

LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB 1911

EDITED BY

JEFFREY HENDERSON

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

VIII

LCL 531

B502
Ea76
(v.8)

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME VIII


SOPHISTS

PART 1

EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY
ANDRÉ LAKS AND GLENN W. MOST

IN COLLABORATION WITH
GÉRARD JOURNÉE

AND ASSISTED BY
DAVID LÉVYSTONÉ



HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
LONDON, ENGLAND
2016



北大图书 21101003955342

Copyright © 2016 by the President and Fellows
of Harvard College
All rights reserved

First published 2016

LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY® is a registered trademark
of the President and Fellows of Harvard College

Library of Congress Control Number 2015957358
CIP data available from the Library of Congress

ISBN 978-0-674-99709-7

*Composed in ZephGreek and ZephText by
Technologies 'N Typography, Merrimac, Massachusetts.
Printed on acid-free paper and bound by
The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group*

CONTENTS

THE 'SOPHISTS,' PART 1

General Introduction to Chapters 31–42	3
31. Protagoras	9
32. Gorgias	114
33. Socrates	293
34. Prodicus	413
35. Thrasymachus	475
36. Hippias	515

THE 'SOPHISTS'
PART 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTERS 31-42

Chapters 31 to 42 present a set of texts relating to an aspect of fifth century BC Greek culture that particularly struck contemporary observers, that enjoyed a kind of renaissance during the Imperial period starting in the second century AD (under the name of the 'Second Sophistic'), and that has continued to fascinate later historians: the so-called 'Sophistic' movement. At first the term *sophistês* was used quite generally and positively, with more or less the same meaning as *sophos* ('sage' in the sense of 'learned, expert'), and even later this remains a possible usage. But Plato applies it, ironically and with a strongly negative connotation, to a particular group of experts who are linked with one another by a kind of family resemblance, although the doctrines they proclaim differ in many important regards: they share personal relations and similarities in their way of life, their pedagogical practices, and their general conceptual orientation. They tended to concentrate (but not exclusively) upon rhetorical, ethical, and political issues rather than upon natural phenomena; they wandered throughout the Greek world, also visiting Athens; they demonstrated their knowledge and skills in public lectures and written treatises; they offered instruction and charged fees for it (in some cases apparently

becoming quite wealthy); and they provoked strong reactions among the Athenians, both positive and negative—Protagoras, indeed, may have been tried and convicted of atheism. To be sure, none of these features considered separately provides a hard-and-fast criterion that would enable us to distinguish the ‘sophists’ sharply from the ‘philosophers’: Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Democritus investigated moral and political questions as well, while conversely Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias were also interested in natural phenomena; Xenophanes and Pythagoras left their native cities and some natural philosophers visited Athens (certainly Anaxagoras, perhaps Parmenides and Zeno); teaching, lecturing in public, and charging high fees became typical of various kinds of experts in the fifth century (already Simonides and Pindar were accused of being greedy); and Anaxagoras was put on trial for impiety and had to flee Athens. But the affinities among the members of this loose socio-professional group, which were already perceived by their contemporaries, are substantial enough to justify considering them all together, as is traditionally done. Nonetheless, we have preferred as far as possible to avoid using the term ‘sophist,’ which, in the wake of Plato’s influential conceptualization, not only suggests a degree of doctrinal homogeneity such as these individuals never possessed but also remains tainted by strongly negative connotations. In any case it should not be forgotten that in chronological terms many of these figures are contemporary with thinkers presented in earlier volumes of our edition like Democritus and Anaxagoras.

It will doubtless surprise some readers that we have chosen to include Socrates together with this group. But any surprise would be due precisely to the fact that it

is only since Plato—and largely because of him—that a sharp dividing line has seemed to many people to separate Socrates, and with him philosophy in general, from the ‘sophists.’ We include Socrates not only for the negative reason that we have not allowed ourselves to be guided by the historical category of ‘Presocratic,’ which by definition would exclude him (see the Preface to our edition in volume 1); but also, positively, because Socrates, whatever his manifest differences from those whom Plato stigmatizes as ‘sophists,’ shares their interest in moral and political issues and in argumentative techniques. Indeed, for understanding the development of Greek philosophy in the fifth century BC, it makes most sense—as has been recognized by part of the philosophical tradition, following Hegel in particular—to think of Socrates not as an opponent of the ‘sophists’ but rather as an idiosyncratic Athenian member of the group that is conventionally designated by this term. Complementarily, we have dedicated a separate chapter (42) to the history of the term ‘sophist’ and to that of the reception of this group as a whole.

But we have also omitted certain figures and texts that readers might have expected to find in this volume. Diels devoted a substantial chapter to Critias (88 DK), and we have included the most philosophically significant fragments of the dramatic works ascribed in antiquity to him (but also to Euripides) in our appendix “Philosophy and Philosophers in Greek Comedy and Tragedy” (cf. **DRAM T49, T63, T67**); but the absence of any pedagogical activity, paid or unpaid, his intense participation in Athenian politics, and the non-philosophical character of his attested prose collections of constitutions make him seem less one of the ‘sophists’ than a statesman who had learned

from them. Other, minor figures we have excluded because it is impossible to grasp their contours, or even to be fully certain of their historical reality—so for example several characters who are known only from Plato, like Callicles (in the *Gorgias*) or Dionysodorus and his brother Euthydemus (in the *Euthydemus* and *Cratylus*).

So too, we have omitted some anonymous prose works sometimes considered to be of a generally 'sophistic' inspiration—this latter is a vast and nebulous category that could include e.g. certain treatises of the Hippocratic corpus and many speeches in Thucydides. This is notably the case of a short text on music transmitted by a papyrus (Περὶ μουσικῆς, *On Music*: P. Hibeh 13: Untersteiner 1954 vol. 3, pp. 209–11); a discussion of law (*nomos*) and nature (*phusis*) in a speech included, erroneously, among the works of Demosthenes (25), considered by some scholars to go back to a 'sophistic' treatise on laws (Περὶ νόμων, *On the Laws*: Untersteiner 1954 vol. 3, pp. 192–207); and a speech concerning the political situation in Thessaly at the end of the fifth century BC, transmitted together with Gorgias' *Helen* and *Palamedes* (Περὶ πολιτείας, *On the Constitution*).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Editions and Translations with Commentary

- Directed by J.-F. Pradeau, with the collaboration of M. Bonazzi, L. Brisson, M. L. Desclos, L. A. Dorion, A. Macé, M. Patillon. *Les Sophistes*, 2 vols. (Paris, 2009).
R. K. Sprague. *The Older Sophists: A Complete Translation* (Columbia, S.C., 1972).

- M. Untersteiner and (for volume 4) A. M. Battagazzore. *Sofisti, testimonianze e frammenti*, 4 vols. (Florence, 1954–1962).

Studies

- M. Bonazzi. *I Sofisti* (Rome, 2010).
B. Cassin. *L'Effet sophistique* (Paris, 1995).
E. Dupréel. *Les Sophistes* (Neuchâtel, 1948).
G. Grote. *A History of Greece* (2nd ed. London, 1869; (1st ed. 1846–1856), chap. 67).
W. C. K. Guthrie. *History of Greek Philosophy*. Vol. 3, *The Fifth-Century Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1969).
G. B. Kerferd. *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge, 1981).

Collections of Articles

- B. Cassin, ed. *Le Plaisir de parler* (Paris, 1986).
———. *Positions de la sophistique* (Paris, 1986).
C. J. Classen, ed. *Sophistik* (Darmstadt, 1976).
G. B. Kerferd, ed. *The Sophists and Their Legacy* (Wiesbaden, 1981).

31. PROTAGORAS (PROT.)

Protagoras was the earliest and most renowned member of the loose group of fifth century BC intellectuals to whom the term 'sophist' (*sophistês*) was gradually applied in a pejorative sense (cf. the chapter **SOPH.**), though he himself, if we can trust Plato's testimony, claimed it for himself in the positive sense ('expert,' 'wise man,' 'sage') that it originally possessed. He was born ca. 490 in Abdera in Thrace (as was Democritus, a generation after him) and he died ca. 420. He visited Athens at least twice, and Plato's *Protagoras* provides some idea of the excitement his arrival caused there. At Athens he was associated with Pericles, who entrusted him with establishing the laws for the colony at Thurii in southern Italy. A number of ancient sources report that he was condemned for impiety and expelled from Athens, but many modern scholars doubt their trustworthiness—Anaxagoras' real fate (cf. **ANAXAG. P23–P26**) may have been applied erroneously to Protagoras. We know the titles of a number of his works, but he was most celebrated in antiquity for the opening sentences of two of them, on man as the measure and on the unknowability of the gods; the precise meaning of the first statement was unclear already to the ancients, who offer a variety of interpretations for it, while the second one led to his being accused of atheism. He also devoted

considerable attention to rhetoric, grammar, literary criticism, the theory of society and its development, and probably geometry as well. As in the case of the other 'sophists,' our image of Protagoras has been profoundly influenced by Plato's portrait of him in his dialogues, especially the *Protagoras* and the *Theaetetus*; given the difficulty of assessing how reliable this portrait is, we include the more important passages not in the main part of the section on Protagoras' doctrines, but in an appendix to it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Studies

- F. Declève Caizzi. "Protagoras and Antiphon," in A. Long, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 311–33.
- J. M. van Ophuijsen, M. van Raalte, P. Stork, eds. *Protagoras of Abdera: The Man, His Measure* (Leiden-Boston, 2013).

See also the titles listed in the General Introduction to Chapters 31–42.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

P

- Father and City* (P1)
Chronology (P2–P4)
Education (P5–P7)
Protagoras' Visits to Athens (P8–P11)
A Public Reading (P8)

- The Visit Presupposed by Plato's Protagoras* (P9)
Testimony to the Impact of His Arrival in Athens (P10)
Connection with Pericles (P11)
His Legislation for Thurii (P12)
His Voyage to Sicily (HIPPIAS P4)
His Fees (P13–P15)
Two Alleged Illustrious Disciples (P16)
Apothegms (P17–P18)
His Trial (P19–P20)
His Death (P21–P23)
Iconography (P24)

D

- Attested Titles* (D1–D8)
The Openings of Two of His Books (D9–D10)
Man the Measure (D9)
Knowledge of the Gods (D10)
On Education (D11–D13)
Protagoras on Language (D14–D32)
The Forms of Protagoras' Discourses (D14–D16)
The Analysis of Discourse (D17–D20)
Grammar and Correctness of Speech (D21–D25)
Arguments (D26–D30)
Interpretation of the Poets (D31–D32)
Geometry (D33–D34)
Appendix: Platonic Representations of Protagoras (D35–D42)
Protagoras the Teacher (D35–D37)
Protagoras' Own Explanation of His Doctrine of Man the Measure in Plato's Theaetetus (D38)

- Protagoras' Myth in Plato's Protagoras (D39–D41)*
The Choice of the Form: Myth or Argument?
 (D39)
The Myth (D40)
The Lesson of the Myth (D41)
Protagoras and the Interpretation of Poetry in Plato's
Protagoras (D42)
Protagoras on the Importance of Interpretation of
the Poets (cf. D31)
Protagoras' Interpretation of Simonides' Poem (D42)

R

- Attestations and Allusions in Dramatic Authors (DRAM.*
T18–T19)
The Attack by Democritus (R22; ATOM. R89, R109)
Protagoras' Role for Plato the Writer (R1–R3)
Protagoras as the Source of Plato's Dialogues? (R1–
R2)
Plato's Parody of Protagoras' Style (R3)
References to Protagoras' Doctrine and Refutations of It
(R4–R29)
Man the Measure in Plato (R4–R11)
The Context of the Citation of D9 (R4)
First Interpretation: Individual Relativism (R5)
Second Interpretation (Protagoras' 'Secret Doc-
trine'): Universal Motion (R6)
The Refutations (R7–R10)
First Refutation: Whose Sensation—a Man's, a
Pig's, a God's? (R7)
Second Refutation: One Can Know When One
Remembers (R8)

- Third Refutation: Protagoras' Doctrine Is Self-*
Refuting (R9–R10)
An Allusion in Plato's Laws (R11)
Doxographic Reports Deriving from Plato's Theaete-
tus (R12–R13)
Aristotle (R14–R18)
The Sceptics (R19–R22)
Epicureans (R23–R24)
A Mention in Epicurus (R23)
A Polemic Concerning the Gods (R24)
The Construction of a Debate (Zeno and Protagoras
on the Argument of the Grain of Millet) (ZEN. D12b)
A Fanciful Biographical Explanation for the Doctrine
about the Gods (R25)
A Neoplatonic Report on Protagoras: Testimonium,
Error, or Invention? (R26)
Protagoras Among the Christians (R27–R29)
An Exegetical Use of Protagoras' Skepticism (R27)
A Sarcasm (R28)
A Reprise of the Accusation of Atheism (R29)
An Aphorism Attributed to Protagoras in Syriac (R30)

PROTAGORAS [80DK]

P

Father and City (P1)

P1 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.50

Πρωταγόρας Ἀρτέμωνος ἦ, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος [FGrHist 244 F70] καὶ Δίνων¹ ἐν Περσικῶν ε' ² [FGrHist 690 F6], Μαιανδρίου, Ἀβδηρίτης, καθά φησιν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς ἐν τοῖς Περὶ νόμων [Frag. 150 Wehrli] [. . . = **P12**]: ὡς δ' Εὐπόλις ἐν Κόλαξι [Frag. 157 K-A], Τήιος· φησὶ γάρ·

ἐνδον³ μὲν ἔστι Πρωταγόρας ὁ Τήιος.

¹ δίων mss., corr. Menagius ² Περσικῶν ε' Diels: περσικοῖς ἐν B; περσ (comp.) ἐν P¹: περσικοῖς F ³ ἐνδον Cobet: ἐνδο^θ (vel -θι) mss.

Chronology (P2–P4)

P2 Plat.

a (< A5) *Protag.* 317c

[ΠΡ.] καίτοι πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ· καὶ

PROTAGORAS

P

Father and City (P1)

P1 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

Protagoras, son of Artemon, or, according to Apollodorus, and Dino in Book 5 of his *Persica*, of Maeandrius. He was from Abdera, according to what Heraclides of Pontus says in his *On Laws* [. . .]; but according to Eupolis in his *Flatterers*, he was from Teos, for he says,

Inside is Protagoras of Teos. [cf. **DRAM. T18b**]

Chronology (P2–P4)

P2 Plato

a (< A5) *Protagoras*

[Protagoras:] And yet it is already many years that I have spent in the profession; for indeed, taken all together, the

γὰρ καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα πολλά μοί ἐστιν—οὐδενὸς ὄτου
οὐ πάντων ἀν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατήρ εἶην [. . .].

b (< A8) *Men.* 91e

[ΣΩ.] οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγυὺς καὶ ἐβδο-
μήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ
ὄντα.

P3 (< A1) *Diog. Laert.* 9.56

Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ φησιν [*FCrHist* 244 F71] ἐβδομή-
κοντα, σοφιστεύσαι δὲ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ἀκμάζειν
κατὰ τὴν τετάρτην καὶ ὄγδοηκοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα.

P4 (< A4) *Eus. = Chron. (Hier.)*, p. 113.20

[*ad Ol.* 84.2]¹ Euripides [. . .] clarus habetur et Protagoras
sophista [. . .].

¹ 84.2] 84 L: XXI [*i.e.* 84.1] *OP*

Education (P5–P7)

P5 (< A1) *Diog. Laert.* 9.50

διήκουσε δ' ὁ Πρωταγόρας Δημοκρίτου.

sum of my years is considerable—there is no one here
among you all [i.e. Socrates, Alcibiades, Callias, Critias,
Prodicus, Hippias] whose father I could not be by age
[. . .].

b (< A8) *Meno*

[Socrates:] I think that he died near the age of seventy and
spent forty years in the profession.

P3 (< A1) *Diogenes Laertius*

Apollodorus says [scil. that he died] at the age of seventy,
that he had been active as a sophist for forty years, and
that he reached his full maturity in the 84th Olympiad [=
444–440].

P4 (< A4) *Eusebius, Chronicle*

84th Olympiad: Euripides [. . .] is considered famous, as
well as Protagoras the sophist [. . .].

Education (P5–P7)

P5 (< A1) *Diogenes Laertius*

Protagoras studied with Democritus.

P6

a (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.53

καὶ πρῶτος τὴν καλουμένην τύλην, ἐφ' ἧς τὰ φορτία βαστάζουσιν, εἶδεν, ὡς φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Περὶ παιδείας [Frag. 63 Rose]. φορμοφόρος γὰρ ἦν, ὡς καὶ Ἐπίκουρός ποῦ φησι [Frag. 172 Usener]. καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἤρθη¹ πρὸς Δημοκρίτου,² ξύλα³ δεδεκῶς⁴ ὀφθείς.⁵

¹ ἤχθη Croenert (servato δημόκριτον) ² δημόκριτον
mss., corr. Toup ³ ξύλα <τύλη> Croenert: ξύλα <εὔ>
Marcovich ⁴ δεδεκῶς Casaubon: δεδο- B: δεδω- PF
⁵ ὀφθείς] σοφῶς con. Croenert

b (< A3) Schol. in Plat. *Rep.* 600c

οὗτος φορτοβαστάκτης ἦν, ἐντυχὼν δὲ Δημοκρίτῳ ἐφιλοσόφησεν καὶ ἐπὶ ῥητορείαν ἔσχεν [. . . = D16].

P7 (< A2) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.10.1–2, p. 13.1–8 Kayser

Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης σοφιστῆς¹ Δημοκρίτου μὲν ἀκροατῆς οἴκοι ἐγένετο, ἀμίλησε δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ Περσῶν μάγοις κατὰ τὴν Ξέρξου ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἔλασιν. πατὴρ γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ Μαίανδρος [. . .] δεξάμενος δὲ καὶ τὸν Ξέρξην οἰκία τε καὶ δάροις τὴν ξυνουσίαν τῶν μάγων τῷ παιδί παρ' αὐτοῦ εὔρετο [. . .].

¹ post σοφιστῆς hab. ms. καὶ, secl. Friedländer

P6

a (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He was the first to discover the so-called 'porter's knot' (*tylē*), on which they carry loads, as Aristotle says in his *On Education*; for he was a porter, as Epicurus says somewhere, and it was in this way that Democritus, who had seen him binding pieces of wood, obtained a more elevated position for him.

b (< A3) Scholia on Plato's *Republic*

He was a porter, but when he met Democritus he began to do philosophy and then devoted himself to rhetoric [. . .].

P7 (< A2) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

Protagoras of Abdera, the sophist, was a student of Democritus at his home, but he also associated with the magi who came from Persia during the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. His father was Maeander [. . .], by welcoming Xerxes with hospitality and presents, he obtained from him permission for his son to spend time with the magi [. . .] [cf. R25].

Protagoras' Visits to Athens (P8–P11)
A Public Reading (P8)

P8 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.54

πρῶτον δὲ τῶν λόγων ἑαυτοῦ ἀνέγνω τὸν Περὶ θεῶν [. . .]. ἀνέγνω δὲ Ἀθήνησιν ἐν τῇ Εὐριπίδου οἰκίᾳ ἢ, ὡς τινες, ἐν τῇ Μεγακλείδου· ἄλλοι ἐν Λυκείῳ, μαθητοῦ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτῷ χρῆσαντος Ἀρχαγόρου τοῦ Θεοδότου.

The Visit Presupposed by Plato's Protagoras (P9)

P9 (< A11) Athen. *Deipn.*

a 5 218B

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Πρωταγόρα διάλογος, μετὰ τὴν Ἴππονίκου τελευτῆν γενόμενος παρειληφότος ἤδη τὴν οὐσίαν Καλλίου, τοῦ Πρωταγόρου <μέμνηται>¹ παραγεγονότος τὸ δεύτερον οὐ πολλαῖς πρότερον ἡμέραις. ὁ δ' Ἴππονίκος [. . .] τέθνηκε [. . .] πρὸ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀλκαίου διδασκαλίας τῶν Εὐπόλιδος Κολάκων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ τὸ εἶκος. πρόσφατον γάρ τινα τοῦ Καλλίου τὴν παράληψιν τῆς οὐσίας ἐμφαίνει τὸ δράμα. ἐν οὖν τούτῳ τῷ δράματι Εὐπολις τὸν Πρωταγόραν ὡς ἐπιδημοῦντα εἰσάγει, Ἀμεψίας δ' ἐν τῷ Κόννῳ² δύο πρότερον ἔτεσιν διδαχθέντι οὐ καταριθμῆι αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ τῶν φροντιστῶν χορῷ· δῆλον οὖν ὡς μεταξὺ τούτων τῶν χρόνων παραγέγονεν.

Protagoras' Visits to Athens (P8–P11)
A Public Reading (P8)

P8 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

The first of his works that he read in public was *On the Gods* [. . .]; he read it at Athens in Euripides' house, or, as some people say, in Megacleides'; other people say that this was in the Lyceum, and that his student Archagoras, the son of Theodotus, lent him his voice.

The Visit Presupposed by Plato's Protagoras (P9)

P9 (< A11) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

a

The dialogue in the *Protagoras* [scil. of Plato], which takes place after the death of Hipponicus, when Callias had already inherited his property, <mentions> the presence of Protagoras [scil. at Athens] for a second time a few days earlier [cf. *Prot.* 309d]. But Hipponicus [. . .] probably died not long before the performance, under Alcaeus [scil. as archon], of Eupolis' *Flatterers* [= 421], for the play represents Callias' inheriting the property as being something recent. Well, in this play, Eupolis shows Protagoras as arriving, whereas Ameipsias in his *Connus*, performed two years earlier [= 423], does not count him among the chorus of thinkers. So it is clear that he arrived between these two dates [i.e. between 423 and 421].

¹ <μέμνηται> Casaubon

² κοινῷ ms., corr. Casaubon

b 11 505F–506A

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ δύνανται Πάραλος καὶ Ξάνθιππος οἱ Περικλέους υἱοὶ¹ Πρωταγόρα διαλέγεσθαι, ὅτε <τὸ>² δεύτερον ἐπεδήμησε ταῖς Ἀθήναις, οἱ ἔτι πρότερον³ τελευτήσαντες <τῷ λοιμῷ>.⁴

¹ post υἱοὶ ms. hab. τελευτήσαντες τῷ λοιμῷ, secl. Kaibel

² <τὸ> Kaibel ³ οἱ πέμπτῳ ἔτι πρότερον Casaubon:
οἱ πολλοῖς ἔτεσι πρότερον conl. Kaibel ⁴ <τῷ λοιμῷ>
Kaibel

*Testimony to the Impact of
His Arrival in Athens (P10)*

P10 (≠ DK) Plat. Prot. 310a–b, 310e–311a

[ΣΩ.] τῆς γὰρ παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βα-
θείος ὄρθρου, Ἰπποκράτης ὁ Ἀπολλοδώρου υἱὸς Φάσω-
νος δὲ ἀδελφὸς τὴν θύραν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ πάνυ σφόδρα
ἔκρουε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἀνέωξέ τις, εὐθύς εἴσω ἦει
ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων, “ὦ Σώκρατες,”
ἔφη, “ἐγγήγορας ἢ καθευδεις;” καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν
γνοῦς αὐτοῦ, “Ἰπποκράτης,” ἔφη, “οὗτος μὴ τι νεώ-
τερον ἀγγέλλεις;” “οὐδέν γ’,” ἢ δ’ ὅς, “εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά
γε.” “εὖ ἂν λέγοις,” ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. “ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ
ἔνεκα τηλικάδε ἀφίκου;” “Πρωταγόρας,” ἔφη, “ἦκει,
στὰς παρ’ ἐμοί. [. . .] [310e] “ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν
ἦκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῆς αὐτῷ. ἐγὼ
γὰρ ἄμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερός εἰμι, ἄμα δὲ οὐδὲ εἰώρακα

b

But Paralus and Xanthippus, the sons of Pericles, cannot have conversed with Protagoras when he visited Athens the second time [i.e. between 423 and 421], since they had already died earlier <from the plague> [= 429].¹

¹ Athenaeus wants to demonstrate that Plato’s indications are fictitious because they do not respect the chronology. The dramatic date usually assigned to the *Protagoras* is 433/31 because of the presence of Pericles’ sons; cf. 315a and 328d. Athenaeus’ argument presupposes that Protagoras visited Athens for a third time (which Athenaeus himself calls the ‘second time’ in P9b) in 423–421, shortly before his death.

*Testimony to the Impact of
His Arrival in Athens (P10)*

P10 (≠ DK) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Socrates:] For during this past night, while it was still well before dawn, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and brother of Phason, knocked very loudly on my door with his stick, and as soon as it was opened for him he rushed inside and shouted, “Socrates! Are you awake or asleep?” I recognized his voice and said, “It’s Hippocrates. Do you have some news to report?” “Nothing,” he said, “except good news.” “May you be right!” I said. “But what is it, and for what reason have you come at such an hour?” “Protagoras,” he said, standing next to me, “has come! [. . .] [310e] But this is precisely why I have now come to you, so that you can speak to him about me. For I am both too young and also I have not ever seen Protagoras or heard

Πρωταγόραν πάποτε οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἔτι γὰρ παῖς ἦ ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησε. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ φασιν σοφώτατον εἶναι λέγειν. ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον καταλαβώμεν; [. . .]"

Connection with Pericles (P11)

P11 (B9) Ps.-Plut. *Cons. Ap.* 33 118E

Περικλέα δὲ [. . .] πυθόμενον ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοῦ τοὺς υἱοὺς μετῆλλαχέναι τὸν βίον, Πάραλόν τε καὶ Ξανθίππον, ὡς φησι Πρωταγόρας εἰπὼν¹ οὕτως: "τῶν γὰρ υἱέων νενηιῶν ὄντων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν ὀκτῶ δὲ ταῖς πάσῃσιν ἡμέρησιν ἀποθανόντων νηπευθέως ἀνέτλη· εὐδίας γὰρ εἶχετο,² ἐξ ἧς πολλὸν ὠνητο κατὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέρην εἰς εὐπομίην καὶ ἀνωδυνίην καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖσι δόξαν· πᾶς γάρ τις μιν ὄρων τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πένθεα ἔρρωμένως φέροντα, μεγαλόφρονά τε καὶ ἀνδρείον ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ κρείσσω, κάρτα εἰδὼς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τοιοῦσδε πράγμασιν ἀμυχανίην." [. . .]

¹ εἰπέω mss., corr. Turnebus

² ἐχέωτο mss., corr. Turnebus

him at all—I was still a child when he came to visit the earlier time. But, Socrates, everyone praises the man and says that he is the wisest (*sophōtatos*) at speaking. So why don't we go to him so that we can find him where he is staying? [. . .]" [cf. **SOPH. R6**].

Connection with Pericles (P11)

P11 (B9) Ps.-Plutarch, *Consolation to Apollonius*

When Pericles [. . .] found out that both his sons, Paralus and Xanthippus, had died, as Protagoras reports in the following words: "Although his sons, who were young and handsome, had died within only eight days, he endured without grieving. For he maintained his serenity, from which every day he derived great benefit for his good fortune, for his freedom from pain, and for his reputation among the many. For all those who saw him enduring his losses with courage judged that he was great-spirited, manly, and self-controlled, knowing full well how helpless they themselves would be in such circumstances."¹ [. . .]

¹ In spite of the way in which the anonymous author introduces this quotation, it is very unlikely to be an authentic citation of Protagoras.

See also **D30**

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VIII

His Legislation for Thurii (P12)

P12 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.50

[. . . = **P1**] ὃς καὶ Θουρίοις νόμους γράψαι φησὶν
[Heracl. Pont. Frag. 150 Wehrli] αὐτόν.

His Voyage to Sicily

See **HIPPIAS P4**

His Fees (P13–P15)

P13

a (< A5) Plat. Prot. 349a

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] σύ γ' [. . .] σοφιστήν ἐπονομάσας σεαντόν
ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶ-
τος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνησθαι.

b (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.52

οὗτος πρῶτος μισθὸν εἰσεπράξατο μνᾶς ἑκατόν.

c (< A3) Schol. in Plat. Rep. 600c

[. . . = **D16**] μισθὸν ἔπραξεν τοὺς μαθητὰς μνᾶς ρ'.
διὸ καὶ ἐπεκλήθη Λόγος. [. . . = **P16**]

PROTAGORAS

His Legislation for Thurii (P12)¹

¹ Pericles organized the colonization of Thurii in 444/43 BC.

P12 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] he [i.e. Heraclides of Pontus in his *On the Laws*] also
says that he wrote the laws for Thurii.

His Voyage to Sicily

See **HIPPIAS P4**

His Fees (P13–P15)

P13

a (< A5) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Socrates:] You [i.e. Protagoras] at least call yourself a
sophist and declare that you are a teacher of education and
excellence (*aretê*), and you are the first to have thought it
appropriate that you receive a fee for this.

b (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He was the first to demand a fee, of one hundred minas.

c (< A3) Scholia on Plato's *Republic*

[. . .] He demanded a fee of one hundred minas from his
students; and this is why he received the nickname *Logos*
[i.e. 'Discourse,' 'Reason,' but also 'Calculation,' 'Financial
account']. [. . .]

P14 (< A8) Plat. *Men.* 91d

οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἓνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὃς οὕτως περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα ἤργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν.

P15 (> A6) Plat. *Prot.* 328b–c

[ΠΡ.] [. . .] ἐγὼ οἶμαι [. . .] διαφερόντως ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὀνήσαι¹ τινα πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀξίως τοῦ μισθοῦ ὃν πράττομαι καὶ ἔτι πλείονος, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ μαθόντι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πεποιήμαι· ἐπειδὴν γὰρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθη, εἰ μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὃ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλθων εἰς ἱερόν, ὁμόσας ὅσον ἂν φῆ ἀξία εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκε.

¹ νοῆσαι mss., corr. Dobree

*Two Alleged Illustrious Disciples (P16)***P16** (< A3) Schol. in Plat. *Rep.* 600c

[. . . = **P13c**] τούτου μαθητῆς Ἰσοκράτης ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος.

P14 (< A8) Plato, *Meno*

[Socrates]: I know one man, Protagoras, who has made more money from this wisdom of his than Phidias, who so splendidly constructed magnificent monuments, and ten other sculptors all together.

P15 (> A6) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Protagoras:] I think [. . .] that I am superior to other people with regard to helping someone become fine and good, and that I deserve the fee that I charge, and even a bigger one—such is the view of whoever studies with me too. That is why I have adopted the following procedure with regard to my fee: when someone has learned from me, he gives me, if he wishes, the amount of money I ask for; otherwise he goes to a temple and, after swearing an oath, he deposits the amount corresponding to what he says what he has learned is worth.

*Two Alleged Illustrious Disciples (P16)***P16** (< A3) Scholia on Plato's *Republic*

[. . .] His disciples included Isocrates the orator and Prodicus of Ceos.

See also **PROD. P1**

*Apothegms (P17–P18)***P17** (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.56

λέγεται δέ ποτε αὐτὸν ἀπαιτοῦντα τὸν μισθὸν Εὐ-
αθλον τὸν μαθητῆν, ἐκείνου εἰπόντος “ἀλλ’ οὐδέπω
δίκην¹ νενίκηκα,” εἰπεῖν “ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν νικήσω, ὅτι
ἐγὼ ἐνίκησα, λαβεῖν με δεῖ· εἰ δὲ σύ, ὅτι σύ.”

¹ δίκην Marcovich: νίκην BP: om. F

P18 (A25) *Gnomol. Vat.* 468

Πρωταγόρας ἐποποιῶν τινος αὐτὸν βλασφημοῦντος
ἐπὶ τῷ¹ μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι τὰ ποιήματα αὐτοῦ “ὦ τάν,”
ἔφη· “κρεῖττόν μοί ἐστι κακῶς ἀκούειν ὑπὸ σοῦ ἢ τῶν
σῶν ποιημάτων ἀκούειν.”

¹ τὸ ms., corr. Sternbach

*His trial (P19–P20)***P19** (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.52

διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ συγγράμματος ἐξ-
εβλήθη πρὸς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὰ βιβλία αὐτοῦ κατ-
έκαυσαν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, ὑπὸ κήρυκι¹ ἀναλεξάμενοι παρ’
ἐκάστου τῶν κεκτημένων.

¹ ὑπὸ κήρυκι Φ: ὑπὸ κήρυκα B: ὑπὸ κήρυκα PF

*Apothegms (P17–P18)***P17** (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

It is said that one day he asked his pupil Euathlus for the
payment of his fee; and when the latter said, “But I have
not yet won a trial,” he replied, “Then if I win, I will have
to receive it, because it is I who will have won; but if you
do, the same, because it is you who will have won.”

P18 (A25) *Vatican Gnomology*

When some poet was insulting him because he did not
approve of his poems, Protagoras said, “My dear man, I
would rather hear your slanders than your poems.”

*His Trial (P19–P20)***P19** (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

Because of this beginning of his book [i.e. *On the Gods*,
cf. **P8**, **D10**], he was expelled by the Athenians, and they
burned his books in the marketplace after they had been
collected by a herald from everyone who owned them.

P20 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.54

κατηγόρησε δ' αὐτοῦ Πυθόδωρος Πολυζήλου, εἰς τῶν τετρακοσίων Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ Εὐαθλὸν φησιν [Frag. 67 Rose].

His Death (P21–P23)

P21 (< A2) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.10.3, p. 13.14–19 Kayser

διὰ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο πάσης γῆς ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ἠλάθη ὡς μὲν τινες, κριθείς, ὡς δὲ ἐνίοις δοκεῖ, ψήφου ἐπενεχθείσης μὴ κριθέντι. νήσους δὲ ἐξ ἠπείρων ἀμείβων καὶ τὰς Ἀθηναίων τριήρεις φυλαττόμενος πάσαις θαλάτταις ἐνεσπαρμένας κατέδν πλέων ἐν ἀκατίῳ μικρῷ.

P22 (< A12) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 9.56

παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν θάνατον αὐτοῦ καταψηφισαμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων διαφυγῶν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν πταίσας ἀπέθανεν.

P23 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.55

φησὶ δὲ Φιλόχορος [FCrHist 328 F217] πλείοντος αὐτοῦ εἰς Σικελίαν τὴν ναῦν καταποντωθῆναι καὶ τοῦτο

P20 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

His accuser was Pythodorus, son of Polyzelus, one of the Four Hundred; but Aristotle says that it was Euathlus [cf. P17].

His Death (P21–P23)

P21 (< A2) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

This is why he was expelled by the Athenians from their whole country, after he had been judged in a trial, according to some, or, as others think, after a public vote without a trial. While he was traveling from the mainland to the islands and avoiding the Athenian triremes, which were deployed on all the seas, he suffered shipwreck while sailing in a small boat.

P22 (< A12) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Natural Philosophers*

It was for this reason [i.e. the atheism he was accused of because of D10] that the Athenians condemned him to death, but he managed to escape and died at sea in a shipwreck.

P23 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

Philochorus says that while he was sailing to Sicily his ship suffered shipwreck, and that Euripides makes a veiled

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VIII

αἰνίττεσθαι Εὐριπίδην ἐν τῷ Ἰξίονι. ἔνιοι <δὲ>¹ κατὰ
τὴν ὁδὸν τελευτήσαι αὐτόν, βιώσαντα ἔτη² πρὸς τὰ
ἐνενήκοντα.

¹ <δὲ> rec.

² ἔτη <ῆ'> Reiske

PROTAGORAS

allusion to this in his *Ixion*.¹ But some people say that he
died during the trip, at the age of about ninety.

¹ Ixion attacked the gods.

Iconography (P24)

P24 (≠ DK) Richter I, p. 108.

PROTAGORAS [80 DK]

D

Attested Titles (D1–D8)

D1 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.55

ἔστι δὲ τὰ σωζόμενα αὐτοῦ βιβλία τάδε.¹ Τέχνη ἐριστικῶν, Περὶ πάλης, Περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων, Περὶ πολιτείας, Περὶ φιλοτιμίας, Περὶ ἀρετῶν, Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως, Περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου, Περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρασσομένων, Προστακτικός, Δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ, Ἀντιλογιῶν α'β'.

¹ post τάδε lac. indic. Menagius

D2 (B8) Plat. *Soph.* 232d–e

[ΞΕ.] τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν.

PROTAGORAS

D

Attested Titles (D1–D8)

D1 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

The books of his that have been preserved are the following: *The Art of Eristic, On Wrestling, On Mathematics* [or: *On the Sciences*], *On the Constitution of the City, On Love of Honors, On Virtues, On the Original Condition* [scil. of humans], *On What is in Hades, On What Humans Do Wrong, Imperative Discourse, Trial for His Payment, Opposing Arguments* in two books.¹

¹ This list, which omits certain titles attested elsewhere, may include others invented on the basis of passages in Plato, like *On Wrestling* (cf. **D2**), or of anecdotes, like *Trial for His Payment* (cf. **P17**).

D2 (B8) Plato, *Sophist*

[The stranger from Elea:] With regard to all the arts and for each one of them, the way in which one must contradict each of the artisans himself is set out (*kataballesthai*), as it were in the public domain, written down for whoever wants to learn it.

[ΘΕ.] τὰ Πρωταγόρειά μοι φαίνη περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι [. . .].

D3 (< B1) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.60

ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τῶν Καταβαλλόντων ἀνεφώνησε [. . . = **D9**].

D4

a (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.54

πρῶτον δὲ τῶν λόγων ἑαυτοῦ ἀνέγνω τὸν Περὶ θεῶν [. . . = **P8**].

b (< B4) Eus. *PE* 14.3.7

λέγεται γοῦν τοιαῦδε κεκρήσθαι εἰσβολῇ ἐν τῷ Περὶ θεῶν συγγράμματι [. . . = **D10**].

D5

a (< B1) Plat. *Theaet.* 161c

[ΣΩ.] τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς Ἀληθείας [. . . = **R7a**].

b (< A24) Plat. *Crat.* 391c

[. . . = **D21**] [ΕΡ.] ἄτοπος μέντ' ἂν εἴη μου, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἢ δέησις, εἰ τὴν μὲν Ἀλήθειαν τὴν Πρωταγόρου

[Theaetetus:] You seem to me to be talking about Protagoras' writings on wrestling and on the other arts [. . .].

D3 (< B1) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

At least he proclaimed at the beginning of his *Refutations* [*Kataballontes*, lit: *Knockdown (Arguments)*]: [. . . = **D9**].

D4

a (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

The first of his works that he read in public was *On the Gods* [. . .].

b (< B4) Eusebius, *Evangelical Preparation*

At any rate he is said to have used the following opening for his treatise *On the Gods*: [. . . = **D10**].

D5

a (< B1) Plato, *Theaetetus*

[Socrates:] I was surprised by the beginning of his text, for he did not say at the beginning of his *Truth* that [. . .].

b (< A24) Plato, *Cratylus*

[Hermogenes:] My question [cf. **D21**] would be very strange, Socrates, if I, although I absolutely refuse to accept Protagoras' *Truth*, displayed some respect for the

ὅλως οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῆ τοιαύτη ἀληθείᾳ ῥη-
θέντα ἀγαπῶν ὡς τοῦ ἄξια.

c (≠ DK) P. Berol. inv. 9782, Col. 2,3–8 (CPF Protagoras
1T)

[. . .] ὁ δ[ὲ] | Θεαίτητος ἐνετύλιχανεν τῷ συγγράμ|ματι
τῷ Πρωταγόρου | τῷ Περὶ ἀληθείας, ἐν ᾧ | περὶ ἐπι-
στήμης λέγει.

D6 (84 B3) Cic. *De orat.* 3.32.128

quid de Prodicō Ceo, de Thrasymachō Chalcedonio, de
Protagora Abderita loquar? quorum unusquisque pluri-
mum temporibus illis etiam de natura rerum et disseruit
et scripsit.

D7 (< B2) Porph. *Lectio philol.* e lib. 1 in Eus. *PE* 10.3.25
(Frag. 410F Smith)

[. . .] Πρωταγόρου τὸν Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος [. . .] λόγον πρὸς
τοὺς ἐν τὸ ὄν εισάγοντας [. . .].

D8 (< B3) *Anecd. Gr.* I 171.31 Cramer

ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Μεγάλῳ λόγῳ ὁ Πρωταγόρας
εἶπε [. . . = D11].

arguments proposed by that kind of truth, as though they
possessed some value.

c (≠ DK) Berlin Papyrus

[. . .] Theaetetus came across the treatise of Protagoras *On
Truth*, in which he speaks about knowledge.

D6 (84 B3) Cicero, *On the Orator*

What should I say [scil. about the ability of the ancient
orators to speak about any subject] regarding Prodicus of
Ceos, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Protagoras of Abdera,
each of whom at that time both spoke and wrote a lot even
about nature? [= **PROD. D2**; **THRAS. D4**]

D7 (< B2) Porphyry, *Philological Course*, in Eusebius,
Evangelical Preparation

[. . .] Protagoras' discourse *On What Is* against those who
introduce the thesis that what is is one [. . .] [cf. **R2**].

D8 (< B3) *Anecdota Graeca*

In the book entitled *Large Discourse* Protagoras said: [. . .
= **D11**].

The Openings of Two of His Books (D9–D10)
Man the Measure (D9)

D9 (B1) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.60 [The beginning of his *Refutations*]

πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἐστίν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

Knowledge of the Gods (D10)

D10 (B4) Diog. Laert. 9.51 (et al.) [The beginning of his *On the Gods*]

περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι,¹ οὐθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὐθ'² ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' ὅποιοι τινες ιδέαν.³ πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντά με⁴ εἰδέναι,⁵ ἢ τε ἀδηλόγησ καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.⁶

¹ οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι D. L.: οὐκ οἶδα Eus. *PE* 14.19.8 ² οὐθ' . . . οὐθ' BP et Eus.: εἶθ' . . . εἶθ' F ³ οὐθ' ὅποιοι τινες ιδέαν Eus., non hab. D. L. ⁴ με add. Di Benedetto ex Eus. ⁵ πολλὰ . . . εἰδέναι D. L.: πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ κωλύοντά με ἕκαστον τούτων εἰδέναι Eus. ⁶ ἢ τε . . . ἀνθρώπου non hab. Eus.

On Education (D11–D13)

D11 (< B3) *Anecd. Gr.* 1.171.32–33 Cramer

[. . . = **D8**] ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπε φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δέεται καὶ ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ ἀρξαμένους δεῖ μαθάνειν [. . . = **R23**].

The Openings of Two of His Books (D9–D10)
Man the Measure (D9)

D9 (B1) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians* [The beginning of his *Refutations*, cf. **D3**]¹

Of all things the measure is man; of those that are, that they are; and of those that are not, that they are not.

¹ Plato's *Theaetetus* suggests that this is the beginning of Protagoras' *Truth* (cf. **D5**, **R7a**).

Knowledge of the Gods (D10)

D10 (B4) Diogenes Laertius (et al.) [The beginning of his *On the Gods*, cf. **D4a**]

About the gods I am able to know neither that they exist nor that they do not exist nor of what kind they are in form: for many things prevent me from knowing this, its obscurity and the brevity of man's life.¹

¹ This fragment is also transmitted, with textual variants, by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9.55 and Eusebius, *PE* 14.3.7, among others; and many ancient authors make allusions to it (see e.g. **R24**).

On Education (D11–D13)

D11 (< B3) *Anecdota Graeca* [in his *Large Discourse*, cf. **D8**]

[. . .] Protagoras said, "Instruction needs nature [i.e. a natural disposition] and practice," and "People must learn starting when they are young" [. . .].

The Analysis of Discourse (D17–D20)

D17 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.53–54

διέλλέ τε τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέτταρα· εὐχολήν, ἐρώτησιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἐντολήν (οἱ δὲ εἰς ἑπτὰ· διήγησιν, ἐρώτησιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἐντολήν, ἀπαγγελίαν,¹ εὐχολήν, κλήσιν), οὗς καὶ πυθμένας εἶπε λόγων.

¹ ἀπαγγελίαν rec.: ἐπαγγελίαν BP¹F

D18 (B6) Cic. *Brut.* 12.46 (= Arist. *Τεχνῶν Συναγωγή*, Frag. 137 Rose)

[. . .] scriptasque fuisse et paratas a Protagora rerum illustrium disputationes, quae nunc communes appellantur loci.

D19 (B6) Quintil. *Inst. or.* 3.1.12

horum primi communis locos tractasse dicuntur Protagoras, Gorgias, affectus Prodicus et Hippias et idem Protagoras et Thrasymachus.

D20 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.52

καὶ πρῶτος μέρη χρόνον διώρισε καὶ καιροῦ δύναμιν ἐξέθετο καὶ λόγων ἀγῶνας ἐποίησατο¹ [. . . = R19b].

¹ ἐποίησατο BP¹: ἐθεάσατο FP⁴

The Analysis of Discourse (D17–D20)

D17 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He was the first person to divide discourse into four [scil. kinds of utterances]: request, question, answer, command (other people say into seven: narration, question, answer, command, report, request, invocation), which he called **'the foundations of discourses (logoi).'**²

D18 (B6) Aristotle, *Collection of Rhetorical Manuals*, in Cicero, *Brutus*

[. . .] disputations on well-known subjects, which now are called 'commonplaces,' were written and prepared by Protagoras.

D19 (B6) Quintilian, *Training in Oratory*

Among them [i.e. the ancient teachers of rhetoric], Protagoras and Gorgias are said to have been the first to discuss the commonplaces, and Prodicus, Hippias, Protagoras again and Thrasymachus the emotions [cf. **GORG. D16; PROD. D12**].

D20 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He was the first person to distinguish the parts of time [i.e. probably: the tenses of the verb], to explain the power of the right moment (*katros*), to compose contests of arguments [. . .].

*Grammar and Correctness of Speech (D21–D25)***D21** (< A24) Plat. *Crat.* 391c

[Σ.Ω.] [. . .] λιπαρεῖν χρή τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ δεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ διδάξαι σε τὴν ὀρθότητα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἣν ἔμαθεν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου [. . . = **D5b**].

D22**a** (< A26) Plat. *Phaedr.* 267b–c

[Φ.Α.] Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἅττα;

[Σ.Ω.] ὀρθοπέειά γέ τις, ὦ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλά.

b (≠ DK) Hermias *In Phaedr.* 267c, p. 251.14–16

τὸ δὲ “ὀρθοπέειά γέ τις”· τουτέστι, κυριολεξία· διὰ γὰρ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων μετήρχετο ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν λόγον καὶ οὐ διὰ παραβολῶν καὶ ἐπιθέτων.

D23 (A27) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.5 1407b7–8

[. . .] Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διήρει, ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεῖη.

*Grammar and Correctness of Speech (D21–D25)***D21** (< A24) Plato, *Cratylus*

[Socrates:] [. . .] you must beseech your brother [i.e. Calias] and ask him to teach you the **correctness** in matters of this sort [scil. of language] that he learned from Protagoras [. . .].

D22**a** (< A26) Plato, *Phaedrus*

[Phaedrus:] And are there not similar terms [i.e. pertaining to rhetorical terminology] in Protagoras?

[Socrates:] Indeed, a certain ‘**correctness of language**’ (*orthoepeia*), my boy, and many other fine things.

b (≠ DK) Hermias, *Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus*

“**a certain correctness of language**”: that is, the use of literal expressions; for it was by means of words used literally that Protagoras pursued his discourse, and not by means of comparisons and epithets.

D23 (A27) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

[. . .] Protagoras distinguished the genders of nouns: masculine, feminine, and neuter.

D24 (A28) Arist. *SE* 14 173b17–22

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιῶντα φαίνεσθαι καὶ ποιῶντα μὴ δοκεῖν, καθάπερ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν, εἰ ὁ μῆνις καὶ ὁ πῆληξ ἄρρεν ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λέγων 'οὐλομένην' σολοικίζει μὲν κατ' ἐκείνον, οὐ φαίνεται δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὁ δὲ 'οὐλόμενον' φαίνεται μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ σολοικίζει.

D25 (A29) Arist. *Poet.* 19 1456b15–18

τί γὰρ ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτηῆσθαι ἂ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἴομενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν "μῆνι ἀειδε θεά"; τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησί, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μῆ, ἐπίταξις ἐστίν.

*Arguments (D26–D30)***D26** (< A1, > B6a) Diog. Laert. 9.51

καὶ πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις· οἷς¹ καὶ συννηρώτα, πρῶτος τοῦτο πράξας.

¹ οἷς] οὗς Richards

D24 (A28) Aristotle, *Sophistic Refutations*

It is possible not only to commit one [i.e. a solecism], but also to seem to commit one although one does not do so, and also to commit one without seeming to do so, as Protagoras used to say, since 'wrath' [*mēnis*, feminine in Greek] and 'helmet' [*pēlēx*, feminine in Greek] are [scil. in reality] masculine: for someone who says 'accursed' [feminine, scil. wrath: cf. *Iliad* 1.1–2] commits a solecism according to him, but does not seem to other people to do so, whereas if he says 'accursed' [masculine] he seems to commit a solecism but in fact does not do so.

D25 (A29) Aristotle, *Poetics*

For who would suppose that he [i.e. Homer] was mistaken in what Protagoras criticizes, namely that he thinks that he is making a request but in fact is uttering a command when he says, "Sing, Goddess, the wrath" [*Iliad* 1.1]? For, he says, to order someone to do something or not to do it is to utter a command.

*Arguments (D26–D30)***D26** (< A1, > B6a) Diogenes Laertius

He was the first person to say that, concerning every subject, there are two arguments opposed to one another; and this is also the way he formulated questions, which he was the first person to do in this way.

D27 (A20) Sen. *Epist.* 88.43

Protagoras ait de omni re in utramque partem disputari posse ex aequo et de hac ipsa, an omnis res in utramque partem disputabilis sit.

D28 (A21) Steph. Byz. s.v. Ἀβδηρα

[. . .] Πρωταγόρας, ὃν Εὐδοξὸς ἱστορεῖ [Frag. 307 Lasserre] τὸν ἥσσω καὶ κρείσσω λόγον πεποιηκέναι καὶ τοὺς μαθητὰς δεδιδαχέναι τὸν αὐτὸν ψέγειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν.

D29 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.53

καὶ πρῶτος κατέδειξε τὰς πρὸς τὰς θέσεις ἐπιχειρήσεις, ὡς φησὶν Ἀρτεμίδωρος ὁ διαλεκτικὸς [Art. script. B III 20] ἐν τῷ Πρὸς Χρυσίππου.

D30 (A10) Plut. *Per.* 36.5

πεντάθλου γάρ τινος ἀκοντίῳ πατάξαντος Ἐπίτιμον τὸν Φαρσάλιον ἀκουσίως καὶ κτείναντος, ἡμέραν ὄλην ἀναλώσαι μετὰ Πρωταγόρου διαποροῦντα, πότερον τὸ ἀκόντιον ἢ τὸν βαλόντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἀγωνοθέτας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθότατον λόγον αἰτίους χρῆ τοῦ πάθους ἠγείσθαι.

D27 (A20) Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*

Protagoras said that concerning every question one can argue equally well in one direction or in the other, and also concerning this very question, whether every question can be discussed in one direction or in the other.

D28 (A21) Stephanus of Byzantium

[. . .] Protagoras, of whom Eudoxus reports that he made the weaker argument also the stronger one and taught his disciples to blame and to praise the same man.

See also **R18**; **DRAM. T19**

D29 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He was the first person to show how to attack theses, as Artemidorus the dialectician says in his *Against Chrysippus*.

D30 (A10) Plutarch, *Pericles*

When a competitor in the pentathlon unintentionally struck Epitimus of Pharsalus with a javelin and killed him, he [i.e. Pericles] spent a whole day with Protagoras examining the difficulty whether, according to the most correct reasoning, it was the javelin, or the man who threw it, or the umpires, that should be considered responsible for this unfortunate event.

*Interpretation of the Poets (D31–D32)***D31** (< A25) Plat. *Prot.* 338e–339a

[ΠΡ.] ἡγοῦμαι [. . .] ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποιήται καὶ ἅ μὴ [. . .].

D32 (A30) Ammon. *Schol.* in *Il.* 21.240 (POxy. 221, Col. XII, 20, II, p. 68 GH) (*CPF* Protagoras 2T)

Πρωταγόρας φησὶν πρὸς τὸ διαλαβεῖν τὴν μάχην τὸ ἐ[πεισό]διον γεγενῆσθαι τὸ ἐξήης τῆς Ξά[νθου κα]ὶ θνητοῦ μάχης ἔν' εἰς τὴν θεο[μαχία]ν μεταβῆ, τάχα δὲ ἵνα καὶ τὸν [Ἀχιλ]λέ[α] ἀξήση [. . .].

*Geometry (D33–D34)***D33** (< B7) Arist. *Metaph.* B2 998a2–4

ἄπεται γὰρ τοῦ κανόνος οὐ κατὰ στιγμὴν ὁ κύκλος, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρους [. . .].

D34 (B7a, Nachtrag, vol. II, p. 425) Philod. *Poem.* (P. Herc. 1676) Frag. XI, p. 243

[. . .] τὸ τὰ πράγματα μὲν ἄγνωστα εἶναι καὶ τὰς δὲ >|

*Interpretation of the Poets (D31–D32)***D31** (< A25) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Protagoras:] I think [. . .] that for a man the most important part of education consists in being expert concerning poems; and this means to be able to understand what is said correctly by the poets and what is not [. . .] [cf. **D42**].

D32 (A30) Ammonius, Scholia on Homer's *Iliad*

Protagoras says that the following episode, the battle between Xanthus and a mortal [*Il.* 21.200–297], serves to articulate the battle, in order to make a transition to the battle of the gods, and perhaps also to lend further importance to Achilles [. . .].

See also **D24–D25, D42***Geometry (D33–D34)***D33** (< B7) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

For a wheel touches a straight rod (*kanōn*) not in [scil. only] one point, but in the way that Protagoras said when he was refuting the geometers [. . .].

D34 (B7a, Nachtrag, vol. II, p. 425) Philodemus, *On Poems*

[. . .] that the <things> are not knowable, <the> words are

λέξεις οὐκ ἀρεστάς, ὅπερ> | ἐπὶ τῆς μαθηματικῆς>
| Πρωταγόρας μάλα.

*Appendix: Platonic Representations
of Protagoras (D35–D42)
Protagoras the Teacher (D35–D37)*

D35 (A5) Plat. Prot. 317b

[ΠΡ.] ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἅπασαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστῆς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους [. . .].

D36 (A5) Plat. Prot. 318a

[ΠΡ.] ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, εἰ ἂν ἐμοὶ συνῆς, ἢ ἂν ἡμέρα ἐμοὶ συγγένη, ἀπίεσαι οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῦτα ταῦτα· καὶ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι.

D37 (A5) Plat. Prot. 318e–319a

[ΠΡ.] οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὐτῶν ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες—καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἰππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν—παρὰ δ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλον τοῦ ἢ περὶ οὗ ἦκει. τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικῶι, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς

not acceptable; <as> Protagoras indeed [scil. said] about mathematics>.

*Appendix : Platonic Representations
of Protagoras (D35–D42)
Protagoras the Teacher (D35–D37)*

D35 (A5) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Protagoras:] So I myself have gone on the opposite path from these men [scil. the ancient sophists who disguised themselves], and I admit that I am a sophist and that I educate people [. . .] [cf. **SOPH. R11a**].

D36 (A5) Plato, *Protagoras* (= **SOPH. R12**)

[Protagoras:] Young man [i.e. Hippocrates, cf. **P10**], if you study with me, this is what will happen to you: the very day that you start to study with me, you will go home having become a better man, and the same thing will happen the following day. And every day you will make progress continually toward what is better.

D37 (A5) Plato *Protagoras* (= **SOPH. R11b**)

[Protagoras:] For the other people harm young men. Driving them back, despite their resistance, toward the arts that they have fled, they cast them upon those arts, teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music (and he cast a glance at Hippias) [cf. **HIPPIAS D14**]; whereas if he comes to me he will learn nothing else than what he came for. The object of my instruction is good deliberation about household matters, to know how to manage one's own household in the best way possible, and about those

πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἶη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.

Protagoras' Own Explanation of His Doctrine of Man the Measure in Plato's Theaetetus (D38)

D38 (> A21a) Plat. *Theaet.* 166d–167d

[ΠΡ.] ἐγὼ γάρ φημι μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μὴ, μυρίον μέντοι διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἐτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τούτου καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὃς ἂν τινι ἡμῶν, ᾧ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτῷ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίδωκε, ἀλλ' ὥδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί λέγω. [166e] οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἂ ἔσθίει καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τὰναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. [167a] σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι—οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν—οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμνων ἀμαθής ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφὸς ὅτι ἄλλοῖα, μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμείνων γὰρ ἢ ἐτέρα ἕξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἐτέρας ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστῆς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὐ τί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζοντά τις

of the city, so as to be most capable of acting and speaking in the city's interests.

Protagoras' Own Explanation of His Doctrine of Man the Measure in Plato's Theaetetus (D38)

D38 (> A21a) Plato, *Theaetetus*

[Protagoras:] For I myself say that the truth is just as I wrote it: each of us is the measure of the things that are and of those that are not [cf. D9], but one person differs enormously from another precisely inasmuch as things exist and appear to be something for one person, something else for another. As for cleverness (*sophia*) and the clever man (*sophos*), I am very far from saying that they do not exist; but I also call that man clever who, by transforming things, makes them appear to be good and be good for someone to whom they appeared to be bad and were bad. And do not track down my discourse once again by being stuck on my words: but understand in the following way even more clearly what I mean. [166e] Remember what was said earlier, that food appears to be bitter, and is bitter, to a sick man, and that it appears to be the contrary, and is the contrary, to a healthy man. [167a] It is not a matter of making either of these two men cleverer—that is not even possible—nor of maintaining that the sick man is ignorant because he has this opinion, nor that the healthy man is clever because he has the contrary one, but instead of bringing the sick one into the other condition, since that one is better. So too in education, it is a matter of bringing people from one condition into a better one. Now, while the doctor does this by means of medicines, the sophist does so by means of discourses. For it has never happened

τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσῃ, ταῦτα δὲ αἰεὶ ἀληθῆ. [167b] ἀλλ' οἶμαι πονηρᾶ¹ ψυχῆς ἕξει δοξάζοντα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς χρηστῆ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὧ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοὺ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργοῦς. φημί γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῆ, [167c] χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεῖν ἀισθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθείς² ἐμποιῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι³ ποιῖν. ἐπεὶ οἶά γ' ἂν ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίξῃ· ἀλλ' ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστῆς τοὺς παιδευμένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφός τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθεῖσιν. καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τε εἰσιν ἕτεροι ἐτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, [167d] ἕάν τε βούλη ἕάν τε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρῳ· σφίξεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος.

¹ πονηρᾶ ed. Ald.: πονηρᾶς mss. ² ἀληθείς] ἀληθείας Schleiermacher: πάθας Richards: ἕξεις Diels: alii alia ³ εἶναι secl. Schanz

that anyone has made someone who previously had false opinions later have true ones; for it is not possible to have opinions concerning what does not exist, nor other impressions than those one is having, and these are always true. [167b] But I think that when someone, because of a bad disposition of his soul, has opinions that are in conformity with that disposition, then, by exchanging this disposition for a good one, one makes him have different opinions in conformity with his new disposition, appearances that some people, because of their ignorance, call true—while I myself say that the ones are better than the others, but not at all truer. And as for clever people, dear Socrates, I am far from calling them frogs [cf. 161d, R7a], but I call them doctors when they have to do with bodies and farmers when they have to do with plants. For I say that the latter too put into plants, when one of them is sick, [167c] sensations that are good and healthy and true instead of bad ones, and that clever and competent orators make good things seem to be just to cities instead of bad ones. For whatever seems [or: is decreed to be, *dokein*] just and fine to each city also is that for it, so long as it thinks that it is [or: adopts this law, *nomizein*]; but the clever man (*sophos*), whenever things are bad for them [i.e. the citizens], exchanges for them other things that are and appear to be good to them. And analogously, the sophist who is able to direct his pupils in this way is clever and deserves a considerable fee from those he has educated. And it is in this way that some men are cleverer than others and no one has false opinions; and as for you, [167d] whether you like it or not, you must put up with being a measure. For this affirmation is not harmed by these considerations.

Protagoras' Myth in Plato's Protagoras (D39–D41)
The Choice of the Form:
Myth or Argument? (D39)

D39 (≠ DK) Plat. *Prot.* 320c

[ΠΡ.] [. . .] πότερον ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέρους, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἢ λόγῳ διεξιέλθῳ;

πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον τῶν παρακαθημένων ὀποτέρως βούλοιο οὕτως διεξιέναι. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν [. . . = D40].

The Myth (D40)

D40 (C1) Plat. *Prot.* 320c–322d

[ΠΡ.] [. . . = D39] ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θνητὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν εἰμαρμένος γενέσεως, τυπούσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μίξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ κεράννυται. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον, προσέταξαν Προμηθεὶ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεὶ κοσμησαί τε καὶ νεύμαι δυνάμεις ἐκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. Προμηθεὶα δὲ παραιτέται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεύμαι, “νεύμαντος δέ μου, ἔφη, ἐπίσκεψαι”. καὶ οὕτω πείσας νέμει.¹ νέμων δὲ τοῖς [320e] μὲν ἰσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους προσήπτεν, τοὺς δ' ἀσθενεστέρους τάχει ἐκό-

¹ νέμει TW: νεύμαι B

Protagoras' Myth in Plato's Protagoras (D39–D41)
The Choice of the Form:
Myth or Argument? (D39)

D39 (≠ DK) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Protagoras:] [. . .] would you rather that I explain by telling you a story (*muthos*), as an older man speaking to younger ones, or by expounding it in an argument (*logos*)?

Many of those who were sitting there suggested that he should expound it in whichever of the two ways he preferred. “Well,” he said, “it seems to me to be more agreeable for me to tell you a story” [. . .].

The Myth (D40)

D40 (C1) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Protagoras:] [. . .] There was once a time when gods existed but the mortal species did not. When the time came that was allotted by fate for the creation of these latter too, the gods fashioned them within the earth, mixing them together out of earth, fire, and whatever blends with earth and fire. When they were about to lead them toward the light, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them and to distribute to each one the capabilities appropriate to it. Epimetheus asked Prometheus to let him do the distributing, and said, “After I have made the distribution, you can check it”; and having persuaded him, he began the distribution. And so he made the distribution, [320e] providing strength without speed to the ones, and giving speed to the ones with less strength. To some he

σμεν τοὺς δὲ² ὀπλιζε, τοῖς δ' ἄοπλον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο δύνάμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἂ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι ἤμπισχεν, πτηνὸν φύγην ἢ κατάγειον οἰκησιν ἔνεμεν· ἂ δὲ ἠδῆξε μεγέθει,³ τῷδε [321a] αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἔσφζεν· καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως ἐπαρισῶν ἔνεμεν.

ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλάβειαν ἔχων μὴ τι γένος ἀιστωθεῖη· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλληλοφθοριῶν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὄρας εὐμάρειαν ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀμφιεννὺς αὐτὰ πυκναῖς τε θριξίν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἱκανοῖς μὲν ἀμύναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ εἰς εὐνάς ἰοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρωμνὴ οἰκεία τε καὶ [321b] αὐτοφυῆς ἐκάστω, καὶ ὑποδῶν⁴ τὰ μὲν ὀπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ⁵ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς⁶ καὶ ἀναίμοις. τοῦντεῦθεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρπούς, τοῖς δὲ ῥίζας· ἔστι δ' οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφήν ζώων ἄλλων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν προσῆψε, τοῖς δ' ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων.

ἄτε δὴ οὖν οὐ πᾶν τι σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν [321c] καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὰ ἄλογα· λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὅτι χρήσαιτο. ἀποροῦντι δὲ

² τοὺς δ' ἀσθενεστέρους . . . τοὺς δὲ . . . BT: τὰ δ' ἀσθενέστερα . . . τὰ δὲ . . . recce. ³ μεγέθει TW: μεγέθη B

⁴ ὑποδῶν Cobet: ὑπὸ ποδῶν mss.

gave weapons, others he made weaponless by nature but devised for them some other means for preservation: for to those that he had given smallness he distributed escape by wings or a dwelling under the earth; while those that had grown large he preserved [321a] by this very fact. And he distributed all the other features in the same way, by balancing them equally against one another.

He devised these things taking care to prevent any race from becoming extinct. But after he had supplied them with a way to escape mutual destruction, he went on to devise for them means of comfort against Zeus' seasons, dressing them in thick furs and tough hides, sufficient to protect them against the cold but also effective against heat, and so that when they went to sleep these same things would be their bedding, [321b] self-grown for each one, and he shod the ones with hooves, the others with tough and bloodless pads of skin. Then he provided different kinds of food to different species, plants from the earth for some, the fruits of trees for others, and roots for yet others. And there are some to which he granted that they devour other animals as their food; but these he allowed to produce only a few offspring, while the others (whom they consumed) had many, thereby providing for the survival of that race.

Well, Epimetheus was not very clever (*sophos*), so he did not notice [321c] that he had used up all the capabilities for the irrational animals; but he still had to deal with the human race, which had not been equipped, and he

⁵ post τὰ δὲ hab. mss. θριξίν καὶ, secl. Ast: ὄνξι καὶ Baiter: ἄθριξι Orelli ⁶ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς gloss. putat Kroschel

αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος τὴν νομὴν, καὶ ὄρᾳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῶα ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἡμέρα παρήν, ἐν ἣ ἔδει καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξίέναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς φῶς. ἀπορία οὖν σχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεὺς ἦντινα σωτηρίαν [321d] τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὖροι, κλέπτει Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἐντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί—ἀμήχανου γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ πυρὸς αὐτῆν κτητῆν τῷ ἡ χρησίμη γένεσθαι—καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπῳ. τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτῃ ἔσχευ, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Δίῳ. τῷ δὲ Προμηθεὶ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς οἴκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν (πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν), εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ Ἡφαίστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐφιλοτεχνεῖτην, [321e] λαθῶν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τὴν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην τὴν τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορία μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθεῖα δὲ [322a] δι' Ἐπιμηθεῖα¹ ὕστερον, ἥπερ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετήλθεν.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ² συγγένειαν³ ζῶων μόνου⁴ θεοῦ ἐνόμισεν, καὶ ἐπεχείρει βωμούς τε ἰδρύνεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν ἔπειτα φωνῆν καὶ ὀνόματα

¹ δι' Ἐπιμηθεῖα secl. Sauppe

was at a loss what to do. While he was in this perplexity, Prometheus came to check the distribution, and he saw that the other animals were suitably provided with everything, but that man was naked, unshod, uncovered, and unarmed, and already the fated day had arrived on which man too had to go out from the earth into the light. So Prometheus, at a loss how he could find salvation [321d] for man, stole cleverness (*sophia*) in the practical arts from Hephaestus and Athena, together with fire (for to possess that expertise without fire would be impossible or useless), and he gave these as a gift to man. This is how man acquired cleverness regarding the resources for life. But he did not possess political cleverness, for that was in Zeus' possession; and Prometheus no longer had the time to go into the acropolis where Zeus dwelled (besides which, Zeus' guards terrified him). So he slipped unnoticed into the building that Athena and Hephaestus shared, in which they cultivated the practical arts, [321e] and he stole the art of fire that belonged to Hephaestus and the other art that belonged to Athena, and gave these to man. And in this way man obtained an abundance of resources for life, but Prometheus [322a] later, as is said, was punished for theft, because of Epimetheus.

Since man had received a share in a divine portion, he was in the beginning, because of his kinship with god, the only one among the animals to believe in the gods, and he set about erecting altars and statues of the gods. Thereafter he used his skill quickly to articulate speech and words,

² τοῦ θεοῦ secl. Hermann; τῶν θεῶν conl. Kroschel ³ διὰ
... συγγένειαν secl. Deuschle ⁴ μόνου] μόνος Cobet

ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ,¹ καὶ οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθή-
 τας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ στρωμνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τρο-
 φὰς ἤϋρετο. οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι κατ' ἀρχὰς
 ἄνθρωποι ῥέκονν σποράδην, [322b] πόλεις δὲ οὐκ
 ἦσαν· ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ παν-
 ταχῆ αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ
 τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφήν ἱκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς
 δὲ τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής—πολιτικὴν γὰρ
 τέχνην οὐπω εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμικῆ²—ἐζήτουν δὴ
 ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σφίξεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις· ὅτ' οὖν
 ἀθροισθεῖεν, ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν
 πολιτικὴν τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθεί-
 ροντο.

Zeus οὖν [322c] δείσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν μὴ ἀπό-
 λοιτο πᾶν, Ἑρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ
 τε καὶ δίκην, ἵν' εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ
 φιλίας συναγωγοί. ἐρωτᾷ οὖν Ἑρμῆς Δία τίνα οὖν
 τρόπον δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις: “πότερον ὡς
 αἱ τέχναι νενέμνηται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νέμω; νενέμη-
 νται δὲ ὧδε· εἰς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώ-
 ταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ
 οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νέμω;”
 [322d] “ἐπὶ πάντας,” ἔφη ὁ Ζεὺς, “καὶ πάντες μετεχόν-
 των· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν με-
 τέχουσαν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ νόμον γε θεὸς παρ'
 ἐμοῦ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν
 κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.” [. . . = D41]

¹ τῇ τέχνῃ secl. Deuschle

and to invent dwellings, clothes, shoes, bedding, and food from the earth. Thus equipped, at first men lived scattered, [322b] and there were no cities. So they were being destroyed by wild animals, because they were weaker than them in every way and their technical craftsmanship (*dēmiourgikē tekhnē*) was sufficient for getting food but inadequate for the war against the animals. For as yet they did not possess the art of politics, of which the art of waging war forms a part. They did indeed try to gather together and preserve themselves by founding cities; but when they gathered together, they committed injustice against one another, since they did not possess the art of politics, so that they scattered once again and were destroyed.

So Zeus, [322c] fearing lest our race be completely destroyed, sent Hermes to bring the sense of shame (*aidōs*) and justice (*dikē*) to men, so that there would be ordered arrangements in the cities and bonds of friendship uniting men. Hermes asked Zeus how he should give men justice and a sense of shame: “Should I distribute these in the same way as the arts are distributed? For these are distributed in the following way: one man who possesses the art of medicine is enough for many laymen, and so too the other craftsmen. So should I set justice and a sense of shame among men in the same way, or should I distribute them to all?” [322d] “To all,” said Zeus, “and let all men have a share. For cities would not exist if only a few men had a share in these things, as in the other arts. And establish this law in my name: that anyone who is unable to possess a share in a sense of shame and justice should be killed as a disease of the city.” [. . .]

² πολιτικὴν . . . πολεμικῆ secl. Karlowa

*The Lesson of the Myth (D41)***D41** (≠ DK) Plat. *Prot.* 322d–323a

[IP.] [. . . = **D40**] οὕτω δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται μετεῖναι συμβουλῆς, καὶ ἐάν τις ἐκτὸς ὦν τῶν ὀλίγων συμβουλεύῃ, [322e] οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῆς—εἰκότως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι—ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλήν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς ἴωσιν, [323a] ἦν δέι διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ προσήκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. αὕτη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.

*Protagoras and the Interpretation of
Poetry in Plato's Protagoras (D42)*
*Protagoras on the Importance of
Interpretation of the Poets*

See **D31**

*Protagoras' Interpretation of Simonides'
Poem (Cf. MOR. T37) (D42)*

D42 (cf. A25) Plat. *Prot.* 339a–e

[IP.] [339a] καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν περὶ οὐπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα,

*The Lesson of the Myth (D41)***D41** (≠ DK) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Protagoras:] [. . .] And this, Socrates, is how and why whenever the discussion is about excellence (*aretê*) in architecture or in some other form of craftsmanship (*démourgikê*), both the Athenians and all other people think that only a small number of people have a claim to give them advice, and they do not tolerate it if someone [322e] outside of those few gives them advice, as you yourself say—rightly, I think. But when they proceed to deliberate about political virtue (*aretê politikê*), [323a] which depends entirely upon justice (*dikaiousunê*) and temperance (*sôphrosunê*), they accept it from every man, and rightly, for they think that every man should have a share in this kind of virtue, or else cities would not exist. And this, Socrates is why.

*Protagoras and the Interpretation of
Poetry in Plato's Protagoras (D42)*
*Protagoras on the Importance of
Interpretation of the Poets*

See **D31**

*Protagoras' Interpretation of Simonides'
Poem (Cf. MOR. T37) (D42)*

D42 (cf. A25) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Protagoras:] [339a] So now too my questions will be about the same subject as the one that you and I are discussing

περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετενηνεγμένον δ' εἰς ποίησιν τοσοῦτον
μόνον διόισει. λέγει γάρ που Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν
τὸν Κρέοντος υἱὸν τοῦ Θετταλοῦ ὅτι [339b] [Frag. 542
Page]

ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι
χαλεπὸν χερσὶν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ
τετράγωνον ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ἄσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω;
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ ἐπίσταμαί τε γάρ, καὶ
πάνυ μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ἄσματος.

εὖ, ἔφη, λέγεις. πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πε-
ποιήσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὐ;

πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, <καλῶς>¹ τε καὶ ὀρθῶς.

δοκεῖ δέ σοι καλῶς πεποιήσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία λέγει
αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁ ποιητής;

οὐ καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

ὄρα δὲ, ἔφη, [339c] βέλτιον.

ἀλλ', ἀγαθὲ, ἔσκεμμαι ἰκανῶς.

οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προϊόντος τοῦ ἄσματος λέγει
που

οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον
νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰ-
ρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.

¹ add. Bekker

now, namely virtue, but it will be transferred to poetry—
this will be the only difference. Simonides says somewhere
to Scopas, the son of Creon of Thessaly, that [339b]

For a man to be (*genesthai*) truly good (*agathos*)
Is difficult, four-square in hands, feet, and mind,
Constructed without any blemish.

Do you know this ode, or should I go through all of it
for you?

And I [i.e. Socrates] said that this was not at all neces-
sary: "For I know it, and I happen to have studied the ode
with particular care."

"Good," he said. "So does it seem to you to be made
well and correctly, or not?"

"Extremely well and correctly," I said.

"And does it seem to you to be well made if the poet
contradicts himself?"

"No," I said.

"Then look more closely," [339c] he said.

"But, my friend, I have already examined it enough."

"Then you know," he said, "that as the ode proceeds he
says somewhere,

Nor does Pittacus' assertion seem well-said to me,
Although it was spoken by a wise man.
He said that it is difficult to be good (*esthlos*
emmenai).

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τὰδε λέγει κάκεινα
τὰ ἔμπροσθεν;

οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι;

φαίνεται ἔμοιγε (καὶ ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τὶ
λέγοι). ἀτάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοὶ οὐ φαίνεται;

πῶς γὰρ ἂν [339d] φαίνοιτο ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ
ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρωθεν λέγων, ὅς γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς
ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀλα-
θείᾳ, ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελ-
θῶν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιττακὸν τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα
ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι "χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι," τοῦτον μέμ-
φεται τε καὶ οὐ φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ
ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος; καίτοι ὁπότε τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα αὐτῷ
μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὥστε ἦτοι
τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει.

εἰπῶν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ
ἔπαινον [339e] τῶν ἀκουόντων.

You understand that the same man makes both this
statements and that earlier one?"

"Yes, I know," I said.

"Then does it seem to you," he said, "that this is in ac-
cord with that?"

"It appears to me to do so," I said, but as I said this I
was worried that he might have a point. "But," I said, "does
it not appear to you to do so?"

"How could [339d] the same man say both these things
and appear to agree with himself? First he himself has
asserted that it is difficult for a man to become (*genesthai*)
truly good (*agathos*), and then going a little further in his
poem he has forgotten, and he criticizes Pittacus, who says
the same thing as he does, namely that 'it is difficult to be
good (*esthlos emmenai*),' and he says that he does not ap-
prove of his saying the same things as he says. But when
he criticizes the man who says the same things as he says,
then it is clear that he is criticizing himself as well, so that
he is speaking incorrectly, either earlier or later."

When he had said this he received applause from many
people and praise [339e] from the audience.

PROTAGORAS [80 DK]

R

Attestations and Allusions in Dramatic Authors

See **DRAM. T18–T19**

The Attack by Democritus

See **R22; ATOM. R89, R109**

Protagoras' Role for Plato the Writer (R1–R3)
Protagoras as the Source of
Plato's Dialogues? (R1–R2)

R1 (< B5) Diog. Laert.

a 3.37

[. . .] ἤν Πολιτείαν Ἀριστόξενός φησι [Frag. 67 Wehrli]
πάσαν σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Πρωταγόρου γεγράφθαι Ἀντι-
λογικοῖς.

PROTAGORAS

R

Attestations and Allusions in Dramatic Authors

See **DRAM. T18–T19**

The Attack by Democritus

See **R22; ATOM. R89, R109**

Protagoras' Role for Plato the Writer (R1–R3)
Protagoras as the Source of
Plato's Dialogues? (R1–R2)

R1 (< B5) Diogenes Laertius

a

[. . .] the *Republic*, which, Aristoxenus says, was almost
entirely written in Protagoras' *Opposing Arguments*.

b 3.57

[. . .] ἦν καὶ εὐρίσκεισθαι σχεδὸν ὄλην παρὰ Πρωταγόρα ἐν τοῖς Ἀντιλογοικοῖς φησι Φαβωρίνος ἐν Παντοδαπῆς ἱστορίας δευτέρῳ [Frag. 60 Amato].

R2 (B2) Porph. *Lectio philol.* e lib. 1 in Eus. *PE* 10.3.25 (Frag. 410F Smith)

[ΠΡ.] “σπάνια δὲ τὰ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος γεγονότων βιβλία, ἐπεὶ ἴσως πλείους ἂν τις ἐφάρασε τοῦ φιλοσόφου <κλοπᾶς>.¹ ἐγὼ δ’ οὖν ἦ κατὰ τύχην περιπέπτωκα Πρωταγόρου τὸν Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἀναγνώσκων λόγον πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὄν εἰσάγοντας τοιαύταις αὐτὸν εὐρίσκω χρώμενον ἀπαντήσεων· ἐσπούδασα γὰρ αὐταῖς λέξεσι τὰ ῥηθέντα μνημονεύειν.” καὶ ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν διὰ πλειόνων τίθησι τὰς ἀποδείξεις.

¹ <κλοπᾶς> Stephanus

Plato's Parody of Protagoras' Style (R3)

R3 (< A2) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.10.4, p. 13.23–26 Kayser
 γνοὺς δὲ τὸν Πρωταγόραν ὁ Πλάτων σεμνῶς μὲν ἐρμηνεύοντα, ἐνυπτιάζοντα δὲ τῇ σεμνότητι καὶ πού καὶ μακρολογώτερον τοῦ συμμέτρου, τὴν ιδεάν αὐτοῦ μύθῳ μακρῷ ἐχαρακτήρισεν.

b

[. . .] which [scil. the *Republic*], Favorinus says in the second book of his *Miscellaneous History*, is found almost as a whole in Protagoras, in his *Opposing Arguments*.

R2 (B2) Porphyry, *Philological Course*, in Eusebius, *Evangelical Preparation*

[Prosenes:] “The surviving books of those who were born before Plato are rare, for [scil. otherwise] one would perhaps have detected more of the philosopher’s <thefts>. But as for me, by chance I ran into Protagoras’ discourse *On What Is* against those who introduce the thesis that what is is one [= **D7**], and when I read it I discovered that he [i.e. Plato] makes use of the same kind of replies. For I took the trouble to memorize the terms verbatim.” And after he has said this, he provides numerous proofs.¹

¹ Eusebius does not reproduce these proofs.

Plato's Parody of Protagoras' Style (R3)

R3 (< A2) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

Knowing that Protagoras expressed himself in a pompous style but that he gloried in his pomposity and was in a certain way verbose beyond measure, Plato characterized his style by means of a lengthy myth [cf. **D40**].

*References to Protagoras' Doctrine and
Refutations of It (R4–R29)*
Man the Measure in Plato (R4–R11)
The Context of the Citation of D9 (R4)

R4 (cf. B1) Plat. *Theaet.* 151e–152a

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] αἴσθησις, φῆς, ἐπιστήμη;

[ΘΕ.] ναί.

[ΣΩ.] κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι
περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρό-
πον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἰρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ
που “πάντων χρημάτων [. . .] ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν” [D9].
ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;

[ΘΕ.] ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

First Interpretation: Individual Relativism (R5)

R5 (< B1) Plat. *Theaet.* 152a

[ΣΩ.] οὐκοῦν οὕτως πως λέγει, ὡς οἶα μὲν ἕκαστα
ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἶα δὲ σοί, τοι-
αῦτα δὲ αὐ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ;

*Second Interpretation (Protagoras' 'Secret
Doctrine'): Universal Motion (R6)*

R6 (≠ DK) Plat. *Theaet.* 152c–e

[ΣΩ.] ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρω-

*References to Protagoras' Doctrine and
Refutations of It (R4–R29)*
Man the Measure in Plato (R4–R11)
The Context of the Citation of D9 (R4)

R4 (cf. B1) Plato, *Theaetetus*

[Socrates:] [. . .] Knowledge, you say, is sensation?

[Theaetetus:] Yes.

[Socrates:] You have made a statement about knowledge
that runs the risk of being no trivial thing, but just what
Protagoras too said. He said the very same thing, though
in a different way. For he says somewhere, “**Of all things**
[. . .] **that they are not**” [D9]. Surely you have read this?
[Theaetetus:] Indeed I have, and often.

First Interpretation: Individual Relativism (R5)

R5 (< B1) Plato, *Theaetetus*

[Socrates:] Well then, is he not saying that just as each
thing appears to me, so too it is for me, and just as it ap-
pears to you, so too again for you? For you and I are both
human beings.¹

¹ The *Theaetetus* contains almost a dozen references to the
doctrine of man the measure (152a, 160c, 160d, 161c, 166d, 170d,
170e–171a, 171c, 178b, 178b–c); see also *Cratylus* 385e4–386a4.

*Second Interpretation (Protagoras' 'Secret
Doctrine'): Universal Motion (R6)*

R6 (≠ DK) Plato, *Theaetetus*

[Socrates:] Well then, by the Graces, was not Protagoras a

ταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρ-
φετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν
ἔλεγεν;

[ΘΕ.] [152d] πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;

[ΣΩ.] ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον, ὡς ἄρα ἐν
μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἂν τι προσείποις
ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὁποιοῦν τι, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγο-
ρεύης, καὶ σμικρὸν φανέται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρὺ, κοῦφον,
σύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐνὸς μήτε τινὸς
μήτε ὁποιοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ
κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δὴ φαμεν
εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· [152e] ἔστι μὲν
γὰρ οὐδέποτε' οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται.

The Refutations (R7–R10)

*First Refutation: Whose Sensation—a Man's,
a Pig's, a God's? (R7)*

R7 Plat. *Theaet.*

a (> B1) 161c–e

[ΣΩ.] τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἠδέως εἶρηκεν, ὡς τὸ
δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἔστιν τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ
λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς Ἀλη-
θείας ὅτι “πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὕς” ἢ
“κυνοκέφαλος” ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀποπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων
αἰσθησιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητι-

surpassingly clever fellow, who was hinting at this [i.e. that
sensation is directed toward what exists and is not fallacious] in riddles for us and the rest of the vulgar crowd,
while to his disciples he was saying the truth in mystic
secrecy?

[Theaetetus:] [152d] What do you mean by this, Socrates?
[Socrates:] I shall tell you, and it is no trivial thing: that
nothing taken in itself is one, and that it would not be possible to determine or to qualify anything at all correctly. If
you call something big, it will also appear little, and if
heavy, also light, and everything is like this, as nothing is
one, whether it is a matter of a determination or of any
quality whatsoever, and it is out of locomotion, movement,
and mixture with one another that all things come about
that we say exist—speaking incorrectly, [152e] for nothing
ever exists, but it is always becoming.

The Refutations (R7–R10)

*First Refutation: Whose Sensation—a Man's,
a Pig's, a God's? (R7)*

R7 Plato, *Theaetetus*

a (> B1)

[Socrates:] The other things he has said I find very agreeable, as for example that what appears to each person also
exists for him. But I was surprised by the beginning of his
text, for he did not say at the beginning of his *Truth* that
“Of all things the measure is pig” or “baboon” or some
other even stranger being among the ones that possess
sensation, so that he could have begun by speaking to us
in a magnificent and thoroughly contemptuous manner,

κὼς ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὡσπερ θεοῦ ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὃ δ' ἄρα [161d] ἐτύγχανεν ὦν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου¹ γυρίνου, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλου του ἀνθρώπων. [. . .] εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι' αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἑτέρου ὀρθὴν ἢ ψευδῆς, ἀλλ' ὃ πολλὰ κίς εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάζσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δὴ ποτε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων [161e] διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ' ἐκείνου, μέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας;

¹ βατράχου secl. Valckenaer

b (≠ DK) 162c

[ΣΩ.] λέγε δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἂ νυνδὴ διήλομεν, ἄρα οὐ σὺ θαυμάζεις εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσῃ μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ὄτουσιν ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ θεῶν; ἢ ἤττον τι οἶε τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι;

demonstrating that even though we used to admire him like a god for his wisdom, in fact he was no better with regard to intelligence, not only than any other man, but than a tadpole. [. . .] For if indeed whatever opinion each person forms on the basis of sensation is true for him, and if no one can judge better about the experience of another, and if no one has more authority than anyone else to examine whether his opinion is true or false, but if instead, as has often been said, each person forms his own opinions by himself all alone, and if these are all correct and true, then how on earth, dear friend, could Protagoras have been so wise that it was thought right to consider him a teacher of other men and to be worthy of large fees, while we were more ignorant and had to go spend time with him, since each of us is the measure of his own wisdom?

b (≠ DK)

[Socrates:] Tell me first, Theaetetus, with regard to the doctrine that we have been explaining now, are you not astonished to suddenly find yourself to be the equal in wisdom of any man or even god? Or do you suppose that Protagoras' measure is meant to apply less to gods than to men?

*Second Refutation: One Can Know When
One Remembers (R8)*

R8 (≠ DK) Plat. *Theaet.* 163e–164a

[ΣΩ.] ὁ δὴ εἶδέ τις, μέμνηται ποῦ ἐνίστε;

[ΘΕ.] μέμνηται.

[ΣΩ.] ἢ καὶ μύσας; ἢ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθετο;

[ΘΕ.] ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε φάναι.

[ΣΩ.] δεῖ γὰρ μέντοι, εἰ σώσομεν¹ τὸν πρόσθε λόγον· εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεται.

¹ σώσομεν mss., corr. Dissen

*Third Refutation: Protagoras' Doctrine
Is Self-Refuting (R9–R10)*

R9 Plat. *Theaet.*

a (≠ DK) 170a3–c5

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι φησὶ ποῦ
ᾧ δοκεῖ;

[ΘΕ.] φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.

[ΣΩ.] οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπων,
μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ
φαμέν οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν
ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἓν γὰρ

*Second Refutation: One Can Know When
One Remembers (R8)¹*

¹ This is an extract from the second of the three arguments that constitute this second refutation.

R8 (≠ DK) Plato, *Theaetetus*

[Socrates:] What someone has seen, he sometimes remembers, I suppose?

[Theaetetus:] Yes he does.

[Socrates:] Even with his eyes closed? Or does he forget, the moment he has closed them?

[Theaetetus:] It would be bizarre, Socrates, to say this.

[Socrates:] But one must say this, if we want to save the preceding argument [scil. that seeing is knowledge, cf. 163d–e]; for otherwise, it is dead and gone.

*Third Refutation: Protagoras' Doctrine
Is Self-Refuting (R9–R10)*

R9 Plato, *Theaetetus*

a (≠ DK)

[Socrates:] [. . .] he [i.e. Protagoras] says, does he not, that what appears (*dokoun*) to each person really exists for him to whom it appears.

[Theodorus:] Indeed he does.

[Socrates:] Well, Protagoras, we too are stating the opinions (*doxai*) of a man, or rather of all men, when we say that there is no one who does not consider that he is wiser than others in some regards, and others wiser than him in others, and that at least in the greatest dangers—when

τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνου, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάτῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτήρας σφῶν [170b] προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλω τῷ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι. [. . .] καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασιν τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν; [. . .] [170c] τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρῆσόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ; πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν αἰετὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ τοτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, τοτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ που συμβαίνει μὴ αἰετὸς ἀληθῆ ἄλλ' ἀμφοτέρα αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν.

b (cf. A15) 170e–171b

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ;

[ΘΕ.] ἔοικεν ἕκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

[ΣΩ.] τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα; ἄρ' οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾤετο μέτρον εἶναι ἀνθρώπων μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν [171a] ἣν ἐκείνος ἔγραψεν; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ᾤετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἶσθ' ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὄσω πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσούτων μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν.

[ΘΕ.] ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ' ἐκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

they are suffering in military campaigns, or diseases, or at sea—they regard those who have the command in these situations as being like gods, because they look to them [170b] for their salvation, even though their only difference from them lies in their knowledge. [. . .] And in all these cases, what will we say, if not that men themselves consider that there is wisdom (*sophia*) and ignorance among them? [. . .] [170c] Well then, Protagoras, what shall we conclude from this argument? Shall we say that the opinions that men form are always true, or that they are sometimes true and sometimes false? For from either of these it follows that the opinions that they hold are not always true but are both [i.e. true and false].

b (cf. A15)

[Socrates:] [. . .] do you want us to say that you have opinions that are true for yourself but false for the multitude? [Theodorus:] This would seem to follow necessarily from that argument.

[Socrates:] And what about for Protagoras himself? If he himself did not believe that man is the measure and if the many did not believe it either (as indeed they do not believe it), then would it not follow of necessity that this Truth [171a] that he wrote down does not exist for anyone? But if on the other hand he himself believed it, but the crowd refused to believe it together with him, then first, by the same number as those who do not believe it exceed those who do, it [i.e. this Truth] does not exist more than it does.

[Theodorus:] That follows necessarily, since its existence or nonexistence depends on each [scil. person's] opinion.

[ΣΩ.] ἔπειτά γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον ἐκείνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴησιν, ἢ ἐκείνον ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, συγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας.

[ΘΕ.] πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[ΣΩ.] οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ συγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;

[ΘΕ.] ἀνάγκη.

R10 (A19) Plat. *Euthyd.* 286c2–4

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκοὺς αἰεὶ θαυμάζω. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι ἐμοὶ δὲ αἰεὶ θαυμαστός τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν.

An Allusion in Plato's Laws (R11)

R11 (≠ DK) Plat. *Leg.* 4.716c

[ΑΘ.] ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πού τις, ὡς φασιν, ἀνθρώπος.

[Socrates:] And second, there is this really nice consequence: with regard to his own belief, he himself concedes that the belief of those people who have the opposite opinion from him, to the degree that they think that he himself is mistaken, is true, since he believes that all men have an opinion that corresponds to reality.

[Theodorus:] Indeed.

[Socrates:] Thus he admits that his own opinion is false if he recognizes that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true?

[Theodorus:] Necessarily.

R10 (A19) Plato, *Euthydemus*

[Socrates:] [. . .] but this argument [scil. in virtue of which it is not possible to contradict]—I have often heard it repeated by many people, and it always astonishes me. Protagoras and his followers, and other people even more ancient than they,¹ made considerable use of it; but as for me, it always seems to me to be astonishing, given that, by overturning the others, it overturns itself as well.

¹ A probable allusion to Heraclitus.

An Allusion in Plato's Laws (R11)

R11 (≠ DK) Plato, *Laws*

[The Athenian Stranger:] Certainly, it is god who would most of all be the measure of all things for us, and, I think, much more than, as they say, some man.

*Doxographic Reports Deriving from
Plato's Theaetetus (R12–R13)*

R12 (> 70 A24) Aristocles in Eus. *PE* 14.20.1 (= Frag. 6 Chiesara)

γεγόνασι δέ τινες οἱ ἀξιούντες τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις μόναις δεῖν πιστεύειν. ἔνιοι μέντοι φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον αἰνίττεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτο πάντων ἀποφαίνοντα τὸν Ὀκεανὸν ἀρχήν, ὡς ἐν ῥύσει τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων· ὧν δ' ἴσμεν ἔοικε [. . .] τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγειν [. . .] ἀντικρὺς γε Πρωταγόρας ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης.

R13 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.51

ἔλεγέ τε μηδὲν εἶναι ψυχὴν παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθὰ καὶ Πλάτων φησὶν ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ, καὶ πάντα εἶναι ἀληθῆ.

*Aristotle (R14–R18)*¹

R14 Arist. *Metaph.* K6

a (A19) 1062b13–19

[. . .] ἐκεῖνος ἔφη πάντων εἶναι χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπων,¹ οὐδὲν ἕτερον λέγων ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι παγίως· τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου τὸ αὐτὸ

¹ ἀνθρώπων]A^b: τὸν ἀνθρώπων E

*Doxographic Reports Deriving from
Plato's Theaetetus (R12–R13)*

R12 (> 70 A24) Aristocles in Eusebius, *Evangelical Preparation*

Some people have maintained that we should rely only on sense perceptions and representations (*phantasiai*). Some say that Homer too is making a covert allusion to a doctrine like this when he calls Ocean the beginning of all things [**COSM. T10c**], since all things are in flux. And of those we know of, [. . .] Protagoras of Abdera seems to say the same thing explicitly [cf. **R6**; **ATOM. R68b**].

R13 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He also said that the soul is nothing outside of sensations, as Plato too says in the *Theaetetus* [cf. **R4**], and that everything is true.

*Aristotle (R14–R18)*¹

¹ See also *Parts of Animals* 4.10 687a23–26 (C1 DK), where Aristotle perhaps refers to the myth of Protagoras (**D40**): “those who say that man is not well constituted and is the most inferior among the animals (for they say that he is unshod, naked, and without weapons to defend himself), do not speak correctly.”

R14 (A19) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

a (A19) [. . .] He [i.e. Protagoras] said that man is the measure of all things (*khremata*) [cf. **D9**], which is the same thing as asserting that what seems to each person also exists firmly. But if this is the case, the consequence

συμβαίνει καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀντικειμένους φάσεις λεγόμενα, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις τοιοῦδι μὲν φαίνεσθαι τόδε εἶναι καλὸν τοιοῦδι δὲ τοῦναντίον, μέτρον δ' εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον ἐκάστῳ.

b (≠ DK) 1063a1-6

οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται τοῖς μὲν γλυκὸ τοῖς δὲ τοῦναντίον, μὴ διεφθαρμένων καὶ λελωβημένων τῶν ἐτέρων τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ κριτήριον τῶν λεχθέντων χυμῶν. τούτου δ' ὄντος τοιοῦτου τοὺς ἐτέρους μὲν ὑποληπτέον μέτρον εἶναι τοὺς δ' ἄλλους οὐχ ὑποληπτέον. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο λέγω καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.

R15 (*13b Untersteiner) Arist. *Metaph.* II 1053a31-b3

καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην δὲ μέτρον τῶν πραγμάτων λέγομεν καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν διὰ τὸ αὐτό, ὅτι γνωρίζομεν τι αὐταῖς, ἐπεὶ μετροῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ μετροῦσιν. ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἄλλον ἡμᾶς μετροῦντος ἐγνωρίσαμεν πηλίκου ἐσμὲν τῷ τὸν πῆχυν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῶν ἐπιβάλλειν. Πρωταγόρας δ' ἀνθρωπὸν φησι πάντων εἶναι μέτρον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸν ἐπιστήμονα εἰπὼν ἢ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον τούτους δ' ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὁ μὲν αἴσθησιν ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ φαμεν εἶναι μέτρα τῶν ὑποκειμένων. οὐθὲν δὴ λέγοντες περιττὸν φαίνονται τι λέγειν.

is that the same thing both exists and does not exist, and is both bad and good, and all the other contradictory statements, because often one thing appears fine to some people and the opposite to others, and because the measure is what appears to each person.

b (≠ DK)

For never does the same thing appear to be sweet to some people and the opposite to others, so long as the latter do not have their sensory organ, which is the judge of these tastes, damaged and impaired. But this being the case, the ones should be taken as a measure but the others should not be taken as one. And I say this likewise about the good and bad, the beautiful and the ugly, and the other qualities of this sort.

R15 (≠ DK) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

We say that science is the measure of things (*pragmata*), and sensation too, for the same reason: that it is by means of them that we know something. And yet it is rather the case that they are measured than that they are measures. What happens to us is just like when someone measures us and we learn how tall we are by his applying the cubit to us a certain number of times. When Protagoras says that man is the measure of all things, he means the man who knows or the man who perceives, and this because one of them possesses sensation, the other knowledge—which are, we said, the measures of things. Thus they are not in fact saying anything at all, though they seem to be saying something extraordinary.

R16 (< A17) Arist. *Metaph.* Θ3 1047a4–7

[. . .] οὔτε γὰρ ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε γλυκὸν οὔτε ὄλως αἰσθητὸν οὐθὲν ἔσται μὴ αἰσθανομένων· ὥστε τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον συμβήσεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς.

R17 (A19) Arist. *Metaph.* Γ4 1007b18–25

ἔτι εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ ἀντιφάσεις ἅμα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πᾶσαι, δῆλον ὡς ἅπαντα ἔσται ἓν. ἔσται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τριήρης καὶ τοίχος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ κατὰ παντός τι ἢ καταφῆσαι ἢ ἀποφῆσαι ἐνδέχεται, καθάπερ ἀνάγκη τοῖς τὸν Πρωταγόρου λέγουσι λόγον. εἰ γὰρ τῷ δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι τριήρης ὁ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τριήρης· ὥστε καὶ ἔστιν, εἴπερ ἢ ἀντίφασις ἀληθής.

R18 (< A21) Arist. *Rhet.* 2.24 1402a23–27

καὶ τὸ τὸν ἤττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστίν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέρανον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα· ψεύδός τε γὰρ ἔστι, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθές ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ ἀλλ' ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐριστικῇ.

The Sceptics (R19–R22)

R19 Tim. Phlias.

a (< A12) in Sext. *Emp. Adv. Math.* 9.55–6

μέμνηται δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ Τίμων ὁ Φλιά-

R16 (< A17) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

[. . .] [scil. if one follows the Megarians] nothing will be either cold or hot, or sweet or perceptible in general, unless it is being perceived. So that they will end up stating the argument of Protagoras.

R17 (A19) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

Furthermore, if all contradictory statements are true at the same time about the same object, it is evident that everything will be one. For a trireme, a wall, and a man will be the same thing, if it is possible either to assert or to deny something about every object, as is necessarily the case for those who state the argument of Protagoras. For if it seems to someone that the man is not a trireme, it is evident that he is not a trireme; so that he is as well, since the contradictory is true.

R18 (< A21) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

This is what is called making the weaker argument stronger [cf. **D28**]. And that is why it was right for people to become annoyed with Protagoras' announcement [scil. that he would do this]. For it [i.e. this procedure] is mendacious, and plausible not in truth but in appearance, and it belongs to no art except to rhetoric and eristic.

The Sceptics (R19–R22)

R19 Timon of Phlius

a (< A12) in Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Natural Philosophers*

Timon of Phlius too mentions this story [i.e. Protagoras'

σιος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Σίλλων [Frag. 5 Di Marco]
ταῦτα διεξερχόμενος·

†ὥστε¹ καὶ² μετέπειτα σοφιστῶν
οὔτ' ἀλιγγυγλώσσῳ οὔτ' ἀσκόπῳ οὔτ' ἀκυλίστῳ
Πρωταγόρῃ. ἔθελον δὲ τέφρην συγγράμματα³
θεῖναι,
ὅττι θεοὺς κατέγραψ' οὔτ' εἰδέναι οὔτε δύνασθαι
ὀπποῖοι τινές εἰσι καὶ οὔ⁴ τινες ἀθρήσασθαι,
πᾶσαν ἔχων φυλακὴν ἐπιεικείης. τὰ μὲν οὖν οἱ
χραίσμῃσ', ἀλλὰ φυγῆς ἐπεμαίετο, ὄφρα μὴ
οὔτως
Σωκρατικὸν πίνων ψυχρὸν ποτὸν Ἄϊδα⁵ δύη.

¹ ὥστε LEAB: ὅς τε V: ἔσητε N: ὡς Stephanus: <πάντων
πρωτίστῳ τό>τε καὶ Diels ² καὶ om. A ³ συγγράμ-
ματι mss., corr. Fabricius ⁴ εἰ Bekker dubit. ⁵ Ἄϊδι
mss., corr. Menagius

b (< A1) in Diog. Laert. 9.52

καὶ πρῶτος [. . . = **D20**] καὶ σοφίσμακτα¹ τοῖς πρα-
γματολογοῦσι προσήγαγε καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφείξ
πρὸς τοῦνομα διελέχθη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιπόλαιον γένος
τῶν ἐριστικῶν ἐγέννησεν· ἵνα καὶ Τίμων φησὶ περὶ
αὐτοῦ [Frag. 47 Di Marco].

Πρωταγόρης τ' ἐπίμεικτος² ἐριζέμεναι εὖ εἰδώς.

¹ σοφίσμα mss., corr. Aldobrandini ² ἐπίμικτος mss.,
corr. Diels

condemnation, escape, and death, cf. **P19–P23**] in the
second book of his *Mockeries* (*Silloi*), telling it as follows:

†so† too, afterward, among the sophists,
For Protagoras, lacking neither a clear tongue nor
attentiveness nor versatility.
They wanted to turn his treatises into ashes
Because he had written that he neither knew nor
could observe
Of what sort the gods are nor who they are,
Taking great care to be equitable. Yet this did him
No good, and he tried to flee, so that he would not
Drink Socrates' chilling potion and so go down to
Hades.

b (< A1) in Diogenes Laertius

He was the first person [. . .] to introduce sophisms for
quibblers. Disregarding the meaning, he discussed the
word, and he fathered the race of eristic speakers that
nowadays is so common. That is why Timon says of him,

And Protagoras, joining in the brawl, expert in eristic
contention.

R20 (B1) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.60

καὶ Πρωταγόραν δὲ τὸν Ἀβδηρίτην ἐγκατέλεξάν τινες τῷ χορῷ τῶν ἀναιρούντων τὸ κριτήριο φιλοσόφων, ἐπεὶ φησι πάσας τὰς φαντασίας καὶ τὰς δόξας ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ πᾶν τὸ φανὲν ἢ δόξαν τινὶ εὐθέως πρὸς ἐκείνον ὑπάρχειν. ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τῶν Καταβαλλόντων ἀνεφώνησε [. . . = D9].

R21 (< A14) Sext. Emp. *Pyrrh. Hyp.* 1.216–19

[216] καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας δὲ βούλεται “πάντων χρημάτων” εἶναι “μετρον τὸν ἀνθρώπον [. . .] ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν” [cf. D9], ‘μέτρον’ μὲν λέγων τὸ κριτήριο, ‘χρημάτων’ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς δυνάμει φάσκειν πάντων πραγμάτων κριτήριο εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τίθησι τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ μόνα, καὶ οὕτως εἰσάγει τὸ πρὸς τι. [. . .] [217] φησὶν οὖν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὴν ὕλην ρευστὴν εἶναι, ρεούσης δὲ αὐτῆς συνεχῶς προσθέσεις ἀντὶ τῶν ἀποφορήσεων γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετακοσμεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι παρὰ τε <τὰς>¹ ἡλικίας καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας κατασκευὰς τῶν σωμάτων. [218] λέγει δὲ καὶ τοὺς λόγους πάντων τῶν φαινομένων ὑποκεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ὡς δύνασθαι τὴν ὕλην ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῇ πάντα

¹ <τὰς> Mutschmann

R20 (B1) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

Some people have included Protagoras of Abdera in the chorus of those philosophers who abolish the criterion, since he says that all representations and opinions are true and that truth is one of the relatives, because everything that is an object of appearance or of opinion for someone simply exists in relation to him. At least he proclaimed at the beginning of his *Refutations* [*Kataballontes*]: [. . . = D9].

R21 (< A14) Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*

[216] Protagoras holds that “**of all things the measure**” is “**man [. . .] that they are not**” [cf. D9], calling the criterion ‘measure’ and objects [*pragmata*] ‘things’ [*khremata*], so that he is virtually saying, “of all objects man is the criterion, of those that are, that they are; and of those that are not, that they are not.” And that is why he posits only what appears to each person, and in this way he introduces the relative. [. . .] [217] So this man affirms that matter is in flux, and that as it flows additions are constantly being produced to replace what flows away [cf. R6], and that sensations are transformed and changed in accordance with age and the other conditions of bodies. [218] He also says that the reasons [*logoi*] for all phenomena reside in matter, so that matter is able, as far as it can be, to be everything that appears to everyone; but that

εἶναι ὅσα πᾶσι φαίνεται. τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους αὐτῶν διαθέσεις· τὸν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα ἐκεῖνα τῶν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καταλαμβάνειν ἅ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι φαίνεσθαι δύναται, τὸν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἅ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν. [219] καὶ ἤδη παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑπνοῦν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος τῶν διαθέσεων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. γίνεται τοῖνυν κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων κριτήριον ὁ ἀνθρώπος. πάντα γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἔστιν, τὰ δὲ μηδενὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαινόμενα οὐδὲ ἔστιν. ὁρῶμεν οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ τὴν ὕλην βρευστὴν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς λόγους τῶν φαινομένων πάντων ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποκεῖσθαι δογματίζει [. . .].

R22 (A15) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.389–90

πᾶσαν μὲν οὖν φαντασίαν οὐκ <ἀν>¹ εἴποι τις ἀληθῆ διὰ τὴν περιτροπήν, καθὼς ὁ τε Δημόκριτος καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἀντιλέγοντες τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐδίδασκον· εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, κατὰ φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον, ἔσται ἀληθές, καὶ οὕτω τὸ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ γενήσεται ψεῦδος.

¹ <ἀν> Bekker

men apprehend different things at different times because of the differences in their dispositions. For he whose condition is in accordance with nature apprehends what in matter is able to appear to those whose condition is in accordance with nature, while he whose condition is contrary to nature, what is able to appear to those whose condition is contrary to nature. [219] And the same reasoning applies as well to ages, to the state of sleep or waking, and to every kind of disposition. So according to him, man is the criterion of what is. For everything that appears to men also exists, and what does not appear to any man does not exist either. So we see that he is dogmatic about matter being in flux and about the reasons for all appearances residing in it [. . .].

R22 (A15) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

One could not say that each representation (*phantasia*) is true, because this is self-refuting (*peritropê*), as Democritus [cf. **ATOM. R107**] and Plato [cf. **R9**] taught when they were contradicting Protagoras. For if every representation is true, so too to say that every representation is not true will be true, since this results from a representation, and so to say that every representation is true will be false.

Epicureans (R23–R24)
A Mention in Epicurus (R23)

R23 (< B3) Anecd. Gr. 1.171.3 Cramer

[. . . **D11**] οὐκ ἂν δὲ ἔλεγε τοῦτο, εἰ αὐτὸς ὀψιμαθῆς ἦν, ὡς ἐνόμιζε καὶ ἔλεγεν Ἐπίκουρος περὶ Πρωταγόρου [Frag. 173 Usener].

A Polemic Concerning the Gods (R24)

R24 (> A23) Diog. Oen. 16.II–III Smith

[Col. II] Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὁ Ἀβδηρείτης | τῇ μὲν δυνάμει τὴν | αὐτὴν ἤνευκε Διαγόρα | [5] δόξαν, ταῖς λέξεσιν δὲ | ἑτέροις ἐχρήσατο, ὡς | τὸ λείαν ἰταμὸν αὐτῆς | ἐκφευξόμενος. ἔφη | σε γὰρ μὴ εἰδέναι εἰ θε[10]οὶ εἰσιν τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν | τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ λέγειν εἰδέναι ὅτι μὴ εἰσιν. εἰ μὲν | γὰρ ἀντιτεθῆκει τῇ | πρώτῃ φωνῇ "οὐ μὴν | [Col. III] ὅτι μὴ εἰσιν," [ἴσως ἂν] | σχεδὸν εἶχε περίφρα[σιν] τινα πρὸς [τὸ μὴ δο]κεῖν τελῶς ἀ[ναίρειν] | [5] τοὺς θεοὺς. εἴπε δὲ τὸ | "εἶναι αὐτούς," [ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ] | "μὴ εἶναι," τὸ ἀ[κρειβῶς] | ποιῶν ἴσον Δ[ιαγόρα, ὅς] | εἰπὼν τὸ μὴ [εἰδέναι] | [10] ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀύπ[νω]ς οὐκ ἐ[παύσατο].

Col. III suppl. Smith (1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 ἀύπ[νω]ς οὐκ), Comperz (3, 4), Heberdey-Kalinka (9, 10 ἐ-) 3.2 maluerimus π[ροφα-

Epicureans (R23–R24)
A Mention in Epicurus (R23)

R23 (< B3) Anecdota Graeca

[. . .] He [i.e. Protagoras] would not have said this [= **D11**; cf. **D8**] if he had been a late-learner himself, as Epicurus thought and said about Protagoras [cf. **P6**].

A Polemic Concerning the Gods (R24)

R24 (> A23) Diogenes of Oenoanda, Epicurean inscription

[Col. II] Protagoras of Abdera in effect maintained the same opinion as Diagoras,¹ but he used different words on the idea that he would thereby avoid its excessive temerity. For he said that he did not know whether the gods exist. But this is the same thing as saying that one knows that they do not exist. For if he had balanced his first phrase [i.e. "About the gods I am able to know neither that they exist," cf. **D10**] by saying, "but certainly not [Col. III] that they do not exist,"² then perhaps he would have had a kind of <formulation> [or: <excuse> (?)] so as not to seem to be abolishing the gods completely. But what he said was "exist," and not "do not exist," doing exactly the same thing as Diagoras, who never tired of saying that he did not know that they exist.

¹ Diagoras of Melos, the epitome of atheism. ² Or perhaps, giving another possible sense to the verb: "if he had substituted for the first phrase [scil. I am not able to know either] that they do not exist." Diogenes' argumentation is difficult to reconstruct, all the more so as Col. III is very damaged.

*The Construction of a Debate
(Zeno and Protagoras on the
Argument of the Grain of Millet)*

See ZEN. D12b

*A Fanciful Biographical Explanation
for the Doctrine about the Gods (R25)*

R25 (< A2) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.10.2, p. 13.9–14 Kayser

τὸ δὲ ἀπορεῖν φάσκειν, εἴτε εἰσὶ θεοὶ εἴτε οὐκ εἰσὶ,
δοκεῖ μοι Πρωταγόρας ἐκ τῆς Περσικῆς παιδείσεως
παρανομήσαι μάγοι γὰρ ἐπιθειάζουσι μὲν οἷς ἀφα-
νώως δρῶσι, τὴν δὲ ἐκ φανεροῦ δόξαν τοῦ θείου κατα-
λύουσι οὐ βουλόμενοι δοκεῖν παρ' αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι.

*A Neoplatonic Report on Protagoras:
Testimonium, Error, or Invention?¹ (R26)*

R26 (≠ DK) Dam. *Princ.* 126.2. (3.169.5–10 Westerink)

ὅτι δὲ ἐστὶ τι τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ ἕτερον
ἑτέρου μετέχει, ἀλλ' οὐ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἔστηκεν,
ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μεμονωμένον καὶ μόνον τοῦτο λε-
γόμενον ὃ ἐστὶ, καθάπερ ἐπιχειρεῖ μὲν Πρωταγόρας

¹This statement has no echo in what we know elsewhere about Protagoras. It could be a thesis illustrated by his example within the framework of a contradictory argumentation (cf. D26–

*The Construction of a Debate
(Zeno and Protagoras on the
Argument of the Grain of Millet)*

See ZEN. D12b

*A Fanciful Biographical Explanation
for the Doctrine about the Gods (R25)*

R25 (< A2) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

With regard to his being at a loss to say whether the gods exist or do not exist, Protagoras seems to me to have violated the law because of his Persian education. For the magi invoke the gods for the practices they perform in secret, but in public they destroy the opinion regarding divinity since they do not want people to ascribe their power to it.

*A Neoplatonic Report on Protagoras:
Testimonium, Error, or Invention?¹ (R26)*

R26 (≠ DK) Damascius, *Treatise on the First Principles*

That something of this sort [scil. participation] exists among real things, and that one thing participates in another, but that no thing stands on its own, completely isolated from the others and only called [scil. the name of] what it is, as Protagoras tries to establish¹ and as Lycoph-

D30), or an interpretation, well or ill informed. The interpretation depends on the meaning attributed to the verb 'establish' (*hupotithesthai*) and on the parallel with Lycophron, whose presence in this context can be easily justified with reference to **Lyc. D1**.

ὑποτίθεσθαι, Δυκόφρων δὲ ἀπεφήματο, δηλώσει ὁ λόγος μέτρια βασανισθεῖς.

Protagoras Among the Christians (R27–R29)
An Exegetical Use of Protagoras' Skepticism (R27)

R27 (≠ DK) Did. Caec. *Comm. in Ps.* 34.17 (F. Tura V 222.18–29, CPF Protagoras 3T)

[. . .] [A.] πῶς λέγεις ὅτι οὐ νενόηκα; οὐ δίδωμι αὐτὸν | δίκαιον.

[B.] ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλος νοήσῃ ὡς εἴρηται καὶ δῶ αὐτὸν δίκαιον, ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ ἄδικός ἐστιν. ἄκουε δέ, διὰ τί εἶπον | εἰς δόξαν ἐτέραν οἱ Πρωταγόρου.—σοφιστῆς δὲ ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας· λέγει ὅτι τὸ εἶναι τοῖς οὐσιν ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἔστιν. | [λ]έγει ὅτι “φαίνομαι σοὶ τῷ παρόντι καθήμενος· τῷ δὲ ἀπόντι οὐ φαίνομαι καθήμενος, ἄδηλον εἰ κάθημαι | ἢ οὐ κάθημαι.” καὶ λέγουσιν ὅτι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἔστιν οἷον ὄρῳ τὴν σελήνην, ἄλλος δὲ οὐχ ὄρῳ· ἄδηλον εἰ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐμοὶ τῷ ὑγίαινοντι ἀντίληψις γίνεται τοῦ μέλιτος ὅτι γλυκύ, ἄλλω δὲ ὅτι πικρόν, ἐὰν | πυρέτῃ· ἄδηλον οὖν εἰ πικρόν ἢ γλυκύ ἐστιν. καὶ οὕτω τὴν ἀκαταληψίαν θέλουσιν δογματίζειν. ἐὰν οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς | λέγωμεν ὅτι “ἐπεὶ οὐ φ[αίν]εται μοι ποίω λογισμῷ εἴρηκεν, ἄδικον καὶ ἀσεβῆ[ν] αὐτὸν ἡγοῦμαι,” ἐὰν ἄλλω | φαίνεται οἷω λογισ[μῷ] εἴρηκεν,

ron asserted [cf. **LYC. D1**—the argument will reveal this, once it has been tested according to the proper measure.

Protagoras Among the Christians (R27–R29)
An Exegetical Use of Protagoras' Skepticism (R27)

R27 (≠ DK) Didymus the Blind, *Commentary on the Psalms*

[. . .] [Question:] Why do you say that I do not understand [scil. what Job means when he says, “May the day perish when I was born,” Job 3:3]? I do not consider him just.

[Didymus' reply:] But if someone else understands in what sense this has been said and considers him just, the same man is both just and unjust. Hear why the disciples of Protagoras spoke in favor of a different opinion. Protagoras was a sophist. He says that for the things that are, their being consists in appearing. He says, “I seem to you who are present to be sitting; to someone who is absent I do not seem to be sitting; it is unclear whether I am sitting or not sitting.” And they say that all the things that are exist in appearing; for example, I see the moon, but someone else does not see it; it is unclear whether it exists or does not exist. I, who am healthy, have a perception of honey as being sweet, but someone else of its being bitter, if he has a fever; so it is unclear whether it is bitter or sweet. And it was in this way that they try to establish the doctrine of the impossibility of apprehension (*akatalēpsia*). And so if we too say, “since it does not appear to me on the basis of what reasoning he [i.e. Job] spoke, I consider him to be unjust and impious”; if to someone else it appears on the basis of what reasoning he [i.e. Job] spoke,

δίκαιος καὶ εὐσεβῆς ἐκέλευν φαίνεται. καὶ ἄλλος πάλιν οὐδὲ ἐπιστάνει τοῖς | εἰρημένοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ· οὐδὲ εὐσεβῆς οὐδὲ ἀσεβῆς ἔστιν, καὶ εἰς τὴν <Πρω>ταγόρειαν¹ ἐμπίπτομεν δόξαν. | ἴδωμεν οὖν· δεῖ πρῶτον νοεῖν τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὕτως ἢ κρίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ κρίνεσθαι. ὁ μὴ λέγειν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς | μηδὲ ὑγιαίνειν εἰρηκῶς, ποῖαν λέγει διάνοιαν τῶν λέξεων;

omnia suppl. et rest. Gronewald ¹ αναξαγόριαν pap.

A Sarcasm (R28)

R28 (> A16) Herm. *Irris.* 9

ἀλλ' ἐπὶ θάτερα Πρωταγόρας ἐστηκῶς ἀνθέλκει με φάσκων "ὄρος καὶ κρίσις τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ ἀνθρώπος καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑποπίπτοντα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἔστιν πράγματα, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑποπίπτοντα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς εἶδεσι τῆς οὐσίας." τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ κολακευόμενος ὑπὸ Πρωταγόρου τέρπομαι, ὅτι τὸ πᾶν ἢ τὸ πλείστον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ νέμει.

*A Reprise of the Accusation
of Atheism (R29)*

R29 (B4) Eus. *PE* 14.3.7

ὁ μὲν γὰρ Δημοκρίτου γεγονῶς ἐταῖρος, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἄθεον ἐκτίσατο δόξαν λέγεται γοῦν τοιαυτὴ κεχρησθαι εἰσβολῇ ἐν τῷ Περὶ θεῶν συγγράμματι [. . . = **D10**].

he appears to him to be just and pious. And someone else in turn does not even pay attention to what he says; [scil. for him] he is neither pious nor impious, and thus we fall into the doctrine of Protagoras. So let us consider: first of all one must understand the things, and on this basis either judge or not judge: he who says that that man [i.e. Job] does not speak correctly and is not of sound mind, what kind of meaning does he ascribe to his words?

A Sarcasm (R28)

R28 (> A16) Hermias, *Derision of Gentile Philosophers*

But Protagoras stands on the other side of me [scil. from Empedocles] and restrains me [scil. from jumping into a volcano], saying, "man is the definition (*horos*) and the determination (*krisis*) of things, and those that fall under the senses exist, while those that do not fall under them do not exist among the forms of being." I am flattered and delighted by this argument of Protagoras, because he assigns everything or the greater part to man.

*A Reprise of the Accusation
of Atheism (R29)*

R29 (B4) Eusebius, *Evangelical Preparation*

For Protagoras acquired an atheistic reputation when he became a companion of Democritus. At any rate he is said to have used the following opening for his treatise *On the Gods*: [. . . = **D10**].

*An Aphorism Attributed to Protagoras
in Syriac (R30)***R30** (B12) *Studia Sinaitica* 1, p. 34 Smith Lewis

ܠܠܠܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ
 ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ
 ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ
 ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ
 ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ

¹ ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ corr. Hugonnard-Roche ex ܠܠܠܐܘܢܐ S

S = Monastery of Saint Catherine on Mount Sinai, Syr. 16, fol. 148r

*An Aphorism Attributed to Protagoras
in Syriac (R30)***R30** (B12) From a Syriac collection of Greek sayings

Protagoras said, "Effort, work, study, education, and wisdom are the garland of glory that is woven out of the flowers of an eloquent language and that is placed on the head of those who love it. In fact, language is difficult, but its flowerings are rich and always new, and those who look, those who applaud, and those who teach are happy, and their pupils make progress and fools are annoyed—or perhaps they are not even annoyed, because they are not intelligent enough."¹

¹ Translated from the French translation by Henri Hugonnard-Roche.

32. GORGIAS (GORG.)

Gorgias, born ca. 485 BC, was a slightly younger contemporary of Protagoras; he was renowned for his longevity and may have lived until ca. 380. He came from Leontini in Sicily, and it is reported that he studied with Empedocles (who came from Agrigentum)—a connection between the two thinkers is already attested in Plato. Gorgias was above all famous as a powerfully effective public orator and as a flamboyant prose stylist; his visit to Athens in 427 BC is often considered to have been a watershed in the history of Greek rhetoric. Two of his surviving works, speeches in defense of Helen and of Palamedes—the only texts belonging to our corpus (with the possible exception of Antiphon's speeches; see our introduction to the latter) to have been preserved in their entirety—provide numerous examples of the features of his style, characterized by balanced clauses with rhyming beginnings or endings, parallel and antithetical structures of language and thought, which exerted an enormous influence on contemporary and later Greek writers and came to be called 'Gorgianic figures.' But Gorgias also dealt implicitly or explicitly with questions of a philosophical type, in particular with the power of language and with human responsibility. Two extensive summaries survive of a work of his entitled *On Nonbeing* or *On Nature*, which manifestly aims to reverse Parmenides' argumentation on be-

GORGIAS

ing; nothing exists, if something does exist it cannot be known, and if it is known by one person this knowledge cannot be communicated to another. He is also known to have written about natural phenomena

As in the case of the other 'sophists,' our image of Gorgias has been profoundly influenced by Plato's portrait of him in his dialogues, especially the *Gorgias*; given the difficulty of assessing how reliable this portrait is, we include the passages in question not in the main part of the section on Gorgias' doctrines, but as an appendix to it.

The reader should note that, whereas elsewhere in our edition we have indicated by boldface the words that we consider to be exact verbal citations from the works of the early Greek philosophers, considerations of appearance have led us in the present chapter to use plain characters for those texts that have reached us in their entirety by direct transmission via medieval manuscripts, viz. Gorgias' speeches on Helen and Palamedes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Editions

- T. Buchheim. *Gorgias von Leontinoi. Reden, Fragmente und Testimonien* (Hamburg, 1989).
- L. Caffaro. *Encomio di Elena, Apologia di Palamede* (Florence, 1997).
- F. Donadi. *Gorgiae Leontini in Helenam laudatio. Testo critico, introduzione e note* (Rome, 1982).
- R. Ioli. *Gorgia di Leontini, Su ciò che non è. Testo greco, traduzione e commento* (Hildesheim-Zurich-New York, 2010).

Studies

L. Montoneri and R. Romano, eds. *Gorgia e la sofistica, Sicularum Gymnasium*, N.S.38 1/2 (1985).

H. Newiger. *Untersuchungen zu Gorgias' Schrift Über das Nichtseiende* (Berlin, 1973).

See also the titles listed in the General Introduction to Chapters 31–42.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

P

Origin and Family (P1–P3)

Chronology (P4)

Disciple of Empedocles (P5)

His Students, Real and Alleged (P6–P10)

His Success and Fame During His Lifetime (P11–P15)

In Thessaly . . . (P11)

. . . and Then in the Rest of Greece . . . (P12)

. . . and Especially, After His Embassy There, in Athens (P13–P15)

His Wealth (P16–P18)

One Contemporary Negative Response (P19)

A Malicious Anecdote (P20)

Apothegms (P21–P23)

Fictitious Reactions by Gorgias to Plato's Portrait of Him (P24)

His Old Age and Death (P25–P32)

Monuments (P33–P35)

The Statue at Delphi (P33)

The Statue at Olympia (P34)

The Tomb of Isocrates (P35)

Iconography (P36)

D

Some of Gorgias' Writings in Circulation in the First Century BC (D1)

The Art of Rhetoric (D2–D23)

Gorgias' Place in the History of Rhetoric (D2–D3)

Elements of the Art of Rhetoric (D4–D23)

Gorgias as a Theoretician of Rhetoric (D4–D18)

His Teaching Method (D4)

His Technical Manual(s) (D5–D6)

Two Possibly Authentic Terms Deriving from

Gorgias' Characterization of Rhetoric (D7)

Some Central Features of Gorgias' Rhetorical Theory (D8–D16)

Universality (D8–D10)

Improvisation and the 'Opportune Moment'

(kairos) (D11–D12)

Verbal Concision and Abundance (D13–D14)

Plausibility (D15)

Praise and Blame (D16)

Two Recommendations (D17–D18)

Features of Gorgias' Own Style (D19–D22)

'Gorgianic' Expressions (D23)

Two Extant Epideictic Speeches (D24–D25)

Encomium of Helen (D24)

Defense of Palamedes (D25)

- The Treatise Entitled On Nonbeing or On Nature* (D26)
The Traditional Title (ALCM. D2)
Two Summaries (D26)
- Political Orations* (D27–D33)
Contents and Occasions of Some of Gorgias' Political Orations (D27)
Fragments from Gorgias' Political Orations (D28–D33)
Funeral Oration (Epitaphios) (D28–D30)
Olympic Oration, On Concord (Olympikos) (D31–D32)
Encomium for the Eleans (D33)
- Fragments from Unidentified Works* (D34–D46)
On Being and Appearing (D34)
On Tragedy (D35–D36)
Homer's Lineage (D37)
A Scene of Turmoil (D38)
On the Granting of Citizenship at Larisa (D39)
Praise for Cimon's Generosity (D40)
Friendship and Justice (D41)
On Decorum in Women (D42)
Examples of Invectives (D43)
Examples of Metaphors (D44)
Physical Doctrines (D45–D46)
Passages (D45)
The Nature of the Sun (D46)
- Appendix: Passages in Plato Relating to Gorgias* (D47–D53)
The Teacher of Rhetoric (D47)
The Nature of Rhetoric (D48–D51)
Kinds of Rhetoric (D52)
The Virtues (D53)

R

- Ancient Works Dedicated to Gorgias' Doctrines* (R1)
Earliest References (DRAM. T20–T21)
His Stylistic Influence on Greek Orators and Writers (R2–R7)
On Contemporary Athenian Writers (R2–R6)
On Two Authors of the Second Sophistic (R7)
General Judgments on Gorgias' Rhetorical Practice (R8–R17)
Criticism of His Teaching Method (R8)
Criticisms of His Style (R9–R17)
Specific Judgments on Individual Works (R18–R26)
Encomium of Helen, cf. D24 (R18)
Funeral Oration (Epitaphios), cf. D28–D30 (R19–R22)
On Nonbeing or On Nature, cf. D26 (R23–R26)
A Judgment Concerning the Whole Text (R23)
Attestations and Criticisms of the First Thesis (R24–R25)
Sextus Empiricus' Sceptical Conclusion about Gorgias (R26)
Traces of Other Polemics (R27–R28)
An Aphorism Attributed to Gorgias in Syriac (R29)

GORGIAS [82 DK]

P

Origin and Family (P1–P3)

P1 (< A1) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.9.1, p. 11.20 Kayser
Σικελία Γοργίαν ἐν Λεοντίνοις ἤνεγκεν [. . . = **D2b**].

P2 (< A7) Paus. 6.17.8
[. . . = **P34a**] οὗτος ὁ Γοργίας πατὴρ μὲν ἦν Χαρμαν-
τίδου [. . . = **D3**].

P3 (< A2) *Suda* Γ.388
[. . .] ἀδελφὸς δὲ ἦν τοῦ ἰατροῦ Ἡροδίκου.

Chronology (P4)

P4 (> A10, > B2) Olymp. *In Gorg.* Prooem. 9 (7.22–8.12
Westerink)

ὑπόλοιπον ζητῆσαι πῶς μέμνηται Γοργίου· λέγομεν
τοῖνν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν οὐδὲν ἄτοπον τὸν γράφοντα

GORGIAS

P

Origin and Family (P1–P3)

P1 (< A1) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*
Sicily brought forth Gorgias at Leontini [. . .].

P2 (< A7) Pausanias, *Description of Greece*
[. . .] This Gorgias had as father Charmantides [. . .].

P3 (< A2) *Suda*
[. . .] He was a brother of the doctor Herodicus.¹

¹ Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 448b, 456b.

Chronology (P4)

P4 (> A10, > B2) Olympiodorus, *Commentary on Plato's*
Gorgias

It remains to ask how it happens that he [i.e. Plato] refers
to Gorgias. We say that, first, there is nothing strange in a

ιστορεῖν καὶ ἀγνώστους ἀνθρώπους καὶ ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς
 διαλεγόμενους· δεύτερον δὲ ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
 χρόνων ἦσαν, ὁ μὲν γὰρ¹ Σωκράτης ἐπὶ τῆς οἴζ' Ὀλυμ-
 πιάδος τῷ γ' ἔτει ὁ δὲ < . . . >² Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ Πυθα-
 γόρειος, ὁ διδάσκαλος Γοργίου, ἐφοίτησεν παρ' αὐτῷ.
 ἀμέλει καὶ γράφει ὁ Γοργίας Περὶ φύσεως σύγ-
 γραμμα [. . . = R23] τῇ πδ' Ὀλυμπιάδι, ὥστε κη' ἔτε-
 σιν ἢ ὀλίγω πλείοσιν εἶναι πρῶτον τὸν Σωκράτην.
 ἄλλως τέ φησιν ἐν τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ ὁ Πλάτων ὅτι "νέος
 ὢν κομιδῇ ἐνέτυχον Παρμενίδῃ ὄντι πάνυ πρεσβύτη
 καὶ εὖρον βαθύτατον ἄνδρα." οὗτος δὲ ὁ Παρμενίδης
 διδάσκαλος ἐγένετο Ἐμπεδοκλέους τοῦ διδασκάλου
 Γοργίου· καὶ ὁ Γοργίας δὲ πρεσβύτης³ ἦν ὡς γὰρ
 ἱστορήται τέθνηκεν ὢν ρθ' ἑτῶν, ὥστε περὶ τοὺς
 αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἦσαν.

¹ γὰρ secl. Jahn
 ρος Diels

² lac. pos. Tarrant

³ πρεσβύτε-

Disciple of Empedocles (P5)

P5 (A3) Diog. Laert. 8.58–59

Γοργίαν γοῦν τὸν Λεοντίνου αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι μαθη-
 τήν, ἄνδρα ὑπερέχοντα ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ Τέχνην ἀπο-

writer's reporting as well about men personally unknown
 to him and representing them in dialogue. Second, we
 shall say that they [i.e. Plato and Gorgias] were alive in the
 same period: for Socrates [scil. was born] in the third year
 of the 77th Olympiad [= 470/69], and < . . . > Empedocles
 the Pythagorean, the teacher of Gorgias, associated with
 him [i.e. probably Anaxagoras¹]. It is also certain that Gor-
 gias wrote his *On Nature* [. . .] during the 84th Olympiad
 [= 444/40], so that Socrates was first [scil. apparently: be-
 fore this treatise] by twenty-eight years or a little more.
 Another argument: Plato [i.e. Plato's Socrates] says in his
Theaetetus [183e], "I met Parmenides when I was very
 young and he was very old and I found him to be a man of
 great profundity" [cf. **PARM. P4**]. This Parmenides was
 the teacher of Empedocles, who was the teacher of Gor-
 gias. But Gorgias also lived to be an old man, for it is re-
 ported that he died at the age of 109, so that they [i.e. Plato
 and Gorgias] were alive at about the same time.

¹ Postulating a lacuna in which Olympiodorus would have
 asserted that Socrates studied with Anaxagoras; cf. H. Tarrant,
 "Olympiodorus and History," in A. Nobbs et al., eds., *Ancient His-
 tory in a Modern University* (Grand Rapids, MI, 1997), pp. 417–
 25. It is also possible that Olympiodorus' chronology is confused.

Disciple of Empedocles (P5)

P5 (A3) Diogenes Laertius

Gorgias of Leontini, a man who excelled in rhetoric and
 who left behind a technical manual on this art was his [i.e.
 Empedocles'] disciple [cf. **EMP. P24**] [. . .]. Satyrus says

λελοιπότα [. . .]. [59] τοῦτόν φησιν ὁ Σάτυρος λέγειν [Frag. 13 Schorn] ὡς αὐτὸς παρεῖη τῷ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γοητεύοντι.

His Students, Real and Alleged (P6–P10)

P6 (A5) Xen. *An.* 2.6.16

Πρόξενος δὲ ὁ Βοιωτίος εὐθὺς μὲν μειράκιον ὦν ἐπεθύμει γενέσθαι ἀνὴρ τὰ μεγάλα πράττειν ἰκανὸς καὶ διὰ ταύτην ἐπιθυμίαν ἔδωκε Γοργίᾳ ἀργύριον τῷ Λεοντίνῳ.

P7 (A16) Quintil. *Inst. or.* 3.1.13

his successere multi, sed clarissimus Gorgiae auditorum Isocrates. quamquam de praeceptore eius inter auctores non convenit, nos tamen Aristoteli credimus [Frag. 139 Rose].

P8 (< A32) Cic. *Orat.* 52.175

[. . .] Isocrates, cum tamen audisset in Thessalia adulescens senem iam Gorgiam [. . .].

P9 (V A 11 G²) Diog. Laert. 6.1

οὗτος κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἤκουσε Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος ὅθεν τὸ ῥητορικὸν εἶδος ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις ἐπιφέρει καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ Ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς.

that he [i.e. Gorgias] claimed that he was present while Empedocles was performing magic [cf. **EMP. P16**].

See also **EMP. R5b**

His Students, Real and Alleged (P6–P10)

P6 (A5) Xenophon, *Anabasis*

Proxenus of Boeotia, starting from childhood, desired to become a man capable of doing great deeds and because of this desire he paid money to Gorgias of Leontini.

P7 (A16) Quintilian, *Training in Oratory*

Many men followed these [i.e. Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, and Thrasymachus], but the most famous of Gorgias' students was Isocrates. Although the sources do not agree about his teacher, nonetheless we ourselves accept the authority of Aristotle.

P8 (< A32) Cicero, *The Orator*

[. . .] Isocrates, who as a young man in Thessaly heard Gorgias when he was already old [. . .].

P9 (≠ DK) Diogenes Laertius

He [i.e. Antisthenes] studied with Gorgias the orator in the beginning; it is from this that he applies the rhetorical character in his dialogues, and especially in his *Truth* and *Protreptics*.

P10 (< A2) *Suda* Γ.388

[. . .] διδάσκαλος Πάλου Ἀκραγαντίνου καὶ Περικλέους καὶ Ἰσοκράτους καὶ Ἀλκιδάμαντος τοῦ Ἐλαίτου,¹ ὃς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν διεδέξατο.

¹ Ἐλεάτου mss., corr. Kuster

*His Success and Fame During His
Lifetime (P11–P15)
In Thessaly . . . (P11)*

P11 (A19) *Plat. Men.* 70a–b

[ΣΩ.] ὦ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐδόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν καὶ ἐθανμάζοντο ἐφ' ἵππικῇ τε καὶ πλούτῳ, νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισαῖοι. τούτου δὲ ὑμῖν αἰτιὸς ἐστὶ Γοργίας· ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν Ἀλευαδῶν τε τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ σοὺς ἐραστής ἐστὶν Ἀριστιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν [. . . = D9].

. . . and Then in the Rest of Greece . . . (P12)

P12 (< A35) *Philostr. Ep.* 73, p. 257.2–7 Kayser

[. . .] Γοργίου δὲ θαυμασταὶ ἦσαν ἄριστοὶ τε καὶ πλείστοι· πρῶτον μὲν οἱ κατὰ Θετταλίαν Ἕλληνες, παρ' οἷς τὸ ῥητορεύειν ἰσογιάζω· ἐπωνυμίαν ἔσχεν, εἴτα τὸ ξύμπαν Ἑλληνικόν, ἐν οἷς Ὀλυμπίασι διελέχθη κατὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ νεῶ βαλβίδος [. . . = R3].

P10 (< A2) *Suda*

[. . .] the teacher of Polus of Agrigentum, Pericles, Isocrates, and Alcidas of Elaea, who was also his successor as head of his school.

See also **P14**, **P35**, **R3**

*His Success and Fame During His
Lifetime (P11–P15)
In Thessaly . . . (P11)*

P11 (A19) *Plato, Meno*

[Socrates:] Meno, in earlier times the Thesalians used to be famous and admired among the Greeks for their horse-riding and wealth, but now, as it seems to me, it is for their wisdom (*sophia*) too, and above all the Larissans, the fellow-citizens of your companion Aristippus. The reason for this is Gorgias: for when he came to that city he turned the first men among the Aleuads, including your lover Aristippus, and among all the other Thesalians into lovers of wisdom [. . .].

. . . and Then in the Rest of Greece . . . (P12)

P12 (< A35) *Philostratus, Letters*

[. . .] The admirers of Gorgias were the best men and there were very many of them: first the Greeks in Thessaly, among whom to practice oratory received the nickname 'to Gorgianize'; then all of Greece, because of what he said at Olympia against the barbarians from the base of the temple [. . .].

... and Especially, After His Embassy
There, in Athens (P13–P15)

P13

a (< A4) Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 3

[. . . = **R2**] ἦνικ' Ἀθήναζε πρεσβεύων κατεπλήξατο
τοὺς ἀκούοντας τῇ δημηγορίᾳ [. . .].

b (< A4) Diod. Sic. 12.53.2–5

[2] ἦν δὲ τῶν ἀπεσταλμένων ἀρχιπρεσβευτῆς Γοργίας ὁ ῥήτωρ [. . .]. [3] οὗτος οὖν κατανήσας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ παραχθεὶς εἰς τὸν δῆμον διελέχθη τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις περὶ τῆς συμμαχίας καὶ τῷ ξενίζοντι τῆς λέξεως ἐξέπληξε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὄντας εὐφυνεῖς καὶ φιλόλογους. [. . . = **D20, R12**] [5] τέλος δὲ πείσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους συμμαχῆσαι τοῖς Λεοντίνους, οὗτος μὲν θαυματοεὶς ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ῥητορικῇ τὴν εἰς Λεοντίνους ἐπάνοδον ἐποιήσατο.

P14 (< A1) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.9.3, p. 12.2–6 Kayser

[. . .] διαλεχθεὶς δὲ Ἀθήνησιν ἤδη γηράσκων εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐθαυμάσθη, οὕτω θαῦμα, ὁ δέ, οἶμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἔλλογιμωτάτους ἀνητήσατο, Κριτίαν μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην νέω ὄντε, Θουκυδίδην δὲ καὶ Περικλέα ἤδη γηράσκοντε. [. . . = **R6c**]

... and Especially, After His Embassy
There, in Athens (P13–P15)

P13

a (< A4) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Lysias*

[. . .] when he [i.e. Gorgias] came as an ambassador to Athens [i.e. in 427], he dumbfounded the listeners with his public oration [. . .].

b (< A4) Diodorus Siculus

[2] Gorgias the orator headed the embassy of those who had been sent as delegates [. . .]. [3] When he arrived at Athens and was presented to the people, he spoke to the Athenians about the military alliance and dumbfounded the Athenians, who are clever by nature and love speeches, by the originality of his style. [. . .] [5] Finally, having persuaded the Athenians to combat alongside the Leontinians, he returned to Leontini, admired in Athens for his rhetorical art.

P14 (< A1) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

[. . .] what is astonishing is not so much that he caused astonishment in the crowd when he spoke in Athens, already as an old man, but that he attached to himself the most illustrious men as well, Critias and Alcibiades when they were young, Thucydides and Pericles when they were already old. [. . .]

P15 (< A7) Paus. 6.17.8–9

[. . . = **D3**] εὐδοκιμῆσαι δὲ Γοργίαν λόγων ἔνεκα ἔν τε πανηγύρει τῇ Ὀλυμπικῇ φασι καὶ ἀφικόμενον κατὰ πρεσβείαν ὁμοῦ Τισία παρ' Ἀθηναίους. [. . .] ἀλλὰ γε ἐκείνου τε ἐς πλεόν τιμῆς ἀφίκετο ὁ Γοργίας παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ Ἰάσων ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ τυραννήσας Πολυκράτους, οὐ τὰ ἔσχατα ἐνεγκαμένον¹ διδασκαλείου τοῦ Ἀθήνησι, τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπίπροσθεν αὐτὸν ὁ Ἰάσων ἐποιήσατο.

¹ ἐνεγκάμενος β, corr. Musurus

His Wealth (P16–P18)

P16 (A18) Isocr. Ant. 155–156.

ὁ δὲ πλείστα κτησάμενος, ὧν ἡμεῖς μνημονεύομεν, Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος, οὗτος διατρίψας μὲν περὶ Θεσσαλίαν, ὅτ' εὐδαιμονέστατοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦσαν, πλείστον δὲ χρόνον καὶ βιωὸς καὶ περὶ τὸν χρηματισμὸν τοῦτον γενόμενος, [156] πόλιν δ' οὐδεμίαν καταπαγίως οἰκήσας οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ κοινὰ δαπανηθεὶς οὐδ' εἰσφορὰν εἰσενεγκεῖν ἀναγκασθεὶς, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις οὔτε γυναικὰ γήμας οὔτε παῖδας ποιησάμενος [. . .], τοσοῦτον προλαβὼν πρὸς τὸ πλείω κτήσασθαι τῶν ἄλλων, χιλίους μόνους στατήρας κατέλιπεν.

P15 (< A7) Pausanias, *Description of Greece*

[. . .] They say that Gorgias was famous because of his speeches, both in his panegyric speech at Olympia and when he came to Athens on an embassy together with Tisias. [. . .] But Gorgias was more honored than he [i.e. Tisias] was in Athens, and Jason, the tyrant of Thessaly [380/70]—Jason himself considered him superior to Polycrates, who won the very greatest prizes of the Athenian school.

His Wealth (P16–P18)

P16 (A18) Isocrates, *Antidosis*

Of those men [i.e. the ones called 'sophists'] that we can remember, it was Gorgias of Leontini, who lived in Thessaly when they were the most prosperous of the Greeks, who acquired the most wealth. But although he lived a very long life and spent it busying himself with making money, did not settle down permanently in any city, spent nothing for the community and was not obliged to pay property taxes, and although, what is more, he did not marry any woman or have any children [. . .] nonetheless, though he had such a head start towards making more money than other people, he left behind only a thousand staters.

P17 (< A4) Dioid. Sic. 12.53.2

οὗτος [. . . = **D6b**] κατὰ τὴν σοφιστείαν τοσοῦτο τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπερέβαλεν, ὥστε μισθὸν λαμβάνειν παρὰ τῶν μαθητῶν μνᾶς ἑκατόν.

P18 (A9) Ael. Var. Hist. 12.32

Ἰππίαν δὲ καὶ Γοργίαν ἐν πορφυραῖς ἐσθήσιν προΐ-
εἶναι διαρρεῖ λόγος.

One Contemporary Negative Response (P19)

P19 (Nachtrag, vol. II, p. 425.26–28) Olymp. In Gorg. 7.2, p. 51.16–18

δεῖ γὰρ εἶδέναι ὅτι εἰς τὸ Ἄργος ἀπῆλθεν ὁ Γοργίας, καὶ οὕτως ἀπεχθῶς εἶχον ἐκεῖνοι πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι καὶ ποιῆ ὑπέβαλον τοὺς φοιτῶντας παρ' αὐτῶ.

A Malicious Anecdote (P20)

P20 (B8a) Plut. Conjug. 43 144 B–C

Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος ἀναγνόντος ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ λόγον περὶ ὁμονοίας τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ὁ Μελάνθιος "οὗτος ἡμῖν" ἔφη "συμβουλευεῖ περὶ ὁμονοίας, ὃς αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὴν θεράπαιναν ἰδίᾳ τρεῖς ὄντας ὁμοσοεῖν οὐ πέπεικεν;" ἦν γὰρ ὡς ἔοικέ τις ἔρωσ τοῦ Γοργίου καὶ ζήλοτυπία τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς τὸ θεραπαινίδιον.

P17 (< A4) Diodorus Siculus

He [. . .] surpassed the others in the sophistic art (*sophisteia*) so much that he earned a fee of one hundred minas from each of his students.

P18 (A9) Aelian, *Historical Miscellany*

The story is widely reported that Hippias and Gorgias appeared in public garbed in purple attire.¹

¹ Cf. **HIPPIAS P3–P5**. Purple dye was notoriously expensive in antiquity.

One Contemporary Negative Response (P19)

P19 (Nachtrag, vol. II, p. 425.26–28) Olympiodorus, *Commentary on Plato's Gorgias*

One should know that Gorgias went to Argos, and that the people there were so hostile to him that they imposed a fine on anyone who associated with him.

A Malicious Anecdote (P20)

P20 (B8a) Plutarch, *Conjugal Precepts*

When the orator Gorgias read a discourse on concord to the Greeks in Olympia, Melanthius said, "This man gives us advice about concord in public? But he has never managed in private to persuade only three people—himself, his wife, and their maidservant—to live together in concord." For it seems that Gorgias felt sexual desire for the maidservant, and his wife felt jealousy for her.

Apothegms (P21–P23)

P21 (A24) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1 Proem., p. 4.6–16 Kayser

οὐ μὴν φθόνου γε ἤμαρτεν ἦν γάρ τις Χαιρεφῶν Ἀθήνησι [. . .]. οὗτος ὁ Χαιρεφῶν τὴν σπουδὴν τοῦ Γοργίου διαμασώμενος “διὰ τί,” ἔφη, “ὦ Γοργία, οἱ κύαμοι τὴν μὲν γαστέρα φυσῶσι, τὸ δὲ πῦρ οὐ φυσῶσιν;” ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν παραχθὴς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος “τουτὶ μὲν,” ἔφη, “σοὶ καταλείπω σκοπεῖν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκείνο πάλαι οἶδα, ὅτι ἡ γῆ τοὺς νάρθηκας ἐπὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φύει.”

P22 (B29) *Gnomol. Vat.* 743 n. 166

Γοργίας ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔλεγε τοὺς φιλοσοφίας μὲν ἀμελοῦντας, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα γινομένους, ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς μνηστῆρσιν, οἱ Πηνελόπην θέλοντες ταῖς θεραπαίαις αὐτῆς ἐμίγνυντο.

P23 (B30) *Gnomol. Vat.* n. 167

Γοργίας τοὺς ῥήτορας ἔφη ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς βατράχοις· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὕδατι κελαδεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πρὸς κλειψύδραν.

Apothegms (P21–P23)

P21 (A24) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

He certainly did not escape envy. For there was a certain Chaerephon at Athens [. . .]. This Chaerephon made fun of Gorgias' seriousness and asked, "What is the reason, Gorgias, why beans puff up the belly but not fire?" But he was not at all bothered by the question and replied, "As far as this goes, I leave it for you to investigate. As for me I have known for a long time that the earth grows fennel stalks to be used against people like you [i.e. for beating them]."

P22 (B29) *Gnomologium Vaticanum*

Gorgias the orator said that those who neglect philosophy but dedicate themselves to the ordinary disciplines (*ta enkuklia mathēmata*) are similar to the suitors, who desired Penelope but slept with her maidservants.

P23 (B30) *Gnomologium Vaticanum*

Gorgias said that orators are similar to frogs: for the latter croak in the water, the former to the water-clock.

*Fictitious Reactions by Gorgias to
Plato's Portrait of Him (P24)*

P24 (> A15a) Athen. *Deipn.* 11 505 D–E

λέγεται δὲ ὡς καὶ ὁ Γοργίας αὐτὸς ἀναγνοὺς τὸν ὁμῶ-
νυμον αὐτῷ διάλογον πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις ἔφη “ὡς
καλῶς οἶδε Πλάτων ἰαμβίζειν.” Ἑρμιππος δὲ ἐν τῷ
περὶ Γοργίου [Frag. 63 Wehrli, *FCrHist* 1026 F41] “ὡς
ἐπεδήμησε,” φησί, “ταῖς Ἀθήναις Γοργίας μετὰ τὸ
ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀνάθεσιν τῆς ἐν Δελφοῖς ἑαυτοῦ
χρυσῆς εἰκόνας, εἰπόντος τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὅτε εἶδεν
αὐτόν, ‘ἦκει ἡμῖν ὁ καλός τε καὶ χρυσοῦς Γοργίας’,
ἔφη ὁ Γοργίας· ‘ἦ καλὸν γε αἱ Ἀθῆναι¹ νέον τοῦτον
Ἀρχίλοχον ἐνηνόχασιν.’” ἄλλοι δὲ φασιν ὡς ἀνα-
γνοὺς ὁ Γοργίας τὸν Πλάτωνος διάλογον πρὸς τοὺς
παρόντας εἶπεν ὅτι οὐδὲν τούτων οὔτ’ εἶπεν οὔτ’
ἤκουσε.²

¹ post Ἀθῆναι hab. ms. καὶ, del. Meineke ² post ἤκουσε
hab. ms. παρὰ Πλάτωνος, del. Rossi

His Old Age and Death (P25–P32)

P25 (A10) Apollod. *Chron.* (*FCrHist* 244 F 33) = Diog.
Laert. 8.58

ἐννέα πρὸς τοῖς ἑκατὸν ἔτη βιώναι.

*Fictitious Reactions by Gorgias to
Plato's Portrait of Him (P24)*

P24 (> A15a) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

It is said that after Gorgias himself had read the dialogue [scil. of Plato] that bears his name, he said to his friends, “How well Plato knows how to write satires!” Hermippus in his *On Gorgias* says, “Gorgias visited Athens after having dedicated the golden statue of himself in Delphi, and when Plato saw him and said, ‘Here comes to us the fine and golden Gorgias,’ Gorgias replied, ‘Fine indeed is this new Archilochus that Athens has brought forth!’ Others say that after Gorgias read Plato’s dialogue he said to those present that he had neither said nor heard any of these things.

His Old Age and Death (P25–P32)¹

¹ Gorgias’ longevity is mentioned very often in antiquity; the sources vary about his exact age at death.

P25 (A10) Apollodorus of Athens, *Chronicle*
He lived 109 years.

P26 (< A1) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.9.6, p. 12.30–21 Kayser

λέγεται δὲ ὁ Γοργίας ἐς ὀκτὼ καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐλάσας ἔτη μὴ καταλυθῆναι τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ τοῦ γήρωτος, ἀλλ' ἄρτιος καταβιώωναι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡβῶν.

P27 (< A11) Athen. *Deipn.* 12 548C–D

[. . .] Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος, περὶ οὗ φησιν ὁ αὐτὸς Κλέαρχος ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ τῶν Βίων [Frag. 62 Wehrli] ὅτι διὰ τὸ σωφρόνως ζῆν σχεδὸν π' ἔτη τῷ φρονεῖν συνεβίωσεν. [. . . = P28a]

¹ π' mss., D–K: ρ' Wilamowitz, Kaibel: ρι' Diels

P28

a (< A11) Athen. *Deipn.* 12.548C–D

[. . . = P27] καὶ ἐπεὶ τις αὐτὸν ἤρητο τίμη διαίτη χρώμενος οὕτως ἐμμελῶς καὶ μετὰ αἰσθήσεως τοσοῦτον χρόνον ζῆσειεν, “οὐδὲν πάποτε,” εἶπεν, “ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν πράξας.” Δημήτριος δὲ ὁ Βυζάντιος ἐν τετάρτῳ Περὶ ποιημάτων Γοργίας, φησίν, ὁ Λεοντίνος ἐρωτηθεὶς, τί αὐτῷ γέγονεν αἴτιον τοῦ βιώσαι πλείω τῶν ρ' ἐτῶν, ἔφη “τὸ μηδὲν πάποτε ἐτέρου ἕνεκεν πεπονηκέναι.”

b (< A13) Ps.-Luc. *Long.* 23

[. . . = P32] ὃν φασιν ἐρωτηθέντα τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ μακροῦ γήρωτος καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν

P26 (< A1) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

Gorgias is said to have reached 108 years without having deteriorated in his body on account of his age, but having lived his whole life in good health and remaining vigorous in his sense perceptions.

P27 (< A11) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

[. . .] Gorgias of Leontini, about whom the same Clearchus says in Book 8 of his *Lives* that because he lived moderately he maintained a sound mind for his whole life until he was almost eighty years old. [. . .]

P28

a (< A11) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

[. . .] And when someone asked him what way of life he had followed so as to be able to live for such a long time, in such harmony and without losing his sense perceptions, he said, “Because I have never done anything for the sake of pleasure.” Demetrius of Byzantium in the fourth book of his *On Poems* says that when Gorgias of Leontini was asked what the reason was that he had lived more than one hundred years, he said, “I have never done anything for the sake of anyone else.”

b (< A13) Ps.-Lucian, *Long-lived Men*

[. . .] they say that when he was asked what the reason was for his long old age and good health, with all his sense

εἰπεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε συμπεριενεχθῆναι ταῖς ἄλλων εὐωχίαις.

P29 (A12) Cic. *Sen.* 5.12

[. . .] cuius magister Leontinus Gorgias centum et septem complevit annos neque umquam in suo studio atque opere cessavit. qui cum ex eo quaereretur, cur tam diu vellet esse in vita, "nihil habeo," inquit, "quod accusem senectutem."

P30 (A15) Ael. *Var. Hist.* 2.35

Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος ἐπὶ τέρματι ὦν τοῦ βίου καὶ γεγηρακῶς εὖ μάλα ὑπὸ τινος ἀσθενείας καταληφθεὶς, κατ' ὀλίγον ἐς ὕπνον ὑπολισθαίνων ἔκειτο. ἐπεὶ δέ τις αὐτὸν παρήλθε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐπισκοπούμενος καὶ ἤρετο ὅ τι πράττοι, ὁ Γοργίας ἀπεκρίνατο "ἤδη με ὁ ὕπνος ἄρχεται παρακατατίθεσθαι τὰ δελφῶ."

P31 (≠ DK) Stob. 4.51.28

ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους Χρειῶν. Γοργίας ὁ ῥήτωρ ἤδη γηραιὸς ὑπάρχων ἐρωτηθεὶς εἰ ἠδέως ἀποθνήσκει, "ἠδιστα," εἶπεν, "ὥσπερ δὲ ἐκ σαπροῦ καὶ βέοντος συνοικιδίου ἀσμένως ἀπαλλάττομαι."

P32 (< A13) Ps.-Luc. *Long.* 23

[. . .] τροφῆς δὲ ἀποσχόμενος ἐτελεύτησεν [. . .] = **P28b**].

perceptions intact, he said that it was because he had never lowered himself to joining other men's festivities.

P29 (A12) Cicero, *On Old Age*

[. . .] his [i.e. Isocrates'] teacher Gorgias of Leonini had completed 107 years and had never interrupted his intellectual activity and his work. When he asked him why he wished to remain alive for so long, he said, "I have nothing to reproach old age with."

P30 (A15) Aelian, *Historical Miscellany*

When Gorgias of Leontini had come to the end of his life and was extremely old, he was overcome by some illness and he lay down, slipping gradually into sleep. When one of his friends came by to check on him and asked him how he was doing, Gorgias replied, "Sleep is already beginning to entrust me to his brother [i.e. death]."

P31 (≠ DK) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

From Aristotle's *Maxims*: When the orator Gorgias was already an old man, he was asked whether he was pleased to be dying. "Very much so," he replied, "I am happy to be set free, as from a decrepit and ramshackle tenement."

P32 (< A13) Ps.-Lucian, *Long-lived Men*

[. . .] he died by starving himself to death [. . .].

Monuments (P33–P35)
The Statue at Delphi (P33)

P33

a (A7) Cic. *De orat.* 3.32.129

[. . .] cui tantus honos habitus est a Graecia, soli ut ex omnibus Delphis non inaurata statua, sed aurea statuere-tur.

b (A7) Plin. *Nat. hist.* 33.83

hominum primus et auream statuam et solidam †LXX†¹ circiter Olympiade Gorgias Leontinus Delphis in templo posuit sibi. tantus erat docendae artis oratoriae quaestus.

¹ LXXXX Bergk

c (A7) Paus. 10.18.7

ἐπίχρυσος δὲ εἰκὼν ἀνάθημα Γοργίου τοῦ ἐκ Λεοντί-ων αὐτὸς Γοργίας ἐστίν.

d (< A1) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.9.4–5, p. 12.11–13 Kayser

[. . .] τὸν μὲν λόγον τὸν Πυθικὸν [. . .] ἐφ' οὗ καὶ χρυ-σοῦς ἀνετέθη, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Πυθίου ἱερῷ [. . .].

Monuments (P33–P35)
The Statue at Delphi (P33)

P33

a (A7) Cicero, *On the Orator*

[. . .] to whom [i.e. Gorgias] Greece showed so much honor that for him alone, out all men, a statue at Delphi was erected that was not gold-plated but of solid gold.

b (A7) Pliny the Elder, *Natural History*

The first man to set up a statue of solid gold for himself in the temple at Delphi was Gorgias of Leontini, around the †70th†¹ Olympiad—so great was the profit he made from teaching the art of oratory.

¹ The date in the manuscripts (= 500/496) is corrupt. Bergk's emendation, 90th, changes it to 420/16.

c (A7) Pausanias, *Description of Greece*

[At Delphi:] A gold-plated statue, a dedication by Gorgias of Leontini, represents Gorgias himself.

d (< A1) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

[. . .] his *Pythian Oration*, [. . .] on which occasion a golden statue of him was dedicated in the temple of Pythian Apollo [. . .].

*The Statue at Olympia (P34)***P34****a** (A7) Paus. 6.17.7

καὶ τὸν Λεοντίνου Γοργίαν ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἀναθεῖναι δὲ
τὴν εἰκόνα ἐς Ὀλυμπίαν φησὶν Εὐμόλπος ἀπόγονος
τρίτος Δηκράτους συνοικήσαντος ἀδελφῇ τῇ Γορ-
γίου. [. . . = P2]

b (A8) CEG 830

Χαρμαντίδου Γοργίας Λεοντίνος.

1

τῆμ μὲν ἀδελφὴν Δηκράτης τῆγ Γοργίου ἔσχεν,
ἐκ ταύτης δ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται Ἴπποκράτης,
Ἴπποκράτους δ' Εὐμόλπος, ὃς εἰκόνα τῆμδ'
ἀνέθηκεν
δισσῶν, παιδείας καὶ φιλίας ἕνεκα.

2

Γοργίου ἀσκῆσαι ψυχὴν ἀρετῆς ἐς ἀγῶνας
οὐδεὶς πω θνητῶν καλλίον' εὔρε τέχνην
οὔ καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος γυάλοις εἰκὼν ἀνάκειται
οὐ πλούτου παράδειγμ', εὐσεβίας δὲ τρόπων.

*The Statue at Olympia (P34)***P34****a** (A7) Pausanias, *Description of Greece*

And [scil. a statue of] Gorgias of Leontini is to be seen:
Eumolpus, the grandson of the Deicrates who married
Gorgias' sister, says that he dedicated the statue in Olym-
pia. [. . .]

b (A8) Inscription from the beginning of the fourth cen-
tury BC found in Olympia

Gorgias of Leontini, son of Charmantides

1

Deicrates received as wife Gorgias' sister;
From her Hippocrates was born to him.
From Hippocrates came Eumolpus, who dedicated
this statue
For the sake of two things, education and
friendship.

2

No mortal ever invented a finer art than Gorgias
To exercise the soul in competitions of excellence.
And it is of him that, in Apollo's hollows, the statue is
dedicated,
A paradigm not of wealth, but of the piety of his
character.

*The Tomb of Isocrates (P35)***P35** (A17) Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X Orat.* 838D

ἦν δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τράπεζα πλησίον, ἔχουσα ποιητὰς τε καὶ τοὺς διδασκάλους αὐτοῦ, ἐν οἷς καὶ Γοργίαν εἰς σφαῖραν ἀστρολογικὴν βλέποντα αὐτὸν τε τὸν Ἴσοκράτην παρεστῶτα.

*The Tomb of Isocrates (P35)***P35** (A17) Ps.-Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators*

There was a tablet near by [scil. Isocrates' tomb] representing poets and his teachers, among whom he had placed Gorgias looking at an astronomical sphere, and Isocrates himself as well, standing next to him.

*Iconography (P36)***P36** (≠ DK) Richter I, pp. 119–20.

GORGIAS [82 DK]

D

Some of Gorgias' Writings in Circulation in the First Century BC (D1)

D1 (< B6) Syr. *In Hermog.* 90.12–16 (cf. Plan. *In Hermog.* 5.548.8–9)

Διονύσιος ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ χαρακτήρων περὶ Γοργίου λέγων τάδε φησί: “δικανικοῖς μὲν οὖν οὐ περιέτυχον αὐτοῦ λόγους, δημηγορικοῖς δὲ ὀλίγοις καὶ τισι καὶ τέχναις, τοῖς δὲ πλείοσιν ἐπιδεικτικοῖς. [. . . = **D28**, **R21**].”

GORGIAS

D

Some of Gorgias' Writings in Circulation in the First Century BC (D1)

D1 (< B6) Syrianus, *Commentary on Hermogenes' On Types of Style*

The Elder Dionysius [scil. of Halicarnassus], speaking about Gorgias in the second book of his *On the Types* [scil. of *Style*], says the following: “I did not come across any judicial speeches of his, but a small number of deliberative ones, and some technical manuals (*tekhnai*), but most of all epideictic speeches [. . .].”¹

¹ Two discourses of Gorgias have been preserved in their entirety—the encomium of Helen (**D24**) and the defense of Palamedes (**D25**)—and one other one in two versions that give us a precise idea of its nature—*On Nonbeing* or *On Nature* (**D26**). For the other titles attested, see **D27**, **R19**, **R20** (*Funeral Oration*); **D27**, **D31**, **D32** (*Olympic Oration*), **D33** (*Encomium for the Eleans*), **P33d** (*Pythian Oration*). For the technical manual(s), see **D5**, **D6**.

The Art of Rhetoric (D2–D23)
Gorgias' Place in the History of Rhetoric (D2–D3)

D2 Philostr. *Vitae soph.*

a (< A1a) 1.1, p. 3.1–3 Kayser

ἤρξε δὲ τῆς μὲν ἀρχαιοτέρας Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐν
 Θετταλοῖς [. . .].

b (< A1) 1.9.1, p. 11.20–27 Kayser

[. . . = **P1**] ἐς ὃν ἀναφέρειν ἠγώμεθα τὴν τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνην, ὥσπερ ἐς πατέρα· εἰ γὰρ τὸν Αἰσχύλον ἐνθυμηθείμεν, ὡς πολλὰ τῇ τραγωδίᾳ ξυνεβάλετο ἐσθῆτί τε αὐτὴν κατασκευάσας καὶ ὀκρίβαντι ὑψηλῶ καὶ ἠρώων εἵδεσιν ἀγγέλοις τε καὶ ἐξαγγέλοις καὶ οἷς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς τε καὶ ὑπὸ σκηνῆς χρῆ πράττειν, τοῦτο ἂν εἶη καὶ ὁ Γοργίας τοῖς ὁμοτέχνους. [. . . = **D22**]

D3 (< A7) Paus. 6.17.8

οὗτος ὁ Γοργίας [. . . = **P2**] λέγεται δὲ ἀνασώσασθαι μελέτην λόγων πρῶτος ἡμελημένην τε ἐς ἅπαν καὶ ἐς λήθην ὀλίγου δέιν¹ ἤκουσαν ἀνθρώπους. [. . . = **P15**]

¹ ὀλίγους δὲ β Phral., corr. Kühn

The Art of Rhetoric (D2–D23)
Gorgias' Place in the History of Rhetoric (D2–D3)

D2 Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

a (< A1a)

The initiator of the older [scil. Sophistic] was Gorgias of Leontini when he was among the Thessalians [. . .].

b (< A1)

[. . .] to whom we must believe that the technique of sophists is traced back as to its father. For if we consider how much Aeschylus contributed to tragedy by furnishing it with costumes, lofty buskins, the kinds of heroes and of messengers from offstage and from backstage, and the actions that must be performed onstage and offstage, this would be what Gorgias was for his colleagues. [. . .]

D3 (< A7) Pausanias, *Description of Greece*

[. . .] this Gorgias [. . .] is said to have been the first to resuscitate the study of speeches, which had been entirely neglected and had almost fallen into oblivion among men. [. . .]

Elements of the Art of Rhetoric (D4–D23)
Gorgias as a Theoretician of Rhetoric (D4–D18)
His Teaching Method (D4)

D4 (< B14) Arist. *SE* 33 183b36–184a1

καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικούς λόγους μισθαρνού-
 ντων ὁμοία τις ἦν ἡ παιδείσιν τῇ Γοργίου πραγμα-
 τείᾳ· λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικούς, οἱ δὲ ἐρωτη-
 τικούς ἐδίδουσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις
 ἐμπίπτειν ᾗθησαν ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους.
 [. . . = **R8**]

¹ οἱ mss.: ὁ Solmsen

His Technical Manual(s) (D5–D6)

D5 (< A14) Quintil. *Inst. or.* 3.1.8

artium autem scriptores antiquissimi Corax et Tisias
 Siculi, quos insecutus est vir eiusdem insulae Gorgias
 Leontinus [. . .].

D6

a (< A3) Diog. Laert. 8.58

[. . .] Τέχνην ἀπολελειπότα.

b (< A4) Diod. Sic. 12.53.2

οὗτος καὶ τέχνας ῥητορικὰς πρῶτος ἐξέευρε [. . . = **P17**].

Elements of the Art of Rhetoric (D4–D23)
Gorgias as a Theoretician of Rhetoric (D4–D18)
His Teaching Method (D4)

D4 (< B14) Aristotle, *Sophistic Refutations*

The instruction given by those who earned money in con-
 nection with eristic discourses was similar to the practice
 of Gorgias. For some supplied rhetorical arguments [or:
 speeches (*logoi*)] to memorize, others interrogatory ones,
 into which both groups supposed that each others' argu-
 ments would most often fall. [. . .]

His Technical Manual(s) (D5–D6)

D5 (< A14) Quintilian, *Training in Oratory*

The most ancient authors of technical manuals (*artes*)
 [scil. of rhetoric] were the Sicilians Corax and Tisias, who
 were followed by a man from the same island, Gorgias of
 Leontini [. . .].

D6

a (< A3) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] who left behind a technical manual (*Tekhnê*).

b (< A4) Diodorus Siculus

He was the first to invent technical manuals (*tekhnai*) of
 rhetoric [. . .].

c (< B6) Syr. *In Hermog.* 90.16 (cf. *Plan. In Hermog.* 5.548.8–9)

[. . . = D1] καὶ τισι καὶ τέχναις [. . . = D1].

*Two Possibly Authentic Terms Deriving from
Gorgias' Characterization of Rhetoric (D7)*

D7 (A27)

a Plat. *Gorg.* 450b

[. . . = D49] χειρουργήματα [. . .] κύρωσις [. . . = D49].

b Olymp. *In Gorg.* 4.9, pp. 36.25–37.5

οἱ περὶ τὰς λέξεις δεινοὶ λαμβάνονται τῶν δύο λέξεων τοῦ τε χειρουργήματος καὶ τῆς κυρώσεως ὡς μὴ λεγομένων κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γὰρ οὐδὲ λέγονται. φαμὲν οὖν ὅτι ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ὁ λέγων, ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνου προφέρει τὰς λέξεις ἐγχωρίουσιν οὐσας· Λεοντίνος γὰρ ἦν.

*Some Central Features of Gorgias'
Rhetorical Theory (D8–D16)
Universality (D8–D10)*

D8 (< A20) Plat. *Gorg.* 447c

[KA.] καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τούτῳ ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιο τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.

c (< B6) Syrianus, *Commentary on Hermogenes' On Types of Style*

[. . .] and some technical manuals (*tekhnai*) [. . .].

*Two Possibly Authentic Terms Deriving from
Gorgias' Characterization of Rhetoric (D7)*

D7 (A27)

a Plato, *Gorgias*

[Gorgias:] [. . .] **manipulation** (*kheirourgêma*) [. . .] **effectuation** (*kurôsis*) [. . .] [cf. D49].

b Olympiodorus, *Commentary on Plato's Gorgias*

Those who are experts on expressions find fault with the two expressions '**manipulation**' (*kheirourgêma*) and '**effectuation**' (*kurôsis*) as not being used [scil. in Attic]. And in fact they are not used. So we say that since it is Gorgias who is speaking, he [i.e. Plato] has him use local expressions; for he was from Leontini.

*Some Central Features of Gorgias'
Rhetorical Theory (D8–D16)
Universality (D8–D10)*

D8 (< A20) Plato, *Gorgias*

[Callicles:] This was one of the main points of his performance; at least, just now he was inviting any of those inside to ask him whatever question they wanted and he said that he would answer them all.

D9 (A19) Plat. *Men.* 70b–c

[ΣΩ.] [. . . = P11] καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἕαν τις τι ἔρηται, ὡσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας, ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὃ τι ἂν τις βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὄτφ οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος.

D10 (< A26) Cic. *Ino.* 1.7

Gorgias Leontinus [. . .] omnibus de rebus oratorem optime posse dicere existimavit.

Improvisation and the 'Opportune Moment'
(kairos) (D11–D12)

D11 Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.1 proem.

a (< A1a) p. 3.19–24 Kayser

[. . .] σχεδίου δὲ λόγου Γοργίας ἄρξαν παρελθὼν γὰρ οὗτος ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων θέατρον ἐθάρρησεν εἰπεῖν “προβάλλετε” καὶ τὸ κινδύνευμα τοῦτο πρῶτος ἀνεφθέγγατο, ἐνδεικνύμενος δήπου πάντα μὲν εἰδέναί, περὶ παντὸς δ’ ἂν εἰπεῖν ἐφίεις τῷ καιρῷ.

b (A24) p. 4.4–6 Kayser

ὁ δὴ Γοργίας ἐπισκώπτων τὸν Προδίκον, ὡς ἔωλά τε καὶ πολλάκις εἰρημένα ἀγορεύοντα, ἐπαφῆκεν ἑαυτὸν τῷ καιρῷ.

D9 (A19) Plato, *Meno*

[Socrates:] [. . .] and he has accustomed you to the habit of answering fearlessly and magniloquently if anyone asks you something, as one might expect for people who are knowledgeable, given that he himself offers himself to any Greek who wishes to ask whatever question they might wish, and that there is no one to whom he does not give an answer.

D10 (< A26) Cicero, *On Invention*

Gorgias of Leontini [. . .] thought that an orator is able to speak best about all subjects.

Improvisation and the 'Opportune Moment'
(kairos) (D11–D12)

D11 Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

a (< A1a)

[. . .] He [scil. seems] to have been the originator of improvised discourse. For when he came to the theater of the Athenians he made so bold as to say, “Propound!” and he was the first to make this challenge publicly, demonstrating evidently thereby that he knew everything and could speak about everything, entrusting himself to the opportune moment (*kairos*).

b (A24)

Gorgias, who made fun of Prodicus for delivering speeches that were stale and had been repeated many times, relied upon the opportune moment (*kairos*).

D12 (B13) Dion. Hal. *Comp. verb.* 12.68

καιρού δὲ οὔτε ῥήτωρ οὐδείς οὔτε φιλόσοφος εἰς τόδε
γε¹ τέχνην ὤρισεν οὐδ' ὅσπερ πρῶτος ἐπεχείρησε
περὶ αὐτοῦ γράφειν Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος οὐδὲν ὃ τι
καὶ λόγου ἄξιον ἔγραψεν.

¹ τόδε γε Usener-Radermacher: τόδε χρόνου FMV: τὸ λέγειν P

Verbal Concision and Abundance (D13–D14)

D13 (A20) Plat. *Gorg.* 449c

[ΓΟ.] καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἑστίν ὧν φημι, μηδένα
ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἔμου τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν.

[ΣΩ.] τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐ-
τοῦ τούτου ποιῆσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας
δὲ εἰς αὐθις.

D14 (cf. A25) Plat. *Phaedr.* 267a–b

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε [. . .], οἳ [. . .] = **D15**
συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μῆκη περὶ πάντων
ἀνηῆρον.

Plausibility (D15)

D15 (cf. A25) Plat. *Phaedr.* 267 a–b

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε [. . .], οἳ πρὸ τῶν
ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τὰ τε αὐτῶν

D12 (B13) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Word Order*

Until the present, no rhetorician and no philosopher has
ever defined the art of the opportune moment (*kairos*)—
not even the man who was the first to try to write about it,
Gorgias of Leontini, wrote anything even worth mention-
ing.

Verbal Concision and Abundance (D13–D14)

D13 (A20) Plato, *Gorgias*

[Gorgias:] And this too again is one of the things I say, that
no one could say the same things more concisely than I
can.

[Socrates:] That is just what I need, Gorgias: make me a
demonstration of this very thing, of verbal concision—ver-
bal abundance we can leave for some other time.

D14 (cf. A25) Plato, *Phaedrus*

[Socrates:] [. . .] Tisias and Gorgias, who [. . .] discovered
concision of speech and infinite lengths on all subjects.

Plausibility (D15)

D15 (cf. A25) Plato, *Phaedrus*

[Socrates:] [. . .] Tisias and Gorgias, who knew that plau-
sibility (*eikota*) should be honored more than truth, and

σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαίνεσθαι
ποιούσιν διὰ ῥώμην λόγον, καινὰ τε ἀρχαίως τὰ τ'
ἐναντία καινῶς [. . . = D14].

Praise and Blame (D16)

D16 (A25) Cic. *Brut.* 12.47 (= Arist. *Τεχνῶν Συναγωγή*,
Frag. 137 Rose)

[. . . **PROT. D18**] quod idem fecisse Gorgiam, cum
singularum rerum laudes vituperationesque conscripsis-
set, quod iudicaret hoc oratoris esse maxime proprium,
rem augere posse laudando vituperandoque rursus adfli-
gere.

Two Recommendations (D17–D18)

D17 (< B17) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.17 1418a32–37

ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν
ἐπαίνοις [. . .]. καὶ ὁ ἔλεγεν Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει
αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, ταῦτό ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγων
Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ, εἶτα Αἰακόν, εἶτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ ἀνδρίαν, ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἢ τοιόνδε ἐστίν.

D18 (B12) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.18 1419b3–5

[. . .] δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθεῖρειν
τῶν ἐναντίων γέλῳ τὸν δὲ γέλῳτα σπουδῆ, ὀρθῶς
λέγων.

who make small things seem large and large ones seem
small by the force of their discourse, and new things old
and the opposite ones new [. . .].

Praise and Blame (D16)

D16 (A25) Aristotle, *Collection of Rhetorical Manuals*, in
Cicero, *Brutus*

[. . .] Gorgias did the same thing [scil. as Protagoras con-
cerning commonplaces]: he wrote down expressions of
praise and blame on particular subjects, since he believed
that it above all belonged to the orator to be able to mag-
nify a thing by praise and inversely to diminish it by blame.

Two Recommendations (D17–D18)

D17 (< B17) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

In epideictic speeches one should make the speech more
varied by introducing expressions of praise [. . .]. And what
Gorgias said, that he was never short of discourse, is the
same thing: for if he is speaking about Achilles, he praises
Peleus, then Aeacus, then the god, and in the same way
manly valor too, which produces this and that or is of such
and such a sort.

D18 (B12) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

[. . .] Gorgias said that we should **destroy our opponents'
seriousness by laughter and their laughter by seri-
ousness**—and he was right.

*Features of Gorgias' Own Style (D19–D22)***D19** Cic. *Orat.*

a (A30) 12.39

tractasse Thrasymachum Chalcedonium primum et Leontinum ferunt Gorgiam [. . .].

b (A32) 52.175

[. . .] paria paribus adiuncta et similiter definita itemque contrariis relata contraria, quae sua sponte, etiamsi id non agas, cadunt plerumque numerose, Gorgias primus invenit [. . . = **R11**].

c (A31) 49.165

in huius concinnitatis consecratione Gorgiam fuisse principem accepimus.

D20 (< A4) Diiod. Sic. 12.53.4

πρῶτος γὰρ ἐχρήσατο τοῖς τῆς λέξεως σχηματισμοῖς περιττοτέρους καὶ τῇ φιλοτεχνίᾳ διαφέρουσιν, ἀντιθέτοις καὶ ἰσοκώλοις καὶ παρίσοις καὶ ὁμοιοτελεύτοις¹ καὶ τισιν ἐτέροις τοιούτοις [. . . = **R12**].

¹ ὁμοτελεύτοις mss., corr. Wess

*Features of Gorgias' Own Style (D19–D22)***D19** Cicero, *The Orator*

a (A30)

They say that Thrasymachus of Chalcedon [cf. **THRAS. D10–D12**] and Gorgias of Leontini were the first to use these figures [scil. antitheses, parallel clauses, etc.] [. . .].

b (A32)

[. . .] parallel clauses, phrases ending with the same sound, antitheses, phrases which, even if one is not aiming at it, on their own most often end with a metrical rhythm—Gorgias was the first to invent these [. . .].

c (A31)

It is reported that Gorgias was the leader in seeking after this symmetry.

D20 (< A4) Diodorus Siculus

For he was the first to use forms of expression that were extraordinary and exceptional for their artistry: antitheses, parallel clauses, balanced expressions, phrases ending with the same sound, and others of this sort [. . .].

D21

a (≠ DK) Dion. Hal. *Imit. Frag.* 4 Aujac [Frag. 8 Usener] in Syrian. In *Hermog.* 1.10.9–16 Rabe

ἄμεινον δὲ τῷ Ἀλικαρνασεὶ Διονυσίῳ ἐπομένους ποιητικὸν μὲν λόγον φάναι τὸν τροπικῇ τε καὶ μεταφορικῇ καὶ διθυραμβώδει συνθήκῃ συντεθειμένον, ὁποῖα ἢ Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος φράσις—πρῶτος γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ὡς φησι Διονύσιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ μιμήσεως δευτέρῳ, τὴν ποιητικὴν καὶ διθυραμβώδη λέξιν εἰς τοὺς πολιτικοὺς εἰσήνεγκε λόγους [. . .].

b (< A29) Dion. Hal. *Imit. Frag.* 5 Aujac [Frag. 9 Usener] in Syrian. In *Hermog.* 1.11.20–23 Rabe

Γοργίας μὲν τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐρμηνείαν μετήνεγκεν εἰς λόγους πολιτικούς, οὐκ ἀξίων ὁμοίον τὸν ῥήτορα τοῖς ἰδιώταις εἶναι [. . .].

D22 (< A1) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.9.2, p. 11.27–32 Kayser

[. . . = D2b] ὀρμῆς τε γὰρ τοῖς σοφισταῖς ἤρξε καὶ παραδοξολογίας καὶ πνεύματος καὶ τοῦ τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλως ἐρμηνεύειν, ἀποστάσεων τε καὶ προσβολῶν, ὑφ' ὧν ὁ λόγος ἡδίων ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται καὶ σοβαρότερος, περιεβάλλετο δὲ καὶ ποιητικὰ ὀνόματα ὑπὲρ κόσμον καὶ σεμνότητος.

D21 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Imitation*, in Syrianus, *Commentary on Hermogenes' On Forms*

a (≠ DK)

It is better, following Dionysius of Halicarnassus, to say that poetic discourse is composed by means of a figural, metaphorical, and quasi-dithyrambic composition, as was the style of Gorgias the orator—for he was the first, as Dionysius says in Book 2 of his *On Imitation*, to introduce the poetic and quasi-dithyrambic style into political speeches [. . .].

b (< A29)

Gorgias transferred the style of poetry to political speeches, for he did not think that the orator is similar to ordinary people.

D22 (< A1) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

[. . .] He was the originator for the sophists of the impulse (*hormē*), the use of paradox, [scil. the sentence spoken in a single] breath, grandeur of expression for great subjects, detached phrases and asyndetic sentences, which make a speech more pleasurable and more impressive, and he used poetic words too for the sake of ornament and solemnity.

'Gorgianic' Expressions (D23)

D23

a (C2) Xen. *Symp.* 2.26 (cf. Athen. *Deipn.* 11 504e)

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ἂν δὲ ἡμῖν οἱ παῖδες μικραῖς κύλιξι πυκνὰ¹ ἐπιψακάζωσιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν Γοργιεῖοις ῥήμασιν εἴπω [. . .].

¹ πυκνὰ Xen.: μικρὰ Athen.

b (≠ DK) Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 5

σχῆμασί τε ποιητικοῖς ἐσχάτην προσβάλλουσιν ἀηδῖαν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς Γοργιεῖοις¹ ἀκαίρως καὶ μειρακιωδῶς ἐναβρύνεται.

¹ Γοργιεῖοις Reiskius: γοργίους MBP: γοργεῖοις Δ

Two Extant Epideictic Speeches (D24–D25)

Encomium of Helen (D24)

D24 (B11)

[Introduction: Praise and blame]

[1] κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία, πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια· τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων ἀκοσμία. ἄνδρα δὲ καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔργον καὶ πόλιν καὶ πρᾶγμα χρῆ τὸ μὲν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου ἐπαίνῳ τιμᾶν, τῷ δὲ ἀναξίῳ μῶμον

'Gorgianic' Expressions (D23)

D23

a (C2) Xenophon, *Symposium*

[Socrates:] [. . .] if the slaves use small cups and constantly 'drizzle out' the wine for us (so that I too may speak with Gorgianic expressions) [. . .].

b (≠ DK) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Demosthenes*

He [scil. Plato] prides himself inappropriately and immaturely on his poetic figures that produce the utmost displeasure, and especially on the Gorgianic ones.

Two Extant Epideictic Speeches (D24–D25)

Encomium of Helen (D24)

D24 (B11)

[Introduction: Praise and blame]

[1] An ornament (*kosmos*) for a city is manliness; for a body, beauty; for a soul, wisdom; for an action, excellence; for a speech (*logos*), truth; the opposites of these things are 'lack of ornament' (*akosmia*). A man and a woman, a speech and a deed, a city and an action—one that is worthy of praise one must honor with praise, and on one that is

¹ καὶ A: om. β

ἐπιθεῖναι ἴση γὰρ ἀμαρτία καὶ ἀμαθία μέμφεσθαι τε
τὰ ἐπαινετὰ καὶ ἐπαινεῖν τὰ μωμητὰ.

[Praise of Helen]

[2] τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέξαι τε τὸ δέον ὀρθῶς καὶ
ἐλέγξαι¹ τοὺς μεμφομένους Ἑλένην, γυναῖκα περὶ ἧς
ὁμόφωνος καὶ ὁμόψυχος² γέγονεν ἢ τε τῶν ποιητῶν
ἀκουσάντων³ πίστις ἢ τε τοῦ ὀνόματος φήμη, δ⁴ τῶν
συμφορῶν μνήμη γέγονεν.

ἐγὼ δὲ βούλομαι λογισμὸν τινα τῷ λόγῳ δοῦς τὴν
μὲν κακῶς ἀκούουσαν παῖσαι τῆς αἰτίας, τοὺς δὲ
μεμφομένους ψευδομένους ἐπιδείξαι καὶ δείξαι⁵ τῆς ἀλη-
θῆς καὶ⁶ παῖσαι τῆς ἀμαθίας.

¹ post ἐλέγξαι lac. stat. Dobree ² sic A: ὁμόψυχος καὶ
ὁμόφωνος β ³ locus suspectus: post ποιητῶν lac. stat.
Dobree: an ἀκουσάντων delendum vel τῶν κακισάντων scriben-
dum? ⁴ ὁ A: om. β ⁵ ἐπιδείξας καὶ δείξας Blass
⁶ καὶ Laskaris: ἢ mss.

[3] ὅτι μὲν οὖν φύσει καὶ γένει τὰ πρῶτα τῶν πρώτων
ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἢ γυνὴ περὶ ἧς ὅδε ὁ λόγος, οὐκ
ἄδηλον οὐδὲ ὀλίγοις. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς μητρὸς μὲν Λή-
δας, πατρὸς δὲ τοῦ μὲν γενομένου θεοῦ, τοῦ δὲ λεγο-
μένου¹ θνητοῦ, Τυνδάρεω καὶ Διός, ὧν ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ
εἶναι ἔδοξεν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φάναί ἠλέγχθη, καὶ ἦν ὁ μὲν
ἀνδρῶν κράτιστος ὁ δὲ πάντων τύραννος.

¹ τοῦ δὲ λεγομένου δζ: τοῦ δὲ γενομένου γ: λεγομένου
δὲ A

unworthy one must impose blame. For to blame what
is praiseworthy and to praise what is blameworthy are
equally a mistake and ignorance.

[Praise of Helen]

[2] It belongs to the same man both to say (*lexai*) cor-
rectly what is necessary and to refute (*elenxai*) those who
blame Helen, a woman concerning whom both the cre-
dence given to poets †having heard†¹ and the reputation
of her name, which has become a memorial of misfor-
tunes, have been in agreement with one another, both in
voice (*homophōnos*) and in thought (*homopsukhos*).

As for me, I wish, by providing a certain argumentation
(*logismos*) to my speech (*logos*), to stop the blame for
her who is being defamed, to demonstrate (*epideixai*) that
those who blame her are liars, to show (*deixai*) the truth,
and to stop their ignorance.

¹ Despite various attempts to defend the transmitted text
(suggesting that what the poets 'hear' is the divinity that inspires
them), it seems indeed to be corrupt.

[3] That the woman who is the subject of the present
speech was by nature and lineage the very first of the very
first of men and women—this is not at all unclear, and not
only to a few people. For it is clear that her mother was
Leda, her real (*genomenou*) father a god, her alleged (*le-
gomenou*) one a mortal, Tyndarus and Zeus, of whom the
one was thought to be [scil. her father] because he was,
while the other was refuted because he claimed to be;
and the one was the most powerful of men, the other the
sovereign over all.

[4] ἐκ τοιούτων δὲ¹ γενομένη ἔσχε τὸ ἰσόθεον κάλλος, ὁ λαβοῦσα καὶ οὐ λαβοῦσα ἔσχε· πλείστας δὲ πλείστοις ἐπιθυμίας ἔρωτος ἐνεργάσατο, ἐνὶ δὲ σώματι πολλὰ σώματα συνήγαγεν ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ μεγάλοις μεγάλα² φρονούντων, ὧν οἱ μὲν πλοῦτου μεγέθη, οἱ δὲ εὐγενείας παλαιᾶς εὐδοξίαν, οἱ δὲ ἀλκῆς οἰκείας³ εὐεξίαν, οἱ δὲ σοφίας ἐπικτήτου δύναμιν ἔσχον· καὶ ἦκον ἅπαντες ὑπ' ἔρωτός τε φιλονίκου φιλοτιμίας τε ἀνικητού.

¹ δὲ β: om. A ² μεγάλα β: μέγα A

³ οἰκείας β: ιδίας A

[The topic: Defense of Helen]

[5] ὅστις μὲν οὖν καὶ δι' ὅτι καὶ ὅπως ἀπέπλησε τὸν ἔρωτα τὴν Ἑλένην λαβῶν, οὐ λέξω· τὸ γὰρ τοῖς εἰδόνσιν ἂ¹ ἴσασι λέγειν πίστιν μὲν ἔχει, τέρψιν δὲ οὐ φέρει. τὸν χρόνον δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸν τότε νῦν ὑπερβὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος λόγου προβήσομαι, καὶ προθήσομαι τὰς αἰτίας, δι' ἃς εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης εἰς τὴν Τροίαν στόλον.

¹ ἂ β: καὶ A

[Plausible reasons for why she went to Troy]

[6] ἥ γὰρ Τύχης βουλῆμασι καὶ θεῶν βουλευμάσι καὶ Ἀνάγκης ψηφίσμασιν¹ ἔπραξεν ἂ ἔπραξεν, ἥ βίᾳ ἀρπασθείσα, ἥ λόγοις πεισθείσα <, ἥ ἔρωτος ἠττηθείσα>.²

[4] Born of parents of this sort, she obtained beauty equal to the gods, which she obtained receiving (*labousa*) and not hiding (*lathousa*) it. And she instilled in very many people very many longings for love, and by means of one body she brought together many bodies of men who had great ambitions about great matters, of whom the ones possessed an abundance of wealth, others renown for ancient nobility, others the vigor of their innate strength, others the power of acquired wisdom. And they all came, driven by the love that desires victory (*erōtos philonikou*) and by the invincible desire for honor (*philotimias anikētou*).

[The topic: Defense of Helen]

[5] Well then, who it was who fulfilled his love by taking Helen, and why and how, I shall not say. For to tell those who know what they know possesses credibility but does not provide pleasure. But jumping now in my speech over the time back then, I shall proceed (*probēsomai*) to the beginning of the coming argument (*logos*) and I shall set forth (*prothēsomai*) the plausible causes for which the voyage of Helen to Troy took place.

[Plausible reasons for why she went to Troy]

[6] For it was either by the designs (*boulēmasti*) of Fortune, the plans (*bouleumasti*) of the gods, and the decrees of Necessity that she did what she did, or because she was seized by force, or persuaded by words <, or overcome by love>.

¹ βουλῆμασι . . . βουλευμάσι . . . ψηφίσμασιν A: βουλήματι . . . κελεύσματι . . . ψηφίσματι β

² <ἥ ἔρωτος ἠττηθείσα> vel <ἥ ἔρωτι δαμασθείσα> nos: <ἥ ἔρωτι ἀλοῦσα> Laskaris: <ἥ ὄψει ἐρασθείσα> Immisch

[1. The gods]

εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἄξιος αἰτιᾶσθαι ὁ αἰτιώμενος· θεοῦ γὰρ προθυμίαν ἀνθρωπίνῃ προμηθία ἀδύνατον κωλύειν. πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τὸ κρείσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἥσσονος κωλύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄγεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κρείσσον ἡγείσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἥσσον ἔπεσθαι. θεὸς δ' ἀνθρώπου κρείσσον καὶ βία καὶ σοφία καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ οὖν τῇ Τύχῃ καὶ τῷ² θεῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετέον, καὶ³ τὴν Ἑλένην τῆς δυσκλείας ἀπολυτέον.

¹ εἰ Reiske: ἡ mss. ² τῷ A: τῇ β

³ καὶ Reiske: ἡ mss.: del. Dobree

[2. Violence]

[7] εἰ δὲ βία ἤρπασθη καὶ ἀνόμως ἐβιάσθη καὶ ἀδίκως ὑβρίσθη, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ <μὲν>¹ ἄρπασας ὡς² ὑβρίσας ἠδίκησεν, ἡ δὲ ἄρπασθείσα ὡς ὑβρισθείσα ἐδυστύχησεν. ἄξιός οὖν ὁ μὲν ἐπιχειρήσας βάρβαρος βάρβαρον ἐπιχείρημα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ νόμῳ καὶ ἔργῳ λόγῳ μὲν αἰτίας, νόμῳ δὲ ἀτιμίας,³ ἔργῳ δὲ ζημίας τυχεῖν· ἡ δὲ βιασθείσα καὶ τῆς πατρίδος στερηθείσα καὶ τῶν φίλων ὀρφανισθείσα πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἐληθθεῖη μᾶλλον ἢ κακολογηθεῖη; ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔδρασε δεινά, ἡ δὲ ἔπαθε· δίκαιον οὖν τὴν μὲν οἰκτίρειν, τὸν δὲ μισῆσαι.

¹ <μὲν> Blass

² ὡς Blass: ἡ mss.

[1. The gods]

If then it was for the first reason, then the one who is responsible (*aitiōmenos*) deserves to be accused (*aitiasthai*). For to prevent a god's vehemence (*prothumia*) is impossible for human forethought (*promētheia*). For by nature the stronger is not prevented by the weaker, but the weaker is ruled and led (*arkhesthai kai agesthai*) by the stronger, and the stronger directs, the weaker follows. But a god is stronger than a human in force, in intelligence, and in all other respects. So if the responsibility is to be ascribed to Fortune and to a god, Helen too is to be freed from her ill repute.

[2. Violence]

[7] But if she was seized by force and was overpowered lawlessly and was outraged unjustly, it is clear that the man who seized her committed an injustice, as he outraged her, while she who was seized suffered misfortune, as she was outraged. So the barbarian who undertook an undertaking that was barbarian with regard to speech and law and deed deserves to meet with an accusation with regard to speech, with dishonor with regard to law, and with punishment with regard to deeds; while she who was seized and deprived of fatherland and robbed of her dear ones—would it not be plausible for her to be pitied rather than defamed? For he committed terrible deeds, while she suffered them. So it is just to feel sorry for her and to feel hatred for him.

³ λόγῳ καὶ νόμῳ . . . λόγῳ μὲν αἰτίας, νόμῳ δὲ ἀτιμίας
A: νόμῳ καὶ λόγῳ . . . νόμῳ μὲν ἀτιμίας, λόγῳ δὲ αἰτίας β

[3. Speech]

[8] εἰ δὲ λόγος ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολύσασθαι ὧδε· λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θεϊότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ· δύναται γὰρ καὶ φόβον παῦσαι καὶ λύπην ἀφελεῖν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ ἔλεον ἐπαυξήσαι. ταῦτα δὲ ὡς οὕτως ἔχει δείξω [9] δεῖ δὲ καὶ δόξῃ δείξαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι·

[Kinds of speech: a. Poetry]

τὴν ποίησιν ἅπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὀνομάζω λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον· ἥς τοὺς¹ ἀκούοντας εἰσήλθε καὶ φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολύδακρυς καὶ πόθος φιλοπενθής,² ἐπ' ἄλλοτριῶν τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωματίων εὐτυχίας καὶ δυσπραγίας³ ἴδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ ψυχὴ.

¹ ἥς τοὺς ε: ἡ ὡς vel ἥς cett.

² πόθος φιλοπενθής A: φίλος vel ζήλος et φιλοπενθής vel φιλοπαθής vel ζηλοπαθής cett. ³ εὐτυχίας καὶ δυσπραγίας A: εὐτυχίας καὶ δυσπραγίας β

φέρει δὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ἀπ' ἄλλου μεταστῶ λόγου.

[b. Persuasion]

[10] αἰ γὰρ ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπιφαίνονται¹ ἐπαγωγὸι ἡδονῆς, ἀπαγωγὸι² λύπης γίνονται· συγγνωμένη γὰρ τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἐπιφάνειας ἔθελε καὶ ἔπεισε καὶ μετέστησεν αὐτὴν³ γοητεία. γοητείας δὲ

[3. Speech]

[8] But if it was speech (*logos*) that persuaded and deceived her soul, it is not difficult to make a defense with regard to this too and to secure acquittal from the accusation in the following way. Speech is a great potentate that by means of an extremely tiny and entirely invisible body performs the most divine deeds. For it is able to stop fear, to remove grief, to instill joy, and to increase pity. I shall demonstrate that this is so; [9] but it is necessary to show this to the listeners by opinion too.

[Kinds of speech: a. Poetry]

I consider all poetry to be speech (*logos*) that possesses meter, and I give it this name. Those who hear it are penetrated by a terribly fearful shuddering, a much-weeping pity, and a yearning that desires grief, and on the basis of the fortunes and misfortunes of other people's actions and bodies their soul is affected, by an affection of its own, by the medium of words.

But now I shall pass from one argument (*logos*) to another one.

[b. Persuasion]

[10] For incantations divinely inspired by means of speeches (*logoi*) are bringers of pleasure and removers of pain. For the power of an incantation, when it is conjoined with the opinion of the soul, beguiles it, persuades it, and transforms it by sorcery. For two arts have been discov-

¹ ἐπιφαίνονται A: ἡδοναὶ β Lex.Vind.
γωγοὶ A

² ἀπαγωγὸι β: ἐπα-

³ αὐτὴν A: om. β

καὶ μαγείας δισσαὶ τέχνηαι εὐρηται, αἱ εἰσι ψυχῆς ἀμαρτήματα καὶ δόξης ἀπατήματα. [11] ὅσοι δὲ ὅσους περὶ ὄσων καὶ ἐπεισαν καὶ πείθουσι δὲ ψευδῆ λόγον πλάσαντες. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πάντες περὶ πάντων εἶχον τῶν <τε>⁴ παροιχομένων μνήμην τῶν τε παρόντων <ἐννοιαν>⁵ τῶν τε μελλόντων πρόνοιαν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως ὁμοίος ἦν⁶ ὁ λόγος, ἦ⁷ τὰ νῦν γε⁸ οὔτε μνησθῆναι τὸ παροιχόμενον οὔτε σκέψασθαι τὸ παρὸν οὔτε μαντεύσασθαι τὸ μέλλον εὐπόρως ἔχει ὥστε περὶ τῶν πλείστων οἱ πλείστοι τὴν δόξαν σύμβουλον τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχονται. ἡ δὲ δόξα σφαλερὰ καὶ ἀβέβαιος οὔσα σφαλεραῖς καὶ ἀβεβαίαις εὐτυχίαις⁹ περιβάλλει τοὺς αὐτῇ χρωμένους.

⁴ <τε> Blass ⁵ <ἐννοιαν> Reiske

⁶ ἦν A: ὦν β ⁷ ἦ nos: ἦ mss.: οἷς Diels

⁸ ὁμοίος ὦν ὁ λόγος ἡκάστα: νῦν δὲ Blass

⁹ εὐτυχίαις Am² Lex.Vind.: ἀτυχίαις cett.

[Preliminary conclusion regarding Helen]

[12] τίς οὖν αἰτία κωλύει καὶ τὴν Ἑλένην ἄμνος ἦλθεν†¹ οὐ νέαν οὔσαν, ὁμοίως ἂν² ὥσπερ εἰ ἄβιατῆριον†³ βία ἠρπάσθη,†⁴ ἰτὸ γὰρ τῆς πειθοῦς ἐξῆν ὁ δὲ νοῦς καίτοι εἰ ἀνάγκη ὁ εἰδὼς ἔξει μὲν οὖν, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει†.⁵ λόγος γὰρ ὁ τὴν ψυχὴν⁶

¹ locum corruptum del. Laskaris: ἄμνος εἰσελθεῖν Untersteiner: an ἄμνος θάλλειν?

² ὁμοίως ἂν οὐ νέαν οὔσαν mss., transp. nos

³ βιατῆριον Aγδ: βιαστήριον M: βατήριον ζ: an θηρίον vel ἀναβατήριον? ⁴ ἠρπάσθη Aβ: ἀρπασθῆναι Laskaris

ered, those of sorcery and of magic, which are errors (*hamartēmata*) of the soul and deceptions (*apatēmata*) of opinion. [11] Whoever has persuaded, and also persuades, whomever about whatever [scil. does so] by fabricating a false discourse (*logos*). For if all men, with regard to all things, had memory of the ones that have passed by, <understanding> of the ones that are present, and forethought for the ones still to come, then a similar speech would not be similarly [scil. deceptive], as things are in fact at present, insofar as it is easy neither to remember what has passed by nor to examine what is present nor to divine what is to come. So that about most things most people furnish themselves with opinion as a counselor for the soul. But opinion, being slippery and unstable, involves those who use it in slippery and unstable successes.

[Preliminary conclusion regarding Helen]

[12] So what reason prevents Helen too from †. . . † even though she was not young, in the same way as if she had been seized by force †. . . †¹ † For the part belonging to persuasion was permitted, and the mind, even if of necessity the one who knows will possess it, it still has the same power†. For speech that persuades the soul constrains the

¹ The beginning of this paragraph presents various textual corruptions. The general meaning of the first sentence can be guessed at; the second one is irremediably corrupt (we provide an indicative translation of its transmitted words).

⁵ locus valde corruptus nondum sanatus

⁶ ὁ τὴν ψυχὴν Laskaris: τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ β: ψυχὴν ὁ A

πέισας, ἣν ἔπεισεν, ἠνάγκασε καὶ πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ συναίνεσαι τοῖς ποιουμένοις. ὁ μὲν οὖν πέισας ὡς ἀναγκάσας ἀδικεῖ, ἡ δὲ πεισθείσα ὡς ἀναγκασθείσα τῷ⁷ λόγῳ μάτην ἀκούει κακῶς.

⁷ τῷ A: om. β

[Generalization: Other domains of persuasion]

[13] ὅτι δ' ἡ πειθῶ προσιούσα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐτυπώσατο ὅπως ἐβούλετο, χρῆ μαθεῖν πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς τῶν μετεωρολόγων λόγους, οἷτινες δόξαν ἀντὶ δόξης τὴν μὲν ἀφελόμενοι τὴν δ' ἐνεργασάμενοι τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα¹ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης² ὄμμασιν ἐποίησαν· δεύτερον δὲ τοὺς ἀναγκαίους³ διὰ λόγων ἀγῶνας, ἐν οἷς εἰς λόγος πολὺν ὄχλον ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε τέχνη γραφεῖς, οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ λεχθείς· τρίτον δὲ⁴ φιλοσόφων λόγων ἀμίλλας, ἐν αἷς δείκνυται καὶ γνώμης τάχος ὡς εὐμετάβολον ποιοῦν τὴν τῆς δόξης πίστιν.

¹ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα A: ἄδηλα καὶ ἄπιστα β ² δόξης
mss.: ψυχῆς Cāffaro ³ ἀναγκαίους mss.: ἀγοραῖους ed.
Aldina ⁴ δὲ Am⁴: om. cett.

[Explanation: How persuasion works]

[14] τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει ἢ τε τοῦ λόγου δύναμις πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τάξιν ἢ τε τῶν φαρμάκων τάξιν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῶν φαρμάκων ἄλλους ἄλλα χυμοὺς¹ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐξάγει, καὶ τὰ μὲν νόσου τὰ δὲ βίου παύει, οὕτω καὶ τῶν

one [i.e. soul] that it has persuaded both to obey what is said and to approve what is done. So he who has persuaded commits injustice by exercising constraint, while she who has been persuaded is defamed in vain, for she was constrained by speech (*logos*).

[Generalization: Other domains of persuasion]

[13] And as for the fact that persuasion, joining together with speech (*logos*), also shapes the soul as it wishes: it is necessary to learn first the arguments (*logoi*) of those who study the heavens, who, abolishing and establishing one opinion instead of another, have made things that are unbelievable and unclear appear to the eyes of opinion; second, contentions that constrain by means of speeches (*logoi*), in which one speech (*logos*), written with artistry, not spoken with truth, delights and persuades a great crowd; third, contests of philosophical arguments (*logoi*), in which it is revealed that rapidity of thought too makes the conviction of an opinion easily changeable.

[Explanation: How persuasion works]

[14] The power of speech (*logos*) has the same relation (*logos*) with the arrangement (*taxis*) of the soul as the arrangement (*taxis*) of drugs has with the nature of bodies. For just as some drugs draw some fluids out of the body, and others other ones, and some stop an illness and others

¹ ἄλλα χυμοὺς Am⁴: ἀλλαχοῦ cett.

λόγων οἱ μὲν ἐλύπησαν, οἱ δὲ ἔτρεψαν,² οἱ δὲ ἐφόβησαν, οἱ δὲ εἰς θάρσος κατέστησαν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, οἱ δὲ πειθοὶ τιμὴν κακῆ τῆν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν.³

[15] καὶ ὅτι μὲν, εἰ λόγῳ ἐπέισθη, οὐκ ἠδίκησεν ἀλλ' ἠτύχησεν, εἴρηται

² ἔτρεψαν β: ἔτρεψαν Α ³ ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν β: ἐξεφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐγοήτευσαν Α

[4. Love]

τὴν δὲ τετάρτην αἰτίαν τῷ τετάρτῳ λόγῳ διέξιμι. εἰ γὰρ ἔρωσ ἦν ὁ ταῦτα πάντα¹ πράξας, οὐ χαλεπῶς διαφεύξεται τὴν τῆς λεγομένης γεγονέναι ἀμαρτίας αἰτίαν.

¹ πάντα Α: om. β

[The power of sight, the cause of love]

ἀ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν, ἔχει¹ φύσιν οὐχ ἦν ἡμεῖς θέλομεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἕκαστον² ἔτυχε διὰ δὲ τῆς ὀψεως ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς τρόποις τυπούται.

[16] αὐτίκα γὰρ ὅταν πολέμια σώματα³ πολέμιον ἐπὶ πολεμίους ὀπλίση⁴ κόσμον χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου, τοῦ μὲν ἀλεξητήριον τοῦ δὲ προβλήματα, εἰ θεάσθηται⁵ ἡ ὄψις, ἐταράχθη καὶ ἐτάραξε τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥστε πολλὰ κινδύνου τοῦ μέλλοντος <ὡς>⁶ ὄντος φεύγουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες. ἰσχυρὰ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια⁷ τοῦ νόου⁸ διὰ τὸν

¹ ἔχει Α' om. β ² ἕκαστος mss., corr. Bekker

³ καὶ post σώματα mss., del. Blass

stop life, in the same way some speeches (*logoi*) cause pain, others pleasure, others fear, others dispose listeners to courage, others drug and bewitch the soul by some evil persuasion.

[15] And it has now been said that if she was persuaded by speech (*logos*) she did not commit injustice (*ēdikēsen*) but suffered misfortune (*ētukhēsen*).

[4. Love]

But I shall expound the fourth reason in a fourth argument (*logos*). For if it was love that did all this, she will be acquitted without difficulty of the accusation of being the cause of the fault being discussed here [or: the alleged fault].

[The power of sight, the cause of love]

For whatever we see does not have the nature that we wish, but the one that each one happens to possess. And by means of sight the soul is shaped even in its basic ways of being.

[16] For immediately, whenever warring bodies arm themselves against warriors with a warring equipment of bronze and iron, of the one defensive, of the other offensive, if sight observes them, it is disturbed and it disturbs the soul, so that often they are dumbstruck and flee a coming danger <as if> it were a present one. For the truth

⁴ ὀπλίση VZ^{PC} Am⁴ La: ὀπλίσει AγX^{Co}

⁵ προβλήματα εἰ θεάσθηται Baiter-Sauppe: προβλήματα εἰ θεάσεται mss.: προβλήματα εἰ θεάσαιο Am¹: προβλήμα, τῆ θεῶ θεάσθηται Diano: loc. corruptum iud. Diels

⁶ <ὡς> Diels

⁷ ἀλήθεια mss.: συνήθεια Diels

⁸ νόου nos: νόμου mss.: πόνου Donadi

φόβον εἰσφκίσθη⁹ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως, ἣτις ἐλθούσα ἐποίησεν ἀμελῆσαι¹⁰ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ διὰ τὸν νόμον κρινομένου καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ διὰ τὴν δίκην¹¹ γινομένου. [17] ἤδη δέ τινες ἰδόντες φοβερά καὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἐν τῷ παρόντι χρόνῳ φρονήματος ἐξέστησαν οὕτως ἀπέσβεσε καὶ ἐξήλασεν ὁ φόβος τὸ νόημα. πολλοὶ δὲ ματαίοις πόνοις καὶ δειναῖς νόσοις καὶ δυσίατοις¹² μαρίαῖς περιέπεσον οὕτως εἰκόνας τῶν ὀρωμένων πραγμάτων ἢ ὄψις ἐνέγραψεν ἐν τῷ φρονήματι. καὶ τὰ μὲν δειματοῦντα πολλὰ μὲν παραλείπεται, ὅμοια δ' ἐστὶ τὰ παραλειπόμενα οἷάπερ <τὰ>¹³ λεγομένα.

⁹ εἰσφκίσθη mss.: ἐξφκίσθη Canter

¹⁰ ἀμελῆσαι Canter: ἀσμενίσαι mss. ¹¹ νίκην Blass

¹² ματαίοις πόνοις καὶ δειναῖς νόσοις A: ματαίαις νόσοις καὶ δεινοῖς πόνοις β ¹³ <τὰ> Am⁴ La

[18] ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ γραφεῖς ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν χρωμάτων καὶ σωμάτων ἐν σώμα καὶ σχῆμα τελείως ἀπεργάσωνται, τέρπουσι τὴν ὄψιν ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀνδριάντων ποίησις καὶ ἢ τῶν ἀγαλλμάτων ἐργασία νόσον¹ ἠδέϊαν παρέσχετο τοῖς ὄμμασιν. οὕτω τὰ μὲν λυπεῖν τὰ δὲ ποθεῖν² πέφυκε τὴν ὄψιν. πολλὰ δὲ πολλοῖς πολλῶν ἔρωτα καὶ πόθον ἐνεργάζεται³ πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων.⁴

¹ νόσον Dobree: ὄσον mss.: θέαν Keil ² ποθεῖν <ποιεῖν> Blass ³ ἐνεργάζεται β: ἐργάζεται A

⁴ καὶ σωμάτων A: om. β

of their thought (*noos*)¹ establishes itself within them as forceful by the fear that comes from sight, which, when it arrives, makes people neglect both what is fine as judged by the law (*dia ton nomon krinomenou*) and what is good as produced by justice (*dia ten dikên ginomenou*). [17] And it has already happened that some people, seeing frightening things, have been driven out from their present mind (*phronêma*) in the present moment: in this way fear has extinguished and expelled thought (*noêma*). And many have fallen victim to groundless sufferings, terrible diseases, and incurable madneses. Thus sight inscribes within thought (*phronêma*) the images of things seen. Many of the things that cause dread are omitted [scil. by me here], but the ones that are omitted are similar to the ones mentioned.

¹ Diels emended to the 'habit of the law.'

[18] Moreover, whenever painters perfectly depict a single body and form on the basis of many colors and bodies, they cause pleasure for sight. And the sculpting of statues of men and the manufacture of statues of gods provide a pleasurable sickness for the eyes. So by nature some things make sight feel pain and it desires others. But many things instill in many people love and desire for many things and bodies.

[Application to the case of Helen]

[19] εἰ οὖν τῷ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου σώματι τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης ὄμμα¹ ἤσθεν προθυμίαν καὶ ἀμιλλαν ἔρωτος τῇ ψυχῇ παρέδωκε, τί θαυμαστόν; ὃς εἰ μὲν θεὸς <ὦν ἔχει>² θεῶν θείαν δύναμιν,³ πῶς ἂν ὁ ἥσσωσιν εἴη τοῦτον ἀπώσασθαι καὶ ἀμύνασθαι δυνατός; εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὡς ἀμάρτημα μεμπτέον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀτύχημα νομιστέον· ἦλθε γάρ, ὡς ἦλθε, Τύχης⁴ ἀγρευμασιν, οὐ γνώμης βουλευμασιν, καὶ ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαις, οὐ τέχνης παρασκευαῖς.

¹ ὄμμα δξ: σώμα Ay ² <ὦν ἔχει> Blass ³ <ἔχει>
post δύναμιν Donadi ⁴ τύχης Reiske: ψυχῆς mss.

[Conclusion]

[20] πῶς οὖν χρῆ δίκαιον ἡγήσασθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης μῶμον, ἥτις εἴτ' ἐρασθεῖσα¹ εἴτε λόγῳ πεισθεῖσα εἴτε βία ἀρπασθεῖσα εἴτε ὑπὸ θείας ἀνάγκης ἀνακασθεῖσα ἔπραξεν ἢ ἔπραξε,² πάντως διαφεύγει τὴν αἰτίαν;

[21] ἀφείλον τῷ λόγῳ δύσκειαν γυναικός, ἐνέμεινα τῷ νόμῳ ὃν ἐθέμην ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου ἐπειράθην καταλῦσαι μῶμον ἀδικίαν καὶ δόξης ἀμαθίαν, ἐβουλήθην γράψαι τὸν λόγον Ἑλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον, ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον.

¹ <ᾧψει> ἐρασθεῖσα Immisch
² ἢ ἔπραξε A: om. β

[Application to the case of Helen]

[19] So if Helen's eye, delighted by Alexander's body, transmitted to her soul an eagerness and a striving for love, what is surprising in this? But if it [i.e. love], <being> a god, <possesses> the divine power of gods, how could someone who is weaker be able to repel it and defend himself? Whereas if it is a human malady (*nosēma*) and an ignorance (*agnoēma*) of the soul, it should not be blamed as a fault (*hamartēma*) but considered as a misfortune (*atukhēma*). For it came, as it came, by the huntings of Fortune (*Tukhēs agreumasin*), not by the plans of thought (*gnōmēs bouleumasin*), and by the constraints of love, not by the preparations of art.

[Conclusion]

[20] How then ought one consider the blame for Helen as being just, given that, whether she did what she did because she had fallen in love or had been persuaded by speech (*logos*) or had been seized with force or had been constrained by divine constraint, on every count she is acquitted of the accusation?

[21] By my speech I have removed the ill repute of a woman, I have abided by the norm that I established at the beginning of my speech. I have attempted to annul the injustice of blame and the ignorance of opinion, I wished to write a speech that would be an encomium for Helen and an amusement for me.

Defense of Palamedes (D25)

D25 (B11a)

[Introduction: Death and dishonor]

[1] ἡ μὲν κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία κρίσις οὐ περὶ θανάτου¹ θάνατον μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις φανερῶ τῇ ψήφῳ πάντων κατεψηφίσαστο τῶν θνητῶν, ἥπερ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο· περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀτιμίας καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ὁ κίνδυνός ἐστι, πότερά με χρῆ² δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν ἢ μετ' ὀνειδῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῆς αισχίστης αἰτίας βιαίως ἀποθανεῖν. [2] δισσωὼν δὲ τούτων ὄντων τοῦ μὲν ὄλου³ ὑμεῖς κρατεῖτε, τοῦ δ' ἐγώ, τῆς μὲν δίκης ἐγώ, τῆς δὲ βίας ὑμεῖς. ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν γὰρ με δυνήσεσθε βουλόμενοι ῥαδίως· κρατεῖτε γὰρ καὶ τούτων, ἃν οὐδὲν ἐγὼ τυγχάνω κρατῶν.

¹ post θανάτου hab. ms. γίνεσθαι, del. Blass: γίγνεται ed. Aldina
² post χρῆ <δικαίως τυχόντα ἀπολογίας> Diels
³ ὄλου del. Reiske

[The accuser, Odysseus]

[3] εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ κατήγορος Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ σαφῶς ἐπιστάμενος προδιδόντα με τὴν Ἑλλάδα τοῖς βαρβάροις ἢ δοξάζων γ' ἀμῆ¹ οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχειν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν κατηγορίαν δι' εὐνοίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἄριστος ἂν ἦν ὁ ἀνὴρ· πῶς γὰρ <οὔχ>³, ὅς γε σώζει πατρίδα, τοκέας, τὴν πᾶσαν Ἑλλάδα, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτους τὸν ἀδικούντα τιμωρούμενος; εἰ δὲ φθόνῳ ἢ κακοτεχνίᾳ ἢ πανουργίᾳ συνέθηκε ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ὥσπερ δι'

Defense of Palamedes (D25)

D25 (B11a)

[Introduction: Death and dishonor]

[1] Accusation and defense are not a judgment regarding death. For nature, by a manifest decree, has condemned to death all mortals on the day that they were born. What is at stake is dishonor and honor, whether I must die justly or must die violently, from the gravest allegations and the most shameful accusation. [2] Since these [scil. alternatives] are two in number, you have the power over the whole of the one, and I over the other: I over justice, you over violence. For, if you wish, you will easily be able to kill me: for you have power over those things too over which I happen to have no power at all.

[The accuser, Odysseus]

[3] If then it is because of his goodwill toward Greece that my accuser, Odysseus, has made the accusation—either knowing clearly that I was betraying Greece to the barbarians, or supposing somehow that this was how things were—then he would be the best of men. For how could it be otherwise, if he is saving his fatherland, his parents, and all Greece, and that furthermore he is punishing a man who has committed injustice? But if he has fashioned this accusation out of jealousy, subterfuge, or wickedness, just as for those reasons he would be the most excellent (*krat-*

¹ δοξάζων γ' ἀμῆ Diels: δοξάζοντα με ms.
² ὁ del. Blass
³ <οὔχ> Stephanus

ἐκεῖνα κράτιστος ἂν ἦν ἀνὴρ, οὕτω διὰ ταῦτα κάκι-
στος ἀνὴρ.

[Disposition]

[4] περὶ τούτων λέγων¹ πόθεν ἄρξωμαι, τί δὲ πρῶτον
εἶπω; ποῦ δὲ τῆς ἀπολογίας τράπωμαι; αἰτία γὰρ ἀν-
επίδεικτος ἔκπληξις ἐμφανῆ ἐμποιεῖ, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἔκ-
πληξις ἀπορεῖν ἀνάγκη τῷ λόγῳ, ἂν μὴ τι παρ' αὐτῆς
τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἀνάγκης μάθω, διδα-
σκάλων ἐπικινδυνωτέρων ἢ ποριμωτέρων τυχῶν.

¹ λέγων nos: ἐγὼ δὲ ms.: δ' ἐγὼ Reiske: δὲ λέγων Blass

[5] ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ σαφῶς <εἰδῶς>¹ ὁ κατήγορος κατ-
ηγορεῖ μου, σαφῶς οἶδα: σύννοια γὰρ ἐμαντῷ σαφῶς
οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον πεποιηκῶς· οὐδὲ οἶδ'² ὅπως ἂν εἰδέη
τις ὄν³ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον. εἰ δὲ οἰόμενος οὕτω ταῦτα
ἔχειν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν κατηγορίαν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν διὰ
δισσῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω τρόπων· οὔτε γὰρ βουλευθεῖς
ἐδυνάμην ἂν οὔτε δυνάμενος ἐβουλήθην ἔργοις ἐπι-
χειρεῖν τοιούτοις.

¹ <εἰδῶς> Reiske ² οἶδ' Diels: οὐχ ms.

³ ὄν Diels: ἦν A^{ac}: ἦ A^{pc}: καὶ Friedländer: del. Reiske

[Two sets of arguments from implausibility]

[First set of arguments from
implausibility: From inability]

[6] ἐπὶ τούτων δὲ τὸν λόγον εἰμι πρῶτον, ὡς ἀδύνατός
εἰμι τοῦτο πράττειν.

istos) of men, so too for these reasons he would be the
most evil (*kakistos*) of men.

[Disposition]

[4] But speaking about these matters, from where should
I begin? What should I say first? To where should I turn
in my defense? For an unproven accusation produces a
manifest consternation, and from this consternation it fol-
lows necessarily that I am at a loss for speech, if I do not
learn from the truth itself and from the present constraint,
though finding therein teachers who provide more risks
than resources.

[5] Well, that the accuser has accused me without knowing
clearly—this I know clearly. For I am clearly aware that I
have done nothing of this sort. And I do not know in what
way someone could know that what has not happened ex-
ists. But if it is because he supposes that this is how things
were that he has made the accusation, I shall show you in
two ways that he is not speaking the truth. For neither, if
I had wished to, would I have been able (*boulêtheis edu-
namên*) to undertake actions of this sort, nor, if I had been
able to, would I have wished to do so (*dunamenos eb-
oulêthên*).

[Two sets of arguments from implausibility]

[First set of arguments from
implausibility: From inability]

[6] I shall proceed to this argument first, that I am unable
to do this.

[First argument from inability:
The implausibility of speeches]

ἔδει γάρ τινα πρῶτον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τῆς προδοσίας, ἢ δὲ ἀρχὴ λόγος ἂν εἴη· πρὸ γὰρ τῶν μελλόντων ἔργων ἀνάγκη λόγους γίνεσθαι πρότερον. λόγοι δὲ πῶς ἂν γένοιτο μὴ συνουσίας τινὸς γενομένης; συνουσία δὲ τίνα τρόπον γένοιτ' ἂν μὴτ' ἐκείνου πρὸς ἐμὲ πέμψαντος μήτε <του>¹ παρ' ἐμοῦ πρὸς ἐκείνον ἐλθόντος; οὐδὲ παραγγελία² διὰ γραμματείων ἀφίκεται ἄνευ τοῦ φέροντος.

¹ <του> Blass ² γὰρ ἀγγελία mss., corr. Reiske

[7] ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι. καὶ δὴ τοίνυν σύννεμι καὶ σύνεστι κακέινος ἐμοὶ κακέινω ἐγώ—τίνα τρόπον; τίνοι τίς ὢν; Ἕλληνα βαρβάρῳ. πῶς ἀκούων καὶ λέγων; πότερα μόνος μόνω; ἀλλ' ἀγνοήσομεν τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἑρμηνέως; τρίτος ἄρα μάρτυς γίνεται τῶν κρύπτεσθαι δεομένων.

[Second argument from inability:
The implausibility of guarantees]

[8] ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο γενέσθω, καίπερ οὐ γεγόμενον. ἔδει δὲ μετὰ τούτους πίστιν δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι. τίς οὖν ἂν ἦν ἡ πίστις; πότερον ὄρκος; τίς οὖν ἐμοὶ τῷ προδότῃ πιστεύειν ἔμελλεν; ἀλλ' ὄμηροι; τίνες; οἷον ἐγὼ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἔδωκ' ἂν (οὐ γὰρ εἶχον ἄλλον), ὁ δὲ βάρβαρος τῶν υἱῶν τινά· πιστότατα γὰρ ἂν ἦν οὕτως ἐμοὶ τε παρ' ἐκείνου ἐκείνῳ τε παρ' ἐμοῦ. ταῦτα

[First argument from inability:
The implausibility of speeches]

For it would have been necessary for the betrayal to have first some beginning, and the beginning must have been a speech (*logos*): for before the ensuing deeds, speeches (*logoi*) must necessarily be produced beforehand. But how could speeches have been produced without some meeting taking place? And in what way could a meeting have taken place if neither that man [i.e. the enemy] sent someone to me nor anyone went from me to him? For not even a message in writing can arrive without someone carrying it.

[7] But [scil. let us suppose that] it is possible for this to come about by speech. And so I am together with him and he is together with me—in what way? Who is together with whom? A Greek with a barbarian. Hearing and speaking how? As one man alone to another one alone? But we will not understand each other's speeches (*logoi*). So with the help of an interpreter? So there is a third man, who becomes a witness of what needed to be concealed.

[Second argument from inability:
The implausibility of guarantees]

[8] But let us suppose that this too happened, even if it did not happen. It would have been necessary after these [scil. speeches] to give and receive guarantees. What then would have been the guarantee? An oath? But who was going to trust me, a traitor? Or hostages? Who? For example, I might have given my brother (for I had no one else), and the barbarian one of his sons—for in this way there would have been the most secure guarantees for me from him and for him from me. But if this had taken place

δὲ γινόμενα πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἂν ἦν φανερά. [9] φήσει τις ὡς χρήμασι τὴν πίστιν ἐποιούμεθα, ἐκείνος μὲν διδούς, ἐγὼ δὲ λαμβάνων. πότερον οὖν ὀλίγοις; ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀντὶ μεγάλων ὑπουργημάτων ὀλίγα χρήματα λαμβάνειν. ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς; τίς οὖν ἦν ἡ κομιδῆ; πῶς δ' ἂν ἐκόμισεν;¹ ἢ πολλοί; πολλῶν γὰρ κομιζόντων πολλοὶ ἂν ἦσαν μάρτυρες τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς, ἐνὸς δὲ κομιζόντος οὐκ ἂν πολὺ τι τὸ φερόμενον ἦν. [10] πότερα δὲ ἐκόμισαν ἡμέρας ἢ νυκτός; ἀλλὰ πολλαὶ καὶ πυκναὶ φυλακαί, δι' ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν. ἀλλ' ἡμέρας; ἀλλά γε τὸ φῶς πολεμεῖ τοῖς τοιούτοις. εἶεν. ἐγὼ δ' ἐξελθὼν ἐδεξάμην, ἢ ἐκείνος ὁ φέρων εἰσήλθεν; ἀμφοτέρα γὰρ ἄπορα. λαβὼν δὲ δὴ πῶς ἂν ἐκρυψα καὶ τοὺς ἔνδον καὶ τοὺς ἔξω; ποῦ δ' ἂν ἔθηκα; πῶς δ' ἂν ἐφύλαξα; χρώμενος δ' ἂν φανερὸς ἐγενόμην, μὴ χρώμενος δὲ τί ἂν ὠφελούμην ἀπ' αὐτῶν;

¹ <εἶς> ante ἐκόμισεν Keil, post ἐκόμισεν Stephanus

[Third argument from inability:
The implausibility of the deed]

[11] καὶ δὴ τοῖνυν γενέσθω καὶ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα. συνήλθομεν, εἶπομεν, ἠκούσαμεν, χρήματα παρ' αὐτῶν ἔλαβον,¹ ἔλαθον λαβῶν, ἐκρυψα. ἔδει δὴπου πράττειν ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα ἐγένετο. τοῦτο τοῖνυν ἔτι τῶν εἰρημίων ἀπορώτερον. πράττων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς² ἔπραττον³

¹ ἔλαβομεν ms., corr. Reiske ² πράττομεν γὰρ οὐτος ms., corr. Diels
³ ἔπραττεν ms., corr. Reiske

it would have been manifest to all of you. [9] Someone will say that we made the guarantee for each other by means of valuables, he by giving them, I by receiving them. Well then, was it by means of a few? But it is not plausible to receive a few valuables in return for great services. So was it by many? What then was the conveyance? How could he (or: it) have conveyed them? Or was it many who did this? But if many had conveyed them, there would have been many witnesses of the conspiracy, and yet if only one had conveyed it, what was brought could not have been very much. [10] And did they convey it by day or at night? But the guards were many and closely stationed, so that this could not be done in secret. So by day? But light is the enemy of such things. But let us suppose it was so. Was it I, who received, who came out, or was it he, who was bringing, who came in? For either of these is impracticable. If I had received it, how could I have hidden it, both from those inside and from those outside? Where could I have put it? How could I have guarded it? If I had used it, it would have been clearly seen that I was doing so; if I had not used it, then what benefit would I have derived from it?

[Third argument from inability:
The implausibility of the deed]

[11] But let us suppose that what did not happen did happen. We came together, we spoke, we heard, I took valuables from them, I received them without being noticed, I concealed them. I suppose that then it was necessary to do the deed for the sake of which this had happened. But this is even more impracticable than what has already been mentioned. For if I had performed the deed, I would

ἢ μεθ' ἐτέρων· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐνὸς ἢ πράξις. ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἐτέρων; τίνων; δηλονότι τῶν συνόντων.⁴ πότερον ἐλευθέρων ἢ δούλων; ἐλευθέρους μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν σύνειμι. τίς οὖν ὑμῶν ξύνουδε; λεγέτω. δούλοις δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἄπιστον; ἐκόντες <τε>⁵ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ χειμαζόμενοί τε δι' ἀνάγκην κατηγοροῦσιν. [12] ἢ δὲ πράξις πῶς <ἂν>⁶ ἐγένετο; δηλονότι τοὺς πολεμίους εἰσαγαγεῖν ἔδει κρείττονας ὑμῶν ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. πῶς ἂν οὖν εἰσήγαγον; πότερα διὰ πυλῶν; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμὸν⁷ ταῦτα<ς>⁸ οὔτε κλήειν οὔτε ἀνοίγειν, ἀλλ' ἡγεμόνες κύριοι τούτων. ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τειχέων <διὰ>⁹ κλίμακος; οὐκουν.¹⁰ ἅπαντα γὰρ πλήρη φυλακῶν. ἀλλὰ διελὼν τοῦ τείχους; ἅπαντες ἄρα φανερά γένοιτο ἂν. ὑπαίθριος γὰρ ὁ βίος (στρατοπέδον γάρ) ἔστ' ἐν¹¹ ὅπλοις, ἐν οἷς <πάντες>¹² πάντα¹³ ὁρῶσι καὶ πάντες ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρῶνται. πάντως ἄρα καὶ πάντη πάντα¹⁴ πράττειν ἀδύνατον ἦν μοι.

⁴ νῦν ὄντων ms., corr. Reiske

⁵ <τε> Reiske

⁶ <ἂν> Blass

⁷ ἐμὸν Reiske: ἐμοὶ ms.: ἐπ' ἐμοὶ Kiel

⁸ ταῦτα ms.: corr. Stephanus

⁹ <διὰ> Reiske

¹⁰ <ἐφωράθην ἂν.> post οὐκουν Diels

¹¹ ἔστ' ἐν ed.

Ald.: ἔστιν ms.

¹² <πάντες> Reiske

¹³ πάντας Radermacher

¹⁴ πάντα ms.: ταῦτα Reiske

[Second set of arguments from
implausibility: From lack of motive]

[13] σκέψασθε κοινῇ καὶ τόδε. τίνας ἐνεκα προσήκε
βουλευθῆναι ταῦτα πράττειν, εἰ μάλιστα πάντων ἐδυ-
νάμην; οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται προῖκα τοὺς μεγίστους

either have performed it by myself or together with others. But this deed is not one for only one man. So together with others? Whom? Evidently my companions. Free men or slaves? But the free men are yourselves, among whom I now am. Well then, who of you knows about this? Let him speak up. But with slaves how could there have been trust? For they make an accusation, either willingly, to gain their freedom, or constrained, by torture. [12] As for the deed, how could it have been performed? Obviously it would have been necessary to bring in enemies superior to you—which is impossible. So how could I have brought them in? Through the gates? But it is not up to me either to close these or to open them, but it is the leaders who are in charge of these. Or over the fortifications with a ladder? Not at all. For they are all full of guards. Or by making a breach in the wall? Then this would have been visible to all. For life under arms (for this is an army encampment) takes place in the open air, in which <all men> see all things and all men are seen by all. So it was completely impossible for me to do all this at all in any way at all.

[Second set of arguments from
implausibility: From lack of motive]

[13] Consider this too in common [scil. with me]. For the sake of what goal would it have been appropriate for me to wish to do this, if only I had been capable most of all? For no one wishes to run the greatest risks for nothing,

¹ εἰ <καὶ> ed. Ald.

κινδύνους κινδυνεύειν οὐδὲ τὴν μεγίστην κακότητα εἶναι κάκιστος. ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τοῦ;² (καὶ αὐθις πρὸς τὸδ' ἐπάνειμι.)

² τούτων ms., corr. Sauppe

[First argument from lack of motive:

The implausibility of the goal of power]

πότερον <τοῦ>¹ τυραννεῖν; ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν βαρβάρων; ἀλλ' ὑμῶν² ἀδύνατον τοσοῦτων καὶ τοιούτων, οἷς ὑπάρχει ἅπαντα μέγιστα, προγόνων ἀρεταί, χρημάτων πλήθος, ἀριστεΐαι, ἀλήκη φρονημάτων, βασιλεία πόλεων. [14] ἀλλὰ τῶν <βαρβάρων>;³ ὁ δὲ παραδώσω τίς; ἐγὼ δὲ ποία δυνάμει παραλήψομαι Ἑλλην βαρβάρους, εἷς ὢν πολλούς; πείσας ἢ βιασάμενος; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκείνοι πεισθῆναι βούλονται ἂν, οὔτ' ἐγὼ βιάσασθαι δυναίμην. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκόντες ἐκόντι παραδώσουσιν, μισθὸν τῆς προδοσίας ἀντιδιδόντες; ἀλλὰ γε ταῦτα πολλῆς μωρίας καὶ πιστεῦσαι καὶ δέξασθαι τίς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο δουλείαν ἀντὶ βασιλείας, ἀντὶ τοῦ κρατίστου τὸ κάκιστον;

¹ <τοῦ> Reiske ² ἀλλ' post ὑμῶν hab. ms., del. ed. Ald.

³ <βαρβάρων> Stephanus

[Second argument from lack of motive:

The implausibility of the goal of wealth]

[15] εἶποι¹ τις ἂν ὅτι πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων ἐραστῆς ἐπεχείρησα τούτοις. ἀλλὰ χρήματα μὲν μέτρια κέκτημαι, πολλῶν δὲ οὐθὲν δέομαι, πολλῶν γὰρ δέονται

nor to be the most wicked in terms of the greatest wickedness. So for the sake of what goal? (And I shall come back to this again.)

[First argument from lack of motive: The implausibility of the goal of power]

In order to be tyrant? Over you or over the barbarians? But over you is impossible, given your numbers and the kind of men you are, who possess all the greatest things: the virtues of your ancestors, numerous valuables, exploits, the force of thoughts, kingship over cities. [14] Or over the <barbarians>? But who will hand them over to me? And I, by means of what power will I, a Greek, take power over them, barbarians, I being one, over them being many? By persuading or by compelling? For neither would they wish to be persuaded, nor would I be able to compel them. But perhaps willing people will hand them over to a willing man, as a reward paid in exchange for my betrayal? But that would be a great stupidity, to believe that and to accept it. For who would prefer slavery instead of kingship, the worst thing of all instead of the best of all?

[Second argument from lack of motive:

The implausibility of the goal of wealth]

[15] Someone could say that it was out of a desire for wealth and valuables that I undertook this. But of valuables I possess a moderate amount, and I have no need of more: for it is those who spend a lot who have need of a

¹ εἶπη ms., corr. Sauppe

χρημάτων οἱ πολλὰ δαπανῶντες, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ κρείττο-
νες τῶν τῆς φύσεως ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ' οἱ δουλεύοντες ταῖς
ἡδοναῖς καὶ ζητοῦντες ἀπὸ πλοῦτου καὶ μεγαλοπρε-
πείας τὰς τιμὰς κτᾶσθαι. τούτων δὲ ἐμοὶ πρόσεστιν
οὐθέν. ὡς δ' ἀληθῆ λέγω, μάρτυρά πιστὸν παρέξομαι
τὸν παροιχόμενον βίον τῷ δὲ μάρτυρι μάρτυρες
ὑμεῖς ἦτε· σύνεστε γάρ μοι, διὸ σύνεστε ταῦτα.

[Third argument from lack of motive:

The implausibility of the goal of honor]

[16] καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν τιμῆς ἕνεκα τοιούτοις ἔργους
ἀνὴρ ἐπιχειρήσειε καὶ μέσως φρόνιμος. ἀπ' ἀρετῆς
γὰρ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ κακότητος αἱ τιμαί· προδότῃ δὲ τῆς
Ἑλλάδος ἀνδρὶ πῶς ἂν γένοιτο τιμῆ; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἐτύγχανον ἐνδεῆς ὦν ἐτιμώμην γὰρ ἐπὶ
τοῖς ἐντιμοτάτοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἐντιμοτάτων, ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἐπὶ
σοφίᾳ.

¹ ἐπὶ Stephanus: ἐν ms.

[Fourth argument from lack of motive:

The implausibility of the goal of safety]

[17] καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἀσφαλείας¹ οὐνεκά τις ἂν ταῦτα
πράξει. πᾶσι γὰρ ὁ γε προδότης πολέμιος, τῷ νόμῳ,
τῇ δίκῃ, τοῖς θεοῖς, τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν
γὰρ νόμον παραβαίνει, τὴν δὲ δίκην καταλύει, τὸ δὲ
πλήθος διαφθείρει, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ἀτιμάζει. τῷ δὲ τοι-
ούτῳ <ὁ> βίος² περὶ κινδύνων τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ³ ἔχει
ἀσφάλειαν.

lot of valuables, not those who are stronger than the plea-
sures of nature, but those who are slaves to pleasures and
who try to acquire honors by means of wealth and mag-
nificence. Of these things, none matters to me. To the fact
that I am telling the truth, I shall offer my past life as a
trustworthy witness; and you, be witnesses in support of
this witness. For you are together (*suneste*) with me, and
for this reason you know (*suniste*) this.

[Third argument from lack of motive:

The implausibility of the goal of honor]

[16] And again: not even a moderately intelligent man
would undertake such deeds for the sake of honor. For
honors come from virtue, not from wickedness; and how
could honor come about for a man who was a traitor to
Greece? Moreover, I did not happen to be lacking in
honor: for I was honored for the most honorable things by
the most honorable men, by you for my wisdom.

[Fourth argument from lack of motive:

The implausibility of the goal of safety]

[17] And again: no one would have done these things for
the sake of safety. For a traitor is an enemy to all, to the
law, to justice, to the gods, to the crowd of men: for he
transgresses the law, abolishes justice, destroys the crowd,
dishonors divinity. For someone of this sort, life possesses
no safety with regard to the greatest dangers.

¹ οὐκ ἀσφαλές ὦν ms., corr Blass ² τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ <ὁ>
βίος nos: τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ βίῳ ms.: ᾧ δὲ τοιοῦτος <ὁ> βίος
Diels ³ οὐκ Diels: οὐδ' ms.

[Fifth argument from lack of motive: The implausibility of the goal of benefiting friends or harming enemies]

[18] ἀλλὰ δὴ φίλους ὠφελεῖν βουλόμενος ἢ πολεμίους βλάπτειν; καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕνεκά τις ἂν ἀδικήσειεν. ἐμοὶ δὲ πᾶν τούναντίον ἐγίνετο· τοὺς μὲν φίλους κακῶς ἐποίουν, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς ὠφέλουν. ἀγαθῶν μὲν οὖν κτήσων¹ οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν ἢ πράξις· κακῶς δὲ παθεῖν οὐδὲ εἰς ἐπιθυμῶν πανουργεῖ.

¹ κτήσων Reiske: ἔκτισων ms.

[Sixth argument from lack of motive: The implausibility of the goal of self-protection]

[19] τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐστίν, εἴ τινα φόβον ἢ πόνον ἢ κίνδυνον φεύγων ἔπραξα. ταῦτα δ' οὐθεὶς ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοι τί μοι προσήκειν. δισσῶν γὰρ τούτων ἕνεκα πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν, ἢ κέρδος τι μετιόντες ἢ ζημίαν φεύγοντες· ὅσα δὲ τούτων ἔξω πανουργεῖται, <ὅτι>¹ κακῶς ἑμαυτὸν ἐποίουν ταῦτα² πράττων οὐκ ἄδηλον· προδιδούσιν³ γὰρ τὴν Ἑλλάδα προὔδιδουν ἑμαυτόν, τοκέας, φίλους, ἀξίωμα προγόνων, ἱερὰ πατρῶα, τάφους, πατρίδα τὴν μεγίστην τῆς Ἑλλάδος. ἃ δὲ πᾶσι περὶ παντός ἐστι, ταῦτα ἂν τοῖς ἀδικηθείσιν ἐνεχέρισα.

[20] σκέψασθε δὲ καὶ τότε. πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀβίωτος ἦν ὁ βίος μοι πράξαντι ταῦτα; ποῖ γὰρ τραπέσθαι με χρῆν; πότερον εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα; δίκην δώσοντα τοῖς

¹ <ὅτι> nos: <μανίας ἐστίν· ὅσα δὲ> Sauppe

[Fifth argument from lack of motive: The implausibility of the goal of benefiting friends or harming enemies]

[18] But [scil. did I do this] wishing to benefit friends or harm enemies? For someone might commit an injustice for these reasons too. But for me exactly the opposite came about. For I inflicted evils on my friends and I helped my enemies. So the action did not involve the acquisition of any good things; and no one acts wickedly out of a desire to suffer evils.

[Sixth argument from lack of motive: The implausibility of the goal of self-protection]

[19] The remaining question is whether I acted in order to avoid some fear, suffering, or danger. But no one would be able to say about these things what relevance they could have to me. For all men do all things for two reasons, either to pursue some gain or to avoid some penalty. As for all the wicked deeds performed extraneously to these [scil. two reasons], it is evident that in doing them I did evils to myself. For by betraying Greece I betrayed myself, my parents, my friends, the reputation of my ancestors, the temples of my forefathers, the tombs, the greatest fatherland, namely Greece. And what is of the highest value for all people [i.e. my life], I would have put into the hands of people who had suffered an injustice [scil. from me].

[20] Consider as well the following point. How would life have been anything other than unlivable for me if I had done this? For where could I turn to? To Greece? So as to be punished for my injustices? Who would protect me

² post ταῦτα habet ms. γὰρ: del. ed. Ald.

³ προδίδουν ms., corr. Reiske

ἡδικημένοι; τίς δ' ἂν ἀπέιχετό μου τῶν κακῶς πεπονθότων; ἀλλὰ μένειν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις; παραμελήσαντα πάντων τῶν μεγίστων, ἐστερημένον τῆς καλλίστης τιμῆς, ἐν αἰσχίστῃ δυσκλείᾳ διάγοντα, τοὺς ἐν τῷ παροίχομένῳ βίῳ πόνους ἐπ' ἀρετῇ πεποιημένους ἀπορρίψαντα; καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἑμαυτόν, ὅπερ αἰσχιστον ἀνδρί, δυστυχεῖν δι' αὐτόν.

[21] οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις πιστῶς ἂν διεκέμην· πῶς γάρ, οἷτινες ἀπιστότατον ἔργον συνηπίσταντό μοι πεποιηκότι, τοὺς φίλους τοῖς ἐχθροῖς παραδεδωκότι; βίος δὲ οὐ βιωτὸς πίστεως ἐστερημένῳ. χρήματα μὲν γὰρ ἀποβαλόντα <ἦ>⁴ τυραννίδος ἐκπεσόντα ἢ τὴν πατρίδα φυγόντα⁵ ἀναλάβοι τις ἂν ὁ δὲ πίστιν ἀποβαλὼν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κτήσαιοτο.

⁴ <ἦ> Reiske ⁵ ἀποβαλὼν <ἦ> τυραννίδος ἐκπεσὼν ἢ τὴν πατρίδα φυγὼν Diels

[Conclusion of the arguments from implausibility]

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐτ' ἂν <ἐδυνάμην οὐτ' ἂν>¹ ἐβουλόμην προδοῦναι τὴν Ἑλλάδα, διὰ τῶν προειρημένων δέδεικται.

¹ <ἐδυνάμην οὐτ' ἂν> Sauppe: ἐβουλόμην <δυνάμενος οὐτ' ἂν βουλόμενος ἐδυνάμην> Keil

[Address to the accuser]

[22] βούλομαι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν κατήγορον διαλεχθῆναι.

from those who had suffered evil from me? Or to remain among the barbarians? Disregarding all the things that are most important, deprived of the fairest honor, passing my life in the most shameful ill repute, casting away the efforts I had endured in my past life for the sake of virtue? And this for my own fault—which is the most shameful thing for a man: to suffer misfortune for his own fault.

[21] And again: Not even among the barbarians would I be considered trustworthy. For how could I be, given that they knew (*sunēpistanto*) that I had committed the most untrustworthy (*apistotaton*) of deeds in betraying friends to enemies? But life is not livable for a man deprived of trustworthiness. For someone might be able to restore one who has lost his valuables, been deposed from tyranny, or been exiled from his fatherland; but someone who has lost trustworthiness could never acquire it again.

[Conclusion of the arguments from implausibility]

So the fact that I would neither <have been able nor> have wished to betray Greece—this has been shown by what I have said up to now.

[Address to the accuser]

[22] After this I wish to discuss with the accuser.

[What is the basis of the accusation?]

τίνοι ποτὲ πιστεύσας τοιοῦτος ὢν τοιοῦτου κατηγορεῖς;
ἄξιον γὰρ καταμαθεῖν, οἷος ὢν οἷα λέγεις ὡς¹ ἀνάξιος
ἀναξίω.

[Is it knowledge or opinion?]

πότερα γὰρ μου κατηγορεῖς εἰδὼς ἀκριβῶς ἢ δοξάζων;

[Is it knowledge?]

εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰδὼς, οἶσθα ἰδὼν ἢ μετέχων ἢ του <μετέχοντος>² πυθόμενος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἰδὼν, φράσου τούτοις <τὸν τρόπον>,³ τὸν τόπον, τὸν χρόνον, πότε, ποῦ, πῶς εἶδες· εἰ δὲ μετέχων, ἔνοχος εἰς ταῖς αὐταῖς αἰτίαις· εἰ δὲ του μετέχοντος ἀκούσας, ὅστις ἐστίν, αὐτὸς ἐλθέτω, φανήτω, μαρτυρησάτω. πιστότερον γὰρ οὕτως ἔσται τὸ κατηγορήμα μαρτυρηθέν. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν παρέχεται μάρτυρα.

¹ οἷα λέγεις ὡς Blass: οἰδᾶς γε ἴσως ms.

² <μετέχοντος> Blass ³ <τὸν τρόπον> Blass

[23] φήσεις ἴσως ἴσον¹ εἶναι τὸ σέ² γε τῶν γενομένων, ὡς σὺ φήης, μὴ παρέχεσθαι μάρτυρας, τῶν δὲ μὴ γενομένων ἐμέ. τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἴσον ἐστὶ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀγένητά πως ἀδύνατα³ μαρτυρηθῆναι, περὶ δὲ τῶν γενομένων οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥάδιον, οὐδὲ μόνον ῥάδιον, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οὐκ ἦν οἶον <τε>⁴ μόνον⁵ μάρτυ-

¹ ἴσον Reiske: σὸν ms.

² τὸ σέ Diels: τοὺς ms.

[What is the basis of the accusation?]

What is it that, trusting in it, you, being the kind of man you are, accuse me, who am the kind of man I am? For it is worth finding out what kind of man you are, what kinds of things you are saying, a man who is undeserving (*anaxios*) to a man who does not deserve them (*anaxios*).

[Is it knowledge or opinion?]

For are you accusing me from exact knowledge or from opinion?

[Is it knowledge?]

For if it is from knowledge, then you know either from having seen, or from having participated, or from having found out from some <participant>. If from having seen, then tell these people <the way,> the place, the time, when, where, how you saw; if from having participated, then you are liable to the same accusations; if from having heard from some participant, whoever he is, let him come forth himself, present himself, give testimony. For in this way the accusation, supported by a witness, will be more trustworthy. For as things stand now, neither of us is providing a witness.

[23] Perhaps you will say that it is the same thing for you not to provide witnesses for what did happen, according to you, and for me for what did not happen. But it is not the same thing. For it is impossible for what did not happen, in some way to be witnessed; whereas concerning what did happen it is not only not impossible, but it is even easy, and not only easy, but for you it was possible to find

³ πως ἀδύνατα ms.: πῶς ἂν εἴη δυνατὰ ed. Ald.: πῶς <οὐκ> ἀδύνατα Blass: ἀ μὲν γέ πως ἀδύνατα?

⁴ <τε> Sykutris

⁵ μόνον ms., corr. Reiske

ρας ἀλλὰ καὶ ψευδομάρτυρας εὐρεῖν, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐδέτερον εὐρεῖν τούτων δυνατόν.

[Is it opinion?]

[24] ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶσθα ἃ κατηγορεῖς, φανερόν τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν <οὐκ>¹ εἰδότα σε δοξάζειν. εἶτα, ὃ πάντων ἀνθρώπων τολμηρότατε, δόξη πιστεύσας, ἀπιστοτάτῳ πράγματι, τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐκ εἰδώς, τολμᾶς ἀνδρα περὶ θανάτου διώκειν; ᾧ τί τοιοῦτον ἔργον εἰργασμένῳ σύνοισθα; ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δοξάσαι κοινὸν ἅπασι περὶ πάντων, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν τούτῳ σὺ τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερος. ἀλλ' οὔτε τοῖς δοξάζουσι δεῖ πιστεύειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰδόσιν, οὔτε τὴν δόξαν τῆς ἀληθείας πιστοτέραν νομίζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰναντία τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς δόξης.

¹ <οὐκ> Sauppe

[The accusation is self-contradictory]

[25] κατηγορήσας δέ μου διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων λόγων δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα, σοφίαν καὶ μανίαν, ὥπερ οὐχ οἶόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔχειν. ὅπου μὲν γάρ με φῆς εἶναι τεχνήεντά τε καὶ δεινὸν καὶ πόριμον, σοφίαν μου κατηγορεῖς, ὅπου δὲ λέγεις ὡς προὔδιδουν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, μανίαν μανία γάρ ἐστιν ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀδυνάτοις, ἀσυμφόροις, αἰσχροῖς, ἀφ' ὧν τοὺς μὲν φίλους βλάψει, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς ὠφελήσει, τὸν δὲ αὐτοῦ βίον ἐπονειδιστον καὶ σφαλερὸν καταστήσει. καίτοι πῶς χρὴ ἀνδρὶ τοιούτῳ πιστεύειν, ὅστις τὸν

not only witnesses, but also false witnesses, whereas for me it is not possible to find either of these.

[Is it opinion?]

[24] Therefore, the fact that you do not have knowledge of what you are accusing me of is evident. It remains that, <not> knowing, you have an opinion. Then is it trusting (*pisteusas*) in opinion, that most untrustworthy (*apistotatos*) of things, and not knowing the truth, that you, most audacious (*tolmêrotate*) of all humans, have the audacity (*tolmats*) to accuse a man of a capital crime? What deed like this do you know that man to have committed? And again: to have an opinion is something in common to all people about all things, and you are not at all wiser in this than the others. But one should not trust in those who have an opinion, but in those who have knowledge, and one should also not consider opinion to be more trustworthy than truth, but on the contrary truth to be more so than opinion.

[The accusation is self-contradictory]

[25] You have accused me, in the speeches I have mentioned, of two things that are completely contrary to one another, craftiness (*sophia*) and madness, of which it is not possible for the same man to possess both. For you accuse me of craftiness when you say that I am skilled, clever, and resourceful, but of madness when you say that I betrayed Greece. For it is madness to undertake deeds that are impossible, disadvantageous, shameful, ones by which one will harm one's friends, help one's enemies, and make one's own life reproachful and insecure. And how can one trust a man like that, one who, in saying the same speech

αὐτὸν λόγον λέγων πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ἐναντιώτατα λέγει; [26] βουλοίμην δ' ἂν παρὰ σοῦ πυθέσθαι, πότερον τοὺς σοφοὺς ἄνδρας νομίζεις ἀνοήτους ἢ φρονίμους. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀνοήτους, καινὸς¹ ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθής· εἰ δὲ φρονίμους, οὐ δήπου προσήκει τοὺς γε φρονούντας ἐξαμαρτάνειν τὰς μεγίστας ἀμαρτίας καὶ μᾶλλον αἰρέεσθαι κακὰ πρὸ παρόντων² ἀγαθῶν. εἰ μὲν οὖν εἶμι σοφός, οὐχ ἤμαρτον· εἰ δ' ἤμαρτον, οὐ σοφός εἶμι. οὐκοῦν δι' ἀμφοτέρα ἂν εἴης ψευδής.

¹ κενὸς ms. corr. Sauppe

² πρὸ παρόντων Diels: πρότερον τῶν ms.

[Conclusion of the address to the accuser]

[27] ἀντικατηγορήσαι δέ σου πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παλαιὰ καὶ νέα πράσσοντος δυνάμενος οὐ βούλομαι <βούλομαι>¹ γὰρ οὐ τοῖς σοῖς κακοῖς ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀποφεύγειν τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην. πρὸς μὲν οὖν σὲ ταῦτα.

¹ <βούλομαι> ed. Ald.

[Address to the judges]

[I shall speak about myself]

[28] πρὸς δ' ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες κριταί, περὶ ἐμοῦ βούλομαι εἰπεῖν ἐπίφθονον μὲν ἀληθὲς δέ, <μῆ>¹ κατηγορημένῳ μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτά,² κατηγορουμένῳ δὲ προσήκοντα. νῦν γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν εὐθύνας καὶ λόγον ὑπέχω τοῦ παροικομένου βίου. δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν, ἂν ὑμᾶς ὑπο-

to the same men, says completely contrary things about the same matters? [26] I would wish to find out from you whether you consider crafty men (*sophoi*) to be mindless (*anothoi*) or intelligent (*phronimoi*). For if they are mindless, the argument is new but not true; but if they are intelligent, it certainly is not fitting that intelligent men commit the greatest mistakes and prefer evils rather than present goods. If then I am crafty, then I have not made a mistake; and if I have made a mistake, then I am not crafty. And so in either case you would be a liar.

[Conclusion of the address to the accuser]

[27] Although I would be able to accuse you in turn of having committed many great crimes, old ones and new ones, I do not wish to do so. For <I wish> to be acquitted of this accusation not because of your evil deeds but because of my good ones. This then was with regard to you.

[Address to the judges]

[I shall speak about myself]

[28] To you, judges, I wish to say about myself something invidious but true, intolerable coming from someone who has <not> been accused, but appropriate for someone who is being accused. For as things stand, I am offering you a justification and an account (*logos*) of my past life. So I ask

¹ <μῆ> Blass

² ἀνεκτά ms.: ἂν εἰκότα Diels

μνήσω τῶν τι ἐμοὶ³ πεπραγμένων καλῶν, μηδένα φθονῆσαι τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἡγήσασθαι κατηγορημένον δεινὰ καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ τι τῶν ἀληθῶν ἀγαθῶν⁴ εἰπεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν ὑμῖν· ὅπερ ἡδιστόν⁵ μοι.

³ τι ἐμοὶ Diels: ἐμοὶ τι A^{ps}: εἰ ἐμοὶ A^m ⁴ ἀγαθῶν ed. Ald.: ἀγαθὸν ms. ⁵ ὅπερ ἡδιστόν Reiske: ὑπερῆδιστόν ms.

[I have always been free from fault]

[29] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν καὶ δεύτερον καὶ μέγιστον, διὰ παντὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος ἀναμάρτητος ὁ παρουχόμενος βίος ἐστὶ μοι, καθαρὸς πάσης αἰτίας· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν οὐδεμίαν αἰτίαν κακότητος ἀληθῆ πρὸς ὑμᾶς περὶ ἐμοῦ εἰπεῖν ἔχοι. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὁ κατήγορος οὐδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν εἴρηκεν ὧν εἴρηκεν· οὕτως λοιδορίαν οὐκ ἔχουσαν ἔλεγchon ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ δύναται.

[I have been a great benefactor for all men]

[30] φήσαιμι δ' ἂν, καὶ φήσας οὐκ ἂν ψευσαίμην οὐδ' ἂν ἐλεγχθεῖην, οὐ μόνον ἀναμάρτητος ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγας εὐεργέτης ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, οὐκουν¹ τῶν νῦν ὄντων ἀλλὰ² τῶν μελλόντων, εἶναι. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐποίησε τὸν ἀνθρώπειον βίον πόριμον ἐξ ἀπόρου καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐξ ἀκόσμου, τάξεις τε πολεμικὰς εὐρῶν μέγιστον εἰς πλεονεκτήματα, νόμους τε γραπτοὺς φύλακας³ τοῦ δικαίου, γράμματα τε μνήμης ὄργανον, μέτρα τε καὶ σταθμὰ συναλλαγῶν εὐπόρους διαλλαγὰς, ἀριθμὸν τε χρημά-

you, if I remind you of the fine things that I have done, that no one feel envy at what I say, but consider it necessary for someone who is being accused of false and terrible deeds to say something as well about true and good ones, among you who know them—and this is something that provides me the greatest pleasure.

[I have always been free from fault]

[29] First then, and second, and most important of all: my past life, for its whole course, from beginning to end, has been free of fault, pure of any accusation. For nobody would be able to state to you any accusation of wickedness concerning me that would be true. For not even the accuser has mentioned any proof of the things he mentioned. In this way his speech is equivalent to an insult that does not admit of disproof.

[I have been a great benefactor for all men]

[30] I would assert—and in asserting this neither would I be telling a lie nor would I be refuted—that not only am I free from fault but also that I am a great benefactor for you, both for the Greeks and for all humans, not for those now alive but for those yet to come. For who would have transformed human life from resourceless to resourceful, and from disordered to ordered, by inventing military formations (the most important thing for victories), written laws (the guardians of justice), writing (an instrument of memory), measures and weights (resourceful means of exchange for commerce), number (the guardian of valu-

¹ οὐκουν nos (iam οὐκ οὖν Rademacher): οὐ κοῦν A: οὐ μό-
νον Reiske ² ἀλλὰ <καὶ> Reiske ³ τε post φύλακας
habet ms.: del. Reiske

των φύλακα, πυρσούς τε κρατίστους καὶ ταχίστους
ἀγγέλους, πεσσοὺς τε σχολῆς ἄλυτον διατριβήν;

[My character is commendable]

τίνος οὖν ἔνεκα ταυθ' ὑμᾶς ὑπέμνησα; [31] δηλῶν¹
<μὲν>² ὅτι³ τοῖς τοιούτοις τὸν νοῦν προσέχω,⁴ σημεῖον
δὲ ποιούμενος ὅτι τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἔργων
ἀπέχομαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνοις τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα τοῖς
τοιούτοις προσέχειν ἀδύνατον. ἀξιώ δέ, εἰ μηδὲν
αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς ἀδικῶ, μηδὲ αὐτὸς ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἀδικηθῆναι.
[32] καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐνεκα
ἄξιός εἰμι κακῶς πάσχειν, οὐθ' ὑπὸ νεωτέρων οὐθ'
ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις ἄλυ-
πὸς εἰμι, τοῖς δὲ νεωτέροις οὐκ ἀνωφελής, τοῖς εὖτυ-
χοῦσιν οὐ φθονερός, τῶν δυστυχοῦντων οἰκτίρμων·
οὔτε πεινίας ὑπερορῶν, οὔτε πλοῦτον ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἀρε-
τὴν πλοῦτου προτιμῶν· οὔτε ἐν βουλαῖς ἀχρηστος
οὔτε ἐν μάχαις ἀργός, ποιῶν τὸ τασσόμενον, πειθό-
μενος τοῖς ἀρχουσιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐμὸν ἐμαυτὸν
ἐπαινεῖν· ὁ δὲ παρῶν καιρὸς ἠνάγκασε, καὶ ταῦτα
κατηγορημένον, πάντως ἀπολογήσασθαι.

¹ δηλῶν Reiske: δήλον ms.

² <μὲν> Blass

³ ὅτι Reiske: οὐ ms.

⁴ προσέχων ms.: corr. Reiske

[Praise of the judges and advice to them]

[33] λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ ὑμῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐστὶ μοι λόγος,
ὄν εἰπὼν παύσομαι τῆς ἀπολογίας. οἰκτος μὲν οὖν καὶ
λιταὶ καὶ φίλων παραίτησις ἐν ὄχλῳ μὲν οὐσης τῆς
κρίσεως χρήσιμα· παρὰ δ' ὑμῖν¹ τοῖς πρώτοις οὐσι

ables), signal fires (the strongest and swiftest messengers),
and dice (a painless way of passing leisure time)? [Cf.
DRAM. T59-T62].

[My character is commendable]

Well, why have I reminded you of this? [31] To show you
that it is to these kinds of things that I pay attention and to
furnish evidence that I refrain from shameful and wicked
deeds. For it is impossible for a man who pays attention
to such things to do so to these other ones. And I think
that, if I myself do you no injustice, neither should I myself
suffer injustice from you. [32] For I do not deserve to be
punished because of my other activities too, neither by
younger men nor by older ones. For to older men I cause
no pain, to younger ones I provide some benefit, for the
fortunate I feel no envy, for the unfortunate I feel pity;
neither do I look down upon poverty nor do I value wealth
above virtue, but instead virtue about wealth. I am neither
ineffective in councils nor idle in battles: I do what I am
ordered, I obey the commanders. And yet it is not for me
to praise myself: but the present circumstance (*katros*) has
compelled me, especially since I am accused of these
things, to defend myself in every way.

[Praise of the judges and advice to them]

[33] It remains for me to speak to you about yourselves;
when I have said this, I shall conclude my defense. Well,
lamentation, entreaties, and supplication of friends are
useful when a judgment takes place in a crowd; but in the

¹ δ' ὑμῖν ed. Ald.: δύναμιν ms.

τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ δοκοῦσιν, οὐ φίλων βοηθείαις οὐδὲ
 λιταῖς οὐδὲ οἴκτοις δεῖ πείθειν ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῷ σαφε-
 στατῶ δικαίῳ, διδάξαντα τᾶληθές, οὐκ ἀπατήσαντά
 με δεῖ διαφνυεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην. [34] ὑμᾶς δὲ χρῆ
 μὴ τοῖς λόγοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἔργοις προσέχειν τὸν
 νοῦν, μηδὲ τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἐλέγχων προκρίνειν, μηδὲ
 τὸν ὀλίγον χρόνον τοῦ πολλοῦ σοφώτερον ἡγείσθαι
 κριτήν, μηδὲ τὴν διαβολὴν τῆς πείρας πιστοτέραν
 νομίζειν. ἅπαντα γὰρ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι μεγάλης
 εὐλαβείας ἀμαρτάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἀνήκεστα τῶν ἀκεστῶν²
 ἔτι μᾶλλον ταῦτα γὰρ προνοήσασι μὲν δυνατά, μετα-
 νοήσασι δὲ ἀνίατα. τῶν δὲ τοιούτων ἐστίν, ὅταν ἄν-
 δρες ἄνδρα περὶ θανάτου κρίνωσιν· ὅπερ ἐστὶ νῦν
 παρ' ὑμῖν.

² ἀκεστῶν Stephanus: ἀνεκέστων ms.

[Appeal to the judges]

[35] εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦν διὰ τῶν λόγων τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν
 ἔργων καθαρὰν τε¹ γενέσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι <καὶ>² φα-
 νεράν, εὐπορος ἂν εἴη κρίσις ἤδη ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, τὸ μὲν σῶμα τοῦμὸν φυλά-
 ξατε, τὸν δὲ πλείω χρόνον ἐπιμείνατε, μετὰ δὲ τῆς
 ἀληθείας τὴν κρίσιν ποιήσατε. ὑμῖν μὲν γὰρ μέγας ὁ
 κίνδυνος, ἀδίκους φανείσι δόξαν τὴν μὲν καταβαλεῖν,
 τὴν δὲ κτήσασθαι. τοῖς δὲ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν αἰρετώ-
 τερος θάνατος δόξης αἰσχρᾶς· ὁ³ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ βίου
 τέλος, ἡ δὲ τῷ βίῳ νόσος. [36] εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως ἀποκτεί-

presence of you, who both are and are reputed to be the
 very first of the Greeks, I do not need to persuade you by
 means of the assistance of friends, entreaties, or laments,
 but to be acquitted of this accusation by the most evident
 justice, by teaching you the truth, not by deceiving you.
 [34] As for you, you should not pay attention to speeches
 more than to deeds, nor prefer accusations to refutations,
 nor consider that a short time is a wiser judge than a long
 one, nor think that slander is more trustworthy than expe-
 rience. For in all matters it belongs to good men to exer-
 cise great caution to avoid making a mistake, and in irre-
 mediable matters even more than in remediable ones: for
 the former are capable [scil. of being healed] by those who
 think beforehand (*pronoēsai*), but they are incurable if
 people think too late (*metanoēsai*). One of the matters of
 this sort is when men judge a man in a capital case—and
 this is what you have before you now.

[Appeal to the judges]

[35] Well, if it were possible for the truth about actions
 to become pure <and> clear for listeners by means of
 speeches, it would already be easy to form a judgment on
 the basis of what I have said. But since matters are not like
 this, protect my body, wait for a longer time, form your
 judgment in conformity with the truth. For the risk for you
 is great, if you show yourselves to be unjust: to lose one
 reputation and to acquire another. For good men, death is
 preferable to a shameful reputation: for the former is the
 end of life, while the latter is an illness for life. [36] If you

¹ γε ms., corr. Diels

² <καὶ> Diels

³ τὸ mss., corr. nos

νητέ με, πολλοῖς γενήσεται φανερόν· ἐγώ τε γὰρ ἀγνός,⁴ ὑμῶν⁵ τε πάσι⁶ Ἑλλησι γνώριμος ἢ κακότης καὶ φανερά. καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν φανερὰν ἅπασιν⁶ ὑμεῖς ἔξετε τῆς ἀδικίας, οὐχ ὁ κατήγορος· ἐν ὑμῖν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ⁷ τῆς δίκης. ἀμαρτία δ' οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο μείζων ταύτης. οὐ γὰρ μόνον εἰς ἐμὲ καὶ τοκέας τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἀμαρτήσεσθε δικάσαντες ἀδίκως, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς δεινὸν ἄθεον ἄδικον ἄνομον ἔργον συνεπιστήσεσθε πεπονηκότες, ἀπεκτονότες ἄνδρα σύμμαχον, χρήσιμον ὑμῖν, εὐεργέτην τῆς Ἑλλάδος, Ἑλληνας Ἑλληνα, φανερὰν οὐδεμίαν ἀδικίαν οὐδὲ πιστὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδείξαντες.

⁴ ἀγνός LévyStone: ἀγνός ms.: <οὐκ> ἀγνώς Stephanus

⁵ ὑμῖν ms., corr. Diels ⁶ ἅπασαν ms., corr. Stephanus

⁷ ἐστὶ Reiske: ἔχει ms.: ἐν Diels

[Conclusion]

[37] εἴρηται τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ, καὶ παύομαι. τὸ γὰρ ὑπομνήσαι τὰ διὰ μακρῶν εἰρημένα συντόμως πρὸς μὲν φαύλους δικαστὰς ἔχει λόγον· τοὺς δὲ πρῶτους τῶν πρῶτων Ἑλληνας Ἑλλήνων οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδ' ἀξιῶσαι μήτε προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν μήτε μεμνήσθαι τὰ λεχθέντα.

kill me unjustly, it will become manifest to many men. For I am guiltless, and your wickedness will be known and manifest to all the Greeks. And it is you, not the accuser, who will receive the accusation, manifest for all, of injustice: for the decision in this trial rests in your power. There could not be a greater mistake than this. For if you judge unjustly, not only will you make a mistake against me and my parents, but you yourselves will know that you have committed a dreadful, godless, unjust, unlawful deed by killing a man who is your ally, useful for you, a benefactor of Greece—Greeks killing a Greek—although you had proven no manifest injustice nor a trustworthy accusation.

[Conclusion]

[37] I have now spoken my part, and I conclude. For to remind people briefly of what has been said at length makes sense (*logos*) if one is speaking to worthless judges. But it is not fitting (*axion*) even to think (*axiōsai*) that the very first Greeks among the very first Greeks do not pay attention or remember what has been said.

*The Treatise Entitled On
Nonbeing or On Nature (D26)*

The Traditional Title

See **ALCM. D2**

D26 Two summaries

a (\neq DK) Ps.-Arist. *MXG* 5.1–5 (979a11–33) et 6.9–25
979b20–980b21)

[The three theses, 5.1–5]

[1] οὐκ εἶναι φησιν οὐδέν· εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ἄγνωστον εἶναι·
εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γνωστόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δηλωτὸν ἄλλοις.

[First thesis]

[Summary of the two arguments]

[2] καὶ ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, συνθεῖς τὰ ἑτέροις εἰρημένα,
ὅσοι περὶ τῶν ὄντων λέγοντες τἀναντία, ὡς δοκοῦσιν,
ἀποφαίνονται αὐτοῖς, οἱ μὲν ὅτι ἓν καὶ οὐ πολλά, οἱ
δὲ αὖ ὅτι πολλά καὶ οὐχ ἓν, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὅτι ἀγένητα,
οἱ δ' ὡς γενόμενα ἐπιδεικνύντες ταῦτα, συλλογίζεται
κατ' ἀμφοτέρων. [3] ἀνάγκη γάρ, φησίν, εἴ τί ἐστι,¹
μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλά εἶναι, μήτε ἀγένητα μήτε γενό-
μενα· οὐδὲν <οὐν>² ἂν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ εἴη τι, τούτων ἂν
θάπερα εἴη. <καὶ> ὅτι³ οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ἓν οὔτε πολλά,
οὔτε ἀγένητα οὔτε γενόμενα, τὰ μὲν ὡς Μέλισσος, τὰ
δὲ ὡς Ζήνων ἐπιχειρεῖ δεικνύειν μετὰ τὴν πρώτην

multa menda quae praesertim in ms. R exhibentur omittimus

*The Treatise Entitled On Nonbeing
or On Nature (D26)*

The Traditional Title

See **ALCM. D2**

D26 Two summaries

a (\neq DK) Ps.-Aristotle, *On Melissus, Xenophanes, and
Gorgias*

[The three theses]

[1] He says that nothing is; and if [scil. something] is, it is
unknowable; and if [scil something] both is and is know-
able, it cannot be indicated to other people.

[First thesis]

[Summary of the two arguments]

[2] That it is not: having put together what others have said
—all those who, speaking about what is, produce state-
ments that appear to be contrary to one another (the ones
showing that it is one and not many, the others inversely
that they are many and not one, and the ones that they are
not generated, the others that they are generated)—he
concludes this against both sides. [3] For it is necessary,
he says, if something is, that it be neither one nor many,
neither generated nor ungenerated: <therefore> nothing
would be. For if something were, it would be either one
or the other of these. And that it is neither one nor many,
neither ungenerated nor generated, he tries to show, in
part like Melissus, in part like Zeno, after his first demon-

¹ post ἔστι pos. Diels lac. <ἓν ἢ πολλά εἶναι καὶ ἢ ἀγένητα
ἢ γενόμενα. εἰ οὐν μὴ ἔστι>, alii alia

² <οὐν> Cook-Wilson

³ <καὶ> ὅτι nos: ὅτι <οὐν> Bonitz

ἴδιον αὐτοῦ ἀπόδειξιν, ἐν ἧ λέγει ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι.

[His own argument]

[4] εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἤττον τὸ μὴ ὄν τοῦ ὄντος εἴη. τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὄν ἔστι μὴ ὄν, καὶ τὸ ὄν ὄν, ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ οὐκ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα. [5] εἰ δ' ὁμως τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι, τὸ εἶναι, φησίν, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀντικείμενον. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι, τὸ εἶναι μὴ εἶναι προσήκει. [6] ὥστε οὐκ ἂν οὕτως, φησίν, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, εἰ μὴ ταυτόν ἔστιν εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταυτό, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐδέν· τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπεὶ περ γε ταυτὸ τῶ μὴ ὄντι. οὗτος μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς ὁ² λόγος ἐκείνου.

¹ τὰ R: om. L

² ὁ αὐτὸς mss., corr. Foss

[Refutation of this argument [6.1–8]: see **R25**]

[Other arguments, 6.9–25]

['Dialectical' argument]

[9] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φησίν· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, ἤτοι ἀγένητον ἢ γενόμενον εἶναι. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀγένητον, ἄπειρον αὐτὸ τοῖς τοῦ Μελίσσου ἀξιώμασι λαμβάνει· τὸ δ' ἄπειρον οὐκ ἂν εἶναι ποτε.¹ οὔτε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτ' ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι· δύο γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἢ πλείω² εἶναι, τό τε ἐνὸν καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ, μηδαμοῦ δὲ ὄν οὐδὲν εἶναι κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγον περὶ τῆς χώρας.

¹ που Foss

² ἢ πλείω mss: ἀπείρω Bonitz

stration, which is his own, in which he says that it can neither be nor not be.

[His own argument]

[4] For if nonbeing is nonbeing, then what is not would no less be than what is. For what is not is something that is not, and what is is something that is, so that things are not more than they are not. [5] But if nevertheless nonbeing is, being, he says, is not—on the contrary. For if nonbeing is, it is fitting that being not be. [6] So that in this way nothing would be, he says, unless being and nonbeing were identical. But if [scil. they are] identical, then in this way too nothing would be. For what is not is not, just like what is, since precisely it is identical to what is not. This then is his argument itself.

[Refutation of this argument: see **R25**]

[Other arguments, 6.9–25]

['Dialectical' argument]

[9] After this argument he says: if [scil. something] is, it is either ungenerated or generated. And if it is ungenerated, he accepts by Melissus' axioms that it is unlimited [cf. **MEL. D3–D5**]. But the unlimited could not ever be. For it is neither in itself nor in something else: for in this way they would be two or more [scil. unlimiteds], the one within and the one within which. But nothing is that would be nowhere, according to Zeno's argument about place [cf. **ZEN. D13**].

[10] ἀγένητον μὲν οὖν διὰ ταύτ' οὐκ εἶναι, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ γενόμενον. γενέσθαι γοῦν οὐδὲν ἂν οὔτ' ἐξ ὄντος οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. εἰ γὰρ τὸ δν¹ μεταπέσοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτ' εἶναι τὸ ὄν, ὡσπερ γ' εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ δν γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη μὴ ὄν. [11] οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδ' ἐξ² ὄντος ἂν γενέσθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκ μηδενὸς ἂν γενέσθαι εἰ δ' ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, δι' ἅπερ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος, διὰ ταῦτα οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι. [12] εἰ οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν, εἴπερ ἔστι τι, ἥτοι ἀγένητον ἢ γενόμενον εἶναι, ταῦτα δὲ <ἀδύνατα>,³ ἀδύνατόν τι καὶ εἶναι.

¹ post γὰρ aut post ὄν lac. ind. plerique editores ² οὐδ'
ἐξ mss.: οὐδ' ἐκ <μὴ> Foss: οὐκ ἐκ Bonitz ³ <ἀδύνατα>
Newiger

[13] ἔτι εἴπερ ἔστιν, ἐν ἣ πλείω, φησίν, ἔστιν· εἰ δὲ μῆτε ἐν μῆτε πολλά, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη. καὶ ἐν μὲν † καὶ ὅτι ἀσώματον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν κ εἶχον μὲν γε τῷ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγῳ. ἐνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐδ' ἂν εἶναι οὐδὲ μὴ μῆτε πολλὰ εἰ δὲ μῆτε μῆτε πολλὰ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν. †¹

¹ ita L (R minime discrepat): locum desperatum ita refecit Ioli <οὐκ ἂν εἶναι ὅτι ἀσώματον ἂν εἴη, τὸ <δ' ἀσώματον οὐδὲν ἔστι, μὴ> ἔχον μέγεθος ὡς ἐν> τῷ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγῳ. ἐνὸς δὲ <μὴ> ὄντος οὐδ' ἂν <ὅλως> εἶναι οὐδὲν μὴ <γὰρ ὄντος ἐνός>, μῆτε πολλὰ <ἂν εἴη>. εἰ δὲ μῆτε <ἐν, φησίν>, μῆτε πολλὰ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν.: alii aliter

[10] For this reason it is not ungenerated, and yet it is not generated either. For nothing could come to be either out of what is or out of what is not. For if what is changed, it would no longer be what is, just as, if what is not came to be, it would no longer be something that is not. [11] And certainly it could not come to be from what is either. For if what is not is not, nothing would come to be from nothing. And if what is not is, it could not come to be from what is not, for precisely the same reason that it does not come to be from what is. [12] If then it is necessary, if something is, that it be either ungenerated or generated, and these are both <impossible>, then it is impossible too that anything be.

[13] Again, if [scil. something] is, he says, it is one or more. But if it is neither one nor many, then it would be nothing. †And one . . . and because it would be incorporeal . . . possessing . . . by Zeno's argument. And being one it would neither . . . be nor not . . . to be nor . . . nor many. But if is not . . . nor many, then nothing is. †¹

¹ This passage is hopelessly corrupt.

[14] οὐδ' ἂν κινήθῃναι φησιν οὐδέν· εἰ¹ γὰρ κινήθῃ, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη ὡσαύτως ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν² οὐκ ἂν εἴη, τὸ δ' οὐκ ὄν γεγονὸς εἴη. [15] ἔτι δὲ εἰ³ κινεῖται καὶ εἰ⁴ μεταφέρεται οὐ συνεχές ὄν, διήρηται, <ἢ δὲ διήρηται>⁵ τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ἔστιν⁶ ταύτη· ὥστ' εἴ' πάντῃ κινεῖται, πάντῃ διήρηται. [16] εἰ δ' οὕτως, πάντῃ οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκλιπὲς γὰρ ταύτη, φησί, ἢ διήρηται, τοῦ ὄντος, ἀντὶ τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ διηρηθῆσθαι λέγων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Λευκίππου καλουμένοις λόγοις γέγραπται.

¹ οὐδενὶ mss., corr. Foss

³ εἰ (ἢ LR) mss.: ἢ Foss

⁵ <ἢ δὲ διήρηται> Apelt

⁷ ὥστε mss., corr. Foss

² μὲν <ὄν> Foss

⁴ εἰ R: ἐν L

⁶ οὐκ ἔστιν Foss: οὔτετι mss.

[Remnants of the second thesis?]

[17] εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐδέν τὰς ἀποδείξεις λέγειν, ἅπαντα <ἄγνωστα>.¹ δεῖν γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι, μηδὲ φρονεῖσθαι. [18] εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶναι ψεύδος² φησιν, οὐδ' εἰ ἐν τῷ πελάγει φαίη ἀμιλλᾶσθαι ἄρματα. πάντα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα εἴη. [19] καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὁρώμενα καὶ ἀκουόμενα διὰ τοῦτό ἔστιν, ὅτι φρονεῖται ἕκαστα αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ ὁρώμεν ἔστιν, οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ὁρώμεν ἢ <ἄ>³ διανοούμεθα.⁴ [20] καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ

¹ <ἄγνωστα> nos: λέγειν <εἶναι ἄγνωστα> ἅπαντα Ioli; alii alia

² οὐδεὶς post ψεύδος habent mss., del. Cook Wilson

³ <ἄ>Foss ⁴ ἢ ὁρώμεν . . . διανοούμεθα loc. difficill. et fortasse corrupt. edd. alii aliter temptav.

[14] He says that it could not move either. For if it [scil. the thing in question] moved, it would no longer be in the same way, but on the one hand it would not be, and on the other what is not would have come to be. [15] Moreover, if it moves and is transported, not being continuous, it is divided, and <where> what is <is divided,> it is not: so that if it moves everywhere, it is divided everywhere. [16] But if this is so, then it is not in any place [or: nor at all]. For where there is division, there is lack of what is—he says “to be divided” instead of “void,” as is written in what are called the arguments of Leucippus [cf. **ATOM. D1b**].

[Remnants of the second thesis?]

[17] If, then, [scil. he says that] the arguments state that nothing [scil. exists], then all things [scil. are] <unknowable>. For the objects of thoughts (*ta phronoumena*) must necessarily be, and what is not, since it is not, cannot even be an object of thought (*phroneisthai*). [18] But if this is so, he says that nothing could be false, not even if he said that chariots were racing in the sea: for all these things would be. [19] For things seen and things heard are for the reason that each of them is an object of thought (*phroneitai*)—and even if it is not for this reason, but just as what we see is not more [scil. by the fact that it is seen], so too what we see [scil. is] more than <what> we think (*dianooumetha*) (?).¹ [20] For just as there many people

¹ This passage is probably corrupt.

ἐκεῖ πολλοὶ ἂν ταῦτα ἴδοιεν,⁵ καὶ ἐνταῦθα πολλοὶ ἂν ταῦτα διανοηθεῖεν.⁶ τὸ οὖν μᾶλλον⁷ δὴ τοιάδ' ἐστὶ, ποῖα δὲ τάληθῆ, ἄδηλον. ὥστε καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, ἡμῖν γε ἄγνωστα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα.

⁵ ἴδοιμεν Diels ⁶ διανοηθείημεν mss., corr. Apelt

⁷ τὸ οὖν μᾶλλον loc. difficill. et fortasse corrupt. edd. alii aliter temptav.

[Third thesis]

[21] εἰ δὲ καὶ γνωστά, πῶς ἂν τις, φησί,¹ δηλώσειεν ἄλλω; ὁ γὰρ εἶδε, πῶς ἂν τις, φησί, τοῦτο εἴποι λόγῳ; ἢ πῶς ἂν ἐκεῖνο δηλον ἀκούσαντι γίγνοιτο, μὴ ἰδόντι; ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἡ ὄψις τοὺς φθόγγους γινώσκει, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἡ ἀκοή τὰ χρώματα ἀκούει, ἀλλὰ φθόγγους· καὶ λέγει ὁ λέγων, ἀλλ' οὐ χρῶμα οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα. [22] ὁ οὖν τις μὴ ἐννοεῖ, πῶς αἰτεῖ² παρ' ἄλλου λόγῳ ἢ σημείῳ τι ἐτέρου πράγματος ἐννοήσει,³ ἀλλ' ἢ ἐὰν μὲν χρῶμα ἰδῶν, ἐὰν δὲ <ψόφον ἀκοῦσας,⁴ ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐ <ψόφον> λέγει <ὁ λέγων⁵ οὐδὲ χρῶμα, ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὥστ' οὐδὲ διανοεῖσθαι χρῶμα ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὄραν, οὐδὲ ψόφον, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν.

¹ φασί mss., corr. Bekker ² αὐτὸ Apelt

³ ἐννοήσει Diels: ἐννοήσειεν mss.: ἐννοήσειεν <ἂν> Foss

⁴ <ψόφον ἀκοῦσας Diels post Cook Wilson: νμος mss.

⁵ <ψόφον> λέγει <ὁ λέγων ita restit. Cook Wilson loc. lacunos. et corrupt.

[23] εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται, γινώσκει τε καὶ ἂ ἂν γινώσκῃ¹ λέγει,² ἀλλὰ πῶς ὁ ἀκούων τὸ αὐτὸ ἐννοήσει; οὐ

could see these things, so too here many people could think (*dianoêtheten*) them. So that with regard to 'more,' such things are; but which ones are true is unclear. So that even if they are, for us at least things would be unknowable.

[Third thesis]

[21] But even if they are knowable, how could someone, he asks, indicate them to someone else? For what one sees, how, he asks, could one say this by a speech (*logos*)? Or how could that thing become clear to someone who hears, but does not see it? For just as sight does not know sounds, so too hearing does not hear colors, but sounds: and someone who speaks utters a speech, but not a color or a thing. [22] So what someone does not think, how can he ask for it from someone else by means of a speech, or how will he think it by means of some sign different from the thing, except, if it is a color, by seeing it, or, if it is <a sound, by hearing it? For on principle <someone who speaks> does not say <a sound> or a color, but a speech; so that it is not possible to think a color, but to see it, nor a sound, but to hear it.

[23] But even if this is possible, that he knows and that he says what he knows, then how will someone who hears

¹ ἀναγνώσκει mss., corr. Diels

² λέγει nos: λέγων mss.: <ὁ> λέγων Foss

γὰρ οἶόν τε τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ἐν πλείοσι καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν εἶναι· δύο γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν. [24] εἰ δὲ καὶ εἴη, φησὶν, ἐν πλείοσι καὶ ταυτόν, οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ ὁμοιον φαίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς, μὴ πάντῃ ὁμοίοις ἐκείνοις οὖσιν καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη, εἰς ἂν³ ἄλλ' οὐ δύο εἶεν.

³ εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη, εἰς ἂν Diels post Cook Wilson: εἰ τι ἐν τοιούτου εἴησαν mss.

[25] φαίνεται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁμοια αἰσθανόμενος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἕτερα τῇ ἀκοῇ καὶ τῇ ὄψει, καὶ νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι διαφόρως. ὥστε σχολῆ ἄλλω πᾶν <ἂν>¹ ταῦτ' αἰσθητοῖς τις. [26] οὕτως οὖν <εἰ> ἔστι τι² γνωστόν, οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτὸ ἐτέρῳ δηλώσειεν, διὰ τε τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα λόγους,³ καὶ ὅτι οὐδ' ἕτερος⁴ ἐτέρῳ ταῦτ' ἐννοεῖ.

¹ πᾶν <ἂν> nos: πᾶν mss.: γ' ἂν Cook Wilson ² οὖν <εἰ> ἔστι τι Cook Wilson: οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν' ἕνεστι L: οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν' ἔστι R ³ λόγους L: λεκτά R ⁴ οὐδ' ἕτερος Newiger: οὐδεὶς ἕτερον mss.: ἕτερον del. Foss

b (B3) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.65–87

[Introduction: the three theses]

[65] ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ Περὶ φύσεως τρία κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς κεφάλαια κατασκευάζει, ἐν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν, δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ, τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῖ γε ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας.

understand the same thing? For it is not possible that the same be at the same time in multiple things that are separately, for one would be two. [24] And even if it were, he says, in multiple things and were identical, nothing prevents it from seeming dissimilar to them, given that they are not similar everywhere nor in the same [scil. place]. For if they were in the same [scil. place], they would be only one [scil. individual] and not two.

[25] But it is manifest that the same [scil. individual] does not even perceive similar things [scil. to what] he himself [scil. perceives] at the same time, but instead different things by hearing and by sight, and differently now and formerly. So that even less could someone perceive identically to someone else. [26] So that therefore <if> something is knowable, no one could indicate it to someone else, since things are not speeches, and since no one thinks an identical thing to someone else.

b (B3) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

[Introduction: the three theses]

[65] In his text entitled *On Nonbeing* or *On Nature*, he [i.e. Gorgias] maintains three main points in sequence: one, the first one, that nothing is; second, that even if [scil. something] is, it cannot be apprehended by a human; third, that even if it can be apprehended, nonetheless it can certainly not be expressed and explained to someone else.

[Summary of the argument for the first thesis]

[66] ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεται τὸν τρόπον τούτων· εἰ γὰρ ἔστι,¹ ἦτοι τὸ ὄν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὄν ἔστι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν, ὡς παραστήσει, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς παραμυθήσεται, οὔτε τὸ ὄν καὶ μὴ ὄν,² ὡς καὶ τοῦτο διδάξει· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι.

¹ ἔστι <τι> Bekker

² <τὸ> μὴ ὄν Bekker

[The argument for the first thesis]

[What is not is not]

[67] καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν, ἔσται τε ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἔσται· ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὄν νοεῖται, οὐκ ἔσται, ἢ δὲ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, πάλιν ἔσται. παντελῶς δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ εἶναι τι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν.

καὶ ἄλλως· εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι, τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔσται· ἐναντία γὰρ ἔστι ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ εἰ τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ εἶναι, τῷ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ εἶναι. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν <τοῖνον>¹ οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται.

¹ <τοῖνον> Bekker

[What is is not]

[Eternal or generated or both eternal and generated]

[68] καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν, ἦτοι αἰδιόν ἔστιν ἢ γενητὸν ἢ αἰδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν· οὔτε δὲ αἰδιόν ἔστιν οὔτε γενητόν οὔτε ἀμφοτέρα, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν.

[Summary of the argument for the first thesis]

[66] That nothing is, then, he argues in the following way: if [scil. something] is, then it is either what is or what is not, or both what is and what is not. But neither is what is, as he will prove, nor what is not, as he will suggest, nor what is and is not, as he will teach, this too. Therefore, nothing is.

[The argument for the first thesis]

[What is not is not]

[67] Certainly, what is not is not. For if what is not is, then at the same time it will be and will not be. For insofar as it is thought as not being, it will not be, while insofar as it is what is not, inversely it will be. But it is completely absurd for something at the same time to be and not to be. Thus what is not is not.

And in a different way: if what is not is, what is will not be. For these are opposed to each other, and if being comes about for what is not, nonbeing will come about for what is. But it is not the case that what is is not: <therefore> what is not will not be either.

[What is is not]

[Eternal or generated or both eternal and generated]

[68] And again: the existent is not either. For if what is is, it is either eternal, or generated, or at the same time eternal and generated. But it is neither eternal, nor generated, nor both, as we shall show. So what is is not.

[Eternal]

εἰ γὰρ αἰδιὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν (ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἐντεύθεν), οὐκ ἔχει τινα ἀρχήν. [69] τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον πᾶν ἔχει τιν' ἀρχήν, τὸ δὲ αἰδιὸν ἀγέννητον καθεστῶς οὐκ εἶχεν ἀρχήν. μὴ ἔχον δὲ ἀρχήν ἀπειρόν ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ἀπειρόν ἐστίν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ πού ἐστίν, ἕτερον αὐτοῦ ἐστίν ἐκέينو τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτ' ἀπειρον ἔσται τὸ ὄν ἐμπεριεχόμενον τινι μείζον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου τὸ ἐμπεριέχον, τοῦ δὲ ἀείρου οὐδὲν ἐστὶ μείζον, ὥστε οὐκ ἐστὶ που τὸ ἀπειρον. [70] καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχεται. ταῦτόν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ δύο γενήσεται τὸ ὄν, τόπος τε καὶ σῶμα (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ᾧ τόπος ἐστίν, τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ σῶμα). τοῦτο δὲ γε ἄτοπον. τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν. ὥστ' εἰ αἰδιὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν, ἀπειρόν ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ ἀπειρόν ἐστίν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ μηδαμοῦ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐστίν. τοίνυν εἰ αἰδιὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχήν ὄν ἐστίν.

[Generated]

[71] καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ γενητὸν εἶναι δύναται τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν, ἦτοι ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γέγονεν. ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος γέγονεν· εἰ γὰρ ὄν ἐστίν, οὐ γέγονεν ἀλλ' ἐστίν ἤδη· οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὐδὲ γεννησαί τι δύναται διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀφείλειν ὑπάρξεως μετέχειν τὸ γεννητικόν τιος. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ γενητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν.

[Eternal]

For if what is eternal (for this is where one must start from), it has no beginning. [69] For everything that comes to be has some beginning, while what is eternal, being ungenerated, has not had a beginning. Not having a beginning, it is unlimited. And if it is unlimited, it is nowhere. For if it is somewhere, then what it is in is different from it, and in this way what is, being enclosed within something, will no longer be unlimited. For what encloses is larger than what is enclosed, while nothing is larger than the unlimited, so that the unlimited is not somewhere. [70] And again: it is not enclosed within itself either. For the 'in which' and the 'in it' will be identical, and what is will become two, place and body (for the 'in which' is a place, and the 'in it' is a body). But this is quite absurd. Therefore what is is not in itself either. So that if what is is eternal, it is unlimited; if it is unlimited, it is nowhere; and if it is nowhere, it is not. Therefore if what is is eternal, it is absolutely not something that is.

[Generated]

[71] And again: what is cannot come to be either. For if it has come to be, it has come to be generated either out of what is or out of what is not. But it has not come to be out of what is (for if it is something that is, it has not come to be but already is) nor out of what is not (for what is not is not able to generate anything because what is generative of something must necessarily have a share in existence). So what is is not generated either.

[Both eternal and generated]

[72] κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ συναμφότερον, αἰδιον ἄμα καὶ γενητόν ταῦτα γὰρ ἀναιρετικά ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐ γέγονεν, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰδιον. τοίνυν εἰ μήτε αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν μήτε γενητόν μήτε τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὄν.

[One or multiple]

[73] καὶ ἄλλως· εἰ ἐστὶν, ἥτοι ἓν ἐστὶν ἢ πολλά· οὔτε δὲ ἓν ἐστὶν οὔτε πολλά, ὡς παρασταθήσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν.

εἰ γὰρ ἓν ἐστὶν, ἥτοι ποσόν ἐστὶν ἢ συνεχές ἐστὶν ἢ μέγεθός ἐστὶν ἢ σῶμά ἐστιν. ὃ τι δὲ ἂν ἦ¹ τούτων, οὐχ ἓν ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ ποσὸν μὲν καθεστῶς διαιρεθήσεται, συνεχές δὲ ὄν τμηθήσεται. ὁμοίως δὲ μέγεθος νοούμενον οὐκ ἔσται ἀδιαίρετον. σῶμα δὲ τυγχάνον τριπλοῦν ἔσται· καὶ γὰρ μήκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος ἔξει. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ μηδὲν τούτων εἶναι λέγειν τὸ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἓν τὸ ὄν.

¹ εἴη mss., corr. Bekker

[74] καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστὶν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐστὶν ἓν, οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστὶν· σύνθεσις γὰρ τῶν καθ' ἓν ἐστὶ τὰ πολλά, διόπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀναιρουμένου συναναιρεῖται καὶ τὰ πολλά.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν οὔτε τὸ ὄν ἔστιν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστὶν, ἐκ τούτων συμφανές.

[Both eternal and generated]

[72] In the same way, it is not both, eternal and generated, at the same time. For these abolish each other, and if what is is eternal, it has not come to be, and if it has come to be, it is not eternal. Therefore, if what is is neither eternal nor generated nor both, what is could not be.

[One or multiple]

[73] And in a different way: if it is, it is either one or multiple. But it is neither one nor many, as will be proven; so what is is not.

For if it is one, it is either a [scil. discrete] quantity, or continuous, or a magnitude, or a body. But whichever of these it is, it is not one: if it is constituted as a quantity, it will be divided; if it is continuous, it will be cut; in the same way, if it is thought as a magnitude, it will not be indivisible; and if it turns out to be a body, it will be triple, for it will have length, breadth, and depth. But it is absurd to say that what is is not any of these: so what is is not one.

[74] And again: it is not multiple either. For if it is not one, it is not multiple either: for a plurality is a composition of unities, and that is why, if the one is destroyed, the plurality is destroyed together with it.

That neither what is is, nor what is not, is evident from these arguments.

[Both what is and what is not are not]

[75] ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀμφοτέρα ἔστιν, τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, εὐεπιλόγιστον. εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὄν ἔστι, ταῦτόν ἔσται τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁμόλογον· δέδεικται δὲ ταῦτό τούτῳ καθεστῶς τὸ ὄν· καὶ αὐτὸ τοῖνυν οὐκ ἔσται.

[76] οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' εἴπερ ταῦτόν ἔστι τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὄν, οὐ δύναται ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα, οὐ ταῦτόν, καὶ εἰ ταῦτόν, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρα.

[Summary of the first thesis]

οἷς ἔπεται τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ μήτε τὸ ὄν ἔστι μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν μήτε ἀμφοτέρα, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν νοεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔστιν.

[The argument for the second thesis]

[If it is, what is is inconceivable]

[77] ὅτι δὲ κὰν ἦ τι, τοῦτο ἀγνωστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητόν ἔστιν ἀνθρώπῳ, παρακειμένως ὑποδεκτέον. εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα, φησὶν ὁ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὄν οὐ φρονεῖται. καὶ κατὰ λόγον ὡς περ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβέβηκεν εἶναι λευκοῖς, κὰν συμβεβήκει τοῖς λευκοῖς φρονεῖσθαι, οὕτως εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβέβηκεν μὴ εἶναι οὐσι, κατ' ἀνάγκην συμβήσεται τοῖς οὐσι μὴ φρονεῖσθαι. [78] διόπερ ὑγιᾶς καὶ σῶζον τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἔστι τὸ 'εἰ τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὄν οὐ φρονεῖται'. τὰ δὲ γε φρονούμενα (προληπτέον γάρ) οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται.

[Both what is and what is not are not]

[75] And that the two of them, both what is and what is not, are not either, is easy to argue. For if what is not is and what is is, what is not will be identical to what is, as far as being goes. And this is why neither of them is. For that what is not is not, is agreed. And it has been shown that what is is identical to this. Therefore it too will not be.

[76] And again: if it is true that what is is identical to what is not, it is not possible that both of them be. For if both of them are, they are not identical, and if they are identical, then both of them are not.

[Summary of the first thesis]

From this it follows that nothing is. For if neither what is, nor what is not, nor both, and if nothing can be thought of besides these, then nothing is.

[The argument for the second thesis]

[If it is, what is is inconceivable]

[77] But that even if something is, this is unknowable and unthinkable for a human, is to be shown in what follows. For if thoughts (*ta phronoumena*), says Gorgias, are not things that are, then what is is not thought of (*ou phroneitai*). And this is in conformity with reason (*logos*): for just as, if it happened to thoughts to be white, it would also happen to white things to be thoughts of, so too if it happens to thoughts to not be things that are, then of necessity it will happen to the things that are to not be thoughts of. [78] That is why [scil. the argument] 'if thoughts are not things that are, then what is is not something thought of' is sound and preserves logical consequence. Now, thoughts (for it must be anticipated) are not things that are, as we shall establish: so what is is not thought of.

καὶ ὅτι τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, συμφανές·
[79] εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα, πάντα τὰ φρο-
νούμενα ἔστιν, καὶ ὅπη ἂν τις αὐτὰ φρονήσῃ. ὅπερ
ἔστιν ἀπεμφαίνον ἢ δέ ἐστι, φαῦλον.¹ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν
φρονῆ τις ἄνθρωπον ἰπτάμενον ἢ ἄρματα ἐν πελάγει
τρέχοντα, εὐθέως ἄνθρωπος ἰπταται ἢ ἄρματα ἐν πε-
λάγει τρέχει. ὥστε οὐ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα.

¹ ἢ δέ ἐστι, φαῦλον nos: εἰ δέ ἐστι, φαῦλον mss., secl.
Bekker

[80] πρὸς τούτοις εἰ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα, τὰ μὴ
ὄντα οὐ φρονηθήσεται. τοῖς γὰρ ἐναντίοις τὰ ἐναντία
συμβέβηκεν, ἐναντίου δέ ἐστι τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως, εἰ τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ
φρονεῖσθαι, τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ φρονεῖ-
σθαι. ἄτοπον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ Σκύλλα καὶ Χί-
μαιρα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ ὄντων φρονεῖται, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ
ὄν φρονεῖται. [81] ὥσπερ τε τὰ ὁρώμενα διὰ τοῦτο
ὁρατὰ λέγεται ὅτι ὁράται, καὶ τὰ ἀκουστὰ διὰ τοῦτο
ἀκουστὰ ὅτι ἀκούεται, καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν ὁρατὰ ἐκβάλλο-
μεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀκούεται, τὰ δὲ ἀκουστὰ παραπέμπομεν
ὅτι οὐχ ὁράται (ἕκαστον γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας αἰσθή-
σεως ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλης ὀφείλει κρίνεσθαι), οὕτω καὶ
τὰ φρονούμενα καὶ εἰ μὴ βλέπεται τῇ ὄψει μηδὲ ἀκού-
οιτο τῇ ἀκοῇ ἔσται, ὅτι πρὸς τοῦ οἰκείου λαμβάνεται
κριτηρίου. [82] εἰ οὖν φρονεῖ τις ἐν πελάγει ἄρματα
τρέχειν, καὶ εἰ μὴ βλέπει ταῦτα, ὀφείλει πιστεῦν ὅτι
ἄρματα ἔστιν ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα. ἄτοπον δὲ τοῦτο
οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται.

And that thoughts are not things that are, is evident.
[79] For if thoughts are things that are, all the [scil. things]
thought of are, and in whatever way one thinks of them—
which contradicts appearances; and in what way this is so,
is something trivial. For it is not because someone thinks
that a human flies or that chariots race in the sea, that im-
mediately a human flies or chariots race in the sea. So that
it is not the case that [scil. things] thought of are things
that are.

[80] Besides, if thoughts are things that are, the things that
are not will not be thoughts of. For opposites happen to
opposites, and what is not is opposite to what is.

And that is why, in general, if it happens to what is to
be thought of, it will happen to what is not to not be
thought of. But this is absurd. For Scylla, Chimera, and
many things that are not are thought of. So it is not the
case that what is is thought of. [81] And just as the things
seen are said to be visible because they are seen, and the
things heard are said to be audible because they are heard,
and just as we do not reject the things seen because they
are not heard, and we do not dismiss the things heard
because they are not seen (for each one must be distin-
guished by its own organ of perception and not by a dif-
ferent one), so too the [scil. things] thought of will be, even
if they are not seen by sight or heard by hearing, because
they are grasped by their own criterion. [82] So that if
someone has the thought that chariots are racing in the
sea, even if he does not see them, he must have the convic-
tion that chariots really are, racing in the sea. But this is
absurd. So it is not the case that what is is thought of and
apprehended.

[The argument for the third thesis]

[If what is is conceivable, it cannot be communicated]

[83] καὶ εἰ καταλαμβάνοιτο δέ, ἀνέξοιστον ἑτέρῳ. εἰ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ὁρατὰ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκουστὰ καὶ κοινῶς αἰσθητά, ἅπερ ἐκτὸς ὑπόκειται, τούτων τε τὰ μὲν ὁρατὰ ὁράσει καταληπτά ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ ἀκουστὰ ἀκοῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐναλλάξ, πῶς οὖν δύναται ταῦτα ἑτέρῳ μνησθῆναι; [84] ᾧ γὰρ μνηνόμεν, ἐστὶ λόγος, λόγος δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ὄντα μνηνόμεν τοῖς πέλας ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὃς ἕτερός ἐστι τῶν ὑποκειμένων. καθάπερ οὖν τὸ ὁρατὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀκουστὸν καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὄν ἐκτός, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο λόγος ὁ ἡμέτερος. [85] μὴ ὦν δὲ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δηλωθείη ἑτέρῳ. ὃ γε μὴν λόγος, φησὶν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἕξωθεν προσπιπτόντων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων συνίσταται, τουτέστι τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ χυλοῦ ἐγκυρήσεως ἐγγίνεται ἡμῖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτης τῆς ποιότητος ἐκφερόμενος λόγος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ χρώματος ὑποπτώσεως ὁ κατὰ τοῦ χρώματος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἐκτός παραστατικός ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκτός τοῦ λόγου μνηντικὸν γίνεται. [86] καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι ὄν τρόπον τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ ἀκουστὰ ὑπόκειται, οὕτως καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὥστε δύνασθαι ἐξ ὑποκειμένου αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄντος τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα μνησθῆναι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὑπόκειται, φησὶν, ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῶν λοιπῶν ὑποκειμένων, καὶ πλείστῳ διενήνοχε τὰ ὁρατὰ σώματα τῶν λόγων· δι' ἑτέρου γὰρ ὀργάνου ληπτὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ δι' ἄλλου ὁ λόγος. οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδείκνυται

[The argument for the third thesis]

[If what is is conceivable, it cannot be communicated]

[83] But even if it were apprehended, it would not be expressible for someone else. For if the things that are are visible and audible and, in general, perceptible, those that exist externally, and if among these the visible ones are apprehended by sight and the audible ones by hearing, and not reciprocally, how then can these be indicated to someone else? [84] For what we indicate by is speech (*logos*), but the things that exist and that are are not speech. So it is not the things that are that we indicate to other people, but rather speech, which is different from the things that exist. So just as what is visible could not become audible and vice versa, so too, since what is exists externally, it could not become our speech; [85] and not being speech, it could not be revealed to another person. Surely speech, he says, is constituted out of the external things that strike us, that is, from perceptibles. For from the encounter with flavor there comes to us speech that expresses this quality, and from the occurrence of color that which expresses color. But if this is the case, it is not the speech that presents the external thing, but the external thing that indicates the speech. [86] And again: it is not possible either to say that speech exists in the same way as visible and audible things exist, so that the things that exist and that are could be indicated on the basis of a thing itself that exists and that is. For even if speech exists, he says, it nonetheless differs from all the other things that exist, and there is nothing that differs more than visible bodies and speeches. For what is visible is grasped by one organ, speech by a different one. So speech does not indi-

τὰ πολλὰ¹ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
ἐκείνα τὴν ἀλλήλων διαδηλοῖ φύσιν [. . . = R26].

¹ πολλὰ mss.: λοιπὰ Heintz

Political Orations (D27–D33)
Contents and Occasions of Some of Gorgias'
Political Orations (D27)

D27 (< A1) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.9.4–5, p. 12.10–11,
13–20 Kayser

[4] ἐμπρέπων δὲ καὶ ταῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων πανηγύρεσι
τὸν μὲν λόγον τὸν Πυθικὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ ἤχησεν
[. . . = P33d], ὁ δὲ Ὀλυμπικὸς λόγος ὑπὲρ τοῦ μεγί-
στου αὐτῷ ἐπολιτεύθη. στασιάζουσαν γὰρ τὴν Ἑλ-
λάδα ὁρῶν ὁμοιοῖας ξύμβουλος αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τρέ-
πων ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ πείθων ἄθλα ποιέισθαι
τῶν ὄπλων μὴ τὰς ἀλλήλων πόλεις, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν
βαρβάρων χώραν. [5] ὁ δὲ Ἐπιτάφιος, ὃν διήλθεν
Ἀθήνησιν, εἶρηται μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων πε-
σοῦσι οὓς Ἀθηναῖοι δημοσίᾳ ξὺν ἐπαίνοις ἔθαψαν
[. . . = R19].

cate the multitude of things that exist, just as these do not
reveal their nature to each other [. . .].

Political Orations (D27–D33)
Contents and Occasions of Some of Gorgias'
Political Orations (D27)

D27 (< A1) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

Conspicuous too in the festal assemblies of the Greeks, he
made his *Pythian Oration* resound from the altar [. . .],
while his *Olympic Oration* [cf. **D31–D32**] was a public
act concerning a matter of the greatest importance. For
seeing that the Greeks were riven by dissension, he made
himself a counselor of concord for them, directing them
against the barbarians and persuading them to make the
prize of their weapons not each others' cities, but the bar-
barians' territory. The *Funeral Oration* [cf. **D28–D30**],
which he pronounced in Athens, was delivered on those
men who had fallen in the wars, whom the Athenians bur-
ied at public expense with eulogies [. . . = R19].

Fragments from Gorgias'
Political Orations (D28–D33)
Funeral Oration (Epitaphios) (D28–D30)

D28 (< B6) Syrian. *In Hermog.* 90.17–91.16 (cf. Plan. *In Hermog.* 5.548.9–551.1)

[. . . = **D1**] τῆς δὲ ἰδέας αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων τοιοῦτος ὁ χαρακτήρ. ἐγκωμιάζει δὲ τοὺς ἐν πολέμοις ἀριστεύσαντας Ἀθηναίων τί γὰρ ἀπὴν τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις ὦν δεῖ ἀνδράσι προσείναι; τί δὲ¹ προσῆν ὦν δεῖ ἀπεῖναι;² εἰπεῖν δυναίμην ἂ βούλομαι, βουλοίμην δ' ἂ δεῖ, λαθὼν μὲν τὴν θείαν νέμεσιν, φυγῶν δὲ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον φθόνον. οὗτοι γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο ἔνθεον μὲν τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀνθρώπινον δὲ τὸ θνητόν, πολλὰ μὲν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον³ ἐπεικὲς τοῦ αὐθάδους δικαίου προκρίνοντες, πολλὰ δὲ νόμου ἀκριβείας λόγων ὀρθότητα,⁴ τοῦτον νομίζοντες θεϊότατον καὶ κοινότατον νόμον,⁵ τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι καὶ λέγειν καὶ σιγᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν⁶ <καὶ εἶν>, καὶ δισσὰ ἀσκήσαντες μάλιστα ὦν δεῖ, γνώμην <καὶ ῥώμην>,⁷ τὴν μὲν βουλευόντες τὴν δ' ἀποτελοῦντες,⁸ θεράποντες μὲν τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχούντων, κολασταὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχούντων, αὐθάδεις πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον,⁹ εὐόργητοι πρὸς τὸ

¹ post δὲ add. Plan. καὶ ² ὦν οὐ δεῖ προσείναι Plan.

³ παρὸν Plan. (om. Syr., cf. ad 4), corr. Spengel

⁴ πολλὰ μὲν . . . ὀρθότητα om. Syr. ⁵ νόμον ex νόμον

Syr. (V): τῶν νόμων cj. Rabe ⁶ <καὶ εἶν> Sauppe

Fragments from Gorgias'
Political Orations (D28–D33)
Funeral Oration (Epitaphios) (D28–D30)

D28 (< B6) Syrianus, *Commentary on Hermogenes' On Types of Style*

[. . .] The character of his kind of discourses is the following—he is eulogizing those Athenian men who distinguished themselves in the wars: **For what was lacking in these men of what men should possess? And what did they possess of what men should not possess? If only I could say what I wish, and wish what one should, unnoticed by divine retribution, and escaping from human envy! For these men possessed a virtue that was divine, and a mortality that was human, often preferring gentle equity to implacable justice, and often the correctness of words (*logoi*) to the punctiliousness of the law (*nomos*), considering the most divine and most universal law to be this: both to say and to leave unsaid, and to do <and to leave undone>, what is necessary when it is necessary; and practicing the two things that are above all necessary, judgment (*gnōmē*) <and strength (*rhōmē*)>, liberating by the one and applying the other, caring for those who suffer misfortune unjustly and punishing those who enjoy good fortune unjustly, indefatigable with regard to utility, good tempered with**

⁷ <καὶ ῥώμην> Foss

⁸ καὶ δισσὰ . . . ἀποτελοῦντες om. Syr.

⁹ αὐθάδεις . . . συμφέρον om. Syr.

πρέπον, τῷ φρονίμῳ τῆς γνώμης παύοντες τὸ ἄφρον
 <τῆς ῥώμης>,¹⁰ ὑβρισταὶ εἰς τοὺς ὑβριστάς,¹¹ κό-
 σμοὶ εἰς τοὺς κοσμίους, ἀφοβοὶ εἰς τοὺς ἀφόβους,
 δεινοὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς. μαρτύρια δὲ τούτων τρόπαια
 ἐστήσαντο τῶν πολεμίων, Διὸς μὲν ἀγάλματα, ἑαυ-
 τῶν¹² δὲ ἀναθήματα, οὐκ ἄπειροὶ οὔτε ἐμφύτου ἄρεος
 οὔτε νομίμων ἐρώτων οὔτε ἐνοπλίου ἔριδος οὔτε φι-
 λοκάλου εἰρήνης, σεμνοὶ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ
 δικαίῳ, ὅσοιοι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τοκέας τῇ θεραπείᾳ, δι-
 καιοὶ δὲ¹³ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστοὺς τῷ ἴσῳ, εὐσεβεῖς δὲ
 πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τῇ πίστει. τοιγαροῦν αὐτῶν ἀπο-
 θανόντων ὁ πόθος οὐ συναπέθανεν, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος
 ἐν οὐκ¹⁴ ἀθανάτοις¹⁵ σώμασι ζῆ οὐ ζώντων.

¹⁰ <τῆς ῥώμης> Sauppe ¹¹ ὑβρίζοντας Syr. ¹² τού-
 των mss., corr. Sauppe ¹³ δὲ om. Syr. (S), Plan. ¹⁴ ἐν
 οὐκ Syr. (S), Plan. (Mon. Par. 2916 et 2918): οὐκ ἐν Syr. (V), Plan.
 (Venet.) ¹⁵ ἀσωμάτοις Plan. (Mon. Par. 2916 et 2918)

D29 (B5b) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.9.5, p. 12.28–29 Kayser
 [. . . = **R19**] τὰ μὲν κατὰ τῶν βαρβάρων τρόπαια
 ὕμνους ἀπαιτεῖ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων θρήνους.

D30 (< B5a) Ps.-Longin. 3.2

a

Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζεὺς

b

γῦπες ἐμψυχοὶ τάφοι

regard to decorum, stopping the madness <of
 strength> by the wisdom of judgment, violent toward
 violent men, orderly toward orderly ones, fearless
 toward fearless ones, formidable in [or: among] for-
 midable [scil. circumstances or: men] Witnesses of
 these things are the victory trophies they erected
 won from their enemies, cult offerings (*agalmata*) to
 Zeus but votive dedications (*anathēmata*) of them-
 selves—men who were not inexperienced either in
 inborn martial valor, or in lawful loves, or in armed
 conflict, or in beauty-loving peace, showing piety
 toward the gods by their justice, reverence to their
 parents by their solicitude, justice to their fellow
 citizens by their equality, respect to their friends by
 their trustworthiness. That is why the longing for
 these men who have died has not died with them,
 but lives deathless, in bodies not deathless, [scil. long-
 ing] for men who are no longer alive.

D29 (B5b) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

[. . .] Trophies won from the barbarians demand
 hymns, those from the Greeks dirges (*thrēnoi*).

D30 (< B5a) Ps.-Longinus, *On the Sublime*

a

Xerxes, the Zeus of the Persians

b

vultures, living tombs [cf. **R22**]

Olympic Oration, On Concord
(Olympikos) (D31–D32)D31 (B7) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.14 1414b29–33

λέγεται δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμια ἐξ ἐπαίνου ἢ ψόγου· οἷον Γοργίας μὲν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ λόγῳ “ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἄξιοι θαυμάζεσθαι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἕλλη- νες.” ἐπαινεῖ γὰρ τοὺς τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγοντας.

¹ ὑπὲρ SauppeD32 (B8) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1.51.3

καὶ τὸ ἀγώνισμα ἡμῶν κατὰ τὸν Λεοντῖνον Γοργίαν διττῶν¹ ἀρετῶν δέεται, τόλμης καὶ σοφίας· τόλμης μὲν τὸ κίνδυνον ὑπομείναι, σοφίας δὲ τὸ αἰνιγμα² γνῶναι. ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος καθάπερ τὸ κήρυγμα τὸ Ὀλυμπίασι καλεῖ μὲν τὸν βουλόμενον, στεφανοῖ δὲ τὸν δυνάμενον.

¹ διττῶν δὲ mss., δὲ secl. Wilamowitz: <διττόν>, διττῶν δὲ Cobet ² αἰνιγμα mss.: πλίγμα Diels; αἴσιμα Bernays

Encomium for the Eleans (D33)D33 (B10) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.14 1416a1–3

τοιούτου γὰρ τὸ Γοργίου Ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἡλείους· οὐδὲν γὰρ προεξαγκωνίσσας οὐδὲ προανακινήσας εὐθὺς ἀρχεται “Ἕλις πόλις εὐδαίμων.”

Olympic Oration, On Concord
(Olympikos) (D31–D32)D31 (B7) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

The proems of epideictic speeches are derived from praise or blame, as Gorgias does in his *Olympic Oration*: “**Worthy of being admired by many people, o men of Greece!**” For he is praising the organizers of the festal assemblies.

D32 (B8) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*

And our combat, to use the words of Gorgias of Leontini, requires two virtues, **bravery** and **intelligence: bravery to endure danger, intelligence to understand the riddle** (?). For our [scil. holy] Word, like the herald’s announcement at Olympia, **summons the man who wants to, but it crowns the one who can.**¹

¹ What belongs to Gorgias in Clement’s text is not certain. Gorgias might have said “our combat,” and compared himself to the herald in Olympia.

Encomium for the Eleans (D33)D33 (B10) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

An example [scil. of a discourse that enters immediately into its subject matter] is Gorgias’ *Encomium for the Eleans*: for without warming up at all, without a prelude, he begins at once: “**Elis, fortunate city!**”

Fragments from Unidentified Works (D34–D46)
On Being and Appearing (D34)

D34 (B26) Procl. *In Hes. Op.* 83 (cclix Marzillo)

οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀληθὲς ὃ ἔλεγε Γοργίας · ἔλεγε δὲ τὸ
 μὲν εἶναι ἀφανὲς μὴ τυχόν τοῦ δοκεῖν, τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν
 ἀσθενὲς μὴ τυχόν τοῦ εἶναι.

On Tragedy (D35–D36)

D35 (B23) Plut. *Gloria Ath.* 5 348 C

ἤνθησε δ' ἡ τραγωδία καὶ διεβοήθη, θαυμαστὸν
 ἀκρόαμα καὶ θέαμα τῶν τότε ἀνθρώπων γενομένη καὶ
 παρασχοῦσα τοῖς μύθοις καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀπάτην,
 ὡς Γοργίας φησὶν, ἦν ὁ τ' ἀπατήσας δικαιοτέρος
 τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος
 τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπατήσας δικαιοτέ-
 ρος, ὅτι τοῦθ' ὑποσχόμενος πεποίηκεν ὁ δ' ἀπατηθεὶς
 σοφώτερος· εὐάλωτον γὰρ ὑφ' ἡδονῆς λόγων τὸ μὴ
 ἀναίσθητον.

D36 (B24) Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 7.10.2 715E

[. . .] εἶπεν ἐν τῶν δραμάτων αὐτοῦ μεστὸν¹ Ἄρεως
 εἶναι, τοὺς Ἑπτ' ἐπὶ Θήβας.

¹ μέγιστον mss., corr. Reiske

Fragments from Unidentified Works (D34–D46)
On Being and Appearing (D34)

D34 (B26) Proclus, *Commentary on Hesiod's Works and Days*

For what Gorgias said is not absolutely true. He said that
**being is without evidence if it does not encounter
 appearing, and appearing is without force if it does
 not encounter being.**

On Tragedy (D35–D36)

D35 (B23) Plutarch, *On the Glory of the Athenians*

Tragedy flourished and was acclaimed—it was a marvelous
 spectacle for the ears and eyes of the men who lived in
 those times, which produced by means of stories and suf-
 ferings, “**a deception,**” as Gorgias says, “**in which the
 one who deceives is more just than the one who does
 not deceive, and the one who is deceived is more
 intelligent than the one who is not deceived.**” For the
 one who deceives is more just because he has done what
 he has promised, and the one who is deceived is more
 intelligent, for whoever is not insensible is easily captured
 by the pleasure of words.

D36 (B24) Plutarch, *Table Talk*

[. . . scil. Gorgias] said that one of his [i.e. Aeschylus']
 dramas, *Seven Against Thebes*, was “**full of Ares.**”

*Homer's Lineage (D37)*D37 (B25) Procl. *Chrestom.*, p. 100.5–6

[. . .] Γοργίας δὲ ὁ Λεοντίνος εἰς Μουσαίου ἀνάγει.

*A Scene of Turmoil (D38)*D38 (B27) *Schol. in Hom. Il.* 4.450a

καὶ Γοργίας ἀνεμίσγοντο δὲ λιταῖς ἀπειλαὶ καὶ εὐχαῖς οἰμωγαί.

*On the Granting of Citizenship at Larisa (D39)*D39 (A19) Arist. *Pol.* 3.2 1275b25–30

Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντίνος τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος ἔφη καθάπερ ὄλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὄλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους· εἶναι γὰρ τινὰς Λαρισοποιοῦς.

*Homer's Lineage (D37)*D37 (B25) Proclus, *Life of Homer*

[. . .] Gorgias of Leontini derives his [i.e. Homer's lineage] from Musaeus.

*A Scene of Turmoil (D38)*D38 (B27) Scholia on Homer's *Iliad*And Gorgias: **Threats were mixed with entreaties and laments with prayers.**¹¹ Diels thinks that the phrase might come from the *Funeral Oration*.*On the Granting of Citizenship at Larisa (D39)*D39 (A19) Aristotle, *Politics*Gorgias of Leontini, in part perhaps because he was really at a loss what to say, in part ironically, said that just as mortars are what are made by mortar makers, so too Lariseans are those who are made by 'people makers' (*dēmiourgoti*), for these are Larisean-makers.¹¹ The pun cannot be translated but only explained: *dēmiourgos* means literally 'people maker' but was applied to craftsmen and also to the magistrates of Larisa who were responsible for assigning citizenship. Larisa was famous for a kind of pot made by craftsmen.

*Praise for Cimon's Generosity (D40)***D40** (B20) Plut. *Cim.* 10

ἔτι τοῖνυν Γοργίας μὲν ὁ Λεοντίνος φησι τὸν Κίμωνα
τὰ χρήματα κτᾶσθαι μὲν ὡς χρῶτο, χρῆσθαι δὲ ὡς
τιμῶτο.

*Friendship and Justice (D41)***D41** (B21) Plut. *Adul. ab amic.* 23 64 C

ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἀπεφαίνετο Γοργίας,
αὐτῷ μὲν ἀξιώσει τὰ δίκαια τὸν φίλον ὑπουργεῖν,
ἐκείνῳ δ' αὐτὸς ὑπηρετήσῃ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν μὴ δι-
καίων.

*On Decorum in Women (D42)***D42** (B22) Plut. *Mulier.* 242 E

ἡμῖν δὲ κομψότερος μὲν ὁ Γοργίας φαίνεται, κλεῦων
μὴ τὸ εἶδος ἀλλὰ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι πολλοῖς γνώριμον
τῆς γυναικός.

*Examples of Invectives (D43)***D43** (B15) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.3 1405b38–1406a1

a

πρωχομουσοκόλακας¹*Praise for Cimon's Generosity (D40)***D40** (B20) Plutarch, *Cimon*

Gorgias of Leontini too [scil. like Aristotle and Cratinus]
says that **Cimon acquired money in order to make use
of it, and made use of it in order to be honored.**

*Friendship and Justice (D41)***D41** (B21) Plutarch, *How to Tell the Flatterer from the Friend*

For a friend will not do what Gorgias said: expect his
friend to assist him when he acts justly, and himself often
help his friend even when he acts unjustly.

*On Decorum in Women (D42)***D42** (B22) Plutarch, *On the Virtues of Women*

Gorgias seems to us to be more refined [scil. than Thucyd-
ides, who says that the most seemly woman is the one
about whom people speak the least], when he demands
that it not be a woman's beauty, but her reputation, that
be known to many people [cf. **D24** [2]].

*Examples of Invectives (D43)***D43** (B15) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

a

beggar-Muse-flatterers

¹ πρωχώμουσος κόλαξ mss., corr. Vahlen

b

ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατευορκήσαντας¹

¹ καὶ κατευορκήσαντας AF: καὶ κατορκ- ε: καὶ κατεπιορκ-
Lobeck: καὶ εὐορκ-Vahlen: [καὶ] κατ' εὐορκήσαντος Diels

*Examples of Metaphors (D44)*D44 (B16) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.3 1406b9–10

χλωρὰ καὶ ἄναιμα¹ τὰ πράγματα· σὺ δὲ ταῦτα αἰ-
σχρῶς μὲν ἔσπειρας, κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας·

¹ ἄναιμα F (anon): ἔναιμα AΔVet.

*Physical Doctrines (D45–D46)**Passages (D45)*

D45

a (< B4) Plat. *Men.* 76 a, c–e

[ME.] τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

[. . .]

[ΣΩ.] [c] βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι,

ἢ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσῃς; [. . .] οὐκοῦν λέγετε

ἀπορροάς τινὰς τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα;

[ME.] σφόδρα γε. [. . .] = EMP. D209

b

false-oath-swearers and good-oath-swearers [cf. R10a]

*Examples of Metaphors (D44)*D44 (B16) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

Matters sallow and bloodless [or: fresh and blood-
filled]. **You have sown these shamefully, you have**
harvested them badly [cf. R10b].

*Physical Doctrines (D45–D46)**Passages (D45)*

D45

a (< B4) Plato, *Meno*[Meno:] And as for color, Socrates, what do you say it is?
[. . .][Socrates:] Do you want me to answer in accordance with
Gorgias, so that you can follow best? [. . .] Do you not both
say that there are certain effluxes from the things that are,
in accordance with Empedocles?

[Meno:] Absolutely. [. . .]

b (< B5) Theophr. *igne* 73

ἐξάπτεται δὲ ἀπὸ τε τῆς ὑέλου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλκοῦ
καὶ τοῦ ἀργύρου τρόπον τινὰ ἐργασθέντων, οὐχ,
ὡσπερ Γοργίας φησὶ καὶ ἄλλοι δέ τινες οἴονται, διὰ
τὸ ἀπιέναι τὸ πῦρ διὰ τῶν πόρων.

The Nature of the Sun (D46)

D46 (> B31) Sopat. *Div. Quaest.* 8.23.21–23 Walz,
4.4.19–20 Weissenberger

μέγας εἰς σοφίαν Γοργίας, μύδρον εἶναι λέγων τὸν
ἥλιον καὶ τῷ λόγῳ φιλονεικῶν πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην
ὑπόθεσιν.

Appendix: Passages in Plato Relating to Gorgias
(D47–D53)

Cf. **P24**

The Teacher of Rhetoric (D47)

D47 (A21) Plat. *Men.* 95c

[ME.] καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἀγα-
μαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνου-
μένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾶ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ
ὑπισχνουμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἶεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δει-
νούς.

b (< B5) Theophrastus, *On Fire*

[scil. a fire] is ignited from glass, from bronze, and from
silver that have been worked in a certain way, and not, as
Gorgias says and some other people believe, because the
fire goes out through the passages.

The Nature of the Sun (D46)

D46 (> B31) Sopater, *Divisions of Questions*

Gorgias was great in wisdom, he who said that the sun is an
incandescent stone [cf. **ANAXAG.** D4[6], D36; **DRAM.**
T75a, b] and argued contentiously against any such hy-
pothesis.

Appendix: Passages in Plato Relating to Gorgias
(D47–D53)

Cf. **P24**

The Teacher of Rhetoric (D47)

D47 (A21) Plato, *Meno*

[Meno:] What I admire most of all in Gorgias, Socrates, is
that you would never hear him promise this [scil. to be
a teacher of virtue]. Instead, he laughs at other people
when he hears them make this promise. No, he thinks that
one should make people clever at speaking.

*The Nature of Rhetoric (D48–D51)***D48** (A28) Plat. *Gorg.* 453a

a 453a

[ΣΩ.] εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ.

b 454e–455a

[ΣΩ.] ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστι πιστευτικῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς, περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον.

D49 (A27) Plat. *Gorg.* 450b–c

[ΓΟ.] [. . .] τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον χειρουργήμα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πράξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστίν. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι.

D50 (A22) Plat. *Gorg.* 456b

[ΓΟ.] πολλάκις γὰρ ἦδη ἔγωγε μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρά τινα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχέιν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἰα-

*The Nature of Rhetoric (D48–D51)***D48** (A28) Plato, *Gorgias*

a

[Socrates:] If I understand at all, you [i.e. Gorgias] are saying that rhetoric is a producer (*dēmiourgos*) of persuasion, and that its whole activity and its main point is to accomplish this.

b

[Socrates:] So rhetoric, it seems, is a producer of persuasion that operates by persuading but not by teaching, regarding what is just and what is unjust.

D49 (A27) Plato, *Gorgias*

[Gorgias:] [. . .] while the knowledge of all the other arts involves almost entirely manual labor and activities of that sort, rhetoric is not at all a **manipulation** like this, but all its action and its **effectuation** is performed by means of speeches [cf. **D7**]. That is why I for one think that rhetoric is an art that concerns speeches, and, as I myself assert, I am right.

D50 (A22) Plato, *Gorgias*

[Gorgias:] For often I myself have gone with my brother [i.e. Herodicus, cf. **P3**] and with other doctors to call on some patient who refused to drink a potion or to permit the doctor to perform surgery or cauterization on him. And while the doctor was unable to persuade him, I suc-

τροῦ πείσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα οὐκ ἄλλη τέχνη ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ.

D51 (A26) Plat. *Phil.* 58a–b

[IP.] ἤκουον [. . .] Γοργίου πολλάκις ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέρει πασῶν τεχνῶν· πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῆ δούλα δι' ἐκόντων, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῦτο [. . .].

Kinds of Rhetoric (D52)

D52 (B14) Plat. *Phaedr.* 261b–c

[ΦΑΙ.] ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας· ἐπὶ πλεον δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα.

[ΣΩ.] ἀλλ' ἢ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσεῶς τέχνας μόνον περὶ λόγων ἀκήκοας, ἃς ἐν Ἰλίῳ σχολάζοντες συνεγραψάτην, τῶν δὲ Παλαμῆδους ἀνήκοος γέγονας; [ΦΑΙ.] καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε τῶν Νέστορος, εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἢ τινα Θρασύμαχόν τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσεῖα.

The Virtues (D53)

D53 (B19) Plat. *Men.* 71c–e

[ΣΩ.] ἀνάμνησον οὖν με πῶς ἔλεγεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ· δοκεῖ γὰρ δήπου σοὶ ἅπερ ἐκέλευε.

[ΜΕ.] ἔμοιγε.

ceeded in persuading him myself, applying no other art than rhetoric.

D51 (A26) Plato, *Philebus*

[Protarchus:] I have often heard [. . .] Gorgias [scil. say] that the art of persuasion is much superior to all the others, because it makes all the things upon which it acts slaves by their own consent and not by force [. . .].

Kinds of Rhetoric (D52)

D52 (B14) Plato, *Phaedrus*

[Phaedrus:] But speaking and writing with artistry seems to concern most of all trials, and, with regard to speaking, the assembly too. But that is all I have heard.

[Socrates:] But have you only heard of the treatises on speeches that Nestor and Odysseus wrote during their spare time in Troy, but not of the ones that Palamedes produced?

[Phaedrus:] No, by Zeus, I for one have not even heard of Nestor's, unless you are representing Gorgias as some Nestor, or some Thrasymachus or Theodorus as Odysseus.

The Virtues (D53)

D53 (B19) Plato, *Meno*

[Socrates:] So remind me of what he [i.e. Gorgias] said. If you don't mind, speak in your own name; for you share the same view as he does, don't you?

[Meno:] I do.

[ΣΩ.] ἐκέλευον μὲν τοίνυν ἐώμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀπεισιν· σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί φῆς ἀρετὴν εἶναι; εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσης, ἵνα εὐτυχέστατον ψεύσμα ἐψευσμένος ὦ, ἂν φανῆς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκῶς μηδεὶ πρόποτε εἰδοῦτι ἐντετυχηκέαι.

[ΜΕ.] [. . .] πρῶτον μὲν εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν, ῥᾶδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴ, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελεῖν, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σφύζουσάν τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὔσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶν παιδὸς ἀρετὴ καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου. καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι ἀρεταὶ εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς περὶ ὅτι ἐστὶν καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἑκάστον ἔργον ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ὡσαύτως δὲ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.

[Socrates:] Let us leave him out, since he is not here. But you yourself, by the gods, Meno, what do you say that virtue is? Tell me, and do not begrudge me, so that I can turn out to have uttered the most fortunate possible falsehood, if it can be shown that you and Gorgias know it, whereas I said that I had never met anyone who knew.

[Meno:] [. . .] First, if you want a man's virtue, it is easy [scil. to say] that this is a man's virtue: to be able to do the city's business and in so doing to help his friends and to harm his enemies, and to make sure that he himself suffers nothing like this. If you want a woman's virtue, it is not hard to describe: she must manage the household well, preserving what is inside and being obedient to her husband. And a child's virtue is different, be it a girl or a boy, and so too an old man's—be he a free man, if you want that, or a slave, if that is you want. And there are very many other virtues, so that there is no difficulty in saying what virtue is. For it is as a function of every [scil. kind of] action and of every age that each of us possesses the virtue relative to every task, and, I think, Socrates, the [scil. corresponding] defect (*kakia*).¹

¹ Aristotle alludes to this passage at *Pol.* 1.13 1260a27–28: "It is much better, when one speaks of the virtues, to enumerate them, as Gorgias does, rather than to define them in this way" [i.e. as Plato does in the *Meno*].

GORGIAS [82 DK]

R

*Ancient Works Dedicated to
Gorgias' Doctrines (R1)*

R1

a (ad B3) Diog. Laert. 5.25 (Arist.)

Πρὸς τὰ Γοργίου α΄

b (> A15a) Athen. *Deipn.* 11 505 D-E

[. . . = P24] Ἑρμιππος δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ Γοργίου [. . .].

Earliest References

See **DRAM. T20-T21**

GORGIAS

R

*Ancient Works Dedicated to
Gorgias' Doctrines (R1)*

R1

a (ad B3) Diogenes Laertius (Aristotle)

Concerning the Doctrines of Gorgias, one book

b (> A15a) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

[. . .] Hermippus, in his *On Gorgias* [. . .].

Earliest References

See **DRAM. T20-T21**

*His Stylistic Influence on Greek
Orators and Writers (R2–R7)
On Contemporary Athenian Writers (R2–R6)*

R2 (< A4) Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 3

ἤψατο δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηνησὶ ῥητόρων ἡ ποιητικὴ τε καὶ τροπικὴ φράσις, ὡς μὲν Τίμαιός φησι [FGrHist 566 F137] Γοργίου ἄρξαντος [. . . = **P13a**].

R3 (< A35) Philostr. *Ep.* 73, p. 257.7–23 Kayser

[. . . = **P12**] λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀσπασία ἡ Μιλησία τὴν τοῦ Περικλέους γλῶτταν κατὰ τὸν Γοργίαν θῆξαι, Κριτίας δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδης οὐκ ἀγνοοῦνται τὸ μεγαλάνυμον καὶ τὴν ὀφρὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ κεκτημένοι, μεταποιῶντες δὲ αὐτὸ ἐς τὸ οἰκεῖον ὁ μὲν ὑπ' εὐγλωττίας, ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ ῥώμης· καὶ Αἰσχίνης δὲ ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους [. . .] οὐκ ἄκνει γοργιάζειν ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Θαργηλίας λόγῳ· φησὶ γάρ που ᾧδε [Frag. 22 Dittmar]· “Θαργηλία Μιλησία ἐλθοῦσα εἰς Θετταλίαν ξυνῆν Ἀντιόχῳ Θετταλῷ βασιλεύοντι πάντων Θετταλῶν.” αἱ δὲ ἀποστάσεις αἱ τε προσβολαὶ τῶν λόγων Γοργίου ἐπεχωρίαζον πολλαχοῦ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν τῷ τῶν ἐποποιῶν κύκλῳ. πείθε δὴ καὶ σύ, ᾧ βασιλεία, [. . .] Πλούταρχον μὴ ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς σοφισταῖς, μηδὲ ἐς διαβολὰς καθίστασθαι τοῦ Γοργίου.

*His Stylistic Influence on Greek
Orators and Writers (R2–R7)
On Contemporary Athenian Writers (R2–R6)*

R2 (< A4) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Lysias*

The poetical and metaphorical style seized hold of the Athenian orators as well: Gorgias being the first, as Timaeus says [. . .].

R3 (< A35) Philostratus, *Letters*

[. . .] And Aspasia of Miletus is said to have whetted Pericles' tongue on Gorgias; it is well known that it is from him that Critias and Thucydides derived their glory and pride, transforming them into something of their own, the one by his eloquence, the other by his forcefulness. And Aeschines the Socratic [. . .] did not hesitate to Gorgianize in his speech about Thargelia: for he says somewhere, “Thargelia of Miletus came to Thessaly and was the companion of Antiochus of Thessaly, who reigned over all the Thessalians.” The detached phrases and the asyndetic sentences typical of Gorgias' speeches were often used, especially in the circle of the poets. So you too must believe, my Queen [scil. Julia Domna], that Plutarch [. . .] is not irritated with the sophists nor inclined toward slandering Gorgias [cf. **R15**].

R4 (< 84 A9) Marcell. *Thuc.* 36

ἐξήλωσε δ' ἐπ' ὀλίγον, ὡς φησιν Ἄντυλλος, καὶ τὰς Γοργίου τοῦ Λεοντίνου παρισώσεις καὶ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων, εὐδοκιμούσας κατ' ἐκείνο καιροῦ παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησι [. . .].

R5 (≠ DK) Diog. Laert. 2.63

[. . .] μάλιστα δὲ μιμείται Γοργίαν τὸν Λεοντῖνον.

R6

a (C1) Plat. *Symp.* 198c

[ΣΩ.] καὶ γάρ με Γοργίου ὁ λόγος ἀνεμίμνησκεν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἐπεπόνθη· ἐφοβούμην μὴ μοι τελευτῶν ὁ Ἀγάθων Γοργίου κεφαλὴν δεινοῦ λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πέμψας αὐτόν με λίθον τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ ποιήσειεν.

b (≠ DK) Schol. in Luc. *Rhet. Praec.* 11 (178.17 Rabe) (cf. Schol. in Plat. *Symp.* 172a)

ἐμιμείτο δὲ τὴν κομψότητα τῆς λέξεως Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος, ὡς Πλάτων ὁ φιλόσοφος Συμποσίῳ.

c (< A1) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.9.3, p. 12.6–9 Kayser

[. . . = P14] καὶ Ἀγάθων δὲ ὁ τῆς τραγωδίας ποιητής, ὃν ἡ κωμῳδία σοφόν τε καὶ καλλιπετῆ οἶδε, πολλαχοῦ τῶν ἰάμβων γοργιάζει.

R4 (< 84 A9) Marcellinus, *Life of Thucydides*

As Antyllus says, he [i.e. Thucydides], also emulated a bit the symmetries of Gorgias of Leontini and his antitheses of terms, which were very successful at that time among the Greeks [. . .].

R5 (≠ DK) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] Most of all he [i.e. Aeschines the Socratic] imitates Gorgias of Leontini.

R6

a (C1) Plato, *Symposium*

[Socrates:] For his speech [i.e. Agathon's, cf. 194e–197e] reminded me of Gorgias, so that I really suffered what Homer talks about [cf. *Od.* 11.632]: I was afraid that at the end Agathon in his speech would hurl the head of Gorgias, whose cleverness at speaking is so terrifying, against my own speech and would strike me dumb and turn me to stone.¹

¹ A pun on the names of Gorgias and of the Gorgon.

b (≠ DK) Scholia on Lucian

He [i.e. Agathon] imitated the stylistic refinement of Gorgias the orator, as Plato the philosopher says in the *Symposium*.

c (< A1) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

[. . .] And Agathon the tragic poet, whom comedy represents as wise and eloquent, Gorgianizes in many places in his iambs.

On Two Authors of the Second Sophistic (R7)

R7 (≠ DK) Philostr. *Vitae soph.*

a 1.21.5, p. 32.7–8 Kayser (Scopelianus)

ὠμίλει δὲ σοφιστῶν μὲν μάλιστα Γοργία τῷ Λεοντίνῳ [. . .].

b 2.11.3, p. 106.12–15 Kayser (Proclus Naucr.)

τὸ μὲν οὖν διαλεχθῆναι αὐτὸν ἐν σπανιστοῖς ἔκειτο, ὅτε δὲ ὀρμήσειεν ἐς διάλεξιν, ἰππιάζοντί τε ἐφῆκε καὶ γοργιάζοντι.

*General Judgments on Gorgias'**Rhetorical Practice (R8–R17)**Criticism of His Teaching Method (R8)*

R8 (< B14) Arist. *SE* 33 184a1–7

[. . . = **D4**] διόπερ ταχεία μὲν ἀτεχνος δ' ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ' αὐτῶν οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδῶσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν ποιεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἶτα σκνυτομικὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκει μηδ' ὅθεν δυνήσεται πορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημάτων.

On Two Authors of the Second Sophistic (R7)

R7 (≠ DK) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

a

He [i.e. Scopelianus] spent his time studying Gorgias of Leontini most of all the sophists [. . .].

b

Engaging in discussion was something that happened to him [i.e. Proclus of Naucratis] only very rarely, but when he was impelled to participate in a dialogue he seemed to Hippianize and to Gorgianize [cf. **HIPPIAS R6**].

*General Judgments on Gorgias'**Rhetorical Practice (R8–R17)**Criticism of His Teaching Method (R8)*

R8 (< B14) Aristotle, *Sophistic Refutations*

[. . .] That is why the instruction for those who learned from them [i.e. Gorgias and those who earned money for teaching eristic discourses] was rapid but untechnical. For they supposed that they were educating when they were imparting not a technique but what derives from a technique, as if someone said that he would provide the knowledge of how to make the feet free of pain, but then taught neither the cobbler's art nor the source from which this could be obtained, but instead presented many shoes of all kinds.

*Criticisms of His Style (R9–R17)***R9** (A29) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.1 1404 a 24–27

ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τὴν¹ δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο ποιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο λέξις, οἷον ἢ Γοργίου. καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν τοὺς τοιοῦτους οἴονται διαλέγεσθαι κάλλιστα.

¹ post τὴν hab. A δὲ, om. Dresd., secl. Spengel: γήνδε τὴν β

R10 Arist. *Rhet.***a** (B15) 3.3 1405 b 34–1406a1

τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ ἐν τέτταρσι γίνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἔν τε τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν [. . .] καὶ ὡς Γοργίας ἀνόμαζε πτωχομουσοκόλακας, ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατευορκήσαντας.

app. cf. ad **D43**

b (B16) 3.3 1406 b 4–11

καὶ ἔτι τέταρτον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίνεται [. . .] οἷον Γοργίας χλωρὰ καὶ ἀναιμα τὰ πράγματα· σὺ δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχυρῶς μὲν ἔσπειρας, κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας. ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν.

app. cf. ad **D44**

*Criticisms of His Style (R9–R17)***R9** (A29) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

Since it was because of their style that the poets seemed to have acquired their fine reputation even though what they said was simpleminded, for this reason in the beginning style was poetic, like that of Gorgias. And even now many uncultured people think that men like this are speaking in the finest way possible.

R10 Aristotle, *Rhetoric***a** (B15)

The effect of frigidity in style is of four kinds: in compound words [. . .] and as Gorgias called “**beggar-Muse-flatterers**” and “**false-oath-swearers and good-oath-swearers**” [= **D43**].

b (B16)

And there is a fourth kind of frigidity, in metaphors [. . .] as Gorgias says: “**matters sallow and bloodless** [or: fresh and blood-filled]. **You have sown these shamefully; you have harvested them badly**” [= **D44**]. For this is expressed too poetically.

c (A23) 3.3 1406 b 14-19

τὸ δὲ Γοργίου εἰς τὴν χελιδόνα, ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοῦ πεπομένη ἀφήκε τὸ περίττωμα, ἄριστα τῶν τραγικῶν εἶπε γὰρ "αἰσχρὸν γε, ὦ Φιλομήλα." ὄρνιθι μὲν γάρ, εἰ ἐποίησεν, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν, παρθένῳ δὲ αἰσχρὸν. εἶ οὖν ἐλοιδόρησεν εἰπὼν ὃ ἦν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὃ ἔστιν.

R11 (A32). Cic. *Orat.* 52.175, 176

[. . .] Gorgias [. . . = D19b] eis usus est intemperantius [. . .]. Gorgias autem avidior est generis eius et eis festivitibus (sic enim ipse censet) insolentius abutitur [. . .].

R12 (< A4) Diod. Sic. 12.53.4.

[. . . = D20] καὶ τισιν ἐτέροις τοιούτοις [. . .] ἂ τότε μὲν διὰ τὸ ξένον τῆς κατασκευῆς ἀποδοχῆς ἠξιούτο, νῦν δὲ περιεργίαν ἔχειν δοκεῖ καὶ φαίνεται καταγέλαστα πλεονάκεις καὶ κατακόρως τιθέμενα.¹

¹ καταγέλαστον . . . τιθέμενον mss., corr. Reiske

R13 (< A4) Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 3.4

δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντίνος ἐν πολλοῖς πάνυ φορτικὴν τε καὶ ὑπέρογκον ποιῶν τὴν κατασκευὴν καὶ "οὐ πόρρω διθυράμβων τινῶν" [Plat. *Phaedr.* 238d] ἔνια φθεγγόμενος, καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου συνουσιαστῶν οἱ περὶ Λικύμνιον καὶ Πῶλον [. . . = P13a].

c (A23)

What Gorgias said to the sparrow, when it flew at him and discharged its droppings, is in the best tragic style. For he said, "For shame, Philomela!" For it would not have been shameful for a bird to have done this, but for a maiden it was shameful. So his rebuke was appropriate only insofar as he said what she had been, but not what she was.

R11 (A32) Cicero, *The Orator*

Gorgias [. . .] used them [scil. a series of rhetorical techniques] without moderation [. . .]. Gorgias is too eager for this kind of style and he makes extravagant use of these 'pleasantries' (this is what he calls them himself) [. . .].

R12 (< A4) Diodorus Siculus

[. . .] and [scil. he was the first to use] other procedures of this kind [. . .] which, because of the unfamiliarity of their elaboration, were deemed worthy of approval at that time, but now are thought to have a certain excessiveness, and seem ridiculous when they are used too often and to the point of surfeit.

R13 (< A4) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Lysias*

An example of this [scil. the use of poetic devices in oratory] is presented by Gorgias of Leontini, who employs a stylistic elaboration that in many passages is entirely vulgar and overly pompous, and some of whose pronouncements are "not far from certain dithyrambs" [Plato, *Phaedrus* 238d] [. . .], as well as, among his disciples, the circles of Licymnius and Polus [. . .].

R14 (< A32) Dion. Hal. *Isaeus* 19.2

[. . .] παρέλιπον ἐκὼν οὓς ἤδευ ἤττον ἐν ταῖς ἰδέαις ταύταις κατορθούοντας, Γοργίαν μὲν τὸν Λεοντῖνον ἐκπίπτοντα τοῦ μετρίου καὶ πολλαχοῦ¹ παιδαριώδη γιγνόμενον ὀρῶν [. . .].

¹ πολλαχοῦ MBP: πανταχοῦ F

R15 (≠ DK) Plut. Frag. 186 Sandbach in Isid. Pelus. *Epist.* 2.42

Πλουτάρχῳ δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ σαφές καὶ λιτὸν¹ γνήσιον εἶναι Ἀττικισμόν· οὕτω γάρ, φησίν, ἐλάλησαν οἱ ῥήτορες. Γοργίας δ' ὁ Λεοντῖνος πρῶτος τὴν νόσον ταύτην εἰς τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους εἰσήγαγε, τὸ ὑψηλὸν καὶ τροπικὸν² ἀσπασάμενος καὶ τῇ σαφηνείᾳ λυμηνάμενος. ἤψατό τε, φησίν, ἡ νόσος αὕτη καὶ τοῦ θαυματοῦ Πλάτωνος.

¹ λείον mss., corr. Ruhnken

² τυπικὸν mss., corr. Bernardakis

R16 (≠ DK) Hermog. *Formis* 1.6, pp. 248.9–249.4 Kayser

[. . .] παρὰ δὲ τοῖς ὑποξύλοις τουτοιῖσι σοφισταῖς πάμπολλα εὖροις ἄν· τάφους τε γὰρ ἐμφύχους τοὺς γῦπας λέγουσιν, ὧν περ εἰσὶ μάλιστα ἄξιοι, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ψυχρεύονται πάμπολλα.

R14 (< A32) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Isaeus*

[. . .] I [i.e. Dionysius] have deliberately omitted those [scil. orators] whom I knew to be less successful [scil. than Isocrates] in these [scil. elevated] kinds of oratory: Gorgias of Leontini, for I saw that he exceeded good measure and often became puerile [. . .].

R15 (≠ DK) Plutarch in Isidore of Pelusium, *Letters*

Plutarch thinks that it is clarity and simplicity that produce genuine Atticism. For this is how, he says, the orators spoke. But Gorgias of Leontini was the first to introduce this disease into political speeches by welcoming sublimity and figures and by outraging clarity. And, he says, this disease also befell the admirable Plato.

R16 (≠ DK) Hermogenes, *On Forms*

[. . .] But you would find very many indeed [scil. examples of excessively figural expressions] among those counterfeit sophists: for they call vultures “living tombs” [cf. **D30b**]—what they themselves deserve most of all—and they supply many other examples of stylistic frigidity.

R17 (B5a) Athan. Alex. *In Hermog.* Περὶ στάσεων
14.180.9–16 = Frag. 14 Sauppe

[. . .] τὴν δὲ τρίτην ῥητορικὴν περὶ γελοιώδη τιὰ τῶν
μευρακίῳν τὸν κρότον ἀνεγείρουσαν καὶ κολακείαν
ὑπάρχουσαν ἀναιδῆ, ἣν καὶ μετεχειρίσαντο ἐν μὲν
χαρκτηρὶ καὶ ἐνθυμήμασιν¹ ἡμαρτημένους οἱ περὶ
Θρασύμαχον καὶ Γοργίαν, πολλῶ μὲν τῷ παρίσῳ
χρησάμενοι καὶ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν ἡγνοηκότες τούτου τοῦ
σχήματος, ἐν δὲ διανοίᾳ καὶ τρόπῳ λέξεως² ἄλλοι τε
πολλοὶ καὶ δὴ καὶ Γοργίας αὐτὸς κουφότητος ὧν [. . .]
= **R20**].

¹ ἐνθυμήματι ms., corr. Diels

² ζώης ms., corr. Diels

*Specific Judgments on
Individual Works (R18–R26)
Encomium of Helen, cf. D24 (R18)*

R18 (ad B14) Isocr. *Hel.* 14

διὸ καὶ τὸν γράψαντα περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης ἐπαινῶ μάλι-
στα τῶν εὖ λέγειν τι βουλευθέντων, ὅτι περὶ τοιαύτης
ἐμνήσθη γυναικός, ἣ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ κάλλει καὶ
τῇ δόξῃ πολὺ διήνεγκεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτον μι-
κρόν τι παρέλαθεν· φησὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον γεγραφέ-
ναι περὶ αὐτῆς, τυγχάνει δ' ἀπολογίαν εἰρηκῶς ὑπὲρ
τῶν ἐκείνη πεπραγμένων.

R17 (B5a) Athanasius of Alexandria, *Prolegomena to
Hermogenes' On Legal Issues*

[. . .] The third kind of rhetoric, which bears on ridiculous
matters and excites the applause of young people but is
really nothing but a shameless flattery, was put into prac-
tice in style, with errors of argumentation, by the mem-
bers of the circle of Thrasymachus and Gorgias, who made
much use of balanced expressions without recognizing the
opportune employment of this figure, and by many [scil.
orators] in thought and kind of diction, and above all by
Gorgias himself, a thoroughly worthless person [. . .].

*Specific Judgments on
Individual Works (R18–R26)
Encomium of Helen, cf. D24 (R18)*

R18 (ad B14) Isocrates, *Encomium of Helen*

This is why, among those who have wished to speak elo-
quently about something, I praise above all the man who
wrote about Helen, because he has reminded us of such a
woman, who was greatly surpassing in birth, beauty, and
fame. And yet he did make a slight slip too: for he says that
he has written an encomium about her, but in fact he has
pronounced a defense of her actions.

Funeral Oration (Epitaphios),
cf. D28–D30 (R19–R22)

R19 (< A1) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.9.5, p. 12.18, 20–27
Kayser

ὁ δὲ Ἐπιτάφιος [. . . = P27] σοφία δὲ ὑπερβαλλούση
ξύγκειται παροξύνων τε γὰρ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ Μή-
δους τε καὶ Πέρσας καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νοῦν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ
ἀγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ ὁμοιοῦς μὲν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλ-
ληνας οὐδὲν διήλθεν, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἦν ἀρ-
χῆς ἐρώντας, ἣν οὐκ ἦν κτήσασθαι μὴ τὸ δραστήριον
αἰρουμένους, ἐνδιέτριψε δὲ τοῖς τῶν Μηδικῶν τρο-
παίων ἐπαίνοις, ἐνδεικνύμενος αὐτοῖς ὅτι [. . . = D29].

R20 (B5a) Athan. Alex. *In Hermog.* Περὶ στάσεων
14.180.16–19 = Frag. 14 Sauppe

[. . . = R17] ὃς κατὰ τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν ταύτην² ἐν τῷ
Ἐπιταφίῳ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἰσχύων γῶπας εἰπεῖν ζῶντας
εἶρηκε τάφους· διανοία δὲ ὑπεκρίπτει τοῦ δέοντος
[. . .].

¹ ὡς καὶ ms., corr. Diels

² αὐτὴν Keil

R21 (≠ DK) Syr. *In Hermog.* 91.16–19 (cf. Plan. *In Hermog.* 5.551.1–5)

σεμνὰς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα συμφορήσας λέξεις ὁ Γοργίας
ἐννοίας ἐπιπολαιωτέρας ἐξαγγέλλει τοῖς τε παρίσοις

Funeral Oration (Epitaphios),
cf. D28–D30 (R19–R22)

R19 (< A1) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

The *Funeral Oration* [. . .] is composed with extraordi-
nary skill. For given that he wanted to rouse the Athenians
against the Medes and Persians and was arguing with the
same intention as in his *Olympic Oration*, he said nothing
at all about concord among the Greeks, since he was
speaking to Athenians (who desired supremacy, which
could only be achieved by choosing a very energetic pol-
icy), but instead he praised at length the trophies won
from the Medes, telling them that [. . . = D29].

R20 (B5a) Athanasius of Alexandria, *Prolegomena to Hermogenes' On Legal Issues*

[. . .] who [i.e. Gorgias], not having the nerve to say "vul-
tures" in this [scil. third] mode of diction in his *Fu-
neral Oration*, said "living tombs" [cf. D30b] And in its
thought this violates decorum [. . .].

R21 (≠ DK) Syrianus, *Commentary on Hermogenes' On Types of Style*

In this passage [scil. from the *Funeral Oration*, D28] Gor-
gias accumulates solemn expressions and proclaims quite
superficial thoughts, beautifying his whole speech to the

καὶ ὁμοιοκατάρκτοις καὶ ὁμοιοτελεύτοις καλλωπίζων
διόλου προσκόρως τὸν λόγον.

R22 (B5a) Ps.-Longin. 3.2

ταύτη καὶ τὰ τοῦ Λεοντίνου Γοργίου γελᾶται γράφον-
τος [... = **D30**].

On Non-Being or On Nature, cf. *D26 (R23–R26)*
A Judgment Concerning the Whole Text (R23)

R23 (B2) Olymp. In Gorg. Prooem. 9

[... = **P4**] Περὶ φύσεως, σύγγραμμα οὐκ ἄκομψον
[...].

*Attestations and Criticisms of the
First Thesis (R24–R25)*

R24 (< B1) Isocr.

a *Antid.* 15.268

[...] τοὺς λόγους τοὺς τῶν παλαιῶν σοφιστῶν, ἃν ὁ
μὲν ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθος ἔφησεν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων [...]
Παρμενίδης δὲ καὶ Μέλισσος ἔν, Γοργίας δὲ παν-
τελῶς οὐδέν.

b *Hel.* 3

πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπερβάλοιτο Γοργίαν τὸν τολμή-
σαντα λέγειν ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἔστιν [...];

point of surfeit by means of balanced expressions and
phrases that begin and end with the same sounds.

R22 (B5a) Ps.-Longinus, *On the Sublime*

That is why people make fun of the expressions of Gorgias
of Leontini, who writes, [... = **D30**].

On Nonbeing or On Nature, cf. *D26 (R23–R26)*
A Judgment Concerning the Whole Text (R23)

R23 (B2) Olympiodorus, *Commentary on Plato's Gorgias*

[...] his *On Nature*, a clever treatise [...].

*Attestations and Criticisms of the
First Thesis (R24–R25)*

R24 (< B1) Isocrates

a *Antidosis*

[...] the arguments of the ancient wise men (*sophistai*),
of whom one said that the number of the things that are
is unlimited [...], Parmenides and Melissus that it is one,
and Gorgias that it is none at all [cf. **DOX. T6**].

b *Encomium of Helen*

How could one surpass Gorgias, who dared to assert that
none of the things that are is [...]?^p

R25 (≠ DK) Ps.-Arist. MXG 6.1–8 (979a34–b19)

[... = D26a] [1] οὐδαμῶθεν δὲ συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν μηδὲν εἶναι. [2] ἂ γὰρ καὶ ἀποδείκνυσιν, οὕτως διαλέγεται.¹ εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν, ἢ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἢ καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοίως² μὴ ὄν. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε φαίνεται οὔτως οὔτε ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰ δυοῖν ὄντων, τοῦ μὲν ὄντος, τοῦ δὲ δοκοῦντος,³ τὸ μὲν ἔστι, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀληθές ὅτι ἔστι, τὸ μὴ ὄν. [3] διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι; τὸ δὲ ἄμφω οὔθ' ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν.⁴ οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἦττον>⁵ φησὶν, εἴη ἂν τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι, εἴπερ εἴη τι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὅτε οὐδεὶς φησιν εἶναι τὸ μὴ εἶναι οὐδαμῶς. [4] εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ ὄν, οὐδ' οὕτως ὁμοίως εἴη ἂν τὸ μὴ ὄν τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν ἔτι. [5] εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀληθές, ὡς δὴ θαυμάσιόν γ' ἂν εἴη τὸ 'μὴ ὄν ἔστιν'. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ οὕτω, πότερον μᾶλλον συμβαίνει ἅπαντα μὴ εἶναι ἢ εἶναι,⁶ αὐτὸ γὰρ οὕτω γε τοῦναντίον ἔοικε γίγνεσθαι. [6] εἰ γὰρ τό τε μὴ ὄν ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὄν ὄν⁷ ἔστιν, ἅπαντα ἔστιν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἔστιν. οὐκ ἀνάγκη γὰρ, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ ὄν μὴ εἶναι. [7] εἰ δὴ καὶ οὕτω τις ξυγρωροῖ, καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὄν εἴη, τὸ δὲ ὄν μὴ εἴη, ὁμοίως

multa menda quae praesertim in ms. R exhibentur omittimus
¹ διελέγεται Wendland ² ἢ καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοίως

Diels, alii alia: locus valde corruptus in mss.

³ δὲ δοκοῦντος L: δ' οὐκ ὄντος R ⁴ τὸ δὲ (δὲ om. R)

... ἔστιν mss., plerique edd. loc. corrupt. esse suspicati sunt

R25 (≠ DK) Ps.-Aristotle, *On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias*

[...] [6.1] But it does not follow from any of his arguments that nothing is. [2] For what he demonstrates he discusses in the following way: If what is not is, it is either absolutely speaking, or else in the way as it also is while not being. But this does not seem to be the case nor is it necessary, but just as in the case of two things that are, of which the one is and the other seems, the one is while it is not true that the other—the one that is not—is. [3] Why then can it neither be nor not be? But that both of them be, and not [scil. only] the one or the other, is not possible. For, he says, what is not would not be <less> than what is, since nonbeing too would be something, since no one says that nonbeing is not in any way at all. [4] But even if what is not is not being, not even in this way would what is not be similar to what is. For the one is not-being, while the other, additionally, is. [5] And even if it is true absolutely speaking, how astonishing, certainly, would be [scil. the proposition] 'it is not-being'! But if this is indeed how it is, is it more the case that all things are not rather than that they are? For in that way it is precisely the contrary that seems to happen. [6] For if what is not is and what is is being, then everything is. For both the things that are and the ones that are not are. For it is not necessary, if what is not is, that what is not be. [7] If then one concedes as well, in this way that what is not is and that what is is not, there

⁵ <ἦττον> Foss

⁶ μὴ post τῷ hab. mss., del. Sylburg

⁷ τὸ <τὸ> Diels

⁸ μὴ εἶναι ἢ εἶναι Apelt: εἶναι ἢ μὴ

εἶναι R: ἢ εἶναι μὴ εἶναι L

⁹ ὄν del. Felicianus

οὐδὲν ἦπτον εἶη ἄν <τι>¹⁰ τὰ γὰρ μὴ ὄντα εἶη κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον. [8] εἰ δὲ ταυτόν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' οὕτως μᾶλλον οὐκ εἶη ἄν τι <ἦ>¹¹ εἶη. ὡς γὰρ κάκεινος λέγει ὅτι εἰ ταυτό τὸ μὴ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄν, τό τε ὄν οὐκ ἔστι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀντιστρέψαντι ἔστιν ὁμοίως φάναί ὅτι πάντα ἔστιν. τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ὥστε πάντα ἔστιν.

¹⁰ <τι> Foss

¹¹ <ἦ> Apelt

*Sextus Empiricus' Sceptical
Conclusion about Gorgias (R26)*

R26 (< B3) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.87

[. . . = **D26b**] τοιούτων οὖν παρὰ τῷ Γοργία ἠπορημένων οἴχεται ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον· τοῦ γὰρ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γνωρίζεσθαι δυναμένου μήτε ἄλλῃ παρασταθῆναι πεφυκτός οὐδὲν ἄν εἶη κριτήριον.

Traces of Other Polemics (R27–R28)

R27 (A33) Antisth. in Athen. *Deipn.* 5 220 D

ὁ δ' Ἀρχέλαος [Antisth. Frag. 203 G²] Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος [scil. καταδρομῆν περιέχει].

would nonetheless be <something>. For the things that are not, according to his argument, would be; [8] but if being and not-being are identical, then not even in this way would something not be more <than> it would be. For just as he says that if what is not and what is are identical, then what is and what is not are not, so that nothing is, by conversion it is possible to say in the same way that everything is. For what is not is, just as well as what is, so that everything is.

*Sextus Empiricus' Skeptical
Conclusion about Gorgias (R26)*

R26 (< B3) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

[. . .] These then being the aporias formulated by Gorgias, the criterion of truth is abolished, as far as is in their power. For there could not be any criterion of what neither is nor can be known nor has a nature such that it can be presented to someone else.

Traces of Other Polemics (R27–R28)

R27 (A33) Antisthenes *Archelaus*, in Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

His [i.e. Antisthenes'] *Archelaus* [scil. contains an attack] against the orator Gorgias.

R28 (A34) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6.26.8

Μελησαγόρου γὰρ [FGrHist 330 T4] ἔκλεψε Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Εὐδήμος ὁ Νάξιος [FGrHist 497 T2] οἱ ἱστορικοὶ [. . .].

*An Aphorism Attributed to Gorgias
in Syriac (R29)*

R29 (B28) *Studia Sinaitica* 1, p. 35 Smith Lewis

כְּדֵי שֶׁכֶּסֶף אֶת הַבַּיִת וְכֵן כֵּן אֵין כְּסִיף . יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר
 יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר
 יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר
 יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר
 יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר
 יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר יִשָּׁר

C = Cambridge, Cambridge University Library, Add. 2012, fol. 176r, Wright cat. p. 538
 S = Monastery of Saint Catherine on Mount Sinai, Syr. 16, fol. 148r

¹ כְּדֵי יִשָּׁר C; כְּדֵי יִשָּׁר S

R28 (A34) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*

Gorgias of Leontini and Eudemus of Naxos, historians, plagiarized from Melesagoras [. . .].¹

¹ The allusion is obscure. Melesagoras of Chalcedon was a historian.

*An Aphorism Attributed to Gorgias
in Syriac (R29)*

R29 (B28) From a Syriac collection of Greek sayings

Gorgias said, "The extraordinary beauty of something hidden is what skilled painters are unable to represent by means of the colors in which they are expert. For their considerable work and their great effort furnish an admirable testimony to what is magnificent in what is hidden. And when the stages of their work have reached their conclusion, in return they bestow upon the painter the crown of victory in silence. But what no hand grasps and what no eye sees, how can the tongue express it or the listener's ear hear it?"¹

¹ Translated from the French translation by Henri Hugonnard-Roche. Ms. C, fol. 176r (Wright, *Catalogue*, p. 538) provides a slightly different text: "Gorgias said, "The beauty of the soul is something hidden, which painters are unable to represent by means of colors. For their work and their unremitting effort furnish an admirable testimony to what is magnificent in what is hidden [. . .]."

33. SOCRATES (SOC.)

Although chronologically Socrates (469–399 BC) is a central figure of the period considered in this collection, Plato's sustained attempts to set him as an authentic philosopher in the sharpest possible contrast to the 'sophists' and the historical success of these attempts have made it difficult to recognize what they in fact had in common. To be sure, there are significant differences between the other 'sophists' and Socrates: for example, they traveled from city to city while he remained in Athens almost all his life, they required payment for their teaching while he did not, and they were deeply involved in politics while he for the most part was not, and not in the same way. But Socrates' interests and teaching, like those of the other members of this loose group of intellectuals, revolve around the question of moral and political excellence and the use of language and argument in order to obtain the agreement of listeners or interlocutors. Thus it makes most sense to see Socrates as an idiosyncratic Athenian 'sophist.' It is for this reason that, even independently of the chronology (which goes in the same direction), he is included in this volume, and in this place.

Aristophanes' caricature of Socrates in the *Clouds* (cf. **DRAM. T10, T28**) is our first significant testimony to the enormous impression produced by what was evidently

quite an extraordinary personality. But Socrates did not leave behind any writings, and any attempt to reconstruct his ideas on the basis of the representations of him provided by his two most famous disciples, Xenophon and Plato—two profoundly different spirits—is speculative. We provide a small selection of what seem to us to be the most reliable reports concerning his life, views, and argumentative style, but we are in no doubt that other scholars would have made different choices. We do not include a section on Socrates' reception: for the reception of Socrates is indistinguishable from a large part of later Greek philosophy. But we do indicate how Hellenistic scholarship on philosophical 'successions' (cf. **DOX. T20-T22**) presented his multitudinous spiritual progeny.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Editions

- G. G. Giannantoni. *Socrate. Tutte le testimonianze: da Aristofane e Senofonte ai padri cristiani* (Bari, 1971). (= G¹)
- . *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* (Naples, 1990). (= G²)

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

P

- Parents and City* (P1–P2)
Chronology (P3)
Wives and Children (P4)

- Pre-Philosophical Activities?* (P5–P7)
Philosophical Teachers (P8)
Other Teachers? (P9–P12)
Prodicus (P9)
Connus and Aspasia (P10–P12)
The Circle of Disciples and Friends (P13–P14)
Influence on Euripides (P15)
Relations with Alcibiades (P16)
Relations with Critias (P17)
Personal Aspects (P18–P26)
Physical Appearance (P18–P19)
His Poverty (P20–P22)
Socrates and Eros (P23–P25)
His daimonion (P26)
Some Apothegms (P27)
Activities as a Citizen (P28–P35)
Military Activity (P28–P30)
General Avoidance of Political Activity (P31)
Attitude Toward the Sicilian Expedition (P32)
Arginusae (P33–P34)
Resistance to the Thirty (P35)
His Trial, Condemnation, and Death (P36–P42)
The Official Accusation (P36)
The Accusation in the Version Probably Going Back to Polycrates (P37–P39)
His Condemnation and Death (P40–P42)
Iconography (P43)

D

- Writings?* (D1)
Socrates' Place in the History of Philosophy (D2–D8)

- Was He Only Ever Interested in Moral Philosophy,
Never in Natural Philosophy . . . (D2–D6)
. . . or Was He Interested in Natural Philosophy Too?
(D7–D8)*
- Conceptions and Methods in Ethics (D9–D53)*
- The Search for Definitions in Ethics (D9–D10)*
- Socrates' Ignorance and Irony, and His Refusal to
Answer Questions (D11–D17)*
- Socrates' Method of Dialogue (D18–D32)*
- The Importance of Discussion (D18)*
- The Interlocutor's Obligation to Agree with Him-
self (D19–D20)*
- The Use of Generally Accepted Views (D21)*
- Induction (D22–D25)*
- Refutation (elenkhos) (D26)*
- Reactions of Socrates' Interlocutors to His Refuta-
tions (D27–D29)*
- Philosophical Dialogues Vs. Rhetorical Speeches
(D30–D32)*
- Self-Knowledge and the Care of the Self (D33–D34)*
- Views on Virtue (D35–D53)*
- Virtue as Knowledge (D35–D38)*
- An Example: Courage as Knowledge (D39–D40)*
- Can Virtue Be Taught? (D41–D42)*
- Some Paradoxical Conclusions (D43–D53)*
- The Unity of Virtue (D43)*
- It Is Impossible Voluntarily to Choose Evil
(D44–D47)*
- Intemperance (akrasia) Is Impossible (D48–
D51)*

- One Must Never Commit an Injustice (D52)
It Is Better to Suffer Injustice Than to Commit
It (D53)*
- Political Views (D54–D61)*
- Politics and Knowledge (D54–D55)*
- Criticism of Election to Public Office by Lot (D56–
D57)*
- Socrates' Laconism (D58–D59)*
- Obedience to the City's Laws (D60–D61)*
- From the First Generation of Disciples (cf. P13–P14) to
the Socratic Schools (D62–D65)*

SOCRATES [\neq DK]

P

Parents and City (P1–P2)

P1 (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.18

Σωκράτης Σωφρονίσκου μὲν ἦν υἱὸς λιθουργοῦ καὶ Φαιναρέτης μαίας, ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ φησὶν, Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν δῆμων Ἄλωπεκῆθεν.

P2 (< I B41 G²) Cyril. Alex. *Jul.* 6.208 (= Porph. Frag. 213F Smith)

[. . .] Μενεδήμῳ τῷ Πυρραΐῳ χρηστέον, Πλάτωνος μὲν γεγονότι μαθητῆ, [. . .] λέγοντι ἐν τῷ Φιλοκράτους¹ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπαύετο Σωκράτης οὔτε ὑπὲρ τοῦ πατρὸς ὡς λιθουργοῦ λαλῶν, οὔτε ὑπὲρ τῆς μητρὸς ὡς μαίας.

¹ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Σωκράτους coni. Nauck

Chronology (P3)

P3 (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.44

Φιλόχορος δὲ φησι [FCGrHist 328 F221] προτελευτήσασαι τὸν Εὐριπίδην τοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐγεννήθη δέ, καθά φη-

SOCRATES

P

Parents and City (P1–P2)

P1 (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and of Phaenarete, a midwife, as Plato says in his *Theaetetus* (149a); he was an Athenian, of the deme of Alopece.

P2 (< I B41 G²) Porphyry in Cyril of Alexandria, *Against Julian*

[. . .] we should use the testimony of Menedemus of Pyrrha, Plato's student, [. . .] who says in his *Philocrates* (?)¹ that Socrates never stopped saying that his father was a stone worker and his mother a midwife.

¹ This title is generally considered to be corrupt; Nauck conjectured that it should be *On Socrates*.

Chronology (P3)

P3 (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

Philochorus says that Euripides died before Socrates. He [i.e. Socrates] was born, according to what Apollodorus

σιν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τοῖς Χρονικοῖς [FGrHist 244 F34], ἐπὶ Ἀμφίβιονος τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἑβδομηκοστῆς ἑβδόμης Ὀλυμπιάδος, Θαργηλιῶνος ἕκτη [. . .]. ἔτελετύησε δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἐνενηκοστῆς πέμπτῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος, γεγονῶς ἑτῶν ἑβδομήκοντα. καὶ ταῦτά¹ φησι καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς [Frag. 153 Wehrli]. ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐξήκοντα ἑτῶν τελευτήσαι φασιν αὐτόν.

¹ ταῦτα mss., corr. Cobet

Wives and Children (P4)

P4 (> I B8, < I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.26

φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης [Frag. 93 Rose] δύο γυναῖκας αὐτὸν ἀγαγέσθαι προτέραν μὲν Ξανθίππην, ἐξ ἧς αὐτῷ γενέσθαι Λαμπροκλέα δευτέραν δὲ Μυρτώ, τὴν Ἀριστείδου τοῦ δικαίου θυγατέρα, ἣν καὶ ἄπρικοι λαβεῖν, ἐξ ἧς γενέσθαι Σωφρονίσκον καὶ Μενέξενον. οἱ δὲ προτέραν γῆμαι τὴν Μυρτώ φασιν ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ ἀμφοτέρας ἔχειν ὁμοῦ, ὧν ἔστι Σάτυρός [Frag. 17a Schorn] τε καὶ Ἱερώνυμος ὁ Ῥόδιος [Frag. 45 Wehrli]. φασὶ γὰρ βουληθέντας Ἀθηναίους διὰ τὸ λειπανδρεῖν συναξήσθαι τὸ πλῆθος, ψηφίσασθαι γαμεῖν μὲν ἀστὴν μίαν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρας ὅθεν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι καὶ Σωκράτην.

says in his *Chronology*, in the archonship of Apsephion, in the fourth year of the 77th Olympiad [= 469/68], on the sixth day of the month of Thargelion [. . .]. He died in the first year of the 95th Olympiad [= 400/399] at the age of seventy. And Demetrius of Phalerum says the same thing. For some people say that he died at the age of sixty.

Wives and Children (P4)

P4 (> I B8, < I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

Aristotle says that he [i.e. Socrates] married two women: first Xanthippe, from whom Lamprocles was born to him; and second Myrto, the daughter of Aristides the Just, whom he wed although she was without a dowry, from whom Sophroniscus and Menexenus were born. Some other people say that he married Myrto first, and some that he had both of them at the same time. Among these latter are Satyrus and Hieronymus of Rhodes. For they say that the Athenians, wishing to increase the population because men were lacking, passed a decree that one could marry only one female citizen, but that one could have children from another; so that Socrates too did this.

Pre-Philosophical Activities? (P5–P7)

P5 (< I B41 G²) Cyril. Alex. *Jul.* 6.208 (= Porph. Frag. 213F Smith; Aristox. Frag. 51 Wehrli).

[. . .] δημιουργὸν γὰρ γενέσθαι τὸν Σωκράτην, πατρῷα τέχνην χρώμενον τῇ λατυπικῇ.¹ καὶ Τίμαιος ἐν τῇ ἐνάτῃ [FGrHist 566 F 15] λιθουργεῖν φησι μεμαθηκέναι Σωκράτην.

¹ λατυπικῇ <Ἀριστοξένος ἱστορεῖ> Jacoby

P6

a (I C9 G²) Paus. 1.22.8

κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἔσοδον αὐτὴν ἤδη τὴν ἐς ἀκρόπολιν Ἑρμῆν, ὃν Προπύλαιον ὀνομάζουσι, καὶ Χάριτας Σωκράτην ποιῆσαι τὸν Σωφρονίσκου λέγουσιν [. . .].

b (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.19

Δούρις [FGrHist 76 F78] δὲ καὶ δουλεῦσαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐργάσασθαι λίθους· εἶναί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀκροπόλει Χάριτας ἐνιοί φασιν [. . .].

P7 (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.20

Κρίτωνα δ' ἀναστήσαι αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργαστηρίου καὶ παιδεύσαι τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν χάριτος ἑρασθέντα Δημήτριός φησιν ὁ Βυζάντιος.

Pre-Philosophical Activities? (P5–P7)

P5 (< I B41 G²) Porphyry in Cyril of Alexandria, *Against Julian*

[. . .] Socrates was an artisan, who practiced his father's craft of sculpting. And Timaeus in his ninth book says that Socrates learned to work in stone.

P6

a (I C9 G²) Pausanias, *Description of Greece*

They say that Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, sculpted a Hermes, which they call the Hermes of the Gateway, and Graces, right at the very entrance to the Acropolis [. . .].¹

¹ According to Pliny, *Natural History* 36.32, the sculptor was a different Socrates who came from Thebes.

b (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

Duris says that he was a slave and worked in stone; and some people say that the Graces on the Acropolis were made by him [. . .].

P7 (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

Demetrius of Byzantium says that Crito, who had fallen in love with the graciousness (*kharis*) of his [i.e. Socrates'] soul, made him leave his workshop and educated him.

*Philosophical Teachers (P8)***P8**

a (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.19

ἀκούσας δὲ Ἀναξαγόρου κατὰ τινας, ἀλλὰ καὶ Δάμωνος, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Διαδοχαῖς [FGrHist 273 F86], μετὰ τὴν ἐκείνου καταδίκην διήκουσεν Ἀρχελαίου τοῦ φυσικοῦ.

b (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.45

ἀμφότεροι δ' ἤκουσαν Ἀναξαγόρου, καὶ οὗτος καὶ Εὐριπίδης [. . .].

c (< I D1 G², 60 A1) Diogenes Laertius 2.16

Ἀρχελαῖος [. . .] μαθητῆς Ἀναξαγόρου, διδάσκαλος Σωκράτους. [. . . cf. ARCH. P1].

d (< I D2 G²) *Suda* Σ.829 Adler (= Aristox. Frag 52b Wehrli)

Ἀριστοξένος δὲ Ἀρχελαίου πρῶτον αὐτὸν διακοῦσαι λέγει [Frag. 52b Wehrli]: γεγενῆσθαι δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ παιδικά, σφοδρότατόν τε περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια [. . .]. [ARCH. P5]

*Philosophical Teachers (P8)***P8**

a (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

He studied with Anaxagoras according to some people, but also with Damon, as Alexander [scil. says] in his *Successions*; after the former's condemnation [cf. ANAXAG. P23-P26], he studied with Archelaus, the natural philosopher [cf. ARCH. R2].

b (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

The two of them studied with Anaxagoras, both this man [i.e. Socrates] and Euripides [. . .].

c (< I D1 G², 60 A1) Diogenes Laertius

Archelaus [. . .] student of Anaxagoras, teacher of Socrates. [. . .].

d (< I D2 G²) Aristoxenus in the *Suda*

Aristoxenus says that he [i.e. Socrates] studied first with Archelaus; and that he also became his beloved, with a very passionate sexual relation [. . .].

Other Teachers? (P9–P12)*Prodicus* (P9)**P9** (≠ G) Plat. *Meno*. 96d

[ΣΩ.] κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί
τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἰκανῶς πε-
παιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμέ Προδίκος.

Connus and Aspasia (P10–P12)**P10** (> VI A66 G²) Plat. *Menexen.* 235e–236a

[ΣΩ.] καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν γε, ὦ Μενέξενε, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν
οἶψ' εἶναι εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τυγχάνει διδάσκαλος οὕσα οὐ
πάνυ φαύλη περὶ ῥητορικῆς, ἀλλ' ἤπερ καὶ ἄλλους
πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς πεποίηκε ῥήτορας, ἓνα δὲ καὶ
διαφέροντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου.

[ΜΕ.] τίς αὕτη; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι Ἀσπασίαν λέγεις;

[ΣΩ.] λέγω γάρ, καὶ Κόννον γε τὸν Μητροβίου· οὗτοι
γάρ μοι δύο εἰσὶν διδάσκαλοι, ὁ μὲν μουσικῆς, ἡ δὲ
ῥητορικῆς.

P11 (≠ G) Plat. *Euthyd.* 272c

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐν μόνον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὖ ὄνειδος τοῖν ξέ-
νων περιάψω, ὥσπερ Κόννω τῷ Μητροβίου, τῷ κιθα-
ριστῇ, ὃς ἐμέ διδάσκει ἔτι καὶ νῦν κιθαρίζειν· ὁρῶντες

Other Teachers? (P9–P12)*Prodicus* (P9)**P9** (≠ G) Plato, *Meno*

[Socrates:] I guess, Meno, that you and I are not up to par,
and that Gorgias has not educated you sufficiently, nor
Prodicus me.

See also **PROD. P5, P9, D5***Connus and Aspasia* (P10–P12)**P10** (> VI A66 G²) Plato, *Menexenus*

[Socrates:] It is not surprising, Menexenus, that I would
be able to deliver the speech [scil. in honor of the war
dead], for I happen to have a teacher who is not at all bad
with regard to rhetoric—in fact she has produced not only
many other good orators, but also the one who is best
among the Greeks, Pericles, son of Xanthippus.

[Menexenus:] Who is that? Surely you are speaking about
Aspasia?

[Socrates:] I am indeed; and about Connus, the son of
Metrobius. For these are my two teachers, he for music,
and she for rhetoric.

P11 (≠ G) Plato, *Euthydemus*

I am afraid of only one thing, that I might bring shame
upon the two foreigners [i.e. Euthydemus and Diony-
sodorus], just as I have upon Connus, the son of Metro-
bius, the lyre player, who is even now still teaching me to

οὖν οἱ παῖδες οἱ συμφουιτηταί μοι ἐμοῦ τε καταγελῶσι
καὶ τὸν Κόννον καλοῦσι γεροντοδιδάσκαλον.

P12 (I C15 G²) Plut. *Per.* 24.5

τὴν δ' Ἀσπασίαν οἱ μὲν ὡς σοφὴν τινα καὶ πολιτικὴν
ὑπὸ τοῦ Περικλέους σπουδασθῆναι λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ
Σωκράτης ἔστιν ὅτε μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων ἐφοῖτα [. . .].

The Circle of Disciples and Friends (P13–P14)

P13 Plat.

a (≠ G) *Apol.* 21a

[ΣΩ.] Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμός τε ἐταί-
ρος ἦν ἐκ νέου [. . .].

b (≠ G) *Apol.* 38b

[ΣΩ.] Πλάτων δὲ ὄδε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων
καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τρι-
άκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι.

c (< I H1 G²) *Phaed.* 59b–c

[ΕΧ.] ἔτυχον δέ, ὃ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;
[ΦΑ.] οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων
παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι
Ἐρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἄντι-

play the lyre. When the boys who go to visit him see this
they laugh at me and call Connus 'the old man's teacher.'

P12 (I C15 G²) Plutarch, *Pericles*

Some people say that Pericles took Aspasia seriously be-
cause she was wise and expert in politics; for Socrates too
sometimes went to visit her together with his companions
[. . .].

The Circle of Disciples and Friends (P13–P14)

P13 Plato

a (≠ G) *Apology*

[Socrates:] You [i.e. the Athenian jurors] know Chaere-
phon. He has been my friend since youth [. . .].

b (≠ G) *Apology*

[Socrates:] Plato here, men of Athens, as well as Crito,
Critobulus, and Apollodorus say that I should set the pen-
alty at thirty minas and that they will give guarantees for it.

c (< I H1 G²) *Phaedo*

[Echecrates:] Who, Phaedo, happened to be present [scil.
at the death of Socrates]?

[Phaedo:] Among the local people, Apollodorus was there,
and Critobulus and his father, and also Hermogenes,
Epigenes, Aeschines, and Antisthenes. And Ctesippus of

σθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεύς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἦσθένοι.

[EX.] ξένοι δέ τινες παρήσαν;

[ΦΑ.] ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

[EX.] τί δέ; Ἀριστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο;

[ΦΑ.] οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

[EX.] ἄλλος δέ τις παρήν;

[ΦΑ.] σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

P14 (< B1 G¹) Xen. Mem. 1.2.48

ἀλλὰ Κρίτων τε Σωκράτους ἦν ὁμιλητὴς καὶ Χαιρεφῶν καὶ Χαιρεκράτης καὶ Ἑρμογένης¹ καὶ Σιμμίας καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδας καὶ ἄλλοι, οἳ ἐκείνῳ συνῆσαν [. . .].

¹ καὶ Ἑρμογένης van Prinsterer; καὶ Ἑρμοκράτης AB, om. Φ

Influence on Euripides (P15)

P15 (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.18

ἔδοκει δὲ συμποιεῖν Εὐριπίδῃ.

Paeania was also there, and Menexenus, and some others of the locals. Plato, I think, was sick.

[Echecrates:] Were some foreigners present?

[Phaedo:] Yes, Simmias from Thebes, Cebes,¹ and Phaedonides; and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion.²

[Echecrates:] What? Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus present?

[Phaedo:] No, they were said to be in Aegina.

[Echecrates:] Was anyone else there?

[Phaedo:] I think that these were just about the ones who were there.

¹ Simmias and Cebes were disciples of Philolaos and are considered to have been Pythagoreans. ² Euclides and Terpsion were members of the Megarian school but are thought by some scholars to have been heterodox Pythagoreans.

P14 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

But Crito was a companion of Socrates, and Chaerephon, Charecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas, and others, who spent time with him [. . .].

Influence on Euripides (P15)¹

¹ For Socrates' relations with Euripides, see also Diogenes Laertius 2.22 [cf. HER. R5a; DRAM. T32].

P15 (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

It was thought that he helped Euripides write his poetry.

*Relations with Alcibiades (P16)***P16** (≠ G) Plat.**a** *Prot.* 309a

[ET.] πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνῃ; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὄραν;

b *Gorg.* 481d

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] λέγω δ' ἐνούησας ὅτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταῦτόν τι πεποιθότες, ἐρώντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους.

Relations with Critias (P17)

P17 (< 88 A1, < I C105 G²) Philostr. *Vitae soph.* 1.16, p. 18.18–21 Kayser

καὶ γὰρ αἱ κάκεινο ἄτοπον Σωκράτει μὲν τῷ Σωφρονίσκου μὴ ὁμοιωθῆναι αὐτόν, ᾧ πλείστα δὴ συνεφιλοσόφησε [. . .].

*Relations with Alcibiades (P16)***P16** (≠ G) Plato**a** *Protagoras*

[A friend:] Where are you coming from, Socrates? Oh, but of course, from hunting after lovely young Alcibiades!

b *Gorgias*

[Socrates:] [. . .] I say this since I have noticed that you [i.e. Callicles] and I both happen to be sharing the same experience, since each of us has two desires: I for Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, and philosophy; and you too for two, the Athenian populace (*dēmos*) and Pyrilampes' son [i.e. Demus].

Relations with Critias (P17)

P17 (< 88 A1, < I C105 G²) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

It is very strange that he [i.e. Critias] did not come to resemble Socrates, son of Sophronicus, with whom he often did philosophy together [. . .].

Personal Aspects (P18–P26)
Physical Appearance (P18–P19)

P18

a (≠ G) Plat. *Theaet.* 143e

[ΘΕ.] νῦν δέ—καὶ μὴ μοι ἄχθου—οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων ἦττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταυτ' ἔχει.

b (< B3 G¹) Xen. *Symp.* 5.5, 6, 7

[ΣΩ.] ὅτι οἱ μὲν σοὶ τὸ κατ' εὐθὺν μόνον ὀρώσῃν, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ πλαγίου διὰ τὸ ἐπιπόλαιοι εἶναι. [. . .] οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοὶ μυκτῆρες εἰς γῆν ὀρώσῃν, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ ἀναπέπτανται, ὥστε τὰς πάντοθεν ὀσμὰς προσδέχεσθαι.

[ΚΡ.] τὸ δὲ δὴ σιμὸν τῆς ῥίνος πῶς τοῦ ὀρθοῦ κάλιον; [. . .] εἰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀποδάκνειν ἔνεκα πεποίηται, πολὺ ἂν σὺ μείζον ἢ ἐγὼ ἀποδάκοις. διὰ δὲ τὸ παχέα ἔχει τὰ χεῖλη οὐκ οἶει καὶ μαλακώτερόν σου ἔχει τὸ φίλημα;

[ΣΩ.] ἔοικα, ἔφη, ἐγὼ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον καὶ τῶν ὄνων αἰσχίον τὸ στόμα ἔχειν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐδὲν τεκμήριον λογίζῃ, ὡς ἐγὼ σου καλλίων εἰμί, ὅτι καὶ Ναΐδες θεαὶ οὔσαι τοὺς Σειληνοὺς ἐμοὶ ὁμοιοτέρους τίκτουσιν ἢ σοί;

Personal Aspects (P18–P26)
Physical Appearance (P18–P19)

P18

a (≠ G) Plato, *Theaetetus*

[Theodorus:] But as it is—don't you [i.e. Socrates] be annoyed with me—he [i.e. Theaetetus] is not good-looking, but he resembles you, with a snub nose and protruding eyes, except that in him those features are less prominent than they are in you.

b (< B3 G¹) Xenophon, *Symposium*

[Socrates:] Yours [scil. Critobulus' eyes] can only look straight ahead, while mine can also see to the side, since they are protuberant. [. . .] Your nostrils open down toward the ground, while mine are distended so that they can receive smells from all directions.

[Critobulus:] But how can a snub nose be better looking than a straight one? [. . .] If it [i.e. the mouth] was made for biting things off, then you could bite them off much better than I can. And don't you think that by having thick lips you can kiss more tenderly?

[Socrates:] According to your account I seem to have a mouth that is uglier than donkeys' are. But do you not consider it evidence for my being better looking than you that the Naiads, goddesses as they are, have given birth to Sileni, who are more similar to me than to you?

c (I C49 G²) Cic. *Fat.* 5.10

Socraten nonne legimus quem ad modum notarit Zopyrus physiognomon [. . .] ? stupidum esse Socraten dixit et bardum, quod iugula concava non haberet: obstructas eas partes et obturatas esse dicebat.

P19 (≠ G) Plat. *Symp.* 215a–b

[AA.] Σωκράτη δ' ἐγὼ ἐπαινεῖν, ὧ ἄνδρες, οὕτως ἐπιχειρήσω, δι' εἰκόνων. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἴσως οἰήσεται ἐπὶ τὰ γελούτερα, ἔσται δ' ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἕνεκα, οὐ τοῦ γελοίου. φημι γὰρ δὴ ὁμοίωτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τούτοις τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἐρμογλυφεῖοις καθήμενοις, οὓστινας ἐργάζονται οἱ δημιουργοὶ σύριγγας ἢ αὐλοὺς ἔχοντας, οἱ διχάδε διοιχθέντες φαίνονται ἐνδοθεν ἀγάλματα ἔχοντες θεῶν. καὶ φημι αὖ εὐοικεῖν αὐτὸν τῷ σατύρῳ τῷ Μαρσύᾳ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τό γε εἶδος ὁμοῖος εἰ τούτοις, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἂν ποῦ¹ ἀμφισβητήσῃς.

¹ ἄν που Baiter: δὴ που BT: ἂν δήπου Sauppe

His Poverty (P20–P22)

P20 (≠ G) Plat. *Apol.*

a 31b–c

[ΣΩ.] καὶ εἰ μὲν τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμεν, εἶχον ἄν τινα λό-

c (I C49 G²) Cicero, *On Fate*

Do we not read how the physiognomist Zopyrus defined Socrates [. . .] ? He said that Socrates was stupid and dull-witted, because his throat was not concave: he said that those parts of his body were obstructed and occluded.

P19 (≠ G) Plato, *Symposium*

[Alcibiades:] I shall try to praise Socrates, men, in this way, by means of images. Perhaps he will suppose that the point of the image will be to make you laugh, but in fact it will be for the sake of the truth, not of laughter. For I say that he is most similar of all to those statues of Silenus sitting in the sculptors' shops, the ones that the craftsmen produce—they hold musical pipes or *auloi*, and when they are split apart and opened up they reveal statues of the gods that they contain within them. And again, I say that he resembles the satyr Marsyas. Well then, Socrates, as for the fact that you are similar to these in appearance, not even you could dispute this.

His Poverty (P20–P22)

P20 (≠ G) Plato, *Apology*

a

[Socrates:] And if I made any profit from these things [i.e. my conversations with my fellow citizens] and received a fee in order to give this advice, what they say would make

γον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι οἱ κατηγοροὶ
τᾶλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό
γε οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι παρασχό-
μενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μι-
σθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν
μάρτυρα ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

b 38b

[ΣΩ.] εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν
χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτεῖσειν, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλά-
βην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ
δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι.
ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι ὑμῖν πού μιν ἀργυ-
ρίου.

P21 (< B2 G¹) Xen. Oec. 2.2–3

καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος γελάσας εἶπε· “καὶ πόσον ἂν πρὸς
τῶν θεῶν οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες,” ἔφη, “εὐρεῖν τὰ σὰ κτή-
ματα πωλούμενα, πόσον δὲ τὰ ἐμά;” “ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι,”
ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, “εἰ ἀγαθοῦ ὠνητοῦ ἐπιτύχοιμι, εὐ-
ρεῖν ἂν μοι σὺν τῇ οἰκίᾳ καὶ τὰ ὄντα πάντα πάνν
ῥαδίως πέντε μνᾶς· τὰ μέντοι σὰ ἀκριβῶς οἶδα ὅτι
πλέον ἂν εὐροὶ ἢ ἑκατονταπλασίονα τούτου.”

P22

a (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.20 (= Aristox. Frag. 59 Wehrli)
φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν Ἀριστόξενος ὁ Σπινθάρου καὶ χρημα-

some sense; but as it is you yourselves see that although
my accusers shamelessly make all kinds of other accusa-
tions, they have not been able for all their shamelessness
to provide a witness to testify that I have ever either re-
ceived a fee or asked for one. For I think that I can provide
a sufficient witness to the fact that I am telling the truth:
my poverty.

b

[Socrates:] If I had money, then I would pay a fine of as
much money as I was able to pay, for that would cause me
no harm; but in fact I have none, unless you wish to fine
me as much as I would be able to pay. Perhaps I would be
able to pay you about one mina of silver.

P21 (< B2 G¹) Xenophon, *Economics*

And Critobulus laughed and said, “And how much, by the
gods, Socrates, do you think you would receive for your
possessions if they were sold, and how much would I for
mine?” Socrates said, “I myself think that if I found a good
purchaser, I would quite easily receive five minas for all
my possessions, together with my house; but I know per-
fectly well that you would receive more than a hundred
times that amount for yours.”

P22

a (< I D1 G²) Aristoxenus in Diogenes Laertius
Aristoxenus, the son of Spintharus, says that he also made

τίσασθαι. τιθέντα γοῦν τὸ βαλλόμενον κέρμα ἀθροίζειν εἴτ' ἀναλώσαντα πάλιν τιθέναι.

b (≠ G) Plut. *Aristid.* 1.9 319C (= Dem. Phal. Frag. 95 Wehrli, p. 25.11–14)

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν Δημήτριος οὐ μόνον Ἀριστείδην, ἀλλὰ καὶ Σωκράτη δῆλός ἐστι τῆς πενίας ἐξελεῖσθαι φιλοτιμούμενος ὡς μεγάλου κακοῦ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ φησὶν οὐ μόνον τὴν οἰκίαν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μνᾶς ἐβδομήκοντα τοκιζομένας ὑπὸ Κρίτωνος.

Socrates and Eros (P23–P25)

P23 (< B3 G¹) Xen. *Symp.* 8.2

[ΣΩ.] ἐγὼ τε γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω χρόνον εἰπεῖν ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔρων τινος διατελῶ [. . .].

P24 (≠ G) Plat. *Symp.* 177d

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ὅς οὐδέν φημι ἄλλο ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά [. . .].

P25 (≠ G) Plat. *Phaedr.* 257a

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] εὐμενῆς καὶ ἴλεως τὴν ἐρωτικὴν μοι τέχνην ἦν ἔδωκας μῆτε ἀφέλη μῆτε πηρώσης δι' ὀργήν, δίδου τ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν παρὰ τοῖς καλοῖς τίμιον εἶναι.

money: for he invested, and collected the cash it generated; and then when he had spent this he invested again.

b (≠ G) Demetrius of Phalerum in Plutarch, *Aristides*

Demetrius [scil. of Phalerum] is clearly eager to rescue not only Aristides but also Socrates from poverty as though from a great evil: for he says that the latter not only possessed his house, but also 70 minas that were invested at interest by Crito.

Socrates and Eros (P23–P25)

P23 (< B3 G¹) Xenophon, *Symposium*

[Socrates:] I am not able to name a time in which I was not continuously in love with someone [. . .].

P24 (≠ G) Plato, *Symposium*

[Socrates:] [. . .] I say that I do not know anything except what regards eros [. . .].

P25 (≠ G) Plato, *Phaedrus*

[Socrates:] [. . .] the erotic art that you [i.e. Eros] bestowed upon me—in your benevolence and kindness, neither take it away nor disable it in anger, but grant that I might be honored by beautiful people even more than now.

*His daimonion (P26)***P26** (≠ G) Plat. *Apol.* 31c-d

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίνετα¹ [. . .]. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε.

¹ φωνή post γίνετα¹ hab. mss., secl. Forster

*Some Apothegms (P27)***P27** (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.331. Εὐριπίδου δ' ἐν τῇ Αὔγῃ¹ εἰπόντος περὶ ἀρετῆς,

κράτιστον εἰκὴ ταῦτ' εἶαν ἀφειμένα [Eur. *El.* 379,
cf. *TrGF* 5.335 Kannicht]

ἀναστὰς ἐξῆλθε, φήσας γελοῖον εἶναι ἀνδράποδον μὲν μὴ εὐρισκόμενον ἀξιούν ζητεῖν, ἀρετὴν δ' οὕτως εἶαν ἀπολωλέναι.

2. ἐρωτηθεὶς πότερον γῆμαι ἢ μὴ, ἔφη, “ὃ ἂν αὐτῶν ποιήσης, μεταγνώση.”

3. ἔλεγέ τε θαυμάζειν τῶν τὰς λιθίνους εἰκόνας κατασκευαζομένων τοῦ μὲν λίθου προνοεῖν ὡς ὁμοίωτατος ἔσται, αὐτῶν δ' ἀμελεῖν, ὡς μὴ ὁμοίους τῷ λίθῳ φαίνεσθαι.

*His daimonion (P26)***P26** (≠ G) Plato, *Apology*

[Socrates:] [. . .] what you have heard me say many times in many places: that something godly and ‘daimonic’ happens to me [. . .]. This is something that began during my childhood, a certain voice that makes itself heard, and whenever it occurs it always deters me from something that I am about to do, but it never urges me [scil. to do something].

Some Apothegms (P27)¹

¹ These represent only a tiny selection from the large number of apothegms and anecdotes attributed to Socrates in antiquity.

P27 (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius1. When Euripides said in his *Auge* (?) about virtue,

The best thing is to let it wander at random
[Euripides, *Electra* 379],

he got up and walked out, saying that it is ridiculous to think that it is worth searching for a slave who has disappeared but to permit virtue to be destroyed in this way.

2. When he was asked whether one should marry or not, he said, “Whichever of these you do, you will regret it.”

3. He said that he was astonished that people who have statues made of themselves make sure the stone resembles them as much as possible but take no care about themselves lest they appear to resemble the stone.

¹ τῇ Αὔγῃ Stephanus: τῇ αὐγῇ Z³ (Frob.): τῇ αὐτῇ BP: τῇ αὐτοῦ F: ἐν τοῖς Φ

4. ἡξίου δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους συνεχῆς κατοπτρίζεσθαι, ἵν' εἰ μὲν καλοὶ εἴεν, ἄξιοι γίνουντο· εἰ δ' αἰσχροί, παιδείᾳ τὴν δυσείδειαν ἐπικαλύπτουεν.

Activities as a Citizen (P28–P35)

Military Activity (P28–P30)

P28 (≠ G) Plat. *Apol.* 28e

[. . .] ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐδ' ἐκείνοι ἔταπτον ἔμενον ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνεον ἀποθανεῖν [. . .].

P29 (≠ G) Plat. *Charm.* 153a, b–c

[ΣΩ.] ἤκομεν τῇ προτεραίᾳ ἑσπέρας ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου [. . .].

ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣ δ' ὅς, πῶς ἐσώθης ἐκ τῆς μάχης;

ὀλίγον δὲ πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι μάχη ἐγεγόνει ἐν τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ, ἣν ἄρτι ἦσαν οἱ τῆδε πεπυσμένοι.

καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκρινόμενος, οὕτωςί, ἔφην, ὡς σὺ ὄρθῳς.

καὶ μὴν ἠγγελταί γε δεῦρο, ἔφη, ἣ τε μάχη πάντῃ ἰσχυρὰ γεγονένη καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων τεθνάναι.

4. He said that young men should continually look at themselves in the mirror, so that if they were good-looking they would become worthy of their good looks, and if they were ugly they would conceal their unattractiveness by means of education.

Activities as a Citizen (P28–P35)

Military Activity (P28–P30)

P28 (≠ G) Plato, *Apology*

[Socrates:] [. . .] when those men whom you [i.e. the Athenians] elected to command me gave me orders—at Potidaea [432 BC], at Amphipolis [422], and at Delium [424]—on those occasions I remained at my position, where they ordered me to do so, just like anyone else, and I ran the risk of dying [. . .].¹

¹ The veracity of this account is put in doubt by Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists* 5 215C–216C (C39 G²) on the basis of other historical accounts.

P29 (≠ G) Plato, *Charmides*

[Socrates:] We arrived on the previous evening from Potidaea from the military camp [. . .].

“Socrates,” he [i.e. Chaerephon] said, “in what condition did you survive the battle?”

A little before we left there had been a battle in Potidaea, and the people there [i.e. in Athens] had just heard about it.

And I answered him, “In the one you see me in.”

“But it was reported here,” he said, “that the fighting was very intense and that many of our friends died in it.”

καὶ ἐπιεικῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ ἀπήγγελλται.
 παρεγένου μὲν, ἦ δ' ὄς, τῆ μάχη;

[ΣΩ.] παρεγενόμην.

P30 (≠ G) Plat. *Symp.* 220e–221b

[ΑΛ.] ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἄξιον ἦν θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη, ὅτε ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῆ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον ἔτυχον γὰρ παραγερόμενος ἵππον ἔχων, οὗτος δὲ ὄπλα. ἀνεχώρει οὖν ἐσκεδασμένων ἤδη τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὗτός τε ἄμα καὶ Λάχης: [. . .] ἔμουγ' ἐδόκει, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐκεῖ διαπορευέσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνθάδε, “βρευθυόμενος καὶ τῶφθαλμῶ παραβάλλων,” ἡρέμα παρασκοπῶν καὶ τοὺς φιλίους καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, δηλὸς ὢν παντὶ καὶ πάνν πόρρωθεν ὅτι εἴ τις ἄψεται τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρός, μάλα ἐρρωμένως ἀμυνεῖται. διὸ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἀπῆει καὶ οὗτος καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος.¹

¹ ἑταῖρος Aristides: ἕτερος BT

General Avoidance of Political Activity (P31)

P31 (≠ G) Plat. *Apol.* 31c

[ΣΩ.] ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλεύω περιῶν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον συμβουλεύειν τῆ πόλει.

“And that report,” I said, “is quite accurate.”
 “Were you present in the fighting?” he asked.
 “Yes I was.”

P30 (≠ G) Plato, *Symposium*

[Alcibiades:] And again, gentlemen, it was worth observing Socrates when the army was retreating in flight from Delium. It happened that I was present in the cavalry while he was a foot soldier. Well, the soldiers had scattered, and this man was retreating together with Laches. [. . .] it seemed to me, Aristophanes, to quote your line, that there too he was walking along just as he does here too, “strutting along and casting your eyes to the sides” [= **DRAM. T28a**], calmly glancing sidelong both at fellow soldiers and at enemies—it would have been obvious to anyone even from far off that if someone were to lay a hand on this man he would defend himself powerfully. And this is why he got off safely, both himself and his comrade.

General Avoidance of Political Activity (P31)

P31 (≠ G) Plato, *Apology*

[Socrates:] Perhaps it might seem strange that I go about giving advice in private and meddling in other people's business but that in public I do not venture to go to your crowded assembly to give advice to the city.

Attitude Toward the Sicilian Expedition (P32)

P32 (< I C410 G²) Plut. *Nic.* 13.9 532B

Σωκράτει δὲ τῷ σοφῷ τὸ δαιμόνιον οἷς εἰώθει συμβόλοις χρησάμενον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐμήνυσε κάκεῖνα, τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ τῆς πόλεως πραττόμενον. ὁ δὲ τοῖς συνήθεσι καὶ φίλοις ἔφρασε, καὶ διῆλθεν εἰς πολλοὺς ὁ λόγος.

Arginusae (P33–P34)

P33 (≠ G) Plat. *Apol.* 32a–c

[ΣΩ.] ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἤρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς¹ πρυτανεύουσα ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβουλεύσασθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ πάσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξεν. τότε ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύμαι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾧ μὴ μάλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον.

¹ Ἀντιοχίς secl. Hirschig

Attitude Toward the Sicilian Expedition (P32)

P32 (< I C410 G²) Plutarch, *Nicias*

To Socrates the wise his *daimonion* employed the tokens that he customarily used for him and revealed that the expedition [scil. against Sicily in 415] that had been undertaken would be the ruin of the city. He told his relatives and friends, and the story circulated widely.

Arginusae (P33–P34)

P33 (≠ G) Plato, *Apology*

[Socrates:] For as for me, men of Athens, I have not ever held any public office in our city, except that I was a member of the Council. And it happened that our tribe, Antiochis, was presiding at the time [406 BC] when you decided that the ten generals who had not picked up the survivors of the naval battle were to be brought to trial en masse—illegally, as you all recognized at a later time. On that occasion, I was the only member of the presiding committee to oppose your doing anything against the laws, and I voted against it. And though the orators were ready to denounce me and to have me arrested, and though you were urging them to do so and shouting, I thought that I must risk everything, with the law and justice on my side, rather than, out of fear of prison or death, joining together with you when what you wanted was not just.

P34

a (< B1 G¹) Xen. Mem. 1.1.18

βουλεύσας γάρ ποτε καὶ τὸν βουλευτικὸν ὄρκον ὁμόσας, ἐν ᾧ ἦν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους βουλευέσθαι, ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἑννέα στρατηγῶν¹ μιᾷ ψήφῳ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Θράσυλλον καὶ Ἐρασινίδην ἀποκτείνει πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσειν, ὀργιζομένου μὲν αὐτῷ τοῦ δήμου, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν ἀπειλούντων.

¹ ἑννέα στρατηγῶν del. Schenk1

b (D109 G¹) Xen. Hell. 1.7.15

οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις φοβηθέντες ὁμολόγουν πάντες προθήσειν πλὴν Σωκράτους τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου· οὗτος δ' οὐκ ἔφη ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ νόμον¹ πάντα² ποιήσειν.

¹ ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ νόμον] ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους Ath. Deirp. 5.58 218A ² πάντα B Ath.: om. mss.

*Resistance to the Thirty (P35)*P35 (< B1 G¹) Xen. Mem. 4.4.3

καὶ ὅτε οἱ τριάκοντα προσέταπτον αὐτῷ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τι, οὐκ ἐπέθετο· τοῖς τε γὰρ νέοις ἀπαγορευόντων αὐτῶν¹ μὴ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ προσταξάντων ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀγαγεῖν τινα

P34

a (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

For one time when he was serving on the Council and had sworn the oath of the Council that he would act in the Council in accordance with the laws, he had been made President of the popular assembly when the assembly desired to condemn to death by a single vote, against the laws, the nine generals, Thrasylus, Erasinides, and all the others. He refused to allow the motion, although the assembly was angry with him and many powerful men threatened him.

b (D109 G¹) Xenophon, *Hellenica*

Then the members of the presiding committee were frightened and agreed to put the question to a vote, all of them except Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus: he refused to do anything that was not according to the law.

*Resistance to the Thirty (P35)*P35 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

And when the Thirty ordered him to do something against the laws, he did not obey them. For when they forbade him to have discussions with young men and ordered him and certain other citizens to arrest a man [i.e. Leon of

¹ αὐτὸν MORZ: αὐτῷ Korais

ἐπὶ θανάτῳ, μόνος οὐκ ἐπέισθη, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους αὐτῷ προστάττεσθαι.

His Trial, Condemnation, and Death (P36–P42)
The Official Accusation (P36)

P36 (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.39, 40

Ἄντισθένης δὲ ἐν ταῖς τῶν Φιλοσόφων Διαδοχαῖς [FCrHist 508 F4] καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Ἀπολογία [23e] τρεῖς αὐτοῦ κατηγορήσασί φασι, Ἄνυτον καὶ Λύκωνα καὶ Μέλητον· τὸν μὲν Ἄνυτον ὑπὲρ¹ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ὀργιζόμενον· τὸν δὲ Λύκωνα ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ τὸν Μέλητον ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν, οὓς ἅπαντας ὁ Σωκράτης διέσυρε. [. . . = P39] ἢ δ' ἀντωμοσία τῆς δίκης τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον· ἀνακέλται γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φαβωρίνος [Frag. F41 Amato], ἐν τῷ Μητρώῳ· "τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο² Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιπθεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἄλωπεκῆθεν· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὓς μὲν ἢ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος."

¹ ὑπὲρ Casaubon: περὶ BP: ὡς περὶ F
σατο BPF Suda, corr. Menage

Salamis] so that he could be put to death, he alone did not obey them, because the order was against the laws.¹

¹ Cf. for another story on this subject Diod. Sic. 14.5 (I C104 G²).

His Trial, Condemnation, and Death (P36–P42)
The Official Accusation (P36)

P36 (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

Antisthenes in his *Successions of the Philosophers* and Plato in his *Apology* say that he was accused by three men, Anytus, Lycon, and Meletus; that Anytus was angry on behalf of the craftsmen and the politicians, Lycon on behalf of the orators, and Meletus on behalf of the poets, all of whom Socrates had attacked. [. . .] The affidavit of the trial was as follows—for it is preserved even now, says Favorinus, in the *Métrôon*:¹ "This is the accusation and affidavit sworn by Meletus, the son of Meletus of Pitthus, against Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus of Alopecce: Socrates commits a crime [literally: an injustice] by not recognizing the gods whom the city recognizes and by introducing other, new divinities (*daimonia*). He also commits a crime [literally: an injustice] by corrupting the young men. The penalty is death."

¹ The temple of Demeter where the city archives were kept.

*The Accusation in the Version Probably
Going Back to Polycrates (P37-P39)*

P37 (< B1 G¹) Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12

ἀλλ' ἔφη γε ὁ κατήγορος, Σωκράτει ὀμιλητὰ γενο-
μένω Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλείστα κακὰ τὴν
πόλιν ἐποίησάτην. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλι-
γαρχίᾳ πάντων κλεπτίστατός¹ τε καὶ βιαιότατος καὶ
φονικώτατος² ἐγένετο, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐν τῇ
δημοκρατίᾳ πάντων ἀκρατέστατός τε καὶ ὕβριστότα-
τος καὶ βιαιότατος.³

¹ κλεπτίστατος A (cf. Aristoph. *Plut.* 27): πλεονεκτίστατος
cett. ² καὶ φονικώτατος om. Φ ³ καὶ βιαιότατος
om. MORZ

P38 (< I E1 G²) Liban. *Declam.* 1 (Σωκράτους Ἀπολογία)
38

[citation of Anytus:] ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι [. . .], ἐπὶ τοὺς
νόμους ἀσκεῖ Σωκράτης τοὺς νέους. ἡ πολιτεία κινδυνεύεται.
θρασεῖς ἡμῖν καὶ τυραννικούς καὶ ἀφορήτους
καὶ τὸ ἴσον ὑπερορῶντας ὁ σοφιστὴς ἀνθρώπους δημιουρ-
γεῖ. οὐ κωλύσομεν; οὐκ ἐπισχῆσομεν; οὐκ ἐκβαλοῦμεν
τούτον, πρὶν <ἄν>¹ τὴν τῶν νόμων ἰσχὺν ἐκβάλλωσιν οἱ
παρὰ τούτῳ τρεφόμενοι;

¹ <ἄν> Foerster

*The Accusation in the Version Probably
Going Back to Polycrates (P37-P39)*

P37 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

But the accuser¹ said that after Critias and Alcibiades be-
came companions of Socrates, they caused the city the
greatest harm. For of all the oligarchs, Critias was the most
thievish, violent, and sanguinary; while of all the demo-
crats, Alcibiades was the most uncontrolled and brutal.

¹ It has often been suggested that the unnamed accuser to
whom Xenophon responds in his Socratic writings is Polycrates,
the author of an *Accusation of Socrates* which was thought (er-
roneously, cf. P39) to be the one that Meletus or Anytos had
spoken during the actual trial.

P38 (< I E1 G²) Libanius, *Apology of Socrates*

[citation of Anytus:] Athenians [. . .], Socrates trains the
young men to turn against the laws. Our city's constitution
is in danger. This sophist (*sophistês*) fabricates men who
are insolent, tyrannical, intolerable, and contemptuous of
equality. Shall we not prevent him? Shall we not stop him?
Shall we not get rid of him before those men who have
been educated by him have gotten rid of the strength of
the laws?¹

¹ Some scholars have suggested that these words assigned by
Libanius to Anytus might go back to Polycrates' version of the
speech of accusation at the trial.

P39 (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.39

[. . . cf. **P36**] Φαβωρίνος δὲ φησιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἀπομνημονευμάτων [Frag. F41 Amato] μὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον τὸν Πολυκράτους κατὰ Σωκράτους· ἐν αὐτῷ γάρ, φησί, μνημονεύει τῶν ὑπὸ Κόνωνος τειχῶν ἀνασταθέντων, ὃ¹ γέγονεν² ἔτεσιν ἕξ τῆς τοῦ Σωκράτους τελευτῆς ὕστερον. καὶ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον.

¹ ᾧ mss., corr. Cobet ² post γέγονεν hab. mss. ἐν, del. Bigot

His Condemnation and Death (P40–P42)

P40 (< I C133 G²) Cic. *De orat.* 1.54.231–33

[. . .] Socraten, qui, cum omnium sapientissimus esset sanctissimeque vixisset, ita in iudicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse iudicium. [. . .] ergo ille quoque damnatus est, neque solum primis sententiis, quibus tantum statuebant iudices damnarent an absolvent, sed etiam illis, quas iterum legibus ferre debebant. [232] erat enim Athenis reo damnato, si fraus capitalis non esset, quasi poenae aestimatio; ex¹ <lege>² sententia cum iudicibus daretur, interrogabatur reus quam quasi aestimationem commeruisse se maxime confiteretur; quod cum interrogatus Socrates esset, respondit sese meruisse ut amplis-

¹ ex L: et V²s ² <lege> Kumaniecki

P39 (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] Favorinus says in the first book of his *Memoirs* that Polycrates' speech against Socrates is not authentic: for in it, he says, he mentions the walls that were rebuilt by Conon, but this happened six years after Socrates' death [= 394]. And this is in fact the case.

His Condemnation and Death (P40–P42)

P40 (< I C133 G²) Cicero, *On the Orator*

[. . .] when Socrates, who had been the wisest and had lived the most piously of all, was on trial for his life he spoke in his own defense in such a way as to seem not a suppliant or a defendant, but the teacher or master of the judges. [. . .] And so he too [scil. like P. Rufus Rutilius] was convicted, and not only in the first sentence, in which the judges decided only whether he was to be convicted or acquitted, but also in the second one that they had to pronounce according to the law. [232] For in Athens, if the crime was not a capital matter, the determination of the penalty was practically left to the convicted defendant. According to <the law>, after sentence had been passed by the judges, the defendant was asked what the maximum penalty was that he considered he deserved. And when Socrates was asked this, he replied that he deserved to receive the greatest honors and rewards, and to be main-

simis honoribus et praemiis decoraretur et ut ei victus cotidianus in Prutaneo publice praeberetur, qui honor apud Graecos maximus haberetur. [233] cuius responso iudices sic exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.

P41 (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.41–42

ὁ δ' οὖν¹ κατεδικάσθη διακοσίαις ὀγδοήκοντα μιᾷ² πλείοσι ψήφοις τῶν ἀπολουσῶν· καὶ τιμωμένων τῶν δικαστῶν τί χρῆ παθεῖν αὐτὸν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ἐφη δραχμὰς ἀποτίσειν (Εὐβουλίδης μὲν γὰρ ἑκατόν φησιν ὁμολογήσαι). θορυβησάντων δὲ τῶν δικαστῶν, “ἐνεκα μὲν,” εἶπε, “τῶν ἐμοὶ διαπεπραγμένων τιμῶμαι τὴν δίκην τῆς ἐν Πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.” καὶ οὐ θάνατον αὐτοῦ κατέγνωσαν, προσθέντες ἄλλας ψήφους ὀγδοήκοντα. καὶ δεθεῖς μετὰ³ πολλὰς ἡμέρας ἔπιε τὸ κώνειον [. . .].

¹ ὁ δ' οὖν Richards: ὅτ' οὖν mss.; ὅτ' οὖν <καὶ> Cobet
² ὀγδοήκοντα μιᾷ F: ὀγδοηκονταμία BP: ὀγδοήκοντα, τριάκοντα Wilamowitz
³ μετ' οὐ mss., corr. Menage

P42 (I C155 G²) Diod. Sic. 14.37.7

Ἀθήνησι δὲ Σωκράτης ὁ φιλόσοφος ὑπ' Ἀνύτου καὶ Μελέτου κατηγορηθεὶς ἐπ' ἀσεβείᾳ καὶ φθορᾷ τῶν νέων θανάτῳ κατεδικάσθη καὶ πινὼν κώνειον ἐτελεύτη-

tained at public expense every day in the Prytaneum¹—something that was considered the greatest honor of all among the Greeks. [233] At this reply of his, the judges became so furious that they condemned to death the most innocent of men.

¹ Cf. Plato, *Apology* 36d.

P41 (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

So he was convicted by 281 votes more than those who voted for acquittal; and when the judges were assessing what penalty he should suffer or pay, he said that he would pay twenty-five drachmas. Eubulides says that he agreed to pay one hundred. When the judges made an uproar, he said, “For the sake of the services I have performed, I assess the penalty as maintenance in the Prytaneum.” And so they condemned him to death, adding a further 80 votes.¹ And he was put in prison, and after many days he drank the hemlock [. . .].

¹ There is some uncertainty about the exact numbers; cf. Plato, *Apology* 36a.

P42 (I C155 G²) Diodorus Siculus

At Athens, the philosopher Socrates, accused by Anytus and Meletus of impiety and of corrupting the young men, was condemned to death and died by drinking hemlock.

σεν. ἀδίκου δὲ τῆς κατηγορίας γεγενημένης ὁ δῆμος
 μετεμελήθη, τηλικούτου ἀνδρα θεωρῶν ἀνηρημένον·
 διόπερ τοὺς κατηγορήσαντας δι' ὀργῆς εἶχε καὶ τέλος
 ἀκρίτους ἀπέκτεινεν.

When the people recognized that his condemnation was unjust, they repented, seeing that such a great man had been put to death. And so they were angry with the accusers and finally put them to death without a trial.¹

¹ No other ancient source reports this; it may be an invention based on Plato, *Apology* 39c.

Iconography (P43)

P43 (≠ DK) Richter I, pp. 109–19 and Figures 456–573; Richter-Smith, pp. 198–204 and Figures 159–65; Döring, “Sokrates. B.2 Antike Bildnisse,” in Flahar (1998), p. 145.

SOCRATES [\neq DK]

D

Writings? (D1)

D1 (< I D2 G²) *Suda* Σ.829 Adler

[. . .] ἀπέθανεν, ἔγγραφον οὐδὲν καταλιπὼν ἢ, ὡς τινες βούλονται, ὕμνον εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ Ἄρτεμιν, καὶ μῦθον Αἰσώπειον δι' ἐπῶν.

*Socrates' Place in the History of
Philosophy* (D2–D8)

*Was He Only Ever Interested in Moral Philosophy,
Never in Natural Philosophy . . .* (D2–D6)

D2 (< I B24 G²) Arist. *Metaph.* A6 987b1–2

Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν [. . . = **D10**].

D3 (< B1 G¹) Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.11

οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πρᾶπτοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως ἤπερ τῶν ἄλλ-

SOCRATES

D

Writings? (D1)

D1 (< I D2 G²) *Suda*

[. . .] he died without leaving behind anything written, or, as some maintain, a hymn to Apollo and Artemis and an Aesopian fable in verse.

*Socrates' Place in the History of
Philosophy* (D2–D8)

*Was He Only Ever Interested in Moral Philosophy,
Never in Natural Philosophy . . .* (D2–D6)

D2 (< I B24 G²) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

Socrates busied himself with ethical matters, and not with nature as a whole [. . .].

D3 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

No one ever saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, anything impious or irreligious. For he never discoursed, like most of the others, about the nature of all things, in-

λων οἱ πλείστοι διελέγετο σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔχει καὶ τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε.

D4 (< I C458 G²) Cic. *Tusc.* 5.4.10

sed ab antiqua philosophia usque ad Socratem, qui Archelaum, Anaxagorae discipulum, audierat, numeri motusque tractabantur, et unde omnia orerentur quove reciderent, studioseque ab iis siderum magnitudines intervalla cursus anquirebantur et cuncta caelestia. Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit et in domus etiam introduxit et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere.

D5 (< I C465 G²) Sext. *Adv. Math.* 7.8

πλὴν οἱ μὲν τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους προστάντες εἰσὶν οἶδε, τοῦ δὲ ἠθικοῦ μόνου¹ ἐπεμελείτο Σωκράτης κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτοῦ γνωρίμους.

¹ μόνος mss., corr. ed. Gen.

D6 Diog. Laert.

a (< I C12 G², 60 A1) 2.16

[. . . = **ARCH. P1**] καὶ ἔληξεν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ φυσικὴ φιλοσοφία, Σωκράτους τὴν ἠθικὴν εἰσαγαγόντος. [. . . = **ARCH. R2**]

investigating the condition of what the sophists (*sophistai*) call 'the world order' (*kosmos*) and by what necessities each of the heavenly phenomena occurs; on the contrary, he declared that those people who study such matters are fools.

D4 (< I C458 G²) Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*

But from the time of ancient philosophy down to Socrates, who had studied with Archelaus, Anaxagoras' pupil, people studied numbers and motions, and what all things arise from and what they end in; and they diligently studied the magnitudes of the stars, their distances, trajectories, and all the heavenly matters. But Socrates was the first one who brought down philosophy from the heavens, established it in cities, introduced it into families, and forced it to examine life and morals, and good and evil.

D5 (< I C465 G²) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

In any case, these [i.e. Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander, Empedocles, Parmenides, Heraclitus] are the chief exponents of the natural part [scil. of philosophy], but Socrates only occupied himself with the ethical part, at least according to his other associates [scil. except Plato, cf. **D7**].

D6 Diogenes Laertius

a (< I C12 G², 60 A1)

[. . .] natural philosophy came to an end with him [i.e. Archelaus], with Socrates introducing ethics. [. . .]

b (< I D I G²) 2.20–21

[...] γνόντα δὲ τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ ἠθικὰ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐργαστηρίων καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ [...].

... or Was He Interested in Natural
Philosophy Too? (D7–D8)

D7 (≠ G) Plat. *Phaed.* 96a–c

[ΣΩ.] ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι¹ τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστον, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι. καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαντὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε ἄρ' ἐπειδὴν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τιὰ λάβη, ὡς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα συντρέφεται; καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονούμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀήρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ; ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλος ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὄραν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνεται μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα² γίνεσθαι ἐπιωτήμην; καὶ αἷ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν τε καὶ τὴν

¹ εἶναι εἰδέναι T: εἶναι B: εἰδέναι εἶναι Stob.: <καὶ> εἰδέναι Burnet
² κατὰ ταῦτα B Stob.: καὶ ταῦτα T: κατὰ ταῦτα Heimdorf

b (< I D I G²)

[...] having become convinced that the study of nature is of no concern to us, he philosophized about ethical matters in workshops and in the marketplace [...].

... or Was He Interested in Natural
Philosophy Too? (D7–D8)

D7 (≠ G) Plato, *Phaedo*

[Socrates:] When I myself was young, Cebes, I was incredibly eager for the kind of wisdom that they call the investigation of nature (*peri phuseōs historia*). For it seemed to me splendid to know the causes of each thing, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists; and I often changed my mind in one direction or another when I asked first of all questions like: are living creatures nourished when heat and cold undergo a kind of putrefaction, as some people say [cf. ARCH. D2[5], D3]? Is it rather blood by which we think [cf. EMP. D240], or air [cf. DIOG. D9, D44] or fire [cf. ATOM. D130, D132]? Or is it none of these, but it is the brain that supplies the sensations of hearing, sight, and smell [cf. ALCM. D19], and is it from these latter that memory and opinion arise, and, when memory and opinion achieve a state of stability, does knowledge come about in accordance with these? And again, investigating the perishing of these processes, I also investigated what happens in the

γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαντῶ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην
τὴν σκέψιν ἀφνῆς εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα.

D8 (< I D1 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.45

δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ὁ Σωκράτης διε-
λέχθαι ὅπου γε καὶ περὶ προνοίας τιὰ διαλέγεται,
καθὰ φησι καὶ Ξενοφῶν, καίτοι περὶ μόνων τῶν ἡθι-
κῶν ποιείσθαι τοὺς λόγους αὐτὸν εἰπῶν.

Conceptions and Methods in Ethics (D9–D53)
The Search for Definitions in Ethics (D9–D10)

D9 (< B1 G¹) Xen. Mem. 1.1.16

αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπέων ἀεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν
τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον,
τί ἄδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δει-
λία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρ-
χικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν
εἰδότας ἡγείτο καλοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνο-
οῦντας ἀνδραποδάδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλήσθαι.

D10 Arist. *Metaph.*

a (< I B24 G²) A6 987b1–6

Σωκράτους [. . . = **D2**] ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου
ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὀρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου

heavens and on earth, until I finally decided that for this
kind of investigation I was quite unfitted by nature.

D8 (< I D1 G²) Diogenes Laertius

But it seems to me that Socrates also discoursed about
natural phenomena. For he also makes some statements
about providence, according to what Xenophon too says
[*Mem.* 1.4.6; 1.1.16], even though this latter reports that he
only discussed ethical matters.

See also **ANAXAG. R7**; **DRAM. T10**

Conceptions and Methods in Ethics (D9–D53)
The Search for Definitions in Ethics (D9–D10)

D9 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

He himself always discoursed about human matters, in-
vestigating what is pious, what is impious, what is fine,
what is shameful, what is just, what is unjust, what is tem-
perance (*sôphrosunê*), what is madness, what is courage,
what is cowardice, what is a city, what is a citizen, what
is the government of men, what is the man who governs
men, and about the other things about which he thought
that those who know them are fine men (*kalos kagathos*)
while those who are ignorant of them could justly be called
slavish.

D10 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

a (< I B24 G²)

Socrates [. . .] sought in these [i.e. ethical matters] the
universal and was the first to direct his thought to defini-

τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐκέλευον ἀποδεξάμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπέλαβεν ὡς περὶ ἐτέρων τοῦτο γιγνόμενον καὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός.

b (< I B26 G²) M4 1078b17–25

Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς πραγματευόμενος καὶ περὶ τούτων ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου ζητούντος πρώτου [. . .]. ἐκέλευος δ' εὐλόγως ἐζήτει τὸ τί ἐστὶν συλλογίζεσθαι γὰρ ἐζήτει, ἀρχὴ δὲ τῶν συλλογισμῶν τὸ τί ἐστὶν.

Socrates' Ignorance and Irony, and His Refusal to Answer Questions (D11–D17)

D11 (≠ G) Plat. *Apol.*

a 21d

[ΣΩ.] πρὸς ἐμαντὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμεν ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κάγαθον εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δὲ, ὡσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε μικρῶ τι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι εἰδέναι.

b 29b

[ΣΩ.] καίτοι¹ πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπονείδι-

tions, and he [i.e. Plato] followed him, assumed that it [i.e. the universal] has to come about with regard not to some one of the sensible entities but to ones of a different kind.

b (< I B26 G²)

Socrates occupied himself with the ethical virtues and was the first to investigate universal definitions with regard to these [. . .]. It was with good reason that he sought what a thing is (*to ti estin*, i.e. the essence), for he was seeking to argue deductively, and the principle of deductive arguments is the essence.

Socrates' Ignorance and Irony, and His Refusal to Answer Questions (D11–D17)

D11 (≠ G) Plato, *Apology*

a.

[Socrates:] So I went away thinking to myself that I am wiser than that man [scil. a public figure reputed wise]. For there is a good chance that neither of us knows what is fine and good, but he thinks he knows something when he does not know it, while I, just as I do not know, so too I do not think that I do. So that it seemed to me that I was a tiny bit wiser than him, by this very difference, that what I do not know, I do not think either that I know it.

b

[Socrates:] And is not this the most reprehensible form of

¹ καίτοι Eus.: καὶ τοῦτο mss. Stob.: καὶ Arm.

στος, ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδῶς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου οὕτω καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι.

D12 (≠ G) Plat. *Men.* 80c-d

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἢ νάρκη αὐτῇ ναρκῶσα οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔοικα αὐτῇ; εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν περὶ ἀρετῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ μέντοι ἴσως πρότερον μὲν ἤδησθα πρὶν ἐμοῦ ἄψασθαι, νῦν μέντοι ὅμοιος εἰ οὐκ εἰδότης. ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν.

D13 (≠ G) Plat. *Theaet.* 150b-e

[ΣΩ.] τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἀνδρᾶς ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναικᾶς μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ πότερον εἰδῶλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές.

ignorance: to think that one knows what one does not know? I myself, gentlemen, differ perhaps in this regard too from most other men, and if I said that I am wiser at all in anything, it would be in this: that not knowing enough about matters in Hades, in consequence I do not think either that I know.

D12 (≠ G) Plato, *Meno*

[Socrates:] [. . .] As for me, if the electric ray is numb itself and thereby makes others numb as well, I resemble it, but if not, then I do not. For it is not because I am good at solving difficulties (*euporein*) myself that I put other people into difficulty (*aporein*), but because I myself am more in difficulties than anyone else that in this way I put others into difficulty. And in the present case, regarding what virtue is, I myself do not know, while you perhaps knew earlier before you came into contact with me, but now you are in the same condition as someone who does not know. All the same, I want to continue the examination together with you and to investigate jointly what it might be.

D13 (≠ G) Plato, *Theaetetus*

My art of midwifery is like theirs [scil. real midwives'] in all other respects, but it differs by being applied to men and not to women, and by regarding their souls when they are in labor and not their bodies. And this is what is greatest in our art: that it is able to test in every way whether a young man's mind is giving birth to a phantom and falsehood or to something generative and true. For what hap-

ἐπεὶ τὸδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγρονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι ἀνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποφαινομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσιν. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τὸδε· μαιεύεσθαι μὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκάλυπεν. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάντι σοφός, οὐδέ τί μοι ἔστιν εὕρημα τοιοῦτον γεγονός τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονον· οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ συγγιγνώμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάντι ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊούσης τῆς συνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρέικη, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πρόποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὐρόντες τε καὶ τεκόντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεὸς τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος.

D14 (≠ G) Plat. *Rep.* 1 336c, 337a, e

[ΘΡ.] ἀλλ' εἴπερ ὡς ἀληθῶς βούλει εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον ὅτι ἔστι, μὴ μόνον ἐρώτα μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων ἐπειδάν τις τι ἀποκρίνηται, ἐγνωκῶς τοῦτο, ὅτι ῥῆον ἐρωτᾶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀποκρίναι καὶ εἰπεὶ τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. [. . .] ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὐτῆ 'κείνη ἢ εἰωθῆναι εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τούτους προύλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσεις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσεις ἢ ἀποκρῖνωιο, εἴ τις τί σε ἐρωτᾷ. [. . .] ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξῃται

pens to midwives happens to me too: I am unable to give birth to wisdom, and what many people have already reproached me for—that I question other people but myself assert nothing about anything, because I possess no wisdom—this reproach is true. And the reason for this is the following: god constrains me to act as a midwife but has prevented me from giving birth. So I myself am not at all wise myself, and no discovery of this sort has been born to me as the offspring of my soul. But as for those who associate with me, some of them seem quite foolish at first, but as our acquaintance continues, all those to whom the god concedes it progress in a way that seems amazing both to themselves and to other people. And it is clear that this happens not because they have ever learned anything from me but because they have discovered many fine things within themselves and have given birth to them. But of this delivery the god and I are the cause.

D14 (≠ G) Plato, *Republic*

[Thrasymachus:] But if you [i.e. Socrates] truly want to know what the just is, then don't merely ask questions or pride yourself on refuting whenever someone gives an answer, knowing as you do that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them. No, you yourself answer and tell us what you say the just is. [. . .] By Heracles, this is that well-known habitual irony of Socrates, and I knew already and predicted to these people that if someone asked you a question you would refuse to answer, would be ironic, and would do anything rather than answer. [. . .] in order that

αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινομένου
λαμβάνη λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ.

[ΣΩ.] πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὶς ἀποκρί-
ναιτο πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων εἶδέναι
[. . .];

D15 (I B20 G²) Arist. *SE* 34 183b7–8

[. . .] ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἠρώτα ἀλλ' οὐκ
ἀπεκρίνετο ὁμολόγει γὰρ οὐκ εἶδέναι.

D16 (< I B23 G²) Arist. *EN* 4.13 1127b25–26

μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἐνδοξὰ ἀπαρνούνται, οἷον καὶ
Σωκράτης ἐποίει.

D17 (I C440 G²) Quintil. *Inst. or.* 9.2.46

[. . .] cum etiam vita universa ironiam habere videatur,
qualis est visa Socratis (nam ideo dictus εἴρων, agens
imperitum et admiratorem aliorum tamquam sapientium)
[. . .].

Socrates' Method of Dialogue (D18–D32)
The Importance of Discussion (D18)

D18 (< B1 G¹) Xen. *Mem.* 4.5.11–12

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι
ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι διαλέγοντας

Socrates can do what he usually does: not give an answer,
but, when someone else gives an answer, seize the argu-
ment and refute it.

[Socrates:] Yes, dear friend, for how can someone give an
answer when, to begin with, he does not know and does
not claim to know [. . .]?

D15 (I B20 G²) Aristotle, *Sophistic Refutations*

[. . .] that is also why Socrates asked questions but did not
answer them; for he admitted that he did not know.

D16 (< I B23 G²) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

Most of all these people too [i.e. ironic self-deprecators]
reject what is generally highly valued [i.e. their reputa-
tion], as Socrates did too.

D17 (I C440 G²) Quintilian, *Training in Oratory*

[. . .] since even a whole life can seem to be ironical, as
seemed to be the case with Socrates, for he was called an
'ironist' (*eirôn*) since he played the role of an ignorant man
who admired other people as though they were wise [. . .].

Socrates' Method of Dialogue (D18–D32)
The Importance of Discussion (D18)

D18 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

[. . .] he also said that 'discussing' (*dialogesthai*) receives
its name from the fact that those people who come to-
gether to deliberate in common classify things (*dialegon-*

κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. δεῖν οὖν πειράσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἑαυτὸν ἔτοιμον παρασκευάζειν καὶ τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιμελείσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἀνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους.

The Interlocutor's Obligation to Agree with Himself (D19–D20)

D19 (≠ G) Plat. *Crit.* 49c–d

[ΣΩ.] καὶ ὄρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῆς· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει.

D20 (≠ G) Plat. *Gorg.* 495a

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε πότερον φῆς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢδὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναι τι τῶν ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν;

[ΚΑ.] ἵνα δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος¹ ἢ ὁ λόγος, εἰ ἄλλο ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ φημι εἶναι.

[ΣΩ.] διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἰκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζεις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σταντῶ ἐρεῖς.

¹ μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος BTP; μὴ ὁμολογούμενος F; γρ. καὶ ἀνομολογούμενος καὶ μὴ ὁμολογούμενος Olympiodorus

tas) according to their kinds. That is why it is necessary to prepare oneself to be ready for this as far as possible and to pay attention most of all to this; for it is from this that men become best and most capable of leading and of discussing.

The Interlocutor's Obligation to Agree with Himself (D19–D20)

D19 (≠ G) Plato, *Crito*

[Socrates:] Crito, be careful, when you agree to this [i.e. to respond to an injustice with an injustice], that you are not agreeing against your own opinion; for I know that this is, and will be, the opinion of very few people.

D20 (≠ G) Plato, *Gorgias*

[Socrates:] But tell me again now whether you say that the pleasant and the good are identical, or whether there exists some pleasure that is not good.

[Callicles:] So that my statements will not be inconsistent if I say that they are different, I say that they are the same.

[Socrates:] You are ruining your first statements, Callicles, and you would no longer be in an adequate position to investigate the truth together with me, if you are going to speak against your own opinions.

*The Use of Generally Accepted Views (D21)***D21** (< B1 G¹) Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.15

ὁπότε δὲ αὐτός τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίει, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγον. τοιγαροῦν πολλὴ¹ μάλιστα ὦν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρέιχε. ἔφη δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρον τῷ Ὀδυσσεὶ ἀναθεῖναι τὸ ἀσφαλῆ ῥήτορα εἶναι, ὡς ἱκανὸν² ὄντα διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τοὺς λόγους.

¹ πολλὸ O: πολλοὶ BM¹RZ: πολλῶ coni. Gilbert ² post ἱκανὸν hab. mss. αὐτὸν (om. XY), del. Hude

*Induction (D22–D25)***D22** (< I B26 G²) Arist. *Metaph.* M4 1078b27–29

δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικούς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἄμφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης

D23 (< I C434 G²) Cic. *Inv.* 1.31.51, 53

inductio est oratio quae rebus non dubiis captat assensionem eius quicum instituta est; quibus assensionibus facit ut illi dubia quaedam res propter similitudinem earum rerum quibus assensit probetur. [. . .] hoc modo sermonis plurimum Socrates usus est, propterea quod nihil ipse

*The Use of Generally Accepted Views (D21)***D21** (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

Whenever he himself examined something in an argument, he proceeded by means of the most generally accepted opinions, since he thought that this would provide infallibility for the argument. And so, of all the men I have known, he was the one who most of all made his listeners agree with him when he spoke. And he said that Homer attributed to Odysseus the quality of being an infallible orator [*Od.* 8.171] because he was able to lead discussions by means of people's opinions.

*Induction (D22–D25)***D22** (< I B26 G²) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

For there are two things that one can fairly attribute to Socrates: inductive reasoning and universal definition; for these are both concerned with the principle of knowledge.

D23 (< I C434 G²) Cicero, *On Invention*

Induction is a kind of discourse that compels the agreement of the interlocutor by means of points that are not doubtful; by these agreements it makes him give his approval also about some doubtful points because of their similarity to the points about which he has agreed. [. . .] Socrates made considerable use of this kind of discourse,

afferre ad persuadendum volebat, sed ex eo, quod sibi ille dederat, quicum disputabat, aliquid conficere malebat, quod ille ex eo, quod iam concessisset, necessario adprobare deberet.

D24 (< I C446 G²) Quintil. *Inst. or.* 5.11.3

nam illa, qua plurimum est Socrates usus, hanc habuit viam, <ut>¹ cum plura interrogasset, quae fateri adversario necesse esset, novissime id, de quo quaerebatur, inferret ut simile concessis.² id est inductio.³

¹ <ut> *Badius* ² concessisse *mss.*, *corr. Törneblad*

³ id est inductio *secl. Meister*

D25 (≠ G) Plat. *Prot.* 332c-d

[ΣΩ.] φέρε δῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι καλόν;
συνεχώρει.

[ΣΩ.] τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν;

[ΠΡ.] οὐκ ἔστιν.

[ΣΩ.] τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν;

[ΠΡ.] ἔστιν.

[ΣΩ.] τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν;

[ΠΡ.] οὐκ ἔστιν.

[ΣΩ.] τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ὀξύ ἐν φωνῇ;

ἔφη.

[ΣΩ.] τούτῳ μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ;

because he himself wished to propose nothing for the purpose of persuasion, but preferred that his interlocutor should reach a conclusion on the basis of arguments that he had supplied to himself and that he had by necessity to approve on the basis of what he had already conceded.

D24 (< I C446 G²) Quintilian, *Training in Oratory*

For the [scil. method] that Socrates chiefly used was this: after he had asked a number of questions to which his adversary was obliged to reply in the affirmative, he finally inferred the object of the discussion from its similarity to what had already been conceded. This is what induction is.

D25 (≠ G) Plato, *Protagoras*

"Well then," I [i.e. Socrates] said, "is there something that is beautiful?"

He [i.e. Protagoras] admitted that there is.

"Is there anything opposite to this besides the ugly?"

"No."

"Well then, is there something that is good?"

"Yes."

"Is there anything opposite to this besides the bad?"

"No."

"Well then, is there something that is high-pitched in tone?"

He said there is.

"Is there nothing else opposite to this besides the deep-pitched?"

οὐκ ἔφη.

[ΣΩ.] οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἐναντίω ἐν
μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά;

συνωμολόγει.

Refutation (elenchos) (D26)

D26 (≠ G) Plat. *Gorg.* 458a–b

[ΣΩ.] ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν περ
καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἂν σε διερωτήην· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐφών ἂν.
ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἶ
τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγχάντων εἶ τίς τι
μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντὰν ἐλεγχθέν-
των ἢ ἐλεγχάντων· μείζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι,
ὅσῳ περ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κα-
κοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶ-
μαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευ-
δῆς περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὦν.

*Reactions of Socrates' Interlocutors
to His Refutations (D27–D29)*

D27 (≠ G) Plat. *Theaet.* 168a–b

[ΠΡ.] ἂν μὲν γὰρ οὕτω ποιῆς, ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ
προσδιατρέβοντές σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπο-
ρίας ἀλλ' οὐ σέ, καὶ σέ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσου-
σιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσι καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν

He said there is not.

"Well then," I said, "for each single one of the opposites
there is only one opposite, and not many?"

He agreed.

Refutation (elenchos) (D26)

D26 (≠ G) Plato, *Gorgias*

[Socrates:] As for me then, if you too are one of the same
kind of people as I am, then I will gladly ask you questions;
but if not, I will let it go. Of what kind am I? One of those
people who would gladly be refuted if I what I say is un-
true and would gladly refute anyone if what he said was
untrue—but would not less gladly be refuted than refute.
For I consider the former to be the greater good, inas-
much as it is a greater good for someone to be freed from
the greatest of evils than to free someone else. For I think
that there cannot be any evil for a human being so great
as a false opinion about the matters we are now discussing
[i.e. the nature of rhetoric].

*Reactions of Socrates' Interlocutors
to His Refutations (D27–D29)*

D27 (≠ G) Plato, *Theaetetus*

[Protagoras, addressing himself to Socrates in an imagined
speech attributed to him by the latter:] If you do this [i.e.
argue loyally], then those people who converse with you
will blame themselves, and not you, for their bewilderment
and perplexity (*aporia*), and they will seek you out and
love you, and they will hate themselves and will flee from

εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἢ ἄλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν οἱ πρότερον ἦσαν ἐὰν δὲ τὰναντία τούτων δρᾶς ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τὰναντία συμβήσεται σοι καὶ τοὺς συνόντας ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων μισούντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀποφανεῖς ἐπειδὴν πρεσβύτεροι γέγονται.

D28 (< B1 G¹) Xen. Mem. 4.2.39–40

καὶ πάνν ἀθύμως ἔχων ἀπήλθε καὶ καταφρονήσας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι. πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσῆσαν, οὓς καὶ βλακότερους ἐνόμιζεν ὁ δὲ Εὐθύδημος ὑπέλαβεν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀνὴρ ἀξιόλογος γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ὅτι μάλιστα Σωκράτει συνείη· καὶ οὐκ ἀπελείπετο ἔτι αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ τι ἀναγκαῖον εἴη· ἕνια δὲ καὶ ἐμμεῖτο ὧν ἐκεῖνος ἐπετήδευεν.

D29 (≠ G) Plat. Soph. 230c–d, 231b

[ΞΕ.] νομίζοντες γάρ, ὦ παῖ φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτούς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νενομίκασι μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σώμα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐντός¹ τις ἐκβάλλῃ, ταῦτόν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διανοήθησαν ἐκεῖνοι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἔξῃ τῶν προσφερομένων μαθημάτων ὄνησι, πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμ-

¹ ἐντός Stob.: ἐν αὐτῷ BT

themselves so as to go toward philosophy, so that by becoming different they can be freed from the people they used to be. But if you do the opposite, like most people, the opposite will ensue and you will turn your companions, not into lovers of wisdom [i.e. philosophers], but into people who hate this when they become older.

D28 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

And he [i.e. Euthydemus] went away [scil. from a discussion with Socrates], completely depressed and despising himself, and convinced that he really was a slave. Now, many of the people who were put into this state by Socrates no longer approached him, and these he thought were pretty fainthearted [or: dull-witted]. But Euthydemus thought that there was no other way for him to become a man worth mentioning unless he spent as much time as possible with Socrates. And afterward he never left him unless there was some necessity, and he even imitated some of the things he did.

D29 (≠ G) Plato, *Sophist*

[The stranger from Elea:] For, my dear young man [i.e. Theaetetus], just as doctors who work on bodies think that the body is not capable of deriving benefit from absorbing any food that is offered to it until someone has expelled everything that is obstructing it inside, so too those men [i.e. the ‘sophists’ who are being discussed] have come to the same conclusion about the soul, viz. that it will never derive any advantage from absorbing teachings offered to it until someone refutes him and reduces the person who has been refuted to a condition of shame, by removing the opinions that stand in the way of learning, displays him as

ποδίους δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρὸν ἀποφήνη καὶ ταῦτα ἠγούμενον ἄπερ οἶδεν εἰδέναι μόνα, πλείω δὲ μή. [. . .] τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γυγνόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἢ γένει γενναία σοφιστικῆ.

*Philosophical Dialogues Vs.
Rhetorical Speeches (D30–D32)*

D30 (≠ G) Plat. *Prot.*

a 334e–335a

[ΣΩ.] ἀκήκοα γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι σὺ οἶός τ' εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν, εἴαν βούλη, οὕτως ὥστε τὸν λόγον μηδέποτε ἐπιλιπεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸ βραχέα οὕτως ὥστε μηδένα σοῦ ἐν βραχυτέροις εἰπεῖν· εἰ οὖν μέλλεις ἐμοὶ διαλέξεσθαι, τῷ ἐτέρῳ χρῶ τρόπῳ πρὸς με, τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ.

b 336a–b

[ΣΩ.] εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμῆς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκοῦεν, τούτου δέον, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχείων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ ἔγωγ' ὄμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναι τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμενους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν.

someone who has been purified and who thinks that he knows only what he does know, and not more than that. [. . .] Within education, according to the present discussion, the refutation that concerns empty pseudo-wisdom must be declared by us to be nothing other than that sophistic which is genuinely nobly born [cf. **SOPH. R32**].

*Philosophical Dialogues Vs.
Rhetorical Speeches (D30–D32)*

D30 (≠ G) Plato, *Protagoras*

a

[Socrates:] I have heard, I said, that you yourself [i.e. Protagoras] are able both to teach someone else about one and the same subject and to speak at length, if you wish to, in such a way that you are never at a loss for something to say; or else to speak briefly, in such a way that that no one could speak more briefly than you. So, if you are going to discuss with me, please use the latter method with me, that of brevity.

b

[Socrates:] So if you [i.e. Callias] want to hear both me and Protagoras, ask him to answer me now too just as he did at first—briefly, and answering exactly the question that was asked. Otherwise what kind of discussions will ours be? For I myself thought that it is one thing to spend time together with one another in discussions and another thing to address the populace.

D31 (≠ G) Plat. *Gorg.*

a 471e

[ΣΩ.] ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὴν τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τάναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχεται ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἐλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἀξίός ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθεῖη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἰναί τι.

b 474a

[ΣΩ.] ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ἂν λέγω ἕνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἂν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾗ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐὼ χαιρεῖν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπιψηφίζω ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι.

D32 (≠ G) Plat. *Apol.* 17b–c, 18a

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ὑμεῖς δὲ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὀνόμασιν—πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω [. . .] καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον

D31 (≠ G) Plato, *Gorgias*

a

[Socrates:] Strange friend, you [i.e. Polus] are trying to refute me in an oratorical manner, just like people in law courts who think they are refuting. For there, the ones think that they are refuting the others when they produce many reputable witnesses in support of whatever speeches they are making, while their opponent produces only one, or none at all. But this sort of refutation is worth nothing with regard to the truth; for sometimes a man can be brought down by the false testimony of many respectable witnesses.

b

[Socrates:] For I know how to produce one witness for what I say, the very same man with whom I am speaking; as for the multitude, I pay them no attention. And I know how to call for the vote of one man, but with the multitude I do not even discuss.

D32 (≠ G) Plato, *Apology*

[Socrates:] [. . .] You will hear from me the whole truth—not, by Zeus, Athenians, prettified speeches, like theirs [i.e. the accusers'], adorned in words and phrases, but you will hear things spoken at random in everyday words—for I am confident that what I say is just [. . .] what I ask of you now is just, as I believe, not to pay attention to the

τῆς λέξεως ἔαν—ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελ-
τίων ἂν εἶη—αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτω τὸν
νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν
γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετὴ, ῥήτορος δὲ τὰληθῆ λέγειν.

*Self-Knowledge and the Care
of the Self (D33–D34)*

D33 (< B1 G¹) Xen. Mem.

a 3.7.9

[ΣΩ.] ὦγαθέ, μὴ ἀγνοοίε σεαυτὸν, μηδὲ ἀμάρτανε ἃ οἱ
πλείστοι ἀμαρτάνουσιν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ὠρηκότες ἐπὶ
τὸ σκοπεῖν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα οὐ τρέπονται ἐπὶ
τὸ ἑαυτοὺς ἐξετάζειν. μὴ οὖν ἀπορραθῦμι τούτου,
ἀλλὰ διατείνου μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ σαυτῷ προσέχειν.

b 3.9.6

μανίαν γε μὴν ἐναντίον μὲν ἔφη εἶναι σοφία, οὐ μέν-
τοι γε τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζε· τὸ δὲ
ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἶεσθαι¹
γιγνώσκειν ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι.

¹ post οἶεσθαι hab. mss. καὶ, del. edd.

c 4.2.24–26

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, “εἰπέ μοι,” ἔφη, “ὦ Εὐθύδημε· εἰς
Δελφοὺς δὲ ἤδη πάποτε ἀφίκου;”

manner of my style—perhaps it is worse, but perhaps it is
better—and to look at this, and to pay attention to this:
whether what I say is just or not. For that is the virtue of
a judge, while that of an orator is to say the truth.

*Self-Knowledge and the Care
of the Self (D33–D34)*

D33 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

a

[Socrates:] My good man, do not fail to know yourself,
and do not commit the error that most men commit: for
the multitude, in their eagerness to pay attention to other
people's affairs, do not turn toward examining themselves.
So do not give up on this, but exert yourself instead at
paying attention to yourself.

b

He said that madness is the opposite of wisdom, but he did
not think that lack of knowledge (*anepistēmosunē*) is mad-
ness: he thought that not to know oneself, and to have
opinions and to suppose that one knows what one does not
know, are very close to madness.

c

And Socrates said, “Tell me, Euthydemus: have you ever
gone to Delphi?”

“καὶ δὶς γε νῆ Δί,” ἔφη.

“κατέμαθες οὖν πρὸς τῷ ναῷ που γεγραμμένον τὸ Γνώθι σαυτόν;”

“ἔγωγε.”

“πότερον οὖν οὐδέν σοι τοῦ γράμματος ἐμέλησεν ἢ προσέσχες τε καὶ ἐπεχείρησας σαυτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν ὅστις εἴης;”

“μὰ Δί οὐ δῆτα,” ἔφη “καὶ γὰρ δὴ πάνν τοῦτό γε ὦμην εἰδέναι· σχολῆ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τι ἦδειν, εἴ γε μῆδ’ ἐμαντὸν ἐγίγνωσκον.” [. . .]

“ἐκείνο δὲ οὐ φανερόν,” ἔφη, “ὅτι διὰ μὲν τὸ εἰδέναι ἐαντοὺς πλείστα ἀγαθὰ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐψεῦσθαι ἐαντῶν πλείστα κακά;”

D34 (≠ G) (Ps.-?) Plat. *Alc. I*

a 129a

[ΣΩ.] πότερον οὖν δὴ ῥάδιον τυγχάνει τὸ γνῶναι ἐαντόν, καὶ τις ἦν φαῦλος ὁ τοῦτο ἀναθεὶς εἰς τὸν ἐν Πυθοὶ νεῶν, ἢ χαλεπὸν τι καὶ οὐχὶ παντός;

[ΑΛ.] ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις μὲν ἔδοξε παντὸς εἶναι, πολλάκις δὲ παγγάλεπον.

[ΣΩ.] ἀλλ’, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἴτε ῥάδιον εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὅμως γε ἡμῖν ὧδ’ ἔχει γνόντες μὲν αὐτὸ τάχ’ ἂν γνοῖμεν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες δὲ οὐκ ἂν ποτε.

“Yes,” he said, “twice, by Zeus.”

“Well, did you notice the phrase ‘Know yourself’ written somewhere on the temple?”

“Yes I did.”

“Well, did you take no notice of the inscription or did you pay attention and try to examine who you are?”

“No, by Zeus,” he said, “for I thought that this at least I know quite well: scarcely would I be able to know anything else, if I did not know myself either.” [. . .]

“And is this not clear,” he asked, “that very many good things happen to people by virtue of their knowing themselves, and very many bad things by virtue of their being mistaken about themselves?”

D34 (≠ G) (Ps.-?) Plato, *Alcibiades I*

a

[Socrates:] Well then, is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a man of little account who inscribed this on the temple at Delphi? Or is it something difficult, and not for everyone?

[Alcibiades:] I have often thought, Socrates, that anyone can do it, but often too that it is extremely difficult.

[Socrates:] But Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, in any case this is how matters stand for us: if we know this, then we will surely know how to take care of ourselves; but if we do not know it, then we will never be able to.

b 130c, e

[ΣΩ.] ἐπειδὴ δ' οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε τὸ συναμφότερόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, λείπεται οἶμαι ἢ μηδὲν αὐτ' εἶναι, ἢ εἴπερ τί ἐστι, μηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἄνθρωπον συμβαίνειν ἢ ψυχὴν.

[ΑΛ.] κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

[ΣΩ.] ἔτι οὖν τι σαφέστερον δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναί σοι ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος; [. . .] ψυχὴν ἄρα ἡμᾶς κελεύει γνωρίσαι ὁ ἐπιτάττων γινῶναι ἑαυτόν.

Views on Virtue (D35–D53)
Virtue as Knowledge (D35–D38)

D35 (< B1 G¹) Xen. Mem. 3.9.5

ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι. τὰ τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῆ πράττεται καλὰ τε κάγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελῆσθαι οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους¹ δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν οὕτω² τὰ καλὰ τε κάγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφοὺς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ τὰλλα καλὰ τε κάγαθὰ πάντα ἀρετῆ³ πράττεται, δῆλον εἶναι ὅτι καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφία ἐστὶ.

b

[Socrates:] Since a human being is neither the body nor the two of them [i.e. body and soul] together, then it remains, I suppose, either that it is nothing, or, if it is indeed something, that the human being is nothing other than the soul.

[Alcibiades:] Yes indeed.

[Socrates:] Then do you need any clearer demonstration that the soul is the human being? [. . .] So the man who ordered us to know ourselves is telling us to know our soul.

Views on Virtue (D35–D53)
Virtue as Knowledge (D35–D38)

D35 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

He said that justice and every other virtue is wisdom. For just actions and whatever ones are performed with virtue are fine and good. And neither would those who know them prefer anything else instead of them nor would those who do not know them be able to perform them, but even if they tried, they would fail. And so wise men perform fine and good actions while those who are not wise are not able to do so, but even if they tried, they would fail. And so, since just actions and all other fine and good actions are performed with virtue, it is clear that justice and every other virtue is wisdom.

¹ μὴ ἐπισταμένους Stephanus: ἐπισταμένους οὐ mss.

² post οὕτω hab. mss. καὶ, del. Heindorf

³ ἀρετῆ] σοφία Reiske

D36 (≠ G) Plat. Prot. 352a-d

[ΣΩ.] ἴθι δὴ μοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον· πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὡς περ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιούτων τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλακίς ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμὸν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλακίς δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοοῦμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὡς περ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελακόμενης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ἀρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιούτον τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλὸν τε εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἶον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ γιννώσκῃ τις τὰ γαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ὥστε ἄλλ' ἄττα πράττειν ἢ ἂν¹ ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ' ἱκανῆν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ;

[ΠΡ.] καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὡς περ σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα, εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπέων πραγμάτων.

¹ ἢ ἂν Sauppe: ἢ ἂ ἢ B: ἢ ἂν T: ἢ ἂν W

D37 Arist. EE

a (< I B28 G²) 1.5 1216b2-10

Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ᾤετ' εἶναι τέλος τὸ

D36 (≠ G) Plato, Protagoras

[Socrates:] Come now, Protagoras, and reveal what you think about this: what is your view of knowledge (*epistēmē*)? Do you think about it as most people do or differently? For most people think about knowledge something like this, that it is not strong or a commander or ruler. And they do not think about it as being like this, but instead think that, while knowledge is often present in a person, it is not knowledge that rules him but something else, sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure, sometimes grief, occasionally lust, often fear—they simply think about knowledge just as if it were a slave, being dragged about by all the other things. Well then, do you too think about it like this, or do you think that knowledge is a fine thing and capable of ruling a person, and that if someone knows what is good and what is bad, then he could not be forced by anything to do something different from what knowledge tells him to do, but that intelligence (*phronēsis*) is capable of coming to the aid of this person?

[Protagoras:] Not only do I think just as you say, Socrates, but it would also be shameful for me, more than for anyone else, to declare that wisdom and knowledge are not the strongest of all things in human affairs.

D37 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics

a (< I B28 G²)

So the older Socrates thought that the goal is to know

γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ ἐπέζητει τί ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐποίει γὰρ ταῦτ' εὐλόγως. ἐπιστήμας γὰρ φεῖ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμὲν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι. διόπερ ἐζήτει τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, ἀλλ' οὐ πῶς γίνεταί καὶ ἐκ τίνων.

b (< I B29 G²) 8.1 1246b32, 34–36

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι [. . .] ὀρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικόν,¹ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως. ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθόν. ἀρετὴ γάρ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ γένος ἄλλο γνώσεως.²

¹ σῶμα κρατητικόν mss., corr. Bekker ² γνώσ tum
spat. 2–3 litt. mss., corr. Spengel

D38 (< I B30 G²) Arist. *EN* 6.13 1144b17–21, 28–30

[. . .] τινές φασιν πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις φετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. [. . .] Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς φετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας) [. . .].

virtue, and he investigated what is justice, courage, and each of its parts. And it was reasonable for him to do this. For he thought that all the virtues are forms of knowledge, so that to know justice and to be just coincide. For as soon as we have learned geometry and architecture, we are architects and geometers. And this is why he investigated what virtue is, but not how it comes about or from what sources.

b (< I B29 G²)

So that it is clear that [. . .] the Socratic saying, “Nothing is stronger than *phronēsis* [scil. taken in the Aristotelian sense of ‘prudence’],” is correct. But in that he said ‘knowledge’ (*epistēmē*), he was incorrect; for this is a virtue and not a form of knowledge, but another kind of cognition (*gnōsis*).

D38 (< I B30 G²) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

[. . .] some people say that all the virtues are forms of knowledge (*phronēsis*), and Socrates’ mode of investigation was correct in one way but mistaken in another. For he was mistaken in thinking that all the virtues are forms of knowledge, but he was right that they do not come about without knowledge. [. . .] So Socrates thought that the virtues are forms of rational discourse (*logoi*), on the grounds that they are all forms of knowledge (*epistēmai*) [. . .].

*An Example: Courage as Knowledge (D39–D40)***D39** (≠ G) Plat. Prot. 360c–d

[ΣΩ.] οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν¹ ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν εἴη; [. . .] ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντίον ἀνδρεία δειλία. [. . .] οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῇ τούτων ἀμαθία ἐστίν; [. . .] ἢ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία δειλία; [. . .] ἢ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν² ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἐναντία οὖσα τῇ τούτων ἀμαθία;

¹ δειλῶν . . . δειλῶν BTW, corr. Ven. 189

² δεινῶν . . . δεινῶν T; δειλῶν . . . δειλῶν BW

D40 Arist.**a** (I B34 G²) EE 3.1 1229a11–12, 14–16

ἔστι δ' εἶδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοιότητα. [. . .] δευτέρα ἢ στρατιωτικὴ αὕτη δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ' ὅτι¹ τὰς βοθηθείας τῶν δεινῶν.

¹ ὅτι secl. Sylburg; ὅτι <ἴσασι> Bonitz

b (> I B35 G²) EE 3.1 1230a5–10

[. . .] καὶ ὅσοι δι' ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους, ὄνπερ τρόπον σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τούναντίον

*An Example: Courage as Knowledge (D39–D40)***D39** (≠ G) Plato, Protagoras

[Socrates:] And so cowardice would be ignorance about what causes fear and what does not? [. . .] But is not courage, I said, the opposite of cowardice? [. . .] And wisdom about what causes fear and what does not is the opposite of ignorance about these things? [. . .] And ignorance about these things is cowardice? [. . .] So wisdom about what causes fear and what does not is courage, because it is the opposite of ignorance about these things?

D40 Aristotle**a** (I B34 G²) Eudemian Ethics

There are five kinds of courage, called such according to their similarity [. . .] The second is that of soldiers: this comes from experience and from knowing not what causes fear, as Socrates said, but what is of assistance against what causes fear.

b (> I B35 G²) Eudemian Ethics

[. . .] and those who face dangers from experience [scil. are not all brave]: this is perhaps how most soldiers face them. For this is the opposite of Socrates' view that cour-

ἔχει ἢ ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην οἰόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. οὔτε γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ φοβερὰ θαρροῦσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰστοὺς ἀναβαίνειν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἴσασι τὰς βοθησίας τῶν δειωῶν.

c (I B36 G²) EN 3.11. 1116b3-5

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία εἶναι ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾤήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Can Virtue Be Taught? (D41-D42)

D41 (≠ G) Plat. Men. 94d-e

[ΣΩ.] καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσιν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτὸν, ἐξευρεῖν ἂν ὅστις ἐμελλεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς υἱεὺς ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσῃ, ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἢ τῶν ξένων, εἰ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν διὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε Ἄνυτε, μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτὸν ἀρετή.

D42 (≠ G) Plat. Prot.

a 319a-b

[ΣΩ.] ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐκ ᾤμην διδακτὸν εἶναι, σοὶ δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως¹ ἀπιστῶ.

¹ post ὅπως hab. mss. ἄν, secl. Heindorf

age is knowledge: for those men who know how to climb masts are not courageous because they know what causes fear but because they know what is of assistance against what causes fear.

c (I B36 G²) *Nicomachean Ethics*

It seems that experience with regard to each kind of situation is courage: that is why Socrates thought that courage is knowledge.¹

¹ Either Aristotle is changing his mind in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as compared to his position in the *Eudemian Ethics*, or else here he is identifying knowledge with experience.

Can Virtue Be Taught? (D41-D42)

D41 (≠ G) Plato, *Meno*

[Socrates:] He [i.e. Pericles] came from a mighty household and had great power in the city and among the other Greeks, so that if this [i.e. virtue] could have been taught, he would have found someone who could make his sons good men, either some local man or a foreigner, if he himself did not have the time to do so because of his care for the city. But no, my dear Anytus, virtue would seem not to be something that can be taught.

D42. (≠ G) Plato, *Protagoras*

a

[Socrates:] For I used to think, Protagoras, that this cannot be taught, but when you say that it is possible, I cannot help but believe you.

b 361a-b

[ΣΩ.] ἄποποί γ' ἐστέ, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα· σὺ μὲν λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτὸν ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν, νῦν σεαυτῷ τὰναντία σπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδείξαι ὡς πάντα χρήματά ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ᾧ τρόπῳ μάλιστα¹ ἂν διδακτὸν φανείη ἡ ἀρετὴ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετὴ, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἐπεχειρεῖ λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν ἦν διδακτὸν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὄν.

¹ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἢ BTW, corr. Stephanus

*Some Paradoxical Conclusions (D43–D53)**The Unity of Virtue (D43)***D43** (≠ G) Plat. *Gorg.* 507a-c

[ΣΩ.] καὶ μὴν ὁ γε σάφρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττει ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοῦ καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράττων. [. . .] καὶ μὴ περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοῦ ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι. [. . .] καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀνδρείον γε ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σάφρονος ἀνδρὸς ἐστὶν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἢ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἂ δέει¹ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπων

b

[Socrates, quoting an imagined discourse by the argument itself.] Both of you are indeed bizarre, Socrates and Protagoras! You [i.e. Socrates] said earlier that virtue cannot be taught, but now you are urging the opposite view to your own, trying to prove that all things—justice, temperance, and courage—are knowledge, in which case virtue would seem to be the thing that can be taught more than any other. For if virtue were something other than knowledge, as Protagoras tried to maintain, then obviously it could not be taught; but if it turns out to be knowledge as a whole, as you are urging, Socrates, then it would be astonishing if it could not be taught.

*Some Paradoxical Conclusions (D43–D53)**The Unity of Virtue (D43)***D43** (≠ G) Plato, *Gorgias*

[Socrates:] And the temperate man will do what is fitting with regard to both gods and men: for if he did not do what is fitting he would not be temperate. [. . .] And again, when he does what is fitting with regard to men, he will do what is just, and with regard to gods what is pious; and he who does what is just and pious must necessarily be just and pious. [. . .] And surely it is necessary that he be courageous too: for it belongs to a temperate man neither to pursue nor to avoid what is unsuitable [scil. to pursue or to avoid], but rather to avoid and to pursue what is suitable

¹ ἀλλ' ἂ δέει Heindorf: ἀλλὰ δεῖ BTf Iambl.: ἀλλὰ δὴ PF

καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπο-
 μένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ ὥστε πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ
 Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλθομεν, δίκαιον
 ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρείον καὶ ὄσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τε-
 λέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἅ ἂν
 πράττη, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαί-
 μονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα
 ἄθλιον.

*It Is Impossible Voluntarily to
 Choose Evil (D44–D47)*

D44 (≠ G) Plat. *Prot.* 358c–d

[ΣΩ.] ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπὶ γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς
 ἐκὼν ἔρχεται οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἔστι
 τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται
 κακὰ εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὅταν τε
 ἀναγκασθῆ δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς
 τὸ μείζον αἰρήσεται ἔξόν τὸ ἕλαττον;

D45 (≠ G) Plat. *Men.* 78a–b

[ΣΩ.] ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαί-
 μων εἶναι;

[ΜΕΝ.] οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[ΣΩ.] οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὦ Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς,
 εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν
 ἄθλιον εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι;

[scil. to pursue or to avoid]—actions, people, pleasures,
 and pains—and to remain steadfast and face them where
 one should. So that it is absolutely necessary, Callicles,
 that the temperate man, as we have explained, because he
 is just, brave, and pious, be a completely good man, that
 the good man do well and finely whatever he does, that he
 who does well be blissful and happy, while the man who is
 wicked and does evil be miserable.

*It Is Impossible Voluntarily to
 Choose Evil (D44–D47)*

D44 (≠ G) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Socrates:] Then, I said, no one goes voluntarily toward
 what is evil or what he thinks is evil, neither is it, as it
 seems, within human nature to wish to go toward what one
 thinks is evil instead of [scil. going] toward the good. And
 when one is forced to choose between two evils, no one
 will prefer the greater one if the lesser one is possible—is
 that not so?

D45 (≠ G) Plato, *Meno*

[Socrates:] Is there anyone who wishes to be miserable
 and unhappy?

[Meno:] I don't think so, Socrates.

[Socrates:] Then no one, Meno, desires what is evil, since
 no one wishes to be like that. For what else is it to be
 miserable than to desire what is evil and to obtain it?

[MEN.] κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά.

D46 (I B38 G²) (Ps.-?) Arist. *MM* 1.9 1187a 5–13

[. . .] μετὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον πότερον δυνατὴ παραγενέσθαι ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἢ φαύλους. εἰ γάρ τις, φησὶν, ἐρωτήσειεν ὄντιναοῦν πότερον ἂν βούλοιο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἀδικος, οὐθεὶς ἂν ἐλοιο τὴν ἀδικίαν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐπ' ἀνδρείας καὶ δειλίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν αἰὲν ὡσαύτως. δῆλον δ' ὡς εἰ φαῦλοί τινες εἰσὶν, οὐκ ἂν ἐκόντες εἴησαν φαῦλοι [. . .].

D47 (< I B17 G²) Arist. *EE* 7.1 1235a36–39

[. . .] καὶ διώκουσι ταῦτα πάντες, τὰ δὲ ἄχρηστα καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν¹ ἀποβάλλουσιν (ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ὁ γέρων ἔλεγε τὸν πτύελον καὶ τὰς τρίχας καὶ τοὺς ὄνυχας παραβάλλων) [. . .].

¹ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν Bonitz: αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν mss.

Intemperance (akrasia) Is Impossible (D48–D51)

D48 (< B1 G¹) Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.4

προσερωτώμενος δέ, εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν ἂ δέει πράττειν, ποιούντας δὲ τὰναντία σοφούς τε καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς¹ εἶναι νομίζου· “οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον,” ἔφη, “ἢ

[Meno:] It seems likely that what you are saying is true, Socrates, and that no one wants what is evil.

D46 (I B38 G²) (Ps.-?) Aristotle, *Magna Moralia*

[. . .] after this we should investigate whether it [i.e. virtue] can be obtained or not, and whether, as Socrates said, it does not lie in our power to be virtuous or wicked. For, he said, if one were to ask anyone at all whether he would want to be just or unjust, no one would prefer injustice. And so too in the case of courage and cowardice, and it is always the same for the other virtues. It is clear that if some people are wicked, it is not voluntarily that they are wicked [. . .].

D47 (< I B17 G²) Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*

[. . .] all men pursue this [i.e. what is useful], and they discard what is useless themselves even in themselves—as the older Socrates used to say, comparing spit, hair, and nails [. . .].

Intemperance (akrasia) Is Impossible (D48–D51)

D48 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

When he was asked further whether he thought that those people who know what they ought to do but do the opposite are both wise and temperate, he said, “Nothing

¹ ἐγκρατεῖς MOY: ἀκρατεῖς cett.

ἄσόφους τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς² πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἃ οἴονται συμφωρότατα αὐτοῖς³ εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντας οὔτε σοφούς οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι.”

² ἀκρατεῖς B: ἀμαθείς Φ

³ αὐτοῖς coni. Hude

D49 (≠ G) Plat. *Prot.* 357d–e

[ΣΩ.] καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὁμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδεία ἐξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἴρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας—ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ τε καὶ κακὰ—καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ὁμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ἡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη πράξις ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἵστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθία πράττεται. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἧττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἢ μεγίστη [. . .].

D50 (I B39 G²) Arist. *EN* 7.2 1145b21–27

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεται τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὐ φασί τινες οἶόν τε εἶναι. δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν.

more than unwise and intemperate. For I think that all men choose out of what is available to them what they think is most advantageous to themselves, and do this. So I think that those who act incorrectly are neither wise nor temperate.”

D49 (≠ G) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Socrates:] You [Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias] agreed that those people who make mistakes with regard to the choice of pleasures and pains—that is, with regard to good and evil—make these mistakes out of a lack of knowledge, and not only of knowledge, but of that knowledge which you earlier agreed to be measurement. And you yourselves surely know well that when one is mistaken in performing an action, it is out of ignorance. So that to be overcome by pleasure is the greatest ignorance [. . .].

D50 (I B39 G²) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

One might raise the difficulty, how someone can be intemperate though he believes correctly [scil. that what he is doing is evil]? Some people say that this is not possible for someone who knows this; for it would be dreadful, as Socrates thought, when knowledge is present, that something else overpowers it and drags it about like a slave [cf. **D36**]. For Socrates used to fight completely against that argument, on the idea that that there is no such thing as intemperance, since no one acts against what is best, believing [scil. that what he is doing is evil], but only through ignorance.

D51 (I B340 G²) (Ps.-?) Arist. *MM* 2.6 1200b25–29

Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρᾶσβύτης ἀνήρει ὄλως καὶ οὐκ ἔφη ἀκρασίαν εἶναι, λέγων ὅτι οὐθεὶς εἰδὼς τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ εἰσιν ἔλοιτ' ἄν' ὁ δὲ ἀκρατῆς δοκεῖ, εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα εἰσίν, αἰρεῖσθαι ὅμως, ἀγόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. διὰ δὴ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ ᾔετ' εἶναι ἀκρασίαν.

One Must Never Commit an Injustice (D52)

D52 (≠ G) Plat. *Crit.* 49a–c

[ΣΩ.] οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὠμολογήθη; [. . .] ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν [. . .] ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικούντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὃν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν ἢ οὐ;

[ΚΡ.] φαμέν.

[ΣΩ.] οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

[ΚΡ.] οὐ δῆτα.

[ΣΩ.] οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. [. . .] οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

D51 (I B340 G²) (Ps.-?) Aristotle, *Magna Moralia*

The older Socrates used to abolish intemperance completely and to say that it does not exist, saying that no one, knowing evil to be evil, would choose it. But the intemperate man seems, although knowing that what he chooses is bad, to choose it nonetheless, being led by passion. It was on the basis of an argument of this sort that he thought that intemperance does not exist.

One Must Never Commit an Injustice (D52)

D52 (≠ G) Plato, *Crito*

[Socrates:] Do we say that one must not voluntarily commit an injustice in any way whatsoever, or that in one way one must commit it and in another way not? Or is it never either good or fine to commit an injustice, as we have often agreed in the past too? [. . .] Or above all is it not the case, as we said back then, [. . .] that to commit an injustice is evil and shameful in every way for the man who commits it? Do we say this or not?

[Crito:] That is what we say.

[Socrates:] Therefore one must never commit an injustice.

[Crito:] Certainly not.

[Socrates:] Nor therefore, when one suffers an injustice, should one commit an injustice in return, as the many think, since one must never commit an injustice. [. . .] Therefore neither should one commit an injustice in turn nor do evil to any person, whatever one may have suffered from him.

*It Is Better to Suffer Injustice
Than to Commit It (D53)*

D53 (≠ G) Plat. *Gorg.*

a 469b-c

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὃν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

[ΠΩ.] ἢ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μείζον;

[ΣΩ.] ἢκιστά γε.

[ΠΩ.] σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

[ΣΩ.] βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

b 472e

[ΣΩ.] κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἀδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μὲντοι ἔαν μὴ διδῶ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἤττον δὲ ἄθλιος ἔαν διδῶ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

*It Is Better to Suffer Injustice
Than to Commit It (D53)*

D53 (≠ G) Plato, *Gorgias*

a

[Socrates:] [. . .] to commit injustice is the greatest of evils.

[Polus:] Is it really the greatest? Is it not a greater one to suffer injustice?

[Soc.:] Not at all.

[Polus:] Then you would prefer to suffer injustice rather than to commit injustice?

[Soc.:] I myself would wish for neither the one nor the other; but if it were necessary either to commit injustice or to suffer it, then I would prefer to suffer injustice rather than to commit it.

b

[Socrates:] According to my view, Polus, the man who commits injustice and the one who is unjust is completely miserable, and is even more miserable if he does not undergo punishment and retribution for the injustice that he has committed, but is less miserable if he is punished and encounters justice from gods and men.

Political Views (D54–D61)
Politics and Knowledge (D54–D55)

D54 (< B1 G¹) Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.10

βασιλέας¹ δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων αἰρεθέντας οὐδὲ τοὺς κλήρῳ λαχόντας οὐδὲ τοὺς βιασαμένους οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξαπατήσαντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν.

¹ βασιλεῖς mss., corr. edd.

D55 (< B1 G¹) Xen. *Mem.* 3.4.6, 12

[ΣΩ.] λέγω ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὡς, ὅτου ἂν τις προστατεύη, εἰάν γιγνώσκῃ τε ὧν δεῖ καὶ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι δύνηται, ἀγαθὸς ἂν εἴη προστάτης, εἴτε χοροῦ εἴτε οἴκου εἴτε πόλεως εἴτε στρατεύματος προστατεύοι. [. . .] μὴ καταφρόνει, ἔφη, ὦ Νικομαχίδη, τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παραπλήσια ἔχει, τὸ μέγιστον, ὅτι οὔτε ἀνευ ἀνθρώπων οὐδετέρα γίνονται οὔτε δι' ἄλλων μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ἴδια πράττεται, δι' ἄλλων δὲ τὰ κοινά.¹ οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελόμενοι χρώνται ἢ οἷσπερ <οἱ>² τὰ ἴδια οἰκονομοῦντες· οἷς οἷ³ ἐπιστάμενοι χρησθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καλῶς πράττουσιν, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθι πλημμελοῦσι.

Political Views (D54–D61)
Politics and Knowledge (D54–D55)

D54 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

Kings and rulers are not those men who hold the scepters, he said, nor those who are chosen by just anyone, nor those who are chosen by lot, nor those who have committed violence, nor those who have used deception, but those who know how to rule.

D55 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

[Socrates:] I myself say, he said, that whatever it is that one rules, if one knows what is necessary and is able to acquire it, one will be a good ruler, whether one rules a chorus, a household, a city, or an army. [. . .] Do not look with disdain, he said, Nicomachides, on the men who administer their household. For the management of private matters differs from that of public ones only in magnitude; and they are similar in many regards, especially in this, that neither of them can be performed without people, and that it is not the case that private matters are performed by some people and public ones by others. For those people who administer public matters do not have recourse to different people from the ones they have recourse to in order to administer their private households. Those who know how to make use of these perform successfully both in private and in public matters, while those who do not know how to do so fail in both.

¹ τὸ μέγιστον . . . κοινά del. Dindorf

² <οἱ> Zeune ³ οἷς οἱ Ernesti: ὡς οἱ Z: ὅσοι cett. (om. Y)

*Criticism of Election to Public
Office by Lot (D56–D57)*

D56 (< B1 G¹) Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.9

ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη, ὑπερορᾶν ἐποίει τῶν
καθεστῶτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας, λέγων ὡς μᾶρον
εἶη τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ κνάμου καθ-
ιστάναί, κυβερνήτη δὲ μηδένα ἐθέλειν χρῆσθαι κνα-
μενῶ μηδὲ τέκτου μηδ' αὐλητῆ μηδ' ἐπ' ἄλλα τοι-
αῦτα, ἃ πολλῶ ἐλάττονας βλάβας ἀμαρτανόμενα
ποιεῖ τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀμαρτανομένων.

D57 (I B16 G²) Arist. *Rhet.* 2.20 1393b3–8

[. . .] παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι
οὐ δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἄρχειν. ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις
τοὺς ἀθλητὰς κληροῖη μὴ οἱ δύνανται¹ ἀγωνίζεσθαι
ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν λάχωσιν, ἢ τῶν πλωτήρων ὄντινα δεῖ κυ-
βερνᾶν κληρώσειεν, ὡς δέον τὸν λαχόντα ἀλλὰ μὴ
τὸν ἐπιστάμενον.

¹ μὴ οἱ δύνανται Spengel: οἱ μὴ δύνανται A: μὴ οἱ ἂν
δύνανται F: μὴ οἱ ἂν δύνανται ε

Socrates' Laconism (D58–D59)

D58 (≠ G) Plat. *Crit.* 52e

[NOM.] σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαιμόνα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρή-
την, ἅς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομεῖσθαι [. . .].

*Criticism of Election to Public
Office by Lot (D56–D57)*

D56 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

But by Zeus, the accuser said, he taught his associates to
despise the established laws, saying that it is stupid to
determine the city's rulers by lot, while no one would want
to have a helmsman chosen by lot, nor an architect, nor an
aulos player, nor anyone for those other activities in which
mistakes cause much less harm than mistakes regarding
the city do.

D57 (I B16 G²) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

[. . .] an example of analogy (*parabolē*) are the sayings of
Socrates: for instance, if someone said that public officials
should not be chosen by lot, for that would be the same
thing as if one chose athletes by lot, not those people who
were able to participate in the competition, but those who
received the lot, or if they chose by lot from among the
sailors the one who would have to take the helm, as though
it were right that it be the man who received it [i.e. the
lot], not the one who knows how.

Socrates' Laconism (D58–D59)

D58 (≠ G) Plato, *Crito*

[The laws of Athens speak:] You [i.e. Socrates] preferred
neither Sparta nor Crete, which you say over and over
again are governed by good laws [. . .].

D59 (< B1 G¹) Xen. Mem. 3.5.15–16

[ΠΕ.] λέγεις, ἔφη, πόρρω που εἶναι τῇ πόλει τὴν καλοκαγαθίαν. πότε γὰρ οὕτως Ἀθηναῖοι ὡσπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ πρεσβυτέρους αἰδέσονται, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἄρχονται καταφρονεῖν τῶν γεραιτέρων, ἢ σωμασκήσουσιν οὕτως, οἱ οὐ μόνον αὐτοὶ εὐεξίας ἀμελοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐπιμελομένων καταγελάωσι; πότε δὲ οὕτω¹ πείσονται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, οἱ καὶ ἀγάλονται ἐπὶ τῷ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων; ἢ πότε οὕτως ὁμονήσουσιν, οἱ γε ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ συνεργεῖν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ συμφέροντα ἐπηρεάζουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ φθονοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, μάλιστα δὲ πάντων ἔν τε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνόδοις καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς διαφέρονται καὶ πλείστας δίκας ἀλλήλοις δικάζονται καὶ προαἰροῦνται μᾶλλον οὕτω κερδαίνειν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἢ συναφελούντες αὐτούς, τοῖς δὲ κοινοῖς ὡσπερ ἀλλοτρίους χρώμενοι περὶ τούτων αὐτὸ μάχονται καὶ ταῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμεσι μάλιστα χαίρουσιν;

¹ οὔτοι mss. (οὐ X¹), corr. Hindenburg

Obedience to the City's Laws (D60–D61)

D60 (≠ G) Plat. Crit. 51a–c

[NOM.] ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφὸς ὥστε λέληθέν σε ὅτι μητρὸς τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμωτέρον ἔστι πατρίς καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώ-

D59 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

[Pericles:] You [i.e. Socrates] say, he said, that true moral excellence (*kalokagathia*) is very remote from our city. For when will the Athenians—people who despise their elders, beginning with their fathers—honor old men in the same way as the Lacedaemonians do, or when will they—people who not only neglect their own physical fitness, but also mock those who care for theirs—train their bodies in the same way as they do? When will they obey their rulers in the same way—people who pride themselves on despising their rulers? Or when will they live in concord with one another in the same way—people who, instead of working together to accomplish what would be advantageous for themselves, threaten each other and envy one another more than they do any other people, who above all disagree with one another in private meetings and in public ones, who go to law against each other in the greatest number of trials and prefer to profit in this way from one another rather than by helping themselves jointly, and who, though they consider public matters to be alien to themselves, nonetheless go on to contend about them and to rejoice above all in the powers that pertain to such things?

Obedience to the City's Laws (D60–D61)

D60 (≠ G) Plato, *Crito*

[The laws of Athens speak:] Are you [i.e. Socrates] so wise that you have failed to recognize that your fatherland is more to be honored and is more venerable and holier than your mother, your father, and all your other ances-

τερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρα καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπέικειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν ἕαν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, ἕαντε τύπτεσθαι ἕαντε δέισθαι, ἕαντε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἢ πόλις καὶ ἢ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε.

D61 (< B1 G¹) Xen. Mem.

a 1.3.1

τὰ μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φανερὸς ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων ἢ περὶ ἢ Πυθία ὑποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας ἢ περὶ προγόνων θεραπείας ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἢ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναρρεῖ ποιούντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρήγει, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως πῶς ποιούντας περιέρους καὶ ματαίους ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.

tors, and that it has greater importance both among gods and among sensible people, and that one must revere one's fatherland, yield to it, and placate it when it is angry, more than one's father, and must either persuade it or do what it tells you to do, and suffer in silence if it orders you to suffer something, whether to be beaten or to be bound, whether it leads you to war to be wounded or killed, you must do this; and that justice consists in acting in this way, and you must not yield nor retreat nor abandon your position, but, whether in war or in the law court or anywhere else, you must do whatever your city and your fatherland tell you to do, or else persuade it about the nature of justice."

D61 (< B1 G¹) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

a

With regard to the gods, in what he did and in what he said he manifestly followed what the Pythian priestess answers to those who ask her what one must do regarding sacrifice, or the cult of the ancestors, or any other such thing. For she replies that those people who act in accordance with the law of their city are the ones who are acting piously; and Socrates himself acted in this way and advised others to do so, and he thought that those who acted differently were useless and stupid.

b 4.4.13

[ΣΩ.] ὁ μὲν ἄρα νόμιμος δίκαιός ἐστιν,¹ ὁ δὲ ἄνομος ἄδικος.

¹ ὁ μὲν . . . ἐστιν Stob.: om. mss.

c 4.4.4

[. . .] προείλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων ἀποθανεῖν ἢ παρανομῶν ζῆν.

From the First Generation of Disciples
(cf. P13–P14) to the Socratic Schools (D62–D65)

D62 (I H4 G²) Cic. *De orat.* 3.16.61–17.62

nam cum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat, proseminatae sunt quasi familiae dissentientes inter se et multum diiunctae et dispares, cum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent et esse arbitrentur. ac primo ab ipso Platone Aristoteles et Xenocrates, quorum alter Peripateticorum, alter Academiae nomen obtinuit, deinde ab Antisthene, qui patientiam et duritiam in Socratico sermone maxime adamarat, Cynici primum, dein Stoici, tum ab Aristippo, quem illae magis voluptariae disputationes delectarant, Cyrenaica philosophia manavit, quam ille et eius posterii simpliciter defenderunt [. . .]. fuerunt etiam alia genera philosophorum, qui se omnes fere Socraticos esse dice-

b

[Socrates:] So the man who obeys the laws is just, and the one who does not is unjust.

c

[. . .] he preferred to die abiding by the laws rather than to live transgressing them.

From the First Generation of Disciples
(cf. P13–P14) to the Socratic Schools (D62–D65)

D62 (I H4 G²) Cicero, *On the Orator*

[. . .] since many [scil. philosophers] were born almost from Socrates, because different ones had understood different things from his disputation, which were various, divergent, and disseminated in every direction, families, as it were, were propagated, disagreeing with each other, and very divided and disparate, even though they all nonetheless wanted to be called 'Socratic' philosophers and thought that they really were. And first from Plato himself came Aristotle and Xenocrates, of whom the one obtained the title of the Peripatetics, the other of the Academy; then from Antisthenes, who loved above all the patience and endurance portrayed in the Socratic discourses, came first the Cynics, then the Stoics; then from Aristippus, who was delighted more by the discussions about pleasure, flowed the Cyrenaic philosophy, which he and his followers defended in a simple manner [. . .]. There were also other kinds of philosophers, who almost all said that they

bant, Eretrorum, Erilliorum, Megaricorum, Pyrrhoneorum [. . .].

D63 (< I H8 G²) Ps.-Gal. *Hist. phil.* 3 (*Dox. Gr.* 599.7–600.18)

οὐπερ Σωκράτης ἀκροατῆς καταστάς πολλοῖς καὶ τῶν ὕστερον γενομένων καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν αἴτιος τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν εἰλικρινῶς γέγονε καὶ τοὺς ἐπιγενομένους σχεδὸν ἅπαντας ὡς εἰπεῖν φιλοσοφίας ἐπιθυμητὰς ἀπέφηνε. τῶν δὲ Σωκρατικῶν πολλῶν γεγονότων ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι νῦν μόνον ποιήσασθαι μνήμην τῶν διαδοχῆν καταλειπόμενων.¹ Πλάτων [. . .] τῆς ἀρχαίας λεγομένης Ἀκαδημίας κατήρξε. [. . .] Ἀντισθένην [. . .] ὃς τὴν Κυνηκὴν² εἰς τὸν βίον παρήγαγεν. [. . .] Ἀριστιππος δὲ Κυρηναῖος [. . .] ἀφ' οὗ τὴν Κυρηναϊκὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἔγνωμεν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν Μεγαρικῶν Εὐκλείδην δίκαιον παριδεῖν³ [. . .] ἢ Στίλωνα [. . .], Φαίδωνα <δὲ>⁴ τὸν Ἡλείου οὐδεὶς ἠγγνόησε [. . .].

¹ τῶν κατὰ διαδοχῆν λειπομένων AB, corr. Usener

² τὴν νίκην AB: et litem N

³ τῶν μεγαρικῶν εὐεκτικὴν δίκαιον παρεῖδεν A: τὴν μεγαρικὴν παριδεῖν δίκαιον B: megaricam dyalecticam est praetervidendum N: corr. Diels

⁴ <δὲ> Diels

D64 (< I H5 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.47

τῶν δὲ διαδεξαμένων αὐτὸν τῶν λεγομένων Σωκρατικῶν οἱ κορυφαιότατοι μὲν Πλάτων, Ξενοφῶν, Ἀντι-

were 'Socratics': the Eretrians, the Herillians, the Megarians, the Pyrrhonians [. . .].

D63 (< I H8 G²) Ps.-Galen, *Philosophical History*

His [i.e. Archelaus'] disciple was Socrates, who made many men, both among those born later and among his contemporaries, dedicate themselves purely to philosophy and who inspired almost all those who came later with a passionate desire for philosophy. And since there were many Socratics, it is necessary here only to make mention of those who founded a succession. Plato [. . .] founded the so-called Older Academy. [. . .] Antisthenes [. . .] who brought the Cynic school to life. [. . .] Aristippus of Cyrene [. . .] from whom we know that the Cyrenaic school comes. But among the Megarians it would be unjust to neglect Euclides [. . .] or Stilpo [. . .]. And no one is unaware of Phaedo of Elis [. . .].

D64 (< I H5 G²) Diogenes Laertius

Of those who succeeded him [i.e. Socrates], the so-called Socratics, the most important ones were Plato, Xenophon,

σθένης· τῶν δὲ φερομένων δέκα οἱ διασημότετοι τέσσαρες, Αἰσχίνης, Φαίδων, Εὐκλείδης, Ἀριστιππος.

D65 (< I H7 G²) *Suda* Σ.829

φιλοσόφους δὲ εἰργάσατο Πλάτωνα, [. . .] Ἀριστιππον Κυρηναῖον [. . .], Φαίδωνα Ἡλείου [. . .], Ἀντισθένην [. . .], Εὐκλείδην Μεγαρέα [. . .], Ξενοφῶντα [. . .], Αἰσχίνην [. . .], Κέβητα Θηβαῖον, Γλαύκωνα Ἀθηναῖον, Βρύσωνα Ἡρακλεώτην [. . .] Ἀλκιβιάδην, Κριτόβουλον, Ξενομήδην, Ἀπολλόδωρον Ἀθηναίους· ἔτι δὲ Κρίτωνα καὶ Σίμωνα, Εὐμάρη Φιλιάσιον, Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον, Τερψίωνα Μεγαρικόν, Χαιρεφῶντα. καὶ Θεόδωρος δέ, ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς ἄθεος, αὐτοῦ διήκουσεν.

and Antisthenes; and of the ten who are named most commonly, the most distinguished are four, Aeschines, Phaedo, Euclides, and Aristippus.

D65 (< I H7 G²) *Suda*

He [i.e. Socrates] made philosophers out of Plato, [. . .] Aristippus of Cyrene [. . .]; Phaedo of Elis [. . .]; Antisthenes [. . .]; Euclides of Megara [. . .]; Xenophon [. . .]; Aeschines [. . .]; Cebes of Thebes; Glaucon of Athens; Bryson of Heraclea [. . .]; Alcibiades, Critobulus, Xenomedes, Apollodorus, all of Athens; and also Crito and Simon, Eumares of Phlius (?), Simmias of Thebes, Terpsion of Megara, Charephon. And Theodorus, called the atheist, also studied with him.

34. PRODICUS (PROD.)

Prodicus of Ceos was an approximate contemporary of Socrates; he became well known at Athens because of his diplomatic missions there on behalf of his city. While he is known to have written about natural phenomena and the origin of the gods, he seems to have devoted himself above all to rhetorical and grammatical questions, especially regarding the definitions of words and the distinctions between near-synonyms. Prodicus was celebrated above all for his story of Heracles' choice between virtue and vice; the original text has been lost, but the story survives in Xenophon's version of it, which is presented in an appendix to the section on Prodicus' doctrines. Plato seems to suggest that Socrates felt a somewhat greater degree of warmth, and even of respect, toward Prodicus than toward the other 'sophists.' Plato also provides a number of examples of Prodicus' verbal distinctions; given the difficulty of assessing how authentic these examples are, we include the passages in question not in the main part of the section on Prodicus' doctrines, but in a second appendix to it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Edition with Commentary

R. Mayhew. *Prodicus the Sophist: Texts, Translations, and Commentary* (Oxford, 2011).

See also the titles listed in the General Introduction to Chapters 31–42.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

P

Origin and Chronology (P1)
At Athens (P2–P3)
 Ambassador (P2)
 At Callias' House (P3)
Remuneration (P4–P8)
Fame and Disciples (P9–P13)
An Improbable Report on His Death (P14)

D

Prodicus' Writings: Reported Titles and Contents (D1–D4)
On Words: Verbal Distinctions and Correctness (D5–D6)
Some Definitions in Various Fields (D7–D10)
Elements of Rhetoric (D11–D14)
Theology: The Origin of the Gods (D15–D18)
"The Seasons" (D19)
Appendix 1: Xenophon's Version of Prodicus' Tale of the Choice of Heracles (D20–D21, cf. D19)
Appendix 2: Platonic Examples of Prodicus' Verbal Distinctions (D22–D25)

R

First Attestations: Aristophanes (DRAM. T22–T24)
Contemporary Fame and Influence (R1)

Stylistic Influence on Thucydides (R2)
A Polemic in Aeschines the Socratic (R3)
Later Reflections of Plato's Portrait of Prodicus (R4–R6)
Callimachus (R7)
An Epicurean Criticizes a Stoic Interpretation of Prodicus (R8)
Criticisms of Prodicus' Views on Language (R9–R10)
Criticisms of Prodicus' Views on the Gods (R11–R13)
A Misdirected Polemic? (R14)

PRODICUS [84 DK]

P

Origin and Chronology (P1)

P1 (< A1) *Suda* Π.2365

Πρόδικος Κείος ἀπὸ Κέω τῆς νήσου, πόλεως δὲ Ἴου-
λίδος, φιλόσοφος φυσικὸς καὶ σοφιστῆς, σύγχρονος
Δημοκρίτου τοῦ Ἀβδηρίτου καὶ Γοργίου, μαθητῆς
Πρωταγόρου τοῦ Ἀβδηρίτου [. . . = **P14**].

At Athens (P2–P3)

Ambassador (P2)

P2 (< A3) *Plat. Hipp. mai.* 282c

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ὁ ἡμέτερος ἑταῖρος Πρόδικος οὗτος πολ-
λάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε δημοσίᾳ ἀφίκετο, ἀτὰρ τὰ τε-
λευταῖα ἔναγχος ἀφικόμενος δημοσίᾳ ἐκ Κέω λέγων
τ' ἐν τῇ βουλῇ πάνν ἠὺδοκίμησεν [. . . = **P4**].

PRODICUS

P

Origin and Chronology (P1)

P1 (< A1) *Suda*

Prodicus, called Cean from the island of Ceos, from the
city of Ioulis, a natural philosopher and sophist, contem-
porary of Democritus of Abdera and Gorgias, disciple of
Protagoras of Abdera [. . .].

At Athens (P2–P3)

Ambassador (P2)

P2 (< A3) *Plato, Greater Hippias*

[Socrates:] [. . .] Our friend Prodicus here has often come
on official missions on other occasions, but just now, finally
coming on an official mission from Ceos and speaking in
the Assembly, he achieved a great reputation [. . .].

*At Callias' House (P3)***P3** (A2) Plat. *Prot.* 315c–e

[ΣΩ.] καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλον γε εἰσείδον—ἐπεδήμει γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος [. . .], ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κφδίους τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο. [. . .] περὶ δὲ ὧν διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἔγωγε μαθεῖν ἔξωθεν καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδικουπάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκῆματι γιγνόμενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα.

*Remuneration (P4–P8)***P4** (< A3) Plat. *Hipp. mai.* 282c

[ΣΩ.] [. . . = P2] καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ τοῖς νέοις συνῶν χρήματα ἔλαβεν θουμαστὰ ὄσα.

P5 (< A11) Plat. *Crat.* 384b

[ΣΩ.] εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠκηκόη παρὰ Προδικου τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν, ἣν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαιδεύσθαι, ὡς φησιν ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκάλυέν σε αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμαίαν.

*At Callias' House (P3)***P3** (A2) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Socrates:] And indeed “I also saw Tantalus” [cf. Homer, *Od.* 11.582];¹ for Prodicus of Ceos too was in town [. . .]. Prodicus was still lying down, covered with some sheepskins and bedclothes, with a lot of them, as could be seen. [. . .] what they were talking about I was not able to understand from outside, although I was very eager to hear Prodicus—for the man seems to me to be surpassingly wise, and divine—but his deep voice produced a booming sound in the room that made what he was saying unclear [cf. **SOPH. R6**].

¹ Tantalus was punished in Hades because of his hostility to the gods (cf. **D15–D18**).

*Remuneration (P4–P8)***P4** (< A3) Plato, *Greater Hippias*

[Socrates:] [. . .] and he made an incredible amount of money by making private performances and teaching the young.

P5 (< A11) Plato, *Cratylus*

[Socrates:] If I had heard Prodicus' fifty-drachma performance, which, as he himself says, makes the listener fully educated in this subject matter [scil. the knowledge of words], nothing would prevent you from immediately knowing quite well the truth about the correctness of words. But as it is, I did not hear that one, but only the one-drachma one.

P6 (< B9) Ps.-Plat. *Ax.* 366c

[ΣΩ.] καὶ ταῦτα δέ, ἃ λέγω, Προδίκου ἐστὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἀπηχῆματα, τὰ μὲν διμοίρου ἑωνημένα τὰ δὲ δυοῖν δραχμαῖν τὰ δὲ τετραδράχμου. προῖκα γὰρ ἀνὴρ οὗτος οὐδένα διδάσκει, διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔθος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ φωνεῖν τὸ Ἐπιχάρμιον [Frag. 211 K-A], “ἃ δὲ χεῖρ τὰν χεῖρα νίξεν δός τι, καὶ λάβε τι” [. . . = **R5**].

P7 (A4a) Xen. *Symp.* 4.62

[ΣΩ.] οἶδα μὲν [. . .] σὲ Καλλίαν τουτονὶ προαγωγέυσαντα τῷ σοφῷ Προδίκῳ, ὅτε εἴρας τουτονὲ μὲν φιλοσοφίας ἐρώωντα, ἐκείνον δὲ χρημάτων δεόμενον.

P8 (< A1a) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.12, p. 14.24–27 Kayser

ἀνίχνευε δὲ οὗτος τοὺς εὐπατρίδας τῶν νέων καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν βαθέων οἰκῶν, ὡς καὶ προξένους ἐκτῆσθαι ταύτης τῆς θήρας, χρημάτων τε γὰρ ἤττων ἐτύγχανε καὶ ἡδοναῖς ἐδεδώκει [. . . = **D20a**].

Fame and Disciples (P9–P13)

P9 (≠ DK) Plat. *Prot.* 340e–341a

[ΣΩ.] κινδυνεύει γὰρ τοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἢ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἥτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερα. σὺ δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν

P6 (< B9) Ps.-Plato, *Axiochus*

[Socrates:] And what I am saying are mere echoes of the wise Prodicus, some for sale for half a drachma, others for two drachmas, still others for four. For that man does not teach anyone for free, and he has the habit of always quoting Epicharmus' saying, “Hand washes hand, give something and get something” [. . .].

P7 (A4a) Xenophon, *Symposium*

[Socrates:] I know [. . .] that you [i.e. Antisthenes] brought Callias here to the wise Prodicus when you saw that the former loved philosophy and the latter needed money.

P8 (< A1a) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

He tracked down the young men of noble families and those from wealthy ones, to the point of even procuring assistants for this hunt. For he could not resist money and gave himself up to pleasures [. . .].

Fame and Disciples (P9–P13)

P9 (≠ DK) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Socrates:] It may well be, Protagoras, that Prodicus' expertise (*sophia*) is a divine and ancient one, whether it began with Simonides or is even more ancient. But you [i.e. Protagoras], who possess much experience in many other fields of expertise, do not seem to have any in this

ἐμπειρος ὦν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι φαίνη, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἐμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητῆς εἶναι Προδίκου τουτουί.

P10 (A8) Aul. Gell. *Noct.* 15.20.4

auditor fuit physici Anaxagorae et Prodicti rhetoris.

P11 (< A1a) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.12, p. 14.18–21 Kayser

Προδίκου δὲ τοῦ Κείου ὄνομα τοσοῦτον ἐπὶ σοφία ἐγένετο, ὡς καὶ τὸν Γρύλλου¹ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς δεθέντα ἀκροᾶσθαι διαλεγόμενου, καθιστάντα ἐγγυητὴν τοῦ σώματος.

¹ post Γρύλλου habent Ξενοφῶντα mss., del. Kayser

P12 (< A7) Dion. Hal. *Isoc.* 1

γενόμενος δὲ ἀκουστῆς Προδίκου τε τοῦ Κείου καὶ Γοργίου τοῦ Λεοντίνου καὶ Τισίου τοῦ Συρακουσίου, τῶν τότε μέγιστον ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἐχόντων ἐπὶ σοφία [. . .].

P13 (A6) Schol. in Aristoph. *Nub.* 361

διδάσκαλος δὲ ἦν οὗτος καὶ Θηραμένους [. . .].

one, unlike myself, who have acquired experience of it by being the pupil of this Prodicus here.

P10 (A8) Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights*

He [i.e. Euripides] was a student of Anaxagoras the natural philosopher [cf. **ANAXAG.** P14] and of Prodicus the orator.

P11 (< A1a) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

The name of Prodicus of Ceos became so renowned for wisdom (*sophia*) that the son of Gryllus [i.e. Xenophon], when he was a prisoner in Boeotia, heard his discussions after providing a surety for himself.

P12 (< A7) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Isocrates*

He [i.e. Isocrates], who was the student of Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontini [cf. **GORG.** P7–P8], and Tisias of Syracuse, those who at that time enjoyed the greatest reputation for wisdom among the Greeks [. . .].

P13 (A6) Scholia on Aristophanes' *Clouds*

He [i.e. Prodicus] was the teacher of Theramenes too [. . .].

*An Improbable Report on His Death (P14)***P14** (< A1) *Suda* Π.2365[. . . = **P1**] ἐν Ἀθήναις κώνειον πῶν ἀπέθανεν ὡς δια-
φθείρων τοὺς νέους.*An Improbable Report on His Death (P14)***P14** (< A1) *Suda*[. . .] He was executed at Athens by drinking hemlock for
allegedly corrupting the young.¹¹ This is most probably due to confusion with Socrates, but cf.
DRAM. T24.

PRODICUS [84 DK]

D

Prodicus' Writings: Reported Titles and Contents (D1–D4)

D1 (< B4) Gal. *Nat. fac.* 2.9 (3.195 Helmreich; cf. 15.325 Kühn)

Πρόδικος δ' ἐν τῷ Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου γράμματι
[. . . = **D9**].

D2 (B3) Cic. *De orat.* 3.32.128

quid de Prodicō Ceo, de Thrasymachō Chalcedonio, de Protagora Abderita loquar? quorum unusquisque plurimum temporibus illis etiam de natura rerum et disseruit et scripsit.

D3 (B1) Schol. in Aristoph. *Nub.* 361

φέρεται δὲ καὶ Προδικὸν βιβλίον ἐπιγραφόμενον Ὀμαι [. . . = **D19**].

PRODICUS

D

Prodicus' Writings: Reported Titles and Contents (D1–D4)

D1 (< B4) Galen, *On the Natural Faculties*
Prodicus, in his text *On the Nature of Man* [. . .].

D2 (B3) Cicero, *On the Orator*

What should I say [scil. about the ability of the ancient orators to speak about any subject] regarding Prodicus of Ceos, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Protagoras of Abdera, each of whom at that time both spoke and wrote a lot even about nature? [= **THRAS. D4**; **PROT. D6**].

See also **ALCM. D2**

D3 (B1) Scholia on Aristophanes' *Clouds*

There is also in circulation a book of Prodicus entitled *The Seasons* [. . .] [cf. **D19**].

D4 (B1) Plat. *Symp.* 177b

[EP.] [. . .] εἰ δὲ βούλει αὐτὸ σκέψασθαι τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστάς, Ἡρακλέους μὲν καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαίνους καταλογάδην συγγράφειν, ὥσπερ ὁ βέλτιστος Πρόδικος [. . .]:

On Words: Verbal Distinctions and Correctness (D5–D8)

D5 Plat.

a (A18) *Charm.* 163d

[ΣΩ.] [. . . = **D25**] καὶ γὰρ Προδικὸν μυρία τιὰ ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιροῦντος.

b (< A16) *Euthyd.* 277e

[ΣΩ.] πρῶτον γάρ, ὥς φησι Προδικός, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ [. . .].

c (< A17) *Lach.* 197d

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] τῷ Προδικῷ [. . .], ὃς δὴ δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα διαιρεῖν.

D6

a (< A19) Arist. *Top.* 2.6 112b22–23

[. . .] καθάπερ Πρόδικος διηγεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην.

D4 (B1) Plato, *Symposium*

[Eryximachus:] [. . .] and if you wish to consider the worthy sophists, [scil. is it not extraordinary] that they have written prose encomia for Heracles and others, for example the excellent Prodicus [. . .]?

On Words: Verbal Distinctions and Correctness (D5–D6)

D5 Plato

a (A18) *Charmides*

[Socrates:] [. . .] For I have heard Prodicus make thousands of distinctions concerning words.

b (< A16) *Euthydemus*

[Socrates:] First of all, as Prodicus says, one must know the correctness of words [. . .].

c (< A17) *Laches*

[Socrates:] [. . .] Prodicus [. . .], who of the sophists has a reputation for distinguishing most finely such words [i.e. 'temerity' and 'courage'].

D6

a (< A19) Aristotle, *Topics*

[. . .] Prodicus divided pleasures (*hêdonai*) into joy (*khara*), enjoyment (*terpsis*), and mirth (*euphrosunê*).

b (*A19 Untersteiner) Herm. In *Phaedr.* 267b, pp. 250.24–251.1

[. . .] ὁ Πρόδικος τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων εἶδεν ἀκρίβειαν, οἷον διαφορὰν τέρψεως, χαρᾶς, εὐφροσύνης, τέρψιν καλῶν τὴν δι' ὠτων ἡδονήν, χαρὰν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, εὐφροσύνην τὴν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων [. . . = **D11b**].

Some Definitions in Various Fields (D7–D10)

D7 (B6) Plat. *Euthyd.* 305c

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] οὗτοι γὰρ εἰσιν μὲν, ὧ Κρίτων, οὓς ἔφη Πρόδικος μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ [. . .].

D8 (B7) Stob. 4.20.65

Προδίκου. ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν διπλασιασθέϊσαν ἔρωτα εἶναι, ἔρωτα δὲ διπλασιασθέντα μανίαν γίγνεσθαι.

D9 (< B4) Gal. *Nat. fac.* 2.9 (3.195 Helmreich; cf. 15.325 Kühn)

Πρόδικος δ' ἐν τῷ Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου γράμματι τὸ συγκεκαυμένον καὶ οἷον ὑπερωπτημένον ἐν τοῖς χυμοῖς ὀνομάζων φλέγμα παρὰ τὸ πεφλέχθαι τῇ λέξει μὲν ἑτέρως χρήται, φυλάττει μέντοι τὸ πρᾶγμα

b (≠ DK) Hermias, *Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus*

[. . .] Prodicus discovered the exactitude of words, for example the difference between enjoyment (*terpsis*), joy (*khara*), mirth (*euphrosunē*): he called 'enjoyment' the pleasure obtained through the ears, 'joy' that of the soul, and 'mirth' that obtained through the eyes [. . .].

See also **D22–D25**

Some Definitions in Various Fields (D7–D10)

D7 (B6) Plato, *Euthydemus*

[Socrates:] [. . .] For these men [i.e. the sophists], Crito, are the ones that Prodicus said are the boundary between the philosopher and the statesman [. . .].

D8 (B7) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Of Prodicus: **Desire doubled is love, but love doubled becomes madness.**

D9 (< B4) Galen, *On the Natural Faculties*

Prodicus, in his treatise *On the Nature of Man*, when he calls the overheated and as it were overcooked element in the humors '**phlegm**' (*phlegma*), derived from 'to be inflamed' (*phlegesthai*), uses the term differently, even though he keeps to the same real thing to which the term

κατὰ ταὐτὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις. τὴν δ' ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰν-
δρὸς τούτου καινοτομίαν ἰκανῶς ἐνδείκνυται καὶ Πλά-
των. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε τὸ πρὸς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ὀνο-
μαζόμενον φλέγμα τὸ λευκὸν τὴν χροῖαν, ὃ βλένναν
ὀνομάζει Πρόδικος [. . . = R9].

D10 (B10) Plut. *Tuenda san.* 8 126C–D

κομφῶς γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ Πρόδικος εἰπεῖν ὅτι τῶν ἡδυ-
σμάτων ἄριστόν ἐστι τὸ πῦρ.

Elements of Rhetoric (D11–D14)

D11

a (A20) Plat. *Phaedr.* 267b

[ΣΩ.] ταῦτα δὲ ἀκούων ποτέ μου Πρόδικος ἐγέλασεν
καὶ μόνος αὐτὸς ἠύρηκέναι ἔφη ὧν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην.
δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων ἀλλὰ μετρίων.

b (≠ DK) Herm. *In Phaedr.* 267b, p. 251.1–3

[. . . = D6b] ἔλεγεν οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος ὅτι διὰ τῶν τοιού-
των ὀνομάτων δεῖ καταποικίλλειν τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ
διὰ μακρῶν λόγων τὰ αὐτὰ ἀνακυκλεῖν, ἀλλὰ συμμε-
τρία χρῆσθαι.

refers when other people use it.¹ This man's innovative-
ness with regard to words is sufficiently demonstrated by
Plato too. But what everyone calls 'phlegm,' something
white in color that Prodicus calls 'mucosity' (*blenna*)
[. . .].

¹ Phlegm is a white, moist, and cold humor.

D10 (B10) Plutarch, *Advice about Keeping Well*

For what Prodicus also said seems quite clever: that
among condiments, the best one is fire.¹

¹ In several passages, Plutarch attributes a very similar idea to
the poet (and probably sophist) Euenus.

Elements of Rhetoric (D11–D14)

D11

a (A20) Plato, *Phaedrus*

[Socrates:] One day when Prodicus heard me speaking
about this [i.e. the discoveries of Tisias and Gorgias, cf.
GORG. D14], he smiled and said that he was the only one
who had discovered the art of the kind of speeches that
are needed: what is needed are ones that are neither long
nor short but of the right length.

b (≠ DK) Hermias, *Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus*

[. . .] So Prodicus said that one should diversify one's dis-
course by means of words like this [cf. **D6b**], and not re-
hash the same things in long discourses but use the right
proportion.

D12 (A10) Quintil. *Inst. or.* 3.1.12

horum primi communis locos tractasse dicuntur Protagoras, Gorgias; adfectus Prodicus, Hippias et idem Protagoras et Thrasymachus.

D13 (A12) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.14 1415b12–17

ὥστε ὅπου ἂν ἦ καιρός, λεκτέον “καί μοι προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμὸν ἢ ὑμέτερον” καὶ “ἐρῶ γὰρ ὑμῖν οἶον οὐδεπώποτε ἀκηκόατε δεινόν” ἢ “οὕτω θαυμαστόν.” τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἔφη Προδικος, ὅτε νυστάζουσιν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρεμβάλλειν τῆς πεντηκονταδράχμου αὐτοῖς.

D14 (≠ DK) Did. Caec. *Comm. in Eccl.* 1.8b (P. Tura III 16.11 = CPF Prodicus 3T [P])

παρ[άδοξ]ός τις γνώμη φέρεται Προδίκου ὅτι ‘οὐκ ἔστιν | [ἀν]τιλέγειν’. [. . . = **R14**]

Theology: The Origin of the Gods (D15–D18)

D15 (< B5) Philod. *Piet.* (PHerc. 1428, Col. 3.2–13, p. 14) (< Persaeus SVF 448)

[. . . = **R8**] τὰ περὶ <τοῦ> | τὰ τρέφοντα καὶ ὠφελούντ[α θεοῦς] νεινομίσθ[αι καὶ τε]πειμῆσθ[αι πρῶτ]ον ὑπὸ [Προ]δ[ί]κου γ[ε]γραμ[μ]έ[ν]α, μ[ετὰ δὲ] ταῦτα τοῦ[ς ἐνό]ντας | ἢ τροφὰς ἢ [σκ]έπας | ἢ τὰς ἄλλας τέ[χ]·

2 suppl. Diels, 7, 9, 12, 12–13 Gomperz, 13–14 Schober

D12 (A10) Quintilian, *Training in Oratory*

Among them [i.e. the ancient teachers of rhetoric], Protagoras and Gorgias are said to have been the first to discuss the commonplaces, and Prodicus, Hippias, Protagoras again and Thrasymachus the emotions. [= **PROT. D19**]

D13 (A12) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

So that at the right moment one should say, “Pay attention to me: for this is not more my concern than it is yours” and “For I shall tell you something such that you have never heard anything so terrible” (or “so astonishing”). That is, as Prodicus said, whenever the listeners started to doze off, one should throw in a bit of the fifty-drachma lesson.

D14 (≠ DK) Didymus the Blind, *Commentary on Ecclesiastes*

A paradoxical opinion of Prodicus is reported, viz. that “it is not possible to contradict.” [. . .].¹

¹ Elsewhere this doctrine is attributed to Protagoras (cf. **PROT. R10**) and to Antisthenes, but never to Prodicus.

Theology: The Origin of the Gods (D15–D18)

D15 (< B5) Philodemus, *On Piety*

[. . .] what has been written by <Prodicus> about the fact that <first> the things that provided nourishment and help were considered <gods> and were honored, and afterward those who had discovered means of nourishment, protec-

γας | ὡς Δήμητρα κ[αὶ] Δι[όνυσον] κα[ὶ] το[ὺς] Διο-
σκούρ]ου[s . . .

D16 (B5) Sext. Adv. Math.

a 9.18

Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ Κέως “ἥλιον,” φησί, “καὶ σελήνην καὶ ποταμούς καὶ κρήνας καὶ καθόλου πάντα τὰ ὠφελού-
ντα τὸν βίον ἡμῶν οἱ παλαιοὶ θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν διὰ τὴν
ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὠφέλειαν, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι τὸν Νεῖλον”
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτον Δήμητραν νομισθῆναι,
τὸν δὲ οἶνον Διόνυσον, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ Ποσειδῶνα, τὸ δὲ
πῦρ Ἡφαιστον καὶ ἥδη τῶν εὐχρηστούντων ἕκαστον.

b 9.52

Πρόδικος δὲ τὸ ὠφελούν τὸν βίον ὑπελήφθαι θεόν,
ὡς ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ποταμούς καὶ λίμνας καὶ
λειμώνας καὶ καρπὸς καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιουτῶδες.

D17 (> B5) Them. Orat. 30 349a–b

εἰ δὲ καὶ Διόνυσον παρακαλοῦμεν καὶ νύμφας καὶ Δή-
μητρος κόρην ὑέτιόν τε Δία καὶ Ποσειδῶνα φυτάλ-
μιον, πλησιάζομεν ἤδη ταῖς τελεταῖς καὶ τὴν Προδί-
κου σοφίαν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγκαταμίζομεν, ὅς ἱεουργίαν
πάσαν ἀνθρώπου καὶ μυστήρια καὶ πανηγύρεις καὶ
τελετὰς τῶν γεωργίας καλῶν ἐξάπτει, νομίζων καὶ

tion, or the other arts, like Demeter, Di<onyus,> and the
<Dioscuri> . . .

D16 (B5) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Natural Philoso-
phers*

a

Prodicus of Ceos says, “The ancients considered that the
sun, the moon, rivers, fountains, and in general everything
that is helpful for our life were gods because of the help
they provided, like the Egyptians regarding the Nile,” and
[scil. he says that] for this reason they considered that
bread was Demeter, wine Dionysus, water Poseidon, fire
Hephaestus, and in this way for each of the things that
benefited them.

b

Prodicus [scil. says] that what was helpful for life was
thought to be a god, like the sun, the moon, rivers, marshes,
meadows, produce, and everything of this sort.

D17 (> B5) Themistius, *Should One Engage in Farming?*

If we invoke Dionysus, the nymphs, Demeter’s daughter,
Zeus the rain giver, and Poseidon the nourisher, we are
already approaching the initiations and will be mixing into
our own words the wisdom (*sophia*) of Prodicus, who de-
rives all the sacred rites of man, the mysteries, festivals,
and initiations, from the fine aspects of agriculture; he also
thinks that this was the source for the gods’ benevolence

θεῶν εὐνοίαν ἐντεύθεν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἔλθειν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐσέβειαν ἐγγνώμενος.¹

¹ post. ἐγγνώμενος lac. pos. Diels

D18 (cf. B5) Min. Fel. *Octav.* 21.2

Prodicus adsumptos in deos loquitur, qui errando inventis novis frugibus utilitati hominum profuerunt.

"The Seasons" (D19)

D19

a (B1) Schol. in Aristoph. *Nub.* 361

φέρεται δὲ καὶ Προδίκου βιβλίον ἐπιγραφόμενον Ὁραὶ, ἐν ᾧ πεποιήκε τὸν Ἡρακλέα τῇ Ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ Κακίᾳ συντυγχάνοντα καὶ καλούσης ἑκατέρας ἐπὶ τὰ ἦθη τὰ αὐτῆς προσκλίνει τῇ Ἀρετῇ τὸν Ἡρακλέα καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνης ἰδρώτας προκρίνει τῶν προσκαίρων τῆς Κακίας ἡδονῶν.

b (ad A1a) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1 praef., p. 3.25–30 Kayser

Προδίκῳ τῷ Κεῖῳ συνεγγράπτῳ τις οὐκ ἀηδῆς λόγος ἡ Ἀρετῇ καὶ ἡ Κακία φοιτῶσαι παρὰ τὸν Ἡρακλέα ἐν εἶδει γυναικῶν, ἐσταλμένοι ἡ μὲν ἀπατηλῶ τε καὶ ποικίλῳ, ἡ δὲ ὡς ἔτυχεν, καὶ προτείνουσαι τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ νέφ' ἔτι ἡ μὲν ἀργίαν καὶ τρυφήν, ἡ δὲ αὐχμὸν καὶ πόνους [. . . = **R1b**].

toward men and provides a guarantee for the whole of piety.¹

¹ The text of the last phrase is uncertain.

D18 (cf. B5) Minucius Felix, *Octavius*

Prodicus says that those men were received among the gods who contributed to human utility by means of new crops that they had discovered during their travels.

"The Seasons" (D19)

D19

a (B1) Scholia on Aristophane's *Clouds*

There is also in circulation a book of Prodicus entitled *The Seasons*, in which he tells how Heracles meets Virtue and Vice and how when each of these calls upon him to follow her own ways Heracles chooses Virtue and prefers her toils to Vice's temporary pleasures.

b (ad A1a) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

A certain quite agreeable text was composed by Prodicus of Ceos: Virtue and Vice approach Heracles in the form of women, the one decked out in deceptive and many-colored attire, the other dressed in ordinary clothing; and the one offers sloth and luxury to Heracles, who is still young, the other aridity and labors [. . .].

See **D20–D21**

*Appendix 1: Xenophon's Version of Prodicus' Tale
of the Choice of Heracles (D20–D21, cf. D19)*

D20 Philostr.

a (< A1a) *Vit. soph.* 1.12, p. 14.27–32 Kayser

τὴν δὲ Ἡρακλέους αἵρεσιν, τὸν τοῦ Προδίκου λόγον
[. . .] οὐδὲ Ξενοφῶν ἀπηξίωσε μὴ οὐχὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι.
καὶ τί ἂν χαρακτηρίζοιμεν τὴν τοῦ Προδίκου γλωτ-
ταν, Ξενοφώντος αὐτὴν ἰκανῶς ὑπογράφοντος;

b (≠ DK) *Epist.* 73, pp. 256.31–257.2 Kayser

[. . .] ὁ τοῦ Γρύλλου φιλοτιμείται πρὸς τὸν τοῦ Προ-
δίκου Ἡρακλέα, ὅποτε ὁ Πρόδικος τὴν Κακίαν καὶ
τὴν Ἀρετὴν ἄγει παρὰ τὸν Ἡρακλέα καλοῦσας αὐτὸν
ἐς βίου αἵρεσιν [. . .].

D21 (B2) *Xen. Mem.* 2.1.21–34 (cf. *Stob. Anth.* 3.1.205a)

[ΣΩ.] καὶ Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι
τῷ περὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπι-
δείκνυται, ὡσαύτως περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται, ὧδέ
πως λέγων, ὅσα ἐγὼ μέμνημαι.

φησὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλέα, ἐπεὶ ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἦβην ὤρ-
μᾶτο, ἐν ᾗ οἱ νέοι ἤδη αὐτοκράτορες γιγνόμενοι δη-
λοῦσιν εἴτε τὴν δι' ἀρετῆς ὁδὸν τρέφονται ἐπὶ τὸν
βίον εἴτε τὴν διὰ κακίας, ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν καθ-
ῆσθαι ἀποροῦντα ὅποτέραν τῶν ὁδῶν τράπηται. [22]

*Appendix 1: Xenophon's Version of Prodicus' Tale
of the Choice of Heracles (D20–D21, cf. D19)*

D20 Philostratus

a (< A1a) *Lives of the Sophists*

The choice of Heracles, the discourse by Prodicus [. . .]
Xenophon himself did not disdain to express it (*herme-
neusai*) [scil. in his own words]. And why should we bother
to characterize the language of Prodicus, given that Xeno-
phon has delineated it sufficiently?

b (≠ DK) *Letters*

[. . .] the son of Gryllus [scil. Xenophon] competes with
the Heracles of Prodicus, when Prodicus brings Vice and
Virtue to Heracles and has them call upon him to choose
his way of life [. . .].

D21 (B2) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

[Socrates:] Prodicus the wise, in his text about Heracles,
which he has delivered publicly to many people, says the
same thing [scil. as Epicharmus] about virtue. He says the
following, as far as I can remember:

For he says that Heracles, at the moment when he left
childhood for adolescence, when young men are now mas-
ters of themselves and show whether they will take the
road of virtue or the one of vice for their life, went out to
sit down and reflect, not knowing which of the roads he

καὶ φανῆναι αὐτῷ δύο γυναικας προσιέναι¹ μεγάλας, τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν εὐπρεπῆ τε ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐλευθέριον φύσει, κεκοσμημένην τὸ μὲν σῶμα² καθαριότητι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα αἰδοῖ, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα σωφροσύνη, ἐσθῆτι δὲ λευκῇ, τὴν δ' ἑτέραν τεθραμμένην μὲν εἰς πολυσαρκίαν τε καὶ ἀπαλότητα, κεκαλλωπισμένην δὲ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα ὥστε λευκοτέραν τε καὶ ἐρυθροτέραν τοῦ ὄντος δοκεῖν³ φαίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθότεραν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, ἐσθῆτα δὲ ἐξ ἧς ἂν μάλιστα ἢ ὥρα διαλάμπου. κατασκοπεῖσθαι δὲ θαμὰ ἑαυτήν, ἐπισκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτὴν θεάται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς σκιὰν ἀποβλέπειν.

¹ προσιέναι Stob.: προίεναι mss.
Stob. ³ δοκεῖν del. Hartmann

² σῶμα mss.: χρῶμα
⁴ ἢ Stob.: om. mss.

[23] ὡς δ' ἐγένοντο πλησσιότερον τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, τὴν μὲν πρόσθεν ῥηθείσαν ἰέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, τὴν δ' ἑτέραν φθάσαι βουλομένην προσδραμεῖν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ καὶ εἰπεῖν "ὄρω σε, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἀποροῦντα ποίαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὸν βίον τράπη. εἰ δὲ οὖν ἐμὲ φίλην ποιησάμενος ἔπη,¹ τὴν ἡδίστην τε καὶ ῥάστην ὁδὸν ἄξω σε, καὶ τῶν μὲν τερπνῶν οὐδενὸς ἀγευστος ἔσει, τῶν δὲ χαλεπῶν ἀπειρος διαβιώση. [24] πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολέμων οὐδὲ πραγμάτων φροντιεῖς ἀλλὰ σκοπούμενος αἰεὶ ἔση² τί ἂν κεχαρισμένον ἢ σιτίον ἢ ποτὸν εὔροις, ἢ τί ἂν ἰδῶν ἢ ἀκούσας τερφθείης ἢ τίνων <ἂν>³ ὀσφραϊνόμενος ἢ ἀπτόμενος ἡσθείης, τίσι δὲ παιδικούς ὀμιλῶν μάλιστα ἂν εὐφρανθείης, καὶ πῶς ἂν

should take. [22] And it seemed to him that two large women approached him, the one beautiful to look on and of a freeborn status, adorned in her body with purity, in her eyes with modesty, in her posture with discretion, in white raiment; while the other had been so nourished as to become plump and soft, her skin beautified so that she would seem whiter and pinker than she was in reality, her posture so that she would seem straighter than she was by nature, her eyes were wide open and her raiment was such that her youthful beauty shone forth from it as much as possible. She inspected herself frequently, and also watched to see if anyone else was looking at her, and frequently she glanced at her own shadow.

[23] When they had come near to Heracles, the one mentioned first continued in the same way, but the other, wishing to reach Heracles first, ran to him and said, "I see, Heracles, that you do not know which road to take for your life. Well, if you become my friend and follow me, I shall lead you on the most pleasant and easy road; and there is no pleasure that you will not taste, while you will pass your life without experiencing any hardships. [24] First of all, you will not worry about wars or legal matters, but you will always be on the lookout to see what kind of enjoyable food or drink you can find, what you can delight in seeing or hearing or be pleased in smelling or touching, with what boys you can most enjoy love, how you can sleep most

¹ ἔπη Radermacher: ἐπὶ mss. plerique

² αἰεὶ ἔση Diels: διείσει Diggle: δεήση A: δὲ ἔση Z: διέση cett. et Stob.

³ <ἂν> Cobet

μαλακώτατα καθεύδοις, καὶ πῶς ἂν ἀπονότατα τούτων πάντων τυγχάνοις. [25] ἔὰν δέ ποτε γένηται τις ὑποψία σπάνεως⁴ ἀφ' ὧν ἔσται ταῦτα, οὐ φόβος μὴ σε ἀγάγω ἐπὶ τῷ⁵ πονοῦντα καὶ ταλαιπωροῦντα τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἷς ἂν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐργάζωνται, τούτοις σὺ χρήσῃ, οὐδενὸς ἀπεχόμενος ὅθεν ἂν δυνατὸν ἦ τι κερδᾶναι. πανταχόθεν γὰρ ὠφελείσθαι τοῖς ἐμοὶ συνουσίῳ ἐξουσίαν ἐγὼ παρέχω.”

⁴ σπάνεως BZ: πόλεως A: σπανίως cett. et Stob.

⁵ τὸ B marg.: τὸν cett. et Stob.

[26] καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀκούσας ταῦτα· “ὦ γύναι,” ἔφη, “ὄνομα δέ σοι τί ἐστίν;” ἡ δέ· “οἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι,” ἔφη, “καλοῦσί με Εὐδαιμονίαν, οἱ δὲ μισοῦντές με ὑποκοριζόμενοι ὀνομάζουσι Κακίαν.”

[27] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἑτέρα γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα εἶπε· καὶ ἐγὼ ἦκω πρὸς σέ, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, εἰδνία τοὺς γεννήσαντάς σε καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν σὴν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καταμαθοῦσα, ἐξ ὧν ἐλπίζω, εἰ τὴν πρὸς ἐμέ ὁδὸν τράποιω, σφόδρ' ἂν σε τῶν καλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐργάτην γενέσθαι καὶ ἐμὲ ἔτι πολὺ ἐντιμωτέραν καὶ ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖς διαπρεπεστέραν φανῆναι. οὐκ ἐξαπατήσω δέ σε προουμίῳ ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' ἥπερ οἱ θεοὶ διέθεσαν τὰ ὄντα διηγῆσομαι μετ' ἀληθείας. [28] τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν οὐδὲν ἄνευ πόνου καὶ ἐπιμελείας θεοὶ διδῶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' εἶτε τοὺς θεοὺς ἴλεως εἶναί σοι βούλει, θεραπευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς, εἶτε ὑπὸ φίλων ἐθέλεις ἀγαπᾶσθαι, τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετητέον,

softly, and how you can obtain all these joys in the most painless way possible. [25] And if you ever become worried that the sources of these things might become scarce, do not fear that I might lead you to acquire them by undergoing toil and hardship in body and soul: you will have the enjoyment of whatever other men obtain by working, and you will refrain from nothing from which you could derive some advantage. For to my companions I grant the possibility of deriving benefits from every possible source.”

[26] When Heracles had heard this he asked, “Woman, what is your name?” She said, “My friends call me Happiness, but those who hate me give me a nickname, calling me Vice.”

[27] At this point the other woman approached and said, “I too have come to you, Heracles, knowing your parents and having learned of your nature during your education, and on this basis I am confident that, if you take the road that leads toward me, you will become a good doer of fine and noble deeds and I shall become even more honored and distinguished for the good things [scil. that I provide]. I shall not deceive you by preludes of pleasure, but I shall explain to you in truth how the gods have established the things that are. [28] For of all the things that are good and fine, the gods give none to humans without toil and diligence: if you want the gods to be propitious to you, you must worship the gods; if you wish to be loved by your friends, you must do your friends good; if you desire to be

εἶτε ὑπό τινος πόλεως ἐπιθυμῆς τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ὠφελητέον, εἶτε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης ἀξιοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι, τὴν Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εἰ ποιεῖν, εἶτε γῆν βούλει σοι καρποὺς ἀφθόρους φέρειν, τὴν γῆν θεραπευτέον, εἶτε ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων οἶει δεῖν πλουτίζεσθαι, τῶν βοσκημάτων ἐπιμελητέον, εἶτε διὰ πολέμου ὀρμῆς αὐξέσθαι καὶ βούλει δύνασθαι τοὺς τε φίλους ἐλευθεροῦν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς χειροῦσθαι, τὰς πολεμικὰς τέχνας αὐτάς τε παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων μαθητέον καὶ ὅπως δεῖ αὐταῖς χρῆσθαι ἀσκητέον· εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι βούλει δυνατὸς εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμναστέον σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἰδρώτι."

[29] καὶ ἡ Κακία ὑπολαβούσα εἶπεν, ὡς φησι Πρῶδικος· "ἐννοεῖς, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ὡς χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐφροσύνας ἢ γυνή σοι αὐτὴ διηγείται; ἐγὼ δὲ ῥαδίαν καὶ βραχεῖαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄξω σε." [30] καὶ ἡ Ἀρετὴ εἶπεν· "ὦ τλήμων, τί δὲ σὺ ἀγαθὸν ἔχεις; ἢ τί ἡδὺ οἴσθα μηδὲν τούτων ἕνεκα πράττειν ἐθέλουσα; ἦτις οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναμένεις, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπιθυμῆσαι πάντων ἐπιπιπλασαι, πρὶν μὲν πεινῆν ἐσθίουσα, πρὶν δὲ διψῆν πίνουσα, καὶ ἵνα μὲν ἡδέως φάγης, ὀψοποιούς¹ μηχανωμένη, ἵνα δὲ ἡδέως πίης, οἶνους τε πολυτελεῖς παρασκευάζῃ καὶ τοῦ θέρους χιόνα περιθέουσα ζητεῖς, ἵνα δὲ καθυπνώσης ἡδέως, οὐ μόνον τὰς στρωμνὰς μαλακάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κλῖνας καὶ τὰ ὑπόβαθρα ταῖς κλῖναις παρασκευάζῃ² οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ πονεῖν

honored by some city, you must help that city; if you strive to be admired for virtue by all of Greece, you must try to do Greece good; if you want the earth to bear its fruits for you in abundance, you must cultivate the land; if you think it necessary to acquire wealth from flocks, you must take care of the flocks; if you strive to become greater by war and wish to be able to free your friends and subdue your enemies, you must learn the arts of war themselves from those who are expert in them and practice the way in which one must make use of them. And if you wish to be powerful in body too, you must accustom your body to serve the mind and you must exercise it with toil and sweat."

[29] And, as Prodicus says, Vice replied, saying, "Do you recognize, Heracles, how difficult and long the road to mirth is which this woman is describing to you? The road on which I will lead you to happiness is easy and short."

[30] And Virtue said, "Oh you wretch, what do you possess that is any good? Or what do you know that provides pleasure if you are not willing to do anything for the sake of those things? You do not even wait for the desire for pleasant things, but you fill yourself with them all before you desire them, eating before you are hungry, drinking before you are thirsty, and so that you can eat pleasantly you hire cooks, so that you can drink pleasantly you buy expensive wines and run around looking for snow in the summer, so that you can sleep pleasantly you buy not only soft blankets but also beds and bedsteads—for what makes you long for sleep is not toiling, but having nothing to do. You force the

¹ ὀψοποιεῖς Bc
2.485.³⁰: -ζεις mss. et Stob.

² παρασκευάζῃ Clem. Alex. Strom.

ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὃ τι ποιήσεις³ ὕπνου ἐπιθυμείς· τὰ δ' ἀφροδίσια πρὸ τοῦ δεῖσθαι ἀναγκάζεις, πάντα μηχανωμένη καὶ γυναιξὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι χρωμένη· οὕτω γὰρ παιδεύεις τοὺς σεαυτῆς φίλους, τῆς μὲν νυκτὸς ὑβρίζουσα, τῆς δ' ἡμέρας τὸ χρησιμώτατον κατακοιμίζουσα.

³ ποιήσεις Z et Stob: ποιῶις M: ποιείς ABROX: ποιεῖν Y; ποιῆς Castalio et D.—K.

[31] ἀθάνατος δὲ οὐσα ἐκ θεῶν μὲν ἀπέρριψαι, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν ἀτιμάζει· τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καὶ τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέασαι. τίς δ' ἂν σοι λεγούση τι πιστεύσειε; τίς δ' ἂν δεομένη τινὸς ἐπαρκέσειεν; ἢ τίς ἂν εὖ φρονῶν τοῦ σοῦ θιάσου τολμήσειεν εἶναι; οἱ νέοι μὲν ὄντες τοῖς σώμασιν ἀδύνατοί εἰσι, πρεσβύτεροι δὲ γενόμενοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀνόητοι, ἀπόνως μὲν λιπαροὶ διὰ νεότητος τρεφόμενοι, ἐπιπόνως δὲ αὐχμηροὶ διὰ γήρωσ περῶντες, τοῖς μὲν πεπραγμένοις αἰσχυρόμενοι, τοῖς δὲ πραττομένοις βαρυνόμενοι, τὰ μὲν ἡδέα ἐν τῇ νεότητι διαδραμόντες, τὰ δὲ χαλεπὰ εἰς τὸ γήρας ἀποθέμενοι. [32] ἐγὼ δὲ σύνειμι μὲν θεοῖς, σύνειμι δὲ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ἔργον δὲ καλὸν οὔτε θεῶν οὔτ' ἀνθρώπων χωρὶς ἐμοῦ γίνεται. τιμῶμαι δὲ μάλιστα πάντων καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις οἷς προσήκει, ἀγαπητὴ μὲν γὰρ συνεργὸς τεχνίταις, πιστὴ δὲ φύλαξ οἴκων δεσπό-

pleasures of sex before you feel the need for them, deploying all kinds of contrivances and using men as though they were women. And this is how you teach your friends, acting outrageously at night and sleeping away the most useful part of the day.

[31] Immortal though you are, you have been cast out by the gods and you are not honored by good men. The most pleasant sound of all, praise of yourself, you do not hear, and the most pleasant sight of all you do not see, for you have never beheld a single fine thing that you have done. Who would trust what you say? Who would supply what you need? What sane man would have the effrontery to be a member of your riotous band? While they are young they are weak in their bodies, when they have become older they are mindless in their souls, raised in youth sleek and free from toil, finishing in old age withered and toilsome, feeling shame for their past actions and distress for their present actions, having run through the pleasures in youth and saved the sufferings for old age. [32] But as for me, I spend my time with gods, I spend it with good men. No fine deed, either divine or human, comes about without me. I am honored most of all both among gods and among humans for whom it is fitting: a beloved colleague for craftsmen, a trusty guardian of the house for homeowners,

ταις, εὐμενῆς δὲ παραστάτις οἰκέταις, ἀγαθὴ δὲ συλλήπτρια τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων, βεβαία δὲ τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ σύμμαχος ἔργων, ἀρίστη δὲ φιλίας κοινωνός.

[33] ἔστι δὲ τοῖς ἐμοῖς φίλοις ἡδεῖα μὲν καὶ ἀπράγμων σίτων καὶ ποτῶν ἀπόλαυσις· ἀνέχονται γὰρ ἕως ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν αὐτῶν. ὕπνος δ' αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν ἡδίων ἢ τοῖς ἀμόχθοις, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολείποντες αὐτὸν ἄχθονται οὔτε διὰ τοῦτον μεθιάσι τὰ δέοντα πράττειν, καὶ οἱ μὲν νέοι τοῖς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπαίνους χαίρουσιν, οἱ δὲ γεραίτεροι ταῖς τῶν νέων τιμαῖς ἀγάλονται· καὶ ἡδέως μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν πράξεων μέμνηνται, εὖ δὲ τὰς παρούσας ἡδονται πράττοντες, δι' ἐμὲ φίλοι μὲν θεοὶς ὄντες, ἀγαπητοὶ δὲ φίλοις, τίμιοι δὲ πατρίσιν· ὅταν δὲ δῆ¹ ἔλθῃ τὸ πεπρωμένον τέλος, οὐ μετὰ λήθης² ἄτιμοι κείνται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μνήμης τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον ὑμνούμενοι θάλλουσι. τοιαῦτά σοι, ὦ παῖ τοκέων ἀγαθῶν Ἡράκλεις, ἔξεστι διαπονησαμένῳ τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτήσθαι."

[34] οὕτω πως διώκει Πρόδικος τὴν ὑπ' Ἀρετῆς Ἡρακλέους παιδεύσιν· ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἐπιμεγαλειότεροις ῥήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν.

¹ δῆ Stob., om. mss.

² λήθης Y¹: μνήμης pler. mss.

a kindly defender for slaves, a good assistant for toils in peace, a steady ally for deeds in war, and the best of partners in friendship.

[33] My friends can have pleasant and easy enjoyment of food and drink, for they are patient until they desire them. Their sleep is more pleasant than that of the idle; they are not irritated when they wake up from it and they do not neglect to do what they ought to do because of it. And the young rejoice in the praises given them by the older, while the older exult in the honors done them by the young. They recall with pleasure their deeds of old, and they are pleased to be doing good deeds in the present; and through me they are dear to the gods, beloved by their friends, honored by their fatherlands. And when the destined end comes, they do not lie forgotten and deprived of honors, but flourish in memory through hymns of praise for all of time. This is what you can obtain, Heracles, son of good parents, if you toil assiduously: the most blessed happiness."

[34] This is how Prodicus presented Heracles' education by Virtue, except that he adorned the thoughts in even more splendid words than I have done now.

Appendix 2: Platonic Examples of Prodicus'
Verbal Distinctions (D22–D25)

D22 Plat. Prot.

a (A13) 337a–c

εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, ὁ Πρόδικος, “καλῶς μοι,”
ἔφη, “δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Κριτία· χρῆ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν
τοιούτοισδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινούς μὲν εἶναι
ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγόμενον ἀκροατάς, ἴσους δὲ μή—
ἔστιν γὰρ οὐ ταῦτόν· κοινῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκούσαι δεῖ
ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἴσον δὲ νεῖμαι ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν
σοφωτέρῳ πλεόν, τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον. ἐγὼ μὲν
καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιώ ὑμᾶς
συναγχεῖν καὶ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβη-
τεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή· ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι-
εῦνοιαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσιν δὲ οἱ διάφοροί
τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις—καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλλίστη ἡμῶν
ἢ συνουσία γίγνοιτο· ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μά-
λιστ' ἂν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ
οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε—εὐδοκίμειν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν παρὰ ταῖς
ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ
ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων—ἡμεῖς τ'
αἱ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως εὐφραϊνοίμεθα, οὐχ
ἡδοίμεσθα—εὐφραϊνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν μαυθάνοντά
τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ,
ἡδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθιοντά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἢδὲ πάσχοντα αὐτῷ
τῷ σώματι.”

Appendix 2: Platonic Examples of Prodicus'
Verbal Distinctions (D22–D25)

D22 Plato, Protagoras

a (A13)

When he [i.e. Critias] had said this, Prodicus spoke up,
“You seem to me to speak well, Critias. For those who
attend discussions like this should be listeners in common
(*koinos*) to the two interlocutors, but not equal (*isos*) ones.
For this is not the same thing. For one must listen to both
of them in common, but not assign an equal share to each
of them, but more to the wiser one and less to the more
ignorant one. As for myself, I too ask you to agree, Pro-
tagoras and Socrates, and to dispute (*amphisbêtein*) with
one another about the arguments but not to quarrel (*eriz-
zein*). For friends dispute benevolently with their friends,
while adversaries and enemies quarrel with each other.
And in this way our session would turn out most finely. For
in this way you speakers would receive the approval (*eu-
dokimein*) of us listeners and not the praise (*epainein*). For
one can receive approval from the listeners' souls without
deception, while praise received in speech often comes
from people who tell a lie contrary to their opinion; as for
us listeners in turn, in this way we would most of all be
gratified (*euphrainein*), not delighted (*hêdesthai*). For one
can be gratified when one learns something and partici-
pates in thought by means of the mind itself, and delighted
when one eats something or experiences something else
agreeable by means of the body itself.”

b (< A14) 340a-b

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ἣ τὸ τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταῦτόν ὄν [. . .].

c (A14) 340b

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ταῦτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο;

[ΠΡ.] ἄλλο νῆ Δί, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.

d (> A14) 341b

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] τὸ γὰρ δεινόν, φησίν, κακόν ἐστιν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν λέγει ἐκάστοτε 'δεινοῦ πλούτου' οὐδὲ 'δεινῆς εἰρήνης' οὐδὲ 'δεινῆς ὑγείας,' ἀλλὰ 'δεινῆς νόσου' καὶ 'δεινοῦ πολέμου' καὶ 'δεινῆς πενίας,' ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος. [. . .] τί ἔλεγεν, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸ 'χαλεπὸν' Σιμωνίδης;

[ΠΡ.] "κακόν," ἔφη.

e (≠ DK) 358a-b

"ὁμολογεῖτε ἄρα," ἦν δ' ἐγώ, "τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακόν. τὴν δὲ Προδικὸν τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παραιτοῦμαι· εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν, εἴτε ὀπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ὦ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὃ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι."

γελᾶσας οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος συνωμολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

b (< A14)

[Socrates:] [. . .] your art (*mousikê*), by which you distinguish 'to wish' and 'to desire,' on the idea that these two are not identical [. . .].

c (A14)

[Socrates:] [. . .] Do you think that 'to become' (*genesthai*) and 'to be' (*einai*) are the same thing or different?

"Different, by Zeus!" said Prodicus.

d (> A14)

[Socrates:] [. . .] for what is 'terrible' (*deinos*), he [i.e. Prodicus] says, is an evil; for no one speaks in each case of 'a terrible wealth,' 'terrible peace,' or 'terrible health,' but of 'a terrible disease,' 'terrible war,' and 'terrible poverty,' on the idea that what is terrible is an evil. [. . .] What did Simonides mean by 'difficult,' Prodicus?

"Evil," he said.

e (≠ DK)

"So you [i.e. Hippias, Prodicus, and Protagoras] agree," I [i.e. Socrates] said, "that what is pleasant is good while what is painful is evil. I forgo the distinction among words of Prodicus here. For whether [scil. you call it] 'pleasant' (*hêdus*), 'delightful' (*terpnos*), or 'enjoyable' (*khartos*), for whatever reason and in whatever way you wish to name these things, my fine friend Prodicus, answer me this with regard to what I am intending."

Prodicus laughed and agreed, as did the others.

f (≠ DK) 358d-e

“τί οὖν;” ἔφην ἐγώ, “καλείτε <τι>¹ δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἄρα ὅπερ ἐγώ; (πρὸς σέ λέγω, ὦ Πρόδικε.) προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε.”

ἔδοκει Πρωταγόρα μὲν καὶ Ἰππία δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο, Προδίκω δὲ δέος, φόβος δ' οὐ.

“ἀλλ' οὐδέν,” ἔφην ἐγώ, “Πρόδικε, διαφέρει [. . .].”

¹<τι> Heindorf

D23 (A15) Plat. *Men.* 75e

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] τελευτήν καλεῖς τι; τοιόνδε λέγω οἶον πέρας καὶ ἔσχατον—πάντα ταῦτα ταυτόν τι λέγω ἴσως δ' ἂν ἡμῶν Πρόδικος διαφέροιο [. . .].

D24 (> A17) Plat. *Lach.* 197b-c, d

[NL.] [. . .] ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὸ ἄφοβον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρείον οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνδρείας μὲν καὶ προμηθείας πάνν τιςιν ὀλίγοις οἶμαι μετεῖναι, θρασύτητος δὲ καὶ τόλμης καὶ τοῦ ἀφόβου μετὰ ἀπρομηθείας πανν πολλοῖς καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ θηρίων. ταυτ' οὖν ἂ σὺ καλεῖς ἀνδρεία καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ἐγὼ θρασεῖα καλῶ, ἀνδρεία δὲ τὰ φρόνιμα περὶ ὧν λέγω. [. . .]

f (≠ DK)

“Well then,” I [i.e. Socrates] said, “is there something that you call ‘fright’ (*deos*) and ‘fear’ (*phobos*)? And is it the same thing that I mean by it—I am speaking to you, Prodicus. I say that this is a certain expectation of something bad, whether you call it ‘fear’ or ‘fright.’”

Protagoras and Hippias were of the opinion that this is what both fright and fear are, Prodicus that it was fright but not fear.

“But Prodicus,” I said, “this does not make any difference. [. . .]”

D23 (A15) Plato, *Meno*

[Socrates:] [. . .] Is there something that you call an ‘end’ (*teleuté*)? I mean something like an edge (*peras*) and outer limit (*eskhaton*). I say that all this is identical, though perhaps Prodicus might disagree with us [. . .].

D24 (> A17) Plato, *Laches*

[Nicias:] [. . .] But I think that fearlessness (*aphobon*) and courage (*andreion*) are not the same thing. I myself think that very few people indeed have a share of courage and foresight (*promêtheia*), but very many—including men, women, children, and wild beasts—have a share of rashness (*thrasutês*), audacity (*tolmê*), and fearlessness, together with lack of foresight (*apromêthia*). So what you and most people call ‘courage’ (*andreia*) I call ‘rashness’ (*thrasea*), while ‘courage’ belongs to the prudence (*phronima*) of which I am speaking.

[. . .]

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν παρὰ Δάμωνος τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἑταίρου παρέιληφεν, ὁ δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδικῷ πολλὰ πλησιάζει [. . .].

D25 (cf. A18) Plat. *Charm.* 163b, d

“εἰπέ μοι,” ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, “οὐ ταῦτόν καλεῖς τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν;”

“οὐ μέντοι,” ἔφη, “οὐδέ γε τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν [. . .].”

“ὦ Κριτία,” ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, “καὶ εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου σου σχεδὸν ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ οἰκεῖά τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοῖς, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις πράξεις· καὶ γὰρ Προδικῷ μυρία τινὰ ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιρούντος [. . . = D5a].”

[Socrates:] [. . .] he [i.e. Nicias] has acquired this wisdom from our friend Damon, and Damon is very close to Prodicus [. . .].

D25 (cf. A18) Plato, *Charmides*

“Tell me,” I [i.e. Socrates] said, “do you not call ‘to make’ (*poiein*) and ‘to do’ (*prattein*) the same thing?”

“Not at all, he [i.e. Critias] said, “and not ‘to fabricate’ (*ergazesthai*) and ‘to make’ (*poiein*) either. [. . .].”

“Critias,” I said, “I understood fairly well what you were saying at the beginning, that you call ‘goods’ (*agatha*) things that belong to one and are one’s own things, and ‘actions’ (*praxeis*) the making of good things. For I have heard Prodicus make thousands of distinctions concerning words [. . .].”

PRODICUS [84DK]

R

First Attestations: Aristophanes

See **DRAM. T22–T24**

Contemporary Fame and Influence (R1)

R1 Philostr. *Vit. soph.*

a (< A1a) 1.12, p. 14.18–19 Kayser

Προδίκου δὲ τοῦ Κείου ὄνομα τοσοῦτον ἐπὶ σοφία ἐγένετο [. . . = **P9**].

b (ad A1a) 1 praef., pp. 3.30–4.4 Kayser

[. . . = **D19b**] καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσι διὰ πλειόνων συντεθέντος, τοῦ λόγου ἔμμισθον ἐπίδειξιν ἐποιεῖτο Πρόδικος περιφοιτῶν τὰ ἄσκη καὶ θέλων αὐτὰ τὸν Ὀρφείως τε καὶ Θαμύρου τρόπον, ἐφ' οἷς μεγάλων μὲν ἠξιοῦτο παρὰ Θηβαίοις, πλειόνων δὲ παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὡς ἐς τὸ συμφέρον τῶν νέων ἀναδιδάσκων ταῦτα.

PRODICUS

R

First Attestations: Aristophanes

See **DRAM. T22–T24**

Contemporary Fame and Influence (R1)

R1 Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

a (< A1a)

The name of Prodicus of Ceos became so renowned for wisdom (*sophia*) [. . .].

b (ad A1a)

[. . .] And when his text [i.e. on Heracles' choice] had finally been composed at considerable length, Prodicus declaimed it in public for a fee, traveling through the cities and charming them like Orpheus and Thamyris; on this occasion he was deemed worthy of large rewards at Thebes and of even larger ones at Sparta, because he was teaching this for the benefit of the young.

*Stylistic Influence on Thucydides (R2)***R2** (< A9) Marcell. *Thuc.* 36

ἐξήλωσε δ' ἐπ' ὀλίγον, ὡς φησιν Ἄντυλλος [. . . =
GORG. R4] καὶ μέντοι καὶ Προδίκου τοῦ Κείου τὴν
 ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβολογίαν.

*A Polemic in Aeschines the Socratic (R3)***R3** (< A4b) Athen. *Deipn.* 5 220B

ὁ δὲ Καλλίας αὐτοῦ περιέχει [. . .] τὴν Προδίκου καὶ
 Ἀναξαγόρου τῶν σοφιστῶν διαμώκησιν. λέγει γὰρ
 ὡς ὁ μὲν Πρόδικος Θηραμένην μαθητὴν ἀπέτελεσεν,
 ὁ δ' ἕτερος Φιλόξενον τὸν Ἐρύξιδος καὶ Ἀριφράδην
 τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἀριγνώτου τοῦ κιθαρωδοῦ, θέλων ἀπὸ
 τῆς τῶν δηλωθέντων μοχθηρίας καὶ περὶ τὰ φαῦλα
 λιχνείας ἐμφανίσαι τὴν τῶν παιδευσάντων διδασκα-
 λίαν.

*Later Reflections of Plato's
 Portrait of Prodicus (R4–R6)*

R4 (B8) Ps.-Plat. *Eryx.* 397c–d, e

[ΣΩ.] τουτουὶ μὲν τὸν λόγον [. . .], πρῶην ἐν Λυκείῳ
 ἀνὴρ σοφὸς λέγων Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος ἐδόκει τοῖς παρ-
 οῦσι φλυαρεῖν οὕτως, ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι πείσαι

*Stylistic Influence on Thucydides (R2)***R2** (< A9) Marcellinus, *Life of Thucydides*

As Antyllus says, he [i.e. Thucydides] also emulated a bit
 [. . .] and also the precision in wording of Prodicus of Ceos.

*A Polemic in Aeschines the Socratic (R3)***R3** (< A4b), Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

His [i.e. of Aeschines the Socratic] *Callias* contains [. . .]
 a satire on the sophists Prodicus and Anaxagoras. For he
 says that Prodicus made Theramenes his disciple, while
 the other one did so with Philoxenus, the son of Eryxis,
 and Ariphraides, the brother of Arignotus the citharodist,
 wanting to reveal, from the immorality of the men repre-
 sented and their gluttony for worthless things, the kind of
 education they had received from their teachers.

*Later Reflections of Plato's
 Portrait of Prodicus (R4–R6)*

R4 (B8) Ps.-Plato, *Eryxias*

[Socrates:] When that wise man, Prodicus of Ceos, just the
 other day in the Lyceum used this very argument [i.e. that
 the quality of things depends on the quality of the people
 using them] [. . .] he seemed to his listeners to be speaking
 such nonsense that he was not able to persuade any of

τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγει· [. . .] ἡρώτα γὰρ αὐτὸν τὸ μειράκιον, πῶς οἶται κακὸν εἶναι τὸ πλουτεῖν καὶ ὅπως ἀγαθόν· ὁ δ' ὑπολαμβάνων, ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ νῦν δὴ, ἔφη, "τοῖς μὲν καλοῖς καγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις ὅπου δεῖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς χρήμασι, τούτοις μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ μοχθηροῖς καὶ ἀνεπιστήμοσι κακόν. ἔχει δ' [. . .] καὶ τᾶλλα πράγματα οὕτω πάντα ὅποιοι γὰρ ἄν τινες ὦσιν οἱ χρώμενοι, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη εἶναι."

R5 (< B9) Ps.-Plat. *Ax.* 366c

[ΣΩ.] [. . . = **P6**] καὶ πρόην γοῦν παρὰ Καλλία τῷ Ἴππονίκου ποιούμενος ἐπίδειξιν τοσαύτε τοῦ ζῆν κατέειπεν, ὥστε ἔγωγε μὲν παρὰ ἀκαρῆ διέγραψα τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου θανατῆ μου ἢ ψυχῆ, Ἄξιοχε.

R6 (< A1a) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.12, p. 14.21–24 Kayser

πρεσβεύων δὲ παρὰ Ἀθηναίους παρελθὼν ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἱκανώτατος ἔδοξεν ἀνθρώπων καίτοι δυσήκοον καὶ βαρὺ φθεγγόμενος.

Callimachus (R7)

R7 (< A10) Schol. in Aristoph. *Av.* 692

ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς Καλλίμαχος [Frag. 431 Pfeiffer] τὸν Πρόδικον ἐν τοῖς ῥήτορσι καταλέγει· σαφῶς γὰρ ἐν τούτοις φιλόσοφος.

those present that he was saying the truth. [. . .] For a young man asked him in what way he thought that being rich was evil and in what way it was good. And the other said in reply just what you [i.e. Critias] said now, "For fine men and for those who know how money should be used it is good, but for wicked and ignorant men it is evil. And this is so [. . .] for all other things: of whatever sort are the people who use things, of the same sort are necessarily these things for them."

R5 (< B9) Ps.-Plato, *Axiochus*

[Socrates:] [. . .] When he was giving a performance recently at the house of Callias, the son of Hipponicus, he said so many bad things about life that I myself came within a hair's breadth of killing myself, and ever since then my soul desires death, Axiochus.

R6 (< A1a) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

When he was an ambassador to the Athenians, he went to the Council and was judged the most competent of men [cf. **P2**], even though he was hard to hear and spoke with a deep voice [cf. **P3**].

Callimachus (R7)

R7 (< A10) Scholia on Aristophanes' *Birds*

Callimachus is mistaken in cataloging Prodicus among the orators: for in these lines [= **DRAM. T23**] he is clearly a philosopher.

*An Epicurean Criticizes a Stoic
Interpretation of Prodicus (R8)*

R8 (< B5) Philod. *Piet.* (P. Herc. 1428, Col. 2.28–3.8, pp. 13–14)

Περσα[ίος δὲ [SVF 448] δ]η[λό]ς ἐστὶν [ἀναιρῶν] | ὄντ[ως κ]α[ὶ ἀφανί]ζων τὸ δαιμόνι[ον] | ἢ μὴθὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γινώσκων, ὅταν | ἐν τῷ Περὶ θεῶν μὴ | [ἀπ]-
ίθανα λέγ[η] φάινεσθαι τὰ [. . . = D15] ὑπὸ [Προ]-
δ[ίκου γ]εγραμ[μέν]α [. . . = D15].

28 suppl. Spengel, 29–30 e.g. Henrichs, 1 Diels

*Criticisms of Prodicus' Views
on Language (R9–R10)*

R9 (< B4) Gal. *Nat. fac.* 2.9 (pp. 195.23–196.1; cf. 15.325 Kühn)

[. . . = D9] ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε τὸ πρὸς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ὀνομαζόμενον φλέγμα, τὸ λευκὸν τὴν χροῖαν, ὃ βλένναν ὀνομάζει Πρόδικος, ὃ ψυχρὸς καὶ ὑγρὸς χυμὸς ἐστὶν οὗτος καὶ πλείστος τοῖς τε γέρονσι καὶ τοῖς ὀπωσδήποτε ψυγείσιν ἀθροίζεται, καὶ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ μαινόμενος ἂν ἄλλο τι ἢ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν εἴποι ἂν αὐτόν.

*An Epicurean Criticizes a Stoic
Interpretation of Prodicus (R8)*

R8 (< B5) Philodemus, *On Piety*

It is manifest that Persaeus really <is suppressing> or <abolishing> the divinity or that he knows nothing about this subject, when he says in his *On the Gods* that what <Prodicus> wrote [. . .] does not seem <implau>sible [. . .].

*Criticisms of Prodicus' Views
on Language (R9–R10)*

R9 (< B4) Galen, *On the Natural Faculties*

[. . .] But what everyone calls 'phlegm,' something white in color that Prodicus calls 'mucosity' (*blenna*), is that cold and moist humor that accumulates mostly in old people and in those who have undergone cooling in some way or another, and no one is so crazy as to say that it is anything other than cold and moist.

R10 (< A19) Alex. In Top., p. 181.2–6

Πρόδικος δὲ ἐπειρᾶτο ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἴδιόν τι σημαίνόμενον ὑποτάσσειν, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς [. . .]. νομοθετούντων δέ ἐστι τοῦτο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς λεγόντων.

*Criticisms of Prodicus' Views
on the Gods (R11–R13)*

R11 (B5) Cic. Nat. deor. 1.37.118

quid? Prodicus Cius, qui ea quae prodessent hominum vitae deorum in numero habita esse dixit, quam tandem religionem reliquit?

R12 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math.

a (B5) 9.51

μη εἶναι δὲ οἱ ἐπικληθέντες ἄθεοι, καθάπερ Εὐήμερος [. . .] καὶ Διαγόρας ὁ Μήλιος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος καὶ Θεόδωρος [. . .]

b (≠ DK) 9.39, 41

καὶ μὴν οἱ λέγοντες ὅτι πάντα τὰ τὸν βίον ὠφελούντα ὑπενόησαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν, ὡς ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην ποταμούς τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, σὺν τῷ ἀπιθάνον προίστασθαι δόξης ἔτι καὶ τὴν ἀνωτάτω εὐθήθειαν καταψηφίζονται τῶν ἀρχαίων.

R10 (< A19) Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Commentary on Aristotle's Topics*

Prodicus tried to assign to each of these terms [cf. **D6a**] its own meaning, like the Stoics [. . .]. But this is what lawgivers do, not those who not say anything sound.

*Criticisms of Prodicus' Views
on the Gods (R11–R13)*

R11 (B5) Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods*

[Velleius, an Epicurean:] What? Prodicus of Ceos, who said that the things that benefit human life have been counted among the gods—what religion then did he leave intact?

R12 Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Natural Philosophers*

a (B5)

That [scil. god] does not exist [scil. is what is asserted by] those called 'atheists,' like Euhemerus [. . .], Diagoras of Melos, Prodicus of Ceos, and Theodorus [. . .].

b (≠ DK)

And again: those people who say that ancient men supposed that all the things that benefit life are gods, like the sun, the moon, rivers, marshes, and things of this sort, not only put forward an implausible opinion but also condemn the ancients for the most extreme simplemindedness. For

οὐ γὰρ οὕτως εἰκὸς ἐκείνους ἄφρονας εἶναι ὥστε τὰ ὀφθαλμοφανῶς φθειρόμενα ὑπολαβεῖν¹ εἶναι θεοὺς ἢ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτῶν κατεσθιομένοις καὶ διαλυομένοις θεῖαν προσμαρτυρεῖν δύναμιν. [. . .] οὕτω γὰρ ἐχρήην καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας ἠγείσθαι θεοὺς, συνωφελοῦσι γὰρ ἡμῶν τὸν βίον, τῶν τε ἀλόγων ζῴων τὰ πολλά, συνεργοπονεῖ γὰρ ἡμῖν, τὰ τε κατ' οἰκίας² σκευή τε καὶ πᾶν εἶ τι τούτων ἐστὶ ταπεινότερον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε σφόδρα ἐστὶ γελοῖα· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκκειμένην δόξαν ῥητέον ὑγιῆ τυγχάνειν.

¹ ὑπολαβεῖν Bekker: προλαβεῖν mss.

² ζῴα post οἰκίας hab. mss, del. Bekker

R13 (*B5 Untersteiner) Epiphanius, *Pan.* 3.21

Πρόδικος τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα θεοὺς καλεῖ εἶτα ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων πᾶσι τὸ ζωτικὸν ἔλεγεν ὑπάρχειν.

A Misdirected Polemic? (R14)

R14 (≠ DK) Did. Caec. *Comm. in Eccl.* 1.8b (P. Tura III 16.11 = CPF Prodicus 3T [?])

[. . . = D14] παρ[άδοξ]ός τις γνώμη φέρεται Προδίκου ὅτι 'οὐκ ἔστιν [ἀν]τιλέγειν'. [πῶς] | λέγει τούτο; παρὰ τῆ[ν γν]ώμην καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῶν πάντων ἐστίν· πάντες γὰρ δι[αλέ]γονται ἀντιλέγουσι[ν κ]αὶ ἐν τοῖς βιωτικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς φρονουμένοις. |

it is not likely that they were so stupid as to suppose that things that with their own eyes they could see were perishable were gods, or to ascribe divine power to things that they themselves ate and annihilated. [. . .] For on this view they ought to have considered humans, and above all philosophers, to be gods (for they come to our aid in life), and also many irrational animals (for they work together with us), and household furnishings and everything else that is even more humble than these. But all of this is quite ridiculous; so that the view expounded here should not be said to be sound either.

R13 (≠ DK) Epiphanius, *Against Heresies*

Prodicus calls the four elements 'gods,' as well as the sun and the moon. For he says that it is from these that the vital force is given to all.

A Misdirected Polemic? (R14)

R14 (≠ DK) Didymus the Blind, *Commentary on Ecclesiastes*

[. . .] A paradoxical opinion of Prodicus is reported, viz. that "it is not possible to contradict."¹ What does he mean? This goes against the thought and opinion of everyone. For everyone discusses with people who contradict them, both in ordinary life and in intellectual matters.

¹ Cf. note on D14.

δογματικῶς [λέγει] | ἐκεῖνος ὅτι 'οὐκ ἔστιν ἀ[ντι]-
λέγειν'. εἰ γὰρ ἀντιλέγουσιν, ἀμφοτέροι λέγουσιν
ἀδύνατον [δέ] | ἔστιν ἀμφοτέρους [λέγει] γ' εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ
πρᾶγμα. λέγει γὰρ ὅτι μόνος ὁ ἀληθεύων καὶ ὡς ἔχ[ει]
τὰ | πράγματα ἀγγέλλων αὐτὰ οὗτος λέγει. ὁ δὲ
ἐνα[ν]τιούμενος αὐτῷ οὐ λέγει τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐκ α . . .
[?] | [παρά]δοξ[ος] [?] λέγεται ἢ γνώμη, ἐπεὶ παρὰ τῆν
τῶν πάντων δόξαν ἔστιν πάντες ἀντι[. . .] | . . . ἀντι-
λογίας.

It is in a dogmatic fashion that this man asserts that "it is not possible to contradict." For if one person contradicts another (*antilegein*), both of them are saying (*legein*) [scil. something]. But it is not possible for both of them to say [scil. what they say] with reference to the same thing. For he says that only that person who says the truth and proclaims how the things are says them, while the man who opposes him does not say the thing . . . this view is called 'paradoxical' (?), since it goes against the opinion of everyone: all . . . contradiction.

35. THRASYMACHUS (THRAS.)

The dates of Thrasymachus of Chalcedon are uncertain but he seems to have been active at Athens in the last third of the fifth century BC. He seems to have concentrated, more than the 'sophists' of earlier generations, on rhetorical technique, contributing especially refinements in word order and prose rhythm and in means for appealing to the emotions. Among the few surviving fragments of his writings, the proem for a (probably fictional) speech delivered in a political crisis is the longest and most important. As in the case of the other 'sophists,' our image of Thrasymachus has been profoundly influenced by Plato, in the present instance by his portrait of his person and by his representation of his views of justice (for which we possess an interesting original fragment, D17) in the first book of his *Republic*; given the difficulty of assessing how reliable this representation is, we include the definitions of justice attributed to him by Plato not in the main part of the section on Thrasymachus' doctrines, but in an appendix to it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

G. B. Kerferd. "The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic*," (1947/48) in J. Classen, ed. (see bibliography of the General Introduction to Chapters 31-42).

M. Vegetti. "Trasimaco," in M. Vegetti et al., *Platone, La Repubblica*, vol. 1 (Rome, 1998), pp. 233–56.

See also the titles listed in the General Introduction to Chapters 31–42.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

P

Origin and Relative Chronology (P1–P2)
Character (P3–P4)
A Report on His Death? (P5)
Epitaph (P6)

D

Thrasymachus' Writings: Reported Titles and Contents (D1–D6)
Thrasymachus' Place in the History of Rhetorical Technique (D7)
His Contributions (D8–D15)
 Style (D8–D9)
 Arrangement of Words (D10–D12)
 Emotions (D13)
 Delivery (D14–D15)
Fragments of Speeches (D16–D18)
 A Proem for a Speech in a Political Crisis (D16)
 A Fragment on Justice (D17)
 A Fragment from a Speech for the Larissians (D18)
Traces of Other Speeches (D19–D20)
Appendix: The Representation in Plato's Republic of Thrasymachus' Views on Justice (D21)

R

First Attestation (DRAM. T25)
Judgments on His Style (R1–R4)
Excerpted as a Model Orator (R5)
Plato's Judgment (R6–R7)
 On His Rhetorical Treatises (R6)
 On His View of Justice in the Republic (R7)
Thrasymachus' Continuing Attractiveness in a Pseudo-Platonic Dialogue (R8)
The Pernicious Influence of Thrasymachus' Demagogy? (R9)
An Epicurean Criticism: Uselessness of the Art of Rhetoric (R10)

THRASYMACHUS [85 DK]

P

Origin and Relative Chronology (P1–P2)

P1 (< A1) *Suda* Θ.462

Θρασύμαχος Χαλκηδόνιος σοφιστής τῆς ἐν Βιθυνία Χαλκηδόνος [. . .].

P2 (< A3) Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 6

[. . .] καὶ γὰρ τοῖς χρόνοις οὗτος ἐκείνου προέχειν ἔμουγε δοκεῖ (λέγω δ' ὡς ἐν ἀκμῇ κοινῇ βίου γενομένων ἀμφοῖν) [. . .].

Character (P3–P4)

P3 (A10) Plat. *Rep.* 1 336b–c

[ΣΩ.] καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγομένων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ἄρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκωλύετο βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον· ὡς δὲ διεπανασάμεθα

THRASYMACHUS

P

Origin and Relative Chronology (P1–P2)

P1 (< A1) *Suda*

Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, sophist, from the Chalcedon in Bithynia [. . .].

P2 (< A3) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Lysias*

[. . .] For the latter [i.e. Lysias] seems to me to be chronologically earlier than the former [i.e. Thrasymachus], I mean with reference to the time when they were both in their full maturity [. . .].

Character (P3–P4)

P3 (A10) Plato, *Republic*

[Socrates:] And a number of times Thrasymachus tried to interrupt us, even in the middle of our discussions, and to seize the word himself, but then he was prevented by those sitting next to him, who wanted to listen to the conversation until the end. But when we paused and I said

καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐδέ τι ἠσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὡσπερ θηρίον ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς διαρπασόμενος. καὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὁ Πολέμαρχος δείσαντες διεπτοήθημεν ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγγόμενος, "τίς," ἔφη, "ὑμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες [. . .]";

P4 (A6) Arist. *Rhet.* 2.23 1400b18–20

[. . .] ὡς [. . .] καὶ Ἡρόδικος¹ Θρασύμαχον "ἀεὶ θρασύμαχος εἶ."

¹ Ἡρόδικος Spengel: ἠρόδικος ὁ <Σηλυμβριανὸς> prop. Diels

A Report on His Death? (P5)

P5 (A7)

a Juv. *Sat.* 7.203–4

paenituit multos vanae sterilisque cathedrae
sicut Tharsymachi probat exitus [. . .].

704 tharsimachi P: ts S: thresimachi Φ: lisimachi FH: *versum*
om. T

b Schol. in Juv. 7.204

rhetoris apud Athenas qui suspensio perit.

this [i.e. "What else might justice be?" as the first answer had failed], he was no longer capable of remaining quiet but gathered himself up like a wild animal and rushed upon us as though he were going to tear us to pieces. Polemarchus and I were all aflutter with fear. But he cried out in front of everyone, "What nonsense has possessed you, Socrates, since a little while ago [. . .]?"

P4 (A6) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

[. . .] and as Herodicus¹ [scil. addressed] Thrasymachus: "You are always reckless (*thrasý-*) in battle (*-makhos*)."

¹ Perhaps Herodicus of Selymbria (or of Megara), the physician and trainer mentioned by Plato at *Protagoras* 316d–e.

A Report on His Death? (P5)

P5 (A7)

a Juvenal, *Satires*

Many have regretted their vain and barren
professorship,
As the death of Thrasymachus (?) proves [. . .].¹

¹ The name is corrupted in the manuscripts; one manuscript gives a name close to Thrasymachus' (which is metrically impossible).

b Scholia on Juvenal's *Satires*

An orator in Athens, who died by hanging himself.¹

¹ An isolated report, and doubtless imaginary, if indeed it refers to the same person.

*Epitaph (P6)***P6** (A8) Athen. *Deipn.* 10 454F

Νεοπτόλεμος δὲ ὁ Παριανὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐπιγραμμάτων ἐν Χαλκηδόνι φησὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ μνήματος ἐπιγεγράφθαι τὸδε τὸ ἐπίγραμμα·

τοῦνομα θήτα ρῶ ἄλφα σὰν ὄ μὴ ἄλφα χεῖ οὐ
σάν,

πατρὶς Χαλκηδών· ἡ δὲ τέχνη σοφίη.

*Epitaph (P6)***P6** (A8) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

Neoptolemus of Paros says in his *On Epitaphs* that the following epitaph is inscribed on the tomb of the sophist Thrasymachus in Chalcedon:

Name: Theta, rho, alpha, sigma, upsilon, mu, alpha, khi, omicron, sigma;

Fatherland: Chalcedon. Profession: wisdom (*sophiē*).

THRASYMACHUS [85 DK]

D

Thrasymachus' Writings: Reported Titles and Contents (D1–D6)

D1 (< A13) Dion. Hal. *Isaeus* 20

[. . . = **D8, R2**] πᾶς δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τεχνογραφικοῖς
καὶ ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, δικανικοῖς δέ¹ οὐκ ἀπολέλοιπε λό-
γους [. . .].

¹ post δὲ hab. mss. ἢ συμβουλευτικοῖς, del. Schwartz

D2 (< A1) *Suda* Θ.462

Θρασύμαχος [. . .] ἔγραψε Συμβουλευτικούς, Τέχνην
ῥητορικὴν, Παίγνια, Ἀφορμὰς ῥητορικάς.

D3 (B3) Schol. in Aristoph. *Av.* 880

τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς Θεοπόμπου καὶ Θρασύμαχος φησιν ἐν
τῇ Μεγάλῃ τέχνῃ.

THRASYMACHUS

D

Thrasymachus' Writings: Reported Titles and Contents (D1–D6)

D1 (< A13) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Isaeus*

[. . .] he [i.e. Thrasymachus] is exclusively concerned with
technical manuals and oratorical displays, and he has not
left behind any judicial speeches [. . .].

D2 (< A1) *Suda*

Thrasymachus [. . .] wrote *Deliberative Speeches*, a *Technical Manual of Rhetoric*, *Amusements*, *Rhetorical Starting Points*.

D3 (B3) Scholia on Aristophanes' *Birds*

Thrasymachus too in his *Large Technical Manual* says the
same thing as Theopompus.¹

¹ Scil. that the Athenians had included the citizens of Chios
in their prayers at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

D4 (> A9) Cic. *De orat.* 3.32.128

quid de Prodicō Ceo, de Thrasymachō Chalcedonio, de Protagora Abderita loquar? quorum unus quisque plurimum temporibus illis etiam de natura rerum et disseruit et scripsit?

D5 (< B7) Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 1.2.3 616D

[. . .] δέι καθάπερ ὑπόθεσιν μελετῶντα συγκριτικὴν τοὺς Ἀριστοτέλους Τόπους ἢ τοὺς Θρασύμαχου Ὑπερβάλλοντας ἔχειν προχείρους [. . .].

D6 (< B5) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.1 1404a14–15

[. . .] Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλέοις.

*Thrasymachus' Place in the History
of Rhetorical Technique (D7)*

D7 (A2) Arist. *SE* 34 183b29–33

οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἷον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως ἠξήκασι, Τεισίας μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, Θρασύμαχος δὲ μετὰ Τεισίαν, Θεόδωρος δὲ μετὰ τούτου καὶ πολλοὶ πολλὰ συνενηνόχασι μέρη.

D4 (> A9) Cicero, *On the Orator*

What should I say [scil. about the ability of the ancient orators to speak about any subject] regarding Prodicus of Ceos, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Protagoras of Abdera, each of whom at that time both spoke and wrote a lot even about nature? [= **PROT. D6**; **PROD. D2**].

D5 (< B7) Plutarch, *Table Talk*

[. . .] one ought [scil. when one makes the mistake of trying to arrange one's guests] as though one were practicing a comparative argument (*hypothesin sunkritikên*), to have Aristotle's *Topics* or Thrasymachus' *Overpowering Ones* [scil. *Arguments*] to hand [. . .].

D6 (< B5) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

[. . .] Thrasymachus in his *Expressions of Pity (Eleot)* [cf. **D14**].

*Thrasymachus' Place in the History
of Rhetorical Technique (D7)*

D7 (A2) Aristotle, *Sophistic Refutations*

Those who are celebrated now inherited it [i.e. rhetorical technique] from numerous predecessors who developed it one part after another, as it were in succession, and made it increase in this way: Tisias after the very first ones, Thrasymachus after Tisias, Theodorus after him, and many other men contributed many parts.

His Contributions (D8–D15)
Style (D8–D9)

D8 (< A13) Dion. Hal. *Isaeus* 20

τῶν δὲ τοὺς ἀκριβεῖς προαιρουμένων λόγους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐναγώνιον ἀσκούντων ῥητορικὴν, ὧν ἐγένετο Ἀντιφῶν τε ὁ Ῥαμνούσιος καὶ Θρασύμαχος ὁ Καλχηδόνιος καὶ Πολυκράτης ὁ Ἀθηναῖος Κριτίας τε ὁ τῶν τριάκοντα ἄρξας καὶ Ζώϊλος ὁ τὰς καθ' Ὀμήρου συντάξεις καταλιπών [. . . = **R2**, **D1**].

D9 (< B1) Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 3

τρίτῃ λέξεως <ιδέα>¹ ἦν ἡ μεικτὴ τε καὶ σύνθετος ἐκ τούτων τῶν δυῶν, ἣν ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἀρμοσάμενος καὶ καταστήσας εἰς τὸν νῦν ὑπάρχοντα κόσμον εἶτε Θρασύμαχος ὁ Καλχηδόνιος ἦν, ὡς οἶεται Θεόφραστος [Frag. 685 FHS&G], εἶτε ἄλλος τις, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν [. . . = **R4**].

¹ λέξεως <ιδέα> Sylburg; λέξις Diels

Arrangement of Words (D10–D12)

D10 (< A12) Cic. *Orat.* 13.40

[. . . cf. **R1**] Thrasymachus [. . .] et Gorgias, qui tamen primi traduntur arte quadam verba vinxisse [. . .].

vinxisse *mss.* *quidam*: iunxisse *cett.*

His Contributions (D8–D15)
Style (D8–D9)

D8 (< A13) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Isaeus*

Among those who prefer precision in speeches and who cultivate combative (*enagōnios*) rhetoric, including Antiphon of Rhamnus, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Polycrates of Athens, Critias, who was the leader of the Thirty, and Zoilus, who left behind treatises against Homer [. . .].

D9 (< B1) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Demosthenes*

The third <form of> style was the one that was mixed and composed out of these two other ones [i.e. the austere style and the simple style]. The first man to fit it together and to establish the arrangement it has today was either Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, as Theophrastus thinks, or someone else, I do not know who [. . .].

Arrangement of Words (D10–D12)

D10 (< A12) Cicero, *The Orator*

[. . .] Thrasymachus [. . .] and Gorgias, who nevertheless are reported to have been the first men to have bound words together by some kind of art [. . .].

D11 (< A1) *Suda* Θ.462

Θρασύμαχος [. . .] ὃς πρῶτος περίοδον καὶ κῶλον κατέδειξε καὶ τὸν νῦν τῆς ῥητορικῆς τρόπον εἰσηγήσατο [. . .].

D12 (A11) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.8 1409a1–3

λείπεται δὲ παιάν, ᾧ ἐχρῶντο μὲν ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξάμενοι, οὐκ εἶχον δὲ λέγειν τίς ἦν.

*Emotions (D13)***D13****a** (B6) Plat. *Phaedr.* 267c

τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογῶων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἐλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέαι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος. “ὀργίσαι” τε αὖ “πολλοὺς” ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν “ὀργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν,” ὡς ἔφη διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὅθεν δὴ κράτιστος.

b (> B6) Herm. *In Phaedr.* 267c, p. 251.18–22

ὁ γὰρ Χαλκηδόνιος, τουτέστιν ὁ Θρασύμαχος, ταῦτα ἐδίδαξεν, ὡς δεῖ εἰς οἰκτον ἐγείρει τὸν δικαστὴν καὶ

D11 (< A1) *Suda*

Thrasymachus [. . .], who was the first person to discover the periodic sentence and the phrase and to introduce the current mode of rhetoric [. . .].

D12 (A11) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

There remains [scil. among the rhythms to which prose could on principle have recourse] the paeon, which they [i.e. orators] began to use starting with Thrasymachus, although they were not able to define what it consists in.

See also **CORG. D19a**

*Emotions (D13)***D13****a** (B6) Plato, *Phaedrus*

The might of the Chalcedonian seems to me to have prevailed by his art of plaintive speeches drawn to the subjects of old age and poverty. At the same time, this man has become expert at “**making the crowd angry**” and inversely “**beguiling them with incantations when they have become angry**,” as he says; and he is the best at slandering and at quashing slanders in one way or another.

b (> B6) Hermias, *Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus*

The Chalcedonian, i.e. Thrasymachus, taught how one must arouse the judge's compassion and secure his pity:

ἐπισπᾶσθαι ἔλεον, γήρας, πείναν, τέκνα ἀποδουρό-
μενα¹ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.—σθένος δὲ εἶπεν, ἢ πρὸς τὴν δύ-
ναμιν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ² ἀποτευνόμενος ἤγουν ἐπειδὴ
ἔγραψεν ἐν λόγῳ ἑαυτοῦ τοιοῦτόν τι, ὅτι [. . . = D17].

¹ ἀποδουρόμενον conit. Diels ut. vid. ² αὐτοῦ Lucarini:
αὐτὰ mss. plerique

Delivery (D14–D15)

D14 (B5) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.1 1404 a13

ἐγκεχειρήκασι δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινας,
οἶον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλείοις.

D15 (*A15 Untersteiner) Quintil. *Inst. or.* 3.3.4

[. . .] Thrasymachus quoque idem de actione crediderit.

Fragments of Speeches (D16–D18)

A Proem for a Speech in a Political Crisis (D16)

D16 (< B1) Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 3

[. . . = D9, R4] ἐβουλόμην μὲν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μετα-
σχεῖν ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου τοῦ παλαιοῦ καὶ τῶν
πραγμάτων,¹ ἤνίκα σιωπᾶν ἀπέχρη τοῖς νεωτέροισι,
τῶν τε πραγμάτων οὐκ ἀναγκαζόντων ἀγορεύειν καὶ
τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ὀρθῶς τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτροπευόντων

¹ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων secl. Sauppe

age, poverty, plaintive children, and things like that.—And he says “the might” either because he is referring to the impetuosity of his discourse or else because in one of his speeches he has written the following: [. . .].

Delivery (D14–D15)

D14 (B5) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

Some have tried to speak a bit about this [i.e. delivery], like Thrasymachus in his *Expressions of Pity (Eleoi)*.

D15 (≠ DK) Quintilian, *Training in Oratory*

[. . .] Thrasymachus too held the same view about delivery [scil. that it derives from nature, not art].

Fragments of Speeches (D16–D18)

A Proem for a Speech in a Political Crisis (D16)¹

¹ The date of composition is generally thought to be between 411/10 and 404/3, in relation with the lively debate on the constitution that followed the Sicilian expedition. This may have been a commission to Thrasymachus by an Athenian citizen or a specimen of deliberative oratory.

D16 (< B1) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Demosthenes*

[. . .] **I wish, Athenians, that I could have belonged to that ancient time and had a share in its actions, when for the young it was enough to be silent, since its actions did not oblige them to speak publicly, and their elders were managing the city correctly. But**

ἐπειδὴ δ' εἰς τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς ἀνέθετο χρόνον ὁ δαίμων, ὥστε <ἐτέρων μὲν ἀρχόντων>² τῆς πόλεως ἀκούειν, τὰς δὲ συμφορὰς <πάσχειν>³ αὐτούς, καὶ τούτων τὰ μέγιστα μὴ θεῶν ἔργα εἶναι μηδὲ τῆς τύχης ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπιμεληθέντων, ἀνάγκη δὴ⁴ λέγειν· ἢ γὰρ ἀναίσθητος ἢ καρτερώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ἕξαμαρτάνειν ἑαυτὸν ἔτι παρέξει τοῖς βουλομένοις καὶ τῆς ἐτέρων ἐπιβουλῆς τε καὶ κακίας αὐτὸς ὑποσχήσει τὰς αἰτίας.

ἄλλο γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ παρελθὼν χρόνος καὶ⁵ ἀντὶ μὲν εἰρήνης ἐν πολέμῳ γενέσθαι καὶ διὰ κινδύνων⁶ εἰς τὸνδε τὸν χρόνον, τὴν μὲν παρελθοῦσαν ἡμέραν ἀγαπῶσι, τὴν δ' ἐπιούσαν δεδιώσι, ἀντὶ δ' ὁμοιοῖας εἰς ἔχθραν καὶ ταραχὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀφικέσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑβρίζειν τε ποιεῖ καὶ στασιάζειν, ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐσωφρονούμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς ἐμάνημεν, ἃ τοὺς ἄλλους σωφρονίζειν εἴωθεν. τί δῆτα μέλλοις ἂν <ἂ> γινώσκει εἰπεῖν, ὅτω γε <γέγονε>⁸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς παρούσι καὶ νομίζειν ἔχειν τι τοιοῦτον, ὡς μηδὲν ἔτι τοιοῦτον ἔσται;

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς διαφερομένους πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδείξω γ' ἐν τῷ λέγειν⁹ πεπονθότας πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅπερ ἀνά-

^{2,3} suppl. Diels

⁴ δὲ mss., corr. Sylburg

⁵ καὶ del. Sauppe

⁶ κινδύνων <ἐλθεῖν> Diels

⁷ <ἂ>

γινώσκει Diels: γινώσκειν mss.

⁸ <γέγονε> Diels

since the divinity has placed us in a time in which we give ear to <other people who rule> the city, while we ourselves <suffer> misfortunes—and of these the worst ones are the doings neither of the gods nor of fate, but of the men in charge—it is necessary to speak. For someone would have to be unfeeling or entirely uncomplaining, to still be willing to submit himself to men who wish to do wrong and to bear the responsibility himself for other men's conspiracy and wickedness.

Enough for us the time that has passed, and to be not at peace but at war and in dangers until the present moment—for us who desire the day that has passed but fear the day that is coming—and to arrive not at concord but instead at hatred and troubles with one another. As for other men, the magnitude of the goods that are theirs leads them to commit acts of wanton outrage and of civil strife, while we ourselves remained temperate while we possessed our goods, but have gone mad in the evils that customarily make other men temperate. Why then would one hesitate to say <what> he knows, someone for whom <it has come about> to feel grief for the present circumstances and who thinks he possesses a means such that he can put a definitive end to this sort of situation?

First then, I shall demonstrate that the discords of men—whether orators or other people—with each other are the result of their suffering from each

⁹ γ' ἐν τῷ λέγειν Diels: γε προλέγων mss.

γκη τοὺς ἄνευ γνώμης φιλονικούντας πάσχειν· οἰόμενοι γὰρ ἐναντία λέγειν ἀλλήλοις, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τὰ αὐτὰ πράττοντες οὐδὲ τὸν τῶν ἐτέρων λόγον ἐν τῷ σφετέρῳ¹⁰ λόγῳ ἐνόντα. σκέψασθε γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἃ ζητοῦσιν ἐκάτεροι. πρῶτον μὲν ἢ πατριος πολιτεία ταραχὴν αὐτοῖς παρέχει ῥάστη¹¹ γνωσθῆναι καὶ κοινοτάτη τοῖς πολίταις οὖσα πᾶσιν. ὅποσα μὲν οὖν ἐπέκεινα¹² τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώμης¹³ ἐστίν, ἀκούειν ἀνάγκη λόγων¹⁴ τῶν παλαιότερων, ὅποσα δ' αὐτοῖ ἐπίειδον οἱ πρεσβύτεροι, ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τῶν εἰδόντων πυνθάνεσθαι . . .

¹⁰ σφετέρῳ Cobet: ἐτέρῳ mss.

¹¹ ῥάστη Sylburg: ῥάστην mss.

¹² ἐπέκεινα Reiske: ἐκείνων mss.

¹³ γνώμης] μνήμης Sauppe

¹⁴ λόγων Diels: λέγειν mss.

A Fragment on Justice (D17)

D17 (B8) Herm. *In Phaedr.* 267c, pp. 251.22–252.2

[. . . = **D13b**] οἱ θεοὶ οὐχ ὀρώσι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθῶν παρεῖδον, τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ὀρώμεν γὰρ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ταύτη μὴ χρωμένους.

other in their discourses what men who contend for victory without judgment necessarily suffer. For they suppose that they are saying things contrary to each other but they do not notice that they are doing the very same things and that what the others say is present in what they themselves say. For consider from the beginning what both sides are looking for. First, the constitution of our fathers causes them trouble, easy as it is to know and shared as it is in common by all the citizens. So for everything that is beyond our own judgment, it is necessary to listen to what the older men say, and for everything that the older ones saw themselves, [scil. it is necessary] to find out from those who know . . .

A Fragment on Justice (D17)

D17 (B8) Hermias, *Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus*

[. . .] the gods do not notice human affairs: for otherwise they would not have failed to take notice of what is the greatest good for humans, justice. For we see that humans do not practice this.

*A Fragment from a Speech
for the Larissians (D18)*

D18 (B2) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6.16.6

Θρασύμαχος ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ Λαρισαίων λέγει: “Ἀρχελάω δουλεύσομεν Ἕλληνες ὄντες βαρβάρῳ”;

Traces of Other Speeches (D19–D20)

D19 (B4) Athen. *Deipn.* 10 416A

Θρασύμαχος δ' ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος ἐν τινι τῶν προομιῶν τὸν Τιμοκρέοντά φησιν ὡς μέγαν βασιλέα ἀφικόμενον καὶ ξενιζόμενον παρ' αὐτῷ πολλὰ ἐμφορεῖσθαι. πυθόμενον δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως ὃ τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἐργάζοιτο, εἶπε Περσῶν ἀναριθμήτους συγκόψειν. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραία πολλοὺς καθ' ἓνα νικήσας μετὰ τοῦτο ἐχειρονόμησε. πυνθανόμενον δὲ τὴν πρόφασιν ὑπολείπεσθαι¹ ἔφη τοσαύτας, εἰ προσίοι τις, πληγᾶς.

¹ ἀπολείπεσθαι mss., corr. Sauppe.

D20 (A5) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.11 1413a5–9

ἔστι γὰρ [. . .] καὶ τὸν Νικήρατον φάναι Φιλοκτήτην εἶναι δεδηγμένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος, ὥσπερ εἴκασε Θρασύμαχος ἰδὼν τὸν Νικήρατον ἡττημένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος ραιψωδοῦντα, κομῶντα δὲ καὶ αὐχμηρὸν ἔτι.

*A Fragment from a Speech
for the Larissians (D18)*

D18 (B2) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*

Thrasymachus says in his *For the Larissians*, “**Shall we, who are Greeks, be slaves to Archelaus,¹ who is a barbarian?**”

¹ King of Macedon from 413 to 399.

Traces of Other Speeches (D19–D20)

D19 (B4) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

Thrasymachus of Chalcedon says in one of his proems that Timocreon, who was visiting the Great King [scil. of Persia] and enjoying his hospitality, had eaten an enormous amount. When the king asked him what he was going to accomplish after this, he answered that he would beat up more Persians than could be counted. And the next day, after he had gained victory over a large number of opponents one after another, he started to practice shadowboxing. When he was asked why, he replied that this was the number of blows he had left over if anyone challenged him.

D20 (A5) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

For it is possible [scil. in order to produce a good comparison, based on a metaphor] [. . .] to say that Niceratus is a Philoctetes bitten by Pratyas, as in Thrasymachus' comparison, when he saw Niceratus defeated by Pratyas in a rhapsodic competition, still grimy and with his hair loosened.

*Appendix: the Representation in Plato's Republic
of Thrasymachus' Views on Justice (D21)***D21** Plat. *Rep.* 1**a** (B6a) 338c

[ΘΡ.] φημί γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον.

b (≠ DK) 339b

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δίκαιον φῆς εἶναι;

[ΘΡ.] ἔγωγε.

c (*A10 Untersteiner) 343c–d

[ΘΡ.] καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἰ περί τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδικίας, ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι ἢ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ἢ δὲ ἀδικία τούναντίον, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐνηθικῶν τε καὶ δικαίων, οἱ δ' ἄρχόμενοι ποιοῦσιν τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαιμόνα ἐκείνου ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες αὐτῷ, ἕαντους δὲ οὐδ' ὀπωσιοῦν.

*Appendix: the Representation in Plato's Republic
of Thrasymachus' Views on Justice (D21)***D21** Plato, *Republic***a** (B6a)

[Thrasymachus:] As for me, I maintain that justice is nothing else than what is advantageous for the person who is stronger.

b (≠ DK)

[Socrates:] [. . .] Do you not also say that justice is to obey the rulers?

[Thrasymachus:] Yes I do.

c (≠ DK)

[Thrasymachus:] You [i.e. Socrates] are so far away from knowing about what is just and justice, and what is unjust and injustice, that you do not know that justice and what is just are in reality what is good for someone else, what is advantageous for the stronger person and the ruler, but is to his own detriment for the person who obeys and serves; and that injustice is the opposite, and that it imposes its power on those men who are truly simpleminded and just, and that those people who are ruled do what is advantageous for that man who is stronger, and make him happy by serving him, but do not do the same thing for themselves in any way whatsoever.

THRASYMACHUS [85 DK]

R

First Attestation

See **DRAM. T25**

Judgments on His Style (R1–R4)

R1 (< A12) Cic. *Orat.* 13.40

[. . .] cum concisus ei Thrasymachus minutis numeris videretur et Gorgias [. . . = **D10**].

R2 (< A13) Dion. Hal. *Isaeus* 20

[. . . = **D8**] Θρασύμαχος δὲ καθαρὸς μὲν καὶ λεπτὸς καὶ δεινὸς εὐρεῖν τε καὶ εἰπεῖν στρογγύλως καὶ περιτῶς ὃ βούλεται [. . . = **D1**].

R3 (< A3) Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 6

μετὰ ταύτας ἀρετὴν εὐρίσκω παρὰ Λυσία πάνυ θαυμαστήν, ἧς Θεόφραστος [Frag. 695 FSH&G] μὲν φησιν ἄρξαι Θρασύμαχον, ἐγὼ δ' ἠγοῦμαι Λυσίαν [. . .

THRASYMACHUS

R

First Attestation

See **DRAM. T25**

Judgments on His Style (R1–R4)

R1 (< A12) Cicero, *The Orator*

[. . .] As Thrasymachus seemed to him [i.e. Isocrates] to be fragmented into tiny phrases, just like Gorgias [. . .].

R2 (< A13) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Isaeus*

[. . .] Thrasymachus is pure, subtle, excellent at inventing and expressing what he means in a compact and refined way [. . .].

R3 (< A3) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Lysias*

After these [scil. the virtues of pure Atticism, viz. literal language, clarity, and brevity], I find one virtue in Lysias that is thoroughly admirable, of which Theophrastus says

= P2] τίς δ' ἐστὶν ἣν φημι ἀρετήν; ἡ συστρέφουσα τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρουσα λέξις, οἰκεία πάνν καὶ ἀναγκαία τοῖς δικανικοῖς λόγοις καὶ παντὶ ἀληθεῖ ἀγῶνι.

R4 (< B1) Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 3

[. . . = D9] ἡ μὲν οὖν Θρασυμάχου λέξις, εἰ δὴ¹ πηγῆ² τις ἦν ὄντως τῆς μεσότητος, αὐτὴν τὴν προαίρεσιν ἔοικεν ἔχειν σπουδῆς ἀξίαν· κέκραται γὰρ εὖ πως καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χρήσιμον εἰληφεν ἐκατέρας. δυνάμει δὲ ὡς³ οὐκ ἴση <τῆ>⁴ βουλήσει κέχρηται, παράδειγμα ἕξ ἐνὸς τῶν δημηγορικῶν λόγων τόδε· [. . . = D16] τοιαύτη μὲν οὖν τις ἡ Θρασυμάχειος ἐρμηνεία, μέση τοῖν δυεῖν καὶ εὐκρατος καὶ εἰς <ἀμφο>τέρους⁵ τοὺς χαρακτῆρας ἐπίκαιρον ἀφετήριον.

¹ εἰ δὴ Schenkl: ἡ mss. ² πηγῆ Sadaeus: λουπή mss.

³ δυνάμει δὲ ὡς Sauppe: δυναμέως· ὡς δὲ mss.

⁴ <τῆ> Reiske ⁵ <ἀμφο>τέρους Sylburg: lac. praeb. mss.

Excerpted as a Model Orator (R5)

R5 (A14) *Suda* O.835

Οὐρηστίνος, Ἰούλιος [. . .] Ἐκλογὴν ὀνομάτων ἐκ τῶν Δημοσθένους βιβλίων, Ἐκλογὴν ἐκ τῶν Θουκυδίδου, Ἰσαίου, Ἰσοκράτους καὶ Θρασυμάχου τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ῥητόρων.

that it was Thrasymachus who initiated it, but I myself think it was Lysias [. . .]. What is the virtue I am speaking about? A style that concentrates thoughts and expresses them compactly, one that is entirely appropriate and necessary for judicial speeches and for every true combat.

R4 (< B1) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Demosthenes*

[. . .] Thrasymachus' style, then, if it really was, as it were, a source of the middle kind of style, seems to correspond to an intention that is worthy of attention. For in a certain way it is a felicitous blending and has taken from each of the other two [scil. the lofty style and the plain style] what is really useful in it. And yet as proof that his ability is not the equal of his intention, here is an example drawn from one of his public speeches: [. . . = D16]. This, then is Thrasymachus' mode of expression, located in the middle between the two other ones, felicitously blended, and supplying an opportune starting point for moving toward either of the other two kinds of style.

Excerpted as a Model Orator (R5)

R5 (A14) *Suda*

Vestinus Julius [scil. composed] [. . .] an *Anthology* of words from the works of Demosthenes, an *Anthology* of texts from Thucydides, Iseaeus, Isocrates, Thrasymachus the orator, and the other orators.

Plato's Judgment (R6–R7)
On His Rhetorical Treatises (R6)

R6 Plat. *Phaedr.*

a (< *A12b Untersteiner) 269d

[ΣΩ.] ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ ἢ Λυσίας τε καὶ Θρασύμαχος πορεύεται δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μέθοδος.

b (> *A12a Untersteiner) 271a

[ΣΩ.] δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ ὁς ἂν ἄλλος σπουδῇ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῶ, πρῶτον πάσῃ ἀκριβεῖα γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἐν καὶ ὁμοιον πέφυκεν ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές [. . .].

On His View of Justice in the Republic (R7)

R7 (*A10 Untersteiner) Plat. *Rep.*

a 1 348b–349a

[ΣΩ.] ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀποκρίναι ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. τὴν τελείαν ἀδικίαν τελέας οὐσης δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φῆς εἶναι;

[ΘΡ.] πάνν μὲν οὖν καὶ φημί, ἔφη, καὶ δι' ἃ, εἴρηκα.

[ΣΩ.] φέρε δὴ, τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; τὸ μὲν που ἀρετὴν αὐτοῖν καλεῖς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν;

Plato's Judgment (R6–R7)
On His Rhetorical Treatises (R6)

R6 (≠ DK) Plato, *Phaedrus*

a

[Socrates:] Now, for what concerns this art [i.e. rhetoric], the path on which Lysias and Thrasymachus are proceeding does not seem to me to reveal the correct method [i.e. 'the method of Hippocrates,' by virtue of which the good rhetorician must know the nature of everything].

b

[Socrates:] So it is clear that Thrasymachus and anyone else who would seriously teach the art of rhetoric will first depict the soul with the greatest possible precision and will make us see whether it is one and homogeneous by nature, or multiform, like a bodily shape [. . .].

See also **CORG. D52**

On His View of Justice in the Republic (R7)

R7 (≠ DK)

a An argument of Socrates in Book I

[Socrates:] Come then, Thrasymachus, I said, go back to the beginning and answer us. You say that perfect injustice is more profitable than perfect justice?

[Thrasymachus:] That is indeed what I say, he said, and I have explained why.

[Soc.:] Well, what do you say about this to a question like the following one: surely you call one of these two things a virtue and the other a vice?

[ΘΡ.] πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

[ΣΩ.] οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν;

[ΘΡ.] εἰκός γ', ἔφη, ὧ ἤδιστε, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' οὐ.

[ΣΩ.] ἀλλὰ τί μήν;

[ΘΡ.] τούναντίον, ἦ δ' ὅς.

[ΣΩ.] ἦ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν;

[ΘΡ.] οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πάνν γενναίαν εὐθέριαν.

[ΣΩ.] τὴν ἀδικίαν ἄρα κακοήθειαν καλεῖς;

[ΘΡ.] οὐκ, ἀλλ' εὐβουλίαν, ἔφη.

[ΣΩ.] ἦ καὶ φρόνιμοί σοι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι;

[ΘΡ.] οἷ γε τελέως, ἔφη, οἰοί τε ἀδικεῖν, πόλεις τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. σὺ δὲ οἶε με ἴσως τοὺς τὰ βαλλάντια ἀποτέμνοντας λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάνπερ λαυθάνῃ. ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἄξια λόγου, ἀλλ' ἂ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον.

[ΣΩ.] τοῦτο μὲν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀγνοῶ δὲ βούλει λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐθαύμασα, εἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας τιθεῖς μέρει τὴν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις.

[ΘΡ.] ἀλλὰ πάνν οὕτω τίθημι.

[ΣΩ.] τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἤδη στερεώτερον, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ οὐκέτι ῥάδιον ἔχειν ὅτι τις εἶπη. εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι ἦ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὠμολόγεις εἶναι ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τιμές, εἵχομεν ἄν

[Thras.:] How could one not?

[Soc.:] Do you call justice a virtue and injustice a vice?

[Thras.:] That is very likely, he said, my dear friend, given that I say that injustice is profitable and justice is not!

[Soc.:] But then, what is it you say?

[Thras.:] The opposite, he said.

[Soc.:] That justice is a vice?

[Thras.:] No, but certainly a noble simplemindedness.

[Soc.:] Then you call injustice a wickedness of character?

[Thras.:] No, but good judgment, he said.

[Soc.:] And do unjust men seem to you, Thrasymachus, to be wise and good?

[Thras.:] Yes, he said, those ones that are able to be perfectly unjust, who are able to subject the cities and races of men to themselves. Perhaps you think that I am speaking about pickpockets? That too is something profitable, he said, like other things of that sort, if one escapes notice. But these are not worth talking about, but only the one about which I have spoken just now.

[Soc.:] I do not fail to grasp what you mean, I said, but I was astonished by this one point, that you include injustice within virtue and wisdom, and justice within their contraries.

[Thras.:] But that is just what I do.

[Soc.:] This, I said, is already harder, my friend, and it is not easy to see what one ought to say at this point. For if you maintained that injustice is profitable, but agreed that it is a vice and shameful, like some other people, we would

τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες· ἡν δὲ δῆλος εἶ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα αὐτῷ πάντα προσθήσεις ἃ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφία ἐτόλμησας θείναι.

[ΘΡ.] ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, μαντεύη.

b 2 358b–c

[ΓΛ.] [. . .] Θρασύμαχος γάρ μοι φαίνεται πρῶαιτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφεις κληθῆναι, [. . .]. ἐπανανεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναι φασιν καὶ ὅθεν γεγενῆσθαι, δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκουτες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τρίτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσιν πολλὴ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ τι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρλημένος τὰ ὦτα, ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον, ὡς ἄμεινον ἀδικίας, οὐδενός πω ἀκῆκοα ὡς βούλομαι [. . .].

*Thrasymachus' Continuing Attractiveness
in a Pseudo-Platonic Dialogue (R8)*

R8 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plat. *Clit.* 410c

[ΚΛ.] ταῦτόν δῆ καὶ σοὶ τις ἐπενέγκοι τάχ' ἂν περὶ

have something to reply, invoking accepted opinions. But as it is, it is clear that you will say that it is fine and strong and will apply to it all the other attributes that I was applying to justice, given that you have the audacity to include injustice together with virtue and wisdom.

[Thras.:] Your prophecy is entirely true, he said.

b The revival of Thrasymachus' argument at the beginning of Book 2

[Glauc.:] [. . .] For Thrasymachus seems to me to have been charmed by you too soon, like a snake [. . .]. I shall revive Thrasymachus' argument, and first I shall state what kind of thing people say justice is and where it comes from, second I will argue that all the men who practice it do so unwillingly, as something that is necessary and not as something that is good, and third I will argue that it is for good reason that they do this. For the life of an unjust person is much better than that of a just one, as they say. It is not, Socrates, as though this were my own opinion. But my ears are deafened when I hear Thrasymachus and countless other people, and I am at a loss: I have not yet heard from anyone argue in favor of justice as I wish, showing that it is better than injustice [. . .].¹

¹ For other mentions of Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, cf. 5.450a, 6.498c, 8.545b.

*Thrasymachus' Continuing Attractiveness
in a Pseudo-Platonic Dialogue (R8)*

R8 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plato, *Clitophon*

[Clitophon:] Perhaps indeed one could make the same

δικαιοσύνης, ὡς οὐ μᾶλλον ὄντι δικαιοσύνης ἐπιστή-
μονι, διότι καλῶς αὐτὴν ἐγκωμιάζεις. οὐ μὴν τό γε
ἐμὸν οὕτως ἔχει· δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον, ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι σε ἢ
οὐκ ἐθέλειν αὐτῆς ἐμοὶ κοινωνεῖν. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ
πρὸς Θρασύμαχον οἶμαι πορεύσομαι καὶ ἄλλοσε
ἅποι¹ δύναμαι, ἀπορῶν.

¹ ὅποι Bekker: ὅπη mss.

*The Pernicious Influence of
Thrasymachus' Demagogy?* (R9)

R9 (≠ DK) Arist. *Pol.* 5.55 1304b39–1305a1

συνέβη δὲ ταῦτόν καὶ περὶ Κύμην ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρα-
τίας ἣν κατέλυσε Θρασύμαχος.

*An Epicurean Criticism: Uselessness
of the Art of Rhetoric* (R9)

R10 (< B7a) Philod. *Rhet.* 2.49 (= Metrod. Frag. 21
Koerte)

Μητρόδωρος [. . .] τοῦναντίον [δ' εἰπ]ά[γει¹ π]αρ[α]-
δ[εικ]νύων | Θρασύμαχον καὶ ἄλλους | οὐκ ὀλίγους
τῶν δοκούνητων τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχειν | λόγων πολιτικῶν
ἢ ῥητορικῶν τέχνας οὐθ[έν, | ὧ]ν φ[α]σιν ἔχειν τὰς
τέχνας, συντελοῦντας | [. . .].

¹ [δ' ἔτ]α[ξε Sudhaus

accusation against you [i.e. Socrates] regarding justice, viz.
that your ability to praise justice beautifully does not make
you any more knowledgeable about it. Now my own view
is not like this, but one or the other of two things must be
the case: either you do not know it, or you do not want to
share your knowledge with me. And this is why I suppose
that I shall go to Thrasymachus and wherever else I can,
since I am at a loss.

*The Pernicious Influence of
Thrasymachus' Demagogy?* (R9)

R9 (≠ DK) Aristotle, *Politics*

The same thing [i.e. that demagogues contributed to the
end of the democracy] happened in Cumae to the democ-
racy that Thrasymachus destroyed.¹

¹ It is not certain that this is the same Thrasymachus.

*An Epicurean Criticism: Uselessness
of the Art of Rhetoric* (R10)

R10 (< B7a) Philodemus, *Rhetoric*

Metrodorus [i.e. the Epicurean] [. . .] maintains the con-
trary [i.e. of the thesis of the usefulness of an art of rhetor-
ic], showing that Thrasymachus and quite a few other
authors who are thought to possess those [scil. techniques]
of political or rhetorical speeches do not put into practice
anything of what they say they possess the technique of
[. . .].

36. HIPPIAS (HIPPIAS)

Hippias of Elis was approximately contemporary with Thrasymachus and, like him, was active in Athens in the last third of the fifth century BC. He traveled widely throughout the Greek world, both to serve as an ambassador for his city and in order to display his knowledge and skill at public festivals, and he published on an enormous variety of subjects, both in prose and in poetry. He acquired great fame and wealth, but also notoriety for his arrogance. His name is associated with polymathy and the art of memory, which he seems to have cultivated intensely. A generous interpretation can recognize throughout his various practices—in politics, literature, and even clothing—the search for a certain universalism and an ideal of self-sufficiency. Among his inquiries, which bore on a great diversity of historical and scientific subjects (perhaps even including mathematics), figures a collection of parallel passages gathered from ancient poets and philosophers, both Greek and non-Greek; Hippias thereby anticipated the genre of doxography, which went on to play a crucial role in the history of Greek philosophy (cf. **D22** = **DOX. T1**). He was also celebrated for his criticism of convention, opposed to nature, which Plato echoes (**D17**).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Studies

J. Brunschwig. "Hippias d'Elis, philosophe-ambassadeur," in K. Boudouris, ed., *The Sophistic Movement* (Athens, 1984), pp. 269-76.

See also the titles listed in the General Introduction to Chapters 31-42.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

P

Origin, Family, Teacher (P1-P2)
The Wealthy Ambassador (P3-P5)
Death? (P6)

D

Literary and Poetic Production (D1-D2)
Writings (D1)
Both Poetry and Prose (D2)
Attested Titles and Contents (D3-D7)
Characteristics of Hippias' Personality and Activity (D8-D15)
The Arrogant Orator (D8-D10)
The Search for Novelty (D11)
The Art of Memory (D12-D13)
Polymathy and Self-Sufficiency (D14-D15)

Inquiries, Positions, Doctrines (D16-D36)
A Global Perspective (D16)
Politics and Ethics (D17-D21)
The Natural Affinity of the Wise (D17)
An Allusion to Hippias' Doctrine on Justice in Xenophon (D18)
Slander and Jealousy (D19-D20)
The Goal of Life (D21)
Historical and Scientific Inquiries (D22-D36)
On the Opinions of the Poets and Philosophers (D22-D23)
On Homer and Other Authors (D24-D27)
Mythography and Geography (D28-D31)
Other Historical Inquiries (D32-D33)
Astronomy (D34-D35)
Mathematics? (D36)

R

Ancient Scholarship on Hippias' Language (R1-R2)
A Judgment on Hippias as a Historian (R3)
The Hippias of Plato (HER. R33)
Athenaeus on Plato's Literary Use of Hippias (R4-R5)
A Parody of Hippias in the Menexenus? (R4)
An Anachronism Regarding Hippias in the Protagoras? (R5)
Proclus of Naucratis, a Hippianizing Rhetorician of the 2nd Century AD (R6)

HIPPIAS [86 DK]

P

Origin, Family, Teacher (P1-P2)

P1 (< A1) *Suda* I.543

Ἰππίας Διοπείθους Ἡλείος, σοφιστῆς καὶ φιλόσοφος, μαθητῆς Ἡγησιδάμου [. . . = **D21**].

P2 (< A3) *Ps.-Plut. Vit. X Orat.* 4 839B

[. . .] ἔπειτα Πλαθάνην τὴν Ἰππίου τοῦ ῥήτορος γυναῖκα ἠγάγετο τρεῖς παῖδας ἔχουσαν, ὧν τὸν Ἀφαρέα [. . .] ἐποιήσατο.

The Wealthy Ambassador (P3-P5)

P3 (A6) *Plat. Hipp. mai.* 281a

[ΣΩ.] Ἰππίας ὁ καλὸς τε καὶ σοφός, ὡς διὰ χρόνου ἡμῶν κατῆρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας.

[III.] οὐ γὰρ σχολή, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἢ γὰρ Ἡλις ὅταν τι δέηται διαπράξασθαι πρὸς τινα τῶν πόλεων, αἰεὶ ἐπὶ πρῶτον ἐμὲ ἔρχεται τῶν πολιτῶν αἰρουμένη πρε-

HIPPIAS

P

Origin, Family, Teacher (P1-P2)

P1 (< A1) *Suda*

Hippias of Elis, son of Diopieithes, sophist and philosopher, pupil of Hegesidamus [. . .].

P2 (< A3) *Ps.-Plutarch, Lives of the Ten Orators*

[. . .] later, he [i.e. Isocrates] took as his wife Plathane, the [scil. former] wife of Hippias the orator; she had three children, and of these he adopted Aphareus [. . .].¹

¹ Aphareus was the youngest of these three children.

The Wealthy Ambassador (P3-P5)

P3 (A6) *Plato, Greater Hippias*

[Socrates:] Hippias the fine and wise! How long it has been since the last time you put in at Athens!

[Hippias:] Yes indeed, Socrates, for I had no free time. For whenever Elis needs to settle some matter with this city or that one, I am always the man, out of all the citizens,

σβευτήν, ἡγουμένην δικαστήν¹ καὶ ἄγγελον ἰκανώτατον εἶναι τῶν λόγων, οἳ ἂν παρὰ τῶν πόλεων ἐκάστων λέγωνται. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν καὶ εἰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπρέσβευσα, πλείστα δὲ καὶ περὶ πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα· διὸ δὴ, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, οὗ θαμίζω εἰς τοῦσδε τοὺς τόπους.

¹ διατητην Burges: δοκιμαστην Naber: ἀκροατην H. Richards

P4 (> A7, cf. 80 A9) Plat. *Hipp. mai.* 282d–e

[III.] εἰ γὰρ εἰδείης ὅσον ἀργύριον εἴργασμαι ἐγώ, θαυμάσαις ἂν· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐώ, ἀφικόμενος δὲ ποτε εἰς Σικελίαν Πρωταγόρου αὐτόθι ἐπιδημοῦντος καὶ εὐδοκιμοῦντος καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ὄντος πολὺ νεώτερος ἂν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πάνυ πλέον ἢ πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μνᾶς εἰργασάμην, καὶ ἐξ ἑνός γε χωρίου πάνυ μικροῦ Ἴνυκοῦ πλέον ἢ εἴκοσι μνᾶς· καὶ τοῦτο ἐλθὼν οἴκαδε φέρων τῷ πατρὶ ἔδωκα, ὥστε ἐκέεινον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας θαυμάζειν τε καὶ ἐκπεπλήχθαι. καὶ σχεδὸν τι οἶμαι ἐμὲ πλείω χρήματα εἰργάσθαι ἢ ἄλλους σύνδνο οὐστιας βούλει τῶν σοφιστῶν.

P5 (< A2) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.11, p. 14.7–15 Kayser

πλείστα δὲ Ἑλλήνων πρεσβεύσας ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἥλιδος οὐδαμοῦ κατέλυσε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δόξαν δημηγορῶν τε καὶ διαλεγόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρήματα πλείστα ἐξέλεξε

that it comes to first when it chooses an ambassador, because they think that I am the best judge and messenger of what the people in each of the cities might say. So I have often served as ambassador to other cities, but most of all, and about the largest number of matters and the most important ones, to Sparta. That is why, to answer your question, I don't spend a lot of time hereabouts.

P4 (> A7, cf. 80 A9) Plato, *Greater Hippias*

[Hippias:] If you [i.e. Socrates] knew how much money I myself have made, you would be amazed. To mention only this one episode: one time I went to Sicily while Protagoras was visiting there—he was famous, and older than me—and even though I was much younger, I made much more than 150 minas in a short time, and out of one very small town, Inycom, I made more than 20 minas. And when I went home I gave this to my father, so that he and the other citizens were amazed and dumbfounded. And I think that I have probably made more money than any other two sophists you please taken together.

P5 (< A2) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

Having served as an ambassador for Elis the most of any Greek, he not only did not ruin his personal reputation anywhere when he gave public speeches or participated in discussions, but he also made the most money and was

καὶ φυλαῖς ἐνεγράφη πόλεων μικρῶν τε καὶ μαιζόνων.
παρήλθε καὶ εἰς τὴν Ἴνυκὸν ὑπὲρ χρημάτων, τὸ δὲ
πολίχνιον τοῦτο Σικελικοὶ εἰσιν, οὗς ὁ Πλάτων <έν>¹
τῷ Γοργία² ἐπισκώπτει. [7] εὐδοκιμῶν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄλ-
λον χρόνον ἔθελγε τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ λόγοις
ποικίλοις καὶ πεφροντισμένοις εὖ.

¹ <έν> Diels

² τῷ Γοργία del. Kayser

Death? (P6)

P6 (A15) Tert. *Apol.* 46.16

[. . .] Hippias¹ dum civitati insidias disponit occiditur.

¹ hippias *dett.*: ychthas vel ichtydiass mss.: Ichthas Hoppe

inscribed in the tribes of cities both small and larger. He also went for the sake of money to Inycum; this is a small town inhabited by Sicilians, of whom Plato makes fun in his *Gorgias* [493a]. [7] At other times too he enjoyed an excellent reputation and enthralled Greece with speeches in Olympia that were varied and well thought out.¹

¹ This notice is largely constructed out of Plato, cf. **P3**, **P4**.

See also **GORG. P18**

Death? (P6)

P6 (A15) Tertullian, *Apology*

[. . .] Hippias is killed while organizing a conspiracy against his own city.¹

¹ The text is uncertain and the indication perhaps erroneous.

HIPPIAS [86 DK]

D

Literary and Poetic Production (D1–D2)
Writings (D1)

D1 (< A1) *Suda* I.543

ἔγραψε πολλά.

Both Poetry and Prose (D2)

D2 (< A12) *Plat. Hipp. min.* 368c–d

[. . . cf. **D15**] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ποιήματα ἔχων ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἔπη καὶ τραγωδίας καὶ διθυράμβους καὶ καταλογάδην πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ παντοδαποὺς συγκειμένους [. . .].

Attested Titles and Contents (D3–D7)

D3 (< B4) *Athen. Deipn.* 13 609A

[. . . = **D33**] ὡς φησιν Ἰππίας ὁ σοφιστῆς ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Συναγωγῇ.

HIPPIAS

D

Literary and Poetic Production (D1–D2)
Writings (D1)

D1 (< A1) *Suda*

He wrote many books.

Both Poetry and Prose (D2)

D2 (< A12) *Plato, Lesser Hippias*

[. . .] and you [scil. Hippias, said that you] came [scil. to Olympia] bringing poems—epics, tragedies, dithyrambs—and many texts composed in prose of all kinds [. . .].

Attested Titles and Contents (D3–D7)

D3 (< B4) *Athenaeus, Deipnosophists*

[. . .] as Hippias the sophist says in his work entitled *Collection* [cf. **D22**].

D4 (< B1) Paus. 5.25.4

[. . .] χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον Ἱππίας ὁ λεγόμενος ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων γενέσθαι σοφὸς ἐλεγεία ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἐποίησεν [. . .].

D5 (< A2) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.11.4, p. 14.3–6 Kayser

[. . . = **D14b**] ἔστιν δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ Τρωικὸς διάλογος, οὗ λόγος ὁ Νέστωρ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἀλούσῃ ὑποτίθεται Νεοπτολέμῳ τῷ Ἀχιλλέως, ἃ χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύοντα ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεσθαι.

D6 (< B2) Schol. in Ap. Rhod. 3.1179

Ἱππίας δὲ ὁ Ἡλείος¹ ἐν Ἑθνῶν ὀνομασίαις [. . . = **D30**].

¹ Δήλιος mss., corr. Müller

D7 (< B3) Plut. *Numa* 1.6

[. . .] τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ὀλυμπιονικῶν ἀναγομένους, ὧν τὴν ἀναγραφὴν ὀψέ φασιν Ἱππίαν ἐκδοῦναι τὸν Ἡλείου [. . . cf. **R3**].

D4 (< B1) Pausanias, *Description of Greece*

[. . .] Later [scil. than the original epitaph of the statues erected by the Messenians], Hippias, who is said by the Greeks to have been a sage (*sophos*), composed a poem in elegiac distichs in honor of them [i.e. a chorus of Messenian children who had died in a shipwreck] [. . .].

D5 (< A2) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

[. . .] A *Trojan Dialogue* of his is extant. Its subject matter is the following: in Troy after its capture, Nestor advises Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles, on what he must do in order to show himself to be a valorous man [cf. **D10**].

D6 (< B2) Scholia on Apollonius Rhodius

Hippias of Elis in his *Names of Peoples* [. . .].

D7 (< B3) Plutarch, *Numa*

[. . .] the list of Olympic victors which they say that Hippias of Elis later published [. . .].

Characteristics of Hippias'
Personality and Activity (D8–D15)
The Arrogant Orator (D8–D10)

D8 (A8) Plat. *Hipp. min.* 363c–d

[III.] καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὰ ποιοίην, ὦ Εὐδικε, εἰ Ὀλυμπίαζε μὲν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πανήγυριν, ὅταν τὰ Ὀλύμπια ᾗ, ἀεὶ ἐπανιῶν οἴκοθεν ἐξ Ἥλιδος εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν παρέχω ἔμαντὸν καὶ λέγοντα ὅ τι ἂν τις βούληται ὧν ἂν μοι εἰς ἐπίδειξιν παρεσκευασμένον ᾗ, καὶ ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅ τι ἂν τις ἐρωτᾷ, νῦν δὲ τὴν Σωκράτους ἐρώτησιν φύγοιμι.

D9 (A8) Plat. *Hipp. min.* 364a

[III.] ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἤργμαι Ὀλυμπίασιν ἀγωνίζεσθαι οὐδενὶ πώποτε κρείττονι εἰς οὐδὲν ἔμαντοῦ ἐνέτυχον.

D10 (A9) Plat. *Hipp. mai.* 286a–b

[III.] καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε ἐπιτηδεύματων καλῶν καὶ ἔναγχος αὐτόθι ἠὺδοκίμησα διεξιῶν, ἃ χρὴ τὸν νέον ἐπιτηδεύειν. ἔστι γάρ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν παγκάλως λόγος συγκείμενος, καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πρόσχημα δέ μοι ἔστι καὶ ἀρχὴ τοιαύδε τις τοῦ λόγου· ἐπειδὴ ἡ Τροία ἦλω, λέγει ὁ λόγος ὅτι Νεοπτόλεμος Νέστορα ἔροιτο ποιά ἐστὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἃ ἂν τις ἐπιτηδεύσας νέος ὧν

Characteristics of Hippias'
Personality and Activity (D8–D15)
The Arrogant Orator (D8–D10)

D8 (A8) Plato, *Lesser Hippias*

[Hippias:] It would be a terrible thing, Eudicus, if I—who, whenever the Olympic games are held, always go from my home in Elis to Olympia for the general assembly of the Greeks and present myself at the temple, in order both to speak about whatever anyone wishes from what I have prepared for a public oration, and to answer whatever questions anyone who wishes might ask—if I should now flee Socrates' questioning!

D9 (A8) Plato, *Lesser Hippias*

[Hippias:] Ever since I began to compete in the Olympic games [scil. in reading his works there], I have never encountered anyone at all who was better than me in anything.

D10 (A9) Plato, *Greater Hippias*

[Hippias:] And by Zeus, Socrates, with regard to fine activities, recently too I enjoyed a great success at that very place [i.e. Sparta] when I explained the practices to which a young man must devote himself. For I have a very beautifully composed discourse on this subject, well arranged in many regards, and especially in its words. The opening and beginning of that discourse go something like this: when Troy was captured, the discourse says that Neoptolemus asked Nestor what the fine activities are that a young man should practice in order to acquire a great reputation.

εὐδοκιμώτατος γένοιτο· μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Νέστωρ καὶ ὑποτιθέμενος αὐτῷ πάμπολλα νόμιμα καὶ πάγκαλα. τοῦτον δὴ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἐπεδειξάμην καὶ ἐνθάδε μέλλω ἐπιδεικνύναι εἰς τρίτην ἡμέραν ἐν τῷ Φειδοστράτον διδασκαλείῳ καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄξια ἀκοῆς· ἐδεήθη γάρ μου Εὐδίκος ὁ Ἀπημάντων.

The Search for Novelty (D11)

D11 (A14) Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.6

καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἴππίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπισκώπτων αὐτόν· “ἔτι γὰρ σύ,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκείνα τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι ποτέ σου ἤκουσα;” καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· “ὁ δέ γε τούτου δεινότερον,” ἔφη, “ὦ Ἴππία, οὐ μόνον αἰεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν· σὺ δ’ ἴσως διὰ τὸ πολυμαθῆς εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις.” “ἀμέλει,” ἔφη, “πειρῶμαι καινόν τι λέγειν αἰεὶ.”

The Art of Memory (D12–D13)

D12

a (< A11) Plat. *Hipp. mai.* 285e

[ΣΩ.] [. . . cf. **D14a**] ναὶ μὰ Δί, ὦ Ἴππία, ἠτύχηκάς γε ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ χαίρουσιν, ἂν τις αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ Σόλωνος τοὺς ἀρχοντας τοὺς ἡμετέρους καταλέγῃ· εἰ δὲ μή, πράγματ’ ἂν εἶχες ἐκμανθάνων.

After this, Nestor speaks and suggests to him a large number of lawful and very beautiful activities. I presented this discourse there [i.e. in Sparta] and I am going to present it here [i.e. in Athens] in two days in Pheidostratus’ school, together with many other things worth hearing. For Eudicus, Apemantus’ son, asked me to do so.

The Search for Novelty (D11)

D11 (A14) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

And Hippias, having heard this [scil. Socrates saying that it is easy to find teachers of the technical arts but not of justice], said, as though he were making fun of him, “Are you still saying, Socrates, the very same things that I have heard you saying for a long time now?” And Socrates said, “Yes, and what is even worse than this, Hippias: not only do I always say the same things, but I also say them about the same subjects. Whereas you, I suppose because you know so much, never say the same things about the same subjects.” “Certainly,” he said, “I always try to say something new” [cf. **D22**].

The Art of Memory (D12–D13)

D12

a (< A11) Plato, *Greater Hippias*

[Socrates:] [. . .] By Zeus, Hippias, you are lucky that the Spartans do not enjoy hearing someone recite to them a list of our archons since Solon! Otherwise you would have had a lot of trouble learning them all!

[III.] πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἀπαξ ἀκούσας πεντήκοντα
ὀνόματα ἀπομνημονεύσω.

[ΣΩ.] ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐνενόησα ὅτι τὸ
μνημονικὸν ἔχεις.

b (< A2) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.11.2–3, p. 13.27–30 Kayser

Ἰππίας δὲ ὁ σοφιστῆς ὁ Ἡλείος τὸ μὲν μνημονικὸν
οὕτω τι καὶ γηράσκων ἔρρωτο, ὡς καὶ πεντήκοντα
ὀνομάτων ἀκούσας ἀπαξ ἀπομνημονεύειν αὐτὰ καθ'
ἦν ἤκουσε τάξω [. . . = **D14b**].

D13 (< A5a) Xen. *Symp.* 4.62

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] Ἰππία τῷ Ἡλείῳ, παρ' οὗ οὗτος καὶ τὸ
μνημονικὸν ἔμαθεν [. . .].

Polymathy and Self-Sufficiency (D14–D15)

D14

a (< A11) Plat. *Hipp. mai.* 285b–286a

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ δὴ σε πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Ἰππία,
καὶ χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ποῖα; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἐκεῖνα
ἂ σὺ κάλλιστα ἐπίστασαι, τὰ περὶ τὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ
τὰ οὐράνια πάθη;

[III.] οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν ταῦτα γε οὐδ' ἀνέχονται.

[ΣΩ.] ἀλλὰ περὶ γεωμετρίας τι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες;

[Hippias:] How so, Socrates? It is enough for me to hear
fifty names only once for me to remember them all.

[Soc.:] You are right, but I was not thinking that you possess
the art of memory [. . .].

b (< A2) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

Hippias of Elis, the sophist, was so powerful in the art of
memory, even as an old man, that it was enough for him
to hear fifty names only once to be able to remember them
in the order in which he had heard them [. . .].

D13 (< A5a) Xenophon, *Symposium*

[Socrates:] [. . .] Hippias of Elis, from whom he [i.e. Cal-
lias] also learned the art of memory [. . .].

Polymathy and Self-Sufficiency (D14–D15)

D14

a (< A11) Plato, *Greater Hippias*

[Socrates:] [. . .] By the gods, Hippias, they [i.e. the Spar-
tans] certainly do praise you, and what are the subjects
that they like to hear you speaking about? Is it not evident
that it is what you know best, the heavenly bodies and
celestial phenomena?

[Hippias:] Not in the least: they cannot even stand these
kinds of things.

[Soc.:] So they like to hear you speaking about geometry?

[III.] οὐδαμῶς, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἀριθμῶν ἐκείνων γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πολλοὶ ἐπίστανται.

[ΣΩ.] πολλοῦ ἄρα δέουσιν περὶ γε λογισμῶν ἀνέχεσθαί σου ἐπιδεικνυμένου.

[III.] πολλοῦ μέντοι, νῆ Δία.

[ΣΩ.] ἀλλὰ δῆτα ἐκείνα ἃ σὺ ἀκριβέστατα ἐπίστασαι ἀνθρώπων διαιρεῖν, περὶ τε γραμμάτων δυνάμεως καὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἀρμονιῶν;

[III.] ποίων, ὠγαθέ, ἀρμονιῶν καὶ γραμμάτων;

[ΣΩ.] ἀλλὰ τί μὴν ἔστιν ἃ ἠδέως σου ἀκροῶνται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν; αὐτὸς μοι εἶπέ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγὼ οὐχ εὗρισκω.

[III.] περὶ τῶν γενῶν, ὧ Σώκρατες, τῶν τε ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν κατοικίσεων, ὡς τὸ ἀρχαίον ἐκτίσθησαν αἱ πόλεις, καὶ συλλήβδην πάσης τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας ἠδιστα ἀκροῶνται, ὥστ' ἔγωγε δι' αὐτοὺς ἠνάγκασμαι ἐκμεμαθηκέναι τε καὶ ἐκμεμελετηκέναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. [. . . = D12a]

[ΣΩ.] ὥστ' ἐννοῶ ὅτι εἰκότως σοὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἅτε πολλὰ εἰδότες, καὶ χρῶνται ὥσπερ ταῖς πρεσβύτισιν οἱ παῖδες πρὸς τὸ ἠδέως μυθολογήσασθαι.

b (< A2) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.11.1–3, pp. 13.30–14.3 Kayser

[. . . = D12b] ἐσήγετο δὲ ἐς τὰς διαλέξεις γεωμετρίαν ἀστρονομίαν μουσικὴν ῥυθμούς, διελέγετο δὲ καὶ περὶ ζωγραφίας καὶ περὶ ἀγαλματοποιίας· ταῦτα ἐτέ-

[Hipp.:] Not at all, for many of them do not understand practically anything about those numbers either.

[Soc.:] So they are a long way from being able to stand your explanations about arithmetic?

[Hipp.:] Yes indeed, a long way, by Zeus.

[Soc.:] But what about those things that you know how to distinguish more precisely than all other men, the properties of letters, syllables, rhythms, and harmonies?

[Hipp.:] What kinds of harmonies and letters do you have in mind, my good friend?

[Soc.:] But then what are the subjects that they take pleasure in hearing you talk about and praise you for? Tell me yourself, since I can't manage to discover them.

[Hipp.:] It is about the families of heroes and of men, Socrates, of foundations, how the cities were founded in ancient times, and in short about all of ancient history that they take great pleasure in hearing, so that because of them I myself am obliged to learn and study profoundly all these kinds of things. [. . .].

[Soc.] What I do think is that the Spartans like to hear you because you know a lot of things, and they make use of you just as children make use of old women, to provide them pleasure by telling them stories (*muthologeîn*).

b (< A2) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

[. . .] He introduced into his popular lectures (*dialexeis*) geometry, astronomy, music, rhythms. He also spoke about painting and sculpture—this he did elsewhere: but

ρωθι, ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι δὲ γένη τε διήει πόλεων καὶ ἀπουκίας καὶ ἔργα, ἐπειδὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι ἄρχειν τῇ ιδέᾳ ταύτῃ ἔχαιρον. [. . . = D5]

D15 (> A12) Plat. *Hipp. min.* 368b–e

[ΣΩ.][. . .] πάντως δὲ πλείστας τέχνας πάντων σοφώτατος εἶ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτέ σου ἤκουον μεγαλαυχουμένου πολλὴν σοφίαν καὶ ζηλωτὴν σαυτοῦ διεξιόντος ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις. ἔφησθα δὲ ἀφικέσθαι ποτέ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἃ εἶχες περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἅπαντα σαυτοῦ ἔργα ἔχων πρῶτον μὲν δακτύλιον (ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἤρχου) ὃν εἶχες σαυτοῦ ἔχειν ἔργον ὡς ἐπιστάμενος δακτυλίου γλύφειν καὶ ἄλλην σφραγίδα σὸν ἔργον, καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ λήκυθον ἃ αὐτὸς εἰργάσω ἔπειτα ὑποδήματα ἃ εἶχες ἔφησθα αὐτὸς σκνυτοτομήσαι καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον ὑφήναι καὶ τὸν χιτωνίσκον καὶ ὃ γε πᾶσιν ἔδοξεν ἀτοπώτατον καὶ σοφίας πλείστης ἐπίδειγμα,¹ τὴν ζώνην ἔφησθα τοῦ χιτωνίσκου, ἣν εἶχες, εἶναι μὲν οἶαι αἱ Περσικαὶ τῶν πολυτελῶν, ταύτην δὲ αὐτὸς πλέξαι πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ποιήματα ἔχων ἐλθεῖν καὶ ἔπη καὶ τραγωδίας καὶ διθυράμβους καὶ καταλογάδην πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ παιτοδαπούς συγκειμένους· καὶ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν δὴ, ὧν ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐπιστήμων ἀφικέσθαι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων καὶ περὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονιῶν καὶ

¹ ἐπειδὴ post ἐπίδειγμα mss., secl. Ast: ἐπιδεικνὺς vel ἐπιδείξας fuisse susp. Schanz

in Sparta he discussed the kinds of cities, colonies, and exploits, since the Spartans, who wished to rule, liked this kind of subject. [. . .]

D15 (> A12) Plato, *Lesser Hippias*

[Socrates:] Of all men, you [i.e. Hippias] are absolutely the most expert (*sophōtatos*) in the most arts, as I myself once heard you say in the marketplace near the bankers' counters when you were boasting and explaining about your great and admirable expertise (*sophia*). You said that, one time when you arrived at Olympia, everything you had on your body was something that you had made yourself. First, the ring you were wearing (for that is what you began with) you had made yourself, as you knew how to engrave rings, and everything else was your work—your seal, strigil, and oil flask, which you had made yourself. Then, the shoes that you were wearing, you said that you yourself had cut them out of leather and had woven your cloak and tunic. And what seemed to be the most extraordinary thing to everyone, and a demonstration of the greatest expertise (*sophia*): you said that the belt of the tunic that you were wearing was like the very luxurious Persian ones, but that you had plaited it yourself. Besides all this, you came bringing poems—epics, tragedies, dithyrambs—and many texts in prose composed of different sorts. And with regard to the arts of which I was speaking just now, you arrived with more knowledge about them than other people have, about rhythms, harmonies, and

γραμμαμάτων ὀρθότητος, καὶ ἄλλα ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις πάννυ πολλά, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μνημονεύειν καίτοι τό γε μνημονικὸν ἐπελαθόμενον, ὡς ἔοικε, τέχνημα, ἐν ᾧ σὺ οἶε λαμπρότατος εἶναι· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πάμυ πολλά ἐπιλελήσθαι.

Inquiries, Positions, Doctrines (D16–D36)
A Global Perspective (D16)

D16 (> *C2 Untersteiner) Plat. *Hipp. mai.* 301b, 304a

[III.] ἀλλὰ γὰρ δὴ σὺ, ᾧ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ' ἐκείνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι, κρούετε δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες. διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα. [. . .] ἀλλὰ δὴ γ', ᾧ Σώκρατες, τί οἶε ταῦτα εἶναι συνάπαντα; κνήσματα τοῖ ἔστι καὶ περιμήματα τῶν λόγων, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, κατὰ βραχὺ δηρημένα.

Politics and Ethics (D17–D21)
The Natural Affinity of the Wise (D17)

D17 (C1) Plat. *Prot.* 337c–338b

[. . .] Ἰππίας ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν, “ᾧ ἄνδρες,” ἔφη, “οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς¹ συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους

¹ ἡμᾶς Heindorf

the correctness of writings, and very many other things besides these, as I seem to recall—but I was apparently forgetting your art of memory, in which you think that you are especially brilliant, and I suspect that I have forgotten many other ones.

Inquiries, Positions, Doctrines (D16–D36)
A Global Perspective (D16)

D16 (≠ DK) Plato, *Greater Hippias*

[Hippias:] But you, Socrates, do not consider things as totalities, and neither do the people with whom you customarily discuss; instead, the way that you test the beautiful and each of the other things is by separating them out and cutting them into little pieces in your arguments. And that is why you fail to notice the bodies of what exists (*ousia*) by nature, even though they are so large and continuous. [. . .] But Socrates, what do you think all this really is? It is scrapings and slivers of speeches, as I said just now, cut up into little pieces.

Politics and Ethics (D17–D21)
The Natural Affinity of the Wise (D17)

D17 (C1) Plato, *Protagoras*¹

Hippias the wise said, “You gentlemen who are present here [scil. in Callias’ house] for the discussion between

¹ Although this is a Platonic reflection, like those for other ‘sophists’ like Protagoras or Gorgias, we have chosen not to put it into an appendix because the allusions to Hippias’ doctrine seem to be authentic.

καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ [337d] τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ἄν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται. ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἶδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνελθούστας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφῆναισθαι, [e] ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεισθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, [338a] καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβές τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχυλίαν, εἰ μὴ ἤδὲ Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλ' ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡμῶν τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρία ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν. ὥς οὖν ποιήσετε, καὶ πείθεσθέ μοι ῥαβδούχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρυτανὴν ἐλέσθαι ὃς ὑμῖν φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μήκος τῶν λόγων ἐκατέρου." [b] ταῦτα ἤρесе τοῖς παρούσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπήνεσαν [. .].

Socrates and Protagoras, cf. **SOPH. R6**], I consider that you all belong to the same family (*suggenets*), household, and city—by nature (*phusis*), not by convention (*nomos*): [337d] for what is similar belongs by nature to the same family (*suggenes*) as what is similar, whereas convention, which is a tyrant over men, commits violence upon many things against nature. Therefore it would be disgraceful for us to know the nature of things—we who are the wisest of the Greeks and have come together now to [scil. the city] that is, in Greece, the town hall itself of wisdom and, in that city itself, to this house, the greatest and most wealthy one it contains—but not to produce anything that would be worthy of this honor, [e] but instead to quarrel with one another like the most vulgar of men. Therefore I ask you and I advise you, Protagoras and Socrates, to meet each other halfway, as though we were arbitrators bringing you together; [338a] and that neither should you [i.e. Socrates] seek this kind of precision in dialogues, a brevity that is excessive, if it is not pleasing to Protagoras, but instead relax and loosen the reins on the speeches so that they can seem more magnificent and elegant to us, nor in turn should Protagoras, letting out full sail and running with the wind, escape to the ocean of words and allow the land to vanish completely, but both of you should steer a middle course. So do this and follow my suggestion: choose someone who will be an umpire, a supervisor, and an overseer, someone who will make sure that your speeches are both of a moderate length." [b] This pleased all those present, and everyone approved it.

*An Allusion to Hippias' Doctrine
on Justice in Xenophon (D18)*

D18 (≠ DK) Xen. *Mem.*

a 4.4.7

“περὶ μὲν τούτων,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡσπερ σύ, καὶ ἐγὼ ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω· περὶ μὲντοι τοῦ δικαίου πάνν οἶμαι νῦν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, πρὸς ἃ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ’ ἄν ἄλλος οὐδεὶς δύναιτ’ ἀντειπεῖν.¹ [. . .]”

¹ ἀντειπεῖν Zeune: ἄν εἰπεῖν mss.

b 4.4.13

“νόμους δὲ πόλεως,” ἔφη, “γυγνώσκεις;”

“ἔγωγε,” ἔφη.

“καὶ τίνας τούτους νομίζεις;”

“ἃ οἱ πολῖται,” ἔφη, “συνθέμενοι ἃ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ὧν ἀπέχεσθαι ἐγράψαντο.”

c 4.4.14

καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, “νόμους δ’,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες, πῶς ἄν τις ἠγήσαιο σπουδαῖον πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὓς γε πολλάκις αὐτοὶ οἱ θέμενοι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατίθενται; [. . .]”

*An Allusion to Hippias' Doctrine
on Justice in Xenophon (D18)*

D18 (≠ DK) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

a

“About these matters [i.e. letters and numbers],” he [scil. Hippias] said, “Socrates, just like you, I too always say the same things; but concerning what justice is, I am quite confident that I can now say something that no one—neither you nor someone else—would be able to contradict. [. . .]”

b

“Do you understand what is meant by ‘the laws of a city,’” he [scil. Socrates] said.

“Yes I do,” he [scil. Hippias] said.

“And what do you think that these are?”

“What the citizens,” he said, “have written down after having made an agreement about what people must do and what they must refrain from.”

c

And Hippias said, “Socrates, how could someone consider either the laws or obedience to them to be something worth taking seriously, given that the very people who establish them often reject and change them? [. . .]”

*Slander and Jealousy (D19–D20)***D19** (B17) Plut. Frag. *Calumn.* in Stob. 3.42.10

Ἰππίας φησὶν ὅτι δεινόν ἐστιν ἢ διαβολία,¹ οὕτως ὀνομάζων, ὅτι οὐδὲ τιμωρία τις κατ' αὐτῶν γέγραπται ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὥσπερ τῶν κλεπτῶν καίτοι ἄριστον ὄν κτήμα τὴν φιλίαν κλέπτουσι, ὥστε ἢ ὕβρις κακούργος οὐσα δικαιοτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς διαβολῆς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀφανῆς εἶναι.

¹ ἢ διαβόλων ἐπιβουλία Wachsmuth

D20 (B16) Plut. Frag. *Calumn.* in Stob. 3.38.32

Ἰππίας λέγει δύο εἶναι φθόνους· τὸν μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν τις τοῖς κακοῖς φθονῇ τιμωμένους· τὸν δὲ ἀδικον, ὅταν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. καὶ διπλᾶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ φθονεροὶ κακούνται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῖς ἰδίους κακοῖς ἄχθονται ὥσπερ ἐκείνοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοτριῶν ἀγαθοῖς.

*The Goal of Life (D21)***D21** (<A1) *Suda* I.543

Ἰππίας [. . . = P1] ὃς τέλος ὠρίζετο τὴν αὐτάρκειαν.

*Slander and Jealousy (D19–D20)***D19** (B17) Plutarch, Fragment from *On Slander*

Hippias says that slander is a terrible thing, speaking in this way because there is no punishment prescribed for such people in the laws as there is for thieves. And yet they steal the greatest possession of all, friendship, so that outrageous violence (*hubris*), wicked though it is, is more just than slander, because it is not concealed.

D20 (B16) Plutarch, Fragment from *On Slander*

Hippias says that there are two kinds of envy (*phthonos*): one that is just, when one envies evil people who are honored; and another that is unjust, when these are good people. And the evils that the envious suffer are the double of those that other people suffer: for such people are afflicted not only by their own evils, as the others are, but also by other people's good things.

*The Goal of Life (D21)***D21** (< A1) *Suda*

Hippias [. . .], who defined the goal as self-sufficiency.

Historical and Scientific Inquiries (D22–D36)
On the Opinions of the Poets
and Philosophers (D22–D23)

D22 (B6) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6.15

τούτων ἴσως εἴρηται τὰ μὲν Ὀρφεῖ, τὰ δὲ Μουσαίῳ
κατὰ βραχὺ ἄλλω¹ ἄλλαχού, τὰ δὲ Ἡσιόδῳ τὰ δὲ
Ὀμήρῳ, τὰ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν ποιητῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐν
συγγραφαῖς τὰ μὲν Ἑλλησι τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις· ἐγὼ
δὲ ἐκ πάντων τούτων τὰ μέγιστα καὶ² ὁμόφυλα συν-
θεῖς τοῦτον καινὸν καὶ πολυειδῆ τὸν λόγον ποιήσο-
μαι [= **DOX. T1**].

¹ ἄλλως Geel ² μέγιστα καὶ mss.: μάλιστα Nauck

D23 (B7) Diog. Laert. 1.24

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Ἰππίας φασὶν αὐτὸν καὶ τοῖς
ἀψύχοις μεταδιδόναι ψυχάς, τεκμαιρόμενον ἐκ τῆς λί-
θου τῆς μαγνήτιδος καὶ τοῦ ἠλέκτρου.

*On Homer and Other Authors (D24–D27)*¹

D24 (B18) Anon. *Vit. Hom. Rom.*, p. 30.27

[. . .] Ἰππίας δ' αὖ καὶ Ἐφορος Κυμαίων.

Historical and Scientific Inquiries (D22–D36)
On the Opinions of the Poets
and Philosophers (D22–D23)

D22 (B6) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* [toward the
beginning of *Collection*, cf. **D3** and **DOX. T1**]

Of these [scil. probably: ancient opinions] **some have doubtless been expressed by Orpheus, others by Musaeus, to put it briefly, by each one in a different place, others by Hesiod, others by Homer, others by the other poets; others in treatises; some by Greeks, others by non-Greeks. But I myself have put together from out of all these the ones that are most important and are akin to one another, and on their basis I shall compose the following new and variegated discourse.**

D23 (B7) Diogenes Laertius

Aristotle and Hippias say that he [i.e. Thales, **D11b**] attributed a share of soul to inanimate beings too, judging from the evidence of the magnet and of amber.

*On Homer and Other Authors (D24–D27)*¹

¹ The Hippias mentioned by Aristotle at *Poet.* 1461a21 (cf. *Soph. El.* 166b1) for the solution of a prosodic problem came from Thasos.

D24 (B18) *Life of Homer*

[. . .] Hippias in turn and Ephorus [scil. say that Homer] was from Cyme.

D25 (A10) Plat. *Hipp. min.* 364c

[III.] φημί γὰρ Ὅμηρον πεποιηκέναι ἄριστον μὲν ἄνδρα Ἀχιλλέα τῶν εἰς Τροίαν ἀφικομένων, σοφώτατον δὲ Νέστορα, πολυτροπώτατον δὲ Ὀδυσσεά.

D26 (< B9) Argum. 2 *ad Soph. OT*

διὰ τί 'τύραννος' ἐπιγέγραπται.

[. . .] ὅψε ποτε τοῦδε τοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας διαδοθέντος, κατὰ τοὺς Ἀρχιλόχου χρόνους, καθάπερ Ἰππίας ὁ σοφιστὴς φησιν.

D27 (< B12) Procl. *In Eucl.*, p. 65.14–15

[. . .] Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος ἱστορήσεν ὡς ἐπὶ γεωμετρίᾳ δόξαν αὐτοῦ λαβόντος.

Mythography and Geography (D28–D31)

D28 (B8) Eust. *In Dion. Perieg.* 270

Ἰππίας δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ Ἀσίας καὶ Εὐρώπης τῶν Ὀκεανίδων τὰς ἡπείρους καλεῖ.

D29 (B14) Schol. in Pind. *Pyth.* 4.288

[. . .] Ἰππίας δὲ Γοργώπιν.

D25 (A10) Plato, *Lesser Hippias*

[Hippias:] For I say that Homer has represented Achilles as the most valiant of the men who went to Troy, Nestor as the wisest, and Odysseus as the most versatile (*polutropos*).

D26 (< B9) Hypothesis of Sophocles' *Oedipus the Tyrant*

Why the play is entitled 'the Tyrant.'

[. . .] it was only later [scil. than Homer] that this word became widespread among the Greeks, at the time of Archilochus, as Hippias the sophist says.

D27 (< B12) Proclus, *Commentary on Euclid's Elements*

[. . .] Hippias of Elis reported that he [i.e. Mamercus, the brother of Stesichorus] acquired a reputation in the field of geometry.

Mythography and Geography (D28–D31)

D28 (B8) Eustathius, *Commentary on Dionysius Periegetes*

Hippias calls the continents after the daughters of Oceanus, Asia and Europe.

D29 (B14) Scholia on Pindar's *Pythians*

[. . .] Hippias [scil. says that the mother-in-law of Phrixus was] Gorgôpis.

D30 (< B2) Schol. in Apoll. Rhod. 3.1179

Ἰππίας δὲ ὁ Ἡλείος¹ ἐν Ἐθνῶν ὀνομασίαις φησὶν ἔθνος τι καλεῖσθαι Σπαρτοῦς [. . .].

¹ Δῆλιος mss., corr. Müller

D31 (B15) Schol. in Pind. *Nem.* 7.53

τρίτην δὲ περὶ Ἡλιῶν, ἧς Ἰππίας μνημονεύει.

Other Historical Inquiries (D32–D33)

D32 (B11) Plut. *Lyc.* 23.1

αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Λυκούργον Ἰππίας μὲν ὁ σοφιστῆς πολεμικώτατόν φησι γενέσθαι καὶ πολλῶν ἔμπειρον στρατειῶν [. . .].

D33 (< B4) Athen. *Deipn.* 13 608F

[. . .] Θαργηλία ἢ Μιλησία, ἧτις καὶ τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα ἀνδράσιν ἐγαμήθη, οὐσα καὶ τὸ εἶδος πάνυ καλὴ καὶ σοφῆ, ὡς φησιν Ἰππίας ὁ σοφιστῆς ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Συναγωγῇ.

Astronomy (D34–D35)

D34 (ad A11) Plat. *Prot.* 315c

ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων

D30 (< B2) Scholia on Apollonius Rhodius

Hippias of Elis in his *Names of Peoples* says that one people is called 'Spartoi' [. . .].

D31 (B15) Scholia on Pindar's *Nemeans*

The third [scil. Ephyra] is near Elis; Hippias mentions it.

Other Historical Inquiries (D32–D33)

D32 (B11) Plutarch, *Lycurgus*

Hippias the sophist says that Lycurgus himself [scil. like the Spartiates in general] was extremely warlike and had experience of many expeditions [. . .].

D33 (< B4) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

[. . .] Thargelia of Miletus, who married as many as fourteen men, as she had a very beautiful appearance and was wise, as Hippias the sophist says in his work entitled *Collection*.

See also **D7**, **D14a**, **R3**

Astronomy (D34–D35)

D34 (ad A11) Plato, *Protagoras*

They [i.e. Hippias' audience in the house of Callias, cf.

ἀστρονομικὰ ἄλλα διερωτῶν τὸν Ἰππίαν, ὁ δ' ἐν
θρόνῳ καθήμενος ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινεν καὶ δι-
εξήει τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.

D35 (B13) Schol. in Arat. *Phaen.* 172, p. 369.27

Ἰππίας δὲ καὶ Φερεκύδης ἐπτά [= **PHER. D19**].

Mathematics? (D36)

D36 (< B21) Procl. *In Eucl.*, p. 272.3–10

Νικομήδης μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κοχχοειδῶν γραμμῶν
[. . .] πᾶσαν εὐθύγραμμον γωνίαν ἐτριχοτόμησεν. ἕτε-
ροι δὲ ἐκ τῶν Ἰππίου καὶ Νικομήδους τετραγωνιζου-
σῶν πεποιήκασιν τὸ αὐτὸ μικταῖς καὶ οὗτοι χρησάμε-
νοι γραμμαῖς ταῖς τετραγωνιζούσαις.

SOPH. R6] seemed to be asking Hippias a number of as-
tronomical questions about nature and celestial phenom-
ena, while he, sitting on his throne, answered each of them
and replied to their questions in detail.

D35 (B13) Scholia on Aratus' *Phaenomena*

Hippias and Pherecydes [scil. say that the Hyades are]
seven.

Mathematics? (D36)

D36 (< B21) Proclus, *Commentary on Euclid's Elements*

Nicomedes by means of conchoid lines [. . .] divided every
rectilinear angle into three equal parts. Other men have
obtained the same result by means of the quadratrixes of
Hippias and Nicomedes, by themselves using mixed lines,
the quadratrixes.¹

¹ The identification of the Hippias who invented this curve,
called quadratrix because it was involved in attempts to square
the circle, with Hippias of Elis is considered doubtful by some
scholars but is accepted by others.

HIPPIAS [86 DK]

R

Ancient Scholarship on Hippias' Language (R1-R2)

R1 (< A2) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.11.8, p. 14.15-17 Kayser
ἡρμήνευε δὲ οὐκ ἑλλιπῶς ἀλλὰ περιπτῶς καὶ κατὰ
φύσιν, ἐς ὀλίγα καταφεύγων τῶν ἐκ ποιητικῆς ὀνό-
ματα.

R2 (B10) Phryn. *Ecl.* 286

παραθήκην Ἰππίαν καὶ Ἴωνά τινα συγγραφέα φασὶν
εἰρηκέναι [. . .].

A Judgment on Hippias as a Historian (R3)

R3 (B3) Plut. *Numa* 1

τοὺς μὲν οὖν χρόνους ἐξακριβῶσαι χαλεπὸν ἔστι καὶ
μάλιστα τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ὀλυμπιονικῶν ἀναγομένους, ὧν
τὴν ἀναγραφὴν ὀψέ φασιν Ἰππίαν ἐκδοῦναι τὸν
Ἥλειον ἀπ' οὐδενὸς ὀρμώμενον ἀναγκαίου πρὸς πί-
στιν.

HIPPIAS

R

Ancient Scholarship on Hippias' Language (R1-R2)

R1 (< A2) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

The style of expression he employed was not deficient (*ellipōs*) but copious (*perittōs*) and in conformity with nature, having recourse to only a small number of poetic words.

R2 (B10) Phrynichus, *Selection of Attic Words and Phrases*

They say that Hippias and an Ionic prose writer [i.e. Herodotus 6.73, 9.45] used the term *parathēkē* [scil. instead of *parakatathēkē*, 'deposit'].

A Judgment on Hippias as a Historian (R3)

R3 (B3) Plutarch, *Numa*

It is difficult to determine precisely the chronology [scil. of Numa], and especially the one derived from the list of Olympic victors that, they say, Hippias of Elis published later, basing it upon no source of a kind such as to compel belief.

*The Hippias of Plato*See **HER. R33***Athenaeus on Plato's Literary**Use of Hippias (R4–R5)**A Parody of Hippias in the Menexenus?* (R4)**R4** (A13) Athen. *Deipn.* 11 506F

ἐν δὲ τῷ Μενεξένῳ οὐ μόνον Ἴππίας ὁ Ἡλείος χλευάζεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ῥαμνούσιος Ἀντιφῶν καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς Λάμπρος.

*An Anachronism Regarding**Hippias in the Protagoras?* (R5)**R5** (> A5) Athen. *Deipn.* 5 218C

ὁ δὲ Πλάτων καὶ τὸν Ἡλείον Ἴππίαν συμπαρόντα ποιεῖ¹ τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ μετὰ τινων ἰδίων πολιτῶν, οὓς² οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐν Ἀθήναις ἀσφαλῶς διατρίβειν πρὸ τοῦ τὰς ἐνιαυσίας ἐπὶ Ἰσάρχου³ Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος συντελεσθῆναι σπονδάς. ὁ δὲ τὸν διάλογον ὑφίσταται γινόμενον περὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους καθ' οὓς αἱ σπονδαὶ προσφάτως ἐγεγόνεσαν [. . .] παρὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας παράγει πολεμίους ὄντας τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἴππίαν, μὴ τῆς ἐκεχειρίας αὐτῆς μενούσης.

*The Hippias of Plato*See **HER. R33***Athenaeus on Plato's Literary**Use of Hippias (R4–R5)**A Parody of Hippias in the Menexenus?* (R4)**R4** (A13) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

In the *Menexenus* it is not only Hippias of Elis who is made fun of, but also Antiphon of Rhamnus and the musician Lamprus.

*An Anachronism Regarding**Hippias in the Protagoras?* (R5)**R5** (> A5) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

Plato shows Hippias of Elis together with some of his fellow citizens as being present in the *Protagoras* [cf. *Prot.* 315c, **SOPH. R6**]: but it is not likely that these men could have spent time safely in Athens before the year's truce had become effective in the archonship of Isarchus in the month of Elaphebolion [i.e. the end of March 423]. But he supposes that the dialogue took place around the time when the truce had just recently been concluded. [. . .] So it is contrary to history that Plato in this dialogue brings to Athens Hippias and his associates, who were enemies of the city, though the truce had not [scil. yet] become effective at the time.

¹ ἐν post ποιεῖ hab. ms., del. Wilamowitz ² ὄς ms., corr. Musurus
³ τοῦ post Ἰσάρχου hab. ms., del. Musurus

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VIII

*Proclus of Naucratis, a Hippianizing
Rhetorician of the 2nd Century AD (R6)*

R6 (≠ DK) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 2.21, p. 106.12–15 Kayser

τὸ μὲν οὖν διαλεχθῆναι αὐτὸν ἐν σπανιστοῖς ἔκειτο,
ὅτε δὲ ὀρμήσειεν εἰς διάλεξιν, ἰππιάζοντί τε ἐώκει καὶ
γοργιάζοντι.

HIPPIAS

*Proclus of Naucratis, a Hippianizing
Rhetorician of the 2nd Century AD (R6)*

R6 (≠ DK) Philostr. *Lives of the Sophists* \

Engaging in discussion was something that happened to him [i.e. Proclus of Naucratis] only very rarely, but when he was impelled to participate in a dialogue he seemed to Hippianize and to Gorgianize [cf. **GORG. R7b**].