

PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

IV

ENNEADS
IV. 1-9



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PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS IV-V

The text of these volumes, except in a few places, is that of the second volume of the revised *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer, *Plotini Opera II* Oxford Classical Texts, 1977. The editors, translator, and publishers have agreed that somewhat fuller critical notes should be appended to the Greek text than in the first three volumes of the Loeb Plotinus. These critical notes show clearly all places where the printed text departs from the manuscripts and all places where the text of these volumes differs from that of the Oxford Plotinus (H-S²): as a result of the extensive critical revision of the text of their first edition which the editors undertook in the preparation of the Oxford text, and in which the translator to a modest degree participated (hence the use of the first person plural in the notes where the changes are agreed by all), these latter are very few (26 in the Fourth Ennead, 7 in the Fifth). A number of them are corrections adopted by the editors after the publication of the Oxford Plotinus II and recorded in *Addenda et Corrigenda ad Textum et Apparatum Lectionum* in III (1982) pp. 304-325.

A word of explanation and apology is due to the reader for the long interval between the publication of the first three volumes and that of these two. The translator's work was completed (except for

PREFACE

minor corrections and revisions) in 1976: but as the result of the agreement between the Oxford University Press and the Loeb Classics the volumes could not have been published with the Greek text before 1979. The subsequent delay was due to the financial stringencies which beset all academic publishing at the present time.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
A' = Codicis A primus corrector.
E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
B = Laurentianus 85, 15.
R = Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbinae Cr. 62.
S = Berolinensis Gr. 375.
N = Monacensis Gr. 215.
M = Marcianus Gr. 240.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
V = Vindobonensis philosophicus Gr. 226.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
L = Ambrosianus Gr. 667.
D = Marcianus Gr. 209.

w = AE
x = BRJ
y = USM
z = QL

Enn.^a = wxUC
Enn.^b = A^{ms}xUC

mg — in margine
ac = ante correctionem
pc = post correctionem
* = consensus editorum sequentium cum editore nominato

ital. = cod. vel ed. Eusebii

H-S¹ — Henry-Schwyzler, editio maior
H-S² = Henry-Schwyzler, editio minor (= OCT)
B-T = Beutler-Theiler
Dodds = *CQ* 28 (1934) 47–53

IV. 1 [2]. ON THE ESSENCE OF THE
SOUL I

Introductory Note

THIS little work is placed first in the Fourth Ennead by most MSS, and this order is confirmed by Porphyry in his account of his edition (*Life* ch. 25, see vol. I p. 78 ff.) and by the *Pinax* (table of contents: see p. 3). Ficino and the *editio princeps*, with the later editors, however, place it second, after the little detached note (IV. 2 [1]) which here follows it. Henry and Schwyzer print it first, but continue to number it IV. 2. It seemed to me slightly less illogical to print it first and number it IV. 1, while retaining the original numbering of the printed editions in brackets.

IV. 1 [2]. (4) ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ
ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τίς ποτέ ἐστι ζητοῦντες
σῶμα οὐδὲν αὐτὴν δείξαντες εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐν ἀσωμά-
τοις αὐτὴν ἀρμονίαν, τό τε τῆς ἐντελεχείας οὔτε
ἀληθὲς οὕτως, ὡς λέγεται, οὔτε δηλωτικὸν ὄν τοῦ
5 τί ἐστὶν ἀφέντες, καὶ μὴν τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως
εἰπόντες καὶ τῆς θείας μοίρας εἶναι τάχα μὲν ἂν τι
σαφὲς εἰρηκότες εἴημεν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς.
ὅμως γὰρ μὴν προσωτέρω χωρεῖν βέλτιον· τότε
μὲν οὖν διηροῦμεν αἰσθητῇ καὶ νοητῇ φύσει
διαστελλόμενοι, ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τὴν ψυχὴν τιθέμενοι.
10 νῦν δὲ κείσθω μὲν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ· κατ' ἄλλην δὲ
ὁδὸν τὸ προσεχὲς τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς μεταδιώκωμεν.
λέγωμεν δὴ τὰ μὲν πρῶτως εἶναι μεριστὰ καὶ τῇ
αὐτῶν φύσει σκεδαστά· ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι, ὧν οὐδὲν
μέρος ταυτῶν ἐστὶν οὔτε ἄλλῳ μέρει οὔτε τῷ ὅλῳ,
τό τε μέρος αὐτῶν ἕλαττον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ παντός
15 καὶ ὅλου. ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ μεγέθη καὶ
ὄγκοι, ὧν ἕκαστον ἴδιον τόπον ἔχει, καὶ οὐχ οἶόν
τε ἅμα ταυτῶν ἐν πλείοσι τόποις εἶναι. ἡ δὲ ἐστὶν

¹ The references back are to IV. 7 (2). Chs. 1-8³ demon-
strate that the soul is not a body; ch. 8⁴ that it is not a har-
8

IV. 1 [2]. ON THE ESSENCE OF
THE SOUL I

1. In our enquiry into what the soul's essential
being is, we have shown that it is not any body, and,
again, that in the class of bodiless things it is not a
harmony; we have abandoned the concept of ente-
lechy, which is not true in the sense in which it is
stated and does not make clear what the soul is;
and certainly, when we said that the soul belongs to
the intelligible nature and the divine order, we did
perhaps manage to say something exact about its
essential being.¹ But all the same, it would really
be better to go further: for then we were dividing
and defining things by their perceptible or intelligible
nature, and putting the soul in the intelligible class.
But now, let it remain in the intelligible, but we will
follow another route in our attempt to track down the
particularity of its nature. Let us state that there
are some things which are primarily divisible and by
their very nature liable to dispersion: these are the
things no part of which is the same as either another
part or the whole, and the part of which must neces-
sarily be less than the all and whole. These are the
perceptible sizes and masses, which each have their
own place, and it is not possible for the same one to

mony; ch. 8⁵ that it is not an Aristotelian entelechy; chs. 9-12
expound Plotinus's own view as stated in the text.

ἀντιτεταγμένη ταύτη οὐσία, οὐδαμῆ μερισμὸν
 δεχομένη, ἀμερής τε καὶ ἀμέριστος, διάστημά τε
 οὐδὲν οὐδὲ δι' ἐπινοίας δεχομένη, οὐ τόπου
 20 δεομένη οὐδ' ἐν τινι τῶν ὄντων γιγνομένη οὔτε
 κατὰ μέρη οὔτε κατὰ ὅλα, οἷον πᾶσιν ὁμοῦ τοῖς
 οὐσιν ἐποχομένη, οὐχ ἵνα αὐτοῖς ἰδρυθῆ, ἀλλ' ὅτι
 μὴ δύναται τὰ ἄλλα ἀνευ αὐτῆς εἶναι μηδὲ θέλει,
 αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχουσα οὐσία, κοινὸν ἀπάντων
 25 τῶν ἐφεξῆς οἷον κέντρον ἐν κύκλῳ, ἀφ' οὗ πᾶσαι
 αἱ πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν γραμμαὶ ἐξημμένοι οὐδὲν
 ἦττοι ἐῶσω αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένειν ἔχουσαι παρ'
 αὐτοῦ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ μετέχουσι μὲν
 τοῦ σημείου, καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸ ἀμερὲς αὐταῖς, προηλθόν
 γε μὴν ἐξαψάμεναι αὐτὰς ἐκεῖ. τούτου δὴ τοῦ
 30 πρῶτως ἀμερίστου ὄντος ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ τοῖς
 οὐσιν ἀρχηγοῦ καὶ αὐ ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐν αἰσθητοῖς
 μεριστοῦ πάντη, πρὸ μὲν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἐγγύς
 τι τούτου καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλη ἐστὶ φύσις, μεριστὴ
 μὲν οὐ πρῶτως, ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα, μεριστὴ γε
 μὴν γιγνομένη ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν· ὥστε διαιρουμένων
 35 τῶν σωμάτων μερίζεσθαι μὲν καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς
 εἶδος, ὅλον γε μὴν ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν μερισθέντων
 εἶναι πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ γινόμενον, ὧν ἕκαστον πάντη
 ἄλλου ἀπέστη, ἅτε πάντη μεριστὸν γενόμενον· οἷα
 χροιαὶ καὶ ποιότητες πᾶσαι καὶ ἐκάστη μορφή,
 ἣτις δύναται ὅλη ἐν πολλοῖς ἅμα εἶναι διεστηκόσιν
 40 οὐδὲν μέρος ἔχουσα πάσχον τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἄλλο
 πάσχειν· διὸ δὴ μεριστὸν πάντη καὶ τοῦτο θετέον.

be in several places at once. But there is another kind of being, opposed to this one, which in no way admits division, is without parts and cannot be divided into parts: it does not admit any extension, even in our thought about it; it has no need of place, and is not in any other being either part-wise or whole-wise; it rides, so to speak, on all beings at once, not so as to make them its basis, but because the other things cannot exist without it and do not want to; it is real being always in the same state, common to all that come after it like the centre in the circle, to which all the lines which extend to the circumference are attached but none the less let it remain in itself, and have from it their origin and their being, and participate in the point, and their principle is what is without parts; in proceeding from it they attached themselves to that central point. There is, then, this primarily indivisible being which dominates in the intelligible and among real beings, and there is also that other in the perceptible world which is altogether divisible; and, bordering on the perceptible, and rather near it, and in it, there is another nature which is not primarily divisible, like bodies, but all the same does become divisible in bodies; so that when bodies are divided, the form in them is divided too, but is a whole in each of the divided parts, becoming many and remaining the same, when each of the parts is completely separated from another part, since it is completely divisible: like colours and all qualities and every shape, which can be at the same time in many separate things, while having no part which is affected in the same way in which another part is affected: and therefore this too must be affirmed to be in every way divisible. But

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 1.

πρὸς δ' αὖ ἐκείνη τῇ ἀμερίστῳ πάντῃ φύσει ἄλλη
 ἐξῆς οὐσία ἀπ' ἐκείνης οὐσα, ἔχουσα μὲν τὸ
 ἀμερίστον ἀπ' ἐκείνης, προόδῳ δὲ τῇ ἀπ' αὐτῆς
 45 ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν σπεύδουσα φύσιν εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῦν
 κατέστη, τοῦ τε ἀμερίστου καὶ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ
 περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν,
 οὐχ ὄντινα τρόπον χροῶ καὶ ποιότης πᾶσα πολλα-
 χοῦ μὲν ἔστιν ἢ αὐτῇ ἐν πολλοῖς σωματίων ὄγκοις,
 ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἀφεστῶς τοῦ ἑτέρου πάντῃ,
 50 καθόσον καὶ ὁ ὄγκος τοῦ ὄγκου ἀπέστη· κἂν τὸ
 μέγεθος δὲ ἐν ἧ, ἀλλὰ τό γε ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ μέρει
 ταῦτόν κοινωνίαν οὐδεμίαν εἰς ὁμοπάθειαν ἔχει, ὅτι
 τὸ ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἕτερον, τὸ δ' ἕτερόν ἐστι· πάθημα
 γὰρ τὸ ταῦτόν, οὐκ οὐσία ἢ αὐτή. ἦν δὲ ἐπὶ
 ταύτῃ τῇ φύσει φαμέν εἶναι τῇ ἀμερίστῳ προσ-
 55 χωροῦσαν οὐσίᾳ, οὐσία τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐγγίγνεται
 σώμασιν, περὶ ἃ καὶ μερίζεσθαι αὐτῇ συμβαίνει οὐ
 πρότερον τοῦτο πασχούσῃ, πρὶν σώμασιν ἑαυτὴν
 δοῦναι. ἐν οἷς οὖν γίγνεται σώμασι, κἂν ἐν τῷ
 μεγίστῳ γίγνηται καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα διεστηκότι,
 60 οὐχ οὕτως, ὡς τὸ σῶμα ἐν· τῷ γὰρ συνεχεῖ τὸ
 σῶμα ἐν, ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν μερῶν ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο
 καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ. οὐδ' ὡς ποιότης μία. ἢ δ' ὁμοῦ
 μεριστῆ τε καὶ ἀμερίστος φύσις, ἦν δὴ ψυχὴν
 εἶναι φαμέν, οὐχ οὕτως ὡς τὸ συνεχὲς μία, μέρος
 65 ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο ἔχουσα· ἀλλὰ μεριστῆ μὲν, ὅτι

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL I

again, next to that altogether indivisible nature there
 is another reality following upon it and deriving from
 it, having indivisibility from that other nature, which
 pressing eagerly on in its progress from the one to
 the other nature, established itself in the middle
 between the two, the indivisible and primary and
 the "divisible which is in the sphere of bodies",
 which is upon bodies: [it does] not [behave] in the
 same way in which every colour and quality is the
 same in many places and many bodily masses, but the
 quality or colour in one mass is totally separate from
 that in the other, just as much as one mass is separate
 from the other; and even if the magnitude is one,
 yet what is the same in each part has no community
 [with any other] leading to a common experience,
 because this "same" is one thing here, another
 there: for what is the same is an affection, not the
 same substance. But the reality which we affirm to
 be immediately above this nature [of the forms in
 body], and bordering on the indivisible reality, is
 substance and becomes present in bodies, and it
 happens to become divided in the sphere of bodies,
 though it was not affected in this way before it gave
 itself to bodies. In any bodies, therefore, which it
 enters, even if it enters the largest of all and that
 which is universally extended, by giving itself to the
 whole it does not abandon its unity. It is not one
 in the sense in which body is one; for body is one by
 continuity, but its parts are different from each other
 and in different places. And it is not one in the way
 in which quality is, either. But the nature at once
 divisible and indivisible which we affirm to be soul
 is not one in the way in which the continuous is,
 having different parts; but it is divisible in that it

ἐν πᾶσι μέρεσι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ἀμέριστος δέ, ὅτι ὅλη ἐν πᾶσι καὶ ἐν ὄψωσιν αὐτοῦ ὅλη. καὶ ὁ τοῦτο κατιδὼν τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς κατιδὼν εἴσεται, ὡς θεῖον τὸ χρῆμα αὐτῆς καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ χρήματα φύσεων.

70 μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσα παντὶ μεγέθει σύνεστι καὶ ὠδὶ οὔσα ὠδὶ πάλιν αὐτῆς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλω, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῷ· ὥστε μεμερίσθαι καὶ μὴ μεμερίσθαι αὐτῆς, μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ μεμερίσθαι αὐτὴν μηδὲ μεμερισμένη γεγενῆσθαι· μένει γὰρ μεθ' ἑαυτῆς ὅλη, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματά ἐστι μεμερισμένη τῶν σωμάτων τῷ

75 οἰκείῳ μεριστῷ οὐ δυναμένων αὐτὴν ἀμερίστως δέξασθαι· ὥστε εἶναι τῶν σωμάτων πάθημα τὸν μερισμόν, οὐκ αὐτῆς.

2. Ὅτι δὲ τοιαύτην ἔδει τὴν ψυχῆς φύσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ παρὰ ταύτην οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι ψυχὴν οὔτε ἀμέριστον οὔσαν μόνον οὔτε μόνον μεριστήν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἄμφω τοῦτοι τὸν τρόπον εἶναι, ἐκ τῶνδε

5 δῆλον. εἴτε γὰρ οὕτως ἦν, ὡς τὰ σώματα, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἔχουσα μέρος, οὐκ ἂν τοῦ ἐτέρου παθόντος τὸ ἕτερον μέρος εἰς αἴσθησιν ἦλθε τοῦ παθόντος, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖν ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ, οἷον ἡ περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον, ὡς ἑτέρα καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς οὔσα ἦσθετο τοῦ παθήματος· πολλαὶ γὰρ ὅλως ἦσαν ψυχαὶ αἱ

10 διοικοῦσαι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πᾶν τὸδε οὐ μία, ἀλλὰ ἄπειροι χωρὶς ἀλλήλων. τὸ γὰρ τῆς συνεχείας, εἰ μὴ εἰς ἓν συντελοῖ, μάταιον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅπερ ἀπατῶντες ἑαυτοὺς λέγουσιν, ὡς διαδόσει

is in all the parts of that in which it is, but indivisible in that it is present in all the parts of it as a whole and in any one part as a whole. And anyone who clearly sees the greatness of the soul, and clearly sees its power, will know what a divine and wonderful thing it is and that it is one of the natures which transcend the things of this world. It has no size, but is present with every size, and is here and again there, not with a different part of itself but the same: so that it is divided and not divided, or rather it is not itself divided and has not become divided; for it remains whole with itself, but is divided in the sphere of bodies by the peculiar divisibility of bodies, since they are not able to receive it indivisibly; so that the division is an affection of bodies, not of itself.

2. The following arguments make it clear that the soul had to be a nature of this kind, and that there cannot be a soul different from this one which is neither only indivisible nor only divisible, but must be both in the way we have described. For if it was like bodies, having parts different from each other, then when one part was affected the other would not arrive at any perception of the affected part, but it would be that particular soul, the one in the region of the finger, for instance, which would perceive the affection as a soul distinct from the other and on its own: so, speaking generally, there would be many souls directing each one of us, and furthermore it would not be one soul which would direct this universe, but innumerable souls separate from each other. For the talk about continuity, if this does not gather to a unity, is futile: we certainly cannot accept what [the Stoics] say, deceiving themselves,

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ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἴασι αἰ αἰσθήσεις, παραδεικτέον.
 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονοῦν ψυχῆς μέρος λέγειν
 15 ἀνεξετάστως λέγεται· πῶς γὰρ καὶ μεριοῦσι καὶ
 τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο φήσουσι, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονοῦν;
 πηλίκῳ ποσῷ διαιροῦντες ἐκάτερον ἢ τίνι διαφορᾷ
 ποιότητος, ἐνὸς καὶ συνεχοῦς ὄγκου ὄντος; καὶ
 πότερα μόνον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἢ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέρη
 20 αἰσθήσεται; καὶ εἰ μὲν μόνον, εἰ μὲν αὐτῷ προσ-
 πέσοι τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι, ἐν τίνι τόπῳ ἰδρυμένον τὸ
 αἰσθημα αἰσθήσεται; εἰ δὲ ἄλλῳ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς,
 αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐ πεφυκὸς τόδε τὸ μέρος οὐ διαδώσει
 τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι τὸ αὐτοῦ πάθημα, οὐδ' ὅλως αἰσθησις
 ἔσται. καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι εἰ προσπέσοι,
 25 ἢ μέρει αὐτοῦ προσπεσεῖται καὶ αἰσθομένου τοῦδε
 τὰ λοιπὰ οὐκέτι· μάταιον γάρ· ἢ πολλαὶ αἰσθήσεις
 καὶ ἄπειροι ἔσονται καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιαι πᾶσαι· ἀλλ' ἢ
 μὲν, ὅτι πρῶτως ἔπαθον ἐγώ, ἢ δ' ὅτι τὸ ἄλλης
 πάθημα ἠσθόμην· ποῦ τε ἐγένετο τὸ πάθημα,
 ἀγνοήσει ἐκάστη πάρεξ τῆς πρώτης. ἢ καὶ ἕκασ-
 30 τον μέρος ψυχῆς ἀπατήσεται δοξάζον, ὅπου ἔστιν,
 ἐκεῖ γεγονέναι. εἰ δὲ μὴ μόνον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν,

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL I

that the perceptions reach the ruling principle by "transmission".¹ For, first of all, to say that the ruling principle is a part of the soul is speaking without critical reflection: for how will they divide the soul, and say that one part is different from another, and one is the ruling principle? By what amount of quantity or difference of quality will they distinguish each part, when the mass is one and continuous? And will only the ruling principle perceive, or the other parts also? And if only the ruling principle perceives, and the object of perception comes into contact with the ruling principle itself, in what place will it perceive the object of perception as situated? But if the object comes into contact with another part of the soul, since this part is not naturally adapted to perceive, it will not transmit its affection to the ruling principle, and there will be no perception at all. And if the object comes into contact with the ruling principle itself, it will either come into contact with a part of it, and this will perceive, but the other parts will not any more: there would be no point in their doing so; or there will be many, indefinitely many, perceptions, and they will not all be alike; but one will say "I was affected first" and another, "I perceived another's affection"; but they will every one of them except the first be ignorant of where the affection occurred. Or even perhaps each part of the soul will deceive itself by supposing that the affection has occurred there where it is. But if not only the ruling principle, but any other part of the soul as well, is going to have per-

¹ For the Stoic doctrine see *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* II 441 and 854 and Alexander of Aphrodisias *De Anima* 41, 5 Bruns.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτιοῦν μέρος αἰσθήσεται, διὰ τί τὸ μὲν
 ἡγεμονοῦν ἔσται, τὸ δὲ οὐ; ἢ τί δεῖ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τὴν
 αἰσθησιν ἀνιέναι; πῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ πολλῶν αἰσ-
 35 θήσεων, οἷον ὠτων καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἐν τι γινώσεται; εἰ
 δ' αὖ πάντῃ ἐν ἡ ψυχῇ εἴη, οἷον ἀμερίστον πάντῃ
 καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐν, καὶ πάντῃ πλήθους καὶ μερισμοῦ
 ἐκφεύγοι φύσιν, οὐδὲν ὅλον, ὃ τι ἂν ψυχῇ κατα-
 λάβοι, ἐψυχωμένον ἔσται· ἀλλ' οἷον περὶ κέντρον
 στήσασα ἑαυτὴν ἐκάστου ἄψυχον ἂν εἴασε πάντα
 40 τὸν τοῦ ζώου ὄγκον. δεῖ ἄρα οὕτως ἐν τε καὶ
 πολλὰ καὶ μεμερισμένον καὶ ἀμερίστον ψυχὴν εἶναι,
 καὶ μὴ ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν
 πολλαχοῦ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο μὴ παραδεχοίμεθα,
 ἢ τὰ πάντα συνέχουσα καὶ διοικοῦσα φύσις οὐκ
 ἔσται, ἢ τις ὁμοῦ τε πάντα περιλαβοῦσα ἔχει καὶ
 45 μετὰ φρονήσεως ἄγει, πλήθος μὲν οὔσα, ἐπεὶ περ
 πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, μία δέ, ἢ ἢ ἐν τὸ συνέχον, τῷ
 μὲν πολλῷ αὐτῆς ἐνὶ ζωῆν χορηγοῦσα τοῖς μέρεσι
 πᾶσι, τῷ δὲ ἀμερίστῳ ἐνὶ φρονίμως ἄγουσα. ἐν
 οἷς δὲ μὴ φρόνησις, τὸ ἐν τὸ ἡγούμενον μιμνῆται
 τοῦτο. τοῦτ' ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ θείως ἡνιγμένον τῆς
 50 ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐχούσης
 καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μερισ-
 τῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῦν συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας
 εἶδους. ἔστιν οὖν ψυχὴ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ οὕτως· τὰ
 δὲ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ ἐν· τὰ δὲ
 55 σώματα πολλὰ μόνον· τὸ δ' ὑπέρτατον ἐν μόνον.

ception, why will one part be the ruling principle and the other not? Or why is there any need for the perception to go up to the ruling principle? And how will it know as one the contents of many perceptions, of eyes and ears for instance? But on the other hand, if the soul was altogether one, in the sense of being altogether indivisible and a self-contained unity, and altogether escaped from multiplicity and divisibility, then nothing which soul took hold upon would ever be ensouled as a whole: but soul would set itself, so to speak, at the centre of each living being and leave the whole mass of it soulless. So then the soul must be in this way both one and many and divided and indivisible, and we must not disbelieve this on the ground that it is impossible for something which is one and the same to be in many places. For if we do not accept this, then the nature which holds together and directs all things will not exist, which encompassing all together holds and directs them with wisdom; it is a multiplicity because the beings of the universe are many, but one, that what holds them together may be one; by its manifold oneness it dispenses life to all the parts, and by its indivisible oneness it directs them wisely. This is the meaning of the divinely inspired riddling saying. "He mixed a third form of being from both, from the indivisible which is always in the same state and that which becomes divisible in the sphere of bodies."¹ So the soul is one and many in this way: the forms in body are many and one; bodies are many only; the Supreme is one only.

¹ The reference is *Timaeus* 35A1-4 (a passage repeatedly quoted or referred to in Plotinus's works on the soul).

IV. 2 [1]. (21) ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ
ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ

Ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷ νοητῷ ἢ ἀληθινῇ οὐσίᾳ· νοῦς τὸ
ἄριστον αὐτοῦ· ψυχαὶ δὲ κάκει· ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ καὶ
ἐνταῦθα· κάκεινος ὁ κόσμος ψυχὰς ἄνευ σωμάτων
ἔχει, οὗτος δὲ τὰς ἐν σώμασι γινουμένας καὶ
5 μερισθείσας τοῖς σώμασιν· ἐκεῖ δὲ ὁμοῦ μὲν νοῦς
πᾶς καὶ οὐ διακεκριμένον οὐδὲ μεμερισμένον, ὁμοῦ
δὲ πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ ἐν αἰῶνι τῷ κόσμῳ, οὐκ ἐν διαστάσει
τοπικῇ· νοῦς μὲν οὖν αἰεὶ ἀδιάκριτος καὶ οὐ μερι-
στός, ψυχὴ δὲ ἐκεῖ ἀδιάκριτος καὶ ἀμέριστος· ἔχει
δὲ φύσιν μερίζεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ μερισμὸς αὐτῆς τὸ
10 ἀποστῆναι καὶ ἐν σώματι γενέσθαι· μεριστῆ
οὖν εἰκότως περὶ τὰ σώματα λέγεται εἶναι,
ὅτι οὕτως ἀφίσταται καὶ μεμέρισται· πῶς οὖν
καὶ ἀμέριστος; οὐ γὰρ ὅλη ἀπέστη, ἀλλ' ἔστι
τι αὐτῆς οὐκ ἐληλυθός, ὃ οὐ πέφυκε μερίζεσθαι· τὸ
οὖν ἐκ τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα
15 μεριστῆς ταῦτόν τῳ ἐκ τῆς ἄνω [καὶ κάτω]¹
οὔσης² καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖθεν ἐξημμένης, ρυείσης δὲ
μέχρι τῶνδε, οἷον γραμμῆς ἐκ κέντρον· ἐλθοῦσα
δὲ ἐνθάδε τούτῳ τῳ μέρει ὄρα,³ ᾧ⁴ καὶ αὐτῷ τῳ

¹ del. Bréhier.

² Enn.^b: οὔσης Enn.^b, H-S¹⁻².

³ Igal: ὄρα Enn.

⁴ Enn.^a, H-S¹⁻²: ὡς Enn.^b, Igal.

IV. 2 [1]. ON THE ESSENCE OF THE
SOUL II

In the intelligible world is true being; Intellect is the best part of it; but souls are There too; for it is because they have come Thence that they are here too. That world has souls without bodies, but this world has the souls which have come to be in bodies and are divided by bodies. There the whole of Intellect is all together and not separated or divided, and all souls are together in the world which is eternity, not in spatial separation. Intellect, then, is always inseparable and indivisible, but soul is inseparable and indivisible There, but it is in its nature to be divided. For its division is departing from Intellect and coming to be in a body. It is therefore properly said to be "divisible in the sphere of bodies" because it departs and is divided in this way. Then how is it also "indivisible"? Because the whole of it did not depart, but there is something of it which did not come [down here] which is not naturally divisible. So then "from the indivisible and that which is divisible in the sphere of bodies" is equivalent to saying that soul is composed of the part which is above and that which is attached to that higher world but has flowed out as far as these parts, like a line from a centre. But when it has come here in this part, see how in this way it preserves in this very part the nature of the whole.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 2.

μέρει σφίξει τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ὅλου. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνταῦ-
θα μόνον μεριστή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀμέριστος· τὸ γὰρ
20 μεριζόμενον αὐτῆς ἀμερίστως μερίζεται. εἰς ὅλον
γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δοῦσα αὐτῆν καὶ μὴ μερισθεῖσα τῷ
ὅλῳ εἰς ὅλον τῷ ἐν παντὶ εἶναι μεμέρισται.

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL II

For even here it is not only divisible, but also indivisible; for that of it which is divided is indivisibly divided. For it gives itself to the whole body and is not divided in that it gives itself whole to the whole and is divided in that it is present in every part.

IV. 3-5. ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL

Introductory Note

THIS great work (Nos. 27-29 in the chronological order), rather oddly divided by Porphyry into two major parts (see notes on IV. 3. 32 and IV. 4. 29) with an appendix on seeing (and hearing), belongs to Plotinus's middle period. It was written soon after the treatise on omnipresence (VI. 4-5 [22-23]) and in Porphyry's chronological order immediately follows the treatise on impassibility (III. 6 [26]). In all these treatises Plotinus seems to have been particularly inclined to minimise the distinction between Intellect and Soul and to represent souls at their highest as virtually indistinguishable from intellects. In the great work which immediately follows in the chronological order (divided by Porphyry into III. 8 [30], V. 8 [31], V. 5 [32], and II. 9 [33]) the distinction between the hypostases is more strongly emphasised. The work consists of a series of very thorough discussions of what seemed to Plotinus to be the main difficulties in the Platonic doctrine of soul as he understood it. It is helpful to us (whose normal philosophical starting-point is very different) in our efforts to understand both the philosophy of Plotinus and late Greek philosophy in general to see how these difficulties arise. In the first place it is important to remember that for Plotinus, as for his Platonist and Stoic predecessors and his Neoplatonic successors, "soul" does not mean only, or primarily, human soul. The physical universe as a whole is a single ensouled living being, and its great parts, the heavenly bodies and the earth, have divine souls

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL

greatly superior in dignity and power to human ones. The problem therefore arises of the relationship of our souls to the World-Soul, and we should notice that the conclusion of the very careful discussion of this at the beginning of IV. 3 is that we are not parts or products of the World-Soul, but it and our souls and all other souls are parts of the hypostasis Soul, beings, that is, on essentially the same level. The World-Soul is our elder sister, not our mother, and we can rise as high as it and become its fellow-contemplatives and collaborators. Problems also arise and have to be carefully considered about the psychology of the universe as a whole, the heavenly bodies and the earth, about whether they have or need sense-perception and memory.

We also need to remember that for Plotinus, as for all Platonists, the presence of souls in bodies is something which raises problems and has to be accounted for. The distinctive characteristic of Platonic thinking about the soul is that its activities of pure thought, which seem to be independent of the body, are not considered in any way problematic; it is the soul's presence, activity and experience in the body and the world of the senses which Platonists find in need of explanation. Hence a large part of IV. 3 is devoted to discussing how the soul gets into the body and in what sense it can ever be said to be "in" the body. It does not seem that there is as much difference as has sometimes been maintained between Plotinus's earlier and later views on the descent of souls into bodies, though, as always with him, there are variations of emphasis in different passages. The doctrine at which he eventually arrives in IV. 8 (6) (after a very pessimistic and dualistic beginning) does not appear to be substantially different from that in this treatise or in later writings, e.g. II. 9 (33), I. 4 (46), III. 2-3 (47-8), I. 1 (53). Consistently with this Platonic attitude, Plotinus takes care in his detailed discussions of sense-perception and emotion to maintain a strict body-soul dualism and does his best to show, here as elsewhere, that body cannot really affect soul

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(this is particularly stressed in the immediately preceding III. 6 [26]). In the last part of the work (IV. 4. 30-end) and in the appendix (IV. 5) the doctrine, already mentioned, that the physical universe is a single living being, is used to solve two different sorts of problem: first, the characteristically late antique problem of how petitionary prayers to the stars and magic spells work; and then, in IV. 5, the problems, much discussed by both ancient and later psychologists, of how we see (and hear) and whether a medium is necessary for this sort of perception at a distance. Both are solved, to the satisfaction of Plotinus, by appealing to the sympathy which unites the parts of the universal living organism.

Readers of the parts of this work which deal with the problems about soul in body are recommended to make continual use of Dr. H. J. Blumenthal's *Plotinus' Psychology. His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul* (The Hague 1971). Reference has been made to this several times in the notes, but its general helpfulness for understanding this very difficult and complex part of Plotinus's thought cannot be sufficiently indicated by particular references.

Synopsis

IV. 3-4

The investigation of the soul is of central importance: it is an investigation of that which investigates. Let us first consider five arguments of those who consider that our souls are part of the Soul of the All (ch. 1). Detailed discussion and refutation of these arguments (chs. 2-8). The entry of soul into body: how body is made by soul's "going forth" and is contained in soul, which is present to it without being affected (ch. 9). Soul between the two universes, intelligible and sense-perceived (which are not spatially separated), making this world in the image of the other (chs. 10-11). The descent of particular souls into bodies is required by the natural order (and their highest

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parts remain above): it is the result of an irresistible impulse which draws them to the bodies prepared for them by Universal Soul, and so is at once free and necessary (chs. 12-13). Comparison with the story of Prometheus, Epimetheus and Pandora arbitrarily interpreted (ch. 14). Souls descend first from the intelligible world to heaven and then some of them go to earthly bodies; the reasons for their differences here below are diverse (ch. 15). Punishments, suffering, injustices are part of the universal order (ch. 16). Heaven is closer to the intelligible than earth; the distracting magic of our lower world (ch. 17). In what sense disembodied souls, or souls in heavenly bodies, are reasonable, and why they do not talk (ch. 18). The embodied soul: what Plato means by "divisible" in the sphere of bodies, and what in embodied soul remains "indivisible" (ch. 19). Neither soul as a whole nor its so-called parts are in body as a place. In what sense then can soul be said to be "in body"? Discussion of this question, on more or less Peripatetic lines but rejecting the Peripatetic solution that soul is in body as form is in matter (chs. 20-21). The analogy of light; body is in soul, not soul in body, and the different organic parts of body (brain and nervous system etc.) are illumined and activated by soul according to their capacities and needs (chs. 22-3). What happens to souls when they have left their bodies, and how sinful souls inevitably and naturally wander into the appropriate place of punishment (ch. 24). Discussion of memory (continuing to IV. 4. 12): what has memory? Certainly not eternal beings; but does it belong to soul or the composite living being (ensouled body) (ch. 25)? Sense-perception and memory; memory belongs to the soul, not the composite (ch. 26). But to which soul? The analogy of the shade of Heracles (ch. 27). It is soul's image-making power which is the seat of memory, of desires, perceptions, and the verbal expression of our thoughts (chs. 28-30). Two image-making powers are required, one for the higher and one for the lower soul (ch. 31). What memories pass from one soul to the other,

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and how quickly good souls lose their memories in the higher world; they do not even remember who they are, but are assimilated to Intellect, grasping the whole of intelligible reality in a single act of intuition (IV. 3. 32-IV. 4. 2). How souls again re-actualise their potential memories when they descend from the intelligible world to heaven and then to the world below (chs. 3-5). Memory and the souls in heaven (in the living, divine, heavenly bodies): they do not exercise memory and do not need to (chs. 6-8). The memory of "Zeus": this divine name can be used either for the World-Soul or for Divine Intellect as Maker of the physical universe; neither needs memory for its divine activity in the world (chs. 9-11). Calculation and memory are only necessary to beings which are not yet intelligent (ch. 12). The difference between Nature and Intellect (chs. 13-14). Time and souls, universal and individual (chs. 15-17). Discussion of the experience and activities of embodied soul (continuing to ch. 29): body is not soulless but ensouled, like warmed air (ch. 18). The nature of pain and pleasure (ch. 19). The part played by body and soul in desire (chs. 20-21). The psychology of the earth: does it have perceptions (ch. 22)? Organs are necessary for sense-perception (ch. 23). The perceptions of the universe and its great parts (heavenly bodies and earth), which do not need sense-organs like ours (chs. 24-7). The part played by body and soul in passions (chs. 28-9). Prayer, magic and the operations of the stars: difficulties can be resolved by understanding the interaction of the parts in the organic unity of the whole (chs. 30-39). The magic of the universal living organism (chs. 40-5).

IV. 5

How do we see? Discussion and detailed refutation of theories that a medium is necessary for sight (chs. 1-4). A medium is not necessary for hearing either: both are to be explained by the organic unity of the universe (ch. 5). Light as incorporeal energy or activity of the luminous

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body (chs. 6-7). If there was a body outside the universe, could the universe see it, if it had an eye on its outside? No, because there would not be the organic sympathy which makes perception possible (ch. 8).

IV. 3. (27) ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΑΠΟΡΙΩΝ
ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Περὶ ψυχῆς, ὅσα ἀπορήσαντας δεῖ εἰς εὐπο-
ρίαν καταστήναι, ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς ἀπορίαις
στάντας τοῦτο γοῦν κέρδος ἔχειν, εἰδέναι τὸ ἐν
τούτοις ἄπορον, ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὴν πραγματείαν
5 ποιήσασθαι. περὶ τίνος γὰρ ἂν τις μᾶλλον τὸ
πολὺ λέγων καὶ σκοπούμενος εὐλόγως ἂν διατρίβῃ
ἢ περὶ ταύτης; διὰ τε πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα, καὶ ὅτι ἐπ'
ἄμφω τὴν γνώσιν δίδωσιν, ὧν τε ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀφ'
ὧν ἐστὶ. πειθοίμεθα δ' ἂν καὶ τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ παρα-
κελεύσματι αὐτοὺς γινώσκειν παρακελευομένῃ περὶ
10 τοῦτου τὴν ἐξέτασιν ποιούμενοι. ζητεῖν τε τὰ
ἄλλα καὶ εὐρεῖν βουλόμενοι δικαίως ἂν τὸ ζητοῦν
τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο ζητούμεν, τό γε ἔραστον
ποθοῦντες λαβεῖν θέαμα τοῦ νοῦ.¹ ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἐν
τῷ παντὶ νῶ τὸ διττόν· ὥστε εὐλόγως ἐν τοῖς κατὰ
μέρος τὸ μὲν οὕτως μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ οὕτω. τὰς δὲ

¹ θέαμα τοῦ νοῦ Dodds: θεαμάτων Ebn., H-S¹: θέαμα
Theiler.

¹ It is interesting to compare the beginning of this great
treatise on the soul with the beginning of the commentary of
Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's work on the same
subject (Alexander *De Anima* 1-2 Bruns). Plotinus had
probably read Alexander's work and quotes the same Delphic

IV. 3. ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT
THE SOUL I

1. It would be right to occupy ourselves with the
soul, with all the points at which we find ourselves
in difficulties about it and must arrive at a solution,
or, continuing in just these difficulties, at least gain
this advantage, that we know what the difficult
points are. For what could one more reasonably
spend time in discussing and investigating extensively
than this? There are many other reasons for doing
so, and especially that it gives us knowledge in both
directions, of the things of which the soul is the prin-
ciple and those from which it is derived. And in
enquiring into this we should be obeying the com-
mand of the god who urged us to know ourselves.¹
And, since we wish to seek and find other things,
and long to grasp the lovely vision of the intellect,
it would be proper for us to seek the real nature of
that which seeks. For in universal Intellect, too,
there was duality; so that it is reasonable that in
partial things one should be more of one kind, and

maxim. But while Alexander firmly announces that his
intention is to commend Aristotle's doctrine, Plotinus (though
remaining convinced throughout that Plato's doctrine as he
understands it is the true one) is much more independent in
tone, and even suggests that the investigation would be worth
making even if all it did was to show us what the difficulties
are. It is the difference between a philosopher and a commen-
tator.

15 ὑποδοχὰς τῶν θεῶν ὅπως, σκεπτέον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο
 μέν, ὅταν πῶς ἐν σώματι ψυχὴ γίνεται ζητῶμεν·
 νῦν δὲ πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς λέγοντας ἐκ τῆς
 τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας εἶναι. οὐδὲ
 γὰρ ἴσως ἱκανὸν φήσουσιν εἶναι τὸ φθάνειν μέχρι
 20 τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας, μέχρις ὧν καὶ ἡ τοῦ
 παντὸς ψυχῆ ἔρχεται, μηδὲ τὸ ὁμοίως νοερόν, καὶ
 εἰ συγχωροῖεν τὸ ὁμοίως, τῷ¹ μὴ μόρια αὐτῆς
 εἶναι· εἶναι γὰρ ὁμοειδῆ καὶ τὰ μέρη τοῖς ὅλοις.
 παραθήσονται δὲ καὶ Πλάτωνι τοῦτο δοξάζοντα,
 ὅταν πιστούμενος τὸ πᾶν ἔμψυχον εἶναι λέγη, ὡς
 25 σῶμα μέρος ὃν τοῦ παντὸς τὸ ἡμέτερον, οὕτω καὶ
 ψυχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν μέρος τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς
 εἶναι. καὶ τὸ συνέπεσθαι δὲ ἡμᾶς τῇ τοῦ παντὸς
 περιφορᾷ καὶ λεγόμενον καὶ δεικνύμενον ἐναργῶς
 εἶναι, καὶ τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὰς τύχας ἐκεῖθεν λαμβάνοντας
 εἶσω τε γενομένους ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος
 30 ἡμᾶς τὴν ψυχὴν λαμβάνειν. καὶ ὅπερ ἐπὶ ἡμῶν
 μέρος ἕκαστον ἡμῶν παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς
 λαμβάνει, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μέρος
 πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὄντας παρὰ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς μεταλαμ-
 βάνειν ὡς μέρη. καὶ τὸ ψυχὴ δὲ πᾶσα παντὸς
 35 ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σημαίνειν
 καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἔξωθεν ψυχῆς καταλείποντος μετὰ
 τὴν τοῦ ὅλου· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τὸ πᾶν ἄψυχον ἐν ἐπι-
 μελείᾳ τιθεμένη.

2. Πρὸς δὲ ταῦτα πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο λεκτέον, ὡς
 ὁμοειδῆ τιθέμενοι τῷ τῶν αὐτῶν συγχωρεῖν
 ἐφάπτεσθαι, τὸ αὐτὸ γένος κοινὸν διδόντες ἕξω

¹ τῷ (coniungendum eum 18 ἱκανὸν) H-S¹: τοῦ Enn.

one of another. And we must consider how the gods
 are received into the soul. But we shall consider
 this when we investigate how the soul comes to be
 in a body; but now let us go back to those who say
 that our own souls, also, come from the soul of the
 All. For they will, perhaps, assert that it is not a
 sufficient argument for our souls not being parts of
 the Soul of the All that they too reach us far as it
 does, and are intellectual in the same way (even if
 they accept that "in the same way"), for parts
 [they will assert] have the same form as their wholes.
 And they will bring forward Plato as holding this
 opinion, when, to confirm that the All is ensouled,
 he says that, just as our own bodies are part of the
 All, so our souls are part of the Soul of the All. And
 [they will assert] that it is said and clearly shown that
 we follow along with the circuit of the All, and,
 deriving our characters and fortunes from it, and
 being inside the All, receive our souls from that which
 encompasses us. And what in us each part of us
 receives from our soul, in the same way we too,
 being on the same pattern parts in relation to the
 whole, receive as parts from the whole soul. And
 [they will say that] "all soul cares for all that is
 soulless" means just this, and that when Plato said
 it he intended not to leave anything else outside
 soul, beyond the Soul of the All: for this is the soul
 put in charge of all that is soulless.

2. The first answer which we have to make to this
 is the following: that, by agreeing that [the Soul of
 the All and individual souls] occupy themselves with
 the same [bodies] they admit that they have the
 same form, and so by this same admission give them

ποιούσι τοῦ μέρους εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἂν τὴν
 5 αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ἐκάστην πᾶσαν δικαιοτέρον ἂν
 εἴποιεν. μίαν δὲ ποιούντες εἰς ἄλλο ἀναρτῶσιν, ὃ
 μηκέτι τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε ἀλλὰ οὐδενός ὄν αὐτὸ ἢ
 κόσμου ἢ τινος ἄλλου αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, ὃ καὶ κόσμου καὶ
 ὄτουσιν ἐμφύχου. καὶ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἔχει μὴ πᾶσαν
 τὴν ψυχὴν τινος εἶναι οὐσίαν γε οὐσαν, ἀλλ' εἶναι,
 10 ἢ μὴ τινός ἐστιν ὅλως, τὰς δέ, ὅσαι τινός, γίνεσθαι
 ποτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἴσως δὲ δεῖ λαβεῖν τὸ
 μέρος ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πῶς λέγεται σαφέστερον.
 τὸ μὲν δὴ ὡς σωμάτων μέρος, εἴτε ὁμοειδὲς τὸ
 σῶμα, εἴτε ἀνομοειδές, ἐατέον ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἐπιση-
 μνημένους, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ὅταν λέγηται
 15 μέρος, κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον ἐστὶ τὸ μέρος, οὐ κατὰ τὸ
 εἶδος, οἷον τὴν λευκότητα· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῷ μορίῳ
 τοῦ γάλακτος λευκότης μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ παντός
 γάλακτος λευκότητος, ἀλλὰ μορίου μὲν ἐστὶ
 λευκότης, μόριον δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ λευκότητος· ἀμέγεθες
 20 γὰρ ὅλως καὶ οὐ ποσὸν ἢ λευκότης. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο
 μὲν οὕτως. ὅταν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν οὐ σωμάτων λέγωμεν
 μέρος, ἢτοι οὕτως ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν λέγομεν ἂν,
 ὡς τὰ δύο τῶν δέκα· ἔστω δὲ ἐπὶ ψιλῶν μόνων τὸ
 λεγόμενον· ἢ ὡς κύκλου καὶ γραμμῆς μέρος, ἢ ὡς
 ἐπιστήμης μέρος τὸ θεώρημα. ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν
 25 μονάδων καὶ τῶν σχημάτων ἀνάγκη ὡσπερ ἐπὶ

a common genus and exclude individual souls from
 being parts; on the contrary, it would be more
 proper for them to say that they are the same, and
 one, and each soul is all. But if they make it one
 they attach it to something else, which is no longer
 the soul of this or that but is not itself the soul of
 anything, either of the universe or of anything else,
 but makes that which is soul both of the universe and
 of anything ensouled. And it really is correct that
 not all of soul belongs to anything, since of course it
 is an essence, but there is a soul which absolutely
 does not belong to anything, and all those which do
 belong to anything become souls of things occasion-
 ally and incidentally. But perhaps we must get a
 clearer idea of what "part" means in things of this
 kind. We can leave out of account "part" as
 understood of bodies, whether the body is all of the
 same form or not, noting only this, that when one
 speaks of "part" in the case of bodies whose parts
 are alike, the "part" refers to the mass, not to the
 form, as for instance with whiteness; for the white-
 ness in the portion of milk is not a part of the
 whiteness of the whole milk but is the whiteness of
 a portion, but not a portion of whiteness; for white-
 ness is totally without magnitude, and not a quantity.
 But when we speak of "part" in things which are
 not bodies, we should be using it either as we do in
 the case of numbers, two part of ten, for instance:
 what we are saying is to be applied only to numbers
 by themselves; or as we speak of a part of a circle
 and a line, or as we say a theorem is part of a science.
 Now in the case of numerical units and geometrical
 figures it is necessary that, just as with bodies, the

τῶν σωμάτων ἐλαττοῦσθαι τε τὸ ὅλον τῷ εἰς τὰ
 μέρη, μερισμῷ, ἐλάττω τε τὰ μέρη ἕκαστα τῶν ὅλων
 εἶναι· ποσὰ γὰρ ὄντα καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ποσῷ ἔχον-
 τα, οὐ τὸ αὐτοποσὸν ὄντα, μείζω καὶ ἐλάττω ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης γίνεται. κατὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
 30 ἐπὶ ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος λέγεσθαι. οὔτε γὰρ ποσὸν
 οὕτως, ὡς δεκάδα τὴν πᾶσαν, τὴν δὲ μονάδα εἶναι·
 ἄλλα τε γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα συμβήσεται, καὶ
 οὐχ ἓν τι τὰ δέκα, καὶ ἐκάστη αὐτῶν τῶν μονάδων
 ἢ ψυχὴ ἔσται, ἢ ἐξ ἀψύχων ἀπάντων ἢ ψυχῆ, καὶ ὅτι
 καὶ τὸ μέρος τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς συγκεχώρηται ὁμοειδές
 35 εἶναι. τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μέρος,
 οἶον τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν, εἶναι, οἶον κύκλου ἢ τετραγώνου,
 ἢ οὐ πάντα γε τὰ μόρια ὁμοία ἐφ' ὧν ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ
 μέρος, οἶον ἐπὶ τῶν τριγώνων τρίγωνα, ἀλλὰ παρα-
 λάσσοντα· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὁμοειδῆ τίθενται εἶναι. καὶ
 40 ἐπὶ γραμμῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν μέρος ἔχει τὸ γραμμὴ εἶναι,
 ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει διαφέρει καὶ ἐνταῦθα. ἐπὶ δὲ
 ψυχῆς ἢ διαφορὰ τῷ μεγέθει εἰ λέγοιτο τῆς μερικῆς
 πρὸς τὴν ὅλην, ποσὸν τι ἔσται καὶ σῶμα τὴν
 διαφορὰν λαμβάνουσα καθὸ ψυχὴ παρὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ·
 ἀλλὰ ὑπέκειντο πᾶσαι ὁμοίαι καὶ ὅλαι. φαίνεται δὲ
 45 οὐδὲ μεριζομένη οὕτως ὡς τὰ μεγέθη, οὐδ' ἂν
 συγχωρήσαιεν δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ κατατέμεσθαι τὴν
 ὅλην εἰς μέρη· ἀναλώσουσι γὰρ τὴν ὅλην, καὶ ὄνομα

whole should become less by division into parts, and each of the parts should be less than the whole; for since they are quantitative and have their reality in their quantity, but are not absolute quantity, they necessarily become more and less. In this sense it is not admissible to speak of "part" when discussing soul; for it is not quantitative in a sense in which the whole could be the ten and the individual soul the unit; many other absurd consequences will follow [from this supposition] and, in particular, the ten are not one thing, and either each of the actual units will be a soul, or the soul will be entirely composed of soulless things, and, besides, it has been agreed that the part of the total soul has the same form as it. And in the case of a continuous surface it is not necessary for the part to be of the same kind as the whole, [the parts of] a circle or a square, for instance; or at any rate it is not necessary for all the parts to be like the whole, in the case of those figures where it is possible to take a part like the whole (as the part of a triangle can be a triangle), but they vary; but they assume that the soul is all of the same form. And in the case of a line, the part has the property of being a line, but there is a difference here too, a difference of size. But in the case of soul, if one were to say that the difference of the partial soul from the whole was one of size, then soul will be some kind of quantity, and a body, which gets its distinctive nature as soul from its quantity; but it was assumed that all souls were of like kind and wholes. But soul is obviously not divided in the way in which sizes are, and [our opponents] themselves would not agree that the whole soul is cut up into parts: if they do, they will use up the whole,

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

μόνον ἔσται, εἰ μὴ ἀρχὴ τίς ποτε ἦν πᾶσα, ὡς εἰ
οἴνου μερισθέντος εἰς πολλὰ ἕκαστον τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ
50 ἀμφορεῖ λέγοι(το)¹ μέρος οἴνου τοῦ ὅλου. ἄρ'
οὐκ οὕτω μέρος ὡς θεώρημα τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης
λέγεται τῆς ὅλης ἐπιστήμης, αὐτῆς μὲν μενούσης
οὐδὲν ἦττον, τοῦ δὲ μερισμοῦ οἶον προφορᾶς καὶ
ἐνεργείας ἑκάστου οὐσης; ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἕκα-
στον μὲν δυνάμει ἔχει τὴν ὅλην ἐπιστήμην, ἣ δὲ ἔστιν
55 οὐδὲν ἦττον ὅλη. εἰ δὴ οὕτως ἐπὶ ψυχῆς τῆς τε
ὅλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ὅλη, ἥς τὰ τοιαῦτα
μέρη, ἔσται τινός, ἀλλὰ αὐτὴ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς· οὐ
τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοῦ κόσμου, ἀλλὰ τις καὶ αὕτη τῶν ἐν
μέρει. μέρη ἄρα πᾶσαι μιᾶς ὁμοειδεῖς οὔσαι.
ἀλλὰ πῶς ἡ μὲν κόσμου, αἱ ² δὲ μερῶν τοῦ κόσμου;
3. Ἄλλ' ἄρα οὕτω μέρη, ὥσπερ ἂν καὶ ἐφ' ἐνὸς
ζώου τις εἴποι τὴν ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ ³ ψυχὴν μέρος
τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ ζώῳ ὅλης; ἀλλ' οὐτός γε ὁ λόγος
ἢ οὐδεμίαν ποιεῖ ψυχὴν ἔξω σώματος γίνεσθαι, ἢ
5 πᾶσαν οὐκ ἐν σώματι, ἀλλ' ἔξω τοῦ σώματος τοῦ

¹ Kirchhoff*: λέγοι wRJUC: λέγει B.

² Theiler: ἡ Ἐνν.*

³ R, Creuzer*: δακτύλῳ wBJUC, H-S.

¹ Here and in IV. 3. 8. 43 practically all the MSS read δακτύλῳ, which Henry and Schwyzer wish to retain, supposing that in these two places alone in Greek the word means *digitulus*, a "fingerlet" or "toelet". But (i) everywhere

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL I

and it will be only a name, unless it was once a kind of universal principle [but exists no longer], as if when wine has been divided into many portions, one might call each portion of wine in each jar a part of the whole wine. Well then, is it a part in the way in which a theorem that belongs to a science is said to be a part of the whole science, which continues to exist [as a whole] none the less, and its division is a kind of manifestation and activity of each individual part? In a state of affairs like this each theorem contains the whole science potentially, but the science is none the less a whole. If this is how it is with the whole soul and the others, the whole, of which the parts are parts of this kind, will not be the soul of anything, but an independent reality: so it will not even be the soul of the universe, but this too will be one of the partial souls. So all [both individual souls and the soul of the universe] will be parts of one, since they have the same form. But how then does one come to be the soul of the universe, and the others of parts of the universe?

3. But perhaps individual souls are parts in the way in which in one living thing the soul in the toe¹ might be called a part of the whole soul in all the living being? But this way of thinking about it either allows no soul to exist outside body, or makes all soul disembodied, and puts even the soul called

else in Greek δακτύλιος means a ring or something ring-shaped; (ii) there is no reason for Plotinus to use a diminutive in either passage. So it seems to me more reasonable to assume the recurrence of the same scribal mistake twice (perhaps the scribe of the archetype had some reason for thinking about rings while he was copying the early chapters of IV. 3!) than a use of a fairly common Greek word in an unprecedented sense for no good reason.

κόσμου τὴν τοῦ παντός λεγομένην. τοῦτο δὲ σκεπ-
 τέον· νῦν δὲ ὡς λέγοιτο ἂν κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα
 ἐξεταστέον. εἰ γὰρ τοῦ παντός παρέχει αὐτὴν
 πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν μέρει ζώοις, καὶ οὕτω μέρος ἐκάστη,
 διαιρεθεῖσα μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὴν ἐκάστῳ παρέχοι, ἢ
 10 αὐτὴ δὲ πανταχοῦ ἔσται ἢ ὅλη, μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ
 ἐν πολλοῖς ἅμα οὔσα. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔτ' ἂν τὴν
 μὲν ὅλην, τὴν δὲ μέρος ἂν εἶναι παράσχοιτο, καὶ
 μάλιστα οἷς τὸ αὐτὸ δυνάμειος παρέσταν· <εἰς
 γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ἅπασαι>. ¹ ἔπει καὶ οἷς ἄλλο
 ἔργον, τῷ δὲ ἄλλο, οἷον ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ ὠσίν, οὐ
 15 μόριον ἄλλο ψυχῆς ὄρασει, ἄλλο δὲ ὡσὶ λεκτέον
 παρεῦναι—ἄλλων δὲ τὸ μερίζειν οὕτως—ἀλλὰ τὸ
 αὐτό, καὶ ἄλλη δύναμις ἐν ἐκατέρω ἐνεργῇ
 [εἰς γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ἅπασαι]. ² τῷ δὲ τὰ
 ὄργανα διάφορα εἶναι διαφόρους τὰς ἀντιλήψεις
 γίνεσθαι, πάσας μέντοι εἰδῶν εἶναι εἰς [εἶδος] ³
 20 πάντα δυνάμενης ⁴ μορφοῦσθαι. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰς
 ἐν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα ἰέναι. τῶν δὲ ὀργάνων,
 δι' ὧν, μὴ <πάντα> ⁵ πάντα δύνασθαι δέξασθαι, καὶ
 τὰ μὲν παθήματα διάφορα γίνεσθαι τοῖς ὀργανοῖς,
 τὴν δὲ κρίσιν παρὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οἷον δικαστοῦ καὶ
 25 τοῦς λόγους τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ τὰ πραχθέντα
 κατανενοηκότος. ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν γε πανταχοῦ, εἴρηται,
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις τῶν ἔργων. εἴ τε ὡς αἰ

¹ hue transpos. Theiler; ἀμφοτέραις sc. ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ἅπασαι: sc. αἰ δυνάμεις.

² transpos. Theiler ad lin. 12-13.

³ del. Kirshhoff*: † εἰς εἶδος πάντα δυνάμενον μορφοῦσθαι† H-S.

⁴ Theiler: δυνάμενον Enn.

⁵ Beutler.

that of the All outside the body of the universe. This we must consider [later]; but now we must enquire in what sense it would be possible to speak of "part" according to this analogy. For if the soul of the All gives itself to all the partial living things, and each individual soul is a part in this sense, then if it was divided it would not give itself to each, but it will be itself everywhere, the complete soul existing simultaneously in many things as one and identical. But this would no longer allow one soul to be the whole and the other a part, especially in the case of things which have the same amount of power: for all the powers are present in both souls. For where organs, too, have different functions, eyes and ears for instance, we must not say that one part of the soul is present in sight, another in the ears—this sort of division belongs to other philosophers—but the same part, even if a different power, is active in each separate organ; but because the organs are different, different perceptions occur—though all are of forms, since the soul can take the shape of all forms (the fact that all perceived forms must go to one centre also makes this clear). And [we must say that] it belongs to the organs through which the forms go that not all of them are able to receive everything, and the affections differ according to the organs, but the judgement on them comes from one and the same principle, which is like a judge and is well informed about the words spoken and the things done. But we have already said that the soul is one thing everywhere, also in its different functions.

αἰσθήσεις, οὐκ ἐν ἑκαστῷ αὐτὸν νοεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνην· εἰ δ' οὐκεία ἦν ἡ νόησις, ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐκάστη. ὅταν δὲ καὶ λογικὴ ἢ ψυχὴ, καὶ οὕτω λογικὴ
30 ὡς <ἡ>¹ ὅλη λέγεται, τὸ λεγόμενον μέρος αὐτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ μέρος ἔσται τοῦ ὅλου.

4. Τί οὖν φατέον, εἰ οὕτω μία, ὅταν τις ζητῇ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν πρῶτον μὲν ἀπορῶν, εἰ οἷόν τε οὕτως ἐν ἅμα ἐν πᾶσιν, ἔπειτα, ὅταν ἐν σώματι ἦ, ἢ δὲ μὴ ἐν σώματι; ἴσως γὰρ ἀκολουθήσει αἰεὶ ἐν σώματι
5 πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ παντός· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡ ἡμέτερα λέγεται καταλείπειν τὸ σῶμα· καίτοι τινὲς φασὶ τόδε μὲν καταλείπειν, οὐ πάντη δὲ ἔξω σώματος ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλ' εἰ πάντη ἔξω σώματος ἔσται, πῶς ἢ μὲν καταλείψει, ἢ δὲ οὐ, ἢ αὐτὴ οὐσα; ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ νοῦ ἑτερότητι
10 χωριζομένου ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ μέρη ἀσχιστα² ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ὄντος³ δὲ ὁμοῦ αἰεὶ—ἀμέριστος γὰρ ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ οὐσία—οὐδεμία τοιαύτη ἂν ἀπορία κατέχοι· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς λεγομένης μεριστοῦς εἶναι κατὰ σώματα τοῦτο τὸ ἐν τι εἶναι πάσας πολλὰς ἂν ἔχοι ἀπορίας· εἰ μὴ τις τὸ μὲν ἐν
15 στήσειεν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὴ πῖπτον εἰς σῶμα, εἴτ' ἐξ ἐκείνου τὰς πάσας, τὴν τε τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, μέχρι τινὸς οἷον συνούσας <ἀλλήλαις>⁴ καὶ μίαν τῷ μηδενὸς τινος γίνεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ πέρασιν αὐτῶν ἐξηρημέναις [καὶ συνούσας ἀλλήλαις]⁵ πρὸς τὸ

¹ Theiler.

² Theiler: μάλιστα (vel ἑκαστα C) Enn.

³ Theiler: ὄντων Enn.

⁴ Harder.

⁵ del. Harder.

And if our souls were like sense-perceptions, it is not possible for each one of us to think himself, but the soul of the All [would have to do the thinking]; but if our thinking was our own, each soul would be independent. But since the soul is also rational, and rational in the sense in which the universal soul is called rational, that which is called a part will be the same as the whole, not a part of the whole.

4. What then is to be said, if the soul is one in this way, when someone enquires into the consequences, and raises the first difficulty, whether this sort of simultaneous unity in all things is really possible, and the next, if it is possible when some soul is in body, and some not in body? For perhaps it will follow that all soul is always in body, and especially the soul of the All: for it is not said to leave the body, as ours is; and yet some people do say that ours will leave this particular body, but will not be altogether outside body. But if it is going to be altogether outside body, how will one soul leave the body and the other not, when it is the same soul [in both]? Now in the case of Intellect, which separates itself by differentiation into parts which are not cut off from each other, but is all together for ever—for this reality is surely undivided—no difficulty of this kind can arise; but in the case of the soul which is said to be divisible in relation to bodies, this assertion that all souls are one thing has many difficulties; unless of course one made the one stand by itself without falling into body, and then said that all the souls, the Soul of the All and the others, came from that one, living together with each other, so to speak, down to a certain level and being one soul by belonging to no particular thing; and that, being

20 ἄνω ὡδὶ καὶ ὡδὶ ἐπιβάλλειν, οἶον φωτὸς ἤδη πρὸς
 τῇ γῆ μεριζομένου κατ' οἴκους καὶ οὐ μεμερισμέ-
 νου, ἀλλ' ὄντος ἑνὸς οὐδὲν ἦττον. καὶ τὴν μὲν τοῦ
 παντὸς αἰεὶ ὑπερέχει τῷ μηδὲ εἶναι αὐτῇ τὸ κατελ-
 θεῖν μηδὲ τῷ¹ κάτω μηδὲ ἐπιστροφῆν τῶν² τῆδε,
 τὰς δ' ἡμετέρας τῷ τε εἶναι ἀφωρισμένον αὐταῖς τὸ
 25 μέρος ἐν τῷδε καὶ τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ τοῦ προσδεομένου
 φροντίσεως, τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκουίας τῇ ἐν φυτῷ
 μεγάλῃ ψυχῇ, ἣ ἀπάνως τὸ φυτὸν καὶ ἀψόφως
 διοικεῖ, τοῦ κατωτάτω τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντός, τοῦ
 δὲ ἡμῶν κάτω, οἶον εἰ εὐλαί ἐν σαπέντι μέρει τοῦ
 30 φυτοῦ γίγνεται. οὕτω γὰρ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἔμφυχον ἐν
 τῷ παντί. τῆς δὲ ἄλλης ψυχῆς τῆς ὁμοειδοῦς τῷ ἄνω
 τῆς ὕλης, οἶον εἴ τις γεωργὸς ἐν φροντίδι τῶν ἐν
 τῷ φυτῷ εὐλῶν γίνονται καὶ ταῖς μερίμναις πρὸς τῷ
 φυτῷ γίγνεται, ἣ εἴ τις ὑγαιώνων μὲν καὶ μετὰ
 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὑγαιώνων ὄντα πρὸς ἐκείνους
 35 εἶναι λέγει, πρὸς οἷς ἐστὶν ἢ πράττων ἢ θεωρίας
 ἑαυτὸν παρέχων, νοσήσαντος δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ
 σώματος θεραπείαις ὄντος πρὸς τῷ σώματι εἶναι
 καὶ τοῦ σώματος γεγονέναι.

5. Ἄλλὰ πῶς ἔτι ἡ μὲν σὴ, ἣ δὲ τοῦδε, ἣ δὲ ἄλλου
 ἔσται; ἀρ' οὖν τοῦδε μὲν κατὰ τὸ κάτω, οὐ τοῦδε δέ,
 ἀλλ' ἐκείνου κατὰ τὸ ἄνω; ἀλλ' οὕτω γε Σωκράτης
 μὲν ἔσται ὅταν ἐν σώματι καὶ ἡ Σωκράτους ψυχῆ.

¹ Harder, B-T: τὸ Enn.*

² suspic. H S¹, ser. B-T: τὰ Enn.

fastened [to the one] by their edges on their upper side, they strike down this way and that, like the light which, just when it reaches the earth, divides itself among houses and is not divided, but is one none the less.¹ And the Soul of the All would always remain transcendent because it would have nothing to do with coming down, even with its lower part, nor with a turning to the things here below, but our souls would come down because they would have their part marked off for them in this sphere, and by the turning to them of that which needs their care. The Soul of the All (that is, its lowest part) would be like the soul in a great growing plant, which directs the plant without effort or noise; our lower part would be as if there were maggots in a rotten part of the plant—for that is what the ensouled body is like in the All. The rest of our soul, which is of the same nature as the higher parts of universal soul, would be like a gardener concerned about the maggots in the plant and anxiously caring for it. Or it is as one might speak of a healthy man living with other healthy men as being at the service of his neighbours either in his action or his contemplation; and of a sick man, concerned with the care of his body, as being at the service of his body and belonging to it.

5. But how will there still be one particular soul which is yours, one which is the soul of this particular man, and one which is another's? Are they the souls of particular individuals in the lower order, but belong in the higher order to that higher unity? But this will mean that Socrates, and the soul of Socrates, will exist as long as he is in the body; but

¹ For this image cp. Marcus Aurelius XII. 30.

5 ἀπολείται δέ, ὅταν μάλιστα γένηται ἐν τῷ ἀρίστῳ.
 ἢ ἀπολείται οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων· ἐπεὶ κάκεῖ οἱ νόες
 οὐκ ἀπολοῦνται, ὅτι μή εἰσι σωματικῶς μεμερισ-
 μένοι, εἰς ἓν, ἀλλὰ μένει ἕκαστον ἐν ἑτερότητι
 ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν εἶναι. οὕτω τοῖνυν καὶ ψυχαὶ
 10 ἐφεξῆς καθ' ἕκαστον νοῦν ἐξηρητημέναι, λόγοι νῶν
 οὔσαι καὶ ἐξελιγμέναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖνοι, οἷον πολλὸν
 ἐξ ὀλίγου γενόμεναι, συναφεῖς τῷ ὀλίγῳ οὔσαι
 ἀμερεστέρω ἐκείνων ἐκάστῳ, μερίζεσθαι ἤδη θελή-
 σασαι καὶ οὐ δυνάμεναι εἰς πᾶν μερισμοῦ ἵέναι, τὸ
 ταῦτόν καὶ ἕτερον σφύζουσαι, μένει τε ἐκάστη ἐν καὶ
 15 ὁμοῦ ἐν πᾶσαι. εἴρηται δὴ κεφάλαιον τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι
 ἐκ μιᾶς, καὶ αἱ ἐκ μιᾶς πολλαὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ νῷ,
 [κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ]¹ μερισθεῖσαι καὶ οὐ μερισθεῖσαι,
 καὶ λόγος εἷς τοῦ νοῦ ἢ μένουσα, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς
 λόγοι μερικοὶ καὶ αὐλοὶ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ.

6. Διὰ τί δὲ ἡ μὲν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ ὁμοειδῆς
 οὔσα πεποιήκε κόσμον, ἡ δὲ ἐκάστου οὔ, ἔχουσα καὶ
 αὐτὴ πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῇ; τὸ γὰρ δύνασθαι ἐν πολλοῖς

¹ del. Kirshhoff.

he will cease to be precisely when he attains to the very best. Now no real being ever ceases to be; since the Intellects There too are not dissolved into a unity because they are not corporeally divided, but each remains distinct in otherness, having the same essential being. So too it is with souls, which depend in order on each several intellect, and are expressions of intellects, further unfolded than they are, having passed, we may say, from brevity to multiplicity.¹ They are linked to the brevity of intellect by that in each of them which is least divided. They have already willed to be divided but cannot reach complete division; they keep identity and difference; each soul remains one, and all are one together. So we have given the sum of the discussion, that the souls spring from one, and the souls springing from one are many in the same way as Intellect, divided and not divided; and the soul which abides is a single expression of Intellect, and from it spring partial expressions which are also immaterial, just as in the world of Intellect.

6. But why has the Soul of the All, which has the same form as ours, made the universe, but the soul of each individual has not, though it too has all things in itself? (We have explained that it can

¹ For the belief that there are Forms or Ideas of individuals (at least of individual men), which is probably, but not quite certainly, asserted here, cp. V. 7. It also seems to be implied in IV. 3. 12, 1-5. For a careful examination of all the evidence about Forms of individuals in Plotinus see H. J. Blumenthal, "Did Plotinus believe in Ideas of Individuals?" in *Phronesis* 11 (1966), 61-80; A. H. Armstrong, "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus"; in *Dionysius* 1 (1977), 49-68 (=A. H. Armstrong *Plotinian and Christian Studies* (London 1979), No. XX.

γίνεσθαι ἅμα καὶ εἶναι εἴρηται. νῦν δὲ λεκτέον—
 5 τάχα γὰρ καὶ πῶς ταυτόν ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ μὲν
 τοδί, τὸ δὲ τοδί ποιεῖ ἢ πάσχει ἢ ἄμφω, γνωσθήσε-
 ται· ἢ καθ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο ἐπιυκεπιτέον—πῶς οὖν
 καὶ διὰ τί κόσμον πεποίηκεν, αἱ δὲ μέρος τι κόσμου
 διοικοῦσιν. ἢ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν τοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν
 ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντας τοὺς μὲν πλείονων, τοὺς δὲ
 10 ἐλαττόνων ἄρχειν. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, εἰπέω ἂν ἔχοι τις.
 ἀλλ' ἔστιν, εἴποι τις ἄν, καὶ ψυχῶν διαφορά, ἢ
 μᾶλλον, καθὸ ἢ μὲν οὐκ ἀπέστη τῆς ὅλης, ἀλλ' ἔσχεν
 ἐκεῖ οὐσα περὶ αὐτὴν τὸ σῶμα, αἱ δὲ ἤδη ὄντος οἴου
 ἀδελφῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης μοίρας διέλαχον, οἷον
 15 προπαρασκευασάσης ταύτης αὐταῖς οἰκήσεις. ἔστι
 δὲ καὶ τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸν ὅλον νοῦν ἰδεῖν, τὰς δὲ
 μᾶλλον πρὸς τοὺς αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν μέρει. τάχα δ' ἂν
 καὶ αὐταὶ δύναντο ποιεῖν, τῆς δὲ ποιησάσης οὐκέτι
 οἶόν τε καὶ αὐταῖς, πρώτης ἐκείνης ἀρξάσης. τὸ δ'
 αὐτὸ ἂν τις ἠπόρησε, καὶ εἰ ἠτισοῦν καὶ ἄλλη πρώτη
 20 κατεῖχε. βέλτιον δὲ λέγειν τῷ ἐξηρητῆσθαι μᾶλλον
 τῶν ἄνω· τῶν γὰρ ἐκεῖ νενευκότων ἢ δύναμις μείζων.
 σφύζουσαι γὰρ αὐτὰς ἐπ' ἀσφαλοῦς ἐκ τοῦ ῥάστου
 ποιοῦσι· δυνάμειος γὰρ μείζονος μὴ πάσχειν ἐν οἷς
 ποιεῖ· ἢ δὲ δύναμις ἐκ τοῦ ἄνω μένειν. μένουσα
 50

come to be and [continue to] exist in many things
 at once.) But now we must state—perhaps we shall
 also come to know how the same thing, when it is
 now in one body and now in another, does now this
 and now that, or is affected in this or that way, or
 both: this however requires a special discussion to
 itself—how then and why the Soul of the All has
 made the universe, but the particular souls direct
 [each] a part of it. There is of course nothing
 remarkable in some of those who have the same
 knowledge being in control of more, and some of
 less. But one could ask the reason why. But there
 is, one might answer, a difference between souls, and
 all the more in that the Soul of the All has not
 separated itself from soul as a whole but remained
 there and put on the body, but the individual souls,
 since body exists already, received their allotted
 parts when their sister soul, as we may say, was
 already ruling, as if it had already prepared their
 dwellings for them. There is a difference too, in
 that the soul of the All looks towards Intellect as a
 whole, but the individual souls rather to their own
 partial intellects. But perhaps these too would have
 been able to make [a world], but as the soul of the
 All had done so already they were unable to do so
 as well, since it had begun first. One could raise
 the same difficulty just as well if any other soul had
 taken the first place. But it is better to say [that
 the soul of the All has made the world] because it
 was more closely dependent on the beings above it:
 the beings which incline that way have greater power.
 For they keep themselves in a place of safety, and
 so make with the greatest ease; for it is a mark of
 greater power not to be affected in what it makes;

25 οὖν ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖ προσιόντων, αἱ δὲ αὐταὶ προσ-
 ἦλθον. ἀπέστησαν οὖν εἰς βάθος. ἢ πολὺ αὐτῶν
 καθελκυσθέν συνεφεικύσατο καὶ αὐτὰς ταῖς γνώ-
 μαις εἰς τὸ κάτω εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ δευτέρας καὶ
 τρίτας τῷ ἐγγύθεν καὶ τῷ πορρώτερον ὑπονοητέον
 εἰρήσθαι, ὡσπερ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν οὐχ ὁμοίως πάσαις
 30 ψυχαῖς ὑπάρχει τὸ¹ πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν
 ἐνούτο ἂν, οἱ δὲ βάλλοιεν ἂν ἐγγυὺς ἐφιέμενοι, οἷς
 δὲ ἦττον ἂν ἔχοι τοῦτο, καθὼς ταῖς δυνάμεσιν οὐ
 ταῖς αὐταῖς ἐνεργοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ, οἱ
 δὲ τῇ μετ' ἐκείνῃ, οἱ δὲ τῇ τρίτῃ, ἀπάντων τὰς
 πάσας ἐχόντων.

7. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ταύτη. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν Φιλίβῳ
 λεχθέν παρέχον ὑπόνοιαν μοίρας τῆς τοῦ παντός τὰς
 ἄλλας εἶναι; βούλεται δὲ ὁ λόγος οὐ τοῦτο, ὃ τις
 οἶεται, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἦν χρήσιμον αὐτῷ τότε, καὶ τὸν
 5 οὐρανὸν ἐμψυχον εἶναι. τοῦτο οὖν πιστοῦται
 λέγων, ὡς ἄτοπον τὸν οὐρανὸν ἄψυχον λέγειν
 ἡμῶν, οἱ μέρος σώματος ἔχομεν τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴν
 ἐχόντων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος ἔσχεν ἀψύχου τοῦ
 παντός ὄντος; δῆλον δὲ μάλιστα τὸ τῆς γνώμης
 αὐτοῦ ἐν Τιμαίῳ ποιεῖ, οὐ γενομένης τῆς ψυχῆς
 10 τοῦ παντός ὑστερον τὰς ἄλλας ποιεῖ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
 μινύτων κρατήρος, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ τῶν ὄλων,
 ὁμοειδῆ ποιῶν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν
 δευτέροις καὶ τρίτοις διδούς. τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ

¹ Harder B-T: τὰ Ern.*

¹ See *Timaeus* 41D7.

² Cp. *Philebus* 30A-B, where, as Plotinus suggests, Plato is really mainly concerned to argue that the universe must have a soul just as we have.

and power comes from abiding above. The Soul of the All, then, abiding in itself makes, and the things which it makes come to it, but the particular souls themselves go to the things. So they have departed to the depths; or rather, a great part of them has been dragged down and has dragged them with it by their thoughts to the lower existence. For we must understand that souls were called "second" and "third"¹ according to whether they are nearer to or farther from [the higher world]; just as among us too not all souls have the same relationship to the realities There, but some men may unify themselves, others nearly reach this point in their striving, and others attain it in a lesser degree, in so far as they act by powers which are not the same, but some by the first, others by that which comes after it, others by the third, though all of them have all.

7. So much for that. But what about the passage in the *Philebus* which suggests that the other souls are parts of the soul of the All²? But this is not, as someone thinks, the intention of what is said, but what suited Plato's purpose at that stage in the argument, that the universe is ensouled. He establishes that by saying that it is absurd to say that the universe is soulless, when we, who possess a part of the body of the All, have souls. For how could the part have a soul when the All was soulless? He makes his own thought especially clear in the *Timaeus*, where [the Demiurge], when the soul of the All has come into existence, makes the other souls, mixing them from the same mixing-bowl from which he made the soul of the whole, making the other kind of soul of the same form [as the soul of the All] but giving it a difference by using second and third class

“ψυχὴ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου”; τί γὰρ ἂν εἶη, ὃ σώματος τὴν φύσιν διοικεῖ καὶ ἢ
 15 πλάττει ἢ τάττει ἢ ποιεῖ ἢ ψυχὴ; καὶ οὐχ ἢ μὲν πέφυκε τοῦτο δύνασθαι, ἢ δὲ οὐ. ἢ μὲν οὖν τελεία, φησὶν, ἢ τοῦ παντὸς μστεωροποροῦσα οὐ δύσα, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἐποχουμένη; εἰς τὸν κόσμον ποιεῖ καὶ ἥτις ἂν τελεία ἦ, οἴτω διοικεῖ. “ἢ δὲ πτερορρησασα” εἰπὼν ἄλλην ταύτην παρ’
 20 ἐκείνην ποιεῖ. τὸ δὲ συνέπεσθαι τῇ τοῦ παντὸς περιφορᾷ καὶ ἤδη ἐκείθεν κομιζέσθαι καὶ πάσχειν παρ’ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη σημεῖον τοῦτο τοῦ μέρη τὰς ἡμετέρας εἶναι. ἰκανὴ γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ παρὰ φύσεως τόπων πολλὰ ἀπομάττεσθαι καὶ ὑδάτων
 25 καὶ ἀέρος· καὶ πόλεων διάφοροι¹ οἰκήσεις καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν αἰ κράσεις. καὶ τι ἔφαμεν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ὄντες τῆς τοῦ ὅλου ψυχῆς, καὶ παρὰ τῆς περιφορᾶς συνεχωροῦμεν τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀντιτίθεμεν ἄλλην ψυχὴν πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ μάλιστα τῇ ἀντιστάσει δεικνυμένην ἄλλην. τὸ δ’ ὅτι εἴσω
 30 γεννώμεθα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μητρῶν² φάμεν ἑτέραν εἶναι οὐ τὴν τῆς μητρὸς τὴν ἐπεισιούσαν.

¹ Taciler: διαφόρων Enn.*

² Harder B-T (in *alio materna* Ficinus): μητέρων Enn.*

¹ Again a reference to *Timaeus* 41D7.

² The reference is to *Phaedrus* 246B6. He then goes on to consider Plato's distinction, which follows immediately, between the perfect soul which is "winged" and "walks on high" and the soul which "loses its feathers" and falls into a human body, whose fall and subsequent fate is described in the rest of the great myth.

³ Cf. *Timaeus* 90C8-D1. For a fuller statement of Plotinus's own position on the determination of the characters of

ingredients.¹ And what about the passage in the *Phaedrus* "All soul cares for all that is soulless"²? What could it be, then, which directs the nature of body, and either shapes it or sets it in order or makes it, except soul? And it is not the case that one soul is naturally able to do this, but the other is not. Plato says, then, that the "perfect" soul, the soul of the All, "walks on high", and does not come down, but, as we may say, rides upon the universe and works in it; and this is the manner of direction of every soul which is perfect. But when he speaks of the "soul which moults" he makes this another, distinct from the perfect one. But as for our following round the circuit of the All,³ and deriving our characters from it and being affected by it, this would be no sort of indication that our souls are parts [of the soul of the All]. For the soul is capable of taking many impressions from the nature of places and waters and air; and the situations of cities and the temperaments of bodies are different. And we stated that, since we are in the All, we have something from the soul of the whole, and we agreed that we were affected by the circuit of the universe; but we opposed another soul to this, and one which shows itself other especially by its opposition. As for the fact that we are begotten inside the universe, in the womb too we say that the soul which comes into the child is another one, not that of the mother.

our lower selves, the composites of body and soul, by the physical universe of which they are parts, see II. 3. 9-12. Plotinus was always ready to admit that most of what ordinary people think of as distinctive traits of character and personality are due to physical conditions, heredity and environment.

8. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι λύσεως καὶ τοῦ
 τῆς συμπαθείας μὴ ἐμποδίζοντος τὸν λόγον· ἐκ γὰρ
 τῆς αὐτῆς πᾶσαι οὔσαι, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὅλου,
 συμπαθεῖς, καὶ γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅτι καὶ μία καὶ
 5 πολλαί. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τῆς
 διαφορᾶς ὅπως, εἴρηται. εἴρηται δὲ καὶ ὅλως περὶ
 διαφορᾶς ψυχῆς καὶ νῦν συντόμως λεγέσθω, ὅτι καὶ
 παρὰ τὰ σώματα μὲν ἂν γίνοντο διαφέρειν καὶ ἐν
 τοῖς ἦθεσι μάλιστα καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς διανοίας ἔργοις
 καὶ ἐκ τῶν προβεβιωμένων βίων· κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς
 10 προβεβιωμένους φησὶ τὰς αἰρέσεις ταῖς ψυχαῖς
 γίνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τις φύσιν ψυχῆς ὅλως λαμβάνοι,
 καὶ ἐν ταύταις εἴρηται αἱ διαφοραί, ἐν οἷς καὶ
 δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα ἐλέγχο, καὶ ὅτι πάντα πᾶσαι,
 κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐνεργῆσαν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐκάστη. τοῦτο
 δὲ τῷ τὴν μὲν ἐνοῦσθαι ἐνεργείᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν
 15 γνῶσει <εἶναι>,¹ τὴν δὲ ἐν ὀρέξει, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῃ
 ἄλλα βλέπειν καὶ ἅπερ βλέπει εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι·
 καὶ τὸ πλήρες δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τέλειον οὐχὶ
 ταῦτόν πάσαις. ἀλλ' εἰ ποικίλον τὸ ὅλον σύνταγμα
 αὐταῖς—εἰς γὰρ πᾶς λόγος πολὺς καὶ ποικίλος,
 ὡσπερ ζῶον ψυχικὸν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἔχον—εἰ δὴ
 20 τοῦτο, καὶ σύνταξις ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐ διέσπασται τὰ
 ὄντα ὅλως ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, οὐδὲ τὸ εἰκὴ ἐν τοῖς
 οὔσαι, ὅπου μὴδὲ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ ἀριθμὸν τινα
 ἀκόλουθόν ἐστὶν εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐστάναι δεῖ τὰ

¹ Theiler.

8. This then is how it is with the solution of this problem, and the fact of sympathy docs not hinder our arguments: for since all souls derive from the same from which the soul of the Whole derives too, they have a community of feeling. For we have said already that they are both one and many. We have also explained how the part differs from the whole. We have made a general statement about the differences between souls, and now let us add briefly that besides their [different] bodies they can differ very notably in character, and in the activities of discursive reason and as a result of the lives they have lived before; for Plato says that the souls' choices take place according to their previous lives. And if one takes a general view of the nature of soul, the differences in souls have been mentioned in those passages too where there was talk of "seconds" and "thirds", and it was said that all souls are all things, but each [is differentiated] according to that which is active in it: that is, by one being united in actuality, one being in a state of knowledge, one in a state of desire, and in that different souls look at different things and are and become what they look at; and the fullness and completion for souls is not the same for all. But if the whole structure in which they exist is complex—for every single rational principle is manifold and complex, like a soul-organism containing many forms—if this is really so, there is structural organisation, and the realities are not completely cut off from each other, and there is nothing random among the realities (as there is not even among bodies), and it follows that there must be a [definite] number. For, again, realities must be static, and the intelligible realities must remain

ὄντα, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ νοητὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν
 25 ἀριθμῷ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ τὸ τόδε. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
 τῶν σωμάτων τῇ φύσει τοῦ καθέκαστον ῥέοντος ἅτε
 ἐπακτοῦ τοῦ εἶδους ὄντος τὸ εἶναι κατ' εἶδος ἀεὶ
 ὑπάρχει μιμήσει τῶν ὄντων, τοῖς δὲ ἅτε οὐκ ἐκ
 συνθέσεως οὐσι τὸ εἶναι ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστὶν
 30 ἀριθμῷ ἔν, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχει, καὶ οὕτε
 γίνεται ὃ μὴ ἦν, οὔτε ὃ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἔσται. ἐπεὶ καὶ
 εἰ ποιοῦν τι ἔσται αὐτά, ἐκ μὲν ὕλης οὐκ ἄν· εἰ δὲ
 καὶ τοῦτο, δεῖ τι καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰσιῶδες προσθεῖναι·
 ὥστε μεταβολὴ περὶ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται, εἰ νῦν
 πλεόν ποιεῖ ἢ ἔλαττον. καὶ διὰ τί νῦν, ἀλλ' οὐκ
 ἀεὶ οὕτως; καὶ τὸ γενόμενον δὲ οὐκ αἰδίων, εἴπερ
 35 πλεόν καὶ ἔλαττον· κεῖται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον.
 πῶς οὖν ἄπειρον, εἰ στήσεται; ἢ τῇ δυνάμει τὸ
 ἄπειρον, ὅτι ἡ δύναμις ἄπειρος, οὐχ ὡς μερισθησο-
 μένης εἰς ἄπειρον. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐ πεπερασ-
 μένος. καὶ αὗται τοῖνυν οὐ πέρατι ἄλλοτρίῳ ἐστὶν

¹ This passage is interesting as an example of the sense in which Plotinus is prepared to speak of the Second and Third Hypostases as *ἄπειρος* (infinite in the sense of unlimited or unbounded). *ὁ θεός* in line 38 is probably *Noûs*. Any kind of spatially conceived or numerical infinity is excluded from his intelligible world (cp. line 37 here and VI. 6. 17-18).

the same, and each must be numerically one: for this is how it is *this* definite reality. For in some things, because of their bodily nature, individuality is fluid because the form comes in from outside and they have continual existence only according to specific form, in imitation of the real beings, but in others, since they are not produced by composition, the existence of each is in that which it is, numerically one, which is there from the beginning, and does not become what it was not and will not cease to be what it is. Since even if there is to be something which makes them it will not make them out of matter; if it does do this it must add something substantial from itself: so that there will be change affecting this making power itself, if it now makes more and now less. And why should it make more or less now, but not go on always in this same way? And that which has come into being will not be everlasting, if it is now more and now less; but it is settled that soul is a thing of this [everlasting] kind. How then will it be infinite, if it is going to remain static? Its infinity lies in its power; it is infinite because its power is infinite, and not as if it was going to be divided to infinity. For God too is not limited.¹ And these souls, too, are not each what

"Infinity" there can only mean infinity of power (as here) or unboundedness because there is nothing to bound or measure intelligible reality—intelligible number is the ultimate measure and so not itself measured, bounded or limited (as in VI. 6). The doctrine of "relative *ἀπειρία*" in Proclus (*Elements of Theology* props. 89-96, pp. 83-7 Dodds) is helpful to the understanding of Plotinus here. The One for him is infinite in the sense of being absolutely beyond any sort of determination or limitation, because it is beyond being and thought, but is hardly ever called *ἄπειρος*.

40 ἐκάστη ὃ ἐστιν, ὄλον τοσαύτη, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ ἐστιν ὅσον
 θέλει, καὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε γένηται προϊούσα ἕξω αὐτῆς,
 ἀλλὰ φθάνει μὲν πανταχοῦ, ὃ πέφυκεν αὐτῆς ἐπὶ
 τὰ σώματα [εἰς τὰ σώματα]¹ φθάνειν· οὐ μὴν
 διέσπασται ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, ὅταν ἦ καὶ ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ
 καὶ ἐν τῷ ποδί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντί, εἰς ὃ
 45 ἂν φθάσῃ, ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ μέρει φυτοῦ καὶ
 ἀποτετμημένου, ὥστε εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 φυτῷ καὶ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τετμημένῳ· ἐν γὰρ τὸ
 σῶμα τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐνί ἐστιν αὐτοῦ
 πανταχοῦ. καὶ σαπέντος δὲ ζώου εἰ πολλὰ ἐξ
 αὐτοῦ, ἐκεῖνη μὲν οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ παντός ζώου
 50 ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει αὐτὸ δεκτικὸν
 αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπέθανε. τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῆς φθορᾶς
 ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντα πρὸς γενέσεις ζώων, τὰ μὲν
 τῶνδε, τὰ δὲ τῶνδε, ἴσχει ψυχὴν οὐδενὸς ὄντος
 ὅτου ἀποστατεῖ, ὄντος δὲ τοῦ μὲν δέχεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ
 μὴ δέχεσθαι δυναμένον. καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα οὕτως
 55 ἔμψυχα οὐ πλείους ἐποίησε ψυχάς· ἐξήρηται γὰρ
 τῆς μιᾶς, ἢ μένει μία· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἡμῶν ἀπο-
 τεμνομένων τινῶν, ἄλλων δὲ ἀντ' αὐτῶν φυομένων,
 τῶν μὲν ἀπέστη ἡ ψυχὴ, τοῖς δὲ προσεγένετο, ἕως
 ἢ μία μένει. ἐν δὲ τῷ παντί μένει αἰεὶ ἢ μία· τὰ
 δὲ ἐντὸς τὰ μὲν ἴσχει, τὰ δὲ ἀποτίθεται, τῶν
 60 αὐτῶν ψυχικῶν μενόντων.

¹ del. Theiler.

they are by some external limit, as if they were a definite size, but each is itself as much as it wants to be, and never goes outside itself as it proceeds, but that part of it which is naturally adapted to reach bodies reaches everywhere in them; it is certainly not torn away from itself when it is in the finger¹ as in the foot. So it is also in the All, to whatever it reaches; it is in one part of a plant and also in another, even if it is cut off; so that it is in the original plant and the part cut off from it: for the body of the all is one, and soul is everywhere in it as in one thing. And when an animal rots, if many others spring from it, the original soul of the whole animal is no longer in the body: for the body on its side does not have the capacity to receive it, or the animal would not have died. But the products of the decay which are adapted for the generation of animals, some for those of one kind and some for those of another, have soul since there is nothing from which it is absent, but one thing is able to receive it and another not to receive it. And things which become ensouled in this way do not make more souls: for they depend on the one soul which remains one; just as in ourselves, when some parts are cut off and others grow instead of them, soul leaves the old ones and comes to the new as long as the one soul remains. But in the All the one soul is always there; but some of the things within it take soul and some put it off, but the soul-activities remain the same.

¹ See ch. 3, n. 1.

9. Ἄλλα <καὶ>¹ πῶς ἐγγίγνεται σώματι ψυχῇ, ζήτητέον. τίς ὁ τρόπος; [καὶ πῶς].² οὐχ ἦττον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο θαυμάσαι τε καὶ ζητῆσαι ἀξίον. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν διττὸς ὁ τρόπος τῆς εἰς σῶμα ψυχῆς
 5 εἰσόδου ἢ μὲν γὰρ γίνεται ψυχῇ ἐν σώματι οὐσῆ τῇ τε μετενσωματομένη καὶ τῇ ἐκ σώματος ἀερίνου ἢ πυρίνου εἰς γήινον γινομένη, ἣν δὴ μετενσωμάτωσιν οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι, ὅτι ἀδηλον τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἢ εἰσκρισις, ἢ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου εἰς ὀτιοῦν σῶμα, ἢ δὴ καὶ πρώτη ἂν εἴη ψυχῇ κοινωνία
 10 σώματι—ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ ταύτης, τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ γινόμενον πάθος τότε, ὅτε ψυχῇ καθαρὰ οὐσα σώματος πάντη ἴσχει περὶ αὐτὴν σώματος φύσιν. περὶ μὲν δὴ τῆς τοῦ παντός—ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἴσως <εἰκὸς>¹ ἀρξάσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναγκαῖον τυγχάνει—δεῖ δὴ τῷ λόγῳ τὴν εἴσοδον
 15 καὶ τὴν ἐμφύχωσιν διδασκαλίας καὶ τοῦ σαφούς χάριν γίνεσθαι νομίζειν. ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἐμφύχωτο τόδε τὸ πᾶν, οὐδὲ ἦν³ ὅτε πᾶμα ὑφείσθηκε ψυχῆς ἀπούσης, οὐδὲ ὕλη ποτέ ὅτε ἀκόσμητος ἦν· ἀλλ' ἐπινοῆσαι ταῦτα χωρίζοντας αὐτὰ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τῷ λόγῳ οἷόν τε. ἔξεστι γὰρ
 20 ἀναλύειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ πᾶσαν σύνθεσιν. ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθές ὧδε ἔχει· σώματος μὲν μὴ ὄντος οὐδ' ἂν προέλθοι ψυχῇ, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τόπος ἄλλος ἐστίν, ὅπου πέφυκεν εἶναι. προϊέναι δὲ εἰ μέλλοι, γενήσκει ἐαυτῇ τόπον, ὥστε καὶ σῶμα. τῆς δὴ στάσεως αὐτῆς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ στάσει οἰονεὶ ῥωννυμένης
 25 οἷον πολὺ φῶς ἐκλάμψαι ἐπ' ἄκροις τοῖς ἑσχατοῖς τοῦ πυρὸς σκότος ἐγίνετο, ὅπερ ἰδοῦσα ἡ ψυχῇ,

¹ Theiler. ² del. Theiler. ³ Preller: οὐδ' ἐν ἡν Enn., H-S¹.

9. But we must also enquire how soul comes to be in body. What is its way of entering? This too is a subject no less worth wondering about and enquiring into. Now there are two ways of soul entering body; one is when a soul is already in a body and changes bodies, or passes from a body of air or fire to one of earth (people do not call this change of body because the body from which entry is made is not apparent); and the other, passage from bodilessness to any kind of body, which would of course be the first communication of soul with body. About this last, then, it will be proper to investigate what it is that happens when a soul which is altogether pure and free from body takes upon itself a bodily nature. It is perhaps suitable, or rather it is necessary, to begin with the Soul of the All. Of course [when talking about the Soul of the All] we must consider that the terms "entry" and "ensoulment" are used in the discussion for the sake of clear explanation. For there never was a time when this universe did not have a soul, or when matter existed in the absence of soul, or when matter was not set in order; but in discussing these things one can consider them apart from each other. [When one is reasoning about] any kind of composition, it is always legitimate to analyse it in thought into its parts. For the truth is as follows. If body did not exist, soul would not go forth, since there is no place other than body where it is natural for it to be. But if it intends to go forth, it will produce a place for itself, and so a body. Soul's rest is, we may say, confirmed in absolute rest; a great light shines from it, and at the outermost edge of this firelight there is a darkness. Soul sees this darkness and informs

ἐπεὶπερ ὑπέστη, ἐμόρφωσεν αὐτό. οὐ γὰρ ἦν
 θεμιτὸν γειτονοῦν τι αὐτῇ λόγον ἄμοιρον εἶναι, οἷον
 ἐδέχετο τὸ λεγόμενον "ἀμυδρὸν ἐν ἀμυδρῷ" τῷ
 γενομένῳ. γενόμενος δὴ οἷον οἰκὸς τις καλὸς καὶ
 30 ποικίλος οὐκ ἀπετημήθη τοῦ πεποιηκότος, οὐδ' αὖ
 ἐκοίνωσεν αὐτὸν αὐτῇ, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ πᾶς ἄξιος
 ἐπιμελείας νομοθεῖς ἀφελίμου μὲν ἑαυτῷ τῷ εἶναι
 καὶ τῷ καλῷ, ὅσον δὴ τοῦ εἶναι δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτῷ
 μεταλαμβάνειν, ἀβλαβοῦς δὲ τῷ ἐφεστηκότι. ἄνω
 35 γὰρ μένων ἐπιστατῆς· ἔμφυχος τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τρόπῳ,
 ἔχων ψυχὴν οὐχ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ, κρατούμενος
 οὐ κρατῶν, καὶ ἐχόμενος ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχων. κείται
 γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνεχοῖσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄμοιρον
 ἔστιν αὐτῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐν ὕδασι δίκτυον τεγγόμενον
 40 ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν δίκτυον ἐκτεινομένης ἤδη τῆς θαλάσ-
 σης συνεκτέταται, ὅσον αὐτὸ δύναται· οὐ γὰρ
 δύναται ἀλλαχόθι ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων ἢ ὅπου
 κείται εἶναι. ἢ δὲ τοσαύτη ἐστὶ τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι μὴ
 τοσήδε, ὥστε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα καταλαμβάνειν τῷ
 αὐτῷ, καὶ ὅπου ἂν ἐκταθῇ ἐκεῖνο, ἐκεῖ ἐστὶ· καὶ
 45 εἰ μὴ εἴη δὲ ἐκεῖνο, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτῇ εἰς μέγεθος
 μέλοι· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἥτις ἐστὶ· τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ
 πᾶν, ὅπου ἐστὶν αὐτή, καὶ ὀρίζεται τῷ ὅσον, εἰς
 ὅσον προῖον σώζουσιν αὐτὴν αὐτὸ ἔχει. καὶ
 τοσαύτη ἐστὶν ἡ σκιά, ὅσος ὁ λόγος ὁ παρ' αὐτῆς.
 ὁ δὲ λόγος τοιοῦτος ἦν, ὡς μέγεθος τοσοῦτον
 50 ἐργάσασθαι, ὅσον τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἐβούλετο μέγεθος
 ἐργάσασθαι.

it, since it is there as a substrate for form. For it was not lawful for that which borders on soul to be without its share of formative principle, as far as that was capable of receiving it of which the phrase was used "dimly in the dimness" which came to be. There came into being something like a beautiful and richly various house which was not cut off from its builder, but he did not give it a share in himself either; he considered it all, everywhere, worth a care which conduces to its very being and excellence (as far as it can participate in being) but does him no harm in his presiding over it, for he rules it while abiding above. It is in this sort of way that it is ensouled; it has a soul which does not belong to it, but is present to it; it is mastered, not the master, possessed, not possessor. The universe lies in soul which bears it up, and nothing is without a share of soul. It is as if a net immersed in the waters was alive, but unable to make its own that in which it is. The sea is already spread out and the net spreads with it, as far as it can; for no one of its parts can be anywhere else than where it lies. And soul's nature is so great, just because it has no size, as to contain the whole of body in one and the same grasp; wherever body extends, there soul is. If body did not exist, it would make no difference to soul as regards size; for it is what it is. The universe extends as far as soul goes; its limit of extension is the point to which in going forth it has soul to keep it in being. The shadow is as large as the rational formative principle which comes from soul; and the formative principle is of such a kind as to make a size as large as the form from which it derives wants to make.

10. Οὕτω δὴ ἀκούσαντας χρῆ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ αἰεὶ οὕτως ἐλθόντας ὁμοῦ λαβεῖν πάντα ὄντα· οἶον τὸν αἶρα, τὸ φῶς, τὸν ἥλιον, ἢ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ πάλιν τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοῦ πάντα, τάξιν δὲ πρώτων
 5 καὶ δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων ἔχοντα, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ψυχὴν αἰεὶ ἐστῶσαν ἢ τὰ¹ πρώτα καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς ὡς πυρὸς ἐσχάτα, εἰς ὑστερον τοῦ πρώτου ἐκ τοῦ ἐσχάτου νοουμένου πυρὸς σκιᾶς, εἶτα ἐπιφωτιζομένου ἅμα καὶ τούτου, ὥστε οἶον εἶδος ἐπιθεῖν τῷ ἐπιβληθέντι
 10 πρώτῳ γενομένῳ παντάπασιν ἀμυδρῷ. ἔκοσμεῖτο δὲ κατὰ λόγον ψυχῆς δυνάμει ἐχούσης ἐν αὐτῇ δι' ὅλης δυνάμει κατὰ λόγους κοσμεῖν· οἶα καὶ οἱ ἐν σπέρμασι λόγοι πλάττουσι καὶ μορφοῦσι τὰ ζῶα οἶον μικροῦς τινας κόσμους. ὅτι γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπτηται ψυχῆς, οὕτω ποιεῖται ὡς ἔχει φύσεως ψυχῆς ἢ
 15 οὐσία· ἢ δὲ ποιεῖ οὐκ ἐπακτῶ γνῶμη οὐδὲ βουλήν ἢ σκέψιν ἀναμείνασα· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπακτὸν τέχνην ἂν ποιοῖ. τέχνη γὰρ ἰστέρα αὐτῆς καὶ μιμεῖται ἀμυδρὰ καὶ ἀσθενῆ ποιούσα μιμήματα, παίγνια ἅττα καὶ οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξια, μηχαναῖς πολλαῖς εἰς εἶδωλον φύσεως²
 20 προσχρωμένη. ἢ δὲ οὐσίας δυνάμει κυρία σωματίων

¹ Igal: εἶτα Enn., H-S¹: ἢ τὰ Theiler, H-S².

² suspic. H-S¹: εἰς εἶδωλον φύσιν Enn., Perna: εἰς εἶδῶλων (Perna¹⁹⁸⁸) φύσιν Creuzer* (ad simulacra pingenda Ficinus), sed φύσιν aliud ac κατὰ φύσιν (lin. 16) significare non potest.

¹ The context of this depreciation of art, which follows Plato's closely, should be noted. It is one of Plotinus's frequent assertions of the inferiority of planned, rational (in the ordinary human sense) activity as inferior to the divine, spontaneous activity which works without planning; cp. V. 8.

10. With this understanding we must go back again to that which is always unchanged and grasp all as existing simultaneously; just as the air, the light, the sun, or the moon, the light and again the sun all exist simultaneously, but hold first, second and third positions, so here there is soul always static, or the first, then the next in order, like the last gleams of the light of a fire; afterwards the first coming from this last gleam is thought of as a shadow of fire, and then this at the same time is thought of as illuminated, so that it is as if a form hovered over what is cast upon soul, which at first was altogether obscure. It was given ordered beauty according to a formative rational principle, since soul has potentially in it, and throughout the whole of it, the power to set in order according to rational principles; just as the formative rational principles in seeds mould and shape living beings like little ordered universes. For whatever comes into contact with soul is made as the essential nature of soul is in a state to make it; and it makes, not according to a purpose brought in from outside, nor waiting upon planning and consideration: for in this way it would not make according to nature, but to an art brought in from outside. For art is later than soul, and imitates it, making dim and weak imitations, toys not worth much, bringing in many devices to help it in producing an image of nature.¹ But soul is by its essential power in control

¹ for his fullest critique of the idea of "artisan" creation. But Plotinus can be much more positive about art, and can even say that sometimes art can improve on nature because the artist's mind has direct access to the Forms in the Intelligible world of which natural things are images too, and sometimes, for various reasons, very imperfect ones; cp. V. 8. 1. 34-40.

εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι τε καὶ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς αὐτῇ ἄγει,
οὐ δυναμένων τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐναντιοῦσθαι τῇ αὐτῆς
βουλήσει. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὑστέροις ἄλληλα ἐμποδί-
ζοντα πολλάκις ἀποστερεῖται τοῦ τυχεῖν μορφῆς
25 τῆς οἰκείας, ἣν ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐν συμκρῶ θέλει· ἐκεῖ
δὲ γιγνομένης καὶ τῆς ὅλης μορφῆς ὑπ' αὐτῆς
καὶ τάξιν τῶν γενομένων ἅμα ἐχόντων ἀπόνως τὸ
γενόμενον καὶ ἀνεμποδίστως καλόν ἐστι. κατεσκευ-
άσατο δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ μὲν θεῶν ἀγάλματα, τὰ δὲ
ἀνθρώπων οἰκήματα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις. τί γὰρ
30 ἔδει γίνεσθαι παρὰ ψυχῆς, ἢ ὦν τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ
ποιεῖν ἔχει; πυρὸς μὲν γὰρ θερμὰ ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸ
ψύχων ἄλλου· ψυχῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ δὲ ἐξ
αὐτῆς εἰς ἄλλο. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀψύχοις τὸ μὲν [ἐξ
αὐτῶν]¹ οἷον εὔδει κείμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς, τὸ δὲ <ἐξ
αὐτῶν>¹ εἰς ἄλλο ὁμοιωσαι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ παθεῖν
35 δυνάμενον· καὶ κοινὸν δὴ τοῦτο παντὶ τῷ ὄντι
εἰς ὁμοίωσιν ἑαυτῷ ἄγειν. ψυχῆς δὲ ἔργον καὶ τὸ
ἐν αὐτῇ ἐγρηγορός τι καὶ τὸ εἰς ἄλλο ὡσαύτως,
ζῆν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ποιεῖ, ὅσα μὴ ζῆ παρ' αὐτῶν,
καὶ τοιαύτην ζωὴν, καθ' ἣν αὐτῇ ζῆ. ζῶσα οὖν
ἐν λόγῳ λόγον δίδωσι τῷ σώματι, εἰδῶλον οὖ
40 ἔχει—καὶ γὰρ καὶ εἰδῶλον ζωῆς, ὅσον δίδωσι τῷ
σώματι—καὶ μορφὰς σωματίων, ὧν τοὺς λόγους

¹ transpos. Kleist (Studien 40): del. Dodds, B-T.

of bodies, so that they come to be and are in the
state to which soul leads them, since their first
principles are unable to resist its will. In the things
that come after one often hinders another and they
are deprived of the attainment of their proper form,
that which the formative principle operating on a
small scale wishes them to have; but there in the
universe as a whole, where the whole form is pro-
duced by soul and the things which are produced
have all together an order, what has come into being
is beautiful without labour or hindrance. But soul
has constructed in the world shrines of gods and
dwellings for men, and others for other creatures.
For what else ought to come from soul except the
things which it has the power to make? It belongs
to fire to make things hot, and to something else to
cool them; but one power belongs to soul which
remains within it, and another which goes out to
form something else. In soulless things the one
power, so to speak, lies asleep in them; and the
power from them which goes out to something else
consists in making like themselves that which is
capable of being affected: and this is of course
common to all that exists, to bring things to likeness
with themselves. But the work of soul is something
awake, both that within it and in the same way that
which goes out to something else. Soul therefore
makes alive all the other things which do not live of
themselves, and makes them live the sort of life
by which it lives itself. So since it lives in a rational
principle, it gives a rational principle to the body, an
image of that which it has—for what it gives to the
body is also [only] an image of life—and the shapes
of body, of which it has the rational formative prin-

ἔχει· ἔχει δὲ καὶ θεῶν καὶ πάντων. διὸ πάντα καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἔχει.

11. Καί μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πάλαι σοφοί, ὅσοι ἐβουλήθησαν θεοὺς αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι ἱερά καὶ ἀγάλματα ποιησάμενοι, εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντός φύσιν ἀπιδόντες, ἐν νῶ λαβεῖν ὡς πανταχοῦ μὲν εὐάγωγον
5 ψυχῆς φύσις, δέξασθαι γὰρ μὴν ῥᾶστον ἂν εἴη ἀπάντων, εἴ τις προσπαθῆς τι τεκτῆναιτο ὑποδέξασθαι δυνάμενον μοῖράν τινα αὐτῆς. προσπαθῆς δὲ τὸ ὀπωσοῦν μιμηθέν, ὥσπερ κάτοπτρον ἀρπάσαι εἶδος τι δυνάμενον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ παντός φύσις πάντα εὐμηχάνως ποιησαμένη εἰς μίμησιν ὧν
10 εἶχε τοὺς λόγους, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστον οὕτως ἐγένετο ἐν ὕλῃ λόγος, ὃς κατὰ τὸν πρὸ ὕλης ἐμεμόρφωτο, συνήψατο τῷ θεῷ ἐκείνῳ, καθ' ὃν ἐγένετο καὶ εἰς ὃν εἶδεν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ εἶχε ποιούσα. καὶ δὴ οὐχ οἶόν τε ἦν ἄμοιρον αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνον αὐτὸν κατελθεῖν εἰς τοῦτον. ἦν δὴ νοῦς ἐκεῖνος ὁ
15 ἐκεῖ ἥλιος—οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν γινέσθω παράδειγμα τοῦ λόγου—ἐφεξῆς δὲ τούτῳ ψυχὴ ἐξηρητημένη μένοιτος νοῦ μένουσα. δίδωσι δὴ αὕτη τὰ πέρατα

¹ The allusion here is to the ancient Egyptian practice of ritually animating statues: cp. the Hermetic *Asclepius* 37. II p. 347 Nock-Festugière. It became a regular part of later

ciples: it has these of gods and of everything. This, then, is why the universe too has everything.

11. And I think that the wise men of old, who made temples and statues in the wish that the gods should be present to them,¹ looking to the nature of the All, had in mind that the nature of soul is everywhere easy to attract, but that if someone were to construct something sympathetic to it and able to receive a part of it, it would of all things receive soul most easily. That which is sympathetic to it is what imitates it in some way, like a mirror able to catch [the reflection of] a form. Yes, the nature of the All, too, made all things skilfully in imitation of the [intelligible] realities of which it had the rational principles, and when each thing in this way had become a rational principle in matter, shaped according to that which was before matter, it linked it with that god in conformity with whom it came into being and to whom the soul looked and whom it had in its making.² For it was certainly not possible for the thing made to be without a share in the god, nor again for the god to come down to the thing made. So that sun in the divine realm is Intellect—let this serve as an example for our discourse—and next after it is soul, dependent upon it and abiding while Intellect abides. This soul gives the edge of itself

Neoplatonic theurgic practice, though not without objection from the more rational members of the school: cp. Eunapius 475 (Maximus, Eusebius of Myndus, and the Emperor Julian).

² For a fuller and more developed account of the making of the forms or rational principles in matter by Nature (the lowest, immanent part of universal Soul) and how the weak, dreamy form-making activity of Nature is linked through Soul with the divine forms in Intellect (here referred to as "the god") see III. 8. 1-5.

PLLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

αὐτῆς τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν ἥλιον τούτῳ τῷ ἡλίῳ,
καὶ ποιεῖ διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κακεῖ συνήφθαι οἶον
20 ἔρμηνευτικῆ γενομένη τῶν τε ἀπ' ἐκείνου εἰς
τοῦτον καὶ τῶν τούτου εἰς ἐκείνον, ὅσον διὰ ψυχῆς
εἰς ἐκείνον φθάνει. οὐ γὰρ μακρὰν οὐδὲ πόρρω
οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν καὶ αὐ πόρρω τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ μὴ¹
μίξει, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ [οὐ τόποις]² καὶ
συνεῖναι χωρὶς ὄν. θεοὶ δὲ εἶσιν οὗτοι τῷ αἰεὶ μὴ
25 ἀποστατεῖν ἐκείνων, καὶ τῇ μὲν ἐξαρχῆς ψυχῇ
προσηρτήσθαι τῇ οἶον ἀπελθούσῃ ψυχῇ, ταύτῃ δέ,
ἥπερ καὶ εἰσι καὶ ὁ λέγονται, πρὸς νοῦν βλέπειν
οὐδαμοῦ ψυχῆς αὐτοῖς ἢ ἐκεῖ βλεπούσης.

12. Ἀνθρώπων δὲ ψυχαὶ εἶδωλα αἰτῶν ἰδοῦσαι
οἶον Διονύσου ἐν κατύπτῳ ἐκεῖ ἐγένοντο ἄνωθεν
ὄρμηθεῖσαι, οὐκ ἀποτμηθεῖσαι οὐδ' αὐταὶ τῆς
ἑαυτῶν ἀρχῆς τε καὶ νοῦ. οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ νοῦ

¹ Theiler: τῇ Enn.*, H-S¹.

² ut glossam post συνεῖναι deleuimus.

¹ For the connection of the visible sun to the intelligible sun see Julian *Oration* IV (To King Helios) *passim*: though for Plotinus this relationship of the two suns is just an example of the way in which everything in the sense-world is linked to the intelligible, of the intimate presence of the divine in the whole material world, but in Julian it is a theological doctrine of central importance.

² For the Orphic story to which Plotinus here casually alludes see W. K. C. Guthrie *Orpheus and Greek Religion* 2nd ed. (London 1952) 122-3. The mirror was one of the toys with which the Titans lured away the child Dionysus-Zagreus

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL I

which borders on this [visible] sun to this sun, and makes a connection of it to the divine realm through the medium of itself, and acts as an interpreter of what comes from this sun to the intelligible sun and from the intelligible sun to this sun, in so far as this sun does reach the intelligible sun through soul.¹ For nothing is a long way off or far from anything else—distance in another sense is a matter of difference and not being mixed but [the divine] is by itself, and is with the world while remaining separate. These [heavenly bodies] are gods by for ever not departing from those intelligible gods and by being linked to the original soul by the soul which, so to speak, went away [to the visible world], and by this, by which they are what they are also called, they look towards Intellect, since soul for them never looks elsewhere than There.

12. But the souls of men see their images as if in the mirror of Dionysus² and come to be on that level with a leap from above: but even these are not cut off from their own principle and from intellect.

to tear him to pieces and eat him; after they had done so Zeus destroyed them with his thunderbolts and men were made out of their ashes; so we contain a "Titanic", earthy, evil element and also a divine Dionysiac one which must be released by purification. Plotinus here simply takes the mirror, in which Dionysus enjoyed seeing his own reflection, as a symbol of the attractiveness of the visible world for the souls which must descend into it (all material things for him are reflections of soul). The later Neoplatonists worked out an elaborate allegorical interpretation of the whole story, in which the rending of Dionysus by the Titans symbolises the "division" of the divine power in the material world. The relevant passages are collected in O. Kern *Orphicorum Fragmenta* (Berlin 1963) 209. See further J. Pépin in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 24 (1970) 304-20.

5 ἦλθον, ἀλλ' ἔφθασαν μὲν μέχοι γῆς, κάρη δὲ αὐταῖς
 ἐστήρικται ὑπεράνω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. πλέον δὲ αὐταῖς
 κατελθεῖν συμβέβηκεν, ὅτι τὸ μέσον αὐταῖς ἠναγκά-
 σθη, φροντίδες δεομένου τοῦ εἰς ὃ ἔφθασαν,
 φροντίσαι. Ζεὺς δὲ πατὴρ ἐλεήσας πονουμένας
 θνητὰ αὐτῶν τὰ δεσμὰ ποιῶν, περὶ ἃ πονοῦνται,
 10 δίδωσιν ἀναπαύλας ἐν χρόνοις ποιῶν σωμάτων
 ἐλευθέρως, ἵν' ἔχοιεν ἐκεῖ καὶ αἴται γίνεσθαι,
 οὐπερ ἢ τοῦ παντός ψυχὴ αἰεὶ οὐδὲν τὰ τῆδε
 ἐπιστρεφομένη. ὃ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ πᾶν ἤδη, τοῦτο αὐτ-
 αρκες αὐτῷ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται, κατὰ λόγους αἰεὶ
 ἐστηκότας ἐν χρόνοις περαινομένον· καὶ κατὰ
 15 χρόνους αἰεὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καθιστάμενον¹ ἐν μέτροις
 βίων ὀρισμένων εἰς συμφωνίαν ἀγομένων τούτων²
 ἐκείνοις καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνα, [τῶνδε]³ περαινομένων
 ὑφ' ἓνα λόγον, πάντων τεταγμένων ἐν τε καθόδοις
 ψυχῶν καὶ ἀνόδοις καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα σύμπαντα.
 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς συμφωνίας τῶν ψυχῶν
 20 πρὸς τὴν τοῦδε τοῦ παντός τάξιν οὐκ ἀπρητημένων,
 ἀλλὰ συναπτουσῶν ἐν ταῖς καθόδοις ἑαυτὰς καὶ
 μίαν συμφωνίαν πρὸς τὴν περιφορὰν ποιουμένων,
 ὡς καὶ τὰς τύχας αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς
 προαιρέσεις σημαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῶν ἄστρον σχήμασι
 25 καὶ οἶον μίαν τινα φωνὴν οὐκ ἐκμελῶς ἀφιέναι· καὶ

¹ A^{bc}B^{ac}, Perna, Creuzer, Müller*: καθιστάμενα A^{bc}EB^{bc}
 R. J. J. C., Kirchoff, H-S.

² Theiler: ἀγομένα ταῦτα Enn., H-S.

³ del. Theiler.

For they did not come down with Intellect, but went on ahead of it down to earth, but their heads are firmly set above in heaven. But they experienced a deeper descent because their middle part was compelled to care for that to which they had gone on, which needed their care. But Father Zeus, pitying them in their troubles, makes the bonds over which they have trouble dissoluble by death and gives them periods of rest, making them at times free of bodies, so that they too may have the opportunity of being there where the soul of the All always is, since it in no way turns to the things of this world. For what it has is the All already complete; this is and will be sufficient to itself: it completes its course periodically according to everlastingly fixed rational principles, and everlastingly returns to the same state, period by period, in a proportionate succession of defined lives, these here being brought into harmony with those there and completed according to them,¹ everything being ordered under one rational principle in the descents of souls and their ascents and with regard to everything else. The harmonious adjustment of the souls to the order of this All of ours witnesses to this; they are not cut off from it, but fit themselves in in their descents and make one harmony with its circuit, so that their fortunes and their lives and their choices are indicated by the figures made by the heavenly bodies and they sing, as it were, with one

¹ I adopt Theiler's text here (see critical notes), in spite of the three alterations of the MSS which he makes, because it seems to me to be the only way of giving a satisfactory sense to the passage and because the critical reasons he gives for his alterations seem to me persuasive (see his note ad loc.).

τὸ μουσικῶς καὶ ἑναρμονίως μᾶλλον τοῦτο εἶναι
 ἡμιγμένως. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἦν μὴ τοῦ παντός
 κατ' ἐκεῖνα ποιούντος καὶ πάσχοντος ἕκαστα ἐν
 μέτροις περιόδων καὶ τάξεων καὶ βίων κατὰ γένη
 διεξόδων, οὓς αἱ ψυχαὶ διεξοδεύουσιν ὅτε μὲν ἐκεῖ,
 30 ὅτε δὲ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ὅτε δὲ εἰς τούσδε τοὺς τόπους
 ἐπιστρεφόμεναι. νοῦς δὲ πᾶς αἰεὶ ἄνω καὶ οὐ μὴ
 ποτε ἔξω τῶν αὐτοῦ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἰδρυμένος πᾶς
 ἄνω πέμπει εἰς τὰ τῆδε διὰ ψυχῆς. ψυχὴ δὲ ἐκ
 τοῦ πλησίον μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἐκεῖθεν διάκειται
 εἶδος καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτήν, ἢ μὲν ὡσαύτως,
 35 ἢ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, ἴσχυσα ἐν τάξει τὴν πλάνην.
 κάτεισι δὲ οὐκ αἰεὶ τὸ ἴσον, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν πλέον, ὅτε
 δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἤ. κάτεισι δὲ
 εἰς ἔτοιμον ἐκάστη καθ' ὁμοίωσιν, τῆς διαθέσεως.
 ἐκεῖ γάρ, ᾧ ἂν ὁμοιωθεῖσα ἦ, φέρεται, ἢ μὲν εἰς
 ἄνθρωπον, ἢ δὲ εἰς ζῶον ἄλλη ἄλλο.

13. Τὸ γὰρ ἀναπόδραστον καὶ ἡ δίκη οὕτως ἐν
 φήσει κρατοῦση ἵνα ἕκαστον ἐν τάξει πρὸς ὃ
 ἔστιν ἕκαστον γενόμενον εἶδωλον προαιρέσεως
 καὶ διαθέσεως ἀρχετύπου, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο πᾶν
 5 ψυχῆς εἶδος ἐκεῖνον πλησίον, πρὸς ὃ τὴν διάθεσιν
 τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχει, καὶ τοῦ τότε πέμποντος καὶ
 εἰσάγοντος οὐ δεῖ, οὔτε ἵνα ἔλθῃ εἰς σῶμα τότε

¹ The "fortunes and lives and choices" come from the concluding myth of Plato's *Republic* (see 617B). For a fuller discussion by Plotinus of this passage in Plato see III. 4. 5. Plotinus here, characteristically, interprets "the music of the spheres" allegorically to suit his own philosophical purposes. For the old literal interpretation of this Pythagorean doctrine see Cicero *Somnium Scipionis* 5. 10; and cf. P.-M. Schuhl *Études sur la Fabulation Platonicienne* (Paris 1947) 117 ff.

voice and are never out of tune. (And this is more properly the hidden meaning of the doctrine that the heavenly spheres move musically and melodically.)¹ But this could not be if the action and experience of the All was not on all occasions in accordance with the intelligible realities, in its measuring of periods and orders and the living through of the lives according to their kinds which the souls live through, sometimes in the intelligible world, sometimes in heaven, and sometimes turning to these regions. But Intellect as a whole is always above, and could never be outside its own world, but is settled as a whole above and communicates with things here through soul. Soul, because it is nearer, is disposed according to the form which comes to it from Intellect, and gives to the things below it, one kind of soul always in the same way, the other in different ways at different times, having its wanderings arranged in regular order. But [the individual soul] does not always come down the same distance, but sometimes more, sometimes less, even if it comes to the same species [of body]: each soul comes down to a body made ready for it according to its resemblance to the soul's disposition. It is carried there to that to which it is made like, one soul to a human being and others to different kinds of animals.

13. The inescapable rule and the justice [which govern the descent of souls] are thus set in a natural principle which compels each to go in its proper order to that to which it individually tends, the image of its original choice and disposition: each form of soul in that world is close to that to which it has an internal disposition, and there is no need of anyone to send it or bring it into body at a particular time,

οὔτε εἰς τοδί, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ ἐνοστάντος οἶον
 αὐτομάτως κάτεισι καὶ εἴσεισιν εἰς ὃ δεῖ—καὶ
 ἄλλος ἄλλη χρόνος, οὗ παραγενομένου οἶον κήρυκος
 10 καλοῦντος κατᾶσι—καὶ εἰσέδῃ εἰς τὸ πρόσφορον
 σῶμα, ὡς εἰκάσαι τὰ γινόμενα οἶον δυνάμει
 μάγων καὶ ὀλκαῖς τισιν ἰσχυραῖς κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ
 φέρεσθαι· οἶον καὶ ἐφ' ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τελεῖται ἢ τοῦ
 ζώου διοικήσεις, ἐν χρόνῳ ἕκαστον κινούσης καὶ
 γεννώσης, οἶον γενειάσεις καὶ <ἐκ>φύσεις¹ κεράτων
 15 καὶ νῦν πρὸς τὰδε ὀρμάς καὶ ἐπανθήσεις πρότερον
 οὐκ οὔσας καὶ περιττάς,² τῶν <τε>³ δένδρων
 διοικήσεις⁴ ἐν προθεσμίας τακταῖς γινόμενη.⁵
 ἴασι δὲ οὔτε ἐκοῦσαι οὔτε πεμφθεῖσαι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ
 ἐκούσιον τοιοῦτον ὡς πρὸς ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πηδᾶν
 κατὰ φύσιν, ἢ <ὡς>⁶ πρὸς γάμων φυσικὰς προθυ-
 20 μίας ἢ [ὡς πρὸς]⁶ πράξεις τινὲς καλῶν οὐ λογισμῶ
 κινούμενοι· ἀλλ' εἰμαρμένον αἰετῶ τοιῶδε τὸ τοιόν-
 δε, καὶ τῶ τοιῶδε τὸ νῦν, τῶ δὲ τὸ ἀδθῖς. καὶ ὁ
 μὲν πρὸ κόσμου νοῦς εἰμαρμένην ἔχει τὴν τοῦ
 μένειν ἐκεῖ ὁπόσον καὶ πέμπει,⁷ καὶ τὸ καθέκαστον
 25 τῶ καθόλου ὑποπίπτον νόμῳ πέμπεται· ἔγκειται
 γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τὸ καθόλου, καὶ ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἔξωθεν
 τὴν ἰσχύον εἰς τὸ τελεσθῆναι ἴσχει, ἀλλὰ δέδοται ἐν
 αὐτοῖς <τοῖς>⁸ χρησαμένοις εἶναι καὶ περιφέρουσιν

¹ Theiler, cf. IV. 4. 11. 19.

² Theiler: *περὶ τὰς Enn.*, H-S: *περὶ del.* Volkmann*.

³ Theiler.

⁴ Theiler: *διοικήσεις Enn.**, H-S.

⁵ Theiler: *γινόμενων R*, H-S: *γινόμενας Vitranga*, Volkmann.

⁶ *transposuimus*.

⁷ Harder B-T: *πέμπειν Enn.**

⁸ *αὐτοῖς τοῖς Kirchhoff*: *αὐτοῖς Enn.*: *τοῖς H-S*².

or into this or that particular body, but when its moment comes to it it descends and enters where it must as if of its own accord. Each has its own time and when it comes, like a herald summoning it, the soul comes down and goes into the appropriate body, so that what happens is like a stirring and carrying away by magic powers and mighty attractions: it is like the way in which the ordered development of a living thing comes to its fulfilment as [its soul] stirs and produces everything in its time—for instance sprouting of beards and horns, and at the moment special impulses, and breaking out into spots in excessive numbers which were not there before, and like the ordered development of trees coming about at its appointed time. The souls go neither willingly nor because they are sent, nor is the voluntary element in their going like deliberate choice, but like a natural spontaneous jumping or a passionate natural desire of sexual union or as some men are moved unreasoningly to noble deeds. Each special kind has its special destiny and moment, one now and one at another time. Intellect which is before the universe has its destiny too, to remain There, however much it also sends out; and the individual, which is subordinated to the universal, is sent according to law. For the universal bears heavily upon the particular, and the law does not derive from outside the strength for its accomplishment, but is given to be in those themselves who are subject to it, and they

αὐτόν· κἄν ἐνστη καὶ ὁ χρόνος, καὶ ὁ θέλει
γενέσθαι, γίνεται τότε ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐχόντων
αὐτόν, ὥστε αὐτοὺς αὐτὸν τελεῖν, ἅτε περιφέροντας
30 ἰσχύσαντα¹ ἐν τῷ ἐν αὐτοῖς αὐτὸν ἰδρῦσθαι, οἷον
βρίθοντα εἰς αὐτοὺς καὶ προθυμίαν ἐμποιοῦντα καὶ
ὠδίνα ἐκεῖ ἐλθεῖν, οὐδ' ὁ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὦν οἷον ἐλθεῖν
φθέγγεται.

14. Τούτων δὴ γυνομένων φῶτα πολλὰ ὁ κόσμος
οἶτος ἔχων καὶ καταυγαζόμενος ψυχαῖς ἐπικοσμι-
ται ἐπὶ τοῖς προτέροις ἄλλους κόσμους ἄλλον παρ'
ἄλλον κομιζόμενος, παρά τε θεῶν ἐκείνων παρά τε
5 νῶν τῶν ἄλλων ψυχὰς διδόντων· οἷον εἰκὸς καὶ τὸν
μῦθον ἀνίττεσθαι, ὡς πλάσαντος τοῦ Προμηθέως
τὴν γυναῖκα ἐπεκόσμησαν αὐτὴν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί·
γαῖαν ὕδρι φέροντες, καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἐνθεῖναι φωνήν,
θεαῖς δ' ὁμοίαν τὸ εἶδος, καὶ Ἀφροδίτην τι δοῦναι
καὶ Χάριτας καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλο δῶρον καὶ ὀνομάσαι· ἐκ
10 τοῦ δῶρου καὶ πάντων τῶν δεδωκότων· πάντες γὰρ
τούτῳ ἔδοσαν τῷ πλάσματι παρὰ προμηθείας τινὸς
γενομένῳ. ὁ δὲ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἀποποιούμενος τὸ

¹ περιφέροντας ἰσχύσαντα Vitringa, Harder, Cilento, B-T:
περιφέροντα καὶ ἰσχύσαντα Enn.: περιφέροντας καὶ ἰσχύσαντας
H-S¹.

¹ The teaching of this chapter about the descent of the
human soul should be carefully compared with that in the
early treatise *On the Descent of the Soul* IV. 8. 3-6. In this
treatise one can see particularly clearly the variations of
emphasis and the fluctuations between optimism and pessi-
mism about the material world and our life in it which are
characteristic of Plotinus' discussions of this subject, because

bear it about with them. And if the time comes too,
then what it wills to happen is also brought about by
beings themselves in whom it is present, so that they
accomplish it themselves because they bear it about,
strong by its firm establishment in them; it makes
itself a sort of weight in them and implants a longing,
a birth pang of desire to come there where the law
within them as it were calls them to come.¹

14. Because all this has happened this universal
order of ours, which has many lights and is illuminated
by souls, is being further set in order and adorned,
receiving new ordered beauties over and above its
former ones, one from one source and one from
another, from the gods of that other world and the
other intellects which give souls²; it seems likely
that this is the hidden meaning of the story that
when Prometheus had made the woman the other
gods too helped to adorn her; that "he mixed
earth with water"; and gave her a human voice,
and made her like the goddesses in appearance, and
that Aphrodite gave her something and the Graces,
and different gods gave her different gifts, and that
she took her name from the gift and all the givers:
for all gave something to this formation which came
into existence as a result of a forethought (or "pro-
vidence"). But what could Epimetheus rejecting

its purpose is to reconcile the divergent accounts, pessimistic
and optimistic, given by Plato in different dialogues. But
there does not seem to be any fundamental difference between
the thought of IV. 8 and the thought of this chapter. See
further my Introductory Note to IV. 3-5, p. 26 ff.

² Cp. VI. 4. 14. 18-19 (from a treatise written shortly before
this one) where the population of the intelligible world is
described as including men (in their pure intelligible state) as
well as gods.

δῶρον αὐτοῦ τί ἂν σημαίνει ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἐν νοητῷ
 μᾶλλον αἴρεσιν ἀμείνω εἶναι; δέδεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς
 15 ὁ ποιήσας, ὅτι πως ἐφάπτεται τοῦ γενομένου ὑπ'
 αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος δεσμὸς ἐξωθεν· καὶ ἡ λύσις
 ἢ ὑπὸ Ἡρακλέους, ὅτι δύνάμις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, ὥστε
 καὶ ὡς λελύσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅπη τις δοξάζει,
 ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐμφαίνει τὰ τῆς εἰς τὸν κόσμον δόσεως, καὶ
 προσάδει τοῖς λεγομένοις.

15. Ἰασι δὲ ἐκκύψασαι τοῦ νοητοῦ εἰς οὐρανὸν
 μὲν πρῶτον καὶ σῶμα ἐκεῖ προσλαβοῦσαι δι' αὐτοῦ
 ἤδη χωροῦσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γεωδέστερα σώματα, εἰς
 ὕσον ἂν εἰς μήκος ἐκταθῶσι. καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀπ'
 5 οὐρανοῦ εἰς σώματα τὰ κατωτέρω, αἱ δὲ ἀπ'
 ἄλλων εἰς ἄλλα εἰσκρινόμεναι, αἷς ἢ δύνάμις οὐκ
 ἤρκεσεν αἶραι ἐντεῦθεν διὰ βάρυνου καὶ λήθην
 πολὺ ἐφέλκομεναι, ὃ αὐταῖς ἐβαρύνθη. γίνονται δὲ

¹ The story of Prometheus, Epimetheus and Pandora here follows Hesiod, with slight variations: for the making of Pandora see Hesiod *Op.* 60–89; for the binding and loosing of Prometheus see Hesiod *Theog.* 521–8. Plotinus' remark about his own casual allegorical interpretation (line 17) shows how little seriously he took this sort of thing. The ancient myths do of course for him, as for other men of his age, express profound truths in symbolic form. But as long as you recognise what the truths are, it does not matter whether you discover them in any particular myth, or how you interpret the details of the poets' stories.

² Here there appears the "cosmic religiosity" which Plotinus shared with other philosophers of late antiquity: the belief, that is, that the celestial regions and the heavenly bodies are divine and far closer to any higher, spiritual or intelligible, divinities there may be, than the world below the

the gift of what had been formed signify except that the choice of a life lived more in the intelligible world is the better one? And the maker is bound because he is somehow in contact with that which he has made, and a bond of this kind is external; and his freeing by Heracles means that he has power even so to free himself. This interpretation is as anyone likes to think it, except that the story displays the gifts made to the universal order and is in harmony with what we say.¹

15. The souls when they have peeped out of the intelligible world go first to heaven, and when they have put on a body there go on by its means to earthier bodies, to the limit to which they extend themselves in length.² And some souls [only] come from heaven to lower bodies; others pass from one body into another, those whose power is not sufficient to lift them from this region because they are weighed down and forgetful, dragging with them much that weighs upon them. They become different

moon, and that consequently the primary and proper material abode of souls is in this higher region from which they descend, assuming progressively inferior sorts of bodies according to the depth of their descent, the earthly body being the last and lowest: cp. chs. 9 and 17 of this treatise and Appendix II, *The Astral Body in Neoplatonism* in Proclus *The Elements of Theology* ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1963) 313–21. Philosophical cosmic religion was something which Plotinus took seriously. He defends it vigorously against astrological superstition in II. 3 and against the Gnostic contempt for the divinities of the visible heaven in II. 9. But it occupies a place of moderate importance in his thought, and is not easy to reconcile with other aspects of it; and the idea of "astral" or "pneumatic" bodies superior to our earthly bodies is of much less importance to him than the belief in the divinity of the heavenly bodies.

διάφοροι ἢ σωμάτων εἰς ἃ ἐνεκρίθησαν παρα-
 λαγαῖς ἢ καὶ τύχαις ἢ καὶ τροφαῖς, ἢ αὐταὶ παρ'
 10 αὐτῶν τὸ διάφορον κομίζουσι ἢ πᾶσι τούτοις ἢ
 τισιν αὐτῶν. καὶ αἱ μὲν τὰ πάντα ὑποσπετώκασι
 εἰμαρμένη τῇ ἐνταῦθα, αἱ δὲ ὅτε μὲν οὕτως, ὅτε δὲ
 αὐτῶν, αἱ δὲ ὅσα μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἵπομεῖναι συγχωρ-
 οῦσι, δύνανται δὲ ὅσα ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἔργα αὐτῶν εἶναι,
 ζῶσαι κατ' ἄλλην τὴν τῶν συμπάντων τῶν ὄντων
 15 νομοθεσίαν ἄλλω ἑαυτὰς θεσμῶ δοῦσαι. πέπλεκται
 δὲ αὕτη ἔκ τε τῶν τῆδε λόγων τε καὶ αἰτίων
 πάντων καὶ ψυχικῶν κινήσεων καὶ νόμων τῶν
 ἐκείθεν, συμφωνοῦσα ἐκείνοις καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκείθεν
 παραλαβοῦσα καὶ συνυφαίνουσα τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις,
 20 ἀσάλευτα μὲν τηροῦσα, ὅσα δύναται σφύζειν ἑαυτὰ
 πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ἔξω, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἢ πέφυκε
 περιάγουσα, ὡς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς κατελθοῦσιν
 εἶναι, ὅτι οὕτως, ὡς τὰ μὲν ὠδὶ τεθῆναι, τὰ δὲ ὠδὶ
 κείσθαι.

16. Τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμενα τιμωρήματα εἰς τοὺς
 πονηροὺς μετὰ δίκης τῇ τάξει ἀποδιδόναι προσήκει
 ὡς κατὰ τὸ δέον ἀγούσῃ· ὅσα δὲ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς
 συμβαίνει ἔξω δίκης, οἷον κολάσεις ἢ πενίαι ἢ
 5 νόσοι, ἄρα διὰ προτέρας ἀμαρτίας λεκτέον γίνεσθαι;
 συμπέλεκται γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ προσημαίνεται, ὡς

either because of the variety of the bodies into which
 they entered or because of their fortunes or their
 upbringing; or they themselves bring with them a
 difference coming from themselves, or all these
 causes, or some of them, operate together to produce
 the differences. And some of them have altogether
 become subject to the destiny of this world, but
 others are sometimes subject to it and sometimes
 belong to themselves; others again accept all that
 it is necessary to endure, but are able to be self-
 possessed in all that is their own work, living accord-
 ing to another code of laws, that which governs the
 whole of reality, and submitting themselves to [this]
 other ordinance. This code of laws is woven from
 all the rational principles and causes here below, and
 the movement of souls and the laws which come from
 the intelligible world; it is in harmony with these
 last, and takes its principles from that world and
 weaves together what comes after with the intelli-
 gible principles, keeping undisturbed all things which
 can maintain themselves in accordance with the
 disposition of the intelligibles, and making the others
 circulate according to their natures, so that the
 responsibility lies with the souls which have come
 down for coming down in such a way that some are
 put in this place and others find themselves in that.

16. It is fitting to attribute the punishments which
 fall with justice on the wicked to the [universal]
 order in that it directs the world according to what
 is right; but as for all that happens without justice
 to the good, like [unjust] punishments or poverty or
 sickness, are these to be said to have come upon
 them because of previous sins? For these are woven
 in and signified beforehand, so that they too happen

καὶ αὐτὰ κατὰ λόγον γίνεσθαι. ἢ οὐ κατὰ λόγους φυσικοὺς ταῦτα, οὐδ' ἦν ἐν τοῖς προηγουμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐπόμενα ἐκείνοις· οἷον πιπτοῦσης τινὸς οἰκοδομίας τὸν ὑποπεσόντα ἀποθανεῖν ὁποῖός ποτ' 10 ἂν ἦ, ἢ καὶ ἵππων¹ δύο κατὰ τάξιν φερομένων ἢ καὶ ἑνὸς τὸ ἐμπεσόν τρωθῆναι ἢ πατηθῆναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο οὐ κακὸν ἐν τῷ παθόντι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὄλου χρήσιμον πλοκῆν. ἢ οὐδὲ ἄδικον ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ἔχον² τὴν δικαίωσιν. οὐ γὰρ τὰ μὲν δεῖ νομίζειν συντετάχθαι, τὰ δὲ κεχαλάσθαι εἰς τὸ 15 αὐτεξούσιον. εἰ γὰρ κατ' αἰτίας γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ φυσικὰς ἀκολουθίας καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἕνα καὶ τάξιν μίαν, καὶ τὰ σμικρότερα δεῖ συντετάχθαι καὶ συνφάνθαι νομίζειν. καὶ τὸ ἄδικον δὴ τὸ παρ' ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον αὐτῷ μὲν τῷ ποιήσαντι ἄδικον, 20 καὶ οὐκ ἀφείθη αἰτίας ὁ δράσας, συντεταγμένον δ' ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐκ ἄδικον ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐδ' εἰς τὸν παθόντα, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχρη. εἰ δ' ἀγαθὸς ὁ παθὼν, εἰς ἀγαθὸν ἢ τελευτῇ τούτων. δεῖ γὰρ τήνδε τὴν σύνταξιν οὐκ ἄθεεῖ οὐδὲ ἄδικον, ἀλλ' ἀκριβῆ εἰς τὴν τοῦ προσήκοντος ἀπόδοσιν νομίζειν, ἀδύλους 25 δὲ ἔχειν τὰς αἰτίας καὶ τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι παρέχειν μέμφεως αἰτίας.

17. "Ὅτι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ εἰς τὴν οὐρανοῦ ἴασιαι αἱ ψυχαὶ τὸ πρῶτον χώραν, λογίσαίτο ἂν τις ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων. εἰ γὰρ οὐρανὸς ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τόπῳ ἀμείνων, εἴη ἂν προσεχῆς τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς ἐσχήτοις.

¹ Theiler: τῶν Enn.*, H-S¹.

² Vitrings, Müller*: ἐχόντων Enn., H-S¹.

according to rational principle. No, these things do not occur according to the rational principles of nature and are not given in their premises, but are consequences of them; for instance, if a building falls the man who is underneath it is killed, whatever sort of man he is; or if two horses are moving in an orderly way—or even one—anything which gets in the way is injured or trampled. Or [we should think that] this injustice is not an evil to the sufferer [and contributes] to the interweaving of the whole. Or it is not unjust because it has its justification from former faults. For one must not think that some things are contained in the order, while others are let loose for the operation of free will. For if things have to happen according to causes and rational sequences and according to one rational principle and a single order, one must think that the less important things too are contained in the order and woven in. And the injustice which one man does to another is certainly an injustice from the point of view of the doer, and the man who perpetrates it is not free from guilt, but as contained in the universal order it is not unjust in that order, or in relation to the sufferer, but it was ordained that he should so suffer. But if the sufferer is a good man, this will turn out for his good. For one must not think that the order is godless or unjust, but that it is accurate in the distribution of what is appropriate, but it keeps its reasons hidden and gives grounds for blame to those who do not know them.

17. One could deduce from considerations like the following that the souls when they leave the intelligible first enter the space of heaven. For if heaven is the better part of the region perceived by the

5 ἐκεῖθεν τοῖνυν ψυχούται ταῦτα πρῶτα καὶ μετα-
 λαμβάνει ὡς ἐπιτηδεώτερα μεταλαμβάνειν. τὸ δὲ
 γεηρὸν ὑστατόν τε καὶ ψυχῆς ἥττονος πεφικὸς
 μεταλαμβάνειν καὶ τῆς ἀσωμάτου φύσεως πόρρω.
 πάσαι μὲν δὲ καταλάμπουσι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ δι-
 δάσκειν οἶον τὸ πολὺ αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκεῖνω,
 10 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῖς ὑστέροις ἐναυγάζονται, αἱ δ'
 ἐπιπλέον κατιούσαι ἐναυγάζουσι μᾶλλον κάτω,
 αὐταῖς δὲ οὐκ ἄμεινον εἰς πολὺ προϊούσαις. ἔστι
 γάρ τι οἶον κέντρον, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτῳ κύκλος ἀπ'
 αὐτοῦ ἐκλάμπων, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἄλλος, φῶς ἐκ
 φωτός· ἔξωθεν δὲ τούτων οὐκέτι φωτός· κύκλος
 15 ἄλλος, ἀλλὰ δεόμενος οὗτος οὐκείνου φωτός ἀπορία
 αὐγῆς ἀλλοτρίας. ἔστω δὲ ῥόμβος οὗτος, μᾶλλον
 δὲ σφαῖρα τοιαύτη, ἣ δὴ κομίζεται ἀπὸ τῆς τρίτης—
 προσεχῆς γὰρ αὐτῇ—ἔσον ἐκεῖνη ἐναυγάζεται. τὸ
 μὲν οὖν μέγα φῶς μένον ἐλλάμπει, καὶ διήκει κατὰ
 20 λόγον ἐξ αὐτοῦ αὐγῆ, τὰ δ' ἄλλα συνεπιλάμπει, τὰ
 μὲν μένοντα, τὰ δ' ἐπιπλέον ἐπισπάται τῇ τοῦ
 ἐλλαμπομένου ἀγλαΐα. εἶτα δεομένων τῶν ἐλ-
 λαμπομένων πλείονος φροντίδος, ὡσπερ χειμαζο-
 μένων πλοίων κυβερνῆται ἐναπερείδονται πρὸς τὸ
 πλεον τῆ τῶν νεῶν φροντίδι καὶ ἀμελήσαντες αὐτῶν

¹ See note on ch. 15. There is here a certain "creeping spatiality". Plotinus does not really think that any part of the material universe, even the highest heaven, can be nearer to the intelligible than any other, because the intelligible is not in space at all. But here his language is influenced, perhaps not only by the "cosmic religiosity" of his time, but by his favourite myth in Plato's *Phaedrus* (cp. 246D6-247E6).

² Cp. VI. 4. 9. 25-6 and the Nicene creed. It is interesting

senses, it borders on the last and lowest parts of the intelligible.¹ So these heavenly regions are first ensouled thence, and participate in soul first because they are better adapted to participate. But the body of earth is the last, and less naturally adapted to participate in soul and far from the bodiless nature. All souls then illuminate the heaven and give it the greatest and first part of themselves, but illuminate the rest of the world with their secondary parts; those which come down further throw their light lower, but it is not to their advantage to have gone on so far. For there is a kind of centre, and around this a circle shining out from it, and beyond these another, light from light²: but outside these there is no longer another circle of light but this next circle through lack of its own light needs illumination from another source. Let this be a wheel, or rather a sphere of a kind which from the third—for it borders upon it—obtains all the illumination which that third receives. So the great light abides and shines, and its radiance goes out through the world in rational order and proportion; the other lights join in illuminating, some staying in their places, but others are more attracted by the brightness of what is illuminated. Then as the things which are illuminated need more care, just as the steersmen of ships in a storm concentrate more and more on the care of their ships and are unaware that to find exactly this phrase (ὡς ἐκ φωτός) which appears in Plotinus in strongly subordinationist contexts, occupying an important place in the first great credal affirmation of non-subordinationist Trinitarian theology, where the Fathers of Nicaea are trying to state with the utmost possible emphasis that the Son is *not* inferior to the Father as one Plotinian hypostasis is to that above it.

25 ἔλαθον, ὡς κινδυνεύειν συνεπισπασθῆναι πολλάκις
 τῷ τῶν νεῶν ναυαγίῳ, ἔρρεψαν τὸ¹ πλεόν και
 αἰται και τοῖς ἑαυτῶν· ἔπειτα δὲ κατεσχέθησαν
 πεδηθεῖσαι γοητείας δεσμοῖς, υχεθεῖναι φύσει
 κηδεμονία. εἰ δ' ἦν τοιοῦτον ἕκαστον ζῶον οἶον
 30 παθεῖν, και παρεῖναι λεγομένη ψυχὴ οὐκ ἂν παρῆν
 αὐτῷ, και παρείχεν αὐτῷ ζωὴν μένουσα πάντη ἐν
 τῷ ἄνω.

18. Πότερα δὲ λογισμῷ ψυχὴ χρῆται πρὶν ἐλθεῖν
 και πάλιν αὖ ἐξελθοῦσα; ἢ ἐνταῦθα ὁ λογισμὸς
 ἐγγίγνεται ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἤδη οὔσης και φροντίδος
 πληρουμένης και μᾶλλον ἀσθενούσης· ἐλάττωσις
 5 γὰρ νοῦ εἰς αὐτάρκειαν τὸ λογισμοῦ δεῖσθαι·
 ὡσπερ και ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ὁ λογισμὸς ἀποροῦσι
 τοῖς τεχνίταις, ὅταν δὲ μὴ χαλεπὸν ἦ, κρατεῖ και
 ἐργάζεται ἢ τέχνη. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐκεῖ ἄνευ λογισμῶν,
 πῶς ἂν ἔτι λογικὰ εἶεν; ἢ ὅτι δύνανται, εἴποι τις
 ἂν, ὅταν περίστασις, εὐπορήσαι διασκοποῦσαι.
 10 δεῖ δὲ τὸν λογισμὸν λαβεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον· ἐπεὶ εἴ
 τις λογισμὸν λαμβάνει τὴν ἐκ νοῦ αἰεὶ γνωμένην και
 οὔσαν ἐν αὐταῖς διάθεσιν, και ἐνέργειαν ἐστῶσαν
 και οἶον ἔμφασιν οὔσαν, εἴεν ἂν κακεῖ λογισμῷ
 χρώμεναι. οὐδὲ δὴ φωναῖς, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι νομι-
 στέον ἐν μὲν τῷ νοητῷ οὔσας και πάμπαν, σώματα
 15 δ' ἐχούσας ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἕσα μὲν διὰ χρείας ἢ δι'

¹ Theiler: τε Enn.*, H-S¹.

¹ For the "magic" of the physical universe, the living power of its organic unity on which the art of the magician depends, see IV. 4. 40.

they are forgetting themselves, that they are in danger of being dragged down with the wreck of the ships, these souls incline downwards more with what is theirs. Then they are held fettered with bonds of magic,¹ held fast by their care for [bodily] nature. But if every living creature was like the All, a perfect and sufficient body and in no danger of suffering, then the soul which is said to be present would not be present in it, and would give it life while remaining altogether in the upper world.

18. Does the soul use discursive reasoning before it comes and again after it goes out of the body? No, discursive reasoning comes into it here below, when it is already in perplexity and full of care, and in a state of greater weakness; for feeling the need of reasoning is a lessening of the intellect in respect of its self-sufficiency; just as in the crafts reasoning occurs when the craftsmen are in perplexity, but, when there is no difficulty, the craft dominates and does its work. But if they are without reasoning processes there, how could they still be reasonable? Because they are capable, one might say, when the circumstances arise, of considering rationally with the greatest of ease. But one must understand reasoning in this sort of sense; because if one understands reasoning to be the state of mind which exists in them always proceeding from Intellect, and which is a static activity and a kind of reflection of Intellect, they would employ reasoning in that other world, too. Nor do I think that we should suppose that they use speech in the intelligible world, and altogether, even if they have bodies in heaven, there would be none of that talk there which they engage in here because of needs or over doubtful and dis-

ἀμφισβητήσεις διαλέγοντα ἐνταῦθα, ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἂν εἶη· ποιοῦσαι δὲ ἐν τάξει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστα οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιτάττοιεν οὐδ' ἂν συμβουλεύοιεν, γινώσκουσι δ' ἂν καὶ τὰ παρ' ἀλλήλων ἐν συνέσει. ἐπεὶ
 20 καὶ ἐνταῦθα πολλὰ σιωπώντων γινώσκοιμεν δι' ὀμμάτων· ἐκεῖ δὲ καθαρὸν πᾶν τὸ σῶμα καὶ οἶον ὀφθαλμὸς ἕκαστος καὶ οὐδὲν δὲ κρυπτὸν οὐδὲ πεπλασμένον, ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν ἄλλω ἰδῶν ἐκείνος ἔγνω. περὶ δὲ δαιμόνων καὶ ψυχῶν ἐν ἀέρι φωνῇ χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἄτοπον· ζῶα γὰρ τοιάδε.

19. Πότερα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰτοῦ τὸ ἀμέριστον καὶ μεριστὸν ὥσπερ κραθέντων, ἢ ἄλλη μὲν καὶ κατ' ἄλλο τὸ ἀμέριστον, τὸ δὲ μεριστὸν οἶον ἐφέξης καὶ ἕτερον μέρος αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ τὸ μὲν λογιζόμενόν
 5 φάμεν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον; γνωσθεῖν δ' ἂν ληφθέντος τί λέγομεν ἐκάτερον. ἀμέριστον μὲν οὐκ ἀπλῶς εἴρηται αὐτῷ, μεριστὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄπλῶς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ σώματά φησι γινομένην μεριστήν καὶ ταύτην οὐ γεγενημένην. τὴν δὲ σώματος
 10 φύσιν ὄραν δεῖ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν οἷας ψυχῆς προσδεῖται, καὶ ὅ τι δεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς πανταχοῦ τῷ σώματι καὶ ὅλω παρεῖναι. πᾶν μὲν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, εἴπερ διὰ παντός αἰσθήσεται, ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ μερίζεσθαι· πανταχοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὄν μεμερίσθαι ἂν λέγοιτο· ὅλον δὲ πανταχοῦ φαινόμενον οὐ μεμερίσθαι ἂν
 15 παντελῶς λέγοιτο, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματα γίνεσθαι μεριστόν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι

puted points; but as they do everything they do in order and according to nature they would not give orders or advice and would know by intuition what passes from one to another. For here below, too, we can know many things by the look in people's eyes when they are silent; but there all their body is clear and pure and each is like an eye, and nothing is hidden or feigned, but before one speaks to another that other has seen and understood. But there is nothing absurd in spirits and souls in the air using voices; for they are [embodied] living creatures of a particular kind.

19. Are the "indivisible" and the "divisible" elements of the soul in the same place, as if they were mixed together, or is the "indivisible" in a different place and differently related, but the "divisible" so to speak following upon it and another part of soul, just as we say that the reasoning part is one thing and the unreasoning part another? This could be answered when it has been understood what we mean by each. The term "indivisible" is used without qualification, but "divisible" is not unqualified but Plato says that soul "becomes divisible in the sphere of bodies", and not that it has already become so. One must then observe what kind of soul the nature of body requires in order to live, and what of soul must be present everywhere to body as a whole. Now the whole of the sense faculty, since it is going to operate throughout the whole body, comes to divide itself; for since it is everywhere it might be said to be divided; but since it appears everywhere as a whole, it could be said not to be absolutely and completely divided, but to become "divisible in the sphere of body". But if anyone

μηδὲ μεμερίσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον ἐν τῇ ἀφῆῃ, λεκτέον
 ὅτι καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις, εἴπερ σῶμά ἐστι τὸ μεταλαμ-
 βάνον, ἀνάγκη οὕτω μερίζεσθαι, ἔλαττον δὲ ἢ
 ἐν τῇ ἀφῆῃ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ φυτικὸν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ
 20 αἰξήτικόν ὡσαύτως· καὶ εἰ περὶ τὸ ἥπαρ ἢ ἐπι-
 θυμία, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν ὁ θυμὸς, ὁ αὐτὸς
 λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων. ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα οὐ παρα-
 λαμβάνει ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ μίγματι, ἴσως δὲ ἄλλον
 τρόπον καὶ ἐκ τίνος τῶν παραληφθέντων ταῦτα.
 25 λογισμὸς δὲ καὶ νοῦς; οὐκέτι ταῦτα σώματι
 δίδωσιν αὐτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν οὐ δι' ὄργανον
 τελείται τοῦ σώματος· ἐμπόδιον γὰρ τοῦτο, εἴ τις
 αὐτῷ ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι προσχρῶτο. ἄλλο ἄρα
 ἐκάτερον τὸ ἀμέριστον καὶ μεριστόν, καὶ οὐχ ὡς
 ἐν κραθέντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ὅλον ἐκ μερῶν ἐκατέρου
 30 καθαροῦ καὶ χωρὶς τῆς δυνάμει. εἰ μέντοι καὶ τὸ
 περὶ τὰ σώματα γιννόμενον μεριστόν παρὰ
 τῆς ἐπάνω δυνάμεως ἔχει τὸ ἀμέριστον, δύναται τὸ
 αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀμέριστον καὶ μεριστόν εἶναι, ὅλον
 κραθὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς εἰς αὐτὸ ἐλλούσης ἄνωθεν
 δυνάμεως.

20. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῆς
 ψυχῆς λεγόμενα μέρη, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν ὅλως οὐκ ἐν
 τόπῳ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐν τόπῳ καὶ ποῦ, ἢ ὅλως οὐδέν,
 ἐπιστήσοι προσήκει. εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἀφοριούμεν

¹ With Theiler I take the subject of παραλαμβάνει here to be "Plato", not, as most editors (including Henry-Schwyzler), "the body". Plotinus in this chapter is trying to give a coherent and philosophically satisfactory exposition of Plato's account of human psychology in the *Timaeus*, based on the often quoted text 35A1-3, to which he refers at the beginning

says that it is not divided at all in the other senses, but only in that of touch, we must reply that it must divide itself in the others too in this way, since it is body which participates in it, but less than in the sense of touch. And the plant principle in it, too, and the principle of growth are divided in the same way; and if desire is in the region of the liver and the spirited part in the region of the heart, the same argument will apply to them. But perhaps Plato does not admit that these sensations occur in the mixture of which we have been speaking: perhaps he considers that they arise in another way and as a result of some one of the things which have been already received.¹ But what about reasoning and intellect? These no longer give themselves to the body; for their work is not done through the instrument of the body: for this gets in the way if one uses it in rational investigations. So then the "indivisible" and the "divisible" are two different things, and not like one mingled thing but like a whole of parts, each of which is pure and separate in its power. If, however, that which is "divisible in the sphere of bodies" holds the "indivisible" from a higher power, this same thing can be both indivisible and divisible, as if it was mixed from itself and the power which comes into it from above.

20. It is proper that we should pay attention to the question whether these and the other so-called parts of the soul are in place, or whether these are

of the chapter. At this point he seems somewhat uneasy about Plato's firm attribution of different parts of the soul to different parts of the body in 70-71. In the next sentence he turns, perhaps with relief, to the clear-cut dualism of *Phaedo* 65.

5 ἐκάστοις τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς τόπον τινὰ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν
 θέντες, οὐ μᾶλλον εἴσω τοῦ σώματος ἢ ἔξω
 ποιούντες, ἄψυχον αὐτὸ ποιήσομεν, τά τε δι'
 ὀργάνων σωματικῶν ἔργα ὅπη γίνεσθαι προσήκει
 εἰπέειν ἀπορήσομεν, εἴτε τοῖς μέν, τοῖς δ' οὐ, οἷς
 μὴ δίδομεν, οὐκ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτὰ ποιεῖν δόξομεν, ὥστε
 10 μὴ πάσαν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι. ὅλως
 μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν οὐδὲ πάσαν
 φατέον ὡς ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι τῷ σώματι· περιεκτικὸν
 μὲν γὰρ ὁ τόπος καὶ περιεκτικὸν σώματος, καὶ
 οὐ ἕκαστον μερισθὲν ἔστιν, ἔστιν ἐκεῖ, ὡς μὴ ὅλον ἐν
 ὄψεσιν εἶναι· ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐ σῶμα, καὶ οὐ περι-
 15 εχόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ περιέχον. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὡς ἐν
 ἀγγείῳ· ἄψυχον γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο τὸ σῶμα, εἴτε ὡς
 ἀγγεῖον, εἴτε ὡς τόπος περιέχει· εἰ μὴ ἄρα
 διαδόσει τινὶ αὐτῆς οὐσης πρὸς αὐτὴν συνηθροισ-
 μένης, καὶ ἔσται, ὅσον μετέλαβε τὸ ἀγγεῖον, τοῦτο
 ἀπολωλὸς αὐτῆ· ὁ δὲ τόπος ὁ κυρίως ἀσώματος
 20 καὶ οὐ σῶμα· ὥστε τί ἂν δέοιτο ψυχῆς; καὶ τὸ
 σῶμα τῷ πέρατι αὐτοῦ πλησιάζει τῇ ψυχῇ, οὐχ
 αὐτῷ· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἐναντιοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ὡς

¹ The sense seems much better if, with Theiler, we omit the comma between *ψυχῆς* and *τόπον* printed by Henry-Schwyzler.

² The denial that soul is in body as a place or a receptacle is normal Aristotelian doctrine: cp. the long critical discussion of ways in which the soul may be said to be "in" the body by Alexander of Aphrodisias *De Anima* 13-15 Bruns, of which Plotinus makes use here and in the next chapter. Plotinus

not in any way in place but the others are, and where they are, or whether no part of the soul is in any way in place. For either, if we do not allot a place to each of the parts of the soul and put none of them anywhere,¹ not making them any more inside the body than outside, we shall make the body soulless, and shall find it difficult to see how the works of the soul which are done through bodily instruments ought to come about; or, if we give a place to some of them, but not to others, then it will appear that we are not making those to which we do not give a place work within us, so that the whole of our soul is not in us. Now we must say in general that neither any of the parts of the soul nor the whole soul are in body as in a place. For place is something encompassing, and encompassing body, and where each divided part is, there it is [and nowhere else] so that the whole is not [as a whole] in any place; but soul is not a body, and is no more encompassed than encompassing. It is certainly not in the body as in a receptacle either.² For the body would be soulless, whether it encompassed the soul as a receptacle or as a place, unless perhaps it was ensouled by a sort of transmission from the soul which remained collected together in itself, and then the amount of which the receptacle partakes will be lost to soul. But place in the strict and proper sense is bodiless and not a body: so what need would it have of soul? And body would come near to soul with its edge, not with itself. And many other objections could be made to [soul's being in body] as in place.

thinks that, if one is to use spatial metaphors at all, it is better to say that body is in soul than that soul is in body: cp. e.g. lines 14-15 here and ch. 22. 8-9.

ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ συμφέροιο ἂν αἰεὶ ὁ τόπος,
 καὶ αὐτό τι ἔσται τὸν τόπον αὐτὸν περιφέρον.
 25 ἄλλ' οὐδ' εἰ ὁ τόπος διάστημα εἴη, πολὺ μᾶλλον
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὡς ἐν τόπῳ τῷ σώματι. τὸ γὰρ διάστημα
 κενὸν εἶναι δεῖ· τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐ κενόν, ἀλλ' ἴσως
 ἐν ᾧ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται, ὥστε ἐν τῷ κενῷ τὸ σῶμα.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσται τῷ σώματι.
 τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ πάθος τοῦ ἐν ᾧ, ὡς χρῶμα
 30 καὶ σχῆμα, καὶ χωριστὸν ἢ ψυχῆ. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὡς
 μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ· οὐ γὰρ μέρος ἢ ψυχῆ τοῦ σώματος.
 εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐν ὅλῳ μέρος τῷ ζῳῳ,
 πρῶτον μὲν ἢ αὐτὴ ἂν μένοι ἀπορία, πῶς ἐν ὅλῳ
 οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀμφορεῖ τοῦ οἴνου ὁ οἶνος, ἢ
 ὡς ὁ ἀμφορεύς, οὐδ' ἢ καὶ αὐτό τι ἐν αὐτῷ ἔσται.
 35 ἄλλ' οὐδ' ὡς ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι· γελοῖον γὰρ τὴν
 μὲν ψυχὴν ὅλον λέγειν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα μέρος. ἀλλ'
 οὐδὲ ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλη· ἀχώριστον γὰρ τὸ ἐν ὕλη
 εἶδος, καὶ ἤδη ὕλης οὐσίας ἕστερον τὸ εἶδος. ἢ δὲ
 ψυχῆ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ ὕλει ἄλλη τοῦ εἶδους οὐσα.
 40 εἰ δὲ οὐ τὸ γενόμενον εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τὸ χωριζόμενον
 φήσουσι, πῶς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ σώματι,
 οὐπω φανερόν [καὶ χωριστὸν ἢ ψυχῆ].¹ πῶς οὖν ἐν
 τῷ σώματι ἢ ψυχῆ λέγεται πρὸς πάντων; ἢ
 ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἢ ψυχῆ, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα. σῶμα
 οὖν ὁρῶντες, ἔμφηχον δὲ συνιέντες, ὅτι κινεῖται
 45 καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχειν φαμέν ψυχὴν αὐτό. ἐν αὐτῷ
 ἄρα τῷ σώματι τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀκολουθῶς ἂν
 λέγοιμεν. εἰ δέ γε ὁρατὸν ἢ ψυχῆ καὶ αἰσθητὸν ἢ

¹ del. Volkmann* ut iteratum e lin. 29-30.

For place would always be carried along with it, and
 body itself would be something carrying space itself
 about. But even if place is taken to mean interval,
 soul would still less be in body as in place. For an
 interval must be void; but body is not void; though
 that in which body is may be, so that body is in the
 void. But soul will certainly not be in body as in a
 substrate, either: for that which is in a substrate
 is an affection of that in which it is, colour and shape
 for instance, and soul is something separable. It is
 certainly not, either, like a part in the whole: for
 soul is not a part of body. If someone were to
 suggest that it was like a part in a whole living crea-
 ture, first of all the same difficulty would remain
 about how it is in the whole: for it is not, presumably,
 as the wine is in the jar of wine, or the gallon in the
 gallon jar, or in the way in which some one thing is
 in itself. But it is not, either, in body as a whole is
 in its parts: for it would be absurd to say that the
 soul is a whole and the body its parts. But it is not,
 either, present like the form in matter: for the form
 in matter is inseparable, and it comes afterwards to
 the matter which is already there. But soul makes
 the form in matter and is other than the form [which
 it makes]. But if they assert that it is not the form
 which comes to be in the matter, but the separate
 form, it is not yet clear how this is the form in the
 body. How then is it that the soul is said by every-
 one to be in the body? It is because the soul is
 not visible, but the body is, so we see the body and
 are aware that it is ensouled because it moves and
 perceives, and so say that it has soul. It would then
 be a natural consequence for us to say that the soul
 is actually in the body. But if the soul was visible

περιειλημμένον πάντη τῇ ζωῇ καὶ μέχρις ἐσχάτων
 οὔσα εἰς ἴσον, οὐκ ἂν ἔφαμεν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ
 σώματι εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κυριωτέρῳ τὸ μὴ
 50 τοιοῦτον, καὶ ἐν τῷ συνέχοντι τὸ συνεχόμενον,
 καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ ῥέοντι τὸ ῥέον.

21. Τί οὖν; πῶς πάρεστιν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῶν
 μηδὲν αὐτὸς λέγων ὅπως, τί ἐροῦμεν; καὶ εἰ
 ὁμοίως πᾶσα, ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ἄλλως, τὸ δ' ἄλλως;
 ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τῶν νῦν λεγομένων τρόπων τοῦ ἐν τι
 5 οὐδεὶς φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ σῶμα
 ἀρμόττων, λέγεται δὲ οὕτως ἐν τῷ σώματι εἶναι
 ἡ ψυχὴ, ὡς ὁ κυβερνήτης ἐν τῇ νηί, πρὸς μὲν τὸ
 χωριστὴν δύνασθαι εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καλῶς εἴρηται,
 τὸν μέντοι τρόπον, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἂν
 πάνυ παραστήσειεν. ὡς μὲν γὰρ πλωτὴρ κατὰ
 10 συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη ἐν αὐτῇ ὁ κυβερνήτης, ὡς δὲ
 κυβερνήτης πῶς; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν πάσῃ τῇ νηί,
 ὡςπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι. ἀλλὰ ἄρα οὕτω
 φατέον, ὡς ἡ τέχνη ἐν τοῖς ὄργανοις, οἷον ἐν τῷ
 οἴακι, [οἶον]¹ εἰ ἔμφυχος ὁ οὔξ ἦν, ὥστε κυβερνη-
 τικὴν εἶναι ἔνδον τὴν κινουσαν τεχνικῶς; νῦν δὲ
 15 τοῦτο διαλλάττειν, ὅτι ἔξωθεν ἡ τέχνη. εἰ οὖν κατὰ
 τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ τοῦ κυβερνήτου τοῦ ἐνδύντος
 πρὸς τὸν οἴακα θείμεθα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι
 εἶναι ὡς ἐν ὄργανῳ φυσικῶ—κιεῖ γὰρ οὕτως αὐτὸ
 ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλη ποιεῖν—ἀρ' ἂν τι πλεον ἡμῶν πρὸς

¹ del. Volkmann*.

and perceptible, in every way surrounded by life and extending equally to all the extremities [of the body], we should not have said that the soul was in the body, but that the unimportant was in the more important, and what is held together in what holds it together, and that which flows away in that which does not.

21. Well then, how is it present? If someone asks the question and does not give any answer himself, what are we going to say? And is it all present in the same sort of way, or one part in one way and another in another? For indeed, none of the ways of a thing's being in anything which are currently spoken of fits the relationship of the soul to the body, but it is also said that the soul is in the body as the steersman is in the ship; this is a good comparison as far as the soul's ability to be separate from the body goes, but would not supply very satisfactorily the manner of its presence, which is what we ourselves are investigating. For the steersman as a voyager would be present incidentally in the ship, but how would he be present as steersman? Nor is he in the whole of the ship, as the soul is in the body. Are we then to say that it is present as the skill is in the tools, in the rudder for instance, so that if the rudder was ensouled the steersman's skill which moves it according to the rules of his art would be within it? But the difference is this, that the skill comes from outside. If then, according to the model of the steersman who has got into the rudder, we stated that the soul was in the body as in a natural tool—for this is how the soul moves the body in whatever it wants to do—should we gain any advantage from the next point of view of our investiga-

τὸ ζητούμενον γένοιτο; ἢ πάλιν ἀπορήσομεν πῶς
20 ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ὄργάνῳ, καίτοι τρόπος οὗτος ἕτερος
τῶν πρόσθεν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔτι ποθοῦμεν ἐξευρεῖν καὶ
ἐγγυτέρω προσελθεῖν.

22. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω φατέον, ὅταν ψυχῇ σώματι
παρῆ, παρεῖναι αὐτὴν ὡς τὸ πῦρ πάρεστι τῷ ἀέρι;
καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦτο παρὸν οὐ πάρεστι καὶ δι'
ὄλου παρὸν οὐδενὶ μίγνυται καὶ ἔστηκε μὲν αὐτό,
5 τὸ δὲ παραρρεῖ· καὶ ὅταν ἔξω γένηται τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τὸ
φῶς, ἀπῆλθεν οὐδὲν ἔχων, ἕως δὲ ἔστιν ὑπὸ τὸ
φῶς, πεφώτισται, ὡστ' ὀρθῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἐνταῦθα
λέγειν, ὡς ὁ ἀῆρ ἐν τῷ φωτί, ἥπερ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῷ
ἀέρι. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων καλῶς τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ θεῖς ἐν
τῷ σώματι ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῇ
10 ψυχῇ, καὶ¹ φησι τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ᾧ τὸ
σῶμα, τὸ δὲ ἐν ᾧ σῶμα μηδέν, ὡς δηλονότι δυνάμεων
οὐ δέεται τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ψυχῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. τῶν μὲν ἄλλων δυνάμεων
οὐδὲ παρουσίαν τῷ σώματι λεκτέαν τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι,
15 ὡς δὲ δέεται, ταῦτα παρεῖναι, καὶ παρεῖναι οὐκ
ἐνιδρυθέντα τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ οὐδ' αὐτῷ ὄλῳ, καὶ
πρὸς μὲν αἰσθησιν παρεῖναι παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ τὸ
αἰσθητικόν, πρὸς δὲ ἐνεργείας ἤδη ἄλλο ἄλλῳ.

23. Λέγω δὲ ὧδε· τοῦ σώματος πεφωτισμένου

¹ καὶ (etiam) Enn.: del. Vitringa, H-S².

tion? We shall again be in a difficulty about how
it is in the tool, though this is a way of being in the
body different from those mentioned before; all the
same we are still anxious to discover it completely
and approach nearer to the goal of our investigation.

22. Are we to say then that when soul is present to
body it is present as fire is present to air? For this
too like soul is present without being present, and
is present throughout the whole and mixed with
none of it, and stays still itself while the air flows
past; and when the air goes outside the space where
the light is, it departs without retaining anything of
it, but while it is under the light it is illuminated, so
that one can rightly say here too that the air is in
the light rather than the light in the air. That is
why Plato¹ rightly does not put the soul in the
body when he is speaking of the universe, but the
body in the soul, and says also that there is a part
of the soul in which body is and part in which there
is no body, clearly the powers of the soul of which
the body has no need. And the same principle
clearly applies to the other souls. We must not say
that there is even a presence of the other powers of
soul to the body, but that the powers which it needs
are present, and present without being situated in
its parts, or in the whole either, and the sense-faculty
is present to the whole of the perceiving body for the
purposes of sense-perception, but one part at one
time to one and one to another according to the
[particular] sense-activity [which is going on].

23. What I mean is this: when the ensouled body
is illuminated by soul, one part of it participates in

¹ The reference is to *Timaeus* 36D9-E3: cp. ch. 20, n. 2.

τοῦ ἐμφύχου ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλλο ἄλλως μεταλαμ-
 βάνειν αὐτοῦ μέρος· καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀργάνου
 πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἐπιτηδειότητα, δύναμιν τὴν προσ-
 5 ἤκουσαν εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἀποδιδούσαν, οὕτω τοι
 λέγεσθαι τὴν μὲν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἰδύναμιν τὴν ὀρα-
 τικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἐν ὠσὶ τὴν ἀκουστικὴν, καὶ
 γευστικὴν ἐν γλώσση, ὄσφρησιν ἐν ῥίσι, τὴν δὲ
 ἀπτικὴν ἐν παντὶ παρεῖναι· πρὸς γὰρ ταύτην τὴν
 ἀντίληψιν πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον τῇ ψυχῇ εἶναι.¹
 10 τῶν δὲ ἀπτικῶν ὀργάνων ἐν πρώτοις τοῖς νεύροις
 ὄντων, ἃ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ζώου τὴν
 δύναμιν ἔχει, ἐνταῦθα τῆς τοιαύτης δούσης ἑαυτὴν,
 ἀρχομένων δὲ ἀπὸ ἐγκεφάλου τῶν νεύρων, τὴν τῆς
 αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὀσμῆς ἀρχὴν καὶ ὅλως παντὸς τοῦ
 ζώου ἐνταῦθα ἔθεσαν φέροντες, οὗ δηλονότι αἱ
 15 ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὀργάνων, ἐκεῖ παρεῖναι τὸ χρῆσόμενον
 τιθέμενοι—βέλτιον δὲ λέγειν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς
 ἐνεργείας τῆς δυνάμεως ἐκεῖ—ὅθεν γὰρ ἐμελλε
 κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὄργανον, ἐκεῖ ἔδει οἶον ἐναπερεῖδεσθαι
 τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ τεχνίτου ἐκείνην τὴν τῷ ὀργάνῳ
 πρόσφορον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ τὴν δύναμιν—πανταχοῦ
 20 γὰρ ἡ δύναμις—ἐκεῖ δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἡ ἀρχή, οὗ ἡ

¹ Beutler: παρεῖναι Enn.*

¹ The great doctor Herophilus of Chalcedon (first half of the 3rd century B.C.) and his younger contemporary Erasistratus of Ceos had discovered a great deal about the functions of the nervous system and the importance of the brain as its

one way and one in another; and according to the adaptation of [each] sense-organ to its task, as soul gives [each] the appropriate power for its task, so the power in the eyes is called that of sight, the power in the ears that of hearing, and the power of taste is said to be present in the tongue, that of smell in the nostrils, and that of touch in the whole body: for the whole body is sense-organ to the soul for this perception. Since the organs of touch are in the first nerves, which also have the power to set the living being in motion because the appropriate soul-power communicates itself at this point, and since these nerves begin in the brain,¹ they established the principle of perception and of impulse and in general of the whole living being in the brain, assuming that obviously that which was going to use the organs would be there where their beginnings were—but it would be better to say that the beginning of the actualisation of the potency [of perception] is there. For it was necessary that at the point from which the organ [or tool] was going to be moved that the power of the workman, as we may call it, which was appropriate to the tool should be fixed: or rather not the power—the power is everywhere—but the beginning of its actualisation at the point where the

centre and seat of the intelligence. Their discoveries had been used and developed by the great Galen (2nd century A.D.) and were well known in the time of Plotinus. Platonists welcomed these discoveries as confirmation of the view of Plato that intelligence was located in the head (*Timaeus* 44D-E: the reasons given are hardly scientific!) as against that of Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans, who located intelligence in the heart—a view still defended by Alexander *De Anima* 94, 7 ff. and 98, 24 ff. Bruns: cp. H. J. Blumenthal *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague 1971) 75.

ἀρχὴ τοῦ ὀργάνου. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι
 δύναμις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὀρμῶν ψυχῆς οὐσα¹ αἰσθητικῆς
 καὶ φανταστικῆς [φύσις]² ἐπάνω ἑαυτῆς εἶχε τὸν
 λόγον, ὡς ἂν <φύσις>³ γειτονοῦσα πρὸς τὸ κάτω
 25 οὐδ' αὐτὴ ἐπάνω, ταύτη ἐτέθη τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐν τοῖς
 ἄκροις τοῦ ζώου παντὸς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς, ὡς οὐσα
 οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἐγκεφάλῳ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ
 αἰσθητικῷ, ὃ ἐν τῇ ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐκείνως ἴδρυτο.
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔδει σώματι διδόναι, καὶ τῷ σώματος
 μάλιστα τῆς ἐνεργείας δεκτικῷ, τὸ δὲ σώματι
 30 οὐδαμοῦ κοινωνοῦν πάντως ἐκείνῳ κοινωνεῖν ἔδει,
 ὃ ψυχῆς εἶδος ἦν καὶ ψυχῆς δυναμένης τὰς παρὰ
 τοῦ λόγου ἀντιλήψεις ποιεῖσθαι. αἰσθητικὸν γὰρ
 κριτικὸν πως, καὶ φανταστικὸν οἶον νοερόν, καὶ
 ὀρμῆ καὶ ὄρεξις, φαντασίᾳ καὶ λόγῳ ἐπόμενα.
 ἐκεῖ οὖν τὸ λογιζόμενον οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ, ἀλλ' ὅτι
 35 τὸ ἐκεῖ ἀπολαύει αὐτοῦ. πῶς δὲ τὸ "ἐκεῖ" ἐπὶ
 τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, εἴρηται. τοῦ δὲ φυτικοῦ αὖ καὶ
 αὐξητικοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ μηδενὸς ἀπολειπομένου,
 τρέφοντος δὲ τῷ αἵματι, τοῦ δὲ αἵματος τοῦ
 τρέφοντος ἐν φλεψίν ὄντος, ἀρχῆς δὲ καὶ φλεβῶν
 καὶ αἵματος ἐν ἥπατι, οἶον³ ἐναπεριδομένης
 40 ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ
 μοῖρα τῆς ψυχῆς οἰκεῖν ἀπεδόθη. ὃ γὰρ τοι καὶ
 γεννᾷ καὶ τρέφει καὶ αὖξει, τοῦτο καὶ τούτων

¹ Theiler: οἴσης Enn.

² transpos. Igal.

³ Harder, H-S, cf. lin. 17: ὅθεν Enn.*

organ begins. Since, then, the power of sensation which is also that of impulsion, belonging to the soul which perceives and imagines, has reason above it, as it were a nature in close contact on its underside with that which this is above, the ancients thus put reason at the highest point of the whole living creature at the head, supposing it to be not in the brain but in this perceptive faculty which in the way described above was situated in the brain. For one part of the soul had to give itself to body, and to the part of body most receptive of its activity, but the other part, which had no communication with body, was under the absolute necessity of communicating with the first part, which was a form of soul, and of soul capable of apprehending what came from reason. For the perceptive part of the soul is in some way capable of judgement, and the imaging part has a sort of intelligence, and impulse and desire are there following the lead of the imaging faculty, and reason. The reasoning part therefore is there in the perceptive not as in a place but because that which is there draws upon it. We have already explained the sense in which we say that the perceptive part is "there". The part of the soul too which we have in common with plants, which is responsible for growth and nutrition, is not absent from any part of the body, and since it nourishes by means of the blood, and the nourishing blood is in the veins, and the starting point of veins and blood is in the liver, it is as if this [nutritive] power was fixed there, and so the appetitive part of the soul was assigned this place to dwell in. For that which generates and nourishes and produces growth must necessarily also have an appetite for generation, nourishment and

ἐπιθυμῆν ἀνάγκη. τοῦ δὲ λεπτοῦ καὶ κούφου καὶ ὀξέος καὶ καθαροῦ αἵματος, θυμῷ προσφόρου <όντας>¹ ὄργανου, ἢ τούτου πηγῆ, <ἢ καρδία>²— ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον αἷμα ἀποκρίνεται—τῆ
45 τοῦ θυμοῦ ζέσει [καρδία]³ πεποιήται οἴκησις πρέπουσα. [ἔχουσαι δὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβά- νεσθαι τῶν σωματικῶν κολάσεων ἔχουσιν.]⁴

24. Ἄλλὰ ποῦ ἐξελθοῦσα τοῦ σώματος γενήσε-
ται; ἢ ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἔσται, οὐδὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δεχόμενον ὅπως οὖν, οὐδὲ δύναται παραμένειν τῷ μὴ πεφυκῶτι αὐτὴν δέχεσθαι, εἰ μὴ τι ἔχει αὐτοῦ ὃ
5 ἔλκει πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφρονα οὔσαν. ἔστι δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ, εἰ ἄλλο ἔχει, καὶ κεῖ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐ πέφυκε τοῦτο εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι. ὄντος δὲ πολλοῦ καὶ ἐκάστου τόπου, καὶ παρὰ τῆς διαθέσεως ἦκειν δὲ τὸ διάφορον, ἦκειν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὔσι δίκης. οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτέ τις ἐκφύγοι, ὃ παθεῖν ἐπ'
10 ἀδίκους ἔργοις προσήκει· ἀναπόδραστος γὰρ ὁ θεῖος νόμος ὁμοῦ ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ποιῆσαι τὸ κριθὲν ἤδη. φέρεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πάσχων ἀγνοῶν ἐφ' ἃ παθεῖν προσήκει, ἀστάτῳ μὲν τῇ φορᾷ πανταχοῦ αἰωρούμενος ταῖς πλάναις, τελευτῶν δὲ ὡσπερ πολλὰ καμῶν οἷς ἀπέτεινεν εἰς τὸν προσήκοντα
15 αὐτῷ τόπον ἐπέπεσεν, ἐκουσίῳ τῇ φορᾷ τὸ ἀκούσιον εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ἔχων. εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τῷ

¹ Kirchhoff*.

² Kleist.

³ Kirchhoff*.

⁴ del. Ficinus, Creuzer*, iterata ex 24, 20-21.

growth. But since the thin, light, quick, pure blood is the proper organ for the spirited part of the soul, the spring of this, the heart—for this is where blood of this kind is separated out—is made to be the appropriate dwelling place for the seething of the spirited part.¹

24. But where will the soul be when it has left the body? It will not be here below, where there is nothing capable in any way of receiving it, and it cannot stay with that which is not naturally adapted to receive it, unless, because it is unreasonable, it still has something of body which draws it to it. If it has another body, it is in that, and accompanies it to the place naturally appropriate to its existence and development. But since there are many places for each as well [as many bodies], the difference between them must come from the disposition of the soul, and must come also from the justice in the nature of things. For no one can ever evade what he ought to suffer for his unrighteous doings: for the divine law is inescapable and has in itself together with the judgment already pronounced its execution. He too who is to suffer punishment is carried unknowing to what he has to suffer; on his unsteady course he is tossed about everywhere in his wanderings, and in the end, as if utterly weary, by his very efforts at resistance he falls into the place which suits him, having that which he did not will for his punish-

¹ I print and translate here the text and punctuation adopted by Beutler-Theiler: the minor alterations by Kirchhoff and Kleist which they accept, the insertion of ὄντος and the transposition of καρδία with their punctuation, seem to me to give a much better sense than the MSS text retained by Henry-Schwyzler.

νόμῳ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον δεῖ παθεῖν, καὶ πάλιν
 αὐτῷ ὁμοῦ συνέδραμεν ἢ ἄνεσις τῆς κολάσεως καὶ ἡ
 δύναμις τοῦ ἀναφυγεῖν ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν τόπων,
 20 ἁρμονίας δυνάμει κατεχούσης τὰ πάντα. ἔχουσαι
 δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν σωματικῶν
 κολάσεων ἔχουσι· ταῖς δὲ τῶν ψυχῶν καθαραῖς
 οὖσαι καὶ μηδὲν μηδαμῆ ἐφέλκομέναις τοῦ
 σώματος ἐξ ἀνάγκης <καὶ>¹ οὐδαμοῦ σώματος
 ὑπάρξει εἶναι. εἰ οὖν εἰσι [καὶ]¹ μηδαμοῦ σώματος
 25 —οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχουσι σῶμα—οὐ ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ
 ὄν καὶ τὸ θεῖον—ἐν τῷ θεῷ—ἐνταῦθα καὶ μετὰ
 τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ ἔσται. εἰ δ'
 ἔτι ζητεῖς ποῦ, ζητητέον σοι ποῦ ἐκεῖνα· ζητῶν
 δὲ ζήτη μὴ τοῖς ὀμμασι μηδ' ὡς ζητῶν σώματα.

25. Περὶ δὲ μνήμης, εἰ αὐταῖς ταῖς ψυχαῖς
 τῶνδε τῶν τόπων ἐξελθούσαις μνημονεύειν
 ὑπάρχει, ἢ ταῖς μὲν, ταῖς δ' οὐ, καὶ πάντων ἢ
 τινων, καὶ εἰ μνημονεύουσιν ἀεὶ, ἢ ἐπὶ τινα
 5 χρόνον τὸν ἐγγὺς τῆς ἀφόδου, ζητεῖν ὁμοίως ἄξιον.
 ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλομεν ὀρθῶς περὶ τούτων τὴν ζήτησιν
 ποιῆσθαι, ληπτέον τί ποτε τὸ μνημονεύον ἔστι.
 λέγω δὲ οὐ τί μνήμη ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τίνι συνίστασθαι
 πέφυκε τῶν ὄντων. τί μὲν γὰρ ἔστι μνήμη,

¹ transpos. Beutler.

¹ It is not clear to what discussion of memory Plotinus is here referring. His short treatise *On Sense-Perception and Memory* (IV. 6) is, according to Porphyry, later than the present one (No. 41 in the chronological order). In the treatise III. 6 (26), written immediately before IV. 3-4, there is a brief treatment of memory which again seems to presuppose a previous discussion. In both these cases the references may be to oral discussions; at any rate, no trace of any writing of

ment as a result of the course which he willed. But it is stated in the law how much and how long he must suffer, and again there come together the release from punishment and the ability to escape up from these regions by the power of the harmony which holds the universe together. But if the souls have bodies they have the capacity to be aware of bodily punishments: but those souls which are pure and do not in any way draw anything of body to them will necessarily also have no place anywhere in body. If then they are nowhere in body—for they have no body—a soul of this kind will be where substance and reality and the divine are—that is in god—there it will be with them and in him. But if you are still looking for the place where the soul is, you must look for the place where they are; but in looking you must not look for it with your eyes or in the way you look for bodies.

25. It is likewise worth investigating the question of memory, whether the souls themselves which have left these regions have the power of remembering or whether some of them have and others have not, and whether they remember everything or only some things, and if they always remember, or only for the time close after their departure. But if we are going to carry out our investigation of these questions correctly, we must understand what it is that remembers, I do not mean what memory is, but in what kind of realities it naturally exists. For what memory is, we have discussed elsewhere and there has been plenty of talk about it,¹ but we must

Plotinus on memory other than the long ch. 3 of IV. 6 and the careful discussion of the subject and content of memory which follows immediately here has survived.

εἶρηται ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ πολλάκις τεθρύλληται, τὸ δὲ
 10 μνημονεύειν πεφυκὸς ὁ τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἀκρι-
 βέστερον ληπτέον. εἰ δέ ἐστι τὸ τῆς μνήμης
 ἐπικτήτου τινὸς ἢ μαθήματος ἢ παθήματος, οὔτε
 τοῖς ἀπαθείαι τῶν ὄντων οὔτε τοῖς ἐν ἀχρόνῳ¹
 ἐγγίνοιτο ἂν τὸ μνημονεύειν. μνήμην δὲ περὶ
 θεὸν οὐδὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ νοῦν θετέον· οὐδὲν γὰρ
 15 εἰς αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ χρόνος, ἀλλ' αἰὼν περὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ
 οὔτε τὸ πρότερον οὔτε τὸ ἐφεξῆς, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αἰεὶ
 ὡς ἔχει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐ δεχόμενον παράλλαξιν.
 τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁμοίῳ πῶς ἂν ἐν μνήμῃ
 γένοιτο, οὐκ ἔχον οὐδ' ἴσχον ἄλλην κατάστασιν
 μεθ' ἣν εἶχε πρότερον, ἢ νόησιν ἄλλην μετ'
 20 ἄλλην, ἵνα ἐν ἄλλῃ μὲν ἦ,² ἄλλῃ δὲ μνημονεύῃ
 ἣν εἶχε πρότερον; ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει τὰς ἄλλων μετα-
 βολὰς εἰδέναι οὐ μεταβάλλοντα αὐτόν, οἷον κόσμου
 τὰς περιόδους; ἢ ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν πρότερον, ἄλλο δὲ
 ὕστερον νοήσει ἐπακολουθοῦν ταῖς τοῦ τρεπομένου
 μεταβολαῖς, τό τε μνημονεύειν παρὰ τὸ νοεῖν ἄλλο.
 25 τὰς δὲ αὐτοῦ νοήσεις οὐ μνημονεύειν λικτέον· οὐ
 γὰρ ἦλθον, ἵνα κατέχη μὴ ἀπέλθουεν· ἢ οὕτω γε τὴν
 οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ φοβοῖτο μὴ ἀπέλθαι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. οὐ
 ταύτην οὐδὲ ψυχὴν φατέον μνημονεύειν τὸν αὐτόν
 τρόπον οἷον λέγομεν τὸ μνημονεύειν εἶναι ὧν ἔχει

¹ Igal: ἐν χρόνῳ Enn.: <μῆ> ἐν χρόνῳ Kirchhoff, H-S¹⁻².

² H-S²: μὲν ἢ A^{ac}E, Kirchhoff*: μὲν A^{pc}xUC, Perna, Cruzer, H-S¹.

understand more exactly what it is that has the natural capacity of remembering. If memory is something acquired, either learnt or experienced, then memory will not be present in those realities which are unaffected by experience or those which are in the timeless. We must certainly not attribute memory to God, or real being or Intellect; for nothing [external] comes to them and there is no time, but eternity in which real being is, and there is neither before nor after, but it is always as it is, in the same state not admitting of any change.¹ But how can that which stays in an identical and exactly similar state be in a condition of memory, when it neither has nor holds another way of being different from that which it had before, or one thought after another, so that it might stay in one and remember the other which it had before? But what prevents it from knowing the changes of other things without changing itself, the revolutions of the universe for instance? The reason is that it will think of one thing as before and another as after, following the changes of that which turns, and remembering is something different from thinking. One must not say that it remembers its own thoughts: for they did not come, so that it has to hold them fast to prevent them from going away; or in this way it would be afraid that its own essential nature might go away from it. In the same way, then, the soul must not be said to remember, either, in the sense in which we are speaking of remembering, the things

¹ The question whether divine beings (including higher souls and the World-Soul) have memory is fully treated and answered, as here, in the negative, in the latter part of the discussion which begins here (IV. 4. 16-17).

30 συμφύτων, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθά ἐστιν, ἔχειν καὶ
 μὴ ἐνεργεῖν κατ' αἰτά, καὶ μάλιστα ἐνταῦθα
 ἠκούση. τὸ δὲ ἐνεργεῖν ἤδη—ταῖς ἐνεργούσαις
 ἃ εἶχον μνήμην καὶ ἀνάμνησιν προστιθέναι ἐόικα-
 σιν οἱ παλαιοί. ὥσθ' ἕτερον εἶδος μνήμης τοῦτο·
 διὸ καὶ χρόνος οὐ πρόσεστι τῇ οὕτω λεγομένῃ
 35 μνήμῃ. ἀλλ' ἴσως εὐχερῶς περὶ τούτων ἔχομεν
 καὶ οὐκ ἐξεταστικῶς. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τις ἀπορήσειε,
 μήποτε οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἐκείνης ἢ λεγομένη τοιαύτη
 ἀνάμνησις καὶ μνήμη, ἀλλὰ ἄλλης ἀμυδροτέρας,
 ἢ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου τοῦ ζώου. εἴτε γὰρ ἄλλης,
 πότε ἢ πῶς λαμβανούσης; εἴτε τοῦ ζώου, πότε ἢ
 40 πῶς; διὸ ζητητέον τί ἐστι τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ τὴν
 μνήμην ἴσχον, ὅπερ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐζητοῦμεν· καὶ
 εἰ μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ μνημονεύουσα, τίς δύναμις ἢ τί
 μέρος, εἰ δὲ τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθανόμενον
 ἔδοξέ τι, τίς ὁ τρόπος, καὶ τί ποτε δεῖ φάναι τὸ
 ζῶον, καὶ ἔτι εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων δεῖ
 45 τίθεσθαι ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ τῶν νοημάτων, ἢ
 ἄλλο τοῦ ἐτέρου.

26. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ζῶον τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἐστὶν
 ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς κατ' ἐνέργειαν, δεῖ τὸ
 αἰσθάνεσθαι τοιούτον εἶναι—διὸ καὶ κοινὸν λέγεται

¹ The comparison of activities in which body and soul are both involved to craft activities like weaving is taken from Aristotle *De Anima* A 4, 408b13. But Plotinus has characteristically substituted the particular carpenter's operation *τροπέων* "boring holes" for Aristotle's vaguer and more general *οἰκοδομεῖν* "building", to make the picture more vivid. *κοινόν* here means common to body and φύσις (nature or

which it possesses as part of its nature, but when it is here below it possesses them and does not act by them, particularly when it has just arrived here. But as for its activity, the ancients seem to apply the terms "memory" and "recollection" to the souls which bring into act what they possessed. So this is another kind of memory; and therefore time is not involved in memory understood in this sense. But perhaps we are being too easy-going about this, and not really examining it critically. For someone might perhaps raise the difficulty that perhaps what is called memory and recollection of this kind does not belong to that [higher] soul, but to another dimmer one, or to the composite, the living creature. Now if it belongs to another soul, when or how did it get it? And if it belongs to the living creature, when or how? So we must enquire what it is of the things within us which possesses memory, which is just what we were enquiring from the beginning. And if it is the soul which remembers, which power or what part of it; but if it is the living creature—just as the power of sense-perception has been thought by some to belong to this—how it works, and what one is to say that the living creature is, and, further, whether one must ascribe the apprehension of sense-perceptions and thoughts to the same thing, or a different one for each.

26. If then the composite living thing is involved in actual sense-perceptions, perception must be something like boring holes and weaving—that is why it is called "common"¹—in order that the soul

(lower soul), which is the other element in the "composite living thing". See Blumenthal *Plotinus' Psychology* 61. There is no reference to anything like Aristotle's *κοινή αἰσθησις*.

—οἷον τὸ τρυπᾶν καὶ τὸ ὑφαίνειν, ἵνα κατὰ μὲν τὸν
 5 τεχνίτην ἢ ψυχῇ ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ
 ὄργανον τὸ σῶμα, τοῦ μὲν σώματος πάσχοντος καὶ
 ὑπηρετοῦντος, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς παραδεχομένης τὴν
 τύπωσιν τῆν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τὴν διὰ τοῦ σώματος,
 ἢ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν ἐποίησατο ἐκ τοῦ παθήματος τοῦ
 σώματος· οὗ δὲ ἢ μὲν αἰσθησις οὕτω κοινὸν
 10 ἔργον λέγοιτο ἂν, ἢ δὲ μνήμη οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο τοῦ
 κοινοῦ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἤδη παραδεξαμένης τὸν
 τύπον καὶ ἢ φυλαξάσης ἢ ἀποβαλοῦσης αὐτήν· εἰ
 μὴ τις τεκμαίροιτο κοινὸν καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν εἶναι
 ἐκ τοῦ ταῖς κράσεσι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ μνημονικοῦς
 καὶ ἐπιλήσμονας ἡμᾶς γίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς
 15 κωλυτικὸν ἂν ἢ οὐ κωλυτικὸν λέγοιτο τὸ σῶμα
 γίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν οὐχ ἦττον
 εἶη. τῶν δὲ δὴ μαθήσεων πῶς τὸ κοινόν, ἀλλ'
 οὐχ ἢ ψυχῇ ἢ μνημονεύουσα ἔσται; εἰ δὲ τὸ ζῶον
 τὸ συναμφοτέρων οὕτως, ὡς ἕτερον ἐξ ἀμφοῶν εἶναι,
 20 πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπον μήτε σῶμα μήτε ψυχὴν τὸ
 ζῶον λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ μεταβαλόντων ἀμφοτέρων
 ἕτερόν τι ἔσται τὸ ζῶον οὐδ' αὖ κραθέντων, ὡς
 δυνάμει τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ ζῳῷ εἶναι· ἔπειτα¹ καὶ
 οὕτως οὐδὲν ἦττον τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν
 ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἐν οἰνομέλιτος κράσει εἴ τι γλυκάζει,
 25 παρὰ τοῦ μέλιτος τοῦτο ἔσται. τί οὖν, εἰ αὐτὴ
 μὲν μνημονεύοι, τῷ δὲ <τῷ>² ἐν σώματι εἶναι
 [τῷ]² μὴ κωλυρὰ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ποιωθεῖσα,
 ἀναμάττεσθαι δύναται τοὺς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τύπους

¹ Beutler: ἐπεὶ Enn.*

² transpos. Theiler.

may be in the position of the workman in perceiving and the body in that of the tool; the body experiences and serves, and the soul receives the impression made on the body, or the impression which comes through the body, or the judgment which it made as a result of the experience of the body: sense-perception would certainly have in this case to be called a common work, but memory would not have to belong to what was common, as the soul would have already received the impression and either kept it or thrown it away; unless one was going to conclude that remembering is a common activity from the fact that the mixture of bodily elements makes us have good or bad memories. But even so the body might be said to be obstructive or not obstructive, but remembering would none the less belong to the soul. And how can it be what is common, and not the soul, which is the principle which remembers what we study? But if the composite living thing is something of such a sort as to be different from both its components, first of all it is absurd to say that the living thing is neither body nor soul: for the living thing will not be something different as the result of both of them having changed, nor again as the result of their having been mixed, so that the soul is in the living thing potentially. And then even so remembering would belong just as much to the soul, as in a mixture of wine and honey any sweetness there is will be due to the honey. But suppose it itself remembers, but because it is not pure as a result of being in the body, but has a kind of special quality, it is able to receive the impressions made by the

καὶ τῷ οἶον ἔδραν ἐν τῷ σώματι πρὸς τὸ παρα-
δέχεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὡς περ παραρρεῖν; ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν
30 οἱ τύποι οὐ μεγέθη, οὐδ' ὡς περ αἱ ἐνσφραγίσεις
οὐδ' ἀντερείσεις ἢ τυπώσεις, ὅτι μὴδ' ὠθισμός,
μὴδ' ὡς περ ἐν κηρῷ, ἀλλ' ὁ τρόπος οἶον νόησις καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νοήσεων τίς ἢ
ἀντερείσις λέγοιτο ἄν; ἢ τί δεῖ σώματος ἢ
ποιότητος σωματικῆς μεθ' ἧς; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν
35 αὐτῆς κινήματων ἀνάγκη μνήμην αὐτῇ γίνεσθαι,
οἶον ὧν ἐπεθύμησε καὶ ὧν οὐκ ἀπέλαυσε οὐδὲ
ἦλθεν εἰς σῶμα τὸ ἐπιθυμητόν. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι
τὸ σῶμα περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἦλθεν εἰς αὐτό; ἢ πῶς μετὰ
σώματος μνημονεύσει, ὃ μὴ πέφυκε γινώσκειν
ὄλως τὸ σῶμα; ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν λεκτέον εἰς ψυχὴν
40 λήγειν, ὅσα διὰ σώματος, τὰ δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναι
μόνης, εἰ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναί τι καὶ φύσιν τινὰ
καὶ ἔργον τι αὐτῆς. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἔφεσις καὶ
μνήμην τῆς ἐφέσεως ἄρα καὶ τῆς τεύξεως καὶ τῆς
οὐ τεύξεως, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς οὐ τῶν
45 ρεόντων. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ συναισθήσιν οὐδὲ
παρακολούθησιν δύνωμεν οὐδέ τινα σύνθεσιν καὶ
οἶον σύνεσιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲν ἔχουσα τοῦτων
ἐν τῇ φύσει αὐτῆς ταῦτα κομίζεται ἐν σώματι, ἀλλ'
ἐνεργείας μὲν τινὰς ἴσχει ὧν ἔργων δέεται ἢ
ἐπιτέλεισις ὀργάνων, τῶν δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ἦκει

¹ An example of Plotinus's continually repeated attack on the corporealistic Stoic theory of sense-perception: cp. *SVF* I 484 and II 343 for the theory; Plotinus's fullest statement of the Platonic case against Stoic psychology is IV. 7. 1-8³ (ch. 6 deals with sense-impressions).

sense-objects¹ and is also able to do this because it has a kind of standing-ground in the body for receiving them and does not, so to speak, flow away? But to begin with, the impressions are not magnitudes; nor are they like seal-impressions or counter-pressures or stamps, because there is no pushing and it is not like what happens in wax, but the way of it is like thinking even in the case of sense-objects. But in acts of thought what counter-pressure could there be said to be? Or what need is there of a body or bodily quality as an accompaniment? But surely, too, the soul must have memory of its own movements, of what it desired, for instance, and of what it did not enjoy and the desired object did not enter the body. For how could the body speak of what did not come into it? Or how will it remember with the help of the body something which the body has been in no condition to know at all? But we must say that some things, all that come through the body, reach as far as the soul, and others belong to the soul alone, if the soul must be something, and a distinct nature, and have a work of its own. If this is so, it will have aspiration, and memory of its aspiration, and of attaining or not attaining it, since its nature is not one of those which are in a state of flux. For if this is not so, we shall not grant it self-awareness or consciousness of its own activities or any sort of power of combination and understanding. For it certainly is not the case that it has none of these in its own nature and acquired them in the body, but it has some activities of the works required for the completion of the bodily organs, and brings the potentialities of some of them with it when it comes, and the actualities of others. But as far as

50 φέρουσα, τῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας. τὸ δὲ τῆς
μνήμης καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐμπόδιον ἔχει· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν
προστιθεμένων τινῶν λήθη, ἐν δ' ἀφαιρέσει καὶ
καθάρσει ἀνακύπτει πολλάκις ἡ μνήμη. μονῆς δὲ
οὔσης αὐτῆς ἀνάγκη τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν
κινουμένην καὶ ρέουσαν λήθης αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ
55 μνήμης εἶναι· διὸ καὶ ὁ τῆς Λήθης ποταμὸς
οὗτος ἂν ὑπονοῦτο. ψυχῆς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὸ
πάθημα τοῦτο.

27. Ἄλλὰ τίνος ψυχῆς, τῆς μὲν λεγομένης ὑφ'
ἡμῶν θειοτέρας, καθ' ἣν ἡμεῖς, τῆς δὲ ἄλλης τῆς
παρὰ τοῦ ὄλου; ἢ λεκτέον εἶναι μνήμας ἑκατέρας,
τὰς μὲν ἰδίας, τὰς δὲ κοινάς· καὶ ὅταν μὲν
5 συνῶσιν, ὁμοῦ πάσας, χωρὶς δὲ γενομένων, εἰ
ἄμφω εἶεν καὶ μένοιεν, ἑκατέραν ἐπιπλέον τὰ
ἑαυτῆς, ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον τὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τὸ
γούν εἶδωλον ἐν Ἄιδου Ἡρακλέους—τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ
τὸ εἶδωλον, οἶμαι, χορῆ νομίζειν ἡμᾶς—μνημονεύειν
τῶν πεπραγμένων πάντων κατὰ τὸν βίον, αὐτοῦ
10 γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ ὁ βίος ἦν. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τὸ
συναμφοτέρον <γενόμεναι> [οὔσαι]¹ οὐδὲν πλέον
ὄμως εἶχον λέγειν· ἢ ἂ γε² τοῦ βίου τούτου, καὶ
αὐταὶ [τὸ συναμφοτέρον γενόμεναι]³ ταῦτα ἤδεσαν·
ἢ εἴ τι δικαιοσύνης ἐχόμενον. ὁ δὲ Ἡρακλῆς

¹ γενόμεναι e lin. 12 transpos. H-S²: οὔσαι Enn.

² H-S²: ἄτε wB^{9c}RJUC: ἀπό B^{9c}: τὰ Kirchhoff, Volk-
mann*, B-T: ἐπι Dodds.

³ del. H-S², ut correctionem ad lin. 10 falso loco insertam:
τὸ . . . ἤδεσαν del. Theiler.

⁴ An example of casual philosophical interpretation of a
Platonic myth: the "river of Lethe" is taken from the

memory is concerned, it has the body as an actual
hindrance: since even as things are, some additions
produce forgetfulness, and when they are removed
and purged away the memory revives. And since
memory is a stable condition, the body's nature,
moving and flowing, must be a cause of forgetful-
ness, not of memory: this is why the "river of
Lethe" might be understood in this sense.¹ So,
then, let this experience [of memory] belong to the
soul.

27. But to which soul, that which we shall call
the more divine, by which we are ourselves, or the
other which comes from the Whole? Perhaps we
must say that there are memories of both kinds,
some individual and some common; and when the
two souls are together all their memories coincide;
but if they become separated, if they were both to
exist and persist in separation, each would have its
own memories for a longer time and for a short time
those of the other. At any rate the shade of
Heracles in Hades²—this shade too, I think, we must

conclusion of the great myth which ends the *Republic* (621C).

² The reference is to *Odyssey* 11. 601ff., where the shade of
Heracles in Hades is distinguished from Heracles himself,
who is with the gods: cp. I, 1. 12. 31ff. The passage had been
recognised since Aristarchus as a later interpolation, but
Plotinus was not aware of this (he was not a scholar), or ignored
it. His philosophical explanation had earlier forerunners, the
ultimate source of which may be in the Old Academy or post-
Platonic Pythagoreanism. See Plutarch *De facie in orbe
lunae* 944F-945A with the note of H. Cherniss ad loc. (*Moralia*,
Loeb edition vol. 12); F. Cumont *Lux Perpetua* (Paris 1949)
189-91; H. J. Blumenthal *op. cit.* 86; and the latest and most
thorough examination by J. Pépin, "Héraclès et son reflet
dans le Néoplatonisme" in *Le Néoplatonisme* (Paris 1971) 167-
99.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδώλου τί ἔλεγεν, οὐκ εἴρηται.
 15 τί οὖν ἂν εἴποι ἢ ἑτέρα ψυχὴ ἀπαλλαγείσα μόνῃ;
 ἢ γὰρ ἐφελκομένη ὅ τι κἂν, πάντα, ὅσα ἔπραξεν ἢ
 ἔπαθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος ἐπὶ τῷ
 θανάτῳ καὶ ἄλλων μνήμαι ἂν φανεῖν ἐκ τῶν
 πρόσθεν βίων, ὥστε τινὰ τούτων καὶ ἀτιμάσασαν
 ἀφεῖναι. σώματος γὰρ καθαρωτέρα γενομένη καὶ
 20 ἂ ἐνταῦθα οὐκ εἶχεν ἐν μνήμῃ ἀναπολήσει· εἰ δ'
 ἐν σώματι γενομένη ἄλλω ἐξέλθοι, ἐρεῖ μὲν τὰ
 τοῦ ἔξω βίου [καὶ ἐρεῖ εἶναι],¹ οἱ² ἄρτι ἀφήκε
 [ἐρεῖ δὲ]³ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν πρόσθεν. χρόνοις δὲ
 πολλῶν τῶν ἐπακτῶν αἰεὶ ἔσται ἐν λήθῃ. ἢ δὲ δὴ
 μόνῃ γενομένη τί μνημονεύσει; ἢ πρότερον
 25 σκεπτέον τίνι δυνάμει ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν
 παραγίνεται.

28. Ἐὰρ γὰρ ὧ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ ὧ μαθάνομεν;
 ἢ καὶ ὧ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν, καὶ τῶν
 ὀργιστῶν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ἀπολαύσει,
 φήσει τις, ἄλλο δὲ μνημονεύσει τῶν ἐκείνου. τὸ

¹ del. Theiler.

² Theiler: ὁ Enn.*

³ del. H-S².

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL I

consider to be our self—remembers all that he did
 in his life, for the life particularly belonged to the
 shade. But the other souls which became composite
 entities [of higher and lower soul], all the same had
 nothing more to talk about than the things of this
 life, and they themselves knew them—except per-
 haps something concerned with righteousness. But
 Homer does not tell us what Heracles himself said,
 the Heracles without the shade. What then would
 the other soul say when it has been freed and is
 alone? The soul which drags after it anything at
 all [from the body] would speak of everything which
 the man had done or experienced. But as time goes
 on after death, memories of other things would
 appear from its former lives, so that it would even
 abandon with contempt some of these memories [of
 its immediately past life]. For since it has become
 freer from bodily contamination it will go over again
 in its memory also what it did not have in this life;
 but if when it goes out [of this body], it comes to
 exist in another, it will speak of the events of its
 outward life, of what it has just left and of many
 events of its former lives. But in time it will come
 to forgetfulness of many things which occurred to it
 from time to time. But when it comes to be alone
 what will it remember? First we must enquire
 what power of soul it is which remembering accom-
 panies.

28. Is it that by which we perceive and by which
 we learn? Or does our remembrance of the things
 we desired accompany our power of desiring, and
 of the things which made us angry, our spirited
 power? For, someone will say, there will not be
 one thing which enjoys [the desired objects] and

5 γοῦν ἐπιθυμητικὸν ὧν ἀπέλαυσε τούτοις¹ κινεῖται
 πάλιν ὀφθέντος τοῦ ἐπιθυμητοῦ δηλονότι τῇ
 μνήμῃ. ἐπεὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἄλλου, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; τί
 οὖν κωλύει καὶ αἰσθησιν τῶν τοιούτων διδόναι αὐτῷ
 καὶ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τοῖνον ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ πάντα
 πᾶσιν ὥστε κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἕκαστον λέγεσθαι;
 10 ἢ αἰσθησιν ἄλλως ἐκάστῳ· οἷον εἶδε μὲν ἡ
 ὄρασις, οὐ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, ἐκινήθη δὲ παρὰ τῆς
 αἰσθήσεως τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν οἷον διαδόσει, οὐχ ὥστε
 εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰσθησιν οἶα, ἀλλ' ὥστε ἀπαρακολου-
 θήτως παθεῖν. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ εἶδε τὸν
 ἀδικήσαντα, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς ἀνέστη, οἷον εἰ ποιμένος
 15 ἰδόντος ἐπὶ ποιμνῇ λύκον ὁ σκύλαξ τῇ ὀσμῇ ἢ τῷ
 κτύπῳ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἰδὼν ὄμμασιν ὀρίνοιτο. καὶ
 τοῖνον ἀπέλαυσε μὲν τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, καὶ ἔχει ἔχνος
 τοῦ γενομένου ἐντεθὲν οὐχ ὡς μνήμην, ἀλλ' ὡς
 διάθεσιν καὶ πάθος· ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐωρακὸς τὴν
 ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχον τὴν μνήμην τοῦ
 20 γεγενημένου. τεκμήριον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἠδέϊαν εἶναι τὴν
 μνήμην πολλάκις ὧν μετέσχε τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν,
 καίτοι, εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἦν ἄν.

29. Ἐὰρ οὖν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ φέροντες ἀναθήσομεν

¹ suspic. Volkman, scr. B-T: τοῦτο Enn.*

¹ The idea of "naming by predominance" goes back at least to Anaxagoras (see Aristotle *Physics* A 4, 187b1 ff.) and was used by Antiochus of Ascalon in discussing the question whether an incompletely happy life could be called "happy" (Cicero *Tusculans* V 22). It became important in post-Plotinian Neoplatonism: see P. Hadot, "Être, Vie, Pensée

another which remembers the objects enjoyed by the first. On this assumption the desiring power is moved by what it enjoyed when it sees the desired object again, obviously by means of the memory. For why [otherwise] should it not be moved when something else is seen, or seen in a different way? What then prevents us from giving the desiring power perception of desirable things and, again, the perceptive power desire, and giving everything to everything so that each is named by that which predominates in it¹? Now perception can be attributed to each power in a different way. Sight, for instance, sees, not the desiring power, but the desiring power is moved by a sort of transmission from the perception, not so that it can say what sort of perception it is, but so that it is unconsciously affected by it. And in the case of anger, sight sees the wrongdoer and the anger arises; it is like when the shepherd sees the wolf by the flock and the sheepdog is excited by the scent or the noise, though he has not himself seen the wolf with his eyes. And the desiring power, certainly, enjoyed and has a trace of what happened implanted in it, not like a memory, but like an [unconscious] disposition and affection; but it is another power which has seen the enjoyment and of its own motion retains the memory of what happened. It is evidence of this that the memory of the desiring power's experiences is often not pleasant, though if it had been in it, it would have been.

29. Shall we then take the memory and put it in

chez Plotin et avant Plotin" in *Les Sources de Plotin (Entretiens Hardt V, Vardoeuvres-Genève 1960)*, with the discussion, 107-57.

τὴν μνήμην, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν μνημονευτικὸν καὶ
 αἰσθητικὸν ἔσται; ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὸ εἶδωλον μνημο-
 νεύσει, ὡς ἐλέγετο, διπλὸν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἔσται,
 5 καὶ εἰ μὴ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν δὲ τὸ μνημονευτικόν, ἀλλ'
 ὅτιοῦν ἄλλο, διπλὸν τὸ μνημονεύον ἔσται. ἔτι εἰ
 τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ἔσται καὶ τῶν
 διανοημάτων τὸ αἰσθητικόν. ἢ ἄλλο γε δεῖ ἐκατέρων.
 ἀρ' οὖν κοινὸν θέμενοι τὸ ἀντιληπτικὸν τούτῳ δώσο-
 μεν ἀμφοῖν τὴν μνήμην; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐν καὶ ταῦτό
 10 τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον αἰσθητῶν τε καὶ νοητῶν,
 τάχα ἂν τι λέγοιτο· εἰ δὲ διαιρεῖται διχῆ, οὐδὲν
 ἦττον δύο ἂν εἴη. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκάτερα τῆ ψυχῆ
 δώσομεν ἀμφω, τέτταρα ἂν γένοιτο. ὅλως δὲ τίς
 ἀνάγκη, εἰ ἀσθανόμεθα, τούτῳ καὶ μνημονεύειν,
 15 καὶ τῆ αὐτῆ δυνάμει γίνεσθαι ἀμφω, καὶ εἰ
 διανοοῦμεθα, τούτῳ τῶν διανοημάτων μνημονεύειν;
 ἐπεὶ οὐδ' οἱ αὐτοὶ διανοεῖσθαι κράτιστοι καὶ
 μνημονεύειν, καὶ ἐπίσης αἰσθήσει χρησάμενοι οὐκ
 ἐπίσης μνημονεύουσι, καὶ εὐαισθήτως ἔχουσιν
 ἄλλοι, μνημονεύουσι δὲ ἄλλοι οὐκ ὀξέως ἐν αἰσθήσει
 20 γεγενημένοι. ἀλλὰ πάλιν αὖ, εἰ ἄλλο ἐκάτερον
 δεήσει εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλο μνημονεύσει ὧν ἡ αἰσθησις
 ἦσθετο πρότερον, κακείνο δεῖ αἰσθῆσθαι οὐπερ
 μελλήσει μνημονεύσειν; ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύσει τῷ μνη-
 μονεύσοντι τὸ αἰσθημα φάντασμα εἶναι, καὶ τῷ
 φανταστικῷ ἄλλω ὄντι τὴν μνήμην καὶ κατοχὴν

the perceptive power, and will what remembers and
 what perceives be the same thing for us? But if
 the shade, too, is going to remember, as was said,
 the perceptive power will be double, and even if it
 is not the perceptive power but something else
 which remembers, this remembering power will be
 double. Again, if it is the perceptive power which
 remembers, this will also perceive studies and
 thoughts [as well as sense-objects]. But there must
 be a different power for each of these. Shall we
 then assume that there is a common power of
 apprehension, and give to it the memory of both?
 But if that which apprehended the objects of both
 the senses and the intelligence was one and the same,
 perhaps there would be something in this statement;
 but if it is divided in two, there will all the same be
 two powers. But if we give both of them to each
 soul, then there will be four. But in general, what
 necessity is there for us to remember by that by
 which we perceive, and for both perceiving and
 remembering to come about by the same power,
 and for us to remember our thoughts by that by which
 we think? For the same people are not the best at
 thinking and at remembering, and those who are
 equally perceptive have not equally good memories,
 and some people have quick perceptions, but others
 whose perceptions are not keen remember well.
 But once more, if it is going to be necessary for each
 of the two to be different, and something else is going
 to remember what perception first perceived, will
 that something else have to perceive what it is going
 to remember? Now nothing will prevent a percep-
 tion from being a mental image for that which is
 going to remember it, and the memory and the reten-

25 ὑπάρχειν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰς ὃ λήγει ἡ αἴσθησις,
καὶ μηκέτι οὔσης τούτῳ πάρεστι τὸ ὄραμα. εἰ
οὖν παρὰ τούτῳ τοῦ ἀπόντος ἤδη ἡ φαντασία,
μνημονεύει ἤδη, κἂν ἐπ' ὀλίγον παρῆ. ὧ δὲ εἰ
μὲν ἐπ' ὀλίγον παραμένοι, ὀλίγη ἡ μνήμη, ἐπι
πολὺ δέ, μᾶλλον μνημονικοὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης
30 οὔσης ἰσχυροτέρας, ὡς μὴ ῥαδίως τρεπομένης
ἀφείσθαι¹ ἀποσεισθεῖσαν τὴν μνήμην. τοῦ φαν-
ταστικοῦ ἄρα ἡ μνήμη, καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν τῶν
τοιούτων ἔσται. διαφόρως δ' ἔχειν πρὸς μνήμας
φήσομεν ἢ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν αὐτῆς διαφόρως ἐχού-
σαις ἢ ταῖς προσέξεσιν ἢ μὴ, ἢ καὶ σωματικαῖς
35 κράσεσιν ἐνούσαις καὶ μὴ, καὶ ἀλλοιούσαις καὶ μὴ,
καὶ οἶον θορυβούσαις. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐτέρωθι.

30. Τὸ δὲ τῶν διανοήσεων τί; ἀρὰ γε καὶ τού-
των τὸ φανταστικόν; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάσῃ νοήσει
παρακολουθεῖ φαντασία, τάχα ἂν ταύτης τῆς φαν-
τασίας, οἶον εἰκόνας οὔσης τοῦ διανοήματος,
5 μενούσης οὕτως ἂν εἶη τοῦ γνωσθέντος ἡ μνήμη· εἰ
δὲ μὴ, ἄλλο τι ζητητέον. ἴσως δ' ἂν εἶη τοῦ λόγου
τοῦ τῷ νοήματι παρακολουθοῦντος ἡ παραδοχὴ εἰς
τὸ φανταστικόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ νόημα ἀμερὲς καὶ

¹ Creuzer*: ἐφείσθαι Enn., H-S.

tion of the object from belonging to the image-making power, which is something different: for it is in this that the perception arrives at its conclusion, and what was seen is present in this when the perception is no longer there. If then the image of what is absent is already present in this, it is already remembering, even if the presence is only for a short time. The man with whom the image remains for a short time will have a short memory, but people with whom the images remain for a long time have better memories; this power is stronger in them, so that it does not easily change and let the memory go, shaken out of it. Memory, then, will belong to the image-making power, and remembering will be of things of the mental image kind. And we shall say that the differences between men in respect of memory are due to the fact that their image-making powers are differently developed, or to the degree to which they attend or do not attend to them, or to the presence or absence of certain bodily temperaments, and whether they change or not and, so to speak, produce disturbances. But this we shall discuss elsewhere.¹

30. But what is it that remembers thoughts? Does the image-making power remember these too? But if an image accompanies every intellectual act, perhaps if this image remains, being a kind of picture of the thought, in this way there would be memory of what was known; but if not, we must look for some other explanation. Perhaps the reception into the image-making power would be of the verbal expression which accompanies the act of intelligence.

¹ These words seem to express the intention to write something like ch. 3 of the later treatise IV. 6.

οὐπω οἶον προεληλυθὸς εἰς τὸ ἔξω ἔνδον ὃν λανθάνει, ὁ
 δὲ λόγος ἀναπτύξας καὶ ἐπάγων ἐκ τοῦ νοήματος εἰς
 10 τὸ φανταστικὸν ἔδειξε τὸ νόημα οἶον ἐν κατόπτρῳ,
 καὶ ἡ ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ οὕτω καὶ ἡ μονὴ καὶ ἡ
 μνήμη. διὸ καὶ αἰεὶ κινουμένης πρὸς νόησιν τῆς
 ψυχῆς, ὅταν ἐν τούτῳ γένηται, ἡμῶν ἡ ἀντίληψις.
 ἄλλο γὰρ ἡ νόησις, καὶ ἄλλο ἡ τῆς νοήσεως
 15 ἀντίληψις, καὶ νοοῦμεν μὲν αἰεὶ, ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα
 δὲ οὐκ αἰεὶ· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι τὸ δεχόμενον οὐ μόνον
 δέχεται νοήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰσθήσεις κατὰ θάτερα.

31. Ἄλλ' εἰ τοῦ φανταστικοῦ ἡ μνήμη, ἐκάτερα
 δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ μνημονεύειν εἴρηται, δύο τὰ φανταστικά.
 χωρὶς μὲν οὖν οὔσαι ἐχέτωσαν ἐκάτερα, ἐν δὲ τῷ
 αὐτῷ παρ' ἡμῶν πῶς τὰ δύο καὶ τίνι αὐτῶν
 5 ἐγγίνεται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις, διτταὶ αἰεὶ αἱ
 φαντασίαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἐτέρας τῶν
 νοητῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν παντά-
 πασι δύο ζῶα οὐδὲν ἔχοντα κοινὸν πρὸς ἄλληλα
 ἔσται. εἰ οὖν ἀμφοτέραις, τίς ἡ διαφορὰ; εἶτα

¹ For this doctrine that the awareness of our own thinking which makes memory possible can only take place when pure thought is translated into images, cp. IV. 8. 8 and I. 4. 9-10; these passages add that the translation into images depends on the good health and freedom from disturbance of the body; consciousness in the ordinary sense, with memory, is thus secondary, dependent on our own physical condition, and

The intellectual act is without parts and has not, so to speak, come out into the open, but remains unobserved within, but the verbal expression unfolds its content and brings it out of the intellectual act into the image-making power, and so shows the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence and memory of it. Therefore, even though the soul is always moved to intelligent activity, it is when it comes to be in the image-making power that we apprehend it. The intellectual act is one thing and the apprehension of it another, and we are always intellectually active but do not always apprehend our activity; and this is because that which receives it does not only receive acts of the intelligence, but also, on its other side, perceptions.¹

31. But if memory belongs to the image-making power, and each of the two souls remembers, as has been said, there will be two image-making powers. Well, then, when the souls are separate we can grant that each of them will have an imaging power, but when they are together, in our earthly life, how are there two powers, and in which of them does memory reside? If it is in both of them, the images will always be double; for one certainly cannot suppose that the power of one soul has images [only] of intelligible things and the power of the other images [only] of perceptible things; for in this way there will be two living things with nothing at all in common with each other. If then [both kinds of images]

relatively unimportant. As it appears in an early, a middle-period, and a late treatise, Plotinus seems to have held this doctrine consistently throughout his writing period.

πῶς οὐ γινώσκουμεν; ἢ ὅταν μὲν συμφωνῇ ἡ ἑτέρα
 10 τῇ ἑτέρῃ, οὐκ ὄντων οὐδὲ χωρὶς τῶν φανταστικῶν,
 κρατοῦντός τε τοῦ τῆς κρείττονος, ἐν τῷ φάντασμα
 γίνεται, οἷον παρακολουθούσης σκιᾶς τῷ ἑτέρῳ, καὶ
 ὑποτρέχοντος οἷον μικροῦ φωτὸς μελίζου. ὅταν
 δὲ μάχη ᾖ καὶ διαφωνία, ἐκφανῆς ἐφ' αὐτῆς καὶ ἡ
 ἑτέρα γίνεται, λανθάνει δὲ <ὅ τι>¹ ἐν ἑτέρῳ.
 15 [ὅτι]¹ καὶ ὅλως τὸ διττὸν τῶν ψυχῶν λανθάνει.
 εἰς ἐν γὰρ ἦλθον ἄμφω καὶ ἐποχεῖται ἡ ἑτέρα.
 ἑώρα οὖν ἡ ἑτέρα πάντα καὶ τὰ μὲν ἔχει ἐξεληθούσα,
 τὰ δ' ἀφίησι τῶν τῆς ἑτέρας· οἷον ἑταίρων²
 ὁμιλίας φαυλοτέρων λαβόντες ποτὲ ἄλλους ἀλλαξά-
 20 μνοι ὀλίγα τῶν ἐκείνων μεμνήμεθα, χρηστοτέρων
 δὲ γεγενημένων πλείω.

32. Τί δὲ δὴ φίλων καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικός;
 πατρίδος δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄν ἂν καὶ ἀστεῖος οὐκ ἄτοπος
 μνημονεύων; ἢ τὸ μὲν μετὰ πάθους ἐκάστου, ὃ
 δὲ ἀπαθῶς ἂν τὰς μνήμας τούτων ἔχοι. τὸ γὰρ
 5 πάθος ἴσως καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα
 τῶν παθῶν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ, καθόσον τῇ ἑτέρῃ τι
 ἐκοίνωσε. πρέπει δὲ τὴν μὲν χείρονα καὶ τῶν τῆς
 ἑτέρας ἐνεργημάτων ἐφίεσθαι τῆς μνήμης καὶ
 μάλιστα, ὅταν ἀστεῖα ᾖ καὶ αὐτή· γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν
 10 τῆς κρείττονος. τὴν δὲ δεῖ ἀσμένως λήθην ἔχειν

¹ transpos. H-S², et sic verterat Bouillet: <τὸ> suspic. Creuzer, ser. Bréhier, B-T.

² C^{ps}, Creuzer* (sodalibus Ficinus): ἐτέρων wxC^{so}: ἐκατέρων II.

are in both souls, what is the difference? And why do we not recognise it? Now when one soul is in tune with the other, and their image-making powers are not separate, and that of the better soul is dominant, the image becomes one, as if a shadow followed the other and as if a little light slipped in under the greater one; but when there is war and disharmony between them, the other image becomes manifest by itself, but we do not notice what is in the other power, and we do not notice in general the duality of the souls. For both have come together into one and the better soul is on top of the other. This other soul, then, sees everything, and takes some things with it which belong to the other when it goes out [of the body] but rejects others; as when we keep company with inferior people and then change to other companions, we remember little of the inferior ones but more of the better sort.

32. But what about the memories of our friends and children and wife? Of our country, and all the things it would not be absurd for a man of quality to remember? Now the image-making power remembers each of these with emotion, but the man of quality would have his memories of them without emotion; for the emotion, perhaps, was in the imaging power even from the beginning, and those of the emotions which have any good quality pass to the noble soul, in so far as it has any communication with the other one. It is proper for the whole soul to aspire to the activities of the memory of the higher soul, especially when it is of good quality itself: for a lower soul can be comparatively good from the beginning and can become so as a result of education by the higher soul. But the higher soul ought to

τῶν παρὰ τῆς χειρόνος. εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ σπουδαίας οὔσης τῆς ἐτέρας τὴν ἐτέραν τὴν φύσιν χειρόνα εἶναι κατεχομένην ὑπὸ τῆς ἐτέρας βίᾳ. ὅσω δὲ σπεύδει πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, πλειόνων αὐτῇ ἢ λήθη, εἰ μὴ που πᾶς ὁ βίος αὐτῇ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοιοῦτος ὅσος
 15 μόνων τῶν κρειττόνων εἶναι τὰς μνήμας· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα καλῶς τὸ ἐξιστάμενον τῶν ἀνθρωπείων σπουδασμάτων. ἀνάγκη οἴην καὶ τῶν μνημονευμάτων· ἵσπε ἐπιλήσιμονα ἂν τις λέγων τὴν ἀγαθὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοι τρόπῳ τοιοῦτῳ. ἐπεὶ καὶ
 20 φεύγει ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν συνάγει τὸ ἄπειρον ἀφιεῖς. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οὐ μετὰ πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλαφρὰ καὶ δι' αὐτῆς· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὅταν ἐκεῖ ἐθέλη εἶναι, ἔτι οὔσα ἐνταῦθα ἀφίησι πάντα ὅσα ἄλλα· ὀλίγα τοίνυν κακεῖ τὰ ἐντεῦθεν· καὶ ἐν οὐρανῷ οὔσα πλείω. καὶ εἴποι ἂν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἐκεῖ-
 25 νος ἀνδραγαθίας ἑαυτοῦ, ὁ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα σμικρὰ ἡγούμενος καὶ μετατεθεῖς εἰς ἀγιώτερον τόπον καὶ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ γεγεννημένος καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἡρακλέα ἰσχύσας τοῖς ἀθλοῖς, οἷα ἀθλεύουσι σοφοί,

be happy to forget what it has received from the worse soul. For it could be that even when the higher soul is noble, the other soul is naturally a rather bad one and is restrained forcibly by the higher soul. The more it presses on towards the heights the more it will forget, unless perhaps all its life, even here below, has been such that its memories are only of higher things; since here below too it is best to be detached from human concerns, and so necessarily from human memories; so that if anyone said that the good soul was forgetful, it would be correct to say so in this sort of sense. For the higher soul also flies from multiplicity, and gathers multiplicity into one and abandons the indefinite; because in this way it will not be [clogged] with multiplicity but light and alone by itself; for even here below, when it wants to be in that higher world, while it is still here below it abandons everything that is different [from that world]; and there are few things here that are also there; and when it is in heaven it will abandon still more. And Homer's Heracles might talk about his heroic deeds; but the man who thinks these of little account and has migrated to a holier place, and has been stronger than Heracles in the contexts in which the wise compete,¹—

¹ Porphyry, oddly, divides the great treatise here in the middle of a sentence. This may seem rather less odd if we consider that the sentence is anacoluthic: that the point of division marks the transition from the man of middle virtue (symbolised by Heracles) to the contemplative sage; and that division here enables Porphyry to lay great emphasis on the important question which begins IV. 4 (cp. the way in which Porphyry divides the treatise *On Providence* (III. 2-3) and the exciting question with which Plotinus himself begins I. 1).

IV. 4. (28) ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΑΠΟΡΙΩΝ
ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ

1. τί οὖν ἐρεῖ; καὶ τῶν τὴν μνήμην ἕξει ψυχῇ
ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκείνης γενομένη;
ἢ ἀκόλουθον εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνα θεωρεῖν καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα
ἐνεργεῖν, ἐν οἷς ἔστιν, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖ εἶναι. τῶν
5 οὖν ἐνταῦθα οὐδέν, οἷον ὅτι ἐφιλοσόφησε, καὶ δὴ
καὶ ὅτι ἐνταῦθα οὐσα ἐθεάτο τὰ ἐκεῖ; ἀλλ' εἰμὴ
ἔστω, ὅτε τις ἐπιβάλλει τινὶ τῇ νοήσει, ἄλλο τι
ποιεῖν ἢ νοεῖν κακεῖνο θεωρεῖν—καὶ ἐν τῇ νοήσει
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμπεριεχόμενον τὸ “ἐνενοήκειν”, ἀλλ'
ὑστερον ἂν τις τοῦτ', εἰ ἔτυχεν, εἴποι, τοῦτο δὲ
10 ἤδη μεταβάλλοντος—οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ νοητῷ
καθαρῶς ὄντα μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν τῆδέ ποτε
αὐτῷ τινι γεγενημένων.¹ εἰ δὲ καί, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ,
ἄχρονος πᾶσα νόησις, ἐν αἰῶνι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ
όντων τῶν ἐκεῖ, ἀδύνατον μνήμην εἶναι ἐκεῖ οὐχ
ὅτι τῶν ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ὄτουσιν. ἀλλὰ
15 ἔστω ἕκαστον παρόν· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ διέξοδος οὐδὲ
μετάβυσσις ἀφ' ἐτέρου ἐπ' ἄλλο. τί οὖν; οὐκ

¹ τινι γεγενημένων Enn.*: ἐπιγεγενημένων Page, H-S¹: co-
dices defendit Theiler, collato VI. 6. 13. 59.

IV. 4. ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE
SOUL II

1.—What will he say? And what will the soul
remember when it has come to be in the intelligible
world, and with that higher reality? It is consistent
to say that it will contemplate those things among
which it is, and its mental activity will be concerned
with them, or else it will not be there at all. Will
it not, then, remember any of its experiences here
below, for instance that it engaged in philosophy,
and even that while it was here it contemplated the
things in that other world? But if it is not possible,
when one has one's thought directed on something,
to do anything else but think and contemplate that
object—and the statement “I had thought [it
before]” is not included in the thinking, but one
would say it afterwards, if one said it at all, that is
when an alteration in one's thinking has already
taken place; it would not then be possible, when
one is purely in the intelligible world, to remember
the things which happened to one at any time when
one was here. But if, as we believe, every act of
intelligence is timeless, since the realities there are
in eternity and not in time, it is impossible that there
should be a memory there, not only of the things
here below, but of anything at all. But each and
every thing is present there; so there is no discursive
thought or transition from one to the other. Well,

ἔσται διαίρεσις ἄνωθεν εἰς εἶδη, ἢ κάτωθεν ἐπὶ τὸ
καθόλου καὶ τὸ ἄνω; τῷ μὲν γὰρ νῶ¹ μὴ ἔστω
ἐνεργεία ὁμοῦ ὄντι, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ ἐκεῖ οὔση διὰ τί
20 οὐκ ἔσται; τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολὴν
ἀθρόαν ἀθρόων γίνεσθαι; ἀρ' οὖν ὡς τινος ὁμοῦ;
ἢ ὡς πολλῶν ὁμοῦ πάσας νοήσεις. τοῦ γὰρ θεάμα-
τος ὄντος ποικίλου ποικίλην καὶ πολλήν τὴν
νόησιν ἅμα γίνεσθαι καὶ πολλὰς τὰς νοήσεις, οἷον
αἰσθήσεις πολλὰς προσώπων ὀφθαλμῶν² ἅμα
25 ὄρωμένων καὶ ῥινός καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐν
τι διαιρηῇ καὶ ἀναπτύσση; ἢ ἐν τῷ νῶ διήρηται
καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐναπέρεις μᾶλλον. τὸ δὲ
πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὑστερον ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσιν οὐ χρόνῳ
ὄν οὐδὲ τὴν νόησιν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου χρόνῳ
ποιήσει· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τάξει, οἷον εἰ φυτοῦ ἢ τάξις
30 ἐκ ῥιζῶν ἀρξαμένη ἕως εἰς τὸ ἄνω τῷ θεωμένῳ
οὐκ ἔχει ἄλλως ἢ τάξει τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὑστερον
ἅμα τὸ πᾶν θεωμένῳ. ἀλλ' ὅταν εἰς ἐν βλέπη,
εἶτα³ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ἔχη,⁴ πῶς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
ἔσχε, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς; ἢ ἡ δύναμις ἢ μία οὕτως ἦν
μία, ὡς πολλὰ ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ οὐ κατὰ μίαν νόησιν
35 πάντα. αἱ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖαι [οὐ]⁵ καθ' ἓνα, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ

¹ Kleist, testatur Theologia II. 11: ἄνω Enn., H-S¹.

² Cpe, Kirchoff* (oculos Ficinus): ὀφθαλμῶ wxUC^{ce}.

³ xUC: εἶτα (sic) w: εἰ τὰ Perna, Creuzer, H-S¹.

⁴ xUC: ἔχει w, Perna, Creuzer, H-S¹.

⁵ del. Theiler, quod testatur Theologia II. 20.

then, will there be no division starting from above into species, or an ascent from below to the universal and the higher? Granted that the Intellect does not have this, since it is all together in one in its actuality, why should the soul when it is there not have it? What then prevents the soul too from having a unified intuition of all its objects in one? Can it really see them as one thing, all together? Rather, it is as if all its acts of intelligence, with their many objects, were all together. For since its object of contemplation is richly varied, the act of intelligence too is richly varied and multiple, and there are many acts of intelligence, as there are many acts of perception of a face when the eyes and the nose and the other features are all seen at once. But [what happens] when the soul divides and unfolds some one object? It is already divided in Intellect and an act of this kind is more like a concentration of attention. And, as the prior and the subsequent in the species-forms are not temporal, so neither will the soul make its acts of intelligence of the prior and the subsequent in temporal sequence. For there is also the prior and the subsequent in order, as in a plant the order which begins from the roots and extends to the topmost point does not have for the observer the prior and the subsequent in any other way than in order, since he observes the whole plant at once. But when the soul looks first at one [intelligible object], and then possesses the whole multiplicity of them, how does it possess one first and another next? The one power is one in such a way that it becomes many in something else, and does not comprehend all things by one act of intelligence. For its acts are individual, but always to-

πάσαι δυνάμει ἐστώση· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις σχιζομέ-
νη.¹ ἤδη γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ὡς μὴ ἐν ὄνι δυναθῆναι τὴν
τῶν πολλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ φύσει δέξασθαι πρότερον οὐκ
ὄντων.

2. Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτη. ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πῶς; ἢ
οὐδὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἔξει τὴν μνήμην, οὐδ' ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ
θεωρῶν, οἷον Σωκράτης, ἢ ὅτι νοῦς ἢ ψυχὴ. πρὸς
δὴ ταῦτά τις ἀναμνησθήτω, ὡς ὅταν καὶ ἐνταῦθα
5 θεωρῆ καὶ μάλιστα ἐναργῶς, οὐκ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς
ἑαυτὸν τότε τῇ νοήσει, ἀλλ' ἔχει μὲν ἑαυτὸν, ἢ
δὲ ἐνέργεια πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ἐκεῖνο γίνεται οἷον
ὑλὴν ἑαυτὸν παρασχών, εἰδοποιούμενος δὲ κατὰ τὸ
ὀρώμενον καὶ δυνάμει ὢν τότε αὐτός. τότε οὖν
αὐτός τί ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ὅταν μὴδὲν νοῆ; ἢ, εἰ μὲν
10 αὐτός, κενός ἐστι παντός, ὅταν μὴδὲν νοῆ. εἰ δὲ
ἐστὶν αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος οἷος πάντα εἶναι, ὅταν αὐτὸν
νοῆ, πάντα ὁμοῦ νοεῖ· ὥστε τῇ μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὁ
τοιοῦτος ἐπιβολῇ καὶ ἐνέργεια ἑαυτὸν ὀρών τὰ
πάντα ἐμπεριεχόμενα ἔχει, τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὰ πάντα
ἐμπεριεχόμενον ἑαυτὸν. ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτω ποιεῖ, μετα-
15 βάλλει τὰς νοήσεις, ὁ πρότερον αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἠξιούμεν.
ἢ λεκτόν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ νοῦ τὸ ἀπαύτως ἔχειν, ἐπὶ
δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν οἷον ἐσχάτοις τοῦ νοητοῦ κειμένης

¹ Theiler: *γνωμένων* Enn., H-S¹: [*γνωμένων*] H-S²: ἐν
. . . *γνωμένων* del. Kleist, Harder: ἄλλοις *γνωμένων* ἤδη
<πολλῶν οὐκ αἰεὶ πάσαι· ἤδη> Igal non male.

¹ I very tentatively adopt Theiler's *σχιζομένη* here to pro-
duce an intelligible text, though I think *locus nominum sanatus*
(H-S²) may well be right. Kleist and Harder delete ἐν . . .

gether in a power which remains unchanged, but is
divided in other things.¹ For that intelligible object
is able in virtue of its not being one to receive in
itself the nature of the many which did not previously
exist.

2. But enough about this. How does it remember
itself? It will not even have the remembrance of
itself, or that it is the man himself, Socrates for
instance, who is contemplating, or that it is intellect
or soul. Besides, one should certainly remember
that even here below when one contemplates, espe-
cially when the contemplation is clear, one does not
turn to oneself in the act of intelligence, but one
possesses oneself; one's activity, however, is directed
towards the object of contemplation, and one be-
comes this, offering oneself to it as a kind of matter,
being formed according to what one sees, and being
oneself then only potentially. Is a man then actually
himself in any way when he is thinking nothing at all?
Yes, if he is [merely] himself he is empty of every-
thing, when he is thinking nothing at all. But if
he is himself in such a way as to be everything, when
he thinks himself, he thinks everything at once; so
that a man in this state, by his intuition of himself,
and when he actually sees himself, has everything
included in this seeing, and by his intuition of every-
thing has himself included. But if this is what he
does, he changes his acts of intelligence, and we
ourselves did not think it right to assert this before.
Must we say then that unchangeability belongs to
Intellect, but that in the case of Soul, which lies, so
γνωμένων. It adds nothing to what has been said in the pre-
vious sentence, but Plotinus is frequently repetitive. Igal's
suggestion is attractive, but not completely convincing.

γίνεσθαι τοῦτο δυνατόν εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ προσχωρεῖν
 εἴσω; εἰ γὰρ τι περὶ τὸ μένον γίνεται, δεῖ αὐτὸ
 20 παραλλαγῆν πρὸς τὸ μένον ἔχειν μὴ ὁμοίως μένον.
 ἢ οὐδὲ μεταβολὴν λεκτέον γίνεσθαι, ὅταν ἀπὸ τῶν
 ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ' ἑαυτόν, καὶ ὅταν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ
 ἄλλα· πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστι καὶ ἄμφω ἔν. ἀλλ'
 ἢ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὐσα τοῦτο πάσχει τὸ ἄλλο
 καὶ ἄλλο πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ; ἢ καθαρῶς
 25 ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὐσα ἔχει τὸ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ αὐτῇ.
 καὶ γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἃ ἐστὶν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν ἐν ἐκείνῳ
 ἢ τῷ τόπῳ, εἰς ἔνωσιν ἔλθειν τῷ νῶ ἀνάγκη,
 εἴπερ ἐπεστράφη· στραφείσα γὰρ οὐδὲν μεταξὺ ἔχει,
 εἷς τε νοῦν ἔλθοῦσα ἡρμουςται, καὶ ἄρμουςθεισα
 ἡνωται οὐκ ἀπολλυμένη, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐστὶν ἄμφω καὶ
 30 δύο. οὕτως οὖν ἔχουσα οὐκ ἂν μεταβάλλοι, ἀλλὰ
 ἔχοι ἂν ἀτρέπτως πρὸς νόησιν ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα τὴν
 συναίσθησιν αὐτῆς, ὡς ἐν ἅμα τῷ νοητῷ ταῦτόν
 γηνομένη.

3. Ἐξελοῦσα δὲ ἐκεῖθεν καὶ οὐκ ἀνασχομένη τὸ
 ἔν, τὸ δὲ αὐτῆς ἀσπασαμένη καὶ ἕτερον ἐθελήσασα
 εἶναι καὶ οἶον προκύψασα, μνήμην, ὡς εἴκειν,
 ἐφεξῆς λαμβάνει. μνήμη δὲ ἢ μὲν τῶν ἐκεῖ ἔτι
 5 κατέχει μὴ πεσεῖν, ἢ δὲ τῶν ἐνταυθα ὡδὶ φέρει, ἢ
 δὲ τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐκεῖ κατέχει, καὶ ὅλως, οὐ μνημο-
 νεύει, ἐκεῖνό ἐστι καὶ γίνεσθαι. ἦν γὰρ τὸ μνημονεύ-

to speak, on the frontier of the intelligible, this change can happen, since it can also advance further into Intellect? For if something comes to be in the region of that which abides, it must be different from that which abides, and not abide in the same way. No, we must not even say that there is a change, when the soul moves from its own content to itself, and from itself to the rest of its content: for the self is all things, and both are one. But does the soul when it is in the intelligible world experience this "one thing after another" in relation to itself and its contents? No, when it is purely and simply in the intelligible world it has itself too the characteristic of unchangeability. For it is really all the things it is: since when it is in that region, it must come to unity with Intellect, by the fact that it has turned to it, for when it is turned, it has nothing between, but comes to Intellect and accords itself to it, and by that accord is united to it without being destroyed, but both of them are one and also two. When therefore it is in this state it could not change but would be unalterably disposed to intelligence while at the same time having a concurrent awareness of itself, as having become one and the same thing with its intelligible object.

3. But if it comes out of the intelligible world, and cannot endure unity, but embraces its own individuality and wants to be different and so to speak puts its head outside, it thereupon acquires memory. Its memory of what is in the intelligible world still holds it back from falling, but its memory of the things here below carries it down here; its memory

ειν ἢ νοεῖν ἢ φαντάζεσθαι, ἢ δὲ φαντασία αὐτῆ¹
 οὐ τῷ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἷα ὄρα, καὶ [οἷα]² διάκειται·
 καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἴδη, ὅποσον αὐτῶν ἂν ἴδη, τοσοῦτον
 10 ἔχει τὸ βάθος. ὅτι γὰρ ἔχει πάντα δευτέρως καὶ
 οὐχ οὕτω τελείως, πάντα γίνεται, καὶ μεθόριον
 οὔσα καὶ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ κειμένη ἐπ' ἄμφω φέρεται.

4. Ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ γαθὸν διὰ νοῦ ὄρα, οὐ γὰρ
 στέγεται ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μὴ διελθεῖν εἰς αὐτήν· ἐπεὶ
 μὴ σῶμα τὸ μεταξὺ ὥστε ἐμποδίζειν· καίτοι καὶ
 σωμάτων μεταξὺ πολλαχῆ εἰς τὰ τρίτα ἀπὸ τῶν
 5 πρώτων ἢ ἀφίξις. εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ κάτω δοίη αὐτήν,
 ἀναλόγως τῆ μνήμῃ καὶ τῆ φαντασίᾳ ἔχει ὁ
 ἠθέλησε. διὸ ἡ μνήμη, καὶ ὅταν τῶν ἀρίστων ᾖ,
 οὐκ ἄριστον. δεῖ δὲ τὴν μνήμην λαμβάνειν οὐ
 μόνον ἐν τῷ οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι μνημονεύει, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ ὅταν διακείηται κατὰ τὰ πρόσθεν παθήματα ἢ
 10 θεάματα. γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν, καὶ μὴ παρακολουθοῦντα
 ὅτι ἔχει, ἔχειν παρ' αὐτῷ ἰσχυροτέρως ἢ εἰ εἰδείη.
 εἰδὼς μὲν γὰρ τάχα ἂν ὡς ἄλλο ἔχοι ἄλλος αὐτὸς
 ὢν, ἀγνοῶν δὲ ὅτι ἔχει κινδυνεύει εἶναι ὁ ἔχει· ὁ
 δὲ πάθημα μέλλον πεσεῖν ποιεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν. ἀλλ'
 15 εἰ ἀφισταμένη τοῦ ἐκεῖ τόπου ἀναφέρει τὰς μνήμας
 ὅπως οὖν, εἶχε κακεῖ. ἢ δυνάμει³ ἢ δὲ ἐνέργειαι

¹ αὐτῆ (sc. τῆ ψυχῆ) Kirchoff*: αὐτῆ xUC, Creuzer: αὐτῆ w, Perna.

² del. Beutler.

³ Gollwitzer, Bréhier, Harder, Cilento, B-T: ἡ δύναμις Enn.: del. Kirchoff, Müller, Volkmann.

of what is in heaven keeps it there, and in general it is and becomes what it remembers. For remembering is either thinking or imaging; and the image comes to the soul not by possession, but as it sees, so it is disposed; and if it sees sense-objects, it sinks low in proportion to the amount of them it sees. For because it possesses all things in a secondary way, and not so perfectly [as Intellect], it becomes all things, and since it is a thing belonging to the frontier between the worlds, and occupies a corresponding position, it moves in both directions.

4. Now in the intelligible world the soul also sees the Good through Intellect; for it is not excluded, so as not to come through to the soul, since what is between them is not a body which would obstruct it —yet even with bodies between there are many ways of arrival at the third level from the first. But if the soul gives itself to what is below it, it has what it wants in proportion to its memory and imaging power. Therefore memory, even when it is of the best, is not the best thing. But one must understand memory not only in the sense of a kind of perception that one is remembering, but as existing when the soul is disposed according to what it has previously experienced or contemplated. For it could happen that, even when one is not conscious that one has something, one holds it to oneself more strongly than if one knew. For perhaps if one knew one would have it as something else, being different oneself, but if one does not know that one has it one is liable to be what one has; and this is certainly the experience which makes the soul sink lower. But if when the soul leaves the intelligible region it recovers its memories, it had them somehow there

ἐκεῖνων ἠφάνιζε τὴν μνήμην. οὐ γὰρ ὡς κείμενοι
 ἦσαν τύποι, ἵνα ἂν ἡ ἴσως ἄτοπον τὸ συμβαῖνον,
 ἀλλ' ἡ δύναμις ἦν ἡ ἀφεθεῖσα ὕστερον εἰς ἐνέργειαν.
 παυσαμένης οὖν τῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἐνεργείας, εἶδεν ἂ
 20 πρότερον ἢ ψυχῆ, πρὶν ἐκεῖ γενέσθαι, ἰδοῦσα ἦν.

5. Τί οὖν; κακέῖνα νῦν αὐτῇ ἡ δύναμις, καθ' ἣν
 τὸ μνημονεύειν, εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγει; ἢ εἰ μὲν μὴ
 αὐτὰ ἐωρῶμεν, μνήμη, εἰ δ' αὐτά, ᾧ κακεῖ ἐωρῶμεν.
 ἐγείρεται γὰρ τοῦτο οἷς ἐγείρεται, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι
 5 τὸ ὄρων περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. οὐ γὰρ εἰκασία δεῖ
 χρώμενον ἀποφαίνεσθαι οὐδὲ συλλογισμῷ τὰς
 ἀρχὰς ἄλλοθεν εἰληφότι, ἀλλ' ἔστι περὶ τῶν
 νοητῶν, ὡς λέγεται, καὶ ἐνθάδε οὔσι τῷ αὐτῷ
 λέγειν,¹ ὃ δύναμιν ἔχει τὰκεῖ θεωρεῖν. ταῦτό γὰρ
 οἶον ἐγείραντας δεῖ ὄραν τὰκεῖ, ὥστε καὶ ἐγείρειν
 10 ἐκεῖ. οἷον εἴ τις ἀνάγων αὐτοῦ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐπι
 τινος ὑψηλῆς σκοπιᾶς ὄρῃ ἂ μῆδεις τῶν οὐ σὺν
 αὐτῷ ἀναβεβηκότων. ἢ τοίνυν μνήμη ἐκ τοῦ
 λόγου φαίνεται ἄρχεσθαι ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ, ἥδη τῆς
 ψυχῆς τοὺς ἐκεῖ τόπους καταλειπούσης. ἐντεῦθεν
 μὲν οὖν ἐν οὐρανῷ γενομένη καὶ σῆμα θωμαστὸν
 15 οὐδέν, εἰ τῶν ἐνθάδε μνήμην πολλῶν ἔχει οἷων
 εἴρηται, καὶ ἐπιγινώσκει πολλὰς τῶν πρότερον

¹ Cruizer* (*dicere* Ficinus): λέγεται Enn.

too. Yes, it had them potentially, but the active actuality of the intelligible realities obscured the memory. For its memories were not like imprints left in it (a supposition which would possibly have absurd consequences), but the potentiality was there which was later let loose into actuality. So when the actuality in the intelligible world ceased to be active, the soul saw what it had been seeing before it came to be in that world.

5. Well, then, does this very potentiality by which we remember bring the intelligible realities also to actuality in us now? If we did not see them themselves, it is by memory [that they are actual], but if we did see them, it is by that with which we also saw them there. For this is awakened by that which awakens it, and this is the power which sees in the sphere of the realities we mentioned. For one must not, when one makes statements about the intelligible world, use analogy or syllogistic reasoning which takes its principles from elsewhere, but even when we are here below we can speak about the intelligible realities by that same power which is able to contemplate the higher world. For one must see the things in that world by a kind of awakening of the same power, so that one can awake it in the higher world also; as if one went up to some high viewpoint and raising one's eyes saw what no one saw who had not come up with one. From our discussion, then, it seems that memory begins in heaven, when the soul has already left the higher regions. Now if the soul has arrived in heaven from down here and stays there, it is in no way surprising if it remembers many things here below of the sort we have mentioned, and recognises many souls from

ἐγνωσμένων, εἴπερ καὶ σώματα ἔχειν περὶ αὐτὰς
 ἀνάγκη ἐν σχήμασιν ὁμοίοις. καὶ εἰ τὰ σχήματα
 δὲ ἀλλάξαντο σφαιροειδῆ ποιησάμεναι, ἄρα διὰ
 20 τῶν ἡθῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν τρόπων ιδιότητος γνωρίζ-
 οειν; οὐ γὰρ ἄτοπον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη ἔστωσαν
 ἀποθέμεναι, τὰ δ' ἦθη οὐ κωλύεται μένειν. εἰ δὲ
 καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δύναίτο, καὶ οὕτως ἂν γνωρίζοιεν.
 ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ κατέλθωσι, πῶς; ἢ
 ἀνυκνήσουσι τὴν μνήμην, ἐλαττόνως μέντοι ἢ
 25 ἐκεῖναι, τῶν αὐτῶν ἄλλα τε γὰρ ἔξουσι μνημον-
 εύειν, καὶ χρόνος πλείων λήθην παντελῆ πολλῶν
 πεποιηκῶς ἔσται. ἀλλ' εἰ τραπέισαι εἰς τὸν αἰ-
 σθητὸν κόσμον εἰς γένεσιν τῆδε πεσοῦνται, ποῖος
 τρόπος¹ ἔσται τοῦ μνημονεύειν; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἰς
 πᾶν βάθος πεσεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ κινηθείσας καὶ στῆναι
 30 ἐπὶ τι προελθούσας καὶ οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει πάλιν
 ἐκδύναί, πρὶν γενέσεως ἐλθεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τόπον.

6. Τὰς μὲν εἰς μετιούσας καὶ μεταβαλλούσας
 [τὰς ψυχὰς]² ἔχοι ἂν τις εἰπεῖν ὅτι καὶ μνημονεύ-
 ούσιν. τῶν γὰρ γεγενημένων καὶ παρεληλυθότων
 ἢ μνήμη· αἷς δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει μένειν,
 5 τίνων ἂν αὐταὶ μνημονεύοιεν; ἀστρων δὲ περὶ
 ψυχῆς τῶν γε ἄλλων ἀπάντων καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου
 καὶ σελήνης ἐπιζητεῖ ὁ λόγος τὰς μνήμας, καὶ τε-

¹ Kleist, Volkmann*: ποῖος χρόνος Enn.: πόσος χρόνος Thillet.

² del. Kirchoff, Müller, H-S.

among those it knew previously, especially if they must necessarily be clothed in bodies of similar forms [to their earthly ones]. And even if they have changed the forms of their bodies and adopted spherical ones, might they recognise [each other] by their characters and the individuality of their behaviour¹? For this is not absurd. Granted that they have put away their passions, there is nothing to prevent their characters persisting. And if they were also able to talk, they could recognise [each other] in this way too. But when they come down from the intelligible world to heaven, how do they remember? They will arouse again their memories of the same things, but less than the souls which come from below; for they will have other things to remember, and the longer time which has elapsed will have produced complete forgetfulness of many things. But if they turn to the world of sense and fall to birth here, what will be the manner of their rememberings? It is not necessary to fall the whole way into the depths. For it is possible for souls in motion to halt when they have advanced a certain distance, and nothing prevents them from emerging again before they come to the lowest point of the process of generation.

6. One could say, then, that souls which migrate and change their state will also remember; for memory is of things which have happened and are past; but as for the souls to which it belongs to remain in the same state, what could they remember? The discussion is trying to find out about the memo-

¹ In view of the importance attached to spherical shape (and circular motion) as the most perfect in late antiquity, Plotinus's lack of interest in the shape of our heavenly bodies is striking.

λευτῶν εἰσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν, καὶ
 ἐπιτολήσει καὶ τοῦ Διὸς αὐτοῦ τὰς μνήμας πολυ-
 πραγμονεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ ζητῶν καὶ τὰς διανοίας αὐ-
 10 τῶν καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τίνες εἰσὶ θεωρήσει, εἴπερ
 εἰσὶν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ζητοῦσι μήτε ἀποροῦσιν—οὐδε-
 νὸς γὰρ δέονται, οὐδὲ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ πρότερον οὐκ
 ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐν γνώσει—τίνες ἂν λογισμοὶ ἢ τίνες συλ-
 λογισμοὶ αὐτοῖς γίνωντο ἢ διανοήσεις; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
 15 περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων αὐτοῖς ἐπίνοιαί καὶ μηχαναί,
 ἐξ ἧν διοικήσουσι τὰ ἡμέτερα ἢ ὅλως τὰ τῆς γῆς·
 ἄλλο γὰρ τρόπος τῆς εἰς τὸ πᾶν παρ' αὐτῶν εὐθη-
 μοσύνης.

7. Τί οὖν; ὅτι τὸν θεὸν εἶδον οὐ μνημονεύουσιν;
 ἢ ἀεὶ ὀρώσιν. ἔως δ' ἂν ὀρώσιν, οὐκ ἐν δῆπου
 φάναι αὐτοῖς ἑωρακέναι· πανσαμένων γὰρ τοῦτο
 ἂν πάθος εἴη. τί δέ; οὐδ' ὅτι περιῆλθον χθὲς τὴν
 5 γῆν καὶ [τὸ] ¹ πέρουσι, οὐδ' ὅτι ἔζων χθὲς καὶ
 πάλαι καὶ ἐξ οὗ ζῶσιν; ἢ ζῶσιν ἀεὶ· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ταυ-
 τὸν ἔν. τὸ δὲ χθὲς τῆς φορᾶς καὶ τὸ πέρουσι τοιοῦ-
 τον ἂν εἴη, οἷον ἂν εἴ τις τὴν ὄρμην τὴν κατὰ πόδα
 ἕνα γενομένην μερίζοι εἰς πολλά, καὶ ἄλλην καὶ
 10 μία φορά, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῖν μετροῦνται πολλαὶ καὶ
 ἡμέραι ἄλλαι, ὅτι καὶ νύκτες διαλαμβάνουσιν.
 ἐκεῖ δὲ μιᾶς οὔσης ἡμέρας πῶς πολλαί; ὥστε
 οὐδὲ τὸ πέρουσι. ἀλλὰ τὸ διάστημα οὐ ταῦτόν,

¹ del. Buchwald.

ries of the soul of all the heavenly bodies in general, and in particular about the sun and moon, and in the end it will go as far as the soul of the All, and will dare to be busy with the memories of Zeus himself. And in looking for this it will observe what their discursive reasonings and calculations are, if there are any. If, then, they neither investigate nor are perplexed—for they need nothing and learn nothing which was not part of their knowledge before—what could their calculations or logical deductions or discursive reasonings be? They will not even have designs and devices concerned with human affairs, by which they will manage our business and that of the earth in general: the right order which comes from them to the All is of another kind.

7. Well, then, will they not remember that they saw God? They always see him; and while they see him it is surely not possible for them to say that they have seen him: this would be something which would happen to those who have ceased to see. Well, will they not remember that they went round the earth yesterday, and last year, and that they lived yesterday and for a long time past and from the beginning of their lives? They live for ever: and "for ever" means an identical unity. The "yesterday" of their transit and the "last year" would be the same kind of thing as if one was to divide the step taken by one foot into many parts, and make the one step into many, one after another. For up there there is one transit, but we measure many, and different days, because nights intervene. But there, since there is one [unbroken] day, how can there be many? So there is not a last year either. But the space traversed is not the same, but

ἀλλ' ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ζῳδίου τμήμα ἄλλο. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἐρεῖ "παρήλθον τόδε, νῦν δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ εἰμί"; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐφορᾷ τὰ ἀνθρώπων, πῶς οὐ καὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τὰς περὶ αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἄλλοι; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ὅτι πρότερον ἕτεροι καὶ ἕτερα· ὥστε καὶ μνήμη.

8. Ἡ οὐκ ἀνάγκη οὔτε ὅσα τις θεωρεῖ ἐν μνήμῃ τίθεσθαι, οὔτε τῶν πάντη κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐπακλουθούντων ἐν φαντασίᾳ γίνεσθαι, ὧν τε ἡ νόησις καὶ ἡ γνώσις ἐνεργεστέρα, εἰ ταῦτα αἰσθητῶς γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἀνάγκη παρέντα τὴν γνώσῳ αὐτῶν τῶν κατὰ μέρος αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ποιείσθαι, εἰ μὴ τις ἔργῳ οἰκονομοῖτό τι, τῶν ἐν μέρει τῇ γνώσει τοῦ ὅλου ἐμπεριεχομένων. λέγω δὲ ἕκαστον ὡδε· πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ἃ τις ὄρᾷ, παρατίθεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν. ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲν¹ διαφέρῃ, ἢ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἢ ὅλως ἢ αἰσθησις ἀπροαιρέτως τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν ὁρωμένων κινήσεια, τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἔπαθε μόνῃ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ δεξαμένης εἰς τὸ εἶσω, ἅτε μήτε πρὸς χρεῖαν μήτε πρὸς ἄλλην ὠφέλειαν αὐτῆς τῆς διαφορᾶς μέλον. ὅταν δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῇ πρὸς ἄλλοις ἢ καὶ παντελῶς, οὐκ ἀνἀσχοιτο τῶν τοιούτων παρελθόντων τὴν μνήμην, ὅπου μὴδὲ παρόντων γινώσκει τὴν αἰσθησιν. καὶ

¹ Beutler: μηδὲ Enn., H-S¹: μὴ Kirchoff*, Theiler.

¹ For the idea that we have sensations of which we are unconscious cp. IV. 9. 2; V. 1. 12; see E. R. Dodds "Tradition and Personal Achievement in the Philosophy of Plotinus" (*J.R.S.* 50, 1960, 5-6) for Plotinus's discovery of the unconscious. On the assimilation in these chapters of celestial

different, and the section of the Zodiac is different. Why, then, will not the star say, "I have passed through this section, and am now in another"? And if it keeps watch over human affairs, why does it not see the changes which take place among men, and that they are now different? And if this is so, it sees that men and their affairs were formerly otherwise: so that it also has memory.

8. Now it is not necessary to deposit in one's memory everything that one observes, or that altogether incidental consequences should come to be present in the imaging faculty; and further, in the case of things of which the thought and knowledge is more effective, it is not necessary, if these occur in the field of sense-perception, to let the knowledge of them go and pay attention to the particulars perceived by sense (unless one is engaged in the practical management of something), since the particulars are included in the knowledge of the whole. What I mean by each of these statements is as follows. First point: that it is not necessary to keep stored up in oneself what one sees. When what is perceived makes no difference, or the perception is not at all personally relevant, but is provoked involuntarily by the difference in the things seen, it is only the sense-perception which has this experience and the soul does not receive it into its interior, since the difference is not of concern to it either because it meets a need or is of benefit in some other way.¹ And when the

souls to the unchanging life of eternity, because they are not aware of and do not remember their embodied experience in so far as it is temporal and changing, see my "Eternity, Life and Movement in Plotinus' Accounts of *Noûs*" in *Le Néoplatonisme* (Paris 1971) 68-9.

μὴν ὅτι τῶν πάντη κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γινομένων οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη ἐν φαντασίᾳ γίνεσθαι, εἰ δὲ καὶ γίνοιτο,
 οὐχ ὥστε καὶ φυλάξαι καὶ παρατηρήσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 20 ὁ τύπος τοῦ τοιοῦτου οὐ δίδωσι συναίσθησιν, μάθοι
 ἂν τις, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον οὕτω λάβοι. λέγω δὲ ὠδε·
 εἰ μηδέποτε προηγούμενον γίνεται τὸν ἄερα τόνδε
 εἶτα τόνδε τεμεῖν ἐν τῷ κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι, ἢ
 καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διελθεῖν, οὐτ' ἂν τήρησις αὐτοῦ οὐτ'
 ἂν ἔννοια βαδίζουσι γένοιτο. ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ εἰ
 25 μὴ ἐγένετο τὸ τότε διανύσαι προηγούμενον, δι'
 ἄερος δὲ ἦν τὴν διεξοδὸν ποιήσασθαι, οὐκ ἂν
 ἐγένετο ἡμῶν μέλειν τὸ ἐν ὅτῳ σταδίῳ γῆς ἐσμεν,
 ἢ ὅσον ἠνύσαμεν· καὶ εἰ κινεῖσθαι δὲ ἔδει μὴ
 τοσόνδε χρόνον, ἀλλὰ μόνον κινεῖσθαι, μηδ'
 ἄλλην τιὰ πρᾶξιν εἰς χρόνον ἀνήγομεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐν
 30 μνήμῃ ἄλλον ἂν καὶ ἄλλον χρόνον ἐποιησάμεθα.
 γνώριμον δέ, ὅτι τῆς διανοίας ἐχούσης τὸ πραττόμε-
 νον ὅλον καὶ πιστευούσης οὕτω πάντως πραχθήσεσ-
 θαι οὐκ ἂν ἔτι προσέχοι γιγνομένοις ἐκάστοις. καὶ
 μὴν καὶ ὅταν τις ταῦτὸν αἰεὶ ποιῇ, μάτην ἂν ἔτι
 35 παρατηροῖ ἕκαστα τοῦ ταυτοῦ. εἰ οὖν τὰ ἄστρα
 φερόμενα τὰ αὐτῶν πράττοντα φέρεται καὶ οὐχ ἵνα

soul's activity is directed to other things, and com-
 pletely directed to them, it will not accept the me-
 mory of things like these when they have passed
 away, since it is not aware of the sense-impression
 produced by them when they are there. Then again,
 one might understand the point that things which
 happen altogether incidentally do not necessarily
 come to be present in the imaging faculty, and even
 if they did would not necessarily be there in such a
 way that it would guard and observe them, but the
 impression of a thing like this does not produce a
 conscious perception, if one took what was said in
 the following sense. This is what I mean: if it is
 never a primary consideration to us in local motion
 to cut through this piece of air and then that, or,
 even more, to pass through the air at all, we shall not
 observe the air or have an idea of it in our minds as
 we walk. For if it was not a primary consideration
 to us to complete a particular stretch of the road,
 but we could go on our way through the air, it would
 be no concern of ours at what milestone in the land
 we were, or how much of the way we had covered;
 and if we did not have to travel for a particular space
 of time, but only to travel, and referred no other
 activity to time, we should not remember successive
 periods of time. It is also well known that when
 our reason grasps what is being done as a whole, and
 has confidence that it will be completely carried out
 in this particular way, it will not any more attend
 to the details as they occur. Again, when someone is
 always doing the same thing, there would be no
 point in his observing the details of this same opera-
 tion. If, then, the heavenly bodies in their courses
 move along concerned with their own affairs and not

παρέλθη ταῦτα ὅσα παρέρχεται, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἡ θέα ὧν πάρευσιν, οὔτε τὸ παρελθεῖν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε ἡ πάροδος, πρὸς ἄλλοις τε ἡ γνώμη μείζουσι, τὰ τε αὐτὰ αἰεὶ δι' ὧν διέρχονται
 40 ταῦτα, ὃ τε χρόνος οὐκ ἐν λογισμῶ ὁ ἐν τοσῶδε, εἰ καὶ διηρεῖτο, οὐκ ἀνάγκη οὔτε τόπων ὧν παρίασιν οὔτε χρόνων εἶναι μνήμην· ζωὴν¹ τε τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα, ἔπου καὶ τὸ τοπικὸν αὐτοῖς περὶ ταυτῶν, ὡς μὴ τοπικόν, ἀλλὰ ζωτικὸν τὸ κίνημα εἶναι ζήσου ἐνός εἰς αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦντος ἐν στάσει μὲν ὡς πρὸς
 45 τὸ ἔξω, κινήσει δὲ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ ζωῇ αἰδίῳ οὔσῃ καὶ μὴν εἰ καὶ χορεία ἀπεικασίει τις τὴν κίνησιν αὐτῶν, εἰ μὲν ἰσταμένη² ποτέ, ἡ πᾶσα ἂν εἴη τελεία ἢ συντελεσθείσα ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος, ἀτελής δὲ ἡ ἐν μέρει ἐκάστη· εἰ δὲ τοιαύτη³ οἷα αἰεὶ,
 50 τελεία αἰεὶ. εἰ δὲ αἰεὶ τελεία, οὐκ ἔχει χρόνον ἐν ᾧ τελεσθήσεται οὐδὲ τόπον· ὥστε οὐδὲ ἔφεσιν ἂν ἔχοι οὔτως· ὥστε οὔτε χρονικῶς οὔτε τοπικῶς μετρήσει· ὥστε οὐδὲ μνήμη τούτων. εἰ μὲντοι αὐτοὶ μὲν ζωὴν ζῶσι μακαρίαν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς τὸ ζῆν προσεμβλέποντες, ταύτη δὲ⁴ τῶν ψυχῶν
 55 αὐτῶν πρὸς ἐν [ταύτη]⁵ τῇ νεύσει καὶ τῇ ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν ἐλλάμψει—ὡσπερ χορδὰν ἐν λύρᾳ συμπαθῶς κινηθεῖσαι μέλος ἂν ἄσειαν ἐν φυσικῇ τινι ἀρμονίᾳ—εἰ οὔτω κινούτο ὁ σύμπας

¹ ApeCpe (=Schegk), Creuzer* (*vitam Ficinus*): ζῶων A^{ac} ExUC^{ac}.

² Kirchhoff*: ἰσταμένη H-S¹.

³ Kirchhoff*: τοιαύτη H-S¹.

⁴ Volkmann*: τῇ δὲ wxC: τῆδε U.

⁵ del. Volkmann*, ut correctionem ad τῇ falso loco insertam.

in order to cover the distance which they cover, and their business is not the sight of what they pass or the passing, and their passage is incidental and their mind is on other, greater things, and these things which they travel through are always the same, and the time taken on a particular stage of their course is not calculated (even if it were divided into stages): then there is no necessity for them to have any memory of the regions they have passed through or the periods of time; and they have the same life, in that their local movement also is around the same centre, so that it is not a local but a vital movement, the movement of a single living being with a self-directed activity, at rest in relation to what is outside it, but in motion by virtue of the everlasting life in it—even if one were to compare their motion to a dance, if it was a dance which at some time came to a stop, the whole would be perfect when it had been completed from beginning to end, but each figure which formed a part of it would be imperfect; but if it is the sort of dance which goes on for ever, it is for ever perfect. But if it is for ever perfect, it has no time or space within which it will be completed; so consequently it will have no aspiration [for completion]; and in consequence of this it will not measure either temporally or spatially; and consequently it will have no memory of this. If, of course, the heavenly bodies themselves live a blessed life, and contemplate this life besides with their souls, by this direction of their souls towards one object and by the illumination which extends from them to the whole heaven—like strings on a lyre plucked harmoniously they sing a song which is naturally in tune—if this is how the whole heaven

οὐρανός και τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ, πρὸς αὐτὸν φερόμενος
καὶ αὐτός, και ἄλλα ἄλλως πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλης
60 αὐτοῖς και τῆς θέσεως οὔσης, ἔτι ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ
λόγος ἡμῖν ὀρθοῖτο μίας ζωῆς και ὁμοίας τῆς
πάντων ἔτι μᾶλλον οὔσης.

9. Ὁ δὲ δὴ πάντα κοσμῶν Ζεὺς και ἐπιτροπεύων
και διατιθεὶς εἰσαΐ, ψυχὴν βασιλικὴν και
βασιλικὸν νοῦν ἔχων και πρόνοιαν, ὅπως γίνοιτο,
και γνομένην ἐπιστασίαν και τάξει διοικῶν και
5 περιόδους ἐλίπτων πολλὰς ἤδη και τελέσας, πῶς ἂν
ἐν τούτοις ἅπασιν μνήμην οὐκ ἔχοι; ὅποσαι τε
ἐγένοντο και οἶαι αἱ περίοδοι, και ὡς ἂν και
ἔπειτα γένοιτο, μηχανώμενος και συμβάλλον και
λογιζόμενος μνημονικώτατος ἂν εἴη πάντων, ὅσω
και δημιουργὸς σοφώτατος. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν
10 περιόδων τῆς μνήμης και καθ' αὐτὸ ἂν ἔχοι πολ-
λὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅποσος ἀριθμὸς εἴη και εἰ εἶδειη.
πεπερασμένος γὰρ ἂν ἀρχὴν τῷ παντὶ χρονικὴν
δώσει· εἰ δ' ἀπειρος, οὐκ εἰδήσει, ὅποσα τὰ
αὐτοῦ ἔργα. ἢ ὅτι ἐν,¹ εἰδήσει, και μία ζωὴ ²
αἰεὶ—οὕτως ³ γὰρ ἀπειρος—και τὸ ἐν οὐ γνώσει
15 ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ' ἔργω, συνόντος αἰεὶ τοῦ οὕτως ἀπείρου,
μᾶλλον δὲ παρεπομένου και θεωρουμένου οὐκ
ἐπακτῶ γνώσει. ὡς γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀπειρον τῆς

¹ Kirchhoff*: ἐν Enn., H-S¹.

² Theiler: μιᾶ ζωῆ Enn.*

³ Kirchhoff, Volkmann*: οὗτος Enn., H-S¹.

¹ As Plotinus says at the beginning of the next chapter, it was legitimate for a Platonist of his period to use "Zeus" as a name either for Divine Intellect or for the Soul of the Universe: *op. III. 5. 8*, where Zeus is Intellect. The general

and its parts move, the heaven itself being self-directed and the different parts having the same direction in different ways (since their positions are different), then our account will be still more correct, since the life of all the heavenly bodies is still more one and uniform.

9. But Zeus who sets all things in order and administers and directs them for ever, who has a "royal soul" and a "royal mind" and foresight of how things will happen and authority over them when they have happened, and arranges the heavens in order and sets their cycles turning and has already brought many cycles to completion, how could he not have memory when all this is going on¹? In his devising and comparing and calculating how many cycles and of what kind there have been, and how thereafter they may come to be, he would have the best memory of all, just as he is the wisest craftsman. Now the matter of his memory of the cycles is in itself one of much difficulty; there is the question of how great the number is and whether he could know it. For if the number is limited it will give the All a temporal beginning; but if it is unlimited, he will not know how many his works are. Now he will know that his work is one and a single life for ever—this is how the number is unlimited—and will know the unity not externally, but in his work; the unlimited in this sense will always be with him, or rather follows upon him and is contemplated by a knowledge which has not come to him from something other than himself. For as he knows the

description of the activity of Zeus is inspired by Plato *Phaedrus* 246E4-6; his "royal soul" and "royal mind" are from *Philebus* 30D1-2.

ζωῆς οἶδεν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν εἰς τὸ πᾶν οὕσαν μίαν, οὐχ ὅτι εἰς τὸ πᾶν.

10. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ κοσμοῦν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸν δημιουργὸν λέγομεν, τὸ δὲ ὡς τὴν τοῦ παντός ψυχὴν, καὶ τὸν Δία λέγοντες ὅτε μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν φερόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν τοῦ
 5 παντός. ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἀφαιρετέον πάντη τὸ πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω μίαν αὐτῷ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἄχρονον ζωὴν διδόντας. ἢ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ζωὴ τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχουσα ἔτι ἐπιζητεῖ λόγον, εἰ οὖν καὶ αὕτη μὴ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι ἔχει τὸ ζῆν, μὴδ' ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν ὅ τι δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἤδη γὰρ ἐξεύρηται
 10 καὶ τέτακται ἂ δεῖ, οὐ ταχθέντα· τὰ γὰρ ταχθέντα ἦν τὰ γινόμενα, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν αὐτὰ ἢ τάξις· τοῦτο δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια ἐξηρητημένης μενούσης¹ φρονήσεως, ἥς εἰκὼν ἢ ἐν αὐτῇ τάξις. οὐ τρεπομένης δὲ

¹ A^{ac}E, Creuzer*: μέσης οὔσης A^Γε^αUC, H S¹.

¹ It seems to have been traditional in the Platonic school to identify the Craftsman, the maker of the world in the *Timaeus*, with Divine Intellect, and Plotinus maintains this identification, though for him Universal Soul is the transcendent organising and directing principle of the material

unlimitedness of his own life, so he knows his activity exercised upon the All as being one single activity, but not that it is exercised upon the All.

10. But since the ordering principle is twofold, we speak of one form of it as the Craftsman and the other as the Soul of the All; and when we speak of Zeus we sometimes apply the name to the Craftsman¹ and sometimes to the ruling principle of the All. In the case of the Craftsman we must completely eliminate "before" and "after" and give him a single unchanging and timeless life. But the life of the universe which contains in itself the ruling principle still requires discussion [to determine] whether this too has a life which is not spent in calculation or in enquiring what it ought to do.² [It does], for the things it ought to do have already been discovered and ordered without being set in order; for the things set in order were the things that happened, and what made them was the order; and this is the activity of soul which depends on an abiding intellect of which the image is the order in soul. But if that intelligence does not change, it is

universe, its lower phase, Nature, being the immanent principle of life and bodily form. Soul's creative activity is for him real and important (cp. V. 1. 2; II. 9. 18) but instrumental and intermediary, entirely dependent on the creative energy of the living World of Forms which is Intellect: cp. V. 8. 7. 15-16. So Intellect remains for him the "true Craftsman and maker of the universe" (V. 9. 3. 25-6).

² The spontaneous, unreasoning (though supremely intelligent) character of the creative activity of Intellect and higher soul is something on which Plotinus several times insists, against Jews, Christians and simple-minded Platonists who supposed that God thought out his plans for the world and then made it: cp. especially the chapter cited in the last note, V. 8. 7.

ἐκείνης ἀνάγκη μηδὲ ταύτην τρέπεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ὅτε
 15 μὲν βλέπει ἐκεῖ, ὅτε δὲ οὐ βλέπει· ἀπολειπομένη
 γὰρ ἂν ἀποροῖ· μία γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ ἓν ἔργον. τὸ
 γὰρ ἡγεμονοῦν ἐν κρατοῦν αἰεί, καὶ οὐχ ὅτε μὲν
 κρατοῦν, ὅτε δὲ κρατούμενον· πόθεν γὰρ τὰ
 πλείω, ὥστε καὶ γενέσθαι μάχην ἢ ἀπορίαν; καὶ
 20 καὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, ἵνα εἰς πλείω ἀπορῆ; καίτοι,
 εἰ καὶ ἐν οὐσα μεταβάλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἀποροῖ· οὐ γὰρ
 ὅτι ἤδη πολλὰ τὸ πᾶν καὶ μέρη ἔχει καὶ ἐναντιώσεις
 πρὸς τὰ μέρη, διὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἀποροῖ, ὅπως διαθεῖτο·
 οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων οὐδ' ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν
 ἄρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, καὶ ἀπὸ πρώτου
 25 ἀρξαμένη ὁδῶ ἀνεμποδίστω ἐπὶ πάντα εἰσι καὶ
 κοσμεῖ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρατεῖ, ὅτι ἐφ' ἐνὸς ἔργου
 μένει τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ταυτόν. εἰ δ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο
 βούλοιο, πόθεν τὸ ἄλλο; εἰθ' ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν
 ἀπορήσει, καὶ ἀσθενήσει τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆ εἰς
 ἀμφίβολον τοῦ πράττειν ἐν λογισμοῖς ἰούση.

11. "Ἔστι γὰρ ὡσπερ ἐφ' ἐνὸς ζώου ἡ διοίκησις, ἡ
 μὲν τις ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν καὶ μερῶν, ἡ δὲ τις ἀπὸ
 τῶν ἔνδον καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθάπερ ἰατρός μὲν
 ἔξωθεν ἀρχόμενος καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἄπορος πολ-
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necessary that this soul does not change either; for
 it does not sometimes look to Intellect and sometimes
 not; for if it left off looking it would be perplexed;
 for there is one soul and one work. For the ruling
 principle is one, always dominant, and not sometimes
 dominant and sometimes dominated: for from what
 source could come a multiplicity [of ruling principles]
 so that there would be strife between them and per-
 plexity? And the one directing principle always
 wills the same thing: for why should it will now one
 thing and now another, so as to be perplexed about
 the multiple alternatives? Yet, even if, being one
 thing, it were to change, it would not be perplexed;
 for because the All is already many, and has parts,
 and oppositions between the parts, it is not for this
 reason in perplexity about how it shall arrange
 them; for it does not start from the last and lowest
 things, or from the parts, but from the primary things,
 and beginning from the first it proceeds by an un-
 obstructed way to all things and arranges them in
 ordered beauty and dominates them for this reason,
 because it persists in one and the same work and is
 the same thing. But if it wishes for one thing after
 another, where would the other thing it wished for
 come from? Then it would be perplexed about what
 it ought to do, and its work would weaken as it
 advanced in its calculations to uncertainty about
 what to do.

11. The administration of the universe is like that
 of a single living being, where there is one kind which
 works from outside and deals with it part by part,
 and another kind which works from inside, from the
 principle of its life. So a doctor begins from outside
 and deals with particular parts and is often perplexed

5 λαχῆ καὶ βουλεύεται, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς
 ἀπροσδεῆς βουλεύσεως. καὶ δεῖ τοῦ παντός τὴν
 διοίκησιν καὶ τὸν διοικοῦντα ἐν τῷ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐ
 κατ' ἰατροῦ ἕξιν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ φύσις. πολὺ δὲ
 μᾶλλον ἐκεῖ τὸ ἀπλοῦν, ὅσῳ κατὰ πάντων ἐμπερι-
 ειλημμένων ὡς μερῶν ζώου ἐνός. πάσας γὰρ τὰς
 10 φύσεις κρατεῖ μία, αἱ δὲ ἔπονται ἀνηρητημένοι καὶ
 ἐξηρητημένοι καὶ οἷον ἐκφῶσαι, ὡς αἱ ἐν κλάδοις τῆ
 τοῦ ὄλου φυτοῦ. τίς οὖν ὁ λογισμὸς ἢ τίς ἀριθ-
 μησις ἢ τίς ἡ μνήμη παροῦσης αἰεὶ φρονήσεως καὶ
 ἐνεργούσης καὶ κρατούσης καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ
 διοικούσης; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅτι ποικίλα καὶ διάφορα τὰ
 15 γινόμενα, δεῖ συνεπόμενον ταῖς τοῦ γινομένου
 μεταβολαῖς καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν ἡγεῖσθαι. ὅσῳ γὰρ
 ποικίλα τὰ γινόμενα, τοσοῦτῳ τὸ ποιοῦν ὡσαύτως
 μένον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐφ' ἐνός ἐκάστου ζώου τὰ
 γινόμενα κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοῦ πάντα, αἱ
 ἡλικίαι, αἱ ἐκφύσεις ἐν χρόνοις, οἷον κεράτων,
 20 γενείων, μαζῶν αὐξήσεις, ἀκμαί, γενέσεις ἄλλων,
 οὐ τῶν πρόσθεν λόγων ἀπολλυμένων, ἐπιγινομένων
 δὲ ἄλλων· δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ γεννωμένῳ
 αὐτῷ ζῳῳ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ σύμπαντα λόγον εἶναι.
 καὶ δὴ τὴν αὐτὴν φρόνησιν ἄξιον περιθεῖναι καὶ
 καὶ ταύτην καθόλου εἶναι οἷον κόσμου φρόνησιν
 25 ἐστῶσαν, πολλὴν μὲν καὶ ποικίλην καὶ αὐτὴ ἀπλήν
 ζώου ἐνός μεγίστου, οὐ τῷ πολλῷ ἀλλοιουμένην,
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and considers what to do, but nature begins from the
 principle of life and has no need of consideration.
 And the administration and the administrator of the
 All must not behave like a doctor in its ruling, but
 like nature. But the administration of the universe
 is much simpler, in that all things with which it deals
 are included as parts of a single living being. For
 one nature rules all the natures, and they come after
 it, depending on and from it, growing out of it so
 to speak, as the natures in branches grow out of that
 of the whole plant. What calculation, then, can
 there be or counting or memory when intelligence is
 always present, active and ruling, ordering things in
 the same way? One certainly should not think that,
 because a great variety of different things comes to
 pass, that which produces them also conforms to the
 changes of the product. The unchanging stability
 of the producer is in proportion to the variety of
 products. For the things which happen according
 to nature in one single living being are many, and
 they do not all happen at once; there are the
 different ages and the growths which occur at parti-
 cular times, for instance of the horns or the beard or
 the breasts; there is the prime of life and procreation
 of other living things; the previous rational forming
 principles are not destroyed, but others come into
 operation as well; this is clear from the fact that the
 same rational forming principle [which is in the
 parent], and the whole of it, is also in the offspring.
 So it is right to attribute the same [unchanging]
 intelligence [to the Soul of the All] and that this, as
 belonging to the universe, is a kind of static universal
 intelligence, manifold and varied, and yet at the same
 same time simple, belonging to a single mighty

ἀλλὰ ἓνα λόγον καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα· εἰ γὰρ μὴ πάντα, οὐκ ἐκείνη, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑστέρων καὶ μερῶν ἢ φρόνησις.

12. Ἄλλ' ἴσως τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον ἔργον φύσεως ἂν τις εἴποι, φρονήσεως δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐσης καὶ λογισμοὺς ἀνάγκη καὶ μνήμης εἶναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων τὸ φρονεῖν ἐν τῷ μὴ φρονεῖν
5 τιθεμένων, καὶ το ζητεῖν φρονεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ φρονεῖν νενομικότητων. τὸ γὰρ λογίζεσθαι τί ἄλλο ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι εὐρεῖν φρόνησιν¹ καὶ λόγον ἀληθῆ καὶ τυγχάνοντα [νοῦ]² τοῦ ὄντος; ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ λογιζόμενος κιθαρίζοντι εἰς κιθάρισιν καὶ μελετῶντι εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ὅλως τῷ μαθηθάνοντι εἰς γνῶσιν.
10 ζητεῖ γὰρ μαθεῖν ὁ λογιζόμενος ὅπερ ὁ ἤδη ἔχων φρόνιμος· ὥστε ἐν τῷ στάντι τὸ φρονεῖν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λογισάμενος· ὅταν γὰρ εὖρη ὁ δεῖ, πέπαυται λογιζόμενος· καὶ ἀνεπαύσατο ἐν τῷ φρονῆσαι γενόμενος. εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τοὺς μαθηθάνοντας τὸ ἡγούμενον τοῦ παντὸς τάξομεν,
15 λογισμοὺς ἀποδοτέον καὶ ἀπορίας καὶ μνήμας συμβάλλοντος τὰ παρεληλυθότα τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ τοῖς μέλλουσιν. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸν εἰδότα, ἐν στάσει ὅρον ἐχούση νομιστέον αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν. εἴτα εἰ μὲν οἶδε τὰ μέλλοντα—τὸ γὰρ μὴ εἰδέναι λέγειν ἄτοπον—διὰ τί οὐχὶ καὶ ὅπως ἔσται οὐκ
20 εἰδήσει; εἰ δὲ εἰδήσει καὶ ὅπως ἔσται, τί ἔτι δεῖ τοῦ λογίζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ τὰ παρεληλυθότα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα συμβάλλειν; καὶ ἡ γνῶσις δὲ τῶν

¹ A^wE, Perna*: φρονεῖν A^wxUC, H-S¹.

² del. Vitringa, Volkmann*.

living being, not subject to change because of the multiplicity of things, but a single rational principle and all things at once; for if it was not everything, it would not be that [universal] intelligence, but the intelligence of partial things.

12. But perhaps someone might say that a work of this kind belongs to nature, but it is necessary that the intelligence which is in the All should have calculations and memories. This is a statement of men who assume that unintelligence is intelligence, and have come to the conclusion that to seek to be intelligent is the same thing as being intelligent. For what else could calculation be but the effort to find intelligence and reason which is true and attains to the truly existent? For the man who calculates is like one who is playing the lyre to acquire the art of lyre-playing or who is practising to acquire habitual proficiency, or in general like one who is learning in order to know. For the man who is calculating seeks to learn that which if someone already possesses, he is intelligent: so that intelligence is in one who has come to rest. The man who has been calculating is himself a witness to this; for when he finds what is needed, he stops calculating; and he comes to rest because he has entered into intelligence. If then we are going to put the ruling principle of the universe into the class of learners, we should attribute to it calculations and perplexities and memories which are proper to one who compares the past with the present and the future. But if we are going to class it as the knower, we must consider that its knowing is in a repose which reached its term. Then if it knows future events and it would be absurd to say that it did not—why will it not

μελλόντων, εἴπερ αὐτῷ συγχωρεῖται παρεῖναι, οὐ
 τοιαύτη ἂν εἴη, οἷα τοῖς μάντεσι πάρεστιν, ἀλλ'
 25 οἷα αὐτοῖς τοῖς ποιούσι τοῖς πεπιστευκόσιν ὅτι
 ἔσται, τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν τοῖς πάντα κυρίους, οἷς
 οὐδὲν ἀμφίβολον οὐδὲ ἀμφιγνοούμενον. οἷς ἄρα
 ἄραρει ἢ δόξα, τούτοις παραμένει. ἢ αὐτῇ ἄρα
 καὶ περὶ μελλόντων φρόνησις, οἷα καὶ ἡ περὶ
 παρόντων, κατὰ τὸ ἐστάναι· τοῦτο δὲ λογισμοῦ
 30 ἔξω. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ οἶδε τὰ μέλλοντα, ἂ αὐτὸς
 ποιήσει, οὐδὲ εἰδήσει ποιήσει.¹ οὐδὲ πρὸς τι
 βλέπων [ποιήσει],² ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπελθὸν ποιήσει·
 τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν τῳ εἰκῆ. μένει ἄρα καθὸ ποιήσει.
 ἀλλ' εἰ μένει καθὸ ποιήσει, οὐκ ἄλλως ποιήσει, ἢ
 ὡς οἶον τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ παράδειγμα ἔχει. μοναχῶς
 35 ἄρα ποιήσει ὡσαύτως· οὐ γὰρ νῦν μὲν ἄλλως,
 ὕστερον δὲ ἄλλως, ἢ τί κωλύει ἀποτυχεῖν; εἰ δὲ
 τὸ ποιούμενον διαφόρως ἔξει, ἀλλ' ἔσχε γε
 διαφόρως οὐ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ δουλεῖον λόγοις·
 οὗτοι δὲ παρὰ τοῦ ποιούντος· ὥστε ἠκολούθησε
 τοῖς ἐφεξῆς λόγοις. ὥστε οὐδαμῆ τὸ ποιούν
 40 ἀναγκάζεσθαι πλανᾶσθαι οὐδ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδ' ἔχειν
 πράγματα, ὥσπερ τινὲς ᾤθησαν δύσκολον εἶναι
 τὴν τῶν ὄλων διοίκησιν. τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πράγματα
 ἦν, ὡς εἶκε, τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἔργοις ἀλλοτρίοις·

¹ Kirchhoff*: ποιῆσαι Ern., H-S¹.

² delevimus.

know how they will turn out? And if it knows how they will turn out, why does it still need calculation and comparison of past events with present? And its knowledge of future events, granted that it has it, will not be like that which diviners have, but like that which those have who make things happen with full confidence that they will do so; this is the same as saying, those who are fully masters of the situation to whom nothing is doubtful or disputable. Now those who have a fixed opinion retain it permanently. The intelligence of future things is, then, in its stability, of the same kind as that of present things; but this is outside the sphere of calculation. But if it does not know the future things which it is going to make, it will not make them with knowledge or looking at any [model] but will make whatever comes to it; but this is the same as saying, it will make at random. [The model], then, according to which it will make, abides. But if that according to which it will make abides, it will not make otherwise than in conformity with the pattern which it has in itself. It will make, then, in one single unvarying way; for it will not make now in one way and now in another, or what is there to prevent its failing? But if that which is being made is in different states, these different states do not derive from itself, but it is subservient to the rational forming principles; and these come from the maker, so that it follows upon the forming principles in their series. So the maker is in no way compelled to be in doubt or perplexity or to have difficulties, as some people have thought who considered the administration of the universe to be a burden. For to have difficulties is a matter, so it seems, of undertaking tasks which

τοῦτο δὲ ὧν μὴ κρατεῖ. ὧν δὲ τις κρατεῖ καὶ
μόνος, τίνος ἂν οὗτος δέοιτο ἢ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς
45 αὐτοῦ βουλήσεως; τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν τῆς αὐτοῦ
φρονήσεως· τῷ γὰρ τοιοῦτῳ ἢ βούλησις φρόνησις.
οὐδενὸς ἄρα δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν, ἐπειδὴ
οὐδ' ἢ φρόνησις ἄλλοτρία, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς οὐδενὶ
ἐπακτῷ χρώμενος. οὐδὲ λογισμῷ τοίνυν οὐδὲ
μνήμη· ἐπακτὰ γὰρ ταῦτα.

13. Ἄλλὰ τί διοίσει τῆς λεγομένης φύσεως ἢ
τοιαύτη φρόνησις; ἢ ὅτι ἡ μὲν φρόνησις πρῶτον,
ἡ δὲ φύσις ἔσχατον· ἵνδαμα γὰρ φρονήσεως ἢ
φύσις καὶ ψυχῆς ἔσχατον ὄν ἔσχατον καὶ τὸν ἐν
5 αὐτῇ ἐλλαμπόμενον λόγον ἔχει, οἷον εἰ ἐν κηρῷ
βαθεῖ δικνοῖτο εἰς ἔσχατον ἐπὶ θάτερα ἐν τῇ
ἐπιφανείᾳ τύπος, ἐναργοῦς μὲν ὄντος τοῦ ἄνω,
ἴχνους δὲ ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος τοῦ κάτω. ὅθεν οὐδὲ
οἶδε, μόνον δὲ ποιεῖ· ὁ γὰρ ἔχει τῷ ἐφεξῆς
διδοῦσα ἀπροαιρέτως, τὴν δύσιν τῷ σωματικῷ καὶ
10 ὑλικῷ ποίησιν ἔχειν, οἷον καὶ τὸ θερμανθὲν τῷ
ἐφεξῆς ἀψαμένῳ δέδωκε τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος, θερμὸν
ἐλαττόνως ποιήσαν. διὰ τοῦτό τοι ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ
φαντασίαν ἔχει· ἡ δὲ νόησις φαντασίας κρείττον·
φαντασία δὲ μεταξὺ φύσεως τύποι καὶ νοήσεως.
ἡ μὲν γε οὐθενὸς ἀντίληψιν οὐδὲ σύνεσιν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ
15 φαντασία· σύνεσιν ἐπακτοῦ· δίδωσι γὰρ τῷ

¹ Plotinus here recognises, but does not satisfactorily solve, one of the great difficulties which his idea of unreasoning intelligence brings with it in his hierarchical system. This is, as he says here, how to explain in any intelligible way the difference between the unreasoning intelligence of Intellect and higher soul, which is above reason and imagination, and

do not belong to one, that is, of which one is not master. But in work of which someone is master, and sole master, what does he need except himself and his own will? But this is the same thing as his own intelligence; for in a being of this kind will is intelligence. So a being like this needs nothing for its making, since its intelligence does not belong to someone else but is itself, using nothing brought in from outside. So it does not use calculation or memory; for these come from outside.

13. But how will intelligence of this kind differ from what we call nature¹? It differs in that intelligence is primary, but nature is last and lowest. For nature is an image of intelligence, and since it is the last and lowest part of soul has the last ray of the rational forming principle which shines in it, just as in a thick piece of wax a seal-stamp penetrates right through to the surface on the other side, and is clear on the upper side, but a faint trace on the lower. For this reason it does not know, but only makes; for since it gives what it has spontaneously to what comes after it, it has its giving to the corporeal and material as a making, just as a heated body gives its own form to that which is next in contact to it and makes it hot in a lesser degree. For this reason nature does not have an imaging faculty either; but intellect is higher than the power of imaging: the imaging faculty is between the impression of nature and intellect. Nature has no grasp or consciousness of anything, but the imaging faculty has consciousness of what comes from outside; for it gives to the

the unreasoning creativity of Nature, the soul-principle immanent in the physical world, which is below reason and imagination (for its unconscious activity see III. 8. 3-4).

φαντασθέντι εἰδέναι ἃ ἔπαθεν· ἡ δὲ γένηα αὐτῆ
καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος. νοῦς μὲν
οὖν ἔχει, ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ παντός ἐκομίσατο εἰς αἰὶ
καὶ ἐκεκόμιστο, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτῇ τὸ ζῆν, καὶ
τὸ φαινόμενον αἰὶ σύνεσις νοούσης· τὸ δὲ ἐξ
20 αὐτῆς ἐμφαντασθέν εἰς ὕλην φύσις, ἐν ἣ ἴστανται τὰ
ὄντα, ἡ καὶ πρὸ τούτου, καὶ ἔστιν ἔσχατα ταῦτα
τοῦ νοητοῦ· ἴδιη γὰρ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν τὰ μιμήματα.
ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις εἰς αὐτὴν ποιούσα καὶ πάσχουσα,
ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ πρὸ αὐτῆς καὶ πλησίον αὐτῆς ποιούσα
25 οὐ πάσχει, ἡ δ' ἔτι ἄνωθεν εἰς σώματα ἢ εἰς ὕλην
οὐ ποιεῖ.

14. Τὰ δὲ σώματα ὑπὸ φύσεως λεγόμενα
γίνεσθαι τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα αὐτὸ τοῦτο [τὰ σώματα],¹
τὰ δὲ ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ἄρα οὕτως, ὥστε τὴν
φύσιν οἶον παρακειμένην ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν; οἶον
5 ἐπὶ φωτός ἔχει· ἀπελθόντος οὐδὲν ὁ ἀήρ αὐτοῦ
ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οἶον χωρὶς τὸ φῶς, χωρὶς δὲ ὁ ἀήρ
οἶον οὐ² κινάμενος· ἡ οἶον ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρός καὶ τοῦ
θερμανθέντος, οὐ ἀπελθόντος μένει τις θερμότης
ἑτέρα οὐσα παρὰ τὴν οὐσαν ἐν τῷ πυρί, πάθος τι
τοῦ θερμανθέντος. τὴν μὲν γὰρ μορφήν, ἣν δίδωσι
10 τῷ πλασθέντι, ἕτερον εἶδος θετέον παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν
φύσιν. εἰ δέ τι ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο ἔχει, ὃ ἔστιν
οἶον μεταξὺ τούτου καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως,
ζητητέον. καὶ ἥτις μὲν διαφορά φύσεως καὶ τῆς
εἰρημένης ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρονήσεως, εἴρηται.

¹ del. Kirchhoff.

² Creuzer, Volkmar* (non Ficinus), cf. IV. 3. 22. 3: ὁ Ἐνν.,
H-S'.

one who has the image the power to know what he
has experienced; but intellect itself is origin and
activity which comes from the active principle itself.
Intellect, then, possesses, and the Soul of the All
receives from it for ever and had always received,
and this is its life, and what appears at each succes-
sive time is its consciousness as it thinks; and that
which is reflected from it into matter is nature, in
which, or indeed before it, the real beings come to a
stop, and these are the last and lowest realities of the
intelligible world: for what comes after at this point
is imitation. But nature acts on matter and is
affected by it, but that soul which is before nature
and close to it acts without being affected, and that
which is still higher does not act on bodies or matter.

14. As for the bodies which are said to be produced
by nature, the elements are just precisely products of
nature; but are the animals and plants so disposed
as to have nature present in them? Their relation-
ship to nature is like that of air to light: when light
goes away air holds nothing of it, but the light is in
a way separate and the air is separate and as if it
did not mix with the light. Or it is like that of fire
and the heated body, when if the fire goes away a
heat remains which is distinct from the heat in the
fire and is an affection of the heated body. In the
same way the shape which nature gives to the formed
body must be considered as another form, distinct
from nature itself. But if the body has anything
else besides this, which is somehow in between it
and nature itself, we must investigate it. And so
we have explained the difference between nature
and the intelligence in the All about which we were
speaking.

15. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄπορον πρὸς [τὰ νῦν]¹ ἅπαντα τὰ <νῦν>¹ εἰρημένα· εἰ γὰρ αἰὼν μὲν περὶ νοῦν, χρόνος δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν—ἔχειν γὰρ φάμεν <ἐν>² τῇ ὑποστάσει·³ τὸν χρόνον περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν-
 5 ἐργεσίαν καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης—πῶς οὐ, μεριζομένου τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἔχοντος, μερίζοντο ἂν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἐπιστρέφουσα ποιήσει καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ παντός ψυχῇ τὴν μνήμην; καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐν μὲν τῷ αἰῶνι τὴν ταυτότητα, ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν ἑτερότητα τίθεσθαι, ἢ ταυτὸν αἰὼν
 10 ἔσται καὶ χρόνος, εἰ καὶ ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργείαις τὸ μεταβάλλειν οὐ δώσομεν. ἄρ' οὖν τὰς μὲν ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς μεταβολὴν δεχομένας τὴν τε ἄλλην καὶ τὴν ἑνδεικνῶν οἶα ἐν χρόνῳ φήσομεν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὄλου γεννᾶν μὲν χρόνον, οὐ μὴν ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι; ἀλλ' ἔστω μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ τί ἐστιν, ὃ
 15 ποιεῖ γεννᾶν αὐτὴν χρόνον, ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰῶνα; ἢ ὅτι, ὃ γεννᾶ, οὐκ αἰδία, ἀλλὰ περιεχόμενα χρόνῳ. ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάθη αὐτῶν ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ποιήματα. αἰδιοὶ γὰρ αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὕστερος, καὶ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ ἔλαττον χρόνου· περιέχειν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν χρόνον τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ,
 20 ὥσπερ, φησί, τὸ ἐν τόπῳ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

16. Ἄλλ' εἰ ἐν αὐτῇ τόδε μετὰ τόδε καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τῶν ποιουμένων, κἂν εἰ

¹ transpos. Theiler.

² Igal.

³ Eum., II-S.: τὴν ὑπόστασιν Kirchoff*.

15. But there is the following difficulty in relation to all that has just been said: for if eternity belongs to Intellect and time to Soul—for we maintain that we grasp time in its essential nature as around the activity of soul and deriving from it—how, if time is divided up, and has a past, will not the activity of soul be divided up, and when it turns towards the past will produce memory in the Soul of the All as well [as in our souls]? For, again, one must place sameness in eternity and otherness in time, or time and eternity will be the same, even if we do not attribute change to the activities of soul. Shall we then say that our souls, which are subject to other kinds of change and especially to deficiency, are somehow in time, but the soul of the universe generates time, but is not in time? But, granted that it is not in time, what makes it generate time, and not eternity? It is because the things which it generates are not eternal, but encompassed by time; since even the [individual] souls are not in time, but such affections as they have are, and the things they make. For the souls are eternal, and time is posterior to them, and that which is in time is less than time; for time must encompass what is in time, as is the case, Aristotle says, with what is in place and number.¹

16. But if in soul one thing comes after another and if it itself makes some of its works earlier and some later, that is, if it makes them in time, it also

¹ φησί "he says" refers here, exceptionally, to Aristotle, not to Plato; op. I. I. 4. 26. The reference is to *Physics* Δ, 12, 221a18 and 28-30. This is the clearest assertion in Plotinus that individual human souls in their true, highest nature live, not in time, but in eternity.

ἐν χρόνῳ, αὐτὴ ποιεῖ, καὶ νεύει καὶ πρὸς τὸ
 μέλλον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρεληλυθός. ἢ
 5 ἐν τοῖς ποιουμένοις τὸ πρότερον καὶ παρεληλυθός,
 ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ οὐδὲν παρεληλυθός, ἀλλὰ πάντες οἱ
 λόγοι ἅμα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ποιουμένοις
 τὸ οὐχ ἅμα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ὁμοῦ, καίτοι ἐν τοῖς
 λόγοις τὸ ὁμοῦ, οἷον χεῖρες καὶ πόδες οἱ ἐν λόγῳ·
 ἐν δὲ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς χωρὶς. καίτοι κάκει ἄλλον
 10 τρόπον τὸ χωρὶς· ὥστε καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἄλλον
 τρόπον. ἢ τὸ μὲν χωρὶς εἴποι ἂν τις ἑτερότητι· τὸ
 δὲ πρότερον πῶς, εἰ μὴ ἐπιστατοῖ τὸ τάττον; ἐπι-
 στατοῦν δὲ ἔρει τὸ τόδε μετὰ τόδε· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ
 ἅμα πάντα ἔσται; ἢ εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τὸ τάττον καὶ ἢ
 τάξις, οὕτως ὡς οἷον λέγειν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐπιστατοῦν ἢ
 15 πρώτη τάξις, οὐκέτι λέγει, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖ μόνον τόδε
 μετὰ τόδε. εἰ γὰρ λέγει, εἰς τάξιν βλέπων λέγει·
 ὥστε ἕτερον τῆς τάξεως ἔσται. πῶς οὖν ταυτὸν;
 ὅτι μὴ ὕλη καὶ εἶδος τὸ τάττον, ἀλλ' εἶδος μόνον
 καὶ δύναμις, καὶ ἐνέργεια δευτέρα μετὰ νοῦν ἐστὶ
 20 ψυχῆ· τὸ δὲ τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι οὐ
 δυναμένοις ἅμα πάντα. σεμνὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἢ ψυχῆ
 ἢ τοιαύτη, οἷον κύκλος προσαρμόττων κέντρῳ εὐ-
 θύς μετὰ κέντρον ἀξηθείς, διάστημα ἀδιάστατον·
 οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ἕκαστα. εἰ δὲ τὰγαθόν τις κατὰ
 κέντρον τάξειε, τὸν νοῦν κατὰ κύκλον ἀκίνητον,
 25 ψυχὴν δὲ κατὰ κύκλον κινούμενον ἂν τάξειε,

¹ The reference back is to the end of ch. 11.

² Cp. V. 8. 7. 23 ff.

directs itself to the future; and if so, also to the
 past. Now the earlier and the past are in the things
 it makes, but in it nothing is past, but all the rational
 forming principles are present at once, as has been
 said.¹ But in the things that are made there is no
 simultaneity, as there is no togetherness, though
 there is togetherness in the rational forming prin-
 ciples, as the hands and feet in the rational principle
 are together, but in the objects of sense they are
 separate. And yet there is separateness in another
 way in the intelligible world; so that there is also
 priority in another way. Now one could speak of
 separateness consisting in otherness; but how could
 one speak of priority unless the arranging principle
 gave orders? But if it gives orders it will say "this
 after that": for why will not all things exist at
 once? Now if the arranging principle is other than
 the arrangement, it will be of such a kind as to speak,
 in a way; but if that which gives orders is the
 primary arrangement, it no longer says, but only
 makes this after that.² For if it says it, it does so
 with its eye on the arrangement: so that it will be
 other than the arrangement. How then is it the
 same? Because the arranging principle is not form
 and matter, but only form and power, and Soul is
 the second active actuality after Intellect; but the
 "this after that" is in the [material] things which
 cannot all exist at once. For the soul of this kind
 is a noble thing, like a circle fitting itself round its
 centre, the first expansion after the centre, an un-
 extended extension: for this is how each [of the
 intelligible realities] is. But if one ranks the Good
 as a centre one would rank Intellect as an unmoved
 circle and Soul as a moving circle; but moving by

κινούμενον δὲ τῇ ἐφέσει. νοῦς γὰρ εὐθὺς καὶ ἔχει
καὶ περιέληφεν, ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος
ἐφίεται. ἢ δὲ τοῦ παντός σφαῖρα τὴν ψυχὴν
ἐκείνως ἐφιερμένην ἔχουσα ἢ πέφυκεν ἐφίεσθαι
κινεῖται. πέφυκε δὲ ἢ σῶμα τοῦ οὐ ἔστιν ἔξω
30 ἐφίεσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ περιπτύξασθαι καὶ περιελθεῖν
πάντη ἑαυτῷ. καὶ κύκλι· ἄρα.

17. Ἄλλὰ πῶς οὐ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν οὕτως αἱ νοήσεις
αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ οἱ λόγοι, ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα ἐν χρόνῳ
καὶ¹ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ αἱ ζητήσεις ὡδί; ἄρ' ὅτι
πολλὰ ἂ ἄρχει καὶ κινεῖται, καὶ οὐχ ἐν κρατεί; ἢ
5 καὶ ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο πρὸς τὴν χρείαν καὶ πρὸς τὸ
παρὸν οὐχ ὠρισμένον ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο
ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλο ἔξω. ὅθεν ἄλλο τὸ βούλευμα καὶ
πρὸς καιρὸν, ὅτε ἢ χρεία πάρεστι καὶ συμβέβηκεν
ἔξωθεν τουτί, εἶτα τουτί. καὶ γὰρ τῷ πολλὰ
ἄρχει ἀνάγκη πολλὰς καὶ τὰς φαντασίας εἶναι καὶ
10 ἐπικτητούς καὶ καινὰς ἄλλου ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐμποδίου
τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου κινήμασι καὶ ἐνεργήμασι.
ὅταν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κινήθῃ, ἦλθεν ἢ φαντασία
τούτου οἶον αἰσθησις ἀπαγγελτικὴ καὶ μηνυτικὴ
τοῦ πάθους ἀπαιτοῦσα συνέπεσθαι καὶ ἐκπορίζεν
τὸ ἐπιθυμούμενον· τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν ἀπόρῳ
15 συνεπόμενον καὶ περιζόν ἢ καὶ ἀντιτεῖνον γίνεται.
καὶ ὁ θυμὸς δὲ εἰς ἄμυναν παρακαλῶν τὰ αὐτὰ
ποιεῖ κινήσεις, καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος χρεῖαι καὶ τὰ

¹ χρόνῳ καὶ Theiler: χρόνους Enn.*

aspiration. For Intellect immediately possesses and encompasses the Good, but Soul aspires to [the Good] beyond being. But the sphere of the All, since it possesses the soul which aspires in that way, moves by its natural aspiration. But its natural aspiration as a body is to that which it is outside: that is, it is an enfolding and surrounding it on every side with itself, and so therefore [movement in] a circle.

17. But why are not the thoughts and reasonings of the soul of this kind in us too, but here below we are in time and there is succession and in this way investigations? Is it because there are many things which rule and are moved, and it is not one which has the power? Yes, and it is because there is one thing after another related to our needs and the present moment, not definite in itself but always related to one external thing after another; as a result our decisions are different and relevant to the occasion when the need arises, and now this and now that external incident occurs. For because there are many that rule it is necessary that there should be many mental images, and they must come in from outside and the images of one must be new to another, and they must get in the way of the movements and activities of each individual part. For when the desiring part of the soul is moved, the mental image of its object comes like a perception announcing and informing us of the experience, and demanding that we should follow along with it and obtain the desired object for it; but our other part necessarily falls into perplexity, whether it goes along and obtains the object or resists. And the spirited part when it summons us to repel something does the same when it is moved, and the needs of

πάθη ἄλλα ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλα δοξάζειν· καὶ ἡ ἄγνοια
 δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὅ τι εἶπη πάντη
 ἀγομένη, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος τούτων ἄλλα.
 20 ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον αὐτὸ ἄλλα δοξάζει; ἢ
 τοῦ κοινοῦ ἢ ἀπορία καὶ ἢ ἀλλοδοξία· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
 βελτίστου ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν δοθεὶς τῷ
 [ἀσθενῆς] ¹ εἶναι ἐν τῷ μίγματι, οὐ τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει
 ἀσθενῆς, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐν πολλῷ θορύβῳ ἐκκλησίας ὁ
 25 ἄριστος τῶν συμβούλων εἰπὼν οὐ κρατεῖ, ἀλλ' οἱ
 χείρονες τῶν θορυβοῦντων καὶ βοῶντων, ὁ δὲ
 κάθηται ἡσυχῇ οὐδὲν δυνηθεὶς, ἡττηθεὶς δὲ τῷ
 θορύβῳ τῶν χειρόνων. καὶ ἔστιν ἐν μὲν τῷ
 φαυλοτάτῳ ἀνδρὶ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ἐκ πάντων ὁ
 ἀνθρωπος κατὰ πολιτείαν τινὰ φαύλην· ἐν δὲ τῷ
 μέσῳ <ὡς> ² ἐν ἡ πόλει κἂν χρηστόν τι κρατήσῃ
 30 δημοτικῆς πολιτείας οὐκ ἀκράτου οὔσης· ἐν δὲ
 τῷ βελτίονι ἀριστοκρατικὸν τὸ τῆς ζωῆς φεύγοντος
 ἤδη τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῖς ἀμείνουσι
 διδόντος· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀρίστῳ, τῷ χωρίζοντι, ἐν τῷ
 ἄρχον, καὶ παρὰ τούτου εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ἢ τάξις· οἷον
 35 διττῆς πόλεως οὔσης, τῆς μὲν ἄνω, τῆς δὲ τῶν
 κάτω, κατὰ τὰ ἄνω κοσμουμένης. ἀλλ' ὅτι γε ἐν

¹ del. Kirchhoff*.

² Theiler.

¹ Plotinus is not interested in politics. When, as here, he expresses political opinions incidentally in the course of a Platonic analogy between soul and state, they are taken from Plato and Aristotle and have little relevance to the Roman Empire in the 3rd century A.D.; though the belief in the inferiority of democracy which he expresses here would have

the body and the passions make us have continually different opinions. Then there is ignorance of the [true] good, and the soul's not knowing what to say when it is dragged in every direction, and still other results from the mixture of all these. But is it actually our best part which has different opinions? No, perplexity and variety of opinions belong to the gathering [of our various parts and passions]: from our best part the right account of the matter is given to the common gathering, and is weak because it is in the mixture, not by its own nature. But it is as if in the great clamour of an assembly the best of the advisers does not prevail when he speaks, but the worse of those who clamour and shout, but he sits quietly unable to do anything, defeated by the clamour of the worse. And in the worst kind of man there is the common gathering and his human nature is composed of everything in the manner of a bad political constitution; in the middling man it is as it is in the city in which some good can prevail as the democratic constitution is not entirely out of control; but in the better kind of man the style of life is aristocratic; his human nature is already escaping from the common gathering and giving itself over to the better sort.¹ But in the best man, the man who separates himself, the ruling principle is one, and the order comes from this to the rest. It is as if there was a double city, one above and one composed of the lower elements set in order by the been shared, not only by his friends of the Roman senatorial aristocracy but by everyone who wrote or spoke about politics in the later Roman Empire (Christians as well as pagans). For the sources of the opinions here see Plato *Republic* VIII 557 ff. and (for the μέγας and his state) Aristotle *Politics* IV 1295a25 ff.

τῆ τοῦ παντός ψυχῆ τὸ ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν καὶ ὁμοίως,
ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλως, καὶ δι' ἃ, εἴρηται. ταῦτα
μὲν οὖν ταύτη.

18. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τι ἔχει τὸ σῶμα
καὶ παρουσίας ζῆ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχον ἤδη τι ἴδιον, ἢ
ὃ ἔχει ἢ φύσις ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ προσομιλοῦν
τῷ σώματι ἢ φύσις. ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα, ἐν ᾧ
5 καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ φύσις, οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ, οἷον τὸ
ἄψυχον καὶ οἷον ὁ ἀήρ ὁ πεφωτισμένος, ἀλλ' οἷον ὁ
τεθερμασμένος, καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ζῶου καὶ
τοῦ φυτοῦ δὲ οἷον σκιὰν ψυχῆς ἔχοντα, καὶ τὸ
ἀλγεῖν καὶ τὸ ἠδεσθαι δὲ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονὰς
περὶ τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμά ἐστιν· ἡμῶν δὲ ἢ τούτου
10 ἀλγηδῶν καὶ ἢ τοιαύτη ἡδονῆ εἰς γνῶσιν ἀπαθῆ
ἔρχεται. λέγω δὲ ἡμῶν τῆ ἄλλῃ ψυχῆ, ἅτε καὶ τοῦ
τοιούδε σώματος οὐκ ἀλλοτρίου, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν ὄντος·
διὸ καὶ μέλει ἡμῶν αὐτοῦ ὡς ἡμῶν ὄντος. οὔτε
γὰρ τοῦτό ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς, οὔτε καθαροὶ τούτου
ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ ἐξήρτηται καὶ ἐκκρέμαται ἡμῶν,
15 ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸ κύριον, ἡμῶν δὲ ἄλλως ὅμως
τοῦτο. διὸ καὶ ἰδομένου καὶ ἀλγοῦντος μέλει, καὶ
ὄσω ὑπενέστεροι μᾶλλον, καὶ ὄσω ἑαυτοὺς μὴ
χωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἡμῶν τὸ τιμιώτατον καὶ
τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν τιθέμεθα καὶ οἷον εἰσδύμεθα εἰς
αὐτό. χρὴ γὰρ τὰ πάθη τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ ψυχῆς
20 ὅλως εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ σώματος τοιοῦδε καὶ τινος
κοινοῦ καὶ συναμφοτέρου. ὅταν γὰρ ἐν τι ᾗ,
αὐτῷ οἷον αἰταρκές ἐστιν. οἷον σῶμα μόνον τί ἂν
πάθοι ἄψυχον ὄν; διαιρούμενόν τε γὰρ οὐκ αὐτό,

powers above. But now it has been explained that
in the soul of the All there is unity, sameness and
likeness, but in other souls things are different, and
what the reasons for this are. So much, then, for
that.

18. Now about whether the body has anything by
itself, and possesses already something of its own in
its life when soul is present, or whether what it has
is nature, and this, nature, is what is in association
with body. Now the body itself, in which are soul
and nature, cannot be something of a soulless kind
or like air which is illuminated, but it must be like
air which is warmed; the body of an animal or a
plant has a kind of shadow of soul, and pain and bodily
pleasures affect a body which is so qualified; but the
pain of this body and pleasure of this kind result for
us in a dispassionate knowledge. When I say "for
us" I am referring to the other soul, since the quali-
fied body does not belong to someone else, but is
ours, and so we are concerned with it because it
belongs to us. We ourselves are not it, nor are we
clear of it, but it depends upon and is attached to us.
"We ourselves" refers to the dominant and essential
part of us; this body is in a different way ours, but
ours all the same. So we are concerned with its
pains and pleasures, more in proportion as we are
weaker and do not separate ourselves, but consider
the body the most honourable part of ourselves and
the real man, and, so to speak, sink ourselves in it.
For we must say that experiences of this kind do not
belong entirely to the soul, but to the qualified body
and something common and composite. For when
something is one, it is sufficient to itself; for example,
what could happen to body by itself if it was lifeless?

ἀλλ' ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔνωσις. ψυχὴ τε μόνη οὐδὲ τοῦτο
 25 [οὐδὲ τὸ διαιρεῖσθαι],¹ καὶ οὕτως ἔχουσα ἐκφεύγει
 πᾶν. ὅταν δὲ δύο ἐθέλῃ ἐν εἶναι, ἐπακτῶ χρη-
 σάμενα τῷ ἐν ἐν τῷ οὐκ ἔασθαι εἶναι ἐν τὴν
 γένεσιν εἰκότως τοῦ ἀλγεῖν ἔχει. λέγω δὲ δύο
 οὐκ, εἰ δύο σώματα· μία γὰρ φύσις· ἀλλ' ὅταν
 ἄλλη φύσις ἄλλη ἐθέλῃ κοινωνεῖν καὶ γένηται ἄλλω,
 30 καὶ τι τὸ χεῖρον λάβῃ παρὰ τοῦ κρείττονος, καὶ
 ἐκεῖνο μὲν μὴ δυναθῆναι λαβεῖν, ἐκεῖνου δὲ τι ἴχνος,
 καὶ οὕτω γένηται δύο καὶ ἐν μεταξὺ γενόμενον τοῦ
 τε ὃ ἦν καὶ τοῦ ὃ μὴ ἐδυνήθη ἔχειν, ἀπορίαν
 ἐγέννησεν αὐτῷ ἐπίκηρον κοινωνίαν καὶ οὐ
 βεβαίαν εὐληχός, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία αἰεὶ φερομένην.
 35 κάτω τε οὖν καὶ ἄνω αἰωρούμενον φερόμενον μὲν
 κάτω ἀπήγγειλε τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀλγηδόνα, πρὸς δὲ τὸν
 ἄνω τὴν ἔφεσιν τῆς κοινωνίας.

19. Τοῦτο δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον ἡδονὴν τε εἶναι καὶ
 ἀλγηδόνα, εἶναι μὲν ἀλγηδόνα γινώσκον ἀπαγωγῆς
 σώματος ἰνδάματος ψυχῆς στερισκομένου,
 ἡδονὴν δὲ γινώσκον ζώου ἰνδάματος ψυχῆς ἐν
 5 σώματι ἐναρμοζομένου πάλιν αὐτῷ. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν τὸ
 πάθος, ἢ δὲ γνώσις τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ
 γειτονίᾳ αἰσθανομένης καὶ ἀπαγγειλάσης τῷ εἰς ὃ
 λήγουσιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις. καὶ ἡλγύνθη μὲν ἐκεῖνο·

¹ del. Kirchoff*, ut glossam ad οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

¹ For a clear and full explanation of Plotinus's doctrine of the parts played by body and soul in experiencing pleasure and pain see H. J. Blumenthal *Plotinus' Psychology* ch. 5, "The Affections". The essential point of it is that only body

For if it was divided the division would not affect it itself, but the unity in it. And soul by itself is not subject even to division, and when it is in this state escapes everything. But when two things aspire to unity, since the unity which they have is an extraneous one, the origin of pain, it is reasonable to expect, lies in their not being permitted to be one. I do not mean "two" as if there were two bodies, for they would have one and the same nature; but when one nature wants to share with another one, and a different kind, and the worse takes something from the better, and cannot take it itself but only a trace of it, and so there come to be two things, and one which has come to be in between what it was and what it could not grasp, this makes difficulties for itself by acquiring a communion with the other which is hazardous and insecure, always borne from one extreme to the other. So it swings up and down, and as it comes down it proclaims its pain, and as it goes up its longing for communion.

19. This is what people call pleasure and pain; pain is consciousness of withdrawal of a body which is being deprived of the image of soul, and pleasure is the knowledge of a living being that the image of soul is again fitting itself back in the body. The affection, then, is there, in the body, but the knowledge belongs to the perceptive soul, which perceives in the neighbourhood of the affection and reports to that in which the sense-perceptions terminate.¹ And it was the body which felt the pain—I mean by "felt

is genuinely affected: soul perceives the affection without being affected (on Plotinus's difficulties in maintaining this position see Blumenthal l.c.).

λέγω δὲ τὸ “ἠλγύνθη” τὸ “πέπονθεν ἐκεῖνο”·
 οἶον ἐν τῇ τομῇ τεμνομένου τοῦ σώματος ἢ μὲν
 10 διαίρεσις κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον, ἢ δ’ ἀγανάκτησις κατὰ
 τὸν ὄγκον τῷ μὴ μόνον ὄγκον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοιούδε
 ὄγκον εἶναι· ἐκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ φλεγμονή· ἦσθετο δὲ ἡ
 ψυχὴ παραλαβοῦσα τῷ ἐφεξῆς οἶον κείσθαι.
 πᾶσα δὲ ἦσθετο τὸ ἐκεῖ πάθος οὐκ αὐτῇ παθοῦσα.
 αἰσθανομένη γὰρ πᾶσα ἐκεῖ λέγει τὸ πάθος εἶναι,
 15 οὐδ’ ἡ πληγὴ καὶ ἡ ὀδύνη. εἰ δ’ ἦν αὐτῇ παθοῦσα
 ἐν παντὶ ὅλη τῷ σώματι οὔσα, οὐκ ἂν εἶπεν οὐδ’
 ἂν ἐμήνυσεν ὅτι ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἔπαθεν ἂν τὴν ὀδύνην
 πᾶσα καὶ ὠδυνήθη ὅλη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἶπεν οὐδὲ
 ἐδήλωσεν ὅτι ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ ὅπου ἐστὶν εἶπεν ἂν ἐκεῖ·
 ἐστὶ δὲ πανταχοῦ. νῦν δὲ ὁ δάκτυλος ἀλγεῖ, καὶ ὁ
 20 ἄνθρωπος ἀλγεῖ, ὅτι ὁ δάκτυλος ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
 τὸν δὲ δάκτυλον ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται ἀλγεῖν,
 ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ γλαυκὸς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ¹ τὸ ἐν
 ὀφθαλμῷ γλαυκόν. ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὖν τὸ πεπονθὸς
 ἀλγεῖ, εἰ μὴ τις τὸ “ἀλγεῖ” μετὰ τὸ ἐφεξῆς
 αἰσθήσεως περιλαμβάνοι· περιλαμβάνων δὲ
 25 δηλονότι τοῦτο σημαίνει, ὡς ὀδύνη μετὰ τοῦ μὴ
 λαθεῖν τὴν ὀδύνην τὴν αἰσθησιν. ἀλλ’ οὖν τὴν
 αἰσθησιν αὐτὴν οὐκ ὀδύνην λεκτέον, ἀλλὰ γνώσων
 ὀδύνης· γνώσων δὲ οὔσαν ἀπαθῆ εἶναι, ἵνα γνώ
 καὶ ὑγιῶς ἀπαγγεῖλη. πεπονθὸς γὰρ ἄγγελος
 σχολάζων τῷ πάθει ἢ οὐκ ἀπαγγέλλει, ἢ οὐχ
 ὑγιῆς ἄγγελος.

¹ suspic. Creuzer, socr. Kirchhoff*: καὶ Enn., H-S¹.

the pain " that the body was affected; as in a surgical operation when the body is cut the division is in its material mass, but the distress is felt in the mass because it is not only a mass, but a mass qualified in a particular way; it is there too that inflammation occurs. But the soul perceives it, taking it over because it is, so to speak, situated next to it. The whole soul perceives the affection in the body without being affected itself. For it perceives as a whole and says that the affection is there where the wound and the pain are. But if it was affected itself, being wholly present in every part of the body, it would not have said or indicated that the affection was there [in that particular place] but would all have been affected by the pain, and in pain as a whole, and would not have said or made clear that the pain was there [in that particular place] but would have said that it was there where the soul is; but the soul is everywhere. But as it is the finger has a pain, and the man has a pain, because the man's finger does. The man is said to have a pain in his finger in the same way as we speak of a bright-looking man, because of his bright eyes. So then that which is affected has the pain, unless one takes " has the pain " as including the immediately consequent perception: if one includes this obviously one is indicating that pain goes with sense-perception's awareness of the pain. But, then, the sense-perception itself is not to be called pain, but knowledge of pain; but since it is knowledge it is unaffected, so that it can know and give a sound report. For a messenger who is affected, if he gives himself over to the affection, either does not deliver his message or is not a sound and reliable messenger.

20. Καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτω κοινοῦ καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης σωματικῆς φύσεως ἀκόλουθον τίθεσθαι γίνεσθαι. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ ὀπωσοῦν ἔχοντι σώματι δοτέον τὴν
 5 ἀρχὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως καὶ προθυμίας, οὔτε τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῇ ἀλμυρῶν ἢ γλυκέων ζήτησιν, ἀλλὰ ὁ σῶμα μὲν ἔστιν, ἐθέλει δὲ μὴ μόνον σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ κινήσεις ἐκτήσατο πλέον ἢ αὐτῇ, καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπίκτησιν ἠνάγκασται τρέπεσθαι· διὸ οὕτως μὲν ἔχον ἀλμυρῶν, οὕτως δὲ γλυκέων, καὶ
 10 ὑγραίνεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μελήσαν, εἰ μόνον ἦν. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐκεῖ ἐκ τῆς ὀδύνης ἐγένετο ἡ γνώσις, καὶ ἀπάγειν ἐκ τοῦ ποιούντος τὸ πάθος ἢ ψυχῇ βουλομένη ἐποίει τὴν φυγὴν, καὶ τοῦ πρώτου παθόντος διδάσκοντος τοῦτο φεύγοντός πως καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ συστολῇ, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἢ
 15 μὲν αἰσθησις μαθοῦσα καὶ ἡ ψυχῇ ἢ ἐγγύς, ἢ δὴ φύσιν φαμέν τὴν δοῦσαν τὸ ἔχνος, ἢ μὲν φύσιν τὴν τρανήν ἐπιθυμίαν τέλος οἶσαν τῆς ὑρξάμενης ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἢ δ' αἰσθησις τὴν φαντασίαν, ἀφ' ἧς ἤδη ἢ πορίζει ἢ ψυχῇ, ἢ τὸ πορίζειν, ἢ ἀντιτείνει καὶ καρτερεῖ καὶ οὐ προσέχει οὔτε τῷ ἄρξαντι τῆς
 20 ἐπιθυμίας, οὔτε τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπιτεθυμηκότι. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δύο ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο εἶναι τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν μόνον τὸ σῶμα τὸ τοιόνδε; ἢ εἰ ἔστιν ἕτερον ἢ φύσις, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ σῶμα τὸ τοιόνδε παρὰ τῆς φύσεως γενόμενον—ἔστι γὰρ ἡ φύσις πρὸ τοῦ τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμα γενέσθαι, αὐτὴ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ
 25 τοιόνδε σῶμα πλάττουσα καὶ μορφοῦσα—ἀνάγκη

20. And it is consistent to attribute the origin of the bodily desires to this kind of common entity and bodily nature. For the origin of appetite and impulse is not to be attributed to the body in any sort of state, nor the search for savoury or sweet to the soul itself, but [the origin] is that which is body, but wants to be not only body, but has acquired a greater number of movements than the soul itself, and has been compelled by this acquisition to turn in many directions; so when it is in one state it desires savoury things, in another sweet, and to be cooled, or warmed, which would be of no concern of its if it was alone. But just as in the case of pain it was from the pain that the knowledge came, and the soul, wishing to take the body away from that which produced the affection, brought about flight—and the part which was primarily affected taught it this by taking flight itself in a way by its contraction—so in this case too it is sense-perception which acquires knowledge and the soul near by, which we call nature, which gives the trace of soul to the body; nature knows the explicit desire which is the final stage of that which begins in the body, and sense-perception knows the image, and the soul starts from the image, and either provides what is desired—it is its function to do so—or resists and holds out and pays no attention either to what started the desire or to that which desired afterwards. But why do we say that there are two desires, but not that it is only that qualified body which we have been discussing that desires? Because, if nature is one thing and the qualified body another which has come into being from nature (for nature exists before the qualified body has come into being, since it itself makes the qualified body, shap-

μήτε ἄρχειν αὐτὴν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε
 σῶμα τὸ πεπονθὸς ταδί καὶ ἀλγινόμενον τῶν
 ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει ἐφιεμένον, ἡδονῆς ἐκ τοῦ
 πονεῖν καὶ πληρώσεως ἐκ τῆς ἐνδεΐας· τὴν δὲ
 φύσιν ὡς μητέρα, ὥσπερ στοχαζομένην τῶν τοῦ
 30 πεπονθότος βουλημάτων, διορθοῦν τε πειρᾶσθαι
 καὶ ἐπανάγειν εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ζήτησιν τοῦ ἀκεσο-
 μένου ποιουμένην συνάψασθαι τῇ ζήτησει τῇ τοῦ
 πεπονθότος ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὴν περάτωσιν ἀπ'
 ἐκείνου πρὸς αὐτὴν ἤκειν. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν
 ἐξ αὐτοῦ—εἴποι ἂν τις προεπιθυμίαν ἴσως καὶ
 35 προθυμίαν—τὴν δὲ ἐξ ἄλλου καὶ δι' ἄλλου ἐπιθυ-
 μεῖν, τὴν δὲ ποριζομένην ἢ μὴ ἄλλην εἶναι.

21. Ὅτι δὲ τοῦτό ἐστι, περὶ ὃ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς
 ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι μαρτυροῦσιν αἱ διάφοροι.
 ἄλλαι γὰρ παίδων καὶ μερακίων καὶ ἀνδρῶν αἱ
 σωματικαὶ ὑγαινόντων τε καὶ νοσοῦντων τοῦ
 5 ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῷ
 σωματικῶν καὶ σῶμα τοιόνδε εἶναι τρεπόμενον
 παντοίας τροπᾶς παντοδαπᾶς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
 ἴσχει. καὶ τὸ μὴ συνεγείρεσθαι δὲ πανταχοῦ ταῖς
 λεγομέναις προθυμίαις τὴν πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν, εἰς
 τέλος τῆς σωματικῆς μενούσης, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τὸν
 10 λογισμὸν εἶναι μὴ βούλεσθαι ἢ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν ἐπί-
 τι προελθοῦσαν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν λέγει, ὅσον ἦν ἐν
 τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι, τὴν δὲ φύσιν μὴ συνάψασθαι
 αὐτὴν μηδὲ προσθέσθαι,¹ μηδὲ βούλεσθαι, ὥσπερ
 οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἐχούσης, ἀγειν εἰς φύσιν, ὡς ἂν
 αὐτὴν τῷ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιστατοῦσαν.
 15 εἰ δέ τις πρὸς τὸ πρότερον λέγοι ἄρκεῖν τὸ σῶμα

¹ Δ^{ac}, Kirchhoff, Müller, Vollmann: ποθέσθαι Ἀρ^cExUC.

ing and forming it), then it is necessary that nature should not begin desire; but it must be the qualified body which is affected in particular ways and feels pain in desiring the opposite of what it experiences, pleasure instead of suffering and sufficiency instead of want; but nature is like a mother, trying to make out the wishes of the sufferer, and attempting to set it right and bring it back to herself; and, searching for the remedy, she attaches herself by her search to the desire of the sufferer, and the consummation of the desire passes from the body to nature. So one might say, perhaps, that the desiring comes from the body itself—one might call it preliminary desiring and eagerness—but that nature desires from and through something else, and it is another soul which provides what is desired or does not.

21. The differences of age-groups show that it is in this region that desire starts, for the bodily desires of children and adolescents and men, and of healthy men and sick men, are different though the desiring faculty is the same: because it is bodily and a qualified body it is subject to every sort of change and has every variety of desire. And the whole desire is not in all cases aroused by what we call impulses and does not wish to eat or drink before consideration though the bodily desire persists to the end; this means that the desire reaches a certain point, as far as it was in the qualified body, but nature does not attach itself to the desire or associate itself with it or wish, as the desire is not according to nature, to bring it into nature, since it has to decide itself what is against nature and according to nature. But if someone answers this first argument by saying that the body in its different states is sufficient to

διάφορον γινόμενον διαφόρους τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ποιεῖν, οὐκ αὐτάρκες λέγει πρὸς τὸ ἄλλου παθόντος ἄλλως αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἄλλου διαφόρους ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν, ὅποτε οὐδ' αὐτῷ γίνεται τὸ ποριζόμενον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ ἢ
 20 τροφή ἢ θερμότης καὶ ὑγρότης [οὐδὲ κίνησις]¹ οὐδὲ κούφισις κενουμένου οὐδὲ πλήρωσις μεστωμένου, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου πάντα.

22. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυτῶν ἄρα ἄλλο μὲν τὸ οἶον ἐναπηχηθὲν τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτῶν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ χορηγήσαν, ὃ δὴ ἐπιθυμητικὸν μὲν ἐν ἡμῖν, ἐν ἐκείνοις δὲ φυτικόν, ἢ ἐν μὲν τῇ γῆ τοῦτο ψυχῆς ἐν
 5 αὐτῇ οὐσίας, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου; ζητήσῃε δ' ἂν τις πρότερον, τίς ψυχὴ ἐν τῇ γῆ, πότερα ἐκ τῆς σφαίρας τοῦ παντός, ἣν καὶ μόνην δοκεῖ ψυχοῦν πρώτως Πλάτων, οἶον ἔλλαμψις² εἰς τὴν γῆν, ἢ πάλιν αὐτὸ λέγων πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανοῦ καὶ
 10 αὐτῇ δίδωσι ψυχὴν οἶαν καὶ τοῖς ἀστροῖς· πῶς γὰρ ἂν θεὸς εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἐκείνην ἔχει; ὥστε συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅπως ἔχει ἐξευρεῖν δύσκολον, καὶ μείζων ἀπορίαν ἢ οὐκ ἐλάττω ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν ὁ Πλάτων γίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πρότερον, πῶς ἂν εὐλόγως ἔχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα δόξῃε. τὴν μὲν οὖν φυτικὴν ψυχὴν ὡς ἔχει ἢ γῆ, ἐκ τῶν φυομένων

¹ del. Igal.

² Kirchoff*: ἔλλαμψιν ARJUC, H-S: ἔλαμψιν EB.

¹ This passage illustrates the attitude of Plotinus to reason and the traditional authority of Plato. He is primarily

make the desires in the desiring faculty different, he does not produce a sufficient reason to show why when one thing is affected in different ways the desiring faculty itself has various desires on behalf of this other, when what is provided to satisfy the desires is not for it. For certainly food, warmth, moisture, relief of what is emptied or satisfaction of what is filled, do not benefit the desiring faculty, but they all belong to the body.

22. But in the case of plants, is the kind of echo of soul in their bodies one thing and that which supplies it another, which is the desiring power in us, but the growth-power in them, or is this in the earth, as the earth has a soul in it, and is it what comes from this which is in plants? One might enquire first what soul there is in the earth. Is it a kind of illumination coming to the earth from the sphere of the All, which alone Plato seems to think primarily ensouled; or, on the other hand, when he says that the earth is "the first and oldest of the gods within heaven", does he give it too a soul like that of the stars? For how could it be a god if it did not have a soul like that? So the consequence is that it is difficult to discover the real state of affairs, and what Plato has said makes the situation more, or at least not less, perplexing. But first of all we should consider what appears to be most probably the real state of affairs.¹ One might con-

concerned to arrive at a true, rationally defensible solution of the problem with which he is dealing; and, though Plato seems to him to be the safest guide to follow, his reverence for him is not so exaggerated as to prevent him here and elsewhere complaining of the difficulties raised by the obscurity or carelessness of the master's language: cp. III. 6. 12. 9-11.

15 ἐξ αὐτῆς ἂν τις τεκμαίροιο· εἰ δὲ καὶ ζῶα πολλὰ
 ἐκ γῆς γινόμενα ὁράται, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ ζῶον ἂν τις
 εἴποι αὐτὴν εἶναι; ζῶον δὲ τοσοῦτον οὖσαν καὶ
 οὐ μικρὰν μοῖραν τοῦ παντός διὰ τί οὐ καὶ νοῦν
 ἔχειν φήσειε καὶ οὕτω θεὸν εἶναι; εἵπερ δὲ καὶ
 20 τῶν ἄστρον ἕκαστον, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὴν γῆν ζῶον
 μέρος τοῦ παντός ζῶου οὖσαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔξωθεν
 μὲν συνέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ἀλλοτρίας φατέον,
 ἔνδον δὲ μὴ ἔχειν ὡς οὐ δυναμένης καὶ αὐτῆς ἔχειν
 οἰκείαν. διὰ τί γὰρ τὰ μὲν πύρινα δύναται, τὸ δὲ
 γῆων οὐ; σῶμα γὰρ ἐκάτερον καὶ οὐκ ἴσες
 οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ σάρκες οὐδ' αἷμα οὐδὲ ὑγρόν·
 25 καίτοι ἢ γῆ ποικιλιώτερον καὶ ἐκ πάντων τῶν
 σωμάτων. εἰ δ' ὅτι δυσκίνητον, τοῦτο πρὸς
 τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι ἐκ τόπου λέγοι τις ἂν. ἀλλὰ τὸ
 αἰσθάνεσθαι πῶς; πῶς γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄστρα; οὐ γὰρ
 δὴ οὐδὲ σαρκῶν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὐδ' ὅλως
 σῶμα δυτέον τῇ ψυχῇ, ἵνα αἰσθάνοιτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ
 30 σώματι δοτέον ψυχῆν, ἵνα ἢ καὶ σφύζοιτο τὸ σῶμα·
 κριτικῇ δὲ οὔσῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχει βλεπούση εἰς
 σῶμα καὶ τῶν τούτου παθημάτων τὴν κρίσιν
 ποιεῖσθαι. τίνα οὖν <τὰ>¹ παθήματα γῆς, καὶ
 τίνων αἰ κρίσεις; ἐπεὶ² καὶ τὰ φυτὰ, καθόσον
 γῆς, οὐκ αἰσθάνεται. τίνων οὖν αἰσθήσεις καὶ διὰ
 35 τίνων; ἢ οὐ τολμητέον καὶ ἄνευ ὀργάνων γίνεσθαι

¹ Theiler.² Müller: ἔπειτα Enn., H-S: (τα correctio ad lin. 32 falso loco inserta).

jecture from the things which grow out of it that the earth has a growth-soul; but if many animals are visibly produced by the earth, why should one not say also that it is an animal? But since it is so large an animal, and no small part of the All, why should not one say that it has intelligence also, and so is a god? For if each of the stars is a living thing, why should not the earth also be a living thing, since it is part of the universal living thing? For one must certainly not say that it is held together from outside by a soul which does not belong to it, but has no soul within it, as if it was not able to have a soul of its own as well as the stars. For why should the fiery bodies be able to have a soul, but not the body of earth? For both are bodies, and the stars do not have muscular fibres or flesh or blood or humours any more than the earth does; even though the earth is more varied in composition and made of all bodies. But if [it is objected] that it is not very mobile, one might say that this only refers to its not moving from its place. But how does it have sense-perception? Well, how do the stars? For perception does not belong to flesh, nor, in general, does a body have to be given to the soul so that it may perceive, but a soul to the body so that the body may exist and be kept in being; but since the soul has the power of making judgments it can look to the body and make a judgment also about the body's affections. What then are the affections of the earth, and about what are the judgments made? Plants, too, insofar as they belong to earth, have no perceptions. Of what, then, are the earth's perceptions, and through what organs do they come? It is surely not too rash to say that perceptions take place with-

αἰσθήσεις; καὶ εἰς τίνα δὲ χρεῖαν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτῆ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἄρκει γὰρ ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἴσως † γνῶσις, οἷς μὴ ἐκ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι γίνεται τις χρεῖα. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν τις συγχωρήσειεν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐν
 40 τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἶδησίς τις οὐκ ἄμουσος, οἷον ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς· αἶ γὰρ τούτων αἰσθήσεις καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖται. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ πάλιν, εἰ αἱ αἰσθήσεις τῆ γῆ, καὶ [ζώων]¹ τίνων αἱ αἰσθήσεις, καὶ πῶς.
 45 ἢ ἀναγκαῖον πρότερον ἀναλαβεῖν τὰ ἀπορηθέντα καὶ καθόλου λαβεῖν, εἰ ἄνευ ὀργάνων ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ εἰ πρὸς χρεῖαν αἱ αἰσθήσεις, κἂν εἰ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν χρεῖαν γίνοιτο.

23. Δεῖ δὴ θέσθαι, ὡς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔστι τῆ ψυχῆ ἢ τῷ ζώῳ ἀντίληψις τὴν προσοῦσαν τοῖς σώμασι ποιότητα συνιείσης καὶ τὰ εἶδη αὐτῶν ἀποματτομένης. ἢ τοῖνυν μόνη ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς
 5 ἀντιλήφεται, ἢ μετ' ἄλλου. μόνη μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς πῶς; ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς γὰρ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ μόνον νόησις· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλων, δεῖ πρότερον καὶ ταῦτα ἐσχηκέναι ἢτοι ὁμοιωθεῖσαν ἢ τῷ ὁμοιωθέντι συνοῦσαν. ὁμοιωθῆναι μὲν οὖν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς μένουσαν

¹ del. Theiler.

¹ The most likely supposition seems to be that γνῶσις here is a gloss on the whole phrase which has ousted some other word now lost; as it is not possible to be quite certain what that word was, I print the MSS text with Henry-Schwyzzer and translate δύναις, a plausible suggestion of Cilento.

out organs. And what use would perception be to the earth? It would not need it for knowledge. For the power of thought¹ perhaps suffices for beings which have no need arising from sense-perception. One could not, however, accept this argument. For over and above need there is in the objects of perception a knowing which brings a not uncivilised pleasure, of the sun and the other heavenly bodies, and the sky and the earth, for instance: for the perception of these is pleasant in itself. This, then, we must consider later; now we must go back to the question whether the earth has perceptions, and of what it has perceptions, and how long it has them. First, we must take up again the difficulties which have been raised, and consider in general whether there can be perception without organs, and if perceptions are to meet a need, or if they have any other purpose independent of need.

23. We must suppose that the perception of sense-objects is for the soul or the living being an act of apprehension, in which the soul understands the quality attaching to bodies and takes the impression of their forms. Well, then, the soul will either apprehend alone by itself or in company with something else. But how can it do this when it is alone and by itself? For when it is by itself it apprehends what is in itself, and is pure thought; but if it also apprehends other things it must first have taken possession of them as well, either by becoming assimilated to them, or by keeping company with something which has been assimilated. But it cannot be

Henry-Schwyzzer tentatively conjectured *χρησις* and Thillet (*Revue internationale de philosophie* 24, 1970, 205) now suggests *δόσις*.

οὐχ οἶόν τε. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὁμοιωθείη σημείον
 10 γραμμῆ; ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἡ νοητὴ τῇ αἰσθητῇ ἂν γραμμῆ
 ἐφαρμόσειεν, οὐδὲ τὸ νοητὸν πῦρ ἢ ἄνθρωπος τῷ
 αἰσθητῷ πυρὶ ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἡ φύσις ἡ
 ποιούσα τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ γενομένῳ ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς
 ταῦτόν. ἀλλὰ μόνη, κἂν εἰ οἶόν τε τῷ αἰσθητῷ
 ἐπιβάλλειν, τελευτήσει εἰς νοητοῦ σύνεσιν, ἐκφυγόν-
 15 τος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ αὐτήν, οὐκ ἐχούσης ὅτι αὐτοῦ
 λάβοιτο. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν ὅταν ψυχῇ πόρρωθεν
 ὄρᾳ, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα εἶδος εἰς αὐτὴν ἦκη, ἀρχόμε-
 νον τὸ πρὸς αὐτὴν οἶον ἀμερὲς ὃν λήγει εἰς τὸ
 ὑποκείμενον χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ
 ὁρώσης. οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ μόνα ταῦτα εἶναι, τὸ ἕξω
 20 καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν πάθοι· ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸ
 πεισόμενον τρίτον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τὴν
 μορφὴν δεξόμενον. συμπαθὲς ἄρα καὶ ὁμοιοπαθὲς
 δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὕλης μιᾶς καὶ τὸ μὲν παθεῖν, τὸ δὲ
 γνῶναι, καὶ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι τὸ πάθος, οἶον
 σφίξειν μὲν τι τοῦ πεποιηκότος, μὴ μέντοι ταῦτόν
 25 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἅτε μεταξὺ τοῦ πεποιηκότος καὶ ψυχῆς
 ὄν, τὸ πάθος ἔχειν μεταξὺ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ
 κείμενον μέσον ἀνάλογον, συνάπτον πῶς τὰ ἄκρα
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assimilated while it remains by itself. For how
 could a point be assimilated to a line? For even the
 intelligible line would not assimilate to the sensible
 one, nor would the intelligible fire or man assimilate
 to the sense-perceived fire or man (since even the
 nature which makes the man does not identify itself
 with the man who comes into being). But when the
 soul is alone, even if it is possible for it to direct its
 attention to the world of sense, it will end with an
 understanding of the intelligible; what is perceived
 by sense will escape it, as it has nothing with which
 to grasp it. Since also when the soul sees the visible
 object from a distance, however much it is a form
 which comes to it, that which reaches it, though it
 starts by being in a way without parts, ends in the
 substrate of the form as colour and shape, when the
 soul sees all that is there outside. There cannot,
 then, be nothing but these two things, the external
 object and the soul: since then the soul would not
 be affected; but there must be a third thing which
 will be affected, and this is that which will receive
 the form. This must be jointly subject to like
 affections and of one matter with the sense-object,
 and it must be this which is affected and the other
 principle [the soul] which knows; and its affection
 must be of such a kind that it retains something of
 that which produced it, but is not the same as it,
 but as it is between the producer of the affection and
 the soul, it must have an affection which lies between
 the sensible and the intelligible, a proportional mean
 somehow linking the extremes to each other, with

ἀλλήλοις, δεκτικὸν ἅμα καὶ ἀπαγγελτικὸν ὑπάρχον,
 ἐπιτήδειον ὁμοιωθῆναι ἑκατέρῳ. ὄργανον γὰρ ὄν
 30 γνώσεώς τινος οὔτε ταῦτόν δεῖ τῷ γινώσκοντι
 εἶναι οὔτε τῷ γνωσθησομένῳ, ἐπιτήδειον δὲ ἑκατέ-
 ρῳ ὁμοιωθῆναι, τῷ μὲν ἕξω διὰ τοῦ παθεῖν, τῷ
 δὲ εἴσω διὰ τοῦ τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ εἶδος γενέσθαι.
 εἰ δὴ τι νῦν¹ ὑγιᾶς λέγομεν, δι' ὀργάνων δεῖ
 σωματικῶν τὰς αἰσθήσεις γίνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο
 35 ἀκόλουθον τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν πάντῃ σώματος ἕξω
 γινόμενῃν μηδενὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι αἰσθητοῦ. τὸ
 δὲ ὄργανον δεῖ ἢ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, ἢ μέρος τι πρὸς
 ἔργον τι ἀφωρισμένον εἶναι, οἷον ἐπὶ ἀφῆς καὶ
 ὄψεως. καὶ τὰ τεχνητὰ δὲ τῶν ὀργάνων ἴδιον τις
 ἂν μεταξὺ τῶν κρινόντων καὶ τῶν κρινόμενων
 40 γινόμενα καὶ ἀπαγγέλλοντα τῷ κρίνοντι τὴν τῶν
 ὑποκειμένων ιδιότητα. ὁ γὰρ κανὼν τῷ εὐθεῖ τῷ
 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ συναψάμενος ἐν τῷ
 μεταξὺ τελεῖς τὸ κρίνειν τῷ τεχνίτῃ τὸ τεχνητόν
 ἔδωκεν. εἰ δὲ συνάπτειν δεῖ τὸ κριθησόμενον τῷ
 ὀργάνῳ, ἢ καὶ διὰ τινος μεταξὺ διεστηκότος πόρρω
 45 τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον εἰ πόρρω τὸ πῦρ τῆς σαρκός,
 <ἢ καὶ>² τοῦ μεταξὺ μηδὲν παθόντος, [ἢ]² οἷον
 εἰ κενόν τι εἴη μεταξὺ ὄψεως καὶ χρώματος, δυνα-
 τὸν ὄραν τοῦ ὀργάνου τῇ δυνάμει παρόντος, ἑτέρου
 λόγου. ἀλλ' οὔτε ψυχῆς ἐν σώματι καὶ διὰ σώματος
 ἢ αἰσθητοῦ, δηλον.

¹ νῦν Theiler: τοίνυν Enn.*

² Kleist.

the capacity both of receiving and of transmitting
 information, suitable to be assimilated to each of the
 extremes. For since it is the organ of a kind of
 knowledge it must not be the same either as the
 knower or what is going to be known, but suitable
 to be assimilated to each, to the external object by
 being affected, and to the internal knower by the
 fact that its affection becomes form. If, certainly,
 what we are going to say now is sound, sense-
 perceptions must take place through bodily organs.
 This is consistent as well with the fact that the soul
 when it is altogether outside the body does not appre-
 hend anything perceived by the senses. The organ
 must be either the body as a whole or some member
 of it set apart for a particular work; an example of
 the first is touch, of the second, sight. And one can
 see how the artificial kind of organs [or tools] are
 intermediaries between those who judge and what
 they are judging, and inform the judge of the
 characteristics of the object under consideration:
 for the ruler acts as link between the straightness
 in the soul and that in the wood; it has its place
 between them and enables the craftsman to judge
 that on which he is working. But it belongs to
 another discussion to determine whether what is to
 be judged must be immediately linked to the organ,
 or can affect it through a space between when it is
 at a distance from the sense-object, as when the
 fire is at a distance from the flesh, or if the medium
 is not affected, as if there was a void between the
 seeing and the colour, the possibility of seeing being
 due to the potential presence of the organ. But it
 is clear that sense-perception belongs to the soul in
 the body and working through the body.

24. Τὸ δὲ εἰ τῆς χρείας μόνον ἢ αἰσθησις, ὧδε
 σκεπτέον. εἰ δὴ ψυχῇ μὲν μόνη οὐκ ἂν αἰσθησις
 γίνοιτο, μετὰ δὲ σώματος αἰ αἰσθήσεις, διὰ σώμα
 ἂν εἴη, ἐξ οὐπερ καὶ αἰ αἰσθήσεις, καὶ διὰ τὴν
 5 σώματος κοινωνίαν δουλεύουσα, καὶ ἦτοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 ἐπακολουθοῦσα—ὅ τι γὰρ πάσχει τὸ σῶμα, καὶ
 φθάνει τὸ πάθος μείζον ὄν μέχρι ψυχῆς—ἢ καὶ
 μεμηχάνηται, ὅπως καὶ πρὶν μείζον γενέσθαι τὸ
 ποιῶν, ὥστε καὶ φθεῖραι, ἢ καὶ πρὶν πλησίον
 γενέσθαι, φυλάξασθαι. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, πρὸς χρείαν ἂν
 10 εἶεν αἰ αἰσθήσεις. καὶ γὰρ εἰ καὶ πρὸς γνώσιν, τῷ
 μὴ ἐν γνώσει ὄντι ἀλλ' ἀμαθαίνοντι διὰ συμφορὰν,
 καὶ ἵνα ἀναμνησθῇ διὰ λήθη, οὐ τῷ μήτε ἐν
 χρείᾳ μήτε ἐν λήθῃ. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ περὶ τῆς
 γῆς ἂν μόνον εἴη σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἄστρον
 ἀπάντων καὶ μάλιστα περὶ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
 15 καὶ τοῦ κόσμου. μέρεσι μὲν γὰρ πρὸς μέρη, οἷς
 καὶ τὸ παθεῖν ὑπάρχει, γένοιτο ἂν αἰσθησις κατὰ
 τὸν παρόντα λόγον, ὅλη δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τίς ἂν εἴη
 ἀπαθῶς ἔχοντι πανταχῇ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτόν; καὶ
 γὰρ εἰ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὄργανον τοῦ αἰσθανομένου εἶναι,
 ἕτερον δὲ παρὰ τὸ ὄργανον τὸ οὐ αἰσθάνεται
 20 ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ὅλον ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ
 τὸ μὲν δι' οὐ, τὸ δὲ οὐ ἢ αἰσθησις· ἀλλὰ συναίσι-

24. But the question whether perception is only concerned with need must be considered in this way. If the soul when it is alone could not have sense-perception, but its perceptions are with the body, then perception would be for the sake of the body, from which the perceptions also come, and would be given to the soul because of its communion with the body; and either it would be a necessary consequence—for every affection of the body, if it is one of the stronger ones, also reaches as far as the soul—or it has been devised so that we can take steps to guard ourselves against what is acting on the body before it becomes so strong as to destroy us, or before it comes too near. If this is so, perceptions would be intended for need. For even if they are also intended for knowledge, this would be for a being which is not in knowledge but is ignorant because of its misfortune, and so that it might remember again because of its forgetfulness, not for a being which is not in a state of need or forgetfulness. But if this is so, our investigation will not be confined to the earth, but must be about all the heavenly bodies and particularly the whole heaven and universe. For according to the present argument parts which are subject to being affected will have sensation directed to other parts, but what sensation directed to itself could the whole have, when it is in every way incapable of being affected; what sensation of itself directed to itself could the universe have? Again, if the organ of perception must belong to that which perceives, and that which it perceives must be something different from the organ, but the All is one whole, it would not have an organ through which the perception comes distinct from the object

θησιν μὲν αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡμῶν συναισ-
 θανόμεθα, δοτέον, αἰσθησιν δὲ αἰεὶ ἑτέρου οὐσαν
 οὐ δοτέον· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν ἡμῖς παρὰ τὸ καθεστῶς
 αἰεὶ τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα,
 25 ἔξωθεν προσελθόντος ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα. ἀλλ' ὥσ-
 περ ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐ μόνον τῶν ἔξωθεν ἢ ἀντίληψις,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρει μέρους, τί κωλύει καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῆ
 ἀπλανεῖ τὴν πλανωμένην ὄραν, καὶ ταύτη τὴν γῆν
 καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ βλέπειν; καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀπαθῆ ταῦτα
 τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν, καὶ ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἔχειν καὶ
 30 τὴν ὄρασιν μὴ μόνον ὡς καθ' αὐτὴν τῆς ἀπλανοῦς
 εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀπαγγέλλοντος τῆ τοῦ
 παντὸς ψυχῆ ἃ εἶδε; καὶ γὰρ εἰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαθῆς,
 διὰ τί ὡς ὄμμα οὐκ ὄψεται φωτοειδῆς ἔμφυχον ὄν;
 ἀλλ' ὀμμάτων, φησὶν, οὐκ ἐπεδεῖτο. ἀλλ' εἰ
 35 ὅτι μηδὲν ἔξωθεν ὑπελέλειπτο ὄρατόν, ἀλλ' ἔνδον
 γε ἦν καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὄραν οὐδὲν ἐκώλυσεν· εἰ δ'
 ὅτι μάτην ἂν ἦν αὐτὸν ὄραν, ἔστω μὴ προηγου-
 μένως μὲν οὕτως ἔνεκα τοῦ ὄραν γεγονέναι, ἀκο-
 λουθεῖν δὲ τῷ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὰ τί οὐκ
 ἂν εἴη τοιούτῳ ὄντι σώματι διαφανεῖ τὸ ὄραν;

25. "Ἡ οὐκ ἀρκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δι' οὗ, ἵνα ὄραῖ καὶ

which it perceives; but we must grant it self-
 perception, just as we are aware of ourselves, but not
 perception of a continual succession of different
 objects; since we too, when we apprehend something
 in our body which differs from its permanent state, X
 apprehend it as something coming from outside. But
 just as with us there is not only apprehension of
 things outside, but apprehension of part by part,
 what prevents the All from seeing the sphere of the
 planets with that of the fixed stars, and looking at
 the earth and the things in it with the planetary sphere?
 And, if these [parts of the universe] are not free from
 the other affections, why should they not have other
 sense-perception, and particularly why should not
 sight not only belong to the sphere of the fixed stars
 as its own by itself, but as an eye announcing to the
 soul of the All what it sees? And even if it is not
 subject to the other affections, why should it not see
 as an eye when it is luminous and ensouled? But,
 Plato says, "it had no need of eyes".¹ But if this
 was because there was nothing visible left outside,
 there were things to see within it, and nothing
 prevented it looking at itself; but if it was because
 it would be pointless for it to look at itself, let us
 assume that it was not brought into being as it is
 with the main purpose of seeing, but that seeing is
 a necessary consequence of its being as it is. Why
 should not a translucent body of this kind have the
 power of seeing?

25. [The answer is that] the existence of the
 medium is not a sufficient cause for sight, and in

¹ The reference is to *Timaeus* 33C1-2. As always, what
 Plato says is accepted as in some sense true, but very firmly
 interpreted to fit in with Plotinus's present line of argument.

ὅλως αἰσθάνηται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτως ἔχειν,
ὡς νεύειν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά. ἡ¹ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει
ἀεὶ πρὸς τοῖς νοητοῖς εἶναι, κἂν οἷόν τε ἡ αὐτῇ αἰσ-
5 θάνεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τοῦτο τῷ πρὸς κρείττοσιν
εἶναι, ὅποτε καὶ ἡμῶν σφόδρα πρὸς τοῖς νοητοῖς
οὔσιν, ὅτε ἐσμέν, λαμβάνουσι καὶ ὄψεις καὶ αἰσθήσει
ἄλλαι· κἂν πρὸς ἑτέρω δὲ ὅλως, τὰ ἕτερα λαμβάνει.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέρος τινὲς μέρους ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι
θέλειν, οἷον ἑαυτὸν εἰ καταβλέπει, περιέργον καὶ
10 ἐφ' ἡμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἕνεκά τινος, μάτην. ἄλλου τε
ὄψιν ὡς καλοῦ ὄρᾶν, πεπονθότος καὶ ἐνδεοῦς.
δοσφραίνεσθαι δὲ [καὶ ἀκούειν]² καὶ γεύεσθαι
χυμῶν περιστάσεις ἂν τις καὶ περιεγκυσμοὺς τῆς
ψυχῆς θεῖτο· ἡλίον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς ὄρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν δέ. εἰ δὲ διὰ καὶ
15 ἐπιστρέφεσθαι δι' ἄμφω, οὐκ ἄλογος ἡ θέσις.
ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπιστρέφεται, καὶ μνημονεύσει· ἢ ἄστοπον,
ὧν εὐεργετῆ, μὴ μνημονεύειν. πῶς οὖν εὐεργετῆ,
εἰ μὴ μνημονεύει;

26. Γίνονται δὲ εὐχῶν γνώσεις κατὰ οἶον
σύναιψιν καὶ κατὰ τοιάνδε σχέσιν ἐναρμοζομένων,
καὶ αἱ ποιήσεις οὕτως· καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάγων τέχναις
εἰς τὸ συναφὲς πᾶν· ταῦτα δὲ δυνάμεσιν ἐπομέναις
συμπαθῶς.

5 Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὴν γῆν αἰσθάνεσθαι

¹ Theiler: τῇ Enn., H-S¹.

² del. Kleist.

general for perception, but the soul must be so
disposed as to incline towards sense-objects. But for
the soul [of the universe], to which it is natural to be
always directed towards the objects of intellect,
even if it can perceive, this could not happen because
it is always directed towards higher things; so with
us too, when we are strongly concentrating on the
objects of intellect, as long as we are in this state,
sights and other perceptions pass unnoticed; and in
general, when one is concentrating entirely on one
thing, all the others are unnoticed. And then, too,
it is mere inquisitiveness to want to apprehend a
part by a part, as if a man were to look at himself,
and if it is not for some purpose, it is futile. And to
see the sight of something else as beautiful is the
mark of someone who is suffering or in need. But
smelling and tasting flavours one would consider as
mere externalities and distractions of the soul; but
one would suppose that the sun and the other
heavenly bodies see and hear incidentally. Certainly
if one supposes that they pay attention [to the world
below] by means of both these senses, the supposition
would not be unreasonable. But if they pay atten-
tion, they will remember: it is absurd not to remem-
ber the benefits one confers. How then will they
confer benefits, if they do not remember?

26. Their knowledge of prayers is the result of a
sort of linking and a particular disposition of things
fitted into the whole, and the same applies to their
accomplishment of what we pray for; and in the arts
of the magicians everything is directed to this linking:
this means that magic works by powers which follow
on sympathetically.

But if this is so, why should we not give perception

δώσομεν; ἀλλὰ ποίας αἰσθήσεις; ἢ διὰ τί οὐ
 πρῶτον ἀφήν καὶ μέρει μέρους ἀναπεμπομένης ἐπὶ
 τὸ ἡγούμενον τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ πυρὸς καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων; καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ σῶμα δυσκίνητον, οὔτι
 10 γε ἀκίνητον. ἀλλ' ἔσονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὐ τῶν
 μικρῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγάλων. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί; ἢ ὅτι
 ἀνάγκη ψυχῆς ἐνούσης τὰς κινήσεις τὰς μεγίστας
 μὴ λανθάνειν. κωλύει δ' οὐδὲν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ
 αἰσθάνεσθαι γίνεσθαι, ἵνα εἶ τίθειτο τὰ πρὸς
 ἀνθρώπους, ὅσον εἰς αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀνάκειται
 15 —εἶ τίθειτο δὲ οἶον συμπαθῶς—καὶ ἀκούειν δὲ
 εὐχομένων καὶ ἐπινεύειν εὐχαῖς οὐχ ὅν ἡμεῖς τρώ-
 πον, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι παθητὴν εἶναι πρὸς
 αὐτήν. καὶ τἄλλα, οἶον ὁσμῶν περί καὶ τῶν γενε-
 τῶν; ἀλλ' ἢ,¹ ὅσα ὁσφραντὰ κατὰ τὰς τῶν χυλῶν
 ὁσμὰς, πρὸς ζώων πρόνοιαν καὶ κατασκευὴν καὶ
 20 ἐπισκευὴν τοῦ σωματικοῦ αὐτῆς. καὶ οὐκ ἀπαιτη-
 τέον ἂ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὄργανα· οὐδὲ γὰρ πᾶσι ζῴοις
 ταῦτά· οἶον ὄτα οὐ πᾶσι, καὶ οἷς μὴ ἔστιν, ἀντί-
 ληψίς ἐστι ψόφων. περὶ δὲ ὄψεως, εἰ φωτὸς δεῖ,
 πῶς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀπαιτητέον ὄμματα. εἰ οὖν τοῦ
 φυτικοῦ συγχωρουμένου ἦν συγχωρεῖν, ἢ ἐν πνεύ-
 25 ματι ὄντος τοῦ φυτικοῦ πρώτως, οὕτως ἔχειν,
 <ἢ>² ὄντος πνεύματος, τί χρὴ ἀπιστεῖν καὶ δια-
 φανὲς εἶναι; μᾶλλον δ' εἶπερ πνεῦμα, καὶ διαφανὲς

¹ coniectimus: ἄλλως ἢ Enn.: ἄλλως ἢ Theiler: ἄλλων καὶ
 Blumenthal: del. Kirchhoff*.

² suspic. Cilento, edd. Harder.

to the earth? But what sort of perceptions? Why
 not first touch, both touching of part by part (with
 sense-perception reporting this to the governing
 principle) and touching of fire and the other elements
 by the whole? For even if the earth's body is
 difficult to move, it is certainly not immovable. But
 the earth's perceptions will not be of small things,
 but of great ones. But why? Because it is neces-
 sary, since there is a soul in it, that it should not be
 unaware of the greatest movements. And there is
 nothing to prevent the earth having perceptions for
 this reason, too, that it may make good arrangements
 for men, as far as the affairs of men concern it—it
 will make good arrangements by a kind of sympathy
 —and hearing those who pray to it, and answering
 their prayers, not in the way we do, and being subject
 to affection by the other senses in relation to itself.
 And what about other things, for instance concerning
 scents and flavours? But [it will perceive] the scents
 which come from the juices of plants in order to
 provide for living things and for the construction and
 repair of its own bodily parts. And we must not
 require it to have the organs which we have: for
 these are not the same in all living creatures; for
 instance, not all have ears, and those which do not
 have them are able to apprehend sounds. But how
 about sight, if light is necessary? For we certainly
 must not require eyes. If, then, accepting that the
 earth has a power of growth, we could agree that this
 was so either because the power of growth was pri-
 marily in the breath of life, or because it was the
 breath of life, why should we disbelieve that this is
 also translucent? But rather, if it is the breath of
 life, it must also be translucent, and, when it is

καί, ἐλλαμπόμενον παρὰ τοῦ κύκλου, ἐνεργεῖα διαφανές· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἄτοπον οὐδ' ἀδύνατον ὄραν τὴν ἐν τῇ γῆ ψυχὴν. καὶ δεῖ¹ καὶ νοεῖν ψυχὴν οὐ
30 φαύλου σώματος εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ θεὸν εἶναι· πάντως γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθὴν δεῖ αἰεὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

27. Εἰ οὖν τοῖς φυτοῖς δίδωσι τὴν γεννητικὴν— ἢ αὐτὴν τὴν γεννητικὴν, ἢ ἐν αὐτῇ μὲν ἢ γεννητικὴ, ταύτης δὲ ἔχνος ἢ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς—καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ὡς ἡ σὰρξ ἔμφυχος ἤδη καὶ ἐκομίσατο, εἰ
5 ἔχει, καὶ τὴν γεννητικὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ φυτά· ἐνοῦσα δὲ δίδωσι τῷ σώματι τοῦ φυτοῦ ὅπερ βέλτιον, ᾧ διαφέρει τοῦ κοπέντος καὶ οὐκέτι φυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ξύλου. ἀλλ' αὐτῷ γε τῷ σώματι τῆς γῆς τί δίδωσιν ἡ ψυχὴ; οὐ ταῦτόν δεῖ νομίζεω σῶμα εἶναι γήινον ἀποτμηθέν τε τῆς γῆς
10 καὶ μένον συνεχές, οἷα λίθοι δεικνύουσιν ἀξέζόμενοι μὲν, ἕως εἰσὶ σνηρητημένοι, μένοντες δὲ ὅσον ἐτμήθησαν ἀφρημένοι. ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν μέρος ἔχνος ἔχειν δεῖ νομίζειν, ἐπιθεῖν δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ πᾶν φυτικόν, ὃ οὐκέτι τοῦδε ἔστιν ἢ τοῦδε, ἀλλὰ

¹ w, Perna*: δὴ xUC.

illuminated by the heavenly circuit, actively translucent; so that there is nothing absurd or impossible in the earth's soul seeing. And we must certainly consider that it is the soul of no inferior body, so that it is even a god: for this soul must also be always good in every way.

27. If, then, the earth gives the generative soul to plants—either the generative soul itself, or the generative soul is in the earth itself and a trace of it is the generative principle in plants—in this latter case too, plants would be like flesh which is already ensouled and have acquired, if they possess it, the generative soul in themselves. And this generative soul, being present in the body of the plant, gives it what is better in it, that by which it differs from the piece which has been cut off and is no longer a plant, but only a stick. But what does the soul give to the body of the earth itself? One should not consider an earthy body the same when it is cut off from the earth and when it remains connected with it, as stones show, which grow as long as they are attached to the earth but remain the size they were cut when they are taken away from it.¹ One must therefore consider that each part has a trace of the generative soul, and the whole power of growth is diffused over this, and belongs no more to this part or that, but

¹ This remarkable doctrine that stones grow as long as they remain parts of the living body of the earth (cp. VI. 7. 11. 24–5) is a striking illustration of the strength of the conviction that the great parts of the universe, the earth and the heavenly bodies, and the universe as a whole are living organisms. The idea that minerals and stones in the earth grow is to be found in Strabo V. 2. 6 and VII. 5. 8 and may well go back to the great Stoic geographer and philosopher Posidonius: see W. Theiler *Vorbereitung d. Neuplatonismus* (Berlin 1930) 74.

τῆς ὄλης· εἶτα τὴν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ φύσιν οὐκέτι
 15 τῷ σώματι συμπεφυρμένην, ἐποχουμένην δέ·
 εἶτα τὴν ἄλλην ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν, ἣν δὴ Ἑστίαν καὶ
 Δήμητραν ἐπονομάζουσιν ἄνθρωποι θεία φήμη καὶ
 φύσει ἀπομαντευομένη τὰ τοιαῦτα χρώμενοι.

28. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτη· ἐπανιτέον δὲ πάλιν
 καὶ περὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς ζητητέον, εἰ, ὥσπερ τῶν
 ἐπιθυμιῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ἡδονάς—
 τὰ πάθη, οὐ τὰς αἰσθήσεις—ἐν τῷ οὕτως ἔχοντι
 5 σώματι ἐτίθεμεν τῷ οἶον ζωθέντι, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ
 θυμοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ καὶ πάντα τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ οὕτως
 ἔχοντος σώματος θηρούμεθα ἢ μέρους τινὸς σώμα-
 τος, οἶον καρδίας οὕτως ἐχούσης ἢ χολῆς οὐ νεκροῦ
 σώματος· καὶ εἰ, ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ διδόντος, τὸ
 ἔχνος τὸ ψυχικόν, ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τι τοῦτο ὁ θυμός,
 10 οὐκέτι παρὰ φυτικῶν¹ ἢ αἰσθητικοῦ. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν
 καθ' ὅλον τὸ σῶμα τὸ φυτικὸν ὄν παντὶ ἐδίδου τῷ
 σώματι τὸ ἔχνος, καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἦν ἐν παντὶ καὶ τὸ
 ἡδεσθαι, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐν παντὶ τοῦ
 πληροῦσθαι· ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισίων οὐκ εἴρητο, ἀλλ'
 15 ἔστω περὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν τοιούτων τελεστικά. ἔστω
 δὲ ὁ περὶ τὸ ἥπαρ τόπος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχή, ὅτι τὸ
 φυτικὸν ἐκεῖ ἐνεργεῖ μάλιστα, ὁ τὸ ἔχνος τὸ ψυχι-
 κὸν τῷ ἥπατι καὶ τῷ σώματι παρέχει· ἐκεῖ δέ, ὅτι
 ἐκεῖ ἄρχεται ἢ ἐνεργεῖα. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ θυμικοῦ²

¹ Sleeman (C.Q. 20, 1926, 53): θυμικοῦ Enn.*

² Theiler: θυμοῦ Enn.*

to the whole earth: then comes the nature of sense-
 perception which is no longer "mixed up with the
 body"¹ but in contact with it from above; then the
 rest of the soul and its intelligence, which men,
 making use of divine revelation and a nature which
 divines such things, call Hestia and Demeter.

28. So much, then, for this. But we must go back
 again and enquire about the passionate power,
 whether, just as we placed the origin of desires, and
 pains and pleasures—the feelings, not the percep-
 tions—in the body in a particular state, the body,
 that is, somehow given life, so we shall attribute the
 origin of the passionate spirit, or the passionate spirit
 as a whole, to the body in a particular state, or some
 part of the body, for instance to the heart in a parti-
 cular state or the bile in a body which is not dead;
 and also whether, if it is something else which gives
 it, the passionate power is the trace of soul, or
 whether here the passionate spirit is this one particu-
 lar thing, no longer derived from a power of growth
 or perception. Now in the case of desires the
 power of growth, which is in the whole body, gave
 the trace of soul to all the body, and pain and pleasure
 were in it all, and the origin of desire was in all the
 body, the desire, that is, of being satisfied; the desire
 of sexual pleasures was not mentioned, but let us
 assume that it concerns the parts which bring them to
 fruition. Let us grant, too, that the region around
 the liver is the origin of desire, because the power of
 growth is most active there which gives the trace of
 soul to the liver and to the body: it is there because
 its activity begins there. But about the passionate

¹ Plato *Phaedo* 66B5.

τί τε αὐτὸ καὶ τίς ψυχῆ, καὶ εἰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἔχνος περι
 20 τὴν καρδίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι τὴν κίνησιν εἰς συναμφότερον
 τελοῦν παρέχεται, ἢ ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔχνος, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ
 τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι παρέχεται. πρῶτον οὖν σκεπτέον, τί
 αὐτό. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πάσχη τὸ σῶμα
 μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν καὶ ἕτερός τις τῶν
 προσηκόντων, καὶ ὅλως ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν τις παρὰ τὸ
 25 προσήκον ποιῆ, ὀργιζόμεθα, δῆλόν που· ὅθεν καὶ
 αἰσθήσεως δεῖ καὶ συνέσεώς τις ἐν τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι.
 διὸ καὶ εἰς ταῦτά τις ὀρῶν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ φυτικοῦ
 ὠρμηθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἄλλου ἂν ζητοῖ τὸν θυμὸν τὴν
 γένεσιν ἴσχειν. ἀλλ' ὅταν ταῖς σωματικαῖς δια-
 30 θέσεσιν ἐπηται τὸ τῆς ὀργῆς πρόχειρον, καὶ ὅταν
 οἱ μὲν ζέοντες αἵματι καὶ χολῇ ἔτοιμοι εἰς τὸ
 ὀργίζεσθαι ὦσιν, ἀνειμένοι δὲ πρὸς ὀργὰς οἱ
 ἄχολοι λεγόμενοι καὶ κατεφυγμένοι, τά τε θηρία
 πρὸς τὰς κράσεις ἀλλ' οὐ¹ πρὸς τὸ δοκηθῆν

¹ κράσεις ἀλλ' οὐ Bréhier: κράσεις οὐδενὸς ἄλλου ἀλλὰ Enn.:
 βράσεις οὐδενὸς ἄλλου ἀλλὰ H-S.

¹ With the utmost regret I find myself compelled (with
 Theiler and B. S. Page in his latest (1969) revision of Mac-
 Kenna's translation) to reject Professor H.-R. Schwyzer's
 emendation βράσεις—printed in the Henry-Schwyzzer text—
 and fall back on the best of Bréhier's usually unacceptable
 critical suggestions. All that can be said in favour of βράσεις
 is excellently said by Schwyzer in his "Sieben ἀπαξ εἰρημῆνα
 bei Plotin" in *Mus. Helv.* 20 (1963) 193-5. My reason for
 rejecting it is not the unprecedented sense given to the rare
 word βράσεις ("boiling"). Schwyzer makes a reasonable case
 for this, and is also of course right in saying that the substi-
 tution of κράσεις for βράσεις is paleographically easy to explain.

power [we must enquire] what it is itself and what
 kind of a soul it is, and whether a trace derived from
 it causes movement around the heart or something
 else which is classed as part of the composite being,
 or whether here it is not a trace, but the passionate
 power of soul itself which causes anger. First of all,
 then, we must consider what it is itself. It is obvious,
 I think, that we are angry not only over whatever our
 bodies suffer, but over the sufferings of anyone closely
 connected with us, and in general over anyone's im-
 proper behaviour. So there is need of perception
 and some kind of understanding in being angry. For
 this reason anyone looking at these facts would not
 think that passion arose from the power of growth,
 but would try to find that it had its source in some
 other power of soul. But when a propensity to
 anger follows bodily dispositions, and when those
 whose blood and bile are boiling are prompt to fly
 into a rage, and those who are said to be "without
 bile" and "chilly" are easy-going and slow to
 anger, and animals are angry because of their tem-
 peraments,¹ but not because it appears to them that

But the sense given by this emendation—that animals are not
 made angry by the "boiling up" of anger in another animal,
 but only by their supposition that they are being ill-treated—
 seems to me inconsistent with the whole argument of the sen-
 tence, which is that the causes of anger should be looked for
 in the constitution and state of the body, not in the soul.
 Bréhier's emendation gives exactly the necessary sense here
 and does not seem to me an intolerably violent change. I
 append Schwyzer's latest note on the passage (on a postcard
 to me), in which he makes clear with force and elegance in
 both ancient languages that he maintains his original position:
 "In IV 4, 28, 32 (quamvis ab omnibus nec non ab infideli Page
 despectus repulsus derelictus) βράσεις (καὶ τὰς ὀργὰς ἔχω
 πρὸς τὸ δοκηθῆν λυμῆνασθαι)."

λυμήνασθαι τὰς ὀργὰς ἔχουσι, πρὸς τὸ σωμα-
 35 τικώτερον πάλιν αὐ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συνέχον τὴν τοῦ
 ζώου σύστασιν τὰς ὀργὰς ἂν τις ἀνοίσειε. καὶ ὅταν
 οἱ αὐτοὶ νοσοῦντες μὲν ὀργιλώτεροι ἢ ὑγιαίνοντες,
 ἄγευστοι δὲ σιτίων ἢ λαβόντες, σώματος τοιοῦδε
 μηρύουσι τὰς ὀργὰς ἢ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς ὀργῆς εἶναι,
 καὶ τὴν χολὴν ἢ τὸ αἷμα οἷον ψυχούντα παρ-
 40 ἔχεσθαι τὰς τοιάσδε κινήσεις, ὥστε παθόντος τοῦ
 τοιοῦδε σώματος εὐθέως κινεῖσθαι τὸ αἷμα ἢ τὴν
 χολήν, αἰσθήσεως δὲ γενομένης τὴν φαντασίαν
 κωνώσασαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῇ τοιοῦδε σώματος δια-
 θέσει ἤδη πρὸς τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἵεσθαι.
 ἄνωθεν δὲ αὐ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν λογισμῶ χρωμένην
 45 φανέντος ἀδικήματος—κἂν¹ μὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα—
 ἔχουσαν ἔτοιμον τὸ ἐκείως θυμούμενον ἅτε πε-
 φυκὸς τῷ ἀποδειχθέντι ἐναντίῳ μάχεσθαι σύμ-
 μαχον τοῦτο ποιεῖσθαι. καὶ εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἐγειρόμε-
 νον ἀλόγως καὶ ἐφέλκεσθαι τῇ φαντασίᾳ τὸν
 λόγον, τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ λόγου καὶ λήγον εἰς
 50 τὸ πεφυκὸς χολοῦσθαι· καὶ παρὰ τοῦ φυτικού καὶ
 γεννητικοῦ ἄμφω γίνεσθαι κατασκευάζοντος τὸ
 σῶμα οἷον ἀντιληπτικὸν ἠδέων καὶ λυπηρῶν, τὸ δὲ
 πεποιηκέναι χολῶδες καὶ πικρὸν. καὶ <τῷ>² ἐν
 τοιοῦτῳ <εἶναι>² ψυχῆς ἵχνος [τῷ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ
 εἶναι]² τοιάδε κινεῖσθαι δυσχεραντικὰ καὶ ὀργίλα
 55 καὶ τῷ κεκακῶσθαι πρῶτον αὐτὸ κακοῦν πῶς
 ζητεῖ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ οἷον ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτῷ.

¹ Igal: καὶ Enn.

² transposuimus.

they have been ill-treated, one would be inclined to
 attribute anger again to the more bodily part and to
 that which keeps the living organism together. And
 when the same people are more prone to anger when
 they are ill than when they are healthy, and when
 they have not tasted food than when they have
 eaten, they indicate that fits of anger, or the origins
 of anger, belong to the qualified body, and that the
 bile or the blood, as a kind of animating principle,
 produce these movements of such a kind that, when
 the qualified body suffers, the blood or the bile are
 immediately set in motion, and a perception occurs,
 and the mental image puts the soul in touch with the
 state of the qualified body, and the soul launches
 itself against what has caused the pain; but on the
 other hand, the process can start from above: the
 reasoning soul, when a wrong appears, even if it is
 not a wrong which concerns the body, has that
 impassioned thing just described ready to hand and
 makes an ally of it, as it is naturally adapted to fight
 against the enemy which has been shown to it.
 And there are two kinds of angry passion, one which
 is irrationally awakened and drags the reason over
 to its side by means of the mental image, and one
 which begins in the reason and comes to its conclusion
 in that which is naturally adapted to be angry; and
 both of these derive from the power of growth and
 generation which constructs the body so as to be
 receptive of pleasures and pains, and it is this which
 makes the body bilious and bitter. And by being in
 a body of this kind the trace of soul is moved in this
 way by displeasure and anger, and, because wrong
 has been done to it itself first, it tries in a way to
 wrong the others too and, so to speak, make them

μαρτύριον δὲ τοῦ ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τοῦτο τῷ ἑτέρῳ
 ἔχει ψυχῆς τὸ τοὺς ἦττον τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδέων
 ἐφιεμένους καὶ ὅλως σώματος καταφρονούντας
 ἦττον κινεῖσθαι πρὸς ὀργὰς [καὶ ἀλόγι ἀπαθείᾳ].¹
 60 τὸ δὲ τὰ δένδρα μὴ ἔχειν θυμὸν καίπερ τὸ φυτικὸν
 ἔχοντα οὐ δεῖ θαυμάζειν· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἵματος οὐδὲ
 χολῆς αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν. ἐγγενομένων μὲν γὰρ
 τούτων ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ζῆσις ἂν ἐγένετο μόνον καὶ
 οἶον ἀγανάκτησις, αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἐγγενομένης καὶ
 πρὸς τὸ ἀδικοῦν ἂν ἦδη, ὥστε καὶ ἀμύνεσθαι,
 65 ὀρμή. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς διαιροῖτο εἰς τὸ
 ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμοειδὲς καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶη τὸ
 φυτικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμοειδὲς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχνος περὶ αἷμα
 ἢ χολῆν ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῆ ἢ
 ἀντιδιαίρεσις γίνοιτο, τοῦ μὲν προτέρου, τοῦ δὲ
 ὑτέρου ὄντος. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἄμφω ὕστερα καὶ
 70 τῶν ἐπιγενομένων ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὴν διαίρεσιν
 εἶναι· ὀρεκτικῶν γὰρ ἢ διαίρεσις, ἢ ὀρεκτικά, οὐ
 τῆς οὐσίας, ὅθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ οὐσία καθ'
 αὐτὴν οὐκ ὀρεξις, ἀλλ' ἴσως τελειοῦσα τὴν ὀρεξιν
 συνάψασα αὐτῇ τὴν παρ' αὐτῆς ἐνέργειαν. καὶ τὸ
 ἐκπεσὸν δὲ εἰς θυμὸν ἔχνος περὶ τὴν καρδίαν λέγειν
 75 οὐκ ἄτοπον· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ τὴν
 τοῦ αἵματος ἀρχὴν τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐνταῦθα λεγέσθω
 εἶναι.

¹ del. Harder.

like itself. The fact that those who are less desirous of bodily pleasures and in general despise the body are less moved to anger is evidence that this trace of soul is consubstantial¹ with the other. But there is no need to be surprised that trees do not have a passionate spirit although they have the power of growth, since they have no share of blood or bile. For if these were present in them without sense-perception there would only be a scorching and a kind of irritation, but if sense-perception was present as well there would then be a drive against the cause of the wrong, resulting also in a movement of self-defence. But if the irrational part of the soul was divided into the desiring and the passionate, and the first was taken to be the power of growth, and the passionate a trace of it in the blood or the gall or the composite being, the dichotomy would not be a correct one, as one would be prior and one posterior. There is however nothing to prevent both being posterior, and the division being one between two things which are derived from a common source: for the division is one of impulses in so far as they are impulses, not of the substance from which they have come. But that substance in itself is not an impulse, but perhaps it brings the impulse to its goal by taking to itself the activity which comes from it. And it is not absurd to say that the trace of soul which is expressed in passion is in the region of the heart; for this is not to say that the soul is there, but the starting point of the blood which has this qualification.

¹ The occurrence of the word ὁμοούσιος, so theologically important later, as an ordinary philosophical term here should be noted.

29. Πῶς οὖν, εἴπερ τῷ θερμανθέντι τὸ σῶμα
 ἔοικεν ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ φωτισθέντι, ἐξελεύσῃ τῆς
 ἄλλης ψυχῆς οὐδέν τι ζωτικὸν ἔχει; ἢ ἔχει ἐπ'
 ὀλίγον, ἀπομαραίνεται δὲ θάπτον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ
 5 τῶν θερμανθέντων ἀποστάντων τοῦ πυρός. μαρ-
 τυροῦσι δὲ καὶ τρίχες φνόμεναι ἐπὶ τῶν νεκρῶν
 σωμάτων καὶ ὄνυχες αὐξόμενοι καὶ ζῶα διαιρούμενα
 ἐπὶ πολὺ κινούμενα· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἔτι ἐγκείμενον
 ἴσως. καὶ εἰ συναπέρχεται δὲ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ, οὐ
 τεκμήριον τοῦτο τοῦ μὴ ἕτερον εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ
 10 ἀπελθόντος ἡλίου οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐφεξῆς φῶς καὶ κατ'
 αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξηρηγμένον ἀπέρχεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ
 τούτου εἰς τὸ ἔξω τούτου ὄρώμενον ἐν τοῖς παρακει-
 μένοις ἕτερον ὃν ἐκείνου συναπέρχεται. ἀρ' οὖν συν-
 ἀπέρχεται, ἢ φθείρεται; τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
 φωτὸς τοῦ τοιοῦτου ζητητέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ζωῆς τῆς
 15 ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἣν δὴ φάμεν οἰκείαν τοῦ σώματος
 εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν τοῦ φωτὸς λειπόμενον
 ἐν τοῖς πεφωτισμένοις, δῆλον· ἀλλ' εἰ μεταπίπτει εἰς
 τὸ πεποιηκὸς ἢ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀπλῶς, ζητεῖ ὁ λόγος.
 πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἐστιν ἀπλῶς ὃν γέ τι πρότερον; ἀλλὰ
 20 τί ἦν ὄλως; ὅτι μὲν αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων, ἀφ'
 ὧν τὸ φῶς, ἢ λεγομένη χρῶα, [καὶ]¹ ὅταν φθαρτὰ
 ἢ τὰ σώματα, μεταβαλόντων² οὐκ ἔστι, [καὶ]³
 οὐδεὶς ζητεῖ, <οἶον>⁴ ὅπου τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ πυρός
 φθαρέντος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὅπου τὸ σχῆμα; ἢ

¹ del. Theiler.

² Theiler: μεταβαλλόντων Enn., H-S.

³ del. Kleist.

⁴ Theiler.

29. Why, then, supposing that the body is like something warmed, but not like something illuminated, does it not have any trace of life when the other soul has gone out of it? It does have it for a short time, but it fades quickly, just as with things which are warmed when they go away from the fire. There is evidence for this in the growth of hair on corpses, and the growth of their nails, and the living creatures which move for a long time after they have been cut in two; for this is probably the trace of life still present in them. And if it goes away with the other soul, this is not a sign that it is not different from it. For when the sun goes away it is not only the light which is continuous with it and depends on it and is attached to it which goes, but the light which passes from this to that which is outside it and is seen in the things near by it, which is different from that first light, goes away too. Does it then really go away too, or does it perish? This is a question we must ask both about light of this kind and about the life in the body, which we say belongs to the body as its own. It is obvious that there is nothing of the light left in the things illuminated; but our discussion is enquiring whether it changes back into that which produced it or does not exist at all. How then can it not exist at all when it was certainly something before? But what, anyhow, was it? That in the case of corrupt bodies, when the bodies from which the light (which we call colour) comes have changed, the light does not exist is something into which nobody enquires, for instance where the colour of a burnt-out fire is, just as no one enquires where its shape is. But still, shape is a disposition, like clen-

τὸ μὲν σχῆμα σχέσις τις, ὥσπερ συστολή τῆς
 χειρὸς καὶ ἡ ἕκτασις, χρῶμα δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλ'
 25 ὥσπερ γλυκύτης. τί γὰρ κωλύει φθαρέντος τοῦ
 σώματος τοῦ γλυκέος τὴν γλυκύτητα μὴ ἀπο-
 λωλέναι καὶ τοῦ εὐώδους τὴν εὐωδίαν, ἐν ἄλλω δὲ
 σώματι γίνεσθαι, οὐκ αἰσθητὰ δὲ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ
 τοιαῦτα εἶναι τὰ σώματι τὰ μετειληφότα, ὥστε
 ἀντερεῖδειν τὰς ἐπ' αὐτῶν γενομένας ποιότητας τῇ
 30 αἰσθήσει; οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ φῶς τῶν φθαρέντων
 σωμάτων μένειν, τὴν δὲ ἀντιτυπίαν τὸ ἐκ πάντων
 οὐσαν μὴ μένειν. εἰ μὴ τις λέγοι νόμῳ ὄραν, καὶ
 τὰς λεγομένας ποιότητας μὴ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις
 εἶναι. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἀφθάρτους ποιήσομεν καὶ οὐ
 35 γινομένας ἐν ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων συστάσεσι τὰς
 ποιότητας, καὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς
 σπέρμασι ποιεῖν τὰς χροίας, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ποικί-
 λων ὀρνίθων, ἀλλ' οὔσας συνάγειν ἢ ποιεῖν μὲν,
 προσχρησθαι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐν τῷ ἀέρι πλήρει ὄντι
 τῶν τοιούτων· καὶ γὰρ καὶ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι οὐ
 40 τοιαῦτα, οἷα, ὅταν γένηται, ἐν τοῖς σώμασι φαίνεται.
 ἀλλ' αὕτη μὲν ἔστω ἡ ἀπορία ἐνθαδὶ κειμένη·
 μενόντων δὲ τῶν σωμάτων εἰ συνήρηται καὶ οὐκ
 ἀποτέμνεται, τί κωλύει τὸ φῶς μετακινουμένου
 τοῦ σώματος συμμετακινεῖσθαι τό τε προσεχές
 καὶ εἴ τι τῷ προσεχεῖ συνήρηται, κἂν μὴ ὄραται
 45 ἀπίον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ προσίον φαίνεται; ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς
 ψυχῆς, εἰ συνέπεται τὰ δεύτερα τοῖς πρυτέραις καὶ

¹ The reference is to the doctrine of Democritus the Atomist that "secondary qualities" exist only "by convention",

ing and opening the hand, but colour is not like this, but like sweetness. What then prevents sweetness and sweet scent from not perishing with the destruction of the sweet or sweet-scented body, but passing into another body, but not being perceptible because the bodies which have received something of them are not of such a kind that the qualities in them make an impact on sense-perception? So then the light of bodies which have perished would remain, but the repercussion, which is the result of all the [visible] qualities, would not remain. One might of course say that one sees by convention, and that the so-called qualities are not in their substrates.¹ But if this is so, we shall make the qualities indestructible and not originating in the structure of bodies, and [we shall maintain] that it is not the forming principles in the seeds which make the colours, in the case of many-coloured birds, for instance, but they bring existing colours together, or produce them but make use in doing so also of the colours in the air, which is full of things of this kind; for in the air they are not as they appear in bodies when they come to exist in them. But let us leave this difficult question here. When, however, the [luminous] bodies remain unchanged, if the light is continuous with them and not cut off, what prevents it, when the luminous body moves to another place, from moving along with it? [This would apply both to] the light immediately adjacent to the luminous body and to any light which is continuous with that adjacent to it, even if it is not seen to move away, just as it does not appear to approach. But in the case of soul, we have discussed and really there are only atoms and void: see fr. B 125 Diels-Kranz.

τὰ ἐφεξῆς αἰεὶ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν, ἢ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστα
καὶ ἑστερημένα τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ δυνάμενα ἐφ'
ἑαυτῶν μένειν ἢ ὅλως οὐδὲν ἀποτέμνεται τῆς ψυχῆς
μέρος, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι μία καὶ πολλαί, καὶ ὅστις ὁ
50 τρόπος, ἐν ἄλλοις. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ ἴδιον σώματος
γενόμενον ἵχνος τῆς ψυχῆς ὄν; ἢ εἰ μὲν ψυχῆ,
συνέβεται, εἴπερ μὴ ἀποτέμνεται, τῷ ψυχῆς
λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ οἶον ζωὴ τοῦ σώματος, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος
ἐκεῖ, ὅς περὶ φωτὸς ἰσθμίου ἠπορεύτο, καὶ εἰ
δινατὸν ζωὴν ἀνευ ψυχῆς εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τῷ
55 παρακείσθαι τῆν ψυχὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν εἰς ἄλλο, ταῦτα
σκεπτέον.

30. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ μνήμας μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀστροῖς
περιττὰς εἶναι ἐθέμεθα, αἰσθήσεις δὲ ἔδομεν καὶ
ἀκούσεις πρὸς ταῖς ὁράσεσι καὶ εὐχῶν δὴ κλύοντας
ἔφαμεν, ἄς πρὸς ἥλιον ποιούμεθα καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς

¹ The reference back is to the earlier treatise IV. 9 (8) *If All Souls are One*.

² At this point the MSS preserve a note which tells us that in the edition of Eustochius the second book on the soul ended here and the third book began with the next chapter. This is the only evidence for the existence of another edition of the works of Plotinus by his physician Eustochius (see *Life* chs. 2 and 7 and my *Preface* to Vol I, ix). Whether this was the edition from which Eusebius took his quotations in the *Praeparatio Evangelica*, as Henry and Schwyzer, with some probability, still maintain, or whether, as a number of other good Plotinian scholars suppose, Eusebius was using Porphyry's edition, is a much disputed but not very important question: in either case the evidence of the Eusebius quotations confirms the soundness of the textual tradition (see Henry and Schwyzer *Plotini Opera* II (1959) *Praefatio* X-XI). If, of course, we could be certain that Eusebius was using the Eustochius edition, we should have some confirmation of the general belief of Plotinian scholars that Porphyry did not as editor tamper with the text of Plotinus.

elsewhere ¹ whether the secondary parts follow along with the prior ones, and those in successive order go along always with those before them, or whether all the individual parts are on their own and separated from those before them and able to remain permanently on their own, or whether in general no part of soul is cut off, but all are one and many, and in what way this is so. But what is that which already belongs to the body and is a trace of soul? Now if it is soul, it will, if it is not cut off, go along with the rational principle of soul. But if it is a kind of life of the body, the same problem arises which arose about the vestige of light, and we must also enquire whether it is possible to have life without soul, except perhaps by the close presence of soul working on something else.²

30. But now, since we established that memory in the heavenly bodies was unnecessary, but gave them perceptions, and hearing as well as sight, and said that they heard the prayers which we make to the sun, and other men to the stars,³ and since it is

³ The cult of the sun was rare, but not unknown, in the ancient Greek world: it flourished particularly at Rhodes, where Helios was the most important god. Socrates prayed to the sun, and this was not considered unusual (Plato *Symposium* 220D4-5). Everyone admitted that the sun was a god, even if he was not much worshipped. In Plotinus's own time the cult of the sun was gaining in importance, and shortly after his death, in 274, the Emperor Aurelian established the cult of the Sun Lord of the Empire at Rome, with a college of senatorial *pontifices*. For devout pagans of the first Christian centuries the sun was often of central religious importance: see Julian *Oration* IV (Hymn to King Helios) and Macrobius *Saturnalia* I. 17 ff. But the cult of the star-gods was always rightly regarded in the Greek world as Oriental (especially Chaldean) and not belonging to the ancient Greek religious tradition.

5 ἄστρο ἄλλοι τινὲς ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πεπίστευται, ὡς
 δι' αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς πολλὰ καὶ τελεῖται καὶ δὴ καὶ
 οὕτω ῥᾶστα, ὡς μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὰ δίκαια τῶν
 ἔργων συλλήπτορας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ
 τῶν ἀδίκων, τοῦτων τε περί παραπεπτωκότων
 ζητητέον ἔχει γὰρ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ μεγίστας καὶ
 10 πολυθρυσλήτους παρὰ τοῖς δυσχεραίνουσιν ἀπορίας,
 θεοὺς συνεργοὺς καὶ αἰτίους γίνεσθαι ἀτόπων
 ἔργων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς ἔρωτας καὶ
 ἀκολάστους συλλήψεις—τούτων τε οὖν εἵνεκα καὶ
 μάλιστα περὶ οὗ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος, τῆς μνήμης
 αὐτῶν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ εὐξαμένῳ ποιοῦσι καὶ
 15 οὐ παραχρήμα δρῶσιν αὐτά, ἀλλ' εἰς ὕστερον καὶ
 πάνυ πολλάκις εἰς χρόνους, μνήμην οὖν εὐχόνται
 ἄνθρωποι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχουσιν. ὁ δὲ πρόσθεν λόγος
 ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενος οὐκ ἐδίδου τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ καὶ
 πρὸς τὰς εἰς ἀνθρώπους εὐεργεσίας ἦν ἂν τοιοῦτον,
 20 οἷον Δῆμητρος καὶ Ἑστίας γῆς γε οὔσης εἰ μὴ τις
 τῆ γῆ μόνον τὸ εἶ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀνθρώπεια λέγοι.
 ἀμφοτέρω οὖν πειρατέον δεικνύναι, πῶς τε τὰ τῆς
 μνήμης θησόμεθα ἐν τούτοις—ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχει,
 οὐ πρὸς τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς ἄλλοις, οἳ οὐ κωλύονται
 μνήμας διδόναι—καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλοκότως δοκούν-
 25 των γίνεσθαι, ὁ φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἐπισκέψασθαι,
 εἴ πῃ ἔστιν ἀπολογήσασθαι πρὸς τὰ κατὰ θεῶν τῶν

believed that the heavenly bodies accomplish many things for men, and do so in such a casual way that they are not only helpers in right actions, but in many wrong actions too, we must enquire into these incidental questions—for there are very great difficulties about them in themselves and these are much talked about by those who dislike the idea that gods should be culpable accomplices in improper behaviour, especially in love affairs and wanton couplings—for these reasons, and particularly about what we were discussing at the beginning, their memory. For it is obvious that if when we pray they act, and do not do it at once, but afterwards, and very often after a long delay, they have memory of the prayers which mortals offer to them. But the argument which we expounded earlier did not allow this. But there would also be some such need of memory for the conferring of benefits on mortals as with Demeter and Hestia—earth after all¹—unless one were to attribute to the earth alone a beneficent influence on human life. We must therefore try to explain both how we are going to understand the phenomena of memory in these beings—this is something which concerns us, not the opinions of others, who are not prevented from giving [the heavenly bodies] memory—and also about these strange and unpleasant things which seem to happen, which it is the task of philosophy to investigate and see if there is any defence to be found to the charges brought against

¹ Demeter was, naturally, always closely connected (though not originally identified) with the earth in Greek religious tradition. The identification of Hestia with earth is to be found in the 5th century B.C. (Euripides frs. 938 and 944 Nauck) and sp. Plato *Phaedrus* 247A1.

ἐν οὐρανῷ· καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ παντὸς τοῦ
κόσμου—ὡς καὶ εἰς τοῦτον εἰσω ἡ αἰτία ἡ τοιαύτη—
εἰ πιστοὶ οἱ λέγοντες, οἱ καὶ αὐτὸν φασὶ τὸν
σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν γοητεύεσθαι ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων τόλ-
30 μης καὶ τέχνης. καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων δὲ ἐπιζητήσῃ
ὁ λόγος, ὅπως τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπουργεῖν λέγονται, εἰ μὴ
διὰ τῶν προτέρων λύσιν καὶ τὰ τούτων λαμβάνοι.

31. Καθόλου τοίνυν τὰς ποιήσεις ληπτέον ἀπάσας
καὶ τὰς πείσεις, ὅσαι γίνονται ἐν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ,
τὰς τε λεγομένας φύσει, καὶ ὅσαι τέχνη γίνονται·
καὶ τῶν φύσει τὰς μὲν φατέον ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς
5 γίνεσθαι εἰς τὰ μέρη καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν εἰς τὸ πᾶν
ἢ μερῶν εἰς μέρη, τὰς δὲ τέχνη γινόμενας ἢ τῆς
τέχνης, ὡςπερ ἤρξατο, ἐν τοῖς τεχνητοῖς τελευτώ-
σης, ἢ προσχωμένης δυνάμει φυσικαῖς εἰς ἔργων
φυσικῶν ποιήσεις τε καὶ πείσεις. τὰς μὲν οὖν τοῦ
ὄλου λέγω, ὅσα τε ἢ φορὰ ἢ πᾶσα ποιεῖ εἰς αὐτὴν
10 καὶ εἰς τὰ μέρη—κινουμένη γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴν διατί-
θησί πως καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς—τά τε ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ
φορᾷ καὶ ὅσα δίδωσι τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς· μερῶν δὲ
πρὸς μέρη πείσεις (καὶ ποιήσεις)¹ εὐδηλοὶ που
παντί, ἡλίου τε πρὸς τε τὰ ἄλλα σχέσεις [καὶ ποι-
ήσεις]¹ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
15 στοιχείοις αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις—περὶ ὧν ἐκάστου ἐξεταστέον.
τέχνη δὲ αἰ μὲν οἰκίαν ποιοῦσαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα

¹ Theiler post Bréhier in versione.

the gods in the sky; and we must also try to explain about the whole universe itself—since this kind of charge is directed against it too—and see if those people are to be believed who say that the whole heavenly system is subject to spells put upon it by the presumption and skill of men. And our discussion will also enquire about spirits, in what way they are said to serve magical purposes, unless the problems of spirits are also solved by the previous discussion.

31. We must, then, take a general view of all actions and experiences which occur in the whole universe, both the ones which are called natural and those which come about by art: we must say that some of the natural ones are effects of the All on its parts and [some] of the parts on the All or of the parts on the parts; and that in those which come about by art the art either ends as it began, in the products of art, or brings in natural powers to help in producing acts and experiences which belong to the works of nature. By the acts of the whole universe I mean those which the whole heavenly circuit does to itself and its parts—for as it moves it disposes both itself and its parts in a certain way—both those within the circuit itself and all the effects which it produces on the things on earth. The effects and actions of parts on parts are obvious, presumably, to everyone, the positions of the sun in relation to the other heavenly bodies and the things on earth, and in the other elements, and not only the actions of the sun but those of the other heavenly bodies and of the things on the earth and in the other elements—each of these requires separate investigation. As for the arts, those which produce a house and the

τεχνητὰ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἔληξαν· ἰατρικὴ δὲ καὶ
 γεωργία καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται ὑπηρετικαὶ καὶ βοήθειαι
 εἰς τὰ φύσει εἰσφερόμεναι, ὡς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν·
 20 ῥητορείαν δὲ καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχαγωγίαν
 ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἄγειν ἀλλοιού-
 σασ, ἐν αἷς ζητητέον, ὅσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ τίνα τὴν
 δύναμιν ἔχουσι· καί, εἴπερ οἶόν τε, ἐν τούτοις
 ἅπασιν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν χρείαν ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ
 25 διατί ἐφ' ὅσον δυνατὸν πραγματευτέον. ὅτι μὲν
 οὖν ἡ φορὰ ποιεῖ, αὐτὴν μὲν πρῶτον διαφόρως
 διατιθεῖσα καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς αὐτῆς, ἀναμφισβητήτως
 μὲν τὰ ἐπίγεια οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσει, καὶ τῶν μερῶν ἕκαστον
 εἰς τὰ ἐπίγεια καὶ ὅλως τὰ κάτω ποιεῖ, πολλαχῆ
 30 δῆλον. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνα, ὕστερον· νῦν
 δὲ τὰ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις συγχωρούμενα ἔασαν-
 τες οὕτως ἔχειν, ὅσα διὰ λόγου φανείται, πειρατέον
 λέγειν τὸν τρόπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῆς ποιήσεως λαβόντας.
 οὐ γὰρ μόνον θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀ δὴ
 ποιότητες πρῶται τῶν στοιχείων λέγονται, οὐδ'
 35 ὅσαι ἐκ τῆς τούτων μίξεως ποιεῖν λεκτέον οὐδὲ
 πάντα τὸν ἥλιον θερμότητι, ψύξει δὲ ἄλλον τινα—τί
 γὰρ ἂν ψυχρὸν εἴη ἐν οὐρανίῳ¹ καὶ πυρίνῳ σώματι;
 —οὐδ' ἄλλον ὑγρῷ πυρί. οὕτω τε γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν δια-
 φορὰν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν οἶόν τε. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν
 40 γινομένων εἰς τούτων τι οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀναγαγεῖν.
 οὐδὲ γὰρ εἴ τις τὰς τῶν ἡθῶν διαφορὰς δοίη αὐτοῖς

¹ Harder: οὐρανῷ Enn.*

other products of art terminate in these; but the
 arts of medicine and agriculture and others of this
 kind are ancillary and help natural things to be in a
 natural state; but rhetoric and music and all the
 class of arts which influence the soul must be said
 to lead men to be better or worse by changing them;
 in these we must enquire how many they are and
 what is the power they have; and in all these which
 are relevant to our present purpose we must, as far
 as is possible, concern ourselves with the reason why.
 Now it is abundantly clear that the heavenly circuit
 acts, first of all disposing itself and the bodies within
 it in different ways, and indisputably acting on the
 things of earth, not only in their bodies but in the
 dispositions of their souls, and that each of the parts
 of the circuit acts on the things of earth and in
 general on what is below it. But we shall discuss
 later whether the things of earth also act on the
 heavenly bodies; but for the present, we grant that
 what is agreed by all, or by most people, is so, in so
 far as rational discussion will show it to be so, and
 we must try to explain the way in which the heavenly
 bodies act, starting from the beginning. For we
 must not simply assert that it is hot and cold and
 things of this kind which act, the things which are
 called the primary qualities of the elements, nor
 that the sun does everything by its heat, and some
 other heavenly body by its cold—for what cold
 could there be in a fiery body in the heavens?—and
 another by its humid fire. In this way it is not
 possible to understand the difference between them,
 and there are many things which happen which
 cannot be referred to one of these qualities as its
 cause. For even if one were to attribute differences

κατὰ τὰς τῶν σωματίων κράσεις διὰ ψυχρότητα
 ἐπικρατοῦσαν ἢ διὰ θερμότητα τοιαύτας—πῶς
 ἂν φθόνους ἢ ζηλοτυπίας ἢ πανουργίας εἰς ταῦτα
 ἀνάγοι; ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ταῦτα, τύχας γοῦν πῶς, χεί-
 45 ρους τε καὶ βελτίους, πλουσίους καὶ πένητας, καὶ
 πατέρων εὐγενείας ἢ αὐτῶν, θησαυρῶν τε εὐρέσεις;
 μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι λέγειν πόρρω ἄγων σωματικῆς
 ποιότητος τῆς ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἰς τὰ τῶν ζώων
 σώματα καὶ ψυχὰς ἰούσης. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ προαιρέσει
 50 ἀναθετέον τῶν ἄστρον καὶ τῆ τοῦ παντὸς γνώμη καὶ
 τοῖς τούτων λογισμοῖς τὰ συμπίπτοντα περὶ
 ἕκαστα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά. ἄτοπον γὰρ ἐκείνους
 μηχανᾶσθαι περὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅπως οἱ μὲν
 γένοιντο κλέπται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδραποδισταὶ τοι-
 χωρύχοι τε καὶ ἱερόσυλοι, ἀνανδροὶ τε ἄλλοι
 55 καὶ θήλεις τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ
 δρῶντες. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι θεῶν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων
 μετρίων, τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ ὀντιμινοῦν τὰ τοιαῦτα
 ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ καταμηχανᾶσθαι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτοῖς
 οὐδ' ἠτισοῦν ὠφέλεια ἂν γίνοιτο.

32. Εἰ οὖν μήτε σωματικαῖς αἰτίασι ἀναθήσομεν
 μήτε προαιρέσειν, ὅσα ἕξωθεν εἰς ἡμᾶς τε καὶ τὰ
 ἄλλα ζῶα καὶ ὅλως ἐπὶ γῆς ἀφικνεῖται ἐξ οὐρανοῦ,
 τίς ἂν εἴη λοιπὴ καὶ εὐλογος αἰτία; πρῶτον τούτων
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of character to these qualities [and say that] they were as they were according to the bodily temperaments,¹ because of the predominance of cold or heat—how could one refer envy or jealousy or wickedness to these causes? But even if one could, how could one anyhow make them responsible for fortunes, for men being good and bad, rich and poor, for the nobility of their families or themselves, and for the finding of treasures? One could mention a vast number of things, leading the discussion very far from the bodily quality which comes from the elements to the bodies and souls of living creatures. We must certainly not, either, attribute to the deliberate choice of stars and the decision of the All, and to their rational calculations, what happens to the individuals subject to them. For it would be inappropriate for those divinities to plan human affairs so that some men became thieves, and other kidnappers, housebreakers and temple-robbers, others again effeminate, womanish in their doings and feelings and committing indecencies. So far from being appropriate behaviour for gods, it would not even be appropriate for respectable men, or perhaps any kind of men, to do and plan things like this, from which they would get not the slightest benefit.

32. If, then, we are not to attribute all that comes from the sky to us and the other living creatures, and in general upon the earth, to bodily causes or the deliberate choices of the heavenly bodies, what reasonable explanation is left? First of all we must

¹ The "bodily temperaments" are those of men, not of the stars. Plotinus follows a long Greek tradition in attributing differences in emotional character and strength of the desires to the varying proportions of the elements mixed in the body.

5 θετέον ζῶον ἐν πάντα τὰ ζῶα τὰ ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ
περιέχον τόδε τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, ψυχὴν μίαν ἔχον εἰς
πάντα αὐτοῦ μέρη, καθόσον ἐστὶν ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ
μέρος· μέρος δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ
αἰσθητῷ, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα καὶ πάντα, ὅσον δὲ
καὶ ψυχῆς τοῦ παντὸς μετέχει, κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ
10 ταύτης· καὶ τὰ μὲν μόνης ταύτης μετέχοντα κατὰ
πᾶν ἐστι μέρη, ὅσα δὲ καὶ ἄλλης, ταύτη ἔχει τὸ μὴ
μέρη πάντα εἶναι, πάσχει δὲ οὐδὲν ἦττον παρὰ τῶν
ἄλλων, καθόσον αὐτοῦ τι ἔχει, καὶ κατ' ἐκείνα, ἃ
ἔχει. συμπαθὲς δὴ πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ἐν, καὶ ὡς ζῶον
15 ἐν, καὶ τὸ πόρρω δὴ ἐγγύς, ὥσπερ ἐφ' ἐνὸς τῶν
καθέκαστα ὄνυξ καὶ κέρασ καὶ δάκτυλος καὶ ἄλλο
τι τῶν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλὰ διαλείποντος τοῦ μεταξὺ
καὶ παθόντος οὐδὲν ἔπαθε τὸ οὐκ ἐγγύς. οὐ γὰρ
ἐφεξῆς τῶν ὁμοίων κειμένων, διειλημμένων δὲ
ἐτέροις μεταξύ, τῇ δὲ ὁμοιότητι συμπασχόντων,
20 καὶ εἰς τὸ πόρρω ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀνάγκη τὸ παρὰ τοῦ
μὴ παρακκιμένου δρώμενον· ζῶου τε ὄντος καὶ εἰς
ἐν τελούντος οὐδὲν οὕτω πόρρω τόπω, ὡς μὴ ἐγγύς
εἶναι τῇ τοῦ ἐνὸς ζῶου πρὸς τὸ συμπαθεῖν φύσει.

posit that this All is a "single living being which encompasses all the living beings that are within it"; it has one soul which extends to all its parts, in so far as each individual thing is a part of it; and each thing in the perceptible All is a part of it, and completely a part of it as regards its body; and in so far as it participates in the soul of the All, it is to this extent a part of it in this way too; and those things which participate in the soul of the All alone are altogether parts, but all those which also participate in another soul are in this way not altogether parts, but none the less are affected by the other parts in so far as they have something of the All, and in a way corresponding to what they have.¹ This one universe is all bound together in shared experience and is like one living creature, and that which is far is really near, just as, in one of the individual living things, a nail or horn or finger or one of the other limbs which is not contiguous: the intermediate part leaves a gap in the experience and is not affected, but that which is not near is affected. For the like parts are not situated next to each other, but are separated by others between, but share their experiences because of their likeness, and it is necessary that something which is done by a part not situated beside it should reach the distant part; and since it is a living thing and all belongs to a unity nothing is so distant in space that it is not close enough to the

¹ The quotation which introduces this sentence is Plato *Timaeus* 30D3-31A1. The doctrine indicated here, that men are truly parts of the all but not only parts—there is something in them which transcends the organic unity of the cosmos in which their lower natures share—is of great importance to Plotinus: see the *Introduction* to this treatise, p. 27.

τὸ μὲν οὖν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὸ ποιοῦν ἔχον πείσιν
 ἔχει οὐκ ἀλλοτρίαν, ἀνομοίου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ ποιοῦν-
 25 τος ἀλλότριον τὸ πάθημα καὶ οὐ προσηγὲς τὸ πά-
 χον ἴσχει. βλαβερὰν δὲ ποίησιν ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλ-
 λου ἐνὸς ὄντος ζῶου οὐ δεῖ τεθνασμακέναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ
 ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ταῖς ἡμετέραις βλάπτει
 ἂν ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλου μέρος, ἐπεὶ καὶ χολή καὶ ὁ
 θυμὸς ἄλλο, ὡς δοκεῖ, πιέζει καὶ κεντεῖ. καὶ δὴ
 30 καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἔστι τι θυμῷ καὶ χολῇ ἀνάλογον
 καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλω· καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς δὲ ἐμπόδιον
 ἔσται ἄλλο ἄλλω, ὥστε καὶ ἀφανᾶναι. τοῦτο δὲ
 οὐ μόνον ἐν ζῶον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ ὄν ὁράται·
 ὥστε καθόσον μὲν ἐν, ἕκαστον τῷ ὅλῳ σώζεται,
 καὶ καθόσον δὲ καὶ πολλά, πρὸς ἄλληλα συνιόντα
 35 πολλαχῇ τῷ διαφόρῳ ἔβλαψε· καὶ πρὸς τὴν
 αὐτοῦ χρεῖαν ἄλλο ἕτερον ἔβλαψε, καὶ δὴ καὶ
 τροφὴν ἐποίησατο συγγενὲς ἅμα καὶ διάφορον
 ὑπάρχον· καὶ σπεῦδον ἕκαστον ἐαντῷ κατὰ φύσιν,
 ὅσον τε οἰκεῖον τοῦ ἐτέρου, λαμβάνει εἰς αὐτό, καὶ
 ὅσον ἀλλότριον ἐγίνετο, ἀφανίζει εὐνοία τῇ ἑαυτοῦ.
 40 ἔργον τε τὸ αὐτοῦ ποιοῦν ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν δυναθὲν
 ἀπολαῦσαι τι τῶν αὐτοῦ ἔργων ὠφέλησεν, ὃ δ'
 ἀδύνατον ἦν ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ὁρμὴν τοῦ ἔργου,
 ἠφάνισεν ἢ ἔβλαψεν, ὥσπερ ὅσα ἀνανθείη ἂν
 παριόντος πυρός, ἢ ζῶα ἐλάττω ὑπὸ μειζόνων
 δρόμου παρασυρείη ἢ καὶ που πατηθείη. πάντων
 45 δὲ τούτων ἢ γένεσις ἢ τε φθορὰ ἀλλοίωσις τε
 πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον τὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς ζῶου
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nature of the one living thing to share experience. So, then, that part which has a likeness to that which is acting upon it has an experience which is not alien to it, but if that which is acting is unlike, that which is affected has an experience which is alien and unpleasant. But one should not be surprised if the action of one part on another is harmful when it is one living creature: for in ourselves too in our activities one part can harm another, since bile and the passionate spirit, so it seems, oppress and sting another part. And there is certainly something in the All which corresponds to bile and the passionate spirit, and other things which correspond to others [in our bodies]; and in plants one part gets in the way of another, so as even to make it wither. This All is visibly not only one living creature, but many; so that in so far as it is one, each individual part is preserved by the whole, but in so far as it is many, when the many encounter each other they often injure each other because they are different; and one injures another to supply its own need, and even makes a meal of another which is at the same time related to and different from it; and each one, naturally striving to do the best for itself, takes to itself that part of the other which is akin to it, and makes away with all that is alien to itself because of its self-love. Each as it does its own work benefits that which can profit in any way from its workings, but makes away with or injures that which cannot endure the impact of its activity, like the things which are withered when fire comes near them, or the smaller animals which are swept aside or even trampled underfoot by the rush of larger ones. The coming into being and destruction and alteration for

ἐκεῖνου ἀνεμπόδιστον καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν ζωῶν ἀποτελεῖ, ἐπεὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἕκαστα οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς μόνα ἦντα, οὐδὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ τὸ τέλος εἶναι καὶ βλέπειν μέρη ὄντα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, 50 οὐπὲρ καὶ μέρη, διάφορά τε ὄντα μὴ πάντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἐν μιᾷ ζωῇ ὄντα ἀεὶ ἔχειν· οὐκ ἦν τε μένειν οὐδὲν πάντη ὡσαύτως, εἴπερ ἔμελλε τὸ πᾶν μένειν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ μένειν ἔχον.

33. Τῆς δὴ φορᾶς τὸ εἰκῆ οὐκ ἐχούσης, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ζῶον φερομένης, εἶδει καὶ συμφωνίαν τοῦ ποιούντος πρὸς τὸ πάσχον εἶναι καὶ τινα τάξιν εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα 5 συντάσσουσιν, ὥστε καθ' ἑκάστην σχέσιν τῆς φορᾶς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τὴν φορὰν ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην τὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι, οἷον μίαν ὄρχησιν ἐν ποικίλῃ χορείᾳ ποιούντων· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς παρ' ἡμῶν ὄρχήσεσι τὰ μὲν ἔξω [πρὸς τὴν ὄρχησιν]¹ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν κινήματων, ὡς ἐτέρως μεταβαλλόντων 10 τῶν συντελούντων πρὸς τὴν ὄρχησιν, αὐτῶν τε καὶ ᾠδῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνηρημένων, τί ἂν τις λέγοι φανερῶν ὄντων; ἀλλὰ τὰ μέρη τοῦ τὴν ὄρχησιν παρεχομένου καθ' ἕκαστον σχῆμα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἂν ὡσαύτως δύναιτο ἔχειν, τῶν μελῶν τοῦ σώματος ταύτῃ συνεπιμένον καὶ καμπτομένου, 15 καταπιεζομένου² μὲν ἐτέρου, ἀνιεμένου δὲ ἄλλου, καὶ τοῦ μὲν πονούντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀναπνοῆν τινα ἐν τῷ διαφόρῳ σχηματισμῷ δεχομένου. καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις τοῦ ὄρχουμένου πρὸς ἄλλο βλέπει, τὰ δὲ πάσχει τῇ ὄρχήσει ἐπομένως καὶ ὑπουργεῖ τῇ

¹ del. Theiler ut iteratum e lin. 9-10.

² Igal: καὶ πιεζομένου Enn.: καὶ <τῶν μελῶν> πιεζομένου Theiler.

worse or better of all these individual things brings to its fulness the unhindered life according to nature of that one [universal] living creature; since it was not possible for all the individual things to be as if they were alone nor for the final purpose to be directed and look towards them when they are [only] parts, but it must be directed to that of which they are parts, and since they are different, they cannot all have their own for ever in a single life; it was not possible for anything to persist altogether the same, if the All was going to persist, which has its persistence in its movement.

33. The heavenly circuit has nothing casual in it, but goes according to the rational principle of its living organism; there must therefore be a harmony of action and experience and an order which arranged things together, adapting them and bringing them into due relation with each other, so that according to every figure of the heavenly circuit there is a different disposition of the things which it governs, as if they were performing a single ballet in a rich variety of dance-movements. In our ballets, too, there is no need to mention, since they are obvious, the external elements, the way in which piping and singing and everything else which joins in contributing to the total effect of the performance change variously at every movement. But the parts of the dancer's body, too, cannot possibly keep the same position in every figure: as his body follows the pattern of the dance and bends with it, one of his limbs is pressed hard down, another relaxed, one works hard and painfully, another is given a rest as the figuring changes. The dancer's intention looks elsewhere; his limbs are affected in accordance with

ὀρχήσῃ καὶ συναποτελεῖ τὴν πᾶσαν, ὥστε τὸν
 20 ἔμπειρον ὀρχήσεως εἰπεῖν ἄν, ὡς τῷ τοιούτῳ
 σχηματισμῷ αἴρεται μὲν ὑψοῦ τοδὶ μέλος τοῦ
 σώματος, συγκάμπτεται δὲ τοδί, τοδί δὲ ἀπο-
 κρύπτεται, ταπεινὸν δὲ ἄλλο γίνεταί, οὐκ ἄλλως τοῦ
 ὀρχηστοῦ προελομένου τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ
 τοῦ ὄλου σώματος ὀρχήσῃ θέσω ταύτην ἀναγκαίαν
 25 ἴσχυοντος τοῦδε τοῦ μέρους τοῦ τὴν ὀρχησιν
 διαπεραίνοντος. τοῦτον τοῖνον τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰ
 ἐν οὐρανῷ φατέον ποιεῖν, ὅσα ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ καὶ
 σημαίνειν, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν μὲν ὄλον κόσμον τὴν
 ὄλην αὐτοῦ ζωὴν ἐνεργεῖν κινουῖντα ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ
 μέρη τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μετασχηματίζοντα αἰεὶ, τὰς δὲ
 30 σχέσεις τῶν μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὄλον
 καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν θέσεις ἐπόμενα καὶ τὰ
 ἄλλα, ὡς ζώου ἐνὸς κινουμένου, παρέχεσθαι, ὡδὶ
 μὲν ἴσχυοντα κατὰ τὰς ὡδὶ σχέσεις καὶ θέσεις καὶ
 σχηματισμούς, ὡδὶ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ὡδί, ὡς μὴ τοὺς
 σχηματίζομένους τοὺς ποιούντας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸν
 35 σχηματίζοντα, μηδ' αὖ τὸν σχηματίζοντα ἄλλο
 ποιούντα ἄλλο ποιεῖν—οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο—ἀλλὰ
 αὐτὸν πάντα τὰ γινόμενα εἶναι, ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ
 σχήματα, ἐνθαυτῷ δὲ τὰ συνεπόμενα τοῖς σχήμασιν
 ἀναγκαῖα παθήματα περὶ τὸ οὕτως κινούμενον
 40 ζῶον εἶναι, καὶ αὖ περὶ τὸ οὕτως συγκείμενον καὶ
 συνεστῶς φύσει καὶ πάσῃ καὶ δρῶν εἰς αὐτὸ
 ἀνάγκαις.

¹ The dancer here, as in III. 2. 16, is one of the great solo
 ballet artists of the Empire, the *phantomimi*, who danced whole
 mythological stories by themselves to a choral and orchestral
 accompaniment. These excellent descriptions, and the choice

the dance and serve the dance, and help to make it
 perfect and complete; and the connoisseur of ballet
 can say that to fit a particular figure one limb is
 raised, another bent together, one is hidden, another
 degraded; the dancer does not choose to make these
 movements for no reason, but each part of him as he
 performs the dance has its necessary position in the
 dancing of the whole body.¹ It is in this way, then,
 that we must say that the beings in the sky do what
 they do (but some things they only indicate); or,
 better, we should say that the whole universe actively
 lives its own complete life, moving its great parts
 within itself, and continually rearranging them, and,
 as when a single living thing moves, the relations of
 the parts to each other and to the whole and their
 different positions make everything else follow, being
 disposed in one way according to one set of relation-
 ships, positions, and arrangements and another way
 according to another, so that it is not the arranged
 parts which do what is done, but the arranger; but
 the arranger is not a doer distinct from what he does
 —for he is not acting on something different from
 himself—but he is himself all the things he does, the
 arrangements up in the sky and their consequences
 here below, which are experiences necessarily affect-
 ing the living being when it moves in this particular
 way, the living being, that is, which is composed in
 this particular way and naturally conjoined, and
 necessarily both acts upon itself and experiences its
 own action.

of the *phantomimus* to symbolise the living and moving har-
 mony of the cosmos, suggest that Plotinus may at some period
 of his life have attended and enjoyed performances by *pan-*
tomimi. The coincidence of symbolism with the (much later)
 bronze figures of the dancing Shiva from India is striking.

34. Ἡμᾶς δὲ διδόντας τὸ μέρος αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ πάσχειν, ὅσον ἦν ἡμέτερον ἐκείνου τοῦ σώματος, μὴ τὸ πᾶν ἐκείνου νομίζοντας, μέτρια παρ' αὐτοῦ πάσχειν· ὡς περ οἱ ἔμφορες τῶν θηγευόντων τὸ
 5 μὲν τι τοῖς δεσπόζουσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες, τὸ δ' αὐτῶν ὄντες, μετριωτέρων τῶν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου ἐπιταγμάτων διὰ τοῦτο τυγχάνοντες, ἅτε μὴ ἀνδράποδα ὄντες μηδὲ τὸ πᾶν ἄλλου. τὸ δὲ τῶν σχηματισμῶν διάφορον τῶν θεόντων μὴ ἰσοταχῶν ὄντων ἀναγκαῖον ἦν γίνεσθαι, ὡς νῦν γίνεται.
 10 λόγῳ δὲ φερομένων καὶ διαφόρων τῶν σχέσεων τοῦ ζῶου γινομένων, εἴτα καὶ ἐνταῦθα τούτων τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν συμπαθῶν πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ γινομένων, εὐλογον ζητεῖν, πότῃ συνέπεσθαι φατέον ταῦτα συμφωνοῦντα ἐκείνοις, ἢ τὰ σχήματα τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν ποιουμένων ἔχειν, καὶ τὰ σχήματα ἀπλῶς
 15 ἢ τὰ τούτων. οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς σχηματισμὸς ταυτοῦ ἐπ' ἄλλου καὶ αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν σημασίαν ἢ ποιήσω ἐργάζεται. ἐπεὶ καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ἕκαστος διάφορον ἔχει τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ. ἢ ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν τὴν τούτων σχηματίσειν ταδὶ καὶ τοιάνδε διάθεσιν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλλων τὴν αὐτὴν
 20 οὕσαν ἐν σχηματισμῷ ἄλλην; ἢ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐκέτι τοῖς σχήμασι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς σχηματιζομένοις δώσομεν. ἢ συναμφοτέροις; τοῖς γούν αὐτοῖς διάφορον σχέσιν λαβοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ

34. But we, by yielding that part of ourselves to experience which was our share of the body of the All, and not considering the whole of ourselves to belong to it, are subject to experience only within reasonable limits: just as sensible serfs with one part of themselves serve their master, but with another belong to themselves, and therefore receive more reasonably limited orders from their master since they are not slaves and do not totally belong to another. But it was necessary that the arrangements of the heavenly bodies should vary as they now do, since the heavenly bodies do not run their courses at equal speeds. But since the heavenly bodies move according to reason and their relationships within the [universal] living being vary, and then here below these events occur in our own sphere in sympathy with those above, it is reasonable to enquire whether we should assert that these earthly occurrences follow on those above by correspondence, or whether the figures have the powers which bring about what is done, and whether it is simply the figures or the figures made by particular heavenly bodies. For the same arrangement of the same body in relation to another body and then again to others does not produce the same signification or action: since even by itself each appears to have a different nature. Or is it right to say that the configuration of these particular heavenly bodies is of a particular kind and this specific disposition, but the configuration of other heavenly bodies which is the same in arrangement is another? But if this is so, we shall give the power no more to the figures but to the actual bodies which are arranged. Should we give it to both? For we shall certainly give different

αὐτῷ μόνῳ διάφορον τόπον ἄλλα. ἀλλὰ τί;
 ποιήσεις ἢ σημασίας; ἢ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ τῷ
 25 σχηματισμῷ τῷ τούτων ἄμφω καὶ ποιήσεις καὶ
 σημασίας ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ σημασίας μόνον.
 οὗτος τοῖνυν ὁ λόγος δυνάμεις μὲν δίδωσι τοῖς
 σχήμασι, δυνάμεις δὲ καὶ τοῖς σχηματιζομένοις·
 ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ὄρχουμένων ἔχει μὲν δυνάμιν τινα καὶ
 χεῖρ ἑκατέρα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέλη, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰ
 30 σχήματα πολλήν, τρίτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ συνεπόμενα,
 αὐτῶν τε τῶν εἰς τὴν ὄρχησιν παραλαμβανομένων
 τὰ μέρη καὶ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα, οἷον χειρὸς τὰ συνθλι-
 βόμενα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ φλέβες συμπαθοῦντα.

35. Πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐταὶ αἱ δυνάμεις; σαφέστερον
 γὰρ πάλιν λεκτέον, τί τὸ τρίγωνον παρὰ τὸ
 τρίγωνον διάφορον ἔχει, τί δὲ ὁδὸν πρὸς τονδί, καὶ
 κατὰ τί τοδὸν ἐργάζεται καὶ μέχρι τίνος. ἐπειδὴ
 5 οὔτε τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτῶν οὔτε ταῖς προαιρέσεσιν
 ἀπέδομεν τὰς ποιήσεις· τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν, ὅτι μὴ
 μόνον σώματος ἦν ποιήματα τὰ γινόμενα, ταῖς δὲ
 προαιρέσεσιν, ὅτι ἄτοπον ἦν προαιρέσει θεοῦς
 ποιεῖν ἄτοπα. εἰ δὲ μνημονεύοιμεν, ὅτι ζῶον ἐν
 ὑπεθέμεθα εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχον συμπαθὲς
 10 αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, ἐξανάγκης ἔδει εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι

¹ "Triangles" are among the important "configurations" or "aspects" of the apparent patterns of the signs of the Zodiac at various seasons on which a great deal of astrological

powers to the same heavenly bodies when they take up different relative positions, and even to the same single one when it occupies a different place. But what powers are we giving them? Powers of action or of signification? To the combination, the arrangement of these particular stars, both, and in many cases there is both action and signification, but elsewhere there are only significations. This argument, then, gives powers to the figures and powers to the bodies arranged: since with dancers each hand has a distinct power and so have the other limbs, but the figures also have great power, and then there is a third group of consequentially effective things, the parts of the limbs which are brought into the dance and their constituents, for instance the clenched fingers of the hand and the muscles and veins which are affected along with them.

35. How, then, should we understand these powers? We need to explain again more clearly what is the difference between triangle and triangle,¹ in what way this heavenly body differs from that, and why and up to what point it acts in this particular way. For we did not attribute their activities either to their bodies or to their deliberate choices: not to their bodies, because the things which happened were not the works of body alone, and not to their choices, because it would be inappropriate for gods to choose to do inappropriate things. But if we remember that we posited that the universe is a single living thing, and that since it is so it was absolutely necessary for it to have an internal self-communication of its experiences; and if we remember further that the calculation was based: cp. II. 3. 4, where Plotinus shows himself much more hostile to the astrologers than here.

κατὰ λόγον ἢ διέξοδος τῆς ζωῆς σύμφωνος ἑαυτῇ
 ἅπασα, καὶ ὅτι τὸ εἰκῆ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ἀλλὰ
 μία ἁρμονία καὶ τάξις, καὶ οἱ σχηματισμοὶ κατὰ
 λόγον, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμούς δὲ ἕκαστα καὶ τὰ
 χορεύοντα ζῶου μέρη, ἄμφω ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν
 15 τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι, τὰ τε ἐν αὐτῷ
 γινόμενα σχήματα καὶ τὰ σχηματιζόμενα μέρη
 αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐπόμενα καὶ οὕτω, καὶ
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ζῆν τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις
 εἰς τοῦτο συμβάλλειν, ἄσπερ¹ καὶ ἔχοντες ἐγένοντο
 ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν λόγοις² πεποιηκότος. καὶ τὰ μὲν
 20 σχήματα οἷον λόγους εἶναι ἢ διαστάσεις ζῶου
 καὶ ῥυθμούς καὶ σχέσεις ζῶου κατὰ λόγον, τὰ δὲ
 διεσθηκότα καὶ ἐσχηματισμένα μέλη· ἀλλὰ³ καὶ
 εἶναι τοῦ ζῶου δυνάμεις χωρὶς [τῆς]⁴ προαιρέσεως
 ἄλλας τὰς ὡς ζῶου μέρη, ἐπεὶ τὸ τῆς προαιρέσεως
 αὐτοῖς ἔξω καὶ οὐ συντελοῦν πρὸς τοῦ ζῶου τοῦδε
 25 τὴν φύσιν. μία γὰρ ἡ προαίρεσις ἐνὸς ζῶου, αἱ δὲ
 δυνάμεις αἱ ἄλλαι αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸ πολλαί. ὅσαι δ'
 ἐν αὐτῷ προαιρέσεις, πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, πρὸς ὃ καὶ ἡ
 τοῦ παντὸς ἡ μία. ἐπιθυμία μὲν γὰρ ἄλλου πρὸς
 ἄλλο τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· λαβεῖν γὰρ τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἐθέλει
 μέρος τὸ ἄλλο μέρος ἐνδεὲς ὄν αὐτό· καὶ θυμὸς
 30 πρὸς ἕτερον, ὅταν τι παρλυσιῇ, καὶ ἡ αὔξησης
 παρ' ἄλλου καὶ ἡ γένεσις εἰς ἄλλο τῶν μερῶν.
 τὸ δ' ὅλον καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν ταῦτα ποιεῖ, αὐτὸ
 δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ βλέπει. τοῦτο
 τοῖνυν καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ προαίρεσις ἢ ὑπὲρ τὰ πάθη

¹ Theiler: ἄσπερ Enn.*

² Enn., H-S¹ recte: εὐλόγως H-S².

³ Dadds, Cilento: ἄλλα Enn.*

⁴ del. Theiler.

process of its life must be rational and all in tune with itself, and that there is nothing casual in its life but a single melody and order, and that the celestial arrangements are rational, and each individual part moves by numbers, as do the dancing parts of the living being, we must admit that both are the activity of the All, the figures in it and the parts of it which are arranged in figures (and the consequences of these and how they follow), and that this is the way in which the All lives, and the powers contribute to this, which they were brought into existence possessing by him who made them in their rational principles. And the figures are like the proportions and intervals of the living being and its rational rhythms and relationships, and the bodies which are set at intervals and arranged in figures are its limbs; but there are other powers of the living being, which are, apart from deliberate choice, like parts of the living being, since what belongs to deliberate choice in these beings is outside [the universal organism] and does not contribute to the nature of this living being. For the deliberate choice of the one living being is one, but the other powers which it has directed towards itself are many. But all the choices which occur in it are directed to the same end to which that one choice of the All is directed. For the desire of one thing in it is directed towards another thing in it; for one part wants to take a part of the others since it is itself in need; and anger is felt against another part, when it is annoying in some way, and growth derives from another of the parts and coming into being results in another. But the Whole does these things in these parts, but itself seeks the Good, or rather gazes upon it. This too is what the right

ζητεῖ καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ταύτη συμβάλλει· ἐπεὶ καὶ
 35 τῶν παρ' ἄλλω θητευόντων πολλὰ μὲν τῶν ἔργων
 αὐτοῖς βλέπει πρὸς τὰ ἐπιταχθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσ-
 πότου, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ, πρὸς
 ὃ καὶ ὁ δεσπότης. εἰ δὴ δρᾷ τι ἥλιος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 ἄστρα εἰς τὰ τῆδε, χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν μὲν ἄνω
 βλέποντα εἶναι—εἴφ' ἐνὸς γὰρ τὸν λόγον ποιητέον
 40 —ποιεῖσθαι δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι
 τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς, οὕτω καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τοῦτο, ψυχῆς
 διαδόσει, ὅσον ἐν αὐτῷ, φυτικῆς¹ ψυχῆς πολλῆς
 οὕσης. καὶ ἄλλο δὲ ὁμοίως οἶον ἐλλάμπον
 δύναμιν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀπρουάρετον διδόναι. καὶ
 45 πάντας² δὴ ἐν τι οὕτως ἐσχηματισμένον γενο-
 μένους τὴν διάθεσιν ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην αὖ διδόναι·
 ὥστε καὶ τὰ σχήματα δυνάμεις ἔχει—παρὰ γὰρ τὸ
 οὕτως ἢ οὕτως ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως—καὶ δι' αὐτῶν
 τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων γίνεσθαι τι—παρὰ γὰρ [τῷ]³
 τοίτους ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο αὖ παρ' ἄλλους. ἐπεὶ καὶ
 50 καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ σχήματα, ὡς δυνάμεις ἔχει, καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῶν τῆδε ἂν τις ἴδοι. διατί γὰρ τὰ μὲν
 φοβερὰ τοῖς ὀρώσι τῶν σχημάτων μηδὲν τι
 προπεπονητότων τῶν φοβουμένων, τὰ δὲ οὐ φοβεῖ
 ὀφθέντα; καὶ ἄλλους μὲν ταδί, ἄλλους δὲ ταδί;
 ἢ ὅτι εἰς μὲν τὸν⁴ τοιόνδε ταδί ἐργάζεται, εἰς δὲ

¹ Kirchoff*: *φυικῆς* Enn., H-S¹.

² πάντας (sc. ἀστέρας, masc. sicut 47-8 ἐσχηματισμένων) et
 τούτους suspic. Theiler: πάντα Enn.*

³ del. Creuzer.

⁴ Kirchoff*: τὸ Enn., H-S.

choice which transcends the emotions seeks and in this way it contributes to the achievement of the same purpose: since when serfs work for another man many of the things they do are directed to fulfilling the commands of their master, but their aspiration to the Good is directed to the same end to which their master also aspires. If then the sun and the other heavenly bodies act in any way on the things here below, one must think that the sun—it is best to speak of one body only—remains looking above, but just as its warming of the things on earth proceeds from it, so do any subsequent actions upon them, by a dissemination of soul, as far as is in its power, since there is plenty of the growth soul in it. And in the same way any other heavenly body, without choosing to do so, gives off a kind of irradiation from itself. And all the heavenly bodies when they have been unified in this or that particular configuration produce now one and now another disposition of things: so that the figures have power—for according to this or that figure different consequences follow—and something is due to the actual heavenly bodies arranged in the figures—for one consequence follows if these particular heavenly bodies are in the figure, and another if others are. As regards the figures themselves, one can see from what happens here below that they have powers. For why are some figures terrifying to those who see them though those who are terrified have had no experience of evil from them before, but others when they are seen do not terrify? And why do these particular figures terrify some people and different ones others? It is because these particular ones work on a man of a particular kind and

55 τοῦτον ἄλλα, οὐκ ἂν μὴ δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πεφυκὸς
 ποιεῖν. καὶ οὕτως μὲν σχηματισθὲν ἐκίνησε τὴν
 ὄψιν, οὕτως δὲ οὐ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις
 λέγοι τὸ κάλλος εἶναι τὸ κινεῖν, διατί τὸν μὲν
 τοῦτο, τὸν δὲ ἄλλο ἐκίνησε, μὴ τῆς κατὰ τὸ
 σχῆμα διαφορᾶς τὴν δύναμιν ἐχούσης; διατί γὰρ
 60 τὰς μὲν χροᾶς φήσομεν δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ ποιεῖν,
 τὰ δὲ σχήματα οὐ φήσομεν; ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅλως
 ἄτοπον εἶναι μὲν τι ἐν τοῖς οὐσι, μὴ μέντοι ἔχειν τι
 ὃ δύναται. τὸ γὰρ ὄν τοιοῦτον, οἷον ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ
 πάσχειν· καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοτέον τὸ ποιεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ
 τῶν ἄλλων ἄμφω. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις δὲ
 65 δυνάμεις καὶ παρὰ τὰ σχήματα· καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρ'
 ἡμῶν εἰσι πολλά, ἃς οὐ θερμὰ ἢ ψυχρὰ παρέχεται,
 ἀλλὰ γενόμενα ποιότησι διαφόροις καὶ λόγοις
 εἰδοποιηθέντα καὶ φύσεως δυνάμειος μεταλαμβάντα,
 οἷον καὶ λίθων φύσεις καὶ βοτανῶν ἐνέργειαι
 θαυμαστά πολλά παρέχονται.

36. Ποικιλώτατον γὰρ τὸ πᾶν καὶ λόγοι πάντες
 ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δυνάμεις ἄπειροι καὶ ποικίλαι· οἷον
 δὲ φασὶ καὶ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου ἄλλην μὲν δύναμιν
 ἔχειν [ὀφθαλμὸν καὶ]¹ ὁστοῦν τόδε, τοδὶ δ' ἄλλην,
 5 χειρὸς μὲν τοδὶ καὶ δακτύλου τοῦ ποδός, καὶ
 οὐδὲν μέρος εἶναι ὃ μὴ ἔχει καὶ οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ
 ἔχει—ἀγνοοῦμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς, εἴ μὴ τις τὰ τοιαῦτα
 μεμάθηκεν—οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον· μᾶλλον δὲ

¹ del. Theiler, Harder.

others on this other man, since they cannot fail to act on that which corresponds to their nature. And something with one kind of figure stimulates one to look at it, but another kind does not stimulate the same man. And if someone were to say that it is the beauty which stimulates, why does one stimulate one man and another another, if it is not the difference in figure which has the power? For why should we assert that colours have power and act, but not assert that figures do? It would be absolutely absurd for something to exist in reality but not to have any power which it could exercise. For anything which exists is of such a kind that it can either act or be acted upon¹: in some cases we should attribute action, in other cases both. But besides the figures there are also powers in the bodies subject to configuration; and in the bodies in our world there are many powers which are not produced by hot or cold things but by things which have come into existence as the result of different qualities and been formed by rational principles and have a share in the power of nature, as the natures of stones and the active powers of herbs produce many astonishing results.

36. The All is full of the richest variety: all rational formative principles are present in it, and an unbounded store of varied powers. It is like what they say about man, that each of the bones has its own distinctive powers, the bones of the hand one power and the toe-bone another, and there is no part which has not a power, and one different from every other—but we know nothing about it, unless one of us has studied this sort of subject. The

¹ This philosophical commonplace goes back to Plato *Sophist* 247D-E and 248C.

ἴχνος ταῦτα ἐκείνων· ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἀδιήγητον δὲ
 καὶ θαυμαστὴν ποικιλίαν εἶναι δυνάμεων, καὶ δὴ
 10 καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ' οὐρανὸν φερομένοις. οὐ γὰρ δὴ,
 ὡσπερ ἄψυχον οἰκίαν μεγάλην ἄλλως καὶ πολλὴν
 ἐκ τιῶν εὐαριθμῆτων κατ' εἶδος, οἷον λίθων καὶ
 ξύλων, εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, εἰς κόσμον
 ἔδει αὐτὸ γεγονέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτὸ ἐγγρηγορὸς
 πανταχῆ καὶ ζῶν ἄλλο ἄλλως καὶ μηδὲν δύνασθαι
 15 εἶναι, ὃ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτῷ. διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λύοιτο
 ἂν ἡ ἀπορία ἢ πῶς ἐν ζῳῷ ἐμψύχῳ ἄψυχον·
 οὕτως γὰρ ὁ λόγος φησὶν ἄλλο ἄλλως ζῆν ἐν τῷ
 ὅλῳ, ἡμᾶς δὲ τὸ μὴ αἰσθητῶς παρ' αὐτοῦ
 κινούμενον ζῆν μὴ λέγειν· τὸ δὲ ἔστιν ἕκαστον
 ζῶν λανθάνον, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητῶς ζῶν συγκείμενον
 20 ἐκ τῶν μὴ αἰσθητῶς μὲν ζώντων, θαυμαστάς δὲ
 δυνάμεις εἰς τὸ ζῆν τῷ τοιούτῳ ζῳῷ παρεχο-
 μένων. μὴ γὰρ ἂν κινήθῃαι ἐπὶ τοσαῦτα ἄνθρωπον
 ἐκ πάντῃ ἀψύχων τῶν αὐτῷ δυνάμεων κινούμενον,
 μηδ' αὖ τὸ πᾶν οὕτω ζῆν μὴ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ
 25 ζώντων τὴν οἰκίαν ζωὴν, καὶν προαίρεσις αὐτῷ
 μὴ παρῆ· ποιεῖ γὰρ καὶ προαιρέσεως οὐ δεηθέν,
 ἅτε προαιρέσεως ὄν προγενέστερον· διὸ καὶ πολλὰ
 δουλεύει αὐτῷ¹ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν.

37. Οὐδὲν οὖν τῷ παντὶ ἀπόβλητον αὐτοῦ·
 ἐπεὶ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὅσα τῶν τοιούτων λέγομεν
 ποιεῖν, εἴ τις τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτῶν ζητήσῃε τί ποτ'

¹ Theiler: αὐτῶν wxUC: αὐτοῦ z.

All is like this, but even more so: or rather the parts
 of our bodies with their powers are only traces of
 the parts and powers of the universe. In the All
 there is an indescribably wonderful variety of powers,
 especially in the bodies which move through the
 heavens. For it did not have to come to be an
 ordered universe like a soulless house, even if a large
 and complex one, made of materials easy to reckon
 up according to kind, stones and timber, perhaps, and
 other things of the sort; but it exists, all awake and
 alive differently in different parts, and nothing can
 exist which does not belong to it. This then solves
 the difficulty of how there can be anything without
 soul in an ensouled living being; for in this way the
 account explains that different things in the Whole
 live in different ways, but we do not say that anything
 is alive which does not move itself perceptibly; but
 each thing of this sort has a hidden life; and the
 thing which is perceptibly alive is composed of parts
 which are not perceptibly alive but contribute won-
 derful powers to the life of a living thing of this kind.
 Man would not have been moved to such great
 achievements if the powers in himself from which he
 started had been without soul, nor would the All
 live as it does if each particular thing in it did not
 live its own life—even if the All does not exercise
 deliberate choice. For it acts without need of de-
 liberate choice, since it is of older birth than choice;
 and therefore many things serve it with their powers.

37. Nothing, therefore, which belongs to the All
 can be discarded by it; since with fire and all the
 other things of the kind which we say are active, if
 any one of the people who have the reputation of
 experts tried to find out what their activity was, he

ἔστι τῶν νῦν δοκούντων εἶδέναι, ἀπαρήσειεν ἂν,
 5 εἰ μὴ δύναμιν ταύτην ἀποδοίη αὐτῷ <τῷ>¹ ἐν τῷ
 παντὶ εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον τοῖς ἐν
 χορήσει λέγει. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς τὰ μὲν συνήθη οὐτ'
 ἀξιούμεν ζητεῖν οὐτ' ἀπιστοῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν
 ἄλλων τῶν ἔξω τοῦ συνήθους δυνάμεων ἀπισ-
 τοῦμέν τε ὡς ἔχει ἕκαστον, καὶ τῷ ἀσυνήθει τὸ
 10 θαυμάζειν προστίθεμεν θαυμάσαντες ἂν καὶ ταῦτα,
 εἰ ἀπίεροι αὐτῶν οὔσω ἕκαστόν τις προσφέρων
 ἐξηγεῖτο αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις. ἔχειν μὲν οὖν
 ἕκαστον δυνάμιν τινα ἄλογον φατέον ἐν τῷ παντὶ
 πλασθὲν καὶ μορφωθὲν καὶ μετειληφός πως ψυ-
 χῆς παρὰ τοῦ ὅλου ὅντος ἐμφύχου καὶ περιειλημ-
 15 μένον ὑπὸ τοιοῦτου καὶ μόριον ὃν ἐμφύχου—
 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ὅ τι μὴ μέρος—ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλων
 πρὸς τὸ δρᾶν δυνατώτερα καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν
 οὐρανίων μᾶλλον, ἅτε ἐναργεστέρᾳ φύσει χρώμενα·
 καὶ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας, οὐ
 τῇ προαιρέσει ἀφ' ἧν δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δρῶμενον—
 20 ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς προαίρεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσιν—
 οὐδὲ ἐπιστραφέντων τῇ δόσει τῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ
 ψυχῆς τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔη. γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ζῶα
 ἐκ ζώου οὐ τῆς προαιρέσεως ποιούσης οὐδ' αὖ
 ἐλαττουμένου οὐδ' αὖ παρακολουθοῦντος· ἀργός²

¹ Bréhier.² Theiler: αὐτὸς Enn., H-S¹: αὐτὸ Kirchhoff*.

¹ A philosophical commonplace, probably of Stoic origin,
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would get into difficulties if he did not attribute this power to their actually being in the All, and did not say the same sort of thing about everything else which is in daily use. But we do not think it proper to investigate ordinary things, nor do we disbelieve in them, but we disbelieve in the detailed working of the other powers which are out of the ordinary, and encounter the extraordinary with astonishment,¹ though we should be astonished at these ordinary things too if we were unfamiliar with them and someone presented a detailed account of them to us and explained their powers. We must admit, then, that each particular thing has an unreasoned power, since it is moulded and shaped in the All and in some way has a share of soul from the Whole which is ensouled, and is surrounded by a universe of this kind and is part of an ensouled being—for there is nothing in it which is not a part—but some things are more powerfully effective than others, both among the things on earth and still more among those in the heavens, since these have a clearer nature; and many things happen according to these powers, not by deliberate choice of the beings from which the action appears to proceed—for the powers exist also in beings which have no choice—nor with any direction of attention to the giving of the power, even if there is some transmission of soul from them. For living beings could be generated from a living being without any act of deliberate choice, nor any diminution of the original living being, nor any consciousness of what is happening: for the act of choice would be inactive, if he had it, or it would not be the choice rhetorically amplified by Seneca *Naturales Quaestiones* VII 1, 1.

γὰρ ἦν ἡ προαίρεσις, εἰ ἔχοι, ἢ οὐκ ἦν ἡ ποιούσα.
25 εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχοι τι προαίρεσιν ζῶον, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ
παρακολουθεῖν.

38. Ἄ τε¹ οὖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μηδενὸς κινήσαντος ἐκ
τῆς ἄλλης αὐτοῦ ζωῆς γίνεται [καὶ ὅλως ὅσα ἐξ
αὐτοῦ],² ὅσα τε κινήσαντος ἄλλου, οἷον εὐχαῖς ἢ
ἀπλαῖς ἢ τέχνῃ ἀδομέναις, ταῦτα οὐκ εἰς ἐκεῖνον
5 ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν τοῦ δρωμένου φύσιν ἀνεκ-
τέον. καὶ ὅσα μὲν χρησιμὰ³ πρὸς ζωὴν ἢ τινα
ἄλλην χρείαν συμβάλλεται, τῇ δόσει ἀνεκτέον,
ἐξ ἄλλου μέρους μείζονος εἰς ἄλλο ἔλαττον ἰόν.
ὅτι δ' ἂν δυσχερὲς ἐξ αὐτῶν λέγεται εἰς τὰς
γενέσεις τῶν ζῴων ἰέναι, ἢ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ
10 εὐχρηστον δεξασθαι τὸ ὑποκείμενον—οὐ γὰρ
ἀπλῶς γίνεται τὸ γινόμενον, ἀλλ' εἰς τοδὶ καὶ ὡδί.
καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάσχον καὶ τὸ πεισόμενον ὑποκει-
μένην τινὰ καὶ τοιάνδε φύσιν ἔχειν—πολλὰ δὲ καὶ
αἱ μίξεις ποιούσιν, ἐκάστου τι εὐχρηστον εἰς τὸ ζῆν
15 διδόντος. γίνονται δ' ἂν τῷ καὶ μὴ συμπερόντων
τῶν λυσιτελῶν τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἡ σύνταξις ἢ τῶν
ὄλων οὐ δίδωσιν ἐκάστῳ αἰεὶ ὃ βούλεται. πολλὰ δὲ
καὶ προστίθεμεν αὐτοῖς τοῖς δοθείσι. πάντα δ'
ὁμῶς εἰς ἓν συμπλέκεται καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὴν
συμφωνίαν ἔχει καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλων ἄλλα, καὶ ἀπ'
ἐναντίων ἕη. πάντα γὰρ ἐνός. καὶ εἴ τι δὲ

¹ Kirchoff*: ἀτε Perna, Creuzer, H-S¹: ὅσα τε Harder:
ὅσα B-T.

² del. Bouillet, Harder, B-T, ut glossam complectentem liu.
1-2 ἀ τε et ὅσα τε.

³ Kirchoff* (utilia Ficinus): χρή τὰ Enn.

which would be operative. But if a living being had no choice, still more would there be an absence of consciousness.

38. The effects, then, which come from the heavenly body from its other kind of life without anything stimulating it, and all which are produced by the stimulation of another, for instance by prayers, either plain or sung according to art, all these are to be attributed, not to each individual heavenly body, but to the nature of what is done. And all the effects which are beneficial for the preservation of life or some other useful purpose are to be attributed to the gift [of the heavenly body] and are something which comes from the greater part of the universe to another lesser one; but whatever bad influence is said to come from the heavenly bodies upon the births of living creatures is to be attributed to the inability of the substrate to receive the favourable influence—for what happens does not simply happen, but happens to this specific thing and in this specific way; and that which is affected, and that which is going to be affected, has a specific kind of underlying nature—but also the mixtures of influences produce many effects, though each individual heavenly body gives something beneficial to life. And a bad effect on something may occur also because the naturally favourable forces are not operating to help it, and the concatenation of universal forces does not always give each individual what it wants; and we too add a great deal to what we are given. But all the same, all things are woven into one, and are marvelously in tune, and things come from other things, even if they come from opposites: for all belong to one [universe]. And if anything among the things

20 ἑλλείπον πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τῶν γινομένων μὴ
εἰδοποιηθὲν εἰς τέλος μὴ κρατηθείσης τῆς ὕλης,
ὅλον ἑλλείπον τῷ γενναίῳ, οὐ στερηθὲν πίπτει εἰς
αἰσχρότητα. ὥστε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνων,
τὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν εἰσφέρεισθαι, τὰ δὲ
παρ' αὐτῶν προστιθέναι.

39. Συνταπτομένων δὲ αἰεὶ πάντων καὶ εἰς ἓν
συντελούντων πάντων, σημαίνεσθαι πάντα.
ἀρετῇ δὲ ἀδέσποτον· συμφαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὰ
αὐτῆς ἔργα τῇ συντάξει, ἅτε καὶ τῶν τῆδε ἐκείθεν
5 ἐξηρητημένων, τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ τοῖς θειωτέροις,
καὶ μετέχοντος καὶ τοῦδε ἐκείνων. γίνεται τοῖνυν
τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ κατὰ σπερματικούς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
λόγους περιληπτικούς καὶ τῶν προτέρων ἢ κατὰ
τοὺς τῶν σπερμάτων λόγους· οὐ γὰρ ἐν σπερματι-
κοῖς λόγοις ἐνι τι τῶν γινομένων παρὰ τοὺς
10 σπερματικούς αὐτοὺς λόγους οὐδὲ τῶν παρὰ τῆς
ὕλης εἰς τὸ ὅλον συντελούντων οὐδὲ τῶν δρωμένων
εἰς ἄλληλα παρὰ τῶν γενομένων. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
ἂν εἰκοίκοι ὁ λόγος τοῦ παντός κατὰ λόγον τιθέντα
κόσμον πόλιωσ καὶ νόμον, ἥδη εἰδότα ἃ πράξουσιν
οἱ πολῖται καὶ δι' ἃ πριξουσι, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα
15 πάντα νομοθετοῦντος καὶ συμφαινόντος τοῖς
νόμοις τὰ πάθη πάντα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰς
ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας, πάντων ὁδῶ
ὅλον αὐτομάτῃ εἰς συμφωνίαν χωρούντων. ἡ δὲ
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which come into being is at all lacking in excellence, since it is not completely formed because the matter has not been mastered, it is, so to speak, lacking in nobility of birth, and since it is deprived of this falls into ugliness. Some things, then, are done by the heavenly bodies, some the underlying nature introduces, and some are additions due to ourselves.

39. But since all things are for ever brought together into order and all are directed to a single end, all are signified. "But virtue has no master",¹ yet its works, too, are woven into the common order, since the things here below depend on the world above, the things in this world on diviner beings, and this universe has a share, also, in those higher realities. What comes to be in the All, then, does not come to be according to seminal formative principles but according to formative principles which include powers which are prior to the principles in the seeds; for in the seminal principles there is nothing of what happens outside the sphere of the seminal principles themselves, or of the contributions which come from matter to the whole, or of the interactions on each other of the things which have come to be. But the rational formative principle of the All is more like the formative thought which establishes the order and law of a state, which knows already what the citizens are going to do and why they are going to do it, and legislates with regard to all this, and weaves together by the laws all their experiences and arts and the honour or dishonour that their acts merit, so that all that happens in the state moves as if spontaneously into a harmonious order. But the

¹ This Platonic phrase, from *Republic* X 617E3, is more than once quoted by Plotinus: cp. II. 3. 9. 17; VI. 8. 5. 31.

σημασία οὐ τούτου χάριν, ἵνα σημαίνῃ προηγου-
 μένως, ἀλλ' οὕτω γιγνομένων σημαίνεται ἐξ
 20 ἄλλων ἄλλα: ὅτι γὰρ ἐν καὶ ἐνός, καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλου
 ἄλλο γινώσκειτ' ἄν, καὶ ἀπὸ αἰτιατοῦ δὲ τὸ αἴτιον,
 καὶ τὸ ἐπόμενον ἐκ τοῦ προηγησαμένου, καὶ
 τὸ σύνθετον ἀπὸ θατέρου, ὅτι θάτερον καὶ θάτερον
 ὁμοῦ ποιῶν. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, λύονται
 ἂν ἤδη αἱ ἀπορίαι, ἧ τε πρὸς τὸ κακῶν δόσιν
 25 παρὰ θεῶν γίνεσθαι τῷ μήτε προαιρέσεις εἶναι
 τὰς ποιούσας, φυσικαῖς δὲ ἀνάγκαις γίνεσθαι,
 ὅσα ἐκείθεν, ὡς μερῶν πρὸς μέρη, καὶ ἐπόμενα
 ἐνὸς ζωῆς, καὶ τῷ πολλὰ παρ' αὐτῶν τοῖς γιγνομένοις
 προστιθέναι, καὶ τῷ τῶν διδομένων παρ' ἐκάστων
 οὐ κακῶν ὄντων ἐν τῇ μίξει γίνεσθαι ἄλλο τι, καὶ
 30 τῷ μὴ ἔνεκα ἐκάστου ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τοῦ ὅλου τὴν
 ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν ὑποκειμένην δὲ φύσιν ἄλλο λαβύσσαν
 ἄλλο πάσχειν καὶ μηδὲ δύνασθαι κρατῆσαι τοῦ
 δοθέντος.

40. Τὰς δὲ γοητείας πῶς; ἢ τῇ συμπαθείᾳ, καὶ
 τῷ πεφυκέναι συμφωνίαν εἶναι ὁμοίων καὶ ἐναντί-
 ωσιν ἀνομοίων, καὶ τῇ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν πολλῶν
 5 ποικιλίᾳ εἰς ἐν ζῶον συντελούντων. καὶ γὰρ
 μηδενὸς μηχανωμένου ἄλλου πολλὰ ἔλκεται καὶ
 γοητεύεται: καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ μαγεία ἢ ἐν τῷ παντὶ
 φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος αὐ. καὶ ὁ γόης ὁ πρῶτος

¹ The reference is to Empedocles: ep. e.g. fr. B 17, 19-20. This and the following chapters make clear that magic was for Plotinus a manipulation of natural forces, attractions and sympathies resulting from the living organic unity of the physical universe. His interest in it was philosophical rather than practical (see further n. 1 on ch. 43). An idea of the sort of magic of which Plotinus is thinking can be obtained

signification is not designed for the sake of indicating what is going to happen before it does, but since things happen as they do some are indicated by others; for since all is one and belongs to one, one thing can be known from another, the cause from what is caused and the consequence from the antecedent, and the composite from one of its parts, because the rational principle of the universe composes one part and another together. If this argument is correct, the difficulties would be solved, that about the gift of evils coming from the gods by the consideration that it is not their deliberate choices which are effective but all that comes from above happens by natural necessity, as actions of parts on parts, and as consequences of the life of the one universe; and that we by ourselves contribute much to what happens, and that, though the gifts of the individual heavenly bodies are not evil, something else comes about in their mixture, and that the life of the universe does not serve the purposes of each individual but of the whole, and that the underlying nature receives one thing but experiences another, and is unable to master what it is given.

40. But how do magic spells work? By sympathy and by the fact that there is a natural concord of things that are alike and opposition of things that are different, and by the rich variety of the many powers which go to make up the life of the one living creature. For many things are drawn and enchanted without anyone else's magical contrivance: and the true magic is the "Love" and also the "Strife" in the All.¹ And this is the primary wizard and enchanted from the spells published in the *Papyri Graecae Magicae* ed. and tr. K. Preisendanz (2 vols., Berlin and Leipzig 1928, 1931).

καὶ φαρμακεὺς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃν κατανοήσαντες
 ἄνθρωποι ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις χρώνται αὐτοῦ τοῖς
 φαρμάκοις καὶ τοῖς γοητεύμασι. καὶ γάρ, ὅτι
 10 ἔρᾶν πεφύκασι καὶ τὰ ἔρᾶν ποιοῦντα ἔλκει πρὸς
 ἀλληλα, ἀλκή¹ ἐρωτικῆς διὰ γοητείας τέχνης
 γεγένηται, προστιθέντων ἐπαφαῖς φύσεις ἄλλας
 ἄλλοις συναγωγούς καὶ ἐγκείμενον ἔχούσας ἔρωτα·
 καὶ συνάπτουσι δὲ ἄλλην ψυχὴν ἄλλη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
 φυτὰ διεστηκότα ἐξαιψάμενοι πρὸς ἀλληλα. καὶ
 15 τοῖς σχήμασι δὲ προσχρῶνται δυνάμεις ἔχουσι,
 καὶ αὐτοὺς σχηματίζοντες ὡδὶ ἐπάγουσιν ἐπ'
 αὐτοὺς ἀψοφητὶ δυνάμεις ἐν ἐνὶ ὄντες εἰς ἓν.
 ἐπεὶ ἔξω γε τοῦ παντός εἴ τις ὑποθεῖτο τὸν
 τοιοῦτον, οὐτ' ἂν ἔλξειεν οὐτ' ἂν καταγάγοι
 ἐπαγωγαῖς ἢ καταδέσμοις· ἀλλὰ νῦν, ὅτι μὴ οἶον
 20 ἀλλαχοῦ ἄγει, ἔχει ἄγειν εἰδὼς ὅπη τι ἐν τῷ ζῳῷ
 πρὸς ἄλλο ἄγεται. πέφυκε δὲ καὶ ἐπωδαῖς τῷ
 μέλει καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡχῇ καὶ τῷ σχήματι τοῦ
 δρώοντος· ἔλκει γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον τὰ ἐλεεῶν
 σχήματα καὶ φθέγματα. [ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ]² οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ἢ προαίρεσις οὐδ' ὁ λόγος ὑπὸ μουσικῆς θέλγεται
 25 ἀλλ' ἡ ἄλογος ψυχὴ, καὶ οὐ θαυμάζεται ἢ γοητεία
 ἢ τοιαύτη· καίτοι φιλοῦσι κηλούμενοι, κἂν μὴ τοῦτο
 αἰτῶνται παρὰ τῶν τῇ μουσικῇ χρωμένων. καὶ
 τὰς ἄλλας δὲ εὐχὰς οὐ τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀκουούσης
 οἰητέον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ θελγόμενοι ταῖς ἐπωδαῖς

¹ E, Creuzer, Cilento (*efficacia nominativus Ficinus*): ἀλκή
 ARJ UCz, Perna, H-S: ἀλκῆς B.

² om. z: delendum ut e glossa ad 24-5 ἀλλ' ἡ . . . ψυχὴ
 ortum.

ter, from observing whom men came to use his
 philtres and spells on each other. For, because love
 is natural to men and the things that cause love have
 a force of attraction to each other, there has come
 into existence the helpful power of a magical art of
 love, used by those who apply by contact to different
 people different magical substances designed to draw
 them together and with a love-force implanted in
 them; they join one soul to another, as if they
 were training together plants set at intervals. They
 use as well figures with power in them, and by
 putting themselves into the right postures they
 quietly bring powers upon themselves, since they
 are within one universe and work upon one universe.
 For if anyone put a magician outside the All, he
 could not draw or bring down by attractive or binding
 spells. But now, because he does not operate as if
 he were somewhere else, he can work on his subjects
 knowing by what way one thing is drawn to another
 in the living being. And there is a natural drawing
 power in spells wrought by the tune and the particu-
 lar intonation and posture of the magician—for
 these things attract, as pitiable figures and voices
 attract; for it is the irrational soul—not the power
 of choice or the reason—which is charmed by music,
 and this kind of magic causes no surprise: people
 even like being enchanted, even if this is not exactly
 what they demand from the musicians. And we
 must not think that other kinds of prayers either are
 freely and deliberately answered: for people charmed
 by spells do not act with free deliberation, nor, when

οὕτως, οὐδ' ὅταν γοητεύῃ ὄφεις ἀνθρώπους, σύνεσεν
 30 ὁ γοητευόμενος ἔχει, οὐδ' αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλὰ
 γινώσκει, ἤδη παθών, ὅτι πέπονθεν, ἀπαθές δ'
 αὐτῷ τὸ ἡγούμενον ἔστιν. ὡς δ' ἠύξατο, ἠλθέ τι
 πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξ ἐκείνου ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον.

41. Ὁ δὲ ἥλιος ἢ ἄλλο ἄστρον οὐκ ἐπαίει. καὶ
 γίνεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν εὐχὴν συμπαθοῦς μέρους
 μέρει γενομένου, ὡσπερ ἐν μιᾷ νευρᾷ τεταμένη·
 5 κινήθεισα γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ κάτω καὶ ἄνω ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν.
 5 πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἄλλης κινήθεισης ἄλλη οἶον
 αἰσθησῶν ἔχει κατὰ συμφωνίαν καὶ τῷ ὑπὸ μιᾷ
 ἡρμόσθαι ἀρμονία. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ λύρα ἢ
 κίνησις ἀπ' ἄλλης ἔρχεται, ὅσον τὸ συμπαθές, καὶ
 ἐν τῷ παντὶ τοίνυν μία ἀρμονία, κἂν ἐξ ἐναντίων
 ἢ καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίων δέ ἐστι καὶ πάντων συγγενῶν
 10 καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. καὶ ὅσα λωβᾶται ἀνθρώπους,
 οἶον τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐλθὲν μετὰ χολῆς εἰς ἥπατος
 φύσιν ἦλθεν, οὐχ ὡς λωβησόμενα· οἶον εἰ πῦρ τις
 ἐκ πυρός λαβὼν ἔβλαψεν ἄλλον † ὁ μηχανησάμενος
 ἢ ἐλθεῖν ἢ ὁ λαβὼν †¹ ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ τῷ² δεδωκέναι
 γοῦν τι³ οἶον μετατιθέν τι⁴ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο.
 15 καὶ τὸ ἐληλυθὸς⁵ δέ, εἰ μὴ οἶός τε ἐγένετο
 δέξασθαι εἰς ὃν μετηνέχθη.

¹ locus nondum sanatus. ² wÜz: τὸ xC.

³ γοῦν τι Enn., H-S: ἀγνοοῦντι Theiler.

⁴ τῷ δεδωκέναι . . . μετατιθέν τι quoniam aliquid (sc. ignem) praebuit quod quasi traderet quiddam (sc. alterum ignem): μετατιθέν τι Enn.: μετατιθέν Creuzer (translatum Ficinus): μετατιθέν τι Theiler. ⁵ τὸ ἐληλυθὸς (i.e. τὸ πῦρ) sc. λωβᾶται.

¹ The text here is very uncertain. H-S's critical note, printed under the Greek text, gives the principal suggestions

a snake fascinates men, does the one who is fascinated understand or perceive what is happening, but he knows only afterwards that he has had the experience; his ruling intellect, however, remains unaffected. But, when a man prays to a heavenly body, some influence comes from it upon him or upon another person.

41. But the sun, or another heavenly body, does not hear his prayers. And that which he prays for comes about because one part is in sympathetic connection with another, just as in one tense string; for if the string is plucked at the lower end, it has a vibration at the upper. But often, too, when one string is plucked another has a kind of sense of this by its concord and the fact that it is tuned to the same scale. But if the vibration can even pass from one lyre to another in so far as a sympathy exists, then there is also one single harmony in the All, even if it is composed of opposites; and it is in fact composed of parts which are alike and all akin, even when they are opposites. And all the things which harm men do not come with the intention of harming, but as when the passionate spirit is drawn down with the bile and enters the nature of the liver; just as if someone, taking a light from a fire, hurts someone else—either the person who has made arrangements to go or that one who took it does the damage by having given some fire to someone who, in a way, moves it about from one place to another; and the fire which has come hurts if the person to whom it was transferred was unable to take hold of it.¹

for improvement. I, very hesitantly, follow Cilento's suggestion (see his commentary ad loc.) in my translation, as it gives some sort of sense without too violent alteration.

42. Ὡστε οἷτε μνήμης διὰ τοῦτο δεήσει τοῖς
 ἄστροις, ὡςπερ χάριν καὶ ταῦτα πεπραγμάτευται,
 οὔτε αἰσθήσεων ἀναπεμπομένων· οὔτε ἐπινοήσεις
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εὐχαῖς, ὡς οἴονται τινες,
 5 προαιρετικὰς τινὰς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετ' εὐχῆς γίνεσθαι
 τι δοτέον καὶ εὐχῆς ἄνευ παρ' αὐτῶν, ἢ μέρη καὶ
 ἐνός· καὶ ὅτι δυνάμεις καὶ χωρὶς προαιρέσεως
 πολλαὶ καὶ αὐταὶ καὶ ἄνευ μηχανῆς καὶ μετὰ
 τέχνης, ὡς ἐν ζώῳ ἐνί· καὶ ἀπολαύει ἄλλο ἄλλον
 καὶ βλέπεται τῷ οὕτω πεφυκέναι, καὶ τέχνας
 10 ἰατρῶν καὶ ἐπαιδῶν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἡναγκάσθη
 παρυσχεῖν τι τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς αὐτοῦ. καὶ τὸ
 πᾶν δὲ ὡσαύτως εἰς τὰ μέρη δίδωσι καὶ παρ'
 αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐλκύσαστος ἄλλου εἰς μέρος τι αὐτοῦ,
 κείμενον τοῖς αὐτοῦ μέρεσι τῷ αὐτοῦ φυσικῶ, ὡς
 μηδενὸς ἄλλοτρίου τοῦ αἰτυοῦντος ὄντος. εἰ δὲ
 15 κακὸς ὁ αἰτῶν, θαυμάζειν οὐ δεῖ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ
 ποταμῶν ἀρνοῦνται οἱ κακοί, καὶ τὸ δίδόν αὐτὸ¹
 οὐκ οἶδεν ᾧ² δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ δίδωσι μόνον· ἀλλ'
 ὅμως συντέτακται καὶ <ὁ>³ δέδοται τῇ φύσει τοῦ
 παντός· ὥστε, εἴ τις ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῶν πᾶσι κεμένων,
 οὐ δέον, ἔπεσθαι αὐτῷ ἀναγκαίῳ νόμῳ τὴν δίκην.
 20 οὔκουν δοτέον τὸ πᾶν πάσχειν· ἢ τὸ μὲν ἡγεμονοῦν
 αὐτοῦ ἀπαθὲς ἐσοτέον πάντῃ εἶναι, γιγνομένων δὲ
 παθῶν ἐν μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ ἐκείνοις μὲν ἦκειν τὸ

¹ z, Creuzer, Müller*: αὐτοῦ wxC: αὐτοῦ U.

² Harder, B-I, et testatur Theologia VI. 41: δ Enn.* (δ correctio ad lin. 17).

³ καὶ δ Theiler: καὶ Enn.* : δ Kleist (Programm 19).

42. So there will be no need for the heavenly bodies to have memory, either, for this purpose [of answering prayers]—this was the reason why this investigation was undertaken—or sense-perceptions arising from the lower world; nor, if we look at it in this way, do they deliberately choose to attend to prayers, but we must admit that some influence comes from them both with and without prayer in so far as they are parts, and parts of one whole; and that there are many powers which work even without deliberate choice, both without contrivance and with [magic] art, as in a single living being; and one thing is benefited and harmed by another because it is naturally so disposed, and by the arts of physicians and magicians one thing is compelled to give something of its power to another. And in the same way the All gives to its parts, both spontaneously and if someone else magically attracts [its power] to a part of it; for it lies at the disposal of its parts by its own natural disposition, and so the one who makes the prayer is no alien. But if the man who prays is evil, there is no need to be surprised; for the wicked draw water from the streams and that which gives does not know itself to what it gives, but only gives; but all the same that which is given is also co-ordinated with the nature of the All; so that if someone takes what he ought not from what lies at the disposal of all, justice pursues him by an inevitable law. We must not therefore assume that the All can be affected; or we must grant that its ruling principle is altogether impassible, and when the parts come to be affected, the affection pene-

πάθος, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῷ ὄντος ἀπαθὲς
[τὸ γενόμενον]¹ ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸ εἶναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ
τοῖς ἀστροῖς, καθόσον μὲν μέρη, τὰ πάθη, ἀπαθῆ
25 μέντοι αὐτὰ εἶναι τῷ τε τὰς προαιρέσεις καὶ
αὐτοῖς ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι καὶ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς
φύσεις ἀβλαβεῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ τῷ, καὶ εἰ διὰ τῆς
ψυχῆς τι διδῶσι, μὴ ἐλαττωθῆναι αὐτοῖς τὴν
ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ σώματα αὐτοῖς τὰ αὐτὰ μένειν καί,
εἴ τι ὑπεκρεῖ, ἀναισθητῶς ἀπιόντος καὶ τοῦ
30 προσιόντος, εἰ πρόσεισι, λανθάνοντος.

43. Ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος πῶς ὑπὸ γοητείας καὶ
φαρμάκων; ἢ τῇ μὲν ψυχῇ ἀπαθὲς εἰς γοήτευσιν,
καὶ οὐκ ἂν τὸ λογικὸν αὐτοῦ πάθοι, οὐδ' ἂν
μεταδοξάσειε· τὸ δὲ ὅσον τοῦ παντός ἐν αὐτῷ
5 ἄλογον, κατὰ τοῦτο πάθοι ἂν, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο
πάθοι ἂν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔρωτας ἐκ φαρμάκων, εἴπερ τὸ
ἐρᾶν ἐπινεούσης καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἄλλης τῷ τῆς
ἄλλης παθήματι. ὡς περ δὲ ἐπωδαῖς τὸ ἄλογον
πάσχει, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀντάδων καὶ ἀντεπάδων
τὰς ἐκεῖ δυνάμεις ἀναλύσει. θάνατον δὲ ἐκ
10 τοιούτων ἢ νόσους ἢ ὅσα σωματικὰ πάθοι ἂν· τὸ
γὰρ μέρος τοῦ παντός ὑπὸ μέρους ἄλλου ἢ τοῦ
παντός πάθοι ἂν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀβλαβής. τὸ δὲ μὴ
εὐθύς, ἀλλ' ὕστερον, οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ φύσεως.

¹ *delevimus*: <εἰς> τὸ γενόμενον Seidel, B-T.

¹ I still think it probable that, although *ἐπωδαῖς* in this sentence means ordinary magic spells, when Plotinus speaks of the *σπουδαῖος* as *ἀντάδων* καὶ *ἀντεπάδων* he is thinking of Plato's metaphorical use of *ἐπωδή* for salutary philosophical exhortation in *Charmides* 156 7. He uses the word himself in this way, of the highest sort of philosophy, in V. 3. 17. 18-20. For a further discussion of this passage, and in general

trates to them, but since there is nothing there which is contrary to the nature of the All, it is unaffected, directed as it is towards itself. For the heavenly bodies, too, in so far as they are parts, are subject to affections; they are however impassible in themselves, because their powers of choice, as well [as that of the All], cannot be affected and their bodies and natures remain unharmed, and if they give something by means of their soul, their soul is not diminished and their bodies remain the same, and if anything flows from them, it goes imperceptibly, and if anything is added to them, it is unnoticed.

43. But how is the good man affected by magic and drugs? He is incapable of being affected in his soul by enchantment, and his rational part would not be affected, nor would he change his mind; but he would be affected in whatever part of the irrational in the All there is in him, or rather this part would be affected; but he will feel no passionate loves provoked by drugs, if falling in love happens when one soul assents to the affection of the other. But, just as the irrational part of him is affected by incantations, so he himself by counter-chants and counter-incantations will dissolve the powers on the other side.¹ But he might suffer death or illnesses or anything bodily from such incantations; for the part of the All [in him] would be affected by another part or by the All, but he himself would be unharmed. (That the effects of magic do not follow immediately, but later, is not out of line with nature.) But spirits

of the attitude of Plotinus to magic, see my contribution to the *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy* 207-8 and the literature there referred to.

δαίμονες δὲ οὐκ ἀπαθεῖς οὐδ' αὐτοὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ·
 μνήμας δὲ καὶ αἰσθήσεις τούτοις οὐκ ἄστοπον
 15 διδόναι καὶ θέλγεσθαι φυσικῶς ἀγομένους καὶ
 κατακούειν καλούντων τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐγγυτέρω τῶν
 τῆδε καὶ ὅσω πρὸς τὰ τῆδε. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο
 γοητεύεται ὑπ' ἄλλον· πρὸς ὃ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἐκεῖνο
 γοητεύει καὶ ἄγει αὐτό· μόνον δὲ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ
 ἀγοήτευτον. διὸ καὶ πᾶσα πράξις γεγοήτευται
 20 καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ βίος· κινεῖται γὰρ πρὸς
 ταῦτα, ἃ θέλγει αὐτόν. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ εὐπρόσωπος
 γὰρ ὁ τοῦ μεγαλήτορος Ἐρεχθέως δῆμος.
 τί γὰρ μαθὼν τις πρὸς ἄλλο ἔχει; ἢ ἐλκόμενος οὐ
 μάγων τέχναις, ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὴν ἀπάτην¹
 δούσης καὶ συναψάσης ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο οὐ τοῖς
 τόποις, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔδωκε φίλτροις.

44. Μόνη δὲ λείπεται ἡ θεωρία ἀγοήτευτος εἶναι,
 ὅτι μηδεὶς πρὸς αὐτὸν γεγοήτευται· εἰς γὰρ ἔστι,
 καὶ τὸ θεωρούμενον αὐτός ἔστι, καὶ ὁ λόγος οὐκ
 ἠπατημένος, ἀλλ' ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖ, καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ
 5 ζῶην καὶ τὸ ἔργον ποιεῖ. ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ
 οὐχ ὁ λόγος τὴν ὀρμὴν, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου,
 αἱ τοῦ πάθους προτάσεις. τέκνων μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέ-
 λειαι καὶ πρὸς γάμον² ὑπουδαί φανεράν τὴν ὀλκὴν

¹ Kirehloff*: τῆς ἀπάτης Enn., H-S.

² wz, Ferra*: γάμων xUC, II-S¹.

¹ This is a reference to Plato *Alcibiades* I 132A5, where Plato is adapting *Iliad* 2. 547 to his own purposes. Plato adds "but you ought to see it undressed", and the context is the attempt by Socrates to prevent Alcibiades from being corrupted by falling in love with the Athenian *demos*. This serves Plotinus as a good Platonic illustration of the charms

themselves, also, are not incapable of being affected in their irrational part; it is not out of place to ascribe memory and sense-perceptions to them and to grant that they are charmed by attractions appropriate to their nature and that those of them who are nearer to the things here below hear the prayers of those who call upon them according to the degree of their concern with things here below. For everything which is directed to something else is enchanted by something else; for that to which it is directed enchants and draws it; but only that which is self-directed is free from enchantment. For this reason all practical action is under enchantment, and the whole life of the practical man: for he is moved to that which charms him. This is the reason for saying "The citizen body of great-hearted Erectheus looks attractive".¹ For why does a man direct himself to something else? He is drawn not by the arts of wizards but of nature, which brings illusion and links one thing to another not spatially but by the magic draughts which it gives.

44. Contemplation alone remains incapable of enchantment because no one who is self-directed is subject to enchantment: for he is one, and that which he contemplates is himself, and his reason is not deluded, but he makes what he ought and makes his own life and work. But in practical life there is no self-possession, and the reason does not produce the impulse, but the irrational also has an origin in the premises derived from the affection. For the care of children and concern for marriage have a manifest drawing power, and so do all the things of the lower world, which are always illusory, whether political or sexual.

ἔχουσι, ὅσα τε ἀνθρώπους δελεάζει ἡδέα γινόμενα
 ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις. πράξεις δὲ αἱ μὲν διὰ θυμὸν
 10 ἀλόγως κινεῖνται, αἱ δὲ δι' ἐπιθυμίας ὡσαύτως,
 πολιτεῦναι δὲ καὶ ἀρχῶν ὀρέξεις τὸ φίλαρχον τὸ ἐν
 ἡμῶν ἔχουσι προκαλούμενον. καὶ αἱ μὲν γινόμεναι
 ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι τὸν φόβον, αἱ δ'
 ὑπὲρ τοῦ πλείονος τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. αἱ δὲ τῶν χρει-
 15 ὠδῶν χάριον τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἔνδειαν ζητοῦσαι ἀπο-
 πληροῦν φανερώς ἔχουσι τὴν τῆς φύσεως βίαν πρὸς
 τὸ ζῆν οἰκειώσασαν. εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι τὰς πράξεις
 τῶν καλῶν ἀγοητεύτους εἶναι ἢ καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν
 καλῶν οὐσαν γοητεύεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ μὲν ὡς
 ἀναγκαίαις καὶ τὰς καλὰς λεγομένας πράξεις
 20 πράττοι ἄλλο τὸ ὄντως καλὸν ἔχων, οὐ γεγοήτευται
 —οἶδε γὰρ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῆδε
 βλέπει, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ὁ βίος—ἀλλὰ τῆ τῆς
 φύσεως τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης βία καὶ τῆ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν
 τῶν ἄλλων ἢ καὶ αὐτοῦ οἰκειώσει—δοκεῖ γὰρ
 εὐλογον ἴσως μὴ ἐξάγειν ἑαυτὸν διὰ τὴν οἰκειώσιν
 25 —[ὅτι]¹ οὕτως ἐγοητεύθη. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ταῖς
 πράξεσιν ἀγαπήσας καλὸν τὰς πράξεις αἰρείται
 ἀπατηθεὶς τοῖς ἔχουσιν τοῦ καλοῦ, γεγοήτευται τὸ
 περὶ τὰ κάτω καλὸν διώκων· ὅπως γὰρ ἢ περὶ τὸ
 εὐκός τῷ ἀληθεῖ πραγματεία καὶ ὀκλή εἰς αὐτὸ
 πᾶσα ἠπατημένου ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν ἐπ' αὐτὰ

¹ del. Theiler.

which entice men since they give pleasure to their carnal desires. And the practical actions which are caused by our passionate spirit are the result of an irrational impulse, as are in the same way those caused by our carnal desires; political activity and the pursuit of office have the desire of power in us provoking them. And the activities which are undertaken to avoid suffering have fear as their origin, and those for the sake of getting more, carnal desire. Those undertaken because of necessary requirements, since they seek to satisfy a need of nature, obviously have the force of nature behind them making survival our own essential concern. But if someone says that noble practical activities are free from enchantment, or, if they are not, contemplation also, which is of noble objects, is under enchantment, [the answer is] that if one carries out the so-called noble activities as necessary ones, and grasps that what is really noble is something else, one has not been enchanted—for one knows the necessity, and does not look to this world, and one's life is not directed to other things—but one has been enchanted in this way by the force of human nature and by the essential concern for the survival of others, or indeed of oneself—for it seems, perhaps, reasonable not to take oneself out of this world on account of this essential concern. But if one is content with the nobility in practical activities, and chooses activity because one is deluded by its vestiges of nobility, one has been enchanted in one's pursuit of the nobility in the lower world; for, in general, to be actively occupied with the semblance of truth and drawn towards it in any way is characteristic of someone who has been deluded by the forces which draw one to the lower

30 ἐλκόντων· τοῦτο δὲ ἢ τῆς φύσεως γοητεία ποιεῖ·
 τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἀγαθὸν διώκειν ἐλχθέντα τῷ
 ἐκείνῳ εἶδει ἀλόγοις ὀρμαῖς, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀγομένου
 ὅπου μὴ ἤθελεν οὐκ εἰδότης. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν τις
 ἄλλο ἢ γοητεῖαν εἴποι; μόνος οὖν ἀγοήτευτος, ὃς
 ἐλκόμενος τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτοῦ μέρεσι τούτων οὐδὲν
 35 ἀγαθὸν λέγει εἶναι ὧν ἐκείνα λέγει, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὃ
 οἶδεν αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠπατημένος οὐδὲ διώκων, ἀλλ'
 ἔχων. οὐκ ἂν οὖν ἔλκοιτο οὐδαμοῦ.

45. Ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀπάντων ἐκείνο
 φανερόν, ὅτι, ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἔχει
 φύσεως καὶ διαθέσεως, οὕτω τοι συντελεῖ εἰς τὸ
 πᾶν καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἕκαστου
 5 ζώου ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν, ὡς ἔχει φύσεως καὶ
 κατασκευῆς, οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ὅλον συντελεῖ καὶ
 ὑπουργεῖ καὶ τάξεως καὶ χρεῖας ἡξίωται· δίδωσίν
 τε τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ δέχεται τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων,
 ὅσων αὐτῷ δεκτικὴ ἢ φύσις· καὶ ὅλον συναίσθησις
 παντὸς πρὸς πᾶν· καὶ εἰ ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν μερῶν
 10 καὶ ζῶον ἦν, εἶχεν ἂν καὶ ζώου ἔργα ἕτερα ὄντα
 τῶν τοῦ μέρους. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐκείνο ἀναφαίνεται,
 ὅπως τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔχει, ὡς ποιῶντες τι καὶ ἡμεῖς
 ἐν τῷ παντί, οὐ μόνον ὅσα σῶμα πρὸς σῶμα καὶ
 πάσχον ἀπὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἔτι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην αὐτῶν
 φύσιν εἰσφερόμεθα συναφθέντες τοῖς συγγενέσιν
 15 οἷς ἔχομεν πρὸς τὰ συγγενῆ τῶν ἕξω· καὶ δὴ καὶ
 ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν καὶ διαθέσει συναφεῖς γινόμενοι,
 μᾶλλον δὲ ὄντες, πρὸς τε τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἐν τῷ δαιμονίῳ

world: this is what the magic of nature does; for to pursue what is not good as if it was good, drawn by the appearance of good by irrational impulses, belongs to one who is being ignorantly led where he does not want to go. And what would anyone call this other than magical enchantment? The man, then, is alone free from enchantment who when his other parts are trying to draw him says that none of the things are good which they declare to be so, but only that which he knows himself, not deluded or pursuing, but possessing it. So he would not be drawn in any direction.

45. From everything which has been said this is perfectly clear, that each thing in the All, according to how it is in nature and disposition, contributes to the All and is acted upon and acts, just as in each individual living thing each of the parts, according to how it is in nature and condition, contributes to the whole and serves its purposes and has its own proper rank and utility; it gives what comes from it and receives as much of what comes from the others as its nature is capable of receiving; and all has a kind of common awareness of all; and if each of the parts was a living being, it would have functions as a living being different from its functions as a part. And this too has become obvious, how it is with us, that we too do something in the All, not only all that body does to body, and the kind of ways in which body is affected in return, but we also introduce the other nature which we have, in that we are connected by what we have that is akin to us in things outside us: we have certainly become connected, or rather we are connected, by our souls and dispositions both to what is next to us in the region of

τόπω καὶ τὰ ἐπέκεινα αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως λαν-
 θάνομεν ὁποῖοί τινες ἐσμέν. οὐ τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τὰ
 αὐτὰ πάντες δίδομεν οὐδὲ ταυτὸν δεχόμεθα· ὁ γὰρ
 20 μὴ ἔχομεν πῶς ἂν μεταδοίημεν ἄλλῳ, οἷον ἀγαθόν;
 οὐδ' αὖ τῷ μὴ δεκτικῷ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθόν τι κομιού-
 μεθα. τὴν οὖν αὐτοῦ τις κακίαν συνάψας ἐγνώσθη
 τε ὅς ἐστι καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ὥσθη εἰς ὃ
 ἔχει καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀπαλλαγεῖς εἰς
 25 ἄλλον τοιοῦτον τόπον φύσεως ὀλκαῖς. τῷ δὲ
 ἀγαθῷ αἱ τε λήψεις αἱ τε δόσεις καὶ αἱ μεταθέσεις
 ἄλλαι, ὥσπερ ἐκ μηρύθων ὀλκαῖς τισι φύσεως
 μεταπιθεμένων. οὕτω θαυμαστῶς ἔχει δυνάμει
 καὶ τάξεως τὸδε τὸ πᾶν γινόμενων ἀπάντων
 ἀψόφῳ κελεύθῳ κατὰ δίκην, ἣν οὐκ ἔστι
 φυγεῖν οὐδενί, ἧς ἐπάτει μὲν ὁ φαῦλος οὐδέν,
 30 ἄγεται δὲ οὐκ εἰδῶς οἱ δεῖ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φέρεσθαι.
 ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ οἶδε, καὶ οὐ δεῖ ἄπεισι, καὶ
 γινώσκει πρὶν ἀπιέναι οὐδ' ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἐλθόντι
 οἰκεῖν, καὶ εὐελπίς ἐστιν, ὡς μετὰ θεῶν ἔσοιτο.
 ἐν μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγῳ ζῶν σμικρὰ τῶν μερῶν αἱ
 μεταβολαὶ καὶ συναισθήσεις καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν
 35 αὐτῷ τὰ μέρη ζῶα εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πον ἐπὶ βραχὺ

¹ As in IV. 3. 15-17 (see notes there) some influence of the "cosmic religiosity" of the period can be detected here. The "region of the spirits" is the air, "what lies beyond them" is the Upper Cosmos of the heavenly bodies.

² Plotinus is here summarising the doctrine of Plato *Laus* X 903E ff., with a reminiscence of the passage about men as

the spirits and to what lies beyond them and it is impossible that it should be unknown what sort of people we are.¹ But of course we do not all give the same things, or receive the same: for how could we give to another what we have not got—for instance, good? Nor, again, could we get any good if we have an incapacity to receive it. Anyone, therefore, who connects up his wickedness is recognised for what he is, and according to his own nature is thrust into that which holds him here in this world, and, when he escapes from here, into another region of the same kind by the pull of nature. But for the good man his acts of taking and giving and his transferences are different, since [all things] are transferred by pulls of nature as if they were drawn by lines.² So wonderfully is this All possessed of power and order; all things go their quiet way according to a justice which nobody can escape; the bad man understands nothing of it, but is taken without knowing it to the place in the All to which he is destined to be carried; but the good man both knows and departs where he must, and knows before he departs where it is necessary for him to come and dwell, and has the good hope that he will be with gods.³ For in a small living being the changes of the parts and their mutual perceptions of each other are little ones, and it is not possible for the parts in it to be living beings—except perhaps for a short time in some things⁴; but

puppets of the gods moved by strings in I 644D-E (*υμῆρινθοι* 644E2). The "quiet way" is from Euripides *Troades* 887-8.

³ Cp. Plato *Phaedo* 63B-C.

⁴ Plotinus may possibly be thinking here of Aristotle's reflections on the psychology of cut-up insects in *De Anima* A 5, 411b19-22 and B 2, 413b19-24.

ἐν τισιν ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐν ᾧ διαστάσεις τε τοσαῦται
 καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ χάλασιν ἔχει καὶ ζῳά
 ἐστὶ πολλά, τὰς κινήσεις δὲ καὶ τὰς μεταστάσεις
 μείζους εἶναι. ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην
 καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα ἐν τάξει μετατιθέμενα καὶ
 40 μετακινούμενα. οὐ τοίνυν ἄλογον οὐδὲ τὰς ψυχὰς
 μετατίθεσθαι μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ ἦθος σφριζόμενας, τατ-
 τομένους δὲ ἀνάλογον ὧν ἔπαθον καὶ ποιούσι, τάξιν
 οἷον κεφαλῆς, τὰς δὲ οἷον ποδῶν λαβούσας, πρὸς τὸ
 πᾶν σύμφωνον. ἔχει γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς πρὸς τὸ
 45 ἄμεινόν τε καὶ χεῖρον. ἢ δ' ἂν μήτε τὸ ἄμεινον τὸ
 ἐνταῦθα αἰρήται μήτε τοῦ χείρονος μετέχουσα ἢ,
 ἄλλον τόπον καὶ καθαρὸν ἠλλάξατο τοῦτον, ὃν
 εἴλετο, λαβοῦσα. αἱ δὲ κολάσεις ὥσπερ νενοσηκότων
 μερῶν, τῶν μὲν ἐπιστύψεις φαρμάκοις, τῶν δὲ
 ἐξαιρέσεις ἢ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις, ἵνα ὑγιαίνοι τὸ πᾶν
 50 ἐκάστου διατιθεμένου οὐ δεῖ. τὸ δ' ὑγιεινὸν τοῦ
 παντός ἀλλοιουμένου, τοῦ δὲ ἐξαιρουμένου ἐντεῦθεν,
 ὡς ἐνθαδὶ νοσοῦντος, οὐ δὲ μὴ νοσήσει, τιθεμένου.

in that in which the distances are so great and each
 of the things in it has freedom of movement, and
 there are many living beings, the movements and
 transitions must be greater. And we see that the
 sun and moon and the other heavenly bodies make
 their transits and move from place to place in order.
 It is not then unreasonable either for souls to change
 their places, since they do not always keep the same
 character, and are ranked in accordance with their
 experiences and actions, some receiving a rank like
 that of the head, others like that of the feet, in tune
 with the All: for the All itself has differences of
 better and worse. But the soul which neither chooses
 what is better here below, nor has any part in what
 is worse, changes to another place, a pure one, and
 has the position which it chose. But the punish-
 ments are like [the medical treatment] of diseased
 parts; some have caustics applied to them, others
 are extracted or modified, so that the All may be
 healthy when every part is disposed where it should
 be; but the healthy state of the All comes about
 when one part is modified, and another extracted
 from the place where it is diseased and placed where
 it will not be diseased.

IV. 5. (29) ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΑΠΟΡΙΩΝ
ΤΡΙΤΟΝ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΟΨΕΩΣ

1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπερεθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, εἰ μηδενὸς
ὄντος μεταξύ ἔστιν ὄραν οἶον ἀέρος ἢ ἄλλον τινὸς
τοῦ λεγομένου διαφανοῦς σώματος, νῦν σκεπτέον.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν διὰ σώματός τινος δεῖ τὸ ὄραν καὶ
5 ὅλως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι γίνεσθαι, εἴρηται· ἄνευ μὲν
γὰρ σώματος πάντη ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.
τοῦ δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὄντος ἀντιλήψεως οὐ νοητῶν,
ἀλλὰ αἰσθητῶν μόνον, δεῖ πως τὴν ψυχὴν συναφῆ
γενομένην τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς διὰ τῶν προσομοίων
κοινωνίαν τινα πρὸς αὐτὰ γνώσεως ἢ παθήματος
10 ποιείσθαι. διὸ καὶ δι' ὀργάνων σωματικῶν ἢ
γνώσις· διὰ γὰρ τούτων οἶον συμφυῶν ἢ συνεχῶν
ὄντων οἶον εἰς ἓν πως πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἰέναι,
ὁμοπαθείας τινὸς οὕτω πρὸς αὐτὰ γενομένης. εἰ
οὖν δεῖ συναφὴν τινα πρὸς τὰ γνωσκόμενα γίνεσθαι,
15 περὶ μὲν τῶν ὅσα ἀφῆ τιμι γινώσκεται, τί ἂν τις
ζητοῖ; περὶ δὲ τῆς ὀράσεως—εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς
ἀκοῆς, ὕστερον—ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄραν, εἰ δεῖ τι
280

IV. 5. ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE
SOUL III, OR ON SIGHT

1. Since we undertook¹ to investigate whether it is possible to see without any medium, like air or some other body of the kind called transparent, we must now carry out the investigation. Now we have said that seeing, and in general sense-perception, must take place by means of some body; for without body the soul is wholly in the intelligible world. Since sense-perception is an apprehension, not of intelligible objects, but of sense-objects alone, the soul must somehow be connected with sense-objects through things which are very much like them and establish a sort of communion of knowledge or affection with them. This is why this knowledge comes through bodily organs; for through these, which are in a way naturally united to or continuous with sense-objects, the soul must somehow in some way come to a unity with the sense-objects themselves, and so a sort of common affection with them must arise. If then there must be a connection with the objects which are being known, why should one investigate all the things which are known by some kind of touch? But about seeing—we shall discuss later if we also ought to include hearing—but about sight, we must enquire whether there must be

¹ In IV. 4. 23. 42 ff. The reference back in the next sentence is to the same chapter.

μεταξὺ εἶναι σῶμα τῆς ἄφειας καὶ τοῦ χρώματος.
 ἢ νύττοι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν τὸ μεταξὺ σῶμα,
 συμβάλλεται δὲ οὐδὲν πρὸς ὄρασιν τοῖς ὄρωσιν;
 20 ἀλλ' εἰ πυκνὰ μὲν ὄντα τὰ σώματα, ὥσπερ τὰ
 γεηρά, κωλύει ὄραν, ὅσῳ δὲ λεπτότερα αἰεὶ τὰ
 μεταξὺ, μᾶλλον ὄρωμεν, συνεργὰ ἂν τις τοῦ ὄραν τὰ
 μεταξὺ θείη. ἢ, εἰ οὐ συνεργά, οὐ κωλυτικά· ταῦτα
 δὲ κωλυτικά ἂν τις εἴποι. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ πάθος πρό-
 τερον τὸ μεταξὺ παραδέχεται καὶ οἶον τυπούται—
 25 σημεῖον δὲ τό, εἰ καὶ ἔμπροσθέν τις ἡμῶν ἔστη¹
 πρὸς τὸ χρώμα βλέπων, κάκεῖνον ὄραν—πάθους ἐν
 τῷ μεταξὺ μὴ γενομένου οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς τοῦτο
 ἀφικνοῖτο. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μεταξὺ πάσχειν, εἰ τὸ
 πεφυκὸς πάσχειν—ὁ ὀφθαλμός—πάσχει. ἢ, εἰ
 30 πάσχοι, ἄλλο πάσχει. ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ὁ κάλαμος ὁ
 μεταξὺ τῆς νάρκης καὶ τῆς χειρός, ὁ πάσχει ἢ χεῖρ·
 καὶ μὴν κάκεῖ, εἰ μὴ μεταξὺ ὁ κάλαμος εἶη καὶ ἢ
 θρίξ, οὐκ ἂν πάθῃ ἢ χεῖρ. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ αὐτὸ
 ἀμφισβητοῖτο ἂν· καὶ γάρ, εἰ ἐντὸς δικτύου γένοιτο,
 ὁ θηρευτῆς πάσχειν λέγεται τὸ ναρκᾶν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ
 35 κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τὰς λεγομένας συμπαθείας
 εἶναι. εἰ δὲ τοδὶ ὑπὸ τουδὶ πέφυκε πάσχειν συμπα-

¹ Beutler: ἔσται ἢ Enn.: ἔσται ἢ H-S¹: ἔσται Kirchhoff, Volkmann*.

some body between the eye and the colour. Or does the body in between impinge¹ incidentally on the sight, but contribute nothing to the seeing for those who see? But if when the bodies in between are dense, earthy for instance, they prevent us seeing, but we see better in proportion as the intervening bodies are subtler, one might maintain that the intermediaries are a help to sight. Otherwise, if they cannot be a help, they cannot be a hindrance: but one would say that earthy bodies are a hindrance. But if the body in between receives the affection first, and is in a way stamped by it—an indication that this is so is the fact that if someone is standing in front of us, in so far as he is looking at the colour, he sees it too—then, if there was no affection in the intermediary, this would not reach us either. But on the other hand it is not necessary that the intermediary should be affected if that which is naturally disposed to be affected—the eye—is affected; or if it is affected, it is affected in a different way: for the rod which is between the torpedo-fish and the hand is not affected at all in the same way as the hand; and certainly there too, if the rod and the line were not in between, the hand would not be affected.² Or even this might be disputed: for if the torpedo-fish gets into a net, the fisherman is said to receive a shock. But really the discussion seems to be moving in the direction of the sympathies we

¹ The word *νύττοι* was used in this context by the Stoics; cp. Alexander of Aphrodisias *Mantissa* p. 130, 15 Bruns (=SVF II. 864).

² The example of the torpedo-fish is probably drawn from ordinary observation; but the comparison of Scrates to the fish in Plato *Meno* 80A may have suggested it to Plotinus.

θῶς τῇ τινα ὁμοιότητα ἔχειν πρὸς αὐτό, οὐκ ἂν τὸ μεταξὺ ἀνόμοιον ὄν πάθοι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐκ ἂν πάθοι. εἰ τοῦτο, πολλῶ μᾶλλον μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξὺ πάθοι ἂν τὸ πεφυκὸς πάσχειν, κἂν τὸ μεταξὺ
40 τοιοῦτον ἦ, οἷον αὐτὸ καὶ παθεῖν τι.

2. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ ὄραν, οἷον τὸ τῆς ὄψεως φῶς συνάπτειν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ [φῶς]¹ μέχρι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, δεῖ μεταξὺ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ φῶς, καὶ ἢ ὑπόθεσις αὐτῇ τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦτο ζητεῖ. εἰ δὲ
5 τροπὴν ἐργάζεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον σῶμα κεχρωσμένον, τί κωλύει τὴν τροπὴν εὐθὺς πρὸς τὸ ὄμμα εἶναι μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξὺ; εἰ καὶ νῦν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὅτε ἐστί, τρέπεται πῶς τὸ τῶν ὀμμάτων πρόσθεν κείμενον. καὶ οἱ ἐκχέοντες δὲ τὰς ὄψεις οὐκ ἂν
10 μὴ φοβοῦντο, μὴ πέση ἢ ἀκτίς· ἀλλὰ φωτὸς ἐστί, καὶ τὸ φῶς εὐθυποροῦν. οἱ δὲ τὴν ἔνστασιν αἰτιώμενοι δέονται ἂν πάντως τοῦ μεταξὺ τι εἶναι, εἰ εἰδῶλων προστάται διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ λέγοντες διέναι
15 χώραν ζητοῦσιν, ἵνα μὴ κωλυθῇ· ὥστε, εἰ ἔτι μᾶλλον οὐ κωλύσει τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι μεταξὺ, οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῇ ὑποθέσει. ὅσοι δὲ συμπαθεῖα τὸ

¹ delevimus.

¹ This very summary sketch of the doctrines of earlier philosophers, which introduces Plotinus's own view that seeing is by sympathy, seems to depend on earlier brief collections and summary refutations of philosophical theories of vision: cp. especially Alexander of Aphrodisias op. cit. pp. 127, 17 ff. Bruns; also Pseudo-Plutarch *De Placitis Philosophorum*

talk about. But if one thing is naturally disposed to be sympathetically affected by another because it has some kind of likeness to it, then the intermediary between them, being unlike, would not be affected, or would not be affected in the same way. If this is so, then that which is naturally disposed to be affected would be so much more if there was nothing in between them, even if the intermediary was of such a kind as to be affected also in some way itself.

2. If then seeing is an activity of such a kind that the light of the eye connects with the intermediary which extends as far as the seen object, the light must be this intermediary, and this supposition requires this intermediary; but if the coloured body which is the object brings about an alteration [in the eye], what prevents the alteration getting to the eye immediately without any intermediary? This is all the more likely if, even as things are, that which is situated immediately in front of the eyes, when it is there, is necessarily altered in some way. Those who regard seeing as an efflux [of light from the eye] would not in consequence have to maintain that there was any intermediary at all, unless they were afraid that the ray might fall down, but it is a ray of light, and light goes straight. Those who regard resistance as the cause of sight would have every reason for requiring an intermediary. The advocates of images, who say that these pass through the void, require space to prevent obstruction; so that, if the absence of an intermediary will result in even less obstruction, they have no quarrel with the supposition.¹

IV. 13, 901A-C; other references in the notes of the Harder-Beutler-Theiler edition II b, p. 548.

ὁρᾶν λέγουσιν, ἤττον μὲν ὁρᾶν φήσουσιν, εἴ τι
 μεταξὺ εἴη, ἣ κωλύοι καὶ ἐμποδίζοι καὶ ἀμυδρὰν
 ποιοῖ τὴν συμπάθειαν· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀκόλουθον λέγειν
 ποιεῖν πάντως ἀμυδρὰν καὶ τὸ συγγενές, ἣ καὶ
 20 αὐτὸ πάσχον. καὶ γὰρ εἰ σῶμα συνεχές ἐν βάθει
 ἐκ προσβολῆς πυρὸς καίοιτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν βάθει
 αὐτοῦ τῆ προυβολῆ τοῦ πρόσθεν ἤττον ἂν πάσχοι.
 ἀλλ' εἰ ζῶου ἐνὸς μόρια εἴη συμπαθῆ, ἀρ' ἂν
 ἤττον πάθοι, ὅτι μεταξὺ τί ἐστῶ; ἣ ἤττον μὲν ἂν
 πάθοι, σύμμετρον δ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, ὅσον ἐβούλετο
 25 ἣ φύσις, κωλύοντος τὸ ἄγαν τοῦ μεταξὺ· εἰ μὴ
 που τοιοῦτον εἴη τὸ διδόμενον, ὥστε ὅλως τὸ
 μεταξὺ μὴ πάσχειν. ἀλλ' εἰ συμπαθές τῶ ἐν ζῶον
 εἶναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν ὅτι ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ ἐνός, πῶς
 οὐ δεῖ, ὅταν τοῦ πόρρω αἰσθησις ἦ, συνέχειαν εἶναι;
 ἣ τὴν συνέχειαν καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ διὰ τὸ τὸ ζῶον δεῖν
 30 συνεχές εἶναι, τὸ δὲ πάθος κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
 συνεχοῦς, ἣ πᾶν ὑπὸ παντὸς φήσομεν πάσχειν. εἰ
 δὲ τόδε μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦδε, ἄλλο δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλου οὐ τὸ
 αὐτό, οὐκ ἂν δεοίτο τις τοῦ μεταξὺ πανταχοῦ. εἰ
 οὖν ἐπὶ ὁμίεις λέγοι τις δεῖσθαι, διὰ τί φατέον·
 ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ πανταχοῦ φαίνεται τὸ δι' ἀέρος ἴν
 35 πάσχειν ποιῶν τὸν ἀέρα, ἀλλ' ἣ μόνον διαιρεῖν·
 εἶον λίθος εἰ ἄνωθεν πίπτει, τί ἄλλο ἣ οὐχ ὑπομένει

But all those who say that seeing takes place by
 sympathy will assert that one would see less well if
 there was any intermediary, in that it would obstruct
 and hinder and weaken the sympathy; but it would
 be more consistent to say that even that which is
 akin in all circumstances weakens the sympathy, in
 so far as it is itself affected. Certainly, if a body
 continuous to the bottom is set alight by the applica-
 tion of fire, all the same the bottom of it will be less
 affected by the fire applied to it than the part before
 it. But if the parts of one living being are in
 sympathy will they be less affected because there
 is something between them? Yes, perhaps they
 might be less affected, but the affection would be in
 the proportion which nature willed, and the inter-
 mediary would prevent excess: unless what is con-
 ceded amounts to this, that the intermediary is not
 affected at all. But if sympathy depends on being
 one living thing, and we are affected because we are
 in one and belong to one, how is continuity not
 needed when there is perception of something far
 off? The answer is that continuity and the inter-
 mediary are there because the living being must be
 continuous, but the affection is only incidentally of
 something continuous, or we shall have to say that
 everything is affected by everything. But if one
 thing is affected by one thing and another by another,
 not in the same way, one would have no need at all
 of an intermediary. If then someone says that an
 intermediary is needed in the case of sight, he must
 say why; since it does not seem to be even generally
 true that what goes through the air produces any
 effect on the air, apart from simply dividing it: for
 instance, if a stone falls from above, does anything

ὁ ἀήρ; ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τῆ ἀντιπεριστάσει εὐλογον κατὰ φύσιν οὐσης τῆς φορᾶς· ἐπεὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἄνω τῆ ἀντιπεριστάσει· ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· φθάνει γὰρ τὸ πῦρ
 40 τῆ αὐτοῦ κινήσει ταχεῖα οὔση τὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν τοῦ ἀέρος. εἰ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ τάχους ταχύνεσθαί τις τὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν φησιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν γίνοντο, οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἄνωθεν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ξύλων ἡ ὄρμη πρὸς τὸ ἄνω οὐκ ὠθούντων· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ κινούμενοι τέμνομεν τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ οὐχ ἡ
 45 ἀντιπερίστασις ὠθεῖ, πληροῖ δὲ μόνον ἐφεπόμενος τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν κενούμενον. εἰ οὖν τοῖς σώμασι δύσταται τοῖς τοιοῦτοις μηδὲν παθῶν, τί κωλύει καὶ ἄνευ διαστάσεως συγχωρεῖν παριέναι τοῖς εἰς ὄψιν εἶδεσιν; εἰ δὲ μηδὲ πάρεσιν ὡς ἐν ῥοῇ τὰ εἶδη, τίς πάσχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ πάθος
 50 πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῷ προπαθεῖν ἵεναι; εἰ γὰρ τῷ προπαθεῖν τὸν ἀέρα ἢ αἰσθησις ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἂν πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποντες τὸ ὀρώμενον εἶδομεν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ παρακειμένου ἔσχομεν ἂν τὴν αἰσθησιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ θερμαίνεσθαι. ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὸ πόρρωθεν πῦρ, ἀλλὰ
 55 ὁ ἀήρ ὁ παρακείμενος θερμανθεὶς θερμαίνειν δοκεῖ· ἀφή γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὀράμασιν οὐχ ἀφή· ὅθεν οὐδ' ἐπιτεθὲν τῷ ὀμματι τὸ αἰσθητὸν ὄραν ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ φωτισθῆναι δεῖ τὸ μεταξύ· ἢ ὅτι σκοτεινὸν ὁ

¹ Cp. again Alexander of Aphrodisias op. cit. 129, 1 Bruns.

² Cp. IV. 6. 1. 32-3; Aristotle *De Anima* B 7, 419a12-13.

else happen except that the air does not stay as it is? For it is unreasonable to say [that the stone falls] as the result of the reciprocal thrust¹ of bodies, when its fall is natural, since if this was so fire would go upwards by reciprocal thrust: /but this is absurd, for the fire by the speed of its movement gets ahead of the reciprocal thrust of air. But if anyone says that the reciprocal thrust is speeded up by the speed of the movement of fire, this would all the same happen incidentally, and would not cause the upward movement; for in trees also the impulse to grow upwards comes from themselves, without anything pushing them; and we when we are in motion cut through the air, and the reciprocal thrust does not push us on, but only follows us and fills up the place we have left empty. If then the air parts to make way for bodies like these without being affected, what prevents it from allowing passage, even without parting, for the forms which come to our sight? But if the forms do not even pass through the air as if in a stream, what need is there for the air to be affected and for the affection to reach us through it as the result of its previous affection? For if our perception resulted from the air being previously affected, when we looked at the object of sight we should not see it, but we should get our perception from the air which lay close to us, just as when we are warmed. For in this case it is not considered to be the distant fire, but the warmed air lying close, that warms us; for warming is by contact, but in acts of seeing there is no contact; this is the reason why the sense-object does not produce sight when it is placed on the eye,² but the intermediary space must be illu-

ἀήρ. μὴ ὄντος δὲ τούτου σκοτεινοῦ οὐδ' ἂν ἐδέησε φωτὸς ἴσως. τὸ γὰρ σκοτεινὸν ἐμπόδιον ὄν τοῦ
60 ὄραν δεῖ κρατηθῆναι τῷ φωτί. τάχα δὲ ἂν καὶ
προσαχθὲν τῇ ὄψει οὐχ ὄραται, ὅτι σκιὰν φέρει
τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ.

3. Μέγιστον δὲ μαρτύριον τοῦ μὴ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος
παθόντος τὸ εἶδος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ὄραν [καὶ τὰς τού-
των μορφὰς]¹ ἄσπερ διαδόσει τὸ νύκτωρ ἐν σκότῳ
πῦρ τε καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ὄρασθαι καὶ τὰς τούτων μορ-
ῆ φάς. οὐ γὰρ δὴ φήσει τις ἐν τῷ σκοτεινῷ τὰ εἶδη
γενόμενα οὕτω σινάψασθαι ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν σκότος
τοῦ πυρὸς ἐλλάμψαντος τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος. ἐπεὶ καὶ
πάνυ πολλοῦ σκότου ὄντος καὶ κεκρυμμένων καὶ
τῶν ἄστρων [καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς]² καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ
παρ' αὐτῶν μὴ ἐλλάμποντος ἐκ τῶν φρυκτωριῶν
10 ὄραται τὸ πῦρ, καὶ ἐκ τῶν πύργων τῶν ταῖς ναυσὶ
σημαινόντων. εἰ δὲ καὶ διέναι τις λέγοι καὶ ἐν
τούτοις τὸ πῦρ ἐναντιούμενος τῇ αἰσθήσει, ἐχρῆν
τὴν ὄψιν τοῦ ἀμυδροῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν
ἀντίληψιν, οὐκ ἐκεῖνου αὐτοῦ, οἷόν ἐστιν ἐναργές.
εἰ δὲ μεταξύ σκότου ὄντος ὄραται τὸ ἐπέκεινα,
15 πολλῷ μᾶλλον μηδενός. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνω ἂν τις ἐπιστή-
σειε, μὴ τῷ μεταξύ μηδεν οὐκ ἔσται ὄραν, οὐχ ὅτι
μηδὲν ἔστι μεταξύ, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡ συμπάθεια τοῦ ζῶον
ἀναιρεῖται πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν μερῶν
τῷ ἐν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι

¹ del. Kirchhoff, ut iteratum e lin. 4.

² del. Volkmann*.

minated—or this may be because the air is [naturally] dark. If it was not dark, it would not perhaps need light. For the darkness which hinders seeing needs to be mastered by the light. But perhaps when the object is applied to the eye it is not seen because it brings with it the shadow of the air and its own shadow.

3. The most important evidence that we do not see the form of the sense-object by a kind of transmission through the medium of the air which has been affected is that fire and the heavenly bodies and their shapes are seen by night. For certainly nobody will assert that the forms come to be present in the darkness and so make connection with the eye: or there would not be a darkness, as the fire would radiate its own form. For even when it is very dark indeed and the stars are hidden and the light from them does not shine, the fire from beacons and light-houses is seen. But if someone, contradicting the evidence of the senses, says that even in these cases the fire passes through the air, then the eye would have to apprehend the dimness in the air, not that original fire in all its brightness. But if when darkness intervenes what lies beyond is seen, it would be all the more visible with nothing intervening. But one might pause to consider this further point, whether it is not possible to see in the absence of an intermediary, not because there is no intermediary but because the sympathy of the living being with itself and of its parts with each other, which depends on being one thing, will be done away with. For it

20 ὁμοιοῦν εἶναι, ὅτι συμπαθὲς τὸ ζῶον—τόδε τὸ πᾶν
 —ἑαυτῷ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, πῶς ἂν ἄλλο ἄλλου τῆς
 δυνάμεως μετελάμβανε καὶ μάλιστα τῆς πόρρω;
 τοῦτο δὴ ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ ἄλλος κόσμος ἦν καὶ ἄλλο
 ζῶον μὴ σπντελοῦν πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ ὄψις ἦν ἐπὶ
 τοῖς νώτοις τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, εἰ ἐθεάσατο ἐκεῖνον
 25 ἐκ διαστήματος συμμέτρον· ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη πρὸς
 ἐκεῖνον τούτῳ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ
 κάκεῖνο ἂν τις μαρτύραιοτο εἰς τὸ μὴ τῷ πάσχειν τὸ
 μεταξὺ τούτῳ τὸ ὄραν γίνεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ δὴ πάσχει
 τὸ τοῦ ἀέρος, σωματικῶς δῆπουθεν ἀνάγκη πάσ-
 χειν· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν οἶον ἐν κηρῷ τύπον γενέσθαι.
 30 μέρος δὴ δεῖ τοῦ ὄρατοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον μόριον τυ-
 ποῦσθαι· ὡστε καὶ τὸ συναφὲς τῇ ὄψει μόριον τοσ-
 οῦτον, ὅσον καὶ ἡ κόρη τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μόριον τοῦ
 ὄρατοῦ δέχοιτο ἄν. νῦν δὲ πᾶν τε ὄραται, καὶ ὅσοι
 ἐν τῷ ἀέρι κατὰ γε τὸ καταντικρὺν ἔκ τε πλαγίων
 ἐπὶ πολὺ ὀρώσιν ἐγγύς τε καὶ κατόπιν οὐκ ἐπιπροσ-

35 θούμενοι· ὥστε ἕκαστον μόριον τοῦ ἀέρος ὅλον
 οἶον τὸ πρόσωπον τὸ ὀρώμενον ἔχειν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ
 κατὰ σώματος πάθημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μείζους καὶ
 ψυχικὰς καὶ ζήου ἐνὸς συμπαθοῦς ἀνάγκας.

4. Ἀλλὰ τὸ συναφὲς τῆς ὄψεως φῶς πρὸς τὸ περι-

looks as if any kind of perception depends on this, that the living being—this All—is in sympathy with itself. For if this were not so, how would one thing share in the power of another, and especially in power from a distance? But we should consider this problem: if there was another universe, that is another living being making no contribution to the life of this one, and there was an eye "on the back of the sky", would it see that other universe at a proportionate distance¹? This universe would have nothing to do with that one. But we will discuss this later. But now one might produce this additional evidence to show that seeing does not happen through the intermediary being affected. For if the intermediary air was affected, the affection would presumably have to be a bodily one; but this means there would have to be an impression, as in wax. Then a part of the seen object would have to be stamped on each part of the air; so that the part of the air in contact with the eye would receive a part of the seen object just as large as the part which the pupil of the eye would receive according to its own size. But as it is, the whole object is seen, and all those who are in the air see it, from the front and sideways, from far and near, and from the back, as long as their line of sight is not blocked; so that each part of the air contains the whole seen object, the face for instance; but this is not a bodily affection, but is brought about by higher necessities of the soul belonging to a single living being in sympathy with itself.

4. But what is the situation with the light of the

¹ The phrase "on the back of the sky" is taken from Plato *Phaedrus* 247B7-C1. This interesting speculation is pursued further in ch. 8: see note there.

τὴν ὄψιν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ πῶς; ἡ πρῶτον
 μὲν τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀέρος οὐ δεῖται, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ φῶς
 οὐκ ἂν ἀέρος ἄνευ λέγοιτο. οὕτω δὲ τοῦτο μεταξὺ
 5 κατὰ συμβεβηκός, αὐτὸ δὲ φῶς ἂν εἴη μεταξὺ οὐ
 πάσχον· οὐδ' ὅλως πάθους ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ἀλλ'
 ὅμως τοῦ μεταξὺ· εἰ δὲ τὸ φῶς οὐ σῶμα, οὐ
 σώματος. καὶ δὴ οὐ πρὸς τὸ ὄραν ἀπλῶς δέοιτο ἂν
 τοῦ φωτός τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου καὶ μεταξὺ ἡ ὄψις, ἀλλὰ
 πρὸς τὸ πόρρω ὄραν. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ τὸ φῶς γένοιτο
 10 ἄνευ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο σκεπτέον.
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ φῶς τοῦτο τὸ συναφές ἔμφυχον
 γίνεται, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ δι' αὐτοῦ φερομένη καὶ ἐν
 αὐτῷ γιγνομένη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔνδον, ἐν τῷ
 ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δῆπουθεν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὄραν, οὐδὲν
 15 ἂν δέοιτο τοῦ μεταξὺ φωτός, ἀλλ' ἀφή ἔσται εἰκότως
 τὸ ὄραν τῆς ὀρατικῆς δυνάμεως ἐν φωτὶ ἀντιλαμ-
 βανομένης πάσχοντος οὐδὲν τοῦ μεταξὺ, ἀλλὰ
 γίνεται τῆς ὄψεως φορὰ ἐκεῖ. οὐ δὴ ζητητέον,
 πότερα τῷ διάστημά τι εἶναι ἐκεῖ δεῖ πορευθῆναι
 τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τῷ σῶμά τι εἶναι ἐν τῷ διαστήματι.
 20 καὶ εἰ μὲν τῷ σῶμα ἐν τῷ διαστήματι εἶναι τὸ
 διεύργον, εἰ ἀφαιρθεὶς τοῦτο, ὄψεται· εἰ δ' ὅτι
 διάστημα ἀπλῶς, ἀργὴν δεῖ ὑποθέσθαι τὴν τοῦ
 ὄρατοῦ φύσιν καὶ οὐδὲν δρῶσαν ὅλως. ἀλλ' οὐχ
 οἶόν τε· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἀφή ὅτι ἐγγύς τι

eye which is connected to the light around the eye and as far as the object? Now first of all the intermediate air is not needed—unless it might be said that the light could not be there without air. In this way the air would be incidentally intermediate, but the light itself would be intermediate without being affected; and in general there is no need of an affection here, but there is, all the same, need for an intermediary; but if the light is not a body, there is no need for a body. And, further, the eye would not need this intermediate light, which is not its own, just for seeing, but only for seeing at a distance. The question then whether light could occur without air will be discussed later¹; but now we must consider our first question. If, then, this connecting light is ensouled, and the soul moves through it and is present in it, as it is also the case with the light within the eye, then of course in the apprehension of the object, which is what seeing is, there would be no need of the intermediate light, but seeing will be like touch; the power of sight will apprehend its object in the light and the intermediary will not be affected but the sight moves to its object. At this point one must enquire whether the sight must move there because there is a space between or because there is a body in the space. And if it is because it is a body in the intervening space which separates sight and object, if this was removed, the sight would see; but if it is simply because there is a space between, one must assume that the nature of the seen object is inert and does nothing at all. But this is not possible: for touch does not only tell us

¹ In ch. 6.

λέγει καὶ ἄπτεται, ἀλλὰ τὰς τοῦ ἀπτοῦ πάσχουσα
 25 ἀπαγγέλλει διαφορὰς, καὶ εἰ μὴ διείργοι τι, κἂν
 τοῦτο πόρρω, ἦσθετο. ἅμα γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ ὁ μεταξὺ
 καὶ ἡμεῖς πυρὸς αἰσθανόμεθα οὐκ ἀναμείναντες
 θερμανθῆναι ἐκεῖνον. μᾶλλον γοῦν τὸ σῶμα
 θερμαίνεται τὸ στερεὸν ἢ ὁ ἀήρ· ὥστε δι' αὐτοῦ
 μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτό. εἰ οὖν ἔχει δύναμιν
 30 εἰς τὸ δρᾶν, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ πάσχειν, ἢ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἢ
 ὄψις, διὰ τί ἄλλον δεῖται μέσου εἰς ὃ δύναται πρὸς
 τὸ ποιῆσαι; τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμποδίου ἐστὶ δεῖσθαι.
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὸ φῶς προσίῃ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, οὐ
 πρότερον δεῖ τὸν ἀέρα εἶτα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ἅμα,
 καὶ πρὶν ἐγγὺς τῆς ὄψεως γενέσθαι πολλῶς
 ὄντος ἀλλαχοῦ, ὡς μὴ παθόντος τοῦ ἀέρος ἡμᾶς
 35 ὄρᾶν, μεταξὺ ὄντος τοῦ μὴ πεπονθότος καὶ τοῦ
 φωτὸς μήπω ἐληλυθότος, πρὸς ὃ δεῖ τὴν ὄψιν
 συνάψαι. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τῆς νυκτὸς ὄρᾶν τὰ ἄστρα
 ἢ ὄλως πῦρ χαλεπὸν ταύτῃ τῇ ὑποθέσει ἀπευθῆναι.
 εἰ δὲ μένει μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, φωτὸς δὲ δεῖται
 40 ὥσπερ βακτηρίας πρὸς τὸ φθάσαι, ἔδει τὴν ἀντίλη-
 ψιν βίαιον καὶ ἀντερείδοντος εἶναι καὶ τεταμένον
 τοῦ φωτός, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, τὸ χρῶμα, ἢ χρῶμα,
 ἀντιτυποῦν καὶ αὐτὸ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ διὰ μέσου αἰ
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that something is near and that it is touching it, but it is affected by and reports the distinctive characteristics of the object, and if there was nothing to separate it, it would perceive the object even if it was a long way off. For the intermediate air and we ourselves perceive a fire at the same time; we do not wait for the air to be warmed. Certainly the solid body¹ is more warmed than the air: so that [the perception of warmth] comes through the air but is not caused by the air. If then the object has the capacity to act, and the recipient of the perception, or in any way the sight, has the capacity to be affected, why does it need another medium to act on what it is capable of acting on? This is to need a hindrance. For when the light of the sun approaches, it does not have to reach the air first and then us, but it reaches both at the same time, and we often perceive it when it is elsewhere, before it comes near our eyes; so we see without the air being affected, with that which has not been affected in between and when the light with which our sight must connect has not yet arrived. Also it would be difficult on this hypothesis to explain correctly how we see the stars, or any kind of fire, at night. But if the soul stays in its own place, but needs light like a stick to reach the object with,² then the apprehension would be a violent business, with the light stretched out and pushing against the object and the object of perception, the colour as colour, itself pressing back: for this is how sensations of touch occur through a medium. And [on this hypothesis] the object was

¹ I.e. our body.

² Again the Stoic theory according to Alexander of Aphrodisias, op. cit. 130, 17 Bruns (—SVF II 867).

ἀφαί. εἶτα καὶ πρότερον ἐγγύς γέγονε μηδενὸς
 μεταξύ ὄντος τότε· οὕτω γὰρ ὕστερον τὸ διὰ
 45 μέσου ἄπτεσθαι ποιεῖ τὴν γνώσιν, οἷον τῇ μνήμῃ
 καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον συλλογισμῶ· νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως.
 ἀλλ' εἰ παθεῖν δεῖ τὸ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν φῶς, εἶτα
 διαδοῦναι μέχρι ὄψεως, ἢ αὐτὴ γίνεται ὑπόθεσις τῇ
 ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τὸ μεταξὺν πρότερον τρεπούση,
 πρὸς ἣν ἤδη καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἠπόρηται.

5. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἄρα ἐνταῦθα συγχωρητέον,
 πάσχοντος τοῦ ἀέρος τὴν κίνησιν τὴν πρώτην τοῦ
 παρακειμένου¹ ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸν ψόφον ποιούντος, τῷ
 τὸν μέχρι ἀκοῆς ἀέρα πάσχειν τὸ αὐτό, οὕτως εἰς
 5 αἰσθησιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι; ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μὲν τὸ
 μεταξύ τῷ παρεῖναι ἐν μέσῳ ἀναιρεθέντος δὲ τοῦ
 μεταξύ, ἅπαξ δὲ γενομένου τοῦ ψόφου, οἷον
 συμβαλλόντων δύο σωμάτων, εὐθέως ἀπαντᾶν
 πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὴν αἰσθησιν; ἢ καὶ δεῖ μὲν ἀέρος τὴν
 πρώτην τοῦ πληττομένου, τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη
 10 ἄλλως τὸ μεταξύ; ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ κύριος
 εἶναι ὁ ἀήρ τοῦ ψόφου· μὴ γὰρ ἂν μηδὲ τὴν
 ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι ψόφον δύο σωμάτων συρραγόντων,
 εἰ μὴ ὁ ἀήρ πληγείς ἐν τῇ ταχείᾳ συνόδῳ αὐτῶν
 καὶ ἐξωσθείς πλήξας ἔδωκε τῷ ἐφεξῆς μέχρῃς
 15 ὧτων καὶ ἀκοῆς. ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ ἀήρ κύριος τοῦ ψόφου
 καὶ τούτου κινήθέντος ἢ πληγῆ, παρὰ τί ἂν εἶεν αἰ

¹ Harder: τὸν παρακείμενον Enn.*: del. Beutler.

formerly close to the eye, and there was nothing
 then between them: for this is the way in which
 touching through a medium causes knowledge, as if
 by memory and, still more, by a process of reasoning:
 but as things are [seeing] is not like this. But if the
 light near the sense-object has to be affected first,
 and the affection then transmitted to the eye, this
 hypothesis becomes the same as that which first
 brings about an alteration in the intermediary which
 originates from the sense-object, against which we
 have raised objections elsewhere.¹

5. But as far as hearing is concerned, must we
 agree that the neighbouring air is given the first
 movement by that which makes the sound, and that
 by the air as far as the ear being affected in the
 same way the movement reaches our perception? Or
 is the intermediary affected incidentally because
 it is in between, and if the intermediary was taken
 away would the sound, once it had occurred, for
 instance when two bodies collide, encounter our
 perception immediately? Or must there be air,
 that which is set vibrating by the first movement, and
 will the intermediary air from that point onwards
 have a different degree of importance? It does
 seem that there air is responsible for sound: for
 there would be no sound at all to begin with when
 two bodies clash together unless the air, struck by
 their quick coming together and pushed out, struck
 the air next to it and so transmitted the vibration
 to our ears and hearing. But if the air is responsible
 for sound and the vibration is of air in motion, what

¹ It is not clear to what Plotinus is referring here. The passage suggested by Henry-Schwyzler, IV. 4. 23. 20 ff. is, as Theiler points out, not very relevant.

διαφοραὶ τῶν φωνῶν καὶ τῶν ψόφων; ἄλλο γὰρ ἤχει χαλκὸς πρὸς χαλκὸν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, ἄλλο δὲ ἄλλο· ὁ δὲ ἀήρ εἰς καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ πληγῇ· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῷ μεγάλῳ καὶ τῷ μικρῷ διαφοραὶ. εἰ δ' 20 ὅτι πρὸς ἀέρα γενομένη πληγῇ ψόφον ἐποίησεν, οὐχ ἢ ἀήρ φατέον· τότε γὰρ φωνεῖ, ὅταν στάσις λάβῃ στερεοῦ σώματος, πρὶν χυθῆναι μένων ὡςπερ στερεόν τι· ὡστε ἄρκεί τὰ συγκρούοντα, καὶ τὴν σύρρηξιν καὶ ταύτην τὴν πληγὴν εἶναι τὸν ψόφον εἰς αἴσθησιν ἐλθοῦσαν· μαρτυρεῖν δὲ καὶ τοὺς 25 ἔνδον ἤχους τῶν ζώων οὐκ ἐν ἀέρι, ἀλλὰ συγκρούσαντος καὶ πλήξαντος ἄλλο ἄλλον· οἷον καὶ ὀστέων κάμψεις καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα παρατριβομένων ἀέρος μὴ ὄντος μεταξὺ [καὶ]¹ πρίσεις. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτου ἠπορήσθω ὁμοίου ἤδη καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ζητήματος γενομένου, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο ἐπὶ τῆς 30 ὀψεως εἶναι, συναισθήσεώς τινος ὡς ἐν ζώῳ καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν πάθους ὄντος.

6. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ φῶς γένοιτο ἂν μὴ ὄντος ἀέρος, οἷον ἡλίου [ὄντος]² ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιλάμποντος, τοῦ μεταξὺ ὄντος κενοῦ καὶ νῦν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι πάρεστι, φωτιζομένου; ἀλλ' εἰ 5 δι' αὐτὸν παθόντα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἶναι τῷ φωτὶ διὰ τὸν ἀέρα—πάθημα γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι—μὴ ἂν οὖν ἔσεσθαι τὸ πάθημα μὴ ὄντος τοῦ πεισομένου. ἢ πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρώτως οὐδ' ἢ αὐτός. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου

¹ del. Theiler.² del. Müller*.

would account for the differences between voices and between other sounds? For bronze when it strikes bronze has a different ring from when it strikes something else, and other things striking others make different noises; but the air is one and so is the vibration in it; the differences of sounds are not just differences of loud and soft. But if a stroke produces sound because it strikes air, it must be admitted that it is not in so far as it is air: for air speaks when it has the static quality of a solid body, when it stays still like something solid before it is set flowing; so that the colliding bodies and their clash are enough [to produce sound] and their impact is the sound which comes to our perception; the sounds inside living beings are evidence of this, which are not in air, but are produced by one part knocking and striking another: bending of joints, for instance, and the grinding of one bone against another with no air between them. But enough of our problems [about hearing]! The line of enquiry has been much the same here too as in the case of sight, since the experience of hearing is a kind of common awareness of the sort which occurs in a living being.

6. But could light also occur if there was no air, as when the sun shines upon the surfaces of bodies, if the intermediary was void—and even as things are the intermediary is illuminated incidentally, because it is there? But if light resulted from an affection of air and the other [translucent bodies], and light had its substantial existence through the air—for it would be an affection of it—the affection could not exist without something to be affected. Now, first of all light does not belong primarily to air, nor to air in virtue of its intrinsic character; for it belongs

σώματος πυρίνου καὶ λαμπροῦ· καὶ δὴ καὶ λίθων
 10 τοιούτων φωτεινὴ χροῖα. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰς ἄλλο ἀπὸ τοῦ
 ἔχοντος χροῖαν τοιαύτην ἴδν ἄρα ἂν εἴη μὴ ὄντος
 ἐκείνου; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ποιότης μόνον καὶ τινος
 ποιότης, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὐσης πάσης ποιότητος,
 ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ φῶς ζητεῖν ἐν ᾧ ἔσται σῶματι. εἰ
 δὲ ἐνέργεια ἀπ' ἄλλου, διὰ τί οὐκ ὄντος ἐφεξῆς
 15 σώματος, ἀλλὰ οἷον κενοῦ μεταξύ, εἴπερ οἷον τε,
 οὐκ ἔσται καὶ ἐπιβαλεῖ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα; ἀνεπὲς
 γὰρ ὄν διὰ τί οὐ περάσει οὐκ ἐποχοῦμενον; εἰ δὲ
 δὴ καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον πεσεῖν, καταφερόμενον ἔσται.
 οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὁ ἀήρ οὐδ' ὅλως τὸ φωτιζόμενον ἔσται
 20 τὸδε ἔλκον ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτίζοντος καὶ βιαζόμενον
 προελθεῖν· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ συμβεβηκός, ὥστε πάντως
 ἐπ' ἄλλῳ, ἢ πάθημα ἄλλου, ὥστε δεῖ εἶναι τὸ
 πεισόμενον· ἢ ἔδει μένειν ἐληλυθότος· νῦν δὲ
 ἄπεισιν· ὥστε καὶ ἔλθοι ἂν· ποῦ οὖν; ἢ τόπον
 δεῖ μόνον εἶναι. ἢ οὕτω γε ἀπολεῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν
 25 [αὐτοῦ]¹ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου σῶμα· τοῦτο
 δὲ ἦν τὸ φῶς. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ τὸ φῶς τινος
 ἔσται. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐκ τινος ὑποκειμένου,
 οὐκ εἰς ὑποκείμενον δέ· πάθοι δ' ἂν τι τὸ ὑποκεί-
 μενον, εἰ παρείη. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ζωὴ ἐνέργεια οὐσα
 ψυχῆς ἔστιν ἐνέργεια παθόντος ἂν τινος, οἷον τοῦ
 30 σώματος, εἰ παρείη, καὶ μὴ παρόντος δὲ ἔστι, τί
 ἂν κωλύοι καὶ ἐπὶ φωτὸς οὕτως, εἴπερ ἐνέργειά τις
 [τὸ φωτεινόν]² εἴη; οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τὸ φωτεινόν³

¹ del. Volkmann*.

² del. Theiler, ut correctionem ad τὸ σκοτεινόν falso loco insertam: τοῦ φωτεινοῦ suspic. Creuzer, ser. Kirchoff*.

³ Kleist (Studien 136), B-T: σκοτεινόν Enn.*

also to each and every bright and fiery body: there are even stones of this kind with a shining surface. But could that which passes to something else from a thing which has a surface of this kind exist if air did not? But if it is only a quality, and a quality of something, since every quality is in a substrate, one must look for a body in which light will be. But if it is an activity from something else, why should it not exist and travel to what lies beyond without the existence of an adjoining body, but with a kind of void in between (if that is possible)? For since it is stretched out straight, why should it not get across without support? But if it is of such a kind as to fall, it will move downwards. For it will certainly not be the air (or in general what is illuminated) which pulls it out of the luminary and compels it to proceed: since it is not something which occurs incidentally, so that it is completely dependent on something else, nor is it an affection of something else, so that there must be something which is affected; or it would have to stay when it arrived; but now it goes away, so that it could also come. But where is it then? All it needs is a place. If this is so, the body of the sun will lose the activity which comes from it. But this was the light. If this is so the light will not belong to anything else. But activity comes from a substrate, but does not pass into a substrate; but the substrate, if it was there, would be affected in some way. But, just as life, being an activity, is activity of the soul, and if something, body for instance, is there, it is affected, but life also exists if this something is not there, what would prevent this being so also in the case of light, if it is a kind of activity? For as things

τοῦ ἀέρος γεννᾷ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλὰ γῆ συμμιγνύμενος¹
σκοτεινὸν ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ καθαρὸν ὄντως· ὥστε
ὁμοιον εἶναι λέγειν τὸ γλυκὺ εἶναι, εἰ πικρῶ
35 μιγείη. εἰ δέ τις τροπὴν λέγοι τοῦ ἀέρος τὸ φῶς,
λεκτέον ὡς ἐχοῖν αὐτὸν τρέπεσθαι τὸν ἀέρα τῇ
τροπῇ, καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν αὐτοῦ μὴ σκοτεινὸν
γεγονέναι ἠλλοιωμένον. νῦν δὲ ὁ ἀήρ οἶός ἐστι
μένει, ὡς ἂν οὐδὲν παθῶν. τὸ δὲ πάθημα ἐκείνου
δεῖ εἶναι, οὐ πάθημα· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ χρῶμα αὐτοῦ,
40 ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ· πάρεστι δὲ ὁ ἀήρ. καὶ
τοῦτο μὲν οὕτως ἐπεσκεφθῆ.

7. Πότερα δὲ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἀνατρέχει; τάχα γὰρ
ἂν τι καὶ ἐκ τούτου λάβοιμεν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. ἢ
εἰ μὲν ἦν ἔνδοθεν, ὥστε τὸ μετεληφὸς ἔχειν
οἰκείον ἤδη, τάχα ἂν τις εἶπεν ἀπόλλυσθαι· εἰ δέ
5 ἔστι ἐνέργεια οὐ ρέουσα—περιέρρει γὰρ ἂν καὶ
ἐχέιτο εἴσω πλέον ἢ ὅσον τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος
ἐπεβάλλετο—οὐκ ἂν ἀπολλύοιτο μένοντος ἐν
ὑποστάσει τοῦ φωτίζοντος. μετακινουμένου δὲ ἐν
ἄλλῳ ἐστὶ τόπω οὐχ ὡς παλιρροίας ἢ μεταρροίας
γενομένης, ἀλλ' ὡς τῆς ἐνεργείας ἐκείνου οὔσης
10 καὶ παραγωμένης, εἰς ὅσον κωλύει οὐδέν. ἐπεὶ
καὶ εἰ πολλαπλασία ἢ ἀπόστασις ἦν ἢ νῦν ἐστὶ
πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῦ ἡλίου, ἦν ἂν καὶ μέχρι ἐκεῖ φῶς
μηδενὸς κωλύοντος μηδὲ ἐμποδῶν ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ
ἴσταμένου. ἔστι δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέργεια καὶ οἶον

¹ Kleist (loc. cit.), B-T: συμμιγνύμενον Enn.*

are it is not the luminosity of air which generates the light, but air, being mixed with earth, makes it dark and not genuinely pure; so that it is like saying that something sweet exists if it is mixed with something bitter. But if someone says that light is a modification of air, one must reply that the actual air would have to be modified by the modification, and its darkness would be altered and cease to be dark. But now the air stays as it is, as if it was not affected at all. But an affection must belong to that of which it is an affection; light therefore is not the colour of air either, but exists independently. Air is [simply] present. And so let us conclude this enquiry.

7. But does light perish or return to its source? For perhaps from this too we could gain something which would contribute to the solution of our previous problem. Now if it entered into what participated in it, so that this possessed it as its own, perhaps one would have said that it perished; but if it is an activity which does not flow away—for if it was, more of it would overflow all round and pour into the interior of the recipient than reached the recipient from the source of activity—it would not perish as long as the luminary remained in existence. But if the luminary moves, the light is in another place, not as if it flowed back or changed the course of its flow, but because the activity belongs to the luminary and becomes present in so far as there is no obstacle. For even if the distance between us and the sun was many times greater than it is, light would extend over that further distance if there was no obstacle or obstruction standing in between. But the activity within the luminous body, which is

ζωή τοῦ σώματος τοῦ φωτεινοῦ πλείων καὶ οὖον
 15 ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ πηγὴ· ἢ δὲ μετὰ τὸ πέρασ
 τοῦ σώματος, εἶδωλον τοῦ ἐντός, ἐνέργεια δευτέρα
 οὐκ ἀφισταμένη τῆς προτέρας. ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστον
 τῶν ὄντων ἐνέργειαν, ἢ ἔστιν ὁμοίωμα αὐτοῦ,
 ὥστε αὐτοῦ ὄντος κἀκεῖνο εἶναι καὶ μένοντος
 20 φθάνειν εἰς τὸ πόρρω, τὸ μὲν ἐπιπλέον, τὸ δὲ εἰς
 ἔλαττον· καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἀμυδραί, αἱ δὲ
 καὶ λαυθάνουσαι, τῶν δ' εἰσὶ μείζους καὶ εἰς τὸ
 πόρρω· καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ πόρρω, ἐκεῖ δὲ νομίζεν
 εἶναι, ὅπου τὸ ἐνεργοῦν καὶ δυνάμενον, καὶ αὖ οὐ
 φθάνει. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἰδεῖν ζώων
 25 λαμπόντων τοῖς ὀμμασι, γινομένου αὐτοῖς φωτός
 καὶ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ ζώων, ἃ
 ἔνδον συνεστραμμένον πῦρ ἔχοντα ταῖς ἀνοι-
 δάνσεσιν ἐν σκότῳ ἐκλάμπει εἰς τὸ ἔξω, καὶ ἐν
 ταῖς συστολαῖς αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔστι φῶς ἔξω, οὐδ' αὖ
 ἐφθάρη, ἀλλ' ἢ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξω. τί οὖν;
 30 εἰσελήλυθεν; ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξω, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ πῦρ
 πρὸς τὸ ἔξω, ἀλλ' ἔδω εἰς τὸ εἴσω. τὸ οὖν φῶς
 ἔδω καὶ αὐτό; ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μόνον· δύντος δὲ
 ἐπίπροσθεν ἔστι τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα, ὡς μὴ ἐνεργεῖν
 ἐκεῖνο πρὸς τὸ ἔξω. ἔστιν οὖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν
 σωμάτων φῶς ἐνέργεια φωτεινοῦ σώματος πρὸς τὸ

¹ Plotinus speaks of the light within the eyes, which sometimes flashes out from them, in V. 5. 7. 24 ff. (a comparison for the internal contemplation of Intellect). Aristotle speaks briefly of the phenomenon of phosphorescence (mentioning luminous fish and fungi and eyes which shine in the dark) in

like its life, is greater and is a kind of source and origin of its [outward] activity; that which is outside the limits of the body, an image of that within, is a second activity which is not separated from the first. For each thing that exists has an activity, which is a likeness of itself, so that while it exists that likeness exists, and while it stays in its place the likeness goes far out, sometimes a longer, sometimes a lesser distance; and some activities are weak and dim, and some even indiscernible, but other things have greater activities which go far; and when an activity goes far, one must think that it is there where the active and powerful thing is, and again there at the point it reaches. As for eyes, one can see what happens when animals have luminous eyes, and their light is also outside the eyes; and with animals which have compressed fire within them, and when they expand, in the darkness, the fire shines outside them, and when they contract there is no light outside, neither has it perished, but it either is outside or is not outside.¹ What then? Has it gone in? Now, it is not outside because the fire is not reaching to the outside, but has gone into the inside. Has the light itself, then, gone in too? No, but only the fire; but when it has gone in the rest of the body is in front of it, so that its activity does not reach the outside. The light from bodies, therefore, is the external activity of a luminous body; but the light

De Anima B 7 419a2-6; Plotinus may be using this passage here or a Peripatetic commentary on it.

35 ἔξω· αὐτὸ δὲ ὅλως [φῶς]¹ τὸ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις
 σώμασιν, ἃ δὴ πρῶτως ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, οὐσία ἢ κατὰ
 τὸ εἶδος τοῦ φωτεινοῦ πρῶτως σώματος. ἔταν
 δὲ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα ἀναμιχθῆ,
 χροῶν ἔδωκε· μόνη δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐ δίδωσιν,
 ἀλλ' οἷον ἐπιχρῶνυσιν, ἅτε οὐσα ἄλλου κάκείνου
 40 οἷον ἐξηρητημένη, οὐ τὸ ἀποστὰν κάκείνου τῆς
 ἐνεργείας ἄπεστιν. ἀσώματον δὲ πάντως δεῖ
 τιθέναι, κἂν σώματος ᾗ. διὸ οὐδὲ τὸ "ἀπελήλυθε"
 κυρίως οὐδὲ τὸ "ἄρρεστιν", ἀλλὰ τρόπον ἕτερον
 ταῦτα, καὶ ἔστιν ὑπόστασις αὐτοῦ ὡς ἐνέργεια.
 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ κατόπτρῳ εἶδωλον ἐνέργεια
 45 λεκτέον τοῦ ἐνορωμένου ποιούντος εἰς τὸ πάσχειν
 δυνάμενον οὐ ρέοντος· ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρρεστι, κάκείνο
 ἐκεῖ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστιν οὕτως ὡς εἶδωλον χροῶς
 ἐσχηματισμένης ὡδί· κἂν ἀπέλθῃ, οὐκέτι τὸ
 διαφανὲς ἔχει, ὃ ἔσχε πρότερον, ὅτε παρείχεν εἰς
 50 αὐτὸ ἐνεργεῖν τὸ ὁρώμενον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
 ψυχῆς, ὅσον ἐνέργεια ἄλλης προτέρας, μενούσης
 τῆς προτέρας μένει καὶ ἡ ἐφεξῆς ἐνέργεια. εἴ τις
 δὲ μὴ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐνεργείας, οἷαν ἐλέγομεν
 τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν ἤδη ζωῆν, ὥσπερ τὸ φῶς

¹ del. Kirchoff*.

¹ For the incorporeality of light in Plotinus cp. I. 6. 3. 18-19; II. 1. 7. 26-8. The background of the doctrine is Aristotelian (cp. *De Anima* B 7 418b3 ff.); but for Plotinus it means, as it did not for Aristotle, that light is, as here (cp. lines 49-51), closely parallel to the life which is the incorporeal activity of soul, and is itself, as he says in I. 6. 3, formative principle and

in bodies of this kind, bodies, that is, which are primarily and originally of this kind, is altogether substance, corresponding to the form of the primarily luminous body. When a body of this kind together with its matter enters into a mixture, it gives colour; but the activity by itself does not give colour, but only, so to speak, tints the surface, since it belongs to something else and is, one might say, dependent on it, and what separates itself from this something else separates itself from its activity. But one must consider light as altogether incorporeal, even if it belongs to a body.¹ Therefore "it has gone away" or "it is present" are not used of it in their proper sense, but in a different way, and its real existence is as an activity. For the image in a mirror must also be called an activity: that which is reflected in it acts on what is capable of being affected without flowing into it; but if the object reflected is there, the reflection too appears in the mirror and it exists as an image of a coloured surface shaped in a particular way; and if the object goes away, the mirror-surface no longer has what it had before, when the object seen in it offered itself to it for its activity. But with soul also, in so far as it is an activity of another prior soul, as long as the prior soul remains, so does the dependent activity. But suppose someone says that it is not an activity, but the product of an activity, as we said that the life was which belongs to the body already, just like the light which has

form. The doctrine of the incorporeality of light is not very much stressed by Plotinus, and seems to have been of only moderate importance to him; but it did provide a justification (if he felt he needed one) for his very free use of the symbolic language of light when speaking of spiritual activity.

τὸ ἀναμεμιγμένον ἤδη τοῖς σώμασιν; ἢ ἐνταῦθα
 55 τῷ καὶ συμμεμίχθαι τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ χρῶμα. ἐπὶ δὲ
 τῆς ζωῆς τῆς τοῦ σώματος τί; ἢ παρακειμένης
 ψυχῆς ἄλλης ἔχει. ὅταν οὖν τὸ σῶμα φθαρῆ—οὐ γὰρ
 δὴ ψυχῆς τι ἄμοιρον δύναται εἶναι—φθειρομένου
 οὖν τοῦ σώματος καὶ οὐκ ἐπαρκούσης αὐτῷ οὔτε
 60 τῆς δούσης οὔτ' εἴ τις παράκειται, πῶς ἂν ἔτι ζωὴ
 μένοι; τί οὖν; ἐφθάρη αὐτή; ἢ οὐδὲ αὐτὴ
 εἰδῶλον γὰρ ἐκλάμψεως καὶ τοῦτο· οὐκέτι δὲ
 ἔστιν ἐκεῖ μόνον.

8. Εἰ δ' εἴη σῶμα ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ὄψις τις
 ἐντεῦθεν μηδενὸς κωλύοντος εἰς τὸ ἰδεῖν, ἄρ' ἂν
 θεάσαστο ὃ τι μὴ συμπαθὲς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, εἰ τὸ
 συμπαθὲς νῦν διὰ τὴν ζώου ἐνὸς φύσιν; ἢ εἰ τὸ
 5 συμπαθὲς διὰ τὸ ἐνὸς ζώου τὰ αἰσθανόμενα καὶ τὰ
 αἰσθητά, καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὕτως οὐκ ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸ
 σῶμα τοῦτο τὸ ἔξω μέρος τοῦδε τοῦ ζώου· εἰ γὰρ
 εἴη, τάχα ἂν. εἰ μέντοι μὴ μέρος εἴη, σῶμα δὲ
 κεχωρισμένον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ποιότητας ἔχον, οἷον
 τὸ ἐνταῦθα, ὁμοειδὲς ὂν τῷ ὀργάνῳ; ἢ οὐδ'
 10 οὕτως, εἰ ὀρθὴ ἢ ὑπόθεσις· εἰ μὴ τις τοῦτω γε
 αὐτῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν πειρῶτο ἄτοπον εἶναι
 λέγων, εἰ μὴ χρῶμα ὄψεται ἢ ὄψις παρόν, καὶ αἱ
 ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις τῶν αἰσθητῶν παρόντων αὐταῖς
 οὐκ ἐνεργήσουσι πρὸς αὐτά. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄτοπον
 τοῦτο, πόθεν δὴ φαίνεται, φήσομεν. ἢ ὅτι ἐνταῦθα

already been mixed with bodies? Now in this case there is colour because that which produces it has been mixed with the bodies. But what about the life of the body? It has it because there is another soul close by it. When, therefore, the body perishes—for nothing can exist without a share of soul—when the body, then, is perishing and neither the soul which gave it life nor any neighbouring soul is sufficient [to avert its destruction] how could the life still remain? Well, then, has this life perished? No, certainly not; for this too is the image of an irradiation: it is simply no longer there.

8. But if there was a body outside the heavenly sphere and there was an eye looking from our universe with nothing to obstruct its vision, would it see what would not be sympathetically connected with our universe, if as things are sympathetic connection is due to the nature of a single living being? Now if sympathetic connection is due to the fact that perceiving subjects and perceived objects belong to a single living thing, there would be no perception, unless this outside body was part of our [universal] living being: for if it was, there would perhaps be perceptions of it. But suppose it was not a part, but a body which was coloured and had the other qualities like those of a body in this world, and so had the appropriate form for the organ of vision? No, it would not be perceived even so, if our hypothesis is correct: unless someone were to try to destroy the hypothesis by saying that it will be absurd if the sight does not see a colour when it is present, and if the other senses, when their objects are presented to them, do not exercise their activities in relation to them. But we shall state the origin

15 ἐν ἐνὶ ὄντες καὶ ἐνὸς ταῦτα ποιούμεν καὶ πάσχομεν.
 τοῦτο οὖν σκεπτέον, εἰ παρὰ τοῦτο. καὶ εἰ μὲν
 ἀτάρκως δέδεικται· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ δι' ἄλλων
 δεικτέον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῶον ὅτι συμπαθὲς αὐτῷ,
 δῆλον· καὶ εἰ εἴη ζῶον, ἀρκεῖ· ὥστε καὶ τὰ μέρη,
 ἧ ἐνὸς ζῴου. ἀλλ' εἰ δι' ὁμοιότητά τις λέγοι;
 20 ἀλλ' ἡ ἀντίληψις κατὰ τὸ ζῶον καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις,
 ἔτι τοῦ ὁμοίου μετέχει τὸ αὐτό· τὸ γὰρ ὄργανον
 ὁμοιον αὐτοῦ· ὥστε ἡ αἴσθησις ψυχῆς ἀντίληψις
 ἔσται δι' ὀργάνων ὁμοίων τοῖς ἀντιληπτοῖς. ἐὰν
 οὖν ζῶον ὃν αἰσθάνηται μὲν μὴ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, τῶν δὲ
 25 ὁμοίων τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ, ἧ μὲν ζῶον, ἀντιλήψεται·
 ἧ¹ μέντοι τὰ ἀντιληπτά <ἀντιληπτά>² ἔσται οὐχ ἧ
 αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἧ ὅμοια τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ. ἧ καὶ τὰ
 ἀντιληπτά οὕτως ἀντιληπτά ὅμοια ὄντα, ὅτι αὐτῇ
 αὐτὰ ὅμοια πεποιήκεν, ὥστε μὴ οὐ προσήκοντα
 εἶναι· ὥστε εἰ τὸ ποιῶν ἐκεῖ εἴη³ ψυχὴ πάντη
 30 ἑτέρα, καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ ὑποτεθέντα ὅμοια οὐδὲν πρὸς
 αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ ἀτοπία τὸ μαχόμενον ἐν τῇ
 ὑποθέσει δείκνυσιν ὡς αἰτιὸν ἔστιν αὐτῆς· ἅμα γὰρ
 ψυχὴν λέγει καὶ οὐ ψυχὴν, καὶ συγγενῆ καὶ οὐ
 συγγενῆ, καὶ ὅμοια ταῦτά⁴ καὶ ἀνόμοια· ὥστε

¹ A¹JUC: ἧ BR, H-S¹.

² Igal.

³ Igal: ἧ Enn.

⁴ Kirchoff*: ταῦτα Enn., H-S¹.

of this apparent absurdity. It is that here, being in one and belonging to one, we act and are affected in this way. We must therefore investigate whether this is the reason why we do so. And if this has already been sufficiently shown, our demonstration is complete; if not, we must demonstrate it by other arguments as well. Now it is clear that a living being is sympathetically aware of itself; and if the universe is a living being, this is enough; so that the parts also will be sympathetically aware of each other in that they belong to one living being. But suppose someone were to say that this [sympathy] is because of their likeness? But apprehension and perception take place in the living being because one and the same thing participates in likeness; for its organ is like itself; so that perception is the soul's apprehension through organs like the objects apprehended. If then the universe, being a living being, perceives, not the things in itself but things like those in itself, will it perceive them by virtue of being a living thing? In so far as the objects apprehended are apprehended, they will be so not by virtue of their belonging to itself, but in virtue of their being like the things in itself. Now the objects apprehended are apprehended in this way by being like, because this soul [of the universe] has made them like, so that they are not incongruous; so that if the active principle out there is the altogether different soul [of that other universe], the objects assumed to exist there would be in no way like the soul of our universe. Certainly, then, the absurdity shows that the contradiction in the hypothesis was its cause: for it says at once "soul" and "not soul" and "akin" and "not akin", and that the objects apprehended

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 5.

ἔχουσα τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἐν αὐτῇ οὐδ' ἂν ὑπόθεσις
 35 εἶη. καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τούτῳ· ὥστε πᾶν καὶ
 οὐ πᾶν τίθησι, καὶ ἄλλο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ
 μηδέν καὶ οὐ τὸ μηδέν, καὶ τέλειον καὶ οὐ τέλειον.
 ὥστε ἀφετέρον τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ὡς οὐκ ὄν ζητεῖν τὸ
 ἀκόλουθον τῷ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑποτεθέν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀναιρεῖν.

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL III

are "like" and "unlike"; so that since it has these oppositions in itself it is no hypothesis at all. For, besides, it asserts that the soul is in this other universe, so that it postulates something which is "all" and "not-all" and "other" and "not-other", and "nothing" and "not-nothing" and "perfect" and "not-perfect". So the hypothesis must be dismissed, as it is not possible to investigate the consequence of it by destroying its foundation in the very investigation.¹

¹ Plotinus in this chapter draws an extreme logical conclusion from his doctrine that perception is due to the sympathy which unites the parts of the great living organism which is the physical universe. Taking up the (to him completely fantastic) suggestion made in ch. 3 that there might be another universe outside this one, he argues that, even if our universe had an eye on its outside, it could not see the other one because it would be outside the universal sympathy which causes perception: the two universes would be distinct organisms with different and unconnected souls. Plotinus does not seem to advert here to his discussion in IV. 3. 1-5, of which the conclusion is that the hypostasis Soul, of which all souls are parts, is not identical with the Soul of the universe, which is a partial soul, like our souls (though of greater power and dignity). If he had done so, he would have had to consider the possibility that there might be two (or more) such partial souls of distinct universes, united by sympathy as being parts in some sense of the hypostasis Soul. But the unity and uniqueness of the physical universe was a dogma so firmly held and passionately defended in late antiquity that this line of thought probably never occurred to him.

IV. 6. ON SENSE-PERCEPTION AND MEMORY

Introductory Note

THIS little treatise is a later supplement to the great treatise on the soul which it immediately follows in the Ennead arrangement. Plotinus is, as always, concerned to show that perceiving and remembering are activities of the soul, and that soul is not a quasi-corporeal thing which passively receives stamps or impressions from sense-objects and then stores them up in its memory.

Synopsis

The expression theory of sense-perception fails to correspond with the facts of sense-experience (ch. 1). The soul is active, not passive, exercising its power of knowing in its acts of sense-perception, as it does to a higher degree in its knowledge of intelligible reality (ch. 2). Memory again is the exercise of a power, which can be strengthened by training and varies in different people (ch. 3).

IV. 6. (41) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ
ΜΝΗΜΗΣ

1. Τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ τυπώσεις οὐδ' ἐνσφραγίσεις
λέγοντες ἐν ψυχῇ γίνεσθαι, οὐδὲ τὰς μνήμας
πάντως τε καὶ ἀκολούθως ἐροῦμεν κατοχὰς
μαθημάτων καὶ αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τοῦ τύπου
5 μείναντος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὅς μὴδὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἐγένετο.
διὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἂν εἴη ἄμφω, ἢ ἐγγίγνεσθαι
τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ μένειν, εἰ μνημονεύοιτο, ἢ τὸ
ἕτερον ὀποτεροῦν μὴ διδόντα μὴ διδόναι μὴδὲ
θάτερον. ὅσοι δὴ λέγομεν μῆδέτερον, ἀναγκαίως
ζητήσομεν, τίς τρόπος ἑκατέρου, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε τὸν
10 τύπον τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐγγίγνεσθαι φάμεν τῇ ψυχῇ
καὶ τυποῦν αὐτήν, οὔτε τὴν μνήμην λέγομεν εἶναι
τοῦ τύπου ἐμμείναντος. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἐναργε-
στάτης αἰσθήσεως θεωροῦμεν τὸ συμβαῖνον,
τάχ' ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων μεταφέροντες
τὸ αὐτὸ ἐξεύροιμεν ἂν τὸ ζητούμενον. δῆλον δὲ
15 δῆπου ἐν παντί, ὡς αἰσθησῶν ὄπου οὐ λαμβάνοντες
δι' ὀράσεως ἐκεῖ ὄρωμεν καὶ τῇ ὄψει προσβάλλομεν,
οὐ τὸ ὄρατόν ἐστιν ἐπ' εὐθείας κείμενον, ὡς ἐκεῖ
δηλονότι τῆς ἀντιλήψεως γινομένης καὶ πρὸς τὸ
ἔξω τῆς ψυχῆς βλεπούσης, ἅτε μὴδενός, οἶμαι,

¹ Cp. Aristotle *De Memoria* I. 450a30-32 for the doctrine here rejected.

² The phrase comes from Plato *Phaedrus* 250D2.

IV. 6. ON SENSE-PERCEPTION
AND MEMORY

1. Since we say that sense-perceptions are not impressions or seal-stamps on the soul, we cannot say either with any sort of consistency that memories are retentions of what we have learnt or perceived while the impression remains on the soul which was not there to begin with.¹ Both would be a part of the same argument; either one must maintain that an impression enters the soul and remains if there is memory, or, if one does not grant one or the other of these propositions, one must not grant the other either. Those of us who do not say either will necessarily enquire how we perceive and how we remember, since we do not assert that the impression of the sense-object enters the soul and stamps it, nor do we say that memory exists because the impression remains. But if we observe what happens in the case of the "clearest sense";² perhaps we could apply the same also to the other senses and find what we are looking for. It is clear presumably in every case that when we have a perception of anything through the sense of sight, we look there where it is and direct our gaze where the visible object is situated in a straight line from us; obviously it is there that the apprehension takes place and the soul looks outwards, since, I think, no impression has

τύπου ἐν αὐτῇ γενομένου ἢ γιγνομένου, οὐδέπω¹
 20 σφραγίδα [λαμβανούσης]² ὥσπερ ἐν κηρῷ
 δακτυλίου λαμβανούσης.³ οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδεήθη τοῦ
 ἔξω βλέπειν, ἤδη ἔχουσα παρ' ἑαυτῆς εἶδος τοῦ
 ὄρωμένου τούτῳ τῷ ἐκεῖ εἰσελθεῖν τὸν τύπον
 βλέπουσα. τὸ δὲ δὴ διάστημα προστιθεῖσα τῷ ὄρα-
 ματι καὶ ἐξ ὅσου ἢ θέα ἢ ψυχὴ λέγουσα οὕτως ἂν
 25 τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐδὲν ἀφεστηκὸς ἀφ' αὐτῆς ὡς πόρρω
 ὄν βλέποι; τό τε μέγεθος αὐτοῦ, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἔξω,
 πῶς ἂν ὅσον ἐστὶ λέγοι, ἢ ὅτι μέγα, οἷον τὸ τοῦ
 οὐρανοῦ, τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ τύπον τοσοῦδε εἶναι οὐ
 δυναμένου; τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀπάντων· εἰ γὰρ
 30 τύπους λαμβάνομεν ὄν ὄρωμεν, οὐκ ἔσται βλέπειν
 αὐτὰ ἃ ὄρωμεν, ἰνδάματα δὲ ὄραμάτων καὶ σκιάς,
 ὥστε ἄλλα μὲν εἶναι αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, ἄλλα δὲ
 τὰ ἡμῶν ὄρώμενα. ὅπως δέ, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ὡς
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιθέντα τῇ κόρῃ τὸ ὄρατὸν θεάσασθαι,
 ἀποστήσαστα δὲ δεῖ οὕτως ὄραν, τοῦτο χρῆ καὶ
 35 πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν μεταφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ
 τὸν τύπον τοῦ ὄρατοῦ θείμεθα ἐν αὐτῇ, ἐκεῖνο μὲν,
 ᾧ ἐνεοφράγισται, οὐκ ἂν ὄραμα ἴδῃ· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ⁴
 δύο γενέσθαι τὸ τε ὄρων καὶ τὸ ὄρώμενον. ἄλλο
 ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ὄρων ἄλλαχού⁵ κείμενον τὸν

¹ Igal: οὐδὲ τῷ A¹BJUC: οὐδὲ τὴν R.

² del. Igal.

³ Igal: βλεπούσης Enn.

⁴ καὶ defendit Igal, collato V. 5. 11. 4: del. Kirshhoff, H-S.

⁵ ὄρων <καὶ> ἄλλαχού H-S¹, sed τὸν τύπον obiectum ad τὸ ὄρων.

been or is being imprinted on it, nor has it yet received a seal-stamp, like the mark of a seal-ring on wax. For there would have been no need for it to look outwards, if it already had in it the form of the visible object since it saw by this entrance into it of the impression. And when the soul adds the distance to what it sees and says how far it is looking at it from, could it in this way be seeing as distant what was in it and not separated from it by any interval? And how would it be able to state the size as it is outside or say that it is large, to state for instance the size of the sky, when it would be impossible for as large an impression to be inside it? Most important of all: if we received impressions of what we see, there will be no possibility of looking at the actual things we see, but we shall look at images and shadows of the objects of sight, so that the objects themselves will be different from the things we see.¹ But in general, just as it is said that it is not possible to look at a visible object if one puts it on the pupil of the eye, but one must move it away to see it,² so, much more, one should transfer this to the soul. For if we placed in it the impression of the visible object, that in which the impression was stamped could not see the sight: for that which sees and that which is seen must be two [distinct things]. That which sees, then, must be a distinct thing seeing the impression situated else-

¹ In V. 5. 1. 17-18, where Plotinus is contrasting sense-perception with the immediate intuition of Intellect, he says that in sense-perception we do only see an image of the thing, not the thing itself.

² Cp. Aristotle *De Anima* B 7, 419a12-13.

τύπον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι¹ κείμενον. δεῖ ἄρα
40 τὴν ὄρασιν οὐ κειμένου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ κειμένου
εἶναι, ἵνα ἦ ὄρασις.

2. Εἰ οὖν μὴ οὕτως, τίς ὁ τρόπος; ἢ λέγει περὶ
ᾧ οὐκ ἔχει· τοῦτο γὰρ δυνάμεως, οὐ τὸ παθεῖν τι,
ἀλλὰ τὸ δυναθῆναι καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται ἐργάσασθαι.
οὕτως γὰρ ἄν, οἶμαι, καὶ διακριθείη τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ
5 ὄρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, οὐκ εἰ τύποι ἄμφω, ἀλλ'
εἰ μὴ τύποι μηδὲ πείσεις, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι περὶ ὧ
ἔπεισι πεφύκασιν. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπιστοῦντες, μὴ οὐ
δύνηται, ἐὰν μὴ πληγῇ, τὸ αὐτῆς γινώσκειν δύναμις
ἐκάστη, πάσχειν, ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκειν τὸ ἐγγὺς
ποιοῦμεν, οὐ κρατεῖν δέδοται, ἀλλ' οὐ κρατεῖσθαι.
10 τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ ἀκοῆς δεῖ νομίζεν
γίνεσθαι· τὸν μὲν τύπον εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι πληγῆν τινα
οὖσαν διηρθρωμένην, οἶον γραμμάτων ἐγγεγραμ-
μένων ὑπὸ τοῦ τῆν φωνῆν πεποιηκότος, τῆν μέν-
τοι δύναμιν καὶ τῆν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν οἶον ἀναγνῶναι
15 τοὺς τύπους ἐν τῷ ἀέρι γεγραμμένους ἐλθόντας πλη-
σίον, εἰς ὃ ἐλθόντες πεφύκασιν ὄρασθαι. γεύσεως
δὲ καὶ ὀσφρήσεως τὰ μὲν πάθη, τὰ δ' ὅσα αἰσθήσεις
αὐτῶν καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν παθῶν εἰσι γνώσεις ἄλλαι
τῶν παθῶν οὐσαι. τῶν δὲ νοητῶν ἡ γνώσις

¹ ad εἶναι subiectum τὸ ὄρων.

where, but not in that in which that which sees it is.
The seeing, then, cannot be of an object situated
where the seeing is, but of something not situated
there.

2. If, then, it is not like this, how does it work?
[The soul] speaks about things which it does not
possess: this is a matter of power, not of being
affected in some way but of being capable of and
doing the work to which it has been assigned. This
is the way, I think, in which a distinction is made by
the soul between what is seen and what is heard,
not if both are impressions, but if they are not by
nature impressions or affections, but activities con-
cerned with that which approaches [the soul]. But
we men do not believe that each particular power [of
perception] can come to know its object unless it is
struck by it, and make it be affected by the object
near it instead of coming to know it, though it has
been appointed to master it, not to be mastered by it.
One should suppose that the same kind of process
takes place in the case of hearing: the impression
is in the air, and is a sort of articulated stroke, like
letters written on the air by the maker of the sound;
but the power and the substance of the soul does
something like reading the impressions written on the
air when they come near and reach the point at
which they can be seen.¹ And where taste and smell
are concerned, there are some affections, but all
[tastings and smellings] that are perceptions of them
and judgments are acts of knowledge of the affections
distinct from the affections themselves. But the

¹ The pre-eminence of sight, the "clearest sense" (cp. p. 321, n. 2), in Greek psychological thought is well illustrated by this casual use of sight-language to describe hearing.

ἀπαθῆς καὶ ἀτύπωτός ἐστι μᾶλλον· ἀνάπαυον γὰρ
 20 ἔσωθεν οἶον προπίπτει, τὰ δὲ ἔξωθεν θεωρεῖται·
 καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον ἐνέργεια καὶ κυριώτεραι·
 αὐτῆς γάρ, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὴ ἐνεργοῦσα ἕκαστον.
 πότερα δὲ αὐτὴν μὲν ἢ ψυχὴ δύο καὶ ὡς ἕτερον
 ὄρα, νοῦν δὲ ἓν καὶ ἄμφω τὰ δύο ἓν, ἐν ἄλλοις.

3. Νῦν δὲ τούτων εἰρημένων περὶ μνήμης ἐφεξῆς
 λεκτέον εἰποῦσι πρότερον, ὡς οὐ θαυμαστόν—μᾶλ-
 λον δὲ θαυμαστόν μὲν, ἀπιστεῖν δὲ οὐ δεῖ τῇ
 τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῆς ψυχῆς—εἰ μὴδὲν λαβούσα εἰς
 5 αὐτὴν ἀντίληψιν ὧν οὐκ ἔσχε ποιεῖται. λόγος γάρ
 ἐστι πάντων, καὶ λόγος ἔσχατος μὲν τῶν νοητῶν
 καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἢ ψυχῆς φύσις, πρῶτος δὲ
 τῶν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ παντί. διὸ δὴ καὶ πρὸς
 ἄμφω ἔχει, ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν εὐπαθοῦσα καὶ ἀναβιωσ-
 κομένη, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τῇ ὁμοιότητι ἀπατωμένη καὶ
 10 κατιοῦσα ὡς περ θελγομένη. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ οὐσα
 αἰσθάνεται ἀμφοῖν, καὶ τὰ μὲν νοεῖν λέγεται εἰς
 μνήμην ἔλθοῦσα, εἰ πρὸς αὐτοῖς γίνονται· γνώσκει
 γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πως εἶναι· γνώσκει γὰρ οὐ τῷ
 ἐπιζάνειν αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τῷ πως ἔχειν αὐτὰ καὶ ὄραν
 αὐτὰ καὶ εἶναι αὐτὰ ἀμυδρότερον καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκ
 15 τοῦ ἀμυδροῦ τῷ οἶον ἐγείρεσθαι ἐναργεύτερα καὶ

¹ The reference is probably to V. 6. 1-2.

² The idea of Soul as the intermediary logos, the lowest principle in the intelligible world which is first in the world of sense because it expresses the intelligible there as far as it can, is frequent in Plotinus (and in general in the Platonist or Platonically-influenced thought of late antiquity): cp. in this Ennead, for Soul as in the lowest region of the intelligible

knowledge of intelligible objects is much freer from affections and impressions; sense-objects are observed from outside, but the intelligibles in reverse come out, one can say, from within; and they are activities in a higher degree and more authentically: for the object belongs to the knowledge, and the knowledge in its active exercise is each of its objects. But we discuss elsewhere¹ whether the soul sees itself as two and as another, but Intellect is one, or whether both the dualities are one.

3. But now that we have said this [about sense-perception] we must next speak about memory; first we must say that it is not astonishing, or rather it is astonishing, but we should not disbelieve that the soul has a power of this kind, if it receives nothing itself and contrives an apprehension of what it does not have. For it is the rational principle of all things, and the nature of soul is the last and lowest rational principle of the intelligibles and the beings in the intelligible world, but first of those in the whole world perceived by the senses.² Therefore it is certainly in relation with both; by the power of the one it flourishes and gains new life, by the power of the others it is deceived because of their likeness and comes down as if charmed. But, being in the middle, it perceives both, and is said to think the intelligibles when it arrives at memory of them, if it comes to be near them; for it knows them by being them in a way: for it knows, not because they settle in it, but because it has them in some way and sees them and is them in a rather dim way, and becomes them more clearly out of the dimness by

IV. 4. 2. 17, and for Soul as the link between the two worlds IV. 8. 7.

ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἰέναι. τὰ δ' αἰσθητὰ
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷον συναψάμενα καὶ ταῦτα παρ'
αὐτῆς οἷον ἐκλάμπειν ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν εἶναι
ἐργάζεται ἐτοιμῆς οὔσης καὶ πρὸ οἷον ὠδινούσης
πρὸς αὐτὰ τῆς δυνάμεως. ὅταν τοίνυν ῥωσθῆ
20 πρὸς ὅτιοῦν τῶν φανέντων, ὥσπερ πρὸς παρὸν διά-
κεῖται ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον καὶ ὕψι μᾶλλον, τόσῳ ἀεί-
διό καὶ τὰ παιδία μνημονεύειν λέγεται μᾶλλον, ὅτι
μὴ ἀφίστανται, ἀλλὰ κείται αὐτοῖς πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν
ὡς ἂν ὀρώσω οὔπω εἰς πλῆθος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὀλίγα·
25 οἷς δὲ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ δύναμις, ὥσπερ
παραθέουσι καὶ οὐ μένουσι. εἰ δέ γε ἔμενον οἱ
τύποι, οὐκ ἂν ἐποίησε τὸ πλῆθος ἡττον μνήμας.
ἔτι, εἰ τύποι μένοντες, οὐδὲν ἔδει σκοπεῖν, ἵνα
ἀναμνησθῶμεν, οὐδὲ πρότερον ἐπιλαθομένους ὕστε-
ρον ἀναμνησθεσθαι κειμένων. καὶ αἱ εἰς ἀνά-
30 ληψιν δὲ μελέται δηλοῦσι δυνάμεων ψυχῆς τὸ
γινόμενον ὑπάρχον, ὥσπερ χειρῶν ἢ ποδῶν τὰ
γυμνάσια εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ῥαδίως, ἃ μὴ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν
ἢ ποσὶ κείται, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἃ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἡτοίμασται.
διὰ τί γὰρ ἅπαξ μὲν ἀκούσας ἢ δεύτερον οὐ μέμνη-
ται, ὅταν δὲ πολλάκις, καὶ ὁ πρότερον ἀκούσας οὐκ
35 ἔσχε, πολλῶ ὕστερον χρόνῳ μέμνηται ἤδη; οὐ γὰρ
δὴ τῷ μέρει ἐσχηκέναι πρότερον τοῦ τύπου· ἔδει
γὰρ τούτων μεμνησθαι· ἀλλ' οἷον ἐξαίφνης γίγνε-

a kind of awakening, and passes from potentiality to actuality. In the same way [the soul] makes the objects of sense which are, so to speak, connected with it, shine out, one might say, by its own power, and brings them before its eyes, since its power [of sense-perception] is ready for them and, in a way, in travail towards them. When, therefore, the soul is strongly moved to anything that appears to it, it is for a long time in a state as if the object was present to it, and the more strongly it is moved, the more lasting the presence. This is why children are said to be better at remembering, because they do not go away from things, but they remain before their eyes, since they do not look at a multiplicity of things, but at few; but those whose thought and soul-power are directed to many things, as it were, rush past them and do not linger on them. But if the impressions remained, their multiplicity would not make memories less. Further, if impressions remained, there would be no need for us to consider in order to remember, nor should we forget before and remember afterwards if the impressions were lying ready to hand. And exercises to improve our mental grasp show that what is going on is an empowering of the soul, just like physical training of our arms and legs to make them do easily what does not lie in the arms or legs, but what they are made ready for by continuous exercise. For why, when one has heard something once or twice, does one not remember it, but [only] when one has heard it many times, and, when one has heard something before and not retained it, why does one remember it long afterwards? It is certainly not because one previously had the parts of the impression; for then one would

ται τοῦτο ἐκ τινος [τῆς]¹ ὑτέρας ἀκροάσεως ἢ
 μελέτης. ταῦτα γὰρ μαρτυροῦν πρόκλησιν τῆς δυνά-
 40 μως καθ' ἣν μνημονεύομεν τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς ῥωσθεύ-
 σαν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο. ὅταν δὲ μὴ μόνον
 πρὸς ἃ ἐμελετήσωμεν τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἡμῶν παρῆ,
 ἀλλ' οἷπερ πολλὰ ἀνειλήφασιν ἐκ τοῦ εἰθίστου
 ἀπαγγελίας χρῆσθαι, ῥαδίως ἤδη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 τὰς λεγομένας ἀναλήψεις ποιῶνται, τί ἂν τις ἐπαιτι-
 45 ῶτο τῆς μνήμης ἢ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ῥωσθεύσαν εἶναι;
 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τύπαι μένοντες ἀσθένειαν μᾶλλον ἢ
 δύναμιν κατηγοροῦν. τὸ γὰρ ἐντυπώτατον τῷ
 εἴκειν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, καὶ πάθους ὄντος τοῦ τύπου τὸ
 μᾶλλον πεπονθὸς τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μνημονεῦον μᾶλλον.
 50 τοῦτοι δὲ τοῦναντίον φαίνεται συμβαῖνον· οὐδα-
 μού γὰρ ἢ πρὸς ὅτιοῦν γυμνασία εὐπαθὲς τὸ γυμνα-
 σάμενον ποιεῖ· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐ τὸ
 ἀσθενὲς ὄρα ὄλον ὀφθαλμός, ἀλλ' ὅτι δύναμις ἐστὶν
 εἰς ἐνέργειαν πλείων. διὸ καὶ οἱ γεγηρακότες καὶ
 πρὸς τὰς αἰσθησεις ἀσθενέστεροι καὶ πρὸς τὰς
 55 μνήμας ὡσαύτως. ἰσχυρὰ ἄρα τις καὶ ἢ αἰσθησις
 καὶ ἢ μνήμη. ἔτι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τυπώσεων οὐκ
 οὐσῶν, πῶς οἶόν τε τὰς μνήμας κατοχὰς τῶν οὐκ
 ἐντεθέντων οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι; ἀλλ' εἰ δύναμις
 τις καὶ παρασκευὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔτοιμον, πῶς οὐχ ἄμα,
 ἀλλ' ὕστερον εἰς ἀναπόλησιν τῶν αὐτῶν ἐρχόμεθα;
 60 ἢ ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν δεῖ οἶον ἐπιστῆσαι καὶ ἐτοιμάσαι-

¹ om. RJ: delendum suspic. Volkmann: del. Theiler.

have to remember these; but this happens with a
 kind of suddenness, as the result of some later
 hearing or exercise. This is evidence of a calling
 out of the power of soul by which we remember, in
 that this is strengthened, either in a general way or
 for the specific art of remembering. But when the
 power of memory is present to us not only for what
 we have trained ourselves [to remember], but men
 who have acquired a great deal of knowledge through
 being accustomed to use reports come to a point
 where they easily apprehend (as people say)¹ other
 information, what could one say was the cause of
 memory if not the strengthened power? For the
 persistence of impressions would tell of weakness
 rather than power; for that which is most impressible
 is so by giving way, and, since the impression is an
 affection, that which is more affected must remember
 more. But what actually occurs appears to be the
 opposite of this; for nowhere does exercise for any
 purpose make what is exercised easily affected;
 since with the senses also it is not what is weak, an
 eye for instance, which sees, but that organ which
 has greater power for its activity. This is why those
 who have grown old are weaker in perception, and
 in just the same way in memory. So both perception
 and memory are a kind of strength. Further, when
 sense-perceptions are not impressions, how could
 memories be retentions of imprints which were never
 made [in the soul] at all? But if memory is a power
 and a preparation for readiness, why do we not come
 to recall the same things at once, but only later?
 Because one needs to set up the power, so to speak,

¹ Cp. Aristotle *De Memoria* 2. 451a20.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 6.

θαι. τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμειν
 ὀρώμεν εἰς τὸ ποιῆσαι ὃ δύνανται ἐτοιμαζομένων
 καὶ τὰ μὲν εὐθύς, τὰ δέ, εἰ συλλέξαιντο ἑαυτάς,
 ἐργαζομένων. γίνονται δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐχ οἱ
 65 αὐτοὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγγίνοι [πολλάκις],¹ ὅτι οὐχ ἡ
 αὐτὴ δύναμις ἑκατέρου, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁ αὐτὸς
 πυκτικὸς καὶ δρομικὸς· ἐπικρατοῦσι γὰρ ἄλλαι
 ἐν ἄλλῳ ἰδέαι. καίτοι οὐκ ἐκώλυε τὸν ἀστυασοῦν
 ἔχοντα πλεονεξίας ψυχῆς ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ κείμενα,
 οὐδὲ τὸν ταύτῃ βνέντα τὴν τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ἔχειν
 70 τὸ πάθος ἀδυναμίαν κεκτῆσθαι. καὶ τὸ τῆς
 ψυχῆς δὲ ἀμέγεθες [καὶ ὅλως]² ψυχὴν μαρτυρεῖ
 δύναμιν εἶναι. καὶ ὅλως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν πάντ' οὐ³
 θαυμαστὸν ἕλλον τρόπον ἔχειν, ἢ ὡς ὑπειλήφασιν
 ὑπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐξετάζειν ἄνθρωποι, ἢ ὡς πρόχειροι
 αὐτοῖς ἐπιβολαὶ ἐξ αἰσθητῶν ἐγγίνονται δι' ὁμοιο-
 75 τήτων ἀπατώσαι. οἷον γὰρ ἐν πίναξιν ἢ δέλτοις
 γεγραμμένων γραμμάτων, οὕτως περὶ τῶν αἰσθή-
 σεων καὶ τοῦ μνημονεῖεν διάκεινται, καὶ οὔτε οἱ
 σῶμα αὐτὴν τιθέμενοι ὀρώσιν, ὅσα ἀδύνατα τῇ
 ὑποθέσει αὐτῶν συμβαίνει, οὔτε οἱ ἀσώματον.

¹ del. Müller.

² del. Müller, ut iteratum e lln. 71.

³ Theiler (πάντα <οὐ> Kirchoff*): πάντα Enn.

ON SENSE-PERCEPTION AND MEMORY

and get it ready. For we see this with the other powers, which are made ready to do what they are able to do, and effect some things at once and some if they collect themselves. But the same people do not as a general rule have both good memories and quick minds,¹ because it is not the same power in each case, just as the same man is not a good boxer and a good runner: for different characteristics dominate in different people. And yet there would be nothing to prevent a man who had any kind of superiority of soul from reading off the deposited impressions, nor would a man who had a strong inclination this way have to possess an inability to be affected and to retain the affection. And the sizelessness of soul is also evidence that soul is a power. And in general it is not surprising that anything about the soul is different from what men have supposed because they have not examined it, or from the hasty notions derived from sense-objects which occur to them and deceive them by likenesses. For they think about perception and memory as they do about letters written on tablets or pages, and neither do those who assume that the soul is a body see all the impossibilities which their hypothesis involves, nor do those who assume it to be bodiless.

¹ Cp. Aristotle *De Memoria* 1. 449b7-8.

IV. 7. ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

Introductory Note

THIS very early treatise is more "scholastic" than any other writing of Plotinus. The greater part of it is occupied by refutations of school-positions opposed to the Platonic doctrine of the immateriality and immortality of the soul by standard arguments taken from any convenient source; and the positive exposition of Platonic doctrine has little that is originally Plotinian. Bréhier's *Notice* introducing the treatise gives an excellent short account of the origins of the various arguments. Those against Stoic corporealism (to the refutation of which most of the controversial part of the treatise is devoted) are Peripatetic in origin, probably derived from the *De Anima* of Plotinus's favourite Aristotelian author, Alexander of Aphrodisias; those against a misinterpretation (so Plotinus thinks) of the Pythagorean soul-harmony doctrine derive from Aristotle's *De Anima* as well as Plato's *Phaedo*; those against Aristotle's own entelechy-doctrine are of course Platonic (and perhaps original), but sometimes intelligently exploit difficulties raised by Aristotle himself in the *De Anima*. The Epicurean position is, as usual, very summarily dismissed (at the beginning of ch. 3) with an objection of Stoic origin.

Considerable portions of the treatise were missing from the archetype of our MSS of the *Enneads*, but were preserved in the excerpts made by Eusebius (*Praeparatio Evangelica* XV, 22 and 10). Henry and Schwyzer give precise details in *Plotini Opera* II, *Praefatio* xviii-xxii. The awkward double numbering of chs. 8¹-8⁵ is due to

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the fact that these chapters, preserved by Eusebius, were not included in the Latin translation of Ficino, from which our chapter-numbering derives; the first printed edition to insert them was that of F. Creuzer.

Chapter 15 is an odd little appendix to the treatise, indicating cursorily the support for belief in the immortality of the soul which those who feel they need this sort of thing can find in traditional religious beliefs and practices. There is no reason to doubt that it is really by Plotinus: it is quite in accordance with his normal respectfully detached attitude to traditional Hellenic religion.

Synopsis

Man is not a simple thing, but a composite of soul and body; the body perishes, but the soul, which is the real self, survives (ch. 1). The soul is not a body: refutation of the Stoic corporealist position (and, incidentally and in passing, the Epicurean) in detail (chs. 2-8³). Refutation of the soul-harmony theory supposed to be held by the Pythagoreans (ch. 8⁴). Refutation of Aristotle's theory that the soul is the body's "entelechy" or inseparable form (ch. 8⁵). Exposition and defence of the Platonic doctrine (chs. 9-14). Those who need this sort of evidence can find support for the doctrine of immortality in oracles and the cult of the dead (ch. 15).

IV. 7. (2) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ
ΨΥΧΗΣ

1. Εἰ δέ ἐστιν ἀθάνατος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἢ φθείρεται πᾶς, ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτοῦ ἄπεισιν εἰς σκεδάσιν καὶ φθοράν, τὰ δὲ μένει εἰς αἰεὶ, ἅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτός, ὡδ' ἂν τις μάθοι κατὰ φύσιν ἐπισκοπούμενος. ἀπλοῦν
5 μὲν δὴ τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ, ἔχει δὲ καὶ σῶμα εἴτ' οὖν ὄργανον οὐ ἡμῶν, εἴτ' οὖν ἕτερον τρόπον προσηρητημένον. ἀλλ' οὖν διηρήσθω τε ταύτη καὶ ἐκατέρου τὴν φύσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν καταθεατέον. τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα καὶ αὐτὸ
10 συγκείμενον οὔτε παρὰ τοῦ λόγου δύναται μένειν, ἢ τε αἰσθησις ὄρα λυόμενόν τε καὶ τηκόμενον καὶ παντοίους ὀλέθρους δεχόμενον, ἐκάστου τε τῶν ἐνότων πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ φερομένου, φθείροντός τε ἄλλου ἕτερον καὶ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς ἄλλο καὶ ἀπολλύντος, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ψυχὴ ἢ φίλα ποιούσα μὴ παρῆ
15 τοῖς ὄγκοις. κἂν μονωθῆ δὲ ἑκαυτον γενόμενον ἐν, οὐκ ἐστι, λύσιν δεχόμενον εἰς τε μορφήν καὶ ὕλην, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἀπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰς συστάσεις ἔχειν. καὶ μὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχοντα, ἅτε σώματα ὄντα, τεμνόμενά τε καὶ εἰς μικρὰ θραυό-

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1. One might discover as follows, by an investigation according to the nature of the subject, whether each individual one of us human beings is immortal, or whether the whole human being is destroyed, or whether some of it goes away to dispersion and destruction but some of it, the part which is the self, abides for ever. Man could not be a simple thing, but there is in him a soul, and he has a body as well, whether it is our tool or attached to us in some other way. But let us divide man like this, and consider the essential nature of each part of him. The body, certainly, is also itself a composite thing and so cannot reasonably be supposed to last, and, besides, our senses perceive it dissolving and wasting away and undergoing all sorts of destructions, when each one of its component parts moves to its own place, and one destroys another, and changes into another and does away with it, especially when soul, which reconciles the parts, is not present to their material masses. And even if one part is isolated when it has become one, it is not really [one], since it admits dissolution into form and matter, from which it is necessary that even the elementary bodies should have their composition. And besides this, since they have size, because they are bodies, they can be divided and broken up into little pieces and so under-

20 μενα καὶ ταύτη φθορὰν ἂν ὑπομένοι. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν
μέρος ἡμῶν τοῦτο, οὐ τὸ πᾶν ἀθάνατοι, εἰ δὲ
ὄργανον, ἔδει γε αὐτὸ εἰς χρόνον τινὰ δοθὲν τοιοῦτον
τὴν φύσιν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ
ἄνθρωπος, εἴπερ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὡς πρὸς ἕλην
τὸ σῶμα ἢ κατὰ τὸ χρώμενον ὡς πρὸς ὄργανον·
25 ἑκατέρως δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτός.

2. Τοῦτο οὖν τίνα φύσιν ἔχει; ἡ σῶμα μὲν ὄν
πάντως ἀναλυτέον· σύνθειον γὰρ πᾶν γε σῶμα.
εἰ δὲ μὴ σῶμα εἴη, ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἄλλης, κἀκεῖνην ἢ
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἢ κατ' ἄλλον οκεπτέον. πρῶτον
5 δὲ σκεπτέον, εἰ ὅ τι δεῖ τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ὃ λέγουσι
ψυχὴν, ἀναλύειν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ζωὴ ψυχῇ πάρεστιν
ἐξανάγκης, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, τὴν ψυχὴν, εἰ
μὲν ἐκ δύο σωμάτων ἢ πλειόνων εἴη, ἢτοι ἑκάτερον
αὐτῶν ἢ ἕκαστον ζωὴν σύμφυτον ἔχειν, ἢ τὸ μὲν
ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ μὴ, ἢ μηδέτερον ἢ μηδὲν ἔχειν. εἰ μὲν
10 δὴ ἐνὶ αὐτῶν προσείη τὸ ζῆν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη
ψυχὴ. τί ἂν οὖν εἴη σῶμα ζωὴν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχον;
πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ ἄψυχα παρ'
αὐτῶν· καὶ ὅτω πάρεστι τούτων ψυχὴ, τοῦτο
ἐπακτῶ κέχρηται τῇ ζωῇ, ἀλλὰ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα
σώματα οὐκ ἔστι. καὶ οἷς γε δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ στοι-
15 χεῖα τούτων ἕτερα, σώματα, οὐ ψυχαί, ἐλέχθησαν
εἶναι οὐδὲ ζωὴν ἔχοντα. εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν ζωὴν
ἔχοντος ἢ σύνοδος πεποίηκε ζωὴν, ἄτοπον—εἰ δὲ
ἕκαστον ζωὴν ἔχοι, καὶ ἐν ἀρκεῖ—μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνα-
τον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζωὴν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ νοῦν

go destruction also in this way. So, if this body of ours is a part of us, the whole of us is not immortal, but if it is a tool, it must, since it was given us for a certain time, be of a nature to last for that time. But the other part is the most important and the man himself; if it is this, then it is related to the body as form to matter or user to tool; in either way, the soul is the self.

2. What nature, then, does this have? If it is a body, it must be completely separable into its parts, for every body is a composite. But if it was not a body, but of another nature, then that nature also would have to be investigated either by the same [analytic] method or by another. But first we must enquire into what [constituent parts] we are to analyse this body which they call soul. For since life is necessarily present in soul, then of necessity if this body, the soul, was composed of two or more bodies, either both or all of them will have a con-natural life, or one of them will have it and another not, or neither or none of them will have it. Now if life was a property of one of them, this one would actually be the soul. What body, then, could there be which has life of itself? For fire and air and water and earth are lifeless of themselves; and when soul is present to any one of them this makes use of a borrowed life—but there are no other bodies besides these. And those who hold that there are elements other than these have maintained that they were bodies, not souls, and that they did not have life. But if, when no single one of them had life, their coming together produced life, it would be absurd (but if each one of them has life, one is enough) or rather impossible for a drawing together

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 7.

γεννᾶν τὰ ἀνόητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ οὐχ ὀπωσοῦν
 20 κραθέντα ταῦτα φήσουσι γίνεσθαι. δεῖ ἄρα
 εἶναι τὸ τάξιν καὶ τὸ τῆς κράσεως αἴτιον· ὥστε
 τοῦτο τάξιν ἂν ἔχοι ψυχῆς. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι¹ σύνθετον,
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀπλοῦν ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἄνευ
 ψυχῆς οὐσης ἐν τῷ παντί, εἴπερ λόγος προσελθὼν τῇ
 25 ὕλη σῶμα ποιεῖ, οὐδαμόθεν δ' ἂν προσέλθοι λόγος
 ἢ παρὰ ψυχῆς.

3. Εἰ δέ τις μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ ἀτόμους ἢ ἀμερῆ
 συνελθόντα ψυχὴν ποιεῖν τῇ ἐνώσει λέγοι καὶ
 ὁμοπαθεία, ἐλέγχοιτ' ἂν καὶ τῇ παραθέσει μὴ δι'
 ὕλου δέ, οὐ γιγνομένου ἐνός οὐδὲ συμπαθοῦς ἐξ
 5 ἀπαθῶν καὶ μὴ ἐνοῦσθαι δυναμένων σωμάτων
 ψυχὴ δὲ αὐτῇ συμπαθῆς. ἐκ δὲ ἀμερῶν σῶμα οὐδὲ
 μέγεθος ἂν γένοιτο. καὶ μὴν εἰ ἀπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ
 σώματος τὸ μὲν ὅσον ὑλικὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ ζωὴν
 ἔχειν οὐ φήσουσιν—ὑλὴν γὰρ ἄποιον—τὸ δὲ κατὰ
 τὸ εἶδος τεταγμένον ἐπιφέρειω τὴν ζωὴν, εἰ μὲν
 10 οὐσίαν φήσουσι τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο εἶναι, οὐ τὸ συν-
 αμφότερον, θάτερον δὲ τούτων ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ· ὁ

¹ ὁ τ. H-S.

ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

of bodies to produce life and for mindless things to generate mind. [The holders of this theory] will not themselves assert that their elements come alive when mixed at random. There is need, therefore, of an ordering principle and a cause of the mixture; so that this would rank as soul. This is not only because body is composite, but not even a simple body could be in existence without soul being in the universe, if it is the coming of a formative principle to matter which makes body, but a formative principle could not come from anywhere except from soul.

3. But if someone says that it is not so, but that atoms or things without parts make the soul when they come together by unity and community of feeling, he could be refuted by their [mere] juxtaposition, and that not a complete one, since nothing which is one and united with itself in community of feeling can come from bodies which are without feeling and unable to be united, but soul is united with itself in community of feeling.¹ But no body or magnitude could be produced from partless constituents. Further, if the body is simple and they² are not going to assert that what is material in it has life of itself, but that what holds the rank of form brings the life, then if they are going to say that this form is a substance, it will not be the composite body but one of these constituents which will

¹ The true sense of this difficult passage was seen and clearly explained by Dr. H-R. Schwyzler in his review of Harder, *Gnomon* 32 (1960) 34-5.

² After a very summary dismissal of the Epicurean position in the first six lines of the chapter, Plotinus returns here to his main corporealists opponents, the Stoics.

οὐκέτ' ἂν σῶμα· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ τοῦτο, ἢ
 πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀναλύσομεν. εἰ δὲ πάθημα
 τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσίαν φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ
 τὸ πάθημα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἐλήλυθε, λεκτέον
 15 αὐτοῖς. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ ὕλη αὐτὴν μορφοῖ οὐδὲ αὐτῇ
 ψυχὴν ἐντίθησι. δεῖ ἄρα τι εἶναι τὸ χορηγὸν τῆς
 ζωῆς, εἴτε τῇ ὕλη ἢ χορηγία, εἴθ' ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν
 σωματίων, ἔξω ὃν καὶ ἐπέκεινα σωματικῆς φύσεως
 ἀπάσης. ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν εἴη σῶμα οὐδὲν ψυχικῆς
 δυνάμεως οὐκ οὔσης. ῥεῖ γάρ, καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτοῦ
 20 ἡ φύσις, καὶ ἀπόλοιτο ἂν ὡς τάχιστα, εἰ πάντα
 σώματα εἴη, κἂν εἰ ὄνομα ἐνὶ αὐτῶν ψυχὴν τις
 θεῖτο. ταῦτά γὰρ ἂν πάθοι τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν
 ὕλης μιᾶς οὔσης αὐτοῖς. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδ' ἂν γένοι-
 το, ἀλλὰ στήσεται ἐν ὕλη τὰ πάντα, μὴ ὄντος τοῦ
 μορφοῦντος αἰτήν. τάχα δ' ἂν οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὕλη τὸ
 25 παράπαν εἴη. λυθήσεται τε καὶ τότε τὸ ξύμπαν, εἴ
 τις αὐτὸ πιστεύσειε σώματος συνέρξει, διδοὺς αὐτῇ
 ψυχῆς τάξιν μέχρι τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀέρι καὶ πνεύματι
 σκεδαστοτάτω καὶ τὸ ἐνὶ εἶναι ἔχοντι οὐ παρ'
 αὐτοῦ. πῶς γὰρ τεμνομένων τῶν πάντων σωματίων
 30 ὥσπερ οὐδὲν τις ἀναθεῖς τότε τὸ πᾶν οὐκ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ
 φερόμενον εἰκῆ ποιήσει; τίς γὰρ τάξις ἐν πνεύματι
 δεομένη παρὰ ψυχῆς τάξεως ἢ λόγος ἢ νοῦς;
 ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν οὔσης ὑπουργὰ ταῦτα πάντα
 αὐτῇ εἰς σύστασιν κόσμου καὶ ζώου ἐκάστου,

be the soul, and this one would no longer be body: for this cannot also be made of matter, or we shall separate it again [into matter and form] in the same way; but if they are going to assert that it is an affection of matter, but not a substance, they must say where the affection and the life came from into matter. For certainly matter does not shape itself or implant soul in itself. There must, then, be something which supplies life, whether it is to matter that it supplies it or to any one of the bodies, and it must be outside and transcend all bodily nature. For there would not even be any body if the power of soul did not exist. For it flows away, and its nature is transitory, and it would perish very quickly if all things were bodies, even if somebody gave one of them the name of soul. For [the body called soul] would be affected in the same way as the other bodies if they had one and the same matter. Or rather it would not even come into existence, but all things would stick [undeveloped] in matter, if there was nothing to shape it. But perhaps there would not even be any matter at all. And this universe of ours would be dissolved if one entrusted it to the conjoining power of a body, giving the rank of soul as far as names go to this body, to air and breath which is extremely liable to dispersion and does not have its unity of itself. For how, since all bodies are in process of division, if one attributed the origin of this universe to any one of them, would one not make it a mindless thing, moving at random? For what order could there be in a breath, which needs order from soul, or what reason or intelligence? But, if soul exists, all these bodies serve it for the maintenance of the world and of each individual

ἄλλης παρ' ἄλλον δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ὅλον συντε-
 35 λούσης· ταύτης δὲ μὴ παρουσίας ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις
 οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη ταῦτα, οὐχ ὅτι ἐν τάξει.

4. Μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας
 ἀγόμενοι, ὡς δεῖ τι πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι κρείτ-
 τον αὐτῶν ψυχῆς εἶδος, ἔνουν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ πῦρ
 νοερὸν τιθέμενοι, ὡσπερ ἄνευ πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος
 5 οὐ δυναμένης τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας ἐν τοῖς οὐδιν
 εἶναι, τόπον δὲ ζητούσης εἰς τὸ ἰδρυθῆναι, δέον
 ζητεῖν, ὅπου τὰ σώματα ἰδρύσουσιν, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ
 ταῦτα ἐν ψυχῆς δυνάμει ἰδρῶσθαι. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν
 παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὴν ζοὴν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τίθενται,
 τί τὸ πολυθρόλλητον αὐτοῖς "πῶς ἔχον" εἰς ὃ
 10 καταφεύγουσιν ἀνυγκαζόμενοι τίθεσθαι ἄλλην παρὰ
 τὰ σώματα φύσιν δραστήριον; εἰ οὖν οὐ πᾶν μὲν
 πνεῦμα ψυχὴ, ὅτι μυρία πνεύματα ἄψυχα, τὸ δὲ
 πῶς ἔχον πνεῦμα φήσουσι, τὸ πῶς ἔχον τοῦτο καὶ
 ταύτην τὴν σχέσιν ἢ τῶν ὄντων τι φήσουσιν ἢ
 15 μηδέν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μηδέν, πνεῦμα ἂν εἶη μόνον, τὸ
 δὲ πῶς ἔχον ὄνομα. καὶ οὕτω συμβήσεται αὐτοῖς
 οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ τὴν ὕλην καὶ ψυχὴν
 καὶ θεόν, καὶ ὀνόματα πάντα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μόνον. εἰ
 δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σχέσις καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμε-
 νον καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ἐν ὕλῃ μὲν, ἄυλον δὲ αὐτὸ τῷ
 20 μὴ πάλιν αὐτὸ συγκείσθαι ἐξ ὕλης, λόγος ἂν εἶη τις

living thing, with different powers from different
 bodies contributing to the whole; but if soul was
 not present in the Whole these bodies would be
 nothing, and certainly not in order.

4. But they themselves are driven by the truth
 to bear witness that there must be a form of soul
 prior to bodies and stronger than they are, when
 they state that the breath has a mind in it and the
 fire is intelligent, as if without fire and breath the
 higher part of reality could not be in existence, and
 as if this higher part was looking for a place to
 establish itself in; when what they ought to be look-
 ing for is a place where they will establish body, as
 bodies must be established in the powers of soul.
 But if they hold that life and soul are nothing but the
 breath, what is this "character" which they are
 always talking about, in which they take refuge when
 they are compelled to posit another working principle
 besides bodies? If, then, not every breath is soul,
 because there are innumerable soulless breaths, but
 they are going to assert that the breath "with a
 certain character" is soul, they will either say that
 this character and this condition belongs to the class
 of real beings or that it does not. But if it does not,
 then soul would be only breath and the character
 would be a mere word. And so it will happen to
 them that they will not be saying that soul and God
 are anything but matter, and these will all be mere
 names—only that [material breath] will exist. But
 if the condition belongs to the class of real beings
 and is something else over and above the substrate
 and the matter, in matter but immaterial itself—
 because it is not again composed of matter and form
 —then it would be a rational principle, and not a

καὶ οὐ σῶμα καὶ φύσις ἐτέρα. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε
 οὐχ ἦττον φαίνεται ἀδύνατον ὄν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι
 σῶμα ὀτιοῦν. ἢ γὰρ θερμὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ψυχρὸν, ἢ
 σκληρὸν ἢ μαλακόν, ὑγρὸν τε ἢ πεπηγός, μέλαν τε
 25 ἢ λευκόν, καὶ πάντα ὅσα ποιότητες σωματίων ἄλλαι
 ἐν ἄλλοις. καὶ εἰ μὲν θερμὸν μόνον, θερμαίνει, ψυχ-
 ρὸν δὲ μόνον, ψύξει· καὶ κοῦφα ποιήσει τὸ κοῦφον
 προσγενόμενον καὶ παρόν, καὶ βαρυνεῖ τὸ βαρύ· καὶ
 μελανεῖ τὸ μέλαν, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν λευκὸν ποιήσει.
 οὐ γὰρ πυρὸς τὸ ψύχειν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ψυχροῦ θερμὰ
 30 ποιεῖν. ἀλλ' ἢ γε ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις μὲν ζώοις
 ἄλλα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ποιεῖ, καὶ ἐν τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ τὰ
 ἐναντία, τὰ μὲν πηγνύσα, τὰ δὲ χέουσα, καὶ τὰ μὲν
 πυκνά, τὰ δὲ ἀραιά, μέλανα λευκά, κοῦφα βαρέα.
 καίτοι ἐν δεῖ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ποιότητά
 τε τὴν ἄλλην καὶ δὴ καὶ χροάν· νῦν δὲ πολλά.

5. Τὰς δὲ δὴ κινήσεις πῶς διαφόρους, ἀλλ' οὐ
 μίαν, μιᾶς οὔσης παντὸς σώματος κινήσεως; εἰ δὲ
 τῶν μὲν προαιρέσεις, τῶν δὲ λόγους αἰτιάσονται,
 ὀρθῶς μὲν τοῦτο· ἀλλ' οὐ σώματος ἢ προαίρεσις
 5 οὐδὲ οἱ λόγοι διάφοροί γε ὄντες, ἐνὸς ὄντος καὶ
 ἁπλοῦ τοῦ σώματος καὶ οὐ μετὸν αὐτῷ τοιούτου
 γε λόγου, ἢ ὅσος δέδοται αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ ποιήσαν-
 τος θερμὸν αὐτὸ ἢ ψυχρὸν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν
 χρόνοις αὔξειν, καὶ μέχρι τοσούτου μέτρον, πόθεν
 ἂν τῷ σώματι αὐτῷ γένοιτο, ᾧ προσήκει ἐναύξεσ-
 10 θαι, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀμοίρω τοῦ αὔξειν εἶναι, ἢ ὅσον παρα-
 ληφθεῖη ἂν ἐν ἕλης ὄγκῳ ὑπηρετοῦν τῷ δι' αὐτοῦ

body, and so a different kind of nature. And be-
 sides, it is equally obvious for the following reasons
 that it is impossible for soul to be any kind of body.
 For [if it is], it is hot or cold, hard or soft, fluid or
 solid, black or white, and [one could mention] all the
 other qualities of bodies which are different in
 different ones. And if it is only hot, it heats, but if
 it is only cold, it will cool, and the light when it is
 present makes things light and the heavy makes them
 heavy; and the black will blacken, and the white will
 make things white. For it does not belong to fire
 to cool things, nor to the cold to make them hot.
 But the soul does different things in different living
 beings, and even opposite things in the same one,
 solidifying some and liquefying others, and making
 some things dense and others rarefied, making things
 black and white, light and heavy. But [if it was a
 body] it ought to produce one effect according to
 the body's qualities, all of them including its colour;
 but as it is it produces many effects.

5. But why, I ask, are the movements different,
 and not one, when every body has one movement?
 If they make choices responsible for some and ra-
 tional principles for others, that is correct; but
 choice does not belong to body and neither do
 rational principles which are various, while body is
 one and simple and has no share in rational principle
 of this kind, but only as much rational principle as
 is given to it by what made it hot or cold. But from
 where could the body get the power to cause growth
 in season and up to a certain measure? It is proper
 to body to grow, but to be without the power of
 causing growth except as much as may be received
 in the mass of matter for the service of that which

τὴν αὐξὴν ἐργαζομένῳ; καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμα
οὔσα αὔξει, ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὴν αὔξεσθαι, προσθήκη
δηλονότι ὁμοίου σώματος, εἰ μέλλει εἰς ἴσον ἵεναι
15 τῷ αὔξομένῳ ὑπ' αὐτῆς. καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται τὸ
προστιθέμενον ἢ ἄψυχον σῶμα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ψυχὴ,
πόθεν καὶ πῶς εἰσιούσης, καὶ πῶς προστιθεμένης;
εἰ δὲ ἄψυχον τὸ προστιθέμενον, πῶς τοῦτο ψυχώσε-
ται καὶ τῷ πρόσθεν ὁμογνωμονήσει καὶ ἐν ἔσται
καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν δοξῶν τῇ πρόσθεν μεταλήψεται,
20 ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥσπερ ξένη ψυχὴ αὕτη ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἔσται ὧν
ἡ ἑτέρα; εἰ δὲ καί, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄλλος ὄγκος ἡμῶν, τὸ
μὲν τι ἀπορρεύσεται αὐτοῦ, τὸ δέ τι προσελεύ-
σεται, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔσται τὸ αὐτό, πῶς οὖν ἡμῶν αἰ-
μνήμαι, πῶς δὲ ἡ γνώρισις οἰκείων οὐδέποτε τῇ
αὐτῇ ψυχῇ χρωμένων; καὶ μὴν εἰ σῶμά ἐστι,
25 φύσις δὲ σώματος μεριζόμενον εἰς πλείω ἕκαστον
μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τῶν μερῶν τῷ ὅλῳ, εἰ τὸ τοσόνδε
μέγεθος ψυχῆ, ὃ ἐὰν ἔλαττον ἢ ψυχὴ οὐκ ἔσται,
ὥσπερ πᾶν ποσὸν ἀφαιρέσει τὸ εἶναι τὸ πρόσθεν
ἠλλάξατο—εἰ δέ τι τῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων τὸν
ὄγκον ἐλαττωθὲν τῇ ποιότητι ταῦτόν μείνει, ἢ μὲν
30 σῶμα ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ποσὸν, τῇ δὲ ποιότητι
ἑτέρα τῆς ποσότητος οὔση τὸ ταῦτόν ἀποσώζειν
δύναται—τί τοίνυν φήσουσιν οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα
εἶναι λέγοντες; πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ἐκάστου μέρους
τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι πότερον ἕκα-
στον ψυχὴν, οἷα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὄλη; καὶ πάλιν τοῦ
35 μέρους τὸ μέρος; οὐδὲν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος συνε-

brings about growth by means of it. For if soul, being a body, was to cause growth, it would have to grow itself, obviously by the addition of similar body, if it was going to keep pace with the body it was causing to grow. And what is added will be either soul or soulless body. And if it is soul, where will it come from, and how will it get in and how is it added? But if what is added is soulless, how will this become soul and how will it come to agreement with what was there before, and be one with it and share the same thoughts with the soul which was there before, but not be like a strange soul which will be ignorant of what the other soul knows? But if, just like the rest of our [bodily] mass, some of its substance will flow away, and some of it will come from outside, and nothing will be the same, how then do we have memories, and how do friends and relations recognise each other when they never have the same souls? Then again, if soul is a body, and when the nature of body is divided into several parts each part is not the same as the whole, if soul is a particular definite size of body, which is not soul if it is smaller, as every quantity changes from its former existence by subtraction—but if one of the things which have size remains the same in quality when its mass is diminished, it is different in so far as it is body, and in so far as it is a particular size, but can retain its identity by its quality which is different from its quantity—what then are the people who assert that soul is a body going to say about this? First of all about each individual part of the soul which is in the same body: is each of them a soul in the same way as the whole is? And again, is the part of the part? If this is so, the size contri-

βάλλετο τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς· καίτοι ἔδει γε ποσοῦ τινος ὄντος· καὶ ὄλον πολλαχῆ ὅπερ σώματι παρῶναι ἀδύνατον ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὄλον εἶναι καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὄλον ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν οὐ ψυχὴν φήσουσιν, ἐξ ἀψύχων ψυχῆ ἀποταίς
 40 ὑπάρξει. καὶ προσέτι ψυχῆς ἑκάστης τὸ μέγεθος ὠρισμένον ἔσται [οὐδὲ]¹ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα, ἢ² ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττόν γε [ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον]³ ψυχῆ οὐκ ἔσται. ὅταν τοίνυν ἐκ συνόδου μιᾶς καὶ ἑνὸς σπέρματος διδυμα γένηται γενήματα, ἢ καί, ὡς περ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 45 ἄλλοις ζώοις, πλείστα τοῦ σπέρματος εἰς πολλοὺς τόπους μεριζομένου, οὐ δὴ ἕκαστον ὄλον ἐστί, πῶς οὐ διδάσκει τοῦτο τοὺς βουλομένους μαθάνειν, ὡς, ὅπου τὸ μέρος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστί τῷ ὄλω, τοῦτο ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι ὑπερβέβηκεν, ἄποσον δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι δεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μένοι τὸ
 50 αὐτὸ τοῦ ποσοῦ κλεπτομένου, ἅτε μὴ μέλον αὐτῷ ποσότητος καὶ ὄγκου, ὡς ἂν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἕτερόν τι οὐσης. ἄποσον ἄρα· ἢ ψυχῆ καὶ οἱ λόγοι.

6. Ὅτι δέ, εἰ σῶμα εἴη ἢ ψυχῆ, οὔτε τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ νοεῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὔτε ἀρετὴ οὔτε τι τῶν καλῶν ἔσται, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. εἴ τι μέλλει αἰσθάνεσθαι τινος, ἐν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ
 5 παντὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ εἰ διὰ πολλῶν αἰσθητηρίων πλείω τὰ εἰσόντα εἴη ἢ πολλαὶ περὶ ἐν ποιότητες, καὶ δι' ἑνὸς ποικίλον οἶον πρόσωπον. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ῥινός, ἄλλο δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀλλὰ

¹ om. Eusebius*.

² Eus.: ἢ Enn.

³ om. Eus.

butes nothing to its essential being; and yet it ought to, if the soul is a particular size, and it is as a whole in many places; this is something of which a body cannot possibly be capable, for the same body to be as a whole in more than one place and for the part to be what the whole is. But if they are going to say that each of the parts is not a soul, their soul will consist of soulless parts. And besides, if the size of each soul is limited in both directions, that at any rate which is less [than the minimum size] will not be soul; when, therefore, from one act of intercourse and one seed twin offspring are produced or, as in other living things a great many, the seed being distributed to many parts [of the womb], and each is a complete whole, why does this not teach those who are willing to learn that, where the part is the same as the whole, this thing transcends quantity in its own essential being, and must necessarily itself be non-quantitative? For thus it would remain the same when robbed of quantity since it would not care about quantity and mass, because its own nature would be something else. The soul and rational principles, then, are without quantity.

6. But it is clear from the following arguments that if soul is a body, neither perception nor thinking nor knowing nor virtue nor anything of value will exist. If anything is going to perceive anything, it must itself be one and perceive every object by one and the same means, both if a number of impressions are received through many sense-organs, or many qualities are perceived in one thing, or if through one sense-organ a complex thing, for example a face, is perceived. For there is not one perception of the nose and another of the eyes, but one and the

ταῦτόν ὁμοῦ πάντων. καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι' ὀφθαλμῶν,
 10 τὸ δὲ δι' ἀκοῆς, ἐν τι δεῖ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ ἄμφω. ἢ
 πῶς ἂν εἴποι, ὅτι ἕτερα ταῦτα, μὴ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοῦ
 τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἐλθόντων; δεῖ τοίνυν τοῦτο
 ὡς κέντρον εἶναι, γραμμὰς δὲ συμβαλλούσας ἐκ
 περιφερείας κύκλου τὰς πανταχόθεν αἰσθήσεις
 πρὸς τοῦτο περαίνειν, καὶ τοιοῦτον τὸ ἀντιλαμ-
 15 βανόμενον εἶναι, ἐν ᾧ ὄντως. εἰ δὲ διεστῶς τοῦτο
 γένοιτο, καὶ ὅσον γραμμῆς ἐπ' ἄμφω τὰ πέρατα αἰ
 αἰσθήσεις προσβάλλοιεν, ἢ συνδραμεῖται εἰς ἓν
 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν, ὅσον τὸ μέσον, ἢ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ
 ἄλλο, ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρου αἰσθησιν ἕξει. ὡς περ ἂν
 εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλου, σὺ δὲ ἄλλον αἰσθοιο. καὶ εἰ
 20 ἐν εἴῃ τὸ αἰσθημα, ὅσον πρόσωπον, ἢ εἰς ἓν
 συναιρεθῆσεται—ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται· συναιρεῖται
 γὰρ καὶ ἐν αἰταῖς ταῖς κόραις· ἢ πῶς ἂν τὰ
 μέγιστα διὰ ταύτης ὄρωτο; ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς
 τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἰόντα ὅσον ἡμερῆ νοήματα γίνεσθαι
 —καὶ ἔσται ἀμερὲς τοῦτο· ἢ μεγέθει ὄντι τοῦτω
 25 συμμερίζοιτο ὄν, ὥστε ἄλλο ἄλλου μέρος καὶ
 μηδένα ἡμῶν ὅλου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τὴν ἀντίληψιν
 ἴσχειν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν ἐστὶ τὸ πᾶν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ

same perception of all together. And if one perception comes through the eyes and another through hearing, there must be some one thing to which both come. Or how could one say that these sense-perceptions are different, if they did not all come together to one and the same [recipient]? This then must be like a centre, and the sense-perceptions from every quarter, lines coming together from the circumference of the circle, must reach it, and that which apprehends them must be of this kind, really one.¹ But if this were extended, and the sense-perceptions arrived at something like the terminal points at both ends of a line, either they will run together again at one and the same point, like the middle of the line, or the two different terminal points will each have a perception of something different (as if I perceived one thing and you another).² And if the object of perception was one, a face for instance, either it will be gathered together into a unity—which is what does obviously happen; for it is gathered together in the pupils of the eyes themselves: or how could the largest things be seen through the pupil of our eye? So still more when they reach the ruling principle they will become like partless thoughts—and this ruling principle will be partless; or if this is a size the sense-objects would be divided up along with it, so that each part would perceive a different part of the object and none of us would apprehend the perceptible thing as a whole. But the whole is one: for how could it be divided?

¹ This is a Peripatetic comparison: cp. Alexander of Aphrodisias *De Anima* p. 63, 8-13 Bruns.

² Again Peripatetic language: cp. Aristotle *De Anima* 2, 426b19 and Alexander *De Anima* p. 61, 1-3 Bruns.

διαιροῦτο; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἴσον τῷ ἴσῳ ἐφαρμόσει,
 ὅτι οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν παντὶ αἰσθητῷ. κατὰ
 30 πηλίκᾳ οὖν ἢ διαίρεσις; ἢ εἰς τοσαῦτα διαιρε-
 θήσεται, καθόσον ἂν ἀριθμοῦ ἔχῃ εἰς ποικιλίαν τὸ
 εἰσὶν αἴσθημα; καὶ ἕκαστον δὴ ἐκείνων τῶν
 μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μορίοις αὐτοῦ
 αἰσθήσεται. ἢ ἀναίσθητα τὰ μέρη τῶν μορίων
 ἔσται; ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ ὅτιοῦν παντὸς
 35 αἰσθήσεται, εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ μεγέθους
 πεφυκότος ἀπείρους καὶ αἰσθήσεις καθ' ἕκαστον
 αἰσθητὸν συμβήσεται γίνεσθαι ἐκάστῳ οἶον τοῦ
 αὐτοῦ ἀπείρους ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας.
 καὶ μὴν σώματος ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθανομένου οὐκ ἂν
 ἄλλον τρόπον γένοιτο τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ οἶον ἐν
 40 κηρῷ ἐνσημανθεῖσαι ἀπὸ δακτυλίων σφραγίδες,
 εἴτ' οὖν εἰς αἷμα, εἴτ' οὖν εἰς ἀέρα τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 ἐνσημαιομένων. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὡς ἐν σώμασιν
 ὑγροῖς, ὅπερ καὶ εὐλογον, ὥσπερ εἰς ὕδωρ συγχυ-
 θήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται μνήμη· εἰ δὲ μένουσιν οἱ
 τύποι, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐνσημαίνεσθαι ἐκείνων
 45 κατεχόντων, ὥστε ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἔσονται, ἢ
 γνωσμένων ἄλλων ἐκείνοι οἱ πρότεροι ἀπολοῦνται·
 ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔσται μνημονεύειν. εἰ δὲ ἔστι τὸ
 μνημονεύειν καὶ ἄλλων αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπ' ἄλλοις
 οὐκ ἐμποδιζόντων τῶν πρόσθεν, ἀδύνατον τὴν
 ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι.

7. Ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀλγεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς
 τοῦ ἀλγεῖν αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰτὸ τοῦτο. ὅταν
 δάκτυλον λέγηται ἀλγεῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἢ μὲν ὀδύνη
 περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον δῆπουθεν, ἢ δ' αἰσθησις τοῦ

So equal will certainly not fit equal, because the
 ruling principle is not equal to every perceptible
 object. Into how many parts, then, will its division
 be? Will it be divided into a number of parts cor-
 responding to the varied complexity of the entering
 sense-object? And of course each of those parts
 of the soul will perceive with its own subdivisions.
 Or will the parts of the parts be without perception?
 But this is impossible. But if any and every part
 perceives the whole, since a size is naturally capable
 of division to infinity, there will come to be an infinity
 of perceptions for each observer regarding the sense-
 object, like an infinite number of images of the same
 thing in our ruling principle. Again, since the object
 being perceived is a body, perception could not occur
 in any other way than that in which seal-impressions
 are imprinted in wax from seal-rings, whether the
 sense-objects are imprinted on blood or on air. And
 if this happens as it does in fluid bodies, which is
 probable, the impression will be obliterated as if it
 was on water, and there will be no memory. But if
 the impressions persist, either it will not be possible
 for others to be imprinted because the first will
 prevent them, so that there will be no other sense-
 impressions, or if others are made, those former
 impressions will be destroyed: so that there will be
 no possibility of remembering. But if it is possible
 to remember and to perceive one set of things after
 another without the previous ones hindering, it is
 impossible for the soul to be a body.

7. One might see this very same thing also from
 pain and from the perception of pain. When a man
 is said to have a pain in his toe, the pain is presu-
 mably in the region of the toe, but they will obviously

5 ἀλγεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ὁμολογήσουσιν, ὡς περὶ τὸ
 ἡγεμονοῦν γίγνεται. ἄλλου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ πονοῦντος
 μέρους τοῦ παθήματος¹ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν αἰσθάνεται,
 καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχει. πῶς οὖν τοῦτο
 συμβαίνει; διαδόσει, φήσουσι, παθόντος μὲν
 πρώτως τοῦ περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ψυχικοῦ πνεύματος,
 10 μεταδόντος δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς καὶ τούτου ἄλλω, ἕως
 πρὸς τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἀφίκοιτο. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἰ τὸ
 πρῶτον πονοῦν ἦσθετο, ἄλλην τὴν αἰσθησιν τοῦ
 δευτέρου εἶναι, εἰ κατὰ διάδοσιν ἢ αἰσθησις, καὶ
 τοῦ τρίτου ἄλλην, καὶ πολλὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ
 ἀπείρους περὶ ἑνὸς ἀλγήματος γίνεσθαι, καὶ
 15 τούτων ἀπασῶν ὑστερον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν αἰσθεσθαι
 καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ παρὰ ταύτας. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς
 ἐκάστην ἐκείνων μὴ τοῦ ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀλγήματος,
 ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἐφεξῆς τῷ δακτύλῳ, ὅτι ὁ τασὸς
 ἀλγεῖ, τὴν δὲ τρίτην, ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ πρὸς τῷ ἄνωθεν,
 καὶ πολλὰς εἶναι ἀλγηδόνας, τό τε ἡγεμονοῦν μὴ
 20 τοῦ πρὸς τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀλγήματος αἰσθάνεσθαι,
 ἀλλὰ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῦτο γινώσκειν μόνον,
 τὰ δ' ἄλλα χαίρειν ἕαν μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, ὅτι ἀλγεῖ ὁ
 δάκτυλος. εἰ τοίνυν κατὰ διάδοσιν οὐχ οἷόν τε
 τὴν αἰσθησιν τοῦ τοιούτου γίνεσθαι μηδὲ σώματος,
 25 ὄγκου ὄντος, ἄλλου παθόντος ἄλλου γινώσκειν εἶναι—
 παντὸς γὰρ μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐστί—
 δεῖ τοιούτον τίθεσθαι. τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον

¹ Vitringa: πνεύματος Enn., Eus., H-S.

agree that the perception of pain is in the region of
 the ruling principle.¹ Well then, though the
 breath or life is different from the suffering part,
 the ruling principle perceives that it is affected, and
 the whole soul is affected in the same way. How
 then does this happen? They will assert that it is
 by transmission²: first of all the soul-breath in the
 region of the toe is affected, and passes the affection
 to the part situated next to it, and this to another,
 until it arrives at the ruling principle. It is neces-
 sary then, if the first part when it suffered perceived
 the suffering, that the second part's perception should
 be different, if the perception is by transmission, and
 the third part's different again, and there would be
 many perceptions, even an infinite number, of one
 pain, and the ruling principle would perceive after
 all these and have its own perception over and above
 all these. But the truth would be that each of those
 perceptions would not be of the pain in the toe, but
 the perception next to the toe would be that the
 sole of the foot was suffering, and the third perception
 that another part higher up was, and there would be
 many feelings of pain, and the ruling principle would
 not perceive the pain in the toe but the pain in the
 part next to itself, and would know this alone and
 let the other pains go, and not understand that the
 toe had a pain. If, then, it is not possible for the
 perception of this kind of thing to come about by
 transmission, nor for one body to have knowledge
 when another is affected, since body is mass—for
 every size has one part different from another—one
 must suppose that the perceiving principle is of such

¹ Cp. SVF II 854.

² This Stoic doctrine is attacked again at IV. 2. 2. 13.

πανταχοῦ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλω τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσήκει.

8. Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ νοεῖν οἶόν τε, εἰ σῶμα ἢ ψυχὴ ὁτιοῦν εἶη, δεικτέον ἐκ τῶνδε. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔστι τὸ σώματι προσχρωμένῃ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐκ ἂν εἶη καὶ τὸ
5 νοεῖν τὸ διὰ σώματος καταλαμβάνειν, ἢ ταῦτόν ἔσται τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. εἰ οὖν τὸ νοεῖν ἔστι τὸ ἄνευ σώματος ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, πολὺ πρότερον δεῖ μὴ σῶμα αὐτὸ τὸ νοήσον εἶναι. ἔτι εἰ αἰσθητῶν μὲν ἢ αἰσθησις, νοητῶν δὲ ἢ νόησις—εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλονται, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔσονται γε καὶ νοητῶν τινων
10 νοήσεις καὶ ἀμεγέθων ἀντιλήψεις—πῶς οὖν μέγεθος ὄν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει καὶ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστὸν νοήσει; ἢ μέρει τινὶ ἀμερεῖ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐ σῶμα ἔσται τὸ νοήσον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ ὅλου χρεια πρὸς τὸ θίγειν· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καθ' ἓν τι. εἰ μὲν οὖν συγχωρήσονται
15 τὰς πρώτας νοήσεις, ὅπερ ἀληθές ἐστιν, εἶναι τῶν πάντη σώματος καθαραπάτων αὐτοεκάστου, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ νοεῖν σώματος καθαρὸν ὄν ἢ γιγνόμενον γινώσκειν. εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωριζομένων γε τῶν σωματίων γίνονται τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος. οὐ
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a kind that it is everywhere identical with itself. But this action is characteristic of some other kind of reality than body.

8. It can be shown by the following arguments that it would not even be possible to think if soul was any kind of body. For if sense-perception is the soul's apprehension of the objects of sense by making use of the body, thinking cannot be comprehension through the body, or it will be the same as sense-perception. If then thinking is apprehension without the body, it is much more necessary that what is going to do the thinking should not be body. Again, if sense-perception is of sense-objects, and thinking is of objects of thought—even if they do not like it, yet all the same there will be thoughts at least of some objects of thought and apprehensions of things without size—how then will something which is a size think what is not a size and think what is partless with something which has parts? Perhaps [it will do so] with a partless part of itself. But if what is going to do the thinking is this, it will not be a body; for there is no need of the whole for touching: contact at one point is enough.¹ If then they are going to agree that the primary thoughts, as is true, are of the objects most completely free from body, of absolute individual reality, then what thinks must know these objects by being or becoming free of body. But if they are going to say that thoughts are of the forms in matter, yet these thoughts come to be by the separation from them of the bodies,

¹ This is again an argument of Aristotle: cp. *De Anima* A 407a15-22. Plotinus does not appear to have noticed that it is directed against Plato (against a literal interpretation of the "soul-circles" of *Timaeus* 35A-37C).

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 7.

20 γὰρ δὴ μετὰ σαρκῶν ἢ ὅλων ὕλης ὁ χωρισμὸς
κύκλου καὶ τριγώνου καὶ γραμμῆς καὶ σημείου.
δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν σώματος αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ
τοιούτῳ χωρῖσαι. δεῖ ἄρα μηδὲ αὐτὴν σῶμα εἶναι.
Ἄμέγεθες δέ, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ
25 δίκαιον· καὶ ἡ τούτων ἄρα νόησις. ὥστε καὶ
προσιόντα ἀμερεῖ αὐτῆς ὑποδέξεται καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν
ἀμερεῖ κείσεται. πῶς δ' ἂν καὶ σώματος ὄντος
τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρεταὶ αὐτῆς, σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιο-
σύνη ἀνδρία τε καὶ αἰ ἄλλαι; πνεῦμά τι γὰρ ἢ
αἷμά τι ἂν τὸ σιφρονεῖν εἴη ἢ δικαιοσύνης ἢ ἀνδρίας,
30 εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἢ ἀνδρία τὸ δυσπαθὲς τοῦ πνεύματος εἴη,
καὶ ἢ σωφροσύνη ἢ εὐκρασία, τὸ δὲ κάλλος
εὐμορφία τις ἐν τύποις, καθ' ἣν λέγομεν ἰδόντες
ὠραίους καὶ καλοὺς τὰ σώματα. ἰσχυρῶ μὲν οὖν
καὶ καλῶ ἐν τύποις πνεύματι εἶναι προσήκοι ἂν·
σωφρονεῖν δὲ τί δεῖ πνεύματι; ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖναντίον
35 ἐν περιπτύξεισι καὶ ἀφαῖς εὐπαθεῖν, ὅπου ἢ
θερμανθήσεται ἢ συμμέτρως ψυχροῦς ἰμεῖροι
ἢ μαλακοῖς τισι καὶ ἀπαλοῖς καὶ λείοις πελάσει; τὸ
δὲ ἀξίαν νεῦμαι τί ἂν αὐτῷ μέλοι; πότερον
δὲ αἰδίων ὄντων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς θεωρημάτων καὶ
40 τῶν ἄλλων νοητῶν ἢ ψυχῆ ἐφάπτεται, ἢ γίνεταί
τῳ ἢ ἀρετῇ, ὠφελεῖ καὶ πάλιν φθείρεται; ἀλλὰ
τίς ὁ ποιῶν καὶ πόθεν; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνο πάλιν
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ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

and it is mind which separates them. For the separation of "circle" and "triangle" and "line" and "point" is certainly not carried out with the help of flesh, or in general of matter. The soul, then, must separate itself from body in this kind of [abstractive] thinking.

But nobility and justice are also, I think, without size; so, then, is thinking about them. So that when they come to it, our thought will receive them in its partlessness and they will remain in it as partless. But how, if the soul is a body, could its virtues exist, self-control and justice and courage and the rest? For self-control or justice or courage would be a kind of breath or blood, unless courage was the breath's lack of susceptibility to affection, and self-control the well-balanced mixture of its elements, and beauty a kind of shapeliness in impressions, by which we say when we see them that people are fresh and young and beautiful in body. Now it might be appropriate to strength and beauty to consist in impressions on the breath: but what does breath need self-control for? Would it not rather find its comfort in embracing and touching, where it will be warmed or have a moderated desire to be cool,¹ or come close to soft, delicate, smooth things? But what would it care about distribution according to worth? But does the soul attain the objects of its contemplation of the virtues and other intelligible things as eternal, or does virtue just happen to someone, benefit them and perish again? But who is it who makes it happen, and where does it come from? For if there is something which

¹ An allusion to *Odyssey* 10. 555.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 7.

μένοι. δεῖ ἄρα ἀδιών εἶναι καὶ μερόντων, οἷα καὶ
τὰ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ. εἰ δὲ ἀδιών καὶ μερόντων, οὐ
σωμάτων. δεῖ ἄρα καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἔσται τοιοῦτον εἶναι.
45 δεῖ ἄρα μὴ σῶμα εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ μένει, ἀλλὰ ρεῖ ἢ
σώματος φύσις πᾶσα.

8¹. Εἰ δὲ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ποιήσεις ὁρῶντες
θερμαινούσας καὶ ψυχούσας καὶ ὠθούσας καὶ
βαρυνούσας ἐνταῦθα τάττουσι τὴν ψυχὴν οἷον ἐν
δραστηρίῳ τόπῳ ἰδρύοντες αὐτήν, πρῶτον μὲν
5 ἀγνοοῦσιν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὰ ¹ τὰ σώματα δυνάμει ταῖς
ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀσωμάτοις ταῦτα ἐργάζεται· ἔπειτα, ὅτι
οὐ ταύτας τὰς δυνάμεις περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀξιούμεν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, λογίζεσθαι, ἐπιθυμεῖν,
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἐμφρόνως καλῶς,² ἃ πάντα ἄλλην
οὐσίαν ζητεῖ. τὰς οὖν δυνάμεις τῶν ἀσωμάτων
10 μεταβιβάσαντες εἰς τὰ σώματα οὐδεμίαν ἐκείνοις
καταλείπουσιν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα ἀσωμάτοις
δυνάμει δύναται ἃ δύναται, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.
ὁμολογήσουσι γὰρ ἕτερον ποιότητα καὶ ποσότητα
εἶναι, καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ποσὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἔτι οὐ πᾶν
15 σῶμα ποιὸν ³ εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὴν ὕλην. ταῦτα δὲ
ὁμολογοῦντες τὴν ποιότητα ὁμολογήσουσιν ἕτερον
οὐσαν ποσοῦ ἕτερον σώματος εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ μὴ

¹ Kirchoff*: ταῦτα Eus., H-S¹.

² Eus., Schwyzer (*Mus. Helv.* 26, 1969, 254): ἐμφρόνως καὶ
καλῶς Vigier*, Creuzer*: ἐμφρόνως κακῶς H-S¹: anconiciendum
[ἐμφρόνως] καλῶς (cf. ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καλῶς Plat. Leg. 756A7)?

³ suspic. Vigier, scr. Volkmann*, Gifford: ποσὸν Eus.,
Stephanus, Gaisford, Creuzer, Kirchoff, Cilento.

ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

makes it happen, that again would abide. The
virtues, then, are required to be eternal and abiding,
like the objects of geometry. But if they are eternal
and abiding they are not bodies. That, therefore,
in which they are must be of the same kind: there-
fore it cannot be a body. For the whole nature of
body does not abide, but flows away.

8¹. But if when they see the actions of bodies
heating and cooling and pushing and weighing down
they rank the soul with them and in a kind of way
establish it in a field of action, first of all they are
ignorant that bodies themselves do these things by
the bodiless powers in them; and then that these
are not the powers which we consider to belong to
the soul, but thinking, perceiving, reasoning, de-
siring, supervising, intelligently and well,¹ which all
require another kind of being. By transferring,
therefore, the powers of bodiless realities to bodies,
they leave nothing for the bodiless. But that bodies
are able to do what they can do by bodiless powers
is obvious for the following reasons. They will
agree that quality is different from quantity, and
that every body is of a certain quantity, and also
that not every body is of a certain quality, as matter
is not. But in admitting this they will also admit
that quality in being different from quantity is
different from body. For how without being of a

¹ This list of powers of soul may be influenced by the list
of soul-movements in Plato *Lysis* X 897A1-4, but the resem-
blance is not very close. Plato's list is neutral and compre-
hensive: bad as well as good soul-movements are included.
In Plotinus's more conventional list there are only good
powers, if the reading of the MSS of Eusebius καλῶς in line 8 is
accepted, as it is now by Henry and Schwyzer, and has
generally been by editors of Eusebius and Plotinus.

ποσόν οὔσα σῶμα ἔσται, εἴπερ πᾶν σῶμα ποσόν;
καὶ μήν, ὅπερ καὶ ἄνω που ἐλέγετο, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα
μεριζόμενον καὶ ὄγκος πᾶς ἀφαιρεῖται ὅπερ ἦν,
20 κερματιζόμενον δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ μέρει
ἢ αὐτῇ ὅλη ποιότης μένει, οἷον γλυκύτης ἢ τοῦ
μέλιτος οὐδὲν ἔλαττον γλυκύτης ἐστὶν ἢ ἐφ'
ἐκάστῳ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἢ γλυκύτης. ὁμοίως καὶ
αἱ ἄλλαι. ἔπειτα, εἰ σώματα ἦσαν αἱ δυνάμεις,
ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὰς μὲν ἰσχυρὰς τῶν δυνάμεων
25 μεγάλους ὄγκους, τὰς δὲ ὀλίγον δρᾶν δυνάμενας
ὄγκους μικροὺς εἶναι. εἰ δὲ μεγάλων μὲν ὄγκων
μικραὶ, ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ μικρότατοι τῶν ὄγκων
μεγίστας ἔχουσι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἢ μεγέθει
τὸ ποιεῖν ἀναθετόν· ἀμεγέθει ἄρα. τὸ δὲ ὕλην
μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι σῶμα, ὡς φασιν, οὐσαν,
30 διάφορα δὲ ποιεῖν ποιότητος προσλαβοῦσαν, πῶς
οὐ δῆλον ποιεῖ τὰ προσγενόμενα λόγους αὐλοῦς¹
καὶ ἀσωμάτους εἶναι; μή, διότι πνεύματος ἢ
αἵματος ἀποστάντων ἀποθνήσκει τὰ ζῶα, λεγόντων.
οὐ γὰρ ἔστω ἄνευ τούτων εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄνευ πολλῶν
35 ἄλλων, ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη. καὶ μήν οὔτε
πνεῦμα διὰ πάντων οὔτε αἷμα, ψυχὴ δέ.

8². Ἐτι εἰ σῶμα οὔσα ἡ ψυχὴ διήλθε διὰ παντός,
κἂν κραθεῖσα εἴη, ὃν τρόπον τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν ἡ
κράσις. εἰ δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων κράσις οὐδὲν
ἐνεργεῖα ἐᾷ εἶναι τῶν κραθέντων, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ
5 ἔτι ἐνεργεῖα ἐνεῖη τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει
μόνον ἀπολέσασα τὸ εἶναι ψυχὴ· ὥσπερ, εἰ γλυκὺ
καὶ πικρὸν κραθεῖη, τὸ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔστω· οὐκ ἄρα

¹ Arnim (*SVF* II. 375), *Theologia* III. 14: αὐτοῦς Eus., *Stephanus**.

certain quantity could it be a body, if every body is of a certain quantity? And further, as I think was said above, if every body and every mass ceases to be what it was before when divided, but when a body is broken up the same quality remains complete in every piece, as for instance the sweetness of the honey is no less sweetness in every fragment, sweetness could not be a body, and the same is true of the other qualities. Then again, if the powers were bodies, it would be necessary for the strong powers to be large masses, and the ones which could do little, small masses. But if the powers of large masses are small, but even the smallest masses have great powers, action must be attributed to something other than size: to something sizeless, therefore. And the fact that matter remains the same, being, as they say, a body, but does different things when it acquires qualities, surely makes clear that what it acquires are immaterial and bodiless rational principles. And they must not say that [soul is a body because] living things die when breath or blood leaves them. For it is not possible for living things to exist without them, or without a great many other things, none of which is soul. And further, neither does breath pervade the whole body nor does blood, but soul does.

8². Again, if soul was a body and permeated the whole body, it would be mixed with it in the way in which other bodies are intermixed. But if the mixture of bodies allows none of the bodies which are mixed to exist in actuality, the soul would not be actually present in bodies either, but only potentially, and would lose its existence as soul, just as, if sweet and bitter are mixed, the sweet does not

ἔχομεν ψυχὴν. τὸ δὲ δὴ σῶμα ὄν σώματι κεκρᾶσθαι ὅλον δι' ὅλων, ὡς ὅπου ἂν ἢ θάτερον, καὶ θάτερον εἶναι, ἴσον ὄγκων ἀμφοτέρων καὶ τόπον¹ κατεχόντων, καὶ μηδεμίαν αὐξὴν γεγονέναι ἐπεμβληθέντος τοῦ ἐτέρου, οὐδὲν ἀπολείψει ὃ μὴ τέμνη. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη παραλλάξ ἢ κρᾶσις—οὕτω γὰρ φησι παράθεσιν ἔσεσθαι—διεληλυθὸς δὲ διὰ παντὸς τὸ ἐπεμβληθέν, ἔτι εἰ² σμικρότερον—ὅπερ ἀδύνατον, τὸ ἔλαττον ἴσον γενέσθαι τῷ μείζονι—ἀλλ' οἷν διεληλυθὸς πᾶν τέμνοι³ κατὰ πᾶν ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἰ καθ' ὅτι οὖν σημείον καὶ μὴ μεταξὺ σῶμα ἔσται ὃ μὴ τέμνηται, εἰς σημεία τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ σώματος γεγονέναι, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δέ, ἀπείρου τῆς τομῆς οὕσης—ὃ γὰρ ἂν λάβης 20 σῶμα, διαιρετόν ἐστιν—οὐ δυνάμει μόνον, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ τὰ ἄπειρα ἔσται. οὐ τοίνυν ὅλον δι' ὅλου χωρεῖν δυνατὸν τὸ σῶμα· ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ δι' ὅλων ἀσώματος ἄρα.

8³. Τὸ δὲ καὶ φύσιν μὲν προτέραν τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα λέγειν, ἐν δὲ ψυχρῷ γενομένην καὶ στομωθεῖσαν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι λεπτοτέραν ἐν ψυχρῷ γιγνομένην—ὃ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ ἄτοπον· πολλὰ γὰρ 5 ζῶα ἐν θερμῷ γίνονται καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχει οὐ ψυχθεῖσαν—ἀλλ' οὖν φασὶ γε προτέραν φύσιν ψυχῆς εἶναι

¹ Schwyzer (*Gnomon* 15, 1939, 10): τὸ πᾶν Eus.

² ἐτι εἰ (*eitiam si*) Schwyzer (*Rh. Mus.* 88, 1939, 377 §16): ἐπει TJMV: ἐπὶ ONDPQ, Stephanus*, Creuzer*: εἰ καὶ Harder: del. Arnim (*SVF* II. 799).

³ Henry (*Etats* 13), Mras: τέμνη ONPTJM: τέμει DQV: τεμεί Harder: τέμνει Stephanus-Gifford, Creuzer*.

exist; we shall not then have a soul. But if it is a body and is mixed with the body "whole through whole" so that wherever the one is, the other is also, with both bodily masses also occupying an equal amount of space, and if no increase takes place when the other one is inserted, this will leave nothing undivided. For mixture is not by large parts placed side by side—for in this way [the Stoic] says it will be juxtaposition [not mixture]—but what is inserted penetrates through every part, even if it is smaller—this is impossible, for the less to be equal to the greater—but, anyhow, in penetrating it all it divides it everywhere; it is necessary therefore, if it divides it at every geometrical point, and there is no body in between which is not divided, that the division of the body must be into geometrical points, which is impossible. But if this is so, since the division is infinite—for whatever body you take is divisible—the infinity of parts will exist not only potentially but actually. It is impossible therefore for one body to penetrate another "whole through whole"¹: but soul penetrates through whole bodies, therefore it is immaterial.

8³. But as for saying that the same breath was growth-principle before, but when it got into the cold and was tempered became soul, since it becomes rarefied in the cold—this is absurd to start with; for many animals come into existence in heat and have a soul which has not been cooled—but anyhow

¹ For the curious Stoic doctrine of "complete transfusion" see e.g. *SVF* I. 102, II. 467 and 471. For a fuller refutation of it by Plotinus, based on Peripatetic arguments from Alexander of Aphrodisias critically used, see *Enneads* II. 7.

κατὰ συντυχίας τὰς ἔξω γιγνομένης.¹ συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ χεῖρον πρῶτον ποιεῖν καὶ πρὸ τούτου ἄλλο ἔλαττον, ἣν λέγουσιν ἔξω, ὃ δὲ νοῦς ὑστατος ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς δηλονότι γενόμενος. ἢ εἰ πρὸ 10 πάντων νοῦς, ἐφεξῆς ἔδει ψυχὴν ποιεῖν, εἶτα φύσιν, καὶ αἰεὶ τὸ ὑστερον χεῖρον, ἥπερ πέφυκεν. εἰ οὖν καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ὑστερος καὶ γεννητὸς καὶ ἐπακτὸν τὸ νοεῖν ἔχων, ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν μηδὲ ψυχὴν μηδὲ νοῦν μηδὲ θεὸν εἶναι. εἰ τὸ 20 δυνάμει, μὴ ὄντος πρότερον τοῦ ἐνεργεία καὶ νοῦ, γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ἦξει εἰς ἐνέργειαν. τί γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἄγον μὴ ὄντος ἐτέρου παρ' αὐτὸ προτέρου; εἰ δ' αὐτὸ ἄξει εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ βλέπον γε πρὸς τι ἄξει, ὃ οὐ δυνάμει, ἐνεργεία δὲ ἔσται. καίτοι τὸ αἰεὶ μένειν τὸ αὐτὸ εἴπερ τὸ δυνάμει ἔξει, καθ' ἑαυτὸ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄξει, καὶ 25 τοῦτο κρεῖττον ἔσται τοῦ δυναμένου οἶον ὀρεκτὸν ὄν ἐκείνου. πρότερον ἄρα τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἐτέραν φύσιν ἔχον σώματος καὶ ἐνεργεία ὄν αἰεὶ πρότερον ἄρα καὶ νοῦς καὶ ψυχὴ φύσεως. οὐκ ἄρα οὕτως ψυχὴ ὡς πνεῦμα οὐδ' ὡς σῶμα. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν μὴ σῶμα λέγουιτ' ἂν, καὶ εἴρηται καὶ ἄλλοις ἕτερα, 30 ἰκανὰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα.

8⁴. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλης φύσεως, δεῖ ζητεῖν, τίς αὕτη.

¹ Kirchhoff*, cf. Theol. III. 37: γι(γ)ομένην Eus.

they assert that growth-principle is prior to soul which comes into existence because of external happenings. So they find themselves making the worse first, and before this another of less good quality, which they call "character", and intellect last, obviously originating from the soul. Now if Intellect is before all things, then they ought to have made soul come next to it, then growth-principle, and have made what comes after always worse, as is the natural state of affairs. If then God (conceived as Intellect) is for them posterior and generated and has his intelligence as something brought in from outside, it would be possible for neither soul nor intellect nor God to exist. If the potential, without the prior existence of what is actual and of Intellect, were to come into existence it could not attain to actuality. For what will be the principle which will bring it there if there is not one different from and prior to itself? But if it is going to bring itself to actuality, which is absurd, all the same it will bring itself by looking to something, which will exist not potentially, but actually; though, if the potential is to have the property of always remaining the same, it will bring itself to an actuality corresponding to itself, and this will be better than that which is potential, as it is the potential's desired objective. The better, which has a nature different from body, and always exists in actuality, is therefore prior: so intellect and soul are prior to growth-principle. Soul, then, is not like breath or like body. But that soul should not be called a body has been proved by others with different arguments, but these too are sufficient.

8⁴. But since it is of another nature, we must

ἀρ' οὖν ἕτερον μὲν σώματος, σώματος δέ τι, οἶον
 ἄρμονία; τοῦτο γὰρ ἄρμονίαν τῶν ἀμφὶ Πυθαγόραν
 λεγόντων ἕτερον τρόπον ᾤθησαν αὐτὸ τοιοῦτόν τι
 5 εἶναι οἶον καὶ ἢ περὶ χορδᾶς ἄρμονία. ὡς γὰρ
 ἐνταῦθα ἐντεταμένων τῶν χορδῶν ἐπιγίνεται τι
 οἶον πάθημα ἐπ' αὐταῖς, ὃ λέγεται ἄρμονία, τὸν
 αὐτὸν πρόπον καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου σώματος ἐν κράσει
 ἀνομοίων γνωμένου τὴν ποιὰν κρᾶσιν ζώην τε
 ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ψυχὴν οὔσαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κράσει
 10 πάθημα. ὅτι δὲ ἀδύνατον, πολλὰ ἤδη πρὸς ταύτην
 τὴν δόξαν εἴρηται· καὶ γάρ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἢ
 ψυχῆ, ἢ δ' ἄρμονία ὑστερον, καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν ἄρχει
 τε καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ τῷ σώματι καὶ μάχεται πολλαχῆ,
 ἄρμονία δὲ οὐκ ἂν οὔσα ταῦτα ποιῶι, καὶ ὡς τὸ
 μὲν οὐσία, ἢ δ' ἄρμονία οὐκ οὐσία, καὶ ὅτι ἢ
 15 κρᾶσις τῶν σωμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέσταμεν, ἐν λόγῳ
 οὔσα ὑγεία ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὅτι καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος
 ἄλλως κραθὲν εἴη ἂν ψυχῆ ἑτέρα, ὥστε πολλὰς
 εἶναι, καὶ τὸ δὴ μέγιστον, ὡς ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῆς
 ψυχῆς ταύτης ἄλλην ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν ποιούσαν τὴν
 ἄρμονίαν ταύτην, οἶον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν
 20 μουσικὸν τὸν ἐντιθέντα ταῖς χορδαῖς τὴν ἄρμονίαν
 λόγον ἔχοντα παρ' αὐτῶ, καθ' ὃν ἀρμόσει. οὔτε
 γὰρ ἐκεῖ αἱ χορδαὶ παρ' αὐτῶν οὔτ' ἐνταῦθα τὰ
 σώματα ἑαυτὰ εἰς ἄρμονίαν ἄγειν δυνήσεται.
 ὅλως δὲ καὶ οὔτοι ἐξ ἀψύχου ἐμφυχα ποιούσι καὶ
 25 [τὰ]¹ ἐξ ἀτάκτων κατὰ συντυχίαν τεταγμένα, καὶ
 τὴν τάξιν οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς

¹ del. *Stephanus*, *Creuzer**.

enquire what this nature is. Is it, then, something
 different from body, but belonging to body, like its
 tuning? For, though the Pythagoreans meant this
 term, tuning, in another sense, people thought it was
 something like the tuning of strings. For just as
 here, when the strings are stretched, they come to
 be affected in a kind of way, and this being affected
 is called being in tune, in the same way, since our
 body also consists of a mixture of dissimilar parts,
 the mixture of a particular kind produces life and
 soul, which is the way of being affected which comes
 upon the mixture. But many arguments have
 already been brought against this view to show that
 it is impossible: they are, that the soul is the prior
 and the tuning subsequent to it; and that this prior
 reality rules and directs the body and fights it in
 many ways, but the soul would not do this if it was
 a being in tune; and that the prior reality is a sub-
 stance, but being in tune is not a substance, and that
 the mixture of bodies of which we consist, when it
 was in proportion, would be health [not soul]; and
 that in each part, which is mixed in a different way,
 there would be a different soul, so that there would
 be many; and what is certainly the greatest diffi-
 culty of all, that it is necessary that there should be
 another soul before this soul producing this being in
 tune, as with musical instruments there is the player
 who brings the strings into tune and has a proportion
 in himself according to which he will tune them.
 For neither can the strings nor the bodies here
 bring themselves into tune by themselves. And in
 general these people also make ensouled things out
 of soulless, and things casually arranged out of
 things in disorder, and do not make order arise from

αὐτομάτου τάξεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἰληφέναι. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις δυνατὸν γενέσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρμονία.

8^b. Τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐντελεχείας ὡδ' ἂν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο, πῶς περὶ ψυχῆς λέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν φασιν ἐν τῷ συνθέτῳ εἶδους τάξω ὡς πρὸς ὕλην τὸ σῶμα ἔμψυχον <ὄν>¹ ἔχειν, σώματος δὲ οὐ παντὸς εἶδος οὐδὲ ἢ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ² ὀργανικοῦ 5 δυναμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἢ παραβέβληται ὁμοίωται, ὡς μορφή ἀνδριάντος πρὸς χαλκόν, καὶ διαιρουμένου τοῦ σώματος συμμερίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἀποκοπτομένου τινὸς μέρους μετὰ τοῦ ἀποκοπέντος ψυχῆς μόριον εἶναι, 10 τὴν τε ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἀναχώρησιν μὴ γίνεσθαι, εἴπερ δεῖ προσφυᾶ τὴν ἐντελέχειαν οὐ ἔστιν εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἀληθές, μηδὲ ὕπνον γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴν ἐντελεχείας οὔσης οὐδὲ ἐναντίωσιν λόγου πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας, ἐν δὲ καὶ ταῦτόν δι' ὄλου πεπονθέναι τὸ πᾶν οὐ διαφωνοῦν ἑαυτῷ. αἰσθήσεις δὲ μόνον 15 δυνατὸν ἴσως γίνεσθαι, τὰς δὲ νοήσεις ἀδύνατον. διὸ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄλλην ψυχὴν ἢ νοῦν εἰσάγουσιν, ὃν ἀθάνατον τίθενται. τὴν οὖν λογιζομένην ψυχὴν ἄλλως ἐντελέχειαν ἢ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἰ δεῖ τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. οὐδ' ἢ αἰσθητικὴ, εἴπερ καὶ αὕτη τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀπόντων

¹ Dodds.

² *Stephanus*, *Creuzer**: ψυχοῦ Eus.

¹ This is a slightly paraphrased version of Aristotle *De Anima* B 1, 412a27-b1. The MSS of Eusebius here read ψυχοῦ for Aristotle's φυσικοῦ and Schwyzler suggests that this could just possibly be a slip of Plotinus himself (who, if we

the soul, but say that the soul has received its existence from a chance arrangement. But this cannot happen either in parts or wholes. The soul, then, is not being in tune.

8^b. One might investigate the question of how the term "entelechy" could be applied to the soul in the following way: [the Peripatetics] assert that the soul in the composite being holds the rank of form in relation to the ensouled body as matter, but is not the form of every kind of body, and not of body simply as body, but of a "natural organic body which has life potentially."¹ If then it is assimilated to the body by being applied to it, as the form of the statue is to the bronze, then when the body was divided the soul would be separated into parts along with it, and when a part was cut off there would be a bit of soul with the cut-off piece of body, and the withdrawal in sleep would not take place, if the entelechy must be firmly fixed where it is—but in fact there could not even be sleep; further, if the soul was an entelechy there could be no opposition of reason to desire, but the whole would be affected throughout in one and the same way without disagreeing with itself. But perhaps it would only be possible for sense-perceptions to occur, but thoughts would be impossible. For this reason [the Peripatetics] themselves introduce another soul or intelligence, which they assume to be immortal. The reasoning soul, therefore, must be an entelechy in some sense other than this, if one really ought to use the name. And the perceiving soul, if this also possesses the impressions of absent sense-objects,

keep the MSS text, rather illogically qualified the body, which is matter to the soul as form, as ἔμψυχον in line 3).

20 τοὺς τύπους ἔχει, αὐτοὺς οὐ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἄρα
 ἔξει· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἐνέσονται ὡς μορφαὶ καὶ
 εἰκόνας· ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλους δέχεσθαι, εἰ οὕτως
 ἐνεῖεν. οὐκ ἄρα ὡς ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. καὶ
 μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, μὴ σιτίων μηδὲ ποτῶν
 25 ἀλλ' ἄλλων παρὰ τὰ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδ' αὐτὸ
 ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. λοιπὸν δὲ τὸ φυτικὸν ἂν
 εἴη, ὃ ἀμφισβήτησιν ἂν δόξειεν ἔχειν, μὴ τοῦτον
 τὸν τρόπον ἐντελέχεια ἀχώριστος ἦ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
 τοῦτο φαίνεται οὕτως ἔχον. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ παντὸς
 φυτοῦ περὶ τὴν ρίζαν καὶ ἀναυνομένου τοῦ ἄλλου
 30 σώματος περὶ τὴν ρίζαν καὶ τὰ κάτω ἐν πολλοῖς
 τῶν φυτῶν ἢ ψυχῇ, δῆλον ὅτι¹ ἀπολιπούσα τὰ
 ἄλλα μέρη εἰς ἓν τι συνεστάλη· οὐκ ἄρα ἦν ἐν τῷ
 ὅλῳ ὡς ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ
 πρὶν ἀξηθῆναι τὸ φυτὸν ἐν τῷ ὀλίγῳ ὄγκῳ. εἰ
 οὖν καὶ εἰς ὀλίγον ἔρχεται ἐκ μείζονος φυτοῦ καὶ
 35 ἐξ ὀλίγου ἐπὶ πᾶν, τί κωλύει καὶ ὅλως χωρίζεσθαι;
 πῶς δ' ἂν καὶ ἀμεροῦς οὐσα μεριστοῦ τοῦ σώματος
 ἐντελέχεια γένοιτο; ἢ τε αὐτὴ ψυχὴ ἐξ ἄλλου
 ζώου ἄλλον γίνεται· πῶς οὖν ἢ τοῦ προτέρου τοῦ
 ἐφεξῆς ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ ἦν ἐντελέχεια ἐνός; φαίνεται
 δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν μεταβαλλόντων ζώων εἰς ἄλλα
 40 ζῶα. οὐκ ἄρα τῷ εἶδος εἶναι τινος τὸ εἶναι ἔχει,
 ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐσία οὐ παρὰ τὸ ἐν σώματι ἰδρῶσθαι τὸ
 εἶναι λαμβάνουσα, ἀλλ' οὐσα πρὶν καὶ τοῦδε
 γενέσθαι [οἶον ζώου οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν]

¹ Gifford, M^{us}, Harder: φυτῶν, ἢ ψυχῇ δηλονότι H-S¹.

will therefore hold them without the assistance of the body; but if this is not so, they will be present in it as shapes and images; but it would be impossible for it to receive other impressions if they were in it in this way. It is therefore not [in the body] as an inseparable entelechy. Furthermore, not even that which desires, not food and drink but other things besides those of body, can be an inseparable entelechy. There would remain the growth-principle, and there might seem to be some possibility of questioning whether this might not be an inseparable entelechy in this sense. But even this is clearly not so. For if the principle of every plant is in the region of the root, and when the rest of the body of the plant withers up, in many plants the soul [remains] in the region of the root and the lower parts, it is obvious that it has left the other parts and gathered itself together into one: it was not, then, in the whole as an inseparable entelechy. And again, before the plant grows, the soul is in the small bulk [of the root]. If then the soul passes into a small root from a larger plant and from a small root to the whole plant, what prevents it from being completely separated? But also, how when it is without parts could it become the entelechy of a body with parts? And the same soul belongs to one living thing after another: how then could the soul of the first become the soul of that which comes next, if it was the entelechy of one? (This is obvious from the change of living things into other living things.) The soul, therefore, does not have its existence by being the form of something, but it is a substance which does not derive its existence from its foundation in body, but exists before belonging to this particular body. What then is its

γεννήσει].¹ τίς οὖν οὐσία αὐτῆς; εἰ δὲ μήτε
 σῶμα, μήτε πάθος σώματος, πράξις δὲ καὶ
 45 ποίησις, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς,
 οὐσία παρὰ τὰ σώματα οὐσα ποία τίς ἔστιν; ἢ
 δῆλον ὅτι ἴην φάμεν ὄντως οὐσίαν εἶναι. τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ γένεσις, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσία, πᾶν τὸ σωματικὸν
 εἶναι λέγεται ἄν, γινόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον,
 ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν, μεταλήψει δὲ τοῦ ὄντος
 50 σφζόμενον, καθόσον ἂν αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνη.

9. Ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα φύσις, ἢ παρ' αὐτῆς ἔχουσα τὸ
 εἶναι, πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὄν, ὃ οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε
 ἀπόλλυται· ἢ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα οἰχήσεται, καὶ οὐκ
 ἂν ὑστερον γένοιτο τοῦτου ἀπολωλὸτος, ὃ παρέχει
 5 αὐτοῖς σωτηρίαν, τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ τῶδε τῶ
 παντὶ διὰ ψυχῆς σφζομένῳ καὶ κεκοσμημένῳ.
 ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινήσεως ἦδε χορηγοῦσα τοῖς ἄλλοις
 κίνησιν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινουμένη, καὶ ζωῆν
 τῶ ἐμφύχῳ σώματι διδοῦσα, αὐτὴ δὲ παρ'
 ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα, ἣν οὔποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ἅτε παρ'
 10 ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάντα ἐπακτῶ ζωῆ
 χοῆται· ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἰσιν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινα φύσιν
 πρώτως ζῶσαν εἶναι, ἣν ἀνώλεθρον καὶ ἀθάνατον
 εἶναι δεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἅτε ἀρχὴν ζωῆς καὶ τοῖς
 ἄλλοις οὔσαν. ἔνθα δὴ καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἅπαν καὶ τὸ
 μακάριον ἰδρῦσθαι δεῖ ζῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄν παρ'
 15 αὐτοῦ, πρώτως ὄν καὶ ζῶν πρώτως, μεταβολῆς
 κατ' οὐσίαν ἄμοιρον, οὔτε γινόμενον οὔτε ἀπολ-
 λύμενον. πόθεν γὰρ ἂν καὶ γένοιτο, ἢ εἰς τί
 ἀπόλοιτο; καὶ εἰ δεῖ ἐπαληθεύειν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος

¹ del. Page, ut glossam.

substance? If it is not a body or an affection of
 body, but action and making and many things are in
 it and come from it, then since it is a substance dis-
 tinct from bodies, of what kind is it? It is obviously
 what we call real substance. For everything bodily
 should be called becoming, not substance; it "comes
 to be and passes away, but never really is", but is
 preserved by participation in being, in so far as it
 does participate in it.

9. But the other nature, which has being of itself,
 is all that really exists, which does not come into
 being or perish: or everything else will pass away,
 and could not come into being afterwards if this real
 existence had perished which preserves all other
 things and especially this All, which is preserved and
 given its universal order and beauty by soul. For
 soul is the "origin of motion"¹ and is responsible
 for the motion of other things, and it is moved by
 itself, and gives life to the ensouled body, but has it
 of itself, and never loses it because it has it of itself.
 For certainly all things cannot have a borrowed life:
 or it will go on to infinity; but there must be some
 nature which is primarily alive, which must be in-
 destructible and immortal of necessity since it is also
 the origin of life to the others. Here, assuredly, all
 that is divine and blessed must be situated, living of
 itself and existing of itself, existing primarily and
 living primarily, without any part in essential change,
 neither coming to be nor perishing. For where could
 it come into being from, or into what could it change
 when it perished? And if we are to apply the name
 "being" to it truly, then being itself ought not to

¹ Plato *Phaedrus* 245C9.

προσηγορίαν, ἀπὸ οὐ ποτὲ μὲν εἶναι, ποτὲ δὲ οὐκ
 εἶναι δεήσει. ὡς καὶ τὸ λευκόν, ἀπὸ τὸ χρώμα,
 20 οὐ ποτὲ μὲν λευκόν, ποτὲ δὲ οὐ λευκόν· εἰ δὲ καὶ
 ὄν ἦν τὸ λευκόν μετὰ τοῦ λευκὸν εἶναι, ἦν ἂν
 αἰεί· ἀλλὰ μόνον ἔχει τὸ λευκόν. ᾧ δ' ἂν τὸ ὄν ἦ
 παρὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ πρώτως, ὄν αἰεί ἔσται.
 τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ ὄν πρώτως καὶ αἰεί ὄν οὐχὶ νεκρόν,
 25 ὡσπερ λίθον ἢ ξύλον, ἀλλὰ ζῶν εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ ζωῆ
 καθαρᾷ κεχρησθαι, ὅσον ἂν αὐτοῦ μένη μόνον· ὁ
 δ' ἂν συμμιχθῆ χειρόνι, ἐμπόδιον μὲν ἔχει πρὸς τὰ
 ἄριστα—οὐτι γὰρ μὴν τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀπολαλέναι—
 ἀναλαβεῖν δὲ τὴν ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἐπὶ τὰ
 αὐτοῦ ἀναδραμόν.

10. Ὅτι δὲ τῇ θειοτέρᾳ φύσει συγγενῆς ἡ ψυχὴ
 καὶ τῇ αἰδίῳ, δῆλον μὲν ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ μὴ σῶμα
 αὐτῆν δεδεῖχθαι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ σχῆμα ἔχει οὐδὲ
 χρώμα ἀναφῆς τε. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε
 5 ἔστι δεικνύναι. ὁμολογουμένου δὴ ἡμῖν παντὸς τοῦ
 θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος ζωῆ ἀγαθῆ κεχρησθαι καὶ
 ἔμφρονι, σκοπεῖν δεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῆς
 ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς, οἷόν ἐστι τὴν φύσιν. λάβωμεν δὲ
 ψυχὴν μὴ τὴν ἐν σώματι ἐπιθυμίας ἀλόγους καὶ
 θυμοῦς προσλαβοῦσαν καὶ πάθη ἄλλα ἀναδεξαμένην,
 10 ἀλλὰ τὴν ταῦτα ἀποτριβαμένην καὶ καθόσον οἷόν
 τε μὴ κοινωνοῦσαν τῷ σώματι. ἥτις καὶ δῆλον
 ποιεῖ, ὡς προσθήκαι τὰ κακὰ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἄλλοθεν,
 καθηραμένη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ ἄριστα, φρόνησις
 καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετή, οὐκ εἶα ὄντα. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ἡ
 15 ψυχὴ, ὅταν ἐφ' ἑαυτὴν ἀνέλθῃ, πῶς οὐ τῆς φύσεως

exist at one time, but not at another; as for instance
 white, the colour itself, is not white at one time and
 not-white another; but if white was being as well
 as being white, it would exist for ever; but [as it is]
 it only has the white [not being]. But that with
 which being is from itself, and primarily, will always
 be existent. This, then, which is primarily and
 always existent cannot be dead, like a stone or wood,
 but must be alive, and have a pure life, as much of it
 as remains alone; but whatever is mixed with what
 is worse has an impeded relationship to the best—
 yet it certainly cannot lose its own nature—but re-
 covers its "ancient state"¹ when it runs up to its own.

10. Our demonstration that the soul is not a body
 makes it clear that it is akin to the diviner and to
 the eternal nature. It certainly does not have a
 shape or a colour, and it is intangible. But we can
 also demonstrate its kinship in the following way.
 We agree of course that all the divine and really
 existent has a good, intelligent life; now we must
 investigate what comes next, starting from our own
 soul and finding out what sort of nature it has. Let
 us take soul, not the soul in body which has acquired
 irrational desires and passions and admitted other
 affection, but the soul which has wiped these away
 and which, as far as possible, has no communion
 with the body. This soul does make it clear that
 its evils are external accretions to the soul and come
 from elsewhere, but that when it is purified the best
 things are present in it, wisdom and all the rest of
 virtue, and are its own. If, then, the soul is some-
 thing of this kind when it goes up again to itself,

¹ Plato *Republic* 517B6-7.

ἐκείνης, οἷαν φαμέν τὴν τοῦ θείου καὶ αἰδίου παντὸς εἶναι; φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθῆς θεῖα ὄντα οὐκ ἂν ἐγγένοιτο φαῦλω τινὶ καὶ θνητῷ πράγματι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη θεῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἅτε θεῖον μετὸν αὐτῷ διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ
 20 ὁμοούσιον. διὸ καὶ ὅστις τοιοῦτος ἡμῶν ὀλίγον ἂν παραλλάττοι τῶν ἄνω τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῇ μόνου τοῦτο, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν σώματι, ἐλαττούμενος. διὸ καὶ, εἰ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος τοιοῦτος ἦν, ἢ πληθὸς τι τοιαύταις ψυχαῖς κεχρημένον, οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἦν ἄπιστος, ὡς μὴ πιστεύειν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῖς
 25 πάντῃ ἀθάνατον εἶναι. νῦν δὲ πολλαχοῦ λελωβημένην τὴν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ψυχῇν ὀρώντες οὔτε ὡς περὶ θείου οὔτε ὡς περὶ ἀθανάτου χρήματος διανοοῦνται. δεῖ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐκάστου σκοπεῖσθαι εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ ἀφορῶντα, ἐπεὶπερ τὸ πρυστεθὲν ἐμπόδιον αἰεὶ πρὸς γνώσιν τοῦ ᾧ
 30 προσετέθη γίγνεται. σκόπει δὴ ἀφελῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ ἀφελῶν ἑαυτὸν ἰδέτω καὶ πιστεύσει ἀθάνατος εἶναι, ὅταν ἑαυτὸν θεάσῃται ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ γεγεννημένον. ὄψεται γὰρ νοῦν ὀρώντα οὐκ αἰσθητὸν τι οὐδὲ τῶν θνητῶν τούτων, ἀλλὰ αἰδίω
 35 τὸ αἰδίον κατανοοῦντα, πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, κόσμον καὶ αὐτὸν νοητὸν καὶ φωτεινὸν γεγεννημένον, ἀληθεία καταλαμπόμενον τῇ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐπιλάμπει τοῖς νοητοῖς ἀλήθειαν· ὡς πολλάκις αὐτῷ δόξαι τοῦτο δὴ καλῶς εἰρησθαι· χαίρετ', ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος πρὸς τὸ
 40 θεῖον ἀναβᾶς καὶ¹ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸ ὁμοιότητα

¹ Em., defendit Seidel: καὶ <εἰς> Kirchhoff*: εἰς H-S¹.

it must surely belong to that nature which we assert is that of all the divine and eternal. For wisdom and true virtue are divine things, and could not occur in some trivial mortal being, but something of such a kind [as to possess them] must be divine, since it has a share in divine things through its kinship and consubstantiality. For this reason any one of us who is like this would deviate very little from the beings above as far as his soul itself was concerned and would only be inferior by that part which is in body. For this reason, if every man was like this, or there were a great number who had souls like this, no one would be so unbelieving as not to believe that what is soul in men is altogether immortal. But, as it is, they see the soul in the great majority of people damaged in many ways, and do not think of it as if it was divine or immortal. But when one considers the nature of any particular thing one must concentrate on its pure form, since what is added is always a hindrance to the knowledge of that to which it has been added. Consider it by stripping, or rather let the man who has stripped look at himself and believe himself to be immortal, when he looks at himself as he has come to be in the intelligible and the pure. For he will see an intellect which sees nothing perceived by the senses, none of these mortal things, but apprehends the eternal by its eternity, and all the things in the intelligible world, having become itself an intelligible universe full of light, illuminated by the truth from the Good, which radiates truth over all the intelligibles; so he will often think that this was very well said: "Greetings, I am for you an immortal god"¹ having ascended

¹ Empedocles fr. B 112 Diels-Kranz 4.

ἀτενίσας. εἰ δ' ἡ κάθαρσις ποιεῖ ἐν γνώσει τῶν ἀρίστων εἶναι, καὶ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι ἐνδον οὔσαι ἀναφαίνονται, αἱ δὲ καὶ ὄντως ἐπιστήμαί εἰσι. οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕξω που δραμουῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ σωφροσύνην καθορᾷ καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ παρ' αὐτῇ
 45 ἐν τῇ κατανοήσει ἑαυτῆς καὶ τοῦ ὁ πρότερον ἦν ὡσπερ ἀγάλματα ἐν αὐτῇ ἰδρυμένα ὄρωσα οἶα ὑπὸ χρόνου ἰοῦ πεπληρωμένα καθαρὰ ποιησαμένη· οἶον εἰ χρυσὸς ἐμψυχος εἴη, εἴτα ἀποκρουσάμενος ὅσον γεηρὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ πρότερον ἑαυτοῦ ὦν, ὅτι μὴ χρυσὸν εἴωρα, τότε δὲ αὐτὸν ἦδη τοῦ
 50 χρήματος θαυμάσειεν ὄρων μεμονωμένον, καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα εἶδει αὐτῷ κάλλους ἐπακτοῦ ἐνθυμοῖτο, αὐτὸς κρατιστεύων, εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ εἴη εἶναι.

11. Περὶ τοιοῦτου χρήματος τίς ἂν ἀμφισβητοῖ νοῦν ἔχων, ὡς οὐκ ἀθάνατον; ᾧ πάρεστι μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ζῶν, ἦν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀπολέσθαι· πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίκτητόν γε οὔσαν οὐδ' αὖ οὕτως ἔχουσαν,
 5 ὡς τῷ πυρὶ ἡ θερμότης πάρεστι; λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἐπακτόν ἡ θερμότης τῷ πυρὶ, ἀλλ' ὅτι, εἰ καὶ μὴ τῷ πυρὶ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὑποκειμένη τῷ πυρὶ ὕλῃ. ταύτη γὰρ καὶ διαλύεται τὸ πῦρ. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐχ οὕτω τὴν ζώην ἔχει, ὡς ὕλην μὲν οὔσαν ὑποκείσθαι, ζώην δὲ ἐπ' αὐτῇ γενομένην τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποδείξει.
 10 ἢ γὰρ οὐσία ἐστὶν ἡ ζώη, καὶ ἐστὶν οὐσία ἡ τοιαύτη παρ' αὐτῆς ζῶσα, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ζητούμεν,

¹ Again the *Phaedrus* myth (247D5 ff.), but remarkably transformed. The moral forms stand, not as in Plato in the "place above the heavens", but within the soul itself, and the soul sees them not as transcendent realities, but as included in its self-vision when it has in the course of its self-

to the divine and concentrating totally on likeness to it. But if purification causes us to be in a state of knowledge of the best, then the sciences which lie within become apparent, the ones which really are sciences. For it is certainly not by running around outside that the soul "sees self-control and justice", but itself by itself in its understanding of itself and what it formerly was, seeing them standing in itself like splendid statues all rusted with time which it has cleaned¹: as if gold had a soul, and knocked off all that was earthy in it; it was before in ignorance of itself, because it did not see the gold, but then, seeing itself isolated, it wondered at its worth, and thought that it needed no beauty brought in from outside, being supreme itself, if only one would leave it alone by itself.

11. Who with any sense could doubt that a thing of this kind is immortal? It has life of itself, which cannot perish: for how could it, since it is not brought in from outside, nor again does soul have it in the way in which heat is present to fire. I do not mean, of course, that heat in relation to fire is something brought in from outside, but that, even if it is not so for fire, it is for the matter which underlies fire; for it is by this that fire comes to an end. But soul does not have life in this way, as if it was underlying matter and life came upon it and made it soul. For life is rather a substance, and soul is a substance of this kind, living of itself—which is the thing we are looking for—and they will admit that this is

purification "cleansed the rust of time" off them and returned to a true self-understanding. The image of the "living gold" hammering away its own dross which follows is one of Plotinus's most original dynamic images.

ἢ ψυχῇ, καὶ τοῦτο ἀθάνατον ὁμολογοῦσιν, ἢ ἀναλύ-
 σουσιν ὡς σύνθετον καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν, ἕως ἂν εἰς
 ἀθάνατον ἔλθωσι παρ' αὐτοῦ κινούμενον, ᾧ μὴ
 θέμις θανάτου μοῖραν δέχεσθαι. ἢ πάθος ἐπακτὸν
 15 τῇ ὕλῃ λέγοντες τὴν ζωὴν, παρ' ὅτου τοῦτο τὸ
 πάθος ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὴν ὕλην, αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκα-
 στήσονται ὁμολογεῖν ἀθάνατον εἶναι, ἄδεκτον ὄν
 τοῦ ἐναντίου ᾧ ἐπιφέρει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ μία φύσις
 ἐνεργείᾳ ζῶσα.

12. Ἐπι εἰ πᾶσαν φήσουσι φθαρτὴν, πάλαι ἂν
 ἔδει πάντα ἀπολωλέναι· εἰ δὲ τὴν μὲν, τὴν δ' οὐ,
 οἷον τὴν τοῦ παντός ἀθάνατον εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡμετέ-
 ραν μὴ, λεκτέον αὐτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν. ἀρχὴ τε γὰρ
 5 κινήσεως ἑκατέρα, καὶ ζῆ παρ' αὐτῆς ἑκατέρα,
 καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶ αὐτῶ ἐφάπτεται νοοῦσα τά τε ἐν
 τῶ οὐρανῷ τά τε οὐρανοῦ ἐπέκεινα καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἐστὶ
 κατ' οὐσίαν ζητοῦσα καὶ μέχρι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς
 ἀναβαίνουσα. ἢ τε δὲ παρ' αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ
 θεαμάτων κατανόσεις αὐτοεκάστου καὶ ἐξ ἀναμνή-
 10 σεως γιγνομένη πρὸ σώματός τε αὐτῇ δίδωσι τὸ
 εἶναι καὶ αἰδίοις ἐπιστήμαις κεχρημένην αἰδίων καὶ
 αὐτὴν εἶναι. πᾶν τε τὸ λυόμενον σύνθεσιν εἰς τὸ
 εἶναι εἰληφὸς ταύτῃ διαλύεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἢ συνε-
 τέθη. ψυχῇ δὲ μία καὶ ἀπλή ἐνεργεία οὐσα ἐν τῶ
 15 ζῆν φύσις· οὐ τοίνυν ταύτῃ φθαρῆσεται. ἀλλ' ἄρα
 μερισθεῖσα κερματιζομένη ἀπόλοιτο ἂν. ἀλλ' οὐκ
 ὄγκος τις οὐδὲ ποσόν, ὡς ἐδείχθη, ἢ ψυχῇ. ἀλλ'

immortal, or they will treat it also as a composite
 and separate its parts until they come to an immortal
 thing moved by itself; it is against the divine law
 for this to accept the fate of death. Or if they say
 that life is an external affection of matter, they will
 be compelled to admit that the very thing from which
 this affection came into matter is immortal, unable to
 receive the opposite of the life it brings. But there
 really is one single nature which is actually alive.

12. Besides, if they are going to assert that every
 soul is destructible, everything ought to have
 perished long ago; but if they say that one soul is
 destructible and another is not, for instance that the
 soul of the All is immortal, but ours is not, they must
 explain why. For each of them is a principle of
 movement, and each of them lives of itself, and each
 of them apprehends the same things by the same
 means, thinking the things in heaven and the things
 beyond heaven and searching out everything which
 has substantial existence, and ascending to the first
 principle. And the intellection of the authentic
 reality of each thing which the soul derives from
 itself, from the contemplations within it, and from
 recollection, gives it an existence prior to body and
 makes it everlasting because it has everlasting know-
 ledge. Again, everything which is dissoluble has
 come into existence by being put together and is
 naturally liable to be disintegrated in the same way
 in which it was put together. But the soul is a
 single and simple nature which has actual existence
 in its living; it cannot, then, be destroyed in this
 way. "But then if it was divided into parts it would
 be chopped up and so perish." But the soul, as has
 been demonstrated, is not a mass or a quantity.

ἀλλοιωθεῖσα ἤξει εἰς φθοράν. ἀλλ' ἡ ἀλλοίωσις
φθείρουσα τὸ εἶδος ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν δὲ ὕλην ἐᾷ· τοῦτο
δὲ συνθέτου πάθος. εἰ οὖν κατὰ μηδὲν τούτων
20 οἷόν τε φθείρεσθαι, ἀφθαρτον εἶναι ἀνάγκη.

13. Πῶς οὖν τοῦ νοητοῦ χωριστοῦ ὄντος ἦδε εἰς
σῶμα ἔρχεται; ὅτι, ὅσος μὲν νοῦς μόνος, ἀπαθὴς
ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ζωὴν μόνον νοερὰν ἔχων ἐκεῖ αἰεὶ
μένει—οὐ γὰρ ἐν ὁρμῇ οὐδ' ὄρεξις—δ' δ' ἂν ὄρεξιν
5 προσλάβῃ ἐφεξῆς ἐκείνῳ τῷ νῷ ὄν, τῇ προσθήκῃ
τῆς ὄρεξεως οἷον πρόεισιν ἤδη ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ
κοσμεῖν ὀρεγόμενον καθὰ ἐν νῷ εἶδεν, ὥσπερ κυοῦν
ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ὠδῖνον γενῆσαι, ποιεῖν σπεύδει καὶ
δημιουργεῖ. καὶ τῇ σπουδῇ ταύτῃ περὶ τὸ αἰσθη-
τὸν τεταμένη, μετὰ μὲν πάσης τῆς τῶν ὄλων
10 ψυχῆς ὑπερέχουσα τοῦ διοικουμένου εἰς τὸ ἔξω καὶ
τοῦ παντὸς συνεπιμελουμένη, μέρος δὲ διοικεῖν βου-
ληθεῖσα μονομένη καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ γιγνομένη, ἐν ᾧ
ἔστιν, οὐχ ὅλη οὐδὲ πᾶσα τοῦ σώματος γενομένη,
ἀλλὰ τι καὶ ἔξω σώματος ἔχουσα. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ὁ
15 ταύτης νοῦς ἐμπαθής· αὕτη δὲ ὅτε μὲν ἐν σώματι,
ὅτε δὲ σώματος ἔξω, ὁρμηθεῖσα μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώ-
των, εἰς δὲ τὰ τρίτα προελθοῦσα εἰς τὰ ἐπὶ τάδε,
νοῦ ἐνεργεία τοῦ¹ μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ δια-
ψυχῆς πάντα καλῶν πληροῦντος καὶ διακοσμοῦντος,
20 ἄθανάτου δι' ἀθανάτου, εἴπερ αἰεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν
ἔσται δι' ἐνεργείας ἀπαύστου.

¹ Harder: ἐνεργεία νοῦ A^{no}: ἐνέργεια νοῦ A^{uc} EUCD:
ἐνέργειαν οὐ x.

"But it will come to destruction by qualitative change." But a qualitative change which destroys anything takes away its form, but leaves its matter; but this is something which happens to a compound. If then soul cannot be destroyed in any of these ways, it must be indestructible.

13. How then, since the intelligible is separate, does soul come into body? It is in this way: as much of it as is only intellect has a purely intellectual life in the intelligible and stays there for ever without being affected; but that which acquires desire, which follows immediately on that intellect, goes out further in a way by its acquisition of desire, and, desiring to impart order and beauty according to the pattern which it sees in Intellect, is as if pregnant by the intelligibles and labouring to give birth, and so is eager to make, and constructs the world. And, straining towards the sense-world by its eagerness, along with the whole of the soul of the universe it transcends what it directs and shares in the care of the All, but when it wants to direct a part it is isolated and comes to be in that part in which it is; it does not come to belong wholly and altogether to the body, but has some part as well outside the body. And not even the intellect of this [individual] soul is subject to affection; but this soul is sometimes in the body and sometimes out of the body; it starts from the first realities and goes out to the third, the things down here, by the activity of the Intellect which remains the same and fills all things through soul with beauties and sets them in order, immortal through immortal, since Intellect will be existent for ever through its inexhaustible activity.

14. Περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ψυχῆς, ὅσαι μὲν αὐτῶν σφαλείσαι καὶ μέχρι θηρίων ἦκον σωματῶν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτας ἀθανάτους εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι εἶδος ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ζώσης φύσεως δεῖ καὶ ταύτην εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴν οὖσαν ζωῆς τοῖς ζώοις αἰτίαν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς· ἀπασαι γὰρ ὠρμήθησαν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς ζωὴν ἔχουσαι οἰκείαν ἀσώματοί τε καὶ αὐται καὶ ἀμερεῖς καὶ οὐσίαι. εἰ δὲ τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν τριμερῆ οὖσαν τῷ συνθέτῳ λυθήσεσθαι¹ <λέγεται>,² καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν τὰς μὲν καθαρὰς ἀπαλλαττομένας τὸ προσπλασθῆν ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἀφήσειν, τὰς δὲ τούτῳ συνέσεσθαι ἐπὶ πλείστον· ἀφειμένον δὲ τὸ χεῖρον οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἀπολείσθαι, ἕως ἂν ἡ, ὅθεν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἀπολείται.

15. Ἄ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀποδείξεν δρομένους ἐχρῆν λέγεσθαι, εἴρηται. ἃ δὲ καὶ πρὸς δρομένους πίστεως αἰσθήσει κεκρατημένης, ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῆς οὔσης ἐκλεκτέον, ἐκ 5 τε ὧν θεοὶ ἀνεῖλον κελεύοντες μῆνιν ψυχῶν ἠδικημένων ἰλάσκεσθαι τιμὰς τε νέμειν τεθνηκόσιν ὡς ἐν αἰσθήσει οὖσι, καθὰ καὶ πάντες ἄνθρωποι ποιοῦσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀπεληλυθότας. πολλαὶ δὲ ψυχαὶ πρότερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὖσαι σωματῶν ἔξω γενόμεναι οὐκ ἀπέστησαν τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν ἀνθρώπους· αἱ δὲ καὶ 10 μαντεῖα ἀποδειξάμεναι εἰς τε τὰ ἄλλα χρώσαι ὠφελούσι καὶ δεικνύουσι δι' αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν, ὅτι μὴ εἰσὶν ἀπολωλυταί.

¹ wD: λυθήσεται xUC.

² on: eoisimus: <λεχθήσεται> Igal.

14. As for the souls of other living things, those of them which have been failures and come into animal bodies must also be immortal. But if there is another [non-human] kind of soul, it cannot come from anywhere else than from the nature which lives, and this too must really exist and be the cause of life in living things, and the same is certainly true of the soul in plants: for they all started from the same origin and have their own life and they too are bodiless and without parts and substances. But if it is said that the human soul, since it is tripartite, will be dissolved because of its composition, we too shall say that pure souls when they are set free abandon what was plastered on to them at their birth, but the others remain with it for a very long time; but when the worse part is abandoned, even it does not perish, as long as that from which it has its origin exists. For nothing of real being perishes.

15. Well, then, we have said what needed to be said to those who require proof. But what needs to be said to those who require confidence supported by the evidence of the senses is to be selected from the body of information about such things, which is extensive; from the oracles of the gods commanding appeasement of the wrath of souls which have been wronged, and the giving of honours to the dead (which supposes that they are conscious of them), just as all men do to those who have passed away. And many souls which were formerly in human beings did not cease to benefit mankind when they were out of the body: they have established oracular shrines and give help by their prophecies in other ways and demonstrate through themselves that the other souls have also not perished.

IV. 8. ON THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO BODIES

Introductory Note

THIS early treatise, written in a style which suggests that it was intended for a comparatively wide circle of readers, is particularly interesting in a number of ways. It shows more clearly than any other work of Plotinus how conscious he was of the tension between the two sides of Plato's thought about the material world and the human body, the pessimistic dualism most strikingly apparent in the *Phaedo* and the optimistic view of the physical universe as the good product of ungrudging divine goodness which all later Platonists found in the *Timaeus*; and it shows how hard (even if never entirely successfully) he tried to reconcile them. The movement of his thought in the treatise is worth noticing, from the pessimistic and dualistic beginning to a view (in chapters 6 and 7) of the material world and of soul's descent into body as positive and optimistic as anything in the *Enneads*. Read as a whole, the treatise is strong evidence against the view that there is a development in the thought of Plotinus from a pessimism about the material world with Gnostic affinities to a sane positive Hellenic view. The tension, and some never fully reconciled inconsistency, between the two sides of Platonism appears in his latest works as it does in this early one. The extremely positive attitude to matter in chapter 6 should be noted. Whether it is to be regarded as an independent reality or as derived from higher principles is a question he here leaves open (in fact he adopted the second alternative; cp. III. 4. [15] 1; II. 3. [52] 17; I. 8. [51] 7). But in either case he sees it

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here as a capacity for good rather than, as he does in later treatises, as the principle of evil (see II. 4 [12]; I. 8 [51]). The passage points forward to the abandonment of the doctrine of matter as the principle of evil and its positive valuation as an expression of the infinity immediately derived from the Good by the later Neoplatonists. The ten lines of spiritual autobiography at the beginning of chapter 1 say more about the personal experience of Plotinus than any other passage in the *Enneads*, and justify the belief generally held by his readers that very much of what he says in the *Enneads* about divine reality is in some way based on his own religious experience.

Synopsis

The experience of "waking up from the body"; how is the fact that we are in the body to be explained? What Heraclitus, Empedocles, Pythagoras and Plato have to say about Universal Soul in the physical universe (chs. 1-2); and about the human soul and its descent to and life in the body (chs. 3-4). Reconciliation of the apparent contradiction in Plato's thought between the idea of a "fall" and the idea of a "mission" of the soul (ch. 5). The necessity of the material world as the term of the divine outgoing, and its closeness to the intelligible of which it is an image (ch. 6). Our souls need not be harmed, and may even be benefited by their necessary descent into this lower world (ch. 7). And we do not altogether descend. Our highest part remains in the intelligible, though we are not always conscious of it (ch. 8).

IV. 8. (6) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΑ ΣΩΜΑΤΑ
ΚΑΘΟΔΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ

1. Πολλάκις ἐγειρόμενος εἰς ἑμαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ
σώματος καὶ γινόμενος τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔξω, ἑμαυ-
τοῦ δὲ εἶσω, θαυμαστὸν ἠλίκον ὄρων κάλλος, καὶ
τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας πιστεύσας τότε μάλιστα
5 εἶναι, ζωὴν τε ἀρίστην ἐνεργήσας καὶ τῷ θεῷ εἰς
ταῦτόν γεγενημένος καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἰδρυθεὶς εἰς
ἐνέργειαν ἐλθὼν ἐκείνην ὑπὲρ πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο νοητὸν
ἑμαυτὸν ἰδρύσας, μετὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐν τῷ θεῷ στάσιν
εἰς λογισμὸν ἐκ νοῦ καταβάς ἀπορῶ, πῶς ποτε καὶ
νῦν καταβαίνω, καὶ ὅπως ποτέ μοι ἔνδον ἢ ψυχῇ
10 γεγένηται τοῦ σώματος τοῦτο οὖσα, οἷον ἐφάνη καθ'
ἑαυτήν, καίπερ οὖσα ἐν σώματι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
Ἡράκλειτος, ὃς ἡμῖν παρακελεύεται ζητεῖν τοῦτο,
ἀμοιβὰς τε ἀναγκαίας τιθέμενος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων,
ὁδὸν τε ἄνω κάτω εἰπὼν καὶ μεταβάλλον
15 ἀναπαύεται καὶ κάματός ἐστι τοῖς αὐτοῖς
μοχθεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι εἰκάζειν ἔδωκεν ἀμελή-
σας σαφῆ ἡμῖν ποιῆσαι τὸν λόγον, ὡς δέον ἴσως
παρ' αὐτῷ ζητεῖν, ὡς περ καὶ αὐτὸς ζητήσας εἶδεν.
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε εἰπὼν ἁμαρτανούσαις νόμον εἶναι
ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταῦθα καὶ αὐτὸς φύγας
20 θεόθεν γενόμενος ἤκειν πίσυρος μαινομένῳ
νεῖκει τοσοῦτον παρεγύμνου, ὅσον καὶ Πύθαγόρας,
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1. Often I have woken up out of the body to my
self and have entered into myself, going out from all
other things; I have seen a beauty wonderfully great
and felt assurance that then most of all I belonged
to the better part; I have actually lived the best life
and come to identity with the divine; and set firm
in it I have come to that supreme actuality, setting
myself above all else in the realm of Intellect. Then
after that rest in the divine, when I have come down
from Intellect to discursive reasoning, I am puzzled
how I ever came down, and how my soul has come to
be in the body when it is what it has shown itself
to be by itself, even when it is in the body. Heracli-
tus, who urges us to investigate this, positing " neces-
sary changes " from opposite to opposite, and saying
" way up and down " and " changing it is at rest ",
and " weariness to toil at and be subjected to the
same things ", has left us guessing, since he has
neglected to make clear to us what he is saying,
perhaps because we ought to seek by ourselves, as
he himself sought and found. And Empedocles,
when he said that it is a law that sinful souls should
fall into this world, and that he himself has come
here as " an exile from the country of the gods " K7
who " put his trust in raving strife ", revealed just
as much as the riddling statements of Pythagoras

οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἠγίττοντο περὶ τε τούτου
 περὶ τε πολλῶν ἄλλων. τῷ δὲ παρῆν καὶ διὰ ποιή-
 σω οὐ σαφεῖ εἶναι. λείπεται δὴ ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος
 Πλάτων, ὃς πολλά τε καὶ καλὰ περὶ ψυχῆς εἶπε
 25 περὶ τε ἀφίξεως αὐτῆς πολλαχῆ εἶρηκεν ἐν τοῖς
 αὐτοῦ λόγοις, ὥστε ἐλπίδα ἡμῖν εἶναι λαβεῖν παρ'
 αὐτοῦ σαφές τι. τί οὖν λέγει ὁ φιλόσοφος οὗτος;
 οὐ ταῦτόν λέγων πανταχῆ φανείται, ἵνα ἂν τις ἐκ
 ῥαδίας τὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς βούλημα εἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
 αἰσθητὸν πᾶν πανταχοῦ ἀτιμάσας καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ
 30 σῶμα κοινωνίαν τῆς ψυχῆς μεμφόμενος ἐν δεσμῷ τε
 εἶναι καὶ τεθάφθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ψυχὴν λέγει, καὶ
 τὸν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενον λόγον μέγαν
 εἶναι, ὃς ἐν φρουρᾷ τὴν ψυχὴν φησὶν εἶναι· καὶ
 τὸ σπήλαιον αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ τὸ
 35 ἄντρον, τόδε τὸ πᾶν—δοκῶ μοι—λέγειν, ὅπου γέ
 λύσιν τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ ἄνοδον ἐκ τοῦ σπηλαίου
 τῆ ψυχῆ φησὶν εἶναι τὴν πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν πορείαν.
 ἐν δὲ Φαίδρῳ πετρορρήσιν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐνταῦθα
 ἀφίξεως· καὶ περίοδοι αὐτῷ ἀνελθοῦσαν πάλιν
 φέρουσι τῆδε, καὶ κρίσεις δὲ καταπέμπουσιν ἄλλας
 40 ἐνταῦθα καὶ κλήροι καὶ τύχαι καὶ ἀνάγκαι. καὶ
 ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι μεμφόμενος τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς
 ἀφίξιν πρὸς σῶμα, ἐν Τιμαίῳ περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ

¹ Plotinus here starts from an account of his own personal experience unique in the *Enneads*, and then turns to tradition to help him to explain that experience. As always, he spends little time in considering the Pre-Socratics and does not seem to find them very helpful. "Necessary changes" is a phrase attributed to Heraclitus by both Iamblichus (cp. Stobaeus

and his followers about this, and many other matters (and, besides, he is unclear because he writes poetry).¹ We are left with the godlike Plato, who said many fine things about the soul and about its coming [into this world] in his writings, so that we hope we can get something clear from him. What, then, does this philosopher say? He is obviously not saying the same thing everywhere, so that one can easily know what his intention is; but he everywhere speaks with contempt of the whole world of sense and disapproves of the soul's fellowship with body and says that soul is fettered and buried in it, and that "the esoteric saying is a great one", which asserts that the soul is "in custody"; and his cave, like the den of Empedocles, means, I think, this universe, where he says that the soul's journey to the intelligible world is a "release from fetters" and an "ascent from the cave". And in the *Phaedrus* he makes "moulting" the cause of coming here; and he has cycles which bring here again the soul which has ascended, and judgments send others down here, and lots and chances and necessities. And, though in all these passages he disapproves of the soul's coming to body, in the *Timaeus* when speaking about

Anth. I 49 p. 378, 21-5) and Stobaeus; the other Heraclitus quotations are fr. B 60, B 84a, and B 84b DK (the last two known from Plotinus alone). The Empedocles quotation is from B 115 DK, lines 13-14. The impatience with which Pythagoras and his followers are dismissed is noteworthy: for Numenius and other Neopythagoreans before Plotinus, and for the later Neoplatonists after him, Pythagoras was a traditional authority if anything more venerable than Plato. The attitude of Plotinus to Pythagoras is here closer to that of Aristotle than to that which was normal in his own school-tradition.

παντὸς λέγων τόν τε κόσμον ἐπαινεῖ καὶ θεὸν λέγει
 εἶναι εὐδαίμονα τὴν τε ψυχὴν παρὰ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ
 δημιουργοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἔννοον τόδε τὸ πᾶν εἶναι
 45 δεδόσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἔννοον μὲν αὐτὸ ἔδει εἶναι, ἄνευ δὲ
 ψυχῆς οὐχ οἶόν τε ἦν τοῦτο γενέσθαι. ἢ τε οὖν
 ψυχὴ ἢ τοῦ παντὸς τούτου χάριν εἰς αὐτὸ παρὰ τοῦ
 θεοῦ ἐπέμφθη, ἢ τε ἐκάστου ἡμῶν, πρὸς τὸ τέλειον
 αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ ἔδει, ὅσα ἐν νοητῷ κόσμῳ, τὰ
 50 αὐτὰ ταῦτα γένη ζώων καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ὑπάρ-
 χειν.

2. Ὡστε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας
 ψυχῆς παρ' αὐτοῦ μαθεῖν ζητήσασιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὅλως ζητῆσαι, πῶς ποτε
 κοινωνεῖν σώματι πέφυκε, καὶ περὶ κόσμου φύσεως
 5 οἶόν τινα δεῖ αὐτὸν τίθεσθαι, ἐν ᾧ ψυχὴ ἐνδαιτάται
 ἐκοῦσα εἴτε ἀναγκασθεῖσα εἴτε τις ἄλλος τρόπος·
 καὶ περὶ ποιητοῦ δέ, εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε ὡς ἡμέτεροι,
 ψυχαὶ ἴσως, ἃς ἔδει σώματα διοικούσας χεῖρω δὲ
 αὐτῶν εἶσω πολὺ δύναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλον κρατήσων,
 10 σκεδασθέντος μὲν ἂν ἐκάστου καὶ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον
 τόπον φερομένου—ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ πάντα ἐν οἰκεῖω
 κατὰ φύσιν κείται—πολλῆς δὲ καὶ ὀχλώδους προ-
 νοίας δεομένων, ἅτε πολλῶν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων αὐτοῖς
 προσπιπτόντων αἰεὶ τε ἐνδεία συνεχόμενων καὶ

¹ As always, Plotinus thinks that Plato will be our best guide to the truth if we take the trouble to interpret him rightly and to reconcile his apparent contradictions. The passages in Plato's dialogues quoted or alluded to here are *Phaedo* 87D1; *Cratylus* 400C2; *Phaedo* 62B2-5; *Republic* 514A5; 515C4; 517B4-5; *Phaedrus* 246C2; 247D4-5; 249A6; *Republic* 619D7; *Timaeus* 34B8. The *Phaedo*, the image of the cave in the *Republic*, and the *Phaedrus* myth are for Plotinus the

this All he praises the universe and calls it a blessed god, and says that the soul was given by the goodness of the Craftsman, so that this All might be intelligent, because it had to be intelligent, and this could not be without soul. The Soul of the All, then, was sent into it for this reason by the god, and the soul of each one of us was sent that the All might be perfect: since it was necessary that all the very same kinds of living things which were in the intelligible world should also exist in the world perceived by the senses.¹

2. So that what happens to us when we seek to learn from Plato about our own soul is that we have also to undertake a general enquiry about soul, about how it has ever become naturally adapted to fellowship with body, and about what kind of a universe we ought to suppose that it is in which soul dwells, willingly or under compulsion or in any other way; and about its maker, whether [he has done his work] rightly, or whether perhaps [the Soul of the All] is in the same state as our souls, which, since they direct worse bodies, had to sink deep into the world because of them, if they were going to control them, as otherwise each [element of the individual bodies] would be dispersed and carried to its appropriate place—but in the All all parts are naturally set in their appropriate place—and our individual bodies need a great deal of troublesome thought, since many alien forces assail them and they are continually in the grip of poverty, and require every

principal Platonic authorities for the negative view of the soul's descent into the world, the *Timaeus* the principal authority for the positive view.

πάσης βοηθείας ὡς ἐν πολλῇ δυσχερεία δεομένων.
 15 τὸ δὲ τέλειόν τε ὄν καὶ ἰκανὸν καὶ αὐτάρκες καὶ
 οὐδὲν ἔχον αὐτῷ παρὰ φύσιν βραχέος οἶον κελεύ-
 ματος δεῖται· καὶ ὡς πέφυκε ψυχὴ ἐθέλειν,
 ταύτῃ καὶ αἰεὶ ἔχει οὐτ' ἐπιθυμίας ἔχουσα οὔτε
 πάσχουσα· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄπεισιν οὐδὲ πρόσσεισι.
 διὸ καὶ φησι καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν, εἰ μετ' ἐκείνης
 20 γένοιτο τελέας, τελεωθεῖσαν καὶ αὐτὴν μετεωρο-
 πορεῖν καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διοικεῖν,
 ὅτε ἀφίσταται εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐντὸς εἶναι τῶν σωμάτων
 μηδέ τις εἶναι, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν ὡσπερ τὴν τοῦ
 παντός συνδιοικήσειν ῥαδίως τὸ πᾶν, ὡς οὐ
 κακὸν ὄν ψυχῇ ὀπωσοῦν σώματι παρέχειν τὴν
 25 τοῦ εὐδυναμῆν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα πρόνοια
 τοῦ χείρονος ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀρίστῳ τὸ προνοοῦν
 μένειν. διττὴ γὰρ ἐπιμέλεια παντός, τὸ¹ μὲν
 καθόλου κελεύσει κοσμοῦντος ἀπράγμονι ἐπιστασίᾳ
 βασιλικῇ, τὸ δὲ καθέκαστα ἤδη αὐτουργῶ τι
 30 ποιήσει συναφῇ τῇ πρὸς τὸ πραττόμενον τὸ πρᾶ-
 ττον τοῦ πραττομένου τῆς φύσεως ἀναμιμνῆσα.
 τῆς δὲ θείας ψυχῆς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τὸν οὐρανὸν
 ἅπαντα διοικεῖν αἰεὶ λεγομένης, ὑπερεχούσης μὲν
 τῷ κρείττονι, δύναμιν δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην εἰς τὸ εἶσω
 πεμπούσης, αἰτίαν μὲν ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι λέγοιτο
 35 ἔχειν τὴν τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ παντός ἐν χείρονι
 πεποιηκέναι, ἢ τε ψυχὴ οὐκ ἀπεστέρηται τοῦ κατὰ
 φύσιν ἐξ αἰδίου τοῦτ' ἔχουσα καὶ ἔξουσα αἰεὶ, ὃ μὴ
 οἶόν τε παρὰ φύσιν αὐτῇ εἶναι, ὕπερ διηνεκῶς αὐτῇ
 αἰεὶ ὑπάρχει οὔποτε ἀρξάμενον. τὰς τε τῶν ἀστέ-

¹ Iga.: τοῦ Enn.

sort of help as being in great trouble. But since
 [the body of the universe] is perfect and adequate
 and self-sufficient and there is nothing in it contrary
 to its nature it needs only a kind of brief command;
 and its soul is always as it naturally wants to be;
 it has no desires and is not affected: for [the world's
 body] "loses nothing and gains nothing".¹ For this
 reason Plato says that our soul as well, if it comes to
 be with that perfect soul, is perfected itself and
 "walks on high and directs the whole universe"²;
 when it departs to be no longer within bodies and
 not to belong to any of them, then it also like the
 Soul of the All will share with ease in the direction
 of the All, since it is not evil in every way for soul to
 give body the ability to flourish and to exist, because
 not every kind of provident care for the inferior
 deprives the being exercising it of its ability to remain
 in the highest. For there are two kinds of care of
 everything, the general, by the inactive command of
 one setting it in order with royal authority, and the
 particular, which involves actually doing something
 oneself and by contact with what is being done infects
 the doer with the nature of what is being done. Now,
 since the divine soul is always said to direct the whole
 heaven in the first way, transcendent in its higher
 part but sending its last and lowest power into the
 interior of the world, God could not still be blamed
 for making the soul of the All exist in something
 worse, and the soul would not be deprived of its
 natural due, which it has from eternity and will
 have for ever, which cannot be against its nature in
 that it belongs to it continually and without beginning.

¹ *Timaeus* 33C6-7.

² *Phaedrus* 246C1-2.

ρων ψυχὰς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἔχειν
 40 λέγων, ὡσπερ τὸ πᾶν—ἐντίθησι γὰρ καὶ τούτων
 τὰ σώματα εἰς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς περιφοράς—
 ἀποσώζοι ἂν καὶ τὴν περὶ τούτους πρέπουσαν
 εὐδαιμονίαν. δύο γὰρ ὄντων δι' ἃ δυσχεραίνεται ἡ
 ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα κοινωνία, ὅτι τε ἐμπόδιον
 πρὸς τὰς νοήσεις γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ἡδονῶν καὶ
 45 ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν πίμπλησιν αὐτήν, οὐδέτε-
 ρον τούτων ἂν γένοιτο ψυχῇ, ἥτις μὴ εἰς τὸ εἶσω
 ἔδω τοῦ σώματος, μηδέ τινός ἐστι, μηδέ ἐκείνου
 ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο αὐτῆς, ἔστι τε τοιοῦτον, ὅσον
 μήτε τινός δεῖσθαι μήτε τινὶ ἐλλείπειν· ὥστε μηδέ
 50 τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπιθυμιῶν πίμπλασθαι ἢ φόβων· οὐδὲν
 γὰρ δευδὸν μήποτε περὶ σώματος προσδοκῆση
 τοιοῦτου, οὔτε τις ἀσχολία νεύσιν ποιούσα κάτω
 ἀπάγει τῆς κρείττονος καὶ μακαρίας θέας, ἀλλ'
 ἔστιν αἰεὶ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἀπράγμονι δυνάμει τόδε τὸ
 πᾶν κοσμοῦσα.

3. Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀνθρωπείας ψυχῆς, ἣ ἐν σώματι
 πάντα λέγεται κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ταλαιπωρεῖν
 ἐν ἀνοίαις καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ φόβοις καὶ τοῖς
 ἄλλοις κακοῖς γιγνομένη, ἣ καὶ δεσμός τὸ σῶμα
 5 καὶ τάφος, καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτῇ σπήλαιον καὶ
 ἄντρον, ἥντινα γνώμην οὐ διάφωνον ἔχει ἐκ τῶν
 αἰτιῶν οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τῆς καθόδου, νῦν λέγωμεν.
 ὄντος τοίνυν παντός νοῦ ἐν τῷ τῆς νοήσεως τόπῳ
 ὅλου τε καὶ παντός, ὃν δὴ κόσμον νοητὸν τιθέμεθα,
 ὄντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτῳ περιεχομένων νοερῶν

And when Plato says that the souls of the stars are related to their bodies in the same way as the All—for he inserts their bodies also into the circles of the soul¹—he keeps safe for them also their appropriate state of well-being. For, as there are two reasons why the soul's fellowship with body is displeasing, that body becomes a hindrance to thought and that it fills the soul with pleasures, desires and griefs,² neither of these things could happen to a soul which has not sunk into the interior of its body, and is not anyone's property, and does not belong to the body, but the body belongs to it, and is of such a kind as to want nothing and be defective in nothing; so that the soul will not be filled with desires or fears; for it will never have any frightening expectations about a body of this kind, nor does any business make it turn to what is below and take it away from the better, blessed vision, but it is always directed to those higher realities and sets this world in order with a power which requires no active effort.

3. As for what Plato says about the human soul, which is said to suffer all kinds of evils and to be in misery because it comes to exist among stupidities and desires and fears and all other evils, in that the body is its chain and tomb and the universe its cave and den, let us now state his thought about it, not inconsistent because the reasons [which he gives] for its descent are different. Now since universal Intellect exists in the realm of thought as a universal whole, which we call the intelligible universe, and since there also exist the intellectual powers con-

¹ *Timaeus* 38C7-8.

² *Phaedo* 65A10 and 66C2-3.

10 δυνάμεων καὶ νόων τῶν καθέκαστα—οὐ γὰρ εἰς
μόνος, ἀλλ' εἰς καὶ πολλοί—πολλὰς ἔδει καὶ ψυχὰς
καὶ μίαν εἶναι, καὶ ἐκ τῆς μιᾶς τὰς πολλὰς διαφό-
ρους, ὥσπερ ἐκ γένους ἑνὸς εἶδη τὰ μὲν ἀμείνω, τὰ
δὲ χείρω, νοερώτερα, τὰ δ' ἦττον ἐνεργεῖα τοιαῦτα.
καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ νῷ τὸ μὲν νοῦς περιέχων δυνά-
15 μαι τὰλλα οἷον ζῶον μέγα, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργεῖα ἕκαστον,
ἃ δυνάμει περιείχε θάτερον· οἷον εἰ πόλις ἐμφυχος
ἦν περιεκτικὴ ἐμφύχων ἄλλων, τελειότερα μὲν <ἦ>¹
πόλεως καὶ δυνατωτέρα, οὐδὲν μὴν ἐκώλυε τῆς
αὐτῆς φύσεως εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. ἢ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ
20 παντὸς πυρὸς τὸ μὲν μέγα, τὸ δὲ μικρὰ πυρὰ εἴη·
ἔστι δὲ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία ἡ τοῦ παντὸς πυρός, μᾶλλον
δὲ ἀφ' ἧς καὶ τοῦ παντός. ψυχῆς δὲ ἔργον τῆς
λογικωτέρας νοεῖν μὲν, οὐ τὸ νοεῖν δὲ μόνον· τί γὰρ
ἂν καὶ νοῦ διαφέρει; προσλαβοῦσα γὰρ τῷ νοεῖν
εἶναι καὶ ἄλλο, καθὸ νοῦς οὐκ ἔμεινε· ἔχει τε
25 ἔργον καὶ αὐτῆ, εἴπερ πᾶν, ὃ ἐὰν ἦ τῶν νοητῶν.
βλέπουσα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρὸ ἑαυτῆς νοεῖ, εἰς δὲ
ἑαυτὴν τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν [ὀ]² κοσμεῖ τε καὶ διοικεῖ
καὶ ἄρχει αὐτοῦ· ὅτι μὴδὲ οἷόν τε ἦν στήναι τὰ
πάντα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, δυναμένου ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἄλλον
γενέσθαι ἐλάττωνος μὲν, ἀναγκαίου δὲ εἶναι, εἴπερ
30 καὶ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ.

4. Τὰς δὴ καθέκαστα ψυχὰς ὀρέξει μὲν νοεῖν

¹ Kirchhoff*.

² del. Kirchhoff*.

tained in this and the individual intellects—for Intellect is not only one, but one and many—there had to be many souls and one soul, and the many different souls springing from the one, like the species of one genus, some better and others worse, some more intelligent, and some whose intelligence is less actualized. For There, in Intellect, we have on the one hand Intellect potentially including the others like a great living creature, and on the other the individual intellects, each of which actualizes a potentiality which the other [universal] intellect includes; as if, supposing that a city had a soul and included other beings with souls, the soul of the city would be more complete and more powerful, but there would certainly be nothing to prevent the others from being the same kind of thing. Or it is like universal fire, from which comes the great fire and the little one; but the universal substance is that of the universal fire, or rather that from which the substance of the universal fire comes. The work, then, of the more rational kind of soul is intellection, but not only intellection; for [if it was] why would it be different from Intellect? For by adding to its being intelligent something else, according to which it did not remain intelligence, it itself also has a work to do, like any other intelligible reality which exists. But when it looks to what comes before it it exercises its intelligence, when it looks to itself it sets in order what comes after it and directs and rules it; because everything could not be stationary in the intelligible, when it was possible for something else as well to exist next in order to it, something less, but something which must exist if that before it exists.

4. The individual souls, certainly, have an intelli-

χρωμέναις ἐν τῇ ἐξ οὗ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπιστρο-
 φῇ, δύναμιν δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπίταδε ἐχούσας, οἷα περ
 φῶς ἐξηρητημένον μὲν κατὰ τὰ ἄνω ἡλίου, τῷ δὲ
 5 μετ' αὐτὸ οὐ φθορῶν τῆς χορηγίας, ἀπήμονας μὲν
 εἶναι μετὰ τῆς ὅλης μενούσας ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, ἐν
 οὐρανῷ δὲ μετὰ τῆς ὅλης συνδιοικεῖν ἐκείνῃ, οἷα οἱ
 βασιλεῖ τῶν πάντων κρατοῦντι συνόντες συνδιοικοῦ-
 σιν ἐκείνῳ οὐ καταβαίνοντες οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῶν
 βασιλείων τόπων· καὶ γὰρ εἰσιν ὁμοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
 10 τότε. μεταβάλλουσαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰς τὸ μέρος
 τε εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτῶν καὶ οἶον κάμνουσαι τὸ σὺν
 ἄλλῳ εἶναι ἀναχωροῦσιν εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἐκάστη.
 ὅταν δὴ τοῦτο διὰ χρόνων ποιῇ φεύγουσα τὸ πᾶν καὶ
 τῇ διακρίσει ἀποσταῖσα καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν
 15 βλέπῃ, μέρος γενομένη μονοῦται τε καὶ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ
 πολυπραγμονεῖ καὶ πρὸς μέρος βλέπει καὶ τῷ ἀπὸ
 τοῦ ὅλου χωρισμῷ ἐνός τινος ἐπιβάσασα καὶ τὸ ἄλλο
 πᾶν φυγοῦσα, ἐλθοῦσα καὶ στραφεῖσα εἰς τὸ ἐν
 ἐκείνῳ πληττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ὄλων κατὰ πᾶν, τοῦ
 τε ὅλου ἀπέστη καὶ τὸ καθέκαστον μετὰ περιστά-
 20 σεως διοικεῖ ἐφαπτομένη ἤδη καὶ θεραπεύουσα τὰ
 ἕξωθεν καὶ παρούσα καὶ δῶσα αὐτοῦ πολὺ εἰς τὸ
 εἶσω. ἔνθα καὶ συμβαίνει αὐτῇ τὸ λεγόμενον πτε-
 ρορρηῆσαι καὶ ἐν δεσμοῖς τοῖς τοῦ σώματος γενέσ-
 θαι ἀμαρτούση τοῦ ἀβλαβοῦς τοῦ ἐν τῇ διοικήσει

¹ This is a particularly clear expression of Plotinus's constant conviction that the sin of the soul is self-isolation, individualism, a turning away (never quite complete) from

gent desire consisting in the impulse to return to itself springing from the principle from which they came into being, but they also possess a power directed to the world here below, like a light which depends from the sun in the upper world but does not grudge of its abundance to what comes after it, and they are free from sorrow if they remain with universal soul in the intelligible, but in heaven with the universal soul they can share in its government, like those who live with a universal monarch and share in the government of his empire; these also do not come down from the abode of royalty: for they are then all together in the same [place]. But they change from the whole to being a part and belonging to themselves, and, as if they were tired of being together, they each go to their own. Now when a soul does this for a long time, flying from the All and standing apart in distinctness, and does not look towards the intelligible, it has become a part and is isolated and weak and fusses and looks towards a part and in its separation from the whole it embarks on one single thing and flies from everything else; it comes to and turns to that one thing battered by the totality of things in every way, and has left the whole and directs the individual part with great difficulty; it is by now applying itself to and caring for things outside and is present and sinks deep into the individual part.¹ Here the "moulting", as it is called, happens to it, and the being in the fetters of the body, since it has missed the immunity which it had when it was with the universal soul directing

the free universality of its higher state to bind itself to the particular. This for him provides the key to the understanding of the Platonic passages referred to in ch. 1.

25 τοῦ κρείττονος, ὃ ἦν παρὰ τῆ ψυχῆ τῆ ὄλη· τὸ δὲ
 πρὸ τοῦ ἦν παντελῶς ἄμεινον ἀναδραμούση·
 ἐλθεται οἷν πεσοῦσα καὶ πρὸς τῷ δεσμῷ οὔσα καὶ
 τῆ αἰσθήσει ἐνεργοῦσα διὰ τὸ κωλύσθαι τῷ νῷ
 ἐνεργεῖν καταρχάς, τεθάφθαι τε λέγεται καὶ ἐν
 σπηλαίῳ εἶναι, ἐπιστραφεῖσα δὲ πρὸς νόησιν λύεσθαι
 30 τε ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ ἀναβαίνειν, ὅταν ἀρχὴν λάβῃ
 ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως θεᾶσθαι τὰ ὄντα· ἔχει γάρ τι
 αἰεὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον ὑπερέχον τι· γίνονται οὖν οἷον
 ἀμφίβιοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸν τε ἐκεῖ βίον τὸν τε ἐνταῦθα
 παρὰ μέρος βιοῦσαι, πλεῖον μὲν τὸν ἐκεῖ, αἰ
 δύνανται πλεῖον τῷ νῷ συνεῖναι, τὸν δὲ ἐνθάδε
 35 πλεῖον, αἷς τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φύσει ἢ τύχαις ὑπήρξεν.
 ἃ δὲ ὑποδεικνύς ὁ Πλάτων ἠρέμα, ὅτε διαιρεῖ αὐ
 τὰ¹ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπέρου κρατῆρος καὶ μέρη ποιεῖ, τότε
 καὶ φησιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς γένεσιν ἐλθεῖν,
 ἐπεὶ περ ἐγένοντο μέρη τοιαῦτα· εἰ δὲ λέγει σπεῖραι
 τὸν θεὸν αὐτάς, οὕτως ἀκουστέον, ὥσπερ ὅταν καὶ
 40 λέγοντα καὶ οἷον δημηγοροῦντα ποιῆ· ἃ γὰρ ἐν
 φύσει ἐστὶ τῶν ὄλων, ταῦτα ἢ ὑπόθεσις γεννᾶ τε
 καὶ ποιεῖ εἰς δεῖξιν προάγουσα ἐφεξῆς τὰ αἰεὶ οὕτω
 γιγνόμενά τε καὶ ὄντα.

ἅ. Οὐ τοίνυν διαφωνεῖ ἀλλήλοις ἢ τε εἰς γένεσιν

¹ Igal: αὐτὰ Enn.: αὐτὰς Kirchhoff.

the better part [of the universe]; it was altogether better for it before when it was running upwards; it is fallen, therefore, and is caught, and is engaged with its fetter, and acts by sense because its new beginning prevents it from acting by intellect, and it is said to be buried and in a cave, but, when it turns to intelligence, to be freed from its fetters and to ascend, when it is started on the contemplation of reality by recollection: for, in spite of everything, it always possesses something transcendent in some way. Souls, then, become, one might say, amphibious, compelled to live by turns the life There, and the life here: those which are able to be more in the company of Intellect live the life There more, but those whose normal condition is, by nature or chance, the opposite, live more the life here below. Plato indicates this unobtrusively when he distinguishes again the products of the second mixing-bowl and makes parts of them; then he says also that they must enter into becoming, since they became parts of this kind.¹ But if he says that God "sowed" them, this must be understood in the same way as when he makes God talk, and even deliver a kind of public speech; for the plan of his exposition generates and makes the things which exist in the nature of the Whole, bringing out in succession for purposes of demonstration what are always coming into being and always existing there.

5. There is then no contradiction between the

¹ Cp. Plato *Timaeus* 41D5-8. There is in fact only one "mixing-bowl" in Plato, though there are two mixtures. But Atticus before Plotinus and Theodore of Asine after him read two mixing-bowls into the Platonic text, as Proclus notes with disapproval (*In Tim.* III 246-7 Diehl).

σπορά ἢ τε εἰς τελείωσιν κάθοδος τοῦ παντός, ἢ τε
 δίκη τό τε σπήλαιον, ἢ τε ἀνάγκη τό τε ἐκούσιον,
 ἐπεὶπερ ἔχει τὸ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὸ ἐν κακῷ
 5 τῷ σώματι εἶναι· οὐδ' ἢ Ἐμπεδοκλέους φυγὴ ἀπὸ
 τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πλάνη οὐδ' ἢ ἁμαρτία, ἐφ' ἢ ἢ δίκη,
 οὐδ' ἢ Ἡρακλείτου ἀνάπαυλα ἐν τῇ φυγῇ, οὐδ'
 ὅλως τὸ ἐκούσιον τῆς καθόδου καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον
 αὐτῶν. πᾶν μὲν γὰρ ἰδὼν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀκούσιον, φορᾶ
 γε μὴν οἰκεία ἰδὼν πάσχον τὰ χεῖρω ἔχειν λέγεται
 10 τὴν ἐφ' οἷς ἔπραξε δίκην. ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα πάσχειν
 καὶ ποιεῖν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἀδίως φύσεως νόμῳ, τὸ δὲ
 συμβαῖνον εἰς ἄλλου του χρεῖαν ἐν τῇ προσόδῳ
 ἀπαντᾶ καταβαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπὲρ αὐτόν, θεὸν εἴ τις
 λόγῳ καταπέμψαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀσύμφωνος οὔτε τῇ
 15 ἀληθείᾳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη. καὶ γὰρ ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχῆς
 ἕκαστα, εἰ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ πολλά, καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα
 εἰς αὐτὴν ἀναφέρεται. διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἁμαρτίας
 οὔσης, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ κατελθεῖν αἰτία, τῆς δὲ
 ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνθάδε γενομένην κακὰ δρᾶσαι, <δίκη>¹ ἢ
 μὲν ἔστιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὃ πέπονθε κατελθοῦσα, τῆς
 20 δὲ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰς σώματα ἄλλα δῦναι καὶ θᾶπτον
 ἐκ κρίσεως τῆς κατ' ἀξίαν—ὃ δὲ θεσμῷ θείῳ
 γιγνόμενον διὰ τοῦ τῆς κρίσεως ὀνόματος δηλοῦται
 —τὸ δὲ τῆς κακίας ἀμετρον εἶδος μείζονος καὶ τῆς
 δίκης ἡξίωται ἐπιστασία τινυμένων δαιμόνων.
 25 οὕτω τοι καίπερ οὔσα θεὸν καὶ ἐκ τῶν τόπων τῶν
 ἄνω ἐντὸς γίνεται τοῦ σώματος καὶ θεὸς οὔσα ὃ
 ὕστερος βροτῶν ἀντεξουσίῳ καὶ αἰτία δυνάμει καὶ

¹ Theiler.

sowing to birth and the descent for the perfection of
 the All, and the judgment and the cave, and neces-
 sity and free-will (since necessity contains the free-
 will) and the being in the body as an evil; nor [is
 there anything inconsistent about] Empedocles'
 flight from God and wandering nor the sin upon
 which judgment comes, nor Heraclitus' rest on the
 flight, nor in general the willingness and also the
 unwillingness of the descent. For everything which
 goes to the worse does so unwillingly, but, since it
 goes by its own motion, when it experiences the
 worse it is said to be punished for what it did. But
 when it is eternally necessary by the law of nature
 that it should do and experience these things, and,
 descending from that which is above it, it meets the
 need of something else in its encounter with it, if any-
 one said that a god sent it down he would not be out of
 accord with the truth or with himself. For final
 results are referred to the principle from which they
 spring, even if there are many intervening stages.
 And since the sin of the soul can refer to two things,
 either to the course of the descent or to doing evil
 when the soul has arrived here below, the punish-
 ment of the first is the very experience of descent,
 and of the lesser degree of the second the entrance,
 and a very quick one, into other bodies according to
 the judgment passed on its deserts—the word
 "judgment" indicates what happens by divine de-
 cree—but the boundless kind of wickedness is judged
 to deserve greater punishment in charge of chastising
 spirits. So then the soul, though it is divine and
 comes from above, enters into the body and, though
 it is a god of the lowest rank, comes to this world by
 a spontaneous inclination, its own power and the

τοῦ μετ' αὐτὴν κοσμήσει ὡδὶ ἔρχεται· κὰν μὲν
 θάπτον φύγη, οὐδὲν βέβλαπται γνώσῃ κακοῦ
 προσλαβοῦσα καὶ φύσιν κακίας γνοῦσα τὰς τε
 30 δυνάμεις ἄγουσα αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν καὶ δείξασα
 ἔργα τε καὶ ποιήσεις, ἃ ἐν τῷ ἄσωμάτῳ ἡρεμοῦντα
 μάτην τε ἂν ἦν εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἀεὶ οὐκ ἴοντα, τῆν
 τε ψυχὴν αὐτὴν ἔλαθεν ἂν ἃ εἶχεν οὐκ ἐκφανέντα
 οὐδὲ πρόοδον λαβόντα· εἴπερ πανταχοῦ ἢ ἐνέρ-
 γεια τὴν δύναμιν ἔδειξε κρυφθεῖσαν ἂν ἀπάντη καὶ
 35 οἶον ἀφανισθεῖσαν καὶ οὐκ οὔσαν μηδέποτε ὄντως
 οὔσαν. νῦν μὲν γὰρ θαῦμα ἔχει τῶν ἔνδον ἕκαστος
 διὰ τῆς ποικιλίας τῶν ἕξω, οἷόν ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ τὰ
 γλαφυρὰ ταῦτα δρᾶσαι.

6. Εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ μὴ ἐν μόνον εἶναι—ἐκέκρυπτο
 γὰρ ἂν πάντα μορφήν ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐκ ἔχοντα, οὐδ'
 ἂν ὑπῆρχέ τι τῶν ὄντων σπάντος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκείνου,
 οὐδ' ἂν τὸ πλήθος ἦν ἂν τῶν ὄντων τούτων τῶν ἀπὸ
 5 τοῦ ἐνὸς γεννηθέντων μὴ τῶν μετ' αὐτὰ τὴν πρό-
 οδον λαβόντων, ἃ ψυχῶν εἴληχς τάξιν—τὸν αὐτὸν
 τρόπον οὐδὲ ψυχὰς ἔδει μόνον εἶναι μὴ τῶν δι'
 αὐτὰς γενομένων φανέντων, εἴπερ ἐκάστη φύσει
 τοῦτο ἐνεστί τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν ποιεῖν καὶ ἐξελίττεσ-
 θαι οἶον σπέρματος ἐκ τινος ἀμεροῦς ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος
 10 τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἰούσης, μένοντος μὲν ἀεὶ τοῦ προτέρου

¹ The same image of the seed is used in III. 7. 11. 23-7, but with a significant difference of tone: here the emphasis is on the both necessary and generous self-expansion and self-

setting in order of what comes after it being the cause of its descent. If it escapes quickly it takes no harm by acquiring a knowledge of evil and coming to know the nature of wickedness, and manifesting its powers, making apparent works and activities which if they had remained quiescent in the spiritual world would have been of no use because they would never have come into actuality; and the soul itself would not have known the powers it had if they had not come out and been revealed. Actuality everywhere reveals completely hidden potency, in a way obliterated and non-existent because it does not yet truly exist. As things are, everyone wonders at what is within because of the varied splendour of the outside and admires what the doer is because it does these fine things.

6. If, then, there must not be just one alone—for then all things would have been hidden, shapeless within that one, and not a single real being would have existed if that one had stayed still in itself, nor would there have been the multiplicity of these real beings which are generated from the One, if the things after them had not taken their way out which have received the rank of souls—in the same way there must not be just souls alone either, without the manifestation of the things produced through them, if this is in every nature, to produce what comes after it and to unfold itself as a seed does,¹ from a partless beginning which proceeds to the final stage perceived by the senses, with what comes before abiding for ever in its own proper

communication of the One, there on the degeneration and weakening which is the inevitable result of the passage from unity to multiplicity.

ἐν τῇ οἰκειᾷ ἔδρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ μετ' αὐτὸ οἶον γεννωμένου
 ἐκ δυνάμεως ἀφάτου, ὅση ἐν ἐκείνοις, ἣν οὐκ ἔδει
 στήσαι οἶον περιγράψαντα φθόνῳ, χωρεῖν δὲ αἰεὶ,
 ἕως εἰς ἔσχατον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τὰ πάντα ἦκη
 15 αἰτία δυνάμεως ἀπλέτου ἐπὶ πάντα παρ' αὐτῆς
 πεμπούσης καὶ οὐδὲν περιδεῖν ἄμοιρον αὐτῆς
 δυναμένης. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἦν ὁ ἐκώλυεν ὀτιοῦν ἄμοιρον
 εἶναι φύσεως ἀγαθοῦ, καθόσον ἕκαστον οἶόν τ' ἦν
 μεταλαμβάνειν. εἴτ' οὖν ἦν αἰεὶ ἢ τῆς ὕλης φύσις,
 οὐχ οἶόν τε ἦν αὐτὴν μὴ μετασχεῖν οὔσαν τοῦ πάσι
 20 τὸ ἀγαθὸν καθόσον δύναται ἕκαστον χορηγοῦντος·
 εἴτ' ἠκολούθησεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ γένεσις αὐτῆς
 τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῆς αἰτίοις, οὐδ' ὡς ἔδει χωρὶς εἶναι,
 ἀδυναμία πρὶν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐλθεῖν σπάντος τοῦ καὶ τὸ
 εἶναι οἶον ἐν χάριτι δόντος. δεῖξίς οὖν τῶν ἀρίστων
 ἐν νοητοῖς τὸ ἐν αἰσθητῷ κάλλιστον, τῆς τε
 25 δυνάμεως τῆς τε ἀγαθότητος αὐτῶν, καὶ συνέχεται
 πάντα εἰσαεὶ τὰ τε νοητῶς τὰ τε αἰσθητῶς ὄντα,
 τὰ μὲν παρ' αὐτῶν ὄντα, τὰ δὲ μετοχῆ τούτων
 τὸ εἶναι εἰσαεὶ λαβόντα, μιμούμενα τὴν νοητὴν
 καθόσον δύναται φύσει.

7. Διττῆς δὲ φύσεως ταύτης οὔσης, νοητῆς, τῆς
 δὲ αἰσθητῆς, ἄμεινον μὲν ψυχῆ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ εἶναι,
 ἀνάγκη γε μὴν ἔχειν καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ μεταλαμ-
 βάνειν τοιαύτην φύσιν ἐχούση, καὶ οὐκ ἀγανακτε-

dwelling-place, but, in a way, bringing to birth what
 comes after it from a power unspeakably great, all
 the power which was in those higher beings, which
 could not stand still as if it had drawn a line round
 itself in selfish jealousy, but had to go on for ever,
 until all things have reached the ultimate possible
 limit [impelled] by the power itself, which sends
 them out and cannot leave anything without a share
 of itself. For there was certainly nothing which
 hindered anything whatever from having a share in
 the nature of good, as far as each thing was able to
 participate in it. The nature of matter, then, either
 existed for ever, and it was impossible for it, since it
 existed, not to participate in that which grants all
 things as much good as each one of them can take;
 or else its coming into being was a necessary conse-
 quence of the causes before it, and not even so was
 it required to be separate because that which gave
 it existence as a kind of gracious gift became sta-
 tionary through lack of power before it came to it.
 The greatest beauty in the world of sense, therefore,
 is a manifestation of the noblest among the intelli-
 gibles, of their power and of their goodness, and all
 things are held together for ever, those which exist
 intelligibly and those which exist perceptibly, the
 intelligibles existing of themselves and the things
 perceived by the senses receiving their existence for
 ever by participation in them, imitating the intelli-
 gible nature as far as they can.

7. Since this nature is twofold, partly intelligible
 and partly perceptible, it is better for the soul to
 be in the intelligible, but all the same, since it has
 this kind of nature, it is necessarily bound to be able
 to participate in the perceptible, and it should not

5 τέον αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ, εἰ μὴ πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ κρεῖττον,
 μέσην τάξιν ἐν τοῖς οὐσίῃ ἐπισχοῦσαν, θείας μὲν
 μοίρας οὐσαν, ἐν ἐσχάτῳ δὲ τοῦ νοητοῦ οὐσαν,
 ὡς ὁμορον οὐσαν τῇ αἰσθητῇ φύσει διδόναι μὲν τι
 τούτῳ τῶν παρ' αὐτῆς, ἀντιλαμβάνειν δὲ καὶ παρ'
 αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ μετὰ τοῦ αὐτῆς ἀσφαλοῦς διακοσμοῖ,
 10 προθυμία δὲ πλείονι εἰς τὸ εἶσω δύοιτο μὴ μείνασα
 ὅλη μεθ' ὅλης, ἄλλως τε καὶ δυνατὸν αὐτῇ πάλιν
 ἐξαναδύναμι, ἱστορίαν ὧν ἐνταῦθα εἶδὲ τε καὶ ἔπαθε
 προσλαβούση καὶ μαθούση, οἷον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ
 εἶναι, καὶ τῇ παραβέσει τῶν οἷον ἐναντίων οἷον
 15 σαφέστερον τὰ ἀμείνω μαθούση. γινώσις γὰρ
 ἐναργεστέρη τὰ γὰρ ἢ τοῦ κακοῦ πείρα οἷς ἢ
 δύναμις ἀσθενεύτερη, ἢ ὥστε ἐπιστήμη τὸ κακὸν
 πρὸ πείρας γινῶναι. ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ νοερά διέξοδος
 κατάβασίς ἐστὶν εἰς ἐσχατον τὸ χεῖρον—οὐ γὰρ ἐν
 εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα ἀναβῆναι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐνεργήσασαν
 20 ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ μὴ δυναθεῖσαν μείναι ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς
 φύσεως δὲ¹ ἀνάγκη καὶ νόμῳ μέχρι ψυχῆς ἔλθειν·
 τέλος γὰρ αὐτῇ τοῦτο· ταύτη δὲ τὸ ἐφεξῆς παρα-
 δοῦναι αὐτὴν πάλιν ἀναδραμοῦσαν—οὕτως καὶ
 ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια· τὸ μὲν μετ' αὐτὴν τὰ τῆδε, τὸ δὲ
 πρὸ αὐτῆς ἢ θέα τῶν ὄντων, ταῖς μὲν παρὰ μέρος
 25 καὶ χρόνῳ γιγνομένου τῷ τοιούτου καὶ ἐν τῷ
 χεῖρονι γιγνομένης ἐπιστροφῆς πρὸς τὰ ἀμείνω, τῇ
 δὲ λεγομένη τοῦ παντός εἶναι τὸ μὴδ' ἐν τῷ χεῖρονι
 ἔργῳ γεγονέναι, ἀπαθεί δὲ κακῶν οὐσία θεωρία τε
 περινοεῖν τὰ ὑπ' αὐτὴν ἐξηρηθῆσθαι τε τῶν πρὸ

¹ Enn., defendit Igal (*Helmantica* 28, 1977, 252): δὴ Creuzer.

be annoyed with itself because, granted that all things are not the best, it occupies a middle rank among realities, belonging to that divine part but being on the lowest edge of the intelligible, and, having a common boundary with the perceptible nature, gives something to it of what it has in itself and receives something from it in return, if it does not use only its safe part in governing the universe, but with greater eagerness plunges into the interior and does not stay whole with whole; especially as it is possible for it to emerge again having acquired the whole story of what it saw and experienced here and learnt what it is like to be There, and, by the comparison of things which are, in a way, opposite, learning, in a way more clearly, the better things. For the experience of evil is a clearer knowledge of the Good for those whose power is too weak to know evil with clear intellectual certainty before experiencing it. And just as the intellectual way of outgoing is a descent to the lower limit of that which is worse [than Intellect]—for it is not possible for it to go up to that which transcends it; but it must, acting outwards from itself and unable to remain on its own, by the necessity and law of nature arrive at soul; for this is its goal, and it must hand over what comes after to soul and run up again itself—so is the activity of soul; what comes after it is this world and what is before it is the contemplation of real being; this kind of experience comes slowly to partial souls, when they are in the worse and a turn takes place to the better, but that which is called the Soul of the All has not become engaged in the worse kind of work and, having no experience of evils, considers what lies below it contemplatively

30 αὐτῆς αἰεί· ἢ ἅμα δυνατὸν καὶ ἄμφω, λαμβανούση
μὲν ἐκεῖθεν, χορηγούση δὲ ἅμα ἐνταῦθα, ἐπεὶ περ
ἀμύχανον ἦν μὴ καὶ τούτων ἐφάπτεσθαι ψυχῆ
οὕση.

8. Καὶ εἰ χροὴ παρὰ δόξαν τῶν ἄλλων τυλμῆσαι
τὸ φαινόμενον λέγειν σαφέστερον, οὐ πάσα οὐδ' ἢ
ἡμετέρα ψυχῆ ἔδου, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ
αἰεί· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ εἰ κρατοῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰ
5 κρατοῖτο καὶ θορυβοῖτο, οὐκ ἔα αἰσθησιν ἡμῶν εἶναι
ὡν θεᾶται τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνω. τότε γὰρ ἔρχεται εἰς
ἡμᾶς τὸ νοηθέν, ὅταν εἰς αἰσθησιν ἦκη καταβαῖνον·
οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ γίγνεται περὶ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ψυχῆς,
γινώσκουμεν, πρὶν ἂν εἰς ὅλην τὴν ψυχὴν ἦκη· ὅλον
10 καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ μένουσα γινώσ-
κεται ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ὅταν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ τῇ ἔνδον δυνάμει
ἢ καὶ διανοητικῇ ἀντιλαβώμεθα ἢ ἄμφω. πάσα
γὰρ ψυχῆ ἔχει τι καὶ τοῦ κάτω πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τοῦ
ἄνω πρὸς νοῦν. καὶ ἢ μὲν ὅλη καὶ ὅλον τῷ αὐτῆς
μέρει τῷ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὅλον κοσμοῖ ὑπερέχου-
15 σα ἀπόνως, ὅτι μηδ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ, ὡς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ
νῶν ὡς ἢ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται,¹ †τὸ κάτω

¹ R^{2ms} (*consulatio* Ficinus): βούλεται Enn.

¹ For this doctrine, that our consciousness of what goes on in the soul is limited and dependent on our bodily condition, cp. IV. 3. (27) 30 and I. 4. (46) 10.

² "Art does not deliberate" is a quotation from Aristotle *Physics* B 199b28-9: "Art in fact does not deliberate either, and if the ship building art were incorporate in the timber, it would proceed by nature in the same way in which it now proceeds by art" (tr. Wicksteed-Cornford). This passage seems to be the starting-point for the development of the doctrine that the activity of Soul and Nature in forming and

and remains attached to the realities before it for ever; both are certainly possible; it can receive from There and at the same time distribute here, since it was impracticable for it as soul not to be in contact with this world.

8. And, if one ought to dare to express one's own view more clearly, contradicting the opinion of others, even our soul does not altogether come down, but there is always something of it in the intelligible; but if the part which is in the world of sense-perception gets control, or rather if it is itself brought under control, and thrown into confusion [by the body], it prevents us from perceiving the things which the upper part of the soul contemplates.¹ For what is grasped by the intellect reaches us when it arrives at perception in its descent, for we do not know everything which happens in any part of the soul before it reaches the whole soul; for instance desire which remains in the desiring part is known by us, but [only] when we apprehend it by the power of inner sense or discursive reason, or both. For every soul has something of what is below, in the direction of the body, and of what is above, in the direction of Intellect. And the soul which is a whole and is the soul of the whole, by its part which is directed to body, maintains the beauty and order of the whole in effortless transcendence because it does not do so by calculating and considering, as we do, but by intellect, as art does not deliberate. . . .² But the

directing the physical world is non-deliberative, on which Plotinus always insists strongly. It seems impossible to make any tolerable sense of the words which follow, and no convincing emendations have been suggested; so I follow Harder in leaving them untranslated.

PILOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 8.

αὐτῆς κοσμοῦντος ὅ τι ὅλον †. αἱ δ' ἐν μέρει
γινόμεναι καὶ μέρους ἔχουσι μὲν καὶ αὐταὶ τὸ
ὑπερέχον, ἀσχοιοὶ δὲ τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ἀντιλήψει
πολλῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ
20 λυπούντων καὶ ταρατιόντων, ἅτε οὐ ἐπιμέλονται
μέρους καὶ ἐλλειποῦς καὶ πολλὰ ἔχοντος τὰ ἀλ-
λότρια κύκλω, πολλὰ δὲ ὧν ἐφίεται· καὶ ἡδεται δὲ
καὶ ἡδονὴν ἠπάτησε. τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνήδονον ὄν
τὰς προσκαιροὺς ἡδονάς, ἣ δὲ διαγωγὴ ὁμοία.

THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO BODIES

souls which are partial and of a part have also the transcendent element, but they are occupied with sense-perception, and by their [lower] faculty of conscious apprehension they apprehend many things which are contrary to their nature and grieve and trouble them, since what they care for is a part, and defective, and has a great many alien and hostile things around it, and a great many which it desires; and it has pleasures, and pleasure deceives it; but there is a higher part which the transitory pleasures do not please, and its life is conformable [to its nature].

IV. 9. IF ALL SOULS ARE ONE

Introductory Note

THIS short early treatise takes up and carries forward the discussion of the same subject in the shorter and earlier IV. 2 (4) and anticipates the much more careful and elaborate discussions of the unity-in-multiplicity of Intellect and of Soul in VI. 4-5 (22-3) and of the relationship of our souls to the Soul of the Universe in IV. 3. (27) 1-8. The subject was one of much concern to Plotinus, to which he often returns in his writings; and he shows clearly by his defensive and argumentative tone in this treatise that he is aware that his characteristic doctrine of the unity-in-diversity of immaterial beings would seem paradoxical and objectionable to some Platonists.

Synopsis

Are all souls one? Objections from differences of perception, virtue, desire, experience and rationality between souls (ch. 1). Answers to these objections; bodily differences affect our perceptions etc. and the unity of soul does not completely exclude diversity (ch. 2). The argument for unity of souls from universal sympathy; and soul is no less a unity because it has many powers, of reason, perception, growth etc. (ch. 3). The one immanent soul in the many bodies derives from a prior, transcendent one which is not many (ch. 4). Soul both gives itself and does not give itself to the multiplicity of individuals; the analogy (often tacit and unnoticed) of the whole of a body of knowledge in each of its parts (ch. 5).

IV. 9. (8) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙ ΠΑΣΑΙ ΑΙ
ΨΥΧΑΙ ΜΙΑ

1. Ἄρ' ὥσπερ ψυχὴν ἐκάστου μίαν φαιμέν εἶναι,
ὅτι πανταχοῦ τοῦ σώματος ὅλη πάρεστι, καὶ ἔστιν
ὄντως τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον μία, οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν τι
αὐτῆς ὡδί, ἄλλο δὲ ὡδί τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ἔν τε
5 τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς οὕτως ἢ αἰσθητική, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
φυτοῖς δὲ ὅλη πανταχοῦ ἐν ἐκάστῳ μέρει, οὕτως
καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σὴ μία καὶ πᾶσαι μία; καὶ ἐπὶ
τοῦ παντὸς ἢ ἐν πᾶσι μία οὐχ ὡς ὄγκῳ μεμερισμένη,
ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ ταύτον; διὰ τί γὰρ ἢ ἐν ἐμοὶ μία,
10 ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ μία; οὐ γὰρ ὄγκος οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ
οὐδὲ σῶμα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ἡ
ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σὴ, μία δὲ ἐκείνη, καὶ ταύτας δεῖ εἶναι
μίαν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ ἐκ ψυχῆς
μίας, πάλιν αὖ πᾶσαι μία. αὕτη τοίνυν τίς ἢ μία;
ἀλλὰ πρότερον λκκτέον, εἰ ὀρθῶς λέγεται τὸ μίαν
15 τὰς πάσας, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου. αἰτοπον γάρ, εἰ
μία ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ ὄτουσθιν ἄλλου· ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἐμοῦ
αἰσθανομένου καὶ ἄλλον αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ
ὄντος ἀγαθὸν ἐκείνον εἶναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ἐπιθυ-
μεῖν, καὶ ὅλως ὁμοπαθεῖν ἡμᾶς τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους

IV. 9. IF ALL SOULS ARE ONE

1. Is it true that, just as we maintain that the
soul of each individual is one because it is present
as a whole at every point of the body, and is really
one in this way, not having one part of it here and
another there in the body, and in beings which have
sense-perception the perceptive soul is there in this
way, and in plants [the growth-soul] is present as a
whole everywhere in each part; so in the same way
my soul and your soul are one, and all the souls are
one? And in the All is the soul in all things one,
not as divided into parts by its mass, but one and
the same thing everywhere? For why should my
soul be one, but the soul in the universe not one?
For there is no mass or body there either. Now if
my soul and your soul come from the soul of the All,
and that soul is one, these souls also must be one.
But if the soul of the All and my soul come from one
soul, again all souls are one. Well, then, what is
this one soul? But, before this, we must discuss
whether it is correct to say that all the souls are one
soul, like the soul of each individual. For it would
be absurd if my soul and anyone else's were one soul:
for if I perceived anything another would have to
perceive it too, and if I was good he would have to
be good, and if I desired anything he would have to
desire it, and in general we should have to have the
same experiences as each other and as the All, so

καὶ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν, ὥστε ἐμοῦ παθόντος συναισθάνεσ-
 20 θαι τὸ πᾶν. πῶς δὲ καὶ μιᾶς οὔσης ἢ μὲν λογική, ἢ
 δὲ ἄλογος, καὶ ἢ μὲν ἐν ζώοις, ἢ δὲ ἐν φυτοῖς ἄλλη;
 πάλιν δὲ εἰ μὴ θησόμεθα ἐκείνως, τό τε πᾶν ἐν οὐκ
 ἔσται, μία τε ἀρχὴ ψυχῶν οὐχ εὐρεθήσεται.

2. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ, εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ μία ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ
 ἢ ἄλλον, ἥδη καὶ τὸ συναμφοτέρων τῶ συναμφοτέρω
 ταυτόν. ἐν ἄλλῳ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ταυτόν ὃν οὐ τὰ
 αὐτὰ πάθη ἔξει ἐν ἑκατέρῳ, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐν ἐμοὶ
 5 κινουμένῳ· ἐν ἐμοὶ γὰρ κινουμένῳ καὶ ἐν σοὶ μὴ
 κινουμένῳ ἐν ἐμοὶ μὲν κινούμενος, ἐν σοὶ δὲ ἐστὼς
 ἔσται· καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπον οὐδὲ παραδοξότερον τὸ ἐν
 ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ ταυτόν εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ἀνάγκη αἰσθανομέ-
 νου ἐμοῦ καὶ ἄλλον πάντῃ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἔχειν.
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς σώματος τὸ τῆς ἑτέρας χειρὸς
 10 πάθημα ἢ ἑτέρα ἦσθετο, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. εἰ δὴ
 ἔδει τὸ ἐμὸν γινώσκειν καὶ σέ, ἐν τι ἐξ ἀμφοῶν ὄν,
 συνημμένον σῶμα ἐχρήν εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ συναφθεῖ-
 σαι ἑκατέρα ἦσθετο ταυτόν. ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δὲ προσ-
 ἤκει τὸ καὶ πολλὰ λανθάνειν τὸ ὅλον καὶ τῶν ἐν
 15 ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι γιγνομένων, καὶ τοσοῦτω,
 ὅσῳ ἂν μέγεθος ἔχη τὸ σῶμα πολὺ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ κη-
 τῶν λέγεται μεγάλων, ἐφ' ὧν παθήματός τινος
 περὶ τὸ μέρος ὄντος τῷ ὅλῳ αἰσθησις διὰ
 μικρότητα τοῦ κινήματος οὐδεμία προσέρχεται·

that if I had an experience the All would share in the perception of it. And how, if there is [only] one soul, is one soul rational and another irrational, and one in animals but a different one in plants? But on the other hand, if we are not going to make that assumption, the All will not be one, and we shall not discover one principle of souls.

2. First of all, then, it is not true that, if my soul and someone else's are one soul, just for that reason my composite [of body and soul] is the same as his composite. For when something which is the same is both in one thing and in another it will not have the same experiences in each of them, as for instance the [form of] the human being in me when I am in motion: the form in me in motion and in you not in motion will be in motion in me and stationary in you; and there is nothing absurd, nothing really disconcerting about the same thing being in me and in you: it is certainly not necessary that when I have a perception the other also should have exactly the same experience. For even in one body one hand does not perceive what happens to the other, but the soul in the whole body. If you really had to know what happened to me because there was some one thing composed of both of us, it would have to be a joint body; for if they were joined together in this way each soul would have the same perceptions. But one ought to consider also that there are a great many things which the whole being does not notice, even among those which happen in one and the same body, and this is all the more so when the body is of great size, as they say happens with great sea-beasts, with whom, when a part is affected, no perception of it reaches the whole because of the

ὥστε οὐκ ἀνάγκη διάδηλον τύπω τὴν αἴσθησιν τῷ
 20 ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ εἰσαφικνεῖσθαι ἐνός τινος παθόντος.
 ἀλλὰ συμπάσχειν μὲν οὐκ ἄτοπον οὐδὲ ἀγνω-
 στέον, τύπωσιν δὲ αἰσθητικὴν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον
 γίνεσθαι. ἀρετὴν δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔχειν, κακίαν δὲ ἐν
 ἑτέρῳ, οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἴπερ καὶ κινεῖσθαι ἐν ἄλλῳ
 καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστάναι ταυτὸν οὐκ ἀδύνατον. οὐδὲ
 25 γὰρ οὕτως μίαν λέγομεν, ὡς πάντα πλήθους
 ἄμοιρον—τοῦτο γὰρ τῇ κρείττονι φύσει δοτέον—
 ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ πλήθος λέγομεν καὶ μετέχειν τῆς
 φύσεως τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς γινο-
 μένης καὶ τῆς ἀμερίστου αὖ, ὥστε πάλιν
 εἶναι μίαν. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπ' ἐμοῦ τὸ γενόμενον περὶ
 30 τὸ μέρος πάθος οὐκ ἀνάγκη κρατεῖν τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ δ'
 ἂν περὶ τὸ κυριώτερον γένηται φέρει τι εἰς τὸ
 μέρος, οὕτω τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παντός εἰς ἕκαστον
 σαφέστερα μᾶλλον ὁμοπαθούντων πολλαχοῦ τῷ
 ὅλῳ, τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀδηλον εἰ συντελεῖ πρὸς τὸ
 ὅλον.

3. Καὶ μὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων φησὶν ὁ λόγος καὶ
 συμπαθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἡμᾶς καὶ συναλοῦντας ἐκ
 τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ διαχωμένους καὶ εἰς τὸ φιλεῖν

smallness of the disturbance; so that it is not neces-
 sary, when one part is affected, for a clearly impressed
 perception to reach the total whole. But it is not
 absurd, and we do not have to abandon the idea,
 that the whole is jointly affected, but there is no
 need for there to be a perceptible impression. And
 it is not absurd that [the one soul] should possess
 virtue in me, but vice in another man, since it is not
 impossible for the same thing to be in motion in one
 and at rest in another. For we do not say, either,
 that it is one in such a way as to be altogether
 without a share in multiplicity—this must be attri-
 buted to a higher nature—but we say that it is one
 and a multiplicity, and participates in “that nature
 which is divisible in the sphere of bodies”, and also
 in the “indivisible nature”,¹ so that again it is one.
 But just as in me the experience of a part need not
 dominate the whole, but what happens to what is
 more essential has an influence on the part, in the
 same way the influences which come from the All
 to the individual are more obvious, and we are often
 affected in the same way as the whole, but it is not
 clear whether what comes from us contributes any-
 thing to the whole.

3. Indeed, the argument deriving from facts op-
 posed [to the assumption of complete separation of
 souls] asserts that we do share each other's experiences
 when we suffer with others from seeing their pain
 and feel happy and relaxed [in their company] and

¹ The phrases from Plato's *Timaeus* 35A1-3 which provide
 the starting-point for the earlier discussion in IV. 2 (4), the
 much more careful and thorough discussion of the unity of
 souls in IV. 3. (27) 1-8, and for many later Neoplatonic
 discussions of the same subject.

ἐλκομένους κατὰ φύσιν· μήποτε γὰρ τὸ φιλεῖν
 5 διὰ τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπωδαὶ καὶ ὄλως μαγείαι
 συνάγουσι καὶ συμπαθεῖς πόρρωθεν ποιούσι, πάντως
 τοὶ διὰ ψυχῆς μιᾶς. καὶ λόγος δὲ ἡρέμα λεχθεὶς
 διέθηκε τὸ πόρρω, καὶ κατακούειν πεποίηκε τὸ
 διεστῶς ἀμήχανον ὅσον τόπον· ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ τὴν
 ἐνότητα μαθεῖν ἀπάντων τῆς ψυχῆς μιᾶς οὔσης.
 10 Πῶς οὖν, εἰ ψυχὴ μία, ἢ μὲν λογικὴ, ἢ δὲ
 ἄλογος, καὶ τις καὶ φυτικὴ; ἢ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀμέριστον
 αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸ λογικὸν τακτέον οὐ μεριζόμενον
 ἐν τοῖς σώμασι, τὸ δὲ μεριζόμενον περὶ σώματα
 ἐν μὲν ὄν καὶ αὐτό, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματα μερι-
 ζόμενον παρεχόμενον τὴν αἴσθησιν πανταχοῦ
 15 ἄλλην δύναμιν αὐτῆς θετέον, τό τε πλαστικὸν
 αὐτῆς καὶ ποιητικὸν σωμάτων δύναμιν ἄλλην.
 οὐχ ὅτι δὲ πλείους αἱ δυνάμεις, οὐ μία· καὶ γὰρ
 ἐν τῷ σπέρματι πλείους αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ ἓν· καὶ ἐξ
 ἐνὸς τούτου πολλὰ ἓν. διὰ τί οἶν οὐ πανταχοῦ
 20 πᾶσαι; καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς μιᾶς ψυχῆς πανταχοῦ
 λεγομένης εἶναι ἢ αἴσθησις οὐκ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς
 μέρεσιν ὁμοία, ὃ τε λόγος οὐκ ἐν ὅλῳ, τό τε
 φυτικὸν καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ αἴσθησις· καὶ ὅμως εἰς
 ἐν ἀνατρέχει ἀποστάντα τοῦ σώματος. τὸ δὲ
 θρεπτικόν, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ ὄλου, ἔχει καὶ ἐκείνης. διὰ
 τί οἶν οὐ καὶ παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς τὸ
 25 θρεπτικόν; ὅτι τὸ τρεφόμενον μέρος τοῦ ὄλου, ὃ
 καὶ παθητικῶς αἰσθητικόν, ἢ δὲ αἴσθησις ἢ

are naturally drawn to love them: for without a
 sharing of experience there could not be love for
 this reason. And if spells and magical acts in
 general draw men together and make them share
 experiences at a distance, this must be altogether
 due to the one soul. And a word spoken quietly
 acts on what is far off, and makes something separated
 by an enormous distance listen; from this one can
 learn the unity of all because their soul is one.

How then, if the soul is one, is one soul rational
 and another irrational, and one a mere principle of
 growth? It is because the indivisible part of it
 must be put on the rational level, and is not divided
 in bodies, but the part which is divided in the sphere
 of bodies is also itself one, but since it is divided in
 the sphere of bodies, when it supplies sense-percep-
 tion in every part of the body this is to be counted
 as one of its powers, and its ability to shape and
 make bodies as another. Not because it has many
 powers is it not one: for in the seed there are many
 powers and it is one; and from this one come many
 units. Why then are not all souls everywhere? Well,
 in the case of the one soul which is said to be
 everywhere in the body, the sense-perception is not
 alike in all the parts, and the reason is not in the
 whole, and the growth-principle is also in the parts
 where there is no perception; and all the same it
 runs up into one when it leaves the body. But the
 nutritive power, if it comes from the whole, has also
 something from that [universal] soul. But why does
 not the nutritive power also come from our soul? Because
 what is nourished is a part of the whole, that which
 also is passively perceptive, but the perception which
 judges with intelligence belongs to the

κρίνουσα μετὰ νοῦ ἐκάστου, ἢ οὐδὲν ἔδει πλάττειν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὴν πλάσιν ἔχον. ἐπεὶ κὰν ἐποίησεν αὐτήν, εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τούτῳ ἔδει αὐτὴν εἶναι.

4. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὡς μὴ θαυμάζειν τὴν εἰς ἐν ἀναγωγὴν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ζητεῖ ὁ λόγος, πῶς μία; ἄρα γὰρ ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἢ μία αἰ πάσαι; καὶ εἰ ἀπὸ μιᾶς, μεριζομένης ταύτης ἢ μενούσης μὲν
5 ὅλης, ποιούσης δὲ παρ' αὐτῆς οὐδὲν ἦττον πολλάς; καὶ πῶς ἂν μένουσα οὐσία πολλάς ποιῶι ἐξ αὐτῆς; λέγωμεν οὖν θεὸν συλλήπτορα ἡμῶν γενέσθαι παρακαλέσαντες, ὡς δεῖ μὲν εἶναι μίαν πρότερον, εἴπερ πολλάί, καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰς πολλάς εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν σῶμα εἴη, ἀνάγκη μεριζομένον τούτου τὰς
10 πολλάς γίνεσθαι, ἄλλην πάντη οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην γινομένην· καὶ ὁμοιομεροῦς οὐσης ὁμοειδεῖς πάσας γενέσθαι εἶδος ἐν ταῦτόν φερούσας ὅλον, τοῖς δὲ ὄγκοις ἐτέρας· καὶ εἰ μὲν κατὰ τοὺς ὄγκους εἶχον τοὺς ὑποκειμένους τὸ ψυχαὶ εἶναι, ἄλλας
15 ἀλλήλων εἶναι, εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, μίαν τῷ εἶδει ψυχὰς εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐν πολλοῖς σώμασι ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ πρὸ ταύτης τῆς μιᾶς τῆς ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλην αὖ εἶναι μὴ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀφ' ἧς ἢ ἐν πολλοῖς μία, ὥσπερ εἶδωλον οὐσα πολλαχοῦ φερόμενον τῆς ἐν ἐνὶ μιᾶς, ὅλον εἰ
20 ἐκ δακτυλίου ἐνός πολλοὶ κηροὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον ἀπομαζάμενοι φέροιεν. ἐκείνως μὲν οὖν ἀηλίσκετο ἂν εἰς πολλάς ἢ μία, ὡς δὲ τὸ δεύτερον ἀσώματον

individual, and there was no need for this to shape that which had its shaping from the All. It would also have made this shaping, if it had not been necessary for it to be in this All.

4. We have said this, then, to prevent astonishment at the bringing back of all souls to one. But our discussion still wants to find out how they are one. Is it because they all come from one or because they all are one? And if they all come from one, is this one divided or does it remain whole, but none the less make many from itself? And how could it continue to exist as a substance and make many souls out of itself? Let us then call upon God to be our helper and say that there must be one which is prior, if there are many, and the many must come from this. If then it was a body, it would be necessary for the many to come into existence by the division of this, each one becoming an entirely different substance; and if the one soul was uniform in all its parts, all the souls would be formally the same, bearing one and the same complete form, but would differ in their [corporal] masses; and if their soulness was due to their underlying masses, they would be different from each other, but if it was due to the form, the souls would be formally the same. But this means that there is one and the same soul in many bodies, and, before this one in the many bodies, another again exists which is not in many bodies, from which derives the one in the many, which is like an image of the one in one projected in many places, as if many pieces of wax took and bore the impression of one seal-ring. Now in the former way the one soul would be used up in making the many, but in the second way the soul would be

μὲν ἢ ψυχὴ ἐγένετο. καὶ πάθημα μὲν ὄν θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν εἶχε μίαν ποιότητα γενομένην ἐξ ἑνός τινος 25 ἐν πολλοῖς εἶναι· καὶ εἰ κατὰ τὸ συναμφότερον δὲ ἢ ψυχῇ, θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν. νῦν δὲ ἀσώματόν τε αὐτὸ τιθέμεθα καὶ οὐσίαν.

5. Πῶς οὖν οὐσία μία ἐν πολλοῖς; ἢ γὰρ ἡ μία ἐν πᾶσιν ὅλη, ἢ ἀπὸ ὅλης καὶ μίας αἰ πολλὰ ἐκείνης μενούσης. ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν μία, αἰ δὲ 5 πολλαὶ εἰς ταύτην ὡς μίαν δοῦσαν ἑαυτὴν εἰς πλῆθος καὶ οὐ δοῦσαν· ἵκανὴ γὰρ πᾶσι παρασχέειν ἑαυτὴν καὶ μένει μίαν· δύναται γὰρ εἰς πάντα ἅμα καὶ ἐκάστου οὐκ ἀποτέμνηται πάντη· τὸ αὐτὸ οὖν ἐν πολλοῖς. μὴ δὴ τις ἀπιστεῖτω· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὅλη, καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς ὡς μένει τὴν ὅλην καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη. καὶ τὸ σπέρμα ὅλον 10 καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη, ἐν οἷς πέφυκε μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἕκαστον ὅλον καὶ μένει ὅλον οὐκ ἡλαττωμένον τὸ ὅλον—ἢ δ' ὕλη ἐμέρισε—καὶ πάντα ἐν. ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, εἴποι τις ἄν, τὸ μέρος οὐκ ὅλον. ἢ κακεῖ ἐνεργεῖα μὲν μέρος τὸ προχειρισθὲν οὐ χρεῖα, καὶ τοῦτο προτέτακται, ἔπεται μόντοι καὶ 15 τὰ ἄλλα δυνάμει λανθάνοντα καὶ ἔστι πάντα ἐν τῷ μέρει. καὶ ἴσως ταύτῃ ἢ ὅλη λέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέρος· ἐκεῖ μὲν οἶον ἐνεργεῖα ἅμα πάντα· ἔτοιμον οὖν ἕκαστον, ὃ προχειρίσασθαι θέλεις· ἐν δὲ τῷ

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incorporeal. And, even if it was an affection, there would be nothing surprising in one quality being produced in many things from some one thing; and if the soul existed as a composition [of affection and substance] there would be nothing surprising. But as it is we suppose it to be incorporeal and a substance.

5. How, then, is there one substance in many souls? Either the one is present as a whole in them all, or the many come from the whole and one while it abides [unchanged]. That soul, then, is one, but the many [go back] to it as one which gives itself to multiplicity and does not give itself; for it is adequate to supply itself to all and to remain one; for it has power extending to all things, and is not at all cut off from each individual thing; it is the same, therefore, in all. Certainly, no one should disbelieve this; for knowledge is a whole, and its parts are such that the whole remains and the parts derive from it. And the seed is a whole and the parts into which it naturally divides derive from it, and each part is a whole and the whole remains an undiminished whole—but matter divides it—and all the parts are one. But someone might say that in knowledge the part is not a whole. Now there too that which has been brought into readiness because it is needed is an actualised part, and this part is put in front, but the other parts follow as unnoticed possibilities, and all are in the part [which is brought forward]. And perhaps this is the meaning of “whole” and “part” here: there [in the whole body of knowledge] all the parts are in a way actual at once; so each one which you wish to bring forward for use is ready; but in the part only that which is

μέρει τὸ ἔτοιμον, ἐνδυναμοῦται δὲ οἶον πλησιάσαν
 20 τῷ ὅλῳ. ἔρημον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων θεωρημάτων οὐ
 δεῖ νομίζειν· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔσται οὐκέτι τεχνικὸν οὐδὲ
 ἐπιστημονικόν, ἀλλ' ὡς περ ἂν καὶ εἰ παῖς λέγοι.
 εἰ οὖν ἐπιστημονικόν, ἔχει δυνάμει καὶ τὰ πάντα.
 ἐπιστήσας γοῦν ὁ ἐπιστήμων ἐπάγει τὰ ἄλλα οἶον
 ἀκολουθία· καὶ ὁ γεωμέτρης δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει
 25 δηλοῖ, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἔχει τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ πάντα, δι' ἧν ἡ
 ἀνάλυσις, καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς δέ, ἅ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννᾶται.
 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν ἀπιστεῖται,
 καὶ διὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπισκοτεῖται· ἐκεῖ δὲ φανὰ πάντα
 καὶ ἕκαστον.

ready for use is actual; but it is given power by a kind of approach to the whole. But one must not think of it as isolated from all other rational speculations; if one does, it will no longer be according to art or knowledge, but just as if a child was talking. If then it is according to knowledge, it contains also all the other parts potentially. So then the knower in knowing [one part] brings in all the others by a kind of sequence; and the geometer in his analysis makes clear that the one proposition contains all the prior propositions by means of which the analysis is made and the subsequent propositions which are generated from it. But we do not believe all this because of our weakness, and it is obscured by the body; but There [in the intelligible world] all and each shine out.