creed and has been translated into English. It was appended to another of his important works, *Minḥāj al-ṣalāh fī ikhtisār al-Miṣbāḥ* (The Proper way to abridge *The Lamp*), an abridgement of Abū Ja'far Ṭūsī's *Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid* (The lamp of the vigilant [in the night prayers]).

Around 1305 al-Ḥillī traveled to Persia, where he engaged in many debates with leading Sunnī scholars. Under his influence the eighth Il-khanid sultan of Persia, Öljeitü Khudā-Banda, who had been first a Christian, later a Buddhist, and then a Ḥanafī Sunnī Muslim, was converted to Twelver Shiism. Under Öljeitü the names of the twelve Shī'ī imams were inscribed on mosques, and coins were struck in their names. Thus for the first time, however briefly, Twelver Shiism was officially recognized as the state religion of Iran.

'Allāmah al-Ḥillī, a contemporary of Ibn Taymīyah and other noted Sunnī scholars, was both admired for his great learning and attacked and vilified as a leading and influential Shī'ī scholar. He was honored by being buried at Najaf in the shrine of 'Alī, the first Shī'ī imam (and not, as William M. Miller, Dwight M. Donaldson, and S. Husain Jafri mistakenly assert, in Mashhad, Iran: “al-Mashhad al-Ghurawī” is an honorific title for the shrine of 'Alī in Najaf). Al-Ḥillī's tomb in Najaf is well known and often visited by pilgrims.

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MAHMOUD M. AYOUB (1987)

**HINCMAR** (c. 805–882) was an archbishop of Reims. He was born in northern France and sent as a boy to be educated at the Abbey of Saint-Denis near Paris under its famous abbot, Hilduin. Hincmar entered the monastic community at Saint-Denis and together with Hilduin spent some long periods at the court of Louis I (r. 814–840). In 845 he was chosen—no doubt with the approval of Charles II (r. 840–877), the son of Louis I—to fill the archepiscopal see of Reims, which had been vacant since the deposition of Ebbo (835). Claiming to have been unjustly deposed, Ebbo had reoccupied his see for a time and had performed ordinations during this period; he and his supporters introduced struggles and complications into Hincmar's career that persisted even after Ebbo's death (851), particularly with respect to the clerics Ebbo had ordained.

A man with a forceful personality and unbounded energy, Hincmar seemed to thrive on controversy; one finds him enmeshed in all the important struggles of his time. The temperate nature of his language and actions gained him more enemies than friends. On the political level he sided with Louis I and Charles II against the emperor Lothair I (r. 840–855) and his son Lothair II, king of Lorraine (r. 855–869). The emperor, part of whose territory came under Reims's jurisdiction, supported Ebbo and attempted to depose Hincmar. With regard to Lothair II, Hincmar strongly opposed the king's repudiation of his wife Theutberga in order to marry his concubine, and he wrote the well-known treatise *De devortio Lotharii et Teutbergae* to clarify all the doctrinal and canonical issues involved.

As archbishop, Hincmar attempted to reorganize his diocese, to recover ecclesiastical possessions that had been alienated, and in particular to bring all his diocesan bishops into obedient submission to his jurisdiction. This last effort led to a bitter and implacable conflict with his own nephew, also named Hincmar, bishop of Laon, against whom he wrote a treatise called the *Opusculum LV capitulorum*. The archbishop likewise interjected himself into the theological controversies of his day, taking the monk Gottschalk to task on the question of predestination in his treatise *Ad reclusos et simplices* and challenging the monk Ratramnus on the formula *trina deitas* in the treatise *De una et non trina deitate*. On the question of predestination, Hincmar sought an ally in John Scottus Eriugena (fl. 847–877), who also wrote on this matter. But the replies of several other contemporary theologians, Lupus (of Ferrières), Prudentius (of Troyes), and Florus (of Lyons), show that Hincmar's theological speculations were not viewed as altogether sound.

Hincmar's vast literary output reflects all aspects of his activities. That he was a man of great learning is reflected in

the splendid library he accumulated at Reims—many of whose books still survive—and in the scriptural, patristic, and other sources quoted in his treatises. His knowledge of civil and canon law is noteworthy; it is evident especially in his treatises on the divorce question and against his nephew, Hincmar of Laon. Only a fraction (about eighty letters) of his vast correspondence has survived, and several of his treatises are also lost, in particular two treatises on the question of images. Even in his own day he was accused of producing forgeries to support the causes he sponsored. His most recent biographer, Jean Devisse, has not succeeded in eliminating the doubts of scholars on this score. Hincmar is one of the first writers to quote the pseudo-Isidorian decretals, forgeries also dating from his time but almost certainly produced in the camp of his opponents, especially Ebbo and his supporters.

The section of the *Annales Bertiniani* from 861 to 882, which Hincmar composed, has earned the admiration of modern historians. In these pages, Hincmar demonstrates his penetrating mind and his ability to comment shrewdly on contemporary personages and events.

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PAUL MEYVAERT (1987)

**HINDI RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS.** Forty percent of India's billion-strong population speaks some form of Hindi as a first language, with the great concentration extending across north India from Rajasthan in the west to Bihar in the east. Urdu, Hindi's sister tongue, is spoken by tens of millions more, and is distinguished from Hindi chiefly by its preference for expressions derived from Persian and Arabic. Urdu is a tongue with Muslim associations, while Hindi has a Hindu flavor that is intensified by vocabulary

adopted directly from Sanskrit. The membrane between the two languages is by no means impermeable, however, and the religious situation is similar: many of the practices surrounding Muslim holy men (*pirs*), for example, closely resemble those associated with their Hindu counterparts (gurus, *sants*, etc.).

Hindi speakers, who see themselves as occupying the geographic center of Hindu culture—what in earlier times was called the Middle Country (Madhyadeśa), where Aryan culture in India flourished—often suppose that regional distinctiveness is something characterizing other areas of the subcontinent more than their own. Local and regional identities are indeed strong in India, even within the Hindi-speaking area; nonetheless, there is a core of religious literature and tradition that sets the Hindi region apart from other areas of India and makes it possible for people whose personal religious emphases vary widely to communicate as members of a single, if large and complex, family.

**THE BHAKTI CORE.** This core is defined by a corpus of devotional (*bhakti*) poetry generated from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries and associated with such names as Kabīr, Mīrā Bāī, Sūrdās, Tulsīdās, and Nānak. In the compositions of these singer-saints and others contemporary with them, various dialects of Hindi came into their own as media suitable for religious expression. Doubtless, earlier poetry also served as the focus for popular piety, but it seems to have remained largely oral; what survives in writing from the fourteenth and earlier centuries is largely in the nature of epic and romance, touching only obliquely on matters of faith. With but a few exceptions, religious texts apparently remained the province of those versed in Sanskrit and the Jain Prakrits: if there were vernacular texts, they have now been lost.

A written tradition of religious literature in the vernacular began to build in the fifteenth century with adaptations of the great Sanskrit epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The earliest were composed by Viṣṇudās at the court of Gwalior in 1435(?) and 1442. A century and a half later writers began giving vernacular form to the Sanskrit *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. The most prestigious medium of literary expression in the western Hindi regions was Braj Bhāṣā, the language spoken from Gwalior northward throughout the Braj region, where the god Kṛṣṇa is said to have spent his youth. To the east, an alternate tradition held sway: Avadhi, the dialect spoken in Avadh, the natal region of the divine king Rāma. Avadhi too played host to vernacular adaptations of Sanskrit works, by far the most influential among them being the *Rāmcaritmānas* (Spiritual lake of the deeds of Rāma) of Tulsīdās, composed toward the end of the sixteenth century. A third major linguistic strand in the religious literature of medieval north India is less regional in character and less associated with myth and legend than either Braj Bhāṣā or Avadhi. Because it apparently had its home in a marketplace environment that made it accessible to Hindi speakers of various classes and regions, it typically contains a great mixture of dialectal forms and varies accord-

ing to where it was spoken. Such language, which sometimes comes tolerably close to the *kharī bolī* that is the basis of modern standard Hindi, is difficult to describe, but insofar as it was productive of a religious literature it is often simply called *sādhukkarī bhāṣā*, “what holy men speak.” In *sādhukkarī bhāṣā* the events of daily life and personal experience play an important role.

Anthologies of vernacular religious poetry, extant examples of which date back to the end of the sixteenth century, can be found in each of these three dialects; often an anthology contains more than one. Collections as different as the massive *Kartāpur Pothī* compiled at the time of Guru Arjun (1604) and the much smaller anthologies prepared for individual merchants or princes suggest by their linguistically diverse contents that songs composed as far west as the Punjab and as far east as Bihar could be considered part of a single network.

Within this overarching tradition, a more or less distinct thematic milieu is associated with each of the three major dialects. Much of the religious poetry in Braj Bhāṣā is devoted to Kṛṣṇa; Rāma is often addressed and described in Avadhi; and in *sādhukkarī bhāṣā* one finds a mixed agenda appropriate to the multiformity of the language: important traces of devotion to Śiva and Śakti, for example, sometimes lurk behind a predominantly Vaiṣṇava facade. Sūrdās, Nanddas, and a host of other poets native to the Braj region composed their Kṛṣṇa lyrics naturally enough in Braj Bhāṣā, as did Tulsīdās when he wrote his *Śrīkṛṣṇāgītavalī* (A series of songs to Kṛṣṇa); Mīrā Bāī, traditionally understood to have been a princess of Rajasthan, seems often to have done the same. Braj Bhāṣā was also deemed appropriate as a medium for the praise of Rāma, but when Tulsīdās began crafting his epic *Rāmcaritmānas*, Avadhi presented itself as a ready tool. Avadhi had already established itself as a fit vehicle for epic or elegiac themes such as those that fill the story of Rāma, and in a similar way Braj Bhāṣā, through its identification with the amorous Kṛṣṇa, came to be seen as the most graceful medium for love poetry in Hindi. *Sādhukkarī bhāṣā*, associated especially with such figures as Gorakhnāth, Kabīr, Ravidās, and Dādū, expressed its eclectic character in anthologies of poetry associated with the *sant* tradition, those “good folk” who preached allegiance to no particular form of God other than that transmitted through the charisma of one’s *gurū*. In the language of *sants* such as Kabīr, the designation *Rāma* had less to do with the *avatāra* of Viṣṇu who was an exemplary king bearing that name than with the totality of the divine presence.

Historians of Hindi literature have usually accepted a tripartite linguistic and theological division in categorizing medieval devotional poetry. They typically present the first two as divergent expressions of *saguṇa bhakti*—the Kṛṣṇaite and the Rāmaite—and the last as *nirguṇa bhakti*. According to the *saguṇa* (“with qualities”) persuasion, God can appropriately be worshiped through divine attributes and forms that make themselves felt in the phenomenal world, hence



through myth and image. According to the *nirguṇa* (“without qualities”) persuasion, the purpose of the religious life is to discard such earthbound symbols and attain a purer apprehension of the divine; this teaching is at the heart of the message of poets such as Kabīr and Nānak.

To overemphasize this tripartite taxonomy, however, is to ignore what binds together this whole array of poet-saints and all who venerate their names. Tradition has recognized these ties by affirming a series of connections—imagined or otherwise—between individual saints. To an extent these links reaffirm the individual dialects and religious traditions to which this article has referred, but they also create confluences between them that have a tendency to draw the group into a single stream. In *sant* poetry, some of these ties are claimed in verses attributed to the saints themselves: Ravidās makes mention of Nāmdev and Kabīr; Dādū adds Ravidās’s name to the list; and Eknāth and Tukārām, the Maharashtrian poet-saints, in turn acknowledge Dādū. Other connections emerge in hagiologies as old as the *Bhaktamāl* of Nabhadās (c. 1625) and the *Caurāsīvaiṣṇavan kī vārtā* (c. 1650) attributed in its final form to Gokulnāth. The former depicts Kabīr, Ravidās, and Pīpā as pupils of a common *gurū*, Rāmānand, and the latter draws the catholic Sūrdās into a chain of sectarian poets such as Kṛṣṇadās and Khumbhandās, who were pupils of Vallabha. Other relationships seem to have been postulated later on, such as the tradition that Nānak met Kabīr, that Tulsīdās encountered Sūrdās, or that Mīrā Bāī embraced Ravidās as her *gurū*. And repeated patterns in the biographies of poet-saints on both sides of the *nirguṇa-sagūṇa* line—a miraculous and undesired access to wealth, for example—draw these figures into even closer proximity.

Such associations at the level of hagiography echo others that figure in the poetry itself. For all their differences of perspective, the *bhakti* poets seem united in their conviction that one must cultivate personal experience as a way to approach God; hence they downplay and often ridicule the preoccupations of ritual religion. Furthermore, all the *bhakti* poets, with the occasional exception of Tulsīdās, seem to consider both sexes and all strata of society as potentially worthy devotees. Finally, they share a common mode of discourse. Poets as different as Sūrdās, with his tender affection for Kṛṣṇa as a child, and Kabīr, with his predilection for trenchant social criticism, unite in dedicating a significant proportion of their creative efforts to poems in the *vinaya* (“humble petition”) genre. These songs of petition and complaint are occasioned primarily by the experience of being separated from God (*viraha*), and although the desire to see God (to have *darśan*, “sight”) may seem natural from a *sagūṇa* perspective such as Sūr’s or Tulsī’s, one also encounters it in poems attributed to Kabīr and Nānak. Indeed, these twin themes of *viraha* and *darśan* are persistent in *bhakti* poetry throughout the subcontinent.

**THE PRESERVATION OF THE TRADITION.** It is a measure of the extent to which the *bhakti* poets of the Hindi area define

a regional sensibility that their works have become important elements in curricula used in the early twenty-first century in the public schools of north India. But the religious impact of the poets is felt even more keenly outside the classroom.

**Performance.** Every autumn, in the period surrounding the festival of Daśahrā or Vijayamadaśamī, when Rāma’s victory over the demon Rāvaṇa is celebrated, Tulsīdās’s *Rāmcaritmānas* becomes the basis for dramas (*rāma līlās*) depicting salient events in the life of Rāma. The most famous of these *rāma līlās* is performed on the grounds of the palace of the maharaja of Banaras and extends over a period of thirty-one days, drawing pilgrims from far and wide; equally well-attended *rāma līlās* are celebrated in cities and towns wherever Hindi is spoken. In a similar way, the weeks leading up to Kṛṣṇa’s birthday Kṛṣṇa Janmāṣṭamī, which comes in August or September in the monsoon season, witness the performance of verses by Sūrdās and other Braj Bhāṣā poets in musical dramas depicting the life of Kṛṣṇa, particularly his childhood and youth. These *rasa līlās* emanate from the Braj region, which is a great center of pilgrimage, especially during the rainy months of Śrāvaṇ and Bhādrapad.

Though the *Rāmcaritmānas* typically becomes the basis for large public performances only in autumn, it serves as the focus of private devotions all year round: often individuals and religious associations engage brahmins to chant it uninterruptedly from start to finish, or do so themselves. Likewise, one can sing the songs of Kṛṣṇa in devotional groups at any time. Indeed, such *bhajan* (“singing”) groups provide much of the informal religious life with which Indian villages and cities pulse. The Indian film industry—whose primary medium is Hindi—has adopted many traditional *bhajans* into its films, making them familiar not just in Hindi-speaking areas but throughout the country and beyond. It is difficult to say whether the public consciousness of religious literature in Hindi is now shaped more by schoolbooks and cheap religious pamphlets, by performers and itinerant preachers, or by the many films depicting religious themes, or again by a television series such as Rāmānand Sāgar’s hugely successful *Rāmāyaṇ* (1987–1988), which was principally based on the *Rāmcaritmānas* and is available worldwide on cassette.

**Communities and orders.** Much of the religious life of north India over the past half millennium has been defined by the religious communities, both householder and ascetic, that were established to channel the religious fervor of the medieval period. These provide access to the *bhakti* tradition in both its *sagūṇa* and *nirguṇa* modes, with the Gauḍīya, Vallabha, Nimbārka, Haridāsī, and Rādhāvallabha *sampradāyas* (“sectarian traditions”) devoted primarily to Kṛṣṇa; the Rāmānandī order devoted especially to Rāma; and the Kabīr, Ravidāsī, Dādū, and Sikh Panths spreading the message of the *sants*.

Among the Kṛṣṇaite groups, the most influential have probably been the Gauḍīya and Vallabha *sampradāyas*. The former looks to the ecstatic saint Caitanya (1486–1533) as

its founder—a Bengali who established temple and monastic lineages not only in his native region but in Braj and Orissa as well. The Caitanyaite influence on Braj has undoubtedly had much to do with elevating the worship of Rādhā, Kṛṣṇa's favorite among his milkmaid loves (*gopīs*), to a status almost on a par with his own: she is his consort, consubstantial with him. Other lineages that have their centers in Braj (the Rādhāvallabha, Haridāsī, and Nimbārka *sampradāyas*) share in this adulation of Rādhā, which finds expression in the poetry of such saints as Hit Harivaṁś, Haridās, and Vṛindāvandās.

The Vallabha Sampradāya, which traces its history to the sixteenth-century theologian Vallabhācārya, appears to have attained institutional definition somewhat later than the Gauḍīya Sampradāya, but was very successful in doing so. Though patronized early in its history by Mughal rulers, it was forced to flee the Braj area during the period when Aurangzeb occupied the throne; it transferred its center to Nāthdvārā in western Rajasthan. Partially in consequence of the proximity of Nāthdvārā to the west, Gujaratis have become among the most influential devotees in the Vallabhite fold, and their mercantile connections make them an important force across North India. Vallabha, in sympathy with the general sensibilities of the *bhakti* movement, questioned the propriety of clerical and monastic institutions, feeling that true faith admitted of no boundaries between religious specialists and ordinary people. Vallabha's progeny, however, developed a ritual style sufficiently elaborate, and a following sufficiently prosperous, to transform their homes into grand temples possessing some of the most detailed ceremonial traditions in all of Hinduism. One of the salient aspects of this style is its careful attention to hymnody: through *dhrupad* (a style of classical music) the Sampradāya has preserved a tradition of performing *bhakti* poetry that is otherwise obsolete in modern India.

Membership in both the Gauḍīya and the Vallabha *sampradāyas* involves initiation at the hands of one of their spiritual leaders. Such initiation is open on an ascriptive basis to anyone who seeks it, though family traditions usually determine the teaching heritage with which a person becomes allied. Another restriction pertains to social status. Normally, membership in these communities is confined to members of caste society; Dalits (formerly "Untouchables"), despite the thrust of some *bhakti* teachings, are usually not welcomed and do not seek to belong.

Membership patterns are significantly different among communities whose allegiance is to the *nirguṇa* side of the *bhakti* tradition. The theological emphasis on turning away from particular characteristics and forms attributed to God appears to go hand in hand with questioning the legitimacy of similar distinctions in society. Among *nirguṇa* poets, Kabīr and Ravidās made especially sharp comments about caste, owing in part, no doubt, to their own humble origins; the communities that have formed in their names continue to appeal to a largely lower-caste clientele. With Ravidās this

is overwhelmingly true: over the past century—particularly in the Punjab but now elsewhere as well—his name has served as a rallying point for communal pride among the *camār* (leatherworking) caste to which he belonged. Ravidās temples, educational institutions, and community centers have been established, and poetry ascribed to him serves as an essential component of Ravidāsī teaching. The institutional heritage of Kabīr, the Kabīr Panth, is more complex and wide-ranging, embracing both monastic institutions and lay groups. It extends from a center in Kabīr's own city, Banaras, eastward into Bihar, and as far west as Gujarat. Although the Kabīr Panth has a predominantly lower-caste membership, merchant castes also play an important role, particularly in the Dharmadāsī branch.

Mercantile castes have exercised an even greater influence over the development of the Sikh Panth, the community that traces its origins to Nānak, since each of its ten *gurūs*, including Nānak himself, belonged to merchant (*khatrī*) families. The Sikh community is by no means restricted to *khatrīs*, however, and its leadership has been shared at least equally by the Punjabi farming and landowning caste called *jāt*. Whereas Kabīr and Ravidās groups often revere their *gurūs* in image form, ensconcing them at the center of their ritual lives, the Sikh community has, at least since the time of the tenth *gurū*, eschewed any such practice. In Sikh worship, the functions that otherwise would cluster around an image or *gurū* are diverted to a book—the *bhakti* anthology that took shape in the *Goindvāl Pothīs* and ultimately emerged as the *Ādi Granth*. For that reason the *Ādi Granth* is referred to as a *gurū* in its own right, the *Gurū granth sahib*. Through it, Sikhs come in daily contact with the words of the *nirguṇa bhakti* saints who stand at the fountainhead of their tradition.

Each of the communities mentioned so far, with the possible exception of the Ravidāsīs, can trace its origins directly to the medieval *bhakti* period, sometimes claiming an individual poet as its founder. But the *bhakti* heritage extends as well to groups whose institutional associations with the medieval saints are harder to establish. Prominent among these is the Radhasoami Satsang, a *nirguṇa* tradition that came into focus in the mid-nineteenth century and has since splintered into a number of *gurū*-centered communities, some with a sizable international constituency. Radhasoami is quite influential in North Indian life: many government bureaucrats count themselves members; its publications are numerous; and when large convocations are held at its center in Beas, Punjab, hundreds of thousands of pilgrims attend. Radhasoami's history features the establishment of several visionary communities, such as the one at Beas, part of whose impetus was to leave behind the encumbrances of caste as members gathered to lead a common life in the presence of a living *gurū*. Curiously, this seemingly plain-spoken egalitarian message from the *bhakti* tradition went hand in hand with an esoteric interpretation of other *bhakti* themes: the traditional importance of listening to the truth within, for

example, was transmuted into a doctrine of the *gurū* as the incarnation of an eternal sound-current. When one seeks the roots of this kind of thinking, one is drawn back, through the Dharmadāsī branch of the Kabīr Panth, to the apotheosis of Kabīr himself as a primordial, supernatural force. Here, as in other aspects of the *nirguṇa bhakti* tradition, the demythologizing fervor that was expressed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries seems to have created a vacuum that was filled by remythologizing later on.

**HINDI TRADITIONS IN A LARGER PERSPECTIVE.** To sketch the religious traditions that have Hindi as their linguistic medium is scarcely to portray the full dimensions of the religious life of Hindus resident in North India. This article has said little about rituals pertaining to days, weeks, months, years, or the life cycle; about the panoply of religious specialists from brahmins to curers to ascetics; about the pantheon revered in various areas; about temple architecture and practice; or about how one's experience of religion is conditioned by one's sex, age, or position in the caste hierarchy, one's urban or rural locale, or one's proximity to a major religious center. Often, one or another of these factors affects patterns of individual piety more profoundly than the specifically "Hindi" traditions discussed here, and often what matters most does not hold constant across the whole Hindi region or the entire social spectrum. In the Hindi area as elsewhere, Hinduism resists easy generalizations. One can, however, point to certain motifs that seem particularly significant in North Indian religion, as contrasted with other areas of the subcontinent.

In the realm of ritual, for example, one might observe that it is somewhat more acceptable in North India than elsewhere for a young man to take on the sacred thread just prior to his marriage; elsewhere, there is greater insistence on keeping these two major rites of the life cycle separate and distinct. As for festivals, Holī, the spring first-fruits celebration that falls in March or April, assumes a bacchanalian intensity one might more easily associate with Gaṇeśa Caturthī in Maharashtra or Dūrgā Pujā in Bengal. Among religious specialists, one might mention the historically formative role played by the iconoclastic Nāth order, with its mixed ascetic and householder membership. The Nāth Sampradāya, which regards Gorakhnāth (c. eleventh century?) as its most important preceptor, was particularly influential in laying the basis for the *sant* tradition as it spread across North India in the early medieval centuries. It is associated with a particular form of yoga that assumed the potential immortality of all and questioned the efficacy of traditional forms of temple and Brahmanic ritual.

This discussion has already touched on several points relating to the pantheon, but it might be stressed in addition that while all of India has tended in recent centuries to shorten the distance between the great and local gods by focusing increased attention on intermediary figures such as the elephant divinity Gaṇeśa, North India has led the way in expanding the significance of his monkey cousin,

Hanumān. In Hanumān, servant of Rāma, superhuman strength and superhuman devotion unite, making this god the very personification of efficacious *bhakti*; at the same time, he remains peculiarly accessible and unthreatening because he belongs to a subhuman species. The *Hanumān cālīsā* (nineteenth century?), dedicated to him, is one of the most frequently recited texts in North India, and many Hindi speakers turn first to the monkey god in times of peril and stress.

Like all of India's major regions, North India has its own set of pilgrimage places: Puṣkar and Nāthdvārā in Rajasthan; Badrināth and Gaṅgotrī in the Himalayas; Mathurā and Vṛndāvana in Braj; Ayodhyā in Avadh; and Hardvar, Prayāga, Banaras, and Gayā stretching along the Ganges from west to east. What is striking about several of these places, however—certainly Vṛndāvana, Prayāga, Ayodhyā, and Banaras—is that they attract pilgrims not merely from the Hindi-speaking regions but from all over India. Three among these—Vṛndāvana, Ayodhyā, and Banaras—gain their national reputation because they are perceived as the homes, the primary residences, of three great gods in the pantheon: Kṛṣṇa, Rāma, and Śiva. Banaras benefits additionally from its special association with the Ganges, holiest of India's waters; the Jumna (Yamunā), sister to the Ganges and for Hindus a goddess like her, contributes to the status of Vṛndāvana. Prayāga owes its special sanctity to the fact that it marks the confluence of these two rivers; every twelve years it plays host to the most populous of all Hindu festivals, the Kumbha Melā. Participants in the Kumbha Melā come from all corners of the subcontinent to bathe in the confluence of the Ganges, the Jumna, and the invisible Sarasvatī at the auspicious moment when the sun passes into the house of Aquarius; all caste groups, all major religious organizations, and all ascetic orders are represented.

The Kumbha Melā suggests what is perhaps the most distinctive feature of regional religion in the Hindi-speaking area: in some of its most important respects it is pan-Indian as well. One can find at Madurai "the Mathurā of the south" or in the Godavari a Ganges transposed to central India, but never the reverse; the songs of Mīrā Bāī are known all over India in a way that the Tamil lyrics of her south Indian counterpart Āṅṅāl can never be. The fact that Hindi rivals English as a lingua franca for modern India is not the only cause of the tendency among Hindi speakers to feel that the religion they practice somehow sets the Hindu paradigm; it is that history and mythology have made them before all others host to the gods. Kṛṣṇa and Rāma lived where they live, and when Śiva descended from the Himalayas to the plain, his feet first touched a place where Hindi is spoken. Successive invasions and movements of population have complicated and transformed the religious landscape of North India more than most areas of the subcontinent, but nothing can alter the Hindi region's special claim that the gods were there first.

**SEE ALSO** Ādi Granth; Banaras; Bhakti; Caitanya; Drama, article on Indian Dance and Dance Drama; Gorakhnāth;



Holi; Kabīr; Kṛṣṇa; Kumbha Melā; Līlā; Mīrā Bāī; Nānak; Pilgrimage, article on Hindu Pilgrimage; Rādhā; Rāma; Sikhism; Śiva; Śrī Vaiṣṇavas; Sūrdās; Tulsīdās; Vallabha; Vṛndāvana.

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JOHN STRATTON HAWLEY (1987 AND 2005)

**HINDUISM.** Hinduism is the religion followed by about 70 percent of the roughly seven hundred million people of India. Elsewhere, with the exception of the Indonesian island of Bali, Hindus represent only minority populations. The geographical boundaries of today's India are not, however, adequate to contour a full account of this religion. Over different periods in the last four or five millennia, Hinduism and its antecedents have predominated in the adjacent areas of Pakistan and Bangladesh and have been influential in such other regions as Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia. But in these areas Hindu influences have been superseded or overshadowed by the influences of other religions, principally Buddhism and Islam. This account will treat only of Hinduism as it has taken shape historically in the "greater India" of the Indian subcontinent.

**INDUS VALLEY RELIGION.** There are good reasons to suspect that a largely unknown quantity, the religion of the peoples of the Indus Valley, is an important source for determining the roots of Hinduism.

The Indus Valley civilization arose from Neolithic and Chalcolithic village foundations at about the middle of the third millennium BCE as a late contemporary of Egyptian and Mesopotamian riverine civilizations. It engaged in trade with both, though mostly with Mesopotamia. Reaching its apogee around 2000 BCE, it then suffered a long period of intermittent and multifaceted decline culminating in its eclipse around 1600 BCE, apparently *before* the coming of the Aryan peoples and their introduction of the Vedic religious current. At its peak, the Indus Valley civilization extended over most of present-day Pakistan, into India as far eastward as near Delhi, and southward as far as the estuaries of the Narmada River. It was apparently dominated by the two cities of Mohenjo-Daro, on the Indus River in Sind, and Harappa, about 350 miles to the northwest on a former course of the Ravi River, one of the tributaries to the Indus. Despite their distance from each other, the two cities show remarkable uniformity in material and design, and it has been supposed that they formed a pair of religious and administrative centers.

The determination of the nature of Indus Valley religion and of its residual impact upon Hinduism are, however, most problematic. Although archaeological sites have yielded many suggestive material remains, the interpretation of such

finds is conjectural and has been thwarted especially by the continued resistance of the Indus Valley script, found on numerous steatite seals, to convincing decipherment. Until it is deciphered, little can be said with assurance. The content of the inscriptions may prove to be minimal, but if the language (most likely Dravidian) can be identified, much can be resolved.

At both Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro, the cities were dominated on the western side by an artificially elevated mound that housed a citadel-type complex of buildings. Though no temples or shrines can be identified, the complex probably served both sacred and administrative functions. A “great bath” within the Mohenjo-Daro citadel, plus elaborate bathing and drainage facilities in residences throughout the cities, suggests a strong concern for personal cleanliness, cultic bathing, and ritual purity such as resurface in later Hinduism. Indeed, the “great bath,” a bitumen-lined tank with steps leading into and out of it from either end, suggests not only the temple tanks of later Hinduism but the notion of “crossing” associated with them through their Sanskrit name, *tīrtha* (“crossing place, ford”).

A granary attached to the citadel may also have involved high officials in ceremonial supervision of harvests and other agricultural rituals. Terracotta female figurines with pedestal waists, found especially at village sites, reveal at least a popular cultic interest in fertility. They are probably linked with worship of a goddess under various aspects, for while some portray the figure in benign nurturing poses, others present pinched and grim features that have been likened to grinning skulls: These are likely foreshadowings of the Hindu Goddess in her benign and destructive aspects.

But most controversial are the depictions on the seals, whose inscriptions remain undeciphered. Most prominently figured are powerful male animals. They are often shown in cultic scenes, as before a sort of “sacred manger,” or being led by a priestly ministrant before a figure (probably a deity and possibly a goddess) in a peepul tree, one of the most venerated trees in Hinduism. Male animals also frequently figure in combination with human males in composite animal-human forms. With female figures seemingly linked to the Goddess and males associated with animal power, it has been suggested that the two represent complementary aspects of a fertility cult with attendant sacrificial scenarios such as are found in the animal sacrifice to the Goddess in post-Vedic Hinduism. In such sacrifices the Goddess requires male offerings, and the animal represents the human male sacrificer. Most interesting and controversial in this connection is a figure in a yogic posture who is depicted on three seals and a faience sealing. Though features differ in the four portrayals, the most fully defined one shows him seated on a dais with an erect phallus. He has buffalo horns that enclose a treelike miter headdress, possibly a caricatured buffalo face, wears bangles and necklaces or torques, and is surrounded by four wild animals. Some of these associations (yoga, ithyphallicism, lordship of animals) have suggested an identification

with the later Hindu god Śiva. Other traits (the buffalo-man composite form, association with wild animals, possible intimations of sacrifice) have suggested a foreshadowing of the buffalo demon *Mashāsura*, mythic antagonist and sacrificial victim of the later Hindu goddess *Durgā*. Possibly the image crystallizes traits that are later associated with both of these figures.

The notion that features of Indus Valley religion form a stream with later non-Aryan religious currents that percolate into Hinduism has somewhat dismissively been called the substratum theory by opponents who argue in favor of treating the development of Hinduism as derivable from within its own sacred literature. Though this “substratum” cannot be known except in the ways that it has been structured within Hinduism (and no doubt also within Jainism and Buddhism), it is clear that a two-way process was initiated as early as the Vedic period and has continued to the present.

**VEDISM.** The early sacred literature of Hinduism has the retrospective title of *Veda* (“knowledge”) and is also known as *śruti* (“that which is heard”). Altogether it is a prodigious body of literature, originally oral in character (thus “heard”), that evolved into its present form over nine or ten centuries between about 1400 and 400 BCE. In all, four types of texts fall under the *Veda-śruti* heading: *Samhitās*, *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas*, and *Upaniṣads*. At the fount of all later elaborations are the four *Samhitās* (“collections”): the *R̥gveda Samhitā* (*Veda* of Chants, the oldest), the *Sāmaveda* and *Yajurveda Samhitās* (*Vedas* of Melodies and Sacrificial Formulas, together known as the “liturgical” *Samhitās*), and the *Atharvaveda Samhitā* (the youngest, named after the sage *Atharvan*). These constitute the four *Vedas*, with some early sources referring to the “three *Vedas*” exclusive of the last. The material of the four was probably complete by 1000 BCE, with younger parts of the older works overlapping older parts of the younger ones chronologically. The *Samhitās*, or portions of them, were preserved by different priestly schools or “branches” (*śākhās*) through elaborate means of memorization. Many of these schools died out and their branches became lost, but others survived to preserve material for literary compilation and redaction. The subsequent works in the categories of *Brāhmaṇa*, *Āraṇyaka*, and *Upaniṣad* are all linked with one or another of the Vedic schools, and thus with a particular Vedic *Samhitā*, so that they represent the further literary output of the Vedic schools and also the interests of the four types of priests who came to be associated differentially with the ritual uses of the four *Samhitās*. It is from the *R̥gveda* that Vedic religion in its earliest sense must be reconstructed.

Although the urban civilization of the Indus Valley had run its course by the time of the arrival of the Aryans in about 1500 BCE, the newcomers met heirs of this civilization in settled agricultural communities. The contrast between cultures was striking to the Aryans, who described the indigenous population as having darker skin, defending themselves from



forts, having no gods or religious rituals but nonetheless worshipping the phallus. As small stone phallic objects have been found at Indus Valley sites, this is probably an accurate description of a cult continued from pre-Vedic Indus Valley religion that prefigures the later veneration of the *liṅga* (phallus) in the worship of Śiva. In contrast to this predominantly agricultural population, the invading Aryans were a mobile, warlike people, unattached to cities or specific locations, entering Northwest India in tribal waves probably over a period of several centuries. Moreover, their society inherited an organizing principle from its Indo-European past that was to have great impact on later Indian civilization in the formation of the caste system. The ideal arrangement, which myths and ritual formulas propounded and society was to reflect, called for three social “functions”: the priests, the warriors, and the agriculturalist-stockbreeders. Early Vedic hymns already speak of three such interacting social groups, plus a fourth—the indigenous population of *dāsa*, or *dasyu* (literally, “slaves,” first mythologized as demon foes of the Aryans and their gods). By the time of the late *R̥gveda*, these peoples were recognized as a fourth “class” or “caste” in the total society and were known as *śūdras*.

Most crucial to the inspiration of the early Vedic religion, however, was the interaction between the first two groups: the priesthood, organized around sacerdotal schools maintained through family and clan lines, and a warrior component, originally led by chieftains of the mobile tribal communities but from the beginning concerned with an ideal of kingship that soon took on more local forms. Whereas the priests served as repositories of sacred lore, poetry, ritual technique, and mystical speculation, the warriors served as patrons of the rites and ceremonies of the priests and as sponsors of their poetry. These two groups, ideally complementary but often having rival interests, crystallized by late Vedic and Brahmanic times into distinct “classes”: the *brāhmanaṣas* (priests) and the *kṣatriyas* (warriors).

Although the *R̥gveda* alludes to numerous details of ritual that soon came to be systematized in the religion of the *Brāhmanaṣas*, it brings ritual into relief only secondarily. The primary focus of the 1,028 hymns of the *R̥gveda* is on praising the gods and the cosmic order (*ṛta*), which they protect. But insofar as the hymns invoke the gods to attend the sacrifice, there is abundant interest in two deities of essentially ritual character: Agni and Soma. Agni (Fire) is more specifically the god of the sacrificial fire who receives offerings to the gods and conveys them heavenward through the smoke. And Soma is the divinized plant of “nondeath” (*amṛta*), or immortality, whose juices are ritually extracted in the *soma* sacrifice, a central feature of many Vedic and Brahmanic rituals. These two gods, significantly close to humankind, are mediators between humans and other gods. But they are especially praised for their capacity to inspire in the poets the special “vision” (*dhī*) that stimulates the composition of the Vedic hymns. Agni, who as a god of fire and light is present in the three Vedic worlds (as fire on earth, lightning in the

atmosphere, and the sun in heaven), bestows vision through “illumination” into the analogical connections and equivalences that compose the *ṛta* (which is itself said to have a luminous nature). *Soma*, the extracted and purified juice of the “plant of immortality,” possibly the hallucinogenic fly agaric mushroom, yields a “purified” vision that is described as “enthused” or “intoxicated,” tremulous or vibrant, again stimulating the inspiration for poetry. The Vedic poet (*kavi*, *ṛṣi*, or *vipra*) was thus a “seer,” or seer, who translated his vision into speech, thus producing the sacred *mantras*, or verse-prayers, that comprise the Vedic hymns. Vedic utterance, itself hypostatized as the goddess Vāc (Speech), is thus the crystallization of this vision.

Vedic religion is decidedly polytheistic, there being far more than the so-called thirty-three gods, the number to which they are sometimes reduced. Though the point is controversial, for the sake of simplification one can say that at the core or “axis” of the pantheon there are certain deities with clear Indo-European or at least Indo-Iranian backgrounds: the liturgical gods Agni and Soma (cf. the Avestan deity Haoma) and the deities who oversee the three “functions” on the cosmic scale: the cosmic sovereign gods Varuṇa and Mitra, the warrior god Indra, and the *Aśvins*, twin horsemen concerned with pastoralism, among other things. Intersecting this structure is an opposition of Indo-Iranian background between *devas* and *asuras*. In the *R̥gveda* both terms may refer to ranks among the gods, with *asura* being higher and more primal. But *asura* also has the Vedic meaning of “demon,” which it retains in later Hinduism, so that the *devaasura* opposition also takes on dualistic overtones. Varuṇa is the *asura par excellence*, whereas Indra is the leader of the *devas*. These two deities are thus sometimes in opposition and sometimes in complementary roles: Varuṇa being the remote overseer of the cosmic order (*ṛta*) and punisher of individual human sins that violate it; Indra being the dynamic creator and upholder of that order, leader of the perennial fight against the collective demonic forces, both human and divine, that oppose it. It is particularly his conquest of the *asura* Vṛtra (“encloser”)—whose name suggests ambiguous etymological connections with Varuṇa—that creates order or being (*sat*, analogous to *ṛta*) out of chaos or nonbeing (*asat*) and opens cosmic and earthly space for “freedom of movement” (*varivas*) by gods and humans. Considerable attention is also devoted to three solar deities whose freedom of movement, thus secured, is a manifestation of the *ṛta*, a prominent analogy for which is the solar wheel: Sūrya and Savitṛ (the Sun under different aspects) and Uṣas (charming goddess of the dawn). Other highly significant deities are Yama, god of the dead, and Vāyu, god of wind and breath. It is often pointed out that the gods who become most important in later Hinduism—Viṣṇu, Śiva (Vedic Rudra), and the Goddess—are statistically rather insignificant in the Veda, for few hymns are devoted to them. But the content rather than the quantity of the references hints at their significance. Viṣṇu’s centrality and cosmological ultimacy, Rudra’s destructive power and outsiderhood, and the this-

worldly dynamic aspects of several goddesses are traits that assume great proportions in later characterizations of these deities.

Although it is thus possible to outline certain structural and historical features that go into the makeup of the Vedic pantheon, it is important to recognize that these are obscured by certain features of the hymns that arise from the type of religious “vision” that inspired them, and that provide the basis for speculative and philosophical trends that emerge in the late Veda and continue into the early Brahmanic tradition. The hymns glorify the god they address in terms generally applicable to other gods (brilliance, power, beneficence, wisdom) and often endow him or her with mythical traits and actions particular to other gods (supporting heaven, preparing the sun’s path, slaying Vṛtra, and so on). Thus, while homologies and “connections” between the gods are envisioned, essential distinctions between them are implicitly denied. Speculation on what *is* essential—not only as concerns the gods, but the ritual and the *mantras* that invoke them—is thus initiated in the poetic process of the early hymns and gains in urgency and refinement in late portions of the *Rgveda* and the subsequent “Vedic” speculative-philosophical literature that culminates in the Upaniṣads. Most important of these speculations historically were those concerning the cosmogonic sacrifices of Puruṣa in *Rgveda* 10.90 (the *Puruṣasūkta*, accounting for, among other things, the origin of the four castes) and of Prajāpati in the Brāhamaṇas. Each must be discussed further. In addition, speculations on *brahman* as the power inherent in holy speech and on the *ātman* (“self”) as the irreducible element of personal experience are both traceable to Vedic writings (the latter to the *Atharvaveda* only). This article shall observe the convergence of all these lines of speculation in the Upaniṣads and classical Hinduism.

**RELIGION OF THE BRĀHAMAṆAS.** The elaboration of Vedic religion into the sacrificial religion of the Brāhamaṇas is largely a result of systematization. The first indication of this trend is the compilation of the liturgical *Samhitās* and the development of the distinctive priestly schools and interests that produced these compendiums. Thus, while the *Rgveda* became the province of the *hotṛ* priest, the pourer of oblations and invoker of gods through the *mantras* (the term *hotṛ*, “pourer,” figures often in the *Rgveda* and has Indo-Iranian origins), the newer collections developed around the concerns of specialist priests barely alluded to in the *Rgveda* and serving originally in subordinate ritual roles. The *Sāmaveda* was a collection of verses taken mostly from the *Rgveda*, set to various melodies (*sāmans*) for use mainly in the *soma* sacrifice, and sung primarily by the *udgātṛ* priest, who thus came to surpass the *hotṛ* as a specialist in the sound and articulation of the *mantras*. And the *Yajurveda* was a collection of *yajus*, selected sacrificial *mantras*, again mostly from the *Rgveda*, plus certain complete sentences, to be murmured by the *adhvaryu* priest, who concerned himself not so much with their sound as with their appropriateness in the ritual, in which he became effectively the master of cere-

monies, responsible for carrying out all the basic manual operations, even replacing the *hotṛ* priest as pourer of oblations. A fourth group of priests, the *brāhamaṇas*, then claimed affiliation with the *Atharvaveda* and assumed the responsibility for overseeing the entire ritual performance of the other priests and counteracting any of their mistakes (they were supposed to know the other three Vedas as well as their own) by silent recitation of *mantras* from the *Atharvaveda*. As specialization increased, each priest of these four main classes took on three main assistants.

The Brāhamaṇas—expositions of *brahman*, the sacred power inherent in *mantra* and more specifically now in the ritual—are the outgrowth of the concerns of these distinctive priestly schools and the first articulation of their religion. Each class of priests developed its own Brāhamaṇas, the most important and comprehensive being the *Satapatha Brāhamaṇa* of one of the *Yajurveda* schools. The ritual system was also further refined in additional manuals: the *Śrautasūtras*, concerned with “solemn” rites, first described in the Brāhamaṇas and thus called *śrauta* because of their provenance in these *śruti* texts, and the *Gṛhyasūtras*, concerned with domestic rites (from *gr̥ha*, “home”), justified by “tradition” (*smṛti*) but still having much of Vedic origins. The *Śrautasūtras* were compiled over the period, roughly, from the Brāhamaṇas to the Upaniṣads, and the *Gṛhyasūtras* were probably compiled during Upaniṣadic times.

The domestic rites take place at a single offering fire and usually involve offerings of only grain or ghee (clarified butter). Along with the maintenance of the household fire and the performance of the so-called Five Great Sacrifices—to *brahman* (in the form of Vedic recitation), to ancestors, to gods, to other “beings,” and to humans (hospitality rites)—the most prominent *gr̥hya* ceremonies are the sacraments or life-cycle rites (*saṃskāras*). Of these, the most important are the rites of conception and birth of a male child; the Upanayana, or “introduction,” of boys to a *brāhamaṇa* preceptor or *guru* for initiation; marriage; and death by cremation (*Antyeṣṭi*, “final offering”). The Upanayana, involving the investiture of boys of the upper three social classes (*varṇas*) with a sacred thread, conferred on them the status of “twice-born” (*dvija*, a term first used in the *Atharvaveda*), and their “second birth” permitted them to hear the Veda and thereby participate in the *śrauta* rites that, according to the emerging Brahmanic orthodoxy, would make it possible to obtain immortality.

The *śrauta* rites are more elaborate and are representative of the sacrificial system in its full complexity, involving ceremonies that lasted up to two years and enlisted as many as seventeen priests. Through the continued performance of daily, bimonthly, and seasonal *śrauta* rites one gains the year, which is itself identified with the sacrificial life-death-regeneration round and its divine personification, Prajāpati. In surpassing the year by the Agnicayana, the “piling of the fire altar,” one gains immortality and needs no more nourishment in the otherworld (see *Satapatha Brāhamaṇa* 10.1.5.4).

*Śrauta* rites required a sacrificial terrain near the home of the sacrificer (*yajamāna*), with three sacred fires (representing, among other things, the three worlds) and an upraised altar, or *vedī*. Nonanimal sacrifices of the first varieties mentioned involved offerings of milk and vegetable substances or even of *mantras*. Animal sacrifices (*paśubandhu*)—which required a more elaborate sacrificial area with a supplemental altar and a sacrificial stake (*yūpā*)—entailed primarily the sacrifice of a goat. Five male animals—man, horse, bull, ram, and goat—are declared suitable for sacrifice. It is likely, however, that human sacrifice existed only on the “ideal” plane, where it was personified in the cosmic sacrifices of Puruṣa and Prajāpati. The animal (*paśu*) was to be immolated by strangulation, and its omentum, rich in fat, offered into the fire. *Soma* sacrifices, which would normally incorporate animal sacrifices within them plus a vast number of other subrites, involved the pressing and offering of *soma*. The most basic of these was the annual Agniṣtoma, “in praise of Agni,” a four-day rite culminating in morning, afternoon, and evening *soma* pressings on the final day and including two goat sacrifices. Three of the most ambitious *soma* sacrifices were royal rites: the Aśvamedha, the horse sacrifice; the Rājasūya, royal consecration; and the Vājapeya, a *soma* sacrifice of the “drink of strength.” But the most complex of all was the aforementioned Agnicayana.

A thread that runs through most *śrauta* rituals, however, is that they must begin with the “faith” or “confidence” (*śrāddha*) of the sacrificer in the efficacy of the rite and the capacity of the officiating priests to perform it correctly. This prepares the sacrificer for the consecration (*dīkṣā*) in which, through acts of asceticism (*tapas*), he takes on the aspect of an embryo to be reborn through the rite. As *dīkṣita* (one undergoing the *dīkṣā*), he makes an offering of himself (his *ātman*). This then prepares him to make the sacrificial offering proper (the *yajña*, “sacrifice”) as a means to redeem or ransom this self by the substance (animal or otherwise) offered. Then, reversing the concentration of power that he has amassed in the *dīkṣā*, he disperses wealth in the form of *dakṣiṇās* (honoraria) to the priests. Finally, the rite is disassembled (the ritual analogue to the repeated death of Prajāpati before his reconstitution in another rite), and the sacrificer and his wife bathe to disengage themselves from the sacrifice and reenter the profane world.

In the elaboration of such ceremonies and the speculative explanation of them in the Brāhmaṇas, the earlier Vedic religion seems to have been much altered. In the religion of the Brāhmaṇas, the priests, as “those who know thus” (*evamvids*), view themselves as more powerful than the gods. Meanwhile, the gods and the demons (*asuras*) are reduced to representing in their endless conflicts the recurrent interplay between agonistic forces in the sacrifice. It is their father, Prajāpati, who crystallizes the concerns of Brahmanic thought by representing the sacrifice in all its aspects and processes. Most notable of these is the notion of the assembly or fabrication of an immortal self (*ātman*) through ritual ac-

tion (*karman*), a self constructed for the sacrificer by which he identifies with the immortal essence of Prajāpati as the sacrifice personified. And by the same token, the recurrent death (*punarṁṛtyu*, “redeath”) of Prajāpati’s transitory nature (the elements of the sacrifice that are assembled and disassembled) figures in the Brāhmaṇas as the object to be avoided for the sacrificer by the correct ritual performance. This Brahmanic concept of Prajāpati’s redeath, along with speculation on the ancestral *gr̥hya* rites (*śrāddhas*) focused on feeding deceased relatives to sustain them in the afterlife, must have been factors in the thinking that gave rise to the Upaniṣadic concept of reincarnation (*punarjanman*, “rebirth”). The emphasis on the morbid and transitory aspects of Prajāpati and the sacrifice, and the insistence that asceticism within the sacrifice is the main means to overcome them, are most vigorously propounded in connection with the Agnicayana.

In the Brāhmaṇas’ recasting of the primal once-and-for-all sacrifice of Puruṣa into the recurrent life-death-regeneration mythology of Prajāpati, a different theology was introduced. Though sometimes Puruṣa was identified with Prajāpati, the latter, bound to the round of creation and destruction, became the prototype for the classical god Brahṁā, personification of the Absolute (*brahman*) as it is oriented toward the world. The concept of a transcendent Puruṣa, however, was not forgotten in the Brāhmaṇas. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 13.6 mentions Puruṣa-Nārāyaṇa, a being who seeks to surpass all others through sacrifice and thereby become the universe. In classical Hinduism, *Nārāyaṇa* and *Puruṣa* are both names for Viṣṇu as the supreme divinity. This Brāhmaṇa passage neither authorizes nor disallows an identification with Viṣṇu, but other Brāhmaṇa passages leave no doubt that sacrificial formulations have given Viṣṇu and Rudra-Śiva a new status. Whereas the Brāhmaṇas repeatedly assert that “Viṣṇu is the sacrifice”—principally in terms of the organization of sacrificial space that is brought about through Viṣṇu’s three steps through the cosmos, and his promotion of the order and prosperity that thus accrue—they portray Rudra as the essential outsider to this sacrificial order, the one who neutralizes the impure forces that threaten it from outside as well as the violence that is inherent within. Biardeau (1976) has been able to show that the later elevation of Viṣṇu and Śiva through yoga and *bhakti* is rooted in oppositional complementarities first formulated in the context of the Brahmanic sacrifice.

**THE UPANIṢADS.** Several trends contributed to the emergence of the Upaniṣadic outlook. Earlier speculations on the irreducible essence of the cosmos, the sacrifice, and individual experience have been mentioned. Pre-Upaniṣadic texts also refer to various forms of asceticism as performed by types of people who in one way or another rejected or inverted conventional social norms: the Vedic *muni*, *vrātya*, and *brahmacārin*, to each of whom is ascribed ecstatic capacities, and, at the very heart of the Brahmanic sacrifice, the *dīkṣita* (the sacrificer who performs *tapas* while undergoing the *dīkṣā*, or consecration). These speculative and ascetic trends

all make contributions to a class of texts generally regarded as intermediary between the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads: the Āraṇyakas, or “Forest Books.” The Āraṇyakas do not differ markedly from the works that precede and succeed them (the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is both an Āraṇyaka and an Upaniṣad), but their transitional character is marked by a shift in the sacrificial setting from domestic surroundings to the forest and a focus not so much on the details of ritual as on its interiorization and universalization. Sacrifice, for instance, is likened to the alternation that takes place between breathing and speaking. Thus correspondences are established between aspects of sacrifice and the life continuum of the meditator.

An *upaniṣad* is literally a mystical—often “secret”—“connection,” interpreted as the teaching of mystical homologies. Or, in a more conventional etymology, it is the “sitting down” of a disciple “near to” (*upa*, “near”; *ni*, “down”; *sad*, “sit”) his spiritual master, or *guru*. Each Upaniṣad reflects the Vedic orientation of its priestly school. There are also regional orientations, for Upaniṣadic geography registers the further eastern settlement of the Vedic tradition into areas of the Ganges Basin. But the Upaniṣads do share certain fundamental points of outlook that are more basic than their differences. Vedic polytheism is demythologized, for all gods are reducible to one. Brahmanic ritualism is reassessed and its understanding of ritual action (*karman*) thoroughly reinterpreted. *Karman* can no longer be regarded as a positive means to the constitution of a permanent self. Rather, it is ultimately negative: “the world that is won by work (*karman*)” and “the world that is won by merit (*puṇya*)” only perish (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.1.6). The “law of karma” (*karman*) or “law of causality” represents a strict and universal cause-effect continuum that affects any action that is motivated by desire (*kāma*), whether it be desire for good or for ill. Thus even meritorious actions that lead to the Vedic heaven “perish,” leaving a momentum that carries the individual to additional births or reincarnations. The result is perpetual bondage to the universal flow-continuum of all *karman*, or *saṃsāra* (from *saṃ*, “together” and *sr*, “flow”), a term that the Upaniṣads introduce into the Vedic tradition but that is shared with Jainism and Buddhism. As with these religions, the Upaniṣads and Hinduism henceforth conceive their soteriological goal as liberation from this cycle of *saṃsāra*: that is, *mokṣa* or *mukti* (“release”).

*Mokṣa* cannot be achieved by action alone, because action only leads to further action. Thus, though ritual action is not generally rejected and is often still encouraged in the Upaniṣads, it can only be subordinated to pursuit of the higher *mokṣa* ideal. Rather, the new emphasis is on knowledge (*vidyā*, *jñāna*) and the overcoming of ignorance (*avidyā*). The knowledge sought, however, is not that of ritual technique or even of ritual-based homologies, but a graspable, revelatory, and experiential knowledge of the self as one with ultimate reality. In the early Upaniṣads this experience is formulated as the realization of the ultimate “connection,”

the oneness of *ātman-brahman*, a connection knowable only in the context of communication from *guru* to disciple. (Herein can be seen the basis of the parable context and vivid, immediate imagery of many Upaniṣadic teachings.) The experience thus achieved is variously described as one of unified consciousness, fearlessness, bliss, and tranquillity.

Beyond these common themes, however, and despite the fact that Upaniṣadic thought is resistant to systematization, certain different strains can be identified. Of the thirteen Upaniṣads usually counted as *śruti*, the earliest (c. 700–500 BCE) are those in prose, headed by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya*. Generally, it may be said that these Upaniṣads introduce the formulations that later Hinduism will develop into the *saṃnyāsa* ideal of renunciation (not yet defined in the Upaniṣads as a fourth stage of life) and the knowledge-path outlook of nondualistic (*advaita*) Vedānta. Even within these early Upaniṣads, two approaches to realization can be distinguished. One refers to an all-excluding Absolute; the self that is identified with *brahman*, characterized as *neti neti* (“not this, not this”), is reached through a paring away of the psychomental continuum and its links with *karman*. Such an approach dominates the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. *Avidyā* here results from regarding the name and form of things as real and forming attachment to them. The other approach involves an all-comprehensive Absolute, *brahman-ātman*, which penetrates the world so that all forms are modifications of the one; ignorance results from the failure to experience this immediacy. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* this second approach is epitomized in the persistent formula “*Tat tvam asi*” (“That thou art”).

The later Vedic Upaniṣads (c. 600–400 BCE) register the first impact of theistic devotional formulations, and of early Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Most important of these historically are two “yogic” Upaniṣads, the *Śvetāśvatara* and the *Kaṭha*, the first focused on Rudra-Śiva and the second on Viṣṇu. Each incorporates into its terminology for the absolute deity the earlier term *puruṣa*. As Biarreau has shown in *L'hindouisme* (1981), they thus draw on an alternate term for the Absolute from that made current in the *brahman-ātman* equation. The *Puruṣa* of *R̥gveda* 10.90 (the *Puruṣasūkta*) is sacrificed to create the ordered and integrated sociocosmic world of Vedic man. But only one quarter of this *Puruṣa* is “all beings”; three quarters are “the immortal in heaven” (*RV* 10.90.3). This transcendent aspect of *Puruṣa*, and also a certain “personal” dimension, are traits that were retained in the characterization of *Puruṣa-Nārāyaṇa* in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and reinforced in the yogic characterizations of Rudra-Śiva and Viṣṇu in the previously mentioned Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣadic texts do not restrict the usage of the term *Puruṣa* to mean “soul,” as classical Sāṃkhya later does; rather, it is used to refer to both the soul and the supreme divinity. The relation between the soul and the Absolute is thus doubly defined: on the one hand as *ātman-brahman*, on the other as *puruṣa-Puruṣa*. In the latter case, the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* describes a spiritual itinerary of the soul’s ascent through yogic



states to the supreme Puruṣa, Viṣṇu. This synthesis of yoga and *bhakti* will be carried forward into the devotional formulations of the epics and the Purāṇas. But one must note that the two vocabularies are used concurrently and interrelatedly in the Upaniṣads, as they will be in the later *bhakti* formulations.

**THE CONSOLIDATION OF CLASSICAL HINDUISM.** A period of consolidation, sometimes identified as one of “Hindu synthesis,” “Brahmanic synthesis,” or “orthodox synthesis,” takes place between the time of the late Vedic Upaniṣads (c. 500 BCE) and the period of Gupta imperial ascendancy (c. 320–467 CE). Discussion of this consolidation, however, is initially complicated by a lack of historiographical categories adequate to the task of integrating the diverse textual, inscriptional, and archaeological data of this long formative period. The attempt to cover as much of this span as possible with the name “epic period,” because it coincides with the dates that are usually assigned to the formation and completion of the Hindu epics (particularly the *Mahābhārata*), is misleading, because so much of what transpires can hardly be labeled “epic.” On the other hand, attempts to define the period in terms of heterogeneous forces operating upon Hinduism from within (assimilation of local deities and cults, geographical spread) and without (heterodox and foreign challenges) either have failed to register or have misrepresented the implications of the apparent fact that the epics were “works in progress” during the whole period. The view one takes of the epics is, in fact, crucial for the interpretation of Hinduism during this period. Here, assuming that the epics already incorporated a *bhakti* cosmology and theology from an early point in this formative period, this article shall try to place them in relation to other works and formulations that contributed to the consolidation of classical Hinduism.

The overall history can be broken down into four periods characterized by an oscillation from disunity (rival regional kingdoms and tribal confederacies on the Ganges Plain) to unity (Mauryan ascendancy, c. 324–184 BCE, including the imperial patronage of Buddhism by Aśoka) to disunity (rival foreign kingdoms in Northwest India and regional kingdoms elsewhere) back to unity (Gupta ascendancy, c. 320–467 CE). The emerging self-definitions of Hinduism were forged in the context of continued interaction with heterodox religions (Buddhists, Jains, Ājīvikas) throughout this whole period, and with foreign peoples (Yavanas, or Greeks; Śakas, or Scythians; Pahlavas, or Parthians; and Kūṣāṇas, or Kushans) from the third phase on. In this climate the *ideal* of centralized Hindu rule attained no practical realization until the rise of the Guptas. That this ideal preceded its realization is evident in the rituals of royal paramountcy (Aśvamedha and Rājasūya) that were set out in the Brāhmaṇas and the Śrautasūtras, and actually performed by post-Mauryan regional Hindu kings.

When one looks to the component facets of the overall consolidation, these four periods must be kept in mind, but with the proviso that datings continue to be problematic: not

only datings of texts, but especially of religious movements and processes reflected in them, and in surviving inscriptions. Most scholars ordinarily assume that when a process is referred to in a text or other document, it has gone on for some time.

**Śruti and smṛti.** Fundamental to the self-definition of Hinduism during this period of its consolidation is the distinction it makes between two classes of its literature: *śruti* and *smṛti*. *Śruti* is “what is heard,” and refers to the whole corpus of Vedic literature (also called Veda) from the four Vedas to the Upaniṣads. *Smṛti*, “what is remembered” or “tradition,” includes all that falls outside this literature. Exactly when this distinction was made is not certain, but it is noteworthy that the six Vedāṅgas or “limbs of the Veda” (writings on phonetics, metrics, grammar, etymology, astronomy, and ritual) are *smṛti* texts that were composed at least in part during the latter half of the Vedic or *śruti* period. The ritual texts (Kalpasūtras) are subdivided into three categories: Śrautasūtras, Gṛhyasūtras, and Dharmasūtras. Whereas the first two (discussed above under Brahmanic ritual) pertain to concerns developed in the Vedic period, the Dharmasūtras focus on issues of law (*dharma*) that become characteristic of the period now under discussion. Dates given for the composition of these texts run from 600 to 300 BCE for the earliest (*Gautama Dharmasūtra*) to 400 CE for the more recent works. Both Gṛhyasūtras and Dharmasūtras were sometimes called Smārtasūtras (i.e., *sūtras* based on *smṛti*), so it seems that their authors regarded them as representative of the prolongation of Vedic orthodoxy (and orthopraxy) that the *smṛti* category was designed to achieve. As the term *smṛti* was extended in its use, however, it also came to cover numerous other texts composed in the post-Upaniṣadic period.

This *śruti/smṛti* distinction thus marks off the earlier literature as a unique corpus that, once the distinction was made, was retrospectively sanctified. By the time of the *Manāva Dharmasāstra*, or *Laws of Manu* (c. 200 BCE–100 CE; see *Manu* 1.23), and probably before this, *śruti* had come to be regarded as “eternal.” Its components were thus not works of history. The Vedic ṛṣis had “heard” truths that are eternal, and not only in content—the words of the Vedas are stated to have eternal connection with their meanings—but also in form. The works thus bear no stamp of the ṛṣis’ individuality. Such thinking crystallized in the further doctrine that the Vedas (i.e., *śruti*) are *apauruṣeya*, not of personal authorship (literally, “not by a *puruṣa*”). They thus have no human imperfection. Further, it was argued that they are even beyond the authorship of a divine “person” (*Puruṣa*). Though myths of the period assert that the Vedas spring from Brahmā at the beginning of each creation (as the three Vedas spring from Puruṣa in the *Puruṣasūkta*), the deity is not their author. Merely reborn with him, they are a self-revelation of the impersonal *brahman*. In contrast to *śruti*, *smṛti* texts were seen as historical or “traditional,” passed on by “memory” (*smṛti*), and as works of individual authors



(*pauruṣeya*), even though mythical authors—both human and divine—often had to be invented for them.

*Smṛti* texts of this period thus proclaim the authority of the Veda in many ways, and nonrejection of the Veda comes to be one of the most important touchstones for defining Hinduism over and against the heterodoxies, which rejected the Veda. In fact, it is quite likely that the doctrines of the eternality and impersonality of the Veda were in part designed to assert the superiority of the Veda over the “authored” and “historical” works of the heterodoxies, whose teachings would thus be on a par with *smṛti* rather than *śruti*. But it is also likely that the *apauruṣeya* doctrine is designed to relativize the “personal” god of *bhakti*. In any case, these doctrines served to place a considerable ideological distance between *śruti* and *smṛti*, and to allow *smṛti* authors great latitude in interpreting *śruti* and extending Hindu teachings into new areas. *Smṛti* thus supposedly functioned to clarify the obscurities of the Veda. But the claim that *smṛti* texts need only not contradict the Veda left their authors great freedom in pursuing new formulations.

**Varnāśramadharmā (“caste and life-stage law”).** The most representative corpus of *smṛti* literature, and the most closely tied to the continued unfolding orthodox interests of the Vedic priestly schools, is that concerned with *dharma* (“law” or “duty”). As a literary corpus, it consists of two kinds of texts: the Dharmasūtras (600/300 BCE–400 CE), already mentioned in connection with the *śruti/smṛti* distinction, and the Dharmasāstras. The most important and earliest of the latter are the *Mānava Dharmasāstra*, or *Laws of Manu* (c. 200 BCE–100 CE), and the *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* (c. 100–300 CE). But other Dharmasāstras were composed late into the first millennium, to be followed by important commentaries on all such texts. The main focus of these two classes of texts is fundamentally identical: the articulation of norms for all forms of social interaction, thus including but going far beyond the earlier Sūtras’ concern for ritual. Four differences, however, are noteworthy: (1) Whereas the Dharmasūtras are in prose, the Dharmasāstras are in the same poetic meter as the epics, *Manu* in particular having much material in common with the *Mahābhārata*. (2) Whereas the Sūtras are still linked with the Vedic schools, the Sāstras are not, showing that study and teaching of *dharma* had come to be an independent discipline of its own. (3) The Sāstra legislation is more extended and comprehensive. (4) The Sāstras are more integrated into a mythic and cosmological vision akin to that in *bhakti* texts, but usually ignoring *bhakti* as such, with references to duties appropriate to different *yugas* (ages), and the identification of north central India as the “middle region” (*madhyadeśa*) where the *dharma* is (and is to be kept) the purest.

The theory of *varnāśramadharmā*, the law of castes and life stages, was worked out in these texts as a model for the whole of Hindu society. There is little doubt that it was stimulated by the alternate lay/monastic social models of the heterodoxies, and no doubt that it was spurred on by the

incurſions of barbarian peoples—frequently named in these texts as *mlecchas* (those who “jabber”)—into the Northwest. The model involves the working out of the correlations between two ideals: first, that society conform to four hierarchical castes, and second, that a person should pass through four life stages (*āśramas*): student (*brahmacārin*), householder (*gṛhasthīn*), forest dweller (*vānaprasthīn*), and renunciant (*saṃnyāsīn*). The first ideal is rooted in the *Puruṣasūkta*. The second presupposes the *śruti* corpus, because the four life stages are correlated with the four classes of *śruti* texts. Thus the student learns one of the Vedas, the householder performs domestic and optimally also *śrauta* rituals of the Brāhamaṇas, the forest dweller follows the teachings of the Āraṇyakas, and the *saṃnyāsīn* follows a path of renunciation toward the Upaniṣadic goal of *mokṣa*. But although all the life stages are either mentioned (as are the first two) or implied in the *śruti* corpus, the theory that they should govern the ideal course of individual life is new to the Dharmasūtras. Together, the *varṇa* and *āśrama* ideals take on tremendous complexity, because a person’s duties vary according to caste and stage of life, not to mention other factors like sex, family, region, and the quality of the times. Also, whereas a person’s development through one life ideally is regulated by the *āśrama* ideal, the passage through many reincarnations would involve birth into different castes, the caste of one’s birth being the result of previous *karman*. A further implication is that the life stages can be properly pursued only by male members of the three twice-born *varṇas*, as they alone can undergo the Upanayana ritual that begins the student stage and allows the performance of the rites pertinent to succeeding stages.

Each of these formulations has persisted more on the ideal plane than the real. In the case of the four *āśramas*, most people never went beyond the householder stage, which the Sūtras and Sāstras actually exalt as the most important of the four, because it is the support of the other three and, in more general terms, the mainstay of the society. The forest-dweller stage may soon have become more legendary than real: In epic stories it was projected onto the Vedic *ṛṣis*. The main tension, however, that persists in orthodox Hinduism is that between the householder and the renunciant, the challenge being for anyone to integrate into one lifetime these two ideals, which the heterodoxies set out for separate lay and monastic communities.

As to the four *varṇas*, the ideal represents society as working to the reciprocal advantage of all the castes, each one having duties necessary to the proper functioning of the whole and the perpetuation of the hierarchical principle that defines the whole. Thus Brāhamaṇas are at the top, distinguished by three duties that they share with no other caste: teaching the Veda, assisting in sacrifice, and accepting gifts. They are said to have no king but Soma, god of the sacrifice. In actual fact the traditional *śrauta* sacrifice counted for less and less in the *brāhamaṇa* householder life, and increasing attention was given to the maintenance of *brāhamaṇa* purity

for the purpose of domestic and eventually temple rituals that, in effect, universalized sacrifice as the *brāhamaṇa's* *dharma*, but a sacrifice that required only the minimum of impure violence. This quest for purity was reinforced by *brāhamaṇas'* adoption into their householder life of aspects of the *saṃnyāsa* ideal of renunciation. This was focused especially on increasing espousal of the doctrine of *ahiṃsā* (non-violence, or, more literally, “not desiring to kill”) and was applied practically to vegetarianism, which becomes during this period the *brāhamaṇa* norm. *Brāhamaṇas* thus retain higher rank than *kṣatriyas*, even though the latter wield temporal power (*kṣātra*) and have the specific and potentially impure duties of bearing weapons and protecting and punishing with the royal staff (*daṇḍa*). The subordination of king to *brāhamaṇa* involves a subordination of power to hierarchy that is duplicated in contemporary rural and regional terms in the practice of ranking *brāhamaṇas* above locally dominant castes whose power lies in their landed wealth and numbers. *Vaiśyas* have the duties of stock breeding, agriculture, and commerce (including money lending). Certain duties then distinguished the three twice-born castes as a group from the *śūdras*. All three upper *varṇas* thus study the Veda, perform sacrifices, and make gifts, whereas *śūdras* are permitted only lesser sacrifices (*pākayajñas*) and simplified domestic rituals that do not require Vedic recitation.

Actual conditions, however, were (and still are) much more complex. The four-*varṇa* model provided the authors of the *dharma* texts with Vedic “categories” within which to assign a basically unlimited variety of heterogeneous social entities including indigenous tribes, barbarian invaders, artisan communities and guilds (*śreṇis*), and specialists in various services. Susceptible to further refinement in ranking and regional nomenclature, all such groups were called *jātis*, a term meaning “birth” and in functional terms the proper word to be translated “caste.” Thus, although they are frequently called subcastes, the *jātis* are the castes proper that the law books classified into the “categories” of *varṇa*.

To account for this proliferation of *jātis*, the authors asserted that they arose from cross-breeding of the *varṇas*. Two possibilities were thus presented: *anuloma* (“with the grain”) unions, in which the husband’s *varṇa* was the same as his wife’s or higher (in anthropological terms, hypergamous, in which women are “married up”), and *pratiloma* (“against the grain”) unions, in which the wife’s *varṇa* would be higher than the husband’s (hypogamous, in which women are “married down”). Endogamous marriage (marriage within one’s own *varṇa*) set the highest standard and was according to some authorities the only true marriage. But of the other two, whereas *anuloma* marriages were permitted, *pratiloma* unions brought disgrace. Thus the *jātis* supposedly born from *anuloma* unions were less disgraced than those born from *pratiloma* unions. Significantly, two of the most problematic *jātis* were said to have been born from the most debased *pratiloma* connections: the Yavanas (Greeks) from *śūdra* males and *kṣatriya* females (similar origins were as-

cribed to other “barbarians”) and the *caṇḍālas* (lowest of the low, mentioned already in the Upaniṣads, and early Buddhist literature, as a “fifth caste” of untouchables) from the polluting contact of *śūdra* males and *brāhamaṇa* females. It should be noted that a major implication of the prohibition of *pratiloma* marriage is the limitation for *brāhamaṇa* women to marriages with only *brāhamaṇa* men. This established at the highest rank an association of caste purity with caste endogamy (and the purity of a caste’s women) and thus initiated an endogamous standard that was adopted by all castes—not just *varṇas* but *jātis*—by the end of the first millennium.

This accounting of the emergence of *jātis* was integrated with further explanations of how society had departed from its ideal. One is that “mixing of caste”—the great abomination of the *dharma* texts and also of the *Bhagavad-gītā*—increases with the decline of *dharma* from *yuga* to *yuga*, and is especially pernicious in this Kali age. Another is the doctrine of *āpad dharma*, “duties for times of distress” such as permit inversion of caste roles when life is threatened. A third doctrine developed in the Dharmaśāstras identifies certain duties (*kalivarjyas*) as once allowed but now prohibited in the *kaliyuga* because people are no longer capable of performing them purely. Through all this, however, the ideal persists as one that embraces a whole society despite variations over time and space.

**The four puruṣārthas (goals of humankind).** The theory that the integrated life involves the pursuit of four goals (*arthas*) is first presented in the Dharmaśāstras and the epics, in the latter cases through repeated narrative illustrations. The development of distinctive technical interpretations of each *artha*, or facets thereof, can also be followed during the period in separate manuals: the *Arthaśāstra*, a manual on statecraft attributed to Candragupta Maurya’s minister Kauṭilya but probably dating from several centuries later, on *artha* (in the sense now of “material pursuits”); the Kāmasūtras, most notably that of Vātsyāyana (c. 400 CE), on *kāma* (“love, desire”); the already discussed Dharmasūtras and Dharmaśāstras on *dharma*; and the Sūtras of the “philosophical schools” (*darśanas*) insofar as they are concerned with the fourth goal, *mokṣa*. Early sources often refer to the first three goals as the *trivarga*, the “three categories,” but this need not imply that the fourth goal is added later. The Dharmaśāstra and epic texts that mention the *trivarga* are focused on the concerns of the householder—and, in the epics, particularly of the royal householder—these being the context for the pursuit of the *trivarga*. The fourth goal, *mokṣa*, is to be pursued throughout life—indeed, throughout all lives—but is especially the goal of those who have entered the fourth life stage of the *saṃnyāsin*. The *trivarga-mokṣa* opposition thus replicates the householder-renunciant opposition. But the overall purpose of the *puruṣārtha* formulation is integrative and complementary to the *varṇāśramadharmā* theory. From the angle of the householder, it is *dharma* that integrates the *trivarga* as a basis for *mokṣa*. But from the angle of the *saṃnyāsin*, it is *kāma* that lies at the root of the *trivar-*

ga, representing attachment in all forms, even to *dharma*. Paths to liberation will thus focus on detachment from desire, or its transformation into love of God.

**Philosophical “viewpoints” (darśanas) and paths to salvation.** As an expression of Hinduism’s increasing concern to systematize its teachings, the fourth goal of life (*mokṣa*) was made the subject of efforts to develop distinctly Hindu philosophical “viewpoints” (*darśanas*, from the root *drś*, “see”) on the nature of reality and to recommend paths to its apprehension and the release from bondage to *karman*. Six Hindu *darśanas* were defined, and during the period in question each produced fundamental texts—in most cases *sūtras*—that served as the bases for later commentaries.

In terms of mainstream developments within Hinduism, only two schools have ongoing continuity into the present: the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta. And of these, only the latter has unfolded in important ways in the postsynthesis period. Nonetheless, all six have made important contributions to later Hinduism. It must thus suffice to discuss them all briefly at this point in terms of their basic features and major impact, and reserve fuller discussion of the Vedānta alone for the period of its later unfolding.

Of the six schools, two—Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta—are rooted primarily in the Vedic *śruti* tradition and are thus sometimes called *smārta* schools in the sense that they develop *smārta* orthodox currents of thought that are based, like *smṛti*, directly on *śruti*. The other four—Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, and Yoga—claim loyalty to the Veda, yet are quite independent of it, their focus instead being on rational or causal explanation. They are thus sometimes called *haituka* schools (from *hetu*, “cause, reason”).

Of the *smārta* schools, the Mīmāṃsā is most concerned with ritual traditions rooted in the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, whereas the Vedānta is focused on the Upaniṣads. It is notable that both sustain Vedic orientations that reject (Mīmāṃsā) or subordinate (Vedānta) *bhakti* until the Vedānta is devotionalized in its post-Śaṅkara forms. Beginning with Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (c. 300–100 BCE), Mīmāṃsā (“reflection, interpretation”) provides exegesis of Vedic injunctive speech, in particular as it concerns the relationship between intentions and rewards of sacrifice. Great refinement is brought to bear on issues relating to the authority and eternalness of the Veda and the relationship between its sounds, words, and meanings. Vedic injunctions are taken literally, the many Vedic gods are seen as real although superfluous to salvation (there is an anti-*bhakti* stance here), and it is maintained that the proper use of injunctions is alone enough to secure the attainment of heaven (not a higher release, or *mokṣa*, as propounded by all the other systems, including *bhakti*). Mīmāṃsā persists in two subschools, but only in small numbers among brahman ritualists.

As to the Vedānta (“end of the Veda,” a term also used for the Upaniṣads), the foundational work is Bādarāyaṇa’s *Vedānta Sūtra*, or *Brahma Sūtra* (c. 300–100 BCE), an exege-

sis of various Upaniṣadic passages in aphoristic style easily susceptible to divergent interpretations. These it received in the hands of later Vedantic thinkers.

The *haituka* schools are notable for their development, for the first time within Hinduism, of what may be called maps and paths: that is, maps of the constituent features of the cosmos, and paths to deliverance from bondage. Emerging within Hinduism at this period, and particularly in the schools least affiliated with the Vedic tradition, such concerns no doubt represent an effort to counter the proliferation of maps and paths set forth by the heterodoxies (not only Buddhism and Jainism, but the Ājīvikas). They allow for a somewhat more open recognition of the deity of *bhakti* (Sāṃkhya excepted) than do the *smārta* schools, though none of the *haituka* schools makes it truly central.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, systems first propounded in Gautama’s *Nyāya Sūtra* (c. 200 BCE–150 CE) and Kaṇāda’s *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* (c. 200 BCE–100 CE), were quickly recognized as a hyphenated pair: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Nyāya (“rule, logic, analysis”), emphasizing logic and methods of argumentation as means to liberation, was viewed as complementary to Vaiśeṣika (“school of distinct characteristics”), which advanced a theory of atomism and posited seven categories to explain such things as atomic aggregation and dualistic distinction between soul and matter. At least by about the fifth century, when the two schools had conjoined, Nyāya logic and Vaiśeṣika cosmology served to provide influential arguments from design for the existence of God as the efficient cause of the creation and destruction of the universe and liberator of the soul from *karman*.

Far more influential, however, were the pair Sāṃkhya (“enumeration”) and Yoga. The foundational texts of these schools may be later than those of the others, but they are clearly distillations of long-continuing traditions, datable at least to the middle Upaniṣads, that had already undergone considerable systematization. Thus Patañjali’s *Yoga Sūtra* is from either about 200 BCE or 300–500 CE, depending on whether or not one identifies the author with the grammarian who lived at the earlier date. And Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāṃkhyakārikās* probably date from the fourth century CE. Even though Sāṃkhya’s “atheism” and its soteriology of the isolation (*kaivalya*) of the soul (*puruṣa*) from matter (*prakṛti*) have been modified or rejected in other forms of Hinduism (both doctrines may link Sāṃkhya with Jainism), Sāṃkhya’s cosmology and basic terminology have become definitive for Hinduism at many levels: not only in the Vedānta, but in *bhakti* and Tantric formulations as well. In fact, given the preclassical forms of theistic Sāṃkhya founded in the Upaniṣads and the *Mahābhārata* and their use in *bhakti* cosmologies, it may well be that the atheism of the classical Sāṃkhya results from a rejection of *bhakti* elements from a fundamentally theistic system. Sāṃkhya thus posits *puruṣa* without a transcendent, divine *Puruṣa*, and its *prakṛti* is also abstract and impersonal.



In any case, a number of Sāṃkhya concepts became basic to the Hindu vocabulary, only to be integrated and reinterpreted from different theological and soteriological perspectives by other schools. These include the concepts of the evolution and devolution of *prakṛti*, the sexual polarity of *puruṣa* as male and *prakṛti* as female, the enumeration of twenty-three substances that evolve from and devolve back into the *prakṛti* “matrix,” the concept of matter as a continuum from subtle psychomental “substances” to gross physical ones (in particular the five elements), and the notion of the three “strands” or “qualities” called *guṇas* (*sattva*, goodness, lucidity; *rajas*, dynamism; *tamas*, entropy), which are “braided” together through all matter from the subtle to the gross.

Meanwhile, whereas Sāṃkhya provides the map to be “known,” Yoga defines the path by which *puruṣa* can extricate itself from *prakṛti*. The “eight limbs” of Yoga (an answer to the Eightfold Path of Buddhism?) represent the most important Hindu formulation of a step-by-step (though also cumulative) path to liberation. The first two “limbs” involve forms of restraint (*yama*) and observance (*niyama*). The next three involve integration of the body and senses: posture (*āsana*), breath control (*prāṇāyama*), and withdrawal of the senses from the dominance of sense objects (*pratyāhāra*). The last three achieve the integration of the mind or the “cessation of the mental turmoil” that is rooted in the effects of *karman*: “holding” (*dhāraṇā*) to a meditative support, meditative fluency (*dhyāna*), and integrative concentration (*samādhi*) through which the freedom of *puruṣa* can be experienced.

The classical Yoga of Patañjali, known as *rājayoga* (“royal yoga”), diverges from the Sāṃkhya in acknowledging the existence of God (Īśvara). But Īśvara is a focus of meditation, not an agent in the process of liberation. The use of the term *rājayoga*, however, suggests that by Patañjali’s time the term *yoga* had already been used to describe other disciplines or paths, resulting in a situation where the terms *yoga* (“yoke”) and *mārga* (“path”) had become interchangeable. One will thus find *rājayoga* mentioned later along with the more generalized “yogas,” or “paths,” that become definitive for Hinduism through their exposition in the *Bhagavadgītā* (c. 200 BCE): the paths (or yogas) of *karman* (“action”), *jñāna* (“knowledge”), and *bhakti* (“devotion”).

**Classical bhakti Hinduism.** The consolidation of Hinduism takes place under the sign of *bhakti*. And though Mīmāṃsā ritualism and Vedantic and other “knowledge” trends continue to affiliate with an “orthodox” strain that resists this synthesis, or attempts to improve upon it, classical *bhakti* emerges as constitutive henceforth of mainstream Hinduism, including forms of devotional sectarianism.

Intimations of *bhakti* developments are registered as early as the late Vedic Upaniṣads, and in inscriptions and other records of syncretistic worship of Hindu deities (Viṣṇu and Śiva) alongside foreign and heterodox figures in the early centuries of the common era. However, the heterogeneity and scattered nature of the nontextual information available

on the emergence of *bhakti* during this period have allowed for conflicting interpretations of the salient features of the process. But rather than reweave a fragile developmental web from supposedly separate sectarian and popular strands, it is better to look at the texts themselves to see what they attempted and achieved. It should be noted, however, that to the best of existing knowledge it was achieved relatively early in the period of consolidation, for the *Bhagavadgītā*—the text that seals the achievement—seems to be from no later than the first or second century BCE (it is cited by Bārdarāyaṇa in the *Vedānta Sūtra*), and possibly earlier. Of course, continued unfolding occurred after that.

The achievement itself is a universal Hinduism that, following Biardeau’s discussion of *bhakti* in “Études de mythologie hindoue” (1976), one may designate as *smārta*. It inherits from the Brahmanic sacrificial tradition a conception wherein Viṣṇu and Śiva are recognized as complementary in their functions but ontologically identical. The fundamental texts of this devotional *smārta* vision are the two epics—the *Mahābhārata* (c. 500 BCE–400 CE) and the *Rāmāyaṇa* (c. 400–200 BCE)—and the *Harivaṃśa* (c. 300–400 CE?). These works integrate much Puranic mythic and cosmological material, which later is spun out at greater length in the classical Purāṇas (“ancient lore”), of which there are said to be eighteen major and eighteen minor texts. The epics and Purāṇas are thus necessarily discussed together. But it should be recognized that whereas the *smārta* vision of the epics and the *Harivaṃśa* is fundamentally integrative and universal in intent, the Purāṇas are frequently dominated by regional and particularistic interests, including in some cases the strong advocacy of the worship of one deity (Śiva, Viṣṇu, or the Goddess) over all others. It is thus tempting to think of the period of Purāṇa composition (c. 400–1200 CE?) as one that extends the integrative vision of the fundamental texts but develops it in varied directions. Still, as it is not clear that instances of Puranic theological favoritism are motivated by distinct sects, it is misleading to speak of “sectarian” Purāṇas.

Taken together, then, the *Harivaṃśa* and the *Mahābhārata* (which includes the *Bhagavadgītā*) present the full biography of Kṛṣṇa, and the *Rāmāyaṇa* that of Rāma. The *Harivaṃśa* (Genealogy of Hari—i. e., Kṛṣṇa), the more recent of the texts concerning Kṛṣṇa, presents the stories of his birth and youth, in which he and his brother Balarāma take on the “disguise” (*veśa*) of cowherds. Thus they engage in divine “sport” (*līlā*) with the cowherd women (*gopīs*), until finally they are drawn away to avenge themselves against their demonic uncle Kaṃṣa, who had caused their exile. The *Mahābhārata* (Story of the Great Bhārata Dynasty) focuses on Kṛṣṇa’s assistance to the five Pāṇḍava brothers in their conflicts with their cousins, the hundred Kauravas, over the “central kingdom” of the lunar dynasty (the Bhārata dynasty) at Hāstīnapura and Indraprastha near modern Delhi. Both texts incorporate telling allusions to the other “cycle,” and because both stories must have circulated orally

together before reaching their present literary forms, any notions of their separate origins are purely conjectural. The *Rāmāyaṇa* (Exploits of Rāma) tells the story of Rāma, scion of the solar dynasty and embodiment of *dharmā*, who must rescue his wife Śīta from the demon (*rākṣasā*) Rāvaṇa. Though each of these texts has its special flavor and distinctive background, they become in their completed forms effectively a complementary triad. Indeed, in the “conservative” South, popular performances of Hindu mythology in dramas and temple recitations are still dominated by three corresponding specializations: *Mahābhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, and *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, the latter (c. 800–900 CE?) enriching the devotional themes of the *Harivaṃśa* in its tenth and eleventh books and in effect replacing it as representing the early life of Kṛṣṇa.

The *smārta* universe in these texts is structured around Viṣṇu, and more particularly around his two heroic incarnations, Rāma and Kṛṣṇa. Thus other deities are frequently represented as subordinated to or subsumed by these figures. But there is also recognition of Viṣṇu’s complementarity with Śīva: some passages that stress mutual acknowledgment of their ontological unity, others that work out the interplay between them through stories about heroic characters who incarnate them, and scenes in which Viṣṇu’s incarnations do homage to Śīva. It should be clear that efforts to find “tendencies toward monotheism” in such texts involve the reduction of a very complex theology to distinctly Western terms. The same applies to those Purāṇas that are structured around Śīva or the Goddess rather than Viṣṇu but are still framed within the same cosmology and the same principles of theological complementarity and subordination.

This *smārta* vision is not, however, limited to one theological conundrum, for it extends to encompass Śīva and Viṣṇu’s interaction with other major figures: the god Brahmā, masculine form of the impersonal Absolute (*brahman*), now subordinated to the higher “personal” deities; the Goddess in her many forms; Indra and other *devas* (now “demigods”); their still perennial foes, the demons (*asuras*); and of course humans, animals, and so on. It also presents an overarching *bhakti* cosmology in which the yogic supreme divinity (Śīva or Viṣṇu) encompasses the religious values of *saṃnyāsa*, *tapas*, knowledge, and sacrifice, and introduces the view that taken by themselves, without *bhakti*, these values may be incomplete or even extreme “paths.” Further, it incorporates the *smārta* social theory of the Dharmasūtras and the Dharmaśāstras, and works out its implications within the cosmology. The details of this *smārta* vision are best discussed, however, in relation to the Hindu chronometric theory that is presumed and first articulated in these texts and then further developed in the Purāṇas.

Time is structured according to three main rhythms, hierarchically defined, the longer encompassing the lesser. Most down-to-earth is the series of four *yugas* named after four dice throws, which define a theory of the “decline of the *dharmā*”: first a *kṛtayuga* (“perfect age”), then a *tretāyuga* and

a *dvāparayuga*, and finally a degenerate *kaliyuga* (“age of discord”). A *kṛtayuga* lasts 4,000 years, a *tretāyuga* 3,000, a *dvāparayuga* 2,000, and a *kaliyuga* 1,000, each supplemented by a dawn and twilight of one-tenth its total. A full four-*yuga* cycle thus lasts 12,000 years and is called a *mahāyuga* (“great *yuga*”). These are not human years, however, but divine years, which are 360 times as long as human years. Thus a *mahāyuga* equals 360 times 12,000, or 4,320,000 human years, and a *kaliyuga* is one-tenth of that total. A thousand *mahāyugas* (4,320 million human years) is a *kalpa*, the second major time unit, which is also called a “day of Brahmā.” Brahmā’s days are followed by nights of equal duration. Brahmā lives a hundred years of 360 such days and nights, or 311,040 billion human years, all of which are sometimes said to pass in a wink of the eye of Viṣṇu. The period of a life of Brahmā, called a *mahākalpa*, is the third major temporal rhythm.

Working backward now, one may observe the *modus operandi* of Viṣṇu and Śīva (and of course others) as it is envisioned in the *smārta* Hinduism of the texts.

First, at the highest level, Viṣṇu and Śīva are great yogins, interacting with the rhythms of the universe in terms of their own oscillations between activity and yogic concentration (*samādhi*). At the *mahāpralaya* (“great dissolution”), the deity (usually Viṣṇu in these early texts, but just as often Śīva or the Goddess in later Puranic ones) oversees the dissolution of the universe into the primal *prakṛti* in accord with the cosmological theory of Sāṃkhya-Yoga. This ends the life of Brahmā, but it is also to be noted that it marks the restoration to its primordial unity of *prakṛti*, which—as feminine—is regarded mythologically as the ultimate form of the Goddess. From a Śaiva standpoint, the male (the deity as Puruṣa) and the female (the Goddess as Prakṛti) are reunited at the great dissolution of the universe, a theme that is depicted in representations of the deity as Ardhānarīśvara, “the Lord who is half female.” Their union is nonprocreative and represents the unitive experience of the bliss of *brahman*. Creation then occurs when the deity (whether Śīva or Viṣṇu) emerges from this *samādhi* and instigates the renewed active unfolding of *prakṛti*.

The coincidence of the death of Brahmā with not only the dissolution of the universe but the reintegration of the Goddess and her reunion with Śīva is highly significant. The Goddess is an eternal being, worthy of worship because—like Viṣṇu and Śīva—she outlasts the universe and can bestow *mokṣa*. Brahmā, ultimately mortal and bound to temporality, is worshiped not for *mokṣa* but rather—and mostly by demons—for earthly power and lordship. Stories that portray Śīva’s severing of Brahmā’s fifth head and refer to the “head of Brahmā” (*brahmaśiras*) as the weapon of doomsday, are perhaps mythic echoes of this ultimate cosmological situation wherein the coming together of Puruṣa and Prakṛti coincide with his death.

The primary creation has as its result the constitution of a “cosmic egg,” the *brahmāṇḍa* (“egg of Brahmā”). Fur-



ther creation, and periodic re-creations, will be carried out by Brahmā, the personalized form of the Absolute (*brahman*). Insofar as the *brahman* is personalized and oriented toward the world, it is thus subordinated to the yogin Puruṣa, the ultimate as defined through *bhakti*. Moreover, the activity of Brahmā—heir in his cosmogenic role of the earlier Prajāpati—is conceived in terms of sacrificial themes that are further encompassed by *bhakti*.

It is at this level that the three male gods cooperate as the *trimūrti*, the “three forms” of the Absolute: Brahmā the creator, Śiva the destroyer, and Viṣṇu the preserver. Within the *brahmāṇḍa*, Brahmā thus creates the Vedic triple world of earth, atmosphere, and heaven (or alternatively heaven, earth, and underworld). These three samsaric worlds are surrounded by four ulterior worlds, still within the *brahmāṇḍa*, for beings who achieve release from *saṃsāra* but still must await their ultimate liberation. These ulterior worlds are not henceforth created or destroyed in the occasional creations or destructions. As to the triple world, Brahmā creates it by becoming the sacrificial boar (*yajñavarāha*) who retrieves the Vedas and the earth from the cosmic ocean. The destruction of the triple world is achieved by Śiva. As the “fire of the end of time,” he reduces it to ashes, thus effecting a cosmic funerary sacrifice. And Viṣṇu, the god whom the Brāhmaṇas identify as “the sacrifice,” maintains the triple world while it is sustained by sacrifices, and also preserves what is left of it after the dissolution when he lies on the serpent Śeṣa (“remainder”) whose name indicates that he is formed of the remnant of the previous cosmos, or more exactly of the “remainder” of the cosmic sacrifice. This form of Viṣṇu, sleeping on Śeṣa, is called Nārāyaṇa, a name that the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* already connects with the Vedic Puruṣa, the “male” source of all beings. When Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa awakens, Brahmā—who in some fashion awakens with him—recreates the universe. Through all these myths the earth is a form of the Goddess, indeed the most concretized form she takes as a result of the evolution of *prakṛti* (earth being the last of the evolutes emitted and the first to dissolve).

Thus the greater universe whose rhythms are integrated within the divine yoga of Viṣṇu and Śiva encompasses an egg of Brahmā, which encloses a triple world whose rhythms form a round sustained by the divine sacrificial acts of the *trimūrti*. This pattern is transposed onto the third temporal rhythm, that of the *yugas*. Thus the characteristic religious virtues of the *yugas* are as follows: *dhyāna* (“meditation”) or *tapas* (“asceticism”) in the *kṛtayuga*; *jñāna* (“knowledge”) in the *tretāyuga*; *yajña* (“sacrifice”) in the *dvāparayuga*; and *dāna* (“the gift”) in the *kaliyuga*. Thus the two *śruti*-based ideals of knowledge and sacrifice are enclosed within a framework that begins with yogic meditation as a divine *kṛtayuga* activity and ends in the *kaliyuga* with the devotional gift. *Bhakti* thus encompasses knowledge and sacrifice.

The distinctive feature of the rhythm of the *yuga* cycle is that it is calibrated by the rise and fall of *dharma* in the triple world. Beings who have achieved release from the triple

world oscillate between the four higher worlds, enduring periodic destructions of the triple world and awaiting the great dissolution of the universe that will dissolve the egg of Brahmā (coincident with his death) and result in a vast collective ultimate liberation of reabsorption into the supreme Puruṣa. Needless to say, this is to occur only after an almost incalculable wait. But beings who have attained these ulterior worlds are no more affected by *dharma* than the yogic deity beyond them. The maintenance of *dharma* within the triple world thus engages the deities in their third level of activity, that of “descent.” In classical terms this is the theory of the *avatāra*. Though the term is not used in the epics or the *Harivaṃśa* in its later, specialized sense, these texts are suffused by the concept and its *bhakti* implications, which include narrative situations wherein the divinity looks to all concerned, and sometimes even to himself, as a mere human. The programmatic statement of the *avatāra* concept (without mention of the term itself) is thus stated by Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavadgītā*: “For whenever the Law [*dharma*] languishes, Bhārata, and lawlessness flourishes I create myself. I take on existence from eon to eon [*yuga* to *yuga*], for the rescue of the good and the destruction of evil, in order to establish the Law” (4.7–8; van Buitenen, trans.).

The classical theory of the ten *avatāras*—most of whom are mentioned in the epics and the *Harivaṃśa*, but not in a single list—is worked out in relation to Viṣṇu. One thus has the following “descents” of Viṣṇu in order of appearance: Fish (Matsya), Tortoise (Kūrma), Boar (Varāha), Man-Lion (Narasimha), Dwarf (Vāmana), Rāma with the Ax (Parasurāma), Rāma of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Kṛṣṇa, the Buddha, and the future *avatāra* Kalki, who will rid the earth of barbarian kings and reestablish the *dharma* at the end of the *kaliyuga*. There are various attempts to correlate appearances of the *avatāras* with distinct *yugas* and even *kalpas*, but the one feature that is consistently mentioned in these formative texts is that Kṛṣṇa appeared at the interval between the last *dvāparayuga* and *kaliyuga*, and thus at the beginning of the present age. It is likely that the theory was first formulated around Kṛṣṇa and Rāma along with the Dwarf (the only form to be associated with Viṣṇu in the *śruti* literature) and the apocalyptic Kalki. But in actuality, the *avatāra* theory is more complex. In the epics and in living Hinduism, Viṣṇu does not descend alone. In the literature, his incarnations take place alongside those of other deities, including most centrally Vāyu, Indra, Sūrya, the Goddess, and—at least in the *Mahābhārata*—Śiva. And in localized temple mythologies throughout India, one hears of *avatāras* of Śiva and the Goddess as well as of Viṣṇu. In devotional terms, the *avatāra* is thus a form taken on earth (or, better, in the three worlds) by any one of the three deities found at the ultimate level of cosmic absorption, where all that remains beside the liberated beings who join them are the eternal yogic deities Viṣṇu and Śiva and the primal Goddess.

The classical concept of the *avatāra*, structured around Viṣṇu, remains, however, the chief Hindu use of the term.

Its formulation in the epics and the *Harivaṃśa* is thus constitutive for succeeding eras of Hinduism, in which it will only be enriched but not essentially changed by later *bhakti* theologies. Looking at these texts comprehensively, then, with the *Gītā* as the main guide, one can outline its main contours. Against the background of the vast, all-embracing *bhakti* cosmology, the involvement of the yogic divinity on earth takes place completely freely, as “sport” or “play” (*līlā*). Still, the god takes birth to uphold the *dharmā* and to keep the earth from being unseasonably inundated in the waters of dissolution under the weight of adharmic kings. The *avatāra* thus intercedes to uphold the system of *varṇāśramadharmā* and to promote the proper pursuit of the four *puruṣārthas*. Because he appears in times of crisis, a central concern in the texts is with the resolution of the conflicts between ideals: renunciation versus householdership, *brāhmaṇa* versus *kṣatriya*, killing versus “not desiring to kill” (*ahiṃsā*), *dharmā* versus *mokṣa*, *dharmā* versus *kāma* and *artha*, and conflicts between different *dharmas* (duties) such as royal duty and filial duty. But though the texts focus primarily on the two upper castes, the full society is represented by singular depictions of figures who evoke the lowest castes and tribal groups. It is also filled in with figures of real and reputed mixed caste.

Confusion of caste is a particularly prominent issue in the *Mahābhārata*, where it is raised by Kṛṣṇa in the *Gītā* as the worst of ills. Most significantly, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Harivaṃśa* identify a particularly pernicious form of caste confusion among the barbarian (*mlecchā*) peoples of the Northwest (the Punjab), mentioning Yavanas, Śakas, and Pahlavas among others as enemies of the *dharmā* and causes for such “mixing.” The fact that events of the period from 300 BCE to 300 CE are projected into the distant past indicates that part of the *bhakti* synthesis was the articulation of a mythical theory of historical events. One may thus look at these *smṛti* texts as posing a model for the revival of Hinduism in accord with “eternal” Vedic models, with the descent of the *avatāra*—and indeed of much of the Vedic pantheon along with him—guaranteeing the periodic adjustment of the sociocosmic world to these eternal norms. Furthermore, the tracing of all Hindu dynastic lines back to the defunct if not mythical “lunar” and “solar” dynasties provided the model for the spatial extension of this ideal beyond the central lands of Aryavarta where the *dharmā*, according to both *Manu* and the *Mahābhārata*, was the purest.

But the focus of the *avatāra* is not solely on the renovation of the *dharmā*. He also brings to the triple world the divine grace that makes possible the presence, imagery, and teachings that confer *mokṣa*. The epics and the *Harivaṃśa* are full of *bhakti* tableaux: moments that crystallize the realization by one character or another of the liberating vision (*darśana*) of the divine. Most central, however, is the *Bhagavadgītā*, which is both a *darśana* and a teaching.

The *Bhagavadgītā* (Song of the Lord) takes place as a dialogue between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna just before the outbreak of the *Mahābhārata* war. Although he is the third oldest of

the five Pāṇḍavas, Arjuna is their greatest warrior, and Kṛṣṇa’s task in the *Gītā* is to persuade him to overcome his reluctance to fight in the battle. Fundamental to the argument is Arjuna’s requirement to fulfill his *dharmā* as a *kṣatriya* rather than adopt the ideal—unsuitable for him in his present life stage—of the renouncer. Thus the *Gītā* champions the theory of *varṇāśramadharmā* as upholding the sociocosmic order.

Kṛṣṇa presents his teaching to Arjuna by revealing a sequence of “royal” and “divine” mysteries that culminate in his granting a vision of his “All-Form” (*Viśvarūpa-darśana*) as God, creator and destroyer of the universe. In this grand cosmic perspective, Arjuna is told that he will be but the “mere instrument” of the deaths of his foes, their destruction having now come to ripeness through Viṣṇu’s own agency in his form as cosmic time, or *kāla* (*Bhagavadgītā* 11.32–33). Arjuna thus recognizes this omniform deity as Viṣṇu in this climactic scene.

On the way to this revelation, however, Kṛṣṇa acknowledges the three paths (*yogas*) to salvation: action, knowledge, and devotion. These are presented as instructions by which Arjuna can gain the resolute clarity of insight (*buddhi*) and yogic discipline by which to recognize the distinctions between soul and body, action and inaction, and thus perform actions—including killing—that are unaffected by desire. Ritual action and knowledge are set forth as legitimate and mutually reinforcing paths, but incomplete unless integrated within and subordinated to *bhakti*. Kṛṣṇa thus presents himself as the ultimate *karmayogin*, acting to benefit the worlds out of no personal desire. He thus bids his devotees (*bhaktas*) to surrender all actions to him as in a sacrifice, but a sacrifice (*karman*) no longer defined in Vedic-Mīmāṃsā terms as a means to fulfill some personal desire. Kṛṣṇa also presents himself as the object of all religious knowledge, the highest *Puruṣa* (*uttamapuruṣa*) and supreme self (*paramātman*), beyond the perishable and the imperishable, yet pervading and supporting all worlds (15.16–17).

One other facet of the *bhakti* synthesis to which the *Gītā* alludes is the transition from traditional Vedic sacrifice (*yajña*) to new forms of offering to the deity (*pūjā*, literally, “honoring”). This corresponds to the theory that the “gift” is the particularly appropriate religious practice for the *kaliyuga*. Thus Kṛṣṇa says: “If one disciplined soul proffers to me with love [*bhakti*] a leaf, a flower, fruit, or water, I accept this offering of love from him. Whatever you do, or eat, or offer, or give, or mortify, make it an offering to me, and I shall undo the bonds of *karman*” (9.26–27; van Buitenen, trans.). The passage probably refers to domestic worship of the “deity of one’s choice” (*iṣṭadevata*). But it is also likely to allude to temple worship, for it is known from inscriptions and literary sources from the third to first century BCE that sanctuaries existed for Vāsudeva and Keśava (presumably as names for Kṛṣṇa and Viṣṇu), as well as for other deities. By the beginning of the Gupta period, around 320 CE, temple building was in full swing, with inscriptions showing con-

struction of temples for Viṣṇu, Śiva, and the Goddess. Temples were built at sites within cities, as well as at remote holy places, and sanctuaries at both such locations became objectives along pilgrimage routes that are first mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*. From very early if not from the beginning of such temple worship, the deities were represented by symbols and/or iconic images.

Certain aspects of temple construction and worship draw inspiration from the Vedic sacrifice. The plan of the edifice is designed on the ground as the *Vastu-puruṣamaṇḍala*, a geometric figure of the “Puruṣa of the Site” (*vāstu*), from whom the universe takes form. The donor, ideally a king, is the *yajamāna*. The *sanctum sanctorum*, called the *garbhagrha* (“womb house”), continues the symbolism of the Vedic *dīkṣā* hut: Here again the *yajamāna* becomes an embryo so as to achieve a new birth, now taking into his own being the higher self of the deity that he installs there in the form of an image. The temple as a whole is thus a Vedic altar comprising the triple world, but also an expanded image of the cosmos through which the deity manifests himself from within, radiating energy to the outer walls where his (or her) activities and interactions with the world are represented.

But the use of the temple for ordinary daily worship involves radically non-Vedic objectives. The Vedic sacrifice is a means for gods and humans—basically equals—to fulfill reciprocal desires. *Pūjā* rites are means for God and human-kind to interact on a level beyond desire: for humans to give without expectation of reward, or, more exactly, to get back nothing tangible other than what they have offered but with the paradoxical conviction that the deity “shares” (from the root meaning of *bhakti*) what is given and returns it as an embodiment of his or her grace (*prasāda*). God is thus fully superior, served as a royal guest with rites of hospitality. Basically four moments are involved: offerings, taking sight (*darśana*) of the deity, receiving this *prasāda*, and leave-taking by circumambulation of the *garbhagrha* and the image within. The offerings are the *pūjā* proper and comprise a great variety of devotional acts designed to please the deity, some of which may be worked into a daily round by the temple priests, who offer on behalf of others.

Finally, one last element of the consolidation of Hinduism achieved by early Gupta times is the emergence of the Goddess as a figure whose worship is recognized alongside that of Viṣṇu and Śiva and is performed with the same basic rites. Indeed, it is possible that aspects of *pūjā* ceremonialism are derived from non-Vedic *śūdra* and village rites in which female deities no doubt figured highly, as they do in such cults today. The two epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, reflect themes associated with the Goddess in the portrayals of their chief heroines, Draupadī and Śita, but the *Harivaṃśa* is probably the first text to acknowledge the Goddess as such. There she takes birth as Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma’s “sister” (actually she and Kṛṣṇa exchange mothers). Some of her future demon enemies are mentioned, and there is also reference to her having numerous places of worship and a

cult that apparently included animal sacrifice. Thus the Goddess is integrated even within the texts of the early *smārta* Hinduism that are centered on Viṣṇu. But the text that registers her full emergence is the *Devīmāhātmyam* (Glorification of the Goddess). Probably from about 400–600 CE, it was included in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāna*. Here the Goddess is recognized under all her major aspects, as primal matter embodied in the universe yet beyond it, incarnate in many forms, cause of the joys and miseries of this world and of liberation from it, the power (*śakti*) enabling the roles of the *trimūrti*, yet higher than the gods and their last resort in the face of certain demons, most notably the buffalo demon Mashāśura, her most dedicated and persistent foe through cults and myths both ancient and current. This emergence of the Goddess is registered more fully in the development of Tantric Hinduism.

**TANTRIC HINDUISM.** *Tantra* is literally “what extends.” In its Hindu form it may be taken, according to its name, as a movement that sought to extend the Veda (whose pedigree it loosely claimed) and more particularly to extend the universalistic implications of *bhakti* Hinduism. However, although it was quick to integrate *bhakti* elements and to influence *bhakti* in nearly all its forms (late Puranic, popular, and sectarian), its earliest and most enduring forms “extend” Hinduism in ways that were directly opposed to the epic-Puranic *bhakti* synthesis. Nonetheless, it is still formulated within the same cosmology.

Early Tantrism developed most vigorously, from the fourth to sixth centuries CE, in areas where Brahmanic penetration had been weakest: in the Northwest, in Bengal and Assam in the East, and in the Andhra area of the South. These are areas where one must assume non-Aryan influences in general, and more particularly probably also tribal and folk practices involving shamanism, witchcraft, and sorcery, and, at least in the East and South, a cult of the Goddess. As Tantrism gained currency in succeeding centuries throughout India, the shamanistic and magical features were assimilated to yogic disciplines, while the elevation of the Goddess gave full projection on a pan-Indian scale to roles and images of the Goddess that had been incorporated, but allowed only minimal scope, in the early orthodox *bhakti* and even earlier Vedic sacrificial traditions. The earliest extant Tantric texts are Buddhist, from about the fourth to sixth centuries. Hindu Tantric texts include Vaiṣṇava *Samhitās*, Śaivāgamas from a slightly later period, and Śākta Tantras (exalting the Goddess as Śakti, or Power) from perhaps the eleventh century on. But from its start Tantrism represented a style and outlook that placed the Goddess at the center of its “extensions” and to a certain extent cut across sectarian and religious distinctions, whether Hindu, Buddhist, or even Jain.

Though Hindu Tantra thus asserts its Vedic legitimacy, its stance is intentionally anti-Brahmanic. It was especially critical of Brahmanic concepts of hierarchy, purity, and sexual status, all of which had been reinforced by the orthodox



*bhakti* synthesis and which were in particular bound up with a theology that viewed the supreme divinity as a male (a Puruṣa, whether Śiva or Viṣṇu) whose ultimate form was accessible only beyond the rhythms of the cosmos and its hierarchy of impure and pure, gross and subtle worlds. For Tantrics, dualities were artificial and their experience was the result of delusion. On the analogy of the union between Śiva and Śakti, which in Puranic devotional terms is conceivable only at the end of the *mahāpralaya*, or great dissolution of the universe, Tantric practice (*sādhana*) addresses itself to experiencing the unity of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (*puruṣa* being both “soul” and deity, *prakṛti* being both “matter” and Goddess), male and female, pure and impure, knowledge and action, and so on. Most important, all this takes place here and now, not only in this world, where *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* on the macrocosmic scale are one, but in the human body, where their microcosmic embodiments can be experienced. The body thus becomes the ultimate vehicle for liberation, the dissolution of opposites taking place within the psychophysical continuum of the experience of the living adept, who realizes beyond duality the oneness of *brahman*.

In terms of practice, Tantra’s rejection of Hindu orthodoxy is even more decisive. And practice is clearly exalted above theological or philosophical formulation. Two types of Tantra are mentioned: “left-hand” and “right-hand.” The Tantric rejection and indeed inversion of orthodoxy is most pronounced in the former, as the right-hand Tantra interprets the most anti-Brahmanic practices of the left metaphorically, and also includes under its heading a wide variety of ceremonial rituals assimilated into *bhakti* Hinduism that are simply non-Vedic. These include the use of non-Vedic *mantras* as well as *yantras* and *maṇḍalas*, aniconic and non-Vedic geometric devices used for visualization and integration of divine-cosmic forces. Adepts come from all castes, but low-caste and even tribal practitioners and teachers are especially revered. The goal of liberation within the body takes the specific form of seeking magical powers (*siddhīs*), which in orthodox forms of Hinduism are regarded as hindrances to spiritual achievement. Under the tutelage of a guru, who embodies the fulfillment sought and its transmission and who is thus all-important, the *siddhīs* are sought through yoga disciplines that show the impact of Tantra through their anatomical analysis of the “subtle body” (*liṅga śarīra*). First practiced is *haṭhayoga*, the “yoga of exertion or violence,” that is, rigorous physical discipline geared to coordinating the body’s “ducts” or “channels” (*nāḍīs*) and “energy centers” (*cakras*). This is followed by *kuṇḍalinīyoga*, which awakens the dormant *śakti*, conceived as a coiled-up “serpent power” in the lowest *cakra* between the genitals and the anus, so that it (or she) can pierce and transform all the *cakras* (usually six) and unite with Śiva in the “thousand-petaled *cakra*” in the region of the brain.

Beyond these practices, “left-handed” Tantrics pursue in literal fashion the ceremonial of the “five *m*’s” (*pañcamākaraṇapūjā*). That is, they incorporate into their cul-

tic practice five “sacraments” beginning with the syllable *ma*: fish (*matsya*), meat (*māṃsa*), parched grain (*mudrā*, regarded as an aphrodisiac), wine (*madya*), and finally sexual intercourse (*maithunā*). It is likely that most if not all of these practices involve the incorporation of elements of the cult and mythology of the Goddess, who already in the *Devīmāhātmyam* delights in meat and wine and is approached by lustful demons for sexual intercourse. Tantric texts stress that these practices are to be carried out within a circle of adepts and supervised by a male and female pair of “lords of the circle” who insist on strict ritual conventions that guard against an orgiastic interpretation. Classically, the male is to retain his semen at the point of orgasm, this being a sign not only of profound dispassion but an actualization of the nonprocreative union of Śiva and Śakti at the dissolution of the universe of dualities.

It is interesting to note that, although their historical validity is debated by scholars, there are strong Indian traditions suggesting that Śaṅkara’s philosophical nondualism had practical Tantric repercussions.

**ŚAṅKARA’S ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND SMĀRTA ORTHODOXY.** The Advaita (nondualist) interpretation of the Vedānta can be traced back at least to Gauḍapāda (c. 600 CE), but it is Śaṅkara (c. 788–820) who established this viewpoint as the touchstone of a revived *smārta* orthodoxy. Born in a small Kerala village, Śaṅkara spent his alleged thirty-two years as a vigorous champion of the unity of Hinduism over and against intra-Hindu divisions and the inroads of Buddhism and Jainism. He toured India, setting up monasteries (*mathas*) near famous temples or holy places at each of the four compass directions, and appointed a disciple at each center to begin a line of renunciant “pontiffs.” And he wrote works of great subtlety and persuasiveness, including commentaries on the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma Sūtra*, and the *Bhagavadgītā* that inspired contemporaries, disciples, and authors of later generations to write additional important works from the perspective that he developed.

An essential feature of Śaṅkara’s argumentation is that lower views of reality must be rejected as they are contradicted or “sublated” by higher experiences of the real. Finally, all dichotomous formulations must be abandoned upon the nondual experience of the self (*ātman*) as *brahman*. The world of appearance is sustained by ignorance (*avidyā*), which “superimposes” limitations on reality. *Māyā* (“illusion” or “fabrication”), itself neither real nor unreal, is indescribable in terms of being or nonbeing. It appears real only so long as *brahman* is not experienced. But it is empirically real relative to things that can be shown false from the standpoint of empirical observation. *Māyā* is thus said to be more mysterious and unknowable than *brahman*, which is experienced as being, consciousness, and bliss (*sat-cit-ānanda*).

As philosophy, Advaita is thus a guide to *mokṣa*, which is experienced when the ignorance that results from superimposing *māyā* on *brahman* is overcome. Liberation arises with

knowledge (*jñāna*), but from a perspective that recognizes relative truth in the paths of both action and *bhakti*. Practically, Śaṅkara fostered a rapprochement between Advaita and *smārta* orthodoxy, which by his time had not only continued to defend the *varṇāśramadharmā* theory as defining the path of *karman*, but had developed the practice of *pañcāyatanapūjā* (“five-shrine worship”) as a solution to varied and conflicting devotional practices. Thus one could worship any one of five deities (Viṣṇu, Śiva, Durgā, Sūrya, Gaṇeṣa) as one’s *iṣṭadevatā* (“deity of choice”). As far as *varṇāśramadharmā* was concerned, Śaṅkara left householder issues largely aside and focused instead on founding ten orders of *saṃnyāsis* (the *daśanāmi*, “ten names”), each affiliated with one of the four principle *mathas* he founded. But traditional orthodox views of caste were maintained. According to Śaṅkara, as *śūdras* are not entitled to hear the Veda, they cannot pursue knowledge of *brahman* as *saṃnyāsis*; rather they may seek *mokṣa* through hearing the *Mahābhārata* and the Purāṇas. Four of the ten *saṃnyāsi* orders were thus restricted to *brāhamaṇas*, and it does not seem that any accepted *śūdras* until long after Śaṅkara’s death. *Bhakti* sectarian reformers were generally more liberal on this point. As to the god (or gods) of *bhakti*, Śaṅkara views the deity (Īśvara) as essentially identical with *brahman* and real relative to empirical experience. But by being identified “with qualities” (*saguṇa*), God can be no more than an approach to the experience of *brahman* “without qualities” (*nirguṇa*). Viewed from the experience of the self as *nirguṇa brahman*, which “sublates” all other experiences, the deity is but the highest form of *māyā*. Clearly, *bhakti* traditions could not rest with this solution. But it should be noted that in opposing Śaṅkara and abandoning the universalist vision of the epic-Puranic devotional synthesis, the sects turned their backs on the main impulses that had attempted to sustain the unity of Hinduism.

**SECTARIAN HINDUISM.** The elaboration of *bhakti* Hinduism continued to unfold in the later Purāṇas, linking up with the temple and pilgrimage cultus and with local and regional forms of worship. It thus established itself until the time of Śaṅkara as the main expression of Brahmanic orthodoxy and the main shaping force of popular Hinduism. But though it proclaimed a universal Hinduism, it gave little weight to the problem of the immediate accessibility of salvation. While caste hierarchy was to remain in effect on earth to assure, among other things, the pure temple worship of the gods by the *brāhamaṇas*, the ultimate release that the Purāṇas promised was almost infinitely postponed. It is possible that their postponement of a collective liberation was a kind of purification process for liberated souls and thus a prolongation of the concern for *brāhamaṇa* purity on earth. In any case, the remoteness of salvation and the defense of caste purity and hierarchy in the Puranic devotionalism of Brahmanic orthodoxy were probably incentives for the development of alternate forms of *bhakti*. These emerged in sectarian traditions, in movements led by saint-singers who inspired vernacular

forms of *bhakti* revivalism, and more generally in local and regional forms of Hinduism.

**Sectarian traditions.** Sectarianism and *bhakti* revivalism are movements of separate origins that converge for the first time in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in the Tamil-speaking area of South India. There the fusion was accomplished in the traditions of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas and the Śaiva Siddhānta, sects whose names indicate their distinctive theological preferences for Viṣṇu and Śiva. Henceforth, sectarianism and *bhakti* revivalism continued to interact and produce hybrid forms as they spread over all of India.

Generally speaking, sects followed a reformist impulse, and in most of them one can identify the emergence of the *guru* as a new type of figure: not the transmitter of an “impersonal” Vedic teaching, but one who takes inspiration from the personal deity of the sect, with whom he may even be identified. Traditional hierarchy was generally respected, but with the proviso that within the sect divine grace was not limited by caste boundaries. Nonetheless, as groups formed around masters and their teachings, they took on many of the characteristics and functions of castes (endogamy, interior ranking), and certain sects formulated their stands with particularly positive attitudes (the northern school of Śrī Vaiṣṇavas) or negative attitudes (Līṅgāyats and Vīraśaivas) toward *brāhamaṇas*. Sects distinguish themselves over and against each other by many means, and often quite passionately: by bodily markings, forms of yoga discipline, worship, theology, and in particular by their choice of supreme deity, whether Śiva, Viṣṇu, Śakti, or, in the North, Kṛṣṇa or Rāma. Nonetheless, they generally participate in wider Hindu activities such as pilgrimage, festival, and temple worship (the Līṅgāyats are an exception) and draw upon fundamental Hindu belief structures. Thus most sects acknowledge other deities as subordinate to the supreme deity of the sect. In particular, most have worked out ways of encompassing the relation of the God and the Goddess at some fundamental theological level. Persistently the supreme deity is identified both as the ultimate *brahman* and also as in some way personal. The sects also frequently define various stages of divine descent or interaction with the world, various stages of the soul’s ascent, and various types of relation between the soul and God. Thus the sects elaborate upon the epic-Puranic cosmology while modifying and refining the theological and soteriological terms. It is only against this background that their formulations are intelligible.

From the historical vantage point, one may note that the consolidation of the separate strands of sectarianism and *bhakti* revivalism occurs after, and is no doubt in part a response to, the growing success of Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta. Prior to Śaṅkara, sectarian groups had centered primarily around distinctive ritual traditions that were increasingly influenced by Tantrism: not only in forms of worship and theological formulation, but also, in some Śaiva sects, in actual practice. Thus the Vaiṣṇava Pañcarātras and Vaikhānasas and the Śaiva Pāsupatas (all mentioned first in



the late *Mahābhārata*) between the fifth and tenth centuries produced their Saṃhitās and Āgamas to regularize the construction of temples, iconography, and *pūjā* ceremonialism. Some Pāśupatas and Kāpālikas (a Tantric Śaiva sect) also incorporated forms of abrupt anticonventional behavior modeled on Śiva's character as the great yogin ascetic. With the exception of the Pañcarātras, who elaborated an influential doctrine of the emanations (*vyūhas*) of Viṣṇu that paralleled the cosmogonic theory of evolution in the Sāṃkhya system, the theological formulations of these movements were apparently among their secondary concerns.

**Saint-singer tradition.** Whereas the early sectarian movements were able to spread their impact from north to south using Sanskrit as their medium, the *bhakti* revivalist movement began in the South, drawing on Tamil. Like the sectarian movements, the saint-singers developed their traditions along Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva lines. The sixty-three Nāyaṇmār (or Nāyaṇārs) promoted the worship of Śiva, while the twelve Ālvārs similarly honored Viṣṇu. Part of the revivalist motivation was provided by the earlier spread of Buddhism and Jainism in the South, both of which lost considerable following as a result of the efforts of the Nāyaṇmār and Ālvārs, as well as those of their contemporary Śaṅkara.

Some of the most renowned among these two companies of saint-singers have left songs that they composed at the temples of Viṣṇu and Śiva, praising the form and presence of the deity therein, the place itself as his manifestation, and the communal attitude of worship generated there through pilgrimage and festival. Though they honor the deities in terms familiar from Puranic myths, the stories are set in the local terrain. The emotional side of *bhakti* thus draws from deep Tamil traditions, including a revival of classical Tamil poetic conventions involving the correlations between different types of landscape, different divinities, and different types of male-female love. In the hands of the saint-singers, erotic love in particular was drawn on as a metaphor for devotional feelings that stressed the feminine character of the soul in relation to the deity and idealized a softening of the mind or heart that could take the forms of “melting” into the divine, ecstatic rapture, divine madness, and possession.

Following the advent of Śaṅkara, most of the sectarian and revivalist movements found common cause in their devotionalist stance against Advaita nondualism and continued to develop for the most part interdependently. Thus, most formatively, the songs of the Ālvārs were collected in the ninth century for eventual use by the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas. And the poems of the Nāyaṇmār—supplemented by the songs of Māṇikkavācakar, who apparently lived just after the list of sixty-three Nāyaṇmār had been set (ninth century)—were collected to form parts of the canon of the Śaiva Siddhānta. However, the revivalist and sectarian strains could also at times follow somewhat independent courses. The saint-singer tradition continued to take Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava forms among the Liṅgāyats and the Haridāsas of Karnataka, and also to be associated there with sects (the Liṅgāyats them-

selves and the Brāhma Saṃpradāya or Dvaita Vedānta tradition of Madhva, respectively). But its spread through Maharashtra, the Hindi-speaking areas of North India, and through Bengal was most focused on Viṣṇu, or more accurately on his forms as Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, who in turn, in the Hindi and Bengali areas, became the deities of different sects. In the case of Kṛṣṇa, erotic devotional poetry opened new dimensions on the theme of Kṛṣṇa's love-play with his “new” consort, Rādhā (her name does not appear before the twelfth-century Sanskrit *Gītāgovinda* by the Bengali court poet Jayadeva). In Hindi and Bengali poems, not only are the emotions of motherly love for the baby Kṛṣṇa and erotic love for the youthful Kṛṣṇa explored, but they are tied in with a classical theory of aesthetic appreciation (*rasa*).

As to the sects, the impact of Śaṅkara's Advaita is evident at many points. Although Śaiva monasticism may predate Śaṅkara by about a century, his establishment of *mathas* around India was highly influential. Certain post-Śaṅkara sects thus adopted institutionalized forms of “monastic” renunciation, either like Śaṅkara setting their *mathas* alongside the temples (Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, Dvaita Vedāntins, Śaiva Siddhāntins) or in opposition to the whole temple cultus (Liṅgāyats). Vaiṣṇava sects also assume henceforth the mantle of new “Vedāntas” in order to seek Vedic authority for their advocacy of *bhakti* theologies over and against Śaṅkara's nondualism and in their efforts to subordinate the path of knowledge to that of *bhakti*.

Most distinctive and most important theologically among the Vaiṣṇava schools are those of Rāmānuja (c. 1017–1137) and Madhva (1238–1317), both of whom attempted to refute Śaṅkara's interpretations of the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma Sūtra*, and the *Bhagavadgītā* with their own commentaries on those texts. The more prolific Madhva also wrote commentaries on the *R̥gveda* and the epics. Rāmānuja, drawing on the ceremonialism and theological formulations of the Pañcaratra sect as well as on the revivalist poetry of the Ālvārs, developed for the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas the first *bhakti* sectarian repudiation of the Advaita. In his “qualified nondualistic Vedānta” (*viśiṣṭādvaita vedānta*), he argued that Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa is the ultimate *brahman*, his relation to the world and souls being “qualified” as substance to attribute. World and souls are thus real, as of course is God—all in opposition to Śaṅkara's view that there is no reality other than *brahman*. For Rāmānuja the three paths not only culminate in *bhakti* but are crowned by *prapatti*, “surrender” to God or “falling forward” at his feet. Criticizing both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Madhva's “dualistic Vedānta” (*dvaita vedānta*) stressed the absolute sovereignty of God and the fivefold set of absolute distinctions between God and souls, God and the world, souls and souls, souls and the world, and matter in its different aspects—all of which are real and not illusory.

On the Śaiva side, the most distinctive sect is the Kashmir Śaiva, or Trika, school, established in the ninth century, with possibly earlier roots. It is nondualist, but from the standpoint that all is essentially Śiva. As pure being and con-

sciousness, Śiva is aware of himself through reflection in the universe, which he pervades as the *ātman* and in which he is manifest through his *śakti* (power, or female energy, personified as the Goddess). The universe is thus an expression of Śiva's aesthetic experience of his creative awareness as self and his delight in unity with his Śakti. "Recognition" of Śiva as the *ātman*, and experience of the self through *spanda* ("vibration")—an attunement to the blissful throbbing waves of divine consciousness in the heart—are among the means to liberation. One of the foremost systematizers of this school was Abhinavagupta (c. 1000 CE), who developed the view that states of aesthetic appreciation (*rasas*, "tastes") are modes of experiencing the divine Self. Though favoring *śantarasa* (the *rasa* of peacefulness), Abhinavagupta's theories influenced the North Indian medieval devotional poetry that explored *bhakti* itself as a state of *rasa*, with such powerfully evocative modes as love of Kṛṣṇa in the relationships of servant-master, parent-child, and lover-beloved. This type of devotional intensity reached its peak in the person of the Bengali saint Caitanya (1486–1533), founder of the Gauḍiyya Vaiṣṇava sect, whose ecstatic dancing and singing enabled him to experience the love of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa. Popular tradition regards him as an *avatāra* of Kṛṣṇa, a form assumed by Kṛṣṇa to experience in one body his union with his Śakti.

**POPULAR HINDUISM.** The main current of living Hinduism is popular Hinduism. It has been affected by every change the tradition has gone through and may fairly be assumed to have ancient roots, in some aspects traceable to Indus Valley religion, in others to *sūdra*, village, and tribal forms of religion that were never more than alluded to—and then negatively—in the ancient and classical sources. *Bhakti* and Tantra are two movements within Hinduism that draw inspiration from this broad current, and popular Hinduism today remains dominated by *bhakti* and Tantric expressions.

It is, however, perilous to look at popular Hinduism from the perspective of what it might have once been: that is, to attempt to isolate or reconstruct its Dravidian, pre-Aryan, or non-Brahmanic components. Although hypotheses about pre-Aryan and non-Aryan forms of popular Hinduism are certainly worth pursuing, they must be informed and restrained by a sound understanding of the comprehensive structures through which both popular and Brahmanic forms of Hinduism are integrated at the popular level. Aspects of popular religion that might look non-Aryan turn out on closer examination to involve Vedic prolongations. Nor are recent constructs such as sanskritization, brahmanization, or kṣatriyazation—all useful up to a point, but stressing only the adoption by low-caste groups of high-caste models—adequate to account for the multivector process that must have occurred for a long time as it continues to occur today.

Amid the bewildering variety of popular Hindu rites, customs, and beliefs, two broad structures can be identified that clarify this overall integration. One involves the working out of the implications of *bhakti* in relation to temple worship; the other involves the working out of the implications

of the caste system in relation to local forms of worship more generally. As they function, the two structures are intimately related.

Generally speaking, whether one defines a locality in large terms (a region, a former kingdom) or small terms (a city, town, or village), one will find two types of divinities: pure and impure. The pure divinities are forms taken locally—*avatāras*—of the great gods Viṣṇu and Śiva. Sometimes the Goddess is also purified to this rank, often with a myth explaining her change from violent to peaceful habits (as with the alleged conversion of the goddess Kāmākṣī at Kanchipuram, Tamil Nadu, by Śaṅkara). And in certain regions Śiva's sons Murukan/Skanda (in Tamil Nadu) and Gaṇeśa (in Maharashtra) also assume this role. In their temples, these gods are offered pure vegetarian food by brahmins. Today, all castes can worship in such temples, thanks to temple entry legislation by the postindependence government; formerly, low castes were excluded. These castes still maintain their own temples where impure gods are served with nonvegetarian offerings, that is, sacrifices of male animals, usually cocks and goats but occasionally water buffalo. Legislation prohibiting buffalo sacrifices has so far had mixed results.

Whereas worship of pure gods—especially at remote pilgrimage sites—is focused ultimately on renunciation and liberation, that of impure gods is dominated by down-to-earth concerns. One thus finds among the general category of impure gods lineage deities (*kuladevatās*), caste deities, and village deities (*grāmadevatās*). The first are usually but not always male, and some are deities for brahmin as well as low-caste lineages. Caste deities and village deities are usually female, and the category may overlap where the deity of a locally dominant caste becomes also the village deity. Where the village deity (usually a goddess) is the deity of a vegetarian caste or has had her cult purified to bring it into accord with high-caste standards, she frequently has one or more male assistants—impure demons converted to her cause and frequently lineage gods themselves—who handle the animal sacrifice (real or symbolic) for her, often out of her line of sight.

Nonetheless, though opposing principles are each given their play, it is their overlap and interrelation that is most striking. Low castes worship the pure gods in their temples. And high castes acknowledge the power of the impure deities, not only as *kuladevatās*, but through selective (pure) means of participation in festivals sponsored by lower castes. Through the universalization of *bhakti*, the impure gods are sometimes also the prototypes for the demons whose deaths at the hands of the pure deities transform them into their devotees. These local myths have their roots in Puranic mythologies, and the sacrificial practices they evoke involve at least in part prolongations and reinterpretations of the Vedic animal sacrifice.

The second issue—working out of the implications of the caste system in relation to local forms of worship—has

thus already been touched upon, but with the focus of issues of purity and impurity as defined by brahman and low-caste involvements. There remains the issue of the role of the *ksatriya*, or more particularly the king, as the ruler of the land. The caste system has traditionally functioned in locally defined territories, “little kingdoms,” where the local ruler had certain roles to perform. No matter what his actual caste, whether high or low, pure or impure, he had to function as a *ksatriya*. In his ceremonial status, he performed the role of *jajmān*, engaging him at the core of a system of prestations and counterprestations with other castes as a sort of patron for those who perform services for him. Most significantly, this title derives from the Vedic *yajamāna*, “sacrificer,” and prolongs not only the *yajamāna*’s function as patron of other castes (particularly brahmins, who offer sacrifices for him), but that of “sacrificer” itself. The model of the king as *jajmān* on the regional territorial level has its counterpart in the village in the person(s) of the leader(s) of the locally dominant caste, who assumes the role of *yajamāna* at village festivals. When, as was until recently widely the case, the village festival involves the sacrifice of a buffalo, it thus occurs within a continuum that includes the royal buffalo sacrifice traditionally performed in connection with the pan-Hindu festival of Dussera, and the mythology of the goddess Durgā and the buffalo demon Mashāsura that is traceable to the *Devimāhātmyam* in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāna*. There are many local and regional transformations of this pattern, but a basic theme is that the Goddess, who personifies victory, acts for the *yajamāna* and the kingdom or village in her conquest over demonic forces (impure barbarians, drought, diseases) that threaten the welfare of the local terrain over which she, as goddess, presides.

**HINDU RESPONSES TO ISLAM AND WESTERNIZATION.** Self-conscious Hindu responses to influences from the West were first worked out in the classical period in the epics, the Dharmaśāstras, and the Purāṇas. It seems that military dominance by “barbarian” peoples in that period provided one of the incentives for the articulation of Hindu orthodoxy. Islamic rule and Western rule in India have provided similar incentives, but this often goes unmentioned as historians place their emphasis on what is supposedly new. A full accounting of the impact of almost ten centuries of Islam and five centuries of Western presence in India would have to deal not only with their distinctive new influences but also with the ways in which traditional Hindu models have been revived and applied in new and adaptive ways, often on the folk and popular level. That, however, can only be alluded to here.

Islamic influence on Hinduism has many dimensions, all difficult to assess. From the time of the raids of Mahmud of Ghazni into Northwest India (977–1030) into the period of Mughal dominance, Hindus had to deal periodically with outbreaks of violence and iconoclastic zeal. Regional defense of Hindu traditions against Islam—first by the Rajputs in Rajasthan, then by the Vijayanagar rulers and their successors in South India (1333–eighteenth century), and finally

by the Marathas in Maharashtra and the South (late sixteenth century–1761)—clearly fostered the Hindu ideal of the territorial kingdom, big or “little,” as a model for the protection of ongoing Hindu values. Under the Muslim rulers, in fact, many Hindu chiefs and petty rajas were left in control of their local realms so long as they paid tribute and supplied military support. In these circumstances, conservative and puritanical tendencies seem to have gained momentum in orthodox Hinduism, particularly in regard to caste and the purity of women. Nonetheless, one finds numerous cases where Muslim themes and figures have been integrated into popular Hindu myth and ritual, but usually in ways that indicate Muslim subordination to a local or regional Hindu deity.

While orthodox, popular, and domestic forms of Hinduism thus drew in on themselves, however, Hindu sectarian traditions multiplied, particularly in the period of the breakup of the Delhi sultanate (1206–1526). Notable at this time were Caitanya in Bengal, and two exemplars of the North Indian *sant* (holy man) tradition: Kabir (c. 1440–1518, from Banaras) and Nānak (1469–1539, from the Punjab). These two latter figures both preached a path of loving devotion to one God that combined aspects of Islamic Sufism and Hindu *bhakti*. They thus formulated probably for the first time in terms partly Hindu an exclusivist monotheism like that found in the Abrahamic traditions of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Over and against the direct experience of this one God, all else was mediate and external, whether the practice were Muslim or Hindu. Thus not only caste but idol worship was rejected by these teachers. But though their syncretistic poetry remained highly popular, it did little to change the Hindu practices it criticized. Nānak’s work in particular provided the foundation for the Sikh tradition, an increasingly non-Hindu and non-Muslim movement on its own. Nor did the syncretistic interests of the great Mughal emperor Akbar (ruled 1555–1605) do much to encourage theological synthesis, despite the popularity of his, for the most part, religiously tolerant rule. Akbar’s successors on the Mughal throne abandoned his policies and pursued expansionist goals that aroused resistance from the heirs of the Vijayanagar and the Rajput kingdoms, and especially from the Sikhs and the new power of the Marathas. The seeds of a nationalist vision of Hinduism may be traced through these movements and back to the imperial ideal of the epics.

Under the British, certain reform tendencies initiated under Muslim rule were carried forward, freshly influenced by Christian missionary activity and Western education. Most notable were the reform movements of the nineteenth century. The Brāhmo Samāj was founded in 1828 by Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833, from Calcutta). In an early treatise Roy wrote an attack on idolatry that showed Muslim influence, but by the time he founded the Samāj he had been more affected by Christianity, and particularly by the Unitarians. Roy thus introduced a kind of deistic monotheism and a form of congregational worship to go along with a rejection of idolatry, caste, sacrifice, transmigration, and *karman*. The



Ārya Samāj, founded in 1875 by Swami Dayananda Sarasvati (1824–1883, from Kathiawar), denied authenticity to Puranic Hinduism and attempted a return to the Vedas. Showing that the Vedas lent no support to image worship and various social practices, he went further to assert that they were monotheistic. As regards caste, he championed the *varṇa* theory as an ancient social institution but denied that it was religious. Both movements split into rival camps.

The Ramakrishna Mission, established on the death of its founder Ramakrishna (1834–1886) and carried forward by his disciples, most notably Vivekananda (1863–1902), is more representative of traditional Hindu values. Strong *bhakti* and Tantric strains converged in the mystical experiences of Ramakrishna and were held in conjunction with an initiation into Advaita Vedānta and experiences of the oneness of all religions through visions not only of Hindu deities but of Jesus and Allāh. For many followers, this humble priest of Kālī has thus come to be regarded as an *avatāra*, in the tradition of Caitanya. Vivekananda, Western-educated and keenly intellectual, attended the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893, lectured widely, and established the Vedānta Society of New York. When he returned to India as a recognized champion of Hindu self-pride, he helped to organize the disciples of Ramakrishna into the pan-Indian Ramakrishna Mission. The first such teacher to gain prominence in India by popularity gained abroad, he thus inadvertently set up a pattern that has been followed by many prominent gurus and swamis in the twentieth century. Notable among them are Swami A. C. Bhaktivedānta (1896–1977), founder of the Hare Krishna movement (ISKCON) as an outgrowth of the Bengal Caitanya tradition, and Swami Muktananda (1908–1982), exponent of *siddhayoga* teachings that draw on Kashmir Saivism.

An earlier figure, one who attracted a large Western following without ever leaving India, was Śrī Aurobindo (1872–1950), whose career spanned nationalist political activism in Bengal (up to 1908), followed by the establishment of an ashram (hermitage) in Pondicherry for the teaching of a type of integral yoga that stressed the “evolutionary” progress of the soul toward the divine. One must also mention Mohandas K. Gandhī (1869–1948), whose reputation upon returning to India in 1915 after twenty-one years in England and Africa was not that of a guru but a champion of Indian causes against social and economic discrimination. As he took on more and more ascetic and saintly aspirations, however, Gandhī sought to combine an ideal of dispassioned and nonviolent service to humanity, modeled on the *Bhagavadgītā*'s doctrine of *karmayoga*, with work for Indian *svarāj* (“self-rule”).

Although sometimes referred to as a Hindu renaissance, the effect of the various reformers since the nineteenth century has been to a certain extent more ideological than religious. Where they founded religious movements, these attracted only small followings. But their religious views—that

Hinduism is essentially monotheistic, that caste is not essentially Hindu, that Hindu tolerance does not deny the truths of other religions, that Hinduism is in accord with modern science, and so on—have had major influence on a Western-educated, largely urban elite that, at least for now, controls the media and the educational processes of contemporary India. It remains to be seen how this new vision of unity will square with the traditionally diverse Hinduism of the vast population of the countryside.

**SEE ALSO** Arya Samaj; Avatāra; Bengali Religions; Bhagavadgītā; Bhakti; Brāhamaṇas and Āraṇyakas; Brahma Samaj; Buddhism, Schools of, article on Esoteric Buddhism; Cosmology, article on Hindu Cosmology; Dharma, article on Hindu Dharma; Domestic Observances, article on Hindu Practices; Drama, article on Indian Dance and Dance Drama; Goddess Worship, article on The Hindu Goddess; Hindi Religious Traditions; Hindu Religious Year; Hindu Tantric Literature; Iconography, article on Hindu Iconography; Indian Philosophies; Indian Religions, article on Rural Traditions; Indus Valley Religion; International Society for Krishna Consciousness; Kṛṣṇaism; Līlā; Mahābhārata; Marathi Religions; Music, article on Music and Religion in India; Poetry, article on Indian Religious Poetry; Priesthood, article on Hindu Priesthood; Pūjā, article on Hindu Pūjā; Purāṇas; Rāmāyaṇa; Rites of Passage, article on Hindu Rites; Śaivism; Śaṅkara; Śāstra Literature; Southeast Asian Religions; Sūtra Literature; Tamil Religions; Tantrism; Temple, article on Hindu Temples; Upaniṣads; Vaiṣṇavism; Varṇa and Jāti; Vedāṅgas; Vedas; Vedism and Brahmanism; Worship and Devotional Life, article on Hindu Devotional Life.

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**HINDUISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.** Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, and other sectarian traditions involving the worship of the many gods and goddesses that fall under the rubric of what is today called *Hinduism* have existed in parts of Southeast Asia for over two thousand years. Most of these early Hindu traditions have died out, but the dominance of their presence is attested by a legacy of architecture and performing arts, and to a lesser extent, proper names, manuscripts, and rituals. Small pockets of Hindus from early migrations, as well as descendants of more recent migrations, still live in Southeast Asia. Many of the early kingdoms in Southeast Asia, starting in the first half of the first millennium CE, adopted and adapted the specific Hindu texts, theologies, rituals, architecture, and forms of social organization that were suitable to their times and conditions. These traditions especially their relationship to the sacrality of the land and social structures indicates that Hinduism was characterized by transnational features, which adds nuance to our understanding of the cultural features that were carried by Hindu migrants.

The many areas where Hindu and Mahāyāna Buddhist culture coexisted, peacefully for the most part, included Champa (central and southern areas of Vietnam), Kambuja (Cambodia), Sri Vijaya, Yavadvipa (Indonesia, Java, and possibly Malaysia and other countries), Suvarṇa Dvīpa ("the gol-



den island," a name identified with many places), Sri Kshetra (Burma/Myanmar), as well as Thailand and Laos. Although Hindu traditions thrived in all these countries, there were perhaps more Hindu dynasties and a greater degree of state-sponsored Hinduism in Cambodia than in other kingdoms. By about the fifteenth century, with the increasing popularity of other traditions, such as Theravāda Buddhism in Cambodia and Islam in Indonesia, the explicit practice and acknowledgment of the Hindu traditions died out.

The boundaries of most kingdoms fluctuated through the centuries. At the height of its power, for instance, the Kambuja Empire included a major part of Southeast Asia from present-day Myanmar (Sri Kshetra) to central Vietnam (Champa), from the southern Chinese province of Yunnan, all the way down to the Malayan peninsula.

George Coedes (1880–1969) and other scholars called the process by which Hindu and Buddhist cultures and worldviews were transplanted in Southeast Asia *Indianization*. Hindu and Buddhist traders, priests, and an occasional prince traveled to Southeast Asia beginning in about the second half of the first millennium BCE (or earlier) and eventually migrated there. The term *Indianization*, however, should be used with caution; although one can certainly speak about many features of "Indian" culture that took root and still linger in the area, there was a dynamic interaction between local traditions and those brought by Indian traders and migrants. While there was considerable Sanskritization and Brahmanization, the depth of the influence of these traditions for the people is still a matter of scholarly dispute. The most pervasive areas of influence seem to have been in the dissemination of architecture, rituals, and narratives such as the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*. Many of the traditions, especially those of the epics, are still performed, but the stories are situated in the context of Buddhist traditions.

**SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.** Our knowledge of Hindu traditions in Southeast Asia is based on archaeological sources, icons, inscriptions, temple architecture, texts, and performing arts. Archaeological evidence, including icons of several deities, coins, jewelry, and the like, has been of utmost importance. Most informative are the elaborate Sanskrit inscriptions that mark donations, consecrations of temples and icons, and dedications of public works. Some of the longest Sanskrit inscriptions are found in this region, particularly in Cambodia. The inscriptions are in many Sanskrit meters and reveal an excellent knowledge of Sanskrit literature and literary conceits. Dating of these inscriptions has been problematic, but some of the early ones in the Mi Son temple complex in Vietnam may date to as early as the third century CE. A late fifth-century inscription in the kingdom known as Funan (southern Cambodia and Vietnam) describing Queen Kulaprabhavati's endowment of monies to a hermitage may be one of the earliest inscriptions in Cambodia. Inscriptions have been found in Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Bali. The rise and decline of Sanskrit as the medium for these inscriptions follow trends that are seen in India. In many cases,

as in Cambodia, the Sanskrit inscriptions are followed by records in a local language. Most books and manuscripts in Cambodia have been destroyed over the centuries, but many stelae carry inscriptions.

Chinese texts, including travelogues and descriptions by visiting political missions, also provide extensive information on cities, everyday life, royal processions, and so on. Theatrical performances in Thailand and Indonesia introduce us to the world of Kakawin poetry, said to be descended from the *kāvya* style of literature in India. Manuscripts, copied through the generations in Indonesia, give us various versions of the Hindu epics and stories from the Purāṇas. Temple architecture and iconography also inform us of the depth and pervasiveness of Hindu culture in Southeast Asia, as well as the areas in India from which the migrants may have come.

**ORIGIN STORIES.** Several founding stories, especially those of the Khmer people, speak about the union of an Indian ancestor with a *nāga* woman. The term *nāga* in Indian (Buddhist, Hindu, and Jain) narratives refers to a semi-divine group of people associated with serpents. Some stories depict them as being descended from serpents, or as having some of their mythical powers. The term *nāga* also referred to a community of people in India during the time of the Buddha. Early Chinese accounts (c. 230 CE) speak of a man from India named Hundien meeting a woman, Liu Ye, who ruled over the land. After a battle, Hundien (Kaundinya?) married the princess. Another story traces the people of Cambodia to the royal holy man Kauṇḍinya who is said to have married the local *nāga* princess, Soma. This version of the story, which some scholars consider a distinct narrative, is recounted in a temple inscription in Mi Son (Champa), which probably dates to around the third century, or perhaps much later. This inscription tells of Kauṇḍinya receiving a javelin or a spear from Asvathamman (the son of Droṇa, a teacher of the princes in the *Mahābhārata*) and throwing it into the air, thus marking his territory. He eventually married Soma, daughter of a *nāga* king. A later Cambodian story that does not turn up until the classical age (c. ninth century CE) tells of a legendary sage Kambu who married a celestial woman called Mera. Some scholars derive the word *K(h)-mer* from the names of these parents. The country born (Skt., *ja*) from the union of Mera and Kambu was called Kambuja.

In these stories, a male ancestor from India marries a divine or local princess; the name Soma ("moon") suggests the alliance between the male ruler from the solar lineage and the woman from a lunar lineage. The solar and lunar dynasties were prominent in Hindu narratives, and almost every Hindu king traced his ancestry to these lines. Some of these stories are connected with the Pallava dynasty, which was in power in the Southeast part of India (Tamil Nadu), particularly near the city of Kanchipuram. Other stories, like those of the *nāga* origin, are strikingly similar to those found near Kashmir.

**ORIGINS OF THE MIGRANTS IN INDIA.** It is difficult to categorically state the various places in India from which the Hindu migrants in Southeast Asia came. Speculations on places of origin in India are based on fragmentary sources, including inscriptions, histories of maritime expeditions, and stylistic similarities between architecture and sculptures. There seem to have been both sea routes and land routes from India to Southeast Asia.

Two areas that seem to have had regular and extensive contact with Southeast Asia are Kanchipuram (near Chennai, South India) and the areas traditionally known as Kalinga (modern Orissa), farther north on the east coast of India. The temple towers of Angkor Wat (or Vatt), for instance, are strikingly similar to those found in Orissa, particularly the Brahmeshwar Temple (built circa 1061 CE by Queen Kolavati) near Bhubaneswar. The area between Orissa and Andhra Pradesh near the lower Kṛṣṇa River also seems to have been a place from which there was active contact with Southeast Asia.

Kanchipuram was an important city in South India for several centuries. The Angkor Wat, for instance, is a three-storied, west-facing temple dedicated to Viṣṇu, similar to the Vaikuntha Perumal temple, built in the eighth century in Kanchipuram. The temple in Cambodia replicates some of these features and combines it with the architecture of Kalinga. The area around Kanchipuram also has several temples with icons of Viṣṇu similar to those in Cambodia.

More speculative are theories pointing to other areas near Kashmir as the source for certain aspects of Hindu culture in Southeast Asia. Some Hindu origin stories are similar to those of Kashmir and Nepal. In addition, there are striking similarities in the sculpture and texts of the Chalukya empire (northern Karnataka, c. sixth century CE) and some Southeast Asian cultures.

There are hundreds of place names in Southeast Asia that are similar to names in India.

There were many areas in India that could have been the land of origin for the migrants who settled in Southeast Asia. Hinduism seems to have been global or at least transnational. There seems to have been regular contact with traders, sailors, pilgrims, and migrants, and therefore continuing links between South and Southeast Asia.

**EARLY HISTORY AND ASPECTS OF HINDU CULTURE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.** Historians believe exchanges of goods and ideas between India and Southeast Asia may have begun as early as 350 BCE; such an exchange had certainly been established by the first few centuries of the Common Era. Traders, their families, and eventually priests came and settled in these lands and eventually intermarried with the local people. The cultures of India may have spread in this way all over Southeast Asia. Some scholars, however, insist that local kingdoms exercised a great deal of control over what they imported from India, that Indian court culture was not a dominant culture imposed from outside on a passive Southeast Asian

land, and that local rulers invited Indian *brahmins* to serve them and selected what they wanted of Indian culture. It is certainly true that although there was extensive cultural influence from India, some important features of Indian life—including the dietary culture and the caste system—never took hold in Southeast Asia.

Indian migration to Southeast Asia occurred in small waves, with the migrants following land and sea routes. These new people came with their narratives and literary traditions, a knowledge of construction techniques and the religious principles behind the engineering of temples, as well as public waterworks, performing arts, astronomy and astrology, and statecraft. Small groups of settlers seem to have shared their traditions through the invitation or request of the local elite. Some of these were adopted by the local people, some modified, others jettisoned.

Archaeological data from the Oc Eo area of the Mekong Delta shows evidence of settlements from before the beginning of the Common Era. Chinese texts speak about a state called Funan occupying a part of Cambodia and southern Vietnam. While there are Chinese descriptions of this kingdom from about the third century CE, it may have been in existence as much as two centuries before that. Historically, evidence of early Indianization in Southeast Asia is offered by Sanskrit inscriptions, including an inscription in Champa (at Vo-Canh in the Khanh-Hoa province of modern Vietnam), which dates to the third century CE. Here, the author refers to himself as the delight of the family of Srimar, a king who established a dynasty in Champa in the second century CE.

By the fifth century CE, several small Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms were established in the Indonesian archipelago. The Srivijaya kingdom, based in Palembang in south Sumatra, was very powerful for a while, controlling key trade routes and extending its empire to Thailand in the north and West Borneo in the east. It was largely Buddhist, but Hindu dynasties flourished in central Java. In the Sanjaya (Mataram) kingdom, one of the best known and largest Hindu temples—the Loro Jonggrang at Prambanan (near Yogyakarta)—was built in the ninth century CE. Hindu dynasties ruled in Bali after the ninth century CE.

Clear Indian influence is evident in the names of places and royalty. Many of the early kings in this region had Hindu Sanskrit names, such as Rudravarman, Bhavavarman, or Jayavarman. Almost all the early kings in Southeast Asia bore names ending with the royal *varman*, as was the custom in India, where, according to the *dharmas*, names of *kṣatriyas* should end with *varman*. There is also evidence of women rulers; the earliest may have been Queen Kulaprabhavati in southern Cambodia in the fifth to sixth centuries CE. Queen Jayadevī ruled in Cambodia in the early eighth century. The earliest capital in Cambodia was called “Hari hara alaya”—the sacred abode of Hari (Viṣṇu) and Hara (Śiva). Some of these names have lingered and have been modified in Southeast Asia.

Coronation and consecration rituals referred to in the inscriptions seem to follow Hindu texts. In Cambodia, after the time of Jayavarman II (early ninth century), we hear about the “*devarāja* [god-king] cult.” Hiranyadama, the royal *gurū*, apparently conducted this rite, and it seems to have established Jayavarman’s legitimacy. The Sdok Kak Thom inscription (c. 1052) gives many details about the concept of *devarāja* and associates it with a particular temple (Rong Chen) and with specific kings. The concept of *devarāja* involved the concept of the king (*rāja*) as a divine being (*deva*), perhaps centering the royal power in a particular icon of Śiva (a *liṅga*) and divine power in the kings. Perhaps only kings whose hereditary legitimacy was in doubt emphasized the *devarāja* concept.

**HINDU DEITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.** Śiva, Viṣṇu, and the goddess Lakṣmī were all popular in Southeast Asia, but in addition, Hari-Hara, an amalgamation of Viṣṇu and Śiva, was revered, particularly in Cambodia. Hari-hara, who is seen in reliefs in the Badami caves (c. sixth century CE, Northern Karnataka in India), became popular after the seventh century. He is mentioned in many inscriptions in Cambodia, and is represented in numerous icons. Icons of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, Hari-Hara, Gaṇeśa, Skanda, Nandi (a bull sacred to Śiva), Garuḍa (the eagle mount of Viṣṇu), the nine planets worshiped by Hindus, and other deities have been found all over Southeast Asia. The invocations in inscriptions also express reverence to amalgamated deities like Ardhanārīśvara (a combination of Śiva and the goddess Pārvatī). Several incarnations of Viṣṇu are carved in temples.

Śiva was perhaps the best known deity in all of Southeast Asia. In Cambodia, Śiva is usually depicted with two wives, Umā and Gaṅgā. Rivers in Cambodia were eventually considered to be holy like the Ganges, such as, after the eleventh century, the rivers flowing from the hill Phnom Kulen to irrigate Angkor. The sacrality of these rivers was stated on carvings made on rocks on their banks, which emphasized the identification of such rivers as the Kbal Spean with the Ganges. While Śiva worship, particularly as represented by the creative symbol of the *liṅga*, was popular, the worship of Viṣṇu also flourished across the region. Knowledge of the Indian Vaiṣṇava texts, including the two epics, was widespread, at least among the elite. Long after Śaivism and other forms of Hinduism disappeared from Cambodia as living religions, knowledge of the *Rāmāyaṇa* thrived through the performing arts. Starting with the endowments of Queen Kulaprabhavati in the late fifth century, many endowments were made to temples of Viṣṇu in Cambodia. The walls of many temples are carved with scenes from the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Purāṇas*, and scenes from the *Rāmāyaṇa* are carved on the walls of the Prambanan temple near Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Most temples in Southeast Asia emphasize one deity but consecrate many others in the same place. Śiva, Viṣṇu, and Devī are commonly represented all in the same building. Women seem to have had an important role in consecrating deities in temples; both in Bakong and later in the temple

at Bantei Srei in Cambodia, women were involved in the consecration. The Prambanan temple in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, has temples to Brahmā and Viṣṇu, but the main shrine is dedicated to Śiva.

Mahāyāna temples included stupas, along with Buddhist and Hindu deities. Thus, there is a stupa at the center of Preah Khan (near Siem Reap), which was constructed by Jayavarman VII (a Mahāyāna king), as well as a very large Śiva *liṅga* on the western side of the structure. There is also a magnificent panel of Viṣṇu on Ananta, with Lakṣmī at his feet. Similarly, at the Bayon, which was built by the same king, there are many panels depicting Viṣṇu, Lakṣmī, and Śiva.

**ARCHITECTURE.** Hindu traditions have been showcased most prominently in Southeast Asia through architecture. There are hundreds of temples in every country, the most famous being the Loro Jonggrang temple (c. mid-ninth century), popularly known as the Prambanan temple, in Indonesia, and the Angkor Wat (mid-twelfth century) in Cambodia.

The Prambanan temple complex is about 20 kilometers east of Yogyakarta, Java. It is variously attributed to a king of the second Mataram dynasty, Rakai Pikatan, or to Bali-tung Maha Sambhu. There are well over 250 smaller temples in the Prambanan complex, which is spread out on the Prambanan plain. The main temple to Śiva is about 47 meters high. Viṣṇu had his own shrine (as did Gaṇeśa) and is represented in the carvings of the *Rāmāyaṇa* found throughout the complex. A princess, Loro Jonggrang, who is sometimes identified with Durgā, is also enshrined in this complex. Śiva’s temple is flanked by shrines to Viṣṇu and Brahmā. While Brahmā, the minor creator deity, is seldom worshiped in temples in India, there are several icons of him in Southeast Asia. Worship of the three deities (Viṣṇu, Śiva, and Brahmā) probably came to Southeast Asia before Brahmā was reduced to a minor deity in the subcontinent. In India, sculptures depicting Brahmā survived long after he lost his importance in the texts.

All the major buildings in the Angkor area of Cambodia emphasize Hindu principles of construction. Many of them are theologies in stone. Some of the early temples were built on a square or a rectangular foundation; in others, the innermost shrine was to be a square. Temples to Śiva frequently stand on artificial hills of five levels; the number five, associated with the five-syllabled *mantra* “Om namaḥ śivāya,” is prominent in all constructions to this deity. The Bakheng, in Cambodia, has 108 towers; from any side, only thirty-three towers are visible. This is said to remind one of the thirty-three *devas* or celestial beings that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* speaks of—describes eight *vasus*, eleven *rudras*, twelve *ādityas*, plus Indra and Prajāpati. Recent studies have shown that the details of the measurements of Angkor Wat correspond to various Hindu deities and their stars, as well as to the Hindu calendar.



Many Cambodia kings built Hindu temples in conjunction with irrigation systems, reservoirs, and the management of water reserves, although the issue of water management is a contentious topic among scholars. Udaya aditya-varman constructed a vast reservoir on the western side of Angkor (the western Baray); it is about 5 miles wide and 1½ miles in length. A temple to Viṣṇu was later built in the center of this area. Angkor functioned as both a sacred temple city and as the administration point of a vast irrigation system.

Sūryavarman II (r. 1131–c. 1150) built Angkor Wat and dedicated it to the Hindu god Viṣṇu. The term *angkor* comes from the Sanskrit word *nagara* (city), and the Buddhists who occupied this building in later centuries called this a place of worship or *wat*, a word derived from the Sanskrit *vatika* (garden). It was one of hundreds of temples built by the Khmers. Angkor Wat, regarded as the highest achievement of Khmer architecture, covers an area of 1,500 by 1,300 meters (4,920 by 4,265 feet) and is surrounded by a vast moat that is 180 meters (590 feet) wide. Balustrades in the shape of giant *nāgas* line the causeway leading to the temple. The Angkor Wat temple, which is built on three levels, has five main towers representing the five peaks of Mount Meru. There are, of course, extensive sculptures throughout the complex.

Viṣṇu is the presiding deity of Angkor Wat. There are many bas reliefs depicting stories from Sanskrit texts, including the *Bhāgavata Purāna*, *Harivaṃśa*, and *Rāmāyaṇa*. Scenes from the *Rāmāyaṇa* appear on the northern side of the western wall. The reliefs on the entire north wall and the north part of the east wall depict stories of celestial beings and gods fighting various demons. The largest bas relief in the world, on Angkor Wat's eastern wall, depicts a story that seems to be the most popular in all of Hindu and Buddhist Cambodia, although it is relatively unknown in India—the story of the churning of the ocean of milk and Viṣṇu's incarnation as a tortoise. The reliefs on the south wall depict various hells and heavens as described in the *Purāṇas*. Near the front entrance, symmetrical to the *Rāmāyaṇa* relief, there is a battle scene from the *Mahābhārata*. Returning to the western wall, we first see the brave warriors on their chariots in the battle scene. It culminates with a striking relief of Bhīṣma, an elderly general lying on a bed of arrows with the five Pāṇḍava brothers near him. The story refers to the time when Bhīṣma instructed Yudhiṣṭhira, the eldest of the brothers.

Reliefs of Viṣṇu reclining on his serpent Ananta are common in Southeast Asia, and narratives from the *Rāmāyaṇa* are seen in many temples in Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia. References to the churning of the ocean of milk appear in stylized panegyrics, as well as in art. For instance, such kings as Indravarman I (877–889) were compared to Viṣṇu with Sri Lakṣmī, the goddess of good fortune. In South India the story of the churning of the ocean of milk is commonly rendered in dance, but rarely in sculpture. The narrative, found in the *Purāṇas*, describes how the *devas* and

the demons, consummate enemies, came together to churn an ocean of milk in search of the nectar of immortality. Viṣṇu, who is glorified in this story, initiated the action and then helped by taking the form of a tortoise upon whose back Mount Mandara, used as a churning rod, rested. The snake Vāsuki served as a rope, and after the rising of initial poison, which Śiva swallowed to protect the participants, various treasures emerged. Lakṣmī also appeared and chose Viṣṇu as her husband. Compared to the thousands of sculptures in India relating to Rāma or Kṛṣṇa, the more important incarnations of Viṣṇu, the tortoise incarnation is marginal except in the performing arts.

Many temples in Southeast Asia had an astronomical and calendrical function. Scholars have shown that the positioning of the Angkor Wat temple is coordinated with very precise astronomical configurations, and the measurements correspond to cycles in the Hindu calendar. In some cases, there is also a numerical correspondence, as between the numbers of celestial beings and demons in the large panels and calendrical calculations.

**SOCIETY.** Sectarian affiliation was flexible among the Hindus, and family members may have followed different sectarian traditions—Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava—in considerable harmony. Many inscriptions, especially in Cambodia, indicate that royalty traced their descent both in matrilineal and patrilineal lines. Importance was given to biological ancestry, and pride was taken in important and learned ancestors who are spoken of as *brahmins* and who were learned in the Vedas. The title *vrahmana* (Skt., *brāhmaṇa*) is also attached to some names in Khmer. However, although great respect was shown to *brahmins* in Cambodian (as well as Thai) culture, the caste system as we know it in India did not exist here. New castes were created by kings, who had the power to assign caste names to subjects. Thus, the caste system existed for *brahmins* and royalty, but beyond that we do not know whether it had much currency. It appears that although the caste (*varṇa*) system existed in Cambodia, the castes were probably largely ceremonial orders, and did not apply to the common people.

There seems to have been a strong matrilineal tendency in Cambodia, but it is not possible to say whether it was a local phenomenon or was imported from South India. The Sdok Kak Thom inscription, for instance, which is one of the most important sources of Cambodian culture, speaks of many generations of kings and priests through a mostly matrilineal descent. Many women apparently held royal office, and they certainly sponsored many pious and charitable projects. The inscriptions also describe many queens—Indra-lakṣmī, Kambuja-rāja-lakṣmī, and Jayaraja-devī—who wielded considerable power. Both men and women made claims to the throne.

It is not clear how the Hindu traditions died out in the many kingdoms of Southeast Asia. Theravāda Buddhism had a strong presence in Thailand, and, after several wars, Buddhism became the religion of Cambodia. Islam became a

dominant presence in Indonesia after the fourteenth or fifteenth century. Small pockets of Hindus have lived continuously in some regions like Bali. Although there is a sense of cultural amnesia among Indian Hindus about the spread of Hindu traditions, the Hindu legacy is evident all over Southeast Asia. Hindu narratives are depicted in the performing arts throughout the region. Sanskritized names are still prevalent, even among Muslims in Indonesia. Brahmanical rituals prevail during coronation celebrations in Thailand. Histories of Hinduism will have to take this transnational aspect of the religion into consideration when assessing the region's culture and legacy.

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VASUDHA NARAYANAN (2005)

#### HINDU PHILOSOPHY SEE INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

**HINDU RELIGIOUS YEAR.** The religious celebrations of the Hindu year appear to be countless, and thus the main difficulty in presenting them here is selecting a pattern that is sufficiently comprehensive to take into account their intricacy. The difficulty is met at two levels. First, diversification occurs not only across broad regional areas, but throughout subregions as well. Second, villagers of a particular locality will share only a part of the series of annual festive observances, most of which vary according to caste, family custom, and sectarian bias. Moreover, even for a festival acknowledged to be pan-Indian, local variations occur concerning the date and the particulars of ritual and mythological background.

Very often, in order to highlight sociological factors, anthropological studies give mere chronological listings of localized festivals. From that perspective, however, the meaning of rituals and of their dating is left open to question. One must be content either with the functionalistic explanation of a fictitious solidarity supposedly reinforced by festivals, or with the obvious general purpose of every ritual, prosperity.

More sophisticated views have been elaborated to account for the multiplicity of local traditions in relation to the Sanskritic-Brahmanic "great tradition" (Srinivas, 1952; pp. 213–228) as well as for the "processes of universalization and parochialization" that McKim Marriott has found to be "generally operative in Indian civilization" (1955, p. 218). Although these theories were initially expressed with careful qualifications, later scholars have sometimes cited them in an almost mechanical manner: The relationship between the "great" and "little" traditions has been reduced to the nineteenth-century pseudohistorical understanding of an irreconcilable dichotomy between Brahmanic religion and the so-called autochthonous tribal, Dravidian (or even pre-Vedic) ones.

With the structural studies of myths and rituals, a renewed interest has grown for the study of Hindu symbolism and, as an outcome, for the study of the Indian calendrical system. When one observes the popular use of intricate almanacs (*pañcāṅga*), one cannot but ascertain the all-inclusive character of the Hindu conception of time in relation to efficient activity and hence to religious celebrations.



**THE HINDU CONCEPTION OF TIME.** The year is the main unit of time in so far as it is equivalent to a day of the gods. From this unit, time computation expands in two ways. The small units, that is, from the year downward, depend on astronomical considerations and directly concern humans in this world. The great units given by the Puranic cosmogonies are on the scale of the gods and have nothing to do with astronomy. However, the eschatological speculation of the cosmogony not only teaches that time is basically cyclical in the very periodical succession of creation-degradation-resorption, but it also institutes a homology among the cosmic periods, the levels of ultimate values, and the divine manifestation for this world (Biardeau, 1981, p. 173). In other words, humankind is at the very center of the cosmos. Because a human is the only being able to act with a goal in mind, by ritual activity at the level of what is at issue on the earth, humans alone are capable of sustaining the whole sociocosmic structure with its two poles, that is, liberation from transmigration and ultimate resorption into the Absolute, as well as the very continuation of this world.

Thus to refer to this world Hindu thought uses the term *karmabhūmi* “earth of (ritual) activity (or of transmigration)”; such activity cannot be but efficacious if the proper actions are observed at the right time and the right place. The principle of appropriateness, which is especially emphasized in the Hindu medical texts, remains at work insofar as every important undertaking of daily Hindu life is related to an astronomical conjunction. It is not a mere question of choosing a good date but of selecting a conjunction of time in which two or more specified astronomical phenomena meet and combine their effects; thus, one is reminded that time is not only cyclical but that it also introduces a rupture in its apparent continuity.

**THE HINDU CALENDRIAL SYSTEM.** The Hindu calendar combines the solar year with a lunar year, both systems being synchronized by adding or deleting lunar time units. A solar month begins with the *saṃkrānti* (“entry”) of the sun from one *rāśi* (zodiacal sign) to another (the twelve *rāśis* have almost the same names as the zodiacal signs of the Western system). Because this system disregards the precession of the equinoxes, the vernal equinox, which is supposed to occur when the sun enters Meṣa, or Aries, takes place around the thirteenth day of April. In the same way, the great *saṃkrānti* of mid-January marks the Indian winter solstice and thus the beginning of the solar year, when the sun’s course is northward (*uttarāyana*); from mid-July its course is southward (*dakṣiṇāyana*). The distinction between the two halves of the year is one of the important structural oppositions of the Hindu conception of time.

For the lunar months, the waxing and waning of the moon provides the major opposition between a bright and a dark fortnight. The very name of the full moon, *pūrṇimā*, conveys an idea of fulfillment; moonlight gives people strength, and the time of the full moon is thus auspicious for offering sacrifices to the gods. On the contrary, the dark half

of the lunar month and the new moon, *amāvāsyā*, “when the sun and moon ‘dwell together,’” are more ambiguous and are often devoted to ancestor worship. Each lunar day (*tithi*) of a fortnight is named in order by a numeral. Some of them are consecrated to a specific god: For example, the fourteenth of each dark fortnight in a year is consecrated to Śiva, but among them, that of February–March is the most important and has been sometimes mythically associated with a *nakṣatra*, or lunar constellation. For in conjunction with the synodical revolution of the moon, the zodiacal belt, already divided into twelve *rāśis*, is also divided into twenty-seven segments, each taking the name of a *nakṣatra* and each deemed to be ruled by a specific (Vedic) deity with a specific influence. Each lunar month is named for the *nakṣatra* that appears (though sometimes with a slight astronomical variation) to be in regular conjunction with the full moon. When the months are solar months, they have been given either the names of the lunar months, as in Tamil Nadu or Bengal, or those of the *rāśis*, as in Kerala. Whichever the case, both solar and lunar cycles with their related elements are taken into consideration. However, there is a great diversity of regional calendrical systems; sometimes a particular holiday is celebrated on different dates in different regions. The variations derive from several factors: Not only do lunar and solar months coincide, but, depending upon the region, the lunar month is known either as “ending with the full moon” (*pūrṇimānta*) or as “ending with the new moon” (*amānta*). Furthermore, each region has several almanacs based on different textual traditions. As in the Western system, the seven planets (including the sun and the moon) are correlated with the days of the week; to the seven are added two mythical bodies, Rāhu and Ketu, which are said to cause eclipses. In addition, planets interfere at sporadic intervals throughout the year.

For any given celebration, not only is a date fixed corresponding to an astral conjunction, but smaller units of time are also assigned with separate values of their own. The determination of the specific moment (*muhūrta*) for the performance of an auspicious act involves highly sophisticated calculations that must account for the fact that the different sidereal components of the date have varying durations. Additionally, there are seemingly endless values to these many combinations that induce auspicious as well as inauspicious periods when no serious enterprises—especially religious ones—can be undertaken.

It would appear, then, that in the Hindu calendrical system each segment of time derives value from its relation first to the astronomical moment and by implication to the cosmical time. Theoretically speaking, the significance of a religious event comes partly from its occurrence in conjunction with different sidereal cycles and partly from the symbolic meaning attached to each astral phenomenon. From a practical viewpoint, however, this is not so easy to ascertain. But, considering that symbolic meaning always carries several possible interpretations, the conception of time mainly

provides for a series of distinctive oppositions—such as bright and dark, pure and impure, and so forth—as a mental framework for (religious) activity.

Furthermore, the notion of a proper or auspicious time would not be so significant if it did not correspond to the notion of a proper place. If crowds gather every twelve years at Prayāga (Allahabad) in northern India or at Kumbakonam in the South for ritual bathing (and with the intent of future salvation), it is because at that very place waters of different sacred rivers are said to mix together at the very time of a special astral conjunction. In a similar way, worship throughout the course of the year takes place not at random but in a delimited space, either in the home or at the temple or at any temporary place that has been set aside according to rule for that purpose. Hinduism emphasizes the relationship of (sacred) time to (sacred) space; that is, the site of the temple or of any home inscribes in its space the same values that are represented in the conceptual square diagram of the earth. The dimensions of space and the positions of the gods are coordinated with the symbolic projections on earth of the solar and lunar cycles and of other astronomical phenomena. The definition of space thus includes a definition of time according to the specific values assigned to each orientation. Consequently, by delimiting a space—or only by facing a specific direction—for worshiping a deity at a prescribed conjunction of time, the worshiper reenacts a cosmos appropriate for his sacrificial relationship with the divine.

**STRUCTURE OF THE RELIGIOUS YEAR.** Among the diverse kinds of religious celebrations, there is but a thin line demarcating *vrata* (religious obligation usually involving a fast, a purificatory bath, and special worship) from *utsava* (festival). They share many elements, and from a list of almost fifteen hundred *vratas* and *utsavas* that Kane (1975) has compiled, twenty-two are still celebrated in various Hindu regions.

At least one-fourth of these are observed by all Hindus throughout India and Nepal. There is also some difficulty in distinguishing private from domestic observances, and popular festivals, celebrated at every level of society, are possibly associated with the temple festivals. Some of the largest temples may include in their festive calendar all the sacred days of the Hindu year and other ones as well, according to the personality of the main deity and to the myths of the place. A temple celebration may provide some Hindus for a reason to undergo a *vrata*, sometimes in connection with a pilgrimage. In small, localized temples of goddesses or subordinate male gods the date of the festival, and eventually of the *vrata*, may appear only minimally connected with the general calendrical system. Such events do conform to their proper seasons and to long-lived tradition, and therefore must be understood in relation to the specific regional pattern.

Most religious celebrations are held during the bright half of the lunar months. The full moon is sacred and is observed, if not everywhere on each month, at least in one region or another. The relatively few celebrations that fall dur-

ing the dark half of the lunar month assume special significance. The three main such festivals are dedicated to Śiva, to Kṛṣṇa, and to the Festival of Lights, Dīvalī. The significance of these sacred *tithis* of the opposed bright and dark halves of the lunar months is correlated to the structure of the solar year.

In many parts of India the New Year begins with mid-April, at the vernal equinox. In Andhra Pradesh the vernal equinox is called Yugādi (“beginning of a cosmic cycle”) and it is often held that this is the time when Brahmā begins the creation. The time of Dīvalī, however, which comes after the autumnal equinox, is also perceived as a beginning. The New Year tends to be celebrated at the balanced time of the equinoxes, whereas both solstices mark an intersection between opposing periods. If one remembers the equivalence of the year to a day of the gods, the solstices are then the metaphorical sunrise and sunset, sensitive transitions that must be manipulated carefully, particularly in the case of the sunset, which is perceived as *pradoṣa* (“break in time,” or “fault”).

Makara (Capricorn) Saṃkrānti (“transiting”) of mid-January, or the winter solstice, is a sacred date almost everywhere in India. It is especially celebrated in regions that observe solar months, such as in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, where the festival of Poṅkal combines worship of the sun, of the ancestors, and of cattle, with a ritual cooking of the new rice and prescribed gift-giving. However, even in areas that observe lunar months, the period of the summer solstice, though not marked by a special day, is the beginning of a period of intense religious activity. At this point seasons must be taken into account insofar as the summer solstice corresponds with the monsoon time of the tropical year. Even in areas with regional climatic variations (in Tamil Nadu the rains do not come from the east until October), everywhere in India the agricultural year begins with the monsoon approximately when the sun begins its apparent course southward. The very accumulation of natural events strengthens the symbolic cosmic drama at issue. Edāśī (the “eleventh day” of the bright fortnight) in July–August is recognized as the time when Viṣṇu, the king and sustainer of the world, goes to sleep for four months; that celebration is thus called the Cāturmāsya (“four months”). The celebration of Viṣṇu lying on the cobra Ananta (celebrated on the fourteenth day of the bright fortnight of September–October), is reminiscent of a *pralaya*, or a destruction of the world submerged by waters, just before a re-creation. This particular fortnight belongs to the *pitṛs* (“fathers”), and ancestors are especially worshiped at the new moon of August–September and during the dark half of September–October in a ceremony called Pitṛpakṣa, just before Navarātri. During these four months, the *asuras* (demons) threaten to take the place of the gods and the earth is left to the power of the underworld beings. Thus the *nagas*, or mythic cobras associated with water and fecundity, are propitiated on Nāga Pañcamī, the fifth day of the bright fortnight of August–September.

Because it is felt that people must protect themselves from inauspicious forces, during the full moon of August–

September the twice-born of the upper social orders (*brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya*, and *vaiśya*) reaffirm the close relationship to the divine that is theirs by virtue of the investiture of the sacred thread, the symbol of their second birth. In a custom observed mainly in northern India, a “thread of protection” (*rakṣābandhana*) is tied by the domestic priest to the hand of his clients, or, more commonly, by a sister to that of her brothers. During this period no marriage is allowed, for it is felt that women are the best mediators for helping to pass through this crisis time, which is crucial to the fecundity of the earth and the continuation of the sociocosmic order. Women thus propitiate different forms of the Goddess (from July to September) and undergo *vratas* for the sake of their husbands on Haritālikā, or Tīj, the third day of the bright fortnight of September–October. Śiva’s son Gaṇeśa is worshiped in the fourth of the same fortnight (with a renewed interest, since 1893, in Maharashtra), and the *ṛṣis*, the archetypal Vedic seers, on the fifth.

However, the birth of Kṛṣṇa on the eighth of the dark fortnight in August–September, and that of Vāmana, the dwarf incarnation of Viṣṇu, on the twelfth day of the bright half of September–October (the Onam festival in Kerala), foretell the final restoration of the sociocosmic order. But the main battle is left again to a feminine power, the goddess Durgā, who, after “nine nights” (Navarātri), from the first to the ninth of the bright fortnight in October–November, killed the buffalo demon. The final “victory of the tenth” (Vijayadaśamī) emphasizes the revival of dharmic kingly rule on earth. On the fourteenth of the dark fortnight in October–November light comes again with Dīvālī, which celebrates Lakṣmī, the goddess of prosperity, with lamps, festivities, and the retelling of stories about Yama, the god of death, and about the inevitable victory of the gods over the forces of evil. At last, Viṣṇu awakes from his sleep on the eleventh of the bright fortnight of November–December.

In South India, the myth of the sleeping Viṣṇu is not well known. Instead, the celebration of Śiva’s son Skanda, a favorite god in Tamil Nadu, reflects a popular myth in which Skanda is the slayer of the *asura*: On the sixth of the bright half of November–December the *mūrtis* (images) of Skanda and of the *asura* are taken out in procession, and the priest (or another participant) holds the spear and symbolically kills the demon. The next full moon, called Karttikaidīpa, duplicates the lightings of Dīvālī. Despite regional variations, the second half of the solar year seems to be perceived everywhere in India as inauspicious and dangerous; it is a period in which the gods must assent to the underground, the demonic, and the feminine powers for the very sake of the fecundity and continuation of the earth.

The first part of the year is auspicious and bright, but, as a corollary, it is unfruitful. Early in the season, during Śivarātri (on the fourteenth of the dark fortnight in February–March), Śiva bestows salvation on his devotees, even if they include hunters, who kill animals. As told by a popular tale, a hunter who spent the night of Śivarātri in a forest,

pouring water and throwing leaves of the *bilva* tree (which is associated with Śiva) on a buried *liṅga*, thus worshiped Śiva without knowing it and obtained salvation when he died. The narrative recalls that salvation through devotion to Śiva is possible for all people, even for those of the lowest social order who have no access to sacred knowledge. It is reminiscent also of the fact that Śiva himself takes the form of a hunter in some myths. As regards the Śivarātri celebration, Śiva is believed to have originally appeared as an unending column of fire, affirming his supremacy over Brahmā and Viṣṇu, thus recalling his relation to the fire of a cosmic destruction before the universal flood.

The fifth of the bright fortnight of February–March is dedicated to the beginning of spring, personified as Vasanta, the “brilliant” companion of Kāma, the god of love. The celebration of Vasanta seems to be to the season of love what the worship of the *nāgas* (six months previous, during August–September) is to fecundity.

The beginning of spring also marks the beginning of the preparations for Holī, at the full moon of March–April. Holī is a very popular festival in northern India. Often defined as the festival of the *śūdra* (members of the fourth and lowest order of Hindu society), Holī is an occasion in which normal, socially restrained behavior is momentarily forgotten; everyone engages in playful dousing with colored powder and water and shares in the bonfire that symbolically destroys all of the world’s evil. In Bengal, Holī is associated with the worship of Kṛṣṇa. Holī is not known in South India, but there the full moon of March–April is variously celebrated, either with the burning in effigy of Kāma, whom Śiva burnt with his third eye, with the marriage of particular gods, or with the worship of Skanda or other deities. The fires of Holī and Kāma are counterpart to the waters on which Viṣṇu sleeps lying upon the cobra Ananta, which occurs six months later, on the day before the full moon of September–October.

Spring merrymaking ends with the turning of the vernal equinox. Again with the bright half of April–May, a Navarātri festival of nine days is held. This festival is the counterpart of the autumnal Navarātri but is less elaborate—often only two or three days are consecrated to the Goddess. However, the birth of Rāma (an incarnation of Viṣṇu) on the ninth echoes the royal restoration of the great Navarātri for the sociocosmic order. With the two next full moons, Yama (or, in Tamil Nadu, Yama’s attendant Citragupta, who records the good and evil deeds of human beings) and the *pitṛs* (in Gujarat) are remembered. The full moon of May–June is dedicated to terrible or warrior forms of the deity (Narāśimha or Skanda). Formerly, on the third of the bright half, a fast was held in some northern areas for Akṣayya (“the inexhaustible”); whatever was given on that day was said to become inexhaustible and undecaying. The *vrata* anticipated the then threatening scarcity of food and water. On that date was also celebrated Viṣṇu’s *avatāra* as Parasurama (“Rama with the axe”), who became incarnate in order to kill all



*ṣatvīryas*, because one of them had stolen his brahman father's cow, the inexhaustible wealth without which no brahman can sacrifice. This mythical event indicates that something has begun to go wrong in the sociocosmic order.

During the oppressive heat of the last month before the summer solstice, people can do almost nothing but wait for the rains. The Ganges River (Gaṅgā) is believed to have come down to earth on the tenth of the bright fortnight of June–July for the salvation of human beings. On that day a bath in the Ganges or in a sacred river is prescribed for destroying sins. This is considered a time of cosmic crisis, for the sun is moving southward (an inauspicious direction), and monsoon floods follow the burning sun of May–June, recalling the image of a cosmic dissolution (*pralaya*) in which destruction by fire is followed by deluge. The month of June–July is called Jyestha (“eldest”); the feminine form of this name is Jyeṣṭha, indicating Lakṣmī’s “eldest” sister, Alakṣmī, the goddess of nonprosperity or misfortune. On the full moon of Jyeṣṭha women renew their series of *vratas* by worshipping the goddess Sāvitrī and the ever-growing banyan tree for a never-dying husband.

There are comparatively many more ascetic observances during the second half of the solar year than during the first, for during the first, bright half of the year the emphasis is rather on the direct relationship of human beings to deities, and most of the festivals for family gods (*kuladeva*) and locality gods (*grāmadeva*) seem to be held during that period. These particular festivities have not been taken into account here because they vary so much from region to region. Instead, this article has emphasized the structure of the Hindu religious year with its complementarily opposed halves. The author has also chosen to rely mainly upon the mythological background for these observances, which emphasizes their sociocosmic significance; on the village level, however, this meaning is not always recognized, and the rituals serve mainly pragmatic interests having to do with food, disease, fate, and so forth. From this point of view, there is a correspondence between the different significant levels. Moreover, one must not forget the importance of *bhakti*, pure devotion, which has a particular influence on worship at every level of society.

Finally, the religious calendar taken as a whole does not convey a sense of rigid sectarian bias. Emphasis on one deity or another appears to be primarily a regional matter. Vaiṣṇava devotees, of course, will give more emphasis to celebrations of Viṣṇu, and Śaiva devotees, to those of Śiva. A few exclusive sects may have their own specific festive dates more or less grafted onto the general calendrical system. But in general, the very complementarity of Viṣṇu, Śiva, and the Goddess contributes to the balance of activities throughout the religious year.

**SEE ALSO** Bengali Religions; Cosmology, articles on Hindu Cosmology, Jain Cosmology; Dīvālī; Durgā Hinduism; Gaṅapatyas; Goddess Worship, article on The Hindu God-

dess; Hindi Religious Traditions; Hinduism; Holī; Indian Religions, article on Rural Traditions; Kṛṣṇa; Kṛṣṇaism; Kumbha Melā; Marathi Religions; Navarātri; Śaivism; Śiva; Tamil Religions; Temple, article on Hindu Temples; Vaiṣṇavism; Viṣṇu; Worship and Devotional Life, article on Hindu Devotional Life.

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**HINDU TANTRIC LITERATURE.** The genre of religious literature known as Tantra exists in all traditional South Asian religions—Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina, and folk religions. The Hindu Tantras are also divided into Śaiva, Śākta, and Vaiṣṇava. The literature classed as Tantra is not a coherent group of texts, nor are the texts always comprised of any homogeneous materials. Sometimes the name *Tantra* is replaced by *Āgama*, *Nigama*, and *Samhitā*, especially when the texts want to emphasize their affinity to the Vedas. There is a convention that Śaiva Tantras are called *Āgamas*, Vaiṣṇava Tantras are called *Samhitās*, and Śākta Tantras are known as Tantras. But there is no regularity in these divisions. Therefore, Tantric literature must be defined as a theistic literature mainly focused on the cult of one or several deities.

Sometimes a single godhead is the focal point of a group of Hindu Tantras, which gave rise to the categories of Śaiva and Śākta. The meaning of the term *Tantra* is extremely vague; it can just be another name for *śāstra*—the canonical literature of religious teachings and practices. But from the angle of religious history, the word *Tantra* means a particular genre of religious literature that the *Mahābhārata* (12, 349, 64) includes among the five authentic doctrines, namely the Pāśupata and the Pāñcarātra. (This group of five doctrines includes Pāśupata, Pāñcarātra, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Vedāraṇyaka.)

Thus, Pāśupata and Pāñcarātra were regarded as authentic traditional religions coming down from Vedic literature. It also proves that these two religions were different from the Vedic tradition of religious practice and philosophy. These two names mentioned by the epic most probably included the two main streams of non-Vedic yet generally accepted tradition, the Śaiva and the Vaiṣṇava.

Sāṃkhya ontology and the Yoga method of meditation are widely accepted by Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava ritual literature; they mainly oppose the Vedic ritual systems and the ideology lying behind them. On the other hand, the early antagonism of traditional Vedic practitioners probably induced these religions gradually to accept some of the Vedic rituals and incorporate quite a number of Vedic *mantras*. As a result, traditional Vedic scholars like Kumārila and Śaṅkara did not completely reject the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava ideologies.

The ritual mainly advocated by Tantric literature is a system of worship in which, by internal and external ritual acts, the worshiper intends to establish his or her identity with the deity worshiped. With a series of rituals conducted by imagination and by physical actions, such as *bhūtaśuddhi*, *prāṇa-pratiṣṭhā*, and *nyāsa*, accompanied by specific *mudrās* and *mantras*, the worshiper achieves self-apotheosis. Only

then can he or she worship the deity and, through the prolonged practice of one-pointed meditation (*samādhi*), achieve his or her soteriological goal. As support of the *samādhi*, there developed a system of iconography, image making, temple construction (and the science of their maintenance), and various classifications of worship programs, such as daily worship, periodic worship, and special worship. A deity is not only represented in image form but also as *maṇḍala*, *yantra*, and other aniconic forms. The practice of yoga also took special forms, such as *laya yoga* and *kuṇḍalinī yoga*. Esotericism is the main feature of these rituals, and the ideology underlying access to the system is also exclusive: initiation is compulsory. Tantric literature comprises all these ritual and supplementary materials.

Besides the two main streams, Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava, there are other streams worshiping deities such as Śakti as goddess, Sun, Gaṇeśa, and Skanda. However, the method of ritual worship of these deities more or less follows the earlier model. There are countless Tantras on the worship of the goddess Śakti, designated as the Śākta Tantras. Nevertheless they should be categorized as Śaiva Tantras, because the goddess Śakti is almost invariably connected with Śiva.

The Śaiva canonical texts are divided into two categories, the higher path (*atimārga*) and the *mantra* path (*mantramārga*). The higher path may have gotten its title from some of the antisocial rites and observances followed by its adherents. Originally it was entirely followed by ascetics.

There are two main branches of the higher-path literature. The first is Pāśupata texts, belonging to the sect known by that name, and the second is called the L(N)ākulīśa Pāśupata. The earliest text available is the *Pāśupata Sūtras*, which is divided into five chapters. It prescribes for its adherents a strict ascetic life and, for a limited period, somewhat antisocial behavior to attract the disapproval of society. This limited period is followed by a period of practicing meditation in total seclusion. The final stage of the practice is carried out at a cremation ground. One important compulsory item of practice is the use of ash for bathing and for a bed. The ultimate goal for the practitioner is salvation (*mokṣa*), which means a total cessation of suffering. Kauṇḍinya wrote a detailed commentary on this canonical text called *Pañcārtha Bhāṣya*.

No text of the Lākulīśa Pāśupata system has survived. However, there is no doubt of its great prevalence in the early period. It must have influenced the emergence of the later sects, the Kālāmukha, Kāpālīka, Siddha, and Nātha. Along with the original Lākulīśa sect, all these sects believe in the supreme importance of the human body; its culture (*kāya sādhana*) leads to salvation in this life as well as to supernatural powers. These later sects have produced many texts, such as the *Kaulajñāna-nirṇaya* and the *Haṭhayogapradīpikā*. It is considered that Matsyendranātha introduced the Kaula system of antinomian practices, and Gorakṣanātha the system of Haṭha Yoga.



The texts belonging to the *mantra* path, though having basically the same type of ritual system and soteriological concepts, admit both ascetics and householders. Among these texts are the canons of the Śaiva Siddhānta. These are called Āgamas and consist of ten Śiva-āgamas (such as *Mrgendra-āgama*) and eighteen Rudra-āgamas (such as *Niḥśvāsa Tantra* and *Raurava Tantra*). Important features of these Tantras are (1) Śakti, as an embodiment of supreme divine power, receives almost no attention; and (2) they do not teach esoteric rituals. The central deity is Śiva.

In the corpus of esoteric Tantras, Śakti as goddess and consort of Śiva occupies an important position. These are divided under two headings, those belonging to the seat of *mantras* (*mantra pīṭha*) and those belonging to the seat of *vidyā* (*vidyā pīṭha*). The Tantras belonging to the *mantra pīṭha* are called Bhairava Tantras. The dominant deity is Śiva bhairava (the terrifying). According to some traditions, there are sixty-four Bhairava Tantras. The *Svacchandabhairava Tantra* is one of the most important texts of this group.

The Tantras belonging to *vidyā pīṭha* are often centered on a dominant female deity, Śakti, and are divided under two headings, Yāmala Tantras and Śakti Tantras. Of these two groups of Tantras, the former teaches the cult of a couple; that is, the ferocious Bhairava and his consort Śakti, the ferocious goddess Bhairavī. *Picumata-brahma Yāmala* is one of the important Tantras of this group. It teaches secret rites of a sexual type, and the position of Śakti and her human representative, the practitioner's female partner, is exalted. Although these Tantras have moved away from strict ascetic practices, the influence of the Kāpālika tradition is quite conspicuous. The teaching is full of esoteric features; the skull cup, disheveled hair, and other symbols point to the cremation ground as the cult's ideal location.

Another interesting Tantra is the *Jayadratha Yāmala*. This introduces the cult of the goddess Kālasaṃkaraṣaṇī, the "Destroyer of Time." This deity is not terrible in form but more like a warrior goddess, adopting the Kāpālika symbolism of holding a skull cup and wearing a deerskin. The Tantra then proceeds to describe more esoteric rituals and iconography of the goddess Kālī. The text possibly represents stages of the development of Kālī's cult, including the twelve Kālīs.

Śakti Tantras are so called because of the ascendancy of Śakti over Śiva, both in the iconography and in the main *mantra* of the central deity. Here is the esoteric worship of Śakti in three hierarchic stages. The supreme one is the goddess Parā śakti. The *śakti* Parāparā stands in the middle of the hierarchy and possesses the characteristics of both the supreme Śakti and the lower *śakti*, who is the goddess Aparā śakti. The latter comes close to the empirical level. A fourth one, who is both the aggregate of all three *śaktis* and the one who transcends them all, then joins this tradition of three *śaktis*. Of the three *śaktis*, Parā is an aspect of the transcendent one. Parā heralds the advent of creation. These three śaktis constitute the core of this cult called the triadic cult

(Trika). The *Siddhayogeśvarīmata Tantra*, the *Māṛsadbhāva Tantra*, and the *Mālinīvijayottara Tantra* belong to this early triadic cult. The iconographic details of the supreme goddess Parā indicate that she is the deity who is the supreme Gnosis and is identified with self-realization.

The development of the Kaula system saw a waning of the ascetic ideology from the original Kāpālika concepts. A text like the *Kulārṇava Tantra* makes this clear. Though dominated by Śakti, the cult accepts the transcendental Śakti, Parā, to be totally united with Śiva, and the pair is enclosed by the three *śaktis* arranged in a triangle. There are two streams or lineages (*kula*) of the Kaula system, Kālikula and Śrīkula. The former presents the cult of Kālī, and the *Kubjikāmata Tantra* belongs to this stream. It deals with the cult of the beautiful goddess Śrī. The *Yoginīhṛdaya Tantra* and the *Nityaśoḍaśikārṇava Tantra* are among those that belong to this cult.

The Krama school of Śakti Tantras propagates the *kaula* style of worship of Kālī. The *Devīpañcaśataka* belongs to this school. This system later influenced many goddess cults and produced many Tantras, such as the *Mahākāla Tantra*.

Two more streams must be mentioned: the Mahāvidyā Tantras and the Cīnācāra Tantras. The *Toḍala Tantra* and the *Śaktisaṃgama Tantra* belong to the former group, whereas the *Mahacīnācāra Tantra* and the *Nīlasarasvatī Tantra* belong to the latter. The Siddha Avadhūta and the Nātha sects also continued to produce Tantras, such as the *Dattātreyā Saṃhitā* and the *Gorakṣa Saṃhitā*.

The Vaiṣṇava Tantras generally belong to the Pāñcarātra sect. According to its own tradition, these texts are divided into four categories, Āgama, Mantra, Tantra, and Tantrāntara. This early Vaiṣṇava sect focused on the Vāsudeva form of Viṣṇu as the godhead. As the name suggests, Vāsudeva is the patronymic of the god Kṛṣṇa, who was a human incarnation of Viṣṇu. The Pāñcarātra philosophy and ritual practice have influenced all Vaiṣṇava sects. The *Mahābhārata* records the sect's three main features: aversion to animal sacrifice, the acceptance of Vāsudeva as the supreme god, and unconditional loyal devotion to Vāsudeva, the only way to remove all human sufferings. There are many Pāñcarātra Tantras. The adherents of the sect hold three texts to be the earliest and the most important, the *Sāttvata Saṃhitā*, the *Jayakhya Saṃhitā*, and the *Paṇḍara Saṃhitā*. The supreme god is the transcendent Vāsudeva/Nārāyaṇa, and Lakṣmī is his inseparable Śakti. The fourfold emanation of Vāsudeva, Caturvyūha constitutes the essence of the Pāñcarātra cosmogony.

SEE ALSO Tantrism, article on Hindu Tantrism.

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SANJUKTA GUPTA (1987 AND 2005)

**HIPPOCRATES** (460?–380? BCE) was a celebrated Greek physician, called the “father of medicine.” In spite of his reputation as the founder of scientific medicine, the embodiment of medical wisdom, and the exemplar of the ideal physician, little is known with certainty about Hippocrates’ life. There are only a few contemporary or near-contemporary references to him. He is mentioned by Plato (*Protagoras* 311b–c, *Phaedrus* 270c), Aristotle (*Politics* 1326a14), and Aristotle’s pupil Menon (in *Anonymous Londinensis* 5–6). He is said to have been a native of the island of Kos, off the southwestern coast of Asia Minor, and to have been an Asclepiad (the term may refer to a family or a guild of physicians that traced their origin to Asklepios, the god of healing, or may simply mean “physician”). He was, according to these sources, a teacher of medicine whose fame Plato compared to that of the sculptors Polyclitus and Phidias. He taught that one cannot understand the body without taking into account the whole, and he explained disease as the result of air that forms in the body during the process of digestion.

A biographical tradition that began long after his lifetime incorporated additional details, many of them anecdotal and legendary. Four short biographies are extant. The earliest is attributed to Soranus, a medical writer of the second century CE, while the others were recorded in the *Suda*, a tenth-century encyclopedia; by the twelfth-century Byzantine poet and scholar Tzetzes; and by an unknown late Latin writer. It is uncertain how much of the information they contain is trustworthy. They relate that Hippocrates learned medicine from his father Heraclides, who was a physician; that he studied under the atomist Democritus and the Sophist Gorgias; that he traveled extensively in Greece, visiting Athens, northern Greece, and the Propontis (the present-day Sea of Marmara); that he taught medical students on Kos; and that he died at an advanced age at Larissa in Thessaly, where he was buried. Additional biographical material contained in a collection of spurious epistles attributed to Hippocrates is almost certainly fictitious.

There has come down to the present, under the name of Hippocrates, a large and heterogeneous collection of medical books, the so-called Hippocratic treatises, which consist of some sixty different works, all written in the Ionic dialect.

Most of them date from the late fifth or fourth centuries BCE, but some are much later. The collection may have originated as the library of a medical school (perhaps that of Kos) that was brought to Alexandria in the third century BCE where it came to be attributed to Hippocrates. All the works are anonymous and exhibit differences of style and approach. It is widely held today that none can be attributed with certainty to Hippocrates. It is possible that he wrote some of them, but there is no agreement on which, if any, are authentic. The Hippocratic treatises are the work of many hands and represent a variety of points of view, both lay and professional. They include clinical, theoretical, and ethical writings.

The best known of the Hippocratic writings is the so-called Hippocratic Oath. Exactly when it was written is uncertain. Although the earliest mention of it is in the first century CE, it may date from as early as the fourth century BCE. There is no evidence of its use in the pre-Christian era. Those who took the oath swore by Apollo, Asklepios, and other gods and goddesses of healing to guard their life and art “in purity and holiness.” Its religious tenor and some of its injunctions (e.g., prohibition of abortions, euthanasia, and perhaps surgery) suggest that it originated among a restricted group of physicians (perhaps the Pythagoreans, a philosophical sect that emphasized moral purity, asceticism, and piety) who lay outside the mainstream of Greek medicine. The oath was later adopted by Christians, Jews, and Muslims, and (with necessary changes) it gained wide use.

According to popular Greek opinion, disease and death were sent by gods or demons. The Hippocratic writers, influenced by the pre-Socratic philosophers, for the most part rejected this supernatural etiology of disease. Hippocratic medicine was both empirical and rational. It was empirical in being based on meticulous clinical observation (its case histories remained unparalleled until the sixteenth century), and rational in rejecting magic and superstition and viewing disease as the result of natural causes. The Hippocratic treatise *On the Sacred Disease* exhibits this rational approach to medicine. The writer does not accept the traditional view that epilepsy is caused by divine possession. It is, he believes, no more sacred than any other disease, and has a natural cause. In rejecting a magico-religious etiology for a natural one, Hippocratic writers did not display an antipathy to religion. Instead, they regarded all things (including disease) as both natural and divine. Medicine itself was a divine art, in which the physician sought the assistance of the gods. “Prayer indeed is good, but while calling on the gods a man should himself lend a hand” (*Regimen* 87). The Hippocratic physicians recognized the healing force of nature (*vis medicatrix naturae*) and attempted to assist the body to heal itself.

There existed alongside Hippocratic medicine a tradition of religious healing centered in the cults of various gods, demigods, and heroes. The most notable was the cult of Asklepios, who by the fourth century BCE came to be the chief healing god of Greece, eclipsing all others as his cult spread throughout Greece. Sanctuaries of Asklepios were later estab-

lished throughout the Mediterranean world and attracted the sick, who sought miraculous healing from the god. Hippocratic medicine and temple-healing coexisted apparently without antagonism. Temple-healing by Asklepios was regarded as complementing secular medicine, particularly in chronic cases for which medicine could do little. Both secular and religious healing came from the same god, who assisted physicians as well as the sick. Asklepios was the patron of physicians. Galen called himself a servant of Asklepios, and in Athens physicians offered sacrifices to the god for themselves and their patients.

The deontological treatises of the Hippocratic collection are the earliest writings on medical etiquette. They seek to create a distinct identity for the physician and to lay down guidelines for professional conduct. In establishing a standard of behavior by defining the obligations of the physician, they created both a tradition of medical ethics and an ideal of dedicated and compassionate practice, which were subsequently adopted in late antiquity and the Middle Ages by Christian, Jewish, and Muslim physicians. They have continued to influence the Western medical tradition down to the present day and they remain the greatest legacy of Hippocratic medicine.

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GARY B. FERNIGREN (1987 AND 2005)

**HIRATA ATSUTANE** (1776–1843) was a prominent Japanese thinker and ardent nationalist who vigorously ar-

gued for the superiority of Shintō and native Japanese institutions over all imported traditions. Atsutane was the fourth son of Ōwada Tsugutane, a member of the warrior class. As an adolescent he was trained in the reading of Chinese texts and in practical medicine. At twenty years of age he left his home province and came to live in Edo, the capital of the Tokugawa government. There, he encountered great difficulty making a living, and was finally forced to do manual labor until he was adopted by Hirata Tōbei, also a member of the warrior class. Thereafter, he went by the name Hirata Atsutane.

In spite of his difficult financial situation Atsutane continued his studies. His first book, entitled *Kamōsho* (Scoldings to a fool), was a criticism of *Bendōsho* (A discourse on the way), a work by the famous Confucianist Dazai Jun. In it, Atsutane accused Dazai of misunderstanding the ancient "way" of Japan. Taking along a handwritten draft of this book, he made a trip to see Motoori Norinaga at his home in Matsuzaka in the hope of being accepted as a disciple. However, it was only in 1803, two years after Norinaga's death, that his discipleship was formally acknowledged by the son of Norinaga. The next year he opened a small private academy in Edo and began to devote himself to writing. He produced two important works during this early period: *Shinkishinron* (A new discourse on *Kami*), a criticism of the Chinese understanding of the fate of the soul and an outline of his own conviction that the soul continues to exist after death, and *Honkyōgaihen* (Additional teachings of the central tradition), a description of ideas regarding the imperial *kami* and life after death, which reveals the influence of Christian texts Atsutane had read in Chinese translation. These works embody the basic attitudes and principles that guided his life thereafter: that truth is one, that Japan is the country in which the original *kami* was born, and that therefore all religions should be interpreted in accordance with Japanese mythology. Hirata also believed that the world of *kami* is the primary, eternal one that controls this world and for which one must prepare during this lifetime.

In 1808 he was certified by the Shirakawa family to teach Shintō priests. This gave him a source of income and made it possible for him to concentrate on teaching and writing. His writings consist of lectures on ancient Shintō, popular Shintō, Confucianism, Buddhism, *waka* poetry, and so forth. Some of his most important works were written in the period beginning in 1811. Typically, Atsutane would append several commentaries to his text in order to avoid mistakes of interpretation. For example, to *Koshi* (Ancient history) are appended two works, *Koshicho* (References to ancient history) and *Koshiden* (Commentaries on ancient history). In 1812, the year his first wife died, he wrote another important work entitled *Tama no mahashira* (The real pillar of the spirit), in which he interpreted the Japanese myth of the creation of the universe in accordance with the principles of astronomy. This methodology had first been attempted by Hattori Nakatsune in *Sandaikō* (A study of the three planets), a dis-



cussion of the relationship between mythological deities and the sun, the earth, and the moon, based on knowledge drawn from books imported from Holland. Atsutane's work was influenced by the same line of thought, a major reason why many of his followers lost influence among intellectuals in the early Meiji period.

In the early 1820s, having established an academic reputation in a somewhat narrow sense, Atsutane became interested in ancient Japanese letters and the field of demonology. His work on the latter subject is regarded today as the model that inspired contemporary studies of folk beliefs. In the late 1820s his studies turned to India and China in an attempt to identify Japan as the ideal country mentioned in the ancient texts of those countries. During this period he also tried to make himself known to certain daimyo in order to secure official patronage. In 1830 he was granted a small stipend from the Owari domain of one of the three collateral Tokugawa families.

Toward the end of his life Atsutane explored the fields of divination and metrology. He published *Kōkoku doseikō* (Japanese Metrology) in 1834, much to the consternation of the government, which wanted to maintain strict control over such matters. As a result, his stipend from the daimyo of Owari was canceled. In spite of this, Atsutane began to publish a study of the calendar in 1837, and in 1840 was again questioned by government officials. On the first day of the following year he was ordered to stop writing. He returned to his home province shortly thereafter, all efforts he had made for the freedom to move and to write having come to naught. In the years of social change that followed his death, however, his disciples increased and contributed to the establishment of the new government in the Meiji restoration a quarter century later.

SEE ALSO Kokugaku; Motoori Norinaga.

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UEDA KENJI (1987)

**HIRSCH, SAMSON RAPHAEL** (1808–1888), was a German rabbi and the foremost ideologue of Jewish Neo-Orthodoxy in the Western world. Hirsch was born in Hamburg and educated in an “enlightened-pious” family of Orthodox Jews who rejected the notion that secular culture is incompatible with traditional Jewish faith. Thus he continued his studies with Jacob Ettlinger and Isaac Bernays, rabbis who were receptive to modern culture. He studied at the University of Bonn in 1829 and, in 1830, became *Landrab-*

*biner* of Oldenburg. In 1836 Hirsch wrote his *Neunzehn Briefe über Judentum* (*The Nineteen Letters on Judaism*), which has become a classic expression of Jewish Neo-Orthodox philosophy. A year later, in 1837, he wrote *Choreb, oder Versuche über Jissroels Pflichten in der Zerstreuung* (Horeb: Essays on Israel's “duties” in the Diaspora), his major work on the nature of Jewish revelation and law. These works earned Hirsch a reputation as a champion of Orthodoxy and a steadfast opponent of Reform.

In 1841 Hirsch became rabbi of Aurich and Osnabrück in Hannover (now Lower Saxony), and in 1846 he was appointed *Landesrabbiner* of Moravia. Hirsch's affirmation of Jewish political emancipation, his wearing of a clerical gown during services, and his emphasis upon the study of the Bible (rather than exclusive concentration on the Talmud) appear to have alienated him from more traditional Orthodox elements in the Moravian community. In any event, he moved to Frankfurt, where he served as rabbi of the Orthodox Israelitische Religionsgesellschaft from 1851 until his death. Here Hirsch formulated his policy of Orthodox separatism from the rest of the Jewish community and implemented his conception of Jewish Neo-Orthodoxy through the educational and communal institutions he created.

Hirsch soon became the leading Orthodox proponent of the notion that traditional Jewish belief in the divinity and the immutability of the written and oral laws could be combined with an affirmation of Western culture. He did oppose *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, however, because he feared that it undermined traditional Jewish notions of revelation. Hirsch detested Reform for its rejection of the oral law and charged that it reformulated Judaism in accordance with the demands of the age; against Reform he argued that the contemporary era had to be viewed in light of Judaism.

Like the Reformers, Hirsch proscribed neither secular culture nor secular education. He saw Torah as increasing humanity's knowledge of the true nature of humankind, while he understood secular education as increasing humanity's understanding of God's will as it unfolds itself in both nature and history. In speaking about the relationship between religious and secular knowledge, Hirsch wrote that “both should be put on the same footing” (*Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 450). Hirsch popularized this educational philosophy through the saying found in *Pirquei avot* (Chapters of the fathers) 2.2, “Yafeh talmud torah ‘im derekh erets” (“An excellent thing is the study of Torah combined with worldly occupation”). While *derekh erets* literally means “worldly occupation,” Hirsch interpreted it as signifying modern culture; this saying became the rallying cry of Jewish Neo-Orthodoxy in the Western world.

In addition, Hirsch enthusiastically embraced the Jewish emancipation. He saw it as a positive development because it afforded Jews increased opportunities to fulfill their divinely ordained mission. He regarded the duty of patriotism as an obligation of love, and he charged that the Land of Israel “had seduced the people Israel from its allegiance

to God" (*The Nineteen Letters on Judaism*, translated by Bernard Drachman, New York, 1960, Ninth Letter, p. 62). Israel's union, for Hirsch no less than the Reformers, was a religious one. "Land and soil," he wrote, "were never Israel's bond of union. That function was always fulfilled solely by the common task set by Torah" (ibid., Sixteenth Letter, p. 107). Jewish separatism was justified because of the universal spiritual mission Israel was mandated by God to fulfill "until . . . humanity as a whole might turn to God and acknowledge Him as the sole Creator and Ruler" (ibid., Seventh Letter, p. 55).

A prolific author, Hirsch articulated these ideals in many other essays, articles, and books. Among the most famous are his commentaries on the siddur and the Pentateuch. In these works, Hirsch argued that the purpose of prayer and devotion is, in terms reminiscent of Kant, an educational one—that is, to prepare the individual philosophically and psychologically for the universal ethical-religious tasks of this world. Furthermore, Hirsch employed Hegelian legal categories in these works and explicated the particular laws and statutes of the Jewish religion in a way that allowed him to identify them with universal concepts and principles of rational thought.

These intellectual characteristics, the pure German literary style evidenced in his writings, his affirmation of emancipation, his embracing of contemporary German standards of aesthetics, and his positive attitudes toward secular education and culture all combined to gain him a great degree of prominence and to mark the emergence of a new type of Orthodox Jewish religious leader. He remains the most important exponent of Jewish Neo-Orthodoxy.

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DAVID ELLENSON (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

## HISTORIOGRAPHY

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

- AN OVERVIEW
- WESTERN STUDIES [FIRST EDITION]
- WESTERN STUDIES [FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS]

### HISTORIOGRAPHY: AN OVERVIEW

The English word *history*, as well as the French *histoire* and the Italian *storia*, stems from the Greek *historia*, which was used first to refer to a general inquiry into things and only later to refer to history as it is now understood. Germans speak of *Geschichte* (from *geschehen*, "to happen"); Chinese choose *shih* (meaning both "fact" and "history"); Hindus use terms such as *itihāsa* (tradition; lit., "verily thus it happened") and *purāṇa* (ancient lore); and Arabs alternate *tar'ikh* (derived from the word for dating events), *khabar* ("report"), and *'ibar* (derived from the verb meaning "to pass on, through, over, or beyond"). Because the meanings of these terms are bound to cultures and periods, etymological analysis does not provide a ready explanation for the universality of the writing of history.

An investigation of time as the basic dimension of human existence yields more profound insights. It demonstrates the relentless change from past to present to future and how that change leads human beings to search for elements of continuity so as to reconcile their memories of the past with their experiences of the present and their expectations for the future. History is the endeavor that reconciles change and continuity by constructing such a unity of past, present, and future. That purpose links history to religion, itself the affirmation of a continuity transcending the world and time. Indeed, the history of historiography is marked decisively by the fate of that link between religion and historiography. In the mythological stage, sacred concepts alone defined the unity in time, telling of the emergence first of the cosmos and then of human society. In the subsequent stage of traditional historiography the ever more multitudinous and complex human phenomena of the ongoing present and the expected future were linked to the sacred past (be it the mythological core or the works of Confucius, the Buddha, Jesus, or Muhammad) and thereby given meaning. In the later phases of traditional historiography, that creative pro-



cess of establishing continuity through reference to the sacred past became more complicated as human history revealed more and more of its scope and some self-regulating patterns. The less frequent direct linkage between the present and a sacred past resulted in a greater prominence of human phenomena in the world's traditional historiographies, a prominence in many cases supported by a nascent rationalist undercurrent. Finally, in modern Western civilization, that linkage snapped completely and a historiographical revolution began that challenged the very link between religion and historiography. The repercussions became worldwide.

For centuries, the mythical accounts of how the cosmos and human society were created shaped both the substance and the tenor of historical works. Therefore, it mattered whether the world was perceived as going through endlessly recurrent cycles (ancient Indian accounts) from which human beings strove to escape into a state of timelessness; or as the onetime creation by an all-powerful creator (the three monotheistic religions), which demanded of human beings lives of decision with reference to a Last Judgment at the end of time; or as depending on the mythological age mainly for the substance and legitimacy of its moral and political order (Chinese and Japanese accounts).

Of even greater import to traditional historiography were accounts of the foundation of human society, most often formulated in terms of a loss of perfection. Ancient Indian texts spoke of a decline from the Golden Age, first to one marked by a need to eat and engage in sex, shortening the human life span, and then, crucially, to one of agriculture and private property that necessitated restraints on power and violence through law and government. The process had four stages (*yugas*): the ideal stage, the *kr̥tayuga*; the beginning of degeneration in the *trētāyuga*; the *dvāparayuga*; and the present, destructive stage of *kaliyuga*. In the Jewish and Christian traditions human society resulted from an act of disobedience—Adam and Eve trying to partake of God's full knowledge. Expulsion from the Garden of Eden brought the new human world of toil and suffering but also the possibility of joy and prosperity contingent on the proper relationship between God and human beings. Chinese, Greeks, and Romans spoke of a decline in more general terms: Confucian scholars saw decay as an ever-present threat (if the proper precepts were not obeyed); Greeks knew of the five consecutive ages (or races) of declining quality suggested by Hesiod; and Greek and Roman writers repeated tales of a lost Golden Age. Each of these fundamental views left its imprint on traditional historiography.

**TRADITIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHIES.** Historiographies in the traditional manner prevailed in the West until the eighteenth century and outside of the West for two more centuries. Traditional historiography established for all events their continuity with the sacred past by authorizing what constitutes proper memory, by interpreting the why and how of events, and by using a methodology that stresses the consensus of continuing texts rather than verification measured according

to human reason. In all of this, the “authority of the past” is dominant.

**Indian traditional historiography.** Indian historiography, which has its mythological anchor in the Vedic literature, particularly the fourth Veda—the Upaniṣads—with its exhortation to focus human life on a union with the all-encompassing and changeless Absolute, gives little encouragement to record the world's changing phenomena. Indeed, it has been argued (too sweepingly) that because of this focus Indian culture lacks a historical consciousness. While no large body of ancient historical works exists, there is a body of historical material in the Vedas, the Itihāsa. Among its historical genres, the Purāṇas contained genealogies and stories of kings. The royal genealogies were kept by a special court official, the *sūta* and later the *māghada*; the genealogies traced the king and his family back to the mythological period. Other lists showed the proper priestly succession. These were important because the link to sacred antiquity gave legitimacy to priests and kings. The Itihāsa-Purāṇa tradition also contained stories with clear lessons on conduct. Narrative historiography, as epic history, found an outstanding example in the *Mahābhārata* (uncertain date; some parts extant in the seventh century) and the popular genre of *ākhyāna*. By 300 CE ancient Indian historiography had found its enduring form. From then on, largely undisturbed by the Muslim and European hegemonies, it offered chronicles of the various feudal states and biographies of outstanding persons in the form of the *carita*. All of these manifest the basic characteristics of Indian historiography: a lack of interest in precise dating; a lack of desire to distinguish clearly between legend, fantasy, and fact; a love of poetry; a preference for the idealized over the realistic; and the absence of a method for establishing the congruence of text and preceding text or of text and observable world. All of these characteristics are consistent with the emphasis on achieving union with the Absolute and reflect the resulting relative inattention to the story of human phenomena for their own sake. Thus, history was seen as the outward manifestation of an inner drama, whose logic was not to be found in mechanical cause-and-effect relationships but in *karman*, a structure by which punishments follow wrong deeds and rewards follow good ones.

Into this historiography was fitted, with some considerable modifications of the ancient tradition, both the Buddhist and Jain histories. In their basic tenor these traditions too placed strong emphasis on individuals escaping from the transient world, although they offer somewhat more encouragement for an involvement in that world. Their radically new feature was the reanchoring of history in the teachings and examples of persons who had actually lived in history. Buddhist historiography anchored in the Tripiṭaka, with its account of episodes in the Buddha's life (566–486 BCE), the formulation of his teachings, and the founding of the *saṃgha* (“community”). Thus, Mahānāma's famous *Mahāvamsa* (Chronicle of Ceylon) was written in the traditional Indian manner, but, while acknowledging the Vedic core, it stressed

the Buddha's life and teachings and the teacher Mahinda's work in Ceylon; none of this was intended to reconstruct accurately the past but to edify readers and listeners. Jain historiography varied Hindu tradition by introducing a succession of twenty-four *jinas* (saints), the last one being Vardhamāna Mahāvīra (d. 476?), and by deemphasizing some supernatural explanations in favor of rational ones.

**Chinese traditional historiography.** Given to the concrete and the particular rather than the supernatural and abstract, Chinese historiography had as its narrow mythological base the mandate of Heaven (*tian-ming*), which required the emperor to organize and maintain a social order according to moral precepts. The mandate deified the emperor without making him a god, but also sanctioned his overthrow if the order was either not maintained or failed to conform to the moral code. Heaven provided for the authority of the ruling dynasty but also for revolution and the subsequent establishment of a new dynasty. That view accorded well with the fifth-century *Chunqiu* (Spring and autumn annals) of the state of Lu. This work, comprising typical annals of military campaigns, events at court, and unusual occurrences, became in the edition attributed to Confucius an instrument of moral and social teaching. Thereafter, the dependence of the fortunes of individuals and dynasties on conformance to the moral code and its correlate political wisdom remained a theme in Chinese historiography. The close connection between the mythical mandate, history writing, the state, and the moral structure of life was maintained when, after 221 BCE, a strong imperial government emerged. Even the destruction by imperial decree (213 BCE) of all previous historical materials emphasized that link: these records fostered the survival of memories dangerous to the new order. History writing was affirmed with the establishment of a commission to collect ancient texts (136 BCE) and a "grand college" (124 BCE), and above all through the sponsorship of the Zhengshi (Standard histories). The pioneering work, the *Shiji* (Records of the historian) by Sima Tan (d. 110 BCE?) and his son Sima Qian (c. 145–85 BCE), contained composite annals (mostly court accounts), genealogical tables of the imperial family, lists of ministers of state, and a biographical section devoted to famous statesmen and scholars. Later, such histories were created by the official history office (*shi guan*). In accordance with the principle of orderly succession—the manifestation of the triumph of peace and harmony over chaos—it became the duty of each dynasty to compose the history of the preceding one, always mindful of linking authority to ancient times and of offering proper lessons from the past. Thus a stable historical record, sustaining and reflecting traditional China, spans the period to the end of the monarchy in 1911. Even Chinese Buddhism with its sense of universal equality and compassion for all human beings, its longing for release from this life, and sense of decline in human history, was adjusted in its historiography to Chinese traditionalism and—partially because of intermittent coercion by the state—never developed a true alternative to the official view of the past.

**Japanese traditional historiography.** Beginning with the early *Nihonshoki* or *Nihongi* (Chronicles of Japan; 720 CE) and its cruder predecessor the *Kojiki* (Record of ancient matters, 712 CE), Japanese historiography carried the imprint of the well-developed Chinese historiography. But while the Confucian linkage of virtue and fortune was present in them, the stronger feature was the Shintō assertion of an unbroken sequence of emperors originally descendant from the sun goddess. This sacred imperial line made superfluous the Chinese concept of the mandate of Heaven and its rationale for dynastic change. Yet, from the eleventh to the seventeenth century there were no imperial histories, because that historiography did not fit a society in which the power was held by noble families. The Japanese prose writings, the *Rekishū monogatari* (Historical tales) and the *Gunki monogatari* (Military tales), recorded the powerful lords' deeds and their relationship with the imperial family. The dominance of noble families, ruling for and through the emperor, raised the issue of legitimate authority. Works by imperial partisans, such as the fourteenth-century *Jinnō shōtōki* (Chronicle of gods and sovereigns) by Kitabatake Chikafusa, extolled the divine/human position of the emperor as the descendant of the sun goddess, a mode of thinking characteristic for the whole "loyalty to the emperor" school, which centuries later (in 1868) was instrumental in the restoration of imperial power.

Historians sympathetic to the feudal overlords found—in the Confucian manner—the dominance by feudal families legitimate if the law and thus harmony was effectively maintained and—in the Shintō manner—if a genealogical link with the imperial line could be established. In either case the traditionally sanctioned authority of the emperor remained above the rise and fall of political power. The Buddhist priest Jien's *Gukanshō* (1219) illustrates well the complexity of interpretation in Japanese traditional historiography. Although written with an ostensibly political purpose it called upon the Shintō concept of the direct divine descent of emperors, the Confucian linkage of virtue, order, and harmony, and a profusion of Buddhist organizing concepts: *kalpas* (cycles with a first half of decadence and a second one of recuperation); the tripartite scheme of True, Imitation, and Final Law (the last being the worst, when even Buddhist teachings were corrupted); and finally, interwoven into all of these, the Principles (impersonal shaping forces, one for each age). In the end all of these schemes were subject to the Buddhist doctrine of continuous universal decline despite temporary respites, a message that fit the pessimism of a difficult period. With the reemergence of a strong central (although not imperial) government under the Tokugawa shoguns (1600–1868), the Chinese historiographical model emphasizing centralized power became once more attractive and shaped the late seventeenth-century *Honchō tsugan* (Comprehensive mirror of Japan). It stressed the political lessons of history interpreted according to the now strongly encouraged Confucianism.

**Greek and Roman historiographies.** Greek and Roman historiographies were in their entirety traditional, as

they were never decisively shaped by the rationalism and skepticism of their own cultures and, of course, never by that of modernity. The Homeric epics were the mythological core of Greek historiography, and their heroic history befitted the ideals of the Greece before the city state (*polis*) and organized record keeping. The Greece of the *polis* preferred an “unheroic” history, although the lessons of honor and noble passions derived from the narratives of the struggles and tragic fates of heroes were never forgotten. The prose histories with a human dimension, often structured by crude chronologies (generation counts, lists of officeholders, priests, and priestesses), offered grand inquiries into cultures (Herodotos, c. 484–c. 425 BCE) or wished to serve the citizens of the *polis* (Thucydides, c. 460–c. 400 BCE). The Homeric gods who had so frequently and directly interfered in battles and individual lives receded soon into a lesser role, punishing those immoderately in love with money or power (Herodotos) or yielding all influence to the human drive for power (Thucydides). The exact role of the often-mentioned Tyche (fate or fortune) was never clear. Yet many traditionalist historians, despite their admiration for human deeds, still gave proper credit to the gods. The uncertain role of gods and mythology continued in Greek historiography after the latter had lost its city-state focus, in the Macedonian monarchy and subsequently in the monarchical Hellenistic states. Universal history, attempted in the fourth century BCE by Ephorus of Cyme, proved impossible in a tradition that lacked any ingredient conducive to the linking of non-Greek and Greek records into a universal history. Traditional historiography, most often local in nature, received support from the antiquarians, who composed critical histories of ancient religious legends and rituals, hoping to use the increasingly rationalist ideal of accuracy for the support of tradition.

Early Roman historiography was really Greco-Roman. One of Rome’s mythological roots reached back to Aeneas, the Trojan refugee who came to Italy and was linked genealogically to the seven legendary Roman kings. The first of these, Romulus, the founder of Rome, was also part of another mythological tradition, that of a Vestal Virgin’s two sons, of Romulus and Remus, set out to die and nursed by a she-wolf. Elaborated at great length, these mythological traditions constituted Rome’s ancient heritage. A non-mythological ritual tradition had a more direct impact on Roman historiography: the *Annales Maximi* kept for each year by the high priest (*pontifex maximus*) fixed the days when sacred law permitted business and court transactions (the *dies fasti*), and thus began a strong annalistic genre that recorded much of the public Roman life. But until the second century BCE the influence of late Greek historiography, speculative in nature and detached from Roman tradition, was overpowering. Histories in Greek predominated, reaching their peak in the *Histories* of Polybius (c. 200–118 BCE), with its cyclical philosophy of history in which each ideal government form first decays into corruption and then is replaced by another ideal form: monarchy moves to tyranny; aristocracy to oligarchy; then democracy to mob rule, where-

upon, it is implied, the cycle begins anew with monarchy. For Polybius this was a cycle only Rome could escape, because only Rome had mixed the three ideal forms in one composite constitution. Decadence also concerned Polybius’s contemporary Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder, who condemned the Greek influence as destructive of traditional “Old Rome.” This theme persisted, the idea that the “Old Rome” of tradition, where people practiced ancient religious rituals and civic virtues and rendered public service willingly, was being corrupted. But as much as the great Roman historians between 86 BCE and 120 CE (Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus) spoke of decadence, none of them suggested a truly cyclical view of history, because the gods had pronounced Rome eternal.

The Roman state and historiography alike remained linked to the traditional core, and Roman historians never speculated in an abstract manner about general forces and patterns shaping events, as some Greeks had done (e.g., Thucydides, Polybius, and the Stoic Posidonius of Apameia). In the main, Greek and Roman histories focused on individual events and deeds, which they judged according to moral precepts and public benefits. For Romans, decadence stemmed from the failure to affirm the ancient virtues; hence the importance of the Roman antiquarians, particularly Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BCE). Such history in support of tradition conformed to Aristotle’s dictum that history dealt only with individual phenomena and not with universals (as did poetry and philosophy); hence the firm link of history to rhetoric (as the art of persuasion) rather than to philosophy (as the endeavor to explain).

**Jewish historiography.** Jewish historiography expressed a unique sense of history—history as sacred memory, telling of God’s great acts throughout time and the Jews’ reactions to them, most importantly God’s choice of the Jews as the instrument for the fulfillment of his purpose. In the covenant that affirmed God’s choice of the Jews as the instrument for the fulfilling of his purpose, God promised Abraham to make the Jews numerous and give them land in return for their obedience and faithfulness. Joined to this was the Deuteronomist account of the pre-covenant period. God’s creation of the world; Adam and Eve’s loss of paradisiacal existence, leading to human life in its present form; and another overreaching deed, the building of the Tower of Babel toward heaven, with the subsequent sudden appearance of many languages and nations. In the world of the covenant, the Jews attempted to fulfill their demanding mission. Thus, in the kingdom period (David and Solomon), they had to translate that mission into actions that satisfied both God’s will and the needs of state policies. When as a people possessing free will they often failed, prophets recalled them intermittently to their great purpose. Then, in the time of the Babylonian exile, with no Jewish state left, the eschatological aspect of the Jewish faith (the concern with the last things) was stressed, leading to the apocalyptic views of late Jewish history (the prophet Daniel).

It was important for the fate of the Jews that an authoritative version of this whole sacred history was conveyed by the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament), a compilation of many sources that had undergone redactions by skilled compilers (such as the Deuteronomist, Yahvist, and Chronicler) until it was put into canonical form in 100 CE. After the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE, Jewish historical writing became insubstantial except for Josephus's *The Jewish War* (75–79 CE) and *Jewish Antiquities* (93? CE). Jewish thought in the Diaspora (the state of being scattered) became ahistorical. The Jewish state, whose fate had offered the possibility of tracing God's will and acts in time, had disappeared. Now Jewish jurisprudence, philosophy, and Qabalah were perceived as surer guides to pious wisdom than history. But the unique Jewish sense of history, with its totally sacral concept of time, became decisive for Western civilization in its Christian interpretation.

**Christian traditional historiography.** Christian historiography also had as its basis a historical record, the biblical account (in the Old and New Testaments) of the entrance of God himself into history. Such a rupture in continuous human time at first retarded the formation of a Christian historiography, as some Christians (the chiliasts), expecting the imminent second coming of Christ, denied a historical future, while other Christians (the Marcionites), emphasizing the newness and uniqueness of Christ's first coming, rejected the Old Testament and thereby denied a meaningful past. As time went on, however, Christians accepted history as the process of universal redemption through the gradual education of mankind. Time was the space in which God worked his purpose, and the end would come when "time was fulfilled." Into that process fitted Paul's reinterpretation of Jewish Christianity in the direction of a universal Christianity and the formulation of a positive view of the Roman Empire. Rejection of the empire had come easily because of Rome's pagan mythology and religion and her persecution of Christians. The positive view of Rome pointed to a divine purpose in the Augustan empire, as its peace, order, and communications network facilitated Christian missionary work. When in 313 Christianity became tolerated and then later the favored faith, its linkage to the empire (and subsequently to other secular states) brought about a flourishing traditional historiography, one that sacralized history, wished to encompass all nations and times, and shared certain forms.

The unity of all nations and times found its grand expression in chronology. In his chronological tables Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 263–339) compiled lists of rulers and events from many ancient cultures and synchronized them with the dominant Judeo-Christian line. While his chronology prevailed in the medieval period, discrepancies in the figuring of world eras—the counting of all dates from creation, Adam, or Abraham on—arose early because scholars used different versions of the Old Testament, a work devoid of dates (years elapsed from Adam to Christ ranged from 3952 to 5500). By the late sixteenth century at least fifty different

world eras were known, a fact that prepared the way for linking faith and chronology through the presently used scheme of reckoning history from the incarnation, which preserves the sacred nature of time without insisting on the substantial unity of the past.

In early Christian historiography the world's duration was often given as six thousand years (six days of creation times one thousand, since "one day is with the Lord as a thousand years," *2 Pt.* 3:8). Each millennium formed a world age (*aetas mundi*), demarcated by prominent biblical figures or events, such as Adam, Noah, Moses, Abraham, David, the building of the Temple, the restoration of the Temple, and, always, Christ. The scheme of world ages, used by Origen, Augustine, Isidore of Seville, Bede—with or without the one-thousand-year spans—became a favored periodization scheme for world chronicles. It found a rival in the Christian adaptation of a Jewish apocalyptic vision: Nebuchadrezzar's dream about a statue and its eventual destruction by a boulder, interpreted by the prophet Daniel (2:32–41) as the successive appearance in history of four empires, followed by God's kingdom. Such a transfer of power from empire to empire (*translatio imperii*), known to ancient writers, was used by Paulus Orosius (fl. 414–417) in his *Histories against the Pagans*. He stipulated a sequence of Babylonian, Macedonian, Carthaginian, and Roman empires; the latter, blessed by Christ's life and work and being the instrument of the universal mission, would endure to the Last Judgment. Augustine (354–430) mentioned various age schemes but suggested a detachment of Christian views of history from all such rigid and earth-bound schemes in favor of a dynamic perspective: history is seen as the battlefield of the forces fueled by the love of God (City of God) and those propelled by the love of self and the world (City of the Earth). No entities or persons in this world belonged wholly to one or the other of the two communities; all of them were of a mixed state, with the separation and the victory of the good only occurring at the Judgment. Augustine's dynamic view found few adherents in medieval historiography with its usually close attachment to secular institutions. When, after 1100, cultural change accelerated in the West, some new periodization schemes followed the trinitarian pattern: the old one of "prior to the law," "under the law," and "under God's glory" or the new one after the Trinity proper—periods of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In each case the most recent period was seen as the one most "advanced" and also closest to the end (Adam reborn). Joachim of Fiore (c. 1130–1202) spoke of the age of the Holy Spirit as the final one of universal brotherhood, with monks as the spiritual leaders, while Hugh of Saint-Victor (d. 1142) perceived a gradual development from natural law to written law to the time of grace, a development marked by progress from a primitive understanding of ritual and sacraments to an ever fuller sacramental union with God through Christ.

In traditional Christian historiography divine providence worked through portents, miracles, the never-ending



cycle of sin and punishment, and the divinely instituted church. Histories of the church began with Eusebius's *Church History*, which with its continuations was compiled into the widely used *Historia Tripartita* (sixth century). But as long as the church was integrated into the total life, ecclesiastical histories reached far beyond the confines of the institution proper. In the histories of the integration of new peoples into Latin Christendom (Germans, Slavs, Danes, Normans), and of Byzantium's mission to the Slavs and the peoples of the Near East, the church appeared clearly as God's means of accomplishing the universal mission. The church also was central in the histories of the Crusades, those attempts to regain the Holy Land for the Christian world, although the later Crusades already reflect the ascendancy of political and economic motives over the zeal for sacred endeavors.

The Christian view of the past was put forth in a number of often ill-defined genres. The biographies of emperors and kings, as well as the *gesta* ("deeds"), which dealt with a whole series of officeholders (abbots and bishops), gave much praise to individuals. That offense to Christian humility was justified by the inspiration the works offered for proper Christian behavior. The most prevalent genres, however, were the annals and chronicles, often difficult to distinguish from each other. Both fit well the Christian image of time rushing toward its fulfillment (the word *chronicle* derives from *chronikos*, "belonging to time"). Particularly the world chronicle, reaching from creation to the contemporary period and divided according to world ages, represented traditional Christian thinking about history at its best. It therefore was a sign of trouble when, from 1100 on, more and more world chronicles dropped the sacred story (at least up to the incarnation) and could no longer master the ever-increasing data by the usual schemes of world ages and four empires. By the fourteenth century the traditional world chronicle also was losing its nourishing base with the decline of monasticism. When its once clearly perceived structure of the human story collapsed, the world chronicle became encyclopedic and, while it was still a source of inspiration (particularly for Franciscan preachers), it conveyed more in the way of information than of a sense of the grand sacred development—a signal for severe problems to come.

**Islamic traditional historiography.** Islamic historiography had its firm anchor in the life and teachings of Muḥammad (570–624 CE). The earlier tribal society left its historiographical traces through the epic *Battle Days of the Arabs* (reports on events and persons) and the genealogical records. But Islamic historiography used also the Old Testament narrative to account for the period before Muḥammad, seen as a time of numerous corruptions of faith reversed at certain points by prophets, each of whom pronounced a new *sharī'ah* (law) and founded a new community of the faithful: Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and the final one, Muḥammad, who had to establish true Islam against the most recent falsifications of faith by the followers of Moses and Jesus.

Muḥammad's bringing of the Qur'ān constituted the center of human history, when God had communicated his will to the human race for all time. Thus, the full meaning of history was ascertainable from the *sīrah*, a biography of the Prophet. Of historical material it included the Old Testament account to Ishmael (strong on genealogies), the events in Arabia before Muḥammad (legends and genealogy of Muḥammad), and the life's work of Muḥammad (with many *maghāzī*, that is, histories of the expeditions, their leaders, purposes, and major participants). Traces of pre-Islamic elements, such as a fondness for the inclusion of poetry and narrative reports and a love for biography, appear in the sacred literature of Islam. The reliability of accounts was ascertained by *isnād*, a critical method parallel to that used in Islamic theology and law for inclusion of records into the *ḥadīth* (tradition in the specific sense of verified tradition). It concentrates on establishing an unbroken series of trustworthy transmitters and not on the verification of content. Thus, Islamic traditional historiography could not corrode the sacred core as it was linked to it in method and content.

The task of traditional historians was facilitated by the unity of the Islamic community in the caliphal state with its combined secular and religious authority. With the empire as its given scope, the time flow as its organizing principle, its chronology firmly anchored in the Hijrah (Muḥammad's emigration from Mecca to Medina, 622 CE), and with room for narrative, the annalistic chronicle became the prevalent genre of traditional historiography, reaching its highpoint in al-Ṭabarī's chronicle, the first comprehensive account of Islamic history, reaching to about 915.

While in al-Ṭabarī's history the united empire served as an integrating factor, it was that empire, with its diverse peoples and cultures (of particular impact were Iraq, Syria, and Persia), that gradually made Islamic historiography broader but less homogeneous. The continuing contacts with the outside world and the internal political disintegration also strengthened the centrifugal influences in Islamic historiography. Universal histories slowly became less the conquering story of Islam, starting from the sacred core, and more the story of various cultures, such as in the *Murūj al-dhahab* (Meadows of gold) by al-Ṭabarī's contemporary al-Mas'ūdī (d. 956?). In these histories, although they retained many elements of traditional historiography, the central principle of unity was often a philosophical idea, unconnected with the religious tradition and the unified Islamic state. The spreading doubt and uncertainty provoked a conscious traditionalism that caused a reemphasis of traditional ways in historiography but also a deemphasis of history in favor of theology and religious law, which were perceived as more stabilizing. Historians, for their part, tried to gain a broader theoretical basis for Islamic historiography. After 1000 CE, as traditional Islamic historiography was being challenged by the increasing rationalism and skepticism emanating from the study of Greek philosophy and science, histories quite often began with introductory remarks on the



theory of history that went well beyond the range of questioning permitted by *isnād*.

**The resilient non-Western traditional historiographies.** In comparison with biblically based historiographies, particularly the Christian one, other historiographies were considerably more stable. They did not reject their mythological and religious heritage, largely because their historiographical truth-finding process never assigned a truly corrective or interpretive critical role to reason. Indian historical writing did not draw a sharp line between fact and legend. Chinese (and with it Japanese) methodology expected from reason a careful refinement of the records of the past but not a reinterpretation of the past. Chinese scholars considered a record true if the sources agreed or a documented contradiction was absent (not, as in the West, if multiple independent confirmations were obtained), a standard that assured a high degree of accuracy with a minimal corrosion of tradition. This standard served historians well who strove for the consensus of an ongoing tradition and saw history as the succession of separate, identifiable, and observed events subject to no abstract concept of wholeness and with no structure of a philosophical nature. In Greek and Roman historiographies any radical challenge to tradition was checked by history's divorce from philosophy, its tie to rhetoric, and its role as public servant. Challenges to Islamic traditional historiography were more serious. After 1000, under the influence of ancient Greek philosophy and science, attempts were made to reformulate history's purpose and to construct histories of interconnected phenomena at a distance from sacred tradition. The highpoint of these attempts came with the *Kitāb al-'ibar* (History) by Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406), which relies on human reflection, not traditional authority, searches universal history for timeless patterns in human conduct as the core to a theory of culture, and aims not at constructing a theoretical image of reality but at assisting in the realization of an ideal society in given circumstances. The *Kitāb al-'ibar* stood between traditionalism and rationalism, as would much of Islamic historiography from then on.

**THE AGE OF ANTHROPOCENTRIC HISTORIOGRAPHY.** Between the 1300s and the 1700s Christian traditional historiography disintegrated slowly but relentlessly and to a degree unprecedented in other cultures. In their quest for authentic texts, Renaissance humanists developed a sophisticated text criticism that stripped layers of later "deposits" from the original texts, beginning the diminution of the aura of ancientness that so far had given weight to tradition and preparing for the view that texts are not the manifestation of universal wisdom but merely the reflection of thought in a particular culture at a given point. Eventually, and with radical consequences, even the Bible would become the object of such critical analysis. Humanist histories also shifted their focus to the world of states and secular individuals, where the religious dimension was secondary.

In the Reformation, Protestants obliterated parts of traditional history when they rejected centuries of ecclesiastical

development as periods of religious corruption. In the bitter struggle over the true tradition, Protestants affirmed a new historical continuity by linking the present directly with the (ideal) apostolic church, while Catholics defended the continuous tradition. The geographical discoveries created a global world whose great variety of people had to be integrated into traditional universal history. At stake were the unitary origin of humankind in Adam and the central position of Jewish history in the course of world history. Thus, according to the Jesuit José de Acosta (late sixteenth century), the American Indians were linked to biblical origins by a migration across the Bering Sea. More audaciously, the seventeenth-century pre-Adamite theory of Isaac de la Peyrere separated the general (pre-Adamite) creation of all people from the subsequent story of the Jewish people beginning with Adam, a view unacceptable to Christians because it left most people without a link to Adam and biblical history.

These challenges further eroded the already weakened traditional universal history. Although that history was much cultivated at the new Protestant universities, its specifically Christian features receded gradually into ecclesiastical history. From the late sixteenth century, schemes appeared that separated human history from sacred history. The latter increasingly became ecclesiastical history and lost ground steadily to the human history that concentrated on the world's immanent concerns. In turn, human history soon experienced difficulties in structuring its accounts similar to those difficulties Christian historians had encountered when dealing with the period after Christ, a period (the sixth world age) that lacked easily identifiable biblical "markers." The new world historians, having abandoned the sacred structures although still accepting the biblical story for the early period, experimented with various structures that gave order and unity to their accounts. Finally, in the 1690s, Christopher Cellarius suggested the still popular division into ancient, medieval, and modern periods, which in effect expelled the Christian story from its central place. The sturdily traditional Roman Catholic historiography never experienced these problems because it yielded the place of honor to systematic theology and its less mutable categories and lessons.

Finally, traditional historiography was drawn into the seventeenth-century battles over epistemological questions. Francis Bacon's empiricism appreciated history as the memory of data for observation. But advocates of the new sciences, along with René Descartes (1596–1650), downgraded historiography for not being able to deliver uncontested general truths. They found history trivial because it did not deduce its insights from a few *a priori* principles. In response, the erudite historians avoided interpretations and restricted their work to establishing an unassailable record of the past through a rigorous criticism of ancient texts and documents. Churchmen, particularly the Jesuit Bollandists and Benedictine Maurists, did pioneering in order to ward off a wholesale rejection of traditional history; indeed, the Maurist Jean Ma-

billon wrote the *De re diplomatica* (1681), which remained the handbook for historical studies for two centuries.

**Adaptation and change of traditional Christian historiography.** From the 1400s to the late 1800s, Western historiography saw attempts to reconcile the traditional Christian view of history with developments that favored a secular vision of history. They included the cyclical interpretation of history, the appreciation of ages and cultures on their own merit (historicism), a simple updating of tradition, stipulations of a unitary process including God and the world, and, finally, development of a historical science that still left room for the Christian interpretation of history.

*God and the organic pattern.* The cyclical model of organic life, particularly its decadence phase, had been part of the classical tradition and recently had been revived as an interpretive view to replace the traditional Christian interpretation of history. Then, in the early 1700s, Giambattista Vico, who accepted biblical history up to the Flood, put forth a systematic cyclical view of history for the time afterward, when human society was formed through the rituals of burial and worship, and the regulation of sex. Divine providence prescribed for history a pattern of *corso* and *recorso* (“cycle” and “recurrent cycle”). Each cycle had three successive stages—the eras of gods, heroes, and men—and was characterized by its own type of life, thought, language, and arts. The last stage, although most advanced, was not superior to the others, because in a paradoxical development the more humane a society became the more subject it became to decay, making the high point of humaneness the beginning of a new barbarism as well. Also using the organic model, Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803) stressed God’s special care for the *Volk*, an organic unity of people with its own language, arts, thought, and literature. History told the stories of *Völker*, none superior to the other because all were equidistant from God, although Herder eventually dropped the mere sequence of nations for a hazy developmental theme—the increase of *Humanität* (a refined civility). Herder stood at the beginning of historicism when he endowed each historical phenomenon with its own value, thus refusing to measure the value of historical ages on the scale of progress. The affirmation of the Christian tradition, including divine providence, saved early historicism from the radical relativism inherent in the assertion that each historical phenomenon must be appreciated on its own terms. In the nineteenth century, that historicism pervaded the historical science of the Lutheran Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886). But after 1850, all religious affirmations were removed from historicism, laying bare its inherent relativism and skepticism toward all schemes of meaning beyond the affirmation of the uniqueness of each phenomenon; this in turn initiated in the 1880s a fervent search for historical truth and meaning.

*Progress, a radical challenge.* The eighteenth century brought a revolution in the interpretation of universal history as the theme of historical progress triumphed over the traditional scheme of Christian universal history. In the previ-

ous century, the latter had found its last prominent advocates in Sir Walter Raleigh (1554–1618) and Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704). Now, as interpreted by a philosophy (as opposed to a theology) of history, world history became the story of humankind’s emancipation through the progressive ascendancy of reason. At first suppressed by ignorance and superstition, rationality increased under the pressure of human unhappiness until by the eighteenth century it reached maturity in some Western nations, a pattern that was expected to be repeated universally. Christian faith and its views on history were seen as manifestations of an earlier, less developed stage and was valued only for the church’s preservation of learning. The meaning of history was entirely immanent, anthropocentric, and entirely determined by the imagined perfect future, a total reversal of the Christian view of the meaning of history as transcendent, God-centered, and dependent on the sacred past. History was no longer the working out of God’s will leading to the transcendent kingdom of God but the demonstration of progress, with all ages being stepping stones toward the perfect future age—a secular kingdom of God (although some proponents of the progress view, such as Voltaire, were skeptical of the idea of universal perfection).

This radical challenge to the traditional Christian view of world history called forth Christian responses along the lines of either rejection or adaptation; the challenge was felt most intensely in the German-speaking world, where, in the early nineteenth century, the historical approach in the search for truth became supreme. There, romantic and idealist adaptations to the progress view were based on a fundamental reinterpretation of God’s relationship with the world. In the eighteenth century, under the influence of rationalism, God, still perceived as a person, was seen to govern a human history in which human beings could, through the education of their reason (one akin to God’s reason), improve the world materially as they simultaneously enhanced themselves spiritually. History was God’s education of mankind to an ever fuller comprehension of God (a progress entailing even the overcoming of some biblical concepts that could be considered outdated) until the spiritual, rational, and historical worlds would be identical. In the nineteenth-century idealist and romantic concepts of history, God no longer governed the world from “outside” but rather was immanent in it as *Urgrund* (primal, eternal cause) or as a dynamic spiritual principle. God and the world formed a dynamic whole. The kingdom of God referred simply to the spiritual perfection in and of this world, making all of history *Heilsgeschichte* (“history of salvation”). Thus, in the philosophy of history of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), the complex relationship of creator and creation in time was transformed into the self-realization of the all-encompassing Idea (pure thought), a process reflected in the increasing identity between the universal and the particular and the potential and the actual. The process was driven by the dialectical struggle of the existing against its inherent negation and directed toward the creation of the new. In a

grand unitary process, the cosmos including God was in motion toward its goal—not happiness or rationality but the fully realized Idea (complete actualization and freedom).

Idealist adaptations of the Christian theology of history reduced the meaning of many traditional elements: the biblical story became relevant for its own time only; the transcendent kingdom of God was transformed to the end stage of the immanent world process; the Christian faith was now only one (although superior) explication of the universal religious truth, with Jesus being one (although special) explicator. History changed from a dramatic struggle between the forces of light and darkness into a dialectically evolving sequence of stages of ever-greater spirituality. In a few cases this mode of thought even affected Roman Catholicism. In the 1830s, Johann Adam Möhler stipulated the reconcilability of tradition with progress as Christians helped the seeds of faith mature by constantly overcoming the time-bound manners of understanding faith and tradition.

*Tradition and historical science.* The drive toward a historiography, not based on traditional authority but on rigorous documentation through critically verified sources begun by erudite historiography, owing a great debt to classical philology, and enhanced by the eighteenth-century Göttingen professors of historical, legal, and political studies, finally produced nineteenth-century German historical science. However, its leading figure, Leopold von Ranke, still considered history God's work, accomplished through the "ideas" as guiding forces and intelligible to historians through an intuitive process (*Abmen*). But the Rankean compromise collapsed, because the new methodology demanded the abandonment of all transcendent elements and because historicism could see in the Christian tradition no more than one of many traditions. Christian scholars who eventually applied text criticism to the Bible in the hope of securing faith through a text properly verified and congenial to modern minds in effect brought about a rapid diminution of the biblical core of traditional historiography. Typical was the attempt to reestablish the authority of the Christian faith in a modern manner through a critically verified biography of Jesus that would reveal what Jesus actually said, did, and taught (see the nineteenth-century "natural" histories of the "prophet" Jesus or Ernest Renan's popular biography of Jesus). Yet, this endeavor failed, because in only a few instances could the Christ of dogmas, miracles, and prophecies be penetrated and make visible the historical Jesus—a problem of great consequence for subsequent attempts to reconcile history and faith.

**Religion and a radically anthropocentric historiography.** Beginning in the 1880s two developments marked the history writing on various continents. Historical science in its secular and tradition-eroding form exerted its impact on the remaining traditional historiographies of the world, while in the West a not-yet-concluded internal struggle began to gain a firm critically verified basis for historical truth, including a new secular interpretation of history. For

their part, Christians continued to reconstruct the traditional Christian view of history.

*Impact on traditional historiographies.* Strains appeared in traditional historiographies even before the impact of the Western critical theory of history. It proved increasingly difficult to integrate the many and varied phenomena of the changing world into a tradition developed from a sacred core. The strains showed first in methodology, the endeavor charged with devising ways to find and affirm truth. Prior to 1900, some Chinese scholars had attempted to make historical methodology (mainly text analysis) more accessible to rational arguments without weakening the tradition so essential for social stability, continuity, and dynastic legitimacy. Then, when Western intrusions ended the isolation of China and the revolution of 1911 overthrew the monarchy, Chinese historiography's continuity and stability were shattered, too. Chinese historians began their search for a new sense of continuity by stressing those genres of traditional historiography most akin to the modern spirit (histories of scholarship, institutions, statecraft); by adapting the old methodology to the Western model, which meant going beyond text criticism and partially accepting the modern Western worldview; by dethroning the classical tradition, such as turning Confucius from a sage for all ages into a "forward"-looking reformer for his own period only; by fusing Western liberalism and its view of progress to the traditional sequence of Chaos, Peace, and Harmony, identifying the last with democracy; and, finally, by adopting a version of Marxist historical materialism, totally hostile to traditional views of the past.

Japanese traditional historiography knew no rationalist undercurrent, although a critical attitude toward past records was not absent as the work of Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) showed. Yet he analyzed the language and the ideas of ancient Japanese texts not in the interest of a rationalist ideal but in accord with the Shintō restoration of the Tokugawa period that attempted to cleanse these texts of all Chinese and Buddhist accretions. After the opening toward the West in 1868, the Japanese were first convinced that minor adjustments in their traditional views on history would suffice. At the College of Historiography a record collection began in 1877 as a basis for the ongoing *Dainippon hennenshi* (Chronological history of Japan), a work written after the Chinese pattern. But during the following decades Japanese historians came to know German historical theory and English historical monographs; this led to the founding in 1889 of the Historical Society of Japan, which was dedicated to the Western historiographical model. Yet both the Chinese and the Western historiographical models soon found resistance in a new Japanese traditionalism—nationalism. In 1895 *Dainippon hennenshi* was abandoned because of its Chinese character, and while many Japanese works in the Western manner appeared, pro-imperial traditionalist historiography received increasing support.

Islamic historiography has experienced the coexistence of traditional and Western critical historiography, so com-

mon to many modern societies. Attempts to fuse Western historiography with the traditional concepts of Islam coexist with calls from fundamentalists for a return to a strictly traditional historiography. Relative to Islam, however, only Indian historiography has preserved more of its traditional historiography. Traditional chronicles were written in the state of Maratha well into the twentieth century. The absence of a true methodological tradition aiming at the “certain fact” denied Western influence a logical point of entry. Western historical science had to create a separate body of historiographical works.

*Christian historiography and the triumph and crisis of historical science.* By the 1880s, history perceived as a science had triumphed in Western historiography. Modest success had come to the “natural science” school of historiography that had started in the 1830s with Auguste Comte’s three-stage interpretation of history as first theological, then metaphysical, and finally positive. This last, the fulfillment of all of history, recognized no absolutes and essences, only laws governing relationships between phenomena. But no such positive historical laws have been found. German historical science, the attempt to unite history and science without destroying history’s autonomy, had become prevalent. It was just as destructive of traditional historiography, because by rejecting the traditional views and interpretations of history it converted pre-nineteenth-century works into mere pools of source materials. In turn, from the 1880s on, the triumphant scientific history was forced to embark on a search for a new logic of historical inquiry, safely distant from religion or metaphysics, but able to forestall the anarchy of opinions that in the absence of a body of traditional truth threatened the very endeavor of history. Since the 1930s that search has accelerated: neo-idealists advocated the process of mental reconstruction of the past (R. G. Collingwood); admirers of the creativeness of life saw historical truth as everchanging with life (Benedetto Croce); neo-positivists looked for laws covering large numbers of phenomena (Carl Hempel); analytical philosophers found the structure of history in the language structure of historical works; and finally there have been scholars who saw in a consistent, densely reasoned, and well-documented narrative the proper basis for historiography.

With much of the Christian historiographical tradition rejected and historical science more certain of its ability to reconstruct the factual past than of its ability to interpret that past, grand ideologies filled the void: liberalism with its faith in inevitable progress; Marxism with its interpretation of history as the story of the dialectical overcoming of all exploitative societies in favor of the socialist/communist society; and fascism with a militantly nationalist interpretation of the past, linked to a romantic notion of the concentration of the “national soul” in a leader. They all in their own ways neutralized religion and other elements of traditional historiography. Those concerned with Christian historiography found the competition fierce and to many of them accom-

modation to modernity seemed more promising than its rejection.

Enamored by the spirit of progress through the sciences and the Enlightenment, the Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955) formulated a Christian view of history full of hope closely akin to the modern “religion of the earth.” As a biologist he spoke of salvation as the evolution of consciousness to higher and higher levels approaching Christ’s perfect consciousness. A modern social reformist spirit shaped the American turn-of-the-century Social Gospel movement, and, since the 1960s, Hegel’s and Marx’s visions of an immanent kingdom of God on earth have reverberated in liberation theology, with its call to Christians to make common cause with the poor and oppressed of the developing nations. Here the end of time is not only defined as the ultimate union of human beings with God but also as the communion of human beings with each other. It is not clear whether the process is an ongoing one (ever-new identifications with ever-new poor and oppressed) or a state of perfection following a onetime liberation.

Rejecting all easy adaptations to secular philosophies of history, Reinhold Niebuhr’s *Faith and History* (1949) put forth a Christian view of history that took into account the achievements and the horrors of the twentieth century, a period whose widespread ignorance of biblical tradition contrasted with the affirmation of the “goodness” of human nature and a belief in progress. Niebuhr demonstrated the irony in history of the best human intentions turning to ill effects and pointed to the greater realism of the Christian historical interpretation, which praises human genius but also is aware of evil, the limitations of the rational mastery of the world, and the futility of a life of immanence. History, in which the sacred and profane could never be fully united, is creative but not redemptive.

In this period of fundamental changes, Christian scholars continued to try to reestablish the authority of the Christian tradition by making its core impervious to modern criticism. For many Protestant scholars this meant reducing the biblical component to a small historically, scientifically, or existentially validated core. Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich held the intrusion of eternity (God) into time (human history) to a minimum. For Bultmann the only historical event of sacred character was the Easter event; all other biblical stories were myths (human images of otherworldly phenomena). The *kerygma*, the challenge to faith in Christ, emanated from an understanding of the Easter event and led to timeless recurring decisions to faith. There was neither a base nor a need for a Christian interpretation of history. Tillich, who doubted that any religious statement could be more than symbolic (that is, could directly depict divine reality), acknowledged the role of the historical Jesus as demonstrating human existence without worldly distortions and calling all people to a “new being.” But since much of human activity reflected to various degrees an “ultimate concern” with the “ground of being,” he considered all cultural history to be sacred or religious history.

Other scholars found the price of such a harmonizing with the modern spirit—the abandonment of much of the biblical story as the basis of historiography—too high to pay. Among these scholars were the Protestant fundamentalists, who restored biblically based prophetic history to the center of Christian historical accounts. In the Augustinian and Kierkegaardian vein, Karl Barth (1886–1968) sharply separated time and eternity, insisting that only in biblical times did God reveal himself and not in the course of history, progress, or culture. Christian faith and wisdom rise from the decision individuals make when confronted, in the biblical record, with the story of Christ, and not from the study of the history of cultures and societies. For Barth, history, even ecclesiastical history, is therefore no more than an auxiliary tool of theology.

Large-scale attempts to write the history of cultures from a Roman Catholic viewpoint have been made (Christopher H. Dawson, Martin C. d’Arcy). But since the 1960s such attempts have focused on Roman Catholic Church history, one of the last bastions of traditional Christian historiography. While Protestant historiographical arguments have focused on how much of the Bible could be used in a scientific age as a foundation for interpreting history, Roman Catholic arguments now concentrated on the unique sacred role of the Catholic Church in history. In the 1950s, the traditional view still prevailed that the church, like Christ, represented a unique presence of eternity in time (Jean Daniélou, Henri-Irénée Marrou, Hubert Jedin). At its core, all interpretation of history was explication of doctrine. Then, Vatican II deemphasized the conception of the church as the *corpus mysticum* (mystical body of Christ) in favor of the church conceived as the people of God through time. Some Catholic scholars took this change to mean that the dependence of historical interpretation on theology could now be broken. They attempted to turn church history into a sociological study of an institution or an analysis of the changing behavior of believers in time. With the abandonment of all claims for a special status of the church in history, its history would become one special history among many.

**Outlook.** The near future should see the beginnings of a solution to the dilemma in historical interpretation, now global in scope. For centuries the ancient myths and then the great religions had created and supported the schemes for explaining and organizing history and, with it, meaning. Also, traditional historical interpretations were part and parcel of the traditional social and political order; thus their diminution in strength meant more than just the fading of some opinions. Their challenger, modern Western historical science, too, is an integral part of a larger whole—the scientific-technological Western culture the achievements of which have radically increased the human potential for good and evil and which for the first time has linked all human societies into an interdependent network. As part of the new “religion of the earth,” historical science rejects all sense of mystery and demands that interpretations of history use forces,

patterns, and aims immanent to this world. Thus there is the suspension of moral judgment in historical methodology, an endeavor of great sophistication that has not only expunged superficial or false interpretations but also the ascertaining of meaning in history. None of the new models or narratives, brilliant as they are, has as yet been able to match the public role of traditional history. On the other hand, various attempts to continue the traditional historiographies in a manner acceptable to scientific historiography have had only temporary success. In this crisis the age-old link between religion and history writing is at stake. Religion is threatened with becoming irrelevant to interpreting history, doomed to an ahistorical, recurrent reliving of the sacred past by individuals, while the writing of history, supported by a sophisticated methodology, remains a technical endeavor given to the reconstruction of aspects of the past. In such a situation neither religion nor history is able to master the reconciliation of the past, present, and future that in centuries past has enabled them, in conjunction with each other, to serve a public purpose and give meaning to the flow of life.

**SEE ALSO** Ages of the World; Chronology; Cosmogony; Cosmology; Enlightenment, The; Evolution, article on Evolutionism; Myth, article on Myth and History; Sacred Time; Tradition.

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## HISTORIOGRAPHY: WESTERN STUDIES [FIRST EDITION]

Within the Jewish and Christian traditions, the origin of philosophical and historical examinations of religion lies in the works of the ancient Greeks. This is equivalent to saying that the point of departure for these traditions' philosophical and historical self-examination is Greek thought. Other attitudes toward the development of religion are undoubtedly to be found in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, and China before Greek thought intervened, but these attitudes will remain

outside my present consideration. I shall here be concerned basically with the examination of religion within the Hellenic tradition.

**HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DICHOTOMY.** A significant distinction was imposed by the very nature of the Greek perspective: philosophical examination and historical examination of religion became two distinct branches of knowledge. Indeed, it is characteristic of Greek thought to distinguish in general (at least from the fifth century BCE onward) between philosophy and history. No doubt philosophical criticism operates inside a historical or antiquarian examination of religion, and, reciprocally, the empirical knowledge of cults and myths collected by historians or antiquarians assists philosophical criticism of religion. But the two subjects—philosophical and historical evaluations of religion—are seldom fused or, at least, seldom confused.

To indicate the depth of this dichotomy in Western thought, it is enough to mention David Hume, who was one of the most radical eighteenth-century thinkers about religion—perhaps one of the most radical thinkers about religion of modern times. Hume approached religion from both the historical and the philosophical points of view. In his *Natural History of Religion* (1757) in which he treats religion in historical terms, he states, "As far as writing of history reaches, mankind, in ancient times, appear universally to have been polytheists." Findings about modern tribes only confirm for him the facts adduced by the ancients about the original polytheism of mankind. In the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, which appeared three years after his death in 1779, Hume discusses religion from a philosophical point of view. His concern is not the evolution of religion but the validity of religion. He contends that the argument from design for the existence of God is of doubtful value. It is generally recognized that Hume took Cicero's *On the Nature of the Gods* as a formal model for his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*. There is no obvious ancient model for his *Natural History of Religion*, but he must have carefully considered Diodorus Siculus's *Historical Library*, book 1 (of the first century BCE) and was familiar with the work of Herodotus and Lucian.

**THE ANCIENT GREEKS.** After Herodotus (fifth century BCE), history in Greece tended to be confined to what we would call political and constitutional history, although doctors like Galen use the word *historia* to mean a compilation of medical reports in literature. Other aspects of the past such as religious ceremonies, festivals, or sacrifices, were more frequently examined in monographs that were sometimes generically designated *archaiologia* (in Latin, *antiquitates*). Biography was a separate literary genre: if the subject of a biography was a religious personality (a religious reformer, a priest, a holy man, or even a superstitious politician), biography was a contribution to the history of religion. Within Christianity such biographies were written to recount the lives of saints.

**Poetry.** Two well-known features of Greek Archaic poetry had consequences for the study of religion. The poetry

of Hesiod, especially his *Theogony*, shows a marked tendency to treat the world of the gods as a historical world. In Hesiod's poetry there is a succession of generations of gods in which older gods, without necessarily dying, lose their power in confrontations with younger gods. The society of gods is perceived as a society to which new members are added and in which members gain or lose power. There is not only a change of human attitudes toward gods, but there is also a change in the attitudes of the gods themselves. In Hesiod, myth already incorporates the notion of a succession of leading gods: myths are presented as a sort of history of religion. Another important feature of Greek Archaic poetry is its frequent criticism of the gods. Such criticism often radically repudiated commonly held views about the gods. For example, Xenophanes (fl. 500 BCE) remarked that just as the Ethiopians imagine their gods to be similar to themselves, so horses, if they could paint, would paint their gods as horses.

**Philosophy.** The critical opinions about the gods in Greek Archaic poetry encouraged and inspired philosophical critiques of religion and historical research on the diversity of religions among the nations. Philosophers tended to separate God from mortals to the point of making God almost unintelligible except as the first mover or as a celestial body. The Stoics used allegorical interpretation (which had been current in explaining away embarrassing episodes of the *Iliad*) to turn mythology into a confirmation of their pantheistic materialism. In the handbook *Theologiae graecae compendium* by Cornutus (c. 50 CE), one finds a systematic summary of Stoic allegory with some interesting statements about the religious attitudes of primitive humans. Only Epicurus (341–270 BCE) insisted on believing in the existence of the traditional gods; his position did not allow the gods to exercise any influence on men, and he found in their happiness a model for the happiness of philosophically minded men. It is surprising how few references are made to the gods in the extant works of Aristotle; passages about them are almost marginal remarks (*On the Heavens* 2.1.284a; *Metaphysics* 1.2.982b, 11.8.1074b). Hence, in later Greek thought, especially among Neoplatonists, mystical practices were introduced to supplement the scanty information about gods in the discussions of the philosophic masters.

**Historical research.** Supported by visits to sanctuaries and by travels to foreign countries and remote localities, historical research provided both the raw material and the guiding principles for alternative historical interpretation. As a keen traveler and as one adept in the comparative method (which contemporary doctors used to explain climatic differences), Herodotos provided a model for research on religion. He explained similarities between Greek and Egyptian gods by claiming that the Greeks had derived their gods from Egypt. His account of the Scythians shows his awareness of the difference between reporting and believing. Even more telling of this awareness is his conclusion of the story of Salmoxis: "Whether there was a man called Salmoxis, or this be a name among the Getae for a god of their country, I have

done with him" (4.95–96). Herodotos influenced Greek, and later, Roman writers who explored the customs of foreign countries and who also, as natives, explained to Greeks and Romans the characteristic features of their own countries. Accounts by non-Greeks became particularly frequent after Alexander the Great. These non-Greeks, who had adopted the Greek language, include Manetho (fl. third century BCE), Berossus (fl. 290 BCE), and later Josephus Flavius (c. 37–100 CE). Incidentally, Josephus's writings on the Jews comprise the only complete ancient account of a "barbarian" religion by a native to be preserved—although they were preserved through Christian, not through Jewish, tradition. Posidonius (c. 135–51 BCE) of Apamea in Syria deserves special note insofar as he was both a Stoic philosopher of somewhat mystical inclinations and a universal historian who purported to be a continuator of Polybius; he was, however, more anthropologically oriented than his predecessor.

Greek and Roman historians tended to ignore religion, especially when they dealt with Greek and Roman history. Consequently, most of what we know about Greek and Roman cults is derived from specific monographs on religious subjects (e.g., Plutarch on the Delphic oracle and Lucian on the Syrian goddess), accounts by travelers and geographers (e.g., Strabo and Pausanias), or, finally, works by Christian polemicists (e.g., Lactantius and Augustine).

Books on religion during the Hellenistic and Roman period reflect contemporary perspectives and interests. In the third century BCE, the ruler cults were developed by Alexander and his immediate successors. Ruler cults had, of course, existed before in and outside of Greece; but this new expansion was far more powerful and, at least for Greek speakers, involved delicate balances of power between men and gods. Persaeus, the pupil of Zeno the Stoic, and others reminded their contemporaries that past benefactors and kings had been divinized (cf. Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 1.15.38). Hecataeus of Abdera (c. 300 BCE) distinguished two categories of gods: the celestial and the terrestrial. The second category was comprised of benefactors. (Diodorus Siculus in his *Bibliotheca historica* 1.12 probably reflects his teaching.) In his *Sacred History*, Euhemerus (fl. 300 BCE) claimed to have discovered on the island of Panchaia an inscription revealing that Zeus had been a mortal king who had received divine honors for his contribution to civilization; Zeus was born and died in Crete. Whether Euhemerus thought that all the gods had been men like Zeus is uncertain. Though Euhemerus shocked many with his ideas and his forgeries (the latter being the object of a virulent attack by Eratosthenes), his ideas had success: his book was translated into Latin by Ennius in the second century BCE, and was summarized by Diodorus in the first century BCE. Antoine Banier's *La mythologie et les fables expliquées par l'histoire* (3d ed., 1738–1740) shows that scholarship continued to be euhemeristic even in the eighteenth century.

In the second and first centuries BCE, many erudite Greek works tried to preserve the memory of ceremonies that

were becoming obsolete. Most of these works were lost, except for what may have passed into later lexicons, such as the so-called *Suda*. A conspicuous model, known to the Latins, of this erudition was the work about Athens by Polemon of Ilium (fl. 200 BCE). In Italy Alexander Polyhistor (d. late first century BCE) gained a reputation for systematic compilations of this kind of information about foreign countries.

**ROMAN THOUGHT.** The Latins of the first century BCE had a state with a vigorous religious tradition of its own; this tradition was considered to be the foundation of and the justification for Rome's enormous power. Roman religion had become a constitutive aspect of Roman prestige among her subjects. On the other hand, Greek philosophy had penetrated Roman thought: antiquarian devotion to the religious past was in conflict with rationalistic and irreverent tendencies. In this context a distinction among the theologies of poets, philosophers, and statesmen, probably borrowed from Greek philosophers, became popular in Rome. This distinction was formulated by the Roman lawyer and pontiff Q. Mucius Scaevola and was accepted by Marcus Terentius Varro and (by implication) by Cicero. Mucius Scaevola preferred the theology of statesmen, finding even the theology of the philosophers dangerous. The hesitation is conspicuous in Cicero who, however, is chiefly the protagonist of the introduction of systematic philosophical criticism into the interpretation of Roman religion. Others were oriented toward a guarded defense, or reconstruction, of Roman religion, though they were aware of philosophical argument. Even in Rome Varro was something of an exception when he produced and dedicated to Julius Caesar his *Divine Antiquities*, a systematic description of Roman religion. Varro had reservations about the traditional religion of Rome, but he was mainly interested in saving what was in danger of being forgotten and in propounding it to the ruling class: unknowingly, he was preparing the ground for the restoration accomplished by Augustus. His work (which, much later, Augustine made the foundation of his criticism of Roman paganism) immediately became more authoritative than that of his contemporary Nigidius Figulus, who was strongly committed to religion. There was a great deal of antiquarian doctrine on Etruscan, Persian, and Egyptian religions—not to mention Greek cults—in Figulus's books (e.g., *On the Gods*). If Varro wanted a reasonable preservation of the Roman past, Nigidius Figulus seems to have been more aggressively in favor of a personal synthesis. He emphasized the power that religious practices give to the individual, not to the state. Varro and Nigidius could hardly ignore their Epicurean contemporaries, such as Lucretius, who preached an almost religious escape from religion.

Traditional Roman religion could never be simply taken for granted after the Caesarian age. Though Augustus put an accent on conservation of the past, the writers of the imperial age, even under Augustus, were explicitly or implicitly conditioned by new religious currents. Some writers remained within the frame of paganism ("Oriental cults"); others preached a god who was incompatible with other gods (Juda-

ism and Christianity). The most difficult pagan writers to assess are those who composed their books when Judaism and Christianity were well known, and yet ignored or gave only perfunctory attention to these religions. There is perhaps no great antiquarian lore behind such writers, but they wrote primarily as historians, rather than as philosophers. It is not very clear why Plutarch (c. 46–after 119) writes what he writes about Isis and Osiris and other religious subjects. The same can be said about Pausanias's *Description of Greece* (second century CE) with its great attention to the history of cults in various parts of Greece. It is also difficult to separate autobiography from antiquarian lore in some of the religious speeches by Aelius Aristides in the same century. With Lucian (c. 120–after 180) we are indeed on the threshold of direct polemics with Christianity ("The Passing of Peregrinus"), though his main contributions to the history of religion are his study of his contemporary Alexander of Abonuteichos, the false prophet, and his description of the cult of Dea Syria in Hierapolis, which was composed in an archaizing style inspired by Herodotus.

**CHRISTIAN-PAGAN POLEMICS.** Though polemics between Christians and pagans became common in the second century, Judaic circles (as judged from preserved works) were no longer inclined to discuss religious differences either philosophically or historically. A possible exception is the recently published letter by "Anna" to Seneca, which may be a piece of Jewish propaganda on monotheism that was written not later than the fourth century (see Bernhard Bischoff, *Anecdota novis-sima*, Stuttgart, 1984). The Christians had to explain to the pagans why paganism, that is, polytheism, existed and was deplorable. This involved an element of historical explanation. The pagans, on the other hand, did not have to explain their own existence: it was sufficient for them to defend the rationality of their beliefs, as Celsus did, for instance, by explaining the function of polytheism in a plurinational world. Thus, in this exchange, there was more historical interest on the Christian side, a point worth remembering, as the Christian view prevailed. Whether the Christian view attributed polytheism to demonic influences or to the adulation by human beings of human beings, as the pagan Euhemerus had suggested, there was an element of historical conjecture in the Christian point of view. Indeed, Christian writers used pagan erudition to support their argument. It is enough to point to the use made of Varro by Augustine in the *City of God*; before Augustine, Varro's work was used by the Christian writers Arnobius and Lactantius. Furthermore, Augustine (and he was not alone in this) applied to the evolution of Jewish religion the biological scheme of the transition from infancy to maturity that he had met in pagan historians (*City of God* 10).

**SECOND TO FOURTH CENTURIES.** It would be idle to pretend that the polemics between pagans and Christians in the second to fourth centuries represented more than a secondary contribution to the historical study of religion. Actual historical work is rather to be found in two other types of writing. One is biography of holy men, both pagan and

Christian, which was common in this period of conflict between paganism and Christianity. For example, the biography of Apollonius of Tyana by Philostratus (c. 170–c. 245) precedes the biography of Antony of Egypt by Athanasius (c. 293–373). Biographical exploration now becomes an essential way of describing and understanding religion. Next to it, and hardly less important, is a new form of ecclesiastical history with its peculiar techniques for following up the growth of the church or churches. There is a question about the relation between Eusebius's *Church History*, the prototype of the genre, and the Gospels and *Acts of the Apostles*. It is enough here to underline the fact that, within the tradition of Greco-Roman historiography, first the Gospels and then the *Church History* introduce new and revolutionary types of historiography of religion. *Acts* is, within this literary genre, less original. There is, furthermore, the wider question of whether what we now call pseudepigrapha intended to provide historical information about past situations. This question can be put to such different texts as *4 Maccabees*, the *Martyrdom and Ascension of Isaiah*, and the *History of the Rechabites*; it can even be put to what to us is a novel, the story of *Joseph and Aseneth*.

**THE MIDDLE AGES.** Insofar as lives of saints and ecclesiastical histories remained extremely fertile genres of historiography in the Middle Ages, there was no shortage of recordings of religious events between the sixth and the fifteenth centuries. Furthermore, the ordinary chronicle was adapted to register events inside religious institutions (e.g., monasteries or cathedral churches), and it may be difficult to distinguish this chronicle from a local ecclesiastical history. Histories of wars had to take into account wars that had overwhelmingly religious meanings, such as the Crusades. Conversely, Ordericus Vitalis (1075–1142?) was not the only chronicler to worry about the encroachments of secular history on that ecclesiastical history that he had meant to write in the early twelfth century.

However mixed in character the single events reported, a definition of new religious experiences emerged everywhere. It is obvious in the “spirit of the Crusades,” though one must remember that there were also crusades against heretics. These crusades had their historians (though not many, unfortunately, on the side of the heretics). Our notion of monastic life would be poorer without the autobiography by Abelard and the answer that Héloïse gave to it. The appearance of anchorites among the debris of rural Anglo-Saxon society after the Norman conquest is made vivid by the autobiography of Christina of Markyate, the recluse of the twelfth century. And, of course, there is the assiduous utilization of prophecies by historians of every kind, even by such a hard-boiled historian of the late twelfth century as Giraldus Cambrensis (Gerald de Barri).

These chronicles and biographies, however, seldom analyzed the religious phenomena they described. In the Middle Ages, understanding of religious diversity, if it was even attempted, is in sermons or philosophical treatises rather than

in histories. This is true also of what Jews and Muslims wrote about religion: the former, in any case, had little historiography. Jews, Muslims, and Christians shared monotheistic presuppositions. The differences between the three faiths were debated theoretically rather than investigated historically. There was even less urgency among Jewish, Muslim, and Christian thinkers to understand polytheistic religions. Even Thomas Aquinas tended to follow the most unhistorical aspects of patristic thought in explaining the existence of polytheism. This tendency is also apparent in Jewish thought. Yehudah ha-Levi (c. 1075–1141) portrays the king of the Khazars discussing his own conversion with a rabbi without any serious reference to data derived from ordinary historical or ethnographical sources. Even Maimonides (Moses ben Maimon, 1135/8–1204), who claimed that he had read all he could in Arabic sources about the heathens and who had a keen sense of the social conditions of religious life, confined himself to philosophical or theological arguments. Some Muslim, Jewish, and Christian thinkers explained changes in religion by reference to astral influences (Abū Mashar, Avraham ibn Ezra, William of Auvergne, etc.) The Bible was of course the enormous exception; it was quoted by both Jews and Christians as a source of historical information. Though it would be wrong to underrate the medieval (especially Jewish) contribution to biblical criticism, the Bible as a sacred text was kept isolated from profane historiography.

The first beginnings of a different, more historical approach to religion, and especially to polytheism, is to be found in Islamic, Christian, and Jewish works of the eleventh to twelfth centuries that report on the religious situation in countries visited either by the authors or by their informants. Examples of this new approach are found in the writings of al-Bīrūnī on India, Adam of Bremen on northern Europe (as seen from the diocese of Bremen–Hamburg), and Benjamin of Tudela on the Jews of various parts of the world. This approach was developed further by Christian writers in the middle of the thirteenth century and coincides with the remarkable attempt of Christianity to come to terms with the Mongolian Empire as a potential ally against Islam. Giovanni del Pian dei Carpinī (John of Plano Carpinī) and William of Rubrouck belong to this current, to which one can add Marco Polo. (An English translation of the reports by del Pian dei Carpinī and W. Rubrouck is found in *Mission to Asia*, trans. Christopher Dawson, Toronto, 1980.) Knowledge gained through exploration and diplomacy restored paganism as a relevant part of the contemporary world and supplemented classical accounts of polytheism. At least one writer, the Icelandic historian Snorri Sturluson (1179–1241) in the thirteenth century collected the pagan myths of his own country. The accumulation of the new information on pagan countries must have modified Christians' awareness of their own pagan past in Christian countries. More research is needed if we are to fully understand the effect of this accumulation of new data on polytheism in the late Middle Ages.

**THE RENAISSANCE.** Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century humanism and the Renaissance would have been inconceivable

without this double awareness of external and internal paganism. Ancient mythology, ancient religion, and ancient historiography acquired a new relevance in countries like Italy because the pagan past seemed to require reinterpretation. In Italian humanism (one may start with Giovanni Boccaccio's *Genealogia deorum gentilium*, 1351–1360), the task of describing the pagans is inseparable from the task of explaining the existence of paganism. Even writers whose goal was the conversion of the infidel (and who used public theological controversy increasingly in efforts to convert Jews) sought more information about paganism. Arabic and Hebrew were studied by Christians in order to dispute with and convert Muslims and Jews. Foreign sacred texts, including the Talmud, were perused. An interest in Indian languages was born, though it did not fully emerge until the discovery and serious study of the sacred texts of India in the eighteenth century. The discovery of America opened up the exploration of a new pagan world in which Hebrew survivals were suspected.

The old interpretative models remained valid: euhemerism, demonic tricks, allegory, and the theory of successive revelations. But the new information acquired a value and created alternatives to the old models. First, the aim of informing readers about the religions of the world was in itself a novelty. One finds, for example, Johann Boemus's *Omni-um gentium mores, leges et ritus*, which appeared in 1520 and had successive editions, partly with additions by other authors, during the sixteenth century. His work was followed, for instance, by Lilio Giraldi's *De deis gentium varia et multiplex historia* (1548) and by Alessandro Sardi's *De moribus ac ritibus gentium* (1557). Second, new speculations about languages and nations began to undermine the traditional picture of the early history of mankind. When, for instance, Jean Becan von Gorp made public his discovery that Dutch had been the primitive language of mankind and that Cimbri had taught wisdom to the Greeks (*Origines antwerpianae*, 1569)—one of the many discoveries about the primitive language of mankind—the oddity of the claim was in itself an indication of change.

The new intellectual nationalists of the divided Europe of the sixteenth century could almost simultaneously sympathize with their pagan ancestors and accuse their enemies (most frequently Roman Catholics) of preserving pagan rituals. Such controversial literature is reported in J. A. Fabricius's *Bibliotheca antiquaria* (2d ed., 1716); a prototype, with a physiognomy of its own, is *Apologie pour Hérodote* (1566) by Henri Estienne. The relation between paganism and Christianity then became a question of historical continuity or discontinuity between specific aspects of paganism and Christianity. Conversely, elements in paganism that were judged to be true were ascribed to the survival within paganism of early revealed truths.

An important feature in all these works, notwithstanding the concern with immediate doctrinal issues, is an examination and analysis of the evidence with an attention to detail

and with a philological skill that had been unknown to earlier authors. Though ecclesiastic history by Matthias Flacius Illyricus and his collaborators (the so-called *Centuriae Magdeburgenses*, 1559–1579), represents the Protestant point of view, and Cesare Baronio's refutation, the *Annales ecclesiastici* (1588–1607), represents a Catholic version, Flacius and Baronio have more or less the same critical method. The new style of collecting and sifting evidence became more conspicuous as religious polemics became less sharp in the seventeenth century and tended to peter out (or rather to be affected by Deism or by skepticism) in the eighteenth century. This is already manifest in the *Vitae sanctorum* (Lives of the Saints) of the Bollandists, in the many works dedicated to the history of Christian institutions in given countries (for instance, Fernando Ughelli's *Italia sacra*, 1642, and William Dugdale's *Monasticon Anglicanum*, 1655). The Benedictine erudition in France and Italy of the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century is the crown of this method.

**SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES.** In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, pagan antiquities were studied in an effort to understand how the pagans preserved elements of the revelation to the Jews: the Phoenicians were assumed to be the transmitters. This is the subject of Samuel Bochart's *Geographia sacra seu Phales et Chanaan* (1646), G. J. Vos's *De theologia gentili* (1647), Theodore Gale's *The Court of the Gentiles* (1669–1677), and Pierre–Daniel Huet's *Demonstratio evangelica* (1690). At the end of the seventeenth century, the notions that Homer mirrored the age of the patriarchs (Gerard Croese, *Homeros Hebraios*, 1704) and that the religion of Delphi preserved traditions of the age of the Judges (Edmund Dickinson, *Delphi phoenicizantes*, 1655) were not unusual. This type of research went on for the whole of the eighteenth century. (See, for instance, Jacob Bryant, *A New System*, 1744–1746.) In fact one of the most telling titles appeared as late as 1786: Guérin du Rocher's *Hérodote historien du peuple hébreu sans le savoir* (1786). At the same time, it was argued at great length and with great erudition that God had thought it wise to give the Hebrews pagan rites made venerable by antiquity (for example, in John Spencer's *De legibus Hebraeorum ritualibus eorumque rationibus*, 1685). Others, especially Spaniards such as Fray Bernardino de Sahagún in his *Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España*, wanted to insert the new American experience into the context of the old pagan world. But Sahagún's attempt, conducted between 1569 and 1582, was obviously premature: his book remained unpublished until 1820. Joseph-François Lafitau returned with greater maturity to the same subject in 1724. His *Mœurs des sauvages américains comparés aux mœurs des premiers temps* was not only published but found an immediate audience. Yet its importance as a pioneer work in anthropological research was not recognized until the twentieth century.

The gradual apprehension of the religions of India and China with their sacred texts remains one of the great achievements of Western scholarship between the end of the sixteenth and the end of the eighteenth century. For research



on China, Juan González de Mendoza's *Historia de las cosas mas notables . . . del gran Reyno de la China* (1585) is considered epoch making. For scholarship in the next century, I shall mention only Athanasius Kircher's *China illustrata* (1663) because the author, a Jesuit, was also the author of *Oedipus Aegyptiacus* (1652–1654), a pioneering attempt to decipher the Egyptian hieroglyphs and to reconstruct Egyptian religion. Kircher's work typifies the dual interest in ancient and modern pagan civilizations. Kircher was already in possession of a Sanskrit grammar, but it was not until the late eighteenth century that the first successful interpretation of basic Iranian and Indian texts was achieved. The translation of the Zand Avesta by A.-H. Anquetil-Duperron appeared in 1771 (later Anquetil-Duperron turned to the Upaniṣads), while Charles Wilkins's translation of the *Bhagavadgītā* appeared in 1785. William Jones gave the first clear formulation of the relations between Indian religion and Greek and Roman paganism (1784; see Jones's *Works*, vol. 1, 1799, pp. 229–280). It is well to remember, however, that the distribution in Europe in the 1760s of the translation of a text called *Ezur Vedam* (True Veda) delayed the understanding of early Indian religion and misled Voltaire; the text was a concoction by Christian missionaries with native help. Chinese wisdom had the greater appeal for the rationalists and theists of the eighteenth century. It was left for the Romantic movement, especially in Germany and France, to appreciate the religions of India. But there are other works that confirm the eighteenth-century contribution to collecting the evidence about the religious history of distant countries and sects, such as Thomas Hyde's *Historia religionis Veterum Persarum* (1700) and Isaac de Beausobre's *Histoire critique de Manichée et du manichéisme* (1734).

**THE RISE OF MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY.** The factual, empirical, almost antiquarian attitude of the historians of religion in the late Renaissance and in the Baroque age was transmitted to the historians of the Enlightenment and of the Romantic period. No doubt, as Hume and Voltaire show, erudition was often conspicuously avoided for the sake of philosophic generalization. But erudition was always kept within reach even by the most dedicated philosopher. If there was a shift it occurred not in erudition itself, but rather in the purpose of erudition, which was increasingly used to support Deism (Edward Herbert of Cherbury), tolerance (Pierre Bayle), and religious emotions when contemplating nature, in preference to dogmas.

A new approach to religion emerged that can be described as typical of the Enlightenment: the attempt to determine and describe the various stages of the development of religion in mankind at large. In this approach new stages were identified, such as fetishism, that is, the adoration of objects, which was defined, after several predecessors, by Charles de Brosses in 1760, and animism, which was first tentatively postulated in various memoirs by Nicolas Fréret, while Banier resurrected the old euhemerism. It is here that Hume's insistence on the priority of polytheism over monotheism belongs. Hume's *Natural History of Religion* (1755)

owed much even in its title to the *Natural History of Superstition* (1709) by John Trenchard. The intention behind these systems was not necessarily anti-Christian, though there were writers who were inclined to straight materialism, such as C. F. Dupuis during the French Revolution. One of the most radical and isolated thinkers, Giovanni Battista Vico, was a devout Catholic who tried to save the ancient Jews from the suspicion of myth making that he saw as essential to ancient paganism. The overall result of this philosophical historical movement was to present schemes of human progress that theologians had to face. For the first time, philosophers and historians joined forces in presenting religion as something that had a history. It was an uneasy collaboration between philosophers and historians, but it was a new and significant one. It was even capable of transforming cultural events into religious experiences, as in Antoine Court de Gébelin's *Le monde primitif* (1773–1784).

**NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES.** But what is this religious experience? What is religion? It is here that pre-Romantic and Romantic thought came out decisively, even against the Enlightenment, to restate the autonomy of religion as an emotion and as a need within the human experience. From G. E. Lessing and J. G. Herder to Friedrich Schleiermacher and F. L. J. von Schelling, the main effort was to rediscover religion as an emotional experience rather than as a culturally conditioned social manifestation. The philosophers parted company again with the historians, for whom the search for the social roots of religion remained a permanent bequest from the eighteenth century. Research in the field of religion during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries reveals an interaction between these two main approaches: the exploration of religious experience as such and the quest for a historical typology of religious attitudes and practices. The two currents seldom run parallel to each other; more often they cross each other, but never achieve confluence. This interaction can be seen in the continuity from Schleiermacher and Benjamin Constant de Rebeque to, say, Gerardus van der Leeuw and the Chicago school of Joachim Wach (with its German roots) in the effort to create a hermeneutic of religious experience. Though this effort must not be confused with that of the various psychological schools that have studied religious phenomena, such as William James's pragmatism and the psychoanalytic doctrines of Freud and Jung, it shares with the psychological schools a search for the roots of the religious experience as such. The relevance of such psychology or philosophy to theology is direct.

On the other side, the historical exploration of specific religions displayed unprecedented sophistication of methods and techniques. The deciphering of hieroglyphics and cuneiform conditioned the modern research on Egyptian and Mesopotamian religions, and even the partial interpretation of Etruscan texts added a new dimension to the knowledge of ancient Italian religions and helped to disentangle Roman from Greek religion. Knowledge of Buddhism, especially outside India, changed dramatically, and new information

about so-called primitive tribes affected our knowledge of (and indeed the terminology we apply to) so-called advanced religions (consider, for example, the scholarly fortunes of the Melanesian term *mana*). The discovery of new texts such as the Dead Sea Scrolls modified the physiognomy of familiar religions.

To these changes, one has to add radical new methods and points of view regarding the examination of traditional texts. The succession (or rather superimposition) of source criticism, comparative studies (especially within Semitic studies), form criticism, redaction criticism, canon criticism, deconstruction, and so on, transformed our understanding of the Bible.

The problem that arose and that dominated the study of religion since the early nineteenth century was how to establish a real connection between theories on the nature of religion (with their hermeneutics of religious experience) and the new “factual” acquisitions about individual religions. Solutions have differed according to intellectual climate and individual preferences. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, for example, G. F. Creuzer tried to create a systematic, symbolic interpretation of ancient mythology (1810–1812). During the middle of the century, F. Max Müller began to develop what he called a “science of religion” on a model offered by the new Indo-European linguists such as Franz Bopp, and English anthropologists, such as E. B. Tylor, tried to improve on their eighteenth-century predecessors by using Darwinian concepts of evolution. The writings of Marx and Engels about the dependence of religion on the economic foundations of society should be mentioned here as well. At the turn of the twentieth century, Wilhelm Wundt developed his “psychology of the nations.” Émile Durkheim, followed by his nephew Marcel Mauss, presented religion as the internal transfiguration of society that keeps society going, and Max Weber, followed by Ernst Troeltsch, proposed a sociology of religion with an inherent typology of religious experience as an answer to the never rigorously developed Marxist interpretation of religion.

Two aspects of this process of connecting history of religion with philosophy of religion deserve special notice. One aspect can be presented with the mere name of Ernest Renan. Though he was a radical critic of the Christian tradition, he communicated genuine religious sentiments in his books and exercised a decisive influence in the formation of modernist currents within Catholicism. (He was, incidentally, also a pioneer in the study of Semitic epigraphy, which renewed our knowledge of Semitic religions.)

The other aspect is the increased scholarship of Jews in a field that had previously been dominated by scholars in the Christian tradition. In the late sixteenth century, the original scholar ‘Azaryah dei Rossi, the author of *Me’or einyeyim* (Light of the Eyes), remained almost unknown to non-Jews and little known to Jews themselves. He was recognized as a pioneer in the study of Judaism by Jews of the generation of Moses Mendelssohn in the late eighteenth century, and

his work opened up the path to the so-called science of Judaism (*Wissenschaft des Judentums*) of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Leopold Zunz, Solomon Munk, Heinrich Graetz, Ismar Elbogen, etc.). Other Jews contributed significantly to the understanding of other religions (James Darmesteter on Persian religion, Ignác Goldziher on Islam) and to the comparative study of religion (Salomon Reinach). It should also be remembered that Durkheim brought a rabbinic education to his sociology.

At present there seems to be a definite preference for sociological interpretations of circumscribed aspects of religion: something less ambitious, say, than the phenomenology of van der Leeuw and Wach, and also less theoretically sophisticated than the sociology of Weber. This preference is due to the realization that many subjects (e.g., the position of women in religion, the function of holy men in different societies, the behavior of sectarians within the “greater societies,” and even apocalyptic and messianic movements) have been studied without sufficient consideration of their social context. This preference for the social aspects of religion may well be a transitory fashion. The tension between the discovery of facts about individual religions and the need adequately to define religion itself is bound to continue. History and philosophy of religion are likely to go on disturbing each other, and theology will go on facing both. The triangle of history, philosophy, and theology is still with us.

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## HISTORIOGRAPHY: WESTERN STUDIES [FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ]

In the Western world the study of religion is normally carried out—with a few exceptions—at universities and other academic institutions located in Europe, America and Oceania. To outline the various approaches of the scholars who have described and interpreted religious phenomena, it is expedient to group them according to their countries of origin and the respective academic traditions (which are profoundly influenced by the dominating religious confession: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, or secular). The scope of this survey includes the scholars who are active at present or were still active at the end of World War II. The first section deals with that generation of scholars (born between 1880 and 1920) whose education took place before World War II. The second section deals with scholars (born between 1920 and 1950) educated either during the war or immediately after it at the time of the break-up of Europe's colonial empires across four continents. The traditional arrangement of the matter according to the various approaches (historical, phenomenological, anthropological, sociological, psychological), which is best suited to more wide-ranging works, do not do justice to the achievements of the scholars who are committed to grasping the dynamics of religious realities with the minimum of hermeneutic preconceptions and the maximum of disregard for cultural fashions.

### THE WESTERN STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE AGE OF EUROCENTRISM AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL SELF-ASSURANCE.

**Scandinavia and the Netherlands.** The Netherlands and the four Scandinavian countries (with the partial exception of Finland) share the Germanic linguistic stock and the adherence to the Protestant Reform. There is evidently a direct link between the predominance of this specific religious tradition (and the consequent establishment—after some initial resistances—of the teaching of history of religions in

the faculties of theology) and the fact that a group of small countries not in the forefront of research in other scientific fields have produced scholars who are undisputed leaders in the field of religious historiography. As great philologists and prominent specialists of various religious traditions (ancient European paganism, Islam, India, Iran), the Dutch Jan de Vries (1890–1964) and the Swedish Tor Andrae (1885–1947), Henryk Samuel Nyberg (1898–1974), Stig Oscar Wikander (1908–1983), all shared a special instinct for comparison and hermeneutics.

Very different from each other were three other major figures, usually collectively labeled as phenomenologists, who played a decisive role in the foundation of the International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR), of which they were respectively first president, third president, and general secretary. Among them the best known is Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890–1950), who is widely regarded as the incarnation of religious phenomenology with an obvious theological concern conditioned by the Protestant experiential tradition. It is important to note here that, in spite of the breadth and depth of his erudition in many fields of humanities, the works he composed as a specialist of ancient Egypt are hardly utilized in current scholarship. The Swede Geo Widengren (1907–1996) has been the champion of a historically oriented phenomenology and has been one of the few scholars to combine a theory of religion (and a method of research, broadly inspired by his teachers Andrae and Nyberg, as well as by the Italian Raffaele Pettazzoni [1883–1959]) with an imposing scientific production dealing with crucial issues of Near and Middle Eastern religious history (Iran, Old Testament, syncretism). His studies, with their emphasis on patternism and scrupulous philology, are (in spite of the haunting ghost of Iran) still a source of inspiration for specialized scholars.

Claas Jouco Bleeker (1898–1983) was a churchman and a phenomenologist like his compatriot van der Leuw, but, like his close friend and collaborator Widengren (with whom he published a *Handbook for the History of Religions*, Leiden, 1969–1971, designed to emphasize structural similarities in the religions of the world), he consciously took up the historical study of a specific religious tradition (in his case the Egyptian one). In several studies he combined historical empiricism with phenomenological usage of Husserlian principles of *epoché* (suspension of judgment) and eidetic vision (i.e. search of the essence and meaning in a religious phenomenon). Also worth mentioning is the second major representative of the flourishing Uppsala School, Carl-Martin Edsman (1911–), who, based on a first-hand expertise in various fields such as New Testament exegesis, patristics, and folklore, gave notable contributions as a wide-ranging, methodologically alert comparatist.

**Germany.** A half-Catholic and half-Protestant country, which at the beginning of the century had monopolized the field of philology and theology, Germany was apparently the ideal place for achieving outstanding results in the field of

religious studies. Actually, despite their quantity and quality, the works produced in all the domains of religious historiography have hardly left a mark in the development of *Religionswissenschaft* (German for history of religions, whereas *Religionsgeschichte*—without further qualifications—means “religious history”). This is due perhaps to the unsolved tension between the historico-philological approach and various hermeneutic preconceptions. The works indulging to dazzling cross-cultural comparisons by two Jewish scholars, the outsider of the Warburg School Robert Eisler (1882–1949) and the orthodox Jungian Eric Neumann (1905–1960), have always raised suspicions among academic historians and are currently absent from scholarly debate. Paul Tillich (1886–1965) became famous for his conception of religion as the state of being grasped by something of ultimate concern. Ernst Benz (1907–1978) came to the fore for his usage of parapsychology as a hermeneutic tool. Both were engaged as systematic theologians, and so it is no surprise that they have been disregarded by positivist historians.

On the basis of their wide-ranging ethnographic researches in Eurasian and Melanesian societies respectively, Karl Meuli (1891–1968) and Adolf Ellegard Jensen (1899–1965) built daring cultural historical models to explain the origin of cult and civilization from particular kinds of prehistoric sacrifice (comedy of innocence, dema deity) that have been influential in religio-historical research (Walter Burkert [1931–], Károly Kerényi [1897–1973] and the Roman School of history of religions) and subsequently came under fire of intense criticism. On the other hand, very limited influence was exerted outside Germany by scholars, contrasted even in their home country, who adopted a phenomenological approach as professors of religious studies in top German universities such as Marburg, Munich, Bonn. Moving from an impressive cross-cultural study of prayer as the central phenomenon in the history and psychology of religion, Friedrich Heiler (1892–1967) developed a personal version of religious phenomenology which was theologically oriented to the search of essences and meaning and regarded ecumenically all religions as manifestations of the same basic truth.

Though more empirically founded in its insistence on the wealth of historical phenomena, the typology of religion elaborated by Gustav Mensching (1901–1978) is aimed to the recognition of the ultimate unity in the diversity of religions and loyal to the ideas of his mentor Rudolf Otto (1869–1937) even in his definition of religion as experiential encounter with the sacred. As a convinced supporter of a phenomenological approach based on a systematic study of religious forms (and also on his experience as scholar of Renaissance Platonism), Kurt Goldammer (1916–) has raised bitter objections by scholars with historical orientation.

The best-known of these German scholars educated in a theological milieu was Joachim Wach (1898–1955), a devout Protestant layman from a Jewish family, who had to flee to the United States where he founded a thriving school of history of religions in Chicago. He felt the influence of Ed-

mund Husserl (1859–1938) and Otto, but much more he was under the spell of Wilhelm Dilthey's (1833–1911) hermeneutics and Max Weber's (1864–1920) “comprehending sociology.” Despite his insistence that the starting point of the history of religions was the empirical study of single religions, he wrote virtually nothing in this specific field. His methodology is based on lucid theoretical premises and personal intuitions which have a limited value for the progress of history of religions as a scholarly discipline.

**Great Britain.** Great Britain apparently had the potentialities for promoting influential trends in the study of religion: a worldwide colonial empire offering ideal conditions for anthropological fieldwork and an educational system for the ministers (and prospective missionaries) of the Church of England more tolerant and open to doctrinal pluralism and modernity than is anti-modernistic Catholicism dominating in southern Europe or pietist North European Lutheranism. In fact, the functionalist approach advocated by the two leaders of British religious anthropology in the period between the two World Wars, Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955) and Bronislaw Kaspar Malinowski (1884–1942)—an approach based on the method of participant observation as regards investigation and on the emphasis on social structures and functions as regards interpretation—proved to be of great fertility in empiric research. The following developments of the British school of social anthropology, even in a direction with a conscious historical concern, as in the case of Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard (1902–1973) cannot be tackled here.

Despite its sociological and ahistorical (if not anti-historical) stress, functionalism gave impetus to subsequent historiographic work. In this period, the main representatives of comparative religion in Britain (holders of chairs in Cambridge, London and Manchester) were all Anglican clergymen: A.C. Bouquet (1884–?), Edwin Oliver James (1888–1972), S.G.F. Brandon (1907–1971), Geoffrey Parrinder (1910–?). None of them made any notable contribution to the methodological debate and—with the partial exception of Brandon—the style of their comparisons hardly meets the requirements of a historiography founded on philological principles. Characteristically, the British scholar of religion whose work has been most influential in the successive historiographical debate was a representative of the English pug-nacious Catholic minority: the prominent Orientalist (with a profound insight into Indian and Iranian matters) Robert C. Zaehner (1913–1974). Despite the various criticisms leveled at his theory of mysticism and at his assertive loyalism to the Catholic faith, Zaehner's outstanding contribution to the comparative and historical study of religions remains undisputed.

**North America.** The United States is a country obsessed with religion. Even the harshest critics of the Americans' pervading religious attitude appear quasi religious in their iconoclastic zeal. Americans were reported by nineteenth- and twentieth-century European observers as the

most religious people in the world, in the same way as the Egyptians and the Etruscans used to be described by Greek or Roman observers in ancient times. Belief in God is the bedrock of American identity and supplies a kind of cultural cement for society, but at the same time the First Amendment to the 1789 Constitution (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”) fixes the separation of church and state—so-called religious “disestablishment.”

The second paradox is that in the United States the multiplicity of religions (five religious groups have been constitutive: Native Americans, Jews, Roman Catholics, English Protestants, and African Americans) coexists with the oneness of religion. In fact, a kind of religious unity and the consequent cultural cohesion of the American is ensured by the identification of public (civil) religion with the Protestant tradition which has perpetuated its hegemonic position since its early Calvinist and Puritan settlement. This unique social and educational context has created very favorable and at the same time peculiar conditions for the study of religion, in a regime—as it were—of delimited pluralism. Another constitutive factor of the American approach to religious studies has been the presence of pre-modern styles of religiosity as a living tradition among Native Americans.

In effect, the American scholars of religion who contributed the most seminal ideas to the theory and method in the study of religion were anthropologists from the school of Franz Boas (1858–1942). A list of names must include: Alexander A. Goldenweiser (1880–1940), for his influential deconstruction of the category of totemism; Robert H. Lowie (1883–1957) and Clyde K.M. Kluckhohn (1905–1960), for their sober and insightful criticisms of any univocal theories of primitive religion; Paul Radin (1883–1959), for his ambitious if controversial adoption of categories from analytical psychology (the trickster as an archetype); Ruth Fulton Benedict (1887–1948), for her invention of fortunate, though historically unfounded, patterns of (religious) culture; and Margaret Mead (1901–1978), for her challenging views of the interrelation between culture and personality.

In the study of ancient Mediterranean religions, four scholars had a strong historiographical consciousness and dominated their respective ambits of research. Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough (1893–1965), a professed pagan in spite of his Protestant upbringing, taught history of religion at Yale for forty years. His theory that Judaism was deeply hellenized before the birth of Christianity, supported on the investigation of a vast body of archaeological materials hitherto unexploited, has been seminal to successive research. Goodenough’s imposing scholarly work is enlivened by his concern with contemporary religious life in the light of scientific progress (psychoanalysis). Arthur Darby Nock (1902–1963), a Briton who taught history of religions at Harvard for thirty-five years was the dominant figure in the study of Greco-Roman religions for the whole span of his life. In his work he combined in a unique way immense erudition, extreme

caution and outstanding brilliance. Despite his avowed aversion to theory and generality, he had his own (functionalist) definition of religion and a sort of empathy in approaching his subject.

Theodor Herzl Gaster (1906–1992), a British-born scion of a dynasty of rabbis and scholars, traced the myth-ritualist scenario based on the seasonal drama reenacted by the divine king’s sacrifice through the Ancient Near East. He differentiated himself from James Frazer (1854–1941) and the other ritualists by stressing the function of myth in translating the real into terms of the ideal, in a sort of metaphysical plane. Many feel much more at home with the work of his coeval antagonist, the classicist Joseph Fontenrose (1903–1986), who, after having dismantled the dogmas of the “myth-ritual” school, returned to the empirical study of Greek oracles, paying the due attention to the variety in recurrent patterns.

Joseph Mitsuo Kitagawa (1915–1992), a Japanese Episcopal minister who spent all his professional career at Chicago, where he had studied history of religion under Joachim Wach, represents at its best the Chicago approach to the study of religion, called “history of religions.” He was conscious of the leading role played by this approach, following in the footsteps of his mentor Wach and his senior colleague Mircea Eliade (1907–1986). The history of religion has both a historical and a systematic dimension, and needs hermeneutics and comparative analysis. His methodology, insisting correctly on the unity of humankind’s experience, was not very original, but he made a durable contribution to understanding the religious tradition of his native country. The only significant threat to the dominance in North America of the Chicago approach to the study of religion came from a Canadian (from Toronto) theologian and Islamist brought up in a devout Presbyterian and Methodist background: Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1916–2000). His view of religion as a blend of personal faith (out of the scope of historical inquiry) and cumulative tradition which is subject to change and the object of historical research, entails dropping the usage of the word “religion” inasmuch as the external tradition is concerned. Theological issues (transcendence of pure religiousness, inter-religious dialogue) are certainly present in Smith’s approach, but his claim that a dialogical attitude to the adherent of a religious tradition is basic to a scientific understanding poses a serious challenge even to an empirical-oriented historiography.

**France.** Contrary to expectations based on historical realities, the dominant religion of France is not Catholicism (not even in its Gallican version). On the one hand the rate of religious observance is one of the lowest in Europe; on the other hand the real dominant “political” religion in France is laicism. As a consequence, the study of religion as an autonomous discipline is considered “theology” and is virtually excluded from the curricula of university education. The only exception is Strasbourg because of the Protestant influence due to its past belonging to the German Reich.



In practice the study of the single religious traditions is intensely pursued in the fifth section of the “*École pratique des hautes études*” and, occasionally, a professorship of history of religions can also be activated at the University of Paris Sorbonne or at the related Collège de France. Moreover, since the historical sciences in France are dominated by an epistemology based on empirical and idiographic principles, every indulgence to systematic or typological interpretative schemes is overtly stigmatized as philosophical and the delinquent scholar is ostracized from the historical guild. Only three scholars have succeeded in overwhelming this strong resistance, and the impact of their theories has proved to be groundbreaking. The fascination of Georges Dumézil’s (1898–1986) work lies in a powerful idea that—apart from his original intentions—has been seductive in a postwar atmosphere dominated by a strange blend of materialist (post-Marxist) basic ideas and remythologizing nostalgias (post-Christian): the interconnection between the tripartite socio-economical organization of men (Indo-European) on earth and the tripartite organization of gods (Indo-European) in heaven. In spite of the fallacy of the linguistic arguments and the hypostatization of the structures, Dumézil’s work has revived the study of specific ancient (Indo-European) traditions. Scholars of Indian, Iranian, Germanic, Celtic and Roman religions had to come to terms with his neo-comparative historical approach. The durability of his contribution to religious historiography is due to the strength of his philology, which rendered his wide-ranging production palatable to specialists who are accustomed to basing their historical works on philological arguments.

Instead, the works of two other representatives of Parisian structuralism are conspicuous by the absence of historical consciousness and philological accuracy. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–) would hardly be worth mentioning here if it were not that his thought has been so influential on several self-styled historians of religion and has attracted so much criticism from other historians. He taught religious ethnology but was an arm-chair anthropologist for most of his life. In his work on mythology he was philologically utterly inaccurate. As a storyteller more than a historian, he neglected empirical data and used a deductive procedure. Being the grandson of a rabbi and a convinced atheist, he candidly professed his aversion to religious forms. Many historians and anthropologists who did real fieldwork consider his view on myths (the structure of which is supposed to be synonymous with its meaning) the dream of a Western philosopher advocating the ultimate reconciliation of thoughts and reality. A partly different case is that of Jean-Pierre Vernant (1914–), who, having received—like Lévi-Strauss—a philosophical education, adopted Dumézil’s trifunctionalism in the interpretation of Greek mythology and then elaborated a personal hermeneutics under the influence of the sociological and psychological approaches of his mentors Louis Gernet (1882–1960) and Ignace Meyerson (1888–1983). This hermeneutics has been influential on the study of ancient religions and has been applied by his followers to the study of various as-

pects of Greek religion (esp. sacrifice and images). His approach has been called “historical anthropology,” but in fact it is placed on the periphery of history.

**Italy.** Italy is notoriously a Catholic country, even if the religious sentiment is not so interiorized as in other strongholds of Catholicism such as Poland or Ireland. However, from its see in Rome the supreme authority of the Catholic Church has always heavily conditioned the ways of education in religious matters. In the primary and secondary schools the teaching of religion has always been reserved for the clergy or for laypersons licensed by the ecclesiastical authority (and in practice identified with the teaching of a popular form of Catholic theology). By contrast, after the closing of the faculties of theology in 1876, in the state universities the teaching of biblical sciences is virtually interdicted; instead, despite some resistances from both the Catholic establishment and the academic milieu (permeated by the historicist views of the philosopher and historian Benedetto Croce [1866–1952]), a few professorships of history of religions and even fewer programs of religious studies have been founded and have been able to survive. In these peculiar conditions, two scholars came forth, who in their respective spheres of competence have been perhaps the most prestigious historians of religions of the twentieth century.

Raffaele Pettazzoni (1883–1959) was the dominant figure among the comparative religionists of his own times and the founder of an influential school. He was, in the words of Mircea Eliade, the last of the encyclopedists: he dared to draw analogies between the spread of Christianity throughout Europe and the spread of Buddhism throughout Asia, but he had also the historical and philological equipment to point out the specific differences. His theory of religion was not particularly sophisticated. In his view there is no insurmountable dualism between the history of religions (concerned with individual data and development) and the phenomenology of religion (concerned with the essences): they are simply two interdependent instruments of the same science, whose unity corresponds to that of its subject, namely religion in its two distinct components, interior experience and exterior manifestations. In his own far-reaching research on the most varied topics (monotheism, confession of sins, religious history of Greece and Iran, mystery cults), he employed a solid method which seems especially suited to counteract the opposite dangers of reductionism, structuralism and phenomenology, and obtained results which represent still a challenge for present-day scholars.

Giuseppe Tucci (1894–1984) was not a comparative religionist, but his achievement was not less significant than that of his long-time colleague at the University of Rome. Indeed, he was the greatest Orientalist of his times, displaying a prodigious activity as a philologist, archaeologist and anthropologist at the same time. His contribution to the history of Asiatic religious traditions (from India to Japan, through China and Tibet) is immense, not only for his outstanding scholarly writings but also for the far-reaching influ-

ence of his teaching: not only on his numerous disciples who became all prominent specialists in their respective fields but also on personalities of high caliber such as Mircea Eliade. His approach to the study of religions was sympathetic but also strictly critical, very distant from both cold positivism and crypto-theological phenomenology.

Two younger scholars affiliated with the school of Pettazzoni were considerably influenced by Pettazzoni's two-ways approach to the study of religion. The older of the two was Ernesto De Martino (1908–1965), who, being the pupil of the ultra-historicist Adolfo Omodeo (1889–1946), tried to integrate the results of various disciplines and approaches (Croce's absolute historicism, Antonio Gramsci's new science of folklore, psychoanalysis, existentialist philosophy, ethnopsychiatry) into a sort of metahistory labeled as "reformed" or "historical" ethnology and based on a method of "differentiating comparison" and "critical ethnocentrism." De Martino's definition of religion as a means of overcoming the crisis of presence is a synthesis of materialism and psychologism in a Heideggerian frame of reference. This overtly hermeneutical presupposition based on a biased selection of historical data makes his production particularly seductive for some anthropologists and historians but invalidates seriously the explanatory value of his scientific project.

The other scholar is Angelo Brelich (1913–1977). Originally a pupil of the classicist Károly Kerényi, he was deeply influenced by Pettazzoni's comparative historical method, but also by Malinowski's functionalism and Jensen's cultural morphology. His main concern was a precise, historical definition of the main religious types (religion itself, myth, ritual, superhuman beings) and of the tasks of the history of religions as an autonomous discipline, based on the comparative method. This discipline is considered by him one of the most efficient tools for the making of "a new type of integral humanism" (Brelich, 1966, p. 70), aiming—in his particular view—to social revolution (Brelich, 1979, p. 222). In stark opposition to phenomenology and any other irrationalist approach, Brelich stresses the omnipresence of history as a factor of total explanation, a concept that in his illusory persuasiveness is clearly conditioned by a positivist mentality. We find, instead, the legacy of functionalism in his tenet that in front of a religious complex a historian must pose the question "what is it for?," not "what does it mean?." Brelich's considerable production is strongly concerned with issues of cultural change and new religious formation, and it has been stimulating for the scholars of ancient Mediterranean religions by pointing out the importance of the history of religions approach for the interpretation of cultural phenomena (polytheism, initiation, human sacrifice) of crucial importance. His work is characterized by great brilliance and meticulous erudition, but his results are sometimes flawed by unfounded presuppositions.

Vittorio Lanternari (1918–), born to a family of secularized Jews, applied the comparative historical method that he had learned from his master Pettazzoni to the study of pre-

literate societies, with particular concern for the interplay between religion and economy as well as for issues of cultural change and acculturation caused by the encounter between the traditional values of third-world societies and the cultural innovation imposed by Western settlers and missionaries. His dialectic-dynamistic approach, revealing the influence of Marxism and, at a more basic level, of his previous education as an agricultural scientist, has borne his best fruit in the study of phenomena eminently interactive, such as modern messianisms and millenarisms throughout all the continents. Despite his professed laicism, Lanternari's theory of religion (and the consequent interpretation of historical phenomena) is conditioned by his quasi-theological socio-political options.

**Hungary and Romania.** The two neighboring countries of Hungary and Romania, in various ways antagonistic, gave birth to two famous scholars of religion who had analogous life experiences and worldviews but opened quite dissimilar routes in the academic study of religion. Károly Kerényi (1897–1973) came from Hungary, a Catholic country with a significant Protestant minority and deeply permeated by a middle-European atmosphere. Soon after his expatriation to Switzerland in 1939 he became an internationally recognized authority on the Greek and Roman religions. His contacts with the hermeneutist of Greek religion Walter Friedrich Otto (1874–1958), the psychoanalyst Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) and the Frankfurt ethnological school of Leo Frobenius (1873–1938) and A. E. Jensen were decisive in the formation of Kerényi's influential hermeneutics of myths as archetypal images. In spite of the accusations of irrationalism and psychologism frequently leveled against him, Kerényi's intuitions—nourished as they are by a painstaking philological and archaeological erudition and a deep humanistic insight—are still to be reckoned with. From the perspective of general history of religions, his attempt at conciliating the viewpoints of psychology, anthropology and history by formulating a dialectic between an archetypal element and a cultural-typical one (a dialectic which is basic to the process of historical individuation) should be taken into consideration on a par with other theories based on historicist or social scientific premises.

The roots of Mircea Eliade (1907–1986) are Romanian, even if he was a cosmopolite throughout his life. From his Romanian heritage he absorbed a romantic attachment to the rural dimension of life, the sensation of being located at the frontier between the East and the West, the so-called terror of history, and a peculiar ritualistic view of Orthodox Christianity. But he was at home in Italy, the land of Renaissance, in India, the land of world-transforming asceticism and "cosmic religiosity," in France, the land of philological erudition and avant-gardism, and in North America, the land where extreme conservatism cohabits with radical innovation. Eliade was the most influential historian of religions of the twentieth century and, notably, the only one to have an audience among the public of laypersons because of his

style of thought and his style of writing. Eliade believed that there was no contradiction between his scholarly work and his successful activity as a fiction writer. He was a *historian* who worked in a strictly philological way: he spent three years in India in order to be in contact with the living tradition of the yogis and the original documents of Tantric historical tradition before writing his own book on yoga; he dedicated himself to the grammatical study of a number of dead and living languages; at every time in his career—even when he was an international star—he felt the necessity to peruse all the documents and the secondary literature before dealing with any subject; and finally he was in close contact with specialists of innumerable religious traditions, by whom he was read and appreciated. Eliade's comprehensive surveys of yoga and shamanism can be criticized with philological arguments in points of detail and even in their overall conception, but they should not be rejected on aprioristic methodological or, worse, pseudo-political grounds.

Eliade was vehemently anti-historicist because he was convinced that not all human realities can be resolved in history, which is in itself a construct of Western culture. His hermeneutical and phenomenological presuppositions are patent in that he assigns a hypostatized status to the notion of sacred and he attributes an absolute value—at least in their permanent structures independent from history—to the naturalistic manifestations of this sacred (so-called hierophanies). His emphasis on the values of archaic man and the consequent nostalgia of origins may suggest some connections with the traditional thought and also with the ideology of pre-war Romanian nationalism, but he has always taken his distances from the tenets of René Guénon, and his initial adherence to the Legionary movement cannot be used as a weapon to destroy his lifelong striving for the liberal humanistic values against every kind of totalitarianism. On the other hand, his plea for the history of religions as a “saving discipline” for the demystifying potentialities of its hermeneutics, together with his juvenile anti-colonialist spirit and his aversion to the Western-centered myth of the indiscriminate technological progress, find an echo in present-day widespread aspirations and give him a distinct place among the advocates of a new humanism which is liberal in its fundamentals despite its elitist consciousness.

Eliade, in fact, demystified the doctrines of two famous demystifiers, Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), demonstrating that religious motives can be no less deep-grounded than socio-economic or psychological driving forces and can also play a role in the background of professedly secular theories of man and society. Eliade's books are still read and discussed intensely by men of letters, historians, philosophers, theologians, and also by human scientists of various specializations. Further, in the Chicago School a great number of promising students chose their own scholarly direction (sometimes very distant from that of their mentor) and became most influential scholars and teachers of religious studies in North America and Europe. In conclu-

sion, Eliade's method of phenomenological typology (with an obvious stress upon the research of “meaning”) is certainly not the only way to do a comparative study of religions, but in judging his work of unparalleled richness we must respect his own intentions by using the same methodology that most scholars advocate for the study of religious phenomena.

#### THE WESTERN STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE AGE OF DE-COLONIZATION AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISENCHANTMENT.

**Scandinavia and the Netherlands.** In postwar times the Nordic countries have maintained a pre-eminent position in the field of religious studies, but the leading role in historiographic work has shifted from the hands of the philologists working on historical reconstructions of the religions of the past to those of scholars studying living traditions with a fieldwork anthropological approach. The Swede Åke Hultrantz (1920–) has done fundamental work on the Lapp and North American Indian religions with focus on soul conceptions, shamanism and healing systems. In his comparative studies he has developed a religio-ecological approach which—without neglecting the dynamics of history—stresses the importance of the environmental factors in determining a religious typology.

In Finland, where an indigenous tradition of folklore studies was flourishing (Uno Harva, Martti Haavio), Lauri Honko (1932–2002) revitalized the discipline of comparative religion with his strong socio-psychological interest in a functionalist-structuralist perspective applied to the study of folk-medicine and Finno-Ugrian religion as well as to methodological issues of definition (theory of genre, myth, and ritual process). His disciple, Juha Pentikäinen (1940–), has developed a particularly rewarding strategy in the study of Finnish mythology, shamanism in Arctic and sub-Arctic regions, and Saami religious life. In his “regional phenomenology approach,” based mainly on fieldwork in close contact with the informant and the usage of religio-anthropological depth-research, he has introduced “world-view analysis” as a new category for scholarship in comparative religion.

Ethnographic in-depth research plays a decisive role also in the work of the Finno-Swedish Nils G. Holm (1943–), concentrating on the study of Pentecostal and Charismatic movements with a focus on the phenomenon of glossolalia. At a methodological level he has developed Hjalmar Sundén's (1908–1993) role theory in the psychology of religion, helping to ensure behavioral sciences an established place in the international field of religious studies.

The Dutch Jacques Waardenburg (1930–) is undisputedly one of the foremost authorities in the field, also on the strength of his skill for trilingual writing and teaching. His contribution to the study of religious historiography is unparalleled, because of its tremendous meticulousness in general and the extraordinary quality of his ground-breaking work on Western Islamic historiography in particular. His

lifelong endeavor to define Islam in the frame of the science of religions is based on a multifaceted and “multi-perspective” approach which aims to respect the concerns of “Reason” as well as those of the (Insider’s) “Religion.” (“Religion and Reason” is the title of an influential series of studies in religion promoted by Waardenburg himself.) If the balance is sporadically tipping in favor of religion to the detriment of reason, this is due to his passionate if secular plea for a new-style phenomenology of religion tuned to its object in order to grasp and understand the so-called religious constructions of reality depending on explicit or implicit intentions.

**Germany.** In Germany the status of religio-historical studies is quite different. The study of ancient religious documents based on philological principles more strict than during the preceding generation has gained a leading position in the current methodology of religious studies. Starting with a critique of the History-of-Religions School and on the strength of expertise in virtually all the philological domains pertaining to the ancient Mediterranean cultures, Carsten Colpe (1929–) has debated with unequalled acumen innumerable issues crucial to the historical understanding of the New Testament, Gnosticism, Manichaeism, Islam, Iranian and Hellenistic religions. More generally, his contribution to the theory of syncretism, prophecy, monotheism, religious innovation, sacred and profane as well as to the methodology of comparison and religious typology is invaluable, characterized as it is by painstaking erudition and hermeneutic subtlety. An equal range of interests—with primary attention to Mandaeism—and a similar formation against a theological and Orientalist background (Leipzig in place of Göttingen) is perceivable in his peer Kurt Rudolph (1929–). With less theoretical sophistication but more concreteness in producing great historical syntheses, Rudolph has been the international advocate of a historical study of religions opposed to any attempt at reducing the autonomy of the history of religions through philosophical, theological or even political devices.

Walter Burkert (1931–) is a classical philologist by formation, but his work on the Greek religion in its interrelationship with Near Eastern religious traditions has been influential far beyond the territory of classical studies, contributing to a new vision—not particularly edifying—of the culture that is at the base of modern consciousness. Further, his theory of sacrificial ritual, tracing parallels between animal behavior and human religious activity, has opened new paths to an understanding of human culture—in all its historicity—within a broader frame of reference. Based instead on a solid training at the phenomenological school of Gustav Mensching and a first-hand knowledge of several Indo-European and Turkish languages, Hans-Joachim Klimkeit (1939–1999) has done seminal work on political Hinduism, Buddhism and Silk-road acculturation. On this firm footing, he has been instrumental in the expansion of the studies on Manichaeism to which he has given an original

contribution by searching literary and artistic motifs in their diffusion throughout the caravan routes of Central Asia. His perceptive studies on encounters of religions and the resulting cultural exchange have left a significant mark in the discipline.

In quite another direction is addressed the scholarly achievement of his peer Hans Georg Kippenberg (1939–), Colpe’s foremost pupil. Moving from the traditional background of post-war *Religionswissenschaft* focused on the so-called “Umwelt des Neuen Testaments,” he has instilled overdoses of social scientific methodology (Max Weber being the main source of inspiration) and ideology criticism theory into his study of ancient salvation religions, sometimes to the detriment of historical concrete evidence. His history of the emergence of religious historiography in tension with modernity is teeming with exact formulations and stimulating ideas, albeit unilateral in its perspectives. Similarly, Kippenberg’s theory of religion is multifaceted and multidisciplinary in its approach, but ultimately quite unilateral, in so far as religion is presented exclusively in cultural terms. Even more versatile is the paradigm proposed by Burkhard Gladigow (1939–), a scholar who has provided stimulating novel contributions in the field of Greek and Roman ancient religions. The material side of a “spiritual” phenomenon emerges forcefully in his perspectives where biology, economics, semiotics and linguistics are called to collaborate on a project of a new science of religions.

More conservative seems the approach of the German-Swiss Fritz Stolz (1942–2001), who, though refusing to give any chance to an old-style phenomenology, sticks to a historically oriented study of traditional themes with focus on ancient Near Eastern religions and Biblical monotheism. However, his attempt at introducing a notion of “worldview” based on three fundamental polarities seems to be a successful strategy for innovating a study of religion concerned with issues of comparison and historical typology.

**Great Britain.** Although in the post-war years anthropology becomes more and more historical and history more and more anthropological, a listing of all of the important anthropologists is not possible here. Nevertheless, mention must be made of anthropologists such as Victor Witter Turner (1920–1983) and Mary Douglas (1921–) whose achievements have been so influential on religious historiography inside and outside Britain. The decolonization of the enormous British Empire has obviously had a large impact on the academic study of religion, as proved also by the outputs of its main representatives. Ninian Smart (1927–2001), the senior of this company, used to confess that he had his initiation to his “empathic” concept of religion when, being in Sri Lanka as a soldier, he saw the appointment of the first Buddhist chaplain in the British army. Apart from widely popular textbooks combining the phenomenological and historical style at its best as well as specialized studies on Indian philosophy, Smart introduced into the British and Anglo-American discourse on religion the notions of “worldviews”

as cross-cultural explorations of human beliefs, and of “dimensions of the sacred” as anatomy of the world’s beliefs. Making no concession to modernist sophistication, he unhesitatingly identifies his approach as a phenomenology or morphology of religion, with all the essentialist implications of this definition.

Eric John Sharpe (1933–2000) has written the most complete history of comparative religion, remarkable for both its thoroughness and lucidity. The first incentive to this work came from his interest in Christian missionary activity encountering Hindu traditions, which also led to the biography of Nathan Söderblom (1866–1931), a founding father of the phenomenological approach to the study of religion but also a promoter of the Ecumenical movement. Apparently, Sharpe was intrigued by the relationship between theology and the scientific study of religions. As a rejoinder to Smart’s six-dimensional structure of religion he offered his own scheme of four functional “modes” (existential, intellectual, institutional, ethical) as well as a hermeneutical tool tuned in to a post-colonial perspective: the concept of “response threshold” implying the right of the insider to advance an interpretation of his or her own tradition. Japan, where he lived for five years, has been for Michael Pye (1939–) the mirror that India was for Smart and Sharpe. After the remarkable juvenile achievement of an introduction to comparative religion based on a choice of significant source materials and an ingenious method keeping the middle-way between understanding and explanation, Pye has gained a distinguished position in the field of Buddhist studies through a painstaking investigation of the Mahāyāna concept of “skilful means” which is basic to the understanding of Buddhist way of salvation. His discovery that the critical study of religions began early in Japan independently from Western influence is, finally, crucial as a deterrent against the dominating trend towards cultural relativism.

**North America.** The impact of an anthropologist such as Clifford Geertz (1926–) or a sociologist such as Robert Bellah (1927–) on religio-historical studies has been certainly stronger than that of theorists scarcely active as empirical historians, such as Robert D. Baird (1933–) or Hans H. Penner (1934–). The former is too conservative in his old plea for understanding religion combined with a problematic mix of functionalism and historicism. The latter is too radical in his keenness on imposing structuralist frames on realities that refuse them firmly. More influential in quite different ways have been two scholars both related to the intellectual atmosphere of the Chicago Divinity School.

A broadly humanistic style combined with fine critical insight operates in the religious hermeneutics devised by Charles H. Long (1926–), following Joachim Wach’s lesson. As a historian, Long applied this hermeneutics to the study of creation myths and, in another vein, he pioneered the post-colonialist approach offering interpretations of Black religion in America which “demask” a series of metaphors of subordination and elucidate symbolic images of the oppressed and the oppressors.

Jonathan Zittel Smith (1938–) after graduating from Yale with a dissertation on Frazer’s *Golden Bough* and a short teaching term at Santa Barbara has spent his career at the University of Chicago. He moves from a wide-ranging in-depth knowledge of Mediterranean religions (with focus on Judaism and Early Christianity in their interrelationship with the Near Eastern and Hellenistic milieus) and an insightful meticulous experience of world-scale anthropological and historical materials. In his concise and intellectually penetrating essays Smith is concerned with testing the adequacy of models developed within the study of history of religions. His inquiries into theories of myth (and truth), ritual and comparison, in passionate critical conversation with such figures as James Frazer, Adolf Jensen and Mircea Eliade, has paved the way for a more self-conscious approach to the comparative study of religion. Smith’s philological accuracy and thoroughness in the treatment of secondary literature is matchless, but his selective style in tackling original sources combined with deconstructionist bias may sometimes result in bold assumptions which can meet difficulties gaining the scholars’ general consensus. Smith’s often quoted dictum, “religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study—there is no data for religion” (Smith, 1982, p. XI), albeit seductive in its blatantly postmodern relativism, seems to be far from complying with the blunt historical data.

**France.** France and the other French-speaking western countries (Belgium, Switzerland, Canada) have produced in post-war years a great number of religious historians who have been influential in their respective fields, but, for the reasons given above, very few historians of religions. Characteristically enough, the French gurus of postmodernism (Michel Foucault [1926–1984], Jacques Derrida [1930–2004], Pierre Bourdieu [1930–2002], Jean-Louis Lyotard [b. 1924]) who are haunting presences in the current discourse on religion going on in the Anglo-Saxon cultural milieu, are virtually missing in the religio-historical work produced by French scholars. Among them, the most active in the international scene has been the Belgian Julien Ries (1920–). A Catholic priest and a leading specialist in the domains of Gnosticism and Manichaeism, Ries has been meritorious in promoting editorial enterprises including cross-cultural surveys of ancient Mediterranean religious themes, but his (crypto-theological) project of “anthropology of the sacred,” inspired by Eliadean hermeneutics (*Homo Religiosus*) combined with Italian-styled historical typology did not bring any significant innovation into religious historiography.

Likewise, the Swiss Carl-Albert Keller (1920–) is deeply influenced by his Calvinist background. Pastor and professor at Lausanne after seven years of missionary activity in Southern India, Keller was a native speaker of two languages (French and German) and he had philological expertise in two textual traditions (Hebrew and Indian). After various researches on biblical prophecy, Hinduism, Islam and Gnosticism he has devoted all his energies to investigating mystical practices in Western and Eastern traditions (Ramakrishna



and Calvin in particular). His approach to mysticism is aimed to respecting the intentions of the mystical practitioner; his vision of religion can be condensed in the formula “communication with the Ultimate (= God).”

Michel Meslin (1926–) had the rare privilege of teaching history of religions at the University of Paris-Sorbonne and has been perhaps the most prestigious—though not the most influential—figure in the discipline. After doing work on ancient Roman and early Christian traditions with focus on their interrelations (persistence of modes and functions in New Year festivals), Meslin came to comparative religion, advocating the practice of “religious anthropology” as the most appropriate method of the discipline. This approach is professedly multidisciplinary and multi-leveled, though it is basically founded on psychoanalytical hermeneutics and fuzzy epistemological premises.

**Italy (and Romania).** There was nothing decisively new in Italian studies in history of religions with the coming of age of Pettazzoni’s younger students. However, while in other countries, in spite of the labels, comparative religion (or history of religions) was in agony, in Italy it was still kept alive. Alessandro Bausani (1921–1988) was trained as a fully fledged Islamist and Iranologist, but the influence of Pettazzoni is apparent in his plea for a “functional-historical typology” applicable to a discipline of Islamic studies embedded in the history of religions agenda. The contribution of Bausani (a Catholic converted to Baha’ism himself) to the historical study of Iranian religious tradition (from Zarathushtra to Baha’u’llah) and fringe Islam (from India to Indonesia) is invaluable; but his endeavors to elaborate an accurate typology of monotheism gain him also a place as a thoughtful theoretician of the science of religions.

Ugo Bianchi (1922–1995), an ancient historian in his formation, has been the most notable prosecutor of Pettazzoni’s style of historical comparison. He gave seminal contributions to defining the typology of dualism (from Iran to modern revivals), mystery cults, Orphism, Gnosticism, Manichaeism, transition rites, asceticism. Primarily, Bianchi was engaged in the defense of the historicity of myth (ritual and his social setting was not his main concern), elaborating—in the wake of W. Schmidt, R. Pettazzoni, A. E. Jensen, M. P. Nilsson, F. Cumont, H.-Ch. Puech, H. Jonas and M. Eliade—a paradigm that connected in intricate patterns dualistic trails, mystery initiations, Platonism, and the birth of Gnosticism. His method consisted of reading primary sources in the light of a theoretical model and then convening international scholars to test the relevance of that model to their empiric materials. As a theoretician of religion, Bianchi was keenly conscious of the responsibility of history of religions in attempting to devise categories able to eschew both phenomenological and reductionist traps. To paraphrase his words, religion can neither be allowed to assume the status of an a-priori autonomous category of human experience nor be reduced to the status of a subcategory within some other dominant science—whether the science be social

or human (history, ethics or even linguistic and cognitive theories).

The second key figure in Pettazzoni’s Roman School is Dario Sabbatucci (1923–2003), a specialist in ancient classical religions who devised theories of Greek mysticism resulting from social revolution and of Roman religion as the product of juridical theory. These theories, which are markedly reductionist though scarcely consistent with the contextual evidence, have interplayed with structuralist tenets from Paris (Lévi-Strauss, Jean-Pierre Vernant [1914–] and Marcel Detienne [1935–]) and social scientific approaches from Germany (Tübingen School) respectively. More generally, besides an ambitious but amateurish taxonomy of polytheistic religions, Sabbatucci has developed a theory of religion as entirely dissolvable in culture and—in a postmodern vein—as an arbitrary product of Western ethnocentrism. While these figures dominated the academic milieu, two other scholars worked out peculiar approaches to the study of religion that have been widely influential on layperson culture.

Alfonso Maria Di Nola (1926–1997) had the encyclopedic ability of writing on virtually every topic of religious historiography in a learned and intelligible style. Obviously, his innumerable writings rely mostly on second-hand sources with all the imaginable consequences. As an original researcher he studied aspects of Greek religion in cross-cultural comparison as well as animal and healing cults among Italy’s contemporary peasants. His approach to religious anthropology is avowedly based on a neo-Marxist methodology influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s reappraisal of folklore studies. Coherently, his general views on religion and religious historiography are ferociously anti-phenomenological and conditioned by his ideological options as well as by his unabashed philological inaccuracy.

Élémire Zolla (1926–2002) was in many ways the exact opposite of Di Nola in his concern for the individual’s (sometimes elitist) religious experience. Trained as a literary critic and expert in worldwide mystical, esoteric and symbolic traditions, Zolla elaborated a very personal style in reading religious phenomena from the insider’s perspective without losing the contact with the cultural setting. His in-depth researches on alchemy, traditionalism, American transcendentalism and the literary image of Native Americans as well as his perceptive reflections on classical issues of comparative religion such as syncretism, shamanism, Gnosticism, and Dionysian ecstasy characterize him as a careful investigator of spiritual modes that are beyond the grasp of scholars utilizing the tools of traditional historiography. As a terminus of this survey it is worth mentioning a scholar belonging to a later generation and to a different cultural tradition (Romanian) who was a disciple of Bianchi as well as a follower of Zolla.

Ioan Petru Culianu (1950–1991), fundamentally Italian in his training, became familiar with the Dutch academy in Groningen and with the North American one in Chicago, where he became the heir to his compatriot Eliade. The foci

of his scholarly concern were coincident with the favorite subjects of his mentors (ecstasy, dualism, esotericism, views of afterlife). He shifted from a historical method to a mentalistic epistemology that turns historicism on its head. His death was the death knell for the discipline: At the current state of the art, a style of history of religions like that fostered by Pettazzoni, Brelich and Bianchi seems to be hardly conceivable.

SEE ALSO Study of Religion.

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GIOVANNI CASADIO (2005)

## HISTORY

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

CHRISTIAN VIEWS  
JEWISH VIEWS

### HISTORY: CHRISTIAN VIEWS

Christians understand history from the perspective of the life of Jesus of Nazareth (c. 4 BCE–30 CE), whom they call the Christ. Christians believe that in Jesus Christ God became incarnate in human history and thereby provided the key to the character, validity, and significance of history. Salient events in Jesus' life in ancient Roman Palestine, as Christians understand them—notably his birth, his ministry, his death by crucifixion, and his resurrection to life—form the basis of the Christian religion. At the same time, the life of Jesus Christ provides the ultimate orientation for understanding the whole of history and the historical process, past, present, and future. To be Christian unavoidably entails bonding with an understanding of history, and over the ages the variety of Christian views has been considerable.

Christian views of history have in common that they encompass all peoples as well as all nonhuman creation. For Christians, history began with the creation of the world and will culminate with the return of Jesus Christ to the world. Christians give a special role within history to the Jews before Jesus' time, to his immediate followers during his lifetime, especially those called the twelve apostles, and to the church and the kingdom of God for the remainder of history after Jesus. For Christians, the ongoing temporal course of worldly existence proceeds according to cycles of worship as well as in cycles of forgiveness and renewal as, under the providence of God, Christians seek to do the will of God and to overcome evil with good.

Christian views of history contrast with the alternatives provided by different ultimate orientations, whether secularist, Islamic, capitalist, Hindu, Buddhist, New Age, or something else. With the secularization of thought and society in European and North American cultures during much of the twentieth century, Christian views tended to shrink to an emphasis on church history. But in tandem with the persistence of religions in pluralist relations with each other across the world, many Christians have reaffirmed the validity of Christian approaches for understanding the whole of history and for engaging in the study of any historical subject.

**ELEMENTS OF CHRISTIAN VIEWS OF HISTORY.** The first people who gathered around Jesus disclosed what they believed mattered for the Christian religion. This they did not by instruction in ritual or law, not by theological discourse or logical argument, but by telling the history of Jesus. At first the followers of Jesus told each other about what happened to him. Paul wrote letters to several Christian communities that recalled aspects of his life. The earliest Christian historical writings are the accounts known as the Gospels and the *Acts of the Apostles* that emerged out of and consolidated the recollections that people passed on after the death of Jesus. Christians ever since have looked to the Gospels as the source for their knowledge of Jesus and for his message of the coming of the kingdom of God. History came to be seen as the repeated overcoming of the kingdom of darkness by God's kingdom of light. In the words of the Lord's Prayer, "Our father in heaven, holy be your name, your kingdom come, your will be done on earth as it is in heaven."

The experience of the crucifixion and the resurrection of Jesus totally transformed the first Christians' understanding of history. They created the earliest Christian views of history by reworking the views they inherited from Jewish sources. They regarded Jesus as the one whose coming the ancient Hebrew prophets had often promised. *John* called Jesus the Messiah, the Christ, the one anointed by God to be the savior of Israel. The very use of that title constituted an understanding of the role of Jesus in world history. *Matthew* and *Luke* contained genealogies constructed to show that Jesus was the direct descendant of the two greatest names in Jewish history, Abraham and David, and, according to *Luke*, the direct lineal offspring of Adam, regarded as the first human being created by God.

The Gospels and the *Acts of the Apostles* also told how Jesus projected a new horizon for the future. After leaving his followers for a time he would return again to be among them. They caught suggestions of the end of the age, the *eschaton*, some time in the near or distant future, and they anticipated a final resurrection of the dead.

Paul, in his *Epistle to the Romans*, created an understanding of history that explained both the continuity of Jesus with Israel and Adam and the radical innovation that Jesus inaugurated for his followers in the future. Paul viewed Jesus both as the descendant of Adam and as the New Adam. History, for Christians, thus divides into two ages. Before Christ there were the creation, the old covenant, the old self, the way of the law, whereas after Christ there would be the new creation, the new covenant, the new self, the way of grace. Paul thought that the Hebrew scriptures, which Christians knew as the Old Testament, contained many anticipations of Christ. The children of Abraham and David were to be completed by a new Israel called the *ekklesia*, composed of children of Abraham by adoption.

It is important to understand that the early Christians formed their views of history as part of living within the new community of the *ekklesia*, later called the church. Their

views of history emerged as they engaged in their worship, read their scriptures, preached their sermons, produced their art, instructed their young, and uttered their confessions of faith in Jesus Christ. Over the centuries, it was largely through such tangible and close-to-home means that Christians taught, maintained, elaborated, revised, and unfolded their views of history into the wide variety of forms known in the history of Christianity. The writings on history by the great thinkers—such as Paul, Eusebius (d. c. 339), Augustine (d. 430), Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), Luther (d. 1546), Calvin (d. 1564), and Bossuet (d. 1704)—depended upon and emerged from within the experience of the worshipping community. The great creeds of the church—from the simple confession of Peter (“You are the Christ, the son of the living God”) to the important Nicene Creed (325), the famous and popular Apostles’ Creed (eighth century), and the many creeds of the Reformation era—were affirmations of the faith of the church that entailed reciting the history of Jesus and a Christian version of world history.

What develops is an understanding of universal history that depicts the course of the ages as a sequence of creation, fall, redemption, and culmination. History begins with the creation of the world, Adam, and Eve by God and continues with a decline into sin and suffering. God then offers the possibility of restoration, first through the line of Abraham and Israel, then through Jesus Christ and the church. Finally come the last days, the *eschaton*, when all things culminate in the return of Jesus Christ, followed by the Last Judgment, the appearance of the new heavens and the new earth, the resurrection of the dead, and the experience of eternal life. It is a comprehensive vision that gathers up the past, opens up the future, and explains the meaning of the present.

Seen in this way, the history of the world has a beginning and will have an ending. History is ongoing. Christian writers, like the author of *Hebrews* and Augustine, use the figures of a journey and a pilgrimage, and others following the Gospels use the image of the way to catch the ongoing tendency of things. They endeavor to grasp the meaning of the course of history by identifying the ages through which the world passes. For example, Paul’s two ages, the old and the new, could also be regarded as one, the present age, surrounded by eternity before creation and eternity after the end of time. The genealogies in *Matthew* and *Luke* calculated four or five ages. The *Letter of Barnabas* (early second century) turns these into six ages by analogy with the six days of creation. And since a day in the eyes of God is like a thousand years (*2 Pt.* 3:8), this suggested that God would bring the world to an end after six thousand years. Augustine adopted the six-age scheme and noted in the final pages of his monumental *City of God* that the world was then in the sixth and final age. Later writers, notably during the Reformation of the sixteenth century, divided the six thousand years into four monarchies—Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome—based on the Old Testament *Book of Daniel*. In the

seventeenth century the threefold scheme of ancient, medieval, and modern came into vogue, appearing first in relation to Christian history. Even then, many Christian writers thought that if the history of the world was analogous to human life they were living in the old age of the world. History was moving toward culmination by way of beneficent decline.

With all this emphasis on ongoing tendencies and periods, many people have asserted that Christian views of history are by definition linear and for that reason distinct from views depicting history as cyclical. They contrasted Christian views as linear with Hindu and Buddhist views as cyclical. However, Christian views are also cyclical, even as Hindu and Buddhist views are also linear, and Christian views offer many ways of understanding the recurrent rhythms of history. The earliest instance was the common meal initiated by Jesus Christ in his last supper, later called the Eucharist or the Lord’s Supper, which became a way for Christians when gathered together to remember (*anamnesis*) the life and death of Jesus. The introduction of Sunday as the day of worship symbolized the resurrection of Jesus and gave Christians a recurrent beat for the life of their communities. Paul emphasized the rhythm of creation and re-creation, and Christians over the ages have sought to implement his message by striving repeatedly for the overcoming of evil with good and the renewal of all things. In other guises they know this recurrent rhythm as the pattern of repentance, forgiveness, and restoration by which God repeatedly shows mercy to sinners and brings new things out of old. The symbol of the resurrection itself is an affirmation of the recurrence of blessing and healing in spite of the persistence of death and evil. Following the example of Jesus and Paul, Augustine envisioned world history as a recurrent spiritual conflict between the city of God and the city of this world. In these and other ways, Christian views of history posit the reality of recurrence in the world within the drama of the ongoing course of events from the origins to the *eschaton*.

Christian views of history also have a personal side. They permit Christians to orient their lives within the overall course of history. Over the years Christians as the church have fashioned rituals that, according to their ecclesiastical traditions, they call sacraments, ordinances, or special services. These mark both the linear course of life in the world and the cyclic experience of life in the world: baptism initiates each person, whether at infancy or as an adult, into the church; confirmation or acceptance into church membership marks religious coming of age; marriage establishes companionship on the journey and the procreative relationship; the Eucharist, or Lord’s Supper, remembers Jesus Christ’s death; penance or prayers for forgiveness register the cycle of sin and restoration; and holy unction, last rites, or the funeral complete the earthly pilgrimage.

Christians gradually came to express their views of history in the form of a calendar that liturgically recalls the events of the life of Jesus Christ in an annual cycle. The first fixture

in the calendar became known as Easter and celebrates the resurrection of Jesus, although agreement on when to mark Easter has eluded Christians and yielded diverse representations of the calendar. Christians have remembered the birth of Jesus as Christmas from at least the early fourth century. The advent to Christmas came to mark the start of the Christian new year. Christians later added the events of Epiphany, Holy Week, Pentecost, and the Ascension. Christians also mark the ongoing sequence of years with reference to the birth of Jesus, counting the years from “Our Lord’s Incarnation” (AD, *anno Domini*, the year of the Lord). This scheme, which formalized a popular Christian usage, was devised by Dionysius Exiguus (early sixth century) as part of his calculation of the liturgical date of Easter. Much later and more slowly, Christians began to count the years backward from the incarnation, calling them “Before Christ” (BC). By using these important symbols, they claim that the whole course of history centers on Jesus Christ and that the annual cycle of Christian experience recapitulates Jesus’ life.

A solid tradition of historical writing reflects the emphasis Christians put on recording the course of events, creating a common memory, and handing on their story in writing to future generations. It began with the Gospels and the *Acts of the Apostles*. Early in the third century Julius Africanus produced a five-volume *Chronology* with the dual purpose of establishing that the antiquity of Moses was greater than that of the Greeks and of tracing the continuity of Christianity with Jesus Christ. Eusebius of Caesarea (early fourth century) stabilized a lasting tradition of Christian historiography with his *Chronology* and his *Ecclesiastical History*. Augustine’s magisterial *City of God* formulated what became the most influential Christian reading of world history. Following patterns of explanation found in the Old Testament, he showed how the activities of God, humans, angels, and devils conjoined to produce human history as a struggle between the city of God and the city of this world. Augustine’s student Paulus Orosius elaborated upon this. From these sources an immense number of medieval chronicles, annals, and histories took their cue. Between the seventh and the fifteenth centuries writers produced histories shaped by Christian views: histories of the church, of the peoples of Christendom, of rulers and governments, of cities, of the Crusades, of the saints, of monasteries, and of the whole world known to them. Protestants, Anglicans, and Catholics from the sixteenth-century Reformation onward wrote histories that continued the fecund traditions of Christian historiography and that served to enliven their polemics against each other.

Running through Christian views of history is the understanding that many actors generate history. The Bible offered the necessary models, and Eusebius provided the example for how to translate the biblical vision into a reading of the post-biblical course of events. Christian historians in other periods, of whom Merle d’Aubigné (1794–1872) was a stunning case, as well as pastors and preachers in their sermons every Sunday to the present day instantiate the view

that history is a lively arena for many actors. God is primary, and, although God’s abode is the timeless present of eternity, God acts directly in history. Acting against God are Satan as the Evil One as well as various devils and evil spirits whose deeds impact the course of history. Joined to these are human beings regarded as responsible for what goes on in the course of the ages. Next to all these are the non-human creatures—the animals, the trees, the wind and the rain—that likewise effect what happens in history. How to explain the relations and relative effects of these great actors in history—God, the Evil One, humans, and nature—has been a matter of perennial disagreement among Christians. Christians created the doctrines of divine predestination and human free will in an effort to explain some of this. The Old Testament supplies the model for understanding God’s work in history, while the New Testament does the same for the work of the Evil One. Just as God governed Israel by leading the Israelites out of Egypt, taking them into the Promised Land, establishing David on the throne of Israel, and confounding the enemies of Israel, so God governs the church through the ages. And just as God also ruled over Assyria, Egypt, and Babylon, so God rules over all things in the world throughout the whole of history according to God’s will. Christians call this wise governance by God “Divine providence.”

In a similar way, following the Lord’s Prayer, Christians attribute to God’s action everything from their daily food to the rise and fall of kingdoms. Yet all the while they know, according to their roles in life, that they are responsible for tending their fields as farmers or governing the commonwealth as rulers. God’s central act in history was the incarnation in Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ continues to rule as Lord of history. Christians began to talk very early in the church’s history of God’s eternal plan of salvation and God’s plan for the world. When human actions fulfill the will of God, God bestows blessings; when they do not, God sends judgment instead. The prospect of the Last Judgment came before the people by means of art, especially during the medieval and early modern periods. The providence of God has given Christians confidence and comfort in history, while the Last Judgment has often given them cause to tremble.

**TYPES OF VIEWS.** From the time of the apostles to the present, Christian views of history have proliferated into at least four dominant types. All types have in common the elements already summarized—orientation by the life of Jesus Christ, the envelopment of universal and personal history, an account of the ongoing and the recurrent matters of history, and so on. They differ, however, in the way they interpret these elements and in the priorities and emphases they assign to them. All appeal to Jesus Christ, the Bible, and the experience of the history of Christianity for justification.

The four types may be called the millenarian, the ecclesiastical, the reform/revivalist, and the mystical. *The millenarian type* of understanding of history appeared quite soon among the early Christians and has reemerged periodically throughout Christian history to the present day. The mille-



narians, or “chiliasts,” emphasize the future of history and eschatology. They are deeply aware of the troubles of the present world. They look forward to the return of Jesus Christ as the means of salvation, and they expect salvific change to be abrupt and total. Their name comes from the anticipated thousand-year rule by Christ at the end of history, the seventh eschatological day after the six days of world history. Their scriptural sources are the *Book of Daniel*, chapter 24 of the *Gospel of Matthew*, and the *Book of Revelation*. The earliest millenarians (see the *First Letter to the Thessalonians*) expected the return of Jesus to occur in their lifetime. Millenarian movements over the years have included the prophets of the end around the year 1000, some elements in the Crusades, Joachim of Fiore (d. 1202), the Fifth Monarchy Men (seventeenth century), and the followers of John Darby (1800–1882). In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries most fundamentalists and evangelicals have been millenarians. They have called themselves “premillenarians” because they emphasize the return of Jesus before the advent of the thousand-year reign of purity, and “dispensationalists” because they emphasize the various ways God has changed the divine mode of working with the world over the ages.

The ecclesiastical type of understanding of history began as the early Christians created the institutional forms of the church community and has carried on to the present by means of the dominant churchly traditions. The ecclesiasticals emphasize the continuity of history expressed by means of a specific sequential connection with Jesus and the apostles (e.g., apostolic succession). They contrast the church and the world, while nonetheless struggling for and often achieving some alliance with the political rulers and some penetration of the general culture with Christian ecclesiastical mores. They believe that salvation comes primarily by means of God’s work through the church, notably in the sacraments and in preaching. They value institution-building, maintenance, and stability and seek to control change. Their biblical sources are the letters of Paul, especially *Romans*. The ecclesiastical view emerged with the appearance of bishops and ecclesiastical organization as recounted by Eusebius. The papacy, the church councils, and the Jesuits are among those who perpetuated this view. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, standard Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Orthodox, and Lutherans exemplify this type.

The reform/revivalist type of understanding of history has ridden in tandem with the ecclesiastical type throughout the history of Christianity. The emphasis in this third type has been on renewal and recurrence, together with either a return to some normative past or a renovation to some better future. Its proponents are concerned with overcoming spiritual or moral decline and often stand in judgment against the dominant structures. They see God’s salvific work especially in institutional reform or personal spiritual revival. They expect the need for change to be periodic, or as the motto of one strain within the Protestant Reformation expressed it, they aim to be “always reforming.” Reformers

have readily converted to the ecclesiastical type (in a conservative form) once their reforms have become established. They take their scriptural inspiration especially from Paul’s theme of new creation in *Romans* and *Colossians*. Some of the many movements that have viewed history in this way have been the early Benedictines, the early Franciscans, Cluny monks, early Calvinists and Lutherans, early Methodists, and in recent times, the evangelical revivalists and reformational Kuyperians. The Pentecostal movement of the twentieth century has been a major revivalist movement stressing the outpouring of the Holy Spirit and the restoration of the pristine spirit of Christ. Liberation theologians in Latin America are another example.

The mystic type of understanding of history also appeared early and has reemerged periodically throughout Christian history. Mystics seek to transcend the course of mundane history, suspending themselves, as it were, above the process of past-present-future. They have tended to condemn and belittle the history of the world and to seek salvation by union with another realm. Their hope has been to overcome change, yet through all that, they have also consciously intended to exercise an influence upon the affairs of the world. The vision of John in *Revelation* inspired them biblically. Notable examples of the mystic type are the pillar saints (Stylites) of Syria, the contemplative orders, the Neoplatonic tradition, Meister Eckhart (d. 1327?), Teresa of Ávila (d. 1582), Jakob Boehme (d. 1624), and the early Quakers. Many Christians in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have welcomed the influence of Buddhist and Hindu mystics on the Christian practice of meditation and prayer.

**DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES.** By the late eighteenth century, as part of the early phases of the secularization of European thought and society, many began to call Christian views of history into question. In particular, capitalist industrialization, the new powers of science and technology, and the thought of philosophers as different from each other as David Hume, Voltaire, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau combined to evoke new faith in humanity and in human powers of control, creativity, and reason. These gave support to new convictions that this world (the *saeculum*) was ultimate and that history was progress toward human improvement.

The practical consequence of the secularizing tendency upon Christian views of history has been the accentuation of two sets of distinctions. First, Christians focused more narrowly on the history of the church and tended to regard the history of the rest of life as a secular concern properly handled by scholars acting as secular historians and not as Christian historians. This contributed to the creation of specialized kinds of histories, such as histories of politics, art, and economic affairs, and treated church history as just another specialization. Second, Christians began to formulate a theology of history—as distinct from a philosophy of history. In the hands of philosophers like Voltaire, J. G. Herder,

G. W. F. Hegel, and a host of more recent thinkers like those of the British analytic school, reflection on the world's history could appear to be an exercise quite remote from what theologians did when they thought about the biblical sources, Jesus Christ, and Christian experience.

In this manner a distinction between sacred and profane history became more pronounced. Church historians and theologians came to see themselves, and to be seen by others, as sociologically set apart from other historians and other scholars of religion. They commonly found themselves employed in seminaries, Divinity schools, and Christian colleges, either separated from universities or other faculties within universities. They associated with each other in specialized professional societies organizationally separated from general scholarly associations. From the perspective of the general culture, people commonly came to regard the church as merely one institution next to others, with the result that the relevance of Christian views of history to life as a whole no longer could be assumed. Liturgy and preaching continued in their cyclic rhythm as the primary vehicles for the transmission of Christian views of history, but with a built-in separation of Christian history from the history of life as a whole, now called secular history. Historians, including those who were themselves Christians, found they could readily explain the temporal course of history solely in terms of human actions in the milieu of the natural environment, without reference to the work of God and the Evil One. This they did quite apart from their still operative belief in the activity of God in history and any Christian vision of universal history. The theories and findings of geology, biology, astronomy, and "prehistory" make a convincing case that the world's history has already taken perhaps billions of years in spite of previously honored calculations of the creation of the world based on *Genesis*. The difficulty, if not impossibility, of genuine prediction beyond the most proximate future made Christian visions of the future *eschaton* seem irrelevant to the course of history if not simply wrong.

In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, however, many historians, philosophers, theologians, writers, and biblical scholars have led a notable renewal of Christian views of history. They have come from a wide range of Christian traditions, including Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, Reformed, Russian Orthodox, Baptists, and others. Prominent names since the 1930s include Reinhold Niebuhr, Herbert Butterfield, Arnold Toynbee, T. S. Eliot, C. S. Lewis, Christopher Dawson, and Georges Florovsky. After World War II, the renewal formed part of the general ecumenical and church renewal movements associated with the World Council of Churches (after 1948), the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), and the resurgence of evangelicalism and Pentecostalism.

Several trends concerning Christian views of history have become noteworthy since the 1970s, even as the four major types of views continued. First, many Christians stressed the need to integrate Christian views of history with

their newly emerging awareness of the diversity of Christianity across the world, and with their renewed appreciation of the genuinely universal character of history. Second, many historians who were Christians explored how Christian insights about human beings and worldly existence might suggest approaches to the historical study of all facets of history, including, in addition to churches, the history of politics, gender, class, economic affairs, art, technology, families, the environment, climate, and so on. Third, the ongoing encounter with other religions of the world, notably Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, and the primal religions, has led Christians to reevaluate the meaning of the claims about Christianity being a religion of history. Fourth, the experience of the secular religions of humanism, capitalism and Marxism has stimulated revisions of Christian views of history as a way of helping to overcome economic, social, and political oppression and to promote the well-being of the whole human community. Fifth, the disintegration of the dominant modes of scientific history characterized by commitment to facts and emphasis on hegemonic elites has given new life to post-modern discussions of historical methods and epistemology, discussions to which historians enlivened by Christian views of history make distinctive contributions.

**SEE ALSO** Apostles; Christian Liturgical Year; Christmas; Church, article on Church Membership; Creeds, article on Christian Creeds; Easter; Epiphany; Eschatology, overview article; Eucharist; Free Will and Predestination, article on Christian Concepts; Gospel; Historiography; Jesus; Lord's Prayer; Millenarianism, overview article; Mysticism; Revival and Renewal; Secularization; Worship and Devotional Life, article on Christian Worship.

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## HISTORY: JEWISH VIEWS

This article describes the conception of history in the Hebrew scriptures and in rabbinic and medieval Judaism and controversies concerning historical continuity and change in modern Judaism.

**BIBLICAL VIEWS.** The unusual importance of history in Israelite religion probably predated the articulation of a full-fledged monotheism that explicitly denies the potency of all gods except Yahveh, the God of Israel. The core of the biblical narrative deals with the relationship between Israel and Yahveh, a relationship created and actualized in history. Yahveh is presented as having anticipated, in the calling out of the patriarchs, the formation of the house of Israel (*Gn.* 18:17) and as having liberated the descendants of the patriarchs from Egyptian bondage in order to enter into a covenantal treaty with them at Mount Sinai (*Ex.* 19:3–8, *Dt.* 26:5–9). In the biblical narrative the subsequent history of Israel, a duration of eight centuries, is winnowed and assembled accordingly.

**History and time.** Whenever it was that monolatry (the sacred obligation to worship only Yahveh and not “other gods,” as in exodus 19:5–6, 20:2–3) became monotheism (the explicit negation of the ontic reality of other gods, as in *Isaiah* 45:5–7), the transformation eschewed some of the most widespread ancient mythological themes. Rather than describing the birth of the various generations of gods, the struggles between them to define their respective sovereignties, and the gods' liaisons with other gods and humans, the dramatic foreground of the Hebrew scriptures is occupied by human responses to Yahveh's acts of revelation and salvation, chastisement and consolation. More than embracing narratives of a series of specific moments, however, biblical history moved toward a new sense of historical time.

The contrast is made between mythological time, where ritual and recitation aim at reexperiencing paradigmatic moments, and historic time as a continuum of unrepeatable occasions each possessing independent value. In this regard, the Hebrew Bible is sometimes described as holding to a linear,

rather than a cyclical, notion of time, but this concept oversimplifies the biblical meaning of history. *Genesis* 1–11, often called “the primeval history,” makes use of ancient Near Eastern mythological materials as reinterpreted by Israelite monotheism. And the biblical notion of history does focus on repetitive patterns (the cycle of sin, punishment, contrition, atonement). The mythological residue and the cyclical patterns are presented in the context of a chain of events reaching back to the absolute beginning of the world and human civilization and forward to a future open in a crucial sense. The cyclical-linear sense of time is also a feature of the prophetic books. Implied in the classical prophets is that past events are guideposts to actions taken in a historical present that is infused by a unique, pregnant tension. The prophet addresses the people and its rulers out of the immediacy of the divine imperative; in order to avert an impending catastrophe, he demands a change of direction (turning, repentance). The prophetic oracles do not embody revelations of predetermined fate but warnings of inevitable acts of divine justice if Israel's behavior continues in the path that the prophet has denounced. The prophet speaks out of the conviction that despite sins committed in the past, the future can assume a different character because God forgives those who reform their habitual ways. The prophet hopes to change rather than predict history and to break through the old cycle of failure to advance the divine demand.

**Stages of history.** In its final redaction the Hebrew Bible locates the Israelite-God covenant in a world historical context, creating a conception of universal history that shaped the consciousness of European civilization for many centuries. The primeval history in *Genesis* 1–11 in effect narates the coming-into-being of the human condition, including humanity's division into many nations and tongues. The remaining chapters of *Genesis* trace the precarious continuity of God's blessing of the direct ancestors of Israel during their sojourns in Canaan until the settlement in Egypt. The objective of the exodus from Egypt is the actual formation of the people at Mount Sinai and during their wilderness wanderings, until the twelve Israelite tribes enter Canaan to occupy their patrimonies (through the *Book of Joshua*). A second historical cycle, *Judges* through *2 Kings*, deals with the history of the people in the promised land: The tribes eventually coalesce into an Israelite kingdom that in less than a century is rent in two. The narrative follows the subsequent history of the two kingdoms (extracted, it relates, from royal *Chronicles*, e.g., *1 Kgs.* 14:29, 16:5, 16:14, 16:20, 16:27) together with stories of the prophets who issued judgments on the kings, until the Assyrian destruction of the northern kingdom of Israel in 722 BCE and the Babylonian conquest of the southern kingdom of Judah in 587/6 BCE. The fall of the Israelite kingdoms is attributed, above all, to God's punishment for idolatry condoned by the rulers (e.g., *2 Kgs.* 17:7–18, 21:10–16, 24:3–4). In contrast to the preceding, the Babylonian exile, the return to Zion, and the second commonwealth are recounted episodically in tales of religious fidelity in Babylon (*Dn.* 1–6), accounts of the rebuilding of

the Temple and the reforms of Ezra and Nehemiah (mainly in the books named for these two men), and the story of the near destruction and last-minute salvation of the Jews of the Persian empire in the *Book of Esther*. A second interpretation of Israelite history up to the Babylonian exile is contained in *1* and *2 Chronicles*.

These accounts of the past are completed by a vision of the future, a conception of the ultimate destiny of humanity. Biblical eschatology is ignored in the historical books but present in the prophetic oracles of the “latter time” concerning the prince of justice who will rule the land (*Is.* 9:2–7, 11:1–10), a utopian age of worldwide peace (*Is.* 2:1–5, *Mi.* 4:1–4), universal worship of Yahveh (*Is.* 56:6–8, *Zec.* 8:20–23), thorough internalization of the covenant and outpouring of prophecy (*Jer.* 31:31–34, *Jl.* 2:28–29), the pacification of nature (*Is.* 65:17–25, *Zec.* 14:1–14), and cataclysmic judgments vindicating God’s holiness among the nations (*Ez.* 38–39; *Is.* 24–27, 63:1–6). Some of these and other prophetic visions already show an evolution from the eschatology of classical prophecy to apocalypticism.

Unlike the classical prophet, who is usually located in the text according to the rulers of his own time and the historic situation that he directly addresses, the apocalyptic hides behind the name of an earlier personage who presents a synoptic vision of history through many centuries. For the apocalyptic, history and eschatology are fused in a preordained sequence from the time of the visionary to the final days. In the most developed apocalyptic material of the Hebrew Bible (*Dn.* 7–12), the subject is the future rise and fall of monstrous pagan empires. Eventually “the saints of the Most High” will triumph, God’s dominion will be firmly established in the earth, “and many of the dead will awaken, some to eternal life and some to everlasting contempt” (*Dn.* 12:2). The extracanonical Jewish apocalyptic literature that took shape between the second century BCE and the second century CE sought to sustain the people’s faith that despite appearances to the contrary, the divine plan would culminate in the destruction of evil and the establishment of God’s direct rule over creation. The growth of apocalypticism is but one symptom of a large shift of emphasis, in a period marked by a turning away from concrete history to other themes and interests in Judaism of late antiquity.

**HELLENISTIC AND PHARISAIC-RABBINIC VIEWS.** While this transformation was occurring, however, a final burst of ancient Jewish historiography adumbrated several historical concerns of considerable importance of Judaism later. The books of the Maccabees, which memorialize the struggle against the Seleucid king Antiochus IV (r. 175–164 BCE) to repress Judaism in Judaea, contain the prototype of the literature of martyrology (2 *Mc.* 6–7) developed by medieval Christian and Jewish writers. Josephus Flavius (37/8–c. 100), who recorded the Jewish war against Rome between 66 and 70 CE that eventuated in the destruction of Jerusalem and its Temple, narrated an occurrence of immense practical and symbolic importance for Judaism. Although Josephus’s

works were not preserved by the Jews in the original, a medieval Hebrew rendition of these events, *sefer yosippon*, probably composed in the tenth century in southern Italy, supplemented Talmudic legends concerning this catastrophic event. The bulk of traditional Jewish knowledge about post-biblical history (the Hasmonean and Herodian kingdoms, the religious movements of the late Second Temple period, the revolts against the Romans in the first and second centuries CE, the personalities and actions of the Pharisaic sages and influential rabbis of late antiquity) were preserved in anecdotal, often legendary, form in the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds and in the Midrash.

Biblical history served as a matrix of lessons and models reinforced by repeated allusion to the personages and experiences of ancient Israel. In the liturgy of holy days, Jews annually relived the turning points of history as distilled from the Bible: creation of the universe (Ro’sh ha-Shanah); exodus from Egypt (Pesah); revelation of the Torah at Sinai (Shavu’ot); divine protection during the wilderness wanderings under the leadership of Moses (Sukkot); the constant availability of divine forgiveness and the holy splendor of the priests, who were the channel for atonement of sin while the Temple stood (Yom Kippur); salvation from threatened extermination in the Diaspora (Purim); the miracle of “those days” in Maccabean Jerusalem (Hanukkah); the destruction of Zion and the Temple (Tish’ah be-Av). An indication of the closure and formalization of the rabbinic conception of history is the emergence in late antiquity of a system of dating from the beginning of the world (*anno mundi*, the era of creation), which came to serve as a Jewish alternative to the Christian chronology based on the birth of Christ and, later, the Muslim system dating from the Hijrah.

The most prominent essentially historic element of Pharisaic-rabbinic Judaism is the notion of a continuous chain of religious authority from the revelation at Sinai to the (moving) present. In the rabbinic worldview Torah is a transcendent, premundane blueprint for creation containing God’s purposes for creating humankind and the people of Israel, and Torah is present in history in two guises: the text of the Pentateuch (the written Torah) and the unfolding body of tradition (the oral Torah) anchored in Moses at Mount Sinai and growing with the teachings of every generation of sages. Torah was passed down by word of mouth from the elders to the prophets to the sages (*Avot* 1.1), given a written form in the Mishnah at the end of the second century CE, and continuously supplemented by the discussions and reasoning of the rabbis in the Talmudic *yeshivot* and thereafter. Tracing the chain of reliable authority became a major interest of medieval Jewish historiography.

**MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN VIEWS.** The continuity of the rabbinic tradition became a polemic issue in the eighth and ninth centuries with the rise of the Karaites, who denied the authority of the Talmud. The tenth-century Karaite historiographer Ya’qūb al-Qirqisānī viewed as forerunners of the Karaite movement the Sadducees of the Second Temple

period, who had rejected the Pharisaic “traditions of the fathers” (an early stage of the notion of the oral Torah). In the tenth century Sherira’ Gaon, head of the Pumbedita *yeshiva*, composed an epistle defending rabbinic authority by explaining how the corpus of Talmudic literature came into being, in the course of which he transmitted considerable historical data. The unbroken continuity of the “order of generations” was one of the principal motives of Avraham ibn Daud’s *Sefer ha-qabbalah* (Book of tradition), a schematic account of Jewish history written in the twelfth century that contained undertones of messianic expectation.

As indicated, in the Middle Ages another impetus to the recording of events in Jewish history was the commemoration of Jewish martyrs. The massacres of the Jews of the Rhineland at the inception of the First Crusade was the subject of an Ashkenazic chronicle literature that was augmented as a result of later crises, such as the massacres of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1648–1649. However, most of the medieval Jewish philosophers had little interest in history as such. Moses Maimonides (1135/8–1204) considered the reading of books of history at best a diversion for one’s leisure hours (*The Guide of the Perplexed* 1.2) and a waste of time for serious scholars who should occupy themselves with jurisprudence, the natural sciences, and metaphysics. Maimonides does employ history incidentally to explain some of the biblical commandments as means to wean Israel from pagan practices of the ancient world. Of the medieval Jewish philosophers, it was Yehudah ha-Levi (c. 1075–1141), a severe critic of Jewish Aristotelianism, who grounded Jewish faith in the experience of a specific people qualified by their innate aptitude, when in a proper moral condition in the Holy Land, to receive the Torah. Ha-Levi’s contrast of the abstract, rational God of the Aristotelian philosophers with the puissant God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob represents a definite, if limited, turning from metaphysical to historical arguments for the truth value of Jewish faith.

Not until the sixteenth century was there a rebirth of Jewish historiography akin to that of the Hellenistic era. Most of the works of this period, by exiles from the Iberian Peninsula, are, in form, medieval chronicles in which there are sometimes found Renaissance elements (the *Shevet Yehudah* by Shelomoh ibn Verga offers a political and social analysis of the expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492). A truly pioneering figure in sixteenth-century Jewish historiography was ‘Azaryah dei Rossi, whose *Me’or ‘enayim* shows the influence of Renaissance humanism in its recovery of Hellenistic Jewish texts and critical treatment of Talmudic anecdotes.

In contrast to this limited interest in historical research for its own sake was the qabbalistic interest in history, which was meant to establish the authenticity of its esoteric exegesis of the Torah. The most influential text of the Spanish Qabbalah, the Zohar, was presented by its thirteenth-century author as the work of a circle of second-century Galilean rabbis, giving the Zohar a pedigree as old as the Mishnah and antedating by many centuries the spread of rationalistic philoso-

phy among Jews. Metahistorical elements in qabbalistic literature reached an apogee in the teachings of the sixteenth-century mystic Isaac Luria. Lurianic Qabbalah developed a theology of cosmic redemption based on the principle that carrying out the divine commandments with the correct mystic intention (*kavvanah*) liberates divine sparks that had been scattered abroad and trapped in husks of evil during the processes of cosmic creation. The Lurianic version of the Qabbalah, inasmuch as it conceived of human action as necessary to bring the Messiah, lent an intrinsic dignity to the temporal process that history had not had in Jewish thought since biblical times. However, these human acts produced their effects in a spiritual realm invisible to mundane eyes. An attempt to apply this theory on the concrete stage of history, expressing the buildup of messianic tension in early modern Jewry, erupted in the short-lived movement around the mystical messiah Shabbetai Tsevi in the 1660s. The revolutionary enthusiasm was quickly extinguished among most Jews.

**MODERN VIEWS.** A modern awareness of history entered Judaism in the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* that emerged in Germany in the 1820s. The proponents of the scientific study of the Jewish past argued that an objective knowledge of Jewish history would increase respect for Judaism’s contributions to civilization and, at the same time, enable Jews to grasp the essence of their tradition. However, the critical methodology of modern scholarship also posed new issues for Judaism (and other revealed traditions) by calling into question the historicity of formative events and persons, challenging the unity of scripture, and drawing attention to data that contradicted the presumed continuity of the received tradition.

The religious trends that crystallized in nineteenth-century European and American Jewry represent contrasting strategies of response. The Reform movement perceived Judaism as a progressive revelation that is based on the original inspiration of Moses and the prophets and has attained its most adequate formulation in modern times; for the Reformers, historical knowledge provided the basis for distinguishing between the authentic kernel of Judaism and the protective husk of law and custom once necessary but no longer relevant in postmedieval circumstances. The Positive-Historical approach (which in America became the basis for Conservative Judaism) conceived of revelation as in part molded by the gradually developing consensus of the historic Jewish community, which thereby assured continuity of sacred practice and doctrine. For the Orthodox, Torah was a timeless, immutable divine instruction for the ideal human life; intervention in the process of explicating Torah as undertaken by the Reformers and, more moderately, by the Conservatives in order to bring Judaism in line with the spirit of the times was considered by and large destructive. At present, both Conservative and Orthodox Judaism (and some Reform figures) emphasize the continuity of the *halakhah* (religious law) as a normative feature of Judaism but disagree as to what extent present-day rabbis have the



right to diverge from earlier sages and the stricter contemporary authorities.

As the nineteenth-century progressed, modern Jewish historiography amassed considerable knowledge of the social and political history of the Jews as well as of the religious and literary history of Judaism. Erudite nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars (preeminently, Heinrich Graetz) published works that educated their readers in the complex and variegated Jewish past, enabling Jews to relate positively to their tradition apart from any commitment to theology or religious praxis. Especially in eastern Europe secular views of Jewish historical identity accompanied the formulation of Jewish nationalist and socialist ideologies (e.g., Simon Dubnow's conception of the centrality of Jewish institutions of self-government in the Diaspora in relation to his ideology of Jewish Diaspora nationalism, and Jewish socialists and Marxists who took economic themes and even the class struggle as central). Most important has been the rethinking of the meaning of Jewish history from the Zionist perspective, emphasizing the age-old longing for redemption from exile and the centrality of the land of Israel as the ancestral homeland to which the Jews were to return to build a new commonwealth, but, in various ways, also seen as a progressive, even revolutionary, advance in history, a kind of active return to history.

Since World War II a theme that has gained prominence in Jewish consciousness is the history of Jewish responses to catastrophe. The Holocaust drew attention to repeated cycles of Judeophobia since ancient times and the ways Jewry has understood itself in relation to the nations of the world. And the Holocaust has raised issues concerning God's relation to history (the traditional problem of theodicy), with reverberations in recent Jewish historical and theological writing.

**SEE ALSO** Apocalypse, article on Jewish Apocalypticism to the Rabbinic Period; Holocaust, article on Jewish Theological Responses; Jewish Studies, article on Jewish Studies from 1818 to 1919; Qabbalah; Torah; Zionism.

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**HISTORY OF RELIGIONS.** This article presents an overview of the history of religions as a scientific discipline. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive survey of the specific data that lie within the province of the historian of religions, nor does it attempt to survey the broader history of the discipline. The purpose here is rather to provide a brief description of the nature of the history of religions and to discuss its methods of research. The first part presents a theoretical examination of the dialectical method proper to the discipline. In the second part, attention will be given to the actual field of comparative research through the presentation of a brief historical typology.

**THEORETICAL OVERVIEW.** The discipline of the history of religions is characterized by the dialectical relationship that exists between its object of study and its methods of research. It is, of course, the concept of religion that best defines the discipline's object. This concept, however, though a necessary precondition for research, is never allowed to function as an *a priori* category, which would predetermine the direction of the historian's inquiries. Instead, it is held in dialectical tension with the ongoing progress of research. The methods employed in this research are in turn adapted to the deeply historical nature of their subject matter. Such meth-

ods are essentially inductive, intended to grasp religion in its concreteness, in its historical creativity, and in its meaningfulness for the cultural, social, and individual lives with which it is interwoven. The dialectic that emerges from this interaction of the concept of religion with specific, ongoing historical investigations may be taken as a distinctive feature of the discipline.

The nature of this dialectical foundation of the history of religions may be clarified by contrasting it with several alternative approaches to religion. First of all, it must be distinguished from the hermeneutical approach, which fixes upon a single interpretative key to unlock the mysteries of the phenomenon under investigation. Hans Jonas's intelligent application of modern existentialist categories, such as the feeling of *Geworfenheit* ("thrownness") in his study of Gnosticism, or Rudolf Otto's use of the category of the holy, may be taken as examples of such an approach. In either case, the task of accurate historical description and the construction of a complete and articulate typology of the phenomenon under study are in danger of being neglected. As a result the interpretative key is insufficiently tested against the facts. In addition, the crucial problems of continuity and change, which are unavoidable in the comparative study of religions, tend to be overlooked.

The dialectical character of the history of religions discipline may also be contrasted with the so-called phenomenological method. This method tends to focus only on the synchronic elements of religion, describing and classifying religious forms without reference to particular historical contexts. It aims at capturing the meaning of religious phenomena without committing itself to an analysis of the historical, cultural, social, and psychological settings of those phenomena. It thereby neglects the study of the diachronic, formative processes that give a religious phenomenon its depth and endow it with the colors of real life. In the end, the special sensitivity of the individual phenomenologist is called upon to fill this gap. No doubt there is something valuable in the phenomenologist's capacity for empathy, or *Einführung*. But the historian of religions must attend first and foremost to the fact that the object of his study is a historical object. The dialectical processes of creation and change, development, and even revolution escape the phenomenologist's ahistorical gaze.

It would be a mistake to conclude from the inadequacies of the phenomenologist's method that the proper alternative lies in historicism. On the contrary, historicism, whether in its idealistic or materialistic form, must also be distinguished from the approach of a historian of religions. While religion is a decidedly historical phenomenon, it must not be reduced to history. Historicism makes religion a mere moment in a dialectic that essentially transcends it. This is as true for Hegel as it is for Marx. In addition to these historical forms of reductionism, there are sociological and psychological approaches to religion that are reductive as well. Whatever the particular form, however, all forms of reductionism have in

common an appeal to a univocal conception of religion located within a preconceived frame of reference.

It is no solution to counter historical reductionism with an appeal to the irreducible character of religion as perceived by the subjective, experiential sensitivity of the phenomenologist. In both cases, that of the phenomenologist as well as that of the historicist, there is an illegitimate appeal to an *a priori*, preconceived conception of religion. It is this *a priori* character of their respective conceptions of religion that is incompatible with the positive, inductive, comparative-historical approach proper to the historian of religions and to the dialectic that the historian must preserve between his tentative interpretative categories and the ongoing progress of his research.

Theory is equally illegitimate in the history of religions when it is applied in an *a priori*, undialectical manner. Nevertheless, it is not to be rejected out of hand. On the contrary, theory is indispensable when it functions as hypothesis open to verification, revision, or rejection on the basis of empirical research. The distinguished anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard, for example, goes too far in his distrust of theory. He would limit the study of religion to the description of the social and cultural functions of specific religions in order to escape the distortions of general theories of religion. This is overly cautious. In fact, even though theoretical biases are unavoidable, arbitrarily reductive positions can be tested on the basis of positive research and their shortcomings exposed. An excellent example of this is Andrew Lang's criticism of the theory of animism. Using concrete evidence, Lang showed that this theory was reductive in its claim to represent the most archaic form of religion. In fact, the theory was unable to account for the widespread belief in a high god among primitive peoples. This use of empirical, historical evidence to test proposed theories or hypotheses provides ample insurance against the dangers of overextended or reductive generalizations.

So far I have argued that preconceived or *a priori* theories of religion that are not held accountable to the findings of historical research remain outside the dialectic that governs the work of the historian of religions. At most, such theories can function as hypotheses awaiting verification. It may be helpful now to examine the dialectic itself more closely by focusing on the particular problem of the definition of religion. How, if at all, are we to arrive at a clear concept of religion? And how does this concept function in actual research? In raising these questions one is immediately confronted with what at first appears to be a methodological impasse. On the one hand, if such a concept is to escape the problems of an *a priori* characterization of religion, it must itself arise out of actual comparative historical study. On the other hand, it is hard to see how such comparative study is to proceed until this concept is in hand.

**The concept of religion.** The appearance of an impasse is created by the way in which the problem is posed. If we assume that a concept of religion is at the same time a prereq-

quisite for and a result of comparison, then we are indeed faced with an insurmountable paradox. But this is not the case if we resort to a dialectic that unites the notion with its employment in such a way as to make them mutually dependent. In this case the concept of religion is inductive in origin, and its clarification goes hand in hand with progress in empirical research.

At this point it is clear that an adequate notion of religion is not to be formed through a mere *a priori* selection of data to which research should be extended. The primary problem is not to extend a conception of religion over the widest possible range of material but rather to discover a conception that is adequate to specific historical contexts. The search for a universally adequate definition of religion can lead quickly to a minimal notion of religion, a kind of lowest common denominator with no practical usefulness. Such a univocal definition, which would seek to rank the different religions as so many species under a single genus, is clearly inadequate for a fundamentally empirical discipline. Such a discipline requires conceptual categories that are continuously being created and are always open to further revision in the light of the development of comparative studies. Far from being a univocal concept, the notion of religion that emerges from the continued comparison of new and varied historical materials is an analogical notion.

Things are described analogically when they correspond to each other in certain important respects but differ from one another in other, equally important respects. Analogical notions thus contrast sharply with univocal notions. When we apply the term *vertebrate*, for instance, to a man, a dog, and a crocodile, we are applying it univocally, since the notion of vertebrate is integrally and equally realized in each of these cases. The same cannot be said of analogical notions. When we describe both a feather pillow and our summer's reading as "light," we are speaking analogically, since the quality of lightness applies very differently in each case. To say, then, that the historian of religions must employ the term *religion* analogically rather than univocally means that it cannot be assumed that all the phenomena studied under the rubric of *religion* are all "religious" in the same respect. This is especially true when studies extend beyond the context of closely related cultural milieus.

Now, it is exactly the analogical value of the notion of religion that relieves it of the impossible task of achieving universal extension while remaining responsive to the specifics of history. If the notion of religion is analogical, the aim of research will not be the progressive extension of a univocal concept but the documentation of sets of partial affinities between different systems of belief and practice, which are the segments of the polychromatic network that constitutes the variegated world of religion. It is clear that this procedure is much more in keeping with the comparative-historical aims proper to the history of religions than any merely phenomenological approach. The approach I am describing is meant to remain constantly in touch with the concreteness of its ob-

ject; facts and sets of facts (historical contexts and processes) are compared directly, without being submitted to an intermediate process of abstract categorization.

If the historian of religions cannot rely on a univocal concept of religion or its deductive use, it follows that he will not be dependent upon philosophy or some metascience for his categories. On the contrary, it is to be expected that comparative-historical research will seek its categories precisely in the historical continuities and discontinuities it studies. The historian of religions is not concerned with facts isolated from their historical contexts and processes but rather with these contexts and processes themselves. The historian of religions aims at discovering the degree and quality of the affinity that exists between religions and that warrants characterizing them as such.

Given the empirical nature of the history of religions and its interpretative categories, and in particular its analogical conception of religion, it becomes apparent that its findings can be neither verified nor falsified through appeals to either *a priori* reasoning or personal convictions. The sole criterion of adequacy becomes empirical. What must be shown is the adequacy of a particular account to the facts it claims to describe, both the facts of a given historical situation and the relationship between one such situation and others. Ultimately, in the comparative context proper to the discipline, this will lead to a principle of holism as the final criterion of adequacy. Accounts will be more adequate as they encompass broader ranges of concrete data.

At this point it may be asked why the concept of religion should be retained at all, even in an analogical sense. Strictly speaking, one could simply refer to various sets of continuities by the use of arbitrary symbols (*x*, *y*, *z*, and so forth). But this analytical procedure would not fit the historical character of the discipline, which is rooted in a cultural milieu and motivated by a specific intellectual interest. It is not by chance that the problem I am analyzing is termed *religion* and not *way*, *law*, or *ethos*, although the latter terms would be equally legitimate labels for comparative study. It is for historical reasons that this particular field is called comparative religion. This does not mean that the validity of the enterprise is merely relative or Eurocentric. It means only that in positing this notion one is conscious that the comparative study of religions began in a particular historical and cultural milieu. It was in this milieu that the term *religion* came to be used in analyzing the problem of continuity and change within systems of belief and ritual behavior. It was in this setting that "true" religion began to be contrasted with the "other" religions. Out of this context arose the history of religions, which rejected the pretense of evaluating different religions normatively (a task, on the other hand, legitimate and unavoidable for philosophy and theology) and instead studied them phenomenologically. On this level it could speak both of the universality of religion, since systems of belief and ritual practice more or less comparable with those in the West can be found everywhere, and of religions in the plural, given the clear differences that distinguish these systems.

These considerations lead us back to the dialectic that is the basis of the comparative-historical methodology proper to the history of religions. The emergence of the notion of religion among Western students of religion was the result of just such a dialectic. This notion was not constructed *a priori* but was already a part of an elaborate cultural and historical milieu that had a Jewish and Christian background. Increased contact with non-Western forms of religious belief and practice initiated the dialectical development just described. This dialectical study continues today as research is progressively extended to new materials, in harmony with the progressively broadened experience of the historian of religions.

This open, dialectical character of comparative historical study will be best served if the actual modalities of this research reflect a consciousness of the analogical character of its categories, especially the category or notion of religion. In this way the distortive effects of the forced employment of univocal terms will be avoided. Dialectical, historical comparison will be free to investigate a wide variety of continuities between different systems of belief and practice without aiming at the reduction of these to a single, comprehensive, univocal referent. The result will be a complex, multidimensional map of religion, a map readable in all directions, on which a given feature or set of features will appear now central, now peripheral. Buddhism, for instance, may appear peripheral when the map is read "theistically" and yet occupy a central place when viewed in terms of its monastic institutions. Similarly, it may appear central when viewed in terms of the widely held belief in transmigrating, but more peripheral in its denial of the reality of the transmigrating soul.

**Holistic approach.** In addition to restricting itself to an analogical use of its interpretative categories in creating such a map of the religious universe, the history of religions must also attempt to be holistic in its approach to its materials. It must study religious beliefs and practices within the specific contexts that give them their full meaning. Within these contexts, functional interpretations will often be of positive value. This is particularly true in the case of simple societies where the functions of religion are relatively undifferentiated from the rest of social life. But the fundamentally analogical character of religion prevents the use of such functional models to explain religion as a whole. As a whole, it remains a concrete whole, and the holisms characteristic of the history of religions must be realized not at the level of univocal theory but at the level of contextualized historical description. This description will aim at the construction of an exhaustive historical typology, a multidimensional map of the actual religious terrain.

The achievement of such an historical typology of religions will result from modalities of historical comparison that must be further specified. In the first place, comparative-historical research in the history of religions must be distinguished from what we may call "idiographic" research, namely, research concentrated on religion in a particular cul-

tural context. Such specific, noncomparative studies are necessary but not sufficient. Nor can the comparative-historical research envisioned here be identified with a systematic, purely formal typology, nor with a phenomenology that neglects issues of origin, growth, and change. The goal is rather the establishment of specific sets of synchronic and diachronic continuities and discontinuities that apply to more than one religion and perhaps to an entire cultural area. In any given case these patterns may be explained either on the basis of cultural diffusion or as the result of independent but parallel developments. In the latter case, parallelism need not signal a unilinear evolution in the history of religions but may rather point to analogies between specific historical and cultural circumstances.

It will often be difficult to decide whether a given pattern is to be explained on the basis of diffusion or parallelism. What is important is to avoid an *a priori* theoretical option in favor of either. This was the mistake of those who, in reaction to the theories of unilinear evolution typical of the nineteenth century, adopted an equally monolithic hypothesis of universal diffusionism. The fact is that one of the major gains in the field of comparative-historical research has been the discovery of partly similar cultural achievements in the field of religion and culture that are not due to phenomena of diffusion, not even stimulus diffusion. A typical example is the birth and diffusion of polytheism. The connection of polytheistic cults and their typical features (such as theogony, theomachy, specialized sanctuaries and priesthoods, anthropomorphic and hypermorphic gods, etc.) with what are known as archaic high cultures is too evident to be overlooked. It is impossible at the present day to explain all such connections solely on the basis of diffusion, even though a diffusionist hypothesis remains obligatory in some well-defined cases (as, for instance, in the case of the widespread cultural and religious diffusion of cuneiform literature).

**HISTORICAL TYPOLOGY OF RELIGION.** Having dwelt on some methodological issues concerning the history of religions as a comparative-historical discipline, I shall turn now to a brief overview of the subject matter of this discipline, that is, to the presentation of a concise and inevitably selective historical typology of religion. But first a few preliminary remarks on earlier attempts to map the most general features of the religions may be in order.

In such earlier attempts we meet with notions that owe much to the different cultural epochs in which they were conceived and to the different theories of the origin and development of religion current at the time. Many of these notions are a legacy of philosophical and theological discussion. The best example here is the concept of monotheism, especially as contrasted with polytheism, deism, and pantheism. Many more concepts, including animism, preanimism, animatism, manism, and—more ancient than these—fetichism, owe their origin to the positivistic evolutionary theories typical of the nineteenth century. All of these notions were conceived as expressing primitive or archaic stages of religious

thought. As such they presupposed a view of religion as primarily concerned with the mental representation of reality. The cultic and ethical aspects of religion were underestimated, as well as the structural and historical complexities of so-called primitive forms of religion (and it was particularly on primitive religions that the new history of religions discipline focused). This rather exclusive emphasis on the conceptual aspect of religion was typical of nineteenth-century anthropology and should be distinguished from what we may call its rational aspect, which had been emphasized both by Scholastic theology and by the Deism of the eighteenth century. These one-sided excesses of the past should serve as a *caveat* for today's historian of religions. This does not mean, however, that attention to the conceptual dimensions of religion should be lessened or arbitrarily reduced in turn.

A very different but equally problematical approach to the study of religion, one mentioned above, was the descriptive and interpretative tendency associated with the familiar concepts of "the holy" and "the numinous," a tendency already in existence before Rudolf Otto's famous book *The Idea of the Holy* (1917, first German edition) gave it a permanent place in religious studies. This new tendency was the opposite of the analytical and conceptual approach just mentioned, and this difference was clearly expressed by Otto's refusal to conceptualize the experience of the holy or to trace it to a specific source, such as God, the gods, spirits, or anything else. Otto's analysis of the essence of religion as the experience of the holy was focused on terms such as *immortality*, *freedom*, or *the absolute*. According to him, man is made intuitively aware of the transcendent reality to which these terms refer through his experience of their opposites on earth. Apart from the similarities of this kind of argument with the ontological argument for the existence of God found in some medieval and modern philosophical systems, the historian of religions must question whether such negative characterizations of the holy are as universal as Otto believed. In fact, they appear to be intertwined, from the point of view of both history and metaphysics, with peculiar notions concerning God, the divine, and religious values, both on the individual level and, as Walter Baetke aptly pointed out, on the social level.

A historical typology of religion should avoid the danger of employing a merely analytical and classificatory conceptualization, particularly if this is intended to reduce the issue of religious ideas and experiences to an issue of mental representations, or to the so-called *imaginaire*. It should also avoid reliance on selective intuitions in the guise of a scientific phenomenology of religion. Both attitudes ultimately prove to be reductive and ethnocentric. As was made clear in the previous section, a historical typology of religion will serve to map specific sets of analogically related affinities that are neither merely conceptual nor phenomenological but in the best sense historical.

Viewed historically, then, religions can be divided into two broad groups, and this division will provide the general

framework for a genuinely historical typology. This initial division is between those religions that are described as ethnic and those that are founded.

**Ethnic religions.** Ethnic religions are a part of the culture of a people and do not owe their origin to a historical founder. No single individual has endowed these religious traditions with the unmistakable impress of his personality. Rather, ethnic religions are historical formations that are originally indistinguishable from the formation processes of the cultures and populations to which they belong. Ethnic religions are not restricted to tribal or nonliterate cultures. They may also be found in highly developed literate cultures. Their exact character, which may thus range from unitary to syncretistic, depends upon specific cultural and historical circumstances.

The historical character of ethnic religions, including those of nonliterate cultures, requires that they be studied holistically. Their actual contents and functions in the epochs and contexts for which there is documentary evidence must be closely examined. This must be done without losing sight of the changes and adaptations that these traditions undergo in the course of time, due to internal, developmental tendencies or to influences and stimuli coming from outside.

The fact that even nonliterate ethnic religions are parts of a larger world means that the purely descriptive or "idiographic" study of these traditions cannot do without a comparative outlook. Comparison becomes inevitable when the scholar's attention is drawn to the cross-cultural affinities or "family resemblances" that link the cultural and religious expressions of different countries and areas.

**Approaches to comparison.** Two main approaches to comparison may be distinguished in the history of religions. The first developed in the nineteenth century, and the other took shape at the end of that century and at the beginning of the twentieth. Each of these warrants a brief discussion before I continue.

The first approach, practiced in the nineteenth century, was inseparably linked to evolutionary thought and to the elaboration of general theories concerning the origins and the growth of religion on a world scale. It was on this basis that notions such as animism and animatism were introduced into what was understood to be scientific research (hence the German name of this field, still with us, of *Religionswissenschaft*). These notions were intended to apply cross-culturally, indeed universally. There is no need to repeat what I have already said about the negative reductive tendencies implicit in such an approach. It was of course highly reductive and arbitrary, insofar as its unilinear evolutionist presuppositions were effective. But it also had some positive effects, inasmuch as it made possible the identification of conceptual, ritual, behavioral, and ethical affinities or continuities that transcended such older categories as idolatry, paganism, and superstition, which were no longer suitable for a descriptive approach.



The rise of a descriptive phenomenology of religion contributed to a further refinement of these new patterns. Take, for instance, the case of the notion of shamanism. Once shamanism was differentiated from the generic notion of animism and considered not only as a peculiar element of religious behavior but also as an element of a structure implying a cosmology and a worldview, it could contribute to the transition from an evolutionistic outlook too fond of concepts and representations to a cultural-historical study based on the discovery of cultural wholes and cultural areas. In other words, the elaboration of a more rigorous, multidimensional, and descriptive phenomenology of religion allowed the history of religions (*Religionswissenschaft*) to survive the inevitable crisis of evolutionism and its universal and unilinear stages and to enter a more rewarding phase characterized by a new form of comparison, namely cultural-historical comparison.

This new form of comparison proved effective when, at the beginning of the twentieth century, cultural-historical research was able to concentrate on area studies, as in the pioneering works of Bernhard Ankermann and Leo Frobenius (on Africa), Fritz Graebner (on Oceania), and Franz Boas (on the North Pacific). On this basis it was possible to connect phenomenological and historical research in the study of a particular group of ethnic religions belonging to nonliterate cultures. In this way the originally negative term *nonliterate* acquired positive content. Nonliterate ethnic traditions became definable on the basis of undeniable categorical continuities (e.g., shamanism) that were at the same time specific to particular areas. As a result, the so-called primitive religions ceased to be studied in terms of a procrustean bed of an alleged, indiscriminate primitivism. Such attributions now had to be demonstrated on the basis of cultural-historical inquiry. In this way the study of nonliterate religions entered with full rights into the field of religious-historical research proper. At the same time, the historian of religions was not obliged to renounce his fundamental interest in comparison and (where appropriate) study of historical development, two aspects that had been neglected by the heirs of the older anthropological methods and the practitioners of an exclusively functional social anthropological research.

**High cultures.** I have already noted that ethnic religions are found among literate as well as nonliterate cultures. In particular, the high cultures of antiquity produced ethnic religious traditions that make special demands on the historian. Study of them requires a philological competence that clearly excludes any simplistic or superficially phenomenological approach. It remains true, however, that even the historian of religions lacking such specialized knowledge can still contribute to a fuller understanding of these religions on the basis of his typological-historical experience. Take, as an example, the discovery of some of the classical characteristics of the demiurgic trickster in such diverse figures as the Greek Prometheus, the ancient Egyptian Seth, and Yurugu, also

named Ogo, of the Dogon of West Africa. This discovery and the accompanying insight into the dualistic cosmology that provides the backdrop for such figures would have been impossible for the classicist or Egyptologist working only within his own speciality. It resulted rather from the comparative method of the historian of religions. This comparative approach can be particularly successful in the comparison of the mythologies of cultures that belong to the same subcontinent but have had different histories. It could, for instance, be expected to shed much light on the difficult question of the relationships between ancient Egyptian culture and other African cultures, both in the sense of an African substratum of Egyptian culture and of an Egyptian influence on sub-Saharan Africa.

Another fascinating problem for comparative research concerns the continuities and discontinuities between the nonliterate cultures and religions on the one hand and the high cultures and their religious systems on the other. Given the differences that exist between them as well as the differences that exist within the respective traditions themselves, the question of their mutual interrelationships becomes quite complex. Particularly important is the question of the partial continuities that exist between the high gods of some nonliterate cultures and the heavenly deities who head the pantheons of some of the typical polytheistic formations in the high cultures of antiquity. This kind of partial continuity, which sometimes extends to founded and universalistic religions as well (as in the case of the God of heaven among the Israelites and the high divinity of pre-Islamic Arabia), is one of the most interesting phenomena in the history of religions.

**Monotheism and polytheism.** Closely connected to the question of continuities between cultures is the question of the exact nature of monotheism. This question has been the subject of a long debate within the history of religions. Some have claimed to find monotheism in the religions of nonliterate cultures, particularly among hunters and gatherers. Others, in contrast, have viewed it as a late phenomenon in the process of evolution, or even, as Raffaele Pettazzoni put it, as a revolutionary stance against a preceding form of polytheism. Actually these alternatives cannot be formulated so rigidly. The explicit and polemical formulations of monotheism that we find in the Bible and the Qur'an have little in common with the high gods of contemporaneous nonliterate cultures. Although the latter are not necessarily *dei otiosi*, severed from the cult and from the world of men, they are nevertheless far from the intense dynamism of the God of the Bible and the Qur'an. It must be admitted that not all religious complexes extraneous to polytheism are *ipso facto* monotheistic. The most developed polytheistic systems did not "evolve" in the direction of monotheism, nor did they express a revolutionary movement in that direction. Rather, they tended to become progressively monistic, elaborating the notion of a deity who is "polyonymous" (as is Isis in the aretalogies of the Hellenistic period) or is *pantheos*, a god containing all the gods. In its most mature form, such a deity

was conceived as “theopantistic,” that is, as identical with the cosmos and at the same time transcending it. Such is the picture of Zeus presented in an Orphic poem: “Zeus is the beginning (or head), Zeus is the middle, from Zeus all things came into existence,” or in a fragment of Aeschylus: “Zeus is all these things, and what is beyond them.” This assessment of Zeus bears comparison with the theopantistic speculation concerning the figure of Purusa in Vedic India.

It is important to realize that polytheism, as a historical type of religion, is much more specific than a merely formal notion of a plurality of gods. In fact, polytheism is not found in all types of culture, but is specifically linked to the high cultures of antiquity (and also to some in modern times, particularly in East and South Asia). These cultures characteristically possess an advanced form of cereal agriculture and show a degree of social stratification, with an attendant differentiation of classes, professions (including scribes), a priesthood and nobility, established sanctuaries, and the like. The cosmos itself is represented as having a departmental organization. Such cultures are found in the ancient Mediterranean area, and in West, South, and East Asia. Further instances can be found in the Nordic countries of Europe, in Central America and Peru, in the medieval kingdoms of the Sudan (owing to Mediterranean influences), and to an extent in Polynesia. The social and historical specificity of polytheism as a religious type would seem to require that opposition between it and monotheism become acute only in particular historical and religious situations. Such situations include the historical emergence of the Hebrew people and their religion in the Near East, the vogue of the cult of Ahura Mazda in Iran, the rise and diffusion of Christianity in the Mediterranean world, and the preaching of Muhammad against the religion of the pre-Islamic Arabs. Clearly, the problem of polytheism and its relation to monotheism is not to be solved on the basis of a general phenomenological “stratigraphy” of religion and its main forms, any more than it was solved by a unilinear evolutionism. It is not a question of relative anteriority between polytheism and monotheism, homogeneous in themselves, but of specific, noninterchangeable historical formations that can interact with different types of religious and cultural organization. Monotheistic formations may present themselves either as immemorial tradition, as a novelty, or as the message of the one God and his triumph over false deities. Other formations could have evolved into pantheons that inspired and also reflected the complex organization of the high cultures of antiquity. Roman religion, for instance, is the product of many different cultural influences, having been almost completely reshaped in the course of time on the basis of long-lasting Greek influence (particularly in its pantheon). Nevertheless, it never lost its continuity with its most primitive expressions. Among these was the notion of a heavenly god, Jupiter, who had an Indo-European heritage. This god was to dominate Roman religion under the name of Optimus Maximus, yet this did not prevent him from being assimilated to the supreme god of

the Greek pantheon, Zeus, and to all types of religious, ethical, philosophical, and symbolic notions.

I have already had occasion to note that the general type that I have identified as ethnic religions and contrasted with founded religions admits of a certain amount of internal diversity. Thus ethnic religions need not be those of nonliterate tribal societies but may also be found in more complex literate societies. I shall now introduce two further subtypes of ethnic religions, those that are scriptural and those that are national.

**Scriptural and national religions.** Some ethnic religions are in fact characterized by the existence of sacred scriptures, organized on the basis of a “canon.” Acceptance of these is considered an essential aspect of religious affiliation. The outstanding example is the function of the Vedas in Hinduism. Ethnic religions possessing scriptures exist in a situation midway between the nonscriptural religions of tribal societies, where religious affiliation is indistinguishable from the simple fact of social life, and at the other extreme, the universal religions, where the individual as such becomes a convert to the “good news” of a prophetic message written down in a book.

Another important subtype among ethnic religions is that of the national religions, those cults that promote a national and political consciousness. This is the case with state Shinto as practiced in some periods of Japanese history, with some forms of Hinduism, with Zoroastrianism in the Sasanid empire, and with the official cults in ancient Rome, such as the cult of Capitoline Jupiter and the cult of the emperor. It must be added that some of the founded religions may initially embrace a national outlook. Islam, for instance, may have been conceived originally as a prophetic message addressed to the Arab nation, although, to be sure, it is considered to be the final form of the historical revelation of God. The situation is similar in Judaism, whose universalism was mediated through the entire course of Hebrew history. There were also particular occasions when Christianity, though possessed of a universalist message, became bound up with specific national, cultural, and political interests, as, for instance, those of the Byzantine empire.

**Founded religions.** I shall now look more closely at the founded religions, which include, in addition to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the religions of Zarathushtra (Zoroaster) and the Buddha, the religion of the Sikhs, and, with certain qualifications, the plethora of prophetic-nativistic cults and the “new religions.” These traditions, which all trace their origin to a specific historical founder, raise fundamental historical questions. When a religion is founded, this obviously takes place in a cultural milieu already characterized by specific religious notions and institutions. The relation of the prophet or founder and his original followers to this milieu may vary considerably, depending on whether the preceding religious environment had been predominantly of the ethnic type or had already known prophets and forerunners. In general there is a vivid sense of novelty in the founda-

tion of these religions, sometimes even a revolutionary novelty. The founder nevertheless often conceives his mission as in part a restoration of primordial values long since lost. In some cases this question of partial continuity is decisive and helps illuminate the religious quality of the founder's message. This can be seen in the case of Buddhism. Many of the notions fundamental to Buddhist doctrine, such as *dharmā*, *karman*, *saṃsāra*, and *mokṣa*, already played an important religious role in India at the time of the Buddha. An understanding of the Buddha's appropriation and modification of these terms is thus of great importance for a typological assessment of his message as a "religious" message, bound up with the religious traditions that preceded him.

Among the founded religions the universal religions stand out as a definite subtype. These religions are based on a universal message of salvation, not limited to any particular group, ethnic or otherwise. They are characterized both by eschatological and otherworldly perspectives and by strong this-worldly ethical and social commitments. Their message is addressed to the individual and demands conversion and adherence to a religious community that, in sociological terms, may be described as a church. This community typically undergoes a rapid initial expansion, sometimes suffers persecution, and actively engages in missionary activities aimed at making new converts. These characteristics clearly distinguish the universal religions from the ethnic and national religions, even though, as noted above, universal religions may occasionally become closely associated with specific cultures.

The emphasis on a universal message and personal conversion in response to it, an emphasis that transcends all racial and social barriers, differentiates the universalistic religions from the cults of antiquity that were sometimes their rivals. These cults, such as the mystery religions, would be better described as cosmopolitan rather than universal. Unlike commitment to any of the universal religions, participation in such cults could coexist with whatever other religious commitments an individual might have had, such as to the gods of the tribe, city, or state; the universal religions, however, demanded the individual's total allegiance.

This contrast becomes less clear in the case of the syncretistic tendencies found at the popular levels of the universal religions. Christianity and Islam, for instance, have been influenced, in some of their popular or ethnic manifestations in South America and Africa respectively, by local traditions of animism or "spiritism." The same lack of a clear differentiation between the universal and the local is found in the prophetic-nativistic cults that reinterpret the message of the great universal religions in strictly local terms, although not infrequently these same cults are inimical to preexisting forms of local magic and sorcery.

The case of Buddhism is somewhat unique. Although it displays many of the features that were attributed above to the universal religions, it nevertheless resembles the mystery cults of antiquity in its ability to coexist, in the belief

system of a single individual and in a single cultural milieu, with other forms of locally preexistent religious belief and practice. This is especially evident in contemporary Japan, where a single individual may have a double allegiance to Buddhism and Shinto, according to the circumstances. The rather peculiar status of the universalism of Buddhism is linked to the equally peculiar status of Buddhism as a "religion."

Finally, another historical type of religion is comprised of those mysteriosophic (i.e., Orphic) and Gnostic movements of antiquity and the Middle Ages that drew heavily on the universal religions of Christianity, Islam, and Zoroastrianism, borrowing many of their basic terms but totally reshaping them to suit their own needs. This procedure is found as well in the scientific theosophy of some contemporary Gnostics, whose reinterpretations of the basic tenets of different religions are for the most part superficial.

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**HITTITE RELIGION.** The exact origin of the Hittites, an Indo-European people, is not known. Invading Asia Minor from the east, by the middle of the second millennium BCE they had established an empire covering the greater part of that region. Their empire declined after 1200 BCE, owing to Indo-European invasions and the growing power of Assyria.

**NAMES OF GODS.** Knowledge about Hittite society, culture, and religion has increased since the deciphering of their cuneiform writing, on clay tablets found early in the twentieth century CE at Bogazköy (in Turkey). Hittite society was ethnically and linguistically diverse, with Hattian, Hurrian, and even some Semitic elements, and this diversity is evident in the divine names.

The earliest identifiable stratum is the Hattian. The Hattians were resident in central Anatolia before the Indo-European Hittites arrived. They had a long tradition of settled urban life. It is understandable that a people open to influences from its neighbors, as the Hittites were, would early adopt the worship of Hattian deities. Because the Hattic language is still very poorly understood, one can only partially understand the meanings of the divine names. Some are common nouns for elements of nature: *Eshtan* (“sun, day”), *Izzishtanu* (“favorable day”), *Kashku* (“moon”), *Kait* (“grain”). Others denote status: *Kattahha* (“queen”), *Wurunkatte* (“king of the land”), *Shulinkatte* (“king of the *suli*”), *Kattishhabi* (“king god”), *Teteshhawi* (“great god”).

The Hurrian language is better understood than Hattic. Still, because the number of Hurrian words that can be translated is not large, it is not possible to interpret many Hurrian divine names. The influence of Sumerian and Akkadian religious vocabulary and divine epithets is obvious. Aya, Ishhara, Ellil (Enlil), Anu, and Alalu were originally Mesopotamian deities.

**NATURE OF DEITY.** In Hittite art the gods were depicted either by their animal totems or anthropomorphically. The

texts concur in depicting them in human terms. Gods needed to eat, drink, sleep, and exercise. They needed companionship, ego-building, and love (including sexual intercourse). They made mistakes through lack of knowledge. They could be deceived. They needed to be informed by others. Each possessed a specialized skill that put him in demand by both mortals and other gods. In myths gods were born and died (i. e., were killed). But very little, if anything, indicates that they aged or became senile. That what they did was not always just or fair is clear from the prayers, in which the human petitioner chides them for mistakes and pleads for fair treatment. Although no god was omniscient, some possessed very wide knowledge and every god was superior to humans in knowledge. In instructions to priests and temple officials, mortals who thought to conceal their offenses from a god were warned of the futility of the attempt. Although every god was more powerful than any mortal, none was omnipotent, and degrees of power were quite diverse among them.

**FUNCTIONS OF A DEITY.** As each mortal had his rank and function in human society, so each deity had his position and role, not only among his fellow deities but in concourse with humanity and the cosmos.

**General functions.** While it is not possible to completely reconstruct the hierarchy of Hittite deities, it is clear that in convocations of gods certain figures naturally assumed leadership. In the Old Hittite vanishing-god myths it is the storm god who presides. But although he presides, he is not always able to enforce his will on the other gods. He must ask advice, plead his case, and seek volunteers for missions. Occasionally he is able to command another figure.

Hierarchical organization is also seen in the New Hittite pantheon. There is a fixed sequence in the god-lists in the state treaties, and there is an order of both gods and goddesses in the processional reliefs at Yazilikaya, near Bogazköy. In the myths *Kingship in Heaven* and *The Kingship of the God Lamma* may be seen how rival factions fight over the position of king of the gods. The god Lamma boasts that his exalted position allows him to control the other gods. In the prayers of Hattusilis III and of his queen, Puduhepa, lower-ranked gods are requested to present the mortals' prayers favorably to their superiors in the pantheon. To be sure, the question is not entirely one of rank. The intercessor god is usually a favorite child or grandchild of the senior god. Indeed, the hierarchy described is that of a large, extended family in which the patriarch and matriarch possess considerable power to direct their descendants and the descendants of their brothers and sisters.

In their prayers the Hittites reminded the gods that they required worshipers who would bring regular food-offerings; thus it was in their own interest that they protect and bless the community of faithful worshipers. But aside from this maintenance of the cult, mortal assistance was rarely needed by the gods. In a mythological context one sees examples in the two versions of the Illuyanka myth. The disabled storm

god must be helped to vanquish his adversary, the great serpent Illuyanka. On the divine level he is assisted by the goddess Inara. She in turn, for no obvious reason, needs the help of the mortal Hupashiya, which she bargains for by consenting to have sexual intercourse with him. But though she subsequently lives with him as a sex partner, she dominates him completely and apparently punishes his unfaithfulness to her with death. Outside of the mythological texts, when a god needed the service of a mortal he revealed himself through omen, oracle, or dream. His request was always viewed as a command, which could not be ignored.

Gods “served” mortals by ensuring material prosperity, protecting them from enemies and natural catastrophes, hearing their prayers, making known to them their sins, and forgiving them (sometimes after a punishment). Although the Hittites apparently believed in an afterlife, at least for their kings and queens, there is no evidence that they prayed or made sacrifices in order to obtain life after death or a better quality of existence in that afterlife.

**Specialized functions.** Just as there were storm gods who sent rain and winds to fertilize the crops and make them prosper, so there were deities of grain and vineyards, deities of the rivers who gave water for irrigation, deities of springs, deities of the forest, and deities of wildlife who gave success in hunting. Under the influence of Mesopotamian concepts, the sun god Ishtanu was the all-seeing dispenser of justice to humans and even to animals. There were war gods (the Zababa type) who gave victory to the Hittite armies. There was a god who could confer invisibility on the Hittite troops and enable them to attack the enemy by surprise. There were deities who sent and withdrew plagues, both upon the Hittites and their enemies. There were deities of human sexual potency. And although one might ask one’s personal god for any of these boons, there were divine specialists for many tasks.

**PANTHEON.** The Hittites called the aggregate of gods and goddesses “the thousand gods,” and there may indeed have been that many. The total number of divine names known from the tablets and inscriptions is slightly more than six hundred, a total arrived at by culling the entire written corpus. The number of deities worshiped in any one Hittite city or town would be much smaller. Lists of divine names are found in state treaties, where the gods of both contracting parties are invoked to ensure that the oaths taken will be kept. Divine names are sometimes listed together with offerings to be made to them either at a particular festival or during the course of a year. In the famous imperial sanctuary at Yazilikaya, carved in low relief on the walls of the sanctuary, is a dual procession of gods and goddesses, the males proceeding from left to right and the females from right to left, with the chief male and female deities meeting at the architectural focus point. The total number of divine figures in the preserved parts of the two processions is seventy-one. This assemblage represents the official imperial pantheon of the last half century of the Hittite kingdom. It is a complete-

ly Hurrianized pantheon, with deities of the Hattian and Hittite-Luwian strata syncretized, where possible, with Hurrian deities. This process of syncretism made possible a considerable reduction in the total number of deities, because several could be included under one (in this case, Hurrian) name. Other divine names in the inscriptions may represent either gods without a cult (e.g. purely literary figures) or gods from cult sites away from the capital who were never admitted into the official state cult.

**MYTHOLOGY.** Mythological texts in the Hittite language may be subdivided into two groups: those of Anatolian origin and those of foreign origin. Myths deriving from Old Hittite originals are all Anatolian. The deities who figure in the Old Hittite Telepinu and Illuyanka myths and the other disappearing-god myths are a mix of what Emmanuel Laroche calls Hattian and Asianic. The myth of the moon falling from heaven occurs in both a Hattic and a Hittite version. There is very little about the Hittite version that linguistically recalls Old Hittite, yet it is surely possible that a long tradition of recopying has removed almost all traces of its original Old Hittite language. Although Kamrushepa is a Hittite replacement for the original Hattic name of this goddess of magic, there is no reason to doubt that the myths in which she figures also belong to this Hattian group. All of the Anatolian myths are associated with incantations or rituals. The myths of non-Anatolian origin are all post-Old Hittite. They are generally independent of any incantation or ritual. One exception is the Ashertu myth, part of which describes a ritual to exorcize and purify Baal.

**Vanishing-god myths.** These myths, the best known of which is about the god Telepinu, are paradigms for dealing with natural catastrophes such as drought, blight, and diseases affecting livestock. The god who disappears must be located, appeased, and brought back. On the mythological level this is accomplished by nonhuman agents. The bee searches for, finds, and stings awake the sleeping god. The goddess Kamrushepa carries out a ritual to appease him. When transferred to the real world of those who are suffering from such a catastrophe, the search for the missing god entails a determination by oracle of which god is angry. Texts recording such oracular inquiry are extremely common in the New Hittite period, but have now been identified in the Old Hittite script, showing that his procedure was probably as common in the earlier period as in the later one. The pacification and return of the god is accomplished by a magic ritual of the type called *mugawar* in Hittite. Directions for such *mugawars* accompany the vanishing-god myths; other *mugawars* are described in ritual texts. It is a characteristic ritual form among the Hittites.

**Illuyanka myths.** Two stories on the same tablet are about the conflict between the storm god and his antagonist, the great serpent Illuyanka. *Illuyanka* is in fact not a name but a common noun, meaning “serpent” or “snake.” But this particular reptile is clearly large and strong enough to have once defeated and disabled the storm god. In both stories the



initially defeated storm god secures the help of a mortal who utilizes a trick to help the storm god triumph in his return match with the reptile. In the first version the goddess Inara and her mortal partner, Hupashiya, make Illuyanka and his brood drunk so that they cannot go back down into their hole in the ground. While they are helplessly drunk, Hupashiya ties them up, and when the storm god comes he is able to kill them. In the second version the storm god's own son by a mortal woman marries the daughter of Illuyanka and apparently uses his right as a son-in-law to ask a gift from Illuyanka. He receives his father's eyes and heart, which he passes on to the storm god. Renewed in his powers, the storm god defeats Illuyanka.

Like the vanishing-god myths, these two stories express natural catastrophes in the mythological terms of a disabled storm god. The disabled god is incapable of restoring himself and needs mortal cooperation, which is but a mythological counterpart of the actual mortal activity in the realm of magic rituals. The breakdown in nature is expressed mythologically as a giant serpent that must be subdued and killed. Reptiles are not a common symbol of evil in Hittite, but it is a fact that in the New Hittite myth of Hedammu a giant reptile is opposed by the goddess Ishtar. Unlike other Hittite myths, the first version of the Illuyanka story is localized, through the mention of the land of Tarukka, in north-central Anatolia. The second version takes place near an unnamed sea.

**Kumarbi cycle.** The theme of this group of stories is kingship among the gods. In *Kingship in Heaven* kingship is first held by Alalu, one of a previous generation of gods, who at the time of the Hittite storyteller are envisaged as dwelling in the netherworld and who bear the name "former gods." After a mere nine years of reign Alalu is driven from his throne by his erstwhile cupbearer, Anu, and he takes refuge in the netherworld. Alalu's own son, Kumarbi, becomes Anu's cupbearer for nine years. Then Anu and Kumarbi do battle, and Kumarbi drives his father's usurper from the throne. Because Anu (Sum., An) was the god of the sky, he tries to escape to the sky. But Kumarbi catches him, drags him down, and emasculates him by biting off and swallowing his genitals. Anu curses Kumarbi and prophesies the birth, from the swallowed genitals, of the god who will ultimately displace Kumarbi. Because Kumarbi is Alalu's son, he hopes to prevent his own removal by Anu's issue. This is the motivation for the emasculation. But fate cannot be denied. The genitals produce in Kumarbi several gods who are "born" from him, one of whom is Teshub, the storm god, who eventually deposes Kumarbi. In the *Song of Ullikummi* the deposed Kumarbi produces issue of his own, a great stone monster conceived by his intercourse with a huge rock, to depose and destroy Teshub. Another myth in this cycle, the *Kingship of Lamma*, also treats the theme of kingship among the gods. Thus the entire cycle of Kumarbi myths deals with struggle among the gods for supremacy.

**Tales of Appu, the Cow and the Fisherman, and the Hunter Keshshi.** These stories, of which unfortunately only

a portion is preserved, were edited almost forty years ago as Hurrian tales in Hittite translation. But it is now known that only the Keshshi story has a Hurrian background. No names in the Appu story, either of gods or humans, are Hurrian, although the geographical setting appears to be somewhere to the east of Mesopotamia. Nor is there any indication of Hurrian elements in the *Cow and the Fisherman*. The fisherman's city is Urma, which is unlocalized. Keshshi marries a woman with the Hurrian name Shintalimeni, whose brother is Udubsharri. The theme of the Appu story is twofold: (1) One cannot escape the fate that marks one at birth; and (2) although evil appears to prevail for a time, the justice of the gods will ultimately triumph. Appu has two sons, to whom the names Unjust and Just are given, and they grow up to fulfill their names. Unjust takes advantage of Just until their case comes to the attention of the gods. And although the end of the story is on a part of the tablet that has broken away, the short prooemium introducing the story predicts the end: The gods always vindicate the just and destroy the unjust.

Not enough is preserved of the *Cow and Fisherman* to discern a theme. Very little is preserved also of the Keshshi story, but it appears that Keshshi has angered the gods by neglecting their cult and doting on his new wife, and that he will suffer for this.

**Baal, Elkunirsha, and Ashertu.** This West Semitic myth about three deities, familiar from the Ugartic myths and the Old Testament, was somewhat inaccurately translated into Hittite. Clues to the wording of the West Semitic original can be found in those places where *parallelismus membrorum* in the original was distorted in translation. The story itself resembles the incident of the patriarch Joseph and Potiphar's wife. Ashertu propositions Baal, and when he refuses, she threatens to get even. He reports the incident to her husband, Elkunirsha, who gives him permission to humble her. He does so, telling her that he has killed her sons. Thereupon Ashertu laments their death and eventually becomes reconciled to Elkunirsha, even turning him against Baal. Ishtar (Astarte), Baal's sister, overhears them plotting against her brother and flies "like a bird" to meet him in the desert, where she warns him. There the tablet breaks off, leaving the narrative unfinished. An attached ritual describes the purification of Baal, which probably followed some injury to him connected with this plot.

**THE HITTITE TEMPLE.** Six Hittite temples have been excavated at Bogazköy. In addition to the cella, where the cult image of the deity was found, each contained a number of rooms that were used to house the permanent personnel and to store temple revenues. Each temple had a central courtyard. Worshipers crossing the courtyard from the temple entrance passed through a portico into the cella, which apparently could accommodate only priests and a small number of worshipers. Some larger temples, such as the principal temple in the lower city at Bogazköy (Temple I), may have contained two or more cellae and therefore housed the cult

images of more than one god. In the terminology of the texts, therefore, going from the “house” of god A to the “house” of god B might have been possible without leaving the confines of a single multiroomed structure.

As in other cultures, the Hittite temple—through its craftsmen personnel, its real estate farmed by sharecroppers, and its shares of booty taken by the king in battle—generated a large amount of revenue. Because of the lack of private economic documents, it cannot be discerned whether in Hatti, as in Babylonia, the temple served as a lending agency, similar to a modern bank. It is not, however, improbable that it did so.

**Cult images.** Although, thanks to rock reliefs depicting Hittite gods and goddesses, researchers have some idea of the appearance of their cult images, these latter (being made of precious metals, which would have been carried off by the destroyers of Bogazköy) have not survived. Small images in gold or silver have indeed survived, but the full-size cult images that stood in the temple cella have not. About these there is information in the inventory texts called statue descriptions, which give a fairly good idea of the appearance of the statues. Here is a quoted example.

The Storm God of Invocation: a gold statue of a standing man with wings coming out of his shoulders. In his right hand he holds a gold ax. In his left hand a gold symbol of good. He stands on an *awitti*-animal, its teeth plated with silver, its chest plated with gold. To the left and right of the wings stand [the attendant goddesses] Ninatta and Kulitta. The Storm God of the Sky: a gold-plated statue of a seated man. In his right hand he holds a *hattalla*-club. In his left hand he holds a gold symbol of good. On top of two mountain gods, portrayed as standing men, silver-plated. Underneath is a silver base. Two silver rhytons. . . . The Storm God of the House: a silver model of a bull's head and neck, facing forward. . . . The Warrior God (Zababa): a silver statue of a standing man. In his right hand he holds a *tukul*-mace. In his left hand he holds a shield. Underneath stands a lion. Under the lion is a silver-plated base. . . . one silver *ashshuzeri*-vessel. He has no attendant. Sun God of the Sky: a silver statue of a seated man. On his head are silver fishes. Beneath him is a wooden base.

From reports of oracle inquiries one learns that the god was thought to be angered when the platings of gold and silver on his statue became worn. When an oracle indicated this, the king had to instruct goldsmiths or silversmiths to replat the image.

**Temple personnel.** Periodically, the king commissioned a census of the temples of the realm. Each city, town, or village was listed with its deities and temple(s). For each deity the census listed two types of male clergy and one type of female clergy. If for any reason a sanctuary lost any of its quota of clergy, it was restaffed. A small staff of two or three clergy was necessary even for a small sanctuary; in the main temple at Bogazköy there were many more. No term corresponding to *high priest* is known in Hittite, but a presiding official for the large, urban temples must have existed.

The larger temples also maintained a staff of craftsmen. A list of the craftsmen employed in the main temple at Bogazköy enumerates goldsmiths and silversmiths, potters, leatherworkers, stonecutters, engravers, weavers, kitchen personnel, and various kinds of musicians. They lived and worked in a precinct just south of the main temple complex. Surviving texts describe the elaborate measures taken to ensure the ritual purity of these temple workers and their counterparts who served the needs of the king. Temple watchmen patrolled the precincts night and day to guard against fire and the intrusion of unwanted “unclean” animals. Visitors had to be escorted by temple guards from the main entrance to their appointments inside the temple and back to the exit once their business was done. Unauthorized persons were not allowed access to the holy precincts. In general, foreigners were not allowed in the Hittite temple; only privileged foreigners, perhaps ambassadors at the court, were allowed admittance under special circumstances.

**Cultus.** As stated above, the gods were treated like rich and powerful men. The description of the transporting of the images uses verbs inappropriate to the transporting of living persons, indicating that the Hittites were well aware that the image was not in fact the god but merely symbolized his presence. Still, the image was treated with the same deference that would be paid to any important personage. It was put to bed at night in the god's bedroom. In the morning it was aroused, washed and groomed, presented with food, and brought out to its cult platform for the day's round of receiving visitors (priests, dignitaries, and so on). On festival days it was put on a litter and carried through the streets to a pleasant meadow outside the city, where ceremonies, prayers, offerings, and even music, acrobatics, and games were performed to entertain the deity. The invisible divine beings symbolized by these statues were also viewed as leading a busy and active life. Ritual prayers invoking their presence in times of great need recognized that the god in question might have gone on a journey to the mountains or even to some foreign land.

No extant tablet contains the entire cultic calendar for the temples of Bogazköy. Texts describing festivals, however, make it evident that the busiest seasons of the year for festivals were fall and spring. The summer was occupied with harvesting and with the king's annual military campaigns. In the winter it was too cold for the outside activity often required at festivals, although it is now known that the Festival of the Year took place toward the end of the winter. There exist elaborate descriptions of some of the major festivals and lists naming many other festivals about which relatively little is known. The personal participation of the king (and sometimes also the queen) was very important. At times of military crisis a king might even have to leave command of the armies to a subordinate in order to return to Bogazköy to celebrate a religious festival. Not to do so constituted an unforgivable affront to the gods that could prove disastrous.

The activities of worship were prayer (addressing the god either to invoke, praise, or petition him), sacrifice (pre-

senting to the god gifts of food and drink), and entertainment (music, games, reciting myths). The musical instruments were drums, stringed and reed instruments, and horns. Singing was done in any of various languages, depending upon the deity's ethnolinguistic background: Hattic, Luwian, Hittite, Palaic, Hurrian, or Babylonian. In the cult of the Hattian gods a lead singer and a chorus sang antiphonally. Hattian deities were addressed in worship under two names: the name used among mortals and that among the gods.

The premise underlying all Hittite prayer is that gods thought like mortals and could be influenced by pleasant words and gifts. The paradigm for the divine-human relationship was a master-slave one. A human could expect from his divine lord or lady just what a slave could from his master.

More than one Hittite noun was used to designate what may be called "prayer." *Mugawar* (*mugesshar*) referred to the invocation of the god's presence through words and ritual acts. Praise, adulation, and adoration were called *wallyiyatar*; petition was *wekuwar*. Reply to accusations of sin (i.e., self-justification or protestation of innocence) was *arkuwar*. A single Hittite prayer often contained several of these types of expression.

Sacrifices were made of domestic animals, principally bulls, cows, sheep, and goats. For certain Hurrian rituals, birds were sacrificed. The cult never prescribed the sacrifice of a wild animal. The animal was killed and its meat prepared to serve as the god's food; no expiatory use was ever made of the blood of the sacrifice.

Animals given to the god were to be healthy specimens. Persons who knowingly substituted scrawny or unhealthy animals for healthy ones were guilty of a serious offense. In some rituals alternate, less expensive victims were accepted from poor worshipers. All sacrifices were to be presented promptly at the prescribed time, and delayed sacrifices or rituals were not accepted. Priests were warned in instructive texts not to tolerate excuses from worshipers who wished to postpone required rites of sacrifice. Especially appropriate at the time of their first harvesting were vegetable and grain offerings; they too had to be brought promptly.

**REVELATION.** The gods communicated their will to mortals in several ways. A surviving oracle text in Old Hittite script proves that oracular inquiry already existed at that time. In the Old Hittite *Telepinu Proclamation*, warnings from the gods about serious offenses came through the words of the "men of the gods," whom a number of scholars have taken to be prophets of some type. A third method—dreams—is not attested earlier than the New Kingdom. Communication of a god's will to a king, queen, or prince is first mentioned in the prayers of Mursilis II and first attested in the childhood of Hattusilis III, the son of Mursilis II. At a certain point in a ritual for a man suffering from sexual impotence, the sufferer is instructed to sleep in a holy place and report his dreams.

**SIN, DEATH, AND THE AFTERLIFE.** Several Hittite words are translated as "sin," "offense," or "crime." Those occurring in prayers are *washtai-*, *washtul*, and *shalla-kardatar*. The first two refer to a deed with evil or unpleasant consequences and in most cases they must be translated as "sin." But either "sin" or "offense" can be expressed by the word *haratar*. A particularly serious offense of a special sexual nature is *hurkel*, which in most instances coincides with what one would call incest. *Shallakardatar* is a deliberate and high-handed offense against a deity.

From the Hittite point of view, sins against the gods could be deliberate or accidental. In either case they had to be identified, confessed, and (in most cases) corrected. Identification of sins committed unwittingly was possible only through consulting the god by oracle. The process was an involved one. By posing questions requiring only a "yes" or "no" answer one gradually narrowed the field of possibilities until a specific offense was determined. Then the question was posed: "Is the god angry for this reason only, and not for any additional reason?" If the answer to this was "yes," the inquiry was terminated. If "no," the inquiry continued until the final cause was identified.

Confession necessitated a promise to make amends. If the offense was the neglect of some religious duty such as a sacrifice, the offender promised to make up the sacrifice, sometimes with a greater outlay of offerings. Two Hittite words denoted gifts to make amends for these sins of neglect: *sharnikzel* and *mashkan*. The former also referred to compensation for injury or breach of contract in civil law, while the latter in profane usage meant a gift or bribe. If the gods punished a person for committing a sin, this did not absolve the sinner from the obligations of confession and compensation. Animal sacrifices were not used to expiate sin, nor did the compensatory gifts mentioned above constitute an expiation. Rather, one's offense against a god was viewed as completely analogous to his offense against another person, and the terminology (e.g., *sharnikzel*) was identical.

Relatively little is said in the surviving Hittite texts about the fate of the deceased after death. The Old Hittite Kantuzzili prayer rather philosophically observes that if one were to go on living under the present circumstances eternally, that might turn out to be a nightmare, for the ills of this life would become eternal. This would turn out to be a grievance (*kattawatar*), that is, a ground for complaint against the gods. In the description of the lengthy ritual for cremation and interring of the ashes of a dead king is the information that certain farming implements were burned in order to accompany the deceased king to the next life, so that he might cultivate the soil there. In the Hittite laws, a clause dealing with a wife's predeceasing her husband decrees that before her dowry can be released to her widowed husband, he must burn certain of her personal possessions. This burning doubtless served the same purpose as the burning of the farming implements for the dead king. In many cultures, items of personal value to the deceased are placed in the grave

with the dead body, a practice strongly suggesting use of the articles in an afterlife. In the case of the Hittite king the texts explicitly confirm this interpretation. Descendants of the dead man continued to make offerings to his spirit. This practice is also attested in Hittite texts. In one instance, King Muwatallis, when he moved the royal residence from Bogazköy to Tarhuntassa, transferred to the new residence the statues of the gods and the “dead [ancestors].”

A Hittite religious belief maintained that the spirit of a dead person with a grievance against a living person might continue to haunt the latter until the grievance was resolved. The precise nature of the grievance was determined in the same way as sins against a god: by oracular investigation. When the grievance had been resolved and the spirit had been pacified, the deceased was “set on the road,” that is, was sent on his or her way to the abode of the dead.

Hittite texts never reveal where that abode was. The Hittite cosmology allowed for a heaven above, where most of the gods dwelled, and the netherworld beneath, where the remainder lived. But it is not known if the dead resided in either of these places. In a ritual intended to remove certain evils and safely dispose of them forever where they could not harm humankind, the dead were magically put into large copper vessels and covered with lids of lead. According to one version of the incantation, these vessels were at the bottom of the sea; according to the other version, in the netherworld. This, of course, does not prove that the spirits of the dead were confined in the netherworld. It only suggests that unwelcome things were kept there.

SEE ALSO Hurrian Religion.

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HARRY A. HOFFNER, JR. (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**HMONG RELIGION** SEE SOUTHEAST ASIAN RELIGIONS, *ARTICLE ON MAINLAND CULTURES*

**HOBBS, THOMAS** (1588–1679) features in intellectual histories as a philosopher and a political theorist and his *Leviathan* as one of the most important political treatises ever written in English. During the last decades of the twentieth century, though, Hobbes came to be regarded as a writer significantly relevant to the history of religious ideas and his *Leviathan* as an early example of a vogue of rational criticism of the Bible that was to become current in the nineteenth century.

**LIFE.** Hobbes was born in Malmesbury, England, on April 5, 1588. He recalls in his verse autobiography that his mother brought forth “twins at once, both me and fear” for she had given birth when the Spanish Armada was approaching the English coast. Hobbes entered Magdalen Hall, Oxford University, in 1603, and immediately after he earned his de-

gree he was offered employment by William Cavendish as tutor of his son. Hobbes remained attached to the Cavendish family throughout his life. Scholars have stressed the classical-humanistic twist in Hobbes's intellectual upbringing as one of the clues that may explain his later standing as a prominent figure in a "European republic of letters" (Malcolm, 2002, p. 474). Although Noel Malcolm's remark refers to Hobbes's posthumous fortune, the roots of this late intellectual prestige are found in the dense network of personal contacts and acquaintances he managed to set up in the course of a number of trips to the Continent as a tutor, as a private man of letters, and later as a refugee from English religious strife. It is worth noting that Hobbes published his masterwork, *Leviathan*, in Paris in 1651. As to Hobbes's elderly years, what is striking is his constant preoccupation with withstanding the attacks of people as well as institutions whose sympathy he had managed to alienate (e.g., the universities, one of the major targets of his polemical concerns) and his interest in exposing the "lies" of his religious adversaries. Indeed the word *Hobbism* became a major current of discourse to label doctrines with a ring of atheism and immorality.

**THE STATE OF NATURE.** Hobbes's early philosophical works include the *Elements of Law* and *De Cive*, where Hobbes addresses religious issues in ways that prelude the more thorough and lavish treatment of Christian religion in *Leviathan* as well as in such later works as the *Historia Ecclesiastica* and the Appendix to the Latin edition of *Leviathan*. That Hobbes, as A. P. Martinich has argued in *The Two Gods of Leviathan* (1992), did not mean to divorce theology from his general philosophical project becomes apparent if one takes a closer look into the subtitle (*The Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil*) and the famous frontispiece of *Leviathan*. The subtitle yields insights on how to decipher the latter, which in fact is construed as a sort of emblem, featuring a giant visible from the waist up, wielding in his right hand a scepter, a symbol of the civil power, and in the left a crosier, a symbol of the ecclesiastical power. Across the foreground, before the vigilant gaze of the giant, stretches the image of a well-ordered community, probably reminiscent of the pages in which Hobbes contends that industry, culture of the earth, use of commodities, and so on only take place in times of peace. Hobbes alleges that peace is nothing but a quick and tentative lapse from what he calls the "natural condition of mankind," which is a condition of enduring war, where "war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary" (*Leviathan*, 13, p. 8). Thus the frontispiece's image of the well-ordered state is the image of an artifact, something that cannot be found in nature. Therefore Hobbes distances himself from Aristotle, who in his *Politics* had pointed out that the state "belongs to the class of things that exist by nature."

**THE LAWS OF NATURE AND THE SOVEREIGN.** The natural disposition of humans to war ensues from Hobbes's radical nominalism, namely, from his belief that humans cannot

agree upon what is good. By rejecting the existence of an agreed-upon natural good, Hobbes destroys the rational teleology steeped in the Aristotelian underpinnings of the major philosophical and theological currents of the time. Given that the words *good* and *evil* "are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so" (*Leviathan*, 6, p. 7), there is no way to detect a natural good by means of one's own private discernment. Thus agreement and accord are commodities hardly to be found in nature. Human intellect, though, provides the means by which human beings can anticipate the vantage of a social accord and so escape the state of nature: Hobbes calls these means "laws of nature." Thus Hobbesian individuals are bound to escape this natural predicament and reach a safer condition, whose distinctive feature is its artificiality. These natural individuals have forced themselves to abide by the laws of nature by giving up their natural right *in omnia* to a third party, which from now on will be entitled to establish what is right and what is wrong, namely, to transform the natural laws into commandments made effective by the third party's irresistible will.

What is striking here is that the laws of nature are coterminous with the laws of God. Hobbes was concerned throughout with how to prevent people from attaining a private apprehension of the laws of God and, in this way, bypassing the dictates of the lawful sovereign. Hobbes's crucial question in the third book of *Leviathan* was not the one that had traditionally puzzled the exegetes of the Scriptures, namely, "from whence the Scriptures derive their Authority," but rather "by what Authority they are made Law" (*Leviathan*, 42, p. 36). Hobbes was wary of the consequences that would fall upon the state if the sovereign were deprived of his authority. Hobbes was particularly wary of those "deceivers," namely, self-appointed interpreters of the word of God, who set about persuading people that a workable shortcut to the kingdom of God was already at hand in this world. One of the conditions Hobbes indicates for social stability is that citizens have "to be taught that they ought not be led with admiration of the virtue of any of their fellow subjects" (*Leviathan*, 30, p. 8). Any impulse to admire one's neighbor (modern moral philosophers would use the words *partiality* or *attachment* instead of *admiration*) is potentially conducive to the eroding of the very basis of social stability.

**ABUSES OF THE SCRIPTURE.** According to Hobbes, a typical "abuse of the Scripture" sustains a workable natural law that is said to convey the mystical installment of the kingdom before the end of time. This law, though natural insofar as it bypasses the will of the sovereign, could turn out to be at odds with "the doctrine established by him whom God hath set in the place of Moses" (*Leviathan*, 40, p. 8). Hobbes tracks down a time in which God had reigned directly over humans, and this image of a peaceful *arché*, in which God governs humans, can already be found in Plato (*Statesman*, 271 e). Yet during the time of "regeneration"—as Hobbes calls the time frame "between the ascension and the general resurrection" (*Leviathan*, 42, p. 7)—with God withdrawn



from earth, humans cannot but obey the laws promulgated by their earthly sovereign. A difficulty that immediately arises concerns those individuals who “confound Lawes with Right,” for they “continue still to doe what is permitted by divine Right, notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civill Law” (*De Cive*, 14, p. 3). The political problem individuals have to address as soon as they reject the direct domination of God consists in setting up enduring institutions in the absence of God’s commandments and possibly avoiding the risk of taking “for His law whatsoever is propounded by every man in His name” (*Leviathan*, 42, p. 46).

**BIBLICAL HISTORY.** Hobbes, as Paul in the synagogue of Antiochia (*Acts* 13:16–41), expounds a narrative of biblical history, starting from the exile of the people of God in Egypt through the announcement of the second coming of Christ. Biblical history constitutes the meaning-making framework in which the birth of *Leviathan* takes place. The narrative of biblical history becomes a “politically authoritative history,” and it is worth noting that the “tendency to disregard biblical history has been particularly evident, for example, in many contemporary discussions of Hobbes and Locke for whom, it is often argued, the nonhistorical social contract is their seminal contribution to the history of political thought” (Mitchell, 1993, p. 5).

This refusal to provide historical investigation of the intellectual roots of modernity with the backing of a specific authoritative history has somehow impaired the ability to make sense of those parts of Hobbes’s work mostly concerned with religion. But taking biblical history as a politically authoritative history is not just a workable technique for highlighting those bits of texts that have not received much consideration by scholars: if one assumes that biblical history refers to both the narrative account of sacred events and the political history of the biblical text, namely, the history “of its establishment, in particular circumstances, as an authoritative text” (Malcolm, 2002, p. 427), then it is by restoring the authoritativeness of biblical history that one can see how, underlying the materialism and reductionism of modern exegesis, there might be a latent reception of the Hobbesian text. The Catholic theologian Peter Henrici pointed out that there would not be any reason to puzzle about the “reductionist techniques of interpretation performed by Hobbes, if these techniques had not become the exegetical canon of the theology of the kingdom of God over two centuries—from Spinoza to protestant theology in XIX century” (Henrici, 1986, p. 134).

**POLITICAL THEOLOGY.** Modern debates concerning the issue of political theology have contributed to opening up “a new historical horizon for the interpretation of Hobbes” (Schmitt, 1984, p. 108). The opening of such a new horizon enabled the overcoming of the standard account of Hobbes’s philosophy as a brand of rational skepticism. Debates on political theology have raised significant questions concerning secularization and the meaning of technology in the modern age. Political theology does not just entail the mutually illu-

minating encounter between rationalist philosophy and a faith-ruled policy guided ultimately by the authority of the Bible. A crucial problem for political theology is that the possibility of creating a nonthreatening acquaintance among humans, though ultimately relying on the absence of theological foundations, seems hardly to be achieved on the sole plane of rational stipulations. Hobbes figures in these debates as the thinker who managed to envision a community in which God’s effective withdrawal from human history (*I Sm.* 8:7) is not ideologically concealed but, rather, taken to its extreme consequences. But political theology also entails that, having withdrawn God, people must establish their bearings without falling back upon the authority of God’s perspicuous commands. Yet Hobbes’s state supplies neither an ultimate end nor a workable direction on how people should regulate their conduct: by reducing politics to a technology of social bonding aimed at minimizing discord, Hobbes seems to indicate a pattern of political existence over which individuals cannot exercise effective control.

**SEE ALSO** Morality and Religion; Sociology, article on Sociology of Religion; Violence.

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ROBERTO FARNETI (2005)

**HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST** (1873–1966), was an American philosopher of religion and metaphysician who also wrote on the philosophies of law, education, selfhood, and civilization. His magnum opus, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (1912; 14th ed., 1962), combined Josiah Royce's idealist concern for meaning and the Absolute with William James's pragmatist commitment to science and experience. Hocking's original contribution was his solution to the problem of solipsism. One shares the mind of another, he argued, through the common perception of, and mutual concern for, a particular object. Mind *is* its content. One cannot simply think (*pace* Descartes); one must think something. This particular object of common concern is the content of everyone's common mind.

The experience is articulated dialectically. Natural realism regards the world as objectively "outside" one's self. Subjective idealism responds that people know only their own individual reality "within" the mind. A dialectical synthesis discovers a world made objectively real by common perception. Hence science assumes public verifiability, and hypothesis becomes fact only when various individual experimenters acknowledge a common perception.

Empirical minds come and go, however, and yet one experiences particular objects as real even when one is alone. How so? One intuitively senses the presence of a nonempirical mind that is constantly a co-observer. One is never absolutely alone. Objective reality is thus grounded in the attention of an Absolute Mind. As personal reality, this caring presence of the Absolute is the meaning of God in human experience.

Hocking relates this natural theology both to Christianity and to the problem of world religious pluralism in three later books: *Re-Thinking Missions* (1932), *Living Religions and a World Faith* (1940), and *The Coming World Civiliza-*

*tion* (1956). There is a natural religion of humankind, shared by ordinary believers the world around. The substance of this religion is compatible with Christian faith. A life lived out of this natural perception will be different from one lived in the light of Christianity's supernatural revelation, but the relation is a natural one. So, in *Human Nature and Its Remaking* (1918), Hocking argues that the natural human will to power finds fulfillment in the evangelism of the Christian world mission, because, ideally, mission seeks to confer power on others, rather than gain power over them.

Nevertheless, the Christian missionary movement has historically been insensitive to non-Western cultures; and Christian theology has been exclusivistic in relation to other world religions. The integrity of the Christian message can be maintained without violence to other religious traditions through a relational model that is neither the indiscriminate amalgamation of synthesis, nor the exclusivism of radical displacement. Encounter causes each religion to rethink basic positions. The world's living religions will not die, nor will the emerging world faith necessarily be called Christian. This way of reconception will, however, lead to a future in which the natural religion of humankind and the substance of historic Christianity will be conjoined, providing the binding ingredient for cultural and religious pluralism in the coming world civilization.

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**HOFFMANN, DAVID** (1843–1921), was a German rabbi, Jewish legal authority, Orthodox communal leader, and biblical and rabbinic scholar. David Tsevi Hoffmann was born in Hungary and studied in the *yeshivot* of Moses Schick and Esriel Hildesheimer. Hildesheimer, who affirmed the worth of secular culture and traditional rabbinic scholarship, had a profound influence on Hoffmann. This influence led Hoffmann to Pressburg (now Bratislava, Slovakia), where he studied in both the famed Sofer Yeshiva and the Evangelical Gymnasium. Hoffmann began his university studies in 1865 in Vienna and immigrated in 1866 to Germany, where he completed his university education at Berlin and Tübingen; he received his doctorate in 1870 for his *Mar Samuel, Re-*

ktor der Jüdischen Akademie zu Nehardea in Babylonien (Mar Samuel, rector of the Jewish Academy at Nehardea in Babylonia). This work was severely criticized by Samson Raphael Hirsch for its application of critical methods to the study of Talmud, although Hoffmann himself felt that his own application of this method did not negate the divine authority of the oral law. In 1873 Hoffmann joined the faculty of the Orthodox Rabbinical Seminary in Berlin; in 1899 he became rector of the seminary. He served, simultaneously, as rabbi of the Berlin separatist Orthodox congregation, Adass Jisroel.

Hoffmann insisted that a defense of traditional Jewish religious belief could be combined with an affirmation of contemporary secular culture and scholarship, and he displayed this commitment through hundreds of essays and numerous books of both scholarly and apologetic natures. His defense of the unitary authorship of the Bible is contained in his commentaries on *Leviticus* and *Deuteronomy* and in his famed *Die wichtigsten Instanzen gegen die Graf-Wellhausensche Hypothese* (The most important arguments against the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis, 1904). Hoffmann also defended German Jews against the attacks of German anti-Semites in *Der Schulchan-Aruch und die Rabbinen über das Verhältnis der Juden zu Andersgläubigen* (The *Shulhan 'arukh* and the rabbis on the relationship between Jews and Gentiles, 1885). Hoffmann's studies in Midrash and Talmud were seminal in the development of modern Jewish scholarship in these areas, and his collection of Jewish legal decisions, *Melammed le-ho'il* (1926–1932), evidences a remarkable sensitivity to the German environment and an absolute determination to preserve Orthodoxy against the encroachments of Reform Judaism. His modern approach to Jewish Orthodoxy provided an important model for Jews in Germany and throughout the West, and, because of this, Hoffmann remains a critical figure to the understanding of the development of Jewish Orthodoxy in the modern world.

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**HOKHMAH.** The Hebrew feminine noun *hokhmah* (variation of *hokhmot*, *Prv.* 1:20, 9:1, 14:1) reflects a common Semitic root, attested in Akkadian, Ugaritic, Phoenician, Aramaic, and Arabic. *Hokhmah* is conventionally rendered as "wisdom," though biblical usage has a broader semantic range than the English term. In itself an ethically and religiously neutral term, *hokhmah* denotes, along with intellectual prowess and sagacity, the mastery of crafts ranging from such concrete skills as spinning cloth (*Ex.* 35:25), working in metal, wood, and stone (*Ex.* 31:3–6), and navigation (*Ps.* 107:27), to the more subtle arts of dream interpretation (*Gn.* 41:8), ritual wailing (*Jer.* 9:16), sorcery (*Is.* 3:3), epigrammatic speech (*1 Kgs.* 5:9–14), diplomacy and court politics (*2 Sm.* 20:16–22; *1 Kgs.* 2:6, 2:9; cf. *Eccl.* 9:13–18;), and the exercise of kingship (*1 Kgs.* 5:26; cf. the ironic use in *Is.* 10:13 and *Ez.* 28:4–5, 28:12).

**HOKHMAH IN BIBLICAL PIETY.** Human *hokhmah* is also interpreted as and identified with piety (literally "fear of the Lord") in the so-called wisdom literature (i.e., *Proverbs*, *Job*, *Ecclesiastes*, *Ben Sira*, *Wisdom of Solomon*) and elsewhere (e.g., *Is.* 33:6). In *Proverbs*, *hokhmah* indicates ethical virtue and character as well as practical accomplishment: wisdom and its antithesis, folly, are equivalent to the paralleled righteousness and wickedness found in other proverbs. *Hokhmah* is evident in industry; integrity; circumspect behavior; felicitous, effective, and truthful speech; respect for parents; and care for the poor. To some degree these are pragmatic measures that make for successful living, with promised results in societal honor, security, and protection from the divine wrath attendant upon transgressions. Thus the formulation that "the beginning of *hokhmah* is the fear of the Lord" reflects, on one level, utilitarian self-interest. But the notion also takes a more speculative turn: fear of the Lord is the means to life and knowledge of God (e.g., *Prv.* 9:10–11, 14:27, 19:23; cf. *Ps.* 111:10).

*Hokhmah* is attributed to the deity, especially to the technical skill with which God created the world (*Jer.* 10:12, 51:15; *Prv.* 3:19–20; *Ps.* 104:24). Extraordinary wisdom of mortals can merit the hyperbole of divineline *hokhmah* (*1 Kgs.* 3:28; *Ezr.* 7:25; cf. *2 Sm.* 14:20, "like the wisdom of a divine angel"), and exceptional human *hokhmah* is sometimes considered God's gift (*Ex.* 28:3; *2 Chr.* 1:10–12). God also may impart the "spirit" of *hokhmah*, as to the anointed king (*Is.* 11:1–2) or to Joshua, Moses' charismatic successor (*Dt.* 34:9). The exemplar is Solomon in *1 Kings* 3 who, when offered a boon by God in a dream, asks for a "listening heart" and is granted riches and honor as well. (Much of the biblical

wisdom literature thus claims explicitly or implicitly to come from Solomon, though this is pseudonymous attribution.)

More typical is wisdom gained through human efforts (e.g., *Prv.* 3:13, 4:5, 4:7, 23:23, 29:15). Though aware of ambiguity and human limitation (e.g., *Prv.* 16:1, 16:9, 16:33, 26:4–5), *Proverbs*' ethos remains optimistic about this quest. The tradition takes a skeptical turn in *Ecclesiastes*, however, where injustice and death lead the author to a sense of meaninglessness (“all is vanity”) and the opinion that one who increases wisdom increases sorrow (*Eccl.* 1:18). The *Book of Job* also severely relativizes human wisdom in comparison to God's.

**THE FEMALE PERSONIFICATION OF HOKHMAH.** The paradox of wisdom sought by humans and also conferred by God appears strikingly in passages that personify *hokhmah* as a woman. The theme's most restrained treatment is found in *Job* 28. This elegant poem treats of the rarity and elusiveness of true wisdom—here perhaps only an abstraction rather than a full personification—whose place in the created order is known only to the Creator. In contrast to *Job*'s hidden wisdom is its—now “her”—easy accessibility in *Proverbs* 1–9, where she is met in the streets, the markets, the city gates, and her house, offering life to followers of her ways (*Prv.* 1:32–33, 8:35–36, 9:1–6, 9:11). This message, as well as the female figure itself, unites the several personification poems in these chapters; however, there are also variations in *Hokhmah*'s portrayal.

In *Proverbs* 1 *Hokhmah*'s rhetoric is much like the angry diatribe of a scolding prophet. Woman Wisdom threatens to turn a deaf ear to those who reject her in good times but seek her counsel when calamity strikes. She will ignore their pleas, laughing scornfully at their downfall (*Prv.* 1:20–33). Although women (e.g., Deborah, *Jgs.* 4–5; and Huldah, *2 Kgs.* 22:14–20) as well as men could be prophets, *Hokhmah*'s female gender predominates in passages that cast her as the wife or lover and source of honor to the man who loves and embraces her (*Prv.* 4:5–9, 7:4). This relational imagery links her with the sexually desirable wife (*Prv.* 5:15–19) and with the industrious worthy woman depicted in the book's concluding poem (*Prv.* 31:10–31), who is herself a paragon of *hokhmah*. Both the wife and Wisdom protect their mates from the dangerous “strange woman,” who lures the unsuspecting man into sexual misadventure (*Prv.* 5:20–23, 7:5–23, cf. 2:26–19). Social commentary regarding proper family bonds finds expression here, although these poems are one of the few places in the Hebrew Bible where the sexual double standard is not in evidence: men are enjoined to fidelity as much as women. The patriarchal mindset nonetheless emerges in the binary opposition of good woman and bad woman.

Other poems use the female imagery to constitute competing superhuman forces. The path of the strange woman, who appears as personified Folly in the concluding poem of *Proverbs* 1–9, leads to death: “her guests are in the depths of Sheol” (*Prv.* 9:18, cf. 2:18–19, 5:5–6, 5:23, 7:27). Wisdom,

in contrast, offers life, an offer whose credibility is enhanced by the remarkable poem in *Proverbs* 8. As in chapter 1, she speaks in the first person, here offering a calmly reasoned exposition of her merits. The setting is once again a public one (*Prv.* 8:2–3), and her appeal is universal (if gendered), to all “men” (*Prv.* 8:4). The words of her mouth represent the timeless virtues of truth and justice. Her self-assertion builds in power as she claims to be the source of just governance (*Prv.* 8:15–17), before touching back to the love language of the earlier poems. Her worth exceeds that of gold and silver, yet she will also fill the treasuries of her righteous lovers (*Prv.* 8:18–21), an allusion perhaps to the story of wise Solomon. The climax of her argument (*Prv.* 8:22–31) asserts nothing less than a cosmic pedigree, placing herself with God before creation.

The language of this section is dense with multiple meanings, creating a complex and shifting picture of her relationship to the deity. Following the Greek translation of *Proverbs* 8:22, most English versions read, “The Lord created me at the beginning of his work.” The verb (*qnh*) more typically means “acquire,” however, and is used of a man acquiring a wife. It can also be construed as “engender,” biological conception language that continues in *Proverbs* 8:24–25, where Wisdom says she was “brought forth” (*hll*), the usual term for birthing. Is she then God's creation, God's wife, God's daughter? Another crux comes in *Proverbs* 8:30 with the unusual word *'amon*, translated by some as “darling child,” by others as “master architect.” She plays before the deity, delighting him, but finds her own delight in the human world (*Prv.* 8:30–31).

In *Proverbs* 9:1–6 the images of the wise homemaker and the divine companion at creation conjoin in the accomplished architect of her own seven-pillared edifice, a structure that has received diverse interpretations (architectural, cosmic, astrological, mythological). From her house she sends out her maids to call to the simple to come partake of the food and wine she has prepared, thus obtaining the life-giving substance of Wisdom herself.

**PERSONIFIED WISDOM IN THE ANCIENT CONTEXT.** While Wisdom's association with acceptable human female roles—including village leaders identified as “wise women” (*2 Sm.* 14:1–20, 20:16–22)—may have contributed to her appropriation into a largely patriarchal culture and monotheistic text, the ancient understanding of this figure has been the subject of much scholarly debate. The personification of *hokhmah* may be compared to the personified attributes Faithfulness (*hesed*), Truth (*'emet*), Well-being (*shalom*), and Right (*tsedeq*) in *Psalms* 85:11–14 and thus understood as merely a literary device, female by virtue of its grammatical feminine gender. Reference to the “spirit of wisdom” provides a further biblical parallel (e.g., *Ex.* 28:3; *Dr.* 34:9; *Is.* 11:2). *First Kings* 22 depicts a vision in which God holds court, surrounded by the hosts of heaven; the “spirit” of Falsehood steps forward, volunteering to do the divine bidding. This ancient belief in independent divine beings atten-



dant upon Yahweh may suggest that *hokhmah's* personification is no mere literary trope but reflects a view of wisdom as “hypostasis,” an independently existing manifestation of divine wisdom, or of the order inherent in the divine creation. The Aramaic *Book of Ahiqar* (fifth century BCE), where *hokhmata* is spoken of as “of the gods,” “precious to the gods,” and whom “the lord of holy ones has exalted,” provides a close parallel in extrabiblical literature.

Ancient Near Eastern literature also depicts a number of goddesses who have been argued, with varying degrees of success, to provide a model, or perhaps a repressed background, for female Wisdom. Both the literary forms and iconography associated with the Egyptian Maat (the term designates both the concept of cosmic order and its divine hypostasis) parallel to some degree the presentation of biblical Wisdom, but it is difficult to establish a direct linkage. Closer yet is Isis, who gains international currency in the Hellenistic period, perhaps a bit later than the *Proverbs* poems but clearly reflected in the Greek-language *Wisdom of Solomon's* rendition of Hōkhmah as Sophia (see below). Inscriptional evidence discovered in the late twentieth century shows the ongoing presence of the Canaanite goddess Asherah in Israelite religious practice (perhaps as Yahweh's consort); the ultimate success of her suppression in the biblical literature leads some to suggest that she appears in sublimated form in Woman Wisdom.

The larger literary role played by the female imagery in *Proverbs* may provide one window into the social setting of those who deployed and developed the *hokhmah* concept. The book consists of twenty-one chapters (10–30) constituted mainly by collections of individual two-line proverbs. The proverb (Hebrew, *masbal*) is a constant feature of verbal rhetoric across all oral cultures (see, e.g., *Jgs.* 8:21 and *1 Sm.* 16:7 for proverb performance in Hebrew narrative). Proverbs were taught in the home and village environment by mothers and fathers (cf. *Prv.* 1:8) as well as used by society's leaders. In the *Book of Proverbs*, however, the collected *mesalim* are removed from their life contexts and shaped into bilinear parallel form, probably by the educated elite in the royal court. The instructional poems in chapters 1–9 and 31 then bracket the proverb collections, providing structure to the book as a whole. Here their situational, utilitarian wisdom is construed as an exemplar of a universal Wisdom, embodied in both divine and earthly female form. This literary work is no doubt that of scribes, probably connected with the Jerusalem Temple during the period of Persian and Hellenistic rule (likely fifth through third centuries BCE). Ironically then the female imagery that is excluded from the Second Temple Judaeon cult is maintained, if also tamed, in the Hōkhmah of the scribes who produce the Bible.

**FEMALE WISDOM IN LATE ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE AGES.** The Wisdom figure constitutes a unique and surprising elevation of the feminine in the Hebrew Bible that reappears in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, sometimes with striking elaboration and innovation. In *Ben Sira* 24:1–21

(composed by a Temple scribe about 180 BCE), Wisdom again speaks on her own behalf, telling of her origination before creation “from the mouth of the Most High.” Seeking a resting place, she makes her dwelling in Zion, this focus on the temple replacing *Proverbs's* focus on creation. Following Hōkhmah's own words, the narrator explicitly identifies her with the law of the covenant (v. 22). So too a hymn to Wisdom in *Baruch* (3:9–4:4) declares Wisdom to be “the book of God's laws,” God's special revelation to Israel. While *Ben Sira's* Wisdom finds a home in Jerusalem, fragments of a Hōkhmah myth preserved in *1 Enoch* 42 recount how Wisdom, not finding any suitable dwelling place among humankind, returns to her original place among the angels.

In *Ben Sira* 51:13–30 the scribe celebrates his acquisition of Wisdom, making novel reference to her “beauty” and the desires it arouses. The Dead Sea Scrolls contain another version of this passage that speaks through bolder, more suggestively erotic double entendre (11QP<sup>s</sup>a cols. xxi–xxii). In the *Wisdom of Solomon* (8:2), composed in Greek, the wise king recalls how he sought to take Wisdom (Sophia) as his “bride.” This Alexandrian text from the first century BCE or CE depicts Wisdom as an independent being, seemingly radiated out from the deity, an auralike emanation of God's glory and light (*Wisd. of Sol.* 7:25–26). Articulating what is only suggested in *Proverbs*, she is an associate, if not the active force, in creation (*Wisd. of Sol.* 7:22, 8:4), sitting by God's throne (*Wisd. of Sol.* 9:4). The rehearsal of Israel's early story in *Wisdom of Solomon* 10 goes so far as to place Sophia in God's saving role.

The Talmud and early midrashim devote little attention to speculation on personified Hōkhmah. There she is effectively replaced by personified Torah, though there is the odd remnant from *Proverbs*. “If one dreams he has had intercourse with his sister, he may expect to obtain wisdom, since it says, Say to wisdom, thou art my sister” (Berachoth 57a). More typical is R. Eleazar: “The deduction is made from this text: Say unto wisdom, ‘Thou art my sister,’ and call understanding thy kinswoman, devise [mnemonic] signs for the Torah” (Eiruvin 54b). In *Genesis Rabbah* 1:1, Torah rather than Hōkhmah is made by God at the beginning of his way and serves as God's architect in creation. Similarly the bread and wine offered in *Proverbs* 9:5 is Torah, with Wisdom's first person reference assimilated to God's voice. The rabbinic interpreter of Torah nonetheless is known as a *hakham*, a wise man or sage. Rabbinic reticence about *hokhmah's* personification may have been partially conditioned by Wisdom's prominent role in the cosmology of Christian and non-Christian Greek Gnostic traditions, which further incorporated the Hebrew term into their system in the form of Achamoth, said to be a daughter or lesser form of Sophia.

In Jewish mystical literature, Qabbalah, *hokhmah* is the second of the ten *sefirot*, or divine emanations, hearkening back to its important role in Greek Jewish and Gnostic speculation. The imagery varies. The ten *sefirot* sometimes form a tree, growing downward from the first *sefirah* (*keter*,



“crown”). Here *ḥokhmah* may be part of the trunk or the water that makes the tree grow. When the *sefirot* form a human, *ḥokhmah* is part of the head.

In another system the first *sefirah* is nothingness, zero, and *ḥokhmah* is the primordial point intermediate between nothingness and being, imaged as the center of a palace, as a river’s source, or as a seed in the womb, with the third *sefirah* (*binah*, “understanding”) comprising, respectively, the palace, the river, or the womb. Whereas in the Bible these two terms are essentially synonyms, here *ḥokhmah* represents a masculine principle, described as Father in the Zohar, requiring the balance of *binah*, the metaphorical Mother. The *sefirot* sometimes reveal different forms of the divine name, with *ḥokhmah* as Yah. Relatedly the divine emanations may be of language as well as creation, tying *ḥokhmah* again to Torah. The preexistent Torah, its most secret aspect, is sometimes identified with God’s primordial wisdom. Qabbalah’s personifications of *Shekhinah* (God’s presence) and Sabbath also took on motifs similar to those associated with personified *Ḥokhmah* in biblical and apocryphal literature. The praise of the wise wife in *Proverbs* 31 became a hymn to *Shekhinah*, which was in turn identified with Queen Sabbath, met as the mystic Bride.

SEE ALSO Sophia.

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**HOLDHEIM, SAMUEL** (1806–1860), was a rabbi and spokesman for the more radical Reform Jews in Germany. Born in Kempen, Posen, Holdheim mastered the traditional study of rabbinic texts as a youngster. He was also attracted to secular culture, however, and as a young man gained fluency in German and attended the universities of Prague and Berlin. He became rabbi in Frankfurt an der Oder in 1836 and in 1840 succeeded to the post of chief rabbi of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. He became well known in these positions as a champion of Reform and emerged from the Reform rabbinical conferences of 1844–1846 as the leader of its extremist elements. In 1846 he was elected rabbi of the Reform congregation in Berlin, a post Abraham Geiger refused because of the congregation’s separation from the general Jewish community. Holdheim served there until his death.

Holdheim articulated his philosophy of Reform Jewish belief and practice in numerous articles, sermons, pamphlets, and books, including *Ueber die Autonomie der Rabbinen und das Prinzip der jüdischen Ehe* (The autonomy of the rabbis and the principle of Jewish marriage laws; 1843), in which he advanced the thesis that the laws of the state and not rabbinic legislation should regulate matters of marriage and inheritance for Jews. In his philosophy of Reform Judaism, he distinguished between religious-ethical and national components in Judaism. The latter, he claimed, constituted the “perishable shell” of Jewish teachings and were no longer binding in the modern era. The religious-ethical elements, in contradistinction, comprised the “everlasting kernel” of Jewish faith and remained valid in the contemporary period. Thus, he was able to write, “The Talmud speaks with the ideology of its own time, and for that time it was right. I speak from the higher ideology of my time, and for this age I am right” (quoted in W. Gunther Plaut, *The Rise of Reform Judaism*, New York, 1963, p. 123). While Holdheim was not alone among the Reformers in expressing these views, his prominence among the leadership of the movement made him a significant exponent of these sentiments.

Holdheim’s thought found practical expression in his enthusiastic support of Jewish political emancipation as justifying the radical transformation of Judaism, in his sanctioning of mixed marriages, and in his advocating that the Jewish Sabbath be transferred from Saturday to Sunday, “a civil day of rest.” Holdheim also supported the almost complete removal of Hebrew from, and the adoption of the vernacular in, Jewish prayer services (although he advocated the reading of Torah in Hebrew) and, in his Berlin congregation, introduced radical reforms into the prayer book and ritual. His approach to Reform found expression in America through

the efforts of David Einhorn of Baltimore and later Philadelphia; Holdheim can thus be identified as an architect of the “classical Reform” position in the United States.

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**HOLĪ** is a popular North Indian festival noted for its Saturnalia-like excitement celebrated each year at the full moon in the lunar month of March–April. The ceremony is not found in South India, but a similar festival in honor of the god of love, Kāma, takes place there at the same time. While there does not seem to be a direct link between the two rites, literary sources suggest that both occasions are examples of an age-old tradition of celebrating the arrival of spring.

People in northern India usually celebrate Holī during the few days after the full moon. However, in many places the festival starts before the full moon, sometimes as early as Vasanta (“spring”), the fifth day of the waxing moon in the lunar month of February–March, when the Holī fire is first prepared for lighting. At this time, people begin to collect and contribute wood and cowdung to pile up around a central pole; in addition, a pot is sometimes filled with seeds and buried beneath this pile. The main Holī ritual centers around a bonfire ceremoniously kindled at the time of the rising moon. Both men and women circumambulate the fire, into which they often throw coconuts or on which they roast new barley. Divinations of the coming harvest are cast by interpreting the direction of the flames (when the fire is burning) or by the state of the seeds in the buried pot (when the fire has gone out). People sometimes take embers from the fire to their homes in order to rekindle their own domestic fires; they also collect the ashes from the Holī fire for use as protection against disease.

The Holī fire is also regarded as a funeral pyre (Marriott, 1966, pp. 201, 204), for it is understood to destroy a female demon commonly known as Holikā. Certain through a boon she was granted that she was never to die by fire,

Holikā climbs the pyre taking in her lap Prahlāda, a faithful devotee of Viṣṇu who is either her brother or the son of her brother Hiraṇyakaśipu (Viṣṇu’s enemy). Prahlāda, who is sometimes identified with the central pole that rises out of the fire, survives the ordeal through his fervent devotion to Viṣṇu; Holikā, the evil one, perishes in the flames.

This exemplary narrative does not really explain the erotic and occasionally violent mood of “playing Holī.” People—usually members of the lower social strata—drench each other as well as powerful and prestigious members of the upper classes with water stained with various powders, cattle urine, and mud. Those victims of the various tricks and pranks played on them, including those men who during the festival have been beaten with sticks by women, must simply go along with their reversed status for the time being. The Holī celebration is marked by the selection of the King of Holī, the hearty enjoyment of lewd singing and shouting, the drinking of *bhang*, a drink of hashish mixed with milk and yogurt, and the fondling of phallus-shaped effigies. Anthropologists have been intrigued by these rites. McKim Marriott, for example, notes that “the dramatic balancing of Holī—the world destruction and world renewal, the pollution followed by world purification—occurs not only on the abstract level of structural principles, but also in the person of each participant” (Marriott, 1966, p. 212). The negation of social status is, however, a limited one, and Holī does not involve the complete reversal of everyday norms (Babb, 1975, p. 174). According to Hindus of northern and central India, the frenzy and licentiousness of the festival is merely a reenactment of the *līlās* of Kṛṣṇa, the amorous and frolicsome “plays” that the god enjoys with cowherd boys and girls. Indeed, Holī is the “feast of love” (Marriott, 1966), and its excesses are clothed in the emotional feelings and motives of Kṛṣṇa *bhakti* movements (Biardeau, 1981, pp. 156–161).

In a Bengali variant of the festival, the burning of a human effigy is associated with the Kṛṣṇaite swing festival (Bose, 1953). In India, the swing carries erotic connotations and may be an element of a generalized marriage ritual. Although Kṛṣṇa does not appear in all variations of the celebrations, the burning of a human or animal effigy is ubiquitous and has gone on for years (*ibid.*, p. 83).

In Andhra Pradesh, the festival to Kāma mentioned earlier retains some of the frenzy of the North Indian Holī (Christian, 1982, p. 255). Such ritual delirium does not appear to any significant extent in Tamil Nadu. Although a festival to Kāma may take place here and there in orthodox Śiva temples, Tamil celebrations usually involve only small local groups instead of entire villages. The Kāma festival begins after Śivarātri and runs until the full moon. An effigy of Kāma is constructed while people recount his story. Assisted by the effects of alcohol, the participants dance wildly, some of them dressed like tribal women (which evokes a good deal of erotic behavior). The effigy of Kāma is burnt in the fire in a ritual reenactment of a well-known tale in which Kāma sends an arrow to Śiva in order to distract him from his med-

itation long enough to allow the god to father a son. Enraged, Śiva destroys Kāma with a bolt of lightening from his third eye, reducing the Lord of Desire to ashes. However, the terrible yogin (Śiva) himself becomes “Desire” for a short time and enjoys the pleasures of sexual union with Pārvatī. For that moment Śiva becomes, in effect, Kāma. The theological reversal echoes the ritual reversal.

The element of *bhakti* does not appear in the South Indian festival, but here the ritual is more explicit. First, in conformity with the Hindu sacrificial context, the Kāma rite focuses on the element of desire—its fulfillment and destruction. Although *kāma* (the fulfillment of desire) may be the lowest of the four traditional goals of life (the others being *artha*, or “prosperity”; *dharma*, or “religious duty”; and *mokṣa*, or “salvation”) it is just as essential as the others, for no aspect of the other three goals can be met without desire (Biardeau, 1981, pp. 49–54, 78). The ascetic Śiva is also Kāma, and thus sires Skanda, for the heroic son must eventually save the world by destroying the demons who are forever threatening the power of the gods. In addition, *kāma*—desire without knowledge—is the goal attributed particularly to the *śūdra*, the noninitiated, lowest order of Hindu society. In the springtime, the time of cosmic renewal, everyone ritually becomes a *śūdra* in order to re-create the world. This temporary inversion of the social hierarchy and of the four goals of Hindu life is marked in the ritual when Kāma, or Holī, is crowned king.

SEE ALSO Hindu Religious Year; Śiva.

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MARIE-LOUISE REINICHE (1987)

**HOLINESS MOVEMENT** is the term commonly used to identify a perfectionist sector of renewal and reform which sometimes paralleled and sometimes fused with the broader stream of the Protestant revivalism in the United States of the nineteenth century. The focal point of the

movement's mission and ethos was the perfectionist call by John Wesley (1703–1791) to Christian believers, subsequent to their justification, to be entirely sanctified in a second work of grace and by faith alone. Wesleyans believed that this work of the Holy Spirit cleansed the hearts of believers from their bent to sinning and restored in them God's image of love. It established a relationship with God of continuing faith in which it was possible to live without willful rebellion, but never without the possibility of again falling into sin through willful unbelief and disobedience. The movement that gathered around these beliefs left an enduring imprint upon the subsequent theological, cultural, and institutional life of Protestant evangelicalism.

**THE FORMATIVE YEARS.** Pioneer bishop Francis Asbury (1745–1816) set this call to personal and social holiness as the keystone of American Methodism's religious life and evangelism. However, by the 1830s the church's phenomenal growth fostered concerns that its mission of spreading Wesley's evangelical Arminian message of free grace, free will, and freedom from sin was being compromised. In 1835 weekly class meetings for women, led first by Sarah Lankford (1806–1896) and then by her sister Phoebe Palmer (1807–1874), became the seedbed of Holiness promotion and renewal. These “Tuesday Meetings” for conversations and testimonies of spiritual experience held in the New York home shared by the sisters and their spouses became the model for a network of hundreds of similar centers across the nation. Within a short time, the meetings attracted clergy and laity of both sexes and participants from many non-Wesleyan churches. In 1839 friends of Palmer's began publication of the *Guide to Holiness*, which was dedicated to coordinating the revival's activities and promoting its cause.

Palmer's promotion of Holiness had always met with opposition in Methodism, but continued support by many of the church's most respected leaders of the period made it difficult to criticize her; instead, opponents attacked the movement's understanding of Wesleyan perfectionism as skewed. They challenged the immediacy of the revival's call for simple faith in the naked word of God as the promised path to one's experience of cleansing and holiness of heart. Palmer taught that God said it, faith grasps it, and it is done; this “shorter way,” her opponents charged, was “un-Wesleyan.” Some contemporary theologians see in Palmer's simple spiritual formula an omen of the “Name it, claim it” theology that rose in late twentieth-century revivalism. Palmer's four years of ministry in Great Britain, largely among the constituencies of the gathering evangelical alliance, strengthened the already existing interrelationships that characterize the history of U.S. and British and European revivalism. Her forty years of Holiness evangelism, her numerous widely read publications, and her public ministry in Methodist and other churches and camp meetings in the United States and Canada made her the spiritual mother of the Holiness movement.

Palmer's ministry became the model for the freedom and authority of women in the movement. She stoutly de-

fended women's participation in the public life of the church. Her book, *The Promise of the Father* (1866), was the first systematic defense of women's rights to public ministry written by a woman. In it she claimed that Joel's promise that the Spirit of God would fall on "all flesh" made the Pentecostal text the authoritative text for interpreting any other texts, which traditionally had been used to deny women a public ministry. Her example inspired the cofounder of the Salvation Army, Catherine Booth (1829–1890), to exert her rights to leadership and ministry.

The revival's milieu also gave birth to other radical reform movements. In 1843 thousands of Methodist abolitionists, with Congregationalists and others, left their denominations to form the Wesleyan Methodist Connection of America. Their leader, Orange Scott (1800–1847), rooted the new church's call for immediate emancipation of slaves in the ethical implications of Wesley's perfectionist theology. In 1860 a second group, the Free Methodists, led by Methodist pastor B. T. Roberts (1823–1893), became the first to organize a Holiness denomination in response to what they perceived to be Methodism's rejection of Wesleyan perfectionism and its increasing neglect of Wesley's concerns for the poor. The new church also called for the immediate abolition of slavery.

The success of the Wesleyan revivalists became the catalyst for the rise of parallel Holiness movements in New School Calvinism. Wesley's writings contributed directly to the Oberlin perfectionism of Charles Finney (1792–1875) and Asa Mahan (1799–1899). Finney sought to keep his Holiness convictions within the confines of his New School theology; Mahan embraced Wesleyanism more openly. Princeton University professor B. B. Warfield (1851–1921) strongly criticized Finney's and Mahan's forms of "Wesleyanism," but Finney and Mahan are enshrined in Wesleyan/Holiness hagiography along with others in the Reformed tradition.

**THE POST-CIVIL WAR REVIVAL.** In the summer of 1867 thousands responded to the call of a committee of Methodist Episcopal pastors to attend a national camp meeting in Vineland, New Jersey, dedicated to the promotion of Christian holiness. The success of the venture prompted the pastors to create the National Camp Meeting Association for the Promotion of Holiness. Under the leadership of Methodist pastor John Inskip (1816–1884), the association's national committee changed the dynamics of Holiness promotion. Hundreds of affiliated local, county, and state interdenominational Holiness evangelistic associations, most with their own annual camp meetings, became the preaching circuit for hundreds of Holiness evangelists. The camp meetings became the primary centers for the movement's nurture and revivalism. The family atmosphere encouraged by living together for an extended period of time, the private and corporate prayer, praise, solemn hymns, and spirited gospel songs created the ambience that prepared the campers for the urgency of the evangelist's call to decisions for salvation and

sanctification. The camps became the dominant shapers of the ethos and mores that were common to the hundreds of small associations that formed the heart of the movement. Through them, and the wealth of journals and publications that reinforced their cause, the movement became the major platform for the rising divine healing movement. The mingling of non-Methodist themes with the Holiness message, and the adoption of Plymouth Brethren preacher John Nelson Darby's (1800–1882) dispensational premillennialism by large sectors of the movement in opposition to Methodism's traditional postmillennialism, began to weaken institutional Methodism's control of the movement.

Many Holiness associations that became Holiness church congregations at the end of the century made salvation, sanctification, healing, the second coming of Christ, and the free worship style of the Holiness camp meeting their church model; they became known as "camp meeting churches." The freedom promised by Holiness teaching and worship style attracted increasing numbers of African Americans to the movement out of the existing African American Methodist and Baptist churches. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the African American woman evangelist Amanda Smith (1837–1915) became one of the most respected of the Holiness movement's itinerant preachers.

From 1873 to 1875 Hannah Whitall Smith (1832–1911), author of the best-selling devotional classic *The Christian's Secret of a Happy Life* (1875) and an ardent Holiness advocate, feminist, and advocate of temperance and women's suffrage, spread the Holiness message with her husband Robert Pearsall Smith (1827–1898) to both the established and free churches of England and continental Europe. A series of Holiness conferences at Oxford and Cambridge Universities, and the annual camp meetings held on the Broadlands estate of Lord and Lady Mount Temple culminated in an 1875 meeting at Brighton, England. Thousands of pastors, theologians, and university students from all across Europe attended. The impact of the Smiths' brief Holiness ministry upon the British and European churches was significant. In Germany it excited the renewal of the pietistic German Fellowship Movement and the Inner-City Movement within the established churches, and the formation of the German Holiness Movement within the free churches. In England the most enduring result was the rise of the Keswick Movement, whose annual meetings for the promotion of scriptural holiness sparked renewal among Reformed evangelicals, both Anglican and free. Keswick gave birth to faith missions movements and student Christian movements around the world.

**INSTITUTIONALIZATION.** By the closing decades of the nineteenth century, many Methodists, tired of the decades-long tensions over the "holiness question," turned from Wesley's perfectionist vision to the theologies rooted in the Enlightenment. In addition, the revival's expansion into non-Methodist environments weakened the national committee's control over the movement as Holiness Baptists, Quakers,

Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Mennonites, and Episcopalian evangelicals sought to assimilate the Holiness message into their own theologies and experiences. Holiness adherents, together with more numerous “populist” association leaders, began to challenge the increasingly strained efforts of the Methodist-controlled National Holiness Association to keep a vibrant and diverse interfaith movement under the aegis of institutional Methodism.

Between 1882 and the century’s end disenchanted Holiness Methodists, joined by converts to the independent Holiness associations who had never been Methodists, formed new Holiness denominations and institutions out of the revival’s constituency. This period marked the largest creation of new denominations in so short a period in U.S. religious history. Other sectors of the revival, within the ministries of Dwight L. Moody (1837–1899), A. T. Pierson (1837–1911), A. J. Gordon (1836–1895), and A. B. Simpson (1843–1919), all rooted in the revivalistic Calvinism of the day, became centers for promoting a Higher-Life theology, the name commonly given to the holiness revival in the Calvinist churches. Organizations of new African American Holiness churches also gathered sectors of the movement to themselves in this organizational phase of the movement’s life.

As the major segments of the Holiness/Higher-Life revival movement were finding homes in new denominations and agencies, a third movement gathered around the pregnant eschatological expectations born of the revival’s steadily increasing emphasis on the significance of the Pentecost event and anticipated new age of the Spirit. The new Pentecostal movement’s structure, leadership, and major theological and worship cultures all were born within the diverse milieu of the Holiness revival. With few exceptions, most established Wesleyan/Holiness leaders quickly condemned the new movement’s teachings as “heretical,” particularly its insistence that “speaking in unknown tongues” was a necessary element of Spirit baptism. Today, although the theological differences between the two movements still exist, their common membership in the National Association of Evangelicals and other interdenominational agencies have lessened the stridency that had often marked the interaction between the two closely related movements.

By the second decade of the twentieth century the movement had largely located within the confines of its new Holiness institutions, with the major exception of the thousands of Holiness adherents who stayed with the older denominations out of hope for renewal from within. Most Wesleyan/Holiness churches and their international affiliates and agencies maintain an informal association with one another and other independent Holiness mission agencies and educational institutions through the Christian Holiness Partnership, the direct descendant of the National Camp Association. A similar association, the Interchurch Holiness Convention, has brought together a group of smaller Holiness adherents who in the post–World War II period separated

from the larger Holiness bodies in protest to what they saw as the established movement’s tendencies to modernism. The worldwide constituency of the Wesleyan/Holiness churches numbers 10 to 15 million. The Church of the Nazarene, the Salvation Army, the Church of God (Anderson, Indiana), the Wesleyan Church (the result of a 1968 merger of the Wesleyan Methodist and the Pilgrim Holiness Churches), and the Free Methodist Church are the largest Holiness Churches. Several of these are active members of the World Methodist Council.

As a whole, these Wesleyan evangelical churches, which have continuing commitments to the plenary inspiration of the Bible and its final authority for doctrine and life, often find themselves in a mediate position in world Protestantism, between the more socially conservative stances of some fellow evangelicals and the more liberal theologies that pervade the religious culture of much of contemporary Protestantism.

**SEE ALSO** Evangelical and Fundamental Christianity; Methodist Churches; Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity; Salvation Army; Smith, Hannah Whitall; Wesley Brothers.

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MELVIN E. DIETER (2005)

**(HOLMBERG-) HARVA, UNO** SEE HARVA, UNO

#### HOLOCAUST, THE

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

- HISTORY
- JEWISH THEOLOGICAL RESPONSES



## HOLOCAUST, THE: HISTORY

From the French Revolution to the 1860s, the Jews of western and central Europe experienced political emancipation. Unencumbered by ties to an agrarian way of life, many Jews also experienced economic prosperity and social mobility during the following decades of industrialization and urbanization, as they seized the opportunities that a period of rapid change offered. However, late nineteenth-century Europe also witnessed the emergence of radical protest movements by those who bore the cost of modernization. Such movements were usually anti-Semitic, as the Jew was an easy symbol of all that these people perceived to be the ills of modern society: urbanization; democratization; disruptive social mobility; and a large-scale, impersonal market economy undermining the livelihoods of tradesmen, artisans, and peasants. The adoption of the Jew as such a symbol was facilitated by a ready-made and widespread negative Jewish stereotype fostered by centuries of religious anti-Semitism. A racist brand of Social Darwinism that emerged at this time was quickly utilized to provide a veneer of pseudoscientific respectability suited to a more secular age. In this later view the Jews had such a baneful influence because they were by nature rootless and subversive cosmopolites who could never become true members of a national community shaped by “blood and soil.”

In Germany and Austria this antimodernist protest was known as the *völkisch* movement, and it received added impetus after World War I from the humiliating defeat, revolutionary turmoil, and disintegrative inflation that afflicted central Europe. The most successful mobilizer of this discontent was the National Socialist German Workers' Party of Adolf Hitler, and the antimodernist, anti-Semitic *völkisch* tradition was the ideological force behind most of its early activists. For Hitler himself, however, the Jew was an even deeper psychological obsession. He saw the Jew not only as the cause of present ills, manifested above all in the rising Bolshevik threat, but also as the very metaphysical source of evil itself spanning the centuries. Thus, in addition to a war of expansion in the east assuring Germany of the territorial base (*Lebensraum*) necessary for its status as a major power, Hitler also advocated the “removal” of the Jews from Germany. But Hitler did not come to power because of his promises for war and racial persecution. A much broader, often contradictory appeal for a “renewal” of German life underlay the Nazis' electoral breakthrough in the early 1930s. The hopes for the restoration of effective government to deal with the communist threat and the economic depression, the reconciliation of a highly factionalized German society into a unified racial entity with a common purpose, and a new meritocracy opening up careers to the professionally disadvantaged of Germany's tradition-bound society won votes from all sectors of the population but above all from the middle and lower-middle classes. With the votes of more than one-third of the German population behind Hitler, the old elites gambled that they could use him for their own pur-

poses (many of which partially overlapped with Hitler's own goals). He was appointed chancellor in January 1933.

While Hitler consolidated his dictatorship in short order, an equally rapid solution to the Nazis' self-imposed Jewish problem was not forthcoming. Hitler's obsessive anti-Semitism provided sanction for various kinds of attacks upon the Jews but neither assured coordination of such attempts nor clarified the ultimate goal. Furthermore, Hitler and the Nazis had to take into account various inhibitive factors, such as the fragile state of the economy, foreign reaction, and the sensibilities of their conservative allies and the German public. What emerged was a cyclical pattern of intensifying persecution, as periodic pressure from party radicals for violent attacks upon the Jews was mollified with legislative discrimination more conducive to economic stability and less disturbing to the majority of the German public. In 1933 the Jews were deprived of civic equality and barred from various professions. In 1935 the Nuremberg Laws completed the social ostracism of Jews by forbidding marriage or sexual intercourse between Jews and “Aryans.” In 1938 another wave of legislation impoverished the Jews by systematically stripping them of their property.

The party radicals made one last attempt to take control of Nazi Jewish policy when Joseph Goebbels incited the *Kristallnacht* riots of November 9–10, 1938. The arson of synagogues and vandalism of Jewish businesses throughout Germany caused dismay among many Germans who did not want to be confronted with a choice between their loyalty to and illusions about the regime on the one hand and their innate respect for property and order on the other. Heinrich Himmler and Hermann Göring joined forces and, with Hitler's approval, centralized control of Jewish policy, effectively excluding Goebbels. Henceforth the persecution of the Jews would be carried out through the orderly administration of the German bureaucracy, not through the violent pogroms of local party activists. Unobtrusive but relentless, this bureaucratic persecution proved far more conducive to the indifference of the German public and far more dangerous to the Jews.

With the growing role of Himmler's *Schutzstaffel* (SS) (a complex and expanding conglomeration of elite party organizations, police forces, and eventually even military formations) in shaping Nazi Jewish policy, one clear vision gradually emerged—a Germany free of Jews through emigration. But it was a vision unrealized. Faced with mounting immigration barriers in a world gripped by economic depression and thus decidedly unsympathetic to impoverished refugees, German Jews were reluctant to abandon career, property, and a country to which they were deeply attached. Emigration proceeded slowly, and the addition of Austrian and Czech Jews in 1938–1939 brought more Jews into the Reich than had emigrated over the past six years. The *Kristallnacht* had removed any remaining illusions of waiting out the Nazi regime, and almost all German Jews were now desperate to leave. The SS conducted experiments in coerced

emigration organized by Adolf Eichmann to get rid of the Austrian and Czech Jews as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, time ran out. The outbreak of war in September 1939 closed most borders, and the acquisition first of two million Polish Jews and then another half million Jews in western Europe by June 1940 shattered any expectation of a solution to the Jewish question through emigration.

The Nazis now sought a solution to their Jewish “problem” through increasingly ambitious expulsion schemes. First the Jews of Germany, especially the additional 550,000 of the newly annexed Polish territories, were to be expelled to a “Jewish reservation” in the Lublin region of Poland. Then, with the defeat of France the Nazis conceived a scheme for expelling all the Jews of Europe to the French island colony of Madagascar. Neither plan proved feasible, but in the meantime the Polish Jews were herded into the major cities of Poland and gradually ghettoized. With economic ties severed and most of their property confiscated, the Jews of these frightfully overcrowded ghettos seemed destined to extinction through starvation and disease. One-half million Jews died in the ghettos between 1939 and 1941. The rest survived while Jewish leaders, forced into Jewish councils on German orders, tenaciously struggled to restore minimal communal life and above all a viable ghetto economy that would keep the Jews alive by giving the Germans a stake in the productive potential of Jewish labor.

Germany’s decision to invade the Soviet Union posed once again the dilemma engendered by military success, which inevitably would bring more Jews into the expanding German empire. To break this vicious circle, Hitler called for an unprecedented “war of destruction” in the east, that was simultaneously a campaign for territorial conquest, an ideological crusade against Bolshevism, and a racial struggle against the Slavs and Jews. In the first month following the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union, the Germans experienced spectacular success. In the euphoria of seeming victory, the mass murder of “potential enemies” by mobile SS firing squads (*Einsatzgruppen*) as well as other police and military units quickly escalated to include the killing of all Soviet Jews. The previous policies of expulsion and ghettoization had at least implied a decimation of the Jewish population, but now the leap to systematic mass murder, at least on Soviet territory, had been taken.

Intoxicated by victory and the prospect of a whole continent at their feet, Hitler and other leading Nazis contemplated extending the “final solution” to all European Jews. The firing-squad method was proving inadequate even on occupied Soviet territory because of the lack of secrecy of the mass executions, the psychological burden on the killers, and the staggering number of victims to be murdered. The technocrats of the Nazi regime solved these problems, however, by inventing the death camp. Secrecy, efficiency, and psychological detachment were to be achieved by deporting the victims to “factories of death” where a small staff would apply assembly-line methods to rob, gas, and cremate thou-

sands of arriving Jews within a few hours. This vision was approved by Hitler in late September or early October 1941, and construction of the two earliest death camps, Belzec and Chelmno, was soon underway. The construction of four additional death camps eventually followed: the Birkenau section of Auschwitz, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Majdanek. When Reinhard Heydrich met with representatives from the various German ministries at the Wannsee Conference on January 20, 1942, to coordinate the deportation of all European Jews “to the east,” the “final solution” to the Nazis’ self-imposed Jewish problem was at hand.

In Poland the Germans descended upon the ghettos in savage “ghetto-clearing” operations, taking off the nonworking population first. Everywhere Jewish leaders faced the same excruciating dilemma. Resistance in the ghetto invited instant and overwhelming German retaliation against the entire community. Escape of the young fighters to the forests involved the abandonment of families. Compliance meant the incremental destruction of the community but at least initially held out hope that a remnant of workers would survive. This course was thus generally followed by Jewish leaders as the least intolerable evil, until family members had been lost, along with the illusion that the Germans were sufficiently utilitarian to preserve skilled labor. Only then did armed resistance seem rational. The Warsaw ghetto uprising, for instance, broke out in April 1943 when only seventy thousand of its nearly one-half million Jews were still alive.

Outside Poland and Russia the number of prospective victims was much less but the political obstacles to deportation to the death camps were much more complicated. Within the Third Reich both the police and a wide variety of local authorities handled the uprooting process. In the areas of German military administration and among Germany’s allies and satellites, help from local collaborators was essential to identify and round up the Jews. Throughout all these regions the complex deportation program was coordinated by Heydrich’s specialist, Eichmann. Deportations began from the Third Reich in the fall of 1941, and from Slovakia, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway in 1942. In 1943 the deportation effort spread to Greece, Bulgaria, Denmark, and Italy, though it faltered in Bulgaria and was thwarted almost entirely in Denmark through local obstruction. In Romania and Yugoslavia most of the Jews perished locally without resort to deportations. Finally, in May and June of 1944, nearly one-half million Hungarian Jews were the victims of the largest single deportation of the war.

As the Holocaust ran its course within the German empire, the outside world gradually learned of but never truly comprehended the magnitude and significance of the disaster. The first reports of a German plan to murder the entire Jewish population of Europe reached the West in the summer of 1942 through contacts in Switzerland. By November the reports had been fully confirmed, and an Allied declaration followed that condemned the Nazi actions and threatened punishment after the war. But little more was done.

Old bureaucratic attitudes and patterns of behavior, shaped in an era when policy had been to turn back the tide of refugees from Nazism, did not change quickly. Rescue through military victory provided an easy excuse for inaction, and Allied leaders did not insist upon a fundamental change in priorities necessary to alter this situation. The vast majority of Hitler's victims were beyond any rescue effort, but inability to stop the murder of millions was only made more horrifying by the pervasive passivity of the Allies concerning the possible rescue of additional thousands of threatened Jews.

When the Nazi regime finally collapsed in defeat, between five and six million Jews (approximately one-third of world Jewry) had perished in the Holocaust. A nearly equal number of non-Jews were also murdered by the Nazis: more than three million Russian prisoners of war, the physically and mentally handicapped, the Roma and Sinti, the Polish intelligentsia, political opponents and resisters, homosexuals and others defined as "asocials," numerous slave laborers kept in unlivable conditions, and countless victims—especially Russians, Poles, and Yugoslavs—of mass reprisals and indiscriminate terror aimed at subduing the civilian populations of occupied territories. The Nazi regime showed itself capable of mass murder against virtually any group of people. But no other group of victims occupied the role in Hitler's mind of metaphysical evil incarnate as did the Jews. No other victims were threatened so totally and pursued so relentlessly. And no other victims died so helpless and abandoned.

**SEE ALSO** Anti-Semitism; Persecution, article on Jewish Experience; War and Warriors, overview article; Zionism.

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## HOLOCAUST, THE: JEWISH THEOLOGICAL RESPONSES

The Holocaust (Heb., *sho'ah*), the willed destruction of European Jewry and the intended complete eradication of world Jewry by the Nazi regime, casts its shadow over all Jewish realities in the post-Holocaust era. The nature of this event, and the particularity and peculiarity of its assault against Jewish life and Jewish dignity, force a fundamental reexamination of all inherited Jewish norms, not the least of which are Judaism's traditional theological foundations. This is not to assert that these classical assumptions will necessarily change or prove inadequate to the test, but only that they must again be asked to answer age-old questions of theodicy.

To grasp the challenge of the Holocaust one must understand the unique racial/Manichaean *Weltanschauung* of Nazism and the role of the Jew in it. For Hitler and his Reich, anti-Semitism and the struggle against world Jewry were not only subjective sentiments of personal will but also actualizations in history of metahistorical antitheses, and as such, necessary and inevitable. Killing Jews, or more precisely eliminating "the Jews," or Judaism itself, was in this modern Gnostic myth a sacred obligation. "The Jew," the collective singular, was the generic, supranatural enemy. The *Endlösung*, the "final solution," was not primarily understood by its cruel initiator as a political or socioeconomic force. It was not an expression of class struggle or nationalism in any recognizable sense. It was intended as, and received its enormous power from, the fact that it aimed at nothing less than restructuring the cosmos. "Those who see in National Socialism nothing more than a political movement," Hitler unflinchingly observed, "know scarcely anything of it. It is more even than a religion: It is the will to create mankind anew" (Hermann Rauschnig, *Gespräche mit Hitler*, Zurich, 1940, pp. 231f.). Thus, as if it were the conclusion of an immutable tautology, Hitler felt that the Jewish people must be annihilated.

In responding to the catastrophic consequences of this racial fantasy, which claimed six million Jewish lives, Jewish thinkers have explored many theological avenues—some old, some new. As to the old, Jewish history is no stranger to national tragedy and, as a consequence, there is an abundance of traditional explanatory models that could be and have been adapted and reapplied to the Holocaust. From these, six have regularly been looked to by modern thinkers as providing maps for understanding the theological complexities raised by the Holocaust.

**THE 'AQEDAH.** The 'Aqedah, or "binding," of Isaac, the biblical narrative recounted in *Genesis* 22:2ff., is often appealed to as a possible paradigm for approaching the Holocaust. (See, for example, Berkovits, 1973, pp. 124–125, and Neher, 1981.) Such a move is rooted in Jewish tradition, especially that of the medieval martyrologies of the Crusader and post-Crusader periods, in which the biblical event became the prism through which the horrific medieval experience became refracted and intelligible. Like Isaac of old, the Jewish

children of Europe, and more generally all of slaughtered Israel, are seen as martyrs to God who willingly sacrifice themselves and their loved ones in order to prove beyond all doubt their faithfulness to the Almighty (see Shalom Spiegel, *The Last Trial*, New York, 1967, and the medieval religious poems collected in A. M. Habermann's *Sefer gezerot Ashkenaz ve-Tsarfat*, Jerusalem, 1945).

The appeal of this interpretation lies in its conferring heroic status on the dead because of their sanctity and obedience to the God of Israel. Their death is not due to sin, to any imperfection on their part, or to any violation of the covenant; rather, it is the climactic evidence of their unwavering devotion to the faith of their fathers—not its abandonment. As a consequence, the traditional (and present-day) reproach, that what befell Israel is "because of our sins," is wholly inappropriate. Not sin but piety is the key factor. God makes unique demands upon those who love him and whom he loves, and, as did Abraham, so too do the Jewish people respond with a fidelity of unmatched purity and selflessness. As such, the dreadful events become a test, the occasion for the maximal religious service, the absolute existential moment of the religious life, whose benefits are enjoyed both by the martyrs in the world to come and by the world as a whole, inasmuch as it benefits from such dedication.

In evaluating the appositeness of this reading of the Holocaust one appreciates its positive elements: It does not assign sin to the victims and denies sin as the cause of the horrific events that unfolded; it praises Israel's heroism and faithfulness. Yet the analogy between biblical and modern events breaks down before other elemental features of the 'Aqedah paradigm. First, in *Genesis* it is God who commands the test. Are Jews likewise to impute Auschwitz to a command of God? Second, in the original it is Abraham, God's especially faithful servant, who is tested because of his special religious status: "Take now thy son, thy only son, whom thou lovest" (*Gn.* 22:2). One cannot transfer, as the analogy requires, Hitler and his *Schutzstaffel* (SS) into the pivotal role of the Abraham who would sacrifice his "beloved." Finally, in the biblical circumstance the angel of the Lord brings the matter to a conclusion with no blood being shed: "Lay not thy hand upon the lad, neither do thou anything to him" (*Gn.* 22:12).

**JOB.** The biblical *Book of Job*, the best-known treatment of theodicy in the Hebrew Bible, naturally presents itself as a second possible model for understanding the Holocaust. (See, for example, Maybaum, 1965, p. 70, and Greenberg, 1981.) According to such a rendering—which is not unlike that offered by the 'Aqedah—Job provides an inviting paradigm because again Job's suffering is not caused by his sinfulness but rather by his righteousness, which is perceived by Satan as a cause for jealousy. Moreover, the tale ends on a "happy" note, as Job is rewarded for his faithfulness with God's double blessing. On a deeper level, the resolution of Job's doubts is never really clear; God's reply through the whirlwind is, in important ways, no answer to Job's ques-

tions; and Job's first wife and family are still dead through no fault of their own.

*Job* presents details that lead away from rather than toward an analogy with the Holocaust, and hence disallow the use of Job's faithfulness as an appropriate response to Hitler's demonic assault. First, the reader of *Job* knows, by way of the prologue, that the pact between God and Satan over the conditions of Job's trial explicitly stipulates that Job not be killed. This, above all, renders the situation of Job and that of Auschwitz altogether different. Second, except for the few who survived them, all theological ruminations are the work of those who were not in the death camps, and hence the theologian's situation is not that of Job but, as Eliezer Berkovits has said, of Job's brother. Third, the haunting matter of those who died in order to make the test possible finds no resolution in *Job*. God's capriciousness appears all too manifest. Finally, the climax of *Job* occurs when God reveals himself. He may not provide an answer to the specific bill of complaints raised by Job, but at least Job knows there is a God and hence, at a minimum, some reason to "trust in the Lord," even if he does not understand his ways. Job receives some sort of "answer," as Martin Buber among others has emphasized, through this manifestation of God's presence: "I had heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye sees thee; wherefore I abhor my words and repent" (*Jb.* 42:5–6; see Martin Buber, *At the Turning*, New York, 1952, pp. 61ff.). By contrast, those who went to their death in the death camps received no such comforting revelation of the divine.

**THE SUFFERING SERVANT.** One of the richest theological doctrines of biblical theodicy is that of the Suffering Servant. Given its classic presentation in the *Book of Isaiah* (especially chapter 53), the Suffering Servant doctrine is that of vicarious suffering and atonement in which the righteous suffer for the wicked and hence atone, in some mysterious way, God's wrath and judgment, thus making the continuation of humankind possible. According to Jewish tradition, the Suffering Servant is Israel, the people of the covenant, who suffer with and for God in the midst of the evil of creation. By suffering for others, the Jewish people make it possible for creation to endure. In this act of faithfulness the guiltless establish a unique bond with the Almighty. As they suffer for and with him, he shares their suffering and agony and comes to love them in a special way for loving him with such fortitude and depth. (For the rabbinic use of this concept see, in the Babylonian Talmud, *Sanhedrin* 98b, *Berakhot* 5a, and *Sotah* 14a.)

In Jewish theological writings emanating from the Holocaust era itself and continuing down to the present day, this theme has been enunciated. One finds it in the writings of Hasidic *rebeyim* (see, for example, Kalman Kalonymus Spiro, *Esh qodesh* [Holy fire], Jerusalem, 1960, and the material presented in *Eleh ezkerah* [These will I remember], edited by Isaac Lewin, 6 vols., New York, 1956–1965). It is also evinced in the work of Conservative thinkers such as Abra-

ham Joshua Heschel (1954 and 1955) and in that of Orthodox thinkers such as Eliezer Berkovits (1973) and Irving Greenberg (1981). "God's servant," writes Berkovits, "carries upon his shoulders God's dilemma with man through history. God's people share in all the fortunes of God's dilemma as man is bungling his way through toward Messianic realization" (p. 127).

One theologian, Ignaz Maybaum, a German Reform rabbi who survived the war in London, takes the paradigm outside the traditional Jewish framework and uses it to construct a more systematic, theological deconstruction of the Holocaust. First in the "servant of God" in *Isaiah*, then in the Jew Jesus, and now at Treblinka and Auschwitz, God uses the Jewish people to address the world and save it: "They died though innocently so that others might live" (Maybaum, 1965, p. 67). According to this reading of the Holocaust the perennial dialectic of history is God's desire that the Gentile nations come close to him while they resist this call. To foster and facilitate this relationship is the special task, the "mission," of Israel. It is they who must make God's message accessible in terms the Gentile nations will understand and respond to. But what language, what symbols, will speak to the nations? Modern Israel repeats collectively the single crucifixion of one Jew two millennia ago and by so doing reveals to humankind its weaknesses as well as the need for its turning to Heaven. In a daring parallelism Maybaum writes: "The Golgotha of modern mankind is Auschwitz. The cross, the Roman gallows, was replaced by the gas chamber. The gentiles, it seems, must first be terrified by the blood of the sacrificed scapegoat to have the mercy of God revealed to them and become converted, become baptized gentiles, become Christians" (*ibid.*, p. 36). For Maybaum, through the Holocaust the world moves again forward and upward, from the final vestiges of medieval obscurantism and intolerance, of which the Sho'ah is a product, to a new era of spiritual maturity, human morality, and encounter between the human and the divine.

Applied to the Holocaust, the doctrine of the Servant seems worse than the problem: It means that God can act cruelly, demand terrible sacrifices, and regulate creation by "unacceptable" means. Surely the omnipotent, omniscient creator could have found a more satisfactory principle for directing and sustaining his creation. Recourse to mystery, to saying "God's ways are not our ways," is not an explanation; rather, it is a capitulation before the immensity of the Sho'ah and a cry of faith.

The more specific, elaborate, form given the doctrine by Maybaum empties Jewish life of all meaning other than that intelligible to and directed toward the gentile nations. Only the Christocentric pattern now applied to the people of Israel gives this people's history and spirituality meaning. In addition, this view is predicated on a false analogy between the Holocaust and Good Friday. Christians are able to declare that "Christ died for the sins of humankind" for (at least) two cardinal reasons. The first and most weighty is that



Christ is believed to be God Incarnate, the second person of the Trinity: The crucifixion is God taking the sins of humanity on himself. He is the vicarious atonement for humankind. There is thus no terrible cruelty or unspeakable “crime” but only divine love, the presence of unlimited divine grace. Second, the human yet divine Christ, the hypostatic union of humanity and God, mounts the cross voluntarily. He willingly “dies so that others might live.” How very different was the Sho’ah. How very dissimilar its victims (not martyrs) and their fate. The murdered were not divine, they were all-too-human creatures crushed in the most unspeakable brutality. If God was the cause of their suffering, how at odds from the traditional Christian picture this is. For here God purchases life for some by sacrificing others, not himself. Furthermore, the Jews were singled out “unwillingly”; they were not martyrs in the classical sense—though some may wish to transform this fate for their own needs by seeing them as such.

The disanalogy of the Holocaust and Good Friday would yet reveal something more. According to Maybaum, the symbol of the crucifixion is one of vicarious atonement. But given the circumstances of the vicarious sacrifice of the Sho’ah, is it not the case that the nature of the atonement is far more criminal and infinitely more depraved than the sins for which it atones? What sort of *kohanim* (“priests”) were the Nazis, and what sort of sacrifice could they bring about? Can one truly envision God, the God of Israel, making such a vicarious expiation?

**HESTER PANIM.** In wrestling with human suffering, the Hebrew Bible appeals, especially in the Psalms, to the notion of *hester panim*, “the hiding of the face” of God. This concept has two meanings. The first, as in *Deuteronomy* 31:17–18 and later in *Micah* 3:4, is the causal one that links God’s absence to human sin. God turns away from the sinner. The second sense, found particularly in certain psalms (e.g., *Ps.* 44, 69, 88 and variants in, e.g., *Ps.* 9, 10, 13; see also *Jb.* 13:24), suggests protest, despair, and confusion over the absence of God for no clear reason, and not as a consequence of sin. Here humankind stands “abandoned” for reasons that appear unknown and unfathomable. Thus the repetitive theme of lament in the Psalms as the psalmists implore God “why” or “how long” he will be absent.

In the rabbinic sources the term *hester panim* is further developed in a variety of contexts, most notably in response to the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE. Its employment is an indication (1) that the traditional, more widely used explanation for that event—that it was brought on by sin—is either not compelling or is being rejected; and (2) that the sages were profoundly perplexed by this and related events and yet could not or would not account for it through appeal to either human sinfulness or divine capriciousness. Their faith in divine providence required that they not abandon trust in God, but just how his will and presence was to be deciphered seemed increasingly uncertain; hence the appeal to *hester panim*.

In applying the doctrine of *hester panim* to the Holocaust, modern theologians are attempting to vindicate Israel, to remove God as the direct cause of the evil by suggesting that evil is something humans do to other humans, and to affirm the reality and even the saving nature of the divine despite empirical evidence to the contrary. *Hester panim* is not merely or only the absence of God; rather, it entails a more complex exegesis of divine providence stemming from an analysis of the ontological nature of the divine. God’s absence, *hester panim*, is a necessary, active, condition of his saving mercy; that is, his “hiddenness” is the obverse of his “long-suffering” patience with sinners. In other words, being patient with sinners means allowing sin. “One may call it the divine dilemma that God’s *Erekh Apayim*, his patiently waiting countenance to some is, of necessity, identical with his *hester panim*, his hiding of the countenance, to others” (Berkovits, 1973, p. 107). *Hester panim* also is dialectically related to the fundamental character of human freedom without which human would not be human. It should also be recognized that this notion is an affirmation of faith. The lament addressed to God is a sign that God exists and that his manifest presence is still possible. Even more, it proclaims that God in his absence is still, paradoxically, present. It is a sign that one believes that ultimately evil will not triumph, for God will not always “hide his face.” For some contemporary Jewish theologians, like Emil L. Fackenheim, Eliezer Berkovits, Irving Greenberg, and Martin Buber, the state of Israel is proof of the vindication of the forces of good over evil, light over darkness.

Martin Buber, in his contemporary idiom, modernized the biblical phrase and spoke of the era, during and after the Holocaust, as a time of “the eclipse of God” (as he titled his book, 1952). This felicitous description represents Buber’s wish to continue to affirm the existence of God despite the counterevidence of Auschwitz. Yet this again is an appeal to faith and mystery despite strong evidence to the contrary. Also, this gambit still fails to answer the pressing question: Where was God in the death camps? Given the moral attributes, the qualities of love and concern, that are integral to God’s nature, how can one rest in the assertion of his self-willed absence, that is, in passivity, in the face of the murder of a million Jewish children. The solution only produces a larger conundrum.

**MIPPENEI HATA’EINU.** In biblical and later Jewish sources the principal though not unique “explanation” for human suffering was sin, as has been seen. There was a balance in the universal order that was inescapable: Good brought forth blessing and sin retribution. Both on the individual and collective level the law of cause and effect, of sin and grief, operated. In the present time it is not surprising that some theologians—particularly traditional ones—and certain rabbinical sages have responded to the tragedy of European Jewry with this classical “answer.” Harsh as it is, the argument advanced is that Israel sinned grievously and God, after much patience and hope of return, finally “cut off” the generation of the wicked. The reasoning is expressed in the phrase *mippenei*

*hata'einu* ("because of our sins" are Jews punished). Though the majority of those who have wrestled with the theological implications of the Sho'ah have rejected this line of analysis, an important, if small, segment of the religious community have consistently advanced it.

Two questions immediately arise in pursuing the application of the age-old doctrine to the contemporary tragedy of the Holocaust. The first is: "What kind of God would exact such retribution?" Christian thinkers who "explain" Auschwitz as one of many punishments of a rebellious Israel for the crime of deicide, and Jewish thinkers who pronounce Israel's sinfulness are both obligated to reflect, to be self-conscious, about the implications of their idea of God. Could a God of love, the God of Israel, use a Hitler to annihilate the Jewish people?

Second, what sin could Israel be guilty of to warrant such retribution? Here the explanations vary depending on one's perspective. For some, such as the Satmar *rebe* Yo'el Teitelbaum (1888–1982) and his small circle of Hasidic and extreme right-wing, anti-Zionist followers, the sin that precipitated the Holocaust was Zionism. For in Zionism the Jewish people broke their covenant with God, which demanded that they not try to end their exile and thereby hasten the coming of the Messiah through their own means. In return "we have witnessed the immense manifestation of God's anger [the Holocaust]" (*Sefer va-Yo'el Moshel*, Brooklyn, New York, 5721/1961, p. 5). For others on the right of the religious spectrum the primary crime was not Zionism but Reform Judaism. In this equation the centrality of Germany as the land that gave birth simultaneously to Reform Judaism and Nazism is undeniable proof of their causal connection. (See, for the presentation of this position, Elhanan Wasserman, *Iqvata de-meshiha* [In the footsteps of the Messiah], Tel Aviv, 5702/1942, p. 6; Hayyim Ozer Qanyevski, *Hayyei Olam* [Eternal Life], Rishon Le-Zion, 5733/1972.) In a similar, if broader vein, others of this theological predisposition identified Jewish assimilation as the root issue. Again the key role played by Germany is "proof" of the mechanism of cause and effect. Alternatively, in these same very traditional Orthodox circles, Issachar Teichthal saw the negative catalyst not in the Jewish people's Zionist activity but just the reverse, in their passionate commitment to life in exile and their failure to support willingly and freely the sanctified activity of Zionist upbuilding and thereby bring the exile to a close. In his book *Em ha-banim semehab* (The mother of children is happy), written in Hungary in 1943, Teichthal, writing in the belief that the twin events of the Holocaust and the growth of the Zionist movement marked the beginning of the messianic era, declaimed: "And these [anti-Zionist leaders] have caused even more lamentation; [and because of their opposition] we have arrived at the situation we are in today . . . this abomination in the house of Israel—endless trouble and sorrow upon sorrow—all because we despised our precious land" (*Em ha-banim semehab*, Budapest, 5703/1943, p. 17).

**THE FREE WILL DEFENSE.** Among philosophical reflections concerning theodicy, none has an older or more distinguished lineage than that known as the free will defense. According to this argument human evil is the necessary and ever-present possibility entailed by the reality of human freedom. If human beings are to be capable of acts of authentic morality they must be capable of acts of authentic immorality. Applying this consideration to the events of the Nazi epoch, the Sho'ah becomes a case of the extreme misuse of human freedom. At the same time such a position in no way forces a reconsideration of the cosmological structure in which the anthropological drama unfolds, nor does it call into question God's goodness and solicitude, for it is humanity and not God who perpetrates genocide. God observes these events with his unique divine pathos, but refrains from intercession in order to allow human morality to be substantively real. At the same time that he is long-suffering with evil elements of humanity, his patience results in the suffering of others.

This situation, however, is not ultimate or final in the Jewish context, for there is also the deeply held contention that God must absent himself for humankind to be but must also be present in order that meaninglessness does not ultimately gain final victory. Thus God's presence in history must be sensed as hiddenness, and his anonymity must be understood as the sign of his presence. God reveals his power in history by curbing his might so that humankind too might be powerful. In Israel's experience, as Berkovits declares in making this case, one sees both attributes of God. The continued existence of the Jewish people despite its long record of suffering is the strongest single proof that God does exist despite his concealment. Israel is the witness to God's presence in space and time. Nazism understood this fact, and its slaughter of Jews was an attempt to slaughter the God of history. The Nazis were aware, even as Israel sometimes fails to be, that God's manifest reality in the world is necessarily linked to the fate of the Jewish people.

This defense has been—not surprisingly, given its historical tenacity and intellectual power—widely advocated by post-Holocaust thinkers of all shades of theological opinion. The two most notable developments of the theme in the general theological literature are in Berkovits's *Faith after the Holocaust* and Arthur A. Cohen's *The Tremendum*.

In trying to estimate the power of the free will argument in the face of Auschwitz, two counterarguments are salient. First, could not God, possessed of omniscience, omnipotence, and absolute goodness, have created a world in which there was human freedom but less evil—or even none at all? The sheer gratuitous evil manifest during the Holocaust goes beyond anything that appears logically or metaphysically necessary for the existence of freedom and beyond the bounds of toleration for a just, all-powerful God. Secondly, it might be argued that it would be morally preferable to have a world in which evil did not exist, at least not in the magnitude witnessed during the Sho'ah, even if this meant doing

without certain heroic moral attributes or accomplishments. That is to say, for example, though feeding and caring for the sick or hungry is a great virtue it would be far better if there were no sickness or hunger and hence no need for such care. Here it is important to recognize that free will is not, despite a widespread tendency so to understand it, all of one piece. Free will can be limited to apply only in certain, specific circumstances, just as action can be constrained in certain ways. Consider, too, that God could have created a human-kind that, while possessing free will, nonetheless also had a proportionately stronger inclination for the good and a correspondingly weaker inclination to evil.

**A NEW REVELATION.** To this point the first six positions analyzed have all been predicated upon classical Jewish responses to national tragedy. In the last two decades, however, a number of innovative, more radical, responses have been evoked from contemporary post-Holocaust thinkers. The remainder of this article will concentrate on the most important of these explorations, beginning with the contention argued by Emil L. Fackenheim, that the Holocaust represents a new revelation. Rejecting any account that analyzes Auschwitz as a *mippenei ḥata'ei nu* event, or, in fact, any notion of an "explanation" for the Holocaust, Fackenheim, employing a Buberian model of dialogical revelation, revelation as the personal encounter of an I with the eternal Thou (God), urges Israel to continue to believe despite the moral outrage of the Sho'ah. God, in this view, is always present in Jewish history, even at Auschwitz. One does not, and cannot, understand what he was doing at Auschwitz, or why he allowed it, but one must insist that he was there. Still more, from the death camps as from Sinai, God commands Israel. The nature of this commanding voice, what Fackenheim has called the "614th Commandment" (there are 613 commandments in traditional Judaism) is: "Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthumous victories" (1970, p. 84); that is, Jews are under a sacred obligation to survive; after the death camps Jewish existence itself is a holy act; Jews are under a sacred obligation to remember the martyrs; Jews are, as Jews, forbidden to despair of redemption or to become cynical about the world and humanity, for to submit to cynicism is to abdicate responsibility for the world and to deliver the world into the hands of Nazism and similar potentially evil forces. And above all, Jews are "forbidden to despair of the God of Israel, lest Judaism perish" (*ibid.*). The voice that speaks from Auschwitz above all demands that Hitler win no posthumous victories, that no Jew do what Hitler could not do. Fackenheim invests the Jewish will for survival with transcendental significance. Precisely because others would eradicate Jews from the earth, Jews are commanded to resist annihilation. Paradoxically, Hitler makes Judaism after Auschwitz a necessity.

This interesting, highly influential response to the Sho'ah requires detailed analysis. How do historical events become "revelatory"? And what exactly does Fackenheim mean by the term *commandment*? In the older, traditional theological vocabulary of Judaism, it meant something God

actually "spoke" to the people of Israel. Fackenheim, however, would reject this literal meaning in line with his dialogical premises. It would seem that for him the word has only analogical or metaphorical sense in this case; if so, what urgency and compelling power does it retain? Secondly, should Hitler gain such prominence in Jewish theology, to the extent that Judaism survives primarily in order to spite his dark memory? Raising these two issues only begins to do justice to the richness and ingenuity of Fackenheim's position.

**THE COVENANT BROKEN: A NEW AGE.** A second modern thinker who has urged continued belief in the God of Israel, though on new terms, is Irving Greenberg. For Greenberg all the old truths and certainties have been destroyed by the Holocaust. Any simple faith is now impossible. Greenberg explicates this radical notion in this way. There are three major periods in the covenantal history of Israel. The first is the biblical era. What characterizes this first covenantal stage is the asymmetry of the relationship between God and Israel. The biblical encounter may be a covenant, but it is clearly a covenant in which "God is the initiator, the senior partner, who punishes, rewards and enforces the punishment if the Jews slacken" (Greenberg, 1981, p. 6). This type of relationship culminated in the crisis engendered by the destruction of the First Temple in 587/6 BCE. To this tragedy Israel, through the prophets, in keeping with the logic of this position, responded primarily through the doctrine of self-chastisement: The destruction was divine punishment rather than rejection or proof of God's nonexistence.

The second, rabbinic phase in the transformation of the covenant idea is marked by the destruction of the Second Temple. The reaction of the rabbis was to argue that now Jews must take a more equal role in the covenant, becoming true partners with the Almighty. "The manifest divine presence and activity was being reduced but the covenant was actually being renewed" (*ibid.*, p. 7). For the destruction signaled the initiation of an age in which God would be less manifest though still present.

Greenberg believes that a "third great cycle in Jewish history" has come about as a consequence of the Holocaust. The Sho'ah marks a new era in which the Sinaitic covenantal relationship was shattered and thus an unprecedented form of covenantal relationship, if there is to be any covenantal relationship at all, must come into being to take its place. "In retrospect, it is now clear that the divine assignment to the Jews was untenable. After the Holocaust, it is obvious that this role opened the Jews to a total murderous fury from which there was no escape. . . . Morally speaking, then, God can have no claims on the Jews by dint of the Covenant." What this means, Greenberg argues, is that the covenant

can no longer be commanded and subject to a serious external enforcement. It cannot be commanded because morally speaking—covenantally speaking—one cannot order another to step forward to die. One can give an order like this to an enemy, but in a moral relationship,



I cannot demand giving up one's life. I can ask for it or plead for it—but I cannot order it. (ibid., p. 23)

Out of this complex of considerations, Greenberg pronounces the fateful judgment: The Jewish covenant with God is now voluntary. Jews have, quite miraculously, chosen to continue to retain their Jewish identity and to build a collective Jewish state, the ultimate symbol of Jewish continuity. But these acts are, after Auschwitz, the result of the free choice of the Jewish people. The consequence of this voluntary action transforms the existing covenantal order. First Israel was a junior partner, then an equal partner, and finally, after Auschwitz, it becomes the senior partner, “so in love with the dream of redemption that it volunteered to carry on with its mission” (ibid., p. 25).

In turn, Israel's voluntary acceptance of the covenant and its continued will to survive suggest three corollaries. First, these factors point, if obliquely, to the continued existence of the God of Israel. By creating the state of Israel, by raising Jewish children, Israel shows that “covenantal hope is not in vain” (ibid., pp. 37–38). Second, in an age of voluntarism rather than coercion, living as a Jew under the covenant can no longer be interpreted monolithically, that is, only in strict halakhic (traditional rabbinic) fashion. Third, any aspects of religious behavior that demean the image of the divine or of humanity, such as racial prejudice, sexism, and oppression of all sorts, must be purged.

Interpretation of Greenberg's view must turn on the following issues: the correctness of his theological reading of Jewish history, an open and difficult question; the theological meaning and status of key categories such as “covenant,” “revelation,” “commandment,” and the like—that is, on the one hand, whether Greenberg has done justice to the classical meaning of these terms, and, on the other, whether his revised rendering is justifiable and functional; and whether Jews should allow Hitler and the Holocaust such decisive power in determining the inner, authentic nature of Jewish theology.

**A REDEFINITION OF GOD.** An important school in modern theological circles known as “process theology,” inspired by the work of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, has argued that the classical understanding of God has to be quite dramatically revised, especially in terms of Jewish conception of God's power and direct, causal involvement in human affairs. According to those who advance this thesis God certainly exists, but the old and the more recent difficulties of theodicy and related metaphysical problems emanating from classical theism arise precisely because of an inadequate description of the Divine, a description that incorrectly ascribes to God attributes of omnipotence and omniscience.

Arthur A. Cohen, in his *The Tremendum: A Theological Interpretation of the Holocaust* (1981), made a related proposal. Although he draws on the writing of F. W. J. Schelling (1775–1854) and Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) and on Qabbalah (Jewish mysticism) as his sources, he is no doubt

also familiar with the work of the process theologians. After arguing for the enormity of the Holocaust, its uniqueness, and its transcendence of any meaning, Cohen suggested that the way out of the dilemma posed by classical thought is to rethink whether “national catastrophes are compatible with our traditional notions of a beneficent and providential God” (p. 50). For Cohen the answer is no, at least to the extent that the activity and nature of the providential God must be reconceptualized. Against the traditional view that asks, given its understanding of God's action in history, how it could be that God witnessed the Holocaust and remained silent, Cohen would pose the contrary “dipolar” thesis that “what is taken as God's speech is really always man's hearing, that God is not the strategist of our particularities or of our historical condition, but rather the mystery of our futurity, always our *posse*, never our acts” (p. 97). That is, “if we begin to see God less as an interferer whose insertion is welcome (when it accords with our needs) and more as the immensity whose reality is our prefiguration . . . we shall have won a sense of God whom we may love and honor, but whom we no longer fear and from whom we no longer demand” (ibid.).

This redescription of God, coupled with a form of the free will defense, made all the more plausible because God is now not a direct causal agent in human affairs, resolves much of the tension created by the *tremendum*.

This deconstruction of classical theism and its substitution by theological dipolarity fails to deal adequately with the problem of God's attributes. Is God still God if no longer the providential agency in history? Is God still God who lacks the power to enter history vertically to perform the miraculous? Is such a “dipolar” God still the God to whom one prays, the God of salvation? Put the other way round, it certainly does not appear to be the God of the covenant, nor the God of exodus and Sinai, nor yet the God of the prophets and the *hurban bayit ri'shon* (“destruction of the First Temple”) and the *hurban bayit sheni* (“destruction of the Second Temple”). These counterevidences suggest that Cohen's God is not the God of the Bible and rabbinic tradition. Hence it is legitimate to ask whether, if Cohen is right—indeed, particularly if Cohen is right—there is any meaning left in Judaism, in the idea of God in Jewish tradition, or any covenantal role or meaning left to the Jewish people? Cohen's revisionism in this particular area is so radical that it sweeps away the biblical ground of Jewish faith and tradition and allows the biblical evidence to count not at all against his own speculative metaphysical hypotheses.

Secondly, is the dipolar, noninterfering God “whom we no longer fear and from whom we no longer demand” yet worthy of “love and honor?” This God seems closer, say, to Plato's Demiurge or perhaps better still to the God of the deists. What difference in Jewish lives is there between this God and no God at all? What sense is there, given his noninterference, in calling him a God of love and salvation?

Nevertheless, *The Tremendum* is an important work of Jewish theology that forces scholars to engage in theology as few recent books by Jewish authors have and that is saturated with an intense concern with the people of Israel; it is the product of a deep and broadly educated mind.

**GOD IS DEAD.** It is natural that many should have responded to the horror of the Holocaust with unbelief. Such skepticism usually takes a nonsystematic, almost intuitive, form: “I can no longer believe.” However, one contemporary Jewish theologian, Richard L. Rubenstein, has provided a formally structured “death of God” theology as a response to the Sho’ah.

In Rubenstein’s view the only honest response to the death camps is the rejection of God, the statement “God is dead,” and the open recognition of the meaninglessness of existence. One’s life is neither planned nor purposeful, there is no divine will, and the world does not reflect divine concern. Humankind must now reject its illusions and recognize the existential truth that life is not intrinsically valuable, that the human condition reflects no transcendental purpose, and that history reveals no providence. All theological “rationalizations” of Auschwitz fall before its enormity and, for Rubenstein, the only worthy reaction is the rejection of the entire Jewish theological framework: There is no God and no covenant with Israel. Drawing heavily upon the atheistic existentialists such as Camus, Sartre, and earlier Nietzsche, Rubenstein interprets this to mean that in the face of history’s meaninglessness human beings must create and project meaning.

What makes Rubenstein’s theology a Jewish theology are the implications he draws from his radical negation with respect to the people of Israel. Rubenstein inverts the ordinary perception and argues that with the death of God, the existence of the *community* of Israel is all the more important. Now that there is nowhere else to turn for meaning, Jews need each other all the more to create meaning: “It is precisely because human existence is tragic, ultimately hopeless, and without meaning that we treasure our religious community” (1966, p. 68). Though Judaism has to be “demythologized,” that is, it has to renounce all normative claims to a unique “chosen” status, at the same time it paradoxically gains heightened importance in the process.

Coupled to this psychoanalytic revisionism in Rubenstein’s ontology is a mystical paganism in which the Jew is urged to forgo history and return to the cosmic rhythms of natural existence. The modern Jew is exhorted to recognize the priorities of nature. So, for example, he or she must come to understand that the real meaning of messianism is “the proclamation of the end of history and return to nature and nature’s cyclical repetitiveness” (*ibid.*, p. 135). The future and final redemption is not to be the conquest of nature by history, as traditionally conceived in the Jewish tradition, but rather the conquest of history by nature and the return of all things to their primal origins. Humanity has to rediscover the sanctity of its bodily life and reject forever the delusion

of overcoming it; humans must submit to and enjoy their physicality—not try to transform or transcend it. Rubenstein sees the renewal of Zion and the rebuilding of the land with its return to the soil as a harbinger of this return to nature on the part of the Jew who has been removed from the earth (symbolically, from nature) by theology and necessity for almost two thousand years. The return to the land points toward the final escape of the Jew from the negativity of history to the vitality and promise of self-liberation through nature.

Rubenstein’s challenging position raises two especially difficult issues. The first has to do with how one evaluates Jewish history as “evidence” for and against the existence of God. It may well be that the radical theologian sees Jewish history too narrowly. He takes *the* decisive event of Jewish history to be the death camps. Logic and conceptual adequacy require that if one gives negative theological weight to Auschwitz one must give positive theological weight to the re-creation of the Jewish state, an event of equal or greater import in Jewish history. Another issue raised by the question of “evidence” is the adoption by Rubenstein of an empiricist theory of meaning as the measure by which to judge the status of God’s existence. History, in its totality, provides evidence both for and against the nonexistence of God on empirical or verificationist grounds—that is, there is both good and bad in history.

**MYSTERY AND SILENCE.** In the face of the Holocaust, recourse to the God of mystery and human silence are not unworthy options. However, there are two kinds of silence, two kinds of employment of the idea of a God of mystery. The first is closer to the attitude of the agnostic: “I cannot know.” Hence all profound existential and intellectual wrestling with the enormous problems raised by the Sho’ah and with God after the Sho’ah are avoided. The second is the silence and mystery that Job and many of the prophets manifest, to which the Bible points in its recognition of God’s elemental otherness. This is the silence that comes after struggling with and reproaching God, after feeling his closeness or his painful absence. This silence, this mystery, is the silence and mystery of seriousness, of that authenticity that will not diminish the tragedy with a too quick answer, yet that, having forced reason to its limits, recognizes the limits of reason. Had Abraham accepted God’s judgment at Sodom too quickly, or Job his suffering in a too easy silence, they would have betrayed the majesty and morality of the God in whom they trusted. In the literary responses to Auschwitz by survivors one finds this attitude more commonly than in works of overt theology. It is preeminent, for example, in the novels of Elie Wiesel, André Schwarz-Bart, and Primo Levi and in the poetry of Nelly Sachs. Assuredly, there is great difficulty in ascertaining when thought has reached its limit and silence and mystery become proper, but, at the same time, there is the need to know when to speak in silence.

**SEE ALSO** Jewish Thought and Philosophy, article on Modern Thought.



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Revised Bibliography

**HOLY, IDEA OF THE.** [This entry attempts an assessment of the role of the German theologian Rudolf Otto and his book *The Idea of the Holy* in setting forth a distinctively phenomenological interpretation of the nature of religion.]

Rudolf Otto's work during the first half of his career culminated with his publication, at the age of forty-eight, of *Das Heilige* (1917), translated as *The Idea of the Holy* (1923). Published in an age of high hopes for science, it has as a central concern the assertion of the autonomy of religion. Otto's position is diametrically opposed to what has come to be called reductionism, that is, the explanation of religion as a creation of human culture, a response to psychological or social needs that is in some sense the product of those needs. Otto, by contrast, asserts the autonomy of religion in the sphere of its own activity and its status as a response to a power transcending the human.

A landmark among theories of religion, Otto's book appeared only five years after the major work by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*. To situate Otto in European intellectual history, it will be useful to discuss Durkheim briefly. This is not because of any direct response by Otto

to Durkheim; as far as can be told, they never met in person, nor did the German theologian and the French sociologist discuss each other's works. Rather, the contrast between these two influential books demonstrates the presence of an issue that has persisted in the interpretation of religion. Durkheim, who analyzes the sacred as originating in a symbolic projection of the clan or tribal group identity, stands as a polar opposite to Otto, who portrays the holy as a power far greater than, and lying far beyond, the human realm.

Although Otto does not seem to have reacted directly to Durkheim, he did write an article in 1910 that was sharply critical of a figure Durkheim found attractive: the German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, whose *Völkerpsychologie* (Leipzig, 1900–1909) offered an evolutionary theory of religion as a social phenomenon, the product of group fantasy. Otto flatly denied the possibility of a social account of customs and myths in the absence of a capacity for religious feeling in the individual, and he asserted the uniqueness of such a feeling as a distinctively human spiritual capacity.

The significance of Rudolf Otto's work is that it takes account of the cumulative critical and scientific tradition of modern Europe and claims a place of respect for religious experience and religious thought in a modern age. That critical heritage, too vast to be set forth in detail here, included the institutional challenges to church authority of the Renaissance, Reformation, and French Revolution. It included the rationalist critique of revealed knowledge made by the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. It included nineteenth-century scientific discovery, comprehending a view of the evolution of human biology that many saw as paradigmatic for culture as well. And it included comparative linguistic, historical, and cultural studies fueled by an expanding fund of information from Europe's contact with the rest of the world; this new knowledge tended to remove the element of uniqueness from various aspects of the Christian heritage. Otto, then, was a product of modern European culture, seeking an up-to-date but sympathetic expression of religion in terms of what that culture had at its disposal.

**RELIGIOUS FEELING.** By and large, the use of the expression the holy as a noun has spread since the appearance of Rudolf Otto's book, and as a direct result of it. Otto was not the first to employ *the holy* as a noun; that distinction may belong to the German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915), who did so in an essay in 1903. In any event, the pattern of making noun concepts out of adjectival qualities was not new; for instance, the term *das Göttliche* ("the divine") is found in the writings of the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831).

In the academic study of religion in the English-speaking world, reference to the holy has implied an appreciation of divine potency as a reality. The usefulness of the term has been generic: It has been possible to take references to the source or object of religious veneration as examples of human religiosity generally, without committing oneself to

the affirmations or practices of a particular community and tradition.

The subtitle of Otto's *The Idea of the Holy* declares his agenda: *An Inquiry into the Nonrational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational*. Otto was not seeking to deny an important role to rationality. Far from it. Otto, in the tradition of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), insisted that reason could operate a priori to establish mathematics, rules of inference, and the like, and could operate a posteriori to distill impressive amounts of information from sense data. In particular, Otto sought to extend and refine the application of the Kantian critique of reason promoted by Kant's disciple Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843). Those today who read *Das Heilige* in isolation should note Otto's priorities in his foreword to the 1923 English translation: "I feel that no one ought to concern himself with the 'Numen ineffabile' who has not already devoted assiduous and serious study to the 'Ratio aeterna.'" Religious orthodoxy in general, and Christian doctrine in particular, have a tendency toward rationalization, Otto asserts. But while highly developed rational, conceptual systems have their place, Christian theology has tended to overlook the nonrational element in religious experience. It is this element that Otto seeks to characterize and illustrate in *Das Heilige* as "something remarkably specific and unique" (p. 4).

The principal and abiding interest of Rudolf Otto's philosophy of religion has centered on his description of religious experience. In *Das Heilige* Otto presented as characteristic of religion a particular awareness of the presence of divinity for which he coined the word *numinous*. He derived the word from *numen*, the Latin term for a divine spirit or localized power that the ancient Romans perceived in nature. The numinous, for Otto, is a feeling that one has as a creature in the presence of a superior power. Otto gives it a three-factor explication: It is the awareness of a mystery (something wholly other than one's self); which is *tremendum* (awe-inspiring, overpowering, possessed of its own emotion-like initiative) yet at the same time fascinating (such that one is drawn to seek communication with it). Having set this forth in forty pages, Otto seeks in the balance of the book to describe ways in which the sense of the numinous is expressed in religious art, in biblical literature, and in the writings of the Christian mystics. Writing as a Lutheran, Otto is particularly interested in mystical elements in the faith of Martin Luther.

Although *Das Heilige* seems to start out as a treatment of a philosophical problem, namely the role of the rational and the nonrational as sources of religious knowledge, the bulk of the book is not so much an argument as a collection of illustrations. Herein perhaps lie both the book's weakness and its strength. The reader is drawn into material from the history of religious life rather than the history of doctrine, drawn into territory that is more psychological or symbolic than conceptual. Bit by bit, the reader is shown that a religiously satisfying response to the Kantian problem of knowl-

edge of the transcendent is likely to be a deeply personal rather than a rationally analytical one. Otto is by no means the first religious philosopher to have made such a point; the limits of reason had been discussed by early Christian theologians, and the twelfth-century Muslim thinker Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī proposed a particularly appealing synthesis of the roles of reason and experience. But Otto's innovation appears to have been to provide a structure for the description of feeling and in so doing to commend feeling itself to people of a rational bent.

Otto's term *numinous* has subsequently become part of the general vocabulary of the study of religion, often in two senses. In one of these senses, the quality inheres in the experience; one has a numinous experience or feeling, numinosity or numinousness is an aspect of that experience or feeling, and the reality that is held to exist is an event in the consciousness of the religious individual. In the other of these senses, *numinous* refers to the quality of that presumed reality beyond the individual; it produces, or is the object of, that experience or feeling, and it is held by religious participants and religiously committed observers to be a reality far transcending the experience of any one individual.

Essentially, in the rhetoric of Otto's presentation, both of these connotations of the term *numinous* are implied; Otto wants the term to function in both senses. On page 7 of *The Idea of the Holy* he says, "I shall speak, then, of a unique 'numinous' category of value and of a definitely 'numinous' state of mind, which is always found wherever the category is applied." The overall thrust of Otto's presentation involves the conviction that there exist not only a state of mind and a realm of value as two distinct realities, but that the first of these is intimately linked to the second and constitutes a form of evidence for it.

For centuries a recurring problem of religious philosophy has been whether anything in the realm of the transcendent or divine can be demonstrated to the uncommitted or skeptical inquirer to be an existing reality. On the whole, the post-Kantian consensus has been that there is no "objective" knowledge of the transcendent possible through the operation of reason on the data received from the senses. Experience of the transcendent, however compelling to the person who has it, is not necessarily compellingly transferable to the person who does not have it.

Although the bulk of Otto's book amounts to a descriptive inventory of various people's intense experiences of divine power, which seeks to elicit an appreciation of intensely felt religion (particularly of mysticism) from the reader, the inescapable fact that Otto himself realizes is that there is no demonstration by argument that can substitute for religious experience itself. Perhaps the best-known phrases in *The Idea of the Holy* appear on page 8:

The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness. Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no such moments in his

experience, is requested to read no farther; for it is not easy to discuss questions of religious psychology with one who can recollect the emotions of his adolescence, the discomforts of indigestion, or, say, social feelings, but cannot recall any intrinsically religious feelings.

This fundamental element of religion, the sense of the numinous, is held to be a primary datum of human experience. The explicit contention appears to be that, as in the case of physical sensations, emotions, or aesthetic feelings, if one has not had the experience, one cannot understand the subject; and it is at least loosely implied that if one has had the experience, one can.

Otto appears to expect people to have had religious experience. But his memorable injunction "to read no farther" takes on significance because it is evident that religious experience is not universal—that is, it is something that some people have and others do not. Even if most people have it and only a few lack it, there are still some persons who must be treated as rational, as perceptive, yet not as religious. Thus religiousness, however characteristic it may be of humans in general, and however "normal" it may be, is not universal. This normality or normativeness of religion, not the universality of religion, can be seen as both a strength and a weakness of Otto's position: a strength, in that many have been tempted to take the objects of religion as experientially evident without exhaustive rational proof; but a weakness, in that for those who seek such a proof there is nothing conclusive forthcoming.

**SEMANTICS OF "HOLY" IN ENGLISH.** One of the more interesting aspects of the use of Otto's discussion of the holy in the two generations since his book appeared is the widespread equation between the terms *the holy* and *the sacred* in writings sympathetic to religion in general.

Speakers of English are not surprised to find in their language two common and near-synonymous terms for the same phenomenon. In instance after instance, a word of Germanic (Anglo-Saxon) background such as *get* or *gut* will be matched by a word of Romanic (Latin or French) origin such as *obtain* or *intestine*. Frequently the Germanic word is felt to be more direct or down-to-earth. But while the word of Romanic origin may connote greater sophistication, its denoted meaning may often be the same as the Germanic. The result is that speakers of English can display a tendency to expect synonyms, to assume for practical purposes an equivalence in terminology, without seriously testing the matter.

An instance of this disposition is that in the English-speaking world, writers on the nature of religion in general have referred sometimes to *the holy* and sometimes to *the sacred* as though the phenomena were identical and the terminology a rather incidental matter of personal taste. This has been true not merely when the subject has been mentioned in passing apropos of another argument; it has also been the case in critical works on this very topic, such as Mircea Eliade's *The Sacred and the Profane*, or in discussions of Eliade such as Thomas J. J. Altizer's *Mircea Eliade and the*

*Dialectic of the Sacred* (Philadelphia, 1963, p. 24). Eliade's generation has invested *the sacred* with the same connotations that Otto's generation found in *the holy*, a point to which this article shall return shortly. Otto's English translator, John W. Harvey, assumes the sacred and the holy to mean the same thing in a sentence he adds to the text of *The Idea of the Holy* at a prominent juncture at the end of the first chapter. And in his own appendix to the English translation, "The Expression of the Numinous in English" (*The Idea of the Holy*, pp. 216–220), he finds *holy* "a distinctly more numinous word than *sacred*" but does not specify a difference in denotation. Indeed, for Harvey the two terms are part of "the English wealth of synonyms" that "has presented the translator with an embarrassment at the very outset" (p. 216).

On equivalency of vocabulary, it should be noted that while English is one of the world's more self-consciously cosmopolitan languages, it is by no means the only one. The Norman conquest of England in the eleventh century, which superimposed a Latin vocabulary on a Germanic one, is suggestively parallel to the Islamic conquest of Iran in the seventh century, which gave Persian a massive inventory of Arabic loanwords as synonyms for the vocabulary of pre-Islamic Iran.

What does the English word *holy* mean? For the range of its usage, with dated examples of the first appearance of various senses, the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1933) provides three copious pages of material. For the purposes of this article, the usage divides into three categories: first, the attributes of God (who is definitively holy) or the divine; second, the attributes of things that derive their holiness from association with God; and third, the attributes of people and actions conforming to what is held to be God's expectation. On God as holy, one has such phrases as "Holy art thou," "the Holy One of Israel," and the like. Examples of holy things are the Holy Bible and the Holy Grail. For people and actions, consider the phrases "holy man," "to lead a holy life," etc. Inevitably, there are borderline cases: "Holy matrimony" falls under the second heading if one regards it as an institution (and therefore a "thing"), but under the third if it is seen as an activity.

*Sacred* may today be a near equivalent of holy, but it differs in two important respects. First, it is more recent as a word in English. Whereas *holy*, a term of Germanic origin, occurred in Old and Middle English, *sacred*, coming from Latin by way of French, made its appearance only gradually in the centuries after the Norman conquest. Second, *sacred* took over some, but by no means all, of the semantic range of holy: Specifically, it referred to respected or venerated objects but not to the divine itself and not to persons as individuals. The God of the Bible did not become the "sacred one of Israel," nor did a "holy man" become a "sacred man."

What was at stake in the extension of the word *sacred* in English usage appears to have been an effort to describe the veneration accorded by human beings rather than to as-

sert that the thing in question had been hallowed by God. *Sacred*, a past participle of a now-archaic verb *sacren*, meaning "to consecrate," implicitly commits the speaker or writer merely to a description of human veneration, whereas holy may more likely imply that the user of the term holds that the object in question has indeed been hallowed by God. *Sacred*, though frequently used by religiously committed persons, had also the potential of being a descriptive term used by an outsider to a religious community, while *holy* was much more exclusively a participant's term. Thus, one says "the holy Bible" in a context where the book is treated with reverence, but in referring to others' scriptures one is comfortable with expressions such as "the sacred books of the East."

A telling illustration of this difference appears in English translations of the Bible. In the King James Version of 1611, the Hebrew *qadosh* is regularly rendered as *holy*, whereas in the Revised Standard Version of 1946–1952, it is sometimes *holy* but in other cases *sacred*; the instances in which the twentieth-century translators departed from the usage of their seventeenth-century predecessors have primarily to do with the cultic utensils of the Hebrew temple, a ritual expression of religion from which mid-twentieth-century Protestant biblical scholarship appears to have sought to keep a distance, feeling presumably that God's real intent for people was located elsewhere than in the Hebrew sacrifices.

Conduct is an area in which *sacred* has never taken over the territory of *holy*. A person, to be holy, must conform to the divine standards of conduct: either ritual, or moral, or both. Thus holiness, through the centuries, has been the pattern of obedience put forward as the ideal for the pious devotee that, when most supremely achieved, renders one a holy person—a "saint." Holiness, in this sense of religious practice, was a prime goal for a religiously motivated person, and was self-consciously reflected on. Indeed, the content of articles on holiness in theological dictionaries and encyclopedias prior to the twentieth century was regularly a discussion of the ideals of the religious life and not a generic discussion of the holy as it has come to be treated.

The second decade of the twentieth century saw a shift from such devotional discussions of holiness to a more comparative treatment. A pioneer in this development was the Swedish historian of religions (and subsequently archbishop) Nathan Söderblom (1866–1931), who contributed a substantial article on holiness to the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (vol. 6, 1913). As Otto would do four years later, Söderblom sought not to discuss so much the practice of holiness in the sense of an attribute of human conduct as the awareness of it in the sense of an attribute of divinity. To accomplish this discussion cross-culturally, Söderblom recapitulated various terms suggestive of supernatural power, such as the positive holiness of *mana* and the negative holiness of *taboo*, from the languages of tribal societies—terms that had come to be used by late nineteenth-century European and American theorists of religion to indicate the most pervasive,

the simplest, the most fundamental, and presumably the original feature of religion throughout human culture. Cross-cultural discussions of the nature of religion had been common since the work of F. Max Müller on comparative mythology in the mid-nineteenth century. It appears, however, to have been Söderblom who first applied the term *holiness* to such a topic.

**TRANSLATION EQUIVALENTS.** The semantic differentiation between *sacred* and *holy* that this article has sketched is limited to English and is not necessarily found in other languages. Elsewhere one might expect to find (a) two (or more) terms, possibly with a different distinction than that between *sacred* and *holy* in English; (b) one term, covering both senses; or (c) no readily identifiable vocabulary equivalent.

Latin and the languages descended from it are an example of the first possibility; German and Russian, of the second; and the languages of certain tribal cultures appear to furnish examples of the last category.

Latin has two words that have been frequently translated as “holy”: *sanctum* and *sacrum*. Unlike the situation in English, where two words have etymological sources in different languages, the two Latin terms go back to the same Indo-European root, *sak-*, with an *-n-* infix occurring in the case of *sanctum*. The spheres of use of the two Latin terms, however, appear roughly parallel to English. On the whole, *sanctum*, like *holy*, generally commits the speaker to an endorsement of the holiness in question as a reality, and it applies to the divine power (God is *sanctus*) and to the conduct of individuals (*saint* being derived from *sanctus*). *Sacrum*, on the other hand, denotes human veneration.

Latin’s “daughter languages,” which emerged from vernacular Latin in the Middle Ages, preserve this vocabulary distinction. From *sanctum* come *santo* in Italian and Spanish, *saint* in French; while from *sacrum* come Italian *sacro*, Spanish *sagrado*, and French *sacré*. Yet in the usage of these various languages, it is not always the case that the same adjective is applied to a particular object. If for *holy* one would expect *sanctum* and its derivatives rather than *sacrum*, then French usage will meet one’s expectations with *la sainte Bible*, but Latin, Italian, and Spanish will surprise one with *Biblia sacra* (or, in Spanish, *sagrada*). Could it be that Catholic Europe did not hold the Bible in as high regard as did the Protestants, who turned to it as a source of authority over against that of the church? Such a view might fit in with the Italian and Spanish usage, but hardly explains the expression *la sainte Bible* in French. This illustration, then, may be sufficient to convince one that the semantic distinction between *holy* and *sacred* can serve as an indicator of a potential confusion but not necessarily as a precise tool with which to resolve it.

German has not classically had two terms to use. To be sure, there is a word *sakral*, meaning “cultic,” but only in recent years has it seen much use as in noun form for an organizing concept, and even then it is primarily used to translate *the sacred* from works in other languages. Prior to the mid-

twentieth century, *heilig* covered what has been reviewed as the participant’s semantic field of English *holy* as well as the observer’s connotation of English *sacred*. As long as Western discourse regarding religion dealt almost exclusively with the received Judeo-Christian tradition, and as long as the disposition of most speakers was to accept at least a major subset of the tenets of that tradition, pressure for precision tended not to arise. Indeed, it can be argued that Rudolf Otto tapped the predispositions of a largely willing audience when he published *Das Heilige*. Writing in a language in which *the holy* and *the sacred* are one and the same, he was able to combine a participant’s appreciation of religious experience with an observer’s range of comparative detail. To a very considerable extent, the excitement that he generated revolved around his call for a participant’s appreciation of religion, but this was focused on his discussion of experience; neither he nor his readers directed attention to the “insider” connotation built into the German term *heilig*. To the extent that readers thought about the word, it appears they gave Otto credit for having given it a more comparative or cross-cultural denotation.

The capacity of the German word *heilig* to leave open the possibility of God-given holiness, while also referring to human respect, has had more than minor consequences. A German scholar, Albert Mirgeler (1901–1979) mentions the semantics of holiness as a contributing factor to the medieval investiture controversy, a major political struggle involving northern versus southern Europe over the role of the Roman church in the designation of rulers (*Mutations of Western Christianity*, London and New York, 1964, pp. 96–97). What may have been only a claim for human respect in the Latin name *sacrum imperium Romanum* came to be understood as a more sweeping claim in its German translation, *heiliges römisches Reich* (“Holy Roman Empire”). One must be cautious in pressing this point, for, after all, a divine sanction for the power of the state *was* claimed; and, moreover, many examples could be adduced to show that where words are ambiguous people do have ways of identifying the ambiguity and deciding which sense of a word applies. Still, the possibility of confusion was clearly present.

Russian is another language with only one common word for *holy* and *sacred*: *sviaty*. Rudolf Otto expressed fascination with the chanting of this term, which he had heard from the lips of Russian priests. Again in the Russian case, there are theopolitical overtones. For centuries prior to the victory of Marxist atheism, Russians referred to their land (both its territory and its tradition as a state) as *sviaty Rus*, “holy Russia.” Russia is not the only territory that has been called holy; specific temple precincts frequently are, and the land of the Bible is called “the Holy Land” (“Terra Sancta,” etc.) in the various languages of Christendom. But the holiness claimed for Russia is probably best understood at the level of Latin *sacrum*, not *sanctum*, at a level, in short, not like the spiritual holiness associated with the Holy Land but like the institutional sacredness of the Holy Roman Empire.



Researchers in comparative and cross-cultural studies have generally been ready to suppose that there exists in tribal societies on all continents, as well as in all the great classic traditions of the Eurasian land mass, a universal human pattern of setting apart certain moments in time or precincts in space and of finding in them hints of a transcendent power or value. It seems to be granted that the *phenomenon* of a sense of the sacred or holy is virtually universal. It is, however, far less clear that appropriate *vocabulary* is equally widespread. There appear to be languages without an equivalent covering the same range of meaning as the word *holy*. This is a problem encountered frequently by Bible translators, whose attempts to render *Holy Spirit* have sometimes yielded expressions like “clean ancestor” in the target language.

Indeed, much of the principal ritual expression of holiness is bound up with the notion of purity. For persons most familiar with the religious tradition of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, this may be not immediately evident, because many interpreters in recent centuries have concentrated on an ethical conception of holiness, crediting the Hebrew prophets or Jesus with a repudiation of ritual. The intimate relationship between holiness and purity can also be overlooked because a separate vocabulary for purity exists in both Hebrew and Greek. But the notion that the holy itself, as well as human beings who seek to draw near to it, should be kept apart from the profane, finds symbolic as well as practical expression in the avoidance of various sorts of contaminating or polluting substances and actions. Jewish avoidance of pork, Muslim traditions regarding fasting, Christian practice of celibacy, Zoroastrian precautions to safeguard the holy fire, traditional Hindu dietary and social taboos, Shintō ablutions at shrines—all these and many more are instances of the maintenance of some sense of purity worthy of holiness in the “great” religions. It should be no surprise that when investigators of tribal traditions have looked at behavior expressing a sense of, or response to, the sacred, the maintenance of standards of purity has been a salient finding. Where an explicit theoretical conceptualization of holiness has seemed to be lacking, emphasis on ritual purity has offered an obvious approximation in the custom and the languages of tribal societies.

**OTTO’S LEGACY.** One of the principal options in the study of religion in the mid-twentieth century has been termed the “phenomenology” of religion. Definitions of this term have varied from strict to loose. Understood strictly, the phenomenology of religion is supposed to be a precise application to religion of insights from the European philosophical movement known as phenomenology, launched by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), in which the self’s awareness of what presents itself to consciousness is explored. Phenomenology in that sense has little to do with Rudolf Otto, because he antedated many of the philosophical phenomenologists and did not employ their terminology; to the extent that philosophical phenomenology has influenced the phenomenology of religion, that influence has occurred through certain comparativists writing since Otto’s time, particularly in Holland.

In a looser sense of the term, however, Otto was a phenomenologist of religion, indeed one of the pioneers of the enterprise. If by *phenomenology* one means the type of sympathetic treatment of material from a variety of religious traditions, seeing recurring features of religion as a response to a divine stimulus, in the pattern of the Dutch comparativists of the 1930s through the 1960s, then this name for the approach can be applied retroactively to Rudolf Otto. After Otto’s time, this sympathetic treatment of religion in general, stressing similarities (which refrained from arguing the superiority of one tradition over another, stressing differences), would become a major methodological option in the academic study of religion. Many of its practitioners would look back to Rudolf Otto’s work of 1917 as a charter document for phenomenology’s attitude of sympathy for religion (Mircea Eliade does this in *The Sacred and the Profane*, for example), just as they would look back to P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye’s *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte* (Manual of the science of religion; 1887–1889) as a prototype of phenomenology of religion’s taxonomic treatment of data from various religions.

One does not need to be a comparativist to appreciate, and to be influenced by, Rudolf Otto’s presentation of the holy in *Das Heilige*. In fact, what made Otto’s book a theological best-seller was only marginally the existence in the first quarter of the twentieth century of a cross-cultural cosmopolitanism with respect to religion. Such an interest would account far more for the sales of James G. Frazer’s *Golden Bough* (1897; 3d ed., 1907–1911), whose net effect was to explain away various religious practices as benighted and to suggest that modern men and women had outgrown traditional religion. Much more important was a widespread desire to hold that traditional religion could be felt, if not proved, to be authentic even in a modern age. Most people who read Otto were looking for intellectual and psychological respectability for their own religious faith, not for an elaboration of the faith of others. And it has become commonplace to suggest that the events of World War I, by shattering many easy assumptions of the inevitability of human progress, turned many people to a renewed quest for religious values. This development is often cited as a factor in assessing the impact of Karl Barth in *Der Römerbrief* (1919), a book differing sharply in its religious assumptions from *Das Heilige* but sharing with it the status of theological best-seller in the aftermath of the war.

However much Rudolf Otto was aware of the diversity of religions, he made his principal mark by contributing to the faith-and-reason agenda of Western philosophy of religion and Christian theology. Immanuel Kant, in demonstrating convincingly the limits of rational proof, had “made room for faith” as not only unprovable but undisprovable. After him, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) was to characterize religion as rooted in a *feeling* of absolute dependence. Otto’s presentation of the “sense of the numinous” likewise takes feeling or experience as what must be dealt

with rather than questioned. In the decades since Otto, probably the most illustrious bearer of this intellectual lineage has been the Protestant theologian Paul Tillich (1886–1965), who (in contrast with Karl Barth’s emphasis on revelation) argues from human concern as the starting point for discourse about God.

The type of position that largely since Otto’s day has come to be known as religious existentialism, arguing from experience and commitment as a primary datum, remains, despite the obvious problems of objective proof, a major twentieth-century option in the philosophy of religion. To call Otto an existentialist philosopher of religion would be a retroactive designation of the same kind as my calling him a phenomenologist of religion.

In the end Otto’s *Das Heilige* remains a classic in the field probably not because his attempts at a solution have great enduring value but because he has put some of the basic questions in an arresting fashion. Many who pick up the book today feel that they have the measure of it by the fortieth page. Just as a standard newspaper article must face the “cut off test,” it seems to make its main point at the beginning, following that up with optional detail. But the challenge of page 8, “whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is requested to read no farther,” is as compelling today as when Otto wrote it. Page 8 of *The Idea of the Holy* will be with Western civilization for a long time to come.

SEE ALSO Otto, Rudolf; Sacred and the Profane, The.

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**HOLY ORDER OF MANS** was a prominent New Age spiritual community whose radical transformation into an Eastern Orthodox Christian brotherhood during the 1980s illustrates the instability of charismatically led religious communities during their founding generation. As the renamed Christ the Saviour Brotherhood, the community has shrunk to a few hundred members unified primarily by a commitment to Orthodoxy and a shared odyssey through late-twentieth-century America’s pluralistic religious marketplace.

The order had its origins in the cultural ferment of mid-1960s San Francisco. Its founder, Earl W. Blighton (1904–1974), was a retired electrical engineer and social worker whose spiritual explorations in California’s alternative religions subculture led him to such organizations as the Theosophical Society, the Subramuniya Yoga order, the Spiritualist church, and the Ancient and Mystical Order Rosae Crucis. Together with his wife, Helen Ruth Blighton, he opened a prayer shrine in 1966 to minister to the young people who were wandering the streets of San Francisco in search of spiritual enlightenment. The committed core of disciples who gathered around the Blightons evolved into an intentional spiritual community organized according to tradition-

al Christian monastic rules. The Holy Order of MANS (there is some controversy surrounding the meaning of the acronym, which was purportedly revealed only to initiates) was incorporated on July 24, 1968.

Blighton's order developed a unique system of initiatory spirituality that included elements of qabbalism, Rosicrucianism, New Age millennialism, New Thought philosophy, and Tantrism. The mission of the order was to prepare the earth and its peoples for an imminent golden dawn of spiritual enlightenment by initiating the masses into the "ancient Christian mysteries." These mystical teachings, Blighton maintained, had disappeared from view once Christianity became a powerful, wealthy institution. In the New Age that was dawning, these esoteric teachings were being revealed again to the world. The order ordained priests under the auspices of the Great White Brotherhood, a hierarchy of advanced spiritual masters who were believed to be responsible for humankind's evolution. Blighton claimed to have received the power to ordain these priests from Christ through revelation. The priests were empowered to perform "solar initiations" that represented stages of the soul's evolution to "mastery." The order's initiations were believed to be recreations of the sacramental initiations of the early Christian church, whose true function had been forgotten with the passage of time.

In the first initiatory rite, baptism, aspirants declared their dedication to the path of spiritual regeneration under the order's guidance. Blighton taught that the rite triggered an infusion of the "Christ force" into the disciple's body and purged the body of the effects of past errors. The second initiation, "illumination," implanted and sealed the "new body of light" in the aspirant. The rite included an awakening of the *kuṇḍalīnī* energy at the base of the spine and an activation of the aspirant's chakra currents. The third initiation, "self-realization," was a neoshamanic rending of an etheric veil that was believed to cover the indwelling spark of divinity at the core of the aspirant's being. After this rite, the disciple could receive interior revelation from the Godhead and was considered a functioning "God-Being." The order also administered a daily communion rite, which was understood as a work of spiritual alchemy in which the wine and bread were transmuted into Christ's body and blood. Communicants believed that they were being infused with the attributes and experience of the Master Jesus, who had taken on the being of the Cosmic Christ during his earthly sojourn.

Between 1969 and 1974, Blighton's order spread quickly throughout the United States. It established mission stations and "brotherhouses" in over sixty cities in forty-eight states. Like traditional monks, order members took vows of obedience, service, poverty, purity, and humility, practiced regular fasting, wore clerical robes, and held all assets in common. Unlike traditional monasteries, however, order centers were coeducational, elevated women to the priesthood, and embraced spiritual practices from non-Christian sources. During this early period, the order also expanded its organi-

zation to include a lay discipleship movement and lay families (Christian Communities) that were interested in practicing the order's path of esoteric spirituality. Blighton also established two suborders, the Immaculate Heart Sisters of Mary and the Brown Brothers of the Holy Light, to provide intermediate training for renunciate members. Members of the suborders performed community service and special Marian devotions, and they engaged in missionary teaching. In 1971 the order opened Raphael House, a shelter for the homeless and for victims of domestic violence. This service outreach would spark a movement across the United States to establish anonymous shelters for battered women and children.

Blighton's sudden death in 1974 precipitated a four-year leadership crisis for the order. A succession of "master-teachers" (the movement's highest level of spiritual attainment) took charge of the group and attempted to impress upon it their own personal interpretation of Blighton's teachings. This period of instability did not impede recruitment, however. The movement reached its height of membership, three thousand, in 1977. Also during this period, international centers opened in London, Bordeaux, San Sebastian, Amsterdam, Buenos Aires, Tokyo, and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

In the spring of 1978, Andrew Rossi was elected director general of the order. Rossi was an erudite former Roman Catholic pre seminarian whose résumé included a stint as a Chinese-language specialist with the Intelligence Section of the U.S. Navy. In his first public statements, Rossi embraced Blighton's Gnostic and New Age vision of the order's mission. He proclaimed that Jesus was calling all peoples to a new understanding of his teachings and divinity, an understanding based on "living Revelation" and unbound by past symbols, dogmas, and scriptures. Though he was the "very form of God Incarnate" and was due the greatest respect and honor, Jesus was not to be worshiped as God himself. The order's mission, according to Rossi, was to present Jesus' teachings in a universal and inclusive way in the dawning millennial age. This new way would lead Christians beyond religion, beyond form, and beyond the figure of Jesus himself, to a state in which all would find their true being in the "Father-Mother God." In obedience to this mission, the order would redouble its efforts to remove the barriers that separated humankind, especially those that had been erected in Jesus' name.

On November 18, 1978, the first reports of the Jonestown mass suicide-murder reached the national media. Within a short time, the cultural context in the United States with regard to new religions changed from one of tolerance and acceptance to one of suspicion and outright hostility. The anticult movement used the national mood of shock and revulsion at the Jonestown events to intensify its efforts to convince politicians and judges to regulate "dangerous cults." Soon, increasingly hostile public scrutiny was brought to bear on the order, which heretofore had enjoyed a positive

public image because of its service outreach in local communities. The order also appeared on the “cult lists” of such leading countercult groups as the Christian Research Institute and the Spiritual Counterfeits Project. To make matters worse, the order community began to experience increasing member defections and a steep drop in recruitment rates.

In response to this crisis, Rossi initiated a strong defense of the order in various public forums. The culmination of these efforts was Rossi's 1980 article in the order's journal, *Epiphany*. Titled “By Their Fruits Ye Shall Know Them: Proclaiming the Spiritual Authenticity of the Holy Order of MANS in a Counterfeit Age,” the article laid out a carefully reasoned apology that defended the order's Christian pedigree, as well as its ecumenical and nonsectarian foundations. Rossi declared that the brotherhood's purpose was to develop a Christian community built around the worship of God, discipleship to Christ, and service to the world. The order, he claimed, lived “within the norms of the Christian Tradition.” Rossi also inaugurated a search by the order's membership for precedents in the history of Christianity for what the movement was attempting to accomplish in the world. This would allow members to explain the order to mainstream Christians in terms that were comprehensible and familiar to them.

These initiatives began to move the order's public and private identity away from its New Age and Rosicrucian/Gnostic origins and towards mainstream Christianity. After flirtations with Protestant evangelicalism and Roman Catholic traditionalism, Rossi directed the group to study Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and in particular its tradition of light mysticism. This directive followed Rossi's secret personal conversion to Eastern Orthodoxy during the early 1980s. At the same time, the order's director general consolidated the group into ten large communities in the United States and Europe and began to jettison its system of esoteric initiatory spirituality. Between 1982 and 1986 the brotherhood focused its energies on the preservation of “authentic cultural traditions of ancient Christianity,” the celebration of seasonal festivals, and the creation of alternative schools for its children based on traditional Christian principles.

With the assistance of a defrocked Russian Orthodox monk, Herman Podmoshensky, Rossi orchestrated a gradual conversion of order members during the mid-1980s to Orthodox monastic spirituality. Blighton's core teachings and practices were replaced with Orthodox doctrines and rituals. Following several years of negotiations with various Orthodox jurisdictions, the order community was received into the autocephalous Archdiocese of Queens, New York, in 1988 by its metropolitan, Pangratos Vrionis. The brotherhood's remaining 750 members were rebaptized and renamed as Christ the Saviour Brotherhood. They proclaimed their new mission as “bringing the light and truth of Orthodox Christianity to the spiritually perishing peoples of these darkening and crucial times.”

The order's decision to become Orthodox led to a steady loss of both members and vitality during the 1990s. Its cohesiveness as a community disintegrated with the disbanding of its renunciate (monastic) brotherhood and the consolidation of its membership into nuclear families. Another problem was the nonrecognition of Pangratos's archdiocese by the Standing Conference of Orthodox Bishops in the Americas (SCOBA), the main legitimating body for Orthodox jurisdictions in North America.

In the late 1990s, following documented proof of Pangratos's conviction for sodomy with minors, Christ the Saviour Brotherhood member communities distanced themselves from the Archdiocese of Queens and negotiated acceptance into SCOBA-approved Orthodox jurisdictions throughout the United States. Although some members have joined the Serbian Orthodox Church or the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia, most Christ the Saviour Brotherhood parishes have been received into communion with the Orthodox Church in America. Some of the brotherhood's remaining members have set up small Orthodox missions throughout the country that sell Orthodox books and periodicals and sponsor periodic Orthodox liturgies.

The order's legacy is best realized in three initiatives pioneered in its early history. The first is the Raphael House movement, which has led to a growing national awareness of domestic violence and the need for anonymous shelters for battered women and children. The second is Rossi's Eleventh Commandment Fellowship, which was instrumental in the creation of the North American Conference on Christianity and Ecology and in the raising of ecological awareness among mainstream Christians. The third significant initiative is the order's early advocacy of spiritual equality for women and its ordination of women to its priesthood. Many mainstream denominations now ordain women, including the Episcopalians and the Lutherans. Women also now play an increasingly influential role in Roman Catholic parishes, serving as parish administrators and liturgical leaders among other roles. Ironically, Christ the Saviour Brotherhood now accepts Eastern Orthodoxy's traditional proscription of women priests.

The order's history also provides persuasive evidence that the glue holding new religious communities together can be primarily affective in nature rather than ideological. In short, the many shifts in doctrine that characterize new religious movements in their first generation do not necessarily threaten group cohesiveness if that cohesiveness is based on strong feelings of group solidarity and affection. Finally, the order's history stands as a paradigmatic example of how new religious movements are shaped by their surrounding cultural environment. Blighton's eclectic, nonsectarian, and universalist movement reflected the innovative, tolerant, and experience-seeking mood of the 1960s and 1970s. In a similar manner, Rossi's exclusivist and traditionalist Eastern Orthodox brotherhood reflected the conservatism and yearning for “traditional values” of America in the 1980s.

**SEE ALSO** Anticult Movements; Eastern Christianity; Jonestown and Peoples Temple; New Age Movement; Rosicrucians; Theosophical Society.

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**HOLY PLACES** **SEE** GEOGRAPHY; PILGRIMAGE; SACRED SPACE

**HOLY SPIRIT** **SEE** GOD; TRINITY

**HOLY WAR** **SEE** CRUSADES; JIHĀD

**HOME** is a universal concept of central importance to religious thought. Like such other general symbols as sun and earth, it recurs from prehistoric times across cultures, in contrast to more culture-specific analogues such as the cross and the Ka'bah. Besides its symbolic importance, home is also a significant locus of ritual in many traditions.

As with most sacred symbols, home is simultaneously an abstraction and a concrete object (as when it is embodied in a dwelling). The development of home as dwelling place can be traced from animal to human habitats; from the dens, windbreaks, and caves of nature to the tents, huts, and houses of culture. To automatically equate house and home, however, is to oversimplify, for home transcends all physical dwellings. Nonetheless, this distinction must be applied cautiously, for it assumes a secular separation of symbol and referent alien to preliterate thought.

The qualities that make home a sacred symbol include the way it traditionally functions as an ordering symbol. As

such, it is a kind of *mandala*, or symbol of wholeness, containing within itself all opposites. Among the Tiv of Nigeria these opposites are primarily social. Spatially, home (the compound of huts and granaries) represents kin and domestic group. Genealogy typically governs both hut and compound location. Consequently, a death in the family necessitates readjustment of hut positions to reflect the resultant social order. When a father dies, his son assumes the father's reception hut and allows the houses of the father's wives to decay. He then builds new huts for the widows among those of the heirs, usually brothers, of the deceased, who now become the women's new husbands through a practice known as levirate. Meanwhile, new huts are built for the son's wives adjacent to his reception hut. With the death of a compound head, fission of a compound often occurs so that sets of brothers and their families leave the compound with a new leader.

Commonly the home symbolizes a cosmic order, as exemplified by the tents of the prerevolutionary Mongol Buriats. The Buriats divided their dwellings into four sections: the south portion from the door to the hearth was the low-status half; that from the hearth back, the high-status half. Each half was then again divided, the west side being male and ritually pure, the east, female and ritually impure. Therefore male visitors would stay in the southwest quadrant, female in the southeast. The seat of honor for the host and high-status guest always rested in the northwest sector. Even objects were categorized in this way; valuables and hunting equipment, for example, were male, household utensils female.

Most Native American cultures saw similar cosmic correlations, leading them to characterize their dwellings as both temple and house. For the Plains Indians, the floor of the tipi represented the earth, the walls the sky, and the poles the paths linking earth and humanity to the sky and Wakan-tanka ("the great mystery"). A small altar of bare earth behind the fireplace, often with sod and roots removed and the earth pulverized and swept clean, represented Mother Earth. Sweet grass, cedar, or sage were burned here as incense to the spirits.

In Africa, the layout of Dogon villages and houses also correlates cosmos, village, house, and individual in a series of scales. Both village and house approximate the figure of a man, some of whose "body parts" are female. The outer door of the house is a phallus, its kitchen door a vagina, and the entire ground floor a woman on her back, ready for sex. The ceiling is her male partner. Such cosmic correlations of home and universe are common to the folklore of many archaic cultures.

**HOMELESSNESS.** When connections linking self, ancestors, society, and cosmos dissolve, homelessness ensues. Dread of such a state is universally expressed in conceptions of the "unhoused" dead. In ancient Greek and Roman thought, for example, the unburied were doomed to wander forever as phantoms incapable of stopping for the offerings necessary



to rescue them. The connection to home is also threatened by enslavement, which severs all bonds to family, tribe, and village, and by banishment, a punishment frequently imposed in preindustrialized cultures.

**CONSECRATION AND DOMESTIC RITUALS.** Consecration initiates the process whereby dwelling becomes home. Worldwide, various kinds of foundation rites effect this transformation. Typically they begin by employing divination (such as the elaborate system of feng-shui in China) or astrology (as in India) to select the appropriate site. Exorcism follows, and then the foundation is laid according to the directions of a priest or sorcerer. Archaeological evidence indicates the universality of foundational “charms” from at least as early as the Shang period in China (c. 1751–1028 BCE), when humans were customarily sacrificed at each house post; similar customs were observed into the twentieth century by groups such as the Maori. Thought to underlie such blood-related offerings is the belief that victims of violent death become demons who make powerful house spirits. Animal substitutes have long been used in foundation rites, as among the Arabs of ancient Moab (present-day Jordan), who sacrifice a sheep to pacify the jinn before laying a tent. Other surrogate victims have included statues (Rome), images of the house god (India), and animal parts, pottery, and vegetable remains (Europe).

In the Korean shamanistic tradition known as *mudang*, this essential process of consecration (*sŏngjo baji*) is repeatedly reenacted even today to symbolize cosmic renewal. Typically, pine branches are hung on the gate and white papers on the roof beams of the central hall room to protect and renew the home. Additional rituals of renewal, the Ttökkosa and Sulkosa, are held at every full moon to correlate cosmic change to the building ground of the new home: as the moon appears the ground is renewed. In this tradition the house replaces the more common archaic symbols of mountains or cosmic trees as symbols of the *axis mundi*.

In Judaism, *hanukat-habayit*, “dedication of the home,” is based on *Deuteronomy* 20:5 (“What man is there that has built a new house and has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home, lest he die in the battle and another man dedicate it”). No established form exists for this ceremony beyond the uttering of appropriate blessings and the affixing of a *mezuzah*, a parchment believed to protect the occupants from committing sin, inscribed: “And you shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates” (*Dt.* 6:9, 11:20).

In some traditions, domestic rituals augment or replace practices otherwise performed in sacred places specifically set aside for religious purposes. Daily prayers are common to many religions, but more elaborate home-based rituals occur in the post-Vedic Hindu *pūja* rites, in which images of deities must be attended daily. In the morning the deity is awakened, bathed, dressed, perfumed, garlanded, and fed. Food is again proffered at noon and at night, with an evening song closing the day. Domestic rituals also significantly character-

ize Orthodox Judaism, Korean *mudang*, Haitian Voodoo, and the resurgent practice of witchcraft, or Wicca.

**POLLUTION.** In contrast to consecration, which is designed to vitalize and protect a dwelling by installing a strong protective spirit, prophylactic processes are enacted to exorcise malevolent spirits or evil substances, the most malevolent of which involve blood as in giving birth, fatally wounding an occupant, or natural death. Death especially pollutes a dwelling, so that its occupants must be ritually purified before freely resuming their lives. Among the Yoruba, for example, if purification rites fail and a dwelling is believed to be ghost-infested, it will be abandoned.

Pollution almost universally attends the onset of menstruation as well, and a young woman is frequently required to leave her home until ritual purification renders her fit again for home life. This ritual is enacted by various tribal cultures, such as that of the Bolivian Yuracare who require her to live in a specially constructed leaf hut for four days. Similarly, an almost universal pattern of purification rites attends childbirth in preindustrial cultures. Houses that fail in these various struggles against pollution are often considered demonic, as *Leviticus* 14:43–44 describes: “If the disease has spread in the house, it is a malignant leprosy in the house; it is unclean.” The motifs in folklore of people-eating and haunted houses are additional manifestations of this phenomenon.

On a daily basis, too, pollution of the home must be guarded against, as Judaism well illustrates. In a traditionally observant Jewish home, all food must be kosher, meaning that it must conform to Jewish dietary laws developed from *Leviticus* 11:1–43 and must be prepared properly, using one set of dishes and cooking utensils for meat, another for dairy products. If mixing accidentally occurs, the polluted object becomes impure and must be rendered ritually and legally fit again, or discarded.

**DEATH AND DWELLING PLACES.** “Home” means belonging, dwelling in one’s proper habitat. In this sense, the term applies equally to the living and the dead, the grave being as much a home for the dead as a house is for the living. The nearly universal custom of bestowing grave goods on the dead underscores this connection, as does the custom of constructing tiny dwellings specifically for the soul, a practice common in the Yang-shao period of China and in ancient Egypt. The present-day Sakai of the Malay Peninsula similarly fill huts with doll-sized furniture and implements for use of the dead, and images of ancestors are kept in miniature “soul houses” in parts of Papua and Melanesia.

Such intimate connection between home and deceased family members is dramatically expressed in the dwellings of the Kwakiutl of the Northwest Coast of North America. For them, the house itself lives as a kind of double of its owner, becoming “empty” or “broken” when he dies. When the family regroups around its new head, a new house is built. Characteristics of the “life” of the house are its “speaker’s posts,” open-mouthed figures through which ceremonial

words of welcome emerge as if from the ancestor himself, and the gigantic mouth of the frontal pole that “swallows” those who enter.

**HOUSEHOLD SHRINES.** From Neolithic times, the practice of setting aside a corner or room of a dwelling as a shrine has been common to many traditions. In ancient Egypt this domestic shrine, usually recessed in the wall of the central hall and adorned with religious scenes, contained a figure of a household god made of pottery or precious metal. Among the Banyankole in Africa each hut contains a special grass-covered, hard-beaten mound of earth, about a foot high, to hold sacred objects. Among the Gold Coast tribes, an honored place is set aside in one corner of the home for special offerings to the domestic spirit known as the *subman*. The Yoruba place a humanized image of the house god Olarosa at the door and make a recess in the wall for their personal fetish as well. Among the Udmurts, the *vorsud* or clan god customarily resided on a shelf in the outhouse. Household altars also prominently characterize domestic observances in China, Japan, and Tibet.

**HOUSE SPIRITS, DOMESTIC DEITIES, AND FAMILY.** Almost universally, home, as opposed to mere dwelling, is vivified by a spirit of some sort, usually an ancestor. Evidence in the form of cave burials, skull cults, and sacrifices to the dead dates from the Paleolithic era, suggesting a sacred connection linking ancestors with dwelling places. In pre-Christian Europe, the house god was commonly represented as a snake, which was believed to be a vehicle for the souls of the dead. Among the Lithuanians, for example, the paterfamilias typically maintained his serpent (*givojitos*, “the living ones”; *givoitos*, “immortal ancestor”) in a corner of the house where he offered it food and sacrificed to it.

An elaborate system of household deities existed among the ancient Romans: the *manes* were the benign gods, an undifferentiated collective of ancestors; the *penates* were gods of the store closet; and the *lar familiaris* was the primitive concept of home personified, to which offerings were made on all family anniversaries. Among the Teutons, the household spirit often assumed manikin form. The *cofgodar* (“house gods”) of the Anglo-Saxons have their counterparts today in the *Kobolde* and *Butzen* of the Germans; Puck of the English; the brownies of the Scots; and the *gardsvor*, *tomte*, and *nisse* of the Scandinavians, all still frequently believed to be spirits of ancestors.

Among the Slavs every house has a *domovoi*, the spirit of the founder of the family. At festivals commemorating ancestors, this little old grayhaired man in old-fashioned dress is honored, too. Before the family moves, its members pray, offering bread and salt to entice the house spirit to accompany them. Before Lent, the head of the house invites the *domovoi* to supper by going into the yard and bowing to the four cardinal points. In Russia the spirit is named according to location: in the cattle shed he is the *chlevnik*; in the yard, *dvorovoi*; in the drying kiln *ovinnik*; and in the bathroom, *bannik*.

Among the shamanistic Samoyed of the Arctic coast of Russia, the domestic spirits (*haha*), usually one male and one female, are represented by oddly shaped roots and stones or anthropomorphic figures kept on a special *haha* sledge. Whenever the family moves, special *haha* reindeer carry it. No woman, even a shaman, may uncover the *haha* or care for the domestic gods. The *haha* sledge ordinarily stands behind the *chum* (“tent”) on the outer side of the *si*, the place of honor, occupied only by the eldest family male.

In most West African tribes, the family fetish and a class of ancestral spirits known as the “well-disposed ones” protect their particular village and family. Among the Kenyahs, a rude image of the minor deity Bali Atap, who protects the house against sickness and attack, stands beside the gangway connecting house and riverbank. A different god, Bali Utong, brings prosperity.

Among the Ainu of Japan a family spirit, *inaw*, is invested with life, dwelling in a special corner of the hut behind the heirlooms. In times of trouble he is stuck in the hearth and offered prayers. The incorporeal *eingsaung nat* of the Burmese scares off burglars; it lives in the southern post of the house, which is devotionally adorned with leaves. The Burmese also pray to images of respected relatives as house guardians.

**THE SACRED HEARTH FIRE.** The sacred quality of household spirits and deities has frequently been associated with one of the most common attributes of home, the sacred hearth fire. In Brahmanism, the householder rekindled the sacred fire whenever religious rites were performed. For all domestic ceremonies (*smārta-karman*) the fire of a clay hearth (*grhyāgni*) was sufficient. Every morning the family assembled around the fire in prayer before “feeding” it with bits of consecrated wood (*samidh*) from the *palāśa* tree. If the smoldering embers were inadvertently extinguished, the household would be plunged into chaos; only for an expiatory ceremony (*prāyaścitta*) was the fire intentionally rekindled. The fire god, Agni, functioned as both the god of the household and of the clan, protecting both from evil, much as Hestia did in Greece and Vesta in Rome.

Among Native Americans of the Northern Hemisphere the sacred fire burned by day in the hearth at the center of the dwelling. Fire, a gift of the gods, symbolized the sun, much as the surrounding home symbolized the universe. The door or tent flap was positioned facing the east to catch the morning’s first rays.

Since ancient times the sacredness of the hearth fire has been symbolized in China by the stove god, Zao-wang, and in Japan by the kitchen gods Okitsu-hiko and Okitsu-hime and the god of the stove, *kama no kami*. Bronze Age Chinese dwellings all had a central opening for smoke called “the center of the house.” The spot beneath it was sacred to the tutelary god of the ground on which the house stood. Here food was prepared and eaten, family council held, and the god worshiped. Originally, the god represented the mystery of

fire, guardianship of the house ground, and the family's ideals and traditions.

**SECULARIZATION.** In traditional cultures, "home" is a sacred symbol capable of transforming chaos into cosmos and engendering personal wholeness. But for many industrial and postindustrial cultures, home has become a purely secular institution, particularly in those societies that accept Plato's denigration of the private sphere associated with home in favor of the public one associated with politics. Accordingly, two strongly opposed orders are thought to govern existence. One, to which all humans belong, is the natural order of things determined by biology, in which woman bears children and man maintains the life of the family. The center of this existence, which is ruled by necessity (*anagkē*), is the hierarchically arranged household (*oikia*) dominated by the eldest male. Contrasting with and transcending this order, however, is the city-state, the *polis*, in which every member is equal. In this "higher" realm of the *polis*, members are most truly alive, as they engage in the two "highest" forms of human activity, action (*praxis*) and speech (*lexis*). But only citizens can be members—women, children, slaves, and foreigners are automatically excluded.

Both implicitly and explicitly, this praise of the public and denigration of the private elevates males to a place of existence from which women, by virtue of their anatomy, are barred. Historically, the public sphere of men is extolled while the domestic sphere of women, the home, is both trivialized and despised (except briefly in Victorian times in the West when it was sentimentalized). Thus, much as Freud in *Totem and Taboo* openly derides the concept of God as a believer's internalized image of his or her father, many contemporary Western feminists, Marxists, and utopian thinkers now ignore or dispise the institution of home. For them home has become an ugly image of privatism instead of a symbol of cosmic order and personal wholeness.

**SEE ALSO** Demons; Domestic Observances; Exile; Fire; Foundation Rites; Geomancy.

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**HOMER** (eighth century BCE), according to unanimous ancient Greek tradition, was the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. His authorship of other epic poems and of long hexametrical hymns was already disputed in antiquity. Tradition assigns to him several dates, all earlier than the foundation of the Olympic Games in 776 BCE. All ancient information, however, is much later than any of these dates and has rightly been seen as unhistorical in modern scholarship. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are now seen as the result and culmination of a long tradition of oral poetry; in their substance, they were composed between the late eighth century BCE and the early seventh century BCE, with a growing consensus for a later rather than an earlier date. As part of a tradition reaching back to the Late Bronze Age, the poems are an important source of information on early Greek religion and cult practice. Because throughout most of later Greek culture the poems had become normative, they in turn shaped the Greek way of perceiving polytheism.

**RELIGION IN HOMER.** Homer's gods are fully anthropomorphic, with the exception of river gods, whose descriptions oscillate between anthropomorphism and their element. Anthropomorphism regards not only the gods' appearance but also their way of thinking and feeling. The major gods live together as a loose family that comprises Zeus, patriarch and king; his siblings Poseidon and Hera (who is also his wife); and his children from several women—Apollo and Artemis, Ares, Aphrodite, Hephaistos, and Athena. Only Demeter and Dionysos are curiously nonexistent. They live in a pala-

tial setting on Olympus, a mythical place that in Homer has already transcended its starting point in geographical reality, Mount Olympus, the highest mountain in Greece. Their common meals are usually the occasion for extensive and often heated policy debates that precede the decisions of Zeus. Although the other gods have some independence of action, Zeus's will runs the world. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* differ somewhat in their views of how human life relates to the divine world. The *Iliad* tends to see humans helplessly exposed to divine caprice, even though Zeus's decisions are just and well balanced, whereas the *Odyssey* explicitly rejects divine causation of bad moral decisions by humans. The overall impression is that the gods of the *Odyssey* are more willing to warn and sometimes even guide humans, but in the end to let them take their decisions alone. This reflects different concerns with theodicy in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Whereas the *Iliad* juxtaposes Zeus and Fate without ever clarifying their mutual relationship or exploring the origins of bad things, the *Odyssey* makes it clear at its very beginning that Zeus is not responsible for evil but that humans (such as Aegisthus) often act foolishly and against the will and warning of Zeus and thus cause their own downfall.

Divine mythology in Homer is independent from specific local and cultic traditions. The local connections of some gods are acknowledged, such as Hera's with Argos, Apollo's with Delphi and Delos, or Aphrodite's with Cyprus, but the myths are not the local cult stories of Argos, Delphi, or Delos. To some extent this is even true for the four long and early *Homeric Hymns*. Only the "Hymn to Demeter" narrates a cult myth, the foundational story of the Eleusinian mysteries, and the "Hymn to Apollo" combines the Delian birth story with the foundation myth of the Delphian oracle. This independence from local traditions made Homeric mythology extremely well suited to give a translocal, Panhellenic appearance to the Greek gods.

The world of ritual practice that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* depict must to some degree reflect the contemporary religion. Cities possess temples of their important gods (Athena or Apollo in Troy, Apollo in Chryse, Poseidon at the Phaeacian harbor, Apollo in a grove near Ithaca's town). Athena's Trojan temple contains a sitting image of the goddess. The major Panhellenic sanctuaries—Delphi, Delos, Dodona—are known; Delphi has a stone temple, Delos a famous altar. Humans perform festivals (for example, the festival for Apollo on Ithaca) and sacrifices, either as a group or individually. Twice Homer describes these sacrifices in loving detail, and once he describes an oath sacrifice. Homeric sacrifice is similar to later sacrificial practice with one exception. Whereas later a seer inspected the killed animal to determine whether it was welcome to the gods or not, this custom is absent in the Homeric poems. It is somewhat unclear whether this is a conscious stylization or an indication of contemporary usage. Divination as such is known to Homer, and seers appear in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. But their art seems to concentrate on observing omens, especially from the flight

of birds. Extispicy, especially the art of consulting the liver of a sacrificial animal, is widespread in the ancient Near East and in Iron Age Etruria, where it must have arrived from the Orient. It is conceivable, although somewhat surprising, that the transfer of extispicy to the Greek world resulted from cultural contacts in the Early Iron Age at about the epoch of Homer.

It is still debated how much the Homeric poems owe to ancient Near Eastern culture, mythology, and literature. Given that both Bronze Age and Geometric Greece were part of a much wider Near Eastern common culture, the influence should not be underrated. On a general level are the common and widespread mythological patterns, such as the succession myth Homer (as well as Hesiod) shares with Near Eastern mythologies. On a second, more specific level are direct influences in mythological motives, such as the (rather isolated) mention of Okeanos and Tethys as "ancestors of the gods" (*Iliad* 14.201). This reflects the Akkadian Apsu and Tiamat as ancestors of the gods as narrated, for example, in the *Enuma elish*. On a third level are highly specific narrative motives shared between literary works, such as the apparition of Patroclus's shadow to Achilles in a dream (*Iliad* 23.65–107), which recalls the apparition of the dead Enkidu to Gilgamesh and points to a close connection between two narrative traditions.

**HOMER'S INFLUENCE ON GREEK RELIGION.** In the course of the Archaic epoch, the poems of Homer became normative for Greek culture. The poems' descriptions of the gods decisively shaped a Panhellenic mythology and iconography. But the anthropomorphism of the Homeric gods that made them act and react like humans provoked the criticism of religious thinkers who were devising a theology in which the gods were viewed as ideal moral beings and who were transcending anthropomorphism for the sake of theology. Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 570–c. 480 BCE) rejected anthropomorphism as a human projection onto the divine, and he heavily criticized Homer and Hesiod for their representations of immoral gods who "steal and lie and commit adultery." Plato (c. 428–348 or 347 BCE) went even further. In the *Republic* he proposed that the ideal state would censure poetry and prohibit immoral representations of the gods.

As a way of dealing with these criticisms, rhapsodes and later Stoic philosophers developed the allegorical explanation of such Homeric scenes. The assumption was that the poet was hiding physical or ethical statements behind a misleading narrative surface; allegorization would reconstruct these original intentions of Homer. Originally developed by the rhapsodic interpreters of Homer, such as Stesimbrotos of Thasos (fifth century BCE), allegorical interpretation turned into a major tool for adapting the understanding of canonical texts to a given society without changing their textual forms.

**SEE ALSO** Aegean Religions; Zeus.

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**HOMO RELIGIOSUS.** When the Swedish botanist Linnaeus developed his system of biological classification in the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment's ideal of rationality strongly governed views of humanity. As a result, Linnaeus designated the human species *Homo sapiens*. Soon, however, the Romantic movement and the incipient human sciences accentuated other dimensions of humanity than the rational. In time, new terms were coined on the Linnaean model to designate humanity in various distinctive aspects: *homo ludens* (G. F. Creuzer and, later, Johan Huizinga), *homo faber* (Henri Bergson), *homo viator* (Gabriel-Honoré Marcel), and others. Perhaps the nineteenth century's growing awareness of the universality of religion, especially in the realm of the "primitives" (as they were then known), made it inevitable that a phrase would emerge to express that aspect of humanity that the Enlightenment's ideal had so opposed: *homo religiosus*, "the religious human." In some circles the expression has gained wide currency, but its sense has not remained constant. Three general meanings of *homo religiosus* are most important to students of religion.

**HOMO RELIGIOSUS AS RELIGIOUS LEADER.** In one meaning, *homo religiosus* refers to a particularly religious person within a given (religious) community, that is, to a religious leader. The roots of this usage are much older than the Enlightenment and Linnaeus's *Systema naturae*. In antiquity *religiosus* denoted persons who were scrupulously but not excessively attentive to observances due to gods and humans (Festus, pp. 278 and 289 M; Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.72). In this sense, Cicero could speak of *homines religiosi* (*Epistulae ad familiares* 1.7.4). Christianization brought overtones of distinctiveness—*religiosi* became persons of special ecclesiastical standing—and this usage was transferred to the vernaculars, as in the English noun *religious* and expressions such as "religious folk" (*Romance of the Rose* 6149).

Later, in reaction to the Reformation's universalization of the religious life, Pietist and Puritan movements emphasized a religious distinctiveness whose center was subjective and individual rather than objective and institutional (a personal *Nachfolge Christi*). Friedrich Schleiermacher thought of religion as neither knowing nor doing but as an experiential awareness of one's absolute dependence upon God. He conceived Christ as the unique person in whom this consciousness received ultimate expression, the person whose fully immediate and perfectly open relationship with the Father qualified him to be the mediator of the divine.

In the twentieth century *homo religiosus* as religious leader has inherited both the medieval meaning of *religiosus* and the liberal Protestant tradition initiated by Schleiermacher. According to Max Scheler, who developed a full version of this view, *homo religiosus* is a particular type of human personality: "the man who has God in his heart and God in his actions, who in his own *spiritual figure* is a transformer of souls and is able in new ways to infuse the word of God into hearts that have softened and yield" (Scheler, 1960, p. 127).

Scheler distinguished the *homo religiosus* from four other exemplars of value: the artist, the leading spirit of a civilization, the hero, and the genius. These other figures are each exemplary in some aspect or other: the hero in deeds, for example; the genius in works. *Homo religiosus*, however, is exemplary in his entire being, which in its totality calls for unquestioning imitation (*Nachfolge*). Moreover, Scheler distinguished several types of *homo religiosus*. Of these, the most significant is the original *homo religiosus*, for historical religious traditions, the founder. Unique in his or her own community, the founder is the medium for a positive revelation of the holy. The various derived *homines religiosi*—followers, martyrs, reformers, priests, theologians, and others—are lesser in stature and reflect the absolute claim advanced by the existence and nature of the perfect *homo religiosus*.

Among modern historians of religions, Joachim Wach spoke of *homo religiosus* in this sense. Unlike Scheler, however, Wach was heavily indebted to Max Weber. He saw the distinctive character of the *homo religiosus* not in an intrinsic



quality or activity of the personality but in the historical and sociological effect of his personal or official charisma.

**RELIGIOUS HUMANITY.** Today, two other senses of *homo religiosus* have eclipsed the definition of *homo religiosus* as religious leader, at least in Anglo-American scholarly parlance. In both cases the term is employed not in a particularistic sense—the *homo religiosus* or *homines religiosi*—but in a generic sense, *homo* referring not to an individual but, as with Linnaeus, to humanity. In one usage, the term is a general designation for all human beings, referring specifically to religion as one constitutive aspect of humanity distinct from others. This usage assumes a fundamental unity of all humankind that is much more than biological, and its proponents speak more of the human condition than they do of concrete religious phenomena.

The Dutch historian of religions Gerardus van der Leeuw openly set this sort of *homo religiosus* in opposition to Scheler's. For van der Leeuw, the human as such emerges in the existential tension between two poles: on the one hand, a fully united collective identity in which the individual is submerged (that is, a primitive mentality, the realm of mysticism); on the other, a duality of subject and object in which a human being strives to render everything a technical object, in the end even itself. With humanity there emerges at the same time both *conscientia* (conscience and consciousness) and, from existential anxiety, a sense of sin—hence God and religion. While van der Leeuw is not unaware of the existence of atheists and agnostics, in his formulation such persons can never escape their own selves, their own *conscientiae*.

More recently, Wilhelm Dupré has seen religion as both a “universal pattern of human self-realization” and a “constitutive presence . . . in the emergence of man” (Dupré, 1975, p. 310). Dupré exposit his conception of humanity by using three expressions, *homo existens*, *homo symbolicus*, and *homo religiosus*, each of which necessitates the next. The symbol, not the existential situation of the subject in the world, is the pivot upon which Dupré's conceptions turn. Because religion is for him both the quality that gives intensity to any process of symbolization and the dimension in which symbolization originates, Dupré sees humanity as inevitably religious.

**HOMO RELIGIOSUS AND HOMO MODERNUS.** In a third meaning, as in the second, *homo religiosus* is a generic term, but here it does not extend to the entire species. Instead, it characterizes the mode of human existence prior to the advent of a modern, secular consciousness. Thus, this usage differs from the second in the seriousness with which it takes secularization as an abandonment of religion and in the weight it assigns religious elements within the modern, secularized world. Its adherents are able to conceive religion in terms of concrete phenomena normally considered religious (such as myths and rites), without recourse to subtle redefinitions governed by their views of humanity in general. At the same time, they may still appreciate religion's secular mani-

festations. Because this view appears above all in the influential writings of Mircea Eliade, it is perhaps the most widely known modern use of *homo religiosus*.

Eliade is struck by the difference between the nature and use of symbols in the ancient classical religions and especially among archaic cultures as opposed to the modern Western intelligentsia. He contrasts two distinct modes of existing in and experiencing the world. His *homo religiosus* is driven by a desire for being; modern humanity lives under the dominion of becoming. *Homo religiosus* thirsts for being in the guise of the sacred. *Homo religiosus* attempts to live at the center of the world, close to the gods and in the eternal present of the paradigmatic mythic event that makes profane duration possible. The experience of time and space for *homo religiosus* is characterized by a discontinuity between the sacred and the profane. Modern humanity, however, experiences no such discontinuity. For *homo religiosus*, neither time nor space is capable of distinctive valorization. *Homo religiosus* is determined indiscriminately by all the events of history and by the concomitant threat of nothingness, which produces a profound anxiety.

The break between the two, however, cannot be complete. Determined by history, modern humankind is thereby determined by its unrenounceable precursor, *homo religiosus*. For support, Eliade points to religious structures in the modern world, such as mythic images suppressed in the modern unconscious and the religious symbols and functions of modern entertainment. Nonetheless, there is a profound difference between archaic reality and modern relic. For *homo religiosus*, recognized structures determine a whole world and a whole person. For modern humanity, these unrecognized structures are particular and private, repressed or relegated to peripheral activities.

The influence of Eliade's notion of *homo religiosus* can be gauged by the amount of discussion it has provoked among scholars. Some, especially anthropologists, question Eliade's data and methods and have come to the radical conclusion that Eliade's *homo religiosus* is never encountered in the field (see Saliba, 1976).

Others point out hidden biases that have skewed what they see as otherwise careful work. Those concerned with women's issues, for example, may find Eliade's view of the genuine human life basically androcentric: Eliade's *homo religiosus* is actually *vir religiosus* (see Saiving, 1976).

A third tack grants Eliade's universal structures but challenges the inferences that he draws. Some wonder, for example, whether archaic structures and their modern survivals might not simply arise from “the organic and psychological constitution of *Homo sapiens*” (Brown, 1981, p. 447). Given human biological unity, they question whether Eliade's differentiation of modern humankind from *homo religiosus* is relevant.

A final critique questions not Eliade's notion of *homo religiosus* but what it sees as his program of revitalizing reli-

gious humanity. For example, Kenneth G. Hamilton, a proponent of the death-of-God theology, finds Eliade's preferences opposed to historical faith (see Hamilton, 1965). Religious humanity surrenders questioning and particularity for openness and universality, and as a result abandons history and morality.

**HOMO RELIGIOSUS IN THE STUDY OF RELIGION.** Clearly, scholars give the term *homo religiosus* a variety of distinctive meanings. In addition, they use it with great variation in specificity and frequency. The expositions given here rely on careful and exact discussions, but many scholars also use the expression casually, and the precise meanings they intend are often difficult to determine. Again, some in the field assign *homo religiosus* a prominent place in their thought, but others do quite well without mentioning the term at all.

The formulation of an adequate concept of *homo religiosus* as such is only rarely a primary scholarly goal. As the varied and often incompatible meanings of the term show, scholars are generally driven by deeper and more substantive questions about religion, and they formulate different views on religious matters in which a phrase like *homo religiosus*—a Latin expression that attracts the reader's attention—can perform a range of services. Nonetheless, so long as the study of religion is conceived of as a human study, some students will find *homo religiosus* a convenient and useful expression.

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Gerardus van der Leeuw develops his views on *homo religiosus* in the context of a discussion of primitive mentality; see his *L'homme primitif et la religion: Étude anthropologique* (Paris, 1940). Similarly, Wilhelm Dupré comes to reflect on the universality of religion when he examines primitive peoples in his *Religion in Primitive Cultures: A Study in Ethnophilosophy* (Paris, 1975).

Indispensable for Eliade's view of *homo religiosus* is his *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York, 1959), which discusses the experience of *homo religiosus* with reference to space, time, nature, and life. The volume contains dispersed contrasts of *homo religiosus* and modern humankind. For these contrasts, see also, among other writings, Eliade's *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries:*

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**HOMOSEXUALITY.** Sexual activity between persons of the same sex is known from many places far and near throughout history. Because the word *homosexuality* derives from the Greek *homos*, meaning "same," and not from the Latin *homo*, meaning "man," the term refers both to sex between males and sex between females, though in practice *lesbianism* is used to refer to sexual relations between females. The image of homosexuality has a special history in the social, medical, and religious discourse of Western culture. This image equates the sexual behavior, personal identity, and sociosexual orientation of a person, often under a negative rubric. Other cultures, however, do not make this equation. Thus to say that someone engages in homosexual activity is different from saying he or she is "homosexual." Moreover, since about the eleventh century CE homosexuality has been seen as antithetical to Western ideas of church, family, and state; this attitude generally reflects a traditional Judeo-Christian cosmology. Homosexual relations in religious contexts outside the Western tradition have a wider meaning.

It has been argued both that homosexuality is universal and, to the contrary, that it is culture-bound to certain societies or historical periods. Part of this controversy depends upon how homosexuality is defined. Victorian scholars such as Krafft-Ebing suggested that homosexuality as an essence indicated nervous degeneracy that produced an inversion of innate instincts. Others, such as Havelock Ellis, saw it differently; and Freud believed that it was “remarkably widespread” in simple societies, because “all human beings are capable of making a homosexual object-choice” based upon bisexual potential and social experience (*Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, New York, 1962, pp. 5–11). The ancient Greeks were an especially puzzling case, as Jeremy Bentham noted, to Victorian scholars, who admired their beautiful art and their accomplishments in literature and philosophy but who detested their customary homosexuality.

Modern research has confirmed Freud’s view that homosexual activity occurs in many simple societies. In a classic comparative study of sexual behavior patterns, Ford and Beach (1951) found that homosexual activity was considered socially acceptable and normative for certain people in 64 percent of the seventy-six societies studied. Moreover, institutionalized homosexuality is known among peoples from parts of Africa and Asia, among North and South American Indian tribes, among peoples on the islands of the Pacific, including New Guinea, and among the Australian Aborigines; it occurs as a religious theme in the ancient world among the Greeks (especially the Dorians and the Spartans), the Celts, and the Romans, in ancient Arabia and Islamic fringe areas, in feudal Japan, in ancient China and Indochina, and in selected Indo-European traditions. Here, religious—or, to be more precise, ritual—homosexuality occurs in relation to phallic cults and fertility symbolism, mythology, and ideas about spirit, seed, and soul, particularly as they concern the creation of the cosmos and maleness in humankind. In some societies, however, same-sex relationships are disliked or defined as taboo; certainly ritual homosexuality is not universal. An analysis of cross-cultural sexual variations does show that in the cultural traditions listed above homosexuality plays a role in respect to the experience of the sacred.

It has been demonstrated that there are three forms of the cultural structuring of homosexual activities and organization the world over: (1) age-structured homosexuality, in which people of the same sex but of different ages are sexually involved; (2) gender-reversed homosexuality, wherein a person adopts the dress, mannerisms, and sexual activities of the opposite sex; and (3) role-specialized homosexuality, in which a person, by virtue of his or her social or religious role, is entitled to engage in homosexual activity. In simple societies these forms usually do not occur together but are mutually exclusive. As described below, most cross-cultural examples of these forms concern only male homosexuality; institutionalized female homosexuality is rare. Contrary to popular Western thought, the first type—age-structured homosexual behavior—seems the most frequent. These social

types can be studied in different ways, each of which provides a somewhat different interpretation. A focus on overt homosexual behavior, for instance, may reveal little about the experience or identities of the persons involved. But it is clear that such ritual homosexual forms do not create the lifelong, habitualized identity that in the West is labelled “the homosexual.” Nor do non-Western homosexual customs necessarily indicate the sexual orientation of the persons involved, because participants in the age-structured type later marry, have children, and may or may not engage in extramarital homosexual relations. The exact causes of these homosexual forms are still unknown. Moreover, to ask what causes these types of homosexuality is very different from understanding how they function or affect individuals and societies. This article shall here examine the latter dimension, on which reliable information exists.

**AGE-STRUCTURED HOMOSEXUALITY.** The most common form of ritual homosexuality is organized through customary sexual relationships between older and younger males. In some cultures the practice is obligatory and universal for all males, usually early in the life cycle and, for the junior partner, before marriage. Age-organized homosexuality is associated with militarized societies as well. Ritual and ceremonial practices frequently provide a social basis for it, thus linking sexuality and religion, though this association is by no means true of all the relevant examples.

Of all age-structured systems, that of the ancient Greeks, the West’s cultural ancestors, is the most famous. In the Hellenic world homosexuality is known among the militaristic Dorians at least as early as 800 BCE. Senior and junior males engaged in homosexual relationships as a part of masculine development. Among the Dorians on Crete, Ephoros describes the experience as an initiation that begins with a ritual capture (*harpagē*) of a boy by his lover; the community acknowledged this by gift giving and feasting, recalling the myths of the pederastic captures of Chrysippus by Laius and of Ganymede by Zeus (see Bremmer, 1980, p. 285). Early Greek homosexuality was fundamentally related to the concept of *aretē*, which in Homer’s time meant “warlike prowess.” *Aretē* implied masculine valor, beauty, and nobility, symbolized, on the earthly plane, by the heroic strength of warrior and athlete, by the spirit and speed of horses, and, on the spiritual plane, by the power of the gods (Jaeger, 1945). Male lovers were known as *erōmenos* (“boy, beloved”) and *erastēs* (“senior, lover”). The ideal was for the senior to transmit the noble qualities of *aretē* to his junior through teaching, love, and sex, the senior receiving sexual pleasure.

The military aspect of Hellenic homosexuality is widely noted. Some scholars feel it has been exaggerated (Hoffman, 1980); certainly it changed over time. The Thebans and Spartans were said to have taken boy lovers with them as comrades and bedmates. The youths in turn learned warrior values and the military arts. The Theban military corps known as the Sacred Band was said to derive its strength from the homoerotic unity of male warrior couples. Many

ancient texts tell celebrated stories of how male lovers overthrew tyrants and defeated invaders. And Plutarch says that “an army consisting of lovers and their beloved ones, fighting at each other’s side, although a mere handful, would overcome the whole world” (Westermarck, 1917, vol. 2, p. 479). In Classical Attic culture, however, the educational and social dimensions of homosexual love were stressed over the military aspect (Dover, 1978).

What did male love mean to the ancient Greeks? The subject has long been a source of controversy, for the ancients have only their texts and art to speak for them. While homosexuality was not directly supported by Greek religion, the polymorphous sexuality of the Greek gods—Zeus himself, for instance, engaged in homosexual love capture, and Aphrodite served as patroness of both heterosexual and homosexual love—is noteworthy. Perhaps polytheism in Greece and in non-Western cultures contributed to the acceptance of homosexuality.

Certainly there is no question that the widely known figures of Greek philosophy, the teacher Socrates and his students Plato and Xenophon, among others, engaged in homosexual relationships as a part of the educational process. The teacher transmitted the noble qualities of *aretē*, knowledge, and virtue in the context of homoerotic love with his students (Dover, 1978). In the Hellenic world, an act could be described as homosexual or heterosexual, but not a person—a view markedly in contrast with the modern one. This was no doubt complemented by the sexual segregation and the taboo on adultery among the Greeks. Still, homosexuality was frowned upon between peers (except with slaves, as among the Romans), and the *erōmenos* went on to marry, father children, and play the role of *erastēs*, which strove toward honor and beauty, “the very heart of the Greek view of life” (Jaeger, 1945, p. 13).

Plutarch reports that in Sparta, at least, noblewomen loved girls as well. There, female initiation involved age-structured lesbian relationships like those of males. The writings of Sappho suggest a similar ritual background.

Age-asymmetric homosexuality was also known in ancient Rome, though the Roman attitude toward it was more ambivalent. The Romans drew upon and emulated Greek culture in many ways, and Livy reports male homosexual intercourse as a part of Bacchic rites in the early Roman Republic. Homosexuality among nobles seems to have elicited a mixed reaction among Romans. Most Romans focused upon the negative character of effeminacy, seduction, and prostitution among those who engaged in homosexual activity, consistent with their patriarchal culture and imperialistic worldview. Nonetheless, there was probably no law against homosexuality until late in the Roman Empire. The masculine senior role in homosexual relationships was widely regarded and honorable; one need only recall the emperor Hadrian’s unending devotion to his dead male lover, the Greek youth Antinous, as a renowned expression of erotic fidelity. The complexity of the Roman response to homosexuality

may have to do with many and diverse influences, which, through Roman conquests, trade, and the advent of Christianity, introduced heterogeneous standards into Roman culture and cosmology.

Age-structured homosexuality appears as a more general theme in various Indo-European traditions from which historical evidence has survived. Most sources suggest that the Celts practiced ritual pederasty, whereas the Irish and Welsh probably did not (see Bremmer, 1980, p. 288). Obligatory homosexuality existed in ancient Germany and Albania and was no doubt linked to their warrior traditions. Here again, age-structured homoeroticism belonged to a transitional period before adulthood, young men engaging in anal intercourse with boys. Because these peoples strongly condemned passive homosexuality in adults (as did the Greeks and Romans), it is reasonable to conclude that whereas for boys the passive role was required, honorable, and masculine, for adults it was dishonorable and despised.

The evidence indicates that homosexuality was broadly accepted and known from the Near East and Mediterranean in biblical times. Homosexual prostitution was known in ritual cults of Mesopotamia and Canaan. Mesopotamian law codes do not mention homosexuality. The Hittite code prohibits only father-son incest, and the Middle Assyrian code forbids only homosexual rape. In the Hebrew scriptures only *Leviticus* 18:22 and 20:13 generally prohibit male homosexuality. It has been argued that negative attitudes toward homosexuality, however, did not take hold until late antiquity. Both Hebrew and Christian dualistic oppositions between good and evil, spirit and flesh, male and female promulgated an ascetic ethos, which repudiated pleasure of all kinds as detrimental to salvation and spirituality. Early Christianity assimilated a view that opposed all sexual pleasure and was generally antagonistic to homosexuality (Greenberg and Bystry, 1982). Following this, church doctrine was ambiguous regarding homosexuality until about the eleventh century CE; thereafter, ecclesiastical law and centralization of the church in the context of European state formation increasingly restricted and criminalized homosexual contact.

Islamic societies held a different and more tolerant, informal attitude toward homosexuality. Indeed, *Šūfis* saw homosexual relations as an expression of the spiritual link between man and God. Some authorities suggest that Islamic ideas influenced the biblical practice of oath taking on the father’s penis. They point to *Genesis* 47:29–31, wherein Jacob, on his deathbed, makes his son Joseph swear he will remove him from Egypt, pledging loyalty by touching Jacob’s penis. This practice may have been a symbolic survival of noble homosexuality in ancient Arabia that involved a primitive rite of transference of male force, from a powerful adult warrior to a younger recruit homoerotically attached to him in order to acquire military and civic education. The same authorities compare the practice to Dorian homosexuality. Modern examples of male homosexuality are known from North Africa and Morocco, and female homosexuality

is reported in harems of certain Muslim societies around the world. Age-structured homosexuality of the ancient Arabian form has been reported in modern times in the Oasis of Siwa.

Love between men in ancient China was seen as an alternate erotic expression not antagonistic to the family or to heterosexual marriage. In some respects the dualistic cosmology of the ancient Chinese, with the principles of yin and yang, was neutralized in the homosexual act. Homosexual love appears to have reached a popular high point in the Han dynasty, when the emperor Aidi cut off the sleeve of his robe when called to court audience rather than awaken his male lover; after this, in Chinese literature, homosexuality was known as "the love of the cut sleeve." Many similar stories are found in feudal Japanese literature.

Age-structured homosexuality was prevalent and esteemed in the militarized feudal order of Japan up to the beginning of the Meiji era (1868). Some of the great shoguns and samurai kept male lovers to provide emotional and sexual support. The youth in this role was esteemed and was given a secure position in the feudal hierarchy. In the seventeenth-century Japanese novelist Saikaku Ihara's book *Comrade Loves of the Samurai* (Tokyo, 1972), are found romantic tales of how samurai sons were urged by their families to form homoerotic alliances with warriors that matured into lifelong companionships, alongside their marriages. The Japanese attitude toward women was similar to that of the ancient Greeks: Women were to be married and produce heirs, whereas boys were for pleasure and companionship. "Samurai warriors would select a particular youth as a favorite and like the Homeric Greeks, a *samurai* would keep a particular lover by his side during battle" (George DeVos, *Socialization for Achievement*, Berkeley, Calif., 1973, p. 269). Because of this homoerotic interest, both male and female houses of prostitution were known in feudal Japan, though the male inmates were probably not boys of noble or samurai birth. The Kabuki theater of Japan is said to have originated from a shogun's preference for male performers.

The Azande of Africa also practiced an age-structured kind of "military homosexuality." The king's household contained hundreds of wives and some boys, all of whom were "married" to him. Young warriors married boys, and a commander could have more than one "boy-wife." When they married, the boy was given spears by his lover; warrior and boy addressed each other as "my love" and "my lover." They traveled together, and the boy kept the senior's household in order. When he matured, the warrior gave him bride-wealth so he could marry in turn and take boy lovers of his own. The example of the Azande suggests that asymmetric homosexuality flourished in a situation in which few females were available for marriage because of polygyny, complexity of marriage arrangements, and warrior segregation (themes also present in Pacific island societies).

The most recent and detailed studies of age-structured homosexuality come from Melanesia, a culture area in which the ancient influence of phallic cults and initiation rites pro-

vides striking parallels with the warrior homosexual ethos noted elsewhere. It has been demonstrated that between 10 and 20 percent of all Melanesian societies, ranging from Fiji and New Caledonia to Malekula Island in Vanuatu and other off-lying islands and lowland areas of New Guinea, practiced ritualized male homosexuality; in the Papuan Gulf region of New Guinea it was universal. Moreover, various Australian Aboriginal tribes, especially those of the Kimberleys and central desert area, had similar customs. The current evidence indicates that these traditions resulted from an ancient migration of peoples into the area around Melanesia some thousands of years ago.

In these societies ritual initiation customs placed homosexuality in a highly structured socioreligious context. The adjective *ritualized* applies best to the Melanesian situation because (1) homosexual practices were implemented through male initiation rites (2) that had sacred significance for society and the individual, (3) the cultural rules and social roles of which were supported by the wider moral-jural force of society or of a secret men's society, (4) which prescribed sexual intercourse between senior and junior males based upon social and kinship taboos. Typically, Melanesian homosexual contact made older adolescent or married men the dominant partners and prepubescent or adolescent boys the passive partners. In most groups age-asymmetric homosexuality was obligatory for all males. It was by nature a transitional sociosexual form that masculinized boys, making them into mature men who eventually married. However, in certain societies, such as the Malekula, the Marind-anim of southwest New Guinea, and the Ingiet secret society (of New Britain), older men were expected to be dominant inseminators of boys, even though they were married and could be grandfathers. In such societies, then, it is appropriate to speak of a pervasive bisexual orientation in the male life cycle.

The military character of Melanesian homosexuality was elaborate and should be underlined. Virtually all of the relevant cultures were caught in a web of intensive and constant Stone Age warfare. Their phallic cults and secret societies not only promoted fertility but constituted the warriorhoods that defended the community and raided neighboring tribes. Initiation into the men's club thus meant entry into military life. Women and children were excluded from secret cult activities, as would be expected in the extreme form of patrilineal culture found there. Phallic worship was omnipresent. John Layard in *Stone Men of Malekula* (London, 1942, p. 489) states that in the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) the penis is held in "high esteem" and the glans penis is accorded "extreme reverence"; elsewhere he refers to these groups as "male admiring societies."

Melanesian homosexual rites involved the transmission of male power by physical means, anal or oral insemination strengthening a boy's penis, body, and masculine character. Little wonder that Arnold van Gennep, in his classic *Les rites de passage* (Chicago, 1960, pp. 169–171), refers to coitus as a rite of great efficacy, and to homosexual insemination as



a final ceremony of incorporation into these male cultures. Such rites should be seen in the broader context of customs that effect boys' submission to the sacred authority of gods and elders. For the Marind-anim, ritual homosexuality was bound up with daring headhunting raids into distant enemy groups; for the Keraki of Papua and the Sambia of the Papuan fringe, the attainment of manhood required participation in war raids, followed by serving as dominant homosexual partners for initiated boys. Homosexuality thus went hand in hand with military training and socialization into the masculine role.

Sexual antagonism is a prominent theme in these Melanesian tribes; some sexual segregation of men and women occurred in all of them. Institutionalized secrecy was supported by ritual sound-producing instruments, such as sacred flutes and bull-roarers, that both protected the cult and symbolized its power over others, thus serving as symbols of male religious orthodoxy. The secret significance of these instruments has been shown to stem from heterosexual hostility and segregation and from men's envious imitation of women's procreative powers. In this context the Dutch authority Jan van Baal goes so far as to refer to Marind-anim homosexuality as the "dark secret" of a phallic religion. Women often were perceived by men as fertile, polluting, and depleting of male life force. Strict taboos on adultery, menstruation, childbirth, and virginity were common. Marriage practices were political arrangements without much freedom of choice. Sister-exchange and bride-wealth marriage customs created alliances between clan groups or villages and enemy groups. It has been found that senior men were expected or allowed to inseminate their wives' younger brothers (i.e., their brothers-in-law) in tandem with impregnating their wives. Polygyny and a shortage of women, too, made institutionalized homosexuality a pragmatic sexual outlet for unmarried mature males. Among the Big Nambas tribe of Vanuatu, it reached an extreme form, in which chiefs were said to exercise a monopoly over females as wives and over boys as lovers, some chiefs becoming so attached to boys that they preferred them to their wives. It is notable that Vanuatu is the only Melanesian area in which institutionalized lesbianism is known.

In the Melanesian world, ritual in general and homosexual rites in particular drew a special boundary between the sacred and profane arenas of culture. The belief system underlying the differences between male and female development must be noted. Females were widely perceived to be "naturally" fast-growing, fertile, and reproductively competent, males slow to grow and not "naturally" fertile or reproductively competent. Here semen and menstrual blood were antithetical; groups such as the Sambia believed they must eradicate "female blood" from boys and then inseminate them through homosexual intercourse in order for them to attain manhood. Thus, women naturally procreated, and men used ceremonies to create spiritually and symbolically "reborn" boys. Insemination thus placed boys in the sacred realm, and initiation created a years-long liminal phase of de-

velopment ultimately leading to the profane and sexually dangerous adult experience of heterosexual marriage.

This dichotomy sheds light on a puzzling bifurcated pattern of homosexuality in Melanesia. Are homosexual relations "real" or "mythical," in Layard's terms? In the vast majority of these societies it has been found that actual homosexual activity occurs for years, as noted. In a small number of societies, however, actual homosexual intercourse may or may not occur, may occur only once, as among the Ingiet cult, or may occur only as a theme in social consciousness or mythology. In most groups, homosexual penetration and submission stress a stronger relationship to the sacred; those cultures that de-emphasize it place homosexuality closer to the profane arena. An intermediate example is the Kaluli of New Guinea, for whom homosexuality was voluntary rather than obligatory, and who stressed symbolic marriage to female spirits as a transition into actual heterosexual relations later (Schieffelin, in Herdt, 1982). Thus the Kaluli saw homosexuality as a profane counterpart to heterosexuality, which was, for them, socially and spiritually higher.

Many scholars have noted the similarities between age-structured homosexual organizations the world over. The comparison of the ancient Greeks and Melanesians is widely cited and seems appropriate, in spite of the cultural differences between their worlds. The Melanesian systems are more closely like those of lowland Amazon tribes, wherein ritualized homosexuality, warfare, and sexual antagonism are also prominent. Yet, Jane Harrison's idea (in *Themis*, New York, 1961) that among the Greeks and primitive peoples, initiations transform boys from a "woman thing" into a "man thing" seems to be borne out. The trend of age-structured homosexuality everywhere was to promote and accomplish the masculinization of boys.

**GENDER-REVERSED HOMOSEXUALITY.** A different social form is based on the adoption of the gender role, dress, and mannerisms of the opposite sex, leading to a different type of homosexual contact. Sometimes this is referred to as institutionalized transvestism, or cross-dressing. It has been found to occur in selected indigenous societies of North and South America, island Polynesia, and Southeast Asia, and among preliterate and peasant groups in mainland Asia and Africa. Gender-reversed homosexuality is associated, although not exclusively, with shamanism as a religious institution. Though the phenomenon is reported in both sexes, male examples are more frequent in the literature. Usually this form exists in societies where it is believed that a small number of individuals in each generation aspire to the gender role of the opposite sex. Gender reversal usually begins in childhood, has recognized customs associated with it, and is acknowledged by the society.

Gender-reversed homosexuality is inextricably linked with symbols of sexual ambiguity in many cultures. Role and erotic inversion here make this symbolic association understandable. If blurring of the genders is present in the cosmology of a society, gender reversal can be expected in socioreli-

gious practice. In the Greek pantheon, for instance, Athena and Dionysos were born of Zeus, blurring on the cosmic plane the boundary between male and female reproduction. In India, Śiva reproduced by spilling his sperm, and Samba, the divine son of Kṛṣṇa, not only engaged in homosexuality but also dressed as a woman to seduce the wives of other gods. Likewise, the *hijāda* role provides a contemporary example of actual gender reversal in Northwest India. Males in this role wear women's clothes, beg alms, and perform as women in ceremonies, though it is unclear whether they engage in homosexual activity. Other examples from ancient and modern times reveal the same link between cosmic sexual ambiguity and actual gender reversal (Carrier, 1980; Hoffman, 1984).

The institution of the berdache (from the Arabic word *bardaj*, meaning a boy slave kept for erotic purposes) is perhaps the best-known anthropological example of gender-reversed homosexuality. Some 115 North American Indian tribes had this traditional role. Most of these groups were hunters and gatherers, some of which permitted a surprising degree of sexual equality. Among the Plains Indians, warfare was also common. Though the male-to-female form of gender reversal is most famous, some 35 of these cultures also recognized female berdaches, who as girls acted and dressed as boys. Three signs indicated that a person could become berdache: preference for occupations of the opposite sex, the adoption of dress and mannerisms indicative of the other sex, and the choice of same-sexed persons as sexual partners. Some berdaches became ritual experts and shamans, and cases are reported of female berdaches who were skilled hunters and great warriors. Few berdaches were biologically abnormal or hermaphroditic. These societies both recognized and legitimized the berdache "calling," which occurred usually in childhood or by vision-quest experiences in adolescence. Berdaches could marry, adopt children, acquire property, and generally participate in most aspects of tribal life. Hostility to the institution of berdache by white settlers and missionaries resulted in the abandonment of the role by the late nineteenth century, though a recent report suggests the survival of acculturated berdaches in some places.

The ranked societies of Polynesia, Tahiti in particular, are associated with gender-reversed homosexual organization. The role of the *mahu* in Tahiti has been reported in depth, and the cross-dressing and feminization of *mahu* males appear very similar to those of the berdache. Female *mahu* are also historically reported. In modern times community response to the *mahu* has varied, with approval of gender-role reversal but disapproval of homosexual behavior. Religious activity seems unrelated to the role.

The obvious sociosexual trend of gender-reversed homosexuality for males is feminization; this is in marked contrast to the age-structured form. Moreover, these traditional gender-reversed roles suggest a lifelong pattern of exclusive homosexual activity, a pattern also at variance with those developed where the age-structured type is practiced. It should

be noted that among Melanesian societies, cross-gender and transvestite behavior are very rare (Herdt, 1984), as was true for the ancient Greeks and others. Hermann Baumann (1955) was perhaps the first scholar to recognize that the age-structured masculinizing form of homosexuality is fundamentally different from the feminizing gender-reversed type found elsewhere. Moreover, he demonstrated that the masculinizing role should not be equated with the androgyne figure in myth or ritual.

**ROLE-SPECIALIZED HOMOSEXUALITY.** The third form of homosexual organization is based solely on the entitlements of a status or role not widely held in a culture. Thus, for example, the person who became a shaman among the Chukchi tribe of Siberia was entitled by supernatural intervention to reverse gender roles and to engage in homosexual behavior, though this was disapproved for others in the society. Here one must consider the element of what Mircea Eliade calls "divine bisexuality," the idea that a special role—usually religious—"is fraught with sacredness" (*Birth and Rebirth*, New York, 1958, p. 25). In simple societies this is different from the obligatory involvement in age-structured homosexuality for all males and from individual expression of gender reversal for selected people noted above. However, examples also show that role-specialized homosexuality in complex societies diverges from a purely religious basis to encompass wider meanings. Because some complex examples do not involve gender reversal, moreover, it is important to avoid confusing the categories of gender-reversed and role-specialized homosexuality.

In ancient societies numerous examples of role-specialized homosexuality drew their support from the religiosity of divine bisexuality. Male and female temple prostitutes who engaged in homosexual activity under the protection of religious cults in Mesopotamia and Canaan are relevant. In the Roman world Semitic cults that utilized gender reversal and homosexuality were role-specialized, the most famous priest in this context being Elagabalus. In these social settings religious morality legitimized homosexual conduct. One should not forget, however, the negative and chaotic consequences of "good" versus "bad" moral choices that could flow from homosexual customs in certain ancient traditions like that of the Greeks. Here a combination of divine royal power and aberrant homosexual choice, as in the Greek myth of Oedipus, arises repeatedly and hangs over the mythology of Western sexuality. It will be recalled that Laius, the father of Oedipus, abducted the boy Chrysippus out of homosexual desire. In rage the goddess Hera, guardian of marriage, sent the Sphinx to destroy Thebes. Eventually, by trickery, Jocasta produced a son from Laius: Oedipus, whom Laius tried to kill. The rest of story is well known; it ends in incest, patricide, Oedipus's self-inflicted blindness (symbolic self-castration), and madness, themes reflected in Shakespeare's great tragedy, *Hamlet*. These mytho-symbolic images of "bad" moral choice foreshadow the ambiguous status of role-specialized homosexuality in the modern Western era.

Role-specialized homosexuality in tribal societies is strongly identified with shamanism. The divine or celestial origins of shamanic curative and medicinal powers is widely attested. What is more, transvestite shamans having important supernatural powers are known on both sides of the Pacific and into Indochina as well. The Chukchi shaman is particularly well known in this respect, and it has been demonstrated that Chukchi shamans cross-dress and engage in homosexual relations, some even taking husbands. Among those who remain heterosexual, their spirit guides still oblige them to dress as women.

An intermediate case of role-specialized homosexuality, which began in a shamanic tradition but changed into a secular form, is provided by the so-called flower boys (*hwarang*) of Silla, known from the Yi dynasty in Korea. Here the concept of *midong* ("good-looking boys," with pederastic overtones) is noteworthy. These boys dressed as girls and accompanied wandering musicians and players. They were sometimes married to the latter, and served as entertainers; they would thus seem to suggest attributes of both age-structured and gender-reversed homosexuality. Yet, they were historically associated with popular shamanic performances and were referred to in terms of the literary and theatrical homosexual traditions of China and the chivalrous homosexual code of medieval Japan.

A more recent and secularized role-specialization example—this one concerning lesbianism—is known from the nineteenth-century Canton Delta in China. Certain villages in this patriarchal class society established girls' houses, wherein girls formed strong affectional and economic bonds with each other. It was notorious throughout China that many of these girls formed lesbian relationships. Non-Buddhist religious sects influenced the young women by stressing sexual equality and purity through nonmarriage. The introduction of the silk industry in this area in the 1860s supported the practice of lesbianism, because families encouraged their daughters to take vows of "popular spinsterhood," rather than lose their income. These spinsterhood bonds were not deviant but were accepted at the time; no other institutional form of lesbian contact occurred in these communities or was acceptable. Remnants of this lesbian sisterhood are still to be found in Hong Kong and Taiwan today. In other words, this role-specialized social form involved homosexual relations but was not gender-reversed or age-structured.

How is homosexual behavior in modern Western society to be interpreted, particularly in light of the trichotomy described here? A partial answer to this question was provided in the historical perspective on homosexuality, noted above, following the fall of the Roman Empire. Role-specialized homosexuality is the most complex category of the three, for it implies elements of social support and ambivalence, normative and gender-reversed behavior, and specialization of socioeconomic and cultural interests. Over the past century homosexuality has undergone a dramatic transfor-

mation, from the "disease of effeminacy" to the modern gay rights movement. It must be made clear, however, that the modern social category and erotic identity signified by the term *gay* is not the same as homosexual organizations or roles found in ancient times and in other cultures (cf. Boswell, 1980); it is in several respects a unique development in human society. This suggests a change from a predominantly gender-reversed feminization to a more frequent masculinization of overt homosexuality in popular culture. In Latin American cultures, such a symbolic transformation is problematic, for as Joseph Carrier notes, gender roles are still defined with respect to the hypermasculine ideal model known as machismo. Western culture, more broadly, has seen a gradual change from the specific identification of gender-reversed homosexuality with specialized roles in the theater and art world. Was it not Freud (*Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 1960, p. 94) who said, "In the great artificial groups, the church and the army, there is no room for woman as a sexual object"? In this sense, contemporary age-asymmetric masculine homoerotic bonding in complex societies was until recently restricted to male clubs, military boarding schools, and the armed services. The gay rights movement and related social changes are altering this view, as homosexuality is increasingly decriminalized and removed from the medical category of psychopathology in Western countries.

Recent Western attitudes toward homosexuality are strongly linked to religious history and theology, but broader socioeconomic trends since the late Middle Ages have played an equally powerful role. Historical research has challenged the widely held view that hostility toward homosexuality was merely the result of the Judeo-Christian tradition (Greenberg and Bystryn, 1982). It has been demonstrated that polytheistic societies are generally more tolerant of homosexuality than are monotheistic ones (Hoffman, 1984), though exceptions to this generalization are plentiful. Perhaps the institutionalization of religiously supported sexual morality, as much as anything, fosters disapproval of sexual behavior deviating from heterosexuality. Other factors, such as trends to urbanization and the establishment of capitalistic industrial apparatus, have undoubtedly contributed to changes in Western attitudes toward homosexuality (Boswell, 1980; Foucault, 1978), yet these trends too cannot account for certain historical examples (Greenberg and Bystryn, 1984). The development of complex state and church bureaucracies, with associated unconscious responses to all deviance, including homosexuality, may eventually provide more adequate institutional and psychosocial explanations of the special image homosexuality occupies in Western discourse.

**SEE ALSO** Agōgē; Androgynes; Gender Roles; Hierodouleia; Masculine Sacrality; Phallus and Vagina.

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GILBERT HERDT (1987)  
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**HÖNEN** (1133–1212), more fully Hōnen Shōnin Genkū, was a Japanese Buddhist priest and reformer, and the founder of the Jōdoshū sect of Japanese Buddhism. Hōnen's life reflects the changing times in which he lived as well as his role in those changes. He was born in the fourth month of 1133 in Mimasaka province (modern Okayama prefecture) into a provincial military family. The military clans of Japan were then embroiled in a struggle with the nobility for control of agricultural lands, and in 1141 Hōnen's father, Uruma Tokikuni, was killed in a skirmish over possession of a local manor. The young Hōnen was sent to a nearby Tendai Buddhist temple, the Bodaiji, probably for protection from his family's enemies. Hōnen seemed a promising candidate for a clerical career and was therefore sent in 1145 to continue his novitiate at the Tendai main temple of Enryakuji on Mount Hiei near Kyoto. His training went well, and in 1147, at the age of fourteen, he was formally ordained into the Tendai priesthood.

Hōnen was a serious and dedicated monk. His early biographies reveal that in the years following his ordination he



read the entire Buddhist canon three times and mastered not only the Tendai doctrines but those of the other contemporary schools as well. Conditions then, however, were every bit as unsettled on Mount Hiei as elsewhere in Japan and hardly conducive to a life of study and contemplation. The great national struggle between the nobility and the provincial military clans (the same struggle that had claimed the life of Hōnen's father) was rapidly increasing in intensity, and the monastic establishments of the day, including the Tendai order, had become deeply involved in this struggle. Not only was political intrigue rife on Mount Hiei, but numbers of monks had been organized into small armies that engaged in constant brawls with the monastic armies of other temples and with the troops of the Taira military clan, which had by then occupied Kyoto, the capital.

In 1150 Hōnen sought refuge at the small Tendai retreat of the saintly master Eikū (d. 1174) located at Kurodani on the flanks of Mount Hiei. Eikū's small community was a center of Pure Land Buddhist devotion. Hōnen spent twenty-five years there studying the Pure Land scriptures and cultivating *nembutsu zammai*, a meditational trance (*samādhi*) in which the devotee concentrates upon Amida Buddha (Skt., Amitābha or Amitayus), the Buddha of the Western Pure Land.

The worship of Amida Buddha had been growing in Japan since the late tenth century, when the Tendai monk Genshin (942–1017) published his compendium on Pure Land thought and practice, the *Ōjōyōshū* (Essentials of Pure Land rebirth). This Buddhism, which had enjoyed wide popularity in China from the sixth century CE, teaches the existence of a purified Buddha field, a “pure land” presided over by Amida Buddha and situated far to the west of the known world. Those who wholeheartedly devote themselves to this Buddha can be saved by rebirth in this Pure Land after death. Those reborn there will receive the status of a *bodhisattva* and achieve their own enlightenment and buddhahood in but one final lifetime.

The appeal of this kind of Buddhism was growing in Hōnen's time because of a deepening conviction at all levels of society that Japan and all the world had entered the age of the decadent *dharma* (Jap., *mappō*)—a desperate time predicted in the scriptures when the Buddhist establishment, teachings, and even the spiritual capacities of humankind would plummet and the world would be plunged into strife and natural calamity. This conviction was based not only upon an assessment of the decadent monastic institutions and bloody civil conflicts of the age in Japan but also upon consideration of the appalling conflagrations and famines that ravaged the capital district in those times. Because none could achieve emancipation through his own efforts in the traditional ways of discipline, works, and wisdom, the only recourse was rebirth in the Western Pure Land through devotion to Amida Buddha. The swelling tide of Pure Land faith in Hōnen's time was further augmented by its appeal to a new clientele that had until then been largely disenfran-

chised from participation in the Buddhist quest—common people and especially the rural folk.

Hōnen also found spiritual solace in Pure Land faith. While at Kurodani he absorbed himself in the Pure Land scriptures and in cultivation of the *samādhi* of meditation upon Amida. This practice was a legacy of Genshin's *Ōjōyōshū*, which teaches a fervent contemplation (meditative envisualization) upon Amida's resplendent body while invoking his name with the formula “Namu Amida Butsu” (“Homage to the Buddha of Limitless Light”), and repeatedly circumambulating his image. The primary goal of this practice was an ecstatic realization of the nondual Buddha mind—that is, a profound enlightenment experience. A secondary goal was to assure one's rebirth into the Pure Land by achieving a perfect vision of Amida as he would appear in welcoming descent at the moment of one's death.

Hōnen did not, however, find spiritual satisfaction in these exercises even after many years at Kurodani. His later writings reveal that he was convinced that he himself dwelt in an age of decadent *dharma*. He considered the achievement of enlightenment by himself or his contemporaries to be all but impossible, and even the attainment of a perfect vision of Amida to be impractical. In this conviction, Hōnen had recourse to an alternative Pure Land teaching.

In addition to the extremely arduous *nembutsu zammai*, Genshin had also prescribed a practice of simply calling upon the name of Amida Buddha (invocational *nembutsu*), constantly and with deep devotion, but especially at the moment of death, in the hope of thereby eliciting Amida's compassion and being brought by him for rebirth into the Pure Land. Within orthodox Tendai circles, this was considered a practice inferior to *nembutsu zammai* and suitable only as a last resort for sinners and others incapable of the correct practice. Hōnen became convinced that this last resort was the only resort for him and his contemporaries. This conviction was based not only on his own experiences but also on the teachings of the great Chinese Pure Land master Shandao (613–681), whom Hōnen discovered in *Ōjōyōshū*. Shandao emphatically taught, and Hōnen came to agree, that calling upon Amida Buddha's name was not an inferior practice at all, but the practice especially designed by Amida for the salvation of otherwise hopelessly damned humankind during the age of the decadent *dharma*.

In the spring of 1175, at the age of forty-two, Hōnen acted upon his new conviction. He left Eikū's Tendai retreat, took up residence in the suburbs of the capital, and began to teach and practice the exclusive cultivation of invocational *nembutsu*. This marked a definitive departure of the Japanese Pure Land movement from its traditional Tendai home. Hereafter it would pursue an independent course both doctrinally and as a community. The Jōdoshū sect of Japanese Pure Land Buddhism, which became the first independent Pure Land Buddhist community in East Asian history, dates its founding from this time.



During the next quarter century, Hōnen taught widely and wrote voluminously on the way of the Pure Land. He gathered around himself a small community of disciples and lay followers. He also became one of the most respected clerics of his age, preaching and ministering to nobility, lecturing at the national temple, Tōdaiji, and becoming the personal chaplain to the regent to the throne, Kujō Kanezane.

Hōnen's most important composition during this period was the *Senchaku hongan nembutsu shū* (Treatise on the selected *Nembutsu* of the original vow). Composed in 1198 at the request of the regent Kanezane, this work establishes the principles of an independent Pure Land movement with regard to both theory and practice. It divides Buddhism into two paths, the difficult path to enlightenment, impractical in an age of decadent *dharmā*, and the easy path for all, that of rebirth in the Pure Land. Moreover, Hōnen's work maintains the legitimacy of a Pure Land school (Jōdoshū) and designates this school's patriarchal lineage and scriptural canon. It also demonstrates that, among all possible means to Pure Land rebirth, the *nembutsu* of calling on Amida's name is the practice especially selected and guaranteed by Amida Buddha because it is the easiest practice, available to all. Further, the *Senchakushū* repeatedly urges its readers to keep the *Nembutsu* constantly on their lips so as to avail themselves of rebirth into Amida's Pure Land and emancipation from the sufferings of both this life and countless future transmigrations.

Hōnen's following and influence had by now become so great as to be seen as a challenge by the established monastic orders. His Pure Land teachings rejected the fundamentals of their faith and his claim of legitimacy for the Pure Land school flew in the face of one of their most cherished presumptions: that only the emperor could establish a legitimate Buddhist institution. These resentments took a serious turn in 1204 when the monks of the Tendai order petitioned their abbot to suppress Hōnen's movement. Hōnen responded by imposing on his disciples a seven-article pledge (the Shichikajō Seikai) to abstain from such excesses as criticizing other schools of Buddhism, encouraging violation of the Buddhist precepts (on the pretext that those who rely on the *Nembutsu* need have no fear of committing evil), and spreading heretical doctrines while falsely claiming them to be those of their master Hōnen.

This mollified the Tendai establishment for a time, but in the following year (1205) the powerful Kōfukuji order of Nara presented a formal petition to the Cloistered Emperor Go-Toba, accusing Hōnen's movement of nine specific heresies and infractions and demanding its suppression. This Kōfukuji petition (*Kōfukuji sōjō*) accused Hōnen and his followers of (1) presuming to establish a new Buddhist school or sect, (2) making new and unauthorized icons, (3) neglecting Śākyamuni Buddha, (4) condemning practices other than *nembutsu*, (5) rejecting the Shintō gods, (6) distorting the Pure Land teachings by rejecting practices other than *nembutsu* as means to rebirth, (7) misrepresenting *nembutsu*

by rejecting the superior meditative and contemplative *nembutsu* in favor of the inferior invocational *nembutsu*, (8) rejecting the Buddha's monastic community and discipline, and (9) instigating disorder and rebellion in the nation.

No immediate action was taken by the emperor, and Hōnen might well have weathered this storm, for he was highly regarded in court circles. But late in 1206 two of his disciples engaged in an indiscretion that had serious repercussions. During the absence of Go-Toba, the priests Anraku and Jūren led the emperor's ladies in a Pure Land devotional service that continued throughout the night. The jealous emperor was furious and acceded to the demands of the Kōfukuji monks. Early in 1207, Jūren and Anraku were executed, the cultivation of exclusive *nembutsu* was prohibited, and Hōnen and several of his disciples were exiled to distant provinces. Hōnen was not allowed to return to the capital until late in 1211, and he died shortly thereafter in the first month of 1212. Two days before his death, he dictated to his disciple Genchi (1182–1238) his final testament (*Ichimai kishōmon*). It begins thus: "My teaching is neither the contemplative *nembutsu* taught by the wise of both China and Japan, nor is it enlightenment by means of learned meditative *nembutsu*. It is nothing other than to utter 'Namu Amida Butsu' for the purpose of rebirth in the Pure Land without a single doubt of achieving that rebirth." He died with the *Nembutsu* on his lips and, according to his disciples, amid auspicious signs of Pure Land rebirth. He was seventy-nine.

These events were grievous impediments to the Pure Land movement, but they did not stem what was to become a great tide of Pure Land faith. Several of Hōnen's chief disciples, notably Benchō (1162–1238) and Shinran (1173–1263), carried his message to the provinces and organized Pure Land communities. These later became established as the influential Jishū and enormously popular Jōdoshū (Pure Land) and Jōdo Shinshū (True Pure Land) sects.

Though Hōnen initiated sweeping changes in the religious life of Japan, he was not a revolutionary. He was a highly respected cleric in his day, admired for his scholarship and revered for his piety by clerics and laity alike. In some ways, he was deeply conservative. Although he urged on his followers the exclusive cultivation of invocational *nembutsu*, he himself never abandoned his monastic vows of chastity and poverty, and to the end of his life he cultivated contemplative *nembutsu*. Yet he definitively broke with the monastic, elitist Buddhism of his times. He provided both the intellectual foundations and the inspired personal leadership for the first independent Pure Land Buddhist movement.

**SEE ALSO** Jōdoshū; Mappō; Nianfo.

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In addition to the *Senchakushū* and the *Ichimai kishōmon*, Hōnen wrote important doctrinal works such as the *Sambukyō daii* (Meaning of the three-part Pure Land canon) and the *Ōjōyōshū shaku* (Commentary on the *Ōjōyōshū*), accounts of his meditations (*Sammai hotokki* and *Onmusōki*), and a vo-

luminous correspondence. These can be found in his collected works, *Hōnen Shōnin zenshū*, edited by Ishii Kyōdō (Tokyo, 1955).

Works on Hōnen in English are few. The best is still *Hōnen, the Buddhist Saint*, by Harper Havelock Coates and Ryugaku Ishizuka, 5 vols. (Kyoto, 1949). This is ostensibly just a translation of the forty-eight-chapter biography of Hōnen (*Yonjūhachi kanden*) by Shunjō (d. 1335), a relatively late biography with much pious elaboration, but it is much more than that. Besides providing an excellent translation of Shunjō's biography of Hōnen prefaced by an extensive, if dated, introduction to the life, times, and thought of Hōnen, this work presents a wealth of useful information on Hōnen's life and times in notes and appendixes. A short but excellent and up-to-date treatment of Hōnen is to be found in *Foundations of Japanese Buddhism*, vol. 2, *The Mass Movement*, by Alicia Matsunaga and Daigan Matsunaga (Los Angeles and Tokyo, 1976). There is an enormous literature on Hōnen in Japanese. A good, critical biography based on contemporary sources is *Hōnen*, by Tamura Encho (Tokyo, 1959).

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ALLAN A. ANDREWS (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**HONJISUIJAKU** is a technical term in Japanese Buddhism that originally designated a theory of emanation pertaining to Shintō and Buddhist divinities. Later, it came to be applied to the interpretative framework of the associations among them (*shimbutsu-shūgō*). The term is a compound: *Honji*, usually translated as “original nature,” designates the limitless potentiality of the Buddha to manifest himself in as many forms as he wishes in order to lure living beings toward awakening; *suijaku*, usually translated as “manifestation” or “hypostasis,” designates those forms. The original use of the term is to be found in the various Chinese commentaries of the *Lotus Sūtra* (Skt., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*; Chin., *Miaofa lianhua jing*; Jpn., *Myōhorengekyō*). These commentaries propose a twofold division of the scripture in which the first fourteen chapters are called (in Japanese) *jakumon* (“teaching by manifestation”) and the second fourteen chapters, *hommon* (“fundamental teaching”). The *jakumon* part is the collection of the doctrines propounded before the *Lotus Sūtra*, whereas the *hommon* part is the Lotus doctrine according to which the historical Buddha (Śākyamuni) was the mere manifestation of a transcendent principle.

This theoretical scheme was generally applied to the various members of the Buddhist pantheon, so that even *bodhisattvas* could manifest themselves under variegated guises, using the doctrine of salvific means, or clever devices (Skt., *upāya*; Chin., *fangbian*; Jpn., *hōben*), in order to guide living beings of different psychological inclinations or intellectual abilities toward the realization of buddhahood. As Buddhism

came into contact with other religious systems in Asia the *honjisuijaku* theory was then applied to interpret the divinities of these religions as lower manifestations of the members of the Buddhist pantheon. This interpretation had surfaced in China at varied levels of religious life, but it played a central role in Japan from the Nara period (710–784 CE) on.

Buddhism was officially recognized in the records of the Japanese state by the middle of the sixth century CE. Relationships between the Buddhist sects and the evolving systems of religious cults loosely referred to as Shintō began soon thereafter: The legends describing the arrival of Buddhism in Japan in the *Kojiki* (Record of ancient matters, 712) show evidence of the fact that mythological and ritual structures of autochthonous creeds were used to interpret the phenomenon, and there is little doubt that Buddhism was treated as an advanced form of Shintō. Various Buddhist scriptures and rites were used in the traditional context of protection of the state and in agrarian rituals; other rites were used to reinforce the legitimacy of the rulers. Shintō shrines were built to symbolize sociopolitical and economic structures; Buddhist temples came to be built along similar lines, often next to Shintō shrines. As a consequence, Buddhist monks came to officiate next to Shintō priests, to the point that they joined them in rites surrounding the funerals of emperors.

From the early Heian period (794–1185) on some monks were ordained specifically in connection with major Shintō shrines and received as such the name of *shimbundōsha* (monks ordained for Shintō divinities). As time passed, the Buddhist ecclesiasts came to administrate the economic, political, and ritual affairs of the shrines they were associated with, and associations between Shintō and Buddhism began to occur at the levels of thought, ritual, literature, and art. Japan thus evolved syncretic systems that were locally grounded in shrine-temple complexes, in which the different particular divinities of the Shintō shrines were associated with the different Buddhist divinities of the adjacent temples. It is there that the *honjisuijaku* theory played fully: Shintō divinities were seen as manifestations of Buddhas or *bodhisattvas*, and their virtues were explained accordingly.

Because these systems of association were occurring in shrine-temple complexes, the *honjisuijaku* theory permeated many local cults during the classical and medieval periods of Japanese history; but during the Kamakura period (1185–1333) the major cultic centers housing the headquarters of the important sects of Buddhism developed integrative philosophical and ritual systems in which the *honjisuijaku* theory was central. Mount Hiei (Hieizan), center of the Tendai school of Buddhism, developed the syncretic sect Sanno Ichijitsu Shintō, and Mount Kōya (Kōyasan), center of the Shingon school of Buddhism, developed the syncretic sect Ryōbu Shintō.

By the middle of the medieval period, almost all Shintō divinities of Japan were essentially linked to Buddhist divini-

ties at all levels of religious life and experience. Virtually all medieval records of shrines show the name of the Shintō divinity, and immediately thereafter indicate the following: “a *suijaku* of” such and such a Buddhist divinity. The result of these systematic associations was the creation of a composite culture in which one easily recognizes the Indian, Chinese, and Japanese ingredients. It should be noted, however, that historically the *honjisuijaku* theory had an implicit vertical power relationship, aptly suited to Buddhism’s superiority in political, economic, and ritual areas. But most of the associations between the divinities were not perceived, originally, to be couched in the context of power, but rather in the context of association and metaphor. These associations were expressed or interpreted according to word games in which initiated people could read subtle meanings and thereby decode the original and fundamental unity of the divinities of both religions.

However, during the Muromachi period (1336–1573) some priests of Shintō shrines, jealous of Buddhist institutional power and motivated by nationalistic reasons, created other syncretic systems in which the *honjisuijaku* theory was reversed to their advantage: Instead of seeing Shintō divinities as hypostases of Buddhist divinities, they claimed that the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* were in fact manifestations of Shintō *kami* (divinities). First and foremost in this respect was Yoshida Kanetomo (1435–1511), a priest of the Yoshida shrine in Kyoto, who authored apocryphal scriptures, designed rituals, and formed a “Shintō-sided” sect of syncretism known as Yūitsu Shintō. This sect was of some importance in Japanese religious and cultural history, for it was granted, in the seventeenth century, the authority to license Shintō priests. From that time on Buddhism faced mounting criticism, it lost much of its economic and political support, and the nature of its relationships with Shintō changed accordingly. In 1868 the Meiji government decreed the official separation of Shintō from Buddhist divinities. Shintō was then changed in order to become the state religion: This marks the historical end to the meaningful existence of the *honjisuijaku* theories and practices in Japan.

In the light of these historical processes, the interpretation of the *honjisuijaku* theory becomes quite complex, for if on the one hand one wants to propose a strictly sectarian interpretation of the term, on the other hand one must keep in mind the various interpretations given to it in the course of history, and there is some discrepancy between the two. The Japanese have, in time of crisis, interpreted the theory as a model of power relationships, whereas in time of peace they have interpreted it as a model of peaceful coexistence. It may be said that many associations remain in the minds of some Japanese religious practitioners, and that composite culture is still a major aspect of Japanese religiosity and culture; but in any case, the *honjisuijaku* theory is no longer applicable as a structural device for communication processes between religious systems.

SEE ALSO Kami; Shintō; Syncretism; Upāya.

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Most of the relevant material for the study of *honjisuijaku* still needs to be thoroughly researched by scholars; the official separation of Shintō from Buddhism has resulted in a general lack of interest in this important area of Japanese religious history. However, in the last few years important studies have appeared in Japan. One may consult with benefit all the works by the historian Murayama Shūichi; particularly recommended is his *Honjisuijaku* (Tokyo, 1974), which is most detailed and provides brilliant analyses. The reader is also referred to the works of another historian, Kuroda Toshio. Among these, *Kokka to shūkyō*, volume 1 of *Nihon shūkyōshi kōza*, edited by Ienaga Saburō et al. (1959; rev. ed., Tokyo, 1971), gives his insightful remarks on the political background of the associations between Shintō and Buddhism. His book entitled *Jisha seiryoku* (Tokyo, 1980) is a systematic exposition of the economic and institutional aspects of Shintō-Buddhist associations and provides many openings for future research. The only book-length study in English is Alicia Matsunaga’s *The Buddhist Philosophy of Assimilation: The Historical Development of the Honji-Suijaku Theory* (Tokyo and Rutland, Vt., 1969), but this work needs to be revised to a considerable extent.

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ALLAN G. GRAPARD (1987)  
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**HONKO, LAURI** (1932–2002) was a Finnish scholar of comparative religion and folklore and one of the most prominent scholars of cultural and religious studies in late-twentieth-century Finland and abroad. His prolific literary output reflects his status as professor of folklore and comparative religion at the University of Turku as well as stints with the Academy of Finland, UNESCO, Folklore Fellows Communications (FFC), and other national and international learned societies.

Honko began his career in the 1950s at the Finnish Literature Society as a student and assistant of Martti Haavio. Honko’s doctoral dissertation discussed folk medicine and phenomenology of religion. His 1962 publication *Geisterglaube in Ingermanland* was a breakthrough that extended research on supernatural experiences into the perception and social psychology of religion on the basis of the folk beliefs he had thoroughly studied in peasant Ingrian society, using archival and field materials gathered from Ingrian refugees in Finland and Sweden.

Honko worked actively to legitimize the academic study of comparative religion in Finnish universities. He was a founder of the Finnish Society for Comparative Religion in 1963, and he launched its journal *Temenos* in 1965 as well as *Uskontotieteen näkökulmia* (Viewpoints on comparative religion) seven years later. He fought equally hard for the discipline of cultural anthropology, which entered Finnish uni-



versity curricula with *Kulttuuriantropologia*, the 1970 textbook he wrote with Juha Pentikäinen.

Honko emphasized the importance of observation in empirical research. His early studies of Ingrian narrations and Karelian laments focused on function and genre analysis, oral poetry in relation to rites of passage, and perception psychology in folk belief. His 1967 fieldwork extended into the *lappmarks* (territorial divisions) of Lapland.

Honko also cofounded the Academy of Finland Sami Folklore Project, in which the Sami themselves worked to establish a folklore collection. He directed the Nordic Folklore Institute (NIF) from 1972 to 1990, producing volumes on such subjects as the ecological tradition. Honko's career culminated in the 1990s with annual visits to India, where he made audiovisual recordings of epic singers. The trips were detailed in his publications *Intian päiväkiriä*, *Textualising the Siri Epic*, and *The Siri Epic as Performed by Gopala Naika I–II*.

Honko's main theoretical contributions were discussions on the phenomenology of religion and the religious traditions of both oral presentations and sacred texts. He wrote several books and encyclopedias on Finnish and Finno-Ugric religions and published numerous works on the Kalevala and other epics, tracing their histories from oral tradition to literary transcription. His last book, a study of Setu (south Estonian) epics, was published posthumously in 2003.

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JUHA PENTIKÄINEN (2005)

**HOOKER, RICHARD** (1554–1600), was an apologist and theologian of the Church of England, famous for his work *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (hereafter cited as *Laws*). Born at Heavitree near Exeter, Hooker received his basic education in the Exeter Grammar School. His parents could not afford more advanced schooling for him, but his uncle took the boy to see Bishop John Jewel of Salisbury (1560–1571), who agreed to be his patron and arranged for his admission as a clerk at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, in 1568. His tutor was Dr. John Rainolds (1549–1604), a leader of the moderate Puritans at the university.

Hooker received his B.A. in 1574 and his M.A. in 1577. He was made a fellow of the college and a lecturer in Hebrew, and in 1581 he was ordained. His wide learning, gentle disposition, and genuine piety were admired at Oxford. Among his pupils two became lifelong friends and advisers in the writing of the *Laws*: Edwin Sandys, son of Bishop Edwin Sandys of London (1570–1576; archbishop of York, 1576–1588), and George Cranmer, grandnephew of Thomas Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury (1533–1556).

In December 1584 Hooker received the living of Drayton Beauchamp, Buckinghamshire, but a few months later he was appointed master of the Temple in London. He was soon involved in bitter controversy with Walter Travers, the afternoon lecturer at the Temple, who was a noted Puritan of presbyterian views and ordination. Instead of living in the

master's house, which was in disrepair and partly occupied by Travers, Hooker took lodging in the nearby home of John Churchman, a prosperous member of the Merchant Taylors' Company and a friend of Sandys. In February 1588, Hooker married Churchman's daughter Joan, who bore him two sons (both of whom died in infancy) and four daughters.

Hooker resigned from the Temple in 1591 and was given the living of Boscombe, near Salisbury. It is doubtful if he was ever resident there, for he was already writing the *Laws* in the Churchmans' home, where he lived with his growing family. There also Sandys, who had entered Parliament, and Cranmer could easily confer with him about the work. In 1595, Hooker moved with his family to a living in Bishopsbourne, near Canterbury. He remained there, except for frequent visits to London, until his death on November 2, 1600.

In the preface to the *Laws*, Hooker outlined the themes of his eight projected books and made clear the purpose of the work. It was a defense, based on scripture, the tradition of the church, and reason, of Queen Elizabeth's settlement of the Church of England against the radical Puritans. The latter sought to overthrow the settlement by abolishing the royal supremacy, episcopacy, and *The Book of Common Prayer* and to substitute a presbyterian system of church government and discipline modeled on Calvin's church at Geneva.

Because Hooker had difficulty finding a publisher, Sandys contracted with a printer, John Windet, Hooker's cousin, to produce the work. Sandys agreed to bear the entire cost. Archbishop John Whitgift of Canterbury gave his license, and the preface and first four books were issued in early March 1593. The publication, as Sandys had hoped and planned, came just before the opening of Parliament to consider (and pass) the Act to Retain the Queen's Subjects in Obedience, a stringent ruling against all who refused to attend the Church of England's services or who were "present at any unlawful assemblies, conventicles, or meetings, under colour or pretence of any exercise of religion."

Book 5, much longer than the others, appeared in 1597. Hooker completed drafts of the last three books before his death. They were not published for many years—books 6 and 8 in 1648 and the complete work, with book 7, in 1662. Their authenticity, often questioned, is now generally accepted. A large portion of the beginning of book 6 has been lost, although notes on it by Sandys and Cranmer are extant, and Hooker's manuscript pages of book 8 were left in some disorder.

Books 1–4 deal with laws in general: the divine law of God himself, the immutable natural law implanted by God in creation, and the positive law of human societies. Yet human reason, impaired by the fall but assisted by divine revelation and grace, can understand the natural law and be guided in positive law according to times, circumstances, and experience. No positive law is perfect, but it is always reformable.

Against the radical Puritans, Hooker argued that the scriptures were not self-authenticating. Their authority had been determined by the church. Nor did the scriptures contain a detailed ordering of the governance and worship of the church, but only its basic principles. These principles were different from the unchanging and essential revelation for faith and salvation. On the basis of scriptural principle, Hooker defended in book 5 the rites and customs of *The Book of Common Prayer* and in book 6 its mode of penitential discipline.

In book 7 he based episcopacy not on any divine institution but on the universal practice of the church since apostolic times. Book 8 on the royal supremacy is cautiously ambivalent. Hooker defended on scriptural grounds the necessity of obedience to constituted civil authority by the consent of the people. In his England, as in ancient Israel, civil and ecclesiastical societies were coextensive. He was aware, however, that the Crown had used its prerogatives to limit the church's freedom in ordering its own internal life.

Hooker's extensive and erudite documentation of his arguments, the richly textured eloquence of his style, and his openness to reforms in the Church of England have made his work a constant resource in the later development of Anglican theology. His political philosophy has been judged as both a conservative apology for the status quo and a liberal critique of the Elizabethan church. He has been acclaimed as the first major prose writer in modern English literature. Yet his lasting legacy has been his appeal to reason in the interpretation of scripture, the church's government, and worship.

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MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR. (1987)



**HOOKER, THOMAS** (1586–1647), was an English and American Puritan minister. Born in Leicestershire, Hooker took his B.A. and M.A. at Cambridge, where he was variously Dixie fellow, catechist, and lecturer in Emmanuel College. As a minister he became active in the unofficial meetings of Puritan ministers then taking place. When William Laud moved to restrict nonconforming ministers in the late 1620s, Hooker fled, first to the Netherlands, thence to New England in 1633. He and Samuel Stone organized the first church in Newtown (now Cambridge), Massachusetts. Partly because of religious and political disputes in the Bay Colony, partly because of his parishioners' dissatisfaction with their land allotments, Hooker led in 1636 a removal to Connecticut, where he and his group founded Hartford. When the General Court of Connecticut first met in May 1638 to draw up its Fundamental Orders, Hooker's sermon on the occasion described the proper relationship between the people and their magistrates. Although an important political statement of early New England, the sermon is no longer commonly accepted, as it once was, as evidence of Hooker's democratic attitudes. Hooker maintained his influence in Boston, returning in 1637 to serve as a moderator of the synod called to deal with Anne Hutchinson and the antinomian threat, then later in 1645 to participate in the meeting called to consider responses to the Westminster Assembly. The first of these meetings marked the triumph of Hooker's preparationist theology as a nearly official view of the process of salvation for the New England churches. At the later meeting Hooker presented his *Survey of the Summe of Church Discipline* (London, 1648), which became one of the definitive statements of the congregational church order in New England. He died at Hartford on July 7, 1647.

More than thirty volumes appeared over Hooker's name or were legitimately credited to him; the most important, in addition to the *Survey*, are collections of sermons that examine the spiritual stages the soul passes through on the way to conversion. Under the influence of Richard Sibbes and other English preparationist theologians who held that the individual soul could not earn grace but could prepare itself for its reception, Hooker preached extensively on the subject and made his final survey of the soul's progress during his pastorate at Hartford. These sermons were published posthumously in the two volumes entitled *The Application of Redemption* (London, 1656–1659). Hooker was well known in his own time for his direction of troubled spirits in the process of discovering saving grace in themselves, and this concern is evident in his various sermonic works on the theology and psychology of conversion. He was also interested in the role meditation could play in the spiritual life of a soul under the workings of grace, and he has been recognized in this century as one of the significant Puritan exponents of the meditative process.

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FRANK SHUFFELTON (1987)

**HOPE.** If we define religion as the systematic expression of the interplay between traditional faith and transforming hope, then hope is of the essence of religion. It is the impetus of religious renewal, as fear is often behind hardening tradition. Priestly conceptions of religion may accentuate the equation of religion with tradition and the past. Prophetic calls for renewal also may emphasize a return to pristine purity. But each major tradition posits a future leader who focuses the hope arising from past faith. Jewish traditions speak of a messiah, Islam of a hidden imam. Christians look for the second coming of Christ. Buddhists speak of Maitreya (Jpn., Miroku) as the Buddha to come, and Hindus of Vaiṣṇava orientation look for another avatar of Viṣṇu. The hope is for a final realization of what is now only anticipated, in continuity with the patterns of devotion fostered by the central figure or founder of the present community.

Until modern times, the emphasis tended to be on reform rather than renewal. Myths of ending were shaped by myths of beginnings. The biblical motif of a return to paradise lost is a case in point. The conception of the new as better comes in European thought with the inversion of the chain of being, the change from classical, hierarchical conceptions of emanation (typically beginning with the spiritual and settling into the material) to contemporary, developmental conceptions of evolution and revolution (beginning with the inorganic and culminating in consciousness). Whether retrospective or prospective, religious thought, to be religious, must be characterized by the hope that present vicissitudes will be overcome, that faith will be vindicated, and that the group, if not the individual, will realize a joy or bliss of which we now experience only passing intimations. Even those who conceive of eternity as timeless and ever present acknowledge that this realization of bliss remains, for most, a future possibility on the horizon of daily living. However conceptualized, the fact of such hope for the future often makes devotees ready to become martyrs to their cause.

Religious hope is necessarily transforming because of the focus in religion on ways of liberation or salvation, often expressed in terms of a movement from death to full life, error

to right knowledge, disease to perfect health, despair to assurance of ultimate satisfaction. Patterns of transformation, or ways to realization of a religious end, were classically conceived in terms of refinement, renunciation, reintegration or resurrection and, more recently, in terms of revolution and reconstruction. Each pattern is generated by different concepts of self and of ultimate reality, although different traditions embody features of more than one means of transformation; as, for instance, in monastic Christian ideas of paradise, where Hebrew visions of restoration or resurrection melded with Hellenistic versions of renunciation.

Refinement is typically of the cultured or cultivated self in repudiation of barbaric, chaotic elements presently disrupting society. The ideal is of the sage, as exemplified in China by Confucius and taken up in the Enlightenment strand of modern Western thought by such thinkers as Voltaire and John Dewey. Renunciation is of material things for spiritual value, or of the demands of the body for the sake of the soul, as in the case of Socrates or the story of Gautama the Buddha. Reintegration is of the whole self as microcosm with the harmonies of earth and heaven as macrocosm, as articulated in the Daoist literature of China and the psychology of C. G. Jung. Restoration may be of the faithful people, as in Israel under King David. But restoration in its Christian pattern, resurrection, is of the individual and corporate self, both body and spirit, re-created by God within a whole new order of being, identified in medieval times with heaven but biblically imaged, especially in the *Book of Revelation*, as both a new heaven and a new earth. Modern transformations may be described as reconstruction, when the emphasis is on the mechanistic thrust of science and technology, notably through medicine, where it is the material order which is renewed. Or we may speak of revolution, partly technological (as in the industrial revolution or the contemporary movement for women's liberation, insofar as this relates to child-bearing and housework) but primarily political and economic, as in the call for collective renewal by Marx and Mao.

As already noted, the different ways of transformation may be blended with each other. The story of Socrates includes motifs of refinement and renunciation. Christian ascetics link renunciation with resurrection, while modern theologies of liberation link resurrection with revolution. Relevant for our topic is the fact that the grounds for hope vary according to the way in question. Resurrection presupposes the reality of transcendent divine power, which can create out of nothing. Revolution comes through human action, whether in solidarity with a wholly human collective or in communion with God. Reintegration affirms the forces of nature in all of us. Thus, religious hope hinges on different conceptions of ultimate transformation—theistic, humanistic, and/or naturalistic—and is not necessarily tied to a particular belief in the existence of a supernatural agent or god. Where classical myths portray gods and goddesses as immortals, modern stories revolve around heroes and antiheroes. What gives each story religious significance is the hope of ultimate transformation, not the reference to god as such.

The subject of transformation is the self; but by self may be meant just a part or principle of life as we first experience it. As mentioned, ways of renunciation deny the physical body but affirm the continuity of a spiritual self. In the extreme case of Buddhism, both mind and matter are identified with the present cycle of miserable existences (*samsāra*), and what is affirmed is a principle (the Buddha nature, which has realized *nirvāṇa*). Reintegration is of the whole self, body and mind, with the present cosmos. By contrast, resurrection entails the gift of a new body and an individuating spirit in a new world (whereas immortality implies a true spiritual self, or soul, now trapped in the body and only really at home in a supernatural realm). Both resurrection in the religion of Israel and revolution in modern times emphasize the community, of which a remnant is restored or gains the ideal condition aspired to by all. In tribal this-worldly traditions, hope for the future is focused on the children and succeeding generations as they return to the ways of their ancestors (a variant on refinement, especially in the ancestral cult called Confucianism by Western scholars). Thus, who and what is hoped for varies, according to conceptions of selfhood and the nature of ultimate reality.

Again, while a common religious hope may be for life after death, this is not necessarily the case. If the sense of self is of an individual or of a pattern of characteristics transmigrating through a possible infinite series of bodies, then the expectation of life after death may instill fear, not inspire hope. The Buddhist doctrine of no self (Sanskrit, *anātman*; Pali, *anatta*) was developed in just such a context. Even when life is thought to be singular, not cyclical, the expectation of an afterlife may be fearful if the prospect is of a ghostly loss of place or of torment in hell. Traditional notions of purgatory arose to meet this fear and to give grounds for hope to those who despaired of immediate entry to heaven.

The scope of renewal may be temporary or permanent, partial, individual, communal or cosmic. Renunciation is for the sake of permanent renewal of the spiritual self or permanent realization of *nirvāṇa*. Reintegration presupposes a permanent process on the cosmic scale, but individual integration within this process may be temporary and partial. Resurrection, in classical Christian and Muslim eschatologies, is of the whole individual with the whole people of God, involving permanent enjoyment of God's enlivening presence for the faithful and perpetual punishment for the faithless. The vision of a new heaven and a new earth includes the whole created order within the compass of the promised renewal. The emphasis falls on faith because it is what God does for humankind, and not unaided human effort, that carries the promise of salvation. By comparison, refinement and revolution are primarily humanistic ways that include the rest of nature only as the setting for human fulfillment.

Reconstruction presupposes the permanence of nature and, through applied science, makes this increasingly available to human beings: for instance, through computerized memory banks, artificial limbs and hearts, and artificial in-

semination (where hope is concentrated on survival through one's children). In principle, such hope is available to all, but in practice, access is limited to the affluent. Science fiction often illustrates how the current limitations on reconstruction may be overcome, at least in our imagination. In general, it seems fair to say that the dominant global cultures, including their religious systems, are increasingly universal in scope and are expanding the range of human expectations from tribal lands to the whole earth, from the earth to the universe, and from the known universe to all possible galaxies and states beyond the terrestrial.

Symbols of hope reflect the blending of traditions and motifs of transformation. In Buddhism, the tree reflects the rootedness of perfect enlightenment conquering ignorance. The tree of life in images of paradise reflects the garden setting for creation in Mesopotamian cultures. Daoist Chinese images include bowls of life-enhancing fruit. By contrast, the cross of Jesus provides a reverse image for Christians, linking the tree of life to the historical paradigm of suffering and atonement. The evergreen tree in northern climes, combined with images of mother and child, is a Christian example of conflated symbols, whose meaning varies according to the story told. The Buddhist wheel, by contrast, can suggest both abhorrence of the cycles of existence and the teaching that reverses the patterns of alienation. The lotus is a reminder that beauty arises even out of the mud.

Symbols are especially important in expressions of hope because hope is always for what is possible but not yet fully realized. As already noted, the sense of ultimate reality shapes the horizon of hope. Symbols of journeys and arrival at the far shore suggest both present separation and eventual satisfaction. Where this world is all there is, hope through children or through lasting achievements dominates, and hope is linked to memory. Where all possibilities seem closed off, despair sets in. We owe to Søren Kierkegaard the definitive contrast, expressed in modern literature, between despair of ever realizing the authentic self and despair caused by realizing what the self has become. Since Plato, Western religious thought has emphasized being as the ideal end of becoming. Asian thought, by comparison, has often posited an ultimate emptiness of individuating features, such that despair more typically has been despair at continuing to be as one is.

Hope, as the obverse of despair, may be hope for oneself as individual or group, hope for one's world, or hope for the ultimate nature of things. As such, classical thought counted hope a virtue. In Chinese traditions, a world in disarray was evidence of the lack of virtue among earthly and heavenly rulers. The concept of the mandate of heaven for the virtuous gave reformers hope that order might be restored. On the Indian subcontinent, despair over the lack of virtue throughout the hierarchy of being led to expectations of periodic, cosmic cataclysms, followed by renewal. Echoes of this idea appear in biblical stories of Noah and the flood followed by the rainbow. In Christian thought, hope is a theological virtue, along with faith and love. According to Thomas Aquinas (*Summa*

*theologiae* 2.1.25.3), hope is always for some future good that is difficult but possible to attain. There is no hope for the damned, while the blessed no longer need hope since they enjoy the direct vision of God. It is theological, since the gift of the possibility comes from God, and a virtue, since the gift may be refused.

With regard to hope for oneself, increasing differentiation in the evolution of modern culture has put more and more emphasis on the individual. To live for the reflected glory of an earthly or heavenly lord no longer appeals to those who would be rulers of their own destiny. In *The Myth of Sisyphus* Albert Camus carries this line of thought to its final point. In existential psychology, the importance of hope was most insisted on by Viktor Frankl. Drawing on his experience in the concentration camps of the 1930s and 1940s, he realized both that while there's life there's hope and that to go on living we must have hope.

**SEE ALSO** Atonement; Enlightenment; Healing and Medicine; Mokṣa; Redemption.

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PETER SLATER (1987)

**HOPKINS, EMMA CURTIS.** Emma Curtis Hopkins (1849–1925) was the oldest of nine children born to Lydia Phillips Curtis and Rufus Curtis. She grew up with her Congregationalist family in Killingly, Connecticut, and became a teacher. In 1874 she married a schoolteacher, George Hopkins, and they had a son, John, born in 1875.

In 1881 Emma had a healing experience using the methods of Christian Science. She heard Mary Baker Eddy (1821–1910) speak in 1883 and subsequently became a member of the Church of Christ, Scientist, traveling to Boston for lessons with Eddy. Recognizing her talents, Eddy appointed her to serve as the first full-time (and unpaid) editor of the *Christian Science Journal* in September 1884. After a year and a half, Hopkins was asked by Eddy to leave the position. Financial constraints or theological differences were most likely the reasons for the split. Hopkins resigned from the Christian Science Association in October 1885.

Hopkins and her family relocated to Chicago in early 1886. There was a burgeoning women's movement there

and she was an immediate success in her educational ventures and healing ministries, which dovetailed with the social activism of the time. George Hopkins later moved back to New England, and they were divorced in 1900. In 1886 Emma Hopkins and a colleague, Mary Plunkett (d. 1900), founded the Hopkins College of Christian Science, which taught an idealistic theology with a focus on serene lifestyles, prosperity, and positive thinking. The first graduates of the initial class in 1886 formed the backbone of the Hopkins Metaphysical Association, which grew in numbers and evolved into the first organized association of the New Thought movement in the United States. At that time, *Christian Science* was a generic term used by many to denote the mental healing movement. It continued to be used in a generic way until Eddy threatened to sue any group that used the term. By the 1890s *New Thought* became the standard term for groups not affiliated with Eddy.

Graduates of the Hopkins College, functioning as religious entrepreneurs and trained as practitioners and teachers, transported Hopkins's idealistic theology to every region of the United States and later to Great Britain and New Zealand, making New Thought an American export. Hopkins's student, Frances Lord, was the first to systematize and teach New Thought's prosperity principles, expounding upon Hopkins's ideas. By the end of 1887 there were seventeen or more New Thought associations around the United States affiliated with Hopkins College and Hopkins's philosophical tenets. The college's graduates, most of them women, traveled by train as missionaries, setting up Truth Centers around the country and checking in with the Hopkins Association in Chicago. From 1887 until 1894, the association served as the social and theological hub for their religious activity.

In 1887, Hopkins, now a national figure as well as a social activist, was invited to speak to large gatherings in San Francisco, Milwaukee, and New York. These lectures gained new proponents for her approach to mental healing and her theology of a monistic, impersonal God who, as Divine Mind, was omniscient, pure, and perfect. Widely read, Hopkins drew upon Gnostic ideas of the immanence of divinity and she rejected the traditional Christian notion of sin, replacing it with a belief that human failings were merely spiritual errors, which could be overcome. She had a theory similar to what would later become Jungian ideas. She believed that racial memory was something akin to what Jung would describe as the collective and individual unconscious. These stored memories, embedded within the genetic code of the individual when triggered, recall disease, traumatic events and health challenges from the individual and collective past. She believed these cases of racial memory could be cured through silent healing. Convinced that the advent of spiritual healing methods ushered in the second coming of Christ, Hopkins dissolved her college and reorganized her teaching to fit an ecclesiastical structure. Believing her mission to be sacred, a hallmark of the second coming of Christ, she orga-

nized the Christian Science Theological Seminary in late October 1887. She meant for her top-ranked disciples to be trained in a religious manner and ordained. Those not taking the most advanced course with her on a one-to-one basis were licensed as teachers and practitioners. She selected talented faculty, such as Annie Rix Militz (1856–1924), who later founded the Homes of Truth, to teach classes in the manner of Protestant seminaries. In 1888 an early graduate, Ida Nichols, founded the periodical *Christian Science*, for which Hopkins, a prolific writer, authored feature articles. Hopkins's classic texts, *Class Lessons 1888* (1888) and *Scientific Mental Practice* (1890), also became seminal lessons to understanding her teachings. At this time she was also asked to write *International Bible Lessons*, a weekly column for the Chicago *Inter-Ocean* newspaper that ran for nine years.

What was unique about Hopkins was that she did not found a church; she thought the sick people of the world were her church. It was her disciples and ordinands that founded churches. Every prominent New Thought church surviving today was started by her students and disciples.

The predominantly female social milieu in which Hopkins operated, and her ideas about the innate goodness of women that she associated with the Holy Spirit of the Trinity, prepared her to act as bishop. On January 10, 1889, she ordained twenty-two ministers to the independent Christian Science ministry. During the next four years, 111 students graduated from her seminary. The importance of her graduates and ordinands, coupled with their success in founding and forming New Thought churches and Truth Centers, earned for her the sobriquet "teacher of teachers" of the New Thought movement.

During 1894, content that her dedicated students had established ministries and were teaching "the newer ways," she closed the seminary, sold the property, and relocated to New York. There, as a reclusive mystic she taught primarily one-to-one in her private hotel suite in Manhattan. She taught Mabel Dodge Luhan (1879–1962), Hutchins Hapgood (1869–1944), Neith Boyce (1872–1951), and other prominent writers working for a more democratic treatment of minority peoples. She taught Elizabeth Duncan, the older sister of the dancer Isadora Duncan (1877–1927), and supported their progressive school for children. Her teachings advocated for Native American and African American rights. One of her students, Emilie Hapgood, supported the first all-black theater troupe to perform on Broadway, while Luhan labored all of her life for Native American rights.

Every major contemporary New Thought organization can be traced directly to Hopkins's teachings. She ordained Myrtle Fillmore (1845–1931) and Charles Fillmore (1854–1948), who founded Unity; Malinda Cramer (1844–1906), Nona Brooks (1861–1945), Fannie James, and Alethea Small, who founded Divine Science in Denver; and Harriet Emilie Cady (1848–1941), who wrote Unity's all-time best-seller, *Lessons in Truth*. During the New York years, she taught a young Ernest Holmes (1887–1960), who founded

Religious Science in Los Angeles and inspired the theology of Norman Vincent Peale (1898–1993) and Robert Schuller (b. 1926). Other speakers and teachers who appropriated Hopkins's work and taught it in more secular form number in the thousands, and they spread her teachings to millions. Prior to her death from heart failure in 1925, Hopkins wrote the culmination of her life's work, *High Mysticism* (1912–1917).

**SEE ALSO** Christian Science; New Thought Movement; Unity.

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GAIL M. HARLEY (2005)

**HORNER, I. B.** The British scholar Isaline B. Horner (1896–1981) devoted her considerable intelligence and energy to furthering scholarly and popular understanding of Buddhism, especially in the English-speaking West. After earning her B.A. (1917) at Newnham College—then one of only two women's colleges at Cambridge University—Horner stayed at the college as assistant librarian (1918–1920) and then acting librarian (1920–1921). In 1921 she accepted an invitation to accompany the college principal's sister, D. J. Stephen, on a trip to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, and Burma (now Myanmar). Although Stephen probably considered the trip a Christian mission, she and Horner shared an interest in Eastern religions, and Horner filled her letters home with descriptions of Buddhist and Hindu practices she encountered in these British colonies.

After two years abroad, Horner returned to Newnham as librarian, a position she would hold until 1936. Shortly thereafter, she began studying the religion she had witnessed in Ceylon: Theravāda Buddhism. At that time Western scholars of Asian religions tended to regard scriptures as repositories of the earliest and, therefore, most authentic forms of these religions. Thomas Rhys Davids had founded the Pali Text Society (PTS) in 1881 to facilitate the study of Theravāda Buddhism by producing editions in roman characters, and translations into English, of the Theravāda tradition's scriptures, written in the language called Pali. In 1925 Horner contacted Caroline Rhys Davids, Thomas's wife and successor as president of the PTS following his death in 1922. Caroline Rhys Davids encouraged Horner to research the topic of women in early Buddhism, in part by studying English translations of Pali texts. Horner followed this advice, while studying the Pali language with Cambridge professor E. J. Rapson.

Horner's *Women under Primitive Buddhism* came out in 1930, and her second book about Theravāda Buddhism based on study of Pali texts, *The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected*, was published in 1936. Both books were well received by scholars of Buddhism and by the intellectual English-reading public. *Women under Primitive Buddhism* remained the only book-length study of women in Buddhism for nearly fifty years. When scholars eventually took up this topic again, they rediscovered—and acknowledged their gratitude for—this book. Several of them corresponded with Horner late in her life, and she encouraged their efforts to build on her work. Although some of Horner's characterizations of early Buddhism in these two books from the 1930s appear outmoded in light of later scholarship, her grounding in the Pali texts ensured the lasting relevance of much of this work.

Horner's greatest contribution to the study of Buddhism came through her work on the Pali literature and her leadership of the PTS. By the early 1930s Horner had begun to edit and translate Pali texts for publication. Over the next fifty years she edited four volumes of Pali scripture and translated fifteen volumes of Pali texts into English for the PTS.



But Horner's impact on the study of Theravāda Buddhism through its Pali scriptures extended far beyond even this impressive list of published Pali editions and translations. Groomed by Caroline Rhys Davids to step in as her successor at the PTS, Horner served the PTS first as honorary secretary (1942–1959) after her mentor's death and later as president (1959–1981). For nearly four decades Horner actively recruited scholars from Europe, America, and Asia to contribute to the work of the PTS, and she then politely but persistently pushed them, and helped them, to complete their projects. Horner guided fifty-six new volumes of PTS publications through the complex process of book production, from initial correspondence with potential editors and translators through final negotiations with printers and distributors. Many acknowledgments of and grateful thanks for Horner's help appear in the prefaces and introductions to these PTS publications. Over the same period, Horner monitored the stocks of PTS books and managed the reprinting of 223 out-of-print and revised volumes.

Horner's indefatigable dedication and financial backing ensured that the PTS continued to publish one to four volumes annually throughout the twentieth century. For decades she inspired and encouraged students to take up the study of Pali and scholars to work on Pali texts without pay or even royalties. Horner actively pursued funding for the work of the PTS and often paid for its publications herself when she could not drum up sufficient financial support from other sources. Horner also left the PTS a substantial legacy in her will that has continued to support many of its activities into the twenty-first century.

In addition to her contributions to the scholarly study of Buddhist texts, Horner influenced the growing popular practice of Buddhism in the West by giving countless lectures to Western Buddhist groups and writing articles for their publications. Horner hesitated to call herself a Buddhist because she did not meditate, but she constantly demonstrated her commitment to propagating what she saw as the true teachings of Buddhism, always grounded in the Pali texts. She had little patience for Western Buddhists who corrupted the teachings of Buddhism with those of Hinduism or ideas of their own devising. Her interpretations of Buddhism for practitioners impressed even Asian Buddhist monks and scholars, including her many friends and admirers in Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand, who frequently asked her to contribute articles to their publications and to give lectures when she traveled in Asia (1934–1935, 1938–1939, 1950, 1953–1954).

The University of Ceylon granted Horner an honorary doctor of letters in 1964, as did Nava Nalanda Mahavihara in 1977. In 1980 Horner received an Order of the British Empire award from Queen Elizabeth II for her services to the PTS. Having lived to see the celebration of the first one hundred years of the PTS, Horner died in London on April 25, 1981.

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GRACE G. BURFORD (2005)

**HORNS.** The physical power and reproductive potency of horned animals, which were so important in the economy of ancient hunting and agricultural societies, made them ideal symbols of strength and fertility. The primitive use of horns as plows and the symbolic view of plowing as the im-

pregnation of Mother Earth led to the belief that horns were charged with sexual power. The association of horns with fertility was further encouraged by their phallic shape and symbolic identification with both the rays of the sun and the crescent moon.

The association of horns with power and fertility accounts for the proliferation of horned gods and goddesses in both the East and the West. The Sumerian gods Anu, Enlil, and Marduk wear horned headdresses, as do the Egyptian deities Hathor, Isis, Nut, Seth, and Amun. The Hindu god Śiva and the Greek god Poseidon share the same emblem, a trident, a symbolic representation of horns. In Greek mythology, Dionysos, Pan, the satyrs, the river gods, Hera, Io, and Aphrodite all have horns as attributes. The Cretan ceremony of bull vaulting involved grasping the horns, the source of fertility and power; and the Cretan symbol of the double ax is probably a pair of stylized horns.

The Canaanite gods Baal and El were horned bull gods as was, originally, Yahveh, which is why horns decorate the altar described in *Exodus 27*. Moses, too, has been associated with horns. In *Exodus 34:29–35*, the Hebrew verb *qaran*, which means either “to send forth beams” or “to be horned,” occurs three times in the phrase *qaran ’or panav*, describing the beaming face of Moses upon his descent from Mount Sinai. In the Vulgate, however, this phrase is translated as *facies cornuta* (“horned face”), and the symbolism of this mistranslation has persisted over the centuries. The horns on the head of Michelangelo’s *Moses*, sculpted about 1515, are one well-known example.

In Christian iconography, the foremost association of horns is with devils and demons, although the Virgin Mary is sometimes depicted with the “horns” of the moon. The Vedic and Buddhist divinity Yama is horned. In ancient China, Shen Nong, one of three legendary divine emperors, is traditionally pictured with two horns on his head, as a symbol of his connection with nutrition and animal life. Celtic gods and goddesses are often horned.

The horned headgear of the gods was appropriated by humans to indicate their divine mandate and power. Babylonian and Assyrian kings wore rounded caps with horns. Alexander the Great identified himself with the horned god Amun and appears on coins with ram’s horns. Etruscans, Celts, Vikings, and Anglo-Saxons wore horned headdresses, as did American Indian chiefs and shamans. Medieval crowns, and even the miters worn by Christian bishops, owe their shape to earlier horned headdresses.

The association of horns with fertility accounts for the metaphoric use of *horn* for “phallus” (*Ps.* 132:17, *Jer.* 48:25), as well as for the worldwide consumption of powdered horn as an aphrodisiac. The image of cornucopias, or horns of plenty, is a well-known symbol of abundance. Horn amulets have been found on every continent. One of their most important uses was in detecting poison, because horned animals, particularly unicorns, were thought to be the natural

enemies of venomous serpents. The Chinese still use ivory for this purpose, reserving carved rhinoceros horns for the decorative function of symbolizing prosperity and strength. The prophylactic properties of horn extends to the sounds made by horned instruments, which have been valued throughout the world for their ability to ward off evil spirits, ghosts, demons, and devils.

Not all associations with horns are positive. Horned animals are dangerous. From the Stone Age on, horns were used as weapons. (The curved shape of swords and daggers reflects this primitive usage.) Potions made from powdered horns may be poisonous. The association of horns with fertility made them the ideal symbol of cuckoldry. The symbolism connecting horns with the moon has negative, as well as positive, implications. While the waxing of the moon is a sign of rebirth, the waning moon symbolizes death, darkness, and the underworld. Horns are, therefore, ideal attributes for evil and libidinous demons, devils, and monsters. Aside from the Devil of Christian folklore, sometimes known as “Old Hornie,” the Babylonian demon Pazzuzu was horned, as were the libidinous satyrs of ancient Greece. Japanese *oni* are evil spirits depicted as humans with bull horns. Most monsters have horns or horny scales.

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A full appreciation of the ramifications of horn symbolism requires a look at mythology and religion throughout the world. A good way to start is by consulting Jack R. Conrad’s *The Horn and the Sword: The History of the Bull as Symbol of Power and Fertility* (New York, 1957) and Frederic T. Elworthy’s *Horns of Honour* (London, 1900).

ALLISON COUDERT (1987)

**HORSES** have played an essential role in the life, and therefore in the religion, of all the peoples who have had direct contact with them, particularly the Indo-Europeans, the ancient Mesopotamians and Egyptians, the Arabs, the Chinese, and the North American Indians. It is fair to say that horses have always captured the mythic imagination through their ability to symbolize a number of related phenomena: power, wealth, divinity, sexuality, flying, and the tension between taming and freedom.

Among the earliest evidence of the importance of the horse to human culture are the magnificent wall paintings in the caves of Lascaux, in southern France, dating from around 30,000 BCE. There the grouping of horses with other wild animals such as stags and bison suggests that they were probably animals that were hunted rather than harnessed or ridden. Even so, it has been proposed that certain structures depicted on the walls at Lascaux represent corrals, implying that some sort of taming may already have begun. André Leroi-Gourhan has argued that the horse is part of the male half of a general sexual bipartition in the animal symbolism at Lascaux. If this is so, there is very early evidence indeed

of the horse in association with both taming and sexuality, perhaps even with the combined concept of the taming of sexuality, which is a dominant theme in the Indo-European religious symbolism of the horse.

But the true history of the horse in human religious conceptualization must begin with the first certain evidence of its domestication: the use of the chariot, which, for several centuries before horses were ridden, was employed as a means of transport, of farming, and as an instrument of war. Starting before 2000 BCE from a location somewhere in the area of the Caspian and Mediterranean seas, the use of the horse to pull a chariot spread eastward through Persia to India, then south through Syria to Egypt, then west through Anatolia to Greece, and then northwest into eastern Europe. Among the Hittites, a Mittannian named Kikkulis, who was employed as Master of the Horse by the Hittite king Sepululiumas, composed the earliest known book that deals with nothing but horses, about 1360 BCE. And the earliest known Egyptian figure of a horse appears on a bronze axhead of the eighteenth dynasty (c. 1450 BCE), which shows a horse led in hand in a manner assumed to be that of a charioteer rather than that of a rider. Horse chariots were also found in the tomb of Tutankhamen and are depicted on a wall painting from Thebes dated about 1400 BCE.

A particularly vivid description of the Egyptian chariots, and one that places horse and horseman in a religious narrative context, is the fifteenth chapter of *Exodus* in the Hebrew scriptures, a chapter that some scholars have dated as early as the twelfth century BCE. The passage that celebrates the parting of the Red Sea and the subsequent drowning of Pharaoh's men, horses, and chariots begins "I will sing unto the Lord, for he hath triumphed gloriously; the horse and his rider hath he thrown into the sea." The term *rider* may not necessarily refer to a mounted horseman; it is a generic term that could apply as well to a charioteer. But it is worth noting that the horse is here associated with several themes that occur often in the mythology of the horse: armies, evil, death, and, most striking, the bottom of the ocean.

**ANCIENT INDO-EUROPEAN HORSE SACRIFICES.** With the Greeks and the Vedic Indians, and later with the Romans, the horse truly came into its own as a religious symbol, one that pervades both myth and ritual. Rituals involving horses, more particularly rituals that involve the killing of a white stallion, are attested throughout the Indo-European world. Among the ancient Norse, a white horse symbolizing the sun and accompanied by women was killed in a ritual that included obscene references to the phallus of the horse, ritual castration, and an intoxicating drink. In the Roman festival of the October Equus, a horse dedicated to Mars was killed in the course of a ritual, and a chariot race took place; in the Roman Parilia, a horse was mutilated (perhaps castrated). Among the Greeks, white horses were sacrificed to Poseidon and to the sun; a white mare was sacrificed at the grave of a maiden who had been raped and had committed suicide; black horses were inauspicious. Both Roman and Greek

sources indicate a fertility cult associated with the horse, one that often agrees in striking detail with the Vedic cult of the horse. The Persians tell of a battle between an evil black horse and a good white horse, whose victory released the fertilizing rains; and the Iranians regarded white horses as symbolic of the sun (Pausanias, 3.4.20; Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 8.3.11). Among the Indo-Europeans in general, it appears, the white horse was sacred.

This article shall examine the Indian and Irish models of these rituals in greater detail, but in this introductory survey it is useful to note a linguistic link between these far-flung Indo-European cults of the horse. The Gallic proper name *Epomeduos* may be cognate with the Sanskrit *śvamedha*; both royal names are possessive compounds designating kings who have (performed) horse sacrifices. The first element of the compound simply means "horse"; the second element is more difficult to pin down, but it has the connotations of a ritual drink (such as mead) or an intoxicating drink. Thus the term as a whole may mean "intoxication with the horse"; Jaan Puhvel, who has noted these linguistic implications, remarks that "the early Indo-Europeans were undoubtedly 'crazy about horses,' and so were the Gauls" (Puhvel, 1955). It may, however, mean "one who has performed a ritual involving a horse and a sacred drink" or even—as is supported by the evidence provided by the Indian and Irish horse sacrifices—a ritual in which the horse itself supplied the substance or the sacrificial food and drink for the king, a ceremony in which a horse was ritually eaten. Whether eaten or not, horses were sacrificed by the Greeks (Herodotus, 7.113; Ovid, *Fasti* 1.385), by the Armenians and Massagetes (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4.5; Herodotus, 1.216), and by the Scythians, of whose spectacular royal burials Herodotus provides a hair-raising description (4.71–72).

Still, it is the Vedic, Roman, and Irish horse sacrifices that provide the triangle on which the Indo-European evidence rests, however shakily. The facts of congruence in existing sources are impressive, although the weight and substance of documentation are grotesquely dissimilar. The Vedic ceremony is by far the best documented, both in terms of the contemporaneous nature of the ritual and the text describing it (both dating from 900 BCE but referring to the hymns to the horse in the *Rgveda*, perhaps as much as three hundred years earlier) and in terms of the volume of data: hundreds and hundreds of pages of Sanskrit texts. The Roman ritual is a poor second, cursorily described by Polybius (12.4b), Plutarch (*Quaestiones Romanae* 97), and Festus (ed. Lindsay, pp. 178.5ff.) with distressing discrepancies and lacunae. The Irish ritual is even more problematic, having been described only in the twelfth century CE by a Christian monk who could scarcely believe his eyes, so appalled was he by the obscenity of the rite (Giraldus Cambrensis, *Topographia Hibernica*, ed. Brewer, p. 169).

Yet the parallels are truly striking. In India, a ritually consecrated stallion was killed after a chariot race; the chief

queen than pantomimed copulation with the stallion, to the accompaniment of verses (spoken by priests) regarded as obscene even by the contemporaneous texts (which prescribe a “perfumed” verse to be recited at the end, to wash out the mouths of the participants). In Rome, after a race the right-hand horse of the winning chariot was sacrificed to Mars; its tail was carried to the Regia, where its blood was sprinkled on the altar (Plutarch) or the hearthstone (Festus). Men from the Sacra Via and the Suburra did battle for the head, the latter (if they won it) carrying it to the Turrus Mamilia, the former to the wall of the Regia. In Ireland, the king pantomimed (or performed) copulation with a live mare who was afterward dismembered and cooked; the king bathed in her broth and drank it, and the broth was then distributed to the people.

The common thread in all three rituals is the killing of an equine. In two of the rituals (India and Rome) the horse is a stallion; in two of the rituals (India and Ireland) there is a sexual union as well as a death. It could be argued, from the writings of Georges Dumézil and others, that the ritual emphasizes a different one of the three Indo-European functions in each of the three cultures in which it appears: the Roman primarily martial, the Indian royal and sacred, the Irish fertile and nourishing. But all three rituals can and do incorporate all three levels of symbolism. A ceremony that is about royalty and the power of the king not only can but, in a sense, must also be about sexuality and nourishment: for the ancient Indo-European stallion symbolized at once the powers of the warrior; of the king, and of the virile male.

**ANCIENT INDO-EUROPEAN HORSE MYTHS.** Given the primacy of the stallion in the aggressively virile cultures of the Indo-Europeans, how is one to explain ritual focus on the Irish mare? It could be argued that the Irish variant is properly Gallic, rather than Indo-European, and make the case (as Robert Graves did in *The White Goddess*, 1948) for an ancient Gallic horse goddess whose cult was superseded by that of an Indo-European horse god. In support of this contention is the Gallic cult of the goddess Epona, almost the only goddess worshiped in the same guise by both continental and insular Celts. Intimately connected with the Welsh Rhiannon and the Irish Macha, whom shall soon be encountered, and thematically connected with the horseheaded Greek Demeter, Epona is often depicted as a woman riding on a mare, or as a mare, or with a mare’s head; she is also associated with a male horse god, Rudiobus. Epona, whose name comes from the Proto-Indo-European \**ékwo*s, “horse” (Lat., *equus*; Skt., *áśva*), is particularly concerned with pregnant mares and with foals. Pseudo-Plutarch (parallel 29; cited by Le Roux, 1963, p. 133) gives what may be the only ancient record of a Celtic hierogamy like the one that is described, as a ritual, by Giraldus Cambrensis so many years later: “A certain Phoulouios Stellos, who hated women, had intercourse with a mare. In time, she brought forth a beautiful maiden whom she named Epona, a goddess of horses.”

Celtic mythology offers rich support for the concept of an ancient horse goddess. The Irish *Táin Bó Cuailnge* nar-

rates the myth of Macha, a tri-functional equine goddess who, forced to run in a chariot race while she is pregnant, dies bringing forth twins or who, in another avatar, brings forth a son at the very moment when a mare in the stable gives birth to twin foals (Kinsella, 1970; Gricourt, 1954). And the Welsh *Mabinogi* tells the story of Rhiannon, who appears to King Pwyll riding on a white horse, marries him, and bears him a child while a mare has a foal at the same moment; accused (falsely) of killing the child, Rhiannon is condemned to carry guests from the mounting block to the court on her back.

The myth of the mare goddess has a broader Indo-European distribution as well. In India, the myth begins with references in the *Rgveda* to the wife and false-wife of the sun, a myth that is told in greater detail in the Brāhmaṇas and the Purāṇas: Vivasvant, the sun, married Saranyū, who fled from him and substituted for herself another female, Chāyā (“dark shadow”) upon whom Vivasvant begat a son, Manu, the ancestor of the human race. Meanwhile, Saranyū took the form of a mare and fled from Vivasvant, but he took the form of a stallion, followed her, and covered her; upon giving birth to the twin horse-gods, the Aśvins, she abandoned them. The parallels with Celtic myths are striking: A goddess in the form of a white mare takes human form and mates with an aging sun king; impregnated by him, she gives birth to hippomorphic twins, the ancestors of the human race, whom she injures or abandons, and she leaves the king to return to her heavenly home. The inversions and reversals that take place over the wide Indo-European area and through the centuries are complex, but clearly this is some sort of protean mythic core.

Greek mythology supplies further evidence in support of this corpus. Demeter, who is often depicted with a mare’s head, mated with Poseidon (the god of the sea, to whom horses were sacrificed, and who was himself called Hippios, “equine”; Apollodorus, 3.6.8; Pausanias, 8.25 and 8.42); in Arcadia, Demeter is portrayed as Black Demeter, with the head and mane of a horse on the body of a woman (Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 6.406b). Poseidon is also involved in several myths in which a woman is raped by a god in the form of a stallion and gives birth to foals that she attempts to destroy; he is more distantly involved in a Greek cycle of myths about overprotective fathers of equine goddesses who destroy their suitors (the myths of Hippodameia, Hippomenes, and Alcippe). Glaucus and Diomedes of Thrace are said to have had savage mares, made more savage by their enforced chastity, who devoured men, and Hippolytus (well known from Euripides’ tragedy), who worshiped Artemis and denied Aphrodite, was dragged to death by chariot horses that were frightened by a monster sent by Poseidon from the sea.

**EUROPEAN MYTHS OF EVIL MARES.** The pattern of myths of evil mares is almost exclusively Indo-European, which is hardly surprising, given the special place of the horse in Indo-European culture. The negative symbolism of the Indo-European mare is epitomized by the myth, widely doc-

umented in India, in which a demonic female full of anger and destructive lust is tricked into taking the form of a mare with flames shooting out of her mouth. While she dwells at the bottom of the ocean, the flames in her mouth keep the ocean from overflowing its bounds and the ocean keeps her flames from destroying the world. On doomsday she will emerge from the ocean; her flames will destroy the universe with fire; and the uncontrolled waters of the ocean will flood the world. The underwater mare is thus a symbol of the tension between uncontrolled powers and the dangers that arise from the brutal suppression of those powers; it is a symbol of the paradox of the wild and the tame, in all three Indo-European spheres: the sacred, the martial, and the sexual.

The underwater mare appears, in various transformations, throughout later European mythology. Celtic mythology describes aquatic monsters known as Goborchinn (“horseheads”) as well as horse eels and water horses, the fore-runners of sea serpents and dragons like the Loch Ness monster, whose heads are often surprisingly equine. And, closer to home, one can see this symbolism at the heart of the climactic scene in Richard Wagner’s opera *Götterdämmerung* (The twilight [or doomsday] of the gods). Brünnhilde is one of the Valkyries, the female warrior spirits who ride their winged horses through the skies to bring fallen warriors to Valhalla; at the end of the opera, Brünnhilde mounts her white horse and rides through a wall of fire to her death, whereupon the waters of the Rhine rise and flood the world.

In folklore, the more anthropomorphic aspects of the myth, particularly the implications of the relationships between the mare and her children, are stressed. The Anti Aarne-Stith Thompson index of tale types and motifs gives many examples of myths in which a queen is falsely accused of the murder of her children and condemned to death, myths in which horses usually play a part. The accused woman sets out on a mare, and the wicked fairy who calumniates her is torn to pieces by a horse (TT 451); the unfaithful wife is transformed into a mare, like adulteresses in the *Arabian Nights* as well as in Finnish, Russian, and Italian tales (TT 449). Witches are closely associated with mares: A witch may be accompanied by a horse, she may appear as a horse, she may transform a man into a horse and ride him, or she may become a man-eating mare. The equine witch appears consistently as the villain in Indo-European folklore: She is the female fiend who eats children and rides her victims (an image with psychological overtones of fear and sexuality); she is the black maiden from hell, riding on her white horse; or she is the leader of the wild chase of witches on their phallic broomsticks, the horses of death. The image of the erotic woman on the white horse is not necessarily negative—there is always Lady Godiva, not to mention naked women on horseback in contemporary soft-core pornography—but her very eroticism is a negative value in the ancient Indo-European conceptual system, in which women should be not erotic but chaste.

The term *nightmare*, even though it is etymologically unrelated to the word for the female horse, comes to assume

explicit equine overtones from an early period in European mythology, in part through the attraction of assonance and in part through the influence of an already developed mythology. The true etymology is from the Old English *mare* (“hag”), and a nightmare, according to the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, is a “female monster . . . supposed to settle upon people and animals in their sleep, producing a feeling of suffocation.” The prototype of the nightmare who presses down on the sleeper or has intercourse with him while lying on top of him is the mare who rides perversely astride her husband or victim. In modern reinterpretations of the image of the nightmare, in literature and art (the horse in Fuseli’s haunting painting entitled *The Nightmare*, or in Blake’s *Death on a Pale Horse*, or the tortured horses in Picasso’s *Guernica*), the cluster of meanings related to the several homonyms often merge: mother (Fr., *mère*), female horse (Eng., *mare*), ocean (Lat., *mare*; Fr., *mer*), death (IE, *\*mer*, *\*mor*), and the underlying Old English etymological meaning, “hag.”

One can postulate chronological levels in the history of the degradation of the symbolism of the mare. At first there may have been one mare goddess, an awesome, dangerous, sacred creature (sacred in Rudolf Otto’s sense of the word: *mysterium fascinans et tremendum*), who was sought by the king, captured, and wooed. She is a source of power, who invigorates the aging king by her annual ritual copulation with him; she dies in a sacrifice of her immortality to his mortality. At this period, the mare is simultaneously maternal, sororal, and erotic. In Semitic and Babylonian myths, she is manifest in the figures of Inanna and Ishtar, both of whom were said to copulate with horses. But in later European mythology, the mare goddess was split into two parts, the good mother and the evil whore, and the benevolent white mare is given a malevolent, black alter ego.

This transition is even more sharply marked in the closely related mythology of the swan-maiden. Mares in many Indo-European myths about evil women are closely associated with birds: They assume the form of birds or appear as winged horses. In the swan-maiden variants of the theme, a woman from the other world assumes the more delicate and feminine form of a white bird, instead of a white horse; she lives with a prince for a while and then leaves him when he violates the condition that she had set for their cohabitation (not to ask her name, or not to see her naked). This may be a very old Indo-European motif indeed, judging from archaeological evidence from Europe before 3500 BCE depicting the bird goddess. Her mythology begins with the Vedic myth of Pururavas and Urvasi and extends to the ballet figures of *The Firebird* (the firebird is the Russian version of the magic sunbird) and *Swan Lake*, in which Odette, the good, chaste White Swan, is opposed by Odile, the evil, seductive Black Swan. Then, too, when the Valkyries are not riding horses they become swans.

But the demotion from mare to swan was not the last step in the degradation of the symbol. The swan became



male. In Greek myth, Zeus assumes the form of a white swan in order to seduce Leda as she is bathing in a river (Leda's two sons, Castor and Pollux, became known as the Dioscuri, or equine twins, the Greek parallel to the Vedic Asvins). And in the legend of Lohengrin, it is he, not she, who rides in the swan boat. In Lohengrin's story the more ancient myth of the immortal woman who visits the mortal man or king came to be replaced by the myth of the immortal man who rescues the mortal woman. In a skiff drawn by a white swan (here a male), Lohengrin rides, as on a white horse, to the rescue of Elsa; the helpless female awaits the great horse/swan god who deigns to visit her and who will make her promise never to ask him his name or his lineage. Now Leda awaits Zeus, awaits the moment when she may, in Yeats's words, "put on his knowledge with his power / before the indifferent beak could let her drop."

**THE RIDER ON THE WHITE HORSE.** Thus the white stallion came to supplant the white mare in Indo-European mythology at a very early period. His mythology, like hers, was a mythology of ambivalence, of the coincidence of opposites, but the powers in question were different. The stallion came to symbolize not only death (as had the mare) but also re-birth, not only the taming of the wild (as had she) but also complete freedom from all social bonds.

Plato likened the human soul to a charioteer who had harnessed two horses to his chariot, one pulling him toward brutish sensuality, the other to a higher spiritualism; and, before Plato, the Indian Upanisads had likened the senses to horses that must be controlled if they are not to remain vicious and wild. The locus of this taming is the mouth of the horse, whence are derived such metaphors as "to bridle," "to curb," "to take the bit between the teeth," and so forth. The horse's mouth was therefore seen as the point of dangerous interaction. This notion is a misconception (for, as every horseman knows, although horses can indeed bite, it is the other end of the horse that poses the real danger, and horses are in any case strict vegetarians); nevertheless, it is the source of the many myths in which horses devour people, myths in which doomsday flames come out of the horse's mouth (or nostrils). That the mouth of the mare is believed to be dangerous is an instance of the projection of aggression, assuming that she will injure you with the organ where you have injured her (through the bit).

In Christian mythology, doomsday appears as the four horsemen of the apocalypse, or the rider on the white horse; in India, death becomes incarnate as the centaur or white horse named Kalki, an avatar of Viṣṇu who will usher in the final Kali Age and the end of the world. This is the image captured in Peter Schaffer's play *Equus*, in which an adolescent boy confuses together in his fantasies the tortured mouth of the horse-god that he rides naked in sexual ecstasy and the tortured head of Christ bridled in his crown of thorns. And it is the image that begins James Joyce's famous poem:

I hear an army charging upon the land

And the thunder of horses plunging, foam about their knees.

Arrogant, in black armour, behind them stand,  
Disdaining the reins, with fluttering whips, the  
charioteers. (from *Chamber Music*, 1907)

But the other, positive aspect of the horse never lost its symbolic power. Centuries before the Roman invasions, someone carved into the chalky hillsides of the English Downs several colossal images of a white horse. The horse by itself, unharnessed, unbridled, unriden, was always at home in the mountains, close to its divine home and far away from the ropes of humans. The horse thus remained always a symbol of freedom. In the ancient Indian horse sacrifice, the stallion wandered freely for a year before the ceremony, attended by his herds and followed by the king's men, to claim for the king whatever grazing land he cared to wander through. This image of freedom was somehow preserved rather than canceled by the later composite image of the white horse and its noble rider, who were thought of as a single creature, ideally a kind of centaur. The horse transferred its freedom and nobility to its rider, even as the ancient Indian stallion transferred these qualities to the king during the sacrifice. Thus Saint George, always mounted on a white horse, kills the very dragon that is, as has been seen, a variant of the demonic underwater mare, the shadow side of the white stallion itself; and medieval equestrian imagery placed not only knights and kings but princes of the church on horseback, to symbolize all that was not only noble, but divine.

The horse carried humanity from earth to heaven. In India and Greece, as well as in medieval Europe, one reads of princes who are lured by white stags (or white swans, or white horses, or unicorns) from the safe territory of the royal parks to the thick of the forest, to the Other World, where they may meet their princess or encounter their dragon (or both, or both in one). The many tales of winged horses, as well as the conflation of horse and bird, often transform this horizontal voyage into a vertical flight. Not until the advent of photography in the mid-nineteenth century did people come to realize that a galloping horse did not actually fly, with forelegs stretched forward and hindlegs backward, and even then galloping continued to feel like flying. In many of the shamasitic myths of Inner Asia, China, and India, the initiate mounts a white horse and is suddenly carried off, out of control, into the world of the gods, where the initiation takes place. Thus the horse leads humankind from the world of the tame to the world of the wild, the magic, supernatural world of the gods.

This symbolism found its expression in the mythology of the American West, where the magnificent white mustang who can never be caught stands on the mountains with the wind lifting his mane, symbolizing all that is wild and free. Yet the stallion is caught, to become the alter ego (in India one would say the vehicle, or *vahana*) of the cowboy, who comes himself to represent the last bastion of male freedom—freedom from sexuality (the cowboy rides alone, like

Lancelot, whose chastity was his power), from the law (for even the lawmen tend to be mavericks, and the outlaws are good outlaws), but most of all from being tamed or “fenced in.”

Humankind can never entirely succeed in taming the horse. This is the charm and the challenge of any intimate association with a wild animal, that it retains some measure of its wildness. But the horse untames humans, transferring to them—or, one might say, sacrificing for them—some of its own wildness and freedom.

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**HORUS.** In ancient Egypt there were originally several gods known by the name Horus, but the best known and most important from the beginning of the historic period was the son of Osiris and Isis who was identified with the king of Egypt. According to myth, Osiris, who assumed the rulership of the earth shortly after its creation, was slain by his jealous brother, Seth. The sister-wife of Osiris, Isis, who collected the pieces of her dismembered husband and revived him, also conceived his son and avenger, Horus. Horus

fought with Seth, and, despite the loss of one eye in the contest, was successful in avenging the death of his father and in becoming his legitimate successor. Osiris then became king of the dead and Horus king of the living, this transfer being renewed at every change of earthly rule. The myth of divine kingship probably elevated the position of the god as much as it did that of the king. In the fourth dynasty, the king, the living god, may have been one of the greatest gods as well, but by the fifth dynasty the supremacy of the cult of Re, the sun god, was accepted even by the kings. The Horus-king was now also “son of Re.” This was made possible mythologically by personifying the entire older genealogy of Horus (the Heliopolitan ennead) as the goddess Hathor, “house of Horus,” who was also the spouse of Re and mother of Horus.

Horus was usually represented as a falcon, and one view of him was as a great sky god whose outstretched wings filled the heavens; his sound eye was the sun and his injured eye the moon. Another portrayal of him particularly popular in the Late Period, was as a human child suckling at the breast of his mother, Isis. The two principal cult centers for the worship of Horus were at Bekhdet in the north, where very little survives, and at Idfu in the south, which has a very large and well-preserved temple dating from the Ptolemaic period. The earlier myths involving Horus, as well as the ritual performed there, are recorded at Idfu.

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**HOSEA,** or, in Hebrew, Hoshe'a (mid-eighth century BCE), was a Hebrew prophet whose words are recorded in the biblical *Book of Hosea*. Hosea prophesied during the reign of Jeroboam II of the northern kingdom of Israel (787/6–747/6 BCE), which was a period of economic prosperity and political stability. There are, however, a number of allusions in the book to either war (5:8ff.) or political anarchy (7:1ff., 10:3, 13:10–11), which may suggest that Hosea continued to prophesy until the fall of Samaria in 722. This fits well with the superscription's list of the Judahite kings (Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah) during whose reigns Hosea prophesied. Hosea's prophetic emphasis is mainly on domestic affairs, especially the cultic situation.

**HOSEA'S MARRIAGE AND HIS PROPHETIC MESSAGE.** The information on Hosea's background is minimal. There is information, however, about a unique personal experience in his life, a peculiar marital episode. God had commanded Hosea to marry a harlot, one Gomer, daughter of Diblaim (1:3), who bore him two sons and one daughter. This mar-

riage and its consequences, interpreted in religio-theological terms, form the major theme of chapters 1–3. The story of the marriage is told twice. The first account (chap. 1) is in the third person, while the second (chap. 3) is reported directly by Hosea. The significance of Hosea's marriage to a harlot and the text's repetition of the story of this marriage have been major issues in research on *Hosea*. Should God's order to "go, take to yourself a wife of harlotry and have children of harlotry" (1:2) be read literally or only as a metaphor for the nation's religious attitude, with Hosea the faithful husband representing God, and Gomer the unfaithful wife representing Israel? Is a "harlot" defined as a professional prostitute or as a sacred prostitute (cf. *Amos* 2:7)? There are no clear answers to these questions. One should not ignore, however, the prophets' tendency to dramatize events literally (e.g., *Is.* 20:2, *Jer.* 28:10, *Am.* 8:1–3) and therefore the possibility that Hosea married a harlot (professional or sacred) to symbolize the content of his message. The root *znh* ("harlotry") appears no fewer than nineteen times in his prophecy, always in key passages. Hosea's personal experience is thus the paradigm of his prophetic message that Israel has betrayed God. The relationship between God and Israel is like that between man and woman, husband and wife, where Israel is the unfaithful wife and God the loving and forgiving husband, who calls to his wife to repent and come back to him (see 2:14ff. [Masoretic text 2:16ff.]). The names of Hosea's three children, dictated to him by God, further express his prophetic message. The elder son is called Jezreel because "I will punish the House of Jehu for the blood of Jezreel" (see *1 Kgs.* 19:15–17; *2 Kgs.* 9–10) and "I will put an end to the kingdom of the house of Israel" (*Hos.* 1:4). His daughter is named *Lo'-ruḥamah* ("not pitied"), "for I will no more have pity on the house of Israel" (1:6), and the younger son is called *Lo'-ammi* ("not my people"), "for you are not my people and I am not your God" (1:8).

No other prophet has portrayed the relationship between God and the people of Israel in such rich images of harlotry and vivid descriptions of the unfaithful wife. Indeed, the key words of Hosea's message are words that connote "fidelity" (*ḥesed*; 4:4, 6:4, 6:6), an emotional relationship with God (*da'at Elohim*; 4:1, 6:6) and repentance (*shuvah*; 6:1, 6:11, 7:10, 12:7).

Hosea's protestations against the unfaithful marriage also raise questions as to the nature of the Israelite religion of this time, because the Hebrew word for "husband," *ba'al*, also connotes the chief Canaanite god. Thus, a renewed relationship of fidelity between God and Israel will be expressed in new terms for marital relationships: "And in that day, says the Lord, you will call me 'my man' [*'ish*], and no longer will you call me 'my husband' [*ba'al*]" (2:16 [MT 2:18]). Scholars call attention to the possibility of religious syncretism that may have taken place in Israel. Archaeological findings in Kuntillet 'Ajrud in Sinai may indicate that a cult of Yahveh, with Baal as either an alternative name or a co-god, existed toward the end of the ninth century BCE. Hosea may

thus have been protesting against a cult of fertility that involved sacred harlots and was practiced in his own agricultural society. Hosea also called to renew the *berit* between Israel and God. Many scholars translate *berit* as "covenant" and reject the existence of the concept of formal covenant between God and Israel prior to the later appearance of the Deuteronomistic school. Nevertheless, *berit* occurs in *Hosea* at least five times (see especially 6:7 and 8:1) and may be understood in terms of faithful marriage, as the context of Hosea's prophecy suggests.

**HOSEA AND EARLIER TRADITION.** Hosea is opposed to fundamental institutions of his society. He criticizes the priests (4:4–10) as well as the political leaders and even the monarchs of his kingdom.

Where now is your king, to save you;  
where are all your princes, to defend you—  
those of whom you said, "Give me a king and princes"?

I have given you kings in my anger,  
and I have taken them away in my wrath. (13:10–11,  
RSV)

He is the only prophet to anchor his reservations about kings in ancient antimonarchical traditions (see *1 Sm.* 8:5ff.). Hosea's disappointment in the kings of Israel may also mirror the political situation that followed the death of Jeroboam II. Jeroboam's son Zechariah ruled for six months and was assassinated by Shallum, who governed for just one month and was killed by Menahem (*2 Kgs.* 15:8ff.). Two other Israelite kings were also assassinated before the fall of the kingdom, for a total of four out of six kings murdered within approximately twenty-five years.

Hosea does not see himself as an innovator. He speaks for and identifies himself with the long prophetic tradition that started with Moses (12:13 [MT 12:14]; see also 6:5, 9:7, 12:10 [MT 12:11]). He has no illusions about the effect of his address, as he points out in 9:7: "The prophet is a fool, the man of the spirit is mad." But he does not withdraw, regarding himself as "the watchman of Ephraim" (9:8), following prophetic tradition (cf. 3:17ff.). (In *Hosea* this tribe's name is often used for the entire northern kingdom.) He is familiar with traditions about the patriarch Jacob—his birth (*Hos.* 12:3 [MT 12:4]), his struggle with the angel (12:4 [12:5]), his devotion to his beloved wife Rachel, and his flight from the land of Aram (12:12 [12:13]). He refers to the period of the Exodus (2:15 [2:17], 11:1, 13:4); to Moses, the prophet who brought Israel up from Egypt (12:13 [12:14]); and to Israel's unfaithful behavior in the desert at Ba'al-pe'or (9:10; see *Nm.* 25:1–18), when God punished the people by means of a plague for committing cultic-sexual sins. Hosea even refers to a certain version of the Decalogue (4:2; cf. *Jer.* 7:9). But he also emphasizes God's care of the Israelite people in the desert (13:5). Thus he shows that Israel's relationship with God has a long history, yet the people have ignored the ancient traditions that demonstrate God's devotion and commitment. For him, fulfillment of the moral commandments is the ultimate condition for the survival of

the land and its people (4:3), for this constitutes faithfulness to this relationship with God.

**LANGUAGE, STRUCTURE, AND AUTHORSHIP.** Hosea's identification with the prophetic tradition as well as certain linguistic affinities with *Deuteronomy* suggest that his ideas and language influenced the Deuteronomistic ideology and terminology. It may be that after the fall of Samaria, either Hosea himself or his disciples moved to Jerusalem, where his speeches were collected and preserved. Hosea's portrayal of God and Israel as husband and wife is also reflected in the prophecy of Jeremiah (cf. *Jer.* 2:17ff., 3:1ff.), who was very familiar with the style of the Deuteronomist.

Hosea was a great poet, a master of language; his verses in 11:8–9 are among the most moving lines in the prophetic literature. His language is a mixture of prose and poetry. His verses are longer than is typical and often break the symmetrical pattern of parallelism, enabling the isolation and emphasis of a specific idea through the device of climax.

What shall I do with you, O Ephraim?

What shall I do with you, O Judah?

Your love is like a morning cloud, like  
the dew that goes early away.

Therefore I have hewn them by the prophets,  
I have slain them by the words of my mouth,  
and my judgment goes forth as the light.

For I desire steadfast love and not sacrifice,  
the knowledge of God, rather than burnt offerings.  
(6:4–6, RSV)

No other prophet employs so many figures of speech, especially simile, as Hosea. He may use a series of similes to create a single long poetic image, as in developing the figure of the oven in 7:4ff. He refers to God as a lion (5:14), a leopard (13:7), and a bear (13:8), images that illustrate his effort to attract his audience's attention in an unconventional way and to deliver his message as effectively as possible.

*Hosea's* language is complicated, however, and every study of the book struggles with the difficulties of the text. The language, especially beginning with chapter 4, is very often puzzling. Perhaps the text has been poorly transmitted, or, as some scholars suggest, perhaps Hosea speaks in a northern dialect, which may sound odd to the modern reader of the Hebrew Bible, who is used to the Judahite style.

The *Book of Hosea* is divided into two major parts: chapters 1–3 and 4–14. The first part includes three literary genres: biography (chap. 1), autobiography (chap. 3), and prophetic speech (chap. 2). There have been discussions concerning the chronological order of these chapters, with some scholars suggesting that chapter 3 precedes chapter 1, so that the biography (chap. 1), which develops the theme of the marriage, elaborates Hosea's personal account. Others, who attempt to preserve the present order, point to the words "Go again, love a woman" (3:1), which may indicate that chapter 3 refers to a second marriage and not to Gomer.

Chapters 4–14 are a compilation of poetic orations, and determining each prophetic speech unit is sometimes difficult. In light of the stylistic differences and the personal approach of chapters 1–3, it has been suggested that two different books composed by two prophets were combined. However, the intense imagery of harlotry, the motif of repentance, and the return of the wife to her husband dominate the second part of the book as well and thus suggest that the entire book is Hosea's composition.

In contrast to many other prophetic books, most of the material in *Hosea* has been assigned by scholars to Hosea himself or to his close disciples, except verses such as 1:7 and 3:5, which may reflect a redaction in terms of a Judahite salvation eschatology. The various historical allusions (which are not always readily obvious), such as the Syro-Ephraimite war (5:8ff.), and 13:9–16, which may refer to a military occupation toward the end of the existence of the northern kingdom, may suggest that the book was edited into chronological order.

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**HOSPITALITY.** The word *hospitality* is a translation of the Latin noun *hospitium* (or the adjective *hospitalis*), which in turn derives from *hospes*, meaning both "guest" and "host." Behind this double connotation is the Greek concept of the *xenos*, the stranger who receives a welcome or, less frequently, acts as a welcomer of others. A great many cultures attach religious and ethical value to the establishment of friendly exchanges between those who view one another as different—in rank, race, or tribe—and, therefore, potentially

dangerous. In order to provide a focus for interpreting the diverse traditions that relate to this subject, the present entry concentrates upon the prescribed behaviors for guests and hosts, particularly at meals, and the reasons (whether stated or implied) for these mores.

Pictures of hospitality abound in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Indeed, the practice of hospitality can be perceived as a cardinal virtue among the Homeric characters. Odysseus, the great wanderer, is praised for his exemplary hosting (Homer, *Odyssey* 1.176). In both epics hospitality represents that aspect of fearing the gods that creates a readiness for reciprocal relationships with strangers. Those who do not attain such openness are deemed barbarians (*Odyssey* 6.120ff.). Conversely, a single act of welcoming on the part of one family group toward another, usually by means of a meal, can result in a bond of friendship that lasts for generations (*Iliad* 6.215ff.). Thus, hospitality is an eminently practical virtue; through gift exchanges and the sharing of food or shelter, peace and harmony are achieved in what would otherwise be a chaotic world.

In Greek epic tradition, the gods themselves sometimes put on human disguises and assume the role of guests. On those occasions when they are welcomed, they respond with good news (*Odyssey* 1.180ff.) or extraordinary gifts (Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 8.678ff.). In this reciprocity there exists a link with the ancient bedouin tradition concerning Abraham's gracious reception of three strangers by the Oaks of Mamre (*Gen.* 18:1ff.). The strangers are variously understood to be human messengers, angels, or, in later Christian thought, the Trinity. Thus, icons of the orthodox churches depict Abraham's *philoxeny*, or love of strangers, as the believer's enjoyment of communion with the divine presence. In the biblical story, Abraham's guests respond to the lavish banquet that he and Sarah have prepared for them with the miraculous news that Sarah, advanced in years like her husband, will soon bear a son, Isaac. It is not surprising that in rabbinic Judaism, early Christianity, and Islam, Abraham becomes a kind of patron saint of hosts. Enmeshed in this tradition is the premise that hospitality merits a reward from God and must therefore be encouraged. One version of the premise occurs in Matthew 25:33ff., where Jesus appears as the judge of all nations and announces that hospitable acts performed for the least of his brothers and sisters have actually been done for him and that, moreover, the end result of these acts is the opening up of God's kingdom to those who have undertaken them. The special vocation of Christian monastics to care for strangers and the needy, in part through the founding of hospitals, may be understood as an attempt to embody this teaching.

Rabbinic Judaism sometimes employs hospitality as a metaphor for the teaching and learning of Torah ("Let thy house be a place of meeting for the wise, and dust thyself with the dust of their feet and drink their words with thirst"; *Avot* 1.4). Sometimes hospitality is thought to be blessed by the bestowal of God's presence ("Three who have eaten at

one table and have said over it words of Torah are as if they had eaten from the table of God"; *Avot* 3.4). Similar thoughts occur in New Testament stories where Jesus and Paul receive material hospitality as guests but then demonstrate by their words and actions that they are agents of God's kingdom, blessing their hosts with divine gifts. (*Luke* 24:28–35; *Acts* 20:6–12; 28:7–9).

Jesus in particular is seen as one who welcomes sinners and marginal people (*Matt.* 11:19; *Luke* 15:1–2); typically the gospels picture him doing this at meals to which he has been invited as a guest (*Mark* 2:15ff.; *Luke* 7:36–50; 19:1–10). The major exception is what Christians have come to call the last supper, a meal during the week of Passover, just before Jesus' death, when he initiates a guest-meal for his disciples. In the Synoptic Gospels Jesus blesses bread and wine at this meal with words relating them to his body and blood. For Christians, this event is usually seen as the institution or forerunner of the Eucharist or Lord's Supper, which often functions today as a welcoming ritual but also, in some branches of the church, as a means of self-definition that excludes nonmembers. According to the Fourth Gospel, the last supper featured a special act of hospitality by Jesus: the humble washing of his disciples' feet followed by an exhortation to perform this act for one another (*John* 13:1–14).

In Islam, the fundamental notion underlying the theory and practice of hospitality is protection. This is expressed in the Arabic term *djiwar*, which denotes neighborliness or the granting of refuge to wayfaring strangers and resident visitors who are not members of one's own tribe. Such practices could have their origin in the bedouin conviction that guest and host alike (the Arabic word *dayf*, like *xenos*, refers to both) stand at the mercy of a hostile environment and must adhere to firm rules for the sharing of necessities to ensure their common survival. Foremost among these rules is a custom according to which travelers may count on receiving food and lodging from a given host for three days. At the end of this period, they are expected to continue their journey unless unusual circumstances intervene (see also the early Christian writing *Didachē* 11–12). From this fundamental rule, refinements of hospitality evolve. Hosts who are especially virtuous prevail upon their guests to stay longer, and they emerge from their tents to welcome passing strangers. Some hosts furnish provisions for their guests when they resume their journeys and even escort them on their way.

Articulations of hospitality that are explicitly religious occur with regularity. For example, proximity to a sacred place is thought to confer protection; and it is said that when one becomes a Muslim, one is henceforth God's *djar* (protected neighbor). Perhaps it is this trust in God's care that stimulates Islamic practitioners of hospitality to extend such largess to their guests. H. R. P. Dickson reported that in the 1920s he was greeted by a number of Saudi Arabian hosts with this couplet: "O Guest of ours, though you have come, though you have visited us, and though you have honored our dwellings / we verily are the real guests, and you are the



Lord of this house” (Dickson, 1951, p. 118). A story from about this same period concerns the German diplomat Leopold Weiss who is reputed to have converted to Islam as a result of reflection on a guest-meal. When a poor bedouin traveling with him aboard a merchant ship brought out his millet bread and olive oil and insisted on sharing half of it with Weiss, he was overcome with the man’s generosity and wanted to know more about his religious convictions (*Islamic Voice*, November 2000). Whether intended or not, the practice of hospitality often becomes a missionary gesture.

In Hinduism of the classical period and, to a lesser extent, Hinduism today, practices of hospitality are shaped primarily by the caste system and the fourfold stages of life through which an individual (i.e., student, householder, hermit, or homeless wanderer) passes. According to some of Hinduism’s oldest sacred texts, members of one caste may not interdine with those of another. Under this constraint the basic foundation for mutuality between strangers, utilized by most cultures, is eliminated. Nevertheless, Hinduism recognizes an alternate code of hospitality whereby the *brahman* (Skt., *brāhmaṇa*), or member of the priestly caste, accepts food from members of other castes (under carefully prescribed conditions) in return for spiritual services, especially the reciting of the Vedas. Moreover, *brahmans* are enjoined to be generous hosts to members of other castes, albeit at separate tables and after their fellow *brahmans* have been provided for (*Laws of Manu* 3–4). The lowest caste, the *śūdra*, is understood to be servant to the other three, although the higher castes must see to the basic material needs of the lowest (*Mahābhārata* 12). In general, *brahmans* are to assume the task of hosting the gods on behalf of other castes by offering sacrifices of food.

With regard to the fourfold stages of life, householders and hermits are the chief host figures, while students and homeless wanderers typically play the role of guests. In all encounters between individuals an exchange of spiritual and material gifts is expected, although not necessarily at large common meals. All gifts are reproductive to the donor; that is, they bring an increase during one’s present life and/or in subsequent reincarnations. Gifts of food in particular exercise special influence over an individual’s *karman*. Indeed, “one is reborn in the other world with the nature of those whose food one accepts, or of those whose food is in one’s stomach, or with the nature of the food itself” (Mauss, 1954, p. 126). Today some of Hinduism’s ancient societal barriers no longer prevail, and a number of castes that had traditionally maintained strict separation from one another practice interdining when it is perceived to be in their common social and economic interests.

Tradition has it that as the Buddha lay dying at the home of Cunda the smith, who had served him poisonous mushrooms by mistake, he ordered his disciples to tell the grieving host that he must not feel guilty about the demise of his guest. On the contrary, said Gautama, Cunda’s meal had granted him final passage to *nirvāṇa* and therefore ought

to be praised. In addition to portraying Gautama’s extraordinary compassion, this story illustrates a constant theme in Buddhist depictions of hospitality: whenever hosts share food with guests, especially when the guests are monks or revered teachers, merit accumulates for all parties.

In Theravāda Buddhism, no ritual acts as such are prescribed. In the canonical texts, however, two public occasions of a religious nature are presupposed: the feeding of monks and preaching. In Sri Lanka, these are often combined in an event called the *pinkama* (“act of merit”), during the course of which a *dāṇé* (gift-meal) is provided, usually by laypeople, and *baṇa* (preaching) or *pirit* (recitation of sacred texts) is contributed by the monks. These events may be large festal gatherings at temples, private visits by monks to the households of laypeople, or funeral meals attended by families and friends. The common feature of all of them, however, is the transferring of merit, which is accomplished when a host expresses his wish that the benefits of the food and drink being served might accrue to others who are not visibly present. Normally, gods, dead relatives, or *pretas* (homeless, hungry spirits) are named, but in the popular understanding merit transferred at a *pinkama* also contributes toward the enlightenment of its ordinary human guests. Indeed, according to the “perfection of donation” tradition in Mahāyāna Buddhism, a *bodhisattva* may reassign the merit produced by his giving so that it benefits every living creature. The merit itself is then conceived of as food, for the *bodhisattva* vows: “I turn over into full enlightenment the meritorious work founded on jubilation. May it feed the full enlightenment (of myself and of all beings)” (*Aṣṭasāhasrikā* 6.138; trans. Conze, 1954). In effect, the *bodhisattva* becomes host to the entire universe.

One sees in this vow a conviction that everyone associated with feeding events will experience spiritual gain. Sometimes the gain is equated with a convivial happiness among the guests, which earns them even more merit than that achieved by the host. Thus, Richard F. Gombrich reports that a priest in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), who had spent five thousand rupees on a *pinkama*, told him how any villager responding to this meritorious act with sympathetic joy could accumulate more merit than the priest—and without spending any money (Gombrich, 1971, p. 226). One may conclude then that for Buddhists hospitality in the form of the guest-meal typically functions to extend compassion; through the meal an endless process toward universal enlightenment is initiated.

In Confucian thought and practice, represented by documents dating from the Zhou dynasty (c. 1150 BCE to 256 BCE), gatherings for the sharing of food and drink are occasions that honor the natural distinctions between individuals or groups and at the same time provide opportunities for a decent, orderly communion among all the participants. When those involved follow the prescribed rites, harmony is achieved, and this harmony has cosmic as well as societal implications. According to Marcel Granet’s reconstruction of the ancient Ba Zha agricultural festival, all those present

were divided into two groups, one acting as hosts, the other as guests. These two groups embodied all the opposing forces of the universe (e.g., *yin* and *yang*), which produce great blessings when they meet under the proper conditions. Similar types of ritual meetings for the sake of harmony are the community drinking ceremony, as pictured in Xunzi's description; the elaborate protocols for state visits and feasts transmitted by the authors of the *Yili* (Book of etiquette and ceremonial) and the family ancestor festivals, during which the living and the dead are united through offerings of food. By means of such offerings, the dead are aided in their journey to the Western Heaven of Happiness, and the living are enabled to appropriate their merit. Thus, everyone benefits from the common feast.

The potlatch assemblies of the American Indians of the Northwest Coast appear to be altogether different from Confucian ceremonies in character and purpose, for their chief visible feature is an almost orgiastic competition in gift giving, which obligates guests to hosts and virtually enforces role reversals at future meals for fear of losing face. Tribal and individual statuses are determined by the ability to give everything away in ritual acts of consumption or destruction. Nevertheless, as Marcel Mauss has shown in his classic work on gift exchanges among archaic peoples, even the radical potlatch (the literal meaning of which is both "nourish" and "consume") becomes a form of acting out natural laws, according to which a reciprocal flow of giving and receiving between those of different ranks must occur in order to preserve society. Guests and hosts are seen to be deeply linked with each other in a cosmic order that requires them to change their roles periodically so as to ensure proper redistributions of wealth and value (Mauss, 1967, pp. 31–45). However much the potlatch differs from its Chinese counterparts in matters of decorum, it resembles them in embodying a basic harmony. For potlatch societies, however, that harmony is one of great flux.

All guest-host events within the life of religious communities involve a certain degree of ritual activity, even when spontaneity is prized. Sometimes the rituals evolve into elaborate liturgies, as in celebrations of the Eucharist or Lord's Supper among members of the more catholic branches of Christianity. Even more stylized forms of hospitality are found in practices associated with the Japanese tea ceremony or *chanoyu*, the origin of which can be traced to ancient China. The sharing of tea by sages is recounted in an old legend concerning the Daoist master Laozi. Upon accepting an invitation to tea from a mountain hermit, the former rewards his host with a copy of the *Dao de jing*. Here again hospitality functions to promote gift exchanges, as well as a certain degree of equality. While Confucian officials used tea ceremonies to solidify status and hierarchical order in society through insuring that only those recognized as the greatest could be hosts, more egalitarian practices prevailed among Chinese Buddhists, especially those of the Chan group. These apparently involved rituals in which monks drank out

of a common bowl before the image of Bodhidharma, the order's Indian founder.

The Way of Tea or *chado* reached Japan in the ninth century CE through the monk Eichu, who returned to his homeland after studying with Chinese Buddhists. Later, Zen Buddhists added most of the distinctive features of the ceremony as we know it today, including the philosophy of hospitality underlying it. The sixteenth-century Zen master Sen Rikyū is reputed to have stated that "through concentrating on *chanoyu* both guests and hosts can obtain salvation," by which he probably meant *satori* (Anderson, 1991, p. 53). Indeed, Rikyū gave a privileged place to the tea ceremony as a vehicle by which all participants could attain enlightenment. In performing the intricate duties prescribed for them, guests and hosts are thought to disclose and even create personal tranquility and harmony with nature. Today many practitioners hold that when the ceremony is done well, everyone present is able to "participate fully in a cooperative act of ritual world maintenance" (Anderson, 1991, p. 8).

By way of summary, it may be noted that in virtually all the cultures and traditions examined above, hospitality, especially when it takes the form of the guest-meal, is marked by exchanges of spiritual goods along with the sharing of food and drink. These exchanges frequently have the effect of multiplying blessings or merit for the participants beyond the sum total of resources brought by the guests and hosts. Indeed, some cosmic progress is effected. Often gods, dead relatives or founding figures, and forces of nature are thought to be present at the meal. When this happens, their influence is felt, typically as a communion or productive alliance with the deeper forces of the universe. In many ways hospitality shows itself to be a universal force for good, at least when it is practiced without guile. In the wide variety of cultures studied here, guest-host events nearly always serve to promote an honoring of the "other," even when that other seems strange or hostile. Host figures are generally perceived to be both powerful and magnanimous, while guests are often expected to be bearers of gifts and, in some cultures, divine messengers (*Heb.* 13:2). One can even speak of hospitality as a catalyst for virtues. Generosity, gratitude, humility, and openness to peaceful relationships among parties otherwise suspicious of one another characterize many guest-host events.

SEE ALSO Gift Giving; Potlatch.

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work, *Precept and Practice: Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon* (Oxford, 1971), proves invaluable. Also useful are the texts and interpretations provided in *Buddhist Texts through the Ages*, edited by Edward Conze, I. B. Horner, David Snellgrove, and Arthur Waley (New York, 1954). With regard to Hinduism, the collected papers of Louis Dumont, published as *Religion, Politics, and History in India: Collected Papers in Indian Sociology* (Paris, 1971), furnish a helpful sociological perspective on guest-host relationships. John Koenig's *New Testament Hospitality: Partnership with Strangers as Promise and Mission* (Minneapolis, 1985; Eugene, Ore., 2001) contains information on spiritual conceptualizations of hospitality in early Christianity and rabbinic Judaism. For Islamic practices of hospitality, especially those based on bedouin traditions, one may consult H. R. P. Dickson's sharp-eyed account of his experiences in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, *The Arab of the Desert*, 2d ed. (London, 1951). The story of Leopold Weiss's encounter with Islamic hospitality occurs in the editorial "Living Islam," in *Islamic Voice*, vol. 14-11, no. 167. Two works on Chinese religion, Marcel Granet's *Festivals and Songs of Ancient China*, translated by E. D. Edwards (New York, 1932), and Francis L. K. Hsu's *Under the Ancestors' Shadow* (New York, 1948), deal specifically with the transcendent aspects of meals. *An Introduction to Japanese Tea Ritual* by Jennifer L. Anderson (Albany, N.Y., 1991) is an accessible source for the history, practice, and ideology of the ritual in its various forms.

JOHN KOENIG (1987 AND 2005)

## HOTTENTOTS SEE KHOI AND SAN RELIGION

**HOWITT, A. W.** (1830–1908), was an English-born explorer, geologist, and amateur anthropologist who made first-hand studies of Aboriginal life in southeastern Australia. To the many aspects of indigenous culture that he described (social and political organization, as well as religion), Alfred William Howitt brought a comprehensive and systematic approach. He did have blind spots, however. He doubted, for example, whether Aboriginal beliefs in the supernatural were religious, apparently because of their remoteness from an ideally conceived Christianity. One of his notable achievements was to show that prolonged and highly organized ceremonies could be celebrated by people with a simple economy and material culture.

Howitt's descriptions of human-making ceremonies (initiation rites) in Southeast Australia, such as the Kuringal and Jeraeil ceremonies, stand comparison with the renowned studies of such rites in other parts of Australia made by Walter Baldwin Spencer and Francis James Gillen. His studies are especially valuable, however, because Aboriginal beliefs and ceremonies have become moribund in the Southeast, whereas much traditional culture survives in the central and northern parts of the continent. Howitt made it clear that ceremonies are ordered sequences of action, and he brought

out the complex articulation of art, myth, choreography, and social organization that characterizes them. In documenting these vital aspects of sequence and articulation, Howitt displayed an intuitive grasp of the structural considerations stressed around the turn of the century by the French comparatists—by Arnold van Gennep in analyzing rites of passage and by Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss in analyzing sacrificial rites. Another of Howitt's services was to show how widespread in the Southeast, and how essential to the intelligibility of the ceremonies, was belief in the powerful sky spirit he named the All-Father.

In addition to his obvious importance as recorder of a now-vanished way of life, Howitt is noteworthy for his urge, at that early date in the history of Australian anthropology, to typify and generalize. It was no mean feat to see in the Kuringal, Jeraeil, and many other ceremonies particular examples of a general type, to classify all Aboriginal initiations as belonging to either an eastern or a western type, or to perceive the All-Father in such diverse mythic personages as Baiame, Bunjil, Daramulun, Kohin, and Mungan-ngaua.

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Howitt published many articles and notes on aspects of Aboriginal culture. Most were drawn upon, together with additional material, in his major work, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia* (London, 1904), which is the essential source for an understanding of his anthropological contribution. *Come Wind, Come Weather* (Melbourne, 1971) is a comprehensive and readable biography of Howitt by his granddaughter, Mary Howitt Walker. It includes several chapters on his work in geology and anthropology, as well as complete bibliographies.

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KENNETH MADDOCK (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**HROTSVIT** (c. 935–c. 1000, alternate spellings include Hrotswitha and Hrosvitha) was canoness in the Abbey of Gandersheim in tenth-century Saxony. Hrotsvit is known today as Europe's first woman playwright, indeed the first known dramatist of Christian Europe. Her six extant plays, written in rhymed Latin prose, offer a Christian response to the Roman comedies of Terence (c. 190–159 BCE), incorporating the traditions of medieval hagiography. Blending comic intrigue and disguise motifs with conflicts between pagan and Christian values, Hrotsvit's plays typically feature strong-willed female protagonists who undergo physical ordeals and achieve redemption. Hrotsvit also created a parallel sequence of eight poetic saint's legends and two historical verse epics.

The appearance of such a figure in the "dark ages" of the tenth century may seem surprising, but the social and in-

tellectual contexts of Hrotsvit's life reveal that she grew up in privileged circumstances, at the height of what is known today as the Ottonian Renaissance. Only recently Christianized, the Saxons became dominant in Germany in the tenth century as inheritors of the empire of Charlemagne. The daughters of the Saxon aristocracy not chosen for dynastic marriages were sent to nunneries to be educated and comfortably housed in circumstances befitting their rank. Hrotsvit was such an aristocrat, closely related to the royal family, and Gandersheim was a uniquely rich and independent foundation. Entering as a canoness rather than a nun, Hrotsvit would have been permitted to retain her own private property, employ servants, and travel at will from the cloister, as well as receive an education in the writings of both classical and Christian authors.

At Gandersheim Hrotsvit mastered the arts of the Latin language and was encouraged to begin her own compositions; appropriately, her Saxon name, *Hro-svit*, is usually translated as "strong voice." Her earliest works were the eight sacred legends, written in the classical measures of dactylic hexameter and elegiac verse. Two poems commemorate incidents in the life of the Virgin Mary and Jesus Christ; the remainder present the lives of Christian saints and martyrs. The legends tell lively tales of pagan-Christian conflicts, and Hrotsvit's taste for sensational incidents is evident.

There is some indication that Hrotsvit's dramas were intended to complement the verse legends, forming part of a larger unified sequence of works. However the immediate stylistic impulse of the plays is a response to the pagan comic dramatic texts of Terence, valued for their refined Latin style. Hrotsvit's innovation was to write new Latin dramas in a similarly refined style, but with Christian characters and subject matter, rather than clever servants and love intrigues in the Roman tradition.

Although sometimes carelessly described as adaptations of Terence's dramas, Hrotsvit's six plays are retellings in dramatic form of the lives of Christian saints and martyrs, borrowing Terentian phrases and plot devices, but leading her central characters through ordeals and tortures to salvation, rather than comic happy endings. *The Conversion of General Gallicanus* features a pagan general who is converted to Christianity on the battlefield, and later suffers martyrdom at the hands of Julian the Apostate. The remaining plays, all with female central figures, were given titles by modern editors that would suggest otherwise; in the summaries below, Hrotsvit's original titles are employed, with the traditional titles in parentheses.

*The Martyrdom of the Holy Virgins Agape, Chionia, and Hirena (Dulcinius)* tells the story of three Christian maidens pursued by a farcically lustful pagan governor and then tortured cruelly by the emperor—an ordeal that they survive without pain, gaining martyrdom in the process. *The Resurrection of Drusiana and Callimachus (Callimachus)* also recounts the martyrdom of a Christian woman who chooses death before dishonor. In *The Fall and Repentance of Mary,*

*the Hermit Abraham's Niece (Abraham)* a young novice in a nunnery runs off to become a notorious prostitute. Her uncle, a monk, disguises himself as a customer and confronts her, winning her repentance. In a similar vein, *The Conversion of the Harlot Thaïs (Paphnutius)* dramatizes the encounter of a monk and a prostitute. In this case, the harlot Thaïs is a secret Christian who gives up her jewels and gold for a foul-smelling cell in a cloister. The final drama in Hrotsvit's sequence is *The Martyrdom of the Holy Virgins Fides, Spes, and Caritas (Sapientia)*, another tale of pagan-Christian conflict, featuring the ordeals and martyrdom of the three allegorically named daughters. All of these works were completed by the year 973, and there are no further records of Hrotsvit's life.

Were these dramas intended for performance, and if so, in what form? Earlier scholars assumed that the plays were intended solely for reading, but most of Hrotsvit's contemporary critics think it likely that the texts were intended for some dimension of performance, whether in a group reading in the abbey or in a more formal performance at the Saxon court.

For many centuries after her death Hrotsvit was a forgotten figure, but all this changed in 1493 when the German humanist Conrad Celtes discovered a manuscript of her work in a monastery. Soon Hrotsvit was celebrated as the first poet of Germany, and her works were printed in 1501 in an elegant edition with woodcuts by Albrecht Dürer and others. Surviving claims by misogynist critics that her works were forgeries invented by Celtes, Hrotsvit is today recognized as a remarkable and unprecedented literary figure. Whether or not her works were intended for performance, there has been no shortage of stage revivals of her work, beginning in 1888 with a marionette performance in Paris inspired by Anatole France, who modeled his popular novel *Thaïs* on Hrotsvit's original. By 1914 her plays had reached the London stage, with Ellen Terry in the role of Thaïs. Since that time performances of Hrotsvit's plays have taken place regularly in Britain, Germany, and the United States, generally in academic settings and often with a feminist focus.

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**HSIAO** SEE XIAO

**HSIAO PAO-CHEN** SEE XIAO BAOZHEN

**HSIEN** SEE XIAN

**HSIN-HSING** SEE XINXING

**HSI-WANG-MU** SEE XI WANG MU

**HSÜAN-TSANG** SEE XUANZANG

**HSÜN-TZU** SEE XUNZI

**HUANGDI**, the Yellow Emperor, is a pan-Chinese culture hero and the mythic first emperor of history. In order to avoid the very narrow connotations of the term *emperor*, the word *di* is often rendered *lord*, *monarch*, *thearch*, *ancestor*, or *god*. The complex mythology of Huangdi is roughly composed of three traditions that evolved during the first millennium BCE and that appear together in the first universal history of China, the *Shiji* (Records of the historian), in the second century BCE: Huangdi as celestial deity, as perfect sovereign, and as patron of the esoteric arts.

As the personification of the central part of heaven, surrounded by the four "emperors" of the four orientals, Huangdi received a cult from feudal lords in the Zhou kingdom. After the unification of the empire by the Qin (221 BCE), the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) affirmed its heaven-ordained rule by unifying the cults to the five emperors and their celestial regions (corresponding to the Han dominion of "all under heaven"). Besides being the color associated with the center of the four directions, *huang* ("yellow") also means "radiant"; there are traces of a sun god myth of Huangdi. More important is the fact that the graph *huang* ("yellow") is often used for another *huang* ("august, sovereign"), thus blurring the distinction between the Yellow Emperor and the "August

Emperor," that is, the supreme celestial deity Shangdi of the feudal religion. This might explain why, by the second century BCE, the majority of feudal clans claimed Huangdi as their ancestor. From the same period dates Huangdi's place in Chinese astronomy. Under his personal name, Xianyuan, and in the form of a yellow dragon (the imperial emblem) he is an asterism in the southern section of the sky (*Jin shu* 11A).

Huangdi's reign at the dawn of history was a "golden age of perfect peace," or *taiping* (*Shiji* 1). Although the Daoists saw in this first ruler the initiator of humanity's decline into artificial and superficial civilization (*Zhuangzi*), Huangdi became for them the paragon of emperors who heed the advice of their counselors. The Daoist traditions of Han times propagated the "teachings of Huang (-di) and Lao (-zi)," hence their name: Huang-Lao Dao. The association of Huangdi with the paragon sage Laozi signifies the double relationship between the ruler-disciple and his adviser-master. Although the adviser is socially inferior to the ruler, the latter's charisma is but a manifestation of the sage's wisdom. Like a puppet moved by invisible hands, the emperor is the tool of the sage; their interplay symbolizes the invisible Dao and its manifest efficacy (*de*). Inspired by these teachings, the millenarian Taiping rebels of 184 CE aimed at the re-creation of Huangdi's golden age and wore yellow head scarves (hence the name Yellow Turban Rebellion) as a sign of the imminent rule under the aegis of the "yellow agent" (earth) of Huangdi. In the many sacred scriptures attributed to him, Huangdi is always the disciple being instructed by a sage or divine master. These scriptures concern not only philosophy and the art of government but also longevity techniques and the martial arts.

The earliest alchemists taught the Han emperor Wu (140–87 BCE) the art of making gold and becoming immortal "like Huangdi," who had cast a sacred crucible and ascended to heaven on a dragon (*Shiji* 28). Daoist lore contains traces of Huangdi's role in archaic confraternities of metalworkers and in medical, pharmaceutical, and yogic traditions that all contributed to the formation of Daoist immortality techniques. The oldest book on medicine, *Huangdi neijing suwen* (The pure questions of Huangdi, esoteric canon of medicine), is a dialogue between Zhi Bo, a Celestial Master, and his disciple Huangdi. Other texts present him as being instructed by two female deities in the related arts of sexual and military techniques. Xuannü ("the dark woman") taught him a magic dance to overcome the rebel Chi You and, according to later legend, revealed to him a Daoist manual of military strategy, the *Yinfu jing* (Classic of the yin talisman; c. eighth century CE). Xuannü or Sunü ("the clear woman") taught the emperor the immortality-conferring "arts of the bedchamber." A *Sunü jing* (Classic of the clear woman), now lost, was popular in the Middle Ages; it probably contained Sunü's sexual instructions to the emperor. Furthermore, Xuannü is his teacher in one of the earliest Daoist treatises on alchemy, the *Huangdi jiuding shendan jing* (Yellow Emperor's canon of the nine vessel magical elixir).



In the official traditions throughout history Huangdi's image has been pale but distinct. His prestige as ancestor of the Chinese people and founder of their culture has recently been reasserted in a syncretist movement, the Xianyuan Jiao. Under the shock of defeat and flight to Taiwan in 1949, its founder, Wang Hansheng, had a vision of Huangdi and his sacred crucible (which is also a symbol of dynastic legitimation). Established in Taipei in 1957 and claiming one hundred thousand followers in 1981, the Xianyuan Jiao teaches a mixture of Daoist, Confucian, and Moist ideas and labors for a renaissance of Chinese culture and for the reunification of the empire.

**SEE ALSO** Chinese Religion, article on Mythic Themes; Kingship, article on Kingship in East Asia.

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**HUAYAN.** A major tradition of Buddhist doctrine and practice that emerged in seventh-century China, Huayan (Jpn., Kegon; Kor., Hwaōm) was soon transmitted to Korea and Japan, and has continued even into modern times to exert great influence on many aspects of religion, thought, and culture throughout East Asia. A product initially of the fruitful encounter between Mahāyāna Buddhism and elements of the native Chinese religious worldview, Huayan is especially noted for its liberating vision of the radical interrelatedness or interpenetration of all events and experiences, a unity amidst diversity wherein each and every particular phenomenon is seen both to incorporate and be absorbed by all other phenomena, without ever losing its own unique identity. It has often been characterized as a syncretism and, although more original than that description might suggest, it does in fact combine classical Mahāyāna themes like “emptiness” (*śūnyatā*), “representation only” (*viññaptimātratā*), and the embryonic Buddhahood of all beings (*tathāgata-garbha*) with such native Chinese motifs as cosmic harmo-

ny, the essential rightness of the natural world, and the intrinsic goodness of human nature.

Although not at all lacking in practical relevance to such forms of actual religious life as meditation and morality, Huayan has traditionally been regarded, along with Tiantai, as one of the more theoretical or philosophical of Buddhist traditions, and as such has commonly been contrasted to supposedly more practical traditions like Chan (Zen) or Pure Land. That this contrast is an invidious oversimplification is seen in the actual history of the tradition, which abounds in examples of the amalgamation of practice with theory. This was the rule during the several centuries in which Huayan maintained its identity as a separate teaching lineage and it was even more apparent later when, having waned as a distinct “school,” it continued to flourish either as a basic ingredient in other Buddhist traditions like Zen and Tantrism or as an influence upon non-Buddhist traditions like neo-Confucianism.

**SCRIPTURAL FOUNDATION.** The scripture on which Huayan was based, and from which it took its name, is the *Da fangguang fo Huayan jing* (Sanskrit, following the Tibetan, *Mahāvaiṣṭya Buddhāvataṃsaka Sūtra*), known most commonly by the abbreviated title *Huayan jing* (*Avataṃsaka Sūtra*) and usually referred to in English as the *Flower Garland* or *Flower Ornament Scripture*. This is a very long text composed of a number of originally independent scriptures of diverse provenance, all of which were combined, probably in Central Asia, sometime during the late third or the fourth century CE. It is a Mahāyāna scripture, mythopoeic and visionary in character like most of its genre and replete with grand descriptions of the Buddha, his extraordinary powers, his retinue of *bodhisattvas* and other heavenly beings, their qualities, and the myriad world-systems of Buddhist cosmology. Its occasion is the primal event itself, for the matters related by the text, insofar as they may be deemed temporal at all, are thought to have occurred during the period immediately following the Buddha's own experience of enlightenment, while he was still absorbed in the ineffable meditative experience (*samādhi*) of all things as they really are.

Of special importance among the text's various themes is that of the *bodhisattva* path, with its many stages and wondrous spiritual attainments. All of this is conveyed in vivid imagery dominated by the motif of light and translucency. Pervasive radiance, the most salient feature of the scripture's world, is understood to represent the boundless scope and unimpeded force of the Buddha's insight, which reaches everywhere and before which nothing remains opaque. The text culminates in a final chapter, by far the longest and most cohesive, known in China as the *Ru fajie pin* (Chapter on entering the realm of truth) but elsewhere better known as the originally independent *Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra*. This is the story of the youth Sudhana (Shancai), who represents all sentient beings aspiring to enlightenment, and of his long pilgrimage, during which he takes instruction from a number of spiritual advisers (fifty-two to fifty-four, depending on

how one counts) and in effect accomplishes the *bodhisattva* path charted throughout the rest of the scripture. It is especially rich in the symbolism of fusion, interpenetration, and unity within multiplicity that would later inspire Huayan doctrine.

The earliest surviving version of the full text of the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* is the Chinese translation done by Buddhahadra between 418 and 420 CE (T.D. no. 278). That version comprises sixty fascicles (scrolls) and thirty-four chapters and is divided into eight “assemblies” (*hui*) or scenes held at seven different locations. This was the version used by the earliest Huayan thinkers in their creation of the tradition. Another complete translation was done between 695 and 699 CE by Śikṣānanda (T.D. no. 279). This is in eighty fascicles and thirty-nine chapters, and it is usually divided into nine assemblies held at seven places. Shortly after its completion, this later version effectively supplanted Buddhahadra’s as the canonical foundation of the Huayan tradition.

**HISTORICAL OUTLINE.** Study of the *Huayan jing* began almost immediately after Buddhahadra’s translation. The chronicles of fifth- and sixth-century Chinese Buddhism reveal not only that it was then a popular focus of scholarly scrutiny but also that it figured prominently in the devotional lives of many practitioners as a text to be chanted, copied, celebrated in maigre feasts, meditated upon, revered for its magical powers, and employed by artists as a repertory of themes. However, it was not until the early seventh century that anything even remotely like a distinctive Huayan “school” or lineage (*zong*) can be said to have emerged. Scholars now trace such an origin to the Sui dynasty (589–618) and the opening decades of the Tang dynasty (618–907). Special attention has recently been given to a trio of monks associated in those years with the Zhixiang monastery, located in the Zhongnan mountains just south of the capital of Chang’an (Xi’an). The eldest was Dushun, also known as Fashun (557–640), a meditation master and thaumaturge who was especially inspired by the *Huayan jing* and whose use of it in the performance of miracles earned him considerable prominence in local traditions of popular piety. He is also credited (but perhaps erroneously so) with the authorship of certain early Huayan treatises, the most important of which was the *Fajie guanmen* (Contemplations of the realm of truth), the *locus classicus* of the most famous of all Huayan doctrines, namely, the teaching of principle (*li*), phenomena (*shi*), and the various modes of their interpenetration. Dushun was anointed by the later tradition as its “first patriarch,” but it should be borne in mind that the conception of Huayan as a master-disciple succession in the manner of the Chan lineages is an anachronistic fiction.

Dushun’s contemporary Zhizheng (559–639) was a scholar-monk, heir to several of the scholastic traditions of sixth-century Chinese Buddhism and noted especially for his exegesis of the *Huayan jing*. These two men shared an outstanding student in the person of the monk Zhiyan (602–668), traditionally held to be Huayan’s second “patriarch.”

Zhiyan combined in his career both the emphasis on practice learned from Dushun and the breadth of scholarship fostered by Zhizheng and other of his teachers. He was expert particularly in the learning of two early Chinese traditions of Yogācāra Buddhism that incorporated important elements of Tathāgatagarbha thought, the Dilun school, based on Vasubandhu’s *Daśabhūmivijyākhyāna* (Exposition of the ten stages scripture) and the Shelun school, based on Pāramārtha’s sixth-century translation of Asaṅga’s *Mahāyānasamgraha* (Compendium of Mahāyāna). He went on to apply his knowledge of these traditions in the study of the *Huayan jing* and composed several fundamental texts that are among the earliest pieces of distinctively Huayan literature. In the composition of these works Zhiyan created many of the doctrines that came to be characteristic of Huayan, not the least of these being the classical fivefold doctrinal classification (*pan-jiao*) system, the rudiments of the sophisticated Huayan view of causation and dependent origination (*yuanqi*), the teaching of “nature origination” (*xingqi*), and the doctrine of the instantaneous achievement of buddhahood (*yi’nian chengfo*).

Among Zhiyan’s disciples, two were of special note. Ūisang (625–702) was a Korean monk who studied with Zhiyan in Chang’an in the mid-660s. He then returned to his homeland to establish Huayan as one of Korea’s most important Buddhist traditions, beginning the process whereby Huayan came to enjoy proportionately greater and more enduring eminence in Korea than in either China or Japan. Ūisang’s fellow student Fazang (643–712), later judged to be the tradition’s third “patriarch,” was a man of enormous erudition and a prolific author especially skilled in the eloquent and methodical exposition of doctrine. He was Huayan’s great systematizer and its first publicist. Much of his career was spent in codifying and elaborating the doctrines first formulated by his teacher and in adding to them teachings of his own devising, notably those born of his study of the *Dasheng qixin lun* (The awakening of faith in Mahāyāna).

The development of Huayan during the several decades following Fazang’s death is complex. One of his disciples, the Korean monk Shimsang (Jpn., Shinjō; d. 742), was instrumental in transmitting Huayan to Japan, where it shortly became one of the dominant scholastic and ecclesiastical traditions of the Nara period (710–794). Shimsang’s lectures on the *Huayan jing* helped motivate Emperor Shomu (r. 724–749) to construct the great Tōdai Temple and to install there the monumental Great Buddha, which ever since has stood as one of the foremost examples of Huayan influence on the arts. Another of Fazang’s disciples, Huiyuan (c. 673–743), departed from his master on several key doctrinal issues and was unfortunately dismissed by the later tradition as a kind of heretic. Familiar with Fazang’s works, although never his student, was the layman Li Tongxuan (635?–730?), whose several writings—including what was perhaps the first complete exposition of the eighty-fascicle translation of the *Huayan jing*—are marked throughout by very original interpretations of Huayan themes.

The next phase in the history of Huayan is signaled by the contributions of its reputed fourth “patriarch,” Chengguan (738–839?). Born twenty-six years after Fazang’s death and thus not his direct descendant, Chengguan nevertheless mastered the Huayan system, which he studied with a student of Fazang’s student Huiyuan. He resided for many years in northern Shanxi, in the complex of monasteries located on the Wutai Mountains, long a center of Huayan devotion and study. His many treatises and exegetical works earned special distinction, particularly his immense commentary on the eighty-fascicle version of the *Huayan jing*, which would later vie with Li Tongxuan’s work for pride of place among all commentaries on the scripture. Perhaps his most notable accomplishment was to have laid a foundation on which Huayan could consort with other kinds of Buddhism, not only the Monastic Discipline (Vinaya) tradition, Tiantai, and Sanlun (all of which he had studied) but also, and most significantly, Chan. Chengguan was a student of Chan during a crucial period in its history, just as it was in the process of taking the forms that would come to be regarded as classical. The Chan lineage with which he was most closely associated was the Oxhead (Niutou) tradition and this, in turn, had direct links with the classical Chan lineage *par excellence*, the Hongzhou school. Since Chan was then on the verge of becoming paramount among all Chinese Buddhist traditions, Chengguan’s efforts to bring Chan and Huayan together were especially important; they helped assure a future for Huayan during the subsequent centuries of Chan dominance.

The last of the five great “patriarchs” of Huayan was the literatus-monk Zongmi (780–841). An accomplished prose stylist and a scholar as well versed in China’s “secular” traditions as in Buddhism, Zongmi combined a devout religious life with a successful clerical career and was cultivated by some of the foremost court scholars of his day. Like those of Chengguan, his Buddhist studies were by no means confined to Huayan. He too was a Chan monk, especially faithful to the Heze or “Southern Lineage” deriving from Shenhui (670–762). He was especially noted for his advocacy of a text associated with none of the established traditions, the *Yuanjue jing* (Scripture of complete enlightenment), a Chinese composition devoted to themes of a Tathāgatagarbha sort. Against the background of mature Huayan doctrine, Zongmi classified all the varieties of Buddhism, including all forms of Chan, into a comprehensive and hierarchical overview of Buddhist doctrine and practice. He then extended that classification to include both Confucianism and Daoism by composing the famous *Yuanren lun* (Enquiry into the origins of man), a reply to the critique of Buddhism found in essays of similar title by Han Yu (768–824), the great precursor of neo-Confucianism. Of special importance for the future of Huayan was his advocacy of a unification of Chan and the more doctrinal (*jiao*) forms of Buddhism, Huayan being in his view the foremost of the latter. He is also sometimes identified as a bridge between Buddhism and neo-Confucianism.

After Zongmi, Huayan’s history becomes rather diffuse. Traditional accounts continue to speak of a Huayan lineage extending through the end of the Tang into the Song dynasty, and such lineages did persist in Korea and Japan, but after the late ninth century the truly significant developments in Huayan were those occurring in other traditions that made use of Huayan themes. Huayan thought was particularly important in several lineages of Five Dynasties and Song dynasty Chan, the Linji master Dahui (1089–1163), for example, being only one of a great many prominent Song Chan figures indebted to Huayan. It was also absorbed just as deeply into Korean Chan (Sŏn), as may be seen in the thought of Chinul (1158–1210), Korea’s greatest Chan teacher. And in Japan, where Esoteric Buddhism (Mikkyō) developed further than anywhere else in East Asia, Mikkyō practitioners like Myōe Shōnin (Kōben; 1173–1232) made unique use of Huayan motifs in their Esoteric contemplations and writings.

**THE TEACHINGS.** Underlying the often bewildering array of technical doctrines that comprise Huayan is the single, unitary vision of a world in which all things—both the particular phenomenal things (*shi*, “phenomena”) that comprise conventional worldly experience and the general noumenal truths or principles (*li*) that govern phenomenal reality—are seen “to be without mutual obstruction” (*wu’ai*), that is, to enter, include, penetrate, absorb, and fuse with each other, but to do so without losing their respective identities. In traditional Buddhist terms, this is simply a novel and ingenious reiteration of the cardinal doctrine of dependent origination (Skt., *pratītya-samutpāda*; Chin., *yuanqi*), whereby things are said neither to exist in themselves (the error of eternalism) nor not to exist (the error of annihilationism). However, whereas it is more typical of earlier Buddhism to employ negative, “neither/nor” phrasing to express this teaching and its corollaries, Huayan favored more affirmative locutions, even if they required figurative rather than literal language.

Perhaps the best known and most effective example of this is the metaphor of the “net of Indra.” This inspired trope pictures a universe in which each constituent of reality is like a multifaceted jewel placed at one of the knots of a vast net. There is such a jewel at each knot, and each jewel reflects not only the rest of the jeweled net in its entirety but also each and every other jewel in its individuality. Thus, each particular reflects the totality, the totality so reflected is both a unity and a multiplicity, and the reflecting particular maintains its distinctive but not discrete reality. All things and beings, Huayan teaches, are like these jewels. When this “metaphysical” insight is made to yield its soteriological or gnoseological implications it is seen to entail, among other things, the essential Buddhahood of each sentient being, the potential enlightenment at the core of all ignorance, the fundamental purity of all defilements, the eternity of each instant, the presence of the Buddha mind in all objects, and the final attainment implicit in even the most elementary stage of the path.

According to Huayan’s five-part scheme of doctrinal classification, all other forms of Buddhism saw only a part

of this comprehensive truth. Hīnayāna Buddhism saw the emptiness of beings, their selflessness, but not the emptiness of all events (*dharmā*). Elementary Mahāyāna—the emptiness teaching and the version of the Representation Only teaching that held the mind to be essentially corrupt—saw the insubstantiality of all things and beings, and the inveterate ignorance and impurity of the mind which infected and distorted the world, but it did not see the countervailing actuality of those things and beings or the deeper purity of their underlying wisdom. Mature Mahāyāna—the Tathāgatagarbha tradition and the version of the Representation Only teaching that affirmed the essential purity of the mind—saw the immanence of transcendental reality, for example, the buddhahood in each sentient being, but ran the risk of a kind of docetism in which particular mundane things were subordinated to the universal supramundane truths they harbored and were not valued in themselves. The so-called sudden teaching (*dunjiao*)—associated initially with the theme of silence in texts like the *Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa* (The discourse of Vimalakīrti) but later with the translinguistic character of Chan practice—saw the limits and snares of language and conceptualization and emphasized the all-at-once nature of liberation, to which words and ideas can make no gradual approach, but it ran the risk of underestimating the need for effortful practice and the importance of language and imagination in practice. It was only Huayan itself—the “complete” or “perfect” (*quan*, literally “round”) teaching—that comprehended the whole truth without succumbing to partiality or extremes. In this respect Huayan saw itself as the “one vehicle,” identical (*tong*) with all other vehicles combined insofar as it included them all, but also separate (*bie*) from them in that it surpassed them all.

There was something about the Huayan worldview that East Asian cultures, shaped as they were by the values of classical Chinese civilization, found quite congenial. Perhaps it was the deft way in which Huayan thinkers combined Chinese values and notions, like the affirmation of “this world” or the conception of reality as a concrete order governed by principles of harmony and complementarity, with basic Buddhist concepts like insubstantiality, interdependence, and the essentially mind-made character of all things. No doubt the abstruse character of Huayan discourse needed the leaven of an emphasis on practice and experience, a leaven of the sort it was to find in its collaboration with Chan and Mikkyō, but with that it rose to be a major ingredient in the intellectual and religious life of the whole East Asian world, and it stands even today as a paramount example of the East Asian transformation of Buddhism.

SEE ALSO Chinul; Dushun; Fazang; Kōben; Pratītyasamutpāda; Ūisang; Zhiyan; Zongmi.

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The best and most extensive scholarship on Huayan is that done by modern Japanese scholars. Those who have access to that

language would do well to consult especially the works of Takamine Ryōshū, Sakamoto Yukio, Kamata Shigeo, Kimura Kiyotaka, and Yoshizu Yoshihide, to name only a few. Sustained Western-language study of the tradition got off to an inauspicious start with the publication of Garma C. C. Chang’s unreliable and tendentious *The Buddhist Teaching of Totality* (University Park, Pa., 1971). The situation was improved considerably, however, by the appearance of Francis D. Cook’s *Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra* (University Park, Pa., 1977), which, though clearly as much concerned to advocate Huayan as to present it to the academic community, is sound and informative. It deals especially with the thought of Fazang. Two other works of lesser value have recently appeared that put Huayan into the service of idiosyncratic Western philosophical programs. They are Alfonso Verdú’s *Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought* (Lawrence, Kans., 1974), which treats especially of uses of Huayan thought in Caodong Chan from a Hegelian perspective, and Steve Odin’s very odd miscellany, *Process Metaphysics and Hua-yen Buddhism* (Albany, N.Y., 1982), which deals haplessly with the thought of Ūisang and attempts to draw comparisons between Huayan and the work of Western thinkers like Whitehead, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and others.

Three different translations of the *Huayan jing* are now under way. Thomas Cleary’s *The Flower Ornament Scripture*, of which the first volume has already appeared (Boulder, Colo. 1984), is an excellent rendering of the eighty-fascicle version of the Chinese text. The same version is being translated by members of the International Institute for the Translation of Buddhist Texts in Talmage, California. Theirs is a resolutely literal translation with interspersed commentary by the contemporary Chinese monk Xuanhua; more than ten volumes have so far appeared. Apart from a few standard pieces like Fazang’s *Golden Lion Treatise* or Zongmi’s *Enquiry into the Origins of Man*, which appear in indifferent translations in certain popular anthologies, not much of the enormous corpus of Huayan literature composed in China, Korea, and Japan has yet been translated into Western languages, but Thomas Cleary has recently published a collection of fine though sparsely annotated translations of several shorter works by Dushun, Zhiyan, Fazang, and Chengguan. The collection is entitled *Entry into the Inconceivable* (Honolulu, 1983).

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ROBERT M. GIMELLO (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**HUBBARD, L. RON** (1911–1986), the founder of the Church of Scientology, emerged in the last half of the twentieth century as one of the most controversial leaders of new religious movements. Hailed by the members of his church as one of the most creative minds of the century, he was equally assailed by his critics.

Lafayette Ron Hubbard was born on March 13, 1911, in Tilden, Nebraska. His father, Harry Ross Hubbard, was an officer in the U.S. Navy. Hubbard spent much of his childhood in Montana on his grandfather's ranch. He was able to take advantage of his father's occupation, however, to make two trips during his youth to the Orient and returned with vivid memories of his time in China.

Hubbard attended the Swavely Preparatory School in Manassas, Virginia, and began his college work at George Washington University in 1930. College proved not to be his forte, and he dropped out after only two years. He spent the rest of the decade participating in a variety of expeditions as an explorer (which earned him membership in the Explorers Club) and writing. He published more than 150 short stories and nonfiction articles. The subject matter ranged from aviation to western adventure stories, though his most memorable work was in science fiction.

Hubbard was commissioned as a lieutenant in the navy in 1941. Holding a variety of posts and commands, he finished World War II at Oak Knolls Naval Hospital, Oakland, California, where he gained the initial insights that led to his development of Scientology. After the war Hubbard continued to make his living as a writer as he accumulated insights into the human mind. His new ideas first appeared in several articles and culminated in *Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health*. The book describes his therapeutic techniques for ridding individuals of the causes of aberrant behavior and leading them to a state he termed *clear*. The response to his book, including the emergence of many amateur efforts to practice the book's teachings, led Hubbard to found the Hubbard Dianetic Research Foundation and to write a set of texts on the proper application of his theories.

The next few years proved to be intense and decisive. Hubbard continued his exploration of human existence,

shifted his focus from the mind to the spirit, and expanded Dianetics into a complete philosophical and religious system he began to call Scientology. The change proved costly in some respects, as many of his early supporters were unable to accept his new findings (such as the preexistence of the human soul) and withdrew. In 1954, however, the first Church of Scientology opened in Los Angeles, California. Hubbard now turned his full attention to the development of the church (including the writing of a detailed organizational manual) and the growth of Scientology into a comprehensive scientific religion.

Hubbard resigned all official positions he held in the church in 1966 and turned his attention to further research into the higher levels of Scientology, in which the soul (which Hubbard termed the *thetan*) learns to operate free of the body. The first of the Operating Thetan (OT) levels, or training steps, was released in 1966, with others released periodically through Hubbard's lifetime. Beginning in 1967 he conducted a significant part of OT research aboard an ocean-going vessel in company with a group of his more dedicated followers. There he founded the Sea Organization, or Sea Org, an ordered though nonmonastic community originally designated to take charge of the delivery of the OT levels. The 1970s were a time of extensive writing on all phases of Scientology.

Hubbard encountered the next crucial test of his ideas at the end of the 1970s. In 1979 a number of church officials connected with the Guardian's Office, including Hubbard's wife, were arrested. The Guardian's Office, which had been established in 1966 to handle a variety of attacks upon the church, had engaged in several clandestine operations to uncover U.S. government files believed to be the source of its problems. The conviction of those arrested led to the disbanding of the Guardian's Office, a complete reorganization of the church at the highest levels, and the assumption of control by the Sea Organization of the church's international and policy-making offices.

Hubbard spent the last years of his life in seclusion, his whereabouts disclosed to only a few friends and high church officials. He returned to fiction writing and produced a major novel, *Battlefield Earth* (1982), and a ten-volume science fiction series, *Mission Earth* (1985–1987). He died on January 24, 1986, in Crestone, California.

Hubbard left his considerable wealth and all his copyrights to the church, which had already assigned scriptural status to his Scientology texts. The church subsequently established a new corporation, Author Services, to handle the ongoing publication and licensing of Hubbard's non-Scientology writings. The church has published a number of smaller works describing Hubbard's various accomplishments, although no comprehensive critical biography had appeared by the beginning of the twenty-first century.

**SEE ALSO** Scientology.



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J. GORDON MELTON (2005)

**HÜGEL, FRIEDRICH VON** (1852–1925), Roman Catholic layman who at the turn of the twentieth century became involved in the modernist crisis and who later became recognized as an outstanding authority on mysticism and religious philosophy. Born in Austria, von Hügel moved with his family to England in 1867. Mainly self-educated, von Hügel became a friend of the French exegete Alfred Loisy (1857–1940) and of the English Jesuit George Tyrrell (1861–1909). He immersed himself in the new scriptural criticism and championed Loisy's right to publish when the latter faced church condemnation. He also generally supported Tyrrell, who was expelled from the Society of Jesus in 1906. The official church saw in the ideas of a number of writers at the time, including Loisy and Tyrrell, a denial of the transcendence of God and of church authority. It labeled their ideas "modernism" and condemned them in the encyclical *Pascendi* in 1907. Von Hügel and others believed that the church's very broad condemnation was unfair and to a degree a misunderstanding. But he gradually cooled to some of Loisy's ideas, although he continued to support the cause of the freedom of the exegete. He showed external respect in every way he could for the church's decrees, but he never essentially changed his position.

Toward the end of the modernist crisis von Hügel published his great work, *The Mystical Element of Religion as Studied in St. Catherine of Genoa and Her Friends* (1909). Around the biographical core of the book he developed his ideas on religion and mysticism. The chief forces of Western civilization he saw as Hellenism, Christianity, and science. He worked out three elements in all religion: the institutional, the intellectual, and the mystical. The thirst for religion and mysticism is at bottom metaphysical, arising from a keen sense of imprisonment in the contingent. "If man did not somehow have a real experience of objective reality and truth, he could never suffer so much from the very suspicion of a complete imprisonment within purely human apprehensions and values."

In 1912 von Hügel published *Eternal Life*, a study of the eternal and the absolute in religion. Time, he insisted,

is a composite phenomenon containing two elements: clock time, or succession, and duration. In duration, the human being stands open to the infinite and experiences a quasi eternity. In 1921 he published *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, in which he underlined the transcendent element in religion and also included a probing essay on the apocalyptic element in Jesus' teaching. Some of his work was published posthumously. *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion, Second Series* (1926) contains discussions on institutional religion, church authority, and suffering in God. Von Hügel's unfinished work on the Gifford Lectures was published as *The Reality of God and Religion and Agnosticism* (1931).

Von Hügel became an outstanding spiritual director. He was a major influence on Evelyn Underhill, who was later to publish her remarkable works on mysticism. His deep spiritual life is seen in *Letters from Baron von Hügel to a Niece* (1928) and *The Life of Prayer* (1929). He received an honorary doctor of law degree from the University of Saint Andrews in Scotland in 1914, and in 1920 he became the first Roman Catholic since the Reformation to be honored with an honorary doctor of divinity degree from Oxford University.

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JOHN J. HEANEY (1987 AND 2005)

**HUGH OF SAINT-VICTOR** (d. 1142) was a regular canon of the Abbey of Saint-Victor, Paris, and influential thinker with lasting and decisive contributions to biblical exegesis, theology, and spirituality. The date and place of Hugh's birth are unknown. Both Saxony and the Low Countries have been plausibly suggested as the place of his birth. By 1125 he was at Saint-Victor teaching in the abbey school, where he founded the vigorous and creative Victorine intellectual tradition. At the same time, the first abbot, Gilduin, was winning royal favor and rich endowments for the young community, which had been founded in 1108 by William of Champeaux upon his retirement from teaching in the Parisian schools.

Hugh's learning was broad and deep. He united in a special way a religious vocation, keen intellectual curiosity,

a strong historical sense, theological creativity, and dedication to the contemplative life. The breadth of Hugh's knowledge is illustrated by his *Didascalicon*, a guide to the study of philosophy and biblical exegesis. Philosophy, embracing all knowledge, was divided into four parts (theoretical; practical, including ethics; mechanical, including weaving, farming, et al.; and logical) that were to remedy the ignorance, vice, and bodily weakness resulting from the fall.

In biblical studies Hugh introduced the idea that history, allegory, and tropology, the traditional three levels of meaning in the biblical text, should be seen as three areas of study to be pursued in succession. This idea had the important effect of making the systematic study of the historical, literal meaning of the text the foundation for all further biblical study. Moreover, Hugh consulted Jewish rabbis about the literal meaning of the Hebrew text and incorporated their comments into his exegesis. In the Victorine program of studies theology was studied systematically to prepare for allegorical exegesis, while tropology was the context of examining not only ethics but also the discipline of body and mind leading to contemplative experience.

For each area of study—historical, theological, and mystical—Hugh wrote important books. His *Chronicon* contained a treatise on the art of memory and numerous tables for biblical chronology and the history of the Christian church, European rulers, and the papacy. *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* (On the sacraments of the Christian faith), Hugh's handbook to prepare for allegorical exegesis, was the first systematic summa of Christian theology and thus initiated a major form of medieval theological literature. Hugh's theology incorporated a unique sense of historical development and distinguished between the divine works of foundation in six days and the divine works of restoration that extend through all history from beginning to end. His doctrine of the sacraments was important for his definition of a sacrament and his recognition of valid sacraments in all historical periods.

Hugh introduced ideas from the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite into the mainstream of theological and mystical discussion. The major sources for Hugh's mystical teachings are two treatises on Noah's ark (*De arca Noe morali* and *De arca Noe mystica*) and a set of sermons on *Ecclesiastes*. In the ark treatises Hugh describes a complex, mandala-like drawing that represents with a subtle iconography the cosmos, salvation history, and the mystic's inward journey to union with the divine as these are related to Christ the creative, sustaining, incarnate, judging, and contemplative Word. This powerful symbolic representation of the spiritual quest is a major document in the development of medieval Christian mysticism.

Hugh's successors at Saint-Victor tended to emphasize single aspects of his thought. Andrew of Saint-Victor (d. 1175) devoted himself to the literal sense of scripture, advancing even further the historical understanding of the biblical text and drawing, like Hugh, on Jewish exegesis. Rich-

ard of Saint-Victor (d. 1173), one of the greatest medieval mystical writers, advanced Hugh's analysis of contemplation and his use of Dionysius in treatises combining subtle symbolic interpretation of scripture, psychological insight, and deep contemplative experience. Through Richard and Hugh, the Victorine tradition influenced the theological and contemplative writings of the great Franciscan writer Bonaventure.

In poems of complex symbolism and theological depth, Adam of Saint-Victor brought the liturgical sequence to a high point in its development. The sermons of Abbot Achard of Saint-Victor (d. 1171) embodied the combination of contemplative and preaching traditions so characteristic of the abbey. The Victorine theological tradition was continued by Godfrey of Saint-Victor (d. after 1194) in *Fons philosophiae* and *Microcosmus*, while a narrow, antidialectical spirit at odds with other Victorines emerged in the writings of Walter of Saint-Victor (d. 1180). Thomas Gallus (d. 1246), a Victorine who became abbot of Vercelli, continued Hugh's interest in the works of Dionysius and wrote a commentary on them. All told, Hugh began an influential intellectual tradition at the abbey, a tradition that exercised a widespread influence on medieval thought and life in many areas.

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*Patriarchs; The Mystical Ark; and Book Three on the Trinity* (New York, 1979).

GROVER A. ZINN, JR. (1987)

**HUICHOL RELIGION.** The twenty to twenty-five thousand Huichol-speakers of the Sierra Madre Occidental are the only sizable indigenous population in Mexico whose aboriginal religion survives with only minor Spanish additions, and almost none of the syncretistic adaptations to Christianity typical of the rest of Mesoamerican Indian cultures. The first missions in Huichol country were established in 1722. More than two and a half centuries later Spanish Roman Catholicism is evident only in the addition of the Virgin of Guadalupe, Jesucristo, and some saints to the extensive native pantheon of male and female nature deities. The Huichol have also added nominal baptism practices; feast day celebrations of the respective patron saints of the five independent, self-governing *comunidades* that make up the mountainous Huichol homeland; and observance of portions of the Christian ritual calendar to their ritual life. The celebration of these holy days is accompanied by recitations and dramatic enactments of a Christian myth cycle so drastically altered to conform to the native worldview that it resembles the New Testament only in broad outlines.

**DEITIES.** In contrast, in the native ceremonial round and in prayers, the Huichol deities have retained their ancient names, personalities, and associations, rather than having become identified with Christian supernatural beings. Some Huichols believe that the Virgin of Guadalupe is really Our Mother Young Eagle Girl, a female sky deity who usually takes the form of a bicephalic eagle; on the other hand, few Huichols have followed the neighboring Cora, and other Indian peoples, in identifying Jesucristo with the indigenous solar deity. The supernaturals are addressed in kinship terms, prefaced by the pronoun *ta* ("our"): for example, the fire god Tatewarí ("our grandfather"); the sun god Tayaupá ("our father"); the whitehaired old earth and creator goddess Tatutsi Nakawé ("our great grandmother Nakawé"); Tamátsi Kauyumari ("elder brother Káuyumarie"), the trickster / culture hero who manifests himself as deer; another deer deity, Tamátsi Maxa Kwaxí ("elder brother deer tail"); the corn goddess, who also personifies the earth made fertile by rain, Tatéi Utuánaka ("our mother"; lit., "our aunt"); and so forth. Female deities personify rain, water holes, lakes, ponds, maize, and squash. Agricultural, human, and animal fertility and fecundity are also personified by female deities, who are often depicted as snakes in ceremonial art. Many of the male deities are associated with the dry season, the hunt, and game. Some male and female deities function as owners of animal or plant species. The divine cactus, peyote, is personified as Sacred Deer, Master of the Deer, in a system of interdependent and interchangeable symbols that, since the shift from hunting and gathering to slash-and-burn agriculture, has also come to include maize. As a group the deities,

or divine ancestors, are variously called *kákaima* or *kakayarixi* (apparently archaic expressions that convey the sense of "gods" or "greater spirits"). Female deities are collectively known as *tatéima* ("our mothers"). Tatewarí is the most prominent deity in the western part of the Huichol territory, and in the eastern part it is Father Sun. The fire deity is also the first shaman, who, with grandmother Nakawé, put the world in order in the "first times," and is often addressed simply as Mara'akáme (*marakáme* is the Huichol term for shaman or singer). Charismatic shamans may be identified with Tatewarí, as is the leader of the peyote pilgrimage. Probably as many as one-third to one-half of the adult Huichols, particularly the men but also some women, are sufficiently schooled in the sacred traditions to function as low-level shamans who are able to divine, conduct curing rites, and communicate with ancestral deities through chants, prayer arrows, symbolic designs of wool yarn and/or beads and beeswax, decorated gourd bowls, and food and drink offerings. To practice the higher level of shamanic and priestly activity, a person must gain community consensus and prestige and trust sufficient for him or her to have assumed successful leadership of at least five peyote pilgrimages.

**SACRED SPACES.** Beyond the local *ranchos*, ritual centers on the large circular sacred house or temple, *tuki* or *tukípa* in Huichol, with the meaning of Big House. Several of these *tuki* or *tukípa* are found scattered through each of the five *comunidades*. They contain a doorway that faces east, a fire-place that represents Tatewarí, an altar, a hole in the center of the floor and another below the roof (from which subterranean gods, divine ancestors, and celestial spirits may emerge), sacred paraphernalia, prayer offerings, a low bench along the interior wall, and sometimes a squared, hollowed-out log that serves as a foot drum, whose sound is intended to alert subterranean ancestors and supernatural beings and to invite them to participate in the ritual.

Individual ranches have a sanctuary, called *xiriki*, that is constructed like the dwellings of the Huichol; the sanctuary houses carved stone and wood images of supernaturals, personal ceremonial paraphernalia, bows, arrows and deer-skin quivers that are used on the peyote pilgrimage, an upright log drum with deerskin head, snares for ceremonial deer hunting, a supply of peyote, clay pots for the ritual maize beer (*nawá*) and so on. The most important occupant of the sanctuary is the *urukáme*, which is a small rock crystal tied in a sacred bundle to the shaft of a hunting-arrow-like prayer arrow and that represents a deceased ancestor, usually a shaman. This miniature medicine bundle functions as supernatural guardian of the ranch community, who gives spiritual and practical counsel to the ranch elder or family shaman.

Numerous shrines associated with one or more deities are located in and around the Huichol territory, most prominent among them the great cave of Teakáta, home of the old earth goddess and other important deities, in the *comunidad* of Santa Catarina. Other shrines as far away as the Pacific

coast and Lake Pátzcuaro, south of Guadalajara, also draw Huichol pilgrims with offerings to such local deities as Tatéi Haramára, divine personification of the Pacific Ocean. A whole series of shrines lies along the three-hundred-mile pilgrimage route to Wirikúta, the Huichol name for the sacred homeland of the divine peyote cactus, *Lophophora williamsii*, *híkuri* in Huichol, just north of the Tropic of Cancer in the high desert of the state of San Luis Potosí.

Peyote was prominent in Aztec religion and divinatory curing, and is still important to several Indian populations of northwestern Mexico. But nowhere does it play so central a role in religious ideology and ritual as among the Huichol. The mythic charter of the Huichol peyote “cult” has a historic ring: in ancient times a group of divine male ancestors, who later become the principal deities, calls on the great *mara’akáme* Tatewarí to cure them of a variety of physical and spiritual afflictions. He diagnoses their ills as having been caused by their separation from Wirikúta, home of the sacred Deer Peyote in the distant north-central high desert, and by their failure to follow the ancestors in hunting and consuming the divine cactus that lives there in the form of deer. He orders them to abstain from sex, salt, food, and drink and leads them on a pilgrimage so lengthy and arduous that some fall by the wayside. Along the way, within sight of the distant sacred mountains of Wirikúta, they are saved from death by thirst by female deities, who meet them with life-giving offerings of water at a place of desert springs called Tateimatiniéri (“where our mothers dwell”). From there the male and female supernaturals proceed to Wirikúta, where, under the leadership of the great shaman, they track and slay the sacred deer. Peyote sprouts from the deer’s antlers and his body transforms into peyote. They grind the antlers with sacred water from the desert springs, and when they drink the mixture they experience visions that restore their health and help them “find their life.”

Huichol are enculturated as infants into the sacred geography and meaning of the peyote pilgrimage during an annual first fruits ceremony, in which the family shaman “transforms” the infants into hummingbirds and, to the beat of the deerskin drum and the chanting of the peyote tradition, leads them on a magical flight to Wirikúta and back. The myth becomes reality during the dry season when small groups of Huichol set out for Wirikúta under the leadership either of an experienced *mara’akáme* or one still in training. The pilgrims assume the identities of the ancestral deities who made the first vision quest, their leader becoming Tatewarí, Grandfather Fire. The three-hundred-mile pilgrimage is a journey back in time and space to the Huichol’s sacred origins, where ordinary language and time are reversed, sand becomes water, night day, and the oldest man *nunútsi* (“a baby”). For novices, who are blindfolded until they reach the sacred female springs, the pilgrimage serves as symbolic birth and initiation rite into the mysteries of the peyote medicine. Along the way, the pilgrims acknowledge the stopping places of the divine ancestors, and the most solemn and emotion-

charged of the rites is reserved for Wirikúta and the first peyote to come into view. As in the myth, peyote is deer; thus, the plant is literally shot with arrows. Each party of pilgrims forms at least a temporary society of *bikuritámete*, that is, a community of veterans of the peyote hunt that disbands at the conclusion of the ritual. In former times the *bikuritámete* may have functioned as a shamanistic medicine society similar to those of North American Indians. Following a solemn communion-like meal of the first peyote, the pilgrims scatter to collect *híkuri* for their own individual vision quests, and large quantities are harvested for future use.

Notwithstanding the emphasis on peyote as *the* divine psychoactive substance, there survive among the Huichol remnants of a former use and veneration of *Solandra*, a class relative of *datura*. Personified as the supernatural sorcerer Kieri, *Solandra* has its own myth cycle with historical overtones and prayer offerings similar to those given to peyote. So far as is known, however, no actual use of the solonaceous *Solandra* or *datura* survives among the Huichol, as it does, for example, among the Native American populations of the Southwest.

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**HUI NENG** (638–713) was a Chan Buddhist teacher, who is best considered in terms of two entirely different persons: historical and legendary.

**THE HISTORICAL FIGURE.** Very little is known about the historical Huineng. He was included in an early list of the ten

most important students of Hongren (601–674), the primary figure of the East Mountain Teaching phase of early Chan. However, the list identifies him as a teacher of merely regional significance, and the only credible detail known about him is that after his death his family home was donated to the *sangha* (i.e., the Buddhist monastic community) for use as a temple, which implies a certain degree of wealth and local prominence. Presumably because of Huineng's place of residence in the far south of China, no awareness of his religious teachings was conveyed either to the Buddhist centers of the Yangzi River valley or the two capitals of Luoyang and Chang'an. Nor did Huineng's famous student, Shenhui (684–758), know very much about his own teacher—or at least this great storyteller provides us with no anecdotes about him. Furthermore, Shenhui was apparently unable to provide Wang Wei (699?–759) with even the most basic biographical details for an epitaph that the great poet, literatus, and Buddhist devotee wrote for Huineng in 739 or shortly thereafter.

**THE FIGURE OF LEGEND.** The legendary account of Huineng portrays him as a penniless and illiterate layman living in Nanhai in the far south (Guangdong province) and supporting his widowed mother by selling firewood. This account derives primarily from the *Platform Sūtra*, the earliest known version of which dates from about 780, almost seven decades after the historical Huineng's death. This text begins with an entertaining and instructive anecdote in which Huineng has a flash of religious insight upon hearing someone recite the *Diamond Sūtra*, after which he travels to Hongren's monastery in the middle Yangzi area (Huangmei, in modern Hubei province). In his first encounter with Hongren, who is depicted as first treating the newly arrived southerner as a bumpkin, Huineng reveals his inner wisdom by pointing out that there was no distinction of north and south in the possession of the buddha-nature, the luminous potential for enlightenment inherent within all sentient beings. In spite of his precociousness, Huineng is sent off to work threshing rice, treatment that may indicate his laborer origins. In the process, however, he becomes one of the temple's lay practitioners (a pre-ordination track in the two-tier system of becoming formally ordained in Tang-dynasty Buddhism).

The story continues to the effect that Hongren, having decided to appoint a successor, instructs his students to write verses expressing their levels of understanding. The only one to do so is the senior student Shenxiu (606?–706), *dharma* instructor to the other students, who with great trepidation writes:

The body is the *bodhi* tree. The mind is like a bright mirror's stand. At all times we must strive to polish it and must not let dust collect.

In response, the illiterate but inspired layman Huineng dictates the following (only one of several variants is given here):

*Bodhi* originally has no tree. The mirror also has no stand. The Buddha-nature is always clear and pure. Where is there room for dust? (McRae, 1986, pp. 1–2)

Despite his lack of formal qualifications to become head of the community—illiterate, penniless, of humble family background, and not even an ordained monk—Huineng is appointed “sixth patriarch” by Hongren. The balance of the text is devoted to his explanation of the *dharmā*, which is identified as the teaching of “sudden enlightenment.” However, the verses and Huineng's sermon, when considered together, actually describe a threefold structure consisting of: (1) the constant teaching of *bodhisattva* practice (in the verse attributed to Shenxiu); (2) the deconstruction of the terms of that teaching through the doctrine of *śūnyatā*, or emptiness (in the verse attributed to Huineng); and (3) a restatement of Chan practice in highly metaphoric terms, culminating in bestowal of the “formless precepts” (in Huineng's sermon that follows).

Although the *Platform Sūtra* follows Shenhui in accepting Huineng as Hongren's sole successor, it effectively writes Shenhui out of the story, saying nothing of his famous campaign and belittling him as a foolish young monk. The *Platform Sūtra* account is demonstrably ahistorical, for Shenxiu studied with Hongren in the 650s, not toward the end of the master's life. In addition, the clever drama by which Hongren selects a single successor could only have made sense after Shenhui's vigorous campaign to have Huineng recognized as the “sixth patriarch” of Chan, which stipulated for the first time that the transmission had to be strictly unilinear.

In spite of the fictive quality of the *Platform Sūtra*, the text had inestimable value as a religious scripture throughout East Asia, based on its inspired depiction of Huineng as an unlettered sage. The legendary persona of Huineng had an everyman quality to it, implying that book learning or even difficult religious training was not necessarily required for spiritual enlightenment, only the innate capacity to understand the ultimate truth. At the same time, this seemingly liberal message had a conservative underside: by showing that the Chan school would go so far as recognizing someone who was so lacking in formal qualifications, the text also implied the converse, that anyone the Chan school installed as abbot (i.e., the patriarch of a given monastic community) was therefore an enlightened individual, no matter what role social privilege or other factors might have played in his selection.

The *Platform Sūtra* is a masterful synthesis of ideas from various early Chan sources. For example, in the text Huineng famously redefines “seated meditation” so that “seated” actually means “not to activate thoughts,” while “meditation” means to see the buddha-nature within oneself. This style of radical redefinition is associated with both the Northern and Oxhead schools; indeed, a member of the latter faction may have edited the earliest known version of the text. The threefold structure described above also seems to be characteristic of Oxhead Chan. Substantial material was added to the scripture over the years, so that the standard editions used from the thirteenth century onward are well over twice the length of the original.



In addition to the fame accorded him through Shen-hui's campaign and his depiction in the *Platform Sūtra*, the legendary Huineng is also recognized as the teacher of two figures from whom all later Chan lineages are said to derive. (There is no reliable biographical evidence that these or any of the other supposed students of Huineng's actually studied with the historical figure.) These are Nanyue Huairang (677–744) and Qingyuan Xingshi (d. 740), who are known only through their identities as the teachers of Mazu Daoyi (709–788) and Shitou Xiqian (710–790), from whom derive the later Linji and Caodong lineages (Japanese, Rinzai, and Sōtō).

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JOHN R. MCRÆ (2005)

#### HUI-NENG SEE HUINENG

**HUITZILOPOCHTLI** ("hummingbird of the south") was the most powerful god in Aztec religion. The tribal god of the wandering México, he became the patron deity of the Aztec ceremonial capital, Tenochtitlán (1325–1521). Primary sources depict the dual nature of the god, including a human aspect as left-handed warrior hero and a divine aspect as the solar god who kills the powers of the night. Both aspects express a single fact about Huitzilopochtli: He was a terrible, overwhelming warrior who completely dominated his enemies.

At the time of the Spanish conquest in 1521, Huitzilopochtli's shrine was situated, along with that of the rain god Tlaloc, on top of the largest pyramid in the Aztec empire, the Templo Mayor (Great Temple) of Tenochtitlán.

His spectacular religious development from a tribal god to the principal god of the imperial capital is reflected in two mythical episodes that were ritually celebrated by the Aztec. The first, telling of the founding of the city, appears in the *Historia de la nación mexicana* and in the Codex Boturini, which recount how Huitzilopochtli led the México from Chicomoztoc ("place of the seven caves") into the Valley of Mexico. In a second episode, Huitzilopochtli appears in the form of a giant eagle landing on a blooming cactus growing from a rock in the center of Lake Tezcoco in 1325 CE, the date of the founding of the Aztec capital. This event, pictured in the Codex Mendoza, is marked by the construction of a shrine to Huitzilopochtli and the division of the community into five parts.

This shrine (which became the Templo Mayor of Tenochtitlán) and much of the ritual activity associated with it were modeled after the myth of Huitzilopochtli's birth recorded in book 3 of Fray Bernardino de Sahagún's *Historia general de las cosas de la Nueva España* (1569–1582; also known as the Florentine Codex). The *teotuatl* ("divine song") of the god's birth depicts a society of the gods preparing for war at the cosmic mountain, Coatepec ("serpent mountain"), where the mother of the gods, Coatlicue, has been mysteriously impregnated by a ball of feathers. Her four hundred children, enraged at her pregnancy, launch an attack. At the critical moment, Coatlicue gives birth to Huitzilopochtli, fully grown and dressed for war. He takes his *xihcoatl* ("serpent of lightning") and slaughters the attacking siblings. This episode has been variously interpreted by scholars as depicting a historical event or an astral encounter of the sun conquering the moon and stars.

Huitzilopochtli's supreme power was lavishly celebrated at the festival of Panquetzalitzli ("raising of banners"), which involved special human sacrifices following an opening ritual called Ipainá Huitzilopochtli ("the swiftness of Huitzilopochtli"). In the latter ritual, according to Fray Diego Durán in *Los dioses y ritos* and *El calendario* (c. 1581), a swift runner carried a dough image of the god through the streets of the capital, pursued by a multitude of "travelers" who never managed to catch him. This signified that Huitzilopochtli was never captured in war, but was always triumphant over his enemies.

Historically, following the formation of the Aztec state with the successful revolution against the empire of Azcapotzalco in 1428, the cult of Huitzilopochtli came to include massive human sacrifices of captured warriors, women, and children, which, the Aztec believed, contributed to the integration of the Aztec state, cosmic order, and Huitzilopochtli's dominance.

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**HUIYUAN** (334–416), more fully Shi Huiyuan or Lüshan Huiyuan, Chinese Buddhist monk. Born to a literati family named Jia in Yanmen (Shanxi province), Huiyuan went to Henan at the age of thirteen to study both the Confucian classics and the *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi*. When he was twenty he met the eminent Buddhist monk Dao'an (312–385), whose personality and explanation of the philosophy of the "perfection of wisdom" (Skt., *prajñāpāramitā*) impressed him so much that he embraced Buddhism and became his disciple. He remained with Dao'an for twenty-four years, residing mostly at Xiangyang. In 378 the invading Qin army forced master and disciple to separate. Huiyuan went south and eventually settled on Mount Lü in Jiangxi, where one of his colleagues from his days in Xiangyang, Huiyong, interceded on his behalf to have the Donglin Monastery built for him around 384. He remained there until his death thirty years later.

The Donglin Monastery soon became the most famous center of Buddhism in southern China and continued to be so for several centuries after Huiyuan's death. Much of this prestige derived from the high esteem in which Huiyuan was held by the courts of the Eastern Jin dynasty in the South and the Yao Qin dynasty in the North, and by local rulers, who regarded him as the bulwark and paragon of Buddhist virtue. Huiyuan was active as a scholar and proponent of Buddhism, improving its status in China by increasing the number of texts available in translation and by defending the religion against its opponents. He sent certain of his disciples west to gather scriptures, of which over two hundred were eventually translated. He was also involved in the activities of many translators, three of whom represented three important tendencies in Buddhism: Saṃghadeva (Abhidharma texts), Buddhahadra (*dhyāna* texts), and Kumārajīva (Mādhyamika texts). In 404, in response to the anti-Buddhist policies of Huan Xuan, the usurper of the Eastern

Jin, Huiyuan elaborated his position on church-state relations in his influential *The Śramaṇa Does Not Pay Homage to the Ruler*. Here he argued that of the two groups in Buddhism, the laity and the clergy, the former is subject to temporal authority but not the latter, since its members had abandoned society for nonworldly ends.

Huiyuan also enjoyed enormous popularity among the gentry of South China, for it was to this group that he primarily directed his literary efforts. Some thirty of his works, in the form of letters, essays, prefaces, eulogies, or inscriptions, are extant. Unlike Dao'an, who primarily wrote commentaries for the Buddhist clergy, Huiyuan addressed issues that most concerned the gentry: rebirth, the immortality of the soul, the doctrine of *karman*, and the nature of the *dharmakāya*. His previous classical training made him successful in explaining these concepts in terms of the philosophical outlook of the Chinese elite, which at the time was dominated by *xuanxue* ("dark learning") speculations into the underlying source (*ben*) of phenomena. That he never once quoted a Buddhist sūtra by name but made numerous allusions to the Confucian classics attests to his fervent desire to bring Buddhism into the mainstream of Chinese spiritual and intellectual life. Modern scholars have identified certain areas in which Huiyuan's understanding of important Buddhist concepts deviates from that of the Indian texts. They have attributed this both to his concern to present Buddhist notions in a form comprehensible to the Chinese, as in his postulation of a cosmic soul (*shen*) as a means of explaining the process of rebirth, or to his frank inability in some instances to master the subtleties of Buddhist doctrine. This is particularly evident in his treatment of the Mādhyamika concepts introduced into China by Kumārajīva. Huiyuan's correspondence with this, perhaps the greatest of all Buddhist translators, is one of our richest sources of information on the development of Buddhist thought in fifth-century China.

Among Huiyuan's many accomplishments, his devotional group probably had the most enduring influence on Chinese Buddhism. In 402 Huiyuan and 123 lay and clerical disciples gathered before an image of the Buddha Amitābha and made a collective vow to be reborn together in his Pure Land. Huiyuan's devotional group served as a model for the lay-based Buddhist societies of the mid-Tang and Song periods, the most well known of which is the White Lotus Society of the early twelfth century. This group claimed to take its name from that of Huiyuan's confraternity; modern scholarship, however, has shown the name to be of later origin. The deliberate evocation of Huiyuan's legacy some eight hundred years after his death, however, attests vividly to his enduring prestige in the Chinese Buddhist community. His influence continues to be acknowledged by the Pure Land traditions of both China and Japan, which have traditionally regarded Huiyuan as their founder and first patriarch.

**SEE ALSO** Dao'an; Jingtu; Kumārajīva; Millenarianism, article on Chinese Millenarian Movements.

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KENNETH TANAKA (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**HUIJWĪRĪ, AL-** (d. AH 469?/1076? CE), more fully 'Alī ibn 'Uthmān ibn 'Alī al-Jullābī al-Ghaznawī al-Hujwīrī, was the author of *Kashf al-mahjūb* (The unveiling of the secrets), a very early textbook of Sufism in the Persian language. Almost all the facts of al-Hujwīrī's life that can be trusted come from what he says about himself and his contemporaries in the *Kashf al-mahjūb*. His name relates that he was a native of Ghaznīn; Jullāb and Hujwīr were apparently quarters of that town. From the descriptions of his contemporaries, it is clear that he was born around the beginning of the eleventh century. He studied Sufism with Abū al-Faḍl Muḥammad Khuṭṭalī and read some other sciences with Abū al-'Abbās al-Ashqānī. Al-Hujwīrī traveled widely through Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Syria as a dervish, staying in Sūfī hospices (*khānqāhs*) and apparently subsisting on alms. For the first eleven years that he was a mystic, he says, he had been preserved from marriage; but then either a marriage or a love affair (for the words are not clear) created a dangerous diversion, although he was able to escape after one year. By the time he wrote the *Kashf al-mahjūb* he had already composed as many as

nine works, all of which, except for a collection of verses (*dīwān*), were devoted to mysticism and ethics. Of these none has survived.

Contrary to later tradition, al-Hujwīrī does not seem to have had a single spiritual guide (pir), and certainly his visit to Lahore, to judge from his own words, was not at this unnamed pir's orders. He says that he was separated from his books in Ghaznīn and forced to be (*giriftār*) among strangers (*nājinsān*) in Lahore. The use of the past tense suggests that he was no longer in Lahore when he was writing the *Kashf al-mahjūb*, and from a passage on contemporary saints it would seem that he was then in Ghaznīn. His tomb in Lahore is, therefore, not likely to be genuine. The traditional year of his death (AH 465) inscribed on this tomb is probably not far wrong, however, though Nicholson believes that he might have died within the next four years.

Al-Hujwīrī's *Kashf al-mahjūb* became a classic text for later Persian and Indian Sufism, partly because of its comprehensive nature, partly because of its moderation, and partly because of its eclecticism. Al-Hujwīrī wrote when many of the later elements of Sufism—the erotic concept of relationship with God, the total submission to the pir (leading to the "chain" of teachers, or *silsilah*), and the doctrine of pantheism—were either subdued or held only in secret. These are, therefore, not prominent in the text, though, as in the section on Maṣṣūr al-Ḥallāj, al-Hujwīrī shows himself capable of both rejecting and tolerating pantheism; elsewhere he attempts a distinction between *maḥabbah* and *'ishq* to grapple with the tendency toward eroticism. The separate Sūfī discipline, of which the pir was later to become the kingpin, is boldly elaborated: The life of poverty, acceptance of alms, the patched garment, the practice of verse recitation (*samā'*), even the trend toward celibacy, are all expounded, though always with a willingness to state or even tolerate contrary opinions. In his treatment of the *ḥājj*, he expresses the same curious reserve toward the actual performance of that ritual as is found in subsequent Sūfī tradition.

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**HUMAN BODY**

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

MYTHS AND SYMBOLISM  
HUMAN BODIES, RELIGION, AND GENDER  
HUMAN BODIES, RELIGION, AND ART



## HUMAN BODY: MYTHS AND SYMBOLISM

One of the great intellectual and spiritual problems throughout human history has been posed by the fact that certain material substances, which are now termed “organic,” possess life, while other matter does not. The observation that some things eat, drink, grow, and reproduce for a finite period of time, then cease to do so, prompts fundamental inquiries into the nature of life and death, time and change, meaning and meaninglessness, and also gives rise to speculation about the nature of living substances—specifically as to what it is that sets them apart from those that are dead and inert. Such speculations, until the very recent past, were hardly confined to technical issues of biochemistry and biophysics. Rather, physiology entailed the study of life, humanity, and the universe; as such, it had always a profoundly religious dimension.

Although there have been countless different systems of religio-physiological speculation that enjoyed currency at one time and place or another, two general patterns are particularly well attested and noteworthy for the pointed way in which they frame the problematic of organic matter. These are the dualism of body and soul (which radically differentiates the life principle from all else) and the homologization of microcosm and macrocosm (which systematically correlates the body with the world outside).

With regard to the first, dualistic physiology posits a radical distinction between base matter and some nonmaterial life principle which inheres only within certain material aggregates for a period of finite duration. The entry of this life principle—be it defined as soul, spirit, breath, warmth, or the like—vivifies and energizes the matter in which it resides; when it departs, death is the result. Such a dualism is implicit in the familiar account of the creation of the first human being in *Genesis* 2:7, where the body is carefully differentiated from the life principle, with only the latter deriving directly from Yahveh himself: “Then the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being.”

Such a dualism inevitably connotes a devaluation of the body in relation to the life principle. To a certain extent, the two are contrasted to one another so that soul is to body as sacred is to profane. The logic of this analogy, however, demands a mythology, cosmology, and metaphysics that attempt to resolve the questions of how and why a divine, immaterial life principle can reside within a profane material body, and what the ultimate fate of this life principle may be. *Genesis* posits an earthly origin for the body of the first man (whose very name, *Adam*, “clay,” underscores this fact) and a divine origin for his life principle, breathed into him by a benevolent creator. The analysis of death in Hebrew scripture follows as a corollary to this, for the body is returned to the dust from which it came, while the life force is breathed back to God with the final (literal) expiration (*Ecl.* 12:7, *Ps.* 104:29).

A more emphatically dualistic understanding of the human condition, supported by a much more elaborate mythology and cosmology, is to be found in the Manichaean system. Although the details differ somewhat from one textual source to another, the basic outlines of Mani’s views are reasonably consistent throughout. Within Mani’s universe, two realms initially stood separate from one another, these being characterized sometimes as the realms of light and darkness, good and evil, God and matter, or the truth and the lie. From the realm of light, it is told there ventured forth a being, a son of God, known as Primeval Man, Ohrmazd, and by other names. This figure took with him his own five sons, who were the beneficent elements of air, wind, light, water, and fire (but note the absence of earth!), and he attached these elements to his body in order that they might serve as armor to protect him. His expedition, however, ended in defeat, and as a result particles of light came to be intermixed with dark, gross, earthly matter. As one Manichaean hymn describes it:

Angry became Āz [“Desire”],  
that evil mother of all demons,  
and she made a heavy disturbance  
for the sake of helping herself.  
And of the dirt of the demons  
and of the filth of the she-demons  
she made this body,  
and she herself entered it.  
Then from the five Elements of Light,  
the armor of Lord Ohrmazd,  
she formed the good soul  
and fettered it into the body.  
She made it like one blind and deaf,  
unconscious and deceived,  
that he at first might not know  
his true origin and family.  
She created the body and prison,  
and fettered the grieved soul. (trans. Jes P. Asmussen)

The problem that then faced Manichaeans was how to regain knowledge of the origin and true nature of the light within them, how to separate it from the disgusting bodily matter with which it was now commingled, and how to return it—along with as many other light particles as possible—to the celestial realm of light. In pursuit of salvation, the Manichaean elect were called upon to purify themselves through meditation, sexual abstinence, withdrawal from normal labor, and a fascinating set of dietary practices. Above all, their prescribed diet emphasized items that were extremely light in color, such as melons and cucumbers, for these were considered to have within them many particles of light. Proper ingestion was thus understood to be the absorption of light, while defecation was the voiding of dark matter. Over time the elect was expected to modify the mixture of darkness and light within his body in favor of the latter, in preparation for the ascent of this concentrated light to its primordial, heavenly home. Bodily processes thus, ironically,

became the mechanism for salvation from the bodily prison. Turning to the second general pattern of religio-physiological speculation, one may take as an example of the homologization of microcosm and macrocosm the general Indo-European system of creation mythology. This system rests upon two elegantly symmetrical myths: a cosmogony, in which is described the creation of the universe from the body of the first man; and an anthropogony, describing the creation of the first man out of parts of the universe. Germanic sources offer excellent examples of both. Consider, for instance, this cosmogonic account:

From Ymir's flesh the earth was made  
and from his sweat, the sea;  
  
Mountains from his bones, trees from his hair,  
and heaven from his skull.  
  
From his brows built the gentle gods  
Midgard for the sons of men;  
  
And from his brain shaped they all the clouds,  
Which were hard in mood. (*Grímnismál* 40–41)

Although the following anthropogonic account exhibits a superficial Christianization, having been written in the fifteenth century CE, the bulk of its contents derive from the pre-Christian tradition, as is seen from the way it preserves the same pattern as the pagan cosmogony cited above:

God made the first man—that was Adam—from eight transformations: his bone from stone, his flesh from earth, his blood from water, his heart from wind, his thoughts from clouds, his sweat from dew, the locks of his hair from grass, and his eyes from the sun. (Code of Emsig)

What is established in texts such as these—Indic, Iranian, Baltic, Slavic, Greek, Roman, and Celtic parallels could also be adduced—is the fundamental consubstantiality of the human body and the universe. The intent of these myths is to demonstrate in convincing detail that the cosmos is composed of the very same matter as is the body, and vice versa, the only difference between the two being one of scale. Flesh, for instance, is only the small-scale version of soil, and stone the large-scale version of bones, the two latter being the dense hard matter located within earth and flesh, respectively. A less obvious homology is that between brain and clouds, which seems to rest upon three perceived similarities: location in the upper regions of the body or world, crenellated shape, and quasi insubstantiality (although this last is more appropriate to thoughts than to the brain itself).

Like flesh and earth or bones and stones, brain and clouds were understood to be alloforms—alternative incarnations—of one another. In all, nine sets of alloformic homologies, beyond the general one of body/universe, may be confidently reconstructed for the Indo-European system: flesh/earth, bone/stone, hair/grass, blood/water, eyes/sun, mind/moon, brain/cloud, skull/rim of heaven, and breath/wind. These detailed homologies gave concrete expression to a sweeping religious vision in which the unity of humanity

and the cosmos, of matter and spirit were resoundingly affirmed; they also provided the basic building blocks for a variety of ritual actions.

Among these rituals, one of the most important was sacrifice. This was no mere gift exchange but a ceremony in which the very cosmos was sustained as matter drawn from the bodily parts of the victim was transformed into its macrocosmic alloform, replenishing and renewing thereby the universe, in repetition of the cosmogony: bones became stones, flesh became earth, and so on. Healing rituals were also based upon knowledge of the homologic relation between body and cosmos. Broken bones might thus be knit by the introduction of matter drawn from stones, flesh injuries healed by application of earth, and loss of hair reversed by rubbing plants into the scalp—as is attested in an Indic charm, in which the priest addresses first the plant to be used and then the patient:

You are a goddess, born upon the divine earth, O Plant!  
We dig you now, you who stretch downward, in order to  
make the hairs firm.

Make the old ones firm; cause to be born those which are  
still unborn, and make those which have been born grow  
longer.

That hair of yours which falls out, and that which is  
cut off with its roots still attached—

This now I sprinkle with the all-healing herb!  
(*Atharvaveda* 6.136)

The posited efficacy of this cure rests on the alloformic relation of hair and plants. Plants were taken to be nothing other than an alternative form for the same matter also present in hair, and the knowledgeable priest could ritually transform this matter back into hair when the need arose. Traces of this ideology and ritual persist today in the enduring popularity of herbal shampoos, conditioners, and hair tonics.

The same physiological views that gave rise to such cures for baldness inform more serious questions of life and death, for at death, bodily matter was taken to be transformed into its macrocosmic counterparts, again in repetition of cosmogonic events. Witness this Middle Persian text:

There are five collectors, receptacles of the corporeal substance of those who have died. One is the earth, which is the keeper of flesh and bone and sinew. The second is water, which is the keeper of blood. The third is the plants, preservers of bodily hair and the hair of the head. The fourth is light, the recipient of fire. Last is the wind, which is the life-breath of creatures at the time of the Renovation. (*Zadspram* 34.3–7)

The Renovation (*Frashokereti*) referred to in the last line of this passage is the eschaton, the moment of world renewal and final purification. The reference is a pointed one, for among the culminating events of this end time is the resurrection (Pahl., *ristāxēz*) of the dead, a process that reverses that of death, taking matter from its macrocosmic incarnation and restoring it to bodily existence; this is spelled out



in another Middle Persian source, which states that in order to accomplish the resurrection “Ohrmazd [the Wise Lord] summons bone from the earth, blood from the water, hair from the plants, and life-breath from the wind” (*Pahlavi Rivāyat accompanying Dādīstān i dīnīg* 48.55).

If death repeats the cosmogony of this system, it is also apparent that resurrection repeats the anthropogony. Bodily incarnation is but one phase of an eternal existence, in which the same material substance moves from body to cosmos to body to cosmos ad infinitum, death and (re)birth being but moments of transition. Knowledge of the body thus amounts to knowledge of the universe, from which it is inseparable and of which it is the counterpart. Moreover, reverence for one amounts to reverence for the other.

In presenting these two systems—body-soul dualism and homology of microcosm and macrocosm—we have focused on attitudes toward and analyses of the origin, nature, and destiny of the body: on the material body as a topic for speculation. But one must also consider the body as a metaphor and a means of communication, for in addition to its being a topic for thought, the body is also a medium for expression. Highly visible to others, the body is something social as well as material, something that does not simply exist but acts and speaks as well. Displayed, viewed, commented upon, criticized, and interpreted, bodies provide powerful vehicles for the discussion of cultural norms and values.

Among the Navajo of the American Southwest, for example, central cultural values are elegantly summarized within the multiple usages of the term *hózhó*, the semantic range of which spans social norms and etiquette, health and healing, ethics, religion, and aesthetics. Usually translated “beauty,” *hózhó* denotes something considerably broader than its English equivalent, referring specifically to a state of order, harmony, dynamic balance, and well-being—in short, all that is desirable and makes life pleasant, stable, interesting, and worthwhile. Yet the translation “beauty” is more a condensation than an oversimplification, for it is possession of these qualities that, according to the Navajo, makes and marks anything as beautiful.

Given such a view, physical beauty is quite naturally highly valued, for it is understood to be the visible form produced by an inner state, specifically by that inner state that makes a person cooperative, dependable, productive, and beneficial to others. Moreover, such beauty is contagious, and can be transmitted from one person to another. That is to say, one who is at peace with himself/herself, possessing a balanced, well-ordered (*hózhó*) mental and emotional state, communicates this to others, leading them to relax and enjoy the same well-being, which they may then transmit to still others. That physical beauty may also be transmitted follows as a natural corollary of this line of thought, and a regular feature of a Navajo woman’s initiation ritual is the “molding” of the initiand by an older woman who is recognized as beautiful in the fullest sense of the word. By the pressure of her body—applied in strenuous massages—and by the

force of her personality, this woman is expected to shape the body and life of the young woman so that she too will enjoy and exhibit *hózhó*.

Costume and adornment may also carry *hózhó* and transmit it, as is most clearly stated regarding silver jewelry. These objects will be beautiful only if they have been made by artisans who are in a state of *hózhó*, the visible beauty of the objects being the result and expression of their makers’ inner beauty. Worn proudly, they communicate balance, rhythm, energy, order, and stability to those who wear them and to any who behold them, transforming their lives and making them more beautiful in the process.

Body decoration is also an important means for communicating cultural values and transforming life experience throughout New Guinea, as is evident, for instance, in the Mount Hagen area, where such practices have been intensively studied by Andrew and Marilyn Strathern (1971). For all important public occasions, Mount Hageners decorate their faces with brilliant painted patterns, and their bodies with oils, shells, plumes, furs, wigs, and fancy aprons. Most of these items are obtained through trade or loan, and involve the wearer in a complex system of socioeconomic bonds, the successful maintenance of which is indispensable in putting together an impressive costume. Moreover, the wearing of such a costume is a public display of one’s success in establishing and maintaining the friendship, kinship, marital, and trading relations necessary for costuming and for life. Nor is body decoration merely the proud display of past success in these relations; it is also a means to ensure future success, especially in marriage and trade, for an effective costume is understood to be one that is attractive—that literally attracts future wives and trading partners to the wearer.

It should be stressed that among Mount Hageners, body decoration is not an individualistic display born of personal ambition or vanity. Rather, it is something undertaken by a corporate group, most often a clan, who paint their faces and arrange their ornaments for a given occasion in accordance with a prearranged pattern set by a “Big Man.” Within the clan, members compete to produce the finest costume while adhering to the common pattern, but they also compete as a group against other clans for the prestige of having the finest decorations. Success in such competition can come only when the clan has the support of its ancestral spirits, and such support is ensured by two methods. First, sacrifices to the ancestors are offered prior to any occasion of public display, thereby cementing good relations between the living and the dead. Second, good relations among clansmen must also be maintained, for the ancestors are outraged by moral failings and friction within the clan group, and will withhold their support should these be present.

In the Mount Hagen area, then, not only is it true that body decoration is a means for announcing and commenting upon social values, but the set of rituals and beliefs associated with body decoration serves as a buttress for those values. As the Stratherns cogently argue:

The two central values are clan solidarity and prestige, and individual wealth and well-being. This suggests why it is so appropriate that Hageners decorate *themselves* for it is men and women as persons who remain the points of reference of these values. This is not to deny that the value of group solidarity could be expressed in many other ways, for example by cult buildings or statues. But decorations and dancing provide an excellent mechanism for demonstrating both of the two values together. Moreover, the values are to some extent complementary rather than opposed. . . . Hageners hold, in fact, that in this context the prestige of the clan coincides with that of its members. It is themselves that they decorate, for it is through men's personal achievements that renown is brought to them and their clan alike. (Strathern and Strathern, 1971, pp. 172–173)

The Navajo and Mount Hagen examples and others like them are particularly important for showing the rich and varied ways in which the body may be used to articulate and activate complex systems of thought and values. At a more general—and thus, of necessity, more superficial—level, certain recurrent patterns of symbolic discourse centered on the body have been identified and analyzed, Raymond Firth, for instance, has singled out four general styles of body symbolism, which may be termed the gestural, the membral, the reliquary, and the corporate, although Firth himself does not make use of these (or any other) specific identifying terms.

Gestural symbolism, for its part, involves the use of an individual actor's body in a deliberately chosen stance or motion to express an attitude or idea, as, for instance, when one kneels in prayer or submission as a means of acknowledging the superior power and stature of some other being, while simultaneously showing one's humility in the face of that being. In contrast, membral symbolism is utilized more in speech acts than in bodily action, for it employs reference to a specific bodily part in order to make statements about abstract personal qualities, as in the common metaphors "big-hearted" (generous) or "silver-tongued" (eloquent). Reliquary symbolism is related to both gestural and membral symbolism in certain ways. Like the latter, it makes use of bodily parts rather than bodily wholes, but like the former, it employs a real body rather than an imagined or metaphorical one. In specific, in reliquary symbolism a piece of the body of some revered figure—a saint, prophet, ancestor, or lover, to cite a few possibilities—becomes the focal object for one's emotional attachment, as with a lock of hair worn around the neck or a saint's enshrined remains.

Most interesting and important, however, is the corporate pattern, in which the entire human body is presented as a model or replica of the social "body," with detailed resemblances between the constituent units of society and the bodily members. Political leaders or others in positions of primacy may thus be described as the "head," "heart," or "backbone" of society, as a means to describe the ways in which they direct, vivify, or support the social grouping. More unusual is the way in which a Roman legend, the so-

called Apologue of Menenius Agrippa, employs corporate imagery. The story, as told by Livy and others, is that at a certain moment in Roman history, the lower classes of society (the plebes) withdrew from the city of Rome, outraged at their exploitation by the ruling Patrician class. Unwilling to confront them militarily—for victory or defeat would be equally disastrous—the Patricians sent an ambassador, one Menenius Agrippa, who recounted the following parable to the rebellious orders:

There was a time when man's bodily parts did not agree in unity, as they do now, but individual limbs had their own opinions and their own powers of speech. Then, the other parts were outraged at having to work for the belly, while the belly rested idly, savoring their delicious gifts. So they plotted that the hands would not take food to the mouth, the mouth wouldn't swallow, and the teeth wouldn't chew. As a result, they starved the belly and all of them wasted away together. It thereby became apparent that the belly is no idler, but just as others feed it, it feeds the rest of the body. (Livy, 2.32.9–11)

Debate here centers on whether the upper classes are parasitic or not, an issue discussed through body symbolism; the parable asks how the belly shall be understood, but it is evident from the frame-story that the real issue is how society will be ordered.

Often, corporate symbolism is used to charter and legitimate social stratification, as in the celebrated Vedic creation hymn, *Rgveda* 10.90 (see especially verses 11–12), in which priests are said to have been created from the first man's mouth, warriors and kings from his arms, the class of food producers and merchants from his thighs, and the servant class from his feet. Similar systems are found in Slavic and Greek texts (the *Poem on the Dove King* and Plato's *Timaeus* 69d–70a and *Republic* 431a–d), although certain details differ. In all cases, however, the position of the dominant social class—numerically smallest but greatest in power and prestige—is justified by comparison to a bodily part (usually the head, sometimes an organ within the head, like the mouth or brain) that is smaller than other bodily parts, representing other social classes, but is placed vertically above them and enjoys some measure of executive control over them. Through this use of corporate imagery, the social order is represented as if it were a natural, thus inviolable, order.

On the horizontal plane, as on the vertical, corporate imagery is also regularly used to represent and reinforce social hierarchies. The polarity of right and left (dextrous and sinister) is here a dominant symbol, by use of which subordination of women to men or of radicals to reactionaries, to cite but two examples, may conveniently be coded. The power of such imagery derives in large measure from the numerous polarities to which right and left are consistently associated, among them light/dark, even/odd, hand used in eating/hand used after defecation, culture/nature, purity/pollution, and sacred/profane.

The distinction between what is inside the body and what is outside is also crucial for countless systems of corporate symbolism that stress the difference between what is self and what is alien, what is contained and what is not, what ordered and what chaotic. Reflections on bodily images of inside and outside, moreover, give rise to the extremely thorny problematic of mediation, for there are certain places—the bodily orifices—where inside and outside meet, and certain substances—food and bodily products of all sorts (urine, feces, tears, sexual fluids, saliva, mucus, pus)—which pass from outside to inside or vice versa. Attitudes toward, and proscribed behaviors (taboos) regarding, these interstitial places and products may thus serve as a means for expressing and working out attitudes toward other borders—social, political, ethnic, taxonomic, or broadly cognitive—as has been forcefully argued by Mary Douglas (1966).

It would be a relatively simple matter to multiply examples almost endlessly for these and other patterns of body symbolism and speculation upon the nature of the body, so widespread have they been. Any thorough study of the religious significance of the body ought to include discussions of systems of physical discipline and the overcoming of fleshly existence, as found in Yoga, among the Jains, and within branches of Christian monasticism; attempts at the winning of bodily immortality as in Daoist and Western alchemy; and systems of bodily ornamentation and expression such as tattooing, scarification, dance, and masquerade. It is important to bear in mind that rich examples may as easily be drawn from one's own culture as from exotic realms, a point delightfully made in Horace Miner's classic essay "Body Ritual among the Nacirema" (1956), in which he describes the cultic significance of such Nacirema (*American* spelled backward) customs as the brushing of teeth and the use of deodorants. Nor is Miner's point mere satire; the rituals and ideology of European and American bodybuilders, dancers, dieters, joggers, healthcare professionals, and fashion designers might well stand comparison to those of the Manichaeans, Navajo, or Mount Hageners.

**SEE ALSO** Bodily Marks; Clothing; Eye; Feet; Hair; Hands; Head; Heart; Knees; Nudity; Phallus and Vagina; Postures and Gestures; Relics; Soul; Yoni.

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## HUMAN BODY: HUMAN BODIES, RELIGION, AND GENDER

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) famously described human beings as sick animals, caught between the apparent transcendence of rationality and the immanent reality of being physical creatures that need food to survive, that defecate, that reproduce through sexual intercourse, and who will die. While one need not accept all Freud's claims, this distinction between two different types of human experience provides a useful starting point for exploring the historical development of ideas concerning the relationship between the human body, religion, and gender. While Freud is at pains to accept the significance of the body (and particularly sexuality) for human self-understanding, in effect questioning the extent to which rationality can be understood as the defining feature of human being, other interpretations of these different experiences have tended to undervalue or belittle physicality. Religious theorizing has made a consistent separation between the intellect and the body, the spiritual and the physical. This distinction is particularly notable in the Western tradition, although by no means exclusive to it. Here, the religious division of existence into that which is "sacred" and that which is "profane" is underpinned by an equally persistent philosophical theory of the human person as consisting of two unequal properties. For Plato (c. 428–347 BCE), the true self is equated with the soul (see *Phaedo*), an idea that is built upon by René Descartes (1596–1650) in his division of the human subject into a mind whose existence can be proved, and a body whose existence is subject to doubt (see *The Second Meditation*).

**THE BODY IN CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS OF PERSONHOOD.** Twentieth-century developments in the philosophy of mind, most notably in the work of Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), challenged this dualistic understanding of the human person that distinguishes "mind" from body and values the former at the expense of the latter. Significantly, feminists have added to this analysis by exposing the unspoken gender assumptions that lie beneath the dualistic construction of the human person. Historically, the visually obvious role that the female plays in reproduction has led to her consistent identification with

the body and the processes of nature. At the same time, the male has been equated with the mind and rationality, and spirituality has been defined in terms of those elements that transcend the natural world. In such a context, it is perhaps not surprising that the desire to impose order upon nature, or perhaps to evade nature entirely, has disproportionately affected women, as control of the female can easily be conflated with control of nature itself. And just as the attributes associated with the male have been equated with the spiritual realm, so it can be argued that the concept of the divine has been created in the image of those masculine values conceived as distinguishable from the potentially chaotic forces of the natural world.

Recent philosophical and theological theorists have begun seeking a return to the body, taking seriously human physicality and refusing to see the body as a disposable container for the human soul. In such a context, issues such as gender and race are revealed as significant indicators for the way in which human beings have understood their placing in the world. At the same time as attention is being directed towards the body, postmodern theorists have challenged any attempt to understand the body in a straightforwardly "natural" or obvious way. The body, like every other aspect of human life and society, is subject to "infinitely variable social constructions" (Coakley, 1997, p. 3). One cannot separate "the body" from its cultural representation.

An analysis of the history of religion in this context is particularly significant, for in the guise of addressing the issues that arise from being a physical being, particular and exacting disciplines have been imposed upon what has been taken to be a potentially unruly and dangerous site of experience. Michel Foucault (1926–1984) has argued that the sexual character of the body has itself been shaped by political intervention. More often than not, women have been associated primarily with the physical, and as such the female body has been disproportionately affected by the attempts of the religious to control the body.

**THE FEMALE BODY IN RELIGIOUS WRITINGS.** According to Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), religion is best understood in terms of its social function. Religious practices and beliefs function as part of the attempt made by human beings to impose order upon the apparently chaotic world of nature. The body is not exempt from this attempt to distinguish what is pure, ordered, and thus holy from what is dirty, disordered, and impure. As the anthropologist Mary Douglas points out, ideas of holiness and social order are closely related to the symbol of the body. The body stands as a symbol for society, and "its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious" (Douglas, 2000, p. 142). In seeking to impose order on their surroundings, human beings render as problematic that which defies order, and this is particularly true of the human body that stands as a microcosm for the world. The discharges of the body, immune to any attempt at ordering, are thus seen as potentially defiling, and in need of careful control (Douglas, 2000, p. 64).

While male and female bodies are both subject to various forms of discharge and excreta, the female body has been associated most intimately with the perceived dangers of discharges (notably menstruation) and has been subjected to all forms of religious stricture and control. Indeed, it can be argued that a pessimistic attitude to the body as a means of achieving spiritual fulfillment leads irrevocably to misogyny. For example, the Hindu *Laws of Manu* (6.76–7) states that the body is “foul-smelling” and “filled with urine and excrement,” and this fundamentally pessimistic attitude toward the body is coupled, argues Wendy Doniger, with an explicit misogyny. Excrement is indeed a popular metaphor for the hidden dangers of the female that crosses religious and cultural boundaries. For Nāgārjuna (second century CE), one of the greatest thinkers of Mahāyāna Buddhism, one who lies with a woman may think that he lies with the most beautiful of creatures, but in fact he “merely lies on top of a woman’s bladder” (Williams, 1997, p. 210). In almost identical fashion, the Christian Saint Odo of Cluny (c. 878–942 CE) notes that “to embrace a woman is to embrace a sack of manure.”

“Dirt is dangerous,” as Douglas points out (2000, p. xi), but to categorize bodily emissions as “dangerous” simultaneously suggests something of their power, and goes some way toward explaining the attitude towards the female in many religious traditions. In prehistoric times, a strong association seems to have been made between the female body and the processes of fertility. Small statuettes of female figures portrayed with large breasts, pregnant stomachs, and prominently marked genitals have been found dating back to Paleolithic times. While the ability to reproduce suggests something of women’s ability to create (for cultures that probably did not fully understand the male role in reproduction, seemingly *ex nihilo*), the attempt to control such power has led to taboos being constructed around both menstruation and birth. Menstruation was, and in some cases remains, subject to rigid practices in most religions. In Orthodox Judaism, a menstruating woman is kept separate from contact with male family members. In Hinduism, both menstrual blood and the blood of birthing are considered unclean. In Christianity, menstruation is described as “the curse,” punishment for the disobedience of Eve, and in medieval times a menstruating woman was not allowed to participate in the Eucharist.

Feminist scholars suggest that this suspicion of the female body and its apparently unruly but also awe-inspiring nature lies at the heart of patriarchal attempts to control the natural world. For Rosemary Ruether “patriarchal religion is built on many millennia of repressed fear of the power of female bodily processes” (quoted in Joseph, 1990, p. 18). Naomi Goldenberg develops such reflections, suggesting that religion arises as “a result of the sustained practise of gender,” for men can, in these cultural arenas, “safely pretend to be women, especially in regard to matters of nurture and reproduction” (Goldenberg, 1998, pp. 193, 199). Under this reading, men envy the power of women to procreate, and re-

ligious systems provide a symbolic setting where they can pretend that they are, in fact, the life-givers.

Goldenberg’s theory goes some way toward offering an explanation for the ambivalence shown towards women in the various world religions. As has been noted, the female body has been seen as potentially dangerous, its “unruly nature” subject to a range of taboos: yet at the same time women’s bodies have also been praised for their virginal and maternal qualities. In Christianity, this veneration gains its supreme expression in the figure of the Virgin Mary, who stands as the embodiment of both. Yet far from forcing an engagement with what it means to be a sexual being, Mary is invariably constructed in theological discourse as an asexual woman, neutered and rendered safe by an overarching male hierarchy. She poses little challenge to patriarchal definitions of what it is to be a woman: she is, after all, defined according to her perceived sexual status and her relationship to the men in her life, be they human or divine. Simultaneously, she provides “real” women with an impossible ideal to emulate: she is the virgin who is also a mother. Indeed, reflection on Mary suggests an apparent distortion in understandings of what it means to be an embodied being that is brought into play by the Christian account of sin.

In the religions of classical antiquity, notions of virginity were not necessarily associated with the bodily integrity of an unbroken hymen: to call a goddess “virgin” was simply to highlight the autonomy of the deity, who was perceived as being beyond the control of men. Thus Artemis and Athena are virgin goddesses not primarily because they “know not man” but because they are not constrained by male power. Once the idea of original sin, transmitted through the sexual act, became the orthodox Christian position, explicated in its fullest form by Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE), virginity takes on an altogether different hue, becoming the way *par excellence* of being spiritual. In such a context, the woman who gives expression to her sexuality is particularly problematic, for she moves outside not simply male control but also the divine order.

Even the apparently safe construction of woman as mother is not altogether removed from the sleight of sin. Childbirth is not enough to remove the inherited guilt of being a daughter of Eve, the first seductress of man. In part, this theological underpinning explains the ritual of “churching” women after childbirth. A Christian form of the purification rite that was prescribed for new mothers in *Leviticus* 12, contemporary forms emphasize the aspect of thanksgiving for the safe delivery of a child. Yet the liturgical emphasis is on the status of the maternal body rather than upon that of either baby or father, suggesting that it is the potentially polluting power of the maternal body that must be addressed and rendered safe by the appropriate religious rite.

The ambiguity felt towards the mother is not peculiar to Christianity. In the Indian tradition, the goddess Kālī expresses the power of the mother both to sustain and annihilate. A manifestation of the mother goddess Devī, she is in-



variably represented as a dark goddess, wearing a girdle of dead men's hands or penises, her face and breasts covered in blood. As such, she provides a subversion of the constraining, conventional formulation of motherhood in the Indian tradition. This terrifying apparition gives expression to the deep-seated fears of the maternal power to consume as well as to succor. For feminists like Vrinda Dalmiya, Kālī provides a model for challenging and confronting the forces that shape patriarchal constructions of motherhood.

Kālī provides an explicit image of the consistent connection that has been made between women and death. The ability to give birth is not conceived in a straightforwardly positive way, for just as the mother gives life, so she also introduces the child to the world of decay and death. Samuel Beckett (1906–1989) expresses succinctly the perceived ambiguity of the mother: Women “give birth astride a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more” (*Waiting for Godot*, 1953, Act II). In her role as progenitrix of the species, woman stands at the boundary between life and death. Existence is never only about being, for it also contains the inevitability of nonbeing. Paradoxically, then, emphasizing the role of the female body in reproduction exposes a further connection between woman and death. The desire to instigate control over the terrifying world of fecundity, change, and decay has already been noted. Indeed, recognizing mortality can lead to a desire to evade the physical, and even the most cursory glimpse at the history of religion suggests that the connection between sexuality and mortality has been developed in such a way as to suggest that by resisting the former the consequences of the latter might be, if not avoided, at least brought under control. In early Sufism, sex was seen as that which disturbed “the pure surrender of the soul” to God. Resistance to the sexual was mirrored in a tacit disgust for women that reflected the disgust felt towards the world that got between the soul and its God. Woman was “the world” for she was an integral part of the process of physical renewal (Schimmel, 1997).

Reflection on gender is of crucial significance at this point, for rather than see sexuality as a fundamental part of what it is to be human (or even *male*) this troubling feature has been consistently projected onto the female. Spirituality in diverse traditions becomes less an engagement with the facts that emerge from accepting that we are creatures that will die, and more an attempt to evade the realm of the body personified by woman. Even Buddhist thought, uncompromising in its attempt to engage with the facts of mortality, is not immune from this process of identifying woman with the spiritual death that comes from valuing physical things. Thus the Buddha is reported to have said:

It would be better, foolish man, to put your male organ into the mouth of a terrible and poisonous snake than into a woman. . . . It would be better, foolish man, to put it into a blazing, burning, red-hot charcoal pit than into a woman. Why? On account of *that*, foolish man, you might die, or suffer deathly agony, but that would not cause you to pass, at the breaking up of the body

after death, to a lower rebirth, a bad destiny, to ruin, to hell. But on account of this, foolish man, [you may].  
(*Vinaya* III 19)

Danger is associated with women's sexuality rather than with the sexual desires of the man himself, although often such negative comments on the female body are accompanied by the proviso that “your own [male] body is as filthy as a woman's” (Nāgārjuna, quoted in Williams, 1997, p. 211). Despite such comments, connecting the female body with the perceived problems of the body and sexuality in general gives the impression that these features are female rather than male, and thus avoiding the female can help the male to overcome these dangers. The debates surrounding the ordination of women to the priesthood of the Anglican Church are a case in point. Analogies used to resist the possibility of ordaining women suggested a clear identification of woman with the (apparently) “lower” physical world. One opponent argued that one might as well ordain a pot of anchovy paste as ordain a woman (Smith, 1989, p. 48), a comment that suggests there is something primal, vegetative, and fundamentally inhuman about woman, and that spirituality will involve resisting all things female. In such a context, a “woman priest” is an anomaly. Women's bodies thus become battlefields upon which the struggle against mortality and the physical world takes place.

The areas of monasticism and asceticism prove fruitful for examples of this construction of (male) spirituality as resistance to the (female) body. A story told of the Desert Father Saint Anthony (c. 250–356) describes him falling prey to the seduction of a demon disguised as a beautiful woman who visits him in his cave. She is exhausted from traveling, and he offers her shelter. They talk, and simply talking with “her” is enough to engender lustful thoughts. Eventually, overcome with desire, the monk seeks to consummate his passion, at which point the demon reveals “herself” and leaves, laughing at the continuing power lust has over him.

Woman is the temptress who lures man away from the path of spiritual perfection into the imperfect world of the physical, often described in overtly sexual terms. The thirteenth-century Ṣūfī sage Jamāl Hānswī gives a suitably gendered interpretation of the different paths confronting the soul: “The seeker of the world is feminine, the seeker of the other-world is a hermaphrodite, and the seeker of the Lord is masculine” (Schimmel, 1997, p. 274). Given this typology, it is not difficult to take the next step: not only is the female body associated with the physical, but it also provides a fitting model for damnation. The image of the *vagina dentata* (“the womb with teeth”) is used in psychoanalytic theories to illuminate the male fear of the castrating female: yet its primary grounding is in religious art and imagery, where the image of the devouring mouth is commonly used as a representation of hell. In this context, the mouth and the womb are connected in what Freud would call “an upward displacement.” Identical images are used to describe both the female sexual organs and the mouth of hell. Boccaccio

(1313–1375), reflecting on the insatiability of the womb, uses explicitly infernal images: “That gulf, then, is certainly an infernal abyss which could be filled or sated as the sea with water or the fire with wood” (Blamires, 1992, p. 176). Jerome (c. 342–420) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), separated by nearly a thousand years, are similarly obsessed with the claim in *Proverbs 7:27* that a wicked woman’s “house” is “the way to hell, reaching even to the inner chambers of death.” The womb, like the mouth, is that which devours, hence a Muslim saying: “Three things are insatiable: the desert, the grave, and a woman’s womb.” The life-giving power of the female body is thus reworked as an image for annihilation.

**“THE RETURN TO THE BODY” IN CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS THEORIZING.** Contemporary feminist theology has played a significant role not only in exposing the ways in which women have been consistently identified with the despised physical: recent work in the area has sought a more positive reconstruction of the place of the body for developing an appropriate contemporary spirituality. “Body theologians” have sought to reclaim women’s bodies from patriarchal interpretation and control, seeking to “allow celebration to take the place of guilt and repression” (Isherwood and Stuart, 1998, p. 19). In this context, the body emerges not as an entity to be resisted, but as a site for knowledge. The philosophical and theological dualism of mind/body is disrupted, leading to the integration of the spiritual into the physical. The logic of such an approach has an impact upon not only the way in which *human* being is conceived. James Nelson, applying feminist insights to the development of an embodied male spirituality, resists the idea that sexuality should be viewed as an aspect of “man’s” lower, animal nature. Integrating spirituality and sexuality leads him to reappraise the nature of God. God is not as an entity transcendent from the world and its processes, but is found in relationship.

This reappraisal of the dichotomy between divine and human is also addressed in the contemporary women’s spirituality movement. The publication of *Womanspirit Rising* (1979), edited by Carol Christ and Judith Plaskow, was a significant landmark in the development of this movement. The women who contributed to this collection came from a number of religious traditions, and sought to reclaim the sacrality of the female body. For some contributors, this involved actively seeking “the female divine.” To adapt Carol Christ’s words, “women need the Goddess,” and writers such as Starhawk and Monica Sjöö have since developed a form of Goddess feminism that links the realization of female power with the rediscovery of a female divine principle. Melissa Raphael, the chief commentator on this movement, argues that Goddess feminism reconstructs the female body as a site for the sacred, disrupting the old ideas of the female body as something profane. Of particular importance to the movement has been the attempt to rediscover and reclaim the biological cycles of the female body. In part this has involved an engagement with the maternal body, not simply

as an aspect of (some) women’s experience, but as a cipher for the creative processes of the cosmos.

Similar reflections are developed—albeit in a rather more abstract way—in the writings of feminist philosophers of religion. In her quest to develop a feminist philosophy of religion, Grace Jantzen proposes that natality (the fact that we are born) replace mortality (the fact that we will die) as the paradigm for understanding human being. This shift in focus leads to a different set of values from those advanced by patriarchy: flourishing and human relationship are fostered, in contrast to the individualistic concerns with immortality and the self cultivated by an overemphasis on death. Such conclusions have been questioned, for reflection upon mortality and death need not lead to the kind of solipsism that Jantzen resists, but can similarly highlight the dependence of human beings upon each other and upon the cosmos itself.

Indeed, reasserting the body affects how the earth itself is understood. Sallie McFague’s “ecothology” results in part from her attempt to break down the dichotomy between transcendence and immanence, and thus to rethink the earth, not as the physical opposition to the spiritual divine, but as “the body of God” (McFague, 1993). Accepting “the interconnect[ed]ness of Spirit and all created beings” (Primavesi, 1991, p. 265) leads to a greater willingness to work with, rather than against, the processes of the physical world.

Reappraising the body thus affects much more than just an understanding of human being. Such reflection can even influence the method for studying religion. Amy Hollywood suggests that an adequate philosophy of religion will reflect not so much on the beliefs that people hold, but upon the way in which bodily practice shapes religious experience and subsequent belief. Adopting Marcel Mauss’s (1872–1950) description of mystical states as resulting from specific “body techniques,” Hollywood argues that ritual action creates “certain kinds of subjects, dispositions, moods, emotions, and desires.” Focusing upon specific religious practices necessitates an acknowledgment of “those differences inscribed in and on bodies (often through rituals and bodily, mental, and spiritual practices themselves).” Bodily experience, under this reading, is both “physiological and cultural” (Hollywood, 2003, pp. 230, 226, 231), a claim that coheres with the way in which social and religious norms have shaped female bodily experience. Her ideas, however, move beyond a simple discussion of the female body: if her claims are taken seriously, it will be difficult to generalize about “religion” just as it will become impossible to separate belief from practice.

Indeed, reflection on the female body opens up a range of topics that transcend any isolated or simplistic engagement with gender. Accepting the significance of difference for understanding bodily practice moves beyond any uniform account of “the body.” Yet such a conclusion need not invalidate the significance of focusing on the body. For example, Nancy Eisland suggests that reflection on the experiences of people with disabilities supports the claim that the

body must be seen as central for human self-understanding. People with disabilities, she notes, “become keenly aware that our physical selves determine our perceptions of the social and physical world” (Eisland, 1994, p. 31).

Eisland’s work, far from challenging the significance of engaging with the body, suggests that this engagement must be complex. Addressing the “lived experience” of disability suggests that it will be difficult, if not disingenuous, to talk of “the body” in a simplistic way. This realization has led some feminists to a more critical engagement with feminism itself. Tina Chanter has suggested that the turn to the body means that mainstream (invariably white) feminism will be forced to take seriously issues of race. Similarly, Ellen Armour resists the notion that there can be any unified, generalized account of “the female body” that fails to take account of “its” multiple differences. It is not just patriarchy who have sought to make such generalizing assertions: feminists have also tended to speak in an unproblematic way of the female body. Armour challenges such theorizing by employing the deconstructionist category of *différance*. Whitefeminists (Armour’s term for “mainstream” feminist theologians) have singularly failed to recognize the different ways in which black women experience the female body. As womanist theologians have argued, black women have been more closely identified with the body than white women. In the United States (the focus for Armour’s study), black women have been identified with nature, while white women have been identified with culture. And this suggests very different experiences of what it means to be female: for the black woman, it may mean being treated as a “beast of burden”; for the white woman, being treated as “the angel in the house.” Just as men are encouraged to reflect upon their own sexual embodiment rather than projecting such features onto women, so white women should be encouraged to grapple with their racial demarcation and what this means, instead of seeing race as an issue only in relation to black women, who are too easily given the mantle of “the other.”

Reflection on the body, then, opens up a rich vein for the study of religion. The constructions of “woman,” spirituality, race, and even the way in which religion itself is studied must be considered once the significance of the body is accepted. And precisely because it opens up such a plethora of subjects, it is important not to ignore the lived experience of being human that underpins such cultural and intellectual constructions. As Lisa Isherwood and Elizabeth Stuart comment: “What must be guarded against at all costs is the disappearance of the real, lived, laughing, suffering, birthing and dying body underneath the philosophical and theological meaning it is called to bear. It would indeed be foolish to allow ‘the body’; to become a disembodied entity” (Isherwood and Stuart, 1998, p. 151).

**SEE ALSO** Asceticism; Birth; Blood; Bodily Marks; Death; Desire; Ecology and Religion, overview article; Feminine Sacrality; Gender and Religion, overview article; Lesbianism;

Masculine Sacrality; Menstruation; Sexuality; Theology; Virginity.

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BEVERLEY CLACK (2005)

## HUMAN BODY: HUMAN BODIES, RELIGION, AND ART

The subject matter of this entry is the depiction, inclusion, and interpretation of the human body in works of art premised on religious principles or beliefs. Investigations of visual presentations of the human body are examinations of the meanings and roles of the various intersections of art and religion. The implicit question of the dichotomy, whether real or imagined, between sacred and secular art is implied throughout any discussion of the human body. Artistic and religious dimensions of the human form highlight cultural values and societal attitudes toward gender, figurative art, and the relationship between humanity and divinity. The fundamental issue is whether art must include the human figure in order to be religious.

**GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF HUMAN BODIES, ART, AND RELIGION.** The role and meaning of the human body incorporates a diverse range of cultural forces, including but not limited to art and religion. Different cultures and eras interpret the meaning and value of the human body in distinctive ways. The various interconnections of ideas, especially concepts related to art and religion, reflect more than aesthetic or devotional applications. As a historical and cultural category, the human body undergoes numerous transformations as prevailing social, political, and economic forces change. Race, gender, and class, as well as religious and cultural values, have been imprinted on depictions of the human body and sanctioned throughout history. Representations of the human body in art, whether identified as religious or secular, raise questions concerning structures of power, ideology, and identity. Artistic renderings and religious interpretations of the human body privilege it as a symbolic value and a political agent, especially during periods of protest against societal norms and definitions of gender as sexual identification.

The broader history of changing attitudes toward corporeality, or the bodily dimension of human existence, raises a question: Can art be identified as religious if it is nonfigural; that is, if it omits the human figure? The human body is the pivotal organizing principle for the expression and comprehension of humanity's position within society and the universe. Traditionally, artistic presentations of bodily proportions, physical motions, and facial or manual gestures were visual signifiers of the internal movements of the soul. For many cultures, including Renaissance Europe, the presentation of the human body was a visual means of classifying knowledge about the world.

The depicting of human bodies draws connections between theology and artistic styles, including presentations of asceticism, the cult of chastity, and the family. Typically, depictions of the human body are predicated on theological and cultural interpretations. For example, in religious cultures like the Christian West, in which the human body is seen as shameful, fallen, and in need of discipline against sin, representations of the human body have emphasized physical weakness through unnatural but symbolic caricatures of such specific body parts as arms, hands, and torsos. In contrast, those religious cultures in which the human was seen as a mirror of the divine, such as classical Greece or Hindu India, emphasized the beauty and balance of the human form. These cultures interpreted the human body as the locus and signifier of internal modes of religious life and thought.

Discrete systems for naming and presenting identical objects evolved naturally within world cultures. The human body was one individual object that possessed both singular and communal identities. Interwoven within the cultural fabric of each distinctive work of art was a simultaneous recognition of both the universality and the uniqueness of the human body. The implicit recognition of the human body, cultural matrix, and religious values reinforced the collective memory of artist and observer.

Western cultural attitudes toward the human body are categorized by three types: classical, medieval, and modern. Referencing philosophic and religious concepts of the human form as an expression of divinity, classical art emphasizes harmony and order as well as a culturally conditioned concept of beauty. Medieval art reflects the preoccupation of Latin-speaking Christianity with finitude and guilt as the human body becomes a visual signifier of corruption and decay. This art tends to distort or exaggerate representations of the human form. Contemporary Western attitudes are extraordinarily varied and complex, which may be as much the result of multiculturalism and globalization as advances in artistic techniques. The human body is often depicted in modern art as an active agent of political and societal protest (especially against social and sexual orthodoxies) or as a victim of aging and disease. The optic metaphor for these varied identities is presentations that depict bodily fragmentation and religious disruption, or physical idealization and theological conformity.

Given the universal nature of humanity, artistic presentations of the human body become the means of drawing viewers' attention and then enticing them into a gradual unfolding of religious narratives or events, thereby forming strong emotional and psychological connections with the underlying religious message. Interactions between human figures, or between human figures with either animals or inanimate objects, convey the psychological and spiritual dimensions of religious teachings. The religious dichotomy between the material and spiritual is symbolized by the human body in naturalistic, representational, and symbolic depictions.

Certain religious cultures, such as those of Judaism and Islam, ban the production and enjoyment of art, either completely or with specific regard to religious usage. Other religious cultures prohibit the creation of figural images for ceremonial purposes. The imaging of the human body as the reference or entry point for viewers is found in these religious cultures through the arts of poetry or music, or through the use of discrete visual symbols denoting the body through abstraction or attribute. Other religious cultures that are characterized initially as aniconic (opposed to the use of figural images) establish symbolic codes that signify the presence of the human form—as in Buddhism, where the earliest images of the Buddha were not anthropomorphic but represented his swaddling clothes and his footprints.

A crucial question in analyzing the various interconnections of the human body with art and religion is the manner in which one comes to describe and understand the ways in which one sees one's own image and in which other peoples see their own images. Since the 1970s there has been an increasing emphasis among Western scholars in studying marginalized groups—rarely studied categories such as women, racial and ethnic minorities, and people of diverse sexual orientations—whose roles, positions, and influences on culture should be factored into human history. Anthropologists and artists recognize differing body types due to climatic and nutritional variations, or due to different religious or aesthetic definitions of the ideal body. Discussions of the meaning and significance of racial and ethnic types within religious art were initiated within studies of marginalized groups.

The perception and interpretation of images of the human body within one culture or across cultures has been amplified significantly since the 1970s. The process of seeing and creating images of the human body is a multilayered syntax composed of sociopolitical, economic, and cultural factors. The fundamental Western attitude of entrancement with one's own image leads to the appreciation of separate elements in the image, including muscular structure, individuality, or culturally conditioned ideas of beauty. This Western perception is derived from the classical Greek view of the human body as a reflection of divine beauty, as a disciplined physical mechanism, and as the temporal home of the human spirit. History and art scholarship has recognized this Western attitude as normative, thereby privileging the West-

ern ideal as the appropriate model for the comprehension and production of images of the human body.

**IDENTIFYING HUMAN BODIES IN ART AND RELIGION.** The "reading" of works of art, especially in terms of the presentation of the human body in religious art, depends on a series of visual cues that provide viewers with information related to the appropriate models of behavior from ceremonial and devotional purposes to religious teachings of gender and morality. The symbolic role of the human body in visual discourse conveys messages through identifiable images and imagery known through cultural memory and the common cultural matrix of religious traditions. These visual cues include the values expressed through gestures and postures, hieratic art, and body symbolism. The physicality of the human body assumes a variety of forms, from naturalistic bodily representations to geometric and linear depictions, ideographic simplifications, or exaggerations. The essence of being human—especially with relation to divinity and cultural concepts of humanity—must be transformed into substantive and convincing shapes, whether natural or abstract.

In religious art, the question of function is paramount in discerning the message conveyed. Whether the work is intended or used for institutional, communal, or personal purposes determines more in this regard than does its size or cost. The manner and mode of depicting the human body and the interpretation placed upon the depiction are predicated on the idea, teaching, or story presented to viewers. The human body is unconsciously viewed as a model of social reality and an element in the larger structures of society, culture, community, and the world. Specific artists, patrons, or religious traditions encode particularized information within artistic renditions of the human body. More than the bearer of cultural concepts of beauty and gender or sex, the human figure embodies religious and cultural values as well as engendered and social behavior. As a result, the focus of investigation becomes the nature and types of tasks that are assigned to the human body in religious art.

Artistic representations of the human figure can be manipulated or designed in multiple ways to signify religious meaning and values. Traditionally—that is, before the advent of interest in marginal groups—art historians construed the prime connector between Eastern and Western art as cultural and religious understandings of the human body as tangible manifestation of the otherwise imagined shapes of divinity. The Greek principle of the idealization and perfection of the human form as a visible image of divine beauty privileged the Western attitude. The Eastern artistic tradition developed the parallel practice of relating the essence of transcendent ideas abstractly through the human body. Considerations of the human body as a signifier of engendered power, racial and ethnic identities, class distinctions, or sociopolitical values encoded with religious meaning and cultural constructs are issues raised by the study of marginalized people. Attention must be given to the relationship between the privileging of Western categories even to the point



of asking questions about what constitutes art and what are appropriate themes for analyses of the intersection of the human body, art, and religion.

Traditional Western art incorporates figural representations, as opposed to the abstractions of the human body found in modern Western art. This difference clarifies the generalization that traditional art emphasizes the object that is portrayed, while modern art accentuates the process of seeing the object. Traditional art is the creative expression of a society, while modern art emphasizes the creative expressions of individual artists. Both artistic modes appropriate visual symbols and signs as revelatory of supernatural or transcendental powers that created and now govern earthly cultures. Whether identified as pedagogical or ceremonial in function, or mystical or aesthetic in intent, religious art includes the anthropomorphic representations of divinity as it gives material shape to that which is otherwise intangible and imperceptible.

**THE HUMAN BODY AS AN EXPRESSION.** From signification of fertility and maternity to objectification of disciplined perfection, the human body becomes the visual locus of a multilayered discourse connecting humanity and divinity. Whether interpreted as culturally conditioned carriers of engendered meaning or sources of sensual pride, artistic renderings of the human figure within the framework of religious language are physical sites of fear and anxiety. The imagery of the human body communicates religious ideas and moral values in the arts through eight categories of expression.

The first expression is creativity and fertility, which are most often represented by the female body. The earliest signifiers of fecundity were primal female bodies like those of the so-called Venus of Willendorf and Cycladic statuettes of goddesses, which emphasize the hips, thighs, and abdomen while deemphasizing the head (particularly the individualized face) and the upper body. The universal recognition of the importance of female fertility figurines—all of which exaggerate those features of the female body that evoke sensuality, invite sexual attention, and signify the fecundity of both the goddess and the earth. Depictions of male fertility, typically symbolized by a tumescent phallus, appear less frequently over the course of history. Expressions of female fecundity were gradually transmuted from figurines of adult females to representations of mother and child, often in the posture of the nursing mother. Subliminally a personification of fertility, the imaging of mother and child became the universal visual purveyor of moral values, the sanctity of the family, and physical and spiritual nurture. Reaching new heights of stylization in presentation and meaning, the iconography of the mother and child was a powerful communicator of religious ideas, values, and significance. The theme of creativity is embodied in artistic depictions of the nine Greek muses and female inspiration of creative activity.

The second expression is religious devotion. The first subcategory of the human body in devotional art is that of the receiver of acts or offerings of devotion. The second sub-

category is that of devotees who proffer ceremonial honor, prayer, adoration, and gifts. Bodily postures and gestures signify both the performed action and provide a model from which viewers can learn to enter into acts of religious devotion. Such activities, whether identified as sacred or secular, turn viewers into participants and are categorized as participative art. The fundamental modes of religious participation—prayer, fasting, ascetic practice, and partaking of sacraments or religious rituals—transform minds and bodies. An encounter with a devotional artwork provides an alternate site for transformation or transcendence through participation.

The third expression is form, particularly ideal form that connotes sacrality and spirituality through the human body, or the distortions resulting from physical suffering and frailty that denote human finitude. Culturally specific as well as universal, the imaging of physical perfection is an ocular metaphor for spiritual presence, evidenced in depictions. The aesthetics of the human body communicates such moral concepts as self-sacrifice, discipline, self-respect, and personal honor. Presentations of a suffering, injured, emaciated, or tormented body in religious art signifies asceticism, sacrifice, or martyrdom.

The fourth expression is gender, which became problematic after the field of women's studies began to influence the fields of art and religion in the late 1970s. Traditional understandings of sex as defined by biological characteristics and gender as a socialized mode of being in the world were questioned in the new fields of women's studies, men's studies, and gay studies. Gender studies became an umbrella term applicable to all these disciplinary categories. All three designations of gender—an inclusive field of study; sexual identification; and a socialized mode of being in the world—are possible in presentations of the human body in art. Investigations and analyses of gender in religious art expanded exponentially throughout the 1980s and 1990s and were closely connected to the themes of power, dress, and nudity.

The fifth expression is power, whose essential characteristic is the visible interactions between individuals or groups. Power has many meanings and iconographic representations. One is the fundamental anthropological category of *mana*, which is a supernatural force that may be concentrated in persons or inanimate objects. *Dynamis* is a force released through the relationship between form—specifically the human body—and the artistic process. The work of art is empowered through the process of embodiment. A form of sociopolitical power is communicated through the bodily figures of the hierarchy of authority, whether social, academic, governmental, military, or religious. Dress is a visual delineation of social order, economic class, and military position. Power is signified through the bodily presentations of monarchs, chiefs, ancestors, guardians, and warriors, including depictions of dress, postures, and gestures. These figures of protection are normatively identified through physical and spiritual attributes that may include physical stature, symbol-

ically enlarged body parts, and expressions of moral or physical strength. As protective figures guarding devotees in sacred or domestic spaces, these embodiments of authority often integrate animal features to represent the primeval forces of nature.

The sixth expression is motion or movement as a medium of communication, through posture and gesture, for ideas, religious values, and moral ideals. Posture includes stance, position, and pose; gesture involves communication through facial contortions, hand signals, and the arrangement of the feet. Combining these elements, the human body conveys messages or ideas, tells stories, or articulates attitudes, emotions, and passions. There are three basic bodily postures in religious art: standing, seated, and recumbent—as exemplified by the Buddha, who stands in contemplation, sits in meditation or pedagogy, and lies on his bed at the moment of his *parinirvāṇa*, or death. Hand gestures, known as *mudrās* in both Buddhism and Hinduism, are a repertoire of digital and manual poses that communicate such specific ideas as protection by the deity (*abhaya*), signified by the raised hand, or the simple gesture of obeisance (*anjali*).

The seventh expression is dress and nudity, a dichotomy greater than the simple distinction between being naked or clothed. First, there is the moral and cultural evaluation of the body as biologically either male or female, as well as the multilayered syntax of nudity. The nude as an artistic category represents a specific set of attitudes toward the depiction of the human body in a state of undress. The classical nude is rooted in the religion and philosophy of ancient Greece, in which the ideal human body is identified as a locus of sacred presence. Depictions of nudity in the Jain tradition reflect perfect yogic control, while in Hindu art such nude female figures as the Yakshī are aligned with female sensuality associated with fertility spirits. The irony here is that noted by Kenneth Clark (1956), who identified nakedness as a state of embarrassment and nudity as a state of ease and comfort with one's body.

In contrast to nudity, dress and drapery enhance the appearance of the human body and reflect the social status of the wearer. In a practical sense, dress is a form of protection, whether from difficult climatic conditions and the elements, from animals, or from the gaze of other human beings. Dress is a moral value, as appropriate garments provided for both women and men testify to the normative conditions of modesty, virginity, or motherhood. Dress is connected to costume, which is a category of dress that identifies a person's social position, military rank, or authoritative status. Drapery, as a specific category of dress, enhances the appearance of the human body because loose flowing fabric creates an illusion of delicacy and motion, or of shadow and light, from the viewer's perspective, thereby enlivening the depiction of the body.

The eighth expression is portraiture, which, as a universal genre, is divided into two categories: realistic portraits of identifiable individuals and idealized depictions of a type,

such as a ruler or saint. Portraiture can be created with only one figure, several figures (as in family portraits), or a larger group representing a community. It can be achieved by both the imagining of oneself and of others. Portraits may be intended for either private use or public display. Portraiture is a testament to success in life or as a remembrance of a deceased person; it is a mode of legitimizing authority and hierarchical power.

**THE HUMAN BODY AS A MEDIUM OF SYMBOLIC DISCOURSE.** A myriad of early texts on aesthetics and the nature of human beings, especially from classical Greece, described the human body as a small-scale copy of the universe, as a microcosm of the macrocosm. Through this smaller but harmonious image of the divine, the human came to identify himself or herself, others, and the world. The beautiful female and handsome male statues of deities attest to the universality of this concept across the classical world, from Egypt, Greece, and Rome into Persia and India. As the idea of individuality emerged within these classical cultures, humanity interpreted itself at the center of a world of symbols in which the human body participated through a series of analogies and correspondences with the universe. In this way, bones signified the earth, blood signified water, and the head signified fire, as delineated in an almost universal pattern of ascent found in sources as different as the sages of the Upanishads and the Fathers of the early Christian Church. The human being was the only creature that connected with the three cosmic levels in such a way that the feet touched the earth, the torso dwelt in the atmosphere, and the head reached the heavens.

The classical Greek cult of physical perfection was based on these correspondences between the human body and the structure of the universe. The athlete was the model of divine perfection and demonstrated this identification by competing in the nude. Buddhism affirmed the existence of an eternal divine Buddha with the teaching of levels of being ascending from the *nirmāṇakāya* (body of manifestation) to the *saṃbhogakāya* (body of bliss) and the *dharmakāya* (body of law). Renderings of the human body were shaped by technical artistry and religious attitudes toward humanity either as symbols of the divine, ideals, or historical individuals.

**THE HUMAN BODY AS EXPRESSIVE POTENTIAL.** Varied artistic and religious approaches to the forming and informing of images of the human body confirm that the central issue is not the specific messages that are conveyed by bodily metaphors, but the ways in which the human figure functions as the central element in art and religion. The endowment of the concept of humanity with an identifying physical form finds two normative categories of expressive potential in art and religion: anthropomorphic (fully human in shape or form) and therianthropic (partly human and partly animal in shape or form). The application of recognizable natural forms for men and women, either as a whole or a part, is found in the majority of world religious art. Whether the formations of that human body are deemed ideal, perfect, cor-

rupted, distorted, or elegant is simultaneously culturally conditioned and theologically defined. Therianthrope bodies depend on recognition of the equality of humanity and animals beyond the symbolic exchange that is fundamental to Christian typology. This combination of human and animal forms raises questions related to the meaning and value of humanity.

Another mode for the human body as expressive potential is *pars pro toto*, or the part for the whole, in which the symbolic employment of body parts—hands, feet, or heads—signifies both coded messages and individual persons. Any transformation, transmutation, or reformulation of body imaging communicates the artist's intention to express an idea or transfer a message by accentuating either the distinct body part or its function. The enlarged eyes or ears of a Byzantine Christ denotes his extraordinary senses and abilities as the creator and guardian of the universe. Exaggerated features or body parts may inspire fear or ridicule, conveying additional symbolic messages and removing the viewer from recognition of the subject's "reality" or "humanity." Alternately, exaggerations of body parts are eloquent examples of the multivalent nature of visual symbols, as in the Buddhist *ushnisha*, or topknot—that singular protuberance on the top of Buddha's head designating his extraordinary wisdom and intelligence.

A third mode is abstraction, in which the essence of the idea, message, or meaning is extracted from larger representational image. The visual emphasis in abstraction results in a minimized if not radical simplification of form for emotional expressiveness or organic structure. Through an economical but elegant use of lines, the essence of humanity is revealed through the separation, reduction, and rearrangement of bodily components. Transformed into decorative patterns of shapes or geometric structures, abstractions appear initially to have little relation to the traditional figure of the human body; re-presentations affect the viewer's emotions and intellect.

**THE HUMAN BODY AS SUBJECT OF ART AND RELIGION.** Historians of sculpture from Herbert Read to Tom Flynn have argued persuasively that 90 percent of sculpture is about the human body. Sculpture's fundamental tactile nature combined with the intrinsic qualities of mass and volume attest to the one-for-one valuing of sculpture with the human body. Until the twentieth century's fascination with abstract and nonfigurative art, the majority of artworks incorporated the human figure as the main focus of aesthetic or thematic interest. The human body was the subject of art and religion even to the point of substituting the human image for the bodiless divinities and celestial personae.

**THE HUMAN BODY AS OBJECT OF ART AND RELIGION.** Body art transforms the human body from the subject to the object of art and religion. Whether specified as permanent or temporary painting of the body or face, tattooing, or the intentional scarification (permanently marking the body by cutting, without the use of pigments) of the body, body art

has multivalent purposes, ranging from an emblem of identification or sign of initiation to the impersonation of an ancestor or divinity. As an art form accessible to all social and economic classes, ethnic groups, and sexes, body art celebrates the generic beauty and prowess of the human body, and it refines the individual body aesthetically. The normative source for the designs is the religious iconography of each community. Body or face painting reconnects individuals with ancestors or ancestral spirits and presages the reappearance of that ancestor as a protector and guide. Regardless of its modality or function, body art is a universal art form that fashions the human body into a bearer of the sacred.

**THE HUMAN BODY AS MEDIUM OF ART AND RELIGION.** Dance and the other performing arts transfer the role of the human body in art and religion from subject or object. Gerardus van der Leeuw identified the human body as the primary agent of the arts in his magisterial *Sacred and Profane Beauty: The Holy in Art* (1963). Whether identified as primal or literate, as indigenous or imperialist, all religious traditions incorporate the human body into expressive rituals and ceremonies. The natural and rhythmic movement of the human body, whether in ecstasy, agony, trance, or prayer, is the elemental form of religious expression. Bodily movements accentuated through gestures, postures, facial expressions, costume, and music have affected religious iconography throughout history. As religious drama, music, and ritual were incorporated within cultural analyses of performance and display, the concept of the human body as medium of art and religion became an established reality.

**FURTHER PERSPECTIVES.** Since the 1970s, the critical relationships between the human body, art, religion, and marginalized groups was articulated predominantly by feminist scholars, especially in the recognition of variable body types and their meanings. Regional and ethnic studies extended that critique into discussions of colonialism and the centrality accorded to body types based on the Greek ideal. Power, in terms of engendered power and male dominance, was a focus of these post-1970s studies as the Western cultural appreciation of the human body, especially of the nude in art and religion, was questioned in relation to voyeurism, pornography, and "the gaze." Caroline Walker Bynum's *The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity* (1995), Linda Nochlin's *The Body in Pieces: The Fragment as a Metaphor of Modernity* (1994), and Margaret R. Miles' *Carnal Knowing: Female Nakedness and Religious Meaning in the Christian West* (1989) provide a feminist lens through which to critique the various meanings of the human body in religion and art.

The interdisciplinary motifs and methodologies for the study of the human body, art and religion have, until the late twentieth century, been treated by Western scholars within the framework, language, and motifs of Western history. Future comparative analyses of this subject may well prove the thesis that the Western preoccupation with order, clarity, and ideal types may be inappropriate or inapplicable to non-

Western art and religion (Apostolos-Cappadona, 1996). Gender distinctions as religious values (and their visualizations) may prove to be discrete and defy traditional patterns of iconographic and iconological examination, thereby expanding both the borders and the methods of scholarship. Three exceptional comparative cultural analyses of human bodies, art, and religion are available for examination in the exhibition catalogue *In Her Image: The Great Goddess in Indian Asia and the Madonna in Christian Culture* (1980); the exhibition catalogue for *The Human Image* (2000); and several special issues of *P+ Art and Culture Magazine*.

**SEE ALSO** Aesthetics, article on Visual Aesthetics; Art and Religion; Bodily Marks; Dance, article on Dance and Religion; Iconography, articles on Iconography as Visible Religion; Nudity; Symbol and Symbolism.

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DIANE APOSTOLOS-CAPPADONA (2005)

**HUMANISM.** The Christian humanism of the Renaissance and Reformation period was a complex intellectual movement, primarily literary and philological in nature, but with important historical, philosophical, and religious implications. Humanism was rooted in the love of classical antiquity and the desire for its rebirth, both in terms of form (primarily a search for new aesthetic standards) and of norm (a desire for more enlightened ethical and religious values). The return to original sources is reflected in a parallel way in the reformers' emphasis upon the scripture as norm and New Testament Christianity as the ideal form of church life. Humanism developed in Italy during the fourteenth century and persisted through the Reformation well into the age of the Enlightenment.

The word *humanism* came from the phrase *studia humanitatis* or *humaniora*, the liberal arts or humane studies, a concept derived largely from Cicero. The liberal arts curriculum emphasized grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy. While the course of studies owed something to the traditional education of the medieval cathedral schools, it was less concerned with dialectic or logic, natural science, and Scholastic metaphysics. The term *humanist* was originally applied to professional public or private teachers of classical literature who continued the medieval vocation of the *dictatores*, who taught the skills of letter-writing and proper style in speech and writing. But the word gradually came to assume a more comprehensive meaning, referring to all devotees of classical learning. Humanism came to be cultivated not merely by professional educators but by many men of letters, historians, moral philosophers, statesmen, and churchmen, including regular as well as secular clergy. They set the *aurea sapientia*, or golden wisdom, of the ancients against the arid dialectic of the Scholastic doctors. Christian humanism tended toward religious syncretism, moralism, and ethical Paulinism, and also toward a Christocentrism that emphasized Christ as an example of good living, rather than a Christology that focused on Christ's sacrifice on the cross as sin-bearer, substitute, and savior.

**ITALIAN RENAISSANCE HUMANISM.** It was natural that humanism should emerge most strongly in Italy, given the Roman inheritance and the artistic and architectural reminders of ancient glories. Toward the end of the thirteenth century, a form of protohumanism developed in the north of Italy, in Padua, Verona, and Vicenza, and in Arezzo and Florence in Tuscany. But the "father of humanism" was Francesco Petrarch (1304–1374), who gave to Italian literary humanism its basic character. He is perhaps best remembered for his vernacular lyrics, chiefly love poems to Laura; he was crowned poet laureate on the Capitoline Hill in Rome in 1341. Petrarch stressed the purity of the classical Latin style, revived enthusiasm for ancient Rome, and helped develop a sense of distance from the past and a revulsion toward the medieval "dark ages." He raised important personal and religious questions in such writings as *On the Solitary Life*, the *Secretum*, *Ascent of Mount Ventoux*, and *On His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others*, in which he wrote as an



apologist for the Christian view of humanity and the humanists' appreciation of the worth of the individual against certain neo-Aristotelians whose natural philosophy subverted those values.

Petrarch's friend Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–1375) gained renown for his *Decameron*, a collection of a hundred short stories, for books on famous men and women, and for an encyclopedic *Genealogy of the Gods*, an important handbook of mythology. Petrarchan humanism spread through Italy, largely as a lay, upper-class, and elitist movement. In the search for classical manuscripts, humanists such as Poggio Bracciolini (1380–1459), Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481), Cyriacus of Ancona (c. 1391–1457), and Giovanni Aurispa (1374–1450) excelled, rediscovering key works of Cicero, Quintilian, Vitruvius, Plautus, Pliny the Younger, Tacitus, Thucydides, Euripides, Sophocles, and other ancient authors.

Humanism gained new momentum and direction with the Greek revival. In the final decades of the fourteenth century the Byzantine emperor, threatened by the Ottoman Turks, who were encircling Constantinople, made two expeditions to the West, in 1374 and 1399, to seek help. His efforts were futile, but some Greek scholars, such as Manuel Chrysoloras (c. 1355–1415), John Bessarion (1403–1472), and Gemistus Plethon (c. 1355–1450), remained in the West and introduced Greek literature, patristics, and philosophy. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, other scholars fled to the West, notably John Argyropoulos, Demetrius Calcondylas, and John and Constantine Lascaris, adding new momentum to the Greek revival and broadening the dimensions of philosophical discussion.

Certain humanists placed their rhetorical gifts in the service of the Florentine republic against the threatening tyrants of Milan and Naples. These civic humanists, such as chancellor Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406) and Leonardo Bruni (c. 1370–1444), stirred up the patriotic impulses of the citizenry for the defense of the state. In a broader sense civic humanism was more than an ideology of embattled republicanism, for it stood for a life of action spent for the common good. Giannozzo Manetti (1396–1459), who wrote *On the Dignity and Excellence of Man*, once described the whole duty of humanity as being to understand and to act. Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472), a truly universal man, the architect of Renaissance churches, palaces, and fountains, wrote treatises that for many decades dominated theory on architecture, painting, and the family.

In order to convey humanist ideals to youth, humanist educators not only wrote influential treatises on education but also established schools to put their theories into practice. Generally optimistic about the educability at least of the upper classes, the humanists cultivated the liberal arts to develop leaders with sound character and lofty vision. Pietro Paolo Vergerio (1370–1444) wrote a treatise on the morals befitting a free man, drawing extensively on Plato, Plutarch, and Cicero. Vittorino Rambaldoni da Feltre (1378–1446)

and Guarino da Verona (1370–1460) set up model schools with a humanist curriculum and introduced such innovations as physical education and coeducation.

Among the disciplines emphasized was history, for the humanists valued both ancient and contemporary history. What the humanists learned from classical historians was reflected in their own histories, from the *History of Florence* of Leonardo Bruni to the *History of Florence* of Niccolò Machiavelli and the *History of Italy in His Own Times* by Francesco Guicciardini (1483–1540). Flavio Biondo (1389–1463), the founder of modern archaeology, produced massive topographical-historical works on Rome and all of Italy. Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457) anticipated many of the questions raised later by Luther, such as free will and predestination, errors in the Vulgate, and the value of lay piety in contrast to monasticism. In a treatise titled *On the Donation of Constantine*, he proved with philological and historical critical arguments that the *Donation of Constantine* was a forgery purporting to prove that when Constantine moved the capital of the Roman empire to the East, he had given the Lateran Palace and outlying provinces to Pope Sylvester I and his successors, as well as conferring immense privileges upon them.

During the second half of the fifteenth century classical scholarship was more closely integrated with literary composition in the vernacular, printing spread rapidly following the establishment of the first printing press in Italy in 1465, and a new metaphysical emphasis superseded the relatively uncomplicated moral philosophy of the literary and civic humanists with the development of Neoplatonic, neo-Pythagorean, neo-Aristotelian, Hermetic, and qabbalistic philosophies and theodicies. Neoplatonism became the most prominent and characteristic form of Renaissance philosophy. The renewal of interest in patristic writings, aided by scholars such as Ambrogio Traversari (1386–1439), and especially in the Greek fathers, added impetus to the Greek revival. Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) was concerned with the search for unity between the infinite One and the infinite multitude of finite things, the *coincidentia oppositorum*, a pantheism that raised the specter of pantheism. Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), the most eminent Renaissance philosopher, presided over the “Platonic Academy” endowed by Cosimo de’ Medici, the de facto ruler of Florence. Ficino did editions of Plato’s works and edited the *Enneads* of Plotinus and works of Greek pagan Neoplatonists such as Proclus and Porphyry, as well as of Dionysius the Areopagite, whose christianized Neoplatonism was so influential throughout the medieval period. Among his own influential works were the *Theologia Platonica* and the *De religione Christiana*, in which he used Neoplatonism apologetically as a support for the Christian faith. His understudy, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), sought to find the religious truth common to Christianity, Platonism, Aristotelianism, Hermetism, Islam, and Qabbalah. He published for public disputation nine hundred theses, the *Conclusiones*, in which he sought to summarize all learning. In his oration *On the Dig-*

nity of Man, sometimes described as the most characteristic Renaissance document, he places humankind at the center of the “great chain of being,” the object of special creation, able to rise upward toward God or to sink downward to the sensate animalistic level, as it chooses. Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), combining Nicholas of Cusa’s Neoplatonism and Hermetic ideas with the physical implications of Copernican astronomy, synthesized a philosophy that verged on pantheism. Aristotelianism persisted in the universities, and Neo-Aristotelianism found advocates such as Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), who wrote on the nature of immortality, fate, free will, predestination, and providence.

**NORTHERN HUMANISM.** Thanks to close political, commercial, ecclesiastical, and university ties with Italy, the new humanist culture came earlier to Germany than to other countries of northern Europe. The pioneers included wandering poets such as Peter Luder, schoolmaster humanists such as Johannes Murmellius and Rudolf von Langen, half-Scholastic humanists such as Conrad Summenhart and Paul Scriptoris, and moralistic critics of church and society such as Heinrich Bebel, Jacob Wimpfeling, Sebastian Brant, and the preacher Johann Geiler von Kaisersberg. But the man credited with being the father of German humanism was Roelof Huysman (Rodolphus Agricola, 1444–1485), known as the “German Petrarch.” After a decade in Italy he returned to “the frozen Northland” and presided over a group of young humanists in Heidelberg, to whom he expounded his theories of rhetoric. One of his disciples, Conrad Pickel (Conradus Celtis, 1459–1508), the “German arch-humanist,” organized young humanists into the Rhenish and Danubian sodalities to promote humanism and to do a topographical-historical work entitled *Germania illustrata*, never completed.

At the universities humanists struggled with Scholastics for positions, and by 1520 humanism had spread to urban centers and to both ecclesiastical and princely courts. The lawyer Conrad Peutinger, the historian Johannes Turmair (Aventinus), the city councilor Willibald Pirckheimer, a friend of Conrad Pickel, and the Nuremberg artist Albrecht Dürer were patrons and advocates of humanism. The clash of humanists and Scholastics came to a head in the celebrated Reuchlin controversy. Johannes Reuchlin (1455–1522) did a Hebrew vocabulary and grammar and wrote two major works, *On the Wonder-Working Word* and *On the Qabbalistic Art*, in which he used the Jewish mystical Qabbalah in support of Christianity. Reuchlin defended some Hebrew books from a vicious book-burner, Johannes Pfefferkorn, a converted Jew, and was in turn attacked by certain Scholastic doctors at Cologne. An Erfurt humanist, Johann Jäger (Crotus Rubianus, c. 1480–1545), and the young knight Ulrich von Hutten (1488–1523) wrote a biting satire, *The Letters of Obscure Men*, ridiculing the Scholastics and defending Reuchlin. In Gotha the canon Mutianus Rufus (1471–1526) gathered a circle of young humanists from the University of Erfurt to promote classical learning.

Although there were early ties with Italy during the Avignon papacy and some promise of a flowering early in the fifteenth century, for example in the circle gathered around chancellor Jean de Montreuil (1354–1418), the Hundred Years’ War and the struggle between France and Burgundy delayed the full development of humanism in France. The great flowering of humanism came from 1515 to 1547, during the reign of Francis I, a great patron of art and literature. Guillaume Budé (1468–1540) did a commentary on the *Pandects* (a digest of Justinian’s law), a work on numismatics, a commentary on the Greek language, and a major work on Hellenism. Lefèvre d’Étaples (1455–1536) worked on biblical texts, doing a critical edition of *Psalms* and commentaries on Paul’s letters and on the four Gospels; this work was important to Luther and the French reformers. Margaret of Angoulême, Francis I’s sister, was not only an author but also a patroness of humanists and young reformers, along with Bishop Guillaume Briçonnet. François Rabelais (c. 1495–1553), author of the witty, gross, and satirical *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, offered criticism through the story of a giant and his son. Although sometimes called a skeptic, Rabelais is now seen more as an Erasmian Christian humanist interested in reform. The famous essayist Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) was the greatest French literary figure of the age.

In Spain, Erasmianism, Lutheranism, and mysticism found followers, but nonconformity was effectively suppressed. Cardinal Jiménez de Cisneros (1436–1517) instituted rigorous clerical reforms, founded the University of Alcalá with a trilingual college, and endowed the publication of the Complutensian Polyglot Bible. Antonio de Nebrija (1441–1522), at Salamanca, was an outstanding classicist. The greatest literary figure of Spanish humanism was Miguel de Cervantes (1547–1616), author of *Don Quixote*.

English humanism developed during the fifteenth century from political and ecclesiastical contacts with Italy. Classical studies were cultivated seriously at Oxford by Thomas Linacre (c. 1460–1524), William Grocyn (c. 1466–1519), and William Latimer (c. 1460–1543). John Colet (1467–1519), dean of Saint Paul’s and founder of Saint Paul’s School, modeled somewhat after the humanist schools of Italy, corresponded with Ficino and was intrigued by Neoplatonism. But he had a serious theological bent, and in his lectures on *Romans* he emphasized humanity’s sinfulness and need for God’s forgiveness. Thomas More (1478–1535) wrote the most famous work of English humanism, *Utopia*.

The prince of the northern humanists was Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam (1469?–1536), who articulated the loftiest ideals of Christian humanism. A great classicist and patristics scholar, he expressed social and ecclesiastical criticism in *The Praise of Folly* and the *Colloquies*, expounded his “philosophy of Christ” in the *Enchiridion* and in *Paraclesis*, and did editions, with long introductions, of Latin and Greek classical authors and church fathers. His fame was eclipsed by the advent of the Reformation, and he reluctantly attacked Luther on the question of the freedom of the will.

Erasmus inclined toward moralism and spiritualism rather than consequential soteriology, emphasizing Christ the teacher and example rather than the Savior who died on the Cross for the salvation of humankind.

**HUMANISM AND THE REFORMATION.** The Reformation owed much to humanism for its success; contributing to an atmosphere favorable to the Reformation were humanism's emphasis on knowledge of the biblical languages and a return to the sources; its criticism of ecclesiastical and social abuses; its negative attitude toward Scholasticism; a concomitant romantic cultural nationalism; the use of the printing press; and the activities of the cadres of young humanists who carried Luther's message to all parts of the Holy Roman Empire in the early years. Luther referred to the Renaissance as akin to John the Baptist heralding the coming of the gospel. The so-called magisterial reformers, Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, Melancthon, Bucer, Beza, and others, were all university men with some background in classical studies and humanist learning. Led by Luther, they reformed the university curricula in favor of humanist disciplines, reformed old and founded new universities, and established secondary schools, *Gymnasiums* and *lycées*, to promote the liberal arts. They insisted upon compulsory education for boys and girls, thus expanding education beyond the elitist upper-class concerns of the Italian humanists. They stressed teaching as a divine vocation. While Luther loved the classics, rejected Scholasticism, and favored humanism, his colleague Philipp Melancthon (1497–1560) was the major influence in promoting classicism. In line with Italian humanism, the reformers de-emphasized dialectic and stressed the value of rhetoric, poetry, moral philosophy, and history. Along with their concern for pure theology, the proper distinction between law and gospel, and the centrality of sin and grace, the reformers viewed higher culture as a sphere of faith's works and became strong advocates of humanist learning. Learned Protestants such as the polymath Joachim Camerarius (1500–1574), the educator Johannes Sturm (1507–1589), the historian Johannes Philippi (Sleidanus, 1506–1556), the irenic theologian Georg Calixtus (1586–1656), and a host of neo-Latin poets, playwrights, and philosophers carried humanism into the seventeenth century and the beginnings of the Enlightenment. Catholic reformers, too, especially the Jesuits, saw the value of the *humaniora*, or humane studies, and introduced them into their academies, colleges, and universities. The Reformation owed much to humanism and repaid the debt richly by broadening the popular base of education and carrying humanist learning into modern times.

The Reformation brought to an end the role of Renaissance humanism as an independent cultural force, for thereafter it became associated closely with the various Christian confessions. Lutheran, Calvinist, Catholic, and radical humanist learning was cultivated in secondary schools and universities. Where humanism was transmitted in this academic way, it was preserved much longer than where it remained a matter of a few individuals or groups; but humanism took

on a more pedantic and less spontaneous character in the universities.

Humanist impulses were not only widespread horizontally on a European scale but reached down vertically through the centuries. Where humanist influence was strong, it nourished tendencies toward universalism, or at least toward latitudinarianism, especially in England and the Netherlands, and fostered an irenic spirit. The humanist way of thinking has remained in evidence into the twentieth century.

**SEE ALSO** Bruno, Giordano; Enlightenment, The; Erasmus, Desiderius; Ficino, Marsilio; Neoplatonism; Nicholas of Cusa; Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni; Reformation; Scholasticism.

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**HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGION.** Human rights are a secular, supposedly normative (because often defined as "universal") doctrine of ethical behavior embedded in national, regional, and international systems of law under the authority of the United Nations (UN) and implemented with varying degrees of success and failure. Indicative of the enhanced role of religion in global politics, the relationship between religion and human rights remains complex and diverse, covering a variety of ever-fluctuating geopolitical situations.

**UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS.** The 1945 Charter of the United Nations sets out basic principles upon which international legal standards have been developed. On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, thirty articles that remain fundamental for all subsequent covenants, conventions, and treaties in the field. The pream-

ble to the declaration states that the "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world." The preamble also recognizes that "disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind." It hopes for "the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want," proclaimed as "the highest aspiration of the common people."

From these aspirations arose the International Bill of Human Rights, which is a collection of five documents, consisting of:

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 10, 1948)
- International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (December 16, 1966; into effect January 3, 1976)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (December 16, 1966; into effect March 23, 1976)
- Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (December 16, 1966; into effect March 23, 1976)
- Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (December 15, 1989)

Given how wide-ranging the statement of human rights is—from basic civil and democratic political freedoms to rights in education, employment, and health—it is not surprising that in an effort to make social progress through subsequent human rights work, the nature and extent of the rights framework has become extremely complex, not to say controversial.

**RELIGION AND POLITICS.** The immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War was a time of ideological triumphalism. If Western models of governance based upon democracy and universal human rights had seemingly come out victorious from a struggle against Soviet Communism, then books such as *The Clash of Civilizations* by Samuel Huntington controversially revitalized an ancient notion that differing value systems will inevitably come into conflict. Some people, such as Francis Fukuyama, suggested that Western models of governance based on democracy and universal human rights had triumphed, receiving collective recognition as the best political system the world had yet produced. This new international consensus over political values demonstrated, according to Fukuyama, nothing less than an end of history. According to this analysis, if secularization theory has widely predicted the marginalization of religion to a private domain rather than a sphere of public influence, then religion simply did not come into the equation to any significant degree.

Arguably more astute commentators were beginning to suggest that the end of the Cold War might mean something

different—what significant scholars of religion had always argued: that the place of religion in world politics had in the modern era been seriously underplayed. In *The World's Religions*, Ninian Smart, foremost among such scholars, argued for the relevance of religion in a number of dimensions. While this might be expected from a scholar of religion, such a notion, unfashionable for so long outside religious studies, came to take on importance in politics and sociology. Jeff Haynes's analysis of religion in world politics builds on Jose Casanova's foundational theoretical work in sociology.

Casanova's *Public Religions in the Modern World* began seriously to challenge the largely accepted secularization thesis, that in modern societies religion becomes less and less relevant to public discourse, and any influence it might have would be relegated to people's private lives. Both Haynes and Casanova demonstrated from a series of geopolitical case studies how the secularization thesis was no longer supportable or at least presented evidence that it needed to be refined to explain how religious traditions were gaining an increasingly public profile, from the rise of Islam in political contexts across innumerable states to increasing conflicts between cultural and religious traditions, notably in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union.

**RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS.** Since the formation of the United Nations, human rights issues related to religion and belief have been the focus of several international instruments:

- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
- The Arcot Krishnaswami Study (1959)
- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
- The International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (1966)
- The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981)

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes a number of articles of relevance to freedom of religion and belief. These include Article 2 (forbidding prejudicial distinctions of any kind, including those related to religion) and Article 26 (on the rights to a particular religious education). The foundation stone of freedom of religion and belief, though, is found in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This states, "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance."

Nathan Lerner in *Religion, Beliefs, and International Human Rights* offers one of the most authoritative commentaries on religion in the UN system. As Lerner suggests, Article 18 greatly influenced the texts incorporated in the 1966

covenants and was influential in regional treaties and the 1981 declaration. Some key international legal standards relating to freedom of religion and belief include:

- Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (November 25, 1981);
- Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (December 18, 1992);
- Oslo Declaration on Freedom of Religion and Belief (1998);
- World Conference against Racism, Xenophobia, and Related Forms of Discrimination (September 2002).

The preamble to the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981) restates the wider context of the charter of the United Nations. Notably this reiterates the "dignity and equality inherent in all human beings," international commitment on the promotion of universal human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, "without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion," and the principles of "non-discrimination and equality before the law and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief."

Issues of religion have increasingly come to the fore in a United Nations formally cautious about being explicit about arguably the most contentious of all human rights, while an increasingly intense post-September 11 context has highlighted the issue of potential violent conflict in the world. The wider significance of these issues might be summarized by four points. First, after a long neglect (or low-level treatment) of religion explicitly, the UN system from the late 1970s and especially with the 1981 declaration began to recognize the international significance of religion for a stable world order.

During the 1990s religion emerged explicitly in numerous international statements, gaining a new and unprecedented prominence. These included the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) and the Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel (1993). The Vienna Declaration and Plan of Action (1993) and the follow-up to the World Conference on Human Rights, the office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (1993), also gave some prominence to freedom of culture and religion, an important development given the respective post-Yugoslavia and post-Rwanda contexts. The new prominence given to religion culminated in the Oslo Declaration on Freedom of Religion and Belief (1998).

Second, and indicated by both the 1981 declaration and the 1998 Oslo declaration, the notion of freedom of religion was itself extended to freedom of religion and belief to allow for a wider interpretation of worldviews. Third, this in turn has had the effect of linking issues such as "freedom of thought, conscience, and religion" to what Carl Wellman in



**Mass Slaughter Since the 1948 Convention Against Genocide**

Date	State	Victims	Deaths
1943–1957	USSR	Chechens, Ingushi, Karachai	230,000
1944–68	USSR	Crimean Tartars, Meskhetians	57,000–175,000
1955–77	China	Tibetans	Not available
1959–75	Iraq	Kurds	Not available
1962–72	Paraguay	Ache Indians	90,000
1963–64	Rwanda	Tutsis	5,000–14,000
1963	Laos	Meo Tribesmen	18,000–20,000
1965–66	Indonesia	Chinese	500,000–1 million
1965–73	Burundi	Hutus	103,000–205,000
1966	Nigeria	Ibos in North	9,000–30,000
1966–84	Guatemala	Indians	30,000–63,000
1968–85	Philippines Equatorial Guinea	Moros Bubi Tribe	10,000–100,000 1,000–50,000
1971	Pakistan	Bengalis of Eastern Pakistan	1.25–3 million
1971–9	Uganda	Karamajong Acholi, Lango	100,000–500,000
1975–79	Cambodia	Including Muslim Cham	2 million?
1975–98	Indonesia	East Timorese	60,000–200,000
1978–	Burma	Muslims in border regions	Not available
1979–86	Uganda	Karamanjong, Nilotic Tribes Bagandans	50,000–100,000
1981	Iran	Kurds, Bahais	10,000–20,000
1983–7	Sri Lanka	Tamils	2,000–10,000
1994	Rwanda	Tutsis	500,000–million
1992–5	Bosnia– Herzegovina	Mainly Bosnian Muslims	200,000

(Ryan, in Gearon, 2002)

TABLE 1.

*The Proliferation of Rights* has called rights of human solidarity, notable in connections publicly made between religious intolerance and the ending of racism, xenophobia, and discrimination. For example, the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief was followed just over a decade later by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (1992).

Fourth, also related to Wellman's notion of human solidarity are the rights affecting particular groups of the world's population, including children and indigenous peoples. In terms of religion and human rights, the major issue here is women and human rights in the world's religions. The prominent and influential World Conference on Women was held in Beijing in 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the

founding of the United Nations. The resulting Beijing declaration was careful to set the event in the context of other conferences. Cited conferences included those on women in Nairobi in 1985, on children in New York in 1990, on environment and development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, on human rights in Vienna in 1993, on population and development in Cairo in 1994, and on social development in Copenhagen in 1995. Convinced that "women's empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace," commitments made by the Beijing declaration included (1) full implementation of the human rights of women and of the girl child "as an inalienable, integral, and indivisible part of all human rights and fundamental freedoms" and (2) the em-

powerment and advancement of women, “including the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief.”

**TENSIONS IN EQUALITY: THEORETIC EQUALITY VERSUS FACTUAL INEQUALITY.** Heightened emphasis upon religion and culture in international relations shows a world that continues to reflect considerable tensions between worldviews when dealing with ideals such as human rights. These tensions are of four kinds: first, between particular cultural and especially religious systems and the notion of universal human rights; second, between religious traditions and different culture’s worldviews; within and between human rights themselves; and between a stated universality of rights and factual inequality in their distribution.

**Human rights.** There are tensions between particular cultural and especially religious systems and the notion of universal human rights. Examples include the right to freedom of expression that might give offense to some religious sensibility or the tension between democratic political systems and religiously inspired systems of governance or, and perhaps especially, issues of universal rights between men and women. Most critically on December 18, 1979, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted by the UN General Assembly. It entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981.

While marking significant progress and the culmination of three decades of work by the UN Commission on the Status of Women (established 1946), the Beijing and Beijing +5 meetings show that the equal status of women remains in many countries and cultures a distant ideal, despite the fact that basic equality in human rights was fundamental to the UN charter and the Universal Declaration. The convention states that discrimination against women is extensive and details the areas (health, education, employment, and legal and political status) where progress needs to be made. The convention also devotes much time to reproductive rights, issues around maternity, and rights centered on marriage. Of general importance is the disparity between the UN definitions of women’s rights and those perceived within certain cultural and religious traditions. In reality each religion will address particular issues of integrating or rejecting women’s rights within their respective traditions. And these will be tempered by political circumstances.

For political case studies on women’s rights, major non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the field, like Human Rights Watch, often focus on similar specific issues. Human Rights Watch has continually updated studies of each of the world’s geographical regions. In general the legal difficulties in combining the equalities, rights, and freedoms of religion with the equalities, rights, and freedoms of women are real, representing arguably the most significant tension between international systems of human rights and religious traditions. On the technical legal side of such matters, Kelly D. Askin and Dorean M. Koenig’s *Women and*

*International Human Rights Law* (1999) is certainly worth consulting.

**Worldviews.** There are tensions between religious traditions and different culture’s worldviews. Religious, cultural, and ethnic differences remain the major source of conflict in a post–Cold War world. After two world wars and with a clear awareness of the systematic mass murders of the Holocaust, the 1948 Genocide Convention was born out of a never-again mentality. Since then genocide, defined here as the systematic and deliberate targeting for extinction of particular sections of a population, has happened repeatedly. Genocide in the twentieth century became fundamental to human rights discourse in the twenty-first century.

**Between rights themselves.** There are tensions within and between human rights themselves, for example, between freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression. Here the conflict between religious traditions and universal human rights contributes to these tensions between rights that seem to compete rather than be complementary.

**Stated universality and factual inequality.** A wider tension exists between a stated universality of rights and factual inequality. The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights attempted to address this with the Vienna Plan of Action. Priorities for the global implementation of human rights were listed and, as with the majority of UN world conferences, a five-year review was planned. The UN commissioner for human rights concludes his Vienna +5 review with this paragraph:

The international community must conclude that five years after Vienna, a wide gap continues to exist between the promise of human rights and their reality in the lives of people throughout the world. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, making all human rights a reality for all remains not only our fundamental challenge but our solemn responsibility.

In the UN system, human rights imply universality. Yet human values are by their nature contested, and history reveals a tragically imperfect world where inequalities abound and justice is too often absent. The World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna expressed “its dismay and condemnation that gross and systematic violations and situations that constitute serious obstacles to the full enjoyment of all human rights continue to occur in different parts of the world.” It is this most fundamental sense of inequality—over and above differences between religious traditions and secular notions of human rights—that arguably presents the greatest cause of conflict the world over. As Albert Camus once remarked, “The spirit of revolt can only exist where a theoretic equality conceals great factual inequalities.”

**CONCLUSION.** Many nation-states now regard issues of religion and human rights as essential barometers of wider democratic freedoms. In the United States, for example, the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act made it a requirement for the U.S. secretary of state to publish an annual report on religious freedom worldwide. Published each September, the

Annual Report on International Religious Freedom is submitted to the Committee on International Relations in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations in the U.S. Senate. The report is extensive and provides country-by-country accounts of religious freedoms and infringements on and improvements in these freedoms. The report contains an extremely useful executive summary and clearly links freedom of religion with the likelihood that countries that preserve this right will respect other fundamental rights.

**SEE ALSO** Law and Religion, article on Law, Religion, and Human Rights.

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## HUMAN SACRIFICE

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

AN OVERVIEW  
AZTEC RITES

### HUMAN SACRIFICE: AN OVERVIEW

Human sacrifice, defined as the killing of humans or the use of the flesh, blood, or bones of the human body for ritual purposes, has been a widespread and complex phenomenon

throughout history. Most contemporary scholars try to explain human sacrifice in terms of earlier theories of sacrifice in general. Though the explanations given for the purposes of sacrifice have been almost as varied as the phenomena themselves, they may be reduced to nine common themes drawn from four of the classic works on sacrifice. These themes may be illustrated with descriptions of human sacrificial practices in differing cultural contexts.

E. B. Tylor (1832–1917) theorized that the origin of religion lay in the primitive tendency to “animate” the entire world with “soul-ghosts.” Human sacrifice released these soul-ghosts so that they might join their ancestors and function as a gift to gain particular ends, as homage to a deity, or as a form of renunciation.

**THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES.** According to W. Robertson Smith (1846–1894), sacrifice originated in totemism. Sacrifice was a communal meal shared between the people and their god, who was simultaneously their totemic animal and their kinsman. Smith postulated two types of sacrifice. The first, the honorific, was a gift either on a friendly basis of exchange or as a part of homage to a powerful deity. The communion meal became a cannibal feast when a tribe, such as the wolf tribe, offered to the god the appropriate food—the members of the sheep tribe, for example. The second, the piacular or expiatory sacrifice, took on a mystical, sacramental flavor when a tribe’s own totemic animal was offered as a redemption for a misdeed. The animal, who as a kinsman was also a representative of the people themselves, was killed and then shared in a communion in which people achieved atonement by physically assimilating into their own bodies the totemic form of themselves. The sacrificed animal was reborn by being assimilated into the living bodies of the people who ate it, and since those people were identified with the totemic animal, they too were reborn through this ritual.

James G. Frazer (1854–1941) developed a theory of regeneration of fertility according to which the sacrificial offering possessed tremendous potency. Sacred kings and human vegetative gods were killed to pass on their power to a younger successor, to incorporate their potency into the living who consumed their bodies, and to prevent their decay in old age since decay would endanger the fertility of earthly existence. Frazer also suggested that animals and plants were eventually substituted for the original human sacrificial offering because of the fear inherent in killing humans.

In their essay on Vedic and Hebrew sacrifice (1898), Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss considered sacrifice to be a religious act which, through the consecration of an offering, modified or transformed the condition of the person who accomplished that act by joining the divine and mortal via the sacrifice. Moreover, the self-sacrifice of a god in human form was the ideal abnegation, for it was an offering of one’s own life.

Nine basic purposes of human sacrifice have been commonly cited from these early theorists: (1) humans are sacri-

ficed in order to release souls for the service of the dead ancestors; (2) human sacrifice is a gift that binds deities to people in an exchange or that serves to propitiate the gods either as homage or as renunciation; (3) human sacrifice is a communion meal in which the power of life is assimilated and thus regenerated; (4) the offering of human sacrifice serves as an expiation of past transgressions and has a redemptive character; (5) it brings about atonement, (6) the regeneration of earthly fertility, or (7) immortality; (8) it transforms human conditions; and (9) it unifies the divine and mortal. Although some new approaches have been added taking into consideration factors such as the role that cosmology plays or the ordering capacities of human sacrifice, contemporary interpreters of human sacrifice still find these themes fruitful in a variety of cultural settings.

**HISTORICAL CORROBORATION.** The burials at Chan Chan (fourteenth–fifteenth centuries) in Peru are illustrative of the theme of soul-release and kinship with the dead. In this capital of the Chimu empire, many adolescent females were sacrificed and buried with their king. It is known that later, during Inca domination (fifteenth–sixteenth centuries), the king was considered alive after death and was treated as a participant in the affairs of his surviving kin. A kinship was established between the dead and the living in the Shang period (c. 1500–1050 BCE) in China as well. According to David N. Keightley (1978), in the Shang political system the dead and the living formed a bureaucracy together. The dead received “salaries” in the form of human sacrifices for their jobs as intercessors between the king and the high god Di. Without this, earthly prosperity could not continue. At Anyang (c. 1500–1400 BCE), the entombment of an entire company of soldiers, four charioteers, their companions, the horses, and the chariots has been unearthed.

The themes of expiation, redemption, and communion were central in the sacrificial tradition of the early Christian church. The early martyrs believed that their sufferings were evidence that the millennium was close at hand. By recapitulating Christ’s death, they shared in his resurrection and were instantly transported into his presence. Ignatius of Antioch (Antakya, Turkey) echoed the themes of redemptive communion when he joyously declared that he looked forward to being crushed by the teeth of beasts so that he might become wheat for God’s bread.

Themes of redemption and abnegation can also be found in the self-sacrifices of the samurai in Japan. Drawing on a warrior tradition dating back to the eleventh century that stressed kinship and extreme loyalty in the face of failure, the Bushidō cult arose in the peaceful Tokugawa period (1600–1868). Since there were few wars for the samurai to fight, Confucian ideals were joined with the earlier warrior ethic to create a martial cult in which the warrior was to give complete loyalty to his lord by rendering service in office rather than in war. If *seppuku* (ritual suicide) was demanded, the samurai were to comply without question. The reasons for *seppuku* might include atonement for transgressions, the

avoidance of capture in war, the death of one's lord, or a final protest to a lord who failed to follow the samurai's good advice—an act of selflessness intended to bring the foolish lord back to his senses. *Seppuku* became a refined art in which the samurai, with tremendous self-control, slashed his own belly. Often an assistant then decapitated him in such a way that the head was left hanging by a bit of flesh. In one incident forty-seven samurai chose this ritual to avenge the disgraceful death of their lord. The kamikaze pilots of World War II also followed this ancient warrior tradition.

In the Hawaiian Islands, sacrifice stands for transformation, communion, and the capacity to reorder what has been disordered. In Hawaiian theology, gods, humans, and nature are one human species. Gods are no more than differentiated manifestations of the undifferentiated cosmic Pō (of which people and nature are extensions) so that the entire world is related by kinship. The sacrificial ritual begins with some perceived lack, which is understood as a kind of disorder. The offering is consecrated to the god, who eats a part of the sacrifice, thus assimilating into himself its *mana* (effective potency). The sacrifice then passes back to the participants, who assimilate it. In this communal sharing, life is reordered and thus regenerated via the mutual assimilation of the sacrifice—an assimilation made possible by the shared kinship of gods and humans. A transformative reordering is made.

The evidence for human sacrifice in Vedic India (c. 1500–600 BCE) is still largely contested. However, by drawing on both textual and archaeological sources, Asko Parpola has suggested that rituals that were precursors of the Agnicayana (Vedic fire sacrifice) included the killing of humans. These earlier rites were part of a yearly cycle of two seasons devoted to war and agriculture, the two divisions marked by sacrifices in which the *Aśvamedha* (horse sacrifice) was equated with the *puruṣamedha* (human sacrifice). Death and regeneration were central concepts in these two sacrifices as they were in the Agnicayana. Even in the early twenty-first century, the Agnicayana symbolically involves human sacrifice: The mythic sacrificial dismemberment of Puruṣa (Cosmic Man) is recalled as the fire altar is constructed brick by brick, an act that reorders both Puruṣa and the cosmos. Five heads originally were buried under the altar—those of a man, a horse, an ox, a sheep, and a goat. Today a live tortoise is buried because of its cosmic and regenerative symbolism. The first layer of bricks represents Puruṣa's thousand eyes, and the finished altar is shaped like the firebird who will carry the sacrifice to heaven. J. C. Heesterman has suggested that human sacrifice was eliminated in the Brāhmaṇas (c. 900–700 BCE), which substituted animals and rice cakes, in an attempt to control the fear of disorder inherent in the ritual killing of humans.

The themes of order and disorder also play a role in Aztec sacrifice as does the theme of sacrificial exchange. A central myth of the Aztec tells of the birth and destruction of four ages prior to the Fifth Sun, the age of the Aztec. Each previous age is named for the way in which the sun was total-

ly destroyed. The Fifth Sun, called the “age of movement,” was also doomed to destruction by earthquakes and famine. The sun of this age was born by the willing self-sacrifice of the gods, and so shall people sacrifice themselves for the gods in return. In a cosmic exchange, gods are the maize of people's existence while people are tortillas for the gods to eat. But just as all people are born, eat food, grow old, and die, so too will the Fifth Sun meet its demise, no matter how much it is fed. The Aztec universe was thus unstable—wobbling between periods of order and disorder. Only human sacrifice could stay the end, and that only temporarily. In this eschatological setting, massive sacrificial rites were performed that may have offered people a chance to take some control of their inevitable destruction, a chance to control the uncontrollable.

Human sacrifice may seem remote to civilized sensibilities. Nevertheless, as a human act it must be at least partly intelligible to other humans. On November 18, 1978, in Jonestown, Guyana, 914 members of the People's Temple took their own lives by means of a cyanide-laced fruit drink. Most of them did so willingly. The complex reasons for this massive sacrifice of human lives are both disturbing and challenging to one's capacity to understand. Yet some familiar themes may be recognized. The people of Jonestown, like the Christian martyrs, believed in a utopian world on “the other side.” Like the samurai, they chose death as a “revolutionary act” to protest against the racism that they had failed to overcome, and like the Aztecs, they preferred to choose the time and place of their own deaths. As Jim Jones said during that “white night”: “I haven't seen anybody yet didn't die. And I like to choose my own kind of death for a change.”

**SEE ALSO** Afterlife, article on Chinese Concepts; Bushidō; Puruṣa; Suicide; Vedism and Brahmanism.

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An extraordinarily rich source of information on the Aztecs was compiled by a sixteenth-century Franciscan father, Bernardino de Sahagun, in his *Historia general de las cosas de la Nueva España*, translated by Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble as *Florentine Codex: A General History of the Things of New Spain*, 13 vols. (Santa Fe, N.Mex., 1950–1982). Volumes 2, 3, and 7 are particularly good for ritualistic and mythic sources on human sacrifice. A general discussion of Aztec sacrifice can be found in *Time and Sacrifice in the Aztec Cosmos* by Kay Read (Bloomington, Ind., 1998), and an excellent synthesis and application of a number of classic and contemporary theories on Aztec sacrifice appears in *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis* by Eric Wolf (Berkeley, Calif., 1999, pp. 134–195).

KAY A. READ (1987 AND 2005)

## HUMAN SACRIFICE: AZTEC RITES

One of the most vivid examples of the Aztec ritual of sacrificing human beings (*tlamictiliztli*) appears in Bernal Díaz del Castillo’s book *The Discovery and Conquest of Mexico* (1632; Eng. ed., 1953). Díaz del Castillo, a foot soldier in Hernando Cortés’s army, describes seeing his comrades, who had been captured in a recent battle, being dragged by force up the steps of the temple of Coatepec by Aztec warriors and priests. As the “dismal drum” of the war god, Huitzilopochtli, mixed with the ominous sounds of shell and horn trumpets, the Aztecs decorated their captives with Aztec costumes and “with fans in their hands they forced them to dance before Huichilobos [Huitzilopochtli]” (p. 191). After this ceremonial preparation, we are told that the Aztecs lay the Spaniards “on their backs on some rather narrow stones which had been prepared as places for sacrifice, and with some knives

they sawed open their chests and drew out their palpitating hearts and offered them to the idols that were there” (p. 191). Following this offering to the gods at the temple, the victims were rolled back down to the bottom of the steps where ritual experts “cut off their arms and feet and flayed the skin off the faces, and prepared it afterwards like glove leather with the beards on, and kept those for the festivals when they celebrated drunken orgies and the flesh they ate in chilimole” (p. 191).

This shocking description of an apparent massacre represents what Burr C. Brundage in his book *The Fifth Sun* (1979) calls “the central fact of Aztec life . . . the nuclear cult of war, sacrifice and cannibalism.” In this no doubt biased selection, major ritual elements of Aztec human sacrifice can be identified that help illuminate some aspects of Aztec religion. Among the outstanding elements in the text are the centrality of the sacred temple of Tenochtitlan, the ascent and descent of the temple stairs, ritual dressing, dancing and music, the heart sacrifice of enemy warriors, the dismemberment and flaying of the victim, cannibalism, and an atmosphere of political and military crisis. While it is significant that even in the report of an enemy soldier like Díaz del Castillo a number of indigenous facts of Aztec ritual sacrifice are communicated, it is important to acknowledge that many crucial dimensions are missed. First, the Nahuatl word that is closest to “sacrifice” was *nextlaoalli* (paying of the debt). In many parts of the Mesoamerican world, the ritual killing of plants, animals, and humans was carried out within a deep-seated belief that the deities had created the universe out of their own self-immolations or the giving of some part of their essences. Secondly, this gift of life put a debt on human beings whose responsibility it was to pay back the gods through ritual sacrifice and the production of blood that would result in the rejuvenation of the divine forces that sustain the world. Thirdly, this commitment to paying the debt had many ritual and theological dimensions that the Spaniards could not understand including the Mesoamerican belief that the reliability of many crucial transitions between months, years and larger cycles of time depended on the ritual giving of blood. These are just some of the key meanings of human sacrifice that is often overlooked by public and scholars alike.

As a means of understanding these elements within a comprehensive setting, this essay will focus on the following: (1) the social-political world of the Aztec Empire, characterized as a pulsating polity marked by ferocious rivalries between the capital city of Tenochtitlan (the center) and the allied and enemy territories of the state (the periphery); (2) the cosmological setting of Aztec religion and human sacrifice; and (3) the practice and paraphernalia of human sacrifice. This approach will show Aztec ritual sacrifice as both text and context, ritual order and ritual destruction aimed at cosmic and social revitalization. The Aztec warrior and worshiper powerfully experienced the gods not only in the poetry, art, and architecture of the ceremonial centers of the

empire but also in the elaborate preparations of ritual places, plants, animals and people for sacrifice through the deadly thrust of the sacrificial knife, the eruption of blood on the temple, and sometimes the transformation of human flesh into ritual food.

**THE SOCIAL WORLD OF CENTER AND PERIPHERY.** The social world in which Aztec ritual sacrifice developed was a rapidly expanding empire, organized around the capital city of Tenochtitlan between 1426 and 1521. This state organization was created and maintained, in part, by military force and a religious cosmology pervaded by themes of competition, conflict, agricultural regeneration, warfare, and the ritual killing of gods and men. In the ninety-plus years of the rise of Aztec power, the elites of Tenochtitlan—who conceived of their world as *cemanabua*, a “land surrounded by water” that was divided by the gods into four quadrants emanating from the capital—constructed the largest and most powerful political state in Mesoamerican history. This achievement of centralization was accomplished through the military conquest of scores of communities that lay in all directions from the capital. This center-oriented cosmological and social world was hampered by a pulsating political process marked by constant rebellions, secessions, and realignments by allies. One of the major political and religious instruments in stabilizing peripheral territories, and in the acquisition of massive tribute payments such as maize, beans, cloth, war service, and labor, was the periodic, sometimes large-scale sacrifice of enemy warriors at the major temples of Tenochtitlan. Some of these sacrifices constituted theatrical ritual displays of the ideology, wealth, and symbolism of the exemplary center for the purpose of establishing and expanding Aztec authority within and beyond the Valley of Mexico.

This pattern of conquest, tributary control, and human sacrifice was already a traditional practice in Mesoamerica when the Aztec ancestors, the *Chichimec* (sons of the dogs), migrated into the valley in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. At that time, the Valley of Mexico was politically fragmented into a myriad of small, warring city-states (each with a population of between ten and fifty thousand) in constant competition and conflict for political, ritual, and economic control. While human sacrifice as an instrument of political intimidation and religious devotion was widely practiced and regulated by several calendars, the Aztec expanded its uses during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.

The most powerful city-state encountered by the Aztec during their rise to dominance was the Tepenac empire, which consolidated some areas of the central valley in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Around 1424, the Aztec of Tenochtitlan and the city-states of Texcoco and Tlacopan successfully rebelled against the Tepenac and formed a state organization called the Triple Alliance, which took over the Tepenac patterns of conquest, territorial control, and tribute payments. However, during the next ninety years, Aztec *tlatoanis* (chief speakers/rulers) directed aggres-

sive military campaigns to the north, south, east, and west of the city and central valley in order to expand their territorial and tributary empire. In some cases, large-scale military campaigns were carried out at great distances from the capital. These expansions into peripheral territories resulted in both new acquisitions of land and tribute but also terrible defeats of the Aztecs at the hands of the Tlaxcala-Puebla Valley kingdom in the east and the Tarascan state in the west.

**The Flowery Wars.** One of the most important ritual and political institutions of the Aztec Empire was the *Xochiyaoyotl* (Flowery Wars), which lasted from 1450 to 1519 and consisted of a series of scheduled battlefield confrontations between warriors of the Triple Alliance and warriors of the Tlaxcala-Puebla Valley kingdoms. In recent years a controversy has arisen over the causes and significance of the Flowery Wars. According to indigenous accounts that reflect the ideology of Aztec elites, the “wars” were staged primarily to provide sacrificial victims for ritual festivals and to keep the warriors in training. One argument is that the devastating famines of 1450 to 1454, during the reign of Motecuhzoma Ilhuicamina (Moctezuma I) (1466–1520) were interpreted by the priestly elites as a sign of angry gods who needed a greater supply of warrior sacrifices. A sixteenth-century chronicler, Fray Diego Durán, states that the Flowery Wars were instituted for the specific purpose of supplying victims for the Templo Mayor (Great Temple) of Tenochtitlan, where the shrines of Huitzilopochtli and Tlaloc stood. Whereas the actual social causes were almost certainly more complex, the argument put forth by Tlacaellel, the chief adviser of Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin (Moctezuma II) (1502–1520) represents the Aztec vision well. He compared a warrior going to the Flowery Wars with a merchant going to distant markets to purchase luxuries. The god and his army went to the battlefield to purchase blood and hearts, the luxuries of the temples.

Recent research has expanded our understanding of the Flowery Wars by revealing that they

began almost as demonstration wars or tournaments, with limited numbers of elite combatants, no intentional killing, and the release of prisoners. A convincing display of superiority could lead to capitulation, but if that failed, the war escalated over a period of years: ever larger numbers of combatants were involved; the types of weapons allowed expanded to include those, such as bows and arrows, that inflicted indiscriminate death; captives were sacrificed and battles became lethal confrontations. (Hassig, 2001, p. 320).

Thus, these military confrontations resulted not just in the capture of warriors for temple sacrifice but eventually in large-scale battlefield killing that left the competing armies depleted and in disarray. In these cases, the Flowery Wars reflect true warfare conditions between states, not simply the acquisition of warriors for sacrifice in the capital. Further, it is certain that during periods of truce between these ritually warring kingdoms, rulers of enemy territories were invited

to witness the theatrical sacrifice of warriors in the ceremonial center of Tenochtitlan. Hidden behind special canopies, these visiting lords witnessed the ritual devastation of allied and enemy warriors. According to Johanna Broda, the Aztec rulers organized the ceremonies so that their enemies could see “the greatness of Mexico” and in order to “bewilder them, fill them with fear, . . . in order to show that the Aztecs were the masters of all the riches of the earth” (Broda, 1970, p. 234). In this case, the rulers from the peripheries of the Aztec state were brought to the center to witness the ceremonial authority of the capital, Tenochtitlan, which assisted the Aztec in their purpose of achieving political superiority.

Whereas the Aztecs were able by the middle of the reign of Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin to consolidate scores of city-states into their empire and to intimidate many others into uneasy alliances, their world was repeatedly shocked by rebellions and defeats at the peripheries of their empire. These tensions put the Aztec state in an atmosphere of periodic crisis and regeneration and likely contributed to the escalation of ritual human sacrifices in the ceremonial center of the capital.

It must be noted, however, that human sacrifice was practiced prior to the Aztec Empire and in many parts of Mesoamerica. There is evidence of human sacrifice among the Olmecs who date back to 1200 BCE and the Classic Maya inscriptions have a special glyph for the notion of sacrifice that sometimes referred to the ritual killing of a defeated, rival king. The ritual torture of prisoners at ceremonial temples as well as the ritual dismemberment and beheading of prisoners is shown on murals and painted vessels from numerous Maya archaeological sites. As González Torres writes, sacrifice is now known to have taken place at the great city of Teotihuacan in central Mexico.

Recent excavations in Teotihuacan have proved that human sacrifice was practiced there on a large scale. So far, 126 skeletons have been found in or around the temple of Quetzalcoatl, and archaeologists think there were at least 272 individuals represented in remains associated just with this building. One hypothesis is that they constituted a foundation sacrifice that may have been part of a great ceremony dedicated to the deities of water, just before the completion of the temple. (González Torres, 2001, p. 103)

Whereas this essay focuses intensely on the Aztec patterns and practices, other Mesoamerican cultures devised elaborate sacrificial practices that deserve further attention.

**COSMOLOGY OF HUMAN SACRIFICE.** In the various creation myths and sacred histories found in such representative works as the *Historia de los Mexicanos por sus pinturas*, the *Leyenda de los soles*, and Fray Bernardino de Sahagún’s *Historia general de las cosas de la Nueva España* (1569–1582), the Aztec cosmos is shown to have several distinctive qualities, including a dynamic, unstable, and destructive cosmic setting that is marked by sharp alternations between order

and disorder, cosmic life and cosmic death. This oscillation reflects historical developments in which the collapse of specific city-states or kingdoms resulted in the initial fragmentation but later proliferation of new communities.

At least three major cosmogonic episodes contain paradigms for the Aztec practices of warfare and human sacrifice. A review of these episodes reveals three important patterns: first, a widening of the pattern of sacrifice from sacrifice to a single deity to sacrifice to masses of deities, and, second, the conquest and sacrifice of gods from the periphery of the cosmos by the gods and warriors at the center of the world. In some cases a third pattern appears—the victory of a weaker god or brother over the dominant sibling or deity.

A major cosmogonic episode related to human sacrifice is reported in Sahagún’s *Florentine Codex* as occurring after the universe has passed through the first four cosmogonic ages. We are told that during the night the gods gathered around a divine fire at Teotihuacan (abode of the gods) to discuss who take it upon himself to “be the sun, to bring the dawn” (vol. 7, p. 6). Following four days of penance and ritual, the god Nanahuatzin (the pimply one), dressed in ceremonial garb, hurled himself into the fire, followed by a second deity, Tecuciztecatl (lord of snails). Immediately, an eagle and a jaguar rose from the flames. “From this event it is said, they took the custom whereby one was called valiant, a warrior” (vol. 7, p. 6). Then the dawn appeared in all directions. Uncertain as to where the sun would rise, the gods fell upon their knees. Quetzalcoatl looked eastward and “when the sun came to rise, when he burst forth, he appeared to be red, he kept swaying from side to side” (vol. 7, p. 7). The gods were faced with an unstable, threatening cosmic orb born out of the self-sacrifice of two of their number. Because of the motionless sun, the gods decide to sacrifice themselves, saying, “Let this be, that through us the sun may be revived. Let all of us die” (vol. 7, p. 7). The wind god, Ecatl (Ehécatl), “deals death” to the mass of deities, but the sun still fails to “follow his path.” In desperation, Ecatl “exerted himself fiercely, and violently as he blew” and the sun “went on his way” (vol. 7, p. 7). Thus began the fifth and present age—the Aztec age—created when one courageous warrior god sacrificed himself, followed by the sacrifice of almost all of the gods. It may be that this cosmogonic sacrifice served as the religious justification for the increase in sacrifices at later ceremonial cities such as Tenochtitlan.

**COSMIC SACRIFICE OF HUITZILOPOCHTLI.** The cosmic pattern of mass sacrifice to energize the sun is repeated in a subsequent episode in which terrestrial warfare and human sacrifice are created by the gods to provide for their nourishment. In one version, the god Mixcoatl (cloud serpent) creates five women and four hundred Chichimec warriors to stir up discord and warfare. While the warriors pass their time hunting and drinking, the god sends the five human beings to slay them. In this account, war is created specifically to provide sacrificial victims for the gods but again we see a large number of sacrifices taking place.

However, the specific paradigm for massive sacrifices of enemy warriors at Tenochtitlan appears in the *teotiuicatl* (divine song) of the birth of Huitzilopochtli, the Aztec war god. This narrative illustrates the pattern of the conquest and ritual killing of warriors from the periphery of the state at the major temple in the heart of the capital. The story begins when the mother of the gods, Coatlicue (serpent skirt), becomes pregnant while sweeping out the temple at Coatepec (serpent mountain). When her daughter Coyolxauhqui hears of the pregnancy, she incites her 399 siblings to dress for war. The text in book 3 of Sahagún's *Historia* reads, "They were very angry, they were very agitated, as if the hearts had gone out of them. Coyolxauhqui incited them, she inflamed the anger of her brothers, so that they should kill her mother" (p. 6). Next, Coyolxauhqui directs them to dress for war: "They distributed among themselves their paper garb, the anecuyotl, the nettles, the streamers of colored paper, . . . their arrows had barbed points, . . . then they began to move" (p. 6). Following a journey through many towns, the army, led by Coyolxauhqui, charges up Serpent Mountain to kill Coatlicue. As they reach the top, Huitzilopochtli is born fully dressed and attired for war. Attacking Coyolxauhqui, he cuts off her head and dismembers her. The text notes, "The body of Coyolxauhqui rolled down the slope; it fell apart in pieces; her hands, her legs, her torso fell in different places" (p. 7). Next, Huitzilopochtli attacks the other warriors: "He pursued them, he chased them like rabbits, all round the mountain . . . four times, . . . with nothing could they defend themselves. He chased them, he drove them away, he humbled them, he destroyed them, he annihilated them" (p. 7). Following the killing of the enemy warriors at the mountain, he takes off their costumes and "introduces them into his destiny" (p. 7).

As the significant excavations (1978–2003) of the Templo Mayor of Tenochtitlan have revealed, this mythic episode was replicated in the architecture and ritual action of the temple, which was dedicated to Huitzilopochtli and Tlaloc. It has been learned that the temple was called "Coatepec" by the Aztec. Its arrangement of parts, with Huitzilopochtli's shrine at the top of one of the great stairways and the eleven-foot-diameter round stone depicting the dismembered Coyolxauhqui located at the bottom, is an architectural repetition of this mythic episode. Ethnographic research has shown that the largest number of ceremonial sacrifices of enemy warriors from surrounding communities took place at this temple. As the divine song of Huitzilopochtli's birth states at the end,

The Méxica venerated him, made sacrifices to him, honored and served him. And Huitzilopochtli paid back those who behaved that way. And his cult was taken from there, from Coatepec, the Mountain of the Serpent, as it was practiced in ancient times. (Sahagún, vol. 3, p. 8)

As remarked earlier, many mythic episodes related to sacrifice constitute an "overthrow" episode in which the younger, weaker or more vulnerable sibling or god overcomes the

older or more powerful sibling resulting in the death of the latter and the creation of a new age, place or era. In the three cases above, we see this pattern acted out when Nanahuatzin becomes the hero god of the Fifth Sun, when the five women take on the role of sacrificing the lazy male deities and when the miracle child Huitzilopochtli defeats his fully grown, experienced warrior sister. In these and many cases, the universe is renewed as a result of an "overthrow" of the younger sibling against the older and more powerful god.

**PRACTICE AND PARAPHERNALIA OF HUMAN SACRIFICE.** It must be understood that the "debt payments" by humans to the gods who created them and the universe—what we are calling human sacrifice—were carried out within a larger, more complex ceremonial system in which a tremendous amount of energy, wealth, and time was spent in a variety of ritual festivals dedicated to a crowded and active pantheon of divinities who needed to be nurtured. This dedication is reflected in the many metaphors and symbols related to agricultural renewal, war and sacrifice. Blood was called *chalchihuatl*, meaning "precious water." Human hearts were likened to fine burnished turquoise, and war was *teotlatchinolli*, meaning "divine liquid" and "burnt things." War was the place "where the jaguars roar," where "feathered war bonnets heave about like foam in the waves." And death on the battlefield was called *xochimiquiztli*, meaning "the flowery death."

The crowded ceremonial schedule was acted out in the many ceremonial centers of the city and empire. The greatest single ceremonial precinct, that surrounding the Templo Mayor, formed the axis of Tenochtitlan and measured 440 meters on each of its four sides. It contained, according to some accounts, more than eighty ritual temples, skull racks, schools, and other ceremonial structures. Book 2 of Sahagún's *Historia* contains a valuable list with descriptions of most of these buildings, including "the Temple of Uitzilopochtli [Huitzilopochtli] . . . of Tlaloc . . . in the middle of the square; . . . it was higher; it was taller; . . . [it] faced toward the setting of the sun." Sahagún's work also contains descriptions of the kinds of sacrifices performed at various sacred places. At Teccizcalli, the Florentine Codex reports, "Moctezuma did penances; . . . there was dying there; captives died there." At Mexico Calmecac "dwelt the penitents who offered incense at the summit of the Temple of Tlaloc, quite daily." At Teccalco "there was casting of men into the fire." At the Great Skull Rack "there also . . . used to be slaying." At the Temple of Cinteotl, "the impersonator of Chicomecoatl died, at night only. And when she died, then they flayed her . . . the fire priest put on the skin." At Coaapan "the fire priest of Coatlan bathed himself." At Tilocan, amaranth-seed dough was "cooked . . . [for] the image of Uitzilopochtli." And, finally, at Acatl Yiacapan Uey Calpulli, "they gathered together the sacrificial victims called Tlalocs . . . when they had slain them, they cut them to pieces there and cooked them. They put squash blossoms with their flesh . . . then the noblemen ate them, all the high judges; but not the common folk—only the rulers." (All

quotations in the preceding passage are from Sahagún, vol. 2, pp. 179–193.)

Though important variations of ritual activity were carried out at these temples, schools, skull racks, and bath-houses, the general pattern of debt payment/human sacrifice was as follows. Most Aztec ritual began with a preparatory period of priestly fasting (*nezahualiztli*) that lasted four (or a multiple of four) days. An important exception was the yearlong fast by a group of priests and priestesses known as the *teocuaque* (god eaters) and the greatly feared *in iachhuan Huitzilopochtli in mocexihzahuhque* (the elder brothers of Huitzilopochtli who fasted for a year). This preparatory period also involved nocturnal vigils (*tozohualiztli*) and offerings of flowers, food, cloth, rubber, paper, and poles with streamers, as well as incensing (*copaltemaliztli*), the pouring of libations, and the embowring of temples, statues, and ritual participants. Dramatic processions of elaborately costumed participants moving to sacred songs played by musical ensembles passed through the ceremonial precinct before arriving at the specific temple of sacrifice. The major ritual participants were called *in ixiptla in teteo* (deity impersonators). All important rituals involved a death sacrifice of either animals or human beings.

**Autosacrifice and bloodletting.** It is often overlooked that autosacrifice or the willful piercing and bleeding was the most common form of sacrificial action carried out by the Aztecs on their own bodies. A simple way to understand the meaning of autosacrifice is to state that Mesoamerican peoples shed their own blood at the completion of major temporal cycles and periods. This reflects their understanding that the continuation of life on the cosmic and local scales depended on the ritual offerings of one's own internal divine substance—namely blood. As Cecelia Klein writes in her superb summary of this ritual practice “Maya rulers let their blood during what we now call ‘period endings,’ which could mark the successful completion of a *katun* (twenty-year period), *baktun* (four-hundred-year period), or even longer time cycle. On those occasions, autosacrifice was intended to encourage the safe transition between the old cycle and the new, and thus the continuation of life” (Klein, 2001, pp. 64–66).

Klein shows that as early as the ninth century BCE, Mesoamerican peoples were using stingray spines and other sharp instruments to ritually bloodlet themselves. This practice, as shown in the archaeological (obsidian, flint blades, animal bones—sometimes found in the foundation of buildings), iconographic (lintels, pictorial manuscripts sometimes showing the ritual instruments as elaborately decorated) and documentary (sixteenth-century accounts) evidence was carried out throughout Mesoamerican history. These practices were carried out by elites and commoners alike with the former sometimes using sharpened jaguar bones and the latter using stingray spines. The Aztecs had elaborate rules determining when and what parts of the body were to be bled. In colonial manuscripts it describes Aztec priests piercing

their tongues, thighs, calves, and there are written reports that the most committed priests pierced their tongues and penises, sometimes splitting them in two. All people—men, women, and children—were apparently expected to carry out ritual bloodletting and several Maya carvings depict royal women involved in highly important scenes of autosacrifice. As Klein writes,

These women are invariably wives or mothers of a male ruler, who typically accompanies them in the image. The most famous example is Lintel 24 from Yaxchilan. In his sixteenth-century *Relacion de las cosas de Yucatan*, the Franciscan bishop Diego de Landa reports that bloodspattered paper strips used in autosacrificial rites by the Conquest-period Yucatec Maya were eventually burned. The smoke from the burning bloodletters and bloodied papers was thought to transmit nourishment to the gods, since blood was perceived as an analogue of both fertilizing water and semen. (2001, p. 64)

The most dramatic and valued sacrifices were the human sacrifices of captured warriors and slaves. These victims were ritually bathed, carefully costumed, taught to dance special dances, and some were fattened or slimmed down during the preparation period. They were elaborately dressed to impersonate the specific deities to whom they were sacrificed. What must be emphasized—if one is to gain a deeper understanding of the indigenous practices, is that these rituals utterly transformed the identity of the human beings to be sacrificed into *teotl ixiptlas* (living images of the gods) as they had lived in the mythic times before the establishment of the daily life of the present age. This point has been made most clearly by Alfredo Lopez Austin who writes that these deity impersonators or

*teteo imixiptlabuan*, . . . men possessed by the gods, who, as such, died in a rite of renewal. The idea of a calendric cycle, or a periodic returning, in which the power of a god was born, grew, decreased, and concluded made it necessary in a rite linking the time of man to mythical time that a god would die so his force might be reborn with new power. It was not men who died, but gods—gods within a corporeal covering that made their possible ritual death on earth. If the gods did not die, their force would diminish in a progressively aging process. Men destined for sacrifice were temporarily converted into receptacles of divine fire, they were treated as gods, and they were made to live as the deity lived in legend. Their existence in the role of *ixiptlatin*, or “images” could last from a few days up to four years. (Lopez Austin, 1988, p. 377)

**Various sacrificial techniques.** The different primary sources reveal a wide range of sacrificial techniques, including decapitation (usually for women), shooting with darts or arrows, drowning, burning, hurling from heights, strangulation, entombment and starvation, and gladiatorial combat. Usually, the ceremony peaked when splendidly attired captors and captives sang and danced in procession to the temple, where they were escorted (sometimes unwillingly) up the stairways to the sacrificial stone. The victim was quickly



thrust on the sacrificial stone (*techcatl*), and the temple priest cut through the chest wall with the ritual flint knife (*techpatl*). The priest grasped the still-beating heart, called “precious eagle cactus fruit,” tore it from the chest, offered it to the Sun for vitality and nourishment, and placed it in a carved circular vessel called the *cuauhxicalli* (eagle vessel). In some cases, the body, now called “eagle man,” was rolled down the temple steps to the bottom, where it was dismembered. The head was cut off and the brains taken out. In some ceremonies the victim was beheaded and the head was placed on the *tzompantli*, a skull rack consisting of long poles laid horizontally and loaded with skulls. In many cases, the captor was decorated (for instance with chalk and bird down) and given gifts. Then, in some cases, together with his relatives, he consumed a ritual meal consisting of a bowl of stew of dried maize called *tlacatlaolli*.

Although this pattern of ritual preparation, ascent, and descent of the temple, as well as heart sacrifice of enemy warriors, dismemberment, and the offering to the gods in order to nurture them was typical, it is also important to emphasize the diversity of sacrificial festivals, which involved variations and combinations of these elements. For instance, during the feast of Tlacaxipeualiztli (the feast of the flaying of men), a prisoner of war “who came here from lands about us” was taken by a priest called the “bear man” and tied to a huge, round sacrificial stone, called the *temalacatl*, that was placed flat on the ground. The captive was provided with a pine club and a feathered staff to protect himself against the attacks of four warriors armed with clubs of wood and obsidian blades. When he was defeated he was taken off the stone, his heart was taken out, and he was flayed. His skin was then prepared to be worn by relatives of the captor and then paraded around the city going from house to house asking for gifts.

Another distinctive festival, called Toxcatl, was dedicated to the protean god Tezcatlipoca. Elaborate efforts were made to find the perfect deity-impersonator for this festival. The captive warrior had to have a flawless body and musical and rhetorical skills. For a full year prior to his sacrifice, he lived a privileged existence in the capital. He had eight servants to ensure that he was splendidly arrayed and bejeweled. Four wives were given to him during the last twenty days of his life. Just before the end of the sacrificial festival, he arrived at a small temple called Tlacoachalco. “He ascended by himself, he went up of his own free will, to where he was to die. As he was taken up a step, as he passed one step, there he broke, he shattered his flute, his whistle.” He was then swiftly sacrificed (see Sahagún, vol. 2, p. 71).

Still another remarkable ceremony was the New Fire Ceremony, also called the Binding of the Years, held only once every fifty-two years on the summit of the Hill of the Star outside Tenochtitlan. At midnight, when the star cluster called *Tianquiztli* (marketplace; the Pleiades) passed through the zenith, marking the end of the fifty-two-year calendrical cycle, a captive warrior was sacrificed. In his chest cavity a

new fire was started, marking the regeneration of the cosmos. The fire was then taken to the Templo Mayor and thence to all the cities and towns in the empire.

A remarkable festival, celebrated on the first day of the month of Atlcuaualo, involved the paying of debts to Tlaloc, the rain god. On this day, children (called “human paper streamers”) with two cowlicks in their hair and favorable day signs were dressed in costumes—some set with pearls—of dark green, black-striped with chili red, and light blue were sacrificed in seven different locations. The flowing and falling of tears of the children insured the coming of rain. It should be noted that some sources indicate the difficulty that priests had in carrying out these particular “debt payments.” The meaning of the rain-blood exchange in this ritual has been interpreted by the historian of religions Phil Arnold as follows. These child sacrifices physically constituted

the central theme of correspondence between human life and the landscape; blood and water. The former is a bodily water and the basis of human life, the latter is an earthly or heavenly blood and logically the basis of Tlalocan or the landscape’s life. The reciprocal nature of life and death was a central element in most of Aztec religious life. The ritual acquisition of water required paying a high price in children’s blood, which offset the costs of the sacrifice given by Tlaloc. The exchange was a liquid one. (Arnold, 1999, p. 227)

**CONCLUSION.** In recent years a controversy has broken out in academic and popular literature as to whether there is any reliable evidence that the Aztecs and other Mesoamerican peoples actually carried out human sacrifice. It has been argued in polemical tones that all the evidence is the result of either distorted archaeology or terribly biased Spanish sources. One motive for these denials is to protect contemporary indigenous peoples from being labeled as descending from uncivilized even monstrous cultures. For years, the word Aztec has been equated—like no other world culture—with the worst and most violent forms of human violence. In books, films, and art, the Aztecs are degraded in ways that sometimes makes a fulsome understanding and appreciation of their culture impossible. The solution is not to deny what is so clearly in the record pre-conquest and post conquest—namely that ritual violence against humans was one of the many ways the Aztecs and their precursors carried out their religious commitments, military expansions, and political dominations. The more useful approach is to study the Aztecs in the full range of their expressions in daily life and political glory—including their extraordinary linguistic achievements, their astonishing aesthetic expressions, their architectural and political practices, and their bellicose traditions of imagining and treating the human body as a receptacle of divine fire that needed to be magically transformed into a divinity, cultivated in spirit, and cut open so the plants and political forces of the world could be rejuvenated. This duality with its apparent contradictions is what makes the study of the Aztecs and all Mesoamerican peoples so interesting, challenging, and necessary. It also demonstrates in dis-

comforting ways that their contradictions—however distant from modern practices—are similar to people in modern times.

With all this cosmology, social history, and ritual practice in mind, it can be seen that Bernal Díaz del Castillo witnessed more than a massacre. He glimpsed and was later able to record with some accuracy fragments of an elaborate ritual tradition struggling to maintain the dominance of the Aztec city and its temple against threats from enemy warriors, who, like the siblings of Huitzilopochtli (and like the Spaniards), had come from the edge of the world to conquer and kill.

SEE ALSO Aztec Religion.

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DAVÍD CARRASCO (1987 AND 2005)

**HUME, DAVID** (1711–1776), was a Scottish philosopher and historian. Hume was born in Edinburgh on April 26, 1711, to Joseph and Katherine Home. Most of his childhood was spent on the family estate at Ninewells, in Berwickshire, forty miles south of Edinburgh near the border of England. At age eleven Hume entered the University of Edinburgh, and upon leaving the university three years later, began to prepare for a career in law. Hume's interest in law was soon eclipsed by his passion for literature, history, and philosophy; over the following decade most of his time was spent studying what he called "polite authors" such as Shaftesbury, Butler, Locke, and Cicero. In 1734, at age twenty-three, Hume left Scotland to take a position as clerk with a Bristol merchant. It was here that he changed the spelling of his surname from *Home* to *Hume*, because in Scotland *Home* is pronounced as *Hume* is in England; Hume preferred that his name be pronounced correctly, even if it meant changing the spelling. After four months in Bristol, Hume left for the south of France, determined to pursue a life of letters.

In 1737 Hume returned from France with the two volumes of *A Treatise of Human Nature* in manuscript form. Being sure that the work would bring him instant fame and fortune, he was eager to publish without delay. In his own words, however, the *Treatise* "fell dead-born from the press." This is not to say that it was not widely read both in Britain and on the continent. Hume undoubtedly meant that the ideas put forth in the *Treatise* fell dead-born on the minds of those who read it. Reviews of the *Treatise* were universally negative.

Hume's disappointment was profound. During the six-year period from 1739 to 1745 he lived in virtual seclusion at Ninewells, writing the third volume of the *Treatise* (published in 1740) and experimenting with the essay form as a medium of expression. Hume's first efforts as an essayist resulted in a two-volume work published in 1742 under the title *Essays Moral and Political*. This was Hume's first successful publication. Only a small selection of the twenty-seven essays therein contained can be counted as serious philosophical pieces, and these were not the ones that accounted for the popularity of the collection as a whole.

Short of money, in 1745 Hume took a position as tutor to the marquis of Annandale, and in the same year applied for the chair of Ethics and Pneumatical Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. Hume judged that a regular academic appointment would provide both the income and leisure necessary to pursue a full-time life of study. However, his application was opposed by the principal of the university, who accused him of atheism, heresy, and skepticism. His failure to secure this appointment was the second great disappointment of his life.

Hume's next two years were spent traveling in France as secretary to James St. Claire, a general in the British army. The army was of interest to Hume for financial reasons only: He stayed just long enough to accumulate the money needed for another retreat to his study. Between 1747 and 1751 he composed and published his two great treatises: *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (originally titled *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding*), and *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. These were the first of Hume's serious philosophical works to achieve acclaim.

In 1752 Hume secured an appointment as librarian to the Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh. This was the first time Hume had had steady access to a major library. He took the opportunity to pursue a project of long-standing interest—the detailed study of English history. Between 1754 and 1761 Hume published, in installments, his masterful six-volume *History of England*. Regarded as a classic in Hume's own time, this text remained the standard in its field until the end of the nineteenth century.

In 1763 Hume became secretary to the British embassy in Paris, spending the next three years writing and conversing with the luminaries of the Parisian intellectual set. By this time he was generally regarded as Britain's foremost man of letters. Hume returned to England in 1766 as under secretary of state, but he resigned from the diplomatic service three years later, retiring to Ninewells. In 1775 Hume was stricken with an internal disorder that claimed his life on August 25, 1776.

David Hume was a man of gentle bearing—humane, tolerant, charitable, and generous in his opinions of others. In his autobiographical essay “My Own Life,” Hume characterized himself as being of “cheerful nature.” From all reports, his wit was sparkling; he was a favorite both in the polite salons of Paris and the rude pubs of Edinburgh. To his French intimates he was known as “le bon David,” while his many friends in Scotland referred to him as “Saint David.” Although Hume never married, he was not unpopular with the ladies; his charm and good humor more than compensated for his obese physical appearance.

Directly following its poor reception in 1739, Hume made two attempts to stimulate interest in *A Treatise of Human Nature*. In 1740 he published an essay titled “An Abstract of a Treatise on Human Nature,” which identified the nub of the work's method and summarized some of the con-

clusions of the text. At the same time, Hume was busy at Ninewells preparing a corrected edition of the first two volumes, which he hoped would remove the misunderstandings that his first efforts had generated. But the corrected edition never appeared. The only changes made during this period that survived in printed form were included in an appendix to the *Treatise* published together with the third volume in 1741. Neither the publication of the *Abstract* nor the materials appended to the *Treatise* had the desired effect. It was not until Hume cast the basic theses of the *Treatise* into essay form and released them in the *Enquiries* that the ideas first delivered in the *Treatise* received the sort of attention Hume thought they deserved. In later years, Hume in effect abandoned the *Treatise* in favor of his *Enquiries*. In the “Author's Advertisement” printed in volume 2 of the 1777 edition of Hume's works, Hume described the *Treatise* as a “juvenile work,” stating that he had made an “error in going to press too early,” and announcing that the *Enquiries* rather than the *Treatise* should be taken as expressing his considered views on the topics therein discussed. Still, succeeding generations of scholars have, as it were, rediscovered the *Treatise*. Most students of the history of philosophy now regard it as Hume's foremost contribution to philosophical literature.

Regarding the impact of the philosophical views first expressed in the *Treatise* and restated in the *enquiries*, two comments are in order. First, book 1 (“Of the Understanding”) and its companion, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, are generally thought to contain definitive statements of the epistemological theses associated with classical British empiricism and generative of the empiricist trends in Western philosophy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant acknowledges Hume as the one who inspired his own probing into the foundations of human knowledge. The empiricist elements in the philosophies of Mill, Russell, Carnap, and Wittgenstein are in no small measure traceable to the direct or indirect influence of Hume.

Second, it should also be noted that, in book 3 of the *Treatise* and in *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume sets the stage for much of what follows in nineteenth- and twentieth-century moral philosophy. Here Hume works out a hedonistic, rule-based, and utilitarian theory of ethics very much like the one suggested more than a hundred years later by John Stuart Mill in chapter 5 of *Utilitarianism*. This theory has served as one of the major foci of moral-theoretical reflection in twentieth-century philosophical literature. It might be added that at least some commentators (e.g., A. J. Ayer, 1980) claim to find in Hume's ethical writings rudiments of the so-called emotive analysis of ethical language—a theory not brought to maturity until the mid-twentieth century, but very influential in British-American moral philosophy since that time. Whether or not this last claim can be sustained, it is clear that Hume stands as a major figure in the history of ethics. Putting it all together, it is hard to imagine how the last two hundred years of Western phi-

losophy would have gone, had the ideas expressed in the *Treatise* really fallen dead-born from the press.

The corpus of Hume's writings includes seven texts that specifically treat religious topics. In order of their appearance in published form, they are: (1) "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm," published in 1742 as one of the *Essays Moral and Political*; (2) "Of Miracles" and (3) "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State," which appeared in 1748 as parts 10 and 11 respectively of *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*; (4) "The Natural History of Religion," one of *Four Dissertations* published in 1757; (5) "Of Suicide" and (6) "On the Immortality of the Soul," brought out together in 1777 under the title *Two Essays*; and (7) the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, which occupied Hume's attention periodically during the last twenty-five years of his life and was finally published in 1779.

All these texts are critical of religion—of religious institutions, religious practices, theological doctrines, and/or theological arguments. Correlatively, all were greeted in orthodox circles with suspicion and, in some cases, with hostility. Most were in one way or another suppressed either by Hume or by his publishers for fear of reprimand from the religious community. Thus, "Of Miracles," written prior to 1739 and originally intended for inclusion in the *Treatise*, was deleted from the text prior to publication, because Hume judged that it might be found scandalous and thus detract from the reception of his work. Similarly, "Of Suicide," "Of the Immortality of the Soul," and an early version of *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* were all scheduled for publication in 1756, but they were suppressed by Hume's publisher for prudential reasons. All three were published only after Hume's death and even then without the author's or publisher's name attached. It should be recalled that in 1745 Hume's appointment at the University of Edinburgh had been opposed because his writings were judged wanting on religious grounds. Eighteenth-century Britain could be hard on religious dissenters; neither Hume nor his publishers sought to cause offense.

Although Hume is best known for his views in epistemology and moral philosophy, the essay "Of Miracles" and the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* are generally regarded by contemporary philosophers as classics in the philosophy of religion. "Of Miracles" is centered on the question of whether evidence supporting the claim that a given miracle occurred could ever be strong enough to warrant belief, given the facts that (1) a miracle is by definition an event whose occurrence violates natural law, and (2) the evidence supporting the claim is derived entirely from human testimony. Hume's negative verdict is based on a general historiographical principle that is applicable not only in the study of religion, but in any area of inquiry that relies on human testimony as a major source of evidence: namely, that the credibility of any given piece of testimony is in part a function of the plausibility of what is affirmed within it.

*Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* is focused on a very special version of the argument from design used by a number of eighteenth-century devotees of Isaac Newton's theological writings. In the course of the discussion, Hume not only delivers what many believe to be the definitive refutation of the argument from design (even anticipating the nineteenth-century Darwinian account of adaptation in nature), but he also presents a series of sharply penetrating critical studies on a wide variety of other important theological topics such as divine attribution, the cosmological argument for the existence of God, and, especially, the problem of evil. It should be added that, apart from its stunning philosophical merits, Hume's *Dialogues* can also be credited with what is perhaps the most beautifully executed employment of the dialogue form in Western philosophical literature.

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comments briefly but broadly on Hume's writings on religious topics.

NELSON PIKE (1987)

## HUMOR AND RELIGION

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

AN OVERVIEW  
 HUMOR AND RELIGION IN EAST ASIAN CONTEXTS  
 HUMOR AND ISLAM  
 HUMOR, IRONY, AND THE COMIC IN WESTERN  
 THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

### HUMOR AND RELIGION: AN OVERVIEW

The topic of humor and religion poses a puzzle. As witnessed by notions such as *Homo ridens* and *Homo religiosus*, both humor and religion have been regarded as defining the human condition. Somewhat differently, both have often been held to be universals found throughout history and across cultures. Even if one questions their use to define the human condition or their status as universals, one must admit that both humor and religion do seem to be found almost everywhere. The relation of religion and humor, however, has not formed a central topic for reflection in the study of religion. Although a number of well-known instances of the conjunction of the two—such as that of tricksters or the Christian festival Carnival—have drawn considerable attention and theoretical reflection, both classic and more current theorists of religion rarely give the topic extended, if any, treatment. In addition, no prominent general studies of the topic exist. Introductory textbooks for the study of religion and encyclopedias of religion have also given the topic rather scant attention.

The puzzle might be stated thus: humor and religion seem to be ubiquitous, yet their relation is rarely treated. Two possible explanations present themselves. The first is that religion and humor represent two different modes of awareness, experience, or cognition that exist only occasionally in any significant relation to one another. This view can be seen, for instance, in the still rather commonly held idea that religion deals with serious matters and humor with the nonserious. A second explanation is that the relation of religion and humor is of more importance than has generally been recognized and deserves fuller exploration and reflection. This overview will attempt, through offering a provisional map of some of the ways humor and religion are related, to suggest that the second explanation is closer to the truth.

Humor and religion clearly share one thing in common. Discussions of the two terms frequently claim at some point that definition of the concepts is almost impossible. Rather than attempt formal definitions here, a characterization of the relation of religion and humor in terms of the interplay of congruity and incongruity will be offered as a means of orienting the discussion. Whether cast in terms of salvation,

order, meaning, or redemption, religion frequently has been characterized as preoccupied with congruity, with bringing human hopes, expectations, actions, and longings into agreement with an ideal that may be described either as conformity with some form of cosmic order or as liberation from some form of oppressive order. Such characterizations of religion are of value as long as religion is not viewed solely in terms of a concern with congruity. A preoccupation with congruity must inevitably result in—perhaps even inevitably generate—an encounter with a range of incongruities including those of both a tragic and humorous sort.

Religion then may be conceived as a complex interplay of congruity and incongruity that inevitably entails humor. Humor here is understood in the most inclusive sense as embracing phenomena such as wit, satire, and comedy from which it is sometimes distinguished. Whatever form it may take, humor may be said to involve a perception of incongruity generated by the intrusion of an unexpected event, logic, or perception that calls into question, at least temporarily, some standard expectation, belief, or orientation.

Humor and religion share something else in common. Although the value of both has been questioned by many throughout history, there is still a widespread assumption at present that religion and, perhaps especially, humor are inherently good, healthy, and liberating. Both seem best approached, however, as morally neutral terms. Humor and religion may serve at times to free people from imposed conceptual constraints, overcome a sense of self-importance, and establish community, yet both may also function to denigrate others, enforce social hierarchies, and underscore the differences between communities.

**HUMOR IN MYTH, SACRED TEXTS, AND LITERATURE.** Although there are no comprehensive comparative studies, humor has played important roles in the central myths and sacred texts of many religious traditions. It has even been argued that a fundamental characteristic of mythic narratives is their humorous nature. In this view, myths in a variety of ways present humorous incongruities that serve to challenge the confines of normal, everyday patterns of thought (Bolte, 1968, pp. 35–72). Although only a few preliminary observations can be offered here, a comparison of the roles of humor in myths, tales, and sacred texts would seem to be a promising project: Are mythic narratives inherently humorous? What sort of sense of humor, if any, do the gods possess? What roles are accorded humor in the interaction of gods and people? What roles does humor play in bringing into being, maintaining, or disrupting cosmic order?

Humor has figured significantly in the mythologies, stories, and folklore of what have been variously termed savage, primitive, nonliterate, primal, indigenous, tribal, or traditional religions. Most attention here has been focused on figures known as tricksters, a term that seems first to have been applied to the often humorous, disruptive, seemingly amoral, and yet at times creative figures appearing in Native American myth and folklore. The term has been extended to



mythological figures in Africa, South America, Southeast Asia, and well beyond. Trickster or tricksterlike figures have even been taken as a fundamental characteristic of traditional religions (Smith, 1995, pp. 1093–1094).

Tricksters usually are presented as having inhabited the world in mythic times when the world was moving toward its present form and a range of supernatural beings was active and present, though some figures identified as tricksters are active and present in this age. Tricksters often exhibit a combination of divine, human, and animal characteristics, and their actions contribute to shaping the world and human condition. They are also frequently preoccupied with their bodies, sexuality, bodily orifices and excretions, and boundaries and limits of all kinds. Tricksters' excesses and experimentation with the body often lead to comic situations. As their name suggests, they often play tricks, with their tricks sometimes backfiring and rendering themselves rather than their victims the objects of humor. Among the many functions and meanings attributed to tricksters is mocking and calling into question both human and divine solemnity.

The usefulness of the category of the trickster has been questioned, and the term has no doubt often been overextended, including applications to the Marx Brothers, Jesus, the Japanese media, and Thomas Merton (1915–1968). For the purposes of this essay, however, scholarship on the trickster clearly establishes a valuable point. Whether narratives of tricksters or tricksterlike figures form a part of central myths or whether they exist as separate narratives commenting on other myths, they clearly demonstrate that humor in a variety of forms has played a central role in the myths of many traditional religious communities. In other words, even if the trickster does not represent a coherent category or concept, the variety of figures gathered under the term at least testify to the importance, if not centrality, of humor in traditional religions.

The history of the study of tricksters is also of significance for reflecting on the relation of humor and religion. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when missionaries and anthropologists were encountering religious communities with myths, tales, and rituals containing humor linked with sexuality, scatology, and other "scandalous" elements, such myths, tales, and rituals were linked with savagery, primitiveness, and childishness. At work here of course were normative assumptions about the nature of proper religion, derived largely from Christianity as well as from the Enlightenment's preoccupation with rationality. The ensuing century or so, however, has seen some change; tricksters and the sensibilities they embody are as like as not to be viewed as positive, as possessing something modernity and Christian traditions have regrettably lost. The reappraisal in the last hundred years of what were deemed "primitive" traditions has at least partially hinged, in other words, on a reappraisal of the humor to be found in such traditions.

Humor has played important roles as well in the myths of religions beyond those once deemed primitive. The gods

of Greek myth, whom Christians came to regard as immoral, are a case in point. While not infrequently laughing at and mocking humans, the gods also acted much like humans: they played tricks on one another, made foolish mistakes, committed adultery, and laughed at and made fun of one another. Being sexual beings themselves, at least some of the Greek gods also had an appreciation for the humorous dimensions of sexuality. As seen in the myth of Demeter, getting the gods to laugh was one way of restoring the world to order and fertility. Dionysos was a god of laughter linked with sexual excess and inebriation. In short it is difficult to conceive of the Greek gods and their relations to humans without taking into account humor.

There is probably no corpus of myth richer in humor than that of India. Though India has produced as refined, abstract, and sublime conceptions of the divine as anywhere, Indian deities, despite all the powers they may possess, share with humans most if not all of the elements necessary to generate a wide variety of humor: folly, ambition, excessive sexual appetite, curiosity, conflicting desires, a delight in trickery, and so forth. Humor is linked also to an important theme running throughout Vedic, epic, and Puranic myths: "the excess of anything, bad or good—such as the virtue of an ascetic—poses a threat to the balance of a closed universe" (O'Flaherty, 1973, p. 282). Mythic exploration of the consequences of excess frequently leads to comic situations, humor, and laughter. When confronted with Śiva's aim to overcome attachment to sexuality through ascetic practices, Kāma, the god of sexuality, commented: "If a man who is wise and intent upon release tries to slay me, I dance before him as he devotes himself to attaining the bliss of liberation—and I laugh at him" (*Mahābhārata* 14.13.16–17). Given Indian deities' explorations of the consequences of excess and the delight of at least some gods in trickery, a number of divine or semidivine figures in Indian myth such as Indra, Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇa, and the sage Nārada have sometimes been identified as tricksters or tricksterlike figures. It has also been suggested that the Indian view of this world as *māyā* (illusion) in contrast to another level of ultimate reality sets up a potentially comic or humorous situation: suddenly seen from the perspective of a higher truth, the events of this world can take on the quality of a joke.

Given the influence they have had on the Western study and conceptualization of religion, the sacred texts of the Abrahamic traditions deserve special attention. The holy books of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have frequently been characterized as being devoid of humor, particularly when satire and ridicule are excluded from the category of humor. This in itself, of course, is evidence of an important, if negative, relation between humor and religion and has done much to shape Western conceptions of the relation of humor and religion by suggesting that sacred matters and texts are or should be marked by an absence of humor. There has been a growing effort in recent years, however, to recover the humorous dimensions of these sacred texts.

Though conceived in various ways, the god of the Abrahamic traditions stands apart from the gods of many other Middle Eastern religions in not having, with some notable exceptions, what might be termed an active sexual life and in rejecting many of the sexual aspects of fertility rituals that were elsewhere a source of humor and laughter. Humor seems, for instance, to have been an issue in the confrontation between the cult of Baal and the cult of Yahweh. In the cult of Baal (as in many traditional religions throughout the world), laughter was associated with rituals of renewal and fertility that included sexual symbolism and practices; joy, sexuality, laughter, and fertility were often linked. The prophets of Israel opposed and ridiculed such practices as well as the gods associated with them.

Perhaps the most prominent mode of humor found in the Hebrew scriptures is the humor of mockery and derision. In *Psalms* 1 and 2, which are often held to serve as guides for reading the entire book of *Psalms*, mockery plays a central role. In *Psalms* 1 the righteous and those who scoff at their implausible beliefs are contrasted. In *Psalms* 2 the Lord “sits in the heavens and laughs” at those who oppose him. A number of the *Psalms* return to these themes, with the righteous being laughed at by the unrighteous and vice versa. The Lord is portrayed as a god who laughs at the unrighteous, knowing that they will come to ruin and eventually understand that what they took as implausible or incongruous is not so.

In addition to the aggressive humor of satire and ridicule, the Hebrew scriptures are marked by other types of humor. The most noted episode involving humor and laughter is found in *Genesis* 17 and 18 where God reveals to Abraham and then Sarah that they shall have a child. The initial response of both Abraham and Sarah is to laugh at the implausibility of the aged Sarah bearing a child. God upbraids Sarah for laughing at his pronouncement. In addition, God stipulates that the child shall be named Isaac, which means “laughter” or “he laughs,” and Sarah exclaims that God has given her reason to laugh. Although the story has been interpreted in various ways, it is difficult to deny that humor based on a perception of incongruity is at the heart of this story of the interaction of God, Abraham, and Sarah. A crucial moment in the Abrahamic tradition is thus marked, in more than one way, by laughter and reflection on the appropriateness of laughter.

Arguments have been made for the existence of a wide variety of forms of humor in various parts of the Hebrew scriptures. Considerable attention has been given to humorous punning, verbal wit, and irony in a number of texts ranging from *Genesis* to *Proverbs*; *Jonah* has been treated as a parody of the standard prophetic narrative or, alternatively, as a satire of a prophet; and figures such as Jacob have been discussed as tricksters. Many of the Hebrew Bible’s narratives, including *Job*, have also been understood as comedies—narratives resolving in a more or less happy ending and, at least in some readings, involving humor.

Considerable humor has also been found in the commentary on sacred texts found in the Talmud and in the Midrash. Included here are witty disputations, farcical animal fables, humorous stories about sinners as well as pious fools and rabbis, portrayals of God as being a bit of a trickster, and some joking at the expense of Jesus and Christians. The flavor of some of this humor is suggested by an encounter between Moses and God: “When Moses went up to God he found God weaving crowns for the letters of the Law. God said to him: Do men give no greetings in your city? Moses said: Does a slave greet his master? God replied: You ought to have wished me success. Then Moses said: May the power of the Lord be great, according as *Thou* hast spoken” (Jónsson, 1985, p. 54). There is also, of course, a rich literature of satire, parody, humorous tales, and jokes to be found throughout Jewish traditions which forms an additional “commentary” on sacred texts. In many traditions the understanding of more “serious” sacred texts has often been conditioned and qualified by humorous commentary on or alternative versions of sacred texts.

Though there is a long tradition denying that Jesus ever laughed (and thus also perhaps that he lacked a sense of humor), growing attention has been given to the question of humor in the New Testament. There has been considerable debate about whether the sayings, repartee, and parables of Jesus can be regarded as humorous. Some have pointed, for instance, to passages such as *Matthew* 19:24—“It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God”—as evidence of Jesus’ use of humorous incongruity in teaching. Even if the debate about Jesus’ humor is unresolved, it is obviously of crucial importance in that it involves fundamental issues concerning the image of Jesus as well as the meaning of his pronouncements and the ways they were understood. Despite the immense progress which has been made in the study of the canonical Gospels, scholars are still uncertain as to whether Jesus was joking or serious and, if joking, uncertain as to how to understand his humor. One of the fundamental ways in which Jesus remains an enigma, in other words, concerns his relation with humor.

In the New Testament humor also functions to define the boundary between and relation of the righteous and non-righteous or believers and unbelievers. *Luke*, for instance, has Jesus describing the coming of the kingdom of God in terms of a reversal of who will be able to laugh: “Blessed are you who weep now, for you will laugh” and “Woe to you who are laughing now, for you will mourn and weep” (*Luke* 6:21, 25). In the canonical Gospels, humor also plays a role in the trial and crucifixion of Jesus, who is mocked and ridiculed as a powerless figure claiming to be (or proclaimed by some to be) a king.

Varying accounts of the crucifixion of Jesus also illustrate how the presence or absence of humor can signal radically different religious orientations. In the canonical Gospels, clearly there is little in the way of humor on Jesus’ part

during the Passion. However, in one of the gnostic gospels, the *Apocalypse of Peter*, Jesus is depicted as laughing because his physical body is only an illusion and, despite what his persecutors may think, he is not really in pain. The joke is reversed, with Jesus now laughing at those who ridicule him, and marks a radically different conception of Jesus and the nature of his presence in the world than that found in some Christian traditions.

The Qurʾān is not usually thought of as containing much in the way of humor. Like the sacred scriptures of Judaism and Christianity, the Qurʾān makes much of the opposition between believers and unbelievers, with the unbelievers mocking the believers and taking them as fools. Allāh in turn will mock the unbelievers (*Sūrah* 1: 11–15). The Qurʾān also makes some use of irony, humor, and wordplay. Much of this dimension of the Qurʾān, however, is lost when the Qurʾān is interpreted into another language without detailed commentary on the original Arabic.

Though humor is not prominently featured in the Qurʾān, it would be a mistake to conclude that humor is thus of little importance in Islam. Though some Muslim theologians have expressed reservations about humor and laughter, this has done little to curb the Muslim appreciation of humor, as witnessed by the numerous collections of jokes, anecdotes, and humorous tales to be found in Arabic literature from a relatively early date. Franz Rosenthal observes in *Humor in Early Islam* that “the otherworldliness of Islam did little to stop the actual enjoyment and literary appreciation of humor. With all his seriousness and the foreboding of impending doom, the prophet Muhammad himself possessed much cheerful humanity and his followers through the centuries have always preserved a good-natured love of jokes and pranks” (1956, p. 5). Indeed some traditions present the Prophet as a bit of a practical joker. As Rosenthal relates, “he told an old woman that old women were not admitted into Paradise, and when she was greatly upset by his statement, he quoted Qurʾān 56. 35–7/34–6 to the effect that all women in Paradise would be equally young” (1956, pp. 5–6).

Because it is difficult if not impossible to deduce the attitudes about humor to be found in a religious community based solely on an examination of its most central or sacred texts, attention should be given to the vast body of tales, folklore, and literature that, often from the perspective of both religious communities and scholars, lies outside the bounds of sacred myths and texts proper. Many of these stories and texts have humorous aspects and treat or comment on the themes of what are usually regarded as more sacred myths and texts. In Europe, Mexico, and the American Southwest, for instance, there is a rich body of folktales presenting Saint Peter as a tricksterlike figure (Hynes and Steele, 1993). How religious communities have understood and experienced their sacred myths and texts cannot be grasped without an appreciation of how they stand in relation to the less sacred stories and texts that often offer a humorous perspective on them.

**HUMOR AND RITUAL.** Humor plays important roles in both the central and more peripheral rituals of religious communities. It should be noted that, even when it is not present, humor is important for ritual. Many religious rituals are marked of course by seriousness and solemnity. In such cases the exclusion of humor is a major strategy for marking the sacred nature of the occasion.

When humor is present in ritual it often exhibits a range of related but not always present features: an at least seeming absence of social control; a reversal or inversion of norms, status, social roles, and conventional behavior; explicitly sexual and scatological behavior; mocking or burlesque of authority, sacred rituals and beings, and foreigners; the appearance of comic, ambiguous, and incongruous figures such as jokesters, fools, and clowns; and an appearance of disorder and chaos. Various meanings and functions, some compatible and some not, have been attributed to ritual humor: conflict resolution; the cathartic release of tension and emotion; entertainment; maintenance of order and social control; the establishment of community; the marking of boundaries between groups; subversion and the questioning of authority; the use of incongruity and ambiguity to facilitate ritual and symbolic transformations; and the use of humorous incongruities to reflect on religious, cosmological, and metaphysical concepts. In short, there is no theoretical consensus on the meaning of ritual humor, and the precise meanings and functions of ritual humor are often context specific.

Although some traditions contain clear charter myths for the use of humor and laughter in ritual, the roles humor and laughter may play in ritual cannot be deduced merely from an examination of sacred texts and theological pronouncements. The New Testament contains little to encourage humor explicitly and Church Fathers often cautioned against it, yet the presence of humor and laughter in Christian ritual is hardly unknown. Easter rituals in some Eastern Orthodox communities, for instance, have made use of ritualized laughter as part of the celebration of Jesus' resurrection.

Ritual humor has formed a key component of both calendrical rituals and life-cycle rituals in traditional societies and has received considerable attention from anthropologists, particularly in their studies of Native American and African societies. In many traditional, agriculture-based societies, rituals linked with the start of the agricultural cycle often involve obscene joking, licentious behavior, or pantomimes of sexual acts. Such rituals of course parallel the fertility-related rituals rejected by Israelite religion and Christianity. Humor, often including scatological and sexual elements, may also be found in puberty rites, weddings, funerals, and a variety of initiation rituals. Humor is integrated into such rites in numerous ways and serves various roles.

The use of humor in some initiation rites illustrates how humor may play a role in encouraging reflection on religious concepts and practices. A famous example here is Victor Turner's analysis of an initiation rite for the cult of Chihamba

among the Ndembu people of Zambia. At one point in the rite, initiates are ordered to strike with rattles an effigy of the deity Kavula hidden under a white cloth. The initiates are then told they have killed the deity. They are soon told, however, that they have not really killed him, and the white cloth is pulled back to reveal nothing more than a few everyday objects. Laughter results (1962, p. 87). The point of the joke seems to be the destruction of any simple-minded identification of the deity with a material object. Humor works here to free one from overly simple conceptions. Reflecting on such examples, Jonathan Z. Smith has gone so far as to suggest that many if not most initiations have the character of a practical joke (1978, p. 301).

Considerable attention has also been given to the role of ritual humorists or clowns (sometimes also referred to as fools or buffoons) in traditional cultures. Anthropologists have focused in particular on ritual clowns in the Americas and Africa, though examples can be found throughout most parts of the world. The role of ritual humorists in the Americas and Africa is at times but by no means inevitably linked to tricksters appearing in myth and folklore. Some have even regarded ritual humorists or clowns as a characteristic though not universal feature of the ritual life of traditional religions (Smith, 1995, pp. 1093–1094). If the category of ritual humorist is extended to include fools, buffoons, and jesters of various sorts, then ritual humorists can be found in many if not most religious traditions. Particularly noteworthy here are court jesters and fools who have played important roles in relation to kings and rulers in China, India, Mesoamerica, medieval and early modern Europe, and the Muslim Middle East.

The history of the study of ritual clowns and humor in traditional religions is instructive and parallels that of the study of the trickster. When initially encountered by missionaries and anthropologists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, religious ritual involving humor as well as often scatological and sexual elements were perceived as strange, exotic, and unusual. According to Mahadev L. Apte, one of the reasons for the attention given these rituals by anthropologists “may have been the ‘exotic’ nature of the rites, since they often involved scatological and sexual acts that appeared to be a strange combination of the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’ to the Western mind” (1985, p. 153). Observers were encountering dimensions of religion that Christianity had for the most part managed to exclude from the domain of the sacred. Such rituals were initially perceived by some as immoral and irrational and as evidence of the primitive and undeveloped character of such cultures. Interpretation of such rites has shifted over the course of the last century, however, to one of celebration rather than denigration.

Within the context of larger ritual systems, some rituals and festivals stand out as distinct because of the central role accorded humor. Two noteworthy examples are the Jewish Purim and the Holī festival of northern India. One of the most widely discussed examples of such ritual humor is the

Christian festival Carnival, as exemplified by the medieval Feast of Fools which generally took place between Christmas and Epiphany. In the course of the festival a choir boy was elected King of the Fools to serve as bishop, a parody of the Holy Mass was staged, and revelry of various sorts took place both within the cathedrals and in the streets of the cities. Unlike the ritual humor found in many traditional societies which was generally accepted as a legitimate and even essential part of rituals and the ritual calendar, the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church struggled, with limited success, for hundreds of years to control, temper, and do away with Carnival. Though the Feast of Fools eventually died out, Carnival has continued in Europe and throughout the Americas despite being modified, controlled, and restrained by both church and secular authorities.

Although the parody of the Mass in the Feast of Fools was not universally approved within the Catholic community, parodies or burlesques of religious rituals that seem to be generally accepted by the community are one notable type of ritual humor. The activities of ritual clowns in many cultures often include comic parodies of priestly figures and sacred rituals. In Japan many rituals are presented in both a serious mode and comic mode (known as *modoki*), with the serious ritual usually being followed by a comic version. Such parodies of religious ritual may, however, reflect tensions and different orientations within communities. There are a number of studies which report on women engaging in comic imitations of rituals wherein men are the major actors. Kwakiutl women, for instance, have at times performed parodies of the potlatch ceremonies so important for determining male prestige and status (Apte, 1985, p. 160).

The interpretation of the role of humor in ritual requires a careful analysis of such factors as kin relations, religious hierarchy and status, and gender. Anthropologists of an earlier generation preoccupied with structural-functional theories of society devoted great efforts to the study of institutionalized kin-based (including extended kin, interclan, and intertribal) joking relationships, particularly in East Africa. Though the content of the joking was not necessarily of an explicitly religious nature, kin-based relationships were frequently if not characteristically understood in religious terms, and such joking relationships frequently impinged upon religious ritual. For example, in the *utani* relationship in some East African tribes, at funerals the joking partner of the deceased was allowed, if not expected, to make fun of the deceased.

The relation of gender, ritual, and humor, however, is a topic only beginning to be explored. It is important to note that there are few women who function as ritual clowns or humorists. There has been considerable research on women’s cults and initiations in various religions, yet the issue of women’s humor and the gender dimensions of ritual humor seem to deserve fuller exploration (Sands, 1999, pp. 442–444). Historical documentation for women’s activities is not as great as that for men’s. In addition it is only



in recent decades that a growing number of women anthropologists have been able to gain access to settings in traditional societies in which only women are permitted (Apte, 1985, p. 78). There are also reports, particularly regarding wedding ceremonies and female rites of passage, of extensive mockery of men by women. Indeed a growing body of scholarship suggests that women have not always taken men's activities—often including religious activities—terribly seriously.

If the relation of women and humor has not received the full attention it deserves, the relation of children, ritual, and humor has received even less. Though there seems to be little research on the topic, there have been reports of children engaging in imitations of religious rituals in both a serious and comic mode. Ijaw children in Nigeria, for instance, have been reported to play by imitating sacred dances used to appease the spirits of the ancestors. Early in the twentieth century in France, sets of paraphernalia were available for children so that they could play at enacting their own versions of the Catholic Mass. It has also become common in some Protestant services to invite young children to the front of the sanctuary, usually prior to the serious sermon, to receive a more informal teaching from the minister. The children often find parts of this informal sermon amusing and funny; the adults almost invariably find funny moments to laugh at. A humorous mode of teaching, in other words, is used to instruct both children and adults; and the message is conveyed that a sense of humor is part of Christian identity. These examples suggest that the role of humor and play in the socialization of children into a religious life deserves fuller exploration.

One last extensive topic deserves at least mention in a discussion of ritual and humor. Even if one does not accept theories that understand drama as having emerged from ritual, one cannot deny that many forms of drama have been linked to religious ritual at some point and that often it is difficult to draw a clear line between ritual and drama. Many forms of drama of course are comic or humorous, and such dramas have played a considerable role in ritual and festival systems throughout the world. In addition to commenting often from a humorous or comic perspective on religious themes and topics, such dramas are often considered as offerings to the gods. Not a few religious communities, as well as the gods themselves, thus seem to be open and receptive to humorous reflection on the relations of people and gods.

**THE DARK SIDE OF HUMOR.** Religious traditions and communities have not infrequently considered humor to be a problem. At times this has resulted in a near outright rejection of humor. More frequently certain types of humor have been rejected or humor excluded from certain occasions and situations. Whether an effort is made to reject, critique, or control humor, the effort serves at least partially to define a particular religious orientation, moment, or mode.

Even in religious communities where humor is markedly present in myth, tales, or rituals, there is never a total em-

bracing of humor. Even if humor is present in some rituals, there are other ritual moments and occasions marked by solemnity and seriousness. Even if some religious themes, rituals, gods, or religious figures are treated humorously in certain rituals, myths, or texts, they are not always treated humorously. In other words, efforts are frequently made to control the distribution of humor in the life of a religious community. Despite the appearance of chaos, disorder, or total freedom in humorous expression that sometimes occurs, humor is usually limited by rules as to who can make light of what and whom under what circumstances.

Aspects of what we might now classify as falling under the category of humor also emerged as a problem for philosophers and religious thinkers at a relatively early date. Plato (c. 428–348 or 347 BCE) discusses laughter primarily as the laughter of ridicule directed at other people's ignorance about themselves. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) also closely links laughter with the ridicule and derision of others. Both suggest that at least some aspects of such laughter and ridicule are morally questionable. Cicero (106–43 BCE) and others throughout classical antiquity echoed similar concerns about at least some aspects of laughter and humor. Such doubts and concerns have continued throughout much of Western philosophy. Some have even read Western philosophical and theological traditions, with some notable exceptions, as basically rejecting humor (Morreall, 1989).

Humor has been treated with some suspicion outside of the West as well. In one of the first analyses of literature in China, *Wenxin diao long* (*The Literary Mind and Carving of Dragons*), Liu Xie (465?–520?) conceded the value of some forms of humor but criticized from a Confucian perspective other forms of humor involving jests, riddles, and puns as undermining the correct and proper use of language. Inappropriate forms of humor were also deemed misleading, possibly immoral, capable of disrupting social order, and not suitable to those of high social standing. An ambivalent and at times negative attitude toward humor runs throughout the Confucian tradition.

What have sometimes been classified as “otherworldly” or “world-rejecting” religions have at times considered humor and laughter particularly problematic. At times, though not invariably, the rejection of humor seems to be linked with the rejection of worldly entertainments and a rejection of or effort to control sexuality. The propriety of at least some forms of humor has been questioned, for instance, within Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam.

In reaction to the laughter of dancing girls attempting to entertain him, the prince Siddhārtha Gautama wondered to himself: “How can anyone laugh who knows of old age, disease, and death?” (*Buddhacarita* 4.59). After his enlightenment the Buddha repeated the question in slightly different form: “How can there be mirth or laughter when the world is on fire?” (*Dhammapada* 146). Within the Buddhist tradition, humor and laughter are also rendered problematic by the noble eightfold path, particularly the precept concerning



right speech that can be read as inveighing against at least some forms of humor, laughter, and mirth. The rejection of sex by Buddhist monks and nuns also would seem to preclude humor associated with sexuality. Buddhism has, however, been anything but a humorless religion. The Buddha himself, at least as portrayed in some texts, seems somewhat to have recovered his sense of humor. There are also many well-known examples within the Buddhist tradition linking insight and enlightenment with humor.

Christianity presents some of the clearest examples of the rejection of humor. As noted, at least some within Judaism and Christianity rejected the humor associated with fertility cults. In addition the writings gathered together as the New Testament express little in the way of explicit humor, despite the best efforts of some to locate it there. The Church Fathers were generally suspicious of and often hostile toward humor and laughter. John Chrysostom (c. 354–407), for instance, made a point of noting that Jesus never laughed, raised the question of how Christians could possibly laugh when they thought of the suffering of Christ, spoke of laughter and mirth as leading to sin, and, like Jesus in *Luke*, predicted that those laughing now will be wailing in torment on the day of judgment. As Chrysostom also complained that members of his congregation were laughing when they should have been praying, not all Christians seem to have shared his views. Part of the rejection of humor by the Church Fathers also seems to be linked to the rejection of entertainments, theater, and rituals linked with pagan religions. The rejection of humor and laughter may also be found among ascetics, hermits, and monks. Christian ascetics “shared with Greek and Jewish ascetics the ideal of the perfect human who never laughed” (Gilhus, 1997, p. 64). Like Jesus, Saint Anthony (c. 250–356) has been regarded by many as a model who never laughed.

Those expressing an ambivalent or even negative attitude toward at least some forms of humor have a point. Although humor may serve to bring people together, humor in the guise of ridicule and satire has also been used to divide peoples, to mark others as somehow inferior, and to enforce social control. If the *we/they* distinction is a basic component of any group’s identity, communities have frequently, if not invariably, partially established their identity by ridiculing others. This seems to hold true for religious communities as well. What is now referred to as “ethnic humor” frequently involves ridicule of other religions and does not seem to be a phenomenon of recent origin.

Ridicule, mockery, and satire of foreign gods, cults, and kings is not uncommon in the Hebrew scriptures. In *1 Kings* 18:27, for instance, Elijah mocks the Baal prophets when their god seemed not to reply to their entreaties: “And it came to pass at noon, that Elijah mocked them, and said, Cry aloud: for he *is* a god; either he is talking, or he is pursuing, he is on a journey, *or* peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awakened.” Prophets themselves of course were also subject to mockery and ridicule. Following Elijah’s ascent, Elisha

was mocked by young children saying: “Go up, thou bald head; go up, thou bald head” (*2 Kings* 2:23). Mockery of prophets, however, is sometimes dangerous. After being cursed by Elisha, the children were eaten by two bears.

Even if the entire history of religions could not be written as a history of the ways in which different religions have made fun of one another, a good portion of it probably could be. A suggestive essay here is the unsigned article “Religions of Antiquity” included in *The HarperCollins Dictionary of Religion* (Smith, 1995). The essay provides an overview of religions of antiquity in which humor (along with death and magic) is a major theme. Humor is examined in terms not only of how it functions within a religious community but also of how it functions with regard to competition and rivalry between different religions or between different communities within the same religion.

The way in which ridicule can shape religious identity is clearly illustrated by examples drawn from the history of Christianity. Early Christians were frequently subject to ridicule because many people found some Christian beliefs laughable. Some Christians such as Paul responded to ridicule by embracing the role of “fools for Christ’s sake.” In turn Christian figures such as Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–215) and Tertullian (c. 160–c. 220) made fun of pagan religions. So-called heretical Christian groups were also ridiculed by those of a more orthodox orientation. Conversely some gnostic texts have been read as making fun of or being parodies of more orthodox texts. In his later years Martin Luther (1483–1546) penned satirical portrayals of Catholicism and the pope which made free use, in “primitive” fashion, of scatological themes. As illustrated by the designations Quakers, Shakers, and Methodists, the names of some Christian groups derive from terms of ridicule often initiated by fellow Christians of a different persuasion.

Religions frequently have been subjected to ridicule, mockery, and satire not only by those of different religious orientations but also by those who might be described as unbelievers. Satirical treatments of religion appear at a relatively early date in India, China, Japan, and the West, though determining whether a rejection of all religion is entailed is often difficult. Some satirists in late antiquity, such as Lucian of Samosata (120–c. 180), seemed to be making fun of most if not all religions. As for modernity, it is difficult to conceive of it without taking into account satirical treatments of religion. Although the United States is often described as the most religious of modern nations, a truly American literature was initiated, according to some, by an author whose works are replete with satires of Christianity as well as religion in general: Mark Twain.

In some instances it is possible to argue that ridicule of religion has a profound impact on the development of some religions and the surrounding culture. An example here would be the 1925 trial of John Scopes (also called the “monkey trial”) that pitted Clarence Darrow (1857–1938), representing a modern scientific orientation, against William Jen-

nings Bryan (1860–1925), representing a Christian perspective embracing a literal reading of the Bible and its account of creation. Although Darrow initially lost the case (the ruling was eventually overturned), he effectively defeated Bryan by exposing, at least to many, Bryan's position to be a foolish one. Much of the press at the time joined in the ridicule of Bryan and the views he represented. Some have suggested that this event had a profound effect on segments of the conservative Christian community, causing them to withdraw from mainstream public life until resurfacing, decades later, when they had regained their confidence.

Religion's use of ridicule and the ridicule of religion are deeply connected to contemporary studies of religion. Introductory textbooks on religion almost invariably state that the purpose of studying religions (and especially religions not one's own) is to gain sympathetic understanding of others so that we no longer see them as strange and, though this is rarely explicitly said, funny. In North America what is called political correctness has repeatedly reminded us that we should not make fun of others. Scholarly studies of groups perceived by some as odd and funny not infrequently remind the reader that we should not laugh at or make fun of these people (though it is hard to imagine that the readers of such books need to be reminded). Although at least some of this effort is no doubt well and for the good, it is possible that this mission to rid the world of negative humor also blinds us in some aspects. It is difficult to find a book on religion that clearly makes the point that religions have sometimes defined themselves by making fun of others.

There is yet another way in which humor plays a role in distinguishing peoples and defining the other. Other peoples can be made to seem strange and alien either by denying them a sense of humor or attributing to them a strange, inappropriate, or inferior sense of humor. As noted many Westerners have found the humor of "primitives" to consist of a scandalous mixing of the sacred and the profane that was taken as evidence of childishness, a lack of civilization, or even immorality. In similar fashion, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl judged the humor of "primitives" to be inferior to that of Europeans because it was lacking in rationality (Chidester, 1996, pp. 230–32). For much of the period after World War II the Japanese were widely perceived as being without humor or, just as disturbingly, given to laughing and giggling at inappropriate times. In the culture and literature of the United States a common characterization of the religious or "overly religious" is that they are without a sense of humor. At present it is difficult to locate studies on the relation of humor and Islam. Either Muslims are humorless or Muslim humor has simply not been explored. The latter alternative is no doubt closer to the truth. The image of Muslims as humorless of course fits well with the image of Muslims as fanatical or overly religious in some way.

**CELEBRATIONS OF HUMOR.** Humor has also been celebrated as possessing particular religious value within some religions or movements within religions. In such cases humor may be

regarded as a teaching tool, a way of awakening religious realization, or a sign of a holy or enlightened state, or a fundamental aspect of the structure of the cosmos; it may also relate to the basic functions of certain religious specialists or even help define the basic orientation of a religious community.

The study of the celebration of humor within religions is closely related to scholarly evaluations of humor and might indeed be linked to a growing celebration of humor within Western thought. As already noted, Western philosophical and theological traditions, from the Greeks through the Enlightenment, have expressed at best an ambivalent attitude toward humor. Humor was considered suspect on a number of grounds. The cruelty of humor, as expressed in ridicule and other forms, was rejected on moral grounds. Humor too closely connected with sexuality, the body, or the emotions was also frequently questioned as undermining either spirituality or the dictates of rationality. Whether considered from the perspective of Christian theology, Enlightenment rationality, or the demands of modern civilization, humor was something more to be controlled or constrained rather than celebrated.

There has been, however, a growing reappraisal of the importance of humor. Amid increasing doubts about the values of modernity, Enlightenment rationality, and traditional Christian theology, not a few have concluded that their costs are too high and that one of these costs is the loss of traditional forms of humor. This loss has been traced to a variety of sources, including Christianity in general, Protestantism in particular, Enlightenment rationality, bourgeois sensibilities, and the modern bureaucratic state. Humor in this reappraisal is accorded a positive, liberating value both emotionally and cognitively. Some have linked this revised view of humor with postmodern sensibilities. Whether or not the West has somehow been lacking in humor and whether or not the cause has been rightly identified, such views are of importance for the ways they have shaped scholarship.

At least some of the roots of this recent reappraisal of humor can be found within Western traditions. *The Praise of Folly* (1511) by Desiderius Erasmus (1466?–1536) anticipates later celebrations of folly and medieval Carnival from both a Christian and non-Christian perspective. Thinkers as diverse as Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746); Anthony Ashley Cooper, the first earl of Shaftesbury (1621–1683); Immanuel Kant (1724–1804); and Jean Paul (1763–1825) all treated humor in terms of a perception of incongruity and attributed to it a cognitive value. Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) was preoccupied with irony throughout much of his work and linked the comic with a perception of the contradiction or incongruity between infinity and the finite. For Kierkegaard such a perception was regarded as the precursor to religious insight or faith.

In the twentieth century a number of thinkers also granted importance to humor and related ideas. Johan Huizinga's *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture*

(1938) defined the human condition in terms of play, an activity closely related to humor, and inspired many in their reflections on the importance of humor. In a similar fashion Arthur Koestler's *The Act of Creation* (1964) placed humor at the center of human thought and culture. Another widely influential work is Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin's *Rabelais and His World* (1965), a celebration of medieval Carnival which argues that the modern world is impoverished in comparison to the fulfilling and liberating culture of laughter existing in the medieval period. Umberto Eco's best-selling novel *The Name of the Rose* (1983) at least implicitly makes a similar argument, with readers being asked to contemplate the cost of the church's supposed suppression of Aristotle's work on comedy. Scholars with orientations based in Marxism, postmodernism, or cultural studies have also come to focus on humor whenever it might be viewed as somehow "subversive" of Enlightenment rationality, social hierarchy, or the political, economic, and cultural hegemony of the West.

Humor has also served to define basic orientations of and within various religions. Saint Paul's presentation of Christians as being "fools for Christ's sake" (*1 Corinthians* 4:10) indicates a recognition that Christian belief and behavior were perceived as folly, if not madness, when viewed from other religious and nonreligious perspectives of the time. At least some Christians in early Christianity willingly embraced the role of the fool. Although this embrace of folly was not inevitably humorous in itself, it was grounded in a willingness to accept mockery and ridicule for embracing what seemed like folly to much worldly and religious wisdom. Jesus himself, indeed, had been subjected to mockery and ridicule. The embrace of folly and acceptance of ridicule and mockery, however, was accompanied by the expectation of reversal: the foolish would be shown to be wise and the wise foolish.

Once Christianity established itself, became a religion of empire, and came to wield considerable political power, Christians were no longer as widely regarded as fools and perhaps less inclined to welcome the designation of fool. Within both Eastern and Western Christianity, though, some continued to embrace the role of fools for Christ's sake. However, many Christians seemed to regard these fools as merely ordinary fools rather than holy fools. There are a number of celebrated holy fools to be found in both Catholic and Orthodox traditions, with the Orthodox traditions more clearly recognizing and celebrating holy fools. Though the list is extensive, prominent examples from the Catholic and Orthodox traditions include Theophilus and Maria of Antioch and Saint Symeon of Emesa in the sixth century, Saint Andrew the Fool of Constantinople in the tenth and eleventh centuries, Saint Isaac Zatvornik of Kiev and Saint Basil the Innocent in the eleventh century, and Saint Francis of Assisi in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Among the range of behaviors embraced by such fools were nakedness, self-humiliation in a variety of forms, association with sin-

ners, radical poverty, an itinerant existence, and engaging in joking and parody. Such figures, it should be noted, frequently set their folly in opposition not simply to worldly wisdom but also to the wisdom of the church.

Within Christianity, mention should be accorded to Meister Eckhart, considered by many to represent the pinnacle of Christian mysticism for identifying, if in somewhat cryptic fashion, laughter as playing a crucial role in the genesis of that most mysterious of Christian mysteries, the Trinity: "Indeed I say, the soul will bring forth Person if God laughs to her and she laughs back to him. To speak in parable, the Father laughs into the Son and the Son laughs back to the Father; and this laughter breeds liking, and liking breeds joy, and joy begets love, and love begets Person, and Person begets Holy Ghost" (Pfeiffer, 1947, p. 59). The genesis and nature of the relation among the persons of the Trinity and people is imagined in terms of laughter.

Within Islam, *Şūfī* traditions have also at times granted a special place to humor. Throughout at least part of the history of Sufism, *Şūfī* communities have existed outside of or in tension with more orthodox orientations, and *Şūfī* figures have rejected some of the local strictures of daily behavior as well as questioned the adequacy of orthodox formulations either to communicate or to express union with the divine. All of these factors have led *Şūfīs* to be sometimes regarded as fools. The name itself, meaning "wool-wearer" in reference to the ascetic garb of early *Şūfīs*, may well have originated as a term of ridicule. *Şūfīs* are also well known for the use of humorous tales in their teaching, as witnessed by considerable use of tales concerning Kheẓr and Mullā Narsruddin, who both make use of humor and who are at times seemingly willing objects of humor themselves. While closely linked with Sufism, tales of these two figures have been appreciated more widely throughout much of the Muslim world. Some *Şūfīs* have also clearly linked laughter and humor with the highest of religious experiences. The *Şūfī* Rūmī (c. 1207–1273) is reported to have observed: "If you want special illumination, look upon the human face: See clearly within laughter the Essence of Ultimate Truth" (Shah, p. 5).

Within Asian religious traditions a range of religious specialists and movements might be viewed as embracing foolishness and humor. Throughout the region a variety of Indian gurus, wandering ascetics, Daoist sages, and Buddhist monks are well known for their use of humor and embrace of folly. The Chan or Zen school of Buddhism has frequently been singled out for special attention here. In addition to pointing to the wide use of humorous tales and teaching methods in Zen, some have even defined the basic Zen orientation as humorous or comic. This celebration of the comic orientation of Zen, however, is much more prominent in the West than in Asia, suggesting that Western images of Zen as particularly humorous perhaps represent in part a fantasy concerning what is sensed to be missing in the West.

In the course of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, some in certain parts of the world have come

to identify Judaism as a religion that is fundamentally comic or humorous in orientation. At least in English and in the United States, there has been an endless stream of mostly popular books celebrating Jewish humor (though at times the humor relates more perhaps to questions of Jewish identity than to Judaism itself, though the two of course cannot be clearly separated). There seems to be, however, relatively few scholarly works on Jewish humor that clearly relate the Jewish humor of the modern period to the history of the Jewish traditions. Even if Judaism is not inherently more humorous in orientation than other religious traditions, the modern perception of Judaism as a particularly humorous religion is of interest and importance in itself.

Mention might also be made of a reappraisal of the importance of humor in popular Christian theology which seems to have begun in the 1960s and is exemplified by works such as Elton Trueblood's *The Humor of Christ* (1964), Harvey Cox's *The Feast of Fools: A Theological Essay on Feast and Fantasy* (1969), Cal Samra's *The Joyful Christ: The Healing Power of Humor* (1986), Conrad Hyers's *And God Created Laughter: The Bible of Divine Comedy* (1987), and Earl Frank Palmer's *The Humor of Jesus: Sources of Laughter in the Bible* (2001). All of these works are united by the notions that Christianity, somewhere along the line, lost its sense of humor and that properly valuing humor is central to the Christian message. Although some of these works have served to raise interest among scholars and theologians in the topic of the relation of religion and humor, none seems to have generated enough interest among Christians at large to engender new Christian movements or orientations embracing humor as a central Christian value. Within some charismatic movements in recent years, however, hysterical or uncontrolled laughter in worship services has come to be taken as a sign of a visitation of the Holy Spirit. It is possible that the perception of the importance of humor in religions such as Judaism and Zen has influenced this reappraisal of the role of humor by some Christian theologians.

**THE HUMOR WE HAVE MISSED.** The importance of the various relations of humor and religion seem to have been overlooked for a number of reasons. Despite all the critical reflection, in the last one hundred fifty years or so, devoted to the study of religion, assumptions concerning the "holy" and the "sacred" deriving primarily from the sacred scriptures of Judaism and Christianity still seem to haunt Western conceptions of religion. Most obvious of these assumptions is that religion is somehow fundamentally connected with what is serious and solemn rather than with what is humorous.

The failure to connect religion and humor might also be traced to the tendency of many Enlightenment philosophers to draw essentialistic distinctions between phenomena such as religion and art by linking them with essentially distinct faculties, epistemologies, or modes of symbolization. Some Enlightenment philosophers, such as Kant, treated humor under the category of the aesthetic and thus neatly separated it from religion. Undoing such essentialistic dis-

tinctions has taken time. It is only in recent decades, for instance, that scholars have begun to explore more fully the connections between religion and the arts.

Vastly different conceptions of religion might have arisen if other sacred texts and other philosophical traditions had formed the starting point for (or had truly been given equal weight in) reflection on religion. For instance, if Japanese myth had formed a starting point for the study of religion, it would have been difficult to form a conception of the "holy," "sacred," or "divine" that was not closely connected to humor. In the myth of the heavenly cave, a central narrative episode in Japanese myth, the gods employ humor and laughter to restore order to the cosmos as well as to establish the basic forms of ritual by which people should relate to the gods.

An additional reason for the neglect of humor in the study of religion is the social location of much humor. Humor and religion have been given scholarly attention most often when humor is institutionalized in myths, texts, rituals, or formal joking relationships. As many have observed, there is a great deal of humor that exists in noninstitutionalized spaces: humor often emerges in informal interactions that comment on the more institutionalized aspects of life. Much of this humor is ephemeral, unrecorded, and often unnoticed.

Historians have access to such moments only when they happen to be recorded in texts, the visual arts, or archeological remains. Although such sources allow us to reconstruct, with varying degrees of certainty, the rituals, myths, and beliefs of the past, we have precious little indication, for example, of what peoples of the past were doing and saying before, after, and perhaps surreptitiously during rituals. If we assume that people have always had recourse to humor and humorous commentary on "serious" matters, then we are perhaps missing an important dimension of the religious life.

Though anthropologists have had direct access to moments of informal humor, they have done little better than historians in bringing the significance of these moments to light. Anthropological theory has not often attuned anthropologists to the importance of such moments, documenting informal interaction is difficult and time consuming, anthropologists have often lacked the near native command of a language required to appreciate and understand humor, and much of the informal joking anthropologists are able to observe is humor provoked by the presence of a strange being—the anthropologist (Driessen, 1997). In addition, not a few have suggested that, even with a command of the language, informal humor is often the most difficult part of a foreign culture to fathom and understand.

What we have lost here is well documented and illustrated in Samuel C. Heilman's *Synagogue Life: A Study in Symbolic Interaction* (1976). In addition to an account of the ritual activity occurring at a synagogue, Heilman also offers an analysis of the joking that takes place at informal mo-

ments, such as the coffee hour, at the synagogue. Some of the joking makes use of or comments on the more serious and solemn moments of ritual activity. Such joking is obviously an important part of the participants' experience of ritual and religion. The lesson here is a simple one: we cannot get a serious sense of people by looking only at serious, formal moments. If we can assume that such moments of informal joking have been ubiquitous in human experience, then we have perhaps seriously misconstrued the degree to which and the ways in which people have been "serious" about their religion.

As suggested above, the history of the study of religion in the last one hundred and fifty years might well be written in terms of a gradual and not yet complete coming to terms with the various ways humor has formed a part of the religious lives of many outside the West. This can be seen in the shifting attitudes to tricksters and ritual clowns. Initially treated as evidence of childishness, primitiveness, a lack of civilization, or even immorality, tricksters and ritual clowns now tend to be celebrated as representing a sensibility and insight into the human condition which many in the modern West have lost. It can also be seen in the ways some religions, such as Zen, have come to be celebrated in the West as possessing an appreciation of humor lacking in Christianity. To an extent at least, the European encounter with the humor of others has led to changes in Western notions of religion, has played a not unimportant, albeit often overlooked, role in the development of the study of religion, and has even entailed a rediscovery of the humor to be found in Western religious traditions.

**SEE ALSO** Carnival; Clowns; Drama; Holī; Myth, overview article; Paradox and Riddles; Play; Purim; Purim Plays; Ritual; Tricksters, overview article.

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#### HUMOR AND RELIGION: HUMOR AND RELIGION IN EAST ASIAN CONTEXTS

An overview of humor and religion in East Asia is complicated by a number of factors. While the area is united by millennia of cultural exchange, exemplified by the spread of the Chinese writing system, it is also marked by sharp cultural and linguistic divides. East Asia has also been influenced by an Indian tradition, Buddhism, which both transformed and was transformed by the religions of the area. In addition, it is difficult to neatly separate religious traditions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, and Shintō; though distinctions were made, there was a constant tendency to combine and blur traditions sometimes now thought of as distinct. What are today thought of as the major traditions have existed in complex relations with what have been variously styled as local, indigenous, or folk traditions.

**INDIGENOUS CONCEPTS AND ORIENTATIONS.** While the English word *humor* has been absorbed into and widely used in both Chinese and Japanese in the modern era, there is a long history of related or analogous indigenous concepts to be found throughout the languages of East Asia. Since there is, however, little in the way of systematic studies of such concepts, only the importance of exploring them further can be suggested here. In Chinese, one related term that was also made use of in Korea and Japan is *huaji*, combining *hua* (slippery) with *ji* (a bobbling motion), a word for ancient jesters, acrobats, jugglers, and entertainers. An integral part of ancient Chinese court and ritual life, *huaji* wore costumes asymmetrically half red and half black. These specialists were mad, or topsy-turvy, and by their frenzy threw the normal world out of its order. Comic jesters were deemed indispensable to the efforts of kings to mediate between heaven and earth. Both the Korean and Japanese languages are also replete with a number of terms and concepts related to humor.

In ancient China, a central locus for the development of humor in religion was the ritual cycle of offerings and per-

formances for the ancestors and gods. As is documented by oracle bone inscriptions, it was hoped that the higher gods could be influenced by establishing smooth relations with the recently dead. Royal ritual life in early China was thus organized in great detail around the need to mollify the dead, with special efforts being made to please them with food and entertainment. Records from the Shang period (late second millennium BCE), show the existence of rituals to “entertain” the ancestors. As the writing system developed, it generated, as a means to express this notion, a system of interchangeable graphs and a network of concepts relating to the terms *pray* (celebrate, intone), *pleasing, elder brother* (who conducted ceremonies for ancestors), *music, joy, sacred speech, and laughter*. Laughter was thus implicated in a network of concepts for conceiving of the relations among people, ancestors, and gods.

In early Japan, a charter myth relating to the role of humor in religion is found in *Kojiki*. The myth narrates how the Sun goddess, Amaterasu, faced with the outrageous behavior of her brother Susano-o (who has sometimes been identified as a trickster), secludes herself in a cave and thus throws the heavenly realm into chaos and darkness. The other gods, however, devise a plan to lure Amaterasu from the cave by pretending another goddess is present. As part of the ruse, Ame no Uzume performs a dance on an overturned tub and exposes herself. Ame no Uzume’s performance produces uproarious laughter on the part of the other gods. Not able to understand why the gods are laughing when she has hidden herself away, Amaterasu is told another goddess is present, and thus is lured out of the cave. The myth testifies to the efficacious power of laughter, as well as the gods’ appreciation of humor. In the medieval Nō play *Emu* (The votive tablet), Amaterasu is even portrayed as wanting to reenact the myth so that she can enjoy the joke again. Ame no Uzume’s performance is also often cited as the origin of *kagura* (ritual song and dance offered to the gods), rites of possession, and many traditional forms of theater and performance.

Though the issue has not been fully argued, some have suggested that the religions of East Asia are inherently more open to humor than the monotheistic religions of the West. There is probably a degree of truth in this argument. The gods of East Asia tend to be more human than those of the monotheistic traditions and not nearly as fastidious about sexual matters, one of the great sources of humor in human life.

**CONFUCIANISM, DAOISM, AND BUDDHISM.** Though the traditions of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism have greatly influenced one another and often existed in symbiotic relation to one another, they nevertheless exhibit somewhat distinctive orientations to humor.

**Confucianism.** Neither Confucius nor Confucianism is particularly noted for humor. One should never underestimate, however, the continuous presence of puns, wordplay, sarcasm, and ridicule throughout the Chinese tradition. The

works of the early ritualists, chroniclers, and philosophers were often invested with puns, wordplay, ambiguity, and amusing stories. In a text purporting to chronicle events of 574 BCE (*Chronicles of Zuo*, 17th year of Duke Cheng), Confucius is, for instance, recorded telling some jokes involving puns about foot amputation that may well have had deeper cosmological implications. Confucius is also depicted (*Analects* 17.4) laughing at an elaborate ritual held in a town of very modest importance, characterizing the villagers as “using a beef cleaver to cut a chicken!” When his students remonstrated, Confucius admits that he had only been joking.

As the body of early texts was canonized and made into the so-called Confucian classics, the Ru (Ritualist or Confucian) school more and more became an arbiter of cultural orthodoxy. With its emphasis on decorum, morality, and the proper use of language, and particularly in its role as state ideology, Confucianism has perhaps rightly been characterized as a dry religion. An early work on literature in the Confucian tradition, which was also of some influence in Japan, is Liu Xie’s (465?–520?) *Wenxin Diaolong* (The literary mind and carving of dragons). The work expresses an ambivalent opinion of the value of humor, particularly in the way it undermines the clear and proper use of language. Perhaps inevitably, Confucianism also became a straight man for humor and ridicule. Ridicule of slavish imitators of Confucius or Confucians became a popular topic in Chinese jest books (Harbsmeier, 1990, p. 152).

Confucianism was sometimes even linked with moves to suppress humor. In the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, Japan witnessed a boom in comic literature that illustrates how religion can be subject to satire and parody and how some religious orientations can oppose humor. Informed by Confucian notions of morality and decorum, the Tokugawa regime made frequent, and mostly futile, efforts to suppress the upsurge of comic and satirical literature that made fun of most aspects of Japanese social, political, and religious life. One early anonymous work was *Hijiri yūkaku* (The pleasure quarter of the sages), in which the Buddha, Confucius, and the Daoist sage Laozi congregate in Japan for the purpose of visiting an Osaka brothel run by the Tang poet Li Bo, with his colleague Bai Ju-i as an entertainer. While some political and religious authorities took offense at much of this satire, it is unclear whether the buddhas and gods were offended or not.

**Daoism.** Daoism has taken many forms throughout Chinese history, and the term is highly contested. As used here, it denotes primarily what has sometimes been referred to as philosophical Daoism, centered on the texts *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi*. While the first of these texts maintains a relative air of dignity and seriousness, *Zhuangzi* is marked by a more humorous orientation and makes considerable use of irony, paradox, and amusing stories. In its philosophical and literary forms, which advocated a radical relativism of opposites and distinctions, Daoism seems inherently open to a comic

and humorous perspective as a way of freeing oneself from the unnatural constraints imposed by society, the state, and an overly rational approach to the world. Daoism also shares with Buddhism a sense of the limits of language to describe reality, thus opening the way for ironic and humorous displays of the limits of language and concepts. Not a few scholars have argued that Daoism contributed much to the Chinese transformation of Buddhism, especially to the use and appreciation of humor in the Chan or Zen schools.

The *Zhuangzi*, of course, is a *locus classicus* for many hilarious images of human limitation that suggest the uselessness of usefulness, the usefulness of uselessness, the irrationality that undermines the very notion of rationality, and in general the possibility of liberation from all such categories. The famous tale of Zhuang Zhou dreaming he was a butterfly (and then on waking not knowing whether he had dreamed of being a butterfly or whether the butterfly was now dreaming of being him) is an amusing and humorous account of a basic human conundrum. The text also makes fun of a variety of human proclivities, such as the desire to better oneself: “A youth of Shouling in the state of Yan studied the proper way of walking in Handan, the capital of Zhao. He failed to learn the distinguished gait of Handan. Moreover he unlearned his original way of walking. So he came crawling back home on all fours” (Harbsmeier, 1989, p. 303).

The general Daoist orientation was also one factor making possible the appearance of a type of religious figure characterized by extreme eccentricity, drunkenness, or madness. Well-known examples of such eccentric figures are Liu Ling (221–300) and the other members of the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove at the time of the transition from the Han dynasty to the Jin dynasty. Liu Ling, who often went around his house naked, is remembered for his retort to the objections of an offended guest: “The universe is my house, and this room is my trousers. What are you doing here inside my trousers?” (Welch, 1957, pp. 124–125)

**Buddhist ambivalence.** While Buddhism is frequently celebrated in the West for its appreciation of humor, the Buddhist attitude to humor has often been ambivalent. The Buddha himself questioned how any one could laugh given the suffering that marked the world. Early Buddhist scholastics debated whether the Buddha had ever laughed (it was decided that only the faintest of smiles had crossed his lips), and the precept concerning right speech was often interpreted as rejecting laughter and joking. Buddhists have nevertheless managed to develop at times a rich appreciation of humor.

The most celebrated aspect of the relation of Buddhism and humor is no doubt the use of humor in Chan, or Zen. In an overstatement of his case, D. T. Suzuki argued that Zen was the only religion to find room for laughter. In many respects, Zen schools took to a radical extreme the Buddhist teaching that the truth could not be fully conveyed in symbols, concepts, and words. Whether expressed in dialogues,

*kōans*, tales, or behavior, humor became a pedagogical tool for teaching the limits and constraints of conventional teachings and concepts. Humor was, in short, a technique for ensuring that one did not take the finger pointing at the moon as the moon itself. Laughter was also often taken as a sign of enlightenment, as a mark of having realized the comic absurdity of attempting to apprehend the truth in rational distinctions, concepts, and categories. How humor might teach and how laughter is a sign of understanding is concisely communicated in a tale about the Chinese master Yangqi, who, when about to lecture his disciples on the path to enlightenment, simply said: “Ha! Ha! Ha! What’s all this! Go to the back of the hall and have some tea!” (Blyth, 1959, p. 90)

Throughout East Asia, Chan/Zen teachers or figures, be they historical or legendary, often exhibited the behavior of clowns or fools. In China, the “foolish” figures Hanshan and Shide are well-known both in paintings and tales about them. In Japan, Zen figures such as Ikkyū, Ryōkan (whose name means “great fool”), and Hakuin were known not only for their foolishness but also as self-consciously embracing the role of fool. The Japanese Zen master Harada Sogaku (1871–1961) even elevated the Buddha himself to the status of fool. “My admonition, then: Be a Great Fool! You know, don’t you, that there was a master [Ryōkan] who called himself just that? Now, a petty fool is nothing but a worldling, but a Great Fool is a Buddha. Śākyamuni and Amitābha are themselves Great Fools, are they not?” (Hyers, 1989, p. 43). The foolishness of Zen figures was directed not only at upsetting the common-sense assumptions of the day but also the rigidity of Buddhist and Zen teachings themselves.

**LOCAL, INDIGENOUS, AND FOLK TRADITIONS.** As has been suggested, what have sometimes been styled as “great traditions” were not only not easily separable but also existed in complex relations with what have sometimes been referred to as local, indigenous, or folk traditions in China, Korea, and Japan. Such traditions and practices embraced a variety of types of humor and were also subject to a variety of forms of control, suppression, and systematization as they were harnessed to the agendas of emerging kingdoms, imperial systems, and modern nation states. As part of these “civilizing” processes, local traditions were often regarded as “superstitions,” and the humor they embraced was at times deemed inappropriate.

Whether motivated by the desire to celebrate auspicious occasions, restore harmony, or divine the future, the center of religious life throughout the indigenous religions of East Asia has been daily and periodic interaction among people, ancestors, and gods. Much of the humor related to religion throughout the area may be traced indeed to this ongoing interaction. In contrast to the gods of the monotheistic traditions, the gods and ancestors of the region seem more human in their engagement in and appreciation of a variety of types of humor. In addition, the coming together of people, ancestors, and gods often aims at the creation of a “happy atmosphere” (Chinese, *xìqì*) or “celebration” (Japanese *iwai*) in



which people, as well as gods and ancestors, are entertained. Given that all involved have an appreciation of humor, the coming together often involves a variety of humorous performances and interactions.

Divination in various forms has played a central role in ritual practices throughout East Asia. At present, Chinese divination activities continue on a daily basis both at home in front of the ancestors' shrine and publicly in temples. The most common articles for divination now are comma-shaped pieces of wood that are flat on one side and convex on the other. The inquirer must throw a pair of such blocks in such a way as to produce one up and the other down. If both land flat, the god has refused the request, but if both land rocking on the round side, the gods are "laughing." This is not an outright refusal; the inquirer continues. Humor has also played a role in divinatory practices in Japan. The Nō play *Emu* (The votive tablet) even presents the gods as making fun of people for wanting to divine the future when the gods have already pledged to bestow their blessings.

**Ritual and festivals.** Ritual life and festivals—be they Buddhist, Shintō, or, as was more often the case, a complex symbiosis of the two—have been marked by humor throughout Japanese history. Though there are solemn Buddhist and Shintō rituals, many ritual complexes contain humorous dimensions, the gods and buddhas of many shrines and temples enjoy humorous performances, and serious rituals often have a comic counterpart known as *modoki*. There is even a tradition of festivals devoted to laughter—*warai matsuri*, or laughing festivals—in which the central ritual act is laughing. As seen in a ritual held annually in May at the Atsuta Shrine in Nagoya, even shrines closely linked with Imperial Shintō (and thus more focused on maintaining an air of dignity and solemnity) are marked by laughter. Following rites of purification to commemorate the shrine's being entrusted with a sacred sword (one of the imperial regalia), the priests begin to laugh aloud and are soon joined in laughter by the crowds gathered there. Folklorists remain a bit uncertain, however, about just what everyone is laughing about.

Some of the ritual humor to be found throughout East Asia is of a sexual nature and is often linked with agriculture and fertility rituals. At a small festival in the mountains of Mikawa in Japan, the gods Ebisu and Daikoku appear. The latter must declare what he has brought with him, and the fun involves him producing, after some hesitation, a larger-than-life-size phallus. Yanagita Kunio (1875–1962), a pioneering scholar of folklore and humor in Japan, has noted that some female mountain deities seem to be amused by and partake in the laughter provoked by the display of a small dried fish. Furthermore, in China, occasions of festivity sometimes involve ribald humor such as in the Yangge (rice-sprout songs) performances at Chinese New Year or in the dances featuring masked figures in the Nuo rituals still held in peripheral areas of China or among minority groups. Ribald humor is also found throughout Korean folk songs. Efforts have often been made, it should be noted, to suppress

or sanitize sexual humor. Under Mao Zedong, extensive attempts were made to recast Yangge dances into properly revolutionary terms. Throughout the Meiji period (1868–1912) in Japan, efforts were also made to suppress or tone down some of the more ribald aspects of ritual in an effort to nationalize and civilize some aspects of Shintō. Despite such efforts, at least traces of earlier practices continue.

Humor has a prominent role to play in the *kut*, the ritual conducted by *mansin* (shamans), that plays a central role in Korea's indigenous religion and aims at harmonizing the relations of gods, ancestors, and the living. The *kut* has been described as a "living and loud event with some mistakes, much skill, clumsy moments, copious wine, and considerable laughter" (Kendall, 1985, pp. 20–21). While various aspects of the interaction of gods, ancestors, shamans, and people in the *kut* can provoke laughter, there is one being in particular that the shaman can call upon and embody who frequently, if not inevitably, will add humor and levity to the interaction. This is Changbu, a female, clownlike figure linked with the spirits of actors, singers, and acrobats. In addition to offering advice, Changbu engages in making fun of people, particularly if they do not seem disposed to accept the advice the shaman has offered or have not sufficiently contributed money to support the proceedings. By engaging in actions such as tweaking the breasts of the recalcitrant, Changbu sometimes transgresses the boundaries of decorum in a way that causes consternation to some and provokes laughter in others. In a somewhat similar fashion, shamanistic rituals in Taiwan not infrequently involve similar comic behavior on the part of the gods and spirits evoked.

**Korean tiger, Chinese Budai.** In Korea, humor is also linked with the activities of the tiger, an important figure in myth and folklore who has sometimes been understood as a trickster figure. Like tricksters, the tiger appears in a variety of guises and roles; exhibits contradictory features (sometimes benevolently working for good, at others wreaking havoc); and frequently plays tricks, many of which backfire on him or her. In addition to serving as the messenger and companion of the mountain god, tigers have also served as guides and aids of shamans. In many tales, tigers are identified as Horangi (young boy tiger), a name suggestive of such tigers' playfulness and mischievousness. It is a bit difficult to determine whether all of these tigers are the same tiger or whether there are different types of tigers. When appearing in his more malevolent form, the tiger's tricks and plans often backfire, and he becomes an object of laughter. When appearing as a more benevolent figure, the tiger often serves to reveal the foolishness of people's actions and preoccupations. Images of the tiger are also common in the visual arts. A common folk painting of Horangi, believed to be capable of repelling evil or bad fortune, often depicts the tiger in humorous fashion as smiling, sometimes almost idiotically.

An important humorous figure in East Asia who illustrates the difficulties of discussing religion in terms of discrete schools and traditions is the Chinese figure Budai (Jap-

anese, Hotei), who is sometimes referred to as the Laughing Buddha and whose legends, at least by some accounts, are based on the life of a Chinese monk of the Tang dynasty (618–907). The name Budai means “sackcloth” and was supposedly given to the monk because of his habit of carrying his meager worldly possessions in a sackcloth over his shoulder. In sculpture and painting, Budai is portrayed as a jolly, fat monk with his large stomach protruding from his disheveled robes. One of his major activities seems to have been playing with children. Budai also came to be regarded as an incarnation of the future buddha Maitreya, both popularly and by some schools of Zen that sometimes enshrine images of Budai as Maitreya. In China, Budai as Maitreya appears as a masked laughing man dancing with dragon dancers at festive occasions such as New Years. In Japan, Hotei appears as one of the Seven Gods of Fortune (*shichifukujin*) and is the patron deity of fortune-tellers and liquor merchants. His sack of material goods now inexhaustible, Hotei is also regarded as a source of material blessings.

**HUMOR, RELIGION, AND THE ARTS.** Another vast area providing evidence of the links between humor and religion is to be found in the rich traditions of visual art, literature, folk tales, theater, and a range of performing arts, including song, dance, music, and storytelling, found throughout East Asia. The origins of many of these art forms are traced to the activities of the gods, cultural heroes, and various types of holy personages. In addition, all of these art forms have at one time or another been offered at shrines, temples, and other places for the entertainment of the gods. It is not unusual for art forms such as sculpture, song and dance, or theater to be conceived as vehicles for rendering the gods present in this world. Comic, humorous, and ribald elements are not at all rare in these art forms.

Throughout the region, temples and shrines often contain a stage or area set aside for the performance of rituals, plays, dances, and a variety of other performing arts. Such performances have pleased the gods throughout history and frequently contain humorous elements. At Takachiho in Kyushu, as well as other places throughout Japan, performances offered as entertainment for the gods depict an old couple attempting to have sex with somewhat hilarious results. In contemporary Taiwan, some temples are equipped with a television appropriately placed so that the gods may view it without impediment.

Various forms of theater and performance throughout the area also make extensive use of humor and satire in relation to religion. The Japanese *Gigaku* (Korean, *Giak*) is a form of Buddhist masked drama originating in China and transmitted from Korea to Japan in the seventh century. A fourteenth-century Japanese text describes the masked performance as containing comic scenes making fun of the evils of drunkenness and lewd behavior. Traditional forms of theater, however, also make fun of religious figures and, at times, even the gods themselves. The traditional Korean masked dance play *Sandae* (some of whose roots may perhaps

be found in *Giak*) incorporates Buddhist and shamanistic music and frequently holds up Buddhist monks and members of the literati for ridicule. In the comic Japanese *Kyōgen* theater, monks and other religious figures are often the object of humor, and the gods themselves are often portrayed in comic fashion. In the play *Asaina*, Enma—the god of the underworld—lets a hunter off lightly for the crime of killing animals when the hunter introduces the god to the delights of eating roasted meat. The humor directed at religion in these plays, however, cannot be simply taken as a rejection of religion. As suggested above, such plays were not infrequently understood as being performed for the entertainment of the gods.

The literary traditions of East Asia are also replete with stories, novels, tales, poems, and songs in which humor and religion are entwined in every conceivable way. A single example must suffice here: *Xiyouji*, translated as *The Journey to the West*, one of the most celebrated of Chinese works of literature. The work narrates the journey of the monk Tang Sanzang, aided by Sun Wukong, or Monkey, to India for Buddhist scriptures to bring back to China. The tale might be regarded as a comedy and contains numerous humorous episodes. Towards the beginning of the tale, the Buddha agrees to confer divine status on Monkey if he is able to jump over the Buddha’s hand, but to make him do penance if he fails. Having acquired magical powers and believing himself up to the task, Monkey thinks the Buddha a fool and accepts the proposition. Jumping to what seems the outer edge of the cosmos, Monkey writes his name on five pillars he finds there to mark his achievement. For good measure, he also pisses on one before leaving. When Monkey returns to where the Buddha is waiting, the Buddha holds up one hand with Monkey’s name written on each finger and with one finger stained yellow.

As suggested, the visual arts throughout the region also include many works linking humor and religion. A well-known subject in painting is the Three Doctrines, which portrays the Buddha, Confucius, and Laozi together as away of symbolizing the unity of the three religions (though it has been noted that some of the paintings do attempt to subtly suggest the superiority of one of the three). At least in a number of the paintings, such as that by the early-fifteenth-century Japanese painter Josetsu, there is a general comic air, and the Buddha and Laozi are depicted as smiling in such a way as to suggest that they are either chuckling or about to chuckle. Confucius, it must be admitted, looks a bit somber. There is the suggestion, however, that a degree of mirth is involved in the coming together and recognition of the unity of the three religions.

**SEE ALSO** Carnival; Clowns; Tricksters.

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## HUMOR AND RELIGION: HUMOR AND ISLAM

"Do not seek to put man in a cosmic dimension, but to humanize the cosmos, for there surely is laughter, and strength against tragedy" (Orfalea and Elmusa, p. 153). Thus the Arab American poet Eugene Paul Nasser neatly sums up the interdependency of religion and humor while acknowledging a certain inevitable tension between those of earnest and those of ironic inclination. Laughter, like music, dance, alcohol or drugs, love, and poetry, can be considered threatening to religion because of its powerful attraction. Although it can be co-opted, repressed, or embraced, it cannot be ignored. A Tunisian trickster tale was the author's introduction to the

world of humor and Islam. Shared by an unlettered thirty-five-year-old North African mother of four over tea on a cold spring afternoon in 1967, the tale for some might humanize the cosmos a little too much, but for many over the centuries and around the Mediterranean Sea, it has borne an essential charm. In it the trickster Juha, not a religious figure, finds himself at odds with a religious practice and religious authority. He is annoyed at the noise of his small town muezzin's early morning call to prayer and the subsequent arising of his mother, who takes their only blanket for prayers. Juha's simple solution is to cut off the muezzin's head and pitch it down a well. Juha is unfazed by his deed, but his mother covers up for him by secretly throwing a ram's head down the well so it is what is discovered when the townspeople search for the missing muezzin. The punch line, yelled up by the investigator from inside the well, is, "Oh townspeople, does your muezzin have horns?" (Dundes, p. 310; Chanfrault, pp. 54–55).

To associate humor with Islam might disconcert readers of publications that stereotype Muslims as essentially humorless and incompatible with the West, members of "a different civilization" living in the "land of bloody borders" (Huntington, 258). And indeed some Muslims, like some Christians and Jews, are serious. Yet M. Conrad Hyers, in *Holy Laughter*, cautions that "the [religiously] over zealous, the fanatic, the excommunicator and executioner . . . are nearly always serious, contemptuous of frivolity and giggles" (Hyers, p. 245). He finds in religious humor the antidote to zealotry. Like the tale above, such humor tends to cluster around areas of social or personal tension or difficulty—in Juha's case, the challenge of required prayers.

The examples of Islam and humor that follow, selected from different centuries, regions, and classes and from both oral and written sources, tend toward breaking down hierarchies, creating liminal spaces that offer a chance to see facets of the Muslim experience afresh as they are played out in personal and congregational, micro and macro situations. In some examples secular humor is used to critique religion, whereas in others religious humor is used to highlight social ills. Some examples have been chosen for their Muslim subject matter, some because the Muslim humorist drew on humor for religiously informed ethical instruction, and some because the protagonist of a humorous joke or anecdote is represented as a religious figure and thus a lesson might be expected. Each is offered to crystallize a certain facet of Muslim artful managing of confluences of humor and Islam or to point to a locus where humor seems often to emerge within a religious context. No doubt other loci will occur to readers from their own experiences. (Nonreligiously referenced joking behavior of people who happen to be Muslim is beyond the scope of this entry.) Although women's humor as well as laughter in noninstitutionalized or marginal spaces is attended to here, more study of humor from the geographical, social, gender, religious, and class hinterlands from whence new thoughts and practices tend to emerge and the

taken-for-granted interrogated needs to be done. Some examples of debate about the appropriateness of humor in Islam are offered in the conclusion.

Humor appears in religiously central Muslim texts, including the Qur'an and *hadiths*, in texts or oral traditions of specific locales, embedded in larger ritual and festival practices, and as a central expectation within certain antinomian Muslim groups. The joking behavior can be directed toward fellow practitioners or, as in the Juha story, to the arduousness of following the basic directives, or can emerge from a generational dissonance. For example, the son of a famous Sūfī irreverently refers to the formulaic and protracted exchange of greetings, compliments and blessings between his Sūfī father and members of his brotherhood as "ping-pong." Further, humor can ease tensions or comment on relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. These humorous incursions reflect but also overtly or obliquely comment on, evaluate, and reimagine shared and personal religious (and other) phenomena (Webber, 1987). A humorous look at religious practice can be a resource for vulnerable or marginalized Muslims, as in many trickster stories, providing a safety valve and sometimes protection for the subaltern, the old, the poor, and the young—especially young women or minorities—to resist power or to defend themselves by humorously calling attention to the fates of those who harm them. In all cases the cosmos is made relevant to the human condition.

**RELIGION AS EVERYDAY LIFE.** Religion is a marked off category so that a certain comportment is expected in the presence of religious leaders, sacred texts, sacred performances and sacred space. Sometimes these expectations get in the way of what really matters and laughter can restore the balance.

Boundaries between the religious and the every day are often relaxed in the "little traditions," and this is a locus of criticism by the more conservative keepers of the "great tradition," itself in flux. The effects of this collapsing vary from one situation to another, but the incongruity catches the attention of the audience—in a narrative, an essay, a *mawlid* (birthday, anniversary), children's play—and opens up the space for insight or revelation.

**Children.** The religious behaviors of children provide unexpected, amusing examples of interweaving of the sacred with playfulness. In 1968 in a Tunisian kindergarten little boys sometimes used the school's dolls to play funeral—with procession and improvised prayers—causing the Muslim teachers to gasp and laugh. In 1985 in a mosque in Toledo, Ohio, startled smiles were elicited from adults who noticed little boys lined up between their fathers for prayer bowing forward contrapuntally to the grownups to play peekaboo with their small friends to their left and right in the row of worshippers. In such circumstances children innocently play the part of outsiders, the uninitiated, and thus remind adult adherents of the constructedness of religious practice.

Memories of childhood religious rituals from an adult's perspective are also a source of humor and perhaps proble-

matize that ritual. In “Theft in Broad Daylight” the scholar Abdulaziz Abbassi recalls the day as a young schoolboy in his Moroccan hometown that he was tricked into his Muslim-ordained circumcision:

And why were the barbers [at his friend Hassan’s house]? Was it to cleanse or purify you before you were allowed to play with Hassan’s [pet] rooster? Or, was it to cleanse and purify you after the incident . . . when a female cousin on the verge of womanhood tricked you into playing body-intertwine with her? Were these people going to let the rooster’s blood or yours? . . . All efforts to struggle out of their tight grip proved futile. The last thing you remembered before fainting was biting desperately at someone’s arm. Later you found out that poetic justice had prevailed. It was rumored that it took Hassan’s father months of doctor’s visits, frequent dressings, and medication before the bite healed. (Abbassi, pp. 226–227)

**The elderly.** Postmenopausal women are both powerful and supposedly naive and thus able to commingle the religious and religiously abjured without the communal censorship that any others except young children, holy fools, or the simpleminded might incur. The following joke about an old lady returning from pilgrimage going through Egyptian customs takes this to extremes. Each duty-laden item in her bag is respectfully forgiven by the customs official due to its religious import (e.g., the imported television she claimed she needed for the sermons of a well-known religious leader, the tape recorder to listen to Qur’anic recitations) until the customs official finds the whiskey. “Whiskey, oh *hājja* (pilgrim)?” She explains that as an old lady the circumambulation of the Ka’bah was too much for her. Thus, she says, “I drink two glasses, and the Ka’bah goes around me!” (Ibrahim, p. 207). This joke critiques the use of the *hājja* as a shopping trip (a kind of money changers in the Temple critique) and religious hypocrisy, while appropriating the *hājja*’s deployment of her old lady status to evade a younger male authority figure.

**Women.** Passion within marriage is considered necessary, and it is not out of bounds for women to allude to it humorously even in some religious settings. So, one afternoon in the late 1970s in Tunisia women and children were sitting in the shrine of a *walī* (Sidi Ahmed) celebrating with feasting the recovery one woman’s husband from an accident. At this *ziyāra* (visit) to a local *walī* tomb, some women in the cool, dusky shrine were getting semi-permanent small, lacy decorations of *harcous*, a black, smoky and clove-scented cosmetic painted on their hands or feet. Admiring the intricate scented decoration on her little finger, a young wife laughed, “I am putting this right next to [my husband’s] nose tonight” (Webber 1991, p. 188)—yet another example of bringing the cosmos home.

The convergence of the sacred and sexual, especially as it relates to women’s desires, seems to be less problematic for the Muslim community than for Judaic or Christian communities. The Qur’an itself does not ignore God-given de-

sires or their human and humorous consequences. In the Joseph Sura v. 30–32 the wife of Potiphar, the Egyptian who bought Joseph, has attempted to seduce him and her lady friends are condemning her. Thus follows an amusing scene when she invites the women to dine. As they are peeling fruit she has Joseph appear unexpectedly and her guests are so affected by his beauty that they lose control of their knives and, en masse, knick their hands instead of the fruit, intimating that they might have behaved no better than she had they been in her situation. Again, this humor in the Qur’an collapses the distance between the sacred and the everyday, brings some Muslims closer to God and even helps believers not fear death (Mir, 1991).

Female modesty can also be a locus of humor when juxtaposed with a new technology. In an 1874 cartoon in an Istanbul journal, a veiled woman instructs her photographer, “above all . . . I want a good likeness.” (Georgeon, p. 109)

**Muslims in the West.** Sometimes a participant observer finds the juxtaposition of sacred and profane humorously and touchingly jarring. The poet H. S. Hamod finds himself next to a busy South Dakota highway as his father, grandfather, and father’s friend have insisted that he stop his car so they can pray on their Navaho blanket-turned-prayer-rug as night falls:

me, driving the 1959 Lincoln ninety miles an hour “STOP, STOP this car.” . . . I stop . . . car lights stream by more than I’ve ever seen in South Dakota . . . they discuss which direction is East after a few minutes it’s decided it must be that way they face what must surely be South they face their East . . . Three old men chanting the Qur’an in the middle of a South Dakota night *Allahu Ahkbar Allahu Ahkbar* . . . more cars flash by *malik a youm a deen* . . . I’m embarrassed to be with them *en umta ailiy him* . . . people stream by, an old woman strains a gawk at them *wil-lathouu leen* . . . I’m standing guard now. (Orfalea and Elmusa, pp. 165–168)

The refusal of the older men to acknowledge “mundane” difficulties to fulfilling prayer requirements puts the worldlier poet into a betwixt and between situation, striving to mediate for himself and his readers religious and everyday, East-West perspectives.

*Hijābs* (head scarfs), sometimes a focus of cultural tension in both east and west, can also be mediated through humor. In a comedy club in the United States, Tissa Hami, an American stand-up comedian who is “covered,” lets her scarf introduce part of who she is to her audience as she jokes about the marginality of Muslims in the United States. “It was scary growing up Iranian in this country,” she tells her audiences, “but when other kids teased me, I threatened to take them hostage” (Potier, p. 2). Another joke told by contemporary American Muslims not only collapses together religious and secular concerns, but also comments on U.S. religious diversity, assumptions about Muslims, immigrant name changes, and immigrant fears about generational divi-



sions and loss of identity. A Muslim immigrant named Mohamed starts his first day of school in his new country. As the youngsters introduce themselves, the teacher tells him that Mohamed is not an American name. They will call him Mike. That night when his parents ask how his day went, he doesn't answer, until finally he announces that they must now address him as Mike. He is spanked for being insolent. The next day his teacher asks him how his first day in America had gone. He grouses, "One day in America and I'm attacked by two terrorists."

**POWERFUL WORDS AND IMPETUOUS ITERATIONS.** In curses the sacred and profane are often collapsed together, and Muslim profanities can be a locus of humor. Many, probably most, curses are not meant seriously, and Muslims do not feel that an impulsive curse is binding or effective but a momentary loss of control that can bring laughter in the appropriate context. In 1996 in Tunisia an extended family was socializing while a fragile old auntie was praying in the midst of them, as women often do. Small children disrupted her by their tumbling on and around her prayer mat—oblivious to her or a sacred space and moment. She stopped in the middle of her prayers, roundly cursed them and then continued praying. Youths and other adults in the room then had to step quietly outside, muffling their laughter. (Laughter in prayer time, as opposed to, say, a smile, invalidates the prayer.) In literary collections as well, humorous accounts of inappropriate behaviors during mosque prayers or attempts to repress one's laughter in the holy site abound. However, this particular example might also be likened to the singlemindedness of the old men praying on their Navaho rug by the side of a superhighway in South Dakota. For most, these incidences of less-than-perfect prayer performances offer occasions to celebrate the lives of the prayers and the unexpected gift of a good story.

In 1967 the author and another Peace Corps volunteer were team teaching with two teenage Muslim women in a Tunisian kindergarten. One day the Muslims remembered the curse "[When you die] may you be buried in the graveyard of the Christians" and "cursed" their Christian counterparts with giggling glee. During the colonial period, just ended at the time, this was a bitter curse "othering" a fellow townspeople who might be a bit of an "Uncle Ahmed." Using it in a new context, among friends, conveyed a good bit about the new leveling of hierarchies. Similarly parents quite often rain curses down on the heads of their misbehaving young children only to shift their ire to any other adult who would dare to intone, "amen" (Webber, 1991, p. 189, n.18).

Even when a curse works, it is sometimes cause for, if not unabashed laughter, a satisfied snort. In a Tunisian town a descendant of a well-known *wali* [holy person] had a philandering husband. After enduring years of his roaming, she finally cursed him with a deadly disease, and he caught it and died. As time passes and the story is told and retold, the regret for the death recedes and the local community wryly

takes note of divine justice for a woman seemingly without recourse.

Impetuous words that cannot legally be unsaid are the cause of laughter for all but the miscreant who is caught with his or her self-control down. Conflation of the sacred, secular, and sexual often results in humorous moments. According to *shari'ah*, once a man swears thrice that he divorces his wife, she is divorced, and they cannot be remarried unless she is first married to and divorced from another. Mirth and good stories arise from cases in which a divorced wife is wed supposedly temporarily to a friend of the former spouse, who she then decides she prefers. It is a cautionary tale that depends for its effectiveness on humorous sexual humiliation.

**SUBALTERN RESISTANCE, HUMOR, AND ISLAM.** Muslim authorities recognized the vulnerability of their religion to the condescension of nineteenth-century colonizers of Asia and Africa. The Orientalist impulse to appropriate the East's intellectual heritage included an assumed mastery of and thus right to critically interrogate its religions. Foreign scholars found fault with Islamic and other religious practices of the colonized. For their part, the colonized, made marginal to their own religious traditions, could through religious-based humor resist, mediate, and educate across religions and cultures. In his work on the Egyptians of the early 1800s, Edward Lane strives to document Egyptian (usually Cairene) lifestyles with little regard for individual personalities or humanity. But in the few cases in which Egyptians are quoted, readers glimpse witty, appealing Muslim individuals. In one anecdote an Egyptian Muslim friend learns that another Egyptian has asked Lane for his watch (*sa'ah*). Because *sa'ah* also means "hour" or "period of general judgment," Lane's friend suggests that Lane return an "equivocal and evasive answer" taken from the Qur'an: "Verily the *sa'ah* shall come: I will surely make it to appear" (Lane, pp. 280–281). Whereas Lane uses this humorous riposte to illustrate what he sees as an unfortunate Muslim tendency to confound the sacred with the everyday, readers might rather glimpse an appealing personality in the unnamed Egyptian friend, a man steeped in the witty culture of Muslim literati (*udaba'*) that often depends for effect on a shared knowledge of the Qur'an.

In another story Lane challenges a Muslim friend concerning the propriety of a certain book that when closed has a page relating a scene of debauchery covering a page of prayer. His friend jokes that Lane could simply turn the book over so that the prayer page would cover the debauchery—the sin would then be covered by forgiveness. To Lane the incident proved Egyptians hypocrites. "The generality of the Arabs," Lane concludes, are "a most inconsistent people" (Lane, p. 280). Readers might find, however, that the Muslim's urbane witticism provides proof of a more subtle, multilayered world than the one Lane perceived.

**TRICKSTERS.** Muslim tricksters, like the Mediterranean Juha, who is also sometimes Jewish or Christian, are humans whose humorous escapades only intermittently attend to religion. Juha's religiously linked escapades are irreverent and

collapse hierarchies so that Juha in some narratives can even outsmart or bargain with God, much as he outsmarts the rich or the learned. Two other tricksters are Nasruddin Hodja or Mullah Nasruddin—poor, rural, low-level religious teachers or scholars, sometimes judges. They, like Juha, are at least quasi-legendary with times of birth and death and place of burial contradictorily noted in various sources. Sidi Khadir, like some *walīs* and *walīyyas*, has supernatural powers and is trickster-like, causing confusion through his miracles (Webber, 1991, pp. 143, 160, 189). Like Juha, Nasruddin Hodja or Mullah Nasruddin are found in various transformations around the Mediterranean. Perhaps because the rough and tumble antics of Juha are tempered in the latter two tricksters by the quasi-respectability endowed by their religiously evocative honorifics, the latter two tricksters take on somewhat more respectable personae. They are comic geniuses, folk philosophers, and a bit less messy and more socially acceptable than Juha. Depending on the listener's or reader's acceptance of the trickster protagonists' credentials, the stories might be expected to offer a religious or ethical life lesson even if the narrative itself is not overtly religious. In *adab* (Arabic corpus of belles lettres) tricksters are often a humorous Sancho Panza-type sidekick or a master of disguise, but again their escapades only incidentally involve religion.

The following Nasruddin account, one of thousands, could be used as the opener to a speech to raise charitable donations or in a conversation with a family member who is borrowing or lending money. Like most of the hodja and mullah stories, it addresses topics of communal tension, such as haves and have-nots, money, and judgmental individuals. The story's seeming senselessness amuses and intrigues the listener or reader long enough that some underlying recurrent cultural and communal quandaries can be confronted:

The Mullah went to see a rich man. "Give me some money." "Why?" "I want to buy . . . an elephant." "If you have no money, you can't afford to keep an elephant." "I came here," said Nasruddin, "to get money, not advice." (Shah, p.13.)

Why the impulse in the Abrahamic traditions toward humorous human tricksters like Till Eulenspiegel, Pedro de Urdemalas, and Juha? A trickster in human form, it seems, has a different cultural role than trickster as animal or as god (or as animal-supernatural being). These legendary, lower-class tricksters, rogues, and fools are not so other as magical or supernatural tricksters: their behaviors, however foolish, quirky, or outrageous, can be identified by listeners or readers with their own curtailed impulses or moments of whimsy but writ large and run out to their logical (illogical) conclusions.

In many trickster escapades involving encounters with the religious establishment, tricksters violate the most basic rules of Islam. Thus, their reverently irreverent behavior is reminiscent of that of socially vulnerable antinomian Sūfis, dervishes and holy fools and their real-life uses of humor and

taboo breaking. By definition these trickster-like religious figures, like the storied tricksters, violate social norms and embrace unconventional and liminal behavior including disregard of Islamic ritual practices and contravention of religious law (Karamustafa, pp. 17-18). Poverty, of course, accentuates perceptions of deviance and sometimes antinomians even gave up great wealth to embark on their antinomian way.

Ahmet Karamustafa's (1994) intriguing work on the antinomian dervishes, wandering Sūfī groups that spread from Egypt to South Asia between 1200 and 1550 BCE, illustrates some of the behaviors of the religious groups known for mirth and merrymaking and assessed as ruffraff by the elite, who felt that "Islam was at the mercy of spiritual delinquents" (Karamustafa, p. 9). The boisterous commentary of these "men of good humour" actually puts the dervishes in danger from the establishment, religious and otherwise, by their trickster-like behaviors—combining mirth and merrymaking with dance and ecstasy, wine drinking, hashish smoking, homosexuality (or chastity), "dependence on love to the point of disregarding reason," and so on (Karamustafa, p. 72). Evoking the image of a holy fool, the leader of one group, the Abdals, brought merriment when he "danced like a bear and sang like a monkey" (Karamustafa, p. 1). Thus, like the tricksters, the antinomians tend toward a motley of dress, ignoring of boundaries—social, temporal, and spatial—and amorality, exhibition of human-animal dualism, and so on.

**TRADITIONAL ADAB, RELIGION, AND HUMOR.** What comprises *adab* has varied over the centuries, but its core genres might be defined at any one time and place as those established *udaba'* (masters of *adab*) choose to include in their broad repertoires: knowledge of philosophy (Greek, Roman, Persian, Arabic), history, manners, theology, sermons, travel narratives, biography and autobiography, sex manuals, proverbs, riddles, tall tales, humorous narratives; a keen assessment of middle-class society; and the ability to write engagingly about such topics according to or challenging aesthetic norms. Although *adab* shares plots, themes, tales, motifs, and genres with popular aesthetic culture, a central distinguishing feature of *adab* is that it is written and transmitted by a renowned author living the lifestyle of an artist who was, even in the fairly recent past, sometimes on the fringes, less frequently in the center, of a rarified court lifestyle (Allen, p. 170). Basic to all scholars was their thorough knowledge of religious texts—beginning with Qur'an memorization. In many cases this training continues in the twenty-first century.

Being able to write humorously was an important talent for the *udaba'*, especially during those times when they were dependent on wealthy patrons, so humorous incidents about misreading or misuse of Qur'anic verses are drawn on as accessible to most everyone. In early *adab* ridicule also surfaced in debates over the relative merits of other religions, especially Zoroastrianism and Christianity. Franz Rosenthal does



not see this early humor as an attack “upon the established religion or expressions of a liberal and skeptical spirit” but comic relief on notice of unexpected deviation from well-known “literary expressions and ritualistic practices” (Rosenthal, p. 28). Some *adab* humor, however, definitely seems to express the liberal or ironic outlook of a jaded, bohemian community. In his satiric debate “The Pleasure of Girls and Boys Compared,” for example, the Basran *adib* Jahiz (c. 776–868 CE), who was also a religious scholar, has his fictional debaters cite verses from the Qurʾān to bolster their sexual preferences for boys or girls. Such quotes from the Qurʾān as those of Jahiz and the quote from Lane’s friend cited previously are humorous because they are frivolous applications from a sacred source. Mistakes in use of Qurʾanic references, which most people knew so well, could also cause laughter: “Abu ʿAlgamah mentioned the name of the wolf who ate the Biblical and Qurʾanic Joseph, and when he was told that Joseph was not eaten by a wolf, he said that the name he had mentioned, then, was the name of the wolf that did *not* eat Joseph” (Rosenthal, p. 10, n. 5).

Inability to recognize a common Qurʾanic quote can also cause laughter. The *adib* Abu al-Faraj al-Isfahani (d. 967 CE) notes an occasion in the mosque when the *imām* recited, “And why should I not serve Him Who created me?” (Qurʾān 36:22), a witty effeminate, al-Dalal, responded, “I don’t know,” and caused most of the worshippers to laugh and invalidate their prayers (Rowson, p. 683).

A theme that runs through earlier *adab* is attribution of humorous, daring statements to the Prophet, seemingly again humanizing the cosmos. The early poet Hassan ibn Thabit observes “that the Prophet was not as puritanical as some people imagine” (cited in Mir, p. 162). Sexual banter is attributed to the Prophet in the form of *ḥadīth* (Rosenthal, p. 29). And class-based humor also invokes the Qurʾān as when Yusuf Shirbini, cited by Nelly Hanna, quotes the ignorant commoners’ *ʿulamāʾ* as claiming to have a copy of the Qurʾān in the author’s handwriting, or as asking for a summary of the Qurʾān since the original is too difficult for his students (Hanna, p. 77).

The practice of listing *ḥadīth* transmitters is also made light of. Rosenthal reports that the famous early *adib* Ashʿab, on being advised by religious critics that it would be more becoming for him to transmit traditions than tell his inappropriate jokes, offered this *ḥadīth*, “I was told by Nafi’ . . . on the authority of Ibn ʿUmar that the Messenger of God said: ‘A man in whom there are found two qualities belongs to God’s chosen friends.’” When his critic then complimented Ashʿab and asked what these two qualities were, he replied that Nafi’ had forgotten one and he, Ashʿab, had forgotten the other (Rosenthal, p. 117).

The five pillars of Islam—profession, prayers, almsgiving, fasting, and pilgrimage—also are resources for *udabaʾ* wit. “A man on pilgrimage was glaring at a slave girl as though she were a heathen in the pulpit. Her arms were bare, her skin was as white as palm-core and she was mouthing one

obscurity after another. ‘How dare you talk like that on pilgrimage! It’s not me on pilgrimage, stupid, it’s my camel! Can’t you see that I’m the one sitting and it’s doing the walking?’” (Colville, p. 206).

Not surprisingly given the number required each day, speedy prayer is also a source of humor. *Udabaʾ* report their protagonists—buffoons, tricksters, and effeminate—drawing upon quotes from the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* for proof that making long prayers is a sign of false piety or accusing the slower prayer of having an inordinate number of sins to assuage.

**ISLAM AND HUMOR: CRITIQUES AND DIALOGUE.** Humor in religion introduces a bit (or more) of the chaotic into what some feel should be a sober and controlled cultural domain—hence attempts to control the uncontrollable. Some joking behavior might be acceptable only among insiders. Some Islamic leaders in colonial Cairo felt that the kinds of humor incorporated into the *mawlid* festivals, the levity and buffoonery, made Islam appear ridiculous in Western eyes and so attempted to manage them. Censorship of religious humor, like that of certain mullah tales in Iran following the fall of the shah, results in risky humor retreating to oral and private venues.

And yet there are apologists for some joking behavior even on the fault lines of religious sectarianism. “The joking is not a problem,” one middle-aged family man told the author in 1986 about the jokes Muslim and Coptic neighbors in Cairo tell on each other, “It’s time to worry when the joking stops.” Laughter might be troubling but also allows space for insight or creativity. Altogether most Islamic leaders viewed joking and laughter relatively positively, although bringing in examples from the behavior of the Prophet and his companions would be taboo for some. Only hurtful, mocking laughter is consistently criticized.

Still debates about the place of humor in Islam surface in times of change or crisis, and sometimes this results in harsh treatment of the perceived irreverent. For example, an *imām* of the early fifteenth century, Ibn Sudun al Busbugawi, wrote in Egypt during a time of failing economy due to the costs of a large army, of recurrent plague, and of famine. Religion and humor were not his principal preoccupation (rather perhaps food and hashish), but in his work *The Diversion of the Souls: Bringing a Laugh to a Scowling Face*, after presenting his favorite rice recipes, he mildly joshes Muslim portion sellers about the efficacy of their products as well as Muslims who claim exclusive access to heaven: “He who eats two platefuls [of the rice] after lunch and two platefuls after dinner for forty years on end . . . will never fall sick, unless from some disease, and he will not die, except when his allotted time is up; and if he should die a Muslim he will enter Paradise” (cited in Vrolijk, p. 28). Indeed he also penned a loving, rather humorous poem about his mother upon her death—behavior that was (and still is) criticized later by more conservative Muslims but which is evocative of some contemporary memorial services or of wake reminiscences.

He remembers, “When I ran away from my teacher and my dad was chasing after me to send me back, my mother always found me a hiding place” (Vroljik, p. 45). And he jokingly reproaches her for her choice of heaven over him: “You’ve gone up to heaven to God who forgives all / How on earth could it please you to leave me / you were never like that before” (Vroljik, p. 134). Again, a familiar approach collapses the distance between the cosmos and the quotidian and thus between the son and his missed mother. Perhaps the hard times account for that fact that Ibn Sudun’s humor and decadent behavior displeased both his father and Cairene religious authorities to such a degree that he was exiled to Damascus near the end of his life.

Another incident of attempted repression of humor occurred in 1877, when the Ottoman parliament debated the issue of press humor during wartime. More conservative members—Muslims and non-Muslims alike—felt that humor was frivolous and dangerous, whereas others felt that it was religiously encouraged even though printing presses at that time (like the Internet of the twenty-first century perhaps) had made a much broader dissemination of humor possible. In fact the Egyptian Boulaq Press had already, almost fifty years earlier, published a collection of Ottoman Turkish Nasruddin Hodja tales. The great majority of deputies defended humor as having a social utility.

Whatever is officially decided in any one time or place about the relation between humor and Islam, humor will accrete to Islam and to its texts and practices, and Muslims will be the first to find, through irreverence, a means to point out the dissonances between Islamic ideals and the practices of those claiming to adhere to them (Sultan-Qurraie, chap. 4). In Casablanca in the last decade of the twentieth century, the new Hasan II Mosque, a pet project of the king of Morocco, had just been completed in a slum area by the Atlantic Ocean. It is absolutely lovely and drew on the talents of Moroccan artisans for stonework, woodwork, and mosaics. It has the tallest minaret in the world. The problem was that the middle classes especially felt that their financial contributions (the mosque cost \$800 million) were more extortions than contributions and that, besides the sewage and flooding problems the mosque has exacerbated in the slum, the contrast between the opulence of the mosque and the poverty of its surroundings jars on some of the faithful. Thus jokes about the mosque abound in the realm of private, verbal art of the local Muslim community. Most popular seemed to be an ironic caution about standing outside one’s local mosque during crowded Friday noon prayer time waiting to get in to pray. “Let’s go home,” goes the punch line, “he’ might decide to build another one.”

SEE ALSO Mawlid; Tricksters, overview article.

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### HUMOR AND RELIGION: HUMOR, IRONY, AND THE COMIC IN WESTERN THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

In the history of Western theology and philosophy, humor and religion have had a stormy relationship. Attitudes to humor and joking—and especially to laughter—have ranged from wholesale condemnation, to qualified acceptance and praise of certain forms of humor, to more enthusiastic acceptance.

**THE SEPARATION OF HUMOR AND RELIGION.** The separation of humor and religion cannot be understood without understanding attitudes to laughter in the history of Western philosophy and theology. For centuries, the condemnation of laughter was commonplace. Among the ancient Greeks, for instance, Plato associates indulgence in laughter with the loss of self-control. In his *Republic*, the guardians who are to govern the ideal society must not be "too fond of laughter" (388e), and no literature portraying the gods or other reputable characters as overcome with laughter can be permitted in the ideal *polis*. Aristotle is rather more charitable, and as we shall shortly see, views wit (*eutrapelia*) as a virtue. Nevertheless, in the *Poetics* he still associates comedy with something "lowly." In comedy we laugh at the imitation of those inferior to us because of their "ridiculousness . . . a particular form of the shameful" (1449a). A comic character is ludicrous in respect of some "error or unseemliness that is not painful or destructive" (1449a). Numerous Greek, Jewish, and Christian ascetics took as an ideal the perfect human who never laughed. In the Christian tradition, Luke 6:25 reports Jesus as saying "Woe to you who laugh now, for you will mourn and weep." Much was made of this verse by early Christian ascetics in judging laughter to be contemptible. John Chrysostom (347–407 CE) has been cited as the first to point out that the gospels never portray Jesus as laughing, and the former's condemnation of laughter is typical of a common attitude in early Christianity:

When . . . thou seest persons laughing, reflect that those teeth, that grin now, will one day have to sustain that most dreadful wailing and gnashing, and that they will remember this same laugh on That Day whilst they are grinding and gnashing! Then thou too shalt remember this laugh! (*Concerning the Statutes, Homily XX*. Cited in Gilhus, p. 63)

But if laughter was contemptible, weeping—over Christ's death, one's own sin, and the threat of eternal damnation—was to be praised and recommended (for more on this idea see Gilhus, chapter 4). This condemnation of laughter seems largely to do with its bodily nature, the idea being that laughter had to be conquered as part and parcel of controlling the body. As Gilhus puts it, "The more the body was closed against the world, the more the soul was opened up to God" (p. 67).

**THE FEAST OF FOOLS: A MORE POSITIVE VIEW.** Though there were exceptions to the disapproving view of humor in early Christianity—chiefly among the Gnostics, several of whose myths included laughter as a reaction to a clash between a material and spiritual interpretation of events—it was not until the medieval period that a far more positive view of laughter and the comic emerged. According to several scholars, this was largely the result of a changed view of the human body, related not least to the centrality of the Eucharist and an increased emphasis upon Christianity as a religion of incarnation. It is from such factors that Mikhail Bakhtin generates his influential view of the Middle Ages' "laughter culture" in his seminal book *Rabelais and His World*. The festivals of this period included the Feast of Fools, nearly all the rituals of which were, according to Bakhtin, "a grotesque degradation of various church rituals and symbols and their transfer to the material bodily level: gluttony and drunken orgies on the altar table, indecent gestures, disrobing" (pp. 74–75).

Certainly, parody and revelry of various kinds were central to such carnivals. The contrast between the likes of John Chrysostom and the writers of an apology for such activities issued by the Paris School of Theology in 1444 could hardly be starker. The apologists claim that "foolishness" is humanity's "second nature," and stress the importance of its being given the opportunity to "freely spend itself at least once a year." Humans are compared to badly constructed wine barrels, "which would burst from the wine of wisdom, if this wine remains in a state of constant fermentation of piety and fear of God." Just as such wine must be given air so that it does not spoil, so the church must allow folly on certain days "so that we may later return with greater zeal to the service of God" (quoted by Bakhtin, p. 75). This can be seen as an embryonic version of the so-called relief or release theory of humor or laughter, later developed in more detail by Herbert Spencer and Sigmund Freud.

**STRIKING THE MEAN: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.** But the Middle Ages also provide a mean between the extremes described by Bakhtin and the ascetic despisers of laughter. St. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, shows a markedly greater tolerance of

laughter than does John Chrysostom. Drawing on Aristotle, according to whose *Nicomachean Ethics* wit (*eutrapelia*) is a virtue, Aquinas argues that the lack of mirth is a vice. Following Aristotle, he commends *eutrapelia*, an application of the doctrine of the golden mean to the sphere of play:

Those who go to excess in merry-making [Aristotle] calls buffoons (*bomolochoi*) . . . these people are always ready to seize anything which they can turn to ridicule. Such men are a nuisance through their efforts at all costs to raise a laugh. . . . But he says also that those who do not want themselves to make a joke and are annoyed by those who do, because they feel insulted, appear to be “agrii,” that is, “boorish,” and hard, because they are not softened by the pleasure of play. . . . Thus Aristotle shows what is the mean in playing. He says that those who exercise moderation in play are called *eutrapeloi*, “well-turning,” because they are able to turn aptly into laughter what is said or done. (St. Thomas Aquinas, *In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nichomachum*, lib. iv, lect. 16. Cited in Hugo Rahner, “*Eutrapelia*: A Forgotten Virtue,” in Hyers, 1969, p. 193)

The fact that Aristotle, so respected a source for medieval Christianity, praises wittiness and its concomitant laughter appears to be a problem for laughter’s religious enemies. This issue is given a memorable fictional portrayal in Umberto Eco’s novel *The Name of the Rose* (1980), in which the laughter-hating monastery librarian Jorge is prepared to kill rather than allow the discovery of his library’s secret treasure, the lost second book of Aristotle’s *Poetics* which praises comedy and laughter. Though Aquinas’s view of laughter and the comic is clearly more measured than that found among certain celebrants of the Feast of Fools, it has often been noted that by the medieval period, the church had moved from an almost entirely negative view of laughter to fostering it actively through religious plays and feasts.

**THE REFORMATION AND BEYOND.** However, the Reformation’s more negative view of the body, exemplified by such moves as the spiritualization of the Eucharist, marked a turn in the opposite direction: in England, for instance, one Particular Baptist group agreed that future members must never make jokes, and certain Puritan pamphlets, putting the case for the closure of theaters, seem to urge a return to John Chrysostom’s view. (For a somewhat contrary view that discusses the significance of Martin Luther in the history of laughter, see Zwart, chapter 4.)

It is from this general trend that Bakhtin derives his view that, in contrast to the Renaissance view of laughter that he associates with Rabelais, Cervantes, and Shakespeare, for whom laughter “has a deep philosophical meaning . . . Certain aspects of the world are accessible only to laughter” (p. 66), from the seventeenth century onwards, what laughter is left becomes diminished: its “cold humor, irony, sarcasm” (p. 38) and the like are “a laughter that does not laugh” (p. 45). This attitude culminates in one of the best-known of all comments on laughter, from one of Lord Ches-

terfield’s mid-eighteenth-century letters to his son: “There is nothing so illiberal, and so ill-bred, as audible laughter. . . . I am sure that since I had full use of my reason, nobody has ever heard me laugh.”

In this view, laughter per se is vulgar, which is in some respects a return to Plato’s view. Several scholars have suggested that this is rooted in a low evaluation of the body in relation to the soul: as Gilhus puts it, “laughter with its anchorage in the body was . . . devalued against superior reason” (p. 101). However, the tide turns again with the increasing association of laughter with humor, understood as being rooted in incongruity. Since the ability to perceive incongruity requires rational capacities, rational beings can view laughter more positively. There is a certain irony in the association with incongruity being viewed as a point in humor’s favor, however, since others have taken quite a contrary view. George Santayana, for instance, in *The Sense of Beauty*, insists that the pleasure of humor or the comic cannot inhere in incongruity itself; since as rational animals, we are incapable of finding incongruity, absurdity, or nonsense pleasurable.

Overall, then, what we note is a deeply ambivalent relationship to humor, the comic, and laughter in the religious thought of the West. For long periods, humor and comedy were condemned, due largely to their association with such an inherently bodily phenomenon as laughter, but also because of their association with derision or scorn. However, there are more positive views of the connection between religion and humor, irony, and the comic, such as Aquinas’s commendation of *eutrapelia* and, in the Renaissance period, Erasmus’s *Praise of Folly*. In this respect, two thinkers in particular deserve special mention: G. W. F. Hegel, for whom the comic consciousness plays an important role in the history of religion; and Søren Kierkegaard, for whom Christianity is “the most humorous view of life in world history.”

**HEGEL.** G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) discusses tragedy and comedy in the section on religion in his influential *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Central to Hegel’s philosophy is the belief that the world is rational, and the purpose of human enquiry is to bring this rationality to consciousness. Hegel characterizes the *Phenomenology* as an introduction to his philosophical system, and in it, he traces the story of Spirit (*Geist*) progressively coming to know itself. A vital part of Spirit’s progress is through various manifestations of religion: from “natural religion” (e.g. the idea of God as light, and of plant and animal spirits); through various forms of “religion in the form of art” (exemplified by the Greeks); to “revealed religion” (Hegel’s version of Christianity).

Hegel briefly discusses epic, tragedy, and comedy in a section entitled “The Spiritual Work of Art” (pp. 439–453). In an epic, the actions and destiny of the heroes are controlled by the gods. In tragedy, by contrast, individuals seem to have more control over their fate. However, this is largely illusory, since the hero or heroine is often destroyed by trusting in the seemingly obvious meaning of an ambiguous ut-



terance of the gods: “The double-tongued character of what they announced as a certainty deceive him” (p. 446). The hero or heroine’s true powerlessness in relation to the gods is revealed by the chorus, which “clings to the consciousness of an alien fate” for him or her (p. 445).

The divine forces in tragedy represent a split between the “feminine” pole of family and the “masculine” pole of state or government. Think, for instance, of Agamemnon, commanded by the gods to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia in exchange for winds favorable to the fleet, so that it can sail and sack Troy. Agamemnon is torn between his love for his daughter Iphigenia (the family pole) and his duty as king (the state pole). However, the focus on the character of the tragic hero or heroine brings about a change in the way the religious consciousness thinks of the gods. Rather than see them as agents directing the lives of the heroes, the divine becomes viewed as fate, and this “completes the depopulation of Heaven. . . . The expulsion of such shadowy, insubstantial picture-thoughts which was demanded of the philosophers of antiquity thus already begins in [Greek] Tragedy” (p. 449).

This is where comedy enters the picture. In comedy, “actual self-consciousness exhibits itself as the fate of the gods” (p. 450): that is, even the gods become selves that are in an important sense indistinguishable from the actor or spectator. Everyone, including the gods, is reduced or leveled, as the religious consciousness no longer distinguishes between the divine and itself. “It is the return of everything universal into the certainty of itself. . . . [a] complete loss of fear and of essential being on the part of all that is alien” (pp. 452–453). Hegel thinks that this contains an element of truth: in the words of J. N. Findlay, “The truth of comedy is that all the great big essential fixtures that stand over against self-consciousness are really products of, and at the mercy of, self-consciousness” (in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 1977, p. 584). Yet this leveling has a downside, as we shall shortly see. In contrast to the lonely isolation of the tragic hero or heroine, Hegel characterizes comedy in terms of the self-assertion of the common man in what Findlay calls “his revolutionary disrespect for everything” (p. 584). Both the comic consciousness and religion in the form of art are the spirit of an age in which pure individualism is starting to get out of control. For Hegel, this is a period, such as the early Roman Empire, which stresses the rights of an abstract self. But Hegel thinks that such a conception of a right is an empty abstraction that needs to be filled by the Spirit of a particular people: a particular community or epoch. Thus the ostensibly liberating universal disrespect in which the comic consciousness revels is not the liberation it appears to be. And the “comic consciousness that is perfectly happy within itself” (p. 455) is brought to completion by its counterpart, the unhappy consciousness, which sees the abstract self for the chimera that it is.

Thus the secular outlook of the comic consciousness will not do, but crucially, it is its inherent instability that

gives rise to the highest stage of religion, “revealed religion,” in which God achieves self-consciousness through humanity. Christianity, for Hegel, constitutes the highest form of religious consciousness, in its recognition that “the divine nature is the same as the human” (p. 460): in its incarnation, the “absolute Being” ascends “for the first time to its own highest essence” (p. 460); the world is able “to behold what absolute Being is, and in it to find itself” (p. 461). In this way, the comic consciousness has a vital role to play in the development of what is, for Hegel, the highest form of religion: Christianity as speculative knowledge.

**KIERKEGAARD.** A rather different view of the relationship between humor and religion is to be found in a philosopher who is influenced by, and yet in many respects opposes himself violently to, Hegel: the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). It is ironic that the thinker who makes one of the most explicit connections between religion and the comic is typically caricatured as “the melancholy Dane.” As well as being capable of dazzlingly witty and amusing prose, Kierkegaard makes some striking remarks about humor’s relation to Christianity in particular and also to a more general religious worldview. In his *Journals and Papers*, he makes the extraordinary claim that Christianity is “the most humorous view of life in world history” (vol. 2, entry 1681).

Kierkegaard had a lifelong fascination with Socrates, “the greatest master of irony,” on whom he wrote a dissertation, *The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates*, and he viewed the notoriously obscure writer J. G. Hamann as “the greatest humorist” (entry 1554). Kierkegaard’s richest and most extended discussion of religion and the comic, however, is in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1846), published under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, a character who describes himself as a “humorist.” As well as containing some of Kierkegaard’s most famous satire at the expense of Hegelianism (for the philosophical significance of this, see Lippitt, 2000, chapter 2), the *Postscript* develops important existential roles for irony and humor, subcategories of Kierkegaard’s more generic term “the comic.”

Irony and humor serve as *confinia*, or “boundary zones,” between the aesthetic, ethical, and religious existence-spheres or “stages on life’s way.” Climacus sees the ironist as being on the boundary between the aesthetic and the ethical life. The ironist has seen the limitations of the aesthetic life—a life which involves an endless evasive toying with existential possibilities—but has not made the movement to the ethical, in which serious choices and commitments for one’s own life are made. The contrast here is between a life of fragmented episodes (the aesthetic) and a life of coherent narrative unity (the ethical). The ironist possesses an insight, albeit limited, into the stage “beyond.” He or she thus occupies a transitional stage between the two spheres of existence: aware of the limitations of the former, but unable or unwilling to make the move to the latter.

One key difference between humor and irony, for Climacus, is that whereas irony is proud, and tends to divide one person from another—Climacus describes it in terms of self-assertion and “teasing” (p. 551)—humor is rather more gentle, and is concerned with those tragicomic elements of the human condition shared by all human beings. Humor thus has a sympathy that irony lacks (p. 582). Moreover, the humorist also has a more profound understanding of important elements of life than the ironist: in particular, the humorist understands that suffering is essential to human life. (There is a complicated relationship, for Climacus, between humor and pain.) It is this insight into such aspects of the religious life as resignation, suffering, and guilt that places humor, but not irony, at the boundary of the ethical and the religious.

Climacus equivocates as to whether humor is on the boundaries of the ethical and Religiousness A (his term for a sort of generic religious consciousness that is aware of the centrality to human life of resignation, suffering, and guilt), or on the boundary of Religiousness A and Religiousness B (Christianity). But the overall idea seems to be that, as one ascends the existence-spheres from the aesthetic to the ethical to the religious, one develops an ever deeper and more profound sense of the comical in life. Hence Climacus’s claim that a sense of and taste for the comic is intimately related to one’s existential capabilities: “the more competently a person exists, the more he will discover the comic” (p. 462).

The religious person is described as one who has “discovered the comic on the greatest scale” (p. 462). Such a person views life as a “jest,” in that she is able to see that all one’s efforts are as nothing, because one is capable of nothing without God. However, there are limits to Climacus’s praise for humor. First, he stresses that for the seriously religious person, such jest is mixed with “earnestness,” in that one’s ultimate dependence upon God does not detract from the need for existential striving. Second, he insists that there are limits to what may legitimately be laughed at: there is nothing comic, for instance, about religious suffering (p. 483). (For more on Climacus’s account of when the comic is legitimate, see Lippitt, 2000, chapter 7.)

Finally, as well as being “boundary zones,” irony and humor play a second important role as “incognitos” for ethical and religious individuals respectively. By acting as a kind of existential disguise, irony and humor allow such individuals to protect their “inwardness.” Yet also, somewhat paradoxically, they act as means by which what it is to live ethically or religiously can be communicated indirectly to those on the boundaries of ethical or religious life. That is, irony and humor can function as forms of “indirect communication,” drawing those with the relevant sensitivity towards an ethical or religious life. In this way, Kierkegaard and his pseudonym Climacus effectively suggest that developing a sense for the comic can play a vital part in a radical shift in one’s view of life. More recently, this idea has been developed by others to suggest that prolonged exposure to humor of an

appropriate sort can have an important role to play in the development of moral and religious virtues, as part of the process of moral education as habituation espoused by Aristotle. (For more on this, see Roberts, 1988, and Lippitt, 2005).

**THE TWENTIETH CENTURY TO DATE: THEORIES OF HUMOR.** By the latter portion of the twentieth century, it had become common among philosophers and other scholars interested in humor to treat theories of humor as falling into three broad types, based around incongruity, superiority, and relief (or the release of energy). *Humor* had by now become the standard umbrella term, with irony, satire, wit, and so on treated as subcategories thereof.

The incongruity tradition is commonly treated as originating in the remarks of Immanuel Kant and, in particular, Arthur Schopenhauer. In *The World as Will and Idea* Schopenhauer claims that “the cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects thought through it in some relation” (vol. 1, p. 76). Recent writers in this tradition have disagreed as to whether what really causes amusement is the perception of incongruity itself, or the resolution of that incongruity: the fitting of an apparent anomaly into some conceptual schema.

The term *incongruity* has been used to cover a wide range of phenomena, from logical impossibility via ambiguity (such as double entendres) to mere inappropriateness (such as importing into one context what belongs to another). Indeed, so wide has the range of application of the term been that it becomes reasonable to wonder whether it has not been stretched so far, or used so vaguely, as to cease to be a particularly informative term at all.

Another difficulty is whether the incongruity tradition puts all the emphasis on form or structure at the expense of content or context. Even if it were possible to point to an element of incongruity in any instance of humor, to what extent is it the incongruity (as opposed to, say, the subject matter, or the surrounding social context, or some combination of factors) that is the real cause of amusement? For example, one joke may be rated as much funnier than another that is entirely identical in structure simply because the former is about sex and the latter about a more neutral topic. This raises a serious question as to whether, in such cases, it can really be a purely formal notion such as incongruity that is doing all the work. These problems notwithstanding, probably a majority of theorists now subscribe to some version of the idea that incongruity is a central element in humor.

The second major theoretical tradition revolves around superiority. This can be traced back to Aristotle’s association of comedy with the “lowly,” and finds its most famous early modern treatment in Thomas Hobbes’s claim, in his *Human Nature*, that laughter is “sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly”

(p. 46). If this is all there is to laughter, it becomes easier to see why so many have held a negative view of it.

But the superiority view is haunted by some problems equivalent to those that haunt the incongruity tradition. First, why do some feelings of superiority (or instances of incongruity) manifest themselves in laughter, but not others? Second, isn't Hobbes's view excessively narrow? It is hard to deny that the misfortune or alleged deficiencies of others is a staple topic of comedy, from the hackneyed example of the man slipping on the banana peel to various kinds of racist and sexist humor. But how plausible is it to claim that *all* humorous laughter involves *Schadenfreude* or one of its close relatives?

One twentieth-century follower of Hobbes, Anthony Ludovici, aims to tackle this problem by explaining all laughter—humorous and non-humorous—in terms of “superior adaptation.” Under this heading, he includes experiences as diverse as *Schadenfreude* and the pleasure taken, such as when enjoying nonsense and absurdity, in a temporary escape from the need to obey the rules of logic and reason. Thus Ludovici is able to account for a greater variety of humor than is Hobbes. But he achieves this only by stretching his use of terminology in a similar, but arguably more extreme, manner than sometimes happens in the incongruity tradition.

Both Hobbes and Ludovici seem to overlook the attitude of childlike playfulness that is important to the enjoyment of so much humor. They also have difficulties adequately explaining the phenomenon of laughing at oneself. For Hobbes, the self at whom I laugh is a former self to whom I am now superior; for Ludovici, finding myself in a position of inferior adaptation, I feign the sign of superior adaptation. Both explanations overlook the fact that one could possibly find one's own current self genuinely amusing, and that this capacity is central to the ability genuinely to laugh at oneself.

Moreover, this point seems especially relevant to an important “religious” use of humor. Many who have seen a positive ethical or religious function for humor (such as Kierkegaard) have done so because they recognize our capacity to transcend ourselves in humorous laughter. But as Kierkegaard's location of humor as a boundary zone on the verge of the genuinely religious suggests, it is important to recognize, *pace* Hobbes, that it can be one's current, flawed, self at which one is genuinely laughing, rather than some former self that one has already transcended.

Another twentieth-century thinker often treated as part of the superiority tradition is Henri Bergson. Central to Bergson's treatment of laughter is that it functions as a social corrective. For Bergson, mechanism and inelasticity are the key elements of the comic, such that what is funny is “something mechanical encrusted on the living” (p. 84). Society requires us to adapt our behaviour to its demands: those who fail demonstrate unsociability, treated by Bergson as a kind of inelasticity, and are thereby comical. Seeing others

laughed at for such behaviour coerces us into acting as society demands: laughter is a kind of policeman of the social order. Again, Bergson's account seems excessively reductionist, and he too seems to overlook the childlike playfulness that is so far removed from this laughter of social correction.

The third major tradition revolves around relief, or the release of tension or psychic energy. Herbert Spencer propounded a relatively simple version of this theory, though the most important and elaborately worked-out version of it is that of Sigmund Freud in *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*. Freud divides jokes into “innocent” and “tendentious,” the latter category being further subdivided into “hostile” and “obscene.” Freud's view of tendentious jokes is in some ways the opposite of Bergson's view of laughter as the policeman of the social order. For Freud, civilization forces us to repress our aggressive and sexual desires. Tendentious jokes allow us to enjoy these pleasures by circumventing the obstacle that stands in the way of the satisfaction of the hostile or lustful instinct. Though the general idea that laughter can provide a release of nervous energy seems plausible, Freud's key error, in trying to offer his theory as a scientific one, is to take the notion of “psychic energy” too literally, and to aim to quantify it in a somewhat implausible manner.

Various connections can be drawn between these three theoretical traditions and our earlier discussions. Kierkegaard, for instance, treats the essence of the comic as rooted in contradiction or incongruity, and the interplay of congruity and incongruity has even been seen as the central feature around which the whole discussion of humor and religion can usefully be oriented. As suggested earlier, the idea that humor and laughter are rooted in one's own perceived superiority probably accounts, at least in part, for why laughter has so commonly been condemned as irreligious. And, as also noted, the justification of “foolishness” given by the apologists for the Feast of Fools seems to trade on an embryonic version of the release theory. However, the idea that these three traditions are exhaustive should be treated with caution, as the significance of many thinkers' contributions to this debate will be missed if one attempts to shoehorn their ideas into one or other of these three traditions.

**SEE ALSO** Carnivals; Clowns; Hegel, G. W. F.; Humor and Religion, overview article, article on Humor and Islam, and article on Humor and Religion in East Asian Contexts; Kierkegaard, Søren; Tricksters.

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JOHN LIPPITT (2005)

**HUNA'** (c. 216–c. 297) was a leading second-generation Babylonian amora, based in the city of Sura. Along with his colleague Yehudah bar Yehezqel, Huna' expanded the work of the first amoraim who employed the Mishnah to spread rabbinic Judaism. He focused directly on the Mishnah, clarifying it and citing alternative or disputing tannaitic sources. He played a key role in presenting the traditions of Rav, his main teacher (B.T., *Shab.* 128a), and, in explaining Rav's and, occasionally, Shemu'el's dicta, he treated unclear legal points and new cases and developed independent teachings (Epstein, 1964). He instructed students and other rabbis in such diverse areas as ritual laws, ethics, and practical behavior (e.g., B.T., *Ber.* 6b, *Shab.* 23b, *Pes.* 105a). Stories, possibly reflecting educational developments, attribute outstanding features to his study sessions (B.T., *Ket.* 106a) and prominently associate him with the *kallah*, a periodic academic convention that lasted several days and was open to masters and disciples (Goodblatt, 1975, pp. 156–157, 168).

In receiving exilarchic authorization to judge civil and property matters, Huna' applied rabbinic principles in the marketplace and in such areas as divorce and inheritance

(e.g., B.T., *San.* 7b; Neusner, 1968). Stories describe his pious acts for the poor and the sick (B.T., *Ta'an.* 20b–21a), and a dictum claiming that “whoever only studies Torah resembles a person without God” (B.T., *A.Z.* 17b) stresses the importance of good deeds. The Talmudic tradition, on the other hand, elevates his Torah study, in that its merit is what protected Huna' from natural calamities and enabled him effectively to hurl curses (B.T., *Mo'ed Q.* 27b, *Ta'an.* 20b).

He also emphasized the human inability wholly to know God's nature and ways (*Gn. Rab.* 12.1) and, like his contemporaries, saw both divine justice and mercy as well as reward and punishment at work (e.g., B.T., *Ber.* 7b, *R. ha-Sh.* 17b; Neusner, 1968, pp. 149–158). The accounts of miraculous events attending his burial underscore the esteem Babylonian and Palestinian Jews held for Huna' even after his death (B.T., *Mo'ed Q.* 25a; cf. Neusner, 1968, pp. 51–53). His exilarchic backing, however, laid the foundations on which he was able to build his influential career of piety and teaching.

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BARUCH M. BOKSER (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**HUNGARIAN RELIGION.** Hungarian belongs to the Uralic languages, which can be traced back by historical linguistic methods at least to 5000–4000 BCE. Its subdivision, the Finno-Ugric languages, can be traced back similarly to 4000–3000 BCE. To reconstruct the earliest possible phases of Uralic or Finno-Ugric religions, we could find their roots in etymologies in the northernmost parts of Central Eurasia. The Ugrians (i.e., today's Voguls, Ostyaks, and Hungarians) might have lived to the east of the Ural Mountains from about 3000 BCE. They were hunters, fishermen, and gatherers around the taiga area. We do not know with any certainty when the Hungarians finally separated from the Ob-Ugrians remaining in Siberia, but their long westward migration lasted more than two thousand years. Thus, the forefathers of the Hungarians crossed the steppes and finally learned animal husbandry and some agriculture. When Byzantine and other sources describe in the eighth- and ninth-centuries CE the way of life of the Hungarians (whom they called Turks), they mention their military ability, the “worship of the fire” and burials, their “sacred kings,” and

a rather complicated social structure of tribes and auxiliary tribes characteristic of nomads. By about 896 CE the seven Hungarian tribes invaded the central regions of the Carpathian Basin. Hungarian sources in medieval times were already calling the event the Conquest or Land-Taking. It was the turning point in the history of religions among the Hungarians.

Only after that time do we find relevant historical, linguistic, and archaeological data that reflect the religion of early Hungarians. Since then Europeans have seen them as relatives of the Huns, and that false association became the origin of the term *Hungarian* in European languages. The ethnonym *Magyar*, a term that can be traced back to Ugrian time, is identical with the ethnonym of the Voguls, *Mansi*.

Inseparable from the establishment of the feudal Hungarian kingdom, Christianity was declared the official religion in 1000 CE by the Roman church. But we know from historical and linguistic data that even before that time Hungarians had already had contacts with Byzantine, Czech, German, and Italian priests, and already among the “conquering” Hungarians were adherents of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faiths. Hungarian Muslims, called *böszörmény*, originally meaning “Muslim,” lived in Hungary until about the fourteenth century. Several times the Jews in the Middle Ages were expelled from Hungary. Then Sephardic Jews came together with the Ottomans in the sixteenth century, but they left the country by the end of the seventeenth century. Immediately thereafter the forefathers of today's Hungarian Jews emigrated from Central Europe. The majority of the Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazi came from Galicia in the nineteenth century, when northeast Hungary was a haven for famous Hasidic “wonder-making rabbis.”

**HYPOTHETIC EARLY FORMS.** Five thousand years of early Hungarian religion remains thus a field for comparative studies, based sometimes on speculation rather than research. In Hungarian there are Uralic words reflecting the dualistic concepts of the soul (*lélek*, “soul of the breath,” later also with the meaning “spirit” or “ghost,” as opposed perhaps to the later *iz*, a “spirit of disease”). A curious Hungarian word, *reg-*, “being intoxicated,” can be compared with the “heat” component of the Siberian shaman's *séance*. If it is a cognate word to Hungarian *rejt*, “to hide,” it might be connected with the activity of early seers too. The names for two figures in modern Hungarian folk beliefs, *tudós* and *táltos* (both “persons with supernatural power or knowledge”) also have solid Uralic etymologies. On the other hand, the possible traces of Uralic totemism or shamanism in modern Hungarian are not known. No origin myth or legend among the Hungarians can be connected with such a distant time. Several scholars such as Róheim, Diószegi, and Hoppál have argued for such connections—for example, for the origin myth concerning the stars in the Milky Way (being “the path of the souls of the dead”) or for the myth on chasing the mythical elk/deer—but their arguments are not convincing. The phratrial system of the Ob-Ugrians stresses a distinction be-



tween “raw meat eating” and “cooked meat eating” kinship groups, but this distinction was unknown among the Hungarians. In Hungarian there are no direct references even to the archaic Siberian cosmology (tripartite word, cosmic tree, the sky and stars as a tent with holes), and the Hungarian data (on upper and lower worlds, more precisely on the “other world,” *másvilág*) are too vague and too widely dispersed to date them back five millennia and exactly to the Uralic or Altaic area. Also, the oldest terms in Hungarian traditional healing, including the word *beteg*, “sick person,” have Siberian parallels, which makes them hard to interpret.

During the time of the migrations the early Hungarians had long, steady, or fortuitous contact with several Turkic and Iranian peoples, and judging by the loanwords in Hungarian and some funeral customs, early attributes of the god(s) can be traced to that time. The South Siberian Altaic word for “shaman” (*bö*) was known in early Hungarian too, perhaps with the meaning “head of the sib, chieftain.” At the time of the migration two interesting forms of totemism may have been developed: tribes and their leaders associated themselves with predatory birds (such as falcons and eagles), and an “agricultural totemism” developed in personal names. (The name of the leader of the Hungarians at the time of the Conquest, Árpád, literally “barley” plus a personal diminutive, is a good example.) In both cases the terminology comes from Turkic languages, which might have been the tongue of the tribal elite. The names for the “seven” tribes do not show direct religious indications.

A series of the most important words used even today in Hungarian religious terminology can be dated back prior to the Conquest. Examples include *isten*, “god”; *ördög*, “devil”; *bűn*, “sin”; *üdv*, “cheer,” later “salvation”; *bocsájt*, “to let free,” later “to forgive”; *lulimád*, “to worship,” later “to adore” or “to pray”; and even *kereszt*, “cross.” Since the words *gyász*, “mourning,” and *tor*, “burial feast,” belong to the same time, in those cases a continuation of customs and beliefs in later Hungarian folklore seems to be more plausible.

But even with such elaborate religious terminology, we do not find any name of any god among the Hungarians. We do not find any hints to a “mythology,” even in the restricted sense of the word in which we can speak of the Ob-Ugrian “deities” or “mythology.” On the other hand, the oldest known Hungarian word for “sacred” (*igy*) was already used at this time. An alleged opposition between *Boldogasszony*, today the common name for “Holy Virgin Mary,” more precisely “happy lady/woman,” and *szépasszony*, “fair lady/woman,” later a taboo name for “witch,” can be dated back to that time; the problem is that we do not know the “first” meaning of those words. The word *hiedelem*, “belief,” originally “a cool place, refrigerium,” might have originated from this time, but it is registered only in late medieval Hungarian texts. Archaeological excavations from the time after the Conquest (in the territory of today’s Hungary) show very rich tombs of tribal and military leaders mounted on their

horses. The Hungarian tribes were surely for a while a part of the Khazar Kaganate and accepted also the institution of the Sacred King. Perhaps the father of Árpád, whose name was Álmos, “from a dream,” was such a sacred ruler.

**RELIGION AFTER ACCEPTING THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.** The conversion of the Hungarians was conducted through the drastic force of the state. Soon “pagan uprisings” (1046 and 1061) tried to restore old habits, including non-Christian dress, hairstyles, horse-meat eating, and horse sacrifices, and to destroy Christian churches and kill their priests. But behind these acts more political and less religious motivations were prevalent. From the decrees made by the first synod in Hungary (1092, organized by King László I) we learn of the strict prohibition of “pagan sacrifices beside springs, trees or stones,” but the question arose: do the decrees reflect the actual religious situation in Hungary, or are the texts simply copies of Carolingian ecclesiastical law? As we know from the *Regestrum Varadinense*, ordeals (oaths upon red-hot iron) were imposed by the church; between 1208 and 1235 there were 389 such cases. “Great sinners” from Hungary had to pay to take faraway pilgrimages; for example, Georgius Miles de Ungaria (1353) and Lőrinc Tar (1410) had to visit St. Patrick’s Purgatory.

The church in Hungary (in spite of good contacts with Byzantium) followed the Roman model. The imposing list of early dynastic saints in Hungary speaks to the strength of the new religion in Hungary. From the House of the Árpáds King Stephen I, Prince Imre (both canonized in 1083), King László I (canonized in 1192), Princess Elisabeth of Thuringia (canonized in 1235), and later Princess Margit (d.1270) were canonized. Among other countries in Europe, Hungary was proclaimed too as *Regnum Marianum* (“the Kingdom of the Holy Virgin Mary”). The veneration of King Stephan’s “holy right hand” is known from 1083 on, and that of the “Holy Crown of Hungary” dates back as early as the fourteenth century (and is practiced today as well). The only religious order that emerged from Hungary (by about 1263) was the Paulians, named after the famous Hermit in Thebes. From the Angevin rulers from Naples Hungarian kings (since the fourteenth century) inherited “royal healing power” (also inherited later by the Hapsburgs). Large numbers of troops for the First, Second, and Third Crusades marched through Hungary, and King András II himself participated with Hungarian soldiers (1217–1218) in the Fifth Crusade. Among the places for pilgrimage for Hungarians, the most important were Rome; from 1307 the cathedral in Aachen (where King Louis the Great erected soon afterwards the magnificent Hungarian Chapel); from the thirteenth century Mariaszell (where again King Louis built the Gothic Chapel in 1366); and later the tomb of Friar John of Capistran, who died in the famous 1453 Hungarian victory over the Turks. The various copies of the register of pilgrims from such cities as London, Paris, and Rome, *Miracula Ioannis de Capistrano* (1460), list from 180 to 621 (mostly healing) miracles there.

We do not know of early heretics active in Hungary. The *bogomils* in Bosnia from the twelfth century were perse-

cuted by the Hungarian kings. We know of some flagellant groups strolling through Hungary. A few (German) Waldensians lived in west Hungary. The Hussites had some influence in Hungary too. Even a peasant revolt in Transylvania, led by Antal Budai Nagy (1437), expressed the same tendency of establishing a people's religion. The first extensive Bible translations into Hungarian date back to the second half of the fifteenth century. The religious terminology of the Hungarian translations of the Hussite Bible hints back to earlier centuries. From its very beginning (twelfth–thirteenth centuries) the vernacular literature in Hungary used elaborate religious terminology, including expressions of Mariology and mysticism. It was further developed by the Franciscans, who preached in Hungarian, and especially during the time of the Reformation.

Humanism in Hungary reached its highest point in the court of King Matthias Corvinus. He invited Italian scholars, who spread Neoplatonism, hermetism, and astrology among the elite. Johannes Regiomontanus (from 1468 on) worked in Buda in cataloging Greek astronomical manuscripts in the royal library, and in 1471 he made suggestions for a new university in Pozsony. Late Humanism in Hungary easily adopted the ideology of the Reformation. For example, Péter Bornemisza in his printed book *Ördögi kísértetek* (1578) added actual Hungarian narratives to Philipp Melanchthon's Lutheran devil lore. But only members of high society knew about magic, occultism, and alchemy. Paracelsus visited Hungary, John Dee wrote his *Monas Hieroglyphica* (1563) in Hungary, and even later he (and Edward Kelly) had Hungarian contacts. Count Boldizsár Batthyány collected a rich library of occult and alchemical works between 1570 and 1580. Later István Weszprémi, in his biography of medical doctors in Hungary (1774–1787), could list a dozen alchemists working in Hungary. The “golden age” of alchemy in Hungary, however, took place in the decades before the French Revolution after it was practiced generally in Europe.

The fall of the independent Hungarian kingdom was first marked by the great peasant revolt (1514) led by György Dózsa with anticlerical and antiféudal violence, but it was not marked by the fanaticism of a “new religion” (as in Germany). In 1516 the winner of the decisive battle at Mohács was Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. Some years later the Reformation won quickly the larger part of the country, but the Ottoman invasion of the central region of Hungary (lasting about 150 years) ended the ecclesiastic structure too. The Counter-Reformation (from the early seventeenth century), supported by the Hapsburg rulers, was successful: two-thirds of the population again became Roman Catholic.

The Reformation in Hungary (and in Transylvania) went on in steps: first the moderate Lutherans, then the more presbyterian Calvinists gained the majority. Somewhat later in Transylvania the Unitarians and Antitrinitarians organized their churches, making there a haven for refugees from Europe. The more radical movements (e.g., the Sabbatists) remained in fact small religious groups. In spite of Otto-

man rule in central Hungary, the conversion to Islam was in fact insignificant (which makes a difference to several Balkan areas). The rest of the people there, without the church hierarchy, established small religious communities. The Reformation stressed the individual's or the community's direct responsibility for its spiritual welfare, including the constant fight against sin and the devil's tricks.

There are in Hungarian archives about five thousand documents of witch trials from about 1408 to about 1768. They follow the general European pattern, and we find little “great” or “politically motivated” witch-hunting. The majority of the witches were peasant women; thus, the trials had a strong flavor of Hungarian folk belief. The Inquisition proper was not active in Hungary then, but we know of a shortened Hungarian version of the *Malleus Maleficarum* from Mátyás Nógrádi's *Lelki próbakő* (1651). Hungarian Protestant theologians studied at German, Dutch, Swiss, and other universities, bringing home the ideas of Cartesianism and Puritanism. Visionary and chiliastic tendencies can be observed from the seventeenth to the late eighteenth centuries. Johannes Amos Comenius was professor of education in Hungary from 1650 to 1654. The then generally accepted actual and political prophecies of Miklós Drábik (Nicolaus Drabitus) were also published by Comenius (*Lux e tenebris*, 1655; *Historia revelationibus*, 1659).

Inchoative religious propaganda (following the Tridentinum principles) was very active in Hungary: miracle stories and private religious pictures were distributed through the eighteenth century. In the second half of the eighteenth century the Roman Catholic Church tried to regulate practically all folk customs. (See the activity of Bishop Márton Pedantic Biro from 1744 on.) At the same time Queen Maria Theresa and King Joseph II modernized education and health care; the later instructed a radical secularization of “nonteaching” religious orders. It was the age of the first anticlerical pamphlets in Hungary. Historians have tried to collect material on early forms of Hungarian religion too. Freemasons, Rosicrucians, and alchemists were active in Hungary in the second half of the eighteenth century. The founder of homeopathy, Samuel Hahnemann, was a medical doctor in his youth in Transylvania. But then Hungary was better known in Europe as a land of the vampires. Dom Augustin Calmet published his *Dissertations sur les Apparitions des Anges, des Démons et des Esprits et sur les Revenants et Vampires de Hongrie, de Bohème, de Moravie et de Silésie* (1746), which was one of the most widely read books in Europe. The Hungarian cases he refers to are not very authentic. (The same identification of vampires with Transylvania, well known from Bram Stoker's book *Dracula* [1897], represents another false allegation.) Hungarian folk-belief narratives tell about werewolf-like figures in Transylvania, most probably a borrowing from Romanian folk beliefs.

**FROM “HUNGARIAN MYTHOLOGY” TO THE STUDY OF FOLK BELIEFS: THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH ON RELIGION IN HUNGARY.** Describing the origin and development of “an-

cient religion” among the Hungarians was for a long time a preoccupation of Hungarian scholars. From the eighteenth century on there were various attempts, for example, by Ferenc Otrókosi Fóris (1648–1714), Daniel Cornides (1732–1787), and others. In 1847 the Hungarian Academy announced a competition for describing “Ancient Hungarian Religion.” The winner, Ferenc Kállay (1790–1861), and even Bishop Arnold Ipolyi (1823–1886) and others, tried to show a hypothetical “historical” stratification of religious practices among early Hungarians, called “Hungarian mythology,” which is the equivalent to *Deutsche Mythology* by the brothers Grimm. There was much discussion about the topic but little in the way of acceptable results from a scholarly standpoint. During the last hundred years positivism, Freudianism, some forms of sociology, the neo-ritual school, and Marxism served as innovative methods.

Among contemporaneous Hungarian folklorists, Vilmos Diószegi (1923–1972) and Mihály Hoppál (1942–) follow the historical-reconstructionist school. Innovative ideas were expressed by Géza Róheim (1891–1953), founder of psychoanalytic folklore research. Recently Vilmos Voigt (1940–), Gábor Klaniczay (1950–), Éva Pócs (1936–), György Endre Szőnyi (1952–), Gábor Tüskés (1955–), and others want to show the European and comparative horizons of the history of religion in a wider sense of the term. Their papers have been published in numerous languages. Hungarian religion is a very important field for comparative studies because Hungarians are the only non-Indo-European people in Central Europe, with their own traditions, at the same time representing fully the common European background of religions (at least during the last thousand years).

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, popular works against superstitions were published. New Protestant churches (Adventists, Baptists) developed in Hungary. Before the First World War new communities appeared, from Jehovah’s Witnesses to Nazarenes and Tolstoianists. Atheism gained a free voice too. The Marxist state after World War II struggled against religion, but to a lesser degree than other East European countries. Among the “new religions” since the 1970s, first Hare Krishna and Bahais arrived. Today there are several small modern Hindu and modern Buddhist churches. New Age or modern “heathen” religions are insignificant. The reconstruction of the “Old Pagan Hungarian Religion” is a preoccupation of a few intellectuals. A handful of “urban shamans” learn from old sources the techniques of ecstasy and combine it with rock-music-style performances. The Hit Gyülekezete (“Congregation of Faith”) is the only new Hungarian church. One should not forget that Zionism was created by a Jew born in Hungary: Theodor Herzl (1860–1904). Rudolf Steiner (1861–1925), founder of Anthroposophy, spent decisive years of his youth in Hungary. At time of the Holocaust 90 percent of Hungary’s Jews were killed, but today there is a Jewish revival in Hungary, though it often lacks religious motivations.

Hungarian folklorists have made summary descriptions of folk beliefs and customs during the last two centuries.

Thank to professor Sándor Bálint (1904–1980), the study of (mostly Roman Catholic) popular religion is very productive. The “lay prayers” were collected and published by Zsuzsanna Erdélyi (1921–). József Török (1946–) has studied the early Christian liturgy in Hungary. Catholic pilgrimage and imagery were studied by Gábor Barna (1950–) and József Liszka (1956–). Greek United folklore is a special topic of Elek Bartha (1956–) and others. The Antitrinitarian (and similar) movements were the research topic of Antal Pirnát (1930–1997), Róbert Dán (1936–1986), Mihály Balázs (1948–), and others. Adventists and Protestants in general were studied by László Kardos (1918–1980), Ambrus Molnár (1922–2000), and Professor Jenő Szigeti (1936–). Jewish studies have a glorious past in Hungary. See the works of Immanuel Löw (1854–1944), Vilmos Bacher (1850–1913), Bertalan Kohlbach (1866–1944), and—last but not least—the director of the Rabbinic Seminar in Budapest, Sándor (Alexander) Scheiber (1913–1985), who was one of the best-known Jewish folklorists. Hungarians are conducting important fieldwork studies in Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Carpatho-Ukraine, discovering archaic beliefs and at the same time interethnic contacts.

The study of the sociology of religion in Hungary (especially in recent works by Miklós Tomka (1941–), István Kamarás (1941–), and others) is today again in progress. On the religious history of Hungary only the first sketches have been made. Still a new handbook on religions in Hungary has not yet appeared.

**SEE ALSO** Alchemy; Anthroposophy; Astrology; Crusades; Dömötör, Tekla; Finno-Ugric Religions; Judaism, articles on Judaism in Northern and Eastern Europe to 1500, Judaism in Northern and Eastern Europe since 1500; Magic; Pilgrimage; Reguly, Antal; Shamanism; Witchcraft.

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VILMOS VOIGT (2005)

**HUN RELIGION.** Over the centuries, the name *Hun* has been widely and indiscriminately applied to a multiplicity of Inner Asian nomad peoples. In this article only the "genuine" Huns will be considered, those who in the second half of the fourth century CE took possession of the North Pontic steppes (the steppes to the north of the Black Sea) and for about eighty years—particularly under the rule of Attila (433?–453)—played a major role in the history of Europe. I shall also take into account those Huns who, following the disintegration of Attila's empire, established and maintained in the northern Caucasus a kingdom that lasted to the end of the seventh century.

By the standards of Inner Asian historiography, the history of the Huns is reasonably well documented, mainly by written sources, among which the (alas!) fragmentary text of Priscus's eyewitness account of daily life in Attila's entourage

is particularly valuable. Archaeology contributes next to nothing to the picture; so far it has not been possible to isolate more than a few finds incontestably Hun. Among these, some typical bronze caldrons have, on occasion, been considered sacrificial vessels, but there is no evidence in support of such an opinion.

The statement by the fourth-century historian Ammianus Marcellinus (31.2.11) that the Huns were not "bound by any reverence for religion or superstition" is contradicted by other, contemporary sources. These do give some clues about Hun religious beliefs, although, with one exception, none attempts to give a systematic description thereof. This exception is to be found in the Armenian chronicle attributed to Moses Daskhuranci, who does give some interesting, trustworthy data on the Caucasian Huns of the second half of the seventh century. He speaks of their "satanically deluded tree-worshipping errors" and mentions that they use horses as burnt offerings in the worship of "some gigantic savage monster whom they invoke as the god T'angri Khan, called Aspandiat by the Persians." In the first of these names it is easy to recognize the Turco-Mongol deity Tengri ("sky" or "heaven"), whose cult is first attested among the Hsiungnu in Mongolia in the centuries just before and after the beginning of the common era. The Huns also "made sacrifices to fire and water and to certain gods of the roads, and to the moon and to all creatures considered in their eyes to be in some way remarkable."

Moses pays special attention to the funeral rites of the Huns who, "possessing completely anarchical minds," so he says, "stumble into every sort of error, beating drums and whistling over corpses, inflicting bloody saber and dagger cuts on the cheek and limbs, and engaging naked in sword fights—O hellish sight—at the graves, man against man and troop against troop. . . ." Although, to my knowledge, sword fights between groups are not noted elsewhere in such a context, the self-inflicted wounds and the laceration of the mourners' faces were a widespread custom among medieval Turkic peoples, described in classical as well as in Chinese sources, and also represented on wall paintings preserved in Chinese Turkistan. Fragment 23 of Priscus relates that at the death of Attila, the Huns, "as is the custom of that race, cut off part of their hair and disfigured their faces horribly with deep wounds so that the distinguished warrior might be bewailed, not with feminine lamentations and tears, but with manly blood." Before burying their dead the Huns were wont to lay out the body and, at least in cases in which the deceased had been a man of importance, the mourners would ride around the bier at full gallop "as in the circus games." The body was put in a coffin and a funeral feast preceded the burial. Priscus gives the Hun word for this repast, *strava*, a term for which no acceptable etymology has been proposed. If not due to a scribal error, the initial consonant cluster excludes the possibility that the word is Turkic or Mongol.

It was customary to place valuable objects in the tombs. Attila was interred by night, in great secrecy, and those who

buried him were slaughtered so that—in Priscus’s opinion—they should not be able to divulge the location of the tomb. It could be that a human sacrifice was performed. Analogies to this case can be found among the early (sixth-century) Türk. Captives were said to have been sacrificed “to victory” by the Huns upon their arrival on the Pontic steppes, but Jordanes’ sixth-century account of this period contains many fictional elements.

There is evidence to show that the services of diviners were appreciated. According to Jordanes, Attila “sought counsel of omens in all warfare.” He reports that the method used by the soothsayers consisted in the examination of the entrails of cattle and of “certain streaks in bones that had been scraped.” The remark refers probably to scapulimancy, widely practiced in Inner Asia. The sources provide no evidence of the very likely use of shamans.

The practice of worshiping a sacred sword, often referred to in the secondary literature, cannot be established. At best, such references can be traced to a remark by Attila who, so it would appear, once declared that a sword that had been accidentally unearthed by a shepherd and brought to him would ensure his supremacy over the whole world.

In the Caucasus, in the Asian or European provinces of Byzantium, in Italy, and in their campaigns through Germanic lands, the Huns were in constant touch, friendly or inimical, with Christians. It can be taken for granted that many of the Huns were converted, a fact that allowed Jerome to write to Laeta in 403 that “the Huns are learning the psalter, the frosts of Scythia are warmed by the fire of faith” (107.2). Perhaps Jerome’s, as it turned out unjustified, optimism was motivated by the news of the missionary efforts of John Chrysostom and others. Success came only to the Albanian bishop Israel who in 681 and 682 stayed with the Huns of the Caucasus, converted their leaders, destroyed their idols, and burned their sacred trees. The Hun prince Alp Ilteber promised, in the words of Moses Daskhuranci, to “burn the sorcerers and wizards who will not adopt the faith, and [to] put to the sword any person who acts like a pagan.” Thus, Western civilization arrived among the Huns of the epigone kingdom, putting an end to the religious tolerance so typical of Inner Asian states, including that of the Huns, those “unreasoning beasts” (to quote Ammianus Marcellinus), “utterly ignorant of the difference between right and wrong.”

SEE ALSO Inner Asian Religions; Tengri.

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DENIS SINOR (1987)

**HURGRONJE, CHRISTIAAN SNOUCK** SEE SNOUCK HURGRONJE, CHRISTIAAN

**HURRIAN RELIGION.** A Near Eastern phenomenon dating mainly from the second millennium BCE, the Hurrian religion is known more from contemporary and later Hittite documents than from native Hurrian sources. The Hurrians were an apparently Armenoid people who moved into northern Syria and northwestern Mesopotamia by at least 2300 BCE. The cities of Nuzi, in the eastern Tigris region, and Alalah, in northern Syria, were major centers of Hurrian culture by circa 1500 BCE. Wassukkanni was the capital of the reign.

The term *Hurrian* is an ethnic designation, and *Subartu* (roughly equivalent to the Hurrian *Aranzab*) is the Sumerio-Akkadian name of the Hurrian-dominated area north and northeast of the Tigris. Mitanni was a Hurrian kingdom of the mid-second millennium in northern Syria and Iraq that had an Indo-Aryan aristocracy, and Urartu (whence Ararat) was a successor kingdom that flourished in southern Armenia circa 800 BCE. The Hurrian language, written in Sumerio-Akkadian cuneiform (and, later, in Ugaritic alphabetic cuneiform), is neither Semitic nor Indo-European in origin.

Some prominent European scholars would deny that the Horites of the Old Testament are Hurrians (in *Gn.* 14 the Horites are enemies of Abraham; in *Dt.* 2 they are dispossessed by the Edomites; in *1 Chr.* 1 they are the ancestors of Esau), but most American authors favor the identification. (Similar efforts to identify the Old Testament Hivites with the Hurrians are less convincing.) While admitting the presence of biblical anachronisms, the American scholars cite the extensive evidence that the Hurrians had moved down into the coastal areas and probably into Palestine at least by the Amarna age (mid-first millennium BCE). By the final quarter of the second millennium BCE there was, for example, a large and flourishing Hurrian population farther north at Ugarit, on the Syrian coast. Also notable are the remarkable parallels of legal and social customs between Nuzi documents of the fifteenth century BCE and the *Genesis* patriarchal narratives.

**HURRIAN RELIGIOUS ASSIMILATIONS.** Because of the limited natively Hurrian resources, it is difficult to distinguish specif-



ically Hurrian religious and cultic elements from those of their neighbors. The Hurrians borrowed heavily from Mesopotamian religion, either by assimilating Assyro-Babylonian divinities into their own pantheon outright or by identifying these divinities with indigenous Hurrian gods. In turn, some of the Hurrian gods and religious practices were adopted by the Hittites. The Hittites also absorbed into their religion pre-Hittite elements and elements from other Anatolian peoples such as the Luwians. Since it is mostly from Hittite mythic and religious texts that scholars have access to the Hurrians, the situation is complicated indeed; many authors have resorted to referring simply to an “Anatolian religion” and have made no substantial effort to separate its strands. The major Hittite sources for Hurrian religion are the archives from Boğazköy (Hattushash), the ancient Hittite capital, and the stone carvings from the shrines at Yazilikaya, about two miles east of Boğazköy.

Hurrian culture is equally notable as a vehicle of exchange of religious concepts and practices, especially from east to west, and as a source of original contributions. The flow of such ideas over almost three millennia was generally from the Mesopotamians to the Hurrians, from the latter to the Hittites and northwestern Semites (Amorites, Canaanites, and Phoenicians), and thence ultimately to Greece and Rome. Recent scholarship suggests that the Hurrians played a far larger role in this process than had previously been detected. Because of the Indic element among their aristocracy, it is also likely that the Hurrians were purveyors of some Indo-Aryan religious motifs to the west.

**HURRIAN PANTHEON** At the head of the native Hurrian pantheon was the weather god Teshub, the “king of heaven,” the later Urartean Teisheba. One of his ancient centers of worship was the yet unidentified town of Kumme (Kummiya). His genealogy varies somewhat, depending on the way in which the relevant Babylonian material was assimilated. In Hittite texts stemming from the Hurrian myth cycle of Kumarbi (the father of the gods), and in some other texts, it is told that Alalu (chthonic divinity, with Mesopotamian origin) was the first king in heaven and was dethroned by Anu (heavenly god, also with a Mesopotamian name). Kumarbi, Alalu’s son, dethroned Anu and swallowed his genitals, to prevent him from having offspring. But Kumarbi became pregnant and gave birth to Teshub, among other gods.

Early Anatolian iconography uses the symbol of a bull or of lightning bolts in connection with Teshub and other weather gods. Teshub, like other gods of this kind, have storm, wind, rain, and lightning as weapons. He provides rain, and is therefore also protector of vegetation and agriculture.

Teshub’s consort was Hebat, or Hapat, who was an ancient Syrian goddess who was known in Ebla and was assimilated by Hurrians and turned into the queen of heaven. Although she is not prominent in the extant mythological texts, worship of her was very widespread, and she was syncretized with other Near Eastern goddesses in later times. In Hittite

iconography she is apparently identified with the sun goddess of Arinna, whose name is not known. Hebat has a rather matronly appearance in Anatolian art, and she is frequently depicted standing on the back of a lion.

The son of Teshub and Hebat was Sharruma, whom the Hittites associated with the weather gods of Nerik and Zipalanda. Sharruma was originally an Anatolian mountain god of the Anatolian and Syrian borderland. At Yazilikaya the god who is represented by a pair of human legs immediately behind Hebat is doubtless Sharruma. The iconography from Yazilikaya reflects the religious reforms of Hattushili III, who tries to assimilate the divine triad into the imperial family. Teshub is identified with the king, the Sun-goddess with the queen, and Sharruma with the heir.

Shaushka, who in Hittite myths about Kumarbi is called Teshub’s sister, is prominent in the extant texts and in works of art, where she is often shown as a winged goddess standing (like Hebat) on the back of a lion. Shaushka’s nature is very elusive. The Hittites identified her with the Mesopotamian Inanna-Ishtar, herself a goddess of extraordinarily complex origins and characteristics. In the Hurrian world she is the goddess of war and sex. Shaushka was said to have had two ladies-in-waiting, Ninatta and Kulitta, known also as musicians.

Kumarbi, already mentioned in a Hurrian tablet from Mari, about 1700 BCE, had scarce importance in the worship but was a major figure in the myths. He had the power in primeval years and was dethroned by Teshub, but tries to recover the throne again and again. The god is identified with the Mesopotamian god of grain, Dagan, with the Sumerian-Akkadian Enlil, and with the Ugaritic El.

Other Hurrian gods are Sheri (“day”) and Hurri (“night”), who pull Teshub’s wagon and are portrayed as bulls (the name of Hurri is replaced by Tilla in the eastern tradition); the moon god Kushuh (the same as the proto-Hattic Kashku), who is the protector of oaths, and his consort, Nikkal, corresponding to the Sumerian Ningal; a sun god, Shimigi (the Urartean Shiwini), who is linked with omens because he sees everything on earth; Shuwaliyatti and his consort, Nabarbi; Teshub’s vizier, Tasmisu; and Ashtabi, the god of war. The later Urartean pantheon included Teisheba, Shiwini, and the national god, Haldi. An inscription found at Sargon II names the goddess Bagbarti as Haldi’s consort.

The Hittite myths mention often a group of underworld gods, called “ancient gods,” whose names come in rhyming pairs such as Nara-Napsara, Minki-Ammunki, Muntara-Mutmuntara. They were the earlier generations of gods, but they were driven into the underworld by Teshub. The “ancient gods” are a sort of opposite of the upper gods, because they are “impure” and represent the disorder.

In the treaty between the Hittite king Shuppiluliuma and Mittanian Shattiwaza, Indo-Aryan gods such as Indra, Mitra, Varuna, and the Nasatya are mentioned as guarantors.

This fact indicates that the Indo-Aryan aristocracy maintained its ancestral gods as protectors of the kings of Mittani.

In addition to personal gods, Hurrians had impersonal divinities such as earth and heaven or mountains and rivers, the mountains being considered as companions of the storm god or as independent deities.

**MYTH CYCLES.** Hurrian mythic narratives are known almost exclusively through their Hittite versions in which the material is considerably intermixed with other Anatolian elements. Only scarce fragments remain from the Hurrian version of some myths, although it is almost impossible to obtain some information about them. The most significant myth cycle is that of the god Kumarbi. This myth tells how Kumarbi was dethroned by Teshub and how the dethroned deity tries repeatedly to recover his power, fathering one son after another. The major texts, all in Hittite, are a myth whose title was probably *Song of Kumarbi* (conventionally called *Kingship in Heaven*), a tale of the struggle for divine kingship strikingly similar to Hesiod's *Theogony*, the *Song of Hedammu*, and the *Song of Ullikummi*, the best-preserved poem, although it is not complete either.

The most remarkable fact is that the poems of Kumarbi cycle, in contrast to other ancient myths, are not part of rituals or cults. They are pure literature, didactic poems that inform people about the history of the world and explain the role that human beings have in the world order, especially in their relations with the gods.

In *Kingship in Heaven*, Alalu (a chthonic god) is king of heaven for nine years, and Anu (the Sumerian sky god), "first among the gods," worships at his feet. Anu, however, battles with Alalu and defeats him, reigning in turn for nine years, with Kumarbi, Alalu's son, now worshipping him. Anu and Kumarbi engage in combat and Anu flees up to the sky. Kumarbi seizes him, drags him down, and bites off his genitals, laughing with glee. Anu cautions: "Do not laugh, for you have a heavy burden: I have impregnated you with the storm god [Teshub], the river Aranzah [the Tigris], and Tasmisu." Kumarbi spits and gets free of part of his burden. Later, a god called KA.ZAL came up out of Kumarbi's skull and Teshub out of the "good place." On the other hand, Tasmisu is born from Mount Kanzura, fertilized by Anu's seed, which Kumarbi had spat. Then Kumarbi tries to swallow his sons, but the god Ea gives him a stone wrapped in diapers. What ensues is not clear, but apparently Teshub captures the kingship from Kumarbi.

There are striking similarities between myths told in *Song of Kumarbi* and some tales from other cultures. In the Babylonian *Enuma elish*, Apsu and Tiamat are the primeval couple. Apsu is deprived of his tiara (a euphemism, because the tiara symbolizes male vigor that goes together with royalty). Other generations of gods follow the primeval couple: Anu, Ea, and Marduk, who, like Teshub, finally seizes the power among gods. On the other hand, Hesiod mentions only three generations of gods: Ouranos (Sky), Kronos, and

Zeus, although Ge (Earth), who generates Ouranos and is relegated at a given moment, corresponds quite well to Hurrian Alalu. It is her son Kronos who, like Kumarbi, will take revenge on the celestial divinity that has her relegated when he castrates Ouranos with a sickle. At the end, Zeus defeats Kronos and seizes power. In the Orphic Theogony commented in the Derveni Papyrus, Night begins the series of generations, followed by Ouranos, Kronos, and Zeus; Kronos castrates Ouranos, but Zeus swallows Ouranos's phallus and he becomes pregnant, as a result of which he gives birth to all the gods. However, in the *Phoenician History* by Sankuniaton, preserved in Philo Byblius's Greek version, the divine kings are Elioun (called in Greek Hysistos, "the Highest")—a god only mentioned by his Greek name, Epigeios, corresponding to Greek Ouranos (who is also castrated); El—in Greek Kronos; and Zeus Demarus—corresponding to Phoenician Baal Hadad.

But there are also significant differences between the quoted versions. The most remarkable one is that in Babylonian and Greek myths every god is son of the previous, while in the Hittite text, Kumarbi, the god that reigns in third place, is "Alalu's offspring," or the son of the first king. On the other hand, Anu, the second god in heaven, does not seem to have any relationship with Alalu, in spite of what is read in some studies, such as those of Kirk or Wilhelm, who believe that there is one (genealogical) line of gods in the Hittite myth. In the Hittite tale, then, according to the text, there is a conflict between two lines of gods that compete for supremacy: one of a netherworld god, Alalu, whose descendant is Kumarbi, and the other of a celestial god, Anu. The conflict is solved because Teshub is a result of Anu's seed, but Kumarbi, with his pregnancy, plays the role of the mother of the god.

In the *Song of Hedammu*, Kumarbi tries to regain the throne and mates with Sertapsuruhi, the huge Sea's daughter, who gives birth to a snake whose voracious appetite leads him to devour all kinds of animals and vegetables. As a result of this, human beings are starving. Since human beings cannot give sacrifices to the gods, the gods are hungry too. In a meeting of the gods, Ea reproaches Kumarbi with having harmed the gods. He fears that gods themselves must work. Then Ishtar seduces Hedammu with the sight of her naked body. The end is not preserved, but probably the monster is defeated and world order recovered.

In the *Song of Ullikummi*, Kumarbi plots against his upstart son, Teshub. Kumarbi mates with a stone and she bears him another son, Ullikummi, made of diorite. The name *Ullikummi* contains the name of Kumme, the city consecrated to Teshub, and probably means "destroyer of Kummi(ya)." Various helper gods place Ullikummi on the shoulders of Ubelluri, an Atlas figure that bears on his shoulders the earth and the sky, and the young Ullikummi grows rapidly. The sun god notices the mighty figure of Ullikummi rising from the sea and warns Teshub, who weeps bitterly. Teshub appeals to the god Ea, who eventually takes in hand the blade

that had originally severed the earth from the heaven and cuts Ullikummi off at the ankles. Presumably (here the story breaks off), Kumarbi and his powerless monster-son are defeated and Teshub's rule is assured.

There are striking similarities between Hedamu and Ullikummi's myths and other Hesiodic themes. In the *Theogony* the Titans and Typhoeus challenge Zeus's power and they are defeated. But there are again differences between Hurrians and Greeks in their view of divinities. In Hesiod, Zeus remains as undisputed lord of gods and men. This has nothing to do with instability of Teshub's power. His whining image when he sees Ullikummi and the description of his defeat and humiliation contrast with the Hesiodic image of Zeus as a strong god with a total control of the situation.

Scarce fragments of other poems belonging to Kumarbi's cycle are preserved. In one of these poems a god called KAL becomes king of heaven. During his reign, humans enjoy excessive welfare, but they neglect worship. Because of that, Ea orders the mutilation of the king. This theme has similarities with the Prometheus's myth. According to the Hurrian conception, the proper relationship between gods and human beings requires that the latter not be excessively pressed (as in *Hedammu*) nor enjoy excessive welfare (as in the poem of KAL). A balance between both extremes is the ideal.

Another poem of the cycle deals with Silver, a character whose Hurrian name Ushu is mentioned in a very fragmentary Hurrian text: "Hail, Silver, the lord that has become king!" Although it is very difficult to reconstruct the plot of the poem from its scarce remains, Silver is another of Kumarbi's sons, who overthrews Teshub and is later defeated by the storm god.

The *Myth of Kessi*, only a few fragments of which are preserved, is the story of a stalwart hunter, and the *Song of Release* is a poem composed of several parables and non-mythological narratives. The parables deal with mountains, animals, cups, or other objects that behave in a bad manner and receive punishment, and later they are compared with the actions of human beings. Many authors who have written on Hurrian myths with religious motifs include the folktale of Appu of Lulluwa and his wife, prosperous folk who go to bed fully clothed and wonder why they cannot conceive. The gods set them right and they bear two sons, Good and Evil. Later both sons fight for the inheritance. The plot has similarities with the story of Hesiod and his brother Perses in *Works and Days*. Others, however, believe that this tale does not have a Hurrian origin.

**HURRIAN WORSHIP.** Little is known of the actual cultic practices and worship of the Hurrians. From syncretic Hittite texts, mostly from Boğazköy, there is evidence for sympathetic magic, bird sacrifices (also attested in texts from Ugarit), and various forms of divination. The interpretation as omens of abnormal natural phenomena, such as eclipses or streaks of lightning, was also a common practice among

the Hurrites. Frequently they resorted to the interpretation of birds' flight or to analysis of bird entrails in order to explain such phenomena. The translation into Hurrian of Babylonian collections of omens shows Hurrian interest in these practices. The Hittites in their turn translated their texts about this topic.

The cult included offers of food and drink. In addition to this the gods' images were anointed with scented oil. Instrumental or choral musical accompaniments were also frequent. Rites could be performed in temples, sacred groves, or shrines in the rocky cliffs.

As with the Hurrian pantheon, there was clearly much Babylonian influence on the Hurrian cult, and in turn, the Hurrian cult apparently was partially assimilated into that of the Hittites.

**SEE ALSO** Hittite Religion; Teshub.

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**HUS, JAN** (1372/3–1415), also known as John Huss, was a Czech reformer of the Christian church. Hus was called John of Husinec after the village in southern Bohemia in which he was born of peasant parents. During his university years, he shortened his name to Hus. After earning a master's degree, in 1398 Hus became a member of the faculty of liberal arts at the University of Prague. He was ordained a priest in 1400, served as dean of the faculty from 1401 to 1402, and matriculated in the faculty of theology to work toward the degree of doctor of theology. Because of his subsequent activities and the controversies that developed around him, Hus never completed the degree.

In 1402 Hus was appointed preacher at Bethlehem Chapel in Prague, where sermons were delivered in Czech rather than Latin. He became a leader in the national Czech reform movement, which emphasized moral reform and preaching in the vernacular. Through his teachers Hus had been introduced to the thought of Milic of Kromeriz (c. 1325–1374) and Matthew of Janov (c. 1355–1393), early leaders of the reform movement.

Hus, along with other reformers, also became interested in the thought of John Wyclif. Prior to 1402, Hus appears to have known only Wyclif's philosophical writings. But after Hus's friend Jerome of Prague brought a number of Wyclif's theological and reformist works to Prague in 1401, and again in 1406, Hus began to use some of Wyclif's less

radical ideas for reform in his own sermons at Bethlehem Chapel. He also translated Wyclif's *Trialogus* into Czech. In 1403, the conflict between the nominalism of the German members of the faculty at the university and the philosophical realism of Wyclif and the Czech faculty members contributed to an academic (not an ecclesiastical) condemnation of the heretical sense of forty-five articles drawn from Wyclif's writings.

The archbishop of Prague, Zbyněk Zajíc, who was primarily a soldier, not a theologian, at first supported both the clerical reform party and Hus. In 1405, he appointed Hus preacher to the Prague synod. However, by attacking clerical vices and abuses in his sermons, Hus aroused increasing clerical opposition to the reform party. Innocent VII and Gregory XII both exhorted Zbyněk to check the growing interest in Wyclif's views. Hus's friends Stanislav of Znojmo and Stephen Pálež later became his bitter enemies after they were forced to defend themselves against charges of heresy by renouncing Wyclif's views (particularly the doctrine of remanence, i.e., that bread and wine remain unchanged after the words of consecration in the sacrament).

Hus lost the archbishop's support when he and other Czech faculty members sided with Wenceslas, king of Bohemia, in his recognition of Alexander V, who in 1409 had been elected pope by the Council of Pisa in an attempt to end the schism that was dividing Western Christendom into three factions. The council had deposed and excommunicated Gregory XII and Benedict XIII, who both, however, refused to abdicate in Alexander's favor. When Zbyněk and the German members of the faculty supported Gregory XII, Wenceslas changed the constitution of the university in a manner that the Germans could not accept, with the result that they left Prague. (Some of them founded the University of Leipzig.) Zbyněk then obtained support from the antireformist clergy and acknowledged Alexander V as legitimate pope in order to secure papal approval of his proposed actions. To silence Hus, the archbishop forbade preaching in private chapels, but Hus continued to preach. Zbyněk retaliated by ordering the burning of Wyclif's books and sending charges of heresy against Hus to the Curia Romana.

When John XXIII, successor of Alexander V, issued indulgences for sale to raise funds for his crusade against Gregory XII and Gregory's supporter Ladislav of Naples, Hus opposed the methods used to sell the indulgences, but not the doctrine of indulgence itself. He thus lost the support of King Wenceslas, who was profiting from the sale of the indulgences. Hus was placed under a stricter ecclesiastical ban, and because his presence threatened Prague with an interdict, he left the city in 1412. He sought refuge in the castles of friends in southern Bohemia, where he completed important works in Czech and Latin, including his famous *De ecclesia* (1413).

Wenceslas's brother Sigismund, king of Hungary and king of the Romans, seeking to crush heresy and to end the papal schism, brought pressure to convoke in 1414 the



Council of Constance. Threatened by an interdict for tolerating heresy in Bohemia, Wenceslas was forced to agree to Sigismund's plan to send Hus to the council. Hus arrived in Constance in 1414 with Sigismund's assurance of safe-conduct, but there he was questioned, imprisoned, and tried for heresy. He was found guilty and was burned at the stake at Constance on July 6, 1415.

Hus's religious views have been interpreted as being derived from the writings of Wyclif, and thus as both heretical and devoid of originality. They have also been interpreted as the culmination of the national Czech reform movement, modified by some of Wyclif's less radical ideas. In this interpretation, Hus is seen as essentially orthodox in his scholastic views, unlike his colleagues, some of whom advocated radical Wyclifite heresies. Some recent Czech writers have seen Hus and his followers as representatives of the lower classes in their revolt against a feudal society.

Hus had what is now called an ecumenical view of the church. He thought of the Roman church as but one among several branches of the church militant and defined the true church as the totality of the predestinated. Thus his judges at the Council of Constance interpreted his views correctly when they accused Hus of denying that the Roman church is the only true church but were wrong in their interpretation that he refuted the valid existence of the church militant. Denying the supreme authority of popes and councils, Hus accorded supreme authority for faith and practice to Christ's teachings and life, as chronicled in scripture; however, he granted a subordinate authority to the traditions of the church, and as a scholastic theologian did not exclude appeals to these traditions. Hus was not, strictly speaking, a pre-Lutheran advocate of *sola scriptura*. Neither was he an advocate of *sola fide*, justification by faith alone. He emphasized (with rare exceptions) the necessity of good works for salvation in the sense of *fide caritate formata*, faith formed by love. He believed in transubstantiation rather than in the doctrine of remanence. Toward the end of his life, in a letter from the Council of Constance to his substitute at Bethlehem Chapel, Hus approved the distribution of both bread and wine, not bread alone, to the laity, a practice that his followers continued.

Hus's influence was especially pronounced among the moderate Hussites who were known as Utraquists (from *utraque*, "each of two," referring to the two Communion elements), and also as Calixtines (from *calix*, "goblet, drinking vessel"). His teachings strongly influenced the members of the *Unitas Fratrum* (Unity of Czech Brethren), who separated from the other Hussites in 1467. The Czechoslovak Hussite Church (or Czechoslovak National Church), founded in 1920, continues the Hussite tradition.

SEE ALSO Wyclif, John.

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**HUSAYN IBN 'ALĪ, AL-** (AH 4–61/626–680 CE) was the son of Fāṭimah, the daughter of the prophet Muḥammad, and the Prophet's cousin 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. Al-Ḥusayn was born in Medina on 3 Sha'bān 4 (January 626). He and his elder brother, al-Ḥasan, were the only grandsons of the Prophet, and many accounts survive in Muslim tradition of the Prophet's affection for them. The Prophet is reported to have said: "al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn are the lords of the youth of Paradise," interpreted by the Shī'ah as proof for their *imāmah*. The Prophet is also reported to have said "al-Ḥusayn is from me and I am from al-Ḥusayn," which signals the intimate relationship between grandson and grandfather, or in the Shī'ī conception, between the Prophet and his third successor as *imām*. Al-Ḥusayn is best known as the archetypal martyr of the Shī'ī cause and a pristine, moral Islam. His tragic death with a small band of followers at Karbala in Iraq on 10 Muḥarram 61 (October 680), an event that according to Shī'ī tradition was foretold and lamented by the Prophet himself, became the pivotal event in Shī'ī salvation history.



**HISTORY.** Al-Ḥusayn grew up as a member of the Muslim elite in Medina. He was a child when the Prophet died, and he suffered the death of his mother soon after. He also saw how his father—according to the Shī'ah—was continuously denied his right as the legitimate religious and political successor to the Prophet until the chaos of 656, when, following the murder of the third caliph, 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān, by disaffected Egyptian rebels, 'Alī was chosen as caliph by the community in Medina. Some, however, were not willing to accept his leadership and 'Alī had to fight fellow Muslims to assert his authority. 'Uthmān's kinsman, Mu'āwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, governor of Syria, disputed 'Alī's authority, claiming that the blood of the dead caliph had not been avenged, ushering in what is known in Muslim tradition as the first civil war. After the famous and inconclusive battle at Ṣiffīn on the northern borders of Syria and Iraq, 'Alī was coerced by a group of his forces, who were unable to countenance further internecine blood, to accept arbitration. This led to the discontent of some of his supporters, who declared him to be an unbeliever for accepting arbitration over what they regarded as the rule of God. These Khārījīs rebelled and were crushed at Nahrawān. But the movement survived and in 661 one of its members assassinated 'Alī in the mosque at Kūfah, the caliphal capital.

Al-Ḥasan succeeded his father. But the intrigue against him and his lack of support led him to agree to terms whereby he abdicated the caliphate in favor of Mu'āwiyah. According to the agreement, Mu'āwiyah would safeguard the life and property of the supporters of 'Alī, cease the public cursing of 'Alī from pulpits in Syria, and ensure that his successor would be decided by consultation, probably in favor of al-Ḥasan or al-Ḥusayn. Al-Ḥasan died in 671, poisoned by Mu'āwiyah according to Shī'ī tradition, which also affirms that Mu'āwiyah never kept his side of the bargain.

**MARTYRDOM.** The hope of the Shī'ah turned to al-Ḥusayn. He stood by the agreement with Mu'āwiyah and refused to revolt in his lifetime. But when Mu'āwiyah died in 680, ensuring the succession of his son Yazīd, universally regarded in Muslim tradition as an immoral and unjust tyrant, al-Ḥusayn became the leader of those who refused to acknowledge the succession. Yazīd ordered the governor of Medina to seek the allegiance of the notables in the city, especially al-Ḥusayn, who was the surviving grandson of the Prophet. Al-Ḥusayn evaded this demand and left for Mecca and its sanctuary. The Shī'ah in Kūfah, upon hearing of al-Ḥusayn's action, urged him to come to Iraq to lead a revolution against Yazīd. Responding to their call, al-Ḥusayn sent his cousin, Muslim ibn 'Aqīl ibn Abī Ṭālib, to Kūfah to assess his support. Yazīd, however, appointed 'Ubayd Allāh ibn Ziyād, the son of a close confidant of Mu'āwiyah, as the governor, with the mandate to crush any resistance. Ibn Ziyād quelled the discontent in Kūfah through coercion and bribery, and he executed Muslim and his protectors, especially Hānī' ibn 'Urwah. Ibn Ziyād then sent out forces to intercept al-Ḥusayn, who had set out from Mecca towards Kūfah with a band of family and followers. As news of events

in Kūfah spread, al-Ḥusayn's following dwindled. The remainder was intercepted by Ibn Ziyād's forces, led by al-Ḥurr ibn Yazīd, and the group was forced to stop on the banks of the Euphrates at Karbala. Ibn Ziyād then sent a further force, under the command of 'Umar ibn Sa'd ibn Abī Waqqās, to urge al-Ḥusayn to submit or to suffer the fate of a rebel. Al-Ḥusayn's party was surrounded and denied water. The Battle of Karbala took place on 10 Muḥarram 61 (October 680), the day known as 'Āshūrā'.

Al-Ḥurr, appalled by the possibility of being responsible for the death of the Prophet's grandson, switched sides. But the forces of the governor, which included many who had initially called al-Ḥusayn to Kūfah to support them against Yazīd, persisted, demonstrating the success of Ibn Ziyād in transforming the rebellion. All of al-Ḥusayn's followers were killed, including his infant child and other children of his family. Al-Ḥusayn was executed, decapitated, and his body trampled under the hooves of horses. Possessions were plundered and the women and children were taken as captives, first to Kūfah and then to Damascus, where they were paraded as defeated rebels. Only one son of al-Ḥusayn, 'Alī, who had been sick throughout, survived. In Shī'ī accounts, the humiliation is amplified by the fact that few in Syria even recognized them as the family of the Prophet.

**HISTORICAL LEGACY, MARTYRLOGY, AND COMMEMORATION.** The martyrdom came as a great shock to the Muslim community and inspired many Shī'ī revolts aimed at revenging the blood of al-Ḥusayn. The earliest, known as the Penitents (*al-Tawwābūn*), were Kūfans who regretted their failure to support al-Ḥusayn. When the 'Abbāsids came to power in 750 through a revolution, the call for avenging al-Ḥusayn was a key aspect of their *kerygma*. Nevertheless, once the rights of the family of the Prophet and the Shī'ah remained unfulfilled, Shī'ī rebellions continued. Vengeance for al-Ḥusayn still lies unfulfilled in Twelver Shī'ī theology until the coming of the messianic *mahdī*, the descendent of the Prophet and al-Ḥusayn, who at the end of time will eradicate injustice, thus avenging the blood of al-Ḥusayn, and usher in a final era of peace and justice.

The emotional affect of al-Ḥusayn's martyrdom inspired elegies and accounts of what happened. These accounts, the earliest being the Kūfan Shī'ī Abū Mikhnaf al-Azdī's *maqṭal*, were central to mobilization for the Shī'ī cause. The *maqātil* (accounts of the martyrdom) literature proliferated in a variety of vernaculars from Arabic to Swahili (and continues to be written—the contemporary Arabic *maqṭal* of the Iraqi scholar Sayyid Muqarram is very popular). As powerful rhetorical devices that represent and express Shī'ī theology, the *maqātil* signal the devotion, aspirations, thought, and collective memory of the Shī'ah. Over time, more miraculous stories and details were layered into the account. These accounts, along with the rituals of commemoration, developed elaborate forms, including sermons recounting the martyrdom (known in the Persianate East as *rawzeh* after a key text of the fifteenth-century, the *Rawḍat*

*al-shuhadā* of Ḥusayn Vā'iz Kāshifī). Concurrently, pilgrimages to the shrine of al-Ḥusayn in Karbala developed, and rulers expressed their piety and devotions through the construction of works at the shrine and charitable endowments. Prayer and pilgrimage manuals set out the excellences and rites of visitation (*ziyārah*) and salutations upon the martyred *imām*, through which the Shī'ah would renew their covenant of allegiance to the *imāms* of the family of the Prophet. The visitation also recognizes the spiritual vitality of the *imām* as an enshrined saint.

The commemoration rituals during the month of Muḥarram, known as *tā ziyah*, take on various cultural forms and illustrate the translations of Shī'ī aspirations and grief for the death of al-Ḥusayn. The earliest public sponsorship of the 'Āshūrā' commemoration occurred during the Būyid period in fourth-century Iraq. In the Fāṭimid period and in subsequent Shī'ī states, such as the early modern Safavids in Iran, patronage of the commemorations was central to the affirmation of Shī'ī identity and dynastic legitimacy. On the Indian subcontinent, processions from the late Mughal period have been the main expression, with mourners, flagellants, and devotees carrying replicas of the shrine of al-Ḥusayn and war banners streaming through the streets. In Iran and Bahrain, passion plays recounting the events are enacted. They are socially and even politically significant, as every political tyrant is equated with Yazīd and every seeker of justice with al-Ḥusayn. It is not insignificant that the Iranian revolution in 1979 was sparked during the Muḥarram commemorations. More recently in Iraq, the fall of Ṣaddām Ḥusayn in 2003 was celebrated with free Shī'ī commemorations for the fortieth day after 'Āshūrā' for the first time in more than twenty years. According to some accounts, up to four million pilgrims were in Karbala for the occasion. The vitality of the symbol of Karbala and the martyred al-Ḥusayn remains a strong strand in the life of the world's Shī'ī communities.

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SAJJAD H. RIZVI (2005)

**HUSSERL, EDMUND** (1859–1938), German philosopher, founder and central figure in the twentieth-century philosophical movement or approach known as phenomenology. Born in Prossnitz (Prostejov), Moravia, Husserl studied at the universities of Leipzig and Berlin and received his Ph.D. from the University of Vienna in 1882. After becoming an assistant to the mathematician Karl Weierstrass in Berlin, he moved to Vienna where, largely under the influence of the philosopher Franz Brentano, he changed his field from mathematics to philosophy.

Husserl's three teaching positions roughly correlate with three periods in the development of his phenomenological philosophy. His stay at the University of Halle (1887–1901) coincided with a prephenomenological period, during which he attempted to provide a psychological basis for mathematics and logic; it culminated in the influential *Logical Investigations* (2 vols., 1900–1901), which laid the foundation for his descriptive phenomenology. During his tenure at the University of Göttingen (1901–1916), Husserl established his role as founder of the “phenomenological movement.” He developed the phenomenological project that he had introduced in the second volume of his *Logical Investigations* and, in his *Ideas* (1913), he turned to a “pure” or “transcendental” phenomenology—a philosophical turn that was rejected by many of his followers. His work at the University of Freiburg (from 1916 to 1929) brought a radicalization of this phenomenological idealism, in which phenomenology was conceived as a renewal of life, a realization of one's ethical autonomy, and an overcoming of the crisis of European science. The years from 1929 to 1939, during which Husserl lived in Freiburg after his retirement from the university, may be designated as a fourth period. This period comprises the works of the “late Husserl.” Though isolated by social and political pressures as a man with Jewish parentage in Nazi Germany and, finally, by illness, Husserl developed, during this period, his existential notion of “life-world” (*Lebenswelt*) with which he explored the intersubjective and historical dimensions of experience.

Since Husserl was continually rethinking his phenomenological project, his works never formed a closed philosophical system. There are, however, several themes that can be found throughout his writings. Phenomenology, for example, was to be a descriptive, "rigorous science," free from unexamined presuppositions, and each step was to have a sense of self-evident necessity. Husserl continually searched for radical "new beginnings," that is, for an absolute foundation on which to ground his phenomenology and to grasp the constitution of meaning.

Husserl conceived phenomenology to be a radically descriptive approach, free from our normal, unexamined preconceptions; it was to utilize a phenomenological method that would allow it to describe the phenomena that appear in immediate experience and to gain direct intuition into their essential structures and meanings.

Husserl's attitude toward religion is open to several interpretations. Though the majority of Husserl scholars have assumed that he had little or no interest in religion, several scholars, largely on the basis of unpublished manuscripts, correspondence, and conversations, have submitted that religion and "the problem of God" were serious concerns for Husserl.

Born to Jewish parents, Husserl became an Evangelical Lutheran in 1887. A few individuals have claimed that he had a religious conversion on his deathbed, but this report has been widely challenged. In general, Husserl's phenomenological suspension of all judgments about what is real produced a tolerance toward all "genuine" religious phenomena. In addition, many scholars have commented that Husserl often conceived his phenomenological approach in terms of a "conversion," and that he regarded his philosophical mission with a kind of religious fervor. It does seem, however, that Husserl had little interest in a personal God or in any other aspect of traditional religion; he rejected the externals of religion and all theological dogma. On the other hand, scattered references to God appear in *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas*; passages with religious reference or implication are found also in later works such as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936) and in Dorian Cairns's *Conversations with Husserl and Fink* (1976); and a greater number of religious references appear in Husserl's diaries and in later unpublished manuscripts and correspondence.

Although these passages tend to be vague, underdeveloped, and open to conflicting interpretations, it is apparent that, according to Husserl, God is neither a personal deity nor a cause of the world, but an "idea" within the context of universal teleology. God as idea is the *telos*, that is, the universal and ideal end and the transcendent motivating force and final principle in the evolution of reason. Furthermore, Husserl cryptically comments that only with an understanding of the "transcendental consciousness" of phenomenology can one "understand the transcendence of God," and that "ethical-religious questions are the last questions of phenom-

enological constitution" (Cairns, *Conversations*, 1976, p. 47).

Husserl's major contribution to the study of religion is found in later attempts by scholars to apply a modified Husserlian analysis to religion. Husserl's influence can be seen in the phenomenological works of Max Scheler, Gerardus van der Leeuw, Paul Ricoeur, and many others. Phenomenology of religion has characterized itself as radically descriptive and antireductionistic. It has often adopted Husserlian terms, such as *epoche* and "eidetic vision," and has sometimes utilized aspects of Husserl's phenomenological method.

To a lesser extent, Husserl's phenomenology has influenced philosophy of religion and theology. In the appendix to his *Ecclesial Man* (1975), Edward Farley surveys the impact of phenomenology on numerous Catholic and Protestant philosophers and theologians, submitting that Max Scheler was the dominant figure in the field during the period between 1921 and 1934, and that the philosopher and theologian Henri Duméry, who applies a Husserlian method to the study of religion, has dominated the period from the 1950s. Many scholars maintain that French phenomenology, deeply influenced by Husserl, took a religious and even a theological turn in the 1980s and 1990s.

Starting in the 1990s, there has been a revival in philosophical phenomenology of religion. This has involved both renewed interest in older phenomenologists and the emergence of younger phenomenologists of religion. In this renewal of phenomenology of religion, most of these scholars either trace their phenomenology back to Husserl or at least interact with Husserl's foundational formulations. Among philosophers considered by other scholars as contributing to the renewal of phenomenology of religion are Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Michel Henry, and Jean-Luc Marion.

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cerned with religion. Perhaps the best source on this subject is *The Teleologies in Husserlian Phenomenology*, edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, volume 9 of "Analecta Husserliana" (Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1979). This volume includes several articles on Husserl, religious experience, and theology, of which Stephan Strasser's "History, Teleology, and God in the Philosophy of Husserl" is especially noteworthy. Edward Farley's *Ecclesial Man* (Philadelphia, 1975) utilizes Husserl's phenomenology in formulating a phenomenological theology and surveys the impact of Husserl's phenomenology on Catholic and Protestant philosophy of religion and theology. Among the works of "the new phenomenology," primarily written by French phenomenologists of religions, one may cite Jean-Luc Marion, *Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology*, translated by Thomas A. Carlson (Evanston, Ill., 1998). See also *Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn": The French Debate* by Dominique Janicaud and others (originally published in French, 1991; New York, 2000).

DOUGLAS ALLEN (1987 AND 2005)

**HUTCHINSON, ANNE** (1591–1643), was the central figure in the antinomian controversy in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636–1637. A native of Alford, Lincolnshire, Anne Marbury married William Hutchinson, an affluent merchant of that town, and mothered a large family. Around 1630 she came under the religious influence of John Cotton, vicar of Saint Botolph's in nearby Boston, and four years later she and her family followed him to the newly settled town of Boston in New England.

The Puritans of the English Congregational churches had sought to leaven John Calvin's harsh predestination decree by incorporating a concrete assurance of election that would be contingent on the moral responsibility of the elect. They asserted that the hopeful believer could prepare his or her soul for the reception of God's saving grace through a life of purity that might offer evidence of salvation. John Cotton, however, warned that this innovation imperiled the basic Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone. The believer must receive "witness of the Spirit itself," he wrote, before being able to advance his or her moral condition as evidence of a state of grace.

Anne Hutchinson incautiously distorted Cotton's doctrine by asserting that the gift of grace implied the actual indwelling of the spirit of the Lord, mystically uniting the elect to himself, thus rendering superfluous all other evidence of salvation. This conclusion verged perilously on the antinomian heresy, which held that Christians are freed from the moral law of the Old Testament by the new dispensation of grace proffered in the gospel.

Hutchinson communicated her beliefs in the guise of an informal exegesis of Cotton's weekly sermons. Large numbers of people attended these doctrinal discussions at her home in Boston, and a majority of the local congregation, including most of the town's political and mercantile leaders,

became enthusiastic disciples. When, at last, she accused all the Massachusetts clergy except Cotton of preaching a covenant of works, she precipitated a factional division that aroused the colony. Soon the religious breach assumed political dimensions and threatened the public safety.

The orthodox leaders, seeing the future of the colony at stake, regained political ascendancy by enlisting the support of outlying agricultural communities. A clerical synod declared Hutchinson guilty of holding numerous erroneous opinions, most of them inferential extensions of her central doctrine. Arraigned before the General Court in November 1637, Hutchinson unguardedly boasted that she had received revelations from the Holy Spirit, a heretical claim that horrified all orthodox Puritans. Repudiated by Cotton, excommunicated from the Boston church, and banished from the colony, she fled with family and friends to neighboring Rhode Island. Further dissension prompted her removal to New Netherland where, in 1643, she and her younger children were massacred by Indians.

Hutchinson left behind neither a religious organization nor a fixed system of belief. Although a remarkably intelligent and courageous woman, she seems to have been intolerant of religious doctrines other than her own. But the struggle of such sectarians who sought freedom of conscience for themselves prompted a diversity of beliefs that paved the way to a general freedom of religion for later generations.

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EMERY J. BATTIS (1987)

**HUTTERIAN BRETHREN.** The Hutterian Brethren are a branch of Anabaptist Christians originally organized by Jacob Hutter (d. 1536). Hutter's followers, known still as Hutterites, accept the year 1528 as the date of their founding because it was then that the founders decid-

ed to pool their resources and—unlike their Anabaptist counterparts the Amish and the Mennonites—to hold “all things common.” Although they have no objection to the name Hutterites, they prefer to be known as Hutterian Brethren or simply Brethren.

Jacob Hutter, a hat maker whose surname means *hatter*, was a Swiss Anabaptist minister who promulgated the practice of adult baptism, rejection of oaths, pacifism, and nonassimilation. He apparently had some education, since he spoke well and had knowledge of geography and basic mathematics. He was also a firm disciplinarian and a brilliant organizer. Journeying in 1529 from the Tyrol to Moravia, he found disarray and dissension among various congregations of Anabaptists. With an unwavering hand, he was able to overcome the schisms and impart a sense of mission.

Hutter was a man of indomitable will and exceptional courage. During a trip to the Tyrol in 1536, he was abducted and imprisoned by his enemies. Despite torture, he refused to give up his beliefs in the separation of church and state, and he refused to take oaths, to bear arms, or to abandon his economic communalism. In February of that year he was burned at the stake. After only three years as leader, he had become a martyr.

Following the death of Jacob Hutter, Hans Amon became head of the church. After Amon's death in 1542, Peter Riedeman, one of Hutter's former assistants, assumed leadership. Like Hutter, Riedeman was a man of total conviction. His beliefs, heretical to prevailing ones, prompted his imprisonment for nine years. Following his death in 1556, the Brethren continued to grow. By 1600 they numbered some 25,000 members.

The so-called golden years ended abruptly, however, and during the 1600s and 1700s persecution became relentless. Hutterite numbers dwindled, and those who remained faithful were forced eastward, to Moravia, Transylvania, Slovakia, and the Ukraine. Under a promise of religious freedom, the Brethren were able to survive in Russia from 1770 to 1870, at which time the promise was withdrawn. Between 1874 and 1877 the entire Hutterite population, more than one thousand members, emigrated to the United States. The communal members, approximately four hundred, settled in South Dakota in three separate colonies known as Bruderhofs. These proved to be successful and growth was rapid. By the time of World War I, some seventeen hundred Brethren lived in seventeen Bruderhofs.

Because of their refusal to bear arms, the war brought great difficulties to the Hutterites. Hostility caused all but one Bruderhof to relocate to Canada, but after the war many returned to the United States. During World War II, the Brethren were granted conscientious-objector status.

Each Bruderhof is a self-supporting agricultural community employing modern farm machinery. All property is owned communally by approximately 150 members. If a group grows beyond this number, branches are set up. The

Bruderhof is administered by five or six men elected for a lifetime; women do not serve on the council, nor are they permitted to vote. The minister of each Bruderhof is both the spiritual and the secular head.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Hutterites had grown to over 400 colonies with a population of more than thirty thousand members throughout the midwestern United States and Canada. Three groups of Hutterites exist (though their differences are more traditional and geographical than doctrinal): the Schmiedeleut, the Dariusleut, and the Lehrerleut. In 1992, the Schmiedeleut branch of the Hutterian Brethren split when a large group of Schmiedeleut Hutterites (also known as Committee Hutterites or Group 2) became dissatisfied with some community policies. Thus, the committee Hutterites created a new church constitution and installed a committee of elders to look after their own affairs.

**SEE ALSO** Anabaptism; Mennonites.

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WILLIAM M. KEPHART (1987)  
*Revised Bibliography*

**HYPOSTASIS** is a Greek noun that became an important term in philosophical and theological speculation. The



use of the term in Greek philosophy, especially in Platonism, contributed directly to its use as a technical term in Christian theology and in Gnosticism. The term is also used in modern scholarship in the history of religions. This article will stress the use of the term *hypostasis* in early Christianity and Gnosticism.

**GENERAL USAGE.** As a verbal substantive the Greek word *hupostasis* depends for its meaning on the verb *huphistēmi* (lit., “stand under”); it can mean the act of “standing under” or the result of that action. A wide range of meanings flow from these possibilities, including such abstract meanings as “origin,” “substance,” “real nature,” and so on.

**GREEK PHILOSOPHY.** The fifth-century Christian historian Socrates, in the context of his discussion of the Synod of Alexandria (362), relates that the founders of Greek philosophy never used the term *hypostasis*, though they often used another term, *ousia* (“being,” “substance,” etc.). While the ancient philosophers ignored the term *hypostasis*, the more recent ones (in Socrates’ terms) have used the term as an equivalent of *ousia*. This statement and its context imply (correctly) that the use of the term *hypostasis* in Christian theology is largely dependent upon its usage by the Greek philosophers.

**Stoicism.** It is among the Stoics that *hypostasis* was first used as a philosophical (ontological) term. In Stoicism *hypostasis* comes to be used to refer to being that has “attained reality,” that is, objective or concrete reality. It is Posidonius (first century BCE) who gives the noun *hypostasis* this particular sense. Posidonius also uses the term in an antithesis: Objects in nature such as rain and hail “have *hypostasis*” (i.e., reality), in contrast to the rainbow, which exists “according to semblance” (*kat’ emphasin*). Another Stoic, Cornutus (first century CE) applies the term to theology: Zeus is “father of gods and men” in that he is the cause of their hypostasis, that is, their objective reality. The Roman Stoic Seneca (first century CE) uses the Latin term *substantia* in an analogous sense, referring to centaurs, giants, and so on, which are fanciful beings not having *substantia* (“reality”).

**Platonism.** Plato did not use the term *hypostasis*. Later Platonists adopted the term from the Stoics, probably by way of Posidonius. Middle Platonists of the second century deny that sense-perceptible objects have their own hypostasis. That is, the term *hypostasis* cannot be used to refer to matter, for the truly real is immaterial. In the Platonic context one can regard *hypostasis* (“reality”) as virtually identical with *ousia* (“being, substance”). When they are distinguished in Neoplatonic usage, *hypostasis* has the sense of a more particular reality that has been brought into actuality by a higher cause.

Plotinus (third century) is the originator of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the hypostases, or “first principles,” though in fact his use of the term *hypostasis* is still rather fluid. He developed the doctrine of three “first principles” (*archai*): the One (*to hen*), Intellect or Mind (*nous*), and Soul (*psuchē*). The *locus classicus* of this doctrine is *Enneads* 5.1, to

which Porphyry gave the title *Concerning the Three Primal Hypostases*.

Plotinus’s hierarchy of being, involving the doctrine of the hypostases, can be summarized as follows. (1) Being flows from being. (2) The realization of the lower hypostasis occurs as a result of the next higher one’s “activity” (*energeia*). (3) Yet the higher level is not thereby diminished. (4) Each perfect hypostasis is dependent upon the preceding one, as multiplicity is to unity. (5) The One is ground of all being. (See Dörrie, 1955, p. 72.) Plotinus also says of the “first hypostasis,” that is, the One, that it is “prior to *hypostasis*” and “beyond being.” (See Witt, 1933, pp. 337–342.) That the One transcends hypostasis is the standard view of the later Neoplatonists. The usage of Proclus (fifth century), for example, involves the tendency, generally observable in Neoplatonism from Iamblichus (fourth century) on, to multiply hypostases and levels within them. Proclus sees in each hypostasis a triadic movement of remaining, procession, and reversion. One can then define the term *hypostasis* as distinct from two other important ontological terms, *huparxis* (“existence”) and *ousia* (“being”). While *ousia* is sometimes used as a synonym of *hypostasis* and sometimes as a synonym of *huparxis*, the latter connotes unity, whereas *hypostasis* connotes triplicity. *Ousia* is thus a more flexible term in Neoplatonism. (See Gersh, 1973, pp. 31–37.)

**THE SEPTUAGINT AND PHILO.** Christian usage of the term *hypostasis* presupposes not only some of the philosophical background already discussed but also the use of the term in the Greek Bible (the Septuagint) and in Hellenistic (Greek-speaking) Judaism, such as is represented by Philo of Alexandria.

**The Septuagint.** *Hypostasis* occurs in the Septuagint some twenty times, corresponding to twelve different words in the Hebrew scriptures (in some cases *hypostasis* is hardly a correct translation). The meaning of the word in the Septuagint is very fluid, corresponding to general usage, though the notion of “reality” is present in a number of cases. For example, *Ruth* 1:12, where *hypostasis* means “reality” as a guarantee, renders the Hebrew word for “hope.” The most important meaning of the word in the Septuagint is “underlying reality behind something” (Koester, 1972, pp. 581–582).

**Philo.** Philo’s use of *hypostasis* reflects both Stoic and Middle Platonic influences. Philo says, for example, that a ray of light “does not have its own *hypostasis*,” that is, it does not have its own “substantial existence” (*On the Eternity of the World* 88), reflecting a Stoic use of *hypostasis*. The Middle Platonic example is found in a passage where Philo refers to the immaterial “intelligible world” (*kosmos noētēs*) as “the world of intelligible *hypostasis*,” that is, of reality, to which is contrasted the material world of sense perception (*On Dreams* 1.188). But Philo would finally attribute ultimate reality only to God, the ground of all being. Using a form of the verb *huphistēmi*, Philo says, “God alone subsists in

being,” basing his statement on *Exodus* 3:14 (*The Worse Attacks the Better* 160).

**EARLY CHRISTIANITY.** A wide variety of meanings of the word *hypostasis* can be found in early Christian literature, but from the fourth century on the term comes to be used in special senses in dogmatic formulations on the Trinity and the doctrine of Christ (Christology). Greek philosophical influence becomes more and more evident in these contexts.

**The New Testament and early patristic literature.**

*Hypostasis* occurs five times in the New Testament, twice in *Paul* and thrice in *Hebrews*. The two Pauline instances are *2 Corinthians* 9:4 and 11:17, where in both verses the term means something like “situation” (not “confidence”). In *Hebrews* 1:3 Christ, as Son of God, is called the “reflection of [God’s] glory and the stamp [*charaktēr*] of his *hypostasis*,” that is, of God’s transcendent reality. *Hebrews* 11:1 contains a famous definition of faith (*pistis*) as “the *hypostasis* of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen,” wherein the word *hypostasis* means “realization” (rather than “assurance,” as in the usual psychologizing interpretation; see Mathis, 1922, p. 87). *Hebrews* 3:14 should be interpreted accordingly: In this verse *hypostasis* refers to the “realization” (by faith) of Christ, already commenced in the life of the Christian community. (See Koester, 1972, p. 587.)

Beginning with Tatian in the second century, the term *hypostasis* comes to be used more often and takes on a distinct philosophical and theological cast. Tatian refers to God as the *hypostasis*, or “absolute reality,” of the universe, inasmuch as he has brought all things into being. Tatian can also refer to the *hypostasis*, or “real nature,” of the demons as “reflections of evil.” The author of the *Epistle to Diognetus* (2.1) challenges the heathen to reflect on what sort of *hypostasis* (“real nature”) or form their so-called gods have. In one of the recently discovered Coptic texts from Nag Hammadi, *The Teachings of Silvanus*, a Christian document whose Greek original probably dates from the second century, it is said that “Christ has a single *hypostasis*” (99.13) and that he is “incomprehensible with respect to his *hypostasis*” (102.3). Here the term means “real nature.” This text represents a transitional stage in the development of a trinitarian and Christological use of the term *hypostasis*.

**Trinitarian theology.** The main issue confronting early Christian theologians was how to reconcile a belief in the deity of Christ (and the Holy Spirit) with the belief in only one God, a fundamental inheritance from Judaism. In the development of Christian trinitarian dogma such basic philosophical terms as *ousia* and *hypostasis* come to play a decisive role. But it was not immediately evident how these terms should be defined in relation to each other. The same fluidity of usage can be seen among Christian theologians as has already been observed in the discussion of Greek philosophy.

Socrates stated that the terms *hypostasis* and *ousia* were being used as equivalents by Greek philosophers. It has been

seen, however, that the terms come to achieve greater specificity in later Neoplatonism. The same thing happens in Christian theology. Origen (third century), while sometimes using the terms as virtual equivalents, does speak of the one God as monad, but also as a *trias* (“trinity”) containing three *hypostaseis*, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Origen is also probably the first to speak of Christ as *homoousios* (“of the same substance”) with the Father. (The Gnostics had already used this word, but in another context; see Stead, 1977, pp. 190–202.) Thus Origen posits for the Deity a unity of *ousia*, or “substance,” as genus, but a triad of *hypostaseis*, in the sense of three distinct species (Wolfson, 1970, p. 322). It is this language that becomes standard in Greek trinitarian theology.

It is possible that the second-century Gnostic Valentinus “was the first to think of three *hypostaseis* and three persons [*prōsopa*; lit., “faces”], Father, Son and Holy Spirit” (fragment 9), but this statement may reflect a later terminology. (The fragment is found in Pseudo-Anthimus, who is perhaps identifiable as Marcellus of Ancyra, of the fourth century.)

Tertullian (second to third century) used the Latin term *substantia* as equivalent to the Greek *ousia* (though its exact Greek etymological counterpart is *hypostasis*), and expressed the unity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as *una substantia*. He used the term *persona* (probably derived from juridical language) to refer to each of the three members of the Trinity. This is the language that became standard in Latin trinitarian theology.

It was not until the fifth century that orthodox trinitarian terminology became standardized. The Council of Nicaea (325), in rejecting the Arian heresy and adopting the *homoousios* formula to express the relationship between Father and Son, nevertheless used the words *ousia* and *hypostasis* as synonyms. At the Synod of Alexandria in 362, under the influence of Athanasius, the designation *treis hypostaseis* (“three hypostases”) was officially adopted, though even there *mia hypostasis* was conceded to express the unity of the divine being as well as *mia ousia*. The Cappadocian Fathers of the fourth century, especially Basil of Caesarea, were influential in the eventual differentiation of *ousia*, as the more common term, from *hypostasis*, the more particular. Hence the Council of Chalcedon (451) could define the unity of God as a unity of *ousia* and characterize the individual members of the Trinity as three perfect *hypostaseis* or three perfect *prosōpa* (Lat., *personae*).

It should be noted that Christian theological development of the term *hypostasis* runs parallel to that of the Neoplatonist philosophers. But, in the final analysis, in orthodox Christian trinitarian language the three hypostases are coordinated, whereas in Neoplatonism lower hypostases are subordinated to the higher in a chain of being, and all hypostases are ultimately subordinated to the One.

**Christology.** As the distinction between *hypostasis* and *ousia* was gradually being defined a new problem was arising:

the relation between *hupostasis* and *phusis* (“nature”) in the context of Christology, that is, in descriptions of Christ as both God and humankind. Apollinarius of Laodicea (fourth century) virtually equated the two terms, maintaining that Christ, even after the incarnation, is “one nature, one *hupostasis*.” Apollinarius was widely denounced as a heretic. In the early fifth century a very different Christology was propounded by Nestorius: Christ has two natures (*phuseis*), divinity and humanity, and each *phusis* has its own *hupostasis* (“substantial reality”). Cyril of Alexandria, the archenemy of Nestorius, developed the notion of a “hypostatic union”: Christ has two natures, but they are united *kath’ hupostasin* (lit., “according to hypostasis,” i.e., in reality). Pope Leo I, in his famous *Tome*, defined the relationship between Christ’s divinity and humanity as a duality in nature but a unity in person or *hupostasis*, and it is this formula that became standardized at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 (“two natures . . . one *prosōpon* and one *hupostasis*”). However, the distinction between *hupostasis* and *phusis* thus achieved was never accepted by the so-called monophysite churches, which continue to reject the Chalcedonian formulation.

**GNOSTICISM.** The word *hupostasis* was used by certain second-century Gnostics, as attested both in Greek patristic testimonies and in the recently available Coptic texts from Nag Hammadi.

**Greek testimonies.** It has already been noted that Valentinus may have been the first to think of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as three *hupostaseis*. Other Valentinian Gnostic uses of the term are more reliably attested. In the system of Ptolemy, as reported by Irenaeus, a primal divine Ogdoad is posited as the “root and *hupostasis* of all things” (*Against Heresies* 1.1.1). Here the term has the connotation of “origin” as well as “underlying reality.” Later in the same system three “underlying” (*hupokeimenoī*) entities are posited: “matter” (*hulē*), “the psychic” (*to psuchikon*), and “the spiritual” (*to pneumatikon*). These entities are subsequently referred to with the terms *ousia* and *hupostasis*, used interchangeably. These entities exist also in humans, and the *pneumatike hupostasis* is the “spiritual reality” of the Gnostic, incapable of being sullied by anything in the world (1.6.2.). The Valentinians can even refer to the “spiritual *hupostasis*” of evil, quoting *Ephesians* 6:12 in this connection (1.5.4). Here the term means “reality” or “real nature,” as in other second-century Christian literature (e.g., Tatian).

Marcus, a Valentinian Gnostic teacher, developed a speculative system based on the letters of the alphabet. Irenaeus, in describing this system, says that Marcus constructs the *ousia* and *hupostasis* (i.e., “real nature”) of the incorporeal and insubstantial Father out of many letters of the alphabet, but the technical terminology here may be that of Irenaeus himself. Monoemus the Arab, a Gnostic known to us only from the testimony of Hippolytus, applied numerology in his interpretation of the Bible. The composition of numbers as “corporeal *hupostaseis*” (i.e., “realities”) out of the primal monad is for him an analogy to the generation of the

Son of man from the unknown Perfect Man (*Refutation of All Heresies* 8.13).

Plotinus accuses the Gnostics known to him of introducing “other *hupostaseis*,” such as “exiles” (*paroikēseis*), “impressions” (*antiitupoi*) and “repentances” (*metanoiai*) (Enneads 2.9.6), referring doubtless to a Gnostic mythological-metaphysical system in which those entities occur, presumably as “levels of reality.” (These terms actually occur in some of the Coptic texts known to us—*Zostrianos*, for example—though the term *hupostasis* is not found in that connection.)

**Coptic texts.** The fourth tractate in Nag Hammadi Codex II is given the title *The Hypostasis of the Archons* and has as its main subject matter the “reality” of the cosmic “rulers.” The meaning of the term in that text, which opens with a quotation from *Ephesians* 6:12, is akin to that of the Valentinian usage noted above (“*hupostasis* of evil”), but it also bears the connotation of “origin,” as the content of the text attests (*hupostasis* is so used at 93.35).

In the *Apocryphon of John*, the term *hupostasis* is used of the “being” created by the Demiurge according to the image of God (15.9); of the seven psychic “substances” out of which Adam’s psychic body is created (15.25); and of the “reality” of the flesh borne by the Gnostic before his final redemption (25.34).

In the *Gospel of the Egyptians*, it is said that the Demiurge “trusted in his *hupostasis*,” that is, his “nature” (59.1). In the *Sophia of Jesus Christ*, the term *hupostasis* is used twice of the “real nature” of the universe (91.3, 92.4).

In *A Valentinian Exposition*, the Son is said to be the “*hupostasis* of the Father,” that is, the Father’s “real nature” (24.23). Later he is called “the *hupostasis* of the All” (25.33), that is, the “underlying reality,” or perhaps “origin,” of the All.

The term *hupostasis* is also used in two non-Christian gnostic texts of the late second or early third century, both of them heavily influenced by Platonic philosophy: *Allogenes*, a text known to Plotinus and his school, and *Marsanes*. In *Allogenes* a divine being called the Triple Power or Autogenes is said to be a “*hupostasis* of the primacy of the One who truly exists.” Here the term means “real nature” but also has the connotation of “first principle” or “hypostasis” in the Neoplatonist sense. In *Marsanes* the term also means “real nature”: of the Three-Powered One (9.17); of the Dyad (32.18); and of the redeemed Gnostic (40.1).

In Gnosticism the term *hupostasis* was used in a variety of ways under the influence of popular (mainly Platonist) philosophy, but it never achieved a consistent philosophical or theological definition, even if Gnostic usage contributed, positively or negatively, to the formulations of Neoplatonist philosophy and Christian theology.

**HISTORY OF RELIGIONS SCHOLARSHIP.** The English term *hypostasis* is used in modern scholarship in the study of reli-

gion to refer to various “hypostatizations” (or “hypostasizations”), that is, mythic objectifications or personifications of divine qualities, gifts, or attributes or of abstract concepts or aspects of human existence, whereby such entities assume an identity of their own. Such “hypostases” are very widespread in ancient religions. Examples are Dike (“justice”) in ancient Greece, Maat (“truth”) in ancient Egypt, and Hokhmah (“wisdom”) in ancient Israel. Such hypostases proliferate in the religious syncretism of the Greco-Roman world, and some of them (e.g., Tyche, “fortune”) even acquire their own cultus. Wisdom is an especially important hypostasis in biblical religion (*Prov.* 8:22–31; *Ben Sira* 24:1–22), and her manifestation as Sophia in Greek-speaking Judaism (*Wisdom of Solomon*; the works of Philo Judaeus) is of great importance for the development of early Christian Christology as well as early Gnostic mythology.

It should be stressed that the use of the term *hypostasis* for such entities is a modern development of the Greek term, though ultimately derived from the ancient philosophical usage. (See Ringgren, 1947, 1959.) An ancient intimation of such usage can be found in Plotinus (*Enneads* 3.5.2): The heavenly Aphrodite, as child of Kronos (“mind”) is “the most divine kind of Soul” and “a separate *hypostasis*.” (See Koester, 1972, p. 577.)

SEE ALSO Jesus.

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
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## I SEE REN AND YI

**I AM.** The “I AM” Religious Activity emerged in the 1930s as a major new representative of the Western Esoteric tradition, drawing most of its theology and imagery directly from the Theosophical Society. It subsequently gave birth to a number of groups that have, with minor variations, generally adopted the unique ideas and practices of the “I AM” while organizationally separating from the parent body.

**HISTORY.** “I AM” founders Guy Ballard (1878–1939) and Edna W. Ballard (1886–1971) were already steeped in esoteric thought when the seminal events in the movement’s formation occurred. Guy Ballard had been employed as a mining engineer when in the early 1930s he visited Mount Shasta in northern California. In several esoteric books, Mount Shasta previously had been identified as a location of spiritual significance, most recently in 1931, in a book published by the Ancient and Mystical Order Rosae Crucis, *Lemuria, the Lost Continent of the Pacific*.

On the slope of the volcanic mountain, Ballard claimed he encountered a man who identified himself as Saint Germain, an important personage in the eighteenth-century European esoteric community, who since his earthly existence had become an ascended master. In Theosophical lore, ascended masters are spiritually evolved individuals who formerly had incarnated in earthly bodies but who no longer participate in the cycles of reincarnation. From their exalted state, they now collectively guide humanity’s spiritual destiny.

Saint Germain described his current purpose as initiating a new spiritual activity, the Seventh Golden Age. He had found Ballard as an embodied human fit to receive and pass on to humanity the Laws of Life. He eventually designated Ballard, his wife Edna, and their son Donald as the only accredited messengers of the ascended masters. Operating as a messenger entailed allowing different masters to speak through oneself (in a manner analogous to Spiritualist mediums or channels). During his lifetime, Guy Ballard was

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CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT CORNER. Relief of the ancient Egyptian deities Horus and Isis with Euergetes II at Kom Ombo in Aswan, Egypt. [©Roger Wood/Corbis]; Twelfth-century Byzantine mosaic of Christ with the Virgin Mary in Hagia Sophia, Istanbul, Turkey. [©Charles & Josette Lenars/Corbis]; Colossal stone Buddha (destroyed in 2001) in Bamiyan, Afghanistan. [The Art Archive]; Fifteenth-century Inca ruins at Machu Picchu in Peru. [©Alison Wright/Corbis]; The Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. [©Scalal/Art Resource, N.Y.]



the only one of the three to operate as a messenger. Edna operated as a messenger only briefly in the last years of her life, and Donald, though active in the movement, never functioned as messenger.

Ballard initially described his experiences with Saint Germain in a set of letters to his wife, sent from Mount Shasta to the family residence in Chicago. It is of some interest that at the time he wrote these letters, he was also reading a set of books by Baird Spaulding, *The Life and Teachings of the Masters of the Far East*, whose description of the masters and their work coincided with what Ballard was learning from Saint Germain. Ballard described his own experiences in more detail in the manuscripts of two books, *Unveiled Mysteries* (1934) and *The Magic Presence* (1935), both written under the pseudonym Godfré Ray King. Upon his return to Chicago, Ballard founded the “I AM” Religious Activity in stages. After deciding in 1932 to release the two books, the Ballards founded the Saint Germain Foundation and its publishing arm, the Saint Germain Press. In 1934 they held a ten-day class at which Guy Ballard for the first time operated as a messenger in a public setting. The first book, *Unveiled Mysteries*, appeared in 1934, and a periodical, *The Voice of the I Am*, which carried the text of newly received messages, was first issued in 1936.

**“I AM” BELIEFS.** The “I AM” Religious Activity centered its attention on the “I AM” Presence, God in Action, which emanates from the Great Central Sun, the impersonal source of the universe. The Great Central Sun is a knowable aspect of the supremely unknowable and transcendent God. The universe has come into being as a series of emanations from God, the material world being the lowest level of those emanations. Each emanated level of the universe is inhabited by evolved beings that together constitute a spiritual hierarchy, frequently referred to as the Great White Brotherhood. At the lowest level of the spiritual hierarchy are the Lords of the Seven Rays (of light), spiritual beings who most easily and often communicate with humans. Saint Germain is seen as one of those Lords, as is Jesus and El Morya (one of the masters believed to have initiated the Theosophical Society).

Individuals are seen as sparks of the divine “I AM” Presence now embodied in the physical word. However, individuals have through history misused the powers available to them, resulting in the individual and social discord that is the current lot of humanity. The problems created by humans are carried over from one incarnation to another. Most individuals remain trapped in a limited situation characterized by evil and discord, but a few people have risen above and learned to attune themselves to their divine nature, the “I AM” Presence. Those who have completely aligned themselves with the “I AM” become ascended masters. The present Lords of the Seven Rays had previously incarnated as outstanding spiritual leaders. Saint Germain, for example, was at different times on Earth as the Jewish prophet Samuel, the British Christian leader Saint Alban, and Francis Bacon. Ballard, who is now seen as having ascended in 1939, was previously on Earth as George Washington.

The “I AM” Presence individualizes as the essence of each embodied soul. Activated, it is the means of cleansing the person of karmic conditions and assisting the process of spiritual evolution. The best means of activating the “I AM” is the use of decrees, affirmative commands calling upon the “I AM” Presence to initiate actions, a practice that appears to have originated early in the twentieth century within the New Thought movement. Decrees are spoken aloud in a chant-like fashion. Decrees, like prayers in other movements, may be of a general nature or directed to specific and immediate concerns. The words *I am* that begin the decrees serve to identify the individual with the divine action being affirmed.

Whereas most decrees are very positive, emphasizing the spread of positive virtues, decrees may also be directed specifically to the dissipation of evil forces. The “I AM” movement has become its most controversial when it has identified specific evils that were subsequently targeted and against which decrees have been directed.

Color forms an important element of “I AM” belief. Those masters who oversee humanity most closely are the Lords of the Seven Rays (of the light spectrum), each color being associated with a particular virtue or character trait. Saint Germain is associated with violet, and the most important activity in the “I AM” Religious Activity is calling upon the Violet Flame pictured around each individual to burn away undesirable personal conditions. Most colors are positive, but two—red and black—are to be avoided. Thus, all “I AM” literature is printed with colored (usually purple) ink rather than black ink.

Through the 1930s, the movement had its creative center in the public classes at which Ballard brought forth messages from the masters. Beginning with the initial class, held in the Civic Opera House in Chicago, subsequent classes were held in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Miami. A class in Los Angeles a short time before Ballard’s death attracted some 7,000 attendees. From these came a book of decrees and a hymnal that were used to provide a format for local groups to emerge, and the movement spread across North America. It claimed more than a million students by 1939, though the number who had had more than a single superficial encounter with the movement was far less.

**LATER HISTORY.** The forward progress of the “I AM” Religious Activity was brought to an abrupt halt in 1939 when Guy Ballard, only in his early 60s, suddenly died. Many in the movement were distressed, as they expected him to bodily ascend rather than face a normal human death. A group of vocal critics arose, led by Gerald B. Bryan, who wrote a series of booklets challenging the integrity of the teachings. Legal authorities moved against Edna and Donald Ballard and the foundation staff. Given First Amendment guarantees of religious freedom, prosecutors found an opening in the movement’s use of the mail to send out “I AM” material. They brought the Ballards to trial for mail fraud and argued that because no rational person could believe what the Bal-

lards were teaching, they had to be knowingly perpetuating a fraud. It was a false religion, and they knew it to be false.

Convicted at the trial level, the Ballards' appeal took them to the U.S. Supreme Court twice and resulted in one of the most important rulings in American jurisprudence concerning religion. In his opinion in *U.S. v. Ballard* (1944), Justice Douglass suggested that the courts get out of the business of examining "other people's faiths." Individuals, he suggested, "may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs." The ruling did not completely end the "I AM" problems, however, as the initial trial verdict had led the U.S. Postal Service to reject the movement's right to distribute material through the mail, a privilege only returned in the 1950s.

Because of its experience in the courts, the "I AM" Religious Activity adopted a low profile, partially accounting for a paucity of scholarly comment on the movement. While continuing to exist, it became largely invisible on the religious landscape, many believing it had been dissolved. In 1978 the foundation moved into new facilities in Schaumburg, Illinois (a Chicago suburb), joined there four years later by the Saint Germain Press. The press continued to publish the messages originally received from Guy Ballard, becoming available in some fifteen volumes of "I AM" Discourses. Land purchased in the 1950s on the slope of Mount Shasta became the site for a range of summer retreats and an annual passion play depicting the life of Jesus (adapted to an "I AM" interpretation concentrating upon his final ascension). Over 300 "I AM" sanctuaries (local centers) exist across the United States.

**BREAKAWAY GROUPS.** Conditions internal to the "I AM" Religious Activity led to several schisms. Beginning in the 1930s, people emerged claiming also to be in contact with the masters, but the decades following Guy Ballard's death when no new messages were being received made many yearn for continued contact with the ascended masters. The movement also had strictures against translating messages into other languages, thus inhibiting its growth into Spanish-speaking communities. As early as 1944, Geraldine Innocente began to receive messages from Ascended Master El Morya and to publish them under the pseudonym Thomas Printz. Following Innocente's refusal to stop publishing the messages and her break with Edna Ballard, her work, which was also translated into Spanish for distribution in Puerto Rico and Cuba, became the basis of an organization called the Bridge to Spiritual Freedom.

Also in the 1950s, other groups formed which claimed they were receiving messages from the masters independently of the "I AM." One such group was the Lighthouse to Freedom in Philadelphia. Originally a member of the Lighthouse to Freedom, Mark L. Prophet (1918–1973) founded the Summit Lighthouse in 1958 and began publishing the messages he was receiving primarily from El Morya. The Summit gained a large following prior to Prophet's sudden death in 1973. Prophet's widow, Elizabeth Clare Prophet (b. 1939),

however, picked up the messenger's mantle and expanded the organization's work as the Church Universal and Triumphant. The church grew significantly in the 1970s and, unlike the "I AM" Religious Activity, assumed a high profile and identified strongly with the New Age Movement. It also became quite controversial after being labeled a "cult" and being subjected to several lawsuits. During the 1990s, following the rise of a period of apocalyptic fervor, the church underwent a thorough reorganization, culminating in the retirement of Mrs. Prophet, who had become increasingly incapacitated by Alzheimer's disease. The church differs from the "I AM" Movement on several points, most noticeably in the manner in which decrees are repeated in a very fast mode and Prophet's emphasis on world religions (especially Buddhism) alongside esoteric Christianity.

**SEE ALSO** Church Universal and Triumphant; New Age Movement; Prophet, Mark and Elizabeth Clare; Theosophical Society.

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J. GORDON MELTON (2005)

**IBĀDIYYA.** The Ibādiyya sect (also known as the Ibādī sect, or simply as the Ibādīs) constitutes one of the main branches of Islam. The Ibādīs are relatively few in number in comparison to the Sunnīs and the Shī'ah, and for many centuries they have lived largely in isolated areas, principally Oman and Zanzibar, Tripolitania in Libya, the island of Jerba in Tunisia, and the Mزاب area of Algeria. This isolation has meant that until the late twentieth century almost all of

what is known about the Ibādīs has come through prejudiced and hostile Sunnī sources. However, since the accession of Qaboos b. Saïd to the sultanate of Oman in 1970, there has been a sustained program for the publication of major Ibādī works, so that it is at last becoming possible to view the Ibādīs through their own tradition. Among the works that have come to light are a number that date back to before 800 CE and are crucial for an understanding of the development of Islamic thought in general. Unfortunately, very little has so far trickled through into English.

The origins of the Ibādīs go back to not much more than twenty years after Muḥammad's death. They have their roots in the groups, collectively known as Khārijites, that came into existence during the First Islamic Civil War (656–661 CE). The basic doctrinal beliefs of the Khārijites were the same as those of all Muslims: the five pillars of Islam. It was in the further tier of doctrine that did not fully emerge until after Muḥammad's death that they had differences with the rest of the nascent Muslim community. Even in these further doctrines there were, in this early period, more similarities than differences with the other parts of that community. Like those who were the precursors of the Sunnīs, the early Khārijites held the views that infidels had no legal existence or protection unless they were Jews or Christians, that Muslims should not live among infidels, and that unprotected infidels should be fought until they were converted or killed.

What split the early Islamic community in the first instance were views about the actions of the third caliph, 'Uthmān, and the fourth caliph, 'Alī. There was much opposition both to 'Uthmān, who was murdered by some of his opponents, and to 'Alī. With the Khārijite groups that opposition acquired a doctrinal underpinning. Already outraged by the wrongdoings of 'Uthmān in his later years as caliph, they were further appalled when 'Alī, during fighting against those who sought vengeance for the death of 'Uthmān, agreed to arbitration about the rights and wrongs of the killing. Summing up their feelings in the slogan "Judgment belongs to God alone," they broke away from the majority of the believers. They took a stern view of those believers who did not share their opinions, holding that their actions and beliefs had caused them to return to unbelief. At first they designated their opponents by the simple term *al-qawm*, "those people," a phrase that, somewhat confusingly, their opponents also used of them. For the Khārijites, *al-qawm* had fallen into a state of *barā'a* (dissociation), having lost the *walāya* (loyalty both to God and fellow-Muslims) that was central to the community of true believers. This applied to those members of the community who accepted the legitimacy of 'Uthmān or 'Alī. However, the Khārijites could not agree among themselves about how to deal with the *qawm*. The majority of early Khārijite groups favored armed confrontation with those whom they considered to have lapsed into infidelity, but a minority favored a live-and-let-live stance. Whenever an opportunity arose, the activist majority pursued its views to the death.

When 'Alī was killed by a Khārijite activist in 661 CE, the Umayyad dynasty came to power, and for a time some stability was imposed. It appears that this was the period when there was a growth in the number of those Khārijites who, while holding that the majority of the Muslim community had lapsed into unbelief, came to the conclusion that those who had lapsed should be merely spurned rather than given the choice of submission or the sword.

By the time of the Second Civil War (688–692 CE), the principal quietist group, living mainly in Basra, had become known as the Ibādīyya. This name derives from 'Abdallāh b. Ibād, who appears to have been the political mentor of the group, though its spiritual leader was Jābir b. Zayd, a man universally recognized for his learning and piety, who became the first *imām* of the group.

While Jābir was alive, the Ibādīyya were tolerated by the central authorities (unlike the violent Khārijite groups, who fought and were fought to the death). The community devised rules, which still hold, to enable them to survive among a non-Ibādī Muslim majority (the *qawm*). Thus it is permitted to marry non-Ibādīs and to enjoy mutual inheritance with them. Religious dissimulation (*taqīyya*) is also permitted, though not to the point of serving non-Ibādī rulers.

After the death of Jābir in 711 CE, the Ibādīs found it more and more difficult to live in Basra, and their next two *imāms* encouraged them to migrate to places where they could follow their own faith without harassment. Most moved to the remote parts of the Arab world—Oman, the Hadramawt, Yemen, and North Africa—although some also went to Khurasan. It was only in Oman and the Mzab that they survived in numbers, with a religious, legal, and political tradition going back unbroken to their earliest days in Basra. In North Africa, in particular, the Ibādīs suffered from some schisms. None of the breakaway groups was particularly important, and only one, the Wahbiyya, survived to the twenty-first century.

The early Ibādīs were an earnest lot, much concerned with the coherence and rectitude of their beliefs and with their relationships with the *qawm*, whom they now increasingly called *ahl-al-qibla* (people who use the *qibla*'), or *ahl al-jumla* (people who utter the *shahāda*'), both phrases ironically indicating the superficial nature of any belief that such persons might have. These included not only those now called Sunnīs and Shī'ah but also the violent, activist Khārijite groups, such as the Azāriqa and the Najdiyya, and other movements that have failed to survive, such as the Murji'a. The Ibādīs designated such "lapsed" Muslims as infidels of a special category, classing them as hypocrites who claimed to be Muslims but whose deeds showed them to be ungrateful for the blessings of God (*kāfir kufr ni'ma*). As such, they were to be shunned and not killed unless they had committed a capital offence or become mischief makers (*muhdithūn*). Ibādīs who are corrupt or do serious wrong also lose their *walāya*.

Because of their doctrines about *walāya* and *barāʿa*, the Ibādīs have also retained the original Khārijite view about who may be the leader of the community, the *imām*. They believe that any believer who is morally and religiously irreproachable may be elected *imām*, regardless of his race or tribe, “even if he is an Ethiopian slave,” as the texts graphically put it. Equally, the community has the right to vote to depose an *imām* from office if he goes astray and becomes corrupt, and it must take every step to remove him if it possibly can do so. This is the most democratic stance toward leadership in traditional Islamic thinking and is one of those points that sharply differentiates the Ibādīs from the Sunnīs, who basically believe that the *imām* must be from Quraysh, the tribe of Muḥammad, and from the Shīʿah, who believe that he must be from the family of ʿAlī.

In legal matters the Ibādīs put more weight on the Qurʾān and less on the *ḥadīth* than other branches of Islam. Thus, they do not impose the (non-Qurʾanic) punishment of stoning for adultery. The nature of their community has also led to more thinking through of problems (*ijtihād*) than is found in the other branches, and unlike the Sunnīs but like the Shīʿīs, they have never “closed the gates of *ijtihād*.” Ibādī scholars have never shut their eyes to the value of major works by writers from other sects, particularly Sunnīs and Muʿtazilīs, though such writings are always viewed from the standpoint of Ibādī intellectual tradition, which has always managed to flourish despite its isolation.

The fact that the Ibādīs differed so radically from the Azāriqa and the Najdiyya in their views about infidels led some Ibādī thinkers to deny their Khārijite origins. This view appears to have emerged in the ninth century, and it has become stronger ever since. Modern Ibādīs, therefore, tend to minimize these Khārijite origins, and even those whose accept that there is a historical link are outraged to be classed as latter-day Khārijites. This has recently become a matter of some importance, as modern Islamist groups have sometimes been likened to the activist Khārijites of the early Islamic era. It is a matter of pride for the Ibādīs that they have consistently opposed terrorist activity for over thirteen hundred years.

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ALAN JONES (2005)

**IBERIAN RELIGION.** The term *Iberian religion* is used here geographically. It refers to the religious systems of Iberia, the name the Greeks gave in antiquity to the Iberian Peninsula, from the arrival of the Phoenicians (documented by the ninth century BCE) to the time these places were incorporated into the Roman Empire in the first centuries CE.

Tartessos is the name that identifies the peninsula in the first historical records dating to ancient Greek literature. That is the time of the expansion of Eastern cultural influence on other parts of the Mediterranean (from the eighth to sixth centuries BCE). Tartessian culture had its core in lower Andalusia and seems to have developed from the cultural contact between the indigenous late Bronze Age population and Semitic colonizers who arrived from the eastern Mediterranean. Later, a secondary Greek presence contributed to the culture.

**TARTESSOS AND RELIGIOUS CONTACT WITH THE PHOENICIAN WORLD.** Phoenician materials appear in several shrines, most importantly in Gadir (Cádiz), the site of the famous temple of Melqart, patron god of Tyre, assimilated to Herakles and described by such authors of the Roman Empire as Strabo (*Geographica* 3.5), Silius Italicus (*Punica* 3.1–44), and Philostratus (*Vita Apollonii* 5.5). Other examples are El Carabolo, near Seville, and the Cerro de San Juan, in Coria del Río, probably dedicated to Baal Saphon, protector of navigation. Phoenician religious pieces, such as altars, betyls, and liturgical bone spoons, are documented also in the interior, near Carmona (in the province of Seville), and in Cancho Roano in the municipality of Zalamea la Real, province of Badajoz. The latter complex was destroyed in the late fifth century BCE and seems to have been an Easternized indigenous sanctuary that served as a dwelling—the residence of the ruler and his family. It also fulfilled economic, political, and religious functions. It was a space to display power and a site to worship ancestors, and it also allowed control of access to the region. The Poggio Civitate complex in Murlo, Etruria, with its multiple functions, was comparable to Cancho Roano.

The problem presented by these sites is that of their identity. Are they indigenous sanctuaries influenced by the Phoenician religious system? Or are they Eastern enclaves placed in indigenous locations that would have also operated as centers of commerce? The sanctuaries of Muela de Cástulo in the province of Jaén; El Acebuchal in Carmona, Seville; and Montemolín in Marchena, Seville, are special cases. They show evidence of sacrifices performed on platforms or

altars and dating to the seventh century BCE. The cooking and consumption of sacrificial animals (cows, goats, sheep, and pigs) recorded in these sites are well-known practices documented in the biblical texts of *Exodus* (29:15–18) and *Leviticus* (7:32–33).

The few existing Phoenician inscriptions, generally property marks preserved on ceramic vases or other objects, document names associated to Melqart, Baal, Eshmun, and Astarte. An inscription associated with Astarte found on an image in El Carambolo (Seville) suggests that indigenous elites would have been attracted to the cult by assimilating Astarte to an indigenous fecundity goddess. The same could have happened with Melqart, who like Reshef is always depicted in the statuettes.

The necropolises document characteristic elements of Phoenician funeral rites, such as the use of plates, libation jars, and perfume burners. The “treasure” of La Aliseda, like the necropolis of Medellín in the province of Badajoz, is proof that Eastern objects spread out by land all the way to the northeast of the peninsula, the source of mineral wealth. The graveyards (La Joya in Huelva and Los Alcores in Carmona) display evidence of both cremation and inhumation; stelae and markers are common features. Especially interesting is the necropolis of Las Cumbres in Castillo de Doña Blanca, province of Cádiz. There the oldest cremation sites, dating to the first half of the eighth century BCE, were local and presented little evidence of social differences. A later group of burials, dating from the seventh century BCE, evidenced funeral rites that included libations, incense, and oil-based perfumes, all Phoenician traits that indicate a clear social hierarchy.

Besides the archaeological data, there is extensive literary data from Greek and Latin authors who speak of two “mythical” dynasties in the region. The first is that of Geryon, about whom Stesichorus of Himera wrote a poem (*Geryoneia*) in the sixth century BCE. The poem narrates how Herakles stole Geryon’s bulls and carried them off to Mycenae. Geryon is depicted in archaic Greek pottery as a three-headed being, and it is possible that the tricephalous image evidences an influence of Celtic culture in the Tartessian world.

The second dynasty is that of Gargoris and Habis, recorded in Justin’s third century CE summary of the work of the historian Pompeius Trogus (*Epitoma Historiarum Philippicarum Pompei Trogi*). Gargoris, the ancient god of the Curetes, forest-dwelling hunters, discovered the value of honey and taught his people to use it. Gargoris’s incestuous relationship with his daughter begot Habis, who was abandoned to be devoured by wild beasts but miraculously survived (a frequent theme in the story of a hero’s infancy, as in those of Sargon, Moses, Cyrus the Great, and Romulus and Remus). As king, Habis “tied the people to the law and the oxen to the plow” (Justin, *Epitoma* 44.4, 11). He is thus the prototype of the civilizing and legislating king. This myth illustrates the transition from a barbarian state (Gargoris) to one of urban culture (Habis). The debate centers on whether

these are expressions of an indigenous culture or simply an invention of the Hellenic scholars in which some previous historical elements, perhaps of Tartessian origin, subsist.

The ancient poem about the seacoast by a Punic or Greek author from the sixth century BCE, *Ora Maritima*, which inspired Rufus Festus Avienus in the fourth century CE, mentions a series of sacred places located in Tartessos. As happened later with Punic and Iberian deities, the poem translates, through the process the Romans called *interpretatio*, the name of the Tartessian or Phoenician gods into those of their Roman or Greek counterparts, or into Greek and Roman deities that fulfilled similar functions to them, such as Herakles, Venus, or Saturn.

**RELIGION OF THE IBERIAN PEOPLES.** After the late sixth century BCE, the Iberian culture was influenced by the contacts between the peoples of the south and east of the peninsula (living between the Huelva estuary and the Rodanus in France) and the Greek and Punic colonizers. After the late third century BCE those contacts included the Romans. The study of Iberian cultural spaces and necropolises has increased among modern scholars.

Following the decline of the Tartessian world, monumental funerary complexes confirm the existence of an aristocratic power. The complex of Pozo Moro (Albacete), shaped like a tower and dated to around 500 BCE, is reminiscent of Eastern monuments, such as Amrit or the tomb of Cyrus the Great, and neo-Hittite models in its art. The monument displays extraordinary iconography—the scene of a sacrificial banquet with a human victim and an animal one and a hero carrying the tree of fertility and uniting in hierogamy with a goddess. Perhaps it is a depiction of a mythical tale of origin or an exaltation of the heroic deeds of the dynasty’s ancestors or the ruling elite. By the first half of the fifth century BCE another imposing funeral complex was built in Cerrillo Blanco within the municipality Porcuna (Jaén) that depicts as a central element a hero’s struggle with a lion or gryph (which has such well-known parallels as the stories of Dumuzi, Sargon the First, and Melqart or Herakles). It also shows combat between armed warriors.

Besides the towerlike burials of the kind found at Pozo Moro, Iberian necropolises present two types of arrangement of monumental sculptures in “princely” graves. One is known as “stelae pillars,” which depict, atop columns, sculptures of bulls, sphinxes, lions, does, or wolves of an apotropaic nature (typical of Contestania, a region between Valencia and Murcia that seems to have been the true center of Iberian culture). The second kind consists of the arrangement of sculptures directly on the funeral mounds, as found in Los Villares (La Hoya Gozalo, Albacete).

Toward 375 BCE there must have been a social crisis that translated into the destruction of several complexes and resulted in important changes to the society of the “princely graves.” There is a documented transition to the world of sanctuaries, where the collective image of society is expressed



through deities and where new sources of expression emerge, such as silver trays and especially pottery, that developed their richest iconography after the third century BCE. Of the two distinguishable periods in pottery iconography, the first (300–150 BCE) shows, through its depictions of warriors, hunters, and ladies, the values of the urban ruling classes, whereas the second (200–50 BCE) centers more on the depiction of deities, myths, and religious rituals (Aranegui Gascó, 1998).

**Sanctuaries and rituals.** Punic materials are characteristic of such sanctuaries as La Algaida in the mouth of the Guadalquivir River, where thousands of votive offerings have been found, some from Etruria and the eastern Mediterranean. They are also characteristic of the Gorham Cave (Gibraltar), Carteia (Algeciras), the Peñón de Salobreña and the Cerro de la Tortuga near Málaga, Baria (Villaricos, Almería), and the Cova d'Es Cuyram (Ibiza) devoted to the Carthaginian goddess Tanit. The last contained splendid terra-cotta figurines, now exhibited in the island's archaeological museum. In these sanctuaries Astarte did not replace Tanit, but rather the two were assimilated beginning in the middle of the fourth century BCE.

Greek and Latin authors related the existence of sanctuaries on the coast of the peninsula that were devoted to certain deities “translated” into their Greek and Roman counterparts, Herakles, Kronos, Hera, Asklepios, Phosphorus, Hephaistos, and Aletes—the mythic discoverer of the silver mines of Carthago Nova, according to Polybius (*Historiae* 10.10.1). Technical progress in archaeology and the increased number of excavations have broadened the evidence considerably, and it is possible to classify the different sacred spaces.

There is a distinction between urban and nonurban sanctuaries. Among the latter there are three kinds: suburban or periurban sanctuaries in close proximity to inhabited centers; great supraterrestrial sanctuaries; and rural sanctuaries, including caves, which are characteristic of the Valencian region.

Sierra Morena in Jaén is the center of the most characteristic territorial and mountain sanctuaries in the Iberian world. These played an important role in the territorial development of the Oretanian peoples. The Collado de los Jardines (Santa Elena) in Despeñaperros and El Castellar de Santisteban were probably centers of salutiferous cults. The most characteristic elements of these sanctuaries are bronze figurines depicting males and females offering gifts (or praying), warriors, riders, and even priests.

The complex rituals typical of the southeast have different characteristics. El Cerro de Los Santos and El Llano de La Consolación in Montealegre del Castillo, Albacete, were characterized by stone statuary. Other good examples include El Cigarralejo (Mula) and Nuestra Señora de La Luz (Verdolay, Murcia). Of the more than two hundred statues that have been found in Cerro de Los Santos, the most fa-

mous are of worshipping females, which probably depict devout aristocrats or priestesses. Most of these sanctuaries were active into the advanced Roman imperial age.

The last category of sanctuaries includes those located in urban settlements. Martín Almagro-Gorbea and Teresa Moneo (2000) developed a typology that includes three parameters of differentiation. The three descriptions of domestic/dynastic family, properly urban, and entrance sanctuaries correspond to the three parameters within the category of urban sanctuaries. First are domestic or dynastic family sanctuaries, which were integrated into a noble family's dwelling inside the *oppidum* or fortified village. La Serreta de Alcoy in Alicante; Sant Miquel de Lliria in Valencia, and Ullastret in Girona are good examples.

Second are urban temples (*Templos urbanos propiamente dichos*), isolated structures with an autonomous relationship to the *oppidum*. These include two kinds. First are the “open-air” areas (La Alcudia de Elche and Campillo Island in Alicante), which consist of square enclosures (*temenos*) and the remains of columns or structures that have been interpreted as altars or offering tables typical of the Phoenician world. The other type consists of buildings set on stone bases and located on the highest point of a settlement. Typical examples include Azaila (Teruel) and Ullastret (Girona). They present influences from Emporion (Ampurias) in the expansion of this kind of Roman-Hellenic temple.

Third are “entrance sanctuaries” located next to a settlement's entrance, in some instances inside the walls (especially in the east and northeast of the peninsula) and in some outside the walls. Sanctuaries located outside the city walls are often located near caves or springs, associated to offerings that suggest fertility rites and rites of passage or social incorporation. Some of these sanctuaries are associated with river ports, such as that in La Muela de Cástulo, or seaports, like that of Artemis, in Sagunto.

The third century BCE is the time of the emergence of great periurban sanctuaries at the territorial level, while territory-wide periurban sanctuaries associated with the construction of ethnic or political projects, coincide with the decline of ritual caves, which were especially common in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. Some of the complexes (El Cerro de Los Santos, La Luz, and La Encarnación in Caravaca Murcia) experimented with a process of monumentalization in the second and first centuries BCE, when they adopted Italo-Hellenistic concepts. Human terra-cotta masks found in some sanctuaries may have been used by the faithful when performing ritual dances like those known to have taken place in the Artemis Orthia sanctuary in Sparta and other locations.

Necropolises show a wide diversity of funerary practices related to cremation. The exceptions are child burials, performed inside homes. Bodies range in age from fetuses to six months old and have been documented in eastern Spain (from Alicante to the French Languedoc) and in the mid-

Ebro River valley. When the remains are found within structures, such as walls or benches, they have been interpreted as sacrificial in nature, having a functional or propitiatory character, and are accompanied by or substitute for animal sacrifices. They have some parallels with those from Etruscan Tarquinia, Latium, and the Greek world.

The iconography offers valuable information about initiatic rites and rites of passage into puberty or heroization. Such subjects as the struggle between a youth and a beast of the underworld, often incarnate in a wolf (portrayed in the pottery of La Alcudia de Elche and in sculptures from the “frontier” sanctuary at El Pajarillo in Huelma, Jaén) were set within city territory. The “goddess of the wolves” found in Moratalla, Murcia, was probably an initiatic figure. Hand-to-hand combat scenes between warriors and hunting scenes also reflect the value system (*ethos*) of the elites. Sacrificial scenes are depicted in such objects as the silver tray of Tivissa (Tarragona), which is dated to the third century BCE; depictions of dances and processions are found in the pottery of Sant Miquel de Liria (Valencia). It is possible that certain themes, such as the sphinx carrying the deceased found in the park of Elche, the pillar of Jumilla, and the wolves with open jaws and human heads of Santisteban del Puerto in Jaén, refer to travel to the afterlife.

The presence of priests in the Tartessian world of the period of Hellenization is documented in the Phoenician sanctuary of Melqart in Cádiz by Silius Italicus (*Punica* 3.1), who writes that the priests wore linen tunics with purple embroidery and shaved their heads. There is no such information regarding the Iberian period after 500 BCE, although archaeological data suggests there was a priesthood. The existence of priests is inferred from sacrificial knives found in graves and sanctuaries, the tonsured characters found in the Collado de los Jardines (Jaén), and the bronze from Segura de la Sierra (Jaén), which is dated to the fifth century BCE and depicts a man slaughtering a goat on the water of a river. These priests would have been recruited among the ruling class and hierarchized according to the types of sanctuaries. Domestically they would have been heads of household.

**Elusive divinities.** In contrast to Indo-European Hispania, the names of the gods worshiped by the Iberian peoples of the coastal regions are not known, with few exceptions, probably because religious acculturation had occurred for centuries and the divine personae were expressed through Punic and Phoenician names (or the Greco-Roman ones with which the Semitic deities were assimilated). One example of such assimilation is in Torrepardones, Jaén. On the forehead of a female stone figure a devotee inscribed, in the second or first century BCE, the caption “Dea Caelestis,” the Latin name of Carthage’s goddess Tanit.

Fortunately iconography contributes to the understanding of certain divine characters. It seems clear that there was a protecting goddess associated with the earth, death, and regeneration. Some depictions, besides aniconic representa-

tions such as pillars, are the statue of the Lady of Baza, the sitting Ladies of El Cigarralejo, La Alcudia de Elche, El Cabe-cico del Tesoro in Verdolay, and probably the Lady of Elche. That goddess, sometimes winged and linked to the Punic Tanit, appears “emerging” from the earth and associated with birds or flowers in Elche-Archena pottery, whereas on some Turdetan coins she is represented as a stalk of wheat. There are about ten examples of representations of the *des-potes hippon*, the “horse-taming” god originally from the Aegean, which appear from Villaricos (Almería) to Saguntum (Valencia). Some votive pieces depicting horses are associated with that deity, like the ones found in El Cigarralejo (Murcia) and Pinos Puente (Granada), as are the Iberian coins from the Ebro Valley, which show the typical rider brandishing a spear or palm, a divinity or mythical ancestor that illustrates the values of the equestrian elites.

The iconography of perfume burners with female heads—associated with Demeter or Tanit—is reproduced in a limestone female head uncovered in La Luz (Murcia), probably a cult image. Perhaps the most interesting of divine iconographies is that of a woman holding her suckling child. Such images were known in Cyprus in the first millennium BCE and were documented in a bronze from the Fundación Gómez-Moreno in Granada, in some sitting statuettes from Alicante and Murcia, and especially in a terra-cotta group from the sanctuary of La Serreta in Alcoy (Alicante) dated to the third and second centuries BCE. Ricardo Olmos Romero (2000–2001) has suggested that the image represents a regional feast where the mothers of the area present their children to the goddess, an event similar to some documented in Locri (southern Italy) and Greece.

Some scenes are interpreted in a mythical key. That is the case of the farmer with a team of oxen depicted in a vase from Cabezo de La Guardia de Alcorisa (Teruel), probably a representation of the god or mythic ancestor who taught men to plow (as Habis did in the Tartessian myth).

**RELIGION IN INDO-EUROPEAN HISPANIA.** Latin epigraphy from the first centuries CE have offered more than five hundred names of deities from Indo-European Hispania (which does not mean so many gods were worshiped, because several names can refer to the same god invoked under different epithets). There is a clear contrast between the western and northwestern regions in the peninsula and the eastern Celtiberian Plateau. Most of the names preserved originate in the former, where Lusitanian, an Indo-European language more archaic than the Hispano-Celtic language known through Celtiberian texts, was spoken. Fewer indigenous names of deities have been preserved in the central areas of the two plateaus of the peninsula or in Celtiberia. That is the result of broader religious acculturation from the Greco-Roman world, which influenced the Iberian peoples of the coast.

**The gods.** The literature on Indo-European gods in Hispania is minimal. Strabo (*Geographica* 3.3.7) states that the peoples of the north sacrificed hecatombs of men and horses to a war god he identifies with the Greek Ares. In an-

other passage Strabo (*Geographica* 3.4.16) says the Galicians were atheists, whereas the Celtiberians and their northern neighbors worshiped an unnamed deity, in honor of whom they danced on nights of the full moon. The supposed atheism of the Galicians contradicts the abundant religious offerings in the northwest, and thus should be interpreted as a denigrating strategy by Strabo to underline the extreme barbarism of the peoples living farther away from the Mediterranean. A minor degree of barbarism must have been that of the Celtiberians, whose gods were yet unnamed (like those of the pre-Greek Carions mentioned by Herodotus (*Historiae* 2.52). On the other hand, Macrobius (*Saturnalia* 1.19.5) mentions that the Accitani of Granada worshiped a god named Neto, astral in nature and equated with Mars, named in a couple of Lusitanian inscriptions and probably appearing as the Neito of the first Celtiberian Bronze Age in Botorrita (Zaragoza).

The cultural geography of the Hispanic Indo-European pantheon allows several levels of differentiation. First are those gods worshiped in ancient Celtica, such as Lugus, the Matres, or Epona. Lugus is the deity worshiped in the mountains of Peñalba de Villastar (Teruel), a great “border” sanctuary between Celtiberia and the eastern Iberian world. His name is also found in Northwest Celtiberia (in the plural, Lugoves). He is an astral god, interpreted to be the Gallic Roman Mercury (Caesar, *Bellum Civile* 6.17). The Matres, who show the Celtic influence of triads (and thus appear represented on a stone in Aquae Flaviae in Chaves, Portugal), are fecundity goddesses worshiped mostly in Celtiberia, as was Epona, the Celtic goddess of horses.

A series of gods are documented mostly in the west of the peninsula. The most common group is formed by four names, Bandua (or Bandis), Cusus, Nabia, and Reva, addressed with various epithets, which probably document the emergence of federative deities and those that protect the territory. But the best-documented Lusitanian deities are Endovellicus and Ataecina. The sanctuary of the former (who seems to be related to Vaelicus, worshiped by the Vettones in the sanctuary of Postoloboso, Avila) is in San Miguel da Mota (Alardoal, Alto Alemtejo, in Portugal), which is under excavation. There are scores of inscriptions with his names, which makes him one of the best-documented gods in the western provinces of the Roman Empire. There are nearly forty inscriptions related to Ataecina, fifteen in the sanctuary of El Trampal (Alcuéscar, Cáceres). Some include the epithet Turobrigensis, a city in Celtic Beturia (Pliny, *Naturalis Historie*, 3.14), from which her cult extended to Sardinia or Noricum. She is mentioned in some execratory inscriptions, and she was assimilated into Proseprina, which suggests she was a diabolical deity.

**Sacred spaces and rites.** In Indo-European Hispania rites were performed in the open air, often in hierophanic spaces and in some instances documented in rupestrian inscriptions. Some sources document human sacrifices among peninsular peoples, such as the Lusitanians (divinatory in na-

ture, Livy, *Periochae* 49; Strabo, *Geographica* 3.3.6), the Bletonenses near Salamanca (Pliny, *Naturalis Historie* 30.12), and the mountain people in the north of the peninsula (Strabo, *Geographica* 3.3.7). The subject is a commonplace of Greco-Latin writings on druidic religion, but such sacrifices must have been exceptional. Such sources are likely to have been used to emphasize the barbarism of “others.”

There is much more evidence of animal sacrifices, documented in sanctuaries, such as the one in Picote, Tras-os-Montes; in inscriptions, such as those in Marecos–Penafiel or Cabeço das Fraguas in Portugal; and in various depictions. Among the depictions are six “sacrificial bronzes” from different locations in the northwest of the peninsula that include cauldrons, torques, or axes. The species mentioned in the Lusitanian inscription from Cabeço das Fraguas (bull, sheep, and pig) correspond to those shown in these bronzes and are similar to the victims of Roman *suovetaurilia* and Indian *sautramani*.

The sanctuary excavated in Castrejón de Capote, Badajoz, is especially important. The site, destroyed by the Romans in the mid-second century BCE, includes an altar with a running bench that opens into the main street of the town. The animal and material remains (knives, a stake, grills, cups, and glasses) give proof of collective sacrifices and banquets celebrated with the cooked flesh of the animals (Berrocal-Rangel, 1994). Similar rituals took place in rupestrian sanctuaries, characterized by the presence of ladders, cavities, and receptacles of different sizes in which the victims’ blood would have been gathered and their entrails handled. They are characteristic of the Celtiberian area, the plateau, and especially the Galician-Lusitanian northwest. The ritual sanctuaries of Ulaca (Avila) and Panoias in Portugal, where inscriptions mention the continuation of the cults into the Roman era, are the most important ones.

Posidonius and other authors (Diodorus, *Bibliotheca Historica* 5.29; and Strabo, *Geographica* 4.4.5 regarding the Gauls) documented the rite among Celtic peoples of “cutting off the head” (“*cabezas cortadas*”) of a prisoner or a defeated foe. In the Iberian Peninsula the practice is recorded in a type of fibula, in which the human heads are depicted hanging from horses, with or without riders, and in some skulls, sometimes perforated by nails, unearthed in Numantia, Ullastret, Puig Castellar, and Garvão, Portugal. They are similar to the skulls displayed in the Celtic-Ligurian sanctuaries of Provence.

There is significant data regarding the role of priests, mostly Celtic, in Indo-European Hispania. Proof of their role is the oracular practice in the sanctuary of Endovellico, in San Miguel da Mota (where epigraphic formulas indicate they received instructions from the deity through dreams—*incubatio*). Further evidence appears in some Celtiberic words that point at priestly functions and in the iconography (in a vase from Numantia, an individual wearing a trunklike tiara sacrifices a rooster on an altar).

Some of the literature sheds light on funeral rites different from the traditional cremation. Silius Italicus (*Punica* 3.340–343) and Elianus (*De natura animalium* 10.22) document how Celtiberians and Vacceans performed a ritual of leaving dead warriors in the open to be devoured by vultures, which carried their souls to the heavens (Sopeña Genzor 1995). The ritual indicates some concepts about an afterlife in the heavens (thus the rich astral iconography found in the Hispano-Roman gravestones of these areas). This is confirmed by scenes depicted in the different stelae and in pottery from Numantia. The rite seems to have been common among other peoples of Celtic Europe and explains the boldness and fearlessness of these peoples for whom, according to Lucanus (*Pharsalia* 1.468), death was but the halfway of a long life.

The statues of the so-called Lusitanian warriors, created under the influence of Romanization, seem to depict deified ancestry and in some instances were placed in the entrance to a village (Santa Comba, Mozinho, or Sanfins). The golden diadems of Moñes in Piloña, Asturias, should be interpreted as scenes of warrior heroization. They depict warriors and riders, birds and fish together with figures carrying enormous cauldrons—receptacles that in the Celtic tradition symbolize abundance and immortality—a key element that is a symbol of the “last voyage.”

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Translated from Spanish by Fernando Feliu-Moggi

#### IBN ʿABD AL-WAHHĀB, MUḤAMMAD

(AH 1115–1206/1703–1792 CE), Islamic fundamentalist teacher who established the Wahhābi movement. He was born in Najd, a central region in Arabia. His father was the judge in the town of al-ʿUyaynah and also taught jurisprudence according to the strict Ḥanbali legal school and traditions. Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb began his study of the Qurʾān and basic Ḥanbalī texts under his father but set out on travels “in search of knowledge” when he was about twenty years old. He went first to Mecca and Medina, where he studied mainly with ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sayf and Muḥammad Ḥāyat al-Sindi. ʿAbd Allāh was a Ḥanbali scholar from Najd who had settled in Medina. Through him, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb became tied to the traditions of Syrian Ḥanbalī

scholarship. Ibn Sayf transmitted the course of studies of the seventeenth-century Syrian teacher ‘Abd al-Bāqī al-Ḥanbalī and instructed him in the works of the great Ḥanbalī jurist and theologian Aḥmad ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328). Al-Sindi was not a Ḥanbalī scholar but a scholar of traditions who came from India; in Medina, he was part of a group of teachers who inspired a spirit of socio-moral revival in students from many areas. It was this basic education, with his father and after, that prepared Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb for his life’s mission: the purification and renewal of Islamic society.

He went next to the city of Basra and the region of al-Ḥasā in eastern Arabia. Although he continued his studies, he also began his mission of purification. In Basra in particular, he opposed popular religious customs as well as the beliefs of the large Shī‘ī Muslim population. Some sources suggest that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb also went to Persia, Syria, and even Egypt; this is, however, highly unlikely, for the sources closest to his lifetime make no mention of these broader travels.

Sometime between 1731 and 1737, he returned to Najd and lived in Ḥuraymilā, where his father was at the time. Following his father’s death in 1740, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb returned to al-‘Uyaynah and received the support of the local ruler for his purification efforts. Soon forced to leave by local opposition, however, he moved to al-Dar‘īyah; there the local leader, Muḥammad ibn Sa‘ūd, swore in 1744 to protect Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and to support his mission. This alliance created a new state based on the fundamentals of Islam.

People from many areas were persuaded by the teachings and writings of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. In addition, as conflicts arose, the military power of the new state brought victory and further expansion. Following Ibn Sa‘ūd’s death in 1765, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb remained a major counselor to his successor, ‘Abd al-Azīz, and continued to preach and write until his death in 1792.

Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb left many works. Although he addressed varied subjects, his writings on *tawḥīd*, or the oneness of God, are the most prominent; the major text in this group is *Kitāb al-tawḥīd*. For him, *tawḥīd* was more than a monotheistic affirmation: it was a rejection of “saint worship” and veneration of anything other than God. A summary of his teachings is presented in *Al-uṣūl al-ṭhalāthah wa-adillatuhā* (The three roots and their proofs). Some of his sermons have been published in *Khuṭab al-shaykh* (Sermons of the shaykh), while some legal decisions are presented in the history written by Ibn Ghannām.

Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb created a movement of renewal at a time of ferment within the Islamic world. During the eighteenth century there were many Muslim groups working for socio-moral reconstruction on the basis of a strict interpretation of Islamic fundamentals. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb was not unique, but he was the most rigorous of the major leaders in rejecting medieval “innovations” and the most intractable in opposing compromises with popular religion.

The immediate result of his work was the creation of a state community in Arabia dedicated to the implementation of his mission. This state was militarily defeated in the nineteenth century but experienced a revival in the twentieth, when it became the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s influence, however, goes beyond this political aspect. Islamic renewal in its Wahhābi form inspired later Muslim thinkers and activists in a variety of areas. For much of the nineteenth century, “Wahhābism” played a role in the Islamic world similar to that of “Khomeinism” in the last part of the twentieth. In intellectual terms, what Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb wrote and taught about themes such as *tawḥīd* became part of the fundamentalist mood in modern Islam. His work was respected by a wide spectrum of thinkers ranging from the relatively fundamentalist Rashīd Rīda in Egypt to the South Asian modernist scholar Muḥammad Iqbāl.

SEE ALSO Wahhābīyah.

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**IBN ADRET, SOLOMON** SEE ADRET, SHELOMOH BEN AVRAHAM

**IBN AL-‘ARABĪ** (1165–1240 CE), known throughout the Islamic world simply as the “greatest master” (*al-Shaykh al-akbar*), is acknowledged to be one of the most important spiritual teachers within the mystical tradition of Islam. A vastly prolific writer and visionary, he is generally known as the prime exponent of the concept of the Unity of Being (*wahdat al-wujūd*), even though that particular term, by which his teachings came later to be designated, was hardly used in his own milieu. His emphasis, as with any mystic,



lay rather on the true potential of the human being and the path to realizing that potential, which reaches its completion in the Perfect or Complete Man (*al-insān al-kāmil*). Ibn al-‘Arabī wrote at least 300 works, ranging from minor treatises to the huge thirty-seven-volume *Meccan Illuminations* (*al-Futūhāt al-Makkīya*) and the quintessence of his teachings, *The Bezels of Wisdom* (*Fusūs al-Hikam*). Approximately 110 works are known to have survived in verifiable manuscripts, some 18 in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s own hand. He exerted an unparalleled influence, not only upon his immediate circle of friends and disciples, many of whom were considered spiritual masters in their own right, but also on succeeding generations, affecting the whole course of subsequent spiritual thought and practice in the Arabic-, Turkish-, and Persian-speaking worlds. In recent years his writings have also increasingly become the subject of interest and study in the West, leading to the establishment of an international academic society in his name.

Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thought is characterized by a profound visionary capacity, coupled with a remarkable intellectual insight into human experience and a thorough knowledge of all the traditional sciences. It has been tempting for scholars to characterize him as a mystical philosopher, a formulation that is rather at odds with his own teachings on the limitations of philosophical thinking. He was as much at home with Qur’anic and *ḥadīth* scholarship as with medieval philology and letter symbolism, philosophy, alchemy, and cosmology. He could write with equal facility in prose or poetry, and utilized the polysemous ambiguity of the Arabic language to great effect—the characteristic resonances of rhymed prose (*saj’*), which are to be found in the Qur’ān, abound in his works. In recent years Western scholars such as Michel Chodkiewicz have begun to explore the radical way in which Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thought is underpinned and inspired by the Qur’ān. He adopts the rich vocabulary of spiritual phenomenology that previous mystics had built up, and gives it both a scriptural basis and an ontological grounding.

The complexity of his writings makes him one of the most demanding of authors, and difficult to comprehend, leading some Islamic scholars to oppose and even reject his positions. Among his admirers, his writing was always considered to be the most elevated exposition of mystical thought in Islam, and therefore unsuitable for the untrained mind. He combines a detailed architecture of spiritual experience, theory, and practice, with descriptions of the attainments of other masters he met and of his own personal visions, insights, and dreams. It is his propensity to recount stories from his own direct experience, primarily in order to make a teaching point, that allows readers to gain such a detailed insight into his inner world, and also allows us to reconstruct his life and times with some accuracy.

**IBN AL-‘ARABĪ’S LIFE.** Born on July 28, 1165, in Murcia, Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad b. ‘Alī b. Muḥammad Ibn al-‘Arabī al-Hātīmī al-Tā’ī, as he signs himself (often shortened to simply Ibn ‘Arabī), was brought up from the age of

seven in Seville, the provincial capital of the Almohad Empire during the heyday of Andalusian Muslim culture. His father served as a professional soldier in the sultan’s entourage, and for a time the son seemed destined to follow in his footsteps. Contrary to the romantic picture painted by later writers, the family was well-off, but neither noble nor very religious. He seems to have been blessed with an extraordinary visionary capacity from a very young age, and the seminal experience of his youth took place when he was about fifteen or sixteen years old. Without having had any formal training and apparently under the impulsion of an irresistible inner demand, he undertook a retreat alone just outside Seville, probably in the ruins of the old Roman city of Italica, where he had a remarkable dream-vision of the three major prophets, Jesus, Moses, and Muḥammad. According to his own testimony, each of them is said to have given him a piece of advice: Jesus, whom he referred to as his first teacher, exhorted him to follow the spiritual life, and instructed him to practice renunciation and detachment; Moses, whom Ibn al-‘Arabī regarded as epitomizing the reception of divine inspiration, promised that he would be given knowledge by God directly, without any intermediary; and, finally, Muḥammad, who rescued him from a host of assailants, told him: “Hold fast to me and you will be safe” (Hirtenstein, 1999, p. 55). As a consequence of this instruction, Ibn al-‘Arabī says, he began his study of *ḥadīth* (reports of the prophet Muḥammad’s words and deeds).

This triple vision also had one other direct result: the great Aristotelian philosopher, Ibn Rushd (Averroës), who was nearing the end of his life in Cordoba, asked to meet him, and their celebrated meeting included a most extraordinary exchange, touching on the very nature of the spiritual quest: in response to Ibn Rushd’s question about whether mystical illumination produces the same results as rational inquiry, Ibn al-‘Arabī replied: “Yes and no, and between the yes and the no spirits take wing from their matter, and necks are separated from their bodies” (*Futūhāt* I.153), leaving the philosopher dumbfounded. This response not only indicates Ibn al-‘Arabī’s understanding of the gulf between the philosophical and the mystical, between intellectual reflection and spiritual retreat, but also his appreciation of how mystical thought can include and accommodate apparently contradictory notions.

Within two years, Ibn al-‘Arabī had irrevocably dedicated himself to a rigorous spiritual life, turning his back on the military career that his father had wanted him to pursue, and entrusting everything he possessed into his father’s keeping. From this time he began to frequent other spiritual masters. An account of the many Sūfī teachers, male and female, that he met in Seville, Córdoba, and other major cities of Andalusia and North Africa is given in one of his most accessible books, *The Spirit of Holiness* (*Rūḥ al-quds fī munāsabāt al-naḥs*), which provides a wonderful insight into spiritual teaching in his time. Some of his teachers were poor and illiterate and referred to Ibn al-‘Arabī as their spiritual son, like

his first master, al-<sup>2</sup>Uryānī, who demonstrated a Christ-like spirituality, or one of his female teachers in Seville, Fatima bint Ibn al-Muthanna, who was already ninety-six years old when they met and appeared superficially as a simpleton, “though she would have replied that he who knows not his Lord is the real simpleton” (Austin, 1988, p. 143). Others were more apparently learned, and introduced Ibn al-‘Arabī to the teachings of the great saint of North Africa, Abū Maḍyan (1115–1198), and to central texts of Sufism. Perhaps the most crucial influence was his friend and mentor in Tunis, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Mahdawī, a master who seems to have shared Ibn al-‘Arabī’s depth and subtlety of mind and with whom he spent two extended periods. In addition to these contacts, Ibn al-‘Arabī undertook a lengthy retreat of at least nine months, following which, in Cordoba in 1190, he experienced a remarkable vision of all the prophets and messengers, from Adam to Muḥammad. In many ways the fruition of the initial triple vision he had had in Seville, this vision would also presage the claim he would later make to being what he called the Seal of Muhammadian Sainthood, the saint who encompasses all the inner meanings of the prophetic message of Muḥammad.

After his first visit outside Andalusia to Tunis where he stayed with al-Mahdawī in 1194, Ibn al-‘Arabī composed probably his first major work, *Contemplation of the Mysteries (Mashāhid al-asrār)*, a series of fourteen visionary episodes and dialogues with God, written specifically for the disciples of al-Mahdawī. His parents died soon after, and as the clouds of war gathered prior to the Almohad victory over the Castilian army at Alarcos in 1195, Ibn al-‘Arabī took his two sisters to the peaceful Moroccan city of Fez, where he arranged for them to be married. With all his family commitments completed, he spent another two years in Fez, where his reputation as a spiritual master in his own right grew. It was here that he experienced his mystical ascension in imitation of the Prophet, recounted in detail in *The Night-Journey (Kitāb al-Isrā’)*: “I gained in this night-journey the true meaning of all the Divine Names, and I saw them returning to One Named and One Essence. This Named was my very object of contemplation; that Essence was my very being” (*Futūhāt* III.350).

In 1198 Ibn al-‘Arabī returned to the Iberian Peninsula for the last time, to bid farewell to the land of his birth. At the same time several other substantial works flowed from his pen, often in response to direct requests from friends and disciples, in particular his Ethiopian companion, friend, and servant, Badr al-Habashī. In Córdoba he attended the funeral of Ibn Rushd, which, poignantly, featured a donkey laden with the master’s body in a coffin on one side, counterbalanced by his works on the other. His decision to leave Andalusia for good may have been partly in response to instability in the wake of the death of the Almohad sultan in 1199, which many saw as marking the end of an age. At the same time, his leaving was certainly also motivated by the desire to accomplish the pilgrimage to Mecca. As he traveled on his

way to Marrakech in 1200, he again underwent a spiritual transformation. He had a vision in which a Ṣūfī saint of two centuries earlier informed him that he had attained the highest degree of sainthood, known as the Station of Closeness.

After spending another six months in Tunis with his friend al-Mahdawī, Ibn al-‘Arabī visited all the major sites of pilgrimage: Hebron, where the Patriarchs are buried; Jerusalem, the city of David and later prophets; Medina, where Muḥammad is buried; and, finally, Mecca, where he arrived in mid-1202. For him, this pilgrimage was a physical reenactment of the ascension he had undertaken inwardly. Three episodes held special significance for him. The first was a meeting with a young girl, Nizam, who “surpassed all the people of her time in refinement of mind and cultivation, in beauty and in knowledge” (Nicholson, 1911, p. 14). The love that she evoked within Ibn al-‘Arabī’s heart led to an outpouring of yearning, and she became the inspiration for his famous collection of poems, *The Interpreter of Ardent Desires (Tarjumān al-ashwāq)*. In the style of the great Arabic *qasīda*, these poems express the poet’s longing for the Divine Beloved, who is ever out of reach but whose traces can be found in the abandoned encampments of the caravan train. This was for Ibn al-‘Arabī the first awakening of love of women, characterized by the tradition that God made women worthy of love for His prophet, and as a consequence he married Fatima, the daughter of a Meccan notable. While Nizam personified wisdom and beauty, her father was a well-known *muhaddith*, or transmitter of prophetic traditions, and Ibn al-‘Arabī assiduously collected these, making one of his works, the *Mishkāt al-anwār*, a collection of 101 *hadīth qudsī* (divine sayings, in which God speaks through the mouth of the Prophet). Ibn al-‘Arabī also states that when he came to know the tradition that God had made women worthy of love for His prophet, he was awakened to love of women, and relinquished his near-monastic life to marry the daughter of a Meccan notable.

The second significant event took place at the Ka‘aba in 1202. During the circumambulation Ibn al-‘Arabī encountered a mysterious Youth, “both speaker and silent, neither alive nor dead, both complex and simple” (*Futūhāt* I.47), who described himself as Knowledge, Knower, and Known. The youth’s being inspired in Ibn al-‘Arabī a series of insights, which he was told to write down and which became his *Meccan Illuminations (Futūhāt)*.

Finally, while writing the *Meccan Illuminations* preface, Ibn al-‘Arabī had a vision of his own role as heir to Muḥammad’s spiritual teaching and Seal of Muhammadian Sainthood: just as Muḥammad had been given the totality of prophetic messages and meanings, so Ibn al-‘Arabī saw himself being granted the “gifts of Wisdoms” in a solemn ceremony of investiture. This privileged status as one who summarizes and completes the spiritual dimension of Islam was confirmed in a dream in the following year, in which he saw himself as two gold and silver bricks that completed the walls of the Ka‘aba.

The momentous years in Mecca saw not only the completion of several works and the initiation of the *Futūhāt*, but also brought Ibn al-‘Arabī into contact with many well-known figures from the eastern lands of Islam. These included direct disciples of the great Baghdad Ṣūfī ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (1077–1166), as well as the adviser to the Seljuk court of Anatolia, Majduddīn Ishāq al-Rūmī (died c. 1215). The latter became a close friend and patron of Ibn al-‘Arabī, and they traveled together to Konya to meet the Seljuk sultan. Typically for that time, Majduddīn was both a man of political power and a spiritual teacher: as adviser to the Seljuk royal family, he encouraged Ibn al-‘Arabī to settle in Majduddīn’s native town of Malatya in southeastern Anatolia, to raise his growing family there, and to benefit people with his teachings. While Ibn al-‘Arabī did live a more settled life writing in Malatya for a time, he also traveled in the Levant, building relations with and serving as adviser to kings and princes throughout the region, from Konya to Baghdad, Aleppo, and Damascus. He had at least two wives and three children—two sons and a daughter. In addition, after Majduddīn died, he took on responsibility for Majduddīn’s son, Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī (d. 1274), who would become his heir and most influential disciple. Ibn al-‘Arabī’s connections to Anatolia would have profound implications for the future course of Sufism there, as his teachings became part of mainstream Ottoman culture.

For the final seventeen years of his life Ibn al-‘Arabī lived in Damascus, under the patronage of a wealthy and influential judge, Ibn al-Zakī. If Tunis may be considered the fulcrum of his Western life as the place where his spiritual training was completed, then Damascus was certainly the axis around which his Eastern career revolved. The writing continued unceasingly, with the first draft of the *Futūhāt* being completed in 1231 and a second recension of the entire work in 1238. As was customary at that time, the whole book was read aloud in sections before a group of friends and disciples, sometimes as large as thirty or more, with the author himself checking that the handwritten text was correct and the names of those present meticulously recorded. These listening certificates (*samā*) are testimony to the enormous respect accorded to Ibn al-‘Arabī by all sections of the spiritual and religious elite, in keeping with which he was named Muḥyī al-Dīn (“the reviver of the religion”), as was his great theological Ṣūfī predecessor, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), who had also taught in Damascus a century before.

It was not only the *Futūhāt* which sealed his reputation: there were other works, most notably a huge *Dīwān* of poetry completed in 1237, and the work that is perhaps his most influential masterpiece, *The Bezels of Wisdom (Fusūs al-Hikam)*, which he states was received from the hand of the prophet Muḥammad in a dream in 1229. The *Fusūs* contains twenty-seven chapters, each related to a particular wisdom as exemplified by one of the prophets whose stories are told in the Qur’ān: for example, the Wisdom of Divinity in the word of Adam (who was created in the divine image, and

thus, just as Allāh is the Name which includes all the Names, is the prototype who includes all humanity); or the Wisdom of Elevation in the word of Jesus (describing the elevated reality of Jesus, born of the water of Gabriel and the water of Mary, as spirit and son of spirit). These twenty-seven prophets represent the different modalities of human spirituality, facets displaying the jewels of divine wisdom, the full meaning of which is understood through the jurisdiction and collective wisdom of Muḥammad, the Seal of prophets. This book has had a perennial appeal, giving rise to at least one hundred commentaries over several centuries and in several languages, and these constitute a whole history of Islamic mystical thought in themselves.

**IBN AL-‘ARABĪ’S THOUGHT.** Ibn al-‘Arabī’s writings reflect a comprehensive explanation of *tawḥīd*, the “Unity of God,” or the assertion that God is One. While this has often been taken to mean the doctrine of the Unity of Being (*wahdat al-wujūd*), the concept his school was later associated with, the crux of his teaching is perhaps better described as the perfectibility of Man, that is to say, the human potential for the fullest realization of Unity, the true nature of existence and the place and function of the human being within the universe. The one who asserts God’s Unity and believes it to be true is capable of being transformed into one who knows what It means (*‘arif*). It is becoming a “knower” or Gnostic that is the prime purpose of all of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s teaching.

Ibn al-‘Arabī deconstructs all systems and reference points except for Being itself, the essence of the Real. This is the only absolute, the base for all phenomena, from which they have come and to which they return. At the same time, we may intellectually conceive of another absolute, pure nonexistence, even though this cannot actually exist, and it is this conception that allows us to distinguish different aspects of Being. Sheer Being or Light cannot be perceived, embraced, or understood by any other than Itself, so none knows God but God. In fact this Absolute One is a total negation of all things, without exception. It is absolutely non-manifest, undetermined, unarticulated: even Allāh, God, can only be considered as Its outward face with regard to things. Being is refracted as “things,” which lie in the relative ambiguity of being both existent/light and nonexistent/dark. Thus the world of creation, which is everything other than God, from the highest spirits to the densest matter, can be viewed as either dark or light, relative nonexistence or existence. In one respect, the thing is He; in another respect, it is not Him. This plurality is one of aspects, not an ontological multiplicity. All aspects refer to God, the One who is named by all Names. “The creation is intelligible,” Ibn al-‘Arabī writes, “and God is perceptible and visible, according to the people of faith and the people of unveiled insight and experience” (Austin, 1980, p. 108). He emphasizes the mutual dependence of God and the world: without the world of creation, God cannot be known as Creator; without living things, God cannot be recognized as the Living.

According to Ibn al-‘Arabī, these two mutually dependent sides must constantly be borne in mind, if the relation-



ship between God and universe, Reality and appearance, is to be truly understood: on the side of nonexistence there are all the possibilities of being or immutable entities (*al-a’yān al-thābita*), which he says “have never smelt the breath of existence” (Austin, 1980, p. 76); on the side of existence there are the divine names, attributes, qualities, and actions. It is because of nonexistence that God is described as transcendent (*tanzīh*), and because of existence that He is known as immanent (*tashbīh*). The first qualification is accomplished through the use of reason, whereas the second is made through the exercise of imagination. By employing both faculties, reason and imagination, together properly, the mystic becomes “the one with two eyes,” that is to say, someone with perfectly balanced vision. The two aspects of God, transcendence and immanence, are summarized for Ibn al-‘Arabī by the Qur’anic verse “There is no thing like Him, and He is the Hearer, the Seer” (Qur’ān 42.11).

Ibn al-‘Arabī’s creed of rigorous Unity is at the same time one of supreme tolerance of diversity and openness to fresh understandings. Throughout his writings he frequently cites an earlier author who wrote that “in everything there is a sign pointing to the fact that He is One” (*Futūhāt* I.491). Each created thing is at once a “receiver” of Divine Being and a “place” where God is manifest (*mazhar*). Whether it is a gnat or an angel, every created thing has a particular dignity and closeness to God that demands respect. Insofar as it has no being of its own, its quality is what is implied by nonexistence, i.e., total dependence and humility; insofar as it manifests the Divine Being, it is imbued with divine qualities such as Knowing and Living.

The two fundamental aspects of all existence, which give rise to all the paradoxes and ambiguities of life, are reconciled for Ibn al-‘Arabī in the heart of Perfect or Complete Man, who is receptive to all possible manifestations at every level, and has no particular inclination to one side over the other. While everything in the universe manifests certain divine aspects, it is only in and to Man that God is fully revealed and the meaning of the universe is made clear. Ibn al-‘Arabī uses a Qur’anic account to contrast, for example, the elevated glorification of God by which the angelic host praise Him with the divine command for them to prostrate before Adam. Although the angelic nature appears to be the closest to the divine, the angels do not possess the all-embracing nature of Man, who is created in the divine image and possesses knowledge of every level and degree.

Because the ordinary perception of the world is that of multiple existences, each self-subsistent and different from others, it follows that human beings are veiled from their true reality by ideas of self-existence. Revelation, in different forms at different times but culminating in the total revelation granted to Muḥammad, is needed to establish proper divinely guided modes of living. True fidelity to the essentials of religious law, however, is only possible for one who realizes its inner spiritual significance. To return to one’s primordial nature voluntarily while in this world (rather than

by the inevitable way of death) demands the shedding of illusions. This journey of awakening ends with the complete annihilation (*fanā*) of all other than God, out of which arises a new kind of existence (*baqā*, literally “remaining”) in full consciousness. Here the true human being becomes “the one with two eyes,” seeing the One and the many, God in the creature and the creature in God, without being veiled by either. The world is seen as the theater of divine theophanies (*tajallī*), renewed at each instant by the “breathing-out” of God. This Ibn al-‘Arabī calls “the Breath of the All-Compassionate,” a loving outpouring relieving the Divine Names from their state of constriction in latency and allowing them fullness in expression. There is, he stresses, “no repetition in revelation”: no two moments are the same for anyone, nor is one moment the same for two people.

Prophets and saints are those who have realized their essential nonexistence, and return again to the world as guides who act in accordance with the celebrated divine saying (*hadīth qudsī*): “I was a Hidden Treasure and I loved to be known; so I created the world that I might be known.” (*Futūhāt* II.399). For them God is forever manifest, as the veil of their own selfhood has been rent.

**CONTINUITY AND INFLUENCES.** The impact of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s teachings is difficult to measure: although no dervish order was founded in his name, their influence has been at the heart of much of Ṣūfī teaching ever since. Commentaries on well-known texts have sometimes used Ibn al-‘Arabī’s terminology and teachings, as in, for example, the famous commentary on Rūmī’s *Mathnawī* by the Mevlevi *shaykh*, Ismā‘il al-Anqarāwī (d. 1631). The list of those who can be considered his direct followers reads like a roll call of some of the most famous masters and authors in Sufism: from his adopted son and heir, Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī—who taught in Konya at the same time as his friend, Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, successfully transmitting the heritage of Ibn al-‘Arabī to succeeding generations, and whose famous library preserved so many of his works—to Mu‘ayyiduddīn Jandī (d. 1300), ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (d. 1329), Dā‘ūd al-Qaysarī (d. 1350), and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 1492). Ibn al-‘Arabī’s work also inspired poets, such as the wandering dervish Fakhr al-Dīn ‘Irāqī (d. 1289) and the author of the *Gulshan-i-rāz* (The rose-garden of mystery), Maḥmūd al-Shabistarī (d. 1320), as well as those of a more philosophical mind like Mullā Ṣadrā of Shiraz (d. 1640). There were many others who did not write books of their own but developed a very deep spiritual affinity with Ibn al-‘Arabī, such as Mehmet Uftade (d. 1580), one of the great Ottoman masters who numbered Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent among his disciples.

While Ibn al-‘Arabī’s works have been publicly adopted at certain times by some Islamic governments, notably the Ottoman Empire and Iran, they have not been universally accepted within the Islamic world and have often been rejected as heretical. Later Muslim scholars have disagreed about the validity of his teaching: some were bitterly antagonistic

to what they saw as heretical philosophizing endangering the moral framework of the whole community; others were equally keen to defend Ibn al-ʿArabī's religious orthodoxy and spiritual stature. This long polemic over Ibn al-ʿArabī's legacy, with all its ambiguities and shifting positions, has lasted until the present day, and reflects both the central importance of the issues he addressed, and the fascination that the multifaceted writings and personality of the "Greatest Master" have exerted.

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**IBN AL-FĀRID** (AH 576–632/1181–1235 CE), more fully Abū Ḥafṣ or Abū al-Qāsim ʿUmar ibn Abī al-Ḥasan



'Alī ibn al-Murshid ibn 'Alī; often called the greatest mystical poet in the history of Arabic literature. His father, known as al-Fāriḍ because his profession was the allocation of shares (*furūd*) in cases of inheritance, migrated from his native Hama in Syria to Cairo, where Ibn al-Fāriḍ was born and where he lived and died.

Though little is known about his life, there is evidence that he married and had at least two sons and a daughter. He studied *ḥadīth* and Shāfi'ī law in his youth, but his spiritual bent was such that he preferred solitary devotion in the desert or on Mount al-Muqaṭṭam, east of Cairo, and he finally became a Ṣūfī. After a long sojourn in Mecca, he returned to Cairo and was venerated by the populace as a saint.

He is said to have been handsome, righteous, and awe-inspiring yet pleasant and sociable. Later generations ascribed supernatural powers to him, following the example of his own grandson, 'Alī, who wrote an introduction to Ibn al-Fāriḍ's *Dīwān* (Collected works) and filled it with several fantastic tales. This may have been a defensive effort to exonerate the poet from accusations of heresy such as those made by Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328) and others regarding the practices and pantheistic tendencies of certain Ṣūfīs.

The *Dīwān* of Ibn al-Fāriḍ is slim, and the poems in it are of varying lengths. Dominated by the theme of love, they are couched in a beautiful style of great tenderness and sensitivity in which the sounds, patterns, and rhetorical conceits of the language are natural elements of the moods and ideas they convey. Capable of being read as love lyrics, they are intended to be expressions of mystical yearning for God. This is true even of the only wine poem in the *Dīwān*, in which intoxication with wine is but a symbol of union with the divine beloved.

Almost half of the *Dīwān* is occupied by a single poem of 761 verses entitled *Nazm al-sulūk* (Poem of the way), often referred to as "The Greater Ode Rhyming in T" to distinguish it from a shorter poem of 103 verses also rhyming in the letter *t*. Considered Ibn al-Fāriḍ's masterpiece, this ode is unique in its description of the mystic's experience of God and of the harmony achieved through realizing the union of phenomenal existence and pure Being. It has so intrigued subsequent generations of Ṣūfīs by its exquisite beauty and mystical truths that many have written large volumes commenting on it, including al-Farghānī (d. 1300), al-Qāshānī (d. 1334), al-Qaysarī (d. 1350), Jāmī (d. 1492), al-Būrīnī (d. 1615), and al-Nābulusī (d. 1730). The commentaries of the last two were combined by Rushayd ibn Ghālib al-Daḥḍāḥ (d. 1889). Commentaries have also been written on the *Khamrīyah* (Wine poem) illuminating its mystical symbolism and explaining its religious and literary allusions.

A Ṣūfī order named al-Fāriḍīyah was known to exist in Egypt during the sixteenth century and claimed to originate from Ibn al-Fāriḍ, but it does not seem to be in existence today. The poet's tomb, however, still stands in a well-known shrine at the foot of Mount al-Muqaṭṭam in Cairo.

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**IBN 'ATĀ' ALLĀH** (AH c. 650–709, c. 1252–1309 CE), more fully Ahmād ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm ibn 'Atā Allāh al-Iskandarī, was an Arab Ṣūfī saint and sage of Egypt. He was the third great master of the Shādhilī order of Sufism founded by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī (d. 1258) and the first shaykh of the order to reduce its teachings and practices to writing. Born in Alexandria into an illustrious dynasty of Mālikī religious scholars, he early evinced mastery in all of the religious disciplines and became an authority on Islamic law while professing antagonism toward Sufism. But a chance encounter with his future Ṣūfī shaykh, Abū al-'Abbās al-Mursī (d. 1287), dramatically transformed him into an ardent contemplative, and he became an authority in both the law and the spiritual path in a relatively short time. Most of his life was spent in Cairo as a Ṣūfī shaykh and as a teacher of the exoteric religious disciplines.

He wrote many works on Sufism and religious topics, a half dozen of which have been particularly popular in Ṣūfī circles over the centuries and have gone through a number of reprints in recent times. The best known of these is his *Kitāb al-ḥikam* (Book of Aphorisms), a series of maxims of great beauty on Ṣūfī spirituality that has produced many commentaries by Ṣūfīs and become a classic in the field because its comprehensive and poetical formulations may easily be memorized. He defended Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240) and other Ṣūfīs against the Ḥanbalī fundamentalist theologian Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328), who objected to their monistic speculations.

In the course of time, some of the works of Ibn 'Atā' Allāh have become practically canonical among the Shādhilīyah; later masters constantly cite him. At his death his funeral procession was immense. He was buried in the

Qarāfah cemetery of Cairo where his tomb, recently totally renovated with a new mosque and minaret, has for long centuries been visited by the pious. Lately he has become the object of a number of studies by scholars because of his preeminence in Sufism and the fact that the Shādhilī order has shown a continuing vitality down to the present.

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VICTOR DANNER (1987)

**IBN BĀBĀWAYHI** or Ibn Bābūyah (AH 306?–381/918?–991 CE), Abu Ja’far Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī, known as al-Ṣadūq (“the veracious”), was a Twelver Shī’ī jurist and traditionist. Very little is known of his life. According to popular belief, he was born after his father, a leading figure in the Twelver community of Qom, had asked the Hidden Imam to pray that he be granted a son. The father had a decisive influence on Ibn Bābawayhi’s early upbringing and education. Following the custom of his day, Ibn Bābawayhi traveled widely in search of knowledge. He came to Baghdad in 963 CE and, after a stay of more than a year, proceeded to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage before returning to Baghdad via Kufa in 966.

Ibn Bābawayhi was a frequent visitor to Nishapur and other Khorasani cities and was regarded by many as the leading light of Khorasani Twelver Shiism. His travels took him as far as Transoxiana, which he visited in 979. At some point in his career he established contacts with the western Iranian city of Rayy. These contacts were reinforced around 983, when Rukn al-Dawlah, the Buyid ruler of Rayy, asked him to take up residence at the court. Rukn al-Dawlah became Ibn Bābawayhi’s patron, and in return Ibn Bābawayhi provided answers to questions that his benefactor put to him on matters of doctrine. Ibn Bābawayhi was highly esteemed in Rayy, although his influence seems to have waned somewhat toward the end of his life. He died and was buried in Rayy, where a domed shrine was erected over his tomb.

Ibn Bābawayhi was a prolific writer, although fewer than twenty of some three hundred works ascribed to him have survived. Even so, the surviving works are greater in number than those of any other older or contemporary Twelver author, and their impact on subsequent generations

has been considerable. *Man lā yahḍuruhu al-faqīh* (Every man his own lawyer) is Ibn Bābawayhi’s best-known work. As the title suggests, the need for such a work arose after the disappearance of the twelfth imam—the so-called greater occultation (*ghaybah*), which began in 941—who was no longer available to answer questions on religious practice. This work was completed in 979 and became one of the four standard legal textbooks of Twelver Shiism. Shorter legal compilations are *Al-hidāyah* (Guidance) and *Al-muqni‘ fī al-fiqh* (Sufficiency in jurisprudence).

Ibn Bābawayhi’s mastery of Twelver traditions also comes to the fore in works such as the *Thawāb al-a‘māl* and *‘Iqāb al-a‘māl*, which include traditions on the reward and punishment, respectively, for praiseworthy or evil actions; the *‘Ilal al-sharā’i‘*, in which many traditions are adduced in explication of the reasons underlying various religious obligations; and the *Kitāb al-khiṣāl*, where traditions describing myriad qualities and actions are grouped in order of increasing numbers, from one to one million. Ibn Bābawayhi’s *‘Uyūn akhbār al-Riḍā* is an invaluable mine of information on the life and times of the eighth imam, ‘Alī al-Riḍā (d. 818), while *Ikmāl al-dīn wa-itmām al-ni‘mah* (The perfection of religion and completion of blessing, a title harking back to *sūrah* 5:3 of the Qur’ān) is one of the earliest and most exhaustive expositions of the doctrine of the twelfth imam, his occultation, and his future reappearance as the Mahdi (Messiah).

Ibn Bābawayhi’s interest in questions of dogma led him to compose the *Risālat al-i‘tiqādāt*, the earliest extant Twelver creed. The views that he upholds there are in general agreement with those of earlier Twelver thinkers, yet they are at times less deterministic and anthropomorphic. He thus holds that the will of God encompasses everything, including evil deeds, but then defines this will as foreknowledge. In contrast to some Twelver traditionists, he denies the possibility that God may be seen in the hereafter. Because of his declared opposition to theological disputation (*kalām*), Ibn Bābawayhi, in the creed and elsewhere, relies almost totally on traditions of the imams, to the exclusion of reasoning. For this he was criticized by his renowned pupil Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 1022) in the latter’s *Taṣḥīh al-i‘tiqād* (Correction of the Creed). Al-Mufīd also attacked Ibn Bābawayhi’s position on some specific matters, such as his contention that the immunity (*‘iṣmah*) of prophets and imams from sin and error did not preclude the possibility of inadvertent mistakes, which God might induce in them to show that they were merely human. In his later years Ibn Bābawayhi was obliged to modify his anti-*kalām* views in the face of attacks by the Mu‘tazilāh, whose rationalist theology came increasingly to dominate Twelver thinking. This change is particularly evident in his *Kitāb al-tawḥīd* (The book of the unity of God).

As the example of al-Mufīd shows, Ibn Bābawayhi was not without his critics, whose main complaint was that he relied on traditions of dubious authenticity. It is perhaps to counter such complaints that the honorary appellation

al-Ṣadūq was conferred on him. later generations of Twelver scholars are virtually unanimous in viewing Ibn Bābawayhi as one of the pillars of Twelver Shiism. His work may in fact be regarded as adumbrating the full-fledged Twelver literature of the eleventh century.

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ETAN KOHLBERG (1987)

**IBN BĀJJAH** (d. AH 533/1139 CE), known in Arabic as Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā ibn al-Ṣā'igh and in Latin as Avempace, was the founder of Islamic metaphysics in Andalusia. Ibn Bājjah was also a poet and musician, an astronomer who dismissed the Ptolemaic epicycles, a politician, and a man of affairs. Born in Saragossa, reportedly of Jewish ancestry, he became a vizier when Saragossa fell to the Almoravids in 1110, but he was subsequently imprisoned while on an embassy to the former ruler. After his release, he avoided the Christian conquest of Saragossa by withdrawing to Valencia, only to be imprisoned for heresy at Játiva. This time Ibn Rushd's father or grandfather secured his release. He served twenty years as vizier to Yaḥyā ibn Yūsuf ibn Tāshufīn, lived in Seville and Granada, circulated to Oran, and died in Fez, reportedly poisoned.

Some thirty brief works preserve Ibn Bājjah's philosophy. Despite the distractions that, according to Ibn Ṭufayl, prevented him from fully clearing the storehouses of his wisdom (Goodman, 1983, p. 99), Ibn Bājjah contributed three distinctive, closely related ideas to the philosophical progression from al-Fārābī to Ibn Rushd.

1. His theory of the soul's "conjunction" (*ittiṣāl*) with the divine (namely, the Active Intellect) explains the common goal of mysticism, philosophy, ethical self-perfection, and metaphysical quest Platonically, as the consummation of an intellectual progress by which humankind is purified of material attachments and regains its true spiritual identity. By speaking of "contact" rather than simply union, and by interposing the Active Intellect between humankind and God, Ibn Bājjah attains a balance that eluded the more "inebriated" mystics (whom he criticized for their sensuality) and avoids their twin paradoxes—that humanity's identity is lost when it is finally fulfilled and that human becomes God just when

it has annihilated the self. For pantheistic oneness Ibn Bājjah substitutes at-oneness, by reading "union" cognitively, as communion. Thus the intellectuality of Ibn Bājjah's vision preserves a quasi identity for the beatified soul.

2. The beatified souls, which ceaselessly sanctify God, are united to the Active Intellect by their contact with it; lacking matter as a principle of individuation, they cannot be differentiated from one another. This artful application of the Neoplatonic insight that the notions of ordinary arithmetic do not apply to disembodied substances is later taken up in Ibn Rushd's mono-psychism; it is further clarified by Ibn Ṭufayl's deployment of the Plotinian argument that the notions of identity and difference proper to the arithmetic of bodies are inapplicable to spiritual substances. Maimonides, who proudly stated that he studied under a disciple of Ibn Bājjah, treated Ibn Bājjah's approach (when properly qualified by the realization that disembodied things can still be differentiated as cause and effect) as the solution to the problem of the arithmetic of souls.

3. Much as Plotinus had recoiled from "this blood-drenched life," Ibn Bājjah looked to fulfillment for the individual despite rather than through the social community and its cultural traditions. In a synthesis of prophetic and ascetic withdrawal, he suggests, like al-Fārābī, that the spiritual adept find a true home beyond the very categories of this life. The gesture is completed again in Ibn Ṭufayl's vivid contrast of the cultural confinement and symbolic opacity of legalism and ritualism with the free and individualistically responsible insight of the spirit of the "solitary."

Ibn Bājjah's philosophy contrasts sharply with his worldly life, but Ibn Ṭufayl, the disciple who never met him, clearly paints in the lines of force that mark the powerful movement of the philosopher from revulsion with pettinesses, shams, and hypocrisies to the higher, purer realm that achieves fuller definition by the contrast.

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L. E. GOODMAN (1987)

**IBN DAUD, AVRAHAM** (1110–1180), known in rabbinic texts by the acronym RABAD I (Rabbi Avraham ben David), to distinguish him from Rabad II, Avraham ben Yitshaq of Narbonne, and Rabad III, Avraham ben David of Posquières, was a Spanish astronomer, historian, and philosopher. Avraham ibn Daud ha-Levi is best known for his history of the Jewish people, *Sefer ha-qabbalah* (*The Book of Tradition*; 1161), and his comprehensive Jewish philosophy, *Al-'aqidah al-rafiyah* (*The Exalted Faith*; 1168). He also published a work on astronomy (1180) that has not survived.

*The Book of Tradition* consists of a history of (1) the biblical period, (2) the Second Commonwealth, (3) the tannaim, (4) the amoraim, (5) the savoraim, (6) the Geonim, and (7) the rabbis after the Geonic period. On the surface, this work is a history of the Jewish people from its origins to the time of Avraham ibn Daud. But in reality, as the work's prologue and epilogue make clear, it is a detailed theological polemic that uses history. Against the Karaites, Muslims, and Christians who claimed that rabbinic tradition does not correctly record the revelation given to the children of Israel at Sinai, Avraham argues that rabbinic tradition is authentic. It is an unbroken chain of transmission of testimony to the true meaning of the divine revelation at Sinai by witnesses whose integrity is beyond question. In other words, the goal of *The Book of Tradition* is not to write the history of a people; rather, it is to show that the rabbinical account of the revelation at Sinai is true. The rabbis' testimony is to be accepted because all of the leaders of the rabbinic communities involved in the chain of tradition from Moses through Ezra to the rabbis of Andalusia in the twelfth century were individuals of intelligence and good character who therefore could be trusted to understand what they were told and to communicate the information they received honestly, without prejudice or distortion. Therefore, all accusations by Israel's enemies to the effect that rabbinic Judaism is a perversion of the theophany at Sinai are without foundation.

Whatever will be the ultimate judgment of historians on the accuracy of Avraham's history, *The Book of Tradition* has served as a prime source of information about Jewish history for Jewish and Christian historians from Avraham's own day to the twenty-first century. The seventh part of the book is considered authoritative for the history of Andalusian Jewry, because it in effect amounts to an eyewitness report. But the earlier sections of the history also continue to have great authority for modern Jewish history; for example, they remain the basis for the list of the generations of tannaim and amoraim in the studies of classical Judaism by scholars such as Isaac Weiss, Hermann Strack, and G. F. Moore.

*The Exalted Faith* is the first work of Jewish philosophy to apply the diverse elements in the thought of Aristotle to a religious philosophy of Judaism. Avraham's arguments and statements are not so developed as those of later Jewish Aristotelians such as Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides, 1288–1344), but his work is the most comprehensive of all the Jewish Aristotelians. Avraham does not cite his contemporary

sources, but he was clearly influenced by Ibn Sīnā (980–1037), Sa'adyah Gaon (892–942), and Yehudah ha-Levi (c. 1075–1141).

*The Exalted Faith* is divided into three books. Book 1 deals with those presuppositions in Aristotelian natural science that are needed to explain what Avraham considers to be the basic principles of Judaism. Book 2 uses the claims in book 1 to explain what Avraham judges to be the basic principles of Jewish faith, namely, God's existence, oneness, and attributes (Principles 1–3); the existence and function of angels (Principle 4); the authenticity of the written Torah and rabbinic tradition (Principle 5); and divine providence (Principle 6). Book 3, "On Spiritual Healing," reads as an addendum to the treatise, the proper conclusion of which is the final principle of book 2.

Avraham asserts that the whole of *The Exalted Faith* was written to solve the problem of necessity and human choice. In the past the rabbis knew a great deal about science and religious law, but in his own time that is not the case. Those who know science know little about Jewish law, and those who know Jewish law know almost no science. This deplorable state of affairs leads many religious Jews to think that the study of science is in itself harmful to Jewish religious commitment. But the price they pay for ignoring science is that they lack the appropriate training that would enable them to grasp the fundamental principles of religious law. Hence, they are not equipped to provide a viable solution to fundamental questions of Jewish faith. The treatise is intended for Jews who have mature minds but insufficient knowledge and, in consequence of both conditions, are religiously confused. In other words, *The Exalted Faith* is intended to be a guide for the perplexed Jews of Avraham's time.

*The Guide of the Perplexed* (1190) of Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon, 1135/8–1204) overshadowed *The Exalted Faith* in subsequent Jewish philosophy. Maimonides' writings clearly exhibit Avraham's influence, but that is not to say that the two Jewish philosophers have the same philosophy. Clearly they do not. For example, Maimonides rejects Avraham's claims that being Jewish in some way is relevant to the qualifications for prophecy, and that to some extent God's relations with the world enable human beings to have positive knowledge of God. Also, Avraham's accounts of all of the sciences are vastly more detailed than the mere hints of information contained in *The Guide*. In fact, no other work in Jewish philosophy is so comprehensive as Avraham's. Book 1 in itself is an excellent introduction to medieval Aristotelian philosophy and science for modern students. It includes a reasonably detailed explanation of philosophical concepts such as substance and accident, as well as all of Aristotelian physics, psychology, and astronomy. (Only Levi ben Gershom presented a more detailed astronomy.) Similarly, book 2 provides an excellent introduction to classical Jewish philosophy and theology for modern students. In addition to its topical breadth, Avraham's work



combines the atomistic and Neoplatonic teachings of the earlier generations of Jewish philosophers such as Sa'adyah Gaon and Yehudah ha-Levi (whose works he transcends but does not abandon) with new Aristotelian themes that subsequent Jewish philosophers such as Levi ben Gershom and Hasdai Crescas would develop in the fourteenth century. Students of Jewish history and Avraham's *Book of Tradition* will be especially interested in the fifth principle of part 2, in which Avraham spells out in detail the philosophical grounds and the theological purposes of his earlier history of the Jews.

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NORBERT M. SAMUELSON (1987)  
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**IBN 'EZRA', AVRAHAM** (c. 1089–c. 1164), was a Jewish biblical commentator and poet. Born in Christian Spain, Ibn 'Ezra' was educated both in traditional Jewish literature and in secular subjects. He was a friend of the theologian and poet Yehudah ha-Levi and recorded his answer to Yehudah's question about God in his commentary on *Exodus* 20:2. After leaving Spain in 1140, Ibn 'Ezra' spent the rest of his life traveling through Italy, France, and England. Most of his works were written during this period.

In his travels Ibn 'Ezra' carried with him the intellectual achievements of Judeo-Muslim culture in Spain. One of the first to write on secular subjects in Hebrew (rather than Ara-

bic), which required that he develop a technical vocabulary for standard scientific terms, he exposed Jews outside the Iberian Peninsula to the sophisticated study of Hebrew grammar and to other new areas of scholarly investigation.

Ibn 'Ezra' wrote several original treatises on mathematics, astronomy, and scientific instruments, chapters of what may have been intended as an encyclopedia of astrology, and Hebrew translations of Arabic scientific works, some no longer extant in the original. More a systematizer than a profoundly original scientific thinker, he was important for his transmission of Arabic science to the West and for his efforts to integrate all bodies of knowledge with biblical exegesis and Jewish doctrine. Some traditionalists viewed him as a dangerous proponent of possibly heretical teachings.

The poetry of Ibn 'Ezra' broke away from classical Andalusian Hebrew poetics to a more popular mode. *Hay ben Mekiz*, modeled after Abū 'Alī Ibn Sīnā's (980–1037) *Ḥayy ibn Yaḳẓān*, is perhaps the first attempt at sustained allegory in medieval Hebrew literature. At the same time Ibn 'Ezra' was one of the last of the Spanish liturgical poets. His commentary on *Ecclesiastes* 5:1 contains an apologia for the newer, Spanish style, celebrating clarity of expression and purity of biblical diction. His commentary also contains an incisive critique of the older form, represented by the great medieval liturgical poet El'azar Kallir, for its intermixing of biblical and rabbinic Hebrew, grammatical errors, and intentional obscurity. Poetry used in prayer, he argued, must be intelligible to the masses.

*Yesod Morā'* (c. 1160) treats many standard problems of medieval Jewish religious and ethical thought. The *Iggeret ha-Shabbat* was written to defend the traditional Jewish view that the Sabbath begins at sundown on Friday evening.

Ibn 'Ezra' composed commentaries on all the books of the Hebrew Bible, although some have been lost. The introduction to his commentary on the Torah provides a critical review of contemporary biblical exegesis. Four types of commentators are censured: (1) those who frequently incorporate scientific treatises into comments on biblical phrases; (2) the Karaites, who reject rabbinic tradition; (3) those who make the Torah into a cryptic expression of esoteric doctrine; and (4) those who fill their commentaries with homiletic interpretations from the rabbis. Ibn 'Ezra' then outlines his own method, heavily dependent upon grammar and semantics. His plan was first to explain each problematic word and then to explicate the simple meaning of the passage as a whole.

These biblical commentaries remained the most enduringly influential part of Ibn 'Ezra's oeuvre, engendering more than a dozen supercommentaries, many of which attempted to elucidate the "secrets" to which he occasionally referred. Some of his interpretations were scathingly rebutted by Moses Nahmanides (Mosheh ben Nahman, 1194–1270), who referred to his "open rebuke and hidden love" for Ibn 'Ezra'. Barukh Spinoza (1632–1677), in chapter eight of *Theological-Political Treatise* (1670), cited the comments of



Ibn 'Ezra' on *Genesis* 12:6 and *Deuteronomy* 1:1 as evidence that the medieval commentator had anticipated his own position in questioning the Mosaic authorship of the entire Pentateuch.

**SEE ALSO** Literature, article on Critical Theory and Religious Studies; Nahmanides, Moses; Spinoza, Baruch; Yehudah ha-Levi.

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MARC SAPERSTEIN (1987 AND 2005)

**IBN GABIROL, SHELOMOH** (c. 1021–1058), known in Latin texts as Avicbron, Avencebrol, and Avicembron; Jewish poet and the first Jewish philosopher in Spain. Ibn Gabirol was born in Malaga, was raised in Saragossa, and died in Valencia. He is best known in the Jewish community as the author of secular, ethical, and liturgical poetry that reflects Jewish faith under the influence of both Neoplatonism and Ṣūfī poetry. His poems include *Ha-‘anaq*, a 400-verse Hebrew grammar that he composed when he was twenty

years old; *Azharot*, a rhymed enumeration of the 613 commandments of the Torah; and *Keter malkhut* (*The Royal Crown*), his most famous liturgical poem, which is a part of the liturgy for the Day of Atonement.

*The Royal Crown* contains four sections. The first two deal with names of God, the third presents Ibn Gabirol's cosmology, and the fourth is a confessional prayer. The overall theme of the poem is the great distance between God and man, and Ibn Gabirol's description of the structure of the heavens in section three reinforces his account of this vast separation. The universe is arranged in five parts, consisting of the sublunar world, the supralunar world (the heavens), the sphere of Intelligence, the "Throne of Glory," and the Will of God (or God's Wisdom).

Of particular importance in Ibn Gabirol's spiritual cosmology are the doctrines of divine glory (*kavod*) and the throne of glory (*kisse ha-kavod*). The soul is generated from the radiance of the former, and the latter is the place under which the souls of the righteous are stored after their separation from their bodies and until the end of days. Ibn Gabirol's eschatology reflects the tension within his own thought between his affirmation of the traditional rabbinic belief in a final end of humanity that is a return to corporeal life and his interpretation of this belief via a Neoplatonic schema that identifies the realm of spirit with good and the realm of body with evil. The result of the tension is that he spiritualizes the nature of the world to come (*ha-'olam ha-ba*). Hence, the final vision is not of a particular place at a particular time, but simply of an idealized perfection, a *sum-mum bonum*, of the human soul.

In 1045 Ibn Gabirol composed an ethical study in Arabic, *Islah al-akhlaq* (On the improvement of the moral qualities), which was translated into Hebrew by Yehudah ibn Tibbon in 1167 under the title *Tiqqun middot ha-nefesh*. Man's soul, Ibn Gabirol says, comes from the realm of Intelligence and enters Nature, but it remains between these two realms throughout its embodied life. Its goal during this life is to return to the level of Intelligence by means of knowledge and practice. Perhaps the most original part of this book is the correlation that Ibn Gabirol draws between virtues and vices, the external human senses, the humors, and the four elements of the sublunar world (air, water, earth, and fire). All human beings are composites of these elements and corresponding humors. A proper balance of these components produces human virtues, whereas an imbalance produces vices.

Ibn Gabirol's major philosophic work is *Yanbu' al-hayat* (*The Fountain of Life*), of which no copies of the original Arabic text have survived. It was translated into Latin in 1150, under the title *Fons vitae*, by Dominicus Gundisalpinus, archbishop of Segovia, with the assistance of a Jewish convert. In the thirteenth century Shem Ṭov ben Yosef Falaquera translated excerpts from the original into Hebrew under the title *Liqqutim mi-sefer meqor hayyim*; Jewish scholars apparently felt no need to prepare a Hebrew translation

of the entire work, since the Aristotelian Avraham ibn Daud had judged it to be excessively verbose, philosophically shallow, and religiously questionable. Ibn Daud's critique of *The Fountain of Life* in his work *The Exalted Faith* (1168) is a major reason why Ibn Gabirol's philosophic masterpiece was ignored by subsequent generations of Jewish philosophers.

A philosophic study of matter and form, *The Fountain of Life* is devoid of any direct reference to biblical or rabbinic texts or doctrines, which in itself explains why subsequent Christian scholars could mistake this book's author for a Muslim or a Christian. In fact it was only in 1845 that Salomon Munk identified Avicebron, the author of *Fons vitae*, as Ibn Gabirol, the author of *Meqor hayyim*.

*The Fountain of Life* is divided into five treatises. The first is a general introduction of the topic of matter and form and their relation to physical substances. The second deals with the substance or matter that underlies the corporeality of the sublunar world. The third is a proof of the existence of simple substances, which function in Ibn Gabirol's ontology as intermediaries between God and the physical world. The fourth is a proof that these simple or spiritual substances are composed of form and matter, and the fifth treatise is an account of the universal form and universal matter that underlie everything in the universe except God.

The main thesis of the work is that everything in God's universe has matter as well as form, a doctrine severely criticized by Ibn Daud and ignored by all subsequent Jewish philosophers until Barukh Spinoza. While *The Fountain of Life* had little influence on Jewish thought, it was a major influence on thirteenth-century Christian philosophy. The main thesis was adopted by Duns Scotus and the Neoplatonic Franciscans, while it was opposed by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and the Aristotelian Dominicans. Among the Christian thinkers who explicitly referred to Avicebron were Dominicus Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, William of La Mar, and Giordano Bruno.

**SEE ALSO** Ibn Daud, Avraham; Jewish Thought and Philosophy, article on Premodern Philosophy.

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NORBERT M. SAMUELSON (1987 AND 2005)

## IBN ḤANĀBILAH SEE ḤANĀBILAH

**IBN ḤAZM** (AH 384–456/994–1064 CE), more fully Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad ibn Saʿīd ibn Ḥazm, was

a Muslim theologian and man of letters. Born in Cordova to a rich and influential family, Ibn Ḥazm received a distinguished education in religious sciences, literature, and poetry. Nonetheless, he grew up in a period of disruptive ethnic and clan rivalries that saw the decline of the Umayyad caliphate at Cordova and the formation of tiny kingdoms fighting among themselves. His own childhood was marred by the disgrace of his father after the fall of Caliph Hishām II and by the destruction of the family home at Balāṭ Mughīth in the course of bloody battles between Arabs and Berbers.

As a result of his political activities on behalf of the legitimist (Umayyad) party, Ibn Ḥazm met with imprisonment, banishment, and flight but was appointed to high positions as well, serving as vizier at least twice, under ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III al-Murtadā and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān V al-Mustazhir, and possibly a third time under the last caliph, Hishām al-Mu‘tadd. Profoundly disappointed by his political experience and offended by the conduct of his contemporaries, Ibn Ḥazm subsequently left public life and devoted his last thirty years to literary activities.

His writings are quite personal, shaped by the intensity of his own reactions and rigorous in their condemnation of what is, in fact, only human nature. *Ṭawq al-ḥamāmah* (The dove’s neck-ring), a youthful work that was clearly revised later, is interesting in several respects. As a collection of prose passages and poetic illustrations on the subject of love and lovers, it offers a fairly standard treatment of a popular theme in Arabic literature. What sets it apart, however, is Ibn Ḥazm’s penetrating observation of human psychology, a trait found in his later study of characters and conduct, *Kitāb al-akhḫāq wa-al-siyar*, as well. Underlying the delicate charm of the prose and poetry in *Ṭawq al-ḥamāmah* is an uneasy sensibility. Questioning, for example, the sincerity of exchanges between women and their lovers, Ibn Ḥazm finds a gap between what is said and what is thought and concludes that language often serves to mask thought. This otherwise commonplace discovery of dishonesty provides him in turn with a basis for profound reflection on language and its wider uses, and it is here that he introduces the notion of *zāhir*, the “apparent” or literal meaning of words.

This line of thought is further developed when Ibn Ḥazm examines the word of God. In opposition to the Mālikīyah, he argues that people are bound to obey only the law of God, in its *zāhir* or literal sense, without restrictions, additions, or modifications. Although he was originally a Shāfi‘ī jurist, Ibn Ḥazm joined the Zāhirī school and brought to it a systematic structure of logic. For the interpretation of sacred texts, he put together a Zāhirī grammar in which he specifically eliminates the ambiguities that grammarians were using to explain certain syntactical forms. He takes the position that language itself provides all that is necessary for the understanding of its content and that, therefore, God, who revealed the Qur’ān in clear (*mubīn*) Arabic, has used the language to say precisely what he means. Each verse should be understood grammatically and lexically in its

immediate and general sense: When God wants a verse to have a specific meaning, he provides an indication (*dalīl*), in the same verse or elsewhere, which allows the meaning to be restricted.

The significance of a Qur’anic text can also be determined by a *ḥadīth* recognized as authentic after careful critical examination; a verb in the imperative, for example, can be taken as a command, but also as a suggestion: The meaning can be determined only from the literal sense of the context. From this position, it follows that Ibn Ḥazm strongly criticizes the use of reasoning by analogy (*qiyās*) and the principles of personal evaluation: the pursuit of what is considered good (*istiḥsān*), the pursuit of values for the common good (*istiṣlāḥ*), and most of all, the recourse to personal opinion (*ra’y*) by which the jurists sought to extend divine law to cases not mentioned in the texts (*nuṣūṣ*). In the same spirit, he limits the basis of consensus (*ijmā‘*) to the companions of the Prophet; the agreement of the community of scholars on a legal question does not authorize the derivation of a law.

In *Al-iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām* (Judgment on the principles of *Aḥkām*), Ibn Ḥazm develops his method for classifying human acts within the five established juridical categories (*aḥkām*) of obligatory, recommended, disapproved, forbidden, and lawful: For an action to fall into one of the first four categories, there must be a text (Qur’ān or authentic *ḥadīth*) that establishes its particular status; otherwise, the act is lawful. This method is further applied in his voluminous treatise on Zāhirī law, *Kitāb al-muḥallā* (The book of ornaments).

Ibn Ḥazm is also famous for his great work, the *Fiṣal* (Detailed critical examination), in which he offers a critical survey of different systems of philosophical thought in relation to religious beliefs among the skeptics, Peripatetics, brahmans, Zoroastrians and other dualists, Jews, and Christians. Using the examination of these religions to establish the preeminence of Islam, he also attacks all the Muslim theologians, the Mu‘tazilah and the Ash‘arīyah in particular, along with the philosophers and mystics. His main objection is that each of them raises questions about the revealed text only to resolve them by purely human means. Ibn Ḥazm does not deny recourse to reason, because the Qur’ān itself invites reflection, but this reflection must be limited to two givens, revelation and sense data, because the so-called principles of reason are in fact derived entirely from immediate sense experience. Thus reason is not a faculty for independent research, much less for discovery.

By submitting humans exclusively to the word of God, Ibn Ḥazm’s literalism frees them from any choice of their own. His drive for synthesis leads him to demonstrate the harmony of all the Qur’anic and prophetic texts through the application of Zāhirī principles. As a result, his work constitutes one of the most original and important monuments of Muslim thought.

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ROGER ARNALDEZ (1987)

*Translated from French by Miriam Rosen*

**IBN KHALDŪN** (AH 732–808/1332–1406 CE) was a Muslim historian, famous as the first systematic theoretician of the social, economic, psychological, and religious forces that determine human history and society. Born in Tunis into an aristocratic and scholarly family that had left Seville for Northwest Africa almost a century earlier, he received the thorough education customary among the Muslim middle and upper classes. Entering government service shortly after he lost his parents and many of his teachers to the Black Death, he soon left Tunis and in 1354 arrived in Fez, where he was well received by the Marinid ruler but also had to suffer the customary tribulations of political involvement.

The Northwest African period of his life included a sojourn of a little over two years in Andalusian Granada (December 1362–February 1365), during which he undertook a diplomatic mission to Christian Seville, and over three years of quiet retirement from active politics (1375–1378) in rural Qal'at Ibn Salāmah (province of Oran). There he started work on his great history of the world (*Kitāb al-'Ibar*) and completed its "introduction," the *Muqaddimah*, in 1377. Returning to his native Tunis in order to complete the history, he reentered government service but soon felt that his position at court was shaky. Under the pretext of going on the pilgrimage to Mecca, he left Tunis in October 1382 for Egypt. There he spent the rest of his life as a college professor and administrator and achieved the zenith of his career with an appointment to the prestigious and influential Mālikī judgeship. His religious experience was enlarged by a pilgrimage to Mecca (1387–1388) and, in particular, a visit to the holy cities of Palestine (1400). A meeting with the Mongol ruler Timur in Damascus early in 1401 was another noteworthy event of his Egyptian period. He died unexpectedly in Cairo on March 17, 1406.

Ibn Khaldūn's approach to religion was conditioned by the fact that he lived in a Muslim society and was a prominent member of its religio-juridical establishment. Both as an enormously complex institution and as a powerful religious force in society, Islam is always present in his work and his thought. The encyclopedic outline of Muslim civilization in the *Muqaddimah* contains brief and factual sketches of the religious sciences and institutions; these sketches are admirably persuasive and have proved useful, for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, as a first introduction to the subject. The historical development of the sciences connected with the Qur'ān, the prophetic traditions (*ḥadīth*), and jurisprudence is analyzed in a deceptively simple manner, and the great political-theological problems agitating Muslim society, such as the character of the caliphate and the ever present messianic expectations, are discussed astutely.

A matter of vital concern in Ibn Khaldūn's life and time was the religious and social meaning of the relationship of Islam, in its dominant traditional manifestation as a sum of fundamentalist theology and law, to the individual and group emotionality of internalized religion represented by Sufism (*taṣawwuf*, "mysticism"). He is credited with a legal responsum (*fatwā*) and historical description and discussion of theories on mysticism, that expands on the chapter devoted to Sufism in the *Muqaddimah*. He supports traditional Sufism and rejects its ecstatic, seemingly antinomian forms, while being fully aware of their great impact on society. Other supernatural sciences, that were taken very seriously throughout medieval Islam, such as sorcery, astrology, and "scientific" attempts at divining the future, are discussed as to their compatibility with the traditional religious outlook. In general, Ibn Khaldūn applies a sense of realism to his basic concern with the forces governing human society. His approach to the religious/political institutions and religious sciences of Islam is predicated upon the assumption that human rationality, different though it is from revealed religion, affects them as it does all other cultural activity. Even where psychological or supernatural factors appear to be involved, humankind's task is to rely on reason, seconded by observation and experience, for understanding and explaining its world.

This approach raises the question of how Ibn Khaldūn reconciled his views on the normal course of human affairs with the dominant religious traditions and beliefs. The importance of his work results from his remarkable attempt to explain the historical processes in human terms, assumed by him to possess universal validity. Culture, equated with human life, is seen as dependent upon population density, a natural assumption in premodern times possibly confirmed for people in the fourteenth century by the devastation of the Black Death. The innate human psychological need to belong and give political support to a group dominated by one or more leading personalities, for which Ibn Khaldūn chose the code word *'aṣabīyah*, translated approximately as "group feeling," is instrumental in producing the circular ebb and

flow of concentrations of political power necessary for all civilization; religious convictions are beneficial, at times even indispensable, for an *‘aṣabiyyah* to achieve its potential. Economic factors—to a large extent controllable by proper human management, provided that the wisdom and will for it are present—complete the picture of human society, or societies, as based upon reason, numbers, and psychology.

What role, then, belongs to the principal religious tenets of Islam, such as God, prophecy, and the other world? Ibn Khaldūn could not disregard this question. He takes for granted the undeniable reality of the vast metaphysical structure set up by traditional Islam. Although he argues that prophecy cannot be proved by logical means, and he explains prophecy, on the human side, as depending on an extraordinary power of the soul, he accepts as a matter of course the existence of a succession of chosen human beings who are transmitters of the divine message, culminating in the prophet Muḥammad. Metaphysical forces are seen to have exercised a large, and often lasting, influence in certain ages, particularly at the origin of Islam. The potential for divine interference in human affairs at any given time continues to exist. Such interference, however, as in the form of miracles whose occasional occurrence cannot be denied, constitutes an interruption of the ordinary and need not be reckoned with in studying human society and the rules governing it. The widespread speculation about the end of the world concerned him only inasmuch as it was a belief that tended to conflict with political realities. There was practically no need for him to discuss life after death, which he accepted as a powerful belief.

It is tempting to ascribe to Ibn Khaldūn a kind of secularism and even claim for him a tendency to separate religion from politics and sociology. This view is anachronistic and disregards Muslim reality. Ibn Khaldūn was not an original religious thinker, but he showed a deep and no doubt genuine appreciation of the importance of Islam and religion in general. As befitted his position in life, he was sincere in his reverence for traditional Islam and the dogmas and practices it had produced. His individual religious views were not such as to cause much of a stir among his contemporaries, and there was little reason for later generations to pay attention to them. It was his way of looking at history that deeply impressed succeeding historians, especially among the Ottoman Turks. The full significance of his achievement began to find worldwide appreciation in the nineteenth century.

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FRANZ ROSENTHAL (1987)

**IBN RUSHD** (AH 520–595/1126–1198 CE), better known in Western sources as Averroës, was the last outstanding Arab philosopher and commentator of Aristotle. Ibn Rushd was born in Córdoba, the capital of Muslim Spain (*al-Andalus*) in 1126, into a family of prominent (Mālikī) religious scholars. His full name in Arabic is given as Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Rushd, and he is reported to have studied jurisprudence (*fiqh*), Arabic letters (*adab*), theology (*kalām*), philosophy, and medicine with a number of eminent teachers, some of whose names are given in the biographical sources. None of his philosophy teachers are mentioned by name, but he is reported to have had the highest regard for Ibn Bājjah (Avempace, d. 1139), who was responsible for introducing Aristotle into al-Andalus and was the first Arab philosopher in that part of the Islamic world. In addition, Ibn Rushd was a friend of Ibn Tufayl (d. 1185), author of a well-known philosophical novel, *Ḥayy Ibn Yaḡzān*, which has been compared to *Robinson Crusoe*. Ibn Tufayl, who was the royal physician of the caliph, Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf, introduced Ibn Rushd in 1169 to that prince, who was apparently genuinely interested in philosophy, but complained of the “abstruse idiom of Aristotle or his (Arabic) interpreters.” Thereupon, Ibn Rushd was commissioned to comment on Aristotle's works for the use of the caliph and was appointed Mālikī judge (*qāḍīn*; *qāḍī*) of Seville and later chief judge of Córdoba. In 1182, he was appointed royal physician at the court of Marakesh, where he died in 1198 at the age of seventy-two; he was buried in his birthplace of Córdoba.

When Abū Yūsuf, surnamed al-Manṣūr, succeeded his father in 1184, Ibn Rushd continued to enjoy royal patronage, but in 1195, probably in response to public pressure instigated by the Mālikī jurists, who were averse to the study of philosophy and the “ancient sciences,” Ibn Rushd's fortune took an adverse turn; he was exiled to Lucena, to the southeast of Córdoba; his books were burned; and the study of philosophy and the sciences, with the exception of astronomy, medicine, and arithmetic, was prohibited. Ibn Rushd's disgrace, however, did not last long and he was soon restored to favor, but died shortly after.

**WRITINGS.** Ibn Rushd's writings fall into five distinct categories: philosophical, theological, juridical, medical, and linguistic.

His philosophical writings consist of a series of commentaries—long, intermediate, and short (i.e., summaries or paraphrases)—of the whole Aristotelian corpus with the exception of the *Politics*, totaling thirty-eight titles, which have



survived in Arabic, as well as Hebrew and Latin translations. In addition, he wrote paraphrases of Plato's *Republic* and the *Isagoge* of Porphyry; commentaries on *De intellectu* of Alexander of Aphrodisias, the *Metaphysics* of Nicolaus of Damascus, and the *al-Magest* of Ptolemy; and a series of original tracts titled *On the Intellect*, *On the Syllogism*, *On the Conjunction with the Active Intellect*, and *On the Heavenly Sphere*. To these tracts should be added a number of polemical tracts, aimed at al-Fārābī (d. 950) and Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037).

The theological treatises include the *Decisive Treatise* (*Faṣl al-Maqāl*) and the *Exposition of the Methods of Proof* (*al-Kashf*), to which his rebuttal of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī's *Incoherence of the Philosophers*, discussed below, might be added. Ibn Rushd's juridical writings include two treatises on jurisprudence, of which the *Primer of the Discretionary Scholar* (*Bidāyat al-Mujtahid*) has survived. His medical writings consist of *al-Kulliyāt*, translated into Latin as *Colliget*, as well as the short tracts *On Fever*, *On the Humors*, and *On Theriac*. There are also a number of paraphrases or summaries of Galen's medical treatises and finally a commentary on Ibn Sīnā's medical proem, known as *al-Urjūzah*. Ibn Rushd also wrote a solitary treatise on Arabic grammar.

**DEFENSE OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE.** Philosophy, which found its way into the Arab Muslim world in the eighth century, was not always well received in intellectual Islamic quarters, but came into collision with Islamic theology (*kalām*) towards the middle of the ninth century. The philosophical-theological confrontation reached its climax in the last quarter of the tenth century, when al-Ghazālī, generally regarded as the greatest theologian of Islam, launched his onslaught against the philosophers in a classic work of antiphilosophical polemic entitled *Incoherence of the Philosophers* (*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*), published in 1085. Almost a century later, Ibn Rushd took up the cudgels against al-Ghazālī in a book entitled *The Incoherence of the Incoherence* (*Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, 1180). Shortly before, Ibn Rushd wrote the already-mentioned *Decisive Treatise* (1178) and *Exposition of the Methods of Proof* (1179) to defend the thesis of the harmony of the religious law (*sharī'ah*) and philosophy (*ḥikmah*) and to define the subject matter of theological enquiry respectively.

In the first of these two treatises, Ibn Rushd sets out to prove that religious law has indeed "commanded" the study of philosophy, which he defines as "the investigation of existing entities and their consideration insofar as they reveal their Maker." He supports this claim by reference to a series of Qur'anic verses that call upon humankind to "investigate the kingdom of the heavens and the earth" (7:184), "to reflect upon the creation of the heavens and the earth" (3:191), and "to consider, you people of understanding" (59:2).

This investigation, reflection, or consideration, Ibn Rushd goes on to argue, is only possible by means of rational deduction (*qiyās*), which he contrasts with legal deduction, or analogy, which had been sanctioned from the earliest times by legal scholars. If the latter is religiously admissible,

he says, the former ought to be as well. To do this, the seeker of religious truth must first acquire a thorough knowledge of the various forms of deduction, the demonstrative (*burhānī, apodeictic*), the dialectical, the rhetorical, and the sophistical, corresponding to the four types of syllogism given in Aristotle's *Organon*. The highest of these forms of deduction, according to Ibn Rushd, is the demonstrative, which is the prerogative of the philosophers, followed by dialectic, the prerogative of the theologians (*Mutakallimūn*), and the rhetorical, the prerogative of the masses at large. The sophistical form is naturally excluded as invalid.

To illustrate the methodology he proposes in the *Decisive Treatise*, Ibn Rushd proceeds in the *Exposition* to list and discuss the major propositions that constitute the subject matter of what was known in the Middle Ages as Scholastic theology, discussed for instance in the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). The list opens with the existence of God, his attributes, and his creation of the world, followed by questions concerning the commissioning of prophets, divine decree and predestination, and resurrection.

In connection with the proofs of the existence of God, Ibn Rushd is critical of the Ash'arite proof, which rests on the two premises of the creation of the world in time and its composition of indivisible particles or atoms, neither of which, according to him, is demonstrable or certain. His own proof, which he believes to be embodied in the Qur'ān, is the teleological, or as he calls it, the proof from divine providence (*'ināyah*) or invention (*ikhtirā'*).

**REBUTTAL OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S INCOHERENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHERS.** A pivotal aspect of Ibn Rushd's philosophical output is the rehabilitation of philosophy, which had come under constant assault almost from the start. The most devastating such assault was launched by the great Ash'arite theologian and mystic al-Ghazālī in his *Incoherence of the Philosophers*, by whom he meant al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, the chief Islamic interpreters of Aristotle, according to him. Those philosophers, al-Ghazālī argues, should be charged with irreligion (*kufī*) on three questions and heresy or innovation (*bid'ah*) on seventeen. The former questions or propositions are the pre-eternity of the world, God's knowledge of universals but not of particulars, and the denial of bodily resurrection. The remaining seventeen include the post-eternity of the world; the inability of the philosophers to prove conclusively the existence of God, his unity, or his simplicity; and their assertion of a necessary causal "correlation" between natural occurrences that neither observation nor reason warrants.

In his rebuttal, Ibn Rushd counters the first charge by arguing that the philosophers distinguish between "continuous" and "discontinuous" creation and hold that the former, known in the Middle Ages as *creatio ab aeterno*, is more appropriately predicated of God. Ibn Rushd counters the second charge by arguing that God's knowledge is generically different from human knowledge insofar as it is the *cause* of the object known, whereas human knowledge is the *effect* of

that object, on the one hand, and its modality is unknown to us on the other. Finally, he counters the third charge by asserting that bodily resurrection is a matter in which all the religious scriptures, including the Qur'ān, the Gospels, and the Jewish scriptures, concur. Belief in bodily resurrection and the similar religious dogmas should not be questioned insofar as they are preconditions of happiness and virtue in this life, and, although not philosophically demonstrable, they should be adhered to on moral, social, and pragmatic grounds.

On the question of necessary causation, Ibn Rushd argues along Aristotelian lines that the repudiation of causality is tantamount to the repudiation of scientific knowledge altogether, since such knowledge is grounded in the knowledge of the specific properties of existing entities and the way in which they impinge on each other as causes and effects.

**ETHICS AND POLITICS.** Ibn Rushd's contribution to ethics is embodied in his summary of Aristotelian ethics and a middle commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which has survived only in Latin translations. More interesting in this context is his *Paraphrase of Plato's Republic*, which has survived in Hebrew and Latin translations and in which he discusses at some length the interrelation of the two "practical" sciences of ethics and politics. He states in the preface that he has elected to paraphrase Plato's famous political treatise because Aristotle's *Politics* "has not fallen into our hands." He does not appear to be aware of the fact that the Aristotelian treatise was never translated into Arabic in his day and was only translated from Greek in 1957 by Augustin Barbara.

In his paraphrase (*jawāmi'*), Ibn Rushd distinguishes the two practical sciences of ethics and politics, whose object is action, from the theoretical, whose object is scientific knowledge. Ethics, he then argues, has a certain analogy with medicine insofar as it has, like medicine, two subdivisions: hygienic and therapeutic. The former is concerned with the way in which habits and voluntary modes of behavior or traits become ingrained in the soul; the latter with the way in which those habits or modes of behavior are restored once they are gone. All the practical virtues, however, are subservient to the theoretical, which consist of the rational, deliberative, moral, and technical, corresponding to Aristotle's table in the *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, or reason (*nous*), practical wisdom (*phronesis*), and practical art (*techné*).

Politics, by contrast, is concerned with those modes of association in which the human is a political animal (*zoon politicon*) and is forced to choose, by dint of the need for security and survival, as Plato held in the *Republic*, Book I. Ibn Rushd agrees with Plato that the state, like the individual soul, has three parts—the rational, the spirited (*thymos*), and the appetitive—with which the perfection of each is bound up. Thus, a person is described as wise to the extent the rational part of his or her soul rules the spirited and the appetitive. A person is courageous to the extent his or her spirited part is subservient to the rational, and temperate to the extent his or her appetitive part is subservient to the rational as well.

The same is true of the state and its parts. When all the parts of the soul or state are rationally ordered, the supreme virtue of justice arises. This virtue is defined at the individual level as "the way in which everyone of the (soul's) parts (i.e., the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive) does only what it has to do in the appropriate manner and at the appropriate time." At the collective or the political level, justice is stated to be "nothing more than that every man in the state does the work that is his by nature in the best way he possibly can." This is achieved once the class that possesses the virtues of knowledge and wisdom (i.e., the philosopher-king and the guardians) are allowed to rule the two subordinate classes of auxiliaries (the military) and laborers.

**LATIN AVERROISM: IBN RUSHD IN THE WEST.** Less than three decades after his death, the commentaries of Ibn Rushd found their way into Western Europe in Hebrew and Latin translations. The interest of the Jews in his writings stemmed from the high regard in which he was held by his countryman, the great Jewish Aristotelian, Moses Maimonides (d. 1204). By 1230, Michael the Scot, Herman the German, and William of Luna rendered into Latin the greater part of Ibn Rushd's commentaries. No sooner had these translations found their way into learned circles in France and Italy than they caused a major intellectual stir. First, they led to the rediscovery of Aristotle, whose philosophy was almost completely forgotten since the time of Boethius (d. c. 525), the Roman consul and author of the *Consolations of Philosophy*, who had translated the whole logical corpus of Aristotle, known as the *Organon*, and commented on parts of it. Secondly, they contributed to the rise of Latin Scholasticism, one of the glories of late Medieval philosophy, as Étienne Gilson has put it, which prior to that rediscovery was inconceivable. Thirdly, they contributed to the rise of European rationalism, which Gilson has attributed in his *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (1938) to the influence of that "Arabian philosopher (meaning Averroës). . . who bequeathed to his successors the ideal of a purely rational philosophy, an ideal whose influence was to be such that, by it, even the evolution of Christian philosophy was to be deeply modified" (p. 38).

By the middle of the thirteenth century, as a consequence of Ibn Rushd's influence, Latin philosophers and theologians split into rival groups, the pro-Averroists, represented by Siger of Brabant (d. 1281), Boethius of Dacia (d. 1284), John of Jandun (d. 1328), and others; and the anti-Averroists, represented by Thomas Aquinas, his teacher Albertus Magnus (d. 1280), and others. The controversy between the two groups reached such a pitch that the bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, was forced to issue in 1270 the first condemnation of fifteen heretical propositions, thirteen of which were of Averroist inspiration. This was followed in 1277 by a second condemnation of 219 propositions of Averroist and Aristotelian inspiration.

In the next century, Dante Alighieri (d. 1321) advanced in his *De Monarchia* an antipapalist and secularist thesis

based on Averroës's theory of the "possible intellect," which was met with staunch opposition from ecclesiastical quarters. In 1327, Dante was condemned as an Averroist and his *De Monarchia* was burned in the public square of Bologna by order of Pope John XXII.

The anti-Averroist group, led by Thomas Aquinas, challenged the Averroists on three major counts: the unity of the intellect, the eternity of the world, and the scope of divine providence. In his famous tract, *De unitate intellectus, contra Averroistas*, Thomas Aquinas challenges Averroës's interpretation of Aristotle's view of the intellect as both universal and transcendent, and accordingly susceptible of immortality in both its possible and active capacities.

On the question of the eternity of the world, Thomas Aquinas contends, following the lead of Maimonides in his *Dux Perplexorum*, that Aristotle did not actually assert the eternity of the world in a conclusive way, but had in two of his works, *Topica* and *De Coelo*, regarded it as simply probable. As regards the scope of divine providence, Averroës explicitly, and Aristotle by implication, were accused of a rigid determinism that left no scope for divine intervention in the form of miracles.

Latin Averroism continued to gain ground in Padua, Bologna, and elsewhere in Italy well into the sixteenth century. The chief Averroists of the period were John of Jandun (d. 1328), Marsilius of Padua (d. 1343), Urban of Bologna, Paul of Venice, and others.

Pietro Pomponazzi (d. 1525), who tended to follow Alexander of Aphrodisias in his interpretation of Aristotle, was nevertheless in agreement with Averroës that religion has a purely pragmatic, social, and ethical function insofar as it contributes to private and public morality. The chief Averroists of the sixteenth century included Niphus and Zimara, the two most accomplished commentators on the works of Aristotle and Averroës during that period.

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**IBN SĪNĀ** (AH 370–428/980–1037 CE), more fully Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Sīnā, known in Latin as Avicenna; Muslim philosopher and physician. Ibn Sīnā was born in Afshana, a village near Bukhara. Today a city in Uzbekistan, Bukhara was at that time the capital of the Samanid rulers, for whom Ibn Sīnā's father worked.

**EDUCATION.** Ibn Sīnā grew up in a bilingual environment; his native language was Farsi (Persian), but the language of his education was Arabic. The heritage of these two cultures was to lead to the two very different lines of his influence on later thinkers.

The education provided for Ibn Sīnā by his father was very wide-ranging, encompassing both Muslim religious studies and secular subjects from the Arabic, Greek, and Indian traditions. He began by memorizing the Qur'ān and much of the didactic literature known as *adab*, then went on to study Muslim jurisprudence (*fiqh*). His father and brother were followers of the Isma'īlī branch of Shī'ī Islam, which encouraged the study of hermetic philosophy, Neoplatonism, and mathematics. Ibn Sīnā did not become an Isma'īlī but did study these subjects, as well as "Indian calculation," probably meaning the use of the Hindi (Arabic) numerical system. When he reached ten years of age, his father hired a tutor to teach him Greek philosophy and science. For the next several years he studied Aristotle's logic, Euclid's geometry, and Ptolemy's astronomy and quickly surpassed his tutor in his knowledge of these subjects.

From age fourteen or fifteen Ibn Sīnā continued his studies on his own, reading the texts and commentaries in the natural sciences, metaphysics, and medicine. He excelled in this last subject, to the point that he was practicing and teaching it by the time he was sixteen. He completed his education in the following year and a half, reviewing and mastering all the branches of philosophy: logic, mathematics, natural science (or physics), and metaphysics. He was helped in his understanding of metaphysics by the commentary of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950 CE), whose commentaries on Greek philosophy and original writings had a great influence on Ibn Sīnā. In his attack on both Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī, the great theologian al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) was to consider their views virtually identical.



**PUBLIC LIFE.** Ibn Sīnā's entry into public life began during this period of study, when he was summoned to treat the Samanid emir in Bukhara and then became part of his court. He was to spend the rest of his life—the next forty years—as a courtier, with all of the vicissitudes of fortune which that position usually entails. He held both medical and political positions in a number of courts in areas that are today part of Iran and the central Asian republics, usually being forced to leave a given territory by “necessity,” as he laconically calls it. At several courts he was an important minister, but the jealousy of rivals and an undoubtedly arrogant attitude toward his intellectual inferiors (virtually everyone he met) brought about his downfall and imprisonment or hasty escape from most of these courts.

During the time of this active political involvement, Ibn Sīnā was also engaged in writing a large and influential corpus of works on medicine and all branches of philosophy. Many of these works have been lost, and many that exist today are unedited, so we cannot speak with certainty about his philosophical development. Most of his major writings have survived, however, with the exception of *Al-inṣāf* (The judgment), in which he compared the Eastern and Western views of Aristotle's philosophy. This work was lost during his lifetime; it might have answered some of the questions about his philosophy which exist even today. The two most influential of his works, *Al-qānūn fī al-ṭibb* (The canon of medicine) and *Al-shifā'* (The healing [of the soul]), were written over a period of years and were intended to be compendia of their subjects, medicine and philosophy. Most of his other major writings that can be dated were composed during the last thirteen years of his life, which he spent in Isfahan or on campaign with its ruler, as his official physician and courtier. During this period he composed some works in Farsi, such as the *Dānish-nāmah-i 'Alā'ī* ('Alā'ī philosophy), and oversaw the translation of some of his earlier Arabic treatises into Farsi. In all, more than 130 works by Ibn Sīnā have survived to this day, many of them found only in manuscript form in Middle Eastern libraries.

Ibn Sīnā was interested in all branches of knowledge, religious and secular. Once, in order to avenge a slighting remark about his knowledge of Arabic philology, he spent three years studying the subject, then wrote several letters imitating exactly the greatest prose stylists in the language, and concluded his study by writing a book on the subject. Most of his surviving writings are of this sort: accounts of one aspect or another of the learning of his time, often in response to questions posed by his contemporaries. His philosophy is presented more systematically in his major works: the *Shifā'*; the *Najāt* (Salvation [from error]), a selection of the most important parts of the *Shifā'*; *Ishārāt wa-al-tanbīhāt* (Instructions and remarks), the last of his major writings; and the *Dānish-nāmah-i 'Alā'ī*. The *Shifā'*, for example, is divided into four parts, treating logic, physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; the first three parts are further subdivided, thus covering virtually all of the subjects of philosophy.

**THOUGHT.** As can be seen from his major writings, Ibn Sīnā wished not merely to study all knowledge but to synthesize it as well. Aristotle's philosophy, Neoplatonism, Islamic religious teachings, and quite possibly Zoroastrian concepts were all present in his intellectual background, and traces of all of these traditions can be found in his thought. In his cosmology, for example, he adopts the Neoplatonic theory of emanation from a Necessary Existent through a series of Intelligences to the Active Intelligence, from which emanate the vegetative, animal, and rational souls and the material basis of the sublunary world. This emanation is necessary, since it is implicit in the nature of the Necessary Existent, as is its absolute goodness.

The Necessary Existent is the only exception to Ibn Sīnā's absolute distinction between essence and existence. For the Necessary Existent, essence and existence are identical; for all other existents they are separate. Even though the Necessary Existent is the Prime Cause of the created universe, the latter is independent of the Necessary Existent, which has no control over the good and (necessary) evil resulting from the process of emanation. Thus he employs Neoplatonic ideas in his attempt to harmonize the theory of Aristotle, which regards matter as coeternal with the Prime Mover, and the belief in creation by God *ex nihilo* held by Muslims. He was later criticized by Ibn Rushd (Averroës; d. 1198) for not following Aristotle more closely and was accused of heresy by al-Ghazālī for not accepting creation *ex nihilo*.

In his exposition of the relationship between human beings and the Necessary Existent, Ibn Sīnā likewise advocates a position that draws upon Neoplatonism to synthesize the various positions current in his time. Each human being, he states, is composed of body, soul, and intelligence. The highest aspect of the human being, the intelligence, desires to reach its perfection, to return to the source from which it has emanated. Passing back through the various stages of emanation, which Ibn Sīnā compares to passing through the stages of the mystical path, the individual intelligence ultimately achieves union with the Necessary Existent. There are similarities between this view and Aristotle's position that the greatest human happiness is found in the godlike activity of contemplation. However, in no sense could a part of the human soul become identified with the Prime Mover in Aristotle's system. Ibn Sīnā is closer to an Islamic position in his discussion of the relationship of humans to the Necessary Existent. But it is not the orthodox theological doctrine, which stresses the absolute separateness of human beings and God, that he approaches in his account. Rather, it is the Šūfī, or mystical, view of the divine-human relationship. His mysticism differs from that of most Šūfīs, however, in his argument that the *'arīf* (“knower,” or, perhaps, “Gnostic”) can attain the *ma'rifat Allāh* (“knowledge of God”) by his own will; he does not need God's grace to achieve this state of illumination.

In recent years, students of Ibn Sīnā's religious thought have found traces of Zoroastrian influence, in addition to the

influences of Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, and Islamic ideas. His theory of the role of the Intelligences in the universe bears a resemblance to the angelology of Zoroastrianism, and much less to the traditional Islamic view of angels as God's vicegerents and messengers. The individual must awaken to the knowledge that his intellect is a part of the world of the angels; at that point the mystical journey begins. Ibn Sīnā's view of the material universe as eternal, evil (mixed with good), and completely determined is related not only to the tenets of Gnosticism and Manichaeism that still survived in the Iran of his time, but also to the late Zoroastrian doctrine of Zurvanism, which held even God to be bound by fate. In his development of a philosophical vocabulary in Farsi, he shows a knowledge of Zoroastrian terminology and adapts it to his own system.

**INFLUENCE ON THE WEST.** In canto 4 of his *Inferno* Dante includes Ibn Sīnā with the great pagan writers of antiquity in Limbo, the highest circle of Hell. Muslims were generally seen as schismatics—Dante in fact puts Muḥammad and ʿAlī among the schismatics in canto 28—so it is surprising to encounter Ibn Sīnā alongside Homer, Plato, and Aristotle. Dante placed him in this high position quite likely because of the great influence his writings had exerted on Christian thought over the previous century and a half. His influence on Dante's ideas was especially strong.

Ibn Sīnā's influence in the West began almost as soon as his works began to be translated in twelfth-century Spain. Most of the *Shifāʾ* was translated into Latin before 1150, and it presented Christian thinkers with their first exposure to a completely coherent cosmology and system of metaphysics. It had a seductive attraction because of its comprehensiveness and was in some respects easier to accept than Aristotle's philosophy. Because Aristotle's works were being translated at the same time as those of Ibn Sīnā, and because some Neoplatonic works were attributed to Aristotle (e.g., the *Liber de causis*, a collection of extracts from Proclus's *Elements of Theology*), it was not always easy to distinguish the ideas of the two philosophers. During the thirteenth century, however, students of their works and commentators on them were able to separate the two men and identify the spurious works attributed to them. At this point it was discovered by Christian theologians, as al-Ghazālī had alleged over a century earlier, that Ibn Sīnā's cosmology and metaphysics posed a danger to orthodox monotheism, whether Christian or Muslim.

Ibn Sīnā's philosophical system was too well constructed to refute completely and too widespread to ignore. Virtually all of the scholastic theologians accepted some of his ideas, although none went so far as to become "Latin Avicennists." The Christian writer who came closest to adopting his philosophy completely was his twelfth-century translator, Dominicus Gundissalinus, who wrote a number of works which borrowed heavily from the psychology and metaphysics of Ibn Sīnā, which Gundissalinus had translated into Latin. Gundissalinus's works, as well as those of Ibn Sīnā, were viewed critically by William of Auvergne (or William

of Paris, c. 1180–1249). He accepted Ibn Sīnā's distinction between essence and existence but strongly rejected his emanationist creation theory, including the hierarchy of Intelligences existing between humans and God. In this rejection he was followed by Albertus Magnus (1206–1280) and Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274).

The two most important Christian thinkers strongly influenced by Ibn Sīnā were the British Franciscans Roger Bacon (c. 1214–after 1292) and John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308). Bacon did not compose a systematic theology but, rather, wrote a scientific encyclopedia resembling in many ways Ibn Sīnā's *Shifāʾ*. Neither Ibn Sīnā nor Roger Bacon wished to compare each point with the views of the ancient philosophers; as Ibn Sīnā told his chief disciple, Jūzjānī, "If you would be satisfied with my composing a work in which I would set forth what, to me, is sound in these sciences, without debating with those who disagree or devoting myself to their refutation, I would do that" (Gohlman, 1974, p. 55). Bacon also believed that Ibn Sīnā was, after Aristotle, the prince of philosophy. Even so, Bacon could not follow Ibn Sīnā completely: he substitutes God for Ibn Sīnā's creating Active Intelligence, for example. Duns Scotus adopted Ibn Sīnā's definition of metaphysics as the study of being *qua* being, and his discussion of universals was largely based on that of Ibn Sīnā as well.

**INFLUENCE IN THE MUSLIM WORLD.** Ibn Sīnā had a number of disciples who continued studying and teaching his philosophical system. The orthodox Islamic revival of the eleventh century CE, however, crowned by al-Ghazālī's attack on the philosophers, limited the spread of his ideas to those areas not under the control of the Seljuk dynasty. The fact that he did not found a school like the Academy or Lyceum also restricted his influence to the occasional scholar or group of scholars. It is ironic that his philosophical writings became a part of the curriculum of European universities but not of the *madrasahs* (colleges) established in the Muslim world.

Ibn Sīnā's influence on Muslim writers, especially in the Farsi-speaking area of the Muslim world, was, nevertheless, important. The most significant impact of his thought was on Sufism, more specifically on the Ishrāqī (Illuminationist) school of Sufism founded by Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (1153–1191). The source of this influence was not his great encyclopedia of philosophy, the *Shifāʾ*, but rather several short treatises, *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān*, *The Bird*, *On Love*, and *Salmān and Absāl*, as well as the last sections of his *Ishārāt*. There is a dispute among contemporary scholars concerning the extent to which Ibn Sīnā intended these works to be interpreted exoterically as mystical treatises. The Ishrāqī Sūfīs, however, read them in this way and combine them with the obviously mystical theosophy of Muḥyi al-Dīn ibn al-ʿArabī (1165–1240) and the ideas of his contemporary Suhrawardī to form the most influential school of mystical philosophy in the Farsi-speaking Islamic world.



The aspect of Ibn Sīnā's writings that attracted Suhrawardī and his followers was his Eastern (*mashriqīyah*) philosophy. The Arabic words for "Eastern" and "Illuminationist" (*mushriqīyah*) are written identically; according to Suhrawardī they mean the same thing in Ibn Sīnā's works. Unfortunately, the most important of his writings on Eastern philosophy, *Al-inṣāf*, was lost, but his references to the East in *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and *The Bird* convinced Suhrawardī that Ibn Sīnā was on the right track. Suhrawardī translated the latter into Farsi and wrote a companion work to *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, which he called *Western Exile*. In his basic treatise *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* (Illumination wisdom), Suhrawardī points out that the sources of wisdom that Ibn Sīnā lacked were precisely those writings of Zoroastrianism, Pythagoreanism, and Hermetism which were both Eastern and Illuminationist. He rejects Ibn Sīnā's distinction between essence and existence, saying that existence has no reality outside the intelligence that abstracts its essence. Ibn Sīnā's view of form and matter, similar to that of Aristotle, is transformed by Suhrawardī into light and darkness; the human soul is composed of light. He interprets Ibn Sīnā's treatises to be symbolic accounts of the return of the soul/light to the Supreme Light, and wrote several treatises that describe this journey of the soul to God.

The Ishrāqī tradition was most influential in Iran after the establishment of the Safavid regime (1499–1722) and its adoption of Shī'ī Islam as the official state religion. In Isfahan, the Safavid capital after 1598, the two greatest exponents of the Ishrāqī school were Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631) and his pupil Mullā Ṣadrā (1571/2–1640). Mīr Dāmād wrote a commentary on the metaphysics of the *Shifā'* in which he combined the teachings of Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī, particularly in the area of angelology. Mullā Ṣadrā, the greatest of the Ishrāqī theosophers, founded a school that continues to the present day. His synthesis of philosophy, revelation, and illumination follows Ibn Sīnā's principle of the primacy of existence and its division into necessary, possible, and impossible existents. He departs from Ibn Sīnā's views and relies more on Ibn al-'Arabī, the Neoplatonists, and Islamic revelation in holding that the sciences of the "otherworld," learned by illumination and revelation, are true knowledge and far superior to the sciences of this world. Just as the Europeans had accepted only one aspect of Ibn Sīnā's thought, the philosophical/scientific, the Ishrāqīyah selected only the other aspect, the mystical, for inclusion in their system of belief.

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metaphysical theories is Parviz Morewedge's *The Metaphysics of Avicenna (ibn Sīnā)* (New York, 1973), which is a translation of the *Ilāhīyāt* (Metaphysics) of the *Dānish-nāmah-i 'Alā'ī* with an extensive commentary and comparison with Ibn Sīnā's other works on metaphysics. The negative side of the debate over interpreting his works esoterically is presented by Amélie-Marie Goichon in such works as the introduction and notes in her French translation of the *Ishārāt: Livre des directives et remarques* (Paris, 1951) and *Le récit de Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* (Paris, 1959). The case for an esoteric interpretation is made in Henry Corbin's *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*, translated by Willard R. Trask (New York, 1960); the connection between Ibn Sīnā and the Ishrāqī school is shown in Seyyed Hossein Naṣr's *Three Muslim Sages: Avicenna, Suhrawardī, Ibn 'Arabī* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).

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**IBN TAYMĪYAH** (AH 661–728/1263–1328 CE), more fully, Taqī al-Dīn Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al-Ḥalīm ibn 'Abd al-Salām al-Ḥarrānī al-Dimashqī, was a jurisconsult, theologian, and Ṣūfī. He was born in Harran, and at the age of six he fled with his father and brothers to Damascus during the Mongol invasions. Ibn Taymīyah devoted himself from early youth to various Islamic sciences (Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, and legal studies), and he was a voracious reader of books on sciences that were not taught in the regular institutions of learning, including logic, philosophy, and *kalām*.

**EARLY CAREER.** Ibn Taymīyah studied law under the direction of his father and Shams al-Dīn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Maqdisī (d. 1283). Under several teachers of *ḥadīth* he studied a number of works, in particular the *Musnad* of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, (a *ḥadīth* collection that he read several times), the "six books" of *ḥadīth*, and the biobibliographical *Mu'jam* of al-Ṭabarānī. He studied Arabic grammar and lexicography for a brief period under Sulaymān ibn 'Abd al-Qawī al-Ṭūfī (d. 1316); then, on his own, he mastered Sībawayh's text on grammar. He became qualified to issue legal opinions before the age of twenty; at twenty-one, upon the death of his father in 1283, he succeeded him as professor of *ḥadīth* and law at Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Sukkarīyah, a Ṣūfī monastery and college of *ḥadīth* founded around the middle of the thirteenth century in Damascus. Ibn Taymīyah was a prolific writer, described as "fast to learn and slow to forget": It was said of him that once he learned something, he never forgot it.

Ibn Taymīyah also succeeded his father at the Umayyad Mosque, where he gave lectures on Qur'anic exegesis. His biographers record that, lecturing without notes, he would give materials for two or more fascicles. On one of these Fridays of Qur'anic exegesis in the Umayyad Mosque in 1291, Ibn Taymīyah lectured briefly on the divine attributes. This was his first known public venture into controversial dogmatics. The reaction was quick among his opponents, who tried to prevent him from lecturing further in the mosque but failed

in their attempt. Ibn Taymīyah's treatment of the divine attributes was given as part of his profession of faith, the *'aqīdah*. The Shāfi'ī chief *qāḍī* Shihāb al-Dīn al-Khuwayyī declared: "I am in agreement with the creed of Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn [ibn Taymīyah]." When he was reproved, he continued: "because he has sound intelligence, speaks from extensive knowledge, and says only what he knows to be sound."

In 1292 Ibn Taymīyah went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he gathered materials for his work *Manāsik al-ḥajj* (Rituals of the pilgrimage), denouncing a number of practices in the rituals of the pilgrimage as condemnable innovations.

The Shāfi'ī historian Ibn Kathīr, in the events of the year 1293/4, treats of the affair of 'Assāf al-Naṣrānī ("the Christian"), who was reported by witnesses to have cursed the Prophet. Ibn Taymīyah and a companion, al-Fāriqī, apparently implicated in the affair for encouraging the assault and battery to which 'Assāf and his bedouin protector were victims, were flogged and put under house arrest. This was the episode behind Ibn Taymīyah's work *Kitāb al-ṣārim al-maslūl 'alā shātim al-rasūl* (The sharp sword drawn against the reviler of the messenger [of God]).

In 1296, at the death of his professor Zayn al-Dīn ibn Munajjā, Ibn Taymīyah succeeded to the chair of law thus vacated in the Madrasah Ḥanbalīyah. His biographer Ibn Rajab said that he read an autobiographical note in Ibn Taymīyah's own hand to the effect that Ibn Taymīyah was offered, before the year 1291 (thus before the age of thirty), the post of *shaykh al-shuyūkh*, or head of the Ṣūfīs, and the post of chief *qāḍī*, but he refused them both. Refusals to assume such posts usually meant that the scholar wished to stay aloof from the central power, out of desire for a private scholarly life, or in order to pursue the ascetic life, or to remain free to criticize practices he deemed not in keeping with the tenets of Islam. When Ibn Taymīyah's subsequent life is taken into consideration, his refusal clearly appears to have been based on the last of these reasons.

**OPPOSITION TO THE ASH'ARĪYAH.** Ibn Taymīyah lived in a period between those of two notable propagandists of the rationalist Ash'arī movement in theology: Ibn 'Asākir (d. 1176) and Subkī (d. 1370). The attempt of the Ash'arī movement to obtain legitimacy by infiltrating the Shāfi'ī *madhhab* (school) of law—an attempt that surfaced in the eleventh century—was still developing and had to face two implacable forces blocking its goal. The traditionalist movement was represented particularly by two *madhhabs* of law: the Ḥanbalī and the Shāfi'ī. The former was the obvious obstructive force, while the latter included the Ash'arī faction, which was hard at work to gain the adherence of fellow Shāfi'īs to Ash'arī thought, an effort destined to fail in the face of the alliance between the traditionalists of the two *madhhabs*.

Already in the days of Ibn 'Asākir the traditionalists had introduced an institution that was conceived to correct,

among other things, the detrimental consequences of the exclusory principle in the *madrasah*, according to which only those students who chose to belong to the *madhhab* represented by the *madrasah* were admitted. This policy tended to be divisive, separating members of the traditionalist movement who belonged to all the Sunnī *madhhabs*, while allowing the Ash'arīyah to stay within one *madhhab*, the Shāfi'ī. The new institution that helped to correct the situation was the Dār al-Ḥadīth, wherein the principal subject of instruction was *ḥadīth* rather than law, and students of any of the four *madhhabs* could attend. Thus a Ḥanbalī professor, such as Ibn Taymīyah, could have students belonging to the Shāfi'ī *madhhab*, such as al-Birzālī, Mizzī, and al-Dhahabī. The first Dār al-Ḥadīth was founded in Damascus by the Zengid ruler Nūr al-Dīn (d. 1173).

To the philosophical theology of the Ash'arīyah, Ibn Taymīyah opposed his famous professions of faith (*'aqīdah*; pl., *'aqā'id*). His first full-length *'aqīdah*, written at the request of the people of Hama in the year 1299 and therefore known as *Al-'aqīdah al-ḥamawīyah*, was very hostile to the Ash'arīyah and their *kalām*-theology. According to Ibn Rajab, Ibn Taymīyah wrote this *'aqīdah* in one sitting. His other important profession of faith is the *'Aqīdah wāsiṭīyah*, written for a group of religious intellectuals in Wāsiṭ (Iraq) before the arrival of the Mongols in Damascus. Both professions of faith were attacked by his enemies, and he was taxed with anthropomorphism. In a meeting in the house of the Shāfi'ī *qāḍī* Imam al-Dīn 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Qazwīnī (d. 1299) the *'Aqīdah ḥamawīyah* was studied; Ibn Taymīyah was questioned regarding various points, and it was deemed to be satisfactory. Regarding the *Wāsiṭīyah*, even the Ash'arī-Shāfi'ī Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Hindī (d. 1315) found it to be in conformity with the Qur'ān and *sunnah*. Nevertheless, his enemies tried hard to keep him in prison, even to have him executed, but failed on both counts.

Ibn Taymīyah's polemic activity extended to the philosophers, especially the logicians, against whom he wrote a refutation, *Al-radd 'alā al-manṭiqīyīn*. He wrote extensively against the monistic (*ittiḥādīyah*) and incarnationist (*hulūlīyah*) Ṣūfīs and condemned as heretical innovations many of the Ṣūfī practices of his day. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymīyah was praised by the Ṣūfī Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Qawwām, who said: "Our Sufism became sound only at the hands of Ibn Taymīyah," implying that Ibn Taymīyah was not an outsider to Sufism. Recently discovered evidence shows that Ibn Taymīyah belonged to the Ṣūfī order of the Qādīriyah, named after the Ḥanbalī Ṣūfī 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, whom he praised and preferred to the other Ḥanbalī Ṣūfī, al-Anṣārī al-Harawī.

On the theological question of the divine attributes, Ibn Taymīyah held that God should be described "as he has described himself in his book and as the Prophet has described him in his *sunnah*." This classical traditionalist doctrine goes back to al-Shāfi'ī (d. 820) and to Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855), the two great leaders of the movement, in whose

works Ibn Taymīyah was thoroughly versed. Ibn Taymīyah and his famous disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah (d. 1350) drew much of their inspiration from the works of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Ḥanbal. From the genesis of the traditionalist movement the principal message has always been that the basic sources for belief and practice are the book of God and the practice (*sunnah*) of the Prophet.

Ibn Taymīyah, in the title of one of his numerous works, emphasized the place of the Prophet in relation to the two fundamental sources: *The Steps Leading to the Knowledge That the Messenger of God Has Already Made a Clear Exposition of the Roots and Branches of Religion*. For the Prophet, as messenger, brought the book of God and was himself a living example of what should be followed. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah quotes from the introduction to al-Shāfiʿī's *Risālah*: "Praise be to God . . . who is as he has described himself, and who is exalted above all the attributes given to him by those among his creatures who have described him." And again: "No event shall befall an adherent of God's religion but that there is a guide in the book of God showing the right way to be followed." These two statements were quoted against the Ashʿariyah, the rationalist movement of the period of Ibn Taymīyah and Ibn Qayyim, as al-Shāfiʿī had said them some five centuries before in condemnation of the Muʿtazilah, the rationalist movement of his day.

**UNDER ATTACK.** Ibn Taymīyah's troubles came chiefly from his opposition to Ashʿarī thought working from within the Shāfiʿī *madhhab*, and also from his criticism of extremist Ṣūfī thought and practices. His troubles (*mihān*; sg., *mihnah*) were treated extensively by his Shāfiʿī disciples al-Birzālī, al-Dhahabī, and Ibn Kathīr, and by the Ḥanbalī biobibliographer Ibn Rajab.

Ibn Taymīyah's enemies finally succeeded in removing him from the scene. The opportunity was presented by one of his legal opinions (*fatwās*) titled "Travel to the Tombs of the Prophets and Saints," in which Ibn Taymīyah prohibited such travel. His opponents pounced on this *fatwā* and charged him with demeaning the prophets and with unbelief (*kufī*). Eighteen jurisconsults, led by the Mālikī *qāḍī* al-Ikhnāʿī, wrote *fatwās* condemning him. The four chief *qāḍīs* of Cairo issued their decision that he be imprisoned in the citadel of Damascus. Other jurisconsults, including the two sons of the leading Mālikī jurisconsult Abū al-Walīd, had issued *fatwās* condemning that decision. They stated that it had no valid basis against Ibn Taymīyah because he had simply cited the divergent opinions of the jurisconsults on the subject of the visiting of tombs (*ziyārat al-qubūr*) and had given preponderance to one side of the question, a choice that was legitimate to make. But the decision stood without appeal. Ibn Taymīyah was never to leave the citadel alive; he died there some two years later. Three months before his death, his enemy al-Ikhnāʿī, against whom he had written a refutation, complained to the sultan, who ordered that Ibn Taymīyah be deprived of the opportunity to write; his ink, pen, and paper were taken away from him.

But to the very last, his enemies could not quite get the better of him.

The biographers cite a number of statements made by Ibn Taymīyah during his imprisonment that show the man's stature and state of mind. "A prisoner is one who has shut out God from his heart." "A prisoner is one whose passions have made him captive." "In this world there is a paradise to be entered; he who does not enter it will not enter the paradise of the world to come." "What can my enemies possibly do to me? My paradise is in my breast; wherever I go it goes with me, inseparable from me. For me, prison is a place of retreat; execution is my opportunity for martyrdom; and exile from my town is but a chance to travel." In reference to his enemies who strove to have him imprisoned: "If I were to give all the gold it takes to fill the space of this citadel, I could not possibly reward them for the good they have done me." And he often repeated the following prayer: "O God! Help me to move my tongue incessantly in your praise, to express my gratitude, and to serve you in perfect worship."

On 20 Dhū al-Qaʿdah 728 (September 26, 1328), Ibn Taymīyah died in the citadel at the age of sixty-five. The populace turned out in the hundreds of thousands for the funeral procession, which was compared to that of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. He was buried next to his brother, Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh, in the Ṣūfī cemetery where other Ṣūfī members of his family were buried.

Ibn Taymīyah's influence has reached modern times. His teachings, first followed by Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792), became the basis of the Wahhābī movement in the nineteenth century and the guiding principles of the Wahhābī state of Saudi Arabia. Again, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, through Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Rashīd Riḍā, they influenced the modernist Salafīyah movement.

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**ICELANDIC RELIGION** SEE GERMANIC RELIGION

**I-CHING** SEE YIJING

## ICONOCLASM

*This entry consists of the following articles:*

AN OVERVIEW

ICONOCLASM IN THE BYZANTINE TRADITION

### ICONOCLASM: AN OVERVIEW

Iconoclasm can be defined as the intentional desecration or destruction of works of art, especially those containing human figurations, on religious principles or beliefs. More general usage of the term signifies either the rejection, aversion, or regulation of images and imagery, regardless of the rationale or intent. Any investigation of either the historical events or the concept of iconoclasm raises questions regarding the valuing and meaning of imagery, particularly sacred art and ecclesiastical doctrines. Traditionally, doctrinal pronouncements defined roles, functions, and meanings of art or iconoclasm within specific religious traditions.

Any study of iconoclasm is premised on the bifurcation of a historical event or a cultural attitude or idea. As a historical event, iconoclasm can be interpreted as being either active or passive. The former category includes legitimate accounts of the damaging of images; whereas the latter category corresponds to the promulgation and the contents of religious doctrines. Evaluations should incorporate motivations, meanings, and results of either form of the iconoclastic enterprise. As a cultural idea or attitude, iconoclasm requires analysis from the perspective of valuing art and imagery within the individual culture, the formative role of religious values on that culture, and the role of the visual within that religious tradition.

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the English word *iconoclasm* is a composite formed from two Greek words: *eikon* (icon) and *klasma* (breaking); whose primary meaning is "[t]he breaking or destroying of images; esp. the destruction of images and pictures set up as objects of veneration; the attacking or overthrow of venerated institutions and cherished beliefs, regarded as fallacious or superstitious." With the same Greek roots, the *Oxford English Dictionary's*

primary definition of an iconoclast is as "[a] breaker or destroyer of images; *spec. (Eccl. Hist.)* One who took part in or supported the movement in the 8th and 9th centuries, to put down the use of images or pictures in religious worship in the Christian churches of the East; hence, applied analogously to those Protestants of the 16th and 17th centuries who practised or countenanced a similar destruction of images in the churches." The *Oxford English Dictionary* lists an important secondary definition to the broader concept of iconoclasm and iconoclast as "[o]ne who assails or attacks cherished beliefs or venerated institutions on the ground that they are erroneous or pernicious." The rarely invoked term *iconomachy* is delineated in the *Oxford English Dictionary* as being from the ecclesiastical Greek, *eikonomachia* is defined as "[a] war against images; hostility or opposition to images, esp. to their use in connexion with worship."

The primary reference for iconoclasm has been religion, and in particular, Western monotheism. This reference raises critical issues in any discussion of the meaning of iconoclasm in world religions. Foremost among these issues is the role of religious belief in the formation of cultural and individual identity. If the procedures by which an individual learns about, assents to, is initiated into, and becomes a member of a religious community is analogous to those for entry into political and social communities, then a socialization process orients perception. How we come to see and interpret what we see is predicated on our disciplined sense of values. Orientation into a religious confession privileges the acceptance of the normative and appropriate, and simultaneously defines the abnormal and inappropriate.

However, if Ernst Cassirer (1962/1944), Moshe Barasch (1992), Mircea Eliade (1992/1986), and Marshall G. Hodgson (1964), to name only a select few, are correct, then how do we resolve their commitment to the basic human activity of "symbol making" with the privileging status of religion in the process of seeing and the discussion of iconoclasm? If iconoclasm is limited to the preconceived categories of Western monotheism, then is it independent of the otherwise universal relationship between art and cultural memory and religious traditions? As the basic nature of human beings is to make symbols—visual as well as auditory and oral symbols—then imaging can be defined as a universal human activity.

All world religions have an attitude toward art and imagery; some have a bifurcated view, others a single lens through which they see and define art. The remaining religions vacillate throughout their individual histories as ambiguous or ambivalent toward imagery. Nonetheless, art and cultural memory are embedded within religion and encoded with religious meaning and value. This reality must be evaluated within the late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century recognition that there is no innocent eye; rather, feminist, deconstructionist, and postmodernist scholarship argues persuasively that *le regard* is more than an engendered gaze. *Le regard* offers a nonreligious basis for the recognition that

there is a right and a wrong way to look and that the process through which one comes to see properly and to recognize impropriety is socialization, into a political, religious, or societal system.

**GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF ICONOCLASM.** The general perceptions of iconoclasm, whether in Eastern or Western cultures, is that it is a religious phenomenon generated from a position of belief and right action as defined within that belief system. There is the recognition that the role of belief in defining cultural identity is primary, and trumps all other constructs of political, societal, and cultural values.

The multilayered syntax of iconoclasm, especially in the Western monotheistic traditions, provides a linguistic analogy to the complexity of its etymology, implementations, and functions. There is the internal correspondence between image and word within each religion. In those traditions in which image plays a primary or even a secondary role, iconoclasm is read as an attack on the orthodoxy of that religion. While in those traditions that question or deny the place or role of images, iconoclasm is not interpreted as a defense of religious orthodoxy.

Despite the placement of the visual modality within the religious hierarchy, the existence of images—especially icons as sacred portraiture of persons, events, or concepts—exists parallel with the fear of idols. Whether named image, icon, or idol, the visual object is presupposed by the believer to contain or partake of sacred energy and power. Whether that power is deemed as positive or negative expression depends on what is depicted.

The “power” of images is critical to *iconoclasm* as both an activity and a concept. Intrinsic to any image, power is the foundation for the fear in some cultures and/or religions results in the primacy of the word and the banning of images. If that power is characterized as sensual in nature, and thereby bifurcated in its moral character, the interpretation may be predicated on a generic cultural or religious distrust of what is seen—“the evidence of our eyes”—or of a fear of the sensory and the sensual.

The question of whether or not images have power, and the nature of that power, is elementary to the variations of cultural and religious definitions of iconoclasm. If a religion assumes that images have power, then iconoclasm is a necessary form of control of or deterrent to that power. How power is defined and manifested is characterized by its generative cause, in the arts named as creativity or the creative process. This power can be transferred either to, by, or through the artist whether native to the artist or gifted through an external source, and then transferred between the artist and the created object, or from the artist to the object, or from the artist through the object to the audience. Alternatively, this transmission could occur without the implied or actual presence of the artist who is merely a vehicle through which an external or other force operates. Thereby, power is exchanged from created object to audience, between object and audi-

ence, or from audience to object. In certain religions, this communication of power occurs only through the ceremonial or ritual function of the created object, or in coordination with its religious consecration. These multiple models for the transfer of “power” can be categorized within the discussions of the nature of creativity and the creative process, sacralization process, and response theory (see especially Freedberg, 1989).

Further questions arise either as to the appropriation or denial of the power of images, especially how that power is manifested, or used, in conjunction with cultural and religious interpretations of both images and iconoclasm. When interpreted as sacred energy, this power is transmitted in the form of healing, enlightenment, spiritual renewal, or protection. However, if initiated from a negative source, this power is interpreted as “misdirected” to effect harm, enchantment, danger, or subversion. Certain forms of religious iconoclasm are intellectual denials of the power or the existence of images.

Throughout his seminal text *The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response* (1989), David Freedberg expands the boundaries of his early historical studies of iconoclasm in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Holland into an analysis of the concept of iconoclasm. Essential to the “power of images” are the ambiguities that arise in any confrontation between fear and religious devotion. This form of fear is specific: what images might do if their usage, effects, and powers were unmonitored. For Freedberg, the iconoclastic motive is not universally and totally destructive of all images. It is a physical, oftentimes violent, response that operates within a series of parameters—geographic, chronological, social, and religious. Iconoclasm is not a total rejection, denial, or destruction of *all* images either for a particular historical moment or throughout history.

Another variant of iconoclasm is defined as iconophobia. This form of the iconoclastic enterprise is detailed in distinctively different studies by Patrick Collinson (1986), and Marshall G. Hodgson (1964). For the former, iconoclasm transmogrifies into a series of spirited “attacks”—verbal, visual, physical, or violent—on unacceptable images. This action is premised on a discernment of inappropriate or false images, although it is not a denial or repudiation of all images. Limitations on the types and styles of appropriate imagery permit visual delight within the iconoclastic hegemony of religion and religious values. For Collinson, iconoclasm moves from a “simple” distrust or suspicion of images and destruction of falsely identified “sacred art” to a complex “horror” or hatred of all imagery. Iconophobia is not an innocent “fear of images,” but a total repudiation of all images that becomes a pervasive cultural attitude predicated on religious values.

Hodgson proffers an understanding of iconophobia as a “mistrust” of symbols that rooted simultaneously in religious values and class struggle. Emphasizing the connections between symbols, worship, and moral impulse, especially in



the monotheistic traditions of Judaism and Islam, Hodgson correlates this mistrust of symbols to the distrust of the aristocracy as an exploitive, privileged class. The connector between aesthetic mistrust and social distrust is art. The foundation is in the unspoken realm of human feeling and emotions as symbols arise from the condition of being human, and art operates through symbols. As a transmitter of feelings and emotions, art, especially in worship, trumps the liturgical or ceremonial rites as it communicates directly and interpersonally. The primordial objections to idols are transferred to images and symbols, and then to art. Mistrust springs from the rigorous moralism found in the prophetic monotheisms of Judaism and Islam. Combined with the economic value of art, the native ambivalence of lower classes toward images becomes synonymous with economic and social status. Thereby, politics merges with religion as the privileged class is rejected by the populace, and the mistrust of images becomes iconophobia.

**Prejudices about iconoclasm.** Whether defined as a mode of behavior or a historical event, studies of iconoclasm are prejudiced by popular “misperceptions” of its origin, intent, and activity. The first misperception is that iconoclasm is an act of complete destruction, most typically described as “the smashing” of images. Second, that this destructive act is premised on a distrust, fear, and perhaps a hatred of images. Third, that iconoclasm is simultaneously a religious act that unifies all believers, regardless of class and gender, and that it is a monolithic response of that religion. Fourth, that iconoclasm is an activity with two historical Christian expressions: Byzantine and Reformation. Fifth, that Judaism is the original historically identified religious expression of iconoclasm. Finally, that twenty-first century demonstrations of iconoclasm by Islamic fundamentalists are solely religiously motivated acts as Islam is iconoclastic monotheism par excellence.

Although iconoclasm is identified as both a generic religious and a Christian attitude predating Byzantium, the most common reference is the Byzantine iconoclastic controversies of the seventh and eighth centuries. Without doubt, the basic tendency—cultural, philosophic, and religious—toward iconoclasm pervades all religious traditions and predates the foundations of Western monotheism. Normatively interpreted as an attack on religious imagery, iconoclasm is any attack on imagery whether works of “high,” “low,” or popular art. Consideration must be given to the related political issues of censorship and the affinities between religious and cultural definitions of *le regard* with its basic implications that there is a right and a wrong way to look.

The object of *le regard* is the work of art that engenders the wrath, admiration, or passions of viewers. The rarely discussed but regularly experienced “power of images” evokes a response through the mystery of the aesthetic dimensions. This evocation is associated with an energy or power beyond the human, so that the religious believer is divided between the divine and the demonic. Among iconophilist religions,

the experience of spiritual affirmation through an encounter with art attests to its salvific value. While those images that excite the senses and exude sensuality are condemned in an iconophilist milieu but destroyed in an iconoclastic culture.

A primary consideration distinguishing images from idols is religio-cultural attitudes toward the human body, especially in terms of measure and form. Carefully rendered human forms, either life-size or monumental, create the experience of a direct encounter with another living being. The life-size depiction of a beautiful nude female or male figure awakens the senses, sensuality, and often sexuality of viewers. The more erotic, or exotic, the presentation of the human figure, the more heightened the viewer’s sexual response.

The question is whether or not religious or sacred art requires the human figure for even geometric and abstract imagery can evoke an aesthetic experience or arouse human sensuality. A classic argument for the removal and desecration of images in iconoclastic religions is their conviction that the believer’s attention is diverted from the sacred, the holy, or God by art. Thereby, the aesthetic experience trumps, and must be separated from, the religious experience.

Closely related to the “fear of the senses and the sensual” is the recognition that the violent acts wrought on art are generated by passionate and opinionated reactions that in combination with religious vocabulary and the religious impulse can only be manifested in a physical response. Perhaps inexplicable if related solely to intellectual or theological upheavals, the physicality of this heightened emotional state is a curiosity not yet fully comprehended or studied. An investigation of the modes by which an otherwise acknowledged inanimate object so inflames the human senses as to garner a physical response might provide a new foundation toward understanding iconoclasm. Interrelated issues include why such physical violence is identified as a “punishment”? What is the religious impulse that motivates an act of physical violence? Is physical violence, even unto the assault on inanimate images, a justifiable physical response to fear, especially to fear inspired by religion? The further reality is that acts of mutilation or destruction are levied against “generic” images—not identifiably religious in nature, motif, or iconography—simply because they are art.

Recognition of this tenuous but direct relationship between iconoclasm and physical violence orients attention to the modes of cultural and political behavior named censorship and vandalism. Throughout history and cultures, innumerable images, objects, and monuments—whether religious or secular in origin—have been replaced, relocated, renamed, modified, updated, defaced, stolen, confiscated, and placed in storage. Beyond the simple inquiry of how this happens, is the more significant issue of the meaning of such actions, and whether they are justifiably categorized as acts of censorship, vandalism, or iconoclasm. Recent commentators in art history and visual culture note the affinities between censorship and iconoclasm (Hoffman and Storr,

1991b; Hoffman, 1996), and iconoclasm and vandalism (Boime, 1998; Gamboni, 1997). These homologous activities are organized within the matrix of art, politics, religion, and society delineated by Hodgson (1964) in his discussion of the role of art and culture in Islam.

Barbara Hoffman defines censorship as the “[c]ontrol of expression that is regarded as outside of and a threat to the religious, political, and social orthodoxy of the time” (1996, vol. 6, p. 174). Premised on the distrust of images—most cogently explicated by Plato (c. 428–348 or 347 BCE) as the deception of forms and the ability to evoke human emotions, and later echoed in a variety of religious and secular documents in the West—iconoclasm as censorship is an expression of power, albeit political or moral power.

Even in the model secular society, the United States of America, prominent acts of public censorship executed ostensibly on behalf of the government and within the purview of the legal system, resulted in outcries of injustice and hegemony of the religious, especially fundamentalist Christian, values of the minority over the body politic. From the nationwide controversies provoked by the withdrawal of federal funding through National Endowment for the Arts grants, to individual artists like Andre Serrano for the creation of his now infamous *Piss Christ* (1989), or to museums that sponsor exhibitions such as the retrospective of Robert Mapplethorpe’s black-and-white photographs cancelled by the Corcoran Gallery of Art (1989), the overt concern has been violation of the individual’s constitutional rights, while the sub rosa fear is the control of artistic expression by those religious individuals driven by a moral impulse that they identify publicly as patriotism but that is in fact a form of religious fundamentalism. The questionable act of government censorship in the threatened withdrawal of city funding to the Brooklyn Museum of Art by Rudolf Giuliani, the then-mayor of New York City, was because of the exhibiting of Chris Ofili’s painting of *The Holy Virgin Mary*, which Roman Catholics found to be morally offensive. This “spin” was motivated as much by the mayor’s own personal sense of affront as by the politics of his bid for reelection and his recognition of the meaning of Roman Catholic values (1990). This discussion of the affinities between religion and censorship through the formation of cultural values is advanced further with consideration of the fate of Serrano’s infamous photograph. When *Piss Christ* was knocked off the wall of a public museum and damaged irreparably by visitors who identified themselves as “outraged believers” (1997), was this an act of public censorship given the public arguments over the allocation of public funds for this work, or was it an act of religious iconoclasm or vandalism?

It is difficult to decipher acts of vandalism as simple but senseless acts of destruction from iconoclastic events. Religious and moral values have motivated the destruction, or desecration, of images and monuments under the guise of “religious iconoclasm as a defense of orthodoxy” or “vandalism as a moral outrage” by religious believers and invading

armies. If these are justifiably deemed as acts of iconoclasm, then what are we to make of the theft of the then recently restored Byzantine icons from Russian churches following the fall of communism (late 1980s–early 1990s), the exploding of the giant Buddhas at Bamiyan (2001), or the looting of the Baghdad museums and the toppling of statues of Saddam Hussein (2003).

One final variant of iconoclasm should be identified: The “silent iconoclasm” of those religious traditions that espouse a nonviolent rejection of images and icons as, for example, among the Āryā Samāj of Hindu India, the Sthānakvāśis and Terāpanthis of Jainism, and Lutheran Christians. This passive form of iconoclasm is doctrinally practiced and pronounced, and can thereby be considered a form of iconoclastic or religious censorship.

**Process of defining iconoclasm.** Throughout human history, culture has been organized around religious identity whether a named religion or a coalition of religions as in the Judeo-Christian tradition. This organizational schema privileges what is typified normatively as culture by religious valuing. Individual and communal discourses are embedded with religious references. The initial consideration is whether iconoclasm is a religious act or a religious act encoded with and motivated by economic, political, or societal purposes.

The integral elements in the process of defining iconoclasm range from the religious impulse to intellectual rationale. The arrangement, or rearrangement, of these elements in distinctive patterns is premised on religious and cultural values. Basic to any study of iconoclasm is a discussion of the meaning and purpose of images, especially with regard to the “power of images.” Analyses of iconoclasm, especially with regard to religion either generally or specifically, become mired in the divisive dichotomy of image veneration versus image destruction. Consideration is not adequately given to the possibility that the iconoclastic impulse is native to human creativity and should be examined in relationship to the definition of art and artist with the exception of Freedberg’s seminal study (1989).

As the visual definition of citizenship, public imagery illustrates the narratives of cultural history and national origin, and is recognized as the common denominator of national identity. These symbols and images envision the political and societal discourse of power, and during invasions or occupations need to be destroyed to “accept” the new government. Such acts of iconoclasm ostensibly motivated by political considerations are in reality deeply rooted in the socialization process from childhood through which an individual learns to accept or deny the “truth claim” of images. Cultures are oriented around religious values, discourse, and meanings, so that any act of political iconoclasm is not a simple secular performance. Similarly, iconoclasm is embedded in economic, societal, or political conflict whether that conflict is defined as class, race, or gender struggles or major cultural shifts such as the Renaissance. With the exception of the recent studies of Albert Boime (1998) and Dario Gam-

boni (1997), there have been insufficient studies of the consequences of the social and cultural function of imagery, especially of national symbols and monuments.

The term *the artist* requires careful attention. There is a history and an etymology to this word that has evolved, or been denied, through a variety of cultural and religious transformations, transmutations, and adaptations. For example, the Western apprehension that began with a coalition of artisan, craftsman, and teacher was transformed by early Christianity into a vehicle for divine expression, by the Renaissance into a cult of the genius, by the nineteenth century into a romantic rebel, and by the twentieth century into a critical, prophetic voice oftentimes self-defined as shamanic. Each definition or redefinition arose from a new way of seeing and valuing human experience. The sanctification of the artist initiated by the Renaissance cult of the genius, strengthened by the nineteenth-century rebel, and affirmed by the twentieth-century shaman, was cultivated in tandem with the secularization of Western culture. Iconoclasm as both event and ideology shifted from the political arena to the religious realm onto the national scene and, ultimately, to a religio-political enterprise.

Iconoclasm is a term loaded with diverse meanings from the “simple” whitewashing of images or placement in storage to the violent acts of total destruction. As both a term and an event, iconoclasm has traversed as complex and undulating a course as have the images and imagery it endangers. Whether the act of “smashing” is incited by the threat of idols to temple worship, by the power of the narrative of a living but particular image, or by the investment of imagery into political and societal narratives, the cardinal fear may be simply Plato’s claim that images fail us by not telling the truth. Images must be apprehended with a hermeneutics of suspicion, thereby, an internal tension exists between iconic and iconoclastic, between image makers and image breakers.

A series of relationships, rarely studied before the initiation of the study of the previously marginalized in the late 1960s and early 1970s, should be amalgamated into the complex alliance of the disparate pieces of the puzzle named “iconoclasm”; for example, the association between class and “taste,” or the affinities between gender and violence. Additionally, there is a cultural or a religious indifference to images. This is not to intend that “silent iconoclasm” of Lutheran Christians or the Brahṃā Samāḃ, but rather an investigation into the indifference, if not, denial of the power of images wrought by the glut of images found among the populace through popular culture, mass media, and the information highway of the internet. The question becomes: Can an individual and a society become numbed by images, as Thomas J. J. Altizer argues happened with words?

Tangential to this anesthetic of images is the subject of the figure and figuration in the arts. The issue is whether or not religious art requires the human figure, and if it does, what type of human figure: idealized, realistic, to scale, or monumental—the possibilities are limitless, but the concept

may prove limiting and maybe even threatening. If religious art were basically aniconic, then would it instill the same level of fear, anxiety, or danger within the eyes and hearts of those predisposed to iconoclasm? As with iconoclasm, not every religion or culture defines or delineates the human in identical terms. Rather, the actuality of a pluralistic world privileges a systematic analysis of cultural contacts and of mutual or contradictory concerns rather than a single explanation for phenomena as diverse as iconoclasm.

**Cultural permutations.** Historically, a distinction has been made by both art historians and historians of religion between the cultural and religious forms distinguished by the geographic and cultural categories identified as East and West. Among the most “glaring” distinctions is the minimal, if nonexistent, conversation about iconoclasm outside of Western monotheism. While there may be an intellectual and historical foundation to iconoclasm as it was identified and studied in terms of Western monotheism, it was not believed to exist in other religious traditions, whether indigenous, preliterate, native, or Eastern. Every religion and every culture has an attitude toward art and commensurately toward iconoclasm. The traditional “single explanation” for such diverse phenomena demands to be reframed and refashioned.

The following survey of cultural permutations of the idea of iconoclasm can be read as a series of suggestions that illustrate differing bases for the intellectual and emotional parallels identified in Eastern and Western religions. These attitudes suggest that there are differing forms of (religious) iconoclasm and that these differences can be clarified most sharply in coordination with examination of the relationships with culture, politics, and society. The distinguishing qualitative characteristic may be to paraphrase the art historian Oleg Grabar (1975), the simple difference between Iconoclasm with a capital *I* and iconoclasm with a lowercase *i*. Confirmation of the distinctions between iconoclasm as a historical event, mode of behavior, ideology, and attitude toward image must be carefully evaluated. The critical question is whether or not iconoclasm should be defined from the perspective of a cultural or religious entity, and equitably from the historical categories of geographic or religious distinctions.

*Eastern permutations of iconoclasm.* Whether perceived as a historic event, a mode of behavior, or an ideology, iconoclasm exists within the multiple cultures identified today as Asian. Culture is directly conjoined with religion, and thereby religious values become enshrined as cultural values. Violent acts of iconoclasm are not supported by or integral to either traditional Indian culture or orthodox Hinduism. As an abstraction without individual parts (Sanskrit *niskala*), the Hindu divinity comes to be known through abstract symbols or figural absence as at Chidambaram. The constant flow of invaders entering the Indian subcontinent proffers an exemplum for cultural and religious syncretism. Investigations into the nature and meaning of iconoclasm need to detail the

destruction, displacement, and replacement by invading groups. The absence of figurations or forms results in an iconism understood as elemental in the historical displacement of indigenous icons by Aryan invaders in northern India (c. 1500 BCE). The dearth of religious buildings and monuments can be credited to both invasion and construction from perishable materials such as light woods, paper, or clay; for single or minimal use; and then prepared for destruction and replacement. These practices remain prevalent in all parts and religions of India. Violent acts of iconoclasm such as the destruction of the temple in Somanatha built by Mahmūd of Ghazna (971–1030) were the results of Muslim invasions in northern India in the eleventh century. Such iconoclastic activity was spurred forward by a rigorous monotheism, a hostility to images, and the moral impulse.

From the eighteenth through the late twentieth century, there was a recognition of the irreparable damage “done” to Indian culture by invasions and invaders. The British occupation of India brought not simply a taste for British cultural values and political status, but an uncompromising allegiance to Protestant Christianity. Incorporating this Protestant indifference to images, the evolution of modern forms of Hindu esotericism, such as Advaita Vedānta, practiced a philosophic monism and rejected religious imagery. Nonviolent rejection of images, icons, and idols was found in the silent forms of iconoclasm as practiced by the Brahṃā Samāj and the Āryā Samāj.

The geographic location of the Indian subcontinent made it an attractive site for multiple invasions, religious and philosophical cross-fertilizations, and cultural fusions. Several religious traditions originated or flourished simultaneously on Indian soil including Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Jainism, and Islam, as well as a variety of Christian traditions. This religious syncretism influenced both attitudes toward images and commensurately iconoclasm. Images whether free-standing forms, monuments, or carved or painted onto buildings reflect these varied religious and philosophical perspectives, multicultural aesthetics, and stylistic advances. Not all works were made for the ages; rather, some ancient monuments and temples were raised for new edifices while others made from perishable materials were regularly replaced (similar to the Shintō practice in Isē-shima, Japan). Individual representations of specific deities or spirits and sand or flower mandalas were created for a single occasion or rite, others for a few days or for several months. Images for popular worship and devotion made of clay, paper, or soft woods, necessitate a short life span. These temporary images were created for specific ceremonial purposes with the specified intention of ritual iconoclasm.

Tantrism affirms a theoretic commitment to interiorized forms of mental worship as the higher form of devotion, while external worship with tangible images is the lowest form. Daily practice is far from the espoused theory, as the Tantric tradition incorporates regular use of visual images. Initially a devotional and reformist movement within

Hinduism, Sikhism partially distinguished itself by its iconoclastic ideology. As with other religions, this initial iconoclasm acceded to iconicism in which images of Gurū Nānak (1469–1539) emerged as a form of religious pedagogy and visual inspiration for piety and good works.

Buddhism encountered the spectrum of attitudes and modes of behavior toward images and iconoclasm ranging from the theoretic iconoclasm of Zen to the iconolatry of Hinayana and Mahayana. More icon or recipient of veneration, the image of Buddha became deified as an object of worship and provoked reaction against state-imposed Buddhism in a fashion reminiscent of Hodgson’s (1964) discussion of the political rejection of art as a category of social privilege. The destruction of Buddha images in the Bayon temple at Angkor Wat by Hindu iconoclasts followed the death of the Mahayana Buddhist king Jayavarman VII (c. 1120–1215 or 1219). The doctrine that Buddha nature pervades all created things and beings affirms the practice of ritual iconoclasm throughout the Buddhist world. Given both the spontaneity and nonconformist mode of satori, or enlightenment, Buddhism aligns iconoclasm with the cessation of visualization during meditation, and the destruction of the canon. Written authority is replaced with the intuitive immediacy between student and master as in Zen Buddhism. The basic ambivalence toward images is in direct correspondence to the developmental stage of an individual’s spiritual consciousness. Tangible images are necessary for the initiate to enter into the meditation, however, material objects of attachment, images are to be transcended. The Buddha counsels individuals to learn to extricate themselves from attachment to material objects like mandalas and images.

As practiced in monastic environments, Zen iconoclasm differs from other forms of Buddhist iconoclasm that occur in temples, urban and rural environments, and domestic settings. Accounts of the destruction of the objects ranging from Hui-neng’s (638–713) physical shredding of scriptures (sixth century) to Tan-hsia’s (1064–1117) incineration of a Buddha-image (ninth century) may be intended more as parables than as documented history. Images, whether text or artwork, are not to become either attachments or objects of worship; rather, they are simply reminders of the Buddha’s way to enlightenment that each person must follow for him- or herself. Hui-neng’s action was a model of Zen’s rejection of written authority in favor of the monastic tradition of intuitive insight as taught by master to disciple. Similarly, Tan-hsia’s story witnessed the Zen practice of nonattachment and the moving away from an external object as the entry point to meditation. Relics of the Buddha, like Buddha images, are accorded due reverence by both the Buddhist traditions and monastic disciplines. Humor is a normative vehicle for the vernacular of Zen iconoclasm. The Zen technique of relentless overthrow of idols employs laughter to effect positive response in believers and a not so positive response in the idols. The sound of laughter causes the idols to turn over on their heads, thereby removing their aura of dignity and simultaneously their claims of authority and truth.



The final, and not often mentioned, category of iconoclasm initiated on the Indian subcontinent is the silent iconoclasm found in both Hinduism—the *Āryā Samāj* and the *Brahmā Samāj*—and Jainism—*Sthānakvāsīs* and *Terāpanthis*. This silent iconoclasm is characterized by a nonviolent rejection of all images, icons, and idols predicated on a religious moralism.

*Western permutations of iconoclasm.* Western understandings of iconoclasm have been deemed normative as historical events, modes of behavior, and ideologies, as well as subjects for scholarly evaluation. This privileging of iconoclasm by Western monotheism raises concerns for wider investigations. As iconoclasm is almost synonymous with monotheism, investigators must consider whether iconoclasm in all of its definitions and etymologies is simply a monotheistic entity; and not applicable to world religions and cultures. Most documentation, analyses, and scholarship related to iconoclasm discusses Christian, more specifically Byzantine or Protestant, forms of iconoclastic activities. This survey suggests additional modes of iconoclasm within Western religions.

The establishment of monotheism in the West transformed cultural attitudes, societal structures, and dispositions toward images. Dedication to the one God as the singular divine source reconfigured the conceptual and spiritual relationality with human beings. This exclusive deity was defined as unique in substance and as transcending traditional boundaries of gender, sexuality, and bodily forms, and was uncircumscribable in visual depictions or cognitive classifications. He spoke authoritatively and through his speech created the world, its contents, and human beings (*Gen.* 1–2). This emphasis on divine utterances enhanced the primacy of the word over the image in Western religions, the written scriptures over the icon.

Western monotheism was initiated by the “new religion” established by the pharaoh Akhenaton (r. 1379–1362 BCE) in his devotion to Aton. Aniconism prevailed in images of Aton while figural depictions of pharaoh and his family were significantly transformed in bodily presentations from earlier pharaonic portraits on monuments and manuscripts. As Aton become singular and aniconic, Akhenaton, his wife Nefertiti (fourteenth century BCE), and their children, were rendered naturalistically even unto physical characteristics of ageing from double chins to sagging bellies. This earliest Western monotheism humanized portrayals of the aristocracy while symbolizing a nonfigural deity without rejection or destruction of all images. Ironically, iconoclasm in Egypt occurred in the desecration of the monuments honoring Akhenaton and the only female pharaoh, Hatshepsut (r. 1503–1482 BCE), whose portraits and written names were “erased” from all records of Egyptian history. Whether these acts were simply expressions of political power or religiously motivated, especially the restoration of the Egyptian pantheon and its priesthood, may be singular case studies in Western iconoclasm.

Western monotheism and its unique prophetic iconoclasm were instituted through the Old Testament religion of Israel. This specific iconoclasm was predicated on adherence to a strict moralism pronounced by a prophet, or series of prophets, inspired by the one God to reveal a message of hope, judgment, and obedience to the transcendent supreme creator. There is a qualitative distance between God and humanity. Faith in God involves fulfillment of moral demands as believers receive a direction and purpose to human history. The faith community is dependent on the commandments and laws that this God has directed be written in “the book.” God is beyond any concepts or forms known to human beings; neither anthropomorphic imaging or identification is possible. Such religions abound with elegant verbal symbols and images in oral and written texts denying the visual.

Defining and differentiating Judaism from its neighbors, the religious hierarchy and prophets named its singular religious identity and ethical practices. As many scriptural citations (e.g., *3 Kings* 11:5; *Dan.* 14:2; *Judg.* 10:6) affirm the neighboring cultic practice of worshiping idols, Judaism demarcates itself attesting to God’s singularity, primacy of the Word, and obedience to a strict moral code. Judaism fostered the ideology of idolatry as “the other” necessitating rigorous iconoclasm. The normative interpretation of Judaism was a religion rich in verbal imagery and symbolism nurturing religious pedagogy, liturgical ceremonies, and spirituality. Archaeological excavations at Dura Europos and Bet Alpha, and cultural studies of Jewish history, question this traditional description of Judaism as a nonvisual culture (Julius, 2001; Mann, 2000).

Historically, Christianity has had a bifurcated attitude toward images that arose from the dual heritage of Hebraic (prophetic) iconoclasm and Hellenistic philosophy. Christian iconoclasm is understood by its two historical expressions: Byzantine and Reformation. However, the concept, if not the violence, of iconoclasm operates in all forms of Christianity, all geographic regions, and among all races, classes, and gender. With the exception of Byzantine iconoclasm, several of the other modes of Christian iconoclasm will be reviewed herewith.

Whether perceived or experienced as an idea or object, art is ambiguous. Although inanimate, art operated humanly communicating and evoking a response from viewers, and was interpreted as a danger as well as a delight. Evidence of this equivocal attitude is found in early Christian art, as there is no portrait of Jesus (c. 6 BCE–c. 30 CE) rather visual symbols, allegories, and signs. The Council of Elvira (309) issued contradictory decrees in which idol worship and sacrifice were denounced, while the breaking of idols was identified as unwarranted according to the scriptures. Among Church Fathers, notably Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–between 211 and 215), Tertullian (c. 155 or 160–after 220), and Augustine of Hippo (354–430), there was affirmation of Plato’s distrust of art as deception. The sensuality and superstition associated with images as idols that created the greatest ap-



prehension within the early church. Initially, Christian iconoclasm included pronounced condemnations and physical removal or destruction of pagan idols and secular images. By the third century, images played an integral role in Christian worship and catechesis. Qualifications were announced in conciliar decrees, patristic texts, and sermons. Christian mistrust of images was reformed by the sixth century into a trust in images with *achieropaic* (not made by hands) icons created through the direct contact with Jesus, especially the miraculous portraits known as the Mandylion of Edessa and Veil of Veronica. The seventh-century synod in Trullo (692) reaffirmed the doctrines of the incarnation and proscribed symbolic or allegorical images, such as the lamb, for Christ. Synodical documents demanded anthropomorphic images of Christ, although not necessarily in the politically motivated placement of his portrait on imperial coins by Justinian II (c. 669–711).

Contemporary to the Byzantine iconoclastic controversies is the little studied Carolingian iconoclasm. As early Christian iconoclasm must be studied in concert with the political and societal establishment of the church, Carolingian iconoclasm demands consideration of both political relations between Constantinople and Aachen, and the Spanish heresy of Adoptionism. The immediate effects of Carolingian iconoclasm are more evident than any permanent attitude or theological shift in Western Christianity. A survey of Carolingian art reveals the conundrum that although Charlemagne imagined himself in the mold of the Roman Empire, there are no surviving depictions of him in any court manuscripts. A similar near-total absence of illustrations of the life of Christ affirms Carolingian iconoclasm espousal of parallels between Christology and the image. Promulgated at the Council of Frankfurt (794), the *Libri Carolini* (Caroline Books) condemned Adoptionism and qualified images in terms of the spirit of Gregory the Great (540–604) as appropriate for pedagogy, aesthetic adornment, and moral inspiration, but not adoration. A conceptual debate on the Christian moral relationship between art and materialism might have occurred between Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) and the Abbé Suger (1081–1151). Bernard, who vilified the expense of images, declared them a hindrance to the contemplation of the divine as witnessed in Benedictine purity and simplicity which cleansed abbey churches of stained-glass windows, wall paintings, and sculptures. Simultaneously, Suger proceeded with his design for the world's first Gothic cathedral, Saint Denis, an innovative model in elegant and inspired Christian aesthetics. The more pertinent theological issue of the abuses of devotional imagery led to violent iconoclasm in medieval Christianity.

Reform, especially as theological thinking on artistic imagery, was initiated in the fourteenth century, if not earlier. John Wycliffe (c. 1330–1384), the English reformer, and his “Lollards” (mumblers) debated the value of imagery and sought the destruction of human-figured forms. While the Dominican monk Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1498)

preached against materialism and the decadence of humanism, decrying, for example, the nude figure in Renaissance art and inspiring the infamous “Bonfire of the Vanities.” Influential not only on a majority of Florentines, Savonarola motivated artists such as Sandro Botticelli (1445–1510) and Michelangelo (1475–1564) to mutilate or destroy their own works.

Sixteenth-century Protestant Reformers resurrected the prophetic iconoclasm of the Judeo-Christian foundations and inspired attitudinal reposition from iconoclasm to iconophobia. Like the Byzantine iconoclastic controversies, Reformation or Protestant iconoclasm was equitably motivated by economic, political, aesthetic, and theological issues. The central question of defining or redefining the God-human relationship affected both the concept and the violent acts of the iconoclastic impulse. Reformers were divided in their individual definitions: Martin Luther (1483–1546) acknowledged the didactic use of religious art and decried the “destructive cleansing” advocated by Bodenstein von Karlstadt (c. 1480–1541). John Calvin (1509–1564) initially defended religious art as didactic but later opposed images given the tendency toward veneration; however, like Luther, he did not support violent iconoclasm. Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531) banned religious art as a distraction from worship and supervised the closing and cleansing of churches by whitewashing the interior walls and removing all statues, images, and stained-glass windows. Proponents of the Church of England advocated public spectacles such as the “Bonfire of the Virgins” (July 1538) to champion the reform process. Calvin's and Zwingli's followers were driven by the “horror of imagery” to destroy not simply individual religious images but entire buildings but to move toward iconophobia as an attitude and activity destructive of all images.

The Christian iconoclastic impulse extended into the colonizing of Latin and South America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The danger, or threat, of idolatry was transformed by European missionaries and explorers to the New World into native images as purveyors of false religion. The destruction, either physically or by assimilation into Roman Catholic imagery, of native religious art signified the concurrent replacement of popular religion with Christianity. The European interpretation of indigenous religion was colored by the perception of art as “craft” and as inferior in quality to the “high art” of the West. This relating of image with religion colored the inculcation of “European” culture and religion on the Americas.

Further violent acts of, or inspired by, Christian iconoclasm include the transformation or “secularization” of Western culture through political and social revolutions from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. Foremost is the spontaneous and wanton destruction of religious art and monuments by the lower classes in establishing the secular state of the French Revolution. This havoc was motivated by the economic, political, and societal abuses the aristocracy and the church—identified as one and the same entity—

wrought on the working poor. Similarly, the political and ideological “revenge” of the Russian people, or at least the leadership of the new Russian government, against the czar and the church was the establishment of a secular state and the disestablishment of a state church.

Given its theocentric universe and resolute avowal of monotheism, Islam interpreted the existence of images not merely as simple idolatry but as an assault on the integrity of God. Aware that he is the sole eternal creator, the qualitative difference between God and humanity becomes immense. Beyond the boundaries of human limitations and descriptors, there is no attempt to humanize God as this would be interpreted as both an act of idolatry and tantamount to the unforgivable sin of *shirk*. Although there is no formal condemnation of the visual arts or of images in the Qurʾān, neither is there affirmation. The Qurʾānic silence on art, human creativity, and the visual modality is interpreted through the lens of inference, so that the passages, for example, such as those relating Solomon’s wealth and power (34:12–13), Abraham’s opposition to idols (6:74), and Jesus’ transformation of the clay bird to life (3:43) attest to a disapproving attitude toward representation. As God is the creator, any discussion or description of the artist as a “creator” proclaims a competition that is not permissible. The Prophet Muhammad (c. 570–632), who denounced the indigenous Arabic customs of idol worship, is credited by tradition with pronouncing that artists as they perceive themselves as “creators” will be severely tested and punished on Judgment Day. Angels, he is further credited with saying, would neither enter or protect a home with pictures or images. Several hadiths identify the artist as a deceiver or idolater, while a variety of texts—Arabic, Persian, and Turkish—of both Sunni and Shiʿah origins, denounce both the artist and art as blasphemous.

Grabar (1975) espouses the position that early Islam was indifferent to images, however, there is reference to an Islamic opposition to representation and to the artist as competing with God in the texts of Thawdhurus Abū Qurrah (c. 750–825). Except for legendary references and a contested episode in the life of Muhammad, there is no public or authoritative “debate on images” in Islam similar to those in Christianity, especially the Byzantine iconoclastic controversies. However, for some commentators the simple historical synchronicity of the rise of Islam during the latter Christian crises is a signifier of a homogeneous ethos or intellectual disposition.

The Islamic rejection of figural representation transformed the art of writing, whether inscriptions or calligraphy, into an artistic vehicle for theological expression. Similarly, abstract, geometric, and floral pictoriality defined the otherwise “religious” arts of Islamic cultures. Aniconism may have so dominated the Islamic attitude toward art that critical issues such as the amorphous relationship between the act of representation and the object represented, and the forms of possible representation of the divine or abstract concepts, were rarely, if ever, discussed. Rather, Islamic art reflected

the cultural matrix of a social and moral ethos and denied expression in figurative forms. Nevertheless, within Islam’s earliest centuries, iconoclasm flourished sporadically, depending on local interpretations of the Qurʾān and hadiths, economic and political struggles, and moral affirmation of the integrity of the one God. Islamic iconoclasm, if this is a justifiable phrase, is an umbrella term for a variety of phenomena ranging from wanton destruction or vandalism in military campaigns to the whitewashing of images of other religions or cultures. Historically documented violent acts of Islamic iconoclasm were related most often either to conquests or to transformations of buildings in central Asia (Buddhist), India (Hindu), Anatolia, Turkey, and Al Andalus, Spain (Christian). Whenever adherents rigorously define Islam as the prophetic witness to the one God, who is the transcendent and invisible creator, and who cannot be restricted by or contained within figural images, such a theological position with which the Taliban might identify itself, then the violent acts of iconoclasm such as the destruction of the giant Buddhas at Bamiyan (2001) may be interpreted as self-justification.

**FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF ICONOCLASM.** Studies of iconoclasm as a mode of behavior or an ideology converge with the issues and methodologies employed in the analyses of response theory (Freedberg, 1989), optics and vision (Elkins, 1996; Kemp, 1990), and the dynamics of class, race, and gender, especially through the lens of visual culture and popular culture (Morgan, 1998; Nochlin, 1998/1995; Plate, 2002/2003). Early twenty-first century history including the destruction of the giant Buddhas at Bamiyan heightens the recognition of the affinities between iconoclasm and violence and points toward both psychologically and religiously based analyses. The censoring of “religious art” such as Chris Ofili’s *The Holy Virgin Mary* motivates in-depth examinations of the affiliations between iconoclasm and censorship. Clearly, both relationships sharpen interest in the connectives between the economy, politics, and religion as the integral matrix sustaining iconoclasm, particularly violent iconoclasm.

The more complex nature of iconoclasm particularly as a religious act requires a thorough investigation into the patterns of iconoclasm in both Eastern and Western religions. A comparison of variations according to cultural patterns, religious values, political structures, and gender and class struggles provides a methodology for examining iconoclasm as both a mode of behavior and historical event. The basic nature of the iconoclastic impulse is clarified by detailed comparison of the singularity of the Western model in and against the global evidence for iconoclasm as a value larger than the limitation of Western monotheism.

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## ICONOCLASM: ICONOCLASM IN THE BYZANTINE TRADITION

Byzantine iconoclasm in all its facets remains an unresolved subject. Key sources are still to be published in modern editions, and interpretation of those that have been published have not yet achieved a consensus. Nonetheless the lengthy bibliography on this topic not only marks its significance but also the breadth of interests potentially, if not necessarily, encompassed by the somewhat misleadingly titled "era of iconoclasm" (literally, the destruction of images) in the eighth and ninth centuries and the iconomachy (contest over the images) that preoccupied the minds of theologians at that time.

The precise dates given by historians to the iconoclastic crisis are not fixed. Modern scholarship has dismissed the historical reality of the traditional opening moment, the destruction in 726 CE of Christ's icon on the Chalke Gate of the Great Palace in Constantinople. Instead, 730 CE, when Emperor Leo III (r. 717–741 CE) forced the resignation of Patriarch Germanos I (r. 715–730 CE), has now become the preferred opening moment of this debate. Given this, it remains possible to trace the origins of the crisis back to legislation enacted at the Quinisext Council held in Constantinople in 691/692 CE. This first phase of iconoclasm was brought to an end by the Seventh Ecumenical Council that met at Nicaea in 787 CE. Iconoclasm returned in 815 CE, when Emperor Leo V (r. 813–820 CE) encouraged the revival and refinement of the iconoclastic case made in the eighth century. This second phase is usually considered to have ended in 843 CE with the first celebration of the Triumph of Orthodoxy. Iconoclasm continued to be discussed, most notably in the writings of Patriarch Photios I (r. 858–867 and 877–886 CE) in the period leading up to and during the Eighth Ecumenical Council that met in Constantinople in 869–870 CE.

**PRELUDE.** Long cast as an atavistic reaction to the increasing popularity of images, the precise origins of Byzantine iconoclasm remain open to debate. The influence of Islam and Judaism as well as imperial adventurism, social and cultural crises, and military failure have all been cited as potential causes for the onset of iconoclasm. These have tended to downplay the internal theological questions that drove and continued to drive the terms of the debate within the Orthodox Church itself, as theologians grappled with the problem of finding an appropriate language to justify the incorporation of images and their veneration into legitimate Christian practice. This problem was raised by the eighty-second canon of the Quinisext Council, which declared that it was inappropriate for Christians to use symbolic representations of Christ (such as the Lamb of God) when the fact of Christ's incarnation made his corporeal representation a necessity.

**FIRST PHASE.** Knowledge of the earliest iconoclastic case against the images is scant. From the reports embedded in iconophile responses, it appears that the iconoclasts asserted the continuing value of Old Testament prohibitions on im-

ages, such as those found in the second commandment. In response, iconophile theologians argued that these prohibitions against idols and their worship were no longer valid for Christians, whose God, thanks to the incarnation, had become a historical being, whose acceptance of the spatial and temporal limits of a human body had made him visible and hence available for representation in icons. The primary advocates of this position were Patriarch Germanos I of Constantinople, whose views are known from three letters included in the documents of the Seventh Ecumenical Council, and John of Damascus (c. 675–749 CE), whose three orations on the images remain an influential discussion of the role of images in Orthodox Christianity. The arguments proposed by Germanos and John are crucial in that they linked the fate of the icon to Christological thought, thus making the debate over the image continuous with the Christological debates of the preceding centuries.

**SECOND PHASE.** The second phase of the iconoclastic era belongs to the early 750s CE. In preparation for an iconoclastic council to be held in 754 CE, Emperor Constantine V (r. 741–775) issued a series of *Enquiries* on the image question. These challenged the Christological case made by the first generation of iconophiles. Constantine deployed a Trinitarian conception of the image to show that the Christological defense of images was insufficient. In particular, he argued that the iconophiles had failed to account for how an icon could represent a divine being such as Christ without either dividing his dual natures or limiting his person. Constantine's position was largely endorsed by 338 bishops and other participants at the iconoclastic Hieria Council held at Chalcedon in 754 CE. The remaining years of Constantine's reign were marked by an intensified persecution of iconophile opponents to this conciliar decision. One further consequence of the council was that it reinforced papal opposition to what had come to be seen as an imperial policy of iconoclasm. This opposition to iconoclasm was expressed in the Lateran Council of 769 CE and in the numerous letters written by Pope Adrian I (r. 772–795) in regard to the Seventh Ecumenical Council held at Nicaea in 787 CE and the Council of Frankfurt in 794 CE. It is arguable that this opposition also contributed to the papal alliance with the emergent Carolingians that began in the 750s CE and that was to culminate with Charlemagne's coronation as Holy Roman Emperor in 800 CE.

The second phase was brought to an end by the ecumenical council that brought together 350 delegates at Nicaea in 787 CE. This council was held under the auspices of Empress Irene (r. 797–802 CE) and her son Constantine VI (r. 780–797 CE) and came about with the strong support of Pope Adrian I. The council was shaped by Patriarch Tarasios I of Constantinople (r. 784–806 CE) and was a direct response to the iconoclastic council of 754 CE. The greater part of the discussion was devoted to the establishment of the continuing tradition of the icon in the life of the church. The enormous array of testimony gathered toward this end remains a primary witness to the early history of the icon. Hav-

ing established that icons belonged within the traditions of the church, the council reiterated that the icon was essential for the commemoration of the reality of the incarnation and that this function made the icon worthy of veneration.

**THIRD PHASE.** In 815 CE Emperor Leo V forced Patriarch Nikephoros I (r. 806–815) to resign. This emperor had sponsored a revival of the iconoclastic theology espoused during the reign of Constantine V. Under the auspices of a committee led by the monk John the Grammarian, who became Patriarch of Constantinople in 837 CE, these ninth-century iconoclasts developed aspects of their iconoclastic predecessors' theology. This included an acceptance of the visual representation of holy persons, although these images were to be denied veneration and were also considered to be a lesser medium than verbal representations.

Resistance to this fresh outbreak was led by Patriarch Nikephoros I of Constantinople and Theodore of Stoudios (759–826). Nikephoros wrote an extensive series of treatises against the unfolding iconoclastic theology, whereas Theodore's primary contribution lay in his three refutations of iconoclastic arguments. Both authors built upon the Christological defense of images. To this they added a rigorous use of Aristotelian logical terminology. This enabled them to clarify the language that framed the icon and to provide a precise description of iconic representation. Above all the icon was defined in relational terms as a likeness of the one depicted therein. An icon was thus understood to represent the formal, nonessential aspects of the visible properties of a historical subject. Furthermore, this relational model was also applied to the question of the veneration of icons. Iconophile theologians vigorously denied that the veneration of an image could lead to any confusion between the icon and its subject. Rather, they continued to build upon Basil of Caesarea's (c. 329–379 CE) fourth-century dictum that the honor addressed to an image was passed on to the person whose portrait was conveyed by that object. Following the death of Emperor Theophilus (r. 829–842 CE), Emperor Michael III (r. 842–867 CE) and Empress Theodora (r. 842–858 CE), guided by the eunuch Theoktistos, installed Methodius (c. 825–884 CE) as Patriarch of Constantinople (r. 843–847 CE) and removed the iconoclastic ban on the cult of images.

**AFTERMATH.** The years of debate that marked Byzantine iconoclasm confirmed the centrality of the icon for Orthodox Christians. Thereafter, the icon was deemed an exact and truthful eyewitness and confirmation of the reality of Christ's incarnation. The arguments presented by John of Damascus, Nikephoros of Constantinople, and Theodore of Stoudios continued to define the key issues concerning the place of art in Byzantine Christianity. The Synodikon of Orthodoxy, first composed before 920 CE, summarized and memorialized the iconophile argument. When this text was read each year on the first Sunday of Lent to mark the Triumph of Orthodoxy, it both reiterated the iconophile defense of the icon and affirmed the centrality of the icon to the definition



of orthodoxy. Furthermore the arguments of these iconophile fathers continued to be studied and invoked in Byzantine debates over the image that took place in the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. Later in the West their ideas were “rediscovered” by the Counter-Reformation theologians of the sixteenth century as they searched for models for a Catholic defense of images.

Indeed, the Council of Trent, Vatican II, and Pope John Paul II's *Letter to Artists* demonstrate the continuing value of Byzantine theology of the icon for Catholic theologians. Each of these texts shows that the ideas addressed during Byzantium's debates over the status of the icon remain fundamental to any discussion of Christian image making and image use.

**SEE ALSO** Icons.

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New translations have also made crucial material more accessible; for example, Saint Nicephorus, Patriarch of Constantinople, *Discours contre les Iconoclastes*, translated by Marie-José Mondzain-Baudinet (Paris, 1989); Theophanes the Confessor, *The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor: Byzantine and Near Eastern History AD 284–813*, translated by Cyril Mango and Roger Scott (Oxford, U.K., 1997); *Byzantine Defenders of Images: Eight Saints' Lives in Translation*, edited by Alice-Mary Talbot (Washington, D.C., 1998); and Andrew Louth, ed., *Three Treatises on the Divine Images* (Crestwood, N.Y., 2003). This work on the texts from this era has led to a more complex assessment of the use of the evidence that is available from this period. This enquiry is led by, among others, the work of Paul Speck, usefully introduced in his *Understanding Byzantium: Studies in Byzantine Historical Sources* (Aldershot, U.K., and Brookfield, Vt., 2003); and Marie-France Auzépy, including her *Hagiographie et l'iconoclasm: Le cas de la Vie d'Étienne le Jeune* (Aldershot, U.K., 1999).

Leslie Brubaker and John Haldon, *Byzantium in the Iconoclast Era, ca. 680–850: The Sources; An Annotated Survey* (Aldershot, U.K., 2001), provides a useful survey of the material and verbal sources available for the study of Byzantine iconoclasm. For art-historical discussion see André Grabar, *L'iconoclasm byzantin: Le dossier archéologique* (Paris, 1984); and Charles Barber, *Figure and Likeness: On the Limits of Representation in Byzantine Iconoclasm* (Princeton, N.J., 2002). The papers collected in Anthony Bryer and Judith Herrin, eds., *Iconoclasm* (Birmingham, U.K., 1977), remain an important point of departure for the study of this topic. For an introduction to the theological issues see Kenneth Parry, *Depicting the Word: Byzantine Iconophile Thought of the Eighth and Ninth Centuries* (Leiden, Netherlands, 1996).

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