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
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ARISTOTLE

THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION

THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS

ON VIRTUES AND VICES

ARISTOTLE

THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION
THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS
ON VIRTUES AND VICES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
H. RACKHAM, M.A.

FELLOW AND LECTURER OF CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE



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ARISTOTLE
THE ATHENIAN
CONSTITUTION

INTRODUCTION

THE *POLITEIAI*

THE place of the *Athenian Constitution* in the encyclopedia of Aristotle's writings is known to us from the concluding paragraph of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. That work forms the first volume of a treatise on the welfare of man as a social being, of which the *Politics* forms the second volume; and at the end of the former (*N.E.* x. ix. 21, 23) a prefatory outline of the latter is given, in which occur the phrases 'the collections of constitutions,' 'the collected constitutions'; it is stated that on these will be based that division of the *Politics* (*i.e.* Books III.-VI.) which will deal with the stability of states in general and of the various special forms of constitution, and with the causes of good and bad government.

These treatises are said in ancient lists of Aristotle's writings to have been a hundred and fifty-eight in number. Each no doubt consisted, like the volume before us, of a constitutional history of the state in question followed by a description of its constitution at the time of writing. They are frequently spoken of as the work of Aristotle, but he may well have employed the aid of pupils in their compilation. They were not preserved through the Middle Ages in the Aristotelian Corpus, and until fifty years ago

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were only known to modern students from numerous references and quotations in later writers.

THE *ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION*: MSS.

But in 1880 two small and much damaged sheets of papyrus were found in the sands of Egypt which scholars eventually proved to come from a copy of the most important of all these constitutional treatises, the one on the Constitution of Athens. These sheets are now in the Berlin Museum. Palaeographers ascribe them to the fourth century A.D. Ten years later, among some papyrus rolls acquired from Egypt by the British Museum, the Librarian F. G. Kenyon recognized four sheets as containing a copy of almost the whole treatise. These sheets have writing on both sides. On the front are some accounts of receipts and expenses kept by a farm bailiff named Didymus for his master Epimachus, near the Egyptian town of Hermopolis, in the tenth and eleventh years of Vespasian, A.D. 78 and 79. On the back is the Aristotelian treatise; its beginning is wanting, and the first page of the book is blank, showing that it was copied from a damaged copy of the work; and the last roll is very fragmentary. Different parts are written in different hands, four in all; the script is said to date the copy at about A.D. 100. It was doubtless made for a private person (perhaps the writer of one of the four hands), and probably buried with its owner at his death.

EDITIONS

In 1891 Sir Frederick Kenyon published a facsimile of the papyrus, and a printed edition of the text with

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an introduction and notes. In 1893 a revised text with a full and valuable commentary was put out by Sandys. Kenyon prepared an edition for the Royal Academy of Berlin, published in 1903, in which he included the fragments of the fourth roll conjecturally arranged in a consecutive text; and his latest edition was published at Oxford in 1920. Of several published abroad, the latest is the Teubner text of 1928 by Oppermann, based on the previous editions of Blass and Thalheim.

TEXT

The text of the present edition is based on the *editio princeps* of Kenyon, but it has been corrected by later scholars' readings of the papyrus. A few critical notes and suggested emendations are appended; but in regard to inaccuracies of grammar and arithmetic, trifling inelegancies of phrase (*e.g.* τόνδε τρόπον, for which most editors substitute τόνδε τὸν τρόπον), exactly how many are due to a copyist's carelessness and how many are to be saddled on the author, no two scholars will agree. To the papyrus text have here been prefixed and appended the principal passages from the lost beginning and end of the treatise that the learned industry of scholars has gleaned from the quotations of later Greek authors.

DATES OF COMPOSITION

The latest event mentioned in the *Athenian Constitution* (liv. 7) is the archonship of Cephisophon, 329 B.C. The book also mentions (xlvi. 1) triremes

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and quadriremes, but not quinquiremes; and the earliest date at which quinquiremes in the Athenian navy are recorded is 325 B.C. The treatise can thus be dated between 328 and 325 B.C. Moreover it speaks (lxii. 16) of officials still being sent to Samos, and Samos ceased to be under the control of Athens in the autumn of 322 B.C., the year of Aristotle's death.

OUTLINE OF CONTENTS

PART I. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ATHENS TO 403 B.C.

- (1) *Fr.* 1. Original hereditary absolute monarchy. Military command transferred from king to war-lord in time of Ion.
 - Fr.* 2. Local division of royal power among four sons of Pandion.
 - Fr.* 3. Unity restored by Theseus.
 - Fr.* 4. Growth of popular power under Theseus.
- (2) *Fr.* 5. Constitution in time of Theseus: four Tribes, Thirds, Brotherhoods, Clans.
 - Fr.* 6. Murder of Theseus. Recovery of his bones by Athens.
 - Fr.* 7. End of hereditary monarchy.
 - Fr.* 8. Conspiracy of Cylon put down by Megacles.
- MS.* c. i. Pollution and purification of Athens.
 - c. ii. Civil disorders from forced labour of debtors. —
 - c. iii. Constitution before Draco. Third archon instituted, the king retaining religious functions. Three archonships finally made annual, and six Thesmothetae added. An aristocracy, the nine archons being elected by the Areopagus, whose members were ex-archons. Conspiracy of Cylon. Discontent and poverty of lower orders.
- (3) c. iv. Constitution of Draco, the first code of laws. Council of Four Hundred and One. Punishment of Alcmaeonidae.
- (4) cc. v.-ix. Constitution of Solon: four property-classes with graded functions, the fourth takes part in the assembly and law-courts.

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- c. x. Solon's cancellation of debts, and system of weights and measures.
- cc. xi., xii. Ten years of party strife. Solon's poems.
- (5) cc. xiii.-xix. Tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons.
- (6) cc. xx.-xxii. Reforms of Cleisthenes. Creation of democracy.
- (7) cc. xxiii., xxiv. Supremacy of Areopagus after Persian wars. Aristides and Themistocles. Confederacy of Delos; taxation of allies.
- (8) cc. xxv., xxvi. Democracy restored by Ephialtes, and extended by Pericles.
- c. xxviii. Popular leadership, historical review.
- (9) cc. xxix., xxx. Revolution of the Four Hundred; after failure of Sicilian expedition Athens forced to abandon democracy; citizenship to be limited to Five Thousand.
- c. xxxi. The Council of Four Hundred govern as an oligarchy.
- (10) cc. xxxii.-xxxiv. Counter-revolution: democracy restored. Then Sparta defeats Athens in the war and sets up the Thirty.
- (11) cc. xxxv.-xxxviii. Despotism of the Thirty. They are put down by exiles led by Thrasybulus.
- (12) cc. xxxix., xl. Extreme democracy restored: the people supreme; payment for attending Assembly.
- c. xli. The eleven revolutions recapitulated.

PART II. THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION

- c. xlii. The franchise.
- cc. xliii.-lx. The officials (*a*) elected by lot—the Council, archons, and others;
- c. lxi. (*b*) elected by vote—military officers.
- c. lxii. Payment of officials.
- c. lxiii. and foll. The law-courts: procedure.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ

Primae partis Epitoma Heraclidis

[*Heraclides Lembos in the second century B.C. compiled a book called Ἱστορίαι which contained quotations from Aristotle's Constitutions. Excerpts made from this book, or from a later treatise by another author based upon it, have come down to us in a fragmentary form in a Vatican ms. of the 8th century, now at Paris, under the title Ἐκ τῶν Ἡρακλείδου περὶ Πολιτειῶν. These were edited by Schneidewin in 1847 and by others later.*

1. Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐχρῶντο βασιλεία. συνοικησάντος δὲ Ἰωνος αὐτοῖς τότε πρῶτον Ἴωνες ἐκλήθησαν.

Ἐξ οὗτου γὰρ οἰκῆσαντος τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησί, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους Ἴωνας κληθῆναι, καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα Πατρῶν αὐτοῖς ὀνομασθῆναι. (Harpocration s.v. Ἀπόλλων Πατρῶος.)

Πατρῶν τιμῶσιν Ἀπόλλωνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπεὶ Ἴων ὁ πολέμαρχος Ἀθηναίων ἐξ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Κρεούσης τῆς Ξούθου¹ ἐγένετο. (Schol. Aristoph. Av. 1537.)

¹ Ξούθου <γυναικὸς> Rose.

* A word has perhaps been lost in the Greek, giving 'the wife of Xuthus'—unless indeed the text is a deliberate

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Heracleides' Epitome of the first part

For a complete study of these contributions to the reconstruction of The Athenian Constitution readers must consult the standard commentators on the latter; only those fragments which belong to the lost early part of the treatise are given here. Quotations of the same passages of Aristotle made by other writers have been collected by scholars, and are inserted in the text in brackets < > where they fill gaps in Heracleides.]

Fr. 1. The Athenians originally had a royal government. It was when Ion came to dwell with them that they were first called Ionians.

⟨For when he came to dwell in Attica, as Aristotle says, the Athenians came to be called Ionians, and Apollo was named their Ancestral god.⟩

The Athenians honour Ancestral Apollo because their War-lord Ion was the son of Apollo and Creusa the daughter ^a of Xuthus.⟩

bowdlerization of the legend. Xuthus, King of Peloponnesus, married Creusa, daughter of Erechtheus, King of Athens, after whose death he was banished; but Creusa's son Ion was recalled to aid Athens in war with Eleusis, won them victory, and died and was buried in Attica.

2. Πανδίων δὲ βασιλεύσας μετὰ Ἐρεχθέα διένειμε τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῖς υἱοῖς (Αἰγεί μὲν δούς τὴν περὶ τὸ ἄστυ χώραν, Λύκω δὲ τὴν διακρίαν, Πάλλαντι δὲ τὴν παραλίαν, Νίσω δὲ τὴν Μεγαρίδα (Id. *Vesp.* 1223.)) 3. καὶ διετέλουν οὗτοι στασιάζοντες· Θήσευς δὲ ἐκήρυξε καὶ συνεβίβασε τούτους ἐπ' ἴση καὶ ὁμοίᾳ.¹ (ἐκάλει πάντας ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ τὸ "δεῦρ' ἴτε, πάντες λεῶ" κήρυγμα Θήσεως γενέσθαι φασὶ πανδημίαν τινὰ καθιστάντος. (Plutarch, *Theseus* 25.))

4. (ὅτι δὲ πρῶτος ἀπέκλινε πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον, ὡς Ἄριστοτέλης φησὶν, καὶ ἀφῆκε τὸ μοναρχεῖν, ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν νεῶν καταλόγῳ μόνους Ἀθηναίους δῆμον προσαγορεύσας. (Plutarch, *ib.*))

5. (Ὡς ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία Ἄριστοτέλης λέγων οὕτως· φυλὰς δὲ αὐτῶν συνενεμηῆσθαι δ', ἀπομιμησαμένων τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἐνιαυτοῖς ὥρας, ἐκάστην δὲ διηρῆσθαι εἰς τρία μέρη τῶν φυλῶν, ὅπως γίνηται τὰ πάντα δώδεκα μέρη, καθάπερ οἱ μῆνες εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτόν, καλεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὰ τριτῦς καὶ φρατρίας· εἰς δὲ τὴν φρατρίαν τριάκοντα γένη διακεκοσμηῆσθαι, καθάπερ αἱ ἡμέραι εἰς τὸν μῆνα, τὸ δὲ γένος εἶναι τριάκοντα ἀνδρῶν. (Lexicon Patm. p. 152 Sakkel.))

6. Οὗτος ἐλθὼν εἰς Σκῦρον (Ἄριστοτέλης ἱστορεῖ ὅτι ἐλθὼν Θήσευς εἰς Σκῦρον ἐπὶ κατασκοπὴν εἰκότως διὰ τὴν Αἰγέως συγγένειαν . . . (Schol. Vatic. ad Eurip. *Hipp.* 11)) ἐτελεύτησεν

¹ Schneidewin: ὁμοία μοῖρα (aut τιμῆ) codd.

^a Perhaps the formula of the crier sent round to announce the meetings of the Ecclesia: cf. ἀκούετε, λέω ('Oyez').

Fr. 2. Erechtheus was succeeded as king by Pandion, who divided up his realm among his sons (giving the citadel and its neighbourhood to Aegeus, the hill country to Lycus, the coast to Pallas and the district of Megara to Nisus). *Fr. 3.* And these sections were continually quarrelling; but Theseus made a proclamation and brought them together on an equal and like footing. (He summoned all on equal terms, and it is said that the phrase 'Come hither, all ye folks'^a was the proclamation of Theseus made when he was instituting an assembly of the whole people.)

Fr. 4. (And that Theseus first leant towards the mob, as Aristotle says, and relinquished monarchical government, even Homer seems to testify, when he applies the term 'people'^b in the Catalogue of Ships to the Athenians only.)

Fr. 5. (. . . As Aristotle narrates in his *Athenian Constitution*, where he says: 'And they were grouped in four tribal divisions in imitation of the seasons in the year, and each of the tribes was divided into three parts, in order that there might be twelve parts in all, like the months of the year, and they were called Thirds and Brotherhoods; and the arrangement of clans was in groups of thirty to the brotherhood, as the days to the month, and the clan consisted of thirty men.')

Fr. 6. He having come to Scyros (probably in order to inspect it because of his kinship with Aegeus^d)

^b *Iliad*, ii. 547.

^c After Cleisthenes' reforms, 510 B.C., there were ten tribes, each divided into Thirds and also into ten or more Demes; each Deme was divided into Brotherhoods (number unknown), and these perhaps into Clans.

^d Aegeus, King of Athens, father of Theseus, is not connected in any extant myth with the Aegean island of Scyros.

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ὠσθεῖς κατὰ πετρῶν ὑπὸ Λυκομήδους, φοβηθέντος μὴ σφετερίζηται τὴν νῆσον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὕστερον μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ μετεκόμισαν αὐτοῦ τὰ ὄστᾶ. (Ἀθηναῖοι μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κατὰ μαντείαν ἀνελόντες αὐτοῦ τὰ ὄστᾶ ἔθαψαν. (Schol. l.c.))

7. Ἀπὸ δὲ Κοδριδῶν οὐκετι βασιλεῖς ἤρουντο, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τρυφᾶν καὶ μαλακοὺς γεγονέναι. Ἰππομένης δὲ εἰς τῶν Κοδριδῶν βουλόμενος ἀπώσασθαι τὴν διαβολήν, λαβὼν ἐπὶ τῇ θυγατρὶ Λειμώνῃ μοιχόν, ἐκείνον μὲν ἀνείλεν ὑποζεύξας μετὰ τῆς θυγατρὸς¹ τῷ ἄρματι, τὴν δὲ ἵππω συνέκλεισεν ἕως ἀπώλετο.

8. Τοὺς μετὰ Κύλωνος διὰ τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν τῆς θεοῦ πεφευγότας οἱ περὶ Μεγακλέα ἀπέκτειναν. καὶ τοὺς δράσαντας ὡς ἐναγεῖς ἤλαυνον.

Incipit codex

¹ I. . . . (κατηγοροῦντος)² Μύρωνος, καθ' ἱερῶν ὁμόσαντες, ἀριστίνδην. καταγνωσθέντος δὲ τοῦ ἄγους, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐκ τῶν τάφων ἐξεβλήθησαν, τὸ δὲ γένος αὐτῶν ἔφυγεν ἀειφυγίαν. Ἐπιμενίδης δ' ὁ Κρής ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐκάθηρε τὴν πόλιν.

¹ II. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβη στασιάσαι τοὺς τε

¹ μετὰ τῶν ζυγίων (sic Aristoph. *Nub.* 122) conl. Blass: secl. Koehler. ² Wilamowitz e Plut. *Sol.* 12.

^a King of Athens, died 1068 B.C. (by the mythical chronology).

^b 722 B.C.; the Attic nobles deposed him in punishment.

^c This nobleman seized the Acropolis to make himself tyrant. When blockaded he escaped. His comrades were induced to surrender by the archon, Megacles of the

met his end by being thrust down a cliff by Lycomedes, who was afraid that he might appropriate the island. But subsequently the Athenians after the Persian Wars brought back his bones. (The Athenians, after the Persian Wars, in conformity with an oracle took up his bones and buried them.)

Fr. 7. Kings were no longer chosen from the house of Codrus,^a because they were thought to be luxurious and to have become soft. But one of the house of Codrus, Hippomenes, who wished to repel the slander, taking a man in adultery with his daughter Leimonē, killed him by yoking him to his chariot with his daughter [? emend 'with his team'], and locked her up with a horse till she died.^b

Fr. 8. The associates of Cylon^c because of his tyranny were killed by the party of Megacles when they had taken refuge at the altar of Athena. And those who had done this were then banished as being under a curse. 620 B.C.?

The MS. begins here

I. (The Alcmaeonids were tried, on the prosecution) of Myron, (by jurymen) solemnly sworn in,^d selected according to noble birth. The charge of sacrilege having been confirmed by the verdict, the bodies of the guilty men themselves were cast out of their tombs, and their family was sentenced to everlasting banishment. Thereupon Epimenides of Crete purified the city. 599 B.C.

II. Afterwards it came about that a party quarrelled Alcmaeonid family, who promised to spare their lives, but then put them to death. From what follows in the text it appears that the movement to punish this sacrilege only came to a head after Megacles was dead and buried. 596 B.C.

^d Lit. 'having taken an oath over the sacred victims.'

- 2 γνωρίμους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος πολὺν χρόνον.¹ ἦν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς τ' ἄλλοις ὀλιγαρχικῇ πᾶσι καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐδούλευον οἱ πένητες τοῖς πλουσίοις καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες· καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πελάται, καὶ ἐκτημόροι· κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ τὴν μίσθωσιν ἠργάζοντο τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀγρούς (ἡ δὲ πᾶσα γῆ δι' ὀλίγων ἦν), καὶ εἰ μὴ τὰς μισθώσεις ἀποδιδούειν, ἀγώγιμοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἐγίγνοντο· καὶ οἱ δανεισμοὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἦσαν μέχρι Σόλωνος· οὗτος δὲ πρῶτος ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου προστάτης.
- 3 χαλεπώτατον μὲν οὖν καὶ πικρότατον ἦν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ δουλεύειν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδυσχέλαινον, οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐτύγχανον μετέχοντες.
- 1 III. Ἦν δ' ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀρχαίας πολιτείας τῆς πρὸ Δράκοντος τοιάδε. τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς καθίστασαν ἀριστίνδην καὶ πλουτίνδην· ἦρχον δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
- 2 διὰ βίου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δεκαέτην. μέγισται δὲ καὶ πρῶται τῶν ἀρχῶν ἦσαν βασιλεὺς καὶ πολέμαρχος καὶ ἄρχων. τούτων δὲ πρώτη μὲν ἡ τοῦ βασιλέως, αὕτη γὰρ ἦν πάτριος. δευτέρα δ' ἐπικατέστη πολεμαρχία διὰ τοῦ γενέσθαι τινὰς τῶν βασιλέων τὰ πολέμια μαλακούς· ὅθεν καὶ τὸν
- 3 Ἴωνα μετεπέμψαντο χρείας καταλαβούσης. τελευταία δ' ἡ τοῦ ἄρχοντος· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πλείους ἐπὶ

¹ χρονοντονδημον cod.: secl. Kenyon.

^a πελάτης, 'one who approaches as a dependent,' was later used as the Greek for *cliens*.

^b Apparently this became almost an official title, see c. xxviii.

took place between the notables and the multitude that lasted a long time. For the Athenian constitution was in all respects oligarchical, and in fact the poor themselves and also their wives and children were actually in slavery to the rich; and they were called Clients,^a and Sixth-part-tenants (for that was the rent they paid for the rich men's land which they farmed, and the whole of the country was in few hands), and if they ever failed to pay their rents, they themselves and their children were liable to arrest; and all borrowing was on the security of the debtors' persons down to the time of Solon: it was he who first became head^b of the People. Thus the most grievous and bitter thing in the state of public affairs for the masses was their slavery; not but what they were discontented also about everything else, for they found themselves virtually without a share in anything.

III. The form of the ancient constitution that existed before Draco was as follows. Appointment to the supreme offices of state went by birth and wealth; and they were held at first for life, and afterwards for a term of ten years. The greatest and oldest of the offices were the King, the War-lord and the Archon. Of these the office of King was the oldest, for it was ancestral. The second established was the office of War-lord, which was added because some of the Kings proved cowardly in warfare (which was the reason why the Athenians had summoned Ion to their aid in an emergency).^c The last of these three offices established was that of the Archon, the institution of which is dated by a majority of authorities in the time of

^c See Fr. 1 above.

Μέδοντος, ἔνιοι δ' ἐπὶ Ἀκάστου φασὶ γενέσθαι ταύτην· τεκμήριον δ' ἐπιφέρουσιν ὅτι οἱ ἑννέα ἄρχοντες ὀμνύουσιν ἢ τὰ¹ ἐπὶ Ἀκάστου ὄρκια² ποιήσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου τῆς βασιλείας παραχωρησάντων τῶν Κοδριδῶν ἀντὶ τῶν δοθεισῶν³ τῶ ἄρχοντι δωρεῶν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὁποτέρως ποτ' ἔχει μικρὸν ἂν παραλλάττοι τοῖς χρόνοις· ὅτι δὲ τελευταία τούτων ἐγένετο τῶν ἀρχῶν, σημεῖον καὶ τὸ μηδὲν τῶν πατρίων τὸν ἄρχοντα διοικεῖν, ὡσπερ ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ ὁ πολέμαρχος, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὰ ἐπίθετα· διὸ καὶ νεωστὶ γέγονεν ἡ ἀρχὴ μεγάλη, 4 τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις αὐξηθεῖσα. θεσμοθέται δὲ πολλοῖς ὕστερον ἔτεσιν ἠρέθησαν, ἥδη κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν αἵρουμένων τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅπως ἀναγράψαντες τὰ θέσμια φυλάττωσι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων κρίσιν· διὸ καὶ μόνη τῶν ἀρχῶν οὐκ ἐγένετο πλείων 5 ἐνιαυσίας. τοῖς μὲν οὖν χρόνοις τοσοῦτον προέχουσιν ἀλλήλων. ἦσαν δ' οὐχ ἅμα πάντες οἱ ἑννέα ἄρχοντες, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν βασιλεὺς εἶχε τὸ νῦν καλούμενον Βουκόλιον, πλησίον τοῦ πρυτανείου (σημεῖον δέ· ἔτι καὶ νῦν γὰρ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως γυναικὸς ἡ σύμμειξις ἐνταῦθα γίνεται τῶ Διονύσω καὶ ὁ γάμος), ὁ δὲ ἄρχων τὸ πρυτανεῖον, ὁ δὲ πολέμαρχος τὸ Ἐπιλυκεῖον (ὁ πρότερον μὲν ἐκαλεῖτο πολεμ-

¹ ἢ <μῆν> τὰ Wilamowitz.

² δίκαια (cf. lv. 5 δικάως ἄρξειν) Richards.

³ ἀντιτωνδοθεισων literis valde obscuris scriptum: ἀνταποδοθεισῶν? Sandys.

^a Son of Codrus (see Fr. 7 above) and life-archon.

^b Medon's successor.

^c Or, with Sandys's reading, 'corresponding privileges being (at the same time) assigned to the Archon.'

^d The official title of the six junior Archons.

Medon,^a though some put it in that of Acastus,^b ad-
 ducing in evidence the fact that the Nine Archons
 swear that they will perform their oaths even as in
 the time of Acastus, showing that in his time the
 house of Codrus retired from the Kingship in return
 for the privileges bestowed on the Archon.^c Which-
 ever of the two accounts is true, it would make very
 little difference in the dates ; but that this was the
 last of these offices to be instituted is also indicated
 by the fact that the Archon does not administer any
 of the ancestral rites, as do the King and the War-
 lord, but merely the duties added later ; on ac-
 count of which also the Archonship only became
 great in recent times, when augmented by the
 added duties. Legislators^d were elected many years 4
 later, when the elections to the offices were now 683 B.C.
 yearly, to perform the function of publicly recording
 the ordinances and to preserve them for the trial of
 litigants ; hence this alone of the supreme offices was
 never tenable for more than a year. These are the 5
 intervals between the dates of the institution of the
 various supreme offices. And the Nine Archons^e
 were not all together, but the King had what is now
 called the Bucolium,^f near the town hall^g (as is indi-
 cated by the fact that even at the present day the
 union and marriage^h of the King's Wife with Dionysus
 takes place there), while the Archon had the Presi-
 dent's Hall, and the War-lord the Epilyceum (which
 formerly used to be called the War-lord's House, but

^a *i.e.* their official residences and courts.

^f Otherwise unknown.

^g Position uncertain.

^h An annual ceremony by which the god Dionysus was incorporated as an Athenian: the lady personifying his consort passed a night in his temple.

αρχεῖον, ἐπεὶ δὲ Ἐπίλυκος ἀνωκοδόμησε καὶ κατ-
 εσκευάσεν αὐτὸ πολεμαρχήσας, Ἐπιλυκεῖον ἐκλή-
 θη), θεσμοθέται δ' εἶχον τὸ θεσμοθετεῖον. ἐπὶ δὲ
 Σόλωνος ἅπαντες εἰς τὸ θεσμοθετεῖον συνῆλθον.
 κύριοι δ' ἦσαν καὶ τὰς δίκας αὐτοτελεῖς κρίνειν,
 καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν προανακρίνειν. τὰ μὲν οὖν
 6 περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦτον εἶχε τὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ
 τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλή τὴν μὲν τάξιν εἶχε τοῦ
 διατηρεῖν τοὺς νόμους, διώκει δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ
 τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κολάζουσα καὶ
 ζημιοῦσα πάντα τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας κυρίως· ἡ
 γὰρ αἵρεσις τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀριστίνδην καὶ πλουτίν-
 δην ἦν, ἐξ ὧν οἱ Ἀρεοπαγῖται καθίσταντο, διὸ
 καὶ μόνη τῶν ἀρχῶν αὕτη μεμένηκε διὰ βίου καὶ
 νῦν. ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη πολιτεία ταύτην εἶχε τὴν
 ὑπογραφὴν.

1 IV. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, χρόνου τινὸς οὐ πολλοῦ
 διελθόντος, ἐπ' Ἀρισταίχμου ἄρχοντος Δράκων
 τοὺς θεσμοὺς ἔθηκεν· ἡ δὲ τάξις αὕτη τόνδε τὸν
 2 τρόπον εἶχε. ἀπεδέδοτο μὲν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς ὄπλα
 παρεχομένοις· ἤρουντο δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐννέα ἄρχοντας
 καὶ τοὺς ταμίας οὐσίαν κεκτημένους οὐκ ἐλάττω
 δέκα μνῶν ἐλευθέραν, τὰς δ' ἄλλας ἀρχὰς τὰς¹
 ἐλάττους ἐκ τῶν ὄπλα παρεχομένων, στρατηγούς
 δὲ καὶ ἱππάρχους οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνοντας οὐκ ἐλάτ-
 τον² ἢ ἑκατὸν μνῶν ἐλευθέραν² καὶ παῖδας ἐκ
 γαμετῆς γυναικὸς γνησίους ὑπὲρ δέκα ἔτη γεγονό-

¹ τὰς suppletum a Richards et aliis.

² edd.: ελευθερων cod.

⁴ Draco was presumably one of the Thesmothetae, Aristaechnus being Archon Eponymus. For Draco's work see

because Epilycus on becoming War-lord rebuilt and furnished it, it received the name of Epilyceum); and the Legislators had the Legislators' Court. But in Solon's time they all came together in the Legislators' Court. They also had power to give final judgement in lawsuits, and not as now merely to hold a preliminary trial. Such then were the regulations relating to the supreme offices. The Council of 6 Areopagus had the official function of guarding the laws, but actually it administered the greatest number and the most important of the affairs of state, inflicting penalties and fines upon offenders against public order without appeal; for the elections of the Archons went by birth and wealth, and the members of the Areopagus were appointed from them, owing to which this alone of the offices has remained even to the present day tenable for life. This, then, was the outline of the first form of the constitution.

IV. And after this when a certain moderate length 1 of time had passed, in the archonship of Aristaechnus, ^{621 B.C.} Draco enacted his ordinances^a; and this system was on the following lines. Citizenship had already been 2 bestowed on those who provided themselves with arms; and these elected as the Nine Archons and the Treasurers,^b who were owners of an unencumbered estate worth not less than 10 minae,^c and the other minor offices from those who provided themselves with arms, and as Generals and Masters of the Horse persons proving their possession of unencumbered estate worth not less than 100 minae and sons legitimately born in wedlock over ten years of age. The *Politics* 1274 b 15 ff.; it is there said that he 'adapted his laws to a constitution that already existed.'

^b For the Treasurers of Athena see xlvi. 1.

^c Say £40.

- τας· τούτους δ' ἔδει διεγγυᾶν τοὺς πρυτάνεις καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς καὶ τοὺς ἱππάρχους τοὺς ἔνους μέχρι εὐθυνῶν, ἐγγυητὰς δ' ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τέλους δεχομένους οὐπερ οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἱππαρχοί.
- 3 βουλευεῖν δὲ τετρακοσίους καὶ ἓνα τοὺς λαχόντας ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας· κληροῦσθαι δὲ καὶ ταύτην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς τοὺς ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας· καὶ δις τὸν αὐτὸν μὴ ἄρχειν πρὸ τοῦ πάντας ἐξελθεῖν, τότε δὲ πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς κληροῦν. εἰ δέ τις τῶν βουλευτῶν, ὅταν ἔδρα βουλῆς ἢ ἐκκλησίας ἦ,¹ ἐκλείποι² τὴν σύνοδον, ἀπέτινον ὁ μὲν πεντακοσιομέδιμνος τρεῖς δραχμάς, ὁ δὲ ἱππεὺς δύο,
- 4 ζευγίτης³ δὲ μίαν. ἢ δὲ βουλὴ ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου φύλαξ ἦν τῶν νόμων, καὶ διετήρει τὰς ἀρχὰς ὅπως κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἄρχωσιν. ἐξῆν δὲ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλὴν εἰσαγγέλλειν, ἀποφαίνοντι παρ' ὃν ἀδικεῖται νόμον. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς σώμασιν ἦσαν οἱ δανεισμοί, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἡ χώρα δι' ὀλίγων ἦν.
- 1 V. Τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς τάξεως οὔσης ἐν τῇ πολιτεία καὶ τῶν πολλῶν δουλευόντων τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἀντέστη
- 2 τοῖς γνωρίμοις ὁ δῆμος. ἰσχυρὰς δὲ τῆς στάσεως οὔσης καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀντικαθημένων ἀλλήλοις, εἴλοντο κοινῇ διαλλακτὴν καὶ ἄρχοντα Σόλωνα καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐπέτρεψαν αὐτῷ, ποιήσαντι τὴν ἐλεγειάν ἧς ἐστὶν ἀρχή·

¹ ὅταν . . . ἦ] ὅτε . . . εἴη? Richards.

² ἐκλείποι Heerwerden, Leeuwen.

³ <ὁ> ζευγίτης Kontos.

^a Probably before Solon's time this denotes the Archons.

^b See vii. 3. A drachma (say 9½d. or 1 franc) was a hundredth part of a mina (say £4).

^c On these quotations from Solon see Edmonds, *Elegy and*

new officials had to bail the outgoing Presidents^a and Generals and Masters of the Horse till the audit, accepting four sureties from the same rating as that to which the Generals and Masters of the Horse belonged. And the Council was to be formed of four 3 hundred and one members chosen by lot from the citizen body, and lots were to be cast both for this and for the other offices by the citizens over thirty years of age; and the same person was not to hold office twice until the whole number had been gone through, and then lots were to be cast among them again from the beginning. And if any Councillor, whenever there was a sitting of the Council or Assembly, failed to attend the meeting, he paid a fine of 3 drachmae if of Five-hundred-measure rank, 2 drachmae if a Knight, and 1 if a Teamster.^b The 4 Council of Areopagus was guardian of the laws, and kept a watch on the magistrates to make them govern in accordance with the laws. A person unjustly treated might lay a complaint before the Council of the Areopagites, stating the law in contravention of which he was treated unjustly. Loans were secured on the person, as has been said, and the ii. 2. land was divided among few owners.

V. Such being the system in the constitution, and 1 the many being enslaved to the few, the people rose against the notables. The party struggle being 2 violent and the parties remaining arrayed in opposition to one another for a long time, they jointly chose Solon as arbitrator and Archon, and entrusted 594 B.C. the government to him, after he had composed the elegy^c that begins :

Iambus (L.C.L.), vol. i. pp. 104 ff., especially pp. 120-121, 142-143, and 148-153.

ARISTOTLE

γινώσκω, καὶ μοι φρενὸς ἔνδοθεν ἄλγεα κείται
 πρεσβυτάτην ἔσορων γαῖαν Ἰαονίας
 καινομένην¹.

ἐν ἣ πρὸς ἑκατέρους ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρων μάχεται καὶ
 διαμφισβητεῖ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κοινῇ παραινεί
 3 καταπαύειν τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν φιλονικίαν. ἦν δ' ὁ
 Σόλων τῇ μὲν φύσει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ τῶν πρώτων,
 τῇ δ' οὐσία καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τῶν μέσων,
 ὡς ἔκ τε τῶν ἄλλων ὁμολογεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν
 τοῖσδε τοῖς ποιήμασιν μαρτυρεῖ, παραινῶν τοῖς
 πλουσίοις μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν·

ὕμεῖς δ' ἡσυχάσαντες ἐνὶ φρεσὶ καρτερόν ἦτορ,
 οἱ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐς κόρον ἠλάσατε,
 ἐν μετρίοισι² τίθεσθε μέγαν νόον· οὔτε γὰρ ἡμεῖς
 πεισόμεθ', οὔθ' ὑμῖν ἄρτια ταῦτ'³ ἔσεται.

καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς στάσεως ἀνάπτει τοῖς
 πλουσίοις· διὸ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐλεγείας δεδοικέναι
 φησὶ

τὴν τε φιλαργυρίαν⁴ τὴν θ' ὑπερηφανίαν,

ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἔχθρας ἐνεστῶσης.

1 VI. Κύριος δὲ γενόμενος τῶν πραγμάτων Σόλων
 τόν τε δῆμον ἠλευθέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ
 εἰς τὸ μέλλον, κωλύσας δανείζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν,
 καὶ νόμους ἔθηκε, καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐποίησε
 καὶ τῶν ἰδίων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων, ἃς σεισάχθειαν

¹ κλινομένην, καρφομένην nonnulli legunt: καιομένην? Edmonds.

² μέτροισι Wilamowitz-Kaibel metri gratia (et τέμεσθε, 'cut to measure,' Edmonds).

³ πάντ' nonnulli legunt: τάστ' Edmonds.

ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, v. 2—VI. 1

I mark, and sorrow fills my breast to see,
Ionia's oldest land being done to death,—

in which he does battle on behalf of each party against the other and acts as mediator, and after this exhorts them jointly to stop the quarrel that prevailed between them. Solon was by birth and re-³putation of the first rank, but by wealth and position belonged to the middle class, as is admitted on the part of the other authorities, and as he himself testifies in these poems, exhorting the wealthy not to be covetous :

Refrain ye in your hearts those stubborn moods,
Plunged in a surfeit of abundant goods,
And moderate your pride! We'll not submit,
Nor even you yourselves will this befit.^a

And he always attaches the blame for the civil strife wholly to the rich ; owing to which at the beginning of the elegy he says that he fears

Both love of money and o'erweening pride—,

implying that these were the causes of the enmity that prevailed.

VI. Solon having become master of affairs made ¹the people free both at the time and for the future by prohibiting loans secured on the person, and he laid down laws, and enacted cancellations of debts both private and public, the measures ^bthat are known

^a 'Nor shall ye possess what ye have now without decrease' (Edmonds).

^b Their actual provisions are quite uncertain.

⁴ *φιλοχρηίαν* legit Edmonds (cf. *φιλοχρηματιᾶν* Plutarch. *Solon* 14).

- 2 καλοῦσιν, ὡς ἀποσεισαμένων¹ τὸ βάρος. ἐν οἷς πειρῶνταιί τινες διαβάλλειν αὐτόν· συνέβη γὰρ τῷ Σόλωνι μέλλοντι ποιεῖν τὴν σεισάχθειαν προειπεῖν τισὶ τῶν γνωρίμων, ἔπειθ', ὡς μὲν οἱ δημοτικοὶ λέγουσι, παραστρατηγηθῆναι διὰ τῶν φίλων, ὡς δ' οἱ βουλόμενοι βλασφημεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸν κοινωνεῖν. δανεισάμενοι γὰρ οὗτοι συνεπρίαντο πολλὴν χώραν, καὶ μετ' οὐ πολὺ τῆς τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπῆς γενομένης² ἐπλούτουν· ὅθεν φασὶ γενέσθαι τοὺς
- 3 ὕστερον δοκοῦντας εἶναι παλαιοπλούτους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πιθανώτερος ὁ τῶν δημοτικῶν λόγος· οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὕτω μέτριον γενέσθαι καὶ κοινὸν ὥστ', ἐξὸν αὐτῷ τοὺς ἑτέρους ὑποποιησάμενον τυραννεῖν τῆς πόλεως, ἀμφοτέροις ἀπεχθέσθαι καὶ περὶ πλείονος ποιήσασθαι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν ἢ τὴν αὐτοῦ πλεονεξίαν, ἐν οὕτῳ δὲ μικροῖς καὶ ἀναξίοις³ καταρρυπαίνειν ἑαυτόν. ὅτι δὲ ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν ἐξουσίαν, τά τε πράγματα νοσοῦντα μαρτυρεῖ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτὸς πολλαχοῦ μέμνηται, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι συνομολογοῦσι πάντες. ταύτην μὲν οὖν χρὴ νομίζειν ψευδῆ τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι.
- 1 VII. Πολιτείαν δὲ κατέστησε καὶ νόμους ἔθηκεν ἄλλους, τοῖς δὲ Δράκοντος θεσμοῖς ἐπαύσαντο χρωμένοι πλὴν τῶν φονικῶν. ἀναγράψαντες δὲ τοὺς

¹ Mayor: αποσεισαμενοι cod.

² Rutherford: γινομενης cod.

³ φανεροῖς incerte legit Rutherford.

ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, VI. 1—VII. 1

as 'the Shaking-off of Burdens,' meaning that the people shook off their load. In these matters some people try to misrepresent him; for it happened 2 that when Solon was intending to enact the Shaking-off of Burdens, he informed some of the notables beforehand, and afterwards, as those of popular sympathies say, he was out-manœuvred by his friends, but according to those who want to malign him he himself also took a share. For these persons borrowed money and bought up a quantity of land, and when not long afterwards the cancellation of debts took place they were rich men; and this is said to be the origin of the families subsequently reputed to be ancestrally wealthy.^a Nevertheless, 3 the account of those of popular sympathies is more credible; for considering that he was so moderate and public-spirited in the rest of his conduct that, when he had the opportunity to reduce one of the two parties to subjection and so to be tyrant of the city, he incurred the enmity of both, and valued honour and the safety of the state more than his own aggrandizement, it is not probable that he besmirched himself in such worthless trifles. And that he got 4 this opportunity is testified by the disordered state of affairs, and also he himself alludes to it in many places in his poems, and everybody else agrees with him. We are bound therefore to consider this charge to be false.

VII. And he established a constitution and made 1 other laws, and they ceased to observe the ordinances of Draco, except those relating to homicide. They

^a Apparently certain well-known families, but not alluded to elsewhere.

ARISTOTLE

νόμους εἰς τοὺς κύρβεις ἕστησαν ἐν τῇ στοᾷ τῇ βασιλείῳ καὶ ὤμοσαν χρῆσεσθαι πάντες· οἱ δ' ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ὀμνύντες πρὸς τῷ λίθῳ κατεφάτιζον ἀναθήσειν ἀνδριάντα χρυσοῦν εἴαν τινα παραβῶσι τῶν νόμων· ὅθεν ἔτι καὶ νῦν οὕτως ὀμνύουσι.

2 κατέκλεισεν δὲ τοὺς νόμους εἰς ἑκατὸν ἔτη. καὶ 3 διέταξε τὴν πολιτείαν τόνδε τρόπον· τιμήματι διεΐλεν¹ εἰς τέτταρα τέλη, καθάπερ διήρητο καὶ πρότερον, εἰς πεντακοσιομέδιμνον καὶ ἵππεία καὶ ζευγίτην καὶ θῆτα· καὶ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας² ἀρχὰς ἀπένειμεν ἄρχειν ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καὶ ἵππέων καὶ ζευγιτῶν, τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ταμίας καὶ τοὺς πωλητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἔνδεκα καὶ τοὺς κωλακρέτας, ἐκάστοις ἀνὰ λόγον τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ τιμήματος ἀποδιδούς ἐκάστην³ ἀρχήν· τοῖς δὲ τὸ θητικὸν τελοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαστηρίων μετέδωκε μόνον. ἔδει δὲ τελεῖν πεντακοσιομέδιμνον μὲν ὅς ἂν ἐκ τῆς⁴ οἰκείας ποιῇ πεντακόσια μέτρα τὰ συνάμφω ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρά, ἵππάδα δὲ τοὺς τριακόσια ποιοῦντας—ὡς δ' ἐνιοῖ φασι, τοὺς ἵπποτροφεῖν δυναμένους· σημεῖον δὲ φέρουσι τό τε ὄνομα τοῦ τέλους, ὡς ἀπὸ⁵ τοῦ πράγματος κείμενον, καὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα τῶν ἀρχαίων· ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἐν ἀκροπόλει εἰκὼν Διφίλου⁶ ἐφ' ἧ ἔπιγέγραπται τάδε·

¹ διεΐλεν <αὐτὴν>? Rutherford.

² μὲν ἄλλας Diels: μ . . . as cod.: μέγιστας Blass olim.

³ ed.: τὴν cod.

⁴ γῆς Bywater.

⁵ ἀπὸ ed.: ἀναπω cod.

⁶ [Διφίλου] Thompson.

^a Three-sided (or perhaps four-sided) structures of wood (or perhaps stone) revolving on pivots; set up in the Stoa Basilike, the court of the King-Archon, on the west side of the Agora.

wrote up the laws on the Boards^a and set them in the Royal Colonnade, and all swore to observe them; and the Nine Archons used to make affirmation on oath at the Stone^b that if they transgressed any one of the laws they would dedicate a gold statue of a man; owing to which they are even now still sworn in with this oath. And he fixed the laws to stay unaltered for 2 a hundred years. And he arranged the constitution in the following way: he divided the people by assess- 3 ment into four classes, as they had been divided before, Five-hundred-measure man, Horseman, Teamster and Labourer, and he distributed the other offices to be held from among the Five-hundred-measure men, Horsemen and Teamsters—the Nine Archons, the Treasurers,^c the Vendors of Contracts,^d the Eleven^e and the Paymasters, assigning each office to the several classes in proportion to the amount of their assessment; while those who were rated in the Labourer class he admitted to the membership of the assembly and law-courts alone. Any man had 4 to be rated as a Five-hundred-measure man the produce from whose estate was five hundred dry and liquid measures jointly,^f and at the cavalry-rate those who made three hundred,—or as some say, those who were able to keep a horse, and they adduce as a proof the name of the rating as being derived from the fact, and also the votive offerings of the ancients; for there stands dedicated in the Acropolis a statue of Diphilus^g on which are inscribed these lines:

^b Perhaps the altar of Zeus Agoraios.

^c See xlvii. 1.

^d See xlvii. 2.

^e See lii. 1.

^f *i.e.* measures of corn and of wine and oil amounting in all to five hundred.

^g 'Of Diphilus' is probably a mistaken insertion; presumably the statue was of Anthemion himself.

Διφίλου Ἀνθεμίων τήνδ' ἀνέθηκε θεοῖς . . .
θητικοῦ ἀντὶ τέλους ἱππάδ' ἀμειψάμενος—

καὶ παρέστηκεν ἵππος ἐκμαρτυρῶν¹ ὡς τὴν ἱππάδα τοῦτο σημαίνουσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εὐλογώτερον τοῖς μέτροις διηρηῆσθαι καθάπερ τοὺς πεντακοσιομεδίμνους. ζευγίσιον δὲ τελεῖν τοὺς διακόσια τὰ συνάμφω ποιούντας· τοὺς δ' ἄλλους θητικόν, οὐδεμιᾶς μετέχοντας ἀρχῆς, διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὰν ἔρηται τὸν μέλλοντα κληροῦσθαί τιν' ἀρχὴν ποῖον τέλος τελεῖ, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς εἶποι θητικόν.

- 1 VIII. Τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐποίησε κληρωτὰς ἐκ προκρίτων οὓς ἐκάστη προκρίνει² τῶν φυλῶν. προῦκρινεν δ' εἰς τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας ἐκάστη δέκα, καὶ³ τούτων ἐκλήρου⁴. ὅθεν ἔτι διαμένει ταῖς φυλαῖς τὸ δέκα κληροῦν ἐκάστην, εἴτ' ἐκ τούτων κυαμεύειν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι κληρωτὰς ἐποίησεν⁵ ἐκ τῶν τιμημάτων ὁ περὶ τῶν ταμιῶν νόμος ᾧ χρώμενοι διατελοῦσιν ἔτι καὶ νῦν· κελεύει γὰρ κληροῦν τοὺς ταμίας ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων.
- 2 Σόλων μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐνομοθέτησεν περὶ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων· τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον ἢ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλῇ ἀνακαλεσαμένη καὶ κρίνασα καθ' αὐτὴν τὸν ἐπιτήδειον ἐφ' ἐκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπ'
- 3 ἐνιαυτὸν ἄρξοντα⁶ ἀπέστελλεν. φυλαὶ δ' ἦσαν δ'

¹ εἰς μαρτύριον coni. Blass. ² Gertz: προκρίνει cod.

³ καὶ Gomperz (sed cf. xxx. 1, xxxi. 1).

⁴ Kaibel-Wilamowitz: του . . . ληρουν cod.

⁵ Bury: ἱκοισαν cod.

⁶ Kaibel: διατάξασα Kenyon: . . . τα vel . . . σα cod.

^a Apparently the property qualification was ignored, without being formally repealed.

^b i.e. nine were taken by lot out of forty elected by vote

ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, VII. 4—VIII. 3

Anthemion Diphilus's son dedicated this statue to the gods . . . having exchanged the Labourer rating for the Cavalry—and a horse stands beside him, in evidence that 'cavalry' meant the class able to keep a horse. Nevertheless it is more probable that the cavalry were distinguished by their amounts of produce as the Five-hundred-measure men were. And men had to be rated in the Teamster class who made two hundred measures, wet and dry together; while the rest were rated in the Labourer class, being admitted to no office: hence even now when the presiding official asks a man who is about to draw lots for some office what rate he pays, no one whatever would say that he was rated as a Labourer.^a

VIII. For the offices of state he instituted election 1 by lot from candidates selected by the tribes severally by a preliminary vote. For the Nine Archons each tribe made a preliminary selection of ten, and the election was made from among these by lot^b; hence there still survives with the tribes the system that each elects ten by lot and then they choose from among these by ballot.^c And a proof that he made the offices elective by lot according to assessments is the law in regard to the Treasurers that remains in force even at the present day; for it orders the Treasurers to be elected by lot from the Five-hundred-measure men. Solon, therefore, legislated thus about the Nine 2 Archons; for in ancient times the Council on the Areopagus used to issue a summons and select independently the person suitable for each of the offices, and commission him to hold office for a year. And 3

by the four tribes; whereas in the writer's day the preliminary election was also by lot and produced one hundred from the ten tribes.

^c *i.e.* by lot again.

καθάπερ πρότερον καὶ φυλοβασιλεῖς τέσσαρες. ἐκ δὲ τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης ἦσαν νενεμημένοι τριτ-
 τῦες μὲν τρεῖς, ναυκραρίαι δὲ δώδεκα καθ' ἐκάστην,
 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν¹ ναυκραριῶν ἀρχὴ καθεστηκυῖα ναύ-
 κραροι, τεταγμένη πρὸς τε τὰς εἰσφοράς καὶ τὰς
 δαπάνας τὰς γινομένας· διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις
 τοῖς Σόλωνος, οἷς οὐκέτι χρῶνται, πολλαχοῦ
 γέγραπται τοὺς ναυκράρους εἰσπράττειν, καὶ ἀνα-
 4 λίσκειν ἐκ τοῦ ναυκραρικοῦ ἀργυρίου. βουλήν δ'
 ἐποίησε τετρακοσίους, ἑκατὸν ἐξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς,
 τὴν δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν ἔταξεν ἐπὶ τὸ νομο-
 φυλακεῖν, ὥσπερ ὑπῆρχεν καὶ πρότερον ἐπίσκοπος
 οὔσα τῆς πολιτείας, ἣ τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰ πλείστα
 καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πολιτικῶν² διετήρει καὶ
 τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας ἠϋθυνεν κυρία οὔσα καὶ ζη-
 μιούν καὶ κολάζειν, καὶ τὰς ἐκτίσεις ἀνέφερεν εἰς
 πόλιν οὐκ ἐπιγράφουσα τὴν πρόφασιν τοῦ ἐκτίνε-
 σθαι,³ καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου συνιστα-
 μένους ἔκρινεν, Σόλωνος θέντος νόμον εἰσαγγελίας
 5 περὶ αὐτῶν. ὁρῶν δὲ τὴν μὲν πόλιν πολλάκις
 στασιάζουσαν τῶν δὲ πολιτῶν ἐνίους διὰ τὴν
 ῥαθυμίαν ἀγαπῶντας τὸ αὐτόματον, νόμον ἔθηκε
 πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἴδιον, ὃς ἂν στασιαζούσης τῆς πόλεως
 μὴ θῆται τὰ ὄπλα μηδὲ μεθ' ἐτέρων ἄτιμον εἶναι
 καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν.

1 IX. Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦτον εἶχε τὸν
 τρόπον. δοκεῖ δὲ τῆς Σόλωνος πολιτείας τρία

¹ ἦν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν nonnulli legunt.

² πολιτικῶν coni. Richards: πολιτων cod.

³ εὐθύνεσθαι nonnulli legunt, δι' ὃ τὸ ἐκτίνεσθαι alii.

^a The *Naucrariae* were forty-eight administrative districts into which the country was divided for taxation, each having

there were four Tribes, as before, and four Tribal Kings. And from each Tribe there had been assigned three Thirds and twelve Ship-boards^a to each, and over the Ship-boards there was established the office of Ship-commissioners, appointed for the levies and the expenditures that were made ; because of which in the laws of Solon, which are no longer in force, the clauses frequently occur, ' the Ship-commissioner to levy ' and ' to spend out of the Ship-commission Fund.' And he made a Council of four hundred 4 members, a hundred from each tribe, but appointed the Council of the Areopagus to the duty of guarding the laws, just as it had existed even before as overseer of the constitution, and it was this Council that kept watch over the greatest number and the most important of the affairs of state, in particular correcting offenders with sovereign powers both to fine and punish, and making returns of its expenditure to the Acropolis without adding a statement of the reason for the outlay, and trying persons that conspired to put down the democracy, Solon having laid down a law of impeachment in regard to them. And as he 5 saw that the state was often in a condition of party strife, while some of the citizens through slackness were content to let things slide, he laid down a special law to deal with them, enacting that whoever when civil strife prevailed did not join forces with either party was to be disfranchised and not to be a member of the state.

IX. This then was the nature of his reforms in 1 regard to the offices of state. And the three most

to defray the equipment of one battle-ship. Their presidents were *Naucrari*. Every four *Naucrariae* formed a *Trittys*, of which there were three in each Tribe.

ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ δημοτικώτατα, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μέγιστον τὸ μὴ δανείζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἔπειτα τὸ ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικουμένων, τρίτον δέ, ὧ¹ μάλιστα φασιν ἰσχυκέναι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἔφεσις· κύριος γὰρ ὢν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ψήφου κύριος γίνεται
 2 τῆς πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ γεγράφθαι τοὺς νόμους ἀπλῶς μηδὲ σαφῶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὁ περὶ τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων, ἀνάγκη πολλὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις γίνεσθαι καὶ πάντα βραβεύειν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τὸ δικαστήριον. οἴονται μὲν οὖν τινὲς ἐπίτηδες ἀσαφεῖς αὐτὸν ποιῆσαι τοὺς νόμους ὅπως ἢ τῆς κρίσεως ὁ δῆμος κύριος· οὐ μὴν εἰκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι καθόλου περιλαβεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον· οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐκ τῶν νῦν γινομένων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας θεωρεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν.

- 1 X. Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς νόμοις ταῦτα δοκεῖ θείναι δημοτικά, πρὸ δὲ τῆς νομοθεσίας ποιήσας² τὴν τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπὴν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν τε τῶν μέτρων καὶ σταθμῶν καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος
 2 αὐξήσιν. ἐπ' ἐκείνου γὰρ ἐγένετο καὶ τὰ μέτρα μείζω τῶν Φειδωνείων, καὶ ἡ μνᾶ πρότερον ἔχουσα σταθμὸν ἑβδομήκοντα δραχμὰς ἀνεπληρώθη ταῖς ἑκατόν. ἦν δ' ὁ ἀρχαῖος χαρακτήρ δίδραχμον. ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ σταθμὰ πρὸς τὸ νόμισμα, τρεῖς καὶ

¹ δέ, ὧ Lipsius: δε cod.

² ποιῆσαι legit Kenyon.

^a King of Argos, probably early 7th century B.C., see *Politics* 1310 b 26. His standards of coinage and weights and measures came to prevail through most of Greece.

^b *i.e.* seventy of the new drachmae: the drachma coin

democratic features in Solon's constitution seem to be these : first and most important the prohibition of loans secured upon the person, secondly the liberty allowed to anybody who wished to exact redress on behalf of injured persons, and third, what is said to have been the chief basis of the powers of the multitude, the right of appeal to the jury-court—for the people, having the power of the vote, becomes sovereign in the government. And also, since the laws are not drafted simply nor clearly, but like the law about inheritances and heiresses, it inevitably results that many disputes take place and that the jury-court is the umpire in all business both public and private. Therefore some people think that Solon purposely made his laws obscure, in order that the people might be sovereign over the verdict. But this is unlikely—probably it was due to his not being able to define the ideal in general terms ; for it is not fair to study his intention in the light of what happens at the present day, but to judge it from the rest of his constitution.

X. Solon therefore seems to have laid down these enactments of a popular nature in his laws ; while before his legislation his democratic reform was his cancellation of debts, and afterwards his raising the standard of the measures and weights and of the coinage. For it was in his time that the measures were made larger than those of Pheidon,^a and that the mina, which previously had a weight of seventy drachmae,^b was increased to the full hundred. The ancient coin-type was the two-drachma piece. Solon also instituted weights corresponding to the cur-

was also enlarged, so that seventy of the new equalled one hundred of the old ; and see note on iv. 1.

ἑξήκοντα μνᾶς τὸ τάλαντον ἀγούσας, καὶ ἐπι-
διενεμήθησαν αἱ τρεῖς μναὶ τῷ στατηῆρι καὶ τοῖς
ἄλλοις σταθμοῖς.

¹ XI. Διατάξας δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν ὄνπερ εἴρηται
τρόπον, ἐπειδὴ προσιόντες αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν νόμων
ἐνώχλουν τὰ μὲν ἐπιτιμῶντες τὰ δὲ ἀνακρίνοντας,
βουλόμενος μήτε ταῦτα κινεῖν μήτ' ἀπεχθάνεσθαι
παρῶν, ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσατο κατ' ἐμπορίαν ἅμα
καὶ θεωρίαν εἰς Αἴγυπτον, εἰπὼν ὡς οὐχ ἥξει δέκα
ἔτων, οὐ γὰρ οἶεσθαι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς νόμους
ἑξηγεῖσθαι παρῶν ἀλλ' ἕκαστον τὰ γεγραμμένα

² ποιῆσαι. ἅμα δὲ καὶ συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τῶν τε
γνωρίμων διαφόρους γεγενῆσθαι πολλοὺς διὰ τὰς
τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς, καὶ τὰς στάσεις ἀμφοτέρας
μεταθέσθαι διὰ τὸ παρὰ δόξαν αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι
τὴν κατάστασιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δῆμος ὤετο πάντ'
ἀνάδαστα ποιήσειν αὐτόν, οἱ δὲ γνώριμοι πάλιν ἢ
τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἀποδώσειν ἢ μικρὸν παρα-
λλάξαντα· ὁ δὲ Σόλων ἀμφοτέροις ἠναντιώθη, καὶ
ἕξὸν αὐτῷ μεθ' ὁποτέρων ἠβούλετο συστάνα
τυραννεῖν εἴλετο πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους ἀπεχθέσθαι¹
σώσας τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὰ βέλτιστα νομοθετήσας.

¹ XII. Ταῦτα δ' ὅτι τοῦτον τρόπον ἔσχεν² οἱ τ'
ἄλλοι συμφωνοῦσι πάντες καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ ποιήσει
μέμνηται περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖσδε·

δῆμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσον ἀπ-
αρκεῖ,
τιμῆς οὐτ' ἀφελὼν οὐτ' ἐπορεξάμενος,

¹ Wyse: ἀπεχθεσθῆναι cod. ² εἶχεν Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

^a The weight of a fiftieth part of a mina.

^b See v. 2 n.

rency, the talent weighing sixty-three minae, and a fraction proportionate to the additional three minae was added to the stater^a and the other weights.

XI. When Solon had organized the constitution 1 in the manner stated, people kept coming to him and worrying him about his laws, criticizing some points and asking questions about others; so as he did not wish either to alter these provisions or to stay and incur enmity, he went abroad on a journey to Egypt, for the purpose both of trading and of seeing the country, saying that he would not come back for ten years, as he did not think it fair for him to stay and explain his laws, but for everybody to carry out their provisions for himself. At the same time 2 it befell him that many of the notables had become at variance with him because of the cancellations of debts, and also that both the factions changed their attitude to him because the settlement had disappointed them. For the people had thought that he would institute universal communism of property, whereas the notables had thought that he would either restore the system in the same form as it was before or with slight alteration; but Solon went against them both, and when he might have been tyrant if he had taken sides with whichever of the two factions he wished, he chose to incur the enmity of both by saving the country and introducing the legislation that was best.

XII. That this is how it happened is the unanimous 1 account of everybody, and in particular Solon himself in his poetry^b recalls the matter in these words:

For to the people gave I grace enough,
Nor from their honour took, nor proffered more;

οἱ δ' εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί,
καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν.
ἔστην δ' ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερόν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι
νικᾶν δ' οὐκ εἶασ' οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.

2 πάλιν δ' ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ τοῦ πλήθους ὡς αὐτῷ
δεῖ χρῆσθαι·

δῆμος δ' ὧδ' ἂν ἄριστα σὺν ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἔποιτο,
μήτε λίαν ἀνεθείς μήτε βιαζόμενος·
τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἔπῃται
ἀνθρώποισιν ὅσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ.

3 καὶ πάλιν δ' ἐτέρωθί που λέγει περὶ τῶν δια-
νειμασθαι τὴν γῆν βουλομένων·

οἱ δ' ἐφ' ἀρπαγαῖσιν ἦλθον ἐλπίδ' εἶχον¹ ἀφνεάν,
καδόκουν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὄλβον εὐρήσειν πδλύν,
καί με κωτίλλοντα λείως τραχὺν ἐκφανεῖν νόον.
χαῦνα μὲν τότε ἔφράσαντο, νῦν δέ μοι χολούμενοι
λοξὸν ὀφθαλμοῖσ' ὀρώσι πάντες ὥστε δήιον,
οὐ χρεῶν· ἅ μὲν γὰρ εἶπα σὺν θεοῖσιν ἦνυσα,
ἄλλα δ' οὐ μάτην ἔερδον, οὐδέ μοι τυραννίδος
ἦνδάνεν² βία τι ρέζειν, οὐδέ μοι πειείρας χθονὸς
πατρίδος κακοῖσιν ἐσθλοὺς ἰσομοιρίαν ἔχειν.

4 πάλιν³ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποκοπῆς τῶν χρεῶν καὶ
τῶν δουλευόντων μὲν πρότερον ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ
διὰ τὴν σεισάχθειαν·

¹ ἐφ' ἀρπαγῆ συνῆλθον κάλπίδ' εἶχον (commate infra post νόον
posito) Ziegler : ἐφ' ἀρπαγαῖς ἔχοντες ἐλπίδ' ἦλθον Richards.

² Richards : ἀνδανει cod.

³ πάλιν Kenyon : λέγει Kontos : lacunam cod.

ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, XII. 1-4


While those possessing power and graced with wealth,
These too I made to suffer nought unseemly ;
I stood protecting both with a strong shield,
And suffered neither to prevail unjustly.

And again, when declaring about how the multi- 2
tude ought to be treated :

Thus would the people with the chiefs best follow,
With neither too much freedom nor compulsion ;
Satiety breeds insolence when riches
Attend the men whose mind is not prepared.

And again in a different place he says about those 3
who wish to divide up the land :

They that came on plunder bent were filled with over-lavish
hope,
Each and all imagining that they would find abundant
wealth,
And that I, though smoothly glozing, would display a purpose
rough.
Vain and boastful then their fancies ; now their bile 'gainst
me is stirred,
And with eyes askance they view me, and all deem me as a
foe—
Wrongly : for the things I promised, those by heaven's aid
I did,
And much else, no idle exploits ; nothing did it please my
mind
By tyrannic force to compass, nor that in our fatherland
Good and bad men should have equal portion in her fertile
soil.



And again about the cancellation of debts, and 4
those who were in slavery before but were liberated
by the Shaking-off of Burdens :

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ξυνήγαγον
 δῆμόν, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;
 συμμαρτυροίη ταῦτ' ἂν ἐν δίκῃ Χρόνου
 μήτηρ μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων
 ἄριστα, Γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγὼ ποτε
 ὄρους ἀνείλον πολλαχῆ πεπηγότας,
 πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρα.¹
 πολλοὺς δ' Ἀθήνας πατρίδ' εἰς θεόκτιτον
 ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας, ἄλλον ἐκδίκως,
 ἄλλον δικαίως, τοὺς δ' ἀναγκαίης ὑπο
 χρειοῦς φυγόντας, γλῶσσαν οὐκέτ' Ἀττικὴν
 ἰέντας, ὡς ἂν² πολλαχῆ πλανωμένους,
 τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα
 ἔχοντας, ἦθη δεσποτῶν τρομευμένους,
 ἐλευθέρους ἔθηκα. ταῦτα μὲν κρατεῖν,
 ὁμοῦ³ βίαν τε καὶ δίκην συναρμόσας,
 ἔρεξα καὶ διήλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμην·
 θεσμούς θ' ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε καγαθῷ,
 εὐθείαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἀρμόσας δίκην,
 ἔγραψα. κέντρον δ' ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβίων,
 κακοφραδῆς τε καὶ φιλοκτῆμων ἀνὴρ,
 οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον· εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον
 ἂ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἦνδανεν τότε,
 αὐθις δ' ἂ τοῖσιν οὐτεροι φρασαίατο,
 πολλῶν ἂν ἀνδρῶν ἦδ' ἐχηρώθη πόλις.
 τῶν οὐνεκ' ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιούμενος
 ὡς ἐν κυσὶν πολλῆσιν ἐστράφην λύκος.

ὅ καὶ πάλιν ὀνειδίζων πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον αὐτῶν
 μεμψιμοιρίας ἀμφοτέρων·

δῆμῳ μὲν εἰ χρὴ διαφραδὴν⁴ ὀνειδίσαι,
 ἂ νῦν ἔχουσιν οὐποτ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἂν

But what did I leave unachieved, of all
 The ends for which I did unite the people?
 Whereof before the judgement-seat of Time
 The mighty mother of the Olympian gods,
 Black Earth, would best bear witness, for 'twas I
 Removed her many boundary-posts^a implanted:
 Ere then she was a slave, but now is free.

And many sold away I did bring home
 To god-built Athens, this one sold unjustly,
 That other justly; others that had fled
 From dire constraint of need, uttering no more
 Their Attic tongue, so widely had they wandered,
 And others suffering base slavery
 Even here, trembling before their masters' humours,
 I did set free. / These deeds I made prevail,
 Adjusting might and right to fit together,
 And did accomplish even as I had promised.
 And rules of law alike for base and noble,
 Fitting straight justice unto each man's case,
 I drafted. — Had another than myself
 Taken the goad, unwise and covetous,
 He'd not have held the people! Had I willed
 Now that pleased one of the opposing parties,
 And then whate'er the other party bade them,
 The city had been bereft of many men.
 Wherefore I stood at guard on every side,
 A wolf at bay among a pack of hounds!

And again in his taunting reply to the later 5
 querulous complaints of both the parties :

If openly I must reprove the people,
 Ne'er in the dreams of sleep could they have seen

^a *i.e.* posts marking mortgaged estates.

¹ πρόσθεν δεδουλευκνῖα νῦν δ' ἐλευθέρα Ziegler.

² ὡσαν cod. et fr. Berol.: ὡς γε? ed.

³ κρατεεινομου cod., κρ·τηομου fr. Berol.: κράτει | νόμου edd.
 nonnulli; cf. vi. 1.

⁴ διαφάδην coni. edd.

εὐδοντες εἶδον. . . .

ὅσοι δὲ μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες
αἰνοῖεν ἄν με καὶ φίλον ποιοῖατο·

εἰ γάρ τις ἄλλος, φησί, ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς ἔτυχεν,

οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον, οὐδ' ἐπαύσατο
πρὶν ἀνταράξας πῖα¹ ἐξείλεν γάλα·
ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐν μεταχμίῳ
ὄρος κατέστην.

- 1 XIII. Τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀποδημίαν ἐποίησατο διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας. Σόλωνος δ' ἀποδημήσαντος, ἔτι τῆς πόλεως τεταραγμένης, ἐπὶ μὲν ἔτη τέτταρα διῆγον ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ· τῷ δὲ πέμπτῳ μετὰ τὴν Σόλωνος ἀρχὴν οὐκ κατέστησαν ἄρχοντα διὰ τὴν στάσιν, καὶ πάλιν ἔτει πέμπτῳ διὰ² τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν
- 2 ἀναρχίαν ἐποίησαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων Δαμασίας αἰρεθεῖς ἄρχων ἔτη δύο καὶ δύο μῆνας ἤρξεν, ἕως ἐξηλάθη βία τῆς ἀρχῆς. εἰτ' ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν ἄρχοντας ἐλέσθαι δέκα, πέντε μὲν εὐπατριδῶν τρεῖς δὲ ἀγροίκων δύο δὲ δημιουργῶν, καὶ οὗτοι τὸν μετὰ Δαμασίαν ἤρξαν ἐνιαυτόν. ὧ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι μεγίστην εἶχεν δύναμιν ὁ ἄρχων· φαίνονται γὰρ αἰεὶ στασιάζοντες
- 3 περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς. ὅλως δὲ διετέλουν νοσοῦντες τὰ πρὸς ἑαυτούς, οἳ μὲν ἀρχὴν καὶ πρόφασιν ἔχοντες τὴν τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπὴν (συνεβεβήκει γὰρ αὐτοῖς γεγόναι πένησιν), οἳ δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ δυσχεραίνοντες διὰ τὸ μεγάλην³ γεγόναι μεταβολήν, ἔνιοι δὲ διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλονικίαν.

The things that they have now . . .
 While all the greater and the mightier men
 Might praise me and might deem me as a friend ;

for had another, he says, won this office,

He had not checked the people nor refrained,
 Ere he had churned and robbed the milk of cream ;
 But I as 'twere betwixt their armèd hosts
 A frontier-post did stand.

XIII. Accordingly Solon made his journey abroad 1
 for these reasons. And when he had gone abroad,
 though the city was still disturbed, for four years
 they kept at peace ; but in the fifth year after Solon's 589 B.C. ?
 archonship because of party strife they did not
 appoint an archon, and again in the fifth year after 585 B.C. ?
 that they enacted a suspension of the archonship for
 the same cause. After this at the same interval of 2
 time Damasias was elected Archon, and held the 581 B.C. ?
 post for two years and two months, until he was
 driven out of the office by force. Then because of ✓
 the civil strife they decided to elect ten Archons,
 five from the nobles, three from the farmers and two ✓
 from the artisans, and these held office for the year 579 B.C. ?
 after Damasias. This shows that the Archon had
 very great power ; for we find that they were always
 engaging in party strife about this office. And they 3
 continued in a state of general internal disorder,
 some having as their incentive and excuse the can-
 cellation of debts (for it had resulted in their having
 become poor), others discontented with the constitu-
 tion because a great change had taken place, and
 some because of their mutual rivalry. The factions 4

¹ *πῆαρ* edd. ex Plutarcho : *πυαρ* cod.

² *διὰ* fr. Berol. : om. cod.

³ <οὐ> *μεγάλην* Vollgraf.

4 ἦσαν δ' αἱ στάσεις τρεῖς· μία μὲν τῶν παραλίων,
 ὧν προειστήκει Μεγακλῆς ὁ Ἀλκμέωνος, οἵπερ
 ἔδόκουν μάλιστα διώκειν τὴν μέσσην πολιτείαν·
 ἄλλη δὲ τῶν πεδιακῶν, οἱ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐζήτουν,
 ἠγεῖτο δ' αὐτῶν Λυκούργος· τρίτη δ' ἡ τῶν
 διακρίων, ἐφ' ἣν τεταγμένος ἦν Πεισίστρατος,
 5 δημοτικώτατος εἶναι δοκῶν. προσεκεκόσμητο δὲ
 τούτοις οἱ τε ἀφηρημένοι τὰ χρέα διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν,
 καὶ οἱ τῷ γένει μὴ καθαροὶ διὰ τὸν φόβον· σημεῖον
 δ' ὅτι μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐποίησαν
 διαψηφισμὸν¹ ὡς πολλῶν κοινωνούντων τῆς πολι-
 τείας οὐ προσῆκον. εἶχον δ' ἕκαστοι τὰς ἐπι-
 νυμίας ἀπὸ τῶν τόπων ἐν οἷς ἐγεώργουν.

1 XIV. Δημοτικώτατος δ' εἶναι δοκῶν ὁ Πεισί-
 στρατος καὶ σφόδρ' εὐδοκιμηκῶς ἐν τῷ πρὸς
 Μεγαρέας πολέμῳ, κατατραυματίσας ἑαυτὸν συν-
 ἔπεισε τὸν δῆμον, ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν
 ταῦτα πεπονθώς, φυλακὴν ἑαυτῷ δοῦναι τοῦ
 σώματος, Ἀριστίωνος γράψαντος τὴν γνώμην.
 λαβὼν δὲ τοὺς κορνηφόρους καλουμένους, ἐπανα-
 στάς μετὰ τούτων τῷ δήμῳ κατέσχε τὴν ἀκρό-
 πολιν ἔτει δευτέρῳ² καὶ τριακοστῷ μετὰ τὴν τῶν

2 νόμων θέσιν, ἐπὶ Κωμέου ἄρχοντος. λέγεται δὲ
 Σόλωνα Πεισιστράτου τὴν φυλακὴν αἰτουῦντος ἀντι-
 λέξαι, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τῶν μὲν εἶη σοφώτερος τῶν
 δ' ἀνδρειότερος· ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἀγνοοῦσι Πεισί-

¹ διαψηφισμὸν edd.: διαφημισμον cod.

² δ' (i.e. τετάρτῳ) conī. Bauer.

^a i.e. by Solon's legislation.

^b Perhaps the hostilities that ended in the Athenians' capture of Nisaea about 570 B.C.

were three: one was the party of the Men of the Coast, whose head was Megacles the son of Alcmaeon, and they were thought chiefly to aim at the middle form of constitution; another was the party of the Men of the Plain, who desired the oligarchy, and their leader was Lycurgus; third was the party of the Hillmen, which had appointed Peisistratus over it, as he was thought to be an extreme advocate of the people. And on the side of this party were also 5 arrayed, from the motive of poverty, those who had been deprived ^a of the debts due to them, and, from the motive of fear, those who were not of pure descent; and this is proved by the fact that after the deposition of the tyrants the Athenians enacted a revision of the roll, because many people shared the citizenship who had no right to it. The different parties derived their names from the places where their farms were situated.

XIV. Peisistratus, being thought to be an extreme 1 advocate of the people, and having won great fame in the war against Megara,^b inflicted a wound on himself with his own hand and then gave out that it had been done by the members of the opposite factions, and so persuaded the people to give him a bodyguard, the resolution being proposed by Aristophon. He was given the retainers called Club-bearers, and with their aid he rose against the people and seized the Acropolis, in the thirty-second year after the enactment of his laws, in the archonship of 560 B.C. Comeas. It is said that when Peisistratus asked for 2 the guard Solon opposed the request, and said that he was wiser than some men and braver than others—he was wiser than those who did not know that

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στρατον ἐπιτιθέμενον τυραννίδι, σοφώτερος εἶναι τούτων, ὅσοι δ' εἰδότες κατασιωπῶσιν, ἀνδρειότερος. ἐπεὶ δὲ λέγων οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἔξαράμενος τὰ ὄπλα πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν αὐτὸς μὲν ἔφη βεβοηθηκέναί τῃ πατρίδι καθ' ὅσον ἦν δυνατὸς (ἤδη γὰρ σφόδρα πρεσβύτης ἦν), ἀξιοῦν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ταῦτο
 3 τοῦτο ποιεῖν. Σόλων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἤνυσεν τότε παρακαλῶν· Πεισίστρατος δὲ λαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν διώκει τὰ κοινὰ πολιτικῶς μᾶλλον ἢ τυραννικῶς. οὐπω δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐρριζωμένης ὁμοφρονήσαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Μεγακλέα καὶ τὸν Λυκουργον ἐξέβαλον αὐτὸν ἔκτῳ ἔτει μετὰ τὴν πρώτην κατάστασιν,
 4 ἐφ' ἧς Ἡγησίου ἄρχοντος. ἔτει δὲ δωδεκάτῳ¹ μετὰ ταῦτα περιελαυνόμενος ὁ Μεγακλῆς τῇ στάσει πάλιν ἐπικηρυκευσάμενος πρὸς τὸν Πεισίστρατον, ἐφ' ᾧ τε τὴν θυγατέρα αὐτοῦ λήψεται κατήγαγεν αὐτὸν ἀρχαίως καὶ λίαν ἀπλῶς. προδιασπείρας γὰρ λόγον ὡς τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καταγούσης Πεισίστρατον, καὶ γυναῖκα μεγάλην καὶ καλὴν ἐξευρών, ὡς μὲν Ἡρόδοτός φησιν ἐκ τοῦ δήμου τῶν Παιανέων, ὡς δ' ἔνιοι λέγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ Κολυττοῦ στεφανόπωλιν Θρηῆτταν ἢ ὄνομα Φύη, τὴν θεὸν ἀπομιμησάμενος τῷ κόσμῳ συνεισήγαγεν μετ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ μὲν Πεισίστρατος ἐφ' ἄρματος εἰσήλαυε παραιβατούσης τῆς γυναικός, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει προσκνυοῦντες ἐδέχοντο θαυμάζοντες.

1 XV. Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη κάθοδος ἐγένετο τοιαύτη. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς² ἐξέπεσε τὸ δεύτερον ἔτει μάλιστα ἐβδόμῳ μετὰ τὴν κάθοδον,—οὐ γὰρ πολὺν χρόνον

¹ τετάρτῳ Thompson.

² ὡς del. Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

Peisistratus was aiming at tyranny, and braver than those who knew it but held their tongues. But as he failed to carry them with him by saying this, he brought his armour out ^a in front of his door and said that for his part he had come to his country's aid as far as he could (for he was now a very old man), and that he called on the others also to do the same. Solon's exhortations on this occasion had no effect; ³ and Peisistratus having seized the government proceeded to carry on the public business in a manner more constitutional than tyrannical. But before his government had taken root the partisans of Megacles and Lycurgus made common cause and expelled him, in the sixth year after his first establishment, in the archonship of Hegesias. In the twelfth year after ⁴ this Megacles, being harried by party faction, made overtures again to Peisistratus, and on terms of receiving his daughter in marriage brought him back, in an old-fashioned and extremely simple manner. Having first spread a rumour that Athena was bringing Peisistratus back, he found a tall and beautiful woman, according to Herodotus ^b a member of the Paeonian deme, but according to some accounts a Thracian flower-girl from Collytus named Phyē, dressed her up to look like the goddess, and brought her to the city with him, and Peisistratus drove in a chariot with the woman standing at his side, while the people in the city marvelled and received them with acts of reverence.

XV. In this way his first return took place. Afterwards, as he was expelled a second time in about the seventh year after his return—for he did not main- ^{539 B.C.}tain his hold for long, but came to be afraid of both

^a Apparently, for some younger man to use. ^b i. 60.

κατέσχευεν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τῇ τοῦ Μεγακλέους θυγατρὶ συγγίνεσθαι φοβηθεὶς ἀμφοτέρας
 2 τὰς στάσεις ὑπεξῆλθεν—· καὶ¹ πρῶτον μὲν συνώκισε περὶ τὸν Θέρμαιον κόλπον χωρίον ὃ καλεῖται Ῥαΐκηλος, ἐκείθεν δὲ παρῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς περὶ Πάγγαιον τόπους, ὅθεν χρηματισάμενος καὶ στρατιώτας μισθωσάμενος, ἐλθὼν εἰς Ἐρετρίαν ἐνδεκάτῳ πάλιν ἔτει τὸ² πρῶτον ἀνασώσασθαι βία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπεχείρει, συμπροθυμονμένων αὐτῷ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἄλλων μάλιστα δὲ Θηβαίων καὶ Λυγδάμιος τοῦ Ναξίου, ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἰππέων τῶν
 3 ἐχόντων ἐν Ἐρετρία τὴν πολιτείαν. νικήσας δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ Παλληνίδι μάχην καὶ λαβὼν τὴν πόλιν καὶ παρελόμενος τοῦ δήμου τὰ ὄπλα, κατεῖχεν ἤδη τὴν τυραννίδα βεβαίως, καὶ Νάξον ἐλὼν ἀρχοντα
 4 κατέστησε Λύγδαμιν. παρέιλε³ δὲ τοῦ δήμου τὰ ὄπλα τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· ἐξοπλάσιαν ἐν τῷ Θησειῷ⁴ ποιησάμενος ἐκκλησιάζειν ἐπεχείρει, τῆς δὲ φωνῆς ἐχάλασεν⁵ μικρὸν, οὐ φασκόντων δὲ κατακούειν ἐκέλευσεν αὐτοὺς προσαναβῆναι πρὸς τὸ πρόπυλον τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ἵνα γεγώνη μᾶλλον· ἐν ᾧ δ' ἐκεῖνος διέτριβε δημηγορῶν, ἀνελόντες οἱ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τὰ ὄπλα καὶ κατακλήσαντες εἰς
 5 ἐλθόντες πρὸς τὸν Πεισίστρατον. ὁ δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸν ἄλλον λόγον ἐπετέλεσεν, εἶπε καὶ περὶ τῶν ὄπλων τὸ γεγονὸς ὡς οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν οὐδ' ἀθυμεῖν,

¹ καὶ fortasse delendum Kenyon.

² τότε Blass.

³ παρέιλετο Rutherford.

⁴ Ἀνακείῳ legunt nonnulli.

⁵ Kontos: τ ασεν (?) cod.: φθέγγεσθαι δ' ἐσπούδασεν Wilamowitz-Kaibel: καὶ χρόνον προσήγορευεν Kenyon.

the factions owing to his unwillingness to live with Megacles' daughter as his wife, and secretly withdrew—; and first he collected a settlement at a place ² near the Gulf of Thermae called Rhaecelus, but from there he went on to the neighbourhood of Pangaeus, from where he got money and hired soldiers, and in the eleventh year went again to Eretria, and now for ^{528 B.C. ?} the first time set about an attempt to recover his power by force, being supported in this by a number of people, especially the Thebans and Lygdamis of Naxos, and also the knights who controlled the government of Eretria. Winning the battle of ³ Pallenis,^a he seized the government and disarmed the people; and now he held the tyranny firmly, and he took Naxos and appointed Lygdamis ruler. The ⁴ way in which he disarmed the people was this: he held an armed muster at the Temple of Theseus, and began to hold an Assembly, but he lowered his voice a little, and when they said they could not hear him, he told them to come up to the forecourt of the Acropolis, in order that his voice might carry better; and while he used up time in making a speech, the men told off for this purpose gathered up the arms,^b locked them up in the neighbouring buildings of the Temple of Theseus, and came and informed Peisistratus. He, ⁵ when he had finished the rest of his speech, told his audience not to be surprised at what had happened about their arms, and not to be dismayed, but to go

^a The deme Pallene, dedicated to Athena Pallenis, lay just N.E. of Athens.

^b The citizens had piled their arms when Peisistratus began to make a speech, and left them behind when they went up the hill.

ἀλλ' ἀπελθόντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν αὐτὸς ἐπιμελήσεσθαι πάντων.

1 XVI. Ἡ μὲν οὖν Πεισιστράτου τυραννὶς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε κατέστη τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ μετα-
 2 βολὰς ἔσχε τοσαύτας. διώκει δ' ὁ Πεισίστρατος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν μετρίως καὶ μᾶλλον πολιτικῶς ἢ τυραννικῶς· ἐν τε γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλάνθρωπος ἦν καὶ πρᾶος καὶ τοῖς ἀμαρ-
 3 τάνουσι συγγνωμονικός, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀπόροις προεδάνειζε χρήματα πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, ὥστε
 4 διατρέφεσθαι γεωργοῦντας. τοῦτο δ' ἐποίει δυοῖν χάριν, ἵνα μήτε ἐν τῷ ἄστει διατρίβωσιν ἀλλὰ διεσπαρμένοι κατὰ τὴν χώραν, καὶ ὅπως εὐποροῦντες τῶν μετρίων καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις ὄντες μήτ' ἐπιθυμῶσι μήτε σχολάζωσιν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι
 5 τῶν κοινῶν. ἅμα δὲ συνέβαιεν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς προσόδους γίνεσθαι μείζους ἐξεργαζομένης τῆς χώρας· ἐπράττετο γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γιγνομένων δεκά-
 6 την. διὸ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ δῆμους κατεσκεύασε¹ δικαστάς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξῆει πολλάκις εἰς τὴν χώραν ἐπισκοπῶν καὶ διαλύων τοὺς διαφορομένους, ὅπως μὴ καταβαίνοντες εἰς τὸ ἄστυ παραμελῶσι τῶν
 7 ἔργων. τοιαύτης γὰρ τινος ἐξόδου τῷ Πεισιστράτῳ γιγνομένης συμβῆναί φασι τὰ περὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ Ὑμηττῷ γεωργοῦντα τὸ κληθὲν ὕστερον χωρίον ἀτελές. ἰδὼν γὰρ τινα παντελῶς πέτρας σκάπτοντα καὶ ἐργαζόμενον, διὰ τὸ θαυμάσαι τὸν παῖδα ἐκέλευσεν ἐρέσθαι τί γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου· ὁ δὲ “ ὅσα κακὰ καὶ ὀδύνας ” ἔφη, “ καὶ τούτων τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ὀδυνῶν² Πεισίστρατον δεῖ

¹ Wilamowitz-Kaibel: κατεσκευαζε cod.

² [τῶν κακῶν καὶ ὀδυνῶν] Hude.

away and occupy themselves with their private affairs, while he would attend to all public business.

XVI. This was the way, therefore, in which the tyranny of Peisistratus was originally set up, and this is a list of the changes that it underwent. Peisistratus's administration of the state was, as has been said,^a moderate, and more constitutional than tyrannic; he was kindly and mild in everything, and in particular he was merciful to offenders, and moreover he advanced loans of money to the poor for their industries, so that they might support themselves by farming. In doing this he had two objects, to prevent their stopping in the city and make them stay scattered about the country, and to cause them to have a moderate competence and be engaged in their private affairs, so as not to desire nor to have time to attend to public business.^b And also the land's being thoroughly cultivated resulted in increasing his revenues; for he levied a tithe from the produce. And for this reason he organized the Local Justices,^c and often went to the country on circuit in person, inspecting and settling disputes, in order that men might not neglect their agriculture by coming into the city. For it was when Peisistratus was making an expedition of this kind that the affair of the man on Hymettus cultivating the farm afterwards called Tax-free Farm is said to have occurred. He saw a man at farm-work, digging mere rocks, and because of his surprise ordered his servant to ask what crop the farm grew; and the man said, "All the aches and pains that there are, and of these aches and pains

^a ch. xiv. § 3.

^b This policy will be found expressed in general formulæ in *Politics* 1311 a 13, 1318 b 6, 1319 a 30, 1320 b 7.

^c See xxvi. 5, liii. 1.

λαβεῖν τὴν δεκάτην.” ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωπος ἀπεκρίνατο ἀγνοῶν, ὁ δὲ Πεισίστρατος ἤσθεις διὰ τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ τὴν φιλεργίαν ἀτελῆ ἀπάντων 7 ἐποίησεν αὐτόν. οὐδὲν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οὐδ’ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις παρηνώχλει¹ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ παρεσκεύαζεν εἰρήνην καὶ ἐτήρει τὴν ἡσυχίαν· διὸ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκούειν ἦν² ὡς ἡ Πεισιστράτου τυραννὶς ὁ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίος εἶη· συνέβη γὰρ ὕστερον διαδεξαμένων τῶν υἱέων πολλῶ γενέσθαι τρα- 8 χυτέραν τὴν ἀρχήν. μέγιστον δὲ πάντων ἦν τῶν εἰρημένων τὸ δημοτικὸν εἶναι τῷ ἦθει καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. ἐν τε γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐβούλετο πάντα διοικεῖν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους οὐδεμίαν ἑαυτῷ πλεονεξίαν διδούς, καὶ ποτε προσκληθεὶς φόνου δίκην εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπήντησεν ὡς ἀπολογησόμενος ὁ δὲ προσκαλεσάμενος φοβηθεὶς 9 ἔλιπεν. διὸ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἔμεινεν ἐν³ τῇ ἀρχῇ, καὶ ὅτ’ ἐκπέσοι πάλιν ἀνελάμβανε ῥαδίως. ἐβούλοντο γὰρ καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν δημοτικῶν οἱ πολλοί· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις τοὺς δὲ ταῖς εἰς τὰ ἴδια βοηθείαις προσήγετο, καὶ πρὸς ἀμ- 10 φοτέρους ἐπεφύκει καλῶς. ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οἱ περὶ τῶν τυράννων νόμοι πρᾶοι κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς οἳ τ’ ἄλλοι καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ μάλιστα καθήκων πρὸς τὴν τῆς τυραννίδος κατάστασιν.⁴ νόμος γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἦν ὅδε· θέσμια τάδε Ἀθηναίων καὶ πάτρια, εἴαν τινες τυραννεῖν

¹ Wyse: παρωχλει cod.

² ἀκούειν ἦν Blass e [Plat.] Hipparch. 229 B: abrasus cod.

³ ἐν supplevit Blass.

⁴ κατάστασιν insertum a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

Peisistratus has to get the tithe." The man did not know who it was when he answered, but Peisistratus was pleased by his free speech and by his industry, and made him free from all taxes. And in all other 7 matters too he gave the multitude no trouble during his rule, but always worked for peace and safeguarded tranquillity ; so that men were often to be heard saying that the tyranny of Peisistratus was the Golden Age of Cronos ; for it came about later when his sons had succeeded him that the government became much harsher. And the greatest of all the things 8 said of him was that he was popular and kindly in temper. For he was willing to administer everything according to the laws in all matters, never giving himself any advantage ; and once in particular when he was summoned to the Areopagus to be tried on a charge of murder, he appeared in person to make his defence, and the issuer of the summons was frightened and left. Owing to this he remained in his office for 9 a long period, and every time that he was thrown out of it he easily got it back again. For both the notables and the men of the people were most of them willing for him to govern, since he won over the former by his hospitality and the latter by his assistance in their private affairs, and was good-natured to both. And also the laws of Athens concerning 10 tyrants were mild at those periods, among the rest particularly the one that referred to the establishment of tyranny. For they had the following law : 'These are the ordinances and ancestral principles of Athens : if any persons rise in insurrection in

ἐπανιστῶνται [ἐπὶ τυραννίδι]¹ ἢ συγκαθιστῆ τὴν τυραννίδα ἄτιμον εἶναι αὐτὸν καὶ γένος.²

- 1 XVII. Πεισίστρατος μὲν οὖν ἐγκατεγήρασε τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ ἀπέθανε νοσήσας ἐπὶ Φιλόνεω ἄρχοντος, ἀφ' οὗ μὲν κατέστη τὸ πρῶτον τύραννος ἔτη τριάκοντα καὶ τρία βιώσας, ἃ δ' ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ διέμεινεν ἐνὸς δέοντα εἴκοσι, ἔφευγε γὰρ τὰ λοιπά.
- 2 διὸ καὶ φανερώς ληροῦσι³ φάσκοντες ἐρώμενον εἶναι Πεισίστρατον Σόλωνος καὶ στρατηγεῖν ἐν τῷ πρὸς Μεγαρέας πολέμῳ περὶ Σαλαμίνοσ· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ταῖς ἡλικίαισ, εἴαν τις ἀναλογίζηται τὸν ἑκατέρου βίον καὶ ἐφ' οὗ ἀπέθανεν ἄρχοντος. τελευτήσαντος δὲ Πεισιστράτου κατεῖχον οἱ υἱεῖς τὴν ἀρχήν, προαγαγόντες⁴ τὰ πράγματα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. ἦσαν δὲ δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς γαμετῆς Ἰππίας καὶ Ἰππαρχος, δύο δ' ἐκ τῆς Ἀργείας Ἰοφῶν καὶ Ἠγησίστρατος ᾧ παρωνύμιον ἦν Θέτταλος.
- 3 ἔγνημεν⁵ γὰρ Πεισίστρατος ἐξ Ἀργεῶν ἀνδρὸς Ἀργεῖου θυγατέρα ᾧ ὄνομα ἦν Γόργιλος, Τιμώνασσαν, ἣν πρότερον ἔσχεν γυναῖκα Ἀρχίνος ὁ Ἀμπρακιώτης τῶν Κυψελιδῶν· ὅθεν καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ἐνέστη φιλία, καὶ συνεμαχέσαντο χίλιοι τὴν ἐπὶ Παλληνίδι μάχην, Ἠγησιτράτου κομίσαντος. γῆμαι δὲ φασὶ τὴν Ἀργεῖαν οἱ μὲν ἐκπεσόντα τὸ πρῶτον, οἱ δὲ κατέχοντα τὴν ἀρχήν.
- 1 XVIII. Ἦσαν δὲ κύριοι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων διὰ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ διὰ τὰς ἡλικίας Ἰππαρχος καὶ Ἰππίας, πρεσβύτερος δ' ὢν ὁ Ἰππίας καὶ τῇ

¹ Keil.

² ἦσαν δὲ . . . γένος] totus locus conflatus et interpolatus ? ed.

³ ληροῦσιν <οἱ> edd.

⁴ προάγοντες edd.

⁵ <ἐπ>έγνημεν edd., coll. Plut. Cato mai. 24.

order to govern tyrannically, or if any person assists in establishing the tyranny, he himself and his family shall be disfranchised.'^a

XVII. Peisistratus, therefore, grew old in office, and died of disease in the archonship of Philoneos, having lived thirty-three years since he first established himself as tyrant, but the time that he remained in office was nineteen^b years, as he was in exile for the remainder. Therefore the story that Peisistratus was a lover of Solon and that he commanded in the war against Megara for the recovery of Salamis is clearly nonsense, for it is made impossible by their ages, if one reckons up the life of each and the archonship in which he died. When Peisistratus was dead, his sons held the government, carrying on affairs in the same way. He had two sons by his wedded wife, Hippias and Hipparchus, and two by his Argive consort, Iophon and Hegesistratus surnamed Thettalus. For Peisistratus married a consort from Argos, Timonassa, the daughter of a man of Argos named Gorgilus, who had previously been the wife of Archinus, a man of Ambracia of the Cypselid family. This was the cause of Peisistratus's friendship with Argos, and a thousand Argives brought by Hegesistratus fought for him in the battle of Pallenis.^c Some people date his marriage with the Argive lady during his first banishment, others in a period of office.

XVIII. Affairs were now under the authority of Hipparchus and Hippias, owing to their station and their ages, but the government was controlled by

^a The genuineness of § 10 may be questioned.

^b *Politics* 1315 b 31 says 'seventeen.'

^c See xv. 3.

φύσει πολιτικὸς καὶ ἔμφρων ἐπεστάται τῆς ἀρχῆς·
 ὁ δὲ Ἴππαρχος παιδιώδης καὶ ἐρωτικὸς καὶ
 φιλόμουσος ἦν (καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἀνακρέοντα καὶ
 Σιμωνίδην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς οὗτος ἦν ὁ
 2 μεταπεμπόμενος), Θέτταλος δὲ νεώτερος πολὺ καὶ
 τῷ βίῳ θρασὺς καὶ ὑβριστής, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ συνέβη
 τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι πάντων τῶν κακῶν.
 ἐρασθεῖς γὰρ τοῦ Ἀρμόδιου καὶ διαμαρτάνων τῆς
 πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίας οὐ κατεῖχε τὴν ὄργην, ἀλλ' ἔν-
 τε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐνεσημαίνετο πικρῶς καὶ τὸ
 τελευταῖον μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀδελφὴν κλη-
 φορεῖν Παναθηναίους ἐκώλυσεν, λοιδορήσας τι τὸν
 Ἀρμόδιον ὡς μαλακὸν ὄντα· ὅθεν συνέβη παρ-
 οξυνθέντα τὸν Ἀρμόδιον καὶ τὸν Ἀριστογείτονα
 3 πράττειν τὴν πράξιν μετεχόντων¹ πολλῶν.² ἤδη
 δὲ παρατηροῦντες ἐν ἀκροπόλει τοῖς Παν-
 αθηναίοις Ἴππῖαν (ἐτύγχανεν γὰρ οὗτος μὲν δε-
 χόμενος ὁ δ' Ἴππαρχος ἀποστέλλων τὴν πομπήν),
 ἰδόντες τινὰ τῶν κοινωνούτων τῆς πράξεως
 φιλανθρώπως ἐντυγχάνοντα τῷ Ἴππῖα καὶ νομί-
 σαντες μηνύειν, βουλόμενοί τι δράσαι πρὸ τῆς
 συλλήψεως, καταβάντες καὶ προεξαναστάντες τῶν
 ἄλλων, τὸν μὲν Ἴππαρχον διακοσμοῦντα τὴν
 4 πομπὴν παρὰ τὸ Λεωκόρειον ἀπέκτειναν, τὴν δ'
 ὄλην ἐλυμήναντο πράξιν, αὐτῶν δ' ὁ μὲν Ἀρ-
 μόδιος εὐθέως ἐτελεύτησεν ὑπὸ τῶν δορυφόρων,

¹ μετὰ πολιτῶν nonnulli legunt.

² <οὐ> πολλῶν Kaibel e Thuc.

Hippias, who was the elder and was statesmanlike and wise by nature; whereas Hipparchus was fond of amusement and love-making, and had literary tastes: it was he who brought to Athens poets such as Anacreon and Simonides, and the others. Thettalus 2 was much younger, and bold and insolent in his mode of life, which proved to be the source of all their misfortunes. For he fell in love with Harmodius, and when his advances were continually unsuccessful he could not restrain his anger, but displayed it bitterly in various ways, and finally when Harmodius's sister was going to be a Basket-carrier^a in the procession at the Panathenaic Festival he prevented her by uttering some insult against Harmodius as being effeminate; and the consequent wrath of Harmodius led him and Aristogeiton to enter on their plot with a number^b of accomplices. At the Panathenaic Festival 3 on the Acropolis they were already keeping a watch 514 B.C. on Hippias (who happened to be receiving the procession, while Hipparchus was directing its start), when they saw one of their partners in the plot conversing in a friendly way with Hippias. They thought that he was giving information, and wishing to do something before their arrest they went down and took the initiative without waiting for their confederates, killing Hipparchus as he was arranging the procession by the Leocoreum.^c This played havoc with 4 the whole plot. Of the two of them Harmodius was at once dispatched by the spearmen, and Aristogeiton

^a Baskets holding the requisites for the religious service were carried by maidens of high birth.

^b Thucydides (vi. 56. 3) says 'not many.'

^c A monument to three daughters of Leon who in obedience to an oracle gave their lives for their country by running against the enemy's ranks in battle.

ὁ δ' Ἀριστογείτων ὕστερον, συλληφθεὶς καὶ πολὺν χρόνον αἰκισθεὶς. κατηγόρησεν δ' ἐν ταῖς ἀνάγκαις πολλῶν οἱ καὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν ἐπιφανῶν καὶ φίλοι τοῖς τυράννοις ἦσαν. οὐ γὰρ ἐδύναντο παραχρῆμα λαβεῖν οὐδὲν ἴχνος τῆς πράξεως, ἀλλ' ὁ λεγόμενος λόγος ὡς ὁ Ἰππίας ἀποστήσας ἀπὸ τῶν ὄπλων τοὺς πομπεύοντας ἐφώρασε τοὺς τὰ ἐγχειρίδια ἔχοντας οὐκ ἀληθῆς ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἔπεμπον τότε¹ μεθ' ὄπλων, ἀλλ' ὕστερον τοῦτο
 5 κατεσκεύασεν ὁ δῆμος. κατηγόρει δὲ τῶν τοῦ τυράννου φίλων, ὡς μὲν οἱ δημοτικοὶ φασιν, ἐπίτηδες ἵνα ἀσεβήσαιεν ἅμα καὶ γένοιτο ἀσθενεῖς ἀνελόντες τοὺς ἀναιτίους καὶ φίλους ἑαυτῶν, ὡς δ' ἔνιοι λέγουσιν, οὐχὶ πλαττόμενος ἀλλὰ τοὺς
 6 συνειδότας ἐμήνυνεν. καὶ τέλος ὡς οὐκ ἐδύνατο πάντα ποιῶν ἀποθανεῖν, ἐπαγγειλάμενος ὡς ἄλλους μηνύσων πολλοὺς καὶ πείσας αὐτῷ τὸν Ἰππίαν δοῦναι τὴν δεξιὰν πίστεως χάριν, ὡς ἔλαβεν ὀνειδίσας ὅτι τῷ φονεῖ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τὴν δεξιὰν δέδωκε, οὕτω παρώξυνε τὸν Ἰππίαν ὥσθ' ὑπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς οὐ κατεῖχεν ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ σπασάμενος τὴν μάχαιραν διέφθειρεν αὐτόν.

1 XIX. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβαιεν πολλῷ τραχυτέραν εἶναι τὴν τυραννίδα· καὶ γὰρ διὰ τὸ τιμωρῶν² τῷ ἀδελφῷ [καὶ διὰ τὸ]³ πολλοὺς ἀνηρηκέναι καὶ
 2 ἐκβεβληκέναι πᾶσιν ἦν ἄπιστος καὶ πικρός. ἔτει δὲ τετάρτῳ μάλιστα μετὰ τὸν Ἰππάρχου θάνατον, ἐπεὶ κακῶς εἶχεν τὰ ἐν τῷ ἄστει, τὴν Μουνυχίαν

¹ ἔπεμπον τότε Rutherford: ἐπεμποντο cod.

² Kokalos: τιμωρεῖν cod.

³ Kokalos.

^a A hill above the sea S. of the city, commanding Peiraeus and the two other harbours.

died later, having been taken into custody and tortured for a long time. Under the strain of the tortures he gave the names of a number of men that belonged by birth to families of distinction, and were friends of the tyrants, as confederates. For they were not able immediately to find any trace of the plot, but the current story that Hippias made the people in the procession fall out away from their arms and searched for those that retained their daggers is not true, for in those days they did not walk in the procession armed, but this custom was instituted later by the democracy. According to the account of people of popular sympathies, Aristogeiton accused the tyrants' friends for the purpose of making his captors commit an impiety and weaken themselves at the same time by making away with men who were innocent and their own friends, but others say that his accusations were not fictitious but that he disclosed his actual accomplices. Finally, as do what he would he was unable to die, he offered to give information against many more, and induced Hippias to give him his right hand as a pledge of good faith, and when he grasped it he taunted him with giving his hand to his brother's murderer, and so enraged Hippias that in his anger he could not control himself but drew his dagger and made away with him.

XIX. After this it began to come about that the tyranny was much harsher ; for Hippias's numerous executions and sentences of exile in revenge for his brother led to his being suspicious of everybody and embittered. About four years after Hipparchus's death the state of affairs in the city was so bad that he set about fortifying Munychia,^a with the intention

ἐπεχείρησε τειχίζειν, ὡς ἐκεῖ¹ μεθιδρυσόμενος. ἐν τούτοις δ' ὦν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ Κλεομένουσ τοῦ Λακεδμήμονος βασιλέωσ, χρησμῶν γινομένων αἰεὶ τοῖσ Λάκωσι καταλύειν τὴν τυραννίδα διὰ τοιάνδ' αἰτίαν.

3 οἱ φυγάδες ὦν οἱ Ἄλκμεωνίδαι προειστήκεσαν αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐδύναντο ποιήσασθαι τὴν κάθοδον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ προσέπταιον· ἐν τε γὰρ τοῖσ ἄλλοισ οἷσ ἔπραττον διεσφάλλοντο, καὶ τειχίσαντες ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ Λειψύδριον τὸ ὑπὲρ Πάρνηθος, εἰσ ὁ συνεξῆλθόν τινεσ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεωσ, ἐξεπολιορκήθησαν ὑπὸ τῶν τυράννων, ὅθεν ὕστερον εἰσ² ταύτην τὴν συμφορὰν ἦδον ἐν τοῖσ σκολίοισ³.

αἰαὶ Λειψύδριον προδωσέταιρον,
οἷουσ ἄνδρασ ἀπώλεσασ, μάχεσθαι
ἀγαθούσ τε καὶ εὐπατρίδασ,
οἱ τότε' ἔδειξαν οἷων πατέρων ἔσαν.

4 ἀποτυγχάνοντεσ οὖν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖσ ἄλλοισ ἐμισθώσαντο τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖσ νεῶν οἰκοδομεῖν, ὅθεν ἠϋπόρησαν χρημάτων πρὸσ τὴν τῶν Λακώνων βοήθειαν. ἡ δὲ Πυθία προέφερεν αἰεὶ τοῖσ Λακεδαιμονίοισ χρηστηριαζόμενοισ ἐλευθεροῦν τὰσ Ἀθήνασ, εἰσ τοῦθ' ἔωσ⁴ προὔτρεψε τοὺσ Σπαρτιάτασ, καίπερ ὄντων ξένων αὐτοῖσ τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν· συνεβάλλετο δὲ οὐκ ἐλάττω μοῖραν τῆσ ὄρμησ τοῖσ Λάκωσιν ἢ πρὸσ τοὺσ Ἀργείοσ τοῖσ Πεισιστρατίδαισ ὑπάρχουσα φιλία. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον Ἀγχίμολον ἀπέστειλαν κατὰ θάλατταν ἔχοντα στρατιάν·

¹ ἐκεῖ<σε> Mayor.

² εἰσ Wilamowitz-Kaibel ex *Etym. Mag.*: μετα cod.

³ σκολίοισ edd.: σκολιοισαιει cod.

⁴ τοῦθ' ἔωσ Blass: τουτευθεωσ cod.

of moving his establishment there. While engaged ^{511 B.C.} in this he was driven out by the king of Sparta, Cleomenes, as oracles were constantly being given to the Spartans to put down the tyranny, for the following reason. The exiles headed by the Alcmeon-³idae were not able to effect their return by their own unaided efforts, but were always meeting reverses; for besides the other plans that were complete failures, they built the fort of Leipsydrion^a in the country, on the slopes of Parnes, where some of their friends in the city came out and joined them, but they were besieged and dislodged by the tyrants, owing to which afterwards they used to refer to this disaster in singing their catches :

Faithless Dry Fountain! Lackaday,
 What good men's lives you threw away!
 True patriots and fighters game,
 They showed the stock from which they came!

So as they were failing in everything else, they con-⁴tracted to build the temple at Delphi,^b and so acquired a supply of money for the assistance of the Spartans. And the Pythian priestess constantly uttered a command to the Spartans, when they consulted the oracle, to liberate Athens, until she brought the Spartiates to the point, although the Peisistratidae were strangers to them; and an equally great amount of incitement was contributed to the Spartans by the friendship that subsisted between the Argives and the Peisistratidae. As a first step, therefore, they ⁵dispatched Anchimolus with a force by sea; but he

^a The name suggests 'water-failure.' Parnes is a mountain in N.E. Attica.

^b It had been burnt down in 548 B.C. Apparently they made a profit on the contract, but rebuilt it to the satisfaction of the priestess.

ἡττηθέντος δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τελευτήσαντος διὰ τὸ
 Κινεάν βοηθῆσαι τὸν Θεσσαλὸν ἔχοντα χιλίους
 ἵππεῖς, προσοργισθέντες τῷ γενομένῳ Κλεομένην
 ἐξέπεμψαν τὸν βασιλέα στόλον ἔχοντα μείζω κατὰ
 γῆν, ὃς ἐπεὶ τοὺς τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ἵππεῖς ἐνίκησεν
 κωλύοντας αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν παριέναι, κατα-
 κλείσας τὸν Ἰππιαν εἰς τὸ καλούμενον Πελαργικὸν
 6 τείχος ἐπολιόρκει μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. προσκαθ-
 ῆμένου δ' αὐτοῦ συνέπεσεν ὑπεξιόντας ἀλῶναι τοὺς
 τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν υἱεῖς· ὧν ληφθέντων ὁμο-
 λογίαν ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν παίδων σωτηρίᾳ ποιησάμενοι
 καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἐν πένθ' ἡμέραις ἐκκομισάμενοι
 παρέδωκαν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπὶ
 Ἀρπακτίδου ἀρχontos, κατασχόντες τὴν τυραννίδα
 μετὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τελευτὴν ἔτη μάλιστα ἑπτα-
 καίδεκα, τὰ δὲ σύμπαντα σὺν οἷς ὁ πατὴρ ἤρξεν
 ἐνὸς δεῖν¹ πεντήκοντα.

- 1 XX. Καταλυθείσης δὲ τῆς τυραννίδος ἐστασίαζον
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους Ἰσαγόρας ὁ Τεισάνδρου, φίλος ὧν
 τῶν τυράννων, καὶ Κλεισθένης τοῦ γένους ὧν τῶν
 Ἀλκμεονιδῶν. ἡττημένος² δὲ ταῖς ἐταιρείαις ὁ
 Κλεισθένης προσηγάγετο³ τὸν δῆμον, ἀποδιδούς
 2 τῷ πλήθει τὴν πολιτείαν. ὁ δὲ Ἰσαγόρας ἐπιλειπό-
 μενος τῇ δυνάμει, πάλιν ἐπικαλεσάμενος τὸν Κλεο-
 μένην ὄντα ἑαυτῷ ξένον συνέπεισεν ἐλαύνειν τὸ
 ἄγος, διὰ τὸ τοὺς Ἀλκμεωνίδας δοκεῖν εἶναι τῶν
 3 ἐναγῶν. ὑπεξελθόντος δὲ τοῦ Κλεισθέους, μετ'

¹ Mayor: δεῖ cod.

² ἡττώμενος edd. ex Herod. v. 66.

³ προσήγετο Thalheim.

^a The fortification surrounding the west end of the Acropolis.

was defeated and lost his life, because the Thessalian Cineas came to the defence with a thousand cavalry. Enraged at this occurrence, they dispatched their king Cleomenes by land with a larger army; he won a victory over the Thessalian cavalry who tried to prevent his reaching Attica, and so shut up Hippias in the fortress called the Pelargicum^a and began to lay siege to it with the aid of the Athenians. While he 6 was sitting down against it, it occurred that the sons of the Peisistratidae were caught when trying secretly to get away; and these being taken they came to terms on the condition of the boys' safety, and conveyed away their belongings in five days, surrendering the Acropolis to the Athenians; this was in the archonship of Harpactides, and Peisistratus's sons 511 B.C. had retained the tyranny for about seventeen years after their father's death, making when added to the period of their father's power a total of forty-nine years.

XX. When the tyranny had been put down, there 1 was a period of faction-strife between Isagoras son of Teisander, who was a friend of the tyrants, and Cleisthenes, who belonged to the family of the Alcmaeonidae. Cleisthenes having got the worst of it in the Comradeships^b enlisted the people on his side, offering to hand over the government to the multitude. Isagoras began to lose power, so he again 2 called in the aid of Cleomenes, who was a great friend of his, and jointly persuaded him to drive out the curse,^c because the Alcmaeonidae were reputed to be a family that was under a curse. Cleisthenes 3 secretly withdrew, and Cleomenes with a few troops

^b Political clubs with anti-democratic leanings.

^c Cf. ch. i.

ὀλίγων¹ ἡγηλάτει τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἑπτακοσίας οἰκίας· ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος τὴν μὲν βουλὴν ἐπειρᾶτο καταλύειν Ἰσαγόραν δὲ καὶ τριακοσίου τῶν φίλων μετ' αὐτοῦ κυρίου καθιστάναι τῆς πόλεως. τῆς δὲ βουλῆς ἀντιστάσης καὶ συναθροισθέντος τοῦ πλήθους οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Κλεομένην καὶ Ἰσαγόραν κατέφυγον εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος δύο μὲν ἡμέρας προσκαθεζόμενος ἐπολιόρκει, τῇ δὲ τρίτῃ Κλεομένην μὲν καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ πάντας ἀφείσαν ὑποσπόνδους, Κλεισθένην δὲ καὶ
 4 τοὺς ἄλλους φυγάδας μετεπέμψαντο. κατασχόντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου τὰ πράγματα Κλεισθένης ἡγεμῶν ἦν καὶ τοῦ δήμου προστάτης. αἰτιώτατοι γὰρ σχεδὸν ἐγένοντο τῆς ἐκβολῆς τῶν τυράννων οἱ Ἀλκμεωνίδαι, καὶ² στασιάζοντες τὰ πολλὰ διέτελεσαν.
 5 ἔτι δὲ πρότερον τῶν Ἀλκμεονιδῶν Κήδων ἐπέθετο τοῖς τυράννοις· διὸ καὶ ἦδον καὶ εἰς τοῦτον ἐν τοῖς σκολίοις·

ἔγχει καὶ Κήδωνι, διάκουε, μηδ' ἐπιλήθου,
 εἰ χρὴ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν οἰνοχοεῖν.

1 XXI. Διὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἐπίστευεν ὁ δῆμος τῷ Κλεισθένει. τότε δὲ τοῦ πλήθους προεστηκῶς ἔπει τετάρτῳ μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων
 2 κατάλυσιν ἐπὶ Ἰσαγόρου ἄρχοντος, πρῶτον μὲν συνένειμε³ πάντας εἰς δέκα φυλάς ἀντὶ τῶν τετάρτων, ἀναμεῖξαι βουλόμενος, ὅπως μετάσχωσι πλείους τῆς πολιτείας· ὅθεν ἐλέχθη καὶ τὸ μὴ

¹ <ἀφικόμενος ὁ Κλεομένης> μετ' ὀλίγων Wilamowitz-Kaibel ex Herod. v. 72.

² <οἱ> καὶ Richards.

³ συνένειμε Newman: ουννειμε cod.

proceeded to expel as accursed seven hundred Athenian households ; and having accomplished this he tried to put down the Council and set up Isagoras and three hundred of his friends with him in sovereign power over the state. But the Council resisted, and the multitude banded together, so the forces of Cleomenes and Isagoras took refuge in the Acropolis, and the people invested it and laid siege to it for two days. On the third day they let Cleomenes and his comrades go away under a truce, and sent for Cleisthenes and the other exiles to come back. The 4 people having taken control of affairs, Cleisthenes was their leader and was head of the People. For almost the chief initiative in the expulsion of the tyrants was taken by the Alcmaeonids, and they accomplished most of it by party faction. And even before the 5 Alcmaeonids Cædon had attacked the tyrants, owing to which people also sang in his honour in their catches :

Now fill to Cædon, boy ! let's drink him too,
If duty bids us toast good men and true.

/ XXI. These were the causes, therefore, that led the 1 people to trust in Cleisthenes. And when this time he had become Chief of the multitude, in the fourth 508 B.C. year after the deposition of the tyrants, in the archonship of Isagoras, he first divided the whole body into 2 ten tribes instead of the existing four, wishing to mix them up, in order that more might take part in the government^a ; from which arose the saying, ' Don't draw distinctions between tribes,' addressed

^a Less incompletely stated in *Politics* iii. 275 b 37 ff. Members of the same class might now belong to different tribes ; and a number of new citizens were enrolled (see § 4), free-born aliens and emancipated slaves, who were not members of clans.

- φυλοκρινεῖν, πρὸς τοὺς ἐξετάζειν τὰ γένη βουλο-
 3 μένους. ἔπειτα τὴν βουλὴν πεντακοσίους ἀντὶ
 τετρακοσίων κατέστησεν, πεντήκοντα ἐξ ἑκάστης
 φυλῆς· τότε δ' ἦσαν ἑκατόν. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ
 εἰς δώδεκα φυλὰς συνέταξεν, ὅπως αὐτῷ μὴ συμ-
 βαίῃη μερίζειν κατὰ τὰς προὔπαρχούσας τριττῦς
 (ἦσαν γὰρ ἐκ δ' φυλῶν δώδεκα τριττῦες), ὥστ'
 οὐ συνέπιπτεν ἂν¹ ἀναμίσγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος.
- 4 διένειμε δὲ καὶ τὴν χώραν κατὰ δήμους τριάκοντα
 μέρη, δέκα μὲν τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄστυ, δέκα δὲ τῆς
 παραλίας, δέκα δὲ τῆς μεσογείου· καὶ ταύτας
 ἐπονομάσας τριττῦς ἐκλήρωσεν τρεῖς εἰς τὴν
 φυλὴν ἑκάστην, ὅπως ἑκάστη μετέχη πάντων τῶν
 τόπων. καὶ δημότας ἐποίησεν ἀλλήλων τοὺς οἰκοῦν-
 τας ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν δήμων, ἵνα μὴ πατρόθεν προσ-
 αγορεύοντες ἐξελέγχωσιν τοὺς νεοπολίτας, ἀλλὰ
 τῶν δήμων ἀναγορεύωσιν· ὅθεν καὶ καλοῦσιν
- 5 Ἀθηναῖοι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς τῶν δήμων. κατέστησε
 δὲ καὶ δημάρχους τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντας ἐπιμέλειαν
 τοῖς πρότερον ναυκράροις· καὶ γὰρ τοὺς δήμους
 ἀντὶ τῶν ναυκραριῶν ἐποίησεν. προσηγόρευσε δὲ
 τῶν δήμων τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τόπων, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ
 τῶν κτισάντων, οὐ γὰρ ἅπαντες ὑπῆρχον ἐν² τοῖς
- 6 τόποις. τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ τὰς φρατρίας καὶ τὰς
 ἱερωσύνας εἶασεν ἔχειν ἑκάστους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.

¹ ἂν supplevit Hude.

² ἐν fr. Berol.: in cod. alii ἐν, alii ἐτι legunt.

^a See viii. 3 n.

^b i.e. he made the deme a social group, united by almost a family feeling.

^c Cf., e.g., xxviii. 3 'Callicrates of the Paeonian deme,' and subsequent designations of persons by their demes; up to that point the father's name is used.

to those who want to inquire into people's clans. Next he made the Council to consist of five hundred 3 members instead of four hundred, fifty from each Tribe, whereas under the old system there had been a hundred. This was the reason why he did not arrange them in twelve tribes, in order that he might not have to use the existing division of the Thirds ^a (for the four Tribes contained twelve Thirds), with the result that the multitude would not have been mixed up. He also portioned out the land among the 4 demes into thirty parts, ten belonging to the suburbs, ten to the coast, and ten to the inland district; and he gave these parts the name of Thirds, and assigned them among the Tribes by lot, three to each, in order that each Tribe might have a share in all the districts. And he made all the inhabitants in each of the demes fellow-demesmen of one another, ^b in order that they might not call attention to the newly enfranchised citizens by addressing people by their fathers' names, but designate people officially by their demes; owing to which Athenians in private life also use the names of their demes as surnames. ^c And he also appointed Demarchs, having the same 5 duties as the former Ship-commissioners, ^d for he put the demes in the place of the Ship-commissions. He named some of the demes from their localities, but others from their founders, for the demes were no longer all corresponding to the places. The clans 6 and brotherhoods ^e and priesthoods belonging to the various demes he allowed to remain on the ancestral

^a See viii. 3 n.

^e In *Politics* 1319 b 23 it is said that 'Cleisthenes increased the number of the brotherhoods,' but that no doubt refers to the new citizens.

ταῖς δὲ φυλαῖς ἐποίησεν ἐπωνύμους ἐκ τῶν προ-
κριθέντων ἑκατὸν ἀρχηγετῶν οὓς ἀνείλεν ἢ Πυθία
δέκα.

- 1 XXII. Τούτων δὲ γενομένων δημοτικωτέρα πολὺ
τῆς Σόλωνος ἐγένετο ἢ πολιτεία· καὶ γὰρ συνέβη
τοὺς μὲν Σόλωνος νόμους ἀφανίσαι τὴν τυραννίδα
διὰ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι, καινοὺς δ' ἄλλους θεῖναι τὸν
Κλεισθένη στοχαζόμενον τοῦ πλήθους, ἐν οἷς ἐτέθη
2 καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὄστρακισμοῦ νόμος. πρῶτον μὲν
οὖν ἔτει πέμπτῳ¹ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν κατάστασιν
ἐφ' Ἐρμοκρέοντος ἀρχοντος τῇ βουλῇ τοῖς πεν-
τακοσίοις τὸν ὄρκον ἐποίησαν ὃν ἔτι καὶ νῦν
ὀμνύουσιν. ἔπειτα τοὺς στρατηγούς ἤρουντο κατὰ
φυλάς, ἐξ ἑκάστης φυλῆς ἓνα, τῆς δὲ ἀπάσης
3 στρατιᾶς ἡγεμῶν ἦν ὁ πολέμαρχος. ἔτει δὲ μετὰ
ταῦτα δωδεκάτῳ νικήσαντες τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι
μάχην, ἐπὶ Φαινίππου ἀρχοντος, διαλιπόντες ἔτη
δύο μετὰ τὴν νίκην, θαρροῦντος ἤδη τοῦ δήμου,
τότε πρῶτον ἐχρήσαντο τῷ νόμῳ τῷ περὶ τὸν
ὄστρακισμόν, ὃς ἐτέθη διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν ἐν
ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ὅτι² Πεισίστρατος δημαγωγὸς καὶ
4 στρατηγὸς ὢν τύραννος κατέστη. καὶ πρῶτος
ὄστρακίσθη τῶν ἐκείνου συγγενῶν Ἰππαρχος
Χάρμου Κολλυτεύς, δι' ὃν καὶ μάλιστα τὸν νόμον
ἔθηκεν ὁ Κλεισθένης, ἐξελάσαι βουλόμενος αὐτόν.
οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς τῶν τυράννων φίλους, ὅσοι
μὴ συνεχξαμαρτάνοιεν³ ἐν ταῖς ταραχαῖς, εἴων οἰ-
κεῖν τὴν πόλιν, χρώμενοι τῇ εἰωθυῖα τοῦ δήμου

¹ πέμπτῳ (= ε') cod.: ὀγδόῳ (= η')? Kenyon.

² Kenyon: οτε cod.

³ Poste: συνεχξαμαρτανον cod.

plan. As eponymous deities of the Tribes he instituted ten tutelary heroes selected by an oracle of the Pythian priestess from a previously chosen list of a hundred.

XXII. These reforms made the constitution much 1 more democratic than that of Solon ; for it had come about that the tyranny had obliterated the laws of Solon by disuse, and Cleisthenes aiming at the 2 multitude had instituted other new ones, including the enactment of the law about ostracism. First of 2 all, in the fifth year^a after these enactments, in the archonship of Hermocreon, they instituted the oath of induction for the Council of Five Hundred that is still in use. Next they began to elect the Generals by tribes, one from each tribe, while the whole 3 army was under the command of the War-lord. Eleven years afterwards came their victory in the 3 battle of Marathon ; and in the archonship of Phaen- 490 B.C. ippus, two years after the victory, the people being 488 B.C. now in high courage, they put in force for the first time the law about ostracism, which had been enacted owing to the suspicion felt against the men in the positions of power because Peisistratus when leader of the people and general set himself up as tyrant. The first person banished by ostracism was one of his 4 relatives, Hipparchus son of Charmus of the deme of Collytus, the desire to banish whom had been Cleisthenes' principal motive in making the law. For the Athenians permitted all friends of the tyrants that had not taken part with them in their offences during the disorders to dwell in the city,—in this the customary mildness of the people was displayed ; and

^a *i.e.* in 504 B.C. ; but if Marathon (490 B.C.) was eleven years later (§ 3), perhaps the Greek should be altered here to give 'in the eighth year after.'

πραότητι· ὧν ἡγεμῶν καὶ προστάτης ἦν Ἰππαρχος.
 5 εὐθύς δὲ τῷ ὑστέρω ἔτει ἐπὶ Τελεσίνου ἄρχοντος
 ἐκνάμευσαν τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας κατὰ φυλὰς ἐκ
 * τῶν προκριθέντων ὑπὸ τῶν δημοτῶν¹ πεντακοσίων
 τότε² μετὰ τὴν τυραννίδα πρῶτον· οἱ δὲ πρότεροι
 πάντες ἦσαν αἰρετοί. καὶ ὠστρακίσθη Μεγακλῆς
 6 Ἰπποκράτους Ἀλωπεκῆθεν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ἔτη γ'
 τοὺς τῶν τυράννων φίλους ὠστράκιζον, ὧν χάριν
 ὁ νόμος ἐτέθη, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τις δοκοίη μείζων εἶναι μεθίστατο·
 καὶ πρῶτος ὠστρακίσθη τῶν ἄπωθεν τῆς τυραν-
 7 νίδος Ξάνθιππος ὁ Ἀρίφρονος. ἔτει δὲ τρίτῳ
 μετὰ ταῦτα Νικομήδου³ ἄρχοντος, ὡς ἐφάνη⁴ τὰ
 μέταλλα τὰ ἐν Μαρωνείᾳ καὶ περιεγένετο τῇ
 πόλει τάλαντα ἑκατὸν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, συμβουλευ-
 όντων τινῶν τῷ δήμῳ διανείμασθαι τὸ ἀργύριον
 Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐκώλυσεν, οὐ λέγων ὅ τι χρήσεται
 τοῖς χρήμασιν, ἀλλὰ δανείσαι κελεύων τοῖς πλου-
 σιωτάτοις Ἀθηναίων ἑκατὸν ἐκάστῳ τάλαντον,
 εἴτ' ἐὰν μὲν ἀρέσκη τὸ ἀνάλωμα, τῆς πόλεως
 εἶναι,⁵ εἰ δὲ μή, κομίσασθαι τὰ χρήματα παρὰ
 τῶν δανεισαμένων. λαβὼν δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐναυ-
 πηγήσατο τριήρεις ἑκατόν, ἐκάστου ναυπηγου-
 μένου τῶν ἑκατὸν μίαν, αἷς ἐναυμάχησαν ἐν
 Σαλαμῖνι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους. ὠστρακίσθη δ'
 ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καιροῖς Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου.

¹ δῆμων fr. Berol.

² τότε Whibley: τοῖς cod.

³ Νικοδημου fr. Berol.

⁴ <λυσιτελέστερα> ἐφάνη Richards coll. Xen. Red. 4. 31.

⁵ post εἶναι, in cod. alia manus τηρδαπανην supra lineam scripsit.

Hipparchus was the leader and chief of these persons. But directly afterwards, in the next year, in the 5 archonship of Telesinus, they elected the Nine ^{487 B.C.} Archons by lot, tribe by tribe, from a preliminary list of five hundred chosen by the demesmen: this was the date of the first election on these lines, after the tyranny, the previous Archons having all been elected by vote. And Megacles son of Hippocrates of the deme Alopekē was ostracized. For three years 6 they went on ostracizing the friends of the tyrants, at whom the legislation had been aimed, but afterwards in the fourth year it was also used to remove any other person who seemed to be too great; the first person unconnected with the tyranny to be ostracized was Xanthippus son of Aripbron. Two 7 years later, in the archonship of Nicomedes, in con- ^{483 B.C.} sequence of the discovery of the mines at Maronea,^a the working of which had given the state a profit of a hundred talents, the advice was given by some persons that the money should be distributed among the people; but Themistocles prevented this, not saying what use he would make of the money, but recommending that it should be lent to the hundred richest Athenians, each receiving a talent, so that if they should spend it in a satisfactory manner, the state would have the advantage, but if they did not, the state should call in the money from the borrowers. On these terms the money was put at his disposal, and he used it to get a fleet of a hundred triremes built, each of the hundred borrowers having one ship built, and with these they fought the naval battle at Salamis against the barbarians. And it was during this period that Aristides son of Lysimachus was

^a Possibly five miles north of Cape Sunium.

8 τετάρτῳ¹ δ' ἔτει κατεδέξαντο πάντας τοὺς ὠστρακισμένους ἄρχοντος Ὑψηλίδου, διὰ τὴν Ξέρξου στρατείαν· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὤρισαν τοῖς ὠστρακιζομένοις ἐντὸς Γεραιστοῦ καὶ Σκυλλαίου (μῆ²) κατοικεῖν ἢ ἀτίμους εἶναι καθάπαξ.

- 1 XXIII. Τότε μὲν οὖν μέχρι τούτου προῆλθεν ἡ πόλις, ἅμα τῇ δημοκρατία κατὰ μικρὸν αὐξανόμενη· μετὰ δὲ τὰ Μηδικὰ πάλιν ἴσχυσεν ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ καὶ διώκει τὴν πόλιν, οὐδενὶ δόγματι λαβοῦσα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα ναυμαχίας αἰτία. τῶν γὰρ στρατηγῶν ἐξαπορησάντων τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ κηρυξάντων σώζειν ἕκαστον ἑαυτόν, πορίσασα δραχμὰς ἐκάστῳ ὀκτῶ διέδωκε καὶ
- 2 ἐνεβίβασεν εἰς τὰς ναῦς. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν παρεχώρουσιν αὐτῆς³ τῷ ἀξιώματι καὶ ἐπολιτεύθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι καλῶς κατὰ⁴ τούτους τοὺς καιροὺς· συνέβη γὰρ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον τά τε εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀσκῆσαι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν εὐδοκιμῆσαι καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλαττης ἡγεμονίαν λαβεῖν ἀκόντων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.
- 3 ἦσαν δὲ προστάται τοῦ δήμου κατὰ τούτους τοὺς καιροὺς Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς ὁ Νεοκλέους, ὁ μὲν τὰ πολέμια ἀσκῶν⁵ ὁ δὲ τὰ πολιτικὰ δεινὸς εἶναι καὶ δικαιοσύνη τῶν

¹ τρίτῳ Wilamowitz-Kaibel collato Plut. *Aristid.* 8.

² μῆ supplevit Kaibel (ἐκτὸς pro ἐντὸς Wyse).

³ Blass: αὐτην cod.

⁴ κατὰ (vel καὶ <μετρίως> κατὰ?) Kenyon: καικατα cod.

⁵ δοκῶν Richards: δοκῶν ἀσκεῖν Kenyon.

ostracized. Three years later in the archonship of 8 Hypsechides they allowed all the persons ostracized to return, because of the expedition of Xerxes; and they fixed a boundary thenceforward for persons ostracized, prohibiting them from living^a within a line drawn from Geraestus^b to Scyllacum^c under penalty of absolute loss of citizenship. 480 B.C.

XXIII. At this date, therefore, the state had 1 advanced to this point, growing by slow stages with the growth of the democracy; but after the Persian Wars the Council on the Areopagus became powerful again, and carried on the administration, having gained the leadership by no definite resolution but owing to its having been the cause of the naval battle of Salamis. For the Generals had been reduced to utter despair by the situation and had made a proclamation that every man should see to his own safety; but the Council provided a fund and distributed eight drachmas a head and got them to man the ships. For this reason, therefore, the Generals gave 2 place to the Council in esteem. And Athens was well governed in these periods; for during this time it occurred that the people practised military duties and won high esteem among the Greeks and gained the supremacy of the sea against the will of the Lacedaemonians. The heads of the People^d in these periods 3 were Aristeides son of Lysimachus and Themistocles son of Neocles, the latter practising to be skilful in military pursuits, and the former in politics,^e and to excel

^a The ms. gives 'enacting that they must live.'

^b The S. point of Euboea.

^c The S.E. point of Argolis.

^d See ii. 3 n.

^e The Greek should perhaps be altered to give 'the latter practising military pursuits, and the former esteemed to be skilful in politics.'

καθ' ἑαυτὸν διαφέρειν· διὸ καὶ ἐχρῶντο τῷ μὲν
 4 στρατηγῷ τῷ δὲ συμβούλῳ. τὴν μὲν οὖν τῶν
 τειχῶν ἀνοικοδόμησιν κοινῇ διώκησαν, καίπερ δια-
 φερόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπόστασιν
 τὴν τῶν Ἰώνων ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων συμ-
 μαχίας¹ Ἀριστείδης ἦν ὁ προτρέψας, τηρήσας τοὺς
 5 Λάκωνας διαβεβλημένους διὰ Πausανίαν. διὸ καὶ
 τοὺς φόρους οὗτος ἦν ὁ τάξας ταῖς πόλεσιν τοὺς
 πρῶτους ἔτει τρίτῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυ-
 μαχίαν ἐπὶ Τιμοσθένους ἄρχοντος, καὶ τοὺς ὄρκους
 ὤμοσε τοῖς Ἴωσι ὥστε τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν εἶναι καὶ
 φίλον, ἐφ' οἷς καὶ τοὺς μύδρους ἐν τῷ πελάγει
 καθεῖσαν.

1 XXIV. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θαρρούσης ἤδη τῆς
 πόλεως καὶ χρημάτων ἠθροισμένων πολλῶν, συν-
 εβούλευεν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ κατα-
 βάντας ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ ἄστει· τροφήν
 γὰρ ἔσεσθαι πᾶσι, τοῖς μὲν στρατευομένοις τοῖς δὲ
 φρουροῦσι τοῖς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι, εἴθ' οὕτω
 2 κατασχῆσειν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. πεισθέντες δὲ ταῦτα
 καὶ λαβόντες τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῖς² συμμάχοις δε-
 σποτικωτέρως ἐχρῶντο πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων
 καὶ Σαμίων· τούτους δὲ φύλακας εἶχον τῆς ἀρχῆς,
 ἐῶντες τὰς τε πολιτείας παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄρχειν
 3 ὧν ἔτυχον ἄρχοντες. κατέστησαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς
 πολλοῖς εὐπορίαν τροφῆς, ὥσπερ Ἀριστείδης

¹ καιτητητωνλακεδαιμονιωνσυμμαχίαν cod., corr. Blass.

² τοῖς Blass: τοῖστε cod.

^a The city fortifications were rebuilt, the harbour of Peiraeus completed and the Long Walls built to link Peiraeus and Phalerum with the city.

^b The parties swore to keep the covenant until the iron

his contemporaries in justice ; hence the Athenians employed the one as general and the other as counsellor. So the rebuilding of the walls^a was directed 4 by both these statesmen jointly, although they were at variance with one another ; (but the secession of the Ionian states from the Lacedaemonian alliance was promoted by Aristeides,) who seized the opportunity when the Lacedaemonians were discredited because of Pausanias. Hence it was Aristeides who 5 assessed the tributes of the allied states on the first occasion, two years after the naval battle of Salamis, 478 B.C. in the archonship of Timosthenes, and who administered the oaths to the Ionians when they swore to have the same enemies and friends, ratifying their oaths by letting the lumps of iron sink to the bottom out at sea.^b

XXIV. Afterwards, (now that the state was emboldened) and (much money had been collected,) he began to advise them to aim at the leadership, and to come down from their farms and live in the city, telling them that there would be food for all, some serving in the army and others as frontier-guards and others conducting the business of the community, and then by this method they would keep the leadership. (Having taken this advice and won the empire, 2 they treated the allies too masterfully, except Chios, Lesbos and Samos, which they kept as outposts of empire, and allowed to have their own governments, and to rule the subjects that they had at the time.) They also established a plentiful food-supply for the 3 multitude, as Aristeides had proposed ; for the com-

appeared again on the surface, πρὶν ἢ τὸν μύθρον τοῦτον ἀναφῆναι Hdt. i. 165, and Hor. *Epodes* 16. 25—

sed iuremus in haec : ' simul imis saxa renarint
vadis leuata, ne redire sit nefas.'

εἰσηγήσατο· συνέβαινε γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν φόρων καὶ τῶν τελῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πλείους ἢ δισμυρίους ἄνδρας τρέφεσθαι. δικασταὶ μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν ἑξακισχίλιοι, τοξόται δ' ἑξακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἰππεῖς χίλιοι καὶ διακόσιοι, βουλὴ δὲ πεντακόσιοι, καὶ φρουροὶ νεωρίων πεντακόσιοι καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐν τῇ πόλει φρουροὶ ν', ἀρχαὶ δ' ἔνδημοι μὲν εἰς ἑπτακοσίους ἄνδρας ὑπερόριοι δ' εἰς ἑπτακοσίους¹. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπεὶ συνεστήσαντο² τὸν πόλεμον ὕστερον, ὀπλίται μὲν δισχίλιοι καὶ πεντακόσιοι, νῆες δὲ φρουρίδες εἴκοσι, ἄλλαι δὲ νῆες αἰ τοὺς φρούρους³ ἄγουσαι τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου δισχιλίους ἄνδρας· ἔτι δὲ πρυτανεῖον καὶ ὄρφανοὶ καὶ δεσμωτῶν φύλακες· ἅπανσι γὰρ τούτοις ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἢ διοίκησις ἦν.

- 1 XXV. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τροφὴ τῷ δήμῳ διὰ τούτων ἐγένετο. ἔτη δὲ ἑπτακαίδέκα μάλιστα μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ διέμεινε ἡ πολιτεία προεστώτων τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν, καίπερ ὑποφερομένη κατὰ μικρὸν. αὐξανομένου δὲ τοῦ πλήθους γενόμενος τοῦ δήμου προστάτης Ἐφιάλτης ὁ Σωφωνίδου καὶ δοκῶν⁴ ἀδωροδόκητος εἶναι καὶ δίκαιος πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐπέθετο τῇ βουλῇ. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀνείλεν πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν ἀγῶνας ἐπιφέρων περὶ τῶν διωκημένων· ἔπειτα τῆς βουλῆς ἐπὶ Κόνωνος ἄρχοντος ἅπαντα περιεῖλε⁵ τὰ ἐπίθετα δι' ὧν ἦν ἡ τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή, καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῖς πεντα-

¹ numerum e priore versu male repetitum notant Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

² συνέστησαν τὰ <eis>? ed.: συνεστήσαντο τὰ eis Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

³ Blass, cf. lxii. 1: φοροῖς cod.

⁴ δοκῶν καὶ Kaibel.

⁵ περιεῖλετο Richards.

bined proceeds of the tributes and the taxes and the allies served to feed more than twenty thousand men. For there were six thousand jurymen, one thousand six hundred archers and also one thousand two hundred cavalry, five hundred members of the Council, five hundred guardians of the docks, and also fifty watchmen in the city, as many as seven hundred officials at home and as many as seven hundred ^a abroad; and in addition to these, when later they settled into the war, two thousand five hundred hoplites, twenty guard-ships and other ships conveying the guards to the number of two hundred elected by lot; and furthermore the prytaneum,^b orphans, and warders of prisoners—for all of these had their maintenance from public funds.

XXV. By these means the people were provided ¹ with their food-supply. The constitution remained under the leadership of the Areopagites for about seventeen years after the Persian War, although it was being gradually modified. But as the population increased, Ephialtes son of Sophonides, having become head of the People ^c and having the reputation of being incorruptible and just in regard to the constitution, attacked the Council. First he made away with ² many of the Areopagites by bringing legal proceedings against them about their acts of administration; then in the archonship of Conon he stripped the ³ Council of all its added powers which made it the safeguard of the constitution, and assigned some of

^a The number is probably repeated from the previous line by mistake; otherwise 'also' would be added.

^b The town-hall, probably in the old Agora, south of the Acropolis; in it a fire was kept continually burning, and the Prytaneis dined.

^c See ii. 3 n.

κοσίους τὰ δὲ τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις
 3 ἀπέδωκεν. ἔπραξε δὲ ταῦτα συναιτίου γενομένου
 Θεμιστοκλέους, ὃς ἦν μὲν τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν
 ἔμελλε δὲ κρίνεσθαι μηδισμού. βουλόμενος δὲ
 καταλυθῆναι τὴν βουλήν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς πρὸς μὲν
 τὸν Ἐφιάλτην ἔλεγεν ὅτι συναρπάζειν αὐτὸν ἢ
 βουλή μέλλει, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Ἀρεοπαγίτας ὅτι
 δείξει τινὰς συνισταμένους ἐπὶ καταλύσει τῆς
 πολιτείας. ἀγαγὼν δὲ τοὺς αἰρεθέντας¹ τῆς βουλῆς
 οὗ διέτριβεν ὁ Ἐφιάλτης ἵνα δείξῃ τοὺς ἀθροί-
 4 ζομένους, διελέγετο μετὰ σπουδῆς αὐτοῖς. ὁ δ'
 Ἐφιάλτης ὡς εἶδεν καταπλαγεῖς καθίζει μονο-
 χίτων ἐπὶ τὸν βωμόν. θαυμασάντων δὲ πάντων
 τὸ γεγονός καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα συναθροισθείσης τῆς
 βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων κατηγόρου τῶν Ἀρεο-
 παγιτῶν ὁ τ' Ἐφιάλτης καὶ ὁ² Θεμιστοκλῆς,
 καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως
 περιείλοντο αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ³ ἀνηρέθη δὲ
 καὶ ὁ Ἐφιάλτης δολοφονηθεὶς μετ' οὐ πολὺν
 χρόνον δι' Ἀριστοδίκου τοῦ Ταναγραίου.

1 XXVI. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλή τοῦ-
 του τὸν τρόπον ἀπεστερήθη τῆς ἐπιμελείας. μετὰ
 δὲ ταῦτα συνέβαιεν ἀνίεσθαι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν
 διὰ τοὺς προθύμως δημαγωγοῦντας. κατὰ γὰρ
 τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους συνέπεσε μηδ' ἡγεμόνα ἔχειν
 τοὺς ἐπιεικεστέρους, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν προεστάναι
 Κίμωνα τὸν Μιλτιάδου νεώτερον⁴ ὄντα καὶ πρὸς

¹ Kenyon: αφαιρεθεντας cod.

² ὁ suppletum a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

³ [καί] Mayor: καὶ <ὁ μὲν Θεμιστοκλῆς . . . > Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

⁴ νεωθρόν Blass: νεωθρότερον Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

them to the Five Hundred and others to the People and to the jury-courts. For these acts of Ephialtes,³ Themistocles^a was partly responsible; he was a member of the Areopagus, but was destined to be put on trial for treasonable dealings with Persia. Themistocles desiring the Council to be destroyed used to tell Ephialtes that the Council was going to arrest him, while he told the Areopagites that he would give information about certain persons who were conspiring to destroy the constitution. And he used to take selected members of the Council to the place where Ephialtes resided to show them the people collecting there, and conversed with them seriously. Ephialtes was dismayed when he saw⁴ this, and took his seat at the altar in only his shirt. Everybody was amazed at what had happened, and afterwards when the Council of Five Hundred assembled Ephialtes and Themistocles kept on denouncing the Areopagites, and again similarly at the meetings of the people, until they deprived them of their power. And also Ephialtes was actually made away with not long after, being craftily murdered by Aristodicus of Tanagra.

XXVI. In this way the Council of the Areopagites¹ was deprived of the superintendence of affairs. After this there came about an increased relaxation of the constitution, due to the eagerness of those who were the leaders of the People. For it so happened that during these periods the better classes^b had no leader at all, but the chief person among them, Cimon son of Miltiades, was a rather young man who had only

^a In *Politics* II. xii. the place assigned here to Themistocles is taken by Pericles.

^b Or 'more respectable': it is a vague term of social approval, cf. § 1 fin, xxvii. 4, xxviii. 1, xxxvi. 9.

τὴν πόλιν ὄψε προσελθόντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐφθάρθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς κατὰ πόλεμον· τῆς γὰρ στρατείας γινομένης ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις ἐκ καταλόγου καὶ στρατηγῶν ἐφισταμένων ἀπείρων μὲν τοῦ πολεμεῖν τιμωμένων δὲ διὰ τὰς πατρικὰς δόξας, αἰεὶ συνέβαινε τῶν ἐξιόντων ἀνὰ δισχιλίους ἢ τρισχιλίους ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὥστε ἀναλίσκεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων.

2 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντα διώκουσιν οὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ πρότερον τοῖς νόμοις προσέχοντες, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων αἴρεσιν οὐκ ἐκίνουν ἄλλ' ἢ¹ ἔκτω ἔτει μετὰ τὸν Ἐφιάλτου θάνατον ἔγνωσαν καὶ ἐκ ζευγῶν προκρίνεσθαι τοὺς κληρωσομένους τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων· καὶ πρῶτος ἦρξεν ἐξ αὐτῶν Μνησιθεΐδης. οἱ δὲ πρὸ τούτου πάντες ἐξ ἰππέων καὶ πεντακοσιομεδίμων ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ² ζευγῆται τὰς ἐγκυκλίους ἦρχον, εἰ μὴ τι παρ-
3 εωρᾶτο τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. ἔτει δὲ πέμπτῳ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπὶ Λυσικράτους ἄρχοντος οἱ τριάκοντα δικασταὶ κατέστησαν πάλιν οἱ καλούμενοι κατὰ δήμους· καὶ τρίτῳ μετὰ τούτου ἐπὶ Ἀντιδότου διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν Περικλέους εἰπόντος ἔγνωσαν μὴ μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως ὅς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστοῖν ἢ γεγονῶς.

1 XXVII. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸ δημαγωγεῖν ἐλθόντος Περικλέους καὶ πρῶτον³ εὐδοκιμήσαντος ὅτε κατηγόρησε τὰς εὐθύνας Κίμωνος στρατηγούντος νέος ὢν, δημοτικωτέραν ἔτι συνέβη

¹ ἢ supplevit Blass.

² δὲ supplevit Kenyon.

³ πρῶτον Blass: πωτου cod.: πρὸ τοῦ Jackson.

lately entered public life ; and in addition, that the multitude had suffered seriously in war, for in those days the expeditionary force was raised from a muster-roll, and was commanded by generals with no experience of war but promoted on account of their family reputations, so that it was always happening that the troops on an expedition suffered as many as two or three thousand casualties, making a drain on the numbers of the respectable members both of the people and of the wealthy. Thus in general all ² the administration was conducted without the same attention to the laws as had been given before, although no innovation was made in the election of the Nine Archons, except that five years after the death of Ephialtes they decided to extend to the Teamster class eligibility to the preliminary roll from which the Nine Archons were to be selected by lot ; and the first of the Teamster class to hold the archonship was Mnesitheides. (All the Archons ^{457 B.C.} hitherto had been from the Knights and Five-hundred-measure-men) while the Teamsters held the ordinary offices, unless some provision of the laws was ignored. Four years afterwards, in the archonship of Lysicrates, ³ the thirty judges called the Local Justices were in- ^{453 B.C.} stituted again ^a ; and two years after Lysicrates, in ^{451 B.C.} the year of Antidotus, owing to the large number of the citizens an enactment was passed on the proposal of Pericles confining citizenship to persons of citizen birth on both sides.

XXVII. After this when Pericles advanced to the ¹ leadership of the people, having first distinguished ^{463 B.C.} himself when while still a young man he challenged the audits of Cimon who was a general, it came about that the constitution became still more democratic.

γενέσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ γὰρ τῶν Ἀρεο-
 παγιτῶν ἕνια παρείλετο, καὶ μάλιστα προὔτρεψεν
 τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν δύναμιν, ἐξ ἧς συνέβη
 θαρρήσαντας τοὺς πολλοὺς ἅπασαν τὴν πολιτείαν
 2 μᾶλλον ἄγειν εἰς αὐτούς. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι
 ναυμαχίαν ἐνὸς δεῖ πεντηκοστῷ ἔτει ἐπὶ Πυθο-
 δώρου ἄρχοντος ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίου ἐνέστη
 πόλεμος, ἐν ᾧ κατακλεισθεῖς ὁ δῆμος ἐν τῷ ἄστει
 καὶ συνεθισθεῖς ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις μισθοφορεῖν, τὰ
 μὲν ἐκὼν τὰ δὲ ἄκων προηρείτο¹ τὴν πολιτείαν
 διοικεῖν αὐτός. ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ μισθοφόρα τὰ
 δικαστήρια Περικλῆς πρῶτος, ἀντιδημαγωγῶν
 3 πρὸς τὴν Κίμωνος εὐπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ Κίμων ἄτε
 τυραννικὴν ἔχων οὐσίαν πρῶτον μὲν τὰς κοινὰς
 λητουργίας ἐλητούργει λαμπρῶς, ἔπειτα τῶν
 δημοτῶν ἔτρεφε πολλοὺς· ἐξῆν γὰρ τῷ βουλομένῳ
 Λακιάδων καθ' ἐκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐλθόντι παρ'
 αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὰ μέτρια, ἔτι δὲ τὰ χωρία πάντα
 ἄφρακτα ἦν, ὅπως ἐξῆ² τῷ βουλομένῳ τῆς ὀψώρας
 4 ἀπολαύειν. πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὴν χορηγίαν ἐπι-
 λειπόμενος ὁ Περικλῆς τῇ οὐσίᾳ, συμβουλεύσαντος
 αὐτῷ Δαμωνίδου τοῦ Οἴηθεν (ὃς ἐδόκει τῶν πολλῶν
 εἰσηγητῆς εἶναι τῷ Περικλεῖ, διὸ καὶ ὠστράκισαν
 αὐτὸν ὕστερον) ἐπεὶ τοῖς ἰδίῳις ἠττάτο διδόναι τοῖς
 πολλοῖς τὰ αὐτῶν, κατεσκεύασε μισθοφορὰν τοῖς
 δικαστηρίοις³. ἀφ' ὧν αἰτιῶνται τινες χεῖρ⁴
 5 τυχόντων ἢ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἤρξατο δὲ

¹ προήγετο Richards.

² ἐξῆ Kenyon: ἐξην cod.

³ Blass: δικασταῖς cod.

⁴ χείρους Wilamowitz-Kaibel (servato δικασταῖς).

For he took away some of the functions of the Areopagus, and he urged the state very strongly in the direction of naval power, which resulted in emboldening the multitude,^a who brought all the government more into their own hands. Forty-eight years after the naval battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Pythodorus, the war against the Peloponnesians broke out, during which the people being locked up in the city, and becoming accustomed to earning pay on their military campaigns, came partly of their own will and partly against their will to the decision to administer the government themselves. Also Pericles first made service in the jury-courts a paid office, as a popular counter-measure against Cimon's wealth. For as Cimon had an estate large enough for a tyrant, in the first place he discharged the general public services in a brilliant manner, and moreover he supplied maintenance to a number of the members of his deme; for anyone of the Laciadae who liked could come to his house every day and have a moderate supply, and also all his farms were unfenced, to enable anyone who liked to avail himself of the harvest. So as Pericles' means were insufficient for this lavishness, he took the advice of Damonides of Oea (who was believed to suggest to Pericles most of his measures, owing to which they afterwards ostracized him), since he was getting the worst of it with his private resources, to give the multitude what was their own, and he instituted payment for the jury-courts; the result of which according to some critics was their deterioration, because ordinary persons always took more care than the respectable to cast lots for the duty. Also it was after this that the organized

^a Cf. xxii. 7, xxiv. 1.

ARISTOTLE

μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ δεκάζειν, πρώτου καταδεί-
ξαντος Ἀνύτου μετὰ τὴν ἐν Πύλῳ στρατηγίαν·
κρινόμενος γὰρ ὑπὸ τινων διὰ τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν Πύλον,
δεκάσας τὸ δικαστήριον ἀπέφυγεν.

- 1 XXVIII. Ἔως μὲν οὖν Περικλῆς προειστήκει
τοῦ δήμου βελτίω τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν ἦν,
τελευτήσαντος δὲ Περικλέους πολὺ χείρω. πρῶτον
γὰρ τότε προστάτην ἔλαβεν ὁ δῆμος οὐκ εὐδοκι-
μοῦντα παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρότερον
χρόνοις αἰεὶ διετέλουν οἱ¹ ἐπιεικεῖς δημαγωγοῦντες.
- 2 Ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρῶτος ἐγένετο προστάτης
τοῦ δήμου Σόλων, δεύτερος δὲ Πεισίστρατος,
τῶν εὐγενῶν καὶ γνωρίμων· καταλυθείσης δὲ
τῆς τυραννίδος Κλεισθένης τοῦ γένους ὦν τῶν
Ἀλκμεονιδῶν, καὶ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδεὶς ἦν ἀντι-
στασιώτης ὡς ἐξέπεσον οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἰσαγόραν·
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ μὲν δήμου προειστήκει Ξάνθ-
ιππος, τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων Μιλτιάδης· ἔπειτα
Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Ἀριστείδης· μετὰ δὲ τούτους
Ἐφιάλης μὲν τοῦ δήμου, Κίμων δ' ὁ Μιλτιάδου
τῶν εὐπόρων· εἶτα Περικλῆς μὲν τοῦ δήμου,
Θουκυδίδης δὲ τῶν ἐτέρων, κηδεστῆς ὦν Κίμωνος.
- 3 Περικλέους δὲ τελευτήσαντος τῶν μὲν ἐπιφανῶν
προειστήκει Νικίας ὁ ἐν Σικελίᾳ τελευτήσας, τοῦ
δὲ δήμου Κλέων ὁ Κλεινέτου, ὃς δοκεῖ μάλιστα
διαφθεῖραι τὸν δῆμον ταῖς ὀρμαῖς,² καὶ πρῶτος
ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος ἀνέκραγε καὶ ἐλοιδορήσατο καὶ
περιζωσάμενος ἐδημηγόρησε, τῶν ἄλλων ἐν κόσμῳ

¹ [οἱ] Richards.

² διανομαῖς Sandys: νομαῖς Thalheim.

^a Pylos (Navarino) on the W. coast of Peloponnesus, had been taken by Athens 425 B.C., but was retaken by Sparta

bribery of juries began, Anytus having first shown the way to it after his command at Pylos^a; for when he was brought to trial by certain persons for having lost Pylos he bribed the court and got off.

XXVIII. So long, then, as Pericles held the headship^b of the People, the affairs of the state went better, but when Pericles was dead they became much worse. For the People now for the first time adopted a head who was not in good repute with the respectable classes, whereas in former periods those always continued to lead the people. For Solon² was the first and original head of the People, and the second was Peisistratus, who was one of the men of nobility and note. After the tyranny had been put down, Cleisthenes, a member of the family of the Alcmaeonidae, was head of the People, and he had no opponent, since the party of Isagoras was banished; but after this Xanthippus held the headship of the People, and Miltiades of the notables; and then Themistocles and Aristides; and after them Ephialtes held the headship of the People, and Cimon son of Miltiades of the wealthy; and then Pericles of the People and Thucydides of the others, he being a relation of Cimon. When Pericles died, Nicias, who³ died in Sicily, held the headship of the men of distinction, and the head of the People was Cleon son of Cleaenetus, who is thought to have done the most to corrupt the people by his impetuous outbursts, and was the first person to use bawling and abuse on the platform, and to gird up his cloak before making a public speech, all other persons speaking in orderly

409 B.C. Anytus (see also xxxiv. 3, one of the prosecutors of Socrates) was sent with 30 triremes to its relief, but owing to weather never got round Cape Malea.

^b See note on ii. 3.

λεγόντων. εἶτα μετὰ τούτους τῶν μὲν ἐτέρων
 Θηραμένης ὁ Ἄγνωτος, τοῦ δὲ δήμου Κλεοφῶν ὁ
 λυροποιός, ὃς καὶ τὴν διωβολίαν¹ ἐπόρισε πρῶτος·
 καὶ χρόνον μὲν τινα διεδίδου,² μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
 κατέλυσε Καλλικράτης Παιανιεὺς πρῶτος ὑπο-
 σχόμενος ἐπιθήσειν πρὸς τοῖν δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν ἄλλον
 ὀβολόν. τούτων μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρων θάνατον κατ-
 ἐγνωσαν ὕστερον· εἴωθεν γὰρ κἂν ἐξαπατηθῆ τὸ
 πλῆθος ὕστερον μισεῖν τοὺς τι προαγαγόντας ποιεῖν
 4 αὐτοὺς τῶν μὴ καλῶς ἐχόντων. ἀπὸ δὲ Κλεο-
 φῶντος ἤδη διεδέχοντο συνεχῶς τὴν δημαγωγίαν
 οἱ μάλιστα βουλόμενοι θρασύνεσθαι καὶ χαρί-
 ζεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς τὸ παραυτίκα βλέποντες.
 5 δοκοῦσι δὲ³ βέλτιστοι γεγονέναι τῶν Ἀθήνησι
 πολιτευσασμένων μετὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους Νικίας καὶ
 Θουκυδίδης καὶ Θηραμένης. καὶ περὶ μὲν Νικίου
 καὶ Θουκυδίδου πάντες σχεδὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἄνδρας
 γεγονέναι οὐ μόνον καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ
 πολιτικοὺς καὶ τῇ πόλει πάσῃ πατρικῶς χρω-
 μένους, περὶ δὲ Θηραμένους διὰ τὸ συμβῆναι κατ'
 αὐτὸν ταραχώδεις τὰς πολιτείας εἶναι⁴ ἀμφισ-
 βήτησις τῆς κρίσεώς ἐστι. δοκεῖ μὲντοι⁵ τοῖς
 μὴ παρέργως ἀποφαινομένοις οὐχ ὥσπερ αὐτὸν
 διαβάλλουσι πάσας τὰς πολιτείας καταλύειν, ἀλλὰ
 πάσας προάγειν ἕως μηδὲν παρανομοῖεν, ὡς δυνά-
 μενος πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ πάσας, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν
 πολίτου ἔργον, παρανομούσαις δὲ οὐ συγχωρῶν
 ἀλλ' ἀπεχθανόμενος.

¹ διωβελίαν edd.² διεδίδοδο Wyse.³ δέ: δοι (= δ' οἱ) cod., ε superscripto.⁴ εἶναι supplevit Richards.⁵ μὲντοι Kenyon: μεν cod.^a By instituting the 'theatre-fund' (τὸ θεωρικόν), which was

fashion. Then after these Theramenes son of Hagnon was chief of the others and Cleophon the lyre-maker of the People, who first introduced the two-obol dole^a; he went on distributing this for a time, but afterwards Callicrates of the Paeonian deme abolished it, being the first person to promise to add to the two obols another obol. Both of these two leaders were afterwards condemned to death; for even though the multitude may be utterly deceived, subsequently it usually hates those who have led it to do anything improper. From Cleon onward the⁴ leadership of the People was handed on in an unbroken line by the men most willing to play a bold part and to gratify the many with an eye to immediate popularity. And it is thought that the best of the⁵ politicians at Athens after those of early times were Nicias, Thucydides and Theramenes. As to Nicias and Thucydides, almost everybody agrees that they were not only honourable gentlemen but also statesmanlike and patriotic servants of the whole state, but about Theramenes, owing to the confused nature of the constitutional changes that took place in his time, the verdict is a matter of dispute. However, the view of writers not making mere incidental references is that he was not a destroyer of all governments, as critics charge him with being, but guided them all forward into a fully law-abiding course, since he was capable of serving the state under all of them, which is the duty of a good citizen, but did not give in to them when they acted illegally, but faced their enmity. —

a state fund for defraying the cost of an ordinary seat at the theatre, 2 obols. Plutarch attributes its institution to Pericles. An obol was about 1½d., 6 to a drachma.

- 1 XXIX. Ἔως μὲν οὖν ἰσόρροπα τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἦν διεφύλαττον τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ γενομένην συμφορὰν¹ ἰσχυρότατα² τὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐγένετο διὰ τὴν πρὸς βασιλέα συμμαχίαν, ἠναγκάσθησαν κινήσαντες τὴν δημοκρατίαν καταστήσαι τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων πολιτείαν, εἰπόντος τὸν μὲν πρὸ³ τοῦ ψηφίσματος λόγον Μηλοβίου, τὴν δὲ γνώμην γράψαντος Πυθοδώρου τοῦ Ἀναφλυστίου,⁴ μάλιστα δὲ συμπεισθέντων τῶν πολλῶν διὰ τὸ νομίζειν βασιλέα μᾶλλον ἑαυτοῖς συμπολεμήσειν ἢ δι' ὀλίγων
- 2 ποιήσονται τὴν πολιτείαν. ἦν δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦ Πυθοδώρου τοιόνδε· τὸν δῆμον ἐλέσθαι μετὰ τῶν προὔπαρχόντων δέκα προβούλων ἄλλους εἴκοσι ἐκ τῶν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων, οἷτινες ὁμόσαντες ἢ μὴν συγγράψειν ἃ ἂν ἠγῶνται βέλτιστα εἶναι τῇ πόλει συγγράψουσι περὶ τῆς
- 3 σωτηρίας· ἐξεῖναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ βουλομένῳ γράφειν, ἢ ἐξ ἁπάντων αἰρῶνται τὸ ἄριστον. Κλειτοφῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ Πυθόδωρος εἶπεν, προσαναζητῆσαι δὲ τοὺς αἰρεθέντας ἔγραψεν καὶ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους οὓς Κλεισθένης ἔθηκεν ὅτε καθίστη τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὅπως⁵ ἀκούσαντες καὶ τούτων βουλεύσονται τὸ ἄριστον, ὡς οὐ δημοτικὴν ἀλλὰ παραπλησίαν οὔσαν τὴν Κλει-
- 4 σθένης πολιτείαν τῇ Σόλωνος. οἱ δ' αἰρεθέντες πρῶτον μὲν ἔγραψαν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι τοὺς πρυ-

¹ Richards: διαφορὰν cod.

² ἰσχυρότερα Mayor. ³ πρὸ] περὶ Wyse.

⁴ Blass: . . . ν.τιον cod.

⁵ ὅπως <ἂν> Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

^a Or ' before the resolution.'

XXIX. In the period of the war therefore, so long 1
 as fortunes were evenly balanced, they continued to
 preserve the democracy. But when after the occur-
 rence of the disaster in Sicily the Lacedaemonian side 413 B.C.
 became very strong owing to the alliance with the
 king of Persia, they were compelled to overthrow the
 democracy and set up the government of the Four
 Hundred, Melobius making the speech on behalf of the
 resolution ^a but Pythodorus of the deme Anaphlystus
 having drafted the motion, and the acquiescence of
 the mass of the citizens being chiefly due to the belief
 that the king would help them more in the war if they
 limited their constitution. The resolution of Pytho- 2
 dorus was as follows: 'That in addition to the ten
 Preliminary Councillors ^b already existing the people
 choose twenty others from those over forty years of
 age, and that these, after taking a solemn oath to
 draft whatever measures they think best for the state,
 shall draft measures for the public safety; and that 3
 it be open to any other person also that wishes, to
 frame proposals, in order that they may choose the
 one that is best out of them all.' Cleitophon moved
 an amendment to the resolution of Pythodorus, that
 the commissioners elected should also investigate the
 ancestral laws laid down by Cleisthenes when he was
 establishing the democracy, in order that they might
 decide on the best course to advise after hearing
 these laws also, on the ground that the constitution
 of Cleisthenes was not democratic but similar to that
 of Solon. The commissioners when elected first pro- 4

^b The ten commissioners appointed at Athens after the Sicilian disaster to deal with the emergency (Thuc. viii. 1), and later instructed to reform the constitution (*ib.* lxvii.).

τάνεις ἅπαντα τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας
 ἐπιψηφίζεις, ἔπειτα τὰς τῶν παρανόμων γραφὰς
 καὶ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας καὶ τὰς προσκλήσεις¹ ἀνεῖλον,
 ὅπως ἂν οἱ ἐθέλοντες Ἀθηναῖοι συμβουλευώσι
 περὶ τῶν προκειμένων· ἐὰν δέ τις τινα² τούτων
 χάριν ἢ ζημιοῖ ἢ προσκαλῆται ἢ εἰσάγῃ εἰς
 δικαστήριον, ἔνδειξιν αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἀπαγωγὴν
 πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγούς, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγούς παρα-
 5 δούναι τοῖς ἔνδεκα θανάτῳ ζημιώσαι. μετὰ δὲ
 ταῦτα τὴν πολιτείαν διέταξαν τόνδε τρόπον· τὰ
 μὲν προσιόντα³ μὴ ἐξεῖναι ἄλλοσε δαπανῆσαι
 ἢ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἀμίσθους
 ἀρχεῖν ἀπάσας ἕως ἂν ὁ πόλεμος ᾗ, πλὴν
 τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων καὶ τῶν πρυτανέων οἳ ἂν
 ὦσιν, τούτους δὲ φέρειν τρεῖς ὀβολοὺς ἕκαστον
 τῆς ἡμέρας· τὴν δ' ἄλλην πολιτείαν ἐπιτρέψαι
 πᾶσαν⁴ Ἀθηναίων τοῖς δυνατωτάτοις καὶ τοῖς
 σώμασιν καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν λητουργεῖν μὴ ἔλαττον
 ἢ πεντακισχιλίοις⁵ ἕως ἂν ὁ πόλεμος ᾗ· κυρίου δ'
 εἶναι τούτους καὶ συνθήκας συντίθεσθαι πρὸς οὓς
 ἂν ἐθέλωσιν· ἐλέσθαι δ' ἐκ⁶ τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης δέκα
 ἄνδρας ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας οἵτινες
 καταλέξουσι τοὺς πεντακισχιλίουσ ὁμόσαντες καθ'
 ἱερῶν τελείων.

1 XXX. Οἱ μὲν οὖν αἰρεθέντες ταῦτα συνέγραψαν·
 κυρωθέντων δὲ τούτων εἶλοντο σφῶν αὐτῶν οἱ

¹ Blass: προκλησεις cod.

² τις τινα Richards: τις cod.

³ προσιόντα Richards (cf. xxxix. 2): χρηματαπροσιοντα cod.:
 χρ. <τὰ> πρ. Kenyon.

⁴ πᾶσαν Mayor: πασιν cod.

⁵ -ων (i.e. ἔλαττον πεντακισχιλιων) v.l. adscr. cod.

⁶ δ' ἐκ edd.: δεκα cod.

posed that it should be compulsory for the Presidents^a to put to the vote all proposals made for the public safety, and then repealed the procedures of impeachment for illegal proposals, information and summons, in order that those Athenian citizens who wished might give advice about the matters before them; and enacted that, if anybody attempted to punish or summon or bring them into court for so doing, he be liable to information and summary arrest before the Generals, and that the Generals should hand him over to the Eleven to be punished with death. After⁵ this they framed the constitution in the following way: that it should not be permissible to spend the revenues on any other object than the war; that all the officers of state should be unpaid for the duration of the war, excepting those who held the posts of the Nine Archons and the Presidents, and these should draw three obols^b per man per day; and that all the rest of the functions of government should be entrusted to those Athenians who in person and property were most capable of serving the state, not less than five thousand, for the duration of the war; and that the powers of this body should include competence to contract treaties with whatever people they wished; and that they should elect ten men over forty years of age from each tribe, who should enroll the Five Thousand after taking oath over unblemished victims.

XXX. So the Commissioners drafted these proposals¹; and these being ratified, the Five Thousand

^a The Presidents of the Council, see xliii. 2.

^b Half a drachma, see iv. 3 n.

πεντακισχίλιοι τοὺς ἀναγράφοντας τὴν πολιτείαν
 ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας. οἱ δ' αἰρεθέντες ἀνέγραψαν καὶ
 2 ἐξήνεγκαν τάδε· βουλευεῖν μὲν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τοὺς¹
 ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας ἀνευ μισθοφορᾶς·
 τούτων δ' εἶναι τοὺς στρατηγούς καὶ τοὺς ἐννέα
 ἄρχοντας καὶ τὸν ἱερομνήμονα καὶ τοὺς ταξιάρχους
 καὶ ἱππάρχους καὶ φυλάρχους καὶ ἄρχοντας εἰς τὰ
 φρούρια καὶ ταμίας τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων τῇ θεῷ
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς δέκα καὶ ἑλληνοταμίας² καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων ὀσίων³ χρημάτων ἀπάντων εἴκοσι οἱ
 διαχειριοῦσιν,⁴ καὶ ἱεροποιούς καὶ ἐπιμελητὰς δέκα
 ἑκατέρους· αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ πάντας τούτους ἐκ προκρί-
 των, ἐκ τῶν αἰεὶ βουλευόντων πλείους προκρίνοντας,
 τὰς δ' ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀπάσας κληρωτὰς εἶναι καὶ
 μὴ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς· τοὺς δὲ ἑλληνοταμίας οἱ ἂν
 3 διαχειρίζωσι τὰ χρήματα μὴ συμβουλεύειν. βουλὰς
 δὲ ποιῆσαι τέτταρας ἐκ τῆς ἡλικίας τῆς εἰρημένης
 εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον, καὶ τούτων τὸ λαχὸν μέρος
 βουλευεῖν, νεῖμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πρὸς τὴν
 λῆξιν ἐκάστην. τοὺς δ' ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας διανεῖμαι
 σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τέτταρα μέρη
 ὡς ἰσαίτατα καὶ διακληρῶσαι, καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν
 4 βουλευεῖν τοὺς λαχόντας⁵. βουλευέσθαι⁶ δὲ ἦ ἂν

¹ τοὺς] τετρακοσίους Niemeyer.

² [καὶ ἑλληνοταμίας] Sandys.

³ [ὀσίων]? ed.

⁴ [-ν οἱ διαχειριοῦσιν] Thompson.

⁵ τοὺς λαχόντας suppletum a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

⁶ βουλευέσθαι suppletum a Sandys.

^a The secretary or registrar who with the actual representative, the Pylagoras, was sent by Athens, as by the other members, to the Amphictyonic Council.

elected a hundred of their members as a committee to draw up the constitution. This committee drew up and published the following resolutions: 'The Council to consist of members over thirty years of age holding office for a year and drawing no pay; these members to include the Generals, the Nine Archons, the Sacred Remembrancer,^a the Company-commanders,^b Officers of the Horse,^c Officers of Tribes^d and officers in command of the Guards,^e the Treasurers of the Sacred Funds of the Goddess^f and the ten Treasurers of the other gods, the Greek Treasurers,^g and twenty Treasurers of all the secular funds as well, who shall manage them,^h and Sacrificial Officers and Superintendents, ten of each; and the Council to elect all of these from a larger preliminary list of candidates proposed by it from its members at the time, but all other offices to be elected by lot and not from the Council; and the Greek Treasurersⁱ that are to manage the funds not to be members of the Council. And four Councils to be formed for the future from 3 persons of the stated age, and a division of these selected by lot to officiate, but the others also to be included in each such selection. And the Hundred Men to divide themselves and the others^j into four divisions as nearly equal as possible, and to cast lots among them, and those on whom the lot falls to form the Council for a year. And the Council to frame 4

^b See lxi. 3.

^c See *ib.* 4.

^d See *ib.* 5.

^e See xxiv. 3.

^f Athena.

^g This contradicts the end of the section, and the text seems to be corrupt.

^h This clause seems to be interpolated from below.

ⁱ The managers of the funds paid as tribute by the Confederacy of Delos.

^j *i.e.* the rest of the Five Thousand.

δοκῆ αὐτοῖς ἄριστα ἔξειν περί τε τῶν χρημάτων ὅπως ἂν σῶα ἦ καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκηται, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἂν δύνωνται ἄριστα· ἐὰν δὲ¹ τι θέλωσιν βουλευσασθαι μετὰ πλειόνων, ἐπεισκαλεῖν ἕκαστον ἐπείσκλητον ὃν ἂν ἐθέλη τῶν ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡλικίας. τὰς δ' ἔδρας ποιεῖν τῆς βουλῆς κατὰ πενθήμερον, ἐὰν μὴ δέωνται πλειόνων.
 5 κληροῦν δὲ τὴν βουλήν τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας. τὰς δὲ χειροτονίας κρίνειν πέντε τοὺς λαχόντας ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἕνα κληροῦσθαι καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν τὸν ἐπιψηφιοῦντα. κληροῦν δὲ τοὺς λαχόντας πέντε τοὺς ἐθέλοντας προσελθεῖν ἐναντίον τῆς βουλῆς, πρῶτον μὲν ἱερῶν, δεύτερον δὲ κήρυξιν, τρίτον πρεσβείαις, τέταρτον τῶν ἄλλων· τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου ὅταν δέη ἀκληρωτὶ προσαγα-
 6 γόντας τοὺς στρατηγούς χρηματίζεσθαι.² τὸν δὲ μὴ ἰόντα εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον τῶν βουλευόντων τὴν ὥραν τὴν προρρηθεῖσαν ὀφείλειν δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκάστης, ἐὰν μὴ εὐρισκόμενος³ ἄφεισιν τῆς βουλῆς ἀπῆ.

1 XXXI. Ταύτην μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον ἀνέγραψαν τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ τήνδε· βουλευεῖν μὲν τετρακοσίους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, τετταράκοντα ἐξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἐκ προκρίτων οὓς ἂν ἔλωνται οἱ φυλέται τῶν ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων. τούτους δὲ τὰς τε ἀρχὰς καταστήσαι, καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄρκου ὄντινα χρῆ ὁμόσαι γράψαι, καὶ⁴ περὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πράττειν ἢ ἂν
 2 ἡγῶνται συμφέρειν. τοῖς δὲ νόμοις οἱ ἂν τεθῶσιν

¹ δὲ suppletum a Mayor.

³ εὐρόμενος Tyrrell.

² χρηματίζειν Blass.

⁴ καὶ supplevit Kenyon.

such resolutions as may seem to them likely to be best to secure the safe preservation of the funds and their expenditure upon necessary objects, and about the other affairs to the best of their ability ; and in case of their desiring to consider some matter with added numbers, each member to summon as a co-opted member anybody of the same age as himself that he may wish. To hold the sittings of the Council every five days, unless more sittings are required. The Council to elect the Nine Archons by 5 lot. The tellers to be five persons elected by lot from the Council, and one of these to be chosen by lot to serve daily as putter of the question. And the five tellers elected to cast lots among those who desire an audience of the Council, first about matters of religion, second for Heralds, third for embassies, fourth about other business ; but whenever questions relating to war need consideration they are to introduce the Generals without casting lots and take their business. A member of the Council not coming to the 6 Council-chamber at the time previously announced to be liable to a fine of a drachma for each day, unless he obtain leave of absence from the Council.'

XXXI. This constitution, therefore, they drew up 1 for the future, but the following to be in force in the present crisis : 'The Council to consist of four hundred members according to the ancestral regulations, forty from each tribe taken from a preliminary list of any persons over thirty years of age that the members of the tribe may elect. These to appoint the officials, and to draft a proposal about the form of oath to be taken, and to take action about the laws and the audits and other matters as they may think good. And to follow any laws that may be enacted 2

περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν χρῆσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι μετακινεῖν μηδ' ἑτέρους θέσθαι. τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν τὸ νῦν εἶναι τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐξ ἀπάντων ποιεῖσθαι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων, τὴν δὲ βουλὴν ἐπειδὰν καταστή¹ ποιήσασαν ἐξέτασιν ἐν² ὄπλοις ἐλέσθαι δέκα ἄνδρας καὶ γραμματέα τούτοις, τοὺς δὲ αἰρεθέντας ἄρχειν τὸν εἰσιόντα ἐνιαυτὸν αὐτοκράτορας, καὶ ἂν τι δέωνται συμβουλευέσθαι μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς.

3 ἐλέσθαι δὲ καὶ ἵππαρχον ἓνα³ καὶ φυλάρχους δέκα· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὴν αἵρεσιν ποιεῖσθαι τούτων τὴν βουλὴν κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα. τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀρχῶν πλὴν τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε τούτοις μήτε ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ πλείον ἢ ἅπαξ ἄρξαι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχήν. εἰς δὲ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον, ἵνα νεμηθῶσιν οἱ τετρακόσιοι εἰς τὰς τέτταρας λήξεις, ὅταν ἐκάστοις⁴ γίγνηται μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων βουλευεῖν, διανειμάντων αὐτοὺς οἱ ἑκατὸν ἄνδρες.

1 XXXII. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἑκατὸν οἱ ὑπὸ τῶν πεντακισχιλίων αἰρεθέντες ταύτην ἀνέγραψαν τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐπικυρωθέντων δὲ τούτων ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπιψηφίσαντος Ἀριστομάχου, ἡ μὲν βουλὴ ἡ⁵ ἐπὶ Καλλίου πρὶν διαβουλεῦσαι κατελύθη μηνὸς Θαρρηλιῶνος τετράδι ἐπὶ δέκα, οἱ δὲ τετρακόσιοι εἰσῆσαν ἐνάτῃ φθίνοντος Θαρρηλιῶνος· ἔδει δὲ τὴν εἰληχυῖαν τῷ κυάμῳ βουλὴν εἰσιέναι δ' ἐπὶ

2 δέκα Σκιροφοριῶνος. ἡ μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχία τοῦτον κατέστη τὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ Καλλίου μὲν ἄρχοντος ἕτεσιν δ' ὕστερον τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολῆς

¹ Wyse: καταστησι cod.

² ἐν supplevit Wyse.

³ ἓνα <καὶ ταξιάρχους δέκα> Wilamowitz.

⁴ ἕκαστοι (vel τοῖς αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς) edd.: τοισαστοι cod.

⁵ ἡ supplevit Rutherford.

about the affairs of state, and not to have powers to alter them nor to enact others. The election of the Generals for the time being to be made from among all the Five Thousand, and the Council as soon as it is appointed to hold a review under arms and elect ten men to the post, and a secretary for them, and those elected to hold office for the ensuing year with autocratic powers, and to consult with the Council about any matter if they require. And also to elect ³ one Master of the Horse and ten Tribe-commanders; and for the future the Council to conduct the election of these according to the procedure enacted. And none of the other officials except the Council and the Generals, nor anybody else, to be allowed to hold the same office more than once. And for the future, in order that the Four Hundred may be divided into the four lists,^a when each division takes its turn to form the Council with the rest, let the Hundred Men divide them into sections.'

XXXII. This then was the constitution drawn up by ¹ the Hundred elected by the Five Thousand. These proposals were carried by the multitude, being put to the vote by Aristomachus, and the Council in Callias's year was dissolved on the 14th day of the ^{412 B.C.} month of Thargelion before it had completed its term of office; while the Four Hundred came into office on Thargelion the 21st; and the Council elected ²²⁰ by lot was due to enter office on Scirophorion the 14th.^b In this way therefore the oligarchy was set ² up, in the archonship of Callias, about a hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants, the chief

^a Cf. xxx. 3.

^b The three dates are about May 31, June 7, and June 30.

μάλιστα ἑκατόν, αἰτίων μάλιστα γενομένων Πεισ-
 ἀνδρου καὶ Ἀντιφῶντος καὶ Θηραμένους, ἀνδρῶν
 καὶ γεγενημένων εὖ καὶ συνέσει καὶ γνώμῃ δοκούν-
 3 των διαφέρειν. γενομένης δὲ ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας
 οἱ μὲν πεντακισχίλιοι λόγῳ μόνον ἠρέθησαν, οἱ δὲ
 τετρακόσιοι μετὰ τῶν δέκα τῶν αὐτοκρατόρων
 εἰσελθόντες εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἦρχον τε¹ τῆς
 πόλεως καὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους πρεσβευσάμενοι
 κατελύοντο τὸν πόλεμον ἐφ' οἷς ἑκάτεροι τυγ-
 χάνουσιν ἔχοντες, οὐχ ὑπακούοντων δ' ἐκείνων
 εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀφήσουσιν,
 οὕτως ἀπέστησαν.

1 XXXIII. Μῆνας μὲν οὖν ἴσως τέτταρας δι-
 ἔμεινεν ἢ τῶν τετρακοσίων πολιτεία, καὶ ἦρξεν ἐξ
 αὐτῶν Μνασίλοχος δῆμινον ἐπὶ Θεοπόμπου ἀρχον-
 τος, ὃς² ἦρξε τοὺς ἐπιλοίπους δέκα μῆνας.
 ἠττηθέντες δὲ τῇ περὶ Ἐρετρίαν ναυμαχίᾳ καὶ
 τῆς Εὐβοίας ἀποστάσης ὅλης πλήν Ὀρεοῦ,
 χαλεπῶς ἐνεγκόντες ἐπὶ τῇ συμφορᾷ μάλιστα τῶν
 προγεγενημένων (πλείω γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας ἢ
 τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐτύγχανον ὠφελούμενοι) κατέλυσαν
 τοὺς τετρακοσίους καὶ τὰ πράγματα παρέδωκαν
 τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις τοῖς ἐκ τῶν ὄπλων, ψηφισά-
 2 μενοι μηδεμίαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι μισθοφόρον. αἰτιώ-
 τατοι δ' ἐγένοντο τῆς καταλύσεως Ἀριστοκράτης
 καὶ Θηραμένης, οὐ συναρεσκόμενοι τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν
 τετρακοσίων γιγνομένοις· ἅπαντα γὰρ δι' αὐτῶν
 ἔπραττον, οὐδὲν ἐπαναφέροντες τοῖς πεντακι-
 σχιλίοις. δοκοῦσι δὲ καλῶς πολιτευθῆναι κατὰ
 τούτους τοὺς καιρούς, πολέμου τε καθεστῶτος
 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὄπλων τῆς πολιτείας οὔσης.

¹ τε supplevit Hude.

² ὃς supplevit Kenyon.

movers having been Peisander, Antiphon and Theramenes, men of good birth and of distinguished reputation for wisdom and judgement. But when this constitution had been set up, the Five Thousand were only nominally chosen, but the Four Hundred with the aid of the Ten with autocratic powers^a entered the Council-chamber and governed the state. They also sent envoys to the Lacedaemonians and proposed to conclude peace on terms of *uti possidetis*; but the Lacedaemonians would not consent unless Athens would also relinquish the empire of the sea, so that they finally abandoned the project.

XXXIII. The constitution of the Four Hundred lasted perhaps four months, for two of which Mnesilochus was archon, in the year of the archonship of Theopompus, who received the office for the remaining ten months. But when they had been worsted in the naval battle off Eretria and the whole of Euboea except Oreum had revolted, they were more distressed at the misfortune than by any previous disaster (for they were actually getting more support from Euboea than from Attica), and they dissolved the Four Hundred and handed over affairs to the Five Thousand that were on the armed roll,^b having passed by vote a resolution that no office should receive pay. The persons chiefly responsible for the dissolution were Aristocrates and Theramenes, who disapproved of the proceedings of the Four Hundred; for they did everything on their own responsibility and referred nothing to the Five Thousand. But Athens seems to have been well governed during this critical period, although a war was going on and the government was confined to the armed roll.

^a The Ten Generals, see xxxi. 2.

^b Cf. iv. 2, xxix. 5.

- 1 XXXIV. Τούτους μὲν οὖν ἀφείλετο τὴν πολιτείαν ὁ δῆμος διὰ τάχους· ἔτει δ' ἑβδόμῳ¹ μετὰ τὴν τῶν τετρακοσίων κατάλυσιν, ἐπὶ Καλλίου τοῦ Ἀγγελῆθεν ἄρχοντος, γενομένης τῆς ἐν Ἀργινοῦσαις ναυμαχίας, πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ νικῶντας συνέβη κριθῆναι μιᾷ χειροτονίᾳ πάντας, τοὺς μὲν οὐδὲ συνναυμαχῆσαντας, τοὺς δ' ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίας νεὼς σωθέντας, ἕξαπατηθέντος τοῦ δήμου διὰ τοὺς παροργίσαντας· ἔπειτα βουλομένων Λακεδαιμονίων ἐκ Δεκελείας ἀπιέναι² ἐφ' οἷς ἔχουσιν ἑκάτεροι καὶ εἰρήνην ἄγειν,³ ἔνιοι μὲν ἐσπούδαζον, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν, ἕξαπατηθέντες ὑπὸ Κλεοφῶντος, ὃς ἐκώλυσε γενέσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην ἔλθων εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μεθύων καὶ θώρακα ἐνδεδυκώς, οὐ φάσκων ἐπιτρέψειν εἰ μὴ πάσας ἀφίωσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς πόλεις. οὐ χρησάμενοι δὲ καλῶς τότε τοῖς πράγμασι μετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἔγνωσαν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν. τῷ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔτει ἐπ' Ἀλεξίου ἄρχοντος ἠτύχησαν τὴν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς ναυμαχίαν, ἐξ ἧς συνέβη κύριον γενόμενον τῆς πόλεως Λύσανδρον καταστήσαι τοὺς τριάκοντα τρόπῳ
3 τοιῶδε· τῆς εἰρήνης γενομένης αὐτοῖς ἐφ' ᾧ τε πολιτεύσονται τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν, οἱ μὲν δημοτικοὶ διασώζειν ἐπειρῶντο τὸν δῆμον, τῶν δὲ

¹ ἕκτω edd.

² Mayor: *αἰεῖναι* cod.

³ ἐφ' οἷς . . . ἄγειν cum schol. Wilamowitz-Kaibel: *κατεφοῖσεχουσινιρηνηηεκατεροιαγειν* cod.

^a 'Sixth' (in Greek arithmetic 'seventh') is a mistake for 'fifth' (Greek 'sixth'): the Four Hundred fell in 411, Callias was archon 406 B.C.

^b *i.e.* with his courage artificially stimulated and with armour to protect him against assassination (unless we adopt

XXXIV. So the people speedily took the govern- 1
 ment out of these men's hands ; and in the sixth ^a
 year after the dissolution of the Four Hundred, in the
 archonship of Callias of the deme of Angelē, after the
 occurrence of the naval battle at Arginusae, it came
 about first that the ten Generals to whom victory
 in the naval battle was due were all condemned by a
 single vote, some of them not even having been in the
 engagement at all and the others having escaped on
 board a ship not their own, the people being com-
 pletely deceived through the persons who provoked
 their anger ; and then, when the Lacedaemonians
 were willing to evacuate Decelea on terms of both
 parties retaining what they held, and to make peace,
 though some persons were eager to accept, yet the
 mass of the people refused to consent, being com-
 pletely deceived by Cleophon, who prevented the
 conclusion of peace by coming into the assembly, drunk
 and wearing a corslet,^b and protesting that he would
 not allow it unless the Lacedaemonians surrendered
 all the cities.^c But though on this occasion they had 2
 managed their affairs ill, they realized their mistake
 not long afterwards. For in the next year, when 405 B.C.
 Alexius was Archon, they met with the disaster in
 the naval battle of Aegospotami which resulted in
 the city's falling into the hands of Lysander, who
 set up the Thirty in the following way. The peace 3
 having been concluded on terms of their carrying on
 the government according to the ancestral constitu-
 tion, the popular party endeavoured to preserve the
 the conjecture that *μεθύων καὶ θώρακα ἐνδεδυκώς* is a mistaken
 paraphrase of some original record giving *θώρακα ἔχων* in
 the slang sense of 'well primed with liquor,' *cf.* Aristoph.
Ran. 1504).

^c *i.e.* those that they had taken in the war.

γνωρίμων οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἑταιρείαις ὄντες, καὶ τῶν φυγάδων οἱ μετὰ τὴν εἰρήνην κατελθόντες, ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπεθύμουν, οἱ δ' ἐν ἑταιρεία μὲν οὐδεμιᾷ συγκαθεστῶτες ἄλλως δὲ δοκοῦντες οὐδενὸς ἐπιλείπεσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν ἐζήτουν· ὧν ἦν μὲν καὶ Ἄρχινος καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Κλειτοφῶν καὶ Φορμίσιος καὶ ἕτεροι πολλοί, προειστήκει δὲ μάλιστα Θηραμένης. Λυσάνδρου δὲ προσθεμένου τοῖς ὀλιγαρχικοῖς καταπλαγεῖς ὁ δῆμος ἠναγκάσθη χειροτονεῖν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. ἔγραψε δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα Δρακοντίδης Ἀφιδναῖος.

- 1 XXXV. Οἱ μὲν οὖν τριάκοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατέστησαν ἐπὶ Πυθοδώρου ἄρχοντος. γενόμενοι δὲ κύριοι τῆς πόλεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τὰ δόξαντα περὶ τῆς πολιτείας παρεώρων, πεντακοσίου δὲ βουλευτὰς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς καταστήσαντες ἐκ προκρίτων ἐκ τῶν χιλίων,¹ καὶ προσελλόμενοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἄρχοντας δέκα καὶ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλακας ἔνδεκα καὶ μαστιγοφόρους τριακοσίους ὑπηρέτας κατεῖχον
2 τὴν πόλιν δι' ἑαυτῶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον μέτριοι τοῖς πολίταις ἦσαν καὶ προσεποιούντο διοικεῖν² τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς τ' Ἐφιάλτου καὶ Ἄρχεστράτου νόμους τοὺς περὶ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν καθεῖλον ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου καὶ τῶν Σόλωνος θεσμῶν ὅσοι διαμφισβητήσεις εἶχον, καὶ τὸ κῦρος ὃ ἦν ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς κατέλυσαν, ὡς ἐπανορ-

¹ [ἐκ τῶν] χιλίων Herwerden: [ἐκ τῶν χιλίων] Rutherford: φυλῶν pro χιλίων Hude.

² διώκειν edd.

democracy, but the notables who belonged to the Comradeships and those exiles who had returned after the peace were eager for oligarchy, while those notables who were not members of any Comradeship but who otherwise were inferior in reputation to none of the citizens were aiming at the ancestral constitution; members of this party were Archinus, Anytus, Cleitophon and Phormisius, while its chief leader was Theramenes. And when Lysander sided with the oligarchical party, the people were cowed and were forced to vote for the oligarchy. The motion was proposed by Dracontides of Aphidna.

XXXV. So in this manner the Thirty were established, in the archonship of Pythodorus. Having become masters of the state they neglected most of the measures that had been resolved on in regard to the constitution, but appointed five hundred Councillors and the other offices from among persons previously selected from the Thousand,^a and also chose for themselves ten governors of Peiraeus, eleven guardians of the prison, and three hundred retainers carrying whips, and so kept the state in their own hands. At first, then, they were moderate towards the citizens and pretended to be administering the ancestral form of constitution, and they removed from the Areopagus the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus^b about the Areopagites, and also such of the ordinances of Solon as were of doubtful purport, and abolished the sovereignty vested in the jurymen, claiming to be rectifying the constitution and removing its un-

^a *i.e.* from the knights; but the text can hardly be correct, and may be emended to give 'from among a thousand persons previously selected.'

^b Probably a supporter of Ephialtes, for whose legislation see ch. xxv.

θοῦντες καὶ ποιοῦντες ἀναμφισβήτητον τὴν πολι-
τείαν, οἷον περὶ τοῦ δοῦναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ᾧ ἂν ἐθέλη
κύριον ποιήσαντες καθάπαξ, τὰς δὲ προσούσας
δυσκολίας “ἐὰν μὴ μανίων ἢ γήρως (ἐνεκα)¹ ἢ
γυναικὶ πιθόμενος” ἀφείλον ὅπως μὴ ἦ τοῖς
συκοφάνταις ἔφοδος· ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔδρων καὶ
3 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν ταῦτ’ ἐποίουν
καὶ τοὺς συκοφάντας καὶ τοὺς τῷ δήμῳ πρὸς
χάριν ὀμιλοῦντας παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ κακοπράγ-
μονας ὄντας καὶ πονηροὺς ἀνήρουν, ἐφ’ οἷς ἔχαιρεν²
ἢ πόλις γιγνομένοις, ἡγούμενοι τοῦ βελτίστου
4 χάριν ποιεῖν αὐτούς. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν πόλιν ἐγκρατέ-
στερον ἔσχον, οὐδενὸς ἀπείχοντο τῶν πολιτῶν,
ἀλλ’ ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς καὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τῷ
γένει καὶ τοῖς ἀξιώμασιν προέχοντας, ὑπεξαιρού-
μενοί τε τὸν φόβον καὶ βουλόμενοι τὰς οὐσίας
διαρπάζειν· καὶ χρόνου διαπεσόντος βραχέος οὐκ
ἐλάττους ἀνηρήκεσαν ἢ χιλίους πεντακοσίους.

1 XXXVI. Οὕτως δὲ τῆς πόλεως ὑποφερομένης
Θηραμένης ἀγανακτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς γινομένοις τῆς
μὲν ἀσελγείας αὐτοῖς παρήνει παύσασθαι μετα-
δοῦναι δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τοῖς βελτίστοις. οἱ δὲ
πρῶτον³ ἐναντιωθέντες, ἐπεὶ διεσπάρησαν οἱ λόγοι
πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος καὶ πρὸς τὸν Θηραμένην οἰκειῶς
εἶχον οἱ πολλοί, φοβηθέντες μὴ προστάτης γενό-
μενος τοῦ δήμου καταλύσῃ τὴν δυναστείαν κατα-
2 δώσοντες τῆς πολιτείας. Θηραμένης δὲ πάλιν

¹ ἐνεκα γήρως Wyse: γηρων cod.

² Sidgwick (cf. xxxiv. 1 τὸ δὲ πλῆθος οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν, ἐξαπατη-
θέντες): ἐχαιρον cod.

³ edd.: πρωτοι cod.

⁴ edd.: δισχιλίους cod.

certainties : for example, in regard to the bestowal of one's property on whomsoever one wishes, making the single act of donation valid absolutely, while they removed the tiresome qualifications ' save when in consequence of insanity or of old age, or under the influence of a woman,' in order that there might be no opening for blackmailers ; and similarly they did this in the other matters as well. At the outset, therefore, they were engaged in these matters, and in removing the blackmailers and the persons who consorted undesirably with the people to curry favour and were evil-doers and scoundrels ; and the state was delighted at these measures, thinking that they were acting with the best intentions. But when they got a firmer hold on the state, they kept their hands off none of the citizens, but put to death those of outstanding wealth or birth or reputation, intending to put that source of danger out of the way, and also desiring to plunder their estates ; and by the end of a brief interval of time they had made away with not less than fifteen hundred.

XXXVI. While the state was thus being undermined, Theramenes, resenting what was taking place, kept exhorting them to cease from their wantonness and to admit the best classes to a share in affairs. At first they opposed him, but since these proposals became disseminated among the multitude, and the general public were well disposed towards Theramenes, they grew afraid that he might become head of the People and put down the oligarchy, and so they enrolled three thousand of the citizens with the intention of giving them a share in the government. But Theramenes again criticized this procedure also,

ἐπιτιμᾶ καὶ τούτοις, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι βουλόμενοι μεταδοῦναι τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι τρισχιλίοις μόνοις μεταδιδόασι, ὡς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πλήθει τῆς ἀρετῆς ὠρισμένης, ἔπειθ' ὅτι δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ποιοῦσιν, βίαιόν τε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἥττω κατασκευάζοντες. οἱ δὲ τούτων μὲν ὀλιγώρησαν, τὸν δὲ κατάλογον τῶν τρισχιλίων πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ὑπερεβάλλοντο¹ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐφύλαττον τοὺς ἐγνωσμένους, ὅτε δὲ καὶ δόξειεν αὐτοῖς ἐκφέρειν τοὺς μὲν ἐξήλειφον τῶν ἐγγεγραμμένων² τοὺς δ' ἀντενέγραφον τῶν ἔξωθεν.

¹ XXXVII. Ἦδη δὲ τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐνεστῶτος, καταλαβόντος Θρασυβούλου μετὰ τῶν φυγάδων Φυλῆν καὶ κατὰ τὴν στρατιὰν ἦν ἐξήγαγον οἱ τριάκοντα κακῶς ἀποχωρήσαντες, ἔγνωσαν τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τὰ ὄπλα παρελίσθαι Θηραμένην δὲ διαφθεῖραι τόνδε τρόπον. νόμους εἰσήνεγκαν εἰς τὴν βουλὴν δύο κελεύοντες ἐπιχειροτονεῖν, ὧν ὁ μὲν εἰς αὐτοκράτορας ἐποίει τοὺς τριάκοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἀποκτείνει τοὺς μὴ τοῦ καταλόγου μετέχοντας τῶν τρισχιλίων, ὁ δ' ἕτερος ἐκώλυε κοινωνεῖν τῆς παρούσης πολιτείας ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν τὸ ἐν Ἡετιωνείᾳ τεῖχος κατασκάψαντες ἢ τοῖς τετρακοσίοις ἐναντίον τι πράξαντες τοῖς³ κατασκεύασασι τὴν προτέραν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ὧν ἐτύγχανεν ἀμφοτέρων κεκοινωνηκῶς ὁ Θηραμένης, ὥστε συνέβαινε ἐπικυρωθέντων τῶν νόμων ἔξω

¹ ὑπερεβάλλοντο <ἐκφέρειν> Gertz.

² ἐγγεγραμμένων Herwerden: γεγραμμενων cod.

³ τοῖς Herwerden: ητοις cod.

first on the ground that although willing to share the government with the respectable they were only giving a share to three thousand, as though moral worth were limited to that number, and next because they were doing two absolutely incompatible things, making their rule one of force and at the same time weaker than those they ruled. But they despised these remonstrances, and for a long time went on postponing the roll of the Three Thousand and keeping to themselves those on whom they had decided, and even on occasions when they thought fit to publish it they made a practice of erasing some of the names enrolled and writing in others instead from among those outside the roll.^a

XXXVII. Winter had already set in, when Thrasybulus with the exiles occupied Phylē, and things went badly with the Thirty on the expedition that they led out against them; so they decided to disarm the others and to destroy Theramenes in the following way. They introduced two laws into the Council, with orders to pass them; one was to give the Thirty absolute powers to execute any citizens not members of the roll of Three Thousand, and the other prohibited admission to citizenship under the present constitution for all who had actually taken part in the demolition of the fort ^b on Eëtionea, or in any act of opposition to the Four Hundred who had instituted the former oligarchy; in both of these proceedings Theramenes had in fact participated, so that the result was that when the laws had been ratified he

^a So that no one would be sure of being on it.

^b A projecting mole on the northern side of Peiræus harbour, commanding the entrance. It had been begun, but was then demolished at the instigation of Theramenes (Thuc. viii. 90-92).

τε γίνεσθαι τῆς πολιτείας αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς τριά-
 2 κοντα κυρίους εἶναι θανατοῦντας. ἀναιρεθέντος δὲ
 Θηραμένους τά τε ὄπλα παρείλοντο πάντων πλὴν
 τῶν τρισχιλίων καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πολὺ πρὸς
 ὠμότητα καὶ πονηρίαν ἐπέδοσαν. πρέσβεις δὲ¹
 πέμψαντες εἰς Λακεδαίμονα τοῦ τε Θηραμένους
 κατηγοροῦν καὶ βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς ἠξίου· ὧν ἀκού-
 σαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Καλλιβίον ἀπέστειλαν
 ἄρμοστήν καὶ στρατιώτας ὡς ἑπτακοσίους, οἱ τὴν
 ἀκρόπολιν ἐλθόντες ἐφρούρου.

1 XXXVIII. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καταλαβόντων τῶν
 ἀπὸ Φυλῆς τὴν Μουνιχίαν καὶ νικησάντων μάχη
 τοὺς μετὰ τῶν τριάκοντα βοηθήσαντας, ἐπανα-
 χωρήσαντες μετὰ τὸν κίνδυνον οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως
 καὶ συναθροισθέντες εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν τῇ ὑστεραία,
 τοὺς μὲν τριάκοντα κατέλυσαν αἰροῦνται δὲ δέκα
 τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτοκράτορας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου
 κατάλυσιν. οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐφ'²
 οἷς μὲν ἠρέθησαν οὐκ ἔπραττον, ἔπεμπον δ' εἰς
 Λακεδαίμονα βοήθειαν μεταπεμπόμενοι καὶ χρή-
 2 ματα δανειζόμενοι. χαλεπῶς δὲ φερόντων ἐπὶ
 τούτοις τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, φοβούμενοι μὴ κατα-
 λυθῶσιν τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ βουλόμενοι καταπλήξαι
 τοὺς ἄλλους (ὅπερ ἐγένετο), συλλαβόντες Δημ-
 ἄρετον οὐδενὸς ὄντα δεύτερον τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπ-
 ἔκτειναν, καὶ τὰ πράγματα βεβαίως³ εἶχον, συναγω-
 νιζομένου Καλλιβίου τε καὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων
 τῶν παρόντων καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐνίων τῶν ἐν
 τοῖς ἵππευσι· τούτων γάρ τινες μάλιστα τῶν
 πολιτῶν ἐσπούδαζον μὴ κατελθεῖν τοὺς ἀπὸ

¹ δὲ supplevit Mayor.

² ἐφ' edd.: εν cod.

³ βιαίως Mayor.

became outside the constitution and the Thirty had authority to put him to death. Theramenes having ² been put out of the way, they disarmed everybody except the Three Thousand, and in the rest of their proceedings went much further in the direction of cruelty and rascality. And they sent ambassadors to Sparta to denounce Theramenes and call upon the Spartans to assist them ; and when the Spartans heard this message they dispatched Callibius as governor and about seven hundred troops, who came and garrisoned the Acropolis.

XXXVIII. After this the refugees in Phylē took ¹ Munichia, and defeated in action the force that came with the Thirty to the defence ; and the force from the city, on their return after this dangerous expedition, held a meeting in the market-place the day after, deposed the Thirty, and elected ten of the citizens as plenipotentiaries to bring the war to a conclusion. These, however, having obtained this office did not proceed to do the things for the purpose of which they had been elected, but sent to Sparta to procure help and to borrow funds. But this was ² resented by those within the constitution, and the Ten, in their fear of being deposed from office and their desire to terrify the others (which they succeeded in doing), arrested one of the most leading citizens, Demaretus, and put him to death, and kept a firm hold upon affairs, while Callibius and the Peloponnesians at Athens actively supported them, and so did some members of the corps of Knights as well ; for some of the Knights were the most eager of all the citizens that the men at Phylē should not

- 3 Φυλῆς. ὡς δ' οἱ τὸν Πειραιέα καὶ τὴν Μουνυχίαν ἔχοντες ἀποστάντος ἅπαντος τοῦ δήμου πρὸς αὐτούς¹ ἐπεκράτουν τῷ πολέμῳ, τότε καταλύσαντες τοὺς δέκα τοὺς πρώτους αἰρεθέντας, ἄλλους εἶλοντο δέκα τοὺς βελτίστους εἶναι δοκοῦντας, ἐφ' ὧν συνέβη καὶ τὰς διαλύσεις γενέσθαι καὶ καταλθεῖν τὸν δῆμον, συναγωνιζομένων καὶ προθυμομένων τούτων. προειστήκεσαν δ' αὐτῶν μάλιστα Ῥίνων τε ὁ Παιανιεύς καὶ Φάυλλος ὁ Ἀχερδούσιος· οὗτοι γὰρ πρὶν τε Πausanίαν² ἀφικέσθαι διεπέμποντο πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πειραιεῖ καὶ ἀφικομένου
- 4 συνεσπούδασαν τὴν κάθοδον. ἐπὶ πέρας γὰρ ἤγαγε τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὰς διαλύσεις Πausanίας ὁ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεὺς μετὰ τῶν δέκα διαλλακτῶν τῶν ὕστερον ἀφικομένων ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος οὓς αὐτὸς ἐσπούδασεν ἐλθεῖν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ῥίνωνα διὰ τε τὴν εὐνοίαν τὴν εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐπηνέθησαν, καὶ λαβόντες τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τὰς εὐθύνas ἔδοσαν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, καὶ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἐνεκάλεσεν αὐτοῖς οὔτε τῶν ἐν ἄστει μεινάντων οὔτε τῶν ἐκ Πειραιέως καταλθόντων, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ στρατηγὸς εὐθύς ἤρέθη Ῥίνων.
- 1 XXXIX. Ἐγένοντο δ' αἱ διαλύσεις ἐπ' Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας τάσδε. τοὺς βουλομένους Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἐν ἄστει μεινάντων ἐξοικεῖν ἔχειν Ἐλευσίνα ἐπιτίμους ὄντας καὶ κυρίου καὶ αὐτοκράτορας ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν
- 2 καρπούμενους. τὸ δ' ἱερὸν εἶναι κοινὸν ἀμφο-

¹ Blass: αὐτην cod.² τε Πausanίαν Richards: ηπαυσανιαντε cod.

return. But the party holding Peiraeus and Munichia, ³ now that the whole of the people had come over to their side, began to get the upper hand in the war, and so finally they deposed the ten who had been elected first, and chose ten others whom they thought to be the best men, and while these were in power there took place the reconciliation and the return of the people, with the active and eager support of the ten. The most prominent among them were Rhinon of the Paeonian deme and Phayllus of the Acherdusian; for these men had repeatedly gone on missions to the men at Peiraeus before Pausanias's arrival, and after his arrival they zealously supported the return. For it was Pausanias the king of the Lacedaemonians ⁴ who brought the peace and reconciliation to fulfilment, with the aid of the ten mediators who later arrived from Sparta, and whose coming was due to the efforts of the king himself. Rhinon and his companions were commended for their goodwill towards the people, and having been appointed to superintend these negotiations under an oligarchy they gave in their accounts under a democracy, and no one made any charge against them whatever, whether of those who had remained in the city or of those who had returned from Peiraeus; indeed, on the contrary Rhinon was immediately elected general because of his conduct in this office.

XXXIX. The reconciliation took place in the 1 archonship of Eucleides on the following terms: ^{403 B.C.}
 'That those of the Athenians who have remained in the city that desire to emigrate do have Eleusis, retaining their full rights, and having sovereignty and self-government, and enjoying their own revenues. And that the temple be the common property of both ²

τέρων, ἐπιμελείσθαι δὲ Κήρυκας καὶ Εὐμολπίδας
κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. μὴ ἐξεῖναι δὲ μήτε τοῖς Ἐλευ-
σίνοθεν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ μήτε τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως
Ἐλευσίναδ' εἰσιέναι πλὴν μυστηρίοις ἑκατέρους.
3 συντελεῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προσιόντων εἰς τὸ συμ-
μαχικὸν καθάπερ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀθηναίους. εἰ δὲ
τινες τῶν ἀπιόντων οἰκίαν λαμβάνωσιν Ἐλευσί-
νι, συμπεῖθειν τὸν κεκτημένον· εἰ δὲ μὴ συμ-
βαίνωσιν ἀλλήλοις τιμητὰς ἐλέσθαι τρεῖς ἑκάτερον,¹
καὶ ἦντιν' ἂν οὗτοι τάξωσι τιμὴν λαμβάνειν.
Ἐλευσινίων δὲ συνοικεῖν οὓς ἂν οὗτοι² βούλωνται.
4 τὴν δ' ἀπογραφὴν εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξοικεῖν,
τοῖς μὲν ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἀφ' ἧς ἂν ὁμόσωσιν τοὺς
ὄρκους δέκα ἡμερῶν, τὴν δ' ἐξοίκησιν εἴκοσι, τοῖς
δ' ἀποδημοῦσιν ἐπειδὰν ἐπιδημήσωσιν κατὰ ταυτά.
5 μὴ ἐξεῖναι δὲ ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ
ἄστει τὸν Ἐλευσί-νι κατοικοῦντα πρὶν ἀπογράψηται
πάλιν ἐν τῷ ἄστει κατοικεῖν. τὰς δὲ δίκας τοῦ
φόνου εἶναι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, εἴ τις τινα αὐτόχειρ
6 ἀπέκτεινεν ἢ ἔτρωσεν.³ τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων
μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν ἐξεῖναι πλὴν πρὸς
τοὺς τριάκοντα καὶ τοὺς δέκα καὶ τοὺς ἑνδεκα
καὶ τοὺς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἄρξαντας, μηδὲ πρὸς
τούτους εἰδὼσιν εὐθύνας. εὐθύνας δὲ δοῦναι
τοὺς μὲν ἐν Πειραιεῖ ἄρξαντας ἐν τοῖς ἐν Πειραιεῖ,
τοὺς δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἐν τοῖς⁴ τὰ τιμήματα παρ-

¹ ἑκάτερον Bury: εκατερων cod.

² αὐτοὶ Richards.

³ εἴ τις . . . ἔτρωσεν Blass, partim ex aliis: valde confusa cod.

⁴ ἐν τοῖς <ἐν τῷ ἄστει>? Kenyon.

^a See lvii. 1.

^b Perhaps 'in the city' should be inserted after 'property.'

sections, and be under the superintendence of the Heralds and the Eumolpidae^a according to the ancestral practice. But that it be not lawful for those at Eleusis to go into the city, nor for those in the city to go to Eleusis, except in either case at a celebration of the Mysteries. And that they contribute from their revenues like the other Athenians to the fund for the common defence. And that any of those who 3 go away that take a house at Eleusis be helped to obtain the consent of the owner; and if they cannot come to terms with one another, each party to choose three valuers, and to accept whatever price these valuers assess. And that of the people of Eleusis those whom the settlers may be willing to allow do dwell in the place with them. And that the 4 registration of those that wish to migrate be, for those who are in the country, within ten days of the date of their swearing the oaths of peace, and their migration within twenty days, and for those abroad similarly from the date when they return. And that 5 it be not permitted for anyone residing at Eleusis to hold any of the offices in the city until he removes himself from the roll in order to reside again in the city. And that trials for homicide be in accordance with the ancestral ordinances, if a man has killed or wounded another with his own hand. And that there 6 be a universal amnesty for past events, covering everybody except the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven, and those that have been governors of Peiraeus, and that these also be covered by the amnesty if they render account. And that those who had been governors in Peiraeus render account before the courts held in Peiraeus, but those in the city before a court of persons that can produce ratable property^b;

ARISTOTLE

εχομένοις· εἴθ' οὕτως ἐξοικεῖν τοὺς μὴ¹ ἐθέλοντας. τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἃ ἐδανείσαντο εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἑκατέρους ἀποδοῦναι χωρὶς.

- 1 XL. Γενομένων δὲ τοιούτων τῶν διαλύσεων, καὶ φοβουμένων ὅσοι μετὰ τῶν τριάκοντα συνεπολέμησαν, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἐπινοούντων ἐξοικεῖν ἀναβαλλομένων δὲ τὴν ἀπογραφὴν² εἰς τὰς ἐσχάτας ἡμέρας, ὅπερ εἰώθασιν ποιεῖν ἅπαντες, Ἀρχῖνος συνιδὼν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ βουλόμενος κατασχεῖν αὐτοὺς ὑφείλε τὰς ὑπολοίπους ἡμέρας τῆς ἀπογραφῆς, ὥστε συναναγκασθῆναι μένειν πολλοὺς ἄκοντας
- 2 ἕως ἐθάρρησαν. καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτό τε πολιτεύσασθαι καλῶς Ἀρχῖνος, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα γραψάμενος τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ Θρασυβούλου παρανόμων, ἐν ᾧ μετεδίδου τῆς πολιτείας πᾶσι τοῖς ἐκ Πειραιέως συγκατελθοῦσι, ὧν ἔνιοι φανερώς ἦσαν δοῦλοι, καὶ τρίτον, ἐπεὶ τις ἤρξατο τῶν κατεληλυθότων μνησικακεῖν, ἀπαγαγὼν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὴν βουλὴν καὶ πείσας ἄκριτον ἀποκτεῖναι, λέγων ὅτι νῦν δείξουσιν εἰ βούλονται τὴν δημοκρατίαν σώζειν καὶ τοῖς ὄρκοις ἐμμένειν· ἀφέντας μὲν γὰρ τοῦτον προτρέψειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέλωσιν παράδειγμα ποιήσειν ἅπασιν. ὅπερ καὶ συνέπεσεν· ἀποθανόντος γὰρ οὐδεὶς πώποτε ὕστερον ἐμνησικάκησεν, ἀλλὰ δοκοῦσιν κάλλιστα δὴ καὶ πολιτικώτατα ἀπάντων καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινῇ χρῆσασθαι ταῖς προ-
- 3 γεγενημέναις συμφοραῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰς περὶ

¹ τοὺς μὴ Blass: τοὺς δ cod. (δ supra lineam).

² Jackson: ἀναγραφὴν cod.

or that those who will not render account on these terms do migrate.^a And that each party separately repay their loans contracted for the war.'

XL. The reconciliation having been made on these 1 terms, all those who had fought on the side of the Thirty were alarmed, and many intended to migrate, but put off their registration to the latest days, as everybody usually does; so Archinus perceiving their numbers and wishing to retain them, cancelled the remainder of the days allowed for registration, so that many should be jointly compelled to stay against their will until they recovered courage. This 2 seems to have been a statesmanlike act of Archinus; as was also later his indicting as unconstitutional the decree of Thrasybulus admitting to citizenship all those who had come back together from Peiraeus, some of whom were clearly slaves; and his third act of statesmanship was that when somebody began to stir up grudges against the returned citizens, he arraigned him before the Council and persuaded it to execute him without trial, saying that this was the moment for them to show if they wished to save the democracy and keep their oaths; for by letting this man off they would incite the others too, but if they put him out of the way they would make him an example to everybody. And this is what actually occurred; for never since he was put to death has anybody broken the amnesty, but the Athenians appear both in private and public to have behaved towards the past disasters in the most completely honourable and statesmanlike manner of any people in history; for they not only blotted out recrimina- 3

^a A variant reading (*εἰθ' οὕτως ἐξοικεῖν τοὺς ἐθέλοντας*) gives 'then those who wish are to emigrate on these terms.'

τῶν προτέρων αἰτίας ἐξήλειψαν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χρήματα Λακεδαιμονίοις ἃ οἱ τριάκοντα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἔλαβον ἀπέδωσαν κοινῇ, κελευουσῶν τῶν συνθηκῶν ἑκατέρους ἀποδιδόναι χωρὶς, τοὺς τ' ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Πειραιέως, ἡγούμενοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἄρχειν δεῖν τῆς ὁμοιοῖας· ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οὐχ οἶον ἔτι προστιθέασιν τῶν οἰκείων οἱ δημοκρατήσαντες¹ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν

4 χώραν ἀνάδαστον ποιούσιν. διελύθησαν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἐλευσίῃ κατοικήσαντας ἔτι τρίτῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐξοίκησιν ἐπὶ Ξεναιέτου ἄρχοντος.

1 XLI. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον συνέβη γενέσθαι καιροῖς, τότε δὲ κύριος ὁ δῆμος γενόμενος τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνεστήσατο τὴν νῦν οὖσαν πολιτείαν ἐπὶ Πυθοδώρου μὲν ἄρχοντος, δοκοῦντος δὲ δικαίως² τοῦ δήμου λαβεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τὸ ποιήσασθαι τὴν κάθοδον δι' αὐτοῦ τὸν δῆμον.

2 ἦν δὲ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἑνδεκάτη τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὕτη. πρώτη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἡ κατάστασις³ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς Ἴωνος καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ συνοικισάντων· τότε γὰρ πρῶτον εἰς τὰς τέτταρας συνενεμήθησαν φυλὰς καὶ τοὺς φυλοβασιλέας κατέστησαν. δευτέρα δέ, καὶ πρώτη μετὰ ταύτην ἔχουσα τι πολιτείας τάξις⁴ ἡ ἐπὶ Θησέως γενομένη, μικρὸν παρεγκλίνουσα τῆς βασιλικῆς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἡ ἐπὶ Δράκοντος, ἐν ἣ καὶ νόμους ἀνέγραψαν πρῶτον. τρίτη δ' ἡ μετὰ τὴν στάσιν ἡ ἐπὶ Σόλωνος, ἀφ'

¹ οἱ δῆμοι κρατήσαντες edd.

² δικαίου Richards.

³ μετάστασις alii legunt.

⁴ Wilamowitz: ἐχουσαι πολιτειανταξιν cod.

^a The Greek text is very doubtful, but apparently the

tions with regard to the past, but also publicly restored to the Spartans the funds that the Thirty had taken for the war, although the treaty ordered that the parties in the city and in Peiraeus were each to make restitution separately. The Athenians thought that they must take this as a first step to concord, whereas in the other states those who have set up democracy not only do not pay any more out of their own property but even make a redistribution of the land. They also made a reconciliation with 4 those that had settled at Eleusis two years after the migration, in the archonship of Xenaenetus. 401 B.C.

XLI. These events then came about in the follow- 1 ing periods ; but at the date mentioned the people having become sovereign over affairs established the now existing constitution, in the archonship of Pythodorus, when the People's having accomplished its return by its own efforts made it appear just for 402 B.C. it to assume the government. In the list of reforms 2 this was the eleventh in number. There first occurred the organization of the original constitution after the settlement at Athens of Ion and his companions, for it was then that the people were first divided into the four Tribes and appointed the Tribal Kings. The second constitution, and the first subsequent one that involved a constitutional point,^a was the reform that took place in the time of Theseus, which was a slight divergence from the royal constitution. After that one came the reform in the time of Draco, in which a code of laws was first published. Third was the one that followed the civil disturbance in the time of Solon, from which democracy took its beginning.

constitution in the time of Ion is taken as the starting-point, and the eleven revolutions follow.

ἥς ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο. τετάρτη δ' ἡ ἐπὶ Πεισιστράτου τυραννίς. πέμπτη δ' ἡ μετὰ τῶν¹ τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἡ Κλεισθένους, δημοτικωτέρα τῆς Σόλωνος. ἕκτη δ' ἡ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά, τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς ἐπιστατούσης. ἑβδόμη δὲ καὶ² μετὰ ταύτην ἦν Ἀριστείδης μὲν ὑπέδειξεν Ἐφιάλτης δ' ἐπετέλεσεν καταλύσας τὴν Ἀρεοπαγίτιν βουλήν, ἐν ἧ ἡ πλείστα συνέβη τὴν πόλιν διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν διὰ³ τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχήν. ὀγδόη δ' ἡ τῶν τετρακοσίων κατάστασις, καὶ μετὰ ταύτην ἑνάτη δὲ ἡ δημοκρατία πάλιν. δεκάτη δ' ἡ τῶν τριάκοντα καὶ ἡ τῶν δέκα τυραννίς. ἑνδεκάτη δ' ἡ μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ Φυλῆς καὶ ἐκ Πειραιέως κάθοδον· ἀφ' ἥς διαγεγένηται μέχρι τῆς νῦν, αἰὲ προσεπιλαμβάνουσα τῷ πλήθει τὴν ἐξουσίαν. ἀπάντων γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν πεποίηκεν ὁ δῆμος κύριον καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψηφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίοις ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἐστίν ὁ κρατῶν, καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῆς βουλῆς κρίσεις εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐληλύθασιν. καὶ τοῦτο δοκοῦσι ποιεῖν ὀρθῶς· εὐδιαφθορώτεροι γὰρ ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν εἰσὶν καὶ κέρδει καὶ χάρισιν. μισθοφόρον δ' ἐκκλησίαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπέγνωσαν ποιεῖν· οὐ συλλεγομένων δ' εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ σοφιζομένων τῶν πρυτάνεων ὅπως προσισητῆται τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὴν ἐπικύρωσιν τῆς χειροτονίας, πρῶτον μὲν Ἀγύρριος ὀβολὸν ἐπόρισεν, μετὰ δὲ

¹ τὴν τῶν Kenyon: των cod.

² καὶ secl. Blass: ἡ conl. Mayor.

³ <καὶ> διὰ, κατὰ, διὰ . . . ἀρχὴν <θαρρήσασαν> conl. edd.

Fourth was the tyranny in the time of Peisistratus. Fifth the constitution of Cleisthenes, following the deposition of the tyrants, which was more democratic than the constitution of Solon. Sixth the reform after the Persian War, under the superintendence of the Council of Areopagus. Seventh followed the reform outlined by Aristides but completed by Ephialtes when he put down the Areopagite Council, during which it came about because of the demagogues that the state made many mistakes, because of the empire of the sea.^a Eighth was the establishment of the Four Hundred, and after that, ninth, democracy again. Tenth was the tyranny of the Thirty and that of the Ten. Eleventh was the constitution established after the return from Phylē and from Peiraeus, from which date the constitution has continued down to its present form, constantly taking on additions to the power of the multitude. For the people has made itself master of everything, and administers everything by decrees and by jury-courts in which the people is the ruling power, for even the cases tried by the Council have come to the people. And they seem to act rightly in doing this, for a few are more easily corrupted by gain and by influence than the many. The proposal to introduce 3 payment for attendance at the Assembly was on the first occasion rejected ; but as people were not attending the Assembly but the presidents kept contriving a number of devices to get the multitude to attend for the passing of the resolution by show of hands, first Agyrrhius introduced a fee of an obol, and after

^a Here again the exact text is doubtful.

τοῦτον Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Κλαζομένιος ὁ Βασιλεὺς ἐπικαλούμενος διώβολον, πάλιν δ' Ἀγύρριος τριώβολον.

- 1 XLII. Ἐχει δ' ἡ νῦν κατάστασις τῆς πολιτείας τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν, ἐγγράφονται δ' εἰς τοὺς δημότας ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες. ὅταν δ' ἐγγράφονται διαψηφίζονται περὶ αὐτῶν ὁμόσαντες οἱ δημόται, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι γεγονέναι τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, κἂν μὴ δόξωσι ἀπέρχονται πάλιν εἰς παῖδας, δεύτερον δ' εἰ ἐλεύθερός ἐστι καὶ γέγονε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους· ἔπειτ' ἂν¹ ἀποψηφίσωνται² μὴ εἶναι ἐλεύθερον, ὁ μὲν ἐφήσιον εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, οἱ δὲ δημόται κατηγορούς αἰροῦνται πέντε ἄνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν, κἂν μὲν μὴ δόξη δικαίως ἐγγράφεσθαι, πωλεῖ τοῦτον ἡ πόλις· εἰ δὲ νικήσῃ, τοῖς δημόταις
- 2 ἐπάναγκες ἐγγράφειν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δοκιμάζει τοὺς ἐγγραφέντας ἡ βουλή, κἂν τις δόξη νεώτερος ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν εἶναι, ζημιοῖ τοὺς δημότας τοὺς ἐγγράψαντας. ἐπὶ δὲ δοκιμασθῶσιν οἱ ἔφηβοι, συλλεγέντες οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν κατὰ φυλὰς ὁμόσαντες αἰροῦνται τρεῖς ἐκ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται βελτίστους εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐφήβων, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὁ δῆμος ἕνα τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης χειροτονεῖ σωφρονιστὴν, καὶ κοσμητὴν ἐκ
- 3 τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ πάντας. συλλαβόντες δ' οὗτοι τοὺς ἐφήβους, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἱερά περι-ἦλθον, εἶτ' εἰς Πειραιέα πορεύονται καὶ φρουροῦ-

¹ ἂν Parageorgios: ἀμμεν cod.

² Wyse: ἐπιψ. cod.

him Heracleides of Clazomenae, surnamed ^a King, two obols, and Agyrrhius again three obols.

XLII. The present form of the constitution is as ¹ follows. Citizenship belongs to persons of citizen parentage on both sides, and they are registered on the rolls of their demes at the age of eighteen. At the time of their registration the members of the deme make decision about them by vote on oath, first whether they are shown to have reached the lawful age, and if they are held not to be of age they go back again to the boys, and secondly whether the candidate is a freeman and of legitimate birth; after this, if the vote as to free status goes against him, he appeals to the jury-court, and the demesmen elect five men from among themselves to plead against him, and if it is decided that he has no claim to be registered, the state sells him, but if he wins, it is compulsory for the demesmen to register him. After ² this the Council revises the list of persons that have been registered, and if anyone is found to be under eighteen years of age, it fines the demesmen that registered him. And when the cadets have been passed by this revision, their fathers hold meetings by tribes and after taking oath elect three members of the tribe of more than forty years of age, whom they think to be the best and most suitable to supervise the cadets, and from them the people elects by show of hands one of each tribe as disciplinary officer, and elects from the other citizens a marshal over them all. These take the cadets in a body, and ³ after first making a circuit of the temples then go to

^a Or 'nicknamed' (as was Peisistratus in Eupolis's comedy *Demos*): but perhaps his family claimed royal descent in Asia Minor.

σιν οί μὲν τὴν Μουνηχίαν οί δὲ τὴν Ἀκτὴν. χειροτονεῖ δὲ καὶ παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδασκάλους οἷτινες ὄπλομαχεῖν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν καὶ καταπάλητην ἀφιέναι διδάσκουσιν.¹ δίδωσι δὲ καὶ εἰς τροφήν τοῖς μὲν σωφρονισταῖς δραχμὴν ἀ' ἐκάστω, τοῖς δ' ἐφήβοις τέτταρας ὀβολοὺς ἐκάστω· τὰ δὲ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνων ὁ σωφρονιστῆς ἕκαστος ἀγοράζει τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ κοινόν (συσσιτουῖσι γὰρ κατὰ φυλάς), καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων.

4 καὶ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον ἐνιαυτὸν οὕτως διάγουσι· τὸν δ' ὕστερον, ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης ἀποδειξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις καὶ λαβόντες ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς

5 φυλακτηρίοις. φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη· χλαμύδας ἔχοντες· καὶ ἀτελεῖς εἰσὶ πάντων· καὶ δίκην οὔτε δίδόασιν οὔτε λαμβάνουσιν, ἵνα μὴ πρόφασις ἢ τοῦ ἀπιέναι,² πλὴν περὶ κλήρου καὶ ἐπικλήρου κᾶν τι κατὰ³ γένος ἰερωσύνη γένηται. διεξελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν ἤδη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσὶν.

1 XLIII. Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐγγραφὴν καὶ τοὺς ἐφήβους τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς τὰς περὶ τὴν ἐγκύκλιον διοίκησιν ἀπάσας ποιοῦσι κληρωτάς, πλὴν ταμίου στρατιωτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν θεωρικῶν καὶ τοῦ τῶν κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητοῦ· ταύτας δὲ χειροτονοῦσιν, καὶ οἱ χειροτονηθέντες ἄρχουσιν ἐκ Παναθηναίων

¹ διδάξουσιν Rutherford.

² πρόφασις . . . ἀπιέναι legit Blass, sed incertus cod.

³ κατὰ Wilamowitz-Kaibel: κατατο cod.

Peiræus, and some of them garrison Munichia,^a others the Point.^b And the people also elects two athletic trainers and instructors for them, to teach them their drill as heavy-armed soldiers, and the use of the bow, the javelin and the sling. It also grants the disciplinary officers one drachma a head for rations, and the cadets four obols a head ; and each disciplinary officer takes the pay of those of his own tribe and buys provisions for all in common (for they mess together by tribes), and looks after everything else. They go 4 on with this mode of life for the first year ; in the following year an assembly is held in the theatre, and the cadets give a display of drill before the people, and receive a shield and spear from the state ; and they then serve on patrols in the country and are quartered at the guard-posts. Their service on 5 patrol goes on for two years ; the uniform is a mantle ; they are exempt from all taxes ; and they are not allowed to be sued nor to sue at law, in order that they may have no pretext for absenting themselves, except in cases concerning estate, marriage of an heiress, and any priesthood that one of them may have inherited. When the two years are up, they now are members of the general body of citizens.

XLIII. Such, then, are the regulations about the 1 registration of the citizens and about the cadets. All the officials concerned with the regular administration are appointed by lot, except a Treasurer of Military Funds, the Controllers of the Spectacle Fund, and the Superintendent of Wells ; these officers are elected by show of hands, and their term of office runs from

^a See xix. 2 n.

^b The southern promontory of Peiræus.

εἰς Παναθήναια. χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀπάσας.

- 2 Βουλὴ δὲ κληροῦται φ', ν' ἀπὸ φυλῆς ἐκάστης. πρυτανεύει δ' ἐν μέρει τῶν φυλῶν ἐκάστη καθ' ὅτι ἂν λάχωσιν, αἱ μὲν πρῶται τέτταρες 5' καὶ λ' ἡμέρας ἐκάστη, αἱ δὲ 5' αἱ ὕστεραι πέντε καὶ λ' ἡμέρας ἐκάστη· κατὰ σελήνην γὰρ ἄγουσιν τὸν
- 3 ἐνιαυτόν. οἱ δὲ πρυτανεύοντες αὐτῶν πρῶτον μὲν συσσιτοῦσιν ἐν τῇ θόλῳ, λαμβάνοντες ἀργύριον παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, ἔπειτα συνάγουσιν καὶ τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὸν δῆμον, τὴν μὲν οὖν¹ βουλὴν ὅσαι ἡμέραι,² πλὴν εἴαν τις ἀφέσιμος ᾖ, τὸν δὲ δῆμον τετράκις τῆς πρυτανείας ἐκάστης. καὶ ὅσα δεῖ χρηματίζειν τὴν βουλὴν, καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, καὶ ὅπου καθίζειν,³ οὗτοι προγράφουσι.
- 4 προγράφουσι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας οὗτοι· μίαν μὲν κυρίαν, ἐν ᾗ δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐπιχειροτονεῖν εἰ δοκοῦσι καλῶς ἄρχειν, καὶ περὶ σίτου καὶ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας χρηματίζειν, καὶ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοὺς βουλομένους ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰς ἀπογραφὰς τῶν δημευομένων ἀναγινώσκειν, καὶ τὰς λήξεις τῶν κλήρων καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήρων ἀναγινώσκειν,⁴ ὅπως μηδένα λάθῃ μηδὲν
- 5 ἐρῆμον γενόμενον· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἕκτης πρυτανείας πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ περὶ τῆς ὄστρακοφορίας ἐπιχειροτονίαν διδῶσιν εἰ δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ μή, καὶ συκοφαντῶν προβολὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν με-

¹ [οὖν] edd.

² ὅσημέραι Kenyon.

³ Wilamowitz-Kaibel: οτιουκαθίζει cod.

⁴ [ἀναγινώσκειν] Gennadios.

^a *i.e.* in every four years; the Great Panathenaic Festival, as also the Pythian, was held in the third Olympic year.

one Panathenaic Festival to the next.^a All military officers also are elected by show of hands.

The Council is elected by lot, and has five hundred 2 members, fifty from each tribe. The Presidency is filled by each tribe in turn, in an order settled by lot, each of the first four selected holding the office for thirty-six days and each of the latter six for thirty-five days ; for their year is divided into lunar months.^b Those of them serving as Presidents first dine to- 3 gether in the Round-house,^c receiving a sum of money from the state, and then convene meetings of the Council and the People, the Council indeed meeting on every day excepting holidays, but the People four times in each presidency. And the Presidents put up written notice of the business to be dealt with by the Council, and of each day's agenda, and of the place of meeting. They also put up written notice of the 4 meetings of the Assembly : one ^d sovereign meeting, at which the business is to vote the confirmation of the magistrates in office if they are thought to govern well, and to deal with matters of food supply and the defence of the country ; and on this day informations have to be laid by those who wish, and the inventories of estates being confiscated read, and the lists of suits about inheritance and heiresses, so that all may have cognizance of any vacancy in an estate that occurs. In the sixth presidency in 5 addition to the business specified they take a vote on the desirability of holding an ostracism, and on preliminary informations against persons charged as malicious informers, citizens and resident aliens, up

^b Alternate months of 29 and 30 days make a year of 354 days, as does $36 \times 4 + 35 \times 6$.

^c At the N.E. of the Areopagus, near the Council-chamber.

^d One in each presidential term of office.

τοίκων μέχρι τριῶν ἑκατέρων, ἄν τις ὑποσχόμενός
 6 τι μὴ ποιήσῃ τῷ δήμῳ. ἑτέραν δὲ ταῖς ἱκετηρίαις,
 ἐν ἧ ἢ θεὸς ὁ βουλόμενος ἱκετηρίαν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν
 βούληται καὶ ἰδίων καὶ δημοσίων διαλέξεται πρὸς
 τὸν δῆμον. αἱ δὲ δύο περὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσὶν, ἐν
 αἷς κελεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι τρία μὲν ἱερῶν χρηματίζων,
 τρία δὲ κήρυξιν καὶ πρεσβείαις, τρία δ' ὀσίων.
 χρηματίζουσιν δ' ἐνίοτε καὶ ἄνευ προχειροτονίας.
 προσέρχονται δὲ καὶ οἱ κήρυκες καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις
 τοῖς πρυτάνεσιν πρῶτον, καὶ οἱ τὰς ἐπιστολὰς
 φέροντες τούτοις ἀποδιδόασιν.

- 1 XLIV. Ἔστι δ' ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων εἷς ὁ
 λαχόν· οὗτος δ' ἐπιστατεῖ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν, καὶ
 οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε πλείω χρόνον οὔτε δις τὸν αὐτὸν
 γενέσθαι. τηρεῖ δ' οὗτος τὰς τε κλεῖς τὰς τῶν
 ἱερῶν ἐν οἷς τὰ χρήματ' ἔστιν καὶ τὰ¹ γράμματα
 τῇ πόλει, καὶ τὴν δημοσίαν σφραγίδα, καὶ μένειν
 ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ θόλῳ τοῦτόν ἔστιν καὶ τριττὸν
 2 τῶν πρυτάνεων ἣν ἂν οὗτος κελεύῃ. καὶ ἐπειδὰν
 συναγάγωσιν οἱ πρυτάνεις τὴν βουλήν ἢ τὸν δῆμον
 οὗτος κληροῖ προέδρους ἑνέα, ἕνα ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς
 ἑκάστης πλὴν τῆς πρυτανευούσης, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ
 τούτων ἐπιστάτην ἕνα, καὶ παραδίδωσι τὸ πρό-
 3 γραμμα αὐτοῖς· οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες τῆς τ' εὐ-
 κοσμίας ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν δεῖ χρηματίζειν
 προτιθέασιν καὶ τὰς χειροτονίας κρίνουσιν καὶ τὰ
 ἄλλα πάντα διοικοῦσιν καὶ τοῦ² ἀφείναι κύριοί εἰσιν.

¹ τὰ suppletum ab edd.

² τοῦ Richards: τουτ cod.: τοῦ δ' Hude.

to the number of not more than three cases of either class, and charges of failure to perform a service promised to the People. Another meeting 6 is given to petitions, at which anyone who wishes, after placing a suppliant-branch,^a may speak to the People about any matter he may wish whether public or private. The two other meetings deal with all other business, at which the laws enact that three cases of sacred matters are to be dealt with, three audiences for heralds and embassies, and three cases of secular matters. And sometimes they do business without a preliminary vote being taken. Also the Presidents give a first audience to heralds and to ambassadors, and to the Presidents dispatches are delivered by their bearers.

XLIV. The Presidents have a single Head elected 1 by lot; he holds office for a day and a night, and may not hold office longer, nor serve a second time. He is keeper of the keys of the temples in which the money and documents of the state are lodged, and of the state seal, and he is required to stay in the Round-house, and so is whichever Third^b of the Presidential Boards he orders. And whenever the 2 Presidents call a meeting of the Council or of the People, this official selects by lot nine Chairmen, one from each tribe except the tribe presiding, and ag in from these a single Head, and he hands over the list of agenda to them; and after receiving it they super- 3 intend procedure, bring forward the business to be dealt with, act as tellers, direct all the other business and have power to dismiss the meeting. A man

^a An olive-branch wreathed with wool was carried by the 'suppliant' and placed on the altar in the assembly.

^b See viii. 30 n.



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καὶ ἐπιστατήσαι μὲν οὐκ ἔξεστιν πλείον ἢ ἅπαξ ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ, προεδρεύειν δ' ἔξεστιν ἅπαξ ἐπὶ τῆς πρυτανείας ἐκάστης.

4 Ποιοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιρεσίας¹ στρατηγῶν καὶ ἱππάρχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχῶν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, καθ' ὃ τι ἂν τῷ δήμῳ δοκῆ· ποιοῦσι δ' οἱ μετὰ τὴν 5' πρυτανεύοντες ἐφ' ὧν ἂν εὐσημία γένηται. δεῖ δὲ προβούλευμα γενέσθαι καὶ περὶ τούτων.

1 XLV. Ἡ δὲ βουλὴ πρότερον μὲν ἦν κυρία καὶ χρήμασι ζημιῶσαι καὶ δῆσαι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι, καὶ Λυσίμαχον δ'² αὐτῆς ἀγαγούσης ὡς τὸν δήμιον, καθήμενον ἤδη μέλλοντα ἀποθιήσκειν Εὐμηλίδης ὁ Ἄλωπεκῆθεν ἀφείλετο, οὐ φάσκων δεῖν ἄνευ δικαστηρίου γνώσεως οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν ἀποθιήσκειν· καὶ κρίσεως ἐν δικαστηρίῳ γενομένης ὁ μὲν Λυσίμαχος ἀπέφυγεν, καὶ ἐπωνυμίαν ἔσχεν ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ τυπάνου· ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἀφείλετο τῆς βουλῆς τὸ θανατοῦν καὶ δεῖν καὶ χρήμασι ζημιοῦν, καὶ νόμον ἔθετο, ἂν τινος ἀδικεῖν ἢ βουλὴ καταγνώῃ ἢ ζημιώσῃ, τὰς καταγνώσεις καὶ τὰς ἐπιζημιώσεις εἰσάγειν τοὺς θεσμοθέτας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ ὃ τι ἂν οἱ δικασταὶ ψηφίσωνται τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι.

2 Κρίνει δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ βουλὴ τὰς πλείστας, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅσαι χρήματα διαχειρίζουσιν· οὐ κυρία δ' ἢ κρίσις ἀλλ' ἐφέσιμος εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις εἰσαγγέλλειν ἢν ἂν βούλωνται

¹ edd.: δεκαῖδεκαρχαιρεσίας (dittographia) cod.

² Λυσίμαχον δ' Παπαγεωργίος: καιλυσιμαχον codex.





cannot become Head more than once a year, but he can be Chairman once in each presidency.

They also conduct elections of Generals, and Cavalry Commanders and the other military officers of the Assembly, in whatever manner seems good to the People; and these elections are held by the first Board of Presidents, after the sixth Presidency,^a in which the term of office favourable weather-omens may occur. These matters also require a preliminary resolution of the Council.

XLV. The Council formerly had sovereign power to pass sentences of fine, imprisonment and death. But once it had brought Lysimachus to the public executioner, when, as he already sat awaiting death, Democles of the deme Alopceē rescued him, saying that no citizen ought to die without sentence by a jury; and when a trial was held in a jury-court Lysimachus got off, and he got the nickname of 'the man from the drum-stick'^b; and the People deprived the Council of the power to sentence to death and imprisonment and to impose fines, and made a law that all verdicts of guilty and penalties passed by the Council must be brought before the jury-court by the Legislators, and that any vote of the jurymen should be sovereign.

Trials of officials are held in most cases by the Council, particularly those of the officials who handle funds; but the verdict of the Council is not sovereign, but subject to appeal to the jury-court. Private citizens also have the right to lay an information against the Presidents holding the seventh or a later term of office, see xliii. 2. Rain, thunder, etc., were bad omens, and the regulation had a practical value for the open-air meetings in the Pnyx.

^a i. e. the man who escaped the bastinado.

τῶν ἀρχῶν μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις· ἔφεσις δὲ τῶν
τούτοις ἐστὶν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἶναι αὐτῶν τὴν
βουλήν καταγνώ.

3 Δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς βουλευτὰς τοὺς τὸν ὕστερον
ἐνιαυτὸν βουλεύσοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐνέα ἀρχοὺς καὶ
καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἦν ἀποδοκιμάσαι κυρία, νῦν δὲ
τούτοις¹ ἔφεσις ἐστὶν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.

4 Τούτων μὲν οὖν ἄκυρός ἐστιν ἡ βουλή, προσ-
βουλεύει δ' εἰς τὸν δῆμον, καὶ οὐκ ἔξεστω οὐδὲν
ἀπροβούλευτον οὐδ' ὅ τι ἂν μὴ προγράψωσι οἱ
πρυτάνεις ψηφίσασθαι τῷ δήμῳ· κατ' αὐτὰ γὰρ
ταῦτα ἔνοχός ἐστιν ὁ νίκησας γραφῆ παρανόμων.

1 XLVI. Ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν πεποιημένων
τριήρων καὶ τῶν σκευῶν καὶ τῶν νεωσοίκων, καὶ
ποιεῖται καινὰς² τριήρεις ἢ τετρήρεις, ὅποτέρας
ἂν ὁ δῆμος χειροτονήσῃ, καὶ σκευὴ ταύταις καὶ
νεωσοίκους· χειροτονεῖ δ' ἀρχιτέκτονας ὁ δῆμος
ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. ἂν δὲ μὴ παραδῶσιν ἐξειργασμένα
ταῦτα τῇ νέᾳ βουλήν, τὴν δωρεὰν οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς
λαβεῖν· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῆς ὕστερον βουλήσιν λαμβάνονται.
ποιεῖται δὲ τὰς τριήρεις, δέκα ἀνδρας ἐξ ἑκάστης

2 ἐλομένη τριηροποιούς. ἐξετάζει δὲ καὶ τὰ οἰκο-
δομήματα τὰ δημόσια πάντα, κἄν τις ἀδικεῖν οὐκ
δόξῃ τῷ τε δήμῳ τούτῳ ἀποφαίνει καὶ καταγνώσκει
καὶ παραδίδωσι δικαστηρίῳ.

1 XLVII. Συνδιοικεῖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρχαῖς
τὰ πλείστα. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οἱ ταμίαι τῆς
Ἀθηνᾶς εἰσὶ μὲν δέκα, κληροῦται δ' εἰς ἓκ τῆς
φυλῆς, ἓκ πεντακοσιομεδίμων κατὰ τὸν Σόλωνα

¹ <καὶ> τούτοις Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

² καινὰς Kenyon: καιναςδε cod.

³ καταγνώσκει Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

of illegal procedure against any official they may wish; but in these cases also there is an appeal to the People if the Council passes a verdict of guilty.

The Council also checks the qualifications of the 3 Councillors who are to hold office for the following year, and of the Nine Archons. And formerly it had sovereign power to reject them as disqualified, but now they have an appeal to the jury-court.

In these matters therefore the Council is not 4 sovereign, but it prepares resolutions for the People, and the People cannot pass any measures that have not been prepared by the Council and published in writing in advance by the Presidents; for the proposer who carries such a measure is *ipso facto* liable to penalty by indictment for illegal procedure.

XLVI. The Council also inspects triremes after 1 construction, and their rigging, and the naval sheds, and has new triremes or quadriremes, whichever the People votes for, built and rigged, and naval sheds built; but naval architects are elected by the People. If the outgoing Council does not hand over these works completed to the new Council, the members cannot draw their honorarium, which is payable when the next Council is in office. For the building of triremes it elects ten of its own members as Naval Constructors. It also inspects all public buildings, 2 and if it finds any commissioner in default it reports him to the People, and if it gets a verdict of guilty hands him over to a jury-court.

XLVII. The Council also shares in the administra- 1 tion of the other offices in most affairs. First there are the ten Treasurers of Athena, elected one from a tribe by lot, from the Five-hundred-bushel class, according to the law of Solon (which is still in force),

νόμον (ἔτι γὰρ ὁ νόμος κύριός ἐστι), ἄρχει δ' ὁ λαχὼν κἄν πάνυ πένης ἦ. παραλαμβάνουσι δὲ τὸ τε ἄγαλμα τῆς Ἀθηναίας καὶ τὰς Νίκας καὶ τὸν ἄλλον κόσμον καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐναντίον τῆς βουλῆς.

- 2 Ἐπιπέτ' οἱ πωληταὶ εἰ μὲν εἰσι, κληροῦνται δ' εἰς ἓκ τῆς φυλῆς. μισθοῦσι δὲ τὰ μισθώματα πάντα, καὶ τὰ μέταλλα πωλοῦσι καὶ τὰ τέλη μετὰ τοῦ ταμίου τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν ἡρημένων ἐναντίον τῆς βουλῆς, καὶ κυροῦσιν ὅτω ἂν ἡ βουλὴ χειροτονήσῃ, καὶ τὰ πραθέντα μέταλλα τὰ τ' ἐργάσιμα¹ τὰ εἰς τρία ἔτη πεπραμένα καὶ τὰ συγκεχωρημένα τ' εἰς . . .² ἔτη πεπραμένα. καὶ τὰς οὐσίας τῶν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου φευγόντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίον τῆς βουλῆς πωλοῦσιν, κατακυροῦσι δ' οἱ θ' ἄρχοντες. καὶ τὰ τέλη τὰ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν πεπραμένα ἀναγράφαντες εἰς λελευκωμένα γραμματεῖα τὸν τε πριάμενον καὶ ὅσου³ ἂν πρήξαι τῇ βουλῇ παραδιδόασιν. ἀναγράφουσιν δὲ χωρὶς μὲν οὖς δεῖ κατὰ πρυτανείαν ἐκάστην καταβάλλειν εἰς δέκα γραμματεῖα, χωρὶς δ' οὖς τρις τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, γραμματεῖον κατὰ τὴν καταβολὴν ἐκάστην ποιήσαντες, χωρὶς δ' οὖς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης πρυτανείας. ἀναγράφουσι δὲ καὶ τὰ χωρία καὶ τὰς οἰκίας ἀπογραφέντα καὶ πραθέντα ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ· καὶ γὰρ ταῦθ' οὗτοι πωλοῦσιν. ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν οἰκιῶν ἐν ε' ἔτεσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν τιμὴν ἀποδοῦναι,

¹ τὰ τ' <ἄργα καὶ τὰ> ἐργάσιμα Sandys.

² numerum rasum alii εἰ, alii γ' legunt.

³ erasum supplevit Wilamowitz.



and the one on whom the lot falls holds office even though he is quite a poor man. They take over the custody of the statue of Athena and the Victories^a and the other monuments and the funds in the presence of the Council.

Then there are the ten Vendors, elected by lot 2 one from a tribe. They farm out all public contracts and sell the mines and the taxes, with the co-operation of the Treasurer of Military Funds and those elected to superintend the Spectacle Fund, in the presence of the Council, and ratify the purchase for the person for whom the Council votes, and the mines sold and the workings that have been sold for three years and the concessions sold for . . .^b years. And the estates of persons banished by the Areopagus and of the others they sell at a meeting of the Council, but the sale is ratified by the Nine Archons. And they draw up and furnish to the Council a list written on whitened tablets^c of the taxes sold for a year, showing the purchaser and the price that he is paying. And 3 they draw up ten separate lists of those who have to pay in each presidency, and separate lists of those who have to pay three times in the year, making a list for each date of payment, and a separate list of those who have to pay in the ninth presidency. They also draw up a list of the farms and houses written off^d and sold in the jury-court; for these sales are also conducted by these officials. Payment must be made for purchases of houses within five years, and for had been ten, but eight were melted down for coinage towards the end of the Peloponnesian War.

^b The number half erased may be 10 or 3.

^c Wooden boards coated with chalk, on which notices were scratched; they could be easily rubbed off, *cf.* xlvi. 1.

^d *i.e.* registered as confiscated.

τῶν δὲ χωρίων ἐν δέκα· καταβάλλουσιν δὲ ταῦτα
 4 ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης πρυτανείας. εἰσφέρει δὲ καὶ ὁ
 βασιλεὺς τὰς μισθώσεις τῶν τεμνῶν ἀναγράψας
 ἐν γραμματείοις λελευκωμένοις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τού-
 των ἢ μὲν μίσθωσις εἰς ἔτη δέκα, καταβάλλεται
 δ' ἐπὶ τῆς θ' πρυτανείας· διὸ καὶ πλείστα χρή-
 5 ματα ἐπὶ ταύτης συλλέγεται τῆς πρυτανείας. εἰσ-
 φέρεται μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν βουλήν τὰ γραμματεῖα
 κατὰ τὰς καταβολὰς ἀναγεγραμμένα, τηρεῖ δ' ὁ
 δημόσιος· ὅταν δ' ἡ χρημάτων καταβολή, παρα-
 δίδωσι τοῖς ἀποδέκταις αὐτὰ ταῦτα καθελὼν ἀπὸ
 τῶν ἐπιστυλίων ὧν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δεῖ τὰ
 χρήματα καταβληθῆναι καὶ ἀπαλειφθῆναι, τὰ δ'
 ἄλλα ἀπόκειται χωρὶς ἵνα μὴ προεξαλειφθῆ.

1 XLVIII. Εἰσὶ δ' ἀποδέκται δέκα κεκληρωμένοι
 κατὰ φυλάς· οὗτοι δὲ παραλαβόντες τὰ γραμματεῖα
 ἀπαλείφουσι τὰ καταβαλλόμενα χρήματα ἐναντίον
 τῆς βουλῆς ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ καὶ πάλιν ἀπο-
 διδόασιν τὰ γραμματεῖα τῷ δημοσίῳ· κἄν τις ἐλλίπη
 καταβολὴν, ἐνταῦθ' ἐγγέγραπται, καὶ διπλασίαν
 ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐλλειφθὲν καταβάλλειν ἢ δεδέσθαι·
 καὶ ταῦτα εἰσπράττειν ἢ βουλή καὶ δῆσαι κυρία
 2 κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐστίν. τῇ μὲν οὖν προτεραίᾳ
 δέχονται τὰς καταβολὰς¹ καὶ μερίζουσι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς,
 τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ τὸν τε μερισμὸν εἰσφέρουσι γράψαντες
 ἐν σανίδι καὶ καταλέγουσιν ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ,
 καὶ προτιθέασιν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ εἴ τίς τινα οἶδεν
 ἀδικοῦντα περὶ τὸν μερισμὸν ἢ ἄρχοντα ἢ ιδιώτην,
 καὶ γνώμας ἐπιψηφίζουσιν εἴαν τίς τι δοκῆ ἀδικεῖν.

¹ τὰς καταβολὰς (vel τὰς πάσας) Kaibel: τα s cod.

farms within ten ; and they make these payments in the ninth presidency. Also the King-archon introduces the letting of domains, having made a list of them on whitened tablets. These also are let for ten years, and the rent is paid in the ninth presidency ; hence in that presidency a very large revenue comes in. The tablets written up with the list of payments are brought before the Council, but are in the keeping of the official clerk ; and whenever a payment of money is made, he takes down from the pillars and hands over to the receivers just these tablets showing the persons whose money is to be paid on that day and wiped off the record, but the other tablets are stored away separately in order that they may not be wiped off before payment is made.

XLVIII. There are ten Receivers elected by lot, one from each tribe ; these take over the tablets and wipe off^a the sums paid in the presence of the Council in the Council-chamber, and give the tablets back again to the official clerk ; and anybody that has defaulted in a payment is entered on them, and has to pay double the amount of his arrears or go to prison ; and the legal authority to impose this fine and imprisonment is the Council. On the first day, therefore, they receive the payments and apportion them among the magistrates, and on the second day they introduce the apportionment, written on a wooden tablet, and recount it in the Council-chamber, and bring forward in the Council any case in which somebody knows of anyone, either an official or a private person, having committed a wrong in relation to the apportionment, and put resolutions to the vote in case anyone is found to have committed any wrong.

^a See xlvii. 2 n.

3 Κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ λογιστὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν οἱ βουλευταὶ
 δέκα τοὺς λογιουμένους ταῖς ἀρχαῖς κατὰ τὴν
 4 πρυτανείαν ἐκάστην. κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ εὐθύνους,
 ἓνα τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης, καὶ παρέδρους β' ἐκάστῳ
 τῶν εὐθύνων, οἷς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι ταῖς ἀγοραῖς¹
 κατὰ τὸν ἐπώνυμον τὸν τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης
 καθῆσθαι, κἄν τις βούληταί τινι τῶν τὰς εὐθύνας
 ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δεδωκότων ἐντὸς γ' ἡμερῶν
 ἀφ' ἧς ἔδωκε τὰς εὐθύνας εὐθυναν ἂν τ' ἰδίαν ἂν τε
 δημοσίαν ἐμβαλέσθαι, γράψας εἰς πινάκιον λελευκω-
 μένον τοῦνομα τό θ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φεύγοντος
 καὶ τὸ ἀδίκημ' ὃ τι ἂν ἐγκαλῆ, καὶ τίμημα ἐπιγρα-
 ψάμενος ὃ τι ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῆ, δίδωσιν τῷ εὐθύνῳ.
 5 ὁ δὲ λαβὼν τοῦτο καὶ ἀναγνούς, εἰάν² καταγνῶ
 παραδίδωσιν τὰ μὲν ἴδια τοῖς δικασταῖς τοῖς κατὰ
 δήμους τοῖς τὴν φυλὴν ταύτην εἰσάγουσιν,³ τὰ
 δὲ δημόσια τοῖς θεσμοθέταις ἐπιγράφει. οἱ δὲ
 θεσμοθέται εἰάν παραλάβωσιν πάλιν εἰσάγουσιν
 ταύτην τὴν⁴ εὐθυναν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ ὃ τι
 ἂν γνῶσιν οἱ δικασταὶ τοῦτο κύριόν ἐστιν.

1 XLIX. Δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἢ βουλή,
 κἄν μὲν τις καλὸν ἵππον ἔχων κακῶς δοκῆ
 τρέφειν, ζημιοῖ τῷ σίτῳ, τοῖς δὲ μὴ δυναμένοις
 ἀκολουθεῖν ἢ μὴ θέλουσι μένειν ἀλλ' ἀνάγουσι⁵
 τροχὸν ἐπὶ τὴν γνάθον ἐπιβάλλει, καὶ ὁ τοῦτο⁶
 παθὼν ἀδόκιμός ἐστι. δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς

¹ Kenyon, sed γ incertum, op desunt.

² εἰάν Herwerden: εανμεν cod.

³ δικάζουσιν Richards.

⁴ ταύτην ante τὴν supplet Blass.

⁵ ἀλλ' ἀνάγουσι Blass, sed incertum: ἀλλ' ἀναγ<ώγοις> οὔσι ('unbroken') Wyse.

⁶ γνάθον . . . τοῦτο Blass (et partim alii): γναθ . . . ουτο cod.

The Council also elect by lot ten of their own body 3
 as Accountants, to keep the accounts of the officials
 for each presidency. Also they elect by lot Auditors, 4
 one for each tribe, and two Assessors for each Auditor,
 who are required to sit at the tribal meetings accord-
 ing to the hero after whom each tribe is named,^a
 and if anyone wishes to prefer a charge, of either a
 private or a public nature, against any magistrate
 who has rendered his accounts before the jury-
 court, within three days from the day on which he
 rendered his accounts, he writes on a tablet his
 own name and that of the defendant, and the
 offence of which he accuses him, adding whatever
 fine he thinks suitable, and gives it to the Auditor ;
 and the Auditor takes it and reads it, and if he con- 5
 siders the charge proved, he hands it over, if a private
 case, to those jurymen in the villages who introduced
 this tribe, and if a public suit, he marks it to the
 Legislators. And the Legislators, if they receive it,
 introduce this audit again before the jury-court, and
 the verdict of the jurymen holds good.

XLIX. The Council also inspects the Knights' 1
 chargers, and if anybody having a good horse keeps it
 in bad condition, it fines him the cost of the feed, and
 horses that cannot keep up with the squadron or
 will not stay in line but jib it brands on the jaw
 with the sign of a wheel, and a horse so treated
 has failed to pass the inspection. It also inspects

^a *i.e.* one Auditor and two Assessors are assigned to each tribe, the assignment being indicated by the name of the hero after whom the tribe was named. See liii. 5 n.

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- προδρόμους ὅσοι ἂν αὐτῇ δοκῶσιν ἐπιτήδειοι προδρομεύειν εἶναι, κἄν τιν' ἀποχειροτονήσῃ, καταβέβηκεν οὗτος. δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀμίππους, κἄν τινα ἀποχειροτονήσῃ, πέπαυται μισθοφορῶν
- 2 οὗτος. τοὺς δ' ἱππέας καταλέγουσιν οἱ καταλογεῖς, οὓς ἂν ὁ δῆμος χειροτονήσῃ δέκα ἄνδρας· οὓς δ' ἂν καταλέξωσι παραδιδόασι τοῖς ἱππάρχοις καὶ φυλάρχοις, οὗτοι δὲ παραλαβόντες εἰσφέρουσι τὸν κατάλογον εἰς τὴν βουλήν καὶ τὸν πίνακα ἀνοίξαντες ἐν ᾧ κατασεσημασμένα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἱππέων ἐστί, τοὺς μὲν ἐξομνυμένους τῶν πρότερον ἐγγεγραμμένων μὴ δυνατοὺς εἶναι τοῖς σώμασιν ἱππεύειν ἐξαλείφουσι, τοὺς δὲ κατειλεγμένους καλοῦσι, κἄν μὲν τις ἐξομόσῃται μὴ δύνασθαι τῷ σώματι ἱππεύειν ἢ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦτον ἀφιαῖσιν, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐξομνύμενον διαχειροτονοῦσιν οἱ βουλευταὶ πρότερον ἐπιτήδειός ἐστιν ἱππεύειν ἢ οὐ· κἄν μὲν χειροτονήσωσιν, ἐγγράφουσιν εἰς τὸν πίνακα, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τοῦτον ἀφιαῖσιν.
- 3 Ἐκρινεν δέ ποτε καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα καὶ¹ τὸν πέπλον ἢ βουλή, νῦν δὲ τὸ δικαστήριον τὸ λαχόν· ἐδόκουν γὰρ οὗτοι καταχαρίζεσθαι τὴν κρίσιν. καὶ τῆς ποιήσεως τῶν Νικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄθλων τῶν εἰς τὰ Παναθηναῖα συνεπιμελεῖται μετὰ τοῦ ταμίου τῶν στρατιωτικῶν.
- 4 Δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους ἢ βουλή· νόμος γάρ ἐστιν ὃς κελεύει τοὺς ἐντὸς τριῶν μῶν κεκτημένους καὶ τὸ σῶμα πεπηρωμένους ὥστε

¹ καὶ] τὰ εἰς coniecit Blass.

^a Woven for Athena at every Panathenaic Festival and carried in the procession.

the mounted skirmishers, to see which it considers fit for skirmishing duty, and any that it votes to reject are thereby deposed from that rank. It also inspects the foot-soldiers that fight in the ranks of the cavalry, and anyone it votes against is thereby stopped from drawing his pay. The Knights' ² roll is made by the ten Roll-keepers elected by the People; and they pass on the names of all whom they enroll to the Cavalry Commanders and Tribe Commanders, and these take over the roll and bring it into the Council, and opening the tablet on which the names of the Knights have been inscribed, they delete those among the persons previously entered who claim on oath exemption from cavalry service on the ground of bodily incapacity, and summon those enrolled, and grant discharge to anyone who claims exemption on oath on the ground of bodily incapacity for cavalry service or lack of means, and as to those who do not claim exemption the Councillors decide by vote whether they are fit for cavalry service or not; and if they vote for them as fit they enter them on the tablet, but if not, these also they dismiss.

At one time the Council used also to judge the ³ patterns for the Robe,^a but now this is done by the jury-court selected by lot, because the Council was thought to show favouritism in its decision. And the Council has joint supervision with the Steward of the Army Funds over the construction of the Victories and over the prizes for the Panathenaic Games.

The Council also inspects the Incapables; for ⁴ there is a law enacting that persons possessing less than 3 minae ^b and incapacitated by bodily infirmity

^b See iv. 4 n.

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μη δύνασθαι μηδὲν ἔργον ἐργάζεσθαι δοκιμάζειν μὲν τὴν βουλήν, διδόναι δὲ δημοσίᾳ τροφήν δύο ὀβολοὺς ἐκάστῳ τῆς ἡμέρας. καὶ ταμίας ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς κληρωτός.

Συνδιοικεῖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρχαῖς τὰ πλείσθ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.

- 1 L. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς διοικούμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν. κληροῦνται δὲ καὶ ἱερῶν ἐπισκευασταὶ δέκα ἄνδρες, οἳ λαμβάνοντες τριάκοντα μνᾶς παρὰ τῶν ἀποδεκτῶν ἐπισκευάζουσιν τὰ μάλιστα
- 2 δεόμενα τῶν ἱερῶν, καὶ ἀστυνόμοι δέκα· τούτων δὲ ε' μὲν ἄρχουσιν ἐν Πειραιεῖ πέντε δ' ἐν ἄστει, καὶ τὰς τε αὐλητρίδας καὶ τὰς ψαλτρίδας καὶ τὰς κιθαριστρίδας οὗτοι σκοποῦσιν ὅπως μὴ πλείονος ἢ δυεῖν δραχμαῖς μισθωθήσονται, κἂν πλείους τὴν αὐτὴν σπουδάσωσι λαβεῖν οὗτοι διακληροῦσι καὶ τῷ λαχόντι μισθοῦσιν. καὶ ὅπως τῶν κοπρολόγων μηδεὶς ἐντὸς ἰ' σταδίων τοῦ τείχους καταβαλεῖ κόπρον ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς κωλύουσι κατοικοδομεῖν καὶ δρυφάκτους ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁδῶν ὑπερτείνειν καὶ ὀχετοὺς μετεώρους εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν ἔκρουν ἔχοντας ποιεῖν καὶ τὰς θυρίδας εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν ἀνοίγειν· καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἀπογιγνομένους ἀναιροῦσιν, ἔχοντες δημοσίους ὑπηρέτας.
- 1 LI. Κληροῦνται δὲ καὶ ἀγορανόμοι ἰ',¹ πέντε μὲν εἰς Πειραιέα, ε' δ' εἰς ἄστυ. τούτοις δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων προστέτακται τῶν ὠνίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πάντων, ὅπως καθαρὰ καὶ ἀκίβδηλα πωλῆται.
- 2 Κληροῦνται δὲ καὶ μετρονόμοι ἰ',¹ πέντε μὲν εἰς ἄστυ, ε' δὲ εἰς Πειραιέα· καὶ οὗτοι τῶν μέτρων

¹ numerum ἰ' bis supplevit Papageorgios.

from doing any work are to be inspected by the Council, which is to give them a grant for food at the public expense at the rate of 2 obols^a a day each. And there is a Treasurer for these persons, elected by lot.

The Council also shares in the administration of virtually the greatest number of the duties of the other offices.

L. These then are the matters administered by the 1 Council. Also ten men are elected by lot as Restorers of Temples, who draw 30 minae^b from the Receivers and repair the temples that most require it; and ten City Controllers, five of whom hold office in Peiraeus 2 and five in the city; it is they who supervise the flute-girls and harp-girls and lyre-girls to prevent their receiving fees of more than two drachmas,^b and if several persons want to take the same girl these officials cast lots between them and hire her out to the winner. And they keep watch to prevent any scavenger from depositing ordure within a mile and a quarter of the wall; and they prevent the construction of buildings encroaching on and balconies overhanging the roads, of overhead conduits with an overflow into the road, and of windows opening outward on to the road; and they remove for burial the bodies of persons who die on the roads, having public slaves for this service.

LI. Also Market-controllers are elected by lot, five 1 for Peiraeus and five for the city. To these the laws assign the superintendence of all merchandise, to prevent the sale of adulterated and spurious articles.

Also ten Controllers of Measures are appointed by 2 lot, five for the city and five for Peiraeus, who super-

^a Say threepence.

^b See iv. 4 n.

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καὶ τῶν σταθμῶν ἐπιμελοῦνται πάντων, ὅπως οἱ πωλοῦντες χρήσονται¹ δικαίως.

3 Ἦσαν δὲ καὶ σιτοφύλακες κληρωτοὶ ἰ,² πέντε μὲν εἰς Πειραιέα, πέντε δ' εἰς ἄστν, νῦν δ' εἴκοσι μὲν εἰς ἄστν, πεντεκαίδεκα δ' εἰς Πειραιέα. οὗτοι δ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πρῶτον μὲν ὅπως ὁ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σίτος ἀργὸς ὄνσιος ἔσται δικαίως, ἔπειθ' ὅπως οἱ τε μυλωθροὶ πρὸς τὰς τιμὰς τῶν κριθῶν τὰ ἄλφιστα πωλήσουσιν καὶ οἱ ἀρτοπῶλαι πρὸς τὰς τιμὰς τῶν πυρῶν τοὺς ἄρτους, καὶ τὸν σταθμὸν ἄγοντας ὅσον ἂν οὗτοι τάξωσιν· ὁ γὰρ νόμος τούτους κελεύει τάττειν.

4 Ἐμπορίου δ' ἐπιμελητὰς δέκα κληροῦσιν· τούτοις δὲ προστέτακται τῶν τ' ἐμπορίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦ σίτου τοῦ καταπλέοντος εἰς τὸ σιτικόν³ ἐμπόριον τὰ δύο μέρη τοὺς ἐμπόρους ἀναγκάζειν εἰς τὸ ἄστν κομίζειν.

1 LII. Καθιστᾶσι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἔνδεκα κληρωτοὺς, ἐπιμελησομένους τῶν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, καὶ τοὺς ἀπαγομένους κλέπτας καὶ τοὺς ἀνδραποδιστὰς καὶ τοὺς λωποδύτας ἂν μὲν ὁμολογῶσι θανάτῳ ζημιώσοντας, ἂν δ' ἀμφισβητῶσιν εἰσάξοντας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, κἂν μὲν ἀποφύγωσιν ἀφήσοντας, εἰ δὲ μὴ τότε θανατώσοντας, καὶ τὰ ἀπογραφόμενα χωρία καὶ οἰκίας εἰσάξοντας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ τὰ δόξαντα δημόσια εἶναι παραδώσοντας τοῖς πωληταῖς, καὶ τὰς ἐνδείξεις εἰσάξοντας—καὶ γὰρ ταύτας εἰσάγουσιν οἱ ἔνδεκα· εἰσάγουσι δὲ τῶν ἐνδείξεων τινὰς καὶ οἱ θεσμοθέται.

¹ χρήσονται Rutherford.

² ἰ suppletum ex Harpocracione a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

³ ἀστικόν vel Ἀττικόν edd. (v.ll. ex Harpocracione).

intend all measures and weights, in order that sellers may use just ones.

Also there used to be ten Corn-wardens elected by 3 lot, five for Peiraeus and five for the city, but now there are twenty for the city and fifteen for Peiraeus. Their duties are first to see that unground corn in the market is on sale at a fair price, and next that millers sell barley-meal at a price corresponding with that of barley, and baker-women loaves at a price corresponding with that of wheat, and weighing the amount fixed by the officials—for the law orders that these shall fix the weights.

They elect by lot ten Port-superintendents, whose 4 duty is to superintend the harbour-markets and to compel the traders to bring to the city two-thirds of the sea-borne corn that reaches the corn-market.

LII. They also appoint the Eleven, officers chosen 1 by lot to superintend the persons in the prison, and to punish with death people arrested as thieves and kidnappers and footpads that confess their guilt, but if they deny the charge to bring them before the Jury-court, and if they are acquitted discharge them, but if not then to execute them ; and to bring before the Jury-court lists of farms and houses declared to be public property and to hand over to the Vendors ^a those that it is decided to confiscate ; and to bring in informations—for these too are brought in by the Eleven, though the Legislators also bring in some informations.

^a See xlvii. 2.

- 2 Κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ εἰσαγωγέας εἴ ἄνδρας, οἱ τὰς ἐμμήνους εἰσάγουσι δίκας, δυοῖν φυλαῖν ἕκαστος. εἰσὶ δ' ἔμμηνοι προικός, ἔάν τις ὀφείλων μὴ ἀποδῶ, κἄν τις ἐπὶ δραχμῇ δανεισάμενος ἀποστερῇ, κἄν τις ἐν ἀγορᾷ βουλόμενος ἐργάζεσθαι δανείσῃται παρά τινος ἀφορμῇ· ἔτι δ' αἰκείας καὶ ἔρανικὰς καὶ κοινωνικὰς καὶ ἀνδραπόδων καὶ ὑποζυγίων
- 3 καὶ τριηραρχίας καὶ τραπεζιτικὰς.¹ οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταύτας δικάζουσιν ἐμμήνους εἰσάγοντες, οἱ δ' ἀποδέκται τοῖς τελώναις καὶ κατὰ τῶν τελωνῶν, τὰ μὲν μέχρι δέκα δραχμῶν ὄντες κύριοι, τὰ δ' ἄλλ' εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσάγοντες ἔμμηνα.
- 1 LIII. Κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ² τετταράκοντα, τέτταρας ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης, πρὸς οὓς τὰς ἄλλας δίκας λαγχάνουσιν· οἱ πρότερον μὲν ἦσαν τριάκοντα καὶ κατὰ δήμους περιόντες³ ἐδίκαζον, μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ὀλιγαρχίαν τετταράκοντα γεγό-
- 2 νασιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν μέχρι δέκα δραχμῶν αὐτοτελεῖς εἰσὶ δικάζειν, τὰ δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦτο τὸ τίμημα τοῖς διαιτηταῖς παραδιδόασιν. οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες ἔαν μὴ δύνωνται διαλῦσαι, γιγνώσκουσι, κἄν μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀρέσκη τὰ γνωσθέντα καὶ ἐμμένωσιν, ἔχει τέλος ἢ δίκη. ἂν δ' ὁ ἕτερος ἐφῆ τῶν ἀντιδίκων εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐμβalόντες τὰς μαρτυρίας καὶ τὰς προκλήσεις καὶ τοὺς νόμους εἰς ἔχίνους, χωρὶς μὲν τὰς τοῦ διώκοντος χωρὶς δὲ τὰς τοῦ φεύγοντος, καὶ τούτους κατασημηνάμενοι

¹ ἔρανικαὶ . . . κοινωνικαὶ . . . τραπεζιτικαὶ Bury.

² καὶ <τοὺς> Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

³ περιόντες Kenyon.

^a A drachma a mina a month = 12 per cent per annum.

^b i.e. particularly an action to recover expenses, brought

They also elect by lot five men as Introducers, who 2 introduce the cases to be tried within a month, each official those of two tribes. These cases include prosecutions for non-payment of dowry due, actions for the recovery of loans borrowed at a drachma interest,^a and of capital borrowed from one party by another wishing to do business in the market; and also actions about outrage, friendly-society business, partnerships, slaves, draft animals, naval command,^b and bank cases. These officials, therefore, bring into court and decide 3 these suits within a month; but the Receivers^c decide suits brought by tax-farmers or against them, having power to deal summarily with suits up to ten francs but bringing the others into the Jury-court within a month.

LIII. They also elect by lot forty persons,^d four 1 from each tribe, who are the court before which the other suits are brought; formerly they were thirty and went on circuit trying cases in each parish, but since the oligarchy of the Thirty their number has been raised to forty. They have summary jurisdiction 2 in claims not exceeding ten drachmas, but suits above that value they pass on to the Arbitrators. These take over the cases, and if they are unable to effect a compromise, they give judgement, and if both parties are satisfied with their judgement and abide by it, that ends the suit. But if one of the two parties appeals to the Jury-court, they put the witnesses' evidence and the challenges and the laws concerned into deed-boxes, those of the prosecutor and those of the defendant separately, and seal them up, and by the captain of a trireme against his successor who had failed to relieve him when his year of office was over.

^c See xlvi. 1.

^d Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'the Forty.'

καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ διαιτητοῦ γεγραμμένην ἐν
 γραμματείῳ προσαρτήσαντες, παραδιδόασιν τοῖς δ'
 3 τοῖς τὴν φυλὴν τοῦ φεύγοντος δικάζουσιν. οἱ δὲ
 παραλαβόντες εἰσάγουσιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, τὰ
 μὲν ἐντὸς χιλίων εἰς ἓνα καὶ διακοσίους, τὰ δ'
 ὑπὲρ χιλίας εἰς ἓνα καὶ τετρακοσίους. οὐκ ἔξεστι
 δ' οὔτε νόμοις οὔτε προκλήσεσι οὔτε μαρτυρίαις
 ἀλλ' ἢ ταῖς παρὰ τοῦ διαιτητοῦ χρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰς
 4 τοὺς ἐχίνους ἐμβεβλημέναις. διαιτηταὶ δ' εἰσὶν οἷς
 ἂν ἐξήκοστον ἔτος ἦ· τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
 ἀρχόντων καὶ τῶν ἐπωνύμων· εἰσὶ γὰρ ἐπώνυμοι
 δέκα μὲν οἱ τῶν φυλῶν, δύο δὲ καὶ τετταράκοντα
 οἱ τῶν ἡλικιῶν· οἱ δ' ἔφηβοι ἐγγραφόμενοι πρό-
 τερον μὲν εἰς λελευκωμένα γραμματεῖα ἐνεγρά-
 φοντο, καὶ ἐπεγράφοντο αὐτοῖς ὃ τ' ἀρχων ἐφ' οὗ
 ἐνεγράφησαν καὶ ὁ ἐπώνυμος ὁ τῷ προτέρῳ¹ ἔτει
 δεδαιτηκῶς, νῦν δ' εἰς στήλην χαλκῆν ἀναγρά-
 φονται, καὶ ἴσταται ἡ στήλη πρὸ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου
 5 παρὰ τοὺς ἐπώνυμους. τὸν δὲ τελευταῖον τῶν
 ἐπώνυμων λαβόντες οἱ τετταράκοντα διανέμουσιν
 αὐτοῖς τὰς διαίτας καὶ ἐπικληροῦσιν ἃς ἕκαστος
 διαιτήσει· καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἃς ἂν ἕκαστος λάχῃ
 διαίτας ἐκδαιτηῶν, ὃ γὰρ νόμος ἂν τις μὴ γένηται
 διαιτητῆς τῆς ἡλικίας αὐτῷ καθηκούσης ἄτιμον
 εἶναι κελεύει, πλὴν ἂν τύχῃ ἀρχὴν ἀρχων τινὰ ἐν
 ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ ἢ ἀποδημῶν· οὗτοι δ' ἀτελεῖς

¹ πρότερον edd. hiatus causa.

^a Of the 100 Attic heroes 10 gave their names to the Tribes (see xxi. 6), and of the remaining 90, 42 names were affixed to the successive years of active citizenship, military service being from the age of 18 to 59, and those in their 60th year serving as *diaietetae*. As each year expired, the

attach to them a copy of the Arbitrator's verdict written on a tablet, and hand them over to the four judges taking the cases of the defendant's tribe. When these have received them they bring them before 3 the Jury-court, claims within 1000 drachmas before a court of two hundred and one jurymen, and claims above that before one of four hundred and one. The litigants are not permitted to put in laws or challenges or evidence other than those passed on by the Arbitrator, that have been put into the deed-boxes. Persons fifty-nine years of age may serve as Arbi- 4 trators, as appears from the regulations for the Archons and Name-heroes; for the Heroes giving their names to the Tribes are ten in number and those of the years of military age forty-two,^a and the cadets used formerly when being enrolled to be inscribed on whitened tablets, and above them the Archon ^b in whose term of office they were enrolled and the Name-hero of those that had been Arbitrators the year before, but now they are inscribed on a copper pillar and this is set up in front of the Council-chamber at the side of the list of Name-heroes. The Forty 5 take the last one of the Name-heroes and distribute the arbitration-cases among those of his year and assign by lot the cases that each is to arbitrate upon; and it is compulsory for each of them to complete the arbitration of the cases allotted to him, for the law enacts the disfranchisement of anybody who does not become Arbitrator when of the proper age, unless he happens to hold some office in that year or to be abroad, these being the only grounds of exemption. Name-hero of the men now passing the age of 60 was transferred to those now just 18.

^b *i.e.* the senior of the Nine Archons, called Ἐπώνυμος because his name dated the year.

6 εἰσὶ μόνοι. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ εἰσαγγέλλειν εἰς τοὺς
 διαιτητὰς¹ ἂν τις ἀδικηθῆ ὑπὸ τοῦ διαιτητοῦ, κἄν
 τινος καταγνώσιν ἀτιμοῦσθαι κελεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι.

7 ἔφεσις δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τούτοις. χρῶνται δὲ τοῖς
 ἐπωνύμοις καὶ πρὸς τὰς στρατείας, καὶ ὅταν
 ἡλικίαν ἐκπέμπωσι προγράφουσιν ἀπὸ τίνος ἄρχον-
 τος καὶ ἐπωνύμου μέχρι τίνων δεῖ στρατεύεσθαι.

1 LIV. Κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ τάσδε τὰς ἀρχάς· ὄδο-
 ποιοὺς πέντε, οἷς προστέτακται δημοσίους ἐργάτας

2 ἔχουσι τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐπισκευάζειν· καὶ λογιστὰς δέκα
 καὶ συνηγόρους τούτοις δέκα, πρὸς οὓς ἅπαντας
 ἀνάγκη τοὺς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄρξαντας λόγον ἀπενεγκεῖν.
 οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ² μόνοι τοῖς ὑπευθύνοις λογι-
 ζόμενοι καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσ-
 ἄγοντες. κἄν μὲν τινα κλέπτοντ' ἐξελέγξωσι,
 κλοπὴν οἱ δικασταὶ καταγινώσκουσι, καὶ τὸ
 γνωσθὲν ἀποτίνεται δεκαπλοῦν· ἂν δὲ τινα δῶρα
 λαβόντα ἐπιδείξωσι καὶ καταγνώσιν οἱ δικασταί,
 δῶρων τιμῶσιν, ἀποτίνεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο δεκα-
 πλοῦν· ἂν δ' ἀδικεῖν καταγνώσιν, ἀδικίου τιμῶσιν,
 ἀποτίνεται δὲ τοῦθ' ἀπλοῦν ἂν πρὸ τῆς θ' πρυ-
 τανείας ἐκτείση τις, εἰ δὲ μή, διπλοῦται· τὸ δὲ³
 δεκαπλοῦν οὐ διπλοῦται.

3 Κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ γραμματέα τὸν κατὰ πρυτα-
 νείαν καλούμενον, ὃς τῶν γραμμάτων⁴ ἐστὶ κύριος
 καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τὰ γινόμενα φυλάττει καὶ
 τᾶλλα πάντα ἀντιγράφεται καὶ παρακάθηται τῇ
 βουλῇ. πρότερον μὲν οὖν οὗτος ἦν χειροτονητός,

¹ δικαστὰς Kenyon.

² εἰσιν οἱ Jos. Mayor: εἰσι cod. ³ δὲ supplevit Kenyon.

⁴ ex Harpocracione edd.: γραμματεων cod.

^a Perhaps διαιτητὰς is a mistake for δικαστὰς, 'jurymen.'

Anybody unjustly dealt with by the Arbitrator may 6
 indict him before the Arbitrators,^a and the laws
 prescribe the penalty of disfranchisement for an
 Arbitrator found guilty; but the Arbitrators also
 have an appeal. The Name-heroes also are employed 7
 to regulate military service; when soldiers of a
 certain age are being sent on an expedition, a notice
 is posted stating the years that they are to serve,
 indicated by the Archon and Name-hero of the
 earliest and latest.

LIV. They also elect by lot the following officials: 1
 five Highway-constructors, whose duty is to repair
 the roads, with workmen who are public slaves; and 2
 ten Auditors and ten Assessors with them, to whom
 all retiring officials have to render account. For these
 are the only magistrates who audit the returns of
 officials liable to account and bring the audits before
 the Jury-court. And if an official is proved by them
 to have committed peculation, the Jury convict him
 of peculation, and the fine is ten times the amount of
 which he is found guilty; and if they show that a man
 has taken bribes and the Jury convict, they assess the
 value of the bribes and in this case also the fine is ten
 times the amount; but if they find him guilty of
 maladministration, they assess the damage, and the
 fine paid is that amount only, provided that it is paid
 before the ninth presidency; otherwise it is doubled.
 But a fine of ten times the amount is not doubled.

They also appoint by lot the officer called Clerk for 3
 the Presidency, who is responsible for documents, is
 keeper of the decrees that are passed and supervises
 the transcription of all other documents, and who
 attends the sittings of the Council. Formerly this
 officer was elected by show of hands, and the most

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καὶ τοὺς ἐνδοξοτάτους καὶ πιστοτάτους ἐχειροτόνου, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς στήλαις πρὸς ταῖς συμμαχίαις καὶ προξενίαις καὶ πολιτείαις οὗτος ἀναγράφεται· νῦν δὲ γέγονε κληρωτός. κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους¹ ἕτερον ὃς παρακάθεται τῇ βουλῇ, καὶ ἀντιγράφεται καὶ οὗτος πάντας. χειροτονεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ δῆμος γραμματέα τὸν ἀναγνωσόμενον αὐτῷ καὶ τῇ βουλῇ, καὶ οὗτος οὐδενός ἐστι κύριος ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀναγνώου.

Κληροῖ δὲ καὶ ἱεροποιοὺς δέκα τοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐκθύματα καλουμένους, οἱ τὰ τε μαντευτὰ ἱερὰ θύουσιν, κἄν τι καλλιερῆσαι δέη καλλιεροῦσι μετὰ τῶν μάντεων. κληροῖ δὲ καὶ ἑτέρους δέκα τοὺς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν καλουμένους, οἱ θυσίας τέ τινας θύουσι καὶ τὰς πεντετηρίδας ἀπάσας διοικοῦσιν πλὴν Παναθηναίων. εἰσὶ δὲ πεντετηρίδες μία μὲν ἢ εἰς Δῆλον (ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπτετηρὶς ἐνταῦθα), δευτέρα δὲ Βραυρώνια, τρίτη δὲ Ἡράκλεια, τετάρτη δὲ Ἐλευσίνα· ἐ' δὲ Παναθήναια, καὶ τούτων οὐδεμιᾶ² ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐγγίνεται. νῦν δὲ πρόσκειται καὶ Ἡφαίστια ἐπὶ³ Κηφισοφῶντος ἄρχοντος.

Κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ εἰς Σαλαμίνα ἄρχοντα καὶ εἰς Πειραιέα δήμαρχον, οἱ τὰ τε Διονύσια ποιοῦσι ἑκατέρωθι καὶ χορηγοὺς καθιστᾶσιν· ἐν Σαλαμίνι δὲ καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀναγράφεται.

¹ e Polluce Kenyon: *επιτουτοινομον* cod.

² Wilamowitz-Kaibel: *ουδεμια* cod.

³ ἀπὸ Blass.

^a An honourable office assigned to a citizen of another state who represented Athenian interests there.

^b *i.e.* taking place once in every four or six years: in Greek this is called "five-yearly," "seven-yearly."

distinguished and trustworthy men used to be elected, for this officer's name is inscribed on the monumental slabs above records of alliances and appointments to consulships ^a and grants of citizenship; but now it has been made an office elected by lot. They also elect ⁴ by lot another officer to superintend the laws, who attends the sittings of the Council, and he also has copies made of all the laws. The People also elect ⁵ by show of hands a clerk to read documents to the Assembly and to the Council; he has no duties except as reader.

The People also elects by lot the ten sacrificial ⁶ officers entitled Superintendents of Expiations, who offer the sacrifices prescribed by oracle, and for business requiring omens to be taken watch for good omens in co-operation with the soothsayers. It also ⁷ elects by lot ten others called the Yearly Sacrificial Officers, who perform certain sacrifices and administer all the four-yearly ^b festivals except the Panathenaic Festival. One of the four-yearly festivals is the Mission to Delos (and there is also a six-yearly ^c festival there), a second is the Brauronia, a third the Heraclea, and a fourth the Eleusinia; a fifth is the Panathenaic, which is not held in the same year as any of the others mentioned. There has now been added the Festival of Hephaestus, instituted in the archonship of Cephisophon.

329 B.C.

They also elect by lot an archon for Salamis and ⁸ a demarch for Peiraeus, who hold the Festivals of Dionysus ^d in each of those places and appoint Choir-leaders; at Salamis the name of the archon is recorded in an inscription.

^c Both the text and the facts are most uncertain.

^d τὰ Διονύσια τὰ κατ' ἀγροῦς.

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- 1 LV. Αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ κληρωταὶ τε καὶ κύριαι τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων¹ εἰσίν. οἱ δὲ καλούμενοι ἐννέα ἄρχοντες τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὄν τρόπον καθίσταντο εἴρηται· νῦν δὲ κληροῦσιν θεσμοθέτας μὲν ἐξ καὶ γραμματέα τούτοις, ἔτι δ' ἄρχοντα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ πολέμαρχον, κατὰ μέρος
- 2 ἐξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς. δοκιμάζονται δ' οὗτοι πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ τοῖς φ', πλὴν τοῦ γραμματέως, οὗτος δ' ἐν δικαστηρίῳ μόνον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄρχοντες (πάντες γὰρ καὶ οἱ κληρωτοὶ καὶ οἱ χειροτονητοὶ δοκιμασθέντες ἄρχουσιν), οἱ δ' ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ἐν τε τῇ βουλῇ καὶ πάλιν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. καὶ πρότερον μὲν οὐκ ἦρχεν ὄντιν' ἀποδοκιμάσειεν ἢ βουλή, νῦν δ' ἔφεσις ἐστὶν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον,
- 3 καὶ τοῦτο κύριόν ἐστι τῆς δοκιμασίας. ἐπερωτῶσιν δ' ὅταν δοκιμάζωσιν πρῶτον μὲν “ τίς σοι πατήρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων, καὶ τίς πατὴρ καὶ τίς μήτηρ, καὶ τίς μητὴρ καὶ τίς πατὴρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων; ” μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ Ἀπόλλων Πατρῶος καὶ Ζεὺς Ἐρκεῖος, καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα τὰ ἱερά ἐστίν· εἶτα ἠρία εἰ ἐστὶν καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα· ἔπειτα γονέας εἰ εὖ ποιεῖ, κεῖ² τὰ τέλη τελεεῖ, καὶ τὰς στρατείας εἰ ἐστράτευται. ταῦτα δ' ἀνερωτήσας “ κάλει ” φησὶν “ τούτων τοὺς μάρτυρας.”
- 4 ἐπειδὰν δὲ παράσχηται τοὺς μάρτυρας, ἐπερωτᾷ “ τούτου βούλεται τις κατηγορεῖν; ” καὶ μὲν ἢ τις κατήγορος, δούς κατηγορίαν καὶ

¹ πάντων Kenyon: πράξεων alii: . . . ων cod.

² Thalheim: και cod. (καὶ τὰ τέλη <εἰ> Wilamowitz-Kaibel).

LV. These offices, then, are elected by lot and have 1
 authority over all the matters stated. As to the
 officials designated the Nine Archons, the mode of
 their appointment that was originally in force has
 been stated before ^a; but now the six Lawgivers and
 their clerk are elected by lot, and also the Archon,^b
 King and War-lord, from each tribe in turn. The 2
 qualifications of these are first checked in the Council
 of Five Hundred, except the Clerk, but he is checked
 only in a Jury-court, as are the other officials (for all
 of them, both those elected by lot and those elected
 by show of hands, have their qualifications checked
 before they hold office), while the Nine Archons are
 checked in the Council and also again in a Jury-
 court. Formerly any official not passed by the
 Council did not hold office, but now there is an
 appeal to the Jury-court, and with this rests the final
 decision as to qualification. The questions put in 3
 examining qualifications are, first, 'Who is your
 father and to what deme does he belong, and who is
 your father's father, and who your mother, and who
 her father and what his deme?' then whether he has
 a Family Apollo and Homestead Zeus,^c and where
 these shrines are; then whether he has family tombs
 and where they are; then whether he treats his
 parents well, and whether he pays his taxes, and
 whether he has done his military service. And after
 putting these questions the officer says, 'Call your
 witnesses to these statements.' And when he has 4
 produced his witnesses, the officer further asks, 'Does
 anybody wish to bring a charge against this man?' And
 if any accuser is forthcoming, he is given a hearing and

^b *i.e.* the Archon Eponymus, see liv. 4 n.

^c The gods of the Athenian's home.

ἀπολογία, οὕτω δίδωσιν ἐν μὲν τῇ βουλῇ τὴν ἐπιχειροτονίαν ἐν δὲ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τὴν ψῆφον· ἂν δὲ μηδεὶς βούληται κατηγορεῖν, εὐθύς δίδωσι τὴν ψῆφον· καὶ πρότερον μὲν εἰς ἐνέβαλλε τὴν ψῆφον, νῦν δ' ἀνάγκη πάντας ἔστι διαψηφίζεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἂν τις πονηρὸς ὢν ἀπαλλάξῃ τοὺς κατηγοροὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς δικασταῖς γένηται τοῦτον
 5 ἀποδοκιμάσαι. δοκιμασθέν¹ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, βαδίζουσι πρὸς τὸν λίθον ἐφ' οὗ τὰ τόμι' ἔστιν (ἐφ' οὗ καὶ οἱ δαιτηταὶ ὁμόσαντες ἀποφαίνονται τὰς διαίτας καὶ οἱ μάρτυρες ἐξόμνυνται τὰς μαρτυρίας), ἀναβάντες δ' ἐπὶ τοῦτον ὁμνύουσι δικαίως ἄρξειν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ δῶρα μὴ λήψεσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕνεκα, κἄν τι λάβωσιν ἀνδριάντα ἀναθήσειν χρυσοῦν. ἐντεῦθεν δ' ὁμόσαντες εἰς ἀκρόπολιν βαδίζουσιν καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖ ταῦτ' ὁμνύουσι, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰσέρχονται.

1 LVI. Λαμβάνουσι δὲ καὶ παρέδρους ὃ τε ἄρχων καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ ὁ πολέμαρχος δύο ἕκαστος οὓς ἂν βούληται, καὶ οὗτοι δοκιμάζονται ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ πρὶν παρεδρεύειν, καὶ εὐθύνας διδόασιν ἐπὶ τὴν παρεδρεύσωσιν.

2 Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄρχων εὐθύς εἰσελθὼν πρῶτον μὲν κηρύττει ὅσα τις εἶχεν πρὶν αὐτὸν εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ταῦτ' ἔχειν καὶ κρατεῖν μέχρι ἀρχῆς
 3 τέλους. ἔπειτα χορηγοὺς τραγωδοῖς καθίστησι τρεῖς, ἐξ ἀπάντων Ἀθηναίων τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους· πρότερον δὲ καὶ κωμικοῖς καθίστησι πέντε, νῦν δὲ

¹ δοκιμασθέν<τες> Rutherford.

the man on trial an opportunity of defence, and then the official puts the question to a show of hands in the Council or to a vote by ballot in the Jury-court ; but if nobody wishes to bring a charge against him, he puts the vote at once ; formerly one person used to throw in his ballot-pebble, but now all are compelled to vote one way or the other about them, in order that if anyone being a rascal has got rid of his accusers,^a it may rest with the jurymen to disqualify him. And ⁵ when the matter has been checked in this way, they go to the stone on which are the victims cut up for sacrifice (the one on which Arbitrators also take oath before they issue their decisions, and persons summoned as witnesses swear that they have no evidence to give), and mounting on this stone they swear that they will govern justly and according to the laws, and will not take presents on account of their office, and that if they should take anything they will set up a golden statue. After taking oath they go from the stone to the Acropolis and take the same oath again there, and after that they enter on their office.

LVI. The Archon, the King and the War-lord also ¹ take two assessors each, chosen by themselves, and the qualifications of these are checked in the Jury-court before they hold office, and they are called to account when they retire from office.

Immediately on coming into office the Archon first ² makes proclamation that all men shall hold until the end of his office those possessions and powers that they held before his entry into office. Then he ³ appoints three Chorus-leaders for the tragedies, the wealthiest men among all the Athenians ; and formerly he used also to appoint five for the comedies,

^a *i.e.* has bribed them to let him off.

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τούτους¹ αἱ φυλαὶ φέρουσιν. ἔπειτα παραλαβὼν τοὺς χορηγοὺς τοὺς ἐνηνεγμένους ὑπὸ τῶν φυλῶν εἰς Διονύσια ἀνδράσιν καὶ παισὶν καὶ κωμωδοῖς καὶ εἰς Θαργήλια ἀνδράσιν καὶ παισὶν (εἰσὶ δ' οἱ μὲν εἰς Διονύσια κατὰ φυλάς, εἰς Θαργήλια δὲ² δυεῖν φυλαῖν εἰς, παρέχει δ' ἐν μέρει ἑκατέρα τῶν φυλῶν) τούτοις τὰς ἀντιδόσεις ποιεῖ καὶ τὰς σκῆψεις εἰσάγει ἕάν τις ἢ λελητουργηκέναι φῆ πρότερον ταύτην τὴν λητουργίαν ἢ ἀτελῆς εἶναι λελητουργηκῶς ἑτέραν λητουργίαν καὶ τῶν χρόνων αὐτῷ τῆς ἀτελείας μὴ ἔξεληλυθότων ἢ τὰ ἔτη μὴ γεγονέναι (δεῖ γὰρ τὸν τοῖς παισὶν χορηγοῦντα ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονέναι). καθίστησι δὲ καὶ εἰς Δῆλον χορηγοὺς καὶ ἀρχιθέωρον τῷ τριακοντορίῳ τῷ τοὺς ἡθέους ἄγοντι.

4 πομπῶν δ' ἐπεμελεῖται τῆς τε τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ γινομένης ὅταν οἰκουρῶσι μύσται, καὶ τῆς Διονυσίων τῶν μεγάλων μετὰ τῶν ἐπιμελητῶν, οὓς πρότερον μὲν ὁ δῆμος ἐχειροτόνει δέκα ὄντας, καὶ τὰ εἰς τὴν πομπὴν ἀναλώματα παρ' αὐτῶν ἀνήλυσκον, νῦν δ' ἓνα τῆς φυλῆς ἑκάστης κληροῖ

5 καὶ δίδωσιν εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν ἑκατὸν μνᾶς· ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ καὶ τῆς εἰς Θαργήλια καὶ τῆς τῷ Διὶ τῷ Σωτήρι. διοικεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Διονυσίων οὗτος καὶ τῶν Θαργηλίων. ἑορτῶν μὲν οὖν

6 ἐπιμελεῖται τούτων. γραφαὶ δὲ καὶ δίκαι λαγχά-

¹ Wyse: *τούτοις* cod.

² δὲ supplent edd.

^a A festival in May, at which there were competitions of cyclic choruses and a procession (§ 5).

^b A citizen appointed to one of these expensive public offices could challenge another as better able to afford it,

but these are now returned by the Tribes. Afterwards he receives the Chorus-leaders nominated by the Tribes for the men's and boys' competitions and the comedies at the Dionysia and for men and boys at the Thargelia ^a (for the Dionysia one for each tribe, for the Thargelia one for two tribes, which take turns to supply them), and deals with their claims for substitution by exchange of property, ^b and brings forward their claims to exemption on the ground of having performed that public service before, or of being exempt because of having performed another service and the period of exemption not having expired, or of not being of the right age (for a man serving as Chorus-leader for the boys must be over forty). He also appoints Chorus-leaders for Delos and a Procession-leader for the thirty-oared vessel that carries the youths. ^c He supervises processions, the 4 one celebrated in honour of Asclepius when initiates keep a watch - night, and the one at the Great Dionysia, in which he acts jointly with the Supervisors; these were formerly ten men elected by show of hands by the People, and they found the expenses of the procession out of their own pockets, but now they are elected by lot, one from each tribe, and given 100 minae for equipment; and he also 5 supervises the procession of Thargelia, and the one in honour of Zeus the Saviour. This official also administers the competition of the Dionysia and of the Thargelia. These, then, are the festivals that he supervises. Criminal and civil law-suits are instituted 6

and the man challenged could only escape undertaking the office by exchanging estates with the challenger.

^a For the festival at Delos see liv. 7; boys' choruses went from Athens.

νονται πρὸς αὐτόν, ἄς ἀνακρίνας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσάγει, γονέων κακώσεως (αὐται δὲ εἰσιν ἀζήμιοι τῷ βουλομένῳ διώκειν), ὀρφανῶν κακώσεως (αὐται δ' εἰσὶ κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων), ἐπικλήρου κακώσεως (αὐται δὲ εἰσὶ κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων καὶ τῶν συν-οικούντων), οἴκου ὀρφανικοῦ κακώσεως (εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐται κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων), παρανοίας, ἔαν τις αἰτιᾶται τινα παρανοοῦντα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα¹ ἀπολλύναι, εἰς δατητῶν αἴρεσιν, ἔαν τις μὴ θέλη κοινὰ τὰ ὄντα νέμεσθαι, εἰς ἐπιτροπῆς κατάστασιν, εἰς ἐπιτροπῆς διαδικασίαν, εἰς ἐμφανῶν κατά-στασιν, ἐπίτροπον αὐτὸν ἐγγράψαι, κλήρων καὶ 7 ἐπικλήρων ἐπιδικασίαι. ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήρων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν ὅσαι ἂν τελευτήσαντος τοῦ ἀνδρὸς σκήπτωνται κύειν, καὶ κύριός ἐστι τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἐπιβάλλειν ἢ εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. μισθοὶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς οἴκους τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήρων ἕως ἂν τις τετταρακαιδεκέτις² γένηται καὶ τὰ ἀποτιμήματα λαμβάνει, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους³ ἔαν μὴ διδώσι τοῖς παισὶν τὸν σῖτον οὗτος εἰσπράττει.

1 LVII. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄρχων ἐπιμελεῖται⁴ τούτων. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς πρῶτον μὲν μυστηρίων ἐπιμελεῖται μετὰ τῶν ἐπιμελητῶν οὓς ὁ δῆμος ἐχειροτονεῖ, δύο μὲν ἐξ Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων, ἓνα δ' ἐξ Εὐμολπιδῶν, ἓνα δὲ ἐκ Κηρύκων. ἔπειτα Διονυσίων τῶν Ἐπι-

¹ Blass (alii alia): τα απολλυν . . cod.

² Blass: επικλ ακαιδε . . τις cod.

³ Brooks: και ουσ cod.

⁴ Blass: καιο . . . αι cod.

before him, and after a preliminary trial he brings them in before the Jury-court : actions for ill-usage of parents (in which anybody who wishes may act as prosecutor without liability to penalty) ; for ill-usage of orphans (which lie against their guardians) ; for ill-usage of an heiress (which lie against the guardians or the relations that they live with) ; for injury to an orphan's estate (these also lie against the guardians) ; prosecutions for insanity, when one man accuses another of wasting his property when insane ; actions for the appointment of liquidators, when a man is unwilling for property to be administered in partnership ; actions for the institution of guardianship ; actions for deciding rival claims to guardianship ; actions for the production of goods or documents ; actions for enrolment as trustee ; claims to estates and to heiresses. He also supervises orphans and 7 heiresses and women professing to be with child after the husband's death, and he has absolute power to fine offenders against them or to bring them before the Jury-court. He grants leases of houses belonging to orphans and heiresses until they are fourteen years of age, and receives the rents, and he exacts maintenance for children from guardians who fail to supply it.

LVII. These are the matters superintended by the 1 Archon. But the King superintends, first, the mysteries, in co-operation with Superintendents elected by show of hands by the People, two from the whole body of the citizens, one from the Eumolpidae and one from the Heralds.^a Next the Dionysia in

^a The Eumolpidae and Kerykes were two ancient priestly families at Athens.

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ληναίων¹. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πομπή τε καὶ ἀγών.²
 τὴν μὲν οὖν πομπὴν κοινῇ πέμπουσιν ὁ τε βασιλεὺς
 καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταί, τὸν δὲ ἀγῶνα διατίθησιν ὁ
 βασιλεὺς. τίθησι δὲ καὶ τοὺς τῶν λαμπάδων
 ἀγῶνας ἅπαντας, ὡς δ' ἔπος εἰπεῖν καὶ τὰς
 2 πατρίους θυσίας διοικεῖ οὗτος πάσας. γραφαὶ δὲ
 λαγχάνονται πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀσεβείας, κἂν τις ἱερω-
 σύνης ἀμφισβητῆ πρός τινα. διαδικάζει δὲ καὶ τοῖς
 γένεσι καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσι τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις τὰς
 ὑπὲρ τῶν γερῶν ἀπάσας οὗτος. λαγχάνονται δὲ
 καὶ αἱ τοῦ φόνου δίκαι πᾶσαι πρὸς τοῦτον, καὶ ὁ
 προαγορεύων εἶργεσθαι τῶν νομίμων οὗτός ἐστιν.
 3 εἰσὶ δὲ φόνου δίκαι καὶ τραύματος, ἂν μὲν ἐκ
 προνοίας ἀποκτείνῃ³ ἢ τρώσῃ, ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ,
 καὶ φαρμάκων, ἐὰν ἀποκτείνῃ δούς, καὶ πυρκαῆς.
 ταῦτα γὰρ ἡ βουλή μόνα δικάζει, τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων
 καὶ βουλευσεως κἂν οἰκέτην ἀποκτείνῃ τις ἢ
 μέτοικον ἢ ξένον, οἱ ἐπὶ Παλλαδίῳ. ἐὰν δ' ἀπο-
 κτεῖναι μὲν τις ὁμολογῇ, φῆ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους,
 οἷον μοιχὸν λαβῶν ἢ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀγνοήσας ἢ ἐν
 ἄθλῳ ἀγωνιζόμενος, τούτῳ ἐπὶ Δελφινίῳ δικά-
 ζουσιν. ἐὰν δὲ φεύγων φυγὴν ὦν ἄρεσίς ἐστιν
 αἰτίαν ἔχῃ ἀποκτεῖναι ἢ τρώσαί τινα, τούτῳ δ' ἐν
 Φρεάτου δικάζουσιν, ὁ δ' ἀπολογεῖται προσ-
 4 ορμισάμενος ἐν πλοίῳ. δικάζουσι δ' οἱ λαχόντες
 ταῦτ' ἐφέται πλήν⁴ τῶν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ γιγνο-

¹ ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ Bywater.

² Van Leeuwen: ἐστι . . . ἡ . . . cod.

³ ἀποκτείνῃ <τις> Papageorgios.

⁴ Kenyon: τα . . . πλὴν cod.

^a Held at the Limnae, S.E. of the Acropolis, at the end of January. The 7th Attic month, Gamelion (January-February), was in old Ionic called Lenaeon.

Lenaeon^a; this festival consists of a procession and a competition, the former conducted by the King and the Superintendents jointly, the latter organized by the King. He also holds all the Torch-race Competitions; also he is the director of practically all the ancestral sacrifices. He holds the court that 2 tries charges of impiety and disputed claims to hereditary priesthoods. He adjudicates between clans and between priests in all disputed claims to privileges. Before him are also brought all murder cases, and proclamations of exclusion from customary rites are made by him. Trials for deliberate murder 3 and wounding are held in the Areopagus, and for causing death by poison, and for arson; for these only are tried by the Council, whereas involuntary homicide and plotting to murder, and murder of a slave or resident alien or foreigner, come before the court at the Palladium^b; and one who admits homicide but declares it to have been legal (for instance when he has killed a man taken in adultery), or who in war has killed a fellow-citizen in ignorance, or in an athletic contest, is tried at the Delphinium; but if, when a man has taken refuge in exile after an offence that admits of satisfaction, he is charged with homicide or wounding, he is tried at the Precinct of Phreatus,^c and delivers his defence from a ship anchored near the shore. Commissioners appointed by lot 4 try these cases, except those that are held on the Areopagus; the cases are introduced by the King,

^b This shrine and the Delphinium were probably S.E. of the Acropolis.

^c Near the harbour of Zea; doubtless the eponymous hero was fictitious, the place being really named from a well, *φρέαρ*. If the defendant had landed he would have been arrested for his former offence.

μένων· εἰσάγει δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ δικάζουσιν ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ ὑπαίθριοι, καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς ὅταν δικάζη περιαιρεῖται τὸν στέφανον. ὁ δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων τὸν μὲν ἄλλον χρόνον εἴργεται τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ οὐδ' εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν νόμος ἐμβαλεῖν αὐτῷ, τότε δ' εἰς τὸ ἱερόν εἰσελθὼν ἀπολογεῖται. ὅταν δὲ μὴ εἰδῆ τὸν ποιήσαντα, τῷ δράσαντι λαγχάνει, δικάζει δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ οἱ φυλοβασιλεῖς, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀψύχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων.

- 1 LVIII. Ὁ δὲ πολέμαρχος θύει μὲν θυσίας τῆν τε τῆ Ἀρτέμιδι τῆ Ἀγροτέρα καὶ τῷ Ἐνναλίῳ, διατίθησι δ' ἀγῶνα τὸν ἐπιτάφιον [καὶ]¹ τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, καὶ Ἀρμοδίῳ καὶ 2 Ἀριστογείτοσι ἐναγίσματα ποιεῖ. δίκαι δὲ λαγχάνονται πρὸς αὐτὸν ἴδιαι μόνον,² αἷ τε τοῖς μετοίκοις καὶ τοῖς ἰσοτελέσι καὶ (αἷ)³ τοῖς προξένοις γιγνόμεναι· καὶ δεῖ τοῦτον λαβόντα καὶ διανείμαντα δέκα μέρη τὸ λαχὸν ἐκάστη τῆ φυλῆ μέρος προσθεῖναι, τοὺς δὲ τὴν φυλὴν δικάζοντας 3 τοῖς διαιτηταῖς ἀποδοῦναι. αὐτὸς δ' εἰσάγει δίκας τὰς τε τοῦ ἀποστασίου καὶ ἀπροστασίου καὶ κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων τοῖς μετοίκοις, καὶ τᾶλλ' ὅσα τοῖς πολίταις ὁ ἄρχων ταῦτα τοῖς μετοίκοις ὁ πολέμαρχος.

- 1 LIX. Οἱ δὲ θεσμοθέται πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ προγράψαι τὰ δικαστήριά εἰσι κύριοι τίσιν ἡμέραις δεῖ δικάζειν,⁴ ἔπειτα τοῦ δοῦναι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς· καθότι γὰρ ἂν οὗτοι δῶσιν, κατὰ τοῦτο χρῶνται.

¹ Kenyon secundum Pollucem.

² μόνον Wilamowitz-Kaibel: μεν cod.

³ Kaibel.

⁴ καθίζειν Richards.

^a A form of Ares.

and the court sits within the sacred precinct in the open air, and when the King is acting in a case he takes off his crown. The accused man all the rest of the time is debarred from sacred places and is even forbidden by law from setting foot in the market-place, but at the trial he enters the precinct and makes his defence. When the King does not know who committed the act, he institutes proceedings against 'the guilty man,' and the King and Tribal Kings try the case, as also prosecutions of inanimate objects and animals for homicide.

LVIII. The War-lord offers sacrifices to Artemis the 1 Huntress and to Enyalios,^a and arranges the funeral games in honour of those who have fallen in war, and makes memorial offerings to Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Only private law-suits are brought before 2 him in which resident aliens, ordinary and privileged, and foreign consuls are concerned; he has to take the list of cases and divide it into ten portions and assign one portion by lot to each tribe, and to assign the jurymen for each tribe to the Arbitrators. He himself brings forward cases in which resident aliens 3 are concerned, on charges of acting without their protectors^b or of lacking a protector, and as to estates and heiresses; and all other actions that in the case of citizens are brought in by the Archon, in the case of resident aliens are introduced by the War-lord.

LIX. The Lawgivers are responsible, first, for 1 preparing lists of the days on which the jury-courts are to sit, and then for giving them to the officers, for these follow the arrangements that the Lawgivers

^b A *metoikos* (other than the *isoteleis*, who for taxation and military service ranked with citizens) had to be enrolled under a citizen, whose sanction was necessary for his actions if important.

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- 2 ἔτι δὲ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας εἰσαγγέλλουσιν¹ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, καὶ τὰς καταχειροτονίας καὶ τὰς προβολὰς ἀπάσας εἰσάγουσιν οὗτοι, καὶ γραφὰς παρανόμων, καὶ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θείναι, καὶ προεδρικὴν
- 3 καὶ ἐπιστατικὴν καὶ στρατηγοῖς εὐθύνας. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ γραφαὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὧν παράστασις τίθεται, ξενίας καὶ δωροξενίας (ἂν τις δῶρα δοὺς ἀποφύγη τὴν ξενίαν) καὶ συκοφαντίας καὶ δώρων καὶ ψευδεγγραφῆς καὶ ψευδοκλητείας καὶ βουλευσεως
- 4 καὶ ἀγραφίου καὶ μοιχείας. εἰσάγουσιν δὲ καὶ τὰς δοκιμασίας ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀπάσαις, καὶ τοὺς ἀπειρητισμένους ὑπὸ τῶν δημοτῶν, καὶ τὰς κατα-
- 5 γνώσεις τὰς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς. εἰσάγουσι δὲ καὶ δίκας ἰδίας, ἐμπορικὰς καὶ μεταλλικὰς, καὶ δούλων, ἂν τις τὸν ἐλεύθερον κακῶς λέγη. καὶ ἐπι- κληροῦσι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς οὗτοι τὰ δικαστήρια τὰ τ'² ἴδια
- 6 καὶ τὰ δημόσια. καὶ τὰ σύμβολα τὰ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις οὗτοι κυροῦσι, καὶ τὰς δίκας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν συμβόλων εἰσάγουσι, καὶ τὰ ψευδομαρτύρια τὰ³ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου.
- 7 Τοὺς δὲ δικαστὰς κληροῦσι πάντες⁴ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες δέκατος δ' ὁ γραμματεὺς ὁ τῶν θεσμοθετῶν, τοὺς τῆς αὐτοῦ φυλῆς ἕκαστος.
- 1 LX. Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τοὺς θ' ἄρχοντας τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀθλοθέτας δέκα ἄνδρας, ἓνα τῆς φυλῆς ἑκάστης. οὗτοι δὲ δοκιμασθέντες ἄρχουσι τέτταρα ἔτη, καὶ διοικοῦσι τὴν τε πομπὴν τῶν Παναθηναίων καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα

¹ <ὡς ἂν τινες> εἰσαγγέλλωσι Blass: εἰσ. . . . δῆμον secl. Wilamowitz-Kaibel. ² τ' suppletum a Kaibel.

³ τὰ suppletum a Bernadakis.

⁴ πάντες coni. Kenyon: παντας cod.

assign. Moreover it is they who bring before the 2
 People indictments, and bring in all votes of re-
 moval from office, preliminary informations sent on
 by the Assembly, impeachments for illegal procedure,
 proceedings against inexpedient legislation, a suit
 against a President or a Superintendent, and audits
 imposed on Generals. Also they hear indictments for 3
 which a fee is paid, on charges of alien birth, alien
 corruption (that is, if a person charged with alien
 birth secures his acquittal by bribery), malicious
 information, bribery, false entry of public debts,
 personation of a witness, conspiracy, non-registration,
 adultery. They also introduce ^a the tests of qualifica- 4
 tion for all offices, and claims to citizenship rejected
 by vote of the deme, and verdicts of guilty passed
 on from the Council.^b They also introduce private 5
 actions in commercial and mining cases, and actions
 against slaves for slandering a freeman. And they
 assign the public and the private jury-courts by lot
 among the magistrates. They ratify contracts with 6
 other states, and bring into court suits arising under
 those contracts, and prosecutions for false witness
 instituted by the Areopagus.

All the Nine Archons with the Lawgivers' Clerk, 7
 making ten, elect by lot the jurymen, each electing
 those of his own tribe.

LX. These are the functions of the Nine Archons. 1
 They also elect by lot ten men as Stewards of the
 Games, one from each tribe, who when passed as
 qualified hold office for four years, and administer the
 procession of the Panathenaic Festival, and the con-

^a *i.e.* before the bodies that checked these qualifications,
 see lv. 2-4.

^b See xliv. 2 fin.

- τῆς μουσικῆς καὶ τὸν γυμνικὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὴν ἵπποδρομίαν, καὶ τὸν πέπλον ποιοῦνται, καὶ τοὺς ἀμφορεῖς ποιοῦνται μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς, καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον
 2 τοῖς ἀθληταῖς ἀποδιδόασι. συλλέγεται δὲ τὸ ἔλαιον ἀπὸ τῶν μοριῶν· εἰσπράττει δὲ τοὺς τὰ χωρία κεκτημένους ἐν οἷς αἱ μορίαί εἰσιν ὁ ἄρχων, τρεῖς ἡμικοτύλια ἀπὸ τοῦ στελέχους ἐκάστου. πρότερον δ' ἐπώλει τὸν καρπὸν ἢ πόλις, καὶ εἴ τις ἐξορύξειεν ἐλαίαν μορίαν ἢ κατάξειεν, ἔκρινεν ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλή, καὶ εἴ του καταγνοίη, θανάτῳ τοῦτον ἐζημίουν. ἐξ οὗ δὲ τὸ ἔλαιον ὁ τὸ χωρίον κεκτημένος ἀποτίνει, ὁ μὲν νόμος ἔστιν, ἢ δὲ κρίσις καταλέλυται· τὸ δ'² ἔλαιον ἐκ τοῦ κτήματος, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν στελεχῶν, ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει.
 3 συλλέξας οὖν ὁ ἄρχων τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον τοῖς ταμίαις παραδίδωσιν εἰς ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναβῆναι πρότερον εἰς Ἀρειον πάγον πρὶν ἂν ἅπαν παραδῶ τοῖς ταμίαις. οἱ δὲ ταμίαι τὸν μὲν ἄλλον χρόνον τηροῦσιν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, τοῖς δὲ Παναθηναίοις ἀπομετροῦσι τοῖς ἀθλοθέταις, οἱ δ' ἀθλοθέται τοῖς νικῶσι τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν. ἔστι γὰρ ἄθλα τοῖς μὲν τὴν μουσικὴν νικῶσιν ἀργύριον³ καὶ χρυσᾶ, τοῖς δὲ τὴν εὐανδρίαν ἀσπίδες, τοῖς δὲ τὸν γυμνικὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὴν ἵπποδρομίαν ἔλαιον.
 1 LXI. Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχὰς ἀπάσας, στρατηγούς δέκα, πρότερον μὲν ἀφ' ἐκάστης⁴ φυλῆς ἓνα, νῦν δ' ἐξ ἀπάντων, καὶ τούτους διατάττουσι τῇ χειροτονίᾳ, ἓνα μὲν ἐπὶ

¹ δὲ τὸ Richards: τοῦ cod.² δ': γὰρ coni. Blass.³ Wilamowitz-Kaibel: ἀργυρία cod.⁴ ἐκάστης supplevit Kenyon: ἀφυλῆς cod.^a See xlix. 3 n.

test in music, the gymnastic contest and the horse-race, and have the Robe ^a made, and in conjunction with the Council have the vases ^b made, and assign the olive-oil to the competitors. The oil is procured from ² the sacred trees ; and the Archon levies it from the owners of the farms in which the trees are, three quarters of a pint from each trunk. Formerly the state used to sell the fruit, and anybody who dug up or cut down a sacred olive-tree was tried by the Council of Areopagus, and if found guilty punished with death ; but ever since the olive-oil has been provided as rent by the owner of the farm, though the law still stands, the trial has gone out ; and the state's claim to the oil is calculated on the estate and not on the number of trees.^c So the Archon collects the tribute of oil ³ accruing in his year, and passes it on to the Treasurers at the Acropolis, and he is not allowed to go up to the Areopagus before he has handed the full quantity over to the Treasurers. These have it in their keeping in the Acropolis always, except that at the Pan-athenaic Festival they dole it out to the Directors of the Games and these to the victorious competitors. For the prizes are for the victors in music silver money and gold vessels, for those in manly beauty shields, and for those in the gymnastic contest and the horse-race olive-oil.

LXI. They also elect by show of hands all the ¹ military officers—ten Generals, formerly one from each tribe, but now from all the citizens together, and the vote decides the assignment of duties to these

^b In athletic contests the prize was a vase of oil and a garland of foliage from the sacred olive-trees.

^c *i.e.* the amount per tree stated above is only approximately calculated.

- τοὺς ὀπλίτας, ὃς ἡγείται τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἂν ἐξίωσι, ἓνα δ' ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, ὃς φυλάττει, κἂν πόλεμος ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γίγνηται πολεμῆ οὗτος· δύο δ' ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιέα, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν Μουνυχίαν τὸν δ' εἰς τὴν Ἀκτὴν, οἱ τῆς φυλακῆς¹ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῶν² ἐν Πειραιεῖ· ἓνα δ' ἐπὶ τὰς συμμορίας, ὃς τοὺς τε τριηράρχους καταλέγει καὶ τὰς ἀντιδόσεις αὐτοῖς ποιεῖ καὶ τὰς διαδικασίας αὐτοῖς εἰσάγει· τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πρὸς τὰ παρόντα πράγματα ἐκπέμπουσιν.
- 2 ἐπιχειροτονία δ' αὐτῶν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πρυτανείαν ἐκάστην, εἰ δοκοῦσιν καλῶς ἄρχειν· κἂν τινα ἀποχειροτονήσωσιν, κρίνουσιν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, κἂν μὲν ἀλῶ τιμῶσιν ὅ τι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, ἂν δ' ἀποφύγῃ πάλιν ἄρχει. κύριοι δέ εἰσιν ὅταν ἡγῶνται καὶ δῆσαι τὸν³ ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ ἐκκηρῦξαι⁴ καὶ ἐπιβολὴν ἐπιβάλλειν· οὐκ εἰώθασι δὲ ἐπιβάλλειν.
- 3 Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ ταξιάρχους δέκα, ἓνα τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης· οὗτος δ' ἡγείται τῶν φυλετῶν καὶ λοχαγοὺς καθίστησιν.
- 4 Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἱππάρχους δύο ἐξ ἀπάντων· οὗτοι δ' ἡγοῦνται τῶν ἱππέων, διελόμενοι τὰς φυλὰς ε' ἐκάτερος· κύριοι δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσιν ὦνπερ⁵ οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν. ἐπιχειροτονία δὲ γίνεται καὶ⁶ τούτων.
- 5 Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ φυλάρχους ἰ',⁷ ἓνα τῆς

¹ φυλακῆς conī. Kenyon, φυλῆς secundum codicem dedit.

² τῶν Wilamowitz-Kaibel: καίτων cod.

³ τιν cod.: corr. Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

⁴ κηρυξαι cod.: corr. Blass.

⁵ εἰσιν ὦνπερ Wilamowitz-Kaibel: ὦνπερῆσιν cod.

⁶ καὶ suppleuit Gertz.

⁷ numerum ἰ' suppleuit Richards.

—one being appointed to the heavy infantry, who commands them on foreign expeditions; one to the country, who guards it and commands in any war that takes place in it; two to Peiraeus, one of them to Munychia and the other to the Point, who superintend the protection of the population of Peiraeus; one to the Symmories,^a who enrolls the Captains of triremes and carries out their exchanges and introduces their claims for exemption; and the others they dispatch on expeditions as occasion arises. A confirmatory vote is taken in each presidency upon the satisfactoriness of their administration; and if this vote goes against any officer he is tried in the jury-court, and if convicted, the penalty or fine to be imposed on him is assessed, but if he is acquitted he resumes office. When in command of a force they have power to punish breach of discipline with imprisonment, exile, or the infliction of a fine; but a fine is not usual.

They also elect by show of hands ten Regimental Commanders, one of each tribe; these lead their fellow-tribesmen and appoint company-commanders.

They also elect by show of hands two Cavalry Commanders from the whole body of citizens; these lead the Knights, each commanding a division consisting of five tribes, and their powers are the same as those of the Generals over the heavy infantry. The Cavalry Commanders' election also is submitted to a confirmatory vote.

They also elect by show of hands ten Tribal Com-

^a The 20 companies in which the 1200 richest citizens were enrolled for payment of the *εἰσφορά* or property-tax levied to meet emergency expenses of war.

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φυλῆς, τὸν ἡγησόμενον τῶν ἰππέων¹ ὥσπερ οἱ ταξίαρχοι τῶν ὀπλιτῶν.

6 Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ εἰς Λῆμνον ἵππαρχον, ὃς ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν ἰππέων τῶν ἐν Λήμνῳ.

7 Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ ταμίαν τῆς Παράλου καὶ νῦν² τῆς τοῦ Ἀμμωνος.

1 LXII. Αἱ δὲ κληρωταὶ ἀρχαὶ πρότερον μὲν ἦσαν αἱ μὲν μετ' ἐννέα ἀρχόντων ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς ὅλης κληρούμεναι, αἱ δ' ἐν Θησειῷ κληρούμεναι διηροῦντο εἰς τοὺς δήμους· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐπώλουν οἱ δῆμοι, καὶ ταύτας ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς ὅλης κληροῦσι, πλὴν βουλευτῶν καὶ φρουρῶν· τούτους δ' εἰς τοὺς δήμους ἀποδιδοῦσι.

2 Μισθοφοροῦσι δὲ πρῶτον ὁ δῆμος ταῖς μὲν ἄλλαις ἐκκλησίαις δραχμὴν, τῇ δὲ κυρία ἐννέα ὀβόλους³. ἔπειτα τὰ δικαστήρια τρεῖς ὀβολούς· εἰθ' ἡ βουλὴ πέντε ὀβολούς. τοῖς δὲ πρυτανεύουσιν εἰς σίτησιν ὀβολὸς προστίθεται [δέκα προστίθενται].⁴ ἔπειτ' εἰς σίτησιν λαμβάνουσι ἐννέα ἄρχοντες τέτταρας ὀβολούς ἕκαστος, καὶ παρατρέφουσι κήρυκα καὶ αὐλητήν· ἔπειτ' ἄρχων εἰς Σαλαμίνα δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας. ἀθλοθέται δ' ἐν πρυτανείῳ δειπνοῦσι τὸν Ἑκατομβαιῶνα μῆνα ὅταν ἦ τὰ Παναθήναια, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς τετράδος ἰσταμένου. ἀμφικτύονες εἰς Δῆλον δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκάστης ἐκ Δήλου λαμβάνουσι.⁵ λαμβάνουσι δὲ

¹ τῶν ἰππέων suppleuit Kenyon.

² νῦν Blass: erasum, δίχτυ legit Kenyon.

³ ὀβόλους suppletum a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

⁴ Blass.

⁵ λαμβάνουσι suppleuit Kenyon (cf. lvii. 2).

manders, one for each tribe, to lead the cavalry as the Regimental Commanders lead the heavy infantry.

They also elect by show of hands a Cavalry Commander for Lemnos, to take control of the cavalry in that island.

They also elect by show of hands a Treasurer of the Paralus,^a and at the present day a Treasurer of the ship of Ammon.

LXII. The officials elected by lot were formerly those elected from the whole tribe together with the Nine Archons and those now elected in the temple of Theseus who used to be divided among the demes; but since the demes began to sell their offices, the latter also are elected by lot from the whole tribe, excepting members of the Council and Guards^b; these they entrust to the demes.

Payment for public duties is as follows: first, the People draw a drachma for ordinary meetings of the Assembly, and a drachma and a half for a sovereign meeting^c; second, the Jury-courts half a drachma; third, the Council five obols; and those acting as president have an additional obol for food. Also the Nine Archons get four obols each for food, and have to keep a herald and a flute-player as well; and the archon for Salamis gets a drachma a day. Games-directors dine in the Prytaneum in the month of Hecatombaeon, during the Panathenaic Festival, from the fourth of the month onward. Amphictyons for Delos get a drachma a day from Delos. All the

^a One of the state triremes used for embassies, etc. The other, the Salamina, was superseded by the one named after Zeus Ammon, specially used to convey missions to Cyrene on the way to the shrine of Zeus Ammon.

^b Possibly the guards of the docks, mentioned at xxiv. 3.

^c See xliii. 4.

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καὶ ὅσαι ἀποστέλλονται ἀρχαὶ εἰς Σάμον ἢ Σκῦρον ἢ Λῆμνον ἢ Ἴμβρον εἰς σίτησιν ἀργύριον.

3 Ἄρχειν δὲ τὰς μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρχὰς ἔξεστι πλεονάκεις, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδεμίαν, πλὴν βουλεῦσαι δῖς.

1 LXIII. Τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια κληροῦσιν οἱ θ' ἀρχοντες κατὰ φυλάς, ὁ δὲ γραμματεὺς τῶν θεσμο-
 2 θετῶν τῆς δεκάτης φυλῆς.¹ εἴσοδοι δέ εἰσιν εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δέκα, μία τῇ φυλῇ ἐκάστη, καὶ κληρωτήρια εἴκοσι, δύο τῇ φυλῇ ἐκάστη, καὶ κιβώτια ἑκατόν, δέκα τῇ φυλῇ ἐκάστη, καὶ ἕτερα κιβώτια εἰς ἅ² ἐμβάλλεται τῶν λαχόντων δικαστῶν τὰ πινάκια, καὶ ὑδρίαὶ δύο καὶ βακτηρίαι παρατίθενται κατὰ τὴν εἴσοδον³ ἐκάστην ὅσοιπερ οἱ δικασταί, καὶ βάλανοι εἰς τὴν ὑδρίαν ἐμβάλλονται ἴσαι ταῖς βακτηρίαις, γέγραπται δὲ ἐν ταῖς βαλάνοις τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνδεκάτου, τοῦ λ,⁴ ὅσαπερ ἂν
 3 μέλλῃ τὰ δικαστήρια πληρωθήσεσθαι. δικάζειν δ' ἔξεστιν τοῖς ὑπὲρ λ' ἔτη γεγονόσιν, ὅσοι αὐτῶν μὴ ὀφείλουσιν τῷ δημοσίῳ ἢ ἀτιμοί εἰσιν· ἐὰν δέ τις δικάζῃ οἷς⁵ μὴ ἔξεστιν, ἐνδείκνυται καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσάγεται, ἐὰν δ' ἄλῳ προστιμῶσιν αὐτῷ οἱ δικασταὶ ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ ἄξιός εἶναι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι· ἐὰν δὲ ἀργυρίου τιμηθῇ δεῖ αὐτὸν δε-

¹ τῇ δεκάτῃ φυλῇ? Richards.

² κιβώτια δέκα εἰς ἅ (uel οἷς) alii: κιβω cod.

³ Kenyon: ἔξοδον Hommel: ε . . . cod.

⁴ Kenyon: post λ inserit τριακοστού (interpretans) cod.

⁵ φ Richards.

^a "The dicasts in each tribe are distributed over all the 10 divisions into which all the dicasts are divided. In each tribe all the tickets (πινάκια) bearing the names of the dicasts in the division A are placed in the first κιβώτιον, those of

officials sent to Samos, Scyros, Lemnos or Imbros also get money for food.

The military offices may be held repeatedly, but 3 none of the others, except that a man may become a member of the Council twice.

LXIII. The Jury-courts are elected by lot by the 1 Nine Archons by tribes, and the Clerk of the Law-givers from the tenth tribe. The courts have ten 2 entrances, one for each tribe, twenty rooms, two for each tribe, in which courts are allotted to jurors, a hundred small boxes, ten for each tribe,^a and other boxes into which the tickets of the jurymen drawn by lot are thrown, and two urns. Staves are placed at each entrance, as many as there are jurymen, and acorns to the same number as the staves are thrown into the urn, and on the acorns are written the letters of the alphabet, starting with the eleventh, *lambda*, as many as the courts that are going to be filled. Right 3 to sit on juries belongs to all those over thirty years old who are not in debt to the Treasury or disfranchised. If any unqualified person sits on a jury, information is laid against him and he is brought before the jury-court, and if convicted the jurymen assess against him whatever punishment or fine he is thought to deserve; and if given a money fine, he has

division B in the second, and so on for all the 10 divisions. According to the number of dicasts required, an equal number of tickets is drawn by lot from each of the 100 *κιβώτια*. Each ticket so drawn has a court assigned to it by lot; and the tickets are now all placed in the second set of 10 *κιβώτια*, all tickets assigned to dicasts of any special court being placed in the *κιβώτιον* which bears the letter corresponding to that court. The names of all the dicasts selected to serve are thus distributed over the several courts that are to sit on the day in question' (Sandys). See further ch. lxiv.

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- δέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ τό τε πρότερον ὄφλημα ἐφ' ᾧ ἐνεδείχθη καὶ ὃ τι ἂν αὐτῷ προστιμήσῃ τὸ
 4 δικαστήριον. ἔχει δ' ἕκαστος δικαστῆς ἐν πινάκιον
 πύξινον, ἐπιγεγραμμένον τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πα-
 τρώθεν καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ γράμμα ἐν τῶν στοι-
 χείων μέχρι τοῦ κ· νενέμηνται γὰρ κατὰ φυλὰς
 δέκα μέρη οἱ δικασταί, παραπλησίως ἴσοι ἐν
 ἐκάστω τῷ γράμματι.
- 5 Ἐπειδὴν δὲ ὁ θεσμοθέτης ἐπικληρώσῃ τὰ γράμ-
 ματα ἃ δεῖ προσπαράτιθεσθαι τοῖς δικαστηρίοις,
 ἐπέθηκε φέρων ὁ ὑπηρέτης ἐφ' ἕκαστον τὸ δικα-
 στήριον τὸ γράμμα τὸ λαχόν.

.

Only fragments of the remaining pages of the ms. survive, much defaced. The most legible passages are here appended, gaps having been filled in without note where the restoration is generally accepted or is very probable.

- 1 LXIV. Τὰ δὲ κιβώτια τὰ δέκα κεῖται ἐν τῷ
 ἔμπροσθεν τῆς εἰσόδου καθ' ἑκάστην τὴν φυλήν.
 ἐπιγέγραπται δ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὰ στοιχεῖα μέχρι τοῦ
 κ. ἐπειδὴν δ' ἐμβάλωσιν οἱ δικασταὶ τὰ πινάκια
 εἰς τὸ κιβώτιον ἐφ' οὗ ἂν ἦ ἐπιγεγραμμένον τὸ
 γράμμα τὸ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῷ πινακίῳ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ
 τῶν στοιχείων, διασεΐσαντος τοῦ ὑπηρέτου ἔλκει ὁ
 θεσμοθέτης ἐξ ἑκάστου τοῦ κιβωτίου πινάκιον ἔν-
 2 οὔτος δὲ καλεῖται ἐμπήκτης, καὶ ἐμπήγνυσι τὰ
 πινάκια τὰ ἐκ τοῦ κιβωτίου εἰς τὴν κανονίδα
 ἐφ' ἧς τὸ αὐτὸ γράμμα ἔπεστιν ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ
 κιβωτίου. κληροῦται δὲ οὔτος ἵνα μὴ αἰεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς
 ἐμπηγνύων κακουργῇ. εἰσὶ δὲ κανονίδες πέντε¹

to go to prison until he has paid both the former debt, for which the information was laid, and whatever additional sum has been imposed on him as a fine by the court. Each juryman has one box-wood ticket, ⁴ with his own name and that of his father and deme written on it, and one letter of the alphabet as far as *kappa*; for the jury-men of each tribe are divided into ten sections, approximately an equal number under each letter.

As soon as the Lawgiver has drawn by lot the ⁵ letters to be assigned to the courts, the attendant immediately takes them and affixes to each court its allotted letter.

.

LXIV. The ten boxes lie in front of the entrance for ¹ each tribe. They have inscribed on them the letters as far as *kappa*. When the jury-men have thrown their tickets into the box on which is inscribed the same letter of the alphabet as is on the ticket itself, the attendant shakes them thoroughly and the Lawgiver draws one ticket from each box. This attendant ² is called the Affixer, and he affixes the tickets taken from the box to the ledged frame on which is the same letter that is on the box. This attendant is chosen by lot, in order that the same person may not always affix the tickets and cheat. There are five

¹ πέντε Blass, δέκα alii: lacunam cod.

- 3 ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν κληρωτηρίων. ὅταν δὲ ἐμβάλη τοὺς κύβους, ὁ ἄρχων τὴν φυλὴν κληροῖ κατὰ κληρωτήριον. εἰσὶ δὲ κύβοι χαλκοῖ μέλανες καὶ λευκοί· ὅσους δ' ἂν δέῃ λαχεῖν δικαστάς, τοσοῦτοι ἐμβάλλονται λευκοί, κατὰ πέντε πινάκια εἰς, οἱ δὲ μέλανες τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. ἐπειδὴν δ' ἐξαιρῆ¹ τοὺς κύβους, καλεῖ τοὺς εἰληχότας ὁ κῆρυξ·
- 4 ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐμπήκτης εἰς τὸν ἀριθμὸν. ὁ δὲ κληθεὶς καὶ ὑπακούσας ἔλκει βάλανον ἐκ τῆς ὑδρίας, καὶ ὀρέξας αὐτὴν ἀνέχων τὸ γράμμα, δείκνυσιν πρῶτον μὲν τῷ ἄρχοντι τῷ ἐφεστηκότι· ὁ δὲ ἄρχων ἐπειδὴν ἴδῃ, ἐμβάλλει τὸ πινάκιον αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ κιβώτιον ὅπου ἂν ᾗ ἐπιγεγραμμένον τὸ αὐτὸ στοιχεῖον ὅπερ ἐν τῇ βαλάνῳ, ἢ εἰς οἶον ἂν λάχῃ εἰσὶ καὶ μὴ εἰς οἶον ἂν βούληται, μηδὲ ᾗ συναγαγεῖν εἰς δικαστήριον οὓς ἂν βούληταί τις.
- 5 παράκειται δὲ τῷ ἄρχοντι κιβώτια ὅσαπερ ἂν μέλλῃ τὰ δικαστήρια πληρωθῆσεσθαι, ἔχοντα στοιχεῖον ἕκαστον ὅπερ ἂν ᾗ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαστηρίου ἐκάστου εἰληχός.
- 1 LXV. Αὐτὸς δὲ δείξας πάλιν τῷ ὑπηρέτῃ εἶτ' ἐντὸς εἰσέρχεται τῆς κιγχλίδος.² ὁ δὲ ὑπηρέτης δίδωσιν αὐτῷ βακτηρίαν ὁμόχρων τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἐφ' οὗ τὸ αὐτὸ γράμμα ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐν τῇ βαλάνῳ, ἵνα ἀναγκαῖον ᾗ αὐτῷ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς ὃ εἴληχε δικαστήριον· ἐὰν γὰρ εἰς ἕτερον εἰσὶ εἰληχόμενος ἐξελέγχεται ὑπὸ
- 2 τοῦ χρώματος τῆς βακτηρίας· τοῖς γὰρ δικαστηρίοις χρώματα³ ἐπιγέγραπται ἐκάστῳ ἐπὶ τῷ σφηκίσκῳ τῆς εἰσόδου. ὁ δὲ λαβὼν τὴν βακτηρίαν

¹ ἐξεληῖ alii: ε . . . cod.

² primae sententiae supersunt tantum paucae literae incertae.

³ χρώμα edd. e schol. Aristoph. *Plut.* 277.

ledged frames in each of the balloting-rooms. When 3
 he has thrown in the dice, the Archon casts lots for
 the tribe for each balloting-room; they are dice of
 copper, black and white. As many white ones are
 thrown in as jurymen are required to be selected, one
 white die for each five tickets, and the black dice
 correspondingly. As he draws out the dice the herald
 calls those on whom the lot has fallen. Also the
 Affixer is there corresponding to the number. The 4
 man called obeys and draws an acorn from the urn
 and, holding it out with the inscription upward, shows
 it first to the superintending Archon; when the
 Archon has seen it, he throws the man's ticket into
 the box that has the same letter written on it as the
 one on the acorn, in order that he may go into what-
 ever court he is allotted to and not into whatever
 court he chooses and in order that it may not be
 possible to collect into a court whatever jurymen a
 person wishes. The Archon has by him as many 5
 boxes as courts are going to be filled, each lettered
 with whichever is the letter assigned by lot to each
 court.

LXV. And the man himself having again shown it 1
 to the attendant then goes inside the barrier, and the
 attendant gives him a staff of the same colour as the
 court bearing the same letter as the one on the acorn,
 in order that it may be necessary for him to go into
 the court to which he has been assigned by lot; for if
 he goes into another, he is detected by the colour of
 his staff, for each of the courts has a colour painted 2
 on the lintel of its entrance. He takes the staff and

βαδίζει εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον τὸ ὁμόχρων μὲν τῇ βακτηρία ἔχον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ γράμμα ὅπερ ἐν τῷ βαλάνῳ. ἐπειδὰν δ' εἰσέλθῃ, παραλαμβάνει σύμβολον δημοσία παρὰ τοῦ εἰληχότος ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν. εἶτα τὴν τε βάλανον καὶ τὴν βακτηρίαν³ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τοῦτον τρόπον εἰσεληλυθότες. τοῖς δ' ἀπολαγχάνουσιν ἀποδιδόασιν οἱ ἐμπῆκται⁴ τὰ πινάκια. οἱ δὲ ὑπηρεταὶ οἱ δημόσιοι ἀπὸ τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης παραδιδόασιν τὰ κιβώτια, ἐν ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον ἕκαστον, ἐν ᾧ ἔνεστι τὰ ὀνόματα τῆς φυλῆς τὰ ὄντα ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν δικαστηρίων. παραδιδόασιν δὲ τοῖς εἰληχόσι ταῦτα ἀποδιδόνασι τοῖς δικασταῖς ἐν ἐκάστῳ [τῷ]² δικαστηρίῳ ἀριθμῶ τὰ πινάκια ὅπως ἐκ τούτων σκοποῦντες ἀποδιδῶσι τὸν μισθόν.

1 LXVI. Ἐπειδὰν δὲ πάντα πλήρη ᾗ τὰ δικαστήρια, τίθεται ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν δικαστηρίων β' κληρωτήρια καὶ κύβοι χαλκοῖ ἐν οἷς ἐπιγέγραπται τὰ χρώματα τῶν δικαστηρίων, καὶ ἕτεροι κύβοι ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπιγεγραμμένα. λαχόντες δὲ τῶν θεσμοθετῶν δύο χωρὶς ἑκατέρων τοὺς κύβους ἐμβάλλουσιν, ὁ μὲν τὰ χρώματα εἰς τὸ ἐν κληρωτήριον, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰ ὀνόματα εἰς τὸ ἕτερον. ἢ δ' ἂν πρώτη λάχῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν, αὕτη ἀναγορεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ κήρυκος ὅτι χρήσεται τῷ πρώτῳ λαχόντι δικαστηρίῳ. . . .

Of cc. lxxvi. 2-lxxviii. 2 (ms. pp. 33, 34) only fragments remain, variously put together and supplemented by editors.

goes to the court of the same colour as his staff and having the same letter as is on the acorn. And when he has come into it he receives a token publicly from the person appointed by lot to this office. Then ³ with the acorn and the staff they take their seats in the court, when they have thus entered. And to those to whom the lot does not fall the Affixers give back their tickets. And the public attendants from ⁴ each tribe hand over the boxes, one to each court, in which are those names of the tribe that are in each of the courts. And they hand them over to the persons appointed by lot to restore the tickets to the jurymen in each court by number, in order that according to these when they examine them they may assign the pay.

LXVI. When all the courts are full, two ballot-¹ boxes are placed in the first of the courts, and copper dice with the colours of the courts painted on them, and other dice with the names of the offices written on them. And two of the Lawgivers are chosen by lot, and throw the two sets of dice in separately, one throwing in the coloured dice into one ballot-box and the other the names of the offices into the other. And to whichever of the offices the lot falls first, it is proclaimed by the herald that this will use the first court allotted. . . .

¹ βακτηρίαν <ἔχοντες καθίζουσιν> Kenyon: <ἀποτιθέασιν> Thalheim.

² si recte legitur, dittographiam secl. ed.

2 LXVIII. . . . μετὰ τὸν γ' (ἀποδιδούς γὰρ γ'
 λαμβάνει) ἵνα ψηφίζονται πάντες· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι
 3 λαβεῖν σύμβολον οὐδενὶ ἐὰν μὴ ψηφίζηται. εἰσὶ δὲ
 ἀμφορεῖς δύο κείμενοι ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ὁ μὲν
 χαλκοῦς ὁ δὲ ξύλινος, διαιρετοὶ ὅπως μὴ λάθῃ
 ὑποβάλλων τις ψήφους, εἰς οὓς ψηφίζονται οἱ
 δικασταί, ὁ μὲν χαλκοῦς κύριος ὁ δὲ ξυλινὸς ἄκυρος,
 ἔχων ὁ χαλκοῦς ἐπίθημα διερρινημένον ὥστ' αὐτὴν
 μόνην χωρεῖν τὴν ψῆφον, ἵνα μὴ δύο ὁ αὐτὸς
 4 ἐμβάλλῃ. ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαψηφίζεσθαι μέλλωσιν οἱ
 δικασταί, ὁ κῆρυξ ἀγορεύει πρῶτον ἂν ἐπισκή-
 πτωνται οἱ ἀντίδικοι ταῖς μαρτυρίαις· οὐ γὰρ
 ἔστιν ἐπισκήψασθαι ὅταν ἄρξωνται διαψηφίζεσθαι.
 ἔπειτα πάλιν ἀνακηρύττει " ἢ τετροπημένη τοῦ
 πρότερον λέγοντος ἢ δὲ πλήρης τοῦ ὕστερον
 λέγοντος." ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς λαβὼν ἅμα¹ ἐκ τοῦ
 λυχνείου τὰς ψήφους, πιέζων τὸν αὐλίσκον τῆς
 ψῆφου καὶ οὐ δεικνύων τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις οὔτε
 τὸ τετροπημένον οὔτε τὸ πλήρες, ἐμβάλλει τὴν
 μὲν κυρίαν εἰς τὸν χαλκοῦν ἀμφορέα τὴν δὲ ἄκυρον
 εἰς τὸν ξύλινον.

1 LXIX. Πάντες δ' ἐπειδὰν ὦσι διεψηφισμένοι,
 λαβόντες οἱ ὑπηρέται τὸν ἀμφορέα τὸν κύριον
 ἐξερωσι ἐπὶ ἄβακα τρυπήματα ἔχοντα ὅσαιπερ
 εἰσὶν αἱ ψῆφοι, ἵν' αὐταὶ φανεραὶ προκειμένα
 εὐαρίθμητοι ᾦσιν, καὶ τὰ τρυπητὰ καὶ τὰ πλήρη
 δῆλα τοῖς ἀντιδίκοις. οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς ψήφους εἰλη-
 χότες διαριθμοῦσιν αὐτὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβακος, χωρὶς
 μὲν τὰς πλήρεις χωρὶς δὲ τὰς τετροπημένας.
 καὶ ἀναγορεύει ὁ κῆρυξ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ψήφων,

¹ λαβόμενος alii : λα | . . . cod.

LXVIII. . . . (a copper token marked with a) 2
 3 (for on giving this up he gets three obols), so that
 they all may vote ; for nobody can get a token if
 he does not vote. And there are two jars placed in 3
 the court, one of copper and one of wood, separate
 so that a man may not secretly throw in pebbles
 undetected, into which the jurymen put their votes,
 the copper jar to count and the wooden jar for
 pebbles not used, the copper jar having a lid with
 a hole in it only large enough to take just the
 pebble alone, so that the same man may not throw in
 two. And when the jury are about to give their 4
 verdict, the herald first asks whether the litigants
 wish to challenge the evidence of the witnesses ; for
 they are not allowed to challenge it after the voting
 has begun. Then he proclaims again, ' The pebble
 with the hole through it is a vote for the first speaker,
 and the whole pebble one for the second speaker.'
 And the jurymen when taking the pebbles out of the
 lamp-stand presses the pebble against the lamp-stand
 and does not let the parties to the action see either the
 perforated pebble or the whole one, and throws the
 one that he wishes to count into the copper vessel and
 the one that he discards into the wooden one.

LXIX. And when all have voted, the attendants 1
 take the vessel that is to count and empty it out on to
 a reckoning-board with as many holes in it as there
 are pebbles, in order that they may be set out visibly
 and be easy to count, and that the perforated and
 the whole ones may be clearly seen by the litigants.
 And those assigned by lot to count the voting-pebbles
 count them out on to the reckoning-board, in two
 sets, one the whole ones and the other those per-
 forated. And the herald proclaims the number of

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τοῦ μὲν διώκοντος τὰς τετρυπημένας τοῦ δὲ
 φεύγοντος τὰς πλήρεις· ὁποτέρῳ δ' ἂν πλείων
 γένηται, οὗτος νικᾷ, ἂν δὲ ἴσαι, ὁ φεύγων.
 2 ἔπειτα πάλιν τιμῶσι, ἂν δέη τιμῆσαι, τὸν αὐτὸν
 τρόπον ψηφίζόμενοι, τὸ μὲν σύμβολον ἀπο-
 δίδοντες βακτηρίαν δὲ πάλιν παραλαμβάνοντες· ἡ
 δὲ τίμησίς ἐστιν πρὸς ἡμίχουν ὕδατος ἑκατέρῳ.
 ἐπειδὴν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἢ δεδικασμένα τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων,
 ἀπολαμβάνουσιν τὸν μισθὸν ἐν τῷ μέρει οὐ ἔλαχον
 ἕκαστοι. . . .

votes, the perforated pebbles being for the prosecutor, and the whole ones for the defendant ; and whichever gets the larger number wins the suit, but if the votes are equal, the defendant wins. Then again they ² assess the damages, if this has to be done, voting in the same way, giving up their ticket and receiving back a staff ; as to assessment of damages each party is allowed to speak during three pints of water. And when they have completed their legal duties as jurymen, they take their pay in the division to which each was assigned by lot. . . .

voted by the people
 and the whole world
 gets the benefit
 are equal in
 assess the same
 the same way
 back a little
 back a little
 and a little
 injury of the
 and a little

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THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS

INTRODUCTION

I. PLACE OF THE *Eudemian Ethics* IN THE ARISTOTELIAN CORPUS

ALL the extant books attributed to Aristotle (including probably the recently recovered treatise on the Athenian Constitution) belong to the group of his works designated by ancient authorities ἀκροατικοὶ λόγοι, 'lecture-courses.' These are scientific treatises, in places hardly more than mere outlines, though for the larger part fully written out arguments; presumably they are records of Aristotle's doctrine made for his pupils, and preserved in the library of the Peripatetic School. The other class of his writings, now lost, were more popular expositions intended for the general reader; some of them were in dialogue form. They were published, and they are alluded to as ἐκδεδομένοι λόγοι.

The former group includes three works on the philosophy of conduct, entitled the *Eudemian Ethics*, the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Magna Moralia*. The two former are full scientific treatises, in eight and ten Books respectively. *Magna Moralia* is a smaller work, more discursive in style, of which only two Books survive, the latter part being lost; its contents correspond partly with the *Eudemian* and partly with the *Nicomachean Ethics*; it was probably compiled

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by a Peripatetic of the generation after Aristotle. Eudemus was the pupil of Aristotle who followed his doctrine most closely ; Nicomachus was Aristotle's son, who fell in battle when a mere lad. Both may have been the compilers of the treatises that bear their names : Cicero (*De Finibus* v. 12) says that the *Nicomachean Ethics*, though attributed to Aristotle himself, can well have been by his son, and Diogenes of Laerte quotes from it as by Nicomachus. But the early commentator Porphyry speaks of both works as ' dedicated to ' the persons whose names they bear. Whatever the truth may be, the *Nicomachean Ethics* has always been accepted as the authoritative exposition of Aristotle's moral science ; and it seems probable that the *Eudemian*, so far as it differs, represents an earlier stage of its development.^a This view is not necessarily precluded by the fact that in some places the *Eudemian Ethics* is fuller in expression or more discursive than the *Nicomachean*.

II. THE EUDEMIAN-NICOMACHEAN BOOKS

For about one third of the whole the two works overlap, the Eudemian Books IV., V., VI. being identical with the Nicomachean V., VI., VII. ; these are given in the mss. and editions of the latter work only. Scholars have debated to which they really belong, some holding that they fit the argument of

^a This is the view of Jaeger, followed by Burnet in his *Essays and Addresses* and by Mansion ; but the *Eudemian Ethics* is regarded as later than the *Nicomachean* by Spengel, Susemihl 1900, and Stocks (in the Oxford Aristotle vol. ix.), as it was by Burnet in his earlier work, his edition of *N.E. Magna Moralia* is put last by almost all scholars, but first of the three treatises by Schleiermacher and Arnim.

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the *Eudemian* and that the corresponding parts of the *Nicomachean* have been lost, others the opposite. But all Aristotle's treatises are so loosely put together that the arguments for neither view are convincing. It is more probable that the three common Books represent his final doctrine, except in so far as they are modified by other parts of his works—thus the excursus on the ethical value of pleasure in *E.E.* VI. = *N.E.* VII. was doubtless superseded by the more accurate treatment of the topic at the beginning of *N.E.* X.

III. THE *EUDEMIAN ETHICS*: OUTLINE OF CONTENTS AND COMPARISON WITH THE *NICOMACHEAN*

Book I. introduces the subject—the nature of Happiness or Well-being, the supreme End or Aim of human conduct. This is a practical study: knowledge of the good is an aid to its attainment. The different views that prevail are crystallized in three typical Lives, the philosopher's life of thought, the statesman's life of action, the voluptuary's life of pleasure. The Platonic theory of an Absolute Good is of questionable philosophic validity, and in any case has no bearing on practical life.

Book II. c. i. defines Happiness as consisting in the right exercise of the functions of man's nature, moral and intellectual. The contents of *E.E.* so far correspond with those of *N.E.* Book I.; the remainder of Book II. with *N.E.* II. and III. i.-v. It examines the nature of Moral Goodness or Virtue, which is defined as a fixed disposition of character that in action or emotion steers a middle course between too much and too little. The various virtues are

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tabulated, with the vices of excess and defect that correspond to each. The problem of the Freedom of the Will is studied in the light of the psychology of Volition and Purpose.

Book III. discusses the Virtues and some minor Graces of Character seriatim, each with its corresponding pair of Vices. The list tallies with that in *N.E.* III., vi. ff. and IV., except that it inserts the virtue of Mildness between Temperance and Liberality, and adds to the minor Graces of Character Nemesis (righteous indignation at another's undeserved good or bad fortune), Friendliness and Dignity, while it omits Gentleness and Agreeableness (*N.E.* IV., v., vi.).

(Books IV., V., VI. are omitted in mss. and editions of the *Eudemean Ethics*, as they are the same as Books V., VI., VII. of the *Nicomachean*; the first of these three Books deals with Justice, thus completing the examination of the Moral Virtues; the second treats the Intellectual Virtues of Prudence or Practical Wisdom and Theoria or Speculative Wisdom; the third forms an appendix to the section on Moral Virtue—it examines Weakness of Will and studies the psychology of Pleasure—a subject again treated differently and more accurately in *N.E.* X. *init.*)

The subject of Book VII. is Friendship. The term includes all forms of friendly mutual regard, whether between equals or superior and inferior, relatives or other associates, and whether based on the motive of utility or the pleasure of society or respect for worth. The psychology of friendship is analysed in relation to that of self-love.

In *N.E.* VIII. and IX. Friendship is discussed at greater length with fuller detail; the arrangement

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of the topics is different but there is perhaps no striking discrepancy of view.

E.E. VIII. notices the epistemological aspect of Virtue (treated in *N.E.* I., ix., but differently); and discusses the ethical bearing of Good Luck (more fully dealt with in a different connexion in c. iii. of *N.E.* VII. = *E.E.* VI.), and there follows an essay on *Kalokâgathia*, Moral Nobility (a virtue merely alluded to without analysis in *N.E.*, as a necessary quality of the Great-spirited man, 1124 a 4 and 1179 b 10); it is treated as the consummation of the particular virtues. In conclusion there is a glance at *Theoria*, the activity of Speculative Wisdom, as the highest life of man; at Book II. *init.* this was coupled with Moral Conduct as constituting happiness. There is nothing corresponding to the full treatment of *Theoria* as the consummation of human well-being that is given in *N.E.* X. vii., viii., or to the transition from ethics to politics (glancing at the importance of public education) which concludes that work.

IV. TEXT, MSS. AND EDITIONS

The *Eudemian Ethics* is not contained in the two best mss. of Aristotle, the 10th c. Laurentianus (denoted by the sign *K^b*) and the 12th c. Parisiensis (*L^b*); we derive it chiefly from Vaticanus (*P^b*), a 13th c. copy of *K^b*, and the early 15th c. Marcianus (*M^b*), not so good a text as *P^b* but an indispensable adjunct to it—according to Jackson, who refers to the text of these two mss. as ‘the Greek tradition.’ Other later copies certainly contain more errors, and are of little value as actual traditions of a sound text—some of their variants may be mere conjectural

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corrections ; their readings are only occasionally given in this edition.

The 13th c. Latin translation attributed to William of Moerbeke follows the Greek very closely, and is almost equivalent to another ms. ranking in value next to Vaticanus and Marcianus ; it is occasionally adduced in this edition either in Latin or in its original Greek when this can be inferred with certainty.

There is an old Latin version of Book VIII. c. ii. with *Magna Moralia* Book II. c. viii., entitled *De Bona Fortuna*, printed in a Latin Aristotle of 1482, which indicates an independent Greek text of that passage.

The earliest printed edition of Aristotle is the Aldine, Venice 1498. The foundation of all modern work on the text is the monumental Berlin edition, with a Latin translation, scholia and indices, published by the Academia Regia Borussica in 1831 and the following years. The text, edited by Bekker, forms Volumes I. and II. which are paged consecutively, the *Eudemian Ethics* occupying pp. 1214-1249 ; the Berlin pages, the columns (indicated by *a* and *b*) and the numbering of the lines are shown in the margin of the present text.

Fritsche's edition of the *Eudemian Ethics* (Ratisbon 1851) has an introduction on the authorship and contents, a text with explanatory notes, illustrative quotations and critical notes, a Latin translation and a Greek index.

The Teubner text of Susemihl (Leipzig 1884) has useful critical notes, collecting the corrections of other scholars published in the learned journals.

Henry Jackson contributed a valuable study of the text and contents of Book VII. cc. i., ii. to *The Journal*

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of *Philology* xxxii. pp. 170 ff. ; and also supplied a number of printed notes to the Oxford translator, J. Solomon.

Solomon's translation, in Volume IX. of the Oxford Aristotle 1925, is the most recent work on the book. Mr. Solomon in his footnotes gives full references to the corresponding passages of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Magna Moralia* ; and his notes on the readings of the Greek that he has adopted make his work a valuable critical edition : they include conjectures of the translator himself, of Professor Ross the general editor of the series, and of other scholars, among them the notes of Henry Jackson referred to above.

In view of the comparatively scanty amount of work on the text hitherto published, the present editor has thought himself justified in making a considerable number of conjectural emendations of his own. Some freedom has been used in incorporating these and those of other scholars in the text ; it seems in keeping with the purpose of this series to present the reader directly with what Aristotle probably wrote, leaving him to glance at the critical notes to discover what he is represented as having written by his copyists. At the same time in the interests of scholarship emended passages in the text are marked by a number referring to the corresponding note.

Similarly, the style of the translation is intended to make it serve as an aid to a student reading the original. It is as interpretative as was possible without becoming a mere paraphrase ; it is not intended as a substitute for the Greek, which might take the form either of a rigidly literal version or

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of a rendering into idiomatic English conveying the sense but ignoring the form of the original.

The following signs are used in the critical notes :

MSS.

P^b = Vaticanus.

M^b = Marcianus.

cet. = all the other MSS. collated by editors where their readings agree.

v.l. = the reading of one or some of these other
MSS.

Guil. = the Latin version of William of Moerbeke.

Γ = the conjectured Greek original of this.

B^f = *De Bona Fortuna*.

The following abbreviations are used for the names of some editors and commentators quoted for the text :

Ald. = editio princeps Aldina.

Bek. = Bekker.

Bus. = Busolt.

Bz. = Bonitz.

Cas. = Casaubon.

Fr. = Fritsche.

Iac. = Henry Jackson.

Rac. = the present editor.

Ras. = Rasso.

Ric. = Richards.

Sol. = Solomon.

Sp. = Spengler.

Sus. = Susemihl.

Syl. = Sylburg.

Vict. = Victorius.

H. R.

November 1934.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ Α

1214 a

Ι. Ὁ μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰ
 γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προ-
 πύλαιον τοῦ Λητώου διελὼν ὡς¹ οὐχ ὑπάρχοντα
 πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ
 ἡδύ, ποιήσας

5 κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν,
 πάντων ἡδιστον δ'² οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτῷ μὴ συγχωρῶμεν· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία
 κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον ἀπάντων οὕσα ἡδιστόν
 ἔστιν.

Πολλῶν δ' ὄντων θεωρημάτων ἃ περὶ ἕκαστον 2
 10 πρᾶγμα καὶ περὶ ἐκάστην φύσιν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ
 δεῖται σκέψεως, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν συντείνει πρὸς τὸ
 γνῶναι μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις³ καὶ
 περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος. ὅσα μὲν οὖν 3
 ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικὴν, λεκτέον κατὰ
 τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα καιρὸν ὅ τι περ ἂν οἰκείον ἦ⁴ τῇ

¹ ὡς add. Sp.

² δ' hic Fr.: ante ἡδιστον aut om. codd.

³ χρήσεις Sp.

⁴ Ric.: ὅ τι περ οἰκείον ἦν.

^a Theognis (255 f. with slight variation, quoted also in *N.E.* i., 1099 a 27).

THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS

BOOK I

1 I. The man ^a who at Delos set forth in the precinct of the god his own opinion composed an inscription for the forecourt of the temple of Leto in which he distinguished goodness, beauty and pleasantness as not all being properties of the same thing. His verses are :

Books I. IX.
init. HAPPINESS.
Introduction
(cc. i. - vi.):
the supreme
good—

Justice ^b is fairest, and Health is best,
But to win one's desire is the pleasantest.

But for our part let us not allow that he is right ;
for Happiness ^c is at once the pleasantest and the fairest and best of all things whatever.

2 About every thing and every natural species there are many views that involve difficulty and require examination ; of these some relate only to our knowledge of the thing, others deal also with modes of
3 acquiring it and of acting in relation to it. As to all those views therefore that involve only speculative philosophy, we must say whatever may be proper to the inquiry when the suitable occasion occurs.

its mode of
acquisition,

^b Or ' Righteousness ' ; the term includes more than justice.

^c Or ' Well-being ' ; the Greek word is entirely non-committal, and does not necessarily denote a state of feeling, consciousness of welfare.

1214 a

15 μεθόδῳ. πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν 4
καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει γίνονται πάντες
εὐδαιμόνες οἱ τυγχάνοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας,
ὥσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χροιάν δια-
φέροντες, ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὐσης ἐπιστήμης
τινὸς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ διὰ τινος ἀσκήσεως
20 (πολλὰ γὰρ οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε μαθοῦσιν ἀλλ'
ἐθισθείσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαῦλα μὲν
τοῖς φαύλως ἐθισθείσι, χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς);
ἢ τούτων μὲν κατ' οὐδένα τῶν τρόπων, δυοῖν δὲ 5
θάτερον, ἢτοι καθάπερ οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεό-
ληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιπνοία δαιμονίου τινὸς
25 ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην (πολλοὶ
γὰρ ταυτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν
εὐτυχίαν).

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ παρουσία¹ διὰ τούτων ἀπάντων ἢ 6
τινῶν ἢ τινὸς ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐκ ἄδηλον.
ἅπασαι γὰρ αἱ γενέσεις σχεδὸν πίπτουσιν εἰς
ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς (καὶ γὰρ τὰς² ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας
30 ἀπάσας πρὸς τὰς ἀπ' ἐπιστήμης ἂν τις συναγάγοι
πράξεις). τὸ δ' εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως 7
καὶ καλῶς εἶη ἂν ἐν τρισὶ μάλιστα τοῖς εἶναι
δοκοῦσιν αἰρετωτάτοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρόνησιν
μέγιστον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθόν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν, οἱ
δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔνιοι 8

1214 b περὶ τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτῶν διαμφισβητοῦσι, συμ-
βάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον θατέρου μᾶλλον εἰς

¹ v.l. παρουσία τῆς εὐδαιμονίας.

² τὰς add. Cas.

^a The Greek term here still retains the general sense that it has in Plato. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* it is limited to 200

4 But we must consider first what the good life consists in and how it is to be obtained—whether all of those who receive the designation ‘happy’ acquire happiness by nature, as is the case with tallness and shortness of stature and differences of complexion, or by study, which would imply that there is a science of happiness, or by some form of training, for there are many human attributes that are not bestowed by nature nor acquired by study but gained by habituation—bad attributes by those trained in bad habits and good attributes by those trained in good ones.

5 Or does happiness come in none of these ways, but either by a sort of elevation of mind inspired by some divine power, as in the case of persons possessed by a nymph or a god, or, alternatively, by fortune? for many people identify happiness with good fortune.

6 Now it is pretty clear that the presence of happiness is bestowed upon men by all of these things, or by some or one of them; for almost all the modes in which it is produced fall under these principles, inasmuch as all the acts that spring from thought may be included with those that spring from knowledge.

7 But to be happy and to live blissfully and finely may consist chiefly in three things deemed to be most desirable: some people say that Wisdom^a is the greatest good, others Goodness^b and others

its three main constituents,

8 Pleasure. And certain persons debate about their importance in relation to happiness, declaring that one contributes more to it than another—some holding Practical Wisdom, *prudentia*, ‘prudence,’ as distinct from *θεωπία*, *sapientia*, ‘speculative wisdom.’

^b It must always be remembered that the Greek term is less limited in meaning than ‘virtue,’ and may denote excellence in any department, not only moral goodness.

1214 b

αὐτήν, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὖσαν μείζον ἀγαθὸν τὴν
 φρόνησιν τῆς ἀρετῆς, οἱ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἀρετὴν,
 οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων τὴν ἡδονήν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν
 5 ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων, τοῖς δ' ἐκ δυοῖν, τοῖς δ'
 ἐν ἐνί τινι τούτων εἶναι τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως.

II. Περὶ δὴ τούτων ἐπιστήσαντας ἅπαντα τὸν 1
 δυνάμενον ζῆν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι
 τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, ἥτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν
 ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν, πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται
 10 πάσας τὰς πράξεις (ὡς τό γε μὴ συντετάχθαι τὸν
 βίον πρὸς τι τέλος ἀφροσύνης πολλῆς σημειῶν
 ἐστίν), μάλιστα δὴ δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῷ διορίσασθαι 2
 μήτε προπετῶς μήτε ῥαθύμως ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων
 τὸ ζῆν εὖ καὶ τίνων ἄνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν ὦν τ'
 15 ἄνευ οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, ὁμοίως 3
 δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν· ὥστ' οὐδὲ
 τὸ ζῆν καλῶς καὶ ὦν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατὸν ζῆν καλῶς.
 ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἴδια τῆς ὑγείας 4
 οὐδὲ τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ
 20 τῶν ἕξεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων, οἷον ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν
 ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ κινήσεως μετέχειν οὐθὲν ἂν
 ὑπάρξειεν ἡμῖν οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τὰ δ'
 ἴδια μᾶλλον περὶ ἐκάστην φύσιν, οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως
 οἰκεῖον πρὸς εὐεξίαν τοῖς εἰρημένοις κρεωφαγία
 καὶ τῶν περιπάτων οἱ μετὰ δεῖπνον. ἅ δεῖ μὴ

^a Cf. *N.E.* i., 1094 a 22, 1095 a 22-26.

that Wisdom is a greater good than Goodness, others the reverse, and others that Pleasure is a greater good than either of them ; and some think that the happy life comes from them all, others from two of them, others that it consists in some one of them.

1 II. Having then in regard to this subject established that everybody able to live according to his own purpose choice should set before him some object for noble living to aim at^a—either honour or else glory or wealth or culture—on which he will keep his eyes fixed in all his conduct (since clearly it is a mark of much folly not to have one's life regulated with
2 regard to some End), it is therefore most necessary first to decide within oneself, neither hastily nor carelessly, in which of the things that belong to us the good life consists, and what are the indispensable conditions for men's possessing it. For there is a distinction between health and the things that are
3 indispensable conditions of health, and this is similarly the case with many other things ; consequently also to live finely is not the same as the things with-
4 out which living finely is impossible. And in the latter class of things some that are indispensable conditions of health and life are not peculiar to special people but common to practically all men—both some states and some actions—for instance, without breathing or being awake or participating in movement we could not possess any good or any evil at all ; whereas others are more peculiar to special types of natural constitution—for instance, eating meat and taking walking exercise after dinner are not closely related to health in the same way as the conditions mentioned. And these facts

its essential conditions.

1214 b

25 λανθάνειν.¹ ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτ' αἷτια τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως 5
περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν τί ἐστι καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων·
ᾧν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔνιοι μέρη
τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσιν.

III. Πάσας μὲν οὖν τὰς δόξας ἐπισκοπεῖν ὅσας 1
ἔχουσί τινες περὶ αὐτῆς περιέρχον. πολλὰ γὰρ
30 φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς παιδαρίοις καὶ τοῖς κάμνουσι
καὶ παραφρονοῦσι περὶ ᾧν ἂν οὐθεὶς νοῦν ἔχων
διαπορήσειεν, δέονται γὰρ οὐ λόγων, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν
ἡλικίας ἐν ἧ μεταβαλοῦσιν² οἱ δὲ κολάσεως
ιατρικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς (κόλασις γὰρ ἢ φαρμακεία
τῶν πληγῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐστίν). ὁμοίως δὲ 2
1215 a ταύταις οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν, εἰκῆ γὰρ λέγουσι
σχεδὸν περὶ ἀπάντων καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ταύτης.
τὰς δὲ τῶν σοφῶν³ ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας· ἄτοπον
γὰρ προσφέρειν λόγον τοῖς λόγου μηδὲν δεομένοις
ἀλλὰ πάθους.⁴ ἐπεὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι περὶ ἐκάστην 3
5 πραγματείαν οἰκεῖαι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ βίου τοῦ
κρατίστου καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἀρίστης εἰσὶν· ταύτας οὖν
καλῶς ἔχει τὰς δόξας ἐξετάζειν, οἱ γὰρ τῶν
ἀμφισβητούντων ἔλεγκοι τῶν ἐναντιουμένων αὐταῖς⁵
λόγων ἀποδείξεις εἰσὶν.

Ἔτι δὲ πρὸ ἔργου τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ λανθάνειν 4
μάλιστα πρὸς ᾧ δεῖ συντείνειν πᾶσαν σκέψιν, ἐκ
10 τίνων ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ζῆν

¹ ᾧ . . . λανθάνειν hic Rac.: supra post φύσιν.

² Sp.: μεταβάλλουσιν.

³ ταύτης . . . σοφῶν add. P^b marg. (δὲ add. Rac.).

⁴ πείθους Iac.

⁵ Rac.: αὐτοῖς.

^a In the mss. this clause comes before the preceding one, 'for instance, eating meat . . . mentioned.'

^b Cf. *N.E.* i., 1095 a 28-30, b 19 ff.

5 must not be overlooked,^a for these are the causes of the disputes about the real nature of happiness and about the means of procuring it; for some people regard the things that are indispensable conditions of being happy as actual parts of happiness.

1 III. Now to examine all the opinions that any people hold about happiness is a superfluous task.^b For children and the sick and insane have many opinions which no sensible man would discuss, for these persons need not argument but the former time in which to grow up and alter and the latter medical or official chastisement (treatment with drugs being chastisement just as much as flogging is). And similarly it is also superfluous to examine the opinions of the multitude^c either; for they talk at random about almost everything, and especially about happiness. We ought to examine only the opinions of the wise^d; for it is out of place to apply reasoning to those who do not need reasoning at all, 3 but experience. But since every subject has special difficulties related to it, it is clear that there are such in regard to the highest life and the best mode of existence; it is then well to examine the opinions putting these difficulties, since the refutations advanced by those who challenge them are demonstrations of the theories that are opposed to them.

Considered opinions as to the nature of happiness

4 Moreover to notice such matters is especially advantageous with a view to the subjects to which all inquiry ought to be directed—the question what are the means that make it possible to participate in living well and finely (if ‘blissfully’ is too invidious

are of practical value for its attainment.

^c Cf. *N.E.* i., 1095 b 19.

^d The words translated ‘happiness’ and ‘the opinions of the wise’ are conjectural insertions in the Greek.

(εἰ τὸ¹ μακαρίως ἐπιφθονώτερον εἰπεῖν), καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν περὶ ἕκαστα γενομένην ἂν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινομένοις 5 ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἐστίν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη πολλοῖς, οὐ γάρ ἐστι δι' ἐπιμελείας ἢ 15 κτῆσις οὐδὲ² ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ³ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας· εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα εἶναι καὶ 6 τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ θειότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετασχεῖν, θειότερον δὲ τῷ κείσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς⁴ αὐτοὺς παρασκευάζουσι ποιούς τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

20 IV. Ἔσται δὲ φανερὰ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων καὶ διαπορουμένων ἂν καλῶς ὀρισθῆ τί χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πότερον ἐν τῷ ποιόν τινα μόνον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καθάπερ 25 τινὲς ᾤήθησαν τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων, ἢ δεῖ μὲν καὶ ποιόν τινα ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖ τὰς πράξεις εἶναι ποιὰς τινας.

Διηρημένων δὲ τῶν βίων καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐδ'⁵ 2 ἀμφισβητούντων τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας ἀλλ' ἄλλως⁶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς καὶ τὰς βαναύσους⁷ καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμὸν (λέγω δὲ 30 φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον, βαναύσους δὲ τὰς ἐδραίας καὶ μισθαρνικὰς,

¹ τὸ Vict., τῷ τὸ Fr.: τῷ.

² οὐδὲ om. Sp.

³ οὐδὲ διὰ Pb.

⁴ v.l. ἐν τοῖς: ἐν τῷ . . . παρασκευάζειν? Rac.

⁵ οὐδ' add. Bz.

⁶ Sp. ὡς.

⁷ Sp.: καὶ τὰς βαναύσους post χρηματισμὸν.

^a The word ψυχὴ, usually rendered 'soul,' has no term exactly corresponding to it in English, as it denotes the whole

an expression)—and with a view to the hope that we may have of the things that are good in the various departments. For if living finely depends on things that come by fortune or by nature, it would be beyond the hopes of many men, for then its attainment is not to be secured by effort, and does not rest with men themselves and is not a matter of their own conduct; but if it consists in oneself and one's own actions having a particular quality, the good would be more common and more divine—more common because it would be possible for more people to share it, and more divine because happiness would then be in store for those who made themselves and their actions of a particular quality.

1 IV. Most of the points debated and the difficulties raised will be clear if it be satisfactorily determined what the proper conception of happiness is—does it consist merely in a person's possessing some particular quality of spirit,^a as some of the sages and the older thinkers held, or although a particular personal character is indeed an indispensable condition, is a particular quality of conduct even more necessary?

Character or conduct?

2 There are various different modes of life, and some do not lay any claim to well-being of the kind under consideration, but are pursued merely for the sake of things necessary—for instance the lives devoted to the vulgar and mechanic arts and those dealing with business (by vulgar arts I mean those pursued only for reputation, by mechanic the sedentary and wage-earning pursuits, and by arts of business those

Three typical lives.

vitality of a living creature, with the unconscious factors of nutrition and growth as well as conscious feelings or emotions and thoughts.

1215 a

χρηματιστικὰς δὲ τὰς πρὸς ὠνὰς ἀγοραίας¹ καὶ
 πράξεις καπηλικὰς), τῶν δ' εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμο-
 νικὴν ταπτομένων τριῶν ὄντων τῶν καὶ πρότερον
 ῥηθέντων ἀγαθῶν ὡς μεγίστων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
 35 ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς, τρεῖς ὀρώμεν
 καὶ βίους ὄντας οὓς οἱ ἐξουσίας² τυγχάνοντες

1215 b

προαιροῦνται ζῆν ἅπαντες, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον
 ἀπολαυστικόν. τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος 3
 βούλεται περὶ φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν
 περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὁ δὲ πολιτικὸς περὶ τὰς πράξεις
 τὰς καλὰς (αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς), ὁ
 5 δ' ἀπολαυστικὸς περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς σωματικὰς.
 διόπερ ἕτερος³ ἕτερον⁴ εὐδαιμόνα προσαγορεύει, 4
 καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον, καὶ⁵ Ἀναξαγόρας
 μὲν ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος,
 "οὐθεὶς" εἶπεν "ὦν σὺ νομίζεις, ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἄν
 τίς σοι φανείη." τοῦτον δ' ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον
 10 ἐκεῖνος ὀρών τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα
 μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον ταύτης
 τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας, αὐτὸς δ' ἴσως ᾤετο
 τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον
 ἢ τινος θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς
 ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν⁶ μακάριον εἶναι.

15 V. Περὶ πολλῶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐτέρων οὐ ῥάδιον 1

¹ Sol.: πρὸς ἀγορὰς μὲν.

² Sp.: ἐπ' ἐξουσίας; ἐπ' ἐξουσίας <όντες> τυγχάνοντες? Rac.

³ ἕτερος add. Ras.

⁴ ἕτερον Rac.: ἕτερον τόν.

⁵ καὶ add. ? Sns.

⁶ εἰπεῖν <δεῖν>? Ric.

^a See 1214 a 30-b 5.

^b Perhaps the Greek should be emended to give 'those who happen to be in power.'

^c i.e. active citizenship: 'statesmanship' is too lofty a term.

concerned with market purchase and retail selling); but on the other hand, the things related to the happy conduct of life being three, the things already mentioned^a as the greatest possible goods for men—goodness, wisdom and pleasure, we see that there are also three ways of life in which those to whom fortune gives opportunity^b invariably choose to live, the life of politics,^c the life of philosophy, and the life of enjoyment. Of these the philosophic life denotes being concerned with the contemplation of truth, the political life means being occupied with honourable activities (and these are the activities that spring from goodness), and the life of enjoyment is concerned with the pleasures of the body. Owing to this, different people give the name of happy to different persons, as was said before too; and Anaxagoras^d of Clazomenae when asked ‘Who is the happiest man?’ said ‘None of those whom you think, but he would seem to you an odd sort of person.’ But Anaxagoras answered in that way because he saw that the man who put the question supposed it to be impossible to receive the appellation ‘happy’ without being great and beautiful or rich, whereas he himself perhaps thought that the person who humanly speaking enjoys bliss is he that lives by the standard of justice without pain and in purity, or participates in some form of divine contemplation.^e

V. While there are many different things as to

Various opinions as to life's goods

^d The physical philosopher, 500–428 B.C., born at Clazomenae in Ionia, taught at Athens.

^e *i.e.* the man who displays the virtues of Temperance, Justice and Wisdom (the fourth cardinal virtue, Courage, is omitted), enhanced by pleasure or freedom from pain. This passage illustrates how Aristotle prepared the way for the hedonism of Epicurus.

1215 b

τὸ κρίναι καλῶς, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ οὗ πᾶσι ῥᾶστον
 εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ γινῶναι, τί
 τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν αἰρετόν, καὶ λαβὼν ἂν τις ἔχοι
 πλήρη τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τοιαῦτα
 τῶν ἀποβαινόντων δι' ἃ προτείνονται τὸ ζῆν, οἷον
 20 νόσους περιωδυνίας χειμῶνας· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι
 καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰρετόν ἦν, εἴ τις αἴρεσιν ἐδίδου,
 διὰ γε ταῦτα τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ¹
 βίος ὃν ζῶσιν ἔτι παῖδες ὄντες· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτον
 ἀνακάμψαι πάλιν οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείνειεν εὖ φρονῶν.
 25 ἔτι δὲ πολλὰ τῶν τε μηδεμίαν ἐχόντων ἡδονὴν ἢ
 λύπην, καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων μὲν ἡδονὴν μὴ καλὴν
 δέ, τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ὥστε τὸ μὴ εἶναι κρείττον εἶναι
 τοῦ ζῆν. ὅλως δ' εἴ τις ἅπαντα συναγάγοι ὅσα
 4 πράττουσι μὲν καὶ πάσχουσιν ἅπαντες, ἐκόντες
 μέντοι μηθὲν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτοῦ χάριν, καὶ
 30 προσθείη χρόνου πλῆθος ἀπέραντόν τι, οὐ μᾶλλον
 ἔνεκ' ἂν τις τούτων ἔλοιτο ζῆν ἢ μὴ ζῆν. ἀλλὰ
 5 μὴν οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν
 τῶν ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρεθεισῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν
 ἃς τὸ γινώσκειν ἢ βλέπειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις
 αἰσθήσεων πορίζει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς
 35 προτιμήσειε τὸ ζῆν μὴ παντελῶς ὢν ἀνδράποδον,
 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῷ ταύτην ποιουμένῳ τὴν αἴρεσιν
 οὐθὲν ἂν διενέγκειε γενέσθαι θηρίον ἢ ἄνθρωπον·
 1216 a ὁ γοῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βουῖς, ὃν ὡς Ἄπιν τιμῶσιν, ἐν 6
 πλείοσι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξουσιάζει πολλῶν μονάρχων.²

¹ <τις> ὁ . . . ; Cas.² Γ: μοναρχιῶν.^a Cf. Soph. O.C. 1225 μὴ φῦναι τὸν ἅπαντα νικᾶ λόγον.

which it is not easy to make a right judgement, this is especially the case with one about which everybody thinks that it is very easy to judge and that anybody can decide—the question which of the things contained in being alive is preferable, and which when attained would fully satisfy a man's desire. For many of life's events are such that they cause men to throw life away, for instance, diseases, excessive pains, storms; so that it is clear that on account of these things any way it would actually be preferable, if someone offered us the choice, not to be born at all.^a And in addition, the kind of life that people live while still children is not desirable—in fact no sensible person could endure to go back to it again.

3 And further, many of the experiences that contain no pleasure nor pain, and also of those that do contain pleasure but pleasure of an ignoble kind, are such that non-existence would be better than being alive.

4 And generally, if one collected together the whole of the things that the whole of mankind do and experience yet do and experience unwillingly, because not for the sake of the things themselves, and if one added an infinite extent of time, these things would not cause a man to choose to be alive rather than

5 not alive. But moreover, also the pleasure of food or of sex alone, with the other pleasures abstracted that knowledge or sight or any other of the senses provides for human beings, would not induce anybody to value life higher if he were not utterly slavish, for it is clear that to one making this choice there would be no difference between being born a

6 beast or a man; at all events, the ox in Egypt, which they reverence as Apis, has a greater abundance of

7 such indulgences than many monarchs. Nor like-

1216 a

ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ καθεύδειν ἡδονήν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει καθεύδειν ἀνέγερτον ὕπνον ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας μέχρι τῆς τελευταίας ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν 5 χιλίων ἢ ὅποσωνοῦν,¹ ἢ ζῆν ὄντα φυτόν; τὰ γοῦν φυτὰ τοιαύτης τινὸς ἔοικε μετέχειν ζωῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ παιδία· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐν τῇ μητρὶ² γένεσιν πεφυκότα μὲν διατελεῖ καθεύδοντα δὲ τὸν πάντα χρόνον. ὥστε φανερόν 8 ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὅτι διαφεύγει σκοπούμενους τί 10 τὸ εὖ καὶ τί τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ ζῆν.

Τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι 9 πρὸς τινα διαποροῦντα τοιαύτ' ἄττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἔνεκ' ἂν τις ἔλοιτο γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι " τοῦ " φάναι " θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον τάξιν." οὗτος μὲν 15 οὖν ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἔνεκεν τὴν αἵρεσιν ᾤετο τιμίαν εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν· οἱ δὲ Σαρδανάπαλλον 10 μακαρίζοντες ἢ Σμινδυρίδην τὸν Συβαρίτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς τῶν ζώντων τὸν ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οὗτοι δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται τάττειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· ἕτεροι δὲ τινες οὔτ' ἂν 11 φρόνησιν οὐδεμίαν οὔτε τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς 20 ἔλοιτο μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· αἰροῦνται γοῦν οὐ μόνον ἐνιοὶ δόξης χάριν αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ μέλλοντες εὐδοκιμήσειν. ἀλλ' οἱ 12 πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι

¹ v.l. ἐτῶν ἀριθμῶν χίλιον ἀριθμὸν ἢ ὅποσωνοῦν : ἐτῶν χιλίων ἢ ὅποσωνοῦν? (excise ἀριθμὸν gloss. ad ὅποσωνοῦν erratum) Rac. ² μήτρα Γ.

^a See 1215 b 6 n.

^b A mythical king of Assyria, proverbial for luxury, cf. N.E. i., 1295 b 22.

wise would anyone desire life for the pleasure of sleep either; for what is the difference between slumbering without being awakened from the first day till the last of a thousand or any number of years, and living a vegetable existence? any way plants seem to participate in life of that kind; and so do children too, inasmuch as at their first procreation in the mother, although alive, they stay asleep all the time.

8 So that it is clear from considerations of this sort that the precise nature of well-being and of the good in life escapes our investigation.

9 Now it is said that when somebody persisted in putting various difficulties of this sort to Anaxagoras ^a and went on asking for what object one should choose to come into existence rather than not, he replied by saying, 'For the sake of contemplating the heavens and the whole order of the universe.'

Anaxagoras therefore thought that the alternative of being alive was valuable for the sake of some kind

10 of knowledge; but those who ascribe bliss to Sardanapallus ^b or Smindyrides of Sybaris ^c or some of the others living the life of enjoyment, all appear for

11 their part to place happiness in delight; while a different set would not choose either wisdom of any kind or the bodily pleasures in preference to the actions

that spring from goodness: at all events, some people choose those actions not only for the sake of reputation

but even when they are not going to get

12 any credit. But the majority of those engaged in politics are not correctly designated 'politicians,' for

^a Greek colony in S. Italy. For Smindyrides, who travelled with 1000 slaves in attendance, see Herod vi. 127, Athenaeus, v. p. 273.

1216 a

τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὸν
 25 ἀλήθειαν, ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶ
 πράξεων προαιρετικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ
 χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἕνεκεν ἄπτονται τοῦ
 ζῆν οὕτως.

Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ὅτι πάντες 13
 ἐπὶ τρεῖς βίους φέρουσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πολιτικὸν
 φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν. τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν περὶ
 30 τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονὴ καὶ τίς καὶ
 ποία τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὥστ'
 οὐ τίνες εἰσὶ δεῖ ζῆτεῖν ἡμᾶς¹ ἀλλ' εἰ συντείνουσι
 τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς συντείνουσι,
 καὶ πότερον, εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῷ ζῆν καλῶς²
 ἡδονάς τινας, ταύτας δεῖ προσάπτειν ἢ τούτων
 35 μὲν ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν, ἕτεροι
 δ' εἰσὶν αἱ³ ἡδοναὶ δι' ἃς εὐλόγως οἴονται τὸν
 εὐδαίμονα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως.

Ἄλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον, 14
 περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως πρῶτον θεωρήσωμεν
 τὴν τε φύσιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρου τίς ἐστὶ καὶ πότερον
 40 μόρια ταῦτα τῆς ἀγαθῆς ζωῆς ἐστὶν⁴ αὐτὰ ἢ αἱ
 1216 b πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ προσάπτουσιν αὐτὰ
 κἂν εἰ μὴ πάντες εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀλλ' οὖν οἱ
 λόγου ἄξιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντες.

Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ᾤετ' εἶναι τέλος 15
 τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ ἐπεζήτηε τί ἐστὶν ἢ
 5 δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἢ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν

¹ Fr.: αὐτάς.² Bz.: καλᾶς.³ al add. Rac.⁴ Rac.: ἐστὶν ἡ.

^a The Greek word is specially associated with sensual pleasures.

^b The promised discussion does not occur, but see *N.E.* vii., 1153 b 7-25.

they are not truly political, since the political man is one who purposely chooses noble actions for their own sake, whereas the majority embrace that mode of life for the sake of money and gain.

- 13 What has been said, therefore, demonstrates that all men ascribe happiness to three modes of life—the political, the philosophic, and the life of enjoyment.^a Among these, the nature and quality of the pleasure connected with the body and with enjoyment, and the means that procure it, are not hard to see; so that it is not necessary for us to inquire what these pleasures are, but whether they conduce at all to happiness or not, and how they so conduce, and, if it be the case that the noble life ought to have some pleasures attached to it, whether these are the pleasures that ought to be attached, or whether these must be enjoyed in some other way, whereas the pleasures which people reasonably believe to make the happy man's life pleasant and not merely painless are different ones.

all come back to the three typical lives.

- 14 But these matters must be examined later.^b Let us first consider Goodness and Wisdom^c—what the nature of each is, and also whether they themselves or the actions that spring from them are parts of the good life, since that they are connected with happiness is asserted, if not by everybody, at all events by all of mankind who are worthy of consideration.

Ethics a practical subject.

- 15 Accordingly Socrates the senior^d thought that the End is to get to know virtue, and he pursued an inquiry into the nature of justice and courage and

^c See 1214 a 33 note; but practical wisdom is specially implied here.

^d Cf. 1235 a 37. A younger Socrates was a pupil of Plato.

1216 b

μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐποίει δὲ ταῦτ' εὐλόγως· ἐπιστήμας
 γὰρ ᾤετ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα
 συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι
 δίκαιον· ἅμα γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν
 καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμὲν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι·
 10 διόπερ ἐζήτει τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἄλλ' οὐ πῶς γίνεται
 καὶ ἐκ τίνων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν 16
 συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρητικῶν, οὐθὲν γὰρ ἕτερον
 τέλος² ἐστὶ τῆς ἀστρολογίας οὐδὲ τῆς περὶ φύ-
 σεως ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲ γεωμετρίας πλὴν τὸ γνωρίσαι
 καὶ θεωρῆσαι τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν
 15 ὑποκειμένων ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις (οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ
 συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγ-
 καίων εἶναι χρησίμους αὐτὰς ἡμῖν), τῶν δὲ 17
 ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἕτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπι-
 στήμης καὶ γνώσεως, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ἰατρικῆς,
 εὐνομία δὲ ἢ τι τοιοῦθ' ἕτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς.
 καλὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἕκαστον τῶν 18
 20 καλῶν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ γ'³ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι
 τιμιώτατον τί ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων
 ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία
 ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐδὲ τί ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ'
 εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ
 γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν
 25 ἔξιν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.

¹ Fr.: γάρ.² τέλος add. Cas.³ Ric.: γε περί.

^a The Greek term primarily denotes biology, rather than physics in the modern sense (with which contrast the modern

each of the divisions of virtue. And this was a reasonable procedure, since he thought that all the virtues are forms of knowledge, so that knowing justice and being just must go together, for as soon as we have learnt geometry and architecture, we are architects and geometers; owing to which he used to inquire what virtue is, but not how and from what sources it is produced. But although this does happen in the case of the theoretical sciences, inasmuch as astronomy and natural science^a and geometry have no other End except to get to know and to contemplate the nature of the things that are the subjects of the sciences (although it is true that they may quite possibly be useful to us accidentally for many of our necessary requirements), yet the End of the productive sciences is something different from science and knowledge, for example the End of medicine is health and that of political science ordered government, or something of that sort, different from mere knowledge of the science. Although, therefore, it is fine even to attain a knowledge of the various fine things, all the same nevertheless in the case of goodness it is not the knowledge of its essential nature that is most valuable but the ascertainment of the sources that produce it. (For our aim is not to know what courage is but to be courageous, not to know what justice is but to be just, in the same way as we want to be healthy rather than to ascertain what health is, and to be in good condition of body rather than to ascertain what good bodily condition is.

limitation of the term 'physiology,' and of 'physic' in the sense of medicine); accordingly it does not here include astronomy.

VI. Πειρατέον δὲ περὶ τούτων πάντων¹ ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον
 30 γέ τινα πάντας.² ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι πως περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δὲ προϋῶσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβάνουσιν
 35 ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν³ εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι συγκεχυμένως. διαφέρουσι δ' οἱ λόγοι περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον οἱ τε φιλοσόφως λεγόμενοι καὶ οἱ μὴ φιλοσόφως· διόπερ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ⁴ οὐ χρῆ νομίζειν περιέργον εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην θεωρίαν δι' ἧς οὐ μόνον τὸ τί φανερόν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διὰ τί· φιλόσοφον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον.
 40 δεῖται μέντοι τοῦτο πολλῆς εὐλαβείας. εἰσὶ γὰρ
 1217 a τινες οἱ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν φιλοσόφου εἶναι τὸ μὴ εἰκῆ λέγειν ἀλλὰ μετὰ λόγου πολλάκις λανθάνουσι λέγοντες ἀλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κενούς (τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶσιν ὅτε μὲν δι' ἄγνοιαν ὅτε δὲ δι' ἀλαζονείαν), ὑφ' ὧν ἀλίσκεσθαι συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς ἐμπείρους καὶ δυναμένους πράττειν ὑπὸ
 5 τούτων τῶν μήτ' ἐχόντων μήτε δυναμένων διάνοιαν ἀρχιτεκτονικὴν ἢ πρακτικὴν. πάσχουσι δὲ τοῦτο

¹ πάντα (vel 27 χρωμένους) Sp.³ <ἀντι> τῶν? Ric.² Vic.: πάντως.⁴ Ric.: τῶν πολιτικῶν.^a Or perhaps 'led on step by step.'^b i.e. practical men often think that any string of arguments constitutes philosophy, though the arguers may be mere charlatans.

1 VI. And about all these matters the endeavour must be made to seek to convince by means of rational arguments, using observed facts as evidences and examples. For the best thing would be if all mankind were seen to be in agreement with the views that will be stated, but failing that, at any rate that all should agree in some way. And this they will do if led to change their ground,^a for every-
 one has something relative to contribute to the truth, and we must start from this to give a sort of proof about our views ; for from statements that are true but not clearly expressed, as we advance, clearness will also be attained, if at every stage we adopt more scientific positions in exchange for the
 2 customary confused statements. And in every investigation arguments stated in philosophical form are different from those that are non-philosophical ; hence we must not think that theoretical study of such a sort as to make manifest not only the nature of a thing but also its cause is superfluous even for the political student, since that is the philosophic procedure in every field of inquiry. Nevertheless this
 3 requires much caution. For because to say nothing at random but use reasoned argument seems to mark a philosopher, some people often without being detected advance arguments that are not germane to the subject under treatment and that have nothing
 4 in them (and they do this sometimes through ignorance and sometimes from charlatanry), which bring it about that even men of experience and practical capacity are taken in by these people, who neither possess nor are capable of constructive or practical
 5 thought.^b And this befalls them owing to lack of

The method of Ethics is to observe facts and discover their reasons.

1217 a

δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἀπαιδευσία γάρ ἐστι περὶ ἕκαστον
 πρᾶγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τοὺς τ' οἰκείους
 λόγους τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους.
 10 καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ χωρὶς κρίνειν τὸν τῆς αἰτίας ὅ
 λόγον καὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον, διὰ τε τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως,
 ὅτι προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων
 ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινομένοις (νῦν δ'
 ὀπότ' ἂν λύειν μὴ ἔχωσιν ἀναγκάζονται πιστεύειν
 15 τοῖς εἰρημένοις), καὶ διότι πολλάκις τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ
 λόγου δεδειχθαι δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς μὲν ἐστὶν οὐ μέντοι
 διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν δι' ἣν φησιν ὁ λόγος. ἔστι
 γὰρ διὰ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῶν
 ἀναλυτικῶν.

VII. Πεπροοιμισμένων δὲ καὶ τούτων, λέγωμεν ἰ
 ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων,² ὥσπερ
 20 εἴρηται, οὐ σαφῶς λεγομένων, ζητοῦντες ἔπειτα³
 σαφῶς εὐρεῖν τί ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ὁμολογεῖται
 2 δὴ μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ ἄριστον τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων (ἀνθρώπινον δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τάχ'
 ἂν εἴη καὶ βελτιόνος τινος ἄλλου τῶν ὄντων
 εὐδαιμονία, οἷον θεοῦ). τῶν⁴ γὰρ ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα
 25 χεῖρω τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, οὐθὲν
 κοινωεῖ ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν
 εὐδαίμων ἵππος οὐδ' ὄρνις οὐδ' ἰχθὺς οὐδ' ἄλλο
 τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν
 τῇ φύσει μετέχει θείου τινός, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην

¹ Rac.: τὸ μὲν.² πρώτων <τῶν>? Ric.³ ἔπειτα Ras.: ἐπὶ τὸ (<προιέναι> ἐπὶ τὸ? Ric.).⁴ Rac.: τῶν μὲν.^a § 1 above.^b i.e. a proposition that logically follows from premisses

education—for in respect of each subject inability to distinguish arguments germane to the subject from those foreign to it is lack of education. And it is also well to judge separately the statement of the cause and the demonstrated fact, both for the reason stated just now,^a that it is not proper in regard to all things to attend to theoretical arguments, but often rather to the facts of observation (whereas now when men are unable to refute an argument they are forced to believe what has been said), and also because often, although the result that seems to have been proved by the arguments is true, it is not true because of the cause asserted in the argument. For it is possible to prove truth by falsehood, as is clear from *Analytics*.^b

1 VII. These prefatory remarks having also been made, let us proceed by starting first from the first statements, which, as has been said,^c are not clearly expressed, afterwards seeking to discover clearly
2 the essential nature of happiness. Now it is agreed that happiness is the greatest and best of human goods (and we say 'human' because there might very likely also be a happiness belonging to some
3 higher being, for instance a god); since none of the other animals, which are inferior in nature to men, share in the designation 'happy,' for a horse is not happy, nor is a bird nor a fish nor any other existing thing whose designation does not indicate that it possesses in its nature a share of something divine, but it is by some other mode of participating in things that are false may be a true one: see *Anal. Pr.* ii., 53 b 26 ff., *Anal. Post.* i., 88 a 20 ff. Aristotle's simplest example is the syllogism 'A man is a stone, but a stone is an animal, therefore a man is an animal.'

Happiness
the supreme
good attain-
able by
action.

^c 1216 b 32 ff.

1217 a

τινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετοχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ζῆ τὸ δὲ χεῖρον αὐτῶν.

30 Ἄλλ' ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ὕστερον⁴ ἐπισκεπτέον. νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν¹ ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτὰ τὰ δ' οὐ πρακτά. τοῦτο δὲ λέγομεν οὕτω διότι ἔνια τῶν ὄντων οὐθέν μετέχει κινήσεως, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τῶν² ἀγαθῶν, καὶ³ ταῦτ' ἴσως ἄριστα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ἔνια δὲ πρακτὰ
35 μὲν, ἀλλὰ πρακτὰ κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ⁵ διχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρακτόν (καὶ γὰρ ὦν ἔνεκα πράττομεν καὶ ἄ τούτων ἔνεκα μετέχει πράξεως, οἷον καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον τίθεμεν τῶν πρακτῶν καὶ τὰ τούτων πραττόμενα χάριν, τὰ θ' ὑγιεινὰ καὶ τὰ χρηματιστικά), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
40 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν ἄριστον θετέον.

1217 b

VIII. Σκεπτέον τοίνυν τί τὸ ἄριστον καὶ ποσαχῶς¹ λέγεται.⁴ ἐν τρισὶ δὴ μάλιστα φαίνεται δόξαις εἶναι τοῦτο. φασὶ γὰρ ἄριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸ δ' εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾧ ὑπάρχει
5 τὸ τε πρῶτῳ εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ αἰτίῳ τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ⁵ εἶναι· ταῦτα δ' ἔ
ὑπάρχειν⁶ ἀμφοτέρω τῇ ἰδέᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (λέγω δὲ ἀμφοτέρω τὸ τε πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον ἀγαθοῖς τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ

¹ vulg. λέγομεν.³ καί<τοι>? Ric.⁵ Vic.: ἀγαθά.² τῶν <πρακτῶν>? Ric.⁴ Rac.: λέγεται ποσαχῶς.⁶ Fr.: ὑπάρχει.^a This promise is not kept.^b Ἰδέα is here used in its Platonic sense, as a synonym for εἶδος, class-form, to denote the permanent immaterial reality that underlies any group of things classed together in virtue of possessing a common quality. An ἰδέα is perceptible

good that one of them has a better life and another a worse.

4 But the fact that this is so must be considered later.^a At the present let us say that among things good some are within the range of action for a human being and others are not. And we make this distinction for the reason that some existing things do not participate in change at all, and therefore some good things do not, and these are perhaps in their nature the best things; and some things, though practicable, are only practicable for beings superior
5 to us. And inasmuch as 'practicable' has two meanings (for both the Ends for which we act and the actions that we do as means to those Ends have to do with action—for example we class among things practicable both health and wealth and the pursuits that are followed for the sake of health and wealth, healthy exercise and lucrative business), it is clear that happiness must be set down as the best of the things practicable for a human being.

1 VIII. We must consider, therefore, what the best is, and in how many senses the term is used. The answer seems to be principally contained in three views. For it is said that the best of all things is the Absolute Good, and that the Absolute Good is that which has the attributes of being the first of goods and of being by its presence the cause to the other goods of their being good; and both of these attributes, it is said, belong to the Form^b of good (I mean both being the first of goods and being by its presence the cause to the other goods of their being good), since it is of that

Plato's
'Idea'
of Good
refuted.

2 only by the mind, but the word does not denote the content of a mental perception, as does the derivative 'idea' in ordinary English.

1217 b

εἶναι). μάλιστα τε γὰρ τἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαι κατ'
 10 ἐκείνης ἀληθῶς (κατὰ μετοχὴν γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητα
 τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ ἐκείνης εἶναι), καὶ πρῶτον τῶν
 ἀγαθῶν, ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ μετεχομένου ἀν-
 αιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῆς ιδέας (ἃ λέγεται
 τῷ μετέχειν ἐκείνης), τὸ δὲ πρῶτον¹ τοῦτον ἔχειν³
 τὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον· ὥστ' εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ
 15 ἀγαθὸν τὴν ιδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ γὰρ χωριστὴν
 εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ιδέας.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ διασκοπεῖν περὶ ταύτης τῆς⁴
 δόξης ἑτέρας τε διατριβῆς καὶ τὰ πολλὰ λογικῶ-
 τέρας ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οἱ γὰρ ἅμα ἀναιρετικοὶ τε καὶ
 κοινοὶ λόγοι κατ' οὐδεμίαν εἰσὶν ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην.
 20 εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, λέγομεν²⁵
 ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἶναι ιδέαν μὴ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν λέγεται λογικῶς καὶ
 κενῶς (ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ
 φιλοσοφίαν). ἔπειτ' εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα⁶ εἰσὶν αἱ⁶
 25 ιδέαι καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ιδέα, μὴ ποτ' οὐδὲ χρήσιμος
 πρὸς ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις.

Πολλαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ἰσαχῶς τῷ ὄντι τὸ⁷
 ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ὄν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις διήρηται,
 σημαίνει τὸ μὲν τί ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ ποιὸν τὸ δὲ ποσόν
 τὸ δὲ πότε καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ
 30 κινεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ κινεῖν· καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν
 ἐκάστη τῶν πτώσεών ἐστι τούτων, ἐν οὐσίᾳ μὲν

¹ πρότερον Sp.² λέγωμεν ? Rac.

^a The use of this phrase by Aristotle elsewhere seems to show that it denotes doctrines, recorded in books or familiar in debate, that were not peculiar to the Peripatetic school.

Form that goodness is most truly predicated (inasmuch as the other goods are good by participation in and resemblance to the Form of good) and also it is the first of goods, for the destruction of that which is participated in involves the destruction of the things participating in the Form (which get their designation by participating in it), and that is the relation existing between what is primary and what is subsequent; so that the Form of good is the Absolute Good, inasmuch as the Form of good is separable from the things that participate in it, as are the other Forms also.

4 Now a thorough examination of this opinion belongs to another course of study, and one that for the most part necessarily lies more in the field of Logic, for that is the only science dealing with arguments that are at the same time destructive and general. But if we are to speak about it concisely, we say that in the first place to assert the existence of a Form not only of good but of anything else is an expression of logic and a mere abstraction (but this has been considered in various ways both in extraneous discourses^a and in those on philosophical lines); next, even granting that Forms and the Form of good exist in the fullest sense, surely this is of no practical value for the good life or for conduct.

7 For 'good' has many senses, in fact as many as 'being.' For the term 'is,' as it has been analysed in other works, signifies now substance, now quality, now quantity, now time, and in addition to these meanings it consists now in undergoing change and now in causing it; and the good is found in each of these cases^b—

A. The Idea of Good does not exist, because

i. 'good' falls under several categories;

^b *i.e.* categories. The last two specified are elsewhere designated *κινεῖν* and *κινεῖσθαι*, Action and Passion.

1217 b

ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὁ θεός, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῶ τὸ μέτριον, ἐν δὲ τῷ πότε ὁ καιρός, τὸ δὲ διδάσκον καὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον περὶ κίνησιν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν ἐν τι ἐστὶ περὶ¹ τὰ εἰρημένα, 8

35 οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ μία οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ ὁμοιοσχημόνως λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ μιᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι, οἷον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ μέτριον, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα ἕτερον καιρὸν θεωρεῖ καὶ ἑτέρα ἕτερον μέτριον, οἷον περὶ τροφήν μὲν τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἰατρικὴ καὶ 40 γυμναστικὴ, περὶ δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις στρατηγία, καὶ οὕτως ἑτέρα περὶ ἑτέραν πράξιν,

1218 a ὥστε σχολῇ αὐτό γε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς.

Ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, 9 οὐκ ἐστὶ κοινόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦτο² χωριστόν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον, πρότερον γὰρ 10 5 τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστόν διὰ τὸ ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρῶτον. οἷον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλασίων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν· ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου πρότερον,³ εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν, οἷον εἰ χωριστόν ποιήσείε τις τὸ κοινόν· εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ 10 δικαιοσύνη ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀνδρεία, ἔστι τοίνυν, φασίν, αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν· τὸ οὖν αὐτὸ πρόσκειται πρὸς τὸν 11 λόγον τὸν κοινόν. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη πλὴν ὅτι αἰδίων καὶ χωριστόν; ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λευκὸν

¹ παρὰ Vic.

² τούτων Sp.

³ lacunam hic Sus.

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in essence, as mind and God, in quality justice, in quantity moderation, in time opportunity, and as instances of change, the teacher and the taught.

8 Therefore, just as being is not some one thing in respect of the categories mentioned, so neither is the good, and there is no one science either of the real or of the good.

But also even the goods predicated in the same category, for example opportunity or moderation, do not fall within the province of a single science to study, but different sorts of opportunity and of moderation are studied by different sciences, for instance opportunity and moderation in respect of food are studied by medicine and gymnastics, in respect of military operations by strategics, and similarly in respect of another pursuit by another science; so that it can hardly be the case that the Absolute Good is the subject of only one science.

ii. even in one category it is the subject of several sciences;

9 Again, wherever there is a sequence of factors, a prior and a subsequent, there is not some common element

0 beside these factors and that element separable; for then there would be something prior to the first in

iii. a series has no unity separately existing;

the series, for the common and separable term would be prior because when the common element was destroyed the first factor would be destroyed. For example, if double is the first of the multiples, the multiplicity predicated of them in common cannot exist as a separable thing, for then it will be prior to double, if it is the case that the common element is the Form, as it would be if one were to make the common element separable: for if justice is a good, and courage, there is then, they say, a Good-in-itself, so the term 'in-itself' is added to the common definition. But what could this denote except that the good is eternal and separable? Yet a thing that is

1

1218 a

τὸ πολλὰς ἡμέρας λευκὸν τοῦ μίαν ἡμέραν· ὥστ'
οὐδὲ <τὸ ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν τῷ αἰδίων εἶναι·
15 οὐδὲ>¹ δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ταῦτὸ τῇ ιδεᾷ· πᾶσι
γὰρ ὑπάρχει κοινόν.

Ἀνάπαλιν δὲ καὶ δεικτέον ἢ ὡς νῦν δεικνύουσι
τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν μῆ² ὁμο-
λογουμένων ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὰ
ὁμολογούμενα εἶναι ἀγαθὰ δεικνύουσιν· οἷον³ ἐξ
ἀριθμῶν ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἀγαθόν,
τάξεις γὰρ καὶ ἀριθμοί, ὡς τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ
20 ταῖς μονάσιν ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἐν
αὐτὸ τὰγαθόν.⁴ δεῖ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων οἷον
ὑγείας ἰσχύος σωφροσύνης ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινή-
τοις μᾶλλον τὸ καλόν· πάντα γὰρ τάδε τάξις καὶ
ἡρεμία· εἰ ἄρα, ἐκείνα μᾶλλον, ἐκείνοις γὰρ ὑπ-
ἀρχει ταῦτα μᾶλλον.—παράβολος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπό-
25 δειξις ὅτι τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅτι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ
ἐφίενται αὐτοῦ⁵. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ἐφίενται λέγουσι⁶
φανερῶς ἀλλὰ λίαν ἀπλῶς τοῦτό φασι, καὶ ὄρεξιν
εἶναι πῶς ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ἐν οἷς ζωὴ μὴ ὑπάρχει;
δεῖ δὲ περὶ τούτου πραγματευθῆναι, καὶ μὴ ἀξιοῦν
μηθὲν ἀλόγως ὃ⁷ καὶ μετὰ λόγου πιστεῦσαι οὐ
30 ῥάδιον.—τό τε φάναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεσθαι ἐνός
τινος ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἀληθές· ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ
ὀρέγεται, ὀφθαλμὸς ὄψεως, σῶμα ὑγείας, οὕτως
ἄλλο ἄλλου.

¹ <τὸ ἀγαθὸν . . . οὐδὲ> Ras.² μῆ add. Zeller.³ οἷον add. Rac.⁴ Fr.: ἀγαθόν.⁵ αὐτοῦ add. ? Ric. (supra post ὅτι Fr.).⁶ Sp.: λέγονται.⁷ Sp.: ἄ.

^a The words rendered 'the good is . . . eternal' are a conjectural insertion.

white for many days is no more white than a thing that is white for one day, so that the good is no more good by being eternal^a; nor yet therefore is the common good the same as the Form, for it is the common property of all the goods.

ⁱ
iv. eternity does not affect quality;

2 Also the proper method of proving the Absolute Good is the contrary of the method now adopted. At present it is from things not admitted to possess goodness that they prove the things admitted to be good, for instance, they prove from numbers that justice and health are good, because they are arrangements and numbers—on the assumption that goodness is a property of numbers and monads because

v. general should be proved from particular, not *vice versa*;

3 the Absolute Good is unity. But the proper method is to start from things admitted to be good, for instance health, strength, sobriety of mind, and prove that beauty is present even more in the unchanging; for all these admitted goods consist in order and rest, and therefore, if that is so, the things unchanging are good in an even greater degree, for they possess order

4 and rest in a greater degree.—And it is a hazardous way of proving that the Absolute Good is unity to say that numbers aim at unity; for it is not clearly stated how they aim at it, but the expression is used in too unqualified a manner; and how can one suppose that

vi. unity of good unproved,

5 things not possessing life can have appetite? One ought to study this matter carefully, and not make an unreasoned assumption about something as to which it is not easy to attain certainty even with the aid of reason.—And the statement that all existing things desire some one good is not true; each thing seeks its own particular good, the eye sight, the body health, and similarly another thing another good.

vii. and not true in fact.

1218 a

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτό τι¹ ἀγαθόν, ἔχει ἀπορίας τοιαύτας, καὶ ὅτι οὐ χρήσιμον τῇ πολιτικῇ, ἀλλ' ἰδιόν τι ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις, οἷον 35 γυμναστικῇ εὐεξία.

²Ἐπι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον· ἢ γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶ χρήσιμον αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶδος ἢ πάσαις ὁμοίως.

Ἐπι οὐ πρακτόν.

Ἄγαθόν ἐστιν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν μικρῷ ὑπάρξει ἀγαθῷ) οὔτε πρακτόν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως ὑπάρξει τὸ ὅτω οὖν ὑπάρχον ἢ ἰατρικῇ πραγματεύεται ἀλλ' ὅπως ὑγίεια, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ἐκάστη. ἀλλὰ 5 πολλαχῶς τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἔστι τι αὐτοῦ καλόν,⁴ καὶ τὸ μὲν πρακτόν τὸ δ' οὐ πρακτόν. πρακτόν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀγαθόν, τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις.

Φανερόν οὖν⁵ ὅτι οὔτε ἢ ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ τὸ ζητούμενον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ κοινόν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀκίνητον καὶ οὐ πρακτόν, τὸ δὲ κίνητον 10 μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ πρακτόν). τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα ὡς τέλος ἄριστον καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὸ καὶ πρῶτον πάντων· ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρακτῶν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ φρόνησις· διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὗται 15 αἱ ἕξεις πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τῷ τοιαῦται εἶναι (πρὸς δ'

¹ τὸ ? Rac.

² ἔτι . . . πρακτόν secl. Wilson.

³ αὐτὸ τὸ ? Rac.

⁴ καὶ . . . καλόν secl. Sus.

⁵ οὖν add. Brandis.

^a This sentence reads like a mere note. The reference seems to be to 1217 b 16-1218 a 32, especially 1217 a 19-25.

16 Such then are the difficulties indicating that the Absolute Good does not exist,—and that it is of no use for political science, but that this has a special good of its own, as have the other sciences also—for instance the good of gymnastics is good bodily condition.

B. The Idea of Good of no practical use if it did exist;

17 ^a Further there is also what has been written in the discourse: either the Class-form of the good is in itself useful to no science, or it is useful to all alike.

Further it is not practicable.

18 And similarly the good as universal also is not an Absolute Good (for universality might be an attribute of even a small good), and also it is not practicable; for medical science does not study how to procure an attribute that belongs to *anything*, but how to procure health, and similarly also each of the other

nor is the good as universal.

19 practical sciences. But 'good' has many meanings, and there is a part of it that is beautiful, and one form of it is practicable but another is not. The sort of good that is practicable is that which is an object aimed at, but the good in things unchangeable is not practicable.

It is manifest, therefore, that the Absolute Good we are looking for is not the Form of good, nor yet the good as universal, for the Form is unchangeable and impracticable, and the universal good though changeable is not practicable. But the object aimed at as End is the chief good, and is the cause of the subordinate goods and first of all; so that the Absolute Good would be this—the End of the goods practicable for man. And this is the good that comes under the supreme of all the practical sciences, which is Politics and Economics and Wisdom; for these states of character differ from the others in the fact that they

For practical purposes Man's aim and End constitutes his Absolute Good.

1218 b

- ἀλλήλας εἴ τι διαφέρουσιν ὕστερον λεκτέον). ὅτι 21
 δ' αἴτιον τὸ τέλος τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὸ δηλοῖ ἢ διδασκαλία·
 ὀριστάμενοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος τᾶλλα δεικνύουσιν ὅτι
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν, αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα·
 οἶον ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοδί, ἀνάγκη τοδί¹ εἶναι
 20 τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς αὐτήν, τὸ δ' ὑγιαίνον τῆς ὑγείας
 αἴτιον ὡς κινήσαν, καίτοι² τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν. ἔτι οὐδὲ δείκνυσιν οὐθεις 22
 ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ὑγίεια (ἂν μὴ σοφιστῆς ἦ καὶ μὴ
 ἰατρός, οὗτοι γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις λόγοις σοφίζονται),
 ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν.
 25 Τὸ δ' ὡς τέλος³ ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον
 τῶν πρακτῶν σκεπτέον ποσαχῶς τὸ ἄριστον πάν-
 των,⁴ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο ἄριστον, μετὰ ταῦτα ἄλλην
 λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν.⁵

¹ τοδί ? Sp. : τότε.² καίτοι Ross : καὶ τότε (καὶ τότε ? Ric.).³ τὸ δὲ τέλος ὡς vel ὡς δὲ τὸ τέλος Ric.⁴ πάντων <λέγεται> ? Rac.⁵ ἐπειδὴ . . . ἀρχήν secl. ? Rac. (μετὰ . . . ἀρχήν secl. Sus.).^a See 1141 b 21-1142 a 11 (*E.E.* v. = *N.E.* vi. viii. init.).

are supreme (whether they differ at all from one another must be discussed later on ^a). And that the End stands in a causal relation to the means subordinate to it is shown by the method of teachers; they prove that the various means are each good by first defining the End, because the End aimed at is a cause: for example, since to be in health is so-and-so, what contributes to health must necessarily be so-and-so; the wholesome is the efficient cause of health, though only the cause of its existing—it is not the cause of health's being a good. Furthermore nobody *proves* that health is a good (unless he is a sophist and not a physician—it is sophists that juggle with irrelevant arguments), any more than he proves any other first principle.

After this we must take a fresh starting-point ^b and consider, in regard to the good as End for man and in regard to the best of practicable goods, how many senses there are of the term 'best of all,' since this is best.

^b This clause and the last clause of the sentence render words that look like an interpolation patched into the text from the opening sentence of Book II.

I. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν περὶ τῶν ἐπομένων λεκτέον.

Πάντα δὴ τὰγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν¹ ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἰρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὧν ἢ ἓνια ἢ 35 πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. τῶν δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ τὰ μὲν ἕξεις ἢ δυνάμεις εἰσὶ, τὰ δ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ κινήσεις.

Ταῦτα δὴ οὕτως ὑποκείσθω, καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ὅτι ἐστὶν ἢ βελτίστη διάθεσις ἢ ἕξις ἢ δύναμις 1219 a ἐκάστων ὅσων ἐστὶ τις χρῆσις ἢ ἔργον. δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς· ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ οὕτω τίθεμεν οἶον ἱματίου ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, καὶ γὰρ ἔργον τι καὶ χρῆσις ἐστίν, καὶ ἢ βελτίστη ἕξις τοῦ ἱματίου ἀρετὴ ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πλοίου καὶ οἰκίας καὶ 5 τῶν ἄλλων. ὥστε καὶ ψυχῆς, ἔστι γὰρ τι ἔργον αὐτῆς. καὶ τῆς βελτίονος δὴ ἕξεως ἔστω βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον, καὶ ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἐχέτω. καὶ τέλος ἐκάστου τὸ ἔργον· φανερόν

¹ ἐν add. Camot: ἢ <ἐν σώματι ἢ ἐν> Sus. (et infra αἰρετώτατα Rac.).

BOOK II

1 I. After this we must take a fresh starting-point and discuss the subjects that follow.

ETHICAL
PSYCHOLOGY
(c. i). Nature
of Happiness
deduced
from func-
tion of man.

Now all goods are either external or within the spirit, and of these two kinds the latter are preferable, as we class them even in the extraneous discourses.^a For Wisdom and Goodness and Pleasure are in the spirit, and either some or all of these are thought by everybody to be an End. And the contents of the spirit are in two groups, one states or faculties, the other activities and processes.

2 Let these assumptions, then, be made, and let it be assumed as to Goodness that it is the best disposition or state or faculty of each class of things that have some use or work. This is clear from induction, for we posit this in all cases: for instance, there is a goodness that belongs to a coat, for a coat has a particular function and use, and the best state of a coat is its goodness; and similarly with a ship and a house and the rest. So that the same is true also
3 of the spirit, for it has a work of its own. And therefore let us assume that the better the state is the better is the work of that state, and that as states stand in relation to one another so do the works
4 that result from them. And the work of each thing

Goodness
means fit-
ness for
function

^a See note on 1217 b 23.

1219 a

τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἕξεως·
 10 τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἄριστον ὡς τέλος, ὑπόκειται γὰρ
 τέλος τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον οὐ ἔνεκα τᾶλλα
 πάντα· ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς ἕξεως
 καὶ τῆς διαθέσεως, δῆλον.

Ἄλλὰ τὸ ἔργον λέγεται διχῶς· τῶν μὲν γάρ 5
 ἐστὶν ἕτερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν, οἷον
 οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκοδόμησις καὶ ἰα-
 15 τρικῆς ὑγίεια ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑγίανσις οὐδ' ἰάτρευσις,
 τῶν δ' ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, οἷον ὄψεως ὄρασις καὶ μαθη-
 ματικῆς ἐπιστήμης θεωρία. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη ὦν ἔργον
 ἢ χρῆσις τὴν χρῆσιν βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἕξεως.

Τούτων δὲ τούτων τὸν τρόπον διωρισμένων, 6
 λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ¹ ἔργον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ
 20 τῆς ἀρετῆς (ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως), οἷον σκυτοτομικῆς
 καὶ σκυτεύσεως ὑπόδημα· εἰ δὴ τις ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ
 σκυτικῆ² καὶ σπουδαῖος σκυτεύς,³ τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ
 σπουδαῖον ὑπόδημα· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων.

Ἔτι ἔστω ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ζῆν ποιεῖν, τοῦτο⁴ 7
 25 δὲ χρῆσις καὶ ἐγρήγορσις (ὁ γὰρ ὕπνος ἀργία τις
 καὶ ἡσυχία)· ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον ἀνάγκη ἐν καὶ
 ταῦτο εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔργον ἂν
 εἴη τῆς ἀρετῆς ζωὴ σπουδαία. τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ

¹ αὐτὸ add. Rac. (ταὐτὸ ante τὸ ἔργον Cas.).

² Rac.: σκυτικῆς.

³ Sp.: σπουδαίου σκύτews.

⁴ Wilson: τοῦ.

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. I. 4-7

is its End ; from this, therefore, it is plain that the work is a greater good than the state, for the End is the best as being an End, since the greatest good is assumed as an End and as the ultimate object for the sake of which all the other things exist. It is clear, therefore, that the work is a greater good than the state and disposition.

5 But the term 'work' has two meanings ; for some things have a work that is something different from the employment of them, for instance the work of architecture is a house, not the act of building, that of medicine health, not the process of healing or curing, whereas with other things their work is the process of using them, for instance the work of sight is the act of seeing, that of mathematical science the contemplation of mathematical truths. So it follows that with the things whose work is the employment of them, the act of employing them must be of more value than the state of possessing them.

(which is not necessarily a productive process),

6 And these points having been decided in this way, we say that the same work belongs to a thing and to its goodness (although not in the same way) : for example, a shoe is the work of the art of shoemaking and of the act of shoemaking ; so if there is such a thing as shoemaking goodness and a good shoemaker, their work is a good shoe ; and in the same way in the case of the other arts also.

7 Again, let us grant that the work of the spirit is to cause life, and that being alive is employment and being awake (for sleep is a kind of inactivity and rest) ; with the consequence that since the work of the spirit and that of its goodness are necessarily one and the same, the work of goodness would be good life. Therefore this is the perfect good, which

and its exercise in action constitutes Happiness.

1219 a

τέλεον ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. δῆλον δὲ 8
 ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων (ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ
 30 ἄριστον, τὰ δὲ τέλη ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ ἄριστα τῶν
 ἀγαθῶν, τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ¹ δὲ ἢ ἕξις ἢ ἐνέργεια), ἐπεὶ
 βέλτιον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τῆς βελτίστης
 ἕξεως ἢ βελτίστη ἐνέργεια ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ βελτίστη
 ἕξις, τὴν² τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν³ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον
 εἶναι. ἦν δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον· ἔστιν 9
 35 ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς⁴ ἐνέργεια. ἐπεὶ
 δὲ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλεόν τι, καὶ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ
 τελέα καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὡσαύτως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 ὄλη, ἡ δὲ μόριον), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐνέργεια
 ἀτελής, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια
 κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν.

Ἔστι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὄρον αὐτῆς λέγομεν 10
 40 καλῶς, μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. τό τε
 1219 b γὰρ εὖ πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐ-
 δαιμονεῖν, ὧν ἐκάτερον⁵ χρῆσις ἐστὶ καὶ ἐνέργεια,
 καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρακτικὴ
 χρηστικὴ ἐστὶν, ὃ μὲν γὰρ χαλκεὺς ποιεῖ χαλινὸν
 5 εἶναι⁶ εὐδαίμονα μῆτε παῖδα μῆθ' ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν
 (διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς, τὸ μὴ ζῶντ'
 εὐδαιμονίζειν ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος)· οὐθὲν γὰρ
 ἀτελὲς εὐδαιμον, οὐ γὰρ ὄλον. ἔτι δ' οἱ ἔπαινοι 11

¹ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ Sus. : αὐτῇ aut αὐτῇ.

² τὴν add. ? Ric.

³ Bz. : ἐνεργεία ἢ aut ἡ.

⁴ ἀγαθῆ Sp.

⁵ ἐκάτερον ? Ric. : ἕκαστον.

⁶ ἡμέραν <εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν μῆτ'> εἶναι Fr.

^a Cf. 1218 b 7-12.

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. I. 8-11

8 as we saw is happiness. And it is clear from the assumptions laid down (for we said that happiness is the greatest good and that the Ends or the greatest of goods are in the spirit, but things in the spirit are either a state or an activity) that, since an activity is a better thing than a disposition and the best activity than the best state, and since goodness is the best state, the activity of goodness is the spirit's greatest good. But also we saw that the greatest good is happiness. Therefore happiness is the activity of a good spirit. And since we saw ^a that happiness is something perfect, and life is either perfect or imperfect, and the same with goodness (for some goodness is a whole and some a part), but the activity of imperfect things is imperfect, it would follow that happiness is an activity of perfect life in accordance with perfect goodness. Definition of Happiness.

0 And that our classification and definition of it are correct is evidenced by opinions that we all hold. For we think that to do well and live well are the same as to be happy ; but each of these, both life and action, is employment and activity, inasmuch as active life involves employing things—the coppersmith makes a bridle, but the horseman uses it. There is also the evidence of the opinion that a person is not happy for one day only,^b and that a child is not happy, nor any period of life ^c (hence also Solon's advice holds good, not to call a man happy while he is alive, but only when he has reached the end), for nothing incomplete is happy, since it is not a whole. And again, Definition supported by Common Sense.

^b A single happy day does not make one a happy (*i.e.* fortunate) man.

^c It is a mistake to say that youth (or maturity, or old age) is the happy time of life.

1219 b

τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν
 10 ἔργων (καὶ στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ
 δυνάμενοι νικᾶν μὴ νικῶντες δέ), καὶ τὸ κρίνειν
 ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ὁποῖός τις ἐστίν. ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ
 εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινείται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τᾶλλα,
 ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι ἢ τῷ μῦρια εἶναι
 αὐτῆς. διὸ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ
 15 ἐγκώμιον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ'
 ἕκαστον ἔργου, ὁ δ' ἔπαινος τοῦ¹ τοιοῦτον εἶναι
 καθόλου, ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.² καὶ τὸ
 ἀπ' ορούμενον δ' ἐνίοτε δῆλον ἐκ τούτων διὰ τί
 ποτ' οὐθὲν βελτίους οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν φαύλων τὸν
 ἡμισυν τοῦ βίου, ὅμοιοι γὰρ καθεύδοντες πάντες.
 20 αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀργία ψυχῆς ὁ ὕπνος ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνέργεια.
 διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἴ τι μῦριόν ἐστι ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ
 θρεπτικόν, ἢ τούτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστι μῦριον τῆς
 ὅλης ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος· ἐν τῷ
 ὕπνῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ τὸ θρεπτικόν, τὸ δ'
 αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ³ ὀρεκτικὸν ἀτελῆ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ.
 ὅσον δὲ τοῦ πη⁴ κινεῖσθαι μετέχουσι, καὶ αἱ φαν-
 25 τασίαι βελτίους αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων, εἰ μὴ διὰ
 νόσον ἢ πῆρωσιν.

Μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρητέον· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ
 ψυχῆς, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνθρωπίνην
 ἀρετὴν ζητοῦμεν, ὑποκείσθω δύο μέρη ψυχῆς τὰ
 λόγου μετέχοντα, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον μετέχειν
 30 λόγου ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν τὸ ἐπιτάττειν τῷ δὲ

¹ τοῦ add. Bz.² Bz.: τέλος.³ τὸ add. Rac.⁴ πη? (cf. N.E. 1029 b 9) Cas.: μῆ.

there are the praises given to goodness on account of its deeds, and panegyrics describing deeds (and it is the victorious who are given wreaths, not those who are capable of winning but do not win); and there is the fact that we judge a man's character
 12 from his actions. Also why is happiness not praised? It is because it is on account of it that the other things are praised, either by being placed in relation to it or as being parts of it. Hence felicitation, praise and panegyric are different things: panegyric is a recital of a particular exploit, praise a statement of a man's general distinction, felicitation is bestowed on
 13 an end achieved. From these considerations light is also thrown on the question sometimes raised—what is the precise reason why the virtuous are for half their lives no better than the base, since all men are alike when asleep? The reason is that sleep is
 14 inaction of the spirit, not an activity. Hence the goodness of any other part of the spirit, for instance the nutritive, is not a portion of goodness as a whole, just as also goodness of the body is not; for the nutritive part functions more actively in sleep, whereas the sensory and appetitive parts are ineffective in sleep. But even the imaginations of the virtuous, so far as the imaginative faculty participates in any mode of motion, are better than those of the base, provided they are not perverted by disease or mutilation.

15 Next we must study the spirit; for goodness is a property of the spirit, it is not accidental. And since it is human goodness that we are investigating, let us begin by positing that the spirit has two parts that partake of reason, but that they do not both partake of reason in the same manner, but one of them by having by nature the capacity to give orders, and the

Psychology
of rational
being.

1219 b

τὸ¹ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν πεφυκέναι (εἰ δέ τι
 ἐστὶν ἑτέρως ἄλογον, ἀφείσθω τοῦτο τὸ μόνιον).
 διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν οὐτ' εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ψυχὴ οὐτ' εἰ 16
 ἀμερῆς, ἔχει μέντοι δυνάμεις διαφόρους καὶ τὰς
 εἰρημένας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ καμπύλῳ τὸ κοῖλον καὶ
 35 τὸ κυρτὸν ἀδιαχώριστον, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ λευ-
 κόν, καίτοι τὸ εὐθὺ οὐ λευκὸν ἀλλ' ἢ² κατὰ συμ-
 βεβηκὸς καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τῇ αὐτοῦ.³ ἀφήρηται⁴ 17
 δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐστὶ μέρος ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ
 φυτικόν.⁵ ἀνθρωπίνης γὰρ⁶ ψυχῆς τὰ εἰρημένα
 μόρια ἴδια, διὸ οὐδ' αἰ ἀρεταὶ αἰ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ
 40 καὶ ἀξητικοῦ⁷ ἀνθρώπου· δεῖ γάρ, εἰ ἡ ἀνθρωπος,
 λογισμὸν ἐνεῖναι πρὸς⁸ ἀρχὴν καὶ πράξιν, ἄρχει
 1220 a δ' ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμοῦ ἀλλ' ὀρέξεως καὶ
 παθημάτων· ἀνάγκη ἄρα ταῦτ' ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. 18
 καὶ ὥσπερ ἡ εὐεξία σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μόνιον
 ἀρετῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ ἢ τέλος.

Ἀρετῆς δ' εἶδη δύο, ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἢ δὲ διανοητικὴ· 19
 5 ἐπαινοῦμεν γὰρ οὐ μόνον τοὺς δικαίους ἀλλὰ καὶ
 τοὺς συνετοὺς καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς. ἐπαινετὸν γὰρ
 ὑπέκειτο ἢ⁹ ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ ἔργον, ταῦτα δ' οὐκ
 ἐνεργεῖ ἀλλ' εἰσὶν αὐτῶν ἐνέργειαί. ἐπεὶ δ' αἰ 20
 διανοητικαὶ μετὰ λόγου, αἰ μὲν τοιαῦται τοῦ λόγου
 ἔχοντος ὁ ἐπιτακτικὸν ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ λόγον

¹ τῷ μὲν . . . τὸ . . . τῷ δὲ . . . τὸ Ric.: τὸ μὲν . . . τῷ
 . . . τὸ δὲ . . . τῷ.

² ἀλλ' ἢ Ric.: ἀλλὰ.

³ Ric.: οὐσία τοῦ αὐτοῦ (οὐσία τὸ αὐτὸ Bz.).

⁴ ἀφηρήσθω Fr.: ἀφείσθω Bz.

⁵ Vict.: φυτικόν.

⁶ Γ: δέ.

⁷ Bz.: ὀρεκτικοῦ.

⁸ Ric.: καὶ (ὡς Sus.).

⁹ ἢ Sol.: ἢ.

^a i.e. the part 'connected with nutrition and growth,'
 man's animal life, which is irrational absolutely, and not

other to obey and listen (let us leave out any part
 6 that is irrational in another way^a). And it makes
 no difference whether the spirit is divisible or is un-
 divided yet possessed of different capacities, namely
 those mentioned, just as the concave and convex
 sides in a curve are inseparable, and the straight-
 ness and whiteness in a straight white line, although
 a straight thing is not white except accidentally and
 7 not by its own essence. And we have also abstracted
 any other part of the spirit that there may be, for
 instance the factor of growth; for the parts that we
 have mentioned are the special properties of the
 human spirit, and hence the excellences of the part
 dealing with nutrition and growth are not the special
 property of a man, for necessarily, if considered as a
 man, he must possess a reasoning faculty for a prin-
 ciple and with a view to conduct, and the reasoning
 faculty is a principle controlling not reasoning but
 8 appetite and passions; therefore he must necessarily
 possess those parts. And just as a good constitution
 consists of the separate excellences of the parts of the
 body, so also the goodness of the spirit, as being an
 End, is composed of the separate virtues.

9 And goodness has two forms, moral virtue and
 intellectual excellence; for we praise not only the
 just but also the intelligent and the wise. For we
 assumed^b that what is praiseworthy is either good-
 ness or its work, and these are not activities but possess
 0 activities. And since the intellectual excellences
 involve reason, these forms of goodness belong to the
 rational part, which as having reason is in command

Moral and
 Intellectual
 Goodness.

merely in the sense of not possessing reason but being capable
 of obedience to it.

^b Cf. 1218 a 37 ff., 1219 b 8 ff., 15 ff.

1220 a

10 ἔχει, αἱ δ' ἠθικαὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν ἀκολουθητικοῦ
δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν
ποιός τις τὸ ἦθος, ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ δεινός, ἀλλ' ὅτι
πρᾶος ἢ θρασύς.

Μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον πρῶτον περὶ ἀρετῆς ἠθι- 2
κῆς τί ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖα μόρια αὐτῆς (εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ
15 ἀνήκται) καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων. δεῖ δὴ ζητεῖν ὡσ-
περ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχοντές τι ζητοῦσι πάντες,
ὥστε δεῖ διὰ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς
δὲ πειρᾶσθαι λαβεῖν τὸ καὶ¹ ἀληθῶς καὶ σαφῶς.
νῦν γὰρ ὁμοίως ἔχομεν ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ εἰδείημεν² καὶ 2
ὑγίειαν ὅτι ἡ ἀρίστη διάθεσις τοῦ σώματος καὶ
20 Κορίσκον³ ὅτι⁴ ὁ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ μελάντατος· τί
μὲν γὰρ ἐκάτερον τούτων οὐκ ἴσμεν, πρὸς μέντοι
τὸ εἰδέναι τί ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν⁵ πρὸ ἔργου τὸ οὕτως
ἔχειν.—ὑποκείσθω δὴ πρῶτον ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις 2
ὑπὸ τῶν βελτίστων γίνεσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι τὰ⁶
ἄριστα περὶ ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάστου ἀρετῆς,
25 οἷον πόνοι τε ἄριστοι καὶ τροφή ἀφ' ὧν γίνεται
εὐεξία, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς εὐεξίας πονοῦσιν ἄριστα· ἔτι 2
πάσαν διάθεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνεσθαί τε⁷ καὶ
φθειρεσθαι πῶς προσφερομένων, ὡσπερ ὑγίεια ὑπὸ
τροφῆς καὶ πόνων καὶ ὥρας· ταῦτα δὲ δῆλα ἐκ
τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄρα ἡ τοιαύτη διά-
30 θεσίς ἐστὶν ἣ γίνεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων περὶ
ψυχὴν κινήσεων καὶ ἀφ' ἧς πράττεται τὰ ἄριστα
τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη· καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν 2

¹ τὸ καὶ Ric.: καὶ τὸ.

² εἰδείημεν add. Sp.

³ Rac.: Κορίσκος.

⁴ ὅτι add. Sp.

⁵ rec. M^b: αὐτῆς.

⁶ τὰ add. Rac.

⁷ τε add. Rac.

of the spirit ; whereas the moral virtues belong to the part that is irrational but by nature capable of following the rational—for in stating a man's moral qualities we do not say that he is wise or clever but that he is gentle or rash.

21 After this we must first consider Moral Goodness—
 its essence and the nature of its divisions (for that is
 the subject now arrived at), and the means by which
 it is produced. Our method of inquiry then must be
 that employed by all people in other matters when
 they have something in hand to start with—we must
 endeavour by means of statements that are true but
 not clearly expressed to arrive at a result that is both
 22 true and clear. For our present state is as if we
 knew that health is the best disposition of the body and
 that Coriscus ^a is the darkest man in the market-place ;
 for that is not to know what health is and who Coriscus
 is, but nevertheless to be in that state is a help to-
 23 wards knowing each of these things.—Then let it first
 be taken as granted that the best disposition is pro-
 duced by the best means, and that the best actions
 in each department of conduct result from the excel-
 lences belonging to each department—for example,
 it is the best exercises and food that produce a good
 condition of body, and a good condition of body en-
 24 ables men to do the best work ; further, that every
 disposition is both produced and destroyed by the
 same things applied in a certain manner, for example
 health by food and exercises and climate ; these points
 are clear from induction. Therefore goodness too is
 the sort of disposition that is created by the best
 movements in the spirit and is also the source of the
 production of the spirit's best actions and emotions ;
 25 and it is in one way produced and in another way

MORAL
 GOODNESS
 OR VIRTUE
 (Bk. II. fin.)
 Its nature
 and genesis.

A fuller de-
 finition of
 Virtue.

1220 a

πὼς μὲν γίνεται πὼς δὲ φθείρεται, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἢ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑφ' ὧν καὶ αὖξεται καὶ φθείρεται πρὸς ἅ βέλτιστα διατίθησιν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι περὶ
 35 ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ κολάσεις ἰατρεῖαι οὔσαι καὶ γινόμεναι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσίν.

1220 b

II. Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρὰ ἐστὶ, δῆλον. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος—
 ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ ὑπ' ἀγωγῆς τὸ μὴ ἔμφυτον¹ τῷ πολλακίς κινεῖσθαι πῶς οὕτως ἡδη² ἐνεργητικόν (ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ ὀρώμεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις ρίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον οὐδέποτε
 5 ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βία)—διὸ ἔστω τὸ³ ἦθος τοῦτο, ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον δυναμένη⁴ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης. λεκτέον δὲ κατὰ τί τῆς ψυχῆς ποι' ἄττα⁵ ἦθη. ἔσται δὲ κατὰ τε τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων καθ' ἃς πὼς⁶ παθητικοὶ λέγονται καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη τοιοῦτοι⁷
 10 λέγονται τῷ πάσχειν πῶς ἢ ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι.

Μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς διειλεγμένοις⁸ τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἕξεων.

¹ Fr.: ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ' ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου.

² ἡδη Rac.: ἡδη τὸ.

³ τὸ add. Rac.

⁴ Sp. (cf. Stob. *Ecl. eth.* p. 36): δυναμένου δ'.

⁵ ποι' ἄττα Sol. (ποι' ἄττα τὰ? Rac., ποιότης τὰ Sp.): ποι' ἄττα.

⁶ Rac.: ὡς.

⁷ τοιοῦτοι Ric.: ταῦτα.

⁸ Ras.: ἀπηλλαγμένοις.

^a e.g. fever, which is caused by heat, is cured by cold (the contrary doctrine to homoeopathy, *similia similibus curantur*).

^b ἦθος derived from ἔθος by lengthening of ε to η: cf. *N.E.*

destroyed by the same things, and its employment of the things that cause both its increase and its destruction is directed towards the things towards which it creates the best disposition. And this is indicated by the fact that both goodness and badness have to do with things pleasant and painful ; for punishments, which are medicines, and which as is the case with other cures ^a operate by means of opposites, operate by means of pleasures and pains.

The hedonistic factor.

1 II. It is clear, therefore, that Moral Goodness has to do with pleasures and pains. And since moral character is, as even its name implies that it has its growth from habit,^b and by our often moving in a certain way a habit not innate in us is finally trained to be operative in that way (which we do not observe in inanimate objects, for not even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times will it ever rise upward unless under the operation of force)—let moral character then be defined as a quality of the spirit in accordance with governing reason that is capable of following

2 the reason. We have then to say what is the part of the spirit in respect of which our moral characters

3 are of a certain quality. And it will be in respect of our faculties for emotions according^c to which people are termed liable to some emotion, and also of the states of character according to which people receive certain designations in respect of the emotions, because of their experiencing or being exempt from some form of emotion.

The moral character.

4 After this comes the classification, made in previous discussions,^c of the modes of emotion, the faculties

II. iii. 4. This clause and the one following interrupt the construction of the sentence.

^c Perhaps a reference to *N.E.* 1105 b 20, inserted in the belief that the *Eudemian Ethics* is the later work.

1220 b

λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ
 ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ
 αἰσθητικὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη καθ' αὐτά· καὶ κατὰ μὲν 5
 15 ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι ποιότης [ἀλλὰ πάσχει]¹, κατὰ δὲ
 τὰς δυνάμεις ποιότης· λέγω δὲ² δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς
 λέγονται κατὰ τὰ πάθη οἱ ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον ὀργίλος
 ἀνάληγτος ἐρωτικὸς αἰσχυνηλὸς ἀναίσχυντος.
 ἔξεις δὲ εἰσιν ὅσαι αἰτιαί εἰσι τοῦ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ
 λόγον ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐναντίως, οἷον ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνη
 20 δειλία ἀκολασία.

III. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ληπτέον ὅτι ἐν 1
 ἅπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἔστιν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ
 ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ
 πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οἷον ἐν γυμναστικῇ, ἐν ἰατρικῇ, ἐν
 25 οἰκοδομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν ὁποιαοῦν πράξει
 καὶ ἐπιστημονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ καὶ τεχνικῇ
 καὶ ἀτέχνῳ· ἢ μὲν γὰρ κινήσεις συνεχές, ἢ δὲ 2
 πρᾶξις κινήσεις. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς
 ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη
 κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος. πανταχοῦ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
 30 ποιεῖ τὴν βελτίστην ἔξιν. καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον διὰ
 τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ τοῦ λόγου· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία
 φθείρει ἄλληλα· τὰ δ' ἄκρα καὶ ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῶ
 μέσῳ ἐναντία, τὸ γὰρ μέσον ἐκάτερον πρὸς
 ἐκάτερόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ ἴσον τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττονος
 μείζον τοῦ μείζονος δὲ ἔλαττον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη 3
 τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ μέσ' ἅττα εἶναι καὶ
 35 μεσότητά τινα. ληπτέον ἄρα ἢ ποία μεσότης

¹ pravum glossema Rac.² δὲ Sus.: δὲ τὰς.

^a This interpolation was made by an editor who derived ποιότης from ποιεῖν.

and the states of character. By emotions I mean such things as anger, fear, shame, desire, and generally those experiences that are in themselves usually accompanied by sensory pleasure or pain. And to these there is no quality corresponding [but they are passive].^a But quality corresponds to the faculties: by faculties I mean the properties acting by which persons are designated by the names of the various emotions, for instance choleric, insensitive, erotic, bashful, shameless. States of character are the states that cause the emotions to be present either rationally or the opposite: for example courage, sobriety of mind, cowardice, profligacy.

1 III. These distinctions having been established, it must be grasped that in every continuum that is divisible there is excess and deficiency and a mean, and these either in relation to one another or in relation to us, for instance in gymnastics or medicine or architecture or navigation, and in any practical pursuit of whatever sort, both scientific and unscientific, both 2 technical and untechnical; for motion is a continuum, and conduct is a motion. And in all things the mean in relation to us is the best, for that is as knowledge and reason bid. And everywhere this also produces the best state. This is proved by induction and reason: contraries are mutually destructive, and extremes are contrary both to each other and to the mean, as the mean *is* either extreme in relation to the other—for example the equal is greater than the less 3 and less than the greater. Hence moral goodness must be concerned with certain means and must be a middle state. We must, therefore, ascertain what sort of middle state is goodness and with what sort of

Virtue and
the relative
mean in
conduct.

ARISTOTLE

1220 b

ἀρετὴ καὶ περὶ ποῖα μέσα. εἰλήφθω δὴ παρα-
δείγματος χάριν, καὶ θεωρείσθω ἕκαστον ἐκ τῆς
ὑπογραφῆς·

	ὀργιλότης	ἀοργησία ¹	πραότης.	≈ v
	θρασύτης	δειλία	ἀνδρεία.	v
1221 a	ἀναισχυντία	κατάπληξις	αἰδώς.	a
	ἀκολασία	ἀναισθησία	σωφροσύνη.	v
	φθόνος	ἀνώνυμον	νέμεσις.	
	κέρδος	ζημία	δίκαιον.	Y
5	ἄσωτία	ἀνελευθερία	ἐλευθεριότης.	v
	ἀλαζονεία	εἰρωνεία	ἀλήθεια.	a
	κολακεία	ἀπέχθεια	φιλία.	e
	ἀρέσκεια	αὐθάδεια	σεμνότης.	g
	τρυφερότης	κακοπάθεια	καρτερία.	
10	χαυνότης	μικροψυχία	μεγαλοψυχία.	v
	δαπανηρία	μικροπρέπεια	μεγαλοπρέπεια.	v
	πανουργία	εὐήθεια	φρόνησις.	V

τὰ μὲν πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει ταῖς
ψυχαῖς, πάντα δὲ λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν
15 τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐλλείπειν. ὀργίλος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ
μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος καὶ θᾶπτον καὶ πλείοσιν
ἢ οἷς δεῖ, ἀόργητος² δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ οἷς καὶ
ὄτε καὶ ὡς· καὶ θραυὸς μὲν ὁ μήτε ἂ χρῆ φοβούμενος
μήθ' ὄτε μήθ' ὡς, δειλὸς δὲ ὁ καὶ ἂ μὴ δεῖ καὶ
ὄτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκόλαστος
20 καὶ³ ὁ ἐπιθυμητικὸς καὶ ὁ⁴ ὑπερβάλλων πᾶσιν ὅσοις

¹ Rac. (cf. *N.E.* 1108 a 7 et 1100 b 33): ἀναληγσία.

² Rac.: ἀνάληγτος. ³ [καὶ] Bz. ⁴ [καὶ ὁ] Vict.

^a This place is filled in *N.E.* 1108 a 7 by ἀοργησία, Spiritlessness, lack of irascibility, and perhaps the Greek should be altered to that here.

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. III. 4-6

4 means it is concerned. Let each then be taken by way of illustration and studied with the help of the schedule :

Irascibility	Spiritlessness ^a	Gentleness
Rashness	Cowardice	Courage
Shamelessness	Diffidence	Modesty
Profligacy	Insensitiveness	Temperance
Envy	(nameless ^b)	Righteous Indignation
Profit	Loss	The Just
Prodigality	Meanness	Liberality
Boastfulness	Self-depreciation	Sincerity ^c
Flattery	Surliness	Friendliness
Subservience	Stubbornness	Dignity
Luxuriousness	Endurance ^d	Hardiness
Vanity	Smallness of Spirit	Greatness of Spirit
Extravagance	Shabbiness	Magnificence
Rascality	Simpleness	Wisdom.

5 These and such as these are the emotions that the spirit experiences, and they are all designated from being either excessive or defective. The man that gets angry more and more quickly and with more people than he ought is irascible, he that in respect of persons and occasions and manner is deficient in anger is insensitive ; the man that is not afraid of things of which he ought to be afraid, nor when nor as he ought, is rash, he that is afraid of things of which he ought not to be afraid, and when and as he ought not to be, is cowardly.^e Similarly also one that is a prey to his desires and that exceeds in everything possible

The Vices of excess and defect.

^b In *N.E.* 1108 b 2 ἐπιχαίρεκακία, Malice, rejoicing in another's misfortune.

^c *N.E.* iv. vii. shows that sincerity in asserting one's own merits is meant.

^d 'Submission to evils' (Solomon): not in *N.E.*

^e The shameless and diffident are omitted here; see the table above.

1221 a

ἐνδέχεται, ἀναίσθητος δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ μῆδ' ὅσον
 βέλτιον καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐπιθυμῶν, ἀλλ' ἀπαθῆς
 ὥσπερ λίθος. κερδαλέος δὲ ὁ πανταχόθεν πλεον- 7
 εκτικός, ζημιώδης δὲ ὁ εἰ μὴ¹ μῆδαμόθεν ἀλλ'
 ὀλιγαχόθεν. ἀλαζῶν δὲ ὁ πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων
 25 προσποιούμενος, εἴρων δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω. καὶ κόλαξ 8
 μὲν ὁ πλείω συνεπαινῶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχει, ἀπεχθητικός
 δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω. καὶ τὸ μὲν λίαν πρὸς ἡδονὴν
 ἀρέσκεια, τὸ δ' ὀλίγα καὶ μόγις αὐθάδεια. ἔτι δ' 9
 ὁ μὲν μῆδεμίαν ὑπομένων λύπην, μῆδ' εἰ βέλτιον,
 30 τρυφερός, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν ὁμοίως ὡς μὲν ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν
 ἀνώνυμος, μεταφορᾷ δὲ λέγεται σκληρὸς καὶ
 ταλαίπωρος καὶ κακοπαθητικός. χαῦνος δ' ὁ 10
 μειζόνων ἀξίων αὐτόν, μικρόψυχος δ' ὁ ἐλαττόνων.
 ἔτι δ' ἄσωτος μὲν ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν δαπάνην
 ὑπερβάλλων, ἀνελεύθερος δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν
 35 ἐλλείπων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μικροπρεπῆς καὶ ὁ 11
 σαλάκων, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ πρέπον, ὁ δ'
 14 ἐλλείπει τοῦ πρέποντος. καὶ ὁ μὲν πανοὔργος
 πάντως καὶ πάντοθεν πλεονεκτικός, ὁ δ' εὐήθης
 5 οὐδ' ὅθεν δεῖ. φθονερός δὲ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ 12
 πλείοσιν εὐπραγίαις ἢ δεῖ, καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀξιοὶ εὖ
 40 πράττειν λυποῦσι τοὺς φθονεροὺς εὖ πράττοντες.
 ὁ δ' ἐναντίος ἀνωνυμώτερος, ἔστι δ' ὁ ὑπερβάλλων
 1221 b τῷ² μὴ λυπεῖσθαι μῆδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις εὖ
 πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' εὐχερῆς ὥσπερ οἱ γαστρίμαργοι
 πρὸς τροφήν, ὁ δὲ δυσχερῆς κατὰ τὸν φθόνον
 ἐστίν.—τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 13

¹ εἰ μὴ add. Fr. (ἀλλ' <εἰ γε> Bussemaker).

² τῷ Sp.: ἐπὶ τῷ.

^a Envy in § 12 comes here in the schedule.

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. III. 6-13

- is profligate, and one that is deficient and does not desire even to a proper degree and in a natural way, but is as devoid of feeling as a stone, is insensitive.^a
- 7 The man that seeks gain from every source is a profiteer, and he that seeks gain if not from no source, yet from few, is a waster.^b He that pretends to have more possessions than he really has is a boaster, and he that pretends to have fewer is a self-depreciator.
- 8 One that joins in approval more than is fitting is a flatterer, one that does so less than is fitting is surly. To be too complaisant is subservience; to be complaisant seldom and reluctantly is stubbornness.
- 9 Again, the man that endures no pain, not even if it is good for him, is luxurious; one that can endure all pain alike is strictly speaking nameless, but by metaphor
- 10 he is called hard, patient or enduring. He that rates himself too high is vain, he that rates himself too low, small-spirited. Again, he that exceeds in all expenditure is prodigal, he that falls short in all, mean.
- 11 Similarly the shabby man and the swaggerer—the latter exceeds what is fitting and the former falls below it. The rascal grasps profit by every means and from every source, the simpleton does not make
- 12 profit even from the proper sources. Envy consists in being annoyed at prosperity more often than one ought to be, for the envious are annoyed by the prosperity even of those who deserve to prosper; the opposite character is less definitely named, but it is the man that goes too far in not being annoyed even at the prosperity of the undeserving, and is easy-going, as gluttons are in regard to food, whereas his opposite is difficult-tempered in respect of jealousy.—
- 13 It is superfluous to state in the definition that the

^b The prodigal and mean in § 10 comes here in the schedule.

1221 b

5 οὕτως ἔχειν περίεργον διορίζειν¹. οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐπιστήμη οὔτε θεωρητικὴ οὔτε ποιητικὴ οὔτε λέγει οὔτε πράττει τοῦτο προσδιορίζουσα, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰς συκοφαντίας τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς λογικάς. ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον 14 τοῦτον, ἀκριβέστερον δ' ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἕξεων λέγωμεν τῶν ἀντικειμένων.

10 Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων εἶδη κατονομάζεται τῷ διαφέρειν κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ χρόνου ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τι τῶν ποιούντων τὰ πάθη. λέγω δ' οἷον ὀξύθυμος μὲν τῷ θάπτον 15 πάσχειν ἢ δεῖ, χαλεπὸς δὲ καὶ θυμώδης τῷ μᾶλλον, πικρὸς δὲ τῷ φυλακτικὸς εἶναι τῆς ὀργῆς, 15 πλήκτης δὲ καὶ λοιδορητικὸς ταῖς κολάσεσι ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς. ὀψοφάγοι δὲ καὶ γαστρίμαργοι 16 καὶ οἰνόφλυγες τῷ πρὸς ὀποτέρας τροφῆς ἀπόλαυσιν ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν παθητικὴν παρὰ τὸν λόγον.

Οὐ δεῖ δ' ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἓνια τῶν λεγομένων οὐκ 17 ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πῶς λαμβάνειν, ἀν πῶς λαμβάνηται 20 τὸ² μᾶλλον πάσχειν. οἷον μοιχὸς οὐ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ πρὸς τὰς γαμετὰς πλησιάζειν (οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ μοχθηρία τις αὐτῇ ἤδη³ ἐστίν, συνειλημμένον γὰρ τό τε πάθος λέγεται καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕβρις. διὸ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦσι, 18 συγγενέσθαι μὲν φάσκοντες ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεύσαι, 25 ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἢ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, καὶ πατάξαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὕβρισαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

¹ προσδιορίζειν ? (ut *De Interpr.* 17 a 36, *Met.* iii., 1005 b 21) Rac.

² Ric. τῷ.

³ Rac.: δῆ.

^a In Book III.

^b τοιόνδε = μοχθηρόν.

specified relation to each thing must not be accidental; no science whether theoretical or productive makes this addition to the definition either in discourse or in practice, but this addition is aimed against the logical quibbling of the sciences. Let us then accept these simple definitions, and let us make them more precise when we are speaking about the opposite dispositions.^a

But these modes of emotion themselves are divided into species designated according to their difference in respect of time or intensity or in regard to one of the objects that cause the emotions. I mean for instance that a man is called quick-tempered from feeling the emotion of anger sooner than he ought, harsh and passionate from feeling it more than he ought, bitter from having a tendency to cherish his anger, violent and abusive owing to the acts of retaliation to which his anger gives rise. Men are called gourmands or gluttons and drunkards from having an irrational liability to indulgence in one or the other sort of nutriment.

But it must not be ignored that some of the vices mentioned cannot be classed under the heading of manner, if manner is taken to be feeling the emotion to excess. For example, a man is not an adulterer because he exceeds in intercourse with married women, for 'excess' does not apply here, but adultery merely in itself is a vice, since the term denoting the passion implicitly denotes that the man is vicious^b; and similarly with outrage. Hence men dispute the charge, and admit intercourse but deny adultery on the ground of having acted in ignorance or under compulsion, or admit striking a blow but deny committing an outrage; and similarly in meeting the other charges of the same kind.

Sub-species
of Vices.

Some Vices
absolute.

1221 b

IV. Εὐλημμένων δὲ τούτων, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον 1
 ὅτι ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ
 ταῦτα διήρηνται, καὶ αἱ μὲν τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος
 30 διανοητικάι,¹ ὧν ἔργον ἀλήθεια, ἢ περὶ τοῦ πῶς
 ἔχει ἢ περὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου ἔχοντος
 δ' ὄρεξιν (οὐ γὰρ ὀτιοῦν μέρος ἔχει τῆς ψυχῆς 2
 ὄρεξιν εἰ μεριστὴ ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη δὴ φαῦλον τὸ
 ἦθος καὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν
 ἡδονὰς τινὰς καὶ λύπας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν
 35 διαιρέσεων τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις
 καὶ τὰς ἕξεις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις
 τῶν² παθημάτων, τὰ δὲ πάθη λύπη καὶ ἡδονῆ
 διώρισται· ὥστε διὰ τε ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὰς 3
 ἔμπροσθεν θέσεις συμβαίνει πᾶσαν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν
 περὶ ἡδονὰς εἶναι καὶ λύπας. πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ³
 40 ὑφ' οἷων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων,
 1222 a πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἡ ἕξις.⁴ δι' 4
 ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαύλους φασὲν εἶναι, τῷ
 διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἢ ὡς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ἄς μὴ δεῖ.
 διὸ καὶ διορίζονται πάντες⁵ προχείρως ἀπάθειαν
 καὶ ἡρεμίαν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς
 5 ἀρετάς, τὰς δὲ κακίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.

V. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη 1
 ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ' ἣν
 ἄριστα διάκεινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ
 καὶ ἄριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δ'

¹ [διανοητικάι] ? Rac.² <αἰτίαι> τῶν Bus.³ πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς Bz.⁴ Bz.: ἡδονή.⁵ [πάντες] Spengel: τινες ? Sus.^a Cf. 1220 b 7-20.^b See 1218 b 37 ff.

1 IV. These points having been taken, we must next say that since the spirit has two parts, and the virtues are divided between them, one set being those of the rational part, intellectual virtues, whose work is truth, whether about the nature of a thing or about its mode of production, while the other set belongs to the part that is irrational but possesses 2 appetite (for if the spirit is divided into parts, not any and every part possesses appetite), it therefore follows that the moral character is vicious or virtuous by reason of pursuing or avoiding certain pleasures and pains. This is clear from the classification ^a of the emotions, faculties and states of character. For the faculties and the states are concerned with the modes of emotion, and the emotions 3 are distinguished by pain and pleasure; so that it follows from these considerations as well as from the positions already laid down that all moral goodness 4 is concerned with pleasures and pains. For our state of character is related to and concerned with such things as have the property of making every person's spirit worse and better. But we say that men are wicked owing to pleasures and pains, through pursuing and avoiding the wrong ones or in the wrong way. Hence all men readily define the virtues as insensitiveness or tranquillity in regard to pleasures and pains, and the vices by the opposite qualities.

The hedonistic factor analysed.

1 V. But since it has been assumed ^b that goodness is a state of character of a sort that causes men to be capable of doing the best actions and gives them the best disposition in regard to the greatest good, and the best and greatest good is that which is in accordance with right principle, and this is the mean be-

1222 a

- 10 ἔστι τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν κατ' αὐτὴν ἐκάστην¹ μεσότητα εἶναι καὶ² περὶ μέσ' ἄττα ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἡδέσει καὶ λυπηροῖς. ἔσται δ' ἡ μεσότης ὅτε μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς (καὶ γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις), ὅτε δ' ἐν λύπαις, ὅτε δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέραις.
- 15 ὁ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλον τῷ χαίρειν τῷ ἡδεῖ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ὁ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι τῷ ἐναντίω, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ πρὸς τινα ὄρον, οἷον ὅταν μᾶλλον ἢ³ ὡς οἱ πολλοί· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς ὡς δεῖ.—ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις⁴ ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς τοιοῦτος ἔσται ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ὥστε τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος ὁ⁴ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν
- 20 ὑπερβολὴν ὁ⁴ δὲ τὴν ἐλλειψιν, ἀνάγκη ὡς ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία καὶ τῷ μέσῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ἕξεις ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίας εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ.

Συμβαίνει μέντοι τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ἔνθα μὲν⁴ φανερωτέρας εἶναι πάσας, ἔνθα δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλλειψιν.

25 αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ὅτι οὐκ αἰεὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα⁵ τῆς ἀνισότητος ἢ ὁμοιότητος⁶ πρὸς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν θᾶπτον ἂν μεταβαίη ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν, ὅτε δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ἧς ὅς⁷ πλέον ἀπέχει⁸ οὗτος δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτερος εἶναι, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐν μὲν τοῖς πόνοις ὑγιεινότερον ἢ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ἐλλείψεως καὶ

30 ἐγγύτερον τοῦ μέσου, ἐν δὲ τῇ τροφῇ ἢ ἐλλειψις

¹ Ric.: καθ' αὐτὸν ἕκαστον.² καὶ Sus.: ἦ.³ μᾶλλον ἢ lac.: μῆ.⁴ ὁ (bis) Bz.: οὐ.⁵ ταῦτα <ἔρχεται> vel <ἦκει> Ric.⁶ Bz.: ἡ ὁμοιότητος.⁷ δs add. Sus.⁸ ἀπέχων M^b.

tween excess and deficiency relative to ourselves, it would necessarily follow that moral goodness corresponds with each particular middle state and is concerned with certain mean points in pleasures and pains and pleasant and painful things. And this middle state will sometimes be in pleasures (for even in these there is excess and deficiency), sometimes in pains, sometimes in both. For he that exceeds in feeling delight exceeds in the pleasant, and he that exceeds in feeling pain exceeds in the opposite—and this whether his feelings are excessive absolutely or excessive in relation to some standard, for instance are felt more than ordinary men feel them; whereas the good man feels in the proper way.—

3 And since there is a certain state of character which results in its possessor's being in one instance such as to accept an excess and in another such as to accept a deficiency of the same thing, it follows that as these actions are contrary to each other and to the mean, so also the states of character that cause them are contrary to each other and to virtue.

4 It comes about, however, that sometimes all the oppositions are more evident, sometimes those on the side of excess, in some cases those on the side of deficiency. The cause of this contrariety is that the resemblance does not always reach the same point of inequality in regard to the middle, but sometimes it may pass over more quickly from the excess, sometimes from the deficiency, to the middle state, the person farther removed from which seems to be more contrary: for instance, with regard to the body excess is more healthy and nearer the middle than deficiency in the case of exercises but deficiency than excess in the case of food. Consequently the

One of the two extremes may be more opposed to the virtue than the other.

1222 a

ὑπερβολῆς. ὥστε καὶ αἱ προαιρετικαὶ ἕξεις αἰ 6
 φιλογυμναστικαὶ φιλοῦγιεῖς μᾶλλον ἔσονται καθ'
 ἑκατέραν τὴν αἴρεσιν, ἔνθα μὲν οἱ πολυπονώτεροι¹
 ἔνθα δ' οἱ ὑποστατικώτεροι,² καὶ ἐναντίος τῷ
 35 μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἔνθα μὲν ὁ ἄπονος
 καὶ οὐκ ἄμφω, ἔνθα δὲ³ ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς καὶ
 οὐχ ὁ πεινητικὸς. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διότι ἡ 7
 φύσις εὐθύς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφέστηκε τοῦ
 μέσου, ἀλλ' ἦττον μὲν φιλόπονοί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον δ'
 ἀπολαυστικοί· ὁμοίως δὲ ταῦτ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ
 40 ψυχῆς. ἐναντίαν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν ἕξιν ἐφ' ἣν τε 8
 ἀμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐφ' ἣν οἱ πολλοί, ἢ δ'
 ἑτέρα ὥσπερ οὐκ οὔσα λανθάνει, διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὀλίγον
 ἀναίσθητός ἐστιν. οἷον ὄργην πραότητι καὶ τὸν 9
 1222 b ὄργιλον τῷ πράῳ· καίτοι ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐπὶ
 τὸ ἴλεων εἶναι καὶ τὸ⁴ καταλλακτικὸν εἶναι καὶ
 μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι ῥαπιζόμενον, ἀλλ' ὀλίγοι οἱ τοι-
 οὔτοι, ἐπ' ἐκείνο δὲ πάντες ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον· διὸ
 καὶ οὐ κολακικὸν⁵ ὁ θυμός.

5 Ἐπεὶ δ' εἴληπται ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἕξεων καθ' 10
 ἕκαστα τὰ πάθη ἧ καὶ⁶ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις,
 καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἕξεων καθ' ἃς ἔχουσι κατὰ τὸν
 ὀρθὸν λόγον (τίς δ' ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ πρὸς τίνα
 δεῖ ὄρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον ὕστερον
 ἐπισκεπτέον), φανερόν ὅτι πᾶσαι αἰ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ

¹ αἱ πολυπονώτεραι Bz.² αἱ ὑποστατικώτεραι Bz.³ Bz.: δὲ καί.⁴ τὸ . . . τὸ Bz.: τῷ . . . τῷ.⁵ καταλλακτικὸν Fr., εὐκόλαστον ? Ric.⁶ ἧ καὶ Ras.: καὶ αἰ.^a In respect of amount of exercise.^b In respect of amount of food.^c A probable alteration of the Greek gives 'is not ready to make up a quarrel.'^a See 1249 a 21 ff.

states of will favourable to athletic training will be variously favourable to health according to the two different fields of choice—in the one case ^a the over-energetic men (will be nearer the mean than the slack ones), in the other ^b the too hardy (will be nearer the mean than the self-indulgent ones); and also the character contrary to the moderate and rational will be in the one case the slack and not both the slack and the over-energetic, and in the other case the self-indulgent and not the man who goes hungry. And this comes about because from the start our nature does not diverge from the mean in the same way as regards everything, but in energy we are deficient and in self-indulgence excessive; and this is also the same with regard to the spirit. And we class as contrary to the mean the disposition to which we, and most men, are more liable to err; whereas the other passes unnoticed as if non-existent, because its rarity makes it not observed. For instance we count anger the contrary of gentleness and the passionate man the contrary of the gentle; yet there is also excess in the direction of being gentle and placable and not being angry when struck, but men of that sort are few, and everyone is more prone to the other extreme; on which account moreover a passionate temper is not a characteristic of a toady.^c

10 And since we have dealt with the scheme of states of character in respect of the various emotions in which there are excesses and deficiencies, and of the opposite states in accordance with which men are disposed in accordance with right principle (though the question what is the right principle and what rule is to guide us in defining the mean must be considered later ^d), it is evident that all the

Recapitulation.

1222 b

- 10 καὶ κακίαι περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶ, καὶ ἡδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ἕξεων καὶ παθημάτων γίνονται. ἀλλὰ 11 μὴν ἢ γε βελτίστη ἕξις ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα μέση ἐστίν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἢ πᾶσαι ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἔσονται τῶν μεσοτήτων.
- 15 VI. Λάβωμεν οὖν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐπιούσης 1 σκέψεως. εἰσὶ δὴ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσίαι κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἀρχαί, διὸ καὶ ἐκάστη πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γεννᾶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῶων¹ ὅλως ζῶα καὶ φυτὸν φυτά. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις 2 ὁ γ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ 20 μόνον τῶν ζῶων· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐθὲν εἴπομεν ἂν πράττειν. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ὅσαι τοιαῦται, ὅθεν 3 πρῶτον αἱ κινήσεις, κύριαι λέγονται, μάλιστα δὲ δικαίως ἀφ' ὧν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως, ἢν ἴσως ὁ θεὸς ἄρχει. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκινήτοις ἀρχαῖς, οἷον ἐν 4 ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κύριον· καίτοι 25 λέγεταιί γε καθ' ὁμοιότητα· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα κινουμένης τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντα μάλιστ' ἂν τὰ δεικνύμενα μεταβάλλοι, αὐτὰ δὲ δι'² αὐτὰ οὐ μεταβάλλει ἀναιρούμενον θάτερον³ ὑπὸ θατέρου ἂν μὴ τῷ 5 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ δι' ἐκείνης δεῖξαι. ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ κινήσεώς τινος· ἢ γὰρ πράξις 30 κίνησις. ἐπεὶ δ' ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἢ ἀρχὴ

¹ Sns.: ζῶων ὄν.² δὲ δι' ? Ric.³ Rieckher: ἀναιρούμενον θατέρου.

^a The writer proceeds to distinguish the strict sense of ἀρχή, 'origin or cause of change' (which applies to man as capable of volition and action) from its secondary sense, 'cause or explanation of an unchanging state of things' (which applies to the 'first principles' of mathematics).

^b e.g. if ἀρχή A led to B and C, of which C was absurd.

forms of moral goodness and badness have to do with excesses and deficiencies of pleasures and pains, and that pleasures and pains result from the states of character and modes of emotion mentioned. But then the best state in relation to each class of thing is the middle state. It is clear, therefore, that the virtues will be either all or some of these middle states.

1 VI. Let us, therefore, take another starting-point for the ensuing inquiry.^a Now all essences are by nature first principles of a certain kind, owing to which each is able to generate many things of the same sort as itself, for example a man engenders men, and in 2 general an animal animals, and a plant plants. And in addition to this, obviously man alone among animals initiates certain conduct—for we should not 3 ascribe conduct to any of the others. And the first principles of that sort, which are the first source of motions, are called first principles in the strict sense, and most rightly those that have necessary results; doubtless God is a ruling principle that acts in this 4 way. But the strict sense of 'first principle' is not found in first principles incapable of movement, for example those of mathematics, although the term is indeed used of them by analogy, for in mathematics if the first principle were changed virtually all the things proved from it would change, though they do not change owing to themselves, one being destroyed by the other, except by destroying the 5 assumption and thereby establishing a proof.^b But man is a first principle of a certain motion, for action is motion. And since as in other matters

Freedom of the Will: human conduct is contingent, not necessary.

then C by refuting A would refute the other consequence B (Solomon).

1222 b

αἰτία ἐστὶ τῶν δι' αὐτὴν ὄντων ἢ γινομένων,
 δεῖ νοῆσαι καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων. εἰ γὰρ 6
 ἔχοντας τοῦ τριγώνου δύο ὀρθὰς ἀνάγκη τὸ τετρά-
 γωνον ἔχειν τέτταρας ὀρθάς, φανερόν ὡς αἴτιον
 τούτου τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν τὸ τρίγωνον· εἰ δέ γε
 35 μεταβάλλοι¹ τὸ τρίγωνον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τετρά-
 γωνον μεταβάλλειν, οἷον εἰ τρεῖς, ἕξ, εἰ δὲ τέτ-
 ταρας,² ὀκτώ· κἂν εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλει³ τοιοῦτον δ'
 ἐστί, κάκεῖνο τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.

Δῆλον δ' ὁ ἐπιχειροῦμεν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐκ τῶν 7
 ἀναλυτικῶν· νῦν δ' οὔτε μὴ λέγειν οὔτε λέγειν
 ἀκριβῶς οἷόν τε πλὴν τοσοῦτον. εἰ γὰρ μὴθὲν
 40 ἄλλο αἴτιον τοῦ τριγώνου οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀρχὴ
 τις ἂν εἴη τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ὑστερον. ὥστ' 8
 εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἕνια τῶν ὄντων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναντίως
 ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τοιαύτας·
 1223 a ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἕξ ἀνάγκης ἀναγκαῖον τὸ συμβαῖνόν
 ἐστί, τὰ δέ γε ἐντεῦθεν ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι ἐπὶ⁴
 τὰναντία. καὶ ἅ⁵ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
 πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν τοιούτων
 εἰσὶν αὐτοί. ὥστε ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἄνθρωπος 9
 5 ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος, φανερόν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ
 γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ
 γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, ὧν γε κύριός ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ

¹ μεταβάλλει Ric.² Sp.: τέτταρες.³ Ric.: μεταβάλλοι.⁴ ἐπὶ add. Bz.⁵ Fr.: δ.^a Cf. *Anal. Post.* 1. i.

the first principle is a cause of the things that exist or come into existence because of it, we must think
 6 as we do in the case of demonstrations. For example, if as the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles the angles of a quadrilateral are necessarily equal to four right angles, that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is clearly the cause of that fact; and supposing a triangle were to change, a quadrilateral would necessarily change too—for example if the angles of a triangle became equal to three right angles, the angles of a quadrilateral would become equal to six right angles, or if four, eight; also if a triangle does not change but is as described, a quadrilateral too must of necessity be as described.

7 The necessity of what we are arguing is clear from *Analytics*^a; at present we cannot either deny or affirm anything definitely except just this. Supposing there were no further cause of the triangle's having the property stated, then the triangle would be a sort of first principle or cause of the later stages.
 8 Hence if in fact there are among existing things some that admit of the opposite state, their first principles also must necessarily have the same quality; for of things that are of necessity the result is necessary, albeit the subsequent stages may possibly happen in the opposite way. And the things that depend on men themselves in many cases belong to this class of variables, and men are themselves the first principle of things of this sort. Hence it is clear that
 9 all the actions of which a man is the first principle and controller may either happen or not happen, and that it depends on himself for them to happen or not, as he controls their existence or non-existence.

Therefore
 virtue and
 vice are
 voluntary.

ARISTOTLE

1223 a

τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ὅσα δ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἐστὶ ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ
 ποιεῖν, αἴτιος τούτων αὐτὸς¹ ἐστίν, καὶ ὅσων αἴτιος,
 ἐφ' αὐτῷ. ἐπεὶ δ' ἢ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἢ κακία καὶ τὰ
 10 ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἐπαινετὰ τὰ δὲ ψεκτά
 (ψέγεται γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινείται οὐ τὰ² ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ
 τύχης ἢ φύσεως ὑπάρχοντα ἀλλ' ὅσων αὐτοὶ αἴ-
 τιοὶ ἐσμεν, ὅσων γὰρ ἄλλος αἴτιος ἐκείνος καὶ τὸν
 ψόγον καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον ἔχει), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἢ ἀρετὴ
 15 καὶ ἢ κακία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ
 ἀρχὴ πράξεων. ληπτέον ἄρα ποίων αὐτὸς αἴτιος 11
 καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. πάντες μὲν δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν,
 ὅσα μὲν ἐκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἐκάστου,
 ἐκείνων³ αἴτιον εἶναι, ὅσα δ' ἀκούσια, οὐκ αὐτὸν
 αἴτιον. πάντα δ' ὅσα προελόμενος, καὶ ἐκὼν δῆλον
 ὅτι. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἢ κακία τῶν
 20 ἐκουσίων ἂν εἴησαν.

VII. Ληπτέον ἄρα τί τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τί τὸ 1
 ἀκούσιον, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ἢ προαίρεσις, ἐπειδὴ ἢ
 ἀρετὴ καὶ ἢ κακία ὀρίζεται τούτοις· καὶ⁴ πρῶτον
 σκεπτέον τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον. τριῶν δὴ 2
 τούτων ἔν τι δόξειεν ἂν⁵ εἶναι, ἢτοι κατ' ὄρεξιν ἢ
 25 κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ διάνοιαν, τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον
 κατὰ τούτων τι, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον παρὰ τούτων τι.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ ὄρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν 3

¹ Bz.: οὗτος.³ Fr.: ἐκείνων.⁴ καὶ add. Fr.² Fr.: διὰ τὰ.⁵ ἂν add. Sp.

But of things which it depends on him to do or not to do he is himself the cause, and what he is the cause of depends on himself. And since goodness and badness and the actions that spring from them are in some cases praiseworthy and in other cases blameworthy (for praise and blame are not given to things that we possess from necessity or fortune or nature but to things of which we ourselves are the cause, since for things of which another person is the cause, that person has the blame and the praise), it is clear that both goodness and badness have to do with things where a man is himself the cause and origin of his actions. We must, then, ascertain what is the kind of actions of which a man is himself the cause and origin. Now we all agree that each man is the cause of all those acts that are voluntary and purposive for him individually, and that he is not himself the cause of those that are involuntary. And clearly he commits voluntarily all the acts that he commits purposely. It is clear, then, that both goodness and badness will be in the class of things voluntary.

1 VII. We must, therefore, ascertain what voluntary and involuntary mean, and what is purposive choice, since they enter into the definition of goodness and badness. And first we must consider the meaning of
 2 voluntary and involuntary. Now they would seem to refer to one of three things—conformity with appetite, or with purposive choice, or with thought: voluntary is what conforms with one of these and
 3 involuntary is what contravenes one of them. But moreover there are three subdivisions of appetite—

THE
 VOLUNTARY
 (cc. vii ix).
 It is not
 acting by
 impulse,
 whether in
 the form of
 appetite

1223 a

καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, ὥστε ταῦτα διαιρετέον·
καὶ πρῶτον τὸ¹ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.

Δόξειε δ' ἂν πᾶν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον⁴
εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ ἀκούσιον πᾶν δοκεῖ εἶναι βίαιον,
30 τὸ δὲ βίαιον λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἀναγκαζόμενοι
ποιοῦσιν ἢ πάσχουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐθηνός φησι·

πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρόν ἔφθ·

ὥστ' εἴ τι λυπηρόν βίαιον καὶ εἴ τι² βίαιον λυπη- 5
ρόν· τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρόν (ἢ
35 γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος), ὥστε βίαιον καὶ ἀκούσιον.
τὸ ἄρα κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον· ἐναντία γὰρ ταῦτ'
ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι ἢ μοχθηρία ἀδικώτερον πᾶσα ποιεῖ, 6
ἢ δ' ἀκρασία μοχθηρία δοκεῖ εἶναι· ὁ δ' ἀκρατῆς
οἶος κατὰ³ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν
πράττειν, ἀκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατ' αὐτήν·

1223 b

ὥστ' ὁ ἀκρατῆς ἀδικήσει τῷ πράττειν κατ'
ἐπιθυμίαν. τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖν ἐκούσιον⁴. ἐκὼν ἄρα
πράξει, καὶ ἐκούσιον τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ γὰρ
ἄτοπον εἰ δικαιότεροι ἔσονται οἱ ἀκρατεῖς γινόμε-
νοι.⁵—ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτων δόξειεν ἂν τὸ κατ' 7
5 ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι· ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε τούναντίον,
ἅπαν γὰρ ὃ ἐκὼν τις πράττει βουλόμενος πράττει,

¹ τὸ add. Cas.

² εἴ τι rec. P^b: εἰ.

³ οἶος κατὰ Sp.: ὁ κατὰ et οἶος infra ante πράττειν.

⁴ τὸ δ' . . . ἐκούσιον hic Rac.: supra ante ὥστ' ὁ ἀκρατῆς.

⁵ καὶ γὰρ . . . γινόμενοι supra post τῷ πράττειν κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν
tr. ? Rac.

^a Quoted also *Met.* 1015 a 28 and (without author's name) *Rhet.* 1370 a 10, and = Theognidea 472 (but that has *χρημ' ἀνιαρόν*); probably by the elder Evenus of Paros, *fl.* 460 B.C. (Bowra, *Cl. Rev.* xlviii. 2).

^b In the mss. this sentence precedes the one before.

wish, passion and desire; so that we have to distinguish these. And first we must consider conformity with desire.

It would seem that everything that conforms with desire is voluntary. For everything involuntary seems to be forced, and what is forced and everything that people do or suffer under necessity is painful, as indeed Evenus says :

(to yield to which can be shown as both voluntary and involuntary),

For all necessity doth cause distress—^a

so that if a thing is painful it is forced and if a thing is forced it is painful; but everything contrary to desire is painful (for desire is for what is pleasant), so that it is forced and involuntary. Therefore what conforms with desire is voluntary, for things contrary to and things in conformity with desire are opposite to one another. Again, all wickedness makes a man more unrighteous, and lack of self-control seems to be wickedness; and the uncontrolled man is the sort of man to act in conformity with desire contrary to calculation, and he shows his lack of control when his conduct is guided by desire; so that the uncontrolled man will act unrighteously by acting in conformity with desire. But unrighteous action is voluntary.^b Therefore he will be acting voluntarily, and action guided by desire is voluntary. Indeed it would be strange if those who become uncontrolled will be more righteous.^c—From these considerations, then, it would appear that what is in conformity with desire is voluntary; and from this the opposite ^d follows, for all that a man does voluntarily

or of anger (for the same reason),

^c This sentence would come in better above, after 'acting in conformity with desire.'

^d Viz. that what is against desire is involuntary.

1223 b

καὶ ὁ βούλεται ἐκῶν, βούλεται δ' οὐθεις ὁ οἶεται
 εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος οὐχ ἂ
 βούλεται ποιεῖ, τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὁ οἶεται βέλτιστον
 εἶναι πράττειν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἔστιν.
 10 ὥστε ἅμα συμβήσεται τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα
 πράττειν. τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον. ἔτι δ' ὁ ἐγκρατῆς 8
 δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἀκρασίας· ἡ γὰρ
 ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ.
 ἐγκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν πράττη παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν
 κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. ὥστ' εἰ τὸ μὲν δικαιοπραγεῖν
 15 ἐκούσιον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (ἄμφω γὰρ δοκεῖ
 ταῦτα ἐκούσια εἶναι, καὶ ἀνάγκη εἶ θάτερον
 ἐκούσιον καὶ θάτερον), τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν
 ἀκούσιον, ἅμα ἄρα ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ αὐτὸ πράξει ἐκῶν
 καὶ ἄκων.

Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ θυμοῦ· ἀκρασία γὰρ 9
 καὶ ἐγκράτεια καὶ θυμοῦ δοκεῖ εἶναι ὥσπερ καὶ
 20 ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸν θυμὸν λυπηρὸν καὶ
 βίαιον ἢ κάθεξις, ὥστ' εἰ τὸ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, τὸ
 κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη πᾶν. ἔοικε δὲ
 καὶ Ἡράκλειτος λέγειν εἰς τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ
 βλέψας ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἢ κώλυσις αὐτοῦ· “χαλεπὸν
 γάρ” φησι “θυμῷ μάχεσθαι, ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖται.”
 25 εἰ δ' ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ¹ ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν 1
 ἅμα καὶ² κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ πράγματος, μᾶλλον
 ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν

¹ P^b: τὸ αὐτὸν M^b: τὸν αὐτὸν edd.

² καὶ Bz.: τὸ.

^a The natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. c. 513 B.C. His sentence ended ὁ τι γὰρ ἂν χρήσῃ γίνεσθαι, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται, Iamblichus, *Protrepticus*, p. 140.

he wishes to do, and what he wishes to do he does voluntarily, but nobody wishes what he thinks to be bad. But yet the uncontrolled man does not do what he wishes, for being uncontrolled means acting against what one thinks to be best owing to desire; hence it will come about that the same person is acting voluntarily and involuntarily at the same
 8 time. But this is impossible. And further, the self-controlled man will act righteously, or more righteously than lack of control will; for self-control is goodness, and goodness makes men more righteous. And a man exercises self-control when he acts against his desire in conformity with rational calculation. So that if righteous action is voluntary, as also unrighteous action (for both of these seem to be voluntary, and if one of them is voluntary it follows of necessity that the other is also), whereas what is contrary to desire is involuntary, it therefore follows that the same person will do the same action voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.

9 The same argument applies also in the case of control of passion; for there appear to be control and lack of control of passion as well as of desire and what is
 or of wish
 (which also
 involves
 contra-
 diction).
 10 contrary to passion is painful and restraint is a matter of force, so that if what is forced is involuntary, what is in accordance with passion will always be voluntary. Even Heracleitus^a seems to have in view the strength of passion when he remarks that the checking of passion is painful; for 'It is difficult (he says) to do battle with passion, for it buys its wish at the price of life.' And if it is impossible to do the same act voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time and in respect of the same part of the act, action guided by one's wish is more voluntary than

1223 b

καὶ θυμόν. τεκμήριον δέ· πολλὰ γὰρ πράττομεν
 ἐκόντες ἄνευ ὀργῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.

Λείπεται ἄρα εἰ τὸ βουλόμενον καὶ ἐκούσιον 11
 30 ταῦτὸ σκέψασθαι. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον.
 ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ δοκεῖ ἢ μοχθηρία ἀδικω-
 τέρους ποιεῖν, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία μοχθηρία τις φαίνεται.
 συμβήσεται δὲ τούναντίον· βούλεται μὲν γὰρ οὐθεὶς
 ἂ οἶεται εἶναι κακά, πράττει δ' ὅταν γένηται¹
 ἀκρατής· εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἐκούσιον, τὸ δ'
 35 ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν, ὅταν ἀκρατής γένηται,
 οὐκέτι ἀδικήσει, ἀλλ' ἔσται δικαιότερος ἢ πρὶν
 γενέσθαι ἀκρατής. τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον. ὅτι μὲν
 τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ ὄρεξιν πράτ-
 τειν οὐδ' ἀκούσιον τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν φανερόν.

VIII. "Ὅτι δ' οὐδὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πάλιν ἐκ 1
 τῶνδε δῆλον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ βούλησιν ὡς οὐκ
 ἀκούσιον² ἀπεδείχθη, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον³ πᾶν δ' βού-
 1224 a λεται καὶ ἐκούσιον· ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον
 ἐνδέχεται πράττειν ἐκόντα, τοῦτο δέδεικται μόνον.⁴
 πολλὰ δὲ βουλόμενοι πράττομεν ἐξαίφνης, προαιρεῖ-
 ται δ' οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἐξαίφνης.

5 Εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἦν τριῶν τούτων ἓν τι εἶναι 2
 τὸ ἐκούσιον, ἢ κατ' ὄρεξιν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ

¹ Sol.: γίνηται.

² οὐχ ὡς ἐκούσιον? Rac. (οὐχ ὡς ἀκ. Ras.: ὡς ἀκ. οὐκ. Bz.).

³ μᾶλλον <ὅτι>? Rac.

⁴ [μόνον] Sol.

^a Or, altering the text, 'It was proved not that acting in accordance with one's wishes is the same as acting voluntarily, but rather that all one wishes is also voluntary although it is possible to act voluntarily without wishing—this is all that has been proved; but many things that we wish—'

^b Cf. 1223 a 23 ff.

action guided by desire or passion. And a proof of this is that we do many things voluntarily without anger or desire.

11 It remains, therefore, to consider whether acting as we wish and acting voluntarily are the same. This also seems impossible. For it is a fundamental assumption with us, and a general opinion, that wickedness makes men more unrighteous; and lack of self-control seems to be a sort of wickedness. But from the hypothesis that acting as we wish and acting voluntarily are the same the opposite will result; for nobody wishes things that he thinks to be bad, yet he does them when he has become uncontrolled, so if to do injustice is voluntary and the voluntary is what is in accordance with one's wish, then when a man has become uncontrolled he will no longer be acting unjustly but will be more just than he was before he lost control of himself. But this is impossible. Therefore it is clear that acting voluntarily does not mean acting in accordance with appetite nor acting involuntarily acting in opposition to appetite.

1 VIII. Also it is clear from the following considerations that voluntary action does not mean acting in accordance with purposive choice. It was proved ^a that acting in accordance with one's wish is not acting involuntarily, but rather everything that one wishes is also voluntary—it has only been proved that it is possible to do a thing voluntarily without wishing; but many things that we wish we do suddenly, whereas nobody makes a purposive choice suddenly.

nor is it
always
purposive.

2 But if as we said ^b the voluntary must necessarily be one of three things—what is in conformity with appetite, or with purposive choice, or with thought—

Therefore
(by
exclusion,

1224 a

κατὰ διάνοιαν, τούτων δὲ τὰ δύο μὴ ἔστι, λείπεται
 ἐν τῷ διανοούμενόν πως πράττειν εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον.
 ἔτι δὲ μικρὸν προαγαγόντες τὸν λόγον ἐπιθῶμεν 3
 τέλος τῷ περὶ τοῦ ἐκούσιου καὶ ἀκούσιου διορισμῷ.
 10 δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ βία καὶ μὴ βία τι ποιεῖν οἰκέια τοῖς
 εἰρημένοις εἶναι· τό τε γὰρ βίαιον ἀκούσιον καὶ
 τὸ ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον εἶναι φαμέν. ὥστε περὶ
 τοῦ βία σκεπτέον πρῶτον τί ἔστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει
 πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ 4
 βίαιον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντικείμεθα, καὶ ἡ βία
 15 καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, τῷ ἐκούσιῳ καὶ τῇ πειθοῖ ἐπὶ
 τῶν πραττομένων. καθόλου δὲ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὴν
 ἀνάγκην καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν· καὶ γὰρ
 τὸν λίθον ἄνω καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω βία καὶ ἀναγκαζό-
 μενα φέρεσθαι φαμέν, ταῦτα¹ δ' ὅταν κατὰ τὴν
 φύσει² καὶ τὴν καθ' αὐτὰ ὀρμὴν φέρηται, οὐ βία
 —οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκούσια λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμος
 20 ἡ ἀντίθεσις, ὅταν δὲ παρὰ ταύτην, βία φαμέν.
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων 5
 ὀρῶμεν βία πολλὰ καὶ πάσχοντα καὶ ποιῶντα,
 ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὀρμὴν ἔξωθέν τι κινή. ἐν
 μὲν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἀπλή ἡ ἀρχή, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις
 πλεονάζει· οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἡ ὄρεξις καὶ ὁ λόγος συμ-
 25 φωνεῖ. ὥστ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἀπλοῦν 6
 τὸ βίαιον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει

¹ Fr.: τοῦτο.² v.l. φύσιν.

and if it is not the two former, it remains that voluntariness consists in acting with some kind of thought.

cf. 1323 a 21)
the
Voluntary
depends on
thought.

3 Moreover, let us put a conclusion to our delimitation of the voluntary and involuntary by carrying the argument a little further. Acting under compulsion and not under compulsion seem to be terms akin to the ones mentioned; for we say that everything forced is involuntary and everything involuntary is forced. So we must first consider the exact meaning of 'forced,' and how what is forced is related to the

Compulsion
is from
without;

4 voluntary and involuntary. It seems, then, that in the sphere of conduct 'forced' or 'necessary,' and force or necessity, are the opposite of 'voluntary,' and of persuasion. And we employ the terms force and necessity in a general sense even in the case of inanimate objects: we say that a stone travels upwards and fire downwards by force and under necessity, whereas when they travel according to their natural and intrinsic impulse we say that they do not move under force—although nevertheless they are not spoken of as moving voluntarily: the state opposite to forced motion has no name, but when they travel contrary to their natural impulse we say

5 that they move by force. Similarly also in the case of living things and of animals, we see many being acted on by force, and also acting under force when something moves them from outside, contrary to the impulse within the thing itself. In inanimate things the moving principle is simple, but in living things it is multiple, for appetite and rational principle are

whereas the
control of
impulse by
reason is
internal,
and
therefore
voluntary.

6 not always in harmony. Hence whereas in the case of the other animals the factor of force is simple, as it is in the case of inanimate objects, for animals do not possess rational principle and appetite in

1224 a

λόγον καὶ ὄρεξιν ἐναντίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὀρέξει (ζῆ). ἐν
 δ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἔνεστιν ἄμφω, καὶ ἐν τινι ἡλικία, ἥ
 καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἀποδίδομεν (οὐ γὰρ φαμεν τὸ
 παιδίον πράττειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλὰ τὸν¹ ἤδη
 30 διὰ λογισμὸν πράττοντα). δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον
 ἅπαν λυπηρὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐθεις βία μὲν ποιεῖ
 χαίρων δέ. διὸ περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ
 πλείστη ἀμφισβήτησις ἐστίν. ἐναντίας γὰρ ὁρμᾶς
 ἔχων αὐτὸς ἐκάτερος² αὐτῷ πράττει, ὥσθ' ὁ τ'
 ἐγκρατῆς βία, φασίν, ἀφέλκων³ αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν
 35 ἡδέων ἐπιθυμῶν⁴ (ἀλγεί γὰρ ἀφέλκων πρὸς ἀντι-
 τείνουσαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), ὁ τ' ἀκρατῆς βία παρὰ τὸν
 λογισμὸν. ἦπτον δὲ δοκεῖ λυπεῖσθαι, ἥ γὰρ ἐπι-
 θυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ἥ ἀκολουθεῖ χαίρων· ὥσθ' ὁ
 ἀκρατῆς μᾶλλον ἐκὼν καὶ οὐ βία, ὅτι οὐ λυπηρῶς.
 ἡ δὲ πειθὴ τῇ βία καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἀντιτίθεται, ὁ δ'
 1224 b ἐγκρατῆς ἐφ' ἧ πέπεισται ἄγεται,⁵ καὶ πορεύεται
 οὐ βία ἀλλ' ἐκὼν· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ πείσασα ἄγει,
 οὐ γὰρ μετέχει λόγου. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι
 9 μόνον⁶ βία καὶ ἄκοντες ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν,
 ὅτι καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα τοῦ βία, καθ' ἣν καὶ ἐπὶ
 5 τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν, εἴρηται. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴ
 10 τις προσθείη⁷ τὸ ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσκείμενον

¹ Iac.: ἀλλ' ὄταν.² Sp.: ἕκαστος.³ Sp.: ἀφέλκει.⁴ Bek.: ἐπιθυμῶν (τῶν <τῶν> ἡδέων ἐπιθυμῶν Fr.).⁵ ἄγεται? Sol. (ὁρμᾶ? Ric.): ἄγει.⁶ Rac.: μόνοι.⁷ Sp.: προσθη.

opposition to it, but live by their appetite, in man both forms of force are present—that is, at a certain age, the age to which we attribute action^a in the proper sense; for we do not speak of a child as acting, any more than a wild animal, but only a person who has attained to acting by rational calculation.

7 So what is forced always seems to be painful, and no one acting under force acts gladly. Consequently there is a great deal of dispute about the self-controlled man and the uncontrolled. For each of them acts under a conflict of impulses within him, so that the self-controlled man, they say, acts under force in dragging himself away from the pleasures that he covets (for he feels pain in dragging himself away against the resistance of appetite), while the uncontrolled man acts under force in going contrary

8 to his rational faculty. But he seems to feel less pain, because desire is for what is pleasant, and he follows his desire; so that the uncontrolled man rather acts voluntarily and not under force, because not painfully. On the other hand persuasion is thought to be the opposite of force and necessity; and the self-controlled man is led towards things that he has been persuaded to pursue, and proceeds not under force but voluntarily; whereas desire leads a man on without employing persuasion, since

9 it possesses no element of rational principle. It has, then, been stated that these men only seem to act under force and involuntarily; and we have shown the reason—it is because their action has a certain resemblance to forced action, just as we speak of forced action even in the case of inanimate objects

10 too. Yet nevertheless if one added there also the addition made in our definition, the statement is

1224 b

κάκει, λύεται τὸ λεχθέν. ὅταν μὲν γάρ τι τῶν
 ἔξωθεν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὄρμην κινῆ ἢ ἡρεμίζη,
 βία φαμέν, ὅταν δὲ μή, οὐ βία· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ
 10 καὶ ἀκρατεῖ ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ὄρμη ἐνοῦσα ἄγει (ἄμφω
 γὰρ ἔχει), ὥστ' οὐ βία οὐδέτερος ἀλλ' ἐκῶν δια
 γε ταῦτα πράττοι ἄν· οὐδ' ἀναγκαζόμενος, τὴν 11
 γὰρ ἔξωθεν ἀρχὴν τὴν παρὰ τὴν ὄρμην ἢ ἐμποδί-
 ζουσαν ἢ κινουσαν ἀνάγκην λέγομεν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις
 λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα τύπτει τινὰ ἀντιτείνοντος καὶ
 15 τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμῆν· ὅταν δ' ἔσωθεν
 ἢ ἀρχή, οὐ βία. ἔτι¹ καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἐν
 ἀμφοτέροις ἔνεστιν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκρατευόμενος 12
 λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἤδη καὶ
 χαίρει τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος ἡδονὴν ὅτι ὕστερον ὠφελή-
 θήσεται ἢ καὶ ἤδη ὠφελείται ὑγιαίνων, καὶ ὁ
 20 ἀκρατῆς χαίρει μὲν τυγχάνων ἀκρατευόμενος οὐ
 ἐπιθυμῆ λυπεῖται δὲ τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος λύπην, οἶεται
 γὰρ κακὸν πράττειν. ὥστε τὸ μὲν βία ἐκάτερον 13
 φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ
 διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκάτερον ἄκοντα ποτὲ πράττειν·
 κευχωρισμένα γὰρ ὄντα ἐκάτερα ἐκκρουέται ὑπ'
 25 ἀλλήλων. ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ὄλην μεταφέρουσι
 ψυχὴν, ὅτι ἐπὶ² τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὀρώσιν.
 ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν, ἢ 14
 δ' ὄλη ἐκοῦσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ

¹ Sus.: ὅτι.² ὅτι ἐπὶ Sol.: ὅτι.

refuted. For we speak of a thing as being forced to act when something external moves it or brings it to rest, acting against the impulse within the thing itself—when there is no external motive, we do not say that it acts under force ; and in the uncontrolled man and the self-controlled it is the impulse present in the man himself that drives him (for he has both impulses), so that as far as these considerations go neither of them would be acting under force, but
11 voluntarily ; nor yet are they acting of necessity, for by necessity we mean an external principle that either checks or moves a man in opposition to his impulse—as if A were to take hold of B’s hand and with it strike C, B’s will and desire both resisting ; whereas when the source of action is from within, we
12 do not speak of the act as done under force./ Again, both pleasure and pain are present in both cases ; for a man exercising self-control both feels pain when he finally acts in opposition to his desire and enjoys the pleasure of hoping that he will be benefited later on, or is even being benefited already, by being in good health ; and the uncontrolled man enjoys getting what he desires owing to his lack of self-control, but feels prospective pain because he thinks he is
13 doing a bad thing. Hence it is reasonable to say that each does what he does under compulsion, and that each is at one point acting involuntarily, from motives both of appetite and of rational calculation—for calculation and appetite are things quite separate, and each is pushed aside by the other. Hence men transfer this to the spirit as a whole, because they see something of this sort in the ex-
14 periences of the spirit. Now it is admissible to say this in the case of the parts, but the spirit as a whole

1224 b

ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βία δ' οὐδέτερος,¹ ἀλλὰ τῶν
 ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφότερα ἔχομεν.
 30 καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος φύσει ὑπάρχει² ὅτι ἐωμένης τῆς
 γενέσεως καὶ μὴ πηρωθείσης ἐνέσται, καὶ ἡ ἐπι-
 θυμία ὅτι εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ἔνεστιν.
 σχεδὸν δὲ τούτοις δυσὶ τὸ φύσει διορίζομεν, τῷ τε 15
 ὅσα εὐθύς γινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσι, καὶ ὅσα
 ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως εὐθυπορεῖν γίνεται ἡμῖν,
 35 οἷον πολιά καὶ γῆρας καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ὥστε
 μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκάτερος πράττει πῶς,³ ἀπλῶς δὲ
 κατὰ φύσιν ἐκάτερος, οὐ τὴν αὐτήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν 16
 περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ ἀκρατῆ ἀπορίαι αὐται,⁴ περὶ
 τοῦ βία πράττειν ἢ ἀμφοτέρους ἢ τὸν ἕτερον,
 ὥστε ἢ μὴ ἐκόντας ἢ ἅμα βία καὶ ἐκόντας,⁵ εἰ
 δὲ τὸ βία ἀκούσιον,⁶ ἅμα ἐκόντας καὶ ἄκοντας
 1225 a πράττειν· σχεδὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ἡμῖν
 ὡς ἀπαντητέον.

Λέγονται δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον βία καὶ ἀναγκα- 17
 σθέντες πρᾶξαι οὐ διαφωνούντος τοῦ λόγου καὶ
 τῆς ὀρέξεως, ὅταν πράττωσιν ὁ καὶ λυπηρὸν καὶ
 5 φαῦλον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλὰ⁷ μὴ τοῦτο πράτ-
 τουσιν⁸ πληγαὶ ἢ δεσμοὶ ἢ θάνατοι ὧσιν· ταῦτα
 γὰρ φασιν ἀναγκασθέντες πρᾶξαι. ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ 18
 πάντες ἐκόντες ποιοῦσιν αὐτὰ ταῦτα,⁹ ἕξεστι γὰρ

¹ οὐδετέρον? Rac.² ὑπάρχει Ras.: ἀρχων.³ πῶς add. ante μὴ Sus., hic Sol. (cf. 1225 a 12 ed.).⁴ αὐται add. Bus.⁵ Sp.: ἄκοντας.⁶ Bz.: ἐκούσιον.⁷ Rac.: ἀλλ' ἄν.⁸ Sp.: πράττωσι.⁹ Sp.: αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

both in the uncontrolled and in the self-controlled man acts voluntarily, and in neither case does the man act under compulsion, but one of the parts in them so acts—for we possess by nature both parts; since rational principle is a natural property, because it will be present in us if our growth is allowed and not stunted, and also desire is natural, because it

15 accompanies and is present in us from birth; and these are pretty nearly the two things by which we define the natural—it is what accompanies everybody as soon as he is born, or else what comes to us if development is allowed to go on regularly, for example grey hair, old age, etc. Therefore each of the two persons in a way acts not in accordance with nature, but absolutely each does act according to nature, though not according to the same nature.

16 The difficulties, then, raised about the uncontrolled and the self-controlled man are these: do both, or does one of them, act under compulsion, so that they either act not voluntarily or else voluntarily and under compulsion at the same time—and if what is done under compulsion is involuntary, act voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time? And it is fairly clear from what has been said how these difficulties are to be met.

17 But there is another way in which people are said to act under compulsion and of necessity without disagreement between rational principle and appetite, when they do something that they consider actually painful and bad but they are faced by flogging or imprisonment or execution if they do not do it; for in these cases they say that they are acting

18 under necessity. Possibly, however, this is not the case, but they all do the actual deeds willingly, since

Mixed acts are voluntary (excepting some caused by overpowering motives).

1225 a

μὴ ποιεῖν ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ὑπομεῖναι τὸ πάθος. ἔτι 19
 ἴσως τούτων τὰ μὲν φαίη τις ἂν τὰ δ' οὔ. ὅσα
 10 μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων μὴ ὑπάρξαι ἢ
 ὑπάρξαι,¹ καὶ² ὅσα πράττει ἂ μὴ βούλεται ἐκὼν
 πράττει καὶ οὐ βία· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τῶν
 τοιούτων, βία πῶς, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἀπλῶς ὅτι οὐκ
 αὐτὸ τοῦτο προαιρεῖται ὃ πράττει ἀλλ' οὐ ἔνε-
 κα· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τις διαφορά. εἰ γὰρ 20
 15 ἵνα μὴ λάβῃ ψηλαφῶν ἀποκτείνῃ, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη
 εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βία καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ
 μείζον κακὸν καὶ λυπηρότερον εἶναι ὃ πείσεται
 μὴ ποιήσας. οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενος καὶ ἢ³ βία
 πράξει ἢ οὐ φύσει ὅταν κακὸν ἀγαθοῦ ἔνεκα ἢ
 μείζονος κακοῦ ἀπολύσεως πράττῃ, καὶ ἄκων γε·
 20 οὐ γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτα. διὸ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα 21
 πολλοὶ ἀκούσιον τιθέασιν καὶ θυμοὺς ἐνίους καὶ
 τὰ φυσικά, ὅτι ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν· καὶ
 συγγνώμην ἔχομεν ὡς πεφυκότα βιάζεσθαι τὴν
 φύσιν. καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειε βία καὶ ἄκων
 25 καὶ ὅλως ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἢ ἵνα χαίρῃ. τὸ γὰρ ἐφ'

¹ μὴ πράξαι ἢ πράξαι Sp.² καὶ (vel δεῖ) Bz.: δεῖ.³ Bz.: μὴ.^a Or 'for in those of such acts which it rests with himself to do or not.'^b i.e. in blind-man's-buff, μίνδα or χαλκῆ μυῖα.

19 it is open to them not to do them but to endure
 the penalty threatened. Moreover, perhaps someone
 might say that in some cases these actions are done
 of necessity and in others not. For in cases where
 the presence or absence of such circumstances de-
 pends on the agent himself,^a even the actions that he
 does without wishing to do them he does willingly
 and not under compulsion ; but where in such cases
 the circumstances do not rest with himself, he acts
 under compulsion in a sense, though not indeed
 under compulsion absolutely, because he does not
 definitely choose the actual thing that he does but
 the object for which he does it ; since even in the
 20 objects of action there is a certain difference. For
 if someone were to kill a man to prevent his catching
 him by groping for him,^b it would be ridiculous for
 him to say that he had done it under compulsion
 and of necessity—there must be some greater and
 more painful evil that he will suffer if he does not
 do it. It is when a man does something evil for
 the sake of something good, or for deliverance from
 another evil, that he will be acting under necessity
 and by compulsion, or at all events not by nature ;
 and then he will really be acting unwillingly, for
 21 these actions do not rest with himself. On this
 account many reckon even love as involuntary, and
 some forms of anger, and natural impulses, because
 their power is even beyond nature ; and we pardon
 them as naturally capable of constraining nature.
 And it would be thought that a man is acting more
 under compulsion and involuntarily when his object
 is to avoid violent pain than when it is to avoid mild
 pain, and in general more when his object is the
 avoidance of pain than when it is to gain enjoyment.

1225 a

αὐτῷ, εἰς ὃ ἀνάγεται ὅλον, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἢ αὐτοῦ φύσις οἷα τε φέρειν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἷα τε μῆδ' ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκείνου φύσει ὀρέξεως ἢ λογισμοῦ, οὐκ ἐφ' αὐτῷ. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας καὶ προλέγοντας, 22
καίπερ διανοίας ἔργον ποιούντας, ὅμως οὐ φαμεν
30 ἐφ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι οὔτ' εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον οὔτε πράξαι
ἃ ἔπραξαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε 23
ἢ¹ διάνοιαι τινες καὶ πάθη οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσὶν
ἢ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας διανοίας καὶ
λογισμούς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Φιλόλαος ἔφη εἶναι τινὰς
λόγους κρείττους ἡμῶν.

“Ὡστ' εἰ τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον καὶ πρὸς τὸ
35 βία ἔδει σκέψασθαι, τοῦτο μὲν οὔτω διηγήσθω (οἱ
γὰρ μάλιστ' ἐμποδίζοντες τὸ ἐκούσιον . . .² ὡς βία
πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἐκόντες).

IX. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχει τέλος, καὶ οὔτε τῇ 1
ὀρέξει οὔτε τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ ἐκούσιον ὤρισταί,
1225 b λοιπὸν δὴ ὀρίσασθαι τὸ³ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. δοκεῖ 2
δὴ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ, καὶ τὸ
εἰδότα ἢ ὄν ἢ ὦ ἢ οὐ ἔνεκα (ἐνίστε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν
ὅτι πατήρ ἀλλ' οὐχ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα σώσῃ,
ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιάδες, ἥτοι ὡς τοδὶ⁴ μὲν πόμα ἀλλ'
5 ὡς φίλτρον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δ' ἦν κώνειον) τῷ
ἀγνοοῦντα⁵ καὶ ὄν καὶ ὦ καὶ ὃ δι' ἄγνοίαν, μὴ

¹ ἢ? Ric.: καί.² lacunam edd.³ τὸ e M.M. 1188 b 26 Sp.: τὰ.⁴ τοδὶ Fr.: ὅτι.⁵ Rieckher: ἀγνοοῦντι.^a Pythagorean philosopher contemporary with Socrates.^b Some words seem to have been lost here (ἀλλά suggests that they contained a negative).^c The daughters of Pelias, King of Iolchus, cut him up and boiled him, having been told by Medea (who wanted Jason to leave his throne) that this would restore his youth.

For what rests with himself—and it wholly turns on this—means what his nature is able to bear; what his nature is not able to bear and what is not a matter of his own natural appetite or calculation does not rest with himself. On this account also in the case of persons who are inspired and utter prophecies, although they perform an act of thought, nevertheless we do not say that saying what they said and doing what they did rested with themselves. Nor yet do we say that what men do because of desire rests with themselves; so that some thoughts and emotions, or the actions that are guided by such thoughts and calculations, do not rest with ourselves, but it is as Philolaus^a said—‘some arguments are too strong for us.’

Hence if it was necessary to consider the voluntary and involuntary with reference also to acting under compulsion, let this be our decision of the matter (for those who cause most hindrance . . . the voluntary . . .^b as acting under compulsion, but voluntarily).

1 IX. Now that this is concluded, and as the voluntary has been found not to be defined by appetite, nor yet by purposive choice, it therefore remains to define it as that which is in accordance with thought.

2 Now the voluntary seems to be the opposite of the involuntary; and acting with knowledge of either the person acted on or the instrument or the result (for sometimes the agent knows that it is his father but does not intend to kill him but to save him—as the Peliads^c did—or knows that what he is offering is a drink but offers it as a love-charm or wine, when really it is hemlock) seems to be the opposite of acting without knowing the person acted on, the instrument and the nature of the act, through

Definition of
Voluntary
and In-
voluntary.
An act done
in ignorance
due to
oneself is
involuntary.

1225 b

κατὰ συμβεβηκός. τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοϊαν καὶ ὁ καὶ ᾧ
καὶ ὄν ἀκούσιον. τὸ ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἐκούσιον. ὅσα 3
μὲν οὖν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὄν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ
ἀγνοῶν καὶ δι' αὐτόν, ἐκούσια ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι,
10 καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν· ὅσα δ' ἀγνοῶν καὶ
διὰ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἄκων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ 4
τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἔν μὲν τὸ ἔχειν, ἔν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι
τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὃ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ ἔστι μὲν
ὡς δικαίως ἂν¹ ἀγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ
δικαίως, οἶον εἰ δι' ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἐχρήτο. ὁμοίως
15 δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἂν, εἰ ὁ ῥάδιον ἢ
ἀναγκαῖον ἦν μὴ ἔχει² δι' ἀμέλειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν ἢ
λύπην. ταῦτ' οὖν προσδιοριστέον.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἐκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου δι-
ωρίσθω³ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

X. Περὶ δὲ προαιρέσεως μετὰ τοῦτο λέγωμεν, 1
διαπορήσαντες πρῶτον τῷ λόγῳ περὶ αὐτῆς.
20 διστάσειε γὰρ ἂν τις ἐν τῷ γένει πέφυκε καὶ ἐν
ποιῶ θεῖναι αὐτὴν χρή, καὶ πότερον οὐ ταῦτόν
τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ προαιρετὸν ἢ ταυτόν ἐστίν.
μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρά τινων καὶ ζητοῦντι 2
δόξειεν⁴ ἂν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον ἢ προαίρεσις, ἢτοι
δόξα ἢ ὄρεξις· ἀμφοτέρα γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολου-
25 θοῦντα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄρεξις, φανερόν. 3

¹ ἂν add. Ras.³ διηρήσθω? Rac.² εἴη μὴ ἔχοι? Ric.⁴ Gr.: δόξειε δ'.

^a Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'Let this be our decision.'

^b The term denotes not the deliberate choice of an object but the selection of means to attain an object: see § 7.

ignorance and not by accident. But to act through ignorance of the act, the means and the person acted on is involuntary action. Therefore the opposite is voluntary. It follows then that all the things that a man does not in ignorance, and through his own agency, when it is in his power not to do them, are voluntary acts, and it is in this that the voluntary consists ; and all the things that he does in ignorance, and through being in ignorance, he does involuntarily. But since to understand or know has two meanings, one being to have the knowledge and the other to use it, a man who has knowledge but is not using it would in one case be justly described as acting in ignorance but in another case unjustly—namely, if his non-employment of the knowledge were due to carelessness. And similarly one would be blamed for not having the knowledge, if it were something that was easy or necessary and his not having it is due to carelessness or pleasure or pain. These points therefore must be added to our definition.

Let this, then, be our mode of definition ^a about the voluntary and involuntary.

X. Next let us speak about purposive choice,^b PURPOSE. first raising various difficulties about it. For one might doubt to which class it naturally belongs and in what class it ought to be put, and whether the voluntary and the purposely chosen are different things or the same thing. And a view specially put forward from some quarters, which on inquiry may seem correct, is that purposive choice is one of two things, either opinion or appetite ; for both are seen to accompany it. Now it is evident that it is not appetite ; for in that case it

It is not appetite, since it is

1225 b

ἢ γὰρ βούλησις ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἢ θυμός· οὐθ-
 εἰς γὰρ ὀρέγεται μηθὲν πεπονθῶς τούτων. θυμὸς
 μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις ὑπάρχει,
 προαίρεσις δ' οὐ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει ἄμφω
 ταῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας προ-
 30 αἰροῦνται· καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες οὐ προ-
 αἰροῦνται ἀλλὰ καρτεροῦσιν. ἔτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ
 θυμὸς αἰεὶ μετὰ λύπης, προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ
 καὶ ἄνευ λύπης. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις καὶ 4
 προαίρεσις ταυτὸν· βούλονται μὲν γὰρ ἔνια καὶ
 τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἰδότες, οἷον βασιλεύειν τε πάντων
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προαιρεῖται δ' οὐθ-
 35 εἰς μὴ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὁ δυνα-
 τὸν μὲν, μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ δ' οἶεται πράξαι ἢ μὴ
 πράξαι. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν φανερόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη¹
 τὸ προαιρετὸν τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ τι εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ 5
 1226 a δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα, οὐδ' ἀπλῶς εἴ τις οἶεται τι
 τῶν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τι ἦν² τὸ προαιρετὸν, δοξάζομεν
 δὲ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οἷον τὴν
 διάμετρον ἀσύμμετρον³. ἔτι οὐκ ἔστι προαίρεσις
 5 ἀληθῆς ἢ ψευδῆς. οὐδὲ δὴ ἢ τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄν- 6
 των πρακτῶν δόξα ἢ τυγχάνομεν οἰόμενοι δεῖν τι
 πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν· κοινὸν δὲ περὶ δόξης
 τοῦτο καὶ βουλήσεως. οὐθεῖς γὰρ τέλος οὐθὲν 7
 προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. λέγω δ' οἷον

¹ P^b: ἀνάγκη μὲν M^b, ἀνάγκη ἦν Fr.² Bz.: εἶναι.³ Rac.: σύμμετρον.^a 1223 a 16-19.^b The mss. give 'commensurable,' but there is no point in specifying an untrue opinion. Cf. N.E. 1112 a 22 περὶ δὴ

would be either wish or desire or passion, since nobody not passion nor desire ; wants to get a thing without having experienced one of those feelings. Now even animals possess passion and desire, but they do not have purposive choice. And again, beings that possess both of these often make choices even without passion and desire ; and while they are experiencing these feelings do not make a choice but hold out. Again, desire and passion are always accompanied by pain, nor is it wish, nor opinion,

4 but we often make a choice even without pain. But moreover purposive choice is not the same as wish either ; for men wish for some things that they know to be impossible, for instance to be king of all mankind and to be immortal, but nobody purposively chooses a thing knowing it to be impossible, nor in general a thing that, though possible, he does not think in his own power to do or not to do. So that this much is clear—a thing purposively chosen must necessarily be something that rests with oneself.

5 And similarly it is manifest that purposive choice is not opinion either, nor something that one simply thinks ; for we saw ^a that a thing chosen is something in one's own power, but we have opinions as to many things that do not depend on us, for instance that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable ^b with

6 the side ; and again, choice is not true or false. Nor yet is purposive choice an opinion about practicable things within one's own power that makes us think that we ought to do or not to do something ; but this characteristic is common to opinion and to wish.

7 For no one purposively chooses any End, but the means to his End—I mean for instance no one

τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλευέται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου, ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι (where K^b has σύμμετροι).

1226 a

οὐθεις ὑγιαίνειν προαιρείται, ἀλλὰ περιπατεῖν ἢ
 10 καθῆσθαι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἔνεκεν, οὐδ' εὐδαιμονεῖν,
 ἀλλὰ χρηματίζεσθαι ἢ κινδυνεύειν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν
 ἔνεκα, καὶ ὅλως δηλοῖ αἰεὶ ὁ¹ προαιρούμενος τί τε
 καὶ τίνος ἔνεκα προαιρείται, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν τίνος²
 οὗ ἔνεκα προαιρείται ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ τί, ὃ προαιρείται
 ἔνεκα ἄλλου. βούλεται δέ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος, 8
 15 καὶ δοξάζει³ δεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ πράττειν.
 ὥστε φανερόν διὰ τούτων ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ δόξης καὶ
 βουλήσεως. βούλεσθαι μὲν γὰρ⁴ καὶ δοξάζειν⁵
 μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαίρεσις δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε βούλησις οὔτε δόξα 9
 οὐθ' ὑπόληψις ἀπλῶς ἢ προαίρεσις, δηλον· τί δὲ
 διαφέρει τούτων; καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον;
 ἅμα δὲ δηλον ἔσται καὶ τί ἐστι προαίρεσις. ἔστι 10
 20 δὴ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα
 ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι βουλευσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, περὶ
 ἐνίων δ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὰ μὲν
 ἐστί καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 αὐτῶν ἢ γένεσις ἐστίν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ φύσιν τὰ
 25 δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας γίνεται· περὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν
 οὐδ' ἐγχειρήσειε βουλευέσθαι μὴ ἀγνοῶν. περὶ 11
 ἐνίων⁶ δ' ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τὸ⁷ βουλευσασθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα δ'
 ἐστὶν ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ πράξαι ἢ μὴ πράξαι. διὸ
 οὐ βουλευόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς, οὐδὲ πῶς ἂν
 30 ὁ κύκλος τετραγωνισθείη· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐφ'

¹ ὁ add. Fr. ² τίνος <ἔνεκα>? Rac.³ Vic.: δοξάζειν.⁴ γὰρ add. Sp.⁵ Sp.: δόξα.⁶ sic Sol.: ὧν.⁷ lacunam hic edd.^a See p. 199, note c.

chooses to be healthy, but to take a walk or sit down for the sake of being healthy, no one chooses to be well off,^a but to go into business or to speculate for the sake of being well off; and generally, one who makes a choice always makes it clear both what his choice is and what its object is, 'object' meaning that for the sake of which he chooses something else and 'choice' meaning that which he chooses for the sake of something else. Whereas clearly it is specially an End that a man wishes, and the feeling that he ought to be healthy and prosperous is an opinion. So these considerations make it clear that purposive choice is different from both opinion and wish. Forming wishes and forming opinions apply specially to one's End; purposive choice is not of Ends.

9 It is clear, then, that purposive choice is not either wish or opinion or judgement simply; but in what does it differ from them? and how is it related to the voluntary? To answer these questions will make
 10 it clear what purposive choice is. Now of things that can both be and not be, some are such that it is possible to deliberate about them, but about others it is not possible. Some things can either be or not be but their coming into being does not rest with us, but in some cases is due to the operation of nature and in others to other causes; and about these things nobody would deliberate unless in ignorance
 11 of the facts. But with some things not only their existence or non-existence is possible, but also for human beings to deliberate about them; and these are all the things that it rests with us to do or not to do. Hence we do not deliberate about affairs in India, or about how to square the circle; for affairs in India do not rest with us, whereas the objects of

but it arises from deliberate opinion prompted by wish.

1226 a

ἡμῖν,¹ τὰ δὲ προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐστί, τὸ δ' ὅλως οὐ πρακτόν (ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα ἀπλῶς ἢ προαίρεσις ἐστίν). ἀλλ' 12
οὐδὲ τῶν² ἡμῖν πρακτῶν περὶ ἀπάντων. διὸ καὶ 13
ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, τί δὴ ποθ' οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ βου-
35 λεύονται περὶ ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιστήμην οἱ δὲ
γραμματικοὶ οὐ; αἴτιον δ' ὅτι διχῆ γινομένης
τῆς ἀμαρτίας (ἢ γὰρ λογιζόμενοι ἀμαρτάνομεν, ἢ
κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὸ δρῶντες) ἐν μὲν τῇ ἰα-
τρικῇ ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται ἀμαρτεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῇ

1226 b

γραμματικῇ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ πρᾶξιν, περὶ
ἧς ἂν σκοπῶσιν, εἰς ἄπειρον³ ἤξουσιν. ἐπειδὴ 14
οὖν οὔτε δόξα οὔτε βούλησις ἢ⁴ προαίρεσις ἐστίν
ὡς ἐκάτερον, οὐδ' ἄμφω (ἐξαίφνης γὰρ προαιρεῖται
μὲν οὐθεῖς, δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν⁵ πράττειν καὶ βούλονται),
5 ὡς⁶ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἄρα· ἄμφω γὰρ ὑπάρχει τῷ προ-
αιρουμένῳ ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκ τούτων σκε-
πτέον· δηλοῖ δὲ πως καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτό. ἢ γὰρ 15
προαίρεσις αἴρεσις μὲν ἐστίν, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δέ, ἀλλ'
έτέρου πρὸς έτέρου· τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἶόν τε ἄνευ
σκέψεως καὶ βουλῆς. διὸ ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς
ἐστὶν ἢ προαίρεσις.

10 Περὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦ τέλους οὐδεὶς βουλευέται, ἀλλὰ 16
τοῦτο κέλται πᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο τεινόν-
των, πότερον τόδε ἢ τόδε συντείνει, ἢ δεδογμένον
τοῦτο πῶς ἔσται. βουλευόμεθα δὲ πάντες⁷ τοῦτο

¹ Il. 30-33 traiecit Bz.: ἡμῖν, τὸ δ' ὅλως οὐ πρακτόν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πρακτῶν περὶ ἀπάντων· ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα ἀπλῶς ἢ προαίρεσις ἐστὶ· τὰ δὲ προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐστίν, διὸ κτλ.

² τῶν Rac.: περὶ τῶν ἐν.

³ εἰς ἀκριβῆ πείραν Bus.

⁵ δεῖν add. ? Sus.

⁴ ἢ Bz.: ἐστι.

⁶ [ὡς] aut <δῆλον> ὡς Sp.

choice and things practicable are among things resting with us, and squaring the circle is entirely impracticable (and thus it is clear that purposive choice 12 is not simply opinion either). But purposive choice does not deal with all the practicable things resting 13 with us either. Hence one might also raise the question, why is it exactly that, whereas doctors deliberate about things in their field of science, scholars do not? The reason is that since error occurs in two ways (for we err either in reasoning, or in perception when actually doing the thing), in medicine it is possible to err in both ways, but in grammar error only occurs in our perception and action, to investigate which would be an endless undertaking.

14 Since then purposive choice is not either opinion nor wish separately, nor yet both (for no one makes a deliberate choice suddenly, but men do suddenly think they ought to act and wish to act), therefore it arises as from both, for both of them are present 15 with a person choosing. But how purposive choice arises out of opinion and wish must be considered. And indeed in a manner the actual term 'choice' makes this clear. 'Choice' is 'taking,' but not taking simply—it is taking one thing in preference to another; but this cannot be done without consideration and deliberation; hence purposive choice arises out of deliberative opinion.

16 Now nobody deliberates about his End—this everybody has fixed; but men deliberate about the means leading to their End—does *this* contribute to it, or does *this*? or when a means has been decided on, how will that be procured? and this deliberation

⁷ M^b: πάντως P^b (sed cf. *N.E.* 1113 a 5 ἕκαστος).

ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν
 ἀρχήν. εἰ δὴ προαιρεῖται μὲν μηθεὶς μὴ παρα- 17
 15 σκευασάμενος μηδὲ βουλευσάμενος εἰ¹ χεῖρον ἢ
 βέλτιον, βουλεύεται² δ' ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῶν
 δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος,
 δῆλον ὅτι ἡ προαίρεσις μὲν ἐστὶν ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ'
 αὐτῷ βουλευτική. ἅπαντα³ γὰρ βουλευόμεθα ἃ
 καὶ προαιρούμεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε ἃ βουλευόμεθα
 πάντα προαιρούμεθα. λέγω δὲ βουλευτικὴν ἥς
 20 ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία βούλευσις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὀρέγεται διὰ
 τὸ βουλεύσασθαι. διὸ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις 18
 ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις οὔτε ἐν πάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ οὔτε
 πάντως⁴ ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ βουλεύ-
 σασθαι, οὐδ' ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί, ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι
 μὲν εἰ ποιητέον ἢ μὴ ποιητέον οὐθὲν κωλύει πολ-
 25 λοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὸ δὲ διὰ λογισμοῦ οὐκέτι. ἔστι γὰρ 19
 τὸ⁵ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας
 τινός· ἡ γὰρ οὐ ἔνεκα μία τῶν αἰτιῶν ἐστίν·
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τί αἰτία, οὐ δ' ἔνεκα ἐστὶν ἡ
 γίνεταί τι, τοῦτ' αἰτιὸν φάμεν εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ
 βαδίζειν ἢ κομιδῇ τῶν χρημάτων, εἰ τούτου ἔνεκα
 30 βαδίζει. διὸ οἷς μηθεὶς κεῖται σκοπός, οὐ
 βουλευτικοί. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄν ἢ 20
 πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν ἐάν τις πράττη ἢ ἀπρακτῇ
 δι' αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἐκὼν πράττει ἢ

¹ Fr.: ἦ.² v.l. βούλεται.³ Bz.: ἅπαντες.⁴ Bz.: παντὸς (παντὸς <λόγον> Sp.).⁵ τὸ add. Sus.

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as to means we all pursue until we have carried the
 starting-point in the process of producing the End
 17 back to ourselves. If, then, nobody chooses without
 first preparing, and deliberating as to the comparative
 merits of the alternatives, and a man deliberates as
 to those among the means to the End capable of
 existing or not existing that are within our power.
 it is clear that purposive choice is deliberative
 18 appetition of things within one's power. For we
 deliberate about everything that we choose, although
 of course we do not choose everything that we de-
 liberate about. I call appetition deliberative when
 its origin or cause is deliberation, and when a man
 19 desires because of having deliberated. Therefore
 the faculty of purposive choice is not present in
 the other animals, nor in man at every age nor in
 every condition, for no more is the act of deliberation,
 nor yet the concept of cause: it is quite possible
 that many men may possess the faculty of forming
 an opinion whether to do or not to do a thing without
 also having the power of forming this opinion by
 20 process of reasoning. For the deliberative faculty is
 the spirit's power of contemplating a kind of cause—
 for one sort of cause is the final cause, as although
 cause means anything because of which a thing
 comes about, it is the object of a thing's existence or
 production that we specially designate as its cause:
 for instance, if a man walks in order to fetch things,
 fetching things is the cause of his walking. Con-
 sequently people who have no fixed aim are not
 21 given to deliberation. Hence inasmuch as if a man
 of his own accord and not through ignorance does or
 refrains from doing something resting with himself
 either to do or not to do, he acts or refrains from

Definition of
Purposive
Choice.

Delibera-
tion.

1226 b

ἀπρακτεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πράττομεν οὐ
 βουλευσάμενοι οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν
 προαιρετὸν ἅπαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον
 35 μὴ¹ προαιρετόν, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πάντα
 ἐκούσια εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἐκούσια μὴ πάντα κατὰ
 προαίρεσιν. ἅμα δ' ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ ὅτι 21
 καλῶς διορίζονται οἱ τῶν ἀδικημάτων² τὰ μὲν
 ἀκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκούσια³ τὰ δ' ἐκ προνοίας
 1227 a νομοθετοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλ'
 ἄπτονται γέ πη τῆς ἀληθείας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν 22
 τούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει·
 ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις ὅτι οὔτε ἀπλῶς βούλησις οὔτε
 δόξα ἐστὶ, δηλόν, ἀλλὰ δόξα τε καὶ ὄρεξις ὅταν
 5 ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσάσθαι συμπερανθῶσιν.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλεύεται αἰεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκά
 τινος, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπὸς τις αἰεὶ τῷ βουλευομένῳ
 πρὸς ὃν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους
 οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ
 ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις 23
 10 ὑποθέσεις (εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν
 ἀρχῇ βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δι' ἀκρι-
 βείας)· περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων ἢ
 σκέψις καὶ μετὰ τέχνης καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης πᾶσιν
 ἐστίν, οἷον εἰ πολεμῶσιν ἢ μὴ πολεμῶσι τούτῳ⁴
 βουλευομένοις. ἐκ προτέρου δὲ μᾶλλον ἔσται τὸ 24
 15 ἡδονὴ ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ὃ τυγχάνει οὐ ἕνεκα.

¹ μὴ <ἅπαν>? Sus.² Bz.: παθημάτων.³ Rac.: τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια.⁴ τούτῳ Fr. (τουτῶ? Rac.): τοῦτο.^a Not in *E.E.*, but cf. *N.E.* 1135 a 16 ff.

acting voluntarily, but yet we do many such things without deliberation or previous thought, it necessarily follows that, although all that has been purposively chosen is voluntary, 'voluntary' is not the same as 'chosen,' and, although all things done by purposive choice are voluntary, not all things
 21 voluntary are done by purposive choice. And at the same time it is clear from these considerations that the classification of offences made by legislators as involuntary, voluntary and premeditated is a good one ; for even if it is not precisely accurate, yet at all events
 22 it approximates to the truth in a way. But we will speak about this in our examination of justice.^a As to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely identical with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion plus appetite when these follow as a conclusion from deliberation.

But since one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of some object, and a man deliberating always has some aim in view with reference to which he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates about his End, but this is a starting-point or assumption,
 23 tion, like the postulates in the theoretic sciences (we have spoken about this briefly at the beginning of this discourse, and in detail in *Analytics* ^b); whereas with all men deliberation whether technical or untechnical is about the means that lead to their End, e.g. when they deliberate about whether to go
 24 to war or not to go to war with a given person. And the question of means will depend rather on a prior question, that is, the question of object, for instance wealth or pleasure or something else of that kind which happens to be our object. For one who deliberates

Deliberation
 considers
 Means to
 Ends.

^b See 1214 b 6 ff., and *Anal. Post.* i., 72 a 20 and context.

1227 a

βουλεύεται γὰρ ὁ βουλευόμενος εἰ¹ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους
 ἔσκεπται ἢ² ὅτι ἐκείσε³ συντείνει ὅπως εἰς αὐτὸν
 ἀναγάγη⁴ ἢ ἢ⁵ αὐτὸς δύναται ἰέναι⁶ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.
 τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶ φύσει μὲν ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ περὶ 25
 οὗ κατὰ μέρος βουλεύονται (οἷον ἰατρὸς βουλεύσαιο
 20 ἂν εἰ δῶ⁷ φάρμακον, καὶ στρατηγὸς ποῦ στρατο-
 πεδεύσῃται) οἷς ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς ἄριστόν
 ἐστίν· παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ κατὰ⁸ διαστροφὴν οὐ τὸ 26
 ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι
 τῶν ὄντων τοῖς⁹ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπ' ἄλλῳ χρῆσασθαι
 ἢ πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν, οἷον ὄψει· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἰδεῖν
 25 οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ὄψις, οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἀκοή·
 ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ποιῆσαι καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἢ
 ἐπιστήμη. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως τῆς ὑγείας ἢ αὐτῇ
 ἐπιστήμη καὶ νόσου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν
 τῆς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ βούλησις 27
 φύσει μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ
 30 τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ βούλεται φύσει μὲν τὸ ἀγαθόν,
 παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ κατὰ¹⁰ διαστροφὴν καὶ τὸ
 κακόν.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἐκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ διαστροφὴ
 οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ.
 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ
 ἀπάτη οὐκ εἰς τὰ τυχόντα γίνεται, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ
 35 ἐναντία ὅσοις ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα τῶν
 ἐναντίων ἃ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐναντία ἐστίν.

¹ Mb ἢ.² ἢ add. Fr.³ Rac.: ἐκεῖ.⁴ Ric.: ἀγάγη.⁵ ἢ add. Rac.⁶ ἰέναι add. Rac.⁷ Sp.: δῶη.⁸ κατὰ add. Syl.: διὰ στροφὴν Iac., διαστροφὴ Fr.⁹ Ric.: τὰ.¹⁰ κατὰ add. Syl.

deliberates if he has considered, from the standpoint of the End, either what tends to enable him to bring the End to himself or how he can himself go to the End.^a And by nature the End is always a good and a thing about which men deliberate step by step (for example a doctor may deliberate whether he shall give a drug, and a general where he shall pitch his camp) when their End is the good that is the absolute best ; but in contravention of nature and by perversion not the good but the apparent good is the End. The reason is that there are some things that cannot be employed for something other than their natural objects, for instance sight—it is not possible to see a thing that is not visible, or to hear a thing that is not audible ; but a science does enable us to do a thing that is not the object of the science. For health and disease are not the objects of the same science in the same way : health is its object in accordance with nature, and disease in contravention of nature. And similarly, by nature good is the object of wish, but evil is also its object in contravention of nature ; by nature one wishes good, against nature and by perversion one even wishes evil.

Wish for
Ends

But moreover with everything its corruption and perversion are not in any chance direction, but leads to the contrary and intermediate states. For it is not possible to go outside these, since even error does not lead to any chance thing, but, in the case of things that have contraries, to the contraries, and to those contraries that are contrary according to

^a *i.e.* he works back in thought from his intended End to some means to its attainment that is already within his power.

1227 a

ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ τὴν ἀπάτην καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν 28
 ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία γίνεσθαι (ἐναντία
 δὲ τῷ μέσῳ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον).—αἴτιον δὲ
 τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὥστε τῇ
 40 ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδιον
 ἄμεινον, καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κακὸν καὶ τὸ λυπηρότερον

1227 b

χεῖρον. ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἡδονᾶς 29
 καὶ λύπας ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· περὶ μὲν γὰρ
 τὰ προαιρετὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις
 περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα,
 5 τοιαῦτα δὲ φύσει ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη.

Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ 30
 αὐτὴ τε μεσότης τίς ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ
 λύπας πᾶσα, ἡ δὲ κακία ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει
 καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τῇ ἀρετῇ, τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν
 ἠθικὴν ἕξιν προαιρετικὴν μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς
 10 ἐν ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς καθ' ὅσα ποιός τις λέγεται
 τὸ ἡθος ἢ χαίρων ἢ λυπούμενος (ὁ γὰρ φιλόγλυκος
 ἢ φιλόπικρος οὐ λέγεται ποιός τις τὸ ἡθος).

XI. Τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων λέγωμεν πότερον 1
 ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ
 τέλος ὀρθὸν οὕτως ὥστε οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι,
 15 ἢ, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισί, τὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο
 ἐγκράτεια, αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τὸν λόγον· ἔστι
 δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον. λεκτέον δ' ὕστερον 2

^a This division of contraries is unusual: elsewhere (*e.g.* *Met.* K, 1061 a 18) Aristotle merely states that contraries are the objects of the same science.

^b The connexion of pleasure and pain with virtue is here clearer than in *N.E.*, and forms part of the definition (Stocks).

28 their science.^a It therefore necessarily follows that both error and purposive choice take place from the middle point to the contraries (the contraries of the middle being the more and the less).—And the cause is pleasure and pain; for things are so constituted that the pleasant appears to the spirit good and the more pleasant better, the painful bad and the more painful worse. So from these things also it is clear that goodness and badness have to do with pleasures and pains; for they occur in connexion with the objects of purposive choice, and this has to do with good and bad and what appears to be good and bad, and pleasure and pain are by nature things of that kind.

perversed by pleasure and pain.

30 It therefore follows that since moral goodness is itself a middle state and is entirely concerned with pleasures and pains, and badness consists in excess and defect and is concerned with the same things as goodness, moral goodness or virtue is a state of purposively choosing the mean in relation to ourselves in all those pleasant and painful things in regard to which according as a person feels pleasure or pain he is described as having some particular moral quality^b (for a person is not said to have a particular moral character merely for being fond of sweets or savouries).

Definition of Moral Goodness or Virtue.

1 XI. These things having been settled, let us say whether goodness makes the purposive choice correct and the End right in the sense of making the agent choose for the sake of the proper End, or whether (as some hold) it makes the rational principle right. But what does this is self-control—for that saves the rational principle from being corrupted; and goodness and self-control are different. But we must

Virtue and vice being voluntary, moral judgement applies to purposive choice, which depends on character,

1227 b

περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν
 παρέχειν ἢ ἀρετῇ, τοῦτο αἴτιον· ἢ μὲν ἐγκράτεια
 τοιοῦτον, τῶν ἐπαινετῶν δ' ἢ ἐγκράτεια. λέγωμεν
 20 δὲ προαπορήσαντες. ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν
 ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν δια-
 μαρτάνειν· ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτηῆσθαι,
 τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκείνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν· καὶ
 μηδέτερον. πότερον δ' ἢ ἀρετῇ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν¹ 4
 ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν
 σκοπὸν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ
 25 λόγος, ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω.
 οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ μή,
 ἀλλ' εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μή, οὔτε ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ
 δεῖ εὖ ἔχειν ἢ μή, ἀλλ' εἰ παλαῖσαι ἢ μή. ὁμοίως 5
 δ' οὐδ' ἄλλη² οὐδεμία περὶ τοῦ τέλους. ὥσπερ
 γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἰ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω
 30 καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις·
 ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τονδι³ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι
 εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον
 δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν νοήσεως 6
 ἀρχὴ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἢ τῆς νοήσεως
 τελευτή. εἰ οὖν πάσης ὀρθότητος ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ
 35 ἀρετῇ αἰτία, εἰ μὴ ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν

¹ σκοπὸν <ὀρθόν>? Rac.² ἄλλη <τέχνη>? Rac.³ Sp.: τόδε.^a Or, altering the text, 'makes the aim right.'

speak about this later, since all who do hold that good-
 ness makes the rational principle right think so on
 the ground that that is the nature of self-control
 3 and self-control is a praiseworthy thing. Having
 raised this preliminary question let us continue. It
 is possible to have one's aim right but to be entirely
 wrong in one's means to the end aimed at; and it is
 possible for the aim to have been wrongly chosen
 but the means conducing to it to be right; and for
 4 neither to be right. But does goodness decide the
 aim ^a or the means to it? Well, our position is that
 it decides the aim, because this is not a matter of
 logical inference or rational principle, but in fact this
 must be assumed as a starting-point. For a doctor
 does not consider whether his patient ought to be
 healthy or not, but whether he ought to take walking
 exercise or not, and the gymnastic trainer does not
 consider whether his pupil ought to be in good
 condition or not, but whether he ought to go in for
 5 wrestling or not; and similarly no other science
 either deliberates about its End. For as in the
 theoretic sciences the assumptions are first principles,
 so in the productive sciences the End is a starting-
 point and assumption: since it is required that so-
 and-so is to be in good health, if that is to be secured
 it is necessary for such-and-such a thing to be pro-
 vided—just as in mathematics, if the angles of a
 triangle are together equal to two right angles,
 such-and-such a consequence necessarily follows.
 6 Therefore the End is the starting-point of the pro-
 cess of thought, but the conclusion of the process of
 thought is the starting-point of action. If, then, of
 all rightness either rational principle or goodness is
 the cause, if rational principle is not the cause of

and not to
 actions,
 which may
 be done
 under com-
 pulsion.

1227 b

ὀρθὸν εἶη τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.
τέλος δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα· ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἔνεκά τινος. οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετὴ τῷ¹ προαιρεῖσθαι². ἔστι μέντοι ἢ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου
40 ἔνεκα. τὸ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυ-

1228 a

νάμεως ὅσα ἔνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ³ ἀρετὴ αἰτία. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποιός τις, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἔνεκα πράττει ἀλλ' οὐ τί πράττει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἢ κακία τῶν ἐν-
5 ἀντίων ἔνεκα ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν. εἰ⁴ δὴ τις, ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄν πράττειν μὲν τὰ καλὰ ἀπρακτεῖν δὲ τὰ αἰσχροῦ, τοῦναντίον ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν τε κακίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὰ μοχθηρὰ πράττειν. διὰ ταῦτα
10 καὶ ψεκτὸν ἢ κακία καὶ ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐπαινετόν· τὰ γὰρ ἀκούσια αἰσχροῦ καὶ κακὰ οὐ ψέγεται⁵ οὐδὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαινεῖται,⁶ ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκούσια. ἔτι πάντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα (καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς), ὅτι⁷ πράττουσι μὲν φαῦλα
15 καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, προαιρεῖται δ' οὐδεῖς. ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι ἰδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅποια τις,

¹ Gr.: τὸ.³ ἢ Gr.: οὐ ἢ.⁵ P^b: ψεκτά Mb.² Ric.: προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα.⁴ προαίρεσιν <εἶναι>. εἰ? Rac.⁶ P^b: ἐπαινετά Mb.⁷ ἔτι Ald.

- the rightness of the End, then the End (though not the means to the End) will be right owing to goodness.
- 7 But the End is the object for which one acts ; for every purposive choice is a choice of something and for some object. The End is therefore the object for which the thing chosen is the mean, of which End goodness is the cause ^a by its act of choice—though the choice is not of the End but of the means
- 8 adopted for the sake of the End. Therefore though it belongs to another faculty to hit on the things that must be done for the sake of the End, goodness is the cause of the End aimed at by choice being right.
- 9 And owing to this it is by a man's purposive choice that we judge his character—that is, not by what he
- 10 does but what he does it for. Similarly also badness causes purposive choice to be made from the opposite motives. If therefore, when a man has it in his power to do what is honourable and refrain from doing what is base, he does the opposite, it is clear that this man is not virtuous. Hence it necessarily follows that both badness and goodness are voluntary ; for there is no necessity to do wicked things.
- 11 For this reason badness is a blameworthy thing and goodness praiseworthy ; for involuntary baseness and evil are not blamed nor involuntary good things praised, but voluntary ones are. Moreover we praise and blame all men with regard to their purpose rather than with regard to their actions (although activity is a more desirable thing than goodness), because men may do bad acts under compulsion,
- 12 but no one is compelled to choose to do them. Moreover because it is not easy to see the quality of

^a Virtue by choosing the right means to achieve the End causes the End to be realized.

ARISTOTLE

1228 a

διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν
 ὁποῖός τις· αἰρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἢ ἐνέργεια, 13
 ἐπαινετώτερον δ' ἢ προαίρεσις. ἔκ τε τῶν κειμένων
 οὖν συμβαίνει ταῦτα καὶ ἔτι ὁμολογείται τοῖς¹
 φαινομένοις.

¹ ὁμολογεῖ τοῖς Sp.

13 a man's purpose we are forced to judge his character from his actions; therefore activity is more desirable, but purpose more praiseworthy. And this not only follows from our assumptions but also is admitted by reason of observed facts.^a

^a Or, emending the text, 'agrees with observation.'

Γ

1228 a

Ι. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότητές τ' εἰσὶ ἐν ταῖς 1
ἀρεταῖς καὶ αὐταὶ προαιρετικαί, καὶ αἱ ἐναντία
25 κακίαι καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αὐταί, καθόλου εἴρηται·
καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ λαμβάνοντες λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς,
καὶ πρῶτον εἴπωμεν περὶ ἀνδρείας.

Σχεδὸν δὴ δοκεῖ πᾶσιν ὅ τ' ἀνδρείος εἶναι περὶ 2
φόβους καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία μία τῶν ἀρετῶν. διείλομεν
δ' ἐν τῇ διαγραφῇ πρότερον² θράσος καὶ φόβον³
30 ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ πως ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις.
δηλὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις ταύτας 3
λεγόμενοι ὁμοίως ἀντικείμενοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς,
οἷον ὁ δειλός (οὗτος γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι
μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ θαρρεῖν ἥττον ἢ δεῖ) καὶ ὁ θρασύς
(καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος
35 φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἥττον ἢ δεῖ θαρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ
δεῖ· διὸ καὶ παρωνυμιάζεται, ὁ γὰρ θρασύς παρὰ
τὸ θράσος λέγεται παρωνύμως). ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἡ 4
ἀνδρεία ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ φόβους καὶ
θάρρη, δεῖ δὲ μῆθ' οὕτως ὡς οἱ θρασεῖς (τὰ μὲν
γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι) μῆθ' οὕτως
1228 b ὡς οἱ δειλοί (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ταὐτὸ ποιοῦσι, πλὴν

¹ τ' εἰσὶ Rac.: εἰσὶ τε.² Bz.: πρότερον.³ Bz.: φόβος.

BOOK III

1 I. It has then been stated in general terms that there are middle states in the virtues and that these are purposive, and also that the opposite dispositions are vices and what these are. But let us take them separately and discuss them seriatim. And first let us speak about Courage. THE MORAL VIRTUES.

2 Now almost everybody holds that the brave man is concerned with fears, and that courage is one of the virtues. And in our schedule^a previously we distinguished daring and fear as contraries, for they are indeed in a manner opposed to one another. COURAGE, the mean between rashness and cowardice.

3 It is clear, therefore, that the persons named after these states of character will also be similarly opposed to each other—that is, the coward (for that is the term that denotes being more afraid than is proper and less daring than is proper) and the daring man (for that denotes the characteristic of being less afraid than is proper and more daring than is proper—and from this the name is derived, as the word ‘daring’ is cognate with the word ‘dare’). So that since courage is the best state of character in relation to feelings of fear and daring, and the proper character is neither that of the daring (for they fall short in one respect and exceed in another) nor that of the cowardly (for they also do the same, only not as regards the same things

1228 b

οὐ περὶ ταῦτ' ἄλλ' ἐξ ἐναντίας, τῷ μὲν γὰρ θαρρεῖν ἑλλείπουσι τῷ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλουσι), δῆλον ὡς ἡ μέση διάθεσις θρασύτητος καὶ δειλίας ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· αὕτη γὰρ βελτίστη.

Δοκεῖ δ' ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ἄφοβος εἶναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 5
 5 πολὺ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς φοβητικός, καὶ ὁ μὲν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα καὶ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ταχύ, ὁ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρέμα καὶ μόλις καὶ ὀλιγάκις καὶ μεγάλα· καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερὰ σφόδρα, ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἡρέμα. ποῖα οὖν ὑπομένει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; πρῶτον, 6
 10 πότερον τὰ αὐτῷ φοβερὰ ἢ τὰ ἑτέρῳ; εἰ μὲν δὴ τὰ ἑτέρῳ φοβερά, οὐθὲν σεμνὸν φαίη ἂν τις εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτῷ, εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ¹ φοβερά· τὰ δὲ φοβερά² φόβου ποιητικὰ ἐκάστῳ ᾧ φοβερά, οἷον εἰ μὲν σφόδρα φοβερά, εἴη ἂν ἰσχυρὸς ὁ φόβος, εἰ δ' ἡρέμα, ἀσθενής· ὥστε συμβαίνει
 15 τὸν ἀνδρεῖον μεγάλους φόβους καὶ πολλοὺς φοβεῖσθαι.³ ἐδόκει δὲ τοῦναντίον ἢ ἀνδρεία ἄφοβον παρασκευάζειν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἢ μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρέμα καὶ μόλις. ἀλλ' ἴσως 7 τὸ φοβερὸν λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὰγαθόν, διχῶς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τινὶ μὲν καὶ ἡδέα

¹ πολλὰ om. M^b.

² τὰ δὲ φοβερὰ add. Bz. (τὰ δὲ φοβερὰ τοιούτου add. ? Rac.).

³ v.l. ποιεῖσθαι vulg.

^a Or, emending the text, 'of corresponding fear.'

but inversely—they fall short in daring and exceed in being afraid), it is clear that the middle state of character between daring and cowardice is courage, for this is the best state.

5 And it seems that the brave man is in general fearless, and the coward liable to fear; and that the latter fears things when they are few in number and small in size as well as when numerous and great, and fears violently, and gets frightened quickly, whereas the former on the contrary either never feels fear at all or only slightly and reluctantly and seldom, and in regard to things of magnitude; and he endures things that are extremely formidable, whereas the other does not endure even those that
6 are slightly formidable. What sort of things, then, does the brave man endure? First, is it the things that are formidable to himself or formidable to somebody else? If the things formidable to somebody else, one would not indeed call it anything remarkable; but if it is those that are formidable to himself, what is formidable to him must be things of great magnitude and number. But formidable things are productive of fear^a in the particular person to whom they are formidable—that is, if they are very formidable, the fear they produce will be violent, if slightly formidable, it will be weak; so it follows that the brave man's fears are great and many. Yet on the contrary it appeared that courage makes a man fearless, and that fearlessness consists in fearing nothing, or else few things, and
7 those slightly and reluctantly. But perhaps 'formidable' is an ambiguous term, like 'pleasant' and 'good.' Some things are pleasant and good absolutely, whereas others are so to a particular

What terrors does the brave man endure?

1228 b

20 καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον
 φαῦλα καὶ οὐχ ἠδέα, ὅσα τοῖς πονηροῖς ὠφέλιμα,
 καὶ ὅσα ἠδέα τοῖς παιδίοις ἢ παιδία. ὁμοίως δὲ 8
 καὶ τὰ φοβερά τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἐστί, τὰ δὲ τινί· ἃ
 μὲν δὴ ὁ δειλὸς φοβεῖται ἢ δειλός, τὰ μὲν οὐδενί
 25 ἐστὶ φοβερά, τὰ δ' ἠρέμα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις
 φοβερά, καὶ ὅσα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ταῦθ'
 ἀπλῶς φοβερά λέγομεν. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος πρὸς ταῦτ'⁹
 ἔχει ἀφόβως, καὶ ὑπομένει τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερά,
 ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς φοβερά αὐτῷ ἐστὶ δ' ὡς οὐ, ἢ μὲν
 ἀνθρωπος φοβερά, ἢ δ' ἀνδρείος οὐ φοβερά ἀλλ'
 30 ἢ ἠρέμα, ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ἐστὶ μέντοι φοβερά ταῦτα·
 τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις φοβερά. διὸ καὶ ἐπαινέται ἢ 10
 ἔξις· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ὑγιεινὸς ἔχει. καὶ
 γὰρ οὗτοι οὐ τῷ ὑπὸ μηθενὸς ὁ μὲν πόνου τρίβεσθαι
 ὁ δ' ὑπὸ μηδεμιᾶς ὑπερβολῆς τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ
 τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθείς εἶναι ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἠρέμα
 35 ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ² οἱ πλείστοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν 11
 νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν
 κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσι τι, πλὴν θάττον τε
 καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, . . . ³ καὶ ἔτι ὑφ' ὧν οἱ
 πολλοὶ πάσχουσιν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθείς ἢ ὅλως ἢ
 ἠρέμα.

¹ Ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ οὐθέν ἐστὶ φοβερόν, 12

¹ ὁ add. Fr.

² οἱ πολλοὶ <ἢ> καὶ vel οἱ ἄλλοι καὶ? Ric.

³ <οἱ δ' ὑγιενοὶ καὶ ἰσχυροὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι ὑπὸ τῶν μεγίστων
 πάσχουσιν, ἀλλὰ βραδύτερόν τε καὶ ἥττον ἢ οἱ πολλοί> Bz. (aut
 secl. καὶ ἔτι . . . ἠρέμα ut prave e ll. 34 seq. repetita).

^a The words 'the healthy, strong and brave . . . mass of men' are a conjectural addition to the ms. text.

person but absolutely are not so, but on the contrary
 are bad and unpleasant—all the things that are
 beneficial for the base, and all those that are pleasant
 8 to children *qua* children. And similarly some things
 are formidable absolutely and others to a particular
 person : thus the things that the coward *qua* coward
 fears are some of them not formidable to anybody
 and others only slightly formidable, but things that
 are formidable to most men, and all that are formid-
 able to human nature, we pronounce to be for-
 9 midable absolutely. But the brave man is fearless
 in regard to them, and endures formidable things
 of this sort, which are formidable to him in one way
 but in another way are not—they are formidable to
 him *qua* human being, but *qua* brave not formid-
 able except slightly, or not at all. Yet such things
 really are formidable, for they are formidable to
 10 most men. Owing to this the brave man's state
 of character is praised, because it resembles that of
 the strong and the healthy. These have those char-
 acters not because no labour in the one case or
 extreme of temperature in the other can crush them,
 but because they are not affected at all, or only
 affected slightly, by the things that affect the many
 11 or the majority. Therefore whereas the sickly and
 weak and cowardly are affected also by the afflictions
 commonly felt, only more quickly and to a greater
 extent than the mass of men, the healthy, strong and
 brave, although affected by the very great afflictions,
 are affected by them more slowly and less than the
 mass of men,^a and moreover they are entirely un-
 affected or only slightly affected by things that affect
 the mass.

Analogy
 of health
 and
 strength.

12 But the question is raised whether to the brave

1228 b

οὐδ' ἂν φοβηθείη. ἢ οὐθὲν κωλύει τὸν εἰρημένον
 1229 a τρόπον; ἢ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολουθήσις¹ τῷ λόγῳ
 ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἰρεῖσθαι κελεύει. διὸ
 καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ τοῦτον² ὑπομένων αὐτά, οὗτος ἦτοι
 ἐξέστηκεν ἢ θρασύς· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν ἄφοβος
 5 καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἄλλος. ὁ μὲν οὖν δειλὸς καὶ ἂ μὴ
 δεῖ φοβεῖται, ὁ δὲ θρασὺς καὶ ἂ μὴ δεῖ θαρρεῖ· ὁ
 δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἄμφω ἂ δεῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ μέσος ἐστίν,
 ἂ γὰρ ἂν ὁ λόγος κελεύῃ, ταῦτα καὶ θαρρεῖ καὶ
 φοβεῖται· ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ
 φθαρτικὰ οὐ κελεύει ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὰ ἦ. ὁ 14
 10 μὲν οὖν θρασύς, καὶ εἰ μὴ κελεύει, ταῦτα θαρρεῖ,
 ὁ δὲ δειλὸς οὐδ' ἂν κελεύῃ· ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἄλλος³
 ἔαν κελεύῃ.

Ἔστι δ' εἶδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ἑαυτὰ
 ὁμοιότητα· τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ
 τὰ αὐτά. μία μὲν πολιτικὴ· αὕτη δ' ἐστίν ἢ δι'
 αἰδῶ οὔσα. δευτέρα ἢ στρατιωτικὴ· αὕτη δὲ δι'
 15 ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης
 ἔφη, τὰ δεινὰ, ἀλλὰ⁴ τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν.
 τρίτη δ' ἢ δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν, δι' ἣν τὰ 16
 παιδία καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι οἱ μὲν ὑπομένουσι τὰ
 φερόμενα⁵ οἱ δὲ λαμβάνουσι τοὺς ὄφεις. ἄλλη δ'
 ἢ κατ' ἐλπίδα, καθ' ἣν οἱ τε κατευτυχηκότες
 20 πολλάκις ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ οἱ
 μεθύοντες· εὐέλπιδας γὰρ ποιεῖ ὁ οἶνος. ἄλλη δὲ 17

¹ ἀκολουθητικὴ Bus.² v.l. τοῦτο: τούτων Cas.³ Rac.: ἄλλος.⁴ Syl. (ἀλλὰ τὸ lac.): ἀλλ' ὅτι.⁵ ἐπιφερόμενα? (cf. b 27) Rac.^a Plato, *Protagoras* 360 d.

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man nothing is formidable, and whether he would be insensible to fear. Or is it not possible that he may feel fear in the way described? For courage is following reason, and reason bids us choose what is fine. Hence he who endures formidable things not on account of reason is either out of his mind or daring, 13 but only he who does so from motives of honour is fearless and brave. The coward, therefore, fears even things that he ought not to fear, and the daring man is bold even about things about which he ought not to be bold, but the brave man alone does both as he ought, and is intermediate in this respect, for he feels both confidence and fear about whatever things reason bids; but reason does not bid him endure things that are extremely painful and 14 destructive, unless they are fine. The daring man, therefore, faces such things with confidence even if reason does not bid him face them, and the coward does not face them even if it does, but only the brave man faces them if reason bids.

15 There are five kinds of courage so called by analogy, because brave men of these kinds endure the same things as the really courageous but not for the same reasons. One is civic courage; this is courage due to a sense of shame. Second is military courage; this is due to experience and to knowledge, not of what is formidable, as Socrates said,^a but of ways 16 of encountering what is formidable. Third is the courage due to inexperience and ignorance, that makes children and madmen face things rushing on them, or grasp snakes. Another is the courage caused by hope, which often makes those who have had a stroke of luck endure dangers, and those who are intoxicated—for wine makes men sanguine.

The brave man fears when reasonable.

Five unreal forms of Courage.

ARISTOTLE

1229 a

διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον, οἷον δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θυμόν.
 ἂν τε γὰρ ἐρᾶ, θρασὺς μᾶλλον ἢ δειλός, καὶ
 ὑπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Μετα-
 ποντίῳ τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείνας καὶ ὁ ἐν Κρήτῃ
 25 μυθολογούμενος· καὶ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ θυμόν ὡς-
 αὐτως· ἐκστατικὸν γὰρ ὁ θυμός. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι
 σύες¹ ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ
 ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι,
 ὥσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς. ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ
 τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἀήττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ
 παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται. διὰ νόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ
 30 ἀνδρεία. κατ' ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων, ἀλλὰ
 πρὸς τὰς παρακελεύσεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις χρή-
 σιμα ταῦτα πάντα.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς εἰρήκαμεν,
 βέλτιον δὲ διορίσασθαι μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν
 φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου, τοιαῦτα δ'
 35 ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς·
 τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλην τινα προσδεχομένοις λύπην ἑτέρα
 μὲν ἂν τις ἴσως λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἕτερον,
 φόβος δ' οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ τις προορῶτο ὅτι
 λυπήσεται λύπην ἣν οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται, ἢ
 τοιαύτην οἷαν οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυρόμενοι.
 40 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἔσεσθαι
 λύπαις φόβος γίνεται ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ
 1229 b ζῆν. διὸ καὶ σφόδρα τινὲς ὄντες μαλακοὶ περὶ
 ἔνια ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι, καὶ ἔνιοι σκληροὶ καὶ² καρτερικοὶ
 καὶ δειλοί. καὶ δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἴδιον τῆς

¹ P^b: M^b θῆρες.² καὶ secl. Vic.

- 17 Another is due to some irrational emotion, for example love or passion. For if a man is in love he is more daring than cowardly, and endures many dangers, like the man ^a who murdered the tyrant at Metapontium and the person in Crete in the story ^a; and similarly if a man is under the influence of anger and passion, for passion is a thing that makes him beside himself. Hence wild boars are thought to be brave, though they are not really, for they are so when they are beside themselves, but otherwise
- 18 they are variable, like daring men. But nevertheless the courage of passion is in the highest degree natural; passion is a thing that does not know defeat, owing to which the young are the best fighters.
- 19 Civic courage is due to law. But none of these is truly courage, though they are all useful for encouragement in dangers.

- 20 Up to this point we have spoken about things formidable in general terms, but it will be better to define them more precisely. As a general term 'formidable' denotes what causes fear, and that is a property of things that appear capable of causing pain of a destructive kind: for persons expecting some other pain might perhaps experience a different sort of pain and a different feeling, but will not have fear—for example if a man foresaw that he was going to feel the pain felt by the jealous, or the sort of pain felt by the envious or by those who are ashamed.
- 21 But fear only occurs in the case of pains that seem likely to be of the kind whose nature it is to destroy life. Hence some people who are even very soft about certain things are brave, and some who are
- 22 hard and enduring are also cowardly. Moreover it is thought to be almost a special property of courage

Only extreme terrors are the sphere of Courage.

1229 b

ἀνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν τούτου
 5 λύπην ἔχειν πῶς· εἰ γὰρ τις εἶη τοιοῦτος οἶος πρὸς
 ἀλέας καὶ ψύχῃ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λύπας ὑπομενε-
 τικός¹ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀκινδύνους οὔσας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν
 θάνατον καὶ μαλακὸς καὶ περίφοβος, μὴ δι' ἄλλο
 τι πάθος ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὴν τὴν φθοράν, ἄλλος δὲ
 πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνας μαλακός, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον
 10 ἀπαθής, ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξειε δειλός, οὗτος
 δ' ἀνδρείος. καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις 2
 λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν ὅταν πλησίον ἢ τὸ
 τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς ποιητικόν, φαίνεται δὲ
 κίνδυνος ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται.²

Τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ περὶ ὅσα φαμὲν εἶναι τὸν
 ἀνδρείον εἶρηται δὴ ὅτι τὰ φαινόμενα ποιητικὰ
 15 λύπης τῆς φθαρτικῆς, ταῦτα μέντοι πλησίον τε
 φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρω, καὶ τοσαῦτα τῷ μεγέθει
 ὄντα ἢ φαινόμενα ὥστ' εἶναι σύμμετρα πρὸς
 ἀνθρώπων· ἕνια γὰρ ἀνάγκη παντὶ φαίνεσθαι 2
 ἀνθρώπῳ φοβερὰ καὶ διαταράττειν, οὐθὲν γὰρ
 κωλύει, ὥσπερ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 20 δυνάμεων ἐνίας ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τοῦ
 ἀνθρώπινου σώματος ἕξεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ
 τὴν ψυχὴν παθημάτων.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν³ δειλοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς διαψεύδονται διὰ
 τὰς ἕξεις, τῷ μὲν γὰρ δειλῷ τά τε μὴ φοβερὰ δοκεῖ
 φοβερὰ εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἡρέμα σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ θρασεῖ
 25 τοῦναντίον τά τε φοβερὰ θαρραλέα καὶ τὰ σφόδρα
 ἡρέμα· τῷ δ' ἀνδρείῳ τὰληθῆ μάλιστα. διόπερ οὗτ'²
 εἴ τις ὑπομένει⁴ τὰ φοβερὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀνδρείος,

¹ ὑπομενετικός <εἶναι> ? Ric.² Syl.: φαίνεται.³ οὖν add. Bz.⁴ ὑπομένει P^b: -νοι M^b, Syl.

to be of a certain disposition in regard to death and the pain of death ; for if a man were such as to be capable of rational endurance in respect of heat and cold and pains of that sort that are not dangerous, but at the same time soft and excessively timid about death, not because of any other feeling but just because it brings destruction, while another man was soft in regard to those pains but impassive as regards death, the former would be thought a coward and
 23 the latter brave. For we speak of danger only in the case of such formidable things as bring near to us what causes destruction of that sort, and when this appears near it appears to be danger.

The formidable things, therefore, in relation to which we speak of a man as brave are, we have said, those that appear likely to cause pain of the destructive kind—provided that these appear close at hand and not far off, and are or appear to be of
 24 a magnitude proportionate to a human being ; for some things must necessarily appear fearful to every human being and throw everybody into alarm, since it is quite possible that, just as heat and cold and some of the other forces are above us and above the conditions of the human body, so also are some mental sufferings.

Therefore whereas the cowardly and the daring
 are mistaken owing to their characters, since the coward thinks things not formidable formidable and things slightly formidable extremely formidable, and the daring man on the contrary thinks formidable things perfectly safe and extremely formidable things only slightly formidable, to the brave man on the other hand things seem exactly what they are.

The
 opposed
 extremes.

25 Hence a man is not brave if he endures formidable

1229 b

οἶον εἴ τις τοὺς κερανοὺς ὑπομένοι¹ φερομένους²
 διὰ μανίαν, οὐτ' εἰ γινώσκων ὅσος ὁ κίνδυνος,
 διὰ θυμόν, οἶον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὄπλα
 30 ἀπαντῶσι λαβόντες· καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρική ἀνδρεία
 μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας ἡδονὰς
 ὑπομένουσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά,
 μετ' ἐλπίδος γάρ ἐστι τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐτ'
 εἰ διὰ ταύτην οὐτ' εἰ δι' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει
 τις τὸν θάνατον, ἢ φυγὴν³ μειζόνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς
 35 δικαίως ἂν⁴ ἀνδρείος λέγοιτο τούτων. εἰ γὰρ ἦν
 ἡδὺ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν, πολλάκις ἂν δι' ἀκρασίαν
 ἀπέθνησκον οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν αὐτοῦ
 μὲν τοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐκ ὄντος ἡδέος, τῶν
 ποιητικῶν δ' αὐτοῦ, πολλοὶ δι' ἀκρασίαν περι-
 πίπτουσιν εἰδότες, ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν⁴ ἀνδρείος εἶναι
 δόξειεν, εἰ καὶ πάνυ ἐτοιμῶς⁵ ἀποθνήσκειν.⁶ οὐτ'
 40 εἰ φεύγοντες τὸ πονεῖν, ὅπερ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὐδὲ
 τῶν τοιούτων οὐθεὶς ἀνδρείος, καθάπερ καὶ
 1230 a Ἀγάθων φησὶ

φαῦλοι βροτῶν γὰρ τοῦ πονεῖν ἡσσώμενοι
 θανεῖν ἐρώσιν.

ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Χείρωνα μυθολογοῦσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ
 διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔλκουσ ὀδύνην εὐξασθαι ἀποθανεῖν
 ἀθάνατον ὄντα. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὅσοι
 5 δι' ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅνπερ τρό-

¹ ὑπομένοι Syl.: ὑπομένει.

² ἐπιφερομένους? (cf. a 17) Rac.

³ <διὰ> φυγὴν? Rac.

⁴ ἂν bis add. Sp.

⁵ v.l. ἐτοιμός.

⁶ ἀποθνήσκει Vic.: -κοι? Rac.

^a This appears to be loosely quoted from a verse passage:

things through ignorance (for instance, if owing to madness he were to endure a flight of thunderbolts), nor if he does so owing to passion when knowing the greatness of the danger, as the Celts 'take arms and march against the waves' ^a; and in general, the courage of barbarians has an element of passion.

The motives
of true
Courage.

26 And some men endure terrors for the sake of other pleasures also—for even passion contains pleasure of a sort, since it is combined with hope of revenge. But nevertheless neither if a man endures death for the sake of this pleasure nor for another, nor for the sake of avoiding greater pains, would any of these
27 persons justly be termed brave. For if dying were pleasant, profligates would be dying constantly, owing to lack of self-control, just as even as it is, when, although death itself is not pleasant, things that cause it are, many men through lack of self-control knowingly encounter it; none of whom would be thought brave, even though he were thought to die quite readily. Nor yet are any of those brave who, as many men do, commit suicide to escape from trouble, as Agathon ^b says :

-The base among mankind, by toil o'ercome,
Conceive a love of death.

As also Cheiron, ^c in the legendary story of the poets, because of the pain from his wound prayed that
28 though immortal he might die. And in like manner to these, all who face dangers because of experience

cf. N.E. iii. 7. 7. An echo of the story survives in Shakespeare's metaphor, 'to take arms against a sea of troubles.'

^b Athenian tragic poet, friend of Plato.

^c The Centaur sage and physician, accidentally wounded by a poisoned arrow of Heracles, transferred his immortality to Prometheus.

1230 a

πον σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦναντίον ἔχει ἢ ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην οἰόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. οὔτε γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ φοβερὰ θαρροῦσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰστούς ἀναβαίνειν ἐπιστάμενοι, 10 ἀλλ' ὅτι ἴσασιν τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν· οὔτε δι' ὃ θαραλεώτερον ἀγωνίζονται, τοῦτο ἀνδρεία, καὶ γὰρ 2 ἂν ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος κατὰ Θεόγνιν ἀνδρεία εἶεν·

πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος.

φανερῶς δ'¹ ἐνιοι δειλοὶ ὄντες ὅμως ὑπομένουσι δι' ἐμπειρίαν, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι οὐκ οἴονται κίνδυνον 15 εἶναι, ἴσασιν γὰρ τὰς βοηθείας. σημεῖον δέ· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οἴωνται βοήθειαν ἀλλ' ἤδη πλησίον ἢ τὸ δεινόν, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ἀλλὰ πάντων τῶν 3 τοιούτων αἰτίων² οἱ διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ὑπομένοντες μάλιστα φανεῖεν ἂν³ ἀνδρείοι, καθάπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἑκτορά φησιν ὑπομεῖναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα·

20

Ἑκτορα δ' αἰδῶς εἶλε·

καὶ⁴

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει.

καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὕτη. ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς 3 οὔτε αὕτη οὔτ' ἐκείνων οὐδεμία, ἀλλ' ὁμοία μὲν, ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἃ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμόσε τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται. οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδοξήσει δεῖ

¹ δ' add. Rieckher.

³ ἂν add. Sus.

² [αἰτίων]? Ric.: ἀνδρείων Sp.

⁴ καὶ add. Fr.

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. I. 28-31

are not brave ; this is how perhaps most of the military class face dangers. For the fact is the exact opposite of the view of Socrates, who thought that bravery was knowledge : sailors who know how to go aloft are not daring through knowing what things are formidable, but because they know how to protect themselves against the dangers ; also courage is not merely what makes men more daring fighters, 29 for in that case strength and wealth would be courage—as Theognis puts it :

For every man by poverty subdued.^a

But manifestly some men do face emergencies in spite of being cowards, owing to experience, and they do so because they do not think that there is any danger, as they know how to protect themselves. A proof of this is that when they think that they have no protection and that the cause of alarm is now 30 close at hand, they turn tail. But among all such causes, it is when shame makes men face what is alarming that they would appear to be bravest, as Homer says Hector faced the danger of encountering Achilles :

And shame on Hector seized——^b

and

Polydamas will be the first to taunt me.^c

31 Civic courage is this kind. But true courage is neither this nor any of the others, though it resembles them, as does the courage of wild animals, which are led by passion to rush to meet the blow. For it is not from fear that he will incur disgrace that a

^a Theognis 177.

^b Not in our Homer.

^c *Iliad* xxii. 100.

1230 a

μένειν φοβούμενον,¹ οὔτε δι' ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ
 25 μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν
 φυλακτικὰς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰήσεται οὕτω γε φοβερὸν
 εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσά γ'² ἀρετὴ προαιρε- 3
 τικὴ (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον,
 ὅτι ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἰρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό
 ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα τὸ καλόν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ
 30 ἀνδρεία ἀρετὴ τις οὔσα ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ
 φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς
 γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλ'
 ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεὶ, ἂν γε μὴ καλὸν ἦ ἀλλὰ μανικόν,
 οὐχ ὑπομενεῖ³. αἰσχροὺν γάρ.

Περὶ ποῖα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης καὶ 35
 τίνων καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τίνα δύναμιν
 ἔχει, σχεδὸν εἴρηται κατὰ τὴν παρούσαν ἔφοδον
 ἱκανῶς.

II. Περὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκολασίας μετὰ 1
 ταῦτα διελέσθαι πειρατέον. λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος
 πολλαχῶς. ὁ τε γὰρ μὴ κεκολασμένος πως⁴ μὴδ'
 1230 ἰατρεύμενος,⁵ ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ τετμημένος·
 καὶ τούτων ὁ μὲν δυνατὸς ὁ δ' ἀδύνατος· ἄτμητον
 γὰρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν
 μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ
 τὸ ἀκόλαστον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι 2
 5 κόλασιν, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ

¹ Cas.: φοβουμένων.³ Ric.: ὑπομένει.⁵ Sp.: ἰατρευόμενος.² γ' add. Mb.⁴ πω Vict.

man ought to stand his ground, nor from motives of anger, nor because he does not think that he will be killed or because he has forces to protect him, for in that case he will not think that there is really any-
 32 thing to be afraid of. But, since indeed all goodness involves purposive choice (it has been said before what we mean by this—goodness makes a man choose everything for the sake of some object, and that object is what is fine), it is clear that courage being a form of goodness will make a man face formidable things for some object, so that he does not do it through ignorance (for it rather makes him judge correctly), nor yet for pleasure, but because it is fine, since in a case where it is not fine but insane he will not face them, for then it would be base to do so.

33 We have now given an account that is fairly adequate for our present procedure of the kind of things in relation to which Courage is a middle state, and between what vices and for what reason it is this, and what is the power that formidable things exercise.

1 II. We must next attempt to decide about Tem-
 perance and Profligacy. The term 'profligate' (unchaste) has a variety of meanings. It means the man who has not been (as it were) 'chastized' or cured, just as 'undivided' means one that has not been divided; and these terms include both one capable of the process and one not capable of it: 'undivided' means both that which cannot be divided and that which though it can be has not been; and similarly with 'unchaste'—it denotes both that
 2 which is by nature incapable of chastening and that which, though capable, has not actually been chast-

TEMPER-
 ANCE.
 Profligacy,
 its meaning.

1230 b

περὶ ἀμαρτίας περὶ ἃς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων,
 ὡσπερ οἱ παῖδες· κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι
 λέγονται τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον οἱ
 3 δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κολάσεως.
 πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν
 10 περὶ ἡδονάς τινας καὶ λύπας εἰσὶ, φανερόν, καὶ
 ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτας διακεῖσθαι πῶς καὶ ἀλλήλων
 διαφέρουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότε-
 ρον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν.
 τοὺς δὲ¹ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας δι' ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς
 4 ταύτας τὰς² ἡδονὰς οἱ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθήτους,
 15 οἱ δ' ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιούτοις προσαγορεύουσιν³.
 ἔστι δ' οὐ πάνυ γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ' ἐπιπόλαιον⁵
 διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον ἀμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον καὶ
 πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδέων ἦτ-
 ταν καὶ αἴσθησιν. μάλιστα δ' εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι οἶους
 οἱ κωμωδοδιδάσκαλοι παράγουσιν ἀγροίκους, οἱ
 20 οὐδὲ⁴ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζουσι τοῖς
 ἡδέσιν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ σώφρων ἔστι περὶ ἡδονάς, ἀνάγκη
 καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ λα-
 βεῖν περὶ τίνων. οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ
 ἅπαντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων σώφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ
 τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περὶ τε τὸ
 25 γευστὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπτόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ

¹ Sus.: γὰρ.² ταύτας τὰς Sp.: τὰς αὐτάς.³ προσαγορεύουσιν <ὅλον . . . > Sus. (cf. 1231 b 1).⁴ οὐδ' ε<ι> vel οὐδ' ἐ<ς>? Rac.

^a ἀκόλαστος (lit. 'incorrigible') often means no more than 'naughty' (Solomon).

ened in respect of the errors as regards which the temperate man acts rightly, as is the case with children; for of them it is in this sense that the term 'unchaste'^a is used, whereas another use of it again refers to persons hard to cure or entirely incurable by chastisement. But though 'profligacy' has more than one sense, it is clear that the profligate are concerned with certain pleasures and pains and that they differ from one another and from the other vicious characters in being disposed in a certain manner towards these; and we described previously the way in which we apply the term 'profligacy' by analogy.^b Persons on the other hand who owing to insensitiveness are uninfluenced by these pleasures are called by some people 'insensitive' and by others are designated by other names of the same sort; but the state is not a very familiar one nor of common occurrence, because all men err more in the other direction, and susceptibility and sensitiveness to pleasures of this sort are natural to everybody. It specially attaches to persons like the boors who are a stock character in comedy—people who steer clear of pleasures even in moderate and necessary indulgences.

Its opposite, Insensitiveness, rare.

And since the temperate character is shown in connexion with pleasures, it follows that it is also related to certain desires. We must, therefore, ascertain what these are. For the temperate man is not temperate about all pleasures nor about everything pleasant, but apparently about the objects of two of the senses, taste and touch, and in reality about

Only some pleasures the sphere of Temperance.

^b This seems to refer to words which must have been lost at 1221 a 20 (Solomon).

1230 b

ἀπτόν· περιὶ γὰρ τὴν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονὴν τῶν 7
 καλῶν (ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων) ἢ λύπην τῶν
 αἰσχροῶν, καὶ περιὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τῶν εὐ-
 αρμόστων ἢ ἀναρμόστων, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς δι-
 ὀσφρήσεως, τὰς τε ἀπὸ εὐωδίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ δυσ-
 30 ωδίας, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ σῶφρων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος
 οὐδεὶς λέγεται τῷ πάσχειν (ὑπὸ τούτων)¹ ἢ μὴ
 πάσχειν· εἰ γοῦν τις ἢ καλὸν ἀνδριάντα θεώμενος 8
 ἢ ἵππον ἢ ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἀκροώμενος ἄδοντος, μὴ
 βούλοιο μῆτε ἐσθίειν μῆτε πίνειν μῆτε ἀφροδισιά-
 ζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καλὰ θεωρεῖν τῶν δ' ἄδόντων
 35 ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ὥσπερ
 οὐδ' οἱ κηλούμενοι παρὰ ταῖς Σειρήσιν. ἀλλὰ 9
 περιὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα περιὶ ἅπερ καὶ
 τᾶλλα θηρία μόνα τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα καὶ
 χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενα, περιὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ
 ἀπτά, περιὶ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων² ἡδέα 10
 1231 a σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνεται ἀναισθητῶς δια-
 κείμενα, οἷον περιὶ εὐαρμοστίαν ἢ κάλλος· οὐθὲν
 γὰρ ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου φαίνεται πάσχοντα αὐτῇ
 τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἢ τῇ ἀκροάσει τῶν εὐαρ-
 μόστων, εἰ μὴ τί που συμβέβηκε τερατῶδες. ἀλλ'
 5 οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ εὐώδη ἢ δυσώδη· καίτοι τὰς γε
 αἰσθήσεις ὀξυτέρας ἔχουσι πάσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν 11
 ὀσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
 εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς· λέγω δὲ μὴ³
 καθ' αὐτὰς αἰς ἢ⁴ ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἢ μεμνημέ-

¹ Fr.³ μὴ add. Fr.² I^b: αἰσθητῶν M^b.⁴ Fr.: μὴ.

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. II. 7-11

7 the objects of touch. For the temperate man is not concerned with the pleasure of beautiful things (apart from sexual desire) or pain caused by ugly things, the medium of which is sight, nor with the pleasure of harmonious sounds or pain of discords conveyed through the medium of hearing, nor yet with the pleasures and pains of smell, derived from good and bad scents ; for neither is anyone termed profligate because of being sensitive or not sensitive
8 to sensations of that sort—for example, a man would not be considered profligate if when looking at a beautiful statue or horse or person, or listening to someone singing, he did not wish for food or drink or sexual indulgence but only wished to look at the beautiful objects or listen to the music,—any more than the persons held spell-bound in the abode of the
9 Sirens. Temperance and profligacy have to do with those two sorts of sensory objects in relation to which alone the lower animals also happen to be sensitive and to feel pleasure and pain—the objects of taste
10 and of touch, whereas about virtually all the pleasures of the other senses alike animals are clearly so constituted as to be insensitive—*e.g.* harmonious sound, or beauty ; for clearly they are not affected in any degree worth speaking of by the mere sight of beautiful objects or by listening to musical sounds, except possibly in the case of some miraculous occurrences. Nor yet are they sensitive to good or bad smells, although it is true that all their senses are
11 keener than man's ; but even the smells they enjoy are those that have agreeable associations, and are not intrinsically agreeable. By smells not intrinsically agreeable I mean those that we enjoy because of either anticipation or recollection, for example the

1231 a

νοι, οἷον ὄψων καὶ ποτῶν, δι' ἑτέραν γὰρ ἡδονὴν
 10 ταύταις χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν· καθ'
 αὐτὰς δὲ οἶαι αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶν (διὸ ἐμμελῶς
 ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰ¹ μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν, τὰ¹ δὲ ἡδύ).
 ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν 12
 ἡδονὴν ἐπτόχεται τὰ θηρία, οὐδ' ὄσων τῷ ἄκρω
 τῆς γλώττης ἢ αἰσθησις, ἀλλ' ὄσων τῷ φάρυγγι,
 15 καὶ ἔοικεν ἀφῆ μᾶλλον ἢ γεύσει τὸ πάθος· διὸ οἱ
 ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὐχονται τὴν γλώτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν
 ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ
 Ἐρύξιδος.² ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἀπτόμενα ὡς ἀπλῶς 13
 εἰπεῖν θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
 ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐστίν· οἰνοφλυγία
 20 γὰρ καὶ γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεῖα καὶ ὀψοφαγία³
 καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστὶν
 αἰσθήσεις, εἰς ἅπερ μόρια ἢ ἀκολασία διαιρεῖται.
 περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ὄψεως ἢ ἀκοῆς ἢ ὀσφρήσεως 14
 ἡδονὰς οὐθεὶς λέγεται ἀκόλαστος εἶναι ὑπερβάλλη,
 ἀλλ' ἄνευ ὀνειδῶν τὰς ἀμαρτίας ψέγομεν ταύτας,
 25 καὶ ὅλως περὶ ὅσα μὴ λέγονται ἐγκρατεῖς· οἱ δ'
 ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι οὐδὲ σώφρονες.

Ἄναίσθητος μὲν οὖν, ἢ ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, ὁ 15
 οὕτως ἔχων ὥστε καὶ ἐλλείπειν ὄσων ἀνάγκη
 κοινωνεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πάντας καὶ χαίρειν· ὁ
 δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἀκόλαστος. πάντες γὰρ τούτοις 16
 30 φύσει τε χαίρουσι καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι, καὶ

¹ τὰ . . . τὰ Cas.: τὰς . . . τὰς.

² Syl.: ἐρύξιος, ἐξ ἕριδος.

³ ὀψοφαγία καὶ λαγνεῖα Ric.

^a A contemporary musician, a number of whose smart sayings are recorded by Athenaeus viii. 347 f-352 d.

smell of things to eat or drink, for we enjoy these scents on account of a different pleasure, that of eating or drinking; by intrinsically agreeable I mean scents such as those of flowers (this is the reason of Stratonicus's^a neat remark that the scent of flowers is beautiful but that of things to eat and drink sweet).

- 12 For even the pleasures of taste are not all attractive to animals, nor are those perceived with the tip of the tongue, but those perceived by the throat, the sensation of which seems more like touch than taste; so that gourmands do not pray that they may have a long tongue but a crane's gullet, like Philoxenus son of Eryxis.^b It follows that broadly speaking profligacy must be considered to be related to the objects of touch, and likewise it is with pleasures of that sort that the profligate is concerned; for tipping and gluttony and lechery and gormandizing and the like all have to do with the sensations specified, and these are the departments into which profligacy is divided. But nobody is called profligate if he exceeds in regard to the pleasures of sight or hearing or smell; those errors we criticize without severe rebuke, and generally all the things included under the term 'lack of self-control': the uncontrolled are not profligate, yet they are not temperate.

- 15 Therefore the person of such a character as to be deficient in all the enjoyments which practically everybody must share and must enjoy, is insensitive (or whatever the proper term is), and he that exceeds in them is profligate. For all people by nature enjoy these things, and conceive desires for them,

^b Mr. Hospitable, son of Mistress Belch—presumably a character in comedy.

Profligacy distinguished from Incontinence.

1231 a

οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδὲ λέγονται ἀκόλαστοι, οὐ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ τυγχάνοντες καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες· οὐδ' ἀνάληγοι, οὐ γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι τῷ χαίρειν ἢ λυπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλουσιν.

35

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις περὶ αὐτά, 17
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μεσότης, καὶ βελτίστη αὕτη ἢ ἕξις, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἐναντία. ὥστ' εἰ¹ σωφροσύνη ἢ βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ ἃ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἢ περὶ τὰ ἡδέα τὰ εἰρημένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεσότης σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, μεσότης οὐσα ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας·

1231 b

ἢ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολασία, ἢ δ' ἔλλειψις ἦτοι ἀνώνυμος ἢ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀνόμασι προσαγορευομένη. ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν 18
ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας.

5

III. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον καὶ περὶ 1
πραότητος καὶ χαλεπότητος. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πρᾶον περὶ λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γιγνομένην ὀρώμεν ὄντα, τῷ πρὸς ταύτην ἔχειν πῶς. διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὀργίλῳ καὶ χαλεπῷ καὶ ἀγρίῳ (πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ 2
10 διαθέσεως) τὸν ἀνδραποδώδη καὶ τὸν ἀνόργητον². σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα καλοῦσι τοὺς μὴδ' ἐφ'²
ὅσοις δεῖ κινουμένους τὸν θυμόν, ἀλλὰ προπηλακίζομένους εὐχερῶς καὶ ταπεινοὺς πρὸς τὰς ὀλιγωρίας· ἔστι γὰρ ἀντικείμενον τῷ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ

¹ Sp.: ὥστε. ² Rac. (cf. 1220 b 38, 1221 a 17): ἀνόητον.

^a ἀνάληγοι is thrown in as a possible synonym for ἀναισθητοί, see § 15.

^b Perhaps in a sentence lost at 1230 b 15.

^c See 1220 b 38, 1221 b 12-15.

without being or being called profligate, for they do not exceed by feeling more joy than they ought when they get them nor more pain than they ought when they do not get them; nor yet are they unfeeling,^a for they do not fall short in feeling joy or pain, but rather exceed.

17 And since there are excess and deficiency in regard to these things, it is clear that there is also a middle state, and that this state of character is the best one, and is the opposite of both the others. Hence if temperance is the best state of character in relation to the things with which the profligate is concerned, the middle state in regard to the pleasant objects of sense mentioned will be Temperance, being a middle state between profligacy and insensitiveness: the excess will be Profligacy, and the deficiency will either be nameless or will be denoted
18 by the terms mentioned.^b We shall have to define the class of pleasures concerned more exactly in our discussion of Self-control and Lack of Control later on.

1 III. And also the nature of Gentleness and Harshness must be ascertained in the same way. For we see that the term 'gentle' is concerned with the pain that arises from passion—a man is gentle by being disposed in a certain way towards that pain. And in our diagram^c we opposed to the irascible and harsh and fierce man (for all such traits belong to the same disposition) the slavish and spiritless^d
2 man; for these are perhaps the most usual words to denote those whose passion is not aroused even at all the things at which it ought to be, but who undergo insulting treatment readily and meet slights with humility; since as opposed to feeling the pain that

GENTLE-
NESS: proper
resentment
of insult.

^a The mss. give 'slavish and senseless.'

1231 b

μόλις, τῷ δ' ἡρέμα τὸ σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ πολὺν
 15 χρόνον τὸ ὀλίγον λυπεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν λύπην ἢ
 καλοῦμεν θυμόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 3
 ἄλλων εἶπομεν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
 ἔλλειψις (ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸς τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ὁ καὶ
 θάττον καὶ μᾶλλον πάσχων¹ καὶ πλείω χρόνον καὶ
 ὅτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὁποίοις οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς,
 20 ὁ δ' ἀνδραποδώδης τούναντίον), δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι
 τις καὶ ὁ² μέσος τῆς ἀνισότητος. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡμαρτη- 4
 μέναι ἀμφοτέραι αἱ ἕξεις ἐκείναι, φανερόν ὅτι ἐπι-
 εικῆς ἢ μέση τούτων ἕξις· οὔτε γὰρ προτερεῖ
 οὔθ' ὑστερίζει, οὔτε οἷς οὐ δεῖ ὀργίζεται οὔτε
 οἷς δεῖ οὐκ ὀργίζεται. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ πραότης ἢ
 25 βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐστίν, εἴη ἂν
 καὶ ἡ πραότης μεσότης τις, καὶ ὁ πρᾶος μέσος τοῦ
 χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους.

IV. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία καὶ ἡ μεγα- 1
 λοπρέπεια καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης μεσότητες, ἡ μὲν
 ἐλευθεριότης περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν καὶ ἀποβολῆν.
 30 ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτήσει μὲν πάσῃ μᾶλλον χαίρων ἢ δεῖ
 ἀποβολῇ δὲ πάσῃ λυπούμενος μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ
 ἀνελεύθερος, ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέρα ἦττον ἢ δεῖ ἄσωτος,
 ὁ δ' ἄμφω ὡς δεῖ ἐλευθέριος (τοῦτο δὲ λέγω τὸ
 ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τὸ
 ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός). ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκείνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἐν 2
 35 ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει, ὅπου δὲ ἔσχατά εἰσι, καὶ
 μέσον, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιστον, ἐν δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον
 τῷ εἶδει τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα

¹ ὁ καὶ . . . πάσχων: οἷος καὶ . . . πάσχειν Sp.

² [ὁ] ? Rac.

^a i.e. half-way between excess and defect.

we call passion quickly, extremely or for a long time there is feeling it slowly, slightly, or for a short time.

3 And since, as we said in the other cases, so here also there is excess and deficiency (for the harsh man is the sort of man that feels this emotion too quickly, too long, at the wrong time, with the wrong kind of people, and with many people, while the slavish man is the opposite), it is clear that there is also somebody who is at the middle point in the inequality.^a

4 Since, therefore, both those states of character are wrong, it is clear that the state midway between them is right, for it is neither too hasty nor too slow-tempered, nor does it get angry with the people with whom it ought not nor fail to get angry with those with whom it ought. So that since the best state of character in regard to those feelings is gentleness, Gentleness also would be a middle state, and the gentle man would be midway between the harsh man and the slavish man.

1 IV. Greatness of Spirit and Magnificence and Liberality are also middle states. Liberality is the mean in regard to the acquisition and expenditure of wealth. The man who is more pleased than he ought to be by all acquisition and more pained than he ought to be by all expenditure is mean, he that feels both feelings less than he ought is prodigal, and he that feels both as he ought is liberal (what I mean by 'as he ought,' both in this and in the other 2 cases, is 'as right principle directs'). And since the two former characters consist in excess and deficiency, and where there are extremes there is also a mean, and that mean is best, there being a single best for each kind of action, a single thing, it necessarily follows that liberality is a middle state between

LIBERALITY, the mean between Mean-ness and Prodigality in getting and spending.

1231 b

μεσότητα εἶναι ἀσωτίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας περὶ
 χρημάτων κτήσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν. διχῶς δὲ τὰ 3

1232 a

χρήματα λέγομεν καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν· ἢ μὲν
 γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ χρῆσις τοῦ κτήματός ἐστιν, οἷον
 ὑποδήματος ἢ ἱματίου, ἢ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
 μὲν, οὐ μέντοι οὕτως ὡς ἂν εἴ τις σταθμῶ
 χρήσαιο τῷ ὑποδήματι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἢ πώλησις καὶ
 ἢ μίσθωσις· χρῆται γὰρ ἢ ὑπόδημα.¹ ὁ δὲ φιλ- 4
 5 ἀργυρος ὁ περὶ τὸ νόμισμά ἐστιν ἐσπουδακῶς, τὸ
 δὲ νόμισμα τῆς κτήσεως ἀντὶ τῆς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
 χρήσεώς ἐστιν. ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος εἶη ἂν² καὶ 5
 ἄσωτος περὶ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τρόπον τοῦ
 χρηματισμοῦ· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν χρη-
 ματισμοῦ τὴν αὔξησιν διώκει. ὁ δ' ἄσωτος
 10 ἐλλείπει τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος τὴν
 περιουσίαν δίδωσιν. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων εἶδη 6
 λέγονται διαφέροντα τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον περὶ
 μόρια· οἷον ἀνελεύθερος φειδωλὸς καὶ κίμβιξ καὶ
 αἰσχροκερδῆς, φειδωλὸς μὲν ἐν τῷ μὴ προῖεσθαι,
 αἰσχροκερδῆς δ' ἐν τῷ ὅτιοῦν προσίεσθαι, κίμβιξ
 15 δὲ ὁ σφόδρα περὶ μικρὰ διατεινόμενος, παραλογισ-
 τῆς δὲ καὶ ἀποστερητῆς ὁ ἄδικος κατ' ἀνελευθερίαν·
 καὶ τοῦ ἀσώτου ὡσαύτως λαφύκτης μὲν ὁ ἐν τῷ 7
 ἀτάκτως ἀναλίσκειν, ἀλόγιστος δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ μὴ
 ὑπομένειν τὴν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ λύπην.

V. Περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλο- 1
 20 ψύχοις ἀποδιδομένων δεῖ διορίσαι τὸ ἴδιον. ὥσπερ³

¹ <ἢ> ὑπόδημα Rac. (ὑποδήματι Vic., ὑποδήματι <ἢ ὑπόδημα> Sus.): ὑποδήματος aut -τα. ² v.l. ἂν εἶη. ³ Vz.: αἷτιον.

^a Cf. *Pol.* I, 1257 a 14, where the use of a shoe for sale is included with its use for wear under *χρῆσις καθ' αὐτό*, but dis-

prodigality and meanness as regards getting and
 3 parting with wealth. But the terms 'wealth' and
 'art of wealth' we use in two senses, since one
 way of using an article of property, for example
 a shoe or a cloak, is proper to the article itself,^a
 another is accidental, though not as using a shoe for
 a weight would be an accidental use of it, but for
 4 example selling it or letting it on hire, for these uses
 do employ it as a shoe. The covetous man is the
 party whose interest centres on money, and money
 is a thing of ownership instead of accidental use.
 5 But the mean man might be even prodigal in
 regard to the accidental mode of getting wealth,
 inasmuch as it is in the natural acquisition of wealth
 that he pursues increase. The prodigal man lacks
 necessities, but the liberal man gives his super-
 6 fluity. And of these classes themselves there are
 species designated as exceeding or deficient in
 respect of parts of the matter concerned: for
 example, the stingy man, the skinflint and the profiteer
 are mean—the stingy in not parting with
 money, the profiteer in accepting anything, the skin-
 flint is he who is very excited about small sums;
 also the man who offends by way of meanness is a
 7 false reckoner and a cheat. Similarly 'prodigal'
 includes the spendthrift who is prodigal in un-
 regulated spending and the reckless man who is
 prodigal in not being able to endure the pain of
 calculation.

1 V. On the subject of Greatness of Spirit we must
 define its characteristic from the attributes of the

MAGNANI-
 MITY.
 It implies
 all the
 virtues.

tinguished from it as *οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ' αὐτό*, because not its
οἰκεία χρήσις, *οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα γέγονεν*. The term *χρήματα*
 itself denotes to the Greek ear 'useful things.'

1232 a

γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα <ᾶ>¹ κατὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν καὶ
 ὁμοιότητα μέχρι τοῦ λανθάνει² <διαφέροντα>³
 πόρρω προϊόντα, καὶ περὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταῦτὸ
 συμβέβηκεν. διὸ ἐνίοτε οἱ ἐναντίοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ²
 ἀντιποιοῦνται, οἷον ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ
 25 αὐθάδης τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· εἰσὶ
 γὰρ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ὁμοροὶ μέχρι τινός, ὥσπερ
 ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομενετικὸς κινδύνων καὶ ὁ θρασὺς,
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ᾧδε ὁ δ' ᾧδε· ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει
 πλείστον. λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ τὴν ³
 τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν μεγέθει τινὶ
 30 ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμει.⁴ ὥστε καὶ τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ τῷ
 μεγαλοπρεπεῖ ὁμοῖος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅτι⁵ καὶ πάσαις
 ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ⁴
 ὀρθῶς κρίναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 ἐπαινετόν· δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτ' εἶναι μεγάλα ᾧ διώκει
 ὁ τὴν κρατίστην ἔχων ἕξιν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα⁶ ἡδέα,
 35 ἢ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία κρατίστη. κρίνει δ' ἢ περὶ ⁵
 ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ὀρθῶς,
 ἅπερ⁷ ὁ φρόνιμος ἂν κελεύσειε καὶ ἢ ἀρετῆ,⁸ ὥστε
 ἔπεισθαι αὐτῇ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἢ αὐτὴν ἔπεισθαι
 πάσαις.

Ἔτι δοκεῖ μεγαλοψύχου εἶναι τὸ καταφρονητικὸν ⁶
 εἶναι. ἐκάστη δ' ἀρετὴ καταφρονητικούς ποιεῖ τῶν
 1232 b παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλων, οἷον ἀνδρεία⁹ κινδύνων
 (μέγα γὰρ ἠγεῖσθαι¹⁰ οἴεται εἶναι τῶν αἰσchrῶν
 καὶ πλήθος οὐ πᾶν φοβερόν), καὶ σώφρων ἡδονῶν

¹ Fr.² Cas.: τοῦ λανθάνειν.³ Rac.⁴ Γ: δυνάμειος.⁵ Sus.: ὅτε.⁶ τοιαῦτα Ric.: τοιαῦτ' εἶναι (e priore linea).⁷ κάθαπερ? Sp.⁸ ἢ <τοιαύτη> ἀρετὴ vel ἢ φρόνησις? Rac.⁹ ἀνδρείος Sp.¹⁰ ἠγεῖσθαι (cf. 1233 a 31) add. Sol.

great-spirited man. For just as in the other cases of things that, owing to their affinity and similarity up to a point, are not noticed to differ when they advance further, the same has happened about greatness of spirit. Hence sometimes the opposite characters elaim the same quality, for instance the extravagant man claims to be the same as the liberal, the self-willed as the proud, the daring as the brave ; for they are concerned with the same things, and also are neighbours up to a point, as the brave man can endure dangers and so can the daring man, but the former in one way and the latter in another, and that makes a very great difference. And we use the term 'great-spirited' according to the designation of the word, as consisting in a certain greatness or power of spirit. So that the great-spirited man seems to resemble both the proud man and the magnificent, because greatness of spirit seems to go with all the virtues also. For it is praiseworthy to judge great and small goods rightly ; and those goods seem great which a man pursues who possesses the best state of character in relation to such pleasures, and greatness of spirit is the best. And the virtue concerned with each thing judges rightly the greater and the smaller good, just as the wise man and virtue would bid, so that all the virtues go with it, or it goes with all the virtues.

Again, it is thought characteristic of the great-spirited man to be disdainful. Each virtue makes men disdainful of things irrationally deemed great : for example, courage makes a man disdainful of dangers, for he thinks that to consider danger a great matter is a disgraceful thing, and that numbers are not always formidable ; and the sober-minded man dis-

Indifferent
to popu-
larity,

μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐλευθέριος χρημάτων.
 μεγαλοψύχου δὲ τοῦτο δοκεῖ εἶναι¹ διὰ τὸ περὶ 7
 5 ὀλίγα σπουδάζειν καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οὐχ
 ὅ τι² δοκεῖ ἑτέρω τινί. καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν φροντίσειεν
 ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος τί δοκεῖ ἐνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολ-
 λοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν,³ ὥσπερ Ἀντιφῶν ἔφη
 πρὸς Ἀγάθωνα κατεψηφισμένος⁴ τὴν ἀπολογίαν
 ἐπαινέσαντα. καὶ τὸ ὀλίγων τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου
 10 μάλιστ' εἶναι πάθος ἴδιον. πάλιν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ 8
 τοῦ ζῆν καὶ πλούτου, περὶ ὧν σπουδάζειν δοκοῦσιν
 οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐθὲν φροντίζειν⁵ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλὴν
 περὶ τιμῆς· καὶ λυποῖτ' ἂν⁶ ἀτιμαζόμενος καὶ ἀρχό-
 μενος ὑπὸ ἀναξίου, καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα τυγχάνων.
 Οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίως ἔχειν, τὸ 9
 15 γὰρ εἶναι τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν καὶ καταφρονη-
 τικὸν εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν καὶ δόξης⁷ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖσθαι.
 δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ τιμὴ 10
 καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλη διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ πολλῶν
 τῶν τυχόντων ἢ καὶ⁸ ὑπὸ⁹ τῶν ἀξίων λόγου, καὶ
 20 πάλιν τῷ ἐπὶ τίνι ἢ τιμὴ διαφέρει· μεγάλη γὰρ
 οὐ τῷ πλήθει τῶν τιμώντων οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῶ μόνον,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τιμία¹⁰ εἶναι· τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δὲ καὶ αἰ
 ἀρχαὶ καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τίμια καὶ ἄξια σπουδῆς
 ταῦτα ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ ἀρετῇ

¹ εἶναι add. Rac.: τοῦτο δοκεῖ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ τοῦτο.

² Rac.: ὅτι edd.

³ τυχοῦσιν Cas.

⁴ v.l. κατεψηφισμένως.

⁵ φροντίζει Cas.

⁶ Ric. (vel λυπηθῆσεται): λυπηθῆσοιτ' ἂν.

⁷ εἶναι τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης? (καὶ om. I') Rac.

⁸ Ric.: ἢ.

⁹ ὑπὸ? Ric.: τῷ ὑπὸ.

¹⁰ Sol. (τίμια? Ric.): τιμίαν.

dains great and numerous pleasures, and the liberal
 7 man wealth. But the reason why this is thought
 characteristic of the great-spirited man is because of
 his caring about few things and those great ones,
 and not about whatever somebody else thinks.
 And a great-spirited man would consider more what
 one virtuous man thinks than what many ordinary
 people think, as Antiphon after his condemnation
 said to Agathon when he praised his speech for his
 defence.^a And a feeling thought to be specially
 characteristic of the great-spirited man is disdain.

8 On the other hand, as to the accepted objects of
 human interest, honour, life, wealth, he is thought to
 care nothing about any of them except honour; it
 would grieve him to be dishonoured and ruled by
 someone unworthy, and his greatest joy is to obtain
 honour.

9 Thus he might therefore be thought inconsistent,
 on the ground that to be specially concerned about
 honour and to be disdainful of the multitude and of
 10 reputation do not go together. But in saying this
 we must distinguish. Honour is small or great in
 two ways: it differs in being conferred either by
 many ordinary people or by persons of consideration,
 and again it differs in what it is conferred for, since
 its greatness does not depend only on the number or
 the quality of those who confer it, but also on its
 being honourable; and in reality those offices and
 other good things are honourable and worthy of
 serious pursuit that are truly great, so that there is
 sincerely praised his defence.' For Antiphon's indictment
 as a leader in the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens
 see Thuc. viii. 68. Agathon is presumably the tragic poet,
 see Plato's *Symposium*. The anecdote is not recorded else-
 where.

but loves
honour

of the noble
kind.

1232 b

οὐδεμία ἄνευ μεγέθους· διὸ δοκοῦσι μεγαλοψύχους
 25 ποιεῖν ἐκάστη περι ὃ ἐστὶν ἐκάστη αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ
 εἶπομεν. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστί τις παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας 11
 ἀρετὰς μία μεγαλοψυχία, ὥστε¹ καὶ ἰδία μεγαλό-
 ψυχον τοῦτον λεκτέον τὸν ἔχοντα ταύτην. ἐπεὶ
 δ' ἐστὶν ἕνια τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια τὰ δ' οὐ,²
 ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, τῶν τοιούτων δ' ἀγαθῶν
 ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὰ δὲ μικρά,
 30 καὶ τούτων ἕνιοι ἄξιοι καὶ ἀξιούσιν αὐτούς, ἐν
 τούτοις ζητητέος ὁ μεγαλόψυχος. τετραχῶς δ' 12
 ἀνάγκη διαφέρειν· ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ἄξιον εἶναι
 μεγάλων καὶ ἀξιούν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δὲ μικρὰ
 καὶ ἄξιον εἶναι³ τηλικούτων καὶ ἀξιούν ἑαυτὸν
 τούτων, ἔστι δ' ἀνάπαλιν πρὸς ἑκάτερα αὐτῶν· ὁ
 35 μὲν γὰρ ἂν εἶη τοιοῦτος οἷος ἄξιος ὢν μικρῶν
 μεγάλων⁴ ἀξιούν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν, ὁ
 δὲ ἄξιος ὢν μεγάλων ἀξιοῖ ἂν μικρῶν ἑαυτόν.
 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄξιος μικρῶν, μεγάλων δ' ἀξίων ἑαυτόν, 13
 ψεκτός· ἀνόητον γὰρ καὶ οὐ καλὸν τὸ παρὰ τὴν
 ἀξίαν⁵ τυγχάνειν. ψεκτός δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἄξιος ὢν
 1233 a ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει μὴ ἀξιοῖ
 ἑαυτόν. λείπεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἐναντίος τούτοις 14
 ἀμφοτέροις ὅστις ὢν ἄξιος μεγάλων ἀξιοῖ αὐτὸς
 ἑαυτὸν τούτων, καὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος ἀξιούν⁶

¹ Γ': ὥσπερ.² οὐ add. Sol.³ εἶναι (vel εἶναι τινα) Ric.: τινα.⁴ [μεγάλων] ? Rac.⁵ ἀξίαν <ἀξιούντα vel οἰόμενον vel χαννούμενον> Ric.⁶ οἷον ἀξιοῖ Ric. (οἷος ἀξιοῖ Sp.).^a See a 39.^b i.e. II. 17 ff.^c Perhaps the lecturer points to a diagram (Solomon).

no goodness without greatness ; owing to which each of the virtues seems to make men great-spirited in regard to the things with which that virtue is concerned, as we said.^a But nevertheless there is a single virtue of greatness of spirit side by side with the other virtues, so that the possessor of this virtue must be termed great-spirited in a special sense. And since there are certain goods which are in some cases honourable and in others not, according to the distinction made before,^b and of goods of this sort some are truly great and others small, and some men deserve and claim the former, it is among these men that the great-spirited man must be looked for. And there are necessarily four varieties of claim : it is possible to deserve great things and to claim them as one's desert ; and there are small things and a man may deserve and claim things of that size ; and as regards each of these two classes of things the reverse is possible—one man may be of such a character that although deserving small things he claims great ones—the goods held in high honour, and another man though deserving great things may claim small ones. Now the man worthy of small things but claiming great ones is blameworthy, for it is foolish and not fine to obtain what does not correspond to one's deserts. And he also is blameworthy who though worthy of such things does not deem himself worthy to partake of them although they are available for him. But there is left here ^c the man who is the opposite of both of these, who being worthy of great things claims them as his desert,^d and is of such a character as to deem

Four attitudes towards honour.

Definition of Magnanimity.

^a The Greek phrase combines the senses of rating one's deserts high and asserting one's claims.

1233 a

1 εαυτὸν· οὗτος ἐπαινετὸς καὶ μέσος τούτων. ἐπεὶ 15
 5 οὖν περὶ τιμῆς αἴρεσιν καὶ χρήσιν καὶ τῶν ἄλ-
 λων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀρίστη ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἢ
 μεγαλοψυχία καὶ οὐ περὶ τὰ χρήσιμα,¹ καὶ τοῦτ'
 ἀποδίδομεν τῷ μεγαλόψυχῳ,² ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης
 [αὕτη]³ ἐπαινετωτάτη, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία
 μεσότης ἂν εἴη. τῶν δ' ἐναντίων, ὥσπερ διεγρά- 10
 ψαμεν, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν εαυτὸν ἀγαθῶν μεγάλων
 ἀνάξιον ὄντα χαυνότης (τοὺς τοιούτους γὰρ χαυ-
 νους λέγομεν ὅσοι μεγάλων οἴονται ἄξιοι εἶναι οὐκ
 ὄντες), ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄξιον ὄντα μὴ ἀξιοῦν εαυτὸν
 μεγάλων μικροψυχία (μικρόψυχος⁴ γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ
 ὅστις ὑπαρχόντων δι' ἃ δικαίως ἂν ἀξιοῖτο μὴ
 15 ἀξιοῖ μηθενὸς μεγάλου εαυτὸν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ
 τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν εἶναι μεσότητα χαυνότητος καὶ
 μικροψυχίας. ὁ δὲ τέταρτος τῶν διορισθέντων 1
 οὔτε πάμπαν ψεκτὸς οὔτε μεγαλόψυχος, περὶ
 οὐδὲν ὧν ἔχον⁵ μέγεθος· οὔτε γὰρ ἄξιος οὔτε ἀξιοῖ
 μεγάλων, διὸ οὐκ ἐναντίος· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν
 20 ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ μεγάλων ἄξιον ὄντα μεγάλων τὸ
 μικρῶν ὄντα ἄξιον μικρῶν⁶ ἀξιοῦν εαυτὸν. οὐκ
 ἔστι δ' ἐναντίος οὐδὲ⁷ τῷ μεμπτὸς εἶναι, ὡς γὰρ ὁ

¹ οὐ περὶ τὰ χρήσιμα hic Ric. : post ἀποδίδομεν.

² Fr. : τὸν μεγαλόψυχον.

³ Rac.

⁴ Fr. : μικροψύχον.

⁵ ὧν ἔχον Rac. (ἔχον ὧν Sus.) : ἔχων.

⁶ μικρῶν add. Sus.

⁷ Sp. : οὔτε.

^a Or, emending the text, 'and is as worthy as he claims to be.'

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. v. 14-18

- himself worthy^a: he is praiseworthy, and he is in
15 the middle between the two. Since, therefore, greatness of spirit is the best disposition in relation to the choice and the employment of honour and of the other good things that are esteemed, and not in relation to useful things, and since we assign this to the great-spirited man, and since also at the same time the middle state is most praiseworthy, it is clear that even greatness of spirit must be a middle state.
- 16 And of the opposites as shown in our diagram, the one in the direction of deeming oneself worthy of great goods when one is not worthy is vanity (for the sort of men that fancy themselves worthy of great things though they are not we call vain), and the one that is concerned with not deeming oneself worthy of great things when one is worthy of them is smallness of spirit (for if a man does not think himself worthy of anything great although he possesses qualities which would justly make him considered worthy of it, he is thought small-spirited); so that it follows that greatness of spirit is a middle
17 state between vanity and smallness of spirit. But the fourth of the persons in our classification is neither entirely reprehensible nor is he great-spirited, as he is concerned with nothing possessing greatness, for he neither is nor thinks himself worthy of great things; owing to which he is not the opposite of the man of great spirit. Yet thinking oneself worthy of small things when one is worthy of small things might be thought the opposite of thinking oneself worthy of great ones when one is
18 worthy of great ones; but he is not opposite to the great-spirited man because he is not blameworthy
- Vanity.
- Modest Self-esteem.

1233 a

λόγος κελεύει ἔχει· καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῇ φύσει τῷ
 μεγαλοψύχῳ· ὧν γὰρ ἄξιοι, τούτων ἀξιούσιν αὐτοὺς
 ἄμφω. καὶ ὁ μὲν γένοιτ' ἂν μεγαλόψυχος, ἀξιῶσει 19
 25 γὰρ ὧν ἐστὶν ἄξιος· ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος, ὃς ὑπαρ-
 χόντων αὐτῷ μεγάλων κατὰ τιμὴν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ
 ἄξιοι, τί ἂν ἐποίει¹ εἰ μικρῶν ἄξιος ἦν; ἢ² γὰρ
 ἂν³ μεγάλων ἀξιώων χαῦνος ἦν,⁴ ἢ ἔτι ἐλαττόνων.
 διὸ καὶ οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι μικρόψυχον εἰ τις μέτοικος 20
 ὧν ἄρχει μὴ ἄξιοι ἑαυτὸν ἀλλ' ὑπέικει, ἀλλ' εἰ
 30 τις εὐγενὴς ὧν καὶ ἡγούμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν.

VI. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς οὐ περὶ τὴν 1
 τυχοῦσαν πρᾶξιν καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δα-
 πάνην,⁵ εἰ μὴ που κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν· ἄνευ
 δὲ δαπάνης μεγαλοπρέπεια οὐκ ἔστιν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 35 πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κόσμος οὐκ ἐκ τῶν
 τυχόντων ἀναλωμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τῶν
 ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. ὁ δὲ ἐν μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ τοῦ 2
 πρέποντος μεγέθους προαιρετικὸς, καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης
 μεσότητος καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡδονῇ⁶ ὀρεκτικὸς,
 μεγαλοπρεπής. ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ παρὰ μέλος 3
 1233 b ἀνώνυμος· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχουσι⁷ τινὰ γειννίασιν
 οὓς καλοῦσί τινας ἀπειροκάλους καὶ σαλάκωνας.

¹ Γ': εἴποι.² Mb: εἰ Pb.³ ἂν om. Mb: εἰ γὰρ μεγάλων ἀξιώων ζαῦτὸν ἀνάξιον ὧν Sp.⁴ post ἦν lacunam Sus.⁵ ἀλλὰ τὴν δαπάνην infra post λέγομεν Ric.⁶ δαπάνη? Ric.⁷ Cas.: ἔχει.

^a The ms. reading hardly gives a sense. An emendation gives 'for if he conceitedly thought himself worthy of great things when unworthy,' and supposes a gap in the text before the following words.

^b A probable emendation substitutes 'expenditure' for 'pleasure.'

^c The ms. text gives 'he has a certain set of neighbours

either, for his character is as reason bids, and in nature he is the same as the great-spirited man, for both claim as their desert the things that they are
 19 worthy of. And he might become great-spirited, for he will claim the things that he is worthy of; Mean-spiritedness.
 whereas the small-spirited man, who when great goods corresponding to his worth are available does not think himself worthy of them,—what would he have done if his deserts were small? For either he would have conceitedly thought himself worthy of
 20 great things, or of still less.^a Hence nobody would call a man small-spirited for not claiming to hold office and submitting to authority if he is a resident alien, but one would do so if he were of noble birth and attached great importance to office.

1 VI. The Magnificent Man also (except in a case Magnificence.
 when we are using the term metaphorically) is not concerned with any and every action and purposive choice, but with expenditure. Without expenditure there is no magnificence, for it is what is appropriate in ornament, and ornament does not result from any chance expenditure, but consists in going
 2 beyond the merely necessary. Therefore the magnificent man is the man who purposively chooses the appropriate greatness in great expenditure, and who even on the occasion of a pleasure^b of this
 3 nature aims at this sort of moderation. There is no name denoting the man who likes spending to excess and inappropriately; however the persons whom some people call tasteless and swaggering have a certain affinity to him.^c For instance if a
Its excess and defect.
 whom some people call . . .': but *γειρνιασις* is abstract at 1232 a 21 and *Pol.* i., 1257 a 2. Its concrete use in later Greek, 'neighbourhood' = 'set of neighbours' (Plutarch, etc.) has led to corruption here.

1233 b

οἶον εἰ εἰς γάμον δαπανῶν τις τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, πλούσιος ὢν, δοκεῖ πρόπειν ἑαυτῷ τοιαύτην κατασκευὴν οἶαν¹ ἀγαθοδαιμονιστὰς ἐστιῶντι, οὗτος μὲν μικροπρεπῆς, ὁ δὲ τοιούτους δεχόμενος ἐκείνως μὴ δόξης χάριν μηδὲ δι' ἐξουσίαν ὅμοιος τῷ σαλάκωνι, ὁ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος μεγαλοπρεπῆς· τὸ γὰρ πρόπειν κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρόπει τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν. δεῖ δὲ πρόπειν ⁴ <καθ' ἕκαστον>² εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πράττοντος³ κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ περὶ ὄν⁴ καὶ περὶ ὄ, οἶον περὶ οἰκέτου ¹⁰ γάμον ἕτερον τὸ πρόπειν καὶ περὶ ἐρωμένον· καὶ αὐτῷ, εἶπερ ἐστὶ⁵ τοσοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον, οἶον τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ᾤοντο⁶ Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρόπειν ἢ ἐποίησατο Ὀλυμπίαζε, διὰ τὴν προϋπάρξασαν ταπεινότητα, ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι. ὁ δ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἔχων πρὸς ¹⁵ τὴν ἀξίαν οὐθεῖς⁷ τούτων. Καὶ ἐπ' ἐλευθεριότητος ὡσαύτως· ἐστὶ γὰρ τις οὐτ' ἐλευθέριος οὐτ' ἀνελεύθερος.⁸

VII. Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ ¹ τὸ ἦθος ἐπαινετῶν καὶ ψεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπερβολαὶ τὰ δ' ἐλλείψεις τὰ δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι παθητικαί, οἶον ὁ φθονερός καὶ ὁ⁹ ἐπιχαιρέκακος. καθ' ἃς ²⁰ γὰρ ἔξεις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ

¹ Rac.: οἶον.² Iac.³ Bus.: πρόπειντος.⁴ Iac.: καὶ πρόπειν.⁵ ἐστὶ? Iac.: ἐπὶ. (ἐστὶ τοσοῦτος καὶ τοιοῦτος, αὐτ εἶπερ ἐστὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον tr. supra post 9 περὶ δ Ric.)⁶ Sp. (vel ᾤετο . . . comici nomine omisso): ᾤετο.⁷ οὐδεῖς Γ: δ οὐδεῖς.⁸ Cas.: τις ὡς ἐλευθέριος ὅταν ἐλεύθερος.⁹ ὁ add. Rac.

^a i.e. persons who only drink the formal toast ('Here's to Good Luck'), with which dinner ended.

rich man spending money on the wedding of a favourite thinks it fitting for him to have the sort of arrangements that would be fitting when entertaining abstainers,^a he is shabby, while one who entertains guests of that sort after the manner of a wedding feast, if he does not do it for the sake of reputation or to gain an office, resembles the swaggerer ; but he that entertains suitably and as reason directs is magnificent, for the fitting is the suitable, as nothing is fitting that is unsuitable.

4 But it must be fitting in each particular, that is, in suitability to the agent and to the recipient and to the occasion—for example, what is fitting at the wedding of a servant is not what is fitting at that of a favourite ; and it is fitting for the agent himself, if it is of an amount or quality suitable to him—for example people thought that the mission that Themistocles conducted to Olympia was not fitting for him, because of his former low station, but would
5 have been for Cimon.^b But he who is casual in regard to the question of suitability is not in any of these classes.

Similarly in regard to liberality : a man may be neither liberal nor illiberal.

1 VII. Generally speaking the other praiseworthy and blameworthy states of character also are excesses or deficiencies or middle states, but in respect of an emotion : for instance, the envious man and the malicious. For—to take the states of character after which they are named—Envy means being

Moderate
and praise-
worthy
States of
Feeling.

^b The story of Themistocles at the Olympic festival incurring disapproval by vying with Cimon in the splendour of his equipment and entertainments is told by Plutarch, *Vit. Them.* 5.

τοῖς κατ' ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρεκάκου πάθος ἔστιν¹ αὐτὸ ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔχων δηλὸς ἔστι² τῷ χαίρειν³ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις· μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεση-
 25 τυκός, καὶ ὁ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις· διὸ καὶ θεὸν οἴονται εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν.

Αἰδῶς δὲ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· 3 ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναισχυντος, ὁ δὲ πάσης ὁμοίως καταπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων.

30 Φιλία δὲ μεσότης ἔχθρας καὶ κολακείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐχερῶς ἅπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὀμιλῶν κόλαξ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἀπάσας ἀντικρούων ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ⁴ πρὸς ἅπασαν ἡδονὴν μῆτ' ἀκολουθῶν μῆτ' ἀντιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον βέλτιστον, φίλος.

35 Σεμνότης δὲ μεσότης αὐθαδείας καὶ ἀρεσκειας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν ἀλλὰ⁵ καταφρονητικὸς αὐθάδης, ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ⁶ πάντων ἐλάττων ἀρεσκος, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὕτως ἔχων, σεμνός.

1234 a Ὁ δ' ἀληθῆς καὶ ἀπλοῦς, ὃν καλοῦσιν αὐθέκαστον, 6 μέσος τοῦ εἴρωνος καὶ ἀλαζόνος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ χεῖρω καθ' αὐτοῦ ψευδόμενος μὴ ἀγνοῶν εἴρων, ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ βελτίω ἀλαζών, ὁ δ' ὡς ἔχει, ἀληθῆς

¹ ἴστιν Sr. : ἐπὶ τὸ.

³ ὁ χαίρων Ric.

⁵ ἀλλὰ Γ : om. codd. (nonnulli ἀκαταφρονητικὸς).

² ἔστι Cas. : ἐπὶ.

⁴ μὴ Sr. : μήτε.

⁶ καὶ Sr. : ἢ καί.

^a The man who calls each thing itself, i.e. what it really is, calls a spade a spade.

pained at people who are deservedly prosperous, while the emotion of the malicious man is itself nameless, but the possessor of it is shown by his 2 feeling joy at undeserved adversities ; and midway between them is the righteously indignant man, and what the ancients called Righteous Indignation —feeling pain at undeserved adversities and prosperities and pleasure at those that are deserved ; hence the idea that Nemesis is a deity.

3 Modesty is a middle state between Shamelessness and Bashfulness : the man who pays regard to nobody's opinion is shameless, he who regards everybody's is bashful, he who regards the opinion of those who appear good is modest.

4 Friendliness is a middle state between Animosity and Flattery ; the man who accommodates himself readily to his associates' desires in everything is a flatterer, he who runs counter to them all shows animosity, he who neither falls in with nor resists every pleasure, but falls in with what seems to be the best, is friendly.

5 Dignity is a middle state between Self-will and Obsequiousness. A man who in his conduct pays no regard at all to another but is contemptuous is self-willed ; he who regards another in everything and is inferior to everybody is obsequious ; he who regards another in some things but not in others, and is regardful of persons worthy of regard, is dignified.

6 The truthful and sincere man, called ' downright,'^a is midway between the dissembler and the charlatan. He that wittingly makes a false statement against himself that is depreciatory is a dissembler, he that exaggerates his merits is a charlatan, he that speaks

καὶ καθ' Ὁμηρον πεπνυμένος· καὶ ὅλως ὁ μὲν φιλαλήθης, οἱ δὲ φιλοψευδεῖς.¹

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐτραπελία μεσότης, καὶ ὁ εὐ- 7
 5 τράπελος μέσος τοῦ ἀγροίκου καὶ δυστραπέλου
 καὶ τοῦ βωμολόχου. ὥσπερ γὰρ περὶ τροφήν ὁ
 σικχὸς τοῦ παμφάγου διαφέρει τῷ ὁ μὲν μηθὲν ἢ
 ὀλίγα καὶ χαλεπῶς προσίεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς,
 οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄγροικος ἔχει πρὸς τὸν φορτικὸν καὶ
 βωμολόχον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν γελοῖον ἀλλ' ἡ² χαλε-
 10 πῶς προσίεται, ὁ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς καὶ ἡδέως.
 δεῖ δ' οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ κατὰ
 λόγον· οὗτος δ' ὁ³ εὐτράπελος. ἡ δ' ἀπόδειξις ἡ⁸
 αὐτή· ἡ τε γὰρ εὐτραπελία ἡ τοιαύτη, καὶ μὴ ἡν
 μεταφέροντες λέγομεν, ἐπιεικεστάτη ἔξις, καὶ ἡ
 μεσότης ἐπαινετή, τὰ δ' ἄκρα ψεκτά. οὔσης δὲ
 15 διττῆς τῆς εὐτραπελίας (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν
 ἐστὶ τῷ γελοίῳ, καὶ⁴ τῷ εἰς αὐτὸν εἶναι ἡ τοιονδί,
 ὧν ἐν καὶ τὸ σκῶμμά ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι
 τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι), ἕτεραι μὲν εἰσὶν ἀλλήλων, ἀμ-
 φότεραι μέντοι μεσότητες· καὶ γὰρ ὁ δυνάμενος⁵ 9
 τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι ἐφ' οἷοις⁶ ἡσθήσεται ὁ⁷ εὐ-
 20 κρίνων κἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ἡ τὸ γελοῖον, μέσος ἔσται
 τοῦ φορτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ. ὁ δ' ὄρος οὗτος
 βελτίων ἢ τὸ μὴ⁸ λυπηρὸν εἶναι τὸ λεχθὲν τῷ σκω-
 πτομένῳ ὄντι ὀπωιωῦν· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τῷ ἐν
 μεσότητι ὄντι ἀρέσκειν· οὗτος γὰρ κρίνει εὖ.

¹ Rac.: ὁ δὲ φιλοψευδής.

² ἀλλ' ἢ Rac. (ἢ Sp): ἀλλὰ.

³ ὁ add. Fr.

⁴ καὶ <δη καὶ>? Rac.

⁵ Syl.: τὸν δυνάμενον.

⁶ Rac.: ὅσοις.

⁷ ὁ add. Fr.

⁸ μὴ add. Cas.

^a The term *εὐτράπελος* means literally 'able to turn easily,' versatile; it denotes both 'witty' and 'easy-going.'

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. VII. 6-9

of himself as he is is truthful and in Homer's phrase 'sagacious'; and in general the one is a lover of truth and the others lovers of falsehood.

7 Wittiness^a also is a middle state, and the witty man is midway between the boorish or stiff man and the buffoon. For just as in the matter of food the squeamish man differs from the omnivorous in that the former takes nothing or little, and that reluctantly, and the latter accepts everything readily, so the boor stands in relation to the vulgar man or buffoon—the former takes no joke except with difficulty, the latter accepts everything easily and with pleasure. Neither course is right: one should allow some things and not others, and on principle,
8 —that constitutes the witty man. The proof of the formula is the same as in the other cases: wittiness of this kind (not the quality^b to which we apply the term in a transferred sense) is a very becoming sort of character, and also a middle state is praiseworthy, whereas extremes are blameworthy. But as there are two kinds of wit (one consisting in liking a joke, even one that tells against oneself if it is funny, for instance a jeer, the other in the ability to produce things of this sort), these kinds of wit differ from one
9 another, but both are middle states; for a man who can produce jokes of a sort that will give pleasure to a person of good judgement even though the laugh is against himself will be midway between the vulgar man and the frigid. This is a better definition than that the thing said must not be painful to the victim whatever sort of man he may be—rather, it must give pleasure to the man in the middle position, since his judgement is good.

^b Viz. βωμολοχία, 'buffoonery,' *N.E.* 1128 a 15.

1234 a

Πᾶσαι δ' αὐται αἱ μεσότητες ἐπαινεταὶ μὲν, 1
 25 οὐκ εἰσὶ δ' ἀρεταί, οὐδ' αἱ ἐναντία κακαί, ἄνευ
 προαιρέσεως γάρ· ταῦτα δὲ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς
 τῶν παθημάτων διαιρέσεσιν, ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν
 πάθος τί ἐστίν. διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς 1
 φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἀρετάς· ἔστι γάρ, ὡσπερ
 λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, ἐκάστη πως ἀρετὴ
 30 καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως, μετὰ φρονήσεως. ὁ μὲν οὖν 1
 φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον
 αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιο-
 σύνην καὶ ἡ αἰδῶς εἰς σωφροσύνην (διὸ καὶ ὀρί-
 ζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τὴν σωφροσύνην), ὁ δ'
 ἀληθῆς καὶ ψευδῆς ὁ μὲν ἔμφρων ὁ δ' ἄφρων.

1234 b

Ἔστι δ' ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἄκροις τὸ μέσον ἢ 1
 ἐκεῖνα ἀλλήλοις, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' οὐδετέρου γίνε-
 ται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πολλάκις μετ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰσὶν
 ἐνίοτε οἱ αὐτοὶ θρασύδειλοι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄσωτοι τὰ
 δὲ ἀνελεύθεροι, καὶ ὅλως ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς· ὅταν μὲν 1
 5 γὰρ καλῶς ἀνώμαλοι ᾧσιν, μέσοι γίνονται, ἐν τῷ
 μέσῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ πως τὰ ἄκρα.

Αἱ δ' ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς
 ἄκροις πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφότεροι, ἀλλ' ὅτε
 μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν. αἷτια 1
 δὲ τὰ τε πρῶτα ῥηθέντα δύο, ὀλιγότης τε, οἶον
 10 τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα ἀναισθητῶν, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ὃ ἀμαρ-
 τάνομεν μᾶλλον, τοῦτο ἐναντιώτερον εἶναι δοκεῖ· τὸ

¹ καὶ add. Rac.^a Not in *E.E.*, but cf. *N.E.* vi., 1144 b 1-17.^b Truthfulness and mendacity contribute to wisdom and folly as νέμεσις and φθόνος do to δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία, and αἰδῶς (and ἀναιδεία) to σωφροσύνη (and ἀκολασία).^c Cf. 1222 a 22-b 4.

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. VII. 10-16

- 10 All these middle states, though praiseworthy, are not virtues, nor are the opposite states vices, for they do not involve purposive choice; they are all in the classification of the emotions, for each of them is an
- 11 emotion. But because they are natural they contribute to the natural virtues; for, as will be said in what follows,^a each virtue exists both naturally and otherwise, that is, in conjunction with thought.
- 12 Therefore envy contributes to injustice (for the actions that spring from it affect another person), and righteous indignation to justice, and modesty to temperance (owing to which people even define temperance as a species of emotion), and the sincere and false are respectively wise and foolish.^b
- 13 And the mean is more opposed to the extremes than the extremes are to one another, because the mean does not occur in combination with either extreme, whereas the extremes often do occur in combination with one another, and sometimes the same men are venturesome cowards, or extravagant in some things and illiberal in others, and in general
- 14 not uniform in a bad way—for when men lack uniformity in a good way, this results in men of the middle characters, since the mean contains both extremes.
- The opposition existing between the mean and the extremes does not seem to be the same in the case of both the extremes, but sometimes the greater opposition is by way of excess, sometimes by way
- 15 of deficiency. The causes of this are partly the two first mentioned,^c rarity (for example, the rarity of people insensitive to pleasant things) and the fact that the error to which we are more prone seems
- 16 more opposite to the mean, and thirdly the fact that

These praiseworthy States of Feeling promote the virtues.

Extremes that meet.

Appendix to II. v. 4 ff.

ARISTOTLE

1234 b

δὲ τρίτον, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιότερον ἦττον ἐναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος¹ καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἴρηται σχεδόν, περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λεκτέον.

¹ τὸ θάρσος πρὸς τὸ θράσος M^b (sed cf. 1220 b 39): τὸ θάρσος (potius θράσος Kac.) πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν Bz.

^a Or, 'confidence'; but perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'courage.'

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. VII. 15-16

the extreme that more resembles the mean seems less opposite to it, as is the case with daring in relation to boldness ^a and extravagance in relation to liberality.

We have therefore sufficiently discussed the other praiseworthy virtues, and must now speak about Justice.

(Books IV, V, VI are omitted, as they are identical with Books V, VI, VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.)

Η

1234 b

I. Περὶ φιλίας, τί ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ τίς ὁ ¹
 φίλος, καὶ πότερον ἢ φιλία μοναχῶς λέγεται ἢ
 20 πλεοναχῶς, καὶ εἰ πλεοναχῶς, πόσα ἐστίν,¹ ἔτι δὲ
 πῶς χρηστέον τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ φιλικόν,
 ἐπισκεπτέον οὐθενὸς ἤττον τῶν περὶ τὰ ἡθῆ καλῶν
 καὶ αἰρετῶν. τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικῆς ἔργον εἶναι ²
 δοκεῖ μάλιστα ποιῆσαι φιλίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ
 τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι χρήσιμον· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται
 25 φίλους ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀδικουμένους ὑπ' ἀλλή-
 λων. ἔτι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον περὶ τοὺς φίλους ³
 εἶναι μάλιστα πάντες φαμέν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δοκεῖ
 ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, καὶ φιλία ἠθικὴ
 τις εἶναι ἕξις· καὶ ἐὰν τις βούληται ποιῆσαι² ὥστε
 μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἄλις³ φίλους ποιῆσαι, οἱ γὰρ ἀληθινοὶ
 30 φίλοι οὐκ ἀδικοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐὰν δίκαιοι ⁴
 ᾧσιν, οὐκ ἀδικήσουσιν· ἢ ταῦτόν ἄρα ἢ ἐγγύς τι ἢ
 δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ φιλία.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν τὸν φίλον ⁵
 εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνομεν, τὴν δὲ ἀφιλίαν καὶ τὴν
 ἐρημίαν δεινότατον, ὅτι ὁ βίος ἅπας καὶ ἡ ἐκού-
 1235 a σιος ὁμίλια μετὰ τούτων· μετ' οἰκείων γὰρ ἢ μετὰ

¹ πόσαι εἰσίν Sp.: ποσαχῶς? Rac. (ποσαχῶς ἐστίν vel πόσα ἐστίν <εἶδη> Bz.). ² πείσαι? Ric.

³ ἄλις Iac.: ἀλλ' εἰς. (ἄλλους, φίλους ποιήσει Sp., ἄλλους φίλους ποιῆσαι δεῖν Fr.)

BOOK VII

1 I. Friendship—its nature and qualities, what con-
stitutes a friend, and whether the term friendship
has one or several meanings, and if several, how
many, and also what is our duty towards a friend
and what are the just claims of friendship—is a
matter that calls for investigation no less than any
of the things that are fine and desirable in men's
2 characters. For to promote friendship is thought to
be the special task of political science ; and people
say that it is on this account that goodness is a
valuable thing, for persons wrongfully treated by
3 one another cannot be each other's friends. Further-
more we all say that justice and injustice are chiefly
displayed towards friends ; it is thought that a
good man is a friendly man, and that friendship is a
state of the moral character ; and if one wishes to
make men not act unjustly, it is enough to make them
friends, for true friends do not wrong one another.
4 But neither will men act unjustly if they are just ;
therefore justice and friendship are either the same
or nearly the same thing.

FRIENDSHIP.
Its nature
and value.

5 In addition to this, we consider a friend to be one
of the greatest goods, and friendlessness and solitude
a very terrible thing, because the whole of life and
voluntary association is with friends ; for we pass

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συγγενῶν ἢ μεθ' ἑταίρων συνδιημερεύομεν, ἢ τέκνων ἢ γονέων ἢ γυναικός. καὶ τὰ ἴδια δίκαια τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν μόνον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους νενομοθέτηται καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

- 5 Ἀπορεῖται δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῆς φιλίας, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οἱ ἕξωθεν περιλαμβάνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ πλεόν λέγοντες. δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ εἶναι φίλον, ὅθεν εἴρηται

ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον·

καὶ γὰρ κολοῖος παρὰ κολοῖον . . .

ἔγνω δὲ φῶρ τε φῶρα καὶ λύκος λύκον.

- 10 οἱ δὲ φυσιολόγοι καὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν διακοσμοῦσιν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον ἰέναι πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον, διὸ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὴν κύν' ἔφη καθῆσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς κεραμίδος διὰ τὸ ἔχειν πλείστον ὅμοιον.

- Οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτω τὸν¹ φίλον λέγουσιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φασὶν εἶναι φίλον, τὸ μὲν γὰρ
15 ἐρώμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν πᾶσιν εἶναι φίλον, ἐπιθυμεῖν² δὲ οὐ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ³ ὑγροῦ (ὅθεν εἴρηται

ἐρᾶ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖα,

καὶ τὸ

μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ·

¹ v.l. τό.

² Fr.: ἐπιθυμεῖ.

³ τοῦ add. M^b.

^a *Od.* xvii. 218.

^b 'Birds of a feather flock together.' *Sc. ἰζάνει*, 'perches': an iambic verse quoted in full *M.M.* 1208 b 9, and in the form *κολοῖον ποτὶ κολοῖον N.E.* viii., 1155 a 35, where the dialect suggests that it is from a Doric poet (unknown).

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. I. 5-9

our days with our family or relations or comrades, children, parents or wife. And our private rights in relation to our friends depend only on ourselves, whereas our rights in relation to the rest of men are established by law and do not depend on us.

7 Many questions are raised about friendship—first, on the line of those who take in wider considerations and extend the term. For some hold that like is friend to like, whence the sayings :

Is friendship based on likeness

Mark how God ever brings like men together ^a ;

For jackdaw by the side of jackdaw . . . ^b ;

And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow wolf. ^c

8 And the natural philosophers even arrange the whole of nature in a system by assuming as a first principle that like goes to like, owing to which Empedocles ^d said that the dog sits on the tiling because it is most like him. ^e

9 Some people then give this account of a friend ; but others say that opposite is dear to opposite, since it is what is loved and desired that is dear to everybody, and the dry does not desire the dry but the wet (whence the sayings—

or on contrast?

Earth loveth rain, ^f

and

In all things change is sweet—^g

^e ' Set a thief to catch a thief.' The origin of the verse is unknown.

^d Mystic philosopher, man of science and statesman of Agrigentum (Girgenti), fl. 490 B.C.

^e Presumably, like in colour ; true of Greek dogs to-day. Empedocles does not appear to have gone on to infer protective mimicry.

^f Quoted as from Euripides, *N.E.* viii., 1155 a 34 ; the play is not known.

^g Euripides, *Orestes* 234.

1235 a

ἡ δὲ μεταβολὴ εἰς τὸναντίον· τὸ δ' ὅμοιον ἐχθρὸν
τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ γὰρ

κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει,

καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενα πολέμια ἀλλήλοις
20 ζῶα. αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ὑπολήψεις τοσοῦτον δι- 10
εστᾶσιν· οἱ¹ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον,² τὸ δ' ἐναντίον
πολέμιον—

τῷ πλέονι δ' αἰεὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται
τοῦλασσον, ἐχθρᾶς θ' ἡμέρας κατάρχεται,

ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τόποι κεχωρισμένοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἢ 11
25 δὲ φιλία δοκεῖ συνάγειν· οἱ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ
'Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι

ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν καὶ³ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,
οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἀρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος,
οὐδὲ τὰ ζῶα ἄνευ θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων
όντων.

Δύο μὲν οὖν⁴ αὐταὶ δόξαι περὶ φιλίας εἰσὶ, λίαν 12
30 τε καθόλου κεχωρισμέναι⁵ τοσοῦτον, ἄλλαι δὲ ἤδη
ἐγγυτέρω⁶ καὶ οἰκειότεραι⁷ τῶν φαινομένων. τοῖς
μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ τοὺς φαύλους εἶναι
φίλους, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· τοῖς δ' ἄτοπον
εἶ μὴ φιλοῦσιν αἱ μητέρες τὰ τέκνα (φαίνεται 13
δ' ἤδη⁸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἐνοῦσα φιλία· προαπο-
35 θνήσκειν γοῦν⁹ αἰροῦνται τῶν τέκνων). τοῖς δὲ τὸ 14
χρήσιμον δοκεῖ φίλον εἶναι μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι

¹ Fr.: αἱ.

² φίλον <φασί> vel <οῖονται> Ric.

³ Rac.: καὶ (ἐκ τ' II. xviii. 107).

⁴ οὖν add. Sus.

⁵ καὶ κεχωρισμέναι Cas.

⁶ ἐγγύτεραι M^b.

⁷ οἰκειότεραι Rac.: οἰκείαι.

⁸ δ' ἤδε Rac.: δὲ (γὰρ Γ').

⁹ Fr.: οὖν.

change being transition to the opposite), whereas like hates like, for

Potter 'gainst potter hath a grudge,^a ✱

and animals that live on the same food are hostile to one another. These opinions, therefore, are thus widely variant. One party thinks that the like is friend and the opposite foe—

The less is rooted enemy to the more
For ever, and begins the day of hate,^b ✱

11 and moreover adversaries are separated in locality, whereas friendship seems to bring men together. The other party say that opposites are friends, and Heracleitus^c rebukes the poet who wrote—

Would strife might perish out of heaven and earth,^d ✱
for, he says, there would be no harmony without high and low notes, and no animals without male and female, which are opposites.

12 These, then, are two opinions about friendship, and being so widely separated they are too general^e; or on virtue?
but there are others that are closer together and more akin to the facts of observation. Some persons think that it is not possible for bad men to be friends,^b but only for the good. Others think it strange that
13 mothers should not love their own children (and maternal affection we see existing even among animals—at least, animals choose to die for their
14 young). Others hold that only what is useful is a friend, the proof being that all men actually do or on utility?

^a Hesiod, *Works and Days* 25 ('Two of a trade never agree').

^b Euripides, *Phoenissae* 539 f. (ἐχθρᾶς ἡμέρας = ἐχθρας, cf. δούλιον ἡμαρ = δουλεία, Paley).

^c The natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. end of 6th cent. B.C.

^d *Iliad* xviii. 107.

^e *i.e.* being so absolutely opposite to one another, they are too sweeping, and do not really correspond with the facts.

1235 a

καὶ διώκουσι ταῦτα πάντες, τὰ δὲ ἄχρηστα καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν¹ ἀποβάλλουσιν (ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ὁ γέρων ἔλεγε τὸν πτύελον καὶ τὰς τρίχας καὶ τοὺς ὄνυχας παραβάλλων), καὶ² τὰ μόρια ὅτι ρίπτουµεν

1235 b

τὰ ἄχρηστα, καὶ τέλος τὸ σῶμα, ὅταν ἀποθάνῃ, ἄχρηστος γὰρ ὁ νεκρός· οἷς δὲ χρήσιμον, φυλάττουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα δοκεῖ μὲν ὑπεναντία ἀλλήλοις εἶναι. τό τε γὰρ ὅμοιον³ ἄχρηστον τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἐναντιότης ὁμοιότητος⁵ ἀπέχει πλείστον, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀχρηστότατον τῷ ἐναντίῳ, φθαρτικὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον. ἔτι δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ κτήσασθαι φίλον, τοῖς δὲ σπανιώτατον γνῶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄνευ ἀτυχίας⁴, τοῖς γὰρ εὖ πράττουσι βούλονται πάντες δοκεῖν φίλοι εἶναι· οἱ δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς συνδιαμένουσιν¹⁰ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις ἀξιουσι πιστεύειν, ὡς ἐξαπατῶντας καὶ προσποιουμένους, ἵνα κτήσωνται διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀτυχούντων ὁμιλίας πάλιν εὐτυχούντων φιλίαν.

II. Ληπτέος δὴ λόγος⁵ ὅστις ἡμῖν ἅμα τὰ τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία δοκοῦντα. μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις· συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ.

Ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ πότερον τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν

¹ ἀφ' αὐτῶν Iac.

² [καὶ] ? Rac.

³ ὅμοιον add. Fr.

⁴ Vict.: εὐτυχίας.

⁵ Cas.: λοιπός. (λοιπός <λόγος> Sp., τρόπος Syl.)

pursue the useful, and discard what is useless even in their own persons (as the old Socrates ^a used to say, instancing spittle, hair and nails), and that we throw away even parts of the body that are of no use, and finally the body itself, when it dies, as a corpse is useless—but people that have a use for it
 15 keep it, as in Egypt. Now all these factors ^b seem to be somewhat opposed to one another. For like is of no use to like and opposition is farthest removed from likeness, and at the same time opposite is most useless to opposite, since opposite is
 16 destructive of opposite. Moreover some think that to gain a friend is easy, but others that it is the rarest thing to recognize a friend, and not possible without misfortune, as everybody wants to be thought
 17 a friend of the prosperous; and others maintain that we must not trust even those who stay with us in our misfortunes, because they are deceiving us and pretending, in order that by associating with us when unfortunate they may gain our friendship when we are again prosperous.

1 II. Accordingly a line of argument must be taken that will best explain to us the views held on these matters and at the same time solve the difficulties and contradictions. And this will be secured if the contradictory views are shown to be held with some reason. For such a line of argument will be most in agreement with the observed facts: and in the upshot, if what is said is true in one sense but not true in another, both the contradictory views stand good.

2 There is also a question as to whether what is

Friendship is based on

^a Cf. 1216 b 3.

^b *i.e.* likeness, contrariety, utility (Solomon).

1235 b

20 ἔστι τὸ φιλούμενον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦμεν οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν (καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως τοιοῦτον, οὐδεὶς γὰρ

ἐραστῆς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ),

ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ταύτη μὲν τὸ φιλούμενον τὸ ἡδύ, εἰ δὲ ὁ βουλόμεθα, τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἔστι δ' ἕτερον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

Περὶ δὴ¹ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συγγενῶν 3
25 τούτοις πειρατέον διορίσαι, λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τήνδε. τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλευτὸν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὀρεκτὸν, φαινόμενον γὰρ τι ἀγαθόν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κἂν μὴ δοκῆ (οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ φαντασίας καὶ ἡ δόξα). ὅτι μέντοι φίλον 30 καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ δῆλον.

Τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου ληπτέον ὑπόθεσιν ἑτέραν. 4
τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ τινί, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ· καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδέα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι φασιν σώματι συμφέροντα ἀπλῶς εἶναι σώματι ἀγαθὰ, τὰ 35 δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι οὐ, οἷον φαρμακείας καὶ τομάς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδέα ἀπλῶς σώματι τὰ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι 5 καὶ ὀλοκλήρῳ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ ζῆν² καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐν τῷ σκότει· καίτοι τῷ ὀφθαλμιῶντι ἐναντίως· καὶ οἶνος ἡδίων οὐχ ὁ τῷ διεφθαρμένῳ τὴν γλῶτταν ὑπὸ οἰνοφλυγίας, ἐπεὶ ἐνίστε³ ὄξος παρεγχεοῦσιν,

¹ Sus.: δὲ P^b, om. M^b.

² Iac. (cf. *Hist. An.* 488 a 26 τὰ μὲν νυκτερόβια . . . τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ φωτὶ ζῆν): ὀράν.

³ Ric.: οὔτε.

^a Enripides, *Troades* 1051.

^b i.e. are different psychological experiences.

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. II. 2-5

dear to us is the pleasant or the good. If we hold dear what we *desire* (and that is specially characteristic of love, for

both goodness and pleasantness (absolute or relative).

None is a lover that holds not dear for aye ^a),

and desire is for what is pleasant, on this showing it is the pleasant that is dear; whereas if we hold dear what we *wish*, it is the good; but the pleasant and the good are different things. X

3 We must therefore attempt to decide about these matters and others akin to them, taking as a starting-point the following. The thing desired and wished is either the good or the apparent good. Therefore also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good, since some people think it good, and to others it appears good even though they do not think it so (as appearance and opinion are not in the same part of the spirit).^b Yet it is clear that both the good and the pleasant are dear. L. 22. c

4 This being decided, we must make another assumption. Things good are some of them absolutely good, others good for someone but not good absolutely; and the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant. For things advantageous for a healthy body we pronounce good for the body absolutely, but things good for a sick body not—for example doses of medicine and surgical operations;
 5 and likewise also the things pleasant for a healthy and perfect body are pleasant for the body absolutely, for example to live in the light and not in the dark, although the reverse is the case for a man with ophthalmia. And the pleasanter wine is not the wine pleasant to a man whose palate has been corrupted by tippling, since sometimes they pour

ARISTOTLE

1236 a ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀδιαφθόρῳ αἰσθήσει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ 6
 ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐχ ἅ τοῖς παιδίοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις,
 ἀλλ' ἅ τοῖς καθεστῶσιν· ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν μεμνη-
 μένοι ταῦθ' αἰρούμεθα. ὡς δ' ἔχει παιδίον καὶ 7
 θηρίον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καθεστῶτα, οὕτως ἔχει ὁ
 5 φαῦλος καὶ ἄφρων πρὸς τὸν ἐπικεικῆ καὶ φρόνιμον·
 τούτοις δὲ ἡδέα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ
 τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλά.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν¹ πλεοναχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ 8
 τοιούδ' εἶναι λέγομεν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὠφέλιμον
 καὶ χρήσιμον), ἔτι δὲ² τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς καὶ
 10 ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ τινὶ καὶ³ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων δι' ἕκαστον τούτων
 ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς αἰρεῖσθαι τι καὶ φιλεῖν, οὕτω⁴ καὶ
 ἄνθρωπον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ὅτι τοιόσδε⁵ καὶ δι' ἀρετῆν,
 τὸν δ' ὅτι ὠφέλιμος καὶ χρήσιμος, τὸν δ' ὅτι ἡδὺς
 καὶ δι' ἡδονῆν. φίλος δὲ⁶ γίνεται ὅταν φιλούμενος
 15 ἀντιφιλήῃ καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνῃ πως αὐτούς.

Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἶδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε 9
 καθ' ἐν ἀπάσας μηδ' ὡς εἶδη ἑνὸς γένους μήτε
 πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως. πρὸς μίαν γὰρ τινα
 λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἰατρικόν, καὶ ψυχῆν
 20 ἰατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὄργανον καὶ ἔργον,

¹ Sp.: τὰ ἀγαθὰ.

² ἔτι δὲ Bz.: ἐπεὶ δὲ P^b, ἐπεὶ M^b.

³ καὶ Beier: ἢ (om. Γ').

⁴ οὕτω Bz.: ὥσπερ.

⁵ Ric.: τὸν μὲν γὰρ τοιόσδε.

⁶ Iac.: δῆ.

⁷ Sus.: μήθ'.

in a dash of vinegar, but to the uncorrupted taste.
 6 And similarly also in the case of the spirit, the really pleasant things are not those pleasant to children and animals, but those pleasant to the adult; at least it is these that we prefer when we remember
 7 both. And as a child or animal stands to an adult human being, so the bad and foolish man stands to the good and wise man; and these take pleasure in things that correspond to their characters, and these are things good and fine.

8 Since therefore good is a term of more than one meaning (for we call one thing good because that is its essential nature, but another because it is serviceable and useful), and furthermore pleasant includes both what is absolutely pleasant and absolutely good and what is pleasant for somebody and apparently good—, as in the case of inanimate objects we may choose a thing and love it for each of these reasons, so also in the case of a human being, one man we love because of his character, and for goodness, another because he is serviceable and useful, another because he is pleasant, and for pleasure. And a man becomes a friend when while receiving affection he returns it, and when he and the other are in some way aware of this.

Definition of friend.

9 It follows, therefore, that there are three sorts of friendship, and that they are not all so termed in respect of one thing or as species of one genus, nor yet have they the same name entirely by accident. For all these uses of the term are related to one particular sort of friendship which is primary, like the term 'surgical'—and we speak of a surgical mind and a surgical hand and a surgical instrument and a surgical operation, but we apply the term

Three kinds of Friendship,

1236 a

ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. πρῶτον δ' οὐδ' ὁ¹ λόγος
 ἐν πᾶσιν² ὑπάρχει, οἷον ὄργανον ἰατρικὸν ᾧ ἂν ὁ
 ἰατρὸς χρῆσαιτο, ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ
 ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὄργάνου. ζητεῖται μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ
 τὸ πρῶτον, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι³ πρῶτον
 λαμβάνουσι καὶ τὸ⁴ πρῶτον καθόλου· τοῦτο δ'
 25 ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλίας οὐ δύνανται
 πάντ' ἀποδιδόναι τὰ φαινόμενα· οὐ γὰρ⁵ ἐφ-
 αρμόττοντος ἐνὸς λόγου οὐκ οἴονται τὰς⁶ ἄλλας
 φιλίας εἶναι· αἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσίν.
 οἱ δ' ὅταν ἢ πρώτη μὴ ἐφαρμόττη, ὡς οὖσαν
 καθόλου ἂν εἶπερ ἦν πρώτη, οὐδ' εἶναι φιλίας τὰς
 30 ἄλλας φασίν. ἔστι δὲ πολλὰ εἶδη φιλίας· τῶν γὰρ
 ῥηθέντων ἦν ἤδη, ἐπειδὴ διώριστα τριχῶς λέγεσθαι
 τὴν φιλίαν, ἢ μὲν γὰρ διώριστα δι' ἀρετὴν ἢ δὲ διὰ
 τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.

Τούτων ἢ μὲν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστι νῆ Δία⁷ τῶν
 πλείστων φιλία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμοι εἶναι φιλοῦσιν
 35 ἀλλήλους, καὶ μέχρι τούτου, ὡσπερ ἢ παροιμία

Γλαῦκ', ἐπίκουρος ἀνὴρ τόσον φίλος⁸ ἔς κε⁹
 μάχηται,

καὶ

οὐκέτι γινώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρήας.

ἢ δὲ δι' ἡδονὴν τῶν νέων, τούτου γὰρ αἴσθησιν
 ἔχουσιν· διὸ εὐμετάβολος φιλία ἢ τῶν νέων,
 μεταβαλλόντων γὰρ τὰ ἦθη κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας

¹ ὁ add. Ric.² πᾶσιν Sus.: ἡμῖν.³ τὸ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι Sus.: τὸ καθόλου εἶναι τὸ.⁴ τὸ add. Sp.⁵ οὐκ οὖν? Rac.⁶ τὰς add. Bz.⁷ ἐστὶ νῆ Δία Iac.: ἐστὶν ἡ.⁸ τόσον φίλος Fr.: τὸν σόφον φίλον.⁹ ἔστε Sol.^a ll. 7-17.^b A friend in need is a friend indeed.

10 properly to that which is primarily so called. The primary is that of which the definition is implicit in the definition of all, for example a surgical instrument is an instrument that a surgeon would use, whereas the definition of the instrument is not
 11 implicit in that of surgeon. Therefore in every case people seek the primary, and because the universal is primary they assume that also the primary is universal; but this is untrue. Hence in the case of friendship, they cannot take account of all the observed facts. For as one definition does not fit, they think that the other kinds of friendship are not friendships at all; but really they are, although
 12 not in the same way, but when they find that the primary friendship does not fit, assuming that it would be universal if it really were primary, they
 13 say that the others are not friendships at all. But in reality there are many kinds of friendships: this was among the things said already,^a as we have distinguished three senses of the term friendship—

14 Of these the one based on utility is assuredly the friendship of most people; for they love one another because they are useful, and in so far as they are so, as says the proverb—

Glaucus, an ally is a friend
 As long as he our battle fights,^b

and

Athens no longer knoweth Megara.

15 On the other hand friendship based on pleasure is the friendship of the young, for they have a sense of what is pleasant; hence young people's friendship easily changes, for since their characters change as

//N.E
 based on utility, pleasure, and goodness.

1236 b μεταβάλλει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ. ἡ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῶν βελτίστων.

Φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐστὶν ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. φίλον μὲν γὰρ τὸ φιλούμενον τῷ φιλοῦντι, φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλουμένῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ φιλῶν.¹
 5 αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ² μόνον ὑπάρχει ἢ³ φιλία, μόνος⁴ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται προαιρέσεως· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις. καὶ γὰρ⁵ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐπὶ μικρόν τι φαίνεται ἐνυπάρχον καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα, οἷον τὸν⁶ τροχίλον
 10 φησὶν Ἡρόδοτος τῷ κροκοδείλῳ, καὶ ὡς οἱ μάντις τὰς συνεδρίας καὶ διεδρίας λέγουσιν. καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἂν εἶεν φίλοι ἀλλήλοις καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οἱ δ', ὅτι ἡ πρώτη οὐχ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς, οὐ¹ φασὶ φίλους εἶναι· ἀδικήσει γὰρ ὃ γε φαῦλος τὸν φαῦλον, οἱ δ' ἀδικούμενοι οὐ φιλοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς.
 15 οἱ δὲ φιλοῦσι μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν πρώτην φιλίαν, ἐπεὶ² τὰς γε ἑτέρας οὐθὲν κωλύει· δι' ἡδονὴν γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν⁷ ἀλλήλους βλαπτόμενοι, ἕως⁸ ἂν ὦσιν ἀκρατεῖς. οὐ δοκοῦσι δ' οὐδ' οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φιλοῦν-
 20 τες ἀλλήλους φίλοι εἶναι, ὅταν κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ζητῶσιν, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ πρώτη· ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ βέβαιος,

¹ αὐτὸς ὁ φιλῶν Ross: ἀντιφιλῶν.

² ἀνθρώπῳ? Sp.: ἀνθρώποις.

³ ἢ add. Ric.

⁴ Sp.: μόνον.

⁵ γὰρ add. Ric.

⁶ <πρὸς> τὸν? Rac.

⁷ Bz.: ὑπονοοῦσιν.

⁸ Iac.: ὡς (ἢς Ric.).

^a Herodotus, ii. 68, says that the *trochilus* picks leeches out of the crocodile's throat, Aristotle, *Hist. An.* ix. 6. 6, that it picks the crocodile's teeth. In reality it picks gnats from the crocodile's open mouth.

Burton

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they grow up, their taste in pleasure also changes. But the friendship in conformity with goodness is the friendship of the best men.

16 It is clear from this that the primary friendship, that of the good, is mutual reciprocity of affection and purpose. For the object of affection is dear to the giver of it, but also the giver of affection is himself dear to the object. This friendship, therefore, only occurs in man, for he alone perceives purpose ; but the other forms occur also in the lower animals. Indeed mutual utility manifestly exists to some small extent between the domestic animals and man, and between animals themselves, for instance Herodotus's account of the friendship between the crocodile and the sandpiper,^a and the perching together and separating of birds of which soothsayers speak.

The last peculiar to virtuous men ; the two former occur among animals, and bad men.

18 The bad may be each other's friends from motives
19 both of utility and of pleasure ; though some say that they are not really friends, because the primary kind of friendship does not belong to them, since obviously a bad man will injure a bad man, and those who suffer injury from one another
20 do not feel affection for one another. But as a matter of fact bad men do feel affection for one another, though not according to the primary form of friendship—because clearly nothing hinders their being friends under the other forms, since for the sake of pleasure they put up with one another although they are being harmed, so long as they are
21 lacking in self-restraint. The view is also held, when people look into the matter closely, that those who feel affection for each other on account of pleasure are not friends, because it is not the primary friendship, since that is reliable but this is unreliable.

1236 b

20 αὕτη δὲ ἀβέβαιος. ἢ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν, ὥσπερ εἶρηται,
 φιλία, οὐκ ἐκείνη δὲ ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης. τὸ μὲν οὖν 22
 ἐκείνως μόνον λέγειν τὸν φίλον βιάζεσθαι τὰ φαι-
 νόμενά ἐστι, καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον· καθ'
 ἓνα δὲ λόγον πάσας ἀδυνατόν.¹ λείπεται τοίνυν 23
 οὕτως, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς μόνη ἢ πρώτη φιλία, ἐστι
 25 δ' ὡς πᾶσαι, οὔτε ὡς ὁμώνυμοι καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν
 ἔχουσαι πρὸς αὐτάς, οὔτε καθ' ἓν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ
 μᾶλλον πρὸς ἓν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ 24
 καὶ ἅμα ἂν μὴ τι² ἐμποδίξῃ, ὁ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος
 καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ πρῶτός ἐστιν, ἐστὶ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ
 30 αὐτὸς δι' αὐτὸν αἰρετός (ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὧ³
 γὰρ βούλεται τις δι' αὐτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθὰ, ἀνάγκη
 καὶ δι'⁴ αὐτὸν αἰρετόν⁵ εἶναι), ὁ⁶ ἀληθινὸς φίλος 25
 καὶ ἡδύς ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς· διὸ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ ὁπωσοῦν
 φίλος ἡδύς. ἔτι δὲ διοριστέον περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον· 26
 ἔχει γὰρ ἐπίστασιν, πότερον⁷ τὸ γ' αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν
 35 ἢ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν φίλον, καὶ πότερον τὸ κατ'
 ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ φιλητὸν
 ἡδύ,⁸ ἢ οὔ. ἄμφω γὰρ εἰς ταῦτ' συνακτέον· τὰ τε
 γὰρ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ἂν πως⁹ τύχη
 φευκτά, καὶ τὸ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν οὐθὲν πρὸς αὐτόν,
 ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ζητεῖται, τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ
 1237 a οὕτως εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἐστὶ γὰρ αἰρετόν μὲν¹⁰ τὸ 27
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν· ἃ δεῖ

¹ Bz.: δυνατόν.³ Sp.: ὡς.⁵ Sp.: αἰρεῖσθαι.⁷ Erasmus: ἔχει ἐπίστασιν. πότερον γάρ.⁸ ὥστε τὸ φιλητὸν καὶ ἡδύ? Rac.⁹ ἂν πως Iac.: ἀπλῶς (ἀπλῶς <κἂν ἡδέα ὄντα> Ric.).¹⁰ μὲν <ἀπλῶς>? Rac.² Γ': τις.⁴ δι' add. Sp.⁶ Sp.: ὁ δ'.

But as a matter of fact it is friendship, as has been said, though not that sort of friendship but one
 22 derived from it. Therefore to confine the use of the term friend to that form of friendship alone is to do violence to observed facts, and compels one to talk paradoxes ; though it is not possible to bring
 23 all friendship under one definition. The only remaining alternative, therefore, is, that in a sense the primary sort of friendship alone is friendship, but in a sense all sorts are, not as having a common name by accident and standing in a merely chance relationship to one another, nor yet as falling under one species, but rather as related to one thing.

24 And since the same thing is absolutely good and absolutely pleasant at the same time if nothing interferes, and the true friend and friend absolutely is the primary friend, and such is a friend chosen in and for himself (and he must necessarily be such, for he for whom one wishes good for his own sake must
 25 necessarily be desirable for his own sake), a true friend is also absolutely pleasant ; owing to which it
 26 is thought that a friend of any sort is pleasant. But we must define this still further, for it is debatable whether what is good merely for oneself is dear or what is absolutely good, and whether the actual exercise of affection is accompanied by pleasure, so that an object of affection is also pleasant, or not. Both questions must be brought to the same issue ; for things not absolutely good but possibly evil are to be avoided, and also a thing not good for oneself is no concern of oneself, but what is sought for is that things absolutely good shall be good for oneself.
 27 For the absolutely good is absolutely desirable, but what is good for oneself is desirable for oneself ;

Pleasant-
ness and
goodness.

1237 a

συμφωνῆσαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἢ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅπως οἷς μήπω ἐστὶ γένηται. εὐθετος¹ δὲ καὶ πρὸ ὁδοῦ ὁ² ἄνθρωπος ὢν (φύσει
 5 γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 28
 ἀνὴρ ἀντὶ γυναικὸς καὶ εὐφυῆς ἀφυοῦς³. διὰ τοῦ
 ἡδέος δὲ ἢ ὁδός· ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰ καλὰ ἡδέα. ὅταν
 δὲ ταῦτα⁴ διαφωνῆ, οὐπω σπουδαῖος⁵ τελέως· ἐν-
 δέχεται γὰρ ἐγγενέσθαι ἀκρασίαν· τῷ⁶ γὰρ δια-
 φωνεῖν τὰγαθὸν τῷ ἡδεῖ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκρασία
 ἐστίν.

10 "Ὡστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ πρώτη φιλία κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἔσον- 29
 ται καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοί, τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ὅτι
 χρήσιμοι, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τρόπον. διχῶς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ 30
 τῷδὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ' ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν· καὶ ὁμοίως,
 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων·
 ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἀπλῶς ὠφέλιμον καὶ τὸ τοισδί (ὄν
 15 τρόπον⁸ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι πρὸς τὸ φαρμακεύεσθαι).
 ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἕξις, ἡ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ (ἔστω γὰρ ὁ 31
 ἄνθρωπος τῶν φύσει σπουδαίων)· ἡ ἄρα τοῦ φύσει
 σπουδαίου ἀρετὴ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ μὴ
 ἐκείνῳ.

Ἐμοίως δὴ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ 32
 ἐπιστατέον καὶ σκεπτέον πότερόν ἐστιν ἄνευ ἡδονῆς
 20 φιλία, καὶ τί διαφέρει, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ποτ' ἐστὶ

¹ Rac.: εὐθέτως (ante quod lacunam Sp., initium protaseos cuius apodosis l. 6 ἀνάγκη).

² ὁ add. Iac.

⁴ Bus.: τοῦτο.

⁶ M^b τὸ.

⁸ τὸ . . . τρόπον Iac. (τὸ add. Rac.): τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον.

³ Bus.: ἀφυῆς εὐφυοῦς.

⁵ sic versio Solomonis: σπουδαίων.

⁷ τὸ add. Rac.

and the two ought to come into agreement. This is effected by goodness ; and the purpose of political science is to bring it about in cases where it does not yet exist. And one who is a human being is well adapted to this and on the way to it (for by nature things that are absolutely good are good to him), and similarly a man rather than a woman and a gifted man rather than a dull one ; but the road is through pleasure—it is necessary that fine things shall be pleasant. When there is discord between them, a man is not yet perfectly good ; for it is possible for unrestraint to be engendered in him, as unrestraint is caused by discord between the good and the pleasant in the emotions.

29 Therefore since the primary sort of friendship is in accordance with goodness, friends of this sort will be absolutely good in themselves also, and this not because of being useful, but in another manner.

Friendship based on virtue the primary kind.

30 For good for a given person and good absolutely are twofold ; and the same is the case with states of character as with profitableness—what is profitable absolutely and what is profitable for given persons are different things (just as taking exercise is a different thing from taking drugs). So the state of character called human goodness is of two kinds—
31 for let us assume that man is one of the things that are excellent by nature : consequently the goodness of a thing excellent by nature is good absolutely, but that of a thing not excellent by nature is only good for that thing.

32 The case of the pleasant also, therefore, is similar. For here we must pause and consider whether there is any friendship without pleasure, and how such a friendship differs from other friendship, and on which

Problems as to the factor of pleasantness.

1237 a

τὸ φιλεῖν, πότερον¹ ὅτι ἀγαθὸς κὰν εἰ μὴ ἡδύς,
 ἀλλ' οὐ² διὰ τοῦτο; διχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ
 φιλεῖν, πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν οὐκ
 ἄνευ ἡδονῆς φαίνεται; δῆλον δ' ὅτι ὡσπερ ἐπὶ 33
 τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἱ πρόσφατοι θεωρίαι καὶ μαθήσεις
 25 αἰσθηταὶ μάλιστα τῶ ἡδεῖ, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τῶν
 συνήθων ἀναγνωρίσεις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπ'
 ἀμφοῖν. φύσει γοῦν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς,
 καὶ οἷς ἀγαθόν, τούτοις ἡδύ. διὸ εὐθύς τὰ ὅμοια 34
 ἀλλήλοις χαίρει, καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἡδιστον ἄνθρωπος·
 ὡστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀτελεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τελειωθέντα·
 30 ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος τέλειος. εἰ δὲ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν
 φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῆς ἀλλήλων
 γνωρίσεως, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὅλως ἢ φιλία ἢ πρώτη
 ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων ὅτι
 ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα· ἔστι δ' αὐτὴ ἢ φιλία ἔξις ἀφ' 35
 ἧς ἢ τοιαύτη προαίρεσις. τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς
 ἐνέργεια, αὕτη δ' οὐκ ἔξω ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῶ τῶ
 φιλοῦντι· δυνάμει δὲ πάσης³ ἔξω, ἢ γὰρ ἐν
 ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἡ⁴ ἕτερον. διὸ τὸ φιλεῖν χαίρειν ἀλλ'
 οὐ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἔστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι οὐ 36
 τοῦ⁵ φιλητοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ καὶ φιλίας, καὶ τὸ
 μὲν ἐν ἐμψύχῳ, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀψύχῳ· φιλεῖται γὰρ
 40 καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν 37

¹ καὶ πότερον Mb.² ἀλλ' οὐ] ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ Sp.³ <σωματικῆς> πάσης? Ric.⁴ ἢ add. Bz.⁵ οὐ τοῦ add. Rac.^a Goodness and pleasantness.^b Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'or not, but because he is pleasant.'^c Potential and actual (Solomon).^d Ross marks this clause as corrupted.

exactly of the two things ^a the affection depends—do we love a man because he is good even if he is not pleasant, but not because he is pleasant? ^b Then, affection having two meanings, ^c does actual affection seem to involve pleasure because activity
 33 is good? It is clear that as in science recent studies and acquirements are most fully apprehended, because of their pleasantness, ^d so with the recognition of familiar things, and the principle is the same in both cases. By nature at all events the absolutely good is absolutely pleasant, and the relatively good
 34 is pleasant to those for whom it is good. ^e Hence *ipso facto* like takes pleasure in like, and man is the thing most pleasant to man; so that as this is so even with imperfect things, it is clearly so with things when perfected, and a good man is a perfect man. And if active affection is the reciprocal choice, accompanied by pleasure, of one another's acquaintance, it is clear that friendship of the primary kind is in general the reciprocal choice of things absolutely good and pleasant because they are good and
 35 pleasant; and friendship itself is a state from which such choice arises. For its function is an activity, but this not external but within the lover himself; whereas the function of every faculty is external, for it is either in another or in oneself *qua* other.
 36 Hence to love is to feel pleasure but to be loved is not; for being loved is not an activity of the thing loved, whereas loving is an activity—the activity of friendship; and loving occurs only in an animate thing, whereas being loved occurs with an inanimate thing also, for even inanimate things are loved.
 37 And since to love actively is to treat the loved

^e Sc. (τὸ τοιοῦδι ἀγαθόν) οἷς ἀγαθόν, τοῦτοις ἡδύ.

1237 b τῷ φιλουμένῳ¹ ἐστὶ χρῆσθαι ἢ φιλούμενον, ὁ δὲ φίλος φιλούμενον τῷ² φίλῳ ἢ φίλος ἀλλὰ μὴ ἢ μουσικὸς ἢ ἰατρός, ἡδονὴ τοίνυν ἢ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτός, αὕτη φιλική· αὐτὸν γὰρ φιλεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλο.³ ὥστ' ἂν μὴ χαίρῃ ἢ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φιλία. οὐδὲ δεῖ ἐμποδίζειν οὐθέν τῶν συμβεβηκότων 38 μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὐφραίνει⁴. τί γάρ; σφόδρα δυσώδης λείπεται⁵. ἀγαπητὸν⁶ γὰρ τὸ εὐνοεῖν συζῆν⁷ δὲ μῆ.

Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἣν⁸ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν. αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δι' αὐτὴν καὶ δοκοῦσι καὶ 39 ἀμφισβητοῦνται, βέβαιον γάρ τι δοκεῖ ἡ φιλία, μόνῃ δ' αὕτη βέβαιος· τὸ γὰρ κεκριμένον βέβαιον, τὰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ γινόμενα μηδὲ ῥαδίως ποιεῖ⁹ τὴν κρίσιν ὀρθήν. οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἄνευ πίστεως φιλία 40 βέβαιος, ἡ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἄνευ χρόνου· δεῖ γὰρ πείραν λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ λέγει καὶ Θεόγυις·

15 οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὐδὲ γυναικός, πρὶν πειραθείης ὥσπερ ὑπόζυγιον.

οἱ δ' ἄνευ χρόνου οὐ φίλοι¹⁰ ἀλλὰ βούλονται εἶναι¹¹ φίλοι. καὶ μάλιστα λανθάνει ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ὡς φιλία· ὅταν γὰρ προθύμως ἔχωσι φίλοι εἶναι, διὰ 41 τὸ πάνθ' ὑπηρετεῖν τὰ φιλικὰ ἀλλήλοις οἴονται οὐ βούλεσθαι εἶναι¹² φίλοι ἀλλ' εἶναι φίλοι. τὸ δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς

¹ Fr.: τὸ φιλούμενον ὅ.

² Bz.: καί.

³ Iac.: ἄλλῳ.

⁴ Rac.: εὐφραίνειν.

⁵ οἷον εἰ σφόδρα δυσώδης γίνεται Ric.

⁶ Ross: ἀγαπάται.

⁷ Sol.: συζῆ.

⁸ Fr.: ἡ.

⁹ Bz.: οὐ ποιεῖ.

¹⁰ οἱ δ' . . . φίλοι Fr.: οὐδ' ἄνευ χρόνου φίλος.

¹¹ εἶναι add. Fr.

¹² εἶναι add. Rac.

object *qua* loved, and the friend is an object of love to the friend *qua* dear to him but not *qua* musician or medical man, the pleasure of friendship is the pleasure derived from the person himself *qua* himself ; for the friend loves him as himself, not because he is something else. Consequently if he does not take pleasure in him *qua* good, it is not the primary
 38 friendship. Nor ought any accidental quality to cause more hindrance than the friend's goodness causes delight ; for surely, if a person is very evil-smelling, people cut him—he must be content with our goodwill, he must not expect our society !

This then is the primary friendship, which all people
 39 recognize. It is on account of it that the other sorts are considered to be friendship, and also that their claim is disputed—for friendship seems to be something stable, and only this friendship is stable ; for a formed judgement is stable, and not doing things
 40 quickly or easily makes the judgement right. And there is no stable friendship without confidence, and confidence only comes with time ; for it is necessary to make trial, as Theognis says :

Thou canst not know the mind of man nor woman
 E'er thou hast tried them as thou triest cattle.

Those who become friends without the test of time are not real friends but only wish to be friends ; and such a character very readily passes for friendship, because when eager to be friends they think
 41 that by rendering each other all friendly services they do not merely wish to be friends but actually are friends. But as a matter of fact it happens in friendship as in everything else ; people are not

Permanence
 of true
 friendship.

1237 b

φιλίας· οὐ γὰρ εἰ βούλονται ὑγιαίνειν ὑγιαίνουσιν,
 ὥστ' οὐδ' εἰ εἶναι¹ φίλοι βούλονται ἤδη καὶ φίλοι
 εἰσίν. σημεῖον δέ· εὐδιάβλητοι γὰρ οἱ διακέιμενοι 4
 25 ἄνευ πείρας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ
 πείραν δεδώκασιν ἀλλήλοις, οὐκ εὐδιάβλητοι, περὶ
 ὧν δὲ μή, πεισθεῖεν ἂν ὅταν σύμβολα λέγωσιν οἱ
 διαβάλλοντες. ἅμα δὲ φανερόν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς 4
 φαῦλοις αὕτη ἢ φιλία· ἄπιστος γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος καὶ
 κακοήθης πρὸς πάντας· αὐτῷ γὰρ μετρεῖ τοὺς
 30 ἄλλους. διὸ εὐεξαπατητότεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί,
 ἂν μὴ διὰ πείραν ἀπιστῶσιν. οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι 4
 αἰροῦνται τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἀντὶ τοῦ φίλου, καὶ οὐθ-
 εῖς φιλεῖ μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ πράγματα, ὥστ'
 οὐ φίλοι· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται οὕτω κοινὰ τὰ φίλων,
 προσνέμεται γὰρ ὁ φίλος τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὐ τὰ
 πράγματα τοῖς φίλοις.
 35 Οὐ γίνεται ἄρ' ἢ φιλία ἢ πρώτη ἐν πολλοῖς, 4
 ὅτι χαλεπὸν πολλῶν πείραν λαβεῖν· ἐκάστῳ γὰρ
 ἂν ἔδει² συζῆσαι. οὐδὲ δὴ αἰρετέον ὁμοίως περὶ
 ἱματίου καὶ φίλου· καίτοι ἐν πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦ νοῦν 4
 ἔχοντος δυοῖν τὸ βέλτιον αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ μὲν τῷ
 χεῖρονι πάλαι ἐχρήτο, τῷ βελτίονι δὲ μηδέπω,
 40 τοῦθ' αἰρετέον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ πάλαι φίλου
 1238 a τὸν ἀγνώτα εἰ βελτίων. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄνευ πείρας

¹ εἶναι add. Rac.² Bus.: ἂν δεῖ (δεῖ? Rac.).

healthy merely if they wish to be healthy, so that even if people wish to be friends they are not actually
 42 friends already. A proof of this is that people who have come into this position without first testing one another are easily set at variance; for though men are not set at variance easily about things in which they have allowed each other to test them, in cases where they have not, whenever those who are attempting to set them at variance produce evidence
 43 they may be convinced. At the same time it is manifest that this friendship does not occur between base people either; for the base and evil-natured man is distrustful towards everybody, because he measures other people by himself. Hence good men are more easily cheated, unless as a result of
 44 trial they are distrustful. But the base prefer the goods of nature to a friend, and none of them love people more than things; and so they are not friends, for the proverbial 'common property as between friends' is not realized in this way—the friend is made an appendage of the things, not the things of the friends.

45 Therefore the first kind of friendship does not occur between many men, because it is difficult to test many—one would have to go and live with each of them. Nor indeed should one exercise choice in the case of a friend in the same way as about a
 46 coat; although in all matters it seems the mark of a sensible man to choose the better of two things, and if he had been wearing his worse coat for a long time and had not yet worn his better one, the better one ought to be chosen—but you ought not in place of an old friend to choose one whom you do not know to be a better man. For a friend is

Its rarity.

1238 a

οὐδὲ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ὁ φίλος, ἀλλὰ χρόνου δεῖ· διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἀλῶν. ἅμα δὲ δεῖ¹ μὴ μόνον ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἀλλὰ⁴ καὶ σοί, εἰ ὁ² φίλος ἔσται σοι φίλος· ἀγαθὸς μὲν⁵ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, φίλος δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθός· ἀπλῶς τε δ'³ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος ὅταν συμφωνήσῃ ταῦτα ἄμφω, ὥστε ὁ ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, τὸ αὐτὸ⁴ ἄλλῳ· ἢ καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς μὲν σπουδαῖος,⁵ ἄλλῳ δ' ἀγαθὸς ὅτι χρήσιμος. τὸ δὲ πολλοῖς ἅμα εἶναι φίλον⁶ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν κωλύει·
 10 οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἅμα πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐνεργεῖν.

Ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερόν ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεται ὅτι⁴ ἢ φιλία τῶν βεβαίων, ὥσπερ ἢ εὐδαιμονία τῶν αὐτάρκων. καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται

ἢ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιον, οὐ τὰ χρήματα—

πολὺ δὲ κάλλιον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἢ ἄρετὴ τῆς φύσεως.⁵
 15 καὶ ὁ τε χρόνος λέγεται δεικνύναι τὸν φίλον καὶ αἱ ἀτυχίαι μᾶλλον τῶν εὐτυχιῶν. τότε γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων, οὗτοι γὰρ μόνοι ἀντὶ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν καὶ φύσει κακῶν, περὶ ἃ αἱ εὐτυχίαι καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι, αἰροῦνται μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι·
 20 ἢ δ' ἀτυχία δηλοῖ τοὺς μὴ ὄντως ὄντας φίλους⁵ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τυχόν.⁸ ὁ δὲ χρόνος δηλοῖ ἀμφοτέρους· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρήσιμος ταχὺ δῆλος,

¹ Bz.: εἰ. ² εἰ ὁ Bus.: εἶναι (εἰ δὲ et ἔσται <καὶ> Ric.).

³ τε δ' add. Rac. (δ' add. Γ).

⁴ Ric.: τούτου.

⁵ Fr.: σπουδαίω.

⁶ Syl.: φίλον.

⁷ [ἢ] Ric.

⁸ τυχόντας Γ.

^a Euripides, *Electra* 941.

^b Or, emending the ms. text, 'that friendship is goodness of nature.'

not to be had without trial and is not a matter of a single day, but time is needed; hence the 'peck
 47 of salt' has come to be proverbial. At the same time if a friend is really to be your friend he must be not only good absolutely but also good to you; for a man is good absolutely by being good, but he is a friend by being good to another, and he is both good absolutely and a friend when both these attributes harmonize together, so that what is good
 48 absolutely is also good for another person; or also he may be not good absolutely yet good to another because useful. But being a friend of many people at once is prevented even by the factor of affection, for it is not possible for affection to be active in relation to many at once.

49 These things, therefore, show the correctness of the saying that friendship is a thing to be relied on, just as happiness is a thing that is self-sufficing. And it has been rightly said ^a: Its trust-worthiness.

Nature is permanent, but wealth is not—

50 although it would be much finer to say 'Friendship' than 'Nature.'^b And it is proverbial that time shows a friend, and also misfortunes more than good fortune. For then the truth of the saying 'friends' possessions are common property' is clear, for only friends, instead of the natural goods and natural evils on which good and bad fortune turn, choose a human being rather than the presence of
 51 the former and the absence of the latter; and misfortune shows those who are not friends really but only because of some casual utility. And both are shown by time; for even the useful friend is not shown quickly, but rather the pleasant one—

1238 a

ἀλλ' ὁ ἡδὺς μᾶλλον, πλὴν οὐδ' ὁ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺς
ταχύς.¹ ὅμοιοι γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς οἴνοις καὶ
ἐδέσμασιν· ἐκείνων τε γὰρ τὸ μὲν γλυκὺ² ταχὺ
25 δηλοῖ, πλείω δὲ χρόνον γινόμενον ἀηδὲς καὶ οὐ
γλυκὺ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοίως. ἔστι γὰρ
τὸ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺ τῷ τέλει ὀριστέον καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ.
ὁμολογήσαιεν δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ πολλοί, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν
ἀποβαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πόματος
καλοῦσι γλύκιον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ³ διὰ τὸ ἀποβαῖνον
30 οὐχ ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνεχὲς ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον
ἐξαπατᾶν.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη φιλία καὶ δι' ἣν αἱ ἄλλαι
λέγονται ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἔστι καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν
ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. αἱ δ' ἄλλαι
ἐγγίνονται φιλίαι καὶ ἐν παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις καὶ τοῖς
φαῦλοις· ὅθεν λέγεται “ἦλιξ ἦλικα τέρπει” καὶ
35 “κακὸς κακῷ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῆν.” ἐνδέχεται δὲ
καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις εἶναι τοὺς φαύλους, οὐχ⁴ ἢ
φαῦλοι ἢ μηδέτεροι, ἀλλ' οἷον εἰ⁵ ὠδικοὶ ἄμφω,
ἢ ὁ μὲν φιλωδὸς⁶ ὁ δ' ὠδικός ἐστιν, καὶ ἢ πάντες
ἔχουσι τι⁷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ταύτῃ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλή-
λοις. ἔτι χρήσιμοι ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ὠφέλιμοι
1238 b (οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν) οὐχ ἢ
φαῦλοι⁸ ἢ οὐδέτεροι. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐπι-
εικεῖ⁹ φαῦλον εἶναι φίλον· καὶ γὰρ χρήσιμος ἂν
εἴη πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁ μὲν φαῦλος πρὸς τὴν

¹ ταχύ Guil.² Ric.: ἡδὺ.³ οὐ add. Rac.⁴ οὐχ Γ: καλ.⁵ εἰ (vel ἦ) add. Ric.⁶ Vict.: φειδωλὸς.⁷ ἔχουσι τι Fr.: ἔχουσιν.⁸ οὐχ ἢ φαῦλοι add. Rac. (<φαῦλοι> Ric.).⁹ Γ: τὸν ἐπεικεῖ.

except that one who is absolutely pleasant is also not quick to show himself. For men are like wines and foods ; the sweetness of those is quickly evident, but when lasting longer it is unpleasant and not sweet, and similarly in the case of men. For absolute pleasantness is a thing to be defined by the
 52 End its effects and the time it lasts. And even the multitude would agree, not in consequence of results only, but in the same way as in the case of a drink they call it sweeter—for a drink fails to be pleasant not because of its result, but because its pleasantness is not continuous, although at first it quite takes one in.

53 The primary form of friendship therefore, and the one that causes the name to be given to the others, is friendship based on goodness and due to the pleasure of goodness, as has been said before. The other friendships occur even among children and animals and wicked people : whence the sayings—
 The two lower forms of Friendship.

Two of an age each other gladden ✓

and

Pleasure welds the bad man to the bad.^a

54 And also the bad may be pleasant to each other not as being bad or neutral,^b but if for instance both are musicians or one fond of music and the other a musician, and in the way in which all men have some
 55 good in them and so fit in with one another. Further they might be mutually useful and beneficial (not absolutely but for their purpose) not as being bad
 56 or neutral. It is also possible for a bad man to be friends with a good man, for the bad man may be useful to the good man for his purpose at the time

^a Euripides, *Bellerophon*, fr. 298 (Nauck).

^b *i.e.* neither good nor bad.

1238 b

ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ σπουδαίῳ, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ
 5 πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ πρὸς τὴν
 κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ἀπλῶς μὲν
 τὰ ἀπλᾶ,¹ τὰ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ἢ πενία
 συμφέρεи ἢ νόσος—ταῦτα τῶν ἀπλῶν¹ ἀγαθῶν
 ἔνεκα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ φάρμακον πιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ²
 βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα βούλεται. ἔτι καθ' 5
 10 οὓς τρόπους καὶ ἀλλήλοις οἱ μὴ σπουδαῖοι εἶεν ἂν
 φίλοι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἡδὺς οὐχ ἢ φαῦλος, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν
 κοινῶν τινὸς μετέχει, οἷον εἰ μουσικός. ἔτι ἢ
 ἔνι τι πᾶσιν ἐπιεικές (διὸ ἔνιοι ὀμιλητικοὶ εἰσιν³
 ἂν καὶ σπουδαῖοι⁴), ἢ ἢ προσαρμόττουσιν ἐκάστῳ·
 ἔχουσι γάρ τι πάντες τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

15 III. Τρία μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα φιλίας· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ 1
 τούτοις κατ' ἰσότητά πως λέγεται ἡ φιλία· καὶ
 γὰρ οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ἐν ἰσότητί πως ἀρετῆς
 εἰσὶ φίλοι ἀλλήλοις.

"Ἄλλη δὲ διαφορὰ τούτων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολήν, 2
 ὥσπερ θεοῦ [ἀρετῆ]⁵ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον, τοῦτο γὰρ
 20 ἕτερον εἶδος φιλίας, καὶ ὅλως ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχο-
 μένου· καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἕτερον, κατ'
 ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἴσον, κατ' ἀριθμὸν δ' οὐκ ἴσον. ἐν
 τούτῳ τῷ γένει πατὴρ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὁ εὐεργέτης

¹ ἀπλῶς Rieckher.² αὐτὸ hic Rac.: ante τὸ φάρμακον.³ εἶεν Ald.⁴ P^b: σπουδαίῳ M^b, <μὴ> σπουδαῖοι Bz.⁵ [ἀρετῆ] Rac. (vel ἀρετῆ vel κατ' ἀρετὴν subaudito φιλία).

^a *i.e.* ready to associate with all and sundry, regardless of moral inferiority. But perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'some (bad men) might be worthy to associate with, even in the judgement of a good man,' or 'some might be worthy to associate with even though not good.'

^b Between two unequal persons justice divides benefits in proportion to their deserts, so that the two shares are not

and the good man to the uncontrolled man for his purpose at the time and to the bad man for the purpose natural to him ; and he will wish his friend what is good—wish absolutely things absolutely good, and under a given condition things good for him, as poverty or disease may be beneficial: things good for him he will wish for the sake of the absolute goods, in the way in which he wishes his friend to drink medicine—he does not wish the action in
 57 itself but wishes it for the given purpose. Moreover a bad man may also be friends with a good one in the ways in which men not good may be friends with one another : he may be pleasant to him not as being bad but as sharing some common characteristic, for instance if he is musical. Again they may be friends in the way in which there is some good in everybody (owing to which some men are sociable^a even though good), or in the way in which they suit each particular person, for all men have something of good.

1 III. These then are three kinds of friendship ; and in all of these the term friendship in a manner indicates equality, for even with those who are friends on the ground of goodness the friendship is in a manner based on equality of goodness. Friendship between unequals.

2 But another variety of these kinds is friendship on a basis of superiority, as in that of a god for a man, for that is a different kind of friendship, and generally of a ruler and subject ; just as the principle of justice between them is also different, being one of equality proportionally but not of equality numerically.^b The friendship of father for son is in this

equal to each other but each equal to its recipient's merit. The word *ισον* itself connotes ' fair,' just, reasonable.

1238 b

πρὸς τὸν εὐεργετηθέντα. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων 3
 διαφοραὶ εἰσιν· ἄλλη¹ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ἀνδρὸς
 25 πρὸς γυναιῖκα, αὕτη μὲν ὡς ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχο-
 μένου, ἣ δὲ² εὐεργέτου πρὸς εὐεργετηθέντα. ἐν
 ταύταις δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντι-
 φιλεῖσθαι. γελοῖον γὰρ εἶ τις ἐγκαλοῖη τῷ θεῷ 4
 ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖ³ ὡς φιλεῖται, ἢ τῷ
 ἄρχοντι ὁ ἀρχομένος⁴. φιλεῖσθαι γάρ, οὐ φιλεῖν,
 30 τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ἢ φιλεῖν ἄλλον τρόπον. καὶ ἡ⁵
 ἡδονὴ διαφέρει, οὐδ' ἐν⁶ ἢ τε τοῦ αὐτάρκου ἐπὶ
 τῷ αὐτοῦ κτήματι ἢ παιδὶ καὶ ἡ⁵ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς
 ἐπὶ τῷ γινομένῳ. ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ 6
 τὴν χρῆσιν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δι' ἡδονήν, οἱ μὲν
 κατ' ἰσότητα εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν. διὸ καὶ
 οἱ ἐκείνως οἰόμενοι ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἐὰν μὴ ὁμοίως
 35 ὡσι⁷ χρήσιμοι καὶ εὖ ποιῶσιν· καὶ⁸ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδο-
 νῆς. δῆλον δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον 7
 τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἀλλήλοις πολλάκις, ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ ὁ
 ἐρῶν ὅτι οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶ τῆς προθυμίας.⁹
 διὸ εἶρηκεν Αἴνικος¹⁰.

ἐρώμενος τοιαῦτ' ἄν, οὐκ ἐρῶν λέγοι.

οἱ δὲ νομίζουσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον.

1239 a IV. Ὡσπερ οὖν εἴρηται τριῶν ὄντων εἰδῶν 1

¹ Mb: ἄλλην Pb, ἄλλαι <καὶ> Sp.

² δὲ <ὡς> Sp.

³ Γ: τῷ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι.

⁴ ὁ ἀρχόμενος Bz.: καὶ ἀρχομένῳ.

⁵ ἢ add. Iac.

⁶ οὐδ' ἐν Iac.: οὐδέν.

⁷ ὡσι add. Cas.

⁸ καὶ <ὁμοίως> vel <ὡσαυτῶς>? Rac.

⁹ Γr.: λόγος τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν προθυμίαν.

¹⁰ Iac.: διὸ εἶρηκεν αἴνικος ὁ.

^a i.e. they complain if the pleasure or benefit they get from their friend is not equal (absolutely, not merely in pro-
 390

3 class, and that of benefactor for beneficiary. And of
 these sorts of friendship themselves there are varie-
 ties: the friendship of father for son is different from
 that of husband for wife—the former is friendship
 as between ruler and subject, the latter that of
 benefactor for beneficiary. And in these varieties
 either there is no return of affection or it is not
 4 returned in a similar way. For it would be ludicrous
 if one were to accuse God because he does not return
 love in the same way as he is loved, or for a subject
 to make this accusation against a ruler; for it is the
 part of a ruler to be loved, not to love, or else to
 5 love in another way. And the pleasure differs; the
 pleasure that a man of established position has in
 his own property or son and that which one who
 lacks them feels in an estate or a child coming to him
 6 are not one and the same. And in the same way
 also in the case of those who are friends for utility
 or for pleasure—some are on a footing of equality,
 others one of superiority. Owing to this those who
 think they are on the former footing complain if
 they are not useful and beneficial in a similar
 7 manner; and also in the case of pleasure.^a This
 is clear in cases of passionate affection, for this is
 often a cause of combat between the lover and his
 beloved: the lover does not see that they have not
 the same reason for their affection. Hence Aenicus^b
 has said:

A loved one so would speak, but not a lover.

But they think that the reason is the same.

1 IV. There being then, as has been said,^c three
 portion to a supposed difference of merit) to that which they
 give to him.

^b A dramatist of the Old Comedy.

^c See 1236 a 7—1237 b 15.

1239 a

φιλίας, κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ¹ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ
κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, αὗται πάλιν διήρηνται εἰς δύο· αἱ
μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον αἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν εἰσιν.
⁵ φιλίαι μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέραι, φίλοι δ' οἱ κατὰ τὴν 2
ἰσότητα· ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ ἀνὴρ παιδίῳ φίλος,
φιλεῖ δέ γε καὶ φιλεῖται. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι
μὲν δεῖ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα, εἶναι δὲ φιλῆ, ὀνειδίζεται
ὡς ἀνάξιον φιλῶν· τῇ γὰρ ἀξία τῶν φίλων²
μετρεῖται καὶ τινι ἴσῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν δι' ἡλικίας 3
¹⁰ ἔλλειψιν ἀνάξια ὁμοίως φιλεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀρε-
τὴν ἢ γένος ἢ κατὰ ἄλλην τοιαύτην ὑπεροχὴν· δεῖ³
δὲ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα ἢ ἥττον ἢ μὴ φιλεῖν ἀξιούν,
καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησίμῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἡδέϊ καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν.
ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς μικραῖς ὑπεροχαῖς εἰκότως γίνονται 4
ἀμφισβητήσεις (τὸ γὰρ μικρὸν ἐνιαχοῦ οὐδὲν
¹⁵ ἰσχύει, ὥσπερ ἐν ξύλου σταθμῷ, ἀλλ' ἐν χρυσίῳ⁴.
ἀλλὰ τὸ μικρὸν κακῶς κρίνουσιν, φαίνεται γὰρ
τὸ μὲν οἰκείον ἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς μέγα τὸ δ'
ἀλλότριον διὰ τὸ πόρρω μικρόν). ὅταν δὲ ὑπερβολὴ 5
ᾗ, οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὡς δεῖ ἢ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι
ἢ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ τὸν θεόν.
²⁰ φανερόν δὴ ὅτι φίλοι μὲν ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ, τὸ 6
ἀντιφιλεῖν δ' ἐστὶν ἄνευ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι. δῆλον 7
δὲ καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν καθ'
ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαν τῆς κατ' ἰσότητα· ἅμα γὰρ

¹ καὶ add. Rac.² τῷ φιλεῖν: τὸ φιλεῖν Bz.³ Wilson: ἀεί.⁴ χρυσοῦ Sp.^a i.e. proportional equality: see note on 1238 b 21.^b Or 'one ought to expect the superior to feel . . .'

[kinds of friendship, based on goodness, utility and pleasantness, these are again divided in two, one set being on a footing of equality and the other on one of superiority. Though both sets, therefore, are friendships, only when they are on an equality are the parties friends; for it would be absurd for a man to be a friend of a child, though he does feel affection for him and receive it from him. In some cases, while the superior partner ought to receive affection, if he gives it he is reproached as loving an unworthy object; for affection is measured by the worth of the friends and by one sort of equality.^a So in some cases there is properly a dissimilarity of affection because of inferiority of age, in others on the ground of goodness or birth or some other such superiority; it is right for the superior to claim to feel^b either less affection or none, alike in a friendship of utility and in one of pleasure and one based on goodness. So in cases of small degrees of superiority disputes naturally occur (for a small amount is not of importance in some matters, as in weighing timber, though in gold plate it is; but people judge smallness of amount badly, since one's own good because of its nearness appears big and that of others because of its remoteness small); but when there is an excessive amount of difference, then even the parties themselves do not demand that they ought to be loved in return, or not loved alike—for example, if one were claiming a return of love from God. It is manifest, therefore, that men are friends when they are on an equality, but that a return of affection is possible without their being friends. And it is clear why men seek friendship on a basis of superiority more than that on one

Friendship between unequals possible in all three forms;

but these are not true friends.

1239 a

ὑπάρχει οὕτως αὐτοῖς τό τε φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἡ
 ὑπεροχή. διὸ ὁ κόλαξ παρ' ἐνίοις ἐντιμότερος τοῦ
 25 φίλου· ἄμφω γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ
 κολακευομένῳ. μάλιστα δ' οἱ φιλότιμοι τοιοῦτοι·
 τὸ γὰρ θαυμάζεσθαι ἐν ὑπεροχῇ. φύσει δὲ 8
 γίνονται οἱ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἱ δὲ φιλότιμοι· φιλητικὸς
 δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι,
 ἐκεῖνος δὲ φιλούμενος¹ μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων
 30 τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖσθαι τῆς ὑπεροχῆς φίλος,
 ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ἡδονῆς² ὁ φιλητικός. ἔνεστι
 γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντι³. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι
 συμβεβηκός, ἔστι γὰρ λανθάνειν φιλούμενον,
 φιλοῦντα δ' οὐ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὸ 9
 35 φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι,⁴ τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι
 κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν. σημεῖον δέ· ἔλοιτ' ἂν ὁ φίλος
 μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἄμφω, γινώσκειν ἢ
 γινώσκεσθαι, οἷον ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς⁵ αἱ γυναῖκες
 ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἢ Ἀντιφῶντος. καὶ
 γὰρ ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ἐθέλειν γινώσκεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα,
 40 καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ
 γινώσκειν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἔνεκα. διὸ 1
 1239 b καὶ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τῷ φιλεῖν πρὸς τοὺς τεθνεῶτας
 ἐπαινοῦμεν· γινώσκουσι γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκονται.
 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείονες τρόποι φιλίας, καὶ πόσοι

¹ Rac.: φιλότιμος.² τῇ . . . ἡδονῇ Sp. (et Ric. om. ὁ).³ Ric. et Sol.: ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα.⁴ [ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι] ? Rac.⁵ Vict.: ὑπερβολαῖς.

^a This poet lived at Syracuse at the court of Dionysius the elder (who came into power 406 B.C.). He is said to have written tragedies in collaboration with the tyrant; and he was sentenced by him to death by flogging (*Rhet.* 1384 a 9).

of equality ; for in the former case they score both affection and a sense of superiority at the same time. Hence with some men the flatterer is more esteemed than the friend, for he makes the person flattered appear to score both advantages. And this most of all characterizes men ambitious of honours, since

8 to be admired implies superiority. Some persons grow up by nature affectionate and others ambitious ; one who enjoys loving more than being loved is affectionate, whereas the other enjoys being loved more. So the man who enjoys being admired and loved is a lover of superiority, whereas the other, the affectionate man, loves the pleasure of loving. For this he necessarily possesses by the mere activity of loving ; for being loved is an accident, as one can be loved without knowing it, but one cannot love

9 without knowing it. Loving depends, more than being loved, on the actual feeling, whereas being loved corresponds with the nature of the object. A sign of this is that a friend, if both things were not possible, would choose to know the other person rather than to be known by him, as for example women do when they allow others to adopt their children, and Andromache in the tragedy of Antiphon.^a Indeed the wish to be known seems to be selfish, and its motive a desire to receive and not to confer some benefit, whereas to wish to know a person is for the sake of conferring benefit and

10 bestowing affection. For this reason we praise those who remain constant in affection towards the dead ; for they know, but are not known.

It has, then, been stated that there are several modes of friendship, and how many modes there

1239 b

τρόποι, ὅτι τρεῖς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἀντι-
 5 φιλεῖσθαι καὶ οἱ φίλοι διαφέρουσιν οἱ τε κατ'
 ἰσότητα καὶ οἱ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, εἴρηται.

V. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φίλον λέγεται καὶ καθόλου 1
 μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐλέχθη, ὑπὸ τῶν
 ἕξωθεν συμπαραλαμβανόντων¹ (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ
 ὁμοίον φασιν εἶναι φίλον, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον),
 λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τούτων πῶς εἰσὶ πρὸς τὰς
 10 εἰρημένας φιλίας. ἀνάγεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὁμοιον καὶ 2
 εἰς τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ἀγαθὸν
 ἀπλοῦν τὸ δὲ κακὸν πολύμορφον· καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς
 μὲν ὁμοιος αἰεὶ καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται τὸ ἦθος, ὁ
 δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ὁ ἄφρων οὐθέν ἔοικεν ἕωθεν καὶ
 15 ἔσπερας. διὸ ἐὰν μὴ συμβάλλωσιν οἱ φαῦλοι, οὐ 3
 φίλοι ἐάντοῖς ἀλλὰ δίστανται· ἢ δ' οὐ βέβαιος
 φιλία οὐ φιλία. ὥστε οὕτω μὲν τὸ ὁμοιον φίλον,
 ὅτι τὸ² ἀγαθὸν ὁμοιον. ἔστι δὲ ὡς καὶ κατὰ τὸ
 ἡδύ· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις ταῦθ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἕκαστον δὲ
 φύσει αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡδύ. διὸ καὶ φωναὶ καὶ ἕξεις³ 4
 20 καὶ συνημερεύσεις τοῖς ὁμογενέσιν ἡδιστα ἀλλήλοις,
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις· καὶ ταύτη ἐνδέχεται καὶ
 τοὺς φαύλους ἀλλήλους φιλεῖν·

κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῆ.

Τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φίλον κατὰ⁴ τὸ 5
 χρήσιμον. αὐτὸ γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ ὁμοιον ἄχρηστον,
 25 διὸ δεσπότης δούλου δεῖται καὶ δούλος δεσπότου
 καὶ γυνὴ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀλλήλων· καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἐπι-

¹ Sp.: συμπεριλαμβανόντων.

² τὸ add. Bz.

³ v.l. αἱ ἕξεις: πράξεις? Rac. (διαλέξεις vel διάλεξις Ric., sed cf. l. 20).

⁴ Rac.: ὡς.

are, namely three, and that receiving affection and having one's affection returned, and friends on an equality and those on a footing of superiority, are different.

- 1 V. But as the term 'friend' is used in a more universal sense as well, as was also said at the beginning,^a by those who take in wider considerations (some saying that what is like is dear, others what is opposite), we must also speak about these forms of friendship and their relation to the kinds that have
 2 been discussed. As for likeness, it connects with pleasantness and also with goodness. For the good is simple, whereas the bad is multiform; and also the good man is always alike and does not change in character, whereas the wicked and the foolish are quite different in the evening from what they were
 3 in the morning. Hence if wicked men do not hit it off together, they are not friends with one another but they separate; yet an insecure friendship is not friendship at all. So the like is dear to us in this way, because the good is like. But in a way it is also dear on the score of pleasantness; for to those who are alike the same things are pleasant, and also everything is by nature pleasant to itself.
 4 Owing to this relations find one another's voices and characters and society pleasantest, and so with the lower animals; and in this way it is possible even for bad men to feel affection for each other:

Friendship of the like and of opposites (see c. i. §§ 7, 8).

But pleasure welds the bad man to the bad.^b

- 5 But opposite is dear to opposite on the score of utility. For the like is useless to itself, and therefore master needs slave and slave master, man and wife need one another; and the opposite is pleasant

1239 b

θυμητὸν τὸ ἐναντίον ὡς χρήσιμον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τῷ¹ τέλει ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος· ὅταν γὰρ τύχη οὐ² ἐπιθυμῆι, ἐν τῷ τέλει μὲν ἔστιν οὐκ ὀρέγεται δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ.

30 Ἔστι δέ πως καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου φιλία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὀρέγεται γὰρ ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ μέσον· ὡς σύμβολα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἀλλήλων, διὰ τὸ οὕτω³ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσον. ὥστε³ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι τοῦ ἐναντίου, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος, ὀρέγονται γὰρ οὐκ ἀλλήλων τὰναντία ἀλλὰ
35 τοῦ μέσου. ὑπερψυχθέντες γὰρ ἐὰν θερμανθῶσιν εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστανται, καὶ ὑπερθερμανθέντες ἐὰν ψυχθῶσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μή, αἰεὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὅτι⁴ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέσοις. ἀλλὰ⁸ χαίρει ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας τοῖς φύσει ἡδέσι, οἱ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξισταῖσι τῆς φύσει ἕξεως.

40 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔστιν· 9
1240 a τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἡ⁹ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων. διὸ ἐνίοτε⁵ ἀνομοίοις χαίρουσιν, οἷον αὐστηροὶ εὐτραπέλοις καὶ ὀξεῖς ραθύμοις· εἰς τὸ μέσον γὰρ καθίστανται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. κατὰ συμβεβηκός οὖν, 10 ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τὰ ἐναντία φίλα καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

5 Πόσα μὲν οὖν εἶδη φιλίας, καὶ τίνες διαφοραὶ καθ' ἃς λέγονται οἱ τε φίλοι καὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες καὶ

¹ τῷ add. Rac. (cf. 1333 a 10).

² Sp.: διὸ οὐ τῷ.

³ Sus.: ἔτι.

⁴ ὅτι add. Sp.

⁵ ἐνιοι τοῖς Fr.

^a The two halves of a bone or coin broken in half by two contracting parties and one kept by each, to serve as a token of identification when found to fit together.

Very important.

and desirable as useful, not as contained in the End but as a means to the End—for when a thing has got what it desires it has arrived at its End, and does not strive to get its opposite; for example the hot the cold and the wet the dry.

6 But in a way love of the opposite is also love of the good. For opposites strive to reach one another through the middle point, for they strive after each other as tallies,^a because in that way one middle
 7 thing results from the two. Hence accidentally love of the good is love of the opposite, but essentially it is love of the middle, for opposites do not strive to reach one another but the middle. If when people have got too cold they are subjected to heat, and when they have got too hot to cold, they reach a mean temperature, and similarly in other matters; but without such treatment they are always in a state of desire, because they are not at the middle
 8 points. But a man in the middle enjoys without passionate desire things by nature pleasant, whereas the others enjoy everything that takes them outside
 9 their natural state. This kind of relationship, then, exists even between inanimate things; but when it occurs in the case of living things it becomes affection. Hence sometimes people take delight in persons unlike themselves, the stiff for instance in the witty and the active in the lazy, for they are brought by one another into the middle state.
 10 Hence accidentally, as was said,^b opposites are dear to opposites also on account of the good.

It has, then, been said how many kinds of friend-
 ship there are, and what are the different senses in which people are termed friends, and also givers

Self-love

^b 1239 b 32.

1240 a

οἱ φιλοῦμενοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥστε φίλοι εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου, εἴρηται.

VI. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ φίλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἢ πολλὴν ἔχει ἐπίσκεψιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις μάλιστα
 10 ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ χρώμενοι κανόνι κρίνουσι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους φιλίαν. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ δοκοῦνθ' ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μὲν ὑπεναντιοῦται, τὰ δ' ὅμοια φαίνεται ὄντα. ἔστι γὰρ πως κατ' 2 ἀναλογίαν αὕτη¹ φιλία ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ. ἐν δυσι γὰρ
 15 διηρημένοις τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν· δι' ἃ μᾶλλον οὕτως² αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος ὡς³ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς εἴρηται πῶς ἐκῶν ἢ ἄκων, τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. καὶ ὅμοιον⁴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰ φίλος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ καὶ ἐχθρός, καὶ εἰ ἀδικεῖ τις αὐτὸς αὐτόν· πάντα
 20 γὰρ ἐν δυσι ταῦτα καὶ διηρημένοις⁵· ἢ⁶ δὴ⁷ δύο³ πως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὑπάρχει πως ταῦτα, ἢ⁸ δ' οὐ διηρημένα, οὐχ ὑπάρχει.

Ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἕξεως εἰσιν⁹ οἱ λοιποὶ τρόποι τοῦ φίλον εἶναι ὠρισμένοι¹⁰ καθ' οὓς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰώθαμεν. δοκεῖ γὰρ φίλος εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενός τινι τἀγαθά, ἢ οἷα οἶεται
 25 ἀγαθά, μὴ δι' αὐτὸν ἀλλ' ἐκείνου ἕνεκα· ἄλλον δὲ 4

¹ Ric.: αὕτη ἢ.² οὗτος Mb.³ ὡς add. Γ.⁴ ὅμοια Sp.⁵ Bz.: διηρημένως.⁶ Fr.: εἰ P^b, ἢ M^b.⁷ Sp. (enim Guil.): δε.⁸ ἢ eodd., εἰ Bk.⁹ Sp.: ὡς (καὶ Ric.).¹⁰ Iac.: φιλεῖσθαι διωρισμένοι.

^a Cf. 1223 a 36–b 17. Self-restraint (or the lack of it) indicates that a man's personality has in a sense two parts, one of which may control the other; and similarly self-love implies that one part of the personality can have a certain feeling in regard to another part.

and objects of affection, both in a manner that makes them actually friends and without being friends.

1 VI. The question whether one is one's own friend or not involves much consideration. Some think that every man is his own best friend, and they use this friendship as a standard by which to judge his friendship for his other friends. On theoretical grounds, and in view of the accepted attributes of friends, self-love and love of others are in some respects opposed but in others manifestly similar.

2 For in a way self-love is friendship by analogy, but not absolutely. For being loved and loving involve two separate factors; owing to which a man is his own friend rather in the way in which, in the case of the unrestrained and the self-restrained man, we have said ^a how one has those qualities voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one's spirit being related to each other in a certain way; and all such matters are a similar thing,—whether a man can be his own friend or foe, and whether a man can treat himself unjustly. For all these relations

only metaphorical friendship;

3 involve two separate factors; in so far then as the spirit is in a manner two, these relations do in a manner belong to it, but in so far as the two are not separate, they do not.

From the state of friendship for oneself are determined the remaining modes of friendship under which we usually study it in our discourses.^b For a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for somebody things that are good, or that he believes to be good, not on his own account but for the other's sake;

but the four notes of true friendship

^b Cf. 1244 a 20. Perhaps a reference to Aristotle's lectures (Stock).

1240 a

τρόπον ᾧ τὸ εἶναι βούλεται δι' ἐκείνον καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτόν, κἂν εἰ μὴ διανέμων τὰγαθὰ, μήτοι' τὸ εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα φίλος εἶναι². ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ συζῆν αἰρεῖται δι' αὐτὴν τὴν 5
 30 ὀμιλίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, οἷον οἱ πατέρες τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις, συζῶσι δ' ἑτέροις. μάχεται 6
 δὲ³ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν μὴ τοδὶ αὐτοῖς,⁴ οἱ δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ τὸ συζῆν, οὐκ οἴονται φιλεῖσθαι. ἔτι τὸ τῷ⁵ ἀλγοῦντι συν- 7
 αλγεῖν μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν—οἷον οἱ δούλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας ὅτι χαλεποὶ ἀλγοῦντες,
 35 ἄλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτούς, ὥσπερ αἱ μητέρες τοῖς τέκνοις καὶ οἱ συνωδίνοντες ὄρνιθες. βούλεται γὰρ μάλιστα 8
 τε οὐ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην (οἷον διψῶντι συνδιψῆν) εἰ ἐνεδέχεται, εἴτε μὴ, ὅτι⁶ ἐγγύτατα. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς 9
 λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαίρειν· τὸ γὰρ χαίρειν⁷ μὴ δι' 10
 1240 b ἕτερόν τι ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκείνον ὅτι χαίρει φιλικόν. ἔτι τὰ τοιάδε λέγεται περὶ φιλίας, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότης, καὶ μίαν ψυχὴν⁸ εἶναι τοῖς ἀληθῶς φίλοις.⁹ ἅπαντα 10
 ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρεται πρὸς τὸν ἕνα· καὶ γὰρ βούλεται 5
 τὰγαθὰ αὐτῷ¹⁰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, οὐθεὶς γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτόν εὖ ποιεῖ διὰ τι ἕτερον, οὐδὲ χάριν τοσοῦδι εὖ¹¹ λέγει, ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ εἰς· δοκεῖν¹² γὰρ

¹ Iac.: μὴ τῷ.² Iac.: μάλιστα φιλεῖν.³ Sp. δὴ.⁴ Iac.: μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῖς.⁵ τὸ τῷ Fr.: τῷ.⁶ εἴτε μὴ, ὅτι Rac.: ὅτι μὴ (εἴτε μὴ Iac.).⁷ τὸ γὰρ χαίρειν add. Γ.⁸ Cas.: καὶ μὴ μίαν φιλίαν.⁹ Rac.: τοὺς . . . φίλους.¹⁰ Bek.: αὐτῷ.¹¹ χάριν τοσοῦδι εὖ Rac.: χάριτος οὐδὲ (χάριν τοσοῦδε Iac.).¹² Iac.: δοκεῖ.

4 and in another way when a man wishes another's
 existence—even though not bestowing goods on
 him, let alone existence—for that other's sake and
 not for his own, he would be thought to be in a high
 5 degree the friend of that other; and in another
 way a man is a friend of one whose society he desires
 merely for the sake of his company and not for some-
 thing else, as fathers desire their children's exist-
 ence, though they associate with other people. All
 6 these cases conflict with one another; some men
 do not think they are loved unless the friend wishes
 them this or that particular good, others unless their
 existence is desired, others unless their society.
 7 Again we shall reckon it affection to grieve with
 one who grieves not for some ulterior motive—as
 for instance slaves in relation to their masters share
 their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and
 not for their masters' own sake, as mothers grieve
 with their children, and birds that share each other's
 8 pain. For a friend wishes most of all that he might
 not only feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel
 actually the same pain—for example when he is
 thirsty, share his thirst—if this were possible, and
 9 if not, as nearly the same as may be. The same
 principle applies also in the case of joy; it is char-
 acteristic of a friend to rejoice for no other reason
 than because the other is rejoicing. Again there
 are sayings about friendship such as 'Amity is
 10 equality' and 'True friends have one spirit.' All
 these sayings refer back to the single individual;
 for that is the way in which the individual wishes
 good to himself, as nobody benefits himself for some
 ulterior motive, nor speaks well of himself for such
 and such a consideration, because he acted as an

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φιλεῖν βούλεται ὁ δῆλον ποιῶν ὅτι φιλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλεῖν.¹ καὶ τὸ εἶναι βούλεσθαι² καὶ τὸ συζῆν καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν, καὶ μία δὴ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ συναποθνήσκειν—οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὁ εἰς, καὶ οὕτως³ ὁμιλεῖ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ—πάντα δὴ⁴ ταῦτα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὐτόν. ἐν δὲ τῷ πονηρῷ διαφωνεῖ, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ καὶ ἐχθρὸν ἐνδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι· ἢ δ' εἰς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, ὀρεκτὸς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. τοιοῦτος ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλος ἐπεὶ ὁ γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἰς ἀλλὰ πολλοί, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἕτερος καὶ ἔμπληκτος. ὥστε καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ὅτι γὰρ πη ὁμοῖος⁵ καὶ εἰς καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός, ταύτη αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος καὶ ὀρεκτός. φύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὁ πονηρὸς παρὰ φύσιν. ὁ δ'⁶ ἀγαθὸς οὐθ' ἅμα λαιδορεῖται ἑαυτῷ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκρατής, οὐθ' ὁ ὕστερος τῷ πρότερον, ὥσπερ ὁ μεταμελητικός,⁷ οὐτε ὁ ἔμπροσθεν τῷ ὕστερον, ὥσπερ ὁ ψεύστης (ὅλως τε εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ διορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος σπουδαῖος, δῆλον γὰρ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον σπουδαῖον αὐτῶν⁸)· ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἐγκαλέσωσιν αὐτοῖς,⁹ ἀποκτιννύασιν αὐτούς,¹⁰ ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πᾶς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός.

¹ φιλεῖ? Rac.³ Rac.: ἴσως.⁵ Bk.: ὁμοῖοι.⁷ Cas.: μεταληπτικός.⁹ Fr.: αὐτοῖς.² Rac.: μάλιστα.⁴ Iac.: γὰρ (δὲ Γ').⁶ Syl.: οὐδέ.⁸ Fr.: αὐτόν.¹⁰ Fr.: αὐτούς.^a Cf. l. 3: δὴ marks a quotation.^b See *Sophistici Elenchi*, 175 b 15 ff. 'Coriscus' is used for any imaginary person, cf. 1220 a 19 f.

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- individual ; for one who displays his affection wishes
 11 not to be but to be thought affectionate. And wishing for the other to exist, and associating together, and sharing joy and grief, and 'being one spirit'^a and being unable even to live without one another but dying together—for this is the case with the single individual, and he associates with himself in this way,—all these characteristics then
 belong to the good man in relation to himself. all apply to the good man's love of self.
 12 In a wicked man on the other hand, for instance in one who lacks self-control, there is discord, and because of this it is thought to be possible for a man actually to be his own enemy ; but as being one and
 13 indivisible he is desirable to himself. This is the case with a good man and one whose friendship is based on goodness, because assuredly an evil man is not a single individual but many, and a different person in the same day, and full of caprice. Hence a man's affection for himself carries back to love of the good ; for because in a way a man is like himself and a single person and good to himself, in this way he is dear and desirable to himself. And a man is like that by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to
 14 nature. But a good man does not rebuke himself either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his former self his later, like the penitent, nor his later
 15 self his former, like the liar—(and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is related to himself as 'John Styles' is related to 'good John Styles'^b ; for it is clear that the same amount of 'John Styles' is good as of 'good John Styles')—because when men blame themselves they are murdering their own personalities, whereas everybody seems to himself good. And he who is

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ζητεῖ δὲ ὁ ἀπλῶς ὢν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι δὴ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ ἅ
 30 φύσει βούλεται εἶναι φίλα καὶ διασπάσαι ἀδύνατον. διὸ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου μὲν δοκεῖ ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἅ φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων οὐ,¹ οἷον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ . . .² οὐκ ἄρα φίλος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ παιδία, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἤδη ἔχη προαίρεσιν· ἤδη γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς³ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἔοικε
 35 δ' ἢ φιλία ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν⁴ τῇ κατὰ συγγένειαν· οὐθέτερον γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς λῦσαι, ἀλλὰ κἂν διαφέρωνται ὅμως οὗτοι μὲν συγγενεῖς ἔτι,⁵ ὁ δὲ ἔτι εἰς ἕως ἂν ζῆ.

Ποσαχῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ φιλεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ φιλῖαι ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

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VII. Οἰκείον δὲ τῇ σκέψει θεωρῆσαι καὶ περὶ ἴ
 ὁμοιοῖας καὶ εὐνοίας· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι ταυτό,⁶ τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων. ἔστι δ' ἢ εὐνοια τῆς φιλίας οὔτε πάμπαν ἕτερον οὔτε ταυτόν. διηρημένης γὰρ τῆς φιλίας κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, ²
 5 οὔτ' ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὔτ' ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡδονὴν ἔστιν. εἴτε γὰρ ὅτι χρήσιμος⁷ βούλεται αὐτῷ τὰγαθά, οὐ δι' ἐκείνον ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν βούλοιστ' ἂν, δοκεῖ δ' ὥσπερ . . .⁸ καὶ ἢ εὐνοια οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα⁹ τοῦ

¹ οὐ add. Sp.² lacunam Sus.³ Fr.: παῖς.⁴ Syl.: αὐτὸν.⁵ εἰσὶ Sp.⁶ Rae.: ταυτά.⁷ Sp.: χρήσιμον.⁸ lacunam edd.: <καὶ ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλία> Sus.⁹ Iac.: εὐνοια.^a ll. 13-21.^b Some words seem to have been lost here.

absolutely good seeks to be dear even to himself, as has been said,^a because he has two factors within him which by nature desire to be friendly and which
 16 it is impossible to draw asunder. Therefore in the case of man each individual seems dear to himself, although in the case of other animals it is not so, for example a horse to itself . . .^b so it is not dear to itself. But neither are children, but only when they have come to possess purposive choice; for when that point is reached the mind is at variance with
 17 the appetite. And affection for oneself resembles the affection of relationship: neither connexion is in people's own power to dissolve, but even if the parties quarrel, nevertheless relatives are still relatives and the individual is still one as long as he lives.

From what has been said, then, it is clear how many meanings there are of the term 'affection,' and that all the forms of friendship carry back to the first one.

1 VII. It is relative to our inquiry to consider also the subject of agreement of feeling and kindly feeling^c; for some people think that they are the same thing, and others that they cannot exist apart. Kindly feeling is neither entirely distinct from friend-
 2 ship nor yet identical with it. If friendship is divided into three modes, kindly feeling is not found in the friendship of utility nor in friendship for pleasure. If A wishes B prosperity because he is useful, the motive of his wish would be not B's interest but his own, whereas it is thought that kindly feeling like . . .^d is not for the sake of the person

Goodwill
the basis of
friendship
founded on
Goodness.

^c These are Solomon's versions of the terms usually rendered 'concord and goodwill.'

^d Perhaps 'virtuous friendship' should be supplied.

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εὐνοῖζομένου εἶναι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ϕ εὐνοεῖ· εἴτ'¹ ἐν τῇ
 τοῦ ἡδέος φιλία, κὰν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἡνύουν· ὥστε
 10 δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλίαν ἢ εὐνοιά ἐστιν.
 ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν εὐνοοῦντος βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστί, τοῦ ³
 δὲ φίλου καὶ πράττειν ἂ βούλεται· ἔστι γὰρ ἢ
 εὐνοια ἀρχὴ φιλίας. ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὐνους, ὁ
 δ' εὐνους οὐ πᾶς φίλος, ἀρχομένῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ὁ
 15 εὐνοῶν μόνον. διὸ ἀρχὴ φιλίας, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλία.

Δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἷ τε φίλοι ὁμονοεῖν καὶ οἱ ὁμονοοῦν-
 τες φίλοι εἶναι. ἔστι δ' οὐ περὶ πάντα ἢ ὁμόνοια ⁴
 ἢ φιλική, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ
 ὅσα εἰς τὸ συζῆν συντείνει. οὐδὲ² μόνον κατὰ διά-
 νοιαν ἢ κατὰ ὄρεξιν· ἔστι γὰρ τάναντία νοεῖν καὶ³
 20 ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ διαφωνεῖ τοῦτο·
 οὐδ' εἰ⁴ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁμονοεῖ,⁵ καὶ κατὰ
 τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὁμόνοια· οἷ ⁵
 γε φαῦλοι ταῦτὰ προαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες
 βλάβπτουσιν ἀλλήλους. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἢ ὁμόνοια οὐχ ⁶
 ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἢ φιλία, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν
 25 πρώτη καὶ φύσει σπουδαία, διὸ οὐκ ἔστι τοὺς
 φαύλους οὕτως⁶ ὁμονοεῖν, ἑτέρα δὲ καθ' ἣν καὶ οἱ
 φαῦλοι ὁμονοοῦσιν, ὅταν τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν
 καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχωσιν. οὕτω δὲ δεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν ⁷
 ὀρέγεσθαι ὥστ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχειν

¹ Sp.: εἰ δ' aut εἰ δῆ.³ νοεῖν καὶ Sol.: τὸ κινεῖν.⁵ ὁμονοεῖν P^b.² Sus.: οὔτε⁴ οὐ δεῖ M^b⁶ <οὔτως> add. Rac.

who feels it himself but for the sake of him for whom he feels kindly ; and if kindly feeling were found in friendship for the pleasant, men would feel kindly even towards inanimate objects. So that it is clear that kindly feeling has to do with the
 3 friendship that is based on character. But it is the mark of one who feels kindly only to wish good, whereas it is the mark of the friend also to do the good that he wishes ; for kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, as every friend feels kindly, but not everyone who feels kindly is a friend, since the kindly man is only as it were making a beginning. Therefore kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, but it is not friendship.

For it is thought that friends agree in feeling,
 4 and that those who agree in feeling are friends. But the agreement of friendship is not in regard to everything, but to things practicable for the parties, and to all that contributes to their association. Nor is it only agreement in thought or in appetite, for it is possible to think and to desire opposite things, as in the man lacking self-control this discord occurs ; if a man agrees with another in purposive choice he does not necessarily agree with him in desire also.
 5 Agreement occurs in the case of good men—at all events when bad men purpose and desire the same
 6 things they harm one another. And it appears that agreement, like friendship, is not a term of single meaning, but whereas the primary and natural form of it is good, so that it is not possible for bad men to agree in this way, there is another sort of agreement shown even by bad men when their purpose and
 7 desire are for the same objects. But it is only proper for them to aim at the same objects in cases when

Concord in social conduct is confined to the good.

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οὐ ὀρέγονται· ἂν γὰρ τοιούτου ὀρέγωνται ὃ μὴ
 30 ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, μαχοῦνται. οἱ ὁμοιοῦντες δ'
 οὐ μάχονται.¹

"Ἔστι δὴ² ὁμόνοια ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ 8
 ἄρχεσθαι³ ἢ αὐτῇ προαίρεσις ἧ, μὴ τοῦ ἐκάτερον,
 ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία
 πολιτική.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὁμοιοῖας καὶ εὐνοίας εἰρήσθω
 τοσαῦτα.

35 VIII. Ἀπορεῖται δὲ διὰ τί μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν οἱ 1
 ποιήσαντες εὖ τοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες εὖ τοὺς
 ποιήσαντας· δοκεῖ δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι τούναντίον.
 τοῦτο δ' ὑπολάβοι μὲν ἂν τις διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον 2
 καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμον συμβαίνειν· τῷ⁴ μὲν
 γὰρ ὀφείλεται⁵ τὸν δ' ἀποδοῦναι δεῖ. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
 40 τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυσικόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια 3

1241 b αἰρετώτερον, τὸν αὐτόν δὲ⁶ λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἔργον καὶ
 ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὃ δ' εὖ παθὼν ὥσπερ ἔργον τοῦ εὖ
 ποιήσαντος. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἡ περὶ τὰ τέκνα
 σπουδῆ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ γεννῆσαι καὶ τοῦ⁷ τὰ⁸ γεννώ-
 μενα σώζειν. καὶ φιλοῦσι δὴ μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες 4
 5 τὰ τέκνα (καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων)⁹ ἢ φι-
 λοῦνται, καὶ οὗτοι πάλιν τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ τοὺς γεννή-
 σαντας, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον. καὶ
 αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων, ὅτι μᾶλλον οἴονται αὐτῶν
 εἶναι ἔργον τὰ τέκνα· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τῷ χαλεπῷ 5

¹ Rac.: μαχοῦνται.

Sp.: δ' ἢ.

⁴ Fr.: τὸ (τὸν cdd.).

³ [καὶ ἄρχεσθαι] ? Rac.

⁵ Fr.: ὠφελείται.

⁶ Sp.: δὴ.

⁷ τοῦ add. Rac.

⁸ τὰ add. Sp.

⁹ [καὶ . . . πατέρων] Sp.

it is possible for both to have the things aimed at, since if they aim at a thing of a kind that it is not possible for both to have, they will quarrel ; but those who agree in mind do not quarrel.

8 Therefore agreement exists when there is the same purposive choice as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to rule but both the same one. Agreement is civic friendship.

So much for the subject of agreement in feeling and kindly feeling.

1 VIII. The question is raised, why those who have conferred a benefit feel more affection for those who have received it than those who have received it feel for those who have conferred it ; whereas justice

Love of benefactor for beneficiary.

2 seems to require the opposite. One might conceive that it occurs for reasons of utility and personal benefit ; for benefit is owing to one party and it is the other party's duty to repay it. But really it is not

3 this alone ; it is also a law of nature—activity is a more desirable thing, and there is the same relation between effect and activity as between the parties here : the person benefited is as it were the product

of the benefactor. This is why even animals have the philoprogenitive instinct, which urges them to produce offspring and also to protect the offspring

4 produced. And in fact fathers love their children more than they are loved by them (mothers more so than fathers) ^a and these in their turn love *their* children more than their parents, because activity is the greatest good. And mothers love their children more than fathers, because they think that the

5 children are more their work ; for people estimate

^a This clause is probably an interpolation in the Greek.

1241 b

διορίζουσιν, πλείω δὲ λυπεῖται περὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἢ¹ μήτηρ.

- 10 Καὶ περὶ μὲν φιλίας τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τῆς ἐν πλείοσι διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

IX. Δοκεῖ δὲ τό τε δίκαιον εἶναι ἴσον τι καὶ ἡ¹ φιλία ἐν ἰσότητι, εἰ μὴ μάτην λέγεται ἰσότης ἢ φιλότης. αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δικαίου τι εἶδος·

- 15 κοινωνίαι² γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ τοῦ δικαίου συνέστηκεν, ὥστε ὅσα εἶδη³ φιλίας, τοσαῦτα⁴ καὶ δικαίου καὶ κοινωνίας, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα σύνορα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐγγὺς ἔχει τὰς διαφοράς. ἐπεὶ δ'⁵ ὁμοίως ἔχει ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τεχνίτης πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ δεσπότης πρὸς δοῦλον, τούτων μὲν
20 οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία· οὐ γὰρ δύο ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἓν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐδ' ἓν⁶. οὐδὲ διαιρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκατέρω, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐ⁷ ἕνεκά ἐστιν. τό τε γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν ὄργανον σύμφυτον, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότης ὁ δοῦλος ὥσπερ μόριον καὶ ὄργανον⁷ ἀφαιρετόν, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ὥσπερ δοῦλος ἄψυχος.

- 25 Αἱ δ' ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι εἰσὶν⁸ μόριον τῶν τῆς³ πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, οἷον ἡ τῶν φρατέρων ἢ τῶν ὀργέων⁹ ἢ αἱ χρηματιστικαὶ [ἔτι πολιτεῖαι].¹⁰ αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις¹¹ συνυπάρχουσι, καὶ αἱ ὀρθαὶ καὶ αἱ παρεκβάσεις (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ

¹ ἡ add. Rac. (et olim Fr.).

² Bz.: κοινωνία.

³ ὥστε ὅσα εἶδη Bz.: ὅστις αἰεὶ δὴ (διὰ Mb).

⁴ τοσαῦτα add. Rac. (cf. M.M. 1211 a).

⁵ δ' <οὐχ>? Rac.

⁶ Iac.: οὐδέν.

⁷ [καὶ ὄργανον]? Rac.

⁸ Bz.: εἰσὶν ἦ.

⁹ Sol. (et v. L. & S.): ὀργίων (ὀργεῶνων Dietsche).

¹⁰ Fr.

¹¹ <ταῖς> οἰκίαις (cf. N.F. 1160 b 24) Fr.: οἰκείους.

work by its difficulty, and in the production of a child the mother has more pain.

Such may be our decision on the subject of friendship for oneself and of friendship among more than one.

1 IX. It is thought that what is just is something that is equal, and also that friendship is based on equality, if there is truth in the saying 'Amity is equality.' And all constitutions are some species of justice; for they are partnerships, and every partnership is founded on justice, so that there are as many species of justice and of partnership as there are of friendship, and all these species border on each other and have their differentia closely related. But since the relations of soul and body, craftsman and tool, and master and slave are similar,^a between the two terms of each of these pairs there is no partnership; for they are not two, but the former is one and the latter a part of that one, not one itself; nor is the good divisible between them, but that of both belongs to the one for whose sake they exist. For the body is the soul's tool born with it, a slave is as it were a member or tool of his master, a tool is a sort of inanimate slave.

Forms of partnerships.

3 The other partnerships are a constituent part of the partnerships of the state—for example that of the members of a brotherhood or a priesthood, or business partnerships. All forms of constitution exist together in the household, both the correct forms and the deviations (for the same thing is found in

Analogy of private relationships with constitutions.

^a *i.e.* to one another. Perhaps the Greek should be emended to give 'not similar' (to those just mentioned).

1241 b

αὐτό, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν, καὶ ἐν¹ ταῖς πολιτείας), βασιλικὴ μὲν ἢ τοῦ γεννήσαντος, ἀριστοκρατικὴ δ' ἢ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, πολιτεία δ' ἢ τῶν ἀδελφῶν, παρέκβασις δὲ τούτων τυραννίς, ὀλιγαρχία, δῆμος· καὶ τὰ δίκαια δὴ τοσαῦτα.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἶδη ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας. κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ ἢ (δημοκρατικὴ)² κοινωνία, καὶ ἢ ἑταιρικὴ φιλία (τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὄρω μετρεῖται), κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἢ ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἢ³ ἀρίστη καὶ ἢ⁴ βασιλικὴ (οὐ γὰρ ταῦτὸν δίκαιον τῷ ὑπερέχοντι καὶ ὑπερεχομένῳ ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον)· καὶ ἢ φιλία δὲ ὁμοίως⁶ πατρὸς καὶ παιδός, καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος.

1242 a X. Λέγονται δὴ⁵ φιλίαι συγγενικὴ, ἑταιρικὴ, κοινωνικὴ, ἢ λεγομένη πολιτικὴ. ἔστι μὲν συγγενικὴ πολλὰ ἔχουσα εἶδη, ἢ μὲν ὡς ἀδελφῶν, ἢ δ' ὡς πατρὸς καὶ υἱῶν⁶. καὶ γὰρ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὡς οἶον ἢ πατρικὴ, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν, οἶον ἢ τῶν ἀδελφῶν. ἐγγὺς γὰρ αὕτη τῆς ἑταιρικῆς· ἐπιλαμβάνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρεσβείων. ἢ δὲ⁷ πολιτικὴ συνέστηκε μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ μάλιστα· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ αὐτάρκες⁷ δοκοῦσι συμ-

¹ Sp.: τῶν ἐν.² Sus.³ ἢ add. Ross.⁴ ἢ add. Rac.⁵ Sp.: δὲ.⁶ [ἢ μὲν ὡς . . . υἱῶν] ? Rac.⁷ Rac.: αὐτάρκη.

constitutions as in the case of musical modes ^a)—
 4 paternal authority being royal, the relationship of
 man and wife aristocratic, that of brothers a republic,
 while the deviation-forms of these are tyranny,
 oligarchy and democracy; and there are therefore
 as many varieties of justice.

5 And since there are two sorts of equality, numerical
 and proportional, there will also be various species
 of justice and of partnership and friendship. The
 partnership of democracy is based on numerical
 equality, and so is the friendship of comrades, as it
 is measured by the same standard; whereas the
 aristocratic partnership (which is the best) and the
 royal are proportional, for it is just for superior and
 inferior to have not the same share but proportional
 6 shares; and similarly also the friendship of father and
 son, and the same way in partnerships.

1 X. Specified sorts of friendship are therefore the
 friendship of relatives, that of comrades, that of
 partners and what is termed civic friendship. Really
 friendship of relatives has more than one species,
 one as between brothers, another as of father and
 son ^b: it may be proportional, for example paternal
 friendship, or based on number, for example the
 friendship of brothers—for this is near the friendship
 of comrades, as in this also they claim privileges of
 2 seniority. [Civic friendship on the other hand is
 constituted in the fullest degree on the principle
 of utility, for it seems to be the individual's lack of
 self-sufficiency that makes these unions permanent—]

Friendships
and Justice.
The claims
of various
friendships
differ.

Heikkinen

καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, 'those harmonies
 and melodies that are highly strung and irregular in colora-
 tion (*i.e.* divergent from the regular scale in having smaller
 intervals) are deviations.'

^b These two clauses look like an interpolation.

1242 a

- μένειν,¹ ἐπεὶ συνῆλθόν γ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ συζῆν χάριν.
 10 μόνη δ' ἢ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἢ παρ' αὐτὴν παρέκβασις
 οὐ μόνον φιλία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς φίλοι κοινωνοῦσιν,
 αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καθ' ὑπεροχὴν. μάλιστα δὲ δίκαιον τὸ
 ἐν τῇ τῶν χρησίμων φιλία, διὰ τὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ
 πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον συνῆλθον
 15 πρίων καὶ τέχνη, οὐχ ἔνεκα κοινοῦ τινός (οἶον² γὰρ
 ὄργανον καὶ ψυχὴ) ἀλλὰ τοῦ χρωμένου ἔνεκεν.
 συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ³ ὄργανον ἐπιμελείας
 τυγχάνειν ἧς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· ἐκείνου γὰρ
 ἔνεκέν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ τρυπάνω εἶναι διττόν, ὧν τὸ
 κυριώτερον ἐνέργεια, ἢ τρύπησις. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ
 εἶδει σῶμα καὶ δοῦλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.
 20 Τὸ δὴ ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῷ φίλῳ ὀμιλεῖν, τὸ ζητεῖν
 δίκαιόν τι ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ ὅλως τὸ δίκαιον ἅπαν
 πρὸς φίλον· τό τε γὰρ δίκαιόν τισι καὶ κοινωνοῖς,
 καὶ ὁ φίλος κοινωνός, ὁ μὲν γένους, ὁ δὲ βίου. ὁ
 γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικόν⁴ ἀλλὰ καὶ
 οἰκονομικὸν ζῶον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τᾶλλά ποτε
 25 συνδύαζεται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι καὶ θήλει καὶ ἄρρενι,
 ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ οὐ μοναυλικόν⁵ ἀλλὰ κοινωνικὸν ἄνθρωπος
 ζῶον πρὸς οὓς φύσει συγγένειά ἐστιν· καὶ κοινωνία
 τοίνυν καὶ δίκαιόν τι καὶ εἰ μὴ πόλις εἴη. οἰκία
 δ' ἐστὶ τις φιλία· δεσπότου μὲν οὖν καὶ δούλου

¹ Sus.: *συνελθεῖν*.² Γ: ὄλον.³ αὐτὸ τὸ Bz.: τοῦτο.⁴ Cas.: ἀνθρώπου μόνον οὐ πολιτικὸς (ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸς Γ').⁵ Sp.: ἀλλ' αἱ διάδυμον αὐλικόν.^a Not its *ἔξις*, its shape, hardness, etc.^b 1241 b 17-24.^c *i.e.* 'friend' in the sense of 'relation.'

since they would have been formed in any case merely for the sake of society. Only civic friendship and the deviation from it are not merely friendships but also partnerships on a friendly footing; the others are on a basis of superiority. The justice that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest degree just, because this is the civic principle of justice. The coming together of a saw with the craft that uses it is on different lines—it is not for the sake of some common object, for saw and craft are like instrument and spirit, but for the sake of the man who employs them. It does indeed come about that even the tool itself receives attention which it deserves with a view to its work, since it exists for the sake of its work, and the essential nature of a gimlet is twofold, the more important half being its activity, boring.^a And the body and the slave are in the class of tool, as has been said before.^b

Therefore to seek the proper way of associating with a friend is to seek for a particular kind of justice. In fact the whole of justice in general is in relation to a friend, for what is just is just for certain persons, and persons who are partners, and a friend is a partner, either in one's family^c or in one's life. For man is not only a political but also a house-holding animal, and does not, like the other animals, couple occasionally and with any chance female or male, but man is in a special way not a solitary but a gregarious animal, associating with the persons with whom he has a natural kinship; accordingly there would be partnership, and justice of a sort, even if there were no state. And a household is a sort of friendship—or rather the relationship of master and

Domestic relations.

102

1242 a

ἤπερ καὶ τέχνης καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ
 30 σώματος, αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται οὔτε φιλίαι οὔτε δικαιο-
 σῦναι ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν¹ οὐ
 δίκαιον ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον. γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς 8
 φιλία ὡς χρήσιμον καὶ κοινωνία· πατρὸς δὲ καὶ
 υἱοῦ ἢ αὐτῆ ἤπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ εὖ
 ποιήσαντος πρὸς τὸν παθόντα καὶ ὅλως τοῦ φύσει
 35 ἄρχοντος πρὸς τὸν φύσει ἀρχόμενον. ἢ δὲ τῶν 9
 ἀδελφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἑταιρική μάλιστα, ἢ² κατ'
 ἰσότητα—

οὐ γάρ τι νόθος τῶδ' ἀπεδείχθη,³
 ἀμφοῖν δὲ πατῆρ⁴ αὐτὸς⁵ ἐκλήθη
 Ζεὺς ἐμὸς ἄρχων—

40 ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς τὸ ἴσον ζητούντων λέγεται. διὸ ἐν
 1242 b οἰκία πρῶτον ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαὶ φιλίας καὶ πολιτείας
 καὶ δίκαιου.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ φιλίαι τρεῖς, κατ' ἀρετὴν, κατὰ τὸ 10
 χρήσιμον, κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, τούτων δὲ ἐκάστης δύο
 διαφοραὶ (ἢ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἢ δὲ κατ'
 5 ἰσότητά ἐστιν ἐκάστη αὐτῶν), τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ περὶ
 αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀμφισβητήσεων⁶ δῆλον, ἐν μὲν τῇ⁷
 καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦται τὸ ἀνάλογον οὐχ ὡσαύτως,
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερέχων ἀνεστραμμένως τὸ ἀνάλογον,
 ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω, οὕτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάτ-
 10 τωτος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ,⁸ διακείμενος⁹ ὥσ-
 περ ἄρχων πρὸς ἀρχόμενον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ 11
 τὸ ἴσον κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀξιοῖ (καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ

¹ ὑγιεινὸν corruptum edd.: ἐπιεικὲς? Sus.

² Iac.: ἦ.

⁴ Γ': πατρὸς.

⁶ Fr.: ἀμφισβητησάντων (ἀμφισβητηθέντων Bz.).

⁷ Fr.: τῶ.

³ Cas.: ἀπεδείχθη.

⁵ Nauck: αὐτός.

⁸ Rac.: αὐτοῦ.

⁹ Bz.: διακείμενον.

slave is that of craft and tools, and of spirit and body, and such relationships are not friendships or forms of justice but something analogous, just as health^a is not justice but analogous to it. But the friendship of man and wife is one of utility, a partnership; that of father and son is the same as that between god and man and between benefactor and beneficiary, and generally between natural ruler and natural subject. That between brothers is principally the friendship of comrades, as being on a footing of equality—

For never did he make me out a bastard,
But the same Zeus, my lord, was called the sire
Of both—,^b

for these are the words of men seeking equality. Hence in the household are first found the origins and springs of friendship, of political organization and of justice.

10 And since there are three sorts of friendship, based on goodness, on utility and on pleasure, and two varieties of each sort (for each of them is either on a basis of superiority or of equality), and what is just in relation to them is clear from our discussions, in the variety based on superiority the proportionate claims are not on the same lines, but the superior party claims by inverse proportion—the contribution of the inferior to stand in the same ratio to his own as he himself stands in to the inferior, his attitude 11 being that of ruler to subject; or if not that, at all events he claims a numerically equal share (for in

Unequal friendships of all three forms.

^a Perhaps the text is corrupt.

^b Sophocles fr. 755 Jebb and Pearson (684 Nauck). The third line is completed in a quotation by Philo, *θηρητων δ' ουδεις*. (For τωδε dative of agent see Kühner-Gerth, i. 422).

1242 b

τῶν ἀλλήλων κοινωνιῶν οὕτω συμβαίνει, ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῶ τὸ ἴσον¹ μετέχουσιν, ὅτε δὲ λόγῳ· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον ἀριθμῶ εἰσήνεγκον ἀργύριον, ἴσον καὶ τῷ
 15 ἴσῳ ἀριθμῶ διαλαμβάνουσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσον, ἀνάλογον), ὁ δ' ὑπερεχόμενος τούναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν· δόξειε δ' ἂν οὕτως ἐλαττοῦσθαι ὁ ὑπερέχων, καὶ λειτουργία ἢ φιλία καὶ ἡ² κοινωνία. δεῖ ἄρα τινὲς ἑτέρῳ ἀνισάσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀνάλογον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ
 20 τιμή, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι φύσει καὶ θεῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχόμενον. δεῖ δὲ ἴσασθῆναι τὸ κέρδος πρὸς τὴν τιμήν.

Ἡ δὲ κατ' ἴσα φιλία ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτική. ἡ δὲ πολιτική ἐστὶ μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις ἀλλήλαις φίλαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ πολῖται, καὶ ὁμοίως

25 οὐκέτι γινώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρήας καὶ οἱ πολῖται, ὅταν μὴ χρήσιμοι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ' ἐκ

¹ Rac.: τοῦ ἴσου.² ἡ] οὐ Fr. (cf. N.E. 1163 a 29).

^a The inferior party p claims to draw a larger share of benefit B and to leave the smaller share b to the superior party P, the result of which would be p + B and P + b. The superior party P also invokes the principle of inverse proportion (line 7), but applies it to their contributions to the common cause, not to the benefits drawn from it: he claims to make a smaller contribution c, while the inferior party makes a larger one C, the result of which would be P - c and p - C. The proposed conjunctions are in fact both of

fact it happens in this way in other situations too—sometimes the shares are numerically equal, sometimes proportionally : if the parties contributed a numerically equal sum of money, they also take a share equal by numerical equality, if an unequal sum, a share proportionally equal). The inferior party on the contrary inverts the proportion, and
 12 makes a diagonal conjunction ^a; but it would seem that in this way the superior comes off worse, and the friendship or partnership is a charitable service.^b Therefore equality must be restored and proportion
 13 secured by some other means ; and this means is honour, which belongs by nature to a ruler and god in relation to a subject. But the profit ^c must be made equal to the honour.



14 Friendship on a footing of equality is civic friendship. Civic friendship is, it is true, based on utility, and fellow-citizens are one another's friends in the same way as different cities are, and

Political friendship.

Athens no longer knoweth Megara,^d

nor similarly do citizens know one another, when they are not useful to one another ; their friend-

them diagonal, connecting the larger person with the smaller thing and *vice versa* :



^b Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'friendship is a charity and not a partnership.'

^c *i.e.* the advantage in the shape of protection, guidance, etc., that the inferior party derives from the friendship.

^d Lit. 'the Athenians no longer recognize the Megarians.' Author unknown (Bergk, *Fr. Eleg.*, Adespota 6).

1242 b

χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα ἢ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἰ
 ἄρχον καὶ ἀρχόμενον, οὔτε τὸ φυσικὸν οὔτε τὸ
 βασιλικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει, οὐδὲ τούτου
 30 ἔνεκα ὅπως εὖ ποιῆ ὡς ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ ἵνα ἴσον ἦ¹
 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ² τῆς λειτουργίας. κατ' ἰσότητα δὴ
 βούλεται εἶναι ἢ πολιτικὴ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ τῆς
 χρησίμου φιλίας εἶδη δύο, ἢ μὲν νομικὴ ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ.
 βλέπει δ' ἢ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὸ
 πρᾶγμα, ὡσπερ οἱ πωλοῦντες καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι·
 διὸ εἴρηται

μισθὸς ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ.

35 ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθ' ὁμολογίαν ἦ,³ πολιτικὴ αὕτη
 φιλία καὶ νομικὴ· ὅταν δ' ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς,⁴
 ἠθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἑταιρική. διὸ
 μάλιστα τὰ ἐγκλήματα⁵ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ· αἴτιον
 δ' ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν· ἕτεραι γὰρ φιλίας ἢ κατὰ τὸ
 40 χρήσιμον καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρα⁶
 βούλονται ἅμα ἔχειν, καὶ ὁμιλοῦσι μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου
 1243 a ἔνεκα, ἠθικὴν δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς ἐπιεικέις, διὸ ὡς
 πιστεύοντες οὐ νομικὴν ποιοῦσιν.

Ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ τῶν τριῶν πλεῖστα⁷
 ἐγκλήματα (ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἀνέγκλητος⁸ οἱ δ'
 ἡδεῖς ἔχοντες καὶ δόντες ἀπαλλάττονται, οἱ δὲ
 5 χρήσιμοι οὐκ εὐθὺς διαλύονται, ἂν μὴ νομικῶς
 καὶ⁹ ἑταιρικῶς προσφέρωνται)· ὁμως δὲ τῆς

¹ ἔχῃ? Rac.

² καὶ Γ': ἢ (ἴσον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῇ λειτουργίᾳ? Rac.).

³ Fr. (et Γ'): ἢ.

⁴ Rac.: αὐτοῖς.

⁵ τὰ ἐγκλήματα Sp.: ἐγκλημα.

⁶ ἀμφοτέρας? Rac.

⁷ πλεῖστα τὰ Sp.

⁸ Sp.: ἀνέγκλητον.

⁹ καί: ἀλλ'? Rac.

^a Cf. N.E. 1262 b 26.

^b N.E. 1164 a 28. Hesiod, W.D. 371 μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ

- 15 ship is a ready-money transaction.^a Nevertheless there is present here a ruling factor and a ruled—not a natural ruler or a royal one, but one that rules in his turn, and not for the purpose of conferring benefit, as God rules, but in order that he may have an equal share of the benefit and of the burden. Therefore civic friendship aims at being on a footing of equality.
- 16 But useful friendship is of two kinds, the merely legal and the moral. Civic friendship looks to equality and to the object, as buyers and sellers do—hence the saying

Unto a friend his wage—.^b

- 17 When, therefore, it is based on a definite agreement, this is civic and legal friendship; but when they trust each other for repayment, it tends to be moral friendship, that of comrades. Hence this is the kind of friendship in which recriminations most occur, the reason being that it is contrary to nature; for friendship based on utility and friendship based on goodness are different, but these people wish to have it both ways at once—they associate together for the sake of utility but make it out to be a moral friendship as between good men, and so represent it as not merely legal, pretending that it is a matter of trust.
- 18 For in general, of the three kinds of friendship, it is in useful friendship that most recriminations occur (for goodness is not given to recrimination, and pleasant friends having got and given their share break it off, but useful friends do not dissolve the association at once, if their intercourse is on comradely and not merely legal lines); nevertheless the legal sort of

Complaints frequent in friendships of utility on a moral basis.

εἰρημένως ἄρκιος ἔστω, 'let the wage stated for a friend stand good.'

1243 a

- χρησίμου ἢ νομικῆ ἀνέγκλητος. ἔστι δ' ἢ μὲν νομικῆ διάλυσις πρὸς νόμισμα (μετρεῖται γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ ἴσον), ἢ δ' ἠθικῆ ἐκούσιος. διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ νόμος ἐστὶ τοῖς οὕτως ὁμιλοῦσι φιλικῶς μὴ εἶναι
 10 δίκας τῶν ἐκουσίων συναλλαγμάτων, ὀρθῶς· τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πέφυκε δίκη¹ εἶναι, οἱ δ' ὡς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πιστοῖς² συναλλάττουσιν. ἔστι δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἀμφιβάλλοντα αὐτοῖς ἀμφοτέρω, πῶς ἐκάτερος ἐγκαλεῖ,³ ὅταν ἠθικῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ νομικῶς πιστεύσωσιν.
- 15 Καὶ ἔχει δὴ ἀπορίαν ποτέρως δεῖ κρίνειν τὸ δίκαιον, πότερα πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα βλέποντα τὸ ὑπηρετηθὲν πόσον ἢ ποῖον, ἢ⁵ τῷ πεπονθότι ἐνδέχεται γὰρ⁶ εἶναι ὅπερ λέγει Θεόγνις—

σοὶ μὲν τοῦτο, θεά, σμικρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγα, ἐνδέχεται δὲ⁷ καὶ τούναντίον γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, σοὶ μὲν παιδιὰν τοῦτ' εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ θάνατον. ἐντεῦθεν δ' ὥσπερ⁸ εἴρηται⁹ ἐγκλήματα· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ ἀντιπαθεῖν ὡς μέγα ὑπηρετήσας ὅτι δεομένῳ ἐποίησεν, ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο λέγων πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου ὠφέλειαν πόσον ἐδύνατο ἀλλ' οὐ τί ἦν αὐτῷ,¹⁰ ὁ δὲ τούναντίον ὅσον ἐκείνῳ ἀλλ'

¹ Sol.: δίκαιον (ἀγαθοῖς αὐτοῖς πέφυκε δικαίοις Sp.).

² Iac.: τοῖς.

³ [πῶς . . . ἐγκαλεῖ]? gloss. (an lege ἐγκαλέσει?) Rac.

⁴ Sp.: τόν.

⁵ ἦν Fr.

⁶ Γ: δέ.

⁷ Fr.: γάρ.

⁸ ὥσπερ add. Fr.

⁹ Rac.: εἴρηται τὰ.

¹⁰ Rac.: αὐτῷ.

^a Or, adopting another conjectural emendation, 'since it is natural for good men to be just of their own accord.'

^b Solomon renders 'It is uncertain how either will re-
 criminate on the other, seeing that they trust each other, not

useful friendship is not given to recrimination. The legal method of discharging the obligation is a matter of money, for that serves as a measure of equality; but the moral method is voluntary. Hence in some places there is a law prohibiting friendly associates of this sort from actions as to their voluntary contracts—rightly, since it is not natural for good men to go to law,^a and these men make their contracts as good men and as dealing with trustworthy people. And in fact in this sort of friendship the recriminations are doubtful on both sides—what line of accusation each party will take, inasmuch as their confidence was of a moral kind and not merely legal.^b

21 Indeed it is a question in which of two ways one ought to judge what is a just return, whether by looking at the actual amount or quality of the service rendered, or by its amount or quality for the recipient; for it may be as Theognis says—

Goddess, 'tis small to thee, but great to me,^c

and also the result may be opposite, as in the saying 22 'This is sport to you but death to me.' Hence recriminations, as has been said^d; for one party claims recompense as having rendered a great service, because he did it for his friend in need, or saying something else of the sort as to how much it was worth in relation to the benefit given to the recipient and not what it was to himself, while the other party on the contrary speaks of how much it was to the

in a limited legal way but on the basis of their characters.' But the Greek text may be questioned.

^c Theognis 14. This quotation illustrates that the amount of a service is 'subjective,' the next quotation shows that its quality is.

^d 1242 b 37.

Estimate of claims.

1243 a

25 οὐχ ὅσον αὐτῷ.¹ ὅτε δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλει². ὁ μὲν 23
 γὰρ ὅσον αὐτῷ¹ μικρὸν ἀπέβη, ὁ δ' ὅσον αὐτῷ³
 μέγα³ ἐδύνατο, οἷον, εἰ κινδυνεύσας δραχμῆς ἄξιον
 ὠφέλησεν, ὁ μὲν τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος ὁ δὲ τὸ
 τοῦ ἀργυρίου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τῶν νομισμάτων ἀποδόσει
 30 —καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα περὶ τούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις·
 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ πῶς τότε ἦν, ὁ δὲ πῶς νῦν, ἂν
 μὴ διείπωνται.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν 24
 καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν·
 ὥστε καὶ δίκαιον τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἔστι, καὶ δικαιο-
 σύνη φιλική. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι διότι καλλίων 25
 35 μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ φιλία ἀναγκαιοτέρα δὲ ἡ χρησίμη· οἱ
 δ' ἄρχονται⁴ μὲν ὡς ἠθικοὶ φίλοι καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν
 ὄντες, ὅταν δ' ἀντικρούσῃ⁵ τι τῶν ἰδίων, δῆλοι γί-
 νονται ὅτι ἕτεροι ἦσαν. ἐκ περιουσίας γὰρ διώ-

1243 b

κουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ καλόν, διὸ καὶ τὴν καλλίω
 φιλίαν. ὥστε φανερόν πῶς διαιρετέον περὶ τούτων. 26
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι, εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν.
 βλεπτέον εἰ ἴση, καὶ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀξιοτέον θατέρω
 παρὰ θατέρου· εἰ δ' ὡς χρήσιμοι καὶ πολιτικοί,
 5 ὡς ἂν ἐλυσιτέλει⁶ ὁμολογοῦσιν. ἂν δ' ὁ μὲν
 φῆ ὧδε ὁ δ' ἐκείνως, οὐ καλόν,⁷ ἀντιποιῆσαι
 δέον, τοὺς καλοὺς λέγειν λόγους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

¹ (bis) Rac.: αὐτῷ.

² μεταβάλλει (vel μεταλαμβάνει) Rac.: μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀμφιβάλλει.

⁴ Bus.: ἔρχονται.

³ [μέγα] Sol.
⁵ Iac.: ἀντικρυσ ἦ.

⁶ ἕως ἂν λυσιτελή? Rac. (ὡς ἂν λυσιτελή Sp.).

⁷ Rac.: καλὸν μὲν.

^a Or, altering the Greek, 'they agree for as long as it profits them.'

23 donor and not how much it was to himself. And at other times the position is reversed: the one says how little he got out of it, the other how much the service was worth to him—for instance, if by taking a risk he did the other a shilling's worth of benefit, the one talks about the amount of the risk and the other about the amount of the cash; just as in the repayment of a money loan, for there too the dispute turns on this—one claims to be repaid the value that the money had when lent, the other claims to repay it at the present value, unless they have put a proviso in the contract.

24 Civic friendship, then, looks at the agreement and to the thing, but moral friendship at the intention; hence the latter is more just—it is friendly justice.

25 The cause of conflict is that moral friendship is nobler but friendship of utility more necessary; and men begin as being moral friends and friends on grounds of goodness, but when some private interest comes into collision it becomes clear that really they were different. For most men pursue what is fine only when they have a good margin in hand, and so with the finer sort of friendship too.

26 Hence it is clear how these cases must be decided. If they are moral friends, we must consider if their intentions are equal, and nothing else must be claimed by either from the other; and if they are friends on the ground of utility or civic friends, we must consider what form of agreement would have been profitable for them.^a But if one says they are friends on one footing and the other on another, it is not honourable, when an active return is due, merely to make fine speeches, and similarly also in

ἐπὶ θατέρον· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐ διείποντο ὡς ἠθικῶς, 2
 δεῖ κρίνειν τινά, μηδ' ὑποκρινόμενον μηδέτερον¹
 αὐτῶν ἐξαπατᾶν· ὥστε δεῖ στέργειν ἐκάτερον τὴν
 10 τύχην. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ κατὰ προαίρεσιν 2
 δῆλον, ἐπεὶ κἂν εἰ μεγάλα παθῶν μὴ ἀποδώῃ δι'
 ἀδυναμίαν ἀλλ' ὅσ'² ἐδύνατο, καλῶς· καὶ γὰρ³ ὁ
 θεὸς ἀνέχεται κατὰ δύναμιν λαμβάνων τὰς θυσίας.
 ἀλλὰ τῷ πωλοῦντι οὐχ ἰκανῶς ἔξει ἂν μὴ φήσῃ 2
 δύνασθαι πλέον δοῦναι, οὐδὲ τῷ δανείσαντι.
 15 Πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ταῖς⁴ 3
 μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδεῖν οὐ ῥάδιον·
 χαλεπὸν γὰρ⁵ μετρήσαι ἐνὶ τῷδε τὰ⁶ μὴ κατ' εὐθυ-
 ωρίαν· οἷον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν, ὁ μὲν 3
 γὰρ διώκει ὡς τὸν⁷ ἡδὺν ἐπὶ τὸ συζῆν, ὁ δ'
 ἐκείνῳ ἐνίοτε ὡς χρήσιμον, ὅταν δὲ παύσῃται τοῦ
 20 ἐρᾶν, ἄλλου γενομένου⁸ ἄλλος γίνεται, καὶ τότε
 λογιζονται τί ἀντὶ⁹ τίνος, καὶ ὡς Πύθων καὶ
 Παμμένης διεφέροντο, καὶ ὅλως διδάσκαλος καὶ
 μαθητῆς (ἐπιστήμη γὰρ καὶ χρήματα οὐχ ἐνὶ
 μετρεῖται), καὶ ὡς Ἡρόδικος¹⁰ ὁ ἰατρὸς πρὸς τὸν
 25 καὶ ὁ βασιλεύς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδεῖ ὁ δ' ὡς 3

¹ Syl.: ὑποκρινόμενος μηδέτερος.

³ καὶ γὰρ Fr.: καί.

⁵ Γ': γὰρ χαλεπὸν.

⁷ [τὸν] Sp.

⁹ τί ἀντὶ Iac.: παντὶ.

² Rac.: ὡς.

⁴ Bz.: τοῖς.

⁶ Γ': τῷ.

⁸ Rac.: γενομένου.

¹⁰ Sp.: Ἡρόδικος.

^a *i.e.* in a moral friendship it is not honourable to insist on a return on a business footing.

^b 'Dissimilar friendships, where action and reaction are not in the same straight line' (Solomon).

^c The distinguished Theban general, friend of Epaminondas. Pytho may be a dramatist of Catania, or a Byzantine rhetorician of the period.

27 the other case ^a;—but since they did not provide for this in the contract, on the ground that it was a moral friendship, somebody must judge, and neither party must cheat by pretending; so that each must
 28 be content with his luck. But it is clear that moral friendship is a matter of intention, since even if a man after having received great benefits owing to inability did not repay them, but only repaid as much as he was able, he acts honourably; for even God is content with getting sacrifices in accordance
 29 with our ability. But a seller will not be satisfied if a man says he cannot pay more, nor will one who has made a loan.

30 In friendships not based on direct reciprocity ^b many causes of recrimination occur, and it is not easy to see what is just; for it is difficult to measure by one given thing relations that are not directly
 31 reciprocal. This is how it happens in love affairs, since in them one party pursues the other as a pleasant person to live with, but sometimes the other the one as useful, and when the lover ceases to love, he having changed the other changes, and then they calculate the *quid pro quo*, and quarrel as Pytho and Pammenes ^c used, and as teacher and pupil do in general (for knowledge and money have no common measure), and as Herodicus ^d the doctor did with the patient who offered to pay his fee with a discount, and as the harpist and the king fell out.
 32 The king associated with the harpist as pleasant and the harpist with the king as useful; but the

Causes and settlement of disputes.

^d Born in Thrace, practised in Athens fifth cent. B.C.; tutor of Hippocrates. The mss. give 'Prodicus' (the sophist, who figures frequently in Plato), and possibly the text has suffered haplography, and both names should be read.

1243 b

χρησίμω ὠμίλει· ὁ δ', ἐπειδὴ¹ ἔδει ἀποδιδόναι, αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ὡς ἡδὺν ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἔφη, ὡσπερ ἐκείνον ἄσαντα εὐφρᾶναι, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποσχόμενος ἐκείνω. ὅμως δὲ φανερόν καὶ ἐνταῦθα 33 πῶς γνωριστέον· ἐνὶ γὰρ μετρητέον καὶ ἐνταῦθ', ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀρίθμω² ἀλλὰ λόγῳ. τῷ³ ἀνάλογον 30 γὰρ μετρητέον, ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ μετρεῖται κοινωνία· πῶς γὰρ κοινωνήσει γεωργῶ σκυτοτόμος, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνάλογον ἰσασθήσεται τὰ ἔργα; ταῖς δὴ⁴ μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν τὸ ἀνάλογον μέτρον, 34 οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν σοφίαν δοῦναι ἐγκαλεῖ, ὁ δ' ἐκείνω ἀργύριον, τί⁵ σοφία⁶ πρὸς τὸ πλούσιον εἶναι⁷; 35 εἶτα τί δοθὲν πρὸς ἐκάτερον⁸; εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἡμισυ ἔδωκεν, ὁ δὲ τοῦ μείζονος μὴ πολλοστὸν μέρος, δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος ἀδικεῖ. ἔστι 35 δὲ κἀνταῦθα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμφισβήτησις, ἂν φῆ ὁ μὲν⁹ ὡς χρησίμους συνελθεῖν αὐτούς, ὁ δὲ μὴ, ἀλλ' ὡς κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ φιλίαν.

1244 a XI. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλου, 1 σκεπτέον πότερον δεῖ ἐκείνω τὰ χρήσιμα ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ βοηθεῖν ἢ τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν τὰ ἴσα¹⁰ δυναμένω. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρόβλημά ἐστι, πότερον τὸν φίλον 5 ἢ τὸν σπουδαῖον εὖ ποιητέον μᾶλλον. ἂν μὲν 2 γὰρ φίλος¹¹ καὶ σπουδαῖος, ἴσως οὐ λίαν χαλεπόν,

¹ Rac.: ἐπεὶ.² Iac.: οὐχ ὄρω.³ Fr.: τὸ.⁴ Rac.: τοῖς δὲ (δὴ? Sus.).⁵ Bz.: τῆ.⁶ Sol.: σοφία.⁷ εἶναι add. Rac.⁸ πρὸς ἐκατέρου Fr.: <ἐκατέρου> πρὸς ἐκάτερον? Rac.⁹ Bk.: φήσωμεν.¹⁰ Iac.: ἀντιποιοῦντι καὶ.¹¹ <καὶ> φίλος? Rac.: <ὁ> φίλος Rieckher.

king, when the time came for him to pay, made out that he was himself of the pleasant sort, and said that just as the harpist had given him pleasure by his singing, so he had given the harpist pleasure by

33 his promises to him.^a Nevertheless here too it is clear how we must decide : here too we must measure by one standard, but by a ratio, not a number. For we must measure by proportion, as also the civic partnership is measured. For how is a shoe-maker to be partner with a farmer unless their

34 products are equalized by proportion? Therefore the measure for partnerships not directly reciprocal is proportion—for example if one party complains that he has given wisdom and the other says he has given the former money, what is the ratio of wisdom to being rich? and then, what is the amount given for each? for if one party has given half of the smaller amount but the other not even a small fraction of the larger, it is clear that the latter is

35 cheating. But here too there is a dispute at the outset, if one says that they came together on grounds of utility and the other denies it and says it was on the basis of some other kind of friendship.

1 XI. About the good friend and the friend on the basis of goodness, we must consider whether one ought to render useful services and assistance to him or to the friend who is able to make an equal return. This is the same problem as whether it is more one's duty to benefit a friend or a virtuous

2 man. If a man is a friend and virtuous, perhaps^b

Casuistry of Friendship.

Plutarch, *De Alexandri fortuna* ii. 1, of the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse.

^b Or, altering the punctuation with Fritsche, 'is a friend and virtuous equally.'

1244 a

ἂν μή τις τὸ μὲν αὐξήσῃ τὸ δὲ ταπεινώσῃ, φίλον
 μὲν σφόδρα εὐ¹ ποιῶν, ἐπεικῆ δὲ ἡρέμα. εἰ δὲ μή,
 πολλὰ προβλήματα γίνεται, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν ἦν οὐκ
 ἔσται δέ, ὁ δὲ ἔσται οὐπω δέ, ἢ ὁ μὲν ἐγένετο ἔστι
 10 δ' οὐ, ὁ δ'² ἔστιν οὐκ ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἔσται. ἀλλ'
 ἐκεῖνο ἐργωδέστερον. μὴ γάρ τι λέγει Εὐριπίδης 3
 ποιήσας

λόγων³ δίκαιον μισθὸν ἂν λόγους φέροις,⁴
 ἔργον δ' ἐκεῖνος⁵ ἔργον ὄς⁶ παρέσχετο·

καὶ οὐ πάντα δεῖ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἄλλ' ἃ δεῖ⁷
 τῇ μητρί, καίτοι βελτίων ὁ πατήρ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ
 15 Διὶ πάντα θύεται, οὐδ' ἔχει πάσας τὰς τιμὰς ἀλλὰ
 τινάς. ἴσως οὖν ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ἄλλα 4
 δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ· οἷον οὐκ εἰ σίτον δίδωσι καὶ ταναγ-
 καῖα, καὶ συζῆν τούτῳ δεῖ· οὐδ' ὧ τοίνυν τὸ συζῆν,⁸
 τούτῳ ἃ μὴ οὗτος δίδωσιν ἀλλ' ὁ⁹ χρήσιμος·
 ἀλλ' οἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες [τούτῳ]¹⁰ πάντα τῷ ἔρω-
 μένῳ διδόασιν οὐ δέον, οὐδενός¹¹ εἰσιν ἄξιοι.

20 Καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅροι τῆς φιλίας πάντες
 μὲν πῶς εἰσι φιλίας, ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς. τῷ μὲν 5
 γὰρ χρησίμῳ τὸ βούλεσθαι τὰ κείνῳ ἀγαθὰ, καὶ
 τῷ εὐ ποιήσαντι, καὶ τῷ ὁποίῳ δῆ¹² (οὐ γὰρ
 ἐπισημαίνει οὗτος ὁ ὀρισμὸς τῆς φιλίας), ἄλλῳ δὲ

¹ εὐ add. Rac.² ὁ δ' Syl.: διδ.³ Bus.: λόγον.⁴ Bus.: λόγον εἰσφέρεις (λόγον φέροις Bk.).⁵ Musgrave: ἐκεῖνοῖς.⁶ ἔργον δὲ Meineke: ἔργα.⁷ ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ Sus.: ἄλλα δέ.⁸ Bz.: τὸ εὐ ζῆν.⁹ Sus.: ἀλλὰ.¹⁰ Rac.¹¹ Fr.: οὐδ'.¹² Iac.: ὁποῖος δεῖ.^a See the first sentence of the chapter.^b Fr. 882 Nauck.

it is not over-difficult, provided one does not exaggerate the one factor and underrate the other, benefiting him greatly as friend but only slightly as good. But in other cases many problems arise, for instance, if A was a friend but is going not to be and B is going to be but is not now, or if A became one but is not one now and B is one now but was not and is going not to be. But the former problem^a
 3 is more difficult. For possibly there is something in the lines of Euripides^b:

Prithee take words as thy just pay for words,
 But he, that gave a deed, a deed shall have ;

and it is not one's duty to give everything to one's father, but there are other things that one ought to give to one's mother, although the father is the superior ; for even to Zeus not all the sacrifices are offered, nor does he have all the honours but some
 4 particular ones. Perhaps, therefore, there are some services that ought to be rendered to the useful friend and others to the good friend : for instance, if a friend gives you food and necessaries you are not therefore bound to give him your society, and accordingly also you are not bound to render to the friend to whom you give your society the things that you do not get from him but from the useful friend ; but those who by so doing wrongly give everything to one whom they love are good-for-nothing people.

° And the defining marks of friendship stated in the discourses all belong to friendship in some sense,
 5 but not to the same kind of friendship. It is a mark of the useful friend that one wishes the things good for him, and so of the benefactor, and in fact a friend of any sort (for this definition of friendship is not distinctive) ; of another friend, that one

Different kinds of friendship have different claims.

1244 a

25 τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλω τὸ συζῆν, τῷ δὲ καθ' ἡδονὴν
τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν. πάντες δ' οὔτοι οἱ 6
ὄροι κατὰ φιλίαν μὲν λέγονταί τινα, οὐ πρὸς μίαν
δ' οὐδεῖς. διὸ πολλοὶ εἰσι, καὶ ἕκαστος μίας
εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλίας, οὐκ ὢν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ εἶναι προ-
αίρεσις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ποιήσας εὖ
βούλεται τῷ ἔργῳ τῷ αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν (καὶ τῷ
30 δόντι τὸ εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἀνταποδιδόναι), ἀλλὰ συζῆν
οὐ τούτῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡδεῖ.

Ἄδικοῦσιν οἱ φίλοι ἔνιοι ἀλλήλους, τὰ γὰρ 7
πράγματα μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλοῦσι τὸν¹ ἔχοντα·
διὸ φίλοι² κάκεινῳ³ (οἷον διότι ἡδὺς τὸν οἶνον
εἴλετο καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἴλετο), χρησι-
μώτερος γάρ. διὸ δὴ ἀγανακτεῖ,⁴ ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
35 μᾶλλον εἴλοντο⁵ ἀντὶ ἡττονος· οἱ δ'⁶ ἐγκαλοῦσιν,
ἐκείνον γὰρ νῦν ζητοῦσι τὸν ἀγαθόν, πρότερον ζητή-
σαντες τὸν ἡδὺν ἢ τὸν χρήσιμον.

1244 b

XII. Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐταρκειᾶς καὶ 1
φιλίας, πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰς ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις.
ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις πότερον, εἴ τις εἶη κατὰ
πάντα αὐτάρκης, ἔσται τούτῳ φίλος, ἢ⁷ κατ'
ἐνδειαν ζητεῖται φίλος καὶ⁸ ἔσται ἀγαθὸς⁹ αὐτ-
5 ἀρκέστατος. εἰ ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς βίος¹⁰ εὐδαίμων,
τί ἂν δέοι φίλου; οὔτε γὰρ τῶν χρησίμων δεῖ-
σθαι αὐτάρκους, οὔτε τῶν εὐφρανούντων¹¹ οὔτε τοῦ

¹ Bz.: τὰ.² edd.: φιλεῖ.³ Rac.: κάκεινοis.⁴ rec. P^b: δεῖ.⁵ Rac.: εἴλετο.⁶ Vict.: ὁ δ'.⁷ Ald.: εἰ.⁸ Fr.: ἢ.⁹ Ross: ἀγαθός.¹⁰ βίος add. Syl.¹¹ Sp.: εὐφροούντων.^a i.e. the beneficiary.^b This also means the beneficiary, who is the cause of the benefactor's *being* a benefactor; so the benefactor ought to repay him in kind by wishing *his* existence (as he does also for the reason that he is his own product).

wishes his existence, of another that one wishes his society; of the friend on the ground of pleasure, that one shares his grief and his joy. All these defining marks are predicated in the case of some friendship, but none of them with reference to friendship as a single thing. Hence there are many of them, and each is thought to belong to friendship as one, though it does not: for instance, the desire for the friend's existence—for the superior friend and benefactor wishes existence to belong to his own work^a—and to him who gave one existence^b it is one's duty to give existence in return; but he wishes the society not of this friend but of the pleasant one.

7 Friends in some cases wrong each other, because they love things more, not the possessor of them, and are friends of the possessor too on this account (just as a man chose his wine because it was sweet and chose his wealth because it was useful), for he is more useful.^c Hence naturally he is annoyed, just as if they had preferred his possessions to himself as being inferior; and they complain, for now they look to find in him the good man, having previously looked for the pleasant or the useful man.

1 XII. We must also consider self-sufficiency and friendship, and the interrelationship of their potentialities. For one may raise the question whether if a person be self-sufficing in every respect he will have a friend, or whether on the contrary a friend is sought for in need, and the good man will be most self-sufficing. If the life that is combined with goodness is happy, what need would there be of a friend? For it does not belong to the self-sufficing man to need either useful friends or friends to amuse

Self-sufficiency and the need for friends.

^c *Sc.* on account of his possessions.

συζῆν, αὐτὸς¹ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἱκανὸς συνεῖναι. μάλιστα²
 δὲ τοῦτο φανερόν ἐπὶ θεοῦ· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐδε-
 νὸς προσδεόμενος οὐδὲ φίλου δεήσεται, οὐδ' ἔσται
 10 αὐτῷ εἶ γε μηθὲν δέοιτό του.² ὥστε καὶ ἄνθρωπος
 ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος ἤκιστα δεήσεται φίλου, ἀλλ' ἢ
 καθ' ὅσον ἀδύνατον εἶναι αὐτάρκη. ἀνάγκη ἄρα³
 ἐλαχίστους εἶναι φίλους τῷ ἄριστα ζῶντι, καὶ
 αἰεὶ³ ἐλάττους γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ σπουδάξουν ὅπως
 ὦσι φίλοι, ἀλλ' ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν χρησίμων
 15 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν⁴ εἰς τὸ συζῆν αἰρετῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν
 καὶ τότε⁵ φανερόν ἄν εἶναι δόξειεν ὡς οὐ χρήσεως
 ἔνεκα ὁ φίλος οὐδ' ὠφελείας, ἀλλ' ὁ⁶ δι' ἀρετὴν
 φίλος μόνος. ὅταν γὰρ μηθενὸς ἐνδεεῖς ὦμεν,⁴
 τότε τοὺς συναπολαυσομένους ζητοῦμεν⁷ πάντες,
 καὶ τοὺς εὖ πεισομένους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ποιήσοντας⁸.
 20 ἀμείνω δ' ἔχομεν κρίσιν αὐτάρκεις ὄντες ἢ μετ'
 ἐνδείας, μάλιστα⁹ τε⁹ τῶν συζῆν ἀξίων δεόμεθα
 φίλων.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης σκεπτέον μή ποτε⁵
 τὸ μὲν τι λέγεται καλῶς τὸ δὲ λανθάνει διὰ τὴν
 παραβολήν. δῆλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ ζῆν τὸ κατ'
 ἐνέργειαν καὶ ὡς τέλος. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι τὸ⁶
 25 αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν
 τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ συγγνωρίζειν ἐστίν.
 ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ¹⁰ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ¹⁰ γνω-
 ρίζειν αἰρετώτατον ἐκάστῳ (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῆν
 πᾶσιν ἔμφυτος ἢ ὄρεξις, τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεῖ τιθέναι¹¹

¹ Sp.: οὗτος.² Iac.: αὐτῷ οὔτε μηθὲν δεσπότου.³ Sp.: δεῖ.⁴ τῶν add. Sp.⁵ τῷδε Rieckher, τούτῳ Sus.⁶ ὁ add. Ald.⁷ Rac.: ζητοῦσι.⁸ Syl.: ποιήσαντας.⁹ Syl.: τε μάλιστα.¹⁰ (bis) Sol.: τὸ αὐτὸ (τὸ αὐτοῦ Bz.).¹¹ Bz.: διατιθέναι.

him and society, for he is sufficient society for himself. This is most manifest in the case of God; for it is clear that as he needs nothing more he will not need a friend, and that supposing he has no need of one he will not have one. Consequently the happiest human being also will very little need a friend, except in so far as to be self-sufficing is impossible. Of necessity, therefore, he who lives the best life will have fewest friends, and they will constantly become fewer, and he will not be eager to have friends but will think lightly not only of useful friends but also of those desirable for society. But assuredly even his case would seem to show that a friend is not for the sake of utility or benefit but that one loved on account of goodness is the only real friend. For when we are not in need of something, then we all seek people to share our enjoyments, and beneficiaries rather than benefactors; and we can judge them better when we are self-sufficing than when in need, and we most need friends who are worthy of our society.

5 But about this question we must consider whether perhaps, although the view stated is partly sound, in part the truth escapes us because of the comparison.^a The matter is clear if we ascertain what life 6 in the active sense and as an End is. It is manifest that life is perception and knowledge, and that consequently social life is perception and knowledge in common. But perception and knowledge themselves are the thing most desirable for each individually (and it is owing to this that the appetite for life is implanted by nature in all, for living must

^a *i.e.* of man with God, l. 8 above; *cf.* 1245 b 13.

Psychology
of social
life.

1244 b

γνώσιν τινα). εἰ οὖν τις ἀποτέμοι καὶ ποιήσῃε 7
 30 τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ¹ μῆ (ἀλλὰ
 τοῦτο μὲν λανθάνει ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται,
 τῷ μέντοι πράγματι ἔστι μῆ λανθάνειν), οὐθὲν
 ἂν διαφέροι ἢ τὸ γινώσκειν ἄλλον ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ· τὸ
 δ' ὅμοιον τῷ² ζῆν ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλον, εὐλόγως δὲ
 τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ³ γνωρίζειν αἰρετώτερον.
 35 δεῖ γὰρ ἅμα συνθεῖναι δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι τε τὸ
 ζῆν αἰρετὸν⁴ καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων
 1245 a ὅτι τὸ αὐτοῖς⁵ ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν. εἰ 8
 οὖν ἐστὶν αἰεὶ τῆς τοιαύτης συστοιχίας ἢ ἕτερα
 ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἰρετοῦ τάξει, καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ
 αἰσθητόν⁶ ἐστὶν ὡς ὅλως εἰπεῖν τῷ⁷ κοινωνεῖν τῆς
 ὠρισμένης φύσεως,⁸ ὥστε τὸ αὐτοῦ βούλεσθαι
 5 αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι τοιονδὶ βούλεσθαι
 ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κατ' αὐτούς ἐσμεν ἕκαστον
 τούτων ἀλλὰ κατὰ μετάληψιν τῶν δυνάμεων ἐν
 τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ γνωρίζειν (αἰσθανόμενος γὰρ
 αἰσθητὸς γίνεται τούτῳ καὶ⁹ ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ
 τοῦτο καθ' ὃ¹⁰ πρότερον αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἢ καὶ οὐ,
 γνωστὸς δὲ γινώσκων)—ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῆν
 10 αἰεὶ βούλεται ὅτι βούλεται αἰεὶ γνωρίζειν, τοῦτο δὲ
 ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶναι τὸ γνωστὸν. τὸ δὴ συζῆν αἰρεῖσθαι 9
 δόξειε μὲν ἂν εἶναι σκοπομένοις πως εὐήθες—

¹ τὸ add. Wilson.³ καὶ <ἑαυτὸν> Sp.⁵ Brandis: τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς.⁷ Fr.: τὸ.⁹ τούτῳ καὶ add. Rac.² Sol.: τοῦ.⁴ Fr.: καὶ αἰρετὸν.⁶ corr. P^b: αἰρετὸν.⁸ hic lacunam Sus.¹⁰ Fr.: καθά.^a τοιαύτην = ἀγαθήν.^b e.g. the Pythagorean pair of series, One, Good, etc. opposed to Many, Bad, etc. (Solomon). 'The Determined'

7 be deemed a mode of knowing). If therefore one were to abstract and posit absolute knowledge and its negation (though this, it is true, is obscure in the argument as we have written it, but it may be observed in experience), there would be no difference between absolute knowledge and another person's knowing instead of oneself; but that is like another person's living instead of oneself, whereas perceiving and knowing oneself is reasonably more desirable. For two things must be taken into consideration together, that life is desirable and that good is desirable, and as a consequence that it is desirable for ourselves to possess a nature of that quality.^a If, therefore, of the pair of corresponding series^b of this kind one is always in the class of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are generally speaking constituted by their participation in the 'determined' nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself to be of a certain character,—since, then, we are not each of these things in ourselves but only by participating in these faculties in the process of perceiving or knowing (for when perceiving one becomes perceived by means of what one previously perceives,^c in the manner and in the respect in which one perceives it, and when knowing one becomes known)—hence owing to this one wishes always to live because one wishes always to know; and this is because one wishes to be oneself the object known.

9 To choose to live in the society of others might, therefore, from a certain point of view seem foolish

Reasons for the pleasure of society.

(opposed to 'the Indeterminate') belonged to the 'desirable' series.

^c *i.e.* perception of something outside oneself causes consciousness of self.

1245 a

(ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν¹ πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις, οἷον τοῦ συνεσθίειν ἢ τοῦ² συμπίνειν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ πλησίον οὔσι ταῦτα συμβαίνειν ἢ χωρὶς
 15 ἂν ἀφέλης τὸν λόγον; ἀλλὰ μὴν³ καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖν τοῦ τυχόντος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον, ἅμα τ' οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε μανθάνειν τοῖς αὐταρκέσι φίλοις οἷόν τε, μανθάνων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει ὡς δεῖ, διδάσκοντος δ' ὁ⁴ φίλος, ἢ δ' ὁμοιότης φιλία) — ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε ὅτι⁵ καὶ πάντες
 20 ἡδίων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων κοινωνοῦμεν, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει ἐκάστω⁶ καὶ οὐ δύναται ἀρίστου, ἀλλὰ τούτων τῷ μὲν ἡδονῆς σωματικῆς τῷ δὲ θεωρίας μουσικῆς τῷ δὲ φιλοσοφίας· καὶ τὸ ἅμα δὴ⁷ εἶναι τῷ φίλῳ (διό φησι 'μόχθος οἱ τηλοῦ φίλοι'), ὥστ'⁸ οὐ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων
 25 τούτου γινομένου. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔρως δοκεῖ φιλία ὅμοιον εἶναι· τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν ὀρέγεται ὁ ἐρῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἴσθησιν.
 Ὁ μὲν τοίνυν λόγος ἐκεῖνά φησι διαπορῶν, τὸ δ' ἔργον οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι παρακρούεται πως ἡμᾶς ὁ διαπορῶν. σκεπτέον
 οὖν⁹ ἐντεῦθεν¹⁰ τάληθές· ὁ γὰρ φίλος βούλεται εἶναι,
 30 ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία φησίν, 'ἄλλος Ἡρακλῆς,' ἄλλος

¹ Bz.: κοινωνῶν.² Bz.: οἷον τὸ . . . ἢ τὸ.³ Bk.: μὴ.⁴ Bz.: οὐ.⁵ ὅτι add. (et *καὶ* om.) Fr.⁶ Ross: ἑκαστον.⁷ Rac. (*καὶ τὸ ἅμα δεῖ* Camerarius): *καὶ* *τολμᾶ* δὴ (δεῖ Γ').⁸ Fr.: ὡς.⁹ οὖν add. Fr.¹⁰ Sp.: ἐνθεν.^a This proverb looks like a quotation, being half a line of verse.^b See 1244 b 2 ff., 1245 a 27.^c *Ib.* 22 ff.

(first in the case of the things common to the other animals also, for instance eating together or drinking together, for what difference does it make whether these things take place when we are near together or apart, if you take away speech? but even to share in speech that is merely casual is a thing indifferent, and also neither to impart nor to receive information is possible for friends who are self-sufficing, since receiving information implies a deficiency in oneself and imparting it a deficiency in one's friend, and likeness is friendship)—but nevertheless it surely seems that we all find it pleasanter to share good things with our friends, as far as these fall to each, and the best that each can—
 11 but among these, it falls to one to share bodily pleasure, to another artistic study, to another philosophy—; and so it is pleasanter to be with one's friend (whence the saying 'Distant friends a burden are'^a), so that they must not be separated when this is taking place. Hence also love seems to resemble friendship, for the lover is eager to share the life of the loved one, although not in the most proper way but in a sensuous manner.

12 Therefore the argument in raising the question asserts the former position,^b but the facts of experience are obviously on the latter lines,^c so that it is clear that the raiser of the question in a way mis-
 13 leads us. We must therefore examine the truth from the following consideration: 'friend' really denotes, in the language of the proverb,^d 'another Hercules'—another self; but the characteristics are

The Alter Ego.

see

^a Quoted elsewhere in the same connexion, but one may conjecture that the phrase originally meant 'as strong as Hercules.'

1245 a

αὐτός· διέσπασται δέ, καὶ χαλεπὸν πάντα¹ ἐφ'
 ἐνὸς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὴν φύσιν ὁ συγ-
 γενέστατον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὁμοίος ἕτερος, ἄλλος
 δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ τούτων κατὰ μόριον ἕτερος
 ἕτερον. ἀλλ' οὐθέν γε² ἦττον βούλεται ὡσπερ

35 αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος. τὸ οὖν τοῦ φίλου 14

αἰσθάνεσθαι <καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου γνωρίζειν>³ τὸ
 αὐτοῦ πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν
 πως γνωρίζειν. ὥστε καὶ τὰ φορτικὰ μὲν συνήδεσ-
 θαι καὶ συζῆν τῷ φίλῳ ἡδὺ εὐλόγως (συμβαίνει γὰρ
 ἐκείνου ἅμα αἰσθησις αἰεί), μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θειοτέρας

1245 b ἡδονάς· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι αἰεὶ ἡδιον ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐν
 τῷ βελτίονι ἀγαθῷ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅτε μὲν πάθος,
 ὅτε δὲ πράξις, ὅτε δὲ ἕτερόν τι. εἰ δ' αὐτὸν⁴ εὖ ζῆν
 καὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ⁵ συζῆν συνεργεῖν,
 ἢ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει μάλιστα γε. διὸ δεῖ⁶

5 συνθεωρεῖν καὶ συνευχεῖσθαι, οὐ τὰ διὰ τροφήν
 καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα (αἱ τοιαῦται γὰρ κοινωνίαι οὐχ⁷
 ὁμιλῖαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀπολαύσεις), ἀλλ'
 ἕκαστος οὐ δύναται τυγχάνειν τέλους, ἐν τούτῳ 15
 βούλεται συζῆν, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ πάσχειν
 ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων αἰροῦνται μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν

10 καὶ δεῖ συζῆν, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλονται πάντες,
 καὶ ὅτι ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ἄριστος μάλιστα
 τοιοῦτος, φανερόν. ὅτι δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐκ
 ἐφαίνετο, καὶ τοῦτ' εὐλόγως συνέβαινε, λέγοντος

¹ Rac.: τὰ.² Syl.: τε.³ Rac.⁴ v.l. εἰ δυνατὸν (εἰ δ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν εὖ ζῆν οὕτω καὶ τὸν φίλον Sus.).⁵ εἰ δὲ τὸ Fr.⁶ δεῖ add. Fr.⁷ γὰρ κοινωνίαι οὐχ add. Rac. (ὁμιλῖαι γὰρ οὐχ Sus.).^a Cf. 1244 b 2 ff., 1245 a 27.

scattered, and it is difficult for all to be realized in the case of one person; though by nature a friend is what is most akin, yet one resembles his friend ✓ in body and another in spirit, and one in one part of the body or spirit, another in another. But still none the less a friend really means as it were a
 14 separate self. To perceive and to know a friend, therefore, is necessarily in a manner to perceive and in a manner to know oneself. Consequently to share even vulgar pleasures and ordinary life with a friend is naturally pleasant (for it always involves our simultaneously perceiving the friend), but more so to share the more divine pleasures; the reason of which is that it is always more pleasant to behold oneself enjoying the superior good, and this is sometimes a passive, sometimes an active experience, sometimes something else. But if it is pleasant to live well oneself and for one's friend also to live well, and if living together involves working together, surely their partnership will be pre-eminently in things included in the End. Hence we should study together, and feast together—not on the pleasures of food and the necessary pleasures (for such partnerships do not seem to be real social
 15 intercourse but mere enjoyment), but each really wishes to share with his friends the End that he is capable of attaining, or failing this, men choose most of all to benefit their friends and to be benefited by them. It is therefore manifest that to live together is actually a duty, and that all people wish it very much, and that this is most the case with the man that is the happiest and best. But that the contrary appeared to be the conclusion of the argument^a was also reasonable, the statement being

1245 b

ἀληθῆ. κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν γὰρ τῆς παραβολῆς ἀληθοῦς οὕσης ἢ λύσις ἐστίν· ὅτι γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ
 15 τοιοῦτος οἶος δεῖσθαι φίλου, καὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἀξιοῖ.¹ καίτοι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν² νοήσει ὁ σπουδαῖος· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεὸς εὖ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἢ ὥστε ἄλλο τι νοεῖν παρ' αὐτὸς αὐτόν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ³ δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν.

20 Καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῖν καὶ εὖχεσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐθεὶς φίλος ᾧ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἅμφω λέγεται ὀρθῶς. ἐνδεχόμενον⁴ γὰρ πολλοῖς συζῆν ἅμα καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι, ὡς πλείστοις⁵ αἰρετώτατον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χαλεπώτατον, ἐν ἐλάττωσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς συναισθήσεως εἶναι, ὥστ'¹
 25 οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ πολλοὺς κτήσασθαι (πέρας γὰρ δεῖ⁶), ἀλλὰ καὶ οὖσι χρήσασθαι.

Καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἀπείναι εὖ πράττοντα τὸν φιλούμενον βουλόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν. καὶ τὸ ἅμα βούλεσθαι εἶναι φιλικόν· ἐνδεχόμενον⁴ μὲν γὰρ ἅμα καὶ εὖ, τοῦτο πάντες αἰροῦνται· μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον⁴ δὲ ἅμα,⁷ ὥσπερ τὸν Ἡρακλῆ⁸ ἴσως ἂν ἢ μήτηρ εἶλετο θεὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα τῷ Εὐρυσθεῖ θητεύειν. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν εἴποιεν καὶ ἰ⁹ ὁ⁹ ὁ Λάκων ἔσκωψεν, ἐπεὶ τις ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν χειμαζόμενον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκούρους.

¹ Bz.: ἀξίου.² Rac.: οὐδὲ.³ ἐκείνος? Rac.⁴ Rac.: ἐνδεχομένου.⁵ Sp.: πλείστους.⁶ Syl.: ἀεί.⁷ Iac.: ἀλλά.⁸ Γ': τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ.⁹ Iac.: ὄν.^a i.e. of man with God, 1244 b 7.^b He doubtless said that being in trouble himself he did not wish to involve the Dioscuri in it (Solomon).

true. For the solution is on the line of the comparison,^a the correspondence being true; for the fact that God is not of such a nature as to need a friend postulates that man, who is like God, also ✓
 16 does not need one. Yet according to this argument the virtuous man will not think of anything; for God's perfection does not permit of this, but he is too perfect to think of anything else beside himself. And the reason is that for us well-being has reference to something other than ourselves, but in his case he is himself his own well-being.

17 As to seeking for ourselves and praying for many friends, and at the same time saying that one who has many friends has no friend, both statements are correct. For if it is possible to live with and share the perceptions of many at once, it is most desirable for them to be the largest possible number; but as that is very difficult, active community of perception must
 18 of necessity be in a smaller circle, so that it is not only difficult to acquire many friends (for probation is needed), but also to use them when one has got them.

Practical limitations.

One for whom we feel affection we sometimes wish to prosper in absence from us, but sometimes to share the same experiences. And to wish to be together is a mark of friendship, for if it is possible to be together and to prosper all choose this; but if it is not possible to prosper together, then we choose as the mother of Heracles perhaps would have chosen for her son, to be a god rather than to
 19 be with her but in service to Eurystheus. For men would say things like the jest which the Spartan made when somebody told him to invoke the Dioscuri in a storm.^b

Presence and absence of friends in prosperity and in adversity.

1245 b

Δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ μὲν φιλοῦντος τὸ ἀπείργειν εἶναι τῆς
 35 συμμεθέξεως τῶν χαλεπῶν, τοῦ δὲ φιλουμένου τὸ
 βούλεσθαι συμμετέχειν. καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρω συμ-
 βαίνει εὐλόγως· δεῖ γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ μηθὲν εἶναι οὕτω
 λυπηρὸν ὡς ἡδὺ τὸν φίλον, δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι
 μὴ τὸ αὐτοῦ. διὸ κωλύουσι συμμετέχειν· ἱκανοὶ 2
 γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθοῦντες, ἵνα μὴ φαίνωνται τὸ
 1248 a αὐτῶν σκοποῦντες καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι τὸ χαίρειν λυπου-
 μένου τοῦ φίλου, ἔτι δὲ¹ κουφότεροι εἶναι μὴ μόνοι
 φέροντες τὰ κακά. ἐπεὶ δ' αἰρετὸν τό τ' εὖ καὶ τὸ 2
 ἅμα, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἅμα εἶναι μετ' ἐλάττονος
 ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετώτερον² πῶς ἢ χωρὶς μετὰ μείζονος.
 5 ἐπεὶ δὲ³ ἄδηλον τὸ πόσον δύναται τὸ ἅμα, ἥδη
 διαφέρονται, καὶ οἱ μὲν⁴ οἴονται⁵ τὸ μετέχειν ἅμα
 πάντων φιλικόν, καὶ⁶ ὥσπερ συνδειπνεῖν ἅμα φασὶν
 ἡδίων⁷ ταῦτ' ἔχοντας· οἱ δ' ἅμα⁸ μὲν τοῦ εὖ⁹ βού-
 λονται, ἐπειδὴ εἰ¹⁰ τις ὑπερβολὰς ποιήσῃ, ὁμολόγους
 εἶναι¹¹ ἅμα κακῶς πράττοντας σφόδρα ἢ¹² εὖ
 10 σφόδρα χωρὶς. παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ περὶ τὰς 2
 ἀτυχίας· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ βουλόμεθα τοὺς φίλους ἀπ-
 εῖναι,¹³ οὐδὲ λυπεῖν ὅταν μηθὲν μέλλωσι ποιήσῃ
 πλέον, ὅτε δὲ αὐτοὺς¹⁴ ἡδιστον παρεῖναι. τὸ δὲ¹⁵
 τῆς ὑπεναντιώσεως ταύτης καὶ μάλ' εὐλογον. διὰ
 γὰρ τὰ προειρημένα τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ ὅτι μὲν
 15 τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ ἐν φαύλῃ ὄντα ἔξει τὸν φίλον

¹ δὲ (et lacunam ante ἔτι) Bk.: δὲ τὸ.

² Sp.: αἰρετὸν.

⁴ οἱ μὲν add. Sus.

⁶ καὶ om. Γ.

⁸ Sp.: ἄν.

¹⁰ Iac.: ἐπεὶ δὲ γέ.

¹² ἢ] καὶ? Rac.

¹⁴ Syl.: τοὺς.

³ Sp.: ἐπειδὴ.

⁵ Cas.: οἶον καὶ.

⁷ ἡδίων <ἢ ἰδία> Fr.

⁹ Iac.: μέντοι οὐ.

¹¹ Iac.: ὁμολογοῦσιν.

¹³ Cas.: εἶναι.

¹⁵ τὸ δ' <αἰτίον> Fr.

It seems to be characteristic of one who feels affection for another to debar him from sharing his troubles, and of the person for whom affection is felt to wish to share them. Both these things happen reasonably ; for to a friend nothing ought to give so much pain as his friend gives pleasure, yet it is felt that he ought not to choose his own interest.

20 Hence people hinder their friends from sharing their sorrows ; they are content to be in trouble by themselves, in order that they may not appear from selfish considerations actually to choose the joy of their friend's grief and furthermore to find it a
 21 relief not to bear their misfortunes alone. And as both well-being and companionship are desirable, it is clear that companionship combined with even a lesser good is in a way more desirable than separation with a greater good. But as it is not clear how much value companionship has, at this point men differ, and some think it is friendly to share everything in company, and say, for instance, that it is pleasanter to dine with company though having the same food ; others wish to share only in well-being, because, they say, if one supposes extreme cases, people experiencing great adversity in company or great prosperity separately are on a par. And it is much the
 22 same as this in regard to misfortunes also ; sometimes we wish our friends to be absent, and do not want to give them pain when their presence is not going to do any good, but at other times for them to be present is most pleasant. And the reason of this contrariety is very easily explained ; it comes about because of the things stated before,^a and because to behold a friend in pain or in a bad state is a thing

^a Cf. 1245 b 26—1246 a 2.

ARISTOTLE

1246 a

θεωρεῖν φεύγομεν ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς,
 τὸ δ' ὄραν τὸν φίλον ἠδὲ ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἠδίστων,
 διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, καὶ μὴν¹ κάμνοντα εἰ
 αὐτός· ὥστε ὀπότερον ἂν τούτων ἢ μᾶλλον ἠδύ, 20
 ποιεῖ τὴν ῥοπήν τοῦ βούλεσθαι παρεῖναι ἢ μὴ. καὶ
 τοῦτο² ἐπὶ τῶν χειρόνων συμβαίνει³ καὶ διὰ τὴν
 αὐτὴν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοτιμοῦνται
 τοὺς φίλους μὴ πράττειν εὖ μηδ' ἀπειναι⁴ ἂν⁵
 ἀνάγκη ἢ⁶ αὐτοῖς κακῶς. διὸ ἐνίοτε τοὺς ἐρω-
 μένους συναποκτινύασιν· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ οἰκείου
 25 αἰσθάνεσθαι κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν, εἰ καὶ μεμνημένος
 ὅτι ποτὲ εὖ ἔπραττε, μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ὤτετο ἀεὶ κακῶς
 πράττειν.

¹ Sol.: μὴ.³ Camot: συμβαίνειν.⁵ ἂν add. Fr.² Fr.: τότε.⁴ Rac.: εἶναι.⁶ ἢ add. Fr.

we absolutely shun, as we shun it in our own case, but to see a friend is as pleasant as anything can be, for the reason stated,^a and indeed to see him ill 23 if one is ill oneself; so that whichever of these is more pleasant, it sways the balance of wishing him to be present or not. And it fits in that the former occurs in the case of inferior people, and for the same reason; they are most eager for their friends not to prosper and not to be absent if they themselves have to suffer adversity. Hence sometimes suicides kill those whom they love with themselves, as they think that they feel their own misfortune more if their loved ones are to survive^b; just as, if a man in trouble had the memory that he had once been prosperous, he would be more conscious of his trouble than if he thought that he had always done badly.

^a Cf. 1245 a 26-b 9.

^b In the Greek this clause is left to be understood.

1246 a

Ι. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις εἰ ἔστιν ἐκάστω¹ χρήσα-
 σθαι καὶ ἐφ' ὃ² πέφυκε καὶ ἄλλως, καὶ τοῦτο ἦ
 αὐτὸ ἢ αὐ³ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἶον ἦ⁴ ὀφθαλμός,
 30 ἰδεῖν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως παριδεῖν διαστρέψαντα ὥστε δύο
 τὸ ἐν φανῆναι, αὐται μὲν δὴ χρεῖαι⁵ ἄμφω ὅτι μὲν
 ὀφθαλμός ἐστιν,⁶ ἦν δ' ὀφθαλμῶ ἄλλη⁷ δέ, κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός, οἶον εἰ ἦν ἀποδοσθαι ἢ φαγεῖν. ὁμοίως ²
 δέ⁸ καὶ ἐπιστήμη⁹· καὶ γὰρ ἀληθῶς καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν,
 οἶον ὅταν ἐκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ, ὡς ἀγνοία δὴ νῦν
 35 χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ μεταστρέψασαι¹⁰ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ
 τὸν ποδα¹¹ τῶ ποδί ποτε ὡς χειρὶ καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς
 ποδὶ χρῶνται αἰ¹² ὀρχηστρίδες. εἰ δὴ πᾶσαι αἰ ³
 ἄρεται¹³ ἐπιστήμαι, εἴη ἂν¹⁴ καὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ὡς
 ἀδικία χρῆσθαι· ἀδικήσει¹⁵ ἄρα ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης
 1246 b ἐπιστήμης· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ

¹ P^b: ἐκάστω φίλω M^b.

³ Iac.: τοῦτο ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ δὴ.

⁵ χρεῖαι add. Sp.

⁷ Iac.: ἄλλη.

⁹ Sp.: ἐπιστήμη.

¹¹ τὸν πόδα add. Iac.

¹³ Sp.: ἄρισται.

² Sp.: ᾗ aut &.

⁴ Iac.: ἦ.

⁶ ἐστιν Iac.: ὅτι.

⁸ Sp.: δὴ.

¹⁰ Iac.: μεταστρέψας.

¹² αἰ add. Sp.

¹⁴ εἴη ἂν Sp.: εἶπαν.

¹⁵ Sp.: εἰ δίκης εἰ.

BOOK VIII ^a

- 1 I. But one may raise the question whether it is possible to use any given thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise, and in the latter case to use it *qua* itself or on the contrary incidentally: for instance, with an eye *qua* eye, to see, or also just to see wrong, by squinting so that one object appears two—both these uses of the eye, then, use it because it is an eye, but it would be possible to make use of an eye but to use it in another way, incidentally, for example, if it were possible to sell it or to eat it.
- 2 And similarly with the use of knowledge: one can use it truly, and one can use it wrongly—for instance, when one spells a word incorrectly on purpose, then at the time one is using knowledge as ignorance, just as dancing-girls sometimes interchange the hand and
- 3 the foot and use foot as hand and hand as foot.^b If then all the virtues are forms of knowledge, it would be possible to use even justice as injustice—in that case a man will be behaving unjustly by doing unjust acts as a result of justice, as when one makes ignorant mistakes from knowledge; but if this is impossible, it is clear that the virtues cannot

c. i. GOOD-
NESS AND
KNOW-
LEDGE. The
virtues
are not
branches of
knowledge,
which is
capable of
misuse.

ceding Book, and some editors print it as cc. xiii.-xv. of Book VII. The text has been fully treated by Jackson, *J. Phil.* xxii. 170.

^b *i.e.* stand on their hands and wave their feet in the air, see *Dict. Ant.*, "Saltatio."

1246 b

ἂν εἶεν ἐπιστήμαι αἱ ἀρεταί. οὐδ' εἰ μὴ ἔστιν
 ἀγνοεῖν ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ἀλλ' ἀμαρτάνειν μόνον καὶ
 τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ποιεῖν, οὔτι ἀπὸ
 δικαιοσύνης γε ὡς ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πράξει. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ¹
 5 φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀληθές τι, τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσει
 κακείνη· ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἀφρόνως ἀπὸ φρονήσεως
 καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν ταῦτ' ἅπερ ὁ ἄφρων· εἰ δὲ ἀπλή
 ἦν² ἢ ἐκάστου χρεία ἦ ἕκαστον, κὰν φρονίμως
 ἔπραττον οὔτω πράττοντες. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ταῖς 4
 ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις ἄλλη κυρία ποιεῖ τὴν στροφὴν·
 10 αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς πασῶν κυρίας τίς; οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐπι-
 στήμη γε ἢ νοῦς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀρετῆ· χρῆται
 γὰρ αὐτῇ,³ ἢ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀρετῆ τῇ τοῦ
 ἀρχομένου χρῆται. τίς οὖν ἐστίν; ἢ ὡς περ λέγεται 5
 ἀκρασία ἢ⁴ κακία τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ πως⁵
 ἀκόλαστος ὁ ἀκρατής, ἔχων νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἂν
 15 ἰσχυρὰ ἦ ἢ ἐπιθυμία, στρέψει καὶ λογιεῖται τάναν-
 τία; ἢ ἔστι⁶ δῆλον ὅτι, κὰν ἐν μὲν τούτῳ ἀρετῆ ἐν
 δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἄνοια ἦ, ἑτέρα⁷ μεταποιοῦνται; ὥστε
 ἔσται δικαιοσύνη τ' οὐ⁸ δικαίως χρῆσθαι καὶ κακῶς
 καὶ φρονήσει ἀφρόνως· ὥστε καὶ τάναντία. ἄτοπον
 20 γὰρ εἰ τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετὴν⁹ μοχθηρία
 ποτὲ ἐγγενομένη ἐν¹⁰ τῷ ἀλόγῳ¹¹ στρέψει καὶ

¹ ἐπεὶ ἢ? Rac.³ αὐτὴ αὐτῇ? Rac.⁵ Iac.: πῶς.⁷ Iac.: ἕτεραί.⁹ I': τῆς . . . ἀρετῆς.² ἦν add. Rac. (ἦν pro ἢ Bus.)⁴ ἢ add. Rac.⁶ Iac.: ἢ σφι.⁸ τ' οὐ Iac.: τὸ.¹⁰ Sp.: μὲν.¹¹ Sus.: λόγῳ.

be branches of knowledge. And also if it is not possible from knowledge to be ignorant, but only to make mistakes and do the same things as one does from ignorance, a man will assuredly never act from justice in the same way as he will act from injustice. But since wisdom is knowledge and a form of truth, wisdom also will produce the same effect as knowledge, that is, it would be possible from wisdom to act unwisely and to make the same mistakes as the unwise man does; but if the use of anything *qua* itself were single,^a when so acting men would
 4 be acting wisely. In the case of the other forms of knowledge, therefore, another higher form causes their diversion; but what knowledge causes the diversion of the actually highest of all? Obviously there is no longer any knowledge or any mind to do it. But moreover goodness does not cause it either; for wisdom makes use of goodness, since the goodness
 5 of the ruling part uses that of the ruled. Who then is there in whom this occurs? or is it in the same way as the vice of the irrational part of the spirit is termed lack of control, and the uncontrolled man is in a manner profligate—possessing reason, but ultimately if his appetite is powerful it will turn him round, and he will draw the opposite inference? Or is it manifest that also if there is goodness in the irrational part but folly in the reason, goodness and folly are transformed in another way? so that it will be possible to use justice unjustly and badly, and wisdom unwisely; and therefore the opposite uses also will be possible. For it is strange if whereas when wickedness at any time arises in the irrational part it will pervert the goodness in

^a As in § 1 above it was shown not to be.

1246 b

ποιήσῃ ἀγνοεῖν, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ ἢ¹ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ
 ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ² ἀνοίας ἐνούσης οὐ στρέφει ταύτην
 καὶ ποιήσῃ φρονίμως κρίνειν καὶ τὰ δέοντα,³ καὶ
 πάλιν ἢ φρόνησις ἢ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τὴν ἐν τῷ
 ἀλόγῳ ἀκολασίαν⁴ σωφρόνως πράττειν, ὅπερ δοκεῖ
 25 εἶναι⁵ ἢ ἐγκράτεια. ὥστ' ἔσται καὶ⁶ ἀπὸ ἀνοίας⁷
 φρονίμως. ἔστι δὲ⁸ ταῦτα ἄτοπα, ἄλλως τε καὶ
 ἀπὸ ἀνοίας⁷ χρῆσθαι φρονήσῃ⁹ φρονίμως· τοῦτο
 γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδαμῶς ὀρώμεν· ὥσπερ τὴν
 ἰατρικὴν ἢ γραμματικὴν στρέφει ἀκολασία, ἀλλ'
 οὐ¹⁰ τὴν ἀγνοίαν, εἰς ἣ ἐναντία διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐνεῖναι
 30 τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅλως μᾶλλον εἶναι
 πρὸς τὴν κακίαν οὕτως ἔχουσαν· καὶ γὰρ ἄ¹¹ ὁ
 ἄδικος πάντα ὁ δίκαιος δύναται, καὶ ὅλως ἔνεστιν
 ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἢ ἀδυναμία. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἅμα φρό-
 7 νιμοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί, ἐκεῖναι¹² δ' ἄλλου ἕξεις, καὶ ὀρθόν¹³
 τὸ Σωκρατικόν¹⁴ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως.
 35 ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμη ἐφη, οὐκ ὀρθῶς¹⁵. ἀρετὴ γὰρ
 ἐστι, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλὰ γένος ἄλλο γνώσεως.¹⁶

II. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἢ φρόνησις ποιεῖ τὴν
 εὐπραγίαν κατ' ἀρετὴν,¹⁷ ἀλλὰ φαμέν καὶ τοὺς εὐ-
 1247 a τυχεῖς εὐ πράττειν ὡς καὶ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἐμποιούσης¹⁸
 εὐπραγίαν κατὰ¹⁹ τὰ αὐτὰ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ,²⁰ σκεπτέον

¹ ἢ add. Rac.² ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ add. Sus.³ δέοντα <πράττειν> vel <ποιεῖν>? Rac.⁴ Γ: κόλασιν ἂν.⁵ εἶναι add. Rac.⁶ καὶ Γ: καὶ ἢ.⁷ (his) Iac.: ἀγνοίας.⁸ ἔστι δὲ Sp.: ἐπὶ τε.⁹ φρονήσῃ add. Sp.¹⁰ οὐ Rac.: οὖν ὁ (οὖν οὐ Iac.).¹¹ ἄ add. Iac. (post πάντα Γ).¹² Iac.: καὶ ἀγαθαὶ ἐκεῖναι αἱ.¹³ Rac.: ὀρθῶς.¹⁴ Bek.: τὸ σῶμα κρατητικόν.¹⁵ Rac.: ὀρθόν.¹⁶ Sp.: γνῶσις . . .¹⁷ Iac.: καὶ ἀρετὴν (καὶ ἀρετὴ Sp.).

the rational and cause it to be ignorant, yet goodness in the irrational part when there is folly in the rational should not convert the folly and make it form wise and proper judgements, and again wisdom in the rational part should not make profligacy in the irrational act temperately—which seems to be what self-control essentially is. So that there
 6 will actually be wise action arising from folly. But these consequences are absurd, especially ^{what} ~~is~~ ^{not} using wisdom wisely as a result of folly; ~~is~~ ^{it} is a thing which we certainly do not see in such cases—for instance profligacy perverts one's medical knowledge or scholarship, but it does not pervert one's ignorance if it be opposed to it, because it does not contain superiority, but rather it is goodness in general that stands in this relation to badness; for example, the just man is capable of all that the unjust man is, and in general inability
 7 is contained in ability. So that it is clear that men are wise and good simultaneously, and that the states of character above described belong to a different person, and the Socratic dictum 'Nothing is mightier than wisdom,' is right. But in that by 'wisdom' he meant 'knowledge,' he was wrong; for wisdom is a form of goodness, and is not scientific knowledge but another kind of cognition.

1 II. But wisdom is not the only thing which acting in accordance with goodness causes welfare, but we also speak of the fortunate as faring well, which implies that good fortune also engenders welfare in the same way as knowledge does; we must therefore consider whether one man is fortunate

*all
 com
 by
 good*

c. ii. GOOD FORTUNE. Luck seems to come by nature, not by wisdom or providence.

¹⁸ ἐμποιούσης Fr.: εὖ ποιούσης.

¹⁹ Sp.: καὶ.

²⁰ Sp.: τῆς ἐπιστήμης.

1247 a

ἀρ' ἐστὶ φύσει ὁ μὲν εὐτυχῆς ὁ δ' ἀτυχῆς ἢ οὐ,
 καὶ πῶς ἔχει περὶ τούτων. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ τινες 2
 εὐτυχεῖς ὀρώμεν· ἄφρονες γὰρ ὄντες κατορθοῦσι
 5 πολλοί¹ ἐν οἷς ἡ τύχη κυρία, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐν οἷς τέχνη
 ἐστί, πολλή² μέντοι καὶ τύχη³ ἐνυπάρχει, οἷον ἐν
 στρατηγίᾳ καὶ κυβερνητικῇ. πότερον οὖν ἀπό τινος 3
 ἔξαιρεσθε οὗτοί εἰσι, ἢ οὐ τῶ⁴ αὐτοὶ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι
 γάρτικοί εἰσι τῶν εὐτυχημάτων; νῦν μὲν γὰρ
 10 οὕτως οἴονται ὡς φύσει τινῶν ὄντων· ἢ δὲ φύσις
 ποιούς τινας ποιεῖ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς διαφέρου-
 σιν, ὥσπερ οἱ μὲν γλαυκοὶ οἱ δὲ μελανόμματοι
 τῶ τοδι⁵ τοιονδὶ ἔχειν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ εὐτυχεῖς καὶ
 ἀτυχεῖς. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐ φρονήσει κατορθοῦσι 4
 δῆλον, οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος ἢ φρόνησις ἀλλ' ἔχει λόγον
 15 διὰ τί οὕτω πράττει, οἱ δ' οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν διὰ
 τί κατορθοῦσι, τέχνη γὰρ ἂν ἦν· ἔτι δὲ φανερόν ὅτι⁶ 5
 ὄντες ἄφρονες, οὐχ ὅτι περὶ ἄλλα (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ
 οὐθὲν ἄτοπον, οἷον Ἰπποκράτης γεωμετρικὸς ὢν,
 ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐδόκει' βλάξ καὶ ἄφρων εἶναι,
 καὶ πολὺ χρυσίον πλέων⁸ ἀπώλεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν
 20 Βυζαντίῳ πεντηκοστολόγων δι' εὐήθειαν, ὡς λέ-
 γουσιν) ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἐν οἷς⁹ εὐτυχοῦσιν ἄφρονες.
 περὶ γὰρ ναυκληρίαν οὐχ οἱ δεινότατοι εὐτυχεῖς, 6
 ἀλλ' (ὥσπερ ἐν κύβων πτώσει ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ἄλλος

¹ Iac.: πολλὰ.² Rac.: πολλοὶ (πολὸν Cas.).³ Rac.: τύχης.⁴ Γ: οὕτω.⁵ Sp.: τὸ δεῖν.⁶ ὅτι add. Sp.⁷ Bf: δοκεῖ.⁸ Sp.: πλέων.⁹ Bf: ἐνίοις.

nate and another unfortunate by nature or not, and
 2 how it stands with these matters. For that some
 men are fortunate we see, since many though fool-
 ish succeed in things in which luck is paramount,
 and some even in things which involve skill although
 3 also containing a large element of luck—for ex-
 ample strategy and navigation. Are, then, these men
 fortunate as a result of a certain state of character,
 or are they enabled to achieve fortunate results not
 by reason of a certain quality in themselves? As it
 is, people think the latter, holding that some men are
 successful by natural causes; but nature makes men
 of a certain quality, and the fortunate and unfortu-
 nate are different even from birth, in the same
 way as some men are blue-eyed and others black-
 eyed because a particular part of them is of a par-
 4 ticular quality. For it is clear that they do not
 succeed by means of wisdom, because wisdom is
 not irrational but can give reason why it acts as it
 does, whereas they could not say why they succeed
 5 —for that would be science; and moreover it is
 manifest that they succeed in spite of being
 unwise—not unwise about other matters (for
 that would not be anything strange, for example
 Hippocrates^a was skilled in geometry but was
 thought to be stupid and unwise in other matters,
 and it is said that on a voyage owing to foolish-
 ness he lost a great deal of money, taken from him
 by the collectors of the two-per-cent duty at Byzan-
 tium), but even though they are unwise about
 6 the matters in which they are fortunate. For in
 navigation it is not the cleverest who are fortunate,
 but (just as in throwing dice one man throws a

^a A Pythagorean philosopher of Chios, *fl.* 460 B.C.

1247 a

δ' ἐξ¹ βάλλει) καθὰ ἤν² φύσει ἐστὶν εὐτυχῆς. ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι, ὡσπερ φασίν, ὑπὸ θεοῦ, καὶ ἐξωθέν τι
 25 εἶναι τὸ κατορθοῦν, οἷον πλοῖον κακῶς νεναυπη-
 γημένον ἄμεινον πολλάκις διαπλεῖ,³ ἀλλ' οὐ δι'
 αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν; ἀλλ' οὕτως
 ὁ εὐτυχῶν⁴ τὸν δαίμον' ἔχει κυβερνήτην.⁵ ἀλλ'
 ἄτοπον θεὸν ἢ δαίμονα φιλεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ
 μὴ τὸν βέλτιστον καὶ τὸν φρονιμώτατον. εἰ δὲ
 30 ἀνάγκη ἢ φύσει ἢ νόῳ ἢ ἐπιτροπία τινὶ κατορθοῦν,
 τὰ δὲ δύο μὴ ἐστι, φύσει ἂν εἶεν οἱ εὐτυχεῖς. ἀλλὰ
 μὴν ἢ γε φύσις αἰτία ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἢ τοῦ ὡς
 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἢ δὲ τύχη τούναντίον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ⁶
 παραλόγως ἐπιτυγχάνει τύχης δοκεῖ εἶναι,⁷ ἀλλ',
 εἴπερ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς, οὐκ ἂν δόξειε⁸ τοιοῦτον
 35 εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον οἷον ἀεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ-
 ἔτι εἰ ὅτι⁹ τοιοσδι ἐπιτυγχάνει ἢ ἀποτυγχάνει,¹⁰
 ὡσπερ ὅτι¹¹ γλαυκὸς οὐκ ὄξυ ὄρα, οὐ τύχη αἰτία
 ἀλλὰ φύσις· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν εὐτυχῆς ἀλλ' οἷον εὐ-
 φυῆς. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη λεκτέον, ὅτι οὗς λέγομεν
 1247 b εὐτυχεῖς, οὐ διὰ τύχην εἰσίν· οὐκ ἄρα εἰσίν εὐτυχεῖς,
 εὐτυχεῖς¹² γὰρ ὅσοις¹³ αἰτία τύχη ἀγαθὴ ἀγαθῶν.

¹ ἐξ add. hic Rac. (post βάλλει B^f, Iac.).

² Iac. (et post φύσει, <τῷ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν εὐτυχῆ>): καθ' ἤν.

³ Syl.: δὲ πλεῖ.

⁴ Syl.: οὗτος εὐτυχῆς (εὐτυχῶν edd.).

⁵ post κυβερνήτην add. ἀγαθόν codd. plur.

⁶ οὖν <οὕτω> τὸ Bus.

⁷ εἶναι <ὁ δὲ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς> Iac., <ὁ δὲ διὰ τύχην ἐπι-
 τυγχάνων εὐτυχῆς>? Rac.

⁸ δόξειε add. Iac.

¹⁰ ἢ ἀποτυγχάνει add. Sus.

¹² B^f: εὐτύχης.

⁹ ὅτι add. Fr.

¹¹ ὅτι ὁ codd. plur.

¹³ Iac.: ὄσων.

blank and another a six) a man is fortunate according as things were arranged by nature.^a Or is it because he is loved by God, as the phrase goes, and because success is something from outside? as for instance a badly built ship often gets through a voyage better, though not owing to itself, but because it has a good man at the helm. But on this showing the fortunate man has the deity as steersman. But it is strange that a god or deity should love a man of this sort, and not the best and most prudent. If, then, the success of the lucky must necessarily be due to either nature or intellect or some guardianship, and of these three causes two are ruled out, those who are fortunate will be so by nature. But again, nature of course is the cause of a thing that happens either always or generally in the same way, whereas fortune is the opposite. If, then, unexpected achievement seems a matter of fortune, but, if a man is fortunate owing to fortune, it would seem that the cause is not of such a sort as to produce the same result always or generally —further, if a man's succeeding or not succeeding is due to his being of a certain sort, as a man does not see clearly because he has blue eyes, not fortune but nature is the cause; therefore he is not a man who has good fortune but one who has as it were a good nature. Hence we should have to say that the people we call fortunate are so not by reason of fortune; therefore they are not fortunate, for the fortunate are those for whom good fortune is a cause of good things.

2
Yet nature
is uniform,
luck is not.

^a Or, with Jackson's emendations, 'another a six according as nature determines, so here a man is lucky because his nature is such.'

1247 b

Εἰ δ' οὕτω, πότερον οὐκ¹ ἔσται τύχη ὅλως, ἢ ἔσται μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰτία²; ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι. ἔσται ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν τισὶν 10 αἰτία ἢ κακῶν· εἰ δ' ὅλως ἐξαιρετέον, καὶ³ οὐδέν⁴ ἀπὸ τύχης φατέον γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἄλλης οὔσης αἰτίας διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄραν τύχην εἶναί φασιν αἰτίαν· διὸ καὶ ὀριζόμενοι τὴν τύχην τιθέασιν αἰτίαν ἄλογον⁵ ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ, ὡς οὔσης τινὸς φύσεως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἄλλο πρόβλημα ἂν εἴη· 10 ἐπεὶ δέ⁶ ὀρώμεν τινὰς ἅπαξ εὐτυχήσαντες, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ πάλιν ἂν διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ κατορθώσασιν,⁷ καὶ πάλιν, καὶ πάλιν⁸; τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ⁹ αἴτιον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται τύχης τοῦτο¹⁰. ἀλλ' ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ 11 ἀποβαίῃ ἀπ'¹¹ ἀπείρων καὶ ἀορίστων, ἔσται μὲν τῷ¹² ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἐπιστήμη δ' οὐκ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἢ δι' ἐμπειρίαν,¹³ ἐπεὶ ἐμάνθανον ἂν τινες εὐτυχεῖς,¹⁴ 15 ἢ καὶ πᾶσαι ἂν αἰ ἐπιστήμαι, ὥσπερ ἔφη Σωκράτης, εὐτυχίαι ἦσαν. τί οὖν κωλύει συμβῆναί τι ἐφ- 12 εῖξῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλάκις οὐχ ὅτι τοιοσδί,¹⁵ ἀλλ' οἷον ἂν εἴη¹⁶ τὸ κύβους ἀεὶ μακαρίαν¹⁷ βάλλειν; τί δὲ δῆ; ἄρ' οὐκ ἔνεισιν ὀρμαὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἰ μὲν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ αἰ δ' ἀπὸ ὀρέξεως ἀλόγου; καὶ 20 πρότεροι αὐταί; εἰ γὰρ ἔστι φύσει ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν

¹ οὐκ Sp.: ἦ.² Sp.: ἀλλ' οὐκέτι.³ [καὶ] Sp.⁴ μηδὲν Sus.⁵ Iac.: ἀνάλογον.⁶ B^f: ἐπειδὴ.⁷ Iac.: διὰ τὸ ἀποκαρθῶσαι (*propter idem dirigere unum B^f*).⁸ καὶ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν M^b: καὶ πάλιν P^b.⁹ B^f: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτ'.¹⁰ B^f: οὐ τό.¹¹ B^f: ἀπ' om. codd.¹² Iac.: τὸ.¹³ B^f: ἀπειρίαν.¹⁴ εὐτυχεῖν Sp.¹⁵ Iac.: τοῖς δεῖ.¹⁶ Syl.: εἶεν.¹⁷ Fr.: μακρὰν.

But if so, shall we say that there is no such thing as fortune at all, or that it does exist but is not a cause? No, it must both exist and be a cause. Consequently it will furthermore be a cause of goods or evils to certain persons; whereas if fortune is to be eliminated altogether, then nothing must be said to come about from fortune, in spite of the fact that, although there is another cause, because we do not see it we say that fortune is a cause—owing to which people give it as a definition of fortune that it is a cause incalculable to human reasoning, implying that it is a real natural principle. This, then, would be a matter for another inquiry. But since we see that some people have good fortune on one occasion, why should they not succeed a second time too owing to the same cause? and a third time? and a fourth? for the same cause produces the same effect. Therefore this will not be a matter of fortune; but when the same result follows from indeterminate and indefinite antecedents, it will be good or bad for somebody, but there will not be the knowledge of it that comes by experience, since, if there were, some fortunate persons would learn it, or indeed all branches of knowledge would, as Socrates said,^a be forms of good fortune. What, then, prevents such things from happening to somebody a number of times running not because he has a certain character, but in the way in which for instance it would be possible to make the highest throw at dice every time? And what then? are there not some impulses in the spirit that arise from reasoning and others from irrational appetite? and are not the latter prior? because if the impulse caused by desire for what is

* ^a Plato, *Euthydemus* 279 D.

1247 b

ἡδέος, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις φύσει γε ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βαδίζου
 ἂν πάντοτε.¹ εἰ δὴ τινές εἰσιν εὐφυνεῖς (ὥσπερ οἱ
 ᾠδικοὶ² οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄδειν οὕτως εὖ πεφύκασιν)
 καὶ ἄνευ λόγου ὀρμῶσιν ἢ³ ἡ φύσις πέφυκε καὶ
 ἐπιθυμοῦσι καὶ τούτου καὶ τότε⁴ καὶ οὕτως ὡς δεῖ
 25 καὶ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, οὗτοι κατορθώσουσι⁵ κἂν
 τύχῳσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες καὶ ἄλογοι, ὥσπερ καὶ εὖ
 ἄσσονται⁶ οὐ⁷ διδασκαλικοὶ ὄντες. οἱ δέ γε τοιοῦτοι
 εὐτυχεῖς, ὅσοι ἄνευ λόγου κατορθοῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
 πολὺ. φύσει ἄρα οἱ εὐτυχεῖς εἶεν ἂν.

Ἡ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται ἡ εὐτυχία; τὰ μὲν γὰρ
 30 πράττεται ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρμῆς καὶ προελομένων πρᾶξαι,
 τὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον· καὶ εἰ⁸ ἐν ἐκείνοις
 κακῶς λογίσασθαι δοκοῦσι κατορθοῦντες, καὶ⁹ εὐ-
 τυχηῖσάι φαμεν· καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις, εἰ ἐβούλοντο
 ἄλλο¹⁰ ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ¹¹ ἔλαβον τὰγαθόν. ἐκείνους
 μὲν τοίνυν εὐτυχεῖν διὰ φύσιν ἐνδέχεται· ἡ γὰρ
 35 ὀρμὴ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις οὕσα οὐ ἔδει¹² κατώρθωσεν, ὁ
 δὲ λογισμὸς ἦν ἡλίθιος· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐνταῦθα,
 ὅταν ὁ¹³ μὲν λογισμὸς μὴ δοκῶν ὀρθὸς¹⁴ εἶναι τύχη,¹⁵
 ὀρμῆ¹⁶ δ' αὐτοῦ αἰτία οὕσα, αὕτη¹⁷ ὀρθὴ οὕσα
 ἔσωσεν¹⁸. ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐλογίσαντο¹⁹
 πάλιν οὕτω καὶ ἠτύχησαν.²⁰ ἐν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἑτέροις

¹ Iac. (*semper* B^f): πᾶν.

² Syl.: ἄδικοι (ἀδίδακτοι ᾠδικοὶ Iac., *indocti* B^f).

³ ἢ add. Iac. (*secundum quod* B^f).

⁴ Sp. (*tunc* B^f): ποτέ.

⁵ Fr. (*dirigent* B^f): κατορθοῦσι.

⁶ Syl.: ἔσσονται.

⁷ Fr. (*non* B^f): οἱ P^b, εἰ M^b.

⁸ εἰ add. Rac. (*post* ἐκείνοις Sp.).

⁹ [καὶ] (*vel* κατετυχηῖσάι) Bus.

¹⁰ Iac.: ἄν.

¹¹ ἢ add. Iac.

¹² Fr.: δεῖ.

¹³ ὁ add. Rac.

¹⁴ v.l.: ὀρθῶς P^b, M^b.

¹⁵ Sp.: τύχη.

¹⁶ ὀρμῆ add. Rac. (ἢ add. Sp.).

¹⁷ Sp.: αὕτη δ'.

¹⁸ Sp. (*saluauit* B^f): ἔξωσεν.

pleasant exists by nature, appetite also would merely by nature proceed towards what is good in every
 13 case. If, therefore, some men have good natures—just as musical people though they have not learnt to sing^a have a natural aptitude for it—and without the aid of reason have an impulse in the direction of the natural order of things and desire the right thing in the right way at the right time, these men will succeed even although they are in fact foolish and irrational, just as the others will sing well although unable to teach singing. And men of this sort obviously are fortunate—men who without the aid of reason are usually successful. Hence it will follow that the fortunate are so by nature.

14 Or has the term 'good fortune' more than one meaning? For some things are done from impulse and as a result of the agents' purposive choice, other things not so but on the contrary; and if in the former cases when the agents succeed they seem to have reasoned badly, we say that in fact they have had good fortune; and again in the latter cases, if they
 15 have got. The former persons then may possibly owe their good fortune to nature, for their impulse and appetite, being for the right object, succeeded, but their reasoning was foolish; and in their case, when it happens that their reasoning seems to be incorrect but that impulse is the cause of it, this impulse being right has saved them; although sometimes on the contrary owing to appetite they have reasoned in this way and come to misfortune.

^a Or, with Jackson's additions, 'just as untaught musical geniuses, without professional knowledge of singing.'

3
 Luck an ambiguous term: it includes success really caused by nature.

¹⁹ Sp.: ἐλογίσατο.

²⁰ Sp.: ἠτύχησεν.

1247 b πῶς ἔσται ἡ εὐτυχία κατ' εὐφυΐαν ὀρέξεως καὶ
 1248 a ἐπιθυμίας; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία κάκεινη
 ἢ αὐτή. ἡ πλείους αἱ εὐτυχίαι καὶ τύχη διττή¹;
 ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρώμεν παρὰ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τοὺς
 λογισμοὺς τοὺς ὀρθοὺς εὐτυχοῦντάς τινας, δῆλον
 5 ὅτι ἕτερον ἂν τι εἴη τὸ αἴτιον τῆς εὐτυχίας. ἐκείνη
 δὲ πότερον ἔστιν² εὐτυχία ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ³ ἐπεθύμη-
 σεν ὧν ἔδει καὶ ὅτε ἔδει ᾧ⁴ λογισμὸς ἀνθρώπινος
 οὐκ ἂν τούτου εἴη; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον
 τοῦτο οὐ γέ⁵ φυσικὴ ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ἀλλὰ δια-
 φθείρεται ὑπὸ τινος. εὐτυχεῖν μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ὅτι ἡ
 10 τύχη τῶν παρὰ λόγον αἰτία, τοῦτο⁶ δὲ παρὰ λόγον,
 παρὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ καθόλου. ἀλλ' ὡς
 ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ διὰ τοῦτο.
 ὥσθ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος οὐ δείκνυσιν ὅτι φύσει εὐ-
 τυχεῖται,⁷ ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ πάντες οἱ δοκοῦντες εὐτυχεῖν
 διὰ τύχην κατορθοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ⁸ διὰ φύσιν· οὐδ' ὅτι
 οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη (οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τύχη)⁹ αἰτία
 15 οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι¹⁰ οὐ τῶν πάντων ὧν
 δοκεῖ.

Τοῦτο μέντ' ἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις, ἄρ' αὐτοῦ τούτου
 τύχη αἰτία, τοῦ ἐπιθυμῆσαι οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ; ἢ
 οὕτω γε πάντων ἔσται; καὶ γὰρ τοῦ νοῆσαι καὶ
 βουλευσασθαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐβουλεύσατο βουλευσά-
 μενος καὶ πρὶν¹¹ τοῦτ' ἐβουλεύσατο οὐδ' ἐνόησε

¹ καὶ τύχη διττή hic Sp.: ante κάκεινη codd.

² ἔστιν Sp.: ἡ M^b, om. P^b.

³ Fr.: ἢ.

⁴ Iac.: τὸ.

⁵ οὐ γέ Iac.: οὔτε.

⁶ Vict. (hoc B^f): τούτου.

⁷ Iac. (bene fortunate agatur B^f): εὐτυχεῖν.

⁸ ἀλλ' <ἐνίοτε>? Rac.: ἀλλὰ <πολλοὶ>? Sus.

⁹ Iac.

¹⁰ ὅτι add. Cas.

¹¹ πρὶν add. Rac. (antequam consiliaretur B^f).

^a Cf. 1247 b 30 τὰ δ' οὐ (Solomon).

16 But in the case of the others,^a then, how will good
 fortune be due to natural goodness of appetite and
 desire? The fact is that the good fortune here and
 that in the other case are the same. Or is good
 fortune of more than one kind, and is fortune two-
 17 fold? But since we see some people being fortunate
 contrary to all the teachings of science and
 correct calculation, it is clear that the cause of good
 fortune must be something different. But is it or is
 it not good fortune whereby a man formed a desire
 for the right thing and at the right time when in
 his case human reasoning could not make this calculation?
 For a thing the desire for which is natural
 is not altogether uncalculated, but the reasoning
 18 is perverted by something. So no doubt he seems
 fortunate, because fortune is the cause of things
 contrary to reason, and this is contrary to reason,
 for it is contrary to knowledge and to general principle.
 19 But probably it does not really come from
 fortune, but seems to do so from the above cause.
 So that this argument does not prove that good
 fortune comes by nature, but that not all those
 who seem fortunate succeed because of fortune, but
 because of nature; nor does it prove that there is
 no such thing as fortune, nor that fortune is not the
 cause of anything, but that it is not the cause of all
 the things of which it seems to be the cause.

20 Yet someone may raise the question whether
 fortune is the cause of precisely this—our forming
 a desire for the right thing at the right time. Or,
 on that showing, will not fortune be the cause
 of everything—even of thought and deliberation?
 since it is not the case that one only deliberates
 when one has deliberated even previously to that

4
 Right desire
 not due to
 chance but
 a gift of
 heaven.

1248 a

20 νοήσας πρότερον ἢ¹ νοῆσαι, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀρχή τις.² οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ νοῆσαι ὁ νοῦς³ ἀρχή, οὐδὲ τοῦ βουλευσασθαι βουλή. τί οὖν ἄλλο πλὴν τύχη; ὥστ' ἀπὸ τύχης ἅπαντα ἔσται. ἢ⁴ ἔστι τις ἀρχή ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη ἔξω, αὕτη δὲ διὰ τὸ τοιαύτη γε εἶναι τοιοῦτο⁵ δύνатаι⁸ ποιεῖν; τὸ 2
25 δὲ ζητούμενον τοῦτ' ἐστί, τίς ἢ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχή ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. δῆλον δὴ ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ, θεὸς καὶ πᾶν ἐκεῖ κινεῖ⁷. κινεῖ γὰρ πῶς πάντα⁸ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον. λόγου δ' ἀρχή οὐ λόγος ἀλλά τι κρείττον.² τί οὖν ἂν κρείττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης εἶη⁹ καὶ νοῦ¹⁰ πλὴν θεός; ἢ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον· καὶ διὰ
30 τοῦτο, ὁ¹¹ πάλαι ἔλεγον, εὐτυχεῖς καλοῦνται οἱ οἱ¹² ἂν ὀρμήσωσι κατορθοῦσιν¹³ ἄλογοι ὄντες. καὶ βουλευεσθαι οὐ συμφέρει αὐτοῖς· ἔχουσι γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἢ κρείττων¹⁴ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ βουλευσεως (οἱ δὲ τὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔχουσι), καὶ ἐν- 2
θουσιασμόν,¹⁵ τοῦτο δ' οὐ δύνανται, ἄλογοι γὰρ
35 ὄντες ἐπιτυγχάνουσι¹⁶ καὶ τοῦ τῶν¹⁷ φρονίμων καὶ σοφῶν ταχεῖαν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν· καὶ μόνον οὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ ἀπολαβεῖν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δι' ἐμπειρίαν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν τοῦ¹⁸ τῷ σκοπεῖν

1 ἢ add. Sp.

2 ἀλλ' . . . τις hic Rac.: ante οὐδ' ἐνόησε codd.

3 ὁ νοῦς Cas.: σιννοῦσα.

4 ἢ Sus. (aut B^f): εἰ (εἰ <μὴ> Sp.).

5 Iac.: διὰ τί τοιαύτη τὸ εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο.

6 Syl. (protest B^f): δύνασθαι.

7 ἐκεῖ κινεῖ Iac.: ἐκείνωφ.

8 πάντα <τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν> Iac.

9 Sp.: εἶποι.

10 καὶ νοῦ add. Sp. (et intellectu B^f).

11 Iac.: οἱ.

12 ol add. Ross.

13 Fr. (dirigunt B^f): κατορθοῦν.

14 Ald.: κρείττον.

15 Sp.: ἐνθουσιασμοί.

16 Syl.: ἀποτυγχάνουσι.

17 τοῦ τῶν Syl.: τούτων (horum B^f).

18 τοῦ Sol.: τε ἐν.

deliberation, nor does one only think when one has previously thought before thinking, and so on to infinity, but there is some starting-point; therefore thought is not the starting-point of thinking, nor deliberation of deliberating. Then what else is, save fortune? It will follow that everything originates from fortune. Or shall we say that there is a certain starting-point outside which there is no other, and that this, merely owing to its being of such and such a nature, can produce a result of such
 21 and such a nature? But this is what we are investigating—what is the starting-point of motion in the spirit? The answer then is clear: as in the universe, so there, everything is moved by God; for in a manner the divine element in us is the cause
 22 of all our motions. And the starting-point of reason is not reason but something superior to reason. What, then, could be superior even to knowledge and to intellect, except God? Not goodness, for goodness is an instrument of the mind; and owing to this, as I was saying some time ago,^a those are called fortunate who although irrational succeed in whatever they start on. And it does not pay them to deliberate, for they have within them a principle of a kind that is better than mind and deliberation
 23 (whereas the others have reason but have not this): they have inspiration, but they cannot deliberate. For although irrational they attain even what belongs to the prudent and wise—swiftness of divination: only the divination that is based on reason we must not specify, but some of them attain it by experience and others by practice in the use of observation;

^a See 1247 b 26.

1248 a

χρησθαι· τῷ θεῷ¹ δὲ οὔτοι.² τοῦτο γὰρ³ εὖ
ὄρᾳ καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὧν ἀπολύεται ὁ

40 λόγος οὔτοι.⁴ διὸ οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ καὶ εὐθύνειροι·

1248 b ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπολυομένου τοῦ λόγου⁵ ἰσχύειν
μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ⁶ οἱ τυφλοὶ μνημονεύουσι μᾶλλον,
ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὄρωμένοις⁷ εἶναι τὸ
μνημονεύον.⁸

Φανερόν δ᾽ ὅτι δύο εἶδη εὐτυχίας, ἡ μὲν θεία· 2.
διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ εὐτυχῆς διὰ θεὸν κατορθοῦν, οὗτος
5 δ' ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν κατορθωτικός,¹⁰ ὁ δ'
ἕτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν. ἄλογοι δ' ἀμφότεροι.
καὶ ἡ μὲν συνεχῆς εὐτυχία μᾶλλον, αὕτη δὲ οὐ συν-
εχής.

III. Κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν περὶ ἐκάστης ἀρετῆς 1
εἴρηται πρότερον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χωρὶς διείλομεν τὴν
10 δύναμιν αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς διαρθρωτέον¹¹
τῆς ἐκ τούτων ἣν καλοῦμεν¹² ἤδη καλοκάγαθίαν.

¹ Sp.: θεῷ. ² Von Arnim: αὐται. ³ Von Arnim: καί.

⁴ Sol.: οὗτος (ll. 37 ff. συνήθειαν τὸ ἐν τῷ σκοπεῖν χρησθαι τῷ θεῷ δύναται τοῦτο καὶ εὖ ὄραν καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὧν ἀπολύεται ὁ λόγος οὕτως Iac.).

⁵ Sp. (cum B^f): ἀπολυομένους τοὺς λόγους.

⁶ Von Arnim: καὶ ὥσπερ.

⁷ Rac.: εἰρημένοις (τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ἰσχυροῖς εἶναι τῷ πρὸς τοῖς) εἰρημένοις ἰσχυροῦς) εἶναι τὸ μνημονεύον Iac., ad mirabilia virtuosius esse quod memoratur B^f).

⁸ [τὸ μνημονεύον] ? Rac.

⁹ Fr. (itaque B^f): δέ.

¹⁰ Von Arnim: διορθωτικός.

¹¹ v.l. διορθωτέον.

¹² I', Iac. (uocatus B^f): ἐκαλοῦμεν.

^a The ms. reading gives 'and experience and habit use God.'

^b Or, with Jackson's text, 'But some of them by experi-

and these men use the divine.^a For this quality discerns aright the future as well as the present, and these are the men whose reason is disengaged.^b This is why the melancholic even have dreams that are true ; for it seems that when the reason is disengaged principle has more strength—just as the blind remember better, being released from having their faculty of memory engaged with objects of sight.^c

24 It is clear, then, that there are two kinds of good fortune—one divine, owing to which the fortunate man's success is thought to be due to the aid of God, and this is the man who is successful in accordance with his impulse, while the other is he who succeeds against his impulse. Both persons are irrational. The former kind is more continuous good fortune, the latter is not continuous.

1 III. We have, then, previously spoken about each virtue in particular ; and as we have distinguished their meaning separately, we must also describe in detail the virtue constituted from them, to which we

c. iii.
NOBILITY.
The combination of
all virtues.

2 now give the name^d of nobility.^e Now it is man-
ence and others by habituation have this capacity of con-
sulting God in examining things, and of discerning aright
both the future and the present ; and those also have it
whose reason is disengaged in the manner described.'

^c Jackson (with some hints from the Latin version) emends to give 'just as blind men, who are released from attention to visibles, remember better than others, because the faculty of memory is thus more earnestly addressed to what has been said.'

^d The ms. reading gives, 'we were already giving the name,' but if that is correct, the passage referred to has been lost.

^e Καλοκάγαθία, like 'nobility', connotes both social status and moral excellence ; so καλοκάγαθός may be rendered 'gentleman.'

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη τὸν ταύτης ἀληθῶς τευξόμενον 2
 τῆς προσηγορίας ἔχειν τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀρετάς,
 φανερόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐθενὸς οἶόν τ'
 ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὅλον μὲν τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει
 15 μέρος δ' οὐθέν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα
 καὶ κυριώτατα τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον τῷ ὅλῳ.
 ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καλὸν καγαθὸν οὐ 3
 μόνον κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ
 ἔχοντα διαφοράν. τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλος
 ἐστὶν ἃ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν ἕνεκά ἐστιν αἰρετά. τούτων δὲ 4
 20 καλὰ ὅσα δι' αὐτὰ ὄντα πάντα² ἐπαινετά ἐστίν·
 ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀφ'³ ὧν αἶ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν
 ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά, δικαιοσύνη⁴ καὶ
 αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ πράξεις, καὶ αἱ⁵ σώφρονες, ἐπαινετὴ
 γὰρ καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑγίεια ἐπαινετόν,
 οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον, οὐδὲ τὸ ἰσχυρῶς, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ
 25 ἰσχὺς, ἀλλ' ἀγαθὰ μὲν, ἐπαινετά δ' οὐ. ὁμοίως 5
 δὲ τοῦτο δῆλον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τῆς
 ἐπαγωγῆς. ἀγαθὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὧ τὰ φύσει
 ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ. τὰ γὰρ περιμάχητα καὶ
 μέγιστα εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἀγαθὰ, τιμὴ καὶ πλοῦτος
 καὶ σώματος ἀρεταὶ καὶ εὐτυχίαι καὶ δυνάμεις,
 30 ἀγαθὰ μὲν φύσει ἐστίν, ἐνδέχεται δ' εἶναι βλαβερά
 τισι διὰ τὰς ἕξεις. οὔτε γὰρ ἄφρων οὔτ' ἄδικος ἢ
 ἀκόλαστος ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν ὀνήσειε⁶ χρώμενος αὐτοῖς,
 ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁ κάμνων τῇ τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος τροφῇ
 χρώμενος, οὐδ' ὁ ἀσθενῆς καὶ ἀνάπηρος τοῖς τοῦ
 35 ὑγιοῦς καὶ τοῖς τοῦ ὀλοκλήρου κόσμοις. καλὸς 6
 δὲ καγαθὸς τῷ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ καλὰ ὑπάρχειν
 αὐτῷ δι' αὐτά, καὶ τῷ πρακτικὸς εἶναι τῶν καλῶν

¹ καὶ add. Bus.³ Syl.: ἐφ'.² αἰρετὰ pro πάντα? Sp.⁴ <οἶον> δικαιοσύνη Syl.

fest that one who is to obtain this appellation truly must possess the particular virtues; for it is impossible for it to be otherwise in the case of any other matter either—for instance, no one is healthy in his whole body but not in any part of it, but all the parts, or most of them and the most important, must necessarily be in the same condition as the whole. Now being good and being noble are really different not only in their names but also in themselves. For all goods have Ends that are desirable in and for themselves. Of these, all those are fine which are laudable as existing for their own sakes, for these are the Ends which are both the motives of laudable actions and laudable themselves—justice itself and its actions, and temperate actions, for temperance also is laudable; but health is not laudable, for its effect is not, nor is vigorous action laudable, for strength is not—these things are good but they are not laudable. And similarly induction makes this clear in the other cases also. Therefore a man is good for whom the things good by nature are good. For the things men fight about and think the greatest, honour and wealth and bodily excellences and pieces of good fortune and powers, are good by nature but may possibly be harmful to some men owing to their characters. If a man is foolish or unjust or profligate he would gain no profit by employing them, any more than an invalid would benefit from using the diet of a man in good health, or a weakling and cripple from the equipment of a healthy man and of a sound one. A man is noble because he possesses those good things that are fine for their own sake and because he is a doer of

More than mere goodness.

Its psychology.

⁵ Sol. : "οί.

⁶ Γ, Sp. : οὐδ' ὀνήσειε.

1248 b

καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα· καλὰ δ' ἐστὶν αἷ τε ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

Ἔστι δέ τις ἕξις πολιτικῆ, οἷαν οἱ Λάκωνες⁷ ἔχουσιν ἢ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι ἔχοιεν ἄν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἕξις τοιαύτη. εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ οἷονται τὴν ἀρετὴν δεῖν⁴⁰ μὲν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ἔνεκεν· διὸ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες εἰσὶν (τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν¹ ἀγαθὰ ἀγαθὰ² αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν), καλοκάγαθίαν δὲ³ οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ δι' αὐτὰ καὶ προαιροῦνται καλὰ κάγαθά⁴. καὶ οὐ μόνον⁵ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ καλὰ μὲν φύσει ὄντα, ἀγαθὰ δὲ φύσει ὄντα, τούτοις καλά. καλά γάρ⁸ ἐστὶν ὅταν οὐ ἔνεκα πράττουσι καὶ αἰροῦνται καλὸν ἢ. διὸ τῷ καλῷ κάγαθῷ καλά ἐστὶ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀξίος δ' οὗτος τούτων· καὶ τὸ πρέπον⁹ καλόν, πρέπει δὲ ταῦτα τούτῳ,⁵ πλοῦτος εὐγένεια δύναμις. ὥστε τῷ καλῷ κάγαθῷ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ⁶ συμφέροντα καὶ καλά ἐστὶν· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς διαφωνεῖ ταῦτα,⁷ οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ κάκεινοις ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ, τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ ἀγαθὰ· τῷ δὲ καλῷ κάγαθῷ⁸ καὶ καλά, πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ καλὰς πράξεις¹⁰ δι' αὐτὰ ἔπραξεν. ὁ δ' οἰόμενος τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν¹⁰ δεῖν ἔνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καλὰ πράττει.

Ἔστιν οὖν καλοκάγαθία ἀρετὴ τέλειος.

Καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ' εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς¹¹

¹ [μὲν] ? Rac.

² ἀγαθὰ alterum add. Sol. (cf. 1248 b 26).

³ Γ': γὰρ.

⁴ Ross: καλοὶ κάγαθοί.

⁵ Γ': πλούτῳ.

⁶ Brandis: καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὰ.

⁷ Rac.: τοῦτο.

⁸ Sp.: τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ.

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. III. 6-11

fine deeds even for their own sake ; and the fine things are the virtues and the actions that arise from virtue.

- 7 But there is also a state of character that is the 'civic' character, such as the Spartans have or others like them may have ; and this character is of the following sort. There are those who think that one ought, it is true, to possess goodness, but for the sake of the things that are naturally good ; hence though they are good men (for the things naturally good are good for them), yet they have not nobility, for it is not the case with them that they possess fine things for their own sake and that they purpose fine actions, and not only this, but also that things not fine by nature but good by nature are fine for them. For things are fine when that for which men do them and choose them is fine. Therefore to the noble man the things good by nature are fine ; for what is just is fine, and what is according to worth is just, and he is worthy of these things ; and what is befitting is fine, and these things befit him—wealth, birth, power. Hence for the noble man the same things are both advantageous and fine ; but for the multitude these things do not coincide, for things absolutely good are not also good for them, whereas they are good for the good man ; and to the noble man they are also fine, for he performs many fine actions because of them.
- 10 But he who thinks that one ought to possess the virtues for the sake of external goods does fine things only by accident.

Nobility then is perfect goodness.

- 11 We have also spoken about the nature of pleasure

1249 a

ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τά τε ἀπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλὰ τά τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ¹ ἡδέα. οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ
 20 ἐν πράξει· διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαιμόνων καὶ ἡδιστα ζήσει, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀξιούσιν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις ὄρος καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ πρὸς ὃν 12

ἀναφέρων κρίνει τὸ ὑγιαῖνον² σῶμα καὶ τὸ³ μή, καὶ πρὸς ὃν μέχρι ποσοῦ ποιητέον ἕκαστον καὶ ὑγιεινόν,⁴ εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ πλεον οὐκέτι, οὕτω καὶ

25 τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἰρέσεις τῶν

1249 b

φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ τινὰ εἶναι ὄρον καὶ ἕξεως καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πλήθος καὶ ὀλιγότητα⁵ καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ 13

ὡς ὁ λόγος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὡσπερ ἂν εἴ τις

5 ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφήν εἶπειεν ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης, τοῦτο δ' ἀληθές μὲν οὐ σαφές δέ. δεῖ δὴ ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πρὸς τὸ 14

ἄρχον ζῆν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν καὶ⁶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντες, οἷον δοῦλον πρὸς δεσπότου καὶ ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστω⁷ καθήκουσαν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ 15

10 δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος φύσει συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καὶ ἕκαστον ἂν⁸ δέοι πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ⁹ ἀρχήν ζῆν (αὕτη δὲ διττή, ἄλλως γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλως ἡ ὑγίεια, ταύτης δὲ ἔνεκα ἐκείνη), οὕτω δὴ¹⁰ ἔχει καὶ¹¹ κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἀρχῶν ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' οὗ ἔνεκα

¹ καὶ hic Rac.: ante τά τε ἀπλῶς.

² Vat.: ὑγιεινόν.

³ τὸ add. Rac.

⁴ Ross: καὶ εἰ ὑγιαῖνον.

⁵ Zeller: καὶ περὶ φυγῆς χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος.

⁶ καὶ Ross: κατὰ.

⁷ Rac.: ἐκάστου.

⁸ ἂν Sp.: δὴ.

⁹ Sp.: ἐαυτῶν (ἐν αὐτῷ? Rac.).

¹⁰ Rieckher: δεῖ.

¹¹ καὶ add. Sus.

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. III. 11-15

and the manner in which it is a good, and have said that things pleasant absolutely are also fine and that things good absolutely are also pleasant. Pleasure does not occur except in action; on this account the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly, and it is not without reason that people demand this.

12 But since a doctor has a certain standard by refer- Limit of
external
goods
ring to which he judges the healthy body and the
unhealthy, and in relation to which each thing up
to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome,
but if less is done, or more, it ceases to be whole-
some, so in regard to actions and choices of things
good by nature but not laudable a virtuous man
ought to have a certain standard both of character
and of choice and avoidance; and also in regard
to large and small amount of property and of good
13 fortune. Now in what preceded^a we stated the
standard 'as reason directs'; but this is as if in
matters of diet one were to say 'as medical science
and its principles direct,' and this though true is
14 not clear. It is proper, therefore, here as in other
matters to live with reference to the ruling factor, and
to the state and the activity of the ruling factor, as
for example slave must live with reference to the rule
of master, and each person with reference to the rule
15 appropriate to each. And since man consists by
nature of a ruling part and a subject part, and each
would properly live with reference to the ruling
principle within him (and this is twofold, for medical
science is a ruling principle in one way and health is
in another, and the former is a means to the latter),
this is therefore the case in regard to the faculty of
contemplation. For God is not a ruler in the sense
of issuing commands, but is the End as a means

1249 b

15 ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιτάττει (διπτὸν δὲ τὸ οὖ ἔνεκα, διώριστα δ' ἐν ἄλλοις), ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνός γε¹ οὐθενὸς δεῖται. ἥτις οὖν αἴρεσις καὶ κτήσις τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιήσει μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν, ἢ σώματος ἢ χρημάτων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, αὕτη ἀρίστη καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος κάλλιστος· εἴ
 20 τις δ' ἢ δι' ἔνδειαν ἢ δι' ὑπερβολὴν κωλύει τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, αὕτη δὲ φαύλη. ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο οὕτω² τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ οὗτος τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος ἀριστος, τὸ³ ἥκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἀλόγου⁴ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ τοιοῦτον.

Τίς μὲν οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκάγαθίας καὶ τίς ὁ
 25 σκοπὸς τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν ἔστω εἰρημένον.

¹ Syl.: τε.³ Zeller: τὰ.² οὕτω add. Rac.⁴ Fr.: ἄλλου.

^a End or 'final cause' (οὖ ἔνεκα) denotes (1) the person or thing for whose good something is done, (2) the purpose for which it is done. God is the Final Cause in the latter sense:

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. III. 15-17

to which wisdom gives commands (and the term 'End' has two meanings, but these have been distinguished elsewhere^a); since clearly God is in
16 need of nothing. Therefore whatever mode of choosing and of acquiring things good by nature—
whether goods of body or wealth or friends or the other goods—will best promote the contemplation
of God, that is the best mode, and that standard is the finest; and any mode of choice and acquisition
that either through deficiency or excess hinders us from serving and from contemplating God—that is a
17 bad one. This is how it is for the spirit, and this is the best spiritual standard—to be as far as possible
unconscious of the irrational part of the spirit, as such.

as means
to the con-
templation
of God.

Let this, then, be our statement of what is the standard of nobility and what is the aim of things absolutely good.

cf. Phys. 194 a 32-36, *De An.* 415 b 2, *Met.* 1072 b 2 (Solomon).

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ON VIRTUES AND VICES

INTRODUCTION

CONTENTS

THIS essay is of interest as an example of the way in which Aristotle's reduction to scientific form of the ethical system adumbrated by Plato was later systematized and stereotyped by smaller minds. It classifies the various kinds of good and bad conduct under the virtues and vices of which they are manifestations. It starts from the ethical psychology of Plato, dividing the Soul or personality of man into three parts, the reason, the passions and the appetites. Then turning to conduct, it ranges the various actions and emotions under the virtues and vices which they exemplify.

AFFINITIES

The list of Virtues or forms of Goodness ^a is Aristotelian, as in addition to the four cardinal virtues of Plato, Wisdom or prudence, Courage or manliness, Temperance or sobriety of mind, and Justice or righteousness, it includes Gentleness, Self-control, Liber-

^a The word 'virtue' to the modern English ear denotes only one department of ἀρετή, viz. ἠθικὴ ἀρετή or 'moral goodness.' The Greek mind saw the unity of human excellence behind its various forms.

ON VIRTUES AND VICICES

ality or generosity, and Magnanimity or greatness of spirit. But the analysis of these virtues adopted is not Aristotle's. He exhibited them as forms of moderation, lying midway between vicious extremes of excess and deficiency; but here each virtue is merely contrasted with a single vice as its opposite. And near the end of the essay (c. viii.) there is an allusion to the comparison drawn by Plato in the *Republic* between the well-ordered Soul and the well-constituted State.

It is true that the rigorously systematic arrangement of the matter and the concise fullness of detail (in cc. vii., viii. three of the Vices are neatly subdivided into three species each) are more characteristic of the Peripatetic School than of the Academy; the formal exposition of a subject already fully explored has replaced the tentative heuristic method which Plato in his dialogues inherited from Socrates. The descriptive treatment of the virtues and vices (a method that had been first foreshadowed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in for instance the portrait of the Magnanimous Man) links the work with the *Characters* of Theophrastus, and seems to have been customary in the Peripatetic School from his time onward. Zeller^a points out that the recognition of an order of beings between gods and men, the *daimones*, in the passages dealing with piety and godliness (cc. v., vii.), also indicates a late period. A faint trace of Stoic influence may be seen in the formal antithesis of praiseworthy and blameworthy actions at the beginning and the end of the treatise.

^a *Eclectics*, p. 145.

ARISTOTLE

DATE

Susemihl ^a agrees with Zeller that the book probably belongs to the eclectic period ; he dates it not earlier than the first century B.C. and perhaps in the first century A.D., and sees in it an author of no great ability, apparently a Peripatetic, attempting to reconcile the moral philosophy of Aristotle with that of Plato.

The earlier date suggested brings it within range of Andronicus of Rhodes, who was head of the Peripatetic School at Athens in Cicero's student days. Andronicus edited and commentated on the Master's works, making some modifications of his own in logic and psychology. Under his name, though scholars usually assign it to a later date, there has come down to us a treatise *Περὶ παθῶν*, and appended to this treatise is an essay *On Virtues and Vices* which is a copy of the one before us, though the order of the contents has been rearranged. This book serves as additional evidence for our text.

Some further evidence is supplied by the MSS. of the *Florilegium* of Joannes Stobaeus (John of Stobi in Macedonia, fifth century A.D. or later), of which miscellany the present essay forms c. xviii of Book I.

MANUSCRIPTS AND TEXTS

The text of this edition is based on that of Bekker in the Berlin Aristotle, 1833, where *Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν* occupies pp. 1249-1251 in the second volume ; Bekker gives no critical notes. The Berlin

^a Teubner ed., p. xxxi.

ON VIRTUES AND VICES

page-numbers, columns (*a* and *b*) and lines are printed in the margin here. The only considerable later work on the text is that of Susemihl, who included this essay in the volume containing the *Eudemean Ethics* (Teubner, Leipzig, 1884); his text has full critical notes, a few selections from which are given here. Susemihl uses chiefly four mss.: *L*^b, the twelfth-century Paris ms. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* which, has *Of Virtues and Vices* appended, in a hand dating probably at the beginning of the thirteenth century; *F*^c, the fourteenth-century Laurentian ms.; and two at Madrid, one grouping with *F*^c and the other with *L*^b, as do six others of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (one in the Bodleian) which he has collated, and the oldest extant edition, published at Basel in 1539: an older edition has now disappeared.

In the brief critical notes beneath the present text the variants of *L*^b and *F*^c are sometimes quoted, and the readings of one or more other mss. are denoted by v.l. The sources of conjectural emendations are indicated by the following abbreviations:

And. = Andronicus
Rac. = Rackham
St. = Stobaeus
Sus. = Susemihl

A few conjectures of Bussemaker and of Sylburg are quoted from Susemihl.

H. R.

December 1934.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΕΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΙΩΝ

1249 a

26 I. Ἐπαινετὰ μὲν ἐστὶν τὰ καλά, ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ 1
αἰσχρά· καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡγοῦνται αἱ ἀρεταί,
τῶν δὲ αἰσχροῶν αἱ κακίαι· ὥστε ἐπαινετὰ μὲν αἱ 2
ἀρεταί,¹ ἐπαινετὰ δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ αἷτια τῶν ἀρετῶν
καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ'
30 αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν,² ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία.

Τριμεροῦς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβανομένης κατὰ 3
1249 b Πλάτωνα, τοῦ μὲν λογιστικοῦ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ἡ
27 φρόνησις, τοῦ δὲ θυμοειδοῦς ἡ τε πραότης καὶ ἡ
ἀνδρεία, τοῦ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἡ τε σωφροσύνη καὶ
ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ὅλης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ τε δικαιοσύνη
καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία· κακία δὲ 4
30 ἐστὶν τοῦ μὲν λογιστικοῦ ἡ ἀφροσύνη, τοῦ δὲ
θυμοειδοῦς ἡ τε ὀργιλότης καὶ ἡ δειλία, τοῦ δὲ
1250 a ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἡ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία, ὅλης
δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία καὶ
ἡ μικροψυχία.

II. Ἔστιν δὲ φρόνησις μὲν ἀρετὴ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ 1
παρασκευαστικὴ τῶν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντεινόν-
5 των. πραότης δὲ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς καθ' 2
ἡν πρὸς ὀργὰς γίνονται δυσκίνητοι. ἀνδρεία δὲ 3

ON VIRTUES AND VICES

1 I. Fine things are the objects of praise, base things of blame ; and at the head of the fine stand the virtues, at the head of the base the vices ; consequently the virtues are objects of praise, and also the causes of the virtues are objects of praise, and the things that accompany the virtues and that result from them, and their works, while the opposite are the objects of blame.

Moral values.

3 If in accordance with Plato the spirit is taken as having three parts, wisdom is goodness of the rational part, gentleness and courage of the passionate, of the appetitive sobriety of mind and self-control, and of the spirit as a whole righteousness, liberality and great-spiritedness ; while badness of the rational part is folly, of the passionate ill-temper and cowardice, of the appetitive profligacy and uncontrol, and of the spirit as a whole unrighteousness, meanness and smallmindedness.

Psychology of ethics

1 II. Wisdom is goodness of the rational part that is productive of the things contributing to happiness. 2 Gentleness is goodness of the passionate part that 3 makes people difficult to move to anger. Courage is

applied to the Virtues

¹ ὥστε . . . ἀρεταί And. : om. codd.

² καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν om. F^c.

ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς καθ' ἣν δυσέκπληκτοὶ
 εἰσιν ὑπὸ φόβων τῶν περὶ θάνατον. σωφροσύνη 4
 δέ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καθ' ἣν ἀνόρεκτοι
 γίνονται τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις φαύλων ἡδονῶν.
 10 ἐγκράτεια δέ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καθ' 5
 ἣν κατέχουσι τῷ λογισμῷ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀρμῶσαν
 ἐπὶ φαύλας ἡδονάς. δικαιοσύνη δέ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ 6
 ψυχῆς διανεμητικὴ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἐλευθεριότης 7
 δέ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς εὐδάπανος εἰς τὰ καλά.
 μεγαλοψυχία δέ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν δύναν-
 15 ται φέρειν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν, τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν.

III. Ἀφροσύνη δέ ἐστὶν κακία τοῦ λογιστικοῦ 1
 αἰτία τοῦ ζῆν κακῶς. ὀργιλότης δέ ἐστὶ κακία 2
 τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς καθ' ἣν εὐκίνητοι γίνονται πρὸς
 ὀργήν. δειλία δέ ἐστὶ κακία τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς καθ' 3
 20 ἣν ἐκπλήττονται ὑπὸ φόβων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν
 περὶ θάνατον. ἀκολασία δέ ἐστὶ κακία τοῦ ἐπι- 4
 θυμητικοῦ καθ' ἣν ὀρεκτικοὶ γίνονται τῶν περὶ
 τὰς ἀπολαύσεις φαύλων ἡδονῶν.¹ ἀκρασία δέ ἐστὶ 5
 κακία τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καθ' ἣν αἰροῦνται τὰς
 φαύλας ἡδονὰς κωλύοντος² τοῦ λογισμοῦ.³ ἀδικία 6
 25 δέ ἐστὶ κακία ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν πλεονεκτικοὶ γίνονται
 τοῦ⁴ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν. ἀνελευθερία δέ ἐστὶν κακία 7
 ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν ὀρέγονται τοῦ πανταχόθεν κέρδους.
 μικροψυχία δέ ἐστὶ κακία ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν ἀδύνατοί 8
 εἰσι φέρειν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ
 ἀτιμίαν.

30 IV. Τῆς δὲ φρονήσεώς ἐστὶ τὸ βουλευσασθαι, 1
 τὸ κρῖναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ⁵ ἐν

¹ ὀρεκτικοὶ . . . ἡδονῶν : v.l. αἰροῦνται τὰς φαύλας ἡδονάς.

² <μῆ> κωλύοντος St.

goodness of the passionate part that makes them un-
 4 dismayed by fear of death. Sobriety of mind is good-
 ness of the appetitive part that makes them not
 desirous of the base pleasures of sensual enjoyment.
 5 Self-control is goodness of the appetitive part that
 enables men by means of reason to restrain their
 6 appetite when it is set on base pleasures. Righteous-
 ness is goodness of the spirit shown in distributing
 7 what is according to desert. Liberality is goodness of
 spirit shown in spending rightly on fine objects. Great-
 spiritedness is goodness of spirit that enables men to
 bear good fortune and bad, honour and dishonour.

1 III. On the other hand folly is badness of the and to the
 2 rational part that causes bad living. Ill-temper is Vices.
 badness of the passionate part that makes men easy
 3 to provoke to anger. Cowardice is badness of the
 passionate part that causes men to be dismayed by
 4 fear, and especially by fear of death. Profligacy is
 badness of the appetitive part that makes men de-
 sirous of the base pleasures of sensual enjoyment.
 5 Uncontrol is badness of the appetitive part that
 makes men choose base pleasures when reason tries
 6 to hinder. Unrighteousness is badness of spirit that
 makes men covetous of what is contrary to their
 7 desert. Meanness is badness of spirit that makes
 8 men try to get profit from all sources. Smallminded-
 ness is badness of spirit that makes men unable to
 bear good fortune and bad, honour and dishonour.

1 IV. It belongs to wisdom to take counsel, to judge Virtuous
 the goods and evils and all the things in life that are actions and
feelings
classified.

³ αἰροῦνται . . . λογισμοῦ: v.l. παρασύρουσι τῇ ἀλογίᾳ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὡθοῦσαν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φαύλων ἡδονῶν ἀπολαύσεις.

⁴ τοῦ add. Rac. (cf. l. 13).

⁵ τὰ add. Rac.

1250 a

τῷ βίῳ αἰρετὰ καὶ φευκτά, τὸ χρῆσασθαι καλῶς
 πᾶσιν τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ἀγαθοῖς, τὸ ὀμιλῆσαι ὀρθῶς,
 τὸ συνιδεῖν τοὺς καιροὺς, τὸ ἀγχίνως χρῆσασθαι
 35 καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ, τὸ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχειν τῶν
 χρησίμων πάντων. μνήμη δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρία καὶ 2
 ἀγχίνοια ἦτοι ἀπὸ τῆς φρονήσεως ἐκάστη αὐτῶν
 ἐστὶν ἢ παρέπεται τῇ φρονήσει· ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν
 οἷον συναίτια τῆς φρονήσεώς ἐστι, καθάπερ ἡ ἐμ-
 πειρία καὶ ἡ μνήμη, τὰ δὲ οἷον μέρη,¹ οἷον εὐβουλία
 καὶ ἀγχίνοια.

40 Πραότητος δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ δύνασθαι φέρειν μετρίως 3
 ἐγκλήματα καὶ ὀλιγωρίας, καὶ τὸ μὴ ταχέως
 ὀρμᾶν ἐπὶ τὰς τιμωρίας, καὶ τὸ μὴ εὐκίνητον εἶναι
 πρὸς τὰς ὀργάς, ἄπικρον δὲ τῷ ἦθει καὶ ἀφιλό-
 νεικον, ἔχοντα τὸ ἡρεμαῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ
 στάσιμον.

Ἄνδρείας δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ δυσέκπληκτον εἶναι ὑπὸ 4
 45 φόβων τῶν περὶ θάνατον καὶ εὐθαρσῆ² ἐν τοῖς
 1250 b δεινοῖς καὶ εὐτολμον πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸ
 μᾶλλον αἰρεῖσθαι τεθνάναι καλῶς ἢ αἰσχροῦς
 σωθῆναι, καὶ τὸ νίκης αἴτιον εἶναι. ἔτι δὲ ἀνδρείας
 ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πονεῖν καὶ καρτερεῖν καὶ ἀνδραγαθί-
 5 ζεσθαι.³ παρέπεται δὲ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ τε εὐτολμία
 καὶ ἡ εὐψυχία καὶ τὸ θάρσος,⁴ ἔτι δὲ ἢ τε φιλο-
 πονία καὶ ἡ καρτερία.

Σωφροσύνης δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ θαυμάζειν τὰς ἀπο- 5
 λαύσεις τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν,⁵ καὶ τὸ εἶναι
 πάσης ἀπολαυστικῆς [αἰσχροῦς]⁶ ἡδονῆς ἀνόρεκτον,
 10 καὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι τὴν ἀταξίαν,⁷ καὶ τὸ τετάχθαι
 περὶ τὸν βίον ὁμοίως ἐν τε μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις.
 παρέπεται δὲ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ εὐταξία, κοσμιότης,
 αἰδώς, εὐλάβεια.

desirable and to be avoided, to use all the available goods finely, to behave rightly in society, to observe due occasions, to employ both speech and action with sagacity, to have expert knowledge of all things that
 2 are useful. Memory and experience and acuteness are each of them either a consequence or a concomitant of wisdom ; or some of them are as it were subsidiary causes of wisdom, as for instance experience and memory, others as it were parts of it, for example good counsel and acuteness.

3 To gentleness belongs ability to bear reproaches and slights with moderation, and not to embark on revenge quickly, and not to be easily provoked to anger, but free from bitterness and contentiousness, having tranquillity and stability in the spirit.

4 To courage it belongs to be undismayed by fears of death and confident in alarms and brave in face of dangers, and to prefer a fine death to base security, and to be a cause of victory. It also belongs to courage to labour and endure and play a manly part. Courage is accompanied by confidence and bravery and daring, and also by perseverance and endurance.

5 To sobriety of mind it belongs not to value highly bodily pleasures and enjoyments, not to be covetous of every enjoyable pleasure, to fear disorder, and to live an orderly life in small things and great alike. Sobriety of mind is accompanied by orderliness, regularity, modesty, caution.

¹ *μέρη* Sus. : *μέρη τῆς φρονήσεως* aut *φρονήσεως* aut *αὐτῆς*.

² *εὐθαρσῆ* v.l. : *τὸ εὐθαρσῆ εἶναι*.

³ *ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι* St. : *αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ δύνασθαι* (viz. lipography

+ gloss). ⁴ *τὸ θάρσος* καὶ *τὸ θράσος* codd. plur.

⁵ *ἡδονῶν* : *ἐπιθυμιῶν* St.

⁶ [*αἰσχρᾶς*] Rac. : v.l. *καὶ αἰσχρᾶς*.

⁷ St. : *τὴν* (καὶ *τὴν* F^c) *δικαίαν ἀδοξίαν* (aut *ἄδειαν*).

V. Ἐγκρατείας δέ ἐστι τὸ δύνασθαι κατασχεῖν 1
 τῷ λογισμῷ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀρμῶσαν ἐπὶ φαύλας
 ἀπολαύσεις καὶ ἡδονάς,¹ καὶ² καρτερεῖν, καὶ τὸ
 15 ὑπομενετικὸν εἶναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνδείας τε³
 καὶ λύπης.

Δικαιοσύνης δέ ἐστι τὸ διανεμητικὸν εἶναι τοῦ 2
 κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τὸ σώζειν τὰ πάτρια ἔθνη καὶ τὰ
 νόμιμα καὶ⁴ τοὺς γεγραμμένους νόμους, καὶ τὸ
 ἀληθεύειν ἐν τῷ διαφέροντι, καὶ τὸ διαφυλάττειν
 20 τὰς ὁμολογίας. ἔστι δὲ πρῶτα τῶν δικαίων⁵ τὰ
 πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, εἶτα τὰ πρὸς δαίμονας, εἶτα τὰ
 πρὸς πατρίδα καὶ γονεῖς, εἶτα τὰ πρὸς τοὺς κατ-
 οιχομένους· ἐν οἷς ἐστι καὶ ἡ εὐσέβεια, ἥτοι
 μέρος οὕσα τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἢ παρακολουθοῦσα.
 ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἡ ὀσιότης καὶ 3
 ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ ἡ πίστις καὶ ἡ μισοπονηρία.

25 Ἐλευθεριότητος δέ ἐστι τὸ προετικὸν εἶναι 4
 χρημάτων εἰς τὰ ἐπαινετὰ καὶ δαψιλῆ⁶ ἐπὶ τῷ εἰς
 τὰ δέοντα⁷ ἀναλωθῆναι, καὶ τὸ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι
 ἐν τῷ διαφόρῳ, καὶ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ.
 ἔστι δὲ ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ περὶ ἐσθῆτα καθάριος
 καὶ περὶ οἴκησιν,⁸ καὶ κατασκευαστικὸς τῶν περι-
 30 τῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ διαγωγῆν ἐχόντων ἡδέϊαν ἄνευ
 τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος, καὶ θρεπτικὸς τῶν ζώων τῶν
 ἴδιον ἐχόντων τι ἢ θαυμαστόν. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ 5
 ἐλευθεριότητι ἡ τοῦ ἥθους ὑγρότης καὶ εὐαγωγία
 καὶ φιλανθρωπία καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐλεητικὸν καὶ φιλό-
 φιλον καὶ φιλόξενον καὶ φιλόκαλον.

¹ L^b: ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονῶν.

² L^b: καὶ τὸ. ³ τε add. St., And.

⁴ καὶ Rac.: τὸ (αὐτ καὶ τὸ) σώζειν.

⁵ v.l. ἔστι δὲ πρῶτη τῶν δικαιοσυνῶν.

ON VIRTUES AND VICES, v. 1-5

- 1 V. To self-control belongs ability to restrain desire by reason when it is set on base enjoyments and pleasures, and to be resolute, and readiness to endure natural want and pain.
- 2 To righteousness it belongs to be ready to distribute according to desert, and to preserve ancestral customs and institutions and the established laws, and to tell the truth when interest is at stake, and to keep agreements. First among the claims of righteousness are our duties to the gods, then our duties to the spirits,^a then those to country and parents, then those to the departed ; and among these claims is piety, which is either a part of righteousness or a
- 3 concomitant of it. Righteousness is also accompanied by holiness and truth and loyalty and hatred of wickedness.
- 4 To liberality it belongs to be profuse of money on praiseworthy objects and lavish in spending on what is necessary, and to be helpful in a matter of dispute, and not to take from wrong sources. The liberal man is cleanly in his dress and dwelling, and fond of providing himself with things that are above the ordinary and fine and that afford entertainment without being profitable ; and he is fond of keeping
- 5 animals that have something special or remarkable about them. Liberality is accompanied by elasticity and ductility of character, and kindness, and a compassionate and affectionate and hospitable and honourable nature.

^a Deities of a minor order, in some cases the souls of dead men of the heroic age ; often the object of only local worship.

⁶ *δαψιλῆ* Sylburg: *ἐπιδαψιλεία* F^c, *δαψιλεί* L^b, *ἐπιδαψιλεύειν* Gaisford.

⁷ *τὰ δέοντα* v.l. : *δέοντι* L^b, *δέον* F^c, *δέον τι* edd.

⁸ *καὶ περὶ οἴκησιν* om. v.l.

1250 b

35 Μεγαλοψυχίας δέ ἐστι τὸ καλῶς ἐνεγκεῖν καὶ 6
 εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν, καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν, καὶ
 τὸ μὴ θαυμάζειν μήτε τρυφήν μήτε θεραπείαν μήτε
 ἐξουσίαν μήτε τὰς νίκας τὰς ἐναγωνίους, ἔχειν
 δέ τι βάθος τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μέγεθος. ἔστι δὲ¹
 40 μεγαλόψυχος οὐθ' ὁ² τὸ ζῆν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιού-
 40 μενος οὐθ' ὁ² φιλόζωος. ἀπλοῦς δὲ τῷ ἦθει
 καὶ γενναῖος ἀδικεῖσθαι δυνάμενος καὶ οὐ τιμωρη-
 τικός. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχία ἀπλότης καὶ 7
 ἀλήθεια.

VI. Ἀφροσύνης δέ ἐστι τὸ κρίναι κακῶς τὰ 1
 πράγματα, τὸ βουλευσασθαι κακῶς, τὸ ὀμιλῆσαι
 45 κακῶς, τὸ χρῆσασθαι κακῶς τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀγαθοῖς,
 1251 a τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν περὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον καλῶν
 καὶ ἀγαθῶν. παρακολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ἀφροσύνη 2
 ἀπειρία, ἀμαθία, ἀκρασία, ἐπαριστερότης, ἀμνη-
 μοσύνη.

Ὀργιλότητος δέ ἐστιν εἶδη τρία, ἀκροχολία 3
 πικρία βαρυθυμία. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ ὀργίλου τὸ μὴ
 5 δύνασθαι φέρειν μήτε³ τὰς μικρὰς ὀλιγωρίας μήτε
 τὰς ἐλαττώσεις,⁴ εἶναι δὲ κολαστικὸν καὶ τιμωρη-
 τικὸν καὶ εὐκίνητον πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ ὑπὸ ἔργου καὶ
 ὑπὸ λόγου τοῦ τυχόντος. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ὀρ- 4
 γιλότητι τὸ παροξυντικὸν τοῦ ἦθους καὶ τὸ⁵
 εὐμετάβολον καὶ ἡ πικρολογία⁶ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ μικροῖς
 10 λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ταῦτα πάσχειν ταχέως καὶ παρὰ
 βραχὺν καιρὸν.

Δειλίας δέ ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων φόβων 5
 εὐκίνητον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν περὶ θάνατον
 καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς πηρώσεις, καὶ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν
 κρεῖττον εἶναι ὅπως οὖν σωθῆναι ἢ τελευτῆσαι
 καλῶς. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ δειλία μαλακία, ἀνανδρία, 6
 496

6 To greatness of spirit it belongs to bear finely both good fortune and bad, honour and disgrace, and not to think highly of luxury or attention or power or victories in contests, and to possess a certain depth and magnitude of spirit. He who values life highly and who is fond of life is not great-spirited. The great-spirited man is simple and noble in character, able to bear injustice and not revengeful. Greatness of spirit is accompanied by simplicity and sincerity.

1 VI. To folly belongs bad judgement of affairs, bad counsel, bad fellowship, bad use of one's resources, false opinions about what is fine and good in life. Vicious actions and feelings classified.

2 Folly is accompanied by unskilfulness, ignorance, uncontrol, awkwardness, forgetfulness.

3 Of ill-temper there are three kinds, irascibility, bitterness, sullenness. It belongs to the ill-tempered man to be unable to bear either small slights or defeats but to be given to retaliation and revenge, and easily moved to anger by any chance deed or word. Ill-temper is accompanied by excitability of character, instability, bitter speech, and liability to take offence at trifles and to feel these feelings quickly and on slight occasions.

5 To cowardice it belongs to be easily excited by chance alarms, and especially by fear of death or of bodily injuries, and to think it better to save oneself by any means than to meet a fine end. Cowardice is accompanied by softness, unmanliness, faint-hearted-

¹ δὲ ὁ L^b.

² οὐθ' ὁ (bis) Bekker: οὐδ' ὁ L^b, οὐδὲ F^c.

³ μηδὲ Bussemaker.

⁴ [μήτε τὰς ἐλαττώσεις] idem: τὰς <μεγάλας> ἐλαττώσεις Sus.

⁵ καὶ τὸ And.: καὶ.

⁶ St.: μικρολογία καὶ ἡ μεταμέλεια codd.

1251 a

15 ἀπόνοια, φιλοψυχία· ὕπεστι δέ τις καὶ εὐλάβεια
καὶ τὸ ἀφιλόνεικον τοῦ ἥθους.¹

Ἄκολασίας δέ ἐστι τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι τὰς ἀπολαύσεις
τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν βλαβερῶν καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ²
ὑπολαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν ταῖς
τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ζῶντας, καὶ τὸ φιλογέλοιον εἶναι
20 καὶ φιλοσκώπτῃν καὶ φιλευτράπελον καὶ τὸ ῥαδιουργ-
γὸν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. ἀκο- 8
λουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ ἀταξία, ἀναίδεια, ἀκοσμία,
τρυφή, ῥαθυμία, ἀμέλεια, ὀλιγωρία, ἔκλυσις.

Ἄκρασίας δέ ἐστι τὸ κωλύοντος τοῦ λογισμοῦ⁹
τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ ὑπο-
25 λαμβάνοντα κρεῖττον εἶναι μὴ μετασχεῖν αὐτῶν
μετέχειν³ μηδὲν ἥττον, καὶ τὸ οἶεσθαι μὲν δεῖν
πράττειν καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα ἀφ-
ίστασθαι δὲ αὐτῶν διὰ τὰς ἡδονάς. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ 10
τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ μαλακία καὶ⁴ ἀμέλεια καὶ τὰ πλείστα
ταῦτ' ἂ καὶ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ.

30 VII. Ἄδικίας δέ ἐστιν εἶδη τρία, ἀσέβεια πλεον- 1
εξία ὕβρις. ἀσέβεια μὲν ἢ περὶ θεοὺς πλημ- 2
μέλεια καὶ περὶ δαίμονας, ἢ⁵ περὶ τοὺς κατοικο-
μένους καὶ περὶ γονεῖς καὶ πατρίδα· πλεονεξία δὲ 3
ἢ περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια, παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν αἰρουμένη
τὸ διάφορον· ὕβρις δὲ καθ' ἣν τὰς ἡδονὰς αὐτοῖς 4
35 παρασκευάζουσιν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες ἑτέρους, ὅθεν
Εὐῆμος περὶ αὐτῆς λέγει

ἥτις κερδαίνουσ' οὐδὲν ὁμως ἀδικεῖ.

ἔστι δὲ τῆς ἀδικίας τὸ παραβαίνειν τὰ πάτρια 5
ἔθῃ⁶ καὶ τὰ νόμιμα, τὸ ἀπειθεῖν τοῖς νόμοις καὶ
1251 b τοῖς ἄρχουσι, τὸ ψεύδεσθαι, τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν, τὸ παρα-

¹ καὶ . . . ἥθους om. v.l.

² καὶ cet. : καὶ τὸ ΙΒΓ^c.

ness, fondness of life ; and it also has an element of cautiousness and submissiveness of character.

7 To profligacy belongs choosing harmful and base pleasures and enjoyments, and thinking that the happiest people are those who pass their lives in pleasures of that kind, and being fond of laughter and mockery and jokes and levity in words and deeds.

8 Profligacy is accompanied by disorder, shamelessness, irregularity, luxury, slackness, carelessness, negligence, remissness.

9 To uncontrol it belongs to choose the enjoyment of pleasures when reason would restrain, and although one believes that it would be better not to participate in them, to participate in them all the same, and while thinking one ought to do fine and expedient things yet to abstain from them for the sake of one's
10 pleasures. The concomitants of uncontrol are softness and negligence and in general the same as those of profligacy.

1 VII. Of unrighteousness there are three kinds,
2 impiety, greed, outrage. Transgression in regard to gods and spirits, or even in regard to the departed
3 and to parents and country, is impiety. Transgression in regard to contracts, taking what is in dispute
4 contrary to one's desert, is greed. Outrage is the unrighteousness that makes men procure pleasures for themselves while leading others into disgrace ; in consequence of which Evenus says about outrage :

She that wrongs others e'en when she gaineth nought.

5 And it belongs to unrighteousness to transgress ancestral customs and regulations, to disobey the laws and the rulers, to lie, to perjure, to transgress

³ And. : μετέχειν δέ.

⁵ v.l. καὶ ἡ, καὶ.

⁴ καὶ v.l. : om. L^bF^c.

⁶ ἐθῆ om. L^bF^c.

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βαίνειν τὰς ὁμολογίας καὶ τὰς πίστεις. ἀκολουθεῖ 6
δὲ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ συκοφαντία, ἀλαζονεία, φιλανθρωπία
προσποίητος, κακοήθεια, πανουργία.

Ἐλευθερίας δὲ ἔστιν εἶδη τρία, αἰσχροκέρδεια 7
5 φειδωλία κιμβικία. αἰσχροκέρδεια μὲν καθ' ἣν 8
κερδαίνειν ζητοῦσι πανταχόθεν καὶ τὸ κέρδος τῆς
αἰσχύνης περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦνται· φειδωλία δὲ 9
καθ' ἣν ἀδάπανοι γίνονται τῶν χρημάτων εἰς τὸ
δέον· κιμβικία δὲ καθ' ἣν δαπανῶσι μὲν, κατὰ 10
10 μικρὸν δὲ καὶ κακῶς, καὶ πλείω βλάπτονται τῷ
μὴ κατὰ καιρὸν προέσθαι τὸ διάφορον. ἔστι δὲ 11
τῆς ἀνελευθερίας τὸ περὶ πλείστον ποιεῖσθαι χρή-
ματα καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ὄνειδος ἡγείσθαι τῶν ποιοῦντων
κέρδος, βίος θητικὸς καὶ δουλοπρεπῆς καὶ ῥυπαρός,
φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἀλλότριος. ἀκολουθεῖ 12
15 δὲ τῇ ἀνελευθερίᾳ μικρολογία, βαρυθυμία [μικρο-
ψυχία],¹ ταπεινότης, ἀμετρία, ἀγένεια, μισαν-
θρωπία.

Μικροψυχίας δὲ ἔστι τὸ μήτε τιμὴν μήτε ἀτιμίαν, 13
μήτε εὐτυχίαν μήτε ἀτυχίαν δύνασθαι φέρειν, ἀλλὰ
τιμώμενον μὲν χαννοῦσθαι² μικρὰ δὲ εὐτυχήσαντα
20 ἐξαίρεσθαι, ἀτιμίαν δὲ μηδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην ἐνεγκεῖν
δύνασθαι ἀπότευγμα δὲ ὅτιοῦν ἀτυχίαν κρίνειν
μεγάλην, ὀδύρεσθαι δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν καὶ δυσφορεῖν.
ἔτι δὲ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ μικρόψυχος οἷος πάντα τὰ
ὀλιγωρήματα καλεῖν ὕβριν καὶ ἀτιμίαν, καὶ τὰ δι'
ἄγνοιαν ἢ λήθην γινόμενα. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ μικρο- 14
25 ψυχία μικρολογία, μεμψιμοιρία, δυσελπιστία, ταπει-
νότης.

VIII. Καθόλου δὲ τῆς μὲν ἀρετῆς ἔστι τὸ ποιεῖν 1
σπουδαίαν τὴν διάθεσιν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἡρεμαίαις
καὶ τεταγμέναις κινήσεσι χρωμένην καὶ συμφωνοῦ-
500

6 covenants and pledges. Unrighteousness is accompanied by slander, imposture, pretence of kindness, malignity, unscrupulousness.

7 Of meanness there are three kinds, love of base
8 gain, parsimony, niggardliness. Love of base gain
9 makes men seek profit from all sources and pay more
10 regard to the profit than to the disgrace ; parsimony
11 makes them unwilling to spend money on a necessary
12 object ; niggardliness causes them only to spend in
13 driblets and in a bad way, and to lose more than
14 they gain by not at the proper moment letting go
15 the difference. It belongs to meanness to set a
16 very high value on money and to think nothing
17 that brings profit a disgrace—a menial and servile
18 and squalid mode of life, alien to ambition and to
19 liberality. Meanness is accompanied by pettiness,
20 sulkiness, self-abasement, lack of proportion, ignoble-
21 ness, misanthropy.

13 It belongs to small-mindedness to be unable to
bear either honour or dishonour, either good fortune
or bad, but to be filled with conceit when honoured
and puffed up by trifling good fortune, and to be
unable to bear even the smallest dishonour and to
deem any chance failure a great misfortune, and to be
distressed and annoyed at everything. Moreover the
small-minded man is the sort of person to call all
slights an insult and dishonour, even those that are
14 due to ignorance or forgetfulness. Small-mindedness
is accompanied by pettiness, querulousness, pessim-
ism, self-abasement.

1 VIII. In general it belongs to goodness to make the
spirit's disposition virtuous, experiencing tranquil and
ordered emotions and in harmony throughout all its

Psychology
of ethics.

¹ Sylburg.

² v.l. ἀναχαννοῦσθαι L^bF^c cet.

ARISTOTLE

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σαν κατὰ πάντα τὰ μέρη· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ παρά-
 30 δειγμα πολιτείας ἀγαθῆς εἶναι ψυχῆς σπουδαίας
 διάθεσις. ἔστι δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὸ εὐεργετεῖν²
 τοὺς ἀξίους καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸ
 μισεῖν τοὺς φαύλους,¹ καὶ τὸ μήτε κολαστικὸν
 εἶναι μήτε τιμωρητικόν, ἀλλὰ ἴλεων καὶ εὐμενικὸν
 καὶ συγγνωμονικόν. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ χρη-
 35 δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷον φίλοικειον εἶναι καὶ φιλό-
 φιλον καὶ φιλέταιρον καὶ φιλόξενον καὶ φιλάνθρω-
 πον καὶ φιλόκαλον· ἃ δὴ πάντα τῶν ἐπαινουμένων
 ἐστί.

Τῆς δὲ κακίας ἐστὶ τὰ ἐναντία, καὶ παρακολουθεῖ⁴
 τὰ ἐναντία αὐτῇ· ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὰ
 παρακολουθοῦντα αὐτῇ τῶν ψεγομένων ἐστίν.

¹ καὶ τὸ μισεῖν τοὺς φαύλους om. v.l.

² post ἀγαθὴ add. μνήμη ἀγαθῆ F^c.

parts ; this is the cause of the opinion that the disposition of a good spirit is a pattern of a good constitution of the state. It also belongs to goodness to do good to the deserving and love the good and hate the wicked, and not to be eager to inflict punishment or take vengeance, but gracious and kindly and forgiving. Goodness is accompanied by honesty, reasonableness, kindness, hopefulness, and also by such traits as love of home and of friends and comrades and guests, and of one's fellow-men, and love of what is noble—all of which qualities are among those that are praised.

4 To badness belong the opposite qualities, and it has the opposite concomitants : all the qualities and concomitants of badness are among the things that are blamed.

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
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
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